Reflecties op wereldburgerschap: in de spiegel van Afghanistan en Nederland

Azizi, M.B.

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Author: Azizi, M.B.
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Summary (Engelse samenvatting)

Reflections on global citizenship: *A comparative analysis of Afghanistan and the Netherlands*

This study addresses two main questions: (1) *What are the justification and the conditions for global citizenship?* and (2) *What is the relation between global citizenship education and education in general?* This investigation is based on the idea that citizenship in the current globalising world should entail more than being a citizen in a territorial nation-state and should be supplemented by the notion of a human being as a global citizen endowed with universal human rights.

This realisation stems from the author's intellectual journey as a political refugee from Afghanistan. For this reason this study will emphasize that the global political events and its effects on Afghanistan have resulted in an impairment of the formation of a democratic rule of law in this country, even to the point of rendering it impossible. The Afghan situation must be situated in a complex globalised world characterised by an interdependent, cultural and politically volatile habitat. It is argued that this global dimension inevitably requires a deeper and broader notion of citizenship, to wit global citizenship. The author's personal involvement with his native country is shown in the case of his analysis of the crime against Farkhunda, which serves as a tragic illustration of the failure of any attempt to bestow freedom upon the Afghan people. Farkhunda's story, as it shows the violation of her basic rights, is used as a benchmark for the verification or relevance of cosmopolitan theories. It is a fact that nations in a globalised world no longer form isolated communities but are related to (and dependent) on other nations. This gives the basic principle of moral responsibility ever more urgency, not only towards our local community but also towards those people that are far removed from our direct experiences. It is our moral duty to hear the voices of the weak and oppressed that suffer from the international power struggles. We ought not to turn a blind eye to the plight of the Afghan people for we are not only responsible for what we do, but also for what we could have prevented.

This dissertation applies a methodology that differs from more traditional forms of philosophical investigation in that there is no attempt made to formulate an ideal form of global citizenship. By contrast, the focus lies on the material obstacles for a cosmopolitan society. This method is dubbed a 'participatory baggage-research' whereby the author is an active participant whose historical baggage constitutes an integral component of the research. For this reason the societies of Afghanistan and the Netherlands are 'mirrored'. Further, placing citizenship in a global context necessitates a comparative method. Comparing a society like the Netherlands with a society like Afghanistan makes it possible to gain a deeper insight concerning justice in both societies. For this participatory study the author used open interviews, participated in public debates, seminars and conferences, hosted workshops on global citizenship, analysed primary sources and did literary research.

The idea of global citizenship is presented in the first chapter by means of a philosophical conceptualisation of citizenship and global citizenship. The next chapter provides a historical perspective on cosmopolitanism. The case of the human rights violation of Farkhunda is here used as a benchmark. Chapter three investigates the notion of the nation-state in relation to citizenship. The topic of the fourth chapter is citizenship and the formative role of education in present day societies. Finally, chapter five addresses the relation between education and global citizenship.

The first chapter shows that a characterization of the concept of citizenship is problematic. Though a general core can be discerned, namely membership and a particular type of rights, the interpretation of these elements can differ. In current times, the concept of citizenship often refers to types of social behaviour and ethical attitudes. This is joined by two conceptions of citizenship, namely an intrinsic conception and an instrumental conception. Citizenship is also a prerequisite for a modern democracy, both the basic institutions as the qualities and attitudes of the citizens. As in present day, democracy and citizenship are connected with a global conception of justice, international institutions are required. These institutions must be able to tackle global issues; this is problematic for a theory of democracy grounded in the nation. This provides a framework to understand global citizenship/cosmopolitanism. Using different typologies, an overview is given of what global citizenship may entail. From this follows that no equivocal definition of cosmopolitanism is possible. The salient point is not what global citizenship is, but what global citizenship can provide to the practices in the world. A working definition is given, thus providing a preliminary idea of the content of global citizenship: *the awareness of being a member of a community of humans in the world, that does not stop at the boundaries of the own local or national community.*

Chapter two provides an overview of cosmopolitan theories throughout history. As a rule these cosmopolitan ideas are contextualised by means of the way citizenship appears in history. As far as we know, the Greek philosopher Diogenes was the first thinker that explicitly expressed the idea of cosmopolitanism, though certain cosmopolitan ideas predated him. These can already be found in traditions that predate Greek antiquity, as in the Ancient Egyptians or the ideas of Zarathustra. Next the ideas of Greek antiquity and the cosmopolitanism of the Roman Empire are explored. Medieval citizenship shows that that an impetus is given to our modern idea of citizenship, but with a central place for religion. In the Renaissance, this conception of urban citizenship is further developed and in modernity the idea of membership is subsequently connected to the nation(-state), by which a reciprocal relationship arises between state and citizen concerning duties.

