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Between grammar and rhetoric : Dionysius of Halicarnassus on language, linguistics, and literature

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CHAPTER 5. *NATURA ARTIS MAGISTRA*.

DIONYSIUS ON NATURAL STYLE, SYNTAX AND WORD ORDER

5.1. Introduction

In the two preceding chapters, we have examined the close connections between grammar, rhetorical theory and literary analysis in Dionysius' treatises. In the present chapter, which will concentrate on Dionysius' views on natural style, syntax and word order, the fruitful cooperation between these disciplines will become even more manifest. Apart from rhetoric and grammar, philosophy will also play a significant role in this chapter. Our investigations will depart from the observation that 'the natural' (τὸ φυσικόν) is a recurrent theme throughout Dionysius' rhetorical works (see also section 2.5.2). On closer inspection, it becomes manifest that we find two different concepts of nature (φύσις) in his treatises. On the one hand, nature corresponds to the artless and the usual. On the other hand, there is a passage in which Dionysius adopts a philosophical concept of nature: in this case, nature corresponds to the rules of logic.

Throughout his works, Dionysius uses the terms φύσις and φυσικός in the sense of the 'usual' and 'normal': according to this concept, natural expression imitates the language of laymen, who are not trained in the use of rhetorical expression. The term φύσις is here opposed to τέχνη (see also section 2.5.2).¹ This concept of nature is applied to various aspects of writing: not only word order can be natural, but also syntax (grammatical constructions), style in general and even the organisation of the ideas in a speech. Dionysius' ideas on natural style, syntax and word order are of course closely related: they will be discussed in section 5.2. I will argue that we can trace a development in Dionysius' analysis of the styles that he regards as natural or unnatural. In the early works, Dionysius merely describes certain plain and simple passages (in particular those of Lysias) as natural, and he characterises the more figured style as 'unnatural'. In the later works, Dionysius adopts a syntactic framework, including a technical terminology, which allows him to be more precise about the exact nature of the passages that he considers to be natural or unnatural. Thus, syntactic theory contributes to the analysis of style.

A different concept of nature is adopted in *Comp.* 5. Here, Dionysius conducts an experiment by which he aims to discover whether attractive and beautiful composition

¹ Untersteiner (1959) discusses the contrast φύσις and τέχνη in Dionysius' works, but his discussion is not in all respects satisfactory: see section 5.2.

depends on the arrangement of words that ‘nature demands’. Natural word order is in this case determined by a number of logical rules, which claim that the parts of speech (τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου) should be arranged according to a fixed order.² Because the experiment proves that Homer’s verses do not always follow the rules of nature, Dionysius decides to reject the natural principles. In section 5.3, I will argue that the concept of natural word order in *Comp.* 5 is largely determined by Stoic ideas. In the final part of this chapter, I will compare Dionysius’ ideas with some other ancient views on natural word order, namely those of the rhetoricians and critics ‘Demetrius’ (section 5.4.1), ‘Longinus’ (section 5.4.2) and Quintilian (section 5.4.3).

Since part of this chapter concentrates on natural word order, I should add some introductory remarks on the importance of order in the ancient language disciplines. Order (τάξις, *ordo*) is a central concept in ancient rhetorical theory, both in the organisation of arguments (*dispositio*) and in the treatment of expression (*elocutio*).³ In the latter department, aspects of word order can be discussed in connection with euphony, rhythm and figures of speech.⁴ In grammatical theory, order plays an equally important role, not only on a practical, but also on a theoretical level. On the one hand, grammarians are concerned with the correct order of words in a sentence.⁵ On the other hand, they discuss the theoretical order in which the parts of speech and their *accidentia* should be treated in a grammar.⁶ The idea that there is one particular order that is *natural* (φυσικός, *naturalis*) occurs in both grammatical and rhetorical discussions of τάξις (*ordo*), on all the levels mentioned. In rhetoric, the distinction between an *ordo naturalis* and an *ordo artificialis* occurs both on the level of thoughts

² On ancient ideas on natural word order (esp. in Dionysius), see also Scaglione (1972) 74-96, Schenkeveld (1983) 85-89 and De Jonge (2001).

³ On *ordo* and related Greek concepts (τάξις, κόσμος, οἰκονομία) in ancient rhetoric, see Ernst (2003), esp. 416: ‘In der Rhetorik erscheint [*ordo*] überall dort, wo es gilt, größere oder kleinere gedankliche (*dispositio*) bzw. sprachliche (*elocutio*) Einheiten der Rede (*partes orationis*, Argumente, Stadien eines erzählten Vorganges bzw. Sätze, Wörter, Silben) in eine sachlich angemessene, taktisch zweckmäßige oder ästhetisch ansprechende Reihenfolge zu bringen.’

