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Early Jaina epistemology: a study of the philosophical chapters of the Tattvārthādhigama; With an English translation of the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya I, II.8 25, and V

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Early Jaina Epistemology
A Study of the Philosophical Chapters of the *Tattvārthādhigama*
With an English Translation of the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* I, II.8-25, and V

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
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Preface

This study deals with the early philosophical ideas of the Jaina tradition. General studies on the history of philosophy do not refer to Jaina thought and even studies on the history of Indian philosophy tend to omit the Jaina sources. Yet, the Jaina tradition has played a significant role in the history of Indian philosophy. Given the paucity of philosophical studies of the Jaina texts, writing this thesis was a challenging task which I could not have completed without the help of others. Their support made me value an often-quoted aphorism from the *Tattvārthādhigama* which rightly observes: *parasparopagraho jīvānām* (the function of souls is mutual support).

Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Prof. Peter C. Bisschop and Paul Dundas, for their continuous support of my PhD study and related research. Additionally, I would like to thank Prof. Piotr Balcerowicz for his insightful comments and help at various stages of the process.

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I. Historical and Textual Analysis

1. Introduction

The *Tattvārthādhigama*¹ (TA) is a foundational text for the Jaina tradition. It was the first text that presented the Jaina worldview in a clear and systematic way and it functioned as the basis for the development of Jaina philosophy. Since its composition in the first half of the 1st millennium CE, the TA has been regarded as an authoritative compendium of Jaina thought and it still has a quasi-scriptural status for the contemporary Jaina community.² Yet, little is known about the historical circumstances in which the TA was composed. The text is often associated with an author named 'Umāsvāti', but the details of this figure are not clear and the attribution of the TA to Umāsvāti is contested. The same goes for the first commentary on the text, the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* (TABh). Even though some scholars and a large section of the Jaina community assume that the TABh was written as an auto-commentary, there is no scholarly consensus about the authorship of the *bhāṣya*.

Since the TA and the TABh played a crucial role in the development of an important intellectual tradition, it is quite unsatisfactory that we know so little about the historical background of each text. Moreover, research on the philosophical content of the texts is lagging far behind comparable studies on seminal works from other traditions, such as the *Yogasūtra* and *Nyāyasūtra* and their first commentaries. The TA is written in the style of the *sūtra* texts and is hard to understand without the help of a commentary. However, no one has published an integral translation of the TABh into any European language as yet, which makes both texts largely inaccessible for many scholars in the field of Indian philosophy.³

¹ The *Tattvārthādhigama* is more commonly known as the '*Tattvārthasūtra*' or '*Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*'. In this study, I will use the title '*Tattvārthādhigama*', which is mentioned in the introductory verses and colophon that accompany the first commentary on the text. For further discussion of the title of the work, see § 2.3, *Authorship of the TA and the TABh*.

² Dundas 1992: 87.

³ The tenth chapter of the TABh has been translated into English by Robert Zydenbos (1983). A German translation of the TA has been published by Hermann Jacobi (1906). Several English translations of the TA have appeared since the second half of the previous century, including an influential translation by Nathmal Tatia, which was published by Yale University Press in 2011 (first published by the Institute of Jainology in 1994). The available English translations are loose and rely heavily on later interpretations, which makes them less

This study provides the first English translation of the philosophical sections of the TABh and an analysis of their content. My textual analysis has a dual purpose. On the one hand, it is an attempt to get a better understanding of the philosophical ideas that are expressed in the TA and the TABh. On the other hand, by examining the way in which the texts relate to other intellectual movements, this study tries to shed some light on the historical positions of the TA and the TABh and, more broadly, on the position of early Jaina thought in the general development of Indian philosophy.

Research questions

The research for this thesis was conducted as a part of the ERC Synergy project 'Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State', an interdisciplinary research project that focuses on the Gupta Age (*circa* 320 to 550 CE).⁴ This period is commonly associated with a great efflorescence of culture and relative political stability. The overall aim of the project is to improve our understanding of this important period in the history of Central, South, and Southeast Asia by working across the disciplinary boundaries. My task in the project was to investigate the role of the Jainas in the Gupta Age. It was clear from the beginning that this would be a major challenge since little is known with certainty about the history of the Jainas at that time.

Given the paucity of material and epigraphical evidence, some scholars have speculated that the Gupta Age must have been a particularly difficult period for the Jainas. In an important study on the TA, Suzuko Ohira writes that it was 'one of the darkest ages for the Jainas', and she speculates that large numbers of Jainas were forced to migrate as a result of the rise of Hinduism under the Guptas.⁵ However, it is far from clear how the Jaina and Hindu communities related to each other at the time and the different studies that deal with the history of the Jainas in the Gupta Period draw very different conclusions on the basis of the available sources.

suitable for scholarly studies. Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 8 of the TABh have been translated into Polish by Piotr Balcerowicz in his unpublished MA thesis, which was submitted at the Oriental Institute of the University of Warsaw in 1990.

⁴ The ERC Synergy project is hosted by the British Museum, the British Library, SOAS, and Leiden University (2014-2020).

⁵ Ohira 1982: 29.

The different scenarios that reoccur in scholarly studies are largely based on the few material and epigraphical sources that are available and are, therefore, highly speculative in nature.⁶ Yet, there is another important source of evidence that is still largely unexplored. The Jainas produced a huge corpus of literature between the beginnings of the movement and the middle of the 1st millennium CE. In one of his articles on the early history of Jainism, Paul Dundas rightly remarks that the 'huge textual culture of early Jainism and the manner and context in which it was produced have generally eluded adequate scholarly interpretation'.⁷ Even though a large part of the texts that Dundas refers to predate the 4th cent. CE, there are several important texts that can be situated in the Gupta Period, including the *Anuyogadvārasūtra*, the *Nandīsūtra*, the TA and the TABh, and the *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

It is precisely in this period that the Jainas begin to write philosophical works that increasingly reflect their intellectual surroundings. The majority of Jaina texts that predate the Gupta Age are inward looking and deal with topics such as the conduct of ascetics. By contrast, the texts from the Gupta Period begin to include discussions on ontology and epistemology in a way that resembles the philosophical treatises of the Hindu and Buddhist movements, which seems to indicate some change in the underlying relations between the Jainas and the other socioreligious groups.

The TA holds a special position amongst the Jaina texts that were written in the Gupta Period. It was the first Jaina text that was composed in Sanskrit instead of Prākṛit, the language of the Jaina scriptures. It was also the first text that was written as a systematic compendium in the style of the foundational texts of the philosophical schools of the Hindus. Even though the text forms a break with the tradition, it was well received by the different Jaina sects, which indicates that the TA filled an important need for the Jaina community. As such, the text raises many questions.

As the TA reflects a pivotal point in the history of the Jainas that coincides with the Gupta Period, I have decided to focus my research on this particular text. Even though the TA is mainly a philosophical text and does not contain any explicit references to the history of the Jainas, the aim of this study is not only to analyse the

⁶ I will elaborate on this observation in § 2.2.

⁷ Dundas 2006: 383.

philosophical content of the work but also to investigate what the text can tell us about the circumstances in which the TA was composed.

This thesis consists of two parts.⁸ The first part contains a study of the historical position of the TA and the TABh (chapter 2) and a textual analysis of the philosophical sections of the TA and the TABh (chapter 3). The second part contains an English translation of these sections.

My textual analysis deals with three of the ten chapters of the TA. I focus on these chapters because they deal with philosophy in a more narrow sense of the term. Although the TA is usually seen as a philosophical work in its totality, it also includes chapters that are largely doctrinal in nature. For example, the third chapter deals with the different classes of gods and the sixth, eighth, and ninth chapter discuss the Jaina theory of *karman*. These chapters are less suitable for the purpose of this study since they mainly summarise the positions that can be found in earlier scriptures. As such, they cannot tell us much about the intellectual surroundings of the text. By contrast, the first, second, and fifth chapter of the TA — which are the parts that I have selected for this thesis — provide a systematic philosophical account. Since these chapters contain new ideas for the Jaina tradition that are clearly formulated in response to theories of other schools, they are more useful for an investigation of their context.⁹

The question of how we can acquire knowledge about reality forms the common thread in the philosophical chapters. The first chapter of the TA deals with the Jaina theory of knowledge. One of the important innovations of this chapter is the way in which the author presents the classification of knowledge that can be found in the Jaina scriptures. Instead of listing these five types of knowledge (*jñāna*) in the traditional way, the author presents them as the two ‘means of cognition’ (*pramāṇa*). This technical term was at the centre of one of the most important debates between the different schools in Indian philosophy. However, the traditional Jaina texts did not contain a theory about the means of cognition, which made it

⁸ I refer to these parts as ‘Part I’ and ‘Part II’ throughout this study.

⁹ I realise that it is somewhat arbitrary to distinguish the philosophical sections from the more doctrinal parts of the TA. One could argue that this is an anachronistic distinction. Yet, the topics and character of the passages that I have selected are typically associated with philosophy, unlike the remaining parts. Moreover, there is another reason to focus on the parts that I identify as the philosophical sections. Most of the later citations of the TA come from these sections, which shows that these parts had the largest impact on the development of Jaina thought. As such, there is also a historical reason to focus on these parts.

difficult to have a formal debate with any other school. By presenting the five traditional types of knowledge as the two sources of cognition, the composer of the TA made the Jaina theory of knowledge compatible with the model that was used by other schools. Apart from a discussion of the sources of cognition, the first chapter also includes an exposition of the Jaina theory of perspectives (*naya*). The second chapter of the TA deals with the soul (*jīva*), which is the seat of knowledge in the Jaina theory. A large part of this chapter (II.8 - 25) discusses the way in which the soul relates to the senses (*indriya*). As it is relevant for the Jaina theory of knowledge, I have included this section in my analysis.¹⁰ The fifth chapter of the TA presents an analysis of the constituents of reality. It deals with the different types of substance (*dravya*) and provides a theory of existence (*sat*) and atoms (*pudgala*).

In short, the philosophical sections of the TA provide a full epistemological account: they discuss the valid means of knowledge (Ch. I), the objects of knowledge (Ch. V), and the way in which knowledge emerges in living beings (Ch. II.8-25). My textual analysis of these sections (chapter 3) is focused on the following questions:

- i. Which philosophical standpoints are presented in the TA and the TABh and what are the arguments for these positions?
- ii. How do the theories in both texts relate to the views of other intellectual traditions?
- iii. What are the underlying aims and strategies of the composers?

As mentioned before, the TA is composed in a very concise manner which often makes it difficult to understand the ideas that are expressed in the text. My textual analysis clarifies the concepts and ideas in the TA based on a close reading of the TA and the TABh. By comparing the standpoints in the TA with the views that are expressed in the commentary, I also question the idea that both texts were written by the same hand.

My textual analysis includes comparisons with the views of other schools, such as the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika traditions. Even though these groups are not mentioned explicitly, it is very clear that the composers of the texts were well

¹⁰ The other parts of the second chapter of the TA deal with different aspects of the soul, such as the relation between the various types of *karman* and the different states of the soul (*bhāva*), the movement of the soul after liberation, and the life span of different types of beings.

acquainted with their theories. By looking at the way in which the TA and the TABh present the Jaina views, my analysis investigates the aims of the composers and the underlying dynamics between the different philosophical traditions.

The historical analysis in chapter 2 focuses on the historical context of the TA and the TABh. In this chapter, I discuss the following questions:

- i. What is the position of the TA and the TABh in the development of Jaina philosophy?
- ii. What do we know about the role of the Jainas in the Gupta Period and how can we situate the TA and the TABh in this socio-historical context?
- iii. Who composed the TA and the TABh?

The first section (§ 2.1) provides a brief overview of the development of Jaina philosophy between the beginning of the 4th cent. CE and the end of the 6th cent. CE. In this section, I also investigate the role of the TA in the general development of Jaina thought. The second section (§ 2.2) deals with the Jainas in the Gupta Age. In this section, I discuss the different hypotheses that have been formulated by other scholars and evaluate their explanatory value when it comes to situating the TA and the TABh in this period. The last section of chapter 2 (§ 2.3) discusses the date and authorship of the TA and the TABh. In addition to a discussion of the existing literature, section § 2.3 also includes some of the outcomes of my textual analysis (chapter 3). An important question in the discussion of the authorship of the TA and the TABh is the reliability of the *sambandhakārikās* and the *praśasti*. These two compositions accompany the *bhāṣya* and provide some information about the author of the texts. However, it is unclear at which stage these passages were added to the *bhāṣya*. Given their importance, I provide a translation of these passages in Part II.¹¹ The outcomes of my analysis of their content (§ 3.5) strongly suggest that the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti* were added at a later stage, which has some important implications for the debate about the authorship of the TA and the TABh.¹²

¹¹ The *sambandhakārikās* have not been translated into any European language before. Other translations of the *praśasti* can be found in Zydenbos 1983 and Dhaky 1996.

¹² As well as the *sambandhakārikās* and the *praśasti*, which are both composed in verse, the TABh also includes some passages in verse. These passages are introduced as citations. Since the TA is usually seen as the first Sanskrit treatise in the Jaina tradition, it is somewhat

Methodological considerations

The paucity of evidence of the Jainas in the Gupta Age constitutes a general problem for the scholarly study on the Jainas in this period. Nevertheless, several scholars have tried to sketch a larger narrative. These accounts are inevitably quite speculative in nature. This does not necessarily invalidate their claims but these studies do not provide enough of a basis from which to move forward. Their claims often contradict each other and there is not enough material that can be used to evaluate the merit of the different accounts. Instead of developing a new account in this study, I have chosen to investigate one specific source, with the aim of gathering more information that can be used for future studies. This choice has some implications for the methodologies used in the different parts of this study.

For my translation of the TA and the TABh, I stay very close to the Sanskrit text and try to give translations for technical terms that are close to their primary meaning. Although it is tempting to use later interpretations of obscure passages, I mainly try to interpret such passages in the light of the theories that are given in the TA itself.¹³ In some cases, this means that their precise meaning remains unclear. Yet, it results in a translation that can be used as a source for other studies on the development of ideas in the history of Jaina philosophy.

I use a similar approach for my analysis of the philosophical sections (chapter 3). My explanations of the philosophical content of the TA and the TABh are primarily based on the information that is provided in the texts themselves.¹⁴ The

strange that the TA seems to include citations of other Jaina works in Sanskrit. A discussion of these verses and their implications can be found in § 3.5.

¹³ For example, later sources interpret the Jaina theory of standpoints (*nayavāda*) as a form of perspectivism, i.e., the idea that truth consists in the totality of individual views, which may seem contradictory at first sight. As such, it is sometimes seen as a model for intellectual tolerance. The last part of the first chapter of the TA deals with this theory of standpoints. However, a critical reading of the text and the explanation in the *bhāṣya* shows that this theory has very little to do with philosophical perspectivism. Instead, it provides an exegetical tool that can be used to determine the intended meaning of a sentence and to explain the problem of change. This shows that the Jaina theory of standpoints did change over time and that the term '*nayavāda*' refers to different ideas at different moments in the history of Jaina philosophy.

¹⁴ My approach differs from the methodologies in most other studies that deal with the epistemological account of the TA. For example, several studies by Jayandra Soni try to reconstruct the 'system' of Jaina epistemology by linking elements from different texts, including the TA and the TABh (Soni 2018). This approach allows Soni to answer some questions that remain open in the individual texts but it runs the risk of constructing a view

building blocks of the philosophical theories in the TA are often scattered across the text but the overall theories become clearer once the different elements are put together.¹⁵ Yet, in some cases, the theories seem to be incomplete or inconsistent with other parts of the text. In such cases, I try to get a better understanding of these passages by comparing them with external sources that deal with similar problems. This sometimes shows that the composers of the TA and the TABh incorporate views that are derived from other texts, such as the *Nyāyasūtra*, even if these ideas do not fit perfectly within the larger context of the TA. In other cases, the inconsistencies indicate later additions to the text. As such, my conceptual analysis of the text does not only help to get a better understanding of the philosophical ideas in the TA but it also reveals anomalies that help to identify historical layers in the text and links with external sources, which are useful to situate the TA and the TABh in their historical context.

The TA and the historiography of philosophy

The TA is a seminal text in the history of an important philosophical tradition. As such, my study of the TA does not only aim to contribute to our understanding of a specific moment in the history of Indian thought but it also attempts to contribute to the historiography of philosophy in general. Even though the text is well known in the Jaina tradition and in the field of Jaina studies, few scholars who study the history of philosophy are aware of the existence of the text. Some of them might even question, after reading the text, whether the TA should be regarded as a philosophical treatise. In the end, the TA is a religious text that outlines a path to

that never existed in history. A different approach can be found in Balcerowicz's article on the logical structure of the *naya* method (Balcerowicz 2001c). In this study, he uses the concepts and methods of contemporary logic to investigate the theory of *nayas* in the TABh. This effort might be interesting from a conceptual point of view but does not help much to get a better understanding of the historical development of Jaina philosophy. In fact, the passage in which the *nayas* are discussed in the TABh seems to consist of several historical layers. Therefore, it is quite unlikely that the theory is based on a coherent logical model. For a discussion of the theory of *nayas*, see § 3.2 *The perspectives*.

¹⁵ I rely heavily on the TABh for my interpretation of the TA. As such, it is possible that some of my explanations of the TA do not correspond with the original views of the composer of the TA and reflect the ideas of the composer of the *bhāṣya*. Yet, the dates of the TA and the TABh seem to be relatively close and the *bhāṣya* rarely deviates from the views in the TA, which makes the TABh an important source for our understanding of the TA. Throughout my analysis, I indicate whether a certain idea is derived from the TA or the TABh.

enlightenment (*mokṣa*) and it contains many elements that are quite different from the topics that are usually studied in the discipline of philosophy, which mainly focuses on the Euro-American traditions.¹⁶ Yet, even if one uses a narrow definition of the word ‘philosophy’, it is still evident that the TA deals with philosophy. Immanuel Kant, who had a strong impact on the shape of the discipline of philosophy, summarised the main questions of philosophy as follows:

All interest of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical) is united in the following three questions:

- i. What can I know?
- ii. What should I do?
- iii. What may I hope?¹⁷

These questions form an interesting parallel with the opening of the TA, which says:

samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ || 1.1 ||

The path to liberation [is constituted by] right worldview (*samyagdarśana*), [right] knowledge (*jñāna*) and [right] conduct (*cāritra*).

These three elements form the subject of the TA. The first chapters of the TA deal with right knowledge (*jñāna*) and provide an answer to the question ‘What can I know?’ The middle part of the TA discusses right conduct (*cāritra*), which answers the question ‘What should I do?’. The last chapter of the TA examines the state of liberation (*mokṣa*), which is the Jaina answer to the question ‘What may I hope?’. In other words, one could reasonably argue that the TA addresses the main questions of philosophy in a Kantian sense of the word.

¹⁶ The fact that some traditions focus on different topics is, in itself, not a reason to say that they are not involved in philosophy. This would exclude many texts in the history of European philosophy from the discipline of philosophy. Moreover, such an argument could also be used by some Chinese or Indian traditions to claim that there is no real philosophy in the Euro-American tradition.

¹⁷ *Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft)* A805/B833 (Kant 1781b: 677). ‘Alles Interesse meiner Vernunft (das spekulative sowohl als das praktische) vereinigt sich in folgenden drei Fragen: i. Was kann ich wissen? ii. Was soll ich tun? iii. Was darf ich hoffen?’ (Kant 1781a: 838).

When it comes to the sections of the TA that have been selected for this study, one cannot reasonably deny that we are dealing with philosophy. These chapters address the basic questions that dominated the history of Euro-American philosophy: What is knowledge? What are the ontological constituents of the world? And what is the relation between human knowledge and the external world? Even though the arguments for the positions that are summarised in the TA are not always provided, it is often easy to understand the underlying rationale for these positions. The fact that the argumentation is not always explicit might be strange from the perspective of Euro-American philosophy. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that the TA was written as a compendium of Jaina thought that was probably used in educational settings. As such, it is likely that teachers would orally transmit the underlying argumentations for the positions in the TA and that the TA mainly functioned as a mnemonic device. This poses some challenges for the contemporary scholar, who only sees the outcomes of the debates and has to reconstruct the underlying argumentation without the help of a teacher. This does not imply, of course, that the text is not a significant document for the history of philosophy.

Even though the TA clearly deals with the fundamental questions of philosophy that Kant identifies, it is doubtful that Kant would be inclined to study the text, if the TA had been available to him. In Kant's infamous characterisation of the different races, Kant describes 'the Hindus' as follows:

[The Hindus] do have motivating forces but they have a strong degree of passivity (*Gelassenheit*) and all look like philosophers. Nevertheless they incline greatly towards anger and love. They thus can be educated to the highest degree but only in the arts¹⁸ and not in the sciences. A great hindustani man is one who has gone far in the art of deception and has much money. The Hindus always stay the way they are, and can never advance, although they began their education much earlier.¹⁹

In Kant's perspective, South-Asians are very limited in their intellectual capacities, notwithstanding the fact that he writes that they all look like philosophers. He contrasts the characteristics of the 'Hindus' with the capacities of the 'Whites', whom he describes as follows:

¹⁸ German: 'Künsten'.

¹⁹ Quoted in Eze 1997: 117.

The white race possesses all motivating forces and talents in itself.²⁰

Whites contain all the impulses of nature in affects and passions, all talents, all dispositions to culture and civilization and can as readily obey as govern. They are the only ones who always advance to perfection.²¹

Although Kant's ideas about the characteristics of different racial groups are repulsive from a contemporary perspective, they strongly influenced the views of later historians. As shown by Peter K.J. Park, the ideas about the history of philosophy radically changed after Kant. Asian and African traditions were actively written out of the history of philosophy by historians who came up with an entirely white canon. If the non-European traditions were mentioned, they were described as 'pre-philosophical' movements.²²

When the first logical texts of the Nyāya tradition were 'discovered' by Henry Thomas Colebrooke in the 19th century, it was quite a surprise to many European intellectuals that such a rational philosophical tradition existed outside of Europe. Yet, some historians were quick to dismiss the Nyāya texts as proper philosophy. For example, Heinrich Ritter, who published a famous handbook on the history of philosophy in 1846, wrote the following:

[The Nyāya] can lay but slight claims to accuracy of exposition. This is proved clearly enough by the form of their syllogism, which is made to consist of five instead of three parts. Two of these are manifestly superfluous, while by introduction of an example in the third the universality of the conclusion is vitiated. [...] [In] its exposition the Nyāya is tedious, loose and unmethodical. Indeed the whole form of this philosophy is a proof of the incapacity of its expositors to enter into the intrinsic developments of ideas.²³

Ritter's perspective on the Nyāya tradition clearly echoes Kant's idea about the unscientific mind of 'the Hindus'. It is quite striking that the European intellectuals in the 19th century failed to recognise the value of the Nyāya texts as important philosophical works. One might wonder whether the reception of Indian philosophy would have been different had there been proper translations and studies available.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Mills 2005: 173

²² Park 2013.

²³ Ritter, *History of Philosophy*, 1846: 365-366. Quoted in Ganeri 2001: 9.

Up until the present day, Indian philosophical texts have been largely ignored by the discipline of philosophy. Yet, more scholars are becoming aware that the Eurocentric perspective of the discipline of philosophy is no longer acceptable.²⁴ Research into the history of Indian philosophy, however, has been greatly hampered by a lack of analytical studies of the primary texts and accurate translations of the commentaries. For this reason, I have chosen to analyse the TA and TABh primarily from a conceptual perspective, in an attempt to clarify their philosophical content. It is, thus, my hope that this study of the philosophical chapters of the TA, which includes the first English translation of the *bhāṣya* on these chapters, will also contribute to the development of the historiography of philosophy as a global discipline.

²⁴ See, e.g., Bryan Van Norden's manifesto for a global approach to philosophy (Van Norden 2017).

2. The Historical Position of the *Tattvārthādhigama* and the *Bhāṣya*

The *Tattvārthādhigama* (TA) is regarded as the oldest extant philosophical treatise of the Jaina tradition. The style and content of the TA deviate from earlier Jaina sources and the text reflects new developments in Jaina thought. Even though some older Jaina texts also deal with the theory of knowledge and the objects of knowledge, the TA is the first text that presents a systematic account of Jaina philosophy, including a clear presentation of Jaina epistemology and ontology. Moreover, the TA is the first Jaina treatise in Sanskrit and differs in this respect from the canonical texts, which are all composed in Prākṛit. Despite the fact that the TA signifies a break with the older tradition, it was well received by the Jaina community. It strongly influenced other Jaina thinkers and the text is still accepted as an authoritative treatise by the different Jaina sects. This raises the question as to why the TA, which deviated from the existing tradition, was so well received. And which need the TA filled for the Jaina community at the time of its composition?

Although there is no scholarly consensus about the exact date of the TA and the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* (TABh), it is safe to say that the text became an important philosophical treatise in the Gupta Period (ca. 320 – 550 CE).²⁵ Unfortunately, it is notoriously difficult to reconstruct the history of the Jainas in the Gupta Period due to a paucity of sources. Given our limited knowledge of the Jainas in this era, it is far from easy to identify the motives behind the composition of the TA and the historical factors that explain the positive reception of this innovative text. In this chapter, I will investigate the intellectual and socio-historical landscape of the Jainas in the Gupta Period in an attempt to situate the TA and the TABh in their historical context.

The first section of this chapter provides an overview of Jaina philosophy in the Gupta Period. The second section deals with the socio-historical situation of the

²⁵ Most scholars agree that the TABh was composed in the Gupta Period. However, there are different views on the relationship between the *sūtra* and the commentary and the proposed dates for the TA range from the 2nd to the 5th cent. CE. Since there is no external evidence for the TA that predates the 5th cent. CE, it is challenging to date the TA more accurately. See § 2.3 for a discussion of the date of the TA and the *bhāṣya*. The way in which the term ‘Gupta Period’ is used in this study is explained in § 2.2.

Jainas in the Gupta Period. In that section, I will discuss the main scholarly accounts of this part of the history of the Jainas and will assess whether these accounts can help to identify the historical motives that lead to the composition of the TA. I will argue that our present understanding of the history of the Jainas in the Gupta Period is strongly limited and that the available source materials do not provide enough evidence to reconstruct the historical background of the TA in a convincing way.²⁶ The last section of this chapter discusses the date and authorship of the TA and the TABh. This section contains an overview of the different scholarly positions on this issue and includes some outcomes of my textual analysis in chapter 3 of this study that are relevant for the date and authorship of both texts.

²⁶ This does not imply that there is nothing to say about the intellectual milieu of the TA. As I will demonstrate in the third chapter of this thesis, it is possible to trace several explicit and implicit debates with rival intellectual movements in the text of the TA and the TABh and these textual elements do provide some clues about the environment of the composers of the TA and the TABh.

2.1 Jaina Philosophy in the Gupta Period

The development of Jaina philosophy

If we want to understand the historical significance of the TA, we need to situate the TA and the TABh in the larger development of Jaina thought. Yet, there are very few scholarly accounts that provide an overview of the history of Jaina philosophy. One of the few studies that deal with the history of Jaina philosophy in general is K.K. Dixit's *Jaina Ontology* (1971). Even though the dates of authors and texts in Dixit's work are often speculative or omitted altogether, his work is still widely read and the way in which he differentiates several historical layers in the philosophical literature of the Jainas has strongly influenced the work of others scholars in the field of Jaina studies.

Dixit's work divides the history of Jaina philosophy in two periods, which he labels as 'the age of Āgamas' and 'the age of logic'. Dixit characterises the 'age of Āgamas' as a period in which the philosophical ideas of the Jainas become gradually more systematic. The term 'age of Logic' is used by Dixit to describe the period in which writers use 'logical faculties' to analyse philosophical problems.²⁷ He mentions Siddhasena, Mallavādin, and Kundakunda as the first authors who wrote in this style. Both periods are further divided into three stages.²⁸ The three stages of the 'age of Āgamas' are represented respectively by:

- i. [T]he old parts of the *Bhagavatī* and by the philosophical parts of the *Ācāraṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Daśavaikālika* (5th – 2nd cent. BCE)
- ii. [...] *Prajñāpanā* (plus the new parts of the *Bhagavatī*) and by the philosophical parts of *Jīvājīvābhigama*, *Rājaprasāniya*, *Uttarādhyāyana* (minus chapter 28) (2nd cent. BCE – 1st cent. CE).
- iii. [T]he *Tattvārthasūtra* (plus the *Uttarādhyāyana* chapter 28) and by the *Anuyogadvāra*, *Nandī*, *Āvaśyakaniryukti*, and *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* (1st– 6th cent. CE).²⁹

²⁷ Dixit 1971: 9.

²⁸ Ibid., 7 – 10. The different stages have no specific names and are simply labelled as 'first stage', 'second stage', and 'third stage'.

²⁹ Ibid., 9. The dates of the different stages of the 'age of Āgamas' are mentioned on p. 31.

The stages of the 'age of Logic' are described as the stages that are represented respectively by the writings of:

- i. Mallavādin (5th cent. CE)
- ii. Vidyānandin (8th – 9th cent. CE)
- iii. Yaśovijaya (18th cent. CE)³⁰

Following Dixit's classification, we can say that the Gupta Period signifies the transition from the third stage of the 'age of Āgamas' to the first stage of the 'age of Logic'. Even though it is somewhat artificial to draw a hard line between the two periods that Dixit identifies, it is indeed rare to find any formal arguments in the texts that predate Siddhasena and the general style of most texts that are written in the 'age of Logic' differs from the style of the canonical texts that were written in the 'age of Āgamas'. In a further qualification of the 'age of Logic', Dixit remarks that authors in this period start to criticise the views of the different Brahmanical and Buddhist schools in an effort to establish the validity of their own doctrine of non-one-sidedness (*anekāntāvāda*).³¹ In other words, the philosophical activity of the Jains does not only get a new style during the Gupta Period but it also has a different aim.

The ontological and epistemological theories that can be found in Jaina texts that predate the TA are usually presented in the form of lists that specify the different types of substance, the varieties of knowledge, etc. The texts do not typically provide arguments for these positions and do not explain how these positions relate to the philosophical ideas of other schools. By contrast, the texts that are composed after the TA frequently refer to other schools and try to demonstrate the superiority of the Jaina theories. Even though we know that this transformation happened during the Gupta Period, it is not evident what accounted for these changes.

The fact that the Jains also started using Sanskrit for their philosophical works since the Gupta Period suggests that the change cannot be explained in terms of an internal development alone. In the rest of this section, I will provide a short overview of philosophical Jaina texts that illustrate the transition from the canonical period, i.e., Dixit's 'age of Āgamas', to the period in which Jaina thinkers started to

³⁰ Ibid., 10 - 11. The dates represent the dates that Dixit suggests.

³¹ Ibid., 10.

compose argumentative philosophical treatises, i.e., Dixit's 'age of logic'. After listing the different philosophical texts, I will critically assess Dixit's model of the development of Jaina philosophy.

Early philosophical Jaina texts

According to Dixit, the following Jaina philosophical texts were composed in the third stage of the 'age of Āgamas' and the first stage of the 'age of Logic':³²

Early Philosophical Jaina Texts mentioned in Dixit 1971		
	Title	Author
'Age of Āgamas', third stage	<i>Anuyogadvārasūtra</i>	-
	<i>Nandīsūtra</i>	-
	<i>Āvaśyakaniryukti</i>	-
	<i>Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama</i>	-
	<i>Tattvārthasūtra</i> ³³ (<i>sabhāṣya</i>)	Umāsvāti
'Age of Logic', first stage	<i>Sanmati</i>	Siddhasena
	<i>Nayacakra</i>	Mallavādin
	<i>Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya</i>	Jinabhadra
	<i>Pañcāstikāya</i>	Kundakunda
	<i>Pravacanasāra</i>	
	<i>Samayasāra</i>	
	<i>Āptamīmāṃsā</i>	Samantabhadra

Dixit writes that several theoretical innovations took place during the third stage of the 'age of Āgamas'. He mentions the development of exegetical models (*anuyogadvāras* and *nikṣepas*) and the theory of viewpoints (*nayas*), the Jaina perspective on the means of cognition (*pramāṇas*), and the doctrine of *karman* as the main contributions of this period.³⁴ With the exception of the TA, Dixit does not provide dates or any information about the authorship of the texts in 'the age of

³² Ibid., 65 – 87, 89.

³³ The titles of texts in this table correspond with the titles that Dixit mentions. In the rest of this study, I use the title '*Tattvārthādhigama*', which is mentioned in the introductory verses (*sambandhakārikās*) that accompany the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya*.

³⁴ Ibid., 65.

Āgamas'. His differentiation of the three stages is mainly based on the content of the different texts. Dixit seems to assume that there is a linear development of Jaina philosophy and that philosophical models and concepts become more systematic and advanced over the course of time.

The different developments that Dixit associates with the third 'age of Āgamas' lead up to Umāsvāti's work, which he describes as the 'crowning achievement of the age of Āgamas'. In his view, the chapters of the TA 'lucidly summarize the Āgamic position on different important questions related to philosophy, ethics and mythology'.³⁵ The TA plays an important role in Dixit's analysis of the development of Jaina philosophy since it closes the 'age of Āgamas' and makes way for the 'age of Logic'. Yet, he supposes that the TA primarily summarises the Jaina views that were developed in texts such as the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* and *Nandīsūtra*.

The fact that he situates the TA at the very end of the 'age of Āgamas' seems to result from his idea that philosophy evolves in a linear way and that theories become more coherent over time. This assumption might have some heuristic value but can be misleading. It is likely that the individual texts that are associated with Dixit's third stage of 'the age of Āgamas' contain different historical layers.³⁶ Moreover, the composers of the Jaina philosophical texts sometimes favour traditional theories over theories that are more recent. As such, the conceptual development of ideas does not necessarily follow a linear path. There are good reasons, therefore, to question Dixit's idea that the TA comes at the very end of the 'age of Āgamas' and that the TA only summarised the positions that were already present in canonical texts.

Moreover, the labels that Dixit uses to describe different periods in the history of Jaina philosophy are somewhat misleading. The way in which Dixit distinguishes the texts in the 'age of Āgamas' from those in the 'age of Logic', suggests that all texts before the TA are mostly doctrinal and that the philosophical texts after the TA are non-doctrinal treatises that are composed in a "proper" philosophical style.

³⁵ Ibid., 83.

³⁶ Dixit is well aware of the fact that the canonical Jaina texts often contain later interpolations. He mentions several interpolations in his discussion of the evolution of *pramāṇa* theory (Dixit 1971: 22).

Apart from Dixit's work, there are very few studies that deal with the general history of Jaina philosophy and Dixit's work is still valuable, despite the fact that the organisation of the material is largely based on his idealistic view on the development of philosophy. Over the last decades, some scholars have made important contributions to our understanding of the history of Jaina philosophy by focusing on the history of particular texts, authors, and concepts. These studies indicate that the history of Jaina philosophy is more complex than Dixit suggests.³⁷

The complexity of the matter is clearly shown in the first volume on Jaina philosophy in Potter's *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*.³⁸ The encyclopedia briefly summarises the Jaina texts that deal with philosophical issues and introduces these texts with a short discussion of their date and context. These short introductions often highlight how little is known with certainty about the date and authorship of most texts that predate the 7th century CE. Nevertheless, by putting the different texts together, it is possible to see some general trends in the development of Jaina philosophy.

In the table below, I have listed those texts that are dated before the 7th cent. CE in Potter's work. The encyclopedia mentions considerably more texts than Dixit, including other works by Umāsvāti, Kundakunda, Samantabhadra, Siddhasena Divākara, and Jinabhadra Gaṇi. However, Potter's encyclopedia omits all the texts that Dixit situates in the 'age of Āgamas' with the exception of the TA. In order to make the overview of early Jaina philosophical texts more comprehensive, I have added the texts that Dixit mentions in his discussion of the third stage of the 'age of Āgamas'. The table contains the title of the works, the name of the author (or the name that is traditionally associated with the text), the sectarian affiliation of the author, the language of the text, and the date that is mentioned in Potter's encyclopedia. In some cases, I rely on other sources for the dates of the texts. In these cases, the sources are specified in the footnote. In addition, I have added a brief description of the content of the texts, which provides insight into some general trends in the development of Jaina philosophy between 300 and 600 CE, which I will discuss below.

³⁷ For example, Balcerowicz's study of the development of the Jaina theory of knowledge convincingly shows that newer ideas were frequently replaced by traditional theories (Balcerowicz 2016d).

³⁸ Malvania 2007.

I. Early Philosophical Jaina Texts (300 – 600 CE)				
Title	Author	Affil. ³⁹	Lang.	Date
i. <i>Tattvārthādhigama</i>	? ⁴⁰	Śvet./Dig.	Skt.	350 (?)
	Treatise on epistemology, ontology, <i>karman</i> , conduct, and liberation.			
ii. <i>Anuyogadvārasūtra</i>	Āryarakṣita ⁴¹	Śvet.	Pkt.	400-450 ⁴²
	Treatise on exegetical methods, including the theory of viewpoints (<i>naya</i>). ⁴³ Canonical text belonging to the ‘outer corpus’ of the Śvetāmbara canon. ⁴⁴			

³⁹ For some of the early texts, such as the *Tattvārthādhigama*, the sectarian affiliation of the author is a matter of debate. In fact, it is possible that some early philosophical texts predate the split between the different Jaina sects. Nevertheless, the early texts are usually only seen as authoritative by one of the two sects that are mentioned in the table, with the exception of the *Tattvārthādhigama*.

⁴⁰ The TA is usually attributed to Umāsvāti. The name ‘Umāsvāti’ appears for the first time in the *praśasti* that accompanies the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya*. However, the date of the *praśasti* is uncertain and it is unlikely that Umāsvāti was the composer of the TA. See also the discussion of the authorship of the TA and the TABh below. For a discussion of the *praśasti*, see Part II.

⁴¹ The *Anuyogadvārasūtra* is traditionally ascribed to Āryarakṣita but there is no evidence for the authorship of the text (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 69).

⁴² It is unclear when the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* was composed. The *Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya*, *Nandīsūtra*, and *Anuyogadvārasūtra* seem to borrow from each other and the *Nandīsūtra* and *Anuyogadvārasūtra* are composed in a similar style. It is plausible, therefore, that they were composed in roughly the same period. Puṇyavijaya claims that the text predates the 4th century CE since the discussion of the *pramāṇas* does not follow the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika model (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 72). This is an unconvincing argument since other Jaina texts that postdate the *Nyāyasūtra*, such as the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya*, also present a theory of *pramāṇas* that differs from the model that was propounded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition.

⁴³ The text mentions the different sources of knowledge at the beginning and focuses on testimonial knowledge (*śrutajñāna*) (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 45).

⁴⁴ The text mentions at the beginning that it is a commentary on the *Āvaśyakasūtra* (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 45). The *Āvaśyakasūtra* deals with the six obligatory (*āvaśyaka*) duties of a mendicant (Dundas 1992: 75, see Dundas 1992: 169-173 for a description of these duties). However, the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* mainly deals with other topics and only refers to the *Āvaśyakasūtra* in examples (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 45).

iii. <i>Nandīsūtra</i>	Devavācaka ⁴⁵	Śvet.	Pkt.	400-450 ⁴⁶
	Discussion of the different sources of knowledge. ⁴⁷ Canonical text belonging to the 'outer corpus' (<i>aṅgabāhya</i>) of the Śvetāmbara canon.			
iv. <i>Āvaśyakaniryukti</i>	Bhadrabāhu ⁴⁸	Śvet.	Pkt.	450 ⁴⁹
	Commentary on the <i>Āvaśyakasūtra</i> . The text begins with a discussion of knowledge and discusses a wide variety of topics, including the relationship between faith and conduct.			
v. <i>Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama</i>	Puṣpadanta & Bhūtabali ⁵⁰	Dig.	Pkt.	400-500 ⁵¹
	Treatise on the soul and karmic theory. Oldest sacred text for the Digambara tradition. ⁵²			
vi. <i>Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya</i>	Umāsvāti ⁵³	Śvet.	Skt.	400-450
	Commentary on the <i>Tattvārthādhigama</i> .			

⁴⁵ The name of Devavācaka is mentioned for the first time as the author of the *Nandīsūtra* in the *cūrṇi* (Prākṛit prose commentary, 7th cent CE), which is attributed to Jinadāsa (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 41, Dundas 1992: 24).

⁴⁶ According to Puṇyavijaya, the *Nandīsūtra* was composed before 523 V.S. (i.e., 466 CE) (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 42-44).

⁴⁷ Some passages in the *Nandīsūtra* are derived from the *Āvaśyakaniryukti* (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 41). It is unclear how the different Jaina philosophical texts that predate the 5th cent. CE relate to each other and the dates of these texts are hard to determine. Since different models of the sources of knowledge can be found in a single text, it is likely that the texts were composed over a longer period.

⁴⁸ The *niryuktis* (verse commentaries on canonical Śvetāmbara texts) are traditionally attributed to Bhadrabāhu. Most scholars agree that there were different Bhadrabāhus and there is much confusion about this name. For a brief summary, see Wiley 2004: 50.

⁴⁹ Ohira dates Bhadrabāhu II, the author of the *niryuktis*, in the 5th century and situates the *niryuktis* in the later 5th century CE (Ohira 1982: 71, 137). Given the unstructured organisation of the material, Dixit assumes that the text was not written by a single author (Dixit 1971: 75).

⁵⁰ The text is traditionally associated with the oral teachings of the monk Dharasena, who lived in the 2nd century CE and who passed on his knowledge of the sacred scriptures — that are now lost, according to the Digambara tradition — to the monks Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali (Dundas 1992: 63-64).

⁵¹ The date of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* is matter of sectarian dispute. The different ideas about the date are summarised in Wiley 2008: 57, n. 36. Wiley refers to the position of Hiralāl Jain and A.N. Upadhye, the editors of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, who date the text 'around 993 V.N. (466/568 CE)' (Wiley 2008: 57, n. 36).

⁵² The Digambara tradition does not accept the Śvetāmbara canon as an authoritative body of texts.

⁵³ As I will discuss in § 2.3, it is unlikely that the TABh is an auto-commentary. Yet, the TA and the TABh are both attributed to Umāsvāti in the Śvetāmbara tradition.

vii. <i>Praśamarati-prakarāṇa</i>	Umāsvāti ⁵⁴	Śvet.	Skt.	400-450
	Treatise on non-attachment, <i>karman</i> , conduct, and liberation.			
viii. <i>Pañcāstikāyasāra</i>	Kundakunda	Dig.	Pkt.	400 (?) ⁵⁵
	Treatise on ontology, <i>karman</i> , the self, and liberation.			
ix. <i>Pravacanasāra</i>	Kundakunda	Dig.	Pkt.	400 (?)
	Treatise on the self, equanimity, omniscience, ontology, and monastic rules.			
x. <i>Samayasāra</i>	Kundakunda	Dig.	Pkt.	400 (?)
	Treatise on the self, which is one and untouched by <i>karman</i> .			
xi. <i>Niyamasāra</i>	Kundakunda	Dig.	Pkt.	400 (?)
	Treatise on the self, ontology, conduct, repentance, concentration, equanimity, knowledge and worldview.			
xii. <i>Aṣṭaprābhṛta</i>	Kundakunda (?) ⁵⁶	Dig.	Pkt.	400 (?)
	Collection of verses, praising right vision, the Jaina <i>sūtras</i> , right action, monasticism, purity of mind, liberation, nudity of the ascetic, and moral conduct.			
xiii. <i>Dvādaśānuprekṣā</i>	Kundakunda (?)	Dig.	Pkt.	400 (?)
	Discussion of twelve topics on which a monk should reflect, including the unbound character of the soul and the causes of <i>saṃsāra</i> .			
xiv. <i>Sarvārthasiddhi</i>	Pūjyapāda	Dig.	Skt.	480 ⁵⁷
	Commentary on <i>Tattvārthādhigama</i> .			
xv. <i>Iṣṭopadeśa</i>	Pūjyapāda	Dig.	Skt.	480
	A collection of aphorisms on the emancipation of the soul and a variety of moral topics. The aphorisms contain many similes.			

⁵⁴ The authorship of the work is uncertain. Jinadāsamahattara's *Niśīthacūrṇi* (7th cent. CE) attributes the work to Umāsvāti (Malvania 2007: 66).

⁵⁵ Malvania & Soni situate the works of Kundakunda ca. 400 CE. However, the date of Kundakunda is quite uncertain, and the proposed dates range from the 2nd to the 8th cent. CE (Dundas 1992: 107). Given the subject and style of Kundakunda's writings, the date that Malvania and Soni suggest seems to be rather early.

⁵⁶ The *Aṣṭaprābhṛta* and *Dvādaśānuprekṣa* are traditionally ascribed to Kundakunda. According to Malvania & Soni, it is unlikely that Kundakunda composed these works (Malvania 2007: 94).

⁵⁷ Malvania & Soni date Pūjyapāda's works ca. 480 CE. This corresponds with the view of Bronkhorst, who situates Pūjyapāda shortly after 455 CE (Bronkhorst 1985: 161). Balcerowicz proposes a later date and situates Pūjyapāda ca. 540 – 600 CE (Balcerowicz 2016e: 477).

xvi. <i>Samādhitantra</i>	Pūjyapāda	Dig.	Skt.	480
	Treatise on the self, meditation, and liberation.			
xvii. <i>Sanmatitarka</i>	Siddhasena Divākara	Śvet.	Pkt.	450-500 ⁵⁸
	Treatise on epistemological topics (e.g., theory of viewpoints, awareness of the omniscient, and sevenfold predication) and ontology (e.g., theory of substance, atoms, and categories).			
xviii. <i>Dvātriṃśikā</i>	Siddhasena Divākara ⁵⁹	Śvet.	Skt.	550
	A group of short metrical texts of 32 stanzas each, discussing a variety of topics, such as eulogies of Mahāvīra and the refutation of rival views, including Nyāya and Sāṃkhya theories.			
xix. <i>Nayacakra</i>	Mallavādin	Śvet.	Skt.	550
	Refutation of different philosophical doctrines, written as a debate between 17 disputants. The text deals with <i>Sāṃkhya</i> , <i>Buddhist</i> , and <i>Vaiśeṣika</i> theories amongst others.			
xx. <i>Viśeṣāvaśyaka- bhāṣya</i>	Jinabhadra Gaṇi	Śvet.	Pkt. ⁶⁰	600
	Commentary on (the first chapter of) the <i>Āvaśyakaniryukti</i> .			
xxi. <i>Dhyānaśataka</i>	Jinabhadra Gaṇi	Śvet.	Pkt.	600
	Treatise on meditation, discussing four types of concentration (<i>ārta</i> , <i>raudra</i> , <i>dharmya</i> , <i>śukla</i>).			
xxii. <i>Āptamīmāṃsā</i>	Samantabhadra	Dig.	Skt.	600 (?) ⁶¹
	Treatise on ontology (being, unity, permanence, causality), knowledge (realism and idealism), liberation, and ethics. Advocates <i>nayavāda</i> and <i>anekāntavāda</i> , and criticises rival theories.			
xxiii. <i>Yuktyanuśāsana</i>	Samantabhadra	Dig.	Skt.	600 (?)
	Treatise about substance, qualities, and the problem of change. Advocates <i>syādvāda</i> .			
xxiv. <i>Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī</i>	Siṃhasūragaṇi	Śvet.	Skt.	600
	Commentary on Mallavādin's <i>Nayacakra</i> .			

⁵⁸ Balcerowicz 2016d: 996.

⁵⁹ See Fujinaga 1999a for a discussion of the authorship of the different works that are attributed to Siddhasena. Fujinaga argues that there were two Siddhasena's.

⁶⁰ The (auto-)commentary on the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* is in Sanskrit.

⁶¹ Malvania & Soni date Samantabhadra ca. 430 CE. However, they date Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā* ca. 600 CE. Balcerowicz situates Samantabhadra ca. 530 – 590 CE (Balcerowicz 2016e: 477).

The information in the table above provides several reasons to rethink Dixit's account of the early history of Jaina philosophy. First, Dixit's idea about the role of the TA in the development of Jaina philosophy seems inaccurate. In Dixit's account, the TA and the TABh — which he attributes to the same author — summarise the traditional philosophical viewpoints that were developed during the 'age of Āgamas' and form the last texts of this period. However, it is highly unlikely that the TABh was written as an auto-commentary and there is no hard evidence that the TA was written after the composition of the *Nandīsūtra* and *Anuyogadvārasūtra*.⁶² Since the TA responds in many passages to issues that are raised in the *Nyāyasūtra* but never refers to discussions in the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, there is a good reason to assume that the text was composed well before the 5th century CE.⁶³ This means that the TA was probably not only a summary of the positions that are found in the later canonical texts. If the TA indeed predates the latest strata of the Jaina canon, it is more likely that the TA played a rather innovative role and influenced texts such as the *Nandīsūtra* and *Anuyogadvārasūtra*. As such, it makes sense to regard the TA as the first philosophical texts of the Jainas.

Second, it is quite problematic to draw a line between the 'age of Āgamas' and the 'age of Logic'. Dixit writes that texts from the 'age of Āgamas' are characterised by a 'closed door atmosphere'.⁶⁴ He explains that none of these texts ever refers to a rival view that is known from other literature. By contrast, texts from the 'age of Logic' explicitly name and criticise non-Jaina schools, and the standpoints that are mentioned are 'always followed by more or less cogent arguments supporting them'.⁶⁵ In other words, texts in the 'age of Logic' differ in two respects from the previous texts according to Dixit: they are explicitly refuting non-Jaina schools and they use philosophical arguments to support their own standpoints.

However, the idea that the early philosophical texts of the Jainas do not respond to positions of other schools is inadequate. The TA does clearly respond to Nyāya positions, even if this school is not mentioned explicitly. In order to see the underlying debates, one has to examine the positions in the text carefully and

⁶² For a detailed discussion of the argument, see § 2.3.

⁶³ See chapter 3 for a discussion of the relationship between the TA, TABh and the *Nyāyasūtra*.

⁶⁴ Dixit 1971: 88.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 89.

compare these views with positions in contemporary texts. Dixit is right when he says that only later texts mention the other schools by name but one could say that this is simply a matter of style. On the other hand, there is considerable number of Jaina philosophical texts that postdate 'the age of Āgamas' that do not deal explicitly with other schools. For example, Pūjyapāda's *Samādhitantra* and Jinabhadra Gaṇi's *Dhyānaśataka* deal with meditation and liberation, and these texts have little to do with the refutation of other views.

Furthermore, the idea that the positions in these later texts are always supported by proper arguments only applies to some texts, such as Mallavādin's *Nayacakra*. Most other texts in the table, however, consist for the main part of statements for which no explicit arguments are given in the text.

Even though Dixit's model has some heuristic value to reconstruct the development of Jaina philosophy, it cannot be used to order the texts in a chronological way. Texts that lack a clear structure, which are not dealing with rival views, and which do not contain proper arguments, do not necessarily predate those texts that have the opposite characteristics. It is important to realise that Dixit's ideas about the development of Jaina philosophy can be misleading if we want to understand the history of early Jaina philosophy. Since Dixit's work is one of the most comprehensive studies about Jaina philosophy, it had a strong influence on other scholars. In fact, the division between the 'age of Āgamas' and the 'age of Logic' also appears to have influenced the organisation of the first volume on Jaina philosophy in Potter's *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. It does not deal with any texts from the 'age of Āgamas' except for the works that are attributed to Umāsvāti. In his introductory chapter on the Jaina canon, Potter writes that 'the philosophical literature of the Jainas proper may be said to begin' after the composition of the canonical texts.⁶⁶ Commenting on the selection of texts that are discussed in the encyclopedia, he explains that the commentaries on the canonical works are 'for the most part ignored'. Instead, the work focuses on 'independent texts and commentaries on them' that try to develop the Jaina worldview in a rational way.⁶⁷

It is unclear to me why it is relevant for the historiography of philosophy to separate the texts that were codified in the Jaina canon and the commentaries thereon from the 'independent' texts. The fact that a text is accepted as an

⁶⁶ Malvania 2007: 41.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

authoritative scripture does not necessarily entail that the text itself differs from non-canonical texts. Potter's approach reinforces the idea that there is no 'real' philosophy in the canonical texts, such as the *Nandīsūtra* and *Anuyogadvārasūtra*, and that there is a hard divide between philosophical speculation in the Jaina canon and the 'independent' work of later authors who wrote 'proper' philosophy. This seems to echo Dixit's division between the 'age of Āgamas' and the 'age of Logic'.

The information in the table above clearly shows that the history of Jaina philosophy did not develop in a straight line from doctrinal thought towards rational philosophy. Treatises on proper ascetic conduct and meditation were written at the same time as treatises on epistemology and ontology, and both topics are often discussed in the same sources. Moreover, authors such as Jinabhadra Gaṇi wrote commentaries on canonical works and composed autonomous treatises as well. In short, the relevance of canonical thought for the development of Jaina philosophy did not end with the TA and independent thought went hand in hand with traditional writings.

Nevertheless, Jaina philosophy did change over time. The texts that are written in a later period show several characteristics that were rarer at the earlier stages and vice versa. For example, the canonical literature and some early philosophical texts are composed in Prākṛit and the later philosophical texts are mostly written in Sanskrit, even though some later authors also wrote in Prākṛit. The TA is a significant text in this respect, since it is the oldest extant text in Sanskrit in the Jaina tradition. Apart from this linguistic shift, there is also a shift in the content of the works. Although the early works do reflect some developments in other philosophical traditions, there are more treatises in later times that explicitly refute the positions of other schools.

Even though we know that these changes took place during the Gupta Period, it is not entirely clear how these changes can be explained. Some scholars have linked these developments with major changes in the Jaina community, such as mass migration. Others have suggested that these changes were caused by the need for royal patronage.⁶⁸ In order to understand why Jaina thinkers started to favour Sanskrit for their philosophical texts and why they became more vocal in their criticism of other philosophical traditions, we need to situate the history of Jaina philosophy in a larger socio-historical context. For this purpose, I will discuss the

⁶⁸ See § 2.2 for a discussion of these theories.

history of the Jainas in the Gupta Period in the next section (§ 2.2). After my discussion of the socio-historical situation of the Jainas, I will address the date and authorship of the TA and the TABh (§ 2.3).

2.2 The Jainas in the Gupta Period⁶⁹

As I will discuss in § 2.3, it is safe to assume that the TA and the TABh were composed in the Gupta period. Even if the composition of the TA itself would slightly predate the 4th cent. CE we know that the TA became an important text for the Jaina community during the Gupta period, since the different Jaina traditions wrote influential commentaries on the TA in the Gupta age. The fact that the style, content, and language of the TA substantially diverge from older Jaina texts raises some important questions: What urged the author of the TA to transform traditional ideas and present them in a way that strongly resembles philosophical works from non-Jaina movements? And why did this particular text become such an important text for the Jainas? It is tempting to conjecture that this intellectual development reflects a change in the social position of the Jaina community. In order to investigate this hypothesis, this section will address the socio-historical situation of the Jainas in the Gupta period. My analysis is mainly based on the scholarly accounts of the history of the Jainas under the Guptas written by Suzuko Ohira, Johannes Bronkhorst, and Paul Dundas.⁷⁰ After analysing their views, I will discuss the explanatory value of these accounts with respect to the composition of the TA.

⁶⁹ In this chapter, the term ‘Gupta period’ refers to the time during which the Gupta dynasty flourished in South Asia, i.e., from ca. 320 CE, when Candragupta I laid the foundations of the Gupta empire, until ca. 550 CE, when the reign of Viṣṇugupta ended (see, e.g., Agrawal 1989). However, the geographical scope of this chapter extends beyond the range of the Gupta Empire, and includes areas under the control of contemporary dynasties, such as the Vākātakas and Kadambas. The fact that 550 CE is used to indicate the end of the Gupta Period does not imply that there was a Gupta empire until that date. Even though there were still some Gupta kings after the middle of the 5th century CE, the heydays of the Guptas were already over by that time (Bakker 2015: 25). For a history of the later Guptas, see also Willis 2005.

⁷⁰ I will limit my overview of the existing literature to scholarly accounts that deal primarily with the history of the Jainas in the Gupta Period and I will focus on those accounts that are particularly relevant for the understanding of the development of early Jaina philosophy. In order to understand the significance of the changes that happened to the Jaina community in the Gupta era, a larger study is needed that contextualises the history of the Jainas in the history of the Gupta Period in general.

Existing scholarship

In her study of the TA, Ohira gives the first comprehensive account of the Jainas in the Gupta period.⁷¹ Although she portrays the Gupta period in general as an age of ‘long stabilized peace and prosperity’, bringing out ‘the most creative period in the history of India in all its fields of its cultural activities’, she concludes that it was ‘one of the darkest ages’ for the Jainas.⁷² Moreover, she holds that the Jaina community underwent significant changes during the Gupta period. She summarises the overall situation as follows:

[T]he social impact of the days drove them to the other parts of India from the North, which ultimately became, together with the accidental factor of the natural calamity of long famine inviting the call of the Third Valabhī Council, the cause of the great schism into the present day Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras.⁷³

But what is the basis of Ohira’s extremely negative analysis of the situation of the Jainas in the Gupta period? And what does she mean exactly by ‘the social impact of the days’ in the passage cited above? In her general overview of the Gupta age, she characterises the period between 320 CE and the end of the 5th cent. CE as ‘the golden age of the Hindus’.⁷⁴ To underpin this view, she mentions the records of Faxian (法顯), a Chinese Buddhist monk who travelled to South Asia in the early 5th

⁷¹ Ohira 1982: 113-134.

⁷² Ohira’s general account of the Gupta period is mainly based on R. C. Majumdar’s *The Classical Age (The History and Culture of the Indian People, vol. 3)*, published in Bombay in 1954. This explains her overly optimistic characterisation of the Gupta period, even though she describes the Gupta period as a dark age for the Jainas. As Upinder Singh observes, it was common for ‘Indian historians who lived during the period of nationalist resistance to colonial rule’ to portray the Gupta period as a golden age, as a reaction to ‘imperialist historiography’, highlighting the ‘political unification of a large part of the subcontinent’ and the efflorescence of art and literature (Singh 2009: 473). In his review of *The Classical Age*, written in 1954, Louis Renou already points out that there is ‘a certain amount of fallacy’ in the presentation of the Gupta period as a classical age (Renou 1954: 125). He mentions that ‘the obscurities and gaps in our information concerning the previous epochs’ and the fact that ‘the history of India has been constructed out of literary material [...] composed by holders of the Brahmanic ideals’ seriously hinder our understanding of the Gupta period (Renou 1954: 126).

⁷³ Ohira 1982: 113. The last part of this section addresses Ohira’s account of the supposed migration and the sectarian division of the Jainas.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

cent. CE and portrays the Gupta Empire as very peaceful and prosperous.⁷⁵ Further, she points to the promotion of Sanskrit under the Guptas. Unlike the inscriptions from the previous Mauryan and Kuṣāṇa period, which are mostly written in Prākṛit or hybrid Sanskrit, the Guptas established Sanskrit as the official language of the state. Sanskrit authors composed numerous works in this era, ranging from poetry to history, philosophy, and mathematics. However, unlike the Buddhists, who adopted Sanskrit at an early stage, the Jainas continued writing in Prākṛit, and Ohira points out that Umāsvāti's choice to use Sanskrit must be a response to the patronage of Sanskrit writing under the Guptas.⁷⁶ She also suggests that the attachment of the *praśasti*⁷⁷ to the TA, which is the first *praśasti* in the history of Jaina literature, reflects the composition of royal genealogies in the *purāṇas*.⁷⁸ Further, Ohira links the 'longstanding peace' and patronage of scholarship to the systematisation of thought and commentarial activities in the various philosophical schools. She claims that the TA was the Jaina response to what she describes as 'the call of time', i.e., the systematisation of the different philosophical traditions.⁷⁹

In her discussion of religion in the Gupta era, Ohira portrays the Guptas as tolerant towards all religions, even though Vaiṣṇavism was the official religion. At the same time she suggests that the Buddhists and Jainas must have 'suffered from the loss of royal patronage which they had enjoyed in the Mauryan and Kuṣāṇa dynasties'. Nevertheless, she writes that the Buddhists, unlike the Jainas, still enjoyed royal favour but the evidence that she provides for this difference is problematic. Ohira contrasts the paucity of epigraphical evidence for Jaina patronage with the information in the Chinese travel records of Faxian and Xuanzang, which portray a favourable attitude of the kings towards the Buddhists.⁸⁰ However, as previously noted, it is highly problematic to interpret these travel

⁷⁵ Ibid., 114. Recent scholarship problematises the decontextualised use of historical Chinese travel reports, such as those of Faxian (法顯) and Xuanzang (玄奘). After all, these records are based on the experience of Buddhist monks who went as pilgrims to the land of the Buddha and whose targeted audience was in their homeland (e.g., Deeg 2012).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ A short text with the details of the author. See § 3.5 for an analysis of the *praśasti*. A translation of the *praśasti* can be found in Part II.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 115. She mentions the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya*, and the *Nyāyavārttika* as examples of this 'historical trend'.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 115-116. There is some evidence for royal patronage of the Jainas under the Guptas. For example, there are three well-known Jaina images that were found in Dujanpur (Vidiśā), which were commissioned by Rāmagupta (Ohira 1982: 118).

records as accurate descriptions of the historical situation.⁸¹ Despite this, she rightly observes that the paucity of Jaina inscriptions in the Gupta period strongly contrasts with the abundance of Jaina inscriptions in Mathurā under the Kuṣāṇas.⁸²

In order to explain this change, Ohira discusses the history of the Jaina community in Mathurā, an important commercial centre along the trade route between Pāṭaliputra and Takṣaśila (Taxila). Mathurā is the main source of Jaina antiquities from North India. The first epigraphical evidence of Jainas at Mathurā dates from the 2nd cent. BCE and the number of inscriptions culminates under the Kuṣāṇas, especially during the reign of Kaniṣka and Huviṣka (2nd cent. CE).⁸³ Ohira suggests that the Jaina community in Mathurā acquired an important economic position under the Kuṣāṇas due to their activities as bankers (*śreṣṭhin*), traders (*sārthavāha*), and merchants (*kulika*), which is supported by the fact that most Jaina inscriptions of this period relate to lay donations, mostly found on images.⁸⁴ The Mathurā inscriptions also suggest that the Jaina community under the Kuṣāṇas came from all over Northern India and that Mathurā became a centre of Jainism around the 2nd cent. CE.⁸⁵

It is interesting that the Jaina inscriptions of this period outnumber the Buddhist inscriptions, even though Kaniṣka and Huviṣka both favoured Buddhism.⁸⁶ However, there is a sudden decrease of Jaina images and inscriptions from Mathurā at the beginning of the Gupta period, which leads Ohira to the conclusion that ‘the Jaina activities at Mathurā [...] suffered a sudden blow with the entry of the Gupta era’ after which the Jainas migrated ‘en masse’ to places in South and West India,

⁸¹ Ohira mentions that Xuanzang refers to *nirgranthas* (interpreted as Jaina mendicants) in Kapiśa, Lanpo, and Siṃhapura but not in North India proper (see also Ohira 1982: 118). However, it is far from clear whether the term ‘*nirgrantha*’ in Xuanzang’s text actually refers to Jaina mendicants, and whether these remarks were based on his own observation. For example, he mentions that there were numerous *nirgranthas* in Eastern Bangladesh (Salles 1995: 535, n.11). However, there is no archaeological evidence for the presence of large groups of Jainas in this region.

⁸² Ohira 1982: 116.

⁸³ Ibid., 119. See Falk 2001 for a discussion of the dates of the Kuṣāṇa kings.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 120-121. The inscriptions by lay donors include the names and lineages of their preceptors, which shows that the lay communities ‘were under the guidance of particular spiritual teachers’ who were dependent on the lay community for their subsistence (Ohira 1982: 124).

⁸⁵ Ibid., 119. Ohira’s claim is based on an analysis of the names of monastic lineages (*gaṇas*, *kulas*, and *sākhās*) mentioned in the Mathurā inscriptions (Ohira 1982: 43-44).

⁸⁶ Ohira mentions Lüders’s study of 159 Kuṣāṇa inscriptions from Mathurā, out of which 87 are Jaina, 55 Buddhist, and 17 ‘non-sectarian’ (Ohira 1982: 119). See also Lüders 1913.

‘which have continued to be centres of Jainism up to the present age’.⁸⁷ But what could explain such a dramatic change?

Ohira writes that the commercial activities of the Jainas were organised in powerful guilds (*śreṇi*) and that the representatives of these guilds had an influential position in the local government. However, the Guptas were Vaiṣṇavas and Ohira conjectures that Mathurā, as the mythical birthplace of Lord Kṛṣṇa, was handed over to the Vaiṣṇavas in the wake of the ‘Hindu revival movement’.⁸⁸ Interestingly, by the end of the Kuṣāṇa period, Kṛṣṇa and his elder brother Balarāma appear in Jaina images as the attendants of Neminātha, the 22nd *tīrthaṅkara*. Moreover, the Kṛṣṇa theme makes its entrance in the Jaina canonical literature from this era, albeit in a non-divine role.⁸⁹ This leads Ohira to the conclusion that there was an aggressive religious struggle going on between the Hindu and non-Hindu sects during the late canonical and post-canonical period, which resulted in the decline of Jainism in Mathurā.⁹⁰ She states that the subsequent migration of the Jainas was initiated by the move of the mercantile class and that the ‘exodus of the lay Jaina communities from Mathurā naturally caused the migration of the ascetic *saṅghas* as well because the latter had to depend on the former for their material needs’.⁹¹

From Mathurā, the Jainas moved to important commercial centres in the South and West, such as Kāñcī, Madurai, Ujjayinī, and Valabhi.⁹² Unlike the Jaina communities in the West, the Jainas in the South managed to secure royal support in the Gupta era, as attested by land grants from the 4th to the 6th cent. CE. However, since there are no records of image donations in the South from this period, Ohira concludes that there were yet to be any Jaina temples. Moreover, she suggests that

⁸⁷ Ohira 1982: 120.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 121.

⁸⁹ Ohira lists the following canonical texts: *Uttarādhyayana* 22, *Antakṛddasāh*, *Jñātādharma-kathāḥ* 16, *Vahnidaśa* 1, and *Daśavaikālika*. Ohira argues that the Hindu literary works of this time make parallel moves. She refers to the *Bhāgavata Purāna*, in which Ṛṣabha, the first *tīrthaṅkara*, appears as one of Viṣṇu’s *avatāras* (Ohira 1982: 121-122). However, it is not entirely clear to me how this supports Ohira’s argument since the *Bhāgavata Purāna* seems to be of a much later date (perhaps 8th cent. CE). Dundas points out that the relationship with Vaiṣṇavism dates back to the 2nd cent. BCE, ‘with the figure of Kṛṣṇa being assimilated to the biography of the twenty-second *tīrthaṅkara* Nemi’ (Dundas 2006: 397).

⁹⁰ Ibid., 122.

⁹¹ Ibid., 123.

⁹² Ibid., 124.

the Jaina lay communities started to invite ascetics in order to win royal patronage, which is supported by epigraphical evidence from Karnataka.⁹³

To sum up, Ohira characterises the Gupta period as a turbulent era for the Jaina community. The prevalent 'Hindu revival movement' directly threatened the powerful Jaina guilds in Mathurā. This prompted Jaina merchants to relocate to other commercial centres in the South and West, and the Jaina ascetics had to follow them given their dependence on the laity. Even though Ohira's account is quite comprehensive, there are some questions that remain unanswered. For example, she argues that the TA was composed in the early 5th cent. CE in Kusumapura, which is another name for Pāṭaliputra. However, her account of the Jainas in the Gupta period does not provide any information about the Jaina community in Pāṭaliputra. In general, Ohira presents a story that is well connected to the evidence but she tends to take the implications of the evidence, and the lack of it too far. For example, is it legitimate to conclude that there was a mass migration just because of a paucity of evidence in one place and a growing number of inscriptions elsewhere?⁹⁴ And can we assume that the Jaina merchants were indeed suppressed as a result of the Vaiṣṇava identity of the Guptas?

Unlike Ohira, Bronkhorst thinks that the TA was composed in the South and that the *bhāṣya* was written in Pāṭaliputra by a different author (see also § 2.3).⁹⁵ In a self-admittedly speculative article, Bronkhorst provides another account of the Jainas under the Guptas, in an effort to explain why the practice of *stūpa* worship disappeared from the Jaina tradition. His account has some valuable observations on the possible context of the TA and provides new hypotheses, especially with respect to the relation between the Jainas and the Buddhists. Based on an analysis of several concepts in the Śvetāmbara canon, such as the atomic nature of matter and the momentariness of all that exists, Bronkhorst claims that Jainism was strongly influenced by Sarvāstivāda Buddhism.⁹⁶ He suggests that this took place in north-western India during the 'final centuries preceding the Common Era and the first ones following it', adding that '[i]t seems to be a safe bet to conclude that it was in

⁹³ Ibid., 124-125.

⁹⁴ Ohira's account of the supposed 'mass migration' of the Jainas during the Gupta period and the way in which this event impacted the Jaina tradition will be discussed later on in this section.

⁹⁵ Bronkhorst 2010.

⁹⁶ See also Bronkhorst 2000.

Mathurā that the Jainas were confronted with these new ideas'.⁹⁷ This theory fits nicely with the presence of a large Jaina *stūpa* in Mathurā.⁹⁸ It seems that this practice of *stūpa* worship was shared with the Buddhists, even though it was later abandoned by the Jaina tradition. The question as to why relic worship mainly disappeared from the Jaina tradition has puzzled several scholars and Bronkhorst tries to answer this question in his article.⁹⁹ His main argument is that the Jainas in Mathurā responded to the competition with the Buddhists by abandoning relic worship and 'concentrating on other things'.¹⁰⁰ However, there is no direct evidence that indicates that *stūpa* worship was abandoned by the Jainas to distance themselves from the Buddhists. Therefore, Bronkhorst's theory should be treated with caution.

In order to understand the adoption of Sanskrit in the Jaina tradition, Bronkhorst draws a comparison with the Buddhist attitude towards Sanskrit in north-western India under the Kuṣāṇas. He suggests that the 'massive change from a Middle Indic language to Sanskrit' was just an aspect of the larger 'in-depth Brahmanization of Buddhism in this region'.¹⁰¹ He claims that the underlying reason for the changing attitude towards Sanskrit is that the Brahmins 'had come to play central roles at and around the royal court' and that '[a]ll others who depended upon royal support had to be able to plead their cause in Sanskrit'.¹⁰²

Yet, Bronkhorst believes that the Jainas, unlike the Buddhists, adopted Sanskrit 'many centuries after the Kuṣāṇas' and that Mathurā does not play a role in this process. He sees the TA, which he dates between 150 and 350 CE, as an

⁹⁷ Bronkhorst 2010: 2-3. His reason to situate this encounter in Mathurā is that Gandhāra and Mathurā were the main centres under the Kuṣāṇas, and that there is little evidence of the Jainas around Gandhāra (see also Dundas 2006: 405-406), while there is ample evidence of the Jainas in Mathurā.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 3. This *stūpa* was excavated from Kaṅkālī Ṭilā and is the centre of the archaeological and inscriptional evidence for the connection of the Jainas with Mathurā (Dundas 1992: 113).

⁹⁹ For a discussion of the history of relic worship, see Cort 2010.

¹⁰⁰ Bronkhorst 2010: 5-6. He also suggests that the later importance of vegetarianism in Jainism (see also Ohira 1994: 18-19), which seems to be a break with the practices mentioned in canonical texts, might be 'inspired by similar motives'. However, this argument seems to be flawed. If the abandonment of relic worship can be explained by the wish to be distinguished from the Buddhist, one can hardly claim that embracing vegetarianism has the same background, since vegetarianism does not distinguish the Jainas from the Buddhists.

¹⁰¹ Bronkhorst 2010: 8

¹⁰² Ibid., 9. Bronkhorst does not provide a source for this claim.

exception.¹⁰³ He points out that only two other Jaina texts written in Sanskrit before the 6th cent. CE have been transmitted, i.e., the TABh and the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Since the TABh was probably composed in Pāṭaliputra and the *Sarvārthasiddhi* somewhere in the South, Bronkhorst concludes that Mathurā did not play a role in the adoption of Sanskrit in the Jaina tradition.¹⁰⁴ This raises the question as to why the Buddhists and Jainas in Mathurā had a different attitude towards Sanskrit. Bronkhorst explains this by pointing out that the Buddhist community needed royal support in order to maintain their ‘sometimes big monasteries’ and *stūpas*.¹⁰⁵ By contrast, the Jainas were moving away from *stūpa* worship and the presence of the temple-dwelling monks was a matter of debate. Moreover, the Jaina ascetics could rely on the wealthy lay donors, which ‘left them relatively independent of the royal court, allowing them to continue using Prakrit rather than Sanskrit’.¹⁰⁶ This would explain why there is no epigraphical evidence from North India that refers to land grants. By contrast, the Jainas in the South had a ‘different relationship to the royal court’ and possessed ‘caves and monasteries accompanied by substantial land endowments’.¹⁰⁷ Bronkhorst speculates that we have to situate the TA in this context; it was the need for royal support for the Jainas in South India that urged the Jainas to present their doctrines in Sanskrit at the ‘brahmanized courts’.¹⁰⁸

Bronkhorst’s account diverges from Ohira’s by situating the TA in South India instead of Pāṭaliputra. This reflects a more fundamental difference between their hypotheses: Ohira assumes that the Jainas in North India received royal patronage, while Bronkhorst thinks that the Jaina community in the North avoided dependence on royal favours, which distinguished them from the Buddhists. Further, Ohira thinks that the adoption of Sanskrit was an immediate response to the patronage of Sanskrit under the Gupta rulers. By contrast, Bronkhorst assumes that the change to Sanskrit happened in the South. Yet, both authors agree that the Jainas adopted Sanskrit in order to secure royal favour.

¹⁰³ Ibid. See also § 2.3.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 10. See § 2.1 and § 2.3 for the date and origin of these texts.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 11. He cites a study by Gregory Schopen, which mentions that the maintenance of permanent quarters requires ‘long-term relationships with donors’, and Bronkhorst assumes that the royal court must have played a role in this.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 12.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 13.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 14.

While both Ohira and Bronkhorst tend to make large claims about the Jainas in the Gupta period based on rather fragmentary evidence, Dundas provides a more careful interpretation of the available data.¹⁰⁹ For example, in one of his more recent articles on Jainism in the Gupta period, he states that ‘attempts to provide a firm chronological location within the Gupta period for Jain authors and their writings’ are unsatisfactory, and he adds that we cannot even be sure that the TA was composed in the Gupta period.¹¹⁰ However, his work contains valuable observations and suggestions with respect to the topics discussed by Ohira and Bronkhorst. In addition to the epigraphical and material evidence that forms the basis of Ohira’s and Bronkhorst’s accounts, Dundas brings in a wide range of literary sources in order to get a better understanding of the situation of the Jainas under the Guptas.¹¹¹

In *The Jains*, Dundas’ seminal handbook on Jainism, he explains how the early Jaina community moved from the Ganges basin, the place of its origin, to the West and the Dravidian South following the trade routes.¹¹² Even though there is an inscription from Hāthīgumphā, which shows that there were Jainas in the East before the beginning of the Common Era, Dundas states that it ‘is the westward shift to the city of Mathurā and its environs which provides the best evidence for generalising about early Jain society’.¹¹³ As mentioned previously, the *stūpa* of Kaṅkālī Ṭilā forms the centre of the archaeological and epigraphical evidence for the early presence of the Jainas in Mathurā. Dundas points out that an inscriptional reference to this *stūpa* from 157 CE, which mentions that the *stūpa* was ‘created by

¹⁰⁹ Relevant discussions of the Jainas under the Guptas can be found in Dundas 1996b, 2002, 2006, and 2014.

¹¹⁰ Dundas 2014: 231. He writes that it is ‘perfectly plausible’ that the TA was written under the Kuṣāṇas, even though he writes that there is a ‘strong possibility’ that the TA was written during the Gupta period. This corresponds with his view in *The Jains*, where he states that the TA was written in the fourth or 5th cent. CE (Dundas 1992: 86).

¹¹¹ In the introduction to his chapter in *The Jains* on the history of the Jainas ‘from early times to the late medieval period’, Dundas writes: ‘I would contend that it will only be possible to gain some sense of it if there is brought into play a wider range of source materials such as stories, legends, *belles-lettres*, clan and sectarian traditions, hagiographies and so on, not all of which constitute unimpeachable documentary evidence of the sort usually required in the writing of history but which nonetheless provide a distinctively Jain perspective on the religion’s past.’ (Dundas 1992: 112).

¹¹² Dundas 1992: 113. He remarks that even the Jainas who are nowadays living in Bihar ‘are descendants of those who migrated back from the West of India for economic reasons’.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 113. The Hāthīgumphā inscription of king Khāravela (ca. 1st cent. BCE) mentions the seizing of a Jaina image from another kingdom, which indicates that image worship was already practiced at this early stage of Jainism.

the gods', suggests that the *stūpa* 'by that period [...] was reckoned to be of considerable antiquity'.¹¹⁴ Further, the donative inscriptions from Kaṅkālī Ṭilā prove that Jainism in this early stage was not just an ascetic movement and that the interaction of lay followers with the monks and nuns 'provided the means for the maintenance of the religion.'¹¹⁵ Even though Dundas agrees with Ohira that substantial sections of the Jaina community from Mathurā drifted to the West during the Gupta period, he points out that a large Pārśva image was dedicated in Mathurā in 980 CE. This somehow nuances Ohira's portrayal of the 'mass migration' of the Jainas. Even though Dundas remarks that the *purāṇas* reflect a negative attitude towards the Jaina ascetics, he does not think that there is evidence of Hindu persecution of the Jainas in the North.¹¹⁶ He speculates that the Jaina community under the Guptas responded to external and internal 'political pressures' by gradually migrating to the West, which offered new business opportunities.¹¹⁷ This shift from Mathurā to the West fits well with the fact that the penultimate Jaina council was held at Valabhī and Mathurā, while the last council was held in Valabhī alone.¹¹⁸

Although these important events took place in North and West India, Jaina culture was certainly not confined to this area; epigraphical evidence testifies the presence of Jaina laymen and ascetics in the South in the second and 1st cent. BCE.¹¹⁹ It is far from clear what the place of this early Jaina community in the South exactly was, and there is a gap in the epigraphical evidence from the first centuries of the Common Era. Yet, based on the analysis of story literature, Dundas points out that the later literary tradition preserved 'some distant memory of wandering Jaina mendicants' who 'acted as transmitters of a northern, prestigious culture'.¹²⁰ Further,

¹¹⁴ Ibid. Dundas mentions a medieval story by Jinaprabha Sūri, in which the Buddhists and Hindus claim the *stūpa* for their own. Likewise, Somadeva (tenth cent. CE) writes how the *stūpa* was founded after rivalry with the Buddhists. These stories match the archaeological evidence for the cohabitation of different religious groups in Mathurā and the similarity of their religious architecture (Dundas 1992: 114).

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 115.

¹¹⁶ He writes that the 'archetypical heretic' in the *purāṇas* is 'an amalgam of the Jain and Buddhist monk and a demonic and anti-social figure' (Dundas 1992: 115).

¹¹⁷ Ibid. He mentions that the kingdom of the Maitrakas of Valabhī offered 'new overseas trading opportunities' from the 5th cent. CE onwards.

¹¹⁸ For a study on the dates of the Jaina councils, see Wiles 2006.

¹¹⁹ For an overview these early inscriptions, such as the Kalugumalai hill inscriptions and the cave inscriptions from Madurai, see Ohira 1982: 116-117.

¹²⁰ Dundas 1992: 116.

he claims that the 'religious and political ideologies' of the Jainas had a significant impact on literature and kingship in the South.¹²¹ Even though the older Jaina texts say that ascetics cannot accept alms from kings, Dundas suggests that Jaina monks in the South 'forged close relationships with kingly patrons'. Interestingly, he remarks that 'there is no epigraphic mention in Karnataka of Jains of a mercantile or bourgeois background until the tenth century' and that 'the picture of Jainism up to this point is very much of a religion sponsored by kings and warrior aristocrats'.¹²²

But what can Jaina ascetics offer these groups? Why would politically powerful persons want to be associated with the Jaina ideology, which focuses on the abandonment of worldly matters? Dundas argues that the Jaina ideology of 'heroic individualism and self-perfection' was often 'expressed in 'images of striving, battle and conquest'. This applies in particular to the Digambaras, who were the dominant sect in the South, and one can argue that this imagery must have been appealing to the ruling class.¹²³ Second, Jaina ideology might have been attractive for its association with 'prestigious northern culture', in contrast to the 'peasant, Hindu society' in the South. The fact that the *Ādipurāṇa* of Jinasena (9th cent. CE) contains a prescription for the conduct of kings, might indicate that Jaina intellectuals actively tried to secure a connection with the royal court. In this account, the institution of kingship is presented as a 'necessary but potentially dangerous' institution, which requires the 'controlling presence' of 'Jain, rather than Brahman, advisers.' Nevertheless, Dundas remarks that it hard to prove that there were ever kings whose religious affiliation was exclusively Jaina.¹²⁴

As Dundas discusses in his study of early Jaina history, titled 'A Non-Imperial Religion?', Jainism received 'a strong degree of bourgeois support but only sporadic royal sponsorship' during its first eight centuries.¹²⁵ This attitude was backed up by

¹²¹ Ibid. Among the Jaina contributions to Tamil literature, Dundas mentions the earliest Tamil grammar, a collection of maxims (the *Tirukkural*), and the oldest Tamil epic (the *Śilāpaḍikkāram*) which he situates in the 5th cent. CE.

For a discussion of Jainism and kingship in medieval western India, see Cort 1998: 85 - 110.

¹²² Ibid., 118.

¹²³ Ibid., 119. A good example of such imagery is the giant Bāhubali statue at Śravaṇa Belgōḷa, which was dedicated by general Cāmuṇḍarāya in 981 CE. Yet, Cāmuṇḍarāya also dedicated temples to Viṣṇu and Śiva (Dundas 1992: 120).

¹²⁴ Ibid., 119-120. More generally, he states that kingship in the South seems to have 'transcended conceptual or religious boundaries'.

¹²⁵ Dundas 2006: 385.

texts, which 'are adamant that it is improper for monks to take alms from a king'.¹²⁶ Dundas points out that 'there are no depictions of *tīrthankaras* on royal coinage' and that 'early Jain images lack royal insignia, such as the parasol'.¹²⁷ However, the mutual rapprochement of the Jaina community and the royal courts in the South seems to indicate a change in the social position of the Jainas. So, why did the Jainas in the South develop a different stance towards royal patronage?

As mentioned previously, Bronkhorst suggests that the Jaina ascetics in the South needed royal patronage since they owned properties, such as caves and monasteries. However, this explanation ignores the underlying question as to why the Jainas in the South had a different attitude towards property in the first place. According to Dundas, it was 'the institution of *dāna*, the giving of alms and temporary shelter by lay people to ascetics,' which developed into the donation of 'rock-cut caverns' and eventually the 'building alongside temples of monasteries which were accompanied by substantial land endowments'.¹²⁸ While some of the rock-cut caves in Tamil Nadu predate the Common Era,¹²⁹ Dundas states that the monasteries (*maṭhas*) 'began to be built near temple complexes from about the fifth century CE'.¹³⁰ These monasteries gave shelter to the temple-dwelling monks (*caityavāsin*). It is hard to determine when Jaina monks started living around temples, but the practice might have begun around the 4th cent. CE.¹³¹

This change seems to be part of a wider transformation of Jaina practices during the Gupta period, in which image worship and *pūjā* became important elements of the ritual practice. Even though Jaina laymen and ascetics were both involved in image worship from an early period, there is evidence that this practice was subject to discussion in the Gupta era.¹³² Dundas suggests that the emergence of

¹²⁶ Dundas 1992: 118. He mentions Vaṭṭakera's *Mūlācāra* and Haribhadra's commentary on *Āvaśyakaniryukti* 153 (Dundas 1992: 292, n16). For a discussion of the ambivalent attitude of the Jaina community towards kings, see Cort 1998: 85 - 110. His account focuses on literary sources on Jainism and kingship in medieval western India.

¹²⁷ Dundas 2006: 391.

¹²⁸ Dundas 1992: 123.

¹²⁹ For an overview of early rock-cut caves in South India, see, e.g., Chatterjee 2000, vol. 1: 113ff.

¹³⁰ Dundas 1992: 123.

¹³¹ Dundas writes that 'by Śvetāmbara reckoning, the temple-dwelling monks appeared in about the 4th cent. CE, but it is impossible to trace their early history beyond the odd reference such as that to a king of Pāṭan who banned non-temple-dwelling monks from his city' (Dundas 1992: 136).

¹³² Dundas 1992: 249.

a story around the 5th cent. CE about an image of Mahāvīra, which according to the story had been made during his lifetime, can be seen as evidence of an attempt to refute those critics ‘who claimed that it had no place in an authentic, textually based Jainism’.¹³³ Further, textual sources from the 6th cent. CE show a ‘broad consensus’ about the ‘basic elements for the most common form of Jaina *pūjā*’.¹³⁴

The fact that multiple texts discuss *pūjā* in a similar way indicates that *pūjā* became an important topic in the period preceding these texts. Even though Dundas writes that ‘the origins of *pūjā* in Jainism are obscure’, he claims that the practice of *pūjā* in Jainism reflects ‘a common ritual culture shared and developed with Hinduism’.¹³⁵ This overlap with Hindu culture can also be seen in the fact that the Jains absorbed local goddesses into their religion, which became prevalent from the beginning of the Common Era.¹³⁶ Eventually some of these goddesses became linked with specific *tīrthaṅkaras*. The first ‘fully iconic example of this phenomenon’ is a Rṣabha image with attendant goddesses from western India, which can be dated to 550 CE.¹³⁷ This suggests that the Jaina community did not simply follow new religious trends but that they actively reframed significant elements from a wider cultural sphere, thus negotiating the Jaina identity.

In his article on the Jaina attitude towards Sanskrit, Dundas sketches a similar pattern with respect to languages. Instead of interpreting the gradual shift from Prākṛit to Sanskrit as a passive process, in which the Jains conformed to a dominant language, Dundas argues that Jaina authors started using Sanskrit in an attempt to reach a wider audience. Yet, texts that were intended for internal use, continued to be written in Prākṛit.¹³⁸ He rejects the idea that Sanskrit was used by Jains as a result of the conversion of Brahmans to Jainism, pointing out that the conversion of Brahmans also happened long before the first use of Sanskrit.¹³⁹ Instead, he proposes that ‘it was the willingness of the Jains to countenance a form

¹³³ Ibid. The image is known as the Jīvantasvāmi.

¹³⁴ Both Digambara and Śvetāmbara authors agree on the eight substances used for the worship of an image (Dundas 1992: 206).

¹³⁵ Ibid., 206.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 212.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 213.

¹³⁸ Dundas 1996b: 147. He gives Siddhasena’s *Nyāyāvatāra* and *Dvātriṃśikā* as examples of Sanskrit texts aimed at a wider audience, and the Prākṛit *Sanmaitakka*, which deals with ‘specifically Jain issues of epistemology’, as a work for ‘internal consumption’ (Dundas 1996b: 147). However, he admits that his general distinction between the use of Sanskrit and Prākṛit does not apply to the entire history of Jaina literature (Dundas 1996b: 148).

¹³⁹ Ibid., 146. Ohira suggests that Umāsvāti was a Brahmin convert (Ohira 1982: 53).

of Sanskrit – Prākṛit bilingualism [...] which may have acted as a positive lure to many scholarly converts from the brahman cast'. Dundas suggests that this shift to Sanskrit took place in Mathurā, where there was a strong presence of brahman users of Sanskrit, spreading from there to the West and South.¹⁴⁰

Situating the TA in the history of Jainism

The above summary of the different scholarly accounts of the Jainas in the Gupta era shows that there is wide variety of ideas about the history of the Jainas in this period. The different authors all suggest that the Gupta Period was a transformative time for the Jainas but they have different hypotheses about the nature of the supposed changes. Ohira argues that the Jainas used to receive royal patronage in the North but were forced to migrate 'en masse' to the South and the West as a result of the Hindu revival under the Guptas. This forced the Jainas to seek for royal patronage in these new areas. By contrast, Bronkhorst does not think that the Jainas suffered as a result of a Hindu revival. Instead, he proposes that the Jainas mainly changed their practices in order to compete with the Buddhists. For this reason, the Jainas in the North moved away from *stūpa* worship. He further speculates that the Jainas in the South began to rely on royal patronage for their rock-cut caves and monasteries. Dundas agrees that the Jaina ascetics in the South needed patronage for their caves and monasteries but he does not think that they relied on royal patronage. Instead, he suggests that these practices were sponsored by the lay community. He also agrees with Bronkhorst that the Jainas were not forced to move from the North because of a Hindu revival. Instead, he suggests that they migrated to the West because of business opportunities and a declining political climate in the North.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 146-147.

Even though there are significant differences between these three accounts, there are several elements that reoccur in their theories. First, they all try to explain why the evidence for Jaina activity in the North declines while there seems to be an increase of sources from the West and the South. Second, the different accounts suggest that there are some changes in the religious practices of the Jainas. *Stūpa* worship declines, the first temples are built, and there seems to be a rise in monastic activity. There is no consensus, however, about the causes for these changes.


One of the main problems for the historiography of Jainism in the Gupta Period is that it is unclear how the available evidence relates to the actual historical situation. For example, the fact that the number of inscriptions from Mathurā declines during the Gupta Period does not necessarily imply that the Jaina activities in Mathurā radically changed. Even if the number of images and inscriptions in a certain region declines while there is an increase of such sources in another region, there is no need to assume that there was a mass migration going on. In the end, the number of historical sources that relate to the Jainas in the Gupta Period is so limited that it can be highly misleading to reconstruct a larger narrative on the basis of apparent patterns in the data.

A comprehensive overview of the material evidence of the Jainas in the Gupta Period can be found in the first volume of Asim Kumar Chatterjee's study on the history of Jainism. In his overview, he discusses approximately 20 stone inscriptions and copperplates that relate to the Jainas from the beginning of the 4th to the end of the 6th cent. CE.¹⁴¹ A few other inscriptions are mentioned in Ram Bhushan Singh's study of Jainism in early medieval Karnataka but Chatterjee argues that these are later forgeries.¹⁴² Apart from these inscriptions, which mainly relate to land donations, Chatterjee discusses a couple of Jaina images. Some of these images contain inscriptions as well.

¹⁴¹ Chatterjee 2000, vol. I: 79-132.

¹⁴² Singh 1975: Appendix A. Singh mentions the Altem copper plates of Pulakeśin I and the copper plates of the Gaṅga king Avinīta found at Mercāra. Chatterjee suggests that both sets are from a later date (Chatterjee 2000, vol. I: 121, 127).

The inscriptions and images that relate to the Jainas in the Gupta Period were found in different places, ranging from the North to the South of the Indian subcontinent. The map below provides an overview of the places where the evidence was found.¹⁴³ As can be seen on the map, most of the evidence derives from three different regions. The first region is situated in the Northeast and stretches from Mathurā to Pāṭaliputra. The second region stretches from Vallabhī in the West to Nāchnā in Madhya Pradesh. The third area stretches from Palāśikā in Karnataka to Kāñcī in Tamil Nadu. The map suggests that there is a concentration of activity in Karnataka. However, this is mainly due to the fact that several sets of copper plates were found together in Palāśikā (Halsi). It is hard to tell whether this indeed



indicates that there was more Jaina activity in this region or whether it was just a matter of luck that a larger number of items were found in this region. Taking into account that most of the pre-Gupta evidence comes from the North, it is easy to see why some scholars believe that there was a movement of the Jainas from the North to the West and

the South.¹⁴⁴ However, the present number of available sources is simply too limited to get an accurate idea of the actual movements of the Jaina community and the changes that happened to the Jainas in the Gupta Period.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ The map indicates the sites that are mentioned as the finding places of the stone inscriptions and copperplates that are discussed in Chatterjee 2000, vol. I. Since it is possible that the finding places of some of these objects differ from the places from where they originate, it is dangerous to draw any conclusions based on this map. The main purpose is simply to show the geographical spreading of the evidence.

¹⁴⁴ For example, there are 172 surviving *jina* images from Mathurā that predate the Gupta Period (Dundas 2006: 398). This number forms a sharp contrast with the few surviving Jaina images from the Gupta Period.

Although Ohira claims that the author of the TA was clearly responding to 'the call of time',¹⁴⁶ there is not enough material evidence to see which historical circumstances could have urged the Jainas to come up with their first compendium of Jaina thought. The inscriptions from the Gupta Period mostly consist of land grants and they do not indicate that there was, for example, some rivalry with either the Buddhists or the Hindus. Moreover, it is hard to infer any regional differences on the basis of the inscriptions and there is nothing in the content of the text that indicates that the TA should be situated in a specific region.¹⁴⁷ In short, it seems that the material evidence does not provide enough information to make an educated guess about the situation in which the TA was composed.¹⁴⁸

Apart from the material evidence, there are some literary sources that could be relevant for our understanding of Jainism in the Gupta Period, such as the latest layers of the Śvetāmbara canon. Yet, thorough textual analyses of these sources are needed in order to derive any historical clues from these documents and the number of available studies on these texts is too small to facilitate a more general overview.¹⁴⁹

In short, the present status of scholarly work on the material evidence and literary sources is insufficient to create a larger historical narrative that has actual explanatory value and that would allow us to situate the TA in the socio-historical context of Jainism in the Gupta Period. Even though the number of scholars in the field of Jaina studies is growing and many valuable studies on the Jaina tradition

¹⁴⁵ This does not imply that the available sources cannot be used at all. By contrast, more studies on these sources are needed in order to develop new ideas and to test some existing hypotheses about the Jainas in the Gupta age. Dundas's study of the *Titthogālī* (Dundas 2014) is a relevant example.

¹⁴⁶ Ohira 1982: 115.

¹⁴⁷ The situation is different for the TABh since the TABh is accompanied by a *praśasti* that situates the composition of the text in Pāṭaliputra. For a discussion of the validity of the information in the *praśasti*, see § 2.3.

¹⁴⁸ The paucity of historical sources has led R.W. Williams to describe the early history of the Jainas, i.e., from its beginning to the 5th cent. CE, as the 'dark age' of Jainism (Williams 1963: xii.). As pointed out by Dundas, this label is somewhat misleading. The 'huge corpus of literature' that was composed in this early phase, suggests that Jainism was a flourishing cultural and religious movement (Dundas 2006: 383). Yet, Dundas rightly remarks that 'if darkness connotes obscurity, then Williams may be deemed to have been partially correct, for the huge textual culture of early Jainism and the manner and context in which it was produced have generally eluded adequate scholarly interpretation' (Dundas 2006: 383).

¹⁴⁹ Dundas's study of the *Titthogālī* (2014) is a relevant example of the way in which literary sources can be explored in order to get a better understanding of the historical context of these texts.

have been published over the last decades, most parts of the history of Jainism are still heavily understudied. It is, therefore, not surprising that the scholarly accounts that try to provide a general narrative of Jaina history in the Gupta Period tend to be highly speculative. For this reason, I am reluctant to add another layer of speculation to the existing accounts by linking the composition of the TA with specific historical trends that are identified in these studies. Yet, this does not imply that we cannot say anything about the historical context of the TA at all. In the third chapter of this study, I will discuss how the content of the philosophical chapters might provide some clues about the historical context of the TA and the way in which the TA fits in the larger development of the history of Indian philosophy.

2.3 Date and Authorship

Even though the TA is widely regarded as a seminal text in the history of Jaina philosophy, there are strongly divergent ideas about the date and authorship of the TA and the TABh. In this section, I will discuss the date and authorship of both texts. Apart from an overview of the different positions in the scholarly literature, I will also include some of the outcomes of my textual analysis from chapter 3.¹⁵⁰

Is the TABh an auto-commentary?

The first issue that needs to be addressed in order to situate the TA and the TABh is the question as to whether the TABh is an auto-commentary or not. The Śvetāmbara tradition assumes that the TA was written by Umāsvāti, who is also regarded as the author of the TABh. By contrast, the Digambara tradition does not accept the TABh as an authoritative commentary and regards Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi* as the first commentary on the TA.¹⁵¹ Over the last decades, scholars have defended both positions. Most of the arguments for the same authorship of both texts can be found in Sanghvi 1974, Ohira 1992, and Dhaky 1996. The counterarguments can be found in Williams 1963, Phoolchandra 1997, Zydenbos 1983, Balcerowicz 2008, Bronkhorst 1975 & 2010.¹⁵² None of the individual arguments that have been put forward are strong enough to prove beyond doubt whether the TABh is an auto-commentary or not. Nevertheless, there are enough arguments that cumulatively suggest that the TABh was written at a later stage.

¹⁵⁰ My discussion primarily deals with the views in the following studies: Williams 1963, Sanghvi 1974, Phoolchandra 1997, Ohira 1982, Zydenbos 1983, Dundas 1992 & 1997, Dhaky 1996, Balcerowicz 2008, and Bronkhorst 1985 & 2010. Other scholarly discussions of the dates of the TA and the TABh usually refer to the views that are expressed in these sources.

¹⁵¹ The Digambara tradition favours the variant name 'Umāsvāmin' instead of 'Umāsvāti', even though the name 'Umāsvāti' is also used (Sanghvi 1974: Introduction, p 14). Some ideas that are mentioned in the *bhāṣya* go against traditional Digambara views. I will discuss these aspects in my discussion of the sectarian affiliation of the author(s) of the TA and the TABh below.

¹⁵² Most contemporary scholars assume that the TABh is not an auto-commentary. I am not aware of any study on this topic that postdates Dhaky's article and which claims that the TABh is an auto-commentary.

The scholars who think that the TABh is an auto-commentary have provided the following main arguments:¹⁵³

- i. The *praśasti*, a short composition of six verses that accompanies the *bhāṣya*, mentions that the '*Tattvārthādhigama*' was written by 'vācaka Umāsvāti'. Haribhadra's *Śāstravārtasamuccaya* cites a passage of the TABh, which he attributes to Umāsvāti. This suggests that not only the TA but also the TABh was written by Umāsvāti.¹⁵⁴
- ii. Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā* contains some remarks that suggest that the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* were composed by the same person.¹⁵⁵ Devagupta's commentary on the *sambandhakārikās* makes the same claim.¹⁵⁶
- iii. Some expressions in the TA suggest that the author of the *sūtra* composed the *bhāṣya* as well. For example, TA 1.23 reads '*yathoktanimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām*'.¹⁵⁷ The expression 'yathokta' seems to refer to a specification that is given in the *bhāṣya* (see TABh 1.21.1). If the *bhāṣya* was not written together with the *sūtra*, the *sūtra* cannot refer to a passage in the *bhāṣya*. Hence, one could argue that both texts must have been composed together.¹⁵⁸
- iv. The *bhāṣya* and the introductory verses (*sambandhakārikās*) use terms such as '*vakṣyāmi*' and '*pravakṣyāmi*'¹⁵⁹ to refer to passages in the *sūtra*. As such, the composer of the *bhāṣya* suggests that he is also the author of the *sūtra*.¹⁶⁰
- v. Some authors argue that the *bhāṣya* does not deviate from the theory in the *sūtras*, which is seen as evidence for the same authorship of both texts. This is further supported by the fact that the *bhāṣya* does not suggest any alternative readings of the *sūtras*.¹⁶¹

¹⁵³ This is not an exhaustive list of the arguments but it summarises the most relevant arguments that reoccur in the studies mentioned above.