Kant takes the next big step in the development of cosmopolitanism. He adds a third dimension of *law* to local civil law of citizens sharing a nationality and international law of states, which pertains to the political unity within a global civil society. He proposes three articles that serve for the attainment of perpetual peace: a civil constitution must be republican, international law must be based upon a

federalism of free states and the law of world citizenship must be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.

Kant's theory had a huge influence on the many philosophers seeking to further develop the notion of cosmopolitanism. Present day theory proceeds beyond Kant's theory of the law of world citizenship by stating that adaptations for the theory are necessary to fit a globalized world. Whether the starting point is an individual conceptions of rights (David Held) or a collective one (Iris Marion Young), or a world organisation is enforcing human rights (Jürgen Habermas), or refugee cities that guarantee hospitality (Jacques Derrida), what all these theories make clear is that the present institutions cannot guarantee human rights nor the law of world citizenship.

Chapter three focusses on the nation-state. The French revolution introduced a new notion of the nation, in which state-citizenship 'as a people' was collective and sovereign, entailing the inalienable right of self-government. This process marked the transition from subject to citizen, thus advancing the people as the sole source of legitimacy of power of the state, to wit the nation-state. Further, it is shown that the relation between territorial state boundaries of nation-states and democratic citizenship was more a matter of historical contingency than of necessity. Applied to Afghanistan, it is found that the process of nation-building was not completed, predominantly due to the interventions of foreign powers (divide and conquer).

Chapter four investigates the condition of citizenship education in both Afghanistan and the Netherlands. Central here is the relation between citizenship and the constituting role of education. Using policy documents and the legal assignment of citizenship, Dutch citizenship education is researched. Many problems concerning the conditions of citizenship education in both countries are found. The analyses of citizenship education in both countries enable the investigation into the relation between the global citizenship education and general education and how citizenship can be implemented in educational practices.

The final chapter delves into the relation of global citizenship and general education. The present day global situation requires a new concept of citizenship placed in a broader context than just the classical citizenship of the nation-state. This new concept is a moral type of citizenship, implying obligations towards all other global citizens. Following the principle of neutrality, membership of a religious or ethnical group cannot serve as a sufficient basis for global citizenship. Conversely, the principle should always be independent thought. Global citizenship can only be realised if it is given a central place in education. Hence, citizenship education needs to be expanded into global citizenship education grounded in human rights. Global citizenship should therefore be taught in all forms of education.

The conclusion of this study provides the answers to the two main questions. *The first main question* contains two elements, separate, but sometimes overlapping, namely (1) the justification and (2) the conditions. A justification constitutes the *why* of (in this case) global citizenship: it provides the reasons

why we should aim for global citizenship and why it should be regarded as an inalienable human right. The conditions by contrast form the *how* of global citizenship: the conditions that make global citizenship possible.

From the many justifications, a choice is made for those formulations that are regarded as the most important:

1. Geographical structure of the earth: The most important (and possibly the least emphasized) justification of global citizenship is the finite nature of the earth. This implies universal hospitality understood as a right: the law of world citizenship.

2. Moral responsibility: Inherent in the law of world citizenship is a moral justification: humans have a mutual moral responsibility, not only towards our fellow citizens as laid down in the laws of the nation-state, but also obligations towards all fellow humans, based on universal rights. This also implies a moral responsibility to keep the earth habitable. Due to this ultimate responsibility, we owe it to the world to widen our perspective. Thus the author pleads for the urgency of a global citizenship that not only focusses on humans, but also on the world itself, including animals and nature.

3. Globalization: Our times show ever growing globalization. This implies that the classical functions of the state should be revised. Current theories are aimed at the relations between states and thus are unable to explain the multiplication of non-state actors and cross-border forms of cooperation and conflict. There are several cross-border specialised networks and domains of regulation, law, governmentality and political activism. It requires a re-interpretation of the role of the nation-state. The theory of democracy itself is linked with the nation-state, thus a re-interpretation of the nation-state requires a re-interpretation of democracy itself. The institutions required do not fit nation-based conceptions of democracy. Presently, transnational organisations point to a large democratic deficit and they lack political legitimacy in the view of citizens. What is needed is a cosmopolitan concept of democracy and conversely of citizenship. Many issues concerning the world are global. The scale of issues concerning climate alone require an approach that cannot be executed on a local or state level alone.

Subsequently, this study identifies the following conditions:

1. Nation-state: Global citizenship requires a relation of equality between states. Nowadays this is only possible if a state is a nation-state, making the nation-state a historical contingent condition. There are countries that do not satisfy the conditions of a nation-state. Countries failing to guarantee civil rights within their own constitutions make it impossible to guarantee such rights in interstate or global relations.