⁴ In grammar, the order of words in a sentence is mainly discussed in the context of syntax (σύνταξις). In rhetorical theory, word order generally belongs to the field of composition (σύνθεσις). Σύνθεσις and σύνταξις are complex terms, both of which are used with different meanings. Although σύνθεσις is more frequent in rhetoric, it also occurs in the works of grammarians (e.g. [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 22,5: λόγος δέ ἐστι πεζῆς λέξεως σύνθεσις διάνοιαν αὐτοτελῆ δηλοῦσα). Likewise, σύνταξις is more frequent in grammar, but it is also used in rhetorical theory (e.g. DH, *Comp.* 5.24,14 and *Dem.* 27.188,3). Both σύνθεσις and σύνταξις are used not only for the composition of sentences, but also for the internal composition of words. For the terms σύνθεσις and σύνταξις, see also Donnet (1967) 24-30. Donnet shows that σύνταξις refers both to grammatical constructions and to the order of words in a sentence. Σύνθεσις is similarly complex: on this term, see Rhys Roberts (1910) 326-327, Pohl (1968) 1-8, Scaglione (1972) 24-26 and Aujac & Lebel (1981) 9 n. 1.

⁵ See e.g. Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.132. Cf. Sluiter (1990) 61-69 and Lallot (1997 II) 68 n. 281.

⁶ For the theoretical order of the parts of speech, see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.13-29. For the order of the moods, see *Synt.* III.59 and III.62. For the order of the voices, see *Synt.* III.87. On these lists, see esp. Lallot (1997 II) 19 n. 51.

(the order of the parts of a speech, the arguments, and the narrated events) and on the level of expression (the order of letters, syllables, and words). In grammar, the concept of natural order pertains not only to the actual sequence of words in a sentence, but also to the theoretical lists of the parts of speech and their *accidentia*.⁷ Before we focus on Dionysius' concept of natural word order, we will first turn to his views on natural style and its relation to syntactic theory.

5.2. Dionysius on natural style, ἀκολουθία and ὁ κατάλληλος λόγος

Central to all of Dionysius' rhetorical teaching is the (Aristotelian) idea that writers should primarily pay attention to clarity of style, while avoiding the use of too many obscure periphrases and figures of speech.⁸ It is for this reason that Dionysius frequently criticises authors like Thucydides, Isocrates, Isaeus and Plato (in his more 'poetic' passages): when discussing the style of these writers, Dionysius constantly points out that their expressions deviate from normal and customary language. We should realise that Dionysius' criticism is not a purpose in itself, but serves to underline his instructions to future orators: Dionysius' main concern is that his students and other readers should learn to write in a clear and perspicuous style. In many cases, Dionysius rewrites the obscure expressions of classical writers in the style of 'those who construct the expression in conformity with common usage' (see sections 4.4.2 and 7.3.1).⁹ The distinction between φύσις and τέχνη, two notions that heavily determine Dionysius' thoughts about language in general, regularly leads to the identification of normal and customary expressions with 'the natural'.¹⁰ Although τὸ φυσικόν is an important concept throughout Dionysius' works, the treatment of this concept in his earlier works differs from that in his later works.¹¹ In the treatises from the earliest period (in particular the first three books of *On the Ancient Orators*), Dionysius regularly refers to the existence of a 'natural' style, which is in his view most clearly represented by Lysias. But in these works the concept of natural style is still very general and not so well defined: Dionysius does not discuss the syntax that characterises natural composition, nor does he point to the grammatical particularities of the opposite type of σύνθεσις, which he regards as artificial. In his later works, however, the concept of 'the naturalness' of style and word order is applied in a more

⁷ On a practical level, Apollonius Dyscolus speaks of ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία (see section 5.2). His theoretical hierarchy of the parts of speech is also supposed to be in accordance with nature: see esp. *Synt.* I.26.

⁸ On the importance of the Aristotelian concept of σαφήνεια, see sections 1.5 and 7.3.1.

⁹ *Amm.* II 11.430,18-20. For the text, see section 4.4.2.

¹⁰ Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 91. For a similar idea in Apollonius Dyscolus, see Lallot (1997 II) 68 n. 281. On the role of φύσις in Dionysius' discussion of mimetic words, see section 2.5.3.

¹¹ On the relative order of Dionysius' rhetorical works, see section 1.3.

specific way. In *On Demosthenes*, *On Thucydides*, and the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, there are two things in particular that enable Dionysius to be more precise about natural style and word order than in his earlier works. First, he introduces the technique of metathesis (rewriting), which makes it possible to compare the ‘artificial’ style of Thucydides with a more ‘natural’ version that expresses the same idea (see section 7.3.1). Second, Dionysius adopts a grammatical framework, including a more sophisticated terminology: technical grammatical terms like ἀκολουθία, referring to the ideal combination of logical order and correct syntax, κατάλληλος, ‘congruent’, and σολοικισμός, ‘grammatical irregularity’, allow Dionysius to give a more precise description of what he considers to be natural or deviant. Dionysius’ views on ἀκολουθία and καταλληλότης in his later works seem to foreshadow the important role that these terms will play in Apollonius Dyscolus’ *Syntax*.¹² In this section, I will first deal with the general concept of natural style in Dionysius’ earlier works, and then turn to the more technical ideas on ἀκολουθία and καταλληλότης in his later works.

