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Beyond the city wall : society and economic development in the Ommelanden of Batavia, 1684-1740

Kanumoyoso, B.

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BEYOND THE CITY WALL

Society and Economic Development
in the Ommelanden of Batavia, 1684-1740

Proefschrift

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Promotor: Prof. dr. J.L. Blussé van Oud-Alblas

Overige Leden: Prof. dr. H.W. van den Doel
Prof. dr. K.J.P.F.M.C. Jeurgens
Dr. J.Th. Linblad
Dr. H.E. Niemiejer (Universiteit Kampen)
Dr. R. Raben (Universiteit Utrecht)

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. *Batavia and its environs*

A major phenomenon in the development of Early Modern history was the emergence of port cities in the wake of expanding global trade. Despite their often relatively small size and proportionately moderate population numbers, towns were the motors of economic change in the seventeenth century. They played an important role as emporia for the buying and selling of commercial and agricultural products. Yet it is often forgotten that people who lived in towns depended on their hinterland. Cities¹ did not produce the food and raw materials they needed themselves. These had to be purchased from the rural producers. In exchange for these means of subsistence, cities offered the manufactured products, services, or trade goods, which rural dwellers could not make or acquire themselves. Although on the face of it a simple exchange mechanism was at work, the relationship between cities and their hinterlands was a force to be reckoned with in socio-economic change.

This study is an attempt to reconstruct some of the factors which propelled the socio-economic development in the environs of Batavia, the area which was called the *Ommelanden* (the surrounding area) throughout the era of the Dutch East India Company (or VOC). Owing to its geographical position, as its name implies, the Ommelanden area was indeed the hinterland of Batavia. Situated in the area between the mountains and the port city by the sea, this region was a never failing source of food crops, building materials, and human resources.

Most historiography about Batavia tends to depict the Ommelanden as the location of the sugar industry and of the private country estates of Europeans. The majority of population in this region, the thousands of Indonesians who came here from elsewhere in the Archipelago, are usually only mentioned in passing. The people who lived in the environs of the city are

¹ The term 'city' needs some preliminary clarification. According to Peter Burke, who was commenting on the standards of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a major urban centre was one with a population of around 100,000 people. In 1500 there were probably only four cities of this size in Europe: Paris, Venice, Naples, and Istanbul. See Peter Burke, *Antwerp, a metropolis in comparative perspective* (Gent: Martial and Snoeck, 1993), p. 8. However, in the case of Southeast Asia, the population of Batavia inside and outside city walls in 1730 was 104,093 people. See Hans Gooszen, *Population Census in VOC-Batavia 1673-1792* (Leiden: Intercontinenta no. 25, 2003), p. 29 and 40.

often dismissed with a few words saying that they resided in separate settlements, were devoted to their own customs, and lived under the authority of their own headmen. The history of the Ommelanden is generally discussed simply as part of the history of Batavia proper.² The Ommelanden as an object of study in themselves have only recently begun to attract scholarly attention. Therefore understandably one historian of Batavia has remarked that ‘our knowledge of the Ommelanden is deficient and fraught with clichés’.³

The specific focus of this study will concentrate on the opening up and the early development of the Ommelanden. My endeavour is to explain the main factors which generated the growing number of socio-economic activities in this region. I shall try to provide an explanation of why the region around Batavia only really began to develop in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. In that period, the socio-economic expansion of Batavia to the Ommelanden changed this region considerably in terms of landscape and demography. A new kind of society and mode of production were created within the colonial context.

Superficially, Ommelanden society greatly resembled rural communities living in the environs of Banten, Semarang, and Surabaya and other port towns in Java. Nevertheless, close scrutiny of this region leads to the conclusion that this was a society in which slave labour played a major role in rural economic activities and in which peasants had to come to terms with new types of agricultural production. In this respect it might rightfully be claimed that the society of Batavia and the Ommelanden was one of the first colonial societies created by the Dutch on Asian soil.

Another aim of this study is to demonstrate how the Ommelanden population was created. This attempt will inevitably stray from or even collide with the romantic tales which still exist about the origins of the *orang Betawi* (the native population of Batavia and later Jakarta), but it in no way detracts from the interesting origins of these people. The history of the Betawi people is inextricably tied to the history of Batavia during the colonial period. They constitute the last ‘discrete’ ethnicity formed among the various indigenous ethnicities in Indonesia. In most of works about the history of Jakarta society, the emergence of the *orang Betawi* only

² The Ommelanden as an object of study is discussed in a stimulating way in Remco Raben, “Round about Batavia: Ethnicity and authority in the Ommelanden, 1650-1800”, in Kees Grijns and Peter J.M. Nas (eds.), *Jakarta-Batavia: socio cultural essays* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000), and in H.E. Niemeijer, “Slavery, Ethnicity and the Economic Independence of Women in Seventeenth-Century Batavia”, in Barbara Watson Andaya (ed.), *Other Pasts. Women, Gender, and History in Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Hawai’i: University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, 2000).

³ Raben, “Round about Batavia”, p. 93.

merits a passing mention. All that is said is that the Betawi people were basically a mixture of the many ethnicities which lived in Batavia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁴

Until the 1980s, no *orang Betawi* raised any objection to this theory of how their group was formed. The reaction first appeared during 1990s.⁵ The main objection raised against the dominant theory was that it postulates that one of the elements which formed Betawi people consisted of slaves. One prominent Betawi author, who has recently written several books about the history of his people, argues that *orang Betawi* were already living in the Jakarta region long before Batavia was founded in 1619.⁶ Unfortunately, his argumentation is based mainly on secondary sources and is not supported by primary sources.

Society in Batavia and the Ommelanden was always multi-ethnic. Out of this polyglot population appeared a distinctive community identifying itself as *orang Betawi*. They were Muslim and speakers of Malay who adopted and incorporated words from the Chinese and Balinese languages.⁷ In this study, I argue that Betawi people are an amalgamation of free and manumitted Indonesians and non-Indonesians who settled in the Ommelanden in the second half of the seventeenth century. As a people they were shaped by colonial rule in a colonial economy. In fact, it is possible to say that these people who became the progenitors of present-day *orang Betawi* were colonists themselves.

2. *The spatial and temporal scope*

The study of the hinterland of an early-modern city is best analysed within the confines of a limited geographical area, that is to say: the area in which the socio-economic expansion of the city was most highly concentrated. As region under the direct control of Batavia, the Ommelanden was a rural area in which the urban impact of Batavia was clearly visible.

⁴ There are several works which examine the origin of orang Betawi such as Pauline D. Milone, *Queen City of the East: The Metamorphosis of a Colonial Capital* (Unpublished PhD dissertation: University of California, Berkeley, 1966); Lance Castle, "The Ethnic Profile of Djakarta", in *Indonesia*, Vol. 3, April 1967, pp. 153-204; Jean Gelman Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia. European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); and Remco Raben, *Batavia and Colombo, The Ethnic and Spatial Order of Two Colonial Cities, 1600-1800* (Unpublished PhD dissertation: Leiden University, 1996).

⁵ Yasmine Z. Shahab, *The Creation of Ethnic Tradition: the Betawi of Jakarta* (Unpublished PhD dissertation: School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1994), p. 82.

⁶ See Ridwan Saidi, *Profil Orang Betawi: asal muasal, kebudayaan, dan adat istiadatnya* (Jakarta: Gunara Kata, 1997), and Ridwan Saidi, *Babad Tanah Betawi* (Jakarta: Gria Media Prima, 2002).

⁷ Jean Gelman Taylor, "Batavia", in Ooi Kiat Gin, *Southeast Asia, A Historical Encyclopedia, From Angkor Wat To East Timor* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC CLIO, 2004), p. 228, see also Cornelis Dirk Grijns, *Jakarta Malay: a multidimensional approach to spatial variation*, 2 Volumes (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1991).

Consequently, a definition and geographical description of the Ommelanden is only possible in the context of the development of the jurisdiction of the VOC in the areas surrounding Batavia. Throughout the seventeenth century, the boundaries of the territory of the Ommelanden were gradually extended, this process which made it more clearly defined, covering an area more or less coinciding with the region nowadays styled Jabodetabek or Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi.⁸

The eighteenth century has conventionally been regarded as a ‘dead’ or ‘sleepy’ period in the history of Southeast Asia; an era inherently less lively and hence implicitly less important than the periods which preceded or followed it.⁹ In fact, in contravention to this conventional opinion, between 1684 and 1740 the Ommelanden of Batavia underwent a dynamic socio-economic development. Because of several important events occurring in that particular year, I have chosen 1684 as the point of departure for this study. In this year, after several decades of hostilities with Mataram and Banten, the Batavian government had finally established its authority in the areas surrounding Batavia as witnessed by the fact that, just two years earlier, the *College van Heemraden* (the District Council) began to carry out its task of administering the Ommelanden.¹⁰ That same year the Chinese imperial government also relaxed its prohibition on overseas trade and a ground swell of Chinese immigration to Batavia and the Ommelanden was the immediate result. During the next more than fifty years, the Ommelanden were transformed from being an unsecured and unexploited backwater into one of the most densely populated and intensively exploited rural areas in the Indonesian Archipelago. This dynamic period of socio-economic development in the Ommelanden ended in 1740 when the Chinese rebellion broke out in this region and this is the reason that this study will terminate in that year.

3. *Previous studies*

The socio-economic development of Batavia and the Ommelanden has already been the subject of various studies. The one which must be mentioned first is the classic study by F. de

⁸ For the development of the Ommelanden territory and boundaries see sub-chapter on boundaries formation in Chapter Two.

⁹ David K. Wyatt, “The Eighteenth Century in Southeast Asia”, in Leonard Blussé and Femme Gastra (eds.), *On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 39.

¹⁰ For the discussion about the tasks and areas under the jurisdiction of the *College van Heemraden* see sub-chapter on land management in chapter four.

Haan. In this pioneering work, the former archivist of the *Landsarchief* at Batavia dealt only briefly with the ethnic composition of the people in the Ommelanden.¹¹ Choosing to concentrate mainly on the urban society within the city walls, he painted a picture in which all the ethnicities were kept separate from each other, compelled to reside in distinct *kampung*; each ethnicity governed by its own headman and all distinctively clad in their ethnic costume.¹² De Haan's work is quite comprehensive and it is apparent that, as an archivist, he did use primary sources. Nevertheless, unfortunately his book might have been better organized and there are no footnotes. In its inception, the Colonial government envisaged *Oud Batavia* as a 'coffee table publication' to commemorate the third centenary of Batavia in 1919, but De Haan had other ideas and preferred to see his book as an academic work, which should be uncluttered by footnotes. Despite these shortcomings, the book has been very important to my research since it contains many keen and incisive insights and observations about the daily life of the citizens of Batavia and to a lesser degree also about the daily activities of the inhabitants of the Ommelanden.

Jean Gelman Taylor's work about the social world of Batavia is concerned with the social relations that developed between the Dutch elite in Asia throughout the VOC period.¹³ In her choice to focus on the Company establishment in Batavia, she ventures beyond the usual emphasis on political, economy, military, and administrative aspects of the colonial regime and portrays instead the human relations between Europeans, Creoles, Asians, and *Mestizos*. She also stresses the important role played by women in helping the careers of their husbands who aspired to become high-ranking Company officials. The drawback to Taylor's work is that it presents only a limited picture of Batavian society since it is primarily concerned with the social elite and their lifestyle in the eighteenth century. Existing alongside the Batavian elites, many other groups, poor Eurasians, Chinese, Moors, and various Indonesian groups, were also part and parcel of the social world of Batavia. They lived their lives and made their livelihoods in the city and its environs, but they are not discussed extensively in Taylor's book with the exception of some who had direct relations with the Batavian elite.

¹¹ F. De Haan, *Oud Batavia*, 2 Volumes (Batavia: G. Kolff, 1922).

¹² In his work, De Haan explained that the people in the Ommelanden lived in separate *kampung* on the basis of their ethnic origin. Each *kampung* had a headman appointed from its own people, see *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 469.

¹³ Jean Gelman Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia. European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia* (Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983).

The developments of the Chinese community of Batavia, the decline of its ecology, the religious life, and the biographical histories of Mestizo women have all captured Leonard Blussé's interest.¹⁴ He postulates that until 1740 Batavia was both a Dutch and a Chinese colonial city and convincingly argues that although with its markets and warehouses Batavia undeniably occupied a central position in the Dutch intra-Asian trading network, it simultaneously also operated as a nucleus in the Chinese trade network in Southeast Asia. Because of the indispensable contribution of Chinese merchants and entrepreneurs, Batavia became prosperous and developed into one of the biggest emporia in Asia. The Chinese were also pioneers in the opening up of the environs of Batavia. Chinese craftsmanship and labour in the sugar industry were the engines which drove the economic development of the Ommelanden. Blussé also gives an explanation of how the uncontrolled economic expansion combined with the weakness of the colonial administration proved the basic, underlying reason for the ecological disaster which engulfed Batavia in the 1730s.

The urban history of Batavia, particularly how it related to the ethnic administration and spatial order, is discussed in Remco Raben's unpublished PhD thesis.¹⁵ The basic thesis of Raben's dissertation is that the colonial city was a meeting place of a great variety of different ethnicities. Raben formulates the spatial aspects of colonial cities in terms of physical arrangements: the layout of the street and buildings; their architecture; the distribution of housing; the density of habitation; and the location and use of public space. He puts forward the argument that the policy of ethnic residential segregation imposed by the colonial government was always more of concept on paper rather than a representation of reality. The actually mixed residential pattern, in combination with a rapid cultural and matrimonial amalgamation among its immigrants, undermined any official classifications. Using quantitative evidence from the annual reports drawn up by the district supervisors in the Ommelanden, he gives the impression of residential freedom.

Hendrik E. Niemeijer's work on the colonial society of Batavia in the seventeenth century is a well-documented monograph based on archival research but does lead us partly beyond the confines of the city to consider its relations with the rural surrounding.¹⁶ Niemeijer argues that Batavia was a Dutch-created colonial city built on Asian soil, made up of an Asian multi-ethnic

¹⁴ Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company. Chinese settlers, mestizo women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Dordrecht: Floris Publication, 1986).

¹⁵ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*.

¹⁶ Hendrik E. Niemeijer, *Batavia. Een koloniale samenleving in de 17de eeuw* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2005).

society. Certainly, Batavia was built by the Company as its Asian headquarters, but this city was not a Dutch city in demographic terms, since more than half of its population consisted of slaves who originated from South Asia and elsewhere in Indonesian Archipelago. Niemeijer's study does venture beyond the city walls. He describes the formation of society in the Ommelanden, focusing on the establishment of the *kampung* and the daily life in the rural surroundings of Batavia. His work has been a great stimulus for my research since he deals with the Ommelanden in depth and devotes separate chapters to a discussion of the cultural character and social interaction of the people who lived in this region.

4. *Source material*

In order to explain the socio-economic development of the Ommelanden in the early eighteenth century, I have investigated the primary archival sources very carefully. Almost all of the records used in this study are kept in the *Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia* (the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia / ANRI) in Jakarta. These primary sources can be divided into four categories: the records left by the High Government (the *Hoge Regering*); the paperwork produced by the urban or civil administration of Batavia (the *College van Schepenen*); the sources left by the local rural administration (the *College van Heemraden*); and the papers of the notaries of Batavia (the *Notariële Archives*). Each of these types of source material gives us different viewpoints on the various subjects being analyzed and they supplement each other. Consequently, together they can provide a better understanding of the nature of the socio-economic development in the Ommelanden.

The records left by the *Hoge Regering* give the perspective of the Colonial Government. The High Government was established in 1609 and consisted of the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies. From 1617, the Council of the Indies consisted of nine members. Their task was to support the Governor-General in a host of matters pertaining to the general management of trade, war, government, and in the administration of justice in all civil and criminal matters.¹⁷ The authority exercised by the High Government was virtually that of an independent state. This institution had the highest authority over all of the Company officials

¹⁷ H.E. Niemeijer, "The Central Administration of the VOC Government and the Local Institutions of Batavia (1619-1811) – an Introduction", in G. L. Balk, F. van Dijk, and D.J. Kortlang (eds.), *The archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Local Institutions in Batavia (Jakarta)* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 62.

and Dutch settlements in Asia. Under the terms of the *octrooi* (charter), the Dutch East India Company received from the States-General in 1602, it was empowered to preserve order, to administer criminal and civil justice, and to issue regulations.¹⁸

There was no separation between the Company administration in Asia and the administration in the Dutch headquarters. Both administrations fell under the authority and supervision of the High Government. All of the important regulations to do with the administration of Batavia and the Ommelanden and other Dutch settlements were issued by the *Hoge Regering*. Most of these regulations have been compiled, ordered, and published by J.A. van der Chijs in the *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek*.¹⁹ These compilations of regulations are very important to this study since they preserve the Company perspectives on the colonial administration, judicial matters, and the way colonial society was organized. The archival deposits of the *Hoge Regering* are enormous in size, but fortunately some sources publications have compiled from these documents including the *Dagbregister van Batavia*²⁰ (Daily Journals of Batavia), the *Generale Missiven*²¹ (General Letters to the Gentlemen XVII – the Board of Directors of the VOC), and the *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum*.²² The first is the journal of daily activities in Batavia to do with trade, politics, and military developments, while the second contains all the important letters from the Governor-General and Council to the Directors in the Dutch Republic, and the third is a compilation of contracts between the VOC and Asian local rulers.

The *Hoge Regering* documents consulted for this study are those which contain information about the policies of the administration for Batavia and Ommelanden. Although most resolutions have been published in the *Plakaatboek*, many other documents relevant to my study are not covered by this source publication. The documents most relevant and important to my study are the *Minuut Generale Resoluties* (MGR). These resolutions are not the final decisions, because they still had to be submitted to the High Government for approval.

¹⁸ John Ball, *Indonesian Legal History 1602-1848* (Sydney: Oughtershaw Press, 1982), p. 9.

¹⁹ J.A. van der Chijs (ed.), *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, 17 Volumes (Batavia and Den Haag, 1885-1901).

²⁰ J.A. van der Chijs *et. al.* (eds.), *Dagbregister gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India*, 31 Volumes (Batavia and 's-Gravenhage, 1888-1931).

²¹ W.P. Coolhaas and J. van Goor (eds.), *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. Rijks geschiedkundige publicatiën, grote serie nos. 104, 112, 125, 134, 150, 159, 164, 193, and 205. 9 Volumes ('s-Gravenhage, 1960-1988).

²² J.E. Heeres en F.W. Stapel (eds.), *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum. Verzameling van politieke contracten en verdere verdragen door de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten*. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde. 57, 87, 91, 93, 96 ('s-Gravenhage 1907-1955).

Consequently they still contain all kinds of information which might have been omitted in the final resolution. The approved resolutions formed the basis for the *Net-Generale Resoluties* (NGR), the formally approved decisions.²³ Since the latter documents are a summary of the first, it is important to consult MGR to discover all the considerations behind the decisions of the High Government.

The sources left by the *College van Schepenen* (the College of Aldermen) provide a view of the Colonial administration at the urban level. The Company established the College van Aldermen on 24 June 1620 to administer urban and civil affairs of Batavia. In its early years, the members of this College consisted of two Company officials and three free burghers of Batavia. The Company appointed the Chinese Captain, the headman of the Chinese community in town, as an extra-ordinary member. Throughout the VOC period, the number of members of the College changed several times depending on their tasks, but invariably consisted of the Company officials, free citizens, a Chinese captain and later also indigenous captains as extra-ordinary members. The president or the chairman of this College was always a Company official with the rank of Councilor of the Indies or Extra-ordinary Councilor of the Indies,²⁴ a clue that the College of Aldermen was not an independent institution.

The jurisdiction of the College of Aldermen covered both inside and outside the town. When the *College van Heemranden* (the District Council) became fully operational in 1682, the authority of this College, especially that pertaining to the supervision of public works, agricultural activities, and land ownership in the Ommelanden, superseded the first. One of the important tasks delegated to the College of Aldermen was the registration of the conveyancing of real estate and the transfer of slaves. Each transfer was subject to a 10 per cent conveyance tax.²⁵ Perhaps in attempts to avoid this tax, people in Batavia and the Ommelanden often preferred to transfer their property by notarial deed. Nevertheless, the sources left by the College van Aldermen have been important to my research since this College was also the court of justice for the free citizens of Batavia and the Ommelanden. When it functioned as the court of justice for the citizens this college was called the *Schepenbank* (Court of Aldermen).

The sources left by the *College van Heemraden* (the District Council) throw light on the colonial administration at the local level. These materials are one of the primary sources which deal

²³ See information about the relation between *Minuut Generale Resoluties* and *Net-Generale Resoluties* in G. L. Balk, F. van Dijk, and D.J. Kortlang (eds.), *The archives of the Dutch East India Company*, p. 220.

²⁴ Niemeijer, "The Central Administration of the VOC", p. 67.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

specifically with the Ommelanden. The *Heemraden* council had been established in 1664, but it did not exercise full powers until 1682. The principal duty of this council was to set up and organize the infrastructure essential to the Company interests in the Ommelanden. Its tasks included the development and maintenance of roads, bridges, water drainage, canals, and dams. Later its duties expanded to cover the management of the Company land and taking the census to monitor population growth. It also issued licences for such industrial undertakings as sugar-mills, brickworks, and *arak* distilleries.²⁶

Given the scope of these tasks, most of the *Heemraden* documents contain information about land ownership and reclamation, water management, infrastructural development, and the management of rural factories. Although they give the colonial perspective, the *Heemraden* resolutions offer plenty of information about how the common people negotiated with the colonial administration. The names of ordinary inhabitants of the Ommelanden appear very frequently in the documents on such occasions as when they had conflicts about landed property with other people, asked permission to build dams, bridges, sluices and other infrastructure, applied for land grants, and asked permission to cut trees on the Company lands. Unfortunately the *Heemraden* archival collection is not very extensive since only the resolutions of the original documents have been preserved. Nevertheless, it remains the most important source for the history of the Ommelanden.

The sources left by the notaries of Batavia offer a micro-level point of view, since notaries recorded transactions related the daily activities of the Ommelanden societies. The notarial archives contain a wealth of material about the inhabitants of Batavia and the Ommelanden, without which any definitive study on the socio-economic history of this city and its environs could not be written.²⁷ The notaries were agents of the legal institutions brought to the Netherlands East Indies by the Dutch East India Company. As headquarters of this organization and a bustling commercial city, Batavia necessarily offered its citizens a judicial system and the notarial offices were part of this. Following the example of Dutch cities, the Company established the notarial institutions wherever possible in the Dutch colonies in Asia, Africa, and America.

²⁶ The system of land management and infrastructure implemented by the Company had only functioned properly after the *College van Heemraden* became fully operational in 1682. See H.E. Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan, The Colonial Port City of Batavia/Jakarta and its Primary Hinterland in the Seventeenth Century" (unpublished paper, 2003), p. 2.

²⁷ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 77.

The notary's position in Batavia should be considered complementary to the work of the *Raad van Justitie* (Council of Justice) and the *Schepenbank* (Court of Aldermen). The legal system which was in force in Batavia separated people into those who worked for the Company and those who did not.²⁸ The *Raad van Justitie* was the court for the Company employees, their families, and slaves. This court was presided over by a member of the *Raad van Indië* (Council of the Indies) and staffed by high-ranking Company men with legal training. The *Schepenbank* was the court for the civilian population of Batavia and the Ommelanden.²⁹ The members of this court consisted of the high-ranking Company officials and prominent Europeans and Chinese, who were not necessarily trained lawyers. The notarial offices provided services to the people who were subject to these two courts.

From the early seventeenth until the early nineteenth century, more than 110 notaries practiced, offering their services to the inhabitants of Batavia and the Ommelanden. They were obliged work for everybody: rich and poor, European and non-European, even slaves. The work of a notary consisted of the drawing up of wills, commercial contracts, marriage certificates, letters of obligation (*obligatie*) and other legal documents. By High Government Resolution of 12 November 1620, the office of public notary was separated from that of the city clerk of the court.

5. Organization of this study

Since the aim of this study is to explain the various factors which stimulated the socio-economic development in the Ommelanden, my strategy has been to scrutinize these factors from the bottom up. In doing so, I shall describe the socio-economic expansion of Batavia to the Ommelanden like an artist who draws the background to his picture first, before filling in the details. Therefore, I have divided the main part of this study into five chapters and each of the previous chapters is the setting of its successor.

In Chapter Two I deal with the landscape of the Ommelanden. It begins with a description of the geographical characteristics of this region which was covered with tropical forests and criss-crossed by rivers. This was the sort of landscape which was very suitable to be developed

²⁸ Eric Alan Jones, *Wives, Slaves, and Concubines: A History of the Female Underclass in Dutch Asia* (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2003), p. 105.

²⁹ Pamela Anne McVay, *"I am the devils own": Crime, Class, and Identity in the Seventeenth Century Dutch East Indies* (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana Campaign, 1995), p. 64.

into an agrarian hinterland which could support a maritime trading port like Batavia, namely: it could feed not only the inhabitants of the city but also the sailors on the ships in the roadstead. The process of boundary formation in the Ommelanden reveals that the Dutch and Javanese concepts of territory and boundary differed markedly. Through a process of wars, alliances, and contracts between the Company and local rulers, the Ommelanden boundaries finally clearly emerged in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Even when the boundary formation was still in progress, various efforts were made by private Chinese and European entrepreneurs to dig canals. Since the colonial government did not want Batavia to have to depend on the supply of foodstuffs from elsewhere, water management and canal building were promoted infrastructural support for agricultural development. However, as the years went by, uncontrolled agricultural development ushered in deforestation. The deforested hinterland and disorganized water management ultimately emerged as the main factors which led to the ecological deterioration of the Ommelanden in the 1730s.

Chapter Three addresses the development of the local administration. As part of its population policy, the colonial government settled various Indonesian ethnic groups which served as auxiliary troops in the Company military campaigns in the Ommelanden. Their settlements provided the basis for the establishment of *kampung* on the basis of communities of the same ethnic origin. This might be considered in the light of a colonial strategy to facilitate the administration of the Indonesian people. No local administration to speak of existed in the forest environment of Jayakarta prior to the establishment of the Company authority. A new local administration had to be created and this was a combination of Indonesian traditional customs and institutions and the administrative conventions current in the Dutch Republic. In this chapter I shall show that the Betawi people in the Ommelanden were a creation of colonial society since they moved in from elsewhere, lived under the colonial administration, and developed their economy within the colonial context.

Chapter Four analyses the patterns of land ownership in the Ommelanden. During the early years of Batavia, the colonial government did not have any special policy on land ownership. Jurisdiction pertaining to land ownership in the Ommelanden only became more organized when the *Heemraden* began to operate fully in 1682. Although the government granted and sold much of its land, it nonetheless remained the biggest land owner. Huge chunks of land or the landed estates (*particuliere landerijen*) belonged mostly to Europeans and to a few Chinese and Mardijkers. Most Indonesians only could afford to have a small plot of land. The estates in the

Ommelanden were utilized for many purposes including paddy cultivation, sugar-cane fields, vegetable gardens, and animal husbandry. In this chapter the value of land and land conflicts will be examined.

Slavery and labour is the subject of Chapter Five. There were two sources of manpower in use in the Ommelanden: slaves and hired labour. Throughout the seventeenth century, Batavia became part of an extensive slave trade network which encompassed all of the Company territories from the Cape of Good Hope in the west to the Moluccas in the east. In this chapter I shall demonstrate that the most active slave sellers and buyers in the Ommelanden were Indonesian people. Nevertheless, the supply of slaves could not keep up with the demand for manpower. Thousands of Chinese sojourners and Javanese migrants were attracted there by the growing agricultural activities in the Ommelanden and became the source of cheap labour.

The development of the sugar industry as the most important agricultural enterprise in the Ommelanden will be reviewed in Chapter Six. I shall begin this chapter by explaining the position of Batavian sugar in the Intra-Asian Trade. The efforts of the Company to find and create an international market for the Batavian sugar led to the sugar boom period of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Chinese entrepreneurs stand out as the prominent movers and shakers who determined the development of the sugar industry but small entrepreneurs with limited capital were not excluded from the sugar industry. The sugar business was not restricted just to sugar production; it also encompassed the selling and renting of sugar-mills and their equipment. The sugar production process in the sugar-mills required huge quantities of firewood, a demand which eventually caused massive deforestation in the Ommelanden.

CHAPTER TWO

THE LANDSCAPE OF THE OMMELANDEN

Introduction

This chapter introduces the Ommelanden of Batavia with a sketch of their most salient geographical features, reasoning that the natural conditions can highlight many aspects of the socio-economic developments in this region at the end of the seventeenth century. The geographical position, the type of the soil, the climate, the rainfall, and the bedding of the rivers all played a role in determining the local ecological conditions and had an impact on the density of population, the agrarian development, even the degree of commercialization in the environs of Batavia. As a matter of fact, the geographical characteristics of the Ommelanden form the background and the basis of the socio-economic activities which will be analysed in the following chapters.

1. *The geographical features*

The port of Calapa is a magnificent port. It is the most important and best of all. This is where the trade is greatest and whither they all sail from Sumatra, and Palembang, Laue, Tamjompura, Malacca, Maccassar, Java and Madura and many other places...The merchandise from the whole kingdom comes here to this port...Many junks anchor in this port.³⁰

This is how the Portuguese merchant Tomé Pires described the port of Calapa at the beginning of the sixteenth century in his *Suma Oriental*. Calapa or Sunda Kelapa was the earlier name of Jayakarta or Jakarta which the Dutch transformed into their Asian headquarters in 1619 and renamed Batavia. Pires praises the strategic position of Kelapa, located close to the Sunda Strait, as a trading port and, around a hundred years later when searching for a base of the VOC, Governor-General Jan Pietersz Coen also recognized the commercial possibilities it

³⁰ Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pirés and The Book of Francisco Rodrigues*, Vol. 1, translated from the Portuguese and edited by Armando Cortesao (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1944), pp. 172-173.

offered. After it had become the Asian nerve centre of the Dutch East India Company, Batavia also assumed the function of the most important port in the western part of Indonesia; it even grew into a hub of the intra-Asian trading maritime network. The nodal position of Batavia in the maritime world of Asia would be retained until the later part of eighteenth century when it was surpassed by first Calcutta and later Singapore.

In the early sixteenth century, Kelapa still served as the main port for the West Javanese Hindu kingdom of Pajajaran (1344-1570s), whose capital was located in the vicinity of the present city of Bogor. In 1527, the sultan of Cirebon sent troops to conquer Kelapa. To crown their success they renamed it Jayakarta, meaning 'Great Victory'. By the end of the sixteenth century, the town had become a satellite of the Banten sultanate.³¹ Kelapa had a well-sheltered roadstead and was conveniently sited as a port of call for ships sailing the sea lanes of the Archipelago. In his description, Pires mentions that Kelapa was the emporium where the commodities from the entire territory of Pajajaran were collected prior to their distribution to other places. Because Pires also mentioned the presence of Chinese junks in the port, it can be assumed that Kelapa had been integrated into the Chinese maritime trading network at least since the early sixteenth century.


The strategic location of Kelapa, its sheltered bay, and its accessibility for the Chinese junks were all important considerations in the Dutch decision to establish their Asian rendezvous in this place.³² Compared to the remote spice-producing islands of Ambon and Banda, the island of Java was much more centrally placed in Asian trade, outweighing the fact that it did not produce the highly sought-after nutmeg and cloves. Instead Java produced other commodities, including pepper, rice, and timber. However, it seems that from the economic point of view the direct environs of Batavia barely played a role in the Company decision to select this location. For its role as an emporium and the Company headquarters, Batavia could also have been founded at any other location with a well-protected roadstead. This explains why the High Government did not pay much attention to its environs in the early decades of the Batavian settlement. The upshot was that initially the city had to depend on the Javanese

³¹ The Portuguese arrived in Sunda Kelapa in 1522. They concluded an agreement with the king of Pajajaran to conduct their future trade through it. According to Portuguese sources, Pajajaran considered the alliance beneficial, as it provided the kingdom with an ally against the threat from Muslim encroachment from the east. But when they Portuguese made a follow-up trip in 1527, they found that the port of Sunda Kelapa had come under the control of Muslim Javanese led by a Sumatran from Pasai known as Falatehan. See, Julian Millie, *Splashed by The Saint, Ritual reading and Islamic sanctity in West Java* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), p. 4.

³² Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 80.

North Coast, Siam and elsewhere for its supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. During this period Batavia acquired the bulk of its population and slaves from India and secured its wealth from maritime trade.

Batavia was located in a coastal region which consisted of low-lying, marshy, sandy-clay soil overgrown with lush tropical forests. Geologically, the coastal plains consist of young alluvial sediment, the deposit of the various rivers which flow down to the north from the Priangan Highlands.³³ The gradual process of land formation still continues today. The chocolate brown colour of the rivers indicates the large amounts of silt which are carried down to the sea and deposited there. Floods or *banjir* are frequent after heavy rains, when the swollen rivers break through their levees and submerge large parts of the plain. Although this area been subjected to gradual infrastructural developments since the middle of the seventeenth century, its general morphology has remained practically unchanged.



Map 1: The lowlands between the bay of Jakarta and the mountains south of Bogor
 Source: A. Heuken, *Historical Sites of Jakarta* (Jakarta: Cipta Loka Caraka, 2007), p. 150.

³³ Samuel van Valkenburg, “Agricultural Regions of Asia. Part IX—Java”, in *Economic Geography*, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1936, p. 1.

Several kilometres inland, the soil becomes more solid but still spongy during the wet season. On account of these characteristics, in soil taxonomy the alluvial soil is categorized as fluvisol.³⁴ Fluvisol soils also occur on the east coast of Sumatra and on the south and west coasts of Kalimantan. Variations in colour, texture, and organic content in fluvisols are linked to the river regime. Well-drained soils may carry forests or bamboo; poorly-drained soils are commonly grass-covered, and highly acid soils carry swamp vegetation.³⁵ Fluvisols can be intensively farmed and can support a high population density. In such undertakings the crop patterns, rotation, and agricultural management on fluvisol soils are closely related to hydrological conditions.

Before this low-lying land around Batavia, known as the Ommelanden, could be brought under cultivation, it had to be raised and any cultivation of this region required a considerable amount of drainage and irrigation. Before the land had been raised, it was difficult to travel inland. Fortunately a series of parallel rivers criss-crossed Batavia and its environs and therefore the principal means of transport was by water. Before the coming of the modern road and railway networks, the rivers still remained the main arteries of communication, especially for transportation. River transport was particularly important, not only to the urban sector, but also to the rural economy, as many roads proved to be impassable during the wet season.

Consequently, Ommelanden rivers had a dual use as highways and for irrigation purposes. They were important as water suppliers for the rice-fields, sugar industry, and the market gardens. The lands along the rivers formed a perfect location for the cultivation of crops which required a constant supply of water and offered excellent pasturage for cattle-breeding. Rural economic activities in the Ommelanden were centred on the river banks and therefore the lands bordering the Ciliwung, Ancol, Sunter, and Marunda to the east, and the Krukut, Grogol, Anke, and Citarum to the west were in high demand.

The spine of Java is formed by a line of volcanoes running the length of the island. Nutrient-rich lava and ash from these volcanoes account for the fertile soils on the foothills of the northern plain, especially in West and Central Java.³⁶ To the south of the Ommelanden, three

³⁴ R. Dudal, "Soils of Southeast Asia", in Avijit Gupta (ed.), *The Physical Geography of Southeast Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 103.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

³⁶ Friedhelm Göthenbolth *et.al.* (eds.), *Ecology of Insular Southeast Asia. The Indonesian Archipelago* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006), p. 10.

high volcanic peaks, Salak, Gede, and Pangrango, form a natural barrier to human travel and transportation. The intermittent eruptions of these volcanoes were the chief sources of essential soil nutrients in the Ommelanden. The presence of an abundance of water for agricultural activities on the foot hills of the mountains and in the coastal plains and the highly fertile soil of the Ommelanden ensured the production of adequate food crops and could also support the cultivation of such cash crops as sugar-cane, pepper, and coffee.

The whole of the Indonesian Archipelago is situated in the tropical zone, which implies a prevailing climate with an average monthly temperature which never falls below 18°C. The tropical climate is also characterized by profuse seasonal rainfall, meaning that a wet season is alternated by a dry season.³⁷ The climate in this zone, which covers nearly half of the globe, is fairly uniform and the differences between daily maximum and minimum temperatures are small. According to recent data, the temperature of Jakarta has a monthly average of 26°C and remains constant at this value throughout the year.³⁸ The month with the lowest average temperature is January with 25.3°C., and that with the highest is May with 26.3°C.

It is important to note that around 1700 the prevailing temperatures in all parts of the world for which climatic assessments are available were below present levels. This phenomenon was the result of reduced evaporation and the accumulation of snow and ice built up over the previous cold decades.³⁹ However, these climatic variations throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century played only a modest role in the Ommelanden. There were some reports of harvest failures in Java during this period, but most of these were caused by such non-climatic factors as war, marauding wild pigs, and fires. Two drought years, 1695 and 1698, were mentioned in Java during the period under review, but the historical records do not speak of harvest failures.⁴⁰

The Indonesian Archipelago is the quintessential monsoon region of the world. East monsoon winds from the Australian continent blowing towards the Asiatic Low prevail from May to October, while western monsoon winds from Asia blow towards the Australian Low from November to April. The east monsoon is a dry continental wind of which the moisture content increases on its way westwards as it picks up water. Conversely, the west monsoon carries a great deal of moisture, the result of passing over a wide stretch of warm oceanic water

³⁷ Kim H. Tan, *Soils in the Humid Tropics and Monsoon Region of Indonesia* (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2008), p. 54.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ H.H. Lamb, *Climate, History and the Modern World* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 222.

⁴⁰ Peter Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History* (Santa Barbara: ABC- CLIO, 2007), p. 125.

and this high moisture content precipitates as heavy convectional rains as soon as it reaches the warm lowlands.⁴¹ The regular pattern of monsoon winds creates two seasons. The east monsoon produces the dry season and the west monsoon the wet season. During the wet season, the rainfall usually increases heavily towards the mountains. In the hinterland of Batavia, the heavy rainfall occurs in the southern region towards the Priangan Highlands,⁴² causing massive *banjir* which flood the low-lying plains.

2. *Boundary formation*

The first factory of the Dutch East India Company in Java was located in Banten.⁴³ The sultanate of Banten pursued a free trade policy as a lure to attract foreign traders from Asia and Europe to the port. Strenuous competition between many merchants from various countries and the refusal of the ruler of Banten to make any concessions turned the Company efforts to monopolize the Banten market into a complete failure. Consequently, the Gentlemen Seventeen, the Company Directors, preferred to establish their own headquarters in Asia where they could govern their own affairs without interference from any local ruler. Ideally, what they sought was a fortified port under complete Dutch sovereignty. This would be the seat of the Governor-General, who would direct the purchases of the Company and, if necessary, take command of military operations against European competitors or un-co-operative Asian rulers.

The Dutch had their eye on Jayakarta, a prosperous port town located around 150 kilometres to the east of Banten, which they thought would be the ideal location for a permanent base in the Indonesian Archipelago. In a 1610, a trading-post was built in this port town after Jacques l'Hermite had received permission to go ahead with this project from the *Pangeran* of Jayakarta. In the summer 1618, Governor-General Jan Pieterz Coen decided to move most of the Company possessions from nearby Banten to the new factory.⁴⁴ A year later, after complicated

⁴¹ Valkenburg, "Agricultural Region of Asia. Part IX—Java", p. 30.

⁴² Samuel van Valkenburg, "Java: The Economy Geography of Tropical Island", in *Geographical Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4, October 1925, p. 572.

⁴³ After the first Dutch fleet arrived in Banten in 1596, the Dutch continued to visit the town in pursuit of pepper. Increasing competition pushed the Portuguese to blockade Kota Banten, but the Dutch managed to break it by defeating a Portuguese fleet in Banten Bay in 1601, after which they established a factory there in 1603. See Ota Atsushi, *Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten, 1750-1830* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 16-17.

⁴⁴ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 21.

conflicts between the Dutch, the *pangeran* of Jayakarta, the sultan of Banten, and the English, the Company troops razed the town and Coen rebuilt it entirely as the Company headquarters. The new colonial government promoted Protestant Christianity as the religion of the ruling class. It introduced the Christian calendar and work week and established Dutch municipal institutions.⁴⁵ Batavia was actually the first city built by the Dutch on Asian soil.

The Dutch were trading on precarious ground when they established Batavia. Several years before the establishment of Batavia the kingdoms of Mataram and Banten --the first located in the southern part of Central Java and the second in the northern corner of West Java-- were embroiled in armed rivalry to gain supremacy of the Priangan and other hilly regions in West Java. These two kingdoms and sometimes Cirebon too --a principality to the north of the eastern Priangan-- were constantly caught up in disputes about control of people and territory. Continuous regional conflicts between the two realms meant that conditions in Jayakarta were unsafe and unstable. When the Dutch arrived, the shapes of the boundaries in West Java had not yet been stabilized and in fact were still never clearly defined until the beginning of eighteenth century.

In the context of the Early Modern period, it is important to realize that the Dutch and Javanese held different views about such concepts as territory and boundary. The Dutch applied Western concepts which emphasized the necessity to establish the clear-cut limits of boundaries which can be represented by lines drawn on maps. Where boundaries did not exist, or old ones no longer applied, it was important to draw a new one.⁴⁶ In the Western world view, the sovereignty of a polity is still always related by its political capacity to exercise authority in a clearly circumscribed, delineated territory. Without a territory and its boundaries, the sovereignty of a state or city could degenerate into a chaotic situation, since it would be difficult to know where the sovereignty of a state or city ended and that of another began.

In the eyes of the Javanese, territorial claims existed only as a subsidiary to claims to overlordship of other subordinated rulers or communities. The concept of a clear boundary line was alien to the Javanese realms and therefore the legal and cartographic instruments used to enforce boundary definition were also absent. Although the essence of sovereignty was of great importance, the territorial aspect of sovereignty was negotiable. As in other pre-modern

⁴⁵ Jean Gelman Taylor, "Batavia", in Ooi Keat Gin (ed.), *Southeast Asia, A Historical Encyclopaedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC Clio, 2004), p. 227.

⁴⁶ Robert L. Solomon, "Boundaries Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia", in *World Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 1, October 1970, p. 1.

Southeast Asian communities, the Javanese considered personal and communal loyalties more important than territorial control. This view was a consequence of the geographical and demographic conditions in Southeast Asia, where land was available in abundance but the number of inhabitants, hence potential subjects, was limited.

After a brief period of intense rivalry and conflict with the British and Portuguese in the early decades of the seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company gradually began to establish itself as the supreme maritime and commercial power in Southeast Asia.⁴⁷ A few years after it was granted its charter in 1602, the Company emerged as a sort of colonial state in the making. Its first colony in the Indonesian Archipelago was Amboina, captured from the Portuguese in 1605, which was followed by the subjugation of other islands in the North Moluccas in 1607, Banda in 1621, and most importantly Batavia in 1619. As the dominant maritime hegemonic power in Asia, the Company was in a position to establish colonies, but the acquisition of territory was not its primary interest. The Dutch realized that their resources were limited, especially in terms of capital and manpower. They were aware that the maintenance of control over a large territory was more difficult than its actual conquest.

Therefore, in many cases the Company preferred to establish a trading-post in the region in which it wanted to engage in commercial activities rather than establish a colony. Territorial control was regarded as subsidiary to commercial interests. As long as the local realms guaranteed the safety of the Company employees, accepted Dutch naval superiority, and did not meddle excessively in the commercial dealings of the Company, the High Government in Batavia refrained from direct intervention in the affairs of the indigenous rulers.⁴⁸

Only when the aim of acquiring economic profits required military enforcement and territorial control would the Dutch become involved in local political affairs. This is what was happening in Jakarta/Batavia but also in some other places like the North Moluccas (1607) and Banda (1621). The foundation of Batavia on the ruins of Jakarta was the outcome of the Dutch determination to have a rendezvous which was strategically situated at the hub of their Asian trading networks and could link the commercial networks of the Indian Ocean with those of insular Southeast Asia and the China seas.

⁴⁷ D.G.E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan and Company, 1960), pp. 197-206.

⁴⁸ Robert R. Reed, "The Colonial Origins of Manila and Batavia: Desultory Notes on Nascent Metropolitan Primacy and Urban Systems in Southeast Asia", in *Asian Studies*, Vol. 5, 1967, p. 555.

During the early decades of Batavia, when the main focus of the Company was concentrated on maritime trade, Batavia tended to resemble Melaka under Portuguese rule, an emporium without back-up from its hinterland, rather than Spanish Manila, a self-sufficient port city supported by its environs. As the years passed, the interest of the High Government in the Ommelanden grew steadily for both security and economic reasons. In the wake of two attacks from Mataram in 1628 and 1629 and several assaults from Banten during the first fifty years of the existence of Batavia, the Dutch realized it was important to establish their authority in the environs of Batavia if they were to maintain the security of the headquarters and end its isolation from its hinterland.

In economic terms, the Dutch also found it useful to develop the environs of Batavia as an agricultural area which could support the city with raw materials, foodstuffs, cash crops, and industrial products. Shortly after the establishment of the headquarters, the colonial government discovered how dependent this entrepôt really was on various agricultural products sold by Chinese and indigenous traders. During this early period, almost all of its necessities were supplied from overseas. Because of the sparse population and limited economic activities in the areas surrounding the city, the existence of Batavia depended fully on its maritime trade. Even if there were local products available, they could not quite compete in price and quantity with the products which were supplied by neighbouring Asian merchants. This situation forced the High Government to conclude that the total dependence of the city on these small trading networks was preventing the exploitation of the hinterland.⁴⁹

In the early years of Batavia, the Dutch incorrectly assumed that the territory of their new headquarters coincided with the territory of the former 'kingdom of Jakarta'. Under this misapprehension the colonial power assumed that the territory of Batavia extended from the Citarum River in the east to the Cisadane River in the west and from the Java Sea in the north to the Indian Ocean in the south.⁵⁰ This assumption was a far cry from reality because the kingdom of Jakarta was no more than a principality under the protectorate of Banten and the highlands to the south of Batavia properly belonged to West Priangan. On account of the various outbreaks of hostilities and wars with the local realms mentioned earlier, the colonial rulers soon realized that the actual territory of Batavia was much smaller than they had

⁴⁹ H.E. Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan. The Colonial Port City of Batavia/Jakarta and its Primary Hinterland in the Seventeenth Century" (Unpublished paper, 2003), p. 3.

⁵⁰ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 1, p. 57.

believed. They also recognized that settlement and economic expansion to the hinterland would be impossible unless the authority of the city could be enforced in this region by political and military power.

It would not be wholly untrue to say that, in the first half of the seventeenth century the Company acted mainly in the capacity of trader, whereas in the later period territorial acquisition put its officials, in the first instance, in the position of having to make political decisions.⁵¹ Although the VOC had already become master of the seas in the Indonesian Archipelago, especially after the conquest of Jakarta (1619) and Melaka (1641), its transition from merchant to a sovereign polity only began in the 1650s.⁵² The Javanese realms did not acknowledge Batavia as a 'sovereign state' until the Batavian government proved it could retain its position and enforce local military supremacy. Consequently, once the colonial government tried to exercise its authority in the areas outside the walled city, it was next to impossible to avoid involvement in internal regional conflicts and all kinds of other troubles with the neighbouring rulers.

The long and short of this story is that the formation of the Ommelanden boundaries was the product of dynamic interaction between the Dutch and the neighbouring realms. The shape of the Ommelanden boundaries gradually began to emerge clearly as a result of various wars, diplomatic negotiations, and contracts between the Company and the indigenous Javanese rulers. The rise of Batavia as a political power in West Java was a parallel process to the rise of the kingdom of Mataram under Sultan Agung⁵³ as the most powerful kingdom in the interior of Java. During Sultan Agung's reign (1613-1646), Mataram expanded its authority over almost the entire island. After a series of military campaigns in East Java which culminated in the fall of Surabaya in 1625,⁵⁴ Mataram turned its attention to extending its power into West Java as far as Cirebon. Two military assaults on Batavia in 1628 and 1629 failed to capture the Dutch headquarters. After these setbacks, Sultan Agung had to accept the continued existence of the Company in Java and he launched no more serious military expeditions against Batavia.

⁵¹ R.Z. Leirissa, "The Dutch Trading Monopolies", in Haryati Soebadio and Carine A. du Marchie Sarvaas (eds.), *Dynamics of Indonesian History* (New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 192-193.

⁵² John Ball, *Indonesian Legal History 1602-1848* (Sydney: Oughtershaw Press, 1982), p. 5.

⁵³ Sultan Agung is remembered in the Javanese historical tradition as the great conqueror, the pious Muslim, and the opponent of the Dutch. His reign was one of the greatest in Javanese history. See M.C. Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta Under Sultan Mangkunbumi, 1749-1792* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 18.

⁵⁴ Peter Carey, "Civilization on Loan: The Making of an Upstart Polity: Mataram and its Successors, 1600-1830", in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1997, p. 716.

The Company had long recognized the importance of the kingdom of Mataram both to its own existence in the island and its commercial endeavours. In 1652, a diplomatic mission under Rykloff van Goens was sent to Mataram. Javanese court poets and chroniclers portray the Dutch diplomatic mission to the court as a gesture of humble submission; nevertheless, this mission succeeded in resolving the western boundaries of Batavia through the conclusion of a verbal agreement with the *susubunan* which stated that Dutch authority extended to the Citarum/Kerawang River.⁵⁵ The eastern boundary of Batavia was extended to the Pamanukan River, and in 1677 south as far as the Indian Ocean after the Company assisted Mataram in suppressing the revolt of the Madurese Prince Trunajaya. When the court of Mataram was captured by the rebels, Amangkurat I escaped to Company controlled territory in 1677 but died during his flight. His successor, Amangkurat II (r. 1677-1703) granted the Company various trade monopolies and ceded the western part of Mataram territory to it in exchange for Company military support for his efforts to regain the throne.⁵⁶ Within the new territory, the West and Central Priangan regions officially came under the jurisdiction of Batavia.

Nevertheless, the 1679 Bantenese military campaign to recapture the Sumedang region by passing through 'Batavia territory' proved that the effective authority of the Company was more a concept on paper rather than an actual reality. In 1681, beset by worries that their principality would be captured by Banten, the rulers of Cirebon ceded their sovereignty to the Company. However, owing to its limitations of capital and manpower, the newly acquired territory was not governed directly by the colonial power. According to Couper's 'Seven Regulations' of 1684, the Priangan Regents were instructed to administer their people under the authority of the Company and the *susubunan* of Mataram, on the basis of their own 'traditional laws, customs, and privileges'.⁵⁷ Finally the eastern territory of Batavia was firmly established under the authority of the Company in 1705, when Mataram officially conceded the Company sovereignty over Cirebon and the Priangan regions.

To the west of the Company headquarters, the way the Ommelanden boundaries took shape was rather different. Banten, a maritime kingdom with territorial authority, was the chief

⁵⁵ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 51.