2. Free citizenship: The formation of the nation-state has proven to be instrumental in the transition from subject to citizen. Citizenship meant the membership of a political community with its resulting rights

and duties, but it also became the dominant identity of a nation that identified itself with the state. Citizenship became the universal denominator. It requires an active and dedicated participation in the nation-state, where the state has explicit expectations of its citizens, thus forging a strong bond between citizen and state. The role of religion in the public domain in Western secular states has all but expired. The ratification of the UDHR, a *secular* declaration on human rights, may serve as an example. These secularly grounded declarations can guarantee the rights of *all* citizens. This stands in contrast with non-secular states such as Afghanistan, where citizens are regarded as *subjects* and religion dictates all duties these subjects should perform. On this basis we conclude that secularisation is necessary for global citizenship as it constitutes a *norm* and a condition for it. Global citizenship can only be realised when the citizens of the constituting states have the status of *free citizen*. This condition is only met in a democratic secular rule of law where all inhabitants are treated equally as a *human being*, guaranteed by shared legislation authored by the citizens themselves by means of a democratic process.

3. Republican, League Nations, Universal Hospitality: All human interaction should be covered by a civil constitution. This constitution ought to *republican*, bound by the principle of freedom of all members of a society, according to the principle of dependence to a common legislation and according to the law of equality. The international law ought to be based on a federalism of free states, from which follows that states, because of their need for security, ought to organise themselves into a *league of nations*. To this the law of world citizenship must be added, limited to the conditions of *universal hospitality*.

4. Cosmopolitan Concept Democracy: Because the law of world citizenship claims an inherent universal moral justice, our moral responsibility towards the other does not stop at the borders of the nation-states. The claim of justice can only be judged by means of the public reason. The public reason, an essential characteristic of a modern understanding of democracy, forges a close connection between global justice and democratic practice. From this one can conclude that if democracy is understood in the broader perspective of public reason, the practice of global democracy can *now* be realised.

5. Independent institutions that guarantee human rights: A cosmopolitan concept of democracy requires global democratic institutions that safeguard human rights and enforce the peace. Human rights should have the status of a constitution for all participating countries, with the inflexible demand that all countries *must* safeguard these human rights. The constitution of the participating countries should be in accordance with the constitution of the supranational world organisation. This means that the U.N. should not merely have to appeal to the interests of the individual nation-states, but that a parliament must be formed, seating both world citizens as state representatives.

6. Non-interventionism: The principle of non-intervention *categorically* states that a state may not intervene in the constitution and government of another state, by means of violence. The granting of a minimal right of intervention on the basis of morally reprehensible conduct thus means the introduction of a right on war. Violence is and can only be legitimate as self-defence. The violation of the principle of reciprocal

non-intervention resulted in the absence of the condition of the nation-state in countries as Afghanistan. Thus the transition from subject to citizen could not materialize, let alone the formation of a global civil society based on sovereignty and equality.

As the education towards global citizenship comprises both a learning process, and the cultivation of attitudes, a major role is reserved for upbringing and education. For this reason, the second main question focuses on the specific role of education.

It is important that when people in the world become aware of the notion of global citizenship, they also realise that all rational beings should acknowledge the ethical claim and the attached moral duties. The validity of the moral duty should be judged by a public and discursive inquiry, in combination with impartiality. The role of education follows from the societal meaning that education has, namely as the place where the young citizen learns how his critical judgement can be sharpened and developed. The student must be made aware of the place he will assume in the community of world citizens. The school should provide a safe practice court for global citizenship. Here, a new awareness should be cultivated of the responsibility of any one person towards all fellow humans and not just towards the citizens of the appropriate state. Global citizenship is after all a supplement to national citizenship and not a replacement of it. The analysis of policy documents in chapter four showed the necessity of a curriculum concerning global citizenship. The core of the problem of Dutch citizenship education is that it does not have the status of a course nor does it have the learning goals. Chapter five offers a possible solution, comprising both substantive as organizational aspects. For the formation of young citizens it is necessary to forge their place in their own community, but global citizenship does demand a symbiotic relationship between the local community and the global community, with a critical attitude towards the inside and an open attitude towards the rest of the world.

Recommendations have been made concerning the academical task, Afghan academics, education and global citizenship, non-intervention, the task for politics and what specific aid should be given to countries like Afghanistan.

Finally and most importantly, it is necessary to draw lesson from the situation of Afghanistan concerning the condition of global citizenship. Because Afghanistan remains a prominent part in contemporary discussions on matters of war and peace and the role of global powers herein, the future policies of the U.S. and the E.U. may benefit from the results of this dissertation. This critical-philosophical analysis may spawn further inquiries in the fields of philosophy, sociology, political sciences, law, educational studies and international relations.