In order to understand what Dionysius means by a ‘natural’ style and ‘natural’ composition, we should pay close attention to Dionysius’ discussion of Lysias, the author who was universally considered to be the champion of ‘the natural’. In the *Lysias*, Dionysius points out that among the most important characteristics of Lysias’ style are the purity of his vocabulary, the expression of ideas in everyday language, and his lucidity (σαφήνεια).¹³ Dionysius regularly refers to these qualities in terms of nature (ἡ φύσις) and the natural (τὸ φυσικόν): Lysias’ style in general is described as ‘displaying the natural to a high degree’ (πολὸν τὸ φυσικὸν ἐπιφαίνουσα), which makes it suited to the portrayal of ‘the reality of human nature’ (ἀλήθειαν ... φύσεως).¹⁴ Further, Lysias’ composition is said to be natural (σύνθεσιν ... φυσικὴν), and his speeches display an ‘uncontrived, natural moral tone’ (ῥῆθος τε οὐ πεπλασμένον ἀλλὰ φυσικόν).¹⁵ Thus, Lysias’ naturalness pertains to many different aspects of his writings, which are, however, all related to each other: the naturalness of his composition (σύνθεσις) and word order is an aspect of his natural style (λέξις) in general, which in its turn is part of the natural (in the sense of ‘realistic’) portrayal

¹² Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 91-92.

¹³ See esp. *Lys.* 2-4.

¹⁴ *Lys.* 10.17, 12-13; *Lys.* 13.23, 14-15.

¹⁵ *Isoc.* 2.57, 3-4; *Is.* 9.103, 8-9. See also *Is.* 3.95, 4-7 (a comparison between the styles of Lysias and Isaeus): ἡ μὲν γὰρ [i.e. ἡ Λυσίου λέξις] ἀφελής τε καὶ ἠθικὴ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ σύγκειται τε φυσικώτερον ... ‘The style of Lysias is plainer and has a stronger moral flavour and its composition is more natural (...).’ *Is.* 7.100, 3-5: παρὰ Λυσίᾳ μὲν ἡδεῖα ἐστὶν ἡ εἰσβολὴ καὶ δι’ οὐδὲν ἄλλο μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτι φυσικῶς πῶς εἴρηται καὶ ἀφελῶς. ‘In Lysias, the introduction is pleasant and the main reason for this is that its expression is natural and simple.’ There are many more passages in which some aspect of Lysias’ speeches is described as natural.

of the speaker's character. The concept of φύσις behind these ideas is complex. What does Dionysius mean when he describes Lysias' style as 'natural'? He does not mean to say that Lysias' composed his speeches instinctively, nor that he did not make use of artistic techniques. In fact, Lysias' speeches are supposed to be the product of an art (τέχνη) that *imitates* nature (φύσις).¹⁶ Dionysius does not always make it very clear in which sense he regards Lysias' style as natural. In most cases, it is simply implied that natural speech corresponds to the speech of a layman, who is not trained in rhetorical skills:¹⁷ correspondingly, natural word order is just an order of words found in everyday language. Dionysius' preference for this kind of language is based on very practical considerations: the orator is supposed to speak in the assembly, before an audience that mainly consists of laymen (ιδιωται).¹⁸ Therefore, if the orator

¹⁶ In *Is.* 16.114,9-13 (already cited above), Dionysius points out that Lysias' narratives are not really natural, but that they are the product of τέχνη, 'whose greatest achievement was to *imitate* nature' (τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς τέχνης] μέγιστον ἔργον ἦν). 'Longinus', *Subl.* 22.1 expresses the same idea: see section 5.4.2. In spite of Dionysius' clear statements on art imitating nature, it has been wrongly supposed that Dionysius is guided by the idea that speeches are the product of an instinctive and irrational process. See Untersteiner (1959) 80-81, who points to *Thuc.* 34.381,17-25. In that passage, Dionysius distinguishes two stages in the treatment of content: first, the invention (εὕρεσις) of ideas, which depends for the most part on talent (φύσις); second, the employment (χρῆσις) of the material, which depends on art (τέχνη). It is true that Dionysius assigns a certain role to 'talent' in the field of content (τὸ πραγματικὸν μέρος), but it is also clear from the same passage and from his other works that τὸ τεχνικὸν is indispensable in all rhetorical and historical writing, especially in the field of style (τὸ λεκτικὸν μέρος). Invention depends more on φύσις because it does not pertain to the form of a text. As Goudriaan (1989) 237-238 points out, Untersteiner's translation of φύσις as 'libera ispirazione' and 'individualità' refers to a romantic ideal that does not fit with Dionysius' theories. Untersteiner's interpretation is governed by a tradition of Italian scholars, to which Pavano (1936) also belongs. These scholars divide ancient theories of art and literary criticism into two approaches, namely a τέχνη-related rationalism and a φύσις-related irrationalism, the latter of which is supposed to be superior. Unlike his Italian colleagues, Untersteiner regards Dionysius as an exponent of the school that emphasised the role of irrationalism in the creation and evaluation of art. (He refers in particular to Dionysius' method in *On Dinarchus*, on the authenticity of the speeches handed down under the name of Dinarchus.) In my view, it is better to avoid unspecific terms like irrationalism and rationalism (cf. Goudriaan [1989] 467). Dionysius clearly supposes that both in the production and in the reception of a text, 'nature' and 'art' work together. Thus, in *Dem.* 47.232,4-6, it is said that nature (φύσις) is the creator (δημιουργός), while the arts (αἱ τέχναι) are the mothers (μητέρες) of every work (ἔργον). With regard to the judgement of works of arts, Dionysius (*Thuc.* 27.371,20-22) states that the rational criterion (of the expert critic) and the irrational criterion (of the layman), although they can be applied separately, will lead to the same evaluation: συνῶδὸν ἔσται τό τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον. 'Reason and instinct will combine in one voice.' On the two criteria, see section 7.3.2. On the two criteria and Dionysius' alleged rationality or irrationality, see further Goudriaan (1989) 142-154, 230-240 and 466-468.