⁵⁶ For a good discussion on Mataram political and economic developments and the Dutch intervention in the regional politics of Java at the end of the seventeenth century see M.C. Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy in Java, 1677-1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the early Kartasura Period* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993)

⁵⁷ F. de Haan, *Priangan: De Preanger-Regentschappen onder het Nederlandsch Bestuur tot 1811*, Vol. 1 (Batavia: G. Kolff, 1910), pp. 48-49.

power to the west of Batavia. By the end of the sixteenth century, this pepper-exporting kingdom had grown into one of the most flourishing entrepôts in Southeast Asia.⁵⁸ Before the port town of Jakarta became a Dutch possession, it had been regarded as a vassal by Banten. Therefore, Banten regarded the Dutch position in Batavia a usurpation of its territory.⁵⁹ The claim of Banten to Batavia and the Ommelanden rested on the necessity to have environs which could be used as an agricultural hinterland and as a 'buffer zone' between its realm and Mataram. The establishment of a fortified European trading-post located close to Banten and beyond the control of any indigenous authority was regarded by this kingdom as a potential threat to its maritime trade activities. To add insult to injury, the roadstead of Banten was periodically being blockaded Company ships, upsetting the economic activities of this port which rebounded on the prosperity of the pepper plantations.⁶⁰

In the early decades of Batavia, Bantenese marauders often created disturbances in the areas surrounding Batavia and could only be gradually repulsed. Although an initial peace agreement between Batavia and Banten was signed in 1639, this piece of paper could not protect the Chinese market gardeners who worked outside the city walls, from Bantenese raiders.⁶¹ The first treaty setting out the boundaries between Batavia and Banten was signed in 1659 and fixed the Cisadane/Tangerang River as the limit between the two polities.

As mentioned before, in Java a written agreement was little more than a promise on paper. This was made explicit in 1678 when Bantenese troops marched to Cirebon through the hinterland of Batavia and an open conflict broke out with the Company. This conflict ended with the defeat of Banten and the subjugation of Cirebon to Company hegemony. The relationship between Batavia and Banten reached a crucial point when the Bantenese crown prince, Pangeran Hadji, rebelled against his father, Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa (1651-1683). In 1682 the crown prince accepted the Dutch suzerainty over Banten in exchange for military support.⁶² Although Banten ceded its full independence to the States-General of the Dutch Republic, the political influence of the Company was not exerted at the village level until the

⁵⁸ Atsushi Ota, "Traditional versus Modern Administrative Concepts. Dutch Intervention and its Results in Rural Banten, 1760-1790", in *Itinerario*, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 2003, p. 63.

⁵⁹ M.C. Ricklefs, "Banten and the Dutch in 1619: Six Early 'pasar Malay' Letters", in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1976, p. 135.

⁶⁰ K.N. Chauduri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean. An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 164-165.


⁶¹ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 23.

⁶² Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (Honolulu, Hawai'i: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), p. 91.

mid-eighteenth century, a situation rather similar to that in Cirebon and Priangan during the same period.⁶³

Since 1705 the Company had officially exercised full authority over a large part of West Java, with the exception of the sultanate of Banten. Because Dutch territorial jurisdiction had grown gradually under widely differing political and economic conditions, the character of the administration differed from region to region. The centre of Dutch authority was the walled city of Batavia, which was governed directly by the High Government. In the environs of Batavia or the Ommelanden, authority rested in the hands of the *College van Heemraden*. The Ommelanden covered the territory bordered in the east by the Citarum River and in the west by the Cisadane River. In the north the limit was the Java Sea and the boundary in the south were the *Jakatrache Bovenlanden* or the highlands of Jakarta. Two other regions under Dutch authority in West Java were the *Preanger Bovenlanden* (the Priangan Highlands) and Cirebon. The first was located directly to the east of the Ommelanden whereas Cirebon was situated between Priangan and Mataram in Central Java. In these two regions, the Dutch governed indirectly. That is to say that the local rulers ran the daily administration and exercised certain duties on behalf of the colonial government, as among them *verplichte leverantiën* or set deliveries of cash crops.


⁶³ Atsushi Ota, "Banten Rebellion, 1750-1752: Factors behind the Mass Participation", in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 37. No. 3, 2003, p. 625.



Map 2: The extension of VOC's territory in Java in the 17th and 18th century

Source: Els M. Jacobs, *Merchant in Asia. The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century*

(Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2006), p. 230.



Map 3: Batavia and the Ommelanden

Source: Hendrik E. Niemeijer, *Batavia. Een koloniale samenleving in de 17^{de} eeuw* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2005), pp. 8-9.

3. *Water control and irrigation*

Generally speaking, Java is an island with a surplus of water, evidence of which is the widespread tropical rain forest in this island prior to 1800. Most of Java receives at least 2000 mm of rainfall per year and there is a positive water balance for the majority of months.⁶⁴ In the Ommelanden it was obvious even in the seventeenth century that water control and irrigation would be essential to the development of economic activities. The hydraulic infrastructure which was gradually built up over the years considerably shaped the regional landscape. Canals and irrigation systems as forms of water control form a visible record of human efforts to tame nature and promote agricultural activities. In turn, water management shapes the nature of economic development, social relations, and transportation.

Careful supply and control of water is the key factor in the cultivation of wet rice, the most important crop in Java. Water control and irrigation for rice-fields (*sawah*) have been a part of agriculture in Java since the pre-modern period. The oldest manifestation of agricultural water management in Indonesian Archipelago appears to have taken the form of the modification of natural swamps.⁶⁵ The flooding of a certain area for agricultural purposes requires an immense input of labour and tools, since such 'wet agriculture' requires land clearance, levelling the ground, the creation of a terrace, and a system of dams and water conduits for the distribution of water. Therefore, intensive irrigation for *sawah* was only feasible in fertile regions traversed by rivers and supported by an adequate labour force organized by a local ruler. Traditional rulers were interested in the creation of densely settled wet-rice areas because the people there were tied to the soil and were therefore easier to tax and to conscript for *corv e* and in times of war.⁶⁶ Massive wet-rice cultivation and impressive irrigation works in pre-modern Java were to be found in the central areas of the island, to the south of Mount Merapi, and in the east, in the Brantas River valley.

For a burgeoning agricultural region like the seventeenth-century Ommelanden, irrigation was of course of crucial importance. The cultivation of both rice and sugar were dependent on it. Because the Ommelanden rivers nearly all have short courses and limited catchment areas, the abrupt uneven and variable rainfall makes it crucial that the agricultural population to

⁶⁴Avijit Gupta, "Rivers in Southeast Asia", in Avijit Gupta (ed.), *The Physical Geography of Southeast Asia*, p. 65.

⁶⁵Jan Wisseman Christie, "Water and rice in early Java and Bali", in Peter Boomgaard (ed.), *A World of Water. Rain, Rivers, and Seas in Southeast Asian Histories* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), p. 235.

⁶⁶Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 189.

harness the flows of water to the best of their ability. There often are two problems with water in 'wet agriculture': not enough and too much. Each condition imposes a constraint on crop growth.⁶⁷ During the dry season, a lack of water is to be expected. It is therefore important to store water in times of relatively abundant rainfall so that it can be used for irrigation in both wet and dry season. During the wet season, the Ommelanden experience a high rate of precipitation which results in a water surplus and floods; hence in that season water drainage is as important as irrigation.

Hydraulic engineering was one of typical forms of expertise the Dutch brought to their colonies. After all, the Dutch had a long tradition of planning and actively shaping their own water environment. The geographical characteristics of the Netherlands, a delta region crossed by big rivers, and the experience of frequent floods had made the Dutch experts in manipulating water flows. Therefore it is not surprising that digging canals and creating irrigation systems were two of the Dutch priorities in Batavia and later also in the Ommelanden. The geographical similarity between the Dutch River estuary landscape and the Ommelanden, low-lying lands with many rivers, was the chief reason which prompted the Dutch to develop a waterworks system similar to those in the Netherlands around Batavia.

The major purpose of the colonial irrigation scheme was to encourage agricultural settlement and political stability, increase production, raise state revenue, and improve communications and transportation. Protection against drought and the prevention of famine were secondary considerations which subsequently loomed much larger.⁶⁸ When the Dutch established Batavia on the ruins of Jayakarta, they had to deal with water control from the very beginning. As a port town, the site of Jayakarta had been determined, like many other port cities in sixteenth century Southeast Asia, by its favourable location for the maritime trade, and not by its proximity to wet-rice growing areas. However, because the Company did not want Batavia to have to depend on the supply of rice imports from elsewhere, water management and canal building were promoted for agricultural development and local transportation.

The earliest infrastructural works in the Ommelanden were pioneered by private initiatives. In 1648, a Chinese sugar entrepreneur, Phoa Bing Ham, dug a canal, known as the *Molenvliet*, to connect his estate in Tanah Abang, located to the south of Batavia, with the city. His ground-breaking work was followed by others who dug canals outside the west wall of Batavia,

⁶⁷ Robert C. Hunt, "Communal Irrigation, A Comparative perspective", in Boomgaard, *A World of Water*, p. 188.

⁶⁸ William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, *Environment and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 134.

the *Ammanusgracht* and *Bacherachtgracht*, and from the city eastwards to the Sunter River and Ancol, the *Sontarse vaart* and *Ancolse vaart*. The digging of this last canal was sponsored by a member of the *Raad van Indië*, François Caron, who been granted seven big estates, amounting to 855 hectares, by the Company.⁶⁹ The digging of the canals not only improved the transportation, it also helped to drain the low-lying land and eased the run-off of water during the rainy season.

These infrastructural works and the economic activities for which they created the opportunity heightened the necessity to set up an administration organ which dealt specifically with areas surrounding the city. Therefore on 19 September 1664, the Batavian government established a *College van Heemraden* (the Board of Land Trustees or the District Council). Before the establishment of the *Heemraden* the duty of supervising the Ommelanden was the responsibility of the *landdrost* (sheriff), but the Batavian government was aware that this Company officer was overloaded with work. In its early years, the *Heemraden* had to operate with no clear description of its tasks, but in the course of time it became apparent that the main responsibility of the board was to administer the affairs of the inhabitants, manage the land ownership, and supervise and maintain the public works. Perhaps owing to the insecurity prevailing in the outlying areas of Batavia, the District Council remained inactive for several years. The reason behind its reactivation in 1679 was the necessity of a body to take charge of the construction of the *Zuiderringsloot* (the south ring canal) since the *College van Schepenen* (the College of Aldermen) refused to have anything to do with the building of this canal.⁷⁰ The *Zuiderringsloot* was to provide irrigation and drainage for land and the estates located to the southwest of the city.⁷¹

The water control and irrigation problems in the Ommelanden stemmed mainly from the efforts of the wet-rice cultivators to obtain a constant supply of water for their rice-fields. The expansion of the acreage of rice-fields created its own problems. The absence of traditional Javanese organizations which would normally have dealt with irrigation and drainage in the Ommelanden forced the involvement of the colonial administration in regulating the water management. Rice is a three- to five-months crop and requires water throughout its growth cycle. To maximize rice production through multiple cropping, water must be stored during

⁶⁹ Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", p. 4. Caron had already been involved in similar enterprises while serving as governor in Taiwan.

⁷⁰ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 3, p. 35.

⁷¹ The cost for the canal construction came from the tax on land located along the *Zuiderringsloot*. See *Ibid.*, p. 34.

the wet season and released during the dry season. It goes without saying that such waterworks as dams, sluices, and ditches are very important to *sawah*. The increasing acreage of *sawah*, and also of the cane-fields at the beginning of eighteenth century created enormous upheavals in terms of irrigation and drainage. The large acreage of *sawah* raised the demand for a water supply which only could be assured by the building of dams during the dry season.

In 1718, a Malay Intje Carim sent a letter to the *Heemraden*. He complained about a Balinese named Salim who had built a dam which meant that his land did not obtain enough water. Salim refused to open the dam because he wanted to be sure that his rice-field, located in Cempaka Putih in the east of the Ommelanden, would have an adequate supply of water. In response, the *Heemraden* sent two of their members, Ary Crul and Barent Blocke, accompanied by a *landmeester* (land surveyor) to examine the dam before a decision was taken.⁷² A week later, the *Heemraden*'s emissaries produce a report which said that the dam did indeed cut off the irrigation supply to Carim's land; so they had it opened and obliged Salim to acquiesce in this decision.⁷³ Another request was submitted about the same time by the Chinese Captain Tomboqua. He complained about the damming up of several ditches on Company land located along the Tangerang River by a Javanese, Aria Soeta Dilaga, which resulted in a shortage of water for the sugar-mill on his land. The *Heemraden* sent Barent Blocke as the *Gecommitteerde voor de Zaken der Inlandereren* (Commissioner in Charge of Native Affairs) to investigate this case.⁷⁴ The commissioner returned with a report stating that the land on which the ditches were located had been granted to Aria Soeta Dilaga in 1717. He had subsequently built the dams to guarantee the supply of water to his rice-fields, vegetable gardens, and fish ponds. To solve this problem, the Chinese Captain was recommended to dig his own ditch since his sugar-mill was located close to the Tangerang River.⁷⁵

The construction of many dams, constructed with timber or natural stone without any coordination by the local authorities created continuous conflicts between the various land owners. The *Heemraden* tried to solve these problems by obliging the landowners to ask permission to build a dam and to provide proof they held a licence by showing a copy of the relevant *Heemraden* resolution. In 1721, some sixty illegal dams were removed by the *Heemraden*,

⁷² ANRI, Resolutie College van Heemraden (RCH) No. 14, 23 April 1718, fol. 95.

⁷³ ANRI, RCH No. 14, 30 April 1718, fol. 96.

⁷⁴ ANRI, RCH No. 14, 30 April 1718, fol. 97-98.

⁷⁵ ANRI, RCH No. 14, 7 May 1718, fol. 103-104.

but many others were repaired by the owners only one day later.⁷⁶ A careful investigation of the Grogol and Krukut Riviers by the *Heemraden* in 1739 found that there were fifty illegal dams interrupting the flow of these rivers.⁷⁷ Large-scale rice cultivation required a large amount of water in constant supply. Without careful organization and intensive supervision of the irrigation and drainage systems by a local authority, it was an uphill battle to stop the construction of illegal dams.

Most of Batavia and its surrounding areas was situated on low-lying land only a few metres above sea level. The city itself was originally located right on the seashore, but the surrounding delta continued expanding towards the sea, built up by the silt carried down by the Ciliwung River. Because of these geographical characteristics, Batavia was and Jakarta still is subject to seasonal flooding by the Ciliwung, Grogol, Krukut, and Anke which cross the plain. During the dry season, the volume of water was low and consequently the rivers and canals were reduced to dirty, muddy trickles of water clogged with smelly sediment. In the wet season the volume of water increased drastically, carrying down all kinds of natural and human waste from the hinterland.

Problems with the slow but inevitable expansion of the shoreline and the forming of sandbanks in the estuary of the Ciliwung were part of the scene right from the earliest years of Batavia. Dutch maps from the years 1619 and 1628 show how much the coastline in front of the city expanded in just a decade. An effort was made to solve these problems by constructing a palisade wall, but it was wasted effort and in the end a canal had to be dug through the newly reclaimed land.⁷⁸ Complaints about the stench from the canals during the dry season were noted down from 1633 at least and were repeated regularly, even becoming more virulent.⁷⁹ *Banjir* flooded Batavia and its immediate environs in 1665 and it was reported that every now and then streets of the town were also inundated by the spring tide.⁸⁰ In 1692, the government announced that it was feared that, within several years, the Ciliwung would no longer be navigable for boats and *sampan* (traditional small craft) because it had become too shallow. It is apparent that the sedimentation at the mouth of the rivers and the alternate

⁷⁶ Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", p. 13.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁷⁸ F. de Haan, *Oud Batavia*, Vol. I, Batavia: G, Kolf & Co., 1922, pp. 236-238.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 252-253.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 248-249.

surplus and the lack of water posed environmental problems in Batavia and its surroundings from the very foundation of the city.

Owing to the human intervention in the nature in the hinterland of Batavia, in the course of time the flooding in town and the Ommelanden worsened considerably. Although economic expansion brought prosperity to the city and its inhabitants, it definitely had a negative impact on the balance of nature. Tree felling to fuel the sugar-mills decreased the amount of land covered by forests in the upstream area of the Ciliwung and caused the sudden rise of water levels in this river during the rainy season. Another factor which aggravated the environmental conditions was the reckless development of waterworks for the irrigation of *sawah* which spiralled out of the control of the local authority. Moreover, the increasing number of inhabitants and rural industrial activities in the Ommelanden led to even more human garbage. The rivers and canal were used by the inhabitants as sewers for their waste. The sugar-mills were the biggest producers of organic waste which was dumped from the mills into the rivers and canals of the Ommelanden.

Some solutions were sought to prevent further flooding. These efforts still could not fully save Batavia from the annual *banjir* during the rainy season. The primary function of the Ommelanden canals was to divert the water currents of the rivers, but even though big canals were built to the east and west side of the city, these waterworks were useless in preventing the inundations caused by heavy rains. The capacity of rivers and canals declined as they were silted up with mud and garbage which had been carried down and become stuck at the outlets, along the riverbanks, in front of the dams, against bridge foundations, and in the sluices. Several attempts were made to stop the silting up process by dredging with mills, nets, and human labour. Even if this work was carried out regularly, the problem of flooding continued.

Massive deforestation aggravated the ecological conditions. Unused logs were dumped into the waterways and impeded the flow of the river. The Ciliwung River was used as the main conduit for transporting both logs and bamboo. On 26 April 1700, Cornelis Chastelein reported to the *Heemraden* that there was a big log of a Rengas tree stuck in the Ciliwung at Condet which had stopped the flow of the river.⁸¹ Four days later, the *Heemraden* sent Hendrik Boland, the *landdrost*, to remove the log but since the log was very big, the sheriff had to cut it into several chunks before it could be taken out of the river.⁸² Two years later, once again

⁸¹ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 26 April 1700, fol. 266.

⁸² ANRI, RCH No. 7, 30 April 1700, fol. 267.

Cornelis Chastelein reported a log which was obstructing the Ciliwung in front of a sugar-mill named Parang Pakis. The upshot was that Chastelein's land in Seringsing could not obtain sufficient water.⁸³ In response, two weeks later the *Heemraden* issued a regulation requiring every land owner to remove personally all obstructing logs from the rivers or canals which flowed through their lands.⁸⁴

To try to prevent the flooding of the Ciliwung, in 1725 the government built a dam for the purpose of redirecting its waters towards the *Westerse vaart*. Nevertheless, during the wet season the volume of water in the river raised so drastically the river tried to retake its previous course. The current in the water caused so much damage to the dam that it had to be opened up again to prevent it from caving in.

4. *The deforestation problem*

Nowadays the area surrounding Jakarta has been entirely denuded of its forests because of economic development and ever-increasing population pressure. It is hard to imagine that, prior to the eighteenth century, this urban region was covered by a dense tropical forest. The only permanent non-forest vegetation in Java before the human intervention of the early-modern period was to be found on coastal cliffs and beaches, seasonally flooded river plains, and the slopes of active volcanoes. Prior to the fifteenth century, the interaction between human habitat and the forest environment in Southeast Asia was primarily one of interdependence. Trees were felled for food, fuel, and aromatic woods, and in the dry season they were set on fire to provide ash for the slash-and-burn shifting cultivation.⁸⁵ Because of the low population density, there was enough time for the forests to regenerate.

Tropical forests in the seventeenth-century Ommelanden stretched from the coastal regions all the way up into the Priangan mountain areas.⁸⁶ Tropical forest is a tall, dense, evergreen forest which forms the natural vegetation cover of the wet tropics. In the tropical lowlands, these forests grow on almost any soil type on which the annual rainfall is well distributed.⁸⁷

⁸³ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 4 July 1702, fol. 433.

⁸⁴ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 28 July 1702, fol. 438.

⁸⁵ Anthony Reid, "Humans and Forests in Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia", in J.R. McNeill, *Environmental History in the Pacific World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), p. 217.

⁸⁶ The term tropical rainforest was first used by the German geographer A.F.W Schimper in his book about Plant Geography in 1898. See Friedhelm Göthenbolth *et al.* (eds.), *Ecology of Insular Southeast Asia*, p. 297.

⁸⁷ Richard Primack and Richard Corlett, *The Tropical Rain Forests* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 3.

There are two kinds of forest in the Indonesian Archipelago: teak forests which are dominated by teak and jungle wood forests, the collective name for all non-teak forests.⁸⁸ The jungle wood forest and water formed the dominant natural elements in the Ommelanden. In the early days of Batavia, some Company employees made reconnaissance trips via the rivers in the vicinity of the town in search for timber.⁸⁹ It was they who discovered that the area surrounding Batavia was covered by heavy jungle.

A crucial factor in the relationship between Batavia and its environs was the fact that this city had to be supplied with a number of basic goods to satisfy the materials needs of its population and the incoming and outgoing shipping. These included basic foodstuffs (rice, vegetables, meat, fish, and fruit), materials for the construction of buildings, and fuel for industrial production (the sugar industry, arak distilleries, brick and lime kilns). Timber from the nearby forest could serve as both fuel and building material and this dual purpose was the principal reason why the forest disappeared so quickly.⁹⁰

Traditional Indonesian houses were built mostly of wood and bamboo, whereas Dutch and Chinese houses were constructed of stone, brick, and wood. Constructions such as bridges, dikes, and warehouses also required large quantities of wood. The artisans in the pre-modern industry, brick-makers, blacksmiths, and goldsmiths, used timber and charcoal as fuel. Timber was also used in huge quantities as fuel in the sugar industry and arak distillery.

Timber, especially teak, was essential to the Company fleet. Teak (*Tectona grandis*) was prized above all other woods in the Archipelago for its durability, strength, virtual immunity to attacks by insects and fungi, relatively light weight, and resistance to corrosion on contact with metal.⁹¹ Throughout the seventeenth century, the building of new ships and the repair of those already afloat by the Company increased the demand for timber. On average, the Company's East Indiamen were much larger than the indigenous ships and boats in the Archipelago and consequently the number of large trees which needed to be felled per ship increased.⁹² Batavia,

⁸⁸ Around 1890, the jungle wood forests of Java covered an area four times as large as that of the teak forests. See Peter Boomgaard, "Oriental Nature, its Friends and its Enemies: Conservation of Nature in Late-Colonial Indonesia, 1889-1949", in *Environment and History*, No. 5, 1999, p. 261.

⁸⁹ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 23.

⁹⁰ Peter Boomgaard, "Environmental Impact of the European Presence in Southeast Asia, 17th-19th Centuries", in *Island and Empires*, Vol. 1, June 1998, p. 28.

⁹¹ Beinart and Hughes, *Environment and Empire*, p. 112.

⁹² Peter Boomgaard, "The long goodbye? Trends in Forest exploitation in the Indonesian Archipelago", in Peter Boomgaard *et.al.* (eds.), *Muddied Waters. Historical and contemporary perspectives on management of forests and fisheries in island Southeast Asia* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), p. 219.

the Dutch headquarters which maintained a large dockyard on the island Onrust, therefore, required a large quantity of timber.

Early-modern Southeast Asia was much more thickly forested than China or Europe and almost certainly also more thickly forested than India. By 1400, perhaps as much as 85 to 95 per cent of Southeast Asia was still under forest cover.⁹³ Until the end of the eighteenth century, with the exception of Java most of the Southeast Asian forests still survived, especially in the area surrounding Batavia and some areas in Central Java. In the latter region, 40 per cent of the teak forests were lost between 1776 and 1840 in the rapid deforestation required to meet economic demands and urban requirements.⁹⁴ But the fact remains that, in the environs of Batavia, deforestation occurred even earlier than in any other place in Java. Unfortunately we do not have quantitative data about the pace of deforestation in this region, but it is apparent that the economic and demographic expansion of Batavia into its hinterland at the end of seventeenth century was the main factor for the rapid deforestation.

One of the first supplies of timber for construction works in Batavia was provided by Jan Con, a Chinese entrepreneur from Banten, just a few years after the founding of the city. Under his supervision, small groups of Chinese wood-cutters felled the trees on the islands and in the forests in the vicinity of the new Dutch colony.⁹⁵ This was a dangerous occupation since the wood-cutters had to be constantly on the look-out for attacks by marauders from Banten. Until the 1650s, every year the Company cut down swathes of the standing forest around Batavia to satisfy the demand for timber and to clear the fields as a precaution against sudden attacks from either Mataram or Banten.⁹⁶

If the demand for timber had mainly come from the public works sector during the early decades of Batavia, from the last quarter of the seventeenth century until the 1730s most of timber was devoured by rural industry, especially sugar-mills. The Batavian sugar-mills operated in the rural areas because they had to be located near the cane-fields and the forests which provided them with fuel. Firewood was used as fuel for boiling the cane juice until it condensed into crystals. This process took several hours and had to be fuelled by large quantities of firewood. Therefore, among rural industries in the Ommelanden, sugar-mills

⁹³ Peter Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia. An Environmental History* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2007), p. 167.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 168. Recent data provides the information that nowadays the coverage of forests in Java is 7%, whereas in Papua it is nearly 92%. Overall the coverage of forest in the Indonesia Archipelago is about 54%. See Göthenbolth *et.al.* (eds.), *Ecology of Insular Southeast Asia*, p. 299.

⁹⁵ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 53.

⁹⁶ Boomgaard, "The long goodbye?" p. 224.

stand out as the biggest consumers of firewood. The ideal location for a sugar-mill was by the side of a river, surrounded by forest. When the forests in the area surrounding a mill had all been felled, the owner would remove his mill to a new location close to a virgin forest.

During the sugar boom period, the Batavian government was inundated with requests from sugar entrepreneurs who intended to relocate their mills. Because of the deforestation in the immediate environs of Batavia the new mill location was usually sited farther away from town than the previous one. In 1704, for instance, the Chinese sugar-miller Oey Soeko requested permission from the government to remove his sugar-mill from the land owned by Domingo Marcus in Cakung on the bank of the Ciliwung River to a plot belonging to the Company in Oedjong Menting.⁹⁷ In 1718, the *College van Heemraden*, approved a request from Chinese Luitenant Li Jonqua to relocate his sugar-mill from the land owned by Ursela Indijk on the bank of the Ciliwung in Condet to his own land on the bank of the Tangerang River.⁹⁸ Another request came from Gouw Tsinko who wanted to move the three sugar-mills which he had just bought, located on the land owned by Burgher Albert Reguleth on the bank of the Ciliwung, to his own land on the bank of the Tangerang River and the Mokervaart.⁹⁹

These examples show that, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, certain regions along the *Grote Rivier* were already denuded of their forests because of the depredations of the sugar industry. Deforestation in the environs of Batavia had taken place at an even earlier date. In 1701, a reconnaissance team was sent to upstream along the Ommelanden rivers to investigate the causes of the polluted water which was flowing through the city. This expedition returned with a report that they had found the upper reaches of the Ciliwung had been completely denuded to fuel the sugar-mills on the land of Cornelis Chastelein.¹⁰⁰

When the situation in the Ommelanden became safer in the 1680s, the Javanese specialized in the job of timber suppliers. Bands of Javanese from the North Coast and Central Java flocked to the Ommelanden to offer their services as wood-cutters. Most of them were seasonal migrants who would cut down trees in the Ommelanden forests under contract to Batavian entrepreneurs to deliver designated quantities of firewood. In 1697, for example, Soeta Wangsa, the Captain of East Javanese, reported to the *College van Heemraden* that 1200 logs had been deposited near the Company redoubt of Mr Cornelis, which was located on the

⁹⁷ ANRI, RCH No. 8, 27 September 1704, fol. 310.

⁹⁸ ANRI, RCH No. 14, 30 April 1718, fol. 99.

⁹⁹ ANRI, RCH No. 14, 2 November 1720.

¹⁰⁰ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 27.

bank of Ciliwung River to the south of the city. These logs had been felled by groups of Javanese at various places in the Ommelanden belonging to the Company.

Table 1: The locations of 1200 logs according to Captain Soeta Wangsa's report¹⁰¹

Name of Place	Group Leader	Number of Logs
Cadong Alang	Tanoe Singa	200
	Naja Diwangsa	50
	Naja Diwangsa	50
Cadong Waringin	Marta Souta	170
	Nata Bradja	60
	Marta Prana	335
Cadong Pandack	Tschitra	130
Parakan Cambangh	Raga Wangsa	180
Tschietayam	Houyan	50
	Sub Total	1225
	Rotten and Lost	25
	Total	1200

This source does not say who placed the order to have these logs cut. It might have come from the government or perhaps the Javanese themselves took the initiative in felling. In the example below it is clear who gave the order to cut the trees. In November 1700, the secretary of the *Heemraden* reported that Karta Silinga, a Javanese lieutenant, and his people had cut 115 square *roeden* of firewood on the Company land in Boedjong Gede.¹⁰² The job was carried out after orders to do so have been issued by the *Heemraden*. In January 1701 this body decided to sell this firewood at auction to Ommelanden sugar-millers.¹⁰³

Deforestation in the Ommelanden was also the consequence of agricultural activities, particularly the creation of rice-fields. The cultivation of rice was enthusiastically encouraged by the Company as part of its efforts to reduce the dependence of Batavia on the import of rice from the north coasts of Central and East Java. Rice was the most important staple in the

¹⁰¹ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 23 March 1697, fol. 128-129.

¹⁰² ANRI, RCH No. 7, 12 November 1700, fol. 298.

¹⁰³ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 14 January 1701, fol. 304.

diet of the city and its environs and consequently the paramount position of rice-fields in the food crop picture of the Ommelanden is incontestable. Rice occupied more land than any other crop. Most of the rice for Batavia was cultivated in *sawah*, but some dry rice was also grown by the slash-and-burn method. This latter method of rice cultivation did enormous harm to the Ommelanden forests. In order to protect the forests, slash-and-burn cultivation in the Ommelanden was forbidden in 1750.¹⁰⁴ By that time the rice production of this region seems have been sufficient to fulfil the demand of the city.

Nobody would deny that economic expansion and population growth were the driving forces behind the deforestation process in the Ommelanden. There was a strong relationship between security conditions, economic expansion, population growth, and deforestation. Each of these factors formed a precondition for the one which followed. As security in the Ommelanden improved in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, Batavian economic expansion mushroomed. The booming economic activities in the Ommelanden acted as a magnet for thousands of migrants from China and Central and North Coast Java. There were 13,593 people living outside the city walls in 1679. A decade later in 1689, this number had swelled to 45,550 and another decade later in 1699 to 49,688.¹⁰⁵

The rapid deforestation in the Ommelanden was a source of worry to the Batavian government. A written placard in 1696 declared that no trees were to be cut on Company land without proper authorization.¹⁰⁶ On the same placard, the government also forbade the setting-up of new sugar-mills, arak distilleries, lime and brick kilns, and saw-mills without government permission. Anyone caught cutting down trees red-handed would be fined as much as 200 *rijksdaalders*. This placard is a clue that the environment in the Ommelanden had begun to deteriorate by the end of the seventeenth century.

Despite such measures, illegal logging continued. Without close on-the-spot supervision, such decrees were not worth the paper they were written on. It was difficult to carry out inspections in all the forests on the Company land since they spread out over the length and breadth of the Ommelanden. As it was Company policy to station only a limited number of employees in this region, it was well-nigh impossible to prevent bands of Javanese from

¹⁰⁴ Peter Boomgaard, "From Riches to Rags? Rice Production and Trade in Asia, Particularly Indonesia, 1500-1950", in Greg Bankoff and Peter Boomgaard (eds.), *A History of Natural Resources in Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 192.

¹⁰⁵ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, pp. 321-323.

¹⁰⁶ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 3, pp. 405-407.

cutting the forests and selling timber illegally. Another fly in the ointment was that the garrison at military outposts in the Ommelanden often failed in their duty of supervising the logs being floated down river past their posts. There are also clues to a mutually beneficial relationship between illegal wood-traders and corrupt local militia officers.

In 1698, three Javanese, Diepa Marta, Derpa Mangala, and Marta Praya, collaborating with fellow Javanese workers, cut 1136 sections of logs from the Company land in Cikarang by the side of Tsikias River. They floated these logs down to the seashore via the river. When the logs passed the Zoutelande Post, located on the bank of the Ancol River, they were confiscated.¹⁰⁷ It seems they had not bribed the Company Javanese militia to turn a blind eye to the logs. The confiscated logs were put up for sale by the *Heemraden* at the going market rate. The board did not have the power to sanction corporal punishment, but it did have the authority to collect fines. The revenue from the sale was used by the *College van Heemraden* for its own benefit.

The government was assisted in its efforts to preserve the forests in the Ommelanden by a high-ranking Company official, Cornelis Chastelein, who was the owner of several private estates. In his will Chastelein manumitted all his slaves and made them collective owners of his estate. In the same will, he decreed that forest on his estate in Depok, located in the south of the Ommelanden, should be preserved. His will expressly stated that the forest at Depok should not be cut down or despoiled, and the local inhabitants were only allowed to cut down timber and firewood for their own use, not for sale.¹⁰⁸ Through the provisions of his will, he succeeded in preserving the forest in Depok, a rare remnant of the Ommelanden lowland rain forest, until the beginning of the twentieth century.

5. *Ecological deterioration*

Pre-modern Batavia had a different morphology to other cities in Indonesia. Anthony Reid has pointed out that pre-modern Indonesian towns consisted of several villages bonded together, in which plants and trees grew aplenty. These ‘towns’ were semi-rural and did not display a typical urban ecology. Houses were surrounded by yards, with fruit trees, vegetables, and

¹⁰⁷ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 30 August 1698, fol. 212.

¹⁰⁸ Boomgaard, “Oriental Nature, its Friends and its Enemies”, p. 267.

bamboo fences.¹⁰⁹ In and around such port towns as Banten, Cirebon, and Semarang pre-industrial and agricultural activities were carried out, but such undertakings were not as extensively planned as in Batavia. It seems that traditional Indonesian towns did not have any ecological problems worth mentioning.

Batavia continued to grow and prosper during its first one hundred years. Although there were several setbacks caused by hostilities with local realms and rice embargoes from the north coast of Java, the city flourished and won fame as the 'Queen of the East'. In 1724 the Dutch minister of religion and writer, François Valentijn, wrote that "of the cities of the East there is none which can be compared with Batavia for beauty, cleanliness of buildings, and the beauty of its shady canals, the ornamentation of its straight street and roads as well as the largeness of its far-flung trade".¹¹⁰

However, only ten years after his *magnum opus* extolled them, the beauty and glory of Batavia had deteriorated and such praise was soon replaced by reproaches about how unhealthy it was. A malaria epidemic took the city by surprise in 1733, spreading death among the inhabitants.¹¹¹ If Batavia had been quite a healthy city until the 1720s, in the 1730s its mortality rate surpassed that of the European cities. Every year more than 2000 Europeans died; many of them new immigrants who had just arrived in Batavia. In 1734 a general day of prayer and fasting was declared to beseech God to lift this plague from the city. The disease did not abate and carried away Governor-General Dirk van Cloon (1732-1735).¹¹² The insalubrity of Batavia was on a par with or even worse than such a notorious plague hole as Calcutta in India.¹¹³ No wonder its nickname 'Queen of the East' was transformed into that of the 'Graveyard of the East'.

The malaria epidemic of 1733 was not the only reason that Batavia was such a hotbed of disease. Certainly it did act as a trigger, but the insalubrity of Batavia had its roots in the ecological deterioration which had been taking place in the Ommelanden ever since the second

¹⁰⁹ Anthony Reid, "The Structure of Cities in Southeast Asia, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries", in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1980, pp. 235-250.

¹¹⁰ François Valentijn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien* (originally published in 1724), edited by S. Keijzer, Vol. 3 (Amsterdam, 1862), p. 510 as cited in James L. Cobban, *The City on Java: An Essay in Historical Geography* (PhD dissertation: University of California, Berkeley, 1970), p. 88.

¹¹¹ Before 1733, 500-700 Company employees died in Batavia every year as a consequence of various diseases such as typhus, malaria, dysentery, beriberi and others. After 1733, this number rose to 2000-3000 employees per year and this was mainly caused by the malaria epidemic. See P.H. van der Brug, "Malaria in Batavia in the 18th century", in *Tropical Medicine and International Health*, Vol. 2, No. 9, September 1997, p. 893.

¹¹² M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, third edition* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), p. 118.

¹¹³ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 30.

half of the seventeenth century. This huge deterioration in health in Batavia did not happen overnight; it was the direct result of the reckless exploitation of the hinterland, which was ruthlessly pursued without any consideration for the balance of nature. It is unfortunate that the economic activities of the town were subjected mainly to the business interests of the VOC and no second thought was spared for the long-term growth of the city itself.

Several explanations have been given for the ecological deterioration and insanitary conditions in Batavia. Leonard Blussé argues that the deterioration of the Batavian environment which began in the 1730s was not caused by the Dutch layout of the city or any natural disaster; it was primarily the rampaging growth in the activities of the sugar industry in the Ommelanden. The rapid expansion of the acreage of cane-fields and the number of sugar-mills in the Ommelanden had ushered in large-scale deforestation and altered the features of the natural irrigation systems in this region until ultimately the tipping point of its ecological balance was reached. The shortage of water and water pollution only became apparent in the late 1720s. Blussé regards the water pollution and the breakdown in water management as the main reasons for the outbreaks of epidemics and the very high mortality rates in Batavia in the eighteenth century. He also argues that the environmental decline was the result of the absence of a properly functioning institutional framework.¹¹⁴

Another explanation is offered by P.H. van der Brug, who argues that malaria was the main factor behind the insanitariness of Batavia. The mosquitoes which are the vectors of malaria belong to the species *Anopheles Sundaicus*, a saltwater species which breeds in brackish waters near the seashore and it was quite clear that the high mortality was restricted to the coastal areas. The mosquitoes could easily find their way into the walled city since they bred in the fishponds surrounding it. These fishponds were first laid out by Javanese fishermen in 1729 but, because saltwater fishponds take several years to construct, the fishermen do not seem to have begun to use them until 1733. In the same year, Batavia was scourged by a virulent malaria epidemic and thousands of native people and European immigrants died.¹¹⁵

In his article about Batavian agricultural expansion and the environmental management of the Ommelanden, H.E. Niemeijer argues that the insanitariness of Batavia and its immediate environs could largely be blamed on the increasing number of dams in the Ommelanden.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17 and 27.

¹¹⁵ P.H. van der Brug, *Malaria en malaise – De VOC in Batavia in de achttiende eeuw* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1994). See also van der Brug, “Malaria in Batavia in the 18th century”, pp. 895-898.

Many of these dams were considered illegal because they were built without any permission from the *Heemraden*. Their purpose was to divert the main stream of the Ciliwung for agricultural purposes. The rub was that, since they had been constructed without any co-ordination and their number were legion, their construction weakened the current of the Ciliwung, even bringing it to a halt when it entered the city.¹¹⁶ The upshot was that the canals inside in the *intramuros* dried up and seawater began to seep into the town, eventually providing an ideal breeding ground for *Anopheles Sundaicus*.

The explanations above shed light on the relationship between the economic expansion of Batavia into its hinterland and ecological deterioration. As the Company headquarters, eighteenth-century Batavia was basically a Dutch city with a physical appearance and administration more similar to the cities in the Netherlands than to other towns in Indonesia. It had to contend with a host of environmental problems such as pollution, deforestation, and a shortage of fresh water as did many cities in Western Europe. As in Batavia, the ecological deterioration of many Western European cities was also attributable to un-co-ordinated pre-modern industrial activities.

Nevertheless, Batavia was different from its European counterparts in the sense that its citizens did not enjoy any political power or privilege. The city administration was firmly under the control of the High Government and the VOC denied Batavia the opportunity to take care of its own affairs. This hegemonic attitude of the colonial government made it difficult for Batavia to grow into a real city. As far as the Company was concerned, Batavia was first and foremost its headquarters and, as a consequence, some important issues which might have helped the city to overcome its problems were never paid proper attention.

One of the main causes of the poor quality of health in Batavia was the lack of freshwater and concomitant water pollution. There were many sources of water pollution in Batavia: direct discharges by local industry; sewage; and landfills. But one major source of pollution came from sources that were difficult to determine, and therefore difficult to control. During the dry season, the current in the canals would stop and stagnate. The city government did take action to prevent the water pollution and to try to guarantee the water supply, but failed to recognize the real problems.

¹¹⁶ Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", pp. 11-14.

The main source of fresh water for Batavia was the Ciliwung. As with most rivers in Southeast Asia, the Ciliwung is relatively short, with a total length of less than 120 km. Throughout the VOC period, almost all of the urban inhabitants obtained their drinking water from this river. Anything that was dumped into the Ciliwung upstream would obviously pollute the waterways in town in the early period of Batavia, industrial activities and agriculture were concentrated along the Ciliwung. Almost all of the waste produced by these undertakings ended up in this river. It is easy to imagine what a negative impact this had on the quality of fresh water which was delivered to the city

Another waste product also tossed into the Ciliwung was human faeces which also contaminated the river. The inhabitants of Batavia and the Ommelanden used river and canals as open sewers and therefore the stench emanating from the waterways during the dry season was horrendous. Many citizens fell victim to such gastro-intestinal diseases as dysentery and cholera.¹¹⁷ This problem lasted until the twentieth century, when people began to boil their drinking water before consuming it. Nevertheless, the practice of using waterways as an open sewer still continues today, especially in the poorer parts of the urban areas of Jakarta.

The urban government tried to protect Batavia from industrial pollution by concentrating the dirtiest industries in a special quarter outside the city. In the Ommelanden, this quarter was located along the Molenvliet. The water of this canal flowed directly into Batavia so it could conveniently facilitate the transportation of industrial products. There were some industries situated along the Molenvliet such as flour-mills, saw-mills, brickworks, and lime kilns.¹¹⁸ Despite all best intentions, this centralization of industry could not protect Batavia against water pollution, because, besides its obvious possibilities as a transportation artery, the Molenvliet also supplied the industrial works with water and carried away their waste.

Figures from 1696 show that there were sixteen sugar-mills located along the Ciliwung. This number was surpassed by the sugar-mills which were lined up along the Sunter (36 mills) and the Pesangrahan River (26 mills).¹¹⁹ Even though their numbers seem modest compared to these latter figures, we should not underestimate the negative effects of these sixteen mills on the water of Ciliwung. In the first half of the eighteenth century, when the forested areas along

¹¹⁷ Dysentery and cholera are contagious diseases, transmitted through direct contact, or indirect contact by way of infected food, utensils and water. See Peter Boomgaard, "Morbidity and Mortality in Java, 1820-1880: Changing Patterns of Disease and Death", in Norman G. Owen (ed.), *Death and Disease in Southeast Asia. Explorations in Social Medical and Demographic History* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 52.

¹¹⁸ De Haan, *Oud Batavia*, Vol. I, p. 390.

¹¹⁹ See table 3 in Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", p. 7.

the river decreased considerably, many of these mills were relocated to other places. The *Heemraden's* inventory of 1767 reveals that, among the eighty-two sugar-mills in the Ommelanden, only six were situated on the banks of this river. According to this inventory, twenty-two mills were sited along the Cisadane River, twelve on the banks of the Bekasi River and the rest were spread over the banks of rivers and canals in the surrounding areas of Batavia.¹²⁰ These two inventories lead to the conclusion that in the eighteenth century, although their fuel requirements had caused the removal of all the forests along their banks, perhaps the sugar-mills were not the main cause of the lack of water and water pollution in Batavia.

Other rural industries besides the sugar-mills were located on the banks of the Ciliwung: arak distilleries; brick- and tile-works, and lime kilns. All of these industries must surely also have contributed to the water pollution. Conceivably, their activities had even had more detrimental effects because, in contrast to the sugar-mills which operated only during the sugar harvesting season, these industries were fully operational throughout the year.

Since the waterways inside the walled city were connected to the network of canals in the Ommelanden, it is also possible that the source of water pollution came from the industries located along the Molenvliet, the Krukut River, and the Grogol River in the areas surrounding Batavia.¹²¹ Besides polluting the water, these pre-modern industries also polluted the air with their smoke. The process of baking bricks and tiles and burning lime in the kilns gave off a thin smoke and, when the wind blew towards the city, this smoke caused air pollution.

Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ciliwung continued to function as the main source of water for many rice- and cane-fields located in the south of the Ommelanden. The construction of new canals connected the Ciliwung with other rivers and provided irrigation to those estates which were not located close the riverside. These canal connections also diverted large quantities of water from the river, thereby reducing its level. Conditions worsened when private landowners built dams to secure an adequate supply of water for their own estates.

In 1732, Governor-General Diderik Durven ordered the construction of the Mokervaart to solve the water supply in the Ommelanden.¹²² This canal was planned to connect the Krukut and the Grogol Rivers and provide irrigation for the estates located between Fort Vijfhoek and

¹²⁰ ANRI, RCH No. 30, 24 January 1767, fol. 380.

¹²¹ See table 5 and 6 in Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", p. 9.

¹²² Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 28.

Fort Rijswijk. The Mokervaart did eventually indeed increase the volume of water supply to Batavia but it failed to create better water circulation. This canal actually even brought in additional deposits of mud, the result of soil erosion, and thereby speeded the silting up process.

Blussé argues that the construction of the Mokervaart was the tipping point for the spread of malaria epidemic in 1733. This was because the stagnant water offered the mosquitoes an ideal breeding ground. Almost all of the canal workers died in harness and the canal was not completed until years later.¹²³ If we combine his argument with those of Van der Brug and Niemeijer, the inescapable conclusion is that the malaria epidemic in Batavia was a result of a series of interconnected factors. These arguments complement each other and provide a better explanation for the insanitariness of the city. To this explanation, we can add such factors as the lack of knowledge about the ecological characteristics of Batavia and the lax control of economic activities in the Ommelanden. Undoubtedly these also contributed to the ecological deterioration of the city and its immediate surroundings.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER THREE

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

The time has now arrived to explore the origins of the people of the Ommelanden and find out how the local administration in the environs of Batavia was formed. At the time city was established, no definitive form of government existed in its environs and therefore the colonial government had to invent a completely new administrative model. In the long run, a combination of the Company interests and the ethnic diversity of the inhabitants ultimately determined the nature of administration which was created. Following the blueprint of local administration in the Dutch Republic, authority in the Ommelanden was represented by the *Heemraden* and the *landdrosten*. The administration at the *kampung* level was entrusted to the hands of *kampung* headmen. It would have been an uphill battle to run the daily administration without the collaboration of these local officers.

1. The origin of the Ommelanden people

Governor-General Jan Pieterzoon Coen occupied Jayakarta on 20 May 1619 and thereupon proceeded to transform it into the Company general rendezvous in Asia. With the weight of being the founder of Batavia resting on his shoulders, his first thought was that the town needed a large workforce to back up the salaried Company personnel if it were to be transformed into a properly functioning centre for the Intra-Asian trading network. The expelled native inhabitants of Jayakarta fled west to Banten with their ruler or east to the interior of Java and were therefore of no use as a potential workforce. At this early stage, the Dutch had a great deal of difficulty in identifying the difference between the Bantenese, the Sundanese, and the Javanese, but felt quite secure after this exodus. There was a general feeling that the new town and its immediate environs were no longer peopled by its erstwhile native inhabitants who could be construed as a possible threat. It was walking on eggshells. Two large-scale attacks launched on the town by Mataram in 1628 and 1629 and the chronic recurrence of hostilities with Banten were the chief reasons the Company felt it had to deal

carefully with the Javanese, keeping them at arm's length. As a consequence, for a few decades after the foundation of the city the Company had to depend on people who moved in from often far distant places to populate Batavia. In 1705, Cornelis Chastelein reported that not a single descendant of the original population of Jakarta was still living in the Ommelanden. They had all been taken along by the Bantenese during the siege of the town in 1619.¹²⁴

Although the city of Batavia was a Dutch colonial settlement, Europeans always formed a minority. The *Heeren XVII* rejected Coen's plan to turn Batavia into a colony run by free European citizens. The implementation of that plan would have meant that these *vrijburgers* could trade on their own account and might therefore develop into putative rivals in the Company monopolies in trade. Another reason the Company was thrown back onto its dependence on Asian human resources was the huge distance separating the new colony from the Netherlands. This distance could only be bridged by a long dangerous voyage lasting at least six months. The majority of the population of Batavia, therefore, consisted of Asians from inside and outside the Indonesian Archipelago.

Among the first settlers in Batavia were the Chinese. They had created a settlement of their own in Jayakarta even before the arrival of the Dutch. Besides the Chinese, there also were many Indians who originated from the Malabar and Coromandel Coasts. Some of these Indians were free traders or soldiers, but most of them had been purchased and transported to Batavia as slaves on Company ships. Other settlers, the so called *Papangers*, had come to Batavia from the Philippines as prisoners-of-war. In the early period of Batavia, a number of immigrants also came from Japan, until the Tokugawa shogunate forbade migration in 1635 and effectively closed off the island empire.¹²⁵ Chinese sojourners continued to arrive in Batavia, even though the Chinese emperor also placed restrictions on and finally prohibited overseas migration in various ways. Beside these groups of people from outside the Archipelago, various indigenous ethnic groups from within Nusantara had also begun to populate the Ommelanden since the 1650s.

Initially, the city of Batavia and its surrounding territory produced hardly any food for local consumption. In order to redress this omission, the first priority of the Company was to develop the immediate hinterland, a move which entailed that it had to set about populating

¹²⁴ Cornelis Chastelein, "Batavia in het begin der achttiende eeuw", in *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië*, New Series Vol. 5, 1876, pp. 178-179.

¹²⁵ Gooszen, *Population Census*, p. 1.

the Ommelanden with farmers. Since Coen's plan to build Batavia as a European colony had been rejected by the *Heeren XVII*, obviously people had to be brought in from elsewhere in Asia to settle around the town. As the local rulers in Java were hostile, the Company preferred to populate the Ommelanden with people from far away who would be less menacing. Hence, mirroring the situation inside the city walls, in the very early years the majority of the population of the Ommelanden consisted of various ethnicities from outside Java.

As a logic consequence of the precarious security situation, the extent of the early settlement of the Ommelanden was very closely related to the degree to which the safety of settlers could be guaranteed. As long as Batavian government could not provide adequate protection for the area surrounding the city, life for settlers in this region was always going to be living on a knife edge. Therefore, during the first few decades after it had been established, the immediate environs of Batavia were cleared of forests, removing any potential cover for unexpected attacks from either Banten or Mataram. In 1636, for instance, some years after it had been successfully defended against the attacks by Mataram, the land to the east of the city was cleared of undergrowth and burned off for the length of about half a Dutch mile. Ten years later, when the government had been reassured by the signing of a peace treaty with Banten, the Ommelanden were considered safe and could be settled at will by those inhabitants who chose to do so. However, westwards the peace with Banten was short-lived. In 1656, hostilities between Banten and the Company broke out anew and, as a precautionary measure, the Batavian government felt itself forced to expell all male Javanese inhabitants residing in the city. This policy remained in force even after the cessation of hostilities. Javanese were required to reside in four specified *kampung* in the Ommelanden, where they were supervised by their own headmen.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ H.E. Niemeijer, "The free Asian Christian community and poverty in pre-modern Batavia", in Grijns and Nas (eds.), *Jakarta-Batavia*, p. 77.



