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Author: Fakih, Farabi
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CHAPTER I

The Indonesian Elite and its Authority

In 1966, during the notorious trial of Sukarno’s last appointed Bank of Indonesia governor, the Acehnese Jusuf Muda Dalam, the mass media and the Suharto regime depicted the crimes of the governor mostly involving corruption and collusion as some of the most heinous in the history of the nation.¹ The harsh language indicated that Muda Dalam was being used as a symbol to criticize Sukarno.² Muda Dalam had authority but they claimed lacked legitimacy. This was not a unique event in the history of the country as recently as 2012 the deputy governor of Bank Indonesia, was jailed after

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¹ Proses Jusuf Muda Dalam ex. Ment. Urusan Bank sentral “Kabinet 100 Menteri”: Gema dari ruang peradilan subversi di Djakarta, (Jakarta: Pembimbing Massa, 1967). There was also explicit personal slander with the publication of a book detailing Muda Dalam’s sexual scandals. Considering the widespread knowledge of Sukarno’s licentious affairs, the attack seemed to be aimed at Sukarno himself, who had transferred some of his authority to Muda Dalam, albeit indirectly. The tradition of sacrificing or attacking peons as a symbolic attack on the authority of the provider of that authority has a long tradition in Indonesian politics. Much of Indonesian political conduct has to be understood within an analysis of the authority and its transference to ‘non-legitimate’ figures.

² The Mahmilub trials were indeed used by the army to discredit Sukarno during the tumultuous year of 1965-1966 when the struggle for power intensified as Sukarno used his fame and authority to try to stem the tide eating away his power base and those of his ally the Communist Party, and the cabinet. Jusuf Muda Dalam, along with Air Vice Marshall Omar Dhani and Foreign Minister Subandrio were sentenced to death by the military tribunal. Their sentences were commuted to life imprisonment later on.
beigne accused of bribing lawmakers. These events highlight the large number of former governors, ministers and deputy governors who have gone to jail for corruption in the Post-Suharto era.

Throughout the 1950s, efforts by both the government and military to root out corruption put behind bars some of Indonesia's most prominent financial and economic policy makers. In a large sweep of corruption suspects, carried out by the military in 1957, many prominent policy makers including Bank Indonesia's first governor, Jusuf Wibisono, and economists such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Ong Eng Die and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo were implicated. Throughout the nation's history, the position of policy makers has been precarious. Only during the New Order did the offices of those in charge of determining Indonesia's policy direction become relatively safe from the scrutiny of civil society.

The facts above present a clue for unraveling the machinations of Indonesian society and its relationship with the state. The relationship between the Indonesian state and society is fluid and interactive, and continually challenges the notion of the state as a bounded entity. Discussion on the criminality of the state and the role of the strongman (jago) and gangsters (preman) as client or extension of the state showed an inherent flaw in abstracting the state as a specific set of bounded institutions with specific authorities. In fact, the state extended beyond its legal boundary.

Yet, both the colonial and New Order regimes prided themselves on their effort to create a strong state, by going for modernity and development. Both regimes maintained a façade of respectability through the application of modern methods of engineering and management. The colonial bureaucracy

3 *Tempo*, 27 September 2012.
4 Includes former Bank head Syahril Sabirin (*Tempo*, 11 June 2009) and Burhanuddin Abdullah (*Kompas*, 29 October 2008) and deputy governors like Aulia Pohan (*Antara*, 17 June 2009), among others.
5 *Keng Po*, 28 March 1957.
was proud of its achievements in Western *techniek* (engineering) and its administrative capabilities. The *raison d’être* of the Dutch colonial project, at least by some colonial supporters, lay exactly in bridging the dichotomy between a modern, official, technically advanced Dutch bureaucracy and the traditional, feudal and technically deficient Indonesian bureaucracy. The Indonesian needed the colonial imposition in order to become modern.

This dichotomy of the official, legal, professional and modern against those on the other side, was the leitmotif of twentieth century Indonesia. The *Pangreh Praja*, the indigenous bureaucracy, originating from Java but assigned to positions throughout the archipelago, arose from a pre-colonial bureaucracy whose claim to authority was based on military power. Their accession to being part of the state was based on their prior demonstration of real military power. Robert Cribb has shown that this notion of violence as conferring legitimate authority was what caused many of Jakarta’s underworld to fight in the revolution, signaling the continued presence of these ideas in post-colonial Indonesia. Yet, the failure of the bandits to gain recognition of their authority from the state, and the willingness of the Republic to stamp them out pointed to the way in which alternative, international protocols of authority existed alongside.

How to prop up bureaucratic authority in a society not under colonial suppression was the big question of the 1950s. Clifford Geertz’s anthropological analysis of the fictional town of Modjokuto in the early 1950s divided Javanese society into two major social groups or *alirans*.

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7 For instance, De Kat Angelino, *Staatkundig Beleid en Bestuurszorg in Nederlandsch Indie. Eerste Gedeelte*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1929), who argued for the melding between the technical west and the spiritual east as the basis for the state.


11 In actuality, the town of Pare.

12 According to Geertz: “The institutional agency of this new mode of integration was the *aliran* system. Aliran… has been extended in Republican Indonesia to signify what in English we call a social movement, an ideologically defined political faction animated by rather far-reaching moral ambitions. In particular, an aliran consists of a political party
It was a religious and ideologically based model of the workings of society, consisting of Javanist and Islamist groups. The Javanist elite, the priyayi-, constituted the social group of the pangregh praja. The priyayi formed the Javanese bureaucracy and their claim to rule was based on traditional notions of authority and the support of the Dutch colonial state. The Islamists were those whose view of society was determined by Islam, not by traditional Javanese notions. Within Islamist ideology, the priyayi’s cultural legitimacy of authority fell apart. The elite of the Islamists had their roots in commerce. On a non-elite level, the Javanists were represented by the abangan, ordinary Javanese who were Muslim in name but were loyal followers of the Javanese religion. The expansion of the devout santri Islamists was the engine that allowed for the creation of the Javanist aliran, which welded together the priyayi bureaucrats and a wider social group that provided these elite with legitimacy and societal power. The Islamist santri and their elite, with no access toward the state bureaucracy, penetrated the state apparatus through other institutions: the political parties and the parliament.

The Indonesian bureaucracy was tied together based on a shared feeling of being overwhelmed by the Islamist, yet the roots of its authority, tradition and the support of the colonial state were, by the 1950s, deteriorating or downright non-existent. The shrill anti-feudal exclamations of the nationalists attacked the core of priyayi privileges while other alirans, especially the Communists and leftists, vied for the support of the abangan. The priyayis were thus under attack from both the Islamists and the Communists. The miracle, perhaps, was how they managed to survive relatively well as a group in the 1950s and 1960s. In an analysis of the country’s elite in the early New Order period, Donald Emmerson has shown that the fundamental classification of the Indonesian elite remained the same until the early 1970s, with abangan in control of the bureaucracy and santri in control of the parliament, and an equal control of the military by both alirans.


14 The military elite, though, was by the early 1960s overwhelmingly Javanese (60-80% of the officers). Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 37. These changed by
As a social group, the *priyayi* were institutionally assisted to overcome the difficulties in transitioning to a modern Indonesian state. Their strength lay in two things. First, they monopolized the local administration. Nationalists, most of them hailed from a *priyayi* background, did not inherit or develop a counter bureaucracy to the official bureaucracy of the colonial state. Suggestions to destroy the *priyayi* bureaucracy during the early independence year of 1945 came to naught, as most state leaders, including Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta and Sjahrir, understood they had to depend on the Pangreh Pradja/Pamong Praja.  

Second, their access to state power allowed them access to education. Their near-monopoly on advanced education meant that they could conveniently adjust themselves to the needs of the modern state, and even more importantly, that they could in turn obtain the power to determine the idea of state-society relations through a new authority that they garnered through education: the authority of the experts. This model, crafted by development economics, sociology, scientific management and public administrations specialists, was a model of modernity that the *priyayi* found inherently attractive. The most important aspect of the model was the monopoly position of the managers as a special group of educated supermen.

Yet it would be a mistake to consider that a mere diploma was enough to confer the magic of authority on these many newly graduated students. Java’s pre-colonial bureaucracy employed gangs of *jagos* and hoodlums as tools for societal control. As Heather Sutherland has remarked, in pre-colonial times, “under Mataram [rule] terror and torture had been essential instruments of control.” Although the Dutch prided themselves on their ability to enforce the rule of law in the archipelago, there still continued to be something of a modus Vivendi between *priyayi* bureaucrats and the criminal elements/
local bullies in keeping order in rural society. In order for authority to be conferred, the reinstitution of some sort of order on the scale of the colonial state had to be done. The local bureaucracy had to have protection from above and collaboration from local strong men. As we will see below, these two long arms of the bureaucracy would be increasingly provided by the military, as both overseer of the state and its enforcers on the ground.

