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## **The Rise of the Managerial State in Indonesia: Institutional Transition during the Early Independence Period. 1950-1965**

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## CHAPTER II

### The Military Expansion into the State

The formation of the military dual-function (*dwifungsi*) was one of the cornerstones of both the Guided Democracy and the New Order. This chapter looks into the structural transformation that allowed for the creation of a military legitimacy within the 'developmentalist' project of the Guided Democracy state. I will first look at the gradual centralization of army command around General Abdul Haris Nasution and, at the same time, the production of military elites. Following the work of both Rudolf Mrazek<sup>1</sup> and Ernst Utrecht,<sup>2</sup> I will look into the development of two different army doctrines: the *territorial doctrine* and the *Tri Ubaya Cakti*. These doctrines represented an ideological response to two army factions, the territorial elite who saw territorial management as the answer to the problems of coordination and the para-military elites who focussed on forward capability.

The question of control is essential here. The territorial doctrine aimed at expanded military control over other institutions within the central and regional governments. The revolutionary doctrine wanted the military to be under the command of Sukarno. In both cases, the formation of territorial and strike-command elites required education. The production of both a

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1 Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1965: a Study of an Intervention*.

2 Ernst Utrecht, *The Indonesian Army: a Socio-Political Study of an Armed, Privileged Group in the Developing Countries*, (Townsville: Southeast Asian Studies Committee, 1978).

military managerial elite and a para-command elite was often predicated on American help. This was especially true for the para-command elites of the Guided Democracy, which obtained educational grants from the Kennedy administration to go to the United States and obtain training in the latest counter-insurgency tactics.

Everett Hawkins calls the process by which Indonesians took on multiple jobs to make ends meet job inflation.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, an institutional inflation occurred within the military. The multiplication of military tasks after 1957 can be conceived as job inflation into civilian fields within an economy that was contracting. Initially, the extension of job provision was conducted as a result of foreign attrition caused by nationalization. The territorial commands during the second Martial Law period (1957-1963) also allowed for a greater role of the army within various posts.

## The Revolutionary Period

During the war, Japanese control of Indonesia was conducted through three separate military administrations controlled by respectively the army and the navy.<sup>4</sup> Each administration pursued different policies, thus indigenous military organizations were prevalent in Java.<sup>5</sup> The Japanese also introduced army control at the neighbourhood level, the so-called *Tonari Gumi*.<sup>6</sup> Because politicians working under the Japanese were not allowed to organize at these

3 Everett Hawkins, "Job Inflation in Indonesia" in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1966, p. 264-275.

4 The 25<sup>th</sup> army division held sway Sumatra and the 16<sup>th</sup> division in Java. East Indonesia was under administration of the navy.

5 Paramilitary organizations and schools were effectively used to instill radical nationalism. M.A. Azis, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia*, (The Hague: n.a., 1955), p. 178.

6 This was translated into Indonesian into the still existing *Rukun Tetangga* (RT) and *Rukun Warga* (RW) system of security control. A committee was created in 1947 under the Minister of Interior Mr. Mohammad Roem, the Social Minister, Mr. Maria Ulfah Santoso and the Minister of Information and later Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir. In the fifties, it grew primarily in the urban areas and was used as proxies by political parties. The Guided Democracy started putting emphasis for social control through these RT/RK bodies, but it was the New Order state that had put it to good use. See *Rantjangan Dasar Undang2 Pembangunan Nasional-Semesta Berentjana delapan tahun: 1961-1969*, VIII book, Edition 16, p. 2518, see also Shigeru Sato, *War Nationalism and Peasant: Java under the Japanese occupation*, (Armonk: Sharpe, 1994), p. 72 and 74-75, and David Kilcullen, *The political consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia*, University of New South Wales-PhD, 2000, p. 32-33.

levels, local state presence was expressed in military forms. "The system was a means of coercion, propaganda, information collection, aid distribution and control over the population."<sup>7</sup>

The PETA<sup>8</sup> was the first army in history commanded and controlled by Indonesians. By December 1944, PETA had 66 battalions in Java, with a total estimated force of over 37,000 soldiers by 1945. The number of Indonesians involved in various military and para-military organizations was estimated to be in the order of 2 to 2.2 million people. Indonesian politicians were never able to form a comparable administrative or organizational presence at the local and village level during this period. Guerilla operations weakened central command, resulting in regionalization of military power.<sup>9</sup>

Military control over the territories contributed to the idea of Indonesia's state-society relations. Robert Cribb writes that Nasution's principal contribution to the study of guerrilla warfare was his ability to depoliticize it, unlike the politicization of people toward social change that was espoused by such generals as Vo Nguyen Giap.<sup>10</sup> The depoliticized nature of Indonesia's guerrillas stemmed from both Nasution's modernist aspiration to create a professional army and what can only be regarded as Indonesia's elite distrust of the masses.<sup>11</sup> Nasution strove to create a conventional and professional force that could meet the Dutch at their level. This was important in the republic's diplomatic effort to convince the outside world of the capability and legitimacy of the Indonesian state.

Nasution's idea of guerrilla warfare was conceived when he was Commander of the Java Army in 1948, in which he was the executive of both the military and civilian authority.<sup>12</sup> With the formation of a military

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7 David Kilcullen, *The political consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia*, (PhD Dissertation University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2000), p. 33.

8 Pembela Tanah Air or Defenders of the Homeland.

9 David Kilcullen, *The political consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia*, p. vii.

10 Robert Cribb, "Military Strategy in the Indonesian Revolution. Nasution's Total People's War in theory and practice" in *War and Society*, Vol. 19, no. 2, 2001, p. 150.

11 The masses was seen as a destabilizing and destructive force that requires a vigilant redirection to productive purposes in an image that equate it with river torrents and the government with the engineer's ability to redirect flows toward irrigation purposes. Something which came up during the seminars held by the military and economists during the transition period of the Guided Democracy and New Order periods.

12 Salim Said, *The Genesis of Power: Civil and Military Relations in Indonesia during the Revolution for Independence. 1945-1949*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

government, the heads of the divisions automatically became military governors for their respective provinces. At the residential level was the sub-regional military command or STM.<sup>13</sup> Beneath this was the district military command<sup>14</sup> or KDM paralleling at the district (*kabupaten*) level. Lastly, at the sub-district level (*kecamatan*) was the sub-district military command<sup>15</sup> or KODM. Only at the village level was there a non-militarized executive level. Yet, the *lurahs* were now responsible not to its civilian line of command, but to the KODM.<sup>16</sup> The *Wehrkreise* or *independent units* formed the main organization of the mobile units. Most STM commanders were also a *Wehrkreise* commander.

This system predated the 1948 reorganization of parallel military government and was created in October 1947 after the First Dutch Military Aggression. It was initially created to support the image of the Siliwangi Division as being under one command, although many of its troops had spread out after the attack and partial occupation of West Java by the Dutch forces in July and August 1947. Instead of utilizing the territorial units, the mobile units were also assigned to assist the Military Government in local administration. The paralleling and subordination of the civilian administration under the military was followed by the decentralization of the local territories by local military administration.<sup>17</sup>

The *guerilla-ization* of the civilian administration was not only limited to the executive administration line, but spread out to include much of the public goods service of the government, including the police and judicial courts, taxation, information services, public health, education, manufacturing and so forth.<sup>18</sup> The military commander put to good use an auxiliary force called the territorial cadres, composed of civilian trained workers, to do the essential and technical jobs that were required for these public goods provision. This replacement of civilian functions by military

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1981), p. 195-196.

13 Sub-Territorium Militer

14 Komando Distrik Militer, later known for its abbreviation Kodam.

15 Komando Onder-District Militer. Salim Said, *The Genesis of Power: Civil and Military Relations in Indonesia during the Revolution for Independence*, p. 195-196.

16 Salim Said, "The political role of Indonesian military: past, present and future" in *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1987, p. 17.

17 Salim Said, *The genesis of power: Civil and Military Relations in Indonesia during the revolution for independence*, p. 199-200.

18 A.H. Nasution, *The Fundamentals of Guerilla War*, p. 26.

ones during the direst episode of the revolutionary war, confirmed the beliefs of many people in the military that the political elite was not indispensable for the running of the state.

What we have during the revolutionary war was thus the development of a segmented army, whereby guerrilla warfare led to the creation of military fiefdoms at various local levels. The result was a territorial army, in which army divisions were manned and officered by people of the same locality.<sup>19</sup> The failure of the political elites to extend their administrative authority outside of the capital was compounded by the failure to effectively integrate the segmented military under civilian supremacy. The social democrats controlling the government had a modern and professional vision of the army that provided backing to ex-KNIL officers to head the military, initially under General Urip Sumohardjo (1893-1948). In 1945, when the army voted for Sudirman (1916-1950), an ex-PETA officer, the government had no power other than to accept the decision.<sup>20</sup>

Yet, as Ruth McVey has shown, the segmentation of the military was more than made up by the fact that the army came out of the revolution without a significant divergence in ideological background. The left-influenced part of the army was destroyed during the Madiun rebellion and the subsequent clampdown. The conservative-colonial part of the army, the KNIL, achieved such notoriety that its participation after the transfer of sovereignty was made impossible, although some of those occupying positions at the Chief of Staff were of KNIL extraction. Lastly, the Islamic influence was reduced by the end of the revolution with the decision of Islamist units to part with the republic and embark on a protracted guerrilla war for the establishment of an Indonesian Islamic State.<sup>21</sup>

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19 Daniel Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), p. 12.

20 Salim Said, *The genesis of power: Civil and Military Relations in Indonesia during the revolution for independence*, p. 98-103.

21 Ruth McVey, "Post-revolutionary transformation of the Indonesian army" in *Indonesia*, no. 11, April 1971, p. 131-176.

## The Centralization of the Army in the 1950s

The Indonesian military carried an inherent divide between the Dutch-educated KNIL officers and the Japanese-educated PETA, *Laskar* and Youth troop officers. Broadly speaking, the division has been attributed by Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey to the two groups. On the one hand was the group that coalesced around the venerable war hero General Sudirman. Sudirman reached mythical status for his role as a military, but also spiritual, leader of the wider army. The Sudirman group was based in the Diponegoro Division of Central Java and was highly imbued with the notion of the spirit of 1945<sup>22</sup>, an almost spiritual concept that attributed positive value to the feelings of revolutionary fervor.<sup>23</sup> This group was highly homogeneous, with the majority of its officers being local Javanese. They lacked the know-how in modern techniques and organizational capability.

The other group was the one that coalesced around the figure of former KNIL-officer General Urip Sumohardjo. The group was based in the former Dutch army headquarters in Bandung and the Siliwangi Division of West Java and was composed of Dutch-trained, westernized individuals like A.H. Nasution and T.B. Simatupang. In 1945, Urip Sumohardjo convened with 13 other former KNIL officers to pledge their allegiance to Indonesia and begin to create a modern military. So the divide in the military was between a Javanese-speaking, *priyayi*-centered, PETA-trained group and a Dutch-speaking, cosmopolitan-intellectual, KNIL-trained group which contained a large proportion of Outer Islanders.<sup>24</sup> The latter group's ability to deal with administrative problems, Republic-level politics and Dutch counterparts brought them into top positions in the course of the war for Independence.<sup>25</sup>

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22 *Semangat 45*

23 Benedict Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, *A preliminary analysis of the October 1, 1965, coup in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), p. 4. "For soldiers of this kind, revolution is more drama than reconstruction, violent action rather than transformation of institutions. Soldiering itself is less a matter of techniques and skills, than the development of moral and spiritual faculties through a kind of modernized asceticism. A good soldier is identified by the kind of man he is rather than by his effectiveness on military exercises."

24 Anderson Benedict and Ruth T. McVey, *A preliminary analysis of the October 1, 1965, coup in Indonesia*, p. 1-6.

25 Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army" in *Indonesia*, p. 134.

Although lacking some of the wider support that Sudirman enjoyed, the Sjahrir, and later Hatta, cabinet were supportive of the Bandung group and proceeded to elect people from the group to head the failed to help modernize the army, the reconstruction and rationalization (*re dan ra*)<sup>26</sup> process, coined by Nasution in 1948. General A.H. Nasution obtained the position of the Army Chief of Staff following the death of General Oerip Soemohardjo in 1948. Taking in the reins during the second military clash with the Dutch, Nasution would start to build his ideas of the role of the military in society as a result of that clash.<sup>27</sup>

With the end of the revolutionary war and the formation of the United States of the Republic of Indonesia cabinet, Prime Minister Hatta's policy to reduce the number of civil servants was followed by the military, which aimed to reduce the number of fighters in the army through a series of rehabilitation programmes that would allow for the transition to civilian life. Unfortunately, the project was a failure. Transmigration and community development schemes would have allowed thousands of former fighters to start new lives,<sup>28</sup> but the implementation was less than satisfactory.<sup>29</sup> Many of these former fighters took up roles in the new and democratic society of the 1950s as gangsters, henchmen or took up roles in party and mass-based organizations. At any rate, there was resentment toward the civilian leadership's lack of concern for the well being of veterans of the revolutionary war.<sup>30</sup>

As Chief of Staff, Nasution would initiate the *re dan ra* again in 1950, with the consent of Prime Minister Hatta, in the hope of creating a small but modern army. This modernization was backed by many of the former-KNIL officers, notably Minister of Defence Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and the Secretary General of Defence, Ali Budiardjo, a PSI sympathiser. Half of the partisan membership left the army, including officers. Consequently, there was a shift in the social background of the military officers.<sup>31</sup>

26 Rekonstruksi dan rasionalisasi (reconstruction and rationalization). Ernst Utrecht, *The Indonesian Army*, p. 14.

27 Abdul Haris Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 25.

28 Report of the Social Ministry to the Prime Minister on the National Planning Board, Jakarta 15 June 1951, ANRI, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1950-1959. Inv. Nr. 1277.