Illustration 1: The killing of Chinese prisoners in the backyard of the Batavia City Hall

Source: A. Heuken, *Historical Sites of Jakarta* (Jakarta: Cipta Loka Caraka, 2007), p. 91.

This policy of expelling a group of people who was regarded as a potential threat to the existence of the city was repeated in 1740 when the Chinese rebellion broke out in the Ommelanden in early October. As it was feared that the Chinese living inside the city might conspire with the rebels, thousands of them were slaughtered by their Asian and European fellow townsmen in a week-long pogrom. After that year, the Chinese were no longer allowed to live inside the city walls, but were obliged to take up residence in the *Chinesche kamp*, a China town outside the city walls.

The Company reaped various advantages from its decision to populate the Ommelanden with Asian people of different ethnic backgrounds. Militarily the move offered the benefit that the inhabitants of the settlements around the city could be called up as soldiers in the event of sudden attacks by either Banten or Mataram. They could also be recruited as auxiliary troops for the armed expeditions mounted by the Company. This was a great saving since these troops only had to be put on the army pay-rolls during any military campaigns. Economically, the presence of inhabitants in the *kampung* around the city boosted the efforts of the Company to make Batavia into a self-sufficient city, because they could be set to work to supply Batavia with agricultural products. Most of them were indeed employed in agricultural occupations, earning a living as workers in the nascent sugar industry, as market gardeners, or as paddy-planters. Tax-wise, the increase in the Ommelanden population at the end of the seventeenth

century was closely related to the contemporary sugar boom in the world market. Every sugar-mill operating in the Ommelanden had to pay taxes. The cultivation of paddy was later also a ready source of taxes-in-kind. Every paddy plantation owner was required to deliver 10 per cent of the paddy harvest to the Company warehouses.

People in the Ommelanden were divided into various categories on the basis of their ethnic background. The first consisted of the local Company soldiers, both active and retired. Among the first groups of Indonesian soldiers who arrived in the Ommelanden in 1656 were the Ambonese. Their commander at that time was Captain Tahalele from the island of Luhu in the Moluccas. Before their arrival in Batavia, they had been part of the military expeditionary force under Commander Arnout de Vlamingh van Outshoorn, which finally ended the war which had been raging in Ambon on and off since the 1630s.¹²⁷ Among these soldiers was the famous Captain Jonker of Manipa, who replaced Tahalele as the commander of the Ambonese in 1658. Although the Ambonese Captain and his followers often participated in military expeditions abroad, the Company provided them with a large chunk of land located some distance to the east of the city, in the coastal region named Marunda. Jonker and his band were required to settle there as a group and form their own *kampung*.

Nevertheless, the first group of Indonesian people who came to Batavia from elsewhere in the Indonesian Archipelago were not soldiers. They were the Bandanese who was brought there soon after Jan Pieterzoon Coen's conquest of their homeland in 1621. The Company provided them with a place to live in a quarter located close by the eastern side of the city walls. This quarter was also occupied by the Japanese, Papangers (people from the Philippines), and other free Asian inhabitants.¹²⁸ The settlement of Ambonese soldiers in 1656 was immediately followed by those of bands of warriors from Makassar, the Bugis kingdoms, and Bali. They also were required to settle in groups in the Ommelanden and were granted areas of land on which to establish a *kampung*.

Apart from these indigenous soldiers, another significant section of the Ommelanden population was composed of slaves and manumitted slaves who had been imported from various places and therefore had different ethnic origins. In the early years of Batavia, most of the slaves working there had originated from the Indian Subcontinent. The Coromandel Coast and Bengal were the two main regions from which these slaves, most of whom had been

¹²⁷ Raben, "Round about Batavia", p. 95.

¹²⁸ F. de Haan, *Oud Batavia*, vol. I (Batavia: G. Kolff, 1922), p. 96.

converted to Christianity by their Dutch masters, were imported. *Mardijker*¹²⁹ was the term used by the Company to label these freed Christian slaves. Information about the early history of Mardijker settlements around the town of Batavia is fairly scant, but it seems that they already opted for the Dutch side during the time at which Banten was laying siege to the fortress of Jayakarta in 1619. In 1628, it was noted that there were two companies of infantry formed by Mardijkers deployed against the troops of Mataram.¹³⁰ The Mardijkers from South Asia used the Portuguese Creole language as their lingua franca and under VOC law they were permitted to dress as Europeans because of their status as Christians. As dark-skinned Indians predominated in the population, the Dutch also began to refer to the manumitted slaves as *vrije swarten* or free blacks.¹³¹ In the 1691 census, the Mardijker population in the Ommelanden was estimated at 6,181,¹³² in 1722 their number had increased to 7,156,¹³³ but by 1739 it had dropped to 5,247.¹³⁴

In the second half of the seventeenth century, islands in the Indonesian Archipelago also began to supply Batavia with a growing number of slaves. It was financially more advantageous to the Company to purchase slaves from within the Archipelago as it only took a couple of weeks to transport them, compared to the passage of South Asian slaves which often took several months. Besides these logistical considerations, in Indonesia itself traditionally there had always been thriving slave markets. In the Archipelago, the VOC did not purchase or transport slaves on its own ships but was supplied by Indonesian, Chinese or Dutch free merchants who delivered the slaves in Batavia on their own ships. One of the biggest exporters of slaves in the Archipelago was the island of Bali where the local *rajas* were eager to dispose of their surplus population. After the conquest of Makassar in 1661, this port city also became a major supplier of slaves for Batavia. Company law forbade the taking of the slaves from among the Javanese because the High Government did not want to offend the neighbouring rulers and for fear that they might conspire against the Europeans.¹³⁵ In contrast

¹²⁹ Mardijker is an Old Dutch rendering of the Portuguese version of *Mahardbika* (Sanskrit for 'great man,' 'high and mighty') and which acquired the meaning of a free person in Indonesia. See Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia*, p. 47.

¹³⁰ Paramita R. Abdurachman, *Bunga Angin Portugis di Nusantara. Jejak-jejak Kebudayaan Portugis di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LIPI and Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2008), p. 32

¹³¹ Niemeijer, "Slavery, Ethnicity and the Economic Independence of Women", p. 181.

¹³² Gooszen, *Population Census*, p. 93.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

¹³⁵ Susan Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 21.

to the *Mardijkers*, the slaves who came from the Indonesian Archipelago and were the property of non-Christian slave owners tended to convert to Islam when they were freed. It is difficult to estimate their number because as soon as they were manumitted, they would mix with the *kampung* population in the Ommelanden with whom there was no religious barrier.

Free immigrants who chose to settle in Batavia for economic and political reasons formed a significant part of the population. Chinese immigrants were attracted by the economic opportunities offered by the Ommelanden. Batavia was a major trading centre for Chinese merchants. The Company allowed indeed even encouraged, Chinese merchants to conduct their commercial activities freely in Batavia, because the merchandise which they brought from China was required by the local population or, in the case of silk or tea, was a useful component in the Company trade with Europe. The Chinese played a crucial role in the development of Batavia from its very foundation, so much so that Batavia was in many respects as much a Chinese colonial town as a Western one. From the last quarter of the seventeenth century, most of the Chinese migrants were workers who sought employment in the rapidly developing sugar industry in the Ommelanden. The *Heemraden* censuses show that the Chinese formed one of the biggest ethnicities in this area. In 1689 their number amounted to 2,342,¹³⁶ in 1719 this had increased to 7,550,¹³⁷ and in 1739 there were some 10,574¹³⁸ registered Chinese were living in the Ommelanden. The Chinese sojourners earned their living as traders, carpenters and other craftsmen, sugar entrepreneurs, workers in the sugar industry, coolies employed in construction, and as dock workers.

Other free migrants who flowed in large numbers were the Javanese, the majority of whom came from the Mataram provinces and Cirebon in the east or from Banten in the west. They were also settled in the Company-controlled areas around Batavia or on vacant land at the foot of the mountains in the south of the Ommelanden. Some worked as peasants who cleared the virgin territory and transformed it into paddy-fields; others were seasonal workers who hired themselves out in groups as labourers in the sugar industry, cattle herders, or wood-cutters felling trees and selling timber to Batavia. In the Dutch sources, the Javanese labourers are referred to as *bujang* (Malay, literary meaning 'bachelor'). In their attempts to control the waves of Javanese migrants and seasonal workers, the colonial administration tried to gain some

¹³⁶ Gooszen, *Population Census*, p. 93.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

overview by concentrating them in specific areas. This proved to be a hopeless task since the Javanese roamed all over the countryside and settled where they pleased; whether on waste ground or on the land which belonged to private owners, or even on the Company land.

The smallest ethnic groups in the Ommelanden were the Europeans¹³⁹ and the Mestizos, Christian people of mixed European and Asian descent. Europeans, particularly women, in Batavia and certainly also in the Ommelanden were mostly of Asian birth or descent on the maternal side and, over time, this mixed parentage was the ethnic background of many Company employees of all ranks.¹⁴⁰ Although Europeans and Mestizos never accounted for more than 3 per cent of the total population, they enjoyed high social status and played important roles in the economy. All the positions in the *Heemraden* were occupied by Dutchmen, so it was normal that the interests of this group in the Ommelanden took priority.

2. *Settlement patterns and kampung development*

When the Dutch visited Jayakarta for the first time in 1596, they found a small urban settlement clustered at the mouth of the Ciliwung River. There were around 3,000 dwelling in the town, all of them constructed of wood and bamboo. The residence of the *Pangeran* Jayakarta, the ruler of the port town and vassal of the sultan of Banten, the mosque, and the market were located on the western bank of the river.¹⁴¹ The indigenous settlements were concentrated on the eastern bank of the Ciliwung, opposite to the palace of the *Pangeran*. A tiny Chinese town was located close to the eastern side of the mouth of the Ciliwung River.

In 1610, the first Company trading post in Jayakarta, named Nassau, was built in the immediate vicinity of the Chinese settlement. Three years after its establishment, it was entirely rebuilt in stone. In 1617 a second building was added. To protect these buildings the Company constructed walls three feet thick. Protected in this walled trading post, the Dutch survived the attacks of the coalition army of Jayakarta, Banten, and the English before they were able to establish Batavia in 1619.

¹³⁹ In the course of time, the majority of so-called Dutchmen in Batavia and the Ommelanden were really Eurasian. It was a common practice for Company servants in Batavia to recognize their offspring by Asian women legally. They had little hesitation about marrying Eurasians or Asians. See Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History*, p. 20.

¹⁴⁰ Kerry Ward, *Networks of Empire. Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 86.

¹⁴¹ H.A. Breuning, *Het voormalige Batavia: Een Hollandse stedestichting in de Tropen, Anno 1619* (Amsterdam: Allert de Lange, 1954), p. 13.

The arrival of the Dutch changed the layout of the city fundamentally. A concept of town planning, foreign to Indonesian culture, was introduced and the former town once dominated by wooden and bamboo structures were transformed into a fortified city built of stone and bricks, with tiled roofs. All of the indigenous settlements clustered along the banks of Ciliwung were demolished, since the Batavian government deemed it wise to depopulate the areas around the city walls to prevent sudden attacks from local enemies. In the founding period of Batavia hardly any indigenous settlements were left standing in its immediate surroundings. The inhabitants of Batavia lived safely inside the walls. As a consequence, during the earliest years of its existence the emerging city remained cut off from its hinterland. It was basically an enclave more accessible by sea than by land.

The isolation of Batavia did not last long. The high density of population inside the city wall, the Company efforts to provide proper protection, and the agricultural potential of the Ommelanden were the three main factors which pushed people to move into the areas surrounding the city. Although this move outside the city walls had already commenced in the 1630s, extensive settlement only began by the end of seventeenth. By 1689, the total number of settlers in the environs of Batavia amounted to 45,550,¹⁴² already more than double the 20,051 people living in the inner city.¹⁴³

Batavia Castle was built at the water's edge, a position from where it could control the harbour. It was the headquarters of the VOC. Ships anchored in the bay and unloaded travellers and goods onto the local craft used as lighters and operated by Malays, Javanese, and Chinese. Batavia only achieved its characteristic shape as a castle town after it had survived two sieges by the armies of Mataram in 1628-1629. The process of fortification and the building of the city walls had been completed by the end of the 1630s. Early in that decade, the Ciliwung which dissected the town was straightened and canalized. The area covered by the walls of the inner city of Batavia was not large, only 1 by 1.5 km.¹⁴⁴ The walled city stretched out in rectangular blocks of houses, intersected by canals on both sides of the Ciliwung. European residences were concentrated in the east, while most of Asian and indigenous dwellings were located in the west. The population in the inner city was already very dense even before the end of the seventeenth century. According to the census of 1673, the total

¹⁴² Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 322.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

¹⁴⁴ P.H. van der Brug, "Unhealthy Batavia and the decline of the VOC in the eighteenth century", in Grijns and Nas (eds.), *Jakarta-Batavia*, p. 45.

number of the population including suburbs amounted to 27,051, in 1680 30,740, and by 1684 the number had increased to 32,243.¹⁴⁵

Institutionally, Batavia was a Dutch city in Asia because many of its civil institutions closely resembled those in contemporary Dutch cities.¹⁴⁶ These bodies included the *College van Schepenen* (Board of Aldermen), the *College van Weesmeesteren* (Board of Governors of the Orphanage), the *Raad van Justitie* (Court of Justice), and the *College van Heemraden* (the District Council). Despite all these governing bodies, this high concentration of population created problems in town. To give but one example, the densely packed housing was a huge hazard in the event of fire. In 1622, many Chinese cottages built of wood and bamboo in the eastern part of the city burned down. Another great fire broke out in 1657, which destroyed some fifty houses in the western quarter. Ten years later, the government decreed that no more bamboo dwellings would be permitted throughout the entire city.¹⁴⁷

This obvious consequence of this regulation was that poor people who could not afford to build or rent houses constructed of stone or brick had no choice but to move *extramuros*. Many Chinese, *Mardijkers*, and *Moors* (Indian Muslims) moved out and formed dominant populations in their new quarters in the eastern, southwestern, and western suburbs. Initially there was no special quarter for the Chinese. Only after the Chinese massacre of 1740 did the government decide to build a *Chinesche kamp* or China town in an area located southwest of the city walls. The *Moors* had their own special quarter known as *Pekojan*.¹⁴⁸ This quarter was located outside of the west wall of Batavia between *Bacherachtgracht* and *Amanusgracht*. The name *Pekojan* is derived from the word *koja*, a term for Muslim immigrants from the Malabar Coast and Coromandel.¹⁴⁹ Most of the *Mardijkers* resided on the swampy land opened up across the river by the southeast gate of the city, where they built a church which was known for centuries as the Portuguese church (now *Gereja Sion*) since the services were held in that language.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ Gooszen, *Population Census*, pp. 23-24.

¹⁴⁶ F.S. Gaastra, "The Organization of the VOC", in Remco Raben and J.C.M. Pennings (eds.), *The archives of the Dutch East India Company* ('s-Gravenhage: algemeen Rijksarchief, 1992), p. 27.

¹⁴⁷ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 19.

¹⁴⁸ Few records mentioned Moorish settlers had lived there, but the survival of *Al Anshor* mosque dating back to 1648 and *Masjid Kampung Baru* to 1748 record their existence.

¹⁴⁹ De Haan, *Oud Batavia*, vol. I, pp. 486-487.

¹⁵⁰ Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History*, p. 31.



Illustration 2: Outer Portuguese Church

Source: Max de Bruijn and Bast Kist, *Johannes Rach 1720-1783, Artist in Indonesia and Asia* (Jakarta: National Library of Indonesia, 2001), p. 58.

The Company always gave the highest priority to the security of Batavia. Threats could come either from inside or outside. All indigenous and non-European inhabitants who lived *intramuros* were obliged to reside in specific *wijken* or quarters under the supervision of *wijkmeesteren* or quartermasters. When Bantenese warriors invaded the countryside around Batavia in 1656, the Company issued a ban on all Javanese in the inner city. After that, Javanese settlements were located near the fort of Jacatra on the bank of the Krukut River, outside the Dietspoort, and outside the Utrecht Gate.¹⁵¹

In order to exercise effective supervision of the Javanese, the colonial government divided their settlements into two groups. Those who settled east of the Ciliwung were called *ooster-Javanen* and those residing west of the river were called *wester-Javanen*. These people were placed under the command of their own officials and the leader of each section was awarded the military title of Javanese Captain. In the performance of their duties, the Javanese Captains were assisted by lower-ranking Javanese officers.

To keep Batavia secure, the Company also decided to concentrate other indigenous settlements outside the city walls. By forcibly locating their residences in the Ommelanden, the

¹⁵¹ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 166.

colonial administration could rid the city of potentially harmful elements. The other purpose was to protect Batavia from direct attacks by the armies of local Javanese rulers. By arranging indigenous settlements at various corners of the city defences, the obvious strategy was that, if war broke out, these settlements could be used as a frontline defence before the enemy warriors could reach the city walls.

The Ambonese soldiers who arrived in 1656 were given land close to the outer Company forts. In 1663, a group of Bugis under Arung Patudju was granted a piece of land by the side of River Krukut.¹⁵² The Makassarese was settled on the northern side of the Amanusgracht in 1673.¹⁵³ In 1687 another group of Bugis was placed “under supervision of Fort Anke” on the northern side of the Bacherachtsgracht.¹⁵⁴

These Indonesian settlements in the environs of Batavia were called *kampung*. All of them were administered by their own headmen. The establishment of *kampung* composed of communities of the same ethnic origin was part and parcel of the Company strategy to facilitate the administration of indigenous people. Nowadays, some districts in Jakarta still bear names like Kampung Ambon, Kampung Makassar, Kampung Bali, and Kampung Bandan. The policy of settling such ethnic groups as Makassarese, Bugis, and Madurese in separate *kampung* around the city was not restricted to Batavia, but was also pursued in other towns along the north coast of Java.¹⁵⁵ There was no obvious pattern in the arrangement of *kampung* in the Ommelanden, everything depended on the availability of vacant land.

The basis of the administrative and land-allotment system was the donation of a plot of land to an indigenous headman, thereby presenting him with a means to earn a living for himself and his fellow-countrymen. These *kampung* were usually clustered around the six small forts (*redoubt*) which formed an outer line of the defence of the city at a distance of one to two kilometres. The initiative of establishing *kampung* was not confined to the side of the Company; the indigenous leaders were also eager to undertake such an enterprise. The Balinese Captain Lampiedja and his people submitted a request to occupy the Company land on the western bank of the Grogol River in 1687.¹⁵⁶ Around about the same time, a group of Bugis people under the command of Jourobassa (*juru babasa*/translator) also submitted a

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 169.

¹⁵³ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 2, p. 567.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 197.

¹⁵⁵ Luc Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch Tiger. The Dutch East Indies Company and the northeast coast of Java, 1680-1743* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), pp. 93-94.

¹⁵⁶ ANRI, Resolutie College van Heemraden (RCH) No. 5, 14 February 1687.

petition to be allowed to occupy a plot of the Company land at Cengkareng,¹⁵⁷ and the Balinese Captain Tiben proposed to create a *kampung* on the bank of the Sunter River.¹⁵⁸

Since the government had no good survey of its own land in the Ommelanden at its disposal, the allocation was somewhat irregular and tended to progress in fits and starts. A list of night watches in various Indonesian quarters in the Ommelanden gives some impression of the location of the *kampung*. The list forms part of the *Heemraden* Resolution of 24 June 1730 which decreed that each indigenous leader in the various *kampung* had to organize a night patrol in his own quarter.¹⁵⁹

Table 2: Location of several kampungs in the Ommelanden

People	Leader	Location
Javanese	Captain Soeta Wangsa	Mangga Doea
Ambonese	Captain Zacharias Bintang	Mangga Doea
Balinese	Captain Achmat Katewel	Pisang Batoe
Javanese	Captain Bagoes Mantoe	Pageraman
Ambonese	Lieutenant Warnar Abrahams	North of the Amanusgracht
Makassarese	Vaandrig Daeng Mabella	North of the Amanusgracht
Bugis	Captain Barak	North of the Bacherachtgracht and close to Fort Sevenhoek
Balinese	Captain Gusti Cutut	North of the Bacherachtgracht and close to Fort Sevenhoek
Balinese	Vaandrig Soedjaja	South of the Bacheracgracht and beyond Fort Vijfhoek
Balinese	Captain Rangin	North of the Bacherachtgracht and below the Fort Vijfhoek
Bugis	Captain To Issa	Patoeakan

¹⁵⁷ ANRI, RCH No. 5, 12 January 1687.

¹⁵⁸ ANRI, RCH No. 5, 10 May 1687.

¹⁵⁹ ANRI, RCH No. 19, 24 Juny 1730. For the information about the location of various *kampung* two decades earlier see Niemeijer, *Batavia, Een koloniale samenleving*, pp. 101-102.

Balinese	Lieutenant Achmat Babandam	Alongside of the Molenvliet
Javanese	Lieutenant Bagus Carta	Buiten de Boom/Outside the Boom on the Molenvliet

Not all of the *kampung* in the Ommelanden are listed in this table. Prominent omissions are the Butonese *kampung* which was located to the south of the Ancolsevaart,¹⁶⁰ the Bandanese *Kampung* on the northern side of the same canal,¹⁶¹ and the Balinese *Kampung* under Captain Mochamat Sale in Pakodjan.¹⁶² The names of *kampung* locations in the *Heemraden* resolutions were not always written consistently, because there were multiple *kampung* named, for instance, Mangga Doea, Pisang Batoe, Pageraman, Patoekan, and Pacodjan. There also were regions which were probably broader in size than *kampung* such as those on the northern side of the Amanusgracht, the northern and southern sides of the Bacherachtgracht, the banks of the Molenvliet, and the northern and southern sides of Ancolsevaart. More than one *kampung* could be located in these areas. For instance, we do know that an Ambonese and a Makassarese *kampung* were both located north of the Amanusgracht and that Bugis and Balinese *kampung* were situated north of the Bacherachtgracht.

Another factor which heavily determined the settlement patterns in the Ommelanden was the growing interest in agricultural activities. The sugar boom which started at the end of the seventeenth century attracted hundreds of Chinese as well as large numbers of Javanese migrants from the north coast and the interior of Java, encouraging to journey to and settle down in the Ommelanden. The number of sugar-mills operating in the Ommelanden in the years 1710, 1713 and, 1734 always amounted to more than 100. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, during the harvest season a sugar-mill required between nineteen and twenty-six labourers. Using that number as a basis, we can estimate how many labourers were employed by the Ommelanden sugar-mills. For example, there were 130 sugar-mills operating in 1710. Those sugar-mills required no fewer than 2,470-3,380 labourers. That number can be doubled because a sugar-mill operated 24 hours a day during the harvest season and required at least two shifts of labourers.

¹⁶⁰ ANRI, RCH No. 15, 31 October 1722.

¹⁶¹ ANRI, RCH No. 19, 20 October 1731.

¹⁶² ANRI, RCH No. 22, 23 March 1737.

Batavian sugar labourers settled in cabins (*petak*) in the sugar-mill camps or on the land around the sugar-mill. These sugar industry workers had to be very mobile since every couple of years sugar-mills were relocated, moving farther away from the city in search of more heavily forested surroundings. In 1711 there were fifty sugar-mills located along the banks of the Ciliwung River and twenty-three on those of the Pesanggrahan River.¹⁶³ Half a century later in 1767, the number of sugar-mills at these locations had been reduced to five and nine.¹⁶⁴ The declining number of sugar-mills along both rivers after a few decades of rapid growth was undoubtedly caused by deforestation. The sugar workers were also seasonal migrants. Most of them came to work at the sugar-mills only during the harvest season. During the off-season, these labourers might either take another job in the Ommelanden, working as paddy cultivator, market gardener, cattle herder or they returned to their home villages if they were Javanese or Sundanese.

3. *Local administration*

There was no definite form of government in the original surroundings of Jayakarta prior to the establishment of the authority of the Company. The challenge was to invent a totally new administrative model to control the newly created multi-ethnic society. The Company interests and the ethnic variety of the population were the two factors which eventually determined the sort of administration created. In an economic sense, the Company needed only a restricted number of agricultural products such as sugar, rice, vegetables, timber, and cattle. All of these products, with the exception of sugar, were for home consumption only. They were required purely to provision Batavia with its necessities. The Company interest in this area was therefore closely related to the recruitment of labour for local agriculture and for the supply of soldiers from the ranks of the non-European militias. The employment of civilians as auxiliary troops in military campaigns was a legacy of the organization of contemporary Dutch cities. During the war of secession with Spain, the Eighty Years' War 1568-1648, the citizens of Dutch towns were organized into civil militias.¹⁶⁵ This practice was brought to Asia by the

¹⁶³J.K.J. de Jonge (ed.), *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indie*, Vol. 8 ('s-Gravenhage/Amsterdam: Martinus Nijhof, 1862-1888), p. 158.

¹⁶⁴ ANRI, RCH No. 30, 24 January 1767.

¹⁶⁵ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 204.

Dutch and implemented in the colonial settlement of Batavia both inside and outside the walls. The militia in town was called the *schutterij* [musketeers]

When it created a local administration in the Ommelanden, the guiding beacon governing the actions of the Company was pragmatism. The form of this administration was not decided on in the mother country and imported but was made up on the spot to suit the local conditions. The upshot was that, in many cases, local customs and usages were fused with the institutions and administrative conventions current in the Dutch Republic. To a certain extent, the Asian inhabitants, grouped in *kampung* under command of their own headmen, remained subordinate to their own laws. This method of indirect rule was the usual state of affairs found throughout all of Southeast Asia, particularly in the cosmopolitan port cities, where foreign nations were grouped under a leader of their own and allowed some degree of autonomous authority. However, the indigenous *kampung* were not completely exempt from colonial government intervention. The government control of the indigenous *kampung* was implemented by the *College van Heemraden*, the *Gecommitteerde voor de zaken der Inlanderen*, the *landdrost*, and the *nijkmeesters*. These institutions and their officials represented the Company authority at the local level. As a result, the local administration which emerged was an amalgam of Southeast Asian and Dutch customs.

It must be emphasized that, although the VOC did become a territorial power in Java, Ceylon and the Moluccas, it always remained an alien body on the fringes of Asian society, even in those regions which it administered directly.¹⁶⁶ The local administration in the Ommelanden was basically a colonial one, since the highest authority remained in the hands of the High Government of Batavia and all important decisions to do with the population in general were determined by the colonial interests. On the other hand, in daily life this administration was run at a lower level by indigenous officers who referred to their own *adat* (customs) and traditions for guidance.¹⁶⁷ As long as there were no important matters which required direct government intervention, the administration at the *kampung* level was quite similar to that in other *kampung* or villages in Indonesia. Nevertheless, although the traditional elements could be found in these *kampung*, life in them was actually considerably modified by

¹⁶⁶ C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 217.

¹⁶⁷ The term *adat* derived from Arabic and has, since the introduction of Islam, been adopted in the languages of the archipelago to signify local or regional rules, customs, usages, practices, personal habits, etc. See John Ball, *Indonesian Legal History 1602-1848* (Sydney: Oughtershaw Press, 1982), pp. 64-65.

the large presence of slaves and migrant labourers.¹⁶⁸ The Ommelanden *kampung* were societies whose homogenous character soon faded away, submerged by the increasing number of manumitted slaves and subsequent ethnic mingling.

The development of the local administration of the Ommelanden was determined by two factors: the effort considered worthwhile to have access to inhabitants who could be drafted into the expeditionary armies and the policy of leaving the daily administration in the hands of the ethnic leaders themselves. The first factor had an obvious impact on the hierarchical arrangement of the indigenous officers. In this situation, obviously a military hierarchy became the prevalent model, since most of the earliest inhabitants in the *kampung* settled in the Ommelanden after having completed a tour of duty in a military campaign. Therefore, the hierarchy of indigenous leaders closely followed that of the colonial military service. The highest title in the indigenous local administration was that of captain. He was assisted by lieutenants, *vaandrighs* (ensigns), and sergeants. The *kampung* headmen were often also the commanders of the indigenous auxiliary troops called up during the Company military campaigns.

The consequence of the second factor was that the colonial government had no direct access to ordinary people in the *kampung*. They had to deal with the indigenous headmen before their decision could have an impact on the *kampung* inhabitants. The principal intention of the Company in allowing the indigenous administration to operate at ground level was to cut costs and avoid unnecessary problems. The absence of direct control was never a big problem as long as the Ommelanden inhabitants followed and obeyed Company orders. To be the spokesman for the administration and general supervisor over the Asian nations, the High Government appointed the *Commissaris over de zaken van de inlander* (Commissioner in Charge of Native Affairs). This office was founded in 1686 when the members of the High Government Joan van Hoorn and Isaac de Saint Martin were assigned to organize the settlement of the *Inlandse* (native Indonesian) population groups in the Ommelanden.¹⁶⁹

The Chinese community in Batavia was the first group to have its own headman or Captain. Captain Souw Beng Kong (Ben Con) was appointed chief of the Chinese community in Batavia on 11 October 1620 by Governor-General Jan Pietersz Coen. ‘Captain’ in this case was simply a title and not a military rank, because the Chinese Captain had no military

¹⁶⁸ Niemeijer, “Slavery, Ethnicity and the Economic Independence of Women”, p. 187.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

function. His task was to maintain law and order and settle any civil affairs which might arise in his community. Another important task Ben Con had to shoulder was to collect a poll tax among his countrymen. This tax, called the *hoofdgeld der Chinesen*, was introduced on 9 October 1619. Every Chinese between sixteen and sixty had an obligation to pay a monthly tax amounting to 1.5 *rijksdaalders*,¹⁷⁰ which exempted them from all corvée labour and militia duties. During the first three days of each month, the Chinese Captain raised the flag in front of his house as the sign to the Chinese that they had to pay their tax. As a result, in later years the street in front of his residence was called *Jalan Tiang Bendera* (Flagpole Street). Every Chinese who paid the poll tax would receive a *vrijbriefje* (exemption permit) as proof. The institution of Chinese Captain and the Chinese poll tax were still in force at the end of the VOC era.

The colonial government complemented the Chinese administration in Batavia with institutions such as the Chinese hospital and the *College van Boedelmeesters* or the Curatorial Board. These institutions were responsible for the social welfare of the Chinese population. The number of Chinese grew exponentially throughout the seventeenth century until they became the largest ethnic group in the city. The swelling number of Chinese citizens made it necessary to appoint lower-ranking Chinese officers. From 1678, the Chinese Captains were assisted by several lieutenants, secretaries, *Chineesche wijkmeesters* (Chinese supervisors of town quarters) and other auxiliaries.¹⁷¹ Together they bore the responsibility for the collection of taxes, the taking of the annual census, and the maintenance of law and order.

Following the example of this model, in the course of time other groups of people were also organized under their own headman or captain. Hence, in the early decades of Batavia, there were Japanese, Mardijker, Malay, and Papangan Captains. Unlike the Chinese Captain, these other captains also had a military function. During the Company military campaigns they acted as commanders of the militias recruited from their own community. In times of peace, they also maintained law and order and settled civil affairs but, since the non-Chinese citizens did not have to pay a poll tax, this was one task these other captains did not have to worry about.

The earliest development of the Javanese Captain can be traced back to a decree issued on 19 January 1635, by which the Company declared that Javanese should choose their own

¹⁷⁰ Mona Lohanda, "The Inlandsche Kommandant of Batavia", in Grijns and Nas (eds.), *Jakarta-Batavia*, p. 116.

¹⁷¹ Leonard Blussé, "Kongkoan and Kongsu: Representations of Chinese Identity and Ethnicity in Early Modern Southeast Asia", in Leonard Blussé and Felipe Fernández-Armesto (eds.), *Shifting Communities and Identity Formation in Early Modern Asia* (Leiden: CNWS, 2003), p. 102.

headman to supervise the thirty Javanese households who lived inside the city walls.¹⁷² More regulation was imposed on the administration of Indonesian people when, by decree of 6 December 1678, the government divided the 'indigenous' population of Batavia into various groups, each consisting of 100 persons, under the supervision of their own officers be they lieutenants, *vaandrighs*, or sergeants.¹⁷³ Because they had arrived as warrior bands, it was not very difficult for some groups of people from Eastern Indonesia, among them Ambonese, Makassarese, and Bugis to adjust themselves to the Ommelanden administration which was based on military organization. However, it was quite a different story and required an enormous adjustment for the Javanese and Balinese who were also present in the Ommelanden in large numbers. The former had come as free migrants; the majority of the second as slaves. As civilians, without any military background, these people proved more difficult to organize and could only gradually be eased into the local administration.

The decision about whether a group would be granted separate status and hence allowed to form a *kampung* was entirely up to the colonial government. There was no standard procedure for appointing the Indonesian captains and other lower-ranking officials. They could be nominated by the government by fellow officials, by their followers, or even by individual request. As a rule, Indonesian officials in the Ommelanden were not permitted to pass on their title to their descendants, but occasionally some indigenous captains did manage to keep the prestigious position within their family. Some good examples were *Captain der Ooster-Javanen* Soeta Wangsa, the Malay Captain Encik Bagus, and the Balinese family Babandam.¹⁷⁴

4. *Authority in the Ommelanden*

Consequently, authority in the Ommelanden was exercised in a two-tier system. The first and highest was the authority vested in the colonial government; the other, subordinate to the first, was that vested in the indigenous officials. The implementation of authority was exercised through various institutions established to control natural and human resources. The actual performance of their duties by the *College van Heemraden*, the *Gecommitteerde voor de zaken der Inlandereren*, the *landdrost*, and the *landmeeter* was limited in terms of budget and potential, since

¹⁷² Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 1, p. 370.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 14.

¹⁷⁴ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 208.

they had to deal with a territory and a population which grew steadily throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth century. This would have been a virtually impossible task without recruiting indigenous headmen as part of the colonial administration and using them as formal leaders of their own ethnicity at ground level.

The Company policy was to intervene in indigenous affairs no more than was necessary to protect its own interests. Hence, its authority and administrative organization depended largely on local circumstances.¹⁷⁵ In the case of the Ommelanden, by delegation of authority through the indigenous officers, the colonial government could rule without being directly involved in the daily administration of the *kampung*. In reality, the indigenous officers enjoyed a great deal of freedom in running their own affairs. Externally, they acted as formal leaders and intermediaries between the colonial government and the *kampung* inhabitants; internally they also enjoyed high status as the religious and *adat* leaders in their communities.

In the early decades of Batavia, no specific administrative institution was appointed to tackle any problems which might happen to arise in the region outside the city. The administration of the intermediate hinterland at that time was taken care of by the *College van Schepenen* (the College of Aldermen). This College was officially established on 1 July 1620, although it had already issued its first instructions on 24 June 1620.¹⁷⁶ Besides carrying out their administrative functions, the Aldermen also had to shoulder judicial tasks. In its capacity as a court, this College was known as the *Schepenbank* (the Court of Aldermen). The whole of the population of Batavia and the Ommelanden was subject to the jurisdiction of this court. Another important duty undertaken by the *Schepenen* was the registration of the transfer of private landed property and slaves. Under Batavian jurisdiction, the transfer of private land was forbidden without possession of a deed issued by the *Schepenen*.¹⁷⁷

The High Government appointed the bailiff or *baljuw*, the chief of police, to be in charge of the law enforcement to which the citizens living inside and outside the city were subject. When his office was set up in 1620, there was no clear description of the extent of the bailiff's authority but this assumed more concrete lines after the establishment of the *Schepenbank* the same year. The main task of the bailiff was the maintenance of peace, order, and security

¹⁷⁵ Ball, *Indonesian Legal History*, p. 8.

¹⁷⁶ Fairly complete information about the *College van Schepenen* is provided in Jacobus La Bree, *De Rechterlijke Organisatie en Rechtsbedeling te Batavia in de XVIIe Eeuw* (Rotterdam and 'sGravenhage: Nijgh & Van Ditmar, 1951), pp. 85-132.

¹⁷⁷ Niemeijer, "The Central Administration of the VOC", p. 69.

within the borders of his territory. He also served as public prosecutor in the Court of Aldermen. To help him in carrying out his duties, the High Government invested him with the authority to arrest persons who broke the law, fine them, or take other legal action against them. He was assisted by *kaffers*, black policemen, who were paid and equipped from the fines he collected. By a decree issued in 1622, the bailiff was assisted by four *kaffers*, but this number had increased to eight in 1681 to keep up with the population growth.¹⁷⁸ Later eighteenth-century court proceedings still refer to the policemen as *kaffers* but it seems that by then they were no longer Indian but Madurese.¹⁷⁹ To maintain law and order, it was necessary for the bailiff and his *kaffers* to keep close contact with the heads of the quarter (*wijkmeesteren*) and with the leaders of the various ethnic communities inside and outside the city.

The territory of the bailiff was reduced and limited to Batavia only in 1651, when the colonial government specially appointed a separate officer, the *landdrost* or sheriff, to keep law and order in the Ommelanden.¹⁸⁰ The growing number of complaints about such crimes as theft, robbery, and violence in the expanding territory of the Ommelanden had eventually forced the government to decide to appoint this *landdrost* to maintain security, peace, and order outside the town. He was essentially a second bailiff and his duties were more or less similar. Nevertheless, the area covered by his jurisdiction was much broader since the Company territory in the areas surrounding Batavia kept steadily increasing. In 1678, after its territory had been extended under the terms of the contract with Mataram signed in 1677, the High Government appointed a second *landdrost* for the environs of Batavia. Henceforth there were two *landdrosten* assigned to the Ommelanden; one for the eastern side and the other for the western side of the city.¹⁸¹ The Ciliwung River was the boundary line. The *landdrosten* were also assisted by *kaffers*, eight on the western side and six on the eastern side.

The expanding area of the Ommelanden gradually made the tasks of the *landdrost* more onerous. Many territorial disputes between landowners in the Ommelanden can simply be put down to the lack of any proper supervision of landownership. The High Government had to concede that the *landdrost* and his assistants were being engulfed by their work. Therefore, in 1664 it was decided to establish the *College van Heemraden* (the District Council) whose principal

¹⁷⁸ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 1, p. 92.

¹⁷⁹ Jones, *Wives, Slaves, and Concubines*, p. 110. See also Niemeijer, "The Central Administration of the VOC", p. 68. Some authors profess that these *kaffers* should be African. In my opinion they were Indian.

¹⁸⁰ Ball, *Indonesian Legal History*, p. 23.

¹⁸¹ Niemeijer, "The Central Administration of the VOC", p. 68.

duty would be to supervise landownership and settle disputes between landowners. In 1667 the *Hoge Regering* decided to dig a canal which would connect the walled city with the River Sunter. The construction costs would be covered by the tax imposed on the land located along the canal and the task of levying this tax was assigned to the *Heemraden*. A year later, the colonial government issued a regulation which stated that it was forbidden to dig any canal along a public road without the authorization of the *Heemraden*.¹⁸² For the first few years of its existence, the *College van Heemraden* was actually a dormant institution and it only became fully active after it was re-established in 1684.¹⁸³ Five years earlier, in 1679, this College had already assumed the duty of the *Schepenen* of supervising the excavation of the *Zuiderringsloot*, the southern ring canal. After its overhaul, the *Heemraden* became the institution in charge of the supervision of the Ommelanden infrastructure, taking responsibility for roads, bridges, canals dams, and buildings. Another of its tasks was the maintenance of security in the countryside and hence the *landdrosten* were attached to it.

One important Company official who was attached to the *Heemraden* was the *Gecommitteerde voor de zaken der Inlanderen*. The increasing number of Javanese migrants who illegally occupied vacant land in the second half of the seventeenth century was the principal reason for the establishment of this office. In the early years of this post, the main task of this Commissioner was to curb the rising number of the illegal settlers. Later he also assumed the job of the implementation of the *tiende paddy* (10 per cent tax on paddy). In 1685 the progress being made in the rice cultivation in the Ommelanden had tempted the *Heemraden* to slap a tax on the rice harvested from the Company land. They put the Commissioner in charge of monitoring the collection of paddy at the Company granaries.¹⁸⁴

The decentralized local administration in the Ommelanden was inspired by the Dutch experience in their homeland. In conformity with the tradition of urban administration in the Dutch Republic, in 1655 Governor-General Joan Maetsuyker decided to divide Batavia and its surrounding into districts. It is likely that he was inspired by the division of the Dutch cities into *kwartieren* (quarters or districts). The *kwartieren* were wards responsible for such duties as tax gathering and extinguishing fires. They also provided *schutters* (members of the citizen

¹⁸² S. van Brakel, "Het Plattelandsbestuur Der Bataviasche Ommelanden", in G.W. Eybers (ed.), *Bepalingen en Instructiën voor het Bestuur van de Buitendistricten van de Kaap de Goede Hoop* (Amsterdam: Johannes Müller, 1922), p. 39.

¹⁸³ Ball, *Indonesian Legal History*, p. 23.

¹⁸⁴ Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", p. 12.

militia).¹⁸⁵ At the urban district level, the colonial authority was represented by the *wijkmeesteren* (quartermasters or district supervisors). The government realized that, since the number of the bailiffs and *kaffers* was limited, they needed to be supported by lower-ranking officials who could maintain law and order at the neighbourhood level. Therefore, two *wijkmeesters* were appointed for each *wijk* (ward) in the inner city. In the beginning, all *wijkmeesters* were European, Mestizo, or Mardijker, but after 1690 there were Chinese *wijkmeesters*¹⁸⁶ and later also Indonesian.

The *wijkmeesters* saw to police matters, supervised construction works, and sanitation.¹⁸⁷ These minor officials also kept an eye on the moral conduct of the inhabitants of the quarter and the situation of the poor. Petitions for the admission to the poorhouse of Batavia were almost always written by the *wijkmeester*.¹⁸⁸ After 1673 they also carried out a yearly census of all the inhabitants of their respective quarters. Unlike other Company officials, the *wijkmeesters* were not paid for doing their job, but their prestige among their fellow citizens rose because of the social responsibilities they assumed in such matters as the management of mutual assistance in the event of illness, death, and marriage. In the Ommelanden, the *wijkmeesters* had to seek co-operation with the *kampung* headmen, since the majority of the inhabitants in this region were Indonesians living in *kampung*. A quarter was often composed of more than one *kampung*, and therefore it was crucial that the Supervisors maintain good relations with the *kampung* leaders if they wanted to carry out their duties successfully.

Two years after the re-establishment of the *Heemraden*, district supervisors were also appointed in the Ommelanden. Their duties closely resembled those of their counterparts in the inner city. Their main task was to help the *landdrost* in maintaining peace and order. They also supervised public works and oversaw the cleaning of the roads and watercourses in their neighbourhood.¹⁸⁹ The Ommelanden *wijkmeesters* were also required to conduct the annual census; a task more difficult than in the city, since a quarter in the Ommelanden was made up of more than one *kampung* and often also contained private estates within its borders. The Supervisors had to rely on the co-operation of *kampung* headmen or of the *mandors* (supervisors

¹⁸⁵ Gooszen, *Population Census*, p. 5.

¹⁸⁶ Jacobus La Bree, *De Rechtelijke Organisatie en Rechtbedeling te Batavia in de XVIIe Eeuw* (Rotterdam: Nijgh & van Ditmar N.V., 1951), p. 88.

¹⁸⁷ Ball, *Indonesian Legal History*, p.24.

¹⁸⁸ Margreet Van Till, "Social Care in Eighteenth-Century Batavia: The Poorhouse, 1725-1750", in *Itinerario*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1995, p. 21.

¹⁸⁹ ANRI, RCH (Afschriften van extract-resoluties van de Hoge Regering) No. 49, 9 April 1686.

of private estates) in collecting data about the population.¹⁹⁰ Through *mandors* and other personnel, the owners of private estates virtually ruled as potentates over the inhabitants living and working on their estates. One such landowner was Cornelis Chastelein, who possessed large holdings at Depok. In 1686, the system was elaborated by the appointment of four members of the *Raad van Indië* as *opperwijkmeesters* (senior district supervisors) for the inner city and the Ommelanden.

Local authority at the ground level was in the hands of *kampung* headmen. In contrast to other institutions in the Ommelanden which were dominated by Europeans, the *kampung* headmen were usually Indonesian group leaders who had shown their loyalty and leadership as commanders of auxiliary troops in the military expeditions organized by the Company. Hence, it was in the natural run of things that the colonial government should grant them the military title of captain. Nevertheless, the military character of the *kampung* was gradually watered down by the influx of new *kampung* inhabitants, the majority of whom were liberated slaves and free migrants from the north coast and interior of Java. In the eighteenth century, the main criterion for the appointment of a *kampung* headman was no longer his military talents but more often his obedience to and capacity to carry out tasks for the Company.

Both the internal order and the successful administration of the *kampung* depended on how well a *kampung* leader could wield his authority and drum up the co-operation of the inhabitants of his *kampung*. Indeed, the authority of a charismatic headman could exceed the boundaries of his *kampung* territory and also be acknowledged by people of other nations. This was the case with *Kapitan* Jonker, the headman of the Ambonese *kampung* in Marunda. He was also accepted as their leader by the Makassarese, Butonese, and Malays. When these people returned to Batavia after having served under this *kapitan* in the Company military campaigns, they refused to take up residence in the *kampung* to which they were assigned by the High Government, preferring to settle with Captain Jonker in Marunda.¹⁹¹

Officially the Indonesian captains represented the government at the ground level, but in practice what won their leadership real recognition were their personal charisma and their ability to provide protection. It was a common practice for the Indonesian officers to petition the Company for land so they could provide their followers with plots on which they could pursue agricultural activities. On 10 May 1687, for instance, the Balinese Captain Tiben asked

¹⁹⁰ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 78.

¹⁹¹ Raben, "Round about Batavia", p. 100.

for a plot located between the Sunter and Cakung Rivers in Pondok Bambu in order to provide his people with land which could be used for rice cultivation.¹⁹² Another example is the petition lodged with the *Heemraden* by the Javanese Lieutenant Tsitra Naya on 21 October 1701. He asked for a plot located to the southeast of Batavia in an area called Cipinang. This Javanese lieutenant had been cultivating this land with his followers since 1682.¹⁹³

5. *Social interaction*

The local society formed in the Ommelanden throughout both the seventeenth and the eighteenth century was essentially a colonial society. It bore many resemblances to other communities in and around the coastal port towns of Java, in the sense that various groups of Asian people, among them Chinese, Arabs, Indians, Malays, Makasarese, Bugis, and Balinese, lived in their own *kampung* and under their own leaders. The major point of divergence was that the Ommelanden people did not become the vassals of a feudal ruler, but lived under the colonial jurisdiction of the Company. At this point it should be stressed that they enjoyed a relative degree of freedom, because they could follow their own religion, observe their own traditional customs, and move to other *kampung* in search of a better job. The *landdrosten* would only intervene in *kampung* life if there were criminal cases involving theft, armed robbery, or murder.

As elsewhere in Java, the people of the Ommelanden obtained their livelihood from the cultivation of rice, vegetables, and fruit, but there was the added dimension that they also undertook the growing of new agricultural produce which could be sold on the Asian and European markets. Chief among them were sugar-cane, pepper, and coffee. Many were employed as paid workers in the rural industries which had sprung up in significant numbers in the areas surrounding Batavia. Chief among them were sugar-mills, arak distilleries, lime-kilns, and brickworks. Another feature which betrayed the fact that the Ommelanden was populated by a colonial society was the inescapable presence of slavery. Slaves were employed in the domestic, agricultural, and rural industrial sectors. The existence of a large number of legal slaves and ex-slaves was what set Ommelanden society apart from its counterparts in the other

¹⁹² ANRI, RCH No. 5, 10 May 1687.

¹⁹³ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 21 October 1701.

port towns of Java. Alongside the free Javanese migrants, manumitted slaves provided the *kampung* with their chief source of new inhabitants.

Jean Gelman Taylor states that the colonial society in Batavia during the VOC period was made up of groups who were only superficially European and, since Asian, Eurasian, and Creole wives constituted the majority of the spouses there, they exerted a strong influence on the colonial elite in such matters as manners, lifestyle, and recreation.¹⁹⁴ Only at the beginning of eighteenth century did the Europeans, who occupied the highest stratum of colonial society, begin to live permanently in the Ommelanden.¹⁹⁵ The majority of them were high-ranking Company servants, retired officials, and rich citizens who built country houses along the Ciliwung River and the Molenvliet Canal to the south of Batavia. In the seventeenth century, the Europeans had merely used their country estates for recreational purposes. They would beguile a couple of hours at their country retreats and return to Batavia before nightfall. But, when this region became more secure in the eighteenth century, the members of the European elite changed their living habits and began to reside there permanently.

The annual census shows that the number of Europeans in the Ommelanden throughout the VOC period never exceeded 1 per cent of the total population. Although they were a tiny minority, they continued to dominate economic life and occupied all of the important administrative positions. In contrast to the Europeans inhabitants in the inner city in which Company personnel and soldiers rubbed shoulders and tried to find some space, the majority of the Europeans in the Ommelanden consisted of prominent, wealthy citizens. They often owned huge country estates, were served by slaves, and lived a completely separate existence from the settlements of other groups of inhabitants. Only the slaves manumitted from the country houses had had experience of intensive contact with Europeans but, after their manumission, these ex-slaves generally left European customs behind them and converted to Islam, after which they were absorbed by the *kampung* communities.

Other non-Indonesian inhabitants of the Ommelanden were the Chinese, Moors, Mestizos, and Mardijkers. The Mardijkers and Moors had been granted land by the Company on which to set up *kampung*. The former had a *kampung* in Tugu, the latter in Pakojan. The colonial

¹⁹⁴ Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia*, p. 61.

¹⁹⁵ The population of the inner city reached its peak of nearly 24,000 people in about 1730 and thereafter went into a decline. One reason for this was the frequent malaria epidemics which started in the early 1730s. The move of the Company elite to the Ommelanden attests to this gradual urban decline. See Ward, *Networks of Empire*, p. 95.

government did not encourage the Chinese and Mestizos to set about establishing their own *kampung*, and as the best way to obviate any such initiative was not to issue these groups with land grants. As a consequence, the Chinese lived dispersed over the *kampung* in the immediate environs of Batavia, among them Pagaraman, Patekuan, Patuakan, and Pakojan. It was only after the trauma of the Chinese revolt in 1740 that they were obliged to move to specially set up the Chinese *kamp* southwest of the city. In fact, a great number of Chinese lived a fair distance from Batavia as they worked in the sugar-mills which over the years were gradually moved farther and farther away from the city in search of more timber to fuel them. The census results indicate that the most of the Mestizos lived in the eastern suburb of Batavia.¹⁹⁶

These non-Indonesian inhabitants earned a livelihood in the Ommelanden as entrepreneurs, agriculturalists, and rural labourers, living in the *kampung* side by side with people of different ethnic origins. Since they had usually arrived from overseas without wives, it was a common practice for the Chinese and Moors to marry local women. Inter-marriage also occurred among the Mardijkers and Mestizos. Therefore, in comparison with the Europeans, these non-Indonesian inhabitants interacted quite closely with the indigenous people. As time went by, their offspring were absorbed by *kampung* communities and became ‘Indonesian’.