The history of the modern Indonesian state is thus a history of its bureaucracy, and by extension, the nation’s priyayi elite. As Professor James Mackie contends, Indonesia’s elite and growing middle class were “essentially bureaucratic elites or, as in the Sukarno era, a party-political elite. To the extent that an Indonesian middle class has been emerging over the last three decades, it is primarily a salaried and professional middle class, not an entrepreneurial or propertied” one. This is, of course, a simplification of the reality. First, although the majority of Indonesian bureaucrats were Javanese, there were large numbers of non-Javanese who became important members of the elite; this was particularly true for the military. Many of the economists that were to play an important part during the New Order, such as Emil Salim and Frans Seda were non-Javanese. Second, the priyayi class itself, as a result of education, was undergoing significant changes.

Franklin Weinstein divided Indonesia’s twentieth century elite into three groups based on their respective generation; those of 1928, 1945 and 1966. The 1928-generation was those who had enjoyed good colonial education, and who continued studies in Dutch universities. Their world-view was highly influenced by the works of Karl Marx and other European social theorists, and although they initially had a positive outlook on the United States, the ‘betrayal’ of America during the revolutionary struggle embittered their view of the US, causing a deep sense of ambivalence.

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18 Ibid. and Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries, p. 1-5.
20 Ann Gregory has noted, though, that the number of Javanese occupying important government positions increased during the Guided Democracy and New Order. Ann Gregory, Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite: Guided Democracy and the New Order, p. 108.
21 Many of the technocrats were also non-Muslim, including the Catholic Frans Seda and J.B. Sumarlin and the Protestant Radius Prawiro, among others. Hamish McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia, (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1981), p. 76.
The second group was the 1945-generation. They had experienced first hand the Second World War. The majority of them joined the student or youth militias set up and trained by the Japanese. Some of the anti-Western propaganda that their Japanese trainers passed on to them determined their world-view for a long time after the end of the war. Unlike the 1928-generation, the 1945-generation did not receive a good and full colonial education. The government’s temporary reduction of the education budget in the 1930s, owing to the Depression and the increasing availability of ‘nationalist’ schools that competed with Dutch education in the colony affected their outlook. 23 Aside from becoming soldiers and participating in the war, many youngsters also had the chance to become low and middle-level civil servants before going off to university in Indonesia, with some continuing on with post-graduate study in the United States. Although less Marxist in their outlook in comparison to many nationalists of the 1928-generation, they were generally open to the ideas that the left had to offer. Their involvement in the Indonesian state as administrators or army officers and their formative education abroad, mostly in US universities, were important factors that changed their world-view of state-society relations in comparison to the earlier generation, which had little opportunity to work in managerial government services and had received almost exclusively Dutch education, and were actually Dutch-speaking among themselves. 24

The 1966-generation was the one that grew up during the Guided Democracy and cheered at the ending of Sukarno’s regime and the rise of the New Order. 25 This generation was generally deeply anti-Marxist, if not apolitical, but for our purpose will not be referred to further because of their limited relevance to the discussion.

The shift from the democracy of the 1950s to Guided Democracy and the New Order must be seen in terms of the shift from the 1928 to the 1945 generation. As we will see, the gradual control of the bureaucracy and state

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23 A process of politicization of the teachers also occurred during the period in government-owned Indonesian schools as well, signifying increased attention at participatory pedagogy which Agus Suwignyo has termed public intellectuals. This process appeared again as part of the participatory discourse of Indonesian nationalism, which will be discussed further in the next chapters. Agus Suwignyo, The breach in the dike: regime change and the standardization of public primary-school teacher training in Indonesia, 1893-1969, Thesis for Leiden, 2013, p. 152-207.

24 Frank Weinstein, Indonesian foreign policy and the dilemma of dependence, p. 42-65

25 Ibid.
by the 1945-generation occurred under the aegis of the 1928-generation, especially as the ideas they espoused became inherently anti-democratic and in favour of a strong state-one that controlled society in a vice-like grip. Sukarno himself, as the pre-eminent icon of the 1928-generation, came to appreciate these tendencies. Even so, Guided Democracy was a period in transition and many in the 1928-generation saw their powers erode. Younger ones just graduating from American universities were able to obtain government positions but saw their influence as highly limited in middle management or university positions. Their ability to hook up with the military meant a deep similarity in outlook and aspirations for the state.

Yet, the Guided Democracy state was anything but a full control of the 1928-generation. Many of its influential policy makers, such as Roeslan Abdulgani and Mohammad Yamin espoused ideas that, on the whole, were a reaction against the competition of the upstart 1945-generation. In an age where the iconic image of the white-collar office head or plant manager was a man employing mathematically inclined science and social science, even in such an underdeveloped society as Indonesia of the 1950s, the old elite was educationally inadequate. In the face of the new perspectives in efficiency and its associated managerial tools, the old elite came from another period. This was a period when leadership was earned through revolutionary capabilities, where history and literature guided the workings of human society and the path of nations instead of the graphs of economics, the analysis of the psychologists and the theories of the sociologists. Where the study of the law meant an understanding of how the state worked and how government functioned, instead of the studies of time-motion and other Taylorist tools. According to MacDougal “…their emergence in policy making roles represents a fundamental shift in the nature of the ruling elite.”

It was this inherent tension between what Roeslan Abdulgani termed the ‘professionals’ or ‘unprofessionals’, what Herbert Feith called the ‘administrator’ or ‘solidarity-makers’ or what Pye called the “administrators” and “politicians” in Burma or what Franz Schurmann called the “experts”

and “reds” in China,\textsuperscript{30} that was inherent in Guided Democracy and indeed in many other countries around the world. Many conflicts that engulfed Third World states during the mid-twentieth century were as much caused by the Cold War as by a generational shift. This was a shift fully realized by many of the older generation, to the extent that the Indonesians used the term reds and experts.\textsuperscript{31}

Going back to the question on the roots of authority in the Indonesian bureaucracy, the answer could be deciphered by analyzing the changing of the guard from the 1928-generation to the 1945-generation highlighted above. The authority of the bureaucracy was possible as a result of an international protocol determined by educational and ideological status.

To understand Indonesian state and society without considering this important international dimension would result in omitting a basic component in determining the reasons why a certain group of people, American-trained, came to dominate policy making in what was essentially a military dictatorship. The New Order state functioned the way it did because it obtained its authority and its legitimacy from two fundamentally different source: a culturally-based definition of authority that had existed in the archipelago for centuries\textsuperscript{32} and an internationally-based definition that allowed the regime to obtain international aid, technical assistance and economic integration. What emerged was a relatively impressive developmental state that brought economic growth and massive political violence at the same time. The 1950s and the Guided Democracy transition was thus essential in unlocking this transformative phase of the Indonesian state.

I will first discuss the inherent tension of the Guided Democracy ideology as it searched for a compromise that would allow the retention of the 1928 generation within a new world of experts and professionals, but contained


\textsuperscript{31} For instance, in the discussion on the production of expert manpower and the university system in the 1960s, which emphasized the creation of both reds and expert cadres. See Bachtari Rifai, \textit{Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi selama 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka}, (Jakarta: Departemen Perguruan Tinggi dan Ilmu Pengetahuan, 1965), p. 26.

\textsuperscript{32} This was also the case with Sukarno under the Guided Democracy. “When we look at the political system of Guided Democracy and its operation, one cannot escape finding striking similarities with the political system and its operation during the Mataram rulers.” Baladas Ghoshal, \textit{Indonesian Politics 1955-1959: The Emergence of Guided Democracy}, (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi, 1982), p. 98.
within it what Geertz has called “the advance toward vagueness” that will ultimately let to its own demise.\(^3^5\) I will then discuss the ideas of state-society relations that were understood by the 1945-generation and its internationally ideological root: development and management.

**Tensions in the Guided Democracy: the 1928-generation and their ideology**

The difference in generation along educational lines represented two almost completely separate groups: the 1928 and 1945 educated elites; their difference could be termed a difference between intellectual and expert-based groups. Ann Gregory wrote, “There is no continuity between the Guided Democracy non-party elite segment and the technocrats of the New Order. The very nature of the two segments differs. The technocratic segment contains a high number of professionals for whom politics is a secondary career begun after success was achieved in their primary occupation, whereas for most of the Guided Democracy non-party elite politics was their primary career.”\(^3^4\) The old generation was effectively fighting for their legitimate elite status and authority.

This difference, as we will see, resulted in a deep distrust of the new generation of expert social scientists. What those of the old generation feared most from economists and other social scientists was what they considered the inherently authoritarian nature of their ideology. Roeslan Abdulgani thus said that “we are therefore faced with the peculiar situation where economists, stern anti-communists all, present us with a plan which politicians believe impossible without economic and social coercion on the communist pattern.”\(^3^5\) The promise of both Communism and Western social


\(^{35}\) Roeslan Abdulgani, *Beberapa soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi* (Jakarta: Dewan Nasional Indonesia, 1958), p. 33. Of course, Abdulgani was a politician first and thinker second. He was to survive the transition to the New Order and become part of the new regime, one that was to be dominated by those professional, text-book thinkers he once derided. Whatever his belief, his position as a spokesperson of the Guided Democracy state gave credence to his announcement, if not purely of his own devising, then as a perfectly capable filter from which the state produced its discourse.
science was an authoritarian state whereby people, intelligent and of good faith, were to be excluded from participation and authority. This dislike was obviously shared by Sukarno. In his address at the Bandung Non-Alignment Summit, he expounded: “I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation.”