¹⁵⁴ See Part II for a translation and analysis of the *praśasti*. Umāsvāti is mentioned as the author of the work in the fifth verse of the *praśasti*.

¹⁵⁵ Sanghvi 1974, Introduction: 31. The relevant passages are listed by Sanghvi.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ 'The other [beings] [have cosmic perception] that is caused as it is said. [This variety of cosmic perception has] six forms.' See also the translation in Part II.

¹⁵⁸ Ohira 1982: 33-34.

¹⁵⁹ 'I will teach'. See, e.g., *Sambandhakārikās* 22 and 31.

¹⁶⁰ For some similar expressions in the TABh, see Bronkhorst 1985: 169.

¹⁶¹ See, e.g., Sanghvi 1974, Introduction: 32.

- vi. Several studies mention that the language and style of the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* are similar. Ohira also argues that both works reflect similar historical circumstances.

Most of the arguments mentioned above have been convincingly refuted by Zydenbos.¹⁶² For this purpose, Zydenbos analyses the debate between Sukhlal Sanghvi and Phoolchandra Shastri about the authorship of the TA and the TABh. Since Sanghvi writes from a Śvetāmbara view — which traditionally accepts the TABh as an authoritative auto-commentary — it is not surprising that he argues in favour of the same authorship of both texts in the introduction to his own commentary on the TA. By contrast, Phoolchandra adheres to the Digambara perspective. Since the Digambaras do not accept the *bhāṣya* as an authoritative work — even though the TA has a quasi-canonical status for them — Phoolchandra rejects all arguments by Sanghvi in the introduction to his edition of the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. It is important to realise that the different positions in these studies have a sectarian background and one cannot take the analyses in these works at face value.¹⁶³

The first argument mentioned above is certainly not conclusive. The argument hinges on the assumption that the *praśasti* was composed by the author of the *bhāṣya*. However, it is not clear at which point in history the *praśasti* was added to the *bhāṣya*. As I will demonstrate in the third chapter of this study, the *praśasti* contains several odd historical references that do not correspond with any other sources.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, if we look at the manuscripts of the TA, there are good reasons to question whether the *praśasti* was composed by the author of the *bhāṣya*. Ohira's study provides an overview of the manuscripts of the 'western version' of

¹⁶² Zydenbos 1983: 10-12.

¹⁶³ The discussion often has a polemical character and many 'arguments' are merely rhetorical in nature. For example, Sanghvi writes that Phoolchandra's view is 'as much contradicted by logic as it goes against the findings of history' and 'that he is so much bent upon establishing his position that a clear meaning of words either does not occur to him or is ignored by him'. By contrast, Sanghvi characterises his own position as 'the only royal road to truth' (Sanghvi 1974, Introduction: 10, 18).

¹⁶⁴ See § 3.5 for an analysis of the *praśasti*. Ohira claims that the *praśasti* contains 'the authentic record of Umāsvāti'. However, her analysis of the names and lineages that are mentioned in the *praśasti* clearly shows that the different historical sources on the lineage of Umāsvāti are contradicting each other. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that she concludes her investigation by confirming that the *praśasti* is a trustworthy source of information about Umāsvāti (Ohira 1982: 42-53).

the TA, with and without the *bhāṣya*.¹⁶⁵ The oldest of these manuscripts is a palm leaf manuscript from 1303 V.S. (i.e., 1246 CE). Apart from one other palm leaf manuscript, which seems to be a copy of the oldest manuscript, all other manuscripts are paper manuscripts that postdate the 16th century.¹⁶⁶ Only four of the seventeen manuscripts that Ohira consulted are accompanied by the *bhāṣya*. Three of the four manuscripts that have the *bhāṣya* also contain the *praśasti*. The *bhāṣya* is not included in the two early manuscripts but one of these early manuscripts includes two verses of the *praśasti* at the end of the verses that conclude the last chapter of the TA.¹⁶⁷ This might indicate that the *praśasti* has its own history and that it is not necessarily composed by the author of the *bhāṣya*.

Of course, this evidence is not conclusive but the manuscripts do not provide sufficient ground to assume that the six verses of the *praśasti* were written at one moment in time and that it was composed together with the *bhāṣya*. Nevertheless, Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā* comments on the full version of the *praśasti*, which shows that the complete *praśasti* already accompanied the *bhāṣya* at the time of the composition of the *ṭīkā* (9th cent. CE). However, if we do not know for sure whether the *praśasti* was written by the author of the *bhāṣya*, we should be hesitant to accept the claim that is made in the *praśasti* about the authorship of the TA.

The fact that Haribhadra attributes some verses of the *bhāṣya* to Umāsvāti shows that the *bhāṣya* was associated with the name 'Umāsvāti' at Haribhadra's time. However, Haribhadra's works date from the 8th cent. CE, which is three centuries after the composition of the *bhāṣya*.¹⁶⁸ It is perfectly possible that Śvetāmbara scholars at the time of Haribhadra attributed the *bhāṣya* to Umāsvāti but this does not prove anything about the actual authorship of the text.

The same goes for the second argument. The fact that Devagupta and Siddhasenagaṇi suggest that the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* were composed by the same

¹⁶⁵ The southern tradition has the Digambara version of the TA, which does not include the *Sambandhakārikās*, *bhāṣya*, and *praśasti*. The manuscripts from the western tradition include Śvetāmbara and Digambara versions, and several manuscripts have mixed characteristics (Ohira 1982: 1-4).

¹⁶⁶ Ohira 1982: 1.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

¹⁶⁸ Sanghvi raises some doubts about the identification of Haribhadra, the commentator on the TABh, with the famous Śvetāmbara writer Haribhadra. He mentions that Haribhadra's commentary was written by at least three different authors, and that this commentary follows Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā*. This would imply that the commentary is of later date (Sanghvi 1974, Introduction: 56-57).

person is not a strong reason to believe that this was actually the case. It is not clear who Devagupta actually was and his date is quite uncertain. He must predate Siddhasenagaṇi since he included Devagupta's commentary on the *sambandhakārikās* in his own *ṭīkā*.¹⁶⁹ However, Siddhasenagaṇi probably wrote his *ṭīkā* in the early 9th cent. CE.¹⁷⁰ If we take into account that there was a sectarian dispute about the authority of the *bhāṣya*, it is clear that the opinion of a 9th century Śvetāmbara author cannot be used to prove that the *bhāṣya* is an auto-commentary.¹⁷¹

The third argument is also not conclusive. It is indeed odd that the *sūtra* seems to refer to a passage in the *bhāṣya*. However, as I will show in the third chapter, it is most likely that the expression 'yathokta' in TA 1.23 originally referred to a part of the *sūtra* that was accidentally moved to the *bhāṣya*.¹⁷² This explanation is supported by the fact that the expression to which TA 1.23 refers is included in the *sūtra* text in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

The fourth argument, about the fact that the forms 'vakṣyāmi' and 'pravakṣyāmi' are used in the *sambandhakārikās* with reference to the *sūtra*, is also not conclusive. It is not unusual for commentators to write from the perspective of the composer of the *sūtra*. The *Sarvārthasiddhi* uses similar forms, even though it is obvious that Pūjyapāda is just the commentator and not the author of the TA.¹⁷³

The fifth argument is quite problematic. The idea that the *bhāṣya* does not deviate from the *sūtra* has been convincingly refuted by Bronkhorst, who identified a list of ideological differences between the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*.¹⁷⁴ Bronkhorst also suggests that the author of the *bhāṣya* intentionally modified the *sūtra* at several

¹⁶⁹ Ohira 1982: 25.

¹⁷⁰ For the date of Siddhasenagaṇi, see Bronkhorst 1985: 155-157.

¹⁷¹ In fact, Siddhasenagaṇi was well aware of the problem of the authorship of the *bhāṣya*. He raises this issue in his commentary on TABh 1.11.2. This passage of the *bhāṣya* writes about the author of the *sūtra* in the third person (see Part II, TABh 1.11.2). However, he concludes that the author of the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya* are nevertheless the same.

¹⁷² See my discussion of TA 1.21 – 1.23 in § 3.2 *Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge*.

¹⁷³ Zydenbos 1983: 10-11. Zydenbos's refutation is based on Phoolchandra's discussion of this phenomenon.

¹⁷⁴ For example, the *bhāṣya* lists 11 classes of gods, even though *sūtra* 4.4 mentions that there are only 10 classes of gods. Likewise, *sūtra* 2.41 – 2.43 explains that each soul in *saṃsāra* has a *taijasa* body, which is denied in the *bhāṣya*. For a detailed discussion of the disagreements between the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*, see Bronkhorst 1985: 163-168.

points.¹⁷⁵ This could explain some of the differences between the Śvetāmbara version of the *sūtra* and the Digambara version, which is not accompanied by the *bhāṣya*. As such, the fact that the *bhāṣya* does not offer any variant readings of the *sūtra* certainly does not entail that the *bhāṣya* is an auto-commentary.

Likewise, the idea that the similarity of the language of the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* indicates the same authorship is not very strong. In fact, the *bhāṣya* uses a different vocabulary at several points in the text, which suggests the opposite.¹⁷⁶

Lastly, Ohira's claim that the TA and the TABh reflect the same historical circumstances is quite farfetched. This argument is based on the fact that the composer of the introductory verses that accompany the TABh stresses how difficult it is to summarise the words of the *jina* in a brief compendium. Ohira argues that this statement is only 'comprehensible in the historical context wherein the author was placed', i.e., the Gupta period. Ohira argues that the Jainas in the Gupta period did not have a standard text, unlike the other schools. Therefore, the author of the TA was facing a difficult challenge. She adds that it would be impossible for a later interpolator to write about these challenging circumstances.¹⁷⁷ This argument is rather weak. The introductory verses simply state how difficult it is to summarise the teachings of the *jina* in a short compendium. There is no reason to assume that a later writer could not write such an introduction.

To summarise, there is no hard evidence for the position that the *bhāṣya* is an auto-commentary, even though it seems that some elements in the *bhāṣya* and the verses that accompany the *bhāṣya* try to suggest that both works derive from the same hand. This might be explained as a matter of style but there could also be another motive. It is not unlikely that the *sambandhakārikās* and the *praśasti* were composed in order to establish the *bhāṣya* as an authoritative auto-commentary at a time in which several aspects of the *bhāṣya* had become a matter of sectarian disagreement.¹⁷⁸ However, the fact that the *bhāṣya* uses a different vocabulary and

¹⁷⁵ Bronkhorst 1985: 174.

¹⁷⁶ For example, TA 1.19 and 1.22 use the word '*anindriya*' and the commentary on these passages uses the peculiar word formation '*noindriya*' (see also § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*). For an overview of some other diverging choices of words, see Bronkhorst 1985: 168.

¹⁷⁷ Ohira 1982: 28-29.

¹⁷⁸ I will discuss this idea further in § 3.5.

contains several ideas that are not in line with the *sūtra* strongly suggests that the *bhāṣya* was written by a later author.¹⁷⁹

As I will demonstrate in my analysis of the *bhāṣya* in chapter 3, it is often easier to explain some problematic passages in the *bhāṣya* if we assume that we are dealing with the commentary of a different author. Furthermore, if we accept that the *bhāṣya* was not composed as an auto-commentary, it is also easier to understand why the Digambaras did not accept the *bhāṣya* even though they accepted the TA as an authoritative text. It would be difficult, however, to explain how the text could get this status if it was accompanied from the start by an auto-commentary that contained unacceptable doctrines. In such a case, one would expect that the author of the whole text would be regarded as a heretical thinker.¹⁸⁰

In short, there is no single argument that is strong enough to prove that the *bhāṣya* is an auto-commentary. If we assume that the *bhāṣya* is not an auto-commentary, we are in a better position to explain some textual and theoretical problems, such as diverging word choices and some doctrinal differences. Moreover, this assumption makes it easier to understand why the *bhāṣya* is not accepted by the Digambaras. Therefore, if we want to get a better understanding of the development of early Jaina philosophy, there is sufficient reason to treat the TA and the TABh as two independent texts that were written at different stages in the history of Jaina philosophy.

Authorship of the TA and the TABh

As I have argued above, it is likely that the TA and the TABh were composed by different authors. However, it is still unclear who the composers of these texts actually are. The TA is usually attributed to a writer with the name Umāsvāti or Umāsvāmin but very little is known with certainty about this figure. Moreover, the fact that the *praśasti* mentions Umāsvāti as the composer of the TA does not necessarily imply that this is a historical fact. As I will demonstrate in § 3.5, there are

¹⁷⁹ At some points in the text, it is doubtful whether the author of the *bhāṣya* fully understands the meaning of the *sūtra*. For example, the commentary on TA 1.20 fails to explain the meaning of '*matipūrva*' and merely rephrases the text of the *sūtra*. See also the discussion of TA 1.20 in § 3.2 *Testimony*.

¹⁸⁰ Of course, it is not impossible that a community accepts one part of a text and rejects the other part. However, it is simply more likely that a community rejects a commentary from another author.

good reasons to assume that the *praśasti* was a later addition to the *bhāṣya*, which might have been added to give some authority to the TA and the TABh at a time when the TABh had become a subject of sectarian dispute. As such, we should not only question the authorship of the *bhāṣya* but also of the TA itself. In the following section, I will discuss the identities of the authors of the TA and the TABh. In the first part, I will focus on the author of the TA and his sectarian affiliation. Thereafter, I will discuss the profile of the author of the *bhāṣya*.

The last two verses of the *praśasti*, which is the only part of the *praśasti* that accompanies the oldest Śvetāmbara manuscripts of the TA, provide the following details about the name of the author and the title of the work:

idam uccairnāgaravācakena sattvānukampayā dṛbdham |
tattvārthādhigamākhyam spaṣṭam umāsvātinā śāstram ||5||
yas tattvādhigamākhyam jñāsyati ca kariṣyate ca tatroktam |
so 'vyābādhasukhākhyam prāpsyaty acireṇa paramārtham ||6||

This compendium (*śāstra*), called '*Tattvārthādhigama*', was composed (*dṛbdha*) in an intelligible way out of compassion for the living beings by *vācaka* Umāsvāti of the *uccairnāgara* [*śākhā*].

He who will know [this compendium] called '*Tattvādhigama*' and also does what is said therein, he will soon attain the highest goal, [which is also] called unimpeded happiness.¹⁸¹

Even though the TA is nowadays commonly known as the '*Tattvārthasūtra*' or '*Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*', the fifth verse of the *praśasti* describes the work as a '*śāstra*' with the title '*Tattvārthādhigama*'. Nevertheless, the Sanskrit word '*dṛbdha*' (lit. 'tied' or 'strung'), which I translate as 'composed', might indicate that the TA was regarded as a *sūtra* (lit. 'thread' or 'string') at the time of the composition of the *praśasti*.¹⁸² This goes against the view of Zydenbos and Phoolchandra, who suggests that the title '*Tattvārthādhigama*' was used for the *bhāṣya* and that the root text was titled '*Tattvārthasūtra*'.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ See Part II for a full translation of the *praśasti* with notes on the translation.

¹⁸² The word '*dṛbdha*' is not commonly used with the meaning of 'composed'. One would expect '*saṃdṛbdha*'.

¹⁸³ Zydenbos' argument is based on the following observations that are made by Phoolchandra. The Digambara commentaries use the title '*Tattvārthasūtra*' with reference to

It is somewhat odd that the sixth verse mentions the title '*Tattvādhigama*' instead of '*Tattvārthādhigama*'. Even though the words '*tattva*' and '*tattvārtha*' are used as synonyms in the TA, it is still curious that the *praśasti* refers to the work in two different ways.¹⁸⁴ *Sambandhakārikā* 22 uses the title '*Tattvārthādhigama*', which corresponds to the title that is mentioned in the fifth verse of the *praśasti*. It describes the work as a short text (*laghugrantha*) and as a summary (*saṃgraha*) of 'some of the words of the *arhat*' (*arhatvacanaikadeśa*).¹⁸⁵ This suggests that the composer of this verse uses the title '*Tattvārthādhigama*' with reference to the root text. In the end, it would be strange to characterise the commentary as a 'short text' and as a 'summary' since the *bhāṣya* is a relatively long text and certainly not a summary.¹⁸⁶

The *praśasti* does not only mention the title of the TA but also provides the name of the author, i.e., Umāsvāti. There are good reasons, however, to question the validity of this attribution. If the TA significantly predates the *bhāṣya*, it is possible that it was unclear at the time of the composition of the *praśasti* who actually composed the TA. Moreover, since there was sectarian disagreement about the status of the commentary, the attribution of the TA to Umāsvāti might have been a strategic choice.¹⁸⁷

the root text. This title is also used in the colophons (*puṣpikā*) at the end of the work. By contrast, the *puṣpikās* at the end of each chapter of the *bhāṣya* mention the title '*Tattvārthādhigama*' (Zydenbos 1983: 11-12). However, it is unclear when the *puṣpikās* were added to the text since the oldest manuscripts date from the 14th century CE. Moreover, the oldest manuscript that has the last two verses of the *praśasti* does not include the *bhāṣya*. This suggests that the titles that are mentioned in the *praśasti* refer to the root text and not to the commentary. As such, the observations by Phoolchandra only indicate that various titles were used to refer to the root text and the *bhāṣya* over the course of time.

¹⁸⁴ For the use of the terms '*tattvārtha*' and '*tattva*' in the TA, see, e.g., TA 1.2 and TA 1.4 in Part II. Since the *praśasti* is composed in verse, it is possible that the author abbreviated the title for the sake of the metre.

¹⁸⁵ See Part II for a translation of the *sambandhakārikās*.

¹⁸⁶ Since my study primarily deals with the version of the TA that is accompanied by the *bhāṣya*, I refer to the root text as the '*Tattvārthādhigama*' (TA), corresponding with the title used in the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti*. It cannot be ruled out that the TA was already known as the '*Tattvārthā(dhigama)sūtra*' at the time of the composition of the TABh. However, since the TABh, the *sambandhakārikās*, and the *praśasti* do not refer to the TA as a '*sūtra*', there is insufficient reason to assume that the text was already known as the '*Tattvārthā(dhigama)sūtra*'.

¹⁸⁷ For example, if Umāsvāti was known as the author of the *bhāṣya*, it would make sense for the Śvetāmbaras to attribute the TA to the same person since they view the *bhāṣya* as an auto-commentary. Unfortunately, there are not enough sources to determine who Umāsvāti was exactly.

Apart from the name ‘Umāsvāti’, various other names have been connected with the TA in the Jaina tradition. A valuable overview of the historical references to the name of the author of the TA can be found in M.A. Dhaky’s study of the authorship of the TA and the TABh.¹⁸⁸ Dhaky’s article discusses how the ‘southern’ and the ‘northern’ tradition have dealt with the authorship of these texts.¹⁸⁹ It seems that the southern tradition did not have a clear idea about the authorship of the TA for a long time.¹⁹⁰ Akalaṅka’s *Tattvārthavārttika* (8th cent CE) does not say anything about the name of the author and some later sources attribute the work to a certain ‘Gṛdhrapicchācārya’.¹⁹¹ The first text that mentions this name as the author of the TA is Vīrasena’s *Dhavalāṭikā* (9th cent. CE). The same name is mentioned in Vidyānanda’s *Tattvārthaslokavārttika* (10th cent. CE) and in several other texts that date from the 10th to the 11th cent CE.¹⁹² Some southern manuscripts mention the variant name ‘Umāsvāmi’ instead of ‘Umāsvāti’. This seems to be a late development that starts with Śrutasāgara’s *Tattvārthavṛtti* (15th – 16th cent. CE).¹⁹³

¹⁸⁸ See Dhaky 1996.

¹⁸⁹ The southern recension is the version that can be found in the Digambara tradition and the northern version is the version that is favoured by the Śvetāmbara tradition. Since it is not clear when the split between the Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects happened exactly, it makes sense to refer to the two versions of the TA as the southern and northern (or, in Ohira’s terminology, ‘western’) tradition. The differences between the two versions might predate the split of the two sects. Ohira’s overview of the western manuscripts shows that the western manuscripts often include elements of the southern recension (Ohira 1982: 2-4).

¹⁹⁰ Dhaky mentions that Pūjyapāda’s *Sarvārthasiddhi*, which is the first commentary on the southern recension of the TA, refers to the author as ‘some Nirgrantha pontiff’ (*kaścid ... nirgranthācārya*), which would confirm that Pūjyapāda did not know the name of the author of the TA (Dhaky 1996: 53). However, Dhaky’s comment seems to be based on an erroneous reading of the opening lines of the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, since ‘*kaścid*’ does not refer to the compound ‘*nirgranthācārya*’. Instead, it refers to ‘*bhavyaḥ*’ (souls that are suitable for liberation) (Piotr Balcerowicz, personal communication). See, e.g., Phoolchandra 1997: 1.1, §1.

¹⁹¹ There is a later legend that tells that Umāsvāti flew through the air to Videha and dropped his peacock-feather broom. He then took the feathers of a vulture (*gṛdhra*) that was flying in the sky, which explains the name ‘Gṛdhrapicchā’ (lit. ‘tail feather of a vulture’) (Ohira 1982: 141).

¹⁹² Dhaky 1996: 53-54.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 54. The name ‘Umāsvāmi’ is used in many contemporary Digambara sources. Balcerowicz attributes the TA to ‘Umāsvāmin’ and the TABh to ‘Umāsvāti’ (Balcerowicz 2008:35, n. 23). Williams makes a similar distinction between Umāsvāmin, the author of the TA, and Umāsvāti, the author of the *Śrāvaka-prajñapti* (Williams 1963: 3, n4). Since the name ‘Umāsvāmi(n)’ only appears after the 15th cent. CE, it is quite unlikely that this was the name of the composer of the TA.

Apart from the textual sources, there are also some inscriptions that are relevant for the authorship of the TA. A group of seven inscriptions from Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa mentions the name 'Gṛddhrapiñcha', which must be the same as the name 'Gṛdhrapicchācārya' that is mentioned in the texts. These inscriptions date from 1115 CE to 1409 CE. Five of these inscriptions are located at Candragiri and two at Vindhyagiri. The five inscriptions at Candragiri predate the inscriptions at Vindhyagiri. They all contain a verse that mentions 'Gṛddhrapiñcha' as an alias of 'Umāsvāti'.¹⁹⁴ However, these five inscriptions do not mention anything about the TA. By contrast, the two inscriptions from Vindhyagiri mention that Umāsvāti was the author of the '*Tattvārthasūtra*'. The first of these two inscriptions (1398 CE) mentions that Gṛddhrapiñcha was a disciple of Umāsvāti. The other inscription (1409 CE) provides the same information as the five inscriptions from Candragiri. Apart from the inscriptions at Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa there is one other inscription that mentions the TA. This inscription, which is located in Humcha, attributes the TA to a certain 'Āryadeva'.¹⁹⁵

In short, none of the southern sources that predate the 9th cent. CE mention the name of the author of the TA. After that, the name Gṛdhrapiccha appears in textual sources as the author of the TA. From the 12th cent. CE, the name Gṛdhrapiccha/Gṛddhrapiñcha is mentioned in inscriptions as an alias of Umāsvāti. However, the first inscription that identifies this Umāsvāti as the author of the TA dates from the end of the 14th cent. CE. Since the TABh is not accepted in the southern tradition, there are no references to the authorship of the TABh in the southern sources.

There are no inscriptions from the northern tradition that refer to the TA.¹⁹⁶ Yet, several literary sources that postdate the *praśasti* identify the author of the TA. Agastyasimha's *cūrṇī* on the *Daśavaikālikasūtra* cites two passages from the TA and two passages from the TABh and attributes them to Umāsvāti.¹⁹⁷ As mentioned previously, Haribhadra's incomplete commentary on the *bhāṣya* and Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā* both attribute the two works to Umāsvāti. From the 12th cent. CE onwards, Umāsvāti is frequently mentioned as the author of the TA and the TABh

¹⁹⁴ 'abhūd Umāsvāti muniśvaro asau ācāryā śabdottara gṛddhrapiñchaḥ' (Dhaky 1996: 51).

¹⁹⁵ Dhaky 1996: 52.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 57.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 59.

in brief eulogies.¹⁹⁸ In short, the sources in the northern tradition unequivocally attribute the TA and the TABh to Umāsvāti. However, there are no sources that refer to the author of the TA that predate the *praśasti*.

Given the consistent attribution of the TA and the TABh to Umāsvāti in the northern tradition, Dhaky's study concludes that both works were written by Umāsvāti. He speculates that the southern tradition came up with a different name, i.e., *Gr̥dhrpiccha*, since they realised that Umāsvāti did not belong to the Digambara sect.¹⁹⁹ However, Dhaky's conclusion rests on the assumption that the TABh is an auto-commentary. As I have argued previously, it is rather unlikely that the TA and the TABh were composed by the same person. This implies that we cannot take the information in the northern sources for granted, since they all attribute the TA and the TABh to the same person. If the *bhāṣya* is not an auto-commentary, it is still a possibility that either the TA or the TABh was written by Umāsvāti but at least one of these attributions must be wrong.

If we suppose that Umāsvāti did not compose the *bhāṣya* but only the TA itself, it would be difficult to explain why the southern tradition completely forgot the name of the author, even though the Jainas in the North were well aware of his name. In the end, it is safe to assume that there was contact between the northern and southern tradition.²⁰⁰ Dhaky's idea that the Digambaras in the South consciously avoided to use Umāsvāti's name since they knew that he was not a Digambara seems to be a bit farfetched. In such a case, it would be hard to understand why they accepted the TA as an authoritative text in the first place.

Therefore, it seems more plausible that the name of the composer of the TA was not known in the North and the South when both traditions wrote their first commentaries on the text.²⁰¹ This suggests that there was a considerable amount of time between the composition of the TA and the first commentaries. Otherwise, it would be somewhat odd that the name of the author was so quickly forgotten. If Umāsvāti did not write the TA, it is still possible that he wrote the *bhāṣya*. Since the

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 57.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 55.

²⁰⁰ The fact that a substantial number of manuscripts of the TA from the North contain elements of the southern recension, shows that the two traditions did not evolve completely independent from each other.

²⁰¹ In chapter 3, I will demonstrate that the TA was probably the outcome of a longer process and that the text contains several historical layers. This would also explain why the text is not consistently associated with one author.

bhāṣya was a matter of sectarian dispute, it would make sense if the northern tradition tried to legitimise the *bhāṣya* by claiming that the two texts were written by the same hand.

Even though it is more likely that Umāsvāti was the author of the *bhāṣya* instead of the *sūtra*, it is also possible that the *bhāṣya* was composed by a different author whose name is unknown to us. There is very little information about Umāsvāti in the Jaina sources, and the information about the teachers and lineage of Umāsvāti in the *praśasti* does not match the records in other texts.²⁰²

According to the *praśasti*, Umāsvāti stayed for some time in Kusumapura (Pāṭaliputra). As I will discuss later in this section, it is most likely that the TABh was composed in the first half of the 5th cent. CE. If Umāsvāti was indeed the author of the *bhāṣya* and if the information in the *praśasti* is correct, we can reasonably assume that the *bhāṣya* was composed in Pāṭaliputra during the Gupta Period. Given the problematic status of the *praśasti*, however, there is very little that can be said with certainty about the author of the *bhāṣya*.²⁰³ The same goes for the composer of the TA itself. If his identity was already unclear at the time of the composition of the first commentaries, it is unlikely that we will ever precisely know who the author of the TA was.²⁰⁴

Sectarian affiliation of the TA and the TABh

Even if we cannot identify the names of the authors of the TA and the TABh with certainty, it is still possible to investigate some aspects of their identity based on the

²⁰² Ohira has argued that the information about Umāsvāti in the *praśasti* is valid (Ohira 1982: 42-53). However, it is quite clear from her discussion that the sources are in fact contradicting each other and she admits that the historical genealogies disagree with each other 'to a great extent' (p. 49). Her reconstruction of the lineage of Umāsvāti is partly based on the identification of the name 'Umāsvāti' and the name 'Svāti'. However, this identification seems to have its origin in the 16th cent. CE (Dharmasāgaragaṇi's *Tapāgaccha paṭṭāvalī*) and is, therefore, not very reliable. For an overview of the relevant *paṭṭāvalis*, see Ohira 1982: 45-48.

²⁰³ See § 3.5 for a further discussion of the biographical information in the *praśasti*.

²⁰⁴ Zydenbos also argues that Umāsvāti was not the author of the TA. Nevertheless, he suggests that Umāsvāti did compose the TABh (Zydenbos 1983: 10-11).

Bronkhorst has suggested that the TA was composed 'in the South'. His main argument for situating the TA in the South is his observation that the TA has some Digambara and Yāpanīya features (Bronkhorst 2010: 10). However, this suggestion has not led to any further clues about the identity of the composer. See also the discussion of the sectarian affiliation of the composer of the TA below.

ideas that are expressed in the texts themselves. On the basis of some doctrinal issues in the TA and the TABh, scholars have tried to identify the sectarian affiliation of the composers. Since the TA has some characteristics that go against Digambara views but also do not fit completely within the Śvetāmbara framework, the scholarly views on the sectarian affiliation of the TA are divided. This debate is further complicated by the fact that the Digambara recension of the text differs from the Śvetāmbara version. Since the manuscripts all postdate the first commentators, who might have changed the text, it is hard to determine which version of the text is older.²⁰⁵

Sanghvi argues that the TA is a Śvetāmbara work. In his argumentation, he first eliminates the possibility that the composer of the TA belonged to the Digambara sect. He argues that the *Uccairnāgara śākhā*, which is mentioned in the *praśasti* as Umāsvāti's branch, cannot be situated in the Digambara tradition since this *śākhā* is not mentioned in the Digambara sources.²⁰⁶ However, as I have previously argued, it is unlikely that Umāsvāti composed the TA, which invalidates Sanghvi's first argument. Sanghvi further claims that several passages, such as TA 5.38 which states that time (*kāla*) is a substance, go against Digambara views. However, even if later Digambara sources have different views on these matters, we do not have to assume that their theories never changed. Pūjyapāda's commentary on TA 5.38, explicitly confirms the view that time is a substance and even provides additional arguments for this idea. Hence, it seems that Pūjyapāda, who belonged to the Digambara tradition, did not have any problems with this idea at all.

After discussing why the TA cannot be a Digambara work, Sanghvi tries to show that the TA must be a Śvetāmbara work. His arguments for this claim are rather weak. Again, he refers to the *śākhā* and lineage that are mentioned in the *praśasti*, which both appear in some Śvetāmbara *paṭṭāvalis*.²⁰⁷ Even though this suggests that the *praśasti*, and perhaps also the *bhāṣya*, was composed in a Śvetāmbara milieu, it does not solve the problem of the sectarian affiliation of the TA

²⁰⁵ In her discussion of the differences between the Śvetāmbara and Digambara version of the TA, Ohira suggests that Pūjyapāda revised the TA in his *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Ohira 1982: 20). However, as I will demonstrate in the third chapter, some problems in the text suggest that the composer of the *bhāṣya* changed the text of the TA. For example, the last verse of the first chapter of the TA (TA 1.35) only exists in the Śvetāmbara version of the text and seems to have been added by the commentator (see also § 3.2).

²⁰⁶ Sanghvi 1974, Introduction: 31.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 34.

itself. He further argues that no ‘ancient or modern Śvetāmbara masters’ have challenged the authority of the text, unlike ‘their Digambara counterparts’. Further, he argues that some aspects of the *Praśamarati*, which is often attributed to Umāsvāti, deals with the clothes and utensils of monks in a way that is only acceptable for Śvetāmbara ascetics.²⁰⁸ However, the authorship of the *Praśamarati* is far from clear and even if it was written by Umāsvāti, we cannot use this argument to say anything about the TA if Umāsvāti did not compose the TA.

Contrary to Sanghvi’s view, R. Williams argues that the TA cannot be a Śvetāmbara work. His claim is based on the discussion of lay practice in the seventh chapter of the TA. This chapter contains several rules that are only found in Digambara sources and some of them contradict the rules that are mentioned in the Śvetāmbara canon.²⁰⁹ He even argues that the development of the corpus of rules for the layman (*śrāvakācāra*) ‘is only understandable if the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* is regarded as belonging originally to the Digambaras’.²¹⁰ Just as in the case of Sanghvi, Williams seems to assume that rules and doctrines within a particular tradition do not change over time, and that the canonical scriptures cannot be contradicted in later literature. However, even though Williams thinks that the TA is a Digambara work, he writes that the TABh is ‘markedly Śvetāmbara in tone’.²¹¹ If the chapter on lay conduct had gone against the Śvetāmbara views at the time of the composition of the *bhāṣya*, it is hard to explain why a Śvetāmbara composer would write a commentary on the TA without even modifying the text.²¹²

Since the TA has some characteristics that do not correspond with traditional Śvetāmbara views and some other features that go against some later Digambara ideas, some scholars have argued that the author of the TA did not belong to the Śvetāmbara or Digambara sect. Instead, they situate the text in a Yāpanīya context.²¹³ This position is favoured by Bronkhorst (1985, 2010).²¹⁴ He proposes

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Williams 1963: 2.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 3.

²¹¹ Ibid., 2, n1.

²¹² Two *sūtras* that are part of the Digambara recension of the TA (TA 4 and 8) are included in the *bhāṣya* in the Śvetāmbara recension. Apart from this, there are no differences between the Digambara and Śvetāmbara version of the chapter on lay conduct (Williams 1963: 2).

²¹³ Wiley’s *Historical Dictionary of Jainism* provides the following information about the Yāpanīyas: The Yāpanīya sect is an ‘early mendicant lineage that combined features from the Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions’. They appear in ‘numerous inscriptions from the 5th through the 14th centuries, primarily in Karnataka’. Some scholars believe that a number of

that the TA is close to the Digambara perspective but he points out that it is unacceptable from a Digambara perspective that a *jina* would eat or drink. Nevertheless, TA 9.11 mentions that there are eleven sufferings (*pariṣahā*) that a *jina* must bear. Two of these sufferings are hunger (*kṣudh*) and thirst (*pipāsā*).²¹⁵ Bronkhorst concludes, therefore, that it is unlikely that the TA is a Digambara work.

Bronkhorst further argues that the views of the Yāpanīyas were very close to the Digambara ideas. However, the Yāpanīyas did not believe that a *jina* cannot eat or drink and they would not have any problem with the reference to the eleven hardships in TA 9.11. This leads Bronkhorst to the conclusion that the TA was probably a Yāpanīya text.

Since the TA has some aspects that do not fit perfectly in the Śvetāmbara or Digambara realm, it would be an attractive solution if we could situate the TA in a sectarian context that was neither Śvetāmbara nor Digambara. The Yāpanīya sect is an interesting candidate for this purpose since we do not have any information about the views of the Yāpanīyas that contradicts the doctrines in the TA. Nevertheless, the attribution of the TA to the Yāpanīyas is certainly not a problem free solution. First, there is not a single historical source that associates the TA or even Umāsvāti with the Yāpanīya sect. Second, our understanding of the views of the Yāpanīyas is very limited. Apart from the fact that they have no problems with the partaking of food of the *jina*, we simply do not know whether the views of the Yāpanīyas correspond with the views in the TA. There are only some minor issues that complicate the identification of the TA as a Śvetāmbara or Digambara text, and one can easily imagine that we would have similar problems if we had more sources from the Yāpanīyas. Third, the composers of the TABh and the *Sarvārthasiddhi* did not change the text of TA 9.11.²¹⁶ If this passage had radically opposed the views of

Kuṣāṇa images from Mathurā are associated with the Yāpanīyas. Unlike the Digambaras, they believed 'that women can attain liberation' and that 'an omniscient (*kevalin*) being partakes of food'. There are only two extant texts that are associated with the Yāpanīyas, which deal with the liberation of women and 'the taking of food by an omniscient being'. Their lay followers, who were apparently 'quite affluent', 'built a number of temples in northern Karnataka' (Wiley 2004: 238-239).

²¹⁴ Several other scholars hold similar positions. Nathooram Premi and A.N. Upadhye even claim that not only the TA but also the TABh is a Yāpanīya work (Dhaky 1996: 62).

²¹⁵ Bronkhorst 1985: 177.

²¹⁶ See Ohira 1982: 21-23 for a discussion of both commentaries on TA 9.11. It seems that the verse was problematic for Pūjyapāda since he tries to alter the meaning of the verse in a somewhat forced manner. Ohira suggests that the verse only applies to a '*sayoga kevali*' and

both sects at the time of the first commentaries, it is difficult to understand why the commentators would not have changed the text or rejected the TA altogether. It is also hard to imagine why the Śvetāmbara and Digambaras would accept the TA as a compendium of Jaina thought if the text had evident Yāpanīya characteristics. Fourth, as mentioned previously, it is unrealistic to expect that the ideas of particular traditions do not change over time. The fact that a group like the Yāpanīyas could emerge and that they had slightly different ideas precisely indicates that the views of the Jainas in general were subject to change. As such, we cannot rule out that the view in TA 9.11 was acceptable for different Jaina groups at the time of the composition of the TA.

Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the author of the TA belonged to the Yāpanīya sect, there are other ways in which we can deal with the fact that the TA does not perfectly match the Śvetāmbara or Digambara views. Taking into account that the history of the split of the different Jaina sects is far from clear, some scholars have suggested that the TA predates the hard schism of the Jaina community. For example, Dhaky suggests that the TA was composed by a ‘pre-Śvetāmbara or non-Śvetāmbara [...] Northern Nirgrantha holyman’.²¹⁷ As discussed previously, Dhaky assumes that the TABh is an auto-commentary. This probably explains why he still tries to connect the text with the Śvetāmbara tradition, albeit in a somewhat vague manner.²¹⁸ Holding a somewhat similar position, Dundas writes that ‘although a case can be made for *Umāsvāti* having been a Śvetāmbara, it seems better to assume that he was writing at a time before the sectarian traditions had fully crystallised’.²¹⁹ Even though Dhaky and Dundas both propose that the TA predates the hard division between the Śvetāmbara and Digambara communities, they still suggest that there are reasons to assume that the text was close to the Śvetāmbara realm. However, this idea seems to rest on the assumption that the TA and the TABh were composed by the same hand. Since it is rather unlikely that the TABh is an auto-commentary there is no need to link the TA with the (pre-)Śvetāmbara community although it seems plausible that the *bhāṣya* was written in an early Śvetāmbara context.

not to an ‘*ayoga kevali*’ (Ohira 1982: 21). However, there is nothing in the text of the TA that suggests that this is indeed the intending meaning.

²¹⁷ Dhaky 1996: 62.

²¹⁸ It is unclear to me what the expression ‘non-Śvetāmbara’ in Dhaky’s analysis could possibly mean.

²¹⁹ Dundas 1992: 86-87.

Given the lack of clarity about the sectarian identity of the composer of the TA and given the wide acceptance of the TA in the different Jaina sects, there is a strong case to be made for the view that the TA was composed before a hard ideological schism had appeared in the Jaina community.²²⁰

Date of the TA and the TABh

Apart from the fact that there is much uncertainty about the identity of the composers of the TA and the TABh, there is also no consensus about the dates of the texts. Since there is no reliable information about the authors that can be used to date the texts, scholars have come up with different arguments to situate the TA and the TABh in time. The suggested dates for both texts range from the 1st to the 5th cent. CE.²²¹

Bronkhorst's article 'On the Chronology of the Tattvārtha-sūtra' contains a detailed analysis of the dates of the TA and the TABh. Bronkhorst concludes that the TA was composed between 150 and 350 CE and that the TABh is likely to have been composed at some point during the 4th cent. CE. His argument is based on a textual analysis of the TA and the TABh and the dates of Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā* and Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi*. He argues that Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā* can be dated to the first half of the 9th cent. CE, which implies that the TA and the TABh must predate the 9th cent. CE.²²² However, there is more evidence that suggests that both texts were written in a much earlier period. Bronkhorst's article situates Pūjyapāda's life not long after 455 CE, which means that the TA at least predates the middle of the 5th cent. CE.²²³ It is doubtful whether the date of the *Sarvārthasiddhi* can be used as an upper limit for the *bhāṣya* as well. Ohira writes that it is 'self-evident' that the *bhāṣya*

²²⁰ In the same article in which Bronkhorst suggests that the TA was written by a Yāpanīya author, he also admits that it is strange that the TA does not say anything about the liberation of women, which was a fundamental issue for the Yāpanīyas. Therefore, he does not rule out the possibility that the text was perhaps 'composed in a time when there was no disagreement as yet on this topic, or even in the time before a split had occurred between the Yāpanīyas and the Digambaras' (Bronkhorst 1985: 178).

²²¹ An overview of the different positions can be found in Balcerowicz 2008: 35, n23. Another brief overview can be found in Zydenbos 1983: 12. Zydenbos mentions that the dating of the TA is a 'difficult matter' and he does not provide a further analysis of the possible date of the text.

²²² See, e.g., Williams 1963: 7 and Bronkhorst 1985: 157.

²²³ Bronkhorst 1985: 161.

predates the *Sarvārthasiddhi* but her arguments are not fully convincing. She writes that the explanations of technical terms are more clear in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, and that Pūjyapāda's text refers more often to other schools. In Ohira's view, this demonstrates that the *Sarvārthasiddhi* was written after the TABh and that Pūjyapāda had the TABh in front of him when he composed his commentary.²²⁴

It does make sense to say that the style of the *Sarvārthasiddhi* seems to be of a later date but Ohira's argument is certainly not conclusive. Yet, Bronkhorst provides another argument that enables us to date the TABh before the middle of the 5th cent. CE. Based on a citation from a version of the Dhātupāṭha that predates 450 CE that appears in the TABh, Bronkhorst infers that the TABh must have been composed before 450 CE.²²⁵ He concludes his analysis of the date of the TABh with the idea that the *bhāṣya* was probably written in 4th cent. CE. He writes that this century 'saw the establishment of the Gupta empire in and around Pāṭaliputra', which is mentioned in the *praśasti*, and that this period was characterised 'by the increased use of Sanskrit' and 'religious tolerance'. This last part of his analysis is somewhat speculative and does not necessarily imply that the TABh was actually composed before the 5th cent. CE. Since Bronkhorst attributes the TA to the Yāpanīyas, he argues that the TA must postdate the origin of the Yāpanīya sect, which he dates to 150 CE. Hence, he concludes that the TA was composed 'in all probability' between 150 and 350 CE.²²⁶

Even though some older studies suggest earlier dates for the TA, most studies from the last decades have suggested dates for the TA and the TABh that are largely similar to Bronkhorst's proposal. The main difference exists between those studies that regard the *bhāṣya* as an auto-commentary and others that assume that the works were composed by different authors. The last group often dates the TA itself earlier in time, although both groups agree that the *bhāṣya* belongs to the 4th or 5th cent. CE. For example, Ohira suggests that the TABh was composed 'somewhere in the late middle' of the 5th cent. CE.²²⁷ Dhaky, who also assumes that the TABh is an

²²⁴ Ohira 1982: 40. Bronkhorst writes that 'no evidence is known' that Pūjyapāda 'was acquainted with' the TABh (Bronkhorst 1985: 172).

²²⁵ Bronkhorst 1985: 161-163.

²²⁶ Ibid., 178.

²²⁷ Ohira's analysis is mainly based on the relationship between the TA and the TABh and other philosophical works. The fact that she assumes that the TA and the TABh were both written by Umāsvāti makes her analysis problematic. She also argues that the TA and the TABh show clear influences of the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, among other

auto-commentary dates both texts to 350-375 CE.²²⁸ Leaving the question of the authorship of the *bhāṣya* aside, Dundas dates the TA to the 'fourth or fifth' cent. CE.²²⁹

The exact date of the TABh will probably remain unclear unless further evidence is discovered but the general scholarly consensus suggests that it is safe to situate the TABh somewhere between 350 and 450 CE. The date of the TA itself is a difficult matter. Since the TA is clearly responding to some passages in the *Nyāyasūtra*, we can be quite sure that the TA postdates the *Nyāyasūtra*.²³⁰ The strong focus on epistemological matters in the first chapter of the TA also indicates that the TA was written at a moment when the theories of knowledge became a popular philosophical theme. Therefore, I am inclined to situate the TA not too far from the rise of epistemological works in the Buddhist and Hindu traditions in the 5th cent. CE. As I have argued previously, it is likely that some time passed between the composition of the TA and the TABh. It seems, therefore, reasonable to accept Balcerowicz's position, who summarises his view as follows:

[W]hen we take into consideration the structure of the text, simplicity of lucid Sanskrit, a moderate level of philosophical depth, clear influence of ideas present in the *Nyāya-sūtra* (but not in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*), no reference to later philosophical ideas, we can assign Umāsvāmin's *Tattvārtha-sūtra* to c. 350-400, and Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* to c. 400-450 (there are strong reasons to believe that the *Bhāṣya* was written by a different person than Umāsvāmin, the author of TA). The upper limit for the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* is the Council of Valabhī (between 450-480; traditionally in *Vīra Saṃvat* 980 or 993, i.e. in 453 or 466 C.E.), presided over by Devarddhi-gaṇin Kṣamā-śramaṇa, where the Śvetāmbara Canon was finally codified (TBh 1.20 reflects an earlier list of the Canonical works).²³¹

works (Ohira 1982: 135). Since there are no direct quotations of these works in the TA and the TABh, it is not evident that the composers of the TA and the TABh were actually acquainted with these works.

²²⁸ Dhaky 1996: 61.

²²⁹ Dundas 1992: 86.

²³⁰ See chapter 3 for an analysis of the relationship between the TA and the *Nyāyasūtra*. There is no evidence that the composers of the TA and the TABh were acquainted with the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*. This is another reason to situate the TABh before the middle of the 5th cent. CE.

²³¹ Balcerowicz 2008:35, n. 23. For a discussion of the wrong attribution of the TA to 'Umāsvāmin', see § 2.3 (*Date of the TA and the TABh*).

The upper limit that Balcerowicz proposes is based on the fact that the *bhāṣya* provides a list of the canonical works, which deviates from the canon that was established during the third Jaina council. This argument has some strength, even though we cannot be sure that the outcomes of the council were immediately accepted and represented in all texts that were written after this event.²³² Nevertheless, Balcerowicz's proposal largely corresponds with the ideas of the majority of recent scholarly studies and his dating of the TA and the TABh seems to be a plausible account in the light of the available evidence.

To sum up, it is reasonable to situate the composition of the TA at some point between 350 and 400 CE. We do not know the name of its author and it seems that he wrote his text at a point in time when the boundaries between the different Jaina sects were not as pronounced as at the time of the first commentaries. The TABh was probably composed between 400 and 450 CE. Umāsvāti might have been the author of this commentary. If the record in the *praśasti* can be trusted, we can situate him in a Śvetāmbara milieu in Pāṭaliputra. Since it is hard to determine the date of the *sambandhakārikās* and the *praśasti* and since there are good reasons to assume that the composer(s) of these verses tried to legitimise the authority of the *bhāṣya*, we should treat the claims in these verses with caution. Hence, as long as no further evidence for the authorship of the TA and the TABh emerges, scholars will have to accept that our understanding of the history of both texts remains a matter of speculation.

²³² For an overview of the works listed in the commentary on TA 1.20, see § 3.1.

2.4 Conclusion of the Historical Analysis

The aim of the foregoing sections was to get a better understanding of the historical position of the TA and the TABh. The first section (§ 2.1) provided an overview of the development of early Jaina philosophy (300 – 600 CE). This survey shows that Jaina philosophy did not develop in a linear way and that the distinction between the ‘age of Āgamas’ and the ‘age of Logic’, made by Dixit, is quite problematic. It is clear that the TA played a seminal role in the developments of Jaina thought but it certainly did not form the end of the ‘age of Āgamas’, as suggested by Dixit. The texts that were written by the Jainas after the TA had a diverse character and doctrinal ideas went hand in hand with rational analysis. Moreover, the later canonical texts seem to contain different historical layers and it is likely that the TA influenced some of these scriptures, such as the *Nandīsūtra* and *Anuyogadvārasūtra*. The idea that the TA simply summarises the positions in the canonical texts is, therefore, untenable. Likewise, there is no sudden shift from Prākṛit to Sanskrit. The TA is an important text in this development, given its status as the oldest extant Sanskrit text of the Jainas. Yet, authors such as Kundakunda, Siddhasena Divākara, and Jinabhadra Gaṇi wrote several treatises in Prākṛit, which clearly shows that Sanskrit did not replace Prākṛit as a philosophical language after the TA.

The second section (§ 2.2) discussed the position of the Jainas in the Gupta Age. This section shows that the Gupta Period was a transformative era for the Jainas even though there is no scholarly consensus on the nature of the changes that took place. The available evidence suggests a decline in activity in the North and a rise of activity in the West and South. Ohira links this phenomenon to the Hindu revival movement under the Guptas, Bronkhorst suggests that there was some rivalry with the Buddhists, and Dundas suggests that there was a general decline in political stability in the North and a more promising business climate in the West. Their views about the position of the Jainas in the South are also different. While Ohira and Bronkhorst believe that the Jainas were actively looking for royal patronage, Dundas thinks that the support was mainly provided by the mercantile class. Even though some scholars have suggested that the TA was composed in order to compete with other movements for royal patronage, there is not enough evidence to link the composition of the TA with a particular need of the Jainas at that time.

The third section (§ 2.3) investigated the date and authorship of the TA and the TABh. This section shows that it is highly unlikely that the TABh has been composed as an auto-commentary. This has some implications for the reliability of the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti*, which seem to claim the opposite. I also argued that there is no reason to assume that the TA was composed by the Umāsvāti, although he might have been the composer of the *bhāṣya*. When it comes to the sectarian affiliation of the texts, I have argued that there is insufficient evidence to situate the TA in an Yāpanīya context, and that it is more likely that the TA predates the hard split between the different sects. Yet, the TABh seems to be written in a Śvetāmbara context. Even though the dating of both texts remains a matter of speculation, I propose to date the TA at some point in the 4th cent. CE and the TABh in the first half of the 5th cent. CE.

The analysis of the historical context of the TA and the TABh leaves many questions unanswered. It is hard to interpret the evidence of the Jainas in the Gupta Period and it is even more complex to situate the composition of the texts in this context. For this reason, I have argued that it is more promising to investigate the texts themselves in an attempt to uncover the aims and strategies of their authors and to get a better understanding of their intellectual surroundings. The next chapter contains the results of my research into these aspects, together with an exploration of the philosophical content of the TA and the TABh.

3. Textual Analysis

3.1 General Structure of the *Tattvārthādhigama*

The TA differs in many respects from canonical Jaina texts that deal with similar topics, such as the *Nandīsūtra*.²³³ The TA provides a soteriology (*mokṣamārga*)²³⁴ which is firmly rooted in an ontological and epistemological framework, and the text is composed in a concise and systematic manner. By contrast, the canonical texts that deal with epistemological and ontological concepts do not present these theoretical elements as a system and the different types of knowledge and substances are usually listed in a merely encyclopaedic way. The order of the ten chapters of the TA clearly indicates that the composer of the text tried to position Jaina soteriology within an overall theory of reality and wanted to legitimise this account by providing a theory of knowledge. The different chapters deal respectively with the following topics:

- I. The means of cognition and perspectives

- II. Types and characteristics of the soul
- III. Cosmology — the lower and the middle regions
- IV. The gods
- V. Non-sentient substances

- VI. The influx of *karman*
- VII. The vows
- VIII. Karmic bondage
- IX. Inhibiting and wearing off *karman*
- X. Liberation

The whole text can be divided into three parts, which are indicated by the horizontal lines in the table above.²³⁵ The first part (chapter I) presents the Jaina theory of

²³³ See § 2.1 for an overview of early Jaina philosophical texts.

²³⁴ The first *sūtra* of the TA uses the term '*mokṣamārga*' (see TA 1.1).

²³⁵ The proposed division relates only to the conceptual structure of the text and does not reflect a historical division of the text.

knowledge (*jñāna*). The second part (chapters II – IV) provides a description of reality from an ontological perspective. It discusses the layout of the universe, which consists of non-sentient (*ajīva*) matter and principles — including space, time, and motion — as well as sentient elements (*jīva*) that animate living organisms, such as plants, animals, human beings, and gods. The third part (chapters VI – X) discusses how the material world affects the non-material soul, and how the soul can cut its bonds with the material world in order to reach a state of liberation. The way in which the chapters are divided is clearly based on the traditional Jaina categories (*tattva*), which Umāsvāti presents as follows:²³⁶

II. The seven categories of reality (<i>tattva</i>) (TA 1.4)	
i.	<i>jīva</i> (soul)
ii.	<i>ajīva</i> (non-soul, i.e., non-living substance)
iii.	<i>āsrava</i> (influx of karmic particles that stick to the soul)
iv.	<i>bandha</i> (binding; the bondage which results from karmic influx)
v.	<i>saṃvara</i> (the way to stop the accumulation of <i>karman</i>)
vi.	<i>nirjarā</i> (destruction; wearing off collected karmic particles through asceticism)
vii.	<i>mokṣa</i> (liberation)

These seven categories contain the basic elements of Jaina soteriology and form a sequential series.²³⁷ The different *tattvas* can be connected with the individual chapters of the TA as follows:

²³⁶ The Jaina *tattvas* are mentioned in TA 1.4, which reads: '*jīvājīvāsravabandhasaṃvaranirjarāmokṣās tattvam*'. See also Part II.

²³⁷ See § 3.2 *The categories of reality* for a discussion of the *tattvas*.

III. Chapters of the <i>Tattvārthādhigama</i> and the <i>tattvas</i>	
Chapters	<i>tattvas</i>
I. The means of cognition and perspectives	-
II. Types and characteristics of the soul	i. <i>jīva</i>
III. Cosmology — the lower and the middle regions	-
IV. The gods	-
V. Non-sentient substances	ii. <i>ajīva</i>
VI. The influx of <i>karman</i>	iii. <i>āsrava</i>
VII. The vows	-
VIII. Karmic bondage	iv. <i>bandha</i>
IX. Inhibiting and wearing off <i>karman</i>	v. <i>saṃvara</i>
	vi. <i>nirjarā</i>
X. Liberation	vii. <i>mokṣa</i>

Even though it is evident that the chapters of the TA largely follow the sequence of the *tattvas*, it is also clear that the TA wants to provide more than a manual on the *tattvas*. Chapters I, III, IV, and VII — which deal respectively with knowledge, cosmology, gods, and the vows — do not address any of the *tattvas* and they form a substantial portion of the whole text.²³⁸ It remains a question whether this was a response to an external intellectual movement or whether the author simply thought that these topics should be part of a compendium on Jaina doctrine even though he could not connect them to the traditional list of *tattvas*.²³⁹

²³⁸ One may argue that chapter III and IV can be subsumed under one of the *tattvas*; since these chapters deal with the different cosmic realms and its inhabitants, it makes sense to see these chapters as a further elaboration on the first *tattva* (i.e., *jīva*), which is discussed in chapter II. Yet, it remains a given that the composer of the TA dedicated separate chapters to these topics.

²³⁹ I am not aware of any Jaina text that predates the TA and has a similar tenfold structure, and one may wonder why the composer of the TA did not choose a sevenfold structure in accordance with the *tattvas*. The structure of the text has some similarities with the layout of the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* and it is noteworthy that chapters III and IV of the TA — which do not correspond with one of the *tattvas* — deal with the same topic as the third chapter of the *Abhidharmakośakārikā*, titled '*Lokanirdeśa*' (for a French translation of this chapter, see La Vallée Poussin 1919). Partly based on this observation, Ohira assumes that the composer of the TA was directly influenced by the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* (Ohira 1982: 59-60). However, since there are no direct references to Vasubandhu's work in the TA, it is hard to determine whether the composer of the TA was indeed acquainted with the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* or not. Mark Mejer has shown that Siddhasenagaṇi and Akalaṅkadeva explicitly refer to the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* in their commentaries on the TA,

It is remarkable that the TA opens with a chapter on knowledge — a topic that is not included in the *tattvas* — and one may wonder why the author gives such a prominent position to epistemology. Looking at the overall structure of the TA, one could argue that the composer of the text started with an epistemological discussion in order to maintain a conceptually clear order. This is a feature that strongly characterises the whole text. For example, the TA opens by saying that ‘the path to liberation is constituted by right worldview, right knowledge, and right conduct’ (TA 1.1). Immediately after that, the text explains the first element in this list — i.e., right worldview — which is defined as confidence in the *tattvas* (TA 1.2). Then, after a remark on the causes of right worldview (TA 1.3), the text continues with an enumeration of these *tattvas* (TA 1.4). In the same way, the author deals with the other two items that are mentioned in TA 1.1, i.e., right knowledge and right conduct. In other words, the questions that are raised by the individual *sūtras* are systematically answered in the subsequent sections.²⁴⁰ A similar pattern applies to the text as a whole. To illustrate, chapter III starts with a general layout of the cosmos. This is followed by an explanation of the different realms, i.e., hells, the middle region, and the heavens. Next, the TA discusses the ontological categories in chapter V. This answers the question as to what ultimately constitutes the cosmos. Only after introducing the ontological categories, which includes material substance (*pudgala*), does the TA continue with an analysis of *karman* — which is seen as a material element — and the way in which *karman* influences the soul’s inherent urge for liberation. However, the Jaina doctrine had to compete with different worldviews, such as those of the Buddhists and Brahmins, and the Jaina doctrine is not self-evident. This is precisely where the first chapter comes in. By discussing the different means of cognition — including verbal testimony which gives an

and Siddhasenagaṇi even mentions Vasubandhu’s name (Mejor 2008: 142). This indicates that Jaina authors after the TA not only knew Vasubandhu’s work but also found the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* a relevant work for a discussion of the TA. This seems to support Ohira’s hypothesis.

²⁴⁰ For a contemporary reader it might seem obvious that philosophical texts are always composed in a systematic way and that the order of sections makes sense for the audience. However, this is certainly not a given for the *sūtra* texts of the classical Indian philosophical traditions. The fact that the structure of the TA is fairly systematic, suggests that a significant part of the composition of the text, or at least its redaction, can be attributed to a single author. See also Ruzsa 2010 for a discussion of the authorship of the philosophical *sūtras*.

authoritative status to traditional Jaina texts — the first chapter provides an epistemological basis for the Jaina doctrine.²⁴¹

While it was new for the Jaina tradition to open a text with a discussion of knowledge, it seems that the overall structure of the TA was influenced by another tradition. The *Nyāyasūtra*, which was one of the most influential treatises on epistemology in the history of Indian philosophy, opens with a discussion of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). As I will show in § 3.2, the TA clearly relied on this part of the *Nyāyasūtra* for its presentation of Jaina epistemology. It seems likely, therefore, that the choice of the composer of the TA to start with a chapter on the sources of knowledge was influenced by the *Nyāyasūtra*.

The importance that the TA gives to epistemology appears to signify a change in the intellectual tradition of the Jainas. Yet, it is unclear what urged the author of the TA to present the Jaina doctrine in a new way. Since there is not enough external evidence to situate the TA and the TABh conclusively in a historical context, this chapter will focus on an internal analysis of the text.²⁴² This analysis serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it will clarify how the texts relate to other schools and movements. By examining the presentation of the material, including the vocabulary and the way in which specific ideas are discussed, I will show the relationship between the TA and other philosophical texts that were written in the first half of the 1st millennium CE. This will contribute to a better understanding of the intellectual landscape in which the TA and the TABh were composed and will help to situate the text in a socio-historical context. Secondly, this analysis will also help to clarify the philosophical content of the TA and the TABh. Even though the TA had a major influence on later Jaina philosophers and is regarded nowadays as a standard compendium of Jaina doctrine, there are many passages in the text that are difficult to understand. Therefore, this chapter explores the philosophical content of the TA and the TABh in an effort to clarify its main purport.

My textual analysis will be limited to chapters I, II.8 – 25, and V, which are translated in Part II of this thesis. Unlike the other chapters, which mainly discuss matters of faith such as the different classes of gods and hellish beings, these chapters provide a philosophical analysis of the constituents of reality (chapter V)

²⁴¹ Likewise, the *sambandhakārikās*, which introduce the TA and the TABh, mention that the TA is a summary of the words of the *jina*, which implies that the text is derived from an indisputable source of knowledge (see *sambandhakārikā* 22).

²⁴² See chapter 2 for an analysis of the historical position of the TA and the TABh.

and the way in which we can gain valid knowledge about this reality (chapter I). *Sūtras* II.8 – 25 provide an account of the sense faculties and form, as such, a logical link between the chapters on ontology and epistemology since ordinary knowledge results from the contact between sense faculties and the surroundings of the subject of knowledge. Apart from the fact that the selected chapters form a consistent whole, there are two more reasons to focus on these parts.

First, if we want to find out more about the intellectual milieu in which the TA was written, it makes sense to look at those chapters that are more likely to reflect external influences. The TA shows little change in doctrinal matter, such as the theory of *karman*, while there is significant conceptual change in the theory of knowledge. Since there was a lively debate about the theory of knowledge amongst the different philosophical schools in the first half of the 1st millennium CE, one can assume that the TA reflects some of the aspects of this wider philosophical debate in its discussion of knowledge and in the underlying ontological framework. Therefore, this chapter will examine whether the philosophical parts of the TA and the TABh reflect any influences from contemporary movements, such as the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. This will provide a better basis to understand the position of the TA and the TABh in the history of Indian philosophy.

The second reason why it makes sense to focus on the selected chapters is that these chapters were the most influential parts of the text. The large majority of citations of the TA in later Jaina texts are derived from chapter I, II and V.²⁴³ This demonstrates that the tradition itself regarded these chapters as the most significant parts of the text.²⁴⁴

Apart from a study of the content of the philosophical parts of the TA, this chapter of the thesis also provides an analysis of the introductory verses, the colophon, and some peculiar verses that are found in the TABh. Even though these parts may not be directly relevant for our understanding of the philosophical account that can be found in the TA, they are most relevant for the authorship of the

²⁴³ Ohira provides an overview of references to the TA in the Jaina commentarial literature up to the 10th cent. CE (Ohira 1982: 71-78).

²⁴⁴ One could argue that it is anachronistic to make a distinction between the more rational or philosophical parts of the text on the one hand, and the doctrinal or religious parts on the other. However, the fact that later authors focused on precisely those chapters that one could label as the 'philosophical chapters' indicates that these chapters are not only significant from a contemporary philosophical point of view.

TA and the TABh, which has important implications for the interpretation of both texts. The study of these textual passages can be found in § 3.5.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁵ The translated passages of the TA and the TABh that I cite in this chapter sometimes deviate from the way in which these passages are translated in Part II. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the expressed ideas, I sometimes opt for a less literal translation and omit some brackets. For a more precise translation of these passages, see the translation in Part II.

3.2 *Tattvārthādhigama* Chapter I

The overall content of the first chapter of the TA can be represented as follows:

- 1.1 The path to liberation
 - 1.2 – 1.3 The right worldview
 - 1.4 The categories of reality
 - 1.5 – 1.8 The modes of analysis and viewpoints
 - 1.9 – 1.12 Knowledge and means of cognition
 - 1.13 – 1.30 Five types of knowledge
 - 1.13 – 1-19 Ordinary cognition
 - 1.20 Testimony
 - 1.21 – 1.23 Cosmic perception
 - 1.24 – 1.26 Mental perception
 - 1.27 – 1.30 Domains of the five varieties of knowledge, including omniscience
 - 1.31 Co-presence of varieties of knowledge
 - 1.32 – 1.33 Misapprehension
 - 1.34 – 1.35 The perspectives

The path to liberation

As mentioned above, chapter I opens by stating that the way to liberation consists of right worldview (*darśana*), right knowledge (*jñāna*), and right conduct (*cāritra*). This idea is not new to the Jaina tradition. Several canonical texts, like the *Uttarādhyaṇa*²⁴⁶ and the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*²⁴⁷ already contain similar expressions. The three elements that are mentioned are known as the ‘three jewels’, a concept which has a parallel in the Buddhist tradition.²⁴⁸ However, the author of the TA deviates from the earlier sources by putting *darśana* before *jñāna* and one may wonder why he felt the need to change the traditional order. Since the three jewels are listed in the first sentence of the text and determine the order of the following sections, it is

²⁴⁶ *Uttarādhyaṇa* 23.33 (Jacobi 1985: 337). See also Ohira 1982: 55.

²⁴⁷ *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.6.17 (Jacobi 1985: 447). See also Dundas 1992: 87.

²⁴⁸ The concept of the three jewels plays a prominent position in both Jainism and Buddhism, and one could argue that the Buddhist version — in which the three jewels stand for the Buddha, his teachings, and the community — is conceptually close to the Jaina version (Dundas 1992: 87).

unlikely that this was an accidental change. In an effort to explain the significance of this change, Dundas writes the following:

By putting faith²⁴⁹ at the beginning of the first rule of the *Tattvārthasūtra* which defines the very nature of Jainism, *Umāsvāti* is both drawing attention to its role as an essential component on the path to salvation and at the same time broadening Jainism's range of spiritual reference beyond early Hinduism for whom faith, at least textually, did not have such a central and formally enunciated position.²⁵⁰

Is it possible that the author of the TA did indeed try to demonstrate the superiority of the Jaina doctrine by stressing an element that is absent in rival soteriologies?²⁵¹ Apart from the fact that the TA deviates from the traditional order, the text also adds the adjective 'samyañc' to the three jewels.²⁵² This seems to be an innovation of the TA. Interestingly, the word does not appear very often in Jaina texts and it is tempting to see a connection with the Buddhist tradition, which uses the word 'samyañc' in the formulation of the 'eightfold path'.²⁵³ In short, the opening verse of the TA consists of a traditional Jaina expression but the small changes of the formulation seem to indicate that the author of the TA was well aware of rival views and tried to overtrump them.

After the introductory *sūtra*, chapter I begins with a discussion of right worldview (*samyagdarśana*), which is characterised as 'confidence in the categories of reality' (*tattvārthasraddhāna*) (TA 1.2). This is a new idea for the Jaina tradition, even though there seems to be a precedent in the *Uttarādhyayana*, which states that '[h]e who verily believes in the true teaching of the (above nine) fundamental truths, possesses righteousness' (*Uttarādhyayana* 28.15).²⁵⁴ However, the TA is making a

²⁴⁹ Dundas translates *darśana* as 'faith', which he defines as follows: 'For Jainism, faith does not imply some kind of blind belief but is rather the correct way of looking at things, a positive and well-informed disposition' (Dundas 1992: 87).

²⁵⁰ Dundas 1992: 87.

²⁵¹ It should be remarked that the TA is not the first text in which the three jewels appear in a new order. Even though the *Uttarādhyayana* mentions the three jewels several times in the traditional order, one can already find the order that the TA uses in *Uttarādhyayana* 28.29-30 (See also Ohira 1982: 55). Interestingly, *Sambandhakārikā* 1 seems to prioritise *jñāna*, and presents *darśana* as an aspect of *jñāna* (see Part II, *sambandhakārikā* 1).

²⁵² '*samyagdarśana jñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ*' (TA 1.1).

²⁵³ A description of the *āryaṣṭāṅgamārga* can be found in Buswell 2014: 763-764.

²⁵⁴ '*tahiyāṇaṃ tu bhāvāṇaṃ sabbhāve uvaesaṇaṃ | bhāveṇaṃ saddahaṃtassa sammataṃ taṃ viyāhiyaṃ* (Amar 2011: 356).' Transl. Jacobi 1985: 357.

different claim. While the *Uttarādhyayana* states that belief in the categories (*tattvas*) is an indicator of righteousness (*samyaktva*), the TA defines *samyagdarśana* as belief or confidence in the categories.²⁵⁵ Since *samyagdarśana* is presented as the first element of the way to liberation (TA 1.1), it seems that the author of the TA presents confidence in the categories as the prerequisite of *mokṣa*. This is a new idea for the Jaina tradition.²⁵⁶ Yet, we can find a similar idea expressed in *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.1, which says:

***pramāṇaprameyasamśayaprayojanadr̥ṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkaniṣṭayavā
dajalpavitaṇḍāhetvābhāsacchalajātīnigrahasthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreya-
sādhigamah***

Par la connaissance juste des moyens-de-connaissance-droite, des objets-de-connaissance-droite, du doute, du but <de la démonstration>, de l'illustration, de la conclusion, des <cinq> membres <du raisonnement dialectique>, de l'argumentation, de la connaissance définitive, de la discussion, de la dispute, de la chicane, des pseudo-raisons, des sophismes, des ripostes sophistiques et des situations de défaite, on atteint le bonheur indépassable (NS I.1.1).²⁵⁷

As can be seen in the above passage, the *Nyāyasūtra* promises that knowledge of the different categories that the Nyāya tradition propounds leads to 'the highest good' (*niḥśreyasa*). The similarity between the opening of the TA and the *Nyāyasūtra* seems to indicate that the author of the TA was acquainted with this text. The fact that he followed the *Nyāya* model in his compendium of Jaina doctrine raises the question as to how the Jaina intellectuals related to the adherents of the Brahmanical schools. In any case, it is clear that the author of the TA conformed to the *Nyāya* model, which suggests that the text was composed in an environment in which the people adhering to the Naiyāyika theory provided the dominant philosophical blueprints.

In addition to TA 1.2, *sūtra* 1.3 explains that right worldview either results from learning or occurs by nature. Even though the *bhāṣya* remains somewhat vague when it explains the latter option — which is caused by 'a particular transformation' (*pariṇāmaviśeṣa*) (TABh 1.3.6) — it is clear that the text tries to solve an important

²⁵⁵ See also Ohira 1982: 55.

²⁵⁶ Ohira 1982: 56.

²⁵⁷ Angot 2009: 246-247 (Sanskrit and translation), my underlining.

epistemological problem. If right worldview could only be obtained from learning, one could question how the teacher obtained his knowledge, and one would end up with an infinite regress. However, by stating that right worldview spontaneously occurs in some beings, the text has an answer to this question, even though it does not have much explanatory value. To summarise, the elements of the way to liberation can be presented as follows:

IV. The threefold path to liberation (<i>mokṣamārga</i>) (TA 1.1)	
i. <i>samyagdarśana</i> (right worldview)	<i>nisargasamyagdarśana</i> (right worldview by nature) (TA 1.3)
	<i>adhigamasamyagdarśana</i> (right worldview from learning) (TA 1.3)
ii. <i>samyagjñāna</i> (right knowledge)	
iii. <i>samyakcāritra</i> (right conduct)	

The categories of reality

Next, TA 1.4 lists the categories of reality (*tattvas*).²⁵⁸ As discussed by Ohira, the TA deviates from previous presentation of the *tattvas* and reduces their number from nine to seven, as can be seen in the table below.²⁵⁹

V. Order of the <i>tattvas</i> in canonical texts and in the TA		
<i>Sthāna</i> 9.867	<i>Uttarādhyayana</i> 28.14	TA 1.4
<i>jīva-ajīva</i>	<i>jīva-ajīva</i>	<i>jīva</i>
<i>puṇya-pāpa</i>	<i>bandha</i>	<i>ajīva</i>
<i>āsrava-saṃvara-nirjarā</i>	<i>puṇya-pāpa</i>	<i>āsrava</i>
<i>bandha-mokṣa</i>	<i>āsrava-saṃvara-nirjarā-mokṣa</i>	<i>bandha</i>
		<i>saṃvara</i>
		<i>nirjarā</i>
		<i>mokṣa</i>

²⁵⁸ See also § 3.1.

²⁵⁹ Ohira 1982: 55.

Unlike the lists that appear in older texts, the TA organises the categories in a causal order. It begins with the primary ontological distinction between the soul (*jīva*) and non-living entities (*ajīva*). Because of the influx (*āsrava*) of karmic particles, the soul becomes entangled with *ajīva* (*bandha*). By subsequently stopping the influx of *karman* (*saṃvara*) and removing karmic residue from the soul through asceticism (*nirjarā*), the soul finally gets liberated from its state of bondage and reaches *mokṣa*. It is interesting to note that the categories of merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*), which appear in the older texts, are completely ignored in the TA. Some scholars have suggested that these categories can be subsumed under *āsrava*, and that the author therefore omitted these categories.²⁶⁰ The TA does not give a reason for this omission and the TABh also does not mention *puṇya* and *pāpa* in its discussion of the categories.²⁶¹ Even if we follow the standard explanation that the TA reduced the number of categories in an attempt to make the Jaina doctrine more systematic, it remains hard to understand why this change of a traditional list was acceptable for the audience of the text.

Even though the enumeration of categories at the beginning of the text resembles the start of the *Nyāyasūtra*, it is clear that the Jaina categories or *tattvas* have very little to do with the categories of the Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika school, which are mainly ontological and dialectical categories. Instead, the Jaina categories provide the basic elements of their soteriological account. It is noteworthy that the *bhāṣya* explicitly mentions that the *tattvas* are the seven ‘*padārthas*’ (TABh 1.4.2). As far as I am aware, the word ‘*padārtha*’ is not used in earlier Jaina discussions of the Jaina *tattvas* but it is the standard word for the ontological categories in the Vaiśeṣika tradition. The fact that the *bhāṣya* explains the word ‘*tattva*’ with the term ‘*padārtha*’ indicates that the audience of the text was familiar with basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory.²⁶² Moreover, it confirms that the TA and the TABh tried to present the Jaina doctrine as an alternative that can compete with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account.

²⁶⁰ See for example Dixit’s introduction to Sanghvi’s commentary on the TA (Sanghvi 1974: 12).

²⁶¹ The TABh talks about ‘the fruit of merit and demerit’ (*puṇyapāpaphala*) but does not refer to these terms as categories. See [1.3.6].

²⁶² For example, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.4 reads ‘*dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarma-sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānām padārthānām sādharmaivaidharmyābhyām tattvajñānān niḥśreyasam*’ (The highest good results from particular merit [and is obtained] by means of the similarity and dissimilarity of the **categories**, substance, attribute, action, generality, particularity, and inhesion) (Gough 1873: 4).

Nevertheless, it also indicates that the Jainas were well aware that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika movement provided the dominant vocabulary for the discussion.

The modes of analysis

Following the list of categories, TA 1.5 introduces the four modes of analysis (*nyāsa*), which can be applied to the categories. These hermeneutical tools deal with the complex relationship between entities, words, and meanings. For example, when the deity Indra is depicted in a painting or a sculpture, we can use the word 'Indra' to refer to this figure, and we have to interpret such a reference from the perspective of representation (*sthāpanā*) (TABh 1.5.8). In other words, the modes of analysis point to the different references of a word, such as 'Indra', which facilitates a better understanding of the precise meaning of sentences and helps to see why two seemingly contradictory statements can be both true. The *bhāṣya* labels these modes of analysis (*nyāsa*) with the traditional word 'doors of examination' (*anuyogadvāra*) (TABh 1.5.1). Apart from the list of perspectives given in TA 1.5, the text provides two more lists in TA 1.7 and TA 1.8. The TABh adds a fourth list in TABh 1.8.8, as can be seen in the following table.

The TA and the TABh do not explain how these different lists relate to each other and the origin of the lists is not clear. They partly overlap with some of the lists that are mentioned in the *Anuyogadvārasūtra*.²⁶³ Yet, the date of the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* is quite uncertain and it is hard to determine whether the lists in the TA and the TABh are derived from the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* or whether the TA influenced some parts of this text.

The fourth list that is mentioned in the *bhāṣya* deviates from the three lists that the TA mentions and mostly relates to aspects that are particular for the Jaina worldview, such as the theory about the colours of the soul (*leśyā*) and the threefold path to liberation (*jñāna, darśana, cāritra*). By contrast, the first three lists address more general aspects, such as number (*saṃkhyā*), place (*kṣetra*), cause (*sādhana*), etc. As such, these lists strongly relate to grammatical categories.²⁶⁴

²⁶³ The different doors of examination are mentioned throughout the *Anuyogadvārasūtra*, in a rather unsystematic manner. The text has been translated by Hanaki (1970).

²⁶⁴ Several modes of analysis also correspond to some elements of the Vaiśeṣika theory such as the category (*padārtha*) 'substance' (*dravya*) and the qualities (*guṇa*) 'touch' (*sparśa*) and 'number' (*saṃkhyā*). See, e.g., Kumar 2013.

VI. The doors of examination (<i>anuyogadvāra</i>) (TA 1.5, 1.7, 1.8)			
The four modes of analysis (<i>nyāsa</i>) (TA 1.5) or four doors of examination (<i>anuyogadvāra</i>) (TABh 1.5.1)	The six doors of examination (<i>anuyogadvāra</i>) (TA 1.7, TABh 1.7.1)	The eight doors of examination (<i>anuyogadvāra</i>) (TA 1.8, TABh 1.8.4)	The thirteen doors of examination (<i>anuyogadvāra</i>) (TABh 1.8.8)
i. <i>nāma</i> (name)	i. <i>nirdeśa</i> (description)	i. <i>sat</i> (existence)	i. <i>gati</i> (transmigration)
ii. <i>sthāpanā</i> (representation)	ii. <i>svāmitva</i> (ownership)	ii. <i>saṃkhyā</i> (numeration)	ii. <i>indriya</i> (the senses)
iii. <i>dravya</i> (substance)	iii. <i>sādhana</i> (cause)	iii. <i>kṣetra</i> (place)	iii. <i>kāya</i> (body)
iv. <i>bhāva</i> (state)	iv. <i>adhikaraṇa</i> (locus)	iv. <i>sparsāna</i> (touching/reach)	iv. <i>yoga</i> (activity)
	v. <i>sthiti</i> (duration)	v. <i>kāla</i> (time)	v. <i>kaṣāya</i> (passion)
	vi. <i>vidhāna</i> (classification)	vi. <i>antara</i> (interval)	vi. <i>veda</i> (feelings)
		vii. <i>bhāva</i> (state)	vii. <i>leśyā</i> (colouring)
		viii. <i>alpabahutva</i> (quantity) ²⁶⁵	viii. <i>samyaktva</i> (rightness)
			ix. <i>jñāna</i> (knowledge)
			x. <i>darśana</i> (worldview)
			xi. <i>cāritra</i> (conduct)
			xii. <i>āhāra</i> (taking food)
			xiii. <i>upayoga</i> (cognitive operation)

The author of the TA is very brief in his explanation of this hermeneutical theory and does not mention the traditional term '*anuyogadvāra*'. By contrast, the TABh provides an elaborate commentary on the *sūtras* that enumerate these modes of analysis and even adds a fourth list that is not mentioned in the *sūtra*. This might indicate that the topic had become more important in the Jaina tradition at the time of the composition of the *bhāṣya*. It is also possible that the composer of the TA was

²⁶⁵ Lit. 'being little or much'.

less interested in this theory because it did not relate to the general epistemological discussions of the other schools.

Classification of the means of cognition

After the enumeration of the modes of analysis, the TA continues with a description of the means of cognition (*pramāṇas*) — one of the main topics in Nyāya philosophy. This part runs from TA 1.9 to TA 1.31 and forms the largest part of chapter I. Hence, it seems that the author of the TA did not only follow the *Nyāyasūtra* by opening his treatise with a chapter on knowledge. He also dedicates most of the chapter to an epistemological discussion that is less important in the Jaina tradition while the more traditional Jaina topics are only briefly mentioned.²⁶⁶

TA 1.6 explains that one can understand the categories through the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and the perspectives (*naya*). TA 1.9 and TA 1.10 state that there are five types of knowledge, which can be subsumed under two *pramāṇas*, as shown in the following table.

VII. The five varieties of knowledge (<i>jñāna</i>) (TA 1.9) or two means of cognition (<i>pramāṇa</i>) (TA 1.10)	
<i>parokṣa</i> (indirect cognition) (TA 1.11)	<i>pratyakṣa</i> (direct cognition) (TA 1.12)
i. <i>mati</i> (ordinary cognition)	iii. <i>avadhi</i> (cosmic perception) ²⁶⁷
ii. <i>śruta</i> (testimony)	iv. <i>manaḥparyāya</i> (mental perception) ²⁶⁸
	v. <i>kevala</i> (absolute knowledge)

²⁶⁶ The *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya* differ in this respect. While the largest part of the epistemological theory in the TA deals with a discussion of the *pramāṇas*, the TABh provides more information on traditional Jaina topics, such as the different lists of *anuyogadvāra*. Likewise, the TA is very brief in its discussion of *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala*. These means of knowledge are specific for the Jainas and were not accepted by other schools. The *bhāṣya* provides a more elaborate discussion of all the subclassifications of these types of knowledge, and their individual ranges. This might indicate that the author of the *bhāṣya* felt that he had to compensate for the omission of important elements of the more traditional Jaina theory of knowledge.

²⁶⁷ For a discussion of the meaning and translation of this term, see § 3.2, *Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge*.

²⁶⁸ A more literal translation of the term '*manaḥparyāya*[*jñāna*]' would be '[knowledge of] the modifications of the mind'. See also § 3.2, *Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge*.

It seems that there were different views on the classification of these five varieties of knowledge.²⁶⁹ Even though the TA clearly refers to two *pramāṇas*, the *bhāṣya* mentions that some people (*eke*) claim that there are four *pramāṇas*.²⁷⁰ The text does not explain whether this alternative view can be attributed to other Jaina intellectuals or whether it is a reference to a different philosophical movement. Since the Nyāya school propounded that there are four *pramāṇas*, Jacobi assumes that the text refers to the Nyāya position.²⁷¹ However, the TABh rarely refers to non-Jaina positions, and it is far from clear what the motive for mentioning the Nyāya view could have been. In his commentary on TA 1.9, which lists the Jaina means of cognition, Jacobi tries to explain the reference to the view of the others (*eke*) as follows:

Diese Einteilung zeigt, wie weit man von Logik und Psychologie noch entfernt war, als man sie aufstellte. Da sie im Kanon gilt und also kanonische Geltung hatte, mussten sich die Jainas damit abfinden, was ihnen nicht leicht war, nachdem der Nyāya die Erkenntnistheorie wissenschaftlich begründet hatte (Jacobi 1906: 294).

In other words, Jacobi assumes that the author of the TA had to present the traditional Jaina view on the different types of knowledge, even though he was well aware that the Nyāya school had a better theory. However, there seems to be a better explanation for the reference to the four *pramāṇas*.

In his discussion of the evolution of *pramāṇa* theory in the Jaina tradition, Dixit states that some early Jaina texts mention four *pramāṇas*, which correspond to the four *pramāṇas* that were accepted by the Nyāya tradition.²⁷² The remark in the TABh that others ‘claim that that there are four *pramāṇas*’²⁷³ could, therefore, refer to the fact that other Jaina texts mention these four means of cognition. Yet, Dixit assumes that the canonical passages that mention the four *pramāṇas* are later interpolations. His argument for this idea, however, is rather weak. He simply states that the *pramāṇas* are not discussed in other parts of these texts, that none of the ‘old Āgamic texts’ deal with *pramāṇa*, and that the *āgamas* usually speak about the

²⁶⁹ The individual varieties of knowledge will be discussed in the next section.

²⁷⁰ See TABh 1.6.3.

²⁷¹ ‘Diese *eke* waren natürlich die Anhänger des Nyāya’ (Jacobi 1906: 294).

²⁷² The *Bhagavatī* (*Viyāhapannatti*) 5.4.26 mentions perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and testimony (*śabda*). See also Balcerowicz 2016: 1004, n. 28

²⁷³ See TABh 1.6.3.

‘five types of *jñānas*’.²⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the fact that the TA discusses the *pramāṇas* shows that the author was not only acquainted with *pramāṇa* theory but also thought that it was somehow relevant for a compendium of Jaina doctrine. This suggests that *pramāṇa* theory was not completely new for the Jainas at the time of the composition of the TA, which is a good reason to doubt Dixit’s line of argumentation.

If we do not accept Dixit’s idea that earlier references to the *pramāṇas* in Jaina literature are all later interpolations, it remains a question whether the TABh refers to the Nyāya school when it mentions that some teachers believe that there are four *pramāṇas*. A recent study by Balcerowicz, which deals with the development of epistemological concepts in the history of Jaina philosophy, shows that the Jaina tradition adopted the *pramāṇa* concept in several stages.²⁷⁵ The first stage is represented by the *Stānāṅgasūtra* (*Ṭhāṇaṅgasutta*), in which four means of cognition are listed as ‘causes of valid cognition’ (*hetu*).²⁷⁶ The *hetus* that are mentioned in this text correspond with the set of *pramāṇas* that were accepted in the Nyāya tradition, i.e., *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *aupamya*, and *āgama*.²⁷⁷ However, at a later stage, these four concepts were listed as *pramāṇas*.²⁷⁸

One may wonder why the Jainas initially adopted the four means of cognition that were advanced by the Nyāya school, instead of coming up with their own list of *pramāṇas*. Balcerowicz speculates that ‘the notion of [*pramāṇa*] was introduced into Jainism with the ‘typological package’, i.e., already with the fourfold classification, not as a separate term’.²⁷⁹ In other words, he claims that before the time of the TA the term ‘*pramāṇa*’ automatically referred to the four *pramāṇas* listed above and was not seen as a general concept that could be redefined by the Jainas. This is certainly not inconceivable and provides a better explanation for the change that the TA proposes. If the concept of *pramāṇas* was completely absent in the Jaina tradition before the TA, it would not make much sense to claim that the *jñānas* are the *pramāṇas*. However, if Jaina thinkers incorporated the Nyāya model in earlier texts, even though this theory did not match the traditional theory of *jñānas*, there

²⁷⁴ Dixit 1977: 22.

²⁷⁵ Balcerowicz 2016d.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 1004.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Balcerowicz refers to the *Bhagavatī* (*Viyāhapannatti*) as an example of this stage (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1004).

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

would be a very good reason to claim that the traditional *jñānas* are the *pramāṇas*. In this way, the TA gets rid of a theoretical element that does not fit very well in the overall system that the TA tries to establish, and it clearly distinguishes the Jaina theory from its opponents.

To sum up, Dixit's claim that the references to the four *pramāṇas* before the TA are later interpolation should not be taken at face value. Further, it is perfectly plausible that the reference to four *pramāṇas* in the TABh refers to the fourfold list that the Jaina tradition had adopted before the composition of the TA. Unlike what Jacobi claims, the fact that the TA presents the five types of knowledge as the *pramāṇas* while the *bhāṣya* refers to the fourfold division, does not prove that the composer of the TABh thought that the traditional Jaina view was inferior to the Nyāya view. Instead, it shows that the TA wanted to present the orthodox position as a viable alternative to the Nyāya theory, which had influenced earlier Jaina text. Yet, the fact that the TA presents the traditional *jñānas* as the *pramāṇas*, instead of abandoning the *pramāṇa* concept, indicates that the Nyāya framework was seen as the dominant model.

Direct and indirect types of knowledge

After listing the varieties of knowledge (*jñāna*) in TA 1.9, the author divides these five varieties into two categories of *pramāṇas*:²⁸⁰

ādye parokṣam ||1.11|| pratyakṣam anyat ||1.12||

The first two [varieties of knowledge are forms of] indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). The other [varieties of knowledge are forms of] direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*).

In other words, the TA teaches that ordinary cognition (*matī*) and testimony (*śruta*) are forms of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), while cosmic perception (*avadhi*), mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*), and absolute [knowledge] (*kevala*) are forms of direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*).²⁸¹ At first sight, this seems a counterintuitive classification.

²⁸⁰ See table above.

²⁸¹ Balcerowicz suggests that the classification that we find in the TA was based on the *Prajñāpanāsūtra* (*Pañṇavaṇāsutta*), which 'mentions the division into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* in passing, but does not mention any division of cognitive criteria, or the term *pramāṇa* per se' (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1005, n29).

From a phenomenological perspective, ordinary cognition — which includes visual experience — appears as a very direct way to acquire knowledge. It is, therefore, somewhat odd that the TA claims that ordinary cognition (*matī*) is a form of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) instead of direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*). However, the inversion of the meaning of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* can be seen as a legitimate move from the perspective of Jaina epistemology as presented in the TA. If one accepts that the soul can acquire knowledge by cosmic perception (*avadhī*), mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*), and omniscience (*kevala*) without the involvement of any sense organ, it makes sense to interpret these types of knowledge as more direct than ordinary cognition (*matī*) and testimony (*śruta*), which cannot take place without the interference of the sense organs. Yet, the fact that one can argue in favour of the Jaina model that we find in the TA does not sufficiently explain what urged the Jainas to change the original meaning of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*.²⁸²

In this section, I will discuss how this inversion relates to the standard interpretation of these terms, and I will explore whether this unique feature of Jaina philosophy can tell us something about the way in which Jaina intellectuals who propounded this model related to other philosophical traditions. For this goal, I will also discuss the *bhāṣya* on TA 1.11 – 1.12, which explicitly deals with some other views on the means of cognition.

The idea that sense perception — which is included in ordinary cognition (*matī*) — is an indirect means of cognition (*parokṣa*) is not only unusual from a contemporary phenomenological perspective but also deviates from the standard interpretation of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* in Indian philosophy. The *Nyāya* tradition, for example, clearly interprets perception (*pratyakṣa*) as an unmediated means of cognition, as can be read in *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.4:

²⁸² The interpretation of *pratyakṣa* in the Jaina tradition is not unprecedented. In his translation of NS 1.1.4, Angot remarks that the meaning of the word ‘*perception*’ (in French) does not fully correspond to the meaning of ‘*pratyakṣa*’ in Sanskrit. Even though he does not discuss the Jaina tradition, he mentions that memory and yogic experience were classified as ‘*pratyakṣa*’ by other philosophical traditions (Angot 2009: 271, n.777). This shows that the Jainas were not alone in interpreting non-sensory cognition as direct forms of knowledge. See also Oberhammer 2006: 37-61 and Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001-1002.

The simple fact that the *sūtra* mentions *parokṣa* before *pratyakṣa* indicates that we are dealing with an inversion of a pre-existing system. From a linguistic point of view, it is somewhat counterintuitive to mention the particle ‘*paras*’ (‘beyond’) before ‘*prati*’ (‘near to’).

*indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri
vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam |*

La perception-immédiate c'est la connaissance produite par le contact d'un organe-sensoriel avec un objet; elle est non-verbale, non sujette à l'erreur et consiste en une connaissance déterminée (NS I.1.4).²⁸³

Note that the word '*pratyakṣa*' in the *Nyāyasūtra* — which Angot translates as '*perception-immédiate*' — refers to the type of knowledge that is included in ordinary cognition (*mati*) in the TA. Yet, the TA does not classify ordinary cognition (*mati*) as a form of direct cognition (which is called '*pratyakṣa*' in the TA) but as a variety of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). This inversion is strange from a historical point of view. In his study of the historical development of Jaina epistemological terms, Balcerowicz notes that the distinction between *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* can be traced back to the *Brāhmaṇas*, in which *pratyakṣa* refers to that which is 'directly in front of our eyes' whereas *parokṣa* refers to 'the realm of the divine, beyond our eyes'.²⁸⁴ However, he demonstrates that the Jaina tradition developed a completely different understanding of these terms, and that '*pratyakṣa* came to denote direct cognition of the soul, unmediated by any physical organ, whereas *parokṣa* referred to cognitive acts by means of sense organs and/or the mind which served as instruments of cognition for the soul'.²⁸⁵ This is indeed the model that we find in the TA.

It is plausible that this move was a conscious effort of the Jainas to distinguish themselves from other philosophical traditions. Since there is no textual evidence that the Jaina tradition classified the five types of knowledge as *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* according to the model of the TA before, it is feasible that this move was initiated by the author of the TA. In fact, such a move would match the overall strategy of the TA, which is characterised by the reorganisation of traditional

²⁸³ Angot 2009: 271-272.

²⁸⁴ Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001. Balcerowicz has proposed a reconstruction of the different stages of the Jaina theory of knowledge. He suggests that the fivefold list of types of knowledge and the twofold classification of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* represent different historical stages, which eventually merged. He tentatively dates the merging of these two models to the 2nd cent. CE (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1002). Unfortunately, he does not specify the texts that represent this stage and it is not clear why he assumes that the Jainas originally associated the term *pratyakṣa* with *mati* and *śruta*, while *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala* were seen as *parokṣa* (Balcerowicz 2016d: Appendix, Model IV).

²⁸⁵ Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001.

Jaina notions in such a way that it resembles the ideas of other movements but also demonstrates the uniqueness of the Jaina model. In fact, one could even say that this model has a certain theoretical advantage. Since the soul is the seat of knowledge in the Jaina system, it makes sense to describe the types of knowledge that are directly perceived by the soul, such as *avadhijñāna*, as direct sources of knowledge. By interpreting sense perception as an indirect means of cognition, the Jaina model can also explain why sense perception can sometimes be erroneous, which is a serious problem for theories that interpret sense perception as a form of direct perception.

Other means of cognition

While the TA teaches that there are only two *pramāṇas*, i.e., *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, the *bhāṣya* discusses an alternative view on the means of cognition:

anumānopamānāgamārthāpattisambhavābhāvān api pramāṇāni iti kecit manyante | tat katham etad iti |

Some people think that inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation, equivalence, and negation are means of cognition too. How, then, can this be explained (TABh 1.12.7 – 1.12.8)?²⁸⁶

This passage shows that the commentator was well aware of *pramāṇa* theories that differed from the theory that the TA presents. Yet, the list of *pramāṇas* that are mentioned in the *bhāṣya* is somewhat peculiar. The sixfold list — which consists of inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*), postulation (*arthāpatti*), equivalence²⁸⁷ (*sambhava*), and negation (*abhāva*) — does

²⁸⁶ See also Part II.

²⁸⁷ This translation of '*sambhava*' follows MW, which explains that equivalence as a *pramāṇa* is 'illustrated by the equivalence between one shilling and pence'. Gerhard Oberhammer discusses the meaning and historical development of *sambhava* in his *Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien*. He mentions that the *Carakaśaṃhitā* refers to '*sambhava*' as a cause or origin of things but the text does not connect this term with an epistemological theory. Although Oberhammer notes that later sources connect the epistemological use of *sambhava* with the 'Paurānikas', he writes: 'Wer jene Lehrer waren, die den *sambhava* als eigenständiges Erkenntnismittel vertraten, läßt sich nicht wirklich klären' (Oberhammer 2006: 232ff). The meaning of '*sambhava*' clearly changed over time and referred to different concepts in different traditions. It is, therefore, hard to tell which

not correspond with any of the standard lists that are associated with the main philosophical schools and it also does not fit within the Jaina framework. The list comes very close to the list of *pramāṇas* that is associated with the Mīmāṃsakas but equivalence (*sambhava*) does not feature in the Mīmāṃsā theory.²⁸⁸ It is possible that the author of the TABh did not refer to the theory of a particular school and simply listed the different elements that were accepted as *pramāṇas* by other philosophical movements. Yet, even in that case, it is remarkable that the author included *sambhava* since none of the known philosophical movements claimed that *sambhava* should be accepted as a *pramāṇa*. Nevertheless, even though there is no textual source that claims that *sambhava* should be accepted as a *pramāṇa*, this position was sometimes attributed to others. For example, an opponent in *Nyāyasūtra* II.2.1 raises the following objection against the Nyāya position:

na catuṣṭvam aitiyārthāpattisambhavābhāvaprāmāṇyam |

Il n'y a pas quatre moyens-de-connaissance-droite parce que le caractère de *pramāṇa* s'attache aussi à la tradition orale (*aitihya*), à la supposition nécessaire (*arthāpatti*), à l'inclusion (*sambhava*) et à l'absence (*abhāva*) (NS II.2.1).²⁸⁹

Even though it is not clear what the identity of the opponent is, this passage indicates that some people interpreted *sambhava* as a *pramāṇa*. However, the *Nyāyasūtra* is the first text that mentions this position and later literature has little

concept the author of the TABh had in mind when he included '*sambhava*' in his list. In his French translation of the *Nyāyasūtra*, Angot translates *sambhava* as 'inclusion', which makes sense in the light of the interpretation that the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* provides: '*sambhavo nāmāvinābhāvino 'rthasya sattāgrahaṇād anyasya sattāgrahaṇam | yathā droṇasya sattāgrahaṇād āḍhakasya sattāgrahaṇam, āḍhakasya [ca] sattāgrahaṇāt prasthasyeti*' ('Ce qu'on nomme *sambhava* 'inclusion', c'est le fait de connaître l'existence de quelque chose en connaissant l'existence d'une autre sans laquelle nécessairement elle n'existerait pas. Par exemple c'est connaître l'existence du poids d'un *āḍhaka* parce qu'on connaît l'existence du poids d'un *droṇa*, celle du *prastha* parce qu'on connaît l'existence de l'*āḍhaka*.') (Angot 2009: 479-480). The idea seems to be that one can infer the existence of a *prastha* ($\frac{1}{4}$ of the weight of an *āḍhaka*, which is in turn $\frac{1}{4}$ of a *droṇa*) of something by knowing that there is an *āḍhaka* of something, just as one can infer that there is a gram of gold when one perceives a kilo of gold. This type of knowledge does indeed rely on sense perception, as claimed in TABh 1.12.10.

²⁸⁸ Śabarasyāmin's commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* lists six *pramāṇas*: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabda*, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti*, and *abhāva* (see, e.g., Oberhammer 2006: 70).

²⁸⁹ Angot 2009: 479.

to say about the identity of the proponents of this theory. One may, therefore, question whether the author of the TABh had a specific opponent in mind when he mentioned the view that *sambhava* is a *pramāṇa*. In fact, it is possible that he simply followed the *Nyāyasūtra*. While there is not enough evidence to answer this question definitively, it is noteworthy that TABh 1.12.7 is phrased as an objection while NS II.2.1 likewise contains the voice of an opponent. This strongly indicates that the author of the TABh was influenced by NS II.2.1.²⁹⁰

Furthermore, the counterargument that is provided in the TABh resembles the counterargument in the *Nyāyasūtra* but the counterargument does not fit very well in the overall theory that is presented in the TA. The TABh refutes the view of the opponent as follows:

sarvāṅy etāni matiśrutayor antarbhūtāni, indriyārthasannikarṣanimittatvāt |

All these [means of cognition] are within ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*) since they are caused by the connection of the object with the sense organ (TABh 1.12.10).

In other words, the author claims that inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*), postulation (*arthāpatti*), equivalence (*sambhava*), [and] negation (*abhāva*) are in fact forms of ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*). This is legitimised by stating that these varieties of cognition are all dependent on sense contact (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa-nimitta*). The first part of this counterargument is similar to *Nyāyasūtra* II.2.2, which refutes the opponent in II.2.1 who claims that *aitihya*, *arthāpatti*, *sambhava*, and *abhāva* are independent means of cognition:

²⁹⁰ Alternatively, it is possible that the objection was a common trope in the discussion of *pramāṇas* at the time of the composition of the TABh and that TABh 1.12.7 was not directly influenced by the *Nyāyasūtra*. Even in that case, however, the similarity between the objections in the TABh and the *Nyāyasūtra* suggests that the TABh derived some of its content from a textual source that was very close to the *Nyāyasūtra*.