¹⁷ See e.g. *Is.* 9.103,7-12: according to Dionysius, Lysias' opening words display a moral flavour that is not contrived (πεπλασμένον) but natural (φυσικόν): 'nobody would say that these are the words of an orator, but only that it is the language of any ordinary person who is exposed to unjust litigation' (οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι ῥήτορος εἶναι, ἀλλὰ παντὸς ιδιώτου καταστάτος εἰς ἀγῶνα ἄδικον). For the natural speech of the layman (ιδιώτης), see also e.g. *Is.* 11.107,5.

¹⁸ See esp. *Dem.* 15, where Dionysius points out that a speech should not only address the well-educated few, but also 'the majority of ordinary men' (τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ιδιώταις). Therefore, the middle style, which avoids the excesses of the plain and the grand style, is to be preferred: its mixed character corresponds to the mixed nature of the audience, which consists of both specialists and laymen. See also *Lys.* 3.10,13-21: predecessors of Lysias, like Gorgias, confused 'the ordinary man'

wishes to be heard and understood, he should to a certain extent adopt the language of ordinary people, in order to avoid offending the ears of the audience.¹⁹

In some cases, Dionysius gives a more sophisticated explanation of the ‘naturalness’ of Lysias’ style, as in the following passage: ‘the most effective style (...) is that which most resembles natural speech; and nature demands that the expression should follow the thought, not that the thoughts should follow the expression’ (κράτιστον δὲ ἐπιτήδευμα (...) τὸ ὁμοιότατον τῷ κατὰ φύσιν. βούλεται δὲ ἡ φύσις τοῖς νοήμασιν ἔπεσθαι τὴν λέξιν, οὐ τῇ λέξει τὰ νοήματα) (see also section 2.3).²⁰ According to the latter explanation, natural language is language that directly expresses the thoughts (τὰ νοήματα), without adding ornaments or changing the order in which the ideas occur. This concept of natural order, as one that closely follows the (logical or chronological) order of the ideas, holds both on the level of the sentence (σύνθεσις) and on the level of the text (οἰκονομία). Thus, in Lysias’ narratives the events are reported in the order in which they actually happened: in a natural style, the organisation of the text mirrors the chronological order of events.²¹ The narratives of Isaeus, on the other hand, are characterised by (among other things) ‘the fact that things that were done are told in other than their chronological order’ (τῷ μὴ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τὰ πραχθέντα εἰρησθαι), and by ‘the fact that everything is told neither as it was natural to have been done nor as a layman would recount it’ (τῷ [ὥς] μὴ πάντα μηδ’ ἅμ’ ὥς φύσιν εἶχε πραχθῆναι μήδ’ ὥς ἂν ιδιώτης τις εἴποι λέγεσθαι).²² From the latter passage it becomes clear that, according to Dionysius, a style in which ‘expression follows the ideas’ coincides with the language of laymen.²³ We may

(τὸν ιδιώτην) with their artificial expressions. Goudriaan (1989) 510-521 convincingly argues that Dionysius’ view that the middle style addresses a mixed audience is influenced by Peripatetic ideas. One may doubt whether the role of the assembly in Dionysius’ time was as important as in the classical period, but Goudriaan (1989) 29-38 points out that meetings of ἐκκλησίαι were still frequently held in the east of the Roman world at the beginning of the principate, even if the most important issues were, of course, not decided there. Ordinary people also attended these assemblies, and orators had to address them in an appropriate way.

¹⁹ *Mutatis mutandis*, the same thing is true for a historian like Thucydides: in Dionysius’ view, history is not the property of a few well-educated specialists. Therefore, Thucydides should have written in a more accessible style, instead of producing such obscure passages that cannot be understood without a linguistic commentary. See *Thuc.* 51 and cf. Grube (1950) 108.

²⁰ *Isoc.* 12.72,4-6. A similar idea is found in Plato, *Republic* 400c12-d4, where it is said that rhythm and harmony should follow the words (λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον), not *vice versa*.