The fear of authoritarianism seemed to be a peculiar irony, considering the fact that Guided Democracy itself reduced participation of parties and organizations it deemed dangerous, the most important being Sjahrir’s Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and the santri-based Masyumi Party, which were banned outright in 1960. On a Geertzian analysis, the banning might have meant a strengthening of the abangan bureaucratic elite whose main power base lay in the Sukarnoist parties like the PNI.

Yet, the attack on these parties was also explicitly an attack on the nascent technocracy, whose ‘liberal’ credentials had been built up through its control of the liaison institutions connecting the vast pools of financial aid and security and educational opportunity of the international community and its Indonesian protégé. This control was explicitly pictured in the PSI, whose members and sympathizers became prominent authorities in important bodies such as the BPN (National Planning Agency), the FINEK (financial and economic) bureau, Seskoad (Army Staff and Command School) and other important institutions. The formation of various Guided Democracy institutions such as the Depernas (National Planning Board), Paran (retooling committee) and others were created to replace these institutions that had been dominated by ‘administrators’. There was one important and major exception: the Army School of Staff and Command under General A.H. Nasution. Although Nasution did not sympathize much with the PSI, he was considered as a relatively able administrator. Yet, Sukarno willy-nilly allowed Nasution to participate in these institutional formations.

37 Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 139-143.
The reason for this was that Sukarno was not powerful enough to run the entire show. He needed the support of the military, yet the development of the army in the 1950s resulted in the lessening influence of PETA-based army commanders who had similar ideological view as Sukarno and who were just as suspicious of the educated ‘professionals’ as Abdulgani. The group was initially successful in ousting Nasution from power after the 1952 attempted putsch, yet they were not strong enough to protect their staff and command school, the Tjandradimuka Academy, from Nasution’s wrecking ball. After 1955, Nasution saw his power rise again. In fact, it was Sukarno who appointed him again as the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1955, thus placing Nasution as head of a vast and growing military government that mimicked and then took over many of the administrative authorities of civilian institutions within the state and the economy. Nasution thus, by the end of the 1950s, had control of both the military government and the military schools that deeply affected graduating army officers. His control of key institutions, especially the Seskoad, was essential in understanding the development of Guided Democracy.

As newly graduated Indonesian social scientists started arriving from the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they found a state that was suspicious of receiving them, but at the same time keen on benefitting some of their expertise. One major institution that opened their arms to incoming social scientists was Nasution’s military faction, especially his Siliwangi Division. His successor, General Ahmad Yani (1962-1965), although loyal to Sukarno, was keeping the doors of the military to these new-graduates open. The marriage between the military and technocracy was thus a development that occurred under the harsh conditions of Guided Democracy.

The tension of Guided Democracy can be understood, albeit simplistically, as a tension between Sukarno and Nasution, each representing an ideology produced from totally different eras. Nasution was born on 3 December 1918.

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39 In an article at Vrij Nederland, the Dutch journalist J. Eijkelboom called Abdulgani a parrot that can say Usdek. The parroting nature of the elites of Guided Democracy may point to the weakness in saying that there was a whole generation of pro-Sukarnoist elements, but it is undeniable that there was a coterie of people within the elites that had put their fortune with supporting Sukarno throughout the entire Guided Democracy.

40 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, p. 82.

41 Split within the army elites occurred at regional level instead of the national level, with regional commanders opposing Nasution’s rationalization policies. Harold Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 32.
18 years after Sukarno (6 June 1901). They came from different generations, maturing intellectually in different periods and different social conditions. While Sukarno was a typical 1928-generation member, forming his ideas on state-society relations during the colonial period, Nasution’s formative period was during the revolutionary struggle. Many of his ideas were rooted in his experience working in the general staff of General Oerip Soemohardjo and developing the tactics for guerilla war and the formation of a state-society model based on that war. This revolution was a formative period that forged the 1945-generation. For instance, many of the people in the “Berkeley Mafia,” the notorious name coined for Suharto’s cabal of technocrats, had participated as soldiers during the revolution, understanding thus the sense of honour of battle and developing an ambivalent attitude toward the simplicity of Marxism and the importance of outside power in determining local events. A comparative analysis of the ideas of these two men opens the way for a better understanding of the inherent contradictions of Guided Democracy.

Sukarno

theorists, from Marx to Weber. His father was Javanese and his mother Balinese, and despite his depiction of poverty in his autobiography, his family was well to do enough as a minor priyayi. His father, being a theosophist, was deep into the Javanese religion. Sukarno himself grew up within a Javanese milieu and he would forever remain enthralled by the history and culture of Java, as was evinced in the amount of Javanese iconography that was erected as symbols of the Indonesian state during his period (and in fact continued under the Suharto dictatorship).

Although a follower of Javanese religion, Sukarno was comfortable enough to venture into Islam during his period of banishments in the 1930s, writing several Islam-related articles. In fact, a peculiar and enduring theme of Sukarno’s belief has been corporatism, the possibility of reconciling the fragmented division of Indonesia’s alirans into one imposing unity. In a 1926 article, Sukarno expounded his Nasakom vision, which reasoned away the differences by stressing commonalities of the major strands of Indonesia’s radical political movements: radical nationalist, Islamic revivalism and communism. The most significant commonality was their anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and anti-liberal drives and their call for Indonesian independence. Sukarno was peculiar in that the ideas he espoused never fundamentally changed throughout his life. He had the same basic ideas in the 1920s as he had in the 1950s. His was an ideology that had little substance and no definitive structure, but it was this fluidity that enabled it to endure. The vagueness left open interpretation and re-interpretation.

Sukarno’s ideas were developed within a deep anti-authoritarian state of mind, considering that he and all other nationalists had little access to

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authority of the colonial state. Imprisonment and banishment had left them deeply distrustful of both the state and its institutions, particularly that of the court and judiciary. Like many of his fellow nationalists, he was much more enthralled by the ideas of Marxists, who were subscribing to the anti-colonial cause. Reading the works of Karl Kautsky, Rudolf Hilferding, Karl Renner and H.N. Brailsford, he came to equate colonialism, the state and capitalism as the same thing. For him, the promise of technical and material progress that the West and its capitalist system offered was a lie. Sukarno kept harping on the sufferings of the people as a result of imperialism, something that was also acknowledged by the colonial government and its Mindere Welvaartscommissie. “Wasn’t it (Colonial) Minister Idenburg who, twenty-five years ago, called the chronic needs as continuous suffering?” He saw capitalism as a big pipe draining the wealth and prosperity of those people on the negative end of the modern imperial project. Colonial capitalism was producing indigenous proletariats, not a middle class.

Way before the Guided Democracy, Sukarno was suspicious of liberalism. Although the Netherlands espoused a social democratic ideology, the liberal elements of the Dutch state were the mainstay that endured in the Netherlands throughout the interwar period when many other European states turned to Fascism or Communism. The 1920s and 1930s saw many parts of Europe ending their experiment with parliamentary democracy and the rise of strong men as leaders of unified, racially purified nations, in the process displacing hundreds of thousands of people in Eastern Europe, and later on during the war killing millions. Although the Netherlands never fell into extremism, its imperialist policies strengthened Sukarno’s disdain for liberals. Here was a liberal, democratic and enlightened European state that was open to participation from its citizens through its own cultural version of aliran, the pillar society, and yet it was also the agent of Western capital draining the wealth of the people of the Indies.

51 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s twentieth century, p. 1-75.
Growing up in the aftermath of World War I, he sided with the leftist criticism of capitalism as heralding the end of the liberal order as a result of the loss of political control over the masses and *petit bourgeois*. Sukarno, like many of his nationalist compatriots had a much more positive outlook on the United States of America in Indonesia’s pre-revolutionary period, and so he was probably unaware that the same process of industrial relations and the decimation of America’s own *petit bourgeois* was happening at the same time.\(^52\) There was thus a perception that democratic states were different from authoritarian ones. Sukarno grew up being explicitly anti-fascist in this regard. “The Indonesian soul is the soul of democracy, the soul of the common people (*kerakyatan*), while the fascist soul is anti-democratic, anti-people.”\(^53\)

He placed the rise of fascism entirely within the logic of capitalism, as an expression of the decline of capitalism in its last phase.\(^54\) Within this Marxist view, fascism was the product of cooperation between the corporation and the petit bourgeois.\(^55\) And yet, his obliviousness to the American change toward its own version of a military-industrial complex and the re-creation of society in the image of the modern industries of capitalism, left him unaware that American social scientists were exporting their version of capitalism through freewheeling agents or corporate giants to places like the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.\(^56\)

In a speech to Parliament during Guided Democracy, he said; “We can no longer follow the politics of liberalism…our revolution is a multi-complex revolution, a summing up of many revolutions in one generation, all of which generates conflicts. Without the leadership in providing planning in each of the fields and complexity of this Revolution, we will achieve a complexity

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52 One of the first books to have warned about the dangers of the ‘managerial revolution’ was James Burnham, *The managerial revolution*.


in chaos. We must have a planned policy. This is the central idea of Guided Democracy. Our revolution is not a revolution for the sake of revolution, it is a highly planned, clear and certain type of revolution.”  