By adhering to a policy of ‘divide and rule’, the intention of the colonial government was to concentrate ethnic groups so that they could be easily administered and kept apart, but in fact there was little control over persons who moved from one *kampung* to another. Therefore, as time went by distinct ethnic quarters still existed only in the official mind, but were rare in reality: *kampung* were officially projected for specific ethnic groups, but most of them were occupied by various ethnicities. The following list shows the places of residence of 1000 slave-buyers in the Ommelanden.¹⁹⁷

Table 3: Residence of slave buyers in the Ommelanden from 1000 samples, 1723-1731

	Bali	Bugis	Chinese	Java	Makasar	Malay	Sumbawa	Others	Total
Ancol	3		3			1			7
Anke	29	11	5		1		1	1	48
Bekasi		1	5	1	1				8
Cililitan				1	1	4			6
Gudang	40		3	2	2				47

¹⁹⁶ See the results of the Ommelanden census between 1673 and 1789 in Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, pp. 322-333.

¹⁹⁷ The data for this list is taken from *akten van transport* of the Notary Carel Schoute. See ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935-3958, *Minuut Akten van Transport (MAT)* Notary Carel Schoute, 11 October 1723 – 18 August 1731.

Panjang									
Grogol	2				2	1			5
Kampung Baru	5				10			1	16
Kampung Melayu	6					5	1	1	13
Krukut	20	1	16					2	39
Mangga Besar			2						2
Mangga Dua	4		3	2					9
Pagaraman	107	13	21	9	6	20	5	10	191
Pajuangan	11		7						18
Patekuan	10		20			1			31
Patuakan	45	7	6			2	1	5	66
Pakojan	84	2	17			2		7	112
Pisang Batu	16	1	5						22
Pluit	22		2						24
Salemba	6		1				1		8
Sunter	1	7	1			1		1	11
Tanah Abang	4		1	1					6
Tanah Sareal	2		2				1		5
Tangerang	3	9	2	1		2			17
Tanjung Priuk			1	1			1	1	4
Others / Unknown	97	15	103	18	1	13	8	30	285
Total	517	67	226	36	24	52	19	59	1000

More than twenty-five different places are recorded in these samples. Each of them was inhabited by at least three different ethnicities. Pagaraman and Pakojan were inhabited by no fewer than seven ethnicities, most of who were actively involved in the slave trade. This demonstrates that the Ommelanden offered everyone, whatever their ethnic origin, freedom to settle.

Since Chinese men preferred Balinese concubines, many free Balinese of mixed parentage were in fact *peranakan*. They were counted as Balinese in the census and other official documents when they followed their manumitted mother if she chose to live in one of the Ommelanden Balinese *kampung*.¹⁹⁸ This was apparently also the case with the Moor, Mardijker, and Mestizo men who had Indonesian wives or concubines. Once they were widowed, these ex-wives and ex-concubines often married other people and moved to one of

¹⁹⁸ Niemeijer, "Slavery, Ethnicity and the Economic Independence of Women", p. 177.

the *kampung* in the Ommelanden. Children of mixed descent who followed their mother would be counted as members of their mother's ethnicity by the colonial administration.

The highest degree of mixed marriage occurred between the various Indonesian ethnicities. Mixed marriage was not encouraged by the colonial government, but nor was it expressly forbidden. Javanese Lieutenant Tsitra Naya, for example, was married to a Makassarese woman name Simba.¹⁹⁹ Another Makassarese woman, Mamin, became the wife of the Buton Captain Abdul Djalaly.²⁰⁰ Intje Cadier, a free Javanese living outside the Diespoort, was married to Norsay van Batavia, probably herself the offspring of a mixed marriage in Batavia.²⁰¹

These examples show that kinship, similarity of ethnic background, and religious bonds were less significant in determining sexual patterns than simple geographical proximity.²⁰² Miscegenation was easier in the Ommelanden because ethnic identity among Indonesian inhabitants was fairly weak and unarticulated. The history of the Indonesian Archipelago supports the impression that ethnic classifications were not central to social structure.²⁰³ Perhaps the children of mixed marriage would in their turn marry people from different ethnic groups. After some generations, the descendants of these people would lose their own ethnic identity and become simply *Anak Betawi*, children of Batavia.

6. *Law enforcement and criminality*

Law and order in the Ommelanden depended on a mutual understanding between the Company and the *kampung* headmen. The vast territory covered by the Ommelanden and the limited number of Company officials stationed in this region meant it was virtually impossible to exert any direct supervision over *kampung* life. Direct administration was also hindered by the fact that the *kampung* had expressly been founded on the basis of different ethnic backgrounds. The most effective way to maintain law and order in the areas surrounding Batavia was by the delegation of authority to Indonesian officials.

¹⁹⁹ ANRI, RCH No. 8, 1 September 1703.

²⁰⁰ ANRI, RCH No. 9, 10 July 1706.

²⁰¹ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3950, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 6 April 1728.

²⁰² Niemeijer, "Slavery, Ethnicity and the Economic Independence of Women", p. 178.

²⁰³ Raben, "Round about Batavia", p. 99.

The Company decided to respect local law and hand the administration of most judicial matters over to the *kampung* headmen who were responsible for maintaining order in their *kampung*. Without a request from or the approval of the *kampung* headmen, colonial police officers had no right of entry to the *kampung*. However, the authority and competence of Indonesian officials did not extend to the serious crimes of murder, assault and grievous bodily harm, robbery, looting, and plunder. When these crimes were committed, either the *baljuw* or the *landdrost* had to be invited to take charge.

The perpetration of any sort of violence could mean that an inhabitant of Batavia had to stand trial before the Court of Aldermen. In some areas of Indonesia where the VOC had full authority, the institution and conventions of Romano-Dutch law were fully in force.²⁰⁴ In the Ommelanden, the implementation of this judicial system was combined with the customary law or *adat* of the Indonesian community. The colonial authority would not intervene in criminal cases as long they could be solved locally.

The legal system applied by the Dutch in their Asian headquarters and its rural surroundings therefore separated the people into those who worked for the Company and those who did not.²⁰⁵ The *Raad van Justitie* was the court to which the Company employees, their families and slaves were answerable. This court was presided over by a member of *Raad van Indië* (Council of the Indies) and staffed by high-ranking Company men with legal training. The *Schepensbank* (Court of Aldermen) was the court for the civilian population of Batavia and the Ommelanden.²⁰⁶ This court treated Europeans, Chinese, and Indonesian people as equal before the law. The members of this court consisted of nine persons who were high-ranking Company officers and prominent European and Chinese persons but were not necessarily legal professionals.

The growing agricultural economy around Batavia transformed this region from virgin forest into plantation areas inhabited by various ethnic groups. The commercialization of agricultural activities transformed the rural subsistence economy into a market-oriented production area. Cash crops, most prominent among them pepper, sugar-cane, and coffee, were planted to supply the demands of the Company. This commercial-scale expansion of agricultural

²⁰⁴ Eric Alan Jones, "Fugitive women: Slavery and social change in early modern Southeast Asia", in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2007, p. 216.

²⁰⁵ Jones, *Wives, Slaves, and Concubines*, p. 105.

²⁰⁶ McVay, "I am the devils own": *Crime, Class, and Identity*, p.64.

production offered jobs to thousands of Javanese, as well as acting as a magnet for Chinese entrepreneurs and labourers.

Nevertheless, not all of the sojourners and new settlers earned their living from the rural economic activities. The fluctuation in the demand for sugar, for instance, could force thousands of workers in that industry out of their job. The same sort of fate could also befall people involved in other cash crop cultivation. As hundreds of newly manumitted and runaway slaves tried to find a place in the Batavian plantation economy, it was quite possible that some of them would fail to find employment. Joining up with other jobless people, they roamed around the countryside doing their best to survive. For the first time, the Ommelanden were inhabited by a significant number of unemployed people who posed a potential threat to law and order.

The Ommelanden was a heterogeneous society in the process of formation which had not yet reached a stage at which its inhabitants could formulate a clear communal identity. Intolerance, misunderstanding, and jealousy between people of different ethnic backgrounds could easily flare up, get out of hand, and result in crime. Nor were hatred and resentment foreign to people of the same ethnic stock, witness the murder of Bongil. The problem began on 18 February 1704, when Bangi, a Javanese from Bagelen, came to the house of another Javanese named Singa Gatti in Patoeakan. Since Singa Gatti was not at home and would not return until several days later. His wife, named Hongtse, asked Bongil to call again later. Hongtse had recognized Bongil as a friend of her husband and therefore it did not occur to her that Bangi might have bad intentions. Two days later towards afternoon Bangi came again, but this time he carried a *keris* (traditional Javanese dagger) in his hand. Singa Gatti still had not yet returned home. Without saying uttering a word, Bangi ran amok and attacked Hongtse. Fortunately Hongtse could escape this onslaught. She ran out of the house and called for the help. This entire incident had been seen by one of Hongtse's neighbours named Bongil who happened to be sitting on the *bale-bale* (traditional Indonesian bed) in front of his house. Bangi who was chasing Hongtse suddenly changed course and attacked Bongil. He stabbed Bongil injuring him so badly he died.²⁰⁷ The investigation conducted by the bailiff revealed that Bangi's motive for running amok was to take revenge for a personal problem he had with Singa Gatti.

²⁰⁷ ANRI, Schepenbank No. 1078, Criminele Sentencies, 7 Maart 1704.

The social stratification among the Asian populations in the Ommelanden was quite loose. People interacted socially without paying too much attention to their status. Marriage and romance between slaves and free people was a common occurrence. However, the close relationships between males and females of a different social status could sometimes end not in marriage but in adultery. This was what happened to the romantic relationship between Tsimpo van Bugis, a male slave belonging to the Chinese Tet Souwko, and Johinio van Batavia, the wife of Tan Kandjenko. Worried that Kandjenko would find out about their secret trysts, they thought up a plan to murder him. The plan was executed on 31 July 1707. On that day, at seven o'clock in the evening, as Tan Kandjenko was sleeping, Johinio quietly opened the front door of her house for Tsimpo who had been hiding behind the fence. After the door was open, Tsimpo and Johinio claspng *parang* in their hands entered Kandjenko's bedroom and murdered him. This murderous couple had planned to marry, but unfortunately for them, their crime was discovered and they were sent to stand trial before the *Schepenbank* Court.²⁰⁸

Most of the Ommelanden inhabitants depended on the sugar industry. It goes without saying that criminality in the Ommelanden often occurred on the sugar plantations since there were so many people gathered on those plantations to work as coolies. Here is one example: Santadjaya, a Javanese from Banjoemas, who worked as a private guard at the sugar-mill owned by Chinese Hoatko in Maroedja (Meruya), conspired with two other Javanese, Soeta Laxana and Soeta Marta, to steal some carts and buffalos from his employer's mill. His fellow Javanese also worked as private guards but not at the Hoatko's mill. They also stole sugar-cane from Hoatko's fields. Only Santadjaya was successfully captured at the end of August 1717; Soeta Laxana and Seota Marta managed to escape.²⁰⁹

It was necessary for the *landdrost* to exercise caution in maintaining law and order in his territories. When informed of a crime, he and his *kaffers* were immediately supposed to begin conducting an investigation and make the necessary arrests. If he did not act speedily, the person who had committed a crime could run away or evidence which might be used could be lost. Crimes in the environs of Batavia often tended to be committed in the remoter regions. In 1705, for instance, Cornelis Chastelein wrote about a Javanese who undertook a three to four day journey from a distant place to report a murder to the *landdrost*. Unfortunately, no serious action was taken by the *landdrost*. He did no more than to instruct the Javanese to bring

²⁰⁸ ANRI, Schepenbank No. 1078, Criminele Sentencies, 22 Augustus 1707.

²⁰⁹ ANRI, Schepenbank No. 1079, Criminele Sentencies, 8 October 1717.

in the body of the victim and the murderer.²¹⁰ This story serves to show how difficult it was to maintain law and order; especially if the officials were corrupt. In the same account, Chastelein wrote that the corrupt *landdrost* and his *kaffers* often put both the plaintiffs and the defendants behind bars. Consequently, both parties had to pay to gain their release. No Javanese or any people from other nations therefore wanted to sue one another.²¹¹ Under such conditions, the maintenance of security in the Ommelanden was bound to fail without the help of Indonesian officials and the mutual feeling of responsibility of the *kampung* inhabitants.

²¹⁰ Cornelis Chastelein, “Invalende Gedagten”, in *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, Vol. 3, 1855, p. 68. See also Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 88.

²¹¹ Chastelein, “Invalende Gedagten”, p. 71.

CHAPTER FOUR

LANDOWNERSHIP

Introduction

Landownership in the Ommelanden was dominated by high-ranking Dutch officials and the colonial government. *Particuliere landerijen* or private estates dated from as early as 1630 when the VOC had begun to grant parcels of land in the Ommelanden to its high-ranking officials. Estate owners were not only granted a freehold title to the land but were also given quasi-feudal rights over its inhabitants, including the right to compulsory labour services (*Herendiensten*). Via leases, land rent and other payments, these estates generated substantial profits for their owners. Other groups of landowners were to be found among the Chinese, Mardijker and other Asian ethnicities, ranging from the rich merchant down to the small entrepreneur. The final group of landowners consisted of Indonesian peasants who had migrated from the North Coast of Java, the Priangan, and elsewhere in the Archipelago. The individual holdings of the last two groups were far less impressive than those of the first and often consisted of only a small plot of land.

1. Reshaping the Ommelanden

The first efforts to develop the Ommelanden commenced in the area immediately adjacent to the Ciliwung River. In the early days of Batavia, various plots along the Ciliwung River in the southern part of the city were already under cultivation for rice.²¹² Besides paddy, other significant crops being planted were coconut palms, sugar-cane, vegetables, and fruit trees. In a letter to the *Heeren XVII*, dated 9 December 1637, Governor-General Antonio van Diemen mentions that 6,000 coconut palms had been planted in the area around Batavia.²¹³ Sugar-cane was being planted by the Batavian Chinese in the 1630s. They took their example from Chinese sugar-cane planters in Banten²¹⁴ and in Formosa.

²¹² Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 58.

²¹³ De Jonge (ed.), *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag*, Vol. 5, p. 229.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

In the early decades of Batavia, the Company did not bother to formulate any special policy to regulate land development. Land would be leased or granted to anyone who showed his or her willingness to develop the Ommelanden as an agriculturally profitable area. This phase was marked by the predominance in the landownership of high-ranking Company officials. One of these pioneers was Director General François Caron who had earlier served as governor of Formosa, where he had also employed Chinese workers on his sugar plantations. Unfortunately, his pioneering efforts came to a premature end when he was summoned to return to Holland to face accusations of corruption. Other landowners were European *vrijburghers*, Chinese, and Mardijkers. The majority of the areas of land covering a huge area, called *particuliere landerijen* or landed estates, were owned by Europeans but some were in the hands of Chinese and Mardijkers, whose estates were usually less extensive.

The High Government was uncomfortably aware that it was attempting to set up a colony in an area encircled by enemies. Because of the precariousness of the situation, it was important for Batavia to be self-sufficient and to be able to produce all of its necessities in the immediate hinterland of the city. Well aware of this the Company encouraged landowners to turn their land into agricultural fields. Importantly, in those days of sail when sea voyages seemed interminable, the food and other commodities produced in the Ommelanden also had to be sufficient to meet not just the needs of Batavia but also to supply the VOC ships and other vessels anchored in the roadstead.²¹⁵ In the eighteenth century, around 100 East Indiamen dropped anchor in the roadstead each year.²¹⁶ Considering the large numbers of crew on board of these and other vessels, a plentiful supply of victuals had to be on hand to feed them. Transforming the Ommelanden into a production area was not something which could be accomplished overnight. The general insecurity prevailing there and a lack of a spirit of entrepreneurship were the main reasons this region failed to live up to expectations until the second half of the seventeenth century.

The majority of the European landowners, especially the high-ranking Company officials, considered their landed estates in the light of long-term investments. Even though they owned huge estates and were not short of capital, they were not falling over themselves to develop

²¹⁵ Leonard Blussé, “On the Waterfront: Life and Labour Around the Batavian Roadstead”, in Haneda Masashi (ed.), *Asian Port Cities 1600-1800, Local and Foreign Cultural Interaction* (Singapore: NUS Press in association with Kyoto University Press, 2009), p. 129.

²¹⁶ Els M. Jacobs, *Merchant in Asia. The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2006), p. 233.

their land. One big stumbling block was that fairly sophisticated construction works which would turn the land into an area of agricultural production required a real spirit of agricultural entrepreneurship. Agricultural pioneers like Abraham Pittavin, Isaac de St. Martin, and Pieter van Hoorn, were specifically assigned land by the Company in the 1660s to boost the production of sugar in the Ommelanden, but most European landowners displayed no ambition to aspire to be agricultural entrepreneurs. They preferred to live the lives of the landed gentry, employing others to work the land. Consequently, they leased the land to Chinese, *Mardijkers*, or indigenous people, who usually turned it into paddy-fields or sugar plantations.²¹⁷

As just said, before the Ommelanden could be transformed into an agricultural area, the construction of basic public works was essential. The geographical features were the factor which determined what sort of infrastructure was required. The land around Batavia was a low-lying alluvial plain traversed by parallel rivers which flowed from the western Priangan Mountains northwards to the sea. During the rainy season, the area in the vicinity of the rivers would be flooded by *banjir* and the road system would often be swamped with mud and become impassable. In the dry season, the soil would dry out and an abundance of irrigation water was needed for successful paddy or sugar cultivation.

The prime infrastructural requirement in such a landscape was canals. Excavating canals had a threefold purpose: it drained the land; improved the run off during the rains; and provided the earth with which the river banks could be effectively raised above flood level to act as levees. The development of the hinterland can really be said to have begun to expand when three canals were dug running in the direction of the eastern, western, and southern parts of the city. These canals connected the Ciliwung River which flowed through the city with the Anke River in the west and the Sunter River in the east. The undertaking of these excavations signalled the beginnings of a water transportation system which linked Batavia with its immediate hinterland via these canals. The canal network was certainly important as a means of transportation and, over and above this, it also regulated the water management in the inner city and the drainage of the Ommelanden.

Although the Company administration supervised the water management closely at the time that Batavia was being built, the initiative taken to construct the canals in the Ommelanden

²¹⁷ Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", p. 5.

came from private entrepreneurs, who needed to transport the produce of their private estates to the city. In the early years, the Company administration was less than keen to put money into building large-scale infrastructural works in the environs of Batavia owing to the instability of relations with Mataram and Banten. This reluctance to commit Company money is why private entrepreneurs were encouraged to initiate canal construction. The administration only took over the management of the canals when the security of the neighbourhood was better established and the profitability of their operations had been confirmed.

One of the pioneers was Phoa Bing Ham, the third Chinese Captain of Batavia after Souw Benkong and Lim Lacco.²¹⁸ In 1648, he dug a canal, first known as the *Bing Ham gracht* and later as the *Molenvliet*, running southwards from the city to his private land in Tanah Abang. Numerous waterwheels were built along this waterway which could be put to use as powder-works, corn- and saw-mills, eventually giving rise to the name Molenvliet or Mill Race.²¹⁹ Other canals which were excavated by private enterprise in the seventeenth century were the *Ammanusgracht* and *Bacherchtsgracht* on the western side of the city wall running towards the Anke Rivier, and the *Ancolse vaart* and *Sontarsevaart* running eastwards from the city to the Ancol and Sunter Rivier.

The bulk of the labour force employed to dig the canals was composed of slaves and corvée workers from Cirebon and its surrounding areas. The latter were also known as *modder Javanen* (mud Javanese). Every year, the Cirebon princes were obliged to send 200 *modder Javanen* to Batavia.²²⁰ Digging canals was an arduous, unhealthy job. Therefore, the inhabitants of the Ommelanden refused to undertake this work, even if it paid well. The *modder Javanen* dug, deepened, and widened canals and rivers when they showed signs of silting up. For instance, 1715, when the mouth of the Ciliwung River silted up as a result of the eruption of the volcano Mount Salak, the Batavian government summoned 200 workers from Cirebon, Indramayu, and Gabang to dig it out.²²¹ A year later, the Batavian government employed seventy labourers from Cirebon to dredge the river again.²²² Almost every year, the city

²¹⁸ Mona Lohanda, *The Kapitan Cina of Batavia* (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1994), p. 203.

²¹⁹ Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History*, p. 41.

²²⁰ In the early 1770s, this corvée was waived, because successive epidemics had claimed many victims among the Cirebon population and the obligation therefore had become too heavy a burden. See Jacobs, *Merchant in Asia*, p. 242.

²²¹ ANRI, Minuut Generale Resolutien (MGR) No. 505, 23 April 1715.

²²² ANRI, MGR No. 507, 24 April 1716.

government had to hire labourers from Cirebon because the rivers and canals had to be periodically cleaned and dredged.



Illustration 3: Digging or deepening a canal in Batavia in the early 18th century

Source: Bea Brommer, *Historische Plattegronden van Nederlandse Steden, deel 4 Batavia* (Alphen aan den Rijn: De Stichting Historische Plattegronden, 1992), p. 9.

The construction of canals facilitated the transportation of logs and other building materials to Batavia and also made a large area of land surrounding the canals available for cultivation. Several years after the Bing Ham Gracht was dug, the Batavian government took over its management in order to assure the water supply to various flour-mills to the south of the city.²²³ In the course of time, other private canals were also taken over by the local authorities. By seizing the initiative to take control of the important canals in the Ommelanden, the Company could get a good grip on the supervision of the water transportation and simultaneously increase its income from the toll collection.

Water management extended far beyond the digging of canals, it also required other facilities such as: dikes, sluices, and ditches. During the dry season, the water volume of rivers dropped considerably. If the water were to be kept available for agriculture, obviously the canals had to

²²³ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 58.

be linked up with irrigation networks. During the rainy season, large floods or *banjir* were an ever present danger. In February 1724, the President of *College van Heemraden*, Wybrand Blom, reported that, the water level had risen suddenly because of heavy rain in the Batavian highlands. Many of the estates along the 'sHeeren Street had been inundated. This was not the first time such a flood or *banjir* had happened, because the *Heemraden* decided to open all the dikes and sluices which were located in the vicinity of 'sHeeren Street, a solution which had already been resorted to in 1717.²²⁴

Other essential public works which were undertaken were the construction of roads and defence works. During the term of office of Governor-General Joan Maetsuyker (1653-1678), several redoubts were built in the eastern (Fort Ancol and Jacatra), southern (Fort Rijswijk and Nordwijk), and western (Fort Anke and Vijfhoek) Ommelanden.²²⁵ The purpose of these fortifications was to defend the city and to guard the rice-fields and sugar-cane plantations. Most of the outlying forts were located at the intersections of rivers and canals but, in order to connect one fort to another, the Company also constructed roads, although it depended on rivers and canals. Because almost all of the Ommelanden area was covered by forest until the middle of seventeenth century, trees had to be cut down, the undergrowth cleared land surface levelled before these roads could be constructed.

The road construction was financed from tax income. The Company administration collected many kinds of tax such as the *Hoofdgeld der Chinezen* (Chinese poll tax), market tax, canal toll tax, sugar tax, tax on gambling, fishing tax, tax on *wayang* (shadow puppet), tax on arrack and so forth and so on. The new road from Batavia to Tangerang, for instance, built in 1685, was financed on the proceeds of the Chinese poll tax.²²⁶ However, the tax income from the Ommelanden was used not only to finance the infrastructural works outside the city walls, it paid for those required inside the walls as well. In 22 March 1708, the Batavian government published a decree requiring every sugar-mill in the Ommelanden had to pay a tax of 10 *rijksdaalders* per year to support the construction of the new town hall.²²⁷

²²⁴ ANRI, MGR No. 521, 22 February 1724, fol. 201.

²²⁵ James L. Cobban, "Geographic Notes on the First Two Centuries of Djakarta", in *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 44, Part 2, 1971, p. 118.

²²⁶ ANRI, Resolutie College van Heemraden (RCH) (Afschriften van extract-resoluties van de Hoge Regering) No. 49, 29 January 1686, fol. 30.

²²⁷ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 3, p. 600.

2. Land management

Various schemes which set forth how the Ommelanden should be developed were presented by high-ranking Company officials. In 1675 Pieter van Hoorn, a member of the *Raad van Indië* and father of Governor-General Joan van Hoorn (1704-1709), proposed a plan to the Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker in which he presented an idea of how a colony based on agricultural activities could be built up. Van Hoorn said that the establishment of a colony depended on bringing in people who already had the requisite skills to clear and cultivate the virgin land in a new settlement area.²²⁸ The establishment of a colony was not unlike planting a tree, the fruits of which could not be expected until twenty years later.²²⁹

In his proposal, Van Hoorn argued that the colony should be freed from the burden of all taxes until it had had time to develop properly. The colonists should also be allowed the freedom of trade in various commodities which could generate profits for them. After the colony had grown and was well-established, it was time to send in women so that local population could increase naturally without being constantly dependent on newcomers.²³⁰ Van Hoorn plainly stated that the initial aim of the Company, first and foremost a trading organization, had not been to establish colonies and therefore the management of the colonies in the early decades of the Company presence in Asia had not yet been properly regulated.²³¹

In connection with what had been proposed thirty years by Councillor Van Hoorn, in 1705 Cornelis Chastelein, an extraordinary member of the *Raad van Indië* and the owner of the Depok estate, presented his ideas about how they government should go about building up a colony. Chastelein made the point that no colony can exist without a large influx of people. The initial efforts to make Batavia a colony in which Europeans predominated had so far not been a success. He criticized the Company for always putting its own (commercial) interests first and paying scant attention to the problems colonization brought in its wake.²³² He stressed that it was not an easy matter to ensure that a colony flourished and plenty of water would have to pass under the bridge first. People in the colony had to be allowed freedom to

²²⁸ Pieter van Hoorn, "Praeparatoire Consideratien", in De Jonge (ed.), *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag*, Vol. 6, p. 130.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

²³² Cornelis Chastelein, "Invallende Gedagten", in *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, Vol. 3, 1855, p. 63.

trade in order to develop their own livelihood. Chastelein was critical of the fact that so far so little had been achieved by Batavia as the most important colony among all Dutch possessions in Asia.²³³



Illustration 4: Cornelis Chastelein in front of his house in Srengseng

Source: A. Heuken, *Historical Sites of Jakarta* (Jakarta: Cipta Loka Caraka, 2007), p. 231.

Chastelein offered some suggestions for populating the areas outside the city walls. His first idea was a recommendation that the population of Batavia migrate to the area surrounding the city. He proposed making a register of those in the city who had no gainful employment. These good-for-nothing layabouts were likely to irritate each other and engage in useless pursuits such as dabbling in the exploitation and the transportation of slaves. Rather than being allowed to become a nuisance in the city, these people should be set to work in the Ommelanden. His second idea for promoting migration to the Ommelanden was a proposal the Company abolishes the *beerendiensten* (corvée labour) for the Javanese, since these services were not important to the colonial government. A further objection on this point was that whenever the Company paid the labourers through their headmen, these lined their own pockets instead.²³⁴

Chastelein recommended that the rulers of Cirebon, the Priangan, and the neighbouring territories should be told that they were not to prohibit their people moving to the Ommelanden with their families. Wives should be encouraged to join their husbands 'because

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

the women of these eastern nations carry out more work than their husbands'.²³⁵ Chastelein explained that people of neighbouring territories had an obligation to contribute to the incomes of their rulers by handing over part of what they earned. They were forced to do this because their wives and children were kept at home as guarantees. Everyday, subjects of the local rulers were working on land located in the region under the Company jurisdiction. They exhausted the soil and they and the Chinese were destroying the Ommelanden forests by making swiddens on which to grow dry rice, *gaga*. To solve this problem, Chastelein advised the Company to welcome these settlers courteously and use them to populate the highlands of Batavia.

A third suggestion was related to the improvement of justice, law and order in the Ommelanden. It made little sense to try to administer the law when the *Schepenen* and the *landdrost* were living in town. The *landdrost* with his *kaffers* never ventured more than half an hour's walk away from the town. This meant that they never, or very rarely, visited the remote areas of the Ommelanden.²³⁶ Judges in Batavia were very ill-informed about the local situation. They sometimes needed one or two weeks simply to hear the testimony of the plaintiffs, leaving a window of time in which the wives and children of the latter, who had remained at home, might be harmed by the criminals. How poor the quality of law enforcement was can be observed from the fact that none of twenty-five cases of murder could be solved and that buffalo stealing was on the increase.²³⁷ In order to enforce the law, Chastelein recommended the Company act severely in its dealings with the criminals. People who committed a serious crime should be banished to the Cape. The *kampung* headmen should also be threatened that they would be treated likewise if they could not keep their own people under control.²³⁸

Chastelein proposed that a more responsible local government could be created if the *kampung* headmen were chosen directly by their own people. To ensure that these *kampung* were better organized, every ten *kampung* should in turn elect one headman who would preside over them. He could act as an arbiter in all kinds of petty felonies and minor cases. If very serious crimes were perpetrated, the latter could assist the *landdrost* and the *Heemraden*. The Company should take the Roman Empire, which was ruled by allowing the subjugated people

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 82

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 68

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

plenty of freedom in running their own affairs, as its example. This was precisely the principle which should be adhered to in the Ommelanden.²³⁹

The expansion of Batavia to the Ommelanden in the second half of the seventeenth century meant that the area falling under Batavian jurisdiction rapidly expanded. After the third war with Banten (1656-1659) had been concluded, leading to greater stability, the Company set about encouraging serious agricultural development in the Ommelanden. Once more the Batavian government was selling and granting plots of lands to Europeans, Chinese, *Mardijkers* and Indonesians in an effort to stimulate agricultural production. Since the amount of the land which could be sold or granted gradually shrank whereas the number of the people kept increasing, conflicts were inevitable. The growing number of conflicts over land boundaries and land rights prompted the Company to establish the *College van Heemraden*, a body which had the authority to solve land disputes, and could also manage and supervise all sorts of vital infrastructure such as roads, canals, bridges, and dams in the same way as *Heemraden* did in the Dutch Republic.

The *College van Heemraden* was set up by High Government Resolution of 19 September 1664. In the beginning it consisted of four persons; a *landdrost* or sheriff and three members of the High Government (Pieter Anthonisz Overtwater, Pieter van Hoorn, and Joan Thuysz). Three extra members were added in 1672 and at the same time the sheriff was also assigned a deputy and four servants to add to the six he already had.²⁴⁰ In 1684 the *kapitains van de buitenforten* were also appointed members of the *Heemraden*, and a year later two extra members were appointed; one of them was the *fabriek* (clerk of public works).²⁴¹ The *Heemraden* were drawn from the ranks of the Company officials and European citizens (*burgers*). If one of the members could no longer continue his duties, he was replaced by another person appointed by the *Heemraden* Board. Below is the list of *Heemraden* members from the year 1717:²⁴²

Hendrik Zwaardcroon (chairman, member of the *Raad van Indië*)

Philip Gyger (deputy-chairman, *landdrost*)

Willem van Bossum (*fabriek*)

Hendrik Huysman (*opperkoopman*)

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

²⁴⁰ H.E. Niemeijer, "The Central Administration of the VOC", p. 70.

²⁴¹ ANRI, RCH No. 49, 15 November 1985, fol. 13-14.

²⁴² ANRI, RCH No. 13, 16 January 1717, fol. 246-247.

Hans Jurgen Roode (captain)

Harmen Sluyter (*burger*)

Pieter Uylkes (*burger*)

Mattys Boeser (*burger*)

Andries van Houten (*koopman*)

The High Government appointed one of the *Raad van Indië* members as a chairman of the *Heemraden*. This power of appointment is a clue that the *Hoge Regering* still retained a great deal of influence in this institution.²⁴³ The position of chairman of the *Heemraden* was very prestigious and some of the *Heemraden* chairmen at the beginning of eighteenth century, among them Hendrik Zwaardecroon, Diederik Durven, Adriaan Valckenier, and Johannes Thedens, later became Governors-General. The *landdrost*, *fabriek*, *captain*, *opperkoopman*, and *koopman* were each assigned their own competence after their appointment to the *Heemraden*. Even though the *College van Heemraden* was an institution which represented the Company interests in the Ommelanden, its members were selected from among the free burgers, usually prominent European citizens who lived in the Ommelanden.

The *Heemraden* possessed all the characteristics of local government such as assuming responsibility for surveying, for the improvement and maintenance of the public works, vigilance for detecting illegal logging and irrigation, rooting out illegal sugar-mills, not to mention registration, taxation, and administration. The burgeoning agricultural activity ushered in better security and therefore in 1678 the High Government appointed two *landdrosten* for the Ommelanden. The jurisdiction of the first *landdrost* was on the eastern side of Ciliwung River, while the second *landdrost* served on the western side. To avoid conflicts of authority, the High Government decided that the first *landdrost* was senior to the other.²⁴⁴

The *Heemraden* council was also designed to administer the rural area of Batavia where large private estates lands which belonged to high-ranking officials and rich burgers were located. Its jurisdiction covered all of the land located outside the city walls of Batavia for as far as the Company territory stretched.²⁴⁵ Since the end of the seventeenth century, this meant the area between the Cisadane River in the west and the Bekasi River in the east. The boundary on the

²⁴³ Gaastra, "The Organization of the VOC", p. 27.

²⁴⁴ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 3, pp. 1-2.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

northern side was the Java Sea, while to the south the border was demarcated by three volcanos: Salak, Gede, and Pangrango. In 1680, the High Government entrusted the *Heemraden* with the job of the mapping of landownership in all of the districts in the Ommelanden.²⁴⁶

The day-to-day administration of the *Heemraden* was the business of a secretary. Besides the secretary, the *Heemraden* employed a number of other officers: a beadle, one or more land surveyors and junior land surveyors, and two clerks. When a new secretary was appointed, the former secretary would hand all the collected and indexed archives over to him. The *Heemraden* secretary was also the custodian of the old and new Ommelanden maps.²⁴⁷ The meetings of the *Heemraden* were held on Saturdays twice to four times a month. However, if there was an important case which had to be dealt with immediately, the board would hold an extra session on Wednesdays as well.

The High Government Instruction of 23 July 1680²⁴⁸ stipulated three main tasks to be undertaken by the *Heemraden*. The most important had to do with landownership. When the Company wanted to sell or grant land, it was the duty of the *Heemraden* to advise the Company about the proposed transfer. The members of the board had the judicial authority to intervene in and solve conflicts arising from disputed land boundaries and landed property and they had to sanction all transactions pertaining to the conveyancing and leasing of land. Therefore, to obviate any conflicts about land and to guarantee legal security, all trading in and purchasing or leasing of land in the Ommelanden had to be reported to the *Heemraden*. If a dispute threatened to become serious, the *Heemraden* could bring it to the attention the *Raad van Justitie*. The second duty with which the *Heemraden* were entrusted was to supervise and maintain all the public works in the Ommelanden. The money to carry out this task came from the income derived from the taxes and details of the work and its financing had to be reported to the High Government at least once a year. Finally, the *Heemraden* were in charge of public security. It was their duty to support the *landdrosten* in the execution of their duties. So that they would be assisted in this task of maintaining law and order in the Ommelanden, it was within the power of the *Heemraden* to nominate candidates for the position of district head (*wijkmeester*), after which their candidature would be confirmed by the High Government.

²⁴⁶ Mona Lohanda, *Sejarah Para Pembesar Mengatura Batavia* (Jakarta: Masup, 2007), p. 33.

²⁴⁷ Niemeijer, "The Central Administration of the VOC Government", p. 71.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

By the end of the seventeenth century, when the Ommelanden had become more law-abiding, increasing numbers of Dutch people ventured to build country houses and run landed estates there. There was a large-scale cultivation of the land and sugar plantations were established, mostly by Chinese farmers and entrepreneurs. In the same period, attracted by the security and the economic opportunities offered in the area, many Javanese also migrated to the Ommelanden to settle and establish rice-fields and market gardens. It was the responsibility of the *Heemraden* to supervise and keep a check on these developments. To assist them in this undertaking, they employed a *landmeeter* or surveyor so that they could obtain a precise picture of the landownership in the environs of Batavia. The first surveyor to work for the *Heemraden* was appointed in 1698.²⁴⁹

The chief duties of the surveyor was mapping the new plots or making sketches of land and keeping the records land registration up-to-date. Another of his jobs was to measure the size of an area of land in private ownership. These data provided a convenient basis for tax gathering. The surveyor was called upon to give an expert opinion when land was disputed. He had an allowance of 15 *rijksdaalders* per month from the *Heemraden*.²⁵⁰ This allowance did not include payment for any special assignments he might have to undertake. For instance, the surveyor was paid 4.24 *rijksdaalders* for surveying a piece of land or garden located close to Forts Zoutelande, Noordwijk, and Rijswijk. If he were required to draw a big map the *Heemraden* would pay him as much as 3 *rijksdaalders*.²⁵¹

The *landmeter's* reports are hard to trace in the Archives, but the following one drawn up by Boudewijn Jansz Vonk in 1732 pertaining to several private estates in the Ommelanden seems quite representative. It contains a survey of the private land possessed by Governor-General Diederik Durven in Topassong Parang and Kamal. Both areas of private property were located north of the Mokervaart, and west of the Angke River.²⁵² The sketches made by Vonk show swamps, trees, bamboo forest, and the Kamal River flowing in a northerly direction.

²⁴⁹ Bea Brommer, *Historische Plattegronden van Nederlandse Steden, deel 4 Batavia* (Alphen aan den Rijn: De Stichting Historische Plattegronden, 1992), p. 15.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 187-188.

²⁵² ANRI, RCH No. 20, 11 October 1732, fol. 193-194.



Illustration 5: Private land possessed by Governor-General Diederik Durven in Topassong Parang and Kamal
 Source: Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Maps Collection, VEL. 1241

On this sketch a sugar-mill surrounded by a sugar-cane plantation can be seen located on the banks of the Kamal River. Around the plantation are the trees which could be felled for firewood. A mulberry plantation is also depicted; mulberry leaves are the only food silkworms will eat.²⁵³ Paddy-fields stretch on either side of the Kamal River in the southern part of this private estate. The detailed sketch makes it possible to form some idea of private land management in the Ommelanden in the early eighteenth century. A similar pattern of land management recurs in Vonk's other reports to the *Heemraden*.²⁵⁴

²⁵³ From the sketches of Governor-General Diderik Durven's private landed estate and other sketches made by *Landmeter* Jansz. Vonk showed that, in the early 18th century, the Company tried to produce silk in the *Ommelanden*, but that this enterprise was stopped because the result was disappointing.

²⁵⁴ See complete report *Landmeter* Boudewijn Jansz. Vonk in ANRI, RCH No. 20, 11 October 1732, fol. 193-198.

3. *The distribution of land*

Prior to the 1680s, the High Government did not pursue any specific policy about landed property. Considerations to do with the allocation of the land depended largely on the availability of vacant land and its distance from the city. The upshot was that pieces of land were irregular in size and a plot of land could be owned by several persons. In the absence of canals and roads, the most sought-after land was that located to the south of the city in the vicinity of the Ciliwung River. The territories east and west of Batavia were marshy and unsuitable for agriculture and settlement. Land only became useful after roads and a drainage system of canals and ditches had been constructed.

In the early eighteenth century, the legacy from the previous period was still obvious. Various areas of land in all shapes and sizes were owned by Europeans, *Mardijkers*, Chinese, and indigenous people and any regularity in the pattern was hit and miss. The overall pattern of landownership can be seen on a map from the *Heemraden* Collection.²⁵⁵ A glance at this gives the impression that the Dutch owned the best land situated closest to the city. The majority of these properties were situated on the river banks or canals, giving them access to transportation and water for agricultural enterprises. Most of the land owned by Chinese and *Mardijkers* was located fairly far from the city. By and large, their properties were also to be found alongside the rivers or canals. The High Government granted the land farthest away from the city to indigenous leaders and their followers.²⁵⁶ These leaders held the land as fief, but had no right to own landed property outright.²⁵⁷ In most instances, the land granted to these leaders was used to create *kampung*.²⁵⁸ It is important to note that, under the First Ordinance of 8 April 1639, the fief status of a land under the jurisdiction of Batavia could transform into private property or *eigendom* after it had been cultivated.²⁵⁹

Landed estates or *particuliere landerijen* were almost invariably the property of Europeans and Chinese and *Mardijkers*. Soon after the establishment of Batavia in 1619, land in its immediate environs itself was granted in loan or in usufruct. Since safety could not yet be guaranteed in

²⁵⁵ Nationaal Archief (NA), The Hague, Maps Collection, VEL. 1184-1187.

²⁵⁶ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 37.

²⁵⁷ Mona Lohanda, *The Kapitan Cina of Batavia*, p. 200.

²⁵⁸ About *kampung* formation in the Ommelanden see Bondan Kanumoyoso, "The Dynamics of a Hinterland: Ethnic Classification and Kampung Settlements in the Environs of Eighteenth-Century Batavia", in *Historia: Journal Pendidikan Sejarah*, No. 12, Vol. VI, December 2005, pp. 78-82.

²⁵⁹ *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, Vol. III ('s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1919), p. 345.

the environs of Batavia in this period, the land was not yet granted as private property. A Placard of 1 April 1629 stated that people could transfer their land grant to a third party.²⁶⁰ A few years after the peace treaty with Banten was signed in 1684, the Company allowed its citizens to purchase land in the Ommelanden.²⁶¹ Some high-ranking Company officials seized the chance to establish landed estates. Cornelis Chastelein, an extraordinary member of *Raad van Indië* in 1696 and 1697, purchased the Seringsing and Depok estates, located in the southern part of the Ommelanden. Another councillor, Abraham van Riebeck who later became a Governor-General (1709-1713), bought a plot of land in Pondok Poetjoeng in 1701.²⁶² A sketch made by Surveyor Jans Vonk in 1732 provides the information that Wouter Hendrix, also a Council member, possessed a landed estate on the eastern side of the Cakung River.²⁶³

Landed property reaped its owner a host of profits. Besides the advantage of being a secure investment, a landed estate offered a regular income in the form of rents payable in both money and kind. Some estate owners required their tenants to pay their rent in cash, which in actual terms meant compelling the tenants to sell their crops to them. The tenants acquiesced in this demand because the markets in Batavia, where their crops would probably fetch a better price, were too far away for them to undertake the journey there. Most of the tenants in the Ommelanden were Chinese entrepreneurs. Land rent paid in kind served the keep the estate owner furnished with supplies and could free him of the necessity to buy commodities as rice, vegetables, timber, and fish at the market. If the landed property was sufficiently large, the surplus produce from the estate and rents paid in kind could also be sold at the market and generate extra financial benefits. The estate owners were not the only ones to profit from agrarian income provided by their property. Renting land was also a promising proposition for Chinese entrepreneurs. Without actually purchasing land –which would have required huge capital sums -- they still could make their share of profit in the agrarian sector.

A resolution of the *Heemraden* pertaining to some landed estates in the Ommelanden throws light on the management of an estate at the beginning of eighteenth century. One of these landed estates, located on the northern side of the Mokervaart, to the west of Angke River,

²⁶⁰ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 1, pp. 216-217.

²⁶¹ Lohanda, *The Kapitan Cina of Batavia*, p. 201.

²⁶² L. van der Hoek, “De Particuliere landerijen in de Residentie Batavia”, in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift*, Vol. XI, 1922, p. 40.

²⁶³ NA, VEL. 1244.

belonged to Governor-General Diderik Durven.²⁶⁴ This estate was a hub of some industrial and agricultural activities which boasted two sugar-mills, various sugar-cane and rice-fields, and a mulberry orchard. Besides the cultivated areas, it was rich in bamboo groves, forests, and some swamps and ponds. Part of the Durven estate, named Cengkareng, located between Mokervaard and sea coast, was leased to Ni Keng Ko for a period of twenty-seven years at 2,000 *rijksdaalders* per annum. Another plot of land, located to the west of Angke River, was leased to Li Hoey Ko. The size of this area was 500 square *roeden* and its lease cost 100 *rijksdaalders* per year.

The majority of the big landed estates had direct access to the main roads or canals which connected the city with the interior. Cornelis Chastelein's landed estate in Depok, for instance, was located close to the road from Batavia to Buitenzorg (Bogor). Jan Andries Duurkoop's estate in Tanjung West, around 30 kilometres south of Batavia, was also located not far from this road. A big estate usually consisted of a country house, a forest, morasses, irrigated rice- and cane-fields, sugar-mills, various *kampung* for the indigenous inhabitants, market gardens, fish ponds, and pasture for cattle. In the eighteenth century, the most fashionable location for country houses with big estates was the Jakarta *weg*, the road running southeast from Batavia in the direction of the outlying Fort Jacatra.²⁶⁵ Some of these mansions were recorded for posterity by Johannes Rach, a Danish painter who worked for the VOC. Rach's drawings depict Baroque-style mansions with elaborate façades, gateways, and gardens complete with fountains and statues.²⁶⁶


Big estates were naturally inhabited by their owners and their families with their servants and slaves, but were also home to a number of other people who had already been living there before the land had become an estate or by new settlers who usually worked on the land as small peasants. The estate owner permitted these people to cultivate rice and vegetables or to exploit fish ponds. The tenants had to pay a tax called *tjoeke*, which usually amounted to as much as 20 per cent of their harvest. During the Company era, the estate owners held complete authority over their property and the people under their jurisdiction. Indeed they wielded police powers over all and everybody to do with their estates. In their maintenance of law and order, the owners usually employed private guards called *opas*, *centeng*, or *jago*, under the

²⁶⁴ NA, VOC 2211

²⁶⁵ Susan Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History*, p. 36.

²⁶⁶ Reproductions of the drawings of Rach can be found in Max de Bruijn and Bas Kist, *Johannes Rach 1720-1778, Artist in Indonesia and Asia* (Jakarta: National Library of Indonesia, 2001).

supervision of a *mandor*. However, if a serious crime was committed, the owner could invite the *landdrost* to intervene to solve the problem. The absolute authority of the estate owners lasted until 1806, when the government introduced legislation to control abuses of power.²⁶⁷



Map 4: Private estates close to Batavia

Source: Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (London: Curzon Press, 2000), p. 94.

Establishing government control over the private estates presented an enormous problem. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the colonial government was unable to prevent serious abuses of their power by the estate owners and their guards simply because it was too weak to impose any sanctions.²⁶⁸ The *tjoeke* was collected by the estate private guards. This

²⁶⁷ Cobban, "Geographic Notes on the First Two Centuries of Djakarta", p. 141.

²⁶⁸ Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 22.

power placed these guards in the position of intermediaries between the owners and the peasants who made their living from the land. The guards often fleeced the peasants by collecting extra money and goods. Heavy extortion could ultimately elicit resistance from the peasants. There are plenty of popular nineteenth-century stories about local heroes who robbed the estate owners and fought against their henchmen.²⁶⁹

One of the most famous ‘social bandits’ in the nineteenth-century Ommelanden was Si Pitung.²⁷⁰ He is the hero of the *orang Betawi* and was one of the Robin Hoods who roamed around Batavia and its surrounding countryside. According to one folk story, Pitung was forced to turn to robbery after the money he had received from selling his father’s goats in Pasar Tanah Abang had been stolen. His efforts to recover the money from the thief established his reputation as a *jago*.²⁷¹ Pitung was born in Pengumben, a village in Rawabelong south of Batavia. He became notorious after he had robbed a wealthy landowner in Marunda named Haji Sapiudin in 1892.²⁷²

In order to keep an up-to-date overview of landownership, the *Heemraden* presented regular reports about land in private hands. For instance, in May 1702 the Secretary of the *Heemraden* drew up a report about landownership in Tugu,²⁷³ an area located west of Batavia. Tugu had been granted to Batavian Mardijkers who had expressed a wish to settle in the Ommelanden by the Company but were by no means the only people living there. Europeans, Chinese, and indigenous people also owned plots of land in this area. They had received their land as a grant from the Company or had bought it from the Mardijkers. *Majoor* Dirk Thomas, a military officer, was granted a plot of land (Number 2) by the Company on 26 January 1696. Another plot of land (Number 66) belonged to the Chinese Que Kianko. He had bought his land from a descendant of the Mardijker Domingo Rodrigo. Mamoe van Macassar, the widow of Jentief Moda da Costa, bought a plot of land (Number 69) from the Mardijker Joseph de Crux.

In total 117 plots of land in Tugu were registered on the *Heemraaden* list, almost half of them indeed owned by Mardijkers (40%). One big plot could be divided into smaller plots, and be

²⁶⁹ Several Indonesian films have been made about social bandits in the nineteenth-century Ommelanden. They are usually named after their ‘hero’: *Si Pitung* (1970), *Si Ronda Macan Betawi* (1978), and *Jampang* (1983).

²⁷⁰ The history of Si Pitung and crime in nineteenth-century Batavia is comprehensively discussed in Margreet van Till, *Batavia bij Nacht: bloei en ondergang van het Indonesisch van het Indonesisch roverswezen in Batavia en de Ommelanden 1869-1942* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2006).

²⁷¹ *Jago* literary means ‘fighting cock’ but is also used to denote someone with good fighting skills.

²⁷² Margreet van Till, “In search of Si Pitung; The history of an Indonesian legend”, in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 152, No. 3 (Leiden, 1996) p. 462.

²⁷³ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 19 May 1702, fol. 414-426.

owned by several people. Plot Number 82, for instance, was divided into two parts: one half belonged to Pieter Aertsz and Carel Carelsz and the other half was owned by Joan Cops. Plot Number 88 was divided into no fewer than six parts and the owners of this plot were: Domingo Swaris, Anthony Soirde, Francis van Bengale, Lourenz Salomonsz, Carel Gerritsz, and Antony Ferera. Since some plots had been divided into smaller plots, the total number amounted to more than 117:

Table 4: List of landownership in Tugu²⁷⁴

	Number of Plots	Percentage
Mardijker	51	40
European	35	27
The Company	9	7
Chinese	2	1,6
Indigenous	16	12,6
Other Asian	6	4,8
Unknown	9	7
Total	128	100

Other Asians who possessed properties in Tugu were Moors and Papangers. Unknown landed properties were those owned by persons whose identity was not clear. For example: Plots 109 and 110 were owned by the widow of Captain Harmen Egbertsz.²⁷⁵ The identity of the widow is blurred since the *Heemraden* list does not mention her name. The Company also still possessed some plots of land in Tugu, for example, Plot Number One. The income from this plot was reserved for the benefit of the Batavia Poorhouse or *Armenhuis* by the Company. Other Company lands were the plots Numbers 100 to 103, which had previously belonged to Kapitan Jonker of Manipa. After his revolt and subsequent death in 1696, the plots were taken back by the Company and leased out to various persons.

In the course of the years, the Batavian government granted and sold many plots in the Ommelanden, but it remained the biggest landowner. The Company lands were scattered all

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 19 May 1702, fol. 425.

over the Ommelanden and consisted of forests, paddy-fields which were leased to the indigenous peasants, sugar-cane plantations leased out to Chinese sugar entrepreneurs, and *kampung* allocated to the indigenous *kapitans* and their followers. The Company land located close to the Sunter River, for instance, was allocated to the Balinese *kampung* under the Kapitan Kiay Ieman Singa Lodra. According to the report made by *Landmeeter* Bartel van der Valk of 2 June 1702, almost everyday day some recalcitrant people cut down coconut palms and stole other agricultural produce from this *kampung*. In order to prevent further loss and ensure greater stability of law and order, the *landmeeter* asked the Company permission to put this *kampung* under his direct supervision.²⁷⁶

4. *Land utilization*

The idea behind the development of the Ommelanden was to provide Batavia with its daily necessities and to victual the ships which called there. Consequently, land was utilized for such purposes as paddy cultivation, sugar-cane plantations, vegetable, coconut, and market gardens, sugar-mills, pasturage for cows and buffalos and other useful purposes. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that paddy and sugar cultivation were the main agricultural activities which drove the development of the local economy and affected ecology in the Ommelanden. Paddy-fields and sugar plantations require fertile land, supplemented by an abundance of water, ample human resources, and the requisite technical skills. The Ommelanden met all these requirements.