*śabda aitihyānarthāntarabhāvād anumāne 'rthāpattisambhavābhāvānar-
thāntarabhāvāc cāpratiśedhaḥ |*

Parce que la 'tradition' n'a pas d'objet qui soit différent de celui du témoignage verbal et que 'supposition nécessaire', 'inclusion' et 'absence' ne diffèrent pas de 'l'inférence', cette dénégation n'est pas justifiée (NS II.2.2).²⁹¹

The *Nyāyasūtra* claims that the means of cognition that the opponent mentions are not proper means of cognition, since they are forms of verbal testimony (*śabda*) and inference (*anumāna*).

While the form of this argument is identical to the form of the argument in the TABh,²⁹² the argument in the *Nyāyasūtra* seems to make more sense. It is perfectly understandable why the *Nyāyasūtra* classifies traditional instruction²⁹³ (*aitihya*) as a type of verbal testimony (*śabda*) and it is also not difficult to see why postulation (*arthāpatti*), equivalence (*sambhava*), and negation (*abhāva*) are classified as forms of inference (*anumāna*). In the end, these means of cognition seem to refer to different types of inferential reasoning. By contrast, the claim in the TABh that inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*), postulation (*arthāpatti*), equivalence (*sambhava*), and negation (*abhāva*) are all forms of ordinary cognition (*matī*) and testimony (*śruta*) is less obvious. First, the TABh does not explain which of these means of cognition are specifically included in ordinary cognition (*matī*) and which means of cognition are subsumed under testimony (*śruta*). Second, the counterargument that the TABh provides is not fully consistent with the theory about ordinary cognition (*matī*) in the TA itself. TABh 1.12.10 states explicitly that the other types of cognition result from 'the connection of the object with the sense organ' (*indriya-artha-sannikarṣa*) but it is not self-evident that inferential reasoning (*anumāna* etc.) is always caused by sense perception. Yet, TA 1.14 mentions that *matī* is caused by the senses (*indriya*) and the mind (*anindriya*) and one could argue, therefore, that inferential reasoning is a form of *matī* that is caused by the mind.²⁹⁴ If the author of the TABh wanted to say that

²⁹¹ Angot 2009: 480.

²⁹² In both texts, the *pramāṇas* that are mentioned by the opponent are subsumed under the accepted *pramāṇas*.

²⁹³ This translation of *aitihya* follows MW. Angot translates 'tradition'.

²⁹⁴ Likewise, TA 1.13 explicitly states that mental activities such as remembrance, recognition, and thought are not different from ordinary cognition (*matīḥ smṛtiḥ saṃjñā*

inferential reasoning is included in *mati* since it is caused by the mind (*anindriya*), it is hard to explain why he only talks about the sense organ (*indriya*) in his counterargument. The fact that the argument in TABh 1.12.10 strongly resembles the argument in NS II.2.2 while it does not fit very well within the epistemological framework of the TA, suggests that the author of the TABh strongly relied on the presentation of *pramāṇa* theory in the *Nyāyasūtra*.

Further, it is somewhat odd that the terminology in the counterargument corresponds with the terminology that the *Nyāyasūtra* uses to qualify *pratyakṣa*. The well-known definition of *pratyakṣa* in NS I.1.4 states that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the knowledge that results from the contact of the object with the sense organ (*indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam ... pratyakṣam*). However, the TABh uses the same description to demonstrate that *anumāna* etc. are forms of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). Perhaps the author used this terminology on purpose to stress that the Jaina model interprets ordinary cognition — which includes sense perception — as *parokṣa* instead of *pratyakṣa*.

Even though the counterargument in TABh 1.12.10 is perhaps not fully convincing, it is still worth questioning why the author tried to refute a different view on the number of *pramāṇas*. Can this passage tell us anything about the opponent and the audience of the TABh? Since the list of mentioned *pramāṇas* cannot be connected with one particular movement but includes *pramāṇas* that were accepted by different opponents, we can assume that the TABh does not try to refute a particular rival. The fact that the list includes *sambhava*, which is an unusual element in *pramāṇa* theory and might be derived from *Nyāyasūtra* II.2.1, further supports the idea that the author is refuting a merely theoretical option and not the actual position of a rival movement. The passage defends the Jaina position by ruling out that there is any other authoritative *pramāṇa* — apart from the five types of knowledge that the TA identifies — and serves, as such, an apologetic goal. The way in which the counterargument is presented only makes sense if one already accepts the Jaina position, which interprets sense perception and mental activity as indirect means of cognition (*parokṣa*). It is, therefore, likely that this passage was mainly written for a Jaina audience that was eager to hear about the superiority of Jaina

cintābhīnibodha ity anarthāntaram). From this perspective, it is not hard to understand why *anumāna* etc. can be seen as forms of *mati*. It is curious that the author of the TABh does not refer to TA 1.13 in his refutation of the opponent.

philosophy. This also explains why the author adds the following remark to his counterargument:

apramāṇāny eva vā | kutaḥ | mithyādarśanaparigrahāt viparītopadeśāc ca |

Or, [they are] indeed not means of cognition. Why? Due to adoption of wrong view and since [it results] from false teaching (TABh 1.12.12 – 1.12.14).²⁹⁵

This is a purely rhetorical remark and not an argument that can be used in any actual debate with a real opponent. Nevertheless, it is clear that the author of the TABh knew the debates in the *Nyāyasūtra*, and the way in which he uses *Nyāya* vocabulary and phrases suggests that his audience was acquainted with the *Nyāyasūtra* too. Therefore, it is likely that the author wrote for a Jaina audience that was acquainted with Nyāya thought but wanted to distinguish itself from the upholders of Nyāya philosophy.

The five types of knowledge

After explaining that the five types of knowledge (*jñāna*) are the two *pramāṇas*, and that the additional *pramāṇas* that are accepted by other movements are in fact forms of *parokṣa*, the TA continues with a discussion of the individual types of knowledge. This section forms the largest part of the first chapter and runs from TA 1.13 up to TA 1.30. The discussion is structured as follows:

²⁹⁵ See also Part II.

[Direct cognition]

TA 1.13 – 1.19 Ordinary cognition (*mati*)

TA 1.13 Synonyms of ordinary cognition

TA 1.14 Relation to the senses and the mind

TA 1.15 Stages of ordinary cognition

TA 1.16 – 1.17 The objects of ordinary cognition

TA 1.17 – 1.18 Perception of the *vyañjana*

TA 1.20 Testimony (*śruta*)

[Indirect cognition]

TA 1.21 – 1.23 Cosmic perception (*avadhi*)

TA 1.24 – 1.25 Mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*)

TA 1.26 Difference between cosmic and mental perception

TA 1.27 – 1.30 Ranges of the different types of knowledge

TA 1.27 Range of ordinary cognition and testimony

TA 1.28 Range of cosmic perception

TA 1.29 Range of mental perception

TA 1.30 Range of omniscience (*kevala*)

The discussion of the types of knowledge starts with an investigation of ordinary cognition (*mati*). First, it defines the concept by giving a list of synonyms (TA 1.13), followed by an explanation of its relation to the senses and the mind (TA 1.14) and an analysis of the different stages that are involved in the process of ordinary cognition (TA 1.15). Next, the *sūtra* deals with the objects of ordinary cognition (TA 1.16 – 1.17) and the role of what is called the *vyañjana*²⁹⁶ in the perceptual process (TA 1.18 – 1.19). The discussion of testimony (*śruta*) is limited to one *sūtra* (TA 1.20). This *sūtra* clarifies the way in which testimony relates to ordinary cognition and explains that ‘testimony’ refers to the different collections of canonical texts. Cosmic perception (*avadhi*) is discussed in three *sūtras*, which mention that there are two classes and six types of cosmic perception (TA 1.21 – 1.23). In a similar way, the *sūtra* mentions that there are two types of mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) (TA 1.24 – 1.25). This is followed by one *sūtra*, which clarifies the difference

²⁹⁶ Since I am not sure about the exact meaning of the term ‘*vyañjana*’, I have left the term untranslated. The prime meaning of the word ‘*vyañjana*’ is ‘sign’ or ‘mark’ (MW). However, these translations do not match the use of ‘*vyañjana*’ in the TA. See the discussion of TA 1.18 below for a further analysis of the term.

between cosmic and mental perception. The final four *sūtras* of the section that deals with the types of knowledge discuss the range of the individual types of knowledge (TA 1.27 – 1.30). The last *sūtra* discusses the range of omniscience (*kevala*) (TA 1.30).

Apart from the comparison of the range of omniscience with the range of other types of knowledge, there is no separate discussion of omniscience. In fact, all types of direct cognition (i.e., *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala*) are only briefly discussed, and the *sūtra* does not provide a proper definition of these means of cognition. Even though the *sūtra* mentions that there are different varieties, it does not explain how these types of knowledge function. By contrast, the discussion of ordinary cognition is quite elaborate and makes it clear what ordinary cognition is and how it functions. The fact that the discussion of knowledge mostly focuses on a type of knowledge that was also accepted by other schools, while the types of knowledge that are not accepted as valid means of cognition by other movements are only briefly mentioned, suggests that the composer of the *sūtra* wanted to clarify the Jaina perspective on ordinary cognition vis-à-vis the views of other movements. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the different types of knowledge in the TA in further detail, with reference to the commentary in the *bhāṣya*. By analysing the way in which the types of knowledge are discussed, I will demonstrate that the TA and the TABh consciously position the Jaina theory of knowledge in a wider epistemological debate.

Ordinary cognition

The TA introduces the discussion of ordinary cognition (*mati*) by giving a list of synonyms:

matih smṛtiḥ saṃjñā cintābhinibodha ity anarthāntaram ||1.13||

‘Ordinary cognition’, ‘remembrance’, ‘recognition’, ‘thought’, [and] ‘apprehension’ — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms).²⁹⁷

At first sight, this list seems to suggest that ordinary cognition is predominantly seen as mental activity.²⁹⁸ However, TS 1.14 states explicitly that *mati* is ‘caused by the

²⁹⁷ See also Part II.

organs of sense (*indriya*) and the mind (*anindriya*).²⁹⁹ This raises the question as to what the role of the senses in ordinary cognition exactly is. The *bhāṣya* on TA 1.14 explains that ordinary cognition that is caused by the sense organs is fivefold, i.e., derived from the five senses; ordinary cognition that is caused by the mind has two varieties: activity of the mind (*manovṛtti*) and instinctive knowledge (*oghajñāna*).³⁰⁰ This indicates that ‘ordinary cognition’ (*mati*) has a very wide meaning — it refers to all types of sensory cognition and includes conscious and unconscious mental activity.

The *sūtra* continues with a description of the four stages of ordinary cognition (TA 1.15). This list suggests that the process of ordinary cognition — from the initial sense perception to the final grasping of its content — involves both the senses and the mind:

***avagrahehāpāyadhāraṇāḥ* ||1.15||**

[The phases of ordinary cognition are]:

- sense perception (*avagraha*)
- endeavour to obtain (*īhā*)
- elimination (*apāya*)³⁰¹ [and]
- holding (i.e., remembrance) (*dhāraṇā*).

This list explains the way in which knowledge is obtained from ordinary cognition. First, there is sense perception (*avagraha*), which should be understood as the initial contact between a sense organ and its object.³⁰² This initial impression is followed by the ‘endeavour to obtain’ (*īhā*), i.e., the attempt of the cogniser to grasp

²⁹⁸ The meaning of the word ‘*abhinibodha*’ (or *ābhinibodhika-jñāna*) is not as obvious as the meaning of the other synonyms in the list and is not mentioned in standard Sanskrit dictionaries. Bhatt writes that the later Jaina tradition interpreted ‘*ābhinibodhika-jñāna*’, which frequently appears in the canonical sources, as a synonym of *mati*. Eventually, the term ‘*mati-jñāna*’ replaced ‘*ābhinibodhika-jñāna*’ (Bhatt 1978: 75).

²⁹⁹ *tad indriyānindriyanimittam* (TA 1.14).

³⁰⁰ The five senses, which are mentioned in TABh 1.14.3, are listed in TA 2.20. The term *oghajñāna* seems to refer to instinctive knowledge. See the translation of TABh 1.14.4 for a discussion of this term.

³⁰¹ Sanghvi reads *avāya*. He remarks that both readings are possible according to Akalaṅka (Sanghvi 1974: 4, footnote 4). Balcerowicz notes that ‘*apāya*’ is used in the Śvetāmbara tradition and ‘*avāya*’ in the Digambara tradition (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001).

³⁰² See also TABh 1.15.4 – 1.15.5.

the object completely.³⁰³ Next, the cogniser determines the right interpretation of the perception by eliminating alternative interpretations. This stage is called 'elimination' (*apāya*). After determining the right interpretation of the sense perception, the cogniser can retain the acquired knowledge. This final stage is labelled 'holding' (*dhāraṇā*).

This fourfold analysis of the process of ordinary cognition is perfectly comprehensible from a common sense point of view and matches ordinary experience. Moreover, it provides a model that can account for the fact that ordinary cognition can lead to false knowledge. To illustrate, when someone walks along the beach, her eye might suddenly be attracted to a shiny object at a short distance because the sun reflects its light on its surface. At this point, the perceiver is not paying proper attention to the object and she does not know yet what it is. This is the stage of 'sense perception' (*avagraha*), i.e., the initial contact between the object and the sense organ. Next, she might focus her attention on the object to find out what it is. In the end, it might be something valuable, like a silver coin. This is the 'endeavour to obtain' (*īhā*). By approaching the object and examining it more carefully, the perceiver can find out that there is no silver coin but just a shell that is coated in mother-of-pearl. This is the stage of 'elimination' (*apāya*). Finally, the perceiver knows what the object is. Having acquired knowledge about the initial sense perception, she can remember this knowledge episode when she is confronted with a similar situation. This is called 'holding' (*dhāraṇā*).

Since a perceiver only acquires knowledge when the initial sense perception is properly investigated, it is possible that one ends up with false cognition (*ajñāna*).³⁰⁴ For example, when someone sees a coin but does not know that there are counterfeit coins, it is likely that this person will falsely determine the object as a genuine coin.³⁰⁵

Even though this fourfold analysis nicely explains how sensory perception can lead to knowledge, it is remarkable that this model assumes that all ordinary

³⁰³ TABh 1.15.6 explains 'īhā' as 'the desire to know the particularities by inquiry' (*niścaya-viśeṣa-jijñāsā*). TABh 1.15.7 mentions 'tarka' as a synonym.

³⁰⁴ See TABh 1.32.3. See § 3.2 *False knowledge* for a discussion of the theory of error.

³⁰⁵ Epistemological models that interpret perception as a linear process in which knowledge automatically results from sense perception face problems in explaining the possibility of error. The four stages of ordinary cognition provide a model in which sense perceptions can lead to false knowledge due to a wrong interpretation of the initial sense perception.

cognition begins with sense perception.³⁰⁶ This does not seem to match the description of ordinary cognition in TA 1.13, which interprets ordinary cognition as mental activity. Of course, one could claim that all forms of thought are ultimately based on sensory input and it is not unlikely that this is the idea behind the discussion of ordinary cognition in the TA. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why the TA deals with ordinary cognition in a rather confusing way: TA 1.13 equates ordinary cognition with *mental activity*, TA 1.14 states that ordinary cognition is caused by the *sense organs and the mind*, and the remainder of the discussion (TA 1.15 – TA 1.19) deals with ordinary cognition as *sensory cognition*. As such, it seems that there are two different views on ordinary cognition, which are only connected by the claim in TA 1.14. This might indicate that the Jaina tradition did not have a consistent view on ordinary cognition at the moment of the composition of the *sūtra* and that the author of the TA tried to unite these views in a single discussion.

Balcerowicz suggests that the Jaina tradition developed its theory about the fourfold stages of perception under influence of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought.³⁰⁷ It is hard to trace exactly how the development of Jaina epistemology took place before the TA but it is clear that Nyāya epistemology influenced the traditional Jaina perspective. This process is reflected in the *Bhagavatī*, which lists the four means of cognition that the Naiyāyikas accept as authoritative *pramāṇas*. The same text also mentions the four stages of ordinary cognition that are listed in TA 1.15, which supports Balcerowicz' claim that this theory developed under Nyāya influence.³⁰⁸ It seems likely, therefore, that the first Jaina epistemological theories had little to say about sense perception. More advanced theories about *pratyakṣa* in other schools probably urged the Jainas to include a theory about sensory perception in their own system. The different layers of this process seem to be reflected in the presentation of ordinary cognition in the TA. The analysis of the role of the *vyāñjana* in ordinary cognition in TA 18 – 19 provides further evidence that the Jainas were still

³⁰⁶ The *bhāṣya* explicitly states that the four stages apply to all forms of ordinary cognition, i.e., those that are caused by the senses and those that are caused by the mind (See TABh 1.15.1).

³⁰⁷ Balcerowicz notes that the fivefold division of knowledge in the Jaina tradition does not reflect any external influence but that the 'particular solutions and definitions of respective cognitions' show influence from outside (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001).

³⁰⁸ See, e.g., Shastri 1990: 202. The oldest layers of the epistemological theory of the Jainas do not include the fourfold theory of perception (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1024, Model I).

developing their theories against the background of Nyāya thought at the time of the composition of the TA.

After listing the stages of ordinary cognition, the TA continues with a description of the objects of ordinary cognition:

bahubahavidhakṣiprāniśritānuktadhruvāṇāṃ setarāṇāṃ ||1.16||

[The objects of ordinary cognition appear as] much (*bahu*), of many sorts (*bahavidha*), swift (*kṣipra*), independent (*aniśrita*), non-verbal (*anukta*), and constant (*dhruva*) together with their opposites.

It is not exactly clear to me what the idea behind this list is.³⁰⁹ The fact that these qualifications are supposed to have their opposites indicates that this list tries to categorise the objects of perception in a systematic way, even though it is hard to understand the underlying principles. The explanation in the *bhāṣya* is not very helpful. It simply mentions that the objects of ordinary cognition throughout its four stages are qualified as described in the *sūtra* (TABh 1.16.1). While these qualifications most likely relate to the objects (*artha*)³¹⁰ of ordinary cognition, it seems that some of them actually qualify the perception itself. In other words, it is not entirely clear whether the terms in TA 1.6 are ontological or phenomenological descriptions. This ambiguity is also reflected in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. In his commentary on TA 1.16, Pūjyapāda explains that the list provides a subdivision of *avagraha* but in the commentary on the following *sūtra* he states that *bahu* etc. qualify the objects of apprehension.³¹¹

It is hard to decide which interpretation of TA 1.16 is more plausible based on the text alone. Apart from the list of adjectives and the reference to their opposites (*itara*), there is no additional information in TA 1.16 that provides any context. The qualifications are in genitive plural and seem to relate syntactically to the four stages of perception (*avagraha* etc.) that are listed in TA 1.15 in nominative plural. If we combine these two *sūtras*, we end up with the basic structure: '[There is]

³⁰⁹ Jacobi points out that the Jaina commentaries have different interpretations of the meaning of '*aniśrita*' (Jacobi 1906: 296). Further, a variant version of the text reads '*sandigdha*' (unambiguous) instead of '*anukta*' (see also Part II). It seems, therefore, that the Jaina tradition struggled to agree on the meaning of this *sūtra*.

³¹⁰ See TA 1.17.

³¹¹ S.A. Jain 1992: 25-26.

sense perception (*avagraha*) etc. of many (*bahu ...*) etc.³¹² However, this combined sentence still needs a noun that is qualified by *bahu* etc. This noun is provided in TA 1.17, which consists of one word only, i.e., '*arthasya*'. It is unclear to me why '*artha*' does not correspond in number with the adjectives in TA 1.16.³¹³ The underlying idea of TA 1.15 – 1.17 seems to be that there is sense perception etc. of sense objects that are many, of many sorts, swift etc.³¹⁴ One could argue that the text allows for this interpretation, even though '*artha*' and '*bahu[...]*' do not correspond in number. Yet, the bigger problem is formed by the three last adjectives. While it is perfectly plausible to describe sense objects as 'many' (*bahu*), 'of many sorts' (*bahavidha*), and 'swift' (*kṣipra*), it is harder to understand how sense objects could be 'independent' (*aniśrita*), 'non-verbal' (*anukta*), and 'constant' (*dhruva*).

The translation of the TA by Tatia solves this problem by taking the first items in TA 1.16 as qualifications of the sense objects and the last items as qualifications of the process of perception.³¹⁵ Unfortunately, Tatia's work does not refer to a source that legitimises this interpretation. The definition of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) in the *Nyāyasūtra*, however, contains a threefold qualification that resembles the last three adjectives in TA 1.16:

³¹² The full translation of TA 1.15 and 1.16 is provided above.

³¹³ One would expect '*arthānām*' instead of '*arthasya*'. It is also possible to read TA 1.17 together with TA 1.18: '*arthasya ||1.17|| vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ ||1.18||*' ([There is] sense perception of the *vyañjana* [and] the sense object.) Pūjyapāda discusses '*arthāvagraha*' and '*vyañjanāvagraha*' in his commentary on TA 1.18, which indicates that he reads TA 1.17 together with TA 1.18 (S.A. Jain 1992: 26 - 27). In fact, it is not impossible that the author of the TA used '*artha*' as the object of the preceding and the following *sūtras*.

³¹⁴ A more straightforward organisation of the content in TA 1.15 – 1.17 would be: *bahubahavidhākṣiprāniśritānuktadhruvāṇām setarāṇām arthānām avagrahehāpāyadhāraṇāḥ*.

³¹⁵ Tatia translates TA 1.16 as follows: 'The objects perceptible by relatively pure mental faculties are multiple and complex and the comprehension of them is quick, partially exposed, unspoken and constant. The objects perceptible by relatively impure mental faculties are few and simple and the comprehension of them is slow, completely exposed, spoken and inconstant' (Tatia 2011: 16-17). He obviously reads a lot into the rather concise *sūtra* and the meaning of the adjectives that qualify the 'comprehension' is still obscure. Nevertheless, the idea that some of the adjectives qualify the sense object while the others qualify the sense perception is appealing.

*indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri
vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam |*

La perception-immédiate c'est la connaissance produite par le contact d'un organe-sensoriel avec un objet; **elle est non-verbale, non sujette à l'erreur et consiste en une connaissance déterminée** (NS I.1.4).³¹⁶

Of course, the individual words in TA 1.16 and NS I.1.4 are quite different but it is remarkable that both *sūtras* are dealing with sense perception and that both passages use the qualifications 'non-verbal' (*anukta* in the TABh, *avyapadeśya* in the NS) and 'definitive' (*dhruva* in the TABh, *vyavasāyātmaka* in the NS).³¹⁷ It is unlikely that this correspondence is completely coincidental. Even though there is not enough evidence to say that TA 1.16 was directly influenced by NS I.1.4, the matching terms do suggest that at least some of the adjectives in TA 1.16 qualify the perceptual process (*avagraha* etc.) instead of the objects (*artha*). The fact that this is not evident from the syntax of the *sūtra* might explain why later commentators did not agree on its interpretation and why we ended up with different versions of this *sūtra*.

The content of the *sūtras* that immediately follow TA 1.15 – 1.17 provides further evidence that this passage was indeed influenced by the discussion of *pratyakṣa* in the *Nyāyasūtra*. TA 1.18 – 1.19 addresses a technical debate about the precise object of sense perception:

vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ ||1.18|| na cakṣuranindriyābhyām ||1.19||

[There is] sense perception of the *vyañjana*. [However, there is] no [sense perception of the *vyañjana*] by the eyes (*caḥsus*) or the mind (*anindriya*).

³¹⁶ Angot 2009: 271-272 (emphasis mine). As demonstrated above, the counterargument in TABh 1.12.10 seems to be based on the first part of this *sūtra*.

³¹⁷ Dasti translates '*vyavasāyātmaka*' as 'definitive' (Dasti 2017: 20). This is very close to the prime meaning of '*dhruva*', which is given as 'unchangeable', 'permanent', etc. in MW. It is hard to evaluate whether the term '*anīśrita*' in the TA possibly relates to '*avyabhicārin*' in the *Nyāyasūtra*. As mentioned above, the reading and meaning of this term is contested in the Jaina tradition (Jacobi 1906: 296). The *Sarvārthasiddhi* reads '*anīḥsṛta*'.

The word ‘*vyañjana*’ is difficult to translate but seems to refer to the actual contact of a sense organ with its object.³¹⁸ TA 1.19 points out that the eye and the mind cannot perceive the ‘*vyañjana*’ and the *bhāṣya* explicitly states that the other senses do have the *vyañjana* as its object.³¹⁹ This suggests that the term ‘*vyañjana*’ refers to the physical contact between the sense organ and the object, which is possible in the case of the other sense organs but not in the case of the eye or the mind.³²⁰ Hence, we end up with the following four possible connections between a sense organ and the *vyañjana*:

VIII. Types of ordinary cognition (<i>mati</i>) that have <i>vyañjanāvagraha</i> (TA1.19)	
<i>indriya</i>	<i>vyañjanāvagraha</i>
i. <i>sparśana</i>	+
ii. <i>rasana</i>	+
iii. <i>ghrāna</i>	+
iv. <i>caḥsus</i>	-
v. <i>śrotra</i>	+
<i>anindriya</i>	
vi. <i>manas</i>	-

The idea that there is no direct contact between the eye and its object goes against the view on *pratyakṣa* in NS I.1.4, which says that *pratyakṣa* — which includes visual perception for the *Naiyāyikas* — results from the contact of the object with the sense organ (*indriyārthasaṃnikarṣa*).³²¹ Hence, it seems that the author of the TA is trying to present a slightly different view by excluding the possibility of direct contact between the object and eye or the mind.

The TABh on TA 1.18 explains that the phrase ‘*vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ*’ entails that the *vyañjana* is the object at the first stage of ordinary cognition only. In other words, there is only sense perception (*avagraha*) of the *vyañjana*, and not the

³¹⁸ Jacobi translates the term ‘*vyañjana*’ as ‘eine unbestimmte Empfindung’ (Jacobi 1906: 296). Tatia translates ‘contact-awareness’ (Tatia 1951:35).

³¹⁹ ‘*caturbhir indriyaiḥ śeśair bhavati*’ (TABh 1.19.2).

³²⁰ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* illustrates this point as follows: ‘The sense-organ of sight is one without contact, for it does not apprehend an object in contact with it. If it were one with contact, it would perceive the collyrium applied to the eye. But it does not perceive it; so it is a sense without contact like the mind’ (S.A. Jain 1992: 27 - 28).

³²¹ The relation between TA 1.18 - 1.19 and NS I.1.4 has been previously observed by Ohira (Ohira 1982: 57).

endeavour to obtain (*īhā*) etc.³²² Ordinary cognition, however, is directed at the object (*artha*) throughout its four stages.³²³ Hence, the way in which the different stages of ordinary cognition relate to the object and the *vyañjana* can be summarised as follows:

IX. Objects of the different phases of ordinary cognition (<i>mati</i>) (TA1.17 – 1.18)		
	<i>artha</i>	<i>vyañjana</i>
<i>avagraha</i>	+	+
<i>īhā</i>	+	-
<i>apāya</i>	+	-
<i>dhāraṇā</i>	+	-

If the *vyañjana* indeed refers to the physical contact between the sense organ and the object, the above table makes perfect sense. In the end, the three last stages of ordinary cognition (*īhā*, *apāya*, and *dhāraṇā*) are predominantly mental activities and do not engage with the object in a physical way.

It is remarkable that the *bhāṣya* on TA 1.19 uses the peculiar word formation ‘*noindriya*’ instead of ‘*anindriya*’, which is used in the *sūtra* itself.³²⁴ Since both words are clearly used to refer to ‘mind’, one could argue that the *bhāṣya* uses a synonym to clarify the term. However, synonyms are explicitly indicated as such in the *bhāṣya*.³²⁵ It is also unlikely that we are dealing with a scribal error since the same phenomenon occurs in the commentary on TA 2.22, in which the *bhāṣya* uses the word ‘*noindriya*’ in the first sentence after the *sūtra* while the *sūtra* says

³²² ‘*vyañjanasyāvagraha eva bhavati nehādayaḥ*’ (TABh 1.18.1).

³²³ ‘*īhādayas tv arthasyaiva*’ (TABh 1.18.3).

³²⁴ The *sūtra* states: ‘*na cakṣuranindriyābhyām*’ (TA 1.19) and the *bhāṣya* comments: ‘*cakṣuṣā noindriyeṇa ca vyañjanāvagraho na bhavati*’ (TA 1.19.1). The word ‘*noindriya*’ is uncommon in classical Sanskrit. It probably derives from ‘*na u indriya*’ (and not ‘*indriya*’). The particle ‘*u*’ can indicate a restriction or an antithesis (MW).

In her article on sensory cognition in the *Nandīsūtra*, Clavel points out that the *Nandīsūtra* uses the term ‘*noindriya*’ in reference to two different meanings: it is used to label the types of cognition that are included in *pratyakṣa* (*avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala*) but it is also used as a name for non-sensory cognition that is caused by the mind. The TABh uses the term in this second sense. In the same article, Clavel remarks that the difference between the TA and the TABh illustrates that the philosophical terminology of the Jainas was subject to change at the time of the composition of these texts. She relates this change of vocabulary and the shifting classifications of cognition to the influence of the Naiyāyikas (Clavel 2015).

³²⁵ The *bhāṣya* usually adds ‘*anarthāntaram*’ when a word is explained with synonyms. See, e.g., TABh 1.3.4, 1.3.7, 1.5.5. The *sūtra* uses the same expression in TA 1.13.

'*anindriya*'.³²⁶ Since the word '*noindriya*' was used in different ways in early treatises on Jaina epistemology, it is possible that there was some controversy about the exact meaning of the term. Since the *bhāṣya* uses both '*noindriya*' and '*anindriya*' while the context of these terms does not indicate that they refer to different concepts, it is hard to tell whether these terms had a different meaning for the author of the *bhāṣya*.³²⁷ The difference can be seen as an argument for the position that the author of the *sūtra* did not write the *bhāṣya*, even though this cannot be taken as conclusive evidence.

After discussing the different types of ordinary cognition (*mati*) and their objects (*artha* and *vyañjana*), the *bhāṣya* concludes the commentary on *mati* by summing up the divisions and subdivisions of *mati*:

***evam etat matijñānaṃ dvividhaṃ caturvidham aṣṭāviṃśatavidham aṣṭaṣaṣṭy-
uttaraśatavidhaṃ ṣaṭtriṃśattriśatavidhaṃ ca bhavati |***

So, this ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*) is twofold, fourfold, 28-fold, 168-fold, and 336-fold (TABh 1.19.3).

The *bhāṣya* does not provide any further explanation about this enumeration and it is hard to interpret the meaning of these numbers on the basis of the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* alone.³²⁸ This suggests that the author of the *bhāṣya* refers to a classification of the types of ordinary cognition that was well known when the *bhāṣya* was composed. In the table below, I provide a possible interpretation of the numbers. The organisation of the table corresponds to the organisation of the types of ordinary cognition in the *Nandīsūtra*, which successively lists four types of '*vyañjanāvagraha*', and six types of '*arthāvagraha*', six types of '*īhā*', six types of '*avāya*', and six types of '*dhāraṇā*'.³²⁹ The number six in these lists refers to the five

³²⁶ While the *sūtra* says '*śrutam anindriyaśya*' (TA 2.22), the *bhāṣya* comments '*śrutajñānaṃ dvividham anekadvādaśavidhaṃ noindriyaśyārthaḥ*' (TABh 2.22.1).

³²⁷ The *bhāṣya* uses the term '*anindriya*' in different parts of the commentary, such as TABh 1.1.9, 1.14.1, and 1.20.36. Unlike the *bhāṣya*, which seems to use the two terms interchangeably, the *sūtra* only uses '*anindriya*'.

³²⁸ The *bhāṣya* mentions the twofold division of *mati* in TABh 1.18.2 and the fourfold division in TABh 1.15.1. The other numbers are not mentioned before.

³²⁹ Amar 2007: 309-319.

senses (*indriya*) and the mind (*manas*). Since the eye and the mind cannot perceive the *vyañjana*, the list of types of *vyañjanāvagraha* is only fourfold.³³⁰

X. Varieties of ordinary cognition (<i>mati</i>) (TA 1.13 – 1.19)				
Stages (TA 1.15)	Types (2) (TABh 1.14.2)	Objects and <i>vyañjana</i>		
	<i>indriyanimitta</i> and <i>anindriyanimitta</i> ³³¹ (TA 1.14)	<i>artha</i> (TA 1.17)		<i>vyañjana</i> (TA 1.18)
		Qualifications (TA 1.16) ³³²	The opposites (TABh 1.16.2–9)	Four types of <i>vyañjanāvagraha</i> (TABh 1.19.1-2)
<i>avagraha</i>	<i>sparśana</i>	<i>bahu</i>	<i>alpa</i>	<i>sparśana</i>
<i>ihā</i>	<i>rasana</i>	<i>bahavidha</i>	<i>ekavidha</i>	<i>rasana</i>
<i>apāya</i>	<i>ghrāna</i>	<i>kṣipra</i>	<i>cireṇa</i>	<i>ghrāna</i>
<i>dhāraṇā</i>	<i>caḥsus</i>	<i>aniśrita</i>	<i>niśrita</i>	
	<i>śrotra</i>	<i>anukta</i> ³³³	<i>ukta</i>	<i>śrotra</i>
	<i>manas</i>	<i>dhruva</i>	<i>adhruva</i>	
4	6	6	6	*4
28 [= (4 × 6) + 4*]		12 (= 2 × 6)		
168 (= 28 × 6)				
336 (= 28 × 12)				

The numbers that are mentioned in TABh 1.19.3 are emphasized in the above table. The **twofold** division refers to the types of ordinary cognition that are caused respectively by the sense organs and the mind (TA 1.14).³³⁴The **fourfold** division relates to the stages of the perceptual process, as mentioned in TA 1.15. The larger numbers result from the multiplication of the stages of ordinary cognition by the types of ordinary cognition and their objects. The **28-fold** division results from the application of the four stages of ordinary cognition to the five senses and the mind

³³⁰ Since the *vyañjana* is the object of sense perception (*avagraha*) only, the *vyañjana* is not the object of '*ihā*' etc. (TABh 1.18.1). Therefore, apart from the four types of *vyañjanāvagraha* (related to *sparśana*, *rasana*, *ghrāna*, and *śrotra*), all other types of ordinary cognition are directed at the object (*artha*) (TA 1.17).

³³¹ The five *indriyas* are listed in TA 2.20.

³³² As discussed above, it is possible that some of the qualifications in TA 1.16 refer to the perceptual process instead of the objects.

³³³ Other versions of the TA read '*asandigdha*' instead of '*anukta*'. See also above.

³³⁴ Alternatively, it could refer to the type of ordinary cognition that relate to the object (*artha*) and the *vyañjana*, as mentioned in TA 1.17 – 1.18. The commentary on these *sūtras* uses the term 'twofold' (*dvividha*).

(which gives 24 varieties) together with the four types of *vyañjanāvagraha*. The number **168** results from the application of the 28 varieties to the six sorts of objects. By adding the six opposite sorts of objects to the same calculation, the number doubles to **336**.³³⁵

Testimony

After discussing ordinary cognition (*mati*), the TA addresses testimony (*śruta*), which is seen as a form of indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*).³³⁶ Testimonial knowledge is discussed as follows:

śrutam matipūrvaṃ dvyanekadvādaśabhedam ||1.20||

Testimony (*śruta*) is preceded by ordinary cognition (*mati*). [It consists of] two [varieties], the many [outer limbs] and the twelve [inner limbs].

The *sūtra* is very concise, and the TA does not provide any further information about testimony as a source of knowledge. It is striking that there is only one *sūtra* that deals with testimony while ordinary cognition is discussed in seven *sūtras*. This suggests that the composer of the TA did not feel the need to defend the Jaina perspective on testimony vis-à-vis the views of other movements. The *sūtra* further suggests that the meaning of ‘two’ (*dvi*), ‘many’ (*aneka*) and ‘twelve’ (*dvādaśa*) was evident for the audience of the TA, since the TA does not explain their meaning. The number ‘two’ (*dvi*) in the *sūtra* seems to refer to the division of texts as listed in the *bhāṣya*, i.e., the twelve ‘inner limbs’ and many ‘outer limbs’.³³⁷ The *bhāṣya* explains that the disciples of the *jina* (*gaṇadharas*) composed the first group of texts, while the second group was composed by later teachers (*ācāryas*).³³⁸ While the *bhāṣya* does not comment on the number ‘two’, it does explain the reference of ‘many’ and ‘twelve’ as follows:

³³⁵ The table is based on the analyses of the TABh by Tatia (Tatia 1951: 44) and Sanghvi (Sanghvi 1974: chapter 1, p. 36).

³³⁶ See TA 1.11.

³³⁷ The ‘inner limbs’ and ‘outer limbs’ are listed in the table below.

³³⁸ TABh 1.20.19 – 22. This interpretation is in line with the explanation in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (S.A. Jain 1960: 30).

aṅgabāhyam anekavidham [...] aṅgapraviṣṭam dvādaśavidham |

The [corpus of] outer limbs (*aṅgabāhya*) [is] manifold (TABh 1.20.5). The [corpus of] inner limbs (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*) [is] twelvefold (TABh 1.20.8).

The word ‘limb’ (*aṅga*) in the commentary refers to a section of the corpus of authoritative Jaina texts or ‘āgamas’.³³⁹ The TABh explains that there are twelve ‘inner limbs’ (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*) and many ‘outer limbs’ (*aṅgabāhya*), which can be interpreted as ‘core teachings’ and ‘additional teachings’.³⁴⁰ The titles of these texts are given in the table below.

XI. Testimonial knowledge (<i>śrutajñāna</i>): The Jaina scriptures	
The corpus of outer limbs (<i>aṅgabāhya</i>) (TABh 1.20.7)	The corpus of inner limbs (<i>aṅgapraviṣṭa</i>) (TABh 1.20.10)
i. <i>Sāmāyika</i>	i. <i>Ācāra</i>
ii. <i>Caturviṃśatistava</i>	ii. <i>Sūtrakṛta</i>
iii. <i>Vandana</i>	iii. <i>Sthāna</i>
iv. <i>Pratikramaṇa</i>	iv. <i>Samavāya</i>
v. <i>Kāyavyutsarga</i>	v. <i>Vyākhyāprajñapti</i>
vi. <i>Pratyākhyāna</i>	vi. <i>Jñātadharmakathāḥ</i> ³⁴¹
vii. <i>Daśavaikālika</i>	vii. <i>Upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ</i>
viii. <i>Uttarādhyāyāḥ</i>	viii. <i>Antakṛddāśāḥ</i>
ix. <i>Daśāḥ</i>	ix. <i>Anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ</i>
x. <i>Kalpavyavahārau</i>	x. <i>Praśnavyākaraṇa</i>
xi. <i>Niśītha</i>	xi. <i>Vipākasūtra</i>
xii. <i>Ṛṣibhāṣitāni</i>	xii. <i>Drṣṭipāta</i>
<i>Etc.</i> ³⁴²	

³³⁹ Dundas notes that the terminology that is used to describe the two main parts of the contemporary Śvetāmbara canon (i.e., *aṅga* and *upāṅga*) ‘may have been borrowed from Vedic learning and indicate an original desire to organise Jain writings on the model of those of the brahmins’. The Jaina tradition compares their body of scriptures to the human body, which both have twelve limbs (*aṅga*), i.e., ‘feet, calves, thighs, forearms, arms, neck and head’ (Dundas 1992: 73).

³⁴⁰ The *Nandīsūtra* divides the Jaina corpus in a similar way into ‘inner limbs’ (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*) and ‘outer limbs’ (*aṅgabāhira*, *anaṅgapraviṣṭa*). It attributes the first group to Mahāvīra’s disciples and the second group to later monks (Dundas 1992: 77). The same view about the composers of these two groups of text is expressed in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (1960: 31).

³⁴¹ Some manuscripts read ‘*jñātādharmakathā*’ (Mody 1903: 20).

³⁴² The TABh adds ‘*evam ādi*’ to the list, which indicates that there are more texts that belong to the group of ‘outer limbs’.

The list of twelve ‘inner limbs’ (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*) in the TABh corresponds to the twelfefold list of *aṅgas* that is accepted by the Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions.³⁴³ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* mentions a similar list in its commentary on TA 1.20.³⁴⁴ However, the *Sarvārthasiddhi* explains the word ‘many’ (*aneka*) in the *sūtra* by giving only two examples of outer limbs (*aṅgabāhya*) instead of twelve: the *Daśavaikālika* and the *Uttarādhyayana*.³⁴⁵ This suggests that the composers of the TABh and the *Sarvārthasiddhi* had different views on the ‘outer limbs’.³⁴⁶ The fact that the TA refers to the ‘many’ (*aneka*) outer limbs instead of giving an exact number indicates that there had yet to be a standard list of ‘outer limbs’, or that there was no consensus about the list. By contrast, it must have been generally accepted that there were twelve ‘inner limbs’, since the *sūtra* explicitly refers to a ‘twelfefold’ list.

Whatever the precise reference of the ‘many’ and ‘twelfefold’ texts might be, the reference to the ‘inner and outer limbs’ in TA 1.20 suggests that the author of the TA interprets testimonial knowledge (*śruta*) as the knowledge that is derived from sacred teachings and not simply as knowledge that is conveyed by any credible person.³⁴⁷ However, the first part of the *sūtra* states that testimony is preceded by ordinary cognition (*matipūrva*). The meaning of this expression is open to various interpretations since it is not specified whether testimony is preceded by ordinary

³⁴³ Even though the Digambara tradition agrees that these titles refer to the twelve *aṅgas*, they assume that the original texts are lost. Unlike the Śvetāmbaras, they do not accept the outstanding versions of these texts as authoritative works. It is unclear how and when the crystallisation of these different perspectives on the Jaina scriptures took place (Dundas 1992: 79-80). Dixit assumes that the Digambara view on the authority of the *aṅgas* started to change in the 6th – 7th cent. CE (Dixit 1971: 2).

³⁴⁴ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* reads ‘*Jñātṛdharmakathā*’ instead of ‘*Jñātadharmakathāḥ*’ (alt. *jñātā*), ‘*Upāsakādhyayana*’ instead of ‘*Upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ*’ and *Drṣṭivāda* instead of *Drṣṭapāta* (see also Fujinaga 2007: 4). These minor variations might result from the fact that these texts are composed in Prākṛit while the titles are provided in Sanskrit. Nevertheless, these differences indicate that the titles of the twelve *aṅgas* were not completely standardised yet at the moment of the composition of the TABh.

³⁴⁵ The TABh uses the name ‘*Uttarādhyāyāḥ*’.

³⁴⁶ It is unclear to me what the source of the list of outer limbs in the TABh is.

³⁴⁷ The explanation in the *bhāṣya* confirms this view: “Testimony’ (*śruta*), ‘the words of the *āpta*’ (*āptavacana*), ‘scriptural tradition’ (*āgama*), ‘teaching’ (*upadeśa*), ‘tradition’ (*aitihya*), ‘sacred tradition’ (*āmnāya*), ‘sacred writings’ (*pravacana*), [and] ‘the words of the *jina*’ (*jinavacana*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*śrutam āptavacanam āgamaḥ upadeśa aitihiyam āmnāyaḥ pravacanam jinavacanam ity anarthāntaram*)’ (TABh 1.20.2). This list strongly suggests that *āptavacana* — the second synonym in the list — refers to scriptural knowledge.

cognition for the receiver or for the conveyer of testimony. In other words, it is unclear whether the *sūtra* tries to say that scriptural knowledge is ultimately derived from ordinary cognition or that one cannot acquire scriptural knowledge without ordinary cognition since one has to hear it. The *bhāṣya* on TA 1.11, which deals with indirect cognition, discusses the relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony as follows:

tatpūrvakatvāt paropadeśajatvāc ca śrutajñānam |

Knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*) [is an indirect means of cognition] from the quality of being preceded by that (i.e., by ordinary cognition) (*tatpūrvakatva*) and by the quality of being caused by the instruction of others (*paropadeśajatva*) (TABh 1.11.8).

Even though this passage in the *bhāṣya* does explain why testimony is not a direct form of cognition, it does not fully clarify the exact relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony. The *bhāṣya* on TA 1.20 comments on the phrase ‘preceded by ordinary cognition’ (*matipūrva*) but does not satisfactorily explain its meaning. It basically repeats the statement in the *sūtra* without giving much more information.³⁴⁸ Therefore, one might question whether the author of the *bhāṣya* had a clear idea about the precise meaning of the expression in the *sūtra*.

The *Sarvārthasiddhi* addresses the relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony in greater detail. It states explicitly that ordinary cognition is the instrumental cause of testimony. Following this statement, Pūjyapāda discusses several objections to this view, such as the idea that testimony cannot be eternal if it is caused by ordinary cognition. He tries to counter this argument by applying different perspectives, which leads Pūjyapāda to the conclusion that testimony is both eternal and non-eternal, depending on one’s perspective.³⁴⁹ This argument is hardly convincing for anyone who does not adhere to the Jaina theory of perspectives. Given the difficulties of the position that testimony results from ordinary cognition, it is hard to understand why the composer of the TA added this

³⁴⁸ The *bhāṣya* on TA 1.20 simply comments that ‘[k]nowledge from testimony is preceded by knowledge from ordinary cognition’ (*śrutajñānam matijñānapūrvakam bhavati*) (TABh 1.20.1). At the end of the commentary on TA 1.20, the *bhāṣya* uses the expression ‘*tatpūrvaka*’ again but does not elaborate on its meaning (see TABh 1.20.37).

³⁴⁹ S.A. Jain 1960: 28 - 30.

phrase to its description of testimony. In the end, there is nothing in the context of TA 1.20 that asks for a specification of the relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony and it would have been sufficient if TA 1.20 simply said '*śrutam dvyanekadvādaśabhedam*' and omitted '*matipūrvam*'.

As shown previously, the discussion of ordinary cognition in the TA seems to respond to the definition of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) in *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.3. It is, therefore, remarkable that the next *sūtra* (i.e., NS I.1.4) uses an expression that is very similar to the phrase 'preceded by ordinary cognition' (*matipūrva*) in TA 1.20:

atha tatpūrvakaṃ trividham anumānaṃ pūrvavaccheṣavatsāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca |

Maintenant l'inférence précédée de cette <perception>; elle est de trois sortes appelées *pūrvavat* 'avec précédent', *śeṣavat* 'avec conséquent' et *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* 'vu à partir d'un trait commun' (NS I.1.5).³⁵⁰

Even though this *sūtra* deals with inference (*anumāna*) and not with testimony, there are some striking similarities between TA 1.20 and NS I.1.5. First of all, NS I.1.5 immediately follows the discussion of *pratyakṣa*, while TA 1.20 immediately follows the discussion of *mati*. The expression '*tatpūrvaka*' in NS I.1.5 means 'preceded by *pratyakṣa*', which is very close to the meaning of '*matipūrva*' in TA 1.20. Both expressions play a similar role in the text: they connect the discussion of the first and second source or type of knowledge.³⁵¹ Further, after stating that inference is preceded by *pratyakṣa*, NS I.1.5 explains that there are three types of inference. Likewise, the TA classifies testimony in a threefold manner by pointing to a twofold, manifold, and twelvefold division of texts. In other words, the structure of both *sūtras* can be rendered as 'X is preceded by Y and has three varieties'. It seems, therefore, that the composer of the TA used NS I.1.5 and twisted its meaning when he wrote his definition of testimony. This might explain why the suggested relation between ordinary cognition and testimony is not evident and caused some difficulties for the early commentators; the expression '*matipūrva*' in the TA basically echoes '*tatpūrvaka*' in the *Nyāyasūtra* but the concepts in both *sūtras* are fundamentally different. Hence, it is not surprising that the relationship between

³⁵⁰ Angot 2009: 280.

³⁵¹ I.e., *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* in the *Nyāyasūtra* and *mati* and *śruta* in the TA.

ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*) is not as evident as the relationship between direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).

The similarity between TA 1.20 and NS I.1.5 confirms my earlier observation that the composer of the TA was well acquainted with Nyāya theory. As mentioned previously, the discussion of knowledge in the TA suggests that the composer of the TA wrote his compendium for an audience that was familiar with Nyāya epistemology. The author of the *bhāṣya* must have been well aware of the content of the *Nyāyasūtra* as well, which is evident from his commentary on TA 1.20.³⁵² At the end of the discussion on testimony, the *bhāṣya* states the following:

matijñānam indriyānindriyanimittam ātmano jñasvabhāvyāt pāriṇāmikaṃ |
śrutajñānaṃ tu tatpūrvakam āptopadeśād bhavatīti |

Knowledge from ordinary cognition is caused by the senses and the mind (*indriyānindriyanimitta*), resulting from a natural disposition (*pāriṇāmika*), due to the own nature of knowing (*jña-svabhāvyā*) of the self (i.e., since knowing is the essence of the self); but knowledge from testimony, **which is preceded by that** (*tatpūrvaka*), arises **from the teaching of the āptas** (*āptopadeśa*) (TABh 1.20.36 – 1.20.37).

First of all, instead of using the phrase ‘preceded by ordinary cognition’ (*matipūrva*) which is used in the *sūtra*, the *bhāṣya* says ‘preceded by that’ (*tatpūrvaka*). As mentioned above, it is likely that the expression ‘*matipūrva*’ in TA 1.20 echoes the phrase ‘*tatpūrvaka*’ in NS I.1.5. The fact that the *bhāṣya* uses the expression that is found in the *Nyāyasūtra*, suggests that the author of the *bhāṣya* was well aware of the connection between NS I.1.5 and TA 1.20.³⁵³ It is unlikely that this correspondence between these phrases in the *bhāṣya* and the *Nyāyasūtra* is merely coincidental, since the expression in the *bhāṣya* is immediately followed by a definition of testimony that seems to be directly derived from the *Nyāyasūtra*. While

³⁵² This does not oppose my earlier observation that the author of the *bhāṣya* has difficulties to explain the meaning of ‘*tatpūrvaka*’. Even if one knows *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.5, which served as the model for TA 1.20, it is still hard to explain TA 1.20 since the concepts in both passages are radically different.

³⁵³ The *bhāṣya* uses the same expression in TABh 1.11.18.

the TA does not mention the role of *āptas*³⁵⁴ in testimony, the *Nyāyasūtra* defines testimony as follows:

***āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ* |**

Le *śabda* ‘mot, verbalité’ c’est le témoignage des personnes fiables (NS I.1.7).³⁵⁵

The fact that the final sentence on testimony (*śabda*) in the *bhāṣya* adds that testimonial knowledge originates from the teachings of the *āptas* — which is precisely the definition that NS I.1.7 provides — shows again that the *Nyāyasūtra* was a relevant source for the author of the *bhāṣya*. Since he does not further explain the meaning of the expression ‘*āptopadeśa*’, it is likely that his audience was acquainted with the Nyāya definition of testimony as well.

As mentioned above, the TABh does not elaborate on the relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony, which raises the question whether the author had a clear idea about the precise meaning of the expression ‘*matipūrva*’. Yet, it is possible that the concept of testimony was simply ambiguous and that the author could not be more precise without contradicting himself. On the one hand, testimony clearly refers to scripture, which is evident from the definition in TA 1.20. On the other hand, however, the TABh explains that testimony is the type of knowledge that is conveyed by an authoritative person (*āpta*), which seems to indicate that testimony is a wider category of knowledge than scripture alone. If testimony is interpreted in this more general way, it is easy to understand why testimony is preceded by ordinary cognition. In the end, the knowledge that the *āpta* conveys must have a proper foundation. However, the same model does not work for all scriptures. The TABh explicitly states that testimony has the ‘three times’ as its object (i.e., past, present, and future), while ordinary cognition only relates to the present.³⁵⁶ Since ordinary cognition can only provide knowledge about the present,

³⁵⁴ The word ‘*āpta*’ can be translated as ‘credible or authoritative person’ (MW).

³⁵⁵ Angot 2009: 286.

³⁵⁶ The TABh explains the difference between the respective ranges of ordinary cognition and testimony as follows: ‘That which perceives objects that have been produced and are not [yet] destroyed, having the present time as its range, that is knowledge from ordinary cognition; but knowledge from testimony has the three times as its range and perceives objects that have been produced, that are destroyed, and are not [yet] produced (*utpannāvinaṣṭārthagrāhakaṃ sāmpratākālaviṣayaṃ matijñānam śrutajñānam tu trikālavīṣayam utpannāvinaṣṭānutpannārthagrāhakaṃ*)’ (TABh 1.20.14 – 1.20.15). See also Part II.

it is impossible that all testimony — including scriptural knowledge about the future — is based on ordinary cognition. This suggests that testimony (*śruta*) in fact refers to two different types of knowledge: scripture and general testimony. This would be in line with *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.8, which explicitly mentions the dual character of testimony:

sa dvividho dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭārthatvāt |

Ce <témoignage verbal>, parce que son objet est soit visible soit non-visible, est de deux sortes (NS I.1.8).³⁵⁷

In his commentary on this *sūtra*, Vātsyāyana explains that the two types of testimony relate respectively to sages (*ṛṣi*) and ordinary people (*laukika*).³⁵⁸ It is possible that the composer of the TA had this division in mind when he wrote that testimony has two varieties.³⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the author of the TABh does not follow this line of interpretation but explains that the twofold division relates to the ‘inner limbs’ and ‘outer limbs’:

vaktṛviśeṣād dvaividhyam | yad bhagavadbhiḥ [...] uktaṃ bhagavacchiṣyair [...] gaṇadharair dṛḥdhaṃ tad aṅgapraviṣṭam | gaṇadharānantaryādibhis tv [...] ācāryaiḥ [...] yat proktaṃ tad aṅgabāhyam iti |

The twofold variance results from the difference of expounder (*vaktṛviśeṣa*): That which has been spoken by the *jinās* (*bhagavat*) [...] — which is composed by the *gaṇadharas*, who are the pupils of the *jinās* (*bhagavacchiṣya*) [...] — that is the corpus of inner limbs (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*). And that which is taught by the *ācāryas* [...] — who are the successors of the *gaṇadharas* etc. — that is the corpus of outer limbs (*aṅgabāhya*) (TABh 1.20.20 – 22).

Even though this interpretation of the twofold nature of testimony clearly differs from the explanation in NS I.1.8, it seems that these two accounts are not completely incompatible. The *bhāṣya* qualifies the *jinās* — who are the source for the inner limbs — as ‘all-knowing (*sarvajña*) and all-seeing (*sarvadarśin*) most excellent sages

³⁵⁷ Angot 2009: 288.

³⁵⁸ ‘*evam ṛṣilaukikavākyānāṃ vibhāga iti*’ (Angot 2009: 288).

³⁵⁹ See TA 1.20.

(*paramarṣi*)'.³⁶⁰ This corresponds to the way in which the *ṛṣis* are described in the *Nyāyasūtra* as the source of testimony about that which is invisible (*adr̥ṣṭārtha*). By contrast, the *ācāryas* — who composed the outer limbs — are described as having 'highly superior powers of speech, ordinary cognition and mind' (*parama-prakṛṣṭa-vāc-mati-buddhi-śakti*).³⁶¹ Even though the *ācāryas* have above average cognitive capacities, this description suggests that their powers are quite different from those of the *jinās*. As such, one could interpret the difference between testimony that is conveyed by the *jinās* and *ācāryas* along the lines of the twofold division between testimony by the sages (*ṛṣi*) and ordinary people (*laukika*) in NS I.1.8.

It is hard to evaluate whether the author of the TABh consciously tried to connect the dual nature of scripture with the two types of testimony that are specified in the *Nyāyasūtra*, or whether the parallels are merely coincidental. However, the passage in the TABh that deals with the twofold nature of testimony is remarkably elliptical and the sentences are unusually long.³⁶² This might be an indication that the author struggled to present his view on the twofold nature of testimony in a way that would please the Jaina audience, without being at odds with the wider accepted view of testimony as described in the *Nyāyasūtra*.

Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge

While it is evident that the composer of the TA was more interested in ordinary cognition (*mati*) than in testimony (*śruta*), it is also clear that he does not have much to say about the three types of knowledge that are classified as direct sources of knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). Cosmic perception (*avadhi*) is discussed in three short *sūtras*, mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) in two *sūtras*, and absolute knowledge (*kevala*) is only briefly mentioned in a more general discussion of the respective ranges of the different types of knowledge.³⁶³

Cosmic perception (*avadhi*), which is the first type of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) that is mentioned in the TA, is discussed as follows:

³⁶⁰ TABh 1.20.21. See also Part II.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² The above quote omits substantial parts of the passage. The complete passage can be found in Part II (TABh 1.20.21 - 22). The style of these sentences deviates from the general style of the *bhāṣya*, which is usually more straightforward.

³⁶³ TA 1.21 – 23 discusses *avadhi*, TA 1.23 – 24 discusses *manaḥparyāya*. *Kevala* is mentioned in TA 1.30.

dvividho 'avadhiḥ ||1.21|| bhavapratyayo narakadevānām ||1.22|| yathokta-nimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣānām ||1.23||

Cosmic perception (*avadhi*) has two varieties (TA 1.21). Hellish beings and gods [have cosmic perception] caused by birth (*bhavapratyaya*) (TA 1.22). The other [beings have cosmic perception] that is caused as it is said. [This variety of cosmic perception has] six forms (TA 1.23).

There are several problems with this explanation of cosmic perception. First, the TA does not clarify what cosmic perception actually is. It mentions that there are several varieties but it does not give a proper definition of the term. Even though ordinary cognition and testimony are also not well defined, the TA does at least provide synonyms of *mati* and explains that *śruta* refers to the Jaina scriptures. Moreover, the meaning of *mati* and *śruta* can be easily derived from the prime meaning of these words in Sanskrit. By contrast, '*avadhi*' usually refers to 'limit' or 'boundary', and it is not immediately evident what '*avadhi*' could mean in an epistemological context. The fact that the *sūtra* does not give a proper explanation of the term strongly indicates that the TA was written for a Jaina audience that was already familiar with basic Jaina terminology.

Based on the commentary in the *bhāṣya*, one could say that cosmic perception is the ability to perceive things that are beyond the range of the senses directly.³⁶⁴ As mentioned in the *sūtra*, there are two types of cosmic perception (TA 1.21). The first type belongs to gods and hellish beings, for whom cosmic perception is an innate capacity (TA 1.22). The second type of cosmic perception appears as a

³⁶⁴ Although the term '*avadhi*' is usually translated as 'clairvoyance' (see, e.g., Tatia 2011), I prefer the translation 'cosmic perception' for two reasons. First, this translation relates directly to the prime meanings of the Sanskrit word '*avadhi*'. Monier-Williams gives '*avadhijñāna*' as 'perception extending as far as the furthest limits of the world', which nicely connects to the meaning of '*avadhi*' as 'limit'. This view is supported by the *bhāṣya*, which explains that *avadhi* provides knowledge of extended substances (*rūpīni dravyāṇi*, TABh 1.26.4), ranging from an extremely small part of the world up to the whole cosmos (*ā sarvalokāt*, TABh 1.23.10). This is the basis of my translation 'cosmic perception'. Another reason to avoid the translation 'clairvoyance' is the vagueness of the term in English. Depending on one's interpretation, 'clairvoyance' can also refer to the ability to read other people's minds. However, the content of the mind is the object of *manaḥparyāya*, and not of *avadhi*.

result of favourable karmic circumstances³⁶⁵ and has six varieties (TA 1.23). These varieties are listed in the TABh as follows:

XII. Varieties of cosmic perception (<i>avadhi</i>) (TABh 1.23.6)	
i.	<i>anānugāmika</i> (the one that is not following)
ii.	<i>ānugāmika</i> (the one that is following)
iii.	<i>hīyamānaka</i> (the one that weakens)
iv.	<i>vardhamānaka</i> (the one that increases)
v.	<i>anavasthita</i> (the one that is not continuous)
vi.	<i>avasthita</i> (the one that is continuous)

The first variety occurs at a specific location to someone and disappears when this person moves away (TABh 1.23.7). By contrast, the second variety remains with the person, even if the person goes to another place (TABh 1.23.8). The third variety initially reveals a large part of the world, after which the range of the perception gradually contracts (TABh 1.23.9). The fourth type does exactly the opposite (TABh 1.23.10). The range of the fifth variety increases and diminishes constantly, like waves (TABh 1.23.11). The sixth variety never goes away but remains until the person reaches absolute knowledge (*kevala*) (TABh 1.23.12).

Even though the *bhāṣya* properly explains the different aspects of cosmic perception that are mentioned in the *sūtra*, the description of the second variety of cosmic perception in the *sūtra* itself is somewhat odd. TA 1.23 explains that this variety is ‘caused as it is said’ (*yathoktanimitta*). However, it is very clear that this refers to the explanation given in the *bhāṣya* on TA 1.21, which says:

bhavapratyayaḥ kṣayopaśamanimittaś ca |

[There are two varieties of cosmic perception], [i.e., cosmic perception] that originates in birth (*bhavapratyaya*) and [cosmic perception] caused by destruction and cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣaya-upaśama-nimitta*) (TABh 1.21.1).

³⁶⁵ I.e., ‘caused by destruction and cessation of *karman*’ (*kṣaya-upaśama-nimitta*) (TABh 1.21.1).

In other words, 'yathoktanimitta' in TA 1.23 refers to the expression 'kṣayopaśamanimitta' in TABh 1.21.1. Since the *sūtra* never refers to the *bhāṣya*, it is highly suspicious that TA 1.23 apparently refers to TABh 1.21.1 here. Ohira interprets this as proof of the common authorship of the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*.³⁶⁶ This is not a farfetched conclusion, since it is hard to explain how the *sūtra* could possibly refer to a passage from a later commentary. However, there are certainly other possible scenarios since there is a good reason to doubt the textual transmission. The Digambara version of the TA, which follows the reading of the *sūtra* in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, omits TA 1.21, and adds 'avadhi' to the following *sūtra*.³⁶⁷ This version also reads 'kṣayopaśamanimittaḥ' instead of 'yathoktanimittaḥ'.³⁶⁸ The differences between the two versions of the passage on cosmic perception are highlighted in the table below:

TA 1.21 – 23: Version A (TA with <i>bhāṣya</i>)	TA 1.21 – 22: Version B (<i>Sarvārthasiddhi</i>)
<i>dvididho 'vadhiḥ</i> [<i>bhavapratyayaḥ</i> <i>kṣayopaśamanimittaś ca</i> (TABh 1.21.1)] <i>bhavapratyayo nārakadevānām</i> <i>yathoktanimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām</i>	<i>bhavapratyayo 'vadhīr devanārakānām</i> <i>kṣayopaśamanimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām</i>

It is hard to tell how these two versions evolved exactly. Yet, it is clear that the first sentence of the *bhāṣya* is an essential part of version A; if it is left out, the expression 'yathokta' does not make any sense. This might indicate that a part of the original *sūtra* ended up in the *bhāṣya*.³⁶⁹ If we accept TABh 1.21.1 as a part of the TA itself, the whole problem of the reference to the *bhāṣya* disappears.³⁷⁰ If this happened before the *Sarvārthasiddhi* was composed, it is understandable why Pūjyapāda felt the need to reformulate the *sūtra*, which does not make sense without the *bhāṣya*. In

³⁶⁶ Ohira 1982: 33-34.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., 10.

³⁶⁸ Ibid., 9.

³⁶⁹ It is striking that the first two sentences of the *bhāṣya* on TA 1.24 have the exact same structure as TA 1.21 and TABh 1.21.1: '*manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ dvididham | ṛjumati-manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ vipulamati-manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ ca*' (TABh 1.24.1 – 2). This might indicate that TA 1.21 used to be part of the *bhāṣya*. In that case, it is unclear what the original *sūtra* could have been.

³⁷⁰ Even if the *bhāṣya* were an auto-commentary, it would still be unlikely that the author of both texts refers to the *bhāṣya* in the *sūtra* itself since this would go against the conventional format of a *sūtra*.

any case, as long as there is no further evidence for the exact textual transmission of this part of the *sūtra*, one cannot take this passage as proof of the common authorship of the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*.

After the discussion of cosmic perception, the TA continues with two *sūtras* on mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*):

***rjuvipulamati manaḥparyāyaḥ ||1.24|| viśuddhyapratipātābhyaṃ tadviśe-
ṣaḥ ||1.25||***

Mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) [has two varieties]: direct perception (*rjumati*) and extensive perception (*vipulamati*).³⁷¹ Their difference results from purity (*viśuddhi*) and permanence (*apratipāta*).

As in the case of cosmic perception, the TA does not explain what mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) is exactly. The *bhāṣya* explains that the knowledge that is obtained by extensive mental perception (*vipulamati*) is more pure and stable than the knowledge that is obtained from direct mental perception (*rjumati*). However, the exact character of mental perception remains unclear. TA 1.29 mentions that the range of mental perception is an infinitesimal part of the range of cosmic perception. This seems to suggest that mental perception does not have extended substance as its object but the subtle matter that makes up the mind. This would also be in line with the term '*manaḥparyāya*', which can also be translated as 'modifications of the mind'.³⁷² As such, *manaḥparyāyajñāna* can be seen as direct knowledge about the modifications of the mind.³⁷³

The passage on cosmic perception and mental perception finishes with a comparison between the different ranges and objects of these types of knowledge (TA 1.26 – 1.28). At the end of this section, the TA says:

³⁷¹ The exact meaning of the terms '*rjumati*' and '*vipulamati*' in this context is not entirely clear to me. The prime meaning of '*rju*' and '*vipula*' is respectively 'straight' and 'extensive', which is interpreted as 'simple' and 'complex' by other translators (e.g., Tatia). The intended meaning might be 'mental perception of simple cognitions' and 'mental perception of complex cognitions'. However, if '*rjuvipulamati*' were the object of '*manaḥparyāya*' one would rather expect a genitive construction.

³⁷² TA 5.37 explains that substance has qualities and modes (*guṇaparyāyavad dravyam*). See also § 3.4.

³⁷³ Since it is not clear whether this type of knowledge includes the capacity to read other people's minds, I prefer to avoid using the more common translation 'mind-reading' (see, e.g., Tatia 2002).

sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya ||1.30||

[The domain of] absolute knowledge (*kevala*) [consists of] all modes of all substances (*sarvadravyaparyāya*).

This is the only passage in the first chapter of the TA that deals with absolute knowledge (*kevala*). The *sūtra* makes it clear that *kevala* is the most extensive type of knowledge and that everything falls in its range.³⁷⁴ Apart from the comparison of the range of absolute knowledge with the range of other varieties of knowledge, the TA does not elaborate on the meaning of absolute knowledge. It seems that the author of the *bhāṣya* felt that absolute knowledge was not properly discussed in the first chapter of the TA. After discussing cosmic perception and mental perception, he addresses the lack of a separate discussion of absolute knowledge in the following way:

***uktaṃ manahparyāyajñānam | atha kevalajñānaṃ kim iti | atrocyate | kevala-
jñānaṃ daśame 'dhyāye vakṣyate | mohakṣayāt jñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāya-
kṣayāc ca kevalam iti |***

Knowledge from mental perception has now been discussed. But what is absolute knowledge (*kevalajñāna*)? At this point, it is said: Absolute knowledge will be discussed in the tenth chapter; [there it will be said that] 'absolute knowledge results from the destruction of deluding [*karman*] (*mohakṣaya*) and from the destruction of knowledge[covering], worldview-covering, and obstacle-creating [*karman*] (*jñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāya*)' (TABh 1.26.18 – 1.26.22).³⁷⁵

In other words, the *bhāṣya* notes that absolute knowledge is omitted in the discussion of knowledge in the *sūtra* and refers to the tenth chapter, which indeed deals with *kevala*. However, the chapter discusses *kevala* as the state of the liberated soul and does not deal with the *kevala* as a type of knowledge. Hence, the fact that *kevala* is not discussed in the first chapter remains a significant omission in the epistemological theory in the TA. The fact that the TA discusses the two indirect

³⁷⁴ While the term is frequently translated as 'omniscience', I translate '*kevala*' as 'absolute knowledge', which still preserves the prime meaning of '*kevala*'.

³⁷⁵ This passage refers to TA 10.1.

types of cognition (i.e., *mati* and *śruta*) in a more precise way than the three direct types of knowledge (i.e., *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala*) and barely deals with *kevala* in the first chapter, might indicate that the TA was written in an environment in which the epistemological debates were mainly focused on sense perception and that there was little discussion of yogic perception between the different schools at the time of composition of the TA.³⁷⁶

Concomitance of the varieties of knowledge

After discussing the different varieties of knowledge, the TA addresses the possible co-occurrence of the varieties of knowledge:

ekādīni bhājyāni yugapad ekasminn ā caturbhyaḥ ||1.31||

One up to four [varieties of knowledge] can be shared simultaneously in one [soul].

Commenting on this *sūtra*, the *bhāṣya* explains that one can simultaneously have knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati*) etc.³⁷⁷ but that there cannot be a concomitance (*sahabhāva*) of absolute knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) and one of the other varieties of knowledge.³⁷⁸ The idea that absolute knowledge cannot co-exist with other varieties of knowledge is certainly understandable since absolute knowledge already entails knowledge of all substances in all modes.³⁷⁹ However, it seems that there were different views on this issue at the time of the composition of the *bhāṣya* since the TABh mentions the view of some teachers who claim that the other varieties of knowledge are still there for someone with absolute knowledge, even though they do not have a real function anymore. This view is illustrated

³⁷⁶ See Isaacson 1993 for a discussion of the early history of yogic perception.

³⁷⁷ 'In some soul[s] there is one of the [varieties of knowledge, i.e.] ordinary cognition etc. (*mati-ādi*). In some soul[s], there are two. In some, there are three. In some, there are four (*kasmimścij jīve matyādīnām ekaṃ bhavati | kasmimścij jīve dve bhavataḥ | kasmimścit trīṇi bhavanti | kasmimścic catvāri bhavanti*)' (TABh 1.31.2 – 1.31.5). The expression 'ordinary cognition etc.' (*matyādi*) most likely refers to ordinary cognition (*mati*), testimony (*śruta*), cosmic perception (*avadhi*), and mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*). However, the *bhāṣya* only mentions the co-occurrence of ordinary cognition and testimony in the subsequent discussion (TABh 1.31.6 – 1.31.8).

³⁷⁸ TABh 1.31.10.

³⁷⁹ '[The domain of] absolute knowledge [extends to] all modes of all substances (*sarvadrayaparyāyeṣu kevalasya*)' (TA 1.30).

through a comparison between absolute knowledge and the blazing light of the sun:³⁸⁰

*yathā vā vyabhre nabhasi āditya udite bhūritejastvād ādityenābhibhūtāny
anyatejāṃsi jvalanamaṇicandranakṣatraprabhṛtini prakāśanaṃ prati akiñcit-
karāṇi bhavanti tadvad iti |*

Or just like the other lights, such as shining jewels, the moon and the stars, [being] surpassed by the sun when the sun rises in the cloudless sky — since [the sun] is a strong light — become likewise non-functional (*akiñcitkara*) with regard to that which is illuminating (*prakāśana*) (TABh 1.31.14).

In other words, by surpassing the light of other celestial bodies, the sun makes their light irrelevant, just as other varieties of knowledge are non-functional when the soul reaches the state of absolute knowledge.

This discussion about the concomitance of absolute knowledge and other varieties of knowledge relates to a broader debate about the nature of a liberated soul and the activities of a liberated being (*kevalin*).³⁸¹ The inclusion of a different view in the *bhāṣya* might indicate that the author of the *bhāṣya* wanted to provide a commentary on the *sūtra* that was acceptable for different groups within the Jaina community. In fact, the metaphor of the sun — which is primarily used to illustrate the other view — works well to mitigate the contrast between the two views. By describing the other varieties of knowledge as ‘non-functional’ or ‘non-significant’ (*akiñcitkara*), just like the stars in daytime, it remains somewhat vague whether these types of knowledge can co-occur with *kevalajñāna* or not. In fact, the metaphor could even be used by the opposite party to illustrate that other types of knowledge cannot go together with absolute knowledge. As such, it seems that the author of the *bhāṣya* tried to mitigate the differences between the two views. This is further supported by his use of vocabulary. The difference between the idea that the *kevalin* cannot have knowledge from ordinary cognition etc. and the idea that the other varieties of knowledge are ‘non-significant’ for someone with *kevalajñāna* seems almost trivial. Therefore, one could question whether the *bhāṣya* discusses the other

³⁸⁰ TABh 1.31.11 - 1.31.14.

³⁸¹ Kundakunda discusses this issue in several works. For an analysis of Kundakunda’s view on *kevalajñāna* and the cognitive state of the *kevalin*, see Bajželj 2018.

view to highlight the differences between the two doctrinal standpoints or to demonstrate that there are no major differences between the two positions after all.

False knowledge

The theory of knowledge in the TA presupposes ontological realism and could be classified as a correspondence theory.³⁸² It assumes that the world exists independent of the observer and that knowledge corresponds to the state of affairs in the external reality. In order to acquire knowledge, therefore, the process of cognition should reveal reality as it is. However, every epistemological account that claims that the process of cognition reveals the world as it is faces the problem of erroneous cognition. The TA describes ordinary cognition, testimony, etc. as reliable means of knowledge. However, these means of cognition can also lead to erroneous cognition.

Therefore, the epistemological theory in the TA needs an account of false cognition in order to disambiguate knowledge from error. The TA addresses this issue in the following two *sūtras*:

matīśrutāvadhayo viparyayaś ca ||1.32|| sadasator aviśeṣād yadṛcchopalabdher unmattavat ||1.33||

[There is knowledge from] ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception, and the opposite. [Erroneous cognition results] from accidental-perception (*yadṛcchopalabdhi*) because of indistinction between [things that are] real and unreal, like a madman.

TA 1.32 is very short and the intended meaning is not immediately obvious. The *sūtra* seems to say that ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception each have their opposite. Even though it is not explained in the *sūtra* what these opposites exactly are, one can infer from TA 1.33 that ‘the opposite’ must refer to erroneous cognition. Commenting on TA 1.32, the *bhāṣya* explains that the ‘opposite’ (*viparyaya*) refers to *ajñāna*, i.e., the opposite of knowledge (*jñāna*).³⁸³ While the

³⁸² See David 2016 for a discussion of the correspondence theory of truth.

³⁸³ ‘The opposite of knowledge is false knowledge (*jñānaviparyayo ’jñānam iti*)’ (TABh 1.32.3). Soni translates the term ‘*viparyaya*’ in TA 1.32 as ‘erroneous’ instead of ‘opposite’. He

term ‘*ajñāna*’ can be translated as ‘ignorance’, the example of the madman (*unmattavat*) in TA 1.33 clearly indicates that we are dealing with erroneous cognition and not with an absence of cognition.³⁸⁴

Since there are five varieties of knowledge, one would expect that there are also five varieties of false knowledge. However, in the commentary on TA 1.35, the *bhāṣya* uses the phrase ‘all eight’,³⁸⁵ in reference to the varieties of knowledge and their opposites. Since there are five varieties of knowledge, one can infer that there are only three varieties of false knowledge. This corresponds with the text in TA 1.32, which only mentions the opposite of the first three varieties of knowledge. The *bhāṣya* specifies these three types of false knowledge as follows:

matyajñānaṃ śrutājñānaṃ vibhaṅgajñānaṃ iti | avadher viparīto vibhaṅga ity ucyate |

False knowledge from ordinary cognition (*maty-ajñāna*), false knowledge from testimony (*śruta-ajñāna*) and deceptive knowledge (*vibhaṅga-jñāna*). It is said that deceptive knowledge is the opposite of cosmic perception (TABh 1.32.11 – 12).³⁸⁶

translates: ‘Sensory knowledge, knowledge of scripture, clairvoyance also are [or: can be] erroneous.’ The word ‘*viparyaya*’ is sometimes used as ‘misapprehension’ or ‘error’ (MW) and this translation does make sense in the context of TA 1.32 - 33. However, the *bhāṣya* clearly interprets ‘*viparyaya*’ as opposite. In the commentary on TA 1.32, the *bhāṣya* explains ‘*viparyaya*’ by contrasting ‘*jñāna*’ and ‘*ajñāna*’, and uses metaphors such as ‘shade and sunshine’ and ‘heat and cold’ (*chāyātapavac chītoṣṇavac ca*) to illustrate the difference between *jñāna* and *ajñāna* (TABh 1.32.3 - 1.32.6). Therefore, I prefer to translate ‘*viparyaya*’ as ‘opposite’ instead of ‘erroneous’.

³⁸⁴ As Soni remarks in his study of the Jaina theory of error, it is somewhat odd that the TA first introduces the five varieties of knowledge as *pramāṇas*, and later explains that *mati*, *śruta*, and *avadhi* can also lead to erroneous cognition (Soni 2018: 57). In the end, *pramāṇas* are usually seen as reliable means of knowledge. Soni tries to explain this by pointing out that TA 1.9 deals with the varieties of knowledge as *pramāṇas*, while TA 1.32 deals with the same varieties of knowledge as forms of *jñānopayoga* (i.e., cognitive operation in the form of knowledge) (Soni 2018: 63-64). Yet, this does not solve the central problem that the varieties of knowledge that are listed in TA 1.9 as *pramāṇas* are not fully reliable, which goes against the concept of *pramāṇa*. As explained above, the *pramāṇa* theory in the TA consists of several historical layers, and the five varieties of knowledge already existed before the concept of *pramāṇa* was introduced in Jaina theory. It is, therefore, not entirely surprising that the TA discusses these varieties of knowledge in a way that does not fully match the standard idea of *pramāṇas*.

³⁸⁵ *naigamādayas trayaḥ sarvāṇy aṣṭau śrayante* (TABh 1.35.77).

³⁸⁶ See also Part II. It is unclear to me why the opposite of cosmic perception (*avadhi*) is labelled ‘*vibhaṅgajñāna*’ instead of ‘*avadhyajñāna*’.

Following the explanation in the *bhāṣya*, the eight varieties of knowledge and false knowledge can be classified as shown in the table below:

XIII. The eight varieties of knowledge (<i>jñāna</i>) and false knowledge (<i>ajñāna</i>) ³⁸⁷	
<i>jñāna</i> (TA 1.9)	<i>ajñāna</i> (TABh 1.32.3)
i. knowledge from ordinary cognition (<i>matijñāna</i>)	vi. false knowledge from ordinary cognition (<i>matyajñāna</i>) (TABh 1.32.11)
ii. knowledge from testimony (<i>śrutajñāna</i>)	vii. false knowledge from testimony (<i>śrutājñāna</i>) (TABh 1.32.11)
iii. knowledge from cosmic perception (<i>avadhijñāna</i>)	viii. deceptive knowledge (<i>vibhaṅga</i>) (TABh 1.32.12)
iv. knowledge from mental perception (<i>manaḥparyāyajñāna</i>)	
v. absolute knowledge (<i>kevalajñāna</i>)	

The overall account of the opposites of the varieties of knowledge makes a rather unsystematic impression. As can be seen in the table above, there is no opposite of knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāyajñāna*).³⁸⁸ However, the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya* do not explain why only the first three varieties of knowledge have their opposite. Furthermore, it is unclear to me why the opposite of cosmic perception (*avadhī*) is labelled '*vibhaṅgajñāna*' instead of '*avadhyajñāna*'. The unsystematic presentation of these opposites suggests that the Jaina theory of erroneous cognition was not yet fully developed, and that the author of the TA combined some pre-existent ideas in an effort to address the problem of error.

Apart from a lack of clarity when it comes to the classification of knowledge and false knowledge, the *sūtra* also does not clearly identify the cause of error, even

³⁸⁷ TA 2.9 refers to the eight and four varieties of cognitive operation (*upayoga*). This eightfold list corresponds to the eight types of *jñānopayoga* that are listed in TABh 2.9.5. TA 2.8 defines *upayoga* as the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the soul. This passage will be further discussed below.

³⁸⁸ One could argue that it is not possible to have the opposite of absolute knowledge (*kevalajñāna*), which could explain why there is no opposite of this means of cognition specified in the TABh. A similar claim could be made with respect to mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*).

though this is a crucial element in any theory of error. According to TA 1.33, the opposites of ordinary cognition etc. arise by accidental perception (*yadṛcchopalabdhi*). This explanation, however, has little explanatory value as it does not identify the actual cause of error. The *bhāṣya* offers a more detailed theory:

yathonmattaḥ karmodayād upahatendriyamatir viparītagrāhī bhavati so 'śvaṃ gaur ity adhyavasyati gāṃ cāśva iti loṣṭaṃ suvarṇam iti suvarṇam loṣṭa iti loṣṭaṃ ca loṣṭa iti suvarṇaṃ suvarṇam iti tasyaivam aviśeṣeṇa loṣṭaṃ suvarṇaṃ suvarṇaṃ loṣṭam iti viparītam adhyavasyato niyatam ajñānam eva bhavati – tadvan mithyādarśanopahatendriyamater matīśrutāvadhayo 'py ajñānaṃ bhavanti |

Just as a madman, whose senses and mind are damaged from the rising of *karman*, perceives the opposite (*viparīta*); he determines a horse as a cow and a cow as a horse, gold as clay and clay as gold, and [sometimes he determines] 'clay as clay and gold as gold'; thus, that is certainly false knowledge for him who is determining the opposite (*viparīta*) without distinction, [saying] 'clay is gold and gold is clay'. In the same way, ordinary cognition, testimony and cosmic perception of a person whose senses and mind are damaged due to wrong worldview (*mithyādarśana*), are also false knowledge (TABh 1.33.1).

First of all, the commentary relates false knowledge to a defect of the senses and mind. This defect is the result of an unfavourable karmic process. In the last part of this passage, the *bhāṣya* relates the defect of the mind and senses to wrong worldview (*mithyādarśana*). Hence, there are two factors that result in a defective cognitive apparatus: unfavourable *karman* and wrong worldview. These two factors, however, are causally related. This is explained in TA 6.14, which says that disrespect for the Jaina religion results in worldview-deluding *karman*.³⁸⁹ In other words, the causal chain that leads up to false knowledge can be summarised as follows:

³⁸⁹ This idea is expressed in TA 6.14, which says: '[The varieties of karmic influx related to] delusion of worldview (*darśanamoha*) are: blaming omniscient beings, scripture, the community, the *dharma*, and the gods' (*kevalīśrutasaṅghadharmadevāvarṇavādo darśanamohasya*). In other words, disrespect for the Jaina religion causes worldview-deluding *karman*.

XIV. Causal factors of false knowledge (<i>ajñāna</i>)
Disrespect for the Jaina religion (TA 6.14) ↓
Influx of worldview-deluding (<i>darśanamohanīya</i>) <i>karman</i> (TA 6.14, TABh 1.7.37, TABh 1.33.1) ↓
Wrong worldview (<i>mithyādarśana</i>) (TABh 1.33.1) ↓
False knowledge (<i>ajñāna</i>) (TABh 1.32.3, TABh 1.33.1)

For a person with wrong worldview (*mithyādarśana*), the cognitive process becomes unreliable. As mentioned in the *bhāṣya*, such a person will falsely determine sense objects, and ends up with false knowledge. The process of determination is random, which implies that one can accidentally identify an object as it is. However, the *bhāṣya* states that even in that case, one cannot say that this person has real knowledge. Instead, it is still labelled as false knowledge (TABh 1.33.1).³⁹⁰

The explanation of error in the *bhāṣya* suggests that cognition is always based on the state of affairs in a world that exists independent of human minds. Even in the case of false knowledge, there is an external object — such as a lump of clay or gold — that forms the basis for the erroneous cognition. This is probably why the five varieties of knowledge (*jñāna*) and the three varieties of false knowledge (*ajñāna*) are grouped together in the *bhāṣya* as a cluster of eight, as mentioned above.³⁹¹ In both cases, the mind and the senses are directed at an object in the real world, which is grasped by the knower. However, only when an object is correctly identified by someone who is endowed with right worldview, can one speak of real knowledge. In all other cases, the outcome of the cognitive process is classified as false knowledge.

When one compares the two *sūtras* on error with the explanation in the *bhāṣya*, it is clear that the *bhāṣya* has a more elaborate theory of error than the *sūtra*. For example, the *bhāṣya* deals with the question as to why someone with wrong

³⁹⁰ In other words, the author of the *bhāṣya* claims that a true cognition (or belief) cannot be called 'knowledge' if it is not justified.

³⁹¹ See TABh 1.35.77.

views (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*)³⁹² can incidentally make right claims (TABh 1.32.15 – 1.33.1). Furthermore, the author of the *bhāṣya* introduces some technical terms that are not mentioned in the *sūtra*, such as ‘*ajñāna*’ and ‘*viparīta*’.³⁹³ While the word ‘*viparīta*’ clearly functions as a synonym of ‘*viparyaya*’, which is used in TA 1.32, it is noteworthy that the term ‘*viparīta*’ is associated with the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory of error, which is known as ‘*viparītakhyāti*’.³⁹⁴

Even though the *bhāṣya* has a more elaborate explanation of error than the *sūtra* itself, it remains an incomplete theory. It claims that a false cognition is based on the perception of an actual object — which the cognizer misidentifies due to wrong worldview — but it does not explain where the content of this false cognition comes from. One can only misidentify a lump of clay as gold if one knows the concept ‘gold’. One obvious solution would be to refer to memory as the source of these concepts. However, it is hard to explain how the concept of gold could ever enter memory if one assumes that a person with wrong worldview can only obtain false knowledge.³⁹⁵ The fact that the TA and the *bhāṣya* do not deal with this issue, suggest that the theory of error was not fully developed in the Jaina tradition at the time of the composition of these texts, even though the difference between the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya* indicates that the theory of error had become more important by the time of the TABh.

³⁹² The term ‘*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*’ also refers to the lowest of the fourteen *guṇasthānas* (stages from bondage to liberation). See, e.g., Wiley 2004: 243-244.

³⁹³ See TABh 1.33.1 (translated above): ‘*yathonmattaḥ karmodayād upahatendriyamatir viparītagrāhī bhavati [...] viparītam adhyavasyato niyatam ajñānam eva bhavati - tadvan mithyādarśanopahatendriyamater matīśrutāvadhayo ’py ajñānaṃ bhavanti*’.

³⁹⁴ See, e.g., Rao 1998: 73ff. It is unclear to me whether there is a historical link between the theory of error in the TABh and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view since the TABh (5th cent. CE) largely predates Kumārila (fl. 700). The shared vocabulary suggests that there was an ongoing debate about error that transcended the boundaries of the different schools. This idea is supported by the fact that the term ‘*viparītakhyāti*’ was not exclusively used for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view. For example, Jayanta uses the word ‘*viparītakhyāti*’ with reference to the Nyāya theory of error, which is usually called ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ (Rao 1998: 63).

³⁹⁵ This problem relates to Prabhākara’s criticism of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory of error (*viparītakhyāti*), propounded by Kumārila. Prabhākara thinks that memory must be involved, while the Kaumārilas assume that error can take place without memory being involved. For them, it is enough that the falsely perceived object (such as silver, when the actual object is a shell) is real, even though it is unperceived (Rao 1998: 74).

The perspectives

The last two *sūtras* of the opening chapter of the TA deal with the theory of perspectives (*naya*). This theory became important in the later Jaina tradition but the presentation of this doctrine in the TA is rather brief:³⁹⁶

naigamasamgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdā nayāḥ ||1.34||

ādyasābdau dvitribhedau ||1.35||

The perspectives are the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*), the collecting [perspective] (*saṅgraha*), the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*), the linear [perspective] (*rjusūtra*), and the literal [perspective] (*śabda*). The first [perspective] (i.e., the commonplace perspective, *naigama*) and the literal perspective (*śabda*) [have respectively] two and three varieties.

The two *sūtras* simply list five different perspectives and add that two of these perspectives have several varieties. The composer of the TA does not explain the meaning of the different perspectives and even does not specify the varieties that TA 1.35 hints at.³⁹⁷

While the Jaina tradition is well known for its advocacy for non-one-sidedness (*anekāntavāda*), it is not that easy to understand the exact purpose of the theory of viewpoints that is presented in the TA. The general idea seems to be that objects of knowledge can be analysed from different perspectives that only grasp a particular aspect of that object. The *bhāṣya* defines the word ‘*naya*’ as follows:

³⁹⁶ For a discussion of *anekāntavāda* throughout the history of Jainism, see Barbato 2018. A more detailed discussion of the different lists of perspectives in the Jaina tradition can be found in Balcerowicz 2003b.

³⁹⁷ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* omits TA 1.35 and has a different reading of TA 1.34. The *sūtra* on the perspectives in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* reads as follows: ‘*naigamasamgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdasamabhirūḍhaivambhūtā nayāḥ*’ (*Sarvārthasiddhi* 1.33, Tatia 2011: 23). *Sarvārthasiddhi* 1.33 adds ‘*samabhirūḍha*’ and ‘*evambhūta*’ to the five perspectives that are listed in the version of the TA that is accompanied by the TABh. However, these two perspectives are listed as varieties of the literal perspective (*śabda*) in the TABh on TA 1.35 (see the table below). Since the *Sarvārthasiddhi* omits TA 1.35, which is the final *sūtra* of the first chapter, one may question whether this *sūtra* was perhaps added to the main body of the TA at a later stage.

***nayāḥ prāpakāḥ kārakāḥ sādhakā nirvartakā nirbhāsakā upalambhakā
vyañjakā ity anarthāntaram | jīvādīn padārthān nayanti prāpnuvanti kārayanti
sādhayanti nirvartayanti nirbhāsayanti upalambhayanti vyañjayantīti nayāḥ |***

‘Perspectives’ (lit. ‘leading’) (*naya*), ‘[that which is] causing to reach’ (*prāpaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to make’ (*kāraka*), ‘[that which is] causing to accomplish’ (*sādhaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to bring about’ (*nirvartaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to illuminate’ (*nirbhāsaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to perceive’ (*upalambhaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to appear’ (*vyañjaka*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms). The perspectives lead (*nayanti*), [i.e.], reach (*prāpnuvanti*), cause to make (*kārayanti*), cause to accomplish (*sādhayanti*), cause to bring about (*nirvartayanti*), cause to illuminate (*nirbhāsayanti*), cause to perceive (*upalambhayanti*), and cause to clarify (*vyañjayanti*) the categories (*padārtha*), beginning with soul (TABh 1.35.19 – 1.35.20).

Simply put, the *bhāṣya* claims that the perspectives lead to knowledge of the categories (*padārtha*).³⁹⁸ The different perspectives that are mentioned in the TA and the TABh are given in the table below:³⁹⁹

³⁹⁸ TABh 1.35.91 says that the perspectives (*naya*) can be used to investigate the *tattvas* (*nayaiḥ parīkṣyāṇi tattvāni*). This is in line with TA 1.6, which says that the categories can be understood through the means of cognition and the perspectives (see Part II).

³⁹⁹ The way in which the TA and the TABh categorise the different perspectives is somewhat unusual. As can be seen in the table, the TA lists five *nayas* and the TABh adds several subtypes. Most other discussions, including the theory of perspectives in Siddhasena Divākara’s *Sanmatitarka*, list seven *nayas*. The etymological viewpoint (*samabhirūḍha*) and the exact viewpoint (*evambhūta*) — which the TABh mentions as subtypes of the literal perspective (*śabda*) — are usually seen as independent *nayas*. The present viewpoint (*sāmprata*) is not mentioned in the other discussions. The fact that the TABh adds several subtypes to the short list in the TA suggests that the theory of perspectives was not standardised yet at the time of the composition of the TA and the TABh. For an overview of different descriptions of the *nayas*, see Balcerowicz 2003b: 48-49.

XV. The perspectives (<i>naya</i>) (TA1.34 – 1.35)	
i. <i>naigama</i> (the commonplace perspective)	<i>deśaparikṣepin</i> (encompassing partially) (TABh 1.35.2)
	<i>sarvaparikṣepin</i> (encompassing all) (TABh 1.35.2)
ii. <i>saṅgraha</i> (the collecting perspective)	
iii. <i>vyavahāra</i> (the practical perspective)	
iv. <i>ṛjusūtra</i> (the linear perspective)	
v. <i>śabda</i> (the literal perspective)	
	<i>sāmprata</i> (the present viewpoint) (TABh 1.35.3)
	<i>samabhirūḍha</i> (the etymological viewpoint) (TABh 1.35.3)
	<i>evambhūta</i> (the exact viewpoint)(TABh 1.35.3)

As mentioned above, it is hard to understand the exact meaning of the different perspectives as described in the *bhāṣya*, especially since the descriptions of several perspectives seem to be partly similar. In the following passage, I will summarise the explanation of the perspectives that the *bhāṣya* provides.⁴⁰⁰

When one analyses something from the ‘commonplace perspective’ (*naigama*), one grasps the object (*artha*) and the meaning of words (*śabdārtha*) as used in daily undertakings (*nigama*). This perspective reveals either a part or the whole⁴⁰¹ (TABh 1.35.7). For this reason, it is said that there are two varieties: the

⁴⁰⁰ Another discussion of this passage in the *bhāṣya* can be found in Balcerowicz 2001c: 382ff. Balcerowicz proposes that each item in the list of *nayas* ‘represents a further restriction of the point of reference’ (2001c: 383). However, I doubt whether the list of *nayas* in the TA was composed with this idea in mind since the list deals with different aspects of language that cannot be reduced to the same categories. For example, it is unclear to me how the point of reference of the practical perspective (*vyavahāra*) could be a further restriction of the point of reference of the collective perspective (*saṅgraha*). They seem to refer to two different ways in which language is used and their difference, therefore, relates more to pragmatics than to semantics.

⁴⁰¹ The compound ‘*deśa-samagra-grāhin*’ can be interpreted in different ways. It is not fully clear to me whether ‘*deśasamagra*’ refers to ‘a part **and** the whole’ or ‘a part **or** the whole’. Since the *naigama* perspective is said to have two varieties (*deśaparikṣepin* and *sarvaparikṣepin*), I interpret the compound as a disjunctive compound. This interpretation is supported by TABh 1.35.27, which uses the word ‘*vā*’ in the application of the *naigama* perspective to the example of a jar. The ‘part’ and the ‘whole’ seem to refer to the ‘object’

commonplace perspective that is ‘encompassing partially’ (*deśaparikṣepin*) and the commonplace perspective that is ‘encompassing all’ (*sarvaparikṣepin*) (TABh 1.35.2). The *bhāṣya* illustrates the different perspectives by applying them to a pot (*ghaṭa*). When the word ‘pot’ is interpreted from the commonplace perspective, it refers either to a particular pot or to all objects of the class (*jātīya*) of pots in general (TABh 1.35.27).

The ‘collecting perspective’ (*saṅgraha*) perceives the ‘whole and the part’ (*sarva-ekadeśa-grahaṇa*) (TABh 1.35.8).⁴⁰² Applied to a pot, the collective perspective reveals the pot as being one (*eka*) or many (*bahu*), its name etc.⁴⁰³ (*nāma-ādi-viśeṣita*), and the aspect of time, i.e., past, present, and future (*sāmprata-atīta-anāgata*) (TABh 1.35.28).

The practical perspective (*vyavahāra*) ‘equals the view of worldly men’ (*laukika-sama*) and is applied in a ‘pragmatic way’ (*upacāra-prāya*) with a ‘broad meaning’ (*vistrta-artha*) (TABh 1.35.9). In the example of the pot, it reveals the pot from the perspective of its use (*upacāra-gamyā*) (TABh 1.35.29).

The linear perspective (*rjusūtra*) focuses on the present aspect of an object, and is not concerned with its past or future (TABh 1.35.10). In the example of the pot, it is the understanding of ‘pot’ as the pot that exists at present (*sāmprata*) (TABh 1.35.30).⁴⁰⁴

The ‘literal perspective’ (*śabda*) is described as the ‘designation in accordance with reality’ (*yathārtha-abhidhāna*) and has three varieties (TABh

(*artha*) and the ‘meaning’ (*śabdārtha*) that are mentioned at the beginning of the explanation, which can be interpreted as the particular and the universal.

⁴⁰² I follow Siddhasenagaṇi’s *ṭīkā*, which analyses this compound as a *dvandva*. Based on the explanation of the *naigama* perspective, one could argue that the phrase ‘the whole and the part’ (*sarva-ekadeśa*) refers to a particular object and its class. As such, the collecting perspective (*saṅgraha*) combines the two varieties of the commonplace perspective (*naigama*). According to John Cort, the *saṅgraha* perspective ‘describes an object in terms of its generic characteristics’ (Cort 2000: 326). This partly corresponds with the description in the *bhāṣya*, which talks about number, name, etc. However, it is not clear to me how this relates to ‘the whole and the part’ (*sarva-ekadeśa*), which are said to be known from the *naigama* perspective.

⁴⁰³ The expression ‘name etc.’ (*nāmādi*) seems to refer to the four *anuyogadvāras*, which are listed in TA 1.5, i.e., name (*nāma*), representation (*sthāpanā*), substance (*dravya*), and state (*bhāva*).

⁴⁰⁴ It is somewhat odd that the explanation of the linear perspective (*rjusūtra*) uses the word ‘*sāmprata*’ to qualify the jar, even though ‘*sāmprata*’ is also presented as a variety of the literal perspective (*śabda*).

1.35.11).⁴⁰⁵ The first variety of this literal perspective, which is the ‘present viewpoint’ (*sāmprata*), results from a word that has previously been coined, which is expressive of name etc. (TABh 1.35.12). Applied to a pot, it is the aspect of a pot that is actually present that is revealed by the word ‘pot’ (TABh 1.35.12).⁴⁰⁶

The ‘etymological perspective’ (*samabhirūḍha*) makes distinctions between existing objects in accordance with their name (TABh 1.35.13).⁴⁰⁷ Applied to the same pot, it is the ‘delimitation of the apprehension’ (*adhyavasāya-asāṅkrama*) of the pots that are present (TABh 1.35.32).

The exact viewpoint (*evambhūta*), which is the third variety of the literal perspective, distinguishes between the object and the sign (*vyañjana*)⁴⁰⁸ (TABh 1.35.3). It grasps the mutual dependence of the word and the object, such as the word ‘pot’ and the actual pot (TABh 1.35.33).

Even though it is hard to understand the precise demarcation of the different perspectives on the basis of the explanation in the *bhāṣya* alone, the commentary does help to identify the underlying problem. Conceived as a whole, the system of *nayas* disambiguates the different ways in which words can be used. The example of the pot shows that the word ‘pot’ can refer to a particular pot or to pots in general. Further, it might point to a particular pot at different moments in time, i.e., a pot that does not yet exist, a pot that exists right now, or a pot that has been destroyed. In addition, the word ‘pot’ might refer to the word ‘pot’ itself. As such, the theory of perspectives addresses different philosophical problems that were discussed amongst the different philosophical schools: the status of universals, the problem of change, and the relationship between words and their meaning.⁴⁰⁹ The list of *nayas*

⁴⁰⁵ Mehta explains that ‘[i]t treats synonymous words as all having the same sense’ (Mehta 1971: 179).