In fact, the word ‘Guided’ itself has a somewhat similar ring to the ‘expert and manager-led’ state and society. Sukarno’s revolution was to be a long drawn-out revolution. Revolution occurs not in the span of months or years, but over decades long. It is a rearrangement of the entire society, toward the creation of a Socialism a la Indonesia.

The role of the state was to guide the revolution, produce its elites and recreate society in the most logical and scientific fashion possible. Replacing atomized society, the state would eventually take over the economy. Quoting Abdulgani: “Within the framework of Indonesian society, economic co-operation and collective action will be effective, not nineteenth century Western individualism. In any case, the fact is that such individualism is outmoded even in the West. It has been displaced by State enterprise and monopoly, which leave little scope for the idealized capitalism of an earlier day.”

Liberalism was the ideology that was imposed on Indonesia to allow for the sinister neocolonial domination of international capitalism on society. Here we see a deep conundrum in the Guided Democracy revolution: despite Sukarno’s sincere intention to apply his ideals of corporatism and unite the various strands of national ideologies in the country, his championing of the state as the prime agent of revolution meant, in essence, giving more authority to the bureaucrats than to anyone else. Within the Depernas development plan, this danger was acknowledged. Quoting E.H. Carr in his book The Soviet Impact on the Western World: “If on the other hand we neglect the “social” aspect, we shall fall into the heresy of efficiency for efficiency’s sake and conclude that planning is simply the instrument of national power and national aggrandizement – the doctrine of fascism. Hitlerism took the name of national socialism. But the fact that it was not capitalist did not make it socialist: it approximated far more nearly to the conceptions of the


59 Roeslan Abdulgani, Beberapa Soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi, p. 38.
American “technocrats” or of Mr. Burnham’s “managerial revolution” – the cult of efficiency for the sake of power.”

As we will see, in the initial Guided Democracy state, there was a genuine effort to involve a variety of people within the state. It lasted briefly and acted only to strengthen the idea that the country needed the expert it once thought it could do without. The focus on planning or retooling, the institutional approach toward revolution and the centralization of power within bodies and experts highlights the difficulties of allowing ‘society’ into the ‘state’, while at the same time applying a planning program that was to be meticulous, scientific and efficient. “In the practice of development, there needs to be firm leadership. Without leadership, the development would be shaky, and could even result in the failure of a well-thought-out plan.”

This state-controlled idea, embodied in Keynesianism and Communist industrialism, represented the Weltanschauung of the era. This explains why Guided Democracy was so successful in bringing together a range of widely disparate groups within the government. The application of Nasakom to Guided Democracy, which entailed giving equal roles to the three major alirans in its various institutions, transcended the ideological divide. It also meant that the nation-state could go both ways, into either a communists or a military state. The real possibility of a Communist takeover seemed slim, even by the middle of the 1960s. Yet, the fear of one was enough to push the army to position it comfortably within the ever-expanding state institutions that was replacing the “nineteenth century individualism” of Indonesian liberalism. Many of the ideas of the army were founded, or at least voiced, by its most important member Army Chief of Staff General Abdul Haris Nasution.

**Nasution**


61 This was also Lenin’s policy in his attack against the bureaucracy and his wish to draw the masses into direct management of affairs. E.H. Carr, *The Soviet impact on the Western world*, p. 17-19.

In many ways, Nasution was the opposite of Sukarno. Unlike Sukarno’s Javanese credentials, Nasution was a Batak, a people living in the interior of North Sumatra around the Toba lake region. He was thus an *Outer Islander*. Unlike Sukarno’s *abangan* religious beliefs, Nasution was a devout Muslim and continued to be so throughout his life. Sukarno was brash and impulsive. Nasution was reflective and pragmatic. He had studied to become a teacher at the *Hogere Inlandse Kweekschool* in Bandung in 1935. Sukarno and other nationalists affected Nasution in the 1930s, where he initially experienced a maturation of his intellect. Despite professing to opinions of nationalism, Nasution’s essentially pragmatic character saw him deciding at the outbreak of the war to join the colonial army as, what he considered to be, a nationalist gesture.

When the Netherlands capitulated to Germany in May 1940, Nasution volunteered as a cadet officer and was admitted, along with five other Indonesians, to the newly created Royal Military Academy in Bandung. Nasution specialized in infantry studies. After the fall of the Netherlands East Indies to Japan in 1942, Nasution slipped away and went into hiding in various areas in Java. After three months, he returned to Bandung after the Japanese released all Indonesian KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Military) soldiers. Knowing full well that the Japanese would be defeated ultimately, Nasution worked with a number of his KNIL colleagues, university students and youth leaders. He did this first by joining the Japanese-created paramilitary organizations. Instead of joining PETA, he then joined the Priangan Soldier’s Aid Society and was elected to the governing board. He also worked as an army instructor for the Seinendan, Keibodan and other organizations. During 1944-1945, Nasution travelled often to Central Java. He once visited Major Oerip Soemohardjo, a retired KNIL officer with experience for military organization who would be appointed as the first chief of staff of the Indonesian army by Prime Minister Sjahrir in 1945. During the first year of the revolution, Nasution rose from being an army instructor to commander of the Siliwangi Division (1946). He would then

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63 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution*, p. 3.
rise to become the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Java (1948) and the Chief of Staff of the Army (1949-1952 and again 1955-1963).66

Many of his ideas concerning state-society relations were formulated during the revolutionary period, especially the emergency of the Second Dutch aggression (19 December 1948 – 5 January 1949), which, as chief of the operational staff of the Army Headquarter, resulted in the publication of his guerrilla instructions. Because of the lack of focus on the part of the political leadership, the army was never able to form a conventional ground force before the coming of the Dutch. Nasution blamed this indecision squarely on the bickering disunity of politicians. In contrast, he resented the ability of the Dutch to create, from scratch, a functioning working army within a short period of time in order to be deployed to the Indies. The lack of trust from politicians, especially from the Communists but also from the nationalists, in promoting the creation of a professional army, was the result of the fragmentation of the politicized public along party lines. With the allowance to create parties, patron-client relations were conventionalized along party lines, with unruly youth groups or pemudas being integrated into paramilitary organization under particular parties. The army thus competed for functions with party-based paramilitary organizations.

For the early part of the revolution, Nasution was busy trying to create a professional army within his West Java Siliwangi Division. The division was to become the most professional part of the army. Based in Bandung, it also contained most of the KNIL military elements that had decided to join the Indonesian revolution. There were plenty of military thinkers and strategists within the division, which allowed for sharing of ideas. Nasution’s main ideas somewhat resembled those of Mao Tse-tung and can be summed up in Mao’s statement about the military being a fish with the people being the water. A fish out of water is akin to a military without of the people’s support, i.e. the people were an essential component.67 The idea of guerrilla war was put forth and executed by Nasution during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Java, where he published a pamphlet on carrying out guerrilla war. As a military strategist, Nasution saw the implementation of total war as a central component of Indonesia’s current and future security strategy.

While Nasution’s 1948 guerilla strategy was never fully implemented, the development of these ideas was essential to understanding his contribution to the Indonesian state. It envisioned the reduction of state-society relations within the dictates of a military strategy. “In this framework of total warfare the leadership could recruit and plan a strategy of the whole people for one aim.”68 During the 1948 aggression, Nasution created a “guerrilla administration,” in which civil administrators who were not keen in ‘cooperating’ with the Dutch administration, left for the countryside and recreated the state. The experience reduced the legitimacy of the politicians and the assertion of their necessary presence to the functioning of the state. “The leadership is held by civilian authorities, with the assistance of the “territorial” forces, but in its relationship to war, everything must be brought under the supervision of the military leadership.”69 The idea was to arouse a ‘total people’s resistance’ and the state would be handed over to the permanent military administration. In conforming to this idea, a military administration was created to mirror the civilian one. Thus, a Military Sub-District Command was created at the Kecamatan level, a Military Region Command for the Kabupaten, Military Sub-Territorium Command for the Residency and a Commander was created for every province. This idea was continued during the Guided Democracy under the Tjatur Tunggal system.

Guerrilla war is based on a decentralized leadership and must, in essence, be conducted on a local basis.70 Much of this is modeled on the German military district or Wehrkreise, with the formation of seven independent military territories (Tentara & Territorium).71 The military district is a product of militarized states, such as the America and Britain during the Second World War and the Chinese and Vietnamese variants that continued after the war. Lack of popular support for civilian counterpart legitimates the military administration as a serious alternative to the civilian one. The experience of a Wehrkreise became a model later on. Much of the military administration was continued through the decentralized divisions. The Wehrkreise unit was to be at the level of the sub-district (kecamatan), with a Military Sub-District

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69 Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, p. 89
70 In fact, “The most salient characteristics of the army was its local character.” Ann Gregory, Recruitment and Political Patterns of the Indonesian Elite: Guided Democracy and New Order, p. 242.
71 CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, p. 55
Command as head, which were given the authority to issue regulations for the administrative harmony.