29 Abdul Haris Nasution, *Tjataan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Pembimbing, 1955), p. 349-350.

30 Abdul Haris Nasution, *Tjataan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia*, p. 204.

31 Ernst Utrecht, "The Indonesian army as instruments of repression" in *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 2, no. 1, 1972, 58, Ernst Utrecht, *The Indonesian Army*, p. 7 and R.E. Elson,

Parliamentary members voiced their support for the partisan grievances, attacking Nasution's effort at army modernization and his willingness to work with the NMM.<sup>32</sup> The parliamentary attack on the military leadership under Nasution and T.B. Simatupang led to the 17 October 1952 affair, in which Nasution's military faction tried to force President Sukarno to dissolve Parliament and take over as a dictator. Sukarno managed to defuse the situation and convinced the troops surrounding the palace to go home and prevented the death of parliamentary democracy until the later part of the 1950s. This action disgraced Nasution who had his position as Chief of Staff annulled. Parliament voted in a new and more neutral Army Chief of Staff: Major-General Bambang Sugeng.<sup>33</sup>

The shift toward the PETA faction in the military might have signaled the weakening power of the modernizer faction that had supported reconstruction and modernization, and the formation of a military based on the rule of military experts, in both the administrative and modern fighting skills. Yet, Chief of Staff Bambang Sugeng made an honest effort to bridge the gap. This culminated in the Yogyakarta Charter of February 1955. This meeting of the most important military elites resulted in ending the bickering between the KNIL and PETA groups under the threat of politicians who had been trying to enforce civilian supremacy over the national army. Under Minister of Defence Iwa Kusumasumantri there was an effort to rid the army of any officers that had connection with the 17 October 1952 affair.

With the support of the PETA faction, Nasution was able to swiftly move to dominate the army leadership. Support by some officers of the Siliwangi division in Col. Zulkifli Lubis's attempt to overthrow the government improved Nasution's image. With the PKI emerging as the fourth largest party in Parliament after the 1955 election, Nasution increasingly called for the dissolution of the parties, a demand that would stir Sukarno's interest later on. In 1956, Nasution announced plans to rotate territorial commanders, which would weaken the hold of these military men and their fiefdoms in order to slowly bring the fragmented and decentralized military under the

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*Suharto, a political biography*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 61.

32 Nederlands Militaire Missie, the Dutch military mission which was created in accordance to the Round Table Agreement to train the Indonesian armed forces in modern warfare for a period of five years. It ended in 1963 and was not renewed.

33 Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics. 1945-1967*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 74-75.

leadership of Jakarta. Regionalist displeasure against Jakarta resulted in the PRRI<sup>34</sup> rebellion and was joined by the PSI and Masyumi leadership.<sup>35</sup>

From 1955, a relatively solid army was being created, supporting the position of A.H. Nasution.<sup>36</sup> Units and commanders reluctant to back-up Jakarta rebelled and eventually merged into the PRRI/Permesta movement, whose core consisted of Masyumi and PSI members. This eventually led to the banning of these two pro-Western, anti-Communist and influential parties. The success of the army in quelling the rebellion meant the destruction of the once independent authority of regional commanders. The new regional commanders represented a more tightly knit, centralized group. The centralization of army command in the 1950s was an important prerequisite to later developments related to the rise of the New Order military regime.

### Anti-Corruption and the Road to Power

During Nasution's civilian stint (1952-1955) he published his ideas concerning the role of the military in modern Indonesian society.<sup>37</sup> The hope of the 1955 election in creating a non-corrupt and stable government was dashed when the Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet proved to be as corrupt and incapable as previous ones.<sup>38</sup> The period of 1955-1957 thus represented a litmus test of the workability of civilian leadership in staving off an increasingly hostile camp of the anti-liberal.<sup>39</sup> At the Technical Faculty of the University of Indonesia in 1955, Sukarno reiterated his feelings for the

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34 *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia was a rebel movement by regional army officers who were dissatisfied with Jakarta's policies and conduct.

35 Herbert Feith and Daniel Lev, "The end of the Indonesian rebellion" in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring, 1963), p. 32-46.

36 Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics. 1945-1967*, p. 79-88, Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 32.

37 Including the publication of his most important work on guerilla warfare. This was later translated into English and was particularly appreciated as a non-Leftist approach toward guerilla warfare.

38 Herbert Feith, *The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia*, p. 462-473.

39 In particular, the Murba party which came out as a supporter of Sukarno's *Konsepsi* later on.

democratic system by saying that “parties can disappear but the universities must not.”<sup>40</sup>

On 14 September 1956, Nasution held a meeting with the National Security Board specifically to design the course to be taken by the military in regulating the press and eradicating corruption.<sup>41</sup> The public rationale for greater military involvement in civilian affairs was thus to eradicate corruption, an effort justified by the failure of Parliament to enact an anti-corruption bill that had been voted during the Burhanuddin Cabinet and failed to materialize into law before the Guided Democracy.<sup>42</sup>

The end of the Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet paved the way for an aggressive military participation in executive affairs. When Ali Sastroamidjojo handed over his mandate to the President at 10 am on 14 March 1957, it took Sukarno 30 minutes to declare martial law.<sup>43</sup> On 9 April, Chief of Staff and military ruler A.H. Nasution issued a Regulation on the Eradication of Corruption, whose broad definition of corruption included persons or bodies which directly or indirectly result in the financial or economic loss to the state and persons upholding a position who receive a salary from the state and through using their authority, power or opportunity provided by the position has, directly or indirectly, resulted in a financial or material benefit to him/her.<sup>44</sup> On the same day, Nasution set-up a system of military observers within the civilian bureaucracy, keeping an eye on the government departments.<sup>45</sup>

On 28 March 1957, one day after Nasution’s announcement to investigate allegedly corrupt government officials, 12 civil servants were called in by the commander of the military police corps (CPM). The newspaper *Keng Po* published their names, which included Dr. A.K. Gani, Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, Dr. Ong Eng Die, Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo, Mr. Tan Goan-Po, Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, Dr. Lie Kiat Teng, Dr. Saroso, Arudji Kartanegara, Djamaluddin

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40 Tangkas, 10 February 1955.

41 Duta Masyarakat, 17 September 1956.

42 Duta Masyarakat, 11 April 1957 and ANRI, Jakarta, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1950-1959, inv. nr. 1939.

43 SOB or Staat van Oorlog en Beleg (State of War and Siege)

44 Duta Masyarakat, 11 April 1957.

45 National Archives of Australia or NAA, Canberra, A1838, Army intervention on civilian affairs.

Malik and others.<sup>46</sup> In total, 37 people went under investigation, with 11 people officially held by the CPM. Among these, several very important names stood out: Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, former Minister of the first Ali Cabinet, Dr. Ong Eng Die, former Finance Minister of the first Ali Cabinet and Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, the Masjumi Finance Minister in the second Ali Cabinet. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo evaded incarceration as he had been in Tokyo on a conference about finance.<sup>47</sup> He went to West Sumatra to join the PRRI rebellion.<sup>48</sup>

By December 1957, the take-over of Dutch-owned companies had begun and the sudden explosion of new posts in both civilian state institutions and newly nationalized state-owned companies opened the opportunity for military officers to find their way into the civilian state structure.

The 9 April Regulation on the Eradication of Corruption was a milestone for Indonesia, for it represented the first legal move to eradicate corruption. Yet it was part of a broader changes enacted by the military.<sup>49</sup> On 27 May 1957, Nasution enacted a regulation to supervise property, followed by a 21 June 1957 regulation on the confiscation of materials gained through unlawful acts. A series of regulation was enacted throughout the period: on 16 October 1957, a regulation on the supervision of property owned by the Military Rulers and other state officials; on 28 October 1957, on the formation of a supervision team and its work programme and the guidelines for supervisors of property; on 16 December 1957, on the selling and limitation of use of confiscated materials; on 18 March 1958, on the supervision of the circulation of essential items; on 16 April 1958, on the investigation and prosecution of corruption and supervision of materials; on 14 May 1958, on the formation of a Coordination Body on Property Investigation<sup>50</sup>; and 9 August 1958, on the supervision, limitation of use and sale of confiscated property. Thus a series of increasingly stringent regulations

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46 Keng Po, 28 March 1957.

47 Duta Masyarakat, 9 May 1957. NA The Hague, Bevelschrift voor aanhouding Prof. Soemitro, inv. nr. 382.

48 Duta Masyarakat, 30 May 1957.

49 "Lampiran Perundang-undangan Peraturan Penguasa Militer" in *Hukum*, no. 7-8, 1957, p. 16-166.

50 *Badan Koordinasi Penilikan Harta Benda*

were created. The Committee on Corruption Eradication finally created The Property Investigation Unit<sup>51</sup> on 12 June 1959.<sup>52</sup>

The June 1958 formation of a team for the investigation of personal wealth was issued by the Justice Ministry to work in all provinces other than those in active rebellions or under Dutch occupation.<sup>53</sup> The Anti-Corruption Commission headed by Prime Minister Djuanda, completed a draft plan on the executive instruction concerning the composition, task and working method of the Coordination Body for the Investigation of Personal Wealth and Property in 1958. Because of the novelty of the entire approach, there were major difficulties to be overcome.<sup>54</sup>

A body on property investigation was considered essential to the task. The body would create an inventory of the property of civil servants or state organizations. The law forced people to disclose land, house and other property purchases and wealth.<sup>55</sup> Dozens of corruption cases were brought to court by end of 1959. Yet, it was also quite clear that the effects were rather disappointing.<sup>56</sup> The Military Ruler has decreed the need to create a list of trustworthy companies that should be screened and controlled regularly by the Ministry of Finance and Trade. The Military Ruler also saw the need to create financial supervision posts in each department and on the provincial and lower level government. Lastly, there was the formation of a Committee on Government Employee Rules<sup>57</sup> in an effort to stop civil servants from taking part in business and party politics. These anti-corruption efforts

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51 *Penilik Harta Benda*

52 Panitia Anti Korupsi. Pemberantasan Korupsi, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 May 1960. ANRI, Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Inv. Nr. 518, *Nasional*, 19 November 1958.

53 With the exception of Central and South Sumatera, Sulawesi, Moluccas and West Irian.

54 Australia National Archive, Indonesian corruption (1956-1970), A. 1838.

55 Pemberantasan Korupsi, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 May 1960. ANRI, Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Inv. Nr. 518

56 Pemberantasan Korupsi, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 May 1960. ANRI, Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Inv. Nr. 518. The results for 1959 were: 48 cases in West Java, 10 cases in Central Java, 20 cases in East Java, 292 persons required to give property detail in Jakarta, 9 cases in West Kalimantan, 4 cases in Aceh and 9 cases in North Sumatra. The Regional Military Government (Territorium) handled these corruption cases.

57 *Panitia Negara Perantjang Undang-undang Kepegawaian*.

paved the way for the formation of the Committee for the Retooling of State Apparatus or PARAN.<sup>58</sup>

Army involvement in corruption was widely known, yet there was a lack of action on the part of Nasution.<sup>59</sup> It seems likely that he did not have the fortitude to push through his anti-corruption campaigns, especially against colleagues in the military. In any case, his effort to assert his presence within the Guided Democracy state in institutions he built were to be thwarted by President Sukarno, who would appoint Ahmad Yani after 1962 to replace him as Head of the Army. Yani “gradually ended the autonomous position of the army and brought the head of the army directly under the hands of Sukarno and, later pioneered by the police, was made obedient to the whims of Sukarno ‘without reserve’.”<sup>60</sup>

## Officer Education

Army training had been conducted since the early years of independence. Ex-PETA officers started training in Tangerang and Karawang. The establishment of the *Akademi Militer Nasional* on 28 October 1945, in Yogyakarta, was the first of its kind. Its curriculum was modelled on the basic training of *Shoodan-Tyoo*.<sup>61</sup> Complementing the colonial state’s military academy in Bandung, the *Koninklijke Militaire Academie*, which was founded in 1940. On the Republican side, a school for officer was opened in Malang, although it was closed in 1948 after the Second Dutch Military Aggression. The military academy re-opened in 1950, but did not produce any officers, as sub-lieutenants (*vaandrig cadets*) were sent to the Dutch military academy in Breda to finish their education. In 1953, a committee was established in order to plan a complete military academy. It finally opened on 1 September 1957 as the National Military Academy (NMA) in Magelang, Central Java.<sup>62</sup>

58 *Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara* or Paran. Laporan Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara. ANRI, Bapekan, Inv. Nr. 345.