⁴⁰⁶ It is not entirely clear to me what the difference between the *sāmprata* variety of the *śabda* perspective and the *ṛjusūtra* perspective is. The list of perspectives in the version of the TA that is included in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* omits the *sāmprata* perspective.

⁴⁰⁷ According to Mehta, the etymological perspective (*samabhirūḍha*) ‘holds that with the difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs.’ He gives the example of a jar (*kumbha*), a pitcher (*kalaśa*), and a pot (*ghaṭa*) (Mehta 1971: 178).’

⁴⁰⁸ The meaning of the word ‘*vyañjana*’, which appears in TA 1.18, has been discussed above. In the context of the theory of perception, the term ‘*vyañjana*’ seems to refer to the physical contact between a sense object and a sense organ. In the commentary on the ‘literal’ perspective, ‘*vyañjana*’ is more likely to have the more common meaning of ‘sign’ or ‘letter’, referring to the words as it is written or pronounced.

⁴⁰⁹ In his study of *anekāntavāda*, B. K. Matilal describes how the different standpoints correspond to the positions of different philosophical schools. For example, he identifies the

in the TA suggests that the Jainas tried to contribute to these debates by pointing out that a single word can have different functions and by providing a model for the analysis of these functions. For example, Indian philosophers disagreed about the question as to whether a pot already exists right before the potter combines the two pot-halves that constitute the pot.⁴¹⁰ Following the model of *nayas*, the Jainas could say that the pot does not exist from a practical perspective (*vyavahāra*), since the two pot-halves cannot be used as a pot yet. Nevertheless, taking the collecting perspective (*saṅgraha*), one could say that the pot already exists in terms of its substance (*dravya*). As such, the Jaina theory of perspectives accommodates seemingly contradictory positions, such as the idea that an object is both existent and non-existent.

The theory of perspectives is usually seen as one of the elements of the Jaina theory of non-one-sidedness (*anekāntavāda*).⁴¹¹ According to this doctrine, reality is multifaceted, which leads to apparent contradictions in philosophical analysis. Jaina philosophers claim that a full understanding of reality, therefore, includes different viewpoints. Given the multifaceted nature of reality, they accept that the views of rival religio-philosophical movements can be partially true, even though their views are ultimately inferior because of their one-sided character.⁴¹² Even though the TA discusses the theory of viewpoints, one should be careful in attributing a perspectivistic view to the composer of the TA. Importantly, the TA does not contain the word '*anekānta*' or '*anekāntavāda*' and there is no explicit reference to the partial truth of the views of other schools.

According to Dundas, the TA was the first text that brought the 'inchoate and unconnected remarks' about the standpoints that can be found in the canonical texts

practical perspective (*vyavahāra*) as the position of the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya traditions and the literal perspective (*śabda*) as the perspective of the grammarians. This is based on the analysis of the *nayas* in Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa*, which links the different *nayas* with the position of different schools (Matilal 1981: 32-34).

⁴¹⁰ The example of the pot-halves and the pot is a stock example in the discussion of causation in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. See, e.g., Potter 1977: 56.

⁴¹¹ The other part is the theory of sevenfold predication (*syādvāda*). The following description of the theory of *anekāntavāda* is based on Wiley 2004: 36.

⁴¹² In more recent times, the Jains have reinterpreted the doctrine of *anekāntavāda* as an 'attitude of tolerance in situations of religious pluralism' (Wiley 2004: 36). This idea is often expressed with the term 'intellectual *ahiṃsā*'. Cort argues that the historical understanding of *anekāntavāda* has nothing to do with 'intellectual *ahiṃsā*'. Instead, Jaina philosophers mainly used this theory to criticise other philosophies because of their one-sided character (Cort 2000: 341).

together in a more systematic way; as such, it functioned as a ‘catalyst in the emergence of philosophical relativism.’⁴¹³ Nevertheless, this does not mean that the theory of standpoints in the TA was already connected with the idea of philosophical relativism. Dundas assumes that Mallavādin was the first author who applied the theory of *anekāntatva* to rival intellectual systems and that the TA only deals with the theory of standpoints as a part of its theory on substance and modifications.⁴¹⁴

However, it seems that the composer of the TABh, which predates Mallavādin, was aware of a pluralistic interpretation of the theory of perspectives. After the explanation of the meaning of the different viewpoints, the *bhāṣya* raises the following question about the nature of the different perspectives:

atrāha | kim ete tantrāntarīyā vādina āhosvit svatantrā eva codakapakṣa-grāhiṇo matibhedena vipradhāvitā iti | atrocyaṭe | naite tantrāntarīyā nāpī svatantrāḥ matibhedena vipradhāvitāḥ | jñeyasya tv arthasyādhyavasāyāntarāṇy etāni |

At this point one says: Are these [perspectives] the proponents (*vādin*) of other sects (*tantrāntarīya*) or [proponents of] our own school (*svatantra*) who are taking the side of the objector (*codaka-pakṣa-grāhin*), [and who are] running in different directions (i.e., disagreeing) (*vipradhāvita*) by difference in opinion (*matibheda*)? At this point it is said: These [perspectives are] not [the proponents belonging to] other schools nor [proponents belonging to] our own school, [who are] running in different directions by difference in opinion. On the contrary, these are different apprehensions (*adhyavasāya-antara*) of the object to be known (TABh 1.35.21 – 1.35.25).

In other words, the *bhāṣya* denies that the perspectives represent the views of different schools and states that the perspectives are just different ways to apprehend an object. As far as I am aware, this would be the earliest reference to the idea that the perspectives represent the views of different schools, even though the text denies that one should interpret the theory of perspectives in this way. However, there are several reasons why we should be cautious in drawing conclusions about the section of the *bhāṣya* in which this passage occurs. First, the *bhāṣya* on the two *sūtras* on the standpoints consists of a hundred sentences, which

⁴¹³ Dundas 1992: 230.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

is exceptionally long.⁴¹⁵ Second, the structure of this passage of the *bhāṣya* is somewhat loose. The different topics that are discussed in the commentary on TA 1.35 can be summarised as follows:⁴¹⁶

XVI. Content of the <i>bhāṣya</i> on TA 1.35 (TABh 1.35.1–100)		
i.	1.35.1–3	The varieties of the commonplace perspective (<i>naigama</i>) and the literal perspective (<i>śabda</i>)
	1.35.4–14	Explanation of the different perspectives
	1.35.15–20	Definition of <i>naya</i>
ii.	1.35.21–25	Denial of contradictions between the standpoints of different schools
	1.35.26–33	The perspectives applied to the example of a pot
	1.35.34–38	Different views on the unity of reality
iii.	1.35.39–41	Comparison between the perspectives and the varieties of knowledge
	1.35.42–49	Summary of the perspectives in four verses in <i>āryā</i> metre
iv.	1.35.50–73	The perspectives applied to the word ‘soul’
v.	1.35.74–88	Relationship between specific perspectives and varieties of knowledge
	1.35.89	Statement about the authoritativeness of direct perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony
	1.35.90–99	Summary of the relation between the perspectives and the varieties of knowledge in five verses in <i>āryā</i> metre
vi.	1.35.100	Closing sentence of the first chapter of the TABh

The first three elements in this discussion (TABh 1.35.1–20) are fairly normal. It explains the meaning of the different perspectives, the varieties that are mentioned in the *sūtra* and it provides a definition of the word perspective ‘*naya*’. Next, the *bhāṣya* deals with seemingly contradictory statements of different philosophical schools, illustrated with the application of the perspectives to the example of a pot (TABh 1.35.21–33). In a similar way, the unity of reality is analysed from different

⁴¹⁵ See TABh 1.35.1 – 1.35.100. This is the only passage of the first chapter in which the *bhāṣya* exceeds fifty sentences and only a few verses have a commentary of more than twenty sentences.

⁴¹⁶ The division of this part of the commentary into six sections (i. – vi.) is based on my analysis of the content and is not indicated as such in the *bhāṣya* itself.

perspectives, which shows that reality can be said to be onefold, twofold, and manifold, depending on one's perspective (TABh 1.35.34–38). Thereafter, the *bhāṣya* explains that the perspectives can be compared to the five varieties of knowledge (*jñāna*), which also reveal different aspects of an object without contradicting each other (TABh 1.35.39–40). Immediately following this comparison, the *bhāṣya* continues as follows:

yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇair eko 'rthaḥ pramiyate svaviṣayaniyamāt na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvan nayavādā iti |

Or, just as one object is understood by the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), [i.e.], direct cognition, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony (*pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana*) — and these are not contradictory (*vipratipatti*) on account of the limitation of their respective ranges — likewise, the statements [from the different] perspectives [are not incompatible] (TABh 1.35.41).

The claim in this sentence is similar to the claim about the compatibility of the five varieties of knowledge in the passage that precedes this sentence.⁴¹⁷ However, instead of mentioning the five varieties of knowledge, this sentence talks about the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). It is striking that the means of cognition are specified as 'direct cognition, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony' (*pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana*) since the TA claims that there are only two means of cognition, i.e., *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*.⁴¹⁸ Moreover, the listed means of cognition are the means of cognition that were associated with the Naiyāyikas and it is not evident what the exact purpose of the reference to the Nyāya means of cognition is. The passage clearly compares the perspectives with the means of cognition, pointing out that one can know an object in different ways without ending up with a contradictory understanding of that object. However, the *bhāṣya* already made that point with reference to the five varieties of knowledge, which is more in line with the general epistemological account of the TA. By repeating the same argument with reference to the means of cognition that were accepted by the Naiyāyikas, the *bhāṣya* seems to suggest that the Nyāya point of view is also a legitimate perspective.

⁴¹⁷ I.e., TABh 1.35.40.

⁴¹⁸ In the commentary on TA 1.6, the *bhāṣya* mentions the position of others who claim that there are four means of cognition (TABh 1.6.3). For a discussion of this passage, see the above section on the classification of the means of cognition.

In fact, this interpretation is supported by another sentence that appears towards the end of the discussion of the perspectives:

*ataś ca pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanānām api prāmāṇyam abhyanu-
jñāyata iti |*

Hence, the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) of direct perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony (*pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana*) is also approved (TABh 1.35.89).

This passage clearly supports the Nyāya position on the means of knowledge, even though the TA offers a different account. Hence, based on the commentary on TA 1.35, one could say that the TABh provides the first account of philosophical pluralism in the Jaina tradition. It is clear that the author of these parts of the *bhāṣya* does not only interpret the theory of standpoints as a solution to the problems of change, universals, etc. but also applies this model to the compatibility of different philosophical traditions.⁴¹⁹ Yet, just as the passage about the four means of cognition (TABh 1.35.41), the above sentence is not well connected with the topic that precedes it. TABh 1.35.74–88 discusses how the perspectives relate to the varieties of knowledge. It explains, for example, that the literal perspective (*śabda*) only applies to knowledge from testimony and absolute knowledge (TABh 1.35.83). Even though TABh 1.35.89 begins with '*ataś ca*', which suggests an argumentative connection with the preceding passage, the conclusion in this sentence does not follow from the foregoing sentences. This might be a further indication that the commentary on TA 1.35 was not written at one moment in time. If this is indeed the case, we cannot say with certainty that the Jaina philosophers already applied their theory of perspectives to the different philosophical traditions when the core of the TABh was composed.

Looking at the different sections of the commentary on TA 1.35, as specified in the table above, it is possible to imagine that some of the sections were added at a later stage. If this passage was written at one moment in time, I would expect that

⁴¹⁹ Since the Naiyāyikas are not mentioned explicitly, it is possible that the *bhāṣya* simply argues for the compatibility of different views within the Jaina tradition. As discussed previously, some Jaina texts do indeed present a fourfold list of *pramāṇas*, which corresponds with the Nyāya model. Nevertheless, even in that case, it remains a fact that the text uses the theory of perspectives to argue for philosophical pluralism.

the application of the perspectives to the word ‘soul’ (TABh 1.35.50–73) would immediately follow the application of the perspectives to the word ‘pot’ (TABh 1.35.26–33). Furthermore, it is remarkable that the *bhāṣya* contains two passages in *āryā* metre, which strongly deviate from the overall style of the *bhāṣya*, which is composed in prose.⁴²⁰ To conclude, the disorderly presentation of this section of the *bhāṣya* and the reference to the Nyāya means of cognition as authoritative sources of knowledge suggest that this passage underwent changes over time. Since the first parts of the commentary on TA 1.35 are straightforward and in line with the general style of the *bhāṣya*, it is plausible that TABh 1.35.1–20 belonged to an early version of the TABh and that the remaining parts were added at a later stage. Given the lack of contemporary sources, it is hard to know whether this happened before or after Mallavādin.

Despite this, it is likely that the theory of perspectives in the TA and the *bhāṣya* on this passage reflect several stages of a theory that was still in development when the *sūtra* and the main part of the *bhāṣya* were composed. As mentioned above, TA 1.34 lists five perspectives while the *Sarvārthasiddhi* lists seven perspectives. Yet, the additional two perspectives that the *Sarvārthasiddhi* mentions are included in the varieties of the literal perspective (*śabda*) that are mentioned in the *bhāṣya* on TA 1.35. This might indicate that the TA originally only listed five perspectives and did not include TA 1.35, which states that the first and fifth perspective have several varieties. This *sūtra* was perhaps added at a later stage in order to make sure that the TA also included those perspectives that were missing in the original text.⁴²¹ The discussion in the *bhāṣya* about the connection between the perspectives and views of different philosophical schools probably reflects another stage in the development of the Jaina theory of perspectives, which ties in with the treatment of the topic by Mallavādin. The fact that these different aspects of the theory of perspectives are included in the present version of the TA and the TABh suggests that the TA was seen as a relevant text in the discussion and that later redactors of the TA and the TABh felt the need to bring the text in line with new ideas that emerged long after the TA itself was composed.

⁴²⁰ The first of these passages occurs halfway through the commentary on TA 1.35 (TABh 1.35.42–49) and the second passage occurs at the very end of the discussion of the perspectives (TABh 1.35.90–99). For a more detailed discussion of these passages, see § 3.5.

⁴²¹ The majority of Jaina authors follow the sevenfold list of perspectives, as listed in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Ohira 1982: 16).

3.3 *Tattvārthādhigama* Chapter II.8-25

After the first chapter of the TA, which primarily deals with epistemology, the second chapter continues with a discussion of the soul (*jīva*). The soul is a central notion in Jaina thought and is an important element of different theories in the TA. First of all, the soul plays a crucial role in the soteriology of the Jainas. In the first chapter of the TA, the soul is mentioned as one of the fundamental categories of reality (*tattva*). These categories are the basic constituents of the path to liberation and the soul — the final goal of which is liberation from karmic influence and rebirth — is the very first category in this list. Apart from its role in the soteriological framework of the Jainas, the soul is also an important element in their ontological theories. The soul constitutes the essence of living beings and is listed in TA 5.2 as one of the five substances (*dravya*). From an ontological perspective, the soul is radically different from the other substances, which are inanimate (*ajīvakāya*).⁴²² Finally, the soul is also the centre of knowledge and is, as such, the cornerstone of the epistemological account in the TA.

The second chapter of the TA discusses various aspects of the Jaina theory of the soul. The first section of the chapter on the soul explains how different types of *karman* relate to different states (*bhāva*) of souls (TA 2.1 – 2.7). Next, the TA mentions different varieties of cognitive operation (*upayoga*), which is introduced as the hallmark of the soul (TA 2.8 – 2.9). Thereafter, the text deals with specific characteristics of different kinds of living beings, ranging from plants to gods (TA 2.10 – 2.52). This section includes a discussion of the senses (*indriya*).

Since the soul is the actual centre of knowledge, it forms an important link between the epistemological and ontological theories in the TA. For this reason, I have included an analysis of the relevant parts of the second chapter of the TA in this chapter. Since this study is mainly concerned with the epistemological account in the TA, I will focus my analysis on those parts that are directly relevant to the theory of knowledge. Therefore, I will leave out the first section (TA 2.1 – 2.7), which deals with karmic theory, and the last section (TA 2.26 – 2.52), which deals with the movements of the transmigrating soul, the varieties of rebirth, the different types of

⁴²² The inanimate entities are listed in TA 5.1.

bodies, and the life span of beings. The middle part (TA 2.8 – 2.25), which forms the basis of the following analysis, discusses the following topics:

- i. Cognitive operation (*upayoga*) (TA 2.8 – 2.9)
- ii. Varieties of worldly souls (TA 2.10 – 2.14)
- iii. The five senses (TA 2.15 – 2.20)
- iv. The objects of the senses and the mind (TA 2.21 – TA 2.22)
- v. Number of senses in classes of beings (TA 2.23 – 2.25)

Cognitive operation (upayoga)

TA 2.8 – 2.9 discuss the notion of cognitive operation (*upayoga*), which is introduced as the defining characteristic of the soul:

upayogo lakṣaṇam ||2.8|| sa dvividho 'ṣṭacaturbhedaḥ ||2.9||

[Cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) [of the soul]. It is twofold and has eight and four varieties.

The more general meaning of the term '*upayoga*' is 'use' or 'application'⁴²³ and the term usually does not refer to cognitive processes. However, the *bhāṣya* and other commentaries, such as the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, interpret *upayoga* as a generic term for the different varieties of knowledge (*jñāna*) and worldview (*darśana*), which are clearly cognitive aspects. Therefore, I translate the term as 'cognitive operation'.⁴²⁴ The *bhāṣya* on TA 2.9 explains the different varieties of cognitive operation as follows:

⁴²³ MW.

⁴²⁴ The term '*upayoga*' also appears in canonical sources, such as the *Prajñāpanāsūtra* (*Pañṇavaṇāsutta*). However, it seems that the interpretation of the term in the commentaries on the TA differs from the canonical use of the term. In my analysis, I will only deal with the concept of *upayoga* as used in the TA and the TABh. For a more detailed study of *upayoga* in different sources, see Soni 2007.

sa upayogo dvividhaḥ sākāro 'nākāraś ca jñānopayogo darśanopayogaś cety arthaḥ | sa punar yathāsaṅkhyam aṣṭacaturbhedo bhavati |

This cognitive operation is twofold: having shape (*sa-ākāra*) and shapeless (*an-ākāra*). The meaning is: cognitive operation [in the form of] knowledge (*jñāna-upayoga*) and cognitive operation [in the form of] worldview (*darśana-upayoga*). This [twofold cognitive operation] is again respectively eight- and fourfold (TABh 2.9.1 – 2.9.2).

First, the *bhāṣya* explains that cognitive operation falls into two categories: 'having shape' (*sa-ākāra*) and 'shapeless' (*an-ākāra*). These terms are explained as references to 'cognitive operation [in the form of] knowledge' (*jñāna-upayoga*) and 'cognitive operation [in the form of] worldview' (*darśana-upayoga*). However, the *bhāṣya* does not explain why *jñānopayoga* is qualified as 'having form' (*sa-ākāra*) and *darśanopayoga* as 'shapeless' (*an-ākāra*). Since the meaning of these terms is not self-evident in this particular context, it remains unclear what the composer of the *bhāṣya* means exactly by these qualifications. However, the two terms are not only used in the Jaina tradition but also feature in the discussion of perception in the Yogācāra tradition.⁴²⁵ The main question in this debate is whether cognition is representational or not. This ties in to the more general discussion in Indian epistemology about determinate (*savikalpa*) and indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa*), i.e., the difference between the bare apprehension of an object and concept-laden perception.⁴²⁶ Yet, it is hard to tell whether the terms that are used in the *bhāṣya* on TA 2.9 have the same meaning as the terms that were discussed by the Yogācārins or the other schools.

After making this distinction, the commentary explains that cognitive operation in the form of knowledge (*jñāna-upayoga*) and cognitive operation in the form of worldview (*darśana-upayoga*) have eight and four varieties respectively. These varieties are summed up in TABh 2.9.5 and 2.9.8 and are given in the table below.

⁴²⁵ For a discussion of the *sākāra* – *nirākāravāda* controversy, see, e.g., Peter Della Santina 2000 and Stephen Phillips 2011.

⁴²⁶ Soni 2007: 208-209. Tatia translates '*sākāra*' and '*anākāra*' as 'determinate' and 'indeterminate' (Tatia 1951: 70) and Sanghvi uses the same terms in his commentary in the TA (Sanghvi 1974: 82). It seems, therefore, that both authors interpret the terms '*sākāra*' and '*anākāra*' as synonyms of '*savikalpa*' and '*nirvikalpa*'. Since the *bhāṣya* does not explain the meaning of these terms, it is hard to evaluate whether this identification is justified.

XVII. Varieties of cognitive operation (<i>upayoga</i>) (TA 2.8 – 2.9)	
<i>jñānopayoga</i> (TABh 2.9.1, 2.9.5)	<i>darśanopayoga</i> (TABh 2.9.1, 2.9.8)
i. <i>matijñānopayoga</i>	i. <i>cakṣurdarśanopayoga</i>
ii. <i>śrutajñānopayoga</i>	ii. <i>acakṣurdarśanopayoga</i>
iii. <i>avadhijñānopayoga</i>	iii. <i>avadhidarśanopayoga</i>
iv. <i>manaḥparyāyajñānopayoga</i>	iv. <i>kevaladarśanopayoga</i>
v. <i>kevalajñānopayoga</i>	
vi. <i>matyajñānopayoga</i>	
vii. <i>śrutājñānopayoga</i>	
viii. <i>vibhaṅga</i> ⁴²⁷ <i>jñānopayoga</i>	

The eight varieties of cognitive operation in the form of knowledge (*jñānopayoga*) correspond to the eight varieties of knowledge (*jñāna*) and false knowledge (*ajñāna*) that are listed in TA 1.9 and TABh 1.32.3. The four varieties of cognitive operation in the form of worldview (*darśanopayoga*) do not correspond to a previously mentioned list.⁴²⁸ The categorisation of these four varieties of *darśanopayoga* differs in several respects from the varieties of *jñānopayoga*. First, the list does not mention any opposites. The list of *jñānopayoga* also contains forms of cognitive operation in the form of false knowledge (*ajñāna*) but the list of *darśanopayoga* does not contain any elements that are related to wrong worldview (*mithyādarśana*).⁴²⁹ Second, the list of varieties of *darśanopayoga* contains two of the five varieties of knowledge — i.e., *avadhi* and *kevala* — but does not refer to *mati*, *śruta*, and *manaḥparyāya*. Instead, it uses the terms ‘*cakṣus*’ and ‘*acakṣus*’. This might refer to a distinction between two forms of ordinary cognition (*matī*) — i.e., ordinary cognition derived from visual perception and ordinary cognition derived from the other senses and the mind — but the *bhāṣya* does not clarify the meaning of these terms.

⁴²⁷ *vibhaṅgajñāna* is the opposite of *avadhijñāna* (TABh 1.32.12).

⁴²⁸ It is unclear to me whether this fourfold list of varieties of *darśanopayoga* is derived from an older source. Glasenapp discusses the different varieties of *upayoga* in his discussion of the soul but he does not specify his source. His explanation, however, seems to follow the TABh (Glasenapp 1925: 203-206).

⁴²⁹ Wrong worldview is seen as a cause of false knowledge. See, e.g., TABh 1.33.1.

The order in which the *bhāṣya* introduces the terms *sākāra/anākāra* and *jñānopayoga/darśanopayoga* suggests that the varieties of *jñānopayoga* are qualified as *sākāra* and the varieties of *darśanopayoga* as *anākāra*. In other words, the varieties of cognitive operation in the form of knowledge are determinate (or concept-laden) and the varieties of cognitive operation in the form of worldview are indeterminate (or conceptless). The general idea seems to be that all varieties of *darśana* are non-representational. They are ways of ‘seeing’ the world in the form of bare perceptions. This could explain why testimony (*śruta*) and mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) are not included in this list, even though the other varieties of cognition — such as cosmic perception (*avadhi*) and absolute worldview⁴³⁰ (*kevala*) — are mentioned in the list of *darśanopayoga*. Testimony and mental perception are inherently conceptual and have, therefore, nothing to do with *darśanopayoga*, which is non-representational (*anākāra*).

Varieties of worldly souls

After the two *sūtras* on cognitive operation (TA 2.8 – 2.9), the TA continues with a discussion of the varieties of souls (TA 2.10 – 2.14).

***saṃsāriṇo muktās ca ||2.10|| samanaskāmanaskāḥ ||2.11|| saṃsāriṇas
trasasthāvarāḥ ||2.12|| pṛthivyabvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ ||2.13|| tejovāyū
dvīndriyādayas ca trasāḥ ||2.14||***

[There are] worldly (*saṃsārin*) and liberated (*mukta*) [souls]. [Souls exist] with minds (*samanaska*) and without minds (*amanaska*). Worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) are mobile (*trasa*) and immobile (*sthāvara*). Earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), and plants (*vanaspati*)⁴³¹ are immobile (*sthāvara*). Fire (*tejas*) and air (*vāyu*) and [beings with] two senses (*indriya*) etc. are mobile (*trasa*).

⁴³⁰ In the first chapter of the TA, the term ‘*kevala*’ is only used with reference to ‘*kevalajñāna*’. For this reason, I have translated the term ‘*kevala*’ as ‘absolute knowledge’. However, in this context, the *bhāṣya* differentiates between *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana*. Therefore, the appropriate translation of ‘*kevala*’ in this context is ‘absolute worldview’.

⁴³¹ The first meaning of ‘*vanaspati*’ is ‘tree’ (MW). However, TABh 2.13.4 explains that this category begins with ‘*śaivala*’, which is a kind of duckweed. Hence, it seems that the term ‘*vanaspati*’ refers to the category of plants.

First, TA 2.10 makes a distinction between worldly (*saṃsārin*) and liberated (*mukta*) souls. Then, the next *sūtra* adds that there are souls with minds (*manaska*) and souls without minds (*amanaska*). The TA and the TABh do not specify whether this relates to worldly and liberated souls, or to worldly souls only. However, the *Sarvārthasiddhi* explicitly mentions that these two qualifications relate to worldly souls.⁴³² TABh 2.25.2 explains that all gods, hellish beings, human beings, and some mammals are provided with a mind (*samanaska*).

Next, the TA 2.12 explains that worldly souls are either mobile (*trasa*) or immobile (*sthāvara*). The souls of earth, water, and plants are classified as immobile and the souls of fire, air, and beings with two or more senses are qualified as mobile.⁴³³ The classification of souls in TA 2.10 – 2.14 can be represented as follows:

⁴³² S.A. Jain 1992: 60 - 61. The TABh on TA 2.11 is less clear. It says: ‘Succinctly, **these souls** are twofold: with minds and without minds. We will explain them later on (see TA 2.25) (*samāsatas ta eva jivā dvividhā bhavanti samanaskās cāmanaskās ca | tāt parastād vakṣyāmaḥ*)’ (TABh 2.11.1 – 2.11.2). The commentary does not explicitly exclude the possibility that the qualifications in TA 2.11 relate to worldly and liberated souls since it is not obvious what the reference of ‘*ta* (< *te*)’ is exactly. If one reads TA 2.11 together with the next *sūtra*, the phrase ‘*samanaskāmanaskāḥ*’ would qualify the word ‘*saṃsāriṇaḥ*’. In fact, if the *daṇḍa* that separates TA 2.11 and TA 2.12 would be placed after ‘*saṃsāriṇaḥ*’ in TA 2.12, we would end up with the following reading: ‘*saṃsāriṇo muktās ca | samanaskāmanaskāḥ saṃsāriṇaḥ | trasasthāvarāḥ | pṛthivyabvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ | tejovāyū dvīndriyādayas ca trasāḥ*’. With this minor change, the whole passage would be more straightforward and the ambiguity of TA 2.11 would disappear.

⁴³³ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* has a variant reading of TA 2.13 – 2.14 and categorises the souls of fire and air bodies as immobile beings (*pṛthivyaptejovāyuvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ | dvīndriyādayas trasāḥ*).

XVIII. Varieties of souls (<i>jīva</i>) (TA 2.10 – 2.14)			
		<i>sthāvara</i> (immobile) (TA 2.12, TABh 2.13.1)	<i>trasa</i> (mobile) (TA 2.12, TABh 2.14.1 – 3)
one-sensed beings (TA 2.23)	<i>amanaska</i> (without a mind) (TA 2.11)	<i>pr̥thivīkāyika</i> (earth-bodied)	<i>tejaḥkāyika</i> (fire-bodied)
		<i>apkāyika</i> (water-bodied)	<i>vāyukāyika</i> (air-bodied)
		<i>vanaspatikāyika</i> (plant-bodied)	
beings with more than one sense (TA 2.14)	<i>samanaska</i> ⁴³⁴ (having a mind) (TABh 2.25.2)		<i>dvīndriya</i> (having two senses)
			<i>trīndriya</i> (having three senses)
			<i>caturindriya</i> (having four senses)
		<i>pañcendriya</i> (having five senses)	

This model shows a general distinction between more complex beings with more than one sense and simple one-sensed beings, which are specified as earth-, water-, plant-, air-, and fire-bodied beings.⁴³⁵ The TABh gives some examples of these beings, such as snow (*hima*), duckweed (*śaivala*), and charcoal (*aṅgāra*).⁴³⁶

⁴³⁴ Not all five-sensed beings have a mind (*manas*). Gods, hellish beings, and humans have a mind but not all animals that have five senses are provided with a mind (TABh 2.25.2).

⁴³⁵ TA 2.23 explains that the souls of earth etc. have only one sense, which is the sense of touch (TABh 2.23.1). Since the Jainas attribute a soul and the sense of touch to these entities, we can qualify their ontology as a form of hylozoism, i.e., the view that matter is in some sense alive. Even though this idea might sound very outlandish from a contemporary perspective, we can find similar ideas attributed to, e.g., Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. For a general outline of their philosophical ideas, see Guthrie 1962.

⁴³⁶ TABh 2.13.2 – 2.14.2. The TA and the TABh do not mention *nigodas*, which are often included in Jaina classifications of beings. P.S. Jaini explains that these minute beings are smaller than the elements, are provided with the sense of touch only, 'permeate the bodies of other beings' and 'are born together in colonies which die a fraction of a second later' (P.S.

The five senses

After the basic outline of the different varieties of living beings, the TA provides an explanation of the senses (TA 2.15 – 2.20):

pañcendriyāṇi ||2.15|| dviividhāni ||2.16|| nirvṛtṭyupakaraṇe dravyendriyam ||2.17|| labdhyupayogau bhāvendriyam ||2.18|| upayogaḥ sparś-ādiṣu ||2.19|| sparśanarasanaghrāṇacakṣuḥśrotrāṇi ||2.20||

There are five senses (*pañcendriya*). [The five senses are] twofold (*dviividha*). The sense organ (*dravyendriya*) [consists of] the ‘manifestation’ (*nirvṛtṭi*) [and] the instrument (*upakaraṇa*). The sense faculty (*bhāvendriya*) [consists of] acquisition (*labdhi*) and cognitive operation (*upayoga*). Cognitive operation (*upayoga*) relates to touch (i.e., touchable objects) (*sparśa*) etc. [The five senses are] the sense of touch (*sparśana*), taste (*rasana*), smell (*ghrāṇa*), sight (*cakṣus*) and hearing (*śrotra*).⁴³⁷

TA 2.15 states that there are five senses (*indriya*), which are specified in TA 2.20. TA 2.16 adds that the senses are twofold. The twofold distinction is explained in the next two *sūtras* (TA 2.17 and 2.18), which deal respectively with the sense organ and the sense faculty. The *bhāṣya* on these two *sūtras* describes the sense organ (*dravyendriya*) as the physical component of the senses and the sense faculty (*bhāvendriya*) as the cognitive power of the senses.

Next, TA 2.17 divides the physical sense organ into the ‘manifestation’ (*nirvṛtṭi*) and the ‘instrument’ (*upakaraṇa*).⁴³⁸ The TABh explains the term ‘*nirvṛtṭi*’ as the apertures of the senses (*indriyadvāra*) — which are brought about (*nirvartita*) by body-determining *karman* (TABh 2.17.2) — and ‘*upakaraṇa*’ as the part that is

Jaini 1998: 109). The beings that are mentioned in the TABh as the earth-bodied (*pṛthivīkāyika*) etc. take the elements as their bodies. The idea that these simple entities are provided with a soul and the sense of touch explains why certain professions that involve harm to these beings are forbidden. For a discussion of the forbidden professions, see Williams 1963: 117-123.

⁴³⁷ The discussion of the senses in the *Bhagavatī* (*Viyāhapannatti*) presents the senses in the inversed order (*Bhagavatī* 2.4.1). Since the TA says that one-sensed beings have the sense of touch only, while the sense of hearing only appears in complex beings such as humans (TA 2.23 – 2.24), it makes sense to begin the list with the sense of touch.

⁴³⁸ Even though the terms ‘*nirvṛtṭi*’ and ‘*upakaraṇa*’ suggest that the *sūtra* makes a distinction between the physical and instrumental aspect of the senses, they are both used to describe an aspect of the physical sense organ.

‘assisting’ (*upakārin*) that which is brought about (*nirvartita*) (TABh 2.17.5).⁴³⁹ TA 2.18 says that sense faculties (*bhāvendriya*) have, likewise, two components: acquisition (*labdhī*) and cognitive operation (*upayoga*). The *bhāṣya* explains the term ‘acquisition’ as something that results from different karmic processes, such as the destruction of knowledge-covering *karman* (TABh 2.18.2).⁴⁴⁰ The meaning seems to be that the capacity of the sense faculty is determined by *karmic* factors. The term ‘cognitive operation’ (*upayoga*)⁴⁴¹ seems to refer to the power of the sense faculty, which links the cognitive apparatus with the objects of the sense.⁴⁴² The *bhāṣya* on TA 2.19 further explains that perception cannot take place in the absence of one of the different components (i.e., *nirvṛtti* etc.) (TABh 2.19.6). The different components of the five senses can be represented as follows:

⁴³⁹ The explanation of these terms in the *bhāṣya* is not entirely clear to me. The *Sarvārthasiddhi* explains that the ‘manifestation’ (*nirvṛtti*) is a minute part of the soul that takes the shape of the sense. The term ‘*upakaraṇa*’ refers to a part of the physical sense organ that assists this process, such as the eyeball and eyelid. This subtle division of the sense organ into the general physical aspect and the involvement of the soul seems to be a way to bridge the gap between the mental and physical aspects of sense perception (S.A. Jain 1992: 64).

⁴⁴⁰ The *bhāṣya* adds that acquisition (*labdhī*) is fivefold, related to the five senses (TABh 2.18.3 – 2.18.5).

⁴⁴¹ See also TA 2.8, which introduces cognitive operation (*upayoga*) as the characteristic of the soul.

⁴⁴² TA 2.19 explains that cognitive operation applies to the objects of the five senses (*sparśādi*). This *sūtra* is omitted in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. The objects of the different senses are listed in TA 2.21. The *bhāṣya* gives ‘joining’ (*āyoga*) as one of the synonyms of ‘*upayoga*’, which confirms the idea that *upayoga* is the power that links the sense object with the sense organ (TABh 2.19.3).

XIX. Structure of the five senses (<i>pañcendriya</i>) (TA 2.15 – 2.20)			
sense organ (<i>dravyendriya</i>) (TABh 2.16.2)		sense faculty (<i>bhāvendriya</i>) (TABh 2.16.2)	
manifestation (<i>nirvṛtti</i>) (TA 2.17)	the instrument (<i>upakaraṇa</i>) (TA 2.17)	acquisition (<i>labdhi</i>) (TA 2.18, TABh 2.18.5)	cognitive operation (<i>upayoga</i>) (TA 2.18 – 2.19)
		related to the sense of touch (<i>sparśanendriyalabdhi</i>)	related to touch (<i>sparśa</i>)
		related to the sense of taste (<i>rasanendriyalabdhi</i>)	related to taste (<i>rasa</i>)
		related to the sense of smell (<i>ghrāṇendriyalabdhi</i>)	related to smell (<i>gandha</i>)
		related to the sense of sight (<i>caḡṣusindriyalabdhi</i>)	related to colour (<i>varṇa</i>)
		related the sense of hearing (<i>śrotrendriyalabdhi</i>)	related to sound (<i>śabda</i>)

The objects of the senses and the mind

At the end of the discussion of the structure of the senses, the TA lists the five senses and their objects (TA 2.20 – 2.21), which are given in the table below. The *bhāṣya* briefly comments that the five items in TA 2.20 are the five senses and the items in TA 2.21 their respective objects. After listing the objects of the five senses, TA 2.22 adds that testimony (*śruta*) is the object of the mind (*anindriya*).⁴⁴³

⁴⁴³ The *bhāṣya* on TA 2.22 uses the word '*noindriya*' instead of '*anindriya*'. The same phenomenon occurs in TABh 1.19.1. For a discussion of this peculiar word formation, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

XX. The senses and their objects (TA 2.20 – 2.22)	
<i>indriya</i> (sense)	<i>artha</i> (sense object)
i. <i>sparśana</i> (sense of touch)	i. <i>sparśa</i> (touch)
ii. <i>rasana</i> (sense of taste)	ii. <i>rasa</i> (taste)
iii. <i>ghrāṇa</i> (sense of smell)	iii. <i>gandha</i> (smell)
iv. <i>cakṣus</i> (sense of sight)	iv. <i>varṇa</i> (colour)
v. <i>śrotra</i> (sense of hearing)	v. <i>śabda</i> (sound)
<i>anindriya</i> (mind) (TA 2.22)	<i>śruta</i> (testimony)

Unlike the longer and complex explanations on the preceding *sūtras* that deal with the structure of the senses, the *bhāṣya* on TA 2.20 – 2.22 is remarkable short and straightforward. Furthermore, it is a somewhat odd that TA 2.20 lists the five senses without mentioning that these are the senses (*indriya*) and puts this *sūtra* at the very end of the discussion of the structure of the five senses. A more obvious place for this *sūtra* would be after TA 2.15, which says that there are five senses. If one joins TA 2.15 and TA 2.20 by taking out TA 2.16 – 2.19, one would end up with a more straightforward passage (*pañcendriyāṇi | sparśanarasanaghrāṇacakṣuḥ-śrotrāṇi*). This might be an indication that the discussion of the senses has several historical layers.

Number of senses in classes of beings

The last part of the discussion of the senses explains how the different senses relate to different types of beings:

vāyvantānām ekam ||2.23|| kṛmipīlikābhramaramanuṣyādīnām ekaikavṛddhāni ||2.24|| saṃjñīnaḥ samanaskāḥ ||2.25||

[Living beings] up to the air[-bodied]⁴⁴⁴ (*vāyv-anta*) have one [sense]. [The number of senses of] worms (*kṛmi*), ants (*pīlikā*), bees (*bhramara*), human beings (*manuṣya*), etc. increases one by one (i.e., worms have two senses, ants three, etc.). Conscious beings (*saṃjñin*) are provided with minds (*samanaska*).

⁴⁴⁴ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* reads '*vanaspatyantānām*', 'up to the plant-bodied'.

TA 2.23 explains that the simplest beings have one sense only. The expression ‘up to the air[-bodied]’ (*vāyvanta*)’ refers to the souls that inhabit the elements, which are mentioned in TA 2.13 – 2.14.⁴⁴⁵ The *bhāṣya* on TA 2.23 mentions that these beings have the sense of touch (*sparsāna*) only (TABh 2.23.1). Beings that are more complex have more senses, as specified in TA 2.24. The table below provides an overview of the different classes of living beings and their respective number of senses.

XXI. Number of senses in the different classes of living beings (TA 2.23 – 2.25)					
Classes of beings (<i>jīva</i>) ⁴⁴⁶	Senses (<i>indriya</i>)				
	<i>sparsāna</i>	<i>rasana</i>	<i>ghrāṇa</i>	<i>cakṣus</i>	<i>śrotra</i>
i. one-sensed beings (<i>pṛthivī, ap, vanaspati, tejaḥ, vāyu</i>)	x				
ii. worms (<i>kṛmi</i>) etc.	x	x			
iii. ants (<i>pipīlikā</i>) etc.	x	x	x		
iv. bees (<i>bhramara</i>) etc.	x	x	x	x	
v. human beings (<i>manuṣya</i>) etc.	x	x	x	x	x

In addition to this model, TA 2.25 adds that conscious beings (*saṃjñīn*) are provided with a mind (*samanaska*). This suggests that the mind (*manas*) was somehow seen as a sixth sense. The *bhāṣya* explains the term ‘*samanaska*’ as a form of moral

⁴⁴⁵ I.e., *pṛthivīkāyika* (earth-bodied), *apkāyika*, (water-bodied), *vanaspatikāyika*, (plant-bodied), *tejaḥkāyika*, (fire-bodied), and *vāyukāyika* (air-bodied) (TABh 2.13.1, 2.14.1 – 2.14.2). See also above.

⁴⁴⁶ The *bhāṣya* provides more examples of beings of each class (see TABh 2.24.4 – 2.24.7). Unfortunately, it is rather difficult to identify many of the species that are mentioned in this passage.

consciousness,⁴⁴⁷ which is attributed to all gods, hellish beings, human beings, and some mammals.⁴⁴⁸

Even though the model is understandable to a certain extent, the suggested link between the classes of beings and the number of senses is not fully evident. For example, the beings in the class of bees etc. do not have the sense of sight according to the theory in the TA. This is somewhat odd, since the eyes of bees and similar insects⁴⁴⁹ are clearly visible. This could be an indication that the classifications of beings was originally not connected with the theory about the senses.

To conclude, the model that is presented in the TA demonstrates a close link between epistemology and ontology in the conceptual framework of the Jainas. The different classes of beings are organised on the basis of the number of senses. Furthermore, the different senses correspond to the different varieties of matter (*pudgala*).⁴⁵⁰ In the next section, I will discuss the ontological account of the TA, which is the topic of the fifth chapter of the TA.

⁴⁴⁷ TABh 2.25.1 uses the term ‘recognition of deliberation’ (*saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā*), which is explained in TABh 2.25.3 as the capacity of making a distinction between merit and vice (*guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā-ātmikā*).

⁴⁴⁸ TABh 2.25.2. Animals such as fishes, snakes, and birds — which are listed as examples of the class of ‘humans etc.’ in TABh 2.24.7 — seem to be excluded.

⁴⁴⁹ The *bhāṣya* mentions several other beings that belong to the class of bees etc., such as gnats (*daṃśā*) and mosquitos (*maśaka*) (TABh 2.24.6).

⁴⁵⁰ Matter (*pudgala*) is discussed in the fifth chapter of the TA. See also the analysis in the next section.

3.4 *Tattvārthādhigama* Chapter V

The fifth chapter of the TA deals with the different types of substance (*dravya*). The discussion mainly focuses on the inanimate entities (*ajīva-kāya*).⁴⁵¹ As such, it forms the counterpart of chapter II, III and IV, which provide a discussion of souls (*jīva*).⁴⁵² Unlike the previous chapters, which contain many lists of types of *karman*, gods, hellish beings, and cosmic realms, chapter V is composed in a more systematic way and presents a concise and coherent ontological account. Even though this study is mainly concerned with the epistemological account of the TA, there are several reasons to look at the ontological theory as well. First, the TA assumes a direct relation between the sense organs and the sense objects, which exist independently of the knower. As such, the ontological makeup of the world determines the knowledge that results from ordinary cognition. Second, the explanation of the differences between mind-reading (*manaḥparyāya*), cosmic perception (*avadhi*), and absolute knowledge (*kevala*)⁴⁵³ in the first chapter of the TA cannot be understood without a proper understanding of the notion of substance (*dravya*) and its modifications (*paryāya*).⁴⁵⁴ Given its relevance to the epistemological account in the TA, this section will provide an outline of the ontological theory in the fifth

⁴⁵¹ The term ‘*ajīva*’ literally translates as ‘non-soul’, and refers to all ontological categories that are not living, such as space and matter (TA 5.1).

⁴⁵² Even though chapter II, III, and IV address different topics — including *karman*, the senses, hellish beings and gods, and the different realms of the cosmos that are inhabited by living beings — they all discuss aspects of the soul (*jīva*). The introductory sentences of chapter II and V in the *bhāṣya*, indicate that the composer of the *bhāṣya* regards chapters II - IV as a unity. The *bhāṣya* introduces the first *sūtra* of the second chapter by asking what the soul is and what its characteristic is (*ko jīvaḥ katham lakṣaṇo veti*) (TABh 2.0.1) and opens the fifth chapter by saying that souls have now been discussed and that the next chapter will address inanimate entities (*uktā jīvāḥ | ajīvān vakṣyāmaḥ*) (TABh 5.0.1 - 5.0.2).

⁴⁵³ I.e., the three direct types of knowledge that are classified as *pratyakṣa* in the TA. See § 3.2.

⁴⁵⁴ TA 1.27 - 1.30 says: ‘The range (*nibandha*) of ordinary cognition and testimony [extends to] all substances (*sarvadravya*) but not in all modes (*asarvaparyāya*). [The range] of cosmic perception [extends to all things] having extension (*rūpin*). [The range of] mental perception [extends to] an infinitesimal part of that. [The range of] absolute knowledge [extends to] all modes (*paryāya*) of all substances’ (*matīśrutayor nibandhaḥ sarvadravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu | rūpiṣv avadheḥ | tadanantabhāge manaḥparyāyasya | sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya*). The *bhāṣya* adds that the domain of cosmic perception extends to all extended substances (*rūpidravya*) but not in all modes (*asarvaparyāya*) (TABh 1.26.15).

chapter of the TA.⁴⁵⁵ The chapter consists of 44 *sūtras* and discusses the following topics:

- i. The substances (*dravya*) (TA 5.1 – 5.6)
- ii. Space-points (*pradeśa*) (TA 5.7 – 5.16)
- iii. Function (*upakāra*) of the substances (TA 5.17 – 5.22)
- iv. The material elements (*pudgala*): atoms and aggregates (TA 5.23 – 5.28)
- v. Existence (*sat*) and permanence (TA 5.29 – 5.31)
- vi. Connection of material elements (*bandha*) (TA 5.32 – 5.36)
- vii. Qualities (*guṇa*), modes (*pariyāya*), and transformation (*pariṇāma*) (TA 5.37 – 5.44)

The substances (dravya)

The first *sūtra* of the fifth chapter opens with an enumeration of the four inanimate entities (*ajīvakāya*). The second *sūtra* explains that the inanimate entities together with the soul are the substances (*dravya*) (TA 5.2). This implies that there are five types of substance, which are given in the table below:

XXII. The five substances (<i>dravya</i>) (TA 5.1 – 5.2)	
<i>ajīvakāya</i> (the non-living entities)	
i. <i>dharma</i> (motion)	v. <i>jīva</i> (souls)
ii. <i>adharma</i> (rest)	
iii. <i>ākāśa</i> (space)	
iv. <i>pudgala</i> (material elements)	
[<i>kāla</i> (time), TA 5.38]	

The first two inanimate substances (*dharma* and *adharma*) facilitate movement (*gati*) and inertia (*sthiti*).⁴⁵⁶ The terms that are used for these categories is peculiar

⁴⁵⁵ The prime goal of the analysis in this section is to present the different components of the ontological account of the TA. My analysis is mainly based on the text of the TA and the explanation in the *bhāṣya*. Since this study is primarily focused on the epistemological account in the TA, my discussion of the ontological account will be relatively brief and I will not analyse its historical relationship with other texts or schools. For a comparative study of the ontological theory in the TA and the ontological account of Kundakunda, see Bajželj 2013.

⁴⁵⁶ The functions of motion (*dharma*) and rest (*adharma*) is explained in TA 5.17, which will be discussed below. The category of rest (*adharma*) does not feature in the ontological model

since '*dharma*' and '*adharma*' usually refer to ethical categories. However, the idea that one needs an ontological category to explain movement or change is not unique to the TA. Similar ideas are expressed in influential ontological treatises such as the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.⁴⁵⁷ Apart from motion and rest, the TA mentions two other inanimate substances, i.e., space (*ākāśa*) and material elements (*puḍgala*). The soul (*jīva*) forms the counterpart of the inanimate entities. It is the cause of life, the locus of knowledge, and explains the agency of living beings.

The ontological categories that the TA proposes, provide a relatively simple but coherent model. It reduces the plurality of phenomena to a limited number of substances that are fundamentally different and cannot be further reduced. The idea that the world exists of material elements (*puḍgala*), which occur in space (*ākāśa*), which can move or be stationary because of the principles of motion and rest (*dharma* and *adharma*), and which can be animated by a sentient principle (*jīva*) has some explanatory value and the text does not postulate special entities such as universals, individuators, or the relation of inherence, which can be found in rival theories.

Even though the TA presents a fairly coherent ontological model, it seems that the text reflects different stages of the Jaina theory of substance. In the last part of the chapter, the TA adds that some teachers also regard time (*kāla*) as one of the

in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, which is the locus classicus for the theory of categories. The TA and the TABh do not explain why motion (*dharma*) has an opposite (*adharma*). The *Dravyasaṃgraha* — a later Jaina text by Nemicandra (fl. 10th cent. CE) — explains that the principle of rest (*adhama*) helps matter (*puḍgala*) and living entities (*jīva*) to stay in the same place, just like shade helps travellers to remain at the same place (*Dravyasaṃgraha* 18, in Balbir 2010: 10 – 11). The inclusion of a principle of rest can also be found in other traditions. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, for example, mentions *tamas* as one of the three strands (*guṇa*) of *prakṛti* (*Sāṃkhyakārikā* 13 in Burley 2007: 166 - 167).

⁴⁵⁷ The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS) includes motion (*karman*) as one of the ontological categories (*padārtha*) (VS 1.1.4, Gough 1873: 4). It is remarkable that the ontological categories in the TA correspond to several of the Vaiśeṣika categories. However, the vocabulary that is used to describe the different ontological categories deviates from the vocabulary that is used in the VS. For example, the different categories are listed as different types of '*dravya*'. By contrast, the VS uses the term '*padārtha*' to refer to the categories. However, it uses '*dravya*' to refer to the material elements, which are called '*puḍgala*' in the TA. Space (*ākāśa*) is seen as one of the substances (*dravya*) in the VS but the list of categories in the same text does not include time. As such, the TA proposes a radically different ontological account even though the similarity of some of the terms suggests that the models in the TA and the VS emerged from a shared intellectual context. For a general overview of the meaning of '*padārtha*' in the different traditions, see Oberhammer 1996: 153 - 156.

substances (TA 5.38).⁴⁵⁸ The TA does not refute this idea, even though time is not listed as one of the substances at the beginning of the chapter in TA 5.1 – 5.2. Furthermore, the discussion of the function (*upakāra*) of the different substances also deals with the function of time (TA 5.22) after discussing the function of the five substances that are mentioned in TA 5.1 – 5.2, which suggests that the composer of that passage regarded time as one of the substances.⁴⁵⁹

After enumerating the substances, the TA continues with some general qualifications of the substances. The first two *sūtras* of this section read as follows:

nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi ||5.3|| rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ ||5.4||

[These substances] are eternal (*nitya*), [their number is] fixed⁴⁶⁰ (*avasthita*), and [they are] formless (*arūpa*). The material elements (*pudgala*), [however], have form (*rūpin*).

This description is somewhat confusing. TA 5.3 seems to suggest that all substances are eternal, that their number is fixed, and that they are formless. Nevertheless, TA 5.4 adds that the material elements (*pudgala*) do have form, even though the material elements are mentioned as one of the substances. The *bhāṣya* provides the following explanation of TA 5.3:

***etāni dravyāṇi nityāni bhavanti | tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam iti vakṣyate ||
avasthitāni ca | na hi kadācit pañcatvaṃ bhūtārthatvaṃ ca vyabhicaranti ||
arūpāṇi ca | naiṣāṃ rūpam astīti | rūpaṃ mūrtir mūrtyāśrayās ca sparśādāya
iti ||***

These substances (*dravya*) are eternal (*nitya*). It will be said⁴⁶¹ that '[an entity that] does not change its condition (*tadbhāvāvyaya*) is eternal (*nitya*)'. Furthermore, [the substances] are fixed (*avasthita*) since they never deviate from the quality of being five (*pañcatva*) and the quality of being real (*bhūtārthatva*). And they are formless (*arūpa*). They have no form. 'Form' (*rūpa*) is 'embodiment' (*mūrti*) and [the objects

⁴⁵⁸ For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.4 (*Qualities, modes, and transformation*).

⁴⁵⁹ The function of the individual substances is discussed in TA 5.17 – 5.22. See also § 3.4 (*Function of the substances*).

⁴⁶⁰ See TABh 5.3.4.

⁴⁶¹ See TA 5.30.

of the senses] beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*) are dependent on embodiment (*mūrti-āśraya*) (TABh 5.3.1 – 5.3.7).

As can be seen in the passage above, the composer of the *bhāṣya* interprets the three terms in TA 5.3 (*nitya, avasthita, arūpa*) as qualifications of the substances. Since TA 5.4 says that the material elements (*pudgala*) have form, it would be strange if TA 5.3 is indeed trying to say that all substances are formless (*arūpa*). Moreover, if the three terms in the *sūtra* all qualify substance, one would expect a different syntactical structure of TA 5.3. The *sūtra* separates the third term (*arūpa*) from the first two terms, which are given in compound (*nityāvasthita*). If the three terms all qualify substance, it would be more obvious to write '*nityāvasthitārūpāṇi*'. However, if we do not follow the interpretation of the *bhāṣya*, we could read TA 5.3 – 5.4 (*nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi | rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ*) in at least two other ways:

- i. The formless [substances are] eternal and [their number is] fixed. The material elements have form.
- ii. [The five substances are] eternal and [their number is] fixed. [There are] formless [substances]. The material elements have form.

The first reading would imply that material elements are not eternal. The second reading does not necessarily entail the same idea about the material elements but it is not the most obvious reading. Unfortunately, the TA does not discuss whether material elements are eternal. Therefore, it is hard to decide how these *sūtras* should be interpreted exactly.⁴⁶² Nevertheless, all the different readings entail at least the eternality of four substances, i.e., motion (*dharmā*), rest (*adharma*), space (*ākāśa*) and souls (*jīva*). Since the qualification 'fixed' (*avasthita*) is not explained in the TA, it is not clear whether the *sūtra* tries to say that the number of types of substances is fixed or whether there is a fixed number of all substances, i.e., a fixed number of souls, material elements, etc. The *bhāṣya* chooses the first option and explains that the number of substances is five (TABh 5.3.4).⁴⁶³

⁴⁶² The *ṭīkā* discusses several interpretations of these *sūtras* and mentions the variant reading '*arūpīṇi*', which is also given in Mody's edition. Kapadia's edition adds '*ca*' at the end of TA 5.3. The fact that there are variant readings of the *sūtra* and different interpretations in the commentaries suggest that there was no consensus about the meaning of the *sūtra* and might indicate a problem in the textual transmission.

⁴⁶³ The same explanation is given in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (S.A. Jain 1992: 132).

The *sūtra* adds that motion, rest, and space are unique substances (*ekadravya*) and that they are inactive (*niṣkriya*).⁴⁶⁴ The *bhāṣya* explains that souls (*jīva*) and matter (*pudgala*) are active (*kriyāvat*) and non-unique substances (*anekadravya*).⁴⁶⁵ The table below shows the different qualities of the substances as discussed in this passage:

XXIII. Qualities of the substances (<i>dravya</i>) (TA 5.5 – 5.6, TABh 5.5.1 – 5.6.1)				
	inactive (<i>niṣkriya</i>)	active (<i>kriyāvat</i>)	unique (<i>ekadravya</i>)	non-unique (<i>anekadravya</i>)
motion (<i>dharma</i>)	x		x	
rest (<i>adharmā</i>)	x		x	
space (<i>ākāśa</i>)	x		x	
matter (<i>pudgala</i>)		x		x
souls (<i>jīva</i>)		x		x

Space and space-points (pradeśa)

After giving an overview of the five substances, the TA continues with a discussion of space (TA 5.7 – 5.16). The first *sūtras* of this section deal with the peculiar concept of ‘space-points’ (*pradeśa*). The general idea seems to be that space consists of atomic spatial units, which are called ‘*pradeśa*’.

The substances motion (*dharma*), rest (*adharmā*), and souls (*jīva*) are said to occupy innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) space-points (TA 5.7 – 5.8). Space (*ākāśa*) occupies infinitely many space-points (TA 5.9). Material elements (*pudgala*) can occupy numerable (*saṅkhyeya*), innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*), or infinitely many (*ananta*) space-points (TA 5.10).⁴⁶⁶ However, individual atoms (*aṇu*) do not occupy space-points (TA 5.11). The *bhāṣya* explains that atoms have no beginning or

⁴⁶⁴ ‘[The substances] up to space (i.e., motion, rest and space) (*ā-ākāśa*) are unique substances. And [they are] inactive’ (*ākāśād ekadravyāṇi | niṣkriyāṇi ca*) (TA 5.5 – 5.6).

⁴⁶⁵ TABh 5.5.2 and 5.6.1. It is interesting that the material elements are seen as active (*kriyāvat*). The *bhāṣya* explains that action (*kriyā*) means ‘the action of going’ (*gati-karman*) (TABh 5.6.3).

⁴⁶⁶ The *bhāṣya* does not explain why matter (*pudgala*) can occupy numerable, innumerable, or infinitely many space-points. The TA does mention that motion, rest, and souls, exist in the worldly realm (*loka-ākāśa*) (TA 5.12 – 5.15), which suggests that they do not exist in the part of the cosmos outside the worldly realm (*aloka*).

centre.⁴⁶⁷ The meaning seems to be that atoms cannot have further divisions and, therefore, cannot occupy multiple space-points.⁴⁶⁸ The number of space-points occupied by the different substances and the atoms, as mentioned in TA 5.7 – 5.11, are summarised in the table below:

XXIV. Space-points (<i>pradeśa</i>) occupied by substances and atoms (TA 5.7 – 5.11)				
	none	numerable (<i>saṅkhyeya</i>)	innumerable (<i>asaṅkhyeya</i>)	infinitely many (<i>ananta</i>)
motion (<i>dharma</i>)			x	
rest (<i>adharmā</i>)			x	
souls (<i>jīva</i>)			x	
space (<i>ākāśa</i>)				x
matter (<i>puṅgalā</i>)		x	x	x
atoms (<i>aṇu</i>)	x			

As can be seen in the table above, the number of space-points that are occupied by motion, rest, and souls is large (innumerable) but ultimately limited (i.e., not ‘infinitely many’). By contrast, the number of space-points that are occupied by space (*ākāśa*) is said to be infinitely many (TA 5.9). However, the *bhāṣya* explains that space (*ākāśa*) in the world (*loka*) occupies a limited number of space-points too, just like motion, rest, and souls. However, the *bhāṣya* makes a distinction between the world (*loka*) and that which is beyond the world (*aloka*) and adds that the space in these two realms together occupies infinitely many space-points, as stated in TA 5.9.⁴⁶⁹ In other words, the cosmos as a whole (*loka* and *aloka*) has infinitely many space-points but the number of space-points in the worldly realm of the cosmos

⁴⁶⁷ “There are no space-points for an atom (*aṇu*) since the infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) is without beginning (*anādi*), without centre (*amadhya*) and without space-point (*apradeśa*)’ (*aṇoḥ pradeśā na bhavanti | anādir amadhyo ‘pradeśo hi paramāṇuḥ*) (TABh 5.11.1 - 5.11.2).

⁴⁶⁸ The size of an atom corresponds to the size of a space-point. Therefore, the *sūtra* says that there are no space-points in atoms. However, clusters of atoms can take up two or more space-points (TABh 5.14.3 - 5.14.6). Jacobi’s commentary on TA 5.11 says: ‘[Das Atom] ist eben ein Punkt und hat keine Punkte’ (Jacobi 1885: 513).

⁴⁶⁹ “The worldly realm and that which is beyond the world (*loka-aloka-ākāśa*) have infinitely many space-points. However, [the number of space-points] in the worldly realm (*loka-ākāśa*) is equal to motion, rest and souls’ (*lokālokākāśasyānantāḥ pradeśāḥ | lokākāśasya tu dharmādharmaikajīvais tulyāḥ*) (TABh 5.9.1 – 5.9.2).

(*loka*) — which is inhabited by souls and in which the principles of motion and rest are present — is limited.

After discussing the number of space-points that are occupied by the different substances, TA 5.12 – 5.16 continues with a discussion of the presence of the substances in the worldly realm (*loka*):

lokākāśe 'vagāhaḥ ||5.12|| dharmādharmayoḥ kṛtsne ||5.13|| ekapradeśādiṣu bhājyaḥ pudgalānām ||5.14|| asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām ||5.15|| pradeśa-saṃhāravisargābhyāṃ pradīpavat ||5.16||

[There is] 'abidance' (*avagāha*) in the worldly realm (*lokākāśa*). [There is abidance of] motion and rest (*dharmā-adharma*) in the entire (*kṛtsna*) [worldly realm]. [There is] distribution (*bhājya*) of material elements (*pudgala*) in one space-point etc. (*ekapradeśa-ādī*). [The abidance] of souls (*jīva*) is in innumerable parts etc. (*asaṅkhyeyabhāga-ādī*). [It is caused] by contraction (*saṃhāra*) and expansion (*visarga*) [of] space-points (*pradeśa*), like a light (*pradīpa*).

The passage begins by saying that there is 'abidance' (*avagāha*)⁴⁷⁰ in the worldly realm of the cosmos. The subject of the abidance is not mentioned explicitly but must be substances, which is the main subject of chapter V. In other words, the intended meaning of the *sūtra* seems to be that the substances have their abode in the worldly realm (*lokākāśa*) but not in the space outside the worldly realm (*aloka*). The principles of motion (*dharmā*) and rest (*adharma*) are present in the entire worldly realm, which facilitates the movement of matter and souls. The material elements (*pudgala*) are dispersed throughout the worldly realm and can take up one, two, or more space-points (*pradeśa*). Individual souls (*jīva*) can expand and contract and their size may grow to the size of the entire worldly realm (TABh 5.15.1 – 5.15.2). This is compared to the way in which light functions. The *bhāṣya* explains that the light of a lamp can reach the ceiling of a large room but remains small when it is placed in a small room (TABh 5.16.3). By expanding itself up to the size of the whole worldly realm, the soul can acquire knowledge about the whole world.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁷⁰ The prime meaning of the word '*avagāha*' is 'plunging' or 'bathing' (MW). In this passage, the term refers to the act of occurring or existing in a specific part of the cosmos.

⁴⁷¹ The *bhāṣya* mentions that the ultimate expansion of the soul happens to worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) in an advanced spiritual state and to perfected beings (*siddha*) (TABh 5.16.9). This relates to the different varieties of cosmic perception (*avadhi*), such as 'the one that

Function of the substances

After discussing the loci of the different substances and the space-points that they can occupy, the TA explains the functions of the individual substances as follows:

***gatisthityupagraho dharmādharmayor upakārah ||5.17|| ākāśasyāva-
gāhaḥ ||5.18|| śarīravānmanahprāṇāpānāḥ pudgalānām ||5.19|| sukhaduḥkha-
jīvitamaraṇopagrahās ca ||5.20|| parasparopagraho jīvānām ||5.21|| vartanā
pariṇāmaḥ kriyā paratvāparatve ca kālasya ||5.22||***

The function (*upakāra*) of motion and rest (*dharmādharmā*) is the support (*upagraha*) of movement (*gati*) and inertia (*sthiti*). [The function] of space (*ākāśa*) is abidance (*avagāha*). [The function] of material elements (*pudgala*) is [the support of] body, speech, mind, inhalation, and exhalation (*śarīra-vāc-manas-prāṇāpāna*) and the support (*upagraha*) of pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), life (*jīvita*), and death (*maraṇa*). [The function] of souls (*jīva*) is mutual support (*parasparopagraha*). [The function] of time (*kāla*) is continuation (*vartanā*), transformation (*pariṇāma*), activity (*kriyā*), temporal priority (*paratva*) and posteriority (*aparatva*).

First, motion (*dharma*) and rest (*adharmā*) are said to facilitate movement and inertia (TA 5.17). Next, space (*ākāśa*) is said to facilitate ‘abidance’ (*avagāha*) (TA 5.18). In other words, it functions as the abode of the other substances. The function of the material elements (*pudgala*) is explained as the support (*upagraha*) of bodily processes, experiences, and states (TA 5.19 – 5.20).⁴⁷² Next, souls (*jīva*) are said to provide mutual support (*paraspara-upagraha*) (TA 5.21). The *bhāṣya* explains this idea in the following way:

weakens’ (*hīyamānaka*) and ‘the one that increases’ (*vardhamānaka*), which are mentioned in TABh 1.23.6. See also the discussion of cosmic perception above (§ 3.2).

⁴⁷² It is not clear to me why the function of the material elements is explained in terms that relate to the human body only. One would expect a more general description of the function of matter, such as hardness, weight etc. Such terms are used, however, in the description of atoms in TA 5.23 - 5.24 (see § 3.4, *The material elements*). It is interesting that the explanation of the material elements (*pudgala*) relates to the primary meaning of the word (i.e., ‘body’, MW).

parasparasya hitāhitopadeśābhyām upagraho jīvānām iti |

[The function] of souls (*jīva*) is support (*upagraha*) for each other by teaching [about that which is] beneficial and disadvantageous (*hita-ahita-upadeśa*) (TABh 5.21.1).

This is a somewhat remarkable passage. So far, the characteristics of the substances were mainly explained in ontological terms. The explanation of the function of the soul, however, has more to do with ethics. It would have been more consistent if the TA had referred to consciousness or the power to animate as the function of the soul as a substance.

In her analysis of this section of the TA, Ohira mentions that the discussion of the functions of the different substances is largely based on canonical sources such as the *Sthāna* and *Uttarādhyayana*.⁴⁷³ However, the description of the function of the soul that is given in the TA does not appear in canonical texts. Hence, this might be an innovation of the composer of the TA. The author might have felt the need to specify the function of the soul since he also mentions the functions of the other substances. In the end, the overall style of the TA is rather systematic and it would be odd to leave one of the substances out of the discussion. Since the canonical sources do not specify the function of the soul, there was a significant lacuna in the theory, which allowed the composer to come up with a new idea.⁴⁷⁴

The discussion of the functions of the different substances finishes with a discussion of time (*kāla*), which is said to facilitate continuation (*vartanā*), transformation (*pariṇāma*), activity (*kriyā*), anteriority (*paratva*), and posteriority (*aparatva*) (TA 5.22).⁴⁷⁵ Since time is not mentioned as one of the substances in TA

⁴⁷³ Ohira 1982: 60.

⁴⁷⁴ One may still question why the composer of the TA chose this particular solution, which differs strongly from the explanations of the functions of the other substances. It is striking that this *sūtra* became one of the most cited parts of the TA and is even included in an often-used contemporary Jaina emblem. The influential English translation of the TA by Tatia has singled out this *sūtra* on a separate page following the title page, translated as ‘Souls render service to one another’ (Tatia 2011: v).

⁴⁷⁵ The *bhāṣya* has an extensive commentary on the terms ‘*paratva*’ and ‘*aparatva*’. It distinguishes three different meanings of these terms, related to praiseworthiness (*praśamsā*), region (*kṣetra*), and time (*kāla*) (TABh 5.22.10). It illustrates these meanings with, respectively, the highest and inferior knowledge, remoteness and proximity, and being young and old. Since the first two options are irrelevant for the discussion of time, it seems that the *bhāṣya* simply lists the possible meanings of the terms and does not try to explain different aspects of the function of time. Therefore, I translate the terms as ‘anteriority’ and ‘posteriority’, even though these English words cannot be related to ‘praiseworthiness’ and

5.1 – 5.2, it is striking that the TA deals with the function of time immediately following the discussion of the function of the five substances. The TA and the TABh do not explain why time is included in this section.⁴⁷⁶ This inconsistency in the presentation might indicate that the chapter on ontology was composed at different stages.

The table below summarises the discussion of the functions of the different substances and time, as discussed in TA 5.17 – 5.22.

XXV. The functions of the substances and time (TA 5.17 – 5.22)	
Substances (<i>dravya</i>) ⁴⁷⁷	Functions (<i>upakāra</i>) ⁴⁷⁸
i. <i>dharma</i> (motion) (TA 5.17)	<i>gati</i> (movement)
ii. <i>adharma</i> (rest) (TA 5.17)	<i>sthiti</i> (inertia)
iii. <i>ākāśa</i> (space) (TA 5.18)	<i>avagāha</i> (abidance)
iv. <i>pudgala</i> (material elements) (TA 5.19 – 5.20)	<i>śarīra</i> (body)
	<i>vāc</i> (speech)
	<i>manas</i> (mind)
	<i>prāṇāpāna</i> (inhalation and exhalation)
	<i>sukha</i> (pleasure)
	<i>duḥkha</i> (pain)
	<i>jīva</i> (life)
v. <i>jīva</i> (souls) (TA 5.21)	<i>parasparopagraha</i> (mutual support)
vi. <i>kāla</i> (time) (TA 5.22)	<i>vartanā</i> (subsistence)
	<i>pariṇāma</i> (transformation)
	<i>kriyā</i> (activity)
	<i>paratva</i> (anteriority)
	<i>aparatva</i> (posteriority)

‘region’. The length of the commentary on this passage might indicate that the discussion of the different meanings of ‘*paratva*’ and ‘*aparatva*’ was added at a later stage, perhaps as a result of the accidental inclusion of a gloss.

⁴⁷⁶ As mentioned previously, the TA says that some teachers classify time as a substance (TA 5.38).

⁴⁷⁷ This list includes time, which is not mentioned as a substance in TA 5.1 - 5.2.

⁴⁷⁸ The function of the individual substances is explained as ‘support of’ (*upagraha*) the items that are listed in the right column of this table.

The material elements (pudgala): atoms and aggregates

Having discussed the functions of the different substances, the TA continues with a discussion of the material elements (*pudgala*) (TA 5.23 – 5.28).

sparśarasagandhavarnavantah pudgalāh ||5.23|| śabdabandhasaukṣmya-sthaulyasaṃsthānabhedatamaśchāyātapodyotavantaś ca ||5.24||

The material elements (*pudgala*) possess touch (*sparśa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*), and colour (*varṇa*); and they possess sound (*śabda*), connection (*bandha*), subtlety (*saukṣmya*), largeness (*sthaulya*), shape (*saṃsthāna*), partition (*bheda*), darkness (*tamas*), shade (*chāyā*), heat (*tapas*), and light (*uddyota*).

aṇavaḥ skandhās ca ||5.25|| saṃghātabhedebhya utpadyante ||5.26|| bhedād anuḥ ||5.27|| bhedasamghātābhyāṃ cākṣuṣāḥ ||5.28||

[The material elements exist as] atoms (*aṇu*) and aggregates (*skandha*). They result (*utpad*) from combination (*saṃghāta*) [and] disintegration (*bheda*). An atom (*aṇu*) [results] from disintegration (*bheda*) [only]. The perceptible [aggregates] (*cākṣuṣa*) [result] from disintegration (*bheda*) [and] combination (*saṃghāta*).

The section on the material elements begins with a list of characteristics, which has been divided into two *sūtras* (TA 5.23 – 5.24).⁴⁷⁹ The *bhāṣya* introduces this section by explaining that the word ‘*pudgala*’ has different meanings in other schools (*tantrāntarīya*) and can even mean ‘soul’ (*jīva*). It adds that the TA explains the meaning of ‘*pudgala*’ in TA 5.23 to distinguish its meaning from the way in which other traditions use the word (TABh 5.22.16 - 5.22.21). The TABh further provides a detailed specification of the varieties of each of the characteristics of the material elements that are mentioned in these two *sūtras*, which are listed in the table below.

⁴⁷⁹ It is not immediately obvious why the characteristics of the material elements are discussed in two separate *sūtras*. The four characteristics that are mentioned in TA 5.23 are all related to the senses (touch, taste, smell, and colour) and describe, as such, phenomenal aspects of the material elements. By contrast, most of the characteristics in TA 5.24 describe more objective aspects of the material elements, such as size and shape. However, the first item that is mentioned in TA 5.24 is sound (*śabda*), which one would expect, rather, in the preceding *sūtra*, which describes the sensory qualities. The *bhāṣya* raises the question about the separation of the list and explains that the items in TA 5.23 relate to infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*) as well as aggregates (*skandha*) but that the items in TA 5.24 qualify aggregates only (TABh 5.24.24 - 5.24.25).

TA 5.25 – 5.28 explains that the group of material elements (*puḍgala*) exists of atoms (*aṇu*), which can be combined into aggregates (*skandha*). When aggregates disintegrate, they end up as smaller aggregates and/or individual atoms. Unlike the atoms, the aggregates are perceptible.

XXVI. Characteristics of material elements (<i>puḍgala</i>)			
TA 5.23 ⁴⁸⁰		TA 5.24	
<i>sparśa</i> (touch)	<i>kaṭhina</i> (hard)	<i>śabda</i> (sound) ⁴⁸¹	<i>tata</i> (far reaching)
	<i>mrdu</i> (soft)		<i>vitata</i> (diffused)
	<i>guru</i> (heavy)		<i>ghana</i> (firm)
	<i>laghu</i> (light)		<i>śuśira</i> (hollow)
	<i>śīti</i> (cold)		<i>gharṣa</i> (frictional)
	<i>uṣṇa</i> (hot)		<i>bhāṣa</i> (speaking)
	<i>snigdha</i> (smooth)	<i>bandha</i> (connection)	<i>prayogabandha</i> (yoked)
	<i>rūkṣa</i> (rough)		<i>visrasābandha</i> (loose)
<i>rasa</i> (taste)	<i>tikta</i> (bitter)	<i>saukṣmya</i> (subtlety)	<i>mīśra</i> (mixed)
	<i>kaṭu</i> (sharp)		<i>antya</i> (ultimate)
	<i>kaṣāya</i> (astringent)	<i>sthaulya</i> (largeness)	<i>āpekṣika</i> (relative)
	<i>amla</i> (acid)		<i>antya</i> (ultimate)
	<i>madhura</i> (sweet)		<i>āpekṣika</i> (relative)
<i>gandha</i> (smell)	<i>surabhi</i> (fragrant)	<i>saṃsthāna</i> (shape)	<i>anekavidha; dīrgha-hrasva-ādi</i> (manifold; long, short, etc.)
	<i>asurabhi</i> (non-fragrant)		<i>autkārika</i> (split)
<i>varṇa</i> (colour)	<i>kṛṣṇa</i> (black)	<i>bheda</i> (partition)	<i>caurṇika</i> (pulverised)
	<i>nīla</i> (blue)		<i>khaṇḍa</i> (a piece)
	<i>lohita</i> (red)		<i>pratara</i> (layered) ⁴⁸²
	<i>pīta</i> (yellow)		<i>anutata</i> (from the sides) ⁴⁸³
	<i>śukla</i> (white)	<i>tamas</i> (darkness)	<i>pariṇāmaja</i> (produced by transformation)
	<i>chāyā</i> (shade)		
	<i>tapas</i> (heat)		
	<i>uddyota</i> (lightness)		

⁴⁸⁰ The items in TA 5.23 qualify infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*) and aggregates (*skandha*). The items in TA 5.24 qualify aggregates only (TA 5.24.24 - 5.24.25).

⁴⁸¹ The *ṭikā* illustrates the different varieties of sound with different musical instruments, such as a drum, a stringed instrument, a bell, and a flute. See also Sanghvi 1974: 195.

⁴⁸² Like chopped off layers of mica (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

⁴⁸³ Like the removal of the bark of bamboo or sugar cane (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

Existence and permanence of substance

After listing the characteristics of material elements, the TA discusses existence (*sat*) and permanence (*nitya*) (TA 5.29 – 5.30):

***utpādayayadhrauvyayuktam sat ||5.29|| tadbhāvāvyayam nityam ||5.30||
arpitānarpitasiddheḥ ||5.31||***

Existence⁴⁸⁴ (*sat*) is connected with production (*utpāda*), decay (*vyaya*), and duration (*dhrauvya*). [An entity that] does not change its state (*bhāva*), is eternal (*nitya*). [The apparent contradiction] results from the validity of the conventional [standpoint] (*arpita*) and the non-conventional [standpoint] (*arpita-anarpita-siddhi*).⁴⁸⁵

It is hard to grasp the intended meaning of these three *sūtras* and translators and commentators have come up with different interpretations.⁴⁸⁶ It seems that the *sūtra* refers to different aspects of substance and tries to explain their apparent contradiction. The first *sūtra* says that existence is connected with decay. However, TA 5.5 says that the substances are eternal (*nitya*). This seems to imply that the existence of substance contradicts its eternity. The composer of the TA was apparently aware of this problem and he explains in TA 5.31 that this contradiction results from analysing the subject from two different standpoints.

Connection of material elements (bandha)

The next section in the *sūtra* is more straightforward and explains how atoms can form aggregates (TA 5.32 – 5.36):

⁴⁸⁴ Alternatively, 'things that exist'.

⁴⁸⁵ The *bhāṣya* explains the '*arpita*' perspective as a common sense perspective (*vyavahārika*) and the '*anarpita*' perspective as an uncommon standpoint (*avyavahārika*) (TABh 5.31.2). Sanghvi translates TA 5.31 as follows: 'Each thing is possessed of a number of properties; for as viewed from the standpoint adopted and as viewed from another standpoint it proves to be something self-contradictory' (Sanghvi 1974: 206). Tatia notes that this *sūtra* is based on the discussion of substance in the *Aṅgapraśāsta* 3.10.46 (Tatia 200: 136, n. 3). See also Soni 2003: 29ff.

⁴⁸⁶ Sanghvi provides different interpretations of this passage (Sanghvi 1974: 202 - 208). See also Tatia 2011: 135 - 140.

*snigdharūkṣatvād bandhaḥ ||5.32|| na jaghanyaguṇānām ||5.33|| guṇasāmye
sadṛśānām ||5.34|| dvyadhikādiguṇānām tu ||5.35|| bandhe samādhikau
pāriṇāmikau ||5.36||*

A connection (*bandha*) [results] from smoothness (*snigdha*) and roughness (*rūkṣatva*). [Such a connection does] not [take place between material elements having a] low [degree] of [these] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) (*jaghanyaguṇa*). [Likewise, such a connection does not take place] when [there is] an evenness of the qualities (*guṇasāmya*) [between] similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*) (i.e., two material elements having the same degree of smoothness or roughness cannot connect). However, [a connection exists between material elements whose] qualities [have a] difference of two or more (i.e., when there is a difference of at least two degrees in smoothness or roughness) (*dvy-adhika-ādi-guṇa*). [When there is] a connection (*bandha*), [two material elements whose smoothness or roughness is] equal or more (*samādhika*) are subject to transformation (*pāriṇāmika*).

The text distinguishes two characteristics of material elements,⁴⁸⁷ i.e., smoothness (*snigdha*) and roughness (*rūkṣatva*). The intensity of these qualities determines the adhesion between the material elements. Only those material elements that have opposite qualities in a sufficient degree — i.e., a difference of two or more degrees in smoothness or roughness — will connect and will thereby transform into aggregates.

Qualities, modes, and transformation

The last section of the fifth chapter discusses several aspect of substance (*dravya*), which centre around the notion of change (*pariṇāma*) (TA 5.37 – 5.44). The passage reads as follows:

⁴⁸⁷ The *sūtra* does not mention explicitly that the material elements (*puḍgala*) are the subject of the passage. However, the *bhāṣya* clearly states that the passage deals with the connection between material elements (TABh 5.32.1).

guṇaparyāyavad dravyam ||5.37|| *kālaś cety eke* ||5.38||
so 'nantasamayaḥ ||5.39|| *dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇāḥ* ||5.40|| *tadbhāvaḥ*
pariṇāmaḥ ||5.41|| *anādir ādimāṃś ca* ||5.42|| *rūpiṣv ādimān* ||5.43||
yogopayogau jīveṣu ||5.44||

Substance (*dravya*) has qualities and modes (*guṇa-paryāyavat*). Time (*kāla*) is also [a substance] according to some. It [consists of] infinitely many moments (*anantasamaya*). Qualities (*guṇa*) inhere in substance (*dravya-āśraya*) [and are themselves] devoid of qualities (*nirguṇa*). The existence of these [substances] (*tadbhāva*) [is characterised by] transformation (*pariṇāma*). [There is transformation, *pariṇāma*] without beginning (*anādi*) and having a beginning (*ādimat*). [Transformation] with a beginning (*ādimat*) [applies to substances which are] having form (*rūpin*). Action (*yoga*) and cognitive operation (*upayoga*) [cause transformation] in the case of souls (*jīva*).

The passage begins by saying that substances (*dravya*) have qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*) (TA 5.37).⁴⁸⁸ Qualities (*guṇa*) are said to inhere in substance and they do not have qualities themselves (TA 5.40). In other words, qualities cannot inhere in qualities but only in matter.⁴⁸⁹ Modes are not further explained in the *sūtra* but the *bhāṣya* explains modes as ‘other states’ (*bhāva-antara*) or ‘other recognitions’ (*saṃjñā-antara*) of substance (TABh 5.37.2).⁴⁹⁰

In the middle of the discussion of qualities, the TA mentions that some teachers say that time is a substance too and that it exists of infinitely many moments (TA 5.38 – 5.39).⁴⁹¹ It is not entirely clear to me why the TA includes a discussion of time at this point even though the notion of time relates to the concept of transformation (*pariṇāma*), which is mentioned in TA 5.41.⁴⁹² This *sūtra* says that substances undergo transformation, and specifies two sorts of transformation (TA 5.42). The first type of transformation relates to substances with form (*rūpin*) (TA

⁴⁸⁸ See Soni 1991 for a discussion of these three notions in Jaina thought.

⁴⁸⁹ Halbfass observes that this *sūtra* reflects the view of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* I.1.15 (Halbfass 1992: 107, n.21).

⁴⁹⁰ As explained in the above analysis of the sources of valid cognition, only the omniscient beings can grasp all modes of all substance.

⁴⁹¹ See the beginning of this section (§ 3.4, *The substances*) for a discussion of the ambiguous status of time in the TA.

⁴⁹² TA 5.22 explains that transformation (*pariṇāma*) is a function of time.

5.43). The second type relates to the transformation of the soul, which is caused by action (*yoga*) and cognitive operation (*upayoga*) (TA 5.44).⁴⁹³

The inclusion of this topic at the very end of the chapter is rather suspicious, especially since the version of the TA in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* deviates from the version that is accompanied by the *bhāṣya*. The *Sarvārthasiddhi* simply reads '*kālaś ca*' and omits '*ity eke*', which indicates that time was seen as a substance by Pūjyapāda.⁴⁹⁴ By contrast, the version of the TA that is accompanied by the *bhāṣya* does not confirm whether time is a substance or not and only mentions that some people regard time as a substance. Furthermore, TA 5.42 – 5.44 are fully omitted in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Given these textual varieties, and because of the unusual position of the discussion of time,⁴⁹⁵ there are good reasons to treat the last verses of the TA with caution.

To sum up, the fifth chapter of the TA provides a rather common-sensical ontological account and the theory is fairly coherent. Yet, the presentation of the material is rather unsystematic, which might indicate that the ontological theory in the TA has undergone some changes. This is further supported by the fact that the version of the fifth chapter of the TA in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* deviates at several points from the version that is accompanied by the *bhāṣya*. In the next section (§ 3.5), I will analyse several passages in the TA, which will further support the idea that the TA contains several historical layers.

⁴⁹³ It is not clear to me why these two varieties of transformation are qualified as 'having a beginning' (*ādīmat*) and 'without beginning' (*anādi*). The underlying idea seems to be that the transformation of the soul is beginningless, unlike the transformation of material elements.

⁴⁹⁴ Tatia 2011: 143.

⁴⁹⁵ Since the TA lists the different substances at the very beginning of the chapter (TA 5.1 – 5.3), it would make more sense if the discussion of time would have been included in the first section of the chapter.

3.5 The Verses in the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya*

As discussed in § 2.3, there are different accounts of the authorship of the TABh. Some scholars, such as Ohira and Dhaky, think that the TABh is an auto-commentary written by Umāsvāti. By contrast, Bronkhorst, Balcerowicz, and others assume that the author of the TA did not write the TABh.⁴⁹⁶ In order to interpret and date the TA and the TABh, it is crucial to know whether the author of the *sūtras* wrote the TABh or not. Since the *sūtras* are composed in a concise manner, many passages are hard to interpret, or are open for various explanations. If the TABh was written as an auto-commentary, we can assume that the commentator correctly understands the *sūtras*, and we can accept the explanations as authoritative. Yet, if the commentator was a different commentator, we have to be more careful in our analysis since it might be that the commentator did not fully understand the *sūtras*, or he might have had his own agenda and might have consciously changed the intended meaning of the root text.

Unfortunately, the existing evidence for the authorship of the TA and the TABh is rather inconclusive. It seems, however, that previous studies have overlooked one aspect of the TABh that is certainly relevant for any discussion of the authorship of the *bhāṣya*. Although the TABh is composed in prose, the text contains some passages in verse, which are introduced as citations. As I will explain below, these short citations form a serious problem for the view that the TA and the TABh were written by the same author as the first Jaina philosophical text in Sanskrit.

The following section contains an analysis of all the verses that accompany the TABh. The first part discusses the different quotations in the TABh. The second part deals with other parts of the *bhāṣya* that are composed in verse but are not introduced as citations. In the third part, I provide an analysis of the introductory verses (*sambandhakārikā*) and the colophon (*praśasti*) that accompany the *bhāṣya*. The authorship and date of these two short texts is contested but most scholars assume that these parts are later additions. Since these passages are also composed in verse, however, I will analyse whether the verses in the *bhāṣya* itself can be linked to these parts. Apart from that, I will also discuss whether the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti* can tell us anything about the authorship of the TA and the TABh.

⁴⁹⁶ See Ohira 1982, Dhaky 1996, Bronkhorst 1985 and 2010, and Balcerowicz 2008.

Quotations in the TABh

There are three passages that are introduced with the expressions 'āha ca' and 'uktaṃ ca', which deviate from the main text. The first instance can be found at the end of the first chapter of the *bhāṣya* at TABh 1.35.42-49, and reads as follows:⁴⁹⁷

āha ca

[1.35.42] *naigamaśabdārthānām ekānekārthanayagamāpekṣaḥ |*

[1.35.43] *deśasamagragrāhī vyavahāri naigamo jñeyaḥ ||1||*

[1.35.44] *yat saṅgrhītavacanam sāmānye deśato 'tha ca viśeṣe |*

[1.35.45] *tat saṅgrahanayanīyatam jñānam vidyān nayavidhijñāḥ ||2||*

[1.35.46] *samudāyavyaktyākṛtisattāsamjñādiniścayāpekṣam |*

[1.35.47] *lokopacāranīyatam vyavahāram vistr̥tam vidyāt ||3||*

[1.35.48] *sāmprataviṣayagrāhakam ṛjusūtranayam samāsato vidyāt |*

[1.35.49] *vidyād yathārthaśabdaṃ viśeṣitapadaṃ tu śabdanayam ||4|| iti ||*

And one says: Grasping either partially or wholly, depending on the understanding from a perspective on objects that are single and many, with reference to meanings of common words, this is to be known as the ordinary commonplace perspective (*naigama*) (TABh 1.35.42-43).

One who knows the perspectives should know that knowledge which is established by the collecting perspective (*saṅgraha-naya*) as the one which is expressive of the collective, in general terms, in partial terms, and specific terms (TABh 1.35.44-45).

He should know the practical perspective (*vyavahāra*) as broad, established by worldly usage, depending on the ascertainment of 'group, individual, form, existence and name etc.' (TABh 1.35.46-47).

He should know concisely the linear perspective (*ṛjusūtra-naya*) as the kind of grasping having the present as its range; and he should know the verbal perspective (*śabda-naya*) as the one where word is in accordance with the object, which has qualified stages (TABh 1.35.48-49).

This passage occurs in a discussion of the theory of perspectives (*nayavāda*) and gives a brief summary of the five perspectives.⁴⁹⁸ Unlike the main body of the text,

⁴⁹⁷ This passage is also given in Part II, with explanatory notes and a discussion of the translation.

⁴⁹⁸ For an explanation of the perspectives, see § 3.2 *The perspectives*.

which is written in prose, this passage consists of four verses in *āryā* metre. It is clearly demarcated by the introductory phrase ‘*āha ca*’ and closes with ‘*iti*’, which suggests that we are dealing with a quotation.⁴⁹⁹ The use of vocabulary in these *āryās* also differs from the overall style of the *bhāṣya*. For example, the *naigama* or commonplace perspective is qualified as *vyavāhārin* or ‘ordinary’ in TABh 1.35.42-43. However, the *vyavahāra* perspective is also discussed as a separate perspective in TABh 1.35.47. This is confusing and does not match the straightforward explanations that characterise most parts of the *bhāṣya*. This strongly suggests that we are dealing with a quotation from an external source.

A similar passage appears later in the commentary on the same *sūtra* in TABh 1.35.90-99:

āha ca

[1.35.90] *viññāyaikārthapadāny arthapadāni ca vidhānam iṣṭam ca* |

[1.35.91] *vinyasya parikṣepān nayaiḥ parikṣyāṇi tattvāni* ||1||

[1.35.92] *jñānaṃ saviparyāsaṃ trayaḥ śrayanty ādito nayāḥ sarvam* |

[1.35.93] *samyagdr̥ṣṭer jñānaṃ mithyādr̥ṣṭer viparyāsaḥ* ||2||

[1.35.94] *r̥jusūtraḥ saṭ śrayate mateḥ śrutopagrahād ananyatvāt* |

[1.35.95] *śrutakevale tu śabdaḥ śrayate nā’nyac chrutāṅgatvāt* ||3||

[1.35.96] *mithyādr̥ṣṭyajñāne na śrayate nāsya kaścīd ajño ’sti* |

[1.35.97] *jñāsvābhāvyāj jīvo mithyādr̥ṣṭir na cāpy ajñāḥ* ||4||

[1.35.98] *iti nayavādās citrāḥ kvacid viruddhā ivātha ca viśuddhāḥ* |

[1.35.99] *laukikaviṣayātītās tattvajñānārtham adhigamyāḥ* ||5||⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁹ One could argue that we are not necessarily dealing with a quotation from an external source. As mentioned by Tubb & Boose, it is often the *mūlakāra* who is the subject of a verb in the third person singular such as ‘*āha*’ in a commentary (Tubb 2007: 227). Likewise, the participle ‘*ukta*’ may mean “stated by the *mūlakāra*” (Tubb 2007: 228). Further, even in the case of an auto-commentary, the author ‘normally refers to the *mūlakāra* as if the *mūlakāra* were another person’ (Tubb 2007: 229). Hence, these quotation marks do not necessarily imply that we are dealing with citations from a different work. However, the cited passages do not occur in the TA and, as far as I am aware, the passages also do not occur in any other text attributed to the author of the TA. It is also unlikely that these verses try to render what is intended by the *mūlakāra*, since in that case there is no reason to write in *āryā* verse while the TA and the TABh are in prose. Hence, the most plausible reading is that we are dealing with genuine quotations from an external source.

⁵⁰⁰ See part II.

Having understood words of single meaning⁵⁰¹ and words referring to objects and their appropriate classification, having set them out completely, the entities are to be examined by the perspectives (*naya*) (TABh 1.35.90-91).

The first three perspectives apply to all [types of cognition], i.e., knowledge together with its opposite; knowledge results from a right view, delusion results from wrong view (TABh 1.35.92-93).

The linear perspective (*rjusūtra*) applies to six [types of cognition] due to identity, since testimony seizes ordinary cognition; but the literal perspective (*śabda*) applies to testimony and absolute knowledge [only] due to the quality of being dependent on testimony, not on anything else (TABh 1.35.94-95).

[The literal perspective] does not apply to wrong view or false knowledge because there is not any [soul which is] unknowing of that; and there is also no unknowing soul having wrong view, due to the own nature of having knowledge (TABh 1.35.96-97).

In this manner, the statements from the different perspectives (*nayavāda*) are manifold; first they appear to be opposed⁵⁰² and yet they are free from vice; surpassing the range of the worldly they are to be studied for the sake of knowledge of reality (TABh 1.35.98-99).

These five verses are also written in *āryā* metre, and form the very last part of the first chapter. Just as the previous *āryā* verses, they summarise the discussion of *nayavāda*. They are introduced in the same way as the first four *āryās*, even though the passage is not closed with '*iti*'. The omission of '*iti*' might be explained by the fact that TABh 1.35.99 is immediately followed by a standard formula which starts with '*iti*' and indicates the end of the chapter.⁵⁰³ As such, it is slightly ambiguous whether the particle '*iti*' forms the beginning of a new sentence or simply closes the *āryās*. The third apparent quotation appears in the fifth chapter, and consists of just one verse, which deals with the concept of *paramāṇu*:

⁵⁰¹ The meaning of the expression '*ekārthapadāni*' is not entirely clear to me. Perhaps the intended meaning is 'synonyms'.

⁵⁰² Alternatively, 'in their pure form they appear to be opposed'.

⁵⁰³ '*iti tattvārthādhigame rhatpravacanasaṅgrāhe prathamō dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ*' (TABh 1.35.100). Similar sentences are used at the end of the other chapters (see also part II).

uktaṃ ca
kāraṇam eva tad antyaṃ sūkṣmo nityaś ca paramāṇuḥ |
*ekarasagandhavarṇo dvisparśaḥ kāryaliṅgaś ca || iti |*⁵⁰⁴

And it has been said: ‘The cause is indeed that, the ultimate (*antya*). The infinitesimal particle is subtle and eternal. It has one taste, smell and colour, two types of touch and its mark is the effect’ (TABh 5.25.1-2).

This verse is introduced with ‘*uktaṃ ca*’ instead of ‘*āha ca*’ and is composed in *upagīti* metre. The fact that these three passages in verse seem to be quotations raises the question as to what their possible source can be. If we are indeed dealing with quotations and if we follow Ohira’s and Dhaky’s idea that the TABh is an auto-commentary, then we have to assume that the author cites a source in Sanskrit that predates the TA. Since the first passage discusses an exclusively Jaina topic, i.e., *naṃavāda*, it has to be derived from a Jaina source. However, the TA is usually seen as the first Jaina text in Sanskrit, and there is no evidence that other Jaina philosophical texts were written in Sanskrit before the TA.⁵⁰⁵ Yet, if the TABh is not an auto-commentary, the source of the quotations could theoretically postdate the TA. But even in that case, it is still not clear which text could have been the source since there are no extant Jaina philosophical texts in Sanskrit that predate the TABh apart from the TA. Hence, if we are dealing with proper quotations, we have to accept that another philosophical Jaina text in Sanskrit existed before the composition of the TABh. Further, if one assumes that the TABh is an auto-commentary, it implies that the TA is not the first Jaina text in Sanskrit.

Other verses in the TABh

The existence of other Jaina philosophical works in Sanskrit is relevant for our investigation of Jaina intellectual life at the time of the composition of the TA and the TABh, and the position of the TA itself. Unfortunately, there are no other sources apart from the TABh that provide any information about these texts. Therefore, we can only look at the TABh itself to find out more about these lost sources. One of the

⁵⁰⁴ See also Part II.

⁵⁰⁵ It is also unlikely that the passages are Sanskrit renderings of verses from a Prākṛit source. In such a case, it would be strange to present the verses as a quotation.

questions that need to be addressed is whether the different quotations are derived from a single source or not. Since the quotations are written in verse, we can assume that the original text was composed in verse. Apart from the three explicit quotations, the main body of the TABh has two more passages in verse, which could potentially be copied from the same source as the quotations. The first verse appears in chapter six:

***saṃrambhaḥ sakaṣāyaḥ paritāpanayā bhavet samārambhaḥ |
ārambhaḥ prāṇivadhaḥ trividho yogas tato jñeyaḥ ||***

The threefold (*trividha*) undertaking (*yoga*) [is] therefore (*tatas*) to be known (*jñeya*) [as] action (*saṃrambha*), [which is] accompanied by passion (*sa-kaṣāya*), undertaking (*samārambhaḥ*), [which] may appear (*bhavet*) by torment (*paritāpanā*), [and] violent action (*ārambha*), [which is] the slaughter of living beings (*prāṇivadha*) (TABh 6.9.18-19).

The verse is composed in *āryā* metre but is not marked as a quotation. However, one could question whether this verse was included in the TABh at the time of its composition since Siddhasenagaṇi and Haribhadra, two important early commentators, do not comment on this verse. Moreover, Siddhasenagaṇi usually comments on every word of the TABh.⁵⁰⁶

The last passage in verse can be found at the end of the final chapter, at TABh 10.7.157-220. This passage consists of 32 verses in *anuṣṭubh* metre. These verses summarise the content of the last chapter, which deals with *mokṣa*, and address some additional problems, such as the question as to whether a bodiless being can experience happiness.⁵⁰⁷

There is no reason to assume that the different verses in the TABh are derived from a single pre-existent source. First, only three of the five passages are introduced as quotations. It is unclear what the character of the verse in chapter six

⁵⁰⁶ Mody 1903: 142. Kapadia has a slightly different verse, which corresponds with manuscript C in Mody.

Mody has one more passage in *āryā* metre in chapter five. However, these *āryās* are part of a longer passage that Mody presents in brackets, indicating that this part does not belong to the TABh. The whole passage is omitted by Kapadia. Mody's edition mentions a comment found in several manuscripts that identifies this passage as a part of Haribhadra's commentary. Therefore, this passage is omitted in the present analysis.

⁵⁰⁷ An analysis and translation of these verses can be found in Zydenbos 1983.

is but the verses at the end of the *bhāṣya* clearly summarise the content of the whole chapter and form a suitable ending of the work. It is highly unlikely that such a summary can be derived from another source. As such, we can assume that these last verses were composed by the author of the *bhāṣya*, unlike the quotations in the first and fifth chapter. The idea that the different passages in verse are not derived from the same source is further supported by the fact that these passages are composed in different meters. The quotations in the first chapter and the verse in the sixth chapter are in *āryā*, the quotation from the fifth chapter is in *upagīti*, and the last 32 verses of the tenth chapter are in *anuṣṭubh*.

In short, it seems that the TABh contains several passages that were derived from various texts. It is possible that some of these passages were added to the TABh at a later stage but this must have happened before the composition of the *ṭīkā* (9th cent. CE). Yet, since none of these passages have been identified, it is plausible that these verses were derived from older works that have not been preserved. This would indicate that there were other Jaina works in Sanskrit at the time of the composition of the TABh.

The sambandhakārikās and praśasti

Since we do not have any Sanskrit texts from the Jaina tradition that are composed before the TABh apart from the TA, we cannot use the quotations in the TABh to answer the question as to whether the TABh was written at a later stage than the TA. However, manuscripts of the TABh often include two additions in verse that are most relevant for the discussion of the authorship.⁵⁰⁸ The first part is an introductory section, which is known as the *sambandhakārikās*. It consists of 31 verses in *āryā* metre. The second addition is a *praśasti*, which is added at the end of the work. It consists of six verses in *āryā* metre and provides information about the work and the author. Both parts can be found in Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā*.⁵⁰⁹ However, it is unclear who the author of the *sambandhakārikās* and the *praśasti* is. Since they contain information about the authorship of the text, the title of the work, and the

⁵⁰⁸ For a discussion of the manuscripts of the TA and the TABh, see Ohira 1982: 1-4. See also § 2.3.