The paddy cultivation was in the hands of indigenous peasants, who were Javanese, Sundanese, and people from Banten. A 1694 report from the head of Jatinegara district, Aria Surawinata, reveals that two general categories of rice were cultivated, namely: *padi gaga* and *padi samah*. The first was a slash-and-burn, dry cultivation of thirty-two varieties of dry rice; the second was a wet form of which there were thirty-four varieties.

The bulk of the paddy *gaga* cultivation was carried out on the well-drained upland soils where the trees and undergrowth had been burned after they had been cut down which suited it. These upland areas varied from fairly low hills to mountainous terrain. Without the enormous effort of building rice terraces, paddy *samah*, on the other hand, had to be cultivated in the

²⁷⁶ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 2 June 1702, fol. 193-194.

lowland areas, on deltaic soils near sea level. This type of rice required soil which would be covered by shallow water for most of the year. Therefore, Paddy *sawah* was usually planted in polders in the vicinity of the river banks.

Aria Surawinata's report mentions that the period of cultivation for the two types of rice varied from between two-and-a-half and five months. Paddy *koas* and *ketak kutik*, for instance, were a fast-growing variety and required only two-and-a-half months before they were ready to harvest. Paddy *katoembaran* needed four months to ripen. Most of the paddy, fifty-eight varieties in all, including *salak*, *devata*, *wonkalan*, *malaman*, required four-and-a-half to five months to reach maturity. The report is quite detailed and provides the information that, besides white rice, the Javanese peasant was cultivating red rice (for instance, *padi dedapan*, *gadonhan*, *panpanaren*) and glutinous rice (for instance, *padi ketan lomboe*, *gadje*, *holik*). Interestingly, Aria Surawinata's list mentions that there were three types of rice used by the Company too as horse fodder: paddy *grogol*, *tzjokrom*, and *omas*.²⁷⁷

The growing number of paddy-fields in the second half of the seventeenth century made it feasible, indeed profitable, to impose a tax on the paddy cultivation. This tax was called *de tiende pady* which meant that the owner of every paddy-field in the Ommelanden had to contribute 10 per cent of his harvest to the Company warehouses. This tax was introduced by the *Heemraden* in 1685.²⁷⁸ To organize the implementation of *de tiende pady*, the *College van Heemraden* appointed one of its members supervisor of the levy and gave him the title: *de Commissaris tot en over de Zaken van de Inlander*.

When it transpired that it was difficult to monitor the collection of paddy without the assistance of the indigenous leaders, in 1689 the *Heemraden* assigned two Javanese captains --a Captain for the Eastern Side and the other was a Captain for the Western Side of the Ciliwung River-- to support *de Commissaris tot en over de Zaken van de Inlander* in supervising and enforcing the tax on paddy. In the undertaking of their duties, the two Javanese captains were assisted by thirteen lower-ranking Javanese officers. Those Javanese officers who were successful in collecting *de tiende pady* were often awarded by the Company with land.²⁷⁹ The annual amount of revenue paddy collected and delivered to the Company warehouses was duly reported to the *Hoge Regering* by the *Heemraden*.

²⁷⁷ KITLV Handschriften Collection, *Bericht over de pady-gevassen door Aria Surawinata, 1694*, KITLV H 238.

²⁷⁸ ANRI, RCH No. 1, 6 October 1685, fol. 97.

²⁷⁹ Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", p. 12.

The majority of the sugar-cane plantations and the sugar-mills were run by the Chinese. They had already developed the traditional sugar industry in Banten, Jayakarta and other port cities in the North Coast of Java long before the establishment of the Dutch East India Company. Before the Chinese immigrants introduced their own cane cultivation technology to Java, the Javanese had been producing and consuming sugar in the form of palm sugar (*gula jawa*), which was made from the sap obtained by tapping the trunk of the Palmyra palm (*aren*). Although the latter is much better nutritionally, cane sugar was more in demand than palm sugar on the international market.

Since sugar-cane also requires an abundant supply of water to grow, the best place for cultivating this plant was on the land located close to a river. Therefore in the Ommelanden most of the sugar-cane plantations were located in the vicinity of the paddy-fields. These two crops had a symbiotic relationship. The expansion of sugar plantations would inevitably bring an expansion of paddy-fields in its train. This tendency was supported by the fact that the irrigation works which were developed for one could also be utilized to irrigate the other. From the point of view of manpower, sugar plantations required a huge influx of labour for harvesting. Therefore, peasants who worked on the rice-fields could work in the cane-fields during the sugar harvest. This temporary, seasonal work on the sugar plantations would provide peasants with extra income.

The bulk of the land used for sugar production was owned by the Company or by European citizens. Consequently, the Chinese sugar growers who wanted to cultivate the land either had to lease or buy it. Tan Siamko, for instance, leased some Company land located on the river bank in Matraman. He planted sugar-cane and when it had ripened he asked the *Heemraden* permission to harvest it. Although Tan Siamko had leased the land, this did not exempt him for paying the *Heemraden* 10 *rijksdaalders* for permission to harvest the sugar-cane.²⁸⁰ Another example is Soey Pieko's request to the *Heemraden* for the licence to operate his three sugar-mills and work his thirty-four sugar-cane plantations, which were located west of Batavia, on the Cengkareng landed estate. He had bought them at an auction held by the *College van Schepenen*. The *Heemraden* gave their permission on condition that, if those properties were to be leased to other persons in the future and that the tenant had to ask the Company permission if he wanted to mill the sugar-cane harvested from them.²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ ANRI, RCH No. 13, 13 June 1716, fol. 110.

²⁸¹ ANRI, RCH No. 22, 19 April 1738, fol. 413.

Sugar-cane was in high demand. Almost all of the vacant land in the Ommelanden suitable for sugar-cane cultivation was utilized. Lim Poanko, for instance, asked authorization from the *Heemraden* to utilize acreage of land for a sugar plantation. The land had previously belonged to Captain Jonker and was located close to Tanjung Priok. He wanted to lease the land for the next three years. The *Heemraden* acceded to Lim Poanko's request on condition that each year he would pay the Company 300 *rijksdaalders*.²⁸²

Sugar-cane was not only planted on the Company lands or landed estates; the river banks were also a prime spot for its cultivation. Adriaan Thamesz, the quartermaster (*wijkmeester*) of Blok G, delivered a report to the *Heemraden* in which he stated that the curbs of the road beside the Pesanggrahan River had been illegally planted with sugar-cane at the several places. He also reported that the river was silting up because of the amount of garbage and the logs which were being thrown into it. Considering the road was used every day and the flow of Pesanggrahan River had to be kept up, the *Heemraden* decided to cut down all the sugar-cane along the road and ordered the local *wijkmeester* to remove the garbage and logs from the river.²⁸³

Fruit, vegetables, and coconuts were cultivated in orchards, gardens and groves located close to the *kampung*. They were even cultivated by the *kampung* inhabitants in their own compounds. Mango, mangosteen, sour lime, grapefruit, tamarind, durian, watermelon, banana, and pineapple were some of the fruit which used to be cultivated for both home consumption and sale at the market. Orchards were a profitable business and therefore in demand and, before renting such land, the prospective lessee would count the number of fruit trees planted on it. For example, Sedelebe, a Moor, leased a plot in *Klein Marunda* to a Chinese named Oey Tsoanko for two years. The area was not mentioned, but it was planted with several sorts of fruit trees such as mangosteen, grapefruit, soursop, coconut, as well as sugar-cane and vegetables. Oey Tsoanko had to pay a rent of 52 ½ *rijksdaalders* a year.²⁸⁴ Joannes Ens, the former *baljuw* of Batavia, leased a piece of land to Oey Tsianko. The land was located in Tanjung Priok and it was planted with coconuts, mangos, sour sops, and grapefruits. Oey Tsianko rented the land for a period of five years and he paid 200 *rijksdaalders* annually.²⁸⁵ The

²⁸² ANRI, RCH No. 7, 16 December 1701, fol. 364.

²⁸³ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 2 April 1701, fol. 340.

²⁸⁴ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2094, minuut akten van verschillende aard (MAVA) Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 3 November 1705.

²⁸⁵ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2097, MAVVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 13 December 1708.

annual rent of Joannes Ens' land was more expensive than Sedelebe's perhaps because it was larger, although it was not as well stocked with fruit trees or other plants.

It was possible to rent fruit trees without actually renting the land. This was a more affordable proposition. Hermanus Kolde de Horn and Fredrik Ribalt both owned land in Peninggaran by the side of the Pesanggrahan River. They leased fruit trees on their land to Mrs Appolonia Davids for two years, at a rate of 24 *rijksdaalders* a year. When her lease had expired, Mrs Davids had to return the fruit trees in good condition.²⁸⁶

Another commercial plant cultivated in the Ommelanden was betel (*sirih*). Betel leaf combined with slaked lime and areca nut from the *Pinang* palm is still used by indigenous people for chewing (*menyirih*) after meals to stimulate digestion. The leaf also has medicinal purposes and plays a role in various traditional ceremonies. Betel vines were cultivated by indigenous people and by the Chinese. Tan Tsoenio farmed betel vines in sixty gardens on his land along the banks of the Anke River. He rented his garden to Gouw Hoeko and Gouw Tinko for two years. Each tenant rented thirty of Tan Tsoenio's gardens on condition that, if some of the betel vines dried out or rotted, they had to replace them with new ones. The rent of the thirty gardens was 35 *rijksdaalders* a year.²⁸⁷ Jacob Jacobsz, a Christian *inlandse burger*, leased his betel vines to Tsoa Siongko for two years. The betel plants were scattered among the fruit trees on his land in Tugu. With the exception of some which grew on the *moerengas* trees, the betel plants were rented for 13 *rijksdaalders* per year.²⁸⁸

Small factories also became part of the picture of economic enterprise in the Ommelanden. The city of Batavia and the Company required some local factory products for their day-to-day necessities. The high demand for building materials, household items, and strong liquor encouraged some entrepreneurs to establish brickworks and tile-yards, lime-kilns, potteries, and arak distilleries. Before commencing an enterprise, an entrepreneur required a licence from the *Heemraden*.²⁸⁹ This application process was an instrument by which the *Heemraden* could monitor and control the number of factories in the Ommelanden. They felt it was necessary to limit the number of factories in order to prevent entrepreneurs from bankruptcy and control

²⁸⁶ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3264, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 19 January 1711.

²⁸⁷ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2092, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 25 January 1703.

²⁸⁸ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3269, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 3 October 1712.

²⁸⁹ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 3, p. 405.

unbridled competition; nevertheless, never losing sight of the fact that they were smoothing the way to providing the Company with cheap manufactured products.²⁹⁰

The manufacturing of bricks, tiles, and pottery was often combined in one workplace, which consisted of kilns and ovens inside a hut, roofed with tiles or sago palm leaves. The firing process required by all three products was time-consuming and required large quantities of firewood. It produced a thin smoke. The factory products were brought to the city on small boats (*perahu*) plying the rivers or canals. One obvious reason most of the factories were located by the sides of rivers. Te Hoeko, for instance, requested permission from the Company to establish a new pottery factory, to be located on a piece of land bordering the Molenvliet. He rented the land from Jo Tsilauw, and built a sugar-pot factory for which he had obtained a licence from the *Heemraden* two years earlier.²⁹¹

On 4 February 1719, Jap Tong Lauw asked the *Heemraden* permission to operate a tile-yard and brickworks on his own private land, on the west bank of Krukut River. He had inherited the land from his father, Jap Keeko, who in turn had inherited it from his father, Jap Sitse. The grandfather had received a licence to operate a tile-yard and brickworks on the same land in January 1695, but the licence had expired at his death. Three weeks after the request was lodged, the *Heemraden* granted the licence.²⁹²

5. *The value of the land*

The value of the land was determined by its location and the condition of the soil: namely, whether it was fertile or not. The value of land in a good location --close to the city, rivers or canals-- was naturally high. The same went for fertile lands that were suitable for paddy fields or sugar cane plantations. The value of land farther away from the city or not located on the river banks or canals could be increased by building new infrastructure. Some good examples are the Chinese Kapitan, Phoa Bingham who dug the Molenvliet in 1648, a member of the *Raad van Indië*, François Caron, dug the *Ancielse Vaart* which connected his private estate in Ancol with Batavia. Other canals were also excavated by private initiative, among them the *Amanusgracht* and the *Bacheraghtsgracht* which made a link between the Anke River and Batavia,

²⁹⁰ Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", p. 9.

²⁹¹ ANRI, RCH No. 8, 24 Augustus 1703, fol. 122.

²⁹² ANRI, RCH No. 14, 4 February 1719, fol. 41-43.

and the *Sontarse Vaart* which connected Sunter with the city. In the course of time, the runnings of all of these canals were taken over by the Company.²⁹³

Each landowner who required a deed of property had to register his ownership with the *Heemraden*. Registered lands would be taxed annually. In most instances, the percentage of the estimated value of the land taxed is not known but several illustrations which reveal the amount of tax levied at specific locations can be provided. According to a report submitted to the *Heemraden* by *Landmeter* Bartel van der Valk in October 1697²⁹⁴, the Balinese Kapitan Lampidia owned a piece of land on the bank of the Grogol River 104 *roeden*²⁹⁵ wide and 250 *roeden* long in the north and south. The *Heemraden* estimated that Kapitan Lampidia should pay tax of as much as 40 *rijksdaalders* annually. The land belonging to *Burger* Dirk Bartelsz located on the side of Pesanggrahan River was taxed at 80 *rijksdaalders*. The width of the land was 400 *roeden* on both the northern and southern sides, and the length was 680 *roeden*. Mrs Jeronima Marinus, widow of Simon Simons, paid an annual tax of 150 *rijksdaalders* on her land located between Pesanggrahan River and Santiga Springs. The width of the land was 1250 *roeden*, while its length was 1280 *roeden*.

The buying and selling of land in the Ommelanden was actively indulged in by every ethnic group which lived in that area. The conveyancing of sales and purchases usually had to take place in the presence of a notary and then announced to the *Heemraden* so that the deed could be legalized. Though the Dutch were the biggest landowners, Chinese, Indonesians, and Mardijkers were also actively involved in purchases and sales of lands. Most of the plots which were traded were fields, sugar-cane plantations, market gardens, or land on which fishponds were located.

A plantation belonging to a Chinese named I Sanio was located close to the Fort Vijfhoek to the southwest of the city wall. This plot was 12 *roeden* wide and 49 *roeden* long. Sou Hienko bought this plantation for 220 *rijksdaalders* making a down payment of 60 *rijksdaalders*. The remaining 160 *rijksdaalders* were to be paid two months later.²⁹⁶ Another example was the land located in Kota Bambu, west of Tanah Abang sold by Sayit from Bali to two Balinese women,

²⁹³ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 58-59.

²⁹⁴ ANRI, RCH No. 7, 14 October 1697, fol. 185-188.

²⁹⁵ A *Roede* was used to measure the size of land in Batavia and its surrounding in the 17th and 18th century. 1 *roede* equals 3,767 metres.

²⁹⁶ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3263, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 4 November 1710.

Tjeramsan and Nyai Boedoek, for 315 *rijksdaalders*. The area of land was 29 and its length was 176 *roeden*.

The Company itself also sold land. For instance, on 25 March 1713, the *Heemraden* published a resolution which announced the sale of the VOC swamp land in Ancol to a Papanger named Jan Anginang. The land measured 30 by 70 *roeden*, and was sold for the low price of 20 *rijksdaalders*.²⁹⁷ On basis of the many transaction recorded in the *Minuut-akten van verschillende aard*, we have to draw the conclusion that leasing was far more frequent than buying or selling land; an indication that the inhabitants of the Ommenlanden preferred to lease land for their agricultural endeavours rather than buy it. The farmers and entrepreneurs who were pursuing ventures in the Ommelanden were people with limited capital but who played an active role in production.

The majority of tenants were Chinese entrepreneurs who owned sugar-mills. Among them was Tan Tsoenko who rented a piece of land from Joan Harman, an *opperkoopman* who worked in Batavia Castle. Joan Harman's land could be reached after a 6-hour walk in a southwesterly direction from the city wall and was located somewhere between the Angke River and Santiga Springs. The width of this plot was 300 *roeden*. Its length was not clear. Tan Tsoenko wanted to build a sugar-mill there and plant sugar-cane on it. He rented Joan Harman's land for five years and paid 180 *rijksdaalders* per annum.²⁹⁸

Other tenants were farmers who planted paddy. Patimalela, a Bandanese, rented a piece of paddy-field from a Mardijker named Alexander van Coylang. It was located close to the Sunter River and measured 10 by 250 *roeden*. It was leased for two years. This farmer did not pay the rent in cash, but with a portion of his harvest. Each year, Patimalela had to pay 60 bunches of paddy with each bunch weighing 12 *cattijs*.²⁹⁹ Pieter Anthonys, a sergeant, rented out a fishpond and a piece of land attached to it for one year to Oey Tecko and Wayahan Sampalang. This plot was located north of the Greuningergracht and cost 27 *rijksdaalders* for one year.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷ ANRI, Minuut Generale Resolutien (MGR) No. 498, 4 April 1713.

²⁹⁸ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3263, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 12 July 1710.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 23 September 1710.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 22 Augustus 1710.

6. Conflicts about land

Landownership in the Ommelanden increased considerably once the Batavian government had been able to establish law and order there at the end of the seventeenth century. During this period people from the city of Batavia and the surrounding regions came in droves to turn the virgin land into sugar plantations, paddy-fields, and gardens. Before the *Heemraden* were established, the government had only little or no control over the use of land and the conveyance of landownership.

Every new inhabitant of the Ommelanden could easily lay claim to virgin territory. Without giving as much as a second glance at the legal procedures, the new settlers built small houses (*pondok*) and began to cultivate the land. Most of these new settlers were Javanese from Mataram, Bantenese, and Sundanese from Priangan. It was impossible for the government to expel all the illegal settlers, since their number kept on rising all the time. In the long run, the Batavian government learned to live with them since these settlers proved to be harmless. As long as the illegal settlers did not create problems and the land on which they settled had not yet been granted to anyone else, the administration allowed them to stay. Only after the *Heemraden* began to operate effectively in 1682, did the government gradually commence strengthening its grip on landownership in the Ommelanden.

The legal status of individual landownership was divided into two categories: land in public possession and donated land. The public land belonged to the Company but was given in use to people who had acquired the proper rights to utilize it. The onus was on the owner to maintain roads, bridges, and ditches located in the vicinity of the land. He or she was also required to pay a tithe if the land was cultivated with paddy. Donated land was that handed out in the form of grants with the right of ownership to an individual by the *Hoge Regering*. The recipient of a land grant would be presented with an *acte van donatie*, and then an *erfbrief*.³⁰¹ Sometimes persons who received donated land had to pay a sum of money, but usually they were granted the land free of charge.

The existence of these two categories of landownership could lead to conflicts. Most of the landowners who owned their own land were indigenous peasants and gardeners who had settled on the land which it was still virgin soil and had turned it into paddy-fields or market

³⁰¹ Niemeijer, *Batavia: Een koloniale samenleving*, pp.140-141.

gardens and orchards. When the land became profitable, other people frequently tried to seize it. They would request an *acte van donatie* from the *Hoge Regering* in order to acquire the land as a grant. If the request was approved, the indigenous peasant living on the land risked losing his or her land, which was on quite the cards because the legal status of a land grant was stronger than the land which people had taken possession of.

A land conflict could arise when the owner of repossessed land would fight his land being handed over to a third party. For instance, a land conflict arose between Narrapatty, a Makasarese lieutenant, and Anthony de la Cores, a Christian Papanger. Narrapatty had a piece of land of which he had taken possession by the side of the Tangerang River. He had cultivated paddy on his land for thirty years, and his possession of the land was authorized by the *Heemraden* since he paid the tithe regularly to the Company. Some time in 1702, Anthony de la Cores, who owned a piece of land located alongside Narrapatty's, grabbed 12 *roeden* of Narrapatty's land. It is not clear whether the 12 *roeden* indicated the acreage of the land or the length of the strip seized by De la Cores. Narrapatty brought this case before the *Heemraden*. To resolve the quarrel, the *Heemraden* assigned the *landmeeter* Bartel van der Valk to investigate the matter and make a report on the basis of which the *Heemraden* could make a fair decision.³⁰²

³⁰² ANRI, RCH No. 7, 8 December 1702, fol. 489-490.

CHAPTER FIVE

SLAVERY AND LABOUR

Introduction

If it were ever to develop successfully in an economic sense, it was obvious that Batavia would require a large labour force. Aware of this shortage, the Company imported large numbers of slaves from South Asia and elsewhere in Indonesia and also recruited in abundance a host of Chinese and Javanese labourers. The slave trade in the Indonesian Archipelago had existed long before the arrival of Europeans and in fact Eastern Indonesia replaced South Asia as chief supplier of slaves for Batavia soon after the fall of Makassar in 1667. In the Ommelanden, even though they might only be able to afford two or three slaves, the majority of the slaves were owned by Balinese, Chinese, and other Indonesian ethnicities and the numbers of these slaves far exceeded those owned by Dutch citizens.

The bulk of the relatively cheap 'free' labour was recruited from China and the North Coast of Java. The bulk of the Chinese labour force was recruited from the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung in southeast China and these men were put to work in various jobs in the sugar industry. Javanese labour came from the Priangan and Cirebon to work as paddy cultivators, woodcutters, cattle herds, and plantation workers.

1. The demand for manpower in the Ommelanden

After struggling through sixty years of intermittent wars and armistices with Banten and Mataram, the Company eventually gained firm control of the environs of Batavia. Until that moment, despite the rather disturbed conditions, there had been two phases of economic development in the Ommelanden encouraged by the Company. The first serious efforts to increase agricultural production were undertaken in the 1640s but suddenly came to an end in 1656 in the wake of raids in the vicinity of Batavia by Bantenese soldiers. Unquestionably, it is no empty claim that the economic development of the Ommenlanden in this first phase was

pioneered by Chinese sugar entrepreneurs and rice cultivators.³⁰³ The years between 1659 and 1683 witnessed a revival of the Ommelanden economy in response to the renewed development of the sugar industry. This time such Dutch entrepreneurs as Abraham Pittavin, Isaac de St. Martin, and Pieter van Hoorn were encouraged by the Company to take the initiative.³⁰⁴

Although the sugar industry was revitalized during this second phase, it and other agricultural activities continued to be a rather risky venture because the relations with Banten and Mataram were still unstable. The real economic potential of the Ommelanden could not be developed until the principality of Cirebon conceded sovereignty to the Company in 1681 and peace contracts were signed with Mataram (1677) and Banten (1683). The latter treaty solved all its problems for Batavia. With the exception of the sultanate of Banten itself, the Company now governed all of West Java through the medium of contracts.

Having achieved this result, the commercial and agricultural interests of the Company in the areas surrounding of Batavia expanded rapidly. As the economic activities intensified, the need for manpower to be put to work in a whole range of activities in the newly pacified region rose proportionately. If the establishment of settlements or *kampung* in the surrounding areas of Batavia was mainly the consequence of encouragement by the Company because of the threat posed to security prior to 1684, most people who now came to settle did so on their own initiative, seeking employment in the sugar industry, brickworks, arak distilleries, cattle herding, or engaging in wet-rice cultivation.

A large area of the Ommelanden had not yet been cleared and settled until the middle of the seventeenth century, consequently the population was still small. The first census of 1673 gives the information that no more than 9,311 people resided outside the city walls. Among these people were 3,680 Mardijkers, 3,343 slaves, and the rest were Europeans (313), Mestizos (101), Chinese (392), Moors and Javanese (928), Malays (251), and Balinese (303).³⁰⁵ Because of the sparseness of the population, especially in the areas at a distance of more than one-day's walk from the city, it was an uphill battle to develop the Ommelanden as a commercial and agricultural area which could be economically beneficial to Batavia.

³⁰³ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p.84.

³⁰⁴ Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", p. 5.

³⁰⁵ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 321.

An abundance of manpower would be required if successful economic development were to take off. In an initial attempt to solve this problem, the Company brought in bands of native militia men and their families from various places in the Archipelago and settled them in the immediate surroundings of Batavia. However, these soldiers often had to leave their *kampung* to join in the Company military campaigns, their total number was not enough to populate the region and provide an adequate, stable work force. Consequently a large part of the potentially productive land lay idle.

The best long-term solution to this situation was to increase the population by immigration and to offer prospective agricultural entrepreneurs favourable terms. The main obstacle to adopting the first approach was that it was difficult to control the influx of immigrants from China and closer to home from Banten and Mataram. Many of the Chinese immigrants entered Batavia illegally and the immigrants from the latter two regions often occupied land which already belonged to the Company or to other persons. Another hurdle was the lack of initial capital for opening up the land and establishing the essential infrastructure. Fortunately, the end of seventeenth century witnessed a sugar boom so it was not that difficult to find entrepreneurs who were willing to invest their money in agricultural activities. Moreover, by making the move to establish the *College van Heemraden*, the High Government committed itself to endorsing the orderly development of the Ommelanden infrastructure.

The main interests of the Company lay in the field of commerce and therefore, in most cases, the Batavian government preferred to limit its involvement in the organization of agricultural and industrial products and its attempts to control the supply of labour. The sugar industry and arak distilleries in the Ommelanden had long been run by Chinese entrepreneurs, while the cultivation of paddy and various vegetables in the same region was in the hands of indigenous peasants. There were, however, some exceptions in the cultivation of some of the cash crops, notably the nutmeg production in Banda Archipelago with slave labour and coffee and indigo cultivation in the Priangan in West Java. Here special arrangements had to be made by the Company to ensure that it controlled production.

To fulfil the demand for manpower in Batavia, the colonial government employed thousands of slaves. As early as 1645, it was noted that neither the Company nor the European

community in the Archipelago could survive without slave labour.³⁰⁶ In 1694, there were 215 Company slaves working in the dockyard on the small island of Onrust. Another 953 slaves were employed in various jobs inside the city of Batavia. In the same year, the Company also hired 579 slaves from the civilian population.³⁰⁷ The colonial recruitment of slave labour to do the manual work and to bolster manufacturing was in fact an extension of the slave system which had existed since time immemorial in Southeast Asia but which was quite different from the system of chattel slave labour on the American plantations. Nevertheless, the colonial government did take a hand in regulating the system by imposing its own legal institutions and measures.

As organization and institution, the Company might have been the first formal slave-holder of its kind in Asia. Over time under its aegis, extensive slave trade networks developed in the Indian Ocean which encompassed all VOC settlements from the Cape of Good Hope in the west to the Moluccas in the east.³⁰⁸ Every year the Dutch purchased or hired hundreds of slaves for jobs which could not be filled by the recruitment of either European or locally hired free labour. The small number of Europeans in Batavia and the high cost of hiring free labour³⁰⁹ made Batavia a city dependent on slave power. The majority of these slaves worked as house servants, artisans, coolies, and canal dredgers. Some slaves provided the labour for the Company industries such as the gunpowder-mills.

Individuals living under Company administration also had slaves; many actually owned quite large numbers. In the Ommelanden the greatest demand for slave labour was from civilians. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, when this region came under the jurisdiction of the Batavian government, private entrepreneurs took the initiative in developing the agricultural and industrial sectors. The High Government inventory from the year 1696 provides the information that in between 1660-1695, 181 rural factories were built in the areas surrounding Batavia consisting of 116 sugar-mills, thirty-three brickworks, ten limekilns, and twenty-two saw-mills.³¹⁰ Most of these enterprises were got off the ground by private, predominantly Chinese, entrepreneurs. Of the 116 sugar-mills, for example, ninety-six were built by Chinese,

³⁰⁶ Peter Boomgaard, "Human Capital, Slavery and Low Rates of Economic and Population Growth in Indonesia, 1600-1910", in Gwyn Campbell (ed.), *The Structure of Slavery in Indian Africa and Asia* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), p. 85.

³⁰⁷ Jan Lucassen, "A Multinational and its Labor force: The Dutch East India Company, 1595-1795", in *International Labor and Working-Class History*, No. 66, fall 2004, p. 14.

³⁰⁸ Ward, *Networks of Empire*, p. 81.

³⁰⁹ Lucassen, "A Multinational and its Labor force", p. 14.

³¹⁰ Niemeijer, "The Closure of the Bendungan", p. 6.

eleven by Mardijkers, seven by Europeans, and two by Javanese.³¹¹ Without doubt, some of the labour used to build and later to work these rural factories was provided by slaves. Unfortunately there are no representative sources available which shed light on the division and composition of labour in these rural factories.

Local agriculture also required slaves as manpower. Various phases of the work in the sugar- and rice-fields and the market gardens, such as ploughing, sowing, and keeping the fields or gardens safe from the ravages of wild boars, but especially the harvesting, demanded a large supply of manpower. In this instance, the bulk of the demand for slave labour was from indigenous farmers. Thousands of slave sales in the Ommelanden, which were recorded in the notarial archives of Batavia, show that most of the slave buyers in the Ommelanden were indigenous people. Compared to the Dutch and Chinese, they were small-scale entrepreneurs but there were many of them. The majority of these indigenous agriculturalists were rice cultivators and market gardeners. In contrast to Dutch and Chinese entrepreneurs, they could only afford to buy two or three slaves and often shared the same dwelling with their slaves.

Despite the employment of slaves as manpower, the total demand for a labour force in the Ommelanden could not be satisfied. The solution was to recruit labour from elsewhere. One of the main sources of relatively cheap labour was the influx of Chinese migrant workers. The majority of them were natives of the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung in southeast China. Several push-and-pull factors drove the Chinese workers to the Nanyang (the Chinese term for the South Seas or insular Southeast Asia). The story of their migration is a historical cocktail of waxing maritime trade, unstable political condition at home, great population pressure, and a limited amount of available land for agriculture in their home villages. The number of Chinese immigrants who entered Batavia and its immediate vicinity increased considerably after the Kangxi Emperor restored maritime trade with Southeast Asia in 1684 under the motto 'prosperous people through trade'.³¹² This policy was an opportunity which spurred thousands of migrant workers from the southeast Chinese coastal provinces to take a passage to Batavia and look for jobs in flourishing agriculture of the Ommelanden.

By coincidence, the year 1684 also marks the moment the Company finally gained firm control of the Ommelanden and, concomitantly, the upper hand over neighbouring Cirebon

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

³¹² Leonard Blussé, *Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 28.

and the Priangan. The integration of these regions under the sovereignty of Batavia and the Company hegemony over the Pasisir created ideal conditions for the recruitment of yet another, much cheaper source for labour: the Javanese *bujang* (young male worker). Attracted by the progress in the sugar and rice cultivation which was going ahead by leaps and bounds, large numbers of Javanese seasonal workers moved to the Ommelanden to work on the sugar and rice plantations. The influx of this source of Javanese labour was difficult to control since no system had been put into place to supervise their entry. The problem was exacerbated because the porous borders of the Ommelanden were too extended to be properly patrolled by the limited number of Company troops. Despite these hurdles, the colonial authority did make an attempt to administer the Javanese by allocating plots of land in order to concentrate their settlements. It was really a wasted effort, since the Javanese were inclined to choose to settle scattered throughout the rural area.

In the Ommelanden, the usual practice of the *bujang* was to offer their labour to sugar entrepreneurs as a group. In their dealings with the entrepreneurs, these labourers were represented by one person who probably was the same man who also acted as their overseer (*mandoor*). Most of these people who represented the *bujang* were free men and some of them were lower-ranking Javanese officers such as sergeants or *vaandrighs*. A Javanese *vaandrigh* by the name of Singa Dria Crocot, for example, signed a contract with a Chinese sugar-miller, Poa Keengko, to deliver twenty-two Javanese labourers to work at Keengko's sugar-mill in Paccabangan.³¹³ Another Javanese officer, Sergeant Prana Wangsa, was committed to delivering twenty-one labourers to a sugar-mill in Panghadagam (Pengadegan) when he signed a contract with the mill owner, Qua Koko.³¹⁴ It seems that most of the men who were recruited by the Javanese officers were actually inhabitants of the *kampung* over which these officers had been appointed.

In 1686 and 1687, in anticipation of the growth of rural economic activities and the increasing flow of migrant labourers, the Batavian government prepared hundreds of hectares of Company land in the Ommelanden for the construction of new *kampung* and the opening up of agricultural areas.³¹⁵ This initiative was welcomed with open arms by the *kampung* leaders. They put in petitions for grants of the Company land in order to provide their followers with a

³¹³ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2089, Minuut Akten van Verschillende Aard (MAVA) Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 7 April 1700.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

³¹⁵ Niemeijer, "The closure of the Bendungan", p. 5.

source of income. The end of the seventeenth and the beginning of eighteenth century were marked by a rapid growth of population and a vigorous expansion of agricultural areas. The favourable land policy just happened to coincide with the sugar boom and turned out to be a strong magnet attracting thousands of Chinese and Javanese labourers to come to settle in the Ommelanden. This situation created an ideal atmosphere for the successful expansion of the Ommelanden economy in the half century between 1684 and the 1730s.

2. *The slave trade in the Ommelanden*

Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century eyewitness accounts provide evidence that the slave trade in Southeast Asia was well established long before the Europeans became involved in it. In 1516, Duarte Barbosa mentioned that ships sailed from Melaka and Java to Timor to purchase sandalwood, horses, honey, wax, pepper, and slaves.³¹⁶ In a 1597 report, a Dutchman named Lintgensz mentioned that women in Bali were bought and enslaved.³¹⁷ A Spanish source of 1609 says that the indigenous people of the Philippines often traded slaves like any other article of merchandise, from village to village, from province to province, and indeed from island to island.³¹⁸ However, these accounts from the sixteenth and the beginning of seventeenth century need further definition: a slave is a 'saleable' person who is regarded as the property of the buyer.³¹⁹

Slaves, captives, and forced labourers were the primary sources of labour in Southeast Asia long before the use of indentured labour was developed under colonial rule in the nineteenth century. Slavery was also an urban phenomenon in pre-modern Southeast Asia. As centres of commerce and hubs of economic activities, Southeast Asian emporia required manpower; a need which was satisfied by the large-scale importation of slaves.

Before the Europeans dominated Southeast Asian waters, port principalities like Melaka, Aceh, Banten, and Makassar had already become centres of a slave trade stretching over long

³¹⁶ Rodney Needham, *Sumba and the Slave Trade* (Clayton: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Working Paper 31, 1983), p. 1.

³¹⁷ Aernoudt Lintgensz, "Verhael van't gheene mij op't eijlandt van Baelle wedervaeren is, terwijl ick er aan landt ben gheweest, alshier nae vollijghen sall", in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde*, 5, 1856, p. 216.

³¹⁸ Anthony Reid, "Introduction", in Anthony Reid (ed.), *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983), p. 1.

³¹⁹ Anthony Reid, "The Decline of Slavery in Nineteenth-Century Indonesia", in Martin A. Klein (ed.), *Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage, and Emancipation in Modern Africa and Asia* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin, 1993), p. 65.

distances from Papua New Guinea to the Coromandel Coast and from Sumbawa to Philippines. In this period a slave was considered as a luxury item. Owing to the high price demanded for them, most of the slaves were owned by the local elite and the wealthier members of the society. In other words, owning a slave was also a symbol of social status.

The arrival of the Dutch in the Indonesian Archipelago obviously did not commence the slave trade in this region, but it undoubtedly influenced the activities of the local trading networks. As the major commercial hub in Southeast Asia, Batavia gained a reputation not only as the centre of the trade in spices, textiles, and ceramics but also a centre of slave trade.³²⁰ Since Batavia was the rendezvous for an Asia-wide transit trade, this entrepôt was not the final destination of all slaves arriving there. Slaves were exported to various Company settlements in Asia, among them the Banda Archipelago, the Moluccas, and Cape Town. Nevertheless, Batavia itself remained the main collection point for the slaves who were found in the Dutch possessions in Asia.³²¹

The places of origin of slaves in the Archipelago did not change drastically from what they had been before and after the arrival of the European. Most of the slaves originated from Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Buton in the north and Bali, Sumbawa, Flores, Timor, and Papua in the east, where the inhabitants had not yet been converted to Islam and where usually there was no strong centralized political authority. The supply of slaves from the Indonesian Archipelago to Batavia fluctuated in response to local political and economic conditions. Famines in those regions caused by natural and human disasters and wars between local potentates generated people who were (often quite willingly) sold as slaves to indigenous or European slave traders.

However, in the first thirty years of the existence of Batavia, the majority of the slaves came from Bengal, Malabar and other South Asian regions. They were acquired or captured from the Portuguese and their number increased when more slaves began to be sent from Melaka after its conquest in 1641.³²² Many of these slaves had already converted to Christianity and spoke a Creole-Portuguese among themselves. In this period, Batavia still had to depend on supplies from distant places since it did not have direct control of the slave trade in the Archipelago which was still largely in the hands of private Asian and European traders. In fact,

³²⁰ A. van der Kraan, "Bali: Slavery and Slave Trade", in Reid (ed.), *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency*, p. 330.

³²¹ De Haan, *Oud Batavia*, Vol. I, p. 454.

³²² J. Fox, "For Good and Sufficient Reasons: An Examination of Early Dutch East India Company Ordinances on Slaves and Slavery", in Reid (ed.), *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency*, p. 249.

the Company preferred slaves from distant places because the greater the distance from their homelands, the less the possibility of slaves absconding from any situation they found intolerable.³²³

Eastern Indonesia only began to replace South Asia as the main source of slaves after the fall of the powerful Makassar sultanate of Goa in southwest Sulawesi in 1667.³²⁴ Before that year, only a small number of slaves had been imported into Batavia directly from Sulawesi. The trading network of Makassar now fell under Company control. Lists of VOC slave populations in the main towns on Java during 1680s suggest that the largest single ethnic groups (over 30 per cent) among the Company slaves was made up of the Buginese and Makassarese.³²⁵ Because Makassar had traditionally been the port of embarkation for slaves from Sulawesi itself as well as from Kalimantan, Buton, Sumba, Sumbawa, Solor, Mandar, and other islands in Nusatenggara, not all the slaves from this port town were native Makassarese but were natives from all over Eastern Indonesia. In the VOC documents, there are plenty of references to the troublesome and rebellious character of the Bugis slaves from South Sulawesi. This character trait was certainly rooted to some extent in their strong Muslim identity but was also a consequence of the facts that these ethnic groups continued vigorously to resist their social, political, and especially commercial displacement by the Dutch and they maintained their unswerving loyalty to their allies to Sulawesi.³²⁶

Bali was also an important slave supplier for Batavia. From the middle of the seventeenth until the early nineteenth century, it consistently exported a significant number of slaves to the VOC headquarters; the total volume is roughly estimated to be 100,000 to 150,000 slaves.³²⁷ Besides their own superfluous subjects, the Balinese kings also exported many slaves who had come from other islands in Eastern Indonesia such as Lombok, Sumba, and Sumbawa.³²⁸ As in the case of the export of slaves from Makassar, this explains that the port of departure of the ship which transported slaves did not necessarily indicate the place origin of the slaves. During the VOC period the vast majority of slave exports from Bali, via the ports of Kuta and

³²³ Reid, "Introduction", p.15.

³²⁴ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 122.

³²⁵ Heather Sutherland, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in South Sulawesi, 1660s-1800s", in Reid (ed.), *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency*, p. 268.

³²⁶ Rik van Welie, "Patterns of slave trading and slavery in the Dutch colonial world, 1596-1863", in Geert Oostindie (ed.), *Dutch Colonialism, Migration and Cultural Heritage* (Leiden: KITLV, 2008), p. 197.

³²⁷ Henk Schulte Nordholt, *The Spell of Power: A History of Balinese politics, 1650-1940* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), p. 41.

³²⁸ C. Lekkerkerker, *De Baliërs van Batavia* (Amsterdam: J.H. De Bussy, 1918), p. 6.

Buleleng, went to the Batavia market.³²⁹ The control of this export was in the hands of Chinese merchants and Balinese slave traders who transported the slaves and sold them to Batavian Chinese, Dutch free burgers, and free Indonesians. The domination of Chinese and non-Dutch slave traders in the Balinese slave export from Batavia gives the impression that the Company was not the 'main player' in the displacement of these Balinese slaves.

The sudden rise in the number of slaves imported from within the boundaries of the Indonesian Archipelago stirred up some unease in the higher echelons of the Company. Therefore, in order to avoid the growth of feelings of solidarity and concomitant slave revolts, steps were taken to stop the concentration of slaves from the same place of origin in Batavia and the Ommelanden. Such fears were also the thinking behind the decision of the Batavian government to restrict slave imports from certain areas and to try to differentiate the supply regions. This policy became evident in October 1688, when the government issued an ordinance decreeing the prohibition of the import of slaves from the Eastern Archipelago without the explicit permission of the authorities.³³⁰ In this same ordinance, the import of slaves by Indonesian traders was forbidden and in practice the slave trade was restricted to Company officials or to other traders who had been granted an exclusive licence. All the informal slave trade between Batavia and Bali was prohibited so as to guarantee the implementation of the decree.³³¹ Yet, no matter how hard the Company tried to limit the import of slaves from the Archipelago, the restrictions on slave imports from Eastern Indonesia were gradually relaxed when the demand for slave labour rose to new heights in the 1720s.³³² Makassar and Bali were to remain the main suppliers of slaves for Batavia.

In economic terms, a slave was not an important commercial commodity for the Company. In contrast to the Dutch West India Company (*West-Indische Compagnie*) which traded between West Africa and the West Indies, the Dutch East India Company did not regard the slave trade as its core business. In the eighteenth century, when the slave trade was substantially higher than it had been in the seventeenth century, it accounted for only 0.5 per cent of the total value of Company trade.³³³ This reckoning does not include the private slave trade carried on

³²⁹ Rik van Welie, "Patterns of slave trading", p. 199.

³³⁰ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 3, p. 239-240.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

³³² Remco Raben, "Cities and the slave trade in early-modern Southeast Asia", in Peter Boomgaard, Dick Kooiman, Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds.), *Linking Destinies. Trade, towns and kin in Asian history* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), p. 129.

³³³ Jacobs, *Merchant in Asia*, p. 418.

by Company servants, free burgers, Asian slave traders, and indigenous people who were subjects of the VOC. Therefore, although the slave trade was of little financial importance to the Company itself, the inhabitants of Batavia became big slave traders.



Illustration 6: Slave auction in Batavia, c.1800

Source: Anthony Reid (ed.), *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983), p. 298.

The Company left the shipping of slaves to Batavia in the hands of private entrepreneurs and contented itself with levying taxes on this activity. In 1720, for every female slave sold at the market in Batavia, the vendor was expected to pay a tax of around 10 *rijksdaalders* and the same amount was levied on a male slave two years later.³³⁴ Anthony Reid states that about 1,000 slaves were imported into Batavia annually in the seventeenth century. This number increased to about 3,000 during the eighteenth century.³³⁵ The census records of 1709, 1719, and 1739 show that the percentage of slaves amounted to 33.8 per cent, 29.7 per cent, and 28 per cent of the total population of the walled city and its surroundings.³³⁶

To understand how the slave trade was conducted in the Ommelanden, it is necessary to scrutinize the collection of the notarial archives in the *Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia* (National Archive of the Republic of Indonesia/ANRI) in Jakarta. This collection is one of the

³³⁴ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 4, p. 149.

³³⁵ Reid, "Introduction", p. 29.

³³⁶ See the list of Batavia and surrounding area population in Raben, "Cities and the slave trade in early-modern Southeast Asia", p. 128.

primary sources for research into the social and economic life of Batavian society.³³⁷ Reliable information about slave trade in Batavia and its environs is available because the notaries scrupulously recorded sales, manumissions, and leases involving slaves. Notarial documents which are useful to research into slavery can be divided into various categories and include wills, attestations, trade contracts and other documents relating to the transfer of slaves.³³⁸ What are known as *akten van transport* contain precious information about the names, sex, ethnic origins, and domiciles of the people, the vendor, buyer, and witness, involved in slave transactions. *Akten van transport* also provide the name, sex, ethnic origin, and price of the slave as the object of this transaction.

Buying and selling slaves was a daily activity among the people in the Ommelanden. A visit to a notary for the purpose of having an *akte van transport* drawn up could be undertaken by anyone and the sum involved was trifling.³³⁹ The ratification of a slave transfer in front of a notary provided legal proof of the transaction. A visit to a notary was not confined to the Europeans and Chinese who formed the high and middle strata in Ommelanden society, indigenous people who often could only afford one or two slaves were also among his clientele. Most of the names documented in the *akten van transport* are fairly common which makes it difficult to link the people involved with the names mentioned in other primary sources.

The following examples are taken from the *akten van transport* left by Notary Carel Schoute. He was among the longest serving notaries in Batavia. His office was open from 1723 to 1736. Unlike the papers preserved by other notaries, most of the documents in Schoute's archives provide pretty complete information about the persons who were involved in the slave trade. Schoute's notarial documents, which we shall take as examples, are all related to slave transactions between indigenous people. As historical sources the *akten van transport* are hampered by certain limitations, because they only record information about the purchase of slaves. They do not offer any other information which might cast light on the profession of the vendor and buyer, the motivation behind the transaction, the age of the slaves and their skills. Nevertheless, this kind of source is useful because it provides early information about the identity of some ordinary people who lived in Batavia and the Ommelanden.

³³⁷ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 77.

³³⁸ Niemeijer, "Slavery, Ethnicity and the Economic Independence of Women", p. 175.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

An examination of the residence of slave vendors and buyers reveals that there were at least two different ways of buying and selling slaves in the inner city and its environs. The first of these involved paying a visit to slave markets or slave auctions. After buyers and sellers had met and agreed on a price, they went to a notary to record their transaction. This was the preferred way of doing business between people who lived in different places and those who were unacquainted with each other. The second method was resorted to by people who were already acquainted and did not necessarily go to the slave market, but had their transaction recorded directly by a notary. This usually worked out well among those living in the same neighbourhood. For example, Catip Assan (vendor) and Niaey Abieba (buyer), both living in Anke, engaged in a transaction on 29 January 1729. Two people who lived in Pagaraman, Intje Oesin (vendor) and Wayahan Coelandie (buyer), engaged in another transaction on 2 February 1729. Meanwhile, Niey Griese (vendor) and To Assing (buyer), both living in Patuakan, engaged in a transaction on 2 June 1729.³⁴⁰

Not all of the slave sellers and buyers who are mentioned in the *akten van transport* came from the city and its surroundings. Some of the most active slave vendors were *nabhkoda* (ship's captains) and slave sellers who came from outside Java. For instance, Tjamba, a Wadjonese who lived in Makassar, is recorded as having sold two Bugis and one Mandarese slave on November 8 1723 for the sum of 255 *rijksdaalders*.³⁴¹ A Balinese *nabhkoda*, Bapak Dama, sold three Balinese slaves with a total value of 242 *rijksdaalders* on the February 2 and 9 1728. Meanwhile, between February 5 and March 13 in the same year, another Balinese *nabhkoda*, Bapak Warnie, sold thirteen Balinese slaves with a total value of 1083 *rijksdaalders*.³⁴² These three people have been chosen at random to represent the many slave sellers from outside Java active in the slave trade of Batavia.

A survey of about 1,000 samples of contracts concluded between 1723 and 1731 clearly demonstrates that six groups of people were most active in the slave trade. They were the Chinese and five ethnicities from elsewhere in the Indonesian Archipelago. As Tables 1 and 2 shows, the Balinese are revealed to be the most active sellers and buyers, followed by Chinese, Bugis, Malays and others. In general, the number of male slave sellers was higher (60.8%) than female (39.2%). Interesting evidence appears when the male and female slave sellers in certain

³⁴⁰ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3953, Minuut Akten van Transport (MAT) Notary Carel Schoute, 27 January, 2 February, and 2 June 1729.

³⁴¹ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 8 November 1723.

³⁴² ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 2 February and 13 March 1723.

ethnic groups are compared. The most active female slave sellers were the Makassarrese (67%). A high percentage was also found among the Sumbawanese (50%) and Balinese (46%), while the lowest percentage of female sellers was among the Chinese (20%).

Table 5: Ethnic origin and sex of slave sellers from 1,000 samples, 1723-1731

	Female sellers	Male sellers	Total	Percentage
Bali	231	265	496	49.6%
Bugis	22	58	80	8%
Chinese	44	177	221	22.1%
Java	11	21	32	3.2%
Makassar	26	13	39	3.9%
Malay	28	44	72	7.2%
Sumbawa	6	6	12	1.2%
Others	24	24	48	4.8%
Total	392	608	1000	100%

Using the same source, the evidence which can be gleaned about slave buyers turns out to be slightly different. The percentage of Balinese buyers was higher than the percentage of Balinese sellers. The reason for this discrepancy is that the number of Balinese female buyers was higher than those of the male buyers. The percentage of female slave buyers was as follows: Makassarrese (62%), Balinese (51%), Sumbawanese (47%), Javanese (44%), Malay (42%), Bugis (23%), and Chinese (23%). A nice piece of evidence which shows that women in the Ommelanden of Batavia were independent actors in the local economy and that they played an active role in the interaction process among the ethnicities.

Table 6: Ethnic origin and sex of slave buyers from 1,000 samples, 1723-1731

	Female buyers	Male buyers	Total	Percentage
Balinese	265	252	517	51.7%
Bugis	16	51	67	6.7%

Chinese	52	174	226	22.6%
Javanese	16	20	36	3.6%
Makassarese	15	9	24	2.4%
Malay	22	30	52	5.2%
Sumbawanese	9	10	19	1.9%
Others	17	42	59	5.9%
Total	412	588	1000	100%

The figures in Tables 1 and 2 show that the Balinese were not only the largest category of slaves but were also to the fore as buyers and sellers as well. The same sample reveals that the percentage of Balinese slave buyers and vendors was even higher than that of the Balinese slaves (see Table 3). This record also makes clear that Balinese sold slaves from Bali and from other ethnicities as well, a statement which is equally valid for the Bugis, Makassarese and Malay. There were no Chinese slaves, so the Chinese could only buy slaves from other ethnicities. The Sumbawanese people presented a different case. Their percentage as slaves was higher than that of slave buyers and sellers. These pieces of evidence demonstrate that ironically the slave trade was a most effective medium for ensuring the ethnic mixing of the Ommelanden people.