59 He did take action against Kol. Ibnu Sutowo for smuggling in Tanjung Priok. *Harian Rakjat*, 7 January 1959.

60 Abdul Harris Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama*, (Jakarta: GunungAgung, 1985), p. 214. “Ia berangsur2 mengakhiri posisi otonom TNI dan membawa pimpinan TNI langsung ditangan Bung Karno dan kelak dipelopori Polri ditingkatkan menjadi taat kepada Bung Karno “tanpa reserve”.”

61 *20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka. Jilid III*, (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1965), p. 217.

62 *National Military Academy*, (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, n.a.), p. 5.

The National Military Academy was a college set up to produce officers. This was different from the SSKAD/Tjandradimuka academies that trained officers on a more advanced level. Candidates for the NMA were high school graduates who aspired for a military career. Those who finished NMA education reaching the highest rank of Chief Warrant Officer (*Pembantu Letnan*) would have the chance to attend the Staff and Command Schools.<sup>63</sup>

Far more important for the purpose of elite formation were the Staff and Command School of which there were two. The first was the Tjandradimuka School, which focused more on the ideological education of army officers. The second was the Staff and Command School (SSKAD). Both schools were located in Bandung. President Sukarno was a frequent lecturer at Tjandradimuka, a school that aimed at fostering the spirit of the 1945 revolution amongst the top leadership of the military. The school was built in 1951 under the directorship of Colonel Bambang Supeno, an ex-PETA officer. Tjandradimuka's nationalist and Javanese-oriented stance was in contrast with SSKAD's social-democratic and PSI-dominated orientation. It was considered by Nasution and Simatupang to be the centre for agitation against military modernization and they succeeded in closing the school down in 1952,<sup>64</sup> to the displeasure of Sukarno and Bambang Supeno.<sup>65</sup>

SSKAD was a school that embodied the efforts of military modernization. It was founded on 17 October 1951. The school aimed at educating future army officers with modern knowledge like scientific administration, military analysis and organizational know-how. Hatta made clear the needs of the post-revolutionary army: 'The revolutionary period needs officers with flaming passion, burned by the dream of fighting and independence. In this period, bravery is rewarded more than capability... Oftentimes, assertiveness in action is more precious than the ability to estimate strategies and tactics in a thorough manner.'<sup>66</sup> After the revolution '... aside from passion

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63 *Aku ke Akademi Militer Nasional*, (Jakarta: s.n., 1957), p. 33.

64 Ernst Utrecht, *The Indonesian Army*, p. 41-46.

65 Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics. 1945-1967*, p. 65.

66 *Buku Peringatan Lustrum ke I SSKAD. 17 Nopember 1951-17 Nopember 1956*, (Bandung: SSKAD, 1956), p. 6. "Masa revolusi menghendaki perwira yang semangatnja berapi-api, dibakar oleh tjita-tjita perjuangan dan kemerdekaan. Dalam masa revolusi seringkali keberanian didahulukan dari ketjakapan, jang dianggap akan diperoleh berangsur-angsur didalam perjuangan dan pertempuran. Seringkali ketegasan bertindak lebih berharga dari perhitungan strategi dan taktik jang dipikirkan dengan teliti."

and assertiveness, the capability to weigh and decide, based on military knowledge, strategy, tactics and knowledge of society is needed.<sup>67</sup>

By 1953, there were around 129 officers that were undergoing education in the Netherlands.<sup>68</sup> Others went to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Fort Benning, Georgia, in the United States. After 1954, the Netherlands wound down Indonesian attendance at its military academies, with the last Indonesian cadet leaving in 1957.<sup>69</sup> In the same year, the plans were laid for a command and staff college along the lines of Fort Leavenworth. SSKAD instructors went to the United States, Great Britain, Yugoslavia and the Middle East to study the command and staff colleges there. In 1959, the SSKAD was renamed Seskoad.<sup>70</sup> By the early 1960s, people were also sent to study in the USSR, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and China.

In the initial years, the army relied heavily on the Netherlands Military Mission (NMM) as the main source for technical and tactical training. This included many of the teachers in the SSKAD. The nationalists and ex-PETA members were suspicious about the role of former Dutch and KNIL enemies being used as instructors and teachers.<sup>71</sup> The Round Table Agreement allowed for an Indonesian-financed Dutch military mission to provide military advisors and trainers. Before 1953, the Netherlands Military Mission supplied the largest number of teachers for the college. Of 24 teachers, six Dutchmen

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67 Of those 129 officers, 29 went to the Royal Military Academy (Koninklijk Militaire Academie), 60 to the Royal Navy Institute (Koninklijk Instituut der Marine) and 21 to the Officer Reserve School (School Reserve Officiëren), the rest went to a variety of schools and courses. Nota Menteri Pertahanan A.L. tanggal 26 Djanuari 1953, ANRI, Jakarta, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, Inv. Nr. 1855.

68 Since 1951, a stream of Indonesian officers went to the United States and Western Europe including the Netherlands to finish their study. In September 1951, 27 Indonesian cadets went to the KMA in Breda. See Wim Cappers, "Nasi goreng en negerzaad. De opleiding van de Indonesische cadetten aan de Koninklijke Militaire Academie". Collectie legermuseum.nl

69 The ending of the Dutch-Indonesian Union in 1956 was important in the ending of Indo-Dutch military cooperation. Wim Cappers, "Nasi goreng en negerzaad. De opleiding van de Indonesische cadetten aan de Koninklijke Militaire Academie". Collectie legermuseum.nl

70 Ann Gregory, *Recruitment and factional patterns of the Indonesian political elite: Guided Democracy and the New Order*, p. 301.

71 Part of Nasution's 5 Year Plan for the army was to end the military mission. He thought the NMM was an imperialist ploy to weaken the army. A.H. Nasution, *TNI*, (Jakarta: Jajasan Pustaka Militer, 1956), p. 18-39. The feeling was mutual from the KL/KNIL side. The paternalistic attitude of the Dutch instructors did not help either. Hans Meijer, *Den Haag-Djakarta: De Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen, 1950-1962*, (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1994), p. 391-393.

were permanent employees and 12 were temporary employees of NMM. There were only three teachers from the Indonesian army and three civilian lecturers. Between 1953 and 1958, there were six class B Courses with 357 officers. Starting from March 1958, a new C-1 Course was inaugurated, which had three classes with 64 attending officers.<sup>72</sup>

By 1953, President Sukarno and the Nationalist-Left Wing coalition, alarmed by the 17 October 1952 affair, pushed for the ending of Dutch influence. After 1953, Indonesian teachers replaced all the NMM teachers. Early in 1951, Chief of Staff Simatupang reiterated the reasons why the NMM might not be the most appropriate for training the Indonesian army; first, the Dutch themselves didn't have a deep knowledge and experience of military matters; second, there were psychological problems plaguing Indonesian-Dutch relations at the time; and lastly, Indonesia's focus on a people's defence was not in line with the more conventional warfare doctrine of the Dutch.<sup>73</sup> The NMM was to help Indonesia build up its land, sea and air power and its members were responsible to the Indonesian government through its Head Mission, which were paid for by the government.<sup>74</sup>

On twentieth April 1953, the Dutch signed an agreement of withdrawal of the NMM. The formal cessation of the NMM by March 1953 was followed immediately by overtures to Australia, Switzerland, West Germany, Sweden and Norway to replace the NMM. This proved unsuccessful, and, Indonesia then approached 'less neutral' countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, but was equally frustrated. Initially, the UK was interested in sending a joint small-scale British Commonwealth Military Mission but this was thwarted by the wish to maintain good relations with the Netherlands. Attitudes in Indonesia had also become less positive about foreign intervention in the military. By October 1953, however,

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72 "Sedjarah Perkembangan Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat" in *Karya Wira Djati*, Vol. 9, no. 31, July, 1969, p. 9.

73 T.B. Simatupang, *De Nederlandse Militaire Missie* translated from Indonesian published in the military magazine *Perwira*, Nr. 5 – 1951 Pag. 182. NA, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, 1950-1957, Inv. Nmr.: 563-573

74 Nota omtrent de ontwikkeling van zaken in Indonesie in zoverre de verhoudingen binnen de Nederlands-Indonesische Unie en de belangen van Nederland daarbij betrokken zijn. Ministerie voor Uniezaken en Overzeesche Rijksdelen. Afd. Wetgeving en Juridische Zaken. No. 1 's-Gravenhage, 23 Mei 1950. De Minister voor Uniezaken en Overzeesche Rijksdelen. J.H. van Maarseveen. Nationaal Archief or NA, The Hague, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, 1950-1957, Inv. Nmr.: 556-566.

the Australian embassy in Washington DC learned that the Americans had in principle agreed about the need for a Western military mission in Indonesia, although it had not resulted in a formal American military mission programme.<sup>75</sup>

By 1956, there were in total 46 teachers, with five civilian lecturers, 17 permanent lecturers and 34 temporary lecturers at SSKAD. The permanent lecturers were either graduates of SSKAD or from foreign institutions such as the *Hogere Krijgsschool* (HKS) in the Netherlands or Fort Benning and Fort Leavenworth in the USA.<sup>76</sup> Much of the curriculum focused on military themes, including military law, military administration, tactical knowledge, artillery, military geography, military history, maintenance of military technology, etc. For the 1956 batch, out of a total of 2210 class hours, 136 were dedicated to general knowledge, in particular political science, sociology, anthropology and economy. Prior to 1956, only political science was taught. In the same year, military management was introduced.<sup>77</sup> After the shift to Seskoad and the introduction of Course C-1 in 1959, the emphasis on socio-political themes rose significantly, up to 50% of the entire curriculum.<sup>78</sup> Course C-1 was 'purely one of Fort Leavenworth', copying the curriculum of the American military staff and command school,<sup>79</sup> with its eight teachers translating the field manuals, advanced sheets and lesson plans.<sup>80</sup>

Beginning in 1961, the importance of the 'defence aspects' in the government resulted in an expansion of Seskoad to include non-military students, from the Ministry of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Immigration, Attorney General's office, the State Administrative Institute (*Lembaga Administrasi Negara*-LAN) and other institutions.<sup>81</sup> This expansion toward

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75 National Archives of Australian or NAA. No. A1838. East Indies-Australian educational and cultural interest in Indonesia, 1946 – 1951. Appendix B. Military Mission to Indonesia.

76 Wilujo Puspojudo, Perkembangan SSKAD in *Buku Peringatan Lustrum ke I SSKAD*, (N.a.: n.a, n.a.), p. 35

77 Wilujo Puspojudo, Perkembangan SSKAD, p. 36-37.

78 Ann Gregory, *Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite: Guided Democracy and the New Order*, p. 302.

79 *Ibid.* Course C also expanded work of Seskoad from purely educational to research and development.

80 "Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak didirikan hingga sekarang" in *Karya Wira Djati*, Vol. 9, no. 31, July, 1969, p. 40-41.

81 "Sedjarah Perkembangan Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat", p. 11. This was within the *Defense Issue Orientation Course*, which had four classes between the years 1961-1964.

greater inclusion of the social sciences broadened cooperation with other learning institutions including the Higher Learning Institute for Police Science, the Political and Social Science Faculties in both Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta (since 1960) and the FEUI in Jakarta and Padjadjaran University in Bandung (since 1962). A political science course on state defence was conducted at Padjadjaran University.<sup>82</sup> From 1961, there was another shift in curriculum toward case studies using the experiences of the Mandala and Bhakti operation<sup>83</sup> and the anti-guerrilla policies used in Malaya, in China, and in Yugoslavia's territorial warfare.<sup>84</sup> The civic-action part of the curriculum was thus strengthened.<sup>85</sup> Seskoad would play a central role in defining civil-military relationship and policy.<sup>86</sup> The school thus had an important social function to unify the perspective of army leadership and also to create an 'old boy' network, which fostered a sense of esprit de corps within a military increasingly being politicized through political party influence.<sup>87</sup>

Nasution's second appointment as Army Chief of Staff on 27 October 1955 gave the impetus for a stronger relationship between the SSKAD and other Staff and Command schools in many countries. Although the United States of America became one of the most important foreign centres for army training, with around one quarter of the army officers getting their education in American schools, Nasution was very eager to obtain help to educate

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82 "Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak didirikan hingga sekarang", p. 53.

83 The Mandala operation was Indonesia's first forward intrusion into enemy territory as part of the military campaign against Dutch forces in West Papua inaugurated in 1961. The Bhakti operation was the locally-based civic action programme conducted by the Siliwangi division under General Ibrahim Adjie.