The assumption of the territorial decentralization saw the national leadership as merely coordinating and directing. “The military, political, psychological, economic and social wars are conducted on a regional basis. Complete decentralization is an essential feature of a guerrilla war.”

The militarization of the administration would allow for a degree of decentralization within the bounds mandated by the army’s vertical command structure. While decentralization allowed for flexibility, it was predicated on the highly reduced roles of civilian politicians and the civil administration. This ‘territorialization’ of command allowed greater control of the central military authority toward the regions.

For Nasution, the village had proven to be the most important component in guerrilla warfare. Territorial structure started from the village level, where the village head (lurahs) were assigned to create guerilla administrations with the help of territorial cadres. The lurahs were integrated into the lowest level of military governments. It was thus also the village that much of the social and economic works of the guerilla administration were to work on, despite the fact that much of the coordination was conducted on the sub-district level. This later on developed to become the military Civic Action program, but its roots were found in these military administrative period. The provision of basic schooling, eradication of illiteracy, provision of mobile clinics with a doctor (and sometimes nurses), were provided for by the military administration.

The Idea of Guided Democracy

Both the ideas of Sukarno and Nasution focused on the state as provider of action. In Sukarno’s case as a leadership that guides society into the path of revolution; in Nasution’s, as an extension of the military, whose tentacles embraced the village and community level of the nation. Going back to the problem of authority that plagued the bureaucracy during the tumultuous years of revolution and parliamentary democracy in the 1940s and 1950s, the ideas espoused above tried to answer these questions. On the one hand,

72 Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, p. 52
73 Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, p. 144
revolution as an ideological banner inadvertently became a way to legitimate the guiding authority of the bureaucracy. As Sukarno stressed over and over again, Guided Democracy was a planned policy. During the initial years of the Guided Democracy, the experiment to create institutions that would enact a corporatist national plan.

Nasution’s idea of total and territorial warfare elevated the role of the military as an essential component of state bureaucracy. The Guided Democracy state saw the extension of military, i.e. army, involvement throughout the bureaucracy and the economy. One might cynically surmise that this was an effort to spread corruption on a grand scale. Yet, that would be to miss the more important point of state authority and control. The military presence at the village level was an affirmation of the authority of the bureaucracy-cum-military state leadership. The army’s deep relationship with parts of the civil society, students, criminals, labour organizations and so forth not only competed with its communist version during the Guided Democracy but was to regulate a specific sort of state-society relationship in which society was to be fully subordinated through these civil society clientele that was, in effect, extensions of the military.74

In the New Order, the army would thus provide the two things that the colonial state had provided, but which had been lost during the revolutionary and pre-New Order period. First was the safety of bureaucratic legitimacy and authority. The army as purveyor of power would convey to the bureaucracy authority through its power to protect them from civil society, especially parliament but also other parts as well. It also conveyed legitimacy through the implementation of a state ideology that put these bureaucratic experts on a pedestal: the ideology of development. Development was different from revolution purely as a result of its success and revolution’s miserable failure.

Second was a bureaucratic extension to control of the rural areas. During the colonial era, the state used the traditional authority of the Pangreh Praja and its local bully clientele to provide this control.75 The army, along with its own clients, would provide state control to its lowest level, thus leaving the bureaucracy with the job of planning development.

74 Loren Stuart Ryter, Youth, Gangs and the State in Indonesia (PhD dissertation University of Washington, Seattle, 2002).
75 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “A genealogy of violence”, Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad (ed.), Roots of Violence in Indonesia, p. 33-63, who argued that the colonial state was a violent state and that ‘criminal elements’ such as the jago, were an integral part of state expression of power.
Although the core leadership of Demokrasi Terpimpin displayed a lack of coherence over key issues regarding the Guided Democracy state and ideology, there was one person who has succeeded in becoming Sukarno’s main ideologue, a person who was capable of translating ‘His Master’s Voice’ with accurate fidelity. This man was Roeslan Abdulgani, politician par excellence, former Minister of Information, who was several times accused of corruption and who, along with A.H. Nasution, the only inner circle to have made the transition to the New Order alive and thriving. It is difficult to gauge the sincerity of Abdulgani’s words during the period. Yet, there was no doubt his influence on Sukarno and the regime as a whole. Casper Schuuring said, “Roeslan had een ‘sturende hand’ gehad in de zogenaamde geleide democratie.”

Sukarno entrusted him with producing important papers and information on the Guided Democracy and Economy, and it was Roeslan who was asked to confer with Prof. Djokosoetono in developing a constitutional order for the new state. The ideas he espoused in his writings had undoubtedly been culled by or had important major similarities with that of Sukarno from the very beginning.

This was different, for instance, with the other of Sukarno’s inner circles. Djuanda’s idea concerning the importance of democracy and his plea for what amounted to reform instead of revolution was very much put in a realist, liberal tone. Nasution’s ideas converged somewhat with the ideas that would be played out during the New Order.

Perhaps one of the most enduring features of early Guided Democracy thought was the deep distrust displayed of so-called ‘experts.’ It has never been explicitly determined who exactly these experts were or what type of expertise they actually conduct, but one major group that has sometimes been alluded to is the economist. There was a particular distrust of Western economists. As Abdulgani said: “I am no economist, and I have reservations about the purely professional approach of the economist. Particularly, I have

78 “Djuanda Terpaksa diadakan modifikasi, karena terbentur kepada realiteiten. Djadi didalam hal ini saja tidak berdiri sendiri akan tetapi berdampingan dengan orang yang mempunjam ideologi yang tinggi itu, akan tetapi jukup realisit untuk melihat beberapa realiteiten dan menjesuatikan djalan selandjutnja kepada realiteiten jang ada.” Quoted from Sukarno, “Pidato Presiden Sukarno tentang “Demokrasi Terpimpin”, p. 2.
reservations about the purely professional approach of the non-Indonesian economists, who, while putting his great skill and knowledge at our disposal, is still outside the stream of our life, our hopes and desires.”

Roeslan Abdulgani’s explicit dislike of economists can be summed up in another of his quotes. Siding with what he called the ‘unprofessionals’ as opposed to the professional experts, he said, “… it was these unprofessionals who created and forwarded the Indonesian Nationalist Movement which proved capable of leading the country to shake off the bonds of colonialism… There is no reason why such persons should be any less successful in the task of continuing the Revolution.” In a speech at the published at the Mimbar Indonesia, Sukarno was apparently angered when professors taught purely ‘liberal economics’. “Can you believe that this morning I have received news from Mr. Prijono (Minister of Education and Culture) that made me angry. There was a university in West Java, where the economics professor, a foreigner, only teaches liberal economics. Can you believe it! I understand now why their students all become liberals.”

The problem was then not simply economics per se, but its particular Western version. The Indonesian must search for his own economic theory and experiment. “It is here, in connection with this effort to attain perfection, there lies the appropriateness of my recommendation to always “think and rethink”, “shape and re-shape”… and not to immerse ourselves in textbook thinking alone, not to immerse ourselves in only swallowing everything stuffed down our throats from the outside, not just to immerse ourselves in the atmosphere of Hollandsdenken – Dutch way of thinking.” Sukarno’s assertion of a “Hollandsdenken” is, of course, particularly interesting because...

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79 Roeslan Abdulgani, Beberapa soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi, p. 36.
82 Sukarno, The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution. Supplements: Manipol-Usidek and the birth of Pancasilta, (Department of Information: Jakarta, 1965), p. 34. The dislike against economists was obviously also well-known amongst economists themselves. Widjojo Nitisastro commented that “there was a strong view among the public at the time that the science of economics was totally useless textbook thinking. Some even viewed this something
there were few Dutch economists working in Indonesia especially by the end of the 1950s. It would have made more sense to allude to the Americans, which Roeslan in fact did by lamenting on the failure of the first five-year plan that had been hatched by the State Planning Bureau (BPN), which had a considerable number of Anglo Saxon economists working in it:

“Perhaps the plans have failed, and perhaps they have not even been applied, because they run counter to certain basic truth about our country. They are plans based on Western conceptions, and do not necessarily have validity in another political and social environment. I am prepared to admit that, in the realm of pure economics, they are certainly ideal, but no economic planning can exist in a vacuum. It is dealing with people living in a society. I know of no reason to support that Indonesian people will react the same way to the same incentives as Western people do.”  

That the West failed to provide an adequate economic plan for the nation meant that Indonesia needed another plan, one that would throw away the constraints of textbook thinking.

“To solve the economic problems of a nation that has been already formed, especially for nations that are called nations arríeves, perhaps the person of outstanding skills in the routine of economics would be required, very precise knowledge of economic science would be required, very highly technical, very “expert”, knowledge of economics would be required. But praise be to God, I know that our economic problems do not have to be solved in a routine fashion.”