The various names appearing in the *akten van transport* also show identity changes among the people who were involved in the slave trade. This tendency is found mainly among the groups known as the *Geschooren Chineesen* (Shaven Chinese). Even though they were officially categorized as Chinese, some of them had ceased to use Chinese names, but had adopted Malay names like Dul Rain, Intje Mansoer,³⁴³ Intje Alam, and Intje Dul;³⁴⁴ names which indicate that they were Muslim converts. The government of Batavia identified a *Geschooren Chinees* as a Chinese who cut his hair short, hence no longer wore the pigtail forced on the Han Chinese in China by the Manchu Ch'ing. Most of them had been born in Batavia as children of mixed-marriages between Chinese men and indigenous wives. A tendency to use Malay names was also prevalent among the Balinese. Since the seventeenth century, many Balinese who lived in Batavia had converted to Islam. They chose Malay names like Abdul Soekoer, Intje

³⁴³ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 7 October and 22 November 1723.

³⁴⁴ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3953, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 24 January and 3 February 1729.

Sayhiet, Intje Ali, Abdul Carim, and Abdul Jabaar.³⁴⁵ The use of Malay names by Chinese and Balinese is a clue that Islam gave a communal identity to the Ommelanden inhabitants to some degree at least.

3. *Slave Identity*

Some evidences concerning slave origins can also be abstracted from the *akten van transport*. More than 75 per cent of slaves sold in the Ommelanden of Batavia came from Eastern Indonesia: Bali, Sulawesi, Sumbawa, and Mandar. The percentage of slaves originating from Bali and Sulawesi amounted to 50 per cent and 18 per cent of all slaves were from farther east. As has been mentioned above, Bali and Makassar (Sulawesi slaves were sent to Batavia from Makassar) were not necessarily the places of origin of the slaves but could well have been simply the transit ports for slaves from remoter areas in Eastern Indonesia. Bearing this in mind, the real number of Balinese and Sulawesi slaves can be estimated as slightly lower and the percentage of slaves from other places in Eastern Indonesia slightly higher.

Table 7: Place of origin of slaves from 1,000 samples, 1723-1731

Place of origin	Number	Percentage
Bali	397	39.7%
Batavia	47	4.7%
Buton	38	3.8%
Malay	22	2.2%
Kalimantan	6	0.6%
Maluku	5	0.5%
Mandar	57	5.7%
Manggarai	26	2.6%
Papua	7	0.7%
Sulawesi	140	14%
Sumbawa	86	8.6%

³⁴⁵ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3953, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 18 October, 8, 15, and 29 November 1723.

Timor	7	0.7%
Others / Unknown	162	16.2%
Total	1000	100%

The Sulawesi slaves came from Bugis, Makassar, Mandar, and Toraja. Slaves purporting to come from Sumbawa actually originated from Manggarai (in Flores), Dompu, and Sumba. Malay slaves came from Riau, Minangkabau, Bengkulu, all in Sumatra, Mindanao in the Philippines, and Johor on the Malay Peninsula. Of course there were also Batavian slaves born to slave parents in Batavia. I came across only two Javanese slaves in the *akten van transport*. The reason their number is so few is that, according to Javanese *adat*, in principle a Javanese could not be enslaved and the Company, anxious that there should be no concentrations of slaves of any one ethnicity, discouraged the import of Javanese slaves. However, at the beginning of eighteenth century many Javanese called *modderjavanen* (mud Javanese) were dispatched by their noble Javanese masters from Cirebon to Batavia and its surrounding areas to work as contract labour excavating and deepening the canals of Batavia. The *modderjavanen* were not technically slaves although their conditions were not much short of slave labour. It would be much more accurate to describe them as bonded labour.

The large contingent of Eastern Indonesian slaves supports the hypothesis that slaves as far away from Batavia as possible were preferred. With their places of origin so distant and their ethnicities so diverse in origin the likelihood that they would band together and conspire against their masters was slim.³⁴⁶ This is the reason the non-Javanese, especially Balinese as well as various people who were transported from Makassar, formed the majority of Batavian and the Ommelanden slaves.

The *akten van transport* also document the custom prevalent among the Ommelanden inhabitants of changing the name of the purchased slave. This name change tended to occur especially when the buyer was from an ethnicity different to that of the seller of the slave (or of the slaves themselves). The new names were usually ones common among the buyer's own ethnicity. For instance: a slave from Sumbawa named Paddy saw his name changed into

³⁴⁶ Susan Abeyasekere, "Slaves in Batavia: Insights from a Slavery Register", in Reid (ed.), *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency*, p. 286.

Calong by a Balinese buyer named Marga.³⁴⁷ A Malay, Intje Rasiep, changed his slave's name from Trima of Manggarai to Daulat. A Chinese, Siauw Tsoenio, changed the name of his slave from Lanckier of Gorontalo to Laytiam.³⁴⁸ Probably slaves who changed owners several times had to accept several name changes. In the *akten van transport* are also recorded slave names, which do not reflect their bearers' ethnic origin such as Tsoelan van Boeton, Catjong van Papoea, and Moejoer van Baly.³⁴⁹ The name changes were undoubtedly a contribution to eradicating the slave's own ethnic identity.

The percentage of male and female slaves based on 575 samples in *akten van transport* was 51.3 and 44.5 per cent. The sex of some (4.2%) is unknown. Most Balinese and Sulawesi slaves were male, while the majority of the Batavia (descendants of slaves who had been brought to Batavia in the seventeenth century) and Mandar slaves were female. Most *akten van transport* recorded the sex of the slaves. Had they not done so, it would have been difficult to recognize the sex of a slave. Male and female slaves, in particular Balinese, sometimes used the same names such as Marga, Tabanan, Peraan, and Sideman, which referred to their place of origin in Bali.

Table 8: Sex of slaves from 575 samples, 1728-1731

Place of origin	Female	Male	Unknown	Number
Bali	101	135	8	244
Batavia	17	14	5	36
Buton	9	8	1	18
Malay / Sumatra	4	6		10
Kalimantan	1	2		3
Maluku	2	1		3
Mandar	21	9	1	31
Manggarai	2	8	1	11
Papua	1			1

³⁴⁷ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3953, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 28 January 1729.

³⁴⁸ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3958, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 5 Juny and 13 Juny 1731.

³⁴⁹ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 4, 10 January, and 23 February 1724.

Sulawesi	28	41	2	71
Sumbawa	22	21	2	45
Timor	1	3		4
Others / Unknown	47	47	4	98
Total	256	295	24	575

The price of a slave was determined by his/her age, skills, and physical appearance. Slaves who were skilled cooks, carpenters, or musicians were more valuable than unskilled slaves. Adult slaves and good-looking slaves were also more expensive than child or elderly slaves. Alas, there is no information in the *akten van transport* about the conditions which determined the price of a slave, but there are some clues to the pricing of the slaves. The Balinese were usually more expensive than the other slaves. The average price for a Balinese was 70 to 80 *rijksdaalders*. Sulawesi and Sumbawanese slaves were valued at 60 to 70 *rijksdaalders*. Most of slaves from the other places in Indonesia could be bought for less than 60 *rijksdaalders*. Of all slaves mentioned in the notaries' papers consulted, Melan of Tangap was the most expensive. This slave was sold by a Balinese woman named Patima to a Javanese named Intje Camar for the price of 140 *rijksdaalders*. Ma Soeboe of Sumbawa was the cheapest slave. She was bought by a Javanese named Bappa Padjar from a Sumbawan slave seller named Abdul Cassim for the price of 20 *rijksdaalders*.³⁵⁰ Young women slaves were in high demand, perhaps because they were increasingly desired as mistresses by the overwhelmingly male population of European and Chinese immigrants.³⁵¹

4. *The Influx of free labour*

In the context of early-modern Southeast Asia, Batavia was not much different from other port cities such as Melaka, Banten and Makassar, in the sense that a large influx of labour migration was required to accomplish a whole range of tasks which were beyond the capacity of the existing population of the city and its environs. In an emporium like Batavia,

³⁵⁰ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935, MAT Carel Schoute, 1 and 22 January 1724.

³⁵¹ Abeyasekere, "Slaves in Batavia", p. 295.

commercial activities and the economic development of the port city and its hinterland were dependent on a continuous stream of immigrants to supply sufficient cheap labour.

The influx of migrants over a long period imbued the colonial city and its environs a plural character in which people of different ethnic origins and backgrounds lived side by side in the same geographical unit. Thanks to this influx of migrants, the Ommelanden of Batavia was gradually populated. The colonial census of 1679 registered 13,593 inhabitants living outside the city walls of Batavia. In twenty years, in 1699, this number increased to 49,688 and twenty years later in 1719 to 65,436.³⁵²

The commercial and agricultural expansion of Batavia created many new job opportunities in the rural sectors. There were plenty of local inhabitants or migrant labourers waiting to fill job opportunities when they arose. Sooner or later, everybody could find a place in the socio-economic setting of the Ommelanden. The Europeans, who never surpassed 2 per cent of the total population, were the governing and political elite and possessed gigantic socio-economic power disproportionate to their number. The free *Mardijkers* who made up about 12 per cent of the Ommelanden population in 1709 originated from South Asia and elsewhere in the Archipelago. Their ancestors were probably slaves because their number grew significantly in the wake of the increase in manumissions in the late 1670s and 1680s.³⁵³ After being manumitted, most of them were absorbed into the Ommelanden population and earned their living as rice cultivators, gardeners, and as labourers in the rural factories.

Besides the slaves, Moors, Mestizos, and various ethnic groups from elsewhere in the Archipelago formed about 59 per cent of the total population in 1719. Among these groups, the Moors and Mestizos were often found as merchants, landowners, and small entrepreneurs. They and the Chinese usually played a role as middlemen in the socio-economic landscape of the Ommelanden. Various indigenous groups from elsewhere in the Archipelago came to the Ommelanden as recruits serving in the Company auxiliary army or militia. When they were not participating in military campaigns, they worked as rice and sugar cultivators, gardeners, woodcutters, or rural factory labourers. Through their presence, the cosmopolitan character of Batavia was extended beyond its walls and spread throughout its surroundings.

Chinese labourers came to Batavia by sea as migrant workers. During the Company period, Batavia was one of the many ports in Southeast Asia which were served by the Chinese junk

³⁵² Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 321, 323, and 325.

³⁵³ Niemeijer, "Slavery, Ethnicity and the Economic Independence of Women", p. 181

trading network. The maritime links between China and the Nanyang ushered in a period of reciprocal prosperity both for the Chinese merchants and for the settlements at which the junks and *wangkang* anchored. The steady supply of Chinese commodities carried by Chinese shipping became a crucial factor in the continuation of the prosperity of Batavia.

The junk trade supplied the city with various kinds of Chinese merchandise, including silk, paper, porcelain, and tea. Nevertheless, the most important ‘commodity’ carried on the Chinese ships was the labour force, represented by the hundreds of Chinese migrants and sojourners who were sent to Batavia every year. Among these passengers were merchants and a contingent of such craftsmen as carpenters, shoemakers, tailors, and blacksmiths. But the majority consisted of workers looking for jobs and opportunities to make a fortune in the biggest Dutch emporium in Asia. They intended to stay in the Nanyang for a long time and not to return to Tang Shan, the mountain of Tang, until they had become wealthy.

The majority of the Chinese immigrants were Fukienese and Cantonese who had embarked at the ports of Amoy and Canton. The southeast provinces of China did have some manufacturing industries, most notably crude ceramics, ironmongery, and textiles and cash crops like tea and sugar were cultivated there.³⁵⁴ Hence the Fukienese and Cantonese were tailor-made to respond to the demand for labour in the Ommelanden, where the largest demand was from the booming sugar industry. The Chinese migrant workers did not just bring their labour; they also brought with them an entire array of social institutions such as clan and dialect associations, trade guilds, Chinese religion, and secret societies. Through the intercession of these institutions the new immigrants had access to housing, occupation, protection, and entertainment.

Among the Dutch establishments in the Archipelago, only in Batavia were the Chinese able to form a large community. In other Dutch colonial settlements, their number was restricted by the authorities. In the city of Ambon ninety-one Chinese men registered as inhabitants in 1694, while in 1724 Makassar there were fewer than forty Chinese inhabitants.³⁵⁵ In comparison, the total population of Chinese living in Batavia and its surrounding areas in 1699 amounted to as many as 8,074.³⁵⁶ The acceptance of a large Chinese population under its authority by the Batavian government was soundly based. The government was well aware that

³⁵⁴ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 104.

³⁵⁵ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 135.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 309 and 323.

Batavia was different from other colonial settlements in Indonesia in the sense that here, and especially in the Ommelanden, the Chinese assumed the role of pioneers and provided manpower for various economic activities.

Between 1684 and 1740, economic activities in the Ommelanden continued to attract a great number of Chinese immigrants. This period coincided with the heyday of the junk trade which Leonard Blussé states took place between 1690 and 1740.³⁵⁷ In 1689, there were 2,333 Chinese officially registered in the Ommelanden. This number increased to 7,550 in 1719 and two decades later to 10,574 in 1739.³⁵⁸

Despite their indisputable uses, some efforts were made by the government to control the increasing number of Chinese. On 21 May 1690, the High Government decided to issue an edict listing the number of Chinese who had annually arrived on junks from China since 1684. All the Chinese who had arrived before 1683 would be permitted to reside in Batavia and the Ommelanden, as long as they were duly registered with their officers.³⁵⁹ In 1730, the government published a placard decreeing that all Chinese and Indonesian ships which put in at Batavia had to be registered.³⁶⁰ This regulation was an attempt by the government to control the number of migrants who arrived in Batavia by sea, but these attempts were less than fruitful. Although river estuaries in Batavia were guarded by Company patrols, many migrants still managed to slip into Batavia illegally. They went into hiding in the Ommelanden and earned a living there as cheap labourers in sugar-mills and other rural factories.

Arousing less public interest, Javanese labourers also stealthily slipped into the rural areas of the Ommelanden over the borders with Banten and Mataram. The pressure of having to comply with compulsory labour demands, tax burdens, natural disasters, famines or epidemics, and frequent civil unrest, especially in Mataram, can be counted among the push factors compelling the Javanese to leave their birthplaces and move to the remote areas of Batavia in search of a better life. Many of these refugee Javanese were from a peasant background and in the rural areas around the city they worked as rice cultivators and provided labour for the sugar and other rural industries. They also ran orchards and market gardens and some found employment as woodcutters, and buffalo herds.

³⁵⁷ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 121.

³⁵⁸ Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p. 322, 325, and 327.

³⁵⁹ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakkaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 3, pp. 262-269.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 270.

The influx of immigrants was an essential factor in providing the Ommelanden with a labour force, because the natural reproduction of the local population was insufficient to replenish itself and create demographic growth. The Javanese immigrants who arrived from the east were natives of such densely populated areas on the North Coast of Java as Kerawang, Bekasi, Cirebon, and Tegal. Those who moved in from the west came from Banten. From the south came the Sundanese from the highlands of the Priangan. Many of these Javanese were seasonal workers, who came to the Ommelanden to earn extra during the sugar and paddy harvests.

Between 1684 and 1740, the Javanese grew to become the largest group of inhabitants in the Ommelanden. Their influx as cheap labourers can also be traced back to some extent in Batavian notarial archives. Some records show how the Javanese struggled to find their niche in the local economy. Since registering a contract was not terribly expensive, many Javanese found their way to the offices of notaries to record their legal contract with their employer.

Our first example regards a group of Javanese who found jobs as labourers in the sugar industry. They were represented by Wiera Soeta, a Javanese from Cirebon, who signed a contract with a Chinese sugar entrepreneur, Tan Kimko, on 9 December 1709. In the contract, Soeta committed himself to delivering twenty Javanese workers to Kimko's sugar-mill in the next sugar harvest season. He also promised to organize the division of labour at the sugar-mill and to supervise his fellow workers. Kimko's sugar-mill was located on a bank of the Cakung River. The Chinese sugar-miller agreed to pay a monthly salary of as much as 2.5 *rijksdaalders* to Wiera Soeta and 1 *rijksdaalder* to every Javanese sugar worker.³⁶¹ The notarial archives of Batavia contain numerous documents like this and provide ample evidence that many Javanese seasonal workers did come to the Ommelanden during the cane-cutting and processing season. This pattern was to be repeated until the end of eighteenth century. In 1779, Jan Hooyman noted that an abundant stream of *bujang* from Cirebon and Tegal found their way to Batavia every year in search of a job at the sugar-mills.³⁶²

The next example is a contract concerning Javanese woodcutters. On 16 April 1729, two Javanese, Wangsa Dita and Carta Naya, signed a contract with a Chinese, Ko Kongko, for the delivery of 200 *roeden* of firewood to Kongko's sugar-mill in Srengseng. The complete quantity of the firewood had to be delivered within four months and for every *roede* Dita and Naya

³⁶¹ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2098, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 9 December 1709.

³⁶² Jan Hooyman, "Verhandeling, over den tegenwoordigen staat van den landbouw, in de Ommelanden van Batavia, in Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 3, 1779, p. 215.

would receive a payment of 1.87 *rijksdaalders* or 90 *stuivers*.³⁶³ It seems highly likely that other Javanese helped Wangsa and Carta to draw up their contract. Unfortunately there is no information about their number or who they were.

For instance, it does really seem as if the Javanese recorded in the following contract was working alone. The document was drawn up between a Javanese who worked as rice cultivator and Mathijs Beurs, a burgher of Batavia. Tsitra Naya, a Javanese from Tegal according to the contract, worked in Beurs' rice-field which was located in Srengseng. The area of this rectangular rice-field was 12 *petaks* long on every side. Naya, and probably his fellow workers, had to carry out all kinds of agricultural labour from preparing the land for planting and cultivating rice to gathering the harvest. He had to tie the harvested rice up into bundles and deliver it to Beurs' house in Batavia. When all of those jobs were finished, he would receive a payment of 18.5 *rijksdaalders*.³⁶⁴

5. *Slave occupations*

A slave could undertake all kinds of work, domestic or external. Slaves were used in a wide variety of occupations, but besides their economic value, socially they also served as status symbols and as such were ostentatiously displayed by dignitaries as an indication of the height of the position they had achieved in the social hierarchy. Besides carrying out agricultural duties, a female slave could be used as concubine and a male slave could be employed as personal guard and soldier. The highest-ranking company officials and the richest citizens of Batavia sometimes owned up to 300 slaves. Free inhabitants and small agricultural entrepreneurs in the Ommelanden were restricted in the number of slaves they could own, perhaps as few as two or three. Unlike the Batavian elite who regarded slaves as show pieces to display their prestige, small entrepreneurs and free inhabitants of the Ommelanden used slaves mainly as a means of production.

³⁶³ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3872, MAVA Notary Carel Schoute, 16 April 1729.

³⁶⁴ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3263, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 5 November 1710.



Illustration 7: Slaves worked in the garden behind the residence of Governor-General R. de Klerk
 Source: Max de Bruijn and Bast Kist, *Johannes Rach 1720-1783, Artist in Indonesia and Asia* (Jakarta: National Library of Indonesia, 2001), p. 56.

The large number of slaves who were present in the Ommelanden shows that slavery in Batavia was not a phenomenon confined to the city itself. Many slaves were employed in agriculture in which they worked as paddy and sugar cultivators, gardeners, and cattle herds (cows, buffalos, and goats) far away from the city. Slaves also laboured in gunpowder-mills, noxious sulphur and saltpetre refineries, arak distilleries, saw-mills, and sugar-mills. Domestic slaves would cook, wash, clean, nurse, and guard their owner's property. In the absence of a well-established free labour force, it was also customary for people to use slaves as assistants in business and retailing; even to hire them out to others for these purposes.³⁶⁵ Slaves were hired out as construction workers (to build houses, roads, bridges, and dams), carpenters, furniture-makers, and to be employed in other kinds of handicrafts. Slaves could also be entertainers and were trained as musicians, singers, and dancers. Slave musicians were the height of fashion and accompanied European ladies on their leisurely boat trips along the canals of Batavia.³⁶⁶

Unfortunately, information about the skills of slaves was not entered into the *akten van transport*, although it is well known that Chinese bought slaves to employ them in their sugar-mills. Seventy-nine Chinese entrepreneurs are recorded as having opened sugar-mills in the Ommelanden of Batavia in 1710.³⁶⁷ The *akten van transport* does mention various Chinese sugar-

³⁶⁵ Abeyasekere, "Slaves in Batavia", p.2 95.

³⁶⁶ De Haan, *Oud Batavia*, Vol. II, p. 222.

³⁶⁷ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 90.

mills owners who sold their slaves. A Chinese named Que Tsipko, who owned a sugar-mill and lived in Krukut, sold two slaves named Laytsim and Layhoe to another Chinese named Njo Soenko on May 9 1729. Around a fortnight after this transaction, another Chinese Lim Thoanko, a sugar-mill owner who also lived in Krukut, sold a slave named Sity of Toradja to a Chinese named Oey Leeko.³⁶⁸

The will of Cornelis Chastelain, *Raad Ordinaris van India*, who died in June 28 1714, gives another illustration of the use of slaves in the Ommelanden. In his will, Chastelain manumitted 150 slaves and left them three pieces of land located in Mampang, Depok, and Caranganyar.³⁶⁹ Among these freed slaves were *mandors* (overseers), carpenters, peasants, livestock farmers, housekeepers, and *gamelan* players.

In 1833, it was recorded that a private estate in Citrap employed 320 people of whom 117 were slaves. The owner of this private estate was Augustijn Michiels, the headman of the *Mardijker* people in Batavia. The slaves in the Citrap house worked as gardeners, grooms, wood foragers, *ronggeng* dancers, *topeng* dancers, and gamelan players.³⁷⁰ The number of slaves owned by Chastelain and Michiels shows that owners of private lands and mansions in the Ommelanden often possessed truly large families of slaves.

³⁶⁸ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3935, MAT Notary Carel Schoute, 9 and 27 May 1729.

³⁶⁹ Cornelis Chastelein, *Het testament van Cornelis Chastelein in leven 'raad ordinaries van India' overleden te Batavia den 28en Juni 1714* (Batavia: Kho Tjeng Bie, 1900), p. 8.

³⁷⁰ V.I. van de Wall, *Oude Hollandse Buitenplaatsen van Batavia* (Deventer: W. Van Hoeve, 1944), p. 135.

CHAPTER SIX

SUGAR AND SOCIETY

Introduction

A hot climate, fertile soil, and an abundance of water determine where sugar-cane can be cultivated successfully. The plants are native to the humid tropics and require an abundance of heat and water all year round for the best results but water mainly is absolutely essential to sugar cane during the first six-months of its initial growth.³⁷¹ A tropical region with high rainfall is therefore the ideal place in which to establish sugar plantations. In areas of low rainfall, the cultivation of sugar cane requires irrigation. The Ommelanden of Batavia was blessed with all these requirements. To grow satisfactorily the lowest temperature limit for sugar cane is 21 °C, and the highest between 27 °C and 38 °C.³⁷² Soils are also important to sugar cane, but not as essential as either temperature or water. Because the plant can tolerate various types of soils, it could be grown on the red clay Ommelanden soil without any problems. Sugar cane is vulnerable to disease and can also fall prey to attacks by rodents and insects. Rats infest cane-fields and by gnawing the stems they damage the crops. Another potential threat in the Ommelanden was posed by wild boars, which invaded sugar-fields and deracinated the young cane. If sugar plantations were to be protected from the depredations of wild boars, bamboo fences had to be built around the plantations.

In the 1630s, sugar cane cultivation in the Ommelanden was taken up by the Chinese of Batavia, who were imitating the example of Chinese sugar cultivators around Banten.³⁷³ The Chinese method of cultivating of sugar cane was relatively simple but time-consuming. It consisted of clearing the fields and then planting, weeding, and cutting the cane equipped with simple tools and using unsophisticated techniques. Axes, hoes, and mattocks were used to clear the land and prepare the soil for planting. A short bladed *klewang* was used to cut the cane. After a piece of land was selected for a sugar plantation, first it had to be cleared using an

³⁷¹ J. Alexander and P. Alexander, "Sugar, Rice and Irrigation in Colonial Java", in *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 25, No .3, summer 1978, p. 210.

³⁷² J.H. Galloway, *The Sugar Cane Industry. A Historical Geography from its Origins to 1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 14.

³⁷³ De Jonge (ed.), *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag*, Vol. 5, p. 233.

axe to fell trees and shrubs. Once cleared of this vegetation, a hoe and sometimes burning off were used to prepare the ground. The field was then ready for planting. Sugar cane is a perennial plant and once planted a field can yield four or five good harvests before replanting is necessary.³⁷⁴

1. *Batavian sugar and the Intra-Asian trade*

Of all the economic activities in the Ommenlanden, the sugar industry was one of the most important. From the very earliest days of its presence in Asia, sugar had been an important commodity for the VOC, to be sold on the European market and also in large quantities in the intra-Asian trade. Although sugar was so dominant, many other commodities were traded by the Company in the intra-Asian markets, including silk and porcelain from China, copper from Japan, spices from Eastern Indonesia, and textiles from India. Creating trading links connecting Japan at one end and Persia at the other, by the second half of the seventeenth century the Company had firmly established an intra-Asia trading network, which covered almost all of the important entrepôts in the regions of the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.

Sugar from Asia had attracted the attention of the Gentlemen Seventeen as early as 1616. In that year, they demanded a fair amount of Asian sugar to be used both as ballast for homeward-bound ships and subsequently to be sold in Europe as a profitable commodity. At that time, because of its high quality sugar from China dominated the intra-Asian trade in this commodity. The Company directors explained that only the Chinese white, candied, and powdered sugar was suitable for use in the Amsterdam refineries. This 1616 demand was a prelude to the Asian sugar boom in Europe. Initially, as long as it still depended only on the sugar imported from China the Company had difficulty in meeting the high demand. By 1649, the European market was already absorbing 2.5-3.0 million pounds of Asian sugar. This success and the satisfactory profits which sugar made on the European market encouraged the Company to support sugar cultivation and processing in two areas under its control: Taiwan (Formosa) and the Ommelanden of Batavia.

³⁷⁴ S.B. Schwartz, *Sugar Plantation in the Formation of Brazilian Society. Bahia, 1550-1835* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 107.

The rise of sugar as an important commodity in the Company repertoire happened to coincide with a decline in the demand for pepper in 1650. Asian sugar was an alternative commodity much sought after on the Amsterdam market and demand for it remained fairly high until 1655, when the price fell because of a large quantity of cheap sugar from Brazil where various new areas of sugar production were being developed. Finally, Asian sugar lost its allure for the Company directors in Amsterdam, not least because large quantities of sugar were lost owing to leakage during the long voyage from Asia to Europe. Nevertheless, the price fall on the European sugar market did not have a great impact on Batavian sugar production because various outlets in the intra-Asian trade could replace the sugar market in Europe, as the commodity was in high demand in Persia, Surat, Bengal, and Japan.

Before the Ommelanden of Batavia emerged as a production region, the Formosan colony (Taiwan) was the most important area for sugar production under Company control. Sugar cultivation in the island was stimulated by the Company from the early 1630s and it succeeded in raising exports from 200 tons in 1636 to 1,300 tons in 1660. However, in 1662 the Dutch were expelled from Taiwan by the Ming loyalist, Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga). The Zheng clan continued the Company policies of promoting the sugar industry, resulting in an annual export of 18,000 tons by the time the Qing gained control over Taiwan in 1683.³⁷⁵

The loss of Taiwan forced the Company to pay more attention to the possibilities offered by the Ommelanden. At that stage, agricultural activities in those areas was still vulnerable, never more so than when the war broke out again between the Company and Banten in 1656. Ten sugar-mills and twenty-three brickworks located at some distance from the city were destroyed.³⁷⁶ For several years security in this area was touch and go and most of the sugar-mills were abandoned. New efforts to reactivate the sugar industry were undertaken when the peace contract with Mataram was signed in 1659. Other events in the last half of the seventeenth century helped to create a favourable atmosphere in which the sugar industry could flourish. In 1677, Kerawang became part of the jurisdiction of Batavia. This region was located on the eastern side of Batavia and the relatively dense population there could provide a workforce for the sugar industry. Six years later, a final peace treaty which guaranteed greater

³⁷⁵ David Bulbeck, Anthony Reid, Tan L. and Wu Y. (eds.), *Southeast Asian Export since the 14th Century: Cloves, Pepper, Coffee, and Sugar* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), p. 111.

³⁷⁶ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 23.

safety of the borders of Batavia with the neighbouring sultanate was signed between Batavia and Banten.

When the Qing army seized Taiwan from the Zheng family, the maritime prohibition edict of 1656 – ‘forbidding even a plank to drift to sea’ – was lifted in 1685. This edict was one of the measures taken by Qing dynasty in its war against the Zheng clan which derived its main income from maritime trade. Soon after the ban was lifted, scores of Chinese junks sailed to Batavia bringing large numbers of Chinese immigrants who contributed to the labour force in the sugar industry and importantly brought with them a wealth of expertise. The availability of land, labour and capital, the security, and the favourable policy by the Company now set the stage for the Batavian sugar boom.³⁷⁷

In intra-Asian trade Batavian sugar had to compete with sugar from other production areas. The most formidable competitors were Southern China (especially Fujian), Taiwan, and Bengal. In Southeast Asia there were also sugar production areas in Siam, Quang Nam (South Vietnam), Tonkin (North Vietnam), Cambodia, and Manila. Most of their exports went to Japan directly or indirectly, as this empire had not yet begun to produce any sugar of its own. Japan was in fact the biggest sugar market in East Asia during the seventeenth century. Data collected in the period of 1637-1683 reveal that the annual import of Japan averaged 950 tons.³⁷⁸ In 1658 the Company sold 780,000 pounds (about 354 tons) of Taiwanese sugar to Japan.³⁷⁹ The records from 1663 showed that Japan imported 94 tons of sugar from Siam, 43 tons from Cambodia, 76 tons from Quang Nam, and 33 tons from Tonkin.³⁸⁰ Batavia sold 500 tons of sugar on the Asian market in 1664, but it is unclear how much of this went to Japan. Ten years later 445 tons of Batavian sugar was recorded as being sent to Nagasaki.³⁸¹

By the end of the seventeenth century, Persia emerged as the biggest market for Java sugar (of which Batavia was the largest producer), pushing Japan into second place.³⁸² The importance of those sugar markets lasted until 1722 when the overthrow of the Safavid dynasty initiated a more disturbed period in the history of Persia and, as a reaction, the export of sugar to Persia declined. The same happened with sugar imports to Japan as a consequence

³⁷⁷ Blussé, *Strange Company*, pp. 84-85.

³⁷⁸ Bulbeck et. Al., *Southeast Asian Export*, p. 111.

³⁷⁹ Sucheta Mazumdar, *Sugar and Society in China: Peasants, Technology, and World Market* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998), p. 86.

³⁸⁰ See the table 4.1A in Bulbeck et.al., *Southeast Asian Export*, p. 112.

³⁸¹ See the Table 4.2B in *Ibid.*, pp. 114-116.

³⁸² Kristoff Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade 1620-1740* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 152 and p. 161.

of import substitution when sugar began to be produced on the southernmost island of Kyushu. Different difficulties arose when other sugar markets opened up in the intra-Asian trading network in such places as Surat, Mocha, Sri Lanka, and Bengal. When the Company began to trade sugar to those areas, Bengali sugar was still cheaper than Batavian sugar. However, by the end of the seventeenth century the Company was successfully able to offer Javanese sugar at a reasonable price, while the prices of Bengali sugar tended to increase.³⁸³ The upshot was that the South Asian sugar market eventually became one of the largest purchasers of Batavian sugar. The ability of the Company to gain a large share in the Indian sugar market was a fundamental contribution to the rapid development of the Batavian sugar industry at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

During the same period, after a long hiatus, the European market demand for Asian sugar also picked up again. In 1700, 43 tons of Batavian sugar was sent to Europe. This high demand continued and reached its peak during 1724-1727 when more than 2,000 tons of Batavian sugar was exported annually to the home posts in Holland.³⁸⁴ This quantity was repeated once again in 1732, when 2,618 tons of Batavian sugar was sent to Europe, but after that Dutch demand tended to tail off again. Sugar production and export came to an abrupt temporary stop in 1740, when the Chinese rebellion broke out in Batavia. A policy of fixed sugar prices and the firm monopoly of the Company on sugar exports from Batavia had led to the bankruptcy of many Chinese sugar enterprises. A number of sugar-mills were closed and thousands of labourers lost their jobs. The Chinese were the main victims; not only because the sugar-mills were almost wholly Chinese owned and worked by Chinese labour, but also because a great part of the Chinese community depended directly or indirectly on this industry.³⁸⁵ These worsening conditions in sugar production created tremendous social unrest, resulting in the Chinese rebellion in the Ommelanden, and the subsequent Chinese massacre in the city.³⁸⁶

³⁸³ Mazumdar, *Sugar and Society*, p. 89.

³⁸⁴ See the table 4.2B in Bulbeck et.al., *Southeast Asian Export*, p. 115

³⁸⁵ Willem Rummelink. *The Chinese war and the Collapse of the Javanese State* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), pp. 125-126.

³⁸⁶ Blussé, *Strange Company*, pp. 93-95.

2. Local growth, restrictions, and decline

Before the establishment of Batavia in 1619, a small-scale sugar industry had already been got off the ground by Chinese entrepreneurs in several Javanese port towns along the north coast of the island, among them Banten, Cirebon, Tegal, and Jepara. Jan Pietersz Coen, the founder of Batavia, was aware of his heavy reliance on the Chinese certainly to populate Batavia with craftsmen, shopkeepers and merchants but first and foremost to throw themselves into the challenge of turning the surroundings of the new colonial town into a profitable agricultural area. In his letters to the Company Directors in Amsterdam, he repeatedly refers to the success of Manila and the way in which that city had been able to profit from its Chinese inhabitants.³⁸⁷ With his sights set on increasing commercial activities in Batavia, he tried with might and main to persuade the Chinese in Banten to leave that port town and move to Batavia. The majority of these Chinese were involved in the Banten pepper trade, although some of them had also had experience in the local sugar industry.

In the early days of its presence in the Indonesian Archipelago, the attention of the Company concentrated on the highly sought-after spices, but it was not long before awareness that sugar also was a commodity with great commercial potential impinged on the Directors, even though the sugar industry was still developing only haltingly in the first half of the seventeenth century.³⁸⁸ Incentives were not long in coming; those Batavian Chinese who chose to take the plunge into agriculture were exempted from individual taxes and were assured that the Company would buy their sugar and rice at a guaranteed price.³⁸⁹ Of course, every rose has a thorn and, because the sugar market in Batavia was monopolized by the VOC from the beginning, the sugar-millers were obliged to deliver their white sugar to the Company.³⁹⁰

Any further expansion and development of the sugar plantations was delayed for several decades by outbreaks of intermittent war between Batavia and Banten but, after the final subjection of Banten in 1683, the industry began to grow rapidly. The Company introduced restrictions on the sugar price, production quota, and the number of sugar-mills which were licensed to operate. Those restrictions were important because the Company tried to adjust the

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

³⁸⁸ M. Leidelmeijer, *Van Suikermolen tot Grootbedrijf: Technische Vernieuwing in de Java- Suikerindustrie in de Negentiende Eeuw* (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1997), p. 18.

³⁸⁹ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 85.

³⁹⁰ Leidelmeijer, *Van Suikermolen*, p. 71.

sugar production in areas under its control to accommodate to the fluctuating demand from the Asian and European markets.

The Company claimed the right to purchase all first class (*cabessa*) and second class (*bariga*) sugar, but it disclaimed all rights to the inferior third class sugar (*pee*) which therefore was traded privately by Company servants and Chinese.³⁹¹ Always concerned about the quantities of sugar which were delivered to its warehouses, the High Government in Batavia often debated delivery prices during its policy meetings. The implementation of this price policy was very simple: when sugar production increased, the Company would reduce the purchasing price, but this would rise again when sugar production dropped.



Illustration 8: The Company's sugar warehouse in Batavia

Source: Francois Valentyn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën*, Vol. IV-I (Dordrecht: J. van Braam, 1724-1726), p. 237.

In 1710 the Batavian government was complaining to the Gentlemen Seventeen in Amsterdam that it had to pay large sums for every *pikul* of sugar which was delivered to the Company warehouses if a constant sugar supply were to be guaranteed. The Directors responded to this complaint by suggesting that the Batavian government should nurture and

³⁹¹ Robert Van Niel, *Java's Northeast Coast 1740-1840. A Study in Colonial Encroachment and Dominance* (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2005), p. 134.

encourage the sugar industry, since it was the most profitable segment of the economy in Batavia. They also explained that, with the exception of saltpetre, no other product provided as good a ballast in homeward-bound Company ships than sugar.³⁹²

Market considerations and the markets were not the only factors which determined the price of sugar. Sugar production was also liable to be affected by local considerations. On 9 October 1705, for instance, the Batavian administration agreed to raise the purchase price of powder sugar to 3.5 rijksdaalders for the *cabessa* and that of sugar candy to 7 *rijksdaalders*.³⁹³ The *Hoge Regering* reached this decision in response to an urgent request of the sugar-millers, who argued that the price of firewood had risen so exceptionally high that they could no longer make a profit without rising of the fixed prices. How this situation came about is easily explained.

The process of boiling sugar juice to crystallize sugar devoured enormous quantities of firewood. As a result, the rapid development of the sugar industry in the Ommelanden at the end of the seventeenth century was a prelude to massive deforestation. A 1701 report provides us with the information that by that time virtually all of the trees around the Ciliwung River basin from its upper course and continuing downstream had disappeared.³⁹⁴ This implies that the local administration was not able to control illegal logging. To fell trees on Company land required authorization, but even with this proviso most of the logging activities occurred haphazardly.

The efforts of the High Government to nurture and encourage the sugar industry were bound to run into problems if the number of sugar-mills increased too rapidly. The proliferation of sugar-mills inevitably led to overproduction. To solve this problem, on 10 October 1710, the High Government issued an edict prohibiting the establishment of any new sugar-mills over and above the existing 131.³⁹⁵ This policy was combined with the regulation that sugar entrepreneurs had to obtain a licence from the Company if they wanted to buy or establish a new sugar-mill. The economic policies of the High Government were nothing less than a continual balancing act.

Permission from the High Government was also required whenever sugar-millers decided to relocate a sugar-mill. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, several sugar-millers moved their mills lock, stock and barrel farther away from the city to areas which still had ample

³⁹² ANRI, Minuut Generale Resolutien (MGR) No. 492, 10 Oktober 1710, fol. 503.

³⁹³ ANRI, MGR No. 483, 30 April 1706, fol. 494.

³⁹⁴ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 27.

³⁹⁵ Van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811*, Vol. 4, p. 6.

supplies of firewood. On 25 July 1716, for instance, the Chinese Lieutenant Li Jonko asked permission to relocate his two sugar-mills. Those mills stood on the land belonging to Willem Muller on the bank of the Ciliwung. Li Jonko moved the mills to his own land on the bank of the Tangerang River.³⁹⁶ Ouw Koako wished to move his sugar-mill in Condet from the land belonging to the old Chinese *Boedelmeeester* Tan Tsayqua to an area farther south, called Cijantung.³⁹⁷ The Chinese Lieutenant Ni Locqua asked the *Heemraden* permission to move his sugar-mill from his land in Tanjung and reassemble it on other land in Rawa Pasang on the bank of the Bekasi River.³⁹⁸

Throughout the eighteenth century, sugar consumption in Europe increased enormously. In this period, England expanded its imports from roughly 10,000 to 150,000 tons a year.³⁹⁹ The mounting demand for sugar in Europe was partly attributable to the great popularity of tea and coffee. Sugar had permanently replaced honey as a preservative and principal sweetener.⁴⁰⁰ To fulfil this demand, the sugar-producing areas throughout the world grew more sugar than ever before and consequently the price of sugar declined. This was unfortunate as the nature of the product and the mediocre storage facilities made it impossible to store sugar for long periods. Therefore, whenever a sudden increase in demand occurred, the Company was sometimes even forced to buy extra sugar from the northeast coast of Java or from nearby Banten. Nevertheless, the import of Javanese sugar had to be carefully watched, as it could threaten the sustainability of the Batavian sugar industry. In 1711, when Batavian sugar production reached its peak, a group of sugar-millers complained about the import of sugar from the northeast coast of Java to Batavia.⁴⁰¹ They requested a total stop on these imports, because they asserted that their own businesses were threatened with ruin. Without having an internal market of its own, the Company had to sell Batavian sugar on the highly competitive free sugar markets of Asia and Europe. In order to maintain its position on these markets, the Company was under constant pressure to keep the local sugar industry on a tight rein for the dual purpose of increasing the efficiency of its operations and lowering the production price. One of the mechanisms used to control the sugar production was to fix the production quota of every sugar-mill. In 1710 the Company required 40,000 *pikuls* of powder sugar to fulfil the Asian and

³⁹⁶ ANRI, Resolutie College van Heemraden (RCH) No. 13, 25 July 1716, fol. 132-133.

³⁹⁷ ANRI, RCH No. 14, 24 December 1718, fol. 12.

³⁹⁸ ANRI, RCH No. 20, 15 March 1732, fol. 54.

³⁹⁹ Fernand Braudel, *The Structures of Everyday Life* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 225.

⁴⁰⁰ Jacobs, *Merchant in Asia*, p. 253.

⁴⁰¹ ANRI, MGR No. 494, 24 April 1711, fol. 447.

European demands. Since there were 131 sugar-mills operating in that year, the Company decided that each sugar-mill should not provide the Company warehouses with more than 300 *pikuls* of powder sugar.⁴⁰²

The fluctuating sugar price arrangements, the licence policy, and production quota eventually dimmed the allure of the sugar industry in Batavia. This decline was already apparent in 1710. Two sugar commissions were formed in 1710 and 1728 to solve that problem. The report of the first commission, written by Hendrik Zwaardcroon and Christoffel van Swol, is very comprehensive and contains important information.⁴⁰³ A second report, compiled by Joan Everhard van der Schuur and Rogier Thomas van Heyningen, with proposals suggesting how to redress the problem was not carried out in a consequent manner. The number of sugar-mills in the Ommelanden decreased from about 135 in 1734 to eighty-seven in September 1740.

3. *Land reclamation and plantations*

The landscape of the Ommelanden of Batavia which was traversed by various rivers was very suitable for development as a plantation area for the sugar industry. Its western border was the Cisadane River, while the Citarum River bordered its eastern side. To the south rose the Priangan Highlands. In between these two border rivers, a number of other rivers flowed from the hinterland to the Java Sea: the Angke, the Pesanggrahan, the Grogol, the Krukut, the Ciliwung, the Sunter, the Cakung and the Bekasi. All these streams contributed to the development of sugar industry. The sugar cane plantations and sugar-mills in the Ommelanden were located on their banks, because the rivers provided the main infrastructure for transporting the sugar products from sugar-mills to the Company warehouses near the coast. The river current was also used to drive the sugar-mills. In other words, water was also used as a resource in the sugar production process. Consequently, the development of the Ommelanden was determined by the river system, especially in the initial period before a road network had been built.

Early agricultural activities got underway in the 1620s when a few plots of lands along the *Grote Rivier* outside the southern city wall were planted with coconut palms. In a letter dated 9

⁴⁰² ANRI, MGR No. 492, 10 Oktober 1710, fol. 535.

⁴⁰³ ANRI, MGR No. 492, 10 Oktober 1710, fol. 491-537.

December 1637, Governor-General Antonio van Diemen mentioned that some 6,000 coconut palms were being cultivated in the areas under the jurisdiction of Batavia.⁴⁰⁴ Constantly faced with the problem of providing food for Batavia, the *Hoge Regering* adopted a policy of stimulating rice cultivation in the Ommelanden of Batavia, because it did not want to be at the mercy of rice imports from the areas under the control of Mataram. For a few years after the war with Mataram in 1628-1629, the rice cultivation was even moved inside the city walls so that it might be protected. When relations improved, rice cultivation outside the city, undertaken by Chinese and Javanese inhabitants, took off again. However, the rice production of the Ommelanden was not sufficient to feed the inhabitants of the city and the troops garrisoned in Batavia Castle. Until 1646, when the Company was able to conclude a peace treaty with Mataram which could also guaranteed a stable supply of rice, a large quantity of rice had to be imported from elsewhere.⁴⁰⁵

The duo of the sugar cane plantations and paddy-fields played a prominent role in reshaping the landscape of the Ommelanden. Plenty of water from the rivers was used for irrigation purposes. A sugar cane plantation had to be located close to sugar-mills, because after the cane was harvested, it had to be delivered to the sugar-mills as soon as possible, before it dried out. Manpower or carts pulled by buffaloes were the common means of transporting the sugar cane to the mills situated near the rivers.

If a sugar plantation was to be profitable, it was important to manage the natural resources around the plantation properly. There were at least three principal types of land which were needed to run a sugar-mill successfully: fields for cultivating sugar; land for growing supplies for the labourers; and a forest reserve to supply the timber for construction purposes and, of course, to be used as firewood for the boiling houses. Sometimes grazing land for the buffaloes was also required, but at most of the Batavian sugar-mills buffaloes were fed with sugar cane leaves.⁴⁰⁶ Because the transport of sugar cane and firewood created extra costs, the ideal organizational set-up was a mill and its boiling houses surrounded by sugar plantation, situated not too far away from a forest or from grazing land, and, of course, a river or canal to transport the sugar to the Company warehouses.

⁴⁰⁴ De Jonge (ed.), *De Opkomst van het Nedelandsch gezag*, Vol.5, p. 229.

⁴⁰⁵ Yao Keisuke, "The VOC and Japanese Rice in the Early Seventeenth Century", in *Itinerario*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1995, p. 41.

⁴⁰⁶ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2089, Minuut Akten van Verschillende Aard (MAVA) Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 7 April 1700.

As an example of how estates in the Ommelanden were organized, it is a good idea to take a look at the Rawa Pasang, Suka Pura, and Tagal Pandas estates, all the properties of Wouter Hendrix, extra-ordinary member of the Council of the Indies. These estates were located on the eastern side of the Cakung River. According the sketch of these estates made in 1732 by Surveyor Boudewijn Jansz. Vonk, three sugar-mills were located on the bank of the Cakung River. Behind the sugar-mills stretched the sugar plantations and, on the other side of the river bank, lay paddy-fields, and another sugar plantation. The sugar-mills and the plantation were surrounded by a dense forest. These estates had been subject to taxation by the *College van Heemraden* since 1729.⁴⁰⁷

The land in the areas around Batavia had been granted or were sold to Company officials who often subdivided the property, selling off portions to other Europeans, Chinese, or indigenous people. Much of this land was transformed into sugar plantations. The huge estates with various crops cultivated on their land were called *landerijen*. From Jans Vonk's sketches, it is possible to see that, as well as sugar cane and paddy, mulberry trees were also cultivated. At the beginning of eighteenth century, the Company also tried to introduce sericulture to Java and the mulberry leaves were needed to feed the silk worms. With the encouragement of the Company, dozens of mulberry orchards were established on the private estates surrounding Batavia, but after several years of experimentation, this industry failed to develop.

Information about the exact size and shape of the sugar plantations is very sparse. Besides some figurative sketches that made by Surveyor Boudewijn Jansz. Vonk, which show the natural environment of the Batavian sugar-mills, there are no other illustrations depicting the layout of sugar plantations. Nevertheless, the archives yield scattered information about the size of the estates on which sugar plantations were usually located. Land in eighteenth-century Batavia was measured in *roeden*. One *roede* is equal to 3.68 metres.⁴⁰⁸ A *roede* was not used only to measure land but also to measure quantities of firewood. The following evidence gives an impression of the size of the land where sugar cane was cultivated. A (Javanese) Company soldier named Madé rented his land in Lebak Bulus to a Chinese sugar-miller, Liem Oenko, for 50 *rijksdaalders* per year. The land was 100 *roeden* wide and 400 *roeden* long. Liem Oenko's sugar-mill was located on this area of land. Madé's land was rented out for two years and five

⁴⁰⁷ ANRI, RCH No. 20, 11 October 1732, fol. 197.

⁴⁰⁸ Niemeijer, *Batavia. Een koloniale samenleving*, p. 429.

months.⁴⁰⁹ Some plots on Governor-General Diderik Durven's estate were also planted with sugar cane. His land was located at Topassang Parang on the western side of Anke River. The area planted with sugar cane measured roughly 300 *roeden* by 600 *roeden*.⁴¹⁰

The first sugar plantations extended in a southerly direction following the course of the Ciliwung River, but their location was gradually moved away to the other rivers to the east and west of the city. According to a report drawn up by a Chinese officer in 1711, among the 131 Batavian sugar-mills, fifty were located on the Ciliwung, twenty-three on the Pesanggrahan, eleven on the Anke, eight on the Cakung, seven on the Cisadane, and the rest were scattered over various other locations.⁴¹¹ The large number of sugar-mills which operated along the Ciliwung River caused rapid deforestation and a decrease in soil fertility in the areas close to this river. Therefore, in the second half of the eighteenth century most of the sugar-mills were relocated to the other rivers. A *Heemraden* resolution of 1767 mentions that of a total of eighty-two Batavian sugar-mills, twenty-two were located on the Sidane, fifteen on the Bekasi, nine on the Anke, nine on the Pesanggrahan, six on the Mokervaard, five on the Ciliwung; the rest were dispersed along other rivers.⁴¹²

4. *The sugar entrepreneurs*

The majority of sugar-mills owners were Chinese entrepreneurs but some VOC servants also felt the urge to try their entrepreneurial wings and they were the driving force who determined the development of the sugar industry. One of these pioneers was the Chinese entrepreneur Jan Con. A letter from the Batavian government to the Company Directors in Amsterdam dated 9 December 1637 states that Jan Con was able to produce as much sugar on his own plantation as the whole quantity being produced in Banten.⁴¹³ In order to support Jan Con's enterprise, in 1638 the Batavian government gave him a lease of land outside the city on the condition that he planted nothing but sugar cane. Nevertheless, this promising start ended in disappointment. In 1638 only 22.5 *pikuls* of white sugar from the Ommelanden of Batavia, instead of the planned 2,000 *pikuls*, could be shipped to the Netherlands. A year later, the

⁴⁰⁹ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3264, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 26 January 1711.

⁴¹⁰ ANRI, RCH No. 20, 11 October 1732, fol. 193-194.

⁴¹¹ De Jonge (ed.), *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag*, Vol. 8, p. 158.

⁴¹² ANRI, RCH No. 30, 24 January 1767.

⁴¹³ N.P. van den Berg, *Uit de Dagen der Compagnie* (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1904), p. 311.

Ommelanden sugar productivity was even more disappointing. The 1639 harvest was destroyed by a spell of long dry weather and whatever survived the drought was stolen.⁴¹⁴

Another prominent initiator of the sugar industry was Phoa Bingham. He was appointed the leader of the Chinese community with the title of captain by the Batavian government. Bingham possessed extensive sugar cane fields in Tanah Abang, and in 1648 he dug a canal which connected his land to Batavia. Other Chinese officers ran numerous sugar plantations right up to 1740. In 1699 Captain Lim Keenqua, for example, was given a licence to set up two sugar-mills on his land in the Ommelanden. Nie Hoe Kong, the Chinese captain at the time of Chinese rebellion of 1740, had no fewer than fourteen mills which he had inherited from his father on his estates.⁴¹⁵ Being a sugar lord was not a privilege restricted to the Chinese officers, various private Chinese entrepreneurs, most of them from the sugar-producing province of South Fujian in China, also took the plunge. They knew how to cultivate sugar cane and ran sugar-mills with the credit facilities received from rich Chinese merchants in Batavia city, from whom they usually also rented the mills.