84 The territorial concept of Lieutenant General Dushan Kveder of Yugoslavia was published in Foreign Affairs magazine in October 1953 and Military Review magazine in July 1954. It was translated by the SSKAD in the end of the 1950s and was published in Bahasa Indonesia in the army magazine *Territorial* in June 1961.

85 "Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak didirikan hingga sekarang", p. 46.

86 Between 1959 until 1966, Seskoad had seven important seminars discussing Indonesia's military doctrine and its relation to the state and society. These included the First Seminar on Military Issue (1959-1960), the Second Seminar on Military Issue (January, 1962), the First Army Seminar on the Tri Ubaya Cakti Doctrine (April, 1965) and lastly the Revision Seminar on the Doctrine Tri Ubaya Cakti (August, 1966). There was also a seminar on Civic Mission in July 1967, on Infantry Doctrine in July 1968 and a pre-seminar on the Indonesian intelligence doctrine in February 1969.

87 Charles Donald McFetridge, "Seskoad: Training the Elite" in *Indonesia*, Vol. 36, (Oct., 1978), p. 87-98.

SSKAD graduates into other army training schools. Nasution himself, who had never finished his schooling at the KMA in Bandung tried to enter into the Dutch school of staff and command in 1952 but was distracted by the 17 October affair.<sup>88</sup> His trips abroad in the second half of the 1950s brought possibilities of expanding the educational experience of the army. This included sending a student to the Soviet's Frunze Military Academy, the *Führungsakademie des Bundeswehr* in West Germany, where the important early New Order General Soemitro received his education,<sup>89</sup> and to the British Imperial Defence College, which annually sent a team to Seskoad.<sup>90</sup>

Aside from the Seskoad, there was another school that was highly important in relation to the production of army elite. This was the AHM (*Akademi Hukum Militer* or Military Law Academy), initially founded as a legal course for military personnel held in May 1951 until June 1952. Nasution issued the order to form a Military Law Academy and appointed the PSI-affiliated Ali Budiardjo, who was at the time General Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, as head of the committee for the formation of the Academy.<sup>91</sup> Throughout the 1950s, only two generations graduated. The first batch started in September 1952, but as a result of the 17 September coup-like event and the havoc it wreaked throughout the military, the cadets finished their initially two-year designed courses in four years.<sup>92</sup>

A second batch was initiated on September 1954 but would not finish their courses until 1960. This group had an even more interesting side-job: the second-generation Military Law Academy was to play a pivotal role in the nationalization of Dutch-owned companies.<sup>93</sup> Most students took a whole year in 1957 to deal with the managerial difficulties of the nationalization process. Many, like Major General Soekamto Sajidiman who would play an important role in nationalizing the large trading firm Jacobson van den Berg

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88 Abdul Haris Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jilid V: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama*, p. 48.

89 Saleh As'ad Jamhari, Sugiharta Sriwibara and Ramadhan K.H., *Perjalanan Seorang Prajurit Pejuang dan Profesional: memoir Jenderal TNI (Purn.) Soemitro*, (Jakarta: Sinar Cakra Sakti, 1999), p. 11.

90 Abdul Haris Nasution, *Memenuhi panggilan tugas. Jilid V: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama*, p. 59 and 147-160.

91 D. Djiwapradja and E. Soewarna, *Buku Peringatan Tudjuh Tahun Akademi Hukum Militer*, (Jakarta: Akademi Hukum Militer, 1960), p. 27.

92 D. Djiwapradja and E. Soewarna, *Buku Peringatan Tudjuh Tahun Akademi Hukum Militer*, p. 35.

93 *Ibid.*

into the state-owned company Juda Bhakti,<sup>94</sup> and Lt. Colonel Soedjiwo and Lt. Colonel Sukotriwarno,<sup>95</sup> would be continuing their managerial role and ease themselves into longer career in the business sector.<sup>96</sup> The extent to which alumni of the Military Law Academy played a role in the nationalization is sketchy. According to Sajidiman, he and his “classmates from the Military Law Academy were instructed by the government to take over Dutch-owned corporations for the purpose of nationalization.”<sup>97</sup> A commemoration booklet for the academy was sponsored by commercials of various state-owned corporations indicating the extensive spread of the cadets into state-owned businesses.<sup>98</sup> AHM graduates like Soedharmono, Ali Said and Ismail Saleh were to play important roles as part of the Sekneg group seeking favour within Suharto’s New Order court later on.<sup>99</sup>

Like the Seskoad, the Military Law Academy was reliant on lecturers from Indonesia’s major universities. Professor Djokosoetono, the University of Indonesia’s legal specialist was appointed as head of the teaching board. FEUI economist Tan Goan-Po and Widjojo Nitisastro taught economics, Soediman Kartohadiprodjo taught introductory law, Satochid Kartanegara criminal law and Hazairin Adat law. P.N. Drost and H.J. Heerens were the only Dutch professors who taught at the academy teaching international law and sociology.<sup>100</sup> Many of the cadets in the academy and in the SSKAD/Seskoad not only had regular contact with professors and lecturers, especially from the UI, but also continue their education to either the universities or

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94 Soekamto Sajidiman, *The Tender Power. An Autobiography*, (Jakarta: Grafikaria Utama Sakti, 1978), p. 44.

95 O.G. Roeder, *Who’s Who in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), p. 388-389 and 404.

96 For more on military business, see Bambang Purwanto, “Economic Decolonization and the Rise of the Indonesian Military Business” in J. Thomas Lindblad and Peter Post (eds), *Indonesian Economic Decolonization in Regional and International Perspective*, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), p. 39-58.

97 Soekamto Sajidiman, *The Tender Power*. p. 44. “Aku ditugaskan oleh Pemerintah untuk mengoper perusahaan Belanda bersama rekan-rekanku lainnya dari Akademi Hukum Militer dalam rangka nasionalisasi perusahaan2 Belanda.”

98 D. Djiwapradja and E. Soewarna, *Buku peringatan tujuh tahun Akademi Hukum Militer*. Including Juda Bhakti (former Jacob van den Berg), Indevitra (former Borsumij), Ralin (former Philips), Satya Negara (former Internatio) and so forth,

99 Robinson Pangaribuan, *The Indonesian State Secretariat, 1945-1993*, (Perth: Asia Research Center on Social, Political and Economic Change, 1995), p. 18-19.

100 F.X. Sunatra, “Beberapa soal tentang text-book thinking” in D. Djiwapradja and E. Soewarna, *Buku peringatan tujuh tahun Akademi Hukum Militer*, p. 88.

took further courses, for instance, the management courses that were to become common in the latter part of the 1950s. They would not only meet in classrooms, but also in boardrooms and government committees throughout the end of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s.

Take a look at the case of Soehardiman, a protégé of General Yani and the instigator of the military-created trade union Soksi. This army officer started his career in the Ministry of Defence before getting the chance to pursue further study in the associate infantry school at Fort Benning in 1954. Returning to Indonesia, he began teaching military tactics in the SSKAD for three years (1954-1957). At the end of 1957, he was assigned to the army headquarters and as an economic expert under the Minister of Economic Stabilization. He then took on the job as secretary of the nationalization body (Banas or *Badan Nasionalisasi*) and would, in fact, become the president director of the state-owned company Djaja Bhakti. Soehardiman's education was furthered when he enrolled at Parahyangan Catholic University in Bandung, in 1958, and the University of Indonesia in 1962, studying business management. In fact, he would obtain a doctorate degree in economics in 1970. His book entitled *Social Structure Reform as precondition for the Development of National Business*, espoused the need to reconfigure society around the figure of a *homo-administrativus* and the formation of a 'welfare, service and administrative state' based on the guidance of strategic elites: a cooperative elite composed of businessmen, administrator, technocrats and *technologues*.<sup>101</sup> He would later play a role in the take-over of the so-called 'palace millionaires', businessmen related to Sukarno, and the formation of the military company Berdikari.<sup>102</sup>

Soehardiman's case was not unique. A look into a *Who's Who in Indonesia* published in 1971 showed that there were around twelve military managers included in the book, although both Soehardiman and Soekamto Sajidiman were absent, obviously indicating the much larger number of military officers that the book failed to notice. Amongst these 12 were well-known New Order military businessmen, including the Pertamina head Ibnu Sutowo and Suharto's special assistant Soedjono Humardhani. Many of them were

101 Soehardiman, *Kupersembahkan kepada pengadilan sejarah. Otobiografi Soehardiman. Disampaikan kepada Ade Komaruddin Mochamad dkk*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Bina Produktivitas, 1993), p. 237-261.

102 Harold Crouch, "Generals and Business in Indonesia" in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Winter, 1975-1976), p. 519-540.

products of Seskoad/AHM and many had attended universities either in Indonesia, with many in the Law School of UI, or management courses like the IMDD management course in Syracuse, USA. Soehardiman's ideas on the military's dual function and the creation of what looked like a managerial state, with a core elite composed of businessmen-experts-military was a result of his rich associations with management specialists and economists.

### Guided Democracy and the Army

The civilian political elite and the military elite translated the concept of Guided Democracy in very different ways. Although the idea of efficiency, modernity and the use of technical and managerial know-how were voiced by both these elites, the politicians never saw themselves as the primary executor of the technical details. If they did, it was immediately dashed after the failure of the Eight Year Overall National Plan introduced in 1960 and the deep economic malaise from 1962. The military elite, meanwhile, because of their stronger corporate sense and more 'technocratic' education, expanded into civilian jobs without hesitating about the primacy of technical know-how. General Suwanto, Commander of the Seskoad, summed this up succinctly; "*de wereld van amateurisme is al voorbij*."<sup>103</sup>

The army's *crème de la crème* had no qualms about experts and expertise. Unlike the politicians, many military officers were trained in the technical fields and were open to educating themselves further either in the educational facilities in Indonesia or abroad. Aside from doctrinal training, they were also given technical knowledge. When the army expanded into the administration of government entities and companies, opportunities in civilian educational institutions were opened up. Traditionally, military officers were trained in various technical fields like engineering, medicine and administration, yet by the early 1960s, the employment of economists, sociologists, psychologists and other social scientists was being considered as a standard in civilian engagement. This could be seen, for instance, in the use of sociologists and economists by the RPKAD during the West Irian infiltration campaign.<sup>104</sup>

103 Suwanto, *Himpunan Karangan Djenderal Anumerta Suwanto*, (Bandung: Karya Wira Jati, 1967), p. 16.

104 Kenneth Conboy, *Kopassus. Inside Indonesia's Special Forces*, (Jakarta: Equinox, 2003), p. 71.

Conversely, the Staff and Command School were opening the door to the social sciences and various counterinsurgency ideas.<sup>105</sup>

Rudolf Mrazek contends that there was a bifurcation of the Indonesian military elite starting from the late 1950s onwards, but especially pronounced in the 1960s. This bifurcation was the result of the expansion of aid in military training in various US military colleges and the production of a new military doctrine and a new military elite within the striking units that had a more outward, offensive spirit than Nasution's territorial ideas. During the era of Guided Democracy, the years 1962 and 1963 were a watershed of major importance. As we will see, these were equally important years in the relationship between social science experts (at least economists) and the state, starting with the initially promising but later on disappointing *Deklarasi Ekonomi* (Dekon).<sup>106</sup> This period saw hope of greater expert participation in national policy-making and planning, and a more important but less noticeable institutional development. The rise of General Yani to replace General Nasution as Army Chief of Staff was one of the pivotal points in this change. Being a member in one of the army's strike group, Yani had no qualms in publicly opposing military involvement in the state and the economy. Sukarno's policy of Konfrontasi was greeted with delight as it conformed to this group's offensive spirit. In contrast, the conflict with Malaysia was seen to be destabilizing and dangerous to the position of the military's territorial elites.

In chapter I, elite divergence was explained as a generational difference between the old, colonial-educated intellectuals of the 1928 and the newer, American-educated experts of the 1945 generations. If we follow Mrazek's line of reasoning, the elite divergence of the military was one of educational experience, although Mrazek also alludes to a generational difference. 'Until the mid-sixties, the Indonesian Army had been officered by the first generation of officers who had matured during the forties or before, and who were now reaching an age close to retirement. We know for sure that by the mid-sixties there served in the Army a great number of young officers trained either in the United States or elsewhere abroad, as well as several thousands

105 Guy Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1963), p. 28 and 37-41.

106 Bradley Simpson, *Economist with Guns*, p. 92 and Eric J. Chetwynd, "The Indonesian Stabilization Attempt of 1963: A Study in the Economics and Politics in Indonesia." (Masters thesis American University, Washington DC, 1965), p. 38-39.

of new Magelang Military Academy graduates.<sup>107</sup> A professional, expert type within the military establishment had grown to become a formidable force. More importantly, they would in turn come to position themselves at the pinnacle of the Indonesian elite.

### **Territorial Management Doctrine**

The territorial doctrine would become the basis for the civic action programme and other military activities in civilian areas. As we saw above, Nasution rooted the formulation of the doctrine during the Indonesian revolution, especially after the Second Dutch Military Aggression and the TNI's shift toward a guerilla-based armed struggle. In 1958, Nasution appointed Commodore Siswadi and Colonel Soewarto, the PSI-leaning deputy commandant of Seskoad, to head an ad hoc committee for the development of the armed forces. The development programme was later submitted to and accepted by both the Depernas and the MPRS.