⁵⁰⁹ Siddhasenagaṇi does comment on the *praśasti*, but he does not comment on the *sambandhakārikās*. However, he includes the commentary of Devagupta on these verses in his own work (Ohira 1982: 25). Devagupta's comments on the *sambandhakārikās* can be found in Kapadia's edition of Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā* (Kapadia 1926).

place of composition, it is important to examine the relationship between these passages and the TA/TABh. Further, there is a good reason to compare the style of the *sambandhakārikās* and the *praśasti* with the verses in the TABh since both passages are composed in *āryā* metre. Even though the *sambandhakārikās* play an important role in the debate about the question as to whether the TABh is an auto-commentary or not, these 31 verses have not been translated in any European language. Therefore, I have provided a translation of this passage in Part II, which serves as the basis for the following analysis.

The *sambandhakārikās* deal with various topics related to Jaina doctrine and the nature of the TA/TABh. The opening verse, which resembles the first *sūtra* of the TA, goes as follows:⁵¹⁰

samyagdarśanaśuddhaṃ yo jñānaṃ viratim eva cāpnoti |
duḥkhanimittam apīdaṃ tena sulabdhaṃ bhavati janma ||1||

[For] him who obtains knowledge, which is pure through right worldview, and indeed non-passion, for him there is good birth, even though this is the cause of pain (SK 1).⁵¹¹

Even though the opening verse of the *sambandhakārikās* seems to deal with the three standard elements of *mokṣamārga* (i.e., *darśana*, *jñāna*, and *cāritra*), the formulation deviates from TA 1.1. First, knowledge (*jñāna*) plays a central role, while right worldview (*samyagdarśana*) is somehow presented as an aspect in the acquisition of knowledge. This raises the question as to why the author of the *sambandhakārikās* chooses to deviate from the way in which *mokṣamārga* is presented in TA 1.1. This deviation would be even more peculiar if these introductory verses are composed by the author of the TA and/or TABh. One may wonder whether it is possible that the author of the *sambandhakārikās* consciously modified the idea presented in TA 1.1 to stress the paramount importance of *jñāna* in the quest for liberation in line with the views of other philosophical treatises like

⁵¹⁰ The first *sūtra* of the TA states: '*samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ*', 'The path to liberation [is constituted by] right worldview, [right] knowledge, and [right] conduct' (see also Part II).

⁵¹¹ See also Part II.

the *Nyāyasūtra*.⁵¹² Apart from the unusual relation between *jñāna* and *darśana* in *sambandhakārikā* 1, it is also remarkable that *cāritra* is not mentioned in the *sambandhakārikās* at all. Of course, one can interpret *virati* as *cāritra* since right conduct results from non-passion in the Jaina perspective. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why the author of the *sambandhakārikās* opens the introductory verses with such an unusual summary of *mokṣamārga*.

As demonstrated in the analysis of the philosophical chapters,⁵¹³ the TABh is clearly influenced by Nyāya thought, and one can hardly escape the impression that the author of the TABh tries to innovate Jaina doctrine based on the model of more influential philosophical treatises, such as the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. In a similar way, the *sambandhakārikās* use some words that are not very common for traditional Jaina texts but clearly resonate with Nyāya doctrine. An illustration of this phenomenon can be found in *sambandhakārikā* 8:

abhyarcanād arhatāṃ manaḥprasādas tataḥ samādhiś ca |
tasmād api niḥśreyasam ato hi tatpūjanam nyāyyam ||8||

From the worship of the arhats comes peace of mind, and from that *samādhi*. And from that comes **ultimate bliss**. Therefore, worship of them is appropriate (SK 8).⁵¹⁴

The term ‘ultimate bliss’ (*niḥśreyasa*) is uncommon for the Jaina tradition, even though it is presented in this verse as the highest goal. Yet, *niḥśreyasa* plays a crucial role in Nyāya philosophy.⁵¹⁵ The same term is used in *sambandhakārikā* 16, where ‘the mark of asceticism’ is described as ‘the means to ultimate bliss’ (*niḥśreyasasādhakam śramaṇaliṅgam*).⁵¹⁶ The fact that the term ‘*niḥśreyasa*’ occurs twice in this short introduction to the TABh demonstrates the importance of the

⁵¹² The order of *darśana*, *jñāna*, and *cāritra* does not correspond with most canonical formulations, in which *jñāna* is usually the first element, followed by *darśana* (Ohira 1982: 55). Therefore, one could also argue that the author of the *sambandhakārikās* simply favours the traditional formulation. However, this does not explain why *cāritra* is replaced with *virati*.

⁵¹³ See § 3.2 – 3.4.

⁵¹⁴ See also Part II.

⁵¹⁵ The *Nyāyasūtra* states at its beginning: ‘*pramāṇaprameya*-[...] *tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*’ (NS I.1.1), ‘Par la connaissance juste des moyens-de-connaissance-droite, des objets-de-connaissance-droite [...], on atteint le bonheur indépassable’ (Angot 2009: 246-247).

⁵¹⁶ See also Part II.

concept to the composer of this passage, which indicates that the author was well acquainted with *Nyāya* thought. Furthermore, this term deviates from the terminology in the TA and TABh, which strongly suggests that the *sambandhakārikās* were written by a different hand.⁵¹⁷

After the first half of the *sambandhakārikās*, which covers the way to liberation, the suitability of different kinds of people to achieve liberation, and the life of Mahāvīra, who reached the highest goal and who taught the Jaina doctrine, the text continues with a salutation to Mahāvīra (*sambandhakārikā* 21). Then, the author introduces the work as a summary of the words of Mahāvīra in verse 22:

***tattvārthādhigamākhyam bahvartham samgraham laghugrantham |
vakṣyāmi śiṣyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadeśasya ||22||***

I will teach this short text, called '*Tattvārthādhigama*', an important compendium of some of the words of the *arhat*, which is beneficial for students (SK 22).

This verse forms the core of the *sambandhakārikās*: it mentions the goal and the title of the work that the *sambandhakārikās* introduce. Even though the work is usually called '*Tattvārthasūtra*' or '*Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*', the text is labelled in the *sambandhakārikās* as '*Tattvārthādhigama*' which can be translated as '*A Study of the Categories*'.⁵¹⁸ By using the verb '*vakṣyāmi*', the author of the *sambandhakārikās* presents himself as the author of the text that the *sambandhakārikās* introduce. A similar expression is used in the final verse of the *sambandhakārikās*, which ends with the words '*imam [...] mokṣamārgam pravakṣyāmi*', I will teach this path to

⁵¹⁷ The tenth chapter of the TA deals with liberation (*mokṣa*). Instead of the term '*niḥśreyasa*', which is used in the *sambandhakārikās*, this part of the TABh associates *mokṣa* with 'unsurpassed (*anuttara*) bliss (*sukha*)'. The 27th verse of the concluding verses of the tenth chapter reads: '*puṇyakarmavipākāc ca sukham iṣṭendriyārthajam | karmakleśavimokśāc ca mokṣe sukham anuttaram ||* (And by the fruition of good karma there is bliss, produced by a desired object of the senses; but by the liberation from the afflictions of karma in *mokṣa*, there is unsurpassed bliss)' (tr. Zydenbos 1983: 37).

⁵¹⁸ The Śvetāmbara tradition accepts the TABh including the *sambandhakārikās* as an authoritative work, written by Umāsvāti. Therefore, most Śvetāmbara works use the title '*Tattvārthādhigama(sūtra)*', based on the title that is mentioned in the *sambandhakārikās*. However, the Digambara tradition does not attribute the TABh and *sambandhakārikās* to Umāsvāti. Therefore, they do not accept the title '*Tattvārthādhigama(sūtra)*' and use '*Tattvārthasūtra*' instead. See also Dhaky 1996: 49.

liberation'.⁵¹⁹ However, this does not imply that the *sambandhakārikās* were actually written by the author of the TA or the TABh. Even though most contemporary scholars agree that the TA predates the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti*, there is no consensus about the question as to whether these verses were written by the author of the *bhāṣya*.⁵²⁰

Even though the *sambandhakārikās* mention the title of the work that it introduces, the *sambandhakārikās* use ambiguous terms to characterise this work, making it hard to determine the relation with the *bhāṣya*. The work is presented as a summary or compendium (*saṃgraha*) of Mahāvīra's teachings, and the author describes his text as a '*laghugrantha*'. Since the TABh is a relatively extensive commentary, it is not an obvious choice to describe the *Tattvārthādhigama* as a 'short text' if it includes the *bhāṣya*. Yet, one can argue that the author contrasts the teachings of the *arhat* with the size of his own text, and wants to say that his text is relatively short compared to the vast amount of Mahāvīra's teachings. Such an interpretation may seem somewhat far-fetched, especially given the straightforward character of the previous verses. However, the next verse seems to go in this direction:

***mahato 'timahāviṣayasya durgamagranthabhāṣy apārasya |
kaḥ śaktaḥ pratyāsaṃ jinavacanamahodadheḥ kartum ||23||***

Who, in enunciating a difficult text, is able to make a summary of the great ocean of the words of the *jina*, which is boundless, whose scope is way larger than large (SK 23)?⁵²¹

This verse elaborates on the enormous extent of the words of the *jina*, which makes it difficult to decide what '*laghugrantha*' in *sambandhakārikā* 22 means exactly. Compared to the foregoing part, the style of *sambandhakārikā* 23 is more poetic and

⁵¹⁹ *Sambandhakārikā* 31. See also Part II. Based on Phoolchandra's discussion of the *sambandhakārikās*, Zydenbos mentions that the identification 'of the commentator with the author of the original text is not uncommon'. (Zydenbos 1983: 10 – 11, Phoolchandra 1997).

⁵²⁰ Dhaky claims that the TA, TABh, *sambandhakārikās*, and *praśasti* are all written by Umāsvāti (Dhaky 1996: 60). Zydenbos attributes the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti* to the author of the *bhāṣya* but he writes that 'we may safely assume that the Sūtra and the Bhāṣya are not by one and the same author' (Zydenbos 1983: 10, 12). Ohira holds basically the same position as Dhaky even though she mentions that *sambandhakārikās* 21, 22 and 31 were possibly composed first as benedictory verses (Ohira 1982: 26 - 28).

⁵²¹ See also Part II.

the verse contains some curious elements. First, the text of the author is described as a '*pratyāsa*'. This is a highly unusual word. Haribhadra's commentary interprets '*pratyāsa*' as '*saṃgraha*', which is used in *sambandhakārikā* 22.⁵²² But even if we follow this interpretation, it does not help in deciding whether this refers to the text with the commentary or not. Second, it is very easy to misread the first line of the verse. In Devanagari script, the compound '*durgamagrānṭhabhāṣya*-' is not separated from '*-apārasya*'. It is very likely that a reader of the manuscript will read '*durgama-grānṭha-bhāṣya-pārasya*', especially since manuscripts of the *sambandhakārikās* usually contain the TA accompanied by the *bhāṣya*.⁵²³ In this way, one could assume that the author of the *sambandhakārikās* claims to have written a '*grānṭha*' and a '*bhāṣya*', i.e., a root text and a commentary. This would support the view that the *bhāṣya* is an auto-commentary. Yet, this reading is problematic from a syntactical perspective, unlike the less intuitive reading '*-bhāṣya apārasya*'.⁵²⁴ It is tempting to think that the author actively tried to create ambiguity.

Up to *sambandhakārikā* 22, the text has a logical structure, and the number of verses that are used for the various subtopics corresponds to the relative importance of these topics. However, the passage that deals with the challenge that the author faces in writing a compendium of the words of the *jina*, is quite elaborate and is written in a different style. This is clearly visible in *sambandhakārikās* 24 – 26, where the text compares the challenge of the author with some Herculean tasks:

śirasā giriṃ bibhited uccikṣipsec ca sa kṣitiṃ dorbhyām |
pratitīrṣec ca samudram mitsec ca punaḥ kuśāgreṇa ||24||
vyomnīduṃ cikramiṣen merugiriṃ pāṇinā cikampayīset |
gatyānilaṃ jigīṣec caramasamudraṃ pipāsec ca ||25||
khadyotakaprabhābhiḥ so 'bhibubhūsec ca bhāskaraṃ mohāt |
yo 'timahāgrānṭhārthaṃ jinavacanaṃ saṃjighṛkṣeta ||26||

He [who] would desire to comprehend the word of the *jina*, [which is] the subject of a very extensive text (SK 26 cd),

he could desire to break a mountain with the head, and he could desire to throw up the earth with two arms (SK 24 ab).

⁵²² Mody 1903: 30, footnote 3.

⁵²³ A discussion of some of the manuscripts can be found in Ohira 1982: 1 – 6.

⁵²⁴ See also the translation of this verse in Part II.

And he could desire to cross the ocean, and further, he could desire to measure [the ocean] with the tip of the *kuśa* grass (SK 24 cd).

He could desire to move the moon in the sky, [and] he could desire to shake mount Meru with one hand (SK 25 ab).

He could desire to move [along with] the wind [by his own] movement, and he could desire to drink the deepest ocean (SK 25 cd).

And he could desire to surpass the sun with the light of fireflies out of delusion (SK 26 ab).

Unlike the previous part, the author uses several verses to present a single idea. Further, the use of multiple desideratives does not match the style of the previous part and does not appear in the TA or TABh. This can be taken as an argument for the position that the *sambandhakārikās* were not written by the author of the TA or TABh. However, we can even question whether this passage was written by the same hand that wrote the first part of the *sambandhakārikās*.

Apart from the difference in style and the unusual length of this passage, it also seems to contradict *sambandhakārikā* 22. While *sambandhakārikā* 22 states that the author wrote a short text (*laghugrantha*), *sambandhakārikā* 26 states that the word of the *jina* is the subject of a very extensive text (*atimahāgranthārtha*). Of course, one could argue that the author simply contrasts the size of his own work with the overwhelming breadth of the subject that he tries to cover. Yet, there is another reference to the size of the work, which creates more ambiguity. In *sambandhakārikā* 28, the author mentions ‘the word of the *jina* in a brief and extended form’ (*samāsato vyāsataś ca jinavacanam*).⁵²⁵ It is not clear from the context what this means exactly but one could interpret this as a reference to the short *sūtra* and extended *bhāṣya*.

Yet, why does the author not make it more explicit what he means? On the one hand, based on *sambandhakārikā* 22, one gets the impression that the *sambandhakārikās* introduce the *sūtra* only since the author mentions that he composed a short text. On the other hand, it seems that the author of *sambandhakārikā* 23 tries to refer to the *bhāṣya*, even though the word ‘*bhāṣya*’ is part of an ambiguous compound. In addition, there seems to be a reference to the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* at the end of the *sambandhakārikās* when the author writes about

⁵²⁵ See Part II.

the subject of his text ‘in a brief and extended form’. These contradictory elements might indicate that we are dealing with a text that has different historical layers. Even though Ohira attributes the *sambandhakārikās* to the author of the TABh, she already speculates that verse 21, 22, and 31 ‘were originally composed as the benedictory verse’ to which the other verses were added.⁵²⁶ However, she fails to explain why the author would write his introduction in two stages.

Even though there is not enough evidence to rule out the possibility that the *sambandhakārikās* were written by a single hand, it seems more likely that there were at least two different authors. It is hard to explain the difference in style of verses 24 – 26 if the whole text was composed by one person, and the incoherent statements about the text that the *sambandhakārikās* introduce support the view that we are dealing with different historical layers. Unfortunately, apart from the differences in the content and style of some of the verses in the *sambandhakārikās*, there is not much more evidence to reconstruct the history of this text.⁵²⁷ However, it seems reasonable to assume that we are dealing with a text that was written by more than one author. This would also explain the strange structure of the *sambandhakārikās*, which can be summarised as follows:⁵²⁸

⁵²⁶ Ohira 1982: 27.

⁵²⁷ The metre of the *āryās* of the *sambandhakārikās*, the TABh, and the *praśasti* is fairly regular and does not provide further evidence to distinguish the writings of different authors. While the *sambandhakārikās* have only one *vipulā āryā* in *sambandhakārikā* 23, almost half of the verses of the *praśasti* are in *vipulā āryā* (i.e., *praśasti* 2, 3, and 5). However, this difference can be explained by the fact that the *praśasti* contains many names, which are harder to fit in a metrical scheme.

In his analysis of the *sambandhakārikās*, Balcerowicz writes that ‘the style of the *sambandhakārikās* resembles that of the *Bhāṣya*’, and that ‘there are some stylistic devices in the *kārikās* typical of the prose style of the *Bhāṣya*, e.g. the frequent use of gerundives (e.g. *kās* 8, 15, 28, etc.) or ablatives of mode that describe their manner of teaching (e.g. *samāsato vyāsataś ca* in *kā* 28, that are evocative of such phrases as *purastāl lakṣaṇato vidhānataś ca vistareṇa* common to the *Bhāṣya*, e.g. TBh 1.1)’ (Balcerowicz 2008: 35). However, these similarities in style do not necessarily imply that these passages were written by the same author, and even if we accept that some of the verses of the *sambandhakārikās* were written by the author of the *bhāṣya*, we cannot rule out that some parts of the *sambandhakārikās* were written by a different author.

Some of the manuscripts that were surveyed by Ohira only contain *sambandhakārikās* 1-9 and omit the rest of the *sambandhakārikās* (Ohira 1982: 2-3). It is unclear to me how these verses can form an independent and meaningful introduction to the text.

⁵²⁸ The analysis of the different parts follows Ohira 1982: 27 – 28.

i.	The Jaina ideal	SK ⁵²⁹ 1 – 3
ii.	Classification of human beings	SK 4 – 6
iii.	Nature of the Tīrthakara	SK 7 – 10
iv.	Life of Mahāvīra	SK 11 – 20
v.	Salutation	SK 21
vi.	Nature of the work	SK 22
vii.	Difficulty of the task of the author	SK 23 – 26
viii.	Benefits for the author and others	SK 27 – 30
ix.	Nature of the work	SK 31

It is somewhat odd that the salutation starts at *sambandhakārikā* 21, and that the statement about the nature of the work in *sambandhakārikā* 22 is interrupted by verse 23-30 and continues at *sambandhakārikā* 31. In fact, the structure of the text seems to suggest that the first historical layer consisted of verses 21, 22, and 31 only, which would constitute a proper introduction for the TA:⁵³⁰

kṛtvā trikaraṇasuddham tasmai paramarṣaye namaskāram |
pūjyatamāya bhagavate vīrāya vilīnamohāya ||21||
tattvārthādhigamākhyam bahvartham saṃgraham laghugrantham |
vakṣyāmi śiṣyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadeśasya ||22||
na rte ca mokṣamārgād dhitopadeśo 'sti jagati kṛtsne 'smin |
tasmāt param imam eveti mokṣamārgam pravakṣyāmi ||31||

⁵²⁹ SK = *sambandhakārikās*.

⁵³⁰ Ohira observes some similarities with the introductory verse of the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, and writes that Pūjyapāda's *maṅgalācaraṇa* 'was directly derived' from *sambandhakārikās* 21 and 31. Pūjyapāda's introductory verse goes as follows: *mokṣamārgasya netāram bhettāram karmabhūbrtām | jñātāram viśvatattvānām vande tadguṇalabdhaye ||* ('I bow to the Lord, the promulgator of the path to liberation, the destroyer of mountains of karmas and the knower of the whole reality, so that I may realize these qualities') (ed. and tr. S.A. Jain 1992: 1). Even though there are some similarities, such as the word '*mokṣamārga*' in both texts, and '*jagat*' in the *sambandhakārikās* and '*viśva*' in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, it is hard to tell how these two passages relate to each other, and Ohira's idea that Pūjyapāda used *sambandhakārikās* 21 and 31 for his own opening verse seems rather speculative. Nevertheless, Pūjyapāda's verse shows that a short introduction with a reference to *mokṣamārga* and the *jina* was as an appropriate opening for a commentary on the TS.

After having made homage to that great sage with purity of the three faculties, [to him who is] a most venerable, illustrious hero, whose delusion is gone (SK 21),

I will teach this short text, called '*Tattvārthādhigama*', an important compendium of some of the words of the *arhat*, [which is] beneficial for students (SK 22).

And besides the path to liberation, there is no beneficial teaching in this entire world. Therefore, I will teach indeed this very highest path to liberation (SK 31).

Perhaps, these introductory verses used to accompany the TA, together with the other *āryās* that became part of the *bhāṣya*. They might have been composed together with the TA, or between the time of the TA and the TABh.

However, what could have been the reason for expanding these introductory verses? As discussed in § 2.3, the Jaina traditions in the North and the South had different ideas about the authorship of the TA and the TABh, and the Jainas in the South did not transmit the TABh. Up to the present day, the Digambara tradition does not accept the TABh as an authoritative commentary, and they disagree with the Śvetāmbara Jainas who assume that Umāsvāti wrote the TA and the TABh. It is hard to believe that the TA and the TABh were originally composed together and that the Jainas in the South embraced the *sūtra* and rejected the *bhāṣya*. If these texts were written together and contained some elements that were unacceptable to the Jaina community, one would expect that the whole text would be considered heretical. Therefore, it is much more likely that the TABh was written at a later stage, and that the text was received differently in the North and the South.

The dispute about the authoritativeness of the TABh might have been a reason for the Jainas in the North to expand the introductory verses of the TA. If the author of the verses that were added to *sambandhakārikās* 21, 22 and 31 indeed tried to legitimate the TABh, it makes perfect sense that he used some ambiguous terms to suggest that the author of the introductory verses claims to be the author of the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*. Since *sambandhakārikā* 22 clearly states that the author wrote a short compendium, there was not much space to alter the meaning in such a way that the introductory verses also introduce the *bhāṣya*. However, by comparing the length of the text to the enormous amount of the words of the *jina*, one can argue that the term '*laghugrantha*' in *sambandhakārikā* 22 only means that the text is short compared to the teachings of the *arhat*. It is clear that this strategy did not

influence the views of the Jainas in the South since the TABh never acquired an authoritative position in the Digambara community. Nevertheless, it gave the northern tradition textual evidence to attribute the TABh to the author of the TA.

For the name of this author, we have to look at the *praśasti*, which is the first source that attributes the TA and the TABh to Umāsvāti. As mentioned above, it is unclear who the author of these six verses is and how they relate to the *sambandhakārikās*. The work to which the *praśasti* is attached is referred to as a *śāstra*, called the '*Tattvārthādhigama*'.⁵³¹ This corresponds with the title mentioned in *sambandhakārikā* 22, even though the *sambandhakārikās* refer to the text as a '*saṃgraha*' (*sambandhakārikā* 22), or '*pratyāsa*' (*sambandhakārikā* 23) instead of '*śāstra*'.⁵³² *Praśasti* 6 mentions the title '*tattvādhigama*' instead of '*tattvārthādhigama*'. The *praśasti* attributes the *Tattv(ārth)ādhigama* to 'vācaka Umāsvāti'.⁵³³ The name Umāsvāti seems to indicate a Brahmanical background. This would also explain why *praśasti* 3 mentions Umāsvāti's *gotra*.⁵³⁴ It is hard to locate 'Nyagrodhikā', which is mentioned as the place of birth of Umāsvāti in *praśasti* 3, since it could refer to any place which has banyan trees. The same verse also mentions that Umāsvāti spent some time in Kusumapura, which is another name for Pāṭaliputra.⁵³⁵ However, the information in the *praśasti* should not be taken at face value for several reasons. First, the name 'Umāsvāti' does not appear in any other text that is attributed to him, and the southern tradition did not even attribute the TA to him.⁵³⁶ Apart from the *praśasti* and the later textual tradition, there is no evidence that there was an actual writer with the name Umāsvāti, working in Pāṭaliputra. Further, the names of the teachers in Umāsvāti's lineage that are mentioned in *praśasti* 2, Muṇḍapāda and Mūla, are quite odd and do not appear in other lineages that mention Umāsvāti.⁵³⁷

Given the lack of external evidence that supports the information in the *praśasti* and the fact that the names that are mentioned are rather unusual, while Umāsvāti's place of birth remains vague, there is enough reason to doubt the

⁵³¹ *Praśasti* 5.

⁵³² *Sambandhakārikā* 22 and *praśasti* 5 both use the phrase '*tattvārthādhigamākhyā*'.

⁵³³ *Praśasti* 5.

⁵³⁴ *Praśasti* 3 mentions that Umāsvāti belonged to the Kaubhīṣaṇi *gotra*.

⁵³⁵ Ohira suggests that the author of the *praśasti* preferred the name 'Kusuma' for metrical reasons (Ohira 1982: 53).

⁵³⁶ Ohira 1982: 43. For a discussion of the TA in the southern tradition, see § 2.3.

⁵³⁷ For an overview of the lineages that mention Svāti, which is another name for Umāsvāti according to Ohira, see Ohira 1982: 44ff.

veracity of the *praśasti*.⁵³⁸ Since it seems that the extended version of the *sambandhakārikās* was written in an attempt to legitimise the TABh as an auto-commentary, one can easily imagine that the *praśasti* was added to substantiate this idea, and to attribute both texts to Umāsvāti.

⁵³⁸ Based on an analysis of the lineages that are mentioned in other texts, Ohira concludes that the *praśasti* is 'the authentic record of Umāsvāti' (Ohira 1982: 53). However, her analysis does not provide the evidence needed for this conclusion. The lineages talk about 'Svāti' instead of 'Umāsvāti' and they assign Svāti to the Hārīta *gotra*, instead of the Kaubhīṣaṇi *gotra*, which is mentioned in *praśasti* 3. Furthermore, the teachers that are mentioned in the *praśasti* do not appear in these lineages.

3.6 Conclusion of the Textual Analysis

In the foregoing sections, I have analysed the content of the philosophical chapters of the TA and the TABh with a dual purpose in mind. On the one hand, I have tried to clarify the philosophical ideas that are conveyed in these texts. On the other hand, I have aimed to get more clarity about the intellectual contexts in which the TA and the TABh were composed. In addition, I have investigated the verses in the TABh, the *sambandhakārikās*, and the *praśasti* in order to get a better understanding of the authorship of both texts.

My analysis shows that the epistemological and ontological theories in the TA constitute a fairly coherent account that can compete with the views of the other philosophical movements that were active at the time of its composition. The TA presents a dualistic ontology, in which the soul (*jīva*) is radically different from all other substances (*ajīvakāya*). It is the centre of knowledge and can occupy an innumerable amount of space-points (*pradeśa*). By expanding its range, the soul can acquire direct knowledge of objects in the entire cosmos, which explains why liberated beings (*kevalin*) are omniscient. Yet, the soul that is still bound by *karman* has a limited range and has to rely on indirect means of cognition, such as ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*).

These theories are not new for the Jaina tradition but the way in which the TA presents the Jaina view is rather innovative. Throughout my analysis, I have shown that the composer of the TA positions the Jaina perspective as an alternative to the views that are expressed in the texts of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* traditions. Although the structure of the TA is based on a traditional list of soteriological categories (*tattva*), the TA opens with a chapter on knowledge, a topic that does not correspond to any of the *tattvas*. By opening the TA with a chapter on knowledge, the composer of the TA stresses the crucial role of knowledge in his overall soteriology. This strongly resembles the view about the relationship between knowledge and ultimate bliss (*niḥśreyasa*) in the *Nyāyasūtra*. Likewise, the classification of the five types of knowledge (*jñāna*) as the two means of cognitions (*pramāṇa*) indicates that the author of the TA tried to connect the Jaina theory with the more dominant epistemological models at his time. The same goes for the way in which the TA presents the ontological categories and their functions.

The TABh is mostly in line with the theories held in the TA but some aspects of the *bhāṣya* suggest that the composer of the *bhāṣya* had a slightly different aim. Even though his views are also influenced by Nyāya theories, he seems to place more value on the traditional Jaina theories than the composer of the TA. For example, he mentions that the TA does not discuss absolute knowledge (*kevalalajñāna*) in the first chapter of the TA, which he apparently interprets as a significant omission. Further, the TABh includes longer discussions of the modes of analysis (*anuyogadvāra*) and the theory of viewpoints (*naya*), which are topics that are particular to the Jaina tradition.

The discussion of the viewpoints at the end of the first chapter seems to consist of different historical layers. It is unusually long and rather unsystematic. Moreover, this passage mentions that the four *pramāṇas* that were accepted by the Nyāya tradition are also valid means of cognition (TABh 1.35.89) which is contradicted in an earlier passage (TABh 1.12.7 – 1.12.14). This supports the idea that the *bhāṣya* contains some later additions. The same goes for the TA itself. For example, the unsystematic character of the fifth chapter of the TA suggests that this chapter has undergone some changes over the course of time. These changes might have been made between the composition of the TA and the TABh but it is also possible that some of them were made by the authors of the TABh and the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. The ambiguous status of time (*kāla*) in the fifth chapter indicates that the ontological theory of the Jainas was still in development at the moment of the composition of the TA. Moreover, the differences between the passage on time (*kāla*) in the different versions of the TA show that the text of the TA was not immune to change after its initial composition.

In short, my textual analysis of the philosophical sections shows that it is unlikely that the TA and the TABh were composed by the same author and that both texts include some later additions. This is in line with the outcome of my analysis of the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti*, which shows that these compositions were probably composed to legitimise the authority of the *bhāṣya* as an auto-commentary. As such, their value as sources about the authorship of the TA and the TABh is quite limited. Yet, the fact that the identity of the authors of the texts is unclear, does not imply that we cannot make an attempt at situating both texts in their historical intellectual context. In the general conclusion of this study, I will further discuss the implications of the outcomes of my textual analysis and will evaluate the position of the TA and the TABh in the context of the larger development of Indian philosophy.

4. Conclusion

In this study, I have investigated the conceptual content and the historical context of the philosophical chapters of the TA and the TABh. In chapter 2, I focused on the position of the TA and the TABh in the development of Jaina philosophy, the role of the Jainas in the Gupta Period, and the date and authorship of both texts. The main outcomes of my investigation of the historical context of these texts can be found in the concluding section of chapter 2 (§ 2.4). In chapter 3, I analysed the philosophical content of the philosophical sections of the TA and TABh. My analysis of the texts indicates that the TA and TABh were composed by different authors and that both texts contain different historical layers. This is further supported by my discussion of the *sambandhakārikās*, the *praśasti*, and the verses in the TABh. A summary of the results of my textual analysis can be found in the conclusion of the third chapter (§ 3.6).

Although chapters 2 and 3 address different topics and have a very different methodology, they are connected by an overarching aim. As explained in the introduction (chapter 1), this study was not only conducted in order to get a better understanding of the philosophical views in the TA but also to find out more about the position of the Jainas in the Gupta Period. In § 2.2, I discussed the different scholarly accounts of the Jainas in the Gupta Period and have argued that the existing hypotheses are underdetermined by the available source materials. Since the TA and the TABh were composed in the Gupta Period and reflect some important changes in the Jaina tradition, I have examined the text of the TA and the TABh in order to get a better idea of their historical surroundings. This was a challenging task since both texts do not explicitly mention any other schools or texts, apart from the Jaina scriptures.

Yet, as I have shown in chapter 3, it is possible to identify some external influences by closely examining the arguments and the structure of the TA and the TABh. The texts contain several conceptual inconsistencies and odd arguments that suggest that their composers borrowed some ideas from other sources. These textual anomalies enabled me to get a better understanding of the intellectual context of the TA and the TABh and the aims of their authors.

As mentioned in the conclusion of the third chapter, my analysis shows that both texts are strongly influenced by Nyāya philosophy. Although the TA is a

soteriological text, it opens with a chapter on the theory of knowledge and gives a prominent place to epistemology in its soteriology. This is a new development for the Jaina tradition and strongly resembles the view on the soteriological purpose of knowledge that is expressed in the *Nyāyasūtra*. Moreover, the epistemological discussion in the TA deals predominantly with ordinary cognition (*mati*), i.e., the type of cognition that plays the main role in the epistemological theory of the Naiyāyikas and most other schools.⁵³⁹ By contrast, the types of knowledge that are particular for the Jaina tradition, such as cosmic perception (*avadhī*) and mental perception (*manahparyāya*), are discussed very briefly.

It is remarkable that the author of the TA pays relatively little attention to some important Jaina subjects and that he is willing to incorporate views and concepts from the Nyāya tradition that are new for the Jainas. However, the way in which these Nyāya elements are incorporated in the Jaina theory is not always successful. In several cases, such as in the analysis of the relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony (*śruta*), it is unclear how these external ideas should be interpreted in the overall framework of the TA. The fact that the first commentaries struggle to explain the precise meaning of these passages indicates that some of the ideas in the TA were far from standard in the Jaina tradition at the time of its composition.

Despite these shortcomings, the author of the TA has succeeded in presenting Jaina epistemology in a way that could relate to the views of the other schools. This innovative move opened the way for later Jaina authors to write philosophical treatises that could directly engage with the philosophical positions of rival movements. Yet, it remains a matter of speculation who the rivals of the Jainas in the Gupta Period actually were. As I have argued in § 2.2, it is quite unclear what the position of the Jainas in the Gupta Period was and in which way they related to other religio-philosophical movements.

My analysis of the TA and TABh suggests that their authors tried to offer an alternative that could compete with the ideas of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika tradition, which goes against the hypothesis of some scholars who situate the TA mainly in the context of a confrontation with the Buddhists.⁵⁴⁰ Instead, the texts seem to indicate a certain rivalry between the Jainas and the Brahmanical movements. The fact that the

⁵³⁹ Ordinary cognition (*mati*) largely corresponds to the type of cognition that is known as '*pratyakṣa*' in most other schools.

⁵⁴⁰ See § 2.2.

TA deviates from the traditional Jaina texts and embraces the style and models of the philosophical texts of the Brahmanical schools, suggests that the TA was written in an intellectual environment in which the Brahmanical views were dominant. The same can be said about the TABh which suggests that the TABh was composed in a similar setting. Yet, we have to be careful about drawing conclusions about the social dynamics between the Jainas and the Brahmanical movements based on certain trends in their philosophical literature.

In order to get a better understanding of the social reality that underlies the philosophical changes in the Jaina texts from the Gupta Period, we need to know more about the way in which philosophy was practiced at that time. The fact that the Jaina texts begin to incorporate elements from the Nyāya traditions might indicate that the Jainas were competing with other schools to secure royal patronage, as suggested by Ohira and Bronkhorst. However, our current understanding of the historical practice of Indian philosophy and the way in which philosophical traditions relate to social groups is very limited. For example, even though the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika views are obviously linked with the Brahmanical tradition, it is unclear who the propounders of these theories are. Studies on the history of Indian philosophy often talk about the different 'schools' but interpreting this term as a reference to actual institutes would be an unwarranted reification of this notion.

The TA and the TABh were evidently composed for a Jaina audience, which can be inferred from the fact that the text cannot be understood without previous knowledge of many Jaina terms and concepts. Yet, it is also clear that the texts were composed for an audience that was acquainted with Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika terminology. This raises some important questions. If we assume that Nyāya philosophy was only practiced by philosophers with a Brahmanical identity, it is hard to explain why the Jainas seem to be acquainted with their texts and ideas. One could argue that the texts of rival movements were only studied in order to defeat the opponent in a debate, but it is hard to situate the TA in such a scenario. The composer of the TA does not treat the Nyāya views with hostility and actually transforms the Jaina theory on the basis of Nyāya concepts. This suggests that the author had a positive attitude towards the Nyāya tradition. One may question, therefore, whether Nyāya philosophy should exclusively be seen as the view (*darśana*) of a particular group within the Brahmanical realm or whether it was also

a general philosophical discipline that was studied by scholars from different socio-religious backgrounds.⁵⁴¹

This study aimed to situate the philosophical theories in the TA and the TABh in the larger context of the history of Indian philosophy. I hope to have demonstrated that a conceptual analysis of a philosophical text does not only provide a better understanding of the philosophical ideas in the text itself but that it can also be a useful tool to investigate the intellectual surroundings of the text. As I have mentioned above, my study indicates that there are good reasons to re-evaluate existing ideas about the boundaries between the philosophical traditions in the history of Indian philosophy, and that we should further investigate the way in which the different “schools” relate to the different socio-religious groups. This cannot be done without an active collaboration of scholars from different disciplines. The contemporary study of Indian philosophy is characterised by a divide between scholars who are primarily interested in the philosophical ideas that can be found in the texts and scholars with expertise of the linguistic and historical aspects of these texts. I hope that my study has shown that a collaboration between both sides is needed if we want to obtain a more complete picture of the history of Indian philosophy.

⁵⁴¹ A relevant discussion of the way in which Nyāya philosophy relates to the Brahmanical tradition can be found in Preisendanz 2000. However, Preisendanz’s article focuses on the dynamics between the religious and philosophical traditions within the Brahmanical realm only. I am not aware of any study that clarifies how students from different socio-religious groups acquainted themselves with Nyāya philosophy.

II. Translation

Preliminary Remarks

The following sections provide an English translation of the philosophical chapters of the *Tattvārthādhigama* (TA) and the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* (TABh).⁵⁴² In addition, this part contains a translation of the *sambandhakārikās* (SK) and the *praśasti*.⁵⁴³

The transliteration of the Sanskrit text is primarily based on the edition of the TA and TABh by Keshavlal Premchand Mody.⁵⁴⁴ I have also consulted the edition by Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia.⁵⁴⁵ In a number of cases, I have followed Kapadia's instead of Mody's reading.⁵⁴⁶ The differences between the two editions are relatively minor and are mentioned in the footnotes.

The numbering of the *sūtras* in my transliteration follows Mody's edition. They indicate the chapter and *sūtra* number. E.g., '|1.1|' is the first *sūtra* of the first chapter. Some of the *sūtras* have a different number in the version of the TA that is accompanied by Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi* (SS). These variant numbers are given in parentheses.⁵⁴⁷ The numbers between square brackets in the *bhāṣya* are my own. They correspond to the *daṇḍas* in Mody's edition. E.g., the number '[1.2.3]' refers to the third sentence of the commentary on the second *sūtra* of the first chapter of the TA.⁵⁴⁸ An overview of the different abbreviations can be found in the references.

For my translation of the TA, I have consulted the following translations: Jacobi 1906, Sanghvi 1974, and Tatia 2011. For the translation of the *praśasti*, I have consulted Dhaky 1996 and Zydenbos 1983. The *bhāṣya* and the *sambandhakārikās*

⁵⁴² I.e., Chapter I, II.8 – 25, and V. In the general introduction (§ 1), I explain why these parts have been selected.

⁵⁴³ I.e., the introductory verses and colophon that accompany the *bhāṣya*.

⁵⁴⁴ See Mody 1903.

⁵⁴⁵ See Kapadia 1926, 1930. Kapadia's edition also contains Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā*.

⁵⁴⁶ All deviations from Mody's edition are mentioned in the footnotes.

⁵⁴⁷ E.g., TA 1.22 corresponds to *sūtra* 1.21 in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. I refer to the version of this *sūtra* in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* as '(SS 1.21)'.
⁵⁴⁸ In Part I of this study, I refer to these numbers as TA 1.1 and TABh 1.2.3. I have numbered the verses of the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti* in the same way as the TABh. The number '[0.1]' refers to the first line of the *sambandhakārikās*. Since the *praśasti* immediately follows the concluding verses of the commentary on TA 10.7, the numbering of the *praśasti* begins with '[10.7.224]'.

have not been translated into a European language before, with the exception of the tenth chapter of the *bhāṣya*.⁵⁴⁹

The TA is written in the style of the philosophical *sūtra* texts and the intended meaning of many passages cannot be understood without the help of a commentary. Yet, since it is highly unlikely that the TABh was written as an auto-commentary, we cannot be certain that the interpretation that the TABh offers is in line with the meaning that the composer of the TA had in mind when he composed the text. Therefore, I have tried to interpret the *sūtras* of the TA primarily in the context of the theories that are provided in the TA itself.⁵⁵⁰

For the same reasons, I have translated most of the technical terms in a literal way. As such, my translation of these terms differs from more conventional translations, which are often based on later interpretations. For example, I translate '*manahparyāyajñāna*' as 'knowledge from mental perception' instead of the more common translation 'telepathy'. Since the discussions of this notion in the TA and the TABh do not say anything about reading the minds of other people, I prefer to use a translation whose meaning is less specific. Since many passages in the TA and TABh are open to various interpretations, I have aimed to indicate as clearly as possible how my English rendering relates to the Sanskrit text. Therefore, I have kept my translation very literal and close to the Sanskrit syntax. Although this complicates the reading of my translation, I hope that my translation can be of help to other scholars who wish to investigate the actual content of the TA and TABh.

The textual analysis in the third chapter of this study discusses the main ideas and concepts that are expressed in the philosophical sections of the TA and TABh, which are translated in this part. The order of the topics in my analysis corresponds to the order of the topics in the translated passages. As such, the reader can consult my interpretation of the content together with the Sanskrit text and my English translation.

⁵⁴⁹ The tenth chapter has been translated by Zydenbos. See Zydenbos 1983.

⁵⁵⁰ For some passages, I have based my translation of the TABh on the explanation in Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā* (Kapadia 1926, 1930). In these cases, I mention the *ṭīkā* in the footnotes as the source of my interpretation.

Tattvārthādhigama⁵⁵¹ Chapter I

samyagdarśanañjñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ ||1.1||

1.1 The path to liberation (*mokṣa-mārga*) [is constituted by] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*), [right] knowledge (*jñāna*) and [right] conduct (*cāritra*).⁵⁵²

[1.1.1] *samyagdarśanaṃ samyagjñānaṃ samyakcāritram ity eṣa trividho mokṣamārgaḥ |*

‘Right worldview (*samyag-darśana*), right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) and right conduct (*samyak-cāritra*)’ — this (*etad*) [is] the threefold (*trividha*) path to liberation (*mokṣa-mārga*).

[1.1.2] *taṃ purastāt lakṣaṇato vidhānataś ca vistareṇopadekṣyāmaḥ |*

Later on (*purastāt*), we will explain (*upadekṣyāmaḥ*) this (*tad*) in detail (*vistara*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*)⁵⁵³ and (*ca*) classification (*vidhāna*)⁵⁵⁴.

[1.1.3] *śāstrānupūrvivinyāsārthaṃ tūddeśamātram idam ucyate |*

However (*tu*), this [*sūtra*] (*idam*) has been formulated (*ucyate*) merely as (*mātra*) a brief statement (*uddeśa*), for the sake of (*artha*) arrangement (*vinyāsa*) [in accordance with] the order (*anupūrvin*) [in] the scriptures (*śāstra*).⁵⁵⁵

[1.1.4] *etāni ca samastāni mokṣasādhanāni |*

And (*ca*) these (*etad*) combined (*samasta*) [are] the means [to] liberation (*mokṣa-sādhana*).

⁵⁵¹ Several other titles are used to refer to the *Tattvārthādhigama*. In this study, I use the title that is mentioned in the *Sambandhakārikās*. For a discussion of the title of the text, see § 2.3, *Authorship of the TA and the TABh*.

⁵⁵² For a discussion of this *sūtra*, see § 3.2 *The path to liberation*.

⁵⁵³ ‘Charakterischen Merkmal’, ‘Kennzeichen’, ‘Definition’ (Oberhammer 2006: 100).

⁵⁵⁴ ‘Anordnung’, ‘Erklärende Differenzierung’; ‘Er bezeichnet die Anordnung des Stoffes bzw. das Nennen der Abschnitte oder Themen einer Darstellung in der ihnen entsprechenden Reihenfolge’ (Oberhammer 2006: 141).

⁵⁵⁵ Alternatively, the order of the chapters in the TA itself, which is called a ‘*śāstra*’ in *praśasti* 5.

[1.1.5] **ekatarābhāve 'py asāadhanānīty atas trayāṇāṃ grahaṇaṃ |**

For (*iti*), even (*apī*) in the absence (*abhāva*) [of] one of them (*ekatara*), [they are] not leading [to liberation] (*a-sādhana*); hence (*atas*) [there should be] adoption (*grahaṇa*) [of] the threefold [means] (*traya*).

[1.1.6] **eṣāṃ ca pūrvalābhe bhajanīyam uttaraṃ | [1.1.7] uttaralābhe tu niyataḥ pūrvalābhaḥ |**

And (*ca*) in the case of acquisition of the first (i.e., *samyag-darśana*)⁵⁵⁶ (*pūrva-lābha*) of these (*idam*), the latter (i.e., *samyag-jñāna* and *samyak-cāritra*) (*uttara*) [have] to be cultivated (*bhajanīya*). But (*tu*) in the case of acquisition (*lābha*) of the latter (i.e., *samyag-jñāna* and *samyak-cāritra*) (*uttara*), the obtainment (*lābha*) [of] the first (*pūrva*) [is] certain (*niyata*)

[1.1.8] **tatra samyag iti praśamsārtho nipātaḥ samañcater vā bhāve⁵⁵⁷ darśana iti |**

In this [*sūtra*] (*tatra*) the word (*iti*) 'right' (*samañc*) [is] a particle (*nipāta*), for the sake of (*artha*) commendation (*praśamsā*), or (*vā*) [it is] 'worldview' (*darśana*) (*iti*) in the state (*bhāva*) of [the verb] '*samañc*' (to correspond, i.e., the state of corresponding with reality) (*samañcatī*)⁵⁵⁸.

[1.1.9] **dr̥ṣer avyabhicāriṇī sarvendriyānindriyārthaprāptiḥ etat samyag-darśanam |**

The obtainment (*prāpti*) [of] all (*sarva*) the object[s] (*artha*) of the organs of sense (*indriya*) and the mind (*anindriya*) which does not deviate (*avyabhicārin*) from the [right] view⁵⁵⁹ (*dr̥ṣī*) — this (*etat*) [is] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*).

[1.1.10] **praśastaṃ darśanaṃ samyagdarśanaṃ | [1.1.11] saṅgataṃ vā darśanaṃ samyagdarśanaṃ |**

'Right worldview' (*samyag-darśana*) [is] the best (*praśasta*) worldview (*darśana*). Alternatively (*vā*), 'right worldview' (*samyag-darśana*) [is] the correct (*saṅgata*) worldview (*darśana*).

[1.1.12] **evam jñānacāritrayor api ||**

The same (*evam*) [applies] to knowledge (*jñāna*) [and] conduct (*cāritra*) as well (*apī*).

⁵⁵⁶ My interpretation of '*pūrva*' and '*uttara*' follows the *ṭīkā*.

⁵⁵⁷ Mody reads '*bhāvaḥ darśana*', and mentions the variant reading '*bhāve*'. Kapadia places the *daṇḍa* before '*darśanam iti*'.

⁵⁵⁸ The form '*samañcateḥ*' is the gen. sg. of the pres. 3 sg. of *sam+√añc*.

⁵⁵⁹ Alternatively, 'which has no deviation of the view'.

tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam ||1.2||

1.2 Right worldview (*samyagdarśana*) [is] confidence (*śraddhāna*) in the categories (*artha*) of reality (*tattva*).

[1.2.1] *tattvānām arthānām śraddhānaṃ tattvena vārthānām śraddhānaṃ tattvārthaśraddhānam tat samyagdarśanam |*

Confidence in the categories of reality (*tattva-artha-śraddhāna*) [is] confidence (*śraddhāna*) in the categories (*artha*) of the entities⁵⁶⁰ (*tattva*) or (*vā*) confidence (*śraddhāna*) in the categories (*artha*) [in terms of] reality (*tattvena*); that (*tad*) [is] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*).

[1.2.2] *tattvena bhāvato niścitam ity arthaḥ |*

The meaning [of] (*ity artha*) ‘*tattvena*’ [is]: ‘understood (*niścita*) in terms of [their] nature (*bhāva*)’.⁵⁶¹

[1.2.3] *tattvāni jīvādīni vakṣyante |*

The entities (*tattva*) will be explained (see TA 1.4) (*vakṣyante*) [to be] the soul (*jīva*) etc. (*ādī*).

[1.2.4] *ta eva cārthāḥ teṣāṃ śraddhānaṃ teṣu pratyayāvadhāraṇam |*

And (*ca*) they (*tad*) [are] indeed (*eva*) the categories (*artha*); confidence (*śraddhāna*) in these (*tad*) [is] ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa*) [of] trust (*pratyaya*) with respect to these [categories] (*tad*).

[1.2.5] *tad evaṃ praśamasamveganirvedānukampāstikyābhivyaṅgilakṣaṇaṃ tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam iti ||*

In this way (*evaṃ*), this (*tad*) confidence in the categories of reality (*tattva-artha-śraddhāna*) — whose characteristic (*lakṣaṇaṃ*) [is] the manifestation (*abhivyaṅgi*) [of] tranquillity (*praśama*), desire for liberation (*samvega*),⁵⁶² indifference (*nirveda*), compassion (*anukampā*) [and] faithfulness (*āstikya*) — [is] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) (*iti*).

⁵⁶⁰ The word ‘*tattva*’ is used in both singular and plural in the *bhāṣya*. I translate ‘reality’ when used in singular and ‘the entities’ when used in plural. See also TABh 1.4.1 and TABh 1.4.2.

⁵⁶¹ The *ṭīkā* explains that this is a gloss (*vivarāṇa*) on the word ‘*tattvena*’ in the previous sentence.

⁵⁶² ‘desire for emancipation’ (MW). The term ‘*samvega*’ is mentioned as a variety of body-determining *karman* (*nāmakarman*) in TA 6.23.

tan nisargād adhigamād vā ||1.3||

1.3 That (i.e., the right worldview) [arises] by nature (*nisarga*) or from learning (*adhigama*).

[1.3.1] ***tad etat samyagdarśanaṃ dvividhaṃ bhavati |*** [1.3.2] ***nisarga-samyagdarśanam adhigamasamyagdarśanaṃ ca |***

That very (*tad etad*) right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) exists (*bhavati*) in two ways (*dvividha*); [i.e.,] right worldview by nature (*nisarga-samyag-darśana*) and right worldview [from] learning (*adhigama-samyag-darśana*).

[1.3.3] ***nisargād adhigamād utpadyate iti dvihetukaṃ dvividham ||***

'It arises (*utpadyate*) from nature (*nisarga*) or (*vā*) by learning (*adhigama*)' (*iti*), [that is the meaning of] 'twofold' (*dvividha*) (see TABh 1.3.1), [i.e.,] having two causes (*dvi-hetuka*).

[1.3.4] ***nisargaḥ pariṇāmaḥ svabhāvaḥ aparopadeśa ity anarthāntaram |***

'Nature' (*nisarga*), '[natural] transformation' (*pariṇāma*), 'innate disposition' (*svabhāva*), 'not taught by others' (*apara-upadeśa*) (*iti*), [they are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

[1.3.5] ***jñānadarśanopayogalakṣaṇo jīva iti vakṣyate |***

[It] will be explained (see TA 2.8) [that] (*iti*) 'the soul (*jīva*) is characterised (*lakṣaṇa*) [by] the cognitive operation (*upayoga*) [in the form of] knowledge [and] worldview (*darśana*).'⁵⁶³

[1.3.6] ***tasyānādaḥ saṃsāre paribhramataḥ karmata eva karmaṇaḥ svakṛtasya bandhanikācanodayanirjarāpekṣaṃ nārakatiryagyonimanuṣyāmarabhava-grahaṇeṣu vividhaṃ puṇyapāpaphalam anubhavato***

For the one (*tad*) [who is] wandering about (*paribhramat*) in beginningless (*anādi*) *saṃsāra* — for [him who is] experiencing (*anubhavat*) the varied (*vividha*) fruit of merit and demerit (*puṇya-pāpa-phala*), depending on (*apekṣā*, bah.) the bondage (*bandha*) *nikācanā*,⁵⁶⁴ rising (*udaya*), [and] destruction (*nirjarā*) of the *karman* made by himself (*svakṛta*), in taking states [of] hellish beings, animals, human beings [and] gods (*nāraka-tiryagyonī-manuṣya-amara-bhava-grahaṇa*), indeed (*eva*) due to [one's] *karman*;

⁵⁶³ Tatia translates *upayoga* as 'sentience' (Tatia 2011: 39). TA 2.9 explains the twofold character of *upayoga* (i.e., knowledge and worldview). See also § 3.3, *Cognitive operation*.

⁵⁶⁴ According to Tatia, the term '*nikācanā*' refers to a karmic process (*karaṇa*) that is predetermined and cannot be altered (Tatia 1951: 259).

***jñānadarśanopayogasvābhāvāt tāni tāni pariṇāmādhyavasāyasthānāntarāṇi
gacchato 'nādimithyādr̥ṣṭer api sataḥ***

for [him] going (*gacchat*) [through] all these (*tāni tāni*) differences (*antara*) of transformation (*pariṇāma*), determination (*adhyavasāya*),⁵⁶⁵ [and] states (*sthāna*), due to the own nature [of] the cognitive operation [in the form of] knowledge [and] worldview (*jñāna-darśana-upayoga-svābhāvya*), even though (*api*) he is (*sat*) [someone whose] wrong view [has] no beginning (*anādi-mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi*) —

***pariṇāmaviśeṣād apūrvakaraṇaṃ tādr̥g bhavati yenāsyānupadeśāt
samyagdarśanam utpadyate ity etat nisargasamyagdarśanam ||***

such (*tādr̥k*) an *apūrvakaraṇa* [process]⁵⁶⁶ (*apūrvakaraṇa*) arises (*bhavati*) due to a particular transformation (*pariṇāma-viśeṣa*); by this [*apūrvakaraṇa* process] (*yad*) there arises (*utpadyate*) right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) for him (*idam*) without instruction (*anupadeśa*) — this (*etat*) [is] right worldview by nature (*nisarga-samyag-darśana*).

[1.3.7] ***adhigamaḥ abhigama āgama nimittaṃ śravaṇaṃ śikṣā upadeśa ity
anarthāntaram |***

‘Learning’ (see TA 1.3) (*adhigama*), ‘understanding’ (*abhigama*), ‘tradition’ (*āgama*), ‘instruction’⁵⁶⁷ (*nimitta*), ‘hearing’ (*śravaṇa*), ‘study’ (*śikṣā*), [and] ‘teaching’ (*upadeśa*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., these are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

[1.3.8] ***tad evaṃ paropadeśād yat tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ bhavati tad
adhigamasamyagdarśanam iti ||***

Thus (*tad evaṃ*), confidence in the categories of reality (*tattva-artha-śraddhāna*), which (*yad*) arises (*bhavati*) [as a result of] instruction by others (*para-upadeśa*), that (*tad*) [is called] right worldview by learning (*adhigama-samyag-darśana*).

[1.3.9] ***atrāha tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam ity uktam |*** [1.3.10] ***tatra kiṃ tattvam iti |*** [1.3.11] ***atrocyate |***

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It has been] explained (*ukta*) [that] ‘right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [is] confidence in the categories of reality (*tattva-artha-śraddhāna*)’. Here (*tatra*), [one may ask]: What (*kim*) [is] reality (*tattva*)? At this point (*atra*), it is said (*ucyate*):

⁵⁶⁵ For a discussion of *adhyavasāya* in the Jaina theory of *karman*, see Wiley 2011.

⁵⁶⁶ ‘the process by which the soul attains to an unprecedented degree of purity’ (P.S. Jaini 1998: 337).

⁵⁶⁷ MW mentions ‘*ādeśa*’ (instruction) as a synonym of ‘*nimitta*’.

jīvājīvāsravabandhasaṃvaranirjarāmokṣās tattvam ||1.4||

1.4 [The categories of] reality (*tattva*) [are]:

- i. soul (*jīva*)
- ii. non-soul (i.e., inanimate entities) (*ajīva*)
- iii. influx (*āsrava*)
- iv. binding (*bandha*)
- v. stopping (*saṃvara*)
- vi. destruction (*nirjarā*), [and]
- vii. liberation (*mokṣa*).

[1.4.1] ***jīvā ajīvā āsravā bandhaḥ saṃvaro nirjarā mokṣa ity eṣa saptavidho 'rthas tattvam |*** [1.4.2] ***ete vā sapta padārthās tattvāni |***

Souls (*jīva*), non-souls (i.e., inanimate entities) (*ajīva*), [types of] influx (*āsrava*), binding (*bandha*), stopping (*saṃvara*), destruction (*nirjarā*), [and] liberation (*mokṣa*) (*iti*) — this (*etad*) [is] the sevenfold (*saptavidha*) category⁵⁶⁸ (*artha*), [which is] reality (*tattva*). Or (*vā*), these (*etad*) seven (*sapta*) categories (*padārtha*) [are] the entities (*tattva*).

[1.4.3] ***tāml lakṣaṇato vidhānataś ca purastād vistareṇopadekṣyāmaḥ ||***

Later on (*purastāt*), we will explain (*upadekṣyāma*) them (*tad*) in detail (*vistara*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*) and (*ca*) classification (*vidhāna*).

nāmasthāpanādravyabhāvatas tannyāsaḥ ||1.5||

1.5 The analysis of these [categories] (*tad-nyāsa*) [can be done] from [the perspective of]:

- i. name (*nāma*)
- ii. representation (*sthāpanā*)⁵⁶⁹
- iii. substance (*dravya*), [and]
- iv. state (*bhāva*)⁵⁷⁰.

⁵⁶⁸ It is somewhat odd that '*artha*' is used in singular in this sentence. For the sake of consistency, I have translated '*artha*' as 'category'.

⁵⁶⁹ Lit. 'causing to stand'. The *bhāṣya* refers to a painting or sculpture of the god Indra. (see TABh 1.5.8).

⁵⁷⁰ For a discussion of these modes of analysis, see § 3.2 *The modes of analysis*.

[1.5.1] **ebhir nāmādibhiś caturbhir anuyogadvārais teṣāṃ jīvādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ nyāso bhavati |**

The analysis (*nyāsa*) of these (*tad*) entities (*tattva*), beginning with soul (*jīva-ādī*), takes place (*bhavati*) by these (*etad*) four (*catur*) doors of examination (*anuyoga-dvāra*), [i.e.], name etc. (*nāma-ādī*).

[1.5.2] **vistareṇa lakṣaṇato vidhānataś cādhigamārthaṃ nyāso nikṣepa ity arthaḥ |**

The analysis (*nyāsa*) for the sake of learning (*adhigama-artha*), based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*) and (*ca*) classification (*vidhāna*), in detail (*vistara*) — that is the meaning (*ity artha*) [of] ‘*nikṣepa*’.

[1.5.3] **tad yathā | [1.5.4] nāmajīvaḥ sthāpanājīvo dravyajīvo bhāvajīvo iti |**

For instance (*tad yathā*), soul [from the perspective of] name (*nāma-jīva*), soul [from the perspective of] representation (*sthāpanā-jīva*), soul [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya-jīva*) [and] soul [from the perspective of] state (*bhāva-jīva*).

[1.5.5] **nāma saṃjñākarma ity anarthāntaram |**

‘Name’ (*nāma*) [and] ‘giving a name’⁵⁷¹ (*saṃjñā-karman*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., these are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

[1.5.6] **cetanāvato ‘cetasasya vā dravyasya jīva iti nāma kriyate | [1.5.7] sa nāmajīvaḥ ||**

[When] the name (*nāma*) ‘soul’ (*jīva iti*) is given (*kriyate*) to animate (*cetanāvat*) or (*vā*) inanimate (*acetana*) substance (*dravya*), that (*tad*) [is] soul [from the perspective of] name (*nāma-jīva*).

[1.5.8] **yaḥ kāṣṭhapustacitrakarmākṣanikṣepādiṣu sthāpyate jīva iti sa sthāpanājīvo devatāpratīkṛtivad indro rudraḥ skando viṣṇur iti ||**

The soul (*jīva*) which (*yaḥ*) is represented (*sthāpyate*) [in the case of] visual representations (*akṣa-nikṣepa*)⁵⁷² [in] wood (*kāṣṭha*), a clay model (*pusta*), a painting (*citra-karman*) etc. (*ādī*) — that (*tad*) [is] soul [from the perspective of] representation (*sthāpanā-jīva*); like the images of deities (*devatā-pratīkṛtivat*), named (*iti*) *Indra, Rudra, Skanda* [or] *Viṣṇu*.⁵⁷³

⁵⁷¹ *saṃjñākarman* = *saṃjñākaraṇa* (MW). I follow Kapadia’s reading ‘*saṃjñākarma*’. Mody reads ‘*saṃjñā karma*’.

⁵⁷² Lit. ‘deposited in the senses’.

⁵⁷³ The same explanation is given in TABh 1.5.16.

[1.5.9] ***dravyajīva iti guṇaparyāyaviyuktaḥ prajñāsthāpito 'nādirīṇāmika-bhāvayukto jīva ucyate |***

[When] the soul (*jīva*) is said (*ucyate*) [to be] destitute of qualities [and] modes (*guṇa-paryāya-viyukta*),⁵⁷⁴ represented by knowledge⁵⁷⁵ (*prajñā-sthāpita*), [and] connected with the condition of beginningless transformation (*anādi-pāriṇāmika-bhāva-yukta*) — [that is] ‘soul [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya-jīva*)’ (*iti*).

[1.5.10] ***athavā śūnyo 'yaṃ bhaṅgaḥ |***

However (*athavā*), this (*idam*) form of analysis (*bhaṅga*) [is] pointless (*śūnya*).⁵⁷⁶

[1.5.11] ***yasya hy ajīvasya sato bhavyaṃ jīvatvaṃ syāt sa dravyajīvaḥ syāt aniṣṭaṃ caitat ||***

For (*hi*), this (*tad*) soul [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya-jīva*) would imply (*syād*) [that] the quality of being a soul (*jīvatva*) might (*syāt*)⁵⁷⁷ occur (*bhavya*) for that (*yad*) which is (*sat*) not-soul (*ajīva*), and (*ca*) this (*etad*) is incorrect (*aniṣṭa*).

[1.5.12] ***bhāvato jīvā aupāśamikakṣāyikakṣāyopāśamikaudayikapāriṇāmika-bhāvayuktā upayogalakṣaṇāḥ saṃsāriṇo muktās ca dvividhā vakṣyante ||***

From [the perspective of] state (*bhāva*), souls (*jīva*) will be said (*vakṣyante*)⁵⁷⁸ [to be] twofold (*dvividha*): transmigratory [souls] (*saṃsārin*) — [which] are connected with the states (*bhāva-yukta*) [that are] resulting from the cessation [of *karman*] (*aupāśamika*), resulting from the annihilation [of *karman*] (*kṣāyika*), resulting from the annihilation and cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣāya-upāśamika*)⁵⁷⁹, resulting from the manifestation [of *karman*] (*audayika*) [and] resulting from a natural disposition (*pāriṇāmika*)⁵⁸⁰ — [and that are] characterised by [cognitive] operation (*upayogalakṣaṇa*) and (*ca*) liberated (*mukta*).

⁵⁷⁴ TA 5.37 explains that ‘substance has qualities and modes’ (*guṇaparyāyavad dravyam*).

⁵⁷⁵ The *ṭīkā* suggests an instrumental relationship between ‘*prajñā*’ and ‘*sthāpita*’. The meaning of this expression is not entirely clear to me. I have translated ‘*sthāpita*’ in accordance with my translation of the term ‘*sthāpanā*’ (representation), which is frequently used in this passage. Perhaps, the intended meaning is ‘mental phenomenon’. Alternatively, ‘*prajñāsthāpita*’ can be translated as ‘established by knowledge’.

⁵⁷⁶ I.e., analysing the soul from the perspective of *dravya* does not make any sense. See also the following sentence (TABh 1.5.11).

⁵⁷⁷ Mody’s K manuscript omits the second ‘*syāt*’ (Mody 1903: 8).

⁵⁷⁸ TA 2.10 explains that there are two types of souls, i.e., ‘worldly and liberated [souls]’ (*saṃsāriṇo muktās ca*).

⁵⁷⁹ Mentioned in TA 2.1 as ‘the mixed state’ (*miśra*).

⁵⁸⁰ These five states are also listed in TA 2.10.

[1.5.13] *evam ajīvādiṣu sarveṣv anugantavyam ||*

Likewise (*evam*), [the different perspectives are] to be applied (*anugantavya*) to all [other categories] (*sarva*), beginning with non-soul (*ajīva-ādi*).⁵⁸¹

[1.5.14] *paryāyāntareṇāpi nāmadravyam sthāpanādravyam dravyadravyam bhāvato dravyam iti |*

Also (*api*), with regard to (*antareṇa*) modes (*paryāya*)⁵⁸², [there is] ‘substance [from the perspective of] name (*nāma-dravya*), substance [from the perspective of] representation (*sthāpanā-dravya*), substance [from the perspective of] substance (*dravyadravya*) [and] substance (*dravya*) from [the perspective of] state (*bhāva*)’ (*iti*).

[1.5.15] *yasya jīvasyājīvasya⁵⁸³ vā nāma kriyate dravyam iti tan nāmadravyam |*
[When] the name (*nāma*) ‘substance’ (*dravya iti*) is given (*kriyate*) to that which (*yad*) [is] soul (*jīva*) or (*vā*) non-soul (*ajīva*), that (*tad*) is substance [from the perspective of] name (*nāma-dravya*).

[1.5.16] *yat kāṣṭapustacitrakarmākṣanikṣepādiṣu sthāpyate dravyam iti tat sthāpanādravyam devatāpratīkṛtivad indro rudraḥ skando viṣṇur iti |*

The substance (*dravyam*) which (*yad*) is represented (*sthāpyate*) [in the case of] visual representations (*akṣa-nikṣepa*) [in] wood (*kāṣṭa*), a clay model (*pusta*), a painting (*citra-karman*) etc. (*ādi*), that (*tad*) [is] substance [from the perspective of] representation (*sthāpanā-dravya*); like the images of deities (*devatā-pratīkṛtivad*), named (*iti*) *Indra, Rudra, Skanda* [or] *Viṣṇu*.⁵⁸⁴

[1.5.17] *dravyadravyam nāma guṇaparyāyaviyuktaṃ prajñāsthāpitaṃ dharmādīnām anyatamat |*

‘Substance [from the perspective of] substance’ can be defined as (*nāma*) [that which is] without qualities [and] modes (*guṇa-paryāya-viyukta*), established by knowledge (*prajñāsthāpita*), [and] different from (*anyatama*) motion etc. (*dharmā-ādi*)⁵⁸⁵.

⁵⁸¹ I.e., the other categories that are mentioned in TA 1.4 can also be analysed from the four perspectives that are mentioned in TA 1.5.

⁵⁸² See TA 5.37 for a discussion of ‘modes’ (*paryāya*). The meaning of this passage is not entirely clear to me.

⁵⁸³ Mody reads ‘*jīvasya vā jīvasya vā*’. He mentions a variant reading that omits the first *vā*. I follow Kapadia, who reads ‘*jīvasyājīvasya vā*’.

⁵⁸⁴ Cf. TABh 1.5.8.

⁵⁸⁵ I.e. the inanimate entities, which are listed in TA 5.1: motion (*dharmā*), rest (*adharma*), space (*ākāśa*), and material elements (*pudgala*).

[1.5.18] **kecid apy āhur yad dravyato dravyam bhavati tac ca pudgaladravyam eveti pratyetavyam |**

Some [people] (*kecid*) also (*apī*) say (*āhuḥ*): ‘And (*ca*) that which (*yad*) is (*bhavati*) substance (*dravya*) [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya*), that (*tad*) [is] just (*eva*) to be understood (*pratyetavya*) [as] ‘the substance [of] material elements’ (*pudgala-dravya*) (*iti*).’

[1.5.19] **aṇavaḥ skandhās ca saṅghātabhedebhya utpadyanta iti vakṣyāmaḥ |**

We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) (see TA 5.25 - 26) [that] (*iti*) the atoms (*aṇu*) and (*ca*) the aggregates (*skandha*) result (*utpadyante*) from combination and disintegration (*saṅghāta-bheda*).

[1.5.20] **bhāvato dravyāṇi dharmādīni saṅṅaparyāyāṇi prāptilakṣaṇāni vakṣyante |**

From [the perspective of] state (*bhāva*), the substances (*dravya*) will be said (see TA 5.37) (*vakṣyante*) [to be]: motion etc. (*dharmā-ādi*) (i.e., the five substances, see TA 5.1), [provided] with qualities [and] modes (*saṅṅa-paryāya*), [and] characterised by reach (*prāpti-lakṣaṇa*) (i.e., having extension)⁵⁸⁶.

[1.5.21] **āgamataś ca prābhṛtajño dravyam iti bhavyam āha | [1.5.22] dravyam ca bhavye |**

And (*ca*) based on scripture (*āgama*), a learned person (*prābhṛta-jña*)⁵⁸⁷ names (*āha*) [that which] exists (*bhavya*) ‘substance’ (*dravya*) (*iti*). And (*ca*) [this is] substance (*dravya*) [in the sense of] ‘that which exists’ (*bhavya*).

[1.5.23] **bhavyam iti prāpyam āha | [1.5.24] bhū prāptāv ātmanepadī | [1.5.25] tad evaṃ prāpyante prāpnuvanti vā dravyāṇi ||**

[He] names (*āha*) that which exists (*bhavya*) (*iti*) as ‘attainable’ (*prāpya*). [The verb] ‘*√bhū*’ (existing) in the middle voice (*ātmanepadin*) [has the meaning of] ‘reaching’ (*prāpti*). In this respect (*tad evaṃ*), the substances (*dravya*) are reached (*prāpyante*), or (*vā*) they reach (*prāpnuvanti*) (i.e., they are either contactable or they come into contact).

⁵⁸⁶ Perhaps, ‘*prāptilakṣaṇa*’ is the opposite of the expression ‘*prajñasthāpita*’ in TABh 1.5.7 and TABh 1.5.15.

⁵⁸⁷ Lit. someone who knows the *āgamas*. The term ‘*prābhṛta*’ refers to a category of texts that are used in the Digambara tradition.

[1.5.26] **evam sarveṣām anādīnām ādimatām ca jīvādīnām bhāvānām mokṣāntānām tattvādhigamārthaṃ nyāsaḥ kārya iti ||**

Likewise (*evam*), the analysis (*nyāsa*) [is] to be done (*kārya*) for all (*sarva*) states (*bhāva*) of souls etc. (*jīva-ādi*), [i.e., the categories]⁵⁸⁸ without beginning (*anādi*) and (*ca*) having a beginning (*ādimat*)⁵⁸⁹, whose end is liberation (*mokṣa-ānta*), for the sake of study of reality (*tattva-adhigama-artha*) (*iti*).

pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ ||1.6||

1.6 [The categories] can be understood (*adhigama*) through the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*)⁵⁹⁰ and the perspectives (*naya*).

[1.6.1] **eṣām ca jīvādīnām tattvānām yathoddiṣṭānām nāmādibhir nyastānām pramāṇanayair vistarādhigamo bhavati ||**

And (*ca*) the full understanding (*vistarādhigama*) of these (*etad*) entities (*tattva*) — [i.e.], souls etc. (*jīva-ādi*) as listed (see TA 1.4) (*yathā-uddiṣṭa*), [which are] analysed (*nyasta*)⁵⁹¹ by name etc. (*nāma-ādi*) — takes place (*bhavati*) through the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) [and] perspectives (*naya*).

[1.6.2] **tatra pramāṇaṃ dvividhaṃ parokṣaṃ pratyakṣaṃ ca vakṣyate |**

Among them (*tatra*), the twofold (*dvividha*) means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), [i.e.], indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) and (*ca*) direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*), will be explained (see TA 1.10 – 1.12) (*vakṣyate*).

[1.6.3] **caturvidhaṃ ity eke | [1.6.4] nayavādāntareṇa ||**⁵⁹²

Some (*eka*) [say that] (*iti*) [the means of cognition are] fourfold (*caturvidha*),⁵⁹³ in accordance with (*antareṇa*) the doctrine of perspectives (*naya-vāda*).

⁵⁸⁸ See TA 1.4.

⁵⁸⁹ TA 5.42 says: '[There is transformation] without beginning and having a beginning' (*anādir ādimāṃś ca*).

⁵⁹⁰ Since a *pramāṇa* can also lead to false cognition (*ajñāna*) according to the *bhāṣya* (see TABh 1.12.15), I translate 'means of cognition' instead of the more commonly used phrase 'means of knowledge'. The difficulty of translating this term partly results from the fact that the word '*pramāṇa*' is used in different ways by different philosophical movements. For some traditions it means 'authoritative means of knowledge', while for others it does 'not necessarily yield true cognition' (Gokhale 1993: 675 - 676). The TABh adheres to the latter position.

⁵⁹¹ Cf. '*nyāsa*' in TA 1.5.

⁵⁹² Kapadia's edition omits the *daṇḍa* between '*ity eke*' and '*nayavādāntareṇa*'.

⁵⁹³ In § 3.2 *Classification of the means of knowledge*, I discuss who the adherents of this view might be.

[1.6.5] *na yāś ca naigamādayo vakṣyante* || [1.6.6] *kiṃ cānyat* |

And (*ca*) the perspectives (*naya*) will be said (see TA 1.34) (*vakṣyante*) [to be] the commonplace [perspective] etc. (*naigama-ādi*). Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

***nirdeśasvāmitvasādhanādhikaraṇasthitividhānataḥ* ||1.7||**

1.7 [The categories can also be analysed] based on classification (*vidhāna*) [into]:

- i. description (*nirdeśa*)
- ii. ownership (*svāmitva*)
- iii. cause (*sādhana*)⁵⁹⁴
- iv. locus (*adhikaraṇa*)
- v. duration (*sthiti*), [and]
- vi. classification (*vidhāna*).

[1.7.1] *ebhiś ca nirdeśādibhiḥ ṣaḍbhir anuyogadvāraiḥ sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ jīvādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ vikalpaśo vistareṇādhigamo bhavati* |

And (*ca*) by these (*idam*) six (*ṣaṣ*) doors of examination (*anuyoga-dvāra*), [i.e.], description etc. (*nirdeśa-ādi*), there is (*bhavati*) varied (*vikalpaśas*) understanding (*adhigama*) in detail (*vistareṇa*) of all (*sarva*) states (*bhāva*) [of all] entities (*tattva*), beginning with soul (*jīva-ādi*).⁵⁹⁵

[1.7.2] *tadyathā* | [1.7.3] *nirdeśaḥ* | [1.7.4] *ko jīvaḥ* | [1.7.5] *aupaśamikādibhāva-yukto dravyaṃ jīvaḥ* |

To illustrate (*tadyathā*), [from the perspective of] description (*nirdeśa*) — what (*kim*) [is] the soul (*jīva*)? The soul (*jīva*) [is] a substance (*dravya*) connected with states (*bhāva-yukta*), beginning with ‘resulting from the cessation [of *karman*]’ (*aupaśamika-ādi*) (see TA 2.1).

[1.7.6] *samyagdarśanaparīkṣāyām* | [1.7.7] *kiṃ samyagdarśanaṃ dravyam* |

[With regard to] the investigation (*parīkṣā*) [of] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*): What (*kim*) [is] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*)? [It is] a substance (*dravya*).

⁵⁹⁴ Lit. ‘bringing about’ (MW). My translation of this term is based on Tatia’s translation of this *sūtra*.

⁵⁹⁵ The word order in this sentence is somewhat strange. One would rather expect ‘*sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ*’ after ‘*jīvādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ*’ if the intended meaning is indeed ‘of all states [of all] entities, beginning with soul’.

[1.7.8] **samyagdr̥ṣṭijīvo 'rūpī noskandho nogrāmaḥ**⁵⁹⁶ ||

The soul [that possesses] right insight (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi-jīva*) [has] no extension (*arūpin*)⁵⁹⁷, [having] a quasi-combination [of atoms] (*no-skandha*), [being] a quasi-collection (*no-grāma*).⁵⁹⁸

[1.7.9] **svāmitvam** | [1.7.10] **kasya samyagdarśanam iti etad ātmasaṃyogena parasam̐yogenobhayaṣaṃyogena ceti vācyam** |

[From the perspective of] ownership (*svāmitva*): Who has (*kim*) right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) (*iti*)? [It is] to be said (*vācyā*): It [exists] (*etad*) [in terms of] connection with the self (*ātma-saṃyoga*), [in terms of] connection with the other (*para-saṃyoga*) and (*ca*) [in terms of] connection with both (*ubhaya-saṃyoga*) (*iti*).

[1.7.11] **ātmasaṃyogena jīvasya samyagdarśanam** |

[There is] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) of the soul (*jīva*) [in terms of] connection with the self (*ātma-saṃyoga*);

[1.7.12] **parasam̐yogena jīvasyājīvasya jīvayor ajīvayor jīvānām ajīvānām iti vikalpāḥ** |

[In terms of] connection with the other (*para-saṃyoga*) [there are] the varieties [of connection] (*vikalpa*):

- i. of soul (*jīva*) [and] non-soul (*ajīva*)
- ii. of two souls (*jīva*) [and] two non-souls (*ajīva*)
- iii. of [many] souls (*jīva*) [and many] non-souls (*ajīva*) (*iti*).

⁵⁹⁶ Mody separates the prefix 'no-' in this passage. I follow Kapadia's reading, which is in line with the way in which 'no-' appears in other passages of the TABh (e.g. TABh 1.7.13).

⁵⁹⁷ TA 5.4 explains that the substances (*dravya*) have no extension with the exception of the material elements (*pudgala*).

⁵⁹⁸ The intended meaning seems to be that, somehow, there is a connection between the soul and material elements (*pudgala*), even though the soul itself is a substance without extension. The peculiar prefix 'no' (< *na* + *u*, 'and not' or 'partly not') also appears in other passages of the TABh and has the meaning of 'quasi-'. For example, TABh 1.7.13 makes a distinction between 'jīva', 'ajīva', and 'nojīva', which indicates that 'nojīva' is different from 'jīva' (soul) and 'ajīva' (non-soul).

[1.7.13] **ubhayasamyogena jīvasya nojīvasya jīvayor ajīvayor jīvānām ajīvānām iti vikalpā na santi śeṣāḥ santi ||**

Soul (*jīva*) [and] quasi-soul (*nojīva*), two souls (*jīva*) [and] two non-souls (*ajīva*), [many] souls (*jīva*) [and] many non-souls (*ajīva*) — [these] (*iti*) are not (*na santi*) varieties (*vikalpa*) [in terms of] connection with both (*ubhaya-samyoga*); the remaining [combinations] (*śeṣa*) are (*santi*).⁵⁹⁹

[1.7.14] **sādhanaṃ | [1.7.15] samyagdarśanaṃ kena bhavati | [1.7.16] nisargād adhigamād vā bhavatīty uktam |**

[From the perspective of] cause (*sādhana*): By what (*kim*) does right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) come into existence (*bhavati*)? It has been said (see TA 1.3) (*ukta*) [that] it arises (*bhavati*) by nature (*nisarga*) or (*vā*) from learning (*adhigama*) (*iti*).

[1.7.17] **tatra nisargaḥ pūrvoktaḥ | [1.7.18] adhigamas tu samyagvyāyamaḥ |**

Among them (*tatra*), ‘by nature’ (*nisarga*) has been explained before (*pūrva-ukta*) (see TABh 1.3.4). And (*tu*) learning (*adhigama*) [is] right exertion (*samyag-vyāyama*).

[1.7.19] **ubhayam api tadāvaraṇīyasya karmaṇaḥ kṣayeṇopaśamena kṣayopasāmābhyām iti ||**

Both (i.e., right worldview by nature and from learning) (*ubhaya*) also (*api*) [arise] by destruction (*kṣaya*), by cessation (*upaśama*) [and] by both destruction [and] cessation (*kṣaya-upaśama*) of *karman* [that is] covering that (i.e., right worldview)⁶⁰⁰ (*tad-āvaraṇīya*) (*iti*).

[1.7.20] **adhikaraṇaṃ trividham ātmasannidhānena parasannidhānenobhaya-sannidhāneneti vācyam |**

[From the perspective of] locus (*adhikaraṇa*) — [it is] to be said (*vācya*) [that] (*iti*) [the locus of right worldview is] threefold (*trividha*):

- i. in the presence of the self (*ātma-sannidhāna*)
- ii. in the presence of the other (i.e., non-self) (*para-sannidhāna*)
- iii. in the presence of both (*ubhaya-sannidhāna*).⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁹ The function of the dual and plural forms and the intended meaning of this passage are not entirely unclear to me. Perhaps, the intended meaning is that there are only five types of connection between substances: (i.) between souls (*jīva*) and non-souls (i.e. non-living substances, such as matter) (*ajīva*), (ii.) between quasi-souls (*no-jīva*) and non-souls (*ajīva*), (iii.) between different souls (*jīva*), (iv.) between different non-souls (*ajīva*), (v.) between different quasi-souls (*nojīva*).

⁶⁰⁰ TA 6.11 lists the different types of ‘knowledge and worldview covering [*karman*]’ (*jñānadarśanāvaraṇa*).

⁶⁰¹ I.e., *samyagdarśana* has something to do with the self, has reference to things other than the self, and is related to both at the same time.

[1.7.21] *ātmasannidhānam abhyantarāsannidhānam ity arthaḥ* | [1.7.22] *parasannidhānaṃ bāhyasannidhānam ity arthaḥ* | [1.7.23] *ubhaya-sannidhānaṃ bāhyābhyantarāsannidhānam*⁶⁰² *ity arthaḥ* |

In the presence of the self (*ātma-sannidhāna*) — the meaning is (*ity artha*) ‘in the presence of the interior’ (*abhyantara-sannidhāna*). In the presence of the other (*para-sannidhāna*) — the meaning is (*ity artha*) ‘in the presence of the exterior’ (*bāhya-sannidhāna*). In the presence of both (*ubhaya-sannidhāna*) — the meaning is (*ity artha*) ‘in the presence of the exterior [and] the interior’ (*bāhya-abhyantara-sannidhāna*).⁶⁰³

[1.7.24] *kasmin samyagdarśanam* |⁶⁰⁴

Right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [is] in what (*kim*)?

[1.7.25] *ātmasannidhāne tāvat jīve samyagdarśanam jīve jñānam jīve cāritram ity etadādi* |

First of all (*tāvat*), [the varieties of] ‘in the presence of the self (*ātma-sannidhāna*)’ [are]: right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) in the soul (*jīva*), [right] knowledge (*jñāna*) in the soul (*jīva*), [right] conduct (*cāritra*) in the soul (*jīva*), and so on (*ity etad-ādi*).

[1.7.26] *bāhyasannidhāne jīve samyagdarśanam nojīve samyagdarśanam iti yathoktā vikalpāḥ* |

The varieties (*vikalpa*) [of] ‘in the presence of the other (*bāhya-sannidhāna*)’ [are]: ‘right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) in the soul (*jīva*) [and] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) in the quasi-soul (*nojīve*)’ (*iti*) as it is said (*yathā-ukta*)⁶⁰⁵.

[1.7.27] *ubhaya-sannidhāne cāpy abhūtāḥ sadbhūtās ca yathoktā bhaṅgavikalpā iti* ||

And (*ca*) also (*api*), the varieties [with respect to] analysis (*bhaṅga-vikalpa*) [of] ‘in the presence of both’ (*ubhaya-sannidhāna*) are: non-existent (*abhūta*) and (*ca*) fully existent⁶⁰⁶ (*sad-bhūta*)’ (*iti*), as it is said (*yathā-ukta*).

⁶⁰² Kapadia reads ‘*abhyantarabāhyayoḥ sannidhānam*’.

⁶⁰³ This passage comments on the previous sentence. It is somewhat strange that the composer of the *bhāṣya* provides a comment on his own text, which might indicate that this passage is a later addition.

⁶⁰⁴ Kapadia adds ‘*ātmasannidhāne parasannidhāne ubhaya-sannidhāne iti*’.

⁶⁰⁵ I have not been able to identify the reference of ‘*yathokta*’ in TABh 1.7.26 and 1.7.27.

⁶⁰⁶ The term ‘*sadbhūta*’ also appears in the commentary on TA 1.8 (TABh 1.8.1, 1.8.8), which deals with the different ‘doors of examination’ (*anuyogadvāra*).

[1.7.30] *sthitiḥ* | [1.7.29] *samyagdarśanam kiyantaṃ kālam* |

[From the perspective of] duration (*sthiti*) — right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [lasts] up to what time (*kiyat kāla*)?

[1.7.30] *samyagdr̥ṣṭir dvividhā* | [1.7.31] *sādiḥ saparyavasānā sādīr aparyavasānā ca* |

Right insight (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*):

- i. having a beginning (*sa-ādi*) [and] having an end (*sa-paryavasāna*), and (*ca*)
- ii. having a beginning (*sa-ādi*) [and] not having an end (*a-paryavasāna*).

[1.7.32] *sādisaparyavasānam eva ca samyagdarśanam* |

And (*ca*) right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [is] only (*eva*) ‘having a beginning [and] having an end (*sa-ādi-saparyavasāna*)’.

[1.7.33] *tajjaghanyenāntarmuhūrtam utkr̥ṣṭena śaṭṣaṣṭiḥ sāgaropamāni sādhikāni* |

At its lowest (*tad-jaghanya*) [the duration is] less than an hour (*antar-muhūrta*); at [its] highest (*utkr̥ṣṭa*) [it is] more than (*sādhika*) 66 (*śaṭṣaṣṭi*) ‘ocean-measured’ [periods] (*sāgara-upamā*)⁶⁰⁷.

[1.7.34] *samyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ sādīraparyavasānā* | [1.7.35] *sayogaḥ śaileśīprāptaś ca kevalī siddhaśceti* ||

[Concerning] ‘right insight’ (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*) [that] has a beginning (*sa-ādi*) [and is] not having an end (*a-paryavasāna*) — [this type of right insight is found in]:

- i. [someone] possessed with *yoga* (*sa-yoga*),⁶⁰⁸ and (*ca*)
- ii. [in someone] reaching the top [of the *guṇasthānas*]⁶⁰⁹ (*śaileśī-prāpta*)
- iii. the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*), and (*ca*)
- iv. the perfected being (*siddha*) (*iti*).

⁶⁰⁷ For a discussion of the measurement of time in the TABh, see Tatia 2011: 271-274.

⁶⁰⁸ I.e., one of the 14 stages of spiritual development (*guṇasthāna*). For an overview of the *guṇasthānas*, see, e.g., Tatia 2011: 279 – 285.

⁶⁰⁹ I.e., the 14th *guṇasthāna*.

[1.7.36] **vidhānam hetutraividhyāt kṣayādi trividhaṃ samyagdarśanam** | [1.7.37] **tadāvaraṇīyasya karmaṇo darśanamohanīyasya ca kṣayādibhyaḥ** |

[From the perspective of] classification (*vidhāna*) — right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [is] threefold (*trividha*), [resulting] from a triple cause (*hetu-traividhya*), beginning with destruction (*kṣaya-ādi*). [I.e., from the destruction etc. (*kṣaya-ādi*) of *karman* [that is] covering [worldview] (*tad-āvaraṇīya*) and (*ca*) deluding worldview (*darśana-mohanīya*).⁶¹⁰

[1.7.38] **tadyathā** | [1.7.39] **kṣayasamyagdarśanam upaśamasamyagdarśanam kṣayopaśamasamyagdarśanam iti** |

To illustrate (*tad-yathā*): ‘the right worldview [resulting from] destruction (*kṣaya-samyag-darśana*), the right worldview [resulting from] cessation (*upaśama-samyag-darśana*) [and] the right worldview [resulting from] destruction [and] cessation (*kṣaya-upaśama-samyag-darśana*) (*iti*).

[1.7.40] **atra caupaśamikakṣāyopaśamikakṣāyikāṇāṃ parataḥ parato viśuddhiprakarṣaḥ** || [1.7.41] **kiṃ cānyat** |

And (*ca*) here (*atra*), [there is a] higher and higher (*paratas paratas*) intensity [of] purity (*viśuddhiprakarṣa*) for [respectively someone] with cessation (*upaśamika*), [someone] with destruction [and] cessation (*kṣāya-upaśamika*), [and] [someone] with destruction (*kṣāyika*) [of worldview covering and deluding *karman*]. Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

satsaṃkhyākṣetrasparśanakālāntarabhāvālpabahutvaiś ca ||1.8||

1.8 And by:

- i. existence (*sat*)
- ii. numeration (*saṃkhyā*)
- iii. region (*kṣetra*)
- iv. touching (i.e., reach) (*sparśana*)
- v. time (*kāla*)
- vi. interval (*antara*)⁶¹¹
- vii. state (*bhāva*), [and]
- viii. quantity⁶¹² (*alpa-bahutva*).

⁶¹⁰ See also TABh 1.7.19.

⁶¹¹ Alternatively, ‘*kāla*’ and ‘*antara*’ can also be read together as ‘*kālāntara*’ (interval). However, TABh mentions that there are eight doors of examination (*anuyogadvāra*). It is more likely, therefore, that these two words represent two different doors of examination.

[1.8.1] *sat saṅkhyā kṣetraṃ sparśanaṃ kālaḥ antaraṃ bhāvaḥ alpabahutvam ity etaiś ca sadbhūtapadaprarūpaṇādibhir aṣṭābhir anuyogadvāraiḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ vikalpaśo vistarādhigamo bhavati |*

And (*ca*) by these (*etaḥ*) eight (*aṣṭa*) doors of examination (*anuyoga-dvāra*), [namely] ‘existence (*sat*), numeration (*saṅkhyā*), region (*kṣetra*), touching (i.e., reach) (*sparśana*), time (*kāla*), interval (*antara*), state (*bhāva*), [and] quantity⁶¹³ (*alpa-bahutva*)’ (*iti*), — [i.e. by exposing]⁶¹⁴ that which is true, a sign, a metaphorical description etc. (*sadbhūta-pada-prarūpaṇādi*) — there is (*bhavati*) full (*vistara*) varied (*vikalpaśas*) understanding (*adhigama*) of all states (*sarva-bhāva*).⁶¹⁵

[1.8.2] *katham iti cet ucyate |* [1.8.3] *sat samyagdarśanaṃ kim asti nāsti astīty ucyate |*

If one asks (*iti cet*): ‘How [are these doors of examination to be applied]?’ (*katham*), [then] it is said (*ucyate*): [From the perspective of] ‘existence’ (*sat*) — does right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) exist [or] does it not exist (*kim asti na-asti*)? [Then] it is said (*ucyate*): It exists (*asti*) (*iti*).

[1.8.4] *kvāstīti ced ucyate |* [1.8.5] *ajīveṣu tāvan nāsti |* [1.8.6] *jīveṣu tu bhājyam |*

If one asks (*iti cet*): “Where is it⁶¹⁶ (*kva-asti*)?”, it is said (*ucyate*): First of all (*tāvat*), it is not (*na-asti*) in non-souls (*ajīva*). However (*tu*), [it is] distributed⁶¹⁷ (*bhājya*) in souls (*jīva*).

[1.8.7] *tadyathā |* [1.8.8] *gatīndriyakāyayogakaṣāyavedaleśyāsamyaktvajñāna-darśanacāritrāhāropayogeṣu trayodaśasv anuyogadvāreṣu yathā sambhavaṃ sadbhūtaprarūpaṇā kartavyā ||*

As here follows (*tad-yathā*), exposing that which is true (*sad-bhūta-prarūpaṇā*) [is] to be done (*kartavya*) respectively (*yathā sambhava*) in the case of the thirteen (*trayodaśa*) doors of examination (*anuyoga-dvāra*), [i.e.]:

- i. transmigration (*gati*)
- ii. the senses (*indriya*)
- iii. body (*kāya*)

⁶¹² Tatia translates ‘relative numerical strength’.

⁶¹³ Lit. ‘being little or much’.

⁶¹⁴ Cf. ‘*sadbhūtaprarūpaṇā*’ in TABh 1.8.8.

⁶¹⁵ The word order of this sentence is somewhat strange. The syntax of this passage is similar to TABh 1.7.1.

⁶¹⁶ I.e., what is the locus of right worldview?

⁶¹⁷ Lit. ‘to be distributed’ (MW).

- iv. activity (*yoga*)
- v. passion (*kaṣāya*)
- vi. feelings (*veda*)
- vii. colouring (*leśyā*)
- viii. rightness (*samyaktva*)
- ix. knowledge (*jñāna*)
- x. worldview (*darśana*)
- xi. conduct (*cāritra*)
- xii. taking food (*āhāra*)
- xiii. [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*).⁶¹⁸

[1.8.9] *saṅkhyeyā* | [1.8.10] *kiyat samyagdarśanam kiṃ saṅkhyeyam asaṅkhyeyam anantam iti* |

[From the perspective of] numeration (*saṅkhyeyā*) — How many (*kiyat*) right worldviews (*samyag-darśana*) [are there]? Is it (*kim*) numerable (*saṅkhyeya*), innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) [or] endlessly many (*ananta*) (*iti*)?

[1.8.11] *ucyate* | [1.8.12] *asaṅkhyeyāni samyagdarśanāni* | [1.8.13] *samyagdr̥ṣṭayas tv anantāḥ* ||

It is said (*ucyate*): [The number of] right worldviews (*samyagdarśana*) [is] innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) but (*tu*) [there are] endlessly many (*ananta*) right insights (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*).

[1.8.14] *kṣetram* | [1.8.15] *samyagdarśanaṃ kiyati kṣetre* | [1.8.16] *lokasyāsaṅkhyeyabhāge* ||

[From the perspective of] place — in a region (*kṣetra*) of what extent (*kiyat*) [does] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [occur]? [It occurs] in an innumerable part (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga*) of the cosmos (*loka*).

[1.8.17] *sparśanam* | [1.8.18] *samyagdarśanena kiṃ spr̥ṣṭam* |

[From the perspective of] touching (i.e., reach) (*sparśana*): What (*kim*) [is] reached (*spr̥ṣṭa*) by right worldview (*samyag-darśana*)?⁶¹⁹

[1.8.19] *lokasyāsaṅkhyeyabhāgaḥ* | [1.8.20] *samyagdr̥ṣṭinā tu sarvaloka iti* ||

An innumerable part (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga*) of the cosmos (*loka*). However (*tu*), the whole cosmos (*sarva-loka*) [is reached] by right insight (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*) (*iti*).

⁶¹⁸ Several items in this list are also mentioned in TA 2.6, which enumerates 21 states (*bhāva*) of the soul, including four varieties of transmigration (*gati*), four passions (*kaṣāya*), and six colourings of the soul (*leśyā*).

⁶¹⁹ In other words: ‘What is the range of right worldview?’

[1.8.21] *atrāha samyagdr̥ṣṭisamyagdarśanayoḥ kaḥ prativiśeṣa iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): What (*kim*) [is] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) between right insight and right worldview (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi-samyag-darśana*) (*iti*)?

[1.8.22] *ucyate* | [1.8.23] *apāyasaddravyatayā samyagdarśanam apāya ābhinibodhikam* | [1.8.24] *tadyogāt samyagdarśanam* |

It is said (*ucyate*): Right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [arises] from existent substance [through] elimination⁶²⁰ (*apāya-sad-dravyatā*); ‘elimination’ (*apāya*) [is] perceptual apprehension (*ābhinibodhika*); right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [arises] from the activity of that (*tad-yoga*).

[1.8.25] *tat kevalino nāsti* | [1.8.26] *tasmāt na kevalī samyagdarśanī samyagdr̥ṣṭis tu*⁶²¹ ||

That (i.e., right worldview) (*tad*) is not (*na-asti*) of the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*). Therefore (*tasmāt*), the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*) is not [someone] possessing right worldview (*samyag-darśanin*); however (*tu*), [he does possess] right insight (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*).

[1.8.27] *kālaḥ* | [1.8.28] *samyagdarśanam kiyantaṃ kālam iti atrocyate* | [1.8.29] *tad ekajīvena nānājīvaiś ca parīkṣyam* |

[From the perspective of] time (*kāla*) — How long (*kiyat kāla*) [does] right worldview [last] (*samyag-darśana*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): That (*tad*) [is] to be examined (*parīkṣya*) with respect to an individual soul (*eka-jīva*) and (*ca*) with respect to all soul[s] (*nānā-jīva*).

[1.8.30] *tadyathā* | [1.8.31] *ekajīvaṃ prati jaghanyenāntarmuhūrtam utkr̥ṣṭena śatṣaṣṭīḥ sāgaropamāni sādḥikāni* | [1.8.32] *nānājīvān prati sarvāddhā* ||

Namely (*tad-yathā*), in the case of (*prati*) an individual soul (*eka-jīva*) [it is] less than an hour (*antar-muhūrta*) at its lowest (*jaghanya*), [and] more than (*sādḥika*) 66 (*śatṣaṣṭī*) *sāgaropamas* at [its] highest (*utkr̥ṣṭa*); in the case of (*prati*) all souls (*nānā-jīva*) [it exists] all the time (*sarva-addhā*).⁶²²

⁶²⁰ TA 1.15 lists ‘elimination’ (*apāya*) as the third phase of ordinary cognition (*matī*) (for a discussion of the phases of ordinary cognition, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*). The general idea of ‘elimination’ is that sensory cognition only becomes knowledge after investigating an object of sense and eliminating false ideas, such as the idea of silver in the case of mother-of-pearl. This passage in the *bhāṣya* seems to explain that right worldview is ultimately based on actual perceptions. For this reason, it is said that the *kevalin* cannot have right worldview (*samyagdarśana*) (TABh 1.8.25), since he is liberated from all bonds with the material world. Instead, the *bhāṣya* says that he has right insight (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*) (TABh 1.8.26).

⁶²¹ Kapadia adds ‘*bhavati*’, mentioned by Mody as a variant reading.

⁶²² ‘*sarvāddhā*’ = ‘*savvadhā*’ (Ardhamāgadhī), ‘gesamte Zeit’ (Mylius 2003: 621).

[1.8.33] *antaram* | [1.8.34] *samyagdarśanasya ko virahakālah* |

[From the perspective of] interval (*antara*): What (*kim*) [is] the time [in] separation (*viraha-kāla*) of right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) (i.e., the time between two instances of right worldview)?

[1.8.35] *ekaṃ jīvaṃ prati jaghanyenāntarmuhūrtam utkr̥ṣṭena upārdhapudgalaparivartaḥ* | [1.8.36] *nānājīvān prati nāsty antaram* ||

In the case of (*prati*) an individual (*eka*) soul (*jīva*) [it is] less than an hour (*antarmuhūrta*) at its lowest (*jaghanya*) [and] nearly half [the time of] the expiration of material elements⁶²³ (*upa-ardha-pudgala-parivarta*) at [its] highest (*utkr̥ṣṭa*); in the case of (*prati*) many souls (*nānā-jīva*) there is no (*na-asti*) interval (*antara*).⁶²⁴

[1.8.37] *bhāvaḥ* | [1.8.38] *samyagdarśanam aupāsamikādīnāṃ bhāvānāṃ katamo bhāva ucyate* | [1.8.39] *audayikapāriṇāmikavarjaṃ triṣu bhāveṣu bhavati* ||

[From the perspective of] state (*bhāva*): Which (*katama*) state (*bhāva*) of the states (*bhāva*) beginning with ‘resulting from the cessation [of *karman*]’ (*aupāsamikādī*)⁶²⁵ [is suitable for] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*)? It is said (*ucyate*): It exists (*bhavati*) in three (*tri*) states (*bhāva*), [i.e., all states] with the exception of [the state] resulting from the manifestation [of *karman* and the state] resulting from a natural disposition (*audayika-pāriṇāmika-varja*).