In the early eighteenth century, although the sugar production was on the decline, there were still plenty of sugar-mills in operation but the number of sugar-mills significantly decreased after the Chinese massacre in Batavia in 1740. The *Hoge Regering* archives provide the information that in 1710 there were 130 sugar-mills operating in the Ommelanden,⁴¹⁶ while in the 1741 there were only nine left.⁴¹⁷ Only ten years later, some 100 sugar-mills were again in operation in Java, eighty in the Ommelanden, eleven on Java's East Coast, five in Cirebon, and four in Banten.⁴¹⁸

Table 9: Number of sugar-mills in the Ommelanden 1648-1750

Year	Number of sugar-mills	Production (tons)
1648	--	288
1651	--	600

⁴¹⁴ Blussé, *Strange Company*, p. 64.

⁴¹⁵ C. Dobbin, *Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities. Conjoint Communities in the Making of the World-Economy, 1570-1940* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1996), p. 54.

⁴¹⁶ ANRI, MGR No. 492, 10 October 1710, fol. 494.

⁴¹⁷ ANRI, MGR No. 590, 15 September 1741, fol. 462.

⁴¹⁸ ANRI, MGR No. 612, 31 December 1750, fol. 293.

1652	20	741
1660	10	--
1710	131	6.422
1713	128 ⁴¹⁹	--
1734	135 ⁴²⁰	--
1740	87 ⁴²¹	987
1741	9	370
1750	50	--

An aspirant sugar entrepreneur needed a good deal of investment capital and plenty of experience. As a first step, he had to acquire a piece of land, either as a grant if he had the right connections or by buying it if he did not. He needed a workforce which meant that he had to hire or buy slaves on the open market. He also needed to build or buy mills and boiling houses for processing the sugar. When this was in order, as well as acquiring draft animals he had to make sure he had an adequate number of carts, hoes, and other agricultural implements. Other expenses for which he had to prepare were legal fees to buy a licence to operate the sugar-mill and a sufficient investment fund to cover the running costs of a sugar-mill for upwards of at least two years until the first returns came in from the sale of the sugar from the first harvest. A sugar-mill could be bought for approximately 1,500 to 3,500 *rijksdaalders*,⁴²² depending on its production capacity and how completely it was equipped. Meanwhile, for the process from which the sugar would be produced, a sugar-mill required twenty to twenty-six labourers. Those labourers were paid between 60 and 80 *rijksdaalders* a month.⁴²³ The price of fire wood to boil the cane juice amounted to 1 or 2 *rijksdaalders* for every *roede*.⁴²⁴

A plantation owner had to apply for a licence from the *College van Heemraden* before he could establish or operate a sugar-mill. The process of obtaining this sugar-mill licence certainly required him to put his hand in his pocket, even though it is not clear how much exactly an

⁴¹⁹ ANRI, RCH No. 13, 27 July 1717, fol. 375.

⁴²⁰ ANRI, MGR No. 570, 19 August 1738, fol. 293.

⁴²¹ ANRI, MGR No. 590, 15 September 1741, fol. 462.

⁴²² ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2089, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 17 November 1700 and Notarieel Archief No. 3267, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 4 May 1712.

⁴²³ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2092 and No. 2094, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 21 May 1703 and 31 Augustus 1705.

⁴²⁴ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2093 and No. 2094, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 7 Oktober 1704 and 6 February 1705.

entrepreneur had to pay. Lin Tsouko, for example, requested a sugar-mill licence from the *Heemraden* on 5 June 1734. He needed the licence because he had just bought a sugar-mill which was located on the banks of the Pasanggrahan River, at a place named Pondok Pucung.⁴²⁵ Another example of a request for a sugar-mill licence came from Ong Jamkong. This Chinese sugar-miller bought a sugar-mill located in the southern Ommelanden, at a place named Condet.⁴²⁶ The sugar-mill which was granted a licence was included in the list compiled by the *Heemraden* and would be regarded as a legally licensed sugar-mill. A sugar-mill without licence would be considered as illegal. One of the illegal sugar-mills which were discovered by the *Heemraden* belonged to Oey Koenko and he was forced to pay a penalty of 100 *rijksdaalders*.⁴²⁷

Not all of the sugar-millers owned a sugar plantation. Occasionally it was more profitable to lease a sugar plantation or even to rent just the sugar *stoelen* (canes) from the plantation owner. Company Senior Merchant Johan Harman Brandouw, for example, leased his land which was located on the bank of the Anke River to the Chinese miller Tan Soeko. Tan Soeko built a sugar-mill on it. The land was farmed out for five years and every year Tan Soeko had to pay 180 *rijksdaalders*.⁴²⁸ Yet another example is that of Chinese sugar planter Bhe Seengko who sold his 20,000 sugar *staelen* to Auw Oenko. Those sugar canes were planted on the land belonging to the Chinese *Boedelmeester* Bepequa in Bekasi. Auw Oenko had to pay 200 *rijksdaalders* for these sugar plants.⁴²⁹ These two pieces of evidence indicate that a sugar-miller had some alternative choices if he did not want to buy a sugar plantation.

Other expenses which a sugar-miller could expect to pay were those for the buffalo-herder (*oppasser der kerbouwen*). At the Batavian sugar-mills buffaloes were used for such varied tasks as transporting sugar cane from the plantation to the sugar-mill, pushing or pulling a pulley to rotate the mills, and pulling sugar carts to the *perahu* or *sampan* waiting on the river to transport the sugar to the Company warehouses. Almost all of the sugar-mills in the Ommelanden listed buffaloes in their inventory. The average cost to herd one buffalo per year was 1 *rijksdaalder*.⁴³⁰ To guarantee that the sugar-miller and the herders would attend to their respective duties

⁴²⁵ ANRI, RCH No. 21, 5 June 1734.

⁴²⁶ ANRI, RCH No. 21, 31 July 1734.

⁴²⁷ ANRI, MGR No. 489, 8 May 1709, fol. 446-447.

⁴²⁸ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3263, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 12 July 1710.

⁴²⁹ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2092, MAVA Notary Cornelis Venendael, 29 December 1703.

⁴³⁰ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2089 and No. 2090, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 15 September 1700 and 24 November 1701.

properly, both parties would visit a notary and sign a contract. However, most of the contracts were signed only by a sugar-miller and a person representing the herders. Chinese sugar-miller Soey Kieuko signed a contract with a Javanese, Marta Dita. The contract mentions that the latter would provide two persons to herd the thirty-five buffaloes of the first party. The buffaloes were stalled at Soey Kieuko's sugar-mill which was located in Tanjung in the southern Ommelanden. Every year Soey Kieuko had to pay 35 *rijksdaalders* to the herders and the payment would rise if the number of buffaloes were to increase. It was written in the contract that, if some of the buffaloes were stolen, lost, or killed by tigers or snakes, the herder would have to pay 10 *rijksdaalders* for every buffalo to its owner.⁴³¹ Since every sugar-mill needed more than twenty buffaloes, it was important to the sugar-millers to conclude a contract with the herdsman to protect their vital livestock.

When he had the necessary land, capital, labour, technical skills, and machinery, plus accessible markets, a sugar entrepreneur could make substantial profits. His first task was to accumulate enough capital to pay for clearing the land, cultivating crops, establishing buildings, buying the requisite tools and implements, and for carrying the cost of funding all of the production process until the cane could be harvested. He had to recruit and pay overseers and skilled labourers to work in the sugar-fields and in the mills. He also had to allocate sufficient money to ship the sugar to the warehouses, if he did not own any small boats himself, and had to wait months for its sale each year. Therefore, financing sugar production remained a tricky business for most of the entrepreneurs since the price of sugar was fixed by the Company.

It is possible to make a rough guess at how much capital was required to operate a regular sugar-mill during the harvest season. The expenses for hiring labourers and buffalo herders are derived from data about a sugar-mill belonging to Poa Kengko located at Pakembangan close to the River Anke, and the other two pieces of evidence come from other sugar-mills:

The average price of a medium sized sugar-mill: 1,500 *rijksdaalders*

The expenses incurred by twenty-three for labourers per-month: 66.5 *rijksdaalders*⁴³²

The lease of a sugar plantation per year: 50 *rijksdaalders*⁴³³

The expenses involved in providing 20 *roeden* firewood per month: 20 *rijksdaalders*⁴³⁴

⁴³¹ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2089, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 20 December 1700.

⁴³² ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2090, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 11 April 1701.

⁴³³ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3264, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 26 January 1711.

The hiring of *oppassers* for herding forty buffaloes per year 59 *rijksdaalders*⁴³⁵

Total 1695.5 *rijksdaalders*

This estimate calculates only the basic costs required to operate a medium-sized sugar-mill. These costs do not include such other expenses as the sugar-mill licence, the transportation of the cane to the mill, the accommodation for the labourers, the repair or the purchase of new equipment for the sugar-mill and so on. The expenses for labourers and firewood are calculated on a monthly basis because a sugar-mill only operated and produced sugar during the harvest season. It was important for a miller to pay his labourers fully at the end of the season. Failure to do so meant he would have problems recruiting labourers for the following season. Considering that there were more than one hundred sugar-mills operating in the Ommelanden at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a skilled labourer had no difficulty in moving from one sugar-mill to another. The expenses incurred for the firewood could vary depending on the distance between the sugar-mill and the forest in which the firewood was collected.

The total cost would decrease if a sugar-miller chose to rent sugar *stoelen* rather than run a sugar plantation himself. For example, the Chinese sugar-miller Lim Oensay leased 15,000 sugar *stoelen* which were being cultivated on his land in Salemba to Oey Goanko. He leased those sugar *stoelen* for five years, for which he received 15 *rijksdaalders* annually.⁴³⁶ The *Mardijker* Jan da Silva leased his land at Toegoe with the 15,000 sugar canes on it to a Chinese sugar-miller Kung Joncko, who leased the canes for four years, for which he had to pay 10 *rijksdaalders* each year.⁴³⁷ This kind of evidence illustrates the truth of the assertion that an enterprising sugar-miller had various avenues open to him to reduce the costs of production.

Although most of Batavian sugar-millers ran no more than one or two sugar-mills, some of them owned more than three sugar-mills. Unquestionably, during the sugar boom at the beginning of eighteenth century, it was usual for a Batavian sugar-miller to purchase or set up more than one sugar-mill. The Chinese miller Pou Poanko, for example, bought two sugar-mills located in Trogong, on the bank of the Pesanggrahan River, from the Chinese merchant

⁴³⁴ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2094, MAVA Noatry Cornelis Veenendael, 6 February 1705.

⁴³⁵ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2090, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 31 August 1701.

⁴³⁶ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3263, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 28 July 1710.

⁴³⁷ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2090, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 2 February 1701.

Go Tsilauw. The price of these sugar-mills amounted to 3,000 *rijksdaalders*.⁴³⁸ Meanwhile, on 10 May 1721 Captain Que Bouqua requested the permission of the *Heemraden* to establish two sugar-mills on his land in Bekasi.⁴³⁹ Certainly, European sugar-millers usually had more than two sugar-mills. Joan François de Witte van Schooten, a member of the Batavian *Raad van Justitie*, owned 6 sugar-mills, which were located in various places, two around Fort Noordwijk, two to the west and two the south of the Seringsing Estate.⁴⁴⁰

The real profits to be made in the sugar industry came from the sugar production itself, but money was also to be had in buying and selling sugar-mills. An entrepreneur willing to take a risk would make his money by investing in a cheap sugar-mill and subsequently selling it to somebody else at a higher price. In fact, sometimes he did not even need to spend his money to make a profit. Ho Peecko, for example, bought a sugar-mill owned by three Chinese: Tsoa Piauko, Qua Tsiko, and Lim Liongko. This mill was located in Pondok Serap on land belonging to *Kapitan* Mangus. The price of the mill was 900 *rijksdaalders*. Since the three Chinese owed a sum equivalent to this to a lady named *Mejuffrouw* Caetje, they were anxious to sell the mill to pay off their debt.⁴⁴¹ Five days later, Ho Peecko sold that same mill to another Chinese named Oey Toanko for no less than 2,000 *rijksdaalders*. Ho Peecko wanted the payment to be made in two parts: 1,100 *rijksdaalders* to be paid to him and 900 *rijksdaalders* to be paid to *Mejuffrouw* Caetje.⁴⁴² Obviously Ho Peecko did not pay his debt until he found a buyer to whom he could sell the mill at a higher price. This example illustrates how a sugar-mill broker could use his experience and networks to make a healthy profit from the sugar industry.

Since running a sugar-mill required a sizable amount of money and managerial skills, only experienced entrepreneurs with a large amount of capital at their disposal could do business in the sugar industry. This is the reason that only few indigenous people from Batavia or the Ommelanden were involved in this industry. The indigenous sugar-millers were limited to the *kapitan* or other leaders of indigenous ethnic groups. Among them was *Kapitan* Daeng Matara, the leader of the Bugis community, who sold his sugar-mill in Condet in 1700.⁴⁴³

⁴³⁸ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3262, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 18 April 1710.

⁴³⁹ ANRI, RCH No. 15, 10 May 1721, fol. 61.

⁴⁴⁰ ANRI, RCH No. 14, 10 October 1720, fol. 320.

⁴⁴¹ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3264, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 27 March 1711.

⁴⁴² ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3264, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 1 April 1711.

⁴⁴³ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2089, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 25 September 1700.

5. *The sugar production process*

A typical sugar-mill consisted of a number of huts constructed of wood or bamboo, roofed with a palm-leaf thatch or tiles. Those huts were used as storehouses, for milling the sugar cane, and boiling the juice, as a buffalo stall, or perhaps as simple lodgings for the labourers during the harvest time. Where the actual milling was done two or three cylinders made from wood, stone, or iron stood in the middle of the hut. These cylinders or large flat stones, which were turned around by the *kerbau* crushed the sugar cane. The crushed cane yielded the cane juice. The boiling house contained a number of ovens or fireplaces constructed of earth and lime. On top of these furnaces were large kettles for boiling down the juice. Batavian sugar-mills were also equipped with buffalo sheds, carts, buffaloes, axes, sledgehammers, shovels, iron saws, a number of *perahu* for transportation purposes and so on.⁴⁴⁴ The size and number of these pieces of equipment varied from one mill to the other.

Newly planted cane needed fourteen to eighteenth months to mature to a state at which it was ready to be cut for processing into sugar. If it survived the dangers of wind, fire, long dry seasons, and foraging animals, the cane grew to a height of between five-and-a-half and seven feet before it was ready to be harvested. Once cut, the cane would produce a new crop or *ratoon* about every twelve months, although the amount of liquid which could be extracted declined after the third or fourth cutting. Because of these circumstances, sugar planters paid careful attention to the age, condition, and status of the cane-fields. In a harvest season, ten to twenty labourers would be employed by a sugar-miller to cut the cane and take it to the sugar-mill. The number of labourers required for harvesting sugar cane depended on the size of the sugar plantation. Some of the labourers would be detailed to bring the harvested cane to the sugar-mill in carts pulled by buffaloes. In the sugar-mill, the cane was stacked in piles outside the milling house. There two or three labourers would strip the leaves from the canes and cut the stalks into the required size. Cleaned and cut, the stalks could be taken to the milling house to be crushed to produce the juice.

The sugar production process in the sugar-mill was carried out under the watchful eye of an overseer (*mandoor*), who usually also supplied the workers for the sugar-mills. They bore full responsibility for the process of sugar production. During harvest time, the overseer was

⁴⁴⁴ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2093, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 8 January 1704.

responsible for supervising the production of eight pots (*passos*) of sugar juice during the day and another eight pots at night. Hence, every twenty-four hours, the workers were expected to produce at least sixteen pots of sugar juice. If the amount of the production remained below target, the mill owner was not obliged to pay any salary for that day.⁴⁴⁵ As a result, the sugar-miller kept a careful record how many pots were delivered to the kettle house every day, and at the end of the season he settled the account. Prior to the development of cold storage and the railway in the nineteenth century, ideally sugar cane had to be processed within forty-eight hours after harvesting. Although sugar cane could be kept in storage for some time, it easily dried out when harvested by hand and stored under the usual pre-industrial agricultural conditions. At harvest time, a sugar-mill would therefore be a hive of activity. It worked non-stop twenty-four hours a day for a month or more, during what was known as the '*suikeer campagne*'.

Sugar cane is hard and brittle, therefore steady pressure and a crushing force is required to extract its juice. In Java, the vertical two-roller cane-crusher made of stone seems to have become standard equipment.⁴⁴⁶ The sugar industry in the Ommelanden was developed by Chinese immigrants and therefore the technology used to crush sugar was Chinese technology. The first detailed description of Chinese sugar manufacture in the seventeenth century occurs in *T'ien-Kung K'ai-Wu* (composed 1634-1636, printed 1637):

The (vertical) roll crusher used for crushing cane in sugar manufacturing is erected as follows: Take two wooden boards measuring five feet long, two feet wide, and one-half foot thick. At the ends of each board holes are bored to accommodate the supporting posts (for the upper board which is placed horizontally several feet above the lower). The upper ends of the posts protrude a little bit above the upper board, while the lower ends extend two or three feet below the lower board and are buried in the ground, so that (the whole apparatus) will be stable. At the centre of the upper board two openings are made, through which two large rollers (made of very hard wood) are placed one next to the other. It would be best to have the rollers measuring seven feet in circumference. One of the rollers is three feet long, the other four and half feet. Affixed to the protruding end of the latter one is a curved pole made of bent wood, measuring fifteen

⁴⁴⁵ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2089 and No. 2090, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 7 April 1700 and 11 April 1701.

⁴⁴⁶ Mazumdar, *Sugar and Society*, p. 479.

feet in length; this is attached to an ox that pulls it in a circle (and thus turns the rolls). The surfaces of both rollers are deeply corrugated or cogged; the cogs of one roll fit into the grooves between cogs of the other. The sugar cane which passes between the two toothed rollers is pressed and crushed. This is on the same principle as the cotton gin. As the cane is pressed the juice runs off. The residue is fed into the crusher again through the receiving hole on the rollers, and after having been crushed three times all the juice in the cane will be pressed out. The bagassee is used as fuel.

On the lower board two depressions one and one half inches deep are hollowed out to receive the bottom end of the rollers. The board is not perforated, and therefore it catches the juice. An iron pellet is affixed to the centre of the bottom end of each roller to facilitate rotation. The cane juice flows into an earthenware jar through that has been cut in the board.⁴⁴⁷

Apart from the wooden mill mentioned in the text, the Chinese also developed a stone mill. The stone-roller mill was a unique Chinese development and Chinese immigrants transferred knowledge of it overseas.⁴⁴⁸ It is very possible that the stone-roller mills used in the Ommelanden were imported from China. The vertical two-roller cane-crusher made of stone was not only used in the Ommelanden, but was also in other places in Java, Vietnam, and Thailand.⁴⁴⁹

The process of crushing the sugar canes using the vertical stone roller was carried out by one or more labourers. The cane was passed through in bundles ranging from just two or three canes up to a dozen. The amount of time needed to crush the cane between the rollers depended on the skill of the labourers. Too many layers crushed together would create problems because the bottom canes would absorb some of the liquid squeezed from those on top of them and because the harder the pressing, the more pieces of stalk fibre and other impurities were deposited in the liquid. Although the work at the rollers was repetitive, it demanded expertise and great attention. The cane had to be placed into the rollers at the right speed and in the right quantity, if not the rollers might break or the cane would not be pressed thoroughly enough.

⁴⁴⁷ Sung Ying-Hsing, *Chinese Technology in the Seventeenth Century, T'ien-Kung K'ai-Wu*, translated from the Chinese and annotated by E-Tu Zen Sun and Shiou-Chuan Sun (New York: Dover Publications, 1997), p. 126.

⁴⁴⁸ Joseph Needham, *Science and Technology in China*, Vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 330.

⁴⁴⁹ Mazumdar, *Sugar and Society*, p. 142.




Illustration 9: Traditional Chinese technology of crushing cane with vertical-toothed roll crusher
 Source: Sung Ying-Hsing, *Chinese Technology in the Seventeenth Century*, T'ien-Kung K'ai-Wu, translated from the Chinese and annotated by E-Tu Zen Sun and Shiou-Chuan Sun (New York: Dover Publications, 1997), p. 127.




Illustration 10: A sugar-mill in Tangerang in the beginning of 20th century
 Source: F. de Haan, *Oud Batavia Platenalbum* (Bandung: A.C. Nix & Co., 1935), b 35.

The juice extracted from the canes, the sugar water, flowed in to an earthenware jar or a huge pot. After a pot was filled with juice, it would be taken to the boiling place. The amount of juice which could be extracted depended on the variety of sugar cane and the efficiency with which the mill worked to extract it. Sometimes a sugar-miller did not even boil the juice himself but would sell it on the open market. A Chinese sugar-miller Oey Tsinsay, for example, sold 400 *pikuls* of sugar water to Ong Soncko. The first party received 40 *rijksdaalders* for every 100 *pikuls* of juice he sold, and that price included the transport of the juice to the second party's sugar-boiling furnace.⁴⁵⁰

In the kettle house juice would be boiled for a certain amount of time until it crystallized. Producing crystallized sugar after extracting the juice was a complicated process. The greatest hurdle was the threat of rapid fermentation as the juice was in full contact with air. Therefore the workers had to begin boiling the juice almost immediately after it was extracted. To obtain the best quality, the work in the boiling place had to be co-ordinated with that in the mill and, one step further back, with the harvesting to avoid either wastage of the juice or time-consuming delays. The temperature while boiling had to be carefully controlled, because heat could change the structure of juice. Using too high a temperature to concentrate the juice would inevitably result in the whole batch turning into burnt, not crystallized syrup. To judge the exact moment when sugar syrup was done required considerable expertise before the advent of industrial technology when temperature controlled pans for boiling were invented. After boiling, separating the sugar crystals from the sugar syrup and drying the sugar required yet another skill.

The process of boiling the juice would produce two kinds of sugar of different quality. White sugar of the best quality was called *cabessa* and darker sugar of lower quality was called *bariga*. In 1725 the price of *cabessa* was 3 ½ *rijksdaalders* per *pikul*, while *bariga* was 3 *rijksdaalders* per *pikul*.⁴⁵¹ *Cabessa* sugar could be sold directly to the public but *bariga* was often used as a mixture for the basis of arak.⁴⁵² The sugar industry was closely associated with Chinese arak distilleries, because *bariga* or molasses constituted the main raw material in the preparation of this alcoholic drink, which also contained fermented rice. The busiest time during the year for the

⁴⁵⁰ ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 2089, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 4 May 1700.

⁴⁵¹ ANRI, MGR No. 532, 27 July 1728.

⁴⁵² ANRI, MGR No. 492, 10 October 1710, fol. 496.

sugar industry was from March until May, because the sugar was required to be ready for the departure of the China-bound Junks at the end of June or early July.⁴⁵³

During the harvest, sufficient quantities of firewood were essential. To guarantee its supply, a sugar-miller rented a patch of forest and hired people to cut down the trees. The payment for the firewood was reckoned on the basis of how many *roeden* of wood were produced within a certain time period. The Javanese lieutenant Wardicka was paid 150 *rijksdaalders* for cutting 150 *roeden* of wood within nine months.⁴⁵⁴ Wardicka and his people had to carry the firewood from a forest in Tandjoeng in the south of the Ommelanden to a sugar-mill belonging to Oey Quanko and Tsiew Tsiewko in Condet. The land leased by sugar-millers to fell the timber was not always the property of Batavian inhabitants, but sometimes belonged to the Company. A Chinese miller Tan Zayqua, for example, took 195 *roeden* of firewood from a plot of Company-owned land called Maraberos. That firewood had to be transported to his sugar-mill via the Ciliwung River, and for every *roede* of firewood Tan Zayqua had to pay the *College van Heemraden* $\frac{1}{2}$ *rijksdaalder*.⁴⁵⁵

The value of a sugar-mill was not determined by the building of the mill itself, which was not particularly expensive because it consisted of only two or three wood, iron, or stone cylinders, but by its equipment. To give an illustration: Oey Toanko bought a sugar-mill in Pondok Serap equipped with one warehouse, five small *petak*, some water buffaloes, sugar cane and others implements for 2,000 *rijksdaalders*,⁴⁵⁶ whereas I Tsiako had to paid 3,500 *rijksdaalders* for a sugar-mill in Kramat equipped with two warehouses, two small *petak*, forty water buffaloes, twenty-eight *laksas* sugar cane and all of the implements required to run it properly.⁴⁵⁷ Detailed information about the implements used in a sugar-mill can be found listed on the premises of Susana Staal, which stood on the western side of the Ciliwung River. There were forty-eight different kinds of tools in her sugar-mill.⁴⁵⁸

By and large, Batavian sugar-mills were cheap to build and easy to repair. They could even be moved about from place to place without too much difficulty. Their drawbacks were their low capacity, the poor job they made of pressing the cane, and they operated slowly. As a

⁴⁵³ Dobbin, *Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities*, p. 54.

⁴⁵⁴ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 2093, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 7 October 1704.

⁴⁵⁵ ANRI, RCH No. 9, 5 June 1706, fol. 206.

⁴⁵⁶ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3264, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 1 April 1711.

⁴⁵⁷ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3267, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 4 May 1712.

⁴⁵⁸ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3269, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 5 November 1712. See appendix 5 for the complete inventory of Susana Staal's sugar-mill.

consequence, the quality of the sugar was adversely affected by the time it took to crush the cane and to extract the juice into the boiling pans. In short, it could be said that the sugar boiling process was an enormous and wasteful consumption of firewood, human labour and cattle.

6. *Management of labour*

The large number of sugar-mills operating in the Ommelanden acted as a magnet for large numbers of migratory labourers from various places on the North Coast of Java, such as Cirebon, Tegal Pekalongan, even from the mainland of China. The sugar-millers preferred to use labourers from distant places because they were less likely to complain about the arduous, unpleasant work than those who happened to live close to Batavia. In Dutch sources, Javanese migrant workers were called *bujang*. In their search for employees, Chinese sugar-millers had to look for middlemen who could supply Javanese labourers. These middlemen were appointed to represent them by the labourers themselves. After a sugar-miller and a supplier reached an agreement, they went to a notary to sign a contract if they needed a guarantee. According to the archival evidence from the office of notary Cornelis Veenendael, most of the contracts signed were between Chinese sugar-millers and Javanese labour suppliers, which suggest that most of Chinese labourers worked in sugar-mills without any Dutch contracts.

The majority of the workers employed in the sugar-mills and sugar plantations were Javanese. The skilled jobs related to the sugar production tended to be done by Chinese, and accordingly they were paid higher than the Javanese.⁴⁵⁹ The average workforce required to run a sugar-mill during the harvest season at the beginning of the eighteenth century consisted of nineteen to twenty-six labourers⁴⁶⁰ for one shift, while at the end of the eighteenth century and the early of nineteenth century these numbers were to increase to 150 to 200 to produce 1,000 or 2,000 *pikuls* of crude sugar.⁴⁶¹ The smaller number of labourers required by the sugar-mills at the beginning of eighteenth century is an indication that these were small enterprises, probably with smaller productivity compared to the sugar-mills of the later period.

⁴⁵⁹ G.R. Knight, "From Plantation to Paddy Field: The origins of the Nineteenth Century Transformation of Java's Sugar Industry", in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1980, p. 179.

⁴⁶⁰ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 2090, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendael, 24 June 1701 and Notarieel Archief No. 2397, MAVA Notary Jan Seullijn, 25 April 1713.

⁴⁶¹ Knight, "From Plantation to Paddy Field", p. 180.

During the harvest season, various tasks awaited the workers. For example, there was a division of labour among twenty-five labourers hired by the Chinese sugar-miller Li Poanko. Six men crushed the sugar cane, six men boiled the juice, ten men cut the sugar cane on the plantation and brought it to the sugar-mill, two men stripped the leaves off the sugar cane and fed the leaves to the buffaloes, and one man carried water from the river to the sugar-mill. Every month Li Poanko was faced with a wage bill of 66 *rijksdaalders*.⁴⁶² The division of labour among the twenty-six workers at the sugar-mill of Harman Sluyters, a member of the *College van Heemraden*, was rather different. Here, sixteen people harvested the sugar cane on the plantation, six people crushed the sugar cane, and four people boiled juice. This workforce was paid 100 *rijksdaalders* a month.⁴⁶³ These records revealing the division of labour in these two sugar-mills provides precise information about what kind of jobs had to be undertaken during the process of sugar production.

One obvious point is that the work in the sugar-mill required more labourers than the work in the cane-fields. The information also clarifies the fact that the workers who cultivated the cane were not those who later harvested it, because the latter were hired with the men who worked in the sugar-mill during harvest season. It is quite possible that there also were sugar labourers who specialized in sugar cultivation, since sugar *staelen* had to be planted once every five years. In the harvest season, a sugar-mill operated twenty-four hours a day, so it required at least two shifts of labourers.

Since most of sugar-mills in the Ommelanden were located in isolated places, far away from the city, it was important to the sugar-millers to provide accommodation for their labour force during harvest season. This basic accommodation was located close to the mill. Most of the sugar-mills provided small houses for workers, called *rumah petak* or *pondok*. In the sugar-mill inventory, these smallish cabins are sometimes simply referred to as *woningen*. According to the inventory of Pou Poanko's sugar-mill which was sold to Go 'Tsilauw, there were two *woningen* listed among all the other amenities.⁴⁶⁴ In the inventory of 'Tsoa Piauko's sugar-mill which was sold to Qua 'Tsiko and Lim Liongko there were five *woningen*,⁴⁶⁵ while the sugar-mill which I 'Tsiako bought from Jo 'Tsia had two *woningen*.⁴⁶⁶ It was also usually up to the sugar-miller to

⁴⁶² ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 2092, MAVA Notary Cornelis Veenendaal, 22 Juny 1703.

⁴⁶³ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 2397, MAVA Notary Jan Seullijn, 19 April 1713.

⁴⁶⁴ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3262, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 18 April 1710.

⁴⁶⁵ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3264, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 27 March 1711.

⁴⁶⁶ ANRI Notarieel Archief No. 3267, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 4 May 1712.

provide the labourers' food. The sketches made by Surveyor Boudewijn Jansz. Vonk in 1732, show that the sugar-mills were often close to the paddy-fields. The rice produced in the paddy-fields was probably meant to provide food for the labourers.

Even though some sugar-mills utilized slaves as a workforce, most of the sugar-millers preferred to use hired labourers. Free labour was much cheaper than slaves. The average price required to buy a strong, healthy male slave in the early eighteenth century amounted to about 60 *rijksdaalders*. At harvest time, around twenty-five workers were needed if a sugar-mill were to operate properly. If a sugar-miller did prefer to use slaves, his choice would cost him a pretty penny. The expense of for hiring a team of workers for one month was about the same as the price of a single slave. This explains why the majority of sugar-mills workers were free workers.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

In conclusion it is perhaps an interesting exercise to compare the history of Batavia with two prominent sister cities in Southeast Asia: namely, Melaka and Singapore. These three maritime trading cities flourished successfully at different periods and were all commercial entrepôts administered for long periods by Europeans. All three were established at strategic locations: Batavia near the Sunda Strait, and the other two port cities located along the Straits of Melaka, the two thoroughfares between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Despite their similarities, as commercial port towns Batavia, Melaka, and Singapore have been studied from rather different angles.

Legend has it that Melaka was founded in 1402 by Parameswara, a prince from Palembang, who had been forced to leave his homeland after an attack by the Javanese in 1391-1392. Around a century later, Melaka emerged as the ultimate Malay harbour principality which was visited by merchants from scores of nations from all over Monsoon Asia who lived and traded in peace under the benign governance of its ruler. The success of Melaka as an entrepôt became a model for other Southeast Asian port principalities which adopted its principles of governance in the centuries which followed. In 1511, Portuguese forces under the command of Alfonso de Albuquerque conquered Melaka. The *Estado da India* used this port city as a centre from which to control the maritime traffic passing through the Straits of Melaka.⁴⁶⁷ In 1641, the Dutch conquered Melaka from the Portuguese. Under VOC rule, Melaka became a substantial exporter of tin and importer of Indian cloth but, as a commercial centre, it always remained secondary to Batavia. In 1795 the Dutch surrendered Melaka to the British. It was restored to the Dutch in 1818 but, under the terms of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, this port city was definitively ceded to the British.

Recent archaeological evidence confirms that Singapore already served as a meeting point for traders from all over the Archipelago centuries before Thomas Stamford Raffles turned it into

⁴⁶⁷ The *Estado da India* or the State of India was the name given by the Portuguese Crown to the Portuguese imperial enterprise in Asia. This state was not a unitary state but a collection of forts, fleets, and communities which stretched from East Africa to Japan. See George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 12.

a free port under the British flag in 1819.⁴⁶⁸ Immediately after this take-over, Singapore began its growth into the biggest port city of Southeast Asia, mainly owing to Chinese entrepreneurship. The city on its tiny island lacked natural resources and had to depend on entrepôt trade, exchanging British manufactured goods, Indian opium, and Chinese wares for tropical products from the Indonesian Archipelago and other parts of Southeast Asia. Geographically speaking, Singapore was excellently positioned to do just this; well situated between the trade winds in the days of sail, and economically supported by a sound policy free of commercial tariffs and few restrictions.

The history of Batavia shares some of the elements of both Melaka and Singapore. First known as Sunda Kelapa, in the fifteenth century this port town served as the principal outlet for pepper from the Hindu kingdom of Pajajaran. In 1527, the sultan of Cirebon dispatched a military expedition under the command of Fatahilah to conquer Sunda Kelapa. The new ruler renamed the town Jayakarta, meaning ‘complete victory’, and a few decades later the town became the vassal of the sultanate of Banten. Local rule changed once again in 1619 when Governor- General Jan Pieterszoon Coen, in charge of the VOC, razed the town of Jayakarta, and built Batavia on its ashes. After that, Batavia became the hub of the VOC trading network in Asia and developed into one of the most prominent Asian port cities. After a short British interregnum, 1811-1816, Batavia became the capital of the Netherlands East Indies and since 1949, as Jakarta, has been the capital of the Republic of Indonesia. All three cities indubitably had Asian roots in some way or another, but they were urbanized under colonial rule.

Curiously enough, only a few studies have been done on the hinterlands of these three cities. Throughout its existence as an entrepôt, Melaka never really had a sizeable hinterland. Under Portuguese rule, it remained an enclave in the kingdom of Johor. As mentioned above, Singapore is an island lacking in natural resources. For the provisions necessary to its existence, this British possession had to rely on the supply of foodstuffs and other raw materials from elsewhere. Singapore has never outgrown the island on which it is situated. By contrast, Batavia had a hinterland of its own, the Ommelanden, which I have shown in this study, was developed during the second half of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century. Batavia/Jakarta has now grown into a metropolis of more than 12

⁴⁶⁸ About the history of Singapore which commenced 500 years before the arrival of Thomas Stamford Raffles in 1819 see Tan Tai Yong, Kwa Chong Guan and Derek Heng, *Singapore: A 700-Year History. From Early Emporium to World City* (Singapore: The National Archives of Singapore, 2009).

million people generally known as Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok Tangerang, and Bekasi) more or less congruent with the boundaries of the erstwhile Ommelanden.

In this study, I have shown that the interaction between man and nature in the Ommelanden irrevocably changed the landscape of this region from a wilderness of tropical forests into an agricultural area dominated by sugar cane and paddy-fields. Water control and irrigation were very essential to the development of transportation and agricultural activities. The hydraulic infrastructure which was laid out under VOC rule slowly but surely shaped the regional landscape over the years. Nevertheless, the various kinds of water control introduced by the Dutch, which included canals, dams, ditches, and sluices, never fully succeeded in preventing Batavia and the Ommelanden from inundation by the seasonal *banjir*. The uncontrolled development of private dams and sluices and the rapid deforestation actually worsened the problem of flooding. Even nowadays the flood problems in Jakarta and its surrounding areas during the rainy season have not been satisfactorily solved.

Certainly, the health situation deteriorated. The first malaria epidemic swept Batavia in 1733, spreading death among the inhabitants of the town. Several explanations have been given for the ecological degradation and insalubriousness of Batavia, but it is my personal opinion this sanitary problem was caused mainly by the lack of knowledge about the worsening ecological environment of Batavia and the lack of control exercised over the economic activities in the Ommelanden.

No well-organized administration had existed in the surroundings of Jayakarta prior to the establishment of the Company authority. To plug this gap and to administer the multi-ethnic society of Batavia and its environs, the Company decided to implement a mixed administration combining local traditions and institutions and administrative conventions derived from the Dutch Republic. The Dutch rule in the Ommelanden was exercised through the *College van Heemraden*, but at the ground level it remained in the hands of *kampung* headmen.

The Company kept the Ommelanden *kampungs* relatively autonomous, as legal enclaves which administered their own *adat* instead of the system of land laws which were in force in the Dutch Republic. Initially, the Ommelanden quarters and *kampung* were officially planned as settlements for specific ethnic groups but, since the inhabitants of these settlements enjoyed relative freedom, most of these *kampung* were occupied by various ethnicities. Nevertheless, whenever a serious crime was committed in a *kampung*, the colonial administration would intervene by sending the *landdrost* with his assistants to conduct an investigation and make the

necessary arrest. In this study, I have shown that the *landdrosten* did not function as well as they might have done. In fact, security and order in the Ommelanden more or less depended on co-operation between *kampung* headmen and their followers.

Prior to the establishment of the *Heemraden* in 1682, there was no clear policy on land ownership. This lack of land registration contributed to the emergence of legal pluralism in the Ommelanden land sector. Many forms of land ownership found in this region can be classified neither under the legally acknowledged system of statutory land rights, nor under traditional *adat* law. The establishment of the *Heemraden* did succeed in increasing colonial control over land ownership, but their presence failed to deter the rural inhabitants from occupying land which did not legally belong to them. It was beyond the capability of the local authorities to evict all illegal settlers since their number just kept on rising. Faced with a seemingly hopeless task, as long as these illicit dwellers did not create trouble and as long as the land they occupied was not granted or sold to someone else by the Company, the local authorities tended to accept their existence.

Several traditions merged in land utilization in the Ommelanden. Javanese *sawah* and *ladang* developed alongside Chinese sugar cultivation techniques and Dutch hydraulic engineering. The upshot was that a teeming population of more than 40,000 was amply provided with food and various agricultural products, among them sugar, pepper and, from the 1720s, also coffee, could also be produced for export.

In less than a century after the establishment of Batavia, the environs of this city developed from a heavily forested region with very small numbers of inhabitants into quite densely populated countryside supporting 58,761 inhabitants in 1710. The Ommelanden was a colony with a heterogeneous population of small Dutch elite, *Mardijkers* consisting of free Christians from India and Maluku, free Indonesian ethnicities, Chinese sojourners and settlers, Javanese migrant workers from the Priangan and the north coast of Java, and slaves. Although the colonial authorities always kept a keen eye on the social dividing lines based on origin and religion, the people from these varied backgrounds frequently mixed and intermarried. In this study, I have shown that intermarriage among the Ommelanden people was a common phenomenon. The stage was already set for this, since ethnic identity among Indonesian nations was quite loose and unarticulated. In their turn, the offspring of inter-ethnic marriages would marry people of different ethnic groups or persons who had similar background as

themselves. A few generations later, they had lost their own ethnic identity and formed a new one as *orang Betawi*, people of Batavia.

Lance Castles claims that the identity of orang Betawi was first formulated in the nineteenth century. Using a historical demographic approach by analysing the census data of 1673, 1815, 1893, and 1930 he shows that the Betawi people were formed by migrants from various ethnic groups.⁴⁶⁹ His approach demonstrates that the orang Betawi are composed of migrant people and are not the original natives of Batavia. A different explanation is provided by Yasmine Zaki Shahab, who argues that the orang Betawi are indeed the original inhabitants of Jakarta. Although they were created from various ethnic groups who migrated to Batavia, the orang Betawi were still 'made' in Batavia.⁴⁷⁰ Using the theory of the invention of tradition devised by E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger,⁴⁷¹ she argues that Betawi culture was recreated in 1970s and that this process succeeded in strengthening the Betawi identity.

The conclusions of my research differs from the above studies because they are based strictly on the so far unused archival sources in the *National Archief* (NA) in The Hague and the *Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia* (ANRI) in Jakarta. These archival sources, particularly the notarial archives kept in ANRI Jakarta, provide information about the socio-economic interaction between ordinary people in the Ommelanden through records of property (land, sugar-mills, and cattle) and the purchasing and leasing and trading slaves. In this study, I have shown that slaves often were traded several times. Changes of ownership affected not only the slaves themselves, they had consequences for the slave owners as well. There were thousands of slaves and slave owners in the Ommelanden, so it goes without saying that the slave trade was an effective medium of cultural assimilation.

Ommelanden society was one of the first colonial societies built by the Dutch on Asian soil. The colonial character of this society can be clearly seen in the development of sugar industry. Very preoccupied with economic interests, the Company promoted and strictly regulated this industry. During the period under study, the sugar industry mushroomed in the Ommelanden boosted by an abundant supply of Chinese and Javanese labourers and of the absolutely essential firewood. Owing to the Chinese entrepreneurship and the Company efforts to create a market in the intra-Asian trade, this industry reached a 'golden age' at the beginning of

⁴⁶⁹ Lance Castle, "The Ethnic Profile of Djakarta", in *Indonesia*, Vol. 3, April 1967, pp. 156-158.

⁴⁷⁰ Shahab, *The Creation of Ethnic Tradition*, pp. 80-87, see also Yasmine Z. Shahab, *Identitas Dan Otoritas. Rekonstruksi Tradisi Betawi* (Jakarta: Laboratorium Antropologi, FISIP UI, 2004), p.5.

⁴⁷¹ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invented Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

eighteenth century. Job opportunities in the sugar-mills and sugar cane-fields caused an increase in the Ommelanden population and a growth in economic activities at the local level.

In 1713 there were 128 sugar-mills operating in the Ommelanden and in 1734 this number reached its peak at 135. To operate so large a number of pre-modern mills required a very abundant supply of firewood. The uncontrolled consumption of firewood for this purpose was the main factor in the rapid deforestation and the severe ecological damage which followed in its wake. No effective efforts were taken by the Company to tackle this problem, if indeed it acknowledged that there was one. Within a few decades, most of the forest in the surrounding areas of Batavia vanished. The decline in the international demand struck the Ommelanden sugar industry a heavy blow and many mills had to close down. The bankruptcy of the sugar industry caused large numbers of people to become unemployed and ushered in widespread social disorder. The dynamic period of socio-economic development in the Ommelanden which began in 1684 came to an end in 1740, when the social unrest escalated into the Chinese massacre in Batavia.

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Glossary

C.: Chinese, D.: Dutch, J.: Javanese, M.: Malay, P.: Persian, S.: Spain

<i>acte van donatie</i>	(D.) certificate of donation, land grant
<i>adat</i>	(M.) custom
<i>arak</i>	(M.) locally product spirit, usually distilled from either sugar cane or rice
<i>baljuw</i>	(D.) head of police
<i>bale-bale</i>	(M.) traditional Indonesian bed
<i>banjir</i>	(J., M.) flood
<i>bujang</i>	(M.) literal: bachelor, but referred to young unmarried Javanese workers labourers
<i>cattij/ kati</i>	(M.) unit of weight equal to 6.25 pounds
<i>Chinesche kamp</i>	(D.) Chinese settlement
<i>eigendom</i>	(D.) property, ownership
<i>erfbrief</i>	(D.) letter of land ownership
<i>Heren XVII</i>	(D.) Gentlemen Seventeen, the Directors of the VOC in Holland
<i>Hoge Regering</i>	(D.) High Government, Governor-General and Council of the Indies
<i>intramuros</i>	(S.) literally: within the walls, the inner city
<i>gaga</i>	(J.) dry rice-fields
<i>gamelan</i>	(J.) traditional Javanese musical instruments
<i>gereja</i>	(M.) church
<i>Geschooren Chinees</i>	(D.) Chinese Muslim who cut his hair short
<i>juffrouw</i>	(D.) literal: miss, but in VOC usage denoting the wives of the higher echelon officials, with the exception of the wife of the Governor-General who was referred to as <i>mevrouw</i>
<i>junk</i>	(C.) Chinese sailing vessel
<i>kaffer</i>	(D.) assistant to the bailiff
<i>kampung</i>	(J., M.) suburban quarter, village
<i>kerbau</i>	(M.) water buffalo
<i>keris</i>	(J.) traditional Javanese dagger
<i>klewang</i>	(M.) short, curved chopping sword
<i>laksa</i>	(M.) ten thousand
<i>landdrost</i>	(D.) sheriff
<i>landmeeter</i>	(D.) land surveyor
<i>mandor</i>	(M.) overseer on a private estate
<i>mardijker</i>	(D.) derived from Sanskrit <i>mahardika</i> , free men: Christian population of South Asian and Indonesian descent
<i>menyirih</i>	(M.) to chew betel
<i>mestizo</i>	(S.) Christian people with a European father and an Asian mother
<i>nahkoda</i>	(M.) captain of Asian vessel
<i>oetroot</i>	(D.) patent, charter
<i>ommelanden</i>	(D.) surrounding countryside, the environs of Batavia
<i>opperkoopman</i>	(D.) senior merchant
<i>orang Betawi</i>	(M.) the native population of Batavia and later Jakarta
<i>pangeran</i>	(J.) prince

<i>parang</i>	(M.) type of large knife
<i>peranakan</i>	(M.) 1. descendant of a Chinese man with a native woman 2. Chinese born in Indonesian Archipelago
<i>petak</i>	(M.) literally: small piece of land, small cabin
<i>pikul</i>	(J., M.) a measure of weight used widely in Southeast Asia. 1 <i>pikul</i> equals 125 pounds
<i>pothia</i>	(C.) Chinese sugar entrepreneur or supervisor on a plantation
<i>perahu</i>	(J., M.) small local craft
<i>rijksdaalder</i>	(D.) a coin. 1 <i>rijksdaalder</i> = 3 gulden (guilders, florin) = 60 stuivers
<i>roeden</i>	(D.) 1 <i>roede</i> = 3,767 m
<i>ronggeng</i>	(M.) dancing girl
<i>sawah</i>	(J.) wet-rice field
<i>schutterij</i>	(D.) citizen militia
<i>susubunan</i>	(J.) you're majesty, the king of Mataram
<i>syahbandar</i>	(P.) harbour master, the title of an official found in native ports all over the Indian Ocean
<i>stuiver</i>	(D.) coin: one <i>gulden</i> is equal to 20 <i>stuivers</i>
<i>tjoeke</i>	(M) tax in the Priangan region amounted to one-fifth of the crop
<i>topeng</i>	(J., M.) mask
<i>vrijburger</i>	(D.) free citizen, not employed by the VOC
<i>wangkang</i>	(C.) Small Chinese sailing vessel

Summary

Batavia was founded as the headquarters of the VOC (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*) in Asia on 30 May 1619, on the ruins of the Javanese port town of Jayakarta. Initially, the Company built Batavia as the rendezvous for its ships in Asia which sailed to and from the Dutch Republic. As it developed, this city became one of the largest trade centres in Asia. To support its livelihood as a large trading centre, Batavia required a hinterland which could provide it with food crops, building materials, and human resources. The area which fulfilled this role as a hinterland from which it could draw what it needed was called the Ommelanden or the environs of the city.

After two attacks by Mataram in 1628 and 1629 and several assaults by Banten in the 1640s, the Company realized how important it was to establish its authority in the Ommelanden if it were to maintain the security of its headquarters and ensure that it was not isolated from its vital hinterland. The territorial expansion of Batavia into the Ommelanden was accomplished in a series of war and contract between the Company with the local potentates, which began in the 1620s and reached their peak in 1707, when Mataram officially conceded sovereignty over Cirebon and the Priangan regions to the Company. This marked the solution to the problem of providing Batavia with an area from which it could obtain supplies. By that date, almost all of West Java with the exception of Banten was under the Company authority.

During its initial years, Batavia and its environs produced hardly any food for local consumption. To overcome this problem of an impending shortage of essential resources, the first priority of the Company government was to develop the immediate hinterland and populate it with peasants. As the local rulers in Java were hostile, the Company preferred to populate the Ommelanden with people who would be brought in from far away who would pose less of a threat. Therefore, in a situation similar to that in the *intramuros*, in its very early years the majority of the population of the Ommelanden consisted of various ethnicities from outside Java.

The highest authority in the Ommelanden was in the hands of the Company government and was administered through various institutions such as: the *College van Heemraden*, the *Gecommitteerde voor de zaken der Inlanderren*, and the *landdrost*. With a limited budget and few personnel, these institutions had to govern the territory of the Ommelanden and a population which grew steadily throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. The policy of

the Company at the very local level was to intervene in indigenous affairs no more than was necessary to protect its own interests. Hence, in daily life the head of the *kampung* enjoyed a great deal of freedom in running its own affairs. By making use of the authority of indigenous officials, the Company government could avoid being directly involved in the daily administration of the *kampung*.

After the third war with Banten (1656-1659) had ended, the Company began to selling and granting plots of lands to Europeans, Chinese, Mardijkers, and Indonesians in a bid to stimulate agricultural production. By the end of the seventeenth century, when the Ommelanden had become more law-abiding, increasing numbers of European ventured to build country houses and run landed estates there. There was a large-scale cultivation of the land and a host of sugar plantations sprang up; the initiative taken principally by Chinese farmers and entrepreneurs. In the same period, attracted by the security and the economic opportunities offered in the area, many Javanese also migrated to the Ommelanden to settle and establish rice-fields and market gardens.

To supervise landownership and the infrastructure in the environs of Batavia, the High Government set up the *College van Heemraden* in 1664, but this institution only became fully functional in 1682. The duty of the *Heemraden* was to administer the rural area of Batavia where large private estates lands which belonged to high-ranking officials and rich burgers were located. Their jurisdiction covered all of the land as far as the Company territory stretched outside the city walls of Batavia. The *Heemarden* had the authority to solve disputes between landowners, but if these became serious, they could bring them to the attention the *Raad van Justitie*. It was within the power of this institution to nominate candidates for the position of district head (*wijkmeester*) and their nomination would be confirmed by the High Government. Another duty of the *Heemraden* was to maintain security in the Ommelanden by supporting the *landdrosten* in the execution of their duties of keeping law and order.

To fulfil the demand for manpower in Batavia, the Company government employed thousands of slaves, the majority of whom originated from South Asia and Eastern Indonesia. In the Ommelanden, the greatest demand for slaves was from civilians. The slave labour was employed in the rural factories, in agriculture, and in the domestic sector. Thousands of slave sales in the Ommelanden, which were recorded in the notarial archives of Batavia, show that most of people involved in slave trade in the Ommelanden were indigenous. Compared to the European and Chinese, they were small-scale entrepreneurs and they were many. A mixture of

identity often occurred when slaves were sold was because a transaction sometimes took place involve a seller, buyer, and slave all three with different ethnicities. The slave trade in the Ommelanden had become a field for social interaction which accelerated the formation of a communal identity among people in this region.