The idea of territorial doctrine lay in the concept of total warfare, one that incorporated the entirety of the nation within a defence strategy. This strategy was assumed to be the only means by which Indonesia could effectively defend its national interests in time of war. Because of the weaknesses of the military, the only way in which Indonesia could give any effective form of resistance would be to use a guerilla-based strategy that utilizes the Indonesian society as part of its heavy warfare.<sup>108</sup> The assumption that there would be another catastrophic world war within their life-time was believed possible by many in the military elite. The basis of total warfare lay in the incorporation of society as a mechanism for defence. Thus war was to be waged as an economic, social, political and even cultural offensive, instead of just a plain military offensive. Mao Tse-tung's conception of the army as fish and the people as water meant that it was important for the fish to have the support and control of the people. Kveder's idea of territorial warfare was also heavy on this assumption of mass control.<sup>109</sup>

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107 Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military. 1945-1965*, p. 142.

108 Guy Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, p. 11-17.

109 Guy Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, p. 34-37.

It is not hard to see that total warfare would mean an even greater control of society by the military. As an article in the magazine *Territorial* stated “we (the army) shall manage and we shall control so that they (the people) could be invited, moved and deployed with their positive power in the general goal of state defence, security and development.”<sup>110</sup> This was initially achieved through the expansion of military duties into civilian areas, including the positioning of military men within formerly civilian positions and the formation of new institutions that placed control of the army over wider arrays of administrative and judicial matters, including Nasution’s anti-corruption and civil service controlling body of Paran. On a wider level, as we will see, the usage of Civic Action programmes was used by the military for wider, rural control. This was important for limiting the influence of the Communists in the rural areas. The expansion of military-civilian bodies was also part of the application of this doctrine.

Civic Action was part of a wider army idea of territorial management. As we saw above, the expansion of military men into nationalized business and the application of Civic Action programmes happened before the formal announcement of the doctrine. It did legitimize, however, the position of army officers as managers, of companies, of rural areas, of whole provinces. The army transformed itself into a managerial elite and in the process they comingled with the nascent civilian managers. Because of the expansion of military jobs into the civilian field, organizations like Seskoad followed suit and expanded their education, as the shift toward the Course C-1 had shown. Thus, the impetus was created that linked young army officers and young American-trained experts in social science to meet and share ideas. This idea of a military-cum-civilian managerial elite was an important component of the Guided Democracy state, for it contradicted Sukarno’s objectives. The idea of managerial control runs counter to the Guided Democracy’s focus on societal incorporation within the leadership of the intellectual-politician. Instead, education fostered the creation of a military-civilian expert, a leadership that saw control as more important than incorporation.

The legitimation of military men as managers was created not only through constant meetings with economists and other social science and technical experts in schools like Seskoad, but also in specialized publications.

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110 “Suatu Konsepsi Pembinaan Wilayah Sehubungan dengan Perang Wilayah dalam rangka Pertahanan Nasional” in *Territorial*, year 1, no. 3, January 1962, p. 3.

Magazines like *Manager* and *Fortuna*, both targeting an audience of nascent professional managers, was very accommodating to the voices of military managers. A.H. Nasution and Ibrahim Adjie, for instance, wrote various pieces for these magazines.<sup>111</sup> The magazines themselves discussed civic action and other military managerial programmes without a hint of suspicion. Army-issued magazines like *Karya Wira Djati* and *Territorial* on the other hand allowed space for expert civilian managers to discuss management issues, including military management ones.

Territorial control, like its civilian managerial counterpart, thus required mass control. “We must control mass opinion in our effort to develop our national morals.”<sup>112</sup> Terms like *Psy-war* were bandied about in military articles on Indonesia. The counter-insurgency tactics used methods by which the hostility of the population in enemy territory could be effectively countered or reduced. The military managers needed to implement several basic elements within their territory: the management of the ideology and psychology of the community, the management of the social, economic, political and logistical issues of the community, the management of the human mindset as subject for people’s resistance and the management of the government in times of war or danger, and the implementation of a special rural development programme.<sup>113</sup>

Territorial management was an important subject for army leaders like Nasution, but this conflicted with Sukarno’s effort to use the military for his foreign policy. In this regard, the shift in power from Nasution to Ahmad Yani and the shift of doctrine from Territorial to Tri Ubaya Cakti must be understood. Under attack from Sukarnoists and from the communists, both civilian experts and military managers sold the territorial doctrine as one that could support Guided Democracy’s developmental plans.

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111 For instance, A.H. Nasution, “Kata Sambutan” in *Manager*, year IV, no. 36, April 1963, p. 4-9 and Ibrahim Adjie, “TNI dan Civic Mission” in *Manager*, year IV, no. 36, April 1963, p. 10-15.

112 “Suatu Konsepsi Pembinaan Wilayah Sehubungan dengan Perang Wilayah dalam rangka Pertahanan Nasional” in *Territorial*, year 1, no. 2, January 1962, p. 8, “...kita harus mengendalikan opini masa untuk ditunjukkan kearah pembentukan moril nasional jang tinggi dengan semangat melawan jang berkobar-kobar.”

113 “Suatu Konsepsi Pembinaan Wilayah Sehubungan dengan Perang Wilayah dalam rangka Pertahanan Nasional” in *Territorial*, year 1, no. 2, January 1962, p. 4-27.

## American Influence and its Counter-Balance

The new generation that obtained foreign military education learned both the territorial doctrine and the technical capabilities that would result in a further bifurcation of military elites. Before 1958, some 250 Indonesian officers had been trained in the United States. Another 500 officers were trained between 1958 and 1962. The spike between the years 1962 and 1964 was significant with more than 3000 military officers going to the United States for further training. The total number of officers with American exposure was thus around 4000 persons, a very significant number of elites within the armed force.<sup>114</sup>

The vast majority of Indonesian military officers received their education at Fort Leavenworth, a staff and command school, which focused on developing military ideas and doctrines. Theories about counterinsurgency and the territorial doctrines were discussed and taught. Various social scientists, including those that had advocated the ideology of development had also taught at the school. The curriculum at Fort Leavenworth was replicated by the C-1 Course focus on a broad-based education, with emphasis on intellectual discussion, especially with American-trained social scientists, was, on the whole, similar to the Fort Leavenworth experience. American help occurred in the form of the Civic Action Programme, with its strong focus on territorial control and economic development.

By comparison, the military's strike groups-like the Army General Reserve (Tjadud, later Kostrad), Army Special Command (RPKAD, later Kopassus), the Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob), the Marines (KKO), the Flying Corps and the Special Air Force Group Airborne (Linud)-had a different educational experience in both the United States and East European countries. In the US, they learned technical skills in the latest counter-insurgent methods applied in the concurrent Vietnam War. The Indonesian military elite aimed to make the country's strike units comparable to American ones, borrowing the American pentomic doctrine as a blueprint for Indonesia's own strike force.<sup>115</sup> On the senate committee, it was said that 'experts consider the Indonesian army as one of the most skilful in the world

114 Peter Dale Scott, "Exporting military-economic development", p. 236, Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: part II" in *Indonesia*, no. 13, April, 1972, p. 169.

115 Kostrad by 1965 was headed by then Brigadier-General Soeharto.

at small unit operations in swamps and jungles.<sup>116</sup> American assistance also came in the form of providing Indonesian strike units with some of the latest US military gadgets. This strike force elite grew to differentiate itself from the territorial elite, because it considered them slothful, corrupt, and wealthy because of their civilian assignments. At the same time, the territorial officers were jealous of the para-command units and their better equipment and greater prestige.<sup>117</sup>

It would be too hasty to conclude that the difference between these elites was in any way profound. Differences between the army, navy, air force and police had bigger consequences in the later New Order period. Ernst Utrecht interprets the relationship differently. He divides the elite as “Field Officers” and “Managers” and accordingly, their relationship was one of mutual symbolism instead of the antagonistic competition as implied by Mrazek. The managers provided the para-commanders with money to operate their units and also to indulge in the lifestyle of the elites.<sup>118</sup> The expansion of ‘experts’ developed along two general lines: a pinnacle position of professional scientists whose duty was to design the national policies and plans, and a middle position of managers whose duty was to run the government offices and state-owned factories.

The relationship between the Indonesian army, American-educated intellectuals and American counterparts has been a leitmotif of leftist Cold War literature on the CIA, perhaps most succinctly expressed in David Ransom’s paper which coined the term ‘Berkeley Mafia’, the name given to the economic technocracy that engineered much of New Order economic policies.<sup>119</sup> Such analysis tends to overlook the weaknesses of the pro-American factions, especially American-educated economists and social scientists and, by 1964, the despair of the State Department’s Indonesian planners, as Sukarno lurched toward intensifying the friendship with Maoist China.

One of the most important individuals in this relationship was Guy Pauker. He collaborated in writing a report funded by the Council on Foreign Relations published in 1959 under the authorship of Professor Fifield that saw the Indonesian army as ‘among the most capable leaders of Indonesia,’ whose

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116 Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian military*, p. 83-84.

117 Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military*, p. 46.

118 Ernst Utrecht, “The Indonesian Army as an Instrument of Repression”, p. 61.

119 David Ransom, “The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre”.

rare qualities cannot be overlooked.<sup>120</sup> Pauker had first visited Indonesia in 1954 as researcher within the Ford Foundation-MIT Modern Indonesia project. In 1958, he became RAND consultant paid for by the CIA. In 1959, he took up residence as chairman of Berkeley University's Department for South and Southeast Asian Studies. He entertained good relations not only with Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, but also with Widjojo Nitisastro and Mohammad Sadli in his Berkeley capacity. He also grew close to Nasution and the commander of Seskoad, Colonel Soewarto.<sup>121</sup>

Peter Dale Scott reasons that Pauker was central to the introduction of the military dual function and that he had persuaded Nasution to convince Sukarno to let the army participate in the government and economy. No doubt the ideas of military-development were, in part, inspired by American thinking, yet thoughts about the *Dwi-Fungsi* had been already part of Sukarno's corporatist idea which was espoused much earlier. On 30 August 1956, an ad hoc committee was created, headed by Col. Azis Saleh in order to study the ways in which the TNI could participate in the development of the state, in order to further the workability of the idea of military dual function.<sup>122</sup> In 1958 Nasution set up a Committee on Army Doctrine, headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Suwarto and Colonel Mokoginta, which would result in the formation of the initial army doctrine of Territorial Warfare.<sup>123</sup>

The United States played a keyrole in the rise of Civic Action, especially in its 1960s form. In 1962, Pauker invited Soewarto to the RAND institute in order to inspect the way RAND organized the "academic resources of the country as consultants." At the same time, the Ford Foundation provided a \$2.5 million grant for training courses. David Ransom pointed out that Ford Foundation used their contacts in the FEUI to influence officers within the Seskoad. By 1962, University of Indonesia economists were regularly visiting the Seskoad where they taught the 'economic aspects of defence' and where they would discuss the national situation, sometimes way into the night.<sup>124</sup> According to Pauker, after Suwarto's visit to the RAND institute, he

120 Peter Dale Scott, "Exporting military-economic development", p. 219.

121 Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the overthrow of Sukarno. 1965-1967" in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Summer, 1985), p. 247-248.

122 Duta Masyarakat, 30 August 1956.

123 Ulf Sundhaussen, *Road to Power*, p. 138.

124 David Ransom, "Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia" in Steve Weissman (ed.), *The Trojan Horse. A Radical Look at Foreign Aid*, (Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1975), p. 101-104.

appointed four or five economists as the army's high-level civilian advisers. According to Robert Shaplen; 'The task of Suwanto and his staff... was to convince as many as possible of the Army's 150 general officers and 400 colonels that it was their responsibility to maintain the delicate balance between the representative democratic principle, which makes parties and policemen a 'necessary evil' in any polity, and the corporative principle which gives the Army the means to participate in the government without creating a military dictatorship.'<sup>125</sup>

No doubt the army had close affinity with the United States, but similar to the wider Indonesian elites, there was a degree of suspicion toward it. Nasution was always looking for potentially useful doctrines and curriculums of other nations. Although the Course C-1 used translated Ft. Leavenworth material, translation of Chinese and Yugoslavian material was used around the same time. The territorial doctrine was very much inspired by Mao Tse-tung's interview with Edgar Snow in *Red Star Over China* and the army's experiences in the revolutionary war.<sup>126</sup> According to Suwanto, the article "Territorial War: the new concept of resistance", written by Yugoslavian general Dushan Kveder, was very influential, with an Indonesian translation available at the Seskoad since 1958, while the officers were also required to read Vladimir Dedijer's "Tito speaks" and other translated Yugoslavian texts.<sup>127</sup> It was planned that by 1965, the army would use Indonesian doctrines for 60% of its curriculum and in 1964, it was stipulated that all departments that focused on doctrinal research and development would be assigned an officer graduating from the Soviet Frunze academy as a counter-balance.<sup>128</sup>

### **Military Strike Force and the Shift in Military Doctrine (1962-1965)**

During the Revolutionary War, the TNI had been involved in both guerilla and counterinsurgency tactics. This two-front approach was rare amongst other independent revolutions of the twentieth century. Guerilla warfare, with its unique command and control structure is inherently decentralized,

125 Robert Shaplen, *Time out of hand. Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 146.

126 Guy Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, p. 8-9.

127 Guy Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, p. 34-37.

128 "Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak didirikan hingga sekarang" in *Karya Wira Djati*, p. 52-53.

lessening the control of the centre, while counterinsurgency tends to increase the degree of control of the local military leaders at the expense of both local political leaders and the centre. The tendency on both accounts was to weaken the central command structure of the army and enhance control by regional and local army commanders.<sup>129</sup>

David Kilcullen has argued that the expanding political influence of the TNI during the period of 1945-1965 was the result of a continuous but uneven development and deployment of TNI's insurgency/counterinsurgency measures. '... (W)here COIN and insurgency are conducted at the same time or close to each other, political power will flow from central to regional and from civilian to military leaders.'<sup>130</sup> But the control of local territories had its roots as far back as the Japanese occupation.