[1.8.40] *alpabahutvam* | [1.8.41] *atrāha samyagdarśanānāṃ triṣu bhāveṣu vartamānānāṃ kiṃ tulyasaṃkhyatvam*⁶²⁶ *āhosvid alpabahutvam astīti* |

[From the perspective of] quantity (*alpa-bahutva*): At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Is there (*kim*) a state of having equal numbers (*tulya-saṃkhyatva*) or is there (*āhosvit*) a state of being little and much (*alpa-bahutva*) of right worldviews (*samyag-darśana*) existing (*vartamāna*) in the three (*tri*) states (*bhāva*) (*iti*) (in other words, is there a same amount of right worldviews in the three states or not)?

⁶²³ According to Tatia, ‘just short of half the time it takes karmic particles to undergo their complete course of binding and falling away from the soul’ (Tatia 2011: 11).

⁶²⁴ In other words, there is always right worldview.

⁶²⁵ The different states of the soul, including the ‘*aupāsamika*’ state, are listed in TA 2.1.

⁶²⁶ Kapadia reads –*saṃkhyātva*–.

[1.8.42] *ucyate* | [1.8.43] *sarvastokam aupaśamikam* | [1.8.44] *tataḥ kṣāyikam asaṅkhyeyaguṇam* |

It is said (*ucyate*): [In] the state ‘resulting from the cessation [of *karman*]’ (*aupaśamika*) [it is] the smallest of all (*sarva-stoka*). From that (*tatas*), [it is multiplied by] an innumerable number (*asaṅkhyeya-guṇa*) [in] the state resulting from the annihilation [of *karman*] (*kṣāyika*).

[1.8.45] *tato 'pi kṣāyopaśamikam asaṅkhyeyaguṇam* | [1.8.46] *samyagdr̥ṣṭayas tv ananta-guṇā iti* ||

Again (*api*) from that (*tatas*), [it is multiplied by] an innumerable number (*asaṅkhyeya-guṇa*) [in] the state resulting from the annihilation and cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣāya-upaśamika*). But (*tu*) right insights (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*) [are multiplied by] an endless number (*ananta-guṇa*).

[1.8.47] *evaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ nāmādibhir nyāsaṃ kṛtvā pramāṇādibhir abhigamaḥ kāryaḥ* ||

Thus (*evaṃ*), having done (*kṛtvā*) the analysis (*nyāsa*) by name etc. (*nāma-ādi*) of all states (*sarva-bhāva*), the study (*abhigama*) by the means of cognition etc. (*pramāṇa-ādi*) [is] to be done (*kārya*).

[1.8.48] *uktaṃ samyagdarśanam* | [1.8.49] *jñānaṃ vakṣyāmaḥ* |

Right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [has been] discussed (*ukta*). [Now] we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) knowledge (*jñāna*).

***matīśrutāvadhimanahparyāyakevalāni jñānam* ||1.9||**

1.9 [The varieties of] knowledge (*jñāna*) [are]:

- i. ordinary cognition (*mati*)
- ii. testimony (*śruta*)
- iii. cosmic perception⁶²⁷ (*avadhi*)
- iv. mental perception (*manah-paryāya*),⁶²⁸ [and]
- v. absolute [knowledge]⁶²⁹ (*kevala*).

⁶²⁷ This term is often translated as ‘clairvoyance’ (e.g., Soni 2000). Literally, the term ‘*avadhi*’ means ‘limit’, which might refer to the range of this variety of knowledge, which consists of all extended substance up to the limits of the cosmos (see also TABh 1.26.6 – 1.26.16).

⁶²⁸ This term is often translated as ‘mind-reading’ (e.g., Tatia 2011). However, ‘mind-reading’ usually refers to telepathy, i.e., reading other people’s mind. As will be explained in TA 1.29, *manahparyāya* should not be interpreted as telepathy. Sanghvi explains that *manahparyāyajñāna* apprehends the shapes or modes (*paryāya*) that the mind (*manas*) assumes while thinking, which correspond with the objects (Sanghvi 1974: 46).

[1.9.1] *matijñānaṃ śrutajñānaṃ avadhijñānaṃ manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ kevalajñānam ity etat mūlavidhānataḥ pañcavidham jñānam* | [1.9.2] *prabhedās tv asya purastād vakṣyante* ||

Knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*), knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*), knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*), knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) [and] absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) (*iti*) — thus (*etat*), knowledge (*jñāna*) [is] fivefold (*pañcavidha*) according to the basic classification (*mūla-vidhāna*). And (*tu*) the varieties (*prabheda*) of this (*idam*) will be explained (*vakṣyante*) later on (*purastāt*).

***tat pramāṇe* ||1.10||**

1.10 These [five varieties of knowledge are] the two means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).⁶³⁰

[1.10.1] *tad etat pañcavidham api jñānaṃ dve pramāṇe bhavataḥ parokṣaṃ pratyakṣaṃ ca* ||

That very (*tad etat*) full (*api*)⁶³¹ fivefold (*pañcavidha*) knowledge (*jñāna*) [is] the two (*dvi*) means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), being (*bhavataḥ*) indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) and (*ca*) direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*).

***ādye parokṣam* ||1.11||**

1.11 The first two [varieties of knowledge are forms of] indirect cognition (*parokṣa*).⁶³²

⁶²⁹ Often translated as ‘omniscience’ (e.g., Soni 2000). A person who acquires absolute knowledge (i.e., a *kevalin*) will attain liberation at the end of their life (Wiley 2004: 123).

⁶³⁰ For a discussion of this *sūtra*, see § 3.2 *Classification of the means of cognition*.

⁶³¹ ‘Putting *api* after a cardinal expresses the completeness of the number’ (Speijer 1886, § 298).

⁶³² For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2 *Direct and indirect types of knowledge*.

[1.11.1] *ādau bhavam ādyam* | [1.11.2] *ādye sūtrakramaprāmāṇyāt prathamadvitīye śāsti* | [1.11.3] *tad evam ādye matijñānaśrutajñāne parokṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhavataḥ* |

[That] which is (*bhava*) at the beginning (*ādi*), that is [the meaning of] ‘first’ (*ādya*). ‘The first [two]’ (*ādya*, du.) — [The author] teaches⁶³³ (i.e., he refers to) (*śāsti*) the first and the second [variety of knowledge] (*prathama-dvitīya*), following the authoritativeness of the order in the *sūtra* (see TA 1.9) (*sūtra-krama-prāmāṇya*); according to that (*tad evam*), the first two (*ādya*), [i.e.], knowledge from ordinary cognition and knowledge from testimony (*mati-jñāna-śruta-jñāna*), are (*bhavataḥ*) indirect (*parokṣa*) means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).

[1.11.4] *kutaḥ* | [1.11.5] *nimittāpekṣatvāt* | [1.11.6] *apāyasaddravyatayā matijñānam* | [1.11.7] *tad indriyānindriyanimittam iti vakṣyate* ||

Why (*kutaḥ*)? Due to the quality of being dependent on a cause (*nimitta-apekṣatva*); ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*) [arises] from existent substance [through] elimination (*apāya-sad-dravyatā*)⁶³⁴. It will be said (see TA 1.14) (*vakṣyate*) [that] ‘this [ordinary cognition] (*tad*) [is] caused by the organs of sense [and] the mind (*indriya-anindriya-nimitta*).’

[1.11.8] *tatpūrvakatvāt paropadeśajatvāc ca śrutajñānam* ||

Knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) [is an indirect means of cognition] due to the quality of being preceded by that (i.e., since knowledge from testimony is preceded by ordinary cognition)⁶³⁵ (*tat-pūrvakatva*), and (*ca*) due to the quality of being caused by the instruction of others (*para-upadeśajatva*).

***pratyakṣam anyat* ||1.12||**

1.12 The other [varieties of knowledge] (*anya*) [are forms of] direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*).

⁶³³ The verb form ‘*śāsti*’ suggests that the author of the *bhāṣya* did not compose the *sūtra*. Siddhasenagaṇi comments on this issue and acknowledges that this is a problem. Nevertheless, he maintains that both texts are composed by the same person.

⁶³⁴ The same expression occurs in TABh 1.8.23 and TABh 1.31.16.

⁶³⁵ See the definition of testimony in TA 1.20.

[1.12.1] **matísrutābhyāṃ yad anyat trividhaṃ jñānaṃ tat pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhavati |**

The threefold (*trividha*) knowledge (*jñāna*) that [is] different (*yad anyat*) from ordinary cognition and testimony (*matīśruta*),⁶³⁶ that (*tad*) is (*bhavati*) direct (*pratyakṣa*) cognition (*pramāṇa*).

[1.12.2] **kutaḥ |** [1.12.3] **atīndriyatvāt |**

Why (*kutaḥ*)? Due to the quality of being beyond [the cognisance] of the senses (*atīndriyatva*).

[1.12.4] **pramīyante 'rthās tair iti pramāṇāni ||**

Since (*iti*) the objects (*artha*) are cognised (*pramīyante*) through them (*tad*), [they are called] 'means of cognition' (*pramāṇa*).

[1.12.5] **atrāha |** [1.12.6] **iha avadhāritaṃ dve eva pramāṇe pratyakṣaparokṣe iti |**

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Here (*iha*) [it is] determined (*avadhārita*) [that] the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) [are] indeed (*eva*) two (*dvi*), [i.e.], direct and indirect cognition (*pratyakṣa-parokṣa*) (*iti*).

[1.12.7] **anumānopamānāgamārthāpattisambhavābhāvān api pramāṇāni iti kecid manyante |** [1.12.8] **tat katham etad iti |**

Some [people] (*kecid*) are of the opinion (*manyante*) [that] (*iti*) inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation, equivalence, [and] negation (*anumāna-upamāna-āgama-arthāpatti-sambhava-abhāva*) [are] also (*api*) means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).⁶³⁷ How (*katham*), then (*tad*), [can] this (*etad*) [be explained] (*iti*)?

[1.12.9] **atrocyate |** [1.12.10] **sarvāṇy etāni matīśrutayor antarbhūtāni, indriyārthasannikarṣanimittatvāt |** [1.12.11] **kiṃ cānyat |**

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): All (*sarva*) these (*etad*) are within (*antarbhūta*) ordinary cognition and testimony (*matīśruta*), due to the quality of being caused by the connection of the object with the sense organ (*indriya-artha-sannikarṣa-nimittatva*)⁶³⁸. Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

⁶³⁶ I.e., *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala* (see TA 1.9).

⁶³⁷ This is a peculiar list, which does not correspond to a known list of *pramāṇas* that were accepted by a specific school. For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2 *Other means of cognition*.

⁶³⁸ The term '*sannikarṣa*' refers to 'the connection of an *indriya* with its *viśaya* or object' (MW). This term plays an important role in the epistemology of the Naiyāyikas. For a discussion of this term and the relationship between the theory in the TA and the *Nyāyasūtra*, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

[1.12.12] *apramāṇāny eva vā* | [1.12.13] *kutaḥ* | [1.12.14] *mithyādarśana-parigrahāt viparītopadeśāc ca* |

Or, (*vā*) [they are] indeed (*eva*) not means of cognition (*apramāṇa*). Why (*kutaḥ*)? [Since this results] from the adoption of wrong view (*mithyā-darśana-parigraha*) and (*ca*) from false teaching (*viparīta-upadeśa*).

[1.12.15] *mithyādṛṣṭer hi matiśrutāvadhayo niyatam ajñānam eveti vakṣyate* | Since (*hi*), it will be said (TA 1.32) (*vakṣyate*) [that] ordinary cognition, testimony [and] cosmic perception (*mati-śruta-avadhi*) [are] certainly (*niyata*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*) for someone who has wrong view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*).

[1.12.16] *nayavādāntareṇa tu yathā matiśrutavikalpajāni bhavanti tathā parastād vakṣyāmaḥ* ||

And (*tu*), in accordance with the doctrine of perspectives (*naya-vāda-antareṇa*), we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) later on (*parastāt*) [that] they are (*bhavanti*) born from the varieties of ordinary cognition and testimony (*mati-śruta-vikalpaja*).

[1.12.17] *atrāha* | [1.12.18] *uktaṃ bhavatā matyādīni jñānāni uddiśya tāni vidhānato lakṣaṇataś ca purastād vistareṇa vakṣyāma iti* | [1.12.19] *tad ucyatām iti* | [1.12.20] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (*bhavat*) [that] ‘after having taught (*uddiśya*) the knowledges (*jñāna*), beginning with ordinary cognition (*mati-ādi*), we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) them (*tad*) below (*purastāt*) in detail (*vistareṇa*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*) and (*ca*) classification (*vidhāna*)’ (see TABh 1.9.2) (*iti*). That (*tad*) should [now] be taught (*ucyatām*) (*iti*). At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

***matih smṛtiḥ samjñā cintābhiniḥ bodha ity anarthāntaram* ||1.13||**

1.13 ‘Ordinary cognition’ (*matī*), ‘remembrance’ (*smṛtī*), ‘recognition’ (*samjñā*), ‘thought’ (*cintā*) [and] ‘apprehension’⁶³⁹ (*abhinibodha*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anārthantara*).

⁶³⁹ The primary meaning of the unusual word ‘*abhinibodha*’ is not given in the standard dictionaries. The *bhāṣya* on this *sūtra* uses a slightly different form of the word, i.e. ‘*abhinibodhikajñāna*’. It is evident that the word is used as a synonym of ‘*matī*’ (ordinary cognition). It is usually translated as ‘apprehension’ (see, e.g., Balcerowicz 2016d: 998), which is close to the primary meaning of ‘*ni-√budh* (to learn, to attend)’ + ‘*abhi*’ (towards).

[1.13.1] **matijñānaṃ smṛtijñānaṃ saṃjñājñānaṃ cintājñānaṃ
abhinibodhikajñānam ity anarthāntaram ||**

‘Knowledge [from] ordinary cognition’ (*mati-jñāna*), ‘knowledge [from] remembrance’ (*smṛti-jñāna*), ‘knowledge [from] recognition’ (*saṃjñā-jñāna*), ‘knowledge [from] thought’ (*cintā-jñāna*), [and] ‘knowledge [from] apprehension’ (*abhinibodhika-jñāna*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

tad indriyānindriyanimittam ||1.14||

1.14 This [ordinary cognition] (*tad*) [is] caused by the organs of sense [and] the mind (*indriya-anindriya-nimitta*).

[1.14.1] **tad etat matijñānaṃ dvididhaṃ bhavati |** [1.14.2] **indriyanimittam
anindriyanimittam ca |**

That very (*tad etat*) ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*) arises (*bhavati*) in a twofold way (*dvididha*): caused by the organs of sense (*indriya-nimitta*) and (*ca*) caused by the mind (*anindriya-nimitta*).

[1.14.3] **tatrendriyanimittam sparśanādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ sparśādiṣu pañcasv
eva svaviṣayeṣu |** [1.14.4] **anindriyanimittam manovṛttir oghajñānaṃ ca |**

Among them (*tatra*), ‘caused by the organs of sense’ (*indriya-nimitta*) [refers to] the respective ranges (*svaviṣaya*), [which are] indeed (*eva*) the five [objects of sense] (*pañca*) beginning with the quality of tangibility (*sparśa-ādi*), which belong to the five [senses] (*pañca*), beginning with the organ of touch (*sparśana-ādi*). ‘Caused by the mind’ (*anindriya-nimitta*) [is] the activity of the mind (*manas-vṛtti*) and (*ca*) *oghajñāna*⁶⁴⁰.

⁶⁴⁰ Siddhasenagaṇi uses the word ‘*sāmānya*’ (general, common) to describe this type of knowledge, and he compares *oghajñāna* with the knowledge of a creeper. This is in line with Tatia’s explanation of ‘*ogha*’ as ‘instinct’ (Tatia 1951: 54). Perhaps, it could be translated as ‘basic knowledge’.

avagrahehāpāyadhāraṇāḥ ||1.15||

1.15 [The phases of ordinary cognition are]:

- i. sense perception (*avagraha*)
- ii. endeavour to obtain (*ihā*)
- iii. elimination (*apāya*),⁶⁴¹ [and]
- iv. holding (i.e., keeping in remembrance) (*dhāraṇā*).⁶⁴²

[1.15.1] ***tad etat matijñānam ubhayanimitam apy ekaśaḥ caturvidhaṃ bhavati*** | [1.15.2] ***tadyathā*** | [1.15.3] ***avagraha ihā apāyo dhāraṇā ceti*** |

That very (*tad etad*) ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*), even though (*api*) [it is] caused by both (i.e., by the senses and the mind)⁶⁴³ (*ubhaya-nimitta*), arises (*bhavati*) in every case⁶⁴⁴ (*ekaśas*) in a fourfold way (*caturvidha*). I.e. (*tad-yathā*), [it arises through] sense perception (*avagraha*), endeavour to obtain (*ihā*), elimination (*apāya*), and (*ca*) holding (*dhāraṇā*) (*iti*).

[1.15.4] ***tatrāvyaktaṃ yathāsvam indriyair viśayāṇām ālocanāvadhāraṇam avagrahaḥ*** |

Among them (*tatra*), sense perception (*avagraha*) [is] an indistinct (*avyakta*) perceptual ascertainment (*ālocana-avadhāraṇa*) of the ranges (*viśaya*) by the senses (*indriya*), each on their own account (*yathāsvam*).

[1.15.5] ***avagraho grahaṇam ālocanam avadhāraṇam ity anarthāntaram*** ||

‘Sense perception’ (*avagraha*), ‘seizing’ (*grahaṇa*), ‘perceiving’ (*ālocana*), [and] ‘ascertainment’ (*avadhāraṇa*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

⁶⁴¹ Sanghvi reads ‘*avāya*’. He remarks that both readings are possible according to Akalaṅka (1974: 4, n. 4). Balcerowicz notes that ‘*apāya*’ is used in the Śvetāmbara tradition and ‘*avāya*’ in the Digambara tradition (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001).

⁶⁴² My translations of the technical terms in this *sūtra* are based on the explanation in the *bhāṣya* (TABh 1.15.1 – 1.15.11).

⁶⁴³ See TABh 1.14.1.

⁶⁴⁴ I.e., in the case of the five varieties of ordinary cognition that are caused by the senses and the two varieties that are caused by the mind (see TABh 1.14.2 – 1.14.4).

[1.15.6] **avagr̥hīte viṣayārthaikadeśāc cheṣānugamaṇaṃ niścayaviśeṣajijñāsā⁶⁴⁵ ihā |**

Seeking the remainder (*śeṣa-anugamana*) on the basis of a part of the objects [within one's] range (*viṣaya-artha-ekadeśa*) in the case of that which is perceived (*avagr̥hīta*), [or] the desire to know the particularities [by] inquiry (*niścaya-viśeṣa-jijñāsā*), [that is] the 'endeavour to obtain' (*ihā*).

[1.15.7] **ihā ūhā tarkaḥ parīkṣā vicāraṇā jijñāsety anarthāntaram ||**

'Endeavour to obtain' (*ihā*), 'comprehending' (*ūhā*), 'reasoning' (*tarka*), 'investigation' (*parīkṣā*), 'consideration' (*vicāraṇā*), [and] 'desire to know' (*jijñāsā*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

[1.15.8] **avagr̥hīte viṣaye samyagasamyag iti guṇadoṣavicāraṇā adhyavasāyāpanodo 'pāyaḥ |**

[Making] a distinction [between] merits and defects (*guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā*) [by telling] (*iti*) 'right' from 'wrong' (*samyag-asamyāñc*) (*iti*) with respect to the perceived (*avagr̥hīta*) range⁶⁴⁶ (*viṣaya*) — [that is] elimination (*apāya*), [which] removes mere opinion⁶⁴⁷ (*adhyavasāya-apanoda*).

[1.15.9] **apāyo 'pagamaḥ apanodaḥ apavyādhaḥ apetaṃ apagataṃ apavidhāṃ apanuttaṃ ity anarthāntaram ||**

'Elimination' (*apāya*), 'going away' (*apagama*), 'removing' (*apanoda*), 'driving away' (*apavyādha*), 'gone' (*apeta*), 'departed' (*apagata*), 'rejected' (*apavidhā*), 'removed' (*apanutta*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntaram*).⁶⁴⁸

[1.15.10] **dhāraṇā pratipattir yathāsvaṃ matyavasthānam avadhāraṇaṃ ca |**

'Holding' (*dhāraṇā*) [means] 'ascertainment' (*pratipatti*), 'properly'⁶⁴⁹ (*yathāsvam*) holding [in] the mind' (*maty-avasthāna*), and (*ca*) 'retaining' (*avadhāraṇa*).

⁶⁴⁵ Kapadia reads '*niścayaviśeṣajijñāsā ceṣṭā ihā*'. The word '*ceṣṭā*' can be translated as 'activity', or 'endeavour' (MW). Alternatively, it can be analysed as '*ca + iṣṭa* (desired)'. Siddhasenagaṇi interprets '*ceṣṭā*' as 'activity'.

⁶⁴⁶ See also TABh 1.15.6.

⁶⁴⁷ 'blosse Meinung' (*adhyavasāya*) (Böhtlingk 1855).

⁶⁴⁸ It is somewhat strange that this list of synonyms contains active and passive word forms (*apāya*, *apagama*, *apanoda*, and *apavyādha* vs. *apeta*, *apagata*, *apavidhā*, and *apanutta*).

⁶⁴⁹ '*yathāsvam*' can also mean 'each on their own account' (MW). Siddhasenagaṇi explains '*yathāsvam*' as '*yathāviṣayam*' (in accordance with [one's] sphere of reference).

[1.15.11] **dhāraṇā pratipattir avadhāraṇāvasthānaṃ niścayo 'vagamaḥ avabodha ity anarthāntaram** ||

'Holding' (*dhāraṇā*), 'assurance' (*pratipatti*), 'the condition of retaining' (*avadhāraṇa-avasthāna*), 'inquiry' (*niścaya*), 'understanding' (*avagama*), [and] 'knowledge' (*avabodha*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

bahubahuvidhakṣiprānīśritānukta⁶⁵⁰dhruvāṇāṃ setarāṇām ||1.16||

1.16 [The objects of ordinary cognition appear as] much (*bahu*), of many sorts (*bahuvidha*), swift (*kṣipra*), independent (*anīśrita*), non-verbal⁶⁵¹ (*anukta*) [and] constant (*dhruva*), together with [their] opposites (*setara*).

[1.16.1] **avagrahādayaś catvāro matijñānavibhāgā eṣāṃ bahvādīnām arthānām setarāṇām bhavanty ekaśaḥ** |

The four (*catūr*) varieties of ordinary cognition (*matijñāna-vibhāga*) — [i.e.], sense perception etc.⁶⁵² (*avagraha-ādi*) — exist (*bhavanti*) for these (*idam*) objects (*artha*), beginning with much (*bahv-ādi*), together with [their] opposites (*sa-itara*), in every case (*ekaśas*).⁶⁵³

[1.16.2] **setarāṇām iti** | [1.16.3] **sapratipakṣāṇām ity arthaḥ** |

Together with [their] opposites (*setara*) (*iti*) — the meaning is (*iti artha*) 'with that which is opposite' (*sa-pratipakṣa*).

[1.16.4] **bahv avagrḥṇāti alpam avagrḥṇāti** |

One perceives (*avagrḥṇāti*) much⁶⁵⁴ (*bahu*) [and] one perceives little (*alpa*).

[1.16.5] **bahuvidham avagrḥṇāti ekavidham avagrḥṇāti** |

One perceives [something] of many sorts (*bahuvidha*) [and] one perceives [something] of one sort (*ekavidha*).

[1.16.6] **kṣipram avagrḥṇāti cireṇāvagrḥṇāti** |

One perceives [something] swift (*kṣipra*) [and] one perceives [something] for a long time (*cireṇa*).

⁶⁵⁰ Kapadia reads '*nīśritāsandigdhadhruvāṇāṃ*' ('independent, **unambiguous**, constant'). The reading of Mody corresponds to the reading in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

⁶⁵¹ Literally 'unspoken'.

⁶⁵² See TA 1.15.

⁶⁵³ In other words, there is *avagraha*, *ihā* etc. of the objects that are much, of many sorts etc.

⁶⁵⁴ The word *bahu* seems to have an adverbial function. The same goes for *kṣipra* etc. in the next sentences.

[1.16.7] ***aniśritam avagr̥hṇāti niśritam avagr̥hṇāti |***

One perceives [something] independent (*aniśrita*) [and] one perceives [something] dependent (*niśrita*).

[1.16.8]⁶⁵⁵ ***anuktam avagr̥hṇāti uktam avagr̥hṇāti |***

One perceives [something] non-verbal (*anukta*) [and] one perceives [something that is] spoken (*ukta*).

[1.16.9] ***dhruvam avagr̥hṇāti adhr̥vam avagr̥hṇāti |***

One perceives [something] constant (*dhruva*) [and] one perceives [something] impermanent (*adhr̥va*).

[1.16.10] ***ity evam ihādīnām api vidyāt ||***

In the same way (*ity evam*), one should also know (*api vidyāt*) [these varieties] of ‘the endeavour to obtain’ etc. (see TA 1.15) (*ihā-ādi*).

arthasya ||1.17||

1.17 [There is ordinary cognition]⁶⁵⁶ of the sense object (*artha*).

[1.17.1] ***avagrahādayo matijñānavikalpā arthasya bhavanti ||***

The varieties of ordinary cognition (*matijñāna-vikalpa*), beginning with sense perception (*avagraha-ādi*), are (*bhavanti*) of a sense object (*artha*).⁶⁵⁷

vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ ||1.18||

1.18 [There is] sense perception (*avagraha*) of the *vyañjana*⁶⁵⁸.

[1.18.1] ***vyañjanasyāvagraha eva bhavati nehādayaḥ |***

There is (*bhavati*) indeed (*eva*) sense perception (*avagraha*) of the *vyañjana*, not ‘the endeavour to obtain’ etc. (*na ihā-ādi*).

⁶⁵⁵ Omitted by Kapadia. See Mody 1903: 28, footnote 3.

⁶⁵⁶ It is somewhat strange that ‘*artha*’ is given in singular since the qualifications of the sense object in the previous *sūtra* are given in plural (TA 1.16). It is also possible that TA 1.17 should be read together with TA 1.18. For a discussion of this possibility, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

⁶⁵⁷ In other words, the sense objects are the object of ordinary cognition.

⁶⁵⁸ The peculiar term ‘*vyañjana*’ seems to refer to the physical contact of a sense organ with its object. Tatia translates the term ‘*vyañjanāvagraha*’ as ‘contact-awareness’ (Tatia 1951:35). For a discussion of this term, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

[1.18.2] *evam dvividho 'vagraho vyañjanasyārthasya ca* | [1.18.3] *ihādayas tv arthasyaiva* ||

Thus (*evam*), sense perception (*avagraha*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], of the *vyañjana* and (*ca*) of the sense object (*artha*). But (*tu*) 'the endeavour to obtain' etc. (*ihā-ādi*) [is] only (*eva*) of the sense object (*artha*).

***na cakṣuranindriyābhyām* ||1.19||**

1.19 [There is] no [sense perception of the *vyañjana*]⁶⁵⁹ by the eyes (*cakṣus*) or the mind (*anindriya*).

[1.19.1] *cakṣuṣā noindriyeṇa ca vyañjanāvagraho na bhavati* | [1.19.2] *caturbhir indriyaiḥ śeśair bhavati* |

There is no (*na bhavati*) sense perception (*avagraha*) of the *vyañjana* by the eye (*cakṣus*) and (*ca*) the mind (*noindriya*)⁶⁶⁰; [however] there is (*bhavati*) [sense perception of the *vyañjana*] by the four (*catur*) other (*śeśa*) senses (*indriya*).⁶⁶¹

[1.19.3] *evam etat matijñānaṃ dvividhaṃ caturvidhaṃ aṣṭāviṃśatavidhaṃ aṣṭaṣaṣṭyuttaraśatavidhaṃ śaṭtriṃśattriśatavidhaṃ ca bhavati* ||

So (*evam*), this (*etad*) ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*) is (*bhavati*) twofold (*dvividha*), fourfold (*caturvidha*), 28-fold (*aṣṭāviṃśatavidha*), 168-fold (*aṣṭaṣaṣṭyuttaraśatavidha*) and (*ca*) 336-fold (*śaṭtriṃśattriśatavidha*).⁶⁶²

***śrutam matipūrvam dvyanekadvādaśabhedam* ||1.20||**

1.20 Testimony (*śruta*) is preceded by ordinary cognition (*matij*). [It consists of] two [varieties], the many [outer limbs] and the twelve [inner limbs].⁶⁶³

⁶⁵⁹ See TA 1.18.

⁶⁶⁰ It is remarkable that the *bhāṣya* uses the word '*noindriya*' instead of '*anindriya*', which is used in the *sūtra*. For a discussion of the peculiar word formation '*noindriya*', see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

⁶⁶¹ An overview of this theory is given in § 3.2, table viii. *Types of ordinary cognition that have vyañjanāvagraha* and ix. *Objects of the different phases of ordinary cognition*.

⁶⁶² See § 3.2, table x. (*Varieties of ordinary cognition*) for a clarification of these numbers.

⁶⁶³ The 'inner limbs' (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*) and 'outer limbs' (*aṅgabāhya*) refer to specific textual categories of the Jaina scriptures (see TABh 1.20.3). They are specified in TABh 1.20.7 and 1.20.10.

[1.20.1] *śrutajñānaṃ matijñānapūrvakaṃ bhavati |*

Knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) is (*bhavati*) preceded by knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna-pūrvaka*).

[1.20.2] *śrutam āptavacanaṃ āgamaḥ upadeśa aitihiyam āmnāyaḥ pravacanaṃ jīnavacanaṃ ity anarthāntaram ||*

‘Testimony’ (*śruta*), ‘the words of the *āpta*’ (*āpta-vacana*), ‘scriptural tradition’ (*āgama*), ‘teaching’ (*upadeśa*), ‘tradition’ (*aitihya*), ‘sacred tradition’ (*āmnāya*), ‘sacred writings’ (*pravacana*), [and] ‘the words of the *jina*’ (*jina-vacana*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

[1.20.3] *tad dvividham aṅgabāhyam aṅgapraviṣṭam ca |* [1.20.4] *tat punar anekavidhaṃ dvādaśavidhaṃ ca yathā saṅkhyam |*

That (i.e., testimony) (*tad*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], the [corpus of] outer limbs (*aṅga-bāhya*)⁶⁶⁴ and (*ca*) the [corpus of] inner limbs (*aṅga-praviṣṭa*). That (*tad*) [is] again (*punar*) manifold (*anekavidha*) and (*ca*) twelvefold (*dvādaśavidha*), according to (*yathā*) numbering (*saṅkhyā*).⁶⁶⁵

[1.20.5] *aṅgabāhyam anekavidham |* [1.20.6] *tadyathā |* [1.20.7] *sāmāyikaṃ caturviṃśatistavo vandanaṃ prati-kramaṇaṃ kāyavyutsargaḥ pratyākhyānaṃ daśavaikālikaṃ uttarādhyāyāḥ daśāḥ kalpavyavahārau niśītham ṛṣibhāṣitāny evam ādi ||*

The [corpus of] outer limbs (*aṅga-bāhya*) [is] manifold (*anekavidha*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- | | |
|------------------------------|--|
| i. <i>Sāmāyika</i> | vii. <i>Daśavaikālika</i> |
| ii. <i>Caturviṃśatistava</i> | viii. <i>Uttarādhyāyāḥ</i> |
| iii. <i>Vandana</i> | ix. <i>Daśāḥ</i> |
| iv. <i>Pratikramaṇa</i> | x. <i>Kalpavyavahārau</i> |
| v. <i>Kāyavyutsarga</i> | xi. <i>Niśītha</i> |
| vi. <i>Pratyākhyāna</i> | xii. <i>Ṛṣibhāṣitāni, etc. (evam ādi)</i> . ⁶⁶⁶ |

⁶⁶⁴ Alternatively, ‘that which is outside the limbs’, i.e., ‘non-canonical’.

⁶⁶⁵ For an overview of these texts, see § 3.2, table xi. *Testimonial knowledge: The Jaina scriptures*.

⁶⁶⁶ For a discussion of this list, see § 3.2 *Testimony*.

[1.20.8] *aṅgapraviṣṭaṃ dvādaśavidham* | [1.20.9] *tadyathā* | [1.20.10] *ācāraḥ sūtrakṛtaṃ sthānaṃ samavāya vyākhyāprajñaptiḥ jñātadharmikathā upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ antakṛddaśāḥ anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ praśnavyākaraṇaṃ vipākasūtraṃ drṣṭipāta iti* ||

The [corpus of] inner limbs (*aṅga-praviṣṭa*) [is] twelvefold (*dvādaśavidha*).

Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| i. <i>Ācāra</i> | vii. <i>Upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ</i> |
| ii. <i>Sūtrakṛta</i> | viii. <i>Antakṛddaśāḥ</i> |
| iii. <i>Sthāna</i> | ix. <i>Anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ</i> |
| iv. <i>Samavāya</i> | x. <i>Praśnavyākaraṇa</i> |
| v. <i>Vyākhyāprajñapti</i> | xi. <i>Vipākasūtra</i> |
| vi. <i>Jñātadharmakathāḥ</i> | xii. <i>Drṣṭipāta</i> . |

[1.20.11] *atrāha* | [1.20.12] *matijñānaśrutajñānayoḥ kaḥ prativiśeṣa iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): What (*kim*) [is] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) between knowledge from ordinary cognition and knowledge from testimony (*matijñāna-śruta-jñāna*) (*iti*)?

[1.20.13] *atrocyate* | [1.20.14] *utpannāvinaṣṭārthagrāhakaṃ sāmpratākāla-viṣayaṃ matijñānam* | [1.20.15] *śrutajñānaṃ tu trikālaviṣayam utpannāvinaṣṭānutpannārthagrāhakaṃ* ||

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): That which perceives objects [that have been] produced [and are] not [yet] destroyed (*utpanna-avinaṣṭa-artha-grāhaka*), having the present time as its range (*sāmprata-kāla-viṣaya*), [that is] knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*); but (*tu*) knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*) has the three times as its range (*trikāla-viṣaya*) [and] perceives objects [that have been] produced, [that are] destroyed [and are] not [yet] produced (i.e., objects in the past, present and future) (*utpanna-vinaṣṭa-anutpanna-artha-grāhaka*).

[1.20.16] *atrāha* | [1.20.17] *grhṇīmo matīśrutayor nānātvam* | [1.20.18] *atha śrutajñānasya dvividham anekadvādaśavidham iti kiṃ kṛtaḥ prativiśeṣa iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): We understand (*grhṇīmaḥ*) the difference (*nānātva*) between ordinary cognition and testimony (*matī-śruta*). Now (*atha*), why (*kim*) [has one] made (*kṛta*) a difference (*prativīśeṣa*) [between] the twofold (*dvividha*), manifold, [and] twelvefold (*aneka-dvādaśavidha*)⁶⁶⁷ [varieties] of knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) (*iti*)?

⁶⁶⁷ See TABh 1.20.3 – 1.20.4.

[1.20.19] *atrocyate* | [1.20.20] *vaktrviśeṣād dvaividhyam* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): The twofold nature (*dvaividhya*) [results] from the difference of speaker (*vaktr-viśeṣa*).

[1.20.21] *yad bhagavadbhiḥ sarvajñaiḥ sarvadarśibhiḥ paramarṣibhir arhadbhis tatsvābhāvvyāt paramaśubhasya ca pravacanapratīṣṭhāpana-phalasya tīrthakaranāmakarmaṇo 'nubhāvād uktaṃ bhagavacchiṣyair atīśayavadbhir uttamātiśayavāgbuddhisampannair gaṇadharair dṛbdhaṃ tad aṅgapraviṣṭam* |

That which (*yad*) has been spoken (*ukta*) by the *jinas* (*bhagavat*) —

[who are] the all-knowing (*sarva-jña*) [and] all-seeing (*sarva-darśin*) most excellent sages (*parama-rṣi*), the *arhats*,⁶⁶⁸ on account of the experience (*anubhāva*) of body-determining *karman* [related to] the *tīrthakara* (*tīrthakara-nāma-karman*)⁶⁶⁹ — which is very positive (*parama-śubha*) [and] the result of which is the establishing of the doctrine (*pravacana-pratīṣṭhāpana-phala*) — [and] on account of their own nature (*tatsvābhāvya*) —

[which has been] composed (*dṛbdha*) by the pupils of the *jinas* (*bhagavat-śiṣya*) —

[who are] the *gaṇadharas*, having supernatural qualities (*atīśayat*),⁶⁷⁰ provided with the most eminent speech and mind (*uttama-atīśaya-vāgbuddhi-sampanna*) —

that (*tad*) [is the corpus] of inner limbs (*aṅga-praviṣṭa*).

[1.20.22] *gaṇadharānantaryādibhis tv atyantaviśuddhāgamaiḥ parama-prakṛṣṭavāṇmatibuddhiśaktibhir ācāryaiḥ kālasaṃhananāyurdoṣād alpa-śaktinām śiṣyāṇām anugrahāya yat proktaṃ tad aṅgabāhyam iti ||*

And (*tu*) that which (*yad*) [is] taught (*prokta*) by the succession of *gaṇadharas* etc. (*gaṇadhara-ānantarya-ādī*)⁶⁷¹ —

[who are] the teachers (*ācārya*), [whose] verbal testimonies [are] excessively pure (*atyanta-viśuddha-āgama*), [whose] powers of speech, ordinary cognition and mind [are] most superior (*parama-prakṛṣṭa-vāc-mati-buddhi-śakti*) —

⁶⁶⁸ The terms 'paramarṣi' and 'arhat' refer to the *jina*.

⁶⁶⁹ This type of *karman* is listed in TA 8.12.

⁶⁷⁰ The word 'atīśaya' refers to 'one of the superhuman qualities attributed to Jaina Arhats' (MW).

⁶⁷¹ Siddhasenagaṇi mentions Jambū as an example. He was the pupil of the *gaṇadhara* Sudharman (see, e.g., Wiley 2004: 104).

for the benefit (*anugraha*) of the pupils (*śiṣya*) —

[whose] power is little (*alpaśakti*) through defect brought about by time,
physical structure [and] vital power (*kāla-saṃhanana-āyur-doṣa*) —

that (*tad*) [is the corpus of] outer limbs (*aṅgabāhya*) (*iti*).

[1.20.23] ***sarvajñapraṇītatvād ānantiyāc ca jñeyasya śrutajñānaṃ matijñānān mahāviṣayam |***

Knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*), [due to] the quality of being conveyed by the all-knowing [beings] (*sarvajña-praṇītatva*) and (*ca*) [due to] the infinity (*ānantiya*) of [that what is] to be known (*jñeya*), [has] a greater range (*mahā-viṣaya*) [than] knowledge by ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*).

[1.20.24] ***tasya mahāviṣayatvāt tāṃs tān arthān adhikṛtya prakaraṇasamāptyapekṣam aṅgopāṅganānātvam |***

And (*ca*) [there is] a variety of ‘limbs’ and ‘additional limbs’⁶⁷² (*aṅga-upāṅganānātvam*) — whose reference is the complete acquisition of the subjects (*prakaraṇa-samāpty-apekṣā*), referring to (*adhikṛtya*) the various (*tad tad*) objects (*artha*) — due to the quality of having a great range (*mahāviṣayatva*) of this (i.e., of testimony) (*tad*).

[1.20.25] ***kiṃ cānyat |*** [1.20.26] ***sukhagrahaṇavijñānāpohaprayogārthaṃ ca |***

Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*), [there is] also (*ca*) [a variety of scriptures] for the sake of (*artha*) easy understanding (*sukha-grahaṇa*), [easy]⁶⁷³ comprehending (*vijñāna*), [easy] reasoning (*apoha*), and [easy] operation of consciousness (*prayoga*).⁶⁷⁴

[1.20.27] ***anyathā hy anibaddham aṅgopāṅgaśaḥ samudraprataraṇavad-duradhyavasānaṃ syāt |***

For (*hi*), otherwise (*anyathā*), it would be (*syāt*) a difficult task (*dur-adhyavasāna*), like crossing the ocean (*samudra-prataraṇavat*), unattached (*anibaddha*) to the limbs and additional limbs (i.e., without arms and legs) (*aṅga-upāṅga*).⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷² The terms ‘*aṅga*’ and ‘*upāṅga*’ refer to the inner and outer corpus, which are mentioned previously (see TABh 1.20.3).

⁶⁷³ Siddhasenagaṇi explains that ‘*sukha*’ qualifies all other elements in the compound. This interpretation is in line with the next sentence.

⁶⁷⁴ Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘*prayoga*’ as ‘*prayoga-vyāpāra*’. The exact meaning of this term is unclear to me.

⁶⁷⁵ In other words, mastering the different subjects without the help of the scriptures would be nearly impossible, just as crossing the ocean. The expression ‘*anibaddham aṅgopāṅgaśaḥ*’ (without arms and legs/without the inner and outer corpus) seems to be a pun.

[1.20.28] *etena pūrvāṇi vastūni prābhṛtāni prābhṛtaprābhṛtāni adhyayanāny uddeśās ca vyākhyātāḥ* ||

By this ⁶⁷⁶ (*etad*), the *pūrvas* ⁶⁷⁷, subjects (*vastu*), chapters ⁶⁷⁸ (*prābhṛta*), subdivisions ⁶⁷⁹ (*prābhṛta-prābhṛta*), readings (*adhyayana*), and (*ca*) brief statements (*uddeśa*), are fully explained (*vyākhyāta*).⁶⁸⁰

[1.20.29] *atrāha* | [1.20.30] *matīśrutayos tulyaviśayatvaṃ vakṣyati* | [1.20.31] *dravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu iti* | [1.20.32] *tasmād ekatvam evāstv iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [There is] the quality of being of equal range (*tulya-viśayatva*) of ordinary cognition and testimony (*matī-śruta*),⁶⁸¹ [since the author of the *sūtra*] will say (*vakṣyati*)⁶⁸² that '[the domain of ordinary cognition and testimony extends] to [all] substances (*dravya*) [but] not in all modes (*a-sarva-paryāya*)' (*iti*) (see TA 1.27). Therefore (*tasmāt*), there must indeed (*eva*) be (*astu*) the quality of being one (i.e., ordinary cognition and testimony must have the same range) (*ekatva*) (*iti*).

[1.20.33] *atrocyate* | [1.20.34] *uktam etat sāmpratākālavīṣayaṃ matijñānaṃ śrutajñānaṃ tu trikālavīṣayaṃ viśuddhataraṃ ceti* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [It has been] said (*ukta*) [that] this (*etad*) 'knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matī-jñāna*) [has] the present time as its range (*sāmprata-kāla-vīṣaya*) but (*tu*) [that] knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) has the three times as its range (*trikāla-vīṣaya*)' (see TABh 1.20.15) and (*ca*) [that knowledge from testimony is] purer (*viśuddhatara*) (*iti*).

⁶⁷⁶ I.e., the limbs (*aṅga*) and additional limbs (*upāṅga*) (see TABh 1.20.27).

⁶⁷⁷ The term '*pūrvā*' is used in the Jaina tradition with reference to a collection of 14 extinct scriptures, which are supposed to contain the oldest teachings of the *tīrthaṅkaras* (see, e.g., Wiley 2004: 176).

⁶⁷⁸ The term '*prābhṛta*' can be used to refer to the chapters of a work (MW). It is also a type of texts in the Digambara tradition (see also TABh 1.5.21). However, since the term is followed by the term '*prābhṛtaprābhṛta*', it is more likely that the intended meaning is 'chapter'.

⁶⁷⁹ The word '*prābhṛtaprābhṛta*' can be used with reference to subdivisions of chapters (MW).

⁶⁸⁰ The precise reference of the different terms in this passage is unclear to me. Siddhasenagaṇi interprets the terms that follow '*pūrvāṇi*' as increasingly smaller subdivisions of the *pūrvas*.

⁶⁸¹ In other words, ordinary cognition and testimony have the same range. This is an objection to TABh 1.20.15, which says that testimony has a greater range than ordinary cognition.

⁶⁸² It is remarkable that that the questioner in the *bhāṣya* refers to a *sūtra* (TA 1.27) that has not yet been discussed.

[1.20.35] *kiṃ cānyat* | [1.20.36] *matijñānam indriyānindriyanimittam ātmano jñasvabhāvyāt pārīṇāmikaṃ* | [1.20.37] *śrutajñānaṃ tu tatpūrvakam āptopadeśād bhavatī* ||

Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*): Knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matī-jñāna*) [is] caused by the senses and the mind (*indriya-anindriya-nimitta*), resulting from a natural disposition (*pārīṇāmika*) due to the own nature of knowing (*jñā-svabhāvyā*) of the self (*ātman*) (i.e., since knowing is the essence of the self); but (*tu*) knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*), [which is] preceded by that (*tat-pūrvaka*), arises (*bhavatī*) from the teaching of the *āptas* (*āpta-upadeśa*) (*iti*).

[1.20.38] *atrāha* | [1.20.39] *uktaṃ śrutajñānam* | [1.20.40] *athāvadhi-jñānaṃ kim iti* | [1.20.41] *atrocyate* ||

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) [has now been] discussed (*ukta*). Now (*atha*), what (*kim*) [is] knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

***dvividho 'vadhiḥ* ||1.21||**

1.21⁶⁸³ Cosmic perception (*avadhi*) [has] two varieties (*dvividha*).

[1.21.1] *bhavapratyayaḥ kṣayopāśamanimittas ca* || *tatra*

[The two varieties of cosmic perception are]: [cosmic perception that] originates in birth (see TA 1.22) (*bhava-pratyaya*), and (*ca*) [cosmic perception that is] caused by the destruction [and] cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣaya-upāśama-nimitta*). Among them (*tatra*):

***bhavapratyayo narakadevānām* ||1.22||**

1.22 (SS 1.21) Hellish beings and gods [have cosmic perception that is] caused by birth (*bhava-pratyaya*).

[1.22.1] *narakāṇaṃ devānām ca yathāsvaṃ bhavapratyayam avadhijñānaṃ bhavati* |

There is (*bhavatī*) knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*) caused by birth (*bhava-pratyaya*) for hellish beings (*nāraka*) and (*ca*) gods (*deva*), in their own way (*yathāsvam*).

⁶⁸³ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* does not include this *sūtra*.

[1.22.2] ***bhavapratyayaṃ bhavahetukaṃ bhavanimittam ity arthaḥ |***

‘Caused by birth’ (*bhava-pratyaya*): The meaning [is] (*iti artha*) ‘effected by birth (*bhava-hetu*) [or] dependent on birth’ (*bhava-nimitta*).

[1.22.3] ***teṣāṃ hi bhavotpattir eva tasya hetur bhavati pakṣiṇām ākāśagamanavat na śikṣā na tapa iti ||***

Since (*hi*) the cause (*hetu*) of it (i.e., of cosmic perception) (*tad*) is (*bhavati*) indeed (*eva*) produced as a consequence of birth (*bhava-utpatti*) for them (*tad*), like flying (*ākāśa-gamanavat*) for birds (*pakṣin*), [it arises] without learning (*na śikṣā*) [and] without austerity (*na tapa*) (*iti*).

yathoktanimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām ||1.23||

1.23 (SS 1.22) The other [beings] (*śeṣa*) [have cosmic perception] that is caused (*nimitta*) as it is said (see TABh 1.21.1) (*yathā-ukta*).⁶⁸⁴ [This variety of cosmic perception has] six forms (*ṣaḍ-vikalpa*).

[1.23.1] ***yathoktanimittaḥ kṣayopāśamanimitta ity arthaḥ |*** [1.23.2] ***tad etad avadhijñānaṃ kṣayopāśamanimittam ṣaḍvidhaṃ bhavati śeṣāṇām***⁶⁸⁵ |

‘Caused as it is said’ (*yathā-ukta-nimitta*): The meaning [is] (*ity artha*) ‘caused by the destruction [and] cessation [of *karman*] (see TABh 1.21.1)’ (*kṣaya-upāśama-nimitta*). That very (*tad etad*) knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*) [that is] caused by the destruction [and] cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣaya-upāśama-nimitta*) exists (*bhavati*) in a sixfold way (*ṣaḍvidha*) for the other beings (*śeṣa*).

[1.23.3] ***śeṣāṇām iti nārakadevebhyaḥ śeṣāṇām tiryagyonijānām manuṣyāṇām ca |***

‘The other [beings]’ (see TA 1.23) (*śeṣa*) (*iti*) [refers to beings] different (*śeṣa*) from hellish beings and gods (*nāraka-deva*), [beings] born from the wombs of animals (*tiryāñc-yoni-ja*) and (*ca*) human beings (*manuṣya*).

⁶⁸⁴ It is remarkable that the *sūtra* refers to the *bhāṣya*. For a discussion of this passage, see § 2.3 *Is the TABh an auto-commentary*.

⁶⁸⁵ Kapadia’s edition omits ‘*śeṣāṇām*’. Note that the next sentence begins with ‘*śeṣāṇām*’.

[1.23.4] *avadhijñānāvaraṇīyasya karmaṇaḥ kṣayaopasāmābhyaṃ bhavati śaḍvidham* | [1.23.5] *tadyathā* | [1.23.6] *anānugāmikaṃ ānugāmikaṃ hīyamānakaṃ, vardhamānakaṃ anavasthitaṃ avasthitam iti* |

[It] arises (*bhavati*) from the destruction [and] cessation (*kṣaya-upasāma*) of *karman* that is covering knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñānāvaraṇīya*), in a sixfold way (*śaḍvidham*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- i. the one that is not following (*an-ānugāmika*)
- ii. the one that is following (*ānugāmika*)
- iii. the one that weakens (*hīyamānaka*)
- iv. the one that increases (*vardhamānaka*)
- v. the one that is not continuous (*an-avasthita*), [and]
- vi. the one that is continuous (*avasthita*) (*iti*).

[1.23.7] *tatrānānugāmikaṃ yatra kṣetre sthitasyotpannaṃ tataḥ pracyutasya pratipatati praśnādeśapurūṣajñānavat* ||

Among them (*tatra*), [there is] ‘the one that is not following’ (*an-ānugāmika*) whenever (*yatra*) [cosmic perception that is] produced (*utpanna*) for [someone who is] staying (*sthita*) in a region (*kṣetra*) goes away (*pratipatati*) [when that person is] gone away (*pracyuta*) from that [place] (*tatas*); like the knowledge of a person [when there is a] teaching of a lesson⁶⁸⁶ (*praśna-ādeśa-puruṣa-jñānavat*).

[1.23.8] *ānugāmikaṃ yatra kvacid utpannaṃ kṣetrāntaragatasyāpi na pratipatati bhāskaraprakāśavat ghaṭaraktabhāvavac ca* ||

[There is] ‘the one that is following’ (*ānugāmika*), [which can be] produced (*utpanna*) in any place (*yatra kvacid*) [but] does not go away (*na pratipatati*) for [that person], even when [that person has] gone to another place (*kṣetra-antara-gata ... api*), like the brightness of the sun (*bhāskara-prakāśavat*) and (*ca*) like the condition of being coloured⁶⁸⁷ of a jar (*ghaṭa-rakta-bhāvavac*).

⁶⁸⁶ The meaning of this simile is unclear to me. Perhaps, it refers to a situation in which students are connected with knowledge when they are listening to a teacher but forget about the teaching when they leave the class.

⁶⁸⁷ Alternatively, ‘red’.

[1.23.9] *hīyamānakam asaṅkhyeyeṣu dvīpeṣu samudreṣu pṛthivīṣu vimāneṣu tiryag ūrdhvam adho vā yad utpannaṃ kramaśaḥ saṅkṣipyamāṇaṃ pratipatati ā aṅgulāsaṃ saṅkhyeyabhāgāt pratipataty eva vā paricchinnendhanopādānasamṭaty agniśikhāvat ||*

[There is] ‘the one that weakens’ (*hīyamānaka*), which (*yad*), [after being] produced (*utpanna*) with regard to⁶⁸⁸ innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) islands (*dvīpa*), oceans (*samudra*), lands (*pṛthivī*), *vimāna*-heavens (*vimāna*) — horizontal (*tiryāñc*), upwards (*ūrdhvam*), or (*vā*) below (*adhas*) — goes away (*pratipatati*), gradually (*kramaśas*) contracting (*saṅkṣipyamāṇa*) up to an innumerable part of a finger’s breadth (*ā aṅgula-asaṅkhyeya-bhāga*); or (*vā*), it goes indeed away (*pratipatati eva*) like a multitude (*samṭati*) of fire flames (*agni-śikhāvat*) [that is] dependent (*upādāna*) on fuel that has diminished (*paricchinna-indhana*).

[1.23.10] *vardhamānakam yad aṅgulasyāsaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣūtpannaḥ vardhate ā sarvalokāt adharottarāraṇinirmathanotpann⁶⁸⁹opāttaśuṣkopaciya-mānādhiyamānendhanarāśyagnivat ||*

[There is] ‘the one that increases’ (*vardhamānaka*), which (*yad*) [is] produced (*utpanna*) with regard to an innumerable part etc. (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādi*) of a finger’s breadth (*aṅgula*) [and] increases (*vardhate*) up to the whole world (*ā sarvalokāt*), like a fire (*agnivat*) from a heap of fuel (*indhana-rāśi*) [that is] gathered (*upātta*⁶⁹⁰), dried up (*śuṣka*), accumulated (*upacīyamāna*), [and] placed in a fire (*ādhiyamāna*) [that is] risen (*utpanna*) by rubbing (*nirmathana*) the lower and upper piece of wood [used for kindling fire] (*adhara-uttara-araṇi*)⁶⁹¹.

[1.23.11] *anavasthitam hīyate vardhate vardhate hīyate ca pratipatati cotpadyate ceti punaḥ punar ūrmivat ||*

‘The one that is not continuous’ (*anavasthita*) diminishes (*hīyate*) [and] increases (*vardhate*), and (*ca*), [it] increases [and] (*vardhate*) diminishes (*hīyate*) (i.e., it fluctuates constantly); and (*ca*) it goes away (*pratipatati*) and (*ca*) is produced [again] (*utpadyate*) (*iti*), like a wave (*ūrmivat*) [that is coming and going] again and again (*punar punar*).

⁶⁸⁸ In other words, the range of this type of cosmic perception includes innumerable islands, oceans, etc.

⁶⁸⁹ Kapadia reads ‘*nirmathanāśannopātta*’ (from near hand, *āsanna*).

⁶⁹⁰ ‘contracted fr. *upā-datta*’ (MW)

⁶⁹¹ The term ‘*araṇi*’ refers to ‘the piece of wood used for kindling fire by attrition’; ‘generally distinction is made between the lower one and the upper one (*adharāraṇi* & *uttarāraṇi*)’ (MW).

[1.23.12] *avasthitam yāvati kṣetre utpannam bhavati tato na pratipataty ā kevalaprāpteḥ⁶⁹² ā bhavakṣayād vā jātyantarasthāyi vā⁶⁹³ bhavati liṅgavat ||23||*

‘The one that is continuous’ (*avasthita*) is (*bhavati*) produced (*utpanna*) in whatever (*yāvat*) region (*kṣetra*), it does not go away (*na pratipatati*) from there (*tatas*) [and] it remains (*avatiṣṭate*) up to the reaching of absolute knowledge (*ā kevala-prāpti*); [it] is (*bhavati*) either (*vā*) remaining [till] the next birth (*jāti-antara-sthāyin*) or (*vā*) up to the termination of [one’s] state (*ā bhava-kṣaya*), like gender (*liṅgavat*).

[1.23.13] *uktam avadhijñānam* | [1.23.14] *manaḥparyāyajñānam vaksyāmaḥ* |

Knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhijñāna*) [has now been] discussed (*ukta*). [Next], we will explain (*vaksyāmaḥ*) knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāya-jñāna*).

rjuvipulamatī manaḥparyāyah ||1.24||

1.24 (SS 1.23) Mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) [has] two [varieties], [i.e.], direct perception (*rju-mati*) [and] extensive perception (*vipula-mati*).⁶⁹⁴

[1.24.1] *manaḥparyāyajñānam dvividham* | [1.24.2] *rjumatimanaḥparyāya-jñānam vipulamatimanaḥparyāyajñānam ca* ||

Knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāya-jñāna*) is twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], knowledge from direct mental perception (*rju-mati-manaḥparyāya-jñāna*) and (*ca*) knowledge from extensive mental perception (*vipula-mati-manaḥparyāya-jñāna*).

[1.24.3] *atrāha* | [1.24.5] *ko ’nayoḥ prativīṣeṣa iti* | [1.24.6] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): What (*kim*) [is] the difference (*prativīṣeṣa*) [between] these two (*idam*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

viśuddhyapratipātābhyāṃ tadviśeṣaḥ ||1.25||

1.25 (SS 1.24) The difference between them [results] from purity (*viśuddhi*) and permanence⁶⁹⁵ (*a-pratipāta*).

⁶⁹² Kapadia reads ‘kevalaprāpter *avatiṣṭate*’.

⁶⁹³ Kapadia omits the second ‘vā’.

⁶⁹⁴ Tatia translates ‘simple’ and ‘complex’. See also § 3.2 *Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge*. See also the discussion of these terms in § 3.2 *Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge*.

⁶⁹⁵ Lit. ‘not falling away’.

[1.25.1] *viśuddhikṛtaś cāpratipātakṛtaś cānayoḥ prativīśeṣaḥ* | [1.25.2] *tadyathā* | [1.25.3] *rjumatimanaḥparyāyād* ⁶⁹⁶ *vipulamati manaḥparyāya-jñānaṃ viśuddhataram* | [1.25.4] *kiṃ cānyat* |

The difference (*prativīśeṣa*) [between] these two (*idam*) is brought about by purity (*viśuddhi-kṛta*) and (*ca*) is brought about by permanence (*a-pratipāta-kṛta*).

Namely (*tad-yathā*), knowledge from extensive mental perception (*vipula-mati-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) [is] purer (*viśuddhatara*) than [knowledge] from direct mental perception (*rju-mati-manaḥ-paryāya*). Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

[1.25.5] *rjumatimanaḥparyāyajñānaṃ pratipataty api bhūyo vipulamati-manaḥparyāyajñānam tu na pratipatati* ||

Knowledge from direct mental perception (*rju-mati-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) goes away (*pratipatati*) again (*api bhūyas*)⁶⁹⁷ but (*tu*) knowledge from extensive mental perception (*vipula-mati-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) does not go away (*na pratipatati*).

[1.25.6] *atrāha* | [1.25.7] *athāvadhimanaḥparyāyajñānayoḥ kaḥ prativīśeṣa iti* | [1.25.8] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), what (*kim*) [is] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) [between] cosmic perception and mental perception (*avadhi-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*), it is said (*ucyate*):

***viśuddhikṣetrasvāmiviśayebhyo 'vadhimanaḥparyāyayoḥ* ||1.26||**

1.26 (SS 1.25) [The difference between] cosmic perception (*avadhi*) and mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya*) [results] from purity (*viśuddhi*), region (*kṣetra*), owner (*svāmin*), [and] range (*viśaya*).

[1.26.1] *viśuddhikṛtaḥ kṣetrakṛtaḥ svāmikṛto viśayakṛtaś cānayoḥ viśeṣo bhavaty avadhimanaḥparyāyajñānayoḥ* |

The difference (*viśeṣa*) [between] this (*idam*) knowledge from cosmic perception and mental perception (*avadhi-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) is (*bhavati*):

- i. brought about by purity (see TABh 1.25.1) (*viśuddhi-kṛta*)
- ii. brought about by region (*kṣetra-kṛta*)
- iii. brought about by owner (*svāmi-kṛta*), and (*ca*)
- iv. brought about by range (*viśaya-kṛta*).

⁶⁹⁶ Kapadia reads '*rjumatimanaḥparyāyajñānād*'.

⁶⁹⁷ The word order is somewhat odd. One would rather expect '*bhūyo 'pi*'.

[1.26.2] *tadyathā* | [1.26.3] *avadhijñānāt manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ viśuddhataram* |

Namely (*tad-yathā*), knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) [is] more pure (*viśuddhatara*) than knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*).

[1.26.4] *yāvanti hi rūpīṇi dravyāṇy avadhijñānī jānīte tāni manaḥparyāyajñānī viśuddhatarāṇi manogatāni jānīte* || [1.26.5] *kiṃ cānyat* |

For (*hi*), as many (*yāvat*) extended (*rūpin*) substances⁶⁹⁸ (*dravya*) [as] the one with knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñānin*) knows (*jānīte*), so many (*tad*) the one endowed with knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya-jñānin*) knows (*jānīte*) [as] more⁶⁹⁹ refined (*viśuddhatara*) thoughts (*manas-gata*). Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

[1.26.6] *kṣetrakṛtaś cānayoḥ prativīśeṣaḥ* | [1.26.7] *avadhijñānam aṅgulasyaśaṅkhyeyabhāgādiśūtpannaṃ bhavaty ā sarvalokāt* | [1.26.8] *manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ tu manuṣyakṣetra eva bhavati nānyakṣetra iti* || [1.26.9] *kiṃ cānyat* |

And (*ca*) [concerning] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) between these two⁷⁰⁰ (*idam*) resulting from region (*kṣetrakṛta*): Knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhijñāna*) is (*bhavati*) produced (*utpanna*) in an innumerable part etc. (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādi*) of a finger's breadth (*aṅgula*), up to the whole world (*ā sarvalokāt*)⁷⁰¹. In contrast (*tu*), knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāya-jñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) only (*eva*) in the region of men (*manuṣyakṣetra*), [and] not (*na*) in another region (*anyakṣetra*) (*iti*). Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*):

[1.26.10] *svāmikṛtaś cānayoḥ prativīśeṣaḥ* | [1.26.11] *avadhijñānaṃ saṃyatasya asaṃyatasya vā*⁷⁰² *sarvagatiṣu bhavati* |

And (*ca*) [concerning] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) between these two (*idam*) resulting from the owner (*svāmikṛta*): Clairvoyant knowledge (*avadhijñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) for [beings with] restraint (*saṃyata*)⁷⁰³ or (*vā*) [beings] without restraint (*asaṃyata*), in all varieties of transmigration (*sarvagati*).

⁶⁹⁸ For a discussion of the substances (*dravya*), see TA 5.1 - 5.3.

⁶⁹⁹ The suffix '-*tara*' can also mean 'particularly', instead of 'more'. However, given the meaning of the term '*viśuddhatara*' in the previous sentence (TABh 1.26.2), I translate 'more'.

⁷⁰⁰ I.e., *manaḥparyāyajñāna* and *avadhijñāna* (see TABh 1.26.1).

⁷⁰¹ See also TABh 1.23.10.

⁷⁰² Kapadia reads '*asaṃyatasya, [saṃyatāsaṃyatasya ca] (vā)*'.

⁷⁰³ Siddhasenagaṇi explains that '*saṃyata*' excludes the first six *guṇasthānas*. See also Wiley 2003: 100.

[1.26.12] *manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ tu manuṣyasamyatasyaiva bhavati nānyasya* ||
[1.26.13] *kiṃ cānyat* |

By contrast (*tu*), knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāya-jñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) only (*eva*) for beings with restraint that are human (i.e., not for gods and hellish beings)⁷⁰⁴ (*manuṣyasamyata*), [and] not (*na*) for another (*anya*). Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*):

[1.26.14] *viṣayakṛtaś cānayoḥ prativīśeṣaḥ* | [1.26.15] *rūpidravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣv avadher viṣayanibandho bhavati* | [1.26.16] *tadanantabhāge manaḥparyāyasyeti* ||

And (*ca*) [concerning] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) between these two (*idam*) resulting from the range (*viṣaya-kṛta*): The scope of the range⁷⁰⁵ (*viṣaya-nibandha*) of cosmic perception (*avadhi*) exists (*bhavati*) with respect to all extended substances (*rūpi-dravya*), [but] not in all modes (*a-sarva-paryāya*) (see TA 1.27). [It will be said] (see TA 1.29) [that] (*iti*) [the domain of] mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) [extends to] an infinitesimal part (*ananta-bhāga*) of that (*tad*).

[1.26.17] *atrāha* | [1.26.18] *uktaṃ manaḥparyāyajñānam* | [1.26.19] *atha kevalajñānaṃ kim iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāya-jñāna*) [has now been] discussed (*ukta*). Now (*atha*), what (*kim*) [is] absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) (*iti*)?

[1.26.20] *atrocyate* | [1.26.21] *kevalajñānaṃ daśame 'dhyāye vakṣyate* | [1.26.22] *mohakṣayāt jñānadarśanāvarenaṅantarāyakṣayāc ca kevalam iti* ||

At this point (*atra*), it is said (*ucyate*): Absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) will be discussed (*vakṣyate*) in the tenth (*daśama*) chapter (*adhyāya*). [It will be said that] (see TA 10.1) 'absolute knowledge (*kevala*) [results] from the destruction [of] deluding [*karman*] (*moha-kṣaya*) and from the destruction [of] knowledge[covering], worldview-covering, [and] obstacle-creating [*karman*] (*jñāna-darśana-āvaraṇa-antarāya-kṣaya*)' (*iti*).

⁷⁰⁴ See also TABh 1.26.9. Knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāyajñāna*) only occurs in the human realm (*manuṣyakṣetra*).

⁷⁰⁵ Lit. 'the binding of the range' (*viṣayanibandha*).

[1.26.23] *atrāha* | [1.26.24] *eṣāṃ matijñānādīnāṃ jñānānāṃ kaḥ kasya viṣayanibandha iti* | [1.26.25] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*), one says (*āha*): Of these (*etad*) [varieties of] knowledge (*jñāna*), beginning with ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna-ādi*), what (*kim*) scope of the range (see TABh 1.26.15) (*viṣaya-nibandha*) [is there] for whom (*kim*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

matīśrutayor nibandhaḥ sarvadraveṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu ||1.27||

1.27 (SS 1.26) The scope (*nibandha*) of ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*) [includes] all substances (*sarva-dravya*) [but] not in all modes (*a-sarva-paryāya*).

[1.27.1] ***matijñānaśrutajñānayor viṣayanibandho bhavati sarvadraveṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu*** |

The scope of the range (*viṣaya-nibandha*) of knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*) and knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) with respect to all substances (*sarva-dravya*) [but] not in all modes (*a-sarva-paryāya*).

[1.27.2] ***tābhyāṃ hi sarvāṇi dravyāni jānīte na tu sarvaiḥ paryāyaiḥ*** ||

For (*hi*), one knows (*jānīte*) all (*sarva*) substances (*dravya*) by these two⁷⁰⁶ (*tad*) but (*tu*) not (*na*) by⁷⁰⁷ all (*sarva*) modes (*paryāya*).

rūpiṣv avadheḥ ||1.28||

1.28 (SS 1.27) [The scope of the range] of cosmic perception (*avadhi*) [includes all things] that have extension (*rūpin*).

[1.28.1] ***rūpiṣv eva dravyeṣv avadhijñānasya viṣayanibandho bhavati asarvaparyāyeṣu*** |

The scope of the range (*viṣaya-nibandha*) of knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) indeed⁷⁰⁸ (*eva*) with respect to the substances (*dravya*) that have extension (*rūpin*), but not in all modes (*a-sarva-paryāya*).

⁷⁰⁶ I.e., *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna*.

⁷⁰⁷ The meaning of the instrumental case is not entirely clear to me. Perhaps, the intended meaning is 'accompanied] by all modes'.

⁷⁰⁸ Alternatively, 'only'.

[1.28.2] *suviśuddhenāpy avadhijñānena rūpīṅy eva dravyāṅy avadhijñānī jānīte tāny api na sarvaiḥ paryāyair iti ||*

Even when (*api*) the one endowed with clairvoyant knowledge (*avadhi-jñānin*) knows (*jānīte*) the substances (*dravya*) that have indeed (*eva*) extension (*rūpin*) by a very pure (*su-viśuddha*) cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*), even then (*api*), [he can] not (*na*) [know] them (*tad*) by all (*sarva*) modes (*paryāya*) (*iti*).

tadanantabhāge manaḥparyāyasya ||1.29||

1.29 (SS 1.28) [The scope] of mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya*) [extends to] an infinitesimal part (*tad-ananta-bhāga*) of that (see TABh 1.29.1).

[1.29.1] *yāni rūpīṅi dravyāṅy avadhijñānī jānīte tato 'nantabhāge manaḥparyāyasya viśayanibandho bhavati |*

The scope of the range (*viśaya-nibandha*) of mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya*) exists (*bhavati*) with respect to an infinitesimal part (*ananta-bhāga*) of that (*tatas*), [i.e.], the substances (*dravya*) that have extension (*rūpin*), which (*yad*) the one endowed with knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñānin*) knows (*jānīte*) (see TABh 1.28.1).

[1.29.2] *avadhijñānaviśayasyānantabhāgaṃ manaḥparyāyajñānī jānīte rūpi-dravyāṅi manorahasyavicāragatāni ca mānuṣa⁷⁰⁹ kṣetraparyāpannāni viśuddhatarāṅi ceti ||*

The one endowed with knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya-jñānin*) knows (*jānīte*) an infinitesimal part (*ananta-bhāga*) of the range of knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna-viśaya*) — [i.e.], extended substances (*rūpi-dravya*), and (*ca*) the movements of thought, [which are] hidden in the mind (*mano-rahasya-vicāra-gata*), and (*ca*) [that which is] beyond the human region (*mānuṣa-kṣetraparyāpanna*) — [as] more refined [thoughts]⁷¹⁰ (*viśuddhatara*) (*iti*).

sarvadrvyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya ||1.30||

1.30 (SS 1.29) [The scope] of absolute knowledge (*kevala*) [extends to] all modes of all substances (*sarva-dravya-paryāya*).

⁷⁰⁹ Mody mentions the variant reading 'manuṣya-' The term 'manuṣyakṣetra' also appears in TABh 1.26.9.

⁷¹⁰ See TABh 1.26.4.

[1.30.1] **sarvadravyeṣu sarvaparyāyeṣu ca kevalajñānasya viṣayanibandho bhavati |**

The scope of the range (*viṣaya-nibandha*) of absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) with respect to all substances (*sarva-dravya*) and (*ca*) in all modes (*sarva-paryāya*).

[1.30.2] **taddhi sarvabhāvagrāhakaṃ sambhinnalokāloka viṣayam |**

For (*hi*), that [absolute knowledge] (*tad*) is the seizer of everything (*sarva-bhāvagrāhaka*), [whose] range [is] both the world and that which is beyond the world (*sambhinna-loka-aloka-viṣaya*).

[1.30.3] **nātaḥ paraṃ jñānam asti | [1.30.4] na ca kevalajñānaviṣayāt paraṃ kiñcid anyaj jñeyam asti |**

There is (*asti*) no (*na*) higher (*para*) knowledge (*jñāna*) than this (*atas*). And (*ca*) there is (*asti*) not (*na*) something else (*kiñcid anyā*) to be known (*jñeya*) [that is] higher (*para*) than the range of absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna-viṣaya*).

[1.30.5] **kevalaṃ paripūrṇaṃ samagram asādhāraṇaṃ nirapekṣaṃ viśuddhaṃ sarvabhāvajñāpakaṃ lokāloka viṣayam anantaparyāyam ity arthaḥ ||**

‘Absolute’ (*kevala*) — The meaning is (*ity artha*): ‘complete’ (*paripūrṇa*), ‘entire’ (*samagra*), ‘extra-ordinary’ (*asādhāraṇa*), ‘independent’ (*nirapekṣa*), ‘pure’ (*viśuddha*), ‘causing to know everything’ (*sarva-bhāvajñāpaka*), [whose] range is the world and that which is beyond the world’ (*loka-aloka-viṣaya*), [whose] modes [are] infinite’ (*ananta-paryāya*).

[1.30.6] **atrāha | [1.30.7] eṣāṃ matijñānādīnāṃ yugapad ekasmiñ jīve kati bhavantīti | [1.30.8] atrocyate |**

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): How much (*kati*) of these (*idam*) [varieties of knowledge], beginning with knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna-ādī*), exist (*bhavanti*) simultaneously (*yugapad*) in one (*eka*) soul (*jīva*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

ekādīni bhājyāni yugapad ekasmin ā caturbhyaḥ ||1.31||

1.31 (SS 1.30) One up to four [varieties of knowledge] (*eka-ādī ā catur*) can be shared (*bhājya*) simultaneously (*yugapad*) in one [soul] (*eka*).

[1.31.1] ***eṣāṃ matyādināṃ jñānānām ādita ekādini bhājyāni yugapad ekasmiñ jīve ā caturbhyaḥ*** |

Starting from (*āditas*) the [varieties] of knowledge (*jñāna*), beginning with ordinary cognition (*mati-ādi*), one up to four (*eka-ādi ... ā catur*) of these (*tad*), can be shared (*bhājya*) simultaneously (*yugapad*) in one (*eka*) soul (*jīva*).

[1.31.2] ***tadyathā - kasmimścij jīve matyādinām ekaṃ bhavati*** | [1.31.3] ***kasmimścij jīve dve bhavataḥ*** | [1.31.4] ***kasmimścit trīṇi bhavanti*** | [1.31.5] ***kasmimścic catvāri bhavanti*** |

To illustrate (*tad-yathā*), in some (*kaścid*) soul[s] (*jīva*) there is (*bhavati*) one (*eka*) of the [varieties of knowledge, i.e.], ordinary cognition etc. (*mati-ādi*). In some (*kaścid*) soul[s] (*jīva*) there are (*bhavataḥ*) two (*dvi*). In some (*kaścid*) there are (*bhavanti*) three (*tri*). In some (*kaścid*) there are (*bhavanti*) four (*catur*).

[1.31.6] ***śrutajñānasya tu matijñānena niyataḥ sahabhāvas tatpūrvakatvāt*** |

However (*tu*), the concomitance (*sahabhāva*) of knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*) with knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*) [is] certain (*niyata*) due the quality of being preceded by that (i.e., ordinary cognition precedes testimony) (*tat-pūrvakatva*).

[1.31.7] ***yasya śrutajñānaṃ tasya niyataṃ matijñānam*** | [1.31.8] ***yasya tu matijñānaṃ tasya śrutajñānaṃ syād vā na veti*** ||

For whom (*yaḥ*) [there is] knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*), for [that person] (*tad*) [there is] certainly (*niyata*) knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*). But (*tu*) for whom (*yaḥ*) [there is] knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*), for him (*tad*) knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) might either exist (*syāt vā*) or not (*na vā*) (*iti*).

[1.31.9] ***atrāha*** | [1.31.10] ***atha kevalajñānasya pūrvair matijñānādibhiḥ kiṃ sahabhāvo bhavati nety⁷¹¹ ucyate*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), is there (*kim ... bhavati*) concomitance (*saha-bhāva*) of absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) with the foregoing [varieties of knowledge] (*pūrva*), [i.e.], knowledge from ordinary cognition etc. (*mati-jñāna-ādi*)? It is said (*ucyate*): '[This is] not [the case]' (*na*) (*iti*).

⁷¹¹ Kapadia reads 'neti? | atrocyate'.

[1.31.11] *kecid ācāryā vyācakṣate* | [1.31.12] *nābhāvaḥ* | [1.31.13] *kiṃ tu tadabhibhūtatvād akiṃcitkarāṇi bhavantiṅdriyavat* |

Some (*kecid*) teachers (*ācārya*) explain (*vyācakṣate*) [that there is] no absence [of the other varieties of knowledge for the one endowed with absolute knowledge] (*na-abhāva*); nevertheless (*kiṃ tu*), due to the quality of surpassing them (*tadabhibhūtatva*), they are (*bhavanti*) non-functional⁷¹² (*akiṃcitkara*), like the senses (*indriyavat*).⁷¹³

[1.31.14] *yathā vā vyabhre nabhasi āditya udite bhūritejastvād ādityenābhibhūtāny anyatejāṃsi jvalanamaṇicandranakṣatraprabhṛtini prakāśanam prati akiṃcitkarāṇi bhavanti tadvat iti* |

Or (*vā*), just as (*yathā*) when the sun (*āditya*) rises (*udita*) in the cloudless (*vyabhra*) sky (*nabhas*), the other lights (*anya-tejas*) — beginning with shining jewels, the moon, and the stars (*jvalana-maṇi-candra-nakṣatra-prabhṛtin*), [which are] surpassed (*abhibhūta*) by the sun (*āditya*), due to the quality of being a great light (*bhūri-tejastva*) — become (*bhavanti*) likewise (*tadvat*) non-functional (*akiṃcitkara*) with regard to (*prati*) [that which is] illuminating (*prakāśana*) (*iti*).

[1.31.15] *kecid apy āhuḥ* | [1.31.16] *apāyasaddravyatayā matijñānam tatpūrvakaṃ śrutajñānam avadhijñānanaḥparyāyājñāne ca rūpidravyaviṣaye tasmān naitāni kevalinaḥ santīti* ||

Some (*kecid*) also (*api*) say (*āhuḥ*): ‘Knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñānam*) [arises] from existent substance [through] elimination⁷¹⁴ (*apāya-saddravyatā*); Knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) [is] preceded by that (*tatpūrvaka*); And (*ca*) knowledge from cosmic perception [and] knowledge from mental perception (*avadhi-jñāna-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) — [their] range [consists of] substances having form (*rūpi-dravya-viṣaya*). Hence (*tasmāt*), these (*etad*) exist not (*na santī*) for the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*)’ (*iti*).

[1.31.17] *kiṃ cānyat* | [1.31.18] *matijñānādiṣu caturṣu paryāyeṇopayogo bhavati na yugapat* |

Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*): In the case of the four [varieties of knowledge]⁷¹⁵ (*catur*), beginning with ordinary cognition (*matijñāna-ādī*), [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) takes place (*bhavati*) successively (*paryāyeṇa*), not simultaneously (*na yugapat*).

⁷¹² *a-kiṃcid-kara*: ‘not able to do anything’, ‘insignificant’ (MW).

⁷¹³ For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2 *Concomitance of the varieties of knowledge*.

⁷¹⁴ See also TABh 1.8.23 and TABh 1.11.6.

⁷¹⁵ Alternatively, ‘[people endowed with] the four [varieties of knowledge]’.

[1.31.19] *saṃbhinnajñānadarśanasya tu bhagavataḥ kevalino yugapat sarvabhāvagrāhake nirapekṣe kevalajñāne kevaladarśane cānusamayam upayogo bhavati* ||

But (*tu*) [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) takes place (*bhavati*) simultaneously (*yugapat*) for the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*), [which is] the *jina* (*bhagavat*), [whose] knowledge and worldview [are] combined (*sambhinnajñāna-darśana*); [in other words, cognitive operation takes place] jointly (*anusamaya*) with respect to absolute knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) — [which is] the seizer of everything⁷¹⁶ (*sarva-bhāva-grāhaka*) [and which is] independent⁷¹⁷ (*nirapekṣa*) — and (*ca*) with respect to absolute worldview (*kevaladarśana*).

[1.31.20] *kiṃ cānyat* | [1.31.21] *kṣayopasamajāni catvāri jñānāni pūrvāṇi kṣayād eva kevalam* | [1.31.22] *tasmān na kevalinaḥ śeṣāṇi jñānāni bhavantīti* ||

Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*): The former (*pūrvā*) four (*catur*) [varieties of] knowledge (*jñāna*) [are] born from the destruction and cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣaya-upasamaja*); absolute knowledge (*kevala*) [is born] from destruction [of *karman*] (*kṣaya*) alone (*eva*). Hence (*tasmāt*), the other (*śeṣa*) [varieties of] knowledge (*jñāna*) exist not (*na bhavanti*) for the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*) (*iti*).

***matīśrutāvadhayo viparyayaś ca* ||1.32||**

1.32 (SS 1.31) [There is knowledge from] ordinary cognition (*matī*), testimony (*śruta*), [and] cosmic perception (*avadhi*), and the opposite (*viparyaya*).

[1.32.1] *matijñānaṃ śrutajñānaṃ avadhijñānaṃ iti* | [1.32.2] *viparyayaś ca bhavaty ajñānaṃ cety arthaḥ* |

[There is] knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*), knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*), [and] knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhijñāna*) (*iti*). And (*ca*) there is (*bhavati*) the opposite (*viparyaya*). The meaning (*ity artha*) [is] ‘false knowledge’ (*ajñāna*).

[1.32.3] *jñānaviparyayo ’jñānaṃ iti* |

The opposite of knowledge (*jñāna-viparyaya*) is false knowledge (*ajñāna*).

⁷¹⁶ See also TABh 1.30.2.

⁷¹⁷ Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘*nirapekṣa*’ as ‘independent of the *indriyas*’. He interprets this as a qualification of both *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana*. The same goes for ‘*sarvabhāvagrāhaka*’. However, these two terms are used in TABh 1.30.2 and TABh 1.30.5 with reference to *kevalajñāna* only.

[1.32.4] *atrāha* | [1.32.5] *tad eva jñānaṃ tad evājñānam iti* | [1.32.6] *nanu cchāyātapavac chitoṣṇavac ca tadatyantaviruddham iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): That (*tad*) [is] indeed (*eva*) knowledge (*jñāna*) [and] that (*tad*) [is] indeed (*eva*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*) (*iti*); surely (*nanu*) [there is] an extreme opposition of them (*tad-atyanta-viruddha*) like shade [and] sunshine (*chāyā-ātapavat*) and (*ca*) like cold [and] hot (*śīta-uṣṇavat*) (*iti*).

[1.32.7] *atrocyate* | [1.32.8] *mithyādarśanaparigrahād viparītagrāhakatvam eteṣām* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [There is] the quality of being a seizer of the opposite (*viparīta-grāhakatva*) of them (i.e., the varieties of knowledge) (*etad*), due to the adoption of wrong view (*mithyā-darśana-parigraha*).⁷¹⁸

[1.32.9] *tasmād ajñānāni bhavanti* | [1.32.10] *tadyathā* | [1.32.11] *matyajñānaṃ śrutājñānaṃ vibhaṅgajñānam iti* |

The [varieties of] false knowledge (*ajñāna*) arise (*bhavanti*) from that (*tasmāt*). Namely (*tad-yathā*), false knowledge from ordinary cognition (*maty-ajñāna*), false knowledge from testimony (*śruta-ajñāna*), [and] deceptive knowledge (i.e., the opposite of *avadhi*) (*vibhaṅgajñāna*) (*iti*).

[1.32.12] *avadher*⁷¹⁹ *viparīto vibhaṅga ity ucyate* ||

It is said (*ucyate*) that (*iti*) deceptive knowledge (*vibhaṅga*) [is] the opposite (*viparīta*) [of] cosmic perception (*avadhi*).

[1.32.13] *atrāha* | [1.32.14] *uktaṃ bhavatā samyagdarśanaparigṛhītaṃ matyādi-jñānaṃ bhavaty anyathā*⁷²⁰ *'jñānam eveti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (*bhavat*) (see TABh 1.32.1 – 1.32.6) [that] 'knowledge, beginning with ordinary cognition (*maty-ādi-jñāna*), is (*bhavati*) obtained by right worldview (*samyag-darśana-parigṛhīta*) [and that] everything contrary to this (*anyathā*) [is] indeed (*eva*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*)' (*iti*).

⁷¹⁸ Cf. TABh 1.12.14.

⁷¹⁹ The edition of Modi has '*avadhir*' even though he mentions '*avadher*' as a variant reading. Since the word is followed by '*viparīta*', I choose the reading with the ablative ending.

⁷²⁰ Mody reads *anyathājñānam*.

[1.32.15] *mithyādr̥ṣṭayo 'pi ca bhavyās cābhavyās cendriyanimittān aviparītān sparśādīn upalabhante upadiśante ca sparśam sparśa iti rasam rasa iti* |
[1.32.16] *evam śeṣān* | [1.32.16] *tat katham etad iti* |

And although (*api ca*) [they may have] wrong view (*mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi*), [both those who are] suitable for liberation⁷²¹ (*bhavya*) and (*ca*) [those who are] not suitable for liberation (*abhavya*) perceive (*upalabhante*) [that which is perceptible by the sense of] touch etc. (*sparśa-ādi*) without mistakes (*aviparīta*), caused by senses (*indriya-nimitta*). And (*ca*) they point out (*upadiśante*): “[there is] touching (*sparśa*) [of] a tangible object (*sparśa*)” (*iti*)⁷²², “[there is] tasting (*rasa*) [of] taste (*rasa*)” (*iti*), [and] likewise (*evam*) [in the case of] the remaining [senses] (*śeṣa*). Then (*tad*), how (*katham*) [is] this [possible] (*etad*) (*iti*)?⁷²³

[1.32.17] *atrocyate* | [1.32.18] *teṣāṃ hi viparītam etad bhavati* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): surely (*hi*), this (*etad*) is (*bhavati*) false (*viparīta*) for them (*tad*).⁷²⁴

sadasator aviśeṣād yadṛcchopalabdher unmattavat ||1.33||

1.33 (SS 1.32) [Erroneous cognition results] from accidental-perception (*yadṛcchupalabhdī*) because of indistinction (*aviśeṣa*) between [things that are] real and unreal (*sad-asat*), like a madman (*unmattavat*).⁷²⁵

[1.33.1] *yathonmattaḥ karmodayād upahatendriyamater viparītagrāhī bhavati so 'śvam gaur ity adhyavasyati gām cāsva iti loṣṭam suvarṇam iti suvarṇam loṣṭa iti loṣṭam ca loṣṭa iti suvarṇam suvarṇam iti tasyaivam aviśeṣeṇa loṣṭam suvarṇam suvarṇam loṣṭam iti viparītam adhyavasyato niyatam ajñānam eva bhavati - tadvan mithyādarśanopahatendriyamater matiśrutāvadhayo 'py ajñānam bhavanti ||*

Just as (*yathā*) a madman (*unmatta*), whose senses and mind are damaged (*upahata-indriya-mati*) from the rising of *karman* (*karma-udaya*), is (*bhavati*) perceiving the opposite (*viparīta-grāhin*). He (*tad*) determines (*adhyavasyati*) a

⁷²¹ TA 2.7 says: ‘[There are] the qualities of being suitable (i.e. for liberation) and unsuitable (*abhavya*) etc. [in the case] of the soul etc.’ (*jīvabhavyābhavyatvādīni ca*).

⁷²² Alternatively, ‘they name tangible objects tangible’ etc. That is, they teach them as they are.

⁷²³ Put differently, how is it possible that people with a wrong view make right observations?

⁷²⁴ In other words, this is false knowledge.

⁷²⁵ For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2 *False knowledge*.

horse [as a] cow (*go*) (*aśva*) (*iti*) and (*ca*) a cow (*go*) [as] a horse (*aśva*) (*iti*), gold (*suvarṇa*) [as] clay (*loṣṭa*) (*iti*) [and] clay (*loṣṭa*) [as] gold (*suvarṇa*) (*iti*), and [sometimes]⁷²⁶ (*ca*) [he determines] clay (*loṣṭa*) [as] clay (*loṣṭa*) (*iti*) [and] gold (*suvarṇa*) [as] gold (*suvarṇa*) (*iti*). Thus (*evam*), [that] is (*bhavati*) certainly (*niyata ... eva*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*) for him (*tad*) [who is] determining (*adhyavasyat*) the opposite (*viparīta*) without distinction (*aviśeṣeṇa*), [saying] ‘clay (*loṣṭa*) [is] gold (*suvarṇa*) [and] gold (*suvarṇa*) [is] clay (*loṣṭa*)’ (*iti*).

In the same way (*tadvat*), ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception (*matī-śruta-avadhi*) of [a person] whose senses and mind are damaged [due to] wrong worldview (*mithyā-darśana-upahata-indriya-matī*) are (*bhavanti*) also (*api*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*).

[1.33.2] **uktaṃ jñānaṃ** | [1.33.3] **cāritraṃ navame ’dhyāye vakṣyāmaḥ** | [1.33.4] **pramāṇe cokte** | [1.33.5] **nayān vakṣyāmaḥ** | [1.33.6] **tadyathā** |

[So far] knowledge (*jñāna*) [has been] discussed (*ukta*). We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) conduct (*cāritra*) in the ninth (*navama*) chapter (*adhyāya*). And (*ca*) the two means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) [have been] discussed (*ukta*). [Now] we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) the perspectives (*naya*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

naigamasāṅgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdā nayāḥ ||1.34||

1.34 (SS 1.33, variant)⁷²⁷ The perspectives (*naya*) [are]:

- i. the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*)
- ii. the collecting [perspective] (*sāṅgraha*)
- iii. the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*)
- iv. the linear [perspective] (*rju-sūtra*)
- v. the literal [perspective] (*śabda*).⁷²⁸

⁷²⁶ This reading is based on Siddhasenagaṇi’s interpretation.

⁷²⁷ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* adds ‘*samabhirūḍhaivambhūta*’ (*naigamasāṅgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdasamabhirūḍhaivambhūta nayāḥ*) (*Sarvārthasiddhi* 1.33). For a discussion of this variant reading, see § 3.2 *The perspectives*.

⁷²⁸ See § 3.2 *The perspectives* for an analysis of the different perspectives.

[1.34.1] **naigamaḥ saṅgrahaḥ vyavahāraḥ ṛjusūtraḥ śabda ity ete pañcanayā bhavanti** | [1.34.2] **tatra**

‘The commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*), the collecting [perspective] (*saṅgraha*), the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*), the linear [perspective] (*ṛju-sūtra*) [and] the literal [perspective] (*śabda*)’ (*iti*) — these (*etad*) are (*bhavanti*) the five (*pañca*) perspectives (*naya*). Among them (*tatra*):

ādyāśabdau dvitribhedau ||1.35||

1.35⁷²⁹ The first [perspective] (i.e., the commonplace perspective, *naigama*) (*ādyā*) [and] the literal perspective (*śabda*) [have respectively] two [and] three varieties (*dvi-tribheda*).

[1.35.1] **ādyā iti sūtrakramaprāmāṇyān naigamam āha |**

[The author of the *sūtra*] refers (*āha*) to the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*) [as] ‘the first’ (*ādyā iti*), following the authoritativeness of the order [in] the *sūtra* (*sūtra-krama-prāmāṇya*).

[1.35.2] **sa dvibhedo deśaparikṣepī sarvaparikṣepī ceti |**

This [perspective] (i.e., *naigama*) (*sa*) [has] two varieties (*dvibheda*): [the one that is] encompassing partially (*deśa-parikṣepin*) and (*ca*) [the one that is] encompassing everything (*sarva-parikṣepin*) (*iti*).⁷³⁰

[1.35.3] **śabdāḥ tribhedaḥ sāmprataḥ samabhirūḍha evambhūta iti ||**

The literal perspective (*śabda*) has three varieties (*tribheda*): the present [viewpoint] (*sāmprata*), the etymological [viewpoint] (*samabhirūḍha*), [and] the exact [viewpoint] (*evam-bhūta*) (*iti*).

[1.35.4] **atrāha | [1.35.5] kim eṣāṃ lakṣaṇam iti |**

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): What (*kim*) is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of these?

⁷²⁹ This *sūtra* is not included in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

⁷³⁰ Tatia explains: ‘regarding a part as the whole and vice versa’ (Tatia 2011: 24).

[1.35.6] *atrocyate* | [1.35.7] *nigameṣu ye 'bhihitāḥ śabdās teṣām arthaḥ śabdārthaparijñānaḥ ca deśasamagragrāhī naigamaḥ* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): The object (*artha*) and (*ca*) the ascertainment of the meaning of the words⁷³¹ (*śabda-artha-parijñāna*) of those (*tad*) words (*yad śabda*) [that are] employed (*abhihita*) in 'daily undertakings' (*nigama*), [that is] the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*), which is grasping either partially or wholly (*deśa-samagra-grāhin*).

[1.35.8] *arthānāṃ sarvaikadeśagrahaṇaṃ saṅgrahaḥ* |

Seizing [both] the whole and the part⁷³² (*sarva-ekadeśa-grahaṇa*) of objects (*artha*), [that is] the collecting [perspective] (*saṅgraha*).

[1.35.9] *laukikasama upacāraprāyo vistṛtārtho vyavahāraḥ* |

The practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*) [is] equal to the [view of] worldly men⁷³³ (*laukika-sama*), applied in a pragmatic way⁷³⁴ (*upacāra-prāya*), having a broad meaning (*vistṛta-artha*).

[1.35.10] *satāṃ sāmpratānām arthānām abhidhānaparijñānaṃ ṛjusūtraḥ* |

The linear [perspective] (*ṛjusūtra*) [is] the ascertainment of the name (*abhidhāna-parijñāna*) of objects (*artha*) existing (*sat*) presently (i.e., not in the past or future) (*sāmprata*).

[1.35.11] *yathārthābhidhānaṃ śabdaḥ* |

The literal perspective (*śabda*) [is] the designation in accordance with reality (*yathārtha-abhidhāna*).

[1.35.12] *nāmādiṣu prasiddhapūrvāc chabdād arthe pratyayaḥ sāmprataḥ* |

The present [viewpoint] (i.e., the first variety of 'śabda') (*sāmprata*) [is] the idea (*pratyaya*) in the case of an object (*artha*) [from] a literal perspective (*śabda*), preceded by being known (i.e., whose conventional meaning is already fixed)⁷³⁵ (*prasiddha-pūrva*), with respect to name etc.⁷³⁶ (*nāma-ādi*).

⁷³¹ It is unclear to me what the precise meaning of 'artha' and 'śabdārthaparijñāna' is in this context. Perhaps the author tries to differentiate between the sense (*śabdārtha-parijñāna*) and reference (*artha*) of a word.

⁷³² Siddhasenagaṇi analyses 'sarvaikadeśagrahaṇaṃ' as a *dvandva* compound.

⁷³³ Siddhasenagaṇi interprets 'laukika' as worldly people.

⁷³⁴ Alternatively, 'by way of metaphor'. Siddhasenagaṇi refers to metaphors in his commentary on this passage. However, this perspective deals with objects in a practical way. See also TABh 1.35.29.

⁷³⁵ Cf. TABh 1.35.31.

⁷³⁶ I.e., the four modes of analysis (see TA 1.5).

[1.35.13] **satsv artheṣv asaṅkramaḥ samabhirūḍhaḥ |**

The etymological [viewpoint] (*samabhirūḍha*) [is] non-going together (i.e., making distinctions) (*asaṅkrama*) in the case of objects (*artha*) [that are] existent (*sat*).

[1.35.14] **vyañjanārthayor evambhūta iti ||**

The exact [viewpoint] (*evam-bhūta*) [makes a distinction]⁷³⁷ between the sign (*vyañjana*)⁷³⁸ [and] the object⁷³⁹ (*vyañjana-artha*) (*iti*).

[1.35.15] **atrāha |** [1.35.16] **uddiṣṭā bhavatā naigamādayo nayāḥ |** [1.35.17] **tan⁷⁴⁰ nayā iti kaḥ padārtha iti |**

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): The perspectives (*naya*) beginning with [the perspective of] the common man (*naigama-ādi*) [have now been] listed (*uddiṣṭā*) by you (*bhavat*). What (*kim*) [is] the meaning (*pada-artha*) [of] the there (*tad*) [mentioned term] (*iti*) ‘perspectives’ (*naya*)?

[1.35.18] **atrocyate |** [1.35.19] **nayāḥ prāpakāḥ kārakāḥ sādhakā nirvartakā nirbhāsakā upalambhakā vyañjakā ity anarthāntaram |**

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): ‘Perspectives’ (lit. ‘leading’) (*naya*), ‘[that which is] causing to reach’ (*prāpaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to make’ (*kāraka*), ‘[that which is] causing to accomplish’ (*sādha*), ‘[that which is] causing to bring about’ (*nirvartaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to illuminate’ (*nirbhāsaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to perceive’ (*upalambhaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to appear’ (*vyañjaka*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms).

[1.35.20] **jīvādīn padārthān nayanti prāpnuvanti kārayanti sādhayanti nirvartayanti nirbhāsayanti upalambhayanti vyañjayantīti nayāḥ ||**

The perspectives lead (*nayanti*), [i.e.], reach (*prāpnuvanti*), cause to make (*kārayanti*), cause to accomplish (*sādhayanti*), cause to bring about (*nirvartayanti*), cause to illuminate (*nirbhāsayanti*), cause to perceive (*upalambhayanti*), and cause to clarify (*vyañjayanti*) the categories (*padārtha*), beginning with soul (*jīva-ādi*) (*iti*).

⁷³⁷ See the previous sentence (TABh 1.35.13).

⁷³⁸ For a discussion of the term ‘*vyañjana*’, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*. The meaning of the term in this context seems to be ‘sign’ or ‘word’. However, the term has a different meaning in the theory of perception in the TA (see TA 1.8). See also TABh 1.35.33.

⁷³⁹ Cf. TABh 1.18.2: ‘Thus, sense perception [is] twofold, [i.e.], of the *vyañjana* and of the sense object’ (*evam dvividho ’vagraho vyañjanasyārthasya ca*).

⁷⁴⁰ Kapadia reads ‘*tatra nayā iti*’.

[1.35.21] *atrāha* | [1.35.22] *kim ete tantrāntarīyā vādina āhosvit svatantrā eva codakapakṣagrāhiṇo matibhedena vipradhāvitā iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [Are] (*kim*) these (*etad*) [perspectives] the proponents (*vādin*) of other sects⁷⁴¹ (*tantrāntarīya*) or (*āhosvit*) [proponents of] our own school (*svatantra*) [who are] taking the side of the objector (*codaka-pakṣagrāhin*), [and who are] running in different directions (i.e., disagreeing) (*vipradhāvita*) by difference in opinion (*mati-bheda*) (*iti*)?

[1.35.23] *atrocyate* | [1.35.24] *naite tantrāntarīyā nāpī svatantrāḥ matibhedena vipradhāvitāḥ* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): These (*etad*) [perspectives are] not (*na*) [the proponents belonging to] other schools (*tantrāntarīya*) nor (*na-api*) [proponents belonging to] our own school (*svatantra*) [who are] running in different directions (i.e., disagreeing) (*vipradhāvita*) by difference in opinion (*mati-bheda*).

[1.35.25] *jñeyasya tv arthasyādhyavasāyāntarāṇy etāni* |

On the contrary (*tu*), these (*etāni*) [are] different apprehensions (*adhyavasāyāntara*) of the object (*artha*) to be known (*jñeya*).