²¹ Cf. *Is.* 11.106,15-16: καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὥς φύσιν εἶχε γενέσθαι τε καὶ ῥηθῆναι, λέγει. ‘And he reports what follows as it was natural for it to happen and to be described.’

²² *Is.* 15.113,17-114,1.

²³ We may compare Horace’s advice on *ordo* in *Ars Poetica* 42-44: *ordinis haec virtus erit et venus, aut ego fallor, | ut iam nunc dicat iam nunc debentia dici, | pleraque differat et praesens in tempus omittat*. ‘This, or I am mistaken, will constitute the merit and beauty of order, that the poet just now say what ought just now to be said, put off most of his thoughts, and waive them for the present.’ (Translation adapted from Smart.)

conclude, then, that a natural style is a style that presents the ideas in a straightforward way; at the same time, Dionysius supposes that this is also the way in which ordinary people would express themselves.

The concept of natural style is closely connected with the rhetorical theory of the three styles (see section 1.5). In his treatise *On Demosthenes*, Dionysius includes a discussion of the grand style (*Dem.* 1), the plain style (*Dem.* 2) and the middle style (*Dem.* 3ff.). The grand style is described as ‘unusual, redundant, elaborate, and full of every kind of additional ornaments’ (ἐξηλλαγμένη καὶ περιττὴ καὶ ἐγκατάσκευος καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις κόσμοις ἅπασι συμπληρωμένη).²⁴ The opposite style, represented especially by Lysias, is ‘simple and plain’ (λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής), and its power consists in its ‘resemblance to the language of ordinary speech’ (τὴν πρὸς ἰδιώτην ἔχειν λόγον [καὶ] ὁμοιότητα).²⁵ The middle style, finally, is formed by a combination of the other two styles.²⁶ In his treatment of the three *χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως*, Dionysius frequently describes the difference between the plain and the grand style in terms of φύσις.²⁷ While Lysias is the champion of ‘the natural’, Thucydides is Dionysius’ favourite example of an unnatural and artificial style.²⁸

Having examined the most important characteristics of Dionysius’ concept of natural style, I will now focus on the grammatical terminology that he adopts in order to trace the precise causes of natural and unnatural composition. An illuminating passage is *On Demosthenes* 9, where Dionysius summarises the aspects that distinguish Thucydides’ style from that of others (see also section 2.5.5): the most characteristic aspect of Thucydides’ style is ‘that the thoughts are not expressed by direct means and not in a simple and plain way, as is the normal practice of other writers, but that the language is removed and turned away from what is customary and natural (κατὰ φύσιν) towards expressions that are unfamiliar to most people and different from what nature (ἡ φύσις) demands’.²⁹ Here we do not only have a clear link between that which is customary (ἐν ἔθει) and that which is according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν), but

²⁴ *Dem.* 1.130,1-3.

²⁵ *Dem.* 2.130,6-8. I follow the text of Usher (1974) and Aujac (1988), who delete καί.

²⁶ Although Dionysius calls the middle style ἡ μικτή τε καὶ σύνθετος ἐκ τούτων τῶν δυεῖν (‘the style that is mixed and formed by combining the other two’), it is not entirely clear whether Dionysius regards this style as an Aristotelian mean or as a mixture of the grand and the plain style: see Hendrickson (1904), Bonner (1938), Grube (1965) 221, Goudriaan (1989) 504-510 and Wooten (1989) 576-580.

²⁷ See e.g. *Dem.* 9.145,7-11 (below), *Dem.* 9.147,9: τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἀπαγγελίαν, ‘the natural expression’. *Dem.* 13.157,16-17: φυσικὴ τις ἐπιτρέχει τοῖς Λυσίου λόγοις εὐστομία καὶ χάρις ... ‘A certain natural euphony and charm flows over the speeches of Lysias (...).’

²⁸ Cf. *Dem.* 2.130,25-131,3. For Dionysius’ evaluation of Thucydides, see section 4.4.1 and the literature mentioned there.

²⁹ *Dem.* 9.145,6-11. For the Greek text, see section 2.5.5.

it is also implied that natural use of language is simple (ἀπλῶς) and plain (ἀφελῶς). *On Demosthenes* belongs to the works of Dionysius' middle period, in which his technique of literary analysis has considerably developed (see section 1.3).³⁰ Thus, no longer does Dionysius restrict himself to describing the artificial style as 'unnatural', but he illustrates his point with a metathesis (rewriting) of a passage from Demosthenes, which he thinks much resembles the style of Thucydides:³¹

Demosthenes, *Philippics* 3.110:

πολλῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων
γινομένων ὀλίγου δεῖν καθ' ἐκάστην
ἐκκλησίαν περὶ ὧν Φίλιππος, ἀφ' οὗ τὴν
εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο, οὐ μόνον ὑμᾶς ἀλλὰ
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους (Ἑλλήνας) ἀδικεῖ ...

Dionysius' metathesis:

πολλῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων
γινομένων καθ' ἐκάστην σχεδὸν
ἐκκλησίαν, περὶ ὧν ἀδικεῖ Φίλιππος ὑμᾶς
τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας, ἀφ' οὗ τὴν
εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο ...