Although the strike forces had existed much earlier, the early 1960s was a watershed in the Guided Democracy. The development of a military-wide strike force, the *Tjaduad* (*tjadangan umum AD* or army general reserve) in 1963,<sup>131</sup> which functioned as an umbrella force composed of selected battalions of various strike groups. This was a culmination of the shift in military emphasis from territorial commands to strike groups.

Moekmin Hidajat, writing after the fall of the Guided Democracy said 'without declaring the reasons, the (active and free foreign) policy is silently left behind. It is then replaced with the politics of confrontation and political axes. Not satisfied, they wanted the defence policy to follow suit with the confrontation policy. Without understanding the requirements, they forced a change to the defence policy so that it would be more 'offensive-revolutionary', a term that is often times run more on the fighting spirit (*semangat*) than on facts. These opportunists were everywhere, even within the armed forces. This group is always searching for personal aggrandizement by proclaiming themselves to be the most revolutionary and discrediting the Territorial Doctrine as a worn concept, not revolutionary and that it should be replaced with something new.'<sup>132</sup>

129 David Kilcullen, *The political consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia*, p. 6.

130 David Kilcullen, *The political consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia*, p. 27.

131 This was the embryo for the Kostrad, an important influential para-military unit during the New Order.

132 Hidajat Moekmin, "PKI versus Perang Wilayah. Penilaian Kembali suatu Doktrin" in *Karya Wira Djati*, Vol. 6, no. 21, 196, p. 13. "Tana menjebukan setjara djelas sebab2nja maka politik ini kemudian ditingalkan. Itupun setjara diam2 sadja. Selandjutnja diganti

The period after 1960 also saw developments of a specific military doctrine within the Seskoad that would result in the creation of the *Tri Ubaya Cakti* doctrine expounded in 1965. In April 1963, the Kostrad Seminar on Indonesian foreign policy was held at the Seskoad. This was followed by a seminar on internal and external affairs (1963-1964).<sup>133</sup>

In addition, the failure of the Depernas to create a workable national planning programme and the economic decline from 1962 curiously resulted in the abandonment of the earlier developmental programme. In early 1963, Sukarno seemed highly conciliatory with the United States and supportive of the economic reform programmes that were initiated by Soebandrio working within a professional economic committee with the assistance of World Bank and IMF economists. The implementation of the programme was politically untenable and Sukarno had by then started his foray into the country's next 'international adventure'. Any pretense of concern about the viability of the Indonesian economy was put aside as the Malaysian confrontation got underway in September 1963.

### Strike Force Units

The most important strike force of the army was the RPKAD or the army rapid force, created not by the central army command, but by the Siliwangi Division under Colonel Alex Kawilarang. On 16 April 1952, Kawilarang formally authorized the Kesko (*Kesatuan Komando* or Commando Unit) command. In early January the Kesko unit was transferred by central command to be positioned under the Army Chief of Staff. On 18 March, it was rechristened as KKAD (*Korps Komando Angkatan Darat* or Army Command Corps). On 25 July 1955, the KKAD was upgraded to RPKAD

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dengan Politik Konfrontasi dan Politik Poros. Tidak terbatas hanya sampai sekian mereka menghendaki agar juga Politik Hankam disesuaikan dengan Politik Konfrontasi itu. Tanpa melihat persjaratan yang ada mereka menusahakan afar politik Hankam kita dibuat lebih "offensive-revolutioner, kata2 yang sudah terlalu sering hanya diisi dengan semangat daripada kenyataan. Golongan opportunist dengan "pamrihisme" memang ada dimana2, juga dalam tubuh AD sendiri. Golongan inilah yang selalu berusaha mentjari "grandeur" pribadi dengan menepuk dada bahwa mereka yang paling revolusioner dan mentjap Konsep Perang Wilajah sebagai konsep yang using, yang tidak revolusioner dan harus diganti dengan Doktrin yang sama sekali baru."

133 "Sedjarah Perkembangan Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat" in *Karya Wira Djati*, Vol. 9, no. 31, July 1969, p. 13.

(*Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat* or Army Commando Force Regiments). After the success of ending the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in February 1958, educational aid for the army was offered by both the US and England, in an effort to mend the relationship.<sup>134</sup>

In 1960, a parachute instructor was sent for six months rigger training and Captain Benny Moerdani graduated from a 12-week special warfare officer's course at Fort Bragg. The American model special forces were very different from what had been in existence in Indonesia. They were "self-sustained units that performed unconventional tasks for long periods far behind enemy lines." They were intended to win the hearts and minds of the people and included an interpreter and a medic to help the villagers. The training included four combat engineers to assist in demolition duties, two doctors, two social scientists and an economist. This unit was called the DPC (*Detasemen Pasukan Khusus* or Special Forces Detachment).<sup>135</sup>

The shift in assistance and funds towards the mobile forces represented a shift in the elite division from the territorial forces. Mrazek contends, "thus the development after 1958 and during the early sixties left its deep imprints in the structure and ideology of the Indonesian armed forces. While before 1958 the mobile striking units represented only very small islands in the vast sea of the territorial army, during the early sixties they acquired in many aspects a decisive position in the Indonesian military establishment."<sup>136</sup> An important development that mirrored other areas of the military elite was the use of social scientists as a viable part of military mission. According to Kenneth Conboy, when the DPC's infiltration unit arrived on the West Papuan coast, a sociologist member of the team was expected to make contact, befriend and study the local population and villages.<sup>137</sup>

With the change from the pro-Territorial General Nasution to the pro-Mobile Force General Ahmad Yani as Sukarno's Chief of Staff, the ideological shift toward an offensive military policy became more pronounced. Yani had received military training in Tokyo during the Japanese occupation. He was also among the first Indonesian officers to attend the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1955. Before returning to Indonesia,

134 Kenneth Conboy, *Kopassus. Inside Indonesia's special forces*, (Jakarta: Equinox, 2003), p. 13-27.

135 Kenneth Conboy, *Kopassus. Inside Indonesia's Special Forces*, p. 86-87.

136 Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1965*, p. 45.

137 Kenneth Conboy, *Kopassus. Inside Indonesia's Special Forces*, p. 86-87.

he took a two-month course on special warfare in England.<sup>138</sup> Nasution appointed him as chief of operations and then as deputy of intelligence. Under him, American-trained officers were given the most influential positions within the staff and command. It was, of course an ironic situation, that at the time when Nasution lost his office, the Americans were fully backing his territorial doctrine because they believed that a military focus on population capture was much more in line with the idea of stamping out Communist influence.<sup>139</sup> The aggressive doctrine espoused by the mobile force elite was a cause for concern, since it destabilized the domestic situation, something in which the Communists could find weaknesses to take advantage of.<sup>140</sup>

The rise of Ahmad Yani and his outward, aggressive stance was in line with Sukarno and his increasingly agitated policy toward the Dutch presence in West Papua. With massive Soviet help, the military, especially the navy and air force, was equipped with an impressive hardware, the likes of which were non-existent in any other Southeast Asian country. By 1962, the Soviet Union had provided hundreds of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery pieces and guided missiles, 170 jets and fighter bombers and many ships. Indonesia felt far more prepared to shift toward an offensive strategy against the Dutch, in comparison to the guerrilla warfare that was Indonesia's only default strategy during the Revolutionary War.

### Tri Ubaya Cakti

The declaration of the *Tri Ubaya Cakti* (Three Sacred Pledges) doctrine was made during a military seminar held at the President's request on 2 - 9 April 1965 at the Seskoad in Bandung. A total of 51 higher officer, 89 mid-level officer and 32 civilian and military experts converged to discuss the military doctrine.<sup>141</sup> The seminar was to discuss the three doctrines/issues: the military *karya*, the Indonesian revolutionary war and the development of the potential for the Indonesian revolution. These discussions envisioned a new government programme that would use the military in a creative-destructive

138 Soehardiman, *Kupersembahkan kepada pengadilan sejarah. Otobiografi Soehardiman*, p. 210.

139 Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian military*, p. 54-59 and 75-81.

140 Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian military*, p. 42.

141 Hikajat Moekmin, "PKI versus perang wilajah. Penilaian kembali suatu Doktrin" in *Karya Wira Djati*, Vol. 11, no. .21, 1966, p. 7.

(*penjebolan-penciptaan*) nation-building programme. The military was to harness a total participation by the people within a specifically offensive and defensive programme. Socially, culturally and economically, the entire society was to participate in the protection of the nation-state.

This active call for the state to destroy elements within and outside society was telling for subsequent state-society relations. Sukarno asked: 'What is the goal of our revolution, and what is the work that we want the revolution to accomplish? To destroy. Our revolution is to destroy and to plant. Now, if we think deeply, what is it that we must destroy? What we have to destroy and destroy right now is imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, capitalism, all of which has been written in the preamble to our constitution.'<sup>142</sup> Such theoretical enemies were fleshed out as had been discussed in a previous Seskoad seminar. Discussion on territorial management as early as 1962 pointed out the enemies of the state.<sup>143</sup> Ideologically, these were individualism and liberalism, international communism, religious fanaticism, atheism, isolationism, autarchy and chauvinism. Politically, they were imperialism and colonialism, federalism and separatism, dictators, tribalism and regionalism. Socio-economically, they were capitalism, feudalism, cosmopolitanism, negative foreign culture, reformism, conservatism, cynicism and apathy.<sup>144</sup>

The state, through its military coercion, was to root out the infiltration of foreign ideas in the minds of its populace. In order to achieve this, indoctrination programmes were devised to reach various sections of the people. Thus, the 'educated section' of the population was to be indoctrinated in an objective-business-like (*zakelijk-objektief*) manner through rational persuasions. The general public was to be seduced by material incentives through provisioning primary needs. The orthodox groups were to be given

142 "Apa tudjuan revolusi kita, dan jang kita kerdajakan dengan revolusi kita itu apa? Menggempur. Revolusi kita itu mendjebol kataku, dan menanam. Nah, kalo kita fikir benar2, revolusi adalah mendjebol; apa jang harus kita djebol, dan apa jang sedang kita djebol. Jang harus kita djebol dan jang sekarang kita djebol jaitu imperialisme dan kolonialisme, neokolonialisme dan kapitalisme, sebagaimana jang tertulis dalam kalimat jang pertama daripada preambul." In *Doktrin Perdjjuangan TNI "Tri Ubaya Cakti"*. Buku Induk, (LP IKIP, Malang, 1965), p. 20.

143 Whose focus was to discuss and create regional operational, logistical and management patterns, but which eventually discussed a much wider and intrusive population control at the individual level. The rise of the New Order Man must be attributed to the ideas discussed within these seminars.

144 "Seminar Seskoad Kedua, 3-8 Januari 1962" in *Karja Wira Djati*, Vol. 2, No. 8, 1962, p. 70-71.

informative seminars that would broaden their horizons and the separatists would be corrected through political incentives. The major enemies of the state was thus defined as its own population: the educated person and his 'liberal and capitalist' tendency, the general public and its 'communistic ideas', the orthodox group and its Islamic fanaticism and the separatists and their wayward ideas of nationhood.<sup>145</sup> This total doctrine formulated during the early Guided Democracy focused much of the energy on internal possibilities. It saw the possibility of only one type of individual: the nationalist, whose definition seems to be much more related to what it was *not* rather than what it was.