[1.35.26] *tadyathā* | [1.35.27] *ghaṭa ity ukte yo 'sau ceṣṭābhinirvṛtta ūrdhvakunḍalauṣṭhāyatavṛttagrīvo 'dhastāt parimaṇḍalo jalādīnām āharaṇadhāraṇasamartha uttaraguṇanirvartanānirvṛtto dravyaviśeṣas tasminn ekasmin viśeṣavati tajjātīyeṣu vā sarveṣv aviśeṣāt parijñānaṃ naigamanayaḥ* |

To illustrate (*tad-yathā*), the understanding (*parijñāna*) [when the word] 'pot' (*ghaṭa*) (*iti*) [is] said (*ukta*) — [i.e.], that [object] (*adas*) which (*yad*) [is] resulting from activity (*ceṣṭā-abhinirvṛtta*), having round handles on top (*ūrdhva-kunḍalauṣṭha*) [and] a stretched circular neck (*āyata-vṛtta-grīvā*), with a globe (*parimaṇḍala*) below (*adhastāt*), [which is] fit for taking and holding (*āharaṇadhāraṇa-samartha*) of water etc. (*jala-ādi*), completed by the application of other qualities (i.e., colour etc.) (*uttara-guṇa-nirvartanā-nirvṛtta*), having some specific material (*dravya-viśeṣa*) — [as] that (*tad*) single (*eka*) particularised⁷⁴² [object] (*viśeṣavat*) or (*vā*) [as] all [objects] (*sarva*) of the class of that (*taj-jātīya*) in general (*aviśeṣāt*), [that is] the commonplace perspective (*naigama-naya*).

⁷⁴¹ Siddhasenagaṇi mentions the Vaiśeṣika tradition as an example.

⁷⁴² Lit. 'having a particular'.

[1.35.28] ***ekasmin vā bahuṣu vā nāmādiviśeṣiteṣu sāmpratātītānāgateṣu ghaṭeṣu sampratyayaḥ saṅgrahaḥ |***

The understanding (*sampratyaya*) in the case of pots (*ghaṭa*) [as being] either (*vā*) one (*eka*) or (*vā*) many (*bahu*), specified by name etc. (*nāma-ādi-viśeṣita*), [existing in] the present, past, and future⁷⁴³ (*sāmprata-atīta-anāgata*), [that is] the collecting [perspective] (*saṅgraha*).

[1.35.29] ***teṣv eva laukikapariṅśakagrāhyeṣūpacāragamyēṣu yathāsthūlartheṣu sampratyayo vyavahāraḥ |***

The understanding (*sampratyaya*) [in the case of] the very same [pots] (*tad eva*) [as] having a broad meaning (*yathā-sthūla*⁷⁴⁴-*artha*), to be understood by the investigator [for the sake] of worldly matters (*laukika-pariṅśaka-grāhya*), to be understood in a pragmatic way⁷⁴⁵ (*upacāra-gamyā*), [that is] the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*).

[1.35.30] ***teṣv eva satsu sāmprateṣu sampratyayaḥ rjusūtraḥ |***

The understanding (*sampratyaya*) [in the case of] the very same [pots] (*tad eva*) [as] existing (*sat*) at present (*sāmprata*), [that is] the linear [perspective] (*rju-sūtra*).

[1.35.31] ***teṣv eva sāmprateṣu nāmādīnām anyatamagrāhiṣu prasiddha-pūrvakeṣu ghaṭeṣu sampratyayaḥ sāmpratāḥ śabdaḥ |***

The understanding (*sampratyaya*) [in the case of] the very same (*tad eva*) pots (*ghaṭa*) [that are] present (*sāmprata*), [which are] previously known⁷⁴⁶ (*prasiddha-pūrvaka*) expressive of any (*anyatama-grāhin*) of [the modes of analysis] beginning with name (*nāma-ādi*), [that is] the present (*sāmprata*) literal perspective (*śabda*).

[1.35.32] ***teṣām eva sāmpratānām adhyavasāyāsaṅkramo vitarkadhyanavat samabhirūḍhaḥ |***

The delimitation of the apprehension (*adhyavasāya-asāṅkrama*) [in the case of] the very same [pots] (*tad eva*) [that are] present (*sāmprata*), as in *vitarka* meditation⁷⁴⁷ (*vitarka-dhyānavat*), [that is] the etymological [viewpoint] (*samabhirūḍha*).⁷⁴⁸

⁷⁴³ Lit. 'gone' (*atīta*) and 'not arrived' (*anāgata*).

⁷⁴⁴ *yathāsthūla*: 'not detailed' (MW).

⁷⁴⁵ Cf. TABh 1.35.9.

⁷⁴⁶ I.e., whose conventional meaning has already been fixed. Cf. TABh 1.35.12.

⁷⁴⁷ I.e., focused on singleness. The ninth chapter of the TA discusses *vitarka* meditation (TA 9.41, TA 9.43, and TA 9.45).

⁷⁴⁸ Cf. TABh 1.35.13.

[1.35.33] *teṣām eva vyañjanārthayor anyonyāpekṣārthagrāhitvam evambhūta iti ||*

The quality of understanding objects [by] mutual dependence (*anyonya-apekṣā-ārtha-grāhitva*) of the sign⁷⁴⁹ (*vyañjana*) [and] the object⁷⁵⁰ (*vyañjana-ārtha*) [in the case of] the very same [pots] (*tad eva*), [that is] the exact [viewpoint] (*evam-bhūta*).

[1.35.34] *atrāha | [1.35.35] evam idānīm ekasminn arthe 'dhyavasāyanānātvān nanu vipratipattiprasaṅga iti |*

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): In this way (*evam*), [is there] not (*nanu*) the unwanted consequence of a contradiction (*vipratipatti-prasaṅga*) at this point (*idānīm*), due to the difference of apprehensions (*adhyavasāya-nānātvā*) in the case of a single (*eka*) object (*ārtha*) (*iti*)?

[1.35.36] *atrocyate | [1.35.37] yathā sarvaṃ ekaṃ sadaviśeṣāt*

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): Just as (*yathā*) everything (*sarva*) [is] a unity (*eka*) on account of non-distinction [with respect to] existence (*sad-aviśeṣa*);⁷⁵¹

sarvaṃ dvitvaṃ jīvājīvātmakatvāt

everything (*sarva*) [is] twofold (*dvitva*) on account of the quality of being characterised by soul and non-soul (*jīva-ajīva-ātmakatva*);

sarvaṃ tritvaṃ dravyaguṇaparyāyāvarodhāt

everything (*sarva*) [is] threefold (*tritva*) on account of the delimitation of qualities, modes and substance (*dravya-guṇa-paryāya-avarodha*);

sarvaṃ catuṣṭvaṃ⁷⁵² caturdarśanaviśayāvarodhāt

everything (*sarva*) [is] fourfold (*catuṣṭva*) on account of the delimitation of the range of the four views⁷⁵³ (*catur-darśana-viśaya-avarodha*);

sarvaṃ pañcatvaṃ astikāyāvarodhāt⁷⁵⁴

everything (*sarva*) [is] fivefold (*pañcatva*) on account of the delimitation of the [five] categories (*astikāya-avarodha*);

⁷⁴⁹ Siddhasenagaṇi interprets *vyañjana* as 'word' (*śabda*).

⁷⁵⁰ Perhaps the intended meaning is that the exact viewpoint analyses the relationship between word and the nature of objects. For example, when people bake, they can be called 'baker'.

⁷⁵¹ In other words, seen from the perspective of existence, everything is the same, i.e. existent.

⁷⁵² Kapadia reads '*catuṣṭayaṃ*'.

⁷⁵³ The reference of these four views eludes me. Perhaps it refers to the eye, the ear, the tongue, and touch. Alternatively, it might refer to the four modes of analysis (TA 1.5).

⁷⁵⁴ Kapadia reads '*pañcāstikāyātmakatvāt*' ('on account of the quality of being characterised by the five categories').

sarvaṃ ṣaṭtvam ṣaḍdravyāvarodhā itī |

everything (*sarva*) [is] sixfold (*ṣaṭtvā*) on account of the delimitation of the six substances (*ṣaḍ-dravya-avarodha*).

[1.35.38] ***yathaitā na vipratipattayo 'tha cādhyavasāyasthānāntarāṇy etāni tadvan nayavādā itī |***

Just as (*yathā*) these (*etad*) [are] not (*na*) contradictory (*vipratipatti*) but (*ca*) these (*etad*) [are] rather (*atha*) different states of apprehension (*adhyavasāya-sthānāntara*), likewise (*tadvat*), the statements [from the different] perspectives (*naya-vāda*) [are not incompatible] (*itī*).

[1.35.39] ***kiṃ cānyat |*** [1.35.40] ***yathā matijñānādibhiḥ pañcabhir jñānair dharmādīnām astikāyānām anyatamo 'rthaḥ pṛthak pṛthag upalabhyate paryāyaviśuddhiviśeṣād utkarṣeṇa na ca tā⁷⁵⁵ vipratipattayaḥ bhavanti tadvan nayavādāḥ |***

Further (*kiṃ cānyat*): Just as (*yathā*) any (*anyatama*) object (*artha*) of the categories (*asti-kāya*), beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*), is perceived (*upalabhyate*) separately (*pṛthak pṛthak*) by the five (*pañca*) knowledges (*jñāna*), beginning with knowledge from ordinary cognition (see TA 1.9) (*matijñāna-ādī*), [resulting] from a difference in the purity of the modes (*paryāyaviśuddhiviśeṣa*), gradually (*utkarṣeṇa*), and (*ca*) these (*tad*) are (*bhavanti*) not (*na*) contradictory (*vipratipatti*), likewise (*tadvat*), the statements [from the different] perspectives (*naya-vāda*) [are not incompatible] (*itī*).

[1.35.41] ***yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇair eko 'rthaḥ pramīyate svaviśayaniyamāt na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvan nayavādā itī |***

Or (*vā*), just as (*yathā*) one (*eka*) object (*artha*) is understood (*pramīyate*) by the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), [i.e.], direct cognition, inference, comparison and verbal testimony (*pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana*) — and these (*tad*) are (*bhavanti*) not (*na*) contradictory (*vipratipatti*) on account of the limitation of their respective ranges (*svaviśaya-niyama*) — likewise (*tadvat*), the statements [from the different] perspectives (*naya-vāda*) [are not incompatible] (*itī*).

⁷⁵⁵ Kapadia reads 'tāni'.

*āha ca*⁷⁵⁶

[1.35.42] *naigamaśabdārthānām ekānekārthanayagamāpekṣaḥ* |

[1.35.43] *deśasamagragrāhī vyavahārī naigamo jñeyaḥ* ||1||

And (*ca*) one says (*āha*): Grasping either partially or wholly⁷⁵⁷ (*deśa-samagragrāhin*), depending on the understanding [from] a perspective on objects that are single and many (*eka-aneke-artha-naya-gama-apekṣaḥ*) [with reference to] meanings of common words (*naigama-śabda-artha*), [this is] to be known (*jñeya*) [as] the ordinary⁷⁵⁸ (*vyavahārin*) commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*).

[1.35.44] *yat saṅgrhītavacanam sāmānye deśato 'tha ca viśeṣe* |

[1.35.45] *tat saṅgrahanayaniyatam jñānam vidyān nayavidhijñāḥ* ||2||

One who knows the perspectives (*naya-vidhijñā*) should know (*vidyāt*) that (*tad*) knowledge (*jñāna*) [which is] established⁷⁵⁹ by the collecting perspective (*saṅgrahanaya-niyata*) [as the one] which (*yad*) [is] expressive of the collective (*saṅgrhītavacana*), in general terms (*sāmānya*), in partial terms (*deśatas*), and (*ca*) specific terms (*viśeṣa*).⁷⁶⁰

[1.35.46] *samudāyavyaktyākṛtisattāsamjñādinīścayāpekṣam* |

[1.35.47] *lokopacāranīyatam vyavahāram vistr̥tam vidyāt* ||3||

[He] should know (*vidyāt*) the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*) [as] broad (*vistr̥ta*), established by worldly usage (*loka-upacāra-niyata*), depending on the ascertainment of 'group, individual, form, existence, name, etc.' (*samudāya-vyaktyākṛti-sattā-samjñā-ādi-nīścaya-apekṣa*).⁷⁶¹

⁷⁵⁶ It is remarkable that this passage is introduced with '*āha ca*', which suggests that the verses that follow are quoted from another source. For a discussion of this issue, see § 3.5 *Quotations in the TABh*.

⁷⁵⁷ See TABh 1.35.7.

⁷⁵⁸ It is somewhat strange that the author uses the word '*vyavahārin*' to qualify the *naigama* perspective since the *vyavahāra* perspective is discussed separately (see TABh 1.35.47). This suggests that this passage was written by a different author.

⁷⁵⁹ Alternatively, 'delimited' (*niyata*).

⁷⁶⁰ It is unclear to me how '*sāmānye deśato 'tha ca viśeṣe*' should be analysed, and the syntax allows for several interpretations. The word '*deśatas*' can be interpreted as a third option, apart from '*sāmānya*' and '*viśeṣa*'. Alternatively, it might qualify '*viśeṣa*', or '*sāmānya*' and '*viśeṣa*'. The vocabulary suggests a link with the Vaiśeṣika theory of universals and particulars.

⁷⁶¹ It is unclear to me what the source of this list is. In his study on Vaiśeṣika philosophy, Halbfass writes that in 'early Nyāya, *ākṛti* is defined as the "mark" (*liṅga*) of the universal (*jāti*). [...] In classical Mīmāṃsā and some grammatical traditions, *ākṛti* can be used as a synonym of *jāti/sāmānya* and refer to the universal itself' (Halbfass 1992: 121).

[1.35.48] *sāmprataviṣayagrāhakam rjusūtranayaṃ samāsato vidyāt |*

[1.35.49] *vidyād yathārthaśabdaṃ viśeṣitapadaṃ tu śabdanayaṃ ||4|| iti ||*

[He] should know (*vidyāt*) concisely (*samāsatas*) the linear perspective (*rju-sūtra-naya*) [as the kind of] grasping [having] the present [as its] range (*sāmprata-viṣaya-grāhaka*); and (*tu*) [he] should know (*vidyāt*) the verbal perspective (*śabda-naya*) [as the one in which] a word [is] in accordance with the object (*yathā-artha-śabda*), which has qualified stages⁷⁶² (*viśeṣita-pada*).

[1.35.50] *atrāha |* [1.35.51] *atha jīvo nojīvaḥ ajīvo no'jīva⁷⁶³ ity ākārīte kena nayena ko 'rthaḥ pratiyata iti |*

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), if [the words] (*iti*) 'soul' (*jīva*), 'quasi-soul' (*nojīva*), 'non-soul' (*ajīva*), [or] 'quasi-non-soul' (*no-ajīva*) are brought into play (*ākārīta*), which (*kim*) object (*artha*) is understood (*pratiyate*) by which (*kim*) perspective (*naya*)?

[1.35.52] *atrocyate |* [1.35.53] *jīva ity ākārīte naigamadeśasaṅgrahavyavahāra-rjusūtrasāmpratasaṃbhirūḍhaiḥ pañcasv api gatiṣv anyatamo jīva iti pratiyate |*

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [When] the word 'soul' (*jīva iti*) is brought into play (*ākārīta*), any (*anyatama*) soul (*jīva iti*) is understood (*pratiyate*) — in all (*api*) the five (*pañca*) varieties of transmigration (*gati*)⁷⁶⁴ — by the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*), the collecting [perspective] (*saṅgraha*) [with respect to] the part⁷⁶⁵ (*deśa*), the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*), the linear [perspective] (*rju-sūtra*), the present [viewpoint] (*sāmprata*), [and] the etymological [viewpoint] (*saṃbhirūḍha*).⁷⁶⁶

[1.35.54] *kasmāt |* [1.35.55] *ete hi nayā jīvaṃ praty aupāśamikādiyukta-bhāvagrāhiṇaḥ |*

Why (*kasmāt*)? Since (*hi*) these (*etad*) perspectives (*naya*) [are] grasping the states of existence, connected with 'the state resulting from the cessation' [of *karman*] etc. (*aupāśamika-ādi-yukta-bhāva-grāhin*), applied to (*prati*) the soul (*jīva*).

⁷⁶² It is not clear to me what the intended meaning is. Perhaps this refers to the three varieties of *śabda*, i.e., *sāmprata*, *saṃbhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*.

⁷⁶³ Kapadia reads 'noajīva'..

⁷⁶⁴ Siddhasenagaṇi explains: animals, hell-beings, humans, gods, and *siddhas*.

⁷⁶⁵ TABh 1.35.69 explains that it is pointless to analyse the words 'soul' (sg.) or 'souls' (du., pl.) from the *saṅgraha* perspective with respect to the whole (*sarva*).

⁷⁶⁶ This seems to be a selective list of *nayas* that can be applied to the word 'soul'.

[1.35.56] **nojīva ity ajīvadravyaṃ jīvasya vā deśapradeśau |**

‘Quasi-soul’ (*nojīva iti*) [implies] inanimate substance (*ajīva-dravya*), or (*vā*) larger and smaller parts⁷⁶⁷ (*deśa-pradeśa*) of the soul (*jīva*).

[1.35.57] **ajīva ity ajīvadravyaṃ eva |**

‘Non-soul’ (*ajīva iti*) [implies] only (*eva*) inanimate substance (*ajīva-dravya*).

[1.35.58] **no’jīva iti jīva eva tasya vā deśapradeśāv iti ||**

‘Quasi-non-soul’ (*no’jīva iti*) [implies] indeed (*eva*) soul (*jīva*), or (*vā*) larger and smaller parts (*deśa-pradeśa*) for this [soul] (*tad*) (*iti*).

[1.35.59] **evambhūtanayena tu jīva ity ākārīte bhavastho jīvaḥ pratiyate |**

But (*tu*) [when] the word ‘soul’ (*jīva iti*) is brought into play (*ākārīta*) from the exact perspective (*evam-bhūta-naya*), the soul (*jīva*) is understood (*pratiyate*) [as] being in existence (*bhava-stha*).

[1.35.60] **kasmāt | [1.35.61] eṣa hi nayo jīvaṃ praty audayikabhāvagrāhaka eva |**

Why (*kasmāt*)? For (*hi*) this (*etad*) perspective (*naya*) [is] only (*eva*) grasping the state [resulting from] the manifestation [of *karman*] (*audayika-bhāva-grāhaka*), applied to the soul (*jīva prati*).

[1.35.62] **jīvatīti jīvaḥ prāṇīti prāṇān dhārayatīty arthaḥ |**

‘The soul (*jīva*) lives (*jīvati*)’ (*iti*) — ‘[it] lives’ (*prāṇīti*), ‘[it] continues living’ (*prāṇān dhārayati*),⁷⁶⁸ [that is] the meaning (*ity artha*).

[1.35.63] **tac ca jīvanaṃ siddhe na vidyate tasmād bhavastha eva jīva iti |**

And (*ca*) that (*tad*) [which is] being alive (*jīvana*) is not seen (*na vidyate*) [in the case of] the perfected being (*siddha*); therefore (*tasmāt*), [the word] ‘soul’ [from the exact perspective]⁷⁶⁹ (*jīva iti*) [is] only (*eva*) [understood as] being in existence (*bhava-stha*).⁷⁷⁰

[1.35.64] **nojīva ity ajīvadravyaṃ siddho vā |**

[The word] ‘quasi-soul’ [from the exact perspective] (*nojīva iti*) [refers to] inanimate substance (*ajīva-dravya*), or (*vā*) the perfected being (*siddha*).

⁷⁶⁷ The term ‘*pradeśa*’ also occurs in the fifth chapter of the TA as ‘space-points’. The word seems to have a more general meaning in this context. Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘*deśapradeśa*’ as larger and smaller parts (see also TABh 1.35.67).

⁷⁶⁸ √*dhṛ* with *prāṇān*: ‘to preserve soul’, ‘continue living’ (MW).

⁷⁶⁹ See above (TABh 1.35.59).

⁷⁷⁰ In other words, *siddhas* are not alive, even though they exist.

[1.35.65] *ajīva ity ajīvadravayam eva |*

[The word] ‘non-soul’ [from the exact perspective] (*ajīva iti*) [refers] indeed (*eva*) [to] inanimate substance (*ajīva-dravya*).

[1.35.66] *no’jīva iti bhavastha eva jīva iti |*

[The word] ‘quasi-non-soul’ [from the exact perspective] (*no-ajīva iti*) [refers] indeed (*eva*) [to] ‘soul’ (*jīva iti*) [as] being in existence (*bhava-stha*).

[1.35.67] *samagrārthagrāhitvāc cāsyā nayasya nānena deśapradeśau gṛhyete |*

And (*ca*) on account of the quality of seizing the objects entirely (*samagra-arthagrāhitva*) of this (*idam*) perspective⁷⁷¹ (*naya*), larger and smaller parts⁷⁷² (*deśa-pradeśa*) are not (*na*) perceived (*gṛhyete*) by it (*idam*).

[1.35.68] *evam jīvau jīvā iti dvitvabahutvākāriteṣv api |* [1.35.69] *sarvasaṅgrahaṇe⁷⁷³ tu jīvo nojīvaḥ⁷⁷⁴ ajīvo no’jīvo jīvau nojīvau ajīvau no’jīvau ity ekadvitvākāriteṣu śūnyam |*

The same applies (*evam*) also (*api*) [when the words] (*iti*) ‘two souls’ (*jīva*) [and] ‘[many] souls’ (*jīva*) [are] brought into play [on account of] the quality of being [respectively] dual and plural (*dvitva-bahutva-ākārita*).⁷⁷⁵ But (*tu*) in the case of grasping the whole⁷⁷⁶ (*sarva-saṅgrahaṇa*), [when the words] (*iti*) ‘soul’ (*jīva*), ‘quasi-soul’ (*nojīva*), ‘non-soul’ (*ajīva*), ‘quasi-non-soul’ (*no-ajīva*), ‘two souls’ (*jīva*), ‘two quasi-souls’ (*nojīva*), ‘two non-souls’ (*ajīva*) [and] ‘two quasi-non-souls’ (*no-ajīva*) [are] brought into play [on account of] the quality of being single or dual (*eka-dvitva-ākārita*), [it is] pointless⁷⁷⁷ (*śūnya*).

⁷⁷¹ I.e., *evambhūtanaya*.

⁷⁷² See also TABh 1.35.56.

⁷⁷³ Since this passage deals with the perspectives, including the ‘*saṅgraha*’ perspective, it is somewhat strange that the text reads ‘*sarvasaṅgrahaṇe*’. Moreover, TABh 1.35.53 mentions ‘*deśasaṅgraha*’, and this seems to be the opposite of that term. Siddhasenagaṇi reads ‘*sarvasaṅgrahaṇa*’.

⁷⁷⁴ Kapadia’s edition has a *daṇḍa* at this point (*nojīvaḥ | ajīvo*). The fact that Mody’s edition reads ‘*nojīvaḥ ajīvo*’ instead of ‘*nojīvo jīvo*’, suggests that there was originally a *daṇḍa* between these two words. However, it is unclear to me how the reading in Kapadia’s edition can be interpreted.

⁷⁷⁵ In other words, one can also apply the above analysis to the dual and plural forms of the words ‘*jīva*’.

⁷⁷⁶ Cf. TABh 1.35.53.

⁷⁷⁷ The same expression appears in TABh 1.5.10.

[1.35.70] *kasmāt* | [1.35.71] *eṣa hi nayaḥ saṅkhyānantyāḥ jīvānāṃ bahutvam evicchati yathārthagrāhī* |

Why (*kasmāt*)? Since (*hi*) this (*etad*) perspective (*naya*), [which is] grasping in accordance with reality (*yathā-artha-grāhin*), indeed (*eva*) seeks for (*icchati*) the quality of being many (*bahutva*) of souls (*jīva*), on account of the infinity of the number [of souls] (*saṅkhyā-anantya*).

[1.35.72] *śeṣās tu nayaḥ jātyapekṣam ekasmin bahuvacanaṭvaṃ bahuṣu ca bahuvacanaṃ sarvākāritagrāhiṇa iti* |

But (*tu*) the remaining (*śeṣa*) perspectives (*naya*), [which are] seizing all that is brought into play (*sarva-ākārīta-grāhin*), [seek for] plurality⁷⁷⁸ (*bahu-vacanaṭva*), [which is] depending on genus (*jāty-apekṣa*), [even when referring to] a single thing (*eka*), and (*ca*) for the plural number (*bahu-vacana*) in the case of many (*bahu*) (*iti*).⁷⁷⁹

[1.35.73] *evam sarvabhāveṣu nayavādādhigamaḥ*⁷⁸⁰ *kāryaḥ* |

Likewise (*evam*), the approach⁷⁸¹ of the statements [from the different] perspectives (*naya-vāda-adhigama*) [is] to be done (*kārya*) in the case of all states (*sarva-bhāva*).

[1.35.74] *atrāha* | [1.35.75] *atha pañcānāṃ jñānānāṃ*⁷⁸² *saviparyayāṇāṃ kāni ko nayaḥ śrayata*⁷⁸³ *iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), which (*kim*) perspective (*naya*) applies to⁷⁸⁴ (*śrayate*) which (*kim*) of the five (*pañca*) [varieties of] knowledge (*jñāna*) together with [their] opposites⁷⁸⁵ (*sa-viparyaya*) (*iti*)?

⁷⁷⁸ *bahuvacana*: ‘the pl. number, the case endings and personal terminations in the pl. number’ (MW).

⁷⁷⁹ The meaning seems to be that plurality is always implied by the other perspectives, even when these perspectives are applied to a singular object.

⁷⁸⁰ Kapadia reads ‘*nayavādānugamaḥ*’.

⁷⁸¹ I translate ‘*adhigama*’ as ‘learning’ in the rest of the chapter. However, this translation does not fit very well in this passage, which might explain why Kapadia’s edition reads ‘*anugama*’.

⁷⁸² Kapadia omits ‘*jñānānāṃ*’.

⁷⁸³ Kapadia reads ‘*samāśrayata*’.

⁷⁸⁴ Lit. ‘rests on’, ‘clings to’ (< √*śri*) (MW).

⁷⁸⁵ I.e., varieties of false knowledge. See TABh 1.32.9 - 1.32.11.

[1.35.76] *atrocyate* | [1.35.77] *naigamādayas trayah sarvāṅy aṣṭau śrayante* |
[1.35.78] *rjusūtranayo matijñānamatyajñānavarjāni ṣaṭ* ||

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): The three [perspectives] (*tri*), beginning with the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama-ādi*), apply to (*śrayante*) all (*sarva*) eight [varieties of knowledge]⁷⁸⁶ (*aṣṭa*); the linear perspective (*rju-sūtra-naya*) [applies to] six (*ṣaṣ*), leaving out knowledge from ordinary cognition and false knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna-maty-ajñāna-varja*).

[1.35.79] *atrāha* | [1.35.80] *kasmān matiṃ saviparyayāṃ na śrayata iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Why (*kasmāt*) does [the linear perspective] not apply to (*na śrayate*) ordinary cognition (*mati*) together with its opposite (*saviparyaya*) (*iti*)?

[1.35.81] *atrocyate* | [1.35.82] *śrutasya saviparyayasyopagrahatvāt* | [1.35.83] *śabdanayas tu dve eva śrutajñānakevalajñāne śrayate* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [The linear perspective does not apply to ordinary cognition together with its opposite] due to the quality of seizing (*upagrahatva*) of scriptural [knowledge] (*śruta*) together with its opposite⁷⁸⁷ (*saviparyaya*). And (*tu*) the literal perspective (*śabda-naya*) applies (*śrayate*) only (*eva*) to two [varieties of knowledge] (*dvi*), [i.e.], knowledge from testimony and absolute knowledge (*śruta-jñāna-kevala-jñāna*).

[1.35.83] *atrāha* | [1.35.84] *kasmān netarāṅi śrayata iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Why (*kasmāt*) does [it] not apply to (*na śrayate*) other [varieties of knowledge] (*itara*) (*iti*)?

[1.35.85] *atrocyate* | [1.35.86] *matyavadhimanahparyāyāṅṅṃ śrutasyaivopagrāhakatvāt* | [1.35.87] *cetanājñāsvābhāvyaḥ ca sarvajīvanāṃ nāsya kaścīn mithyādrṣṭir ajño vā jīvo vidyate* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): Due to the quality of being a seizer (*upagrāhakatva*) of [this] very (*eva*) testimony (*śruta*) of ordinary cognition, cosmic perception and mental perception⁷⁸⁸ (*maty-avadhi-manah-paryāya*). And (*ca*) due to the own nature [and] intelligence⁷⁸⁹ (*cetanā-jñā-svābhāvya*) of all souls (*sarva-jīva*),

⁷⁸⁶ I.e. five varieties of knowledge and three types of false knowledge (see TABh 1.32.11).

⁷⁸⁷ In other words, the linear perspective (*rjusūtra*) can be applied to knowledge from testimony and false knowledge from testimony, but not to knowledge from ordinary cognition.

⁷⁸⁸ In other words, since knowledge from testimony includes ordinary cognition, cosmic perception, and mental perception.

⁷⁸⁹ Siddhasenagaṇi analyses this as a *dvandva* compound.

[there is] not (*na*) seen (*vidyate*) any (*kaścid*) soul (*jīva*) that has⁷⁹⁰ (*idam*) wrong view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) or (*vā*) false knowledge (*ajñā*).⁷⁹¹

[1.35.88] ***tasmād api viparyayān na śrayata iti*** |

Therefore (*tasmāt*) [it] also (*api*) does not apply to (*na śrayate*) the opposites (*viparyaya*) (*iti*).

[1.35.89] ***atas ca pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanānām api prāmāṇyam abhyanuñjāyata iti | āha ca –***

And (*ca*) hence (*atas*), the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) of direct perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony (*pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana*) [is] also (*api*) approved (*abhyanuñjāyate*) (*iti*).⁷⁹² And (*ca*) one says (*āha*) –

[1.35.90] ***vijñāyaikārthapadāny arthapadāni ca vidhānam iṣṭaṃ ca*** |

[1.35.91] ***vinyasya parikṣepān nayaiḥ parikṣyāni tattvāni*** ||1||

Having understood (*vijñāya*) words of single meaning⁷⁹³ (*eka-artha-pada*) and (*ca*) words referring to objects (*artha-pada*), and (*ca*) [their] appropriate (*iṣṭa*) classification⁷⁹⁴ (*vidhāna*), having set them out (*vinyasya*) completely (*parikṣepāt*), the entities (*tattva*) [are] to be examined (*parikṣya*) by the perspectives (*naya*).

[1.35.92] ***jñānaṃ saviparyāsaṃ trayaḥ śrayanty ādito nayāḥ sarvam*** |

[1.35.93] ***samyagdṛṣṭer jñānaṃ mithyā-dṛṣṭer viparyāsaḥ*** ||2||

The first (*āditas*) three (*tri*) perspectives (*naya*) apply to (*śrayanti*) all⁷⁹⁵ (*sarva*), [i.e.], knowledge (*jñāna*) together with its opposite (*sa-viparyāsa*). Knowledge (*jñāna*) [results] from right view (*samyag-dṛṣṭi*), delusion (*viparyāsa*) [results] from wrong view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*).

⁷⁹⁰ I interpret ‘*asya*’ as ‘*jīvasya*’. However, it is not entirely clear to me what the reference of ‘*asya*’ in this sentence is.

⁷⁹¹ Cf. TABh 1.35.96 – 1.35.97.

⁷⁹² It is remarkable that the four means of cognition that are accepted by the Nyāya tradition are said to be valid. For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2, *The perspectives*.

⁷⁹³ Perhaps ‘synonyms’.

⁷⁹⁴ Siddhasenagaṇi refers to the four modes of analysis (*nāma, sthāpana, etc.*).

⁷⁹⁵ I.e. the eight varieties of knowledge and false knowledge.

[1.35.94] *rjusūtraḥ ṣaṭ śrayate mateḥ śrutopagrahād ananyatvāt |*

[1.35.95] *śrutakevale tu śabdaḥ śrayate nānyac chrutāṅgatvāt ||3||*

The linear perspective (*rju-sūtra*) applies to (*śrayate*) six⁷⁹⁶ (*ṣaṣ*) due to identity (*ananyatva*), [i.e.], due to the seizing of testimony (*śruta-upagraha*) of ordinary cognition⁷⁹⁷ (*mati*). And (*tu*) the literal perspective (*śabda*) applies to (*śrayate*) testimony [and] absolute knowledge⁷⁹⁸ (*śruta-kevala*) due to the quality of being dependent on testimony (*śruta-aṅgatva*), not on anything else (*na-anyat*).

[1.35.96] *mithyādrṣṭyajñāne na śrayate nāsyā kaścīd ajñō 'sti |*

[1.35.97] *jñāsvābhāvyaḥ jīvo mithyādrṣṭir na cāpy ajñāḥ⁷⁹⁹ ||4||*

[The literal perspective]⁸⁰⁰ does not apply to (*na śrayate*) wrong view or false knowledge (*mithyā-drṣṭy-ajñāna*) [because] there is not (*na asti*) any (*kaścīd*) false knowledge (*ajñā*) for [the soul] (*idam*). The soul (*jīva*) [is] not (*na*) ignorant (*ajñā*) and (*ca*) also (*apī*) [not] having false view (*mithyā-drṣṭi*), due to the own nature of having knowledge (*jñā-svābhāvya*).

[1.35.98] *iti nayavādās citrāḥ kvacid viruddhā ivātha ca viśuddhāḥ |*

[1.35.99] *laukikaṣayātītās tattvajñānārtham adhigamyāḥ ||5||*

In this manner (*iti*), the statements [from the different] perspectives (*naya-vāda*) [are] manifold⁸⁰¹ (*citra*), first they appear to be opposed (*kvacid viruddhā iva*), and (*ca*) yet (*atha*), [they are] free from vice (*viśuddha*). Surpassing the worldly range (*laukika-ṣaya-atīta*) [they are] to be studied (*adhigamyā*) for the sake of knowledge of reality (*tattva-jñāna-artha*).

[1.35.100] *iti tattvārthādhigame 'rhatpravacanasaṅgrāhe prathamō 'dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ ||802*

Thus (*iti*), the first (*prathama*) chapter (*adhyāya*) of the *Tattvārthādhigama*, [which is] a summary of the words of the *arhat* (*arhat-pravacana-saṅgraha*), [is now] completed (*samāpta*).

⁷⁹⁶ According to Siddhasenagaṇi, the varieties of knowledge with the exception of knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati*).

⁷⁹⁷ I.e., because testimony (*śruta*) is preceded by ordinary cognition (*mati*) (see TA 1.20).

⁷⁹⁸ See also TABh 1.35.83.

⁷⁹⁹ Kapadia reads '*cāpyasti*'.

⁸⁰⁰ See TABh 1.35.83.

⁸⁰¹ The word '*citra*' also means 'excellent' (MW).

⁸⁰² Kapadia has a different concluding sentence, which refers to the *bhāṣya* and the *ṭikā*.

Tattvārthādhigama Chapter II (II.8-25)

[2.0.1] *atrāha* | [2.0.2] *uktaṃ bhavatā jīvādīni tattvānīti* | [2.0.3] *tatra ko jīvaḥ kathaṃlakṣaṇo veti* | [2.0.4] *atrocyate* | [...]

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): You have mentioned (*uktaṃ bhavatā*) ‘[the categories of] reality (*tattva*) beginning with soul (*jīva-ādī*)’ (see TA 1.4) (*iti*). Here (*tatra*), [one may ask]: ‘What (*kim*) [is] the soul (*jīva*), or (*vā*), how [is it] characterised (*kathaṃ-lakṣaṇa*) (*iti*)?’ At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [...]⁸⁰³

***upayogo lakṣaṇam* ||2.8||**

2.8 [Cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) [is] the characteristic [of the soul] (*lakṣaṇa*).

[2.8.1] ***upayogo lakṣaṇam jīvasya bhavati*** |

[Cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) is (*bhavati*) the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the soul (*jīva*).

sa dvividho ’ṣṭacaturbhedaḥ ||2.9||

2.9 This [cognitive operation] (*tad*) is twofold (*dvividha*), [having] eight [and] four varieties (*aṣṭa-caturbheda*).

[2.9.1] ***sa upayogo dvividhaḥ sākāro ’nākāraś ca jñānopayogo darśanopayogaś cety arthaḥ*** |

This (*tad*) [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*): having shape (*sākāra*) and (*ca*) shapeless (*anākāra*).⁸⁰⁴ The meaning is (*ity artha*): [cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge (*jñāna-upayoga*) and (*ca*) [cognitive] operation [in the form of] worldview (*darśana-upayoga*).

⁸⁰³ The second chapter of the TA deals with the soul. The first *sūtras* (TA 2.1 - 2.7), which follow the opening sentences of the *bhāṣya*, deal with the states of the soul (*bhāva*) and the Jaina theory of *karman*. They are not included in this study.

⁸⁰⁴ I.e., representational and non-representational. For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.3, *Cognitive operation*. Sanghvi translates ‘determinate’ and ‘indeterminate’ (Sanghvi 1974: 82).

[2.9.2] ***sa punar yathāsaṅkhyam aṣṭacaturbhedo bhavati |***

This [twofold cognitive operation] (*tad*) is (*bhavati*) again (*punar*) respectively (*yathā-saṅkhyam*) eight- and fourfold (*aṣṭa-caturbheda*).

[2.9.3] ***jñānopayogo 'ṣṭavidhaḥ |*** [2.9.4] ***tadyathā |*** [2.9.5] ***matijñānopayogaḥ śrutajñānopayogo 'vadhijñānopayogo manaḥparyāyajñānopayogaḥ kevalajñānopayogo matyajñānopayogaḥ śrutājñānopayoga vibhaṅgajñānopayoga iti |***

[Cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge (*jñāna-upayoga*) [is] eightfold (*aṣṭavidha*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- i. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñāna-upayoga*)
- ii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna-upayoga*)
- iii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] cosmic knowledge (*avadhijñāna-upayoga*)
- iv. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] mental knowledge (*manaḥparyāyajñāna-upayoga*)
- v. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] absolute knowledge (*kevalajñāna-upayoga*)
- vi. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] false knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matyajñāna-upayoga*)
- vii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] false knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna-upayoga*)
- viii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] deceptive knowledge⁸⁰⁵ (*vibhaṅgajñāna-upayoga*) (*iti*).

[2.9.6] ***darśanopayogaś caturbhedaḥ |*** [2.9.7] ***tadyathā |*** [2.9.8] ***cakṣur-darśanopayogo 'cakṣurdarśanopayogo 'vadhidarśanopayogaḥ kevaladarśanopayoga iti |***

[Cognitive] operation [in the form of] worldview (*darśana-upayoga*) [has] four varieties (*caturbheda*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- [cognitive] operation [in the form of] visual worldview (*cakṣur-darśana-upayoga*)
- [cognitive] operation [in the form of] non-visual⁸⁰⁶ worldview (*acakṣur-darśana-upayoga*)

⁸⁰⁵ I.e., the opposite of *avadhijñāna* (see TABh 1.32.12).

- [cognitive] operation [in the form of] cosmic worldview (*avadhi-darśana-upayoga*)
- [cognitive] operation [in the form of] absolute worldview (*kevala-darśana-upayoga*) (*iti*).

***saṃsāriṇo muktās ca* ||2.10||**

2.10 [There are] worldly (*saṃsārin*) and liberated (*mukta*) [souls].

[2.10.1] ***te jīvāḥ samāsato dvividhā bhavanti saṃsāriṇo muktās ca*** | [2.10.2] ***kiṃ cānyat*** |

Succinctly (*samāsatas*), these (*tad*) souls (*jīva*) are (*bhavanti*) twofold (*dvividha*): worldly (*saṃsārin*) and liberated (*mukta*). Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

***samanaskāmanaskāḥ* ||2.11||**

2.11 [Souls exist] with minds (*samanaska*) and without minds (*amanaska*).

[2.11.1] ***samāsatas ta***⁸⁰⁷ ***eva jīvā dvividhā bhavanti samanaskās cāmanaskās ca*** |
[2.11.2] ***tān parastād vakṣyāmaḥ*** ||

Succinctly (*samāsatas*), these (*tad*) souls (*jīva*) are (*bhavanti*) twofold (*dvividha*): with minds (*samanaska*) and without minds (*amanaska*). We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) them (*tad*) later on (see TA 2.25) (*parastāt*).

***saṃsāriṇas trasasthāvarāḥ* ||2.12||**

2.12 Worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) [are] mobile (*trasa*) and immobile (*sthāvara*).

[2.12.1] ***saṃsāriṇo jīvā dvividhā bhavanti trasāḥ sthāvarās ca*** | [2.12.2] ***tatra***

Worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) are (*bhavanti*) twofold (*dvividha*): mobile (*trasa*) and (*ca*) immobile (*sthāvara*). Among them (*tatra*):

⁸⁰⁶ It is not entirely clear to me what the intended meaning of ‘*caḥṣus-*’ and ‘*acaḥṣus-*’ in this context is. Siddhasenagaṇi interprets ‘*acaḥṣus-*’ as the other senses, which I follow in my translation. This distinction resembles TA 1.14, which says that ordinary cognition is caused by the organs of sense and the mind (*indriya-anindriya-nimitta*). Siddhasenagaṇi illustrates *acaḥṣurdarśanopayoga* with the example of feeling a snake behind one’s back.

⁸⁰⁷ Mody reads ‘*te*’. Kapadia has the correct reading ‘*ta*’.

ṛthivyabvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ ||2.13||⁸⁰⁸

2.13 Earth (*ṛthivī*), water (*ap*), [and] plants⁸⁰⁹ (*vanaspati*) [are] immobile [souls] (*sthāvara*).

[2.13.1] ***ṛthivīkāyikā apkāyikā vanaspatikāyikā ity ete trividhā sthāvarā jīvā bhavanti |***

These (*etad*) immobile (*sthāvara*) souls (*jīva*) are (*bhavanti*) threefold (*trividha*):

- i. earth-bodied (*ṛthivī-kāyika*)
- ii. water-bodied (*ap-kāyika*) [and]
- iii. plant-bodied (*vanaspati-kāyika*) (*iti*).

[2.13.2] ***tatra ṛthivīkāyo 'nekavidhaḥ śuddhapṛthivīśarkarāvālukādīḥ |***

Among them (*tatra*), the earth-bodied [immobile souls] (*ṛthivī-kāya*) [are] manifold (*anekavidha*), beginning with pure earth, small stones, [and] sand (*śuddha-pṛthivī-śarkarā-vāluka-ādī*).

[2.13.3] ***apkāyo 'nekavidho himādīḥ |***

The water-bodied [immobile souls] (*ap-kāya*) [are] manifold (*anekavidha*), beginning with snow (*hima-ādī*).

[2.13.4] ***vanaspatikāyo 'nekavidhaḥ śaivalādīḥ ||***

The plant-bodied [immobile souls] (*vanaspati-kāya*) [are] manifold (*anekavidha*), beginning with *śaivala*⁸¹⁰ (*śaivala-ādī*).

tejavāyū dvīndriyādayaś ca trasāḥ ||2.14||⁸¹¹

2.14 Fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), and (*ca*) [beings with] two or more senses (*dvi-indriya-ādī*) [are] mobile [souls] (*trasa*).

[2.14.1] ***tejaḥkāyikā aṅgārādayaḥ |***

The fire-bodied [mobile souls] (*tejaḥ-kāyika*) [are] charcoal⁸¹² etc. (*aṅgāra-ādī*).

⁸⁰⁸ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* has a different reading and includes fire- and air-bodied beings in the class of immobile souls (SS 2.13-14).

⁸⁰⁹ The primary meaning of '*vanaspati*' is 'tree' (MW). However, the explanation of '*vanaspati-kāya*' in TABh 2.13.4 clearly indicates that the term refers to the category of plants in general.

⁸¹⁰ 'Blyxa Octandra', 'a kind of duck-weed or green moss-like plant growing in pools' (MW).

⁸¹¹ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* includes '*tejas*' and '*vāyu*' in the class of immobile souls (see also TA 2.13).

[2.14.2] *vāyukāyikā utkalikādayaḥ* |

The air-bodied [mobile souls] (*vāyukāyika*) [are] the outgoing etc.⁸¹³ (*utkalikā-ādi*).

[2.14.3] *dvīndriyās trīndriyāś caturindriyāḥ pañcendriyā ity ete trasā bhavanti* |

[Beings with] two senses (*dvi-indriya*), [beings with] three senses (*tri-indriya*), [beings with] four senses (*catur-indriya*) [and] [beings with] five senses (*pañca-indriya*) (*iti*) — these (*etad*) are (*bhavanti*) mobile (*trasa*).

[2.14.4] *samsāriṇas trasāḥ sthāvarā ity ukte etad uktaṃ bhavati muktā naiva trasā naiva sthāvarā iti* ||

When it is said (see TA 2.12) (*ity ukta*) ‘worldly souls (*samsārin*) [are] mobile (*trasa*) [and] immobile (*sthāvara*)’, this (*etad*) is (*bhavati*) said (*ukta*): ‘liberated [souls] (*mukta*) [are] neither (*na-eva*) mobile (*trasa*) nor (*na-eva*) immobile (*sthāvara*)’ (*iti*).

***pañcendriyāṇi* ||2.15||**

2.15 [There are] five senses (*pañca-indriya*).

[2.15.1] *pañcendriyāṇi bhavanti* | [2.15.2] *ārambho niyamārthaḥ ṣaḍādipraṭiṣedhārthaś ca* ||

[There] are (*bhavanti*) five senses (*pañca-indriya*). The beginning [of the subject]⁸¹⁴ (*ārambha*) [is] for the sake of restriction (i.e., of the number of senses) (*niyama-ārtha*) and (*ca*) for the sake of exclusion of six etc. (*ṣaḍ-ādi-praṭiṣedha-ārtha*).

[2.15.3] *indriyaṃ* | [2.15.4] *indralingam indradiṣṭam indradṛṣṭam indrasṛṣṭam indrajuṣṭam iti vā*⁸¹⁵ |

‘Sense’ (*indriya*) [means] ‘mark of the soul’ (*indra-liṅga*), ‘directed by the soul’ (*indra-diṣṭa*), ‘perceived by the soul’ (*indra-dṛṣṭa*), ‘brought forth by the soul’ (*indra-sṛṣṭa*), or (*vā*) ‘welcomed by the soul’ (*indra-juṣṭa*)’ (*iti*).

⁸¹² It is somewhat strange that charcoal is seen as a mobile soul. Perhaps the idea is that charcoal is inhabited by fire-bodied mobile souls. The classification in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, which classifies fire-bodied souls as immobile (SS 2.13), is easier to understand.

⁸¹³ Siddhasenagaṇi explains: ‘Air (*vāyu*) [has the following] varieties (*bheda*): eastern, western etc. (*prācyā-pratīcyā-ādi*), [and] outgoing (*utkalikā*), circular etc. (*maṇḍalikā-ādi*) (*prācyapratīcyādyutkalikāmaṇḍalikādibhedo vāyuh*).

⁸¹⁴ I.e., TA 2.15, which opens the passage on the senses.

⁸¹⁵ This is a quote from Pāṇini 5.2.93. However, Umāsvāti skips ‘*indradatta*’ and adds ‘*indradiṣṭa*’ (Ohira 1982: 59).

[2.15.5] *indro jīvaḥ sarvadravyeṣv aiśvaryayogād viṣayeṣu vā paramaiśvarya-yogāt |*

The soul (*jīva*) [is called] ‘*indra*’ on account of the power (*aiśvarya-yoga*) with respect to all substances (*sarvadravya*), or (*vā*) on account of the highest power (*parama-aiśvarya-yoga*) with respect to the range [of the senses] (*viṣaya*).

[2.15.6] *tasya liṅgam indriyaṃ liṅganāt sūcanāt pradarśanād upaṣṭambhanād vyañjanāc ca jīvasya liṅgam indriyam ||*

The sense (*indriya*) [is] the mark (*liṅga*) of this (*tad*), [i.e.], the sense (*indriya*) [is] the mark (*liṅga*) of the soul (*jīva*) [on account of its] marking (*liṅgana*), indicating (*sūcana*), pointing out (*pradarśana*), supporting (*upaṣṭambhana*), and (*ca*) manifesting (*vyañjana*).

dvividhāni ||2.16||

2.16.1 [The five senses are] twofold (*dvividha*).

[2.16.1] *dvividhānīndriyāṇi bhavanti |* [2.16.2] *dravyendriyāṇi bhāvendriyāṇi ca ||* [2.16.3] *tatra*

[The five] senses (*indriya*) are (*bhavanti*) twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], the sense organs⁸¹⁶ (*dravya-indriya*) and (*ca*) the sense faculties (*bhāva-indriya*).⁸¹⁷ Among them (*tatra*):

nirvṛtṭyupakaraṇe dravyendriyam ||2.17||

2.17 The sense organ (*dravya-indriya*) [consists of] the ‘manifestation’ (*nirvṛtṭi*) [and] the ‘instrument’ (*upakaraṇa*).

[2.17.1] *nirvṛtṭīndriyam upakaraṇendriyaṃ ca dvividhaṃ dravyendriyam |*

The sense organ (*dravya-indriya*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], the manifested sense (*nirvṛtṭi-indriya*) and (*ca*) the instrumental sense (*upakaraṇa-indriya*).

[2.17.2] *nirvṛtṭir aṅgopāṅganāmanirvartitānīndriyadvārāṇi karmaviśeṣa-saṃskṛtāḥ śarīrapradeśāḥ |*

The ‘manifestation’ (*nirvṛtṭi*) [is] the regions of the body (*śarīra-pradeśa*) [that are] conditioned [by] a particular type of *karman*⁸¹⁸ (*karma-viśeṣa-saṃskṛta*), [i.e.], the

⁸¹⁶ Literally ‘material sense’.

⁸¹⁷ For a discussion of this distinction, see § 3.3, *The five senses*.

apertures [of] the senses (*indriyadvāra*) [that are] brought about (*nirvartita*) [by] body determining [*karman* that causes] the limbs and additional limbs⁸¹⁹ (*aṅga-upāṅga-nāma*).

[2.17.3] ***nirmāṇanāmāṅgapratyayā mūlaguṇanirvartanety arthaḥ*** ||

The meaning is (*ity artha*): [whose] accomplishment [is due to] the basic virtues⁸²⁰ (*mūla-guṇa-nirvartana*) [and whose] cause⁸²¹ (*pratyaya*) [of] the body-parts (*aṅga*) [is the *karman* that causes] the formation [of the body]⁸²² (*nirmāṇa-nāma*).

[2.17.4] ***upakaraṇaṃ bāhyam abhyantaraṃ ca*** | [2.17.5] ***nirvartitasyānupa-ghātānugrahābhyām upakārīti*** ||

The ‘instrument’⁸²³ (*upakaraṇa*) [is] outer (*bāhhyā*) and (*ca*) interior (*abhyantara*). [Is is] assisting (*upakārīn*) [by] not-obstructing (*anupaghāta*) [and] favouring (*anugraha*) [that which is] brought about (*nirvartita*)⁸²⁴ (*iti*).

labdhyupayogau bhāvendriyam ||2.18||

2.18 The sense faculty (*bhāva-indriya*) [consists of] acquisition (*labdhi*) and [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*).

[2.18.1] ***labdhir upayogaś ca bhāvendriyaṃ bhavati*** |

The sense faculty (*bhāvendriya*) is (*bhavati*) acquisition (*labdhi*) and (*ca*) [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*).

⁸¹⁸ Alternatively, ‘for a particular type of action’. However, Siddhasenagaṇi glosses ‘*karmaviśeṣa*’ as ‘*nāmakarman*’.

⁸¹⁹ I.e., a particular type of body determining *karman* (*aṅgopaṅganāmakarmani*). For a discussion of the 93 varieties of *nāmakarman*, see Glasenapp 1925: 188ff.

⁸²⁰ In the Śvetāmbara tradition, the word ‘*mūlaguṇa*’ usually refers to the list of *aṇuvrata*, i.e., the minor vows that a householder should observe. See Williams 1963: 50ff for a discussion of the different lists of *mūlaguṇa*.

⁸²¹ Siddhasenagaṇi glosses ‘*nimitta*’.

⁸²² Glasenapp explains *nirmāṇanāmakarman* as the *karman* that ‘causes that the parts of a being are in the right place’ (Glasenapp 1925: 190).

⁸²³ I.e., the *dravyendriya* as instrument (see TA 2.17).

⁸²⁴ Perhaps the intended meaning is ‘brought about [by *aṅgopaṅganāmakarman*]’ (see ‘*nirvartita*’ in TABh 2.17.2).

[2.18.2] **labdhir nāma gati-jātyādināmakarmajanitā tadāvaraṇīyakarma-kṣayaopasamajanitā cendriyāśrayakarmodayanirvṛttā ca jīvasya bhavati |**

[That which is] called (*nāma*) ‘acquisition’ (*labdhi*), is (*bhavati*) [that which is]:

- i. produced (*janita*) by body-determining *karman* (*nāmakarman*), beginning with [the varieties of] transmigration [and] birth (*gati-jāti-ādi*), and (*ca*)
- ii. produced (*janita*) by both destruction [and] cessation (*kṣaya-upasama*) of *karman* [that is] covering that (i.e., knowledge- and worldview)⁸²⁵ (*tad-āvaraṇīya-karman*), and (*ca*)
- iii. resulting (*nirvṛtta*) from the rising (*udaya*) of *karman* [that is] attached to the senses (*indriya-āśraya-karman*), of the soul (*jīva*).

[2.18.3] **sā pañcavidhā |** [2.18.4] **tadyathā |** [2.18.5] **sparsānendriyalabdhiḥ rasanendriyalabdhiḥ ghrāṇendriyalabdhiḥ cakṣurindriyalabdhiḥ śrotrendriyalabdhir iti ||**

It (i.e., *labdhi*) (*tad*) [is] fivefold (*pañcavidha*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- i. acquisition [related to] the sense of touch (*sparsāna-indriya-labdhi*)
- ii. acquisition [related to] the sense of taste (*rasana-indriya-labdhi*)
- iii. acquisition [related to] the sense of smell (*ghrāṇa-indriya-labdhi*)
- iv. acquisition [related to] the sense of sight (*cakṣus-indriya-labdhi*)
- v. acquisition [related to] the sense of hearing (*śrotra-indriya-labdhi*) (*iti*).

upayogaḥ sparsādiṣu ||2.19||⁸²⁶

2.19 [Cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) relates to touch (i.e., touchable objects) (*sparsā*) etc.

[2.19.1] **sparsādiṣu matijñānopayoga ity arthaḥ |**

The meaning is (*ity artha*): [Cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñāna-upayoga*) with respect to touch etc. (*sparsā-ādi*)

[2.19.2] **uktam etad upayogo lakṣaṇam |**

It (*etad*) has been said (see TA 2.8) (*ukta*) [that] ‘[cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) [is] the characteristic [of the soul] (*lakṣaṇa*)’.

[2.19.3] **upayogaḥ praṇidhānam āyogas tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāma ity arthaḥ ||**

⁸²⁵ See, e.g., TABh 1.7.19.

⁸²⁶ This *sūtra* is not included in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

‘[Cognitive] operation’ (*upayoga*) — the meaning is (*ity artha*): ‘directing’⁸²⁷ (*prañidhāna*), ‘joining’ (*āyoga*), ‘becoming’ (*tad-bhāva*), ‘developing’ (*pariṇāma*).

[2.19.4] **eṣāṃ ca satyāṃ nirvṛttāv upakaraṇopayogau bhavataḥ** | [2.19.5] **satyāṃ ca labdhau nirvṛtṭyupakaraṇopayogā bhavanti** | [2.19.6] **nirvṛtṭyādīnām ekatarābhāve viṣayālocanaṃ na bhavati** |

And (*ca*) among these (i.e., *nirvṛtti*, *upakaraṇa*, *labdhi*, and *upayoga*)⁸²⁸ (*idam*), when there is (*satī*) the manifestation (*nirvṛtti*), [then] there are (*bhavatas*) the instrument and cognitive operation (*upakaraṇa-upayoga*). And (*ca*) when there is (*satī*) acquisition (*labdhi*), there are (*bhavanti*) the manifestation, the instrument, and cognitive operation (*nirvṛtti-upakaraṇa-upayoga*). [There] is (*bhavati*) no (*na*) perception of the range [of the senses] (*viṣaya-ālocana*) in the absence of one (*ekatarā-abhāva*) of the ‘manifestation’ etc. (*nirvṛtti-ādi*).⁸²⁹

[2.19.7] **atrāha** | [2.19.8] **uktaṃ bhavatā pañcendriyānīti** | [2.19.9] **tat kāni tādīndriyānīty ucyate** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (*bhavat*) [that] ‘[there are] five senses (*pañca-indriya*)’ (see TA 2.15) (*iti*). Now (*tad*), which (*kim*) [are] these (*tad*) senses (*indriya*)? It is said (*ucyate*):

sparśanarasanaghrāṇacakṣuḥśrotrāṇi ||2.20||

2.20 [The five senses are]:

- i. [sense of] touch (*sparśana*)
- ii. [sense of] taste (*rasana*)
- iii. [sense of] smell (*ghrāṇa*)
- iv. [sense of] sight (*cakṣus*) [and]
- v. [sense of] hearing (*śrotra*).

[2.20.1] **sparśanaṃ rasanam ghrāṇam cakṣuḥ śrotram ity etāni pañcendriyāṇi** |
[Sense of] touch (*sparśana*), [sense of] taste (*rasana*), [sense of] smell (*ghrāṇa*), [sense of] sight (*cakṣus*), [and] [sense of] hearing (*śrotra*) (*iti*) — these (*etad*) [are] the five senses (*pañca-indriya*).

⁸²⁷ *pra+ni+√dhā*: ‘to turn or direct (the eyes or thoughts) upon’ (MW).

⁸²⁸ See TA 2.17 – 2.18.

⁸²⁹ Sanghvi explains the order as follows: *labdhi* is a prerequisite for *nirvṛtti*. Again, *nirvṛtti* is a prerequisite for *upakaraṇa* and *upayoga*. *Upayoga* is the combination of *labdhi*, *nirvṛtti* and *upakaraṇa* (Sanghvi 1974: 89-90).

***sparśarasagandhavarṇasābdās teṣām arthāḥ* ||2.21||**

2.21 The objects (*artha*) of them (i.e., of the senses) (*tad*) [are]:

- i. touch (*sparśa*)
- ii. taste (*rasa*)
- iii. smell (*gandha*)
- iv. colour (*varṇa*)
- v. and sound (*śabda*).

[2.21.1] *eteṣām indriyāṇām ete sparśādayo 'rthā bhavanti yathāsaṅkhyam* ||

These (*etad*) objects (*artha*), beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*), are (*bhavanti*) respectively (*yathāsaṅkhyam*) [the objects] of these (*etad*) senses (*indriya*).

***śrutam anindriyasya* ||2.22||**

2.22 Testimony (*śruta*) [is the object] of the mind (*anindriya*).

[2.22.1] *śrutajñānaṃ dvividham anekadvādaśavidhaṃ noindriyasyārthaḥ* |

Knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], manifold [and] twelvefold (see TABh 1.20.3 – 1.20.4) (*aneka-dvādaśavidha*). [It is] the object (*artha*) of the mind (*noindriya*).⁸³⁰

[2.22.2] *atrāha* | [2.22.3] *uktaṃ bhavatā pṛthivyabvanaspatitejovāyavo dvīndriyādayas*⁸³¹ *ca nava jīvanikāyāḥ* | [2.22.4] *pañcendriyāṇi ceti* | [2.22.5] *tat kiṃ kasyendriyam iti* | [2.22.6] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TA 2.13 – 2.14) (*bhavat*) [that] earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), plants (*vanaspati*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), and (*ca*) [beings with] two senses etc. (*dvi-indriya-ādi*) [are] the nine classes of souls (*jīva-nikāya*). And [is has also been said by you] (*ca*) [that there are] five senses (*pañca-indriya*) (see TA 2.15) (*iti*). Now (*tad*), which sense (*kim ... indriya*) [belongs to] which [class of beings] (*kim*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

⁸³⁰ The *bhāṣya* reads 'noindriya' instead of 'anindriya'. The same phenomenon occurs in TABh 1.19.1. For a discussion of this peculiar word formation, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

⁸³¹ Mody erroneously reads 'dvīndriyādayas'. Kapadia has the correct reading '-ādayas'.

vāyvantānām ekam ||2.23||

2.23 [Souls] up to the air[-bodied]⁸³² (*vāyv-anta*) [have] one [sense] (i.e., touch) (*eka*).⁸³³

[2.23.1] ***pr̥thivyādīnām vāyvantānām jīvanikāyānām ekam evendriyaṃ sūtrakramaprāmāṇyāt prathamam sparsanam evety arthaḥ |***

The meaning [is] (*ity artha*): [There is] only (*eva*) one (*eka*) sense (*indriya*) for the classes of souls (*jīva-nikāya*) beginning with earth (*pr̥thivī-ādi*) up to air (*vāyu-anta*). Following the authoritativeness of the order [in] the *sūtra* (*sūtra-krama-prāmāṇya*), the first [is] indeed (*eva*) sense of touch (*sparsana*).

kṛmipipīlikābhramaramanuṣyādīnām ekaikavṛddhāni ||2.24||

2.24 [The number of senses of] worms (*kṛmi*), ants (*pipīlikā*), bees (*bhramara*), human beings (*manuṣya*) etc. (*ādi*) increases one by one (i.e., worms have two senses, ants three etc.) (*ekaika-vṛddha*).

[2.24.1] ***kṛmyādīnām pipīlikādīnām bhramarādīnām manuṣyādīnām ca yathāsaṅkhyam ekaikavṛddhānīndriyāṇi bhavanti |***

The senses (*indriya*) of

- i. [the class of souls] beginning with worms (*kṛmi-ādi*),
- ii. [the class of souls] beginning with ants (*pipīlikā-ādi*),
- iii. [the class of souls] beginning with bees (*bhramara-ādi*), and (*ca*)
- iv. [the class of souls] beginning with human beings (*manuṣya-ādi*)

are (*bhavanti*) respectively (*yathāsaṅkhyam*) increasing one by one (*ekaika-vṛddha*).

[2.24.2] ***yathākramam |*** [2.24.3] ***tadyathā |*** [2.24.4] ***kṛmyādīnām apādika-nūpurakagaṇḍūpadaśaṅkhasuktikāśambūkājālūkāprabhṛtīnām ekendriyebhyaḥ pr̥thivyādibhya ekena vṛddhe sparsanarasanendriye bhavataḥ |***

Successively⁸³⁴ (*yathākramam*) — Namely (*tad-yathā*): The senses of touch and taste (*sparsana-rasana-indriya*) are (*bhavatas*) increased (*vṛddha*) by one (*eka*) from [the class of souls] beginning with earth etc. (*pr̥thivī-ādi*) for [the class of souls]

⁸³² The *Sarvārthasiddhi* reads '*vanaspatyantānām*', 'up to the plant-bodied'.

⁸³³ For a discussion of this passage, see §3.3, *Number of senses in classes of beings*.

⁸³⁴ Kapadia adds '*yathākramam*' to the previous sentence.

beginning with worms⁸³⁵ (*kṛmi-ādi*) — [i.e.], beginning with (*prabhṛtin*) *apādika*, *nūpuraka*, *gaṇḍūpada*, conch-shells (*śaṅkha*), *śuktikā*, *śambūkā*, [and] leeches (*jalūkā*).⁸³⁶

[2.24.5] ***tato 'py ekena vṛddhāni pipīlikārohiṇikāupacikākunthūtuburukatra-
pusabijakarpāsāsthikāśatapadyutpatakatṛṇapatrakāṣṭahāarakaprabhṛtīnām
trīṇi sparśanarasanaghrāṇāni |***

Again (*api*), from that (i.e., the class of souls beginning with worms) (*tatas*), the three (*tri*) [senses of] touch, taste, [and] smell (*sparśana-rasana-ghrāṇa*) [are] increased (*vṛddha*) by one (*eka*) for [the class of souls] beginning with (*prabhṛtin*) ants (*pipīlikā*), *rohiṇikā*, *upacikā*, *kunthū*, *tuburuka*, *trapusabīja*, *karpāsāsthikā*, centipedes (*śatapadī*), *utpataka*, *tṛṇapatra*, [and] *kāṣṭa-hāraka*.

[2.24.6] ***tato 'py ekena vṛddhāni bhramara-vaṭara-sāraṅga-makṣikā-puttikā-
daṃśa-maśaka-vṛścika-nandyāvarta-kīṭa-pataṅgādīnām catvāri sparśana-
rasanaghrāṇacakṣūṃṣi |***

Again (*api*), from that (i.e., the class of souls beginning with ants) (*tatas*), the four (*catur*) [senses of] touch, taste, smell, [and] sight (*sparśana-rasana-ghrāṇa-cakṣus*) [are] increased (*vṛddha*) by one (*eka*) for [the class of souls] beginning with (*ādī*) bees (*bhramara*), *vaṭara*, *sāraṅga*, flies (*makṣikā*), *puttikā*, gnats (*daṃśa*), mosquitos (*maśaka*), scorpions (*vṛścika*), *nandyāvarta*, worms (*kīṭa*), [and] moths (*pataṅga*).

[2.24.7] ***śeṣānām ca tiryagyonijānām matsyoragabhujāṅgapakṣicatuṣ-
padānām sarveṣāṃ ca narakamanuṣyadevānām pañcendriyāṇīti ||***

And (*ca*) [there are] five (*pañca*) senses (*indriya*) for the remaining [classes of souls] (*śeṣa*), [i.e.]:

- i. [beings] born from the womb of an animal (*tiryag-yoni-ja*) and (*ca*)
- ii. all (*sarva*) fishes, snakes, serpents, birds, [and] quadrupeds (*matsya-uraga-
bhujāṅga-pakṣi-catuṣpada*) [and]
- iii. hellish beings, human beings, [and] gods (*nāraka-manuṣya-deva*) (*iti*).

⁸³⁵ In other words, the class of souls that includes worms etc. has one sense more than the class of souls that includes earth etc.

⁸³⁶ I have been unable to identify most of the species in this list and the following two lists.

[2.24.8] *atrāha* | [2.24.9] *uktaṃ bhavatā dvividhā jīvāḥ* | [2.24.10] *samanaskā amanaskāś ceti* | [2.24.11] *tatra ke samanaskā iti* | [2.24.12] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TABh 2.11.1) (*bhavat*) [that] souls (*jīva*) [are] twofold (*dvividha*): with minds (*samanaska*) and without minds (*amanaska*). Among them (*tatra*), which [souls] (*kim*) [are provided] with minds (*samanaska*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

***saṃjñīnaḥ samanaskāḥ* ||2.25||**

2.25 Conscious [beings] (*saṃjñīn*) [are provided] with minds (*samanaska*).

[2.25.1] *saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñāyāṃ saṃjñīno jīvāḥ samanaskā bhavanti* |

Souls (*jīva*) [that are] conscious (*saṃjñīn*) with respect to the awareness of deliberation⁸³⁷ (*saṃpradhāraṇa-saṃjñā*) are (*bhavanti*) [provided] with minds (*samanaska*).

[2.25.2] *sarve narakadevā garbhavyutkrāntayaś ca manuṣyās tiryagyonijās ca kecid* ||

[I.e.], all (*sarva*) hellish beings and gods (*nāraka-deva*), and (*ca*) [beings] born from the womb (*garbhavyutkrānti*), [and] human beings (*manuṣya*), and (*ca*) some⁸³⁸ (*kecid*) [beings] born from the womb of animals (*tiryagyonija*).

[2.25.3] *ihā*⁸³⁹ *pohayuktā guṇadoṣavicāraṇātmikā saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā* |

[2.25.4] *tāṃ prati saṃjñīno vivakṣitāḥ* |

The awareness of deliberation (*saṃpradhāraṇa-saṃjñā*), the nature of which [is] the distinction [between] merits and defects⁸⁴⁰ (*guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā-ātmikā*), [is] connected with desire and exclusion (*ihā-apoha-yuktā*). [Souls are] said (*vivakṣita*) [to be] ‘conscious’ (see TA 2.15) (*saṃjñīn*) with respect to (*prati*) this (i.e., *saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā*) (*tad*).

⁸³⁷ I.e., with moral consciousness (see TABh 2.25.3). According to Sanghvi, the term ‘*saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā*’ refers to ‘reflection over the merits and demerits of things’ (Sanghvi 1974: 95-96).

⁸³⁸ The Sanskrit is ambiguous; it is not clear whether *kecid* should be connected with both *manuṣya* and *tiryagyonija* or only with the latter. Siddhasenagaṇi connects *kecid* with *tiryagyonija* only.

⁸³⁹ Mody reads *ihopoha-*. Kapadia has the correct reading ‘*ihā-*’.

⁸⁴⁰ See also TABh 1.15.8.

[2.25.5] *anyathā hy āhārabhayamaithunaparigrahasaṃjñābhiḥ sarva eva jīvāḥ saṃjñina iti ||*

For (*hi*), otherwise (*anyathā*), all (*sarva*) souls (*jīva*) [would be] indeed (*eva*) conscious (*saṃjñin*), by the awareness of taking food, fear, sexual intercourse [and] possession (*āhāra-bhaya-maithuna-parigraha-saṃjñā*).

Tattvārthādhigama Chapter V

[5.0.1] *uktā jīvāḥ* | [5.0.2] *ajīvān vakṣyāmaḥ* ||

Souls (*jīva*) have been discussed (*ukta*). [Now] we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) non-souls (i.e., inanimate entities) (*ajīva*).⁸⁴¹

***ajīvakāyā dharmādharmākāśapudgalāḥ* ||5.1||**

5.1 The inanimate entities⁸⁴² (*ajīva-kāya*) [are]:

- i. motion (*dharmā*)
- ii. rest (*adharma*)
- iii. space (*ākāśa*) [and]
- iv. material elements⁸⁴³ (*pudgala*).

[5.1.1] *dharmāstikāyo 'dharmāstikāya ākāśastikāyāḥ pudgalāstikāya ity ajīvakāyāḥ* | [5.1.2] *tān lakṣaṇataḥ parastād vakṣyāmaḥ* |

We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) them (*tad*) below (see TABh 5.16.11) (*parastāt*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*). The category of motion (*dharmā-astikāya*), the category of rest (*adharma-astikāya*), the category of space (*ākāśa-astikāya*) and the category of material elements (*pudgala-astikāya*) — [these are] (*iti*) the inanimate entities (*ajīvakāya*).

[5.1.3] *kāyagrahaṇaṃ pradeśāvayavabahutvārtham addhāsamaya-pratiṣedhārthaṃ ca* ||

The expression ‘entity’ (*kāya-grahaṇa*) [denotes] the plurality of space-points and parts (*pradeśa-avayava*⁸⁴⁴-*bahutva-artha*) and (*ca*) the exclusion of ‘real-time’⁸⁴⁵ (*addhā-samaya-pratiṣedha-artha*).

⁸⁴¹ For a discussion of the different substances in the TA, see § 3.4, *The substances*.

⁸⁴² I translate ‘*kāya*’ as ‘entity’. The primary meaning ‘body’ does not fit in this context, since the list of entities (*kāya*) also includes space, motion, and rest.

⁸⁴³ The word ‘*pudgala*’ consistently appears in plural in the TA. Therefore, I translate ‘material elements’.

⁸⁴⁴ The word ‘*avayava*’ is also used in Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which postulates ‘[a] “whole” (*avayavin*) as an entity over and above its constituent parts (*avayava*)’ (Halbfass 1992: 94).

⁸⁴⁵ Jacobi translates the term ‘*addhāsamaya*’ as ‘real-time’ (*Uttarādhyayana* 35: 5-6). He explains: ‘It has no divisions or parts as the other things, because of time only the present

***dravyāṇi jīvās ca* ||5.2||**

5.2 [These inanimate entities] together with (*ca*) the souls (*jīva*) are the substances (*dravya*).

[5.2.1] ***ete dharmādayas catvāro prāṇinas ca pañca dravyāni ca bhavantīti*** |

And (*ca*) these (*etad*) four [entities] (*catur*), beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*), together with (*ca*) the living [entities] (*prāṇin*) are (*bhavantī*) the five (*pañca*) substances (*dravya*) (*iti*).

[5.2.2] ***uktaṃ hi matiśrutayor nibandho dravyeṣv asarvāparyāyeṣu sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasyeti*** ||

Indeed (*hi*), it has been said (see TA 1.27, 1.30) (*ukta*) [that] ‘the binding (i.e., the range) (*nibandha*) of ordinary cognition (*matī*) and testimony (*śruta*) [extends to all] substances (*dravya*)⁸⁴⁶ [but] not in all modes (*asarva-paryāya*)’ and ‘[the domain of] absolute knowledge (*kevala*) [extends to] all modes of all substances (*sarva-dravya-paryāya*)’.

nityāvasthitāny arūpāni ||5.3||⁸⁴⁷

5.3 [These substances] are eternal (*nitya*), fixed⁸⁴⁸ (*avasthita*) [and] formless (*arūpa*).

moment is existent. And a moment cannot be divided’ (Jacobi 1885: 208, n1). Time is not included in the list of ‘entities’ (*kāya*) or ‘substances’ (*dravya*) in TA 5.1, even though TA 5.38 mentions that some people regard time as a substance.

⁸⁴⁶ TA 1.27 reads ‘*sarvadravyeṣu*’.

⁸⁴⁷ Siddhasenagaṇi discusses several interpretations of this *sūtra* and mentions the variant reading ‘*rūpīni*’, which is also given in Mody. Kapadia adds ‘*ca*’ after *arūpāni*. It is unclear to me why the *sūtra* presents ‘*nitya*’ and ‘*avasthita*’ in compound, unlike ‘*arūpa*’. The syntax is somewhat odd if the author is trying to express that the five *dravyas* have these three qualities, as the *bhāṣya* suggests. In fact, there are two other possibilities to translate this *sūtra*:

- I. ‘The formless [substances] [are] eternal and fixed.’
- II. ‘[The five substances are] eternal and fixed. [There are] formless [substances].’ (By contrast, the material elements do have form. See TA 5.4).

However, both alternatives are contradicted by TABh 5.3.5.

⁸⁴⁸ I.e., their number is fixed (Jacobi 1906: 512). See also 5.3.4.

[5.3.1] *etāni dravyāṇi nityāni bhavanti* | [5.3.2] *tadbhāvavyayaṃ nityam iti vakṣyate* ||

These (*etad*) substances (*dravya*) are (*bhavanti*) eternal (*nitya*). It will be said (see TA 5.30) (*vakṣyate*) [that] '[that] whose state is not changing (*tad-bhāva-avyaya*), [is] eternal (*nitya*)' (*iti*).

[5.3.3] *avasthitāni ca* | [5.3.4] *na hi kadācit pañcatvaṃ bhūtārthatvaṃ ca vyabhicaranti* ||

And (*ca*) [these substances are] fixed (*avasthita*). For (*hi*), [they] never (*na ... kadācit*) transgress (*vyabhicaranti*) the quality of being five (*pañcatva*) and (*ca*) the quality of being real (*bhūtārthatva*).

[5.3.5] *arūpāni ca* | [5.3.6] *naiṣāṃ rūpam astīti* | [5.3.7] *rūpaṃ mūrtir mūrtyāśrayās ca sparśādaya iti* ||

And (*ca*) [these substances are] formless (*arūpa*).⁸⁴⁹ [There] is (*asti*) no (*na*) form (*rūpa*) for them (*idam*). 'Form' (*rūpa*) [is] 'embodiment' (*mūrti*), and (*ca*) [the objects of the senses (see TA 2.21)] beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*) [are] dependent on embodiment (*mūrti-āśraya*) (*iti*).

***rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ* ||5.4||**

5.4 [However], material elements (*pudgala*) [are] having form (*rūpin*).

[5.4.1] *pudgalā eva rūpiṇo bhavanti* | [5.4.2] *rūpam eṣāṃ asty eṣu vāstīti rūpiṇaḥ* ||

Only (*eva*)⁸⁵⁰ material elements (*pudgala*) are (*bhavanti*) having form (*rūpin*). [There] is (*asti*) form (*rūpa*) for them (*idam*), or (*vā*), [there] is (*asti*) [form] in the case of them (*idam*) — [that is the meaning of] (*iti*) 'having form' (*rūpin*).

***ākāśād ekadravyāṇi* ||5.5||**

5.5 [The substances] up to space (i.e., motion, rest and space) (*ā-ākāśa*)⁸⁵¹ [are] unique substances (*eka-dravya*).

⁸⁴⁹ Alternatively, 'And there are formless [substances].' See the footnote on TA 5.3.

⁸⁵⁰ Alternatively, 'material elements are **indeed** (*eva*) having form'.

⁸⁵¹ The *bhāṣya* explains '*ākāśād*' as '*ā ākāśād*'.

[5.5.1] *ā ākāśād dharmādīny ekadravyāṅy eva bhavanti* | [5.5.2] *pudgalajīvās tv anekadravyāṅīti* ||

[The substances] up to space (*ā ākāśa*), beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*) are (*bhavanti*) indeed (*eva*) unique substances (*ekadravya*). However (*tu*), material elements [and] souls (*pudgala-jīva*) [are] non-unique substances (*aneka-dravya*).

niṣkriyāṅī ca ||5.6||

5.6 And [they] (i.e., motion, rest, and space) (*ca*) [are] inactive (*niṣkriya*).

[5.6.1] *ā ākāśād eva dharmādīni niṣkriyāṅī bhavanti* | [5.6.2] *pudgalajīvās tu kriyāvantaḥ* | [5.6.3] *kriyeti gatikarmāha* |

[The substances] up to space (*ā ākāśa*), beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*) are (*bhavanti*) indeed (*eva*) inactive (*niṣkriya*). However (*tu*), material elements [and] souls (*pudgala-jīva*) [are] active (*kriyāvāt*). It has been said (*āha*)⁸⁵² [that] ‘action’ (*kriyā*) (*iti*) [is] ‘the action of going’⁸⁵³ (*gati-karman*).

[5.6.4] *atrāha* | [5.6.5] *uktaṃ bhavatā pradeśāvayavabahutvaṃ kāyasamjñam iti* | [5.6.6] *tasmāt ka eṣāṃ dharmādīnāṃ pradeśāvayavaniyama iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TABh 5.1.3) (*bhavāt*) [that] the term ‘entity’ (*kāya-samjñā*) [denotes] ‘the plurality of space-points and parts’ (*pradeśa-avayava-bahutva*) (*iti*). Therefore (*tasmāt*), what (*kim*) [is] the limitation (i.e., number) of space-points and parts (*pradeśa-avayava-niyama*) for these (*idam*) [substances] beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*)?

[5.6.7] *atrocyate* | [5.6.8] *sarveṣāṃ pradeśāḥ santy anyatra paramāṇoḥ* | [5.6.9] *avayavās tu skandhānām eva* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): For all [substances] (*sarva*) there are (*santi*) space-points (*pradeśa*), except for an infinitesimal particle (*parama-aṇu*). However (*tu*), [there are] parts⁸⁵⁴ (*avayava*) for the aggregates (*skandha*) only (*eva*).

⁸⁵² Siddhasenagaṇi comments that ‘*āha*’ refers to the author of the *sūtra*. However, I have not been able to identify the source of this reference.

⁸⁵³ Alternatively, ‘the *karman* of transmigration’. Siddhasenagaṇi explains that the author of the *bhāṣya* uses an alternative root, i.e., ‘*gam-dhātu*’ instead of ‘*ḥ-dhātu*’.

⁸⁵⁴ See TABh 5.1.3.

[5.6.10] *vakṣyate hy aṇavaḥ skandhās ca saṃghātabhedebhya utpadyante iti* ||
[5.6.11] *tatra*

For (*hi*), it will be said (see TA 5.25, TA 6.26) (*vakṣyate*) [that] '[material elements exist as] atoms (*aṇu*) and aggregates (*skandha*)' [and that] '[they] result (*utpad*) from combination (*saṃghāta*) [and] disintegration (*bheda*)' (*iti*). Among them (i.e., the substances) (*tatra*):

***asaṅkhyeyāḥ pradeśā dharmādharmayoḥ* ||5.7||**

5.7 [There are] innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) space-points (*pradeśa*) for motion [and] rest (*dharmā-adharma*).

[5.7.1] *pradeśo nāmāpekṣikaḥ sarvasūkṣmas tu paramāṇor avagāha iti* ||

[That which is] called (*nāma*) 'space-point' (*pradeśa*) [is] relative⁸⁵⁵ (*āpekṣika*). However (*tu*), the abidance⁸⁵⁶ (*avagāha*) of the infinitesimal particle (*parama-aṇu*) [is] most subtle (*sarva-sūkṣma*).⁸⁵⁷

***jīvasya ca* ||5.8||**

5.8 Likewise (see TA 5.7) (*ca*), [there are innumerable space-points] for the soul (*jīva*).

[5.8.1] *ekajīvasya cāsaṅkhyeyāḥ pradeśā bhavantīti* ||

Likewise (*ca*), [there] are (*bhavanti*) innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) space-points (*pradeśa*) for an individual soul (*eka-jīva*).

***ākāśasyānantāḥ* ||5.9||**

5.9 There are infinitely many [space-points] (*ananta*) for space (*ākāśa*).

[5.9.1] ***lokālokākāśasyānantāḥ pradeśāḥ* |** [5.9.2] ***lokākāśasya tu dharmādharmajīvais tulyāḥ* ||**

The worldly realm and that which is beyond the world (*loka-aloka-ākāśa*) have infinitely many (*ananta*) space-points (*pradeśa*). However, [the space-points] of the

⁸⁵⁵ TABh 5.24.5 distinguishes relative (*āpekṣika*) and ultimate (*antya*) subtlety of matter.

⁸⁵⁶ For an explanation of the term 'abidance' (*avagāha*), see TA 5.12.

⁸⁵⁷ For a discussion of the size of space-points (*pradeśa*) and the infinitesimal particle (*paramaṇu*), see § 3.4, *Space and space-points*.

worldly realm (*loka-ākāśa*) [are] equal to (*tulya*) [the space-points occupied by] motion, rest, and souls (*dharma-adharma-jīva*).⁸⁵⁸

saṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyās ca pudgalānām ||5.10||

5.10 [There are infinitely many]⁸⁵⁹ and (*ca*) numerable (*saṅkhyeya*) [and] innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) [space-points] for material elements (*pudgala*).

[5.10.1] ***saṅkhyeyā asaṅkhyeyā anantās ca pudgalānām pradeśā bhavanti |***

[5.10.2] ***anantā iti vartate ||***

There are (*bhavanti*) numerable (*saṅkhyeya*), innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) and (*ca*) infinitely many (*ananta*) space-points (*pradeśa*) for material elements (*pudgala*). [The expression] ‘infinitely many’ (*ananta iti*) is present (i.e., is carried over from TA 5.9) (*vartate*).⁸⁶⁰

nāṇoḥ ||5.11||

5.11 [There are] no [space-points] for an atom (*aṇu*).

[5.11.1] ***aṇoḥ pradeśā na bhavanti |*** [5.11.2] ***anādir amadhyo 'pradeśo hi paramāṇuḥ ||***

There are (*bhavanti*) no (*na*) space-points (*pradeśa*) for an atom (*aṇu*). For (*hi*), the infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) [is] without beginning (*anādi*), without centre (*amadhya*), [and] without space-point (*apradeśa*).⁸⁶¹

lokākāśe 'vagāhaḥ ||5.12||

5.12 [There is] abidance (*avagāha*)⁸⁶² in the worldly realm (*loka-ākāśa*).

[5.12.1] ***avagāhinām avagāho lokākāśe bhavati ||***

The abidance (*avagāha*) of [those entities that are] abiding (*avagāhin*) is (*bhavati*) in the worldly realm (*lokākāśa*).

⁸⁵⁸ In other words, the space-points in *loka* are innumerable but not infinitely many. The space-points in *aloka* are infinitely many.

⁸⁵⁹ See TABh 5.10.2.

⁸⁶⁰ For an explanation of the meaning of ‘*vartate*’, see Tubb & Boose 2007: 165-166.

⁸⁶¹ See also TABh 5.14.1.

⁸⁶² The prime meaning of the word ‘*avagāha*’ is ‘plunging’ or ‘bathing’ (MW). In this passage, the term refers to the act of occurring or existing in a specific part of the cosmos.

dharmādharmayoḥ kṛtsne ||5.13||

5.13 [There is abidance of] motion [and] rest (*dharmā-adharma*) in the entire (*kṛtsna*) [worldly realm].

[5.13.1] ***dharmādharmayoḥ kṛtsne lokākāśe 'vagāho bhavatīti ||***

There is (*bhavatī*) abidance (*avagāha*) of motion [and] rest (*dharmā-adharma*) in the entire (*kṛtsna*) [worldly realm].

ekapradeśādiṣu bhājyaḥ pudgalānām ||5.14||

5.14 [There is] distribution (*bhājya*) of material elements (*pudgala*) in one space-point etc. (*eka-pradeśa-ādi*).

[5.14.1] ***apradeśasaṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyānantapradeśānām pudgalānām ekādiṣv ākāśapradeśeṣu bhājya 'vagāhaḥ |***

Abidance (*avagāha*) [is] distribution (*bhājya*) of material elements (*pudgala*) — [which are] without space-points, with numerable, innumerable, and infinitely many space-points (*apradeśa-saṅkhyeya-asāṅkhyeya-ananta-pradeśa*) — in [a number of] units of space⁸⁶³ (*ākāśa-pradeśa*), beginning with one (*eka-ādi*).⁸⁶⁴

[5.14.2] ***bhājyo vibhājyo vikalpa ity anarthāntaram |***

'Distribution' (*bhājya*), 'to be divided' (*vibhājya*), 'arranged' (*vikalpa*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).⁸⁶⁵

[5.14.3] ***tadyathā |*** [5.14.4] ***paramāṇor ekasminn eva pradeśe |*** [5.14.5]

dvyaṅkasyaikasmin dvayoś ca | [5.14.6] ***tryaṅkasyaikasmin dvayos triṣu ca |***

Namely (*tadyathā*):

- i. [the abidance] of the infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) [is] only (*eva*) in one (*eka*) space-point (*pradeśa*);
- ii. [the abidance] of [an aggregate of] two atoms (*dvi-aṅka*) [is] in one (*eka*) and (*ca*) two (*dvi*) [space-points];

⁸⁶³ The general meaning of '*pradeśa*' in this chapter of the TA is 'space-points'. However, it seems that the author of the *bhāṣya* tries to explain this notion by describing space-points as '*ākāśa-pradeśa*', which I translate in this passage as 'units of space'.

⁸⁶⁴ In other words, material elements occupy one or more space-points (see TABh 5.15.4 – 5.14.6).

⁸⁶⁵ Kapadia reads '*bhājyo vibhāṣyo vikalpya*'.

- iii. [the abidance] of [an aggregate of] three atoms (*tri-aṅuka*) [is] in one (*eka*), two (*dvi*), and (*ca*) three (*tri*) [space-points].

[5.14.7] **evam caturaṅukādīnāṃ saṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyapradeśasyaikādiṣu saṅkhyeyeṣv asaṅkhyeyeṣu ca** | [5.14.8] **anantapradeśasya ca** ||

Likewise (*evam*), [the abidance] of

- i. [an aggregate of] four atoms etc. (*catur-aṅuka-ādi*)
- ii. [an aggregate] whose space-point[s]⁸⁶⁶ (*pradeśa*) [are] numerable (*saṅkhyeya*)
- iii. [and an aggregate whose space-points are] innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*)

[is respectively] in

- i. one [space-point] etc. (*eka-ādi*),
- ii. numerable (*saṅkhyeya*), and (*ca*)
- iii. innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) [space-points].

And (*ca*) [the same applies] to [an aggregate] whose space-points [are] infinitely many (*ananta-pradeśa*).

asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām ||5.15||

5.15 [The abidance] of souls (*jīva*) [is] in innumerable parts etc. (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādi*).

[5.15.1] **lokākāśapradeśānām asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām avagāho bhavati** |

[5.15.2] **ā sarvalokād iti** ||

There is (*bhavati*) abidance (*avagāha*) of souls (*jīva*) in innumerable parts⁸⁶⁷ etc. (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādi*) of the space-points in the worldly realm (*loka-ākāśa-pradeśa*), up to the whole world (*ā sarva-loka*).

[5.15.3] **atrāha** | [5.15.4] **ko hetur asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām avagāho bhavatīti** | [5.15.5] **atrocyate** ||

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): What (*kim*) is (*bhavati*) the cause (*hetu*) [of the fact that] ‘there is (*bhavati*) abidance (*avagāha*) of souls (*jīva*) in innumerable parts etc. (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādi*)⁸⁶⁸ (*iti*)’? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

⁸⁶⁶ It is unclear to me why the word ‘-*pradeśasya*’ appears in a singular rather than plural form.

⁸⁶⁷ Siddhasenagaṇi analyses the compound as a *karmadhāraya*.

⁸⁶⁸ See TABh 5.15.1.

pradeśasamhāravisargābhyāṃ pradīpavat ||5.16||

5.16 [It is caused] by contraction (*saṃhāra*) [and] expansion (*visarga*) [of] space-points (*pradeśa*), like a light⁸⁶⁹ (*pradīpa*).

[5.16.1] *jīvasya hi pradeśānāṃ saṃhāravisargāṃ iṣṭau pradīpasyeva |*

For, contraction (*saṃhāra*) [and] expansion (*visarga*) of the space-points (*pradeśa*) of the soul (*jīva*) [are] desired (*iṣṭa*), like (*iva*) [the contraction and expansion] of a light (*pradīpa*).

[5.16.2] *tadyathā | [5.16.3] tailavartyagnyupādānapravṛddhaḥ pradīpo mahatīm api kūṭāgārasālāṃ prakāśayaty aṇvīm api māṇikāvṛtaḥ māṇikāṃ droṇāvṛto droṇam āḍhakāvṛtaścāḍhakaṃ prasthāvṛtaḥ prasthaṃ pāṇyāvṛto pāṇim iti |*

Namely (*tadyathā*), a light (*pradīpa*) [whose] increase [is] dependent on fuel, a wick and fire (*taila-vartī-agni-upādāna-pravṛddha*), illuminates (*prakāśayati*) also (*api*) a big (*mahat*) room [of] a house [up to] the top (*kūṭa-agāra*⁸⁷⁰-*śāla*), as well as (*api*) a small [room] (*aṇvī*). [To illustrate],

- [when there is] a *māṇika*⁸⁷¹ [of fuel], [the light is] limited by a *māṇika* (*māṇika-āvṛta*);
- [when there is] a *droṇa*⁸⁷² [of fuel], [the light is] limited by a *droṇa* (*droṇa-āvṛta*);
- and (*ca*) [when there is] an *āḍhaka*⁸⁷³ [of fuel], [the light is] limited by an *āḍhaka* (*āḍhaka-āvṛta*);
- [when there is] a *prastha*⁸⁷⁴ [of fuel], [the light is] limited by a *prastha* (*prastha-āvṛta*);
- [when there is] a *hand* [of fuel] (*pāṇi*) [the light is] limited by a hand (*pāṇi-āvṛta*) (*iti*).

⁸⁶⁹ I.e., like the reach of a light, which adapts to the size of the space in which the light is placed.

⁸⁷⁰ Or: *āgāra*.

⁸⁷¹ A particular weight.

⁸⁷² Idem.

⁸⁷³ Idem.

⁸⁷⁴ Idem.

[5.16.4] *evam eva pradeśānām saṃhāra-visargābhyām jīvo mahāntam aṇuṃ vā pañcavidhaṃ śarīraskandhaṃ dharmādharmākāśapudgala-jīva-pradeśa-samudāyaṃ vyāpnotīty avagāhata ity arthaḥ |*

Exactly so (*evam eva*), the soul (*jīva*) pervades (*vyāpnoti*)

- a big (*mahānta*) or (*vā*) small [space] (*aṇu*),
- the fivefold (*pañcavidha*) types of the body⁸⁷⁵ (*śarīra-skandha*),
- [or] the totality of space-points of motion, rest, space, material elements, and souls (*dharmādharmā-ākāśa-pudgala-jīva-pradeśa-samudāya*)

by contraction [and] expansion (*saṃhāra-visarga*) [of] space-points (*pradeśa*); ‘it abides’ (*avagāhate*) — [that is] the meaning (i.e., of *vyāpnoti*) (*ity artha*).

[5.16.5] *dharmādharmākāśajīvānām paraspareṇa pudgaleṣu ca vṛttir na virudhyate ’mūrtatvāt ||*

The activity (*vṛtti*) of motion, rest, space, and souls (*dharmādharmā-ākāśa-pudgala-jīva*) and (*ca*) [the activity] in the case of⁸⁷⁶ the material elements (*pudgala*) is not (*na*) mutually (*paraspara*) obstructed (*virudhyate*), on account of the absence of form (*amūrtatva*).

[5.16.6] *atrāha |* [5.16.7] *sati pradeśasaṃhāra-visargasaṃbhava kasmād asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām avagāho bhavati naikapradeśādiṣv iti |* [5.16.8] *atrocyate |*

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): If it is (*sat*) caused⁸⁷⁷ by contraction [and] expansion [of] space-points (*pradeśa-saṃhāra-visarga-saṃbhava*), why (*kasmāt*) is [there] (*bhavati*) abidance (*avagāha*) of souls (*jīva*) in innumerable parts etc.⁸⁷⁸ (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādi*) [but] not (*na*) in a single space-point etc. (*eka-pradeśa-ādi*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

⁸⁷⁵ TA 2.37 lists the five types of body as follows: ‘[The varieties of] body [are]: the gross [body] (*audārika*), [the body that is] subject to change (*vaikriya*), the conveyance [body] (*āhāraka*), the fiery [body], (*taijasa*) [and] the karmic [body] (*kārmaṇa*)’ (*audārika-vaikriyāhārakataijāsakārmaṇāni śarīrāṇi*).

⁸⁷⁶ My interpretation of this sentence is based on Siddhasenagaṇi’s analysis of the syntax.

⁸⁷⁷ See TABh 5.15.4 (*ko hetur*) and TA 5.16.

⁸⁷⁸ See TABh 5.15.2.

[5.16.9] *sayogadvāt saṃsāriṇām caramaśarīratribhāghināvagāhitvāc ca siddhānām iti* |

Due to the quality of being possessed with *yoga*⁸⁷⁹ (*sayogatva*) of worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) and (*ca*) due to abidance [of] the final body, [which is] free from the three parts⁸⁸⁰ (*carama-śarīra-tri-bhāga-hīna-avagāhitva*), of the perfected beings (*siddha*).⁸⁸¹

[5.16.10] *atrāha* | [5.16.11] *uktaṃ bhavatā dharmādīn astikāyān parastāl lakṣaṇato vakṣyāma iti* (5.1) | [5.16.12] *tat kim eṣāṃ lakṣaṇam iti* | [5.16.13] *atrocyate*

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*) — [The following] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TABh 5.1.1 - 5.1.2) (*bhavat*): ‘We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) the categories (*astikāya*) beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*) below (*parastāt*), based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*)’. Now (*tad*), what (*kim*) [are] the characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*) of them (*idam*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

gatisthityupagraho dharmādharmayor upakāraḥ ||5.17||

5.17 The function (*upakāra*) of motion and rest (*dharmā-adharma*) [is] the support (*upagraha*) [of] movement (*gati*) and inertia⁸⁸² (*sthiti*).

[5.17.1] *gatimatāṃ gateḥ sthitimatāṃ ca sthiter upagraho dharmādharmayor upakāro yathāsaṅkhyam* |

The support (*upagraha*) of movement (*gati*) of [those entities] having movement (*gatimat*, gen.pl.) and (*ca*) [the support] of inertia (*sthiti*) of [those entities] having inertia (*sthitimat*), [that is] the function (*upakāra*) of motion and rest (*dharmā-adharma*) respectively (*yathā-saṅkhyam*).

[5.17.2] *upagraho nimittam apekṣā kāraṇam hetur ity anarthāntaram* |

‘Support’ (*upagraha*), ‘condition’ (*nimitta*), ‘requirement’ (*apekṣā*), ‘ground’ (*kāraṇa*), ‘reason’ (*hetu*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

⁸⁷⁹ See also TABh 1.7.35.

⁸⁸⁰ My analysis of the compound follows Siddhasenagaṇi’s interpretation.

⁸⁸¹ It is not entirely clear to me how this passage answers the question that is raised in the previous sentence (TABh 5.16.7).

⁸⁸² In TA 1.7 ‘*sthiti*’ has been translated as ‘duration’. However, in this passage ‘*sthiti*’ refers to the opposite of movement.

[5.17.3] ***upakāraḥ prayojanaṃ guṇo 'rtha ity anarthāntaram*** ||

'Function' (*upakāra*), 'purpose' (*prayojana*), 'quality' (*guṇa*), 'use' (*artha*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

ākāśasyāvagāhaḥ ||5.18||

5.18 [The function, *upakāra*] of space (*ākāśa*) [is] abidance⁸⁸³ (*avagāha*).

[5.18.1] ***avagāhinām dharmādharmapudgalajīvānām avagāha ākāśasyopakāraḥ*** | [5.18.2] ***dharmādharmayor antaḥpraveśasambhavena pudgalajīvānām saṃyogavibhāgaiś ceti*** ||

The function (*upakāra*) of space (*ākāśa*) [is] abidance (*avagāha*) of motion, rest, material elements, and souls (*dharmā-adharma-pudgala-jīva*). [It is] made possible by permeation⁸⁸⁴ (*antaḥpraveśa-sambhava*) of motion and rest (*dharmā-adharma*) and (*ca*) by the varieties of connection⁸⁸⁵ (*saṃyoga-vibhāga*) of material elements [and] souls (*pudgala-jīva*).

śarīravānmanahprāṇāpānāḥ pudgalānām ||5.19||

5.19 [The function] of material elements (*pudgala*) [is] body, speech, mind, inhalation, [and] exhalation (*śarīra-vāc-manas-prāṇa-apāna*) [...] ⁸⁸⁶

[5.19.1] ***pañcavidhāni śarīrāṇy audārikādīni vān manah prāṇāpānāv iti pudgalānām upakāraḥ*** |

The function (*upakāra*) of material elements (*pudgala*) [is]: the fivefold (*pañcavidha*) [varieties] of bodies (*śarīra*), beginning with the gross [body]⁸⁸⁷ (*audārika-ādī*), speech (*vāc*), mind (*manas*), inhalation, [and] exhalation (*prāṇa-apāna*).

[5.19.2] ***tatra śarīrāṇi yathoktāni*** |

Among them (*tatra*), the [varieties of] bodies (*śarīra*) [are] as it is said (see TA 2.37) (*yathokta*).

⁸⁸³ See also TA 5.12.

⁸⁸⁴ Böhtlingk translates '*antaḥpraveśa*' as 'das Hinenschlüpfen' (Böhtlingk 1855).

⁸⁸⁵ See also TABh 1.7.10.

⁸⁸⁶ The list continues in TA 5.20.

⁸⁸⁷ See TA 2.37.