The revolutionary character of the Guided Democracy was to be placed in the hands of what he termed the ‘non-professional’; those who has had experience in the real world, with a broad education and broad interests.

“Government by experts is no substitute for democracy, any more than good government is any substitute for self-government. Again, that pattern of...
thinking shows a deplorable lack of faith in the good sense and intelligence of the people."  

This belittling of the professional was a major theme of Sukarno’s speeches, in which often he attacked those “bald headed non-political individuals and text-book thinking teachers.” This sentiment was to be displayed by the National Planning Council (Depernas), which was to be composed of the ordinary people, with a smattering of intellectuals. “Differing from the planning and development boards of yore, who restricted their membership to the expert-intellectuals, the Depernas will stress their membership on the golongan karya who are rooted and live in the community without ignoring the advice and opinion of the experts.” The expert-intellectuals are motivated only by careerism and professionalism, which, according to Abdulgani, is the root problem of modern bureaucracy. Instead, the membership of the Depernas is of the cultivated man: “a person who has a general education and a wide and forward perspective, who may not be or not yet become a specialist, but who is not yet infected by the disease of modern bureaucracy.”

The assumption of Guided Democracy must be seen as an appeal for collectivism and the raising of the Indonesian mass as participants in its development. “With the creation of the Depernas we have entered a new

85 Roeslan Abdulgani, Beberapa soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi, p. 19.
87 Golongan karya or Golkar functional groups are groups of associations based on their function in society (youth, women, farmers, journalists, intellectuals and so forth), which in Sukarno’s ideal society were to replace political parties as the main component for political participation. Golkar was continued under the Suharto regime as a method of political control and became the main political party of the New Order.
89 Ibid., “…seorang jang berpendidikan umum, dan berpandangan luas serta diajuh kemuka, jang mungkin tidak ada atau belum gespecialiseerd, tetapi tidak kena tularan kesempitan pandangan dari penjakit birokrasi modern.”
phase in the forms of development of our country and nation. This means that the past experiences must not be replicated again, a development plan that did not involve the masses, but was a purely academic plan that was incomprehensible to the rest of the Indonesian population. As was discussed previously, the difference between collectivism and the absence of the masses was a difference between fascism or technocratism and that of a true socialism a la Indonesia. In a speech in front of the Depernas on August 1959, Sukarno said, “Within management there must be decentralization and democratization of control.” The state was to be decentralized and democratized by opening up its management, previously a strong monopoly of the experts. By empowering the unprofessional, it assumed the empowerment of the people, i.e. the mass. Socialism à la Indonesia was not merely a means for reaching the goals of the nation-state: it was the goal itself. Socialism was a way of life and one that was to be created through the adjustment, adaptation and acculturation of a Western idea, i.e. socialism, with the cultural base of the Indonesian nation. It assumed a deep wide-ranging changes within the Indonesian personhood. Including the need to adapt and acculturate rationality as a Western value within Indonesian culture, which has always been based on a deep spiritual belief.

The need to balance out Western rationality and Indonesian spirituality was a touchy subject. “The scientific/rational way of thought is something new to us Indonesians, because previously our culture has stressed on spiritual issues. This rational way of thought is the result of Western culture, where a harmonious relationship has been achieved between rational thought and the core values of Western culture.” But because of the divide in Indonesian

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92 “Tjara berfikir setjara ilmiah/raisonil ini merupakan sesuatu jang baru bagi kita di Indonesia, karena sebelumnya kebudajaan kita lebih menekankan pada soal2 spirituil. Tjara berfikir setjara rasionil ini adalah hasil kehidupan kebudajaan di Barat, dimana telah tertjapai harmoni antara tjara berfikir setjara rasionil itu dengan dasar2 kehidupan kebudajaan bangsa2 Barat itu” in Rantjangan Dasar Undang2 Pembangunan Nasional Semesta-Berentjana
culture between belief and rational thought, it was important that the school did not only focus upon rationalism. It would result in the students regarding their own culture as worthless. This intellectual foundation of the colonial education system had resulted in the estrangement of its Indonesian pupils toward their own culture. It resulted in the formation of a Westernized man: individualistic, materialistic, capitalistic, liberal and intellectual differing from the Eastern man, which was to be a collectivist and socialist, with a sense of family (kekeluargaan), focusing on harmony and giving weight to spiritual matters.93

The main appeal was thus directed to Indonesia’s new educated youths, i.e. the future elite of the nation, at least those that hadn’t yet received too much Western education. The university thus had a very important role in the process. Instead of liberal theories, they were expected to cultivate the ideas of scientific socialism.

“Indonesian socialism needs thousands of young working cadres on all fields, and the University and its students should function to educate these cadres with the proper intellect, behaviour and goals as soon as possible.”94

The university thus should not confine itself to producing experts. It should produce militant revolutionized youths between the ages of 20 and 25 years. It should not be a sanctum sanctorum saevis tranquillis in undis, an island of peace amongst the revolutionary upheaval, producing cynical, skeptical, hyper-intellectual and hedonistic (leedvermaak) young people. Universities should not be ivory towers, which would allow the importation of ideas that become barrier towards progress and socialism.95 Sukarno reiterated the dangers of these types of intellectuals.

94 Roeslan Abdulgani, Sosialisme Indonesia, p. 96.
95 Roeslan Abdulgani, Sosialisme Indonesia, p. 98.
“Cynicism would appear. The faith in the ability of their own nation would be shaken. The *inlander* souls look down upon their own nation and praise to high heavens the foreigners. Especially amongst the intellectuals.”

Abdulgani used the image of the helmsman assisted by experts to picture the Indonesian ‘elite’ under Guided Democracy. The experts would thus be relegated to the position of assistant to the broadly cultivated elite. In speeches to the Dewan Nasional conferences during the early years of Guided Democracy, Sukarno never once used the term *experts* (*ahli*) instead he used *intellectuals*. In comparison, Djuanda and Nasution both used the word ‘experts’ in a positive light. Djuanda said this about the Depernas; “If we can harmoniously put together the best experts of each field, then it would succeed.”

Nasution said “because of that, the Depernas must be filled with experienced or highly educated experts to be a permanent advisor of the government that would guarantee the perfection of the plan by conducting dynamic planning and supervision.”

Sukarno had reiterated several times of the experimental nature of the revolution and asked students and intellectuals to, in fact, fill in the blank spaces. “It is to you, youths who are pursuing knowledge, to the experts, to the professors, to all those with the intelligence of the mind, that I ask of you to enrich my ideas.”

The idea of an intellectual supremacy over the more technical experts is, of course, an elite definition that would allow the position of the 1928-generation politician to continue under the onslaught of the new generation. By positioning the politician as

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helmsman in a boat, helped by the experts, the politician, as purveyor of the Revolution, would still have a role to play.

The fact that Djuanda and Mohammad Hatta, amongst others, support the new generation of experts, to what extent can we say about an intergenerational divide as opposed to what Feith has called the group divide between the solidarity maker and administrator? While it is true that there were some within the 1928-generation that were supportive of the new growing expertise in Indonesia, they themselves were never truly educated in the kinds of American social science that the new elite of the 1945-generation had been during the period. Among those of the 1945-generation, the great majority never obtained the kind of higher education that would put them on an elite mantel. The educational difference is a generational difference.

One of the first questions asked to Sukarno by a member of the Dewan Nasional concerning the Guided Democracy was its implementation outside the country. Sukarno had always stressed the ideology’s universal nature, putting the Indonesian revolution within a spectrum of a humanity-wide revolution. He was to equate it favourably with the Chinese. Sukarno had visited China in 1956 and was highly impressed with the success of its industrialization programme. Interviewed by reporters, Sukarno said “if you were to ask me to make a comparison what I learned and experienced during my first wave of visits to the USA, Canada, Italy, West Germany and Switzerland and what I learned and experienced during my second wave of visits to socialist countries, I say firmly, once again firmly, that I gained more experience and knowledge during the second wave of visits.”

The roots of this fascination with China were based on alleged efficacy of Chinese collectivism, which was compared with Indonesia’s idealized notions of its own village collectivism based on rural, non-feudal values of self-help and cooperation. “It is not to be denied that the development in the People’s Republic of China is a development under the policy of a New Democracy or a People’s Democracy, a type of state-society relations (ketatanegaraan) that is in accordance with the character of the Chinese nation. This is similar to the Guided Democracy, which we are implementing today in order to replace a worn and outdated liberal democracy. The wish of the people to be directed so as to participate in the development with efficiency in funds, time and forces

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should be made real.”101 It also assumed that the incentives for development were inherently present within the people. China’s backwardness and, thus, its seeming similarity with Indonesia during this period, concealed its capability for state managerialism and the relative efficacy of its civil service.