Many of the ideas espoused in the doctrine were developed in the annual seminars held by the Seskoad. The idea of Total People's Defence<sup>146</sup> had been discussed in earlier seminars at the Seskoad and this envisioned a three-pronged approach toward defence: a conventional force consisting of the military, a non-conventional force consisting of a Civil Defence (*Pertahanan Sipil* or *Hansip*), and a People's Resistance Force (*Perlawanan Rakjat*). The Civil Defence would be organizationally under the head of the state to ensure unity of command.<sup>147</sup> The roots of this strategy were derived from the total warfare doctrine that the Japanese had introduced to Indonesian youth by the formation of military units (*daidans*) through community organizations (*tonarigumi*).<sup>148</sup>

Yet, the *Revolusi* component of the doctrine represented a change from earlier ideas. It was a change from internal to external enemies. This shift was possible on condition that Sukarno's control of the army was total and this was only possible after Nasution had been neutralized and Ahmad Yani put in his place. Sukarno's speech during the seminar provided a glimpse into the difference. Sukarno said "... during our time, our Revolution was side-tracked. Our army also followed with a side-tracked defence policy. It side-tracked from the revolution. Our defence policy was force-fed by the Neo-colonialist powers. Several of our officers who have obtained foreign education... were taught on defence strategies, large and small tactics all of which aimed to convince us that 'the possible enemy will come from the

145 "Seminar Seskoad Kedua, 3-8 Januari 1962" in *Karja Wira Djati*, Vol. 2, No. 8, 1962, p. 70-71.

146 *Pertahanan Rakjat Semesta*

147 "Pertahanan Rakjat" in *Karja Wira Djati*, Year III, Vol. 1, July 1963.

148 *20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka*, (Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia: Jakarta,), p. 22.

North.' We have been 'forced fed' those words. Thus, it was taught to us that if we want to defend the country, we have to face the north, not the south, west or east."<sup>149</sup> The North here was, of course, communist Russia or China. But Sukarno insisted that the enemy was the West, the Neo-colonialist powers headed by the United States of America.

This 'Rediscovery of the Revolution' was a realignment of Indonesian international interests, with Indonesia's confirmation of its position within the non-aligned Third Power Bloc, the Newly Emerging Forces. The military played an important part. Sukarno continued: 'So the military, that word is closely inherent, very much inherent with the idea of the enemy. What is the purpose of war? It isn't purely for self-defence. The purpose of war is to destroy the enemy; no one conducts war without having this purpose to destroy, to defeat the enemy.'<sup>150</sup> The doctrine was in line with Sukarno's increasingly erratic view of the world (the Nefo and Oldefo classification) and Indonesia as a beacon of revolution.

This doctrine was significantly revamped after the fall of Sukarno in 1965. In the Second Army Seminar held on 25 - 31 August 1966, the belligerent tone had disappeared. Instead of a revolutionary army, the army was depicted as a modern one; an organization with expert men and their expertise. Thus, the values of military leadership were still extolled, with its leadership ideals based on almost feudal characteristics side-by-side with modern managerial

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149 "Pada waktu kita, revolusi kita menjeleweng, Angkatan Bersendjata kitapun ikut2 didalam ia punja defence policy menjeleweng, njeleweng daripada revolusi itu. Defence policynja pada waktu itu, kita "ditjekokkin", djustru oleh fihak Nekolim. Beberapa hal jang salah misalnja saja kenal beberapa Opsir, Perwira, dapat didikan dari Luar Negeri, eh, Parman djuga manggut2, didikan dari luar negeri, disitu diadjarkan, hal2 jang mengenai defence strategy, taktik besar, taktik ketjil, pada dasarnja jalah, diadjarkan kepada kita itu "the possible enemy will come from the North". Kita 'ditjekokkin' begitu "the possible enemy will come from the North. Malahan segala susunan defence policy itu didasarkan atas itu. "The enemy is the North, the possible attack of the enemy will come from the North". Djadi, diadjarkan kepada kita, kalau kau mau defence, menghadaplah keutara, djangan ngadap kidul, ngadap ngulon, ngadap ngetan, menghadaplah keutara." In *Doktrin Perdjjuangan TNI "Tri Ubaya Cakti"*. *Buku Induk*, (Malang: LP IKIP, 1965), p. 21.

150 "Djadi Angkatan Bersendjata, perkataan itu adalah closely inhaerent, inhaerent serapat2nja dengan musuh. Malahan "doel" dari perang jaitu apa? Bukan sadja mempertahankan diri sendiri. "Doel" daripada perangnja itu, mengalahkan musuh; tidak ada orang mengadakan perang, kalau tidak dengan maksud untuk menghantjurkan, mengalahkan musuh." In *Doktrin Perdjjuangan TNI "Tri Ubaya Cakti"*. *Buku Induk*, p. 20.

leadership ideals.<sup>151</sup> Most important was how un-revolutionary the character of the new regime was. ‘The New Order wants a more realistic and pragmatic order, although it does not leave behind the idealism of struggle.’<sup>152</sup>

## Mass Control and Job Expansion

The discussion of the definition of state-enemy in the Seskoad above has already identified the elements that the military wished to control: communists, separatists, federalists, atheists, religious extremists, imperialists, isolationists, liberals and even cynics. What this meant was that the enemy existed both outside and within the Indonesian society itself. In accordance with the rule book of the Cold War, the government was fighting against ideas and ideologies as well as armed militias and other radicals. The fight was to have a variety of psychological, ideological and military dimensions. There were two major approaches that the military took in regard to State enemies. The first one was deployment of conventional strike forces against separatists, imperialists and, later on, communists and leftists through the use of military violence. The second was the so-called Military *Karya* programme.

Nasution initially introduced the *Karya* programme in order to allow the military access to positions and influence in the various sectors of civilian life that had been off limits before the programme’s formal inauguration at the end of the 1950s. Another significant reason behind the programme was mass population control, especially against communist influence in the rural areas. The PKI, with good reasons, wanted the army to abandon the territorial doctrine, which the *karya* programme was partially based upon. Communist support for the *Tri Ubaya Cakti* doctrine and its legitimating of foreign adventures provided relief to the harassment that was inflicted by the army during the late Guided Democratic period.<sup>153</sup> *Karya* were functional

151 Thus, the *panutan* characters discussed earlier and within the Javanese proverbs: Ing Ngarsa Sung Tuladha, Hing Madya Mangun Karsa and Tut Wuri Handayani, extolling the virtues of leadership within the common people, but also more modern ideals of efficiency, transparency, humbleness and planning capabilities. See *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD. “Tri Ubaya Cakti”*. *Buku Induk*, p. 38.

152 “Orde Baru menginginisuat tatan-fikir jang lebih realistik dan pragmatis, walaupun tidak meninggalkan idealisme perjuangan.” *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD. “Tri Ubaya Cakti”*. *Buku Induk* (Jakarta: Skodik Wala dan Pawamil ABRI, 1968), p. 9.

153 Aidit in his many speeches to military personnel in the various officer schools repeatedly stressed the need to abandon the territorial doctrine. Hidajat Moekmin, “PKI versus

groups based on a professional definition of community participation in the nation. They included, among others, farmers, intellectuals, artists, journalists and so forth. These groups were to have representational seats in important Guided Democracy bodies such as Parliament, Depernas, the National Council, etc.

By the early 1960s, several ideologies had been effectively banned in national politics. Liberalism, with its perceived supporters epitomized by the PSI, was banned. Nasution had by the late 1950s begun in earnest to control civil society through the formation of various BKS.<sup>154</sup> The BKS mirrored party-based *onderbouw* organizations, the largest of which were usually communist organizations. The move to integrate civil society organization was first begun with the veterans through the formation of the LVRI<sup>155</sup>, as a new veteran's organization that would replace all other veteran organizations, some of the largest of which were the Perbepsi associated with the PKI and the Bekas Pedjuang Islam Bersendjata associated with Masjumi. The extensive opposition to this military move made them change tactics with the BKS.

The first BKS was the BKSPM,<sup>156</sup> an organization that employed *preman* youths with a thuggish reputation. As Loren Ryter has shown, the BKSPM was the nucleus for the later powerful Pemuda Pancasila group of the New Order and played an important part in the early years of the regime, including during the 1965-66 Communist massacres.<sup>157</sup> Relations between BKSPM and the military were similar to the relation between *pamongpradja* and the *jago* elements of the colonial period.<sup>158</sup>

Job expansion for army personnel occurred at a variety of levels. At the highest levels were those military officers who were asked to sit in Parliament or to head various ministries, departments, provinces and other high-level administrative posts. For instance, the expansion of the military territorial

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PerangWilajah. Penilaiankembalisuatudoktrin" in *Karya Wira Djati*, Vol. 6, no. 21, 1966, p. 18-23.

154 *Badan Kerdjasama Militer* or Military Cooperation Bodies

155 *Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia* or Veteran's Legion of the Republic of Indonesia

156 *Badan Kerdjasama Pemuda Militer* or the Cooperation Body between Youth and Military

157 Loren Ryter, *Youth, Gangs and the State in Indonesia*, p. 36 and 82. Many of those in the gangs of the New Order were sons of bureaucrats and army officers, indicating the tight connections that the elites had to various sectors of Indonesian society.

158 Yong Mun Cheong, "The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-1959" in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 7, Issue 1, March, 1976, p. 92-101.

district<sup>159</sup> during Guided Democracy was significant: from 7 to 16 districts.<sup>160</sup> The root of this job expansion was the willingness of the army under Nasution in 1958 to avert a military dictatorship and in turn implement a Middle Way. This concept as planned between Sukarno, the cabinet, and the Armed Forces leaders would give wide opportunities to military officers on an individual basis but as exponents of the military, “to participate in non-military fields and in determining national policies of the highest levels including such fields as state finance, economy, and so on.”<sup>161</sup>

The take-over of formerly Dutch-owned businesses resulted in a sudden expansion of managerial posts for which Indonesia had a hard time to find replacement. Nationalization was only achieved after Parliament passed a law authorizing a change of legal ownership of the Dutch companies.<sup>162</sup> By June 1960, 489 Dutch-owned companies had been nationalized. The majority of them were in manufacturing and mining (161 companies), estate agriculture (216 companies) and trading (40 companies). They ranged from relatively small bakeries to large multinationals such as the Big Five.<sup>163</sup> In 1960, there were still around 100 Dutch-owned companies, which had not yet been nationalized.<sup>164</sup>

The famous Parliamentary Decree no. II/MPRS/1960 is an important document for it legalized army participation and proposed a fundamentally different economic framework for the country. On A/III/402/5, it stated that ‘the Indonesian Armed Forces and the State Police shall participate in the process of production without diminishing their main respective tasks.’ On A/III/69/415, it stated that ‘the role and activities of the Armed Forces in the field of production brings them closer to the People more intensively in the process of State Development especially in matters of industrialization and the carrying out of land reform.’<sup>165</sup>

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159 *Komando District Militer* or Kodam

160 Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, p. 125.

161 Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, p. 126.

162 Thomas Lindblad, *Bridges to new business. The economic decolonization of Indonesia*, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), p. 194-203

163 Borsumij, Jacobson van den Berg, Internatio, Lindeteves and Geo Wehry.

164 *Kumpulan ketentuan-ketentuan dan pengumuman-pengumuman BANAS*, (Jakarta: Badan Nasionalisasi, 1961), p. 348.

165 Peraturan Pemerintah no.16 tentang permintaan dan pelaksanaan bantuan militer.

According to Panglaykim, there were at least six informal groups that made up Indonesia's state company managerial class. 'i. Lower managers who became middle managers and were recruited from the personnel of the ex-Dutch firms – this group has a lot of practical experience; ii. Employees who were given special on-the-job training by the ex-Dutch firms in the framework of their Indonesianization; iii. Officers of the army and other military forces who were also given managerial position; iv. Political appointees recruited from private companies and the civil service; v. Managers recruited from people who had business themselves before coming into the state trading corporations, and civil servants who were already at the stage of retirement; vi. Young men who had just been awarded a university degree and who joined the state trading companies.'<sup>166</sup> Many of the military men had some measure of education. The army officer corps represented an especially highly educated elite group, 71% with higher education, with some attending management courses in the United States.<sup>167</sup>

Military expansion was also obviously occurring within the civilian administration. As part of the *karya* group, the military were reserved 35 seats as military deputies in Parliament. In practically all newly created institutions of the Guided Democracy, the military were to play a role and get prominent seats. Military members were appointed as governors and other executive civil service positions. In fact, there were more military members in important civil government posts during the last years of the Guided Democracy than in the early years of the New Order.<sup>168</sup>

The territorial affairs department of the general staff had been developing the regional authority of the military since proclamation of martial law in 1957 in a structure commonly known as the *Tjatur Tunggal*.<sup>169</sup> At the first regional (provincial) level, in martial law the role of the army was supreme within a governmental structure that incorporated other civilian authorities. *Tjatur Tunggal* structured regional government in a hierarchy placing the

166 Panglaykim, *State Trading Corporations in Indonesia. First Year's Performance, 1961*, (Jakarta: Jajasan Badan Penerbit FEUI, 1965), p. 7-8.

167 O.G. Roeder, *Who's who in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1980), p. 460

168 In September 1962, officers of the karya operation attended the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard University, among others. *Laporan tahunan 1963 Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, Direktorat Keamanan Dalam Negeri, Territorial dan Perlawanan Rakjat*, (Jakarta : Direktorat Keamanan Dalam Negeri, Territorial dan Perlawanan Rakjat, 1964), p. 11-12.