'Many speeches, Athenians, are made in all but every assembly about the outrages that Philip, ever since he made peace with us, has been committing not only against you but also against the rest of the Greeks (...).'

'Many speeches, Athenians, are made in almost every assembly about the outrages that Philip has been committing against you and the other Greeks ever since he has made peace with us (...).'

Dionysius' remarks on his metathesis further clarify his ideas on natural style and word order. According to Dionysius, there are three devices that have made Demosthenes' style 'removed from the customary' (τοῦ συνήθους ἐξηλλαγμένην) and 'laboured' (περίεργον). First, Demosthenes uses ὀλίγου δεῖν instead of the more usual σχεδόν. Second, the pair ἀδικεῖ Φίλιππος has been broken up and has 'carried away the ἀκολουθία over a long distance'.³² Third, the phrase 'not only against you but also against the rest of the Greeks' (οὐ μόνον ὑμᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας) could have expressed the sense by means of the simple connection (διὰ τῆς συμπλοκῆς μόνης), that is, without the extra negation: therefore, Dionysius has simplified this phrase by using the connectives τε καί.³³ From this analysis it appears that Dionysius' concept of customary and natural expression is related to vocabulary (ὀλίγου δεῖν), σύνδεσμοι (οὐ μόνον ... ἀλλὰ καί) and word order (Demosthenes' hyperbaton Φίλιππος ... ἀδικεῖ has interrupted the logical order of the sentence). Now, it is important to notice that Dionysius presents his own metathesis as the basic form of language, from which Demosthenes' sentence deviates (see also section

³⁰ Cf. Bonner (1939) 59-80.

³¹ *Dem.* 9.144,14-145,24. For a discussion of the method of metathesis in general I refer to chapter 7 and to De Jonge (2005b). On Dionysius' analysis of *Phil.* 3.110, see also Bonner (1939) 68-69.

³² For the expression κομίζεσθαι τὴν ἀκολουθίαν, see also *Thuc.* 53.413,8.

³³ See *Dem.* 9.145,18-24.

7.3.2). Dionysius points out that in Demosthenes' version, ὀλίγου δεῖν 'has been adopted instead of' (παρὰληφθὲν ἀντὶ) the more customary word σχεδόν: this formulation reveals Dionysius' view that the natural and normal expression used in his paraphrase 'underlies' the artificial expression of Demosthenes. Similarly, Dionysius tells us that ὀδικεῖ Φίλιππος 'has been split up' (διαίρεθέν) in Demosthenes' version; Dionysius presents his metathesis as the basic and natural order, from which Demosthenes has consciously deviated, thus interrupting the ἀκολουθία.³⁴

The use of the term ἀκολουθία ('logical order'), which appears only in the works of his middle and later period, marks a significant development in Dionysius' treatment of style in general and that of natural word order and syntax in particular. Apart from ἀκολουθία, the term κατάλληλος ('syntactically congruent') should be mentioned as an important term in Dionysius' more developed syntactic analyses.³⁵ We have already encountered both terms in our discussion of Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides (section 4.4.2). The terms ἀκολουθία and κατάλληλος occur in both philological and philosophical contexts, but the author that makes the most systematic use of these terms is the technical grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus (second century AD). The question presents itself how Dionysius got to know these terms and the grammatical theory behind them. He may have acquired his knowledge from the grammarians who were active in Augustan Rome, or he may have studied the works of earlier philologists, grammarians or philosophers (see section 1.4). But the interesting thing is that Dionysius' contemporary Tryphon, who is often considered to have been the great model of Apollonius Dyscolus, presumably did not use the terms ἀκολουθία and κατάλληλος. Having closely examined the fragments of Tryphon, Matthaios argues that Tryphon did not deal with the concept of καταλληλότης: 'Ausblickend dagegen unterscheidet sich Tryphon vom Syntaxtheoretiker Apollonius Dyskolos dadurch, daß er die für den syntaktischen Bereich wesentliche Frage nach der καταλληλότης und nach ihren Bedingungen nicht stellte.'³⁶ The term ἀκολουθία is not found in the extant fragments of Tryphon either.³⁷ Given the fact that both Apollonius and Dionysius are interested in Stoic ideas, we might suppose that they have borrowed the syntactical terminology from the philosophers: both ἀκολουθία

³⁴ A similar case is discussed in *Comp.* 9.35,7-16: see section 7.3.2.

³⁵ The term σολοικισμός ('solecism') is also important, but this seems to have been a more common term among philosophers and grammarians and even in common language.

³⁶ Matthaios (2003) 128.

³⁷ Von Velsen (1965) reads ἀκολουθίαν in Tryphon fr. 33, but here we should read ἀκολουθώς: see Matthaios (2003) 104-105.

and κατάλληλος are found in Stoic works (see below).³⁸ The term κατάλληλος also occurs in the scholia on Homer, so Dionysius may also have found the terms in the works of Alexandrian philologists (cf. section 4.4.1).³⁹ But because of the limited number of fragments of Tryphon and grammarians like Tyrannion and Asclepiades, we should be cautious and avoid drawing sweeping conclusions about the discipline from which Dionysius borrowed the syntactic terminology and the theory behind it.