The Chinese were also quite skeptical about experts and, specifically, intellectuals. The main credentials of Chinese elite were their participation in the military. The Chinese were obtaining help from Soviet engineers in their industrialization programme, which would be discontinued in 1960 as a result of the ideological rupture between Beijing and Moscow. This was different from American aid to Indonesia that was to a large extent dominated by social science. It was no secret that the Chinese model had a very important influence to Sukarno. In comparison, Djuanda appealed for electoral reform so that voters had direct representation in parliament “so they would not merely represent the party, but would also represent voters similar to the system in England and Japan.”102

The Guided Democracy state has a number of similarities and differences with the New Order state. Both saw the revolution and Indonesian socialism as having deep roots in Indonesia’s ancient cultural past. This cultural root is the source of Indonesian socialist ideals. Thus although an important cultural root of Indonesian nationalism is contained within the Javanese shadow play, “the Javanese concept of “Ratu Adil”, the Goddess of Justice,” is used, “for it is again social justice which is meant here, not merely the implementation of laws, regulations and other social codes.”103 The Indonesian past is


103 Roeslan Abdulgani, Manipol and USDEK in questions and answers, (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1961), p. 36.
an agrarian-communitarian past, an ur-communist society whose latent socialism is inherent in its deepest make up. The ancient past is thus shown to be socialist and leftist, not the glorification of a rightist, culturalist aristocratic culture.

“Since ancient times, Indonesian society has been averse both to dictatorship and to the individualism of liberalism. The old system of government was based upon *musjawarah* and *mufakat* (consensus) with the leadership of a single central authority in the hands of a “sesepuh” or elder, who did not dictate, but led and protected.”

This idea of an elder who was not dictatorial was also to be used by the New Order to picture the ideal leadership. This is different from the feudal aristocratic assumption of authority based on heredity. Alluding to the ideas of the aristocratic nationalist Noto Soeroto, Abdulgani said that

“Guided Democracy was not an Aristo-democracy or a Demo-aristocracy… This is because the term Guided Democracy is not a combination of the term Demos with Aristos, or the *Kawulo* with the *Gusti*. In other words, the Demos is not combined with Hero, Führer, Held or Il Duce, but with the idea of social justice; it is the synthesis between Democracy and Socialism.”

The body politic of the nation is to be pictured within the harmonious image of the family; “Guided Democracy is the democracy of the family system, without the anarchy of liberalism, without the autocracy of dictatorship.” Sukarno though, rarely used the image of himself as father of the revolution for his position in Indonesian society. In comparison to Suharto who fashioned himself as the father of development, Sukarno’s depiction of himself was active, as being part of the youth. The leadership of Guided Democracy was actually the leadership of an Idea, of the nationalist ideology of Pancasila. Perhaps the most peculiar nature of the ideas that was discussed

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108 Instead of father of the revolution, he was its mouthpiece, signifying vigor and participation. This was inherently different from Suharto, who looked on with the benign and concerned visage of the father, or the Sultan from his throne.
surrounding Guided Democracy was its stated ideal toward democracy. By extension, it was coupled with keeping a healthy distance from the military. Obviously, the period in question was to see a greater increase in military participation in all walks of life, but within the writings of its main ideologues, with the exception of Nasution, the military was always assumed to be a state apparatus. It wasn’t assumed that the structure of the state would or should mimic that of the military, an idea that was to have greater traction later on during the New Order.

The Ideology of the 1945-Generation

Selo Soemardjan, secretary to Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and one of the pioneers in the development of sociology in Indonesia, explicitly divided the elite into three groups: the aristocrats, the religious leaders and the intellectuals. Differing from Geertz broad classification of the abangan and santri, Soemardjan placed greater emphasis on the third group whose power to legitimacy was made purely through education and technical capabilities. “It can even be said without exaggeration that a university degree in modern Indonesian social life functions in the same way as did the now de-socialized aristocratic titles before the 1945 revolution for national independence and democracy.”

It is also of no irony, though, that many of the Indonesian intellectuals were composed of those men who had fought during the revolution and had the good luck of being family members of bureaucrats, i.e. the same aristocrats that he alluded to. Few of the santris were to obtain access to post-graduate education in the West well until the 1980s, when a shift in foreign aid provided greater access to non-governmental organization to send non elite, i.e. non-state actors, for Western scholarship. Soemardjan’s own acceptance of the difference between the feudal aristocrats and the modern intellectual was an admission of a generational difference.

First, the revolutionary credential was an important component of legitimacy. Several of Suharto’s most important economic policy makers, including Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli and Subroto, were active

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110 Ann Gregory, Recruitment and Political Patterns of the Indonesian Elite: Guided Democracy and New Order, p. 52. “The technocrats and the military came from the highest social status origins (97% and 71% respectively)”
in the war in a student battalion. The revolutionary experience was as transformative to these people as it had been to the experience of Nasution.

Second was the American educational experience. For the top policy makers, America represented a formative influence that was not only important in determining the kinds of ideas that they had for the nation and the state, but more importantly, their stay in the USA was punctuated with an increasing sense of togetherness and a feeling of solidarity and common goals. In terms of economic policy making, it was in the dorm rooms of the University of California, Berkeley and in the halls of the Army Staff and Command School that the idea of a future Indonesian economy was thought out amongst the economists and the military men. Head of the School General Suwanto often asked the economists to stay the night at the compound to discuss about the Indonesian economy. Widjojo Nitisastro came out as being the natural leader of a small team of economists (altogether 17 persons), which determined policy-making during the entire New Order period. The American experience also underscored the importance of the university as a binding force among the group. “The technocratic elite led primarily academic lives, before and after the completion of their degrees,” and the universities represented a mechanism for elite recruitment and for forging solidarity, just as the officer school and the military legal school reflected the military side of the equation.

As David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz explained, the New Order national discourse seemed to be a mishmash of ideas that at first sight appeared to clash with one another. On the one hand, the state was seen to be organicist, i.e., state-society relations was seen through familial, nativist and organic

111 Ann Gregory, Recruitment and Political Patterns of the Indonesian Elite: Guided Democracy and New Order, p. 327-357.
Chapter I

metaphors, with the state or elite being the father and the nation being the children. In following with Eastern ideals of family relationship, the emphasis was on harmony, not justice. The children were obliged to respect and follow the orders of the father. The roots of this organic notion were plucked from the ideas of the noted legal scholar Soepomo and then carried over into the New Order under Brigadier General Soetjipno and the Military Law Academy.¹¹⁶

The second strand of state-society relations was the emphasis on the communitarian and agricultural basis of Indonesian society, the roots of which came from the army’s experience during the revolution and their anti-communist efforts at the end of the 1950s and 1960s, when they actively created and promoted civil organizations that were extensions of the army in various sectors of society. Many of these ideas were discussed by Nasution in his extensive collection of works, and were shared by a large majority of the army elite. Fearing social revolution from the agrarian population, which represented the majority of the Indonesian society as a result of communist agitation, the army’s main concern was to develop and create programmes that would involve the military in the rural areas on a more-or-less permanent basis, as we will see in the chapter on the military.¹¹⁷

What was significant about the ideas of the New Order was actually how widely it was accepted amongst the elite. To be sure, there were differences between whether the economy should be opened up for investments or whether an import-substitution industrialization model was the better option. Another significant aspect was how many of the New Order ideas were actually a continuation of the ideas that had been developed during the Guided Democracy. As General Panggabean remarked during his opening speech at the second army seminar in 1966; “What we mean by the New Order is not a political, economic or societal order that is totally different from the Old Order… What we want is to do away with some of the Old Order way of thinking and social system that would be a hindrance to our goals of achieving our national dream.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (ed.), *Indonesian Politics and Society*, p. 27.
¹¹⁸ “Jang kita maksudkan dengan Orde Baru bukanlah suatu tata politik, tata ekonomi atau tata masjarakat jang sama sekali berbeda daripada jang dinamakan Orde Lama… Jang kita mau buang djauh2 dari Orde Lama adalah beberapa tjiri tata fikir dan tata kehidupan jang
As Bourchier and Hadiz wrote: “the regime’s managerial and developmentalist character grew partly out of Soeharto’s close relations with Lieutenant-General Suwarto, the man who brought together Indonesia’s first generation of US-trained economists and senior officers at the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad).”¹¹⁹ According to Koentjoro-Jakti, “the culmination of these trends emerged when all the ideas finally appeared as an ideological package under the authoritarian systems of Guided Democracy, and later, the New Order.”¹²⁰ The traditionalist ideas of New Order *organicism* and rural bias developed earlier, as part of the revolutionary war or even as part of the effort by Indonesian intellectuals to understand the nature of Indonesian society during the colonial period.¹²¹ Development, on the other hand, was an idea that appeared after independence, especially during the Guided Democracy period. What Sukarno called as ‘revolution’ was what many of New Order intellectuals termed ‘development’. It’s modernist and planned character, its managerial component, its almost fetish need to control and change society were shared.