169 Translated as Four in One from Javanese, providing a picture for the structure of regional governments.

territorial military commander in charge of a committee that had as members the civil governor, the chief of police and the district attorney. If martial law were lifted, the civilian governor would replace him as chairman of the committee. When martial law was finally lifted in 1963, the military regional structure of *Tjatur Tunggal* remained effectively in place

The expansion of the army in the administrative and economic life of the nation resulted in deep centrifugal forces for the military. Obtaining managerial and administrative posts, these untrained army men were sometimes outwitted and used by more clever elements within the company, government or society. Cases where military administrators or managers were solely blamed for a fiasco or corruption began to mount. The territorial commanders of the army also had very different opinion in comparison to those of the mobile forces commanders about Sukarno's belligerent foreign policy. This was most succinctly demonstrated in the less than enthusiastic attitude shown by Nasution and many others in the unpublicized opposition they had mounted to both the West Irian campaign and Malaysian Confrontation.

Seskoed further developed the territorial doctrine under the order of General Nasution. In 1958, Colonel Soewarto, Assistant Commander of the Seskoed was ordered to conduct a series of meetings to discuss the meaning of the territorial doctrine. This was a precursor to the formation of the Civic Action programme, but an equally important component of the doctrine was the extension of army-based civilian groups that acted to counterweight society-based organization of political parties, in particular that of the Communists. *Onderbouw* organizations are extensions of political parties and have been a feature of Indonesian political life since the revolutionary war and perhaps even during the colonial period. The Pamongpradja used proxy groups during the pre-colonial and colonial period in order to extend the power of a particular elite group for things outside the state's legal boundaries.<sup>170</sup>

Prior to Sukarno's visit to Washington in April 1961, General Edward Lansdale proposed a Civic Action Programme for Indonesia by involving the Indonesian army in rural reconstruction and development projects.<sup>171</sup> According to Bunnell, the Chief of Staff approached US officers in Jakarta in

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170 Sutherland, *The making of a bureaucratic elite*, p. 26.

171 Brad Simpson, *Economists with guns*, p. 48.

July 1962 for American assistance in Civic Action programmes as one of the TNI's post-West Irian military strategies.<sup>172</sup> In 1963, the Americans started implementing the Civic Action programme as part of the US assistance programme, along with five other Asia-Pacific countries.

President Kennedy offered the MAP agreement during President Sukarno's visit to Washington in 1961. In the spring of 1962, Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor visited Indonesia and concluded a Civic Action agreement at the Indonesian Army headquarters. Near the end of the year, an Inter-Agency Civic Action Advisory Team arrived in Indonesia and established the office of Special Assistant for Civic Action at the US embassy in Jakarta. Colonel George Benson, former military attaché to Indonesia and close friend to many top Indonesian military elite became its first Special Assistant.<sup>173</sup> By early 1963, American bulldozers, road scrapers and power hammers were arriving in Indonesia. Fifty US officers from Fort Belvoir civic training action centre, Virginia, were expected to train Indonesian army engineers on the use of the machinery. A group of Indonesian officers was also sent to army engineering training centres at Fort Belvoir and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. General Ahmad Yani officially opened the civic action course in late 1963. Civic action centres were being opened up throughout the archipelago for the purpose of training those in the 'development' brigade. The programme was conceived as counterinsurgency training and the plan was to equip 35-40 infantry battalions and 13 engineering battalions.<sup>174</sup>

Whether the roots of the Civic Action lay in the United States or was an indigenous development of Indonesia is difficult to determine. Looking at the roots of Nasution's guerrilla doctrine, public goods provision was already considered an important component of guerrilla warfare during the revolutionary period. Under the commander of the Siliwangi Division's General Kosasih and then continued by General Ibrahim Adjie,<sup>175</sup> the Bhakti Operation was launched specifically to implement the Civic Action

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172 Frederick Bunnell, *The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963*, (PhD Dissertation Cornell University, Ithaca, 1969), p. 147 and Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military*, p. 78.

173 Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military*, p. 77 and Brian Evans III, "The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army, 1954-1964" in *Indonesia*, Vol. 47, April 1989, p. 25-48.

174 Frederick Bunnell, *The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963*, p. 148.

175 A. H. Nasution, *Memenuhi panggilan tugas. Jilid 5: Kenangan masa Orde Lama*, p. 182.

programme within former DI areas in West Java. By 1962, the Civic Mission was absorbing 40% of the army's manpower in rural development projects.

The expansion of Civic Action and the implementation of the military's *Karya* role, meant an expansion of military education in sectors previously limited to civilians.<sup>176</sup> Some, like the formation of these Civic Action training centres above, were created specifically for military training in civilian fields. They focussed specifically on the development of the military's engineering capabilities in building roads and other infrastructural projects similar to the American Military Engineering Corps. Special managerial courses for military students were held at various universities, including Administration Science at the Faculty of Social and Political Science Padjadjaran University in Bandung. Padjadjaran social scientists regularly lectured at the Seskoad and army officers took BA courses there. Ahmad Yani said 'we know for certain that the development of our country should be in the hands of the experts and those responsible. That would require technical education in all fields. Administrative science involving managerial know-how is one of the most important sciences, because administrative capabilities determine the smoothness of our efforts and increase efficiency.'<sup>177</sup>

Even when US aid to Indonesia was significantly reduced in 1964 and was said to be stopped in 1965, the amount of money going into the MAP was actually increasing. Between 1962 and 1965, \$39.5 million of US aid was given to the MAP in comparison to the \$ 28.3 million of US aid that been disbursed between 1949 and 1961. In fact, military aid for the Civic Action programme was increased in 1965, when many thought that

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176 For instance, the production of rice, in which the military increasingly played a part in the People's Welfare Operation Command (KOGM-Komando Operasi Gerakan Makmur) created in 1959. The effort to achieve sustainability in rice production was thus created within military style organization or commandos, in which the military played an important part together with the agricultural ministry and the Depernas. The production of rice would be coordinated with the Food Source Board (Dewan Bahan Makanan) and the various Tjatur Tunggal at the Provincial level thus securing a truly state-controlled food production institution. The military is an essential component in this command structure.

177 Ahmad Yani, *TNI Membina Revolusi*, p. 112. Yani in a speech entitled "Beladjar dengan tekun dan penuh kesadaran" at the Social and Political Faculty, Padjadjaran University. "Kita mengetahui dengan pasti bahwa pembangunan Negara kita ini hendaknjalah berada didalam tangan para ahli dan jang bertanggung-djawab. Untuk itu diperlukan pendidikan kedjuruan dalam segala bidang. Kedjuruan administrasi jang meliputi managerial Know how adalah salah satu kedjuruan jang sangat penting, karena keberhasilan administrasi akan membantu melantjarkan setiap usaha kita dan meninggikan efficientie."

the United States had stopped all aid. As early as May 1965, US military suppliers were negotiating equipment sales to Indonesia. In July 1965, Rockwell-Standard delivered 200 light aircraft for the army as part of the Civic Mission programme.<sup>178</sup>

Suwarto in an article co-written with UI economist Kartomo Wirosuhardjo laid bare the importance of territorial development and the Civic Action programme. The rationale for Civic Action from a military standpoint was obviously security, yet the goal of the programme was in line with the Constitution: the creation of a peaceful, wealthy and just society. In order to reach that goal, the military would have to do its part in directing social change. Thus, Civic Action implied bringing about modernization by channeling villagers toward other modes of social, political and cultural being. 'By introducing the spirit of *gotongroyong*, which is one of the principles of Indonesian socialism, Civic Action would have already helped in moving Indonesian socialism forward.'<sup>179</sup>

This was the result of the changing attitude the army has toward security. According to Soewarto 'in the Cold War there is no difference between peace and war,'<sup>180</sup> implying the necessity of building a doctrine that functions both during wartime and peacetime. Like the BKS organizations, the purpose of Civic Action was in line with population control. In accordance to the Seskoad's classification of potential enemies of the state, the uneducated and simple peasants were potentially attracted to Communist ideas. The army's anti-Communist campaign was through material incentives; i.e. through a military sponsored economic development. Suwarto and Kartomo imagined a rural-based army by building military barracks throughout the rural heartlands.

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178 Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno", p. 239-264.

179 Suwarto and Kartomo Wirosuhardjo, "Bantuan Angkatan Perang dalam pembangunan suatu persiapan Pembinaan Wilayah" in Suwarto, *Himpunan Karangan Letnan Djenderal Anumerta*, (Jakarta: Karya Wira Jati, 1967), p. 57. "Jang terpenting ialah adanya kesadaran bahwa perbaikan desa mungkin ditjapai dan telah ditjapai dengan gotong royong. Dengan kembalinja semangat gotong rojong jang merupakan salah satu sendi dari Sosialisme Indonesia, civic action ikut membantu langsung pelaksanaan Sosialisme Indonesia."

180 Suwarto, "Tjeramah tentang perang wilayah" in Suwarto, *Himpunan Karangan Letnan Djenderal Anumerta*, (Jakarta: Karya Wira Jati, 1967), p. 25. The full sentence was: "Djadi oleh karena dalam *cold war* ini pada hakekatnja tidak ada perbedaan antara perang dan damai dikatakan bahwa *war is never our goal*."

For the army, the introduction of army personnel to manual work would provide them with capabilities that would help them in transitioning toward a future civilian life. Soewarto in an article in *Karya Wira Djati* commented that army personnel must learn to become community leaders; they must act in a kind way that would not alienate the villagers. It thus asked the individual soldier to develop his social skills.<sup>181</sup>

It was hoped that developing the rural areas would lessen the perceived jealousy of villagers towards the cities. The idea of a military with pretensions to pushing forth modernization and social change was very much related to the threat of Communism. In fact, the main security threat seen by the army was in the form of rural poverty. Development was an essential component for the protection of the national and urban elite from the threat of a Communist insurrection. Kartomo's idea, which has been elaborated above, of a military-expert-businessman tripartite ruling class is a continuation of this idea. Thus, mass control was not merely being conceived through the lens of a projection of violent power, but also as a projection of modernity.<sup>182</sup> The employment of sociologists and economists within the para-commando and the rationale behind the Civic Action programme were part of the same counter insurgency idea. It was an effort to turn soldiers into social engineers.<sup>183</sup>

## Conclusion

Expansion of military importance within the state can be gauged by the amount of money the government reserved for it. In 1950, the Indonesian military obtained one-third of the total government budget, a small amount in comparison to the two-thirds meted out by countries like India, the Philippines and Thailand at the time.<sup>184</sup> By the time the West Irian campaign was under way, 75% of the budget had gone to the military.<sup>185</sup> Added to the

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181 Suwarto, "Civic Action" in *Karya Wira Djati*, No. 8, Vol. 2, 1962.

182 Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution*, p. 123-124.

183 Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976*, (Washington: Center of Military History, 2006), p. 225 and Suwarto and Kartomo, "Bantuan Angkatan Perang dalam pembangunan suatu persiapan Pembinaan Wilayah" in Suwarto, *Himpunan karangan Letnan Djenderal Anumerta Suwarto* (Bandung: Karya Wira Jati, 1967), p. 56-57.

184 Abdul Haris Nasution, *Tjatanan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Pembimbing, 1955) p. 337.

185 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Harris Nasution*, p. 160

large Soviet aid in military hardware, there was every reason for the military to support Sukarno's foreign adventures.

The relationship between social scientists, military officers and managers became stronger as the Guided Democracy proceeded. Military officers routinely undertook economic research, such as visiting Eastern European countries in order to find a better economic platform for the Guided Economy, and many like Nasution and Adjie published articles in professional managerial magazines during the period. It is also no coincidence that officers with managerial careers were those that supported the territorial doctrine. The territorial doctrine legitimated their participation in the management of Indonesian public office and its economy. As a result, both civilian experts and territorial officers had the same affinity being both managers. It was in this position that they both maintained a strong connection and, perhaps, even a feeling of *esprit de corps*.

Soehardiman credited Suharto's success "especially to his capable managerial skills."<sup>186</sup> It tells a lot about his position as a military manager, but it also opens up the view of many from within the New Order: its success was the result of the application of the managerial ideology that had become available and was taught to many military officers during the period. The increasing relationship between the military with both social science and social scientist strengthened the view that this was not merely a momentary strategic decision but a basic strategy of the New Order state and the modernist view it has of itself; its rational and scientific foundation, its managerial capabilities. The *Tri Ubaya Cakti* doctrine was created to replace the territorial doctrine and support Sukarno's offensive approach toward national defence. Although the doctrine was significantly reformulated in 1966, eliminating much of Sukarno's adventurist spirit, including the Nefo-Oldefo analysis of geopolitics, the permanent revolutionary stance and the project of creating Indonesia as a lighthouse of the world and so forth was gone.

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186 Soehardiman, *Kupersembangkan kepada Pengadilan Sejarah. Otobiografi Soehardiman*, p. 223.