Despite this thriving trade, slaves could not fulfil the demand for manpower in Batavia and its environs. The solution was to recruit labour from elsewhere. Large numbers of migrant workers came to Batavia from the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung in south-east China. They left their home country in the hope of finding jobs in the flourishing agriculture in the Ommelanden. Another source of cheap labour was Javanese *bujang* (young male workers) who came from Priangan, Cirebon, and the Pasisir. Attracted by the progress in the sugar and rice cultivation, which was going ahead by leaps and bounds, many Javanese seasonal workers moved to the Ommelanden to work in the sugar industry and in the rice-fields.

Sugar was indubitably the prime commodity in determining the economic development in the Ommelanden. The rise of sugar as one of the principal commodities traded by the Company happened to coincide with a decline in the demand for pepper in 1650. The Company introduced restrictions on the sugar prices, set production quotas, and limited the number of sugar-mills which were licensed to operate. These restrictions were important because the Company juggled to adjust the sugar production in areas under its control to accommodate to the fluctuating demand from the Asian and European markets. Batavian sugar enjoyed its heyday at the end of seventeenth century.

This heyday of sugar was of short duration. The crisis in Batavian sugar began in the 1710s and after several fluctuations really began to deteriorate in the 1730s, as a consequence of an accumulation of inauspicious circumstances. Just as the European demand for Batavian sugar was increasing, the deforestation, soil exhaustion, and erosion in the Ommelanden, which had already been evident at the beginning of eighteenth century, was really taking its toll. The costs of transport and labour for each mile had risen because the raw materials for sugar production had to expand exponentially to a larger area. The deforestation also forced up the price of firewood, the essential fuel for the mills. The consequence of all these circumstances was that the production costs increased and the sugar entrepreneurs had a difficulty in selling sugar at the price set by the Company.

While all this was happening, the High Government was trying to reorganize the sugar industry and hence was not inclined to encourage businessmen by paying them a higher price.

Since the bulk of the sugar produced in Ommenlanden was sold to the Company, this policy pushed the sugar entrepreneurs ever closer to the brink of financial ruin. They failed to accumulate the capital required to relocate their businesses to more fertile regions, farther away from the city. This explains why the number of sugar-mill decreased significantly at the end of 1730s. The upshot of the bankruptcy of the sugar industry was large numbers of unemployed people and growing social disorder which culminated with the Chinese massacre of 1740.

Samenvatting

Op 30 Mei 1619 werd Batavia gesticht als hoofdkwartier van de VOC (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*) in Azië. Gunstig gelegen in de nabijheid van Straat Soenda diende de stad met zijn prachtige baai allereerst als rendez-vous voor de vloot van de Compagnie in Azië en de komende en gaande schepen uit *Patria*. Weldra ontwikkelde de stad met zijn enorme pakhuizen zich tot één van de belangrijkste stapelplaatsen in Azië. Rondom Batavia werden de zogenaamde Ommelanden in culture gebracht die in de loop van de tijd de stad gingen voorzien van voedsel, bouwmaterialen en mankracht in tijden van vrede en oorlog.

Na de twee belegeringen door troepen van het Javaanse rijk van Mataram eind jaren twintig en verschillende aanvallen van het naburige Banten in de jaren veertig van de zeventiende eeuw, begreep de Hoge Regering van Batavia hoe belangrijk het was ook in de Ommelanden haar gezag te vestigen. De territoriale uitbreiding van Batavia en de Ommelanden werd in 1705 afgerond met een verdrag, waarbij het koninkrijk Mataram de soevereiniteit van de Compagnie erkende over de Priangan Bovenlanden en Cirebon. Daarmee was met uitzondering van Banten vrijwel heel West Java onder het gezag van de Compagnie gebracht.

In de roerige pionierstijd werd in de directe omgeving van Batavia aanvankelijk nog weinig voedsel voor lokale consumptie verbouwd. De stad was vrijwel geheel en al aangewezen op bevoorrading van buitenaf. Zodra de gelegenheid zich daartoe voordeed, deed de Hoge Regering van Batavia er alles aan om de Ommelanden te bevolken en in cultuur te brengen. De naburige inheemse vorsten stelden zich nog steeds vijandig op en daarom gaf men uit veiligheidsoverwegingen er de voorkeur aan mankracht van veraf gelegen gebieden te betrekken. Zo kon het gebeuren dat in de eerste decennia zowel binnen- als buiten de muren de Aziatische bevolking van Batavia voornamelijk van buiten Java afkomstig was.

Weldra kwam het bestuur van de Ommelanden in handen van het speciaal daartoe in het leven geroepen *College van Heemraden* dat werd bijgestaan door de *Gecommitteerde voor de zaken der Inlander* en de *landdrost*. Deze laatste was met de politionele taken belast. Met beperkte middelen moesten deze gezagsdragers de snel toenemende bevolking zien te besturen in een achterland dat zich gaandeweg steeds verder uitstreekte. Het zal geen verbazing wekken dat zij zich zo weinig mogelijk inlieten met interne affaires van de omliggende inheemse kampongs, en dat zij het aan de inheemse kamponghoofden overlieten om hun dorpszaken te bestieren.

Na afloop van de derde oorlog met Banten (1656-1659) kwamen de Ommelanden tot rust en begon de koloniale overheid land uit te geven en te verkopen aan Europeanen, Chinezen, Mardijkers, en Indonesiërs om zo de landbouwproductie te stimuleren. Aan het einde van de zeventiende eeuw was zodanige 'rust en orde' ingetreden, dat welgestelde Europeanen eigen particuliere landerijen ontwikkelden en zich daar als landsheren vestigden. Tot diep in het achterland werden tropische wouden omgehakt en plat gebrand, en werd het braak liggende land in cultuur gebracht. Met name Chinese ondernemers richtten zich op de suikerrietcultuur en legden uitgestrekte plantages aan waarop ook suikermolens werden opgericht. Tegelijkertijd zetten nu vele Javaanse *tanj's* zich neer in de Ommelanden en legden daar rijstvelden en moestuinen aan. Ook werd de infrastructuur van de Ommelanden door aanleg van kanalen en dijken ingrijpend veranderd.

Hoewel het *College van Heemraden* al in 1664 werd opgericht, begonnen de heemraden pas na de vrede met Banten van 1682 werkelijk te functioneren. Hun jurisdictie besloeg al het territorium buiten de muren van Batavia, dat in wijken verdeeld werd. Zij benoemden de *wijkmeesters* en bemiddelden in geschillen tussen de landeigenaren, maar ernstige vergrijpen droegen zij over aan de *Raad van Justitie* in de stad. Tevens ondersteunden de Heemraden waar mogelijk de landdrosten in de uitoefening van hun ambt.

Om te voorzien in het chronische gebrek aan arbeidskrachten werden slaven uit Zuid Azië en Oost Indonesië aangevoerd. Zij werden voornamelijk ingezet als huisdienaren en handwerkslieden, of als arbeiders in de steenfabrieken en de tuinbouw. De duizenden koopcontracten in de notariële archieven laten zien dat de meeste slaveneigenaren in de Ommelanden inheemse kleine ondernemers waren. Vaak was er sprake van verandering van etnische identiteit wanneer slaven werden verkocht omdat de verkoper, de koper en de slaaf meestal van verschillende etnische afkomst waren. De namen van de slaven werden dan veranderd naar gelang van de etniciteit van hun nieuwe meester. Curieus genoeg kwam als gevolg van deze slavenhandel in de Ommelanden uiteindelijk een proces van groepsidentiteit tot stand onder de lokale bevolking die aanvankelijk onderling gescheiden in kampongs van verschillende volksaard woonde. Zo werd de *orang betawi* geboren.

Omdat de aanvoer van slaven bij lange na niet kon voorzien in de benodigde mankracht werd arbeid voor Batavia en de Ommelanden ook gerekruteerd in de vorm van contractarbeid. Grote aantallen gastarbeiders uit de zuidelijke kustprovincies van China werden elk jaar met

Chinese jonken aangevoerd, Zij zochten vooral werk in de bloeiende landbouwsector of zij verhuurden zich als ambachtslieden. Een andere bron van goedkope arbeidskrachten vormden de Javaanse *bujang* (jongelieden) uit Priangan, Cirebon, en de noordkust van Java, de *Pasisir*. Veel van deze seizoensarbeiders vonden werk in de rietsuikerindustrie en op de rijstvelden.

De suikercultuur speelde zonder twijfel een hoofdrol in de economische ontwikkeling van de Ommelanden. De toenemende suikerproductie compenseerde in zekere zin het gat dat ontstond door de afnemende vraag naar peper rond 1650. Aanvankelijk stimuleerde de Compagnie de suikerrietteelt door het bepalen van een hoge inkoopprijs van de suiker maar toen er weldra sprake was van overproductie, en kelderende prijzen, werden voor het eerst productiequota ingesteld, en werd zelfs het aantal suikermolens beperkt. Zo probeerde de Compagnie de suikerproductie aan te passen aan de fluctuerende vraag naar suiker op de internationale markten. Het laatste decennium van de zeventiende eeuw markeerde het hoogtepunt van de suikercultuur in de Bataviase Ommelanden.

Zo rond 1710 dienden zich de eerste tekenen aan dat de hausse in de suikerteelt voorbij was, en in de jaren dertig ontstond een ware economische crisis door ontbossing, uitputting van de grond en verregaande erosie. Ook de transportkosten waren enorm toegenomen omdat zowel het brandhout als het suikerriet over grotere afstanden moesten worden vervoerd. Daarnaast had de ontbossing de kosten van het brandhout voor de suikerfabricage flink opgedreven. Omdat de Compagnie om markttechnische redenen niet bereid was de aankoopprijs van de suiker te verhogen, werden vele suikerondernemers op de rand van de afgrond gebracht en nam het aantal suikermolens in de loop van de jaren dertig snel af, zodat er plotseling een groot overschot aan arbeidsaanbod ontstond. Grote groepen werklozen zwierven door de Ommelanden. In september 1740 pleegden Chinese landarbeiders uit de Ommelanden zelfs een mislukte aanslag op de stad Batavia. Een verschrikkelijke progrom op de Chinese bevolking binnen de muren was het gevolg. Ruim 8000 mannen, vrouwen en kinderen werden binnen een week vermoord.

APPENDIX

1. Location of some lands and kampung in the Ommelanden in the beginning of eighteenth century

No.1 Campong der Baliers Gelegen omtrent $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans bewesten dese stadt aan de zuyd zyde van de Bacheragt Gragt even boven de post de Vyffhoek of in't Westerveld het 8^e deel van t' blok J, synde door zyn Edelheydt Willem van Outhoorn anno 1689 aan Capt. Lampidia ter wooning verleend, thans sorteerende onder de Baliese capitains Abdul Atip Tangoek en Tsieradiya, meest bebouwd met steene huysen en het overige met houte woningen met panne gedekt, belendend ten noorden met een nok sloot langs de Heereweg van Anke ten oosten en ten zuyden met de oude revier Grogol, en ten westen met de Oosterring sloot breed @ r gr N 132 roeden, mitsgaders diep N.2 gr w 56 roeden.

No.2 Campong der Baliers gelegen omtrent $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans bewesten deese stadt aan de noordzyde van de Bacheragt gragt even beneden de Vyffhoek door zyn Edelhyt Willem van Outhorn anno 1690 aan den Luitenant Mambal en Capt. Pangoekiran ter wooning verleend, thans bebouwd met veele steene pedakken en houte woningen met panne gedekt, belendend ten zuyden met een clappus laan, langs de Bacharagts gragt en verders rondom met verschyde particulieren, breed voor of aan de zuydzyde W 5 Gr N 62 (r) 3 vt en agter of aande noordzyde w 4 gr Z 25 (r) 9 vt, mitsgaders diep aande oostzyde eerst Z en N 16 (r) versmallende alhier westwaerds 34 (r) 6 vt en dan nog diep z 6 gr @ 76 (r) 6 vt en aan de westzyde is de diepte Z 3 gr @ 89 roeden.

No.3. Campong der Baliers gelegen omtrent $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans beoosten deese stadt of eigentlyk aan de zuydzyde, bewesten de Molevlietse Dyk, door zyn Edelheydt Willem van Outhoorn aan Capt. Nenga Goelian ter wooning verleend, thans bebouwd met verschyde steene woningen en de rest met bamboese pedakken gedeeltelyk met panne gedekt, belendend ten oosten met de Heereweg langs het Molenvliet, en verders rondom met verscheyde persoonen, breed voor of ande oostzyde N.10 gr @ 65 (r) en aan de west zyde N.4 gr @ meede 65 (r) mitsgaders diep @ 4 gr N aan de noord zyde 87 (r) 3 vt en aan de zuyd zyde 93 (r) 3 vt.

No.4. Campong der Baliers, gelegen omtrent $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans beoosten deese stadt, aan de zuydzyde van de gegrave revier Sontaar, door syn Edelhydt Willem van Outhoorn aan Capt. Tambesie ter wooning verleend, thans beset met verscheyde woningen van hout en bamboese met panne gedekt, belendend ten noordwesten met de groote zuyderweg ten Z revier oosten met diferente particuliere, en ten noordoosten met de gegrave revier Sontaer, breed aan de noordoost syde @ 31 gr Z 104 roeden, langs de Zuyderweg in twee differente courssen 140 (r) mitsgaders diep N 36 $\frac{1}{2}$ gr @ 107 (r).

No.5. Campong der Baliers geleegeen omtrent $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans beoosten deese stadt, aan de Z west syde van de gegrave revier Sontaer, door zyn Edelheydt Willem van Outhoorn aan den Capt. Luitenant Salladt ter woon verleend, thans beset met eenige bamboese woningen belendend ten noordoosten met de gegrave revier Sontaer ten zuid westen met de campong gemelte No.6, ten oosten met de groote Zuyderweg en ten noordwesten met de oude vervalte weg die na de khoe markt loopt, breed aan de noordzyde @ 34 gr Z 32 (r) en aan de zuidwest syde

O.34 gr Z 70 (r) mitsgaders diep aan de Oost syde N.8 gr W. 59 (r) en aan de noordwest syde N 35 gr @ 44 roeden.

No.6. Campong de Boegineesen gelegen omtrent $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans beoosten deese stadt, aan de gegrave revier Sontaer, door zyn edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck aan de luitenant Tossolo ter woon verleend, than met houte en bamboese huysingen beset, belendend ten oosten met de groote Zuyderweg, ten noordwesten met de oude vervalte weg na de khoe markt, ten noordoosten met de campong gemelte No.5 en ten zuidwesten met een articulier, breed N 34 gr @ 22 roeden, mitsgaders diep @ 34 gr z 71 (r).

No.7. Campong de Boegineesen geleegeen omtren $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans Zuid oostwaerds buyten deese stadt aan de noordoost syde van de Jacatrasede weg, door zyn edelhydt, Abraham van Riebeck aan den lieutenant Day Malaya ter wooning verleend, thans beset met wynige bamboese wooninge, belendend ten noordoosten met de groote zuyder weg, ten zuidwesten met de Jacatrasede heere weg, ten zuidoosten en noordwesten met differente particuliere, breed aan de noordoost syde Z ter @ 33 (r) en aan de zuidwest syde W 35 gr N 23 (r) 9 vt, mitsgaders diep aan de Z @ oost syde Z 36 gr W 87 (r) 4 vt en aan de noordwest syde 108 (r) 6 vt.

No.8. Land geleegeen omtrent $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans zuid oostwaerds buyten deese stadt aan de Noordoost syde van de Jacatrasede heere weg door zyn edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck tot een beeste markt gedestineerd, thans bebout met twee houte pangons en khoestall, en met boom alleen beplant, belendend ten noordoosten met de groote Zuyderweg ten zuidwesten met de Jacatrasede Heere weg, ten zuid oosten en noordwesten met differente particuliere, breed aan de noordoost syde N ten W 31 (r) en aan de zuidwest syde W 35 gr N 23 (r) 9 vt, mitsgaders diep aan de zuidoost syde Z 36 gr W 66 (r) 5 vt, en aan de noordwest syde 87 (r) 4 vt.

No.9. Deese stuk compg: land door zyn Edelhyd Abraham van Riebeck aan de post Jacatra tot een coffythuyn gegeven, werdende thans nog tot een thuyn en boom plantagie gebruykt geleegeen omtren $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans be Z oosten deese stadt, en belendend ten zuidwesten met genoemde post en de Heere weg, ten noordoosten met de Groote Zuyder weg, ten zuidoosten met het Moorse Hospitaal en ten noordwesten met particuliere, breed aan de zuidwest syde, W 35 gr N 24 (r) en aan de noordoost syde N ten W 53 (r), mitsgaders diep aan de noordwest syde Z 36 gr W 22 (r), versmallende alhier zuydwaerds W 35 gr N 16 (r) 4 vt en dan nog diep z 38 gr W 32 (r) 4 vt en aan de zuidoost syde Z 36 gr W 31 roeden.

No.10. Campong der Javaanen en Amboineesen, geleegeen even buyten deese stadt, tusschen de Jacatrasede en Sontaerse weg, door zyn Edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck aan den Capt. Soeta Wangsa ter wooning verleend, thans geheel bebouwd met houte en bamboese wooningen met panne gedekt, en nog eenige steene gebouwen, belendend ten zuidwesten met de Jacatrasede heere weg en de oude Chinese graven, ten noordoosten met de gegrave revier Sontaer, ten noordwesten en zuidoosten met differente personen, breed aan de zuidwest syde W 14 gr N 25 roeden en aan de noordsyde W 7 gr N 30 roeden, mitsgaders diep aan de noordwest syde Z 14 gr N 31 (r) 6 vt, verbreedende alhier noordwaerds w 14 gr N 49 roeden, vervolgens diep Z 14 gr N 9 roeden 6 vt, versmallende alhier zuidoostwaerds W 14 gr N 15 (r) dan nog diep Z 14 N 37 roeden nog versmallende zuidoostwaerds 10 roeden, en voor het laatste nog diep Z 14 gr N tot aan de Sontaerse revier 15 (r) aan de zuidoost syde is de diepte, eerst Z 14 gr N 42 (r) 6 vt versmallende alhier noord westwaerds W 14 gr N 25 (r), alsdan diep Z 14 gr N 10 (r) ...

alhier zuidoostwaerds 25 (r) synde dan de diepte Z 14 gr N 20 roeden, verbreedende wederom zuidoostwaerds W 14 gr N 25 roeden alsdan is de diepte op de ... vers van Z 14 gr N 39 roeden alwaer het land nog versmalt W 14 gr N 25 roeden en voor het laatste nog diep tot aan de Sontaerse revier Z 14 gr N 23 roeden.

No.11. De twee beveelen gemelte No.11 syn al lang geleeden onder differente persoonen vervallen.

No.12. Campong der Maccassaer, gelegen omtrent $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans bewesten deese stadt, aan de Noord syde van de Amanus gragt, door syn Edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck aan Day Matara tot wooning verleend, thans bebouwd met een Mohametaens tempel, veele steene wooningen en de ovrighe opstallen van hout en bamboese met panne gedekt, belendend ten zuyden met de Heere weg langs de Amanus gragt, en verders rondom met differente particuliere, breed O en W 100 (r) mitsgaders diep zuid en noord meede 100 roeden.

No.13. Deeser stuk Comp. Land, gelegen ruym $\frac{1}{4}$ uur gaans, beoosten deese stadt aan de noordsyde van de Amanus gragt door zyn Edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck aan eenige Christen Amboineesen en Macassaeren ten wooning verleend, veel van dit stuk dat onbebouwt en leedig gelegen heeft syn 26 roeden breedte, met de volle diepte van 100 roeden aan de heer comandeur Coest Roseboom, nog 30 roden breedte met de volle diepte aan d'Edele Johannes Hartkop per taxatie geleveert, blyvende thans nog een strook van 8 roeden breedte en 100 roeden diepte met eenige Macassaerse wooningen belet langs de Oosterringsloot aan d'E comp: overige.

No.14. Campong der Baliers en Boegineesen gelegen ruym $\frac{1}{2}$ uur gaans bewesten deese stadt door zyn Edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck aan Kiey Gustie Badaolo te wooning verleend thans voor het grootste gedeelt met houte en bamboese woonningen beset, met eenige steene peedakken, synde het overige ... land en Mohametaense graven belendend, bezuyder en benoorden de heere weg van Anke met differente persoonen, ten oosten meede met verscheyde eygenaer, en ten westen met den Wel ed: Gest: heer van der Sparre, Raad Ordinaris van Nederland Indie bakmeesteren, de post en revier van Anke, breed aan de zuyd zyde 31 Gr N 60 roeden en aan de Noorsyde 89 roden, mitsg: diep ten noord aan de westsyde langs de revier van Anke 123 roeden versmallende alhier oostwaerds 19 roeden, vervolgens diep ten N 51 roeden verbreedende wederom westwaerds O 4 Gr N 75 roeden dan diep ten N 30 roeden (springende?) alhier oostwaerds O 4 Gr N 75 roeden en dan nog diep tot de agterste sluyt... ten N meede 75 roeden en aan den oostsyde is de diepte ten N 233 roeden.

No.15. Zekeere 3 beveelen E. Comp: land, gelegen omtrent $\frac{1}{2}$ uur gaans bewesten deese stadt aan de noordsyde van de Bacharagts gragt door syn Edelheydt Abraham van Riebeck aan de Javanen tot een campong of woonplaats verleend, thans sorteerende onder capt: Baktie en met verscheyde houte en bamboese wooning beset, belend ten zuyden met de Bacharagts gragt en differente menschen, ten noorden en ten westen meede met particuliere, en ten oosten met een gemeene weg, breed oost ende aan de zuydsyde 15 roeden en aan de noordsyde 80 roeden mitsg: diep aande oostsyde eerst ter N 41 roeden verbreedende alhier oostwaerds 29 roeden en dan nog diep ten N 82 roeden en aan de west syde is de diepte ten N meede 41 roeden verbreedende alhier westwaerds 36 roeden en vervolgens diep tot agter ten N 82 roeden.

No.16. De Baliese Campong gemt: No.16 is al voor lange tyd onder verscheyde particuliere vervallen, synde de woonplaats van der Rebel capt: Boelilling geweest.

No.17. Zeeker stuk land anno 1709, op den february door het Eerw: Collegie van Heeren Heemraden gekogt, en aan de post Mr. Cornelis gegeven thans met eenige bamboese wooningen beset en het overige tot thuyne en clappus plantagie geapproprierd, geleegeen ruym 2 uren gaens bezuyden deese stadt in't ooster veld het 21 deel van 't blok L, belendend ten oosten met de passar, ten westen en zuyden met de groote revier, en ten noorden met het land Tsielemba van d' Ed: Jan van t' Hoft en een Moor, breed voor aan de oostsyde ten N 10 roeden mitsg: diep oost en west aan de noordsyde 95 roeden.

No.18. Zeeker stukje Ed: Comp: land, thans bebouwd met eene steene wooning en een planke school, staande en geleegeen even buyten deese stadt poort Uytregt of in't wester veld het be deel van 't blok S, belendend ten zuyden met de heere weg langs de Amanus gragt, en verders rondom met differente eygenaers, breed oost en west 5 roeden 6 vt, mitsgd: diep ten N 11 roeden.

No.19. Het erf gemt: No.19 is door heeren Heemraden voor eenige tydt aan den burger en wagen verhuurder ...veld verkogt.

No.20. Zeeker stuk Ed: Comp: land, geleegeen omtrent $\frac{3}{4}$ uur gaans beoosten deese stadt, by de post Zoutelande, synde het perceel t' welk aande Noordsyde van de Angiolse vaart geleegeen door heer Heemraden voor eenige tyd, aan een Inlander verkogt, en het zuydelyke perceel, heeft gedeltelyk tot de onlangs gedaene vergrooting en versterking van gene post zoutelande verstrekt van dit perceel manqueerd de kaart in neevens geend bestek.

No.21. Zeeker stookje E. Comps: land geleegeen even beoosten de Post Rijswijk omtrent $\frac{1}{2}$ uur gaans bezuiden deze stad zynde thans door Heeren Heemraden met kas dyken verker, tegens het opperwater in de groote rivier.

NB: Hiervan is meede geene kaart in het bestek.

No.22. Zeeker stuk E. Comp. Land, thans bebouwt met de Post Rijswijk en eenige bamboese wooning met een clappus plantagie staande en geleegeen omtrent $\frac{1}{2}$ uur gaans zuidwaerde buiten deze stad. Belendend ten oosten met de heer weg na Tanna Abang, ter westen met de rivier Crocot een de edele Jan ..., ten norden met de edele agtb. Heer Bleeck raad van justitie dezer casteels, en ten zuider met differente particuliere, breed aan de oost zyde Z 10 gronden 41 roeden, en aande west zyde lange de rivier Crocot 19 roeden, meting: diep aan de zuid zyde 0.50 gronden 18 roeden, versmallende alhier noordwaerds, Z 10 gronden 23 roeden en dan nog diep achter aan de rivier Crocot 0.50 gronden 39 roeden en aande noordzyde is de diepte eerst oost 10 gronden 8 roeden 9 vt, verbreedende alhier noorwaerds 8 vt en vas volgens nog diep oost 10 gronden 31 roeden.

No.23. Zeker stuk aangespoeld Ed. Comp. land zynde thans voor heemraden oester bank geemploieerd, en bebouwd met eenige woningen van steek en hout, staande en geleegeen omtrent 1 uur gaans beoosten deze stad. belendend ten noordooster met slingerland, ten zuidwesten en noordwesten met de zee, en ten zuidoosten met de rivier Angiol, zynde in het begin afgestooken, W 31 gronden N 23 roeden breedte en W 40 gronden Z 52 roeden diep,

maar thans is door het continueele af en aanspoelen de zee, dit terrain merkelyk verandert en vergroot.

No.24. Zeker stuk ed. Comp. Land gelegen ruym 1 uur gaans beoosten deze stad aan de noord zyde van de Angiolse rivier, zynde van Comp. Wegen voor de leproosen gedestineerd. Belendend ten oosten met Slingerland, of een inlander, ten westen en ten zuiden met de rivier Angiol, en ten norden met de land Slingerland, breed aan de oostzyde N. Nwt. 310 roeden, mitsgader diep in differente coerser 320 roeden. Zynde voorigen door de loop van de rivier van Angiol menigt en beslooten.

No.25. Zeeker 3 perceelen Ed. Comp: land, thans bebouwd met verschydene groote woningen dienende tot een hospital voor Europesen, staande en gelegen omtrent 1 ½ uur gaans bezuiden deze stad, tegens over de Post Nordwijk. Belendend ten noorden met de heer weg en differente persoonen, ten zuiden en ten westen meede met verschyde eigenaars en ten oosten met de groote rivier. Breed aan de noord zyde O 13 gronden Z 27 roeden en aan de zuid zyde O en W 200 roeden mitsgaders diep N 12 gronden W eerst 108 roeden verbreedende alhier westwaards, O en W 123 roeden en dan nog diep tot aande achterste sluyt linie N en Z 74 roeden.

No.26. Zeker stuk Ed. Comp. land gens. De javaanse campong, thans naar het zuydelijkste gedelte bebouwd met verschyde houte en bamboese woningen zynde het vorige of het noordlijkste meest vyvers of moeras, gelegen de noordwesten deze stad, aan de west zyde van de groote rivier, belendend ten zuiden met het plein, langs de vrymans haven, ten westen en ten noorden met de moerassige grond langs deze strand en de wester rivier, en ten ooster met de vlakte langs de Barm of westerhoofd van de groote rivier, breed oost en west 84 roeden 6 vt, mitsgaders diep zuid en noord 69 roeden.

No.27. Is de Chinese Campong be zuidwesten deze stad, behorende de erven en woningen allemaal aan differenten eigenaare, uitgesonderd twee perceelen, waar op de Europeese wachten staan, en die zeer weinig terrain beslagen.

No.28. De zelve steen pedakken met de annexe grond gemt. No 28 zijn reets voor lange tijd onder verschydene particuliere vervallen.

Source: National Archief, Hoge Regering van Batavia, No. 1006.

**2. The Heemraden's spending and income between 1685/6 – 1700/1 as reported by
Reikert Heere (the secretary of the *Heemraden*)**

Korte samentrekkinge van de lasten en uitgiften gedaan door Heeren Heemraden tot Batavia het sedert anno 1685/6 tot anno 1700/1 waar men de jaarlijkste vergelijkinge en de toe en afneminge der lasten cortelijc kan bespeuren te weten.

(1) In Rijksdaalder

Anno	1685/6	1686/7	1687/8	1688/9	1689/90	1690/1	1691/2	1692/3
Betaalde Ongelden voor het maken van wegen en bruggen &a	4486 41/48	3741 17/48	1891 5/12	2566 7/8	1678	2496	1159 1/8	1155 5/8
Gerembours taxatie penningen van verkochte landerijen	50	--	200	--	--	--	--	250
Ingekochte landen tot campons voor vreemdelingen	--	--	--	2532 ³ / ₄	320	--	70	4251 ⁵ / ₈
Schenkagien aan den tommogon tot Craoang	--	--	--	400	--	--	--	--
Secretaris loon van het collegie	--	--	--	--	28 ¹ / ₂ /m 931	276	276	276
Het loon der bode	14/m 280	14/m 280	240	240	240	240	240	240
Het costgeld off loon der clerquen	16	48	48	92	72	72	28	--
Het loon van der thuyns mandadoor	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Landmeters loon	--	150	60	--	--	157 ¹ / ₂	180	180
Het loon der landmeters kregt	12	48	44	48	48	48	48	48
Kleine en extraordinaire ongelden	56	137 ¹ / ₄	88 ³ / ₈	48 ⁵ / ₈	93 ³ / ₈	100 ³ / ₄	61 ³ / ₄	73 ⁷ / ₈
Betaalde schult van 1678 Capitan Jonker v: geleent geld	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Afgesz: oude schulden en in dispuut staande gelden	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Sommarium de jaarlijkse lasten	4900 41/48	4404 29/48	2571 9/24	6928 ¹ / ₄	3382 3/8	3390 ¹ / ₄	2062 7/8	6475 1/8

(2) In Rijksdaalder

Anno	1693/4	1694/5	1695/6	1696/7	1697/8	1698/9	1699/1700	1700/1
Betaalde Ongelden voor het maken van wegen en bruggen &a	2393 3/8	1933 7/8	427 1/2	1720 3/4	3912 5/8	2977 19/24	3242 5/12	1664 25/48
Gerembours taxatie penningen van verkochte landerijen	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ingekochte landen tot campons voor vreemdelingen	--	--	--	--	994 2/3	--	--	--
Schenkagien aan den tommogon tot Craoang	133	--	--	200	--	--	250	250
Secretaris loon van het collegie	291	336	336	336	336	336	--	18/m 504
Het loon der bode	240	240	240	240	240	10/m 200	7/m 140	12 1/2 /m 250
Het costgeld off loon der clerquen	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Het loon van der thuyms mandadoor	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Landmeters loon	180	180	180	180	180	180	180	11/m 165
Het loon der landmeters knegt	48	48	1 1/2 / m 48	18	48	48	48	11/m 44
Klene en extraordinair ongelden	194 3/4	209 2/3	61 1/2	87 7/8	67 17/24	67 17/24	103 1/2	161 1/6
Betaalde schult van 1678 Capitan Jonker v: geleent geld	1500	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Afgesz: oude schulden en in dispuut staande gelden	--	--	--	--	--	1327 3/4	--	--
Sommarium de jaarlijkse lasten	4980 1/8	2947 13/24	1293	2782 5/8	5779	5137 1/4	3963 11/12	3038 11/16

(3) In Rijksdaalder

Anno	1701/2	1702/3	1703/4	1704/5	1705/6	1706/7	1707/8	1708/9
Betaalde Ongelden voor het maken van	2496 3/4	2197 1/2	2746 1/4	6383 3/16	4248 5/48	4564 19/24	5210 5/12	4400 19/48

wegen en bruggen &a								
Gerembours taxatie penningen van verkochte landerijen	--	1174	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ingekochte landen tot campons voor vreemdelingen	--	--	--	330	100	--	--	--
Schenkagien aan den tommogon tot Craoang	--	--	--	200	--	200	200	200
Secretaris loon van het collegie	316	276	276	276	276	276	345	207
Het loon der bode	11 ½ /m 239	276	336	342	336	336	420	252
Het costgeld off loon der clerquen	56	44	48	48	48	48	60	36
Het loon van der thuyns mandadoor	48	48	48	21	--	--	--	--
Landmeters loon	180	180	180	180	180	180	232	180
Het loon der landmeters kregt	48	48	48	60	96	100	60	36
Kleine en extraordinair ongelden	66 ¼	64 7/12	60	87 1/8	163 11/24	62 ¼	62 ¼	62 3/8
Betaalde schult van 1678 Capitan Jonker v: geleent geld	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Afgesz: oude schulden en in dispuut staande gelden	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Sommarium de jaarlijkse lasten	3450	4308 1/12	3742 ¼	7927 5/16	5447 27/48	5767 1/24	6589 2/3	5373 37/48

Korte samentrekkinge ofte verthoninge vande inkomsten van het collegie van Heeren Heemraden tot Batavia het sedert het jaar 1685/6 tot anno 1700/1 waaruit men de jaarlijkse vergelijkinge en de toe en afneminge der voordeelen in het korte kan bespeuren te weten

(1) In Rijksdaalder

Anno	1685/6	1686/7	1687/8	1688/9	1689/90	1690/91	1691/2	1692/3
Particuliere Collecten tot het maken van bruggen Daar onder voor	3829 2/3	1244 ¾	320	--	--	--	--	--

anno 1685/6 rds 3137 tot het maken van de Tangerangse weg ter ordre van de edele heer Speelman zalgr. collecteerd								
De gesamentlijke vierhonderste penningen	2924 37/48	4123 37/48	1741 3/16	2824	3086 5/6	2974 43/48	--	--
Verkogte oft aangetaxeerde landerijen	3890	1060	1658	220	260	835	--	230
Inkomsten van verhuurde landen	--	--	--	--	--	157 43/48	240	699 19/48
Het geproseede van aangehaalde houtwerken op compagnie land gekapt	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	16 1/2
Ditto van verkogt brandhout	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Idem van verkogte baye planken op compagnie land gekapt en daar ongeconfsiq:	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pagt voor de vissery in de Craoangse rivier	440	650	923 1/3	1453 1/3	1663 1/3	1350	1560	966 2/3
Ditto voor het vissen in de rivier van Tangerang	--	--	--	--	133 1/3	206 2/3	228 1/3	98 1/3
Het geprocedeerde van de pady voor tiende de landerijen, de laaste post en overgebleve restantje van het vorige jaar	--	--	--	--	--	--	838 1/4	834 3/4
De intresten van het capitaal bij de edele Compagnie staande	--	642 1/2	528 7/8	591 5/8	481 3/4	620 1/8	700	642 3/4
Inkomsten der tiende van brandhout	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Karossen, berlijns en chaise gelden	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Extraordinair ingekomen van de	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

boedelmeesters dezer stede								
Sommarium der jaarlijkse inkomsten	11084 7/16	7721 1/48	5171 31/48	5088 23/24	5625 1/4	6144 7/12	3566 7/12	3488 19/48
Voorleden jaarse inkomsten soo veel door de gewesene secretaris Glass anno passato niet opgebracht, dog naderhand uitgevonden en vergoed is, tot	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(2) In Rijksdaalder

Anno	1693/4	1694/5	1695/6	1696/7	1697/8	1698/9	1699/1700	1700/1
Particuliere Collecten tot het maken van bruggen Daar onder voor anno 1685/6 rds 3137 tot het maken van de Tangerangse weg ter ordre van de edele heer Spielman zalgr. collecteerd	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	123 17/24
De gesamentlijke vierhonderste penningen	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Verkogte oft aangetaxeerde landerijen	250	1620	5352 1/4	640	80	470	370	80
Inkomsten van verhuurde landen	519	450	735	485	500	955	500	818 1/3
Het geproseedeerde van aangehaalde houtwerken op compagnie land gekapt	14	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ditto van verkogt brandhout	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	100
Idem van verkogte baye planken op compagnie land gekapt en daar ongeconfisq:	--	--	--	3303 5/8	1418	1079	--	--
Pagt voor de vissery in de Craoangse rivier	1160	1160	1353 1/3	716 2/3	444 1/6	690	608 1/3	500
Ditto voor het vissen in de rivier van	129 1/6	94 2/3	15	54 1/6	25	60	40	41 2/3

Tangerang								
Het geprocedeerde van de pady voor tiende de landerijen, de laaste post en overgebleve restantje van het vorige jaar	707	980	1064	103 ³ / ₄	--	--	--	--
De intresten van het capitaal bij de edele Compagnie staande	506 ¹ / ₄	500	599	875	875	875	820	685 ⁵ / ₈
Inkomsten der tiende van brandhout	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Karossen, berlijns en chaise geldes	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Extraordinair ingekomen van de boedelmeesters dezer stede	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Sommarium der jaarlijkse inkomsten	3285 ⁵ / ₁₂	4804 ² / ₃	9118 ⁷ / ₁₂	6178 ⁵ / ₂₄	3342 ¹ / ₆	4129	2338 ¹ / ₃	2349 ¹ / ₃
Voorleden jaarse inkomsten soo veel door de gewesene secretaris Glass anno passato niet opgebracht, dog naderhand uitgevonden en vergoed is, tot	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(3) In Rijksdaalder

Anno	1701/2	1702/3	1703/4	1704/5	1705/6	1706/7	1707/8	1708/9
Particuliere Collecten tot het maken van bruggen Daar onder voor anno 1685/6 rds 3137 tot het maken van de Tangerangse weg ter ordre van de edele heer Spielman zalgr. collecteerd	219 ²³ / ₂₄	528 ¹¹ / ₂₄	43 ³ / ₈	934 ¹ / ₄	--	--	--	--
De gesamentlijke vierhonderste penningen	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Verkogte oft aangetaxeerde landerijen	60	2899 ⁵ / ₈	90	201	1100	--	438	--
Inkomsten van verhuurde landen	926 ² / ₃	513 ¹ / ₃	786 ² / ₃	1278 ¹ / ₃	1295	1389 ¹ / ₄	2320 ⁷ / ₁₂	--
Het								

geproseede van aangehaalde houtwerken op compagnie land gekapt	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ditto van verkogt brandhout	--	--	--	--	279 ½	50	50	--
Idem van verkogte baye planken op compagnie land gekapt en daar ongeconfisq:	--	--	--	--	126 5/8	--	--	--
Pagt voor de vissery in de Craoangse rivier	700	733 1/3	860	963 1/3	800	800	--	--
Ditto voor het vissen in de rivier van Tangerang	155	135 2/3	155 1/3	162	92	131 1/3	--	--
Het geprocedeerde van de pady voor tiende de landerijen, de laaste post en overgebleve restantje van het vorige jaar	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
De intresten van het capitaal bij de edele Compagnie staande	885 ¾	902 3/8	872 ¼	859 1/8	873 1/8	926 5/8	926 5/8	--
Inkomsten der tiende van brandhout	--	--	--	27 19/48	--	117	133 5/12	--
Karossen, berlijns en chaise gelden	--	--	--	2440	2620	2837	2837	--
Extraordinair ingekomen van de boedelmeesters dezer stede	--	--	--	1500	--	--	--	--
Sommarium der jaarlijkse inkomsten	2947	5712 19/24	2807 5/8	8365 7/16	7186 ¼	6251 5/24	6705 5/8	7635 1/48
Voorleden jaarse inkomsten soo veel door de gewesene secretaris Glass anno passato niet opgebracht, dog naderhand uitgevonden en vergoed is, tot	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1122 19/48

Source: KITLV H 387.

3. Report about paddy cultivation by Aria Surawinata, 1694

Pady gaga is zulk die inde boven landen aan het gebergten werd geplant als:
Pady koas werd naar verkoop van 2 ½ / m afgesneden

Pady pandak } werd met de 3 maanden gesneden
Pady hawara }

De volgende schiet wat langzamer op, en mag voor de 4 1/2 of 5 maanden, niet ingesamelt werden, de namen daar van zijn:

Pady salak
Pady dewata
Pady ontok
Pady hantini
Pady boenar

Pady grogol } heeft geen staarten (of hayren) is goed voor paarden
Pady T'zjokrom }
Pady Omaas }

Pady mohon
Pady Tangay
Pady Sere
Pady Salak gadin
Pady Ratzik Mangaly
Pady Majang
Pady Katoembar
Pady Malaman
Pady Tjahok
Pady in-alen
Pady Thowoe
Pady mera geeft rood rijs

De pady kattan in gebergten werd genaamt:

Pady kattan itam
Pady kattan mera
Pady kattan koening
Pady kattan parasary
Pady kattan gaadje
Pady kattan lomboe
Pady kattan poho dilakki
Pady kattan T'zjokor en
Pady kattan nanka

Het volgende is pady zawa, en werd op de velden in de lege landen gesayt, als:

Pady seri koenin moet na dat se 40 of 50 dagen is gesayt, weder uit getrokken en naar verloop van 3 ½ maand (de voorsz: dagen daar onder gerekend) gesneden werden.

Pady mogol als vooren, en geeft roode rijs

Pady menoer ditto
Pady malaty --
Pady katoembaran met de 4 maanden
Pady ketak kutik, kan men de 2 ½ maanden insamelix, maar groeyt niet omtrent Batavia maar wel op Banten, en Sirrebon

Deze volgende pady moet vier en ½ of 5 maanden op het veld staan als:

Pady lampoejanaan
Pady jedjohan
Pady diliran
Pady gadonhan
Pady nandie
Pady sokanandie
Pady sokalawas
Pady wonkalan
Pady kontoelan
Pady Malaman
Pady kidan kantzjana
Pady manjanaan mangalar
Pady baly
Pady te tambon

Pady rasse } geeft roode ruijkende rijs
Pady sisip naga }

Pady de dappan } roode rijs
Pady gadonhan }
Pady panpanaren }

Pady kattan lomboe
Pady kattan gaadje
Pady kattan holik
Pady kattan goblak
Pady kattan itam swarte rijs
Pady kattan aban roode rijs
Pady kattan baly
Pady kattan goelabre
Pady kattan segaking

Getranslateerd Batavia
Den 15-17 February 1694.

Source: KITLV H 238.

**4. The *Heemraden*'s list of sugar-mill in the Ommelanden
(Registered between 11 December 1766 to 16 January 1767)**

Namen der Moolens	Hun de zelve eigenaars getaal	Aan wat rivier ze leggen	Hoe lang ider de laatste keer gemalen heeft	Uitgele verde quantit eit in picols	Hoe veel het malen nog dagten te malen
Pondok Lankap	1 d' heer van Basel	Tjakon	5 maanden	892.21	
Oedjon Menteen, Comp. land, onder Heemraden	2 d' heer Wypkens	---	4 ½ ---	1512.12 te samen	
Cali Abang	1 d' heer Sanders	Baccassie landwaart in	6 ---	1260.10	
Cadauon	1 -- ---	---	6 ---	1260.nihil	
Tolok Boeyon	1 -- ---	---	7 ---	1500.-----	
Tana Doea Ratoes, Comp. land, onder Heemraden	2 d'E. Van Jansen	Baccassie aan d'overzyde	5 ---	2950.-----	
Tollok Ansana, Comp. land, onder Soeta Wangsa	2 -- ---	---	5 ¼ ---	2460.-----	
Karang Tjon-ok, Comp. land, een inlander	2 lieutenant Kou Tjanko	---	7 ---	3800.14 te samen	
Pangalinan Tengha	1 d' heer Sanders	---	5 2/3 --	1350.10	
Kabaleen	2 -- ---	---	5 ½ ---	3000.12	
Tolok Poetjon	1 -- ---	---	6 1/3 --	1590.20	
Pangalinan Baroe	2 -- ---	---	5 ½ ---	2640.20 te samen	
Selemba	2 -- Mohr	Grote rivier	4 2/3 --	2550.30	
Tjikoko	1 -- ---	---	4 1/10--	825.30	
Wester Tanjong	3 d' E. Duurkoop	---	6 9/10	2100 een 70	
Cabantanan	2 d'erfgen. van de wed. Lafarque	De Vinke vaart	6 17/30--	1800.nihil	
Lagoa	1 d'erfgen van Pieter Theunis	De Troesan	5 ½ ---	1700.-----	
[382] Assan	1 meer van der Spaar	Passangrahan aan d' Ooster kant	3 ---	787.nihil	
Kobon Jorok of Klappa Doea	2 d' heer Bangeman	---	5 ½ ---	3150.-----	
Paningaran of Pancalan	2 meer van der Spaar	Passangrahan aan de Wester kant	3 ---	665. een 40	
Pondok Poton	1 Tan Tjanlon	---	5 ---	1450.30	
Prigi	1 -- ---	---	4 14/15--	1500.nihil	
Pondok Tjabe	1 d' heer Winter en Behrens	---	4 14/15--	870.-----	
Tjilidoek, comp. land, onder Heemraden	4 d' heer Sanders	Anke (2 aande Oost kant en 2 aan de West kant)	5 ---	4800.-----	
Pondok Soroet	2 -- ---	Anke aan de	5 ---	2150.-----	

		Oost kant		
Leenkon	2 (1 Arnolda Schulp, 1 de wed. Ong Engsay)	Sidani aan de Oost kant	5 ½ ---	2700.een 4
Tjikokol/ NB deze haar privilegie casseert ult. Juny 1767	2 de wed. Nie Hoekon	---	7 1/30 --	3825.nihil
Babakan	2 Juff. Huysvoorn	---	4 ---	2500.-----
Batoe Tjeper en Cadauon	2 -- ---	Mokeervaart aan de West kant	5 6/15 --	3300.-----
Bataoe Tjeper di blakan of Cadauon	2 -- ---	---	6 ---	3632.-----
Pakodjan of Concordia	2 d'heer Jan Coning	---	5 7/30 --	2750.-----
Paran Koeda	3 --- Wypkens	Sidani aan de Weest kant	3 2/3 ---	1900.-----
Wester Cadauon	4 --- Mossel C.S.	Sidani (2 aan de Oost kant, 2 aan de Oost kant)	6 ---	6000.-----
Sala Padjan	3 --- ----	Sidani aan de Oost kant	3 17/30	2990.-----
Boedjon Ringit	3 d' heer Sanders	---	5 ---	4810.-----
Tollok Naga	2 juff. Huysvoorn	---	6 ½ ---	3900.-----
Pacayanghan	1 -- ---	Sidani aan de West kant	2 1/10 ---	456.2
Campong Malayoe	2 -- ---	Sidani aan de Oost kant	7 ½ ---	4800.nihil
Tagal Anghoes	3 Tan Soenko C.S.	Sidani aan de West kant	6 5/6 ---	6300.-----
Campong Lemo of Daalvliet	1 juff. Huysvoorn	Sidani aan de Oost kant	8 21/30 ---	2100.-----
Dadap of Laylap	2 -- ---	¼ uur van strant	2 ¼ ---	990.-----
Camal, Comp. land, onder Heemraden	2 d'heer Greving	½ uur van strant	4 ---	1860.-----
Capok	1 -- ---	Anke aan de West kant	5 ½ ---	1650.-----
Anke	2 -- ---	---	5 ---	2400.-----
Te samen Molens	82	Die reets uytgelevert hadden	Picols	107433.325

Source: ANRI, RCH No. 30, 24 January 1767, fol. 380.

5. The Inventory of Susanna Staal's sugar-mill

Ben Ik Jacob Reguleth notaris publicq bij de Hooge regeringe van Nederlands India geadmitteerd binnen der stad Batavia residerende nevens de ondergenoemde getuigen verzocht en verscheenen op het land van Juffrouw Susanna Staal, weduwe wijlen de edele Joan Treuijtman de oude zalr., gelegen aande westzijde van de groote rivier buiten dezer stad tegen over het Noordwijk ende aldaar op het verzoek van haar ed: zoon en gemagtigde de edele Joannes Treuijtman, cornet van de burgerlijk cavallerije alhier, opgenomen en geïnventariseerd hebbe de zuikermolen met de op- en dependentien van dien op het voormelte land staande ende gelegen bestaande in het volgende namentlijk:

- het opstal van een zuikermolen met pannen gedekt met een paar maalsteen
- 1 zuiker packhuis met pannen gedekt
- 1 kleinder zuiker packhuis met pannen gedekt
- 1 buffels loots met adap gedekt
- 20 stuks ijzere kookpannen
- 2 stuks stoele koelpannen
- 2 stuks drumpel ijzers
- 2 groote ijzere forcken
- 1 ijzere pers in een houte kas genaamd Leeuw dienende aan off voor de maalsteen
- 7 stuks ijzere beugels genaamd atie-atie
- 3 stuks kopere schuyms pannen
- 4 lange vierkante ijzers waar op de kookpannen rusten
- 2 platte ijzere sift lepels
- 8 ijzere nootjes
- 6 ijzere platte nootjes
- 3 ijzere zuiker schrapers
- 1 ijzere zuikerpers
- 1 ijzere hoopschepper
- 2 stuks groote kromme zagen
- 2 stuks groote rechte zagen
- 4 Chinese ijzere ploegen met de ijzere bladen daar bij behoorende
- 1 groote ijzere ham ofte harck
- 20 zo oude als nieuwe houwelen
- 3 stuckende houwelen
- 1 stuckende bijl
- 1 schop
- 2 oud en onbruikbaar schop
- 11 hangsloten
- 3 Chinese parrings
- 8 kromme parrings
- 1 lange parring
- 2 kou bijtels
- 1 stuckende en onbruikbare dommekracht
- 1 kromme dissel
- 1 merk ijzer
- 3 groote houte mokers

- 1 groote daats met zijn gewigt
- 1 kleine daats met zijn gewigt
- 1 compas
- 2 houte ploegen
- 600 stuks passos
- 40 stuckende passos
- 118 stuks passos voeten
- 10 stuks groote syroop balijs
- 5 stuks kleine syroop balijs
- 2 platte syroop balijs
- 2 meet syroop balijs
- 7 water syroop balijs
- 2 schep syroop balijs
- 87 stuks groote wannen
- 42 cannassers met oude zuiker
- 16 stuks buffels karren
- 25 stuks buffels alzo 2 stuks wegh gestolen en 6 stuks gestorven zijn
- 275 moot en brandhout
- 17 ½ laxa ofte 175000 stoelen zuiker dewelke a uzo aan de voors: zuikermolen moeten werden gemaakt
- 2 Chinees chianpans of zuikerprauwen

aldus opgenomen op het voors: land van Juffrouw Treuijtman voornoemt in presentie van Samuel Anthonys en Cornelis Fiers clercq als getuigen.

Source: ANRI, Notarieel Archief No. 3269, MAVA Notary Jacob Reguleth, 5 November 1712.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Bondan Kanumoyoso was born in Madiun on the 11th November 1972. In 1996 he graduated from the Department of History, University of Indonesia. He joined the TANAP programme at the University of Leiden in 2002. Within this programme he got the opportunity to study 17th and 18th century VOC archives. In 2005 he received a scholarship from the Nuffic-Netherlands Fellowship Programme which gave him a chance to finish his PhD at the University of Leiden. His research interests are socio-economic history, local history, and the early modern history of Indonesia. Since 1996 he has been working as a lecturer at the Department of History, University of Indonesia.