In 1965-1966, several conferences were held at Seskoad and The University of Indonesia to discuss what the change in regime meant for Indonesian state-society relations. If one reads the speeches given at these conferences, one gains an insight into a project, which entailed molding traditional society into its modern form. At that junction, the New Order was fragile and illusory. The intellectuals who hailed from the social science halls of the Universitas Indonesia (especially the Faculty of Economics) and the school of staff and command in Bandung regarded their project from a respectable intellectual position and saw their nation-building project using the latest social science ‘knowledge’ with deep homage to Guided

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¹¹⁹ David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (ed.), *Indonesian Politics and Society*, p. 27.

¹²⁰ He defined the trends as technocracy, elitism, populism and nationalism all of which were to at some variance similar to Bourchier and Hadiz’s analysis. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, *The political economy of development: the case of Indonesia under the New Order government, 1966–1978*, (PhD Dissertation University of California, Berkeley, 1980), p. 29.

¹²¹ To what extent the rural bias of the army was a fully Indonesian invention is open to doubt. Although generally speaking, the roots of the army’s civic action programme was attributed by Ibrahim Adjie’s Siliwangi Division’s effort for community development after a successful counter-insurgency programme mounted on the DI/TII rebels, there are possibility for its American roots.
Democracy’s traditionalist-socialist roots. That Indonesia was under an intensely brutal clampdown which resulted in massive loss of life in a manner that seemed patently primitive, barbaric, and anti-modern, didn’t seem to have fazed the modern outlook of the people in the conference. The violence was seen in terms of systemic excesses, a failure to control, and channel and command society by the old regime.

A persistent theme of many of the papers given in this conference was the almost logically assumed position of the military within a leadership position. In fact, both the society and the economy were seen in a militarized fashion, under the command of a militarized elite. Thus Emil Salim said that there was good reason for the launching of the Guided Economy by Sukarno because “economic activities cannot be put under the mercy of market powers alone, but would need to be controlled and commanded.”

The Guided Democracy’s effort at militarily controlling the economy and with Sukarno granting himself and the state’s economic policy makers like Abdulgani, Soebandrio and Chairul Saleh with military ranks, weren’t seen so much as a break with the perceived normal route toward modernity as a lack on the part of the leadership to orient themselves with development. Thus Sarbini Sumawinata contends, “Only a leadership that was ‘developmentally oriented’ could face the challenges of development. A leadership that failed to orient their goals toward development, fail to maintain stability within the community.”

“The raw determination to overcome economic difficulties in a responsible and disciplined manner can only be conducted if all of the government’s...
apparatus can work as one harmonious team with an effective ‘unity of command’ in the economic sector.”

Nitisastro would actually run a relatively tight ship within his group of technocrats and so his reference to a ‘unity of command’ was to a large extent aimed at technocratic policy makers. Yet, the militarized language was to concede the necessity of a military-run state, one in which the technocrats would eventually, hopefully, help in directing its leadership towards development.

The people were reconfigured within a new imagery: the masses. Barli Halim said, “the masses has a temporary relationship with its members, its relationship based on emotion and is less rational. The masses feels itself ‘more powerful and more potent’ than other people/groups or it has a tendency to blame other groups for something despite a lack of evidence.” Being a managerial specialist with an MBA degree, Halim reduced the people and their political aspiration to a form of mob and masses. Sumawinata’s discussion about stability panders to this image of the masses. That a society transitioning from the traditional masses to its modern citizen contains within it political, social and cultural powers that will have to be channelled by the authority in a way that was to benefited the development process.

“The goal of political stability should be a dynamic stability, in which social forces should neither be suppressed nor equalized, but should be channeled and guided toward positive and productive activities. This type of stability is not in ‘static equilibrium’, but must be understood as a type of control and


supervision, in which all the tensions and conflicts be resolved in a peaceful manner, without killing its dynamism.”

The people as masses were seen in opposition to the nurturing and managing capability of the elite. In fact, the military elite was seen to be the opposite of the masses. Kartomo Wirjosuhardjo’s article paints the inevitable picture of societal stratification and the need to place each group according to their place in society. If each group objectively knows where it belongs within the pyramidal structure of social stratification, then peace and harmony would reign in the body politic. This traditionalist and static view of society was ironically couched within a picture of a modern transition from the previous feudal society.

In fact, the top tier of the pyramid should be filled with a combination of three elites. First, the military elite with their “discipline, initiative, militancy and earnestness in doing their duty.” Second, the secular intelligentsia, which are those “people who have obtained expert education, for instance doctors, economists, lawyers, engineers, agricultural experts, educational experts, journalists and others. This is a group of people who uses science and technology in their line of work. They have expertise in their field but sometimes lack the push to conduct real change.” The third group is the entrepreneurs who are “creators or people who uses new ways to obtain great profits. They are motors of industry and trade and are composed of people who are always searching for greater success.” Each of these three

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groups working together can strengthen modernity among the masses. The people on the other hand, required the guiding hands of disciplined experts and creators. In fact, instead of power, the masses would be given culture.

A national culture based on the nation’s history was essential in indoctrinating the people to accept this pyramidal structure with military-expert-businessman elite at the helm. Wirjosuhardjo again argued for the necessity of creating a culture that would be immune to outside cultural influences that have the devious tendency to seep into Old Order national culture. For instance, the Communist cultural forms of indoctrination with their general meetings or party parades with their flags, banners, drum band, traditional dancers and so forth. The usage of foreign terminology, which effectively replaces Indonesian ideas with those imported from outside, i.e. Communist’s frame of reference: progressive, revolutionary, socialist, patriots, the people, etc. Social realist art forms that tend to “depict the importance of physical prowess in comparison to mental power, and their paintings of large-bodied people with strong hands and tiny heads.”

As were songs and dances inspired by socialist/communist countries. What Wirjosuhardjo contends is that by allowing these type of cultural forms to exist in the country, it spreads their content across the wider community, thus allowing for subtle forms of indoctrination. Cultural forms are instruments and weapons in the elite’s arsenal to control and channel the masses. The New Order would thus have to search for its own specific forms of national culture; and a return to tradition is what was offered by many social scientists. Selo Soemardjan called for the need to revive the old idea of role model in traditional society (panutan), whose roots went deep into Javanese society. The Javanese word manut means to follow, specifically to follow the leadership. The Javanese role model is passive, while its modern role would be active.

“In other words, the role model of the past requires only tut wuri handayani, which mean pushing their influence from behind. But now role models within Indonesia’s modern society are expected to take the lead and fulfil their role as ing ngarsa sung tulada, i.e. to give a good example up front. The

128 Kartomo Wiroushardjo, “Re-thinking Dalam Indoktrinasi” in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), Masalah-masalah ekonomi dan faktor-faktor Ipolsos, p. 41. “gambar-gambar/lukisan-lukisan jang selalu menggambarkan pentingnja tenaga fisik dan kurang pentingnja kerdja otak, jaitu dengan lukisan orang bertubuh besar dengan tangan-tangan jang kuat, tetapi kepala ketjil.” A decidely anti-intellectual form that was popular amongst the Communist of the period.
appreciation of society in today’s democratic age for their role models would surely increase if they also situated themselves as *ing madya mangun karsa*, which is to live in society and together work with society to build a strong spirit in the effort to create societal happiness and state magnificence.”

What is significant about Soemardjan’s imagery is again their deeply feudal form taken from Javanese’s long feudal past, something that the nationalists, leftists and many Islamist in Indonesia abhorred. Soemardjan, a loyal follower and personal secretary of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, and himself an aristocrat, must have had fewer qualms in painting a picture of modern Indonesian society through an aristocratic Javanese ‘frame of reference.’ Even more significant is, of course, his credential as the ‘father of Indonesian sociology.’ His American education did not conflict with what he saw as a rational way of ordering society. Wirjosuhardjo’s ideas on indoctrination also have their roots in his study in America. A modern take on Indonesian culture thus took the form primarily of a feudal revivalism. The reason for this was the inherently conservative form of Indonesian intellectualism, since many of Indonesia’s social scientists hailed from basically the same social class: Javanese *priyayi* bureaucrats.

**Conclusion**

The development of the Indonesian idea about authority and state-society relations evolved during the Guided Democracy. The change was partly brought about by both a generational shift from what I’ve termed, using Weinstein’s analysis, the 1928 and 1945 generation. More importantly, the roots of these changes were entwined with the development of the 1950s and the expansion of education, which will be discussed in chapter 5. The

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clash of ideas between Sukarno and expert economists represented a conflict over authority. The expert elite of the 1950s was considered to be a threat to Sukarno’s corporatist ideas. What Sukarno wanted was not to destroy and eliminate experts, professionals and economists, but merely to discipline them. Force them to conform to his ideas of state-society relations that would allow the continued relevance of politicians.

Two things happened. The major decision makers of the 1950s had been sidelined and, more importantly, a new generation of experts was to work within the new Guided Democracy state corporate discourse. As we will see in Chapter 7, their study of Communist institutions increasingly drew them closer to the military managerial elites. The development of the military in relations to the corporatist state is an essential development of Guided Democracy that cemented Indonesia’s long twentieth century military rule. The coalescence of experts and the military elite was a side effect of Sukarno’s anti-expert ideology. The Guided Democracy thus had a profound role in molding this emergent elite.