[5.19.3] ***prāṇāpānau ca nāmakarmaṇi vyākhyātau*** |

And (*ca*) inhalation [and] exhalation (*prāṇa-apāna*) are explained (TA 8.12)⁸⁸⁸ (*vyākhyāta*) in [the discussion of] body-determining *karman* (*nāma-karman*).

[5.19.4] ***dvīndriyādayo jihvendriyayogād⁸⁸⁹ bhāṣātvena gr̥hṇanti nānye*** |

[Beings with] two senses etc. (*dvi-indriya-ādi*) understand (*gr̥hṇanti*) by the quality of being [provided with] language (*bhāṣātva*), because [they are] provided with speech [and] mind (*jihvā-indriya-yoga*), not (*na*) others (i.e., not one-sensed beings) (*anya*).

[5.19.5] ***saṃjñinas ca manastvena gr̥hṇanti nānye iti*** |

And (*ca*) conscious [beings] (see TA 2.25) (*saṃjñin*) understand (*gr̥hṇanti*) by the quality of being [provided with] a mind (*manastva*), not (*na*) others⁸⁹⁰ (*anya*).

[5.19.6] ***vakṣyate hi sakaṣāyatvāj jīvaḥ karmaṇo योग्याṇ pudgalān ādatta iti || kiṃ cānyat***

Indeed (*hi*), it will be said (see TA 8.2) (*vakṣyate*) [that] ‘due to the quality of being with passions (*sakaṣāyatva*) the soul (*jīva*) attracts (*ādatte*) material elements (*pudgala*) appropriate to (*yogya*) karmic activity (*karman*)’ (*iti*). Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

sukhaduḥkhajīvitamaraṇopagrahās ca ||5.20||

5.20 [...] and the support⁸⁹¹ (*upagraha*) [of] pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), life (*jīvita*), [and] death (*marāṇa*).

[5.20.1] ***sukhopagraho duḥkhopagraho jīvitopagraho maraṇopagrahās ceti pudgalānām upakārah*** |

The function (*upakāra*) of material elements (*pudgala*) [is] the support of pleasure (*sukha-upagraha*), the support of pain (*duḥkha-upagraha*), the support of life (*jīvita-upagraha*), and (*ca*) the support of death (*marāṇa-upagraha*) (*iti*).

[5.20.2] ***tadyathā*** | [5.20.3] ***iṣṭāḥ sparśarasagandhavarṇaśabdāḥ sukhasyopakārah*** | [5.20.4] ***aniṣṭā dukhasya*** |

⁸⁸⁸ TA 8.12 lists 42 varieties of body-determining *karman*. One of these varieties is ‘breath’ (*ucchvāsa*).

⁸⁸⁹ Kapadia reads ‘*saṃyogād*’.

⁸⁹⁰ I.e., not the beings without a mind (*amanaska*) (see TA 2.11 and TA 2.25).

⁸⁹¹ Lit. ‘supports’ (pl.), i.e., the support of pleasure, the support of pain, etc.

Namely (*tad-yathā*), [objects of] touch, tastes, smells, colours, and sounds⁸⁹² (*sparsā-rasa-gandha-varṇa-śabda*) [that are] desirable (*iṣṭa*) — [their] function (*upakāra*) [is the support] of pleasure (*sukha*). [The function of the objects of the senses that are] undesirable (*aniṣṭa*) [is the support] of pain (*dukha*).

[5.20.5] ***snānācchādanānulepanabhojanādīni vidhiprayuktāni jīvitasyānapavartanaṃ cāyuskasya*** | [5.20.6] ***viśaśastrāgnyādīni maraṇasyāpavartanaṃ cāyuskasya*** ||

[Actions] performed according to rule (*vidhi-prayukta*), beginning with bathing, clothing, anointing, and eating (*snāna-ācchādana-anulepana-bhojana-ādī*) – [their function is] sustenance⁸⁹³ (*an-apavartana*) of life (*jīvita*) and (*ca*) of life span determining *karman*⁸⁹⁴ (*āyuska*). [Objects beginning with] poison, weapons, [and] fire (*viśa-śastra-agnī*) – [their function is] death (*marāṇa*) and (*ca*) the removal (*apavartana*) of life span determining *karman* (*āyuska*).

[5.20.7] ***atrāha*** | [5.20.8] ***upapannaṃ tāvad etat sopakramāṇām apavartanīyāyusām*** | [5.20.9] ***athānapavartyāyusām katham iti*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): First of all (*tāvat*), this (*etat*) [is] appropriate (*upapanna*) for [those whose] lives [can] be shortened (*apavartanīya-āyus*), [who are provided] with life span reducing factors⁸⁹⁵ (*sa-upakrama*). Now (*atha*), how [is this] (*kim*) for [those whose] lives cannot be shortened⁸⁹⁶ (*anapavartya-āyus*) (*iti*)?

[5.20.10] ***atrocyate*** | [5.20.11] ***teṣām api jīvitamarāṇopagrahaḥ pudgalānām upakāraḥ*** | [5.20.12] ***katham iti cet tad ucyate*** | [5.20.13] ***karmaṇaḥ sthitiḥkṣayābhīyām*** | [5.20.14] ***karma hi paudgalam iti*** |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): The function (*upakāra*) of these (*tad*) material elements (*pudgala*) [is] also (*api*) the support of life and death⁸⁹⁷ (*jīvita-maraṇa-upagraha*). If one asks (*iti cet*) “How?” (*katham*), then (*tad*) it is said (*ucyate*): By maintenance and destruction (*sthiti-kṣaya*) of *karman*. For (*hi*), *karman* [is] material (*paudgala*) (*iti*).

⁸⁹² I.e., the objects of the senses (see TA 2.21).

⁸⁹³ Lit. ‘non-removal’.

⁸⁹⁴ This type of *karman* is listed in TA 8.5.

⁸⁹⁵ The term ‘*upakrama*’ is discussed in the *bhāṣya* on TA 2.52 and refers to factors that reduce one’s life span (Balcerowicz 2016c: 165). It is also mentioned in the *Ṭhāṇaṃgasutta* as one of the six states ‘according to the manner in which *karman* can be operated upon’ (Balcerowicz 2016c: 163).

⁸⁹⁶ The term ‘*anapavartyāyus*’ is also used in TA 2.52. The life span of some classes of beings cannot be shortened.

⁸⁹⁷ See TABh 5.20.1.

[5.20.15] *āhāraś ca trividhaḥ sarveṣāṃ evopakurute* | [5.20.16] *kiṃ kāraṇam* |
And (*ca*) the threefold (*trividha*) livelihood (*āhāra*) assists (*upakurute*) all (*sarva*).
What (*kim*) [is] the reason [for this] (*kāraṇa*)?

[5.20.17] *śārīrasthityupacayabalavṛddhiprītyarthaṃ hy āhāra iti* ||
Indeed (*hi*), livelihood (*āhāra*) [is] for the sake of maintenance, growth, strength,
flourishing, [and] satisfaction [of] the body (*śārīra-sthity-upacaya-bala-vṛddhi-prīty-*
artha).

[5.20.18] *atrāha* | [5.20.19] *grhṇīmas tāvad dharmādharmākāśapudgalā*⁸⁹⁸
jīvadravyāṇām upakurvantīti | [5.20.20] *atha jīvānām ka upakāra iti* | [5.20.21]
atrocyate |

At this point (*atra*), one says (*āha*): So far (*tāvat*), we understand (*grhṇīmaḥ*) [that]
motion, rest, space, and material elements (*dharmādharmākāśapudgala*) assist
(*upakurvantī*) the animate substances (*jīva-dravya*) (*iti*). Now (*atha*), what (*kim*) [is]
the function (*upakāra*) of souls (*jīva*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

parasparopagraho jīvānām ||5.21||

5.21 [The function] of souls (*jīva*) [is] mutual support (*paraspara-upagraha*).⁸⁹⁹

[5.21.1] *parasparasya hitāhitopadeśābhyām upagraho jīvānām iti* |
[The function] of souls (*jīva*) [is] the support (*upagraha*) by teaching (*upadeśa*)
[about that which is] beneficial and disadvantageous (*hita-ahita-upadeśa*) for each
other (*paraspara*).

[5.21.2] *atrāha* | [5.21.3] *atha kālasyopakāraḥ ka iti* | [5.21.4] *atrocyate* |
At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), what (*kim*) [is] the function
(*upakāra*) of time (*kāla*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

vartanā pariṇāmaḥ kriyā paratvāparatve ca kālasya ||5.22||

5.22 [The function, *upakāra*] of time (*kāla*) [is] beginning⁹⁰⁰ (*vartanā*),
transformation (*pariṇāma*), activity (*kriyā*), [temporal] priority (*paratva*) and
posteriority (*aparatva*).

⁸⁹⁸ Kapadia reads *-pudgala-jīva-*.

⁸⁹⁹ It seems that the TA is the first text that makes this claim. For a discussion of this *sūtra*, see § 3.4, *Function of the substances*.

⁹⁰⁰ Alternatively, 'continuation'. TABh 5.22.3 seems to interpret 'vartanā' as 'beginning'.

[5.22.1] **tadyathā** | [5.22.2] **sarvabhāvānām vartanā kālāśrayo vṛttiḥ** |

Namely (*tad-yathā*), the beginning (*vartanā*) of all things (*sarvabhāva*) [is] a state (*vṛtti*) [that is] dependent on time (*kāla-āśraya*).

[5.22.3] **vartanā utpattiḥ sthitiḥ prathamasaṁyāśrayā ity arthaḥ** ||

‘Beginning’ (*vartanā*), ‘occurrence’ (*utpatti*), ‘the state’ (*sthiti*) [that is] depending on the first moment’ (*prathama-samaya-āśraya*) — [that is] the meaning (*ity artha*).⁹⁰¹

[5.22.4] **pariṇāmo dvidvidhaḥ** | [5.22.5] **anādir ādimāṁś ca** | [5.22.6] **taṁ parastād vakṣyāmaḥ** ||

Transformation (*pariṇāma*) [is] twofold: without beginning (*anādi*) and (*ca*) having a beginning (*ādimat*). We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) this (*tad*) later on (see TA 5.42) (*parastāt*).

[5.22.7] **kriyā gatiḥ** | [5.22.8] **sā trividhā** | [5.22.9] **prayogagatir visrasā**⁹⁰²**gatir miśriketi** ||

Activity (*kriyā*) [is] movement (*gati*). It (*tad*) [is] threefold: beginning movement (*prayoga-gati*), declining movement (*visrasā-gati*), [and] mixed [movement] (*miśrika*) (*iti*).

[5.22.10] **paratvāparatve trividhe praśaṁsākṛte kṣetrakṛte kālakṛte iti** |

The quality of being uppermost and the quality of being lowermost⁹⁰³ (*paratva-apatva*) [are] threefold (*trividha*): resulting from praiseworthiness (*praśaṁsā-kṛta*), resulting from region (*kṣetra-kṛta*), resulting from time (*kāla-kṛta*) (*iti*).⁹⁰⁴

[5.22.11] **tatra praśaṁsākṛte paro dharmāḥ paraṁ jñānaṁ aparo 'dharma'**⁹⁰⁵**aparam ajñānam iti** |

Among them (*tatra*), resulting from praiseworthiness (*praśaṁsā-kṛte*) [are]:

- i. the uppermost (*para*) *dharma*
- ii. the uppermost (*para*) knowledge (*jñāna*)
- iii. the lowermost (*apara*) *adharmā*, [and]

⁹⁰¹ The syntactical structure of this sentence is not entirely clear to me. I interpret ‘*prathama-samaya-āśrayā*’ as a *bahuvrīhi* compound that qualifies ‘*sthiti*’. However, it is also possible that ‘*sthiti*’ is given as a separate synonym.

⁹⁰² Mody reads ‘*visrasāgatir*’ and mentions ‘*visrasāgatir*’ as a variant reading. Kapadia reads ‘*visrasāgatir*’. The word seems to be derived from the verbal root ‘*√sras*’ (falling, dropping). Therefore, I follow the reading ‘*visrasāgatir*’.

⁹⁰³ In TA 5.22 I translate ‘[temporal] priority (*paratva*) and posteriority (*apatva*)’ since both terms are clearly related to the function of time. However, the *bhāṣya* comments on those terms in a more general way.

⁹⁰⁴ The *bhāṣya* seems to point out that the terms ‘*paratva*’ and ‘*apatva*’ can refer to moral, geographical, and temporal differences.

⁹⁰⁵ Mody reads ‘*dharma*’. Kapadia has the correct reading ‘*adharmā*’.

iv. the lowermost (*apara*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*) (*iti*).

[5.22.12] ***kṣetrakṛte ekadikkālāvasthitayor viprakṛṣṭaḥ paro bhavati sannikṛṣṭo 'paraḥ |***

Resulting from region (*kṣetra-kṛta*) — [Amongst two things that are] placed in a single space [and] time (*eka-diś-kāla-avasthita*), remote (*viprakṛṣṭa*) is (*bhavati*) the uppermost (*para*), proximate (*sannikṛṣṭa*) [is] the lowermost (*apara*).

[5.22.13] ***kālakṛte dviraṣṭavarṣād varṣāsatikaḥ paro bhavati varṣāsatikād dviraṣṭavarṣo 'paro bhavati ||***

Resulting from time (*kālakṛta*) — Someone of hundred years (*varṣa-satika*) is (*bhavati*) higher (i.e., older) (*para*) than someone of sixteen years (*dvi-aṣṭan-varṣa*). Someone of sixteen years⁹⁰⁶ (*dvi-aṣṭan-varṣa*) is (*bhavati*) lower (i.e., younger) than someone of hundred years (*varṣāsa-tika*).

[5.22.14] ***tad evaṃ praśamsākṣetrakṛte paratvāparatve varjayitvā vartanādīni kālakṛtāni kālasyopakāra iti ||***

Thus (*tad evaṃ*), with the exception of (*varjayitvā*) the quality of being uppermost and lowermost [that are] resulting from praiseworthiness and region (*praśamsā-kṣetra-kṛta*), the function (*upakāra*) of time (*kāla*) [are the things] resulting from time (*kāla-kṛta*), i.e., beginning etc. (*vartanā-ādi*) (*iti*).

[5.22.15] ***atrāha |*** [5.22.16] ***uktaṃ bhavatā śarīrādīni pudgalānām upakāra iti |***

[5.22.17] ***pudgalān iti ca tantrāntariyā jīvān paribhāṣante |*** [5.22.18]

sparsādirahitās cānye | [5.22.19] ***tat katham etad iti |***

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): You have mentioned (*uktaṃ bhavatā*) [that] the function (*upakāra*) of material elements (*pudgala*) [are] the body etc. (*śarīra-ādi*) (see TA 5.19). Yet (*ca*), other schools⁹⁰⁷ (*tantrāntariyā*) teach (*paribhāṣante*) [that] (*iti*) souls (*jīva*) [are] material elements (*pudgala*). And (*ca*) others (*anya*) [teach that they are] destitute of touch etc. (*sparsā-ādi-rahita*). Then (*tad*), how (*katham*) [is] this [possible] (*etad*) (*iti*)?

⁹⁰⁶ Siddhasenagaṇi explains 'dvyāṣṭan' as 'sixteen' (*ṣoḍaśavarṣa*).

⁹⁰⁷ This might be a reference to the pudgalavādins.

[5.22.20] *atrocyate* | [5.22.21] *etadādivipratipattipratīṣedhārtham viśeṣa-
vacanavivakṣayā cedam ucyate* ||

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): For the sake of exclusion of contradictory [views] beginning with this⁹⁰⁸ (*etad-ādi-vipratipatti-pratīṣedha-artha*) and (*ca*) by the wish to explain⁹⁰⁹ the different teachings (*viśeṣa-vacana-vivakṣā*), this (*idam*) is said (*ucyate*):

***sparsārasagandhavarnāvantah pudgalāḥ* ||5.23||**

5.23 The material elements (*pudgala*) possess:

- i. touch (*sparsā*)
- ii. taste (*rasa*)
- iii. smell (*gandha*) [and]
- iv. colour (*varṇa*);

[5.23.1] ***sparsāḥ rasaḥ gandhaḥ varṇa ity evamlakṣaṇāḥ pudgalā bhavanti* |**

Touch (*sparsā*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*), [and] colour (*varṇa*) (*iti*) — the material elements (*pudgala*) are (*bhavanti*) characterised in this way (*evam-lakṣaṇa*).

[5.23.2] ***tatra sparsō 'ṣṭavidhaḥ kaṭhino mṛdur gurur laghuḥ śīti uṣṇaḥ
snigdhaḥ rūkṣa iti* |**

Among them (*tatra*), touch (*sparsā*) [is] eightfold (*aṣṭavidha*):

- i. hard (*kaṭhina*)
- ii. soft (*mṛdu*)
- iii. heavy (*guru*)
- iv. light (*laghu*)
- v. cold (*śīti*)
- vi. hot (*uṣṇa*)
- vii. smooth (*snigdha*) [and]
- viii. rough (*rūkṣa*) (*iti*).

⁹⁰⁸ I.e., the alternative views that are mentioned in TABh 5.22.17 – 5.22.18.

⁹⁰⁹ Perhaps the intended meaning is 'oppose'. The term '*vivakṣā*' can also mean 'doubt' or 'uncertainty' (MW).

[5.23.3] **rasaḥ pañcavidhaḥ tiktaḥ kaṭuḥ kaṣāyo 'mlo madhura iti |**

Taste (*rasa*) [is] fivefold (*pañcavidha*):

- i. bitter (*tikta*)
- ii. sharp (*kaṭu*)
- iii. astringent (*kaṣāya*)
- iv. acid (*amla*) [and]
- v. sweet (*madhura*) (*iti*).

[5.23.4] **gandho dvividhaḥ surabhir asurabhiś ca |**

Smell (*gandha*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*):

- i. fragrant (*surabhi*) and (*ca*)
- ii. non-fragrant (*asurabhi*).

[5.23.5] **varṇaḥ pañcavidhaḥ kṛṣṇo nīlo lohitaḥ pītaḥ śukla iti ||** [5.23.6] **kiṃ cānyat |**

Colour (*varṇa*) [is] fivefold (*pañcavidha*):

- i. black (*kṛṣṇa*)
- ii. blue (*nīla*)
- iii. red (*lohita*)
- iv. yellow (*pīta*) [and]
- v. white (*śukla*) (*iti*).

Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

**śabdabandhasaukṣmyasthaulyasamsthānabhedatamaśchāyātapodyotavantaś
ca ||5.24||**

5.24 And⁹¹⁰ [the material elements] possess:

- i. sound (*śabda*)
- ii. connection (*bandha*)
- iii. subtlety (*saukṣmya*)
- iv. largeness (*sthaulya*)
- v. shape (*samsthāna*)
- vi. partition (*bheda*)
- vii. darkness (*tamas*)
- viii. shade (*chāyā*)

⁹¹⁰ This is a continuation of TA 5.23. TABh 5.24.21 — 5.24.25 explains why these *sūtras* are separated.

- ix. heat (*tapas*) [and]
- x. light (*uddiyota*).

[5.24.1] ***tatra śabdaḥ ṣaḍvidhaḥ tato vitato ghaṇaḥ śuṣīro gharṣo bhāṣa iti*** ||

Among them (*tatra*), sound (*śabda*) [is] sixfold (*ṣaḍvidha*):⁹¹¹

- i. far reaching (*tata*)
- ii. diffused⁹¹² (*vitata*)
- iii. firm (*ghana*)
- iv. hollow (*śuṣīra*)⁹¹³
- v. frictional (*gharṣa*), [and]
- vi. spoken (*bhāṣa*) (*iti*).

[5.24.2] ***bandhas trividhaḥ*** | [5.24.3] ***prayogabandho visrasābandho***⁹¹⁴ ***mīśra iti*** |

Connection (*bandha*) [is] threefold (*trividha*):

- i. yoked connection⁹¹⁵ (*prayoga-bandha*)
- ii. loose connection (*visrasā-bandha*), [and]
- iii. mixed [connection] (*mīśra*) (*iti*).

[5.24.4] ***snigdharūkṣatvād bhavatīti vakṣyate*** ||

It will be said (see TA 5.32) (*vakṣyate*) [that a connection of material elements] arises (*bhavati*) due to smoothness and roughness (*snigdha-rūkṣatva*) (*iti*).

[5.24.5] ***saukṣmyaṃ dvividham antyam āpekṣikaṃ ca*** |

Subtlety (*saukṣmya*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*): ultimate (*antya*), and (*ca*) relative (*āpekṣika*).

[5.24.6] ***antyaṃ paramāṇuṣv eva*** | [5.24.7] ***āpekṣikaṃ dvyañukādiṣu saṃghātapariṇāmāpekṣaṃ bhavati*** |

Ultimate [subtlety] (*antya*) [is] only (*eva*) in the infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*). Relative [subtlety] (*āpekṣika*) exists (*bhavati*) dependent on combination⁹¹⁶ [and] transformation (*saṃghāta-pariṇāma-apekṣā*) in the case of [aggregates] beginning with [an aggregate of] two atoms (*dvi-aṇuka-ādi*).

⁹¹¹ Siddhasenagaṇi explains each sound with the example of a musical instrument. E.g., the sound of a drum is ‘far reaching (*tata*), the sound of a lute is ‘diffused’ (*vitata*), etc.

⁹¹² Alternatively, ‘not far reaching’.

⁹¹³ = ‘*suṣīra*’ (MW).

⁹¹⁴ Mody reads ‘*visrasābandha*’. I follow Kapadia’s edition, which reads ‘*visrasābandha*’. Cf. TABh 5.22.9.

⁹¹⁵ Siddhasenagaṇi explains this as related to the soul (*jīva-vyāpāra*).

⁹¹⁶ See TA 5.26.

[5.24.8] **tadyathā** | [5.24.9] **āmalakād badaram iti** ||

Namely (*tadyathā*): a jujube (*badara*) [compared with] a gooseberry (i.e., a jujube is relatively subtle compared to a gooseberry) (*āmalaka*) (*iti*).

[5.24.10] **sthaulyam api dvividham antyam āpekṣikaṃ ca** |

Largeness (*sthaulya*) [is] also (*api*) twofold (*dvividha*): ultimate (*antya*) and (*ca*) relative (*āpekṣika*).

[5.24.11] **saṃghātapariṇāmāpekṣam eva bhavati** | [5.24.12] **tatrāntyaṃ sarvalokavyāpini mahāskandhe bhavati** | [5.24.13] **āpekṣikaṃ badarādibhya āmalakādiṣv iti** ||

It exists (*bhavati*) indeed (*eva*) dependent on combination [and] transformation (*saṃghāta-pariṇāma-apekṣā*). Among them (*tatra*), ultimate [largeness] (*antya*) exists (*bhavati*) in the great aggregate⁹¹⁷ (*mahā-skandha*), [which is] pervading the whole world (*sarva-loka-vyāpin*). Relative [largeness] (*āpekṣika*) [exists] in gooseberries etc. (*āmalaka-ādi*) [compared to] jujubes etc. (*badara-ādi*) (*iti*).

[5.24.14] **saṃsthānam anekavidham** | [5.24.15] **dīrghahrasvādyanitthantva**⁹¹⁸-**paryantam** ||

Shape (*saṃsthāna*) [is] manifold (*anekavidha*): including indefinite [shapes]⁹¹⁹, beginning with long and short (*dīrgha-hrasva-ādy-anitthantva-paryanta*).

[5.24.16] **bhedaḥ pañcavidhaḥ** | [5.24.17] **autkārikaḥ caurṇikaḥ khaṇḍaḥ pratarāḥ anutaṭa iti** ||

Partition (*bheda*) [is] fivefold:⁹²⁰

- i. split (*autkārika*)
- ii. pulverised (*caurṇika*)
- iii. a piece (*khaṇḍa*)
- iv. layered⁹²¹ (*pratara*)
- v. from the sides⁹²² (*anutaṭa*) (*iti*).

⁹¹⁷ The precise meaning of ‘*mahāskandha*’ is not clear to me. Perhaps it refers to the conceptual opposite of a *paramāṇu*.

⁹¹⁸ Mody reads ‘-*anitthatva*-’. Kapadia has the correct reading ‘*anitthantva*’.

⁹¹⁹ Lit. ‘not-thusness’ (*an-itthantva* <*ittham*). Sanghvi refers to the shapes of clouds (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

⁹²⁰ My translation of the following terms is based on Sanghvi’s interpretation (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

⁹²¹ Like chopped off layers of mica (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

⁹²² Like the removal of the bark of bamboo or sugar cane (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

[5.24.18] **tamaśchāyātapoddyotās ca pariṇāmajāḥ ||**

And (*ca*) darkness, shade, heat, [and] light (*tamas-chāyā-tapas-uddyota*) [are] produced by transformation (*pariṇāma-ja*).⁹²³

[5.24.19] **sarva evaite sparśādayaḥ pudgaleṣu eva bhavantīti |** [5.24.20] **ataḥ pudgalās tadvantaḥ ||**

All these (*sarva etad*) [characteristics]⁹²⁴ beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*) exist (*bhavanti*) indeed (*eva*) in the very (*eva*) material elements (*pudgala*) (*iti*). Hence (*atas*), the material elements (*pudgala*) [are] like that (*tadvat*).

[5.24.21] **atrāha |** [5.24.22] **kim arthaṃ sparśādīnāṃ śabdādīnāṃ ca pṛthak sūtrakaraṇam iti |**

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Why (*kim artham*) [is] the composition of the *sūtra* (*sūtra-karaṇa*) separate (*pṛthak*) for [the objects of the senses] beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*) and (*ca*) for [the objects of the senses] beginning with sound (*śabda-ādi*) (*iti*)?⁹²⁵

[5.24.23] **atrocyate |** [5.24.24] **sparśādayaḥ paramāṇuṣu skandheṣu ca pariṇāmajā eva bhavantīti |** [5.24.25] **śabdādayas tu skandheṣv eva bhavanti anekanimittās cety ataḥ pṛthak karaṇam ||**

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [The objects of the senses] beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*) exist (*bhavanti*) indeed (*eva*), produced by transformation⁹²⁶ (*pariṇāma-ja*), in [the case of] the infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*) and (*ca*) aggregates⁹²⁷ (*skandha*). However (*tu*), [the objects of the senses] beginning with sound (*śabda-ādi*) exist (*bhavanti*) only (*eva*) in [the case of] aggregates (*skandha*). And (*ca*) [they are] caused differently (*aneka-nimitta*) (*iti*). Hence (*atas*), the composition [of the *sūtras*] (*karaṇa*) [is] separate (*pṛthak*).

[5.24.26] **ta ete pudgalāḥ samāsato dvividhā bhavanti |** [5.24.27] **tadyathā**

Succinctly (*samāsatas*), these (*tad*) very (*etad*) material elements (*pudgala*) are (*bhavanti*) twofold (*dvividha*), namely (*tadyathā*):

aṇavaḥ skandhās ca ||5.25||

5.25 [The material elements exist as] atoms (*aṇu*) and aggregates (*skandha*).

⁹²³ It is somewhat strange that this explanation differs from the previous explanations, which all mention different varieties.

⁹²⁴ See TABh 5.23.1: 'lakṣaṇa'.

⁹²⁵ In other words, why are TA 5.23 and TA 5.24 separated?

⁹²⁶ See TABh 5.24.18.

⁹²⁷ See TA 5.25.

[5.25.1] **uktam ca kārāṇam eva tad antyaṃ⁹²⁸ sūkṣmo nityaś ca paramāṇuḥ |**

[5.25.2] **ekarasaḡandhavarṇo dvisparśaḡ kāryaliṅgaś ca || [5.25.3] iti |⁹²⁹**

And (*ca*) [it has been] said (*ukta*):

‘The cause (*kārāṇa*) [is] indeed (*eva*) that (*tad*), the ultimate (*antya*). The infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) [is] subtle (*sūkṣma*) and (*ca*) eternal (*nitya*).

[It has] one taste, smell, [and] colour (*eka-rasa-gandha-varṇa*), two [types of] touch⁹³⁰ (*dvi-sparśa*), and (*ca*) its mark [is] the effect (*kārya-liṅga*) (*iti*).’

[5.25.4] **tatrāṇavo ’baddhāḡ skandhās tu baddhā eva ||**

Among them (*tatra*), the atoms (*aṇu*) [are] unconnected (*abaddha*) but (*tu*) the aggregates (*skandha*) [are] indeed (*eva*) connected (*baddha*).

[5.25.5] **atrāha | [5.25.6] katham punar etad dvaividhyaṃ bhavati | [5.25.7]**

atrocyate | [5.25.8] skandhās tāvat |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Again (*punar*), why (*katham*) does this (*etad*) exist (*bhavati*) in a twofold manner (*dvaividhya*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): First of all (*tāvat*), [with respect to] the aggregates (*skandha*):

saṃghātabhedebhya utpadyante ||5.26||

5.26 They (i.e., the aggregates) result (*utpad*) from combination (*saṃghāta*) [and] disintegration (*bheda*).

[5.26.1] **saṃghātād bhedād saṃghātabhedād iti | [5.26.2] ebhyas tribhyaḡ**

kārāṇebhyaḡ skandhā utpadyante dvipradeśādayaḡ |

From combination (*saṃghāta*), from disintegration (*bheda*), [and] from combination and disintegration (*saṃghāta-bheda*) — the aggregates (*skandha*) beginning with [those having] two space-points (*dvi-pradeśa-ādi*) result (*utpadyante*) from these (*īdam*) three (*tri*) causes (*kārāṇa*).

[5.26.3] **tadyathā | [5.26.4] dvayoḡ paramāṇvoḡ saṃghātād dvipradeśaḡ |**

Namely (*tad-yathā*): [An aggregate having] two space-points (*dvi-pradeśa*) [results] from combination (*saṃghāta*) of two (*dvi*) infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*).

⁹²⁸ Alternatively, one can read ‘*antyaṃsūkṣmo*’ in compound, as ‘ultimately subtle’.

⁹²⁹ It is unclear to me what the source of this verse in *upaḡīti* metre is. For a discussion of this quotation, see § 3.5. *Quotations in the TABh*.

⁹³⁰ Cf. TA 5.23.

[5.26.5] ***dvipradeśasyānoś ca saṃghātāt tripradeśaḥ*** |

[An aggregate having] three space-points (*tri-pradeśa*) [results] from combination (*saṃghāta*) of [an aggregate that has] two space-points (*dvi-pradeśa*) and (*ca*) an atom (*aṇu*).

[5.26.6] ***evam saṅkhyeyānām asaṅkhyeyānām anantānām⁹³¹ ca pradeśānām saṃghātāt tāvatpradeśāḥ*** ||

Likewise (*evam*), from the combination (*saṃghāta*) of numerable (*saṅkhyeya*), innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*), and (*ca*) infinitely many (*ananta*) space-points (*pradeśa*), [result aggregates having] such a number of space-points (*tāvat-pradeśa*).

[5.26.7] ***eṣām eva bhedād dvipradeśaparyantāḥ*** ||

[Aggregates] ending with two space-points (i.e., two or more) (*dvi-pradeśa-paryanta*) [result] from disintegration (*bheda*) indeed (*eva*) of these (*idam*).

[5.26.8] ***eta eva saṃghātabhedābhyām ekasāmāyikābhyām dvipradeśādayaḥ skandhā utpadyante*** |

These (*eta*) very same (*eva*) aggregates (*skandha*), beginning with [aggregates having] two space-points (*dvi-pradeśa-ādi*), [result] from single-momentary (*ekasāmāyika*) combination and disintegration (*saṃghāta-bheda*).

[5.26.9] ***anyasya saṃghātenānyato bhedeneti*** ||

[I.e.], by combination (*saṃghāta*) with another (*anya*) [and] by disintegration (*bheda*) from another (*anyatas*) (*iti*).⁹³²

[5.26.10] ***atrāha*** | [5.26.11] ***atha paramāṇuḥ katham utpadyate iti*** | [5.26.12] ***atrocyate*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), how (*katham*) does the infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) arise (*utpadyate*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

bhedād anuḥ ||5.27||

5.27 An atom (*aṇu*) [results] from disintegration (*bheda*) [only].

⁹³¹ Mody reads ‘*anantām anantānantānām*’ and mentions the variant reading ‘*anantānām anantānām*’. However, in other passages of the *bhāṣya* the list is simply ‘*saṅkhyeya, asaṅkhyeya, ananta*’ (see, for example, TABh 1.8.9 and TABh 5.10.1). Kapadia omits ‘*ananta*’ but gives the variant reading ‘*anantānām anantānantānām*’ in the footnote.

⁹³² According to Siddhasenagaṇi, by combination with another atom and by separation from another aggregate.

[5.27.1] ***bhedād eva paramāṇur utpadyate na saṃghātād iti*** ||

The infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) results (*utpadyate*) indeed (*eva*) from disintegration (*bheda*), not (*na*) from combination (*saṃghāta*).

bhedasaṃghātābhyāṃ cākṣuṣāḥ ||5.28||

5.28 The perceptible [aggregates] (*cākṣuṣa*) [result] from disintegration (*bheda*) [and] combination (*saṃghāta*).

[5.28.1] ***bhedasaṃghātābhyāṃ cākṣuṣāḥ skandhā utpadyante*** |

The aggregates (*skandha*) [that are] perceptible (*cākṣuṣa*) result (*utpadyante*) from disintegration (*bheda*) [and] combination (*saṃghāta*).

[5.28.2] ***acākṣuṣās tu yathoktāt saṃghātād bhedāt saṃghātabhedāc ceti*** ||

However (*tu*), [the aggregates that are] imperceptible (*acākṣuṣa*) [result] ‘from combination (*saṃghāta*), from disintegration (*bheda*), and (*ca*) from combination and disintegration (*saṃghātabheda*)’ (*iti*), as it is said (see TABh 5.26.1) (*yathokta*).

[5.28.3] ***atrāha*** | [5.28.4] ***dharmādīni santīti katham gr̥hyate iti*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): How (*katham*) is [the saying that] (*iti*) [substances] beginning with motion⁹³³ (*dharmā-ādi*) are existent (*santi*) understood (*gr̥hyate*) (*iti*)?

[5.28.5] ***atrocyate*** | [5.28.6] ***lakṣaṇataḥ*** || [5.28.7] ***kiṃ ca sato lakṣaṇam iti*** |

[5.28.8] ***atrocyate*** |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): based on the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*). And (*ca*) what (*kiṃ*) is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of existence (*sat*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat ||5.29||

5.29 Existence⁹³⁴ (*sat*) [is] endowed with (*yukta*) production (*utpāda*), decay (*vyaya*), [and] duration (*dhrauvya*).

⁹³³ See TA 5.1.

⁹³⁴ Alternatively, ‘things that exist’.

[5.29.1] *utpādayayābhyām dhrauvyeṇa ca yuktaṃ sato lakṣaṇam yad utpadyate yad vyeti yac ca dhruvaṃ tat sat ato 'nyad asad iti* ||⁹³⁵

The characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of existence (*sat*) [is] endowed with (*yukta*) production and decay (*utpāda-vyaya*), and (*ca*) duration (*dhrauvya*). That which (*yad*) is produced (*utpadyate*), that which (*yad*) decays (*vyeti*), and (*ca*) that which (*yad*) [is] enduring (*dhruva*), that (*that*) [is] existent (*sat*). Hence (*atas*), [that which is] different [from this] (*anya*) [is] non-existent (*asad*) (*iti*).

[5.29.2] *atrāha* | [5.29.3] *grhṇīmas tāvad evaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ sad iti* | [5.29.4] *idaṃ tu vācyam tat kiṃ nityam āhosvid anityam iti* | [5.29.4] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): So far (*tāvat*), we understand (*grhṇīmaḥ*) [that] existence (*sat*) [is] thus (*evam*) characterised (*lakṣaṇa*) (*iti*). However (*tu*), this (*idaṃ*) [is] to be said (*vācya*): [Is] it (i.e., existence) (*tad kim*) eternal (*nitya*) or (*āhosvid*) non-eternal (*anitya*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

***tadbhāvavyayaṃ nityam* ||5.30||**

5.30 [An entity that] does not change its state (*tad-bhāva-avyaya*), [is] eternal (*nitya*).

[5.30.1] *yat sato bhāvān na vyeti na vyeṣyati tan nityam iti* |

That which (*yad*) does not change (*na vyeti*) [and] will not change (*na vyeṣyati*) from the state (*bhāva*) of existence (*sat*), that (*tad*) [is] eternal (*nitya*) (*iti*).

***arpitānarpitasiddheḥ* ||5.31||**

5.31 [The apparent contradiction] results from the validity (*siddhi*) of the conventional [standpoint] (*arpita*) and the non-conventional [standpoint] (*anarpita*).⁹³⁶

⁹³⁵ This reading follows Kapadia. Mody reads 'utpādayayau dhrauvyaṃ ca yuktaṃ sato lakṣaṇam'. After this sentence, Mody adds a substantial passage between square brackets (Mody 1903: 131-133). This passage seems to be a later addition and is omitted by Kapadia. However, the last sentence of the omitted part (*yad utpadyate yad vyeti yac ca dhruvaṃ tat sat ato 'nyad asad iti*) is given by Kapadia, immediately following 'sato lakṣaṇam' (*yad utpadyate yad vyeti yac ca dhruvaṃ tat sat ato 'nyad asad iti*).

⁹³⁶ It seems that the author tries to explain the apparent contradiction between TA 5.5, which says that substance is eternal, and TA 5.29, which says that substance is connected with decay. For a discussion of this *sūtra*, see Soni 2003: 29ff. The terms 'arpita' and 'anarpita' are explained in TABh 5.31.2 as 'vyāvahārika' and 'avyāvahārika' (see below). See also § 3.4, *Existence and permanence of substance*.

[5.31.1] **sac ca trividham api nityam cobhe⁹³⁷ api arpitānarpitasiddheḥ |**

And (*ca*) existence (*sat*) [is] also (*api*) threefold (see TA 5.29) (*trividha*), [namely] eternal (see TA 5.30)⁹³⁸ (*nitya*) and (*ca*) also (*api*) both⁹³⁹ (*ubhe*), [which] results from the validity (*siddhi*) of the conventional [standpoint] (*arpita*) and the non-conventional [standpoint] (*anarpita*).

[5.31.2] **arpitaṃ vyāvahārikam anarpitam avyāvahārikam⁹⁴⁰ cety arthaḥ |**

‘Conventional’ (*arpita*) [is the standpoint that is] relating to common life (*vyāvahārika*) and (*ca*) ‘non-conventional’ (*anarpita*) [is the standpoint that is] not relating to common life (*avyāvahārika*) — that is the meaning (*ity artha*).

[5.31.3] **tac ca⁹⁴¹ sac caturvidham | [5.31.4] tadyathā | [5.31.5] dravyāstikaṃ māṭṛkāpadāstikaṃ utpannāstikaṃ paryāyāstikaṃ iti |**

And (*ca*) that (*tad*) existence (see TABh 5.31.1) (*sat*) [is] fourfold (*caturvidha*). Namely:

- i. [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya-āstika*)
- ii. [the view on] existence [from] the linguistic perspective⁹⁴² (*māṭṛkā-pada-āstika*)
- iii. [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] production (*utpanna-āstika*)
- iv. [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] transformation (*paryāyā-āstika*) (*iti*).

[5.31.6] **eṣām arthapadāni dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vā sat | [5.31.7] asan nāma nāsty eva dravyāstikasya ||**

The objects ⁹⁴³(*artha-pada*) of these [perspectives] (*idam*) [are as follows]:

For [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya-āstika*) — Either (*vā*) a [single] substance (*dravya*), or (*vā*) two substances (*dravya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] substances (*dravya*, pl.) [are] existent (*sat*); [that which is] called (*nāma*) non-existence (*asat*), [that] does not exist (*nāsti*) indeed (*eva*).

⁹³⁷ Mody reads ‘*ca ubhe*’.

⁹³⁸ Is ‘*nitya*’ interpreted as ‘*dhrauvya*’ (see TA 5.29)?

⁹³⁹ This seems to refer to TA 5.29, which says that existence is also endowed with production and decay.

⁹⁴⁰ Kapadia reads ‘*anarpitavyāvahārika*’.

⁹⁴¹ Kapadia reads ‘*tatra*’.

⁹⁴² Lit. ‘letters and words’.

⁹⁴³ Cf. TABh 1.35.90.

[5.31.8] *māṭṛkāpadāstikasyāpi* | [5.31.9] *māṭṛkāpadaṃ vā māṭṛkāpade vā māṭṛkāpadāni vā sat* | [5.31.10] *amāṭṛkāpadaṃ vā amāṭṛkāpade vā amāṭṛkāpadāni vā asat* ||

And likewise (*api*), for [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] letters and words (*māṭṛkā-pada-āstika*) — Either (*vā*) a [single] linguistic [entity] (*māṭṛkā-pada*), or (*vā*) two linguistic entities, (*māṭṛkā-pada*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] linguistic [entities] (*māṭṛkā-pada*, pl.) [are] existent (*sat*); Either (*vā*) a [single] non[-existent] linguistic expression (*amāṭṛkā-pada*), or (*vā*) two non[-existent] linguistic expressions (*amāṭṛkā-pada*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] non[-existent] linguistic expressions (*amāṭṛkā-pada*, pl.) [are] non-existent (*asat*).

[5.31.11] *utpannāstikasya* | [5.31.12] *utpannaṃ votpanne votpannāni vā sat* | [5.31.13] *anutpannaṃ vānutpanne vānutpannāni vāsat*⁹⁴⁴ ||

For [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] production (*utpanna-āstika*) — either (*vā*) [a single object that is] produced (*utpanna*), or (*vā*) two [objects that are] produced (*utpanna*, du.), or (*vā*) [many objects that are] produced (*utpanna*, pl.) [are] existent (*sat*); either (*vā*) [a single object that is] not produced (*anutpanna*), or (*vā*) two [objects that are] not produced (*anutpanna*, du.), or (*vā*) [many objects that are] not produced (*anutpanna*, pl.) [are] non-existent (*asat*).

[5.31.14] *arpite 'nupanīte na vācyaṃ sad ity asat iti vā* |

When the conventional [standpoint]⁹⁴⁵ (*arpita*) [is] not applied (*anupanīta*), [it] should not be said (*na vācya*) [to be] existent (*sat*) or (*vā*) non-existent (*asat*) (*iti*).⁹⁴⁶

[5.31.15] *paryāyāstikasya sadbhāvaparyāye vā sadbhāvaparyāyayor vā sadbhāvaparyāyeṣu vā ādiṣṭaṃ dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vā sat* | [5.31.16] *asadbhāvaparyāye vā asadbhāvaparyāyayor vā asadbhāvaparyāyeṣu vā ādiṣṭaṃ dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vāsat* |

For [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] transformation (*paryāya-āstika*) — Either (*vā*) a [single] substance (*dravya*), or (*vā*) two substances (*dravya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] substances (*dravya*, pl.) pointed out (*ādiṣṭa*) [with respect to] either (*vā*) a transformation of the real state (*sad-bhāva-paryāya*), or (*vā*) two transformations of the real state (*sad-bhāva-paryāya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many]

⁹⁴⁴ Kapadia reads 'vā 'sat'.

⁹⁴⁵ See also TABh 5.31.2.

⁹⁴⁶ Cf. TABh 5.31.17. The meaning seems to be that things are either existent or non-existent from a conventional standpoint. However, from a non-conventional standpoint, this is not the case.

transformations of the real state (*sad-bhāva-paryāya*, pl.) [are] existent (*sat*); Either (*vā*) a [single] substance (*dravya*), or (*vā*) two substances (*dravya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] substances (*dravya*, pl.) pointed out (*ādiṣṭa*) [with respect to] either (*vā*) a non-transformation of the real state (*asad-bhāva-paryāya*), or (*vā*) two non-transformations of the real state (*asad-bhāva-paryāya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] non-transformations of the real state (*asad-bhāva-paryāya*, pl.) [are] non-existent (*asat*).

[5.31.17] ***tadubhayaparyāye vā tadubhayaparyāyayor vā tadubhayaparyāyeṣu vā ādiṣṭam dravyam vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vā na vācyam sad ity asad iti vā*** |

[5.31.18] ***deśādeśena vikalpayitavyam iti*** ||

Either (*vā*) a [single] substance (*dravya*), or (*vā*) two substances (*dravya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] substances (*dravya*, pl.) pointed out (*ādiṣṭa*) [with respect to] either (*vā*) a transformation of both of them⁹⁴⁷ (*tad-ubhaya-paryāya*), or (*vā*) two transformations of both of them (*tad-ubhaya-paryāya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] transformations of both of them (*tad-ubhaya-paryāya*, pl.), should not be said (*na vācyam*) [to be] existent (*sat iti*) or (*vā*) non-existent (*asat iti*).⁹⁴⁸ It should be explained (*vikalpayitavyam*) by the application⁹⁴⁹ (*ādeśa*) of partial [viewpoints] (*deśa*).

[5.31.19] ***atrāha*** | [5.31.20] ***uktaṃ bhavatā saṃghātabhedebhyaḥ skandhā utpadyante iti*** | [5.31.21] ***tat kiṃ saṃyogamātrād eva saṃghāto bhavati*** | [5.31.22] ***āhosvid asti kaścīd viśeṣa iti*** | [5.31.23] ***atrocyate*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TA 5.26) (*bhavat*) [that] the aggregates (*skandha*) result (*utpadyante*) from combination and disintegration (*saṃghāta-bheda*). Now (*tad*), is (*bhavati*) combination (*saṃghāta*) in fact (*eva*) [resulting from] connection only (*saṃyoga-mātra*)? Or (*āhosvid*), is (*asti*) [there] something (*kiṃcid*) specific [to the connection]⁹⁵⁰ (*viśeṣa*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

[5.31.24] ***sati saṃyoge baddhasya saṃghāto bhavatīti*** ||

When there is (*sat*) a connection (*saṃyoga*), there is (*bhavati*) a combination (*saṃghāta*) with [an aggregate that is] connected⁹⁵¹ (*baddha*).

⁹⁴⁷ I.e., *sadbhāva* and *asadbhāva* (see TABh 5.31.15 – 5.31.16).

⁹⁴⁸ In other words, from the perspective of transformation, the labels ‘existent’ and ‘non-existent’ cannot be applied to a substance that is subject to both transformation and non-transformation.

⁹⁴⁹ Siddhasenagaṇi interprets the compound as ‘*deśa-ādeśena*’. The term ‘*ādeśa*’ seems to be related to ‘*ādiṣṭa*’ in the previous sentence.

⁹⁵⁰ Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘*viśeṣa*’ as ‘*saṃyogaviśeṣa*’.

⁹⁵¹ See TABh 5.25.4.

[5.31.25] *atrāha* | [5.31.26] *atha katham bandho bhavatīti* | [5.31.27] *atrocyate* |
At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), how (*katham*) [does] a connection
(*bandha*) arise (*bhavati*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

snigdharūkṣatvād bandhaḥ ||5.32||

5.32 A connection (*bandha*) [results] from smoothness (*snigdha*) and roughness
(*rūkṣatva*).

[5.32.1] ***snigdharūkṣayoḥ pudgalayoḥ sprṣṭayor bandho bhavatīti*** |

A connection (*bandha*) exists (*bhavati*) [between] two material elements (*pudgala*)
[that are] smooth and rough (*snigdha-rūkṣa*) [and that are] touching [each other]
(*sprṣṭa*).

[5.32.2] *atrāha* | [5.32.3] *kim eṣa ekānta iti* | [5.32.4] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [Does] this (*kim etad*) [happen] invariably
(*ekānta iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

na jaghanyaguṇānām ||5.33||

5.33 [Such a connection does] not (*na*) [take place between material elements
having a] low [degree] of [these] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness)
(*jaghanya-guṇa*).

[5.33.1] ***jaghanyaguṇasnidhānām jaghanyaguṇarūkṣānām ca paraspareṇa
bandho na bhavatīti*** ||

A mutual (*paraspara*) connection (*bandha*) does not exist (*na bhavati*) [between
material elements having] a low smooth quality (*jaghanya-guṇa-snidha*) and (*ca*)
[material elements having] a low rough quality (*jaghanya-guṇa-rūkṣa*) (*iti*).

[5.33.2] *atrāha* | [5.33.3] ***uktaṃ bhavatā jaghanyaguṇavarjānām snidhānām
rūkṣeṇa rūkṣānām ca snidhena saha bandho bhavatīti*** | [5.33.4] *atha
tulyaguṇayoḥ kim atyantapratīṣedha iti* | [5.33.5] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TABh 5.32.1)
(*bhavat*) [that] a connection (*bandha*) exists (*bhavati*) [between] smooth [material
elements] (*snidha*) [and] rough [material elements] (*rūkṣa*) and (*ca*) [between]
rough [material elements] (*rūkṣa*) and (*saha*) smooth [material elements] (*snidha*),
with the exception of [those whose] quality [is] low (*jaghanya-guṇa-varja*). Now
(*atha*), is there (*kim*) an absolute exclusion (*atyanta-pratīṣedha*) of [material

elements that have an] equal [degree] of [these] qualities (*tulya-guṇa*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

[5.33.6] ***na jaghanyaguṇānām ity adhikṛtyedam ucyate ||***

Referring to (*adhikṛtya*) [the *sūtra* that says] (see TA 5.33) '[Such a connection does] not (*na*) [take place between material elements having a] low [degree] of [these] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) (*jaghanya-guṇa*)' (*iti*), this (*idam*) is said (*ucyate*):

guṇasāmye sadṛśānām ||5.34||

5.34 [Likewise, such a connection does not take place] when [there is] an evenness of the qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) (*guṇa-sāmya*) between similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*).⁹⁵²

[5.34.1] ***guṇasāmye sati sadṛśānām bandho na bhavati |***

When there is (*sati*) an evenness of the qualities (*guṇa-sāmya*), there is (*bhavati*) no (*na*) connection (*bandha*) between similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*).

[5.34.2] ***tadyathā |*** [5.34.3] ***tulyaguṇasnigdhasya tulyaguṇasnigdhenā tulyaguṇarūkṣasya tulyaguṇarūkṣeṇeti |***

Namely (*tad-yathā*),

- i. between a [material element whose] smoothness [is] of equal quality (*tulya-guṇa-snigdha*) [and another material element whose] smoothness [is] of equal quality (*tulya-guṇa-snigdha*), [and]
- ii. between a [material element whose] roughness [is] of equal quality (*tulya-guṇa-rūkṣa*) [and another material element whose] roughness [is] of equal quality (*tulya-guṇa-rūkṣa*) (*iti*).

[5.34.4] ***atrāha |*** [5.34.5] ***sadṛśagrahaṇam kim apekṣate iti |*** [5.34.6] ***atrocyate |***

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): To what (*kim*) does the expression 'similar' (*sadṛśa-grahaṇa*) refer (*apekṣate*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

[5.34.7] ***guṇavaiśamyē sadṛśānām bandho bhavatīti ||***

A connection (*bandha*) exists (*bhavati*) [between] similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*) [when there is] a diversity of qualities (*guṇa-vaiśamyā*) (*iti*).

⁹⁵² In other words, two material elements that have the same degree of smoothness or roughness cannot connect.

[5.34.8] *atrāha* | [5.34.9] *kim aviśeṣeṇa guṇavaiṣamye sadṛśānām bandho bhavatīti* | [5.34.10] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Is it so [that] (*kim*) a connection (*bandha*) exists (*bhavati*) between similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*) [when there is] a diversity of qualities (*guṇa-vaiṣamya*) without exception (*aviśeṣeṇa*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

dvyadhikādiguṇānām tu ||5.35||

5.35 However (*tu*), [a connection exists between material elements whose] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) [have a] difference of two or more⁹⁵³ (*dvy-adhika-ādi-guṇa*).

[5.35.1] ***dvyadhikādiguṇānām tu sadṛśānām bandho bhavati*** |

A connection (*bandha*) exists (*bhavati*) [between] similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*) [whose] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) [have] a difference of two or more (i.e., when there is a difference of at least two degrees in smoothness or roughness) (*dvy-adhika-ādi-guṇa*).

[5.35.2] *tadyathā* | [5.35.3] *snigdhasya dviguṇādyadhikasnigdhenā* | [5.35.4] *dviguṇādyadhikasnigdhasya snigdhenā* | [5.35.5] *rūkṣasyāpi dviguṇādyadhikarūkṣeṇa* | [5.35.6] *dviguṇādyadhikarūkṣasya rūkṣeṇa* |

Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- i. [between] a smooth [material element] (*snigdha*) [and another material element whose] smoothness [is] different by two or more degrees (*dvi-guṇa-ādi-adhika-snigdha*) [and]
- ii. [between] a [material element whose] smoothness [is] different by two or more degrees (*dvi-guṇa-ādi-adhika-snigdha*) [and another] smooth [material element] (*snigdha*);

And likewise (*apī*):

- i. [between] a rough [material element] (*rūkṣa*) [and another material element whose] roughness [is] different by two or more degrees (*dvi-guṇa-ādi-adhika-rūkṣa*) [and]

⁹⁵³ I.e., when there is a difference of at least two degrees in smoothness or roughness.

- ii. [between a material element whose] roughness [is] different by two or more degrees (*dvi-guṇa-ādi-adhika-rūkṣa*) [and another] rough [material element] (*rūkṣa*).

[5.35.7] ***ekādiguṇādhikayoḥ tu sadṛśayor bandho na bhavati |***

However (*tu*), a connection (*bandha*) does not exist (*na bhavati*) [between] two similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*) whose difference is one or less [than one]⁹⁵⁴ degree (*eka-ādi-guṇa-adhika*).

[5.35.8] ***atra tu śabda vyāvṛttiviśeṣañārthaḥ pratiśedhaṃ vyāvartayati bandhaṃ ca viśeṣayati ||***

Here (i.e., in the foregoing sentence) (*atra*) the word (*śabda*) ‘however’ (*tu*) [is] an indication of exclusion [and] specification (*vyāvṛtti-viśeṣaṇa-artha*); it singles out (*vyāvartayati*) an exception (*pratiśedha*) and (*ca*) it specifies (*viśeṣayati*) the connection (*bandha*).

[5.35.9] ***atrāha |*** [5.35.10] ***paramāṇuṣu skandheṣu ca ye sparśādayo guṇās te kiṃ vyavasthitās teṣv āhosvid avyavasthitā iti |*** [5.35.11] ***atrocyate |***

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): These (*tad*) qualities (*guṇa*), beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*), which (*yad*) [exist] in the case of infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*) and (*ca*) in the case of aggregates (*skandha*), [are they] (*kim*) fixed (*vyavasthita*) or (*āhosvid*) not fixed (*avyavasthita*) to these [infinitesimal particles and aggregates] (*tad*)⁹⁵⁵ At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

[5.35.12] ***avyavasthitāḥ |*** [5.35.13] ***kutaḥ |*** [5.35.14] ***pariṇāmāt ||***

[They are] not fixed (*avyavasthita*). Why (*kutaḥ*)? On account of transformation (*pariṇāma*).

[5.35.15] ***atrāha |*** [5.35.16] ***dvayor api badhyamānayoḥ guṇavattve sati katham pariṇāmo bhavatīti |*** [5.35.17] ***ucyate |***

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): When there is (*sat*) the state of possessing a quality (*guṇavattva*) for two [material elements] (*dvi*) that are connected⁹⁵⁶ (*badhyamāna*), how (*katham*) does a transformation (*pariṇāma*) exist (*bhavati*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

⁹⁵⁴ It seems that the suffix ‘*ādi*’ means ‘or less than one’ in this context, unlike the previous sentences, in which it means ‘or more’.

⁹⁵⁵ See also TABh 5.24.24 – 5.24.25.

⁹⁵⁶ In other words, ‘when two connected elements share a quality’.

bandhe samādhikau pāriṇāmikau ||5.36||

5.36 [When there is] a connection (*bandha*), [two material elements whose smoothness or roughness is] equal [or] more (*samādhika*) [are] subject to transformation (*pāriṇāmika*).

[5.36.1] ***bandhe sati samaguṇasya samaguṇaḥ pariṇāmako bhavati |*** [5.36.2] ***adhikaguṇo hīnasyeti ||***

When there is (*sati*) a connection (*bandha*) [with a material element] whose quality is equal (*sama-guṇa*), [the material element] whose quality is equal (*samaguṇa*) becomes (*bhavati*) subject to transformation (*pāriṇāmika*); [when there is a connection] [with a material element] whose quality is less (*hīna*), [the material element] whose quality is more (*adhika-guṇa*) [becomes subject to development] (*iti*).

[5.36.3] ***atrāha |*** [5.36.4] ***uktaṃ bhavatā dravyāṇi jīvās ceti (5.2) |*** [5.36.5] ***tat kim uddeśata eva dravyāṇāṃ prasiddhir āhosvil lakṣaṇato 'pīti |*** [5.36.6] ***atrocyate |***

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TA 5.2) (*bhavat*) [that] '[the inanimate entities] together with (*ca*) the souls (*jīva*) are the substances (*dravya*).' Now (*tad*), [is there] (*kim*) only (*eva*) an explanation (*prasiddhi*) of the substances (*dravya*) by a brief statement (*uddeśa*) or (*āhosvid*) also (*apī*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

[5.36.7] ***lakṣaṇato 'pi prasiddhiḥ tad ucyate -***

[There is] also (*apī*) an explanation (*prasiddhi*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*). It (*tad*) is said (*ucyate*):

guṇaparyāyavad dravyam ||5.37||

5.37 Substance (*dravya*) has qualities [and] modes (*guṇa-paryāyavat*).⁹⁵⁷

⁹⁵⁷ For a discussion of this *sūtra*, see § 3.4, *Qualities, modes, and transformation*. See also Soni 1991.

[5.37.1] *guṇān lakṣaṇato vakṣyāmaḥ* | [5.37.2] *bhāvāntaraṃ saṃjñāntaraṃ ca paryāyaḥ* | [5.37.3] *tadubhayaṃ yatra vidyate tad dravyam* |

We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) the qualities (*guṇa*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*). Another state (*bhāva-antara*) and (*ca*) another recognition (*saṃjñā-antara*) – [that is] a mode (*paryāya*). Where (*yatra*) the combination of them (i.e., of a quality and a mode) (*tad-ubhaya*) is seen (*vidyate*), that (*tad*) [is] substance.

[5.37.4] *guṇaparyāyā asya santy asmin vā santīti guṇaparyāyavat* ||

‘Having qualities [and] modes’ (*guṇa-paryāyavat*) [means that] (*iti*) qualities [and] modes (*guṇaparyāya*) exist (*santi*) for this (*idam*) or (*vā*) they exist (*santi*) in the case of it (*idam*).

***kālaś cety eke* ||5.38||**

5.38 Time (*kāla*) [is] also [a substance] (*ca*) according to some (*iti eke*).

[5.38.1] *eke tv ācāryā vyācakṣate kālo ’pi dravyam iti* ||

And (*tu*) some (*eka*) teachers (*ācārya*) explain (*vyācakṣate*) [that] time (*kāla*) [is] also (*api*) a substance (*dravya*) (*iti*).

***so ’nantasamayaḥ* ||5.39||**

5.39 That (i.e., time) (*tad*) [consists of] infinitely [many] moments (*ananta-samaya*).

[5.39.1] *sa caiṣa kālo ’nantasamayaḥ* | [5.39.2] *tatraika eva vartamāna-samayaḥ* | [5.39.3] *atītānāgatayos tv ānantyam* ||

And (*ca*) ‘that’ (*tad*) [refers to] this (*etaḥ*) time (*kāla*), [which consists of] infinitely [many] moments (*anantasamaya*). Among them (i.e., the *dravyas*) (*tatra*), [time is] a single substance (see TA 5.5) (*eka*), [which has] moments [that are] existent (*vartamāna-samaya*). And (*tu*) [there is] infinity (*ānantya*) of past and future [moments] (*atīta-anāgata*).

[5.39.4] *atrāha* | [5.39.5] *uktaṃ bhavatā guṇaparyāyavaddravyam iti* | [5.39.6] *tatra ke guṇā iti* | [5.39.7] *atrocyate*

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TA 5.37) (*bhavat*) [that] ‘substance (*dravya*) has qualities [and] modes (*guṇa-paryāyavat*)’ (*iti*). Among them (*tatra*), what (*kim*) [are] qualities (*guṇa*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇāḥ ||5.40||⁹⁵⁸

5.40 Qualities (*guṇa*) inhere in substance⁹⁵⁹ (*dravya-āśraya*) [and are themselves] devoid of qualities (i.e., qualities cannot inhere in qualities but only in matter) (*nirguṇa*).

[5.40.1] ***dravyam eṣām āśraya iti dravyāśrayāḥ*** | [5.40.2] ***naiṣāṃ guṇāḥ santīti nirguṇāḥ*** |

Substance (*dravya*) [is] the locus (*āśraya*) of them (i.e., of qualities) (*idam*) (*iti*) — [that is the meaning of] ‘inhering in substance’ (*dravya-āśraya*). [There] are no (*na santi*) qualities (*guṇā*) for them (i.e., for qualities) (*idam*) (*iti*) — [that is the meaning of] ‘devoid of qualities’ (*nirguṇa*).

[5.40.3] ***atrāha*** | [5.40.4] ***uktaṃ bhavatā bandhe samādhikau pāriṇāmikau iti*** (5.36) | [5.40.5] ***tatra kaḥ pariṇāma iti*** | [5.40.6] ***atrocyate***

At this point (*atra*), one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TA 5.36) (*bhavat*) [that] ‘[the material elements whose smoothness or roughness is] equal [or] more (*samādhika*) [are] subject to transformation (*pāriṇāmika*) [when there is] a connection (*bandha*)’ (*iti*). Here (i.e., in this *sūtra*) (*tatra*), what (*kim*) [is] transformation (*pariṇāma*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ ||5.41||

5.41 The existence of these [substances]⁹⁶⁰ (*tad-bhāva*) [is characterised by] transformation (*pariṇāma*).

[5.41.1] ***dharmādīnāṃ dravyāṇāṃ yathoktānāṃ ca guṇānāṃ svabhāvaḥ svatattvaṃ pariṇāmaḥ*** | [5.41.2] ***sa dvividhaḥ*** |

Transformation (*pariṇāma*) [is] the essence (*svabhāva*) [or] own nature (*svatattva*) of the substances (*dravya*) beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādi*) — as it is said (*yathokta*) — and (*ca*) of the qualities (*guṇa*). This [transformation] (*tad*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*):

⁹⁵⁸ Halbfass suggests that this *sūtra* reflects VS I.1.15 (Halbfass 1992: 107, n.21). See also § 3.4, *Qualities, modes, and transformation*.

⁹⁵⁹ Lit. ‘whose locus is matter’ (bah.).

⁹⁶⁰ Siddhasenagaṇi interprets ‘*tad*’ as a reference to the *dravyas*.

anādir ādimāṃś ca ||5.42||

5.42 [There is transformation] without beginning (*anādi*) and having a beginning (*ādimat*).⁹⁶¹

[5.42.1] *tatrānādir arūpiṣu dharmādharmākāśajīveṣv iti |*

Among them (*tatra*), [transformation] without beginning (*anādi*) [applies to] motion, rest, space, and souls (*dharmā-adharma-ākāśa-jīva*), [which are] formless (*arūpin*) (*iti*).

rūpiṣv ādimān ||5.43||

5.43 [Transformation] with a beginning (*ādimat*) [applies to substances that are] having form (*rūpin*).

[5.43.1] *rūpiṣu tu dravyeṣu ādimān | [5.43.2] pariṇāmo 'nekavidhaḥ sparśapariṇāmādir iti ||*

And (*tu*) [transformation] with a beginning (*ādimat*) [applies to] substances (*dravya*) that are] having form (*rūpin*). Transformation (*pariṇāma*) [is] manifold (*anekavidha*), beginning with the transformation of touch (*sparsā-pariṇāma-ādi*) (*iti*).

yogopayogau jīveṣu ||5.44||

5.44 [There is] action [and] cognitive operation (*yoga-upayoga*) in the case of souls (*jīva*).

[5.44.1] *jīveṣv arūpiṣu api satsu yogopayogau pariṇāmāv ādimantau bhavataḥ |*
Action [and] cognitive operation (*yoga-upayoga*) are (*bhavatas*) the two transformations (*pariṇāma*) having a beginning (*ādimat*), in the case of the souls (*jīva*), being (*sat*) indeed (*api*) formless (*arūpin*).

[5.44.2] *tatropayogaḥ pūrvoktaḥ |*

Among them (*tatra*), cognitive operation (*upayoga*) has been discussed before (see TA 2.19) (*pūrvokta*).

⁹⁶¹ See also TABh 5.22.4 – 5.22.6.

[5.44.3] *yogas tu parastād vakṣyate* ||

And (*tu*) action (*yoga*) will be explained (*vakṣyate*) later on (see TA 6.1) (*parastāt*).

***iti tattvārthadhigame 'rhatpravacanasāṅgrāhe pañcama 'dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ* ||**

Thus (*iti*), the fifth (*pañcama*) chapter (*adhyāya*) of the *Tattvārthādhigama*, [which is] a summary of the words of the *arhat* (*arhat-pravacana-sāṅgraha*), [is now] completed (*samāpta*).

Sambandhakārikās⁹⁶²

[The Jaina ideal]⁹⁶³

[0.1] *samyagdarśanaśuddhaṃ yo jñānaṃ viratiṃ eva cāpnoti |*

[0.2] *duḥkhanimittam apīdaṃ tena sulabdhaṃ bhavati janma ||1||*

[For] him who (*yaḥ*) obtains (*āpnoti*) knowledge (*jñāna*), [which is] pure [through] right worldview (*samyak-darśana-śuddha*),⁹⁶⁴and (*ca*) indeed (*eva*) non-passion (*virati*), for him (*tad*) there is (*bhavati*) good (*sulabdha*) birth (*janman*), even though (*api*) this (*idam*) [is] the cause of pain (*duḥkha-nimitta*).

[0.3] *janmani karmakleśair anubaddhe 'smiṃs tathā prayatitavyam |*

[0.4] *karmakleśābhāvo yathā bhavaty eṣa paramārthaḥ ||2||*

Pains have to be taken (*prayatitavya*) in this (*idam*) birth (*janman*), [which is] connected with (*anubaddha*) the afflictions of *karman* (*karma-kleśa*), in such a way that (*yathā ... tathā*) the absence of the afflictions of *karman* (*karma-kleśa-abhāva*) occurs (*bhavati*); this (*etad*) [is] the highest aim (*parama-artha*).

[0.5] *paramārthālābhe vā doṣeṣv ārambhakasvabhāveṣu |*

[0.6] *kuśalānubandham eva syād anavadyaṃ yathā karma ||3||*

Or (*vā*), when there is no acquirement of the highest aim (*paramārtha-alābha*), [when there are] faults (*doṣa*), [being] the inherent nature of someone who

⁹⁶² The verses of this introductory text are labelled '*sambandhakārikāḥ*' at the end of the passage. See SK 0.63.

⁹⁶³ The description of the content of the sections of the *sambandhakārikās* is based on Ohira 1982: 27.

⁹⁶⁴ Alternatively, one could interpret the compound as '*samyagdarśanaṃ śuddham*'. The general content of this verse deviates from TA 1.1 (*samyagdarśanaṃ jñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ*), in which *darśana* and *jñāna* seem to play an equal role. It is remarkable that '*virati*' is mentioned instead of '*cāritra*'. For a discussion of this verse, see § 3.5, *The sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti*.

performs [violent activities]⁹⁶⁵ (*ārambhaka-svabhāva*), [pains have to be taken] in such a way (*yathā*) [that] *karman* might be (*syāt*) faultless (*anavadya*), [having] indeed (*eva*) a suitable⁹⁶⁶ connection (*kuśala-anubandha*).

[Classification of human beings]

[0.7] ***karmāhitam iha cāmutra cādhamatamo naraḥ samārabhate |***

[0.8] ***iha phalam eva tv adhamo vimadhyamas tūbhayaphalārtham ||4||***

The very lowest (*adhamatama*) man (*nara*) undertakes (*samārabhate*) evil deeds (*karma-ahita*) here (*iha ca*) and there (i.e., the next life) (*amutra ca*). But (*tu*) the low [man] (*adhama*) [undertakes deeds which give] fruit (*phala*) here (*iha*) only (*eva*). And (*tu*) the exactly mediocre⁹⁶⁷ [man] (*vi-madhyama*) [undertakes deeds] for the sake of the fruit in both [lives] (*ubhaya-phala-artha*).

[0.9] ***paralokahitāyaiva pravartate madhyamaḥ kriyāsu sadā |***

[0.10] ***mokṣāyaiva tu ghaṭate viśiṣṭamatir uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ ||5||***

The middling [man] (*madhyama*) always (*sadā*) engages (*pravartate*) in actions (*kriyā*) for the sake of the future world (*paralokahita*) only (*eva*), while (*tu*) the highest (*uttama*) man (*puruṣa*), having excellent cognition (*viśiṣṭa-mati*) is suitable (*ghaṭate*) for liberation (*mokṣa*) only (*eva*).

[0.11] ***yas tu kṛtārtho 'py uttamam avāpya dharmam parebhya upadiśati |***

[0.12] ***nityam sa uttamebhyo 'py uttama iti pūjyatama eva ||6||***

But (*tu*) [he] who (*yaḥ*) has indeed accomplished [his] goal (*kṛta-artha api*), having obtained (*avāpya*) the highest (*uttama*), teaches (*upadiśati*) the *dharmā* to others (*para*). He (*tad*) [is] always (*nityam*) the highest (*uttama*) of the very highest (*uttama api*). Thus (*iti*), [he is] indeed (*eva*) the most venerable (*pūjyatama*).

⁹⁶⁵ The term '*ārambha*' has a very negative connotation in Jainism, and carries the meaning of violent action (Johnson 1995: 38).

⁹⁶⁶ The term '*kuśala*' is not very common in Jainism but frequently appears in Buddhist texts.

⁹⁶⁷ The prefix '*vi-*' is interpreted as '*viśiṣṭa-*'.

[Nature of the *Tīrthakara*]

[0.13] *tasmād arhati pūjām arhann evottamottamo loka |*

[0.14] *devarṣinarendrebhyaḥ pūjyebhyo 'py anyasattvānām ||7||*

Therefore (*tasmāt*), the *arhat* alone (*eva*), [who is] the very highest (*uttamottama*) in this world (*loka*), is worthy (*arhati*) of veneration (*pūjā*) [from] gods, sages, and lords (*deva-rṣi-narendra*), even though (*api*) [they are] worthy of veneration (*pūjyā*) [from] other beings (*anya-sattva*) [themselves].

[0.15] *abhyarcanād arhatāṃ manaḥprasādas tataḥ samādhiś ca |*

[0.16] *tasmād api niḥśreyasam ato hi tatpūjanam nyāyyam ||8||*

From the worship (*abhyarcana*) of the arhats (*arhat*) [comes] peace of mind (*manaḥ-prasāda*), and (*ca*) from that (*tatas*) *samādhi*. And from that (*tasmāt api*) [comes] ultimate bliss⁹⁶⁸ (*niḥśreyasa*). Therefore (*atas hi*), worship of them (*tatpūjanam*) is appropriate (*nyāyya*).

[0.17] *tīrthpravartanaphalam yat proktaṃ karma tīrthakaranāma |*

[0.18] *tasyodayāt kṛtārtho 'py arhaṃs tīrtham pravartayati ||9||*

That which [is] (*yad*) called (*prokta*) 'body-determining *karman* [related to] the *tīrthakara*'⁹⁶⁹ (*tīrthakara-nāma*) [has] the commencement of a ford [as its] result (*tīrtha-pravartana-phala*). From the occurrence (*udayāt*) of that (*tad*), the *arhat*, having his goal accomplished (*kṛtārtha*), also (*api*) proceeds to initiate (*pravartayati*) a ford (*tīrtha*).

⁹⁶⁸ This term is uncommon for the Jaina tradition. See also § 3.5, *The sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti*.

⁹⁶⁹ This type of *karman* is listed in TA 8.12.

[0.19] *tatsvābhāvyaḍ eva prakāśayati bhāskaro yathā lokam |*

[0.20] *tīrthapravartanāya pravartate tīrthakara evam ||10||*

Just as (*yathā*) the sun (*bhāskara*) illuminates (*prakāśayati*) the world (*loka*) out of its own nature (*tat-svābhāvya*), in the same way (*evam*) the *tīrthakara* is occupied with⁹⁷⁰ (*pravartate*) making a ford (*tīrtha-pravartana*).

[Life of Mahāvīra]

[0.21] *yaḥ śubhakarmā sevānabhāvitabhāvo bhaveṣv anekeṣu |*

[0.22] *jajñe jñāteḥkṣvākuṣu siddhārthanarendrakuladīpaḥ ||11||*

He who [is] (*yaḥ*) of virtuous conduct⁹⁷¹ (*śubha-karman*), whose being is pervaded by serving (*sevāna-bhāvita-bhāva*) in many (*aneka*) lives (*bhava*), was born (*jajñe*) in the well-known Ikṣvāku [clan] (*jñāta-ikṣvāku*), [being] the lamp of the lineage of kings whose goals are accomplished (*siddhārtha-narendra-kula-dīpa*)

[0.23] *jñānaiḥ pūrvādhigatair apratipatitair matiśrutāvadhibhiḥ |*

[0.24] *tribhir api śuddhair yuktaḥ śaityadyutikāntibhir ivenduḥ ||12||*

... endowed (*yukta*) with knowledge (*jñāna*), acquired previously (*pūrvādhigata*), which does not disappear⁹⁷² (*apratipatita*), [being] ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception (*mati-śruta-avadhi*), which [are] all three (*tri api*) pure (*śuddha*), like (*iva*) the moon (*indu*), [which is endowed] with coolness, splendour, and brightness (*śaitya-dyuti-kānti*), ...

[0.25] *śubhasārasattvasaṃhananavīryamāhātmyarūpaḥ |*

[0.26] *jagati mahāvīra iti tridaśair guṇataḥ kṛtābhikhyāḥ ||13||*

... endowed with auspiciousness, energy, strength, firmness, power, magnanimity, beauty, and virtue (*śubha-sāra-sattva-saṃhanana-vīrya-māhātmya-rūpa-guṇa-*

⁹⁷⁰ The middle voice fits the 'svābhāvya' character of the activity.

⁹⁷¹ Alternatively, 'auspicious *karman*'.

⁹⁷² See also TABh 1.23.8.

yukta), [who] is made famous (*kṛta-abhikhyā*) as 'Mahāvīra' (*mahāvīra iti*) in this world (*jagat*) by the gods (*tridaśa*) because of his virtues (*guṇa*), ...

[0.27] ***svayam eva buddhatattvaḥ sattvahitābhyudyatācalitasattvaḥ |***

[0.28] ***abhinanditaśubhasattvaḥ sendrair lokāntikair devaiḥ ||14||***

... he himself (*svayam*) indeed (*eva*), whose essence is enlightened (*buddha-tattva*), whose strength is unshakable, [who is] engaged in beneficial [deeds] for [other] beings (*sattva-hita-abhyudyata-acalita-sattva*), whose auspicious essence is venerated (*abhinandita-śubha-sattva*) by the *lokāntika* gods⁹⁷³ (*lokāntika deva*), including Indra (*sa-indra*), ...

[0.29] ***janmajarāmarañārttaṃ jagad aśaraṇam abhisamīkṣya niḥsāram |***

[0.30] ***sphītam apahāya rājyaṃ śamāya dhīmān pravavrāja ||15||***

... after having seen (*abhisamīkṣya*) the world (*jagat*) [being] without refuge (*aśaraṇa*), without essence (*niḥsāra*), afflicted by birth, old age, and death (*janmajarā-maraṇa-ārtta*), the wise one (*dhīmat*) renounced the world (*pravavrāja*), for the sake of peace (*śama*), leaving behind (*apahāya*) a prosperous (*sphīta*) kingdom (*rājya*).

[0.31] ***pratipadyāśubhaśamanaṃ niḥśreyasasādhakaṃ śramaṇaliṅgam |***

[0.32] ***kṛtasāmāyikakarmā vratāni vidhivat samāropya ||16||***

After taking up (*pratipadya*) the mark of asceticism (*śramaṇaliṅga*), [which is] destroying [that which is] inauspicious (*aśubhaśamana*), [and which is] the means to ultimate bliss (*niḥśreyasa-sādhaka*), [he who is] engaged in the performance of *sāmāyika*⁹⁷⁴ (*kṛta-sāmāyika-karman*), after undertaking (*samāropya*) the vows (*vrata*) according to the rules (*vidhivat*), ...

⁹⁷³ TA 4.25 explains that the *lokāntika* gods dwell in Brahmaloaka (*brahmalokālayā lokāntikāḥ*) (Mody 1903: 112).

⁹⁷⁴ I.e., the totality of the Jaina path.

[0.33] *samyaktvajñānacāritrasaṃvaratapahsamādhibalayuktaḥ |*

[0.34] *mohādīni nihatyāśubhāni catvāri karmāṇi ||17||*

... endowed with righteousness, knowledge, stopping,⁹⁷⁵ asceticism, *samādhi*, power⁹⁷⁶ (*samyaktva-jñāna-cāritra-saṃvara-tapaḥ-samādhi-bala-yukta*), having destroyed (*nihatya*) four (*catur*) [types of] inauspicious (*aśubhāni*) *karman*, beginning with deluding [*karman*]⁹⁷⁷ (*moha-ādi*), ...

[0.35] *kevalam adhigamya vibhuḥ svayam eva jñānadarśanam anantam |*

[0.36] *lokahitāya kṛtārtha 'pi deśayām āsa tīrtham idam ||18||*

... after having attained (*adhigamya*) absolute knowledge (*kevala*), [which is] unlimited (*ananta*) knowledge and worldview (*jñāna-darśanam*), the lord (*vibhu*) himself (*svayam eva*), even though (*api*) he has accomplished his goals (*kṛta-artha*), taught (*deśayām āsa*) this (*idam*) path (*tīrtha*)⁹⁷⁸ for the benefit of this world (*loka-hita*), ...

[0.37] *dvividham anekadvādaśavidhaṃ mahāviśayam amitagamayuktam |*

[0.38] *saṃsārārṇavapāragamanāya duḥkhakṣayāyālam ||19||*

... [i.e.], the twofold (*dvividha*), manifold, [and] twelvefold [varieties of knowledge from testimony]⁹⁷⁹ (*aneka-dvādaśavidha*), having great range (*mahā-viśaya*), endowed with many perspectives⁹⁸⁰ (*amita-gama-yukta*), [being] adequate for the annihilation of pain (*duḥkha-kṣayāya-alam*), in order to go to the other shore of the ocean of *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāra-arṇava-pāra-gamana*).

⁹⁷⁵ I.e., of karmic influx (see TA 1.4).

⁹⁷⁶ Alternatively, 'power acquired by austerities' (*tapo[bala]*) and 'force of meditation' (*samādhibala*).

⁹⁷⁷ This type of *karman* is listed in TA 10.1. See also TABh 1.26.22.

⁹⁷⁸ Alternatively, 'showed this ford'.

⁹⁷⁹ I.e., the canonical Jaina scriptures. See TABh 1.20.18.

⁹⁸⁰ The term '*gama*' is a synonym of '*naya*' (see also Mody 1903: 30, footnote 1).

[0.39] *granthārthavacanapaṭubhiḥ prayatnavadbhir api vādibhir nipuṇaiḥ |*
[0.40] *anabhibhavanīyam anyair bhāskara iva sarvatejobhiḥ ||20||*

[It] cannot be surpassed (*anabhibhavanīya*) by other (*anya*) skilful (*nipuṇa*) teachers (*vādin*), even (*api*) [not by those] who are diligent (*prayatnavat*) [and] skilful [with respect to] the meaning and words of scripture (*grantha-artha-vacana-paṭu*), just like (*iva*) the sun (*bhāskara*) [cannot be surpassed] by all lights (*sarva-tejas*).

[Salutation]⁹⁸¹

[0.41] *kṛtvā trikaraṇaśuddhaṃ tasmai paramarṣaye namaskāram |*
[0.42] *pūjyatamāya bhagavate vīrāya vilīnamohāya ||21||*

After having made (*kṛtvā*) homage (*namaskāra*) to that (*tad*) great sage (*parama-rṣi*) with purity of the three faculties⁹⁸² (*tri-karaṇa-śuddham*), [to him who is] a most venerable (*pūjyatama*) illustrious (*bhagavat*) hero (*vīra*), whose delusion is gone (*vilīna-moha*), ...

[Nature of the work]

[0.43] *tattvārthādhigamākhyam bahvartham saṃgraham laghugrantham |*
[0.44] *vakṣyāmi śiṣyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadeśasya ||22||*

..., I will teach (*vakṣyāmi*) this (*idam*) short text (*laghu-grantha*), called 'Tattvārthādhigama' (*tattvārtha-adhigamā-ākhyā*) — an important⁹⁸³ (*bahu-artha*) compendium (*saṃgraha*) of some⁹⁸⁴ of the words of the *arhat* (*arhat-vacana-ekadeśa*), [which is] beneficial for students (*śiṣya-hita*).

[Difficulty of the task of the author]

⁹⁸¹ Ohira writes that SK 21, 22, and 31 are the 'essential three *kārikās*', and observes that the *maṅgalācaraṇa* in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* was 'directly derived from SK 21 and 31' (Ohira 1982: 29-30). See also § 3.5.

⁹⁸² I.e., body, speech, and mind. See, e.g., Balcerowicz 2008: 36.

⁹⁸³ Lit. 'having much meaning'.

⁹⁸⁴ Lit. 'a part'.

[0.45] *mahato 'timahāviṣayasya durgamagranthabhāṣy⁹⁸⁵ apārasya* |
[0.46] *kaḥ śaktaḥ pratyāsaṃ jinavacanamahodadheḥ kartum* ||23||

Who (*kim*), in enunciating a difficult text (*durgama-grantha-bhāṣin*), [is] able (*śakta*) to make (*kartum*) a summary⁹⁸⁶ (*pratyāsa*) of the great ocean of the words of the *jina* (*jina-vacana-maha-udadhi*), [which is] boundless (*apāra*), [whose] scope [is] way larger (*atimahā-viṣaya*) [than] large (*mahat*)?

[0.47] *śirasā giriṃ bibhitset uccikṣipsec ca sa kṣitiṃ dorbhyām* |
[0.48] *pratitīrṣec ca samudram mitsec ca punaḥ kuśāgreṇa* ||24||

[He who would desire to comprehend the word of the *jina*, which is the subject of a very extensive text],⁹⁸⁷ he (*tad*) could desire to break (*bibhitset*) a mountain (*giri*) with the head (*śiras*), and (*ca*) he could desire to throw up (*uccikṣipset*) the earth (*kṣiti*) with two arms (*dos*), and (*ca*) he could desire to cross (*pratitīrṣet*) the ocean (*samudra*), and (*ca*) further (*punar*), he could desire to measure (*mitset*) [the ocean] with the tip of the *kuśa* grass (*kuśa-agra*) ...

[0.49] *vyomnīduṃ cikramiṣen merugiriṃ pāṇinā cikampayīset* |
[0.50] *gatyānilaṃ jigīṣec caramasamudraṃ pipāsec ca* ||25||

... [and] he could desire to move (*cikramiṣet*) the moon (*indu*) in the sky (*vyoman*), [and] he could desire to shake (*cikampayīset*) mount Meru (*merugiri*) with one hand (*pāṇi*), [and] he could desire to move (*jigīṣet*) [along with] the wind [by his own] movement⁹⁸⁸ (*gaty-ānila*), and (*ca*) he could desire to drink (*pipāset*) the deepest ocean (*carama-samudra*) ...

⁹⁸⁵ There are different ways to analyse '*durgamagranthabhāṣyapārasya*'. It is tempting to read '*bhāṣya-pārasya*' since the *sambandhakārikās* seem to introduce the main text (*grantha*) and the *bhāṣya*. However, this is syntactically unlikely. Therefore, '*bhāṣy apārasya*' seems to be the correct word division. For a discussion of this verse, see § 3.5, *The sambandhakārikās* and the *praśasti*.

⁹⁸⁶ This is an unusual word. Haribhadra interprets '*pratyāsa*' as '*saṃgraha*' (Mody 1903: 30, footnote 3).

⁹⁸⁷ See SK 0.52.

⁹⁸⁸ I.e., going as fast as the wind.

[0.51] *khadyotakaprabhābhiḥ so 'bhibubhūsec ca bhāskaraṃ mohāt |*

[0.52] *yo 'timahāgranthārthaṃ jinavacanāṃ saṃjighṛkṣeta ||26||*

... and (*ca*) he (*tad*) could desire to surpass (*abhibubhūset*) the sun (*bhāskara*) with the light of fireflies (*khadyotaka-prabhā*) out of delusion (*mohāt*). He [who] (*yaḥ*) would desire to comprehend (*saṃjighṛkṣeta*)⁹⁸⁹ the word of the *jina* (*jinavacana*), [which is] the subject of a very extensive text (*atimahā-grantha-artha*), [he could desire to ... (see SK 0.47 – 0.52)]

[Benefits for the author and others]

[0.53] *ekam api tu jinavacanād yasmān nirvāhakaṃ padaṃ bhavati |*

[0.54] *śrūyante cānantāḥ sāmāyikamātrapadasiddhāḥ ||27||*

Because (*yasmāt*), even though⁹⁹⁰ (*api tu*) one (*eka*) state (*pada*) which brings about deliverance (*nirvāhaka*) comes into being (*bhavati*)⁹⁹¹ from the word of the *jina* (*jina-vacana*), yet (*ca*), infinitely [many] (*ananta*) are heard (*śrūyante*) [to have] accomplished a state consisting of *sāmāyika* (*sāmāyika-mātra-pada-siddha*), ...

[0.55] *tasmāt tatprāmāṇyāt samāsato vyāsataś ca jinavacanam |*

[0.56] *śreya iti nirvicāraṃ grāhyaṃ dhāryaṃ ca vācyam ca ||28||*

... therefore (*tasmāt*), from the authority of that⁹⁹² (*tat-prāmāṇya*), the word of the *jina* (*jina-vacana*) in a brief (*samāsa*) and (*ca*) extended [form] (*vyāsatas*), should be accepted (*grāhya*), without doubt (*nirvicāra*), [thinking] '[this is] the best (*sreyas*)' (*iti*), and (*ca*) [it] should be remembered (*dhārya*), and (*ca*) [it] should be taught (*vācyā*).

⁹⁸⁹ Middle voice, metri causa.

⁹⁹⁰ Alternatively, 'in fact'.

⁹⁹¹ In other words, the highest accomplishing state becomes possible.

⁹⁹² I.e., because many people have reached the *sāmāyika* state by the words of the *jina*.

[0.57] **na bhavati dharmah śrotuḥ sarvasyaikāntato hitaśravaṇāt |**
[0.58] **bruvato 'nugrahabuddhyā vaktus tv ekāntato bhavati ||29||**

There is no (*na bhavati*) exclusive⁹⁹³ (*ekāntatas*) *dharma* for the hearer (*śrotr*) from the act of hearing [which is] beneficial (*hita-śravaṇa*) for all (*sarva*). However (*tu*), [that] final [dharma] (*ekāntatas*) comes into being (*bhavati*) [for someone who is] speaking (*vaktṛ*) because the mind (*buddhi*) of the speaker (*bruvat*) is promoting a good thing⁹⁹⁴ (*anugraha*).

[0.59] **śramam avicintyātmagatam tasmāc śreyaḥ sadopadeṣṭavyam |**
[0.60] **ātmānaṃ ca paraṃ ca hi hitopadeṣṭānugṛhṇāti ||30||**

Therefore (*tasmāt*), the bliss of final emancipation (*śreyas*) should always (*sadā*) be taught (*upadeṣṭavya*) without thinking about (*avicintya*) the trouble (*śrama*) for oneself (*ātmagata*). Certainly (*hi*), someone who teaches [that which is] beneficial (*hita-upadeṣṭṛ*) favours (*anugṛhṇāti*) himself (*ātman*) as well as (*ca ... ca*) the other (*para*).

[Nature of the work]

[0.61] **na rte ca mokṣamārgād dhitopadeśo 'sti jagati kṛtsne 'smin |**
[0.62] **tasmāt param imam⁹⁹⁵ eveti mokṣamārgaṃ pravakṣyāmi ||31||**

And (*ca*) besides (*na rte*) the path to liberation (*mokṣamārga*), there is (*asti*) no (*na*) beneficial teaching (*hita-upadeśa*) in this (*idam*) entire (*kṛtsna*) world (*jagat*). Therefore (*tasmāt*), I will teach (*pravakṣyāmi*) indeed (*eva*) this (*idam*) very (*iti*) highest (*para*) path to liberation (*mokṣa-mārga*).

[0.63] **iti sambandhakārikāḥ samāptāḥ ||**

Thus (*iti*), the introductory verses (*sambandha-kārikā*) [are now] completed (*samāpta*).

⁹⁹³ I.e., focused on one thing.

⁹⁹⁴ Lit. 'from the mind, [which is] showing favour (*anugraha-buddhi*), of the speaker (*bruvat*)'.

⁹⁹⁵ Kapadia reads 'idam'.

Praśasti

[10.7.224] *vācakamukhyasya śivaśriyaḥ prakāśayaśasaḥ praśiṣyeṇa |*

[10.7.225] *śiṣyeṇa ghoṣanandikṣamaṇasyaikādaśāṅgavidāḥ ||1||*

[This compendium was composed by *vācaka* Umāsvāti],⁹⁹⁶ the pupil of the pupil (*praśiṣya*) of Śivaśrī, [whose] fame [is] widely known (*prakāśa-yaśas*), [who is] the best among the *vācakas* (*vācaka-mukhya*), the pupil (*śiṣya*) of *kṣamaṇa* Ghoṣanandin, knower of the eleven main scriptural texts⁹⁹⁷ (*ekādaśa-aṅga-vid*) ...

[10.7.226] *vācanayā ca mahāvācakakṣamaṇamuṇḍapādaśiṣyasya |*

[10.7.227] *śiṣyeṇa vācakācāryamūlanāmaṇaḥ prathitakīrteḥ ||2||*

... and (*ca*) [based on] the interpretation⁹⁹⁸ (*vācanā*) of the pupil of *mahāvācaka kṣamaṇa* Muṇḍapāda⁹⁹⁹ (*mahā-vācaka-kṣamaṇa-muṇḍapāda-śiṣya*), the pupil (*śiṣya*) of *vācaka ācārya* Mūla (*vācaka-ācārya-mūla-nāman*) [whose] fame [is] known (*prathita-kīrti*), ...

[10.7.228] *nyagrodhikāprasūtena viharatā puravare kusumanāmnī |*

[10.7.229] *kaubhīṣaṇinā svātitanayena vātsīsutenārghyam ||3||*

... [who was] born in Nyagrodhikā (*nyagrodhikā-prasūta*), [who was] spending time (*viharat*) in the chief town (*puravara*) called Kusuma¹⁰⁰⁰ (*kusuma-nāman*), [belonging to the] *Kaubhīṣaṇi*[-gotra] (*kaubhīṣaṇi*), the son of Svāti (*svāti-tanaya*), [and] Vātsī (*vātsī-suta*).¹⁰⁰¹

⁹⁹⁶ See 10.7.232 – 10.7.233.

⁹⁹⁷ I.e., eleven out of the twelve ‘inner limbs’ or ‘aṅgas’ (see TA 1.20).

⁹⁹⁸ Lit. ‘by the lesson/recitation’.

⁹⁹⁹ The names Mūla and Muṇḍapāda (lit. the venerable baldhead) are unusual for Jaina ascetics.

¹⁰⁰⁰ I.e., Pāṭaliputra.

¹⁰⁰¹ It seems that ‘*arghyam*’ has to be taken with the next verse. This is exceptional and does not occur in the other verses of the *praśasti* and *sambandhakārikās*.

[10.7.230] *arhadvacanaṃ samyaggurukrameṇāgataṃ samupadhārya |*
[10.7.231] *duḥkhārtaṃ ca durāgamavihatamatiṃ lokamavalokya ||4||*

[After having] reflected (*samupadhārya*) on the priceless (*arghya*)¹⁰⁰² word of the *arhat* (*arhat-vacana*), [which] arrived (*āgata*) through the succession of right teachers¹⁰⁰³ (*samyak-guru-krama*), after having seen (*avalokya*) the people (*loka*) [whose] mind [is] impeded by wicked teachings¹⁰⁰⁴ (*dur-āgama-vihata-mati*) and (*ca*) [who are] afflicted by pain (*duḥkha-ārta*), ...

[10.7.232] *idam uccairnāgaravācakena sattvānukampayā dṛbdham |*
[10.7.233] *tattvārthādhigamākhyam spaṣṭam umāsvātinā śāstram ||5||*

... this (*idam*) compendium (*śāstra*), called ‘*Tattvārthādhigama*’ (*tattva-arthadhigama-ākhyā*) [was] composed (*dṛbdha*)¹⁰⁰⁵ in an intelligible way (*spaṣṭa*) out of compassion for the living beings (*sattva-anukampā*) by *vācaka* Umāsvāti of the *uccairnāgara* [*śākhā*]¹⁰⁰⁶ (*uccais-nāgara-vācaka ... umāsvāti*).

[10.7.234] *yas tattvādhigamākhyam jñāsyati ca kariṣyate ca tatroktam |*
[10.7.235] *so ’vyābādhasukhākhyam prāpsyaty acireṇa paramārtham ||6||*

He who (*yaḥ*) will know (*jñāsyati*) [this compendium] called ‘*Tattvādhigama*’ (*tattva-arthadhigama-ākhyā*) and (*ca*) also (*ca*) does (*kariṣyate*) what is said (*ukta*) therein (*tatra*), he (*tad*) will soon (*acireṇa*) attain (*prāpsyati*) the highest goal (*parama-ārtha*), [which is also] called unimpeded happiness (*avyābādha-sukha-ākhyā*).

¹⁰⁰² The word ‘*arghya*’ appears in verse 3.

¹⁰⁰³ In other words, the teachings of the *arhat* were passed down by the succession of teachers.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Alternatively, ‘whose ordinary cognition (*mati*) is hindered (*vihata*) by the difficult verbal testimonies (*durāgama*)’.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Unlike ‘*saṃdṛbdha*’, ‘*dṛbdha*’ is not a common word.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Translation based on Dhaky 1996: 60. Zydenbos mistranslates ‘the lofty nāgaravācaka Umāsvāti’ (Zydenbos 1983: 38).

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Abbreviations

- MW See: Monier-Williams 1899
NS *Nyāyasūtra*. See: Angot 2009
SK *Sambandhakārikās*
SS *Sarvārthasiddhi*
TA *Tattvārthādhigama*
TABh *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya*
VS *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*

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Summary

Early Jaina Epistemology: A Study of the Philosophical Chapters of the *Tattvārthādhigama*; With an English Translation of the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* I, II.8 - 25, and V.

This thesis provides an analysis and translation of the oldest extant philosophical treatise in the Jaina tradition. The *Tattvārthādhigama* (*A Study of the Fundamental Categories*) provides a systematic overview of the Jaina view on epistemology, ontology, and ethics. The text situates human beings in an overall cosmology and explains how the soul can reach liberation from the eternal cycle of rebirths. This study deals primarily with the ideas about knowledge in the *Tattvārthādhigama*, which can be found in the first, second, and fifth chapter.

The first part of this study consists of three chapters. The first chapter forms an introduction to this thesis and discusses the research questions, methodology, and the position of the *Tattvārthādhigama* in the history of philosophy from a global perspective. The second chapter situates the *Tattvārthādhigama* and the first commentary on this text, the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya*, in their historical context. This chapter deals with the role of both texts in the development of Jaina philosophy, the history of the Jainas in the Gupta Period, and the authorship of both texts. The third chapter forms the core of this thesis and offers a conceptual analysis of the content of *Tattvārthādhigama* I, II.8 – 25, and V.

The second part of this study contains an English translation from the original Sanskrit text of the *Tattvārthādhigama*. This part also provides the first English translation of the commentary on these passages from the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya*.

This thesis demonstrates that the *Tattvārthādhigama* offers a coherent philosophical system that was strongly influenced by the Nyāya tradition. Nevertheless, this study also shows the *Tattvārthādhigama* has a unique character and that it played a crucial role in the further development of the philosophical tradition of the Jainas.

Samenvatting

Vroege Jaina epistemologie: Een studie van de filosofische hoofdstukken van de *Tattvārthādhigama*; Met een Engelse vertaling van de *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* I, II.8 – 25, en V.

Dit proefschrift bevat een analyse en vertaling van de oudst overgeleverde filosofische tekst uit de Jaina traditie. De *Tattvārthādhigama* (*Een studie van de fundamentele categorieën*) biedt een systematisch overzicht van de Jaina theorieën op het gebied van epistemologie, ontologie, en ethiek. Het werk als geheel situeert de mens in de kosmos en schetst de weg naar bevrijding van de ziel uit de eeuwige cyclus van wedergeboortes. Deze studie richt zich voornamelijk op de ideeën over kennis in de *Tattvārthādhigama*, welke te vinden zijn in het eerste, tweede, en vijfde hoofdstuk.

Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie hoofdstukken. Het eerste hoofdstuk vormt de inleiding van deze studie, en behandelt de onderzoeksvragen, de methodologie, en de plaats van de *Tattvārthādhigama* in de algemene geschiedenis van de filosofie. Het tweede hoofdstuk situeert de *Tattvārthādhigama* en het eerste commentaar op deze tekst, de *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya*, in hun historische context. Hierbij wordt er ingegaan op de plaats van beide teksten in de ontwikkeling van Jaina filosofie, de geschiedenis van de Jainas in de Gupta Periode, en het auteurschap van beide teksten. Het derde hoofdstuk vormt de kern van dit proefschrift en biedt een conceptuele analyse van de inhoud van *Tattvārthādhigama* I, II.8 – 25, en V. Het tweede deel van deze studie bestaat uit een Engelse vertaling van deze passages uit het Sanskriet. Dit deel biedt tevens de eerste Engelse vertaling van het commentaar op deze passages uit de *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya*.

Dit proefschrift laat zien dat de *Tattvārthādhigama* een coherent filosofisch systeem bevat dat in sterke mate door de Nyāya traditie is beïnvloed. Niettemin toont deze studie aan dat de filosofie in de *Tattvārthādhigama* een uniek karakter heeft, en dat de tekst een cruciale rol in de verdere ontwikkeling van de filosofische tradities van de Jainas heeft gespeeld.

Curriculum Vitae

Lucas den Boer was born on the 14th of December 1982 in Beringen, Belgium. After finishing high school at Humaniora Voorzienigheid (1994 – 2000), Lucas studied fine art at Academie Minerva (2005 – 2008, BA) and philosophy, with additional courses in religious studies and Sanskrit, at the University of Groningen (2009 – 2015, MA, cum laude). Following his studies in philosophy, he was appointed as a PhD student in the ERC Synergy project ‘Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State’, which is hosted by the British Museum, the British Library, SOAS, and Leiden University (2015 – 2020). The PhD research was conducted at Leiden University. Lucas has an ancillary position as a lecturer in Asian philosophies at the University of Groningen.