Blank and Sluiter have usefully analysed Apollonius Dyscolus' use of the terms ἀκολουθία and καταλληλότης.⁴⁰ Καταλληλότης, 'syntactical congruence', denotes the mutual agreement between the parts of a sentence: a sentence is κατάλληλος if all the words agree with each other, both syntactically and semantically.⁴¹ A sentence that is completely κατάλληλος, is called τὸ ἐξῆς or ἀκολουθία: the latter terms indicate the correct, grammatical order of a sentence whose words agree with each other and at the same time occupy their proper places.⁴² In Stoic philosophy, the term ἀκολουθία was used to denote the rational order that pervades the whole cosmos.⁴³ This idea of cosmic orderliness is implicitly preserved in Apollonius' grammatical works, for he seems to have thought that the rational order of the universe was reflected in the orderly structure of language.⁴⁴ Ἀκολουθία therefore denotes not only a logical, but also a *natural* order;⁴⁵ in some cases, the latter aspect of the concept of ἀκολουθία is made more explicit by the addition of the words κατὰ φύσιν.⁴⁶ Where τάξις designates the order as such, ἀκολουθία implies that the constituents of the order follow from each other, so that the order may be regarded as logical or natural.

³⁸ For the Stoic use of the term καταλληλότης, see Blank (1982) 31. According to Diogenes Laertius VII.59, the Stoics defined solecism as λόγος ἀκαταλήλως συντεταγμένος.

³⁹ Cf. Blank (1982) 55-57.

⁴⁰ For καταλληλότης, see Blank (1982) 24-39, Sluiter (1990) 50-52 and 61-69, Lallot (1997 I) 45-47, and Luhtala (2000) 163-167. For ἀκολουθία, see esp. Sluiter (1990) 13-16.

⁴¹ Cf. Sluiter (1990) 50: 'Καταλληλότης refers to the mutual relationships of the constituents of a sentence; it is the notion into which symmetry of structure and semantics merge.' Blank (1982) 28 suggests that καταλληλότης is the term that represents ἀναλογία in syntax. For the use of κατάλληλος in writers before Apollonius (including Dionysius), see Blank (1982) 55-57.

⁴² See Sluiter (1990) 61-62. In his *Syntax*, Apollonius normally uses the expression τὸ ἐξῆς; see e.g. *Synt.* I.132 and cf. Lallot (1997 II) 68 n. 281. For ἀκολουθία as the rational order of words, see *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 42,8-9. Ἀκολουθία can also refer to a group of correlative words: see Steinthal (1891 II) 346 and Sluiter (1990) 84 and 130.

⁴³ See Sluiter (1990) 13-16.

⁴⁴ See Blank (1982) 31. This idea is implicitly present in various ancient accounts of natural word order: see especially sections 5.3 and 5.4.3 (on Dionysius, *Comp.* 5 and 'Longinus', *Subl.* 22.1).

⁴⁵ See Blank (1982) 16-17 and Lallot (1997 II) 68 n. 281.

⁴⁶ For ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία, see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 42,8-9; Dionysius, *Thuc.* 24.362,6, *Thuc.* 53.413,3 and *Amm.* II 2.423,12-13. See also section 5.4.2 for 'Longinus', *Subl.* 22.1: τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰρμοῦ παντοίως πρὸς μυρίας τροπὰς ἐναλλάττουσι τάξιν.

Coming back to Dionysius, we can observe that in his rhetorical works of the middle and later period (see section 1.3), he makes use of ideas on syntax that are related to Apollonius' views mentioned above.⁴⁷ In his earlier works, Dionysius merely points to the naturalness of Lysias' composition in a general way, and he criticises the artificiality of authors like Isaeus; but he does not yet describe the grammatical order and syntax that characterises the natural and artificial styles. In his later works, however, he develops a grammatical apparatus that describes the unnatural style in a more precise way. In particular, Dionysius frequently points out that a passage deviates from ἀκολουθία because the construction of the parts of speech is not congruent κατάλληλος). We have already encountered some interesting illustrations of this approach in the preceding chapter (section 4.4.2). For example, we have seen that Dionysius points out that a participle should have had the feminine instead of the masculine form in order to agree with a corresponding feminine noun.⁴⁸ With regard to a sentence that combines a future (in fact an optative present) and a present tense, he describes the style as 'deviating from the syntactical congruence' (ἐκβεβηκυῖα τὸ κατάλληλον).⁴⁹ He also points to the fact that a pronoun and a participle that should agree with each other are expressed in two different cases, thus forming an 'incongruent construction' (σχηματισμὸς ἀκατάλληλος).⁵⁰ Thus, by combining the grammatical theory of the parts of speech with an implicit theory of syntax (indicated by the terms ἀκολουθία and κατάλληλος), Dionysius has found a useful tool for analysing the precise character of different styles and composition types. In particular, the syntactic analysis enables him to pin down the causes of the style that he regards as 'unnatural'.

Another tool that enables Dionysius to be more precise about the defects of unnatural composition is the method of metathesis (rewriting) (see section 2.3 and chapter 7). In the first instance, it might seem attractive to compare Dionysius' rewritings with the paraphrases that we find in Apollonius Dyscolus. However, there is an important difference between the rewriting techniques of the rhetorician and the grammarian. Apollonius frequently rewrites sentences from daily usage or literary texts in order to

⁴⁷ The adjective κατάλληλος occurs four times in Dionysius: *Dem.* 27.189,9; *Thuc.* 31.378,9; *Thuc.* 37.389,21; *Amm.* II 12.431,17. The opposite ἀκατάλληλος occurs twice: *Dem.* 27.188,3 and *Amm.* II 12.432,9 (for the latter passage, see section 4.4.2). The substantive καταλληλότης, which we find in Apollonius, does not occur in Dionysius' works. The term ἀκολουθία is rather frequent in Dionysius' later works; it only occurs in *Dem.*, *Thuc.*, *Amm.* II and *Comp.* Dionysius uses the word ἐξῆς only in the sense of 'following' or 'in close succession', not with the technical meaning that the term has in Apollonius.

⁴⁸ *Amm.* II 11: see section 4.4.2.

⁴⁹ *Amm.* II 12: see section 4.4.2.

⁵⁰ *Amm.* II 12: see section 4.4.2.

bring out their meaning.⁵¹ Sluiter has pointed out that these paraphrases are primarily intended as interpretations of the original sentences.⁵² Apollonius' paraphrases often contain ungrammatical Greek: they bring out the meaning of an utterance without pretending to give the normal expression: thus, Apollonius' paraphrases are *theoretical* constructions.⁵³ Dionysius' rewritings, on the other hand, show the future orator how he should write himself: they are practical models of correct writing, which are intended to correct the artificial and obscure writings of authors like Thucydides.⁵⁴ Thus, while Apollonius' paraphrases sometimes produce unfamiliar or even ungrammatical Greek, Dionysius' metatheses intend to correspond to the regular structure of ordinary Greek.⁵⁵

In order to illustrate further how Dionysius' employs syntactic theory in his analyses of 'natural' style and word order, I will discuss two more passages, one from *On Demosthenes* and one from *On Thucydides*. My discussion of these passages aims to show that the grammatical framework on the one hand and the method of metathesis on the other enable Dionysius to give a more detailed analysis of what he regards as '(un)natural' style.

In *On Demosthenes* 23-32, Dionysius draws a comparison between the funeral speech in Plato's *Menexenus* and the encomium of Athens in Demosthenes' *On the Crown*. It has been pointed out that this comparison is rather unfair, since Plato probably

⁵¹ The grammarian Nicanor (first half of the second century AD) held that one could remove all grammatically unnecessary words in order to bring out the basic structure of the sentence (τὸ ἐξῆς). Nicanor called the unnecessary parts of the sentence διὰ μέσου: see Sluiter (1990) 68-69. The expression διὰ μέσου also occurs three times in Dionysius' works, but he does not use it to denote 'unnecessary parts': (1) In *Thuc.* 25.365,9-13, Dionysius objects to the arrangement of a sentence from Thucydides 4.34.1: he says that the last part (of the sentence) should immediately follow the first part, and that 'the intervening parts' (τῶν δὲ διὰ μέσου) should take the next place. (2) In *Dem.* 38.210,22-211,2, hiatus is described as the pause that exists in the middle between (διὰ μέσου) the vowel at the end of one word and the vowel at the beginning of the next word. (3) In *Comp.* 25.129,6-7 (καὶ τί γε δὴ διὰ μέσου παρεμπεσὸν τὸ 'καὶ σκοπῶ' according to Usener-Radermacher), Dionysius seems to use the expression διὰ μέσου for the words καὶ σκοπῶ (quoted from Demosthenes' *Against Aristocrates*), which he considers an intrusion that rightly obscures the metre of the rest of the passage; without the intrusion, the passage would have been 'in rhythm' rather than rhythmical. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 181 however, following the MSS, read καὶ ἔτι γε, νῆ Δία, μέσου παρεμπεσόντος τοῦ 'καὶ σκοπῶ' etc.

⁵² Sluiter (1990) 65-69.

⁵³ Cf. Lallot (1997 I) 59: 'Il va sans dire qu'il s'agit, dans tous ces exemples, d'un ordre *théorique* (ou "profond", pour parler comme Householder), celui de la "séquence normale" (τὸ ἐξῆς), qui peut toujours être altéré par transposition (...), hyperbate.'

⁵⁴ As I have pointed out before, Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides is not an aim in itself, but serves to guide future orators and historians (like Tubero). With regard to Thucydides' style, Dionysius' message is: 'Do not try this at home!'

⁵⁵ On the ungrammatical Greek of Apollonius' paraphrases, see Sluiter (1990) 65-68.

intended Aspasia's funeral speech as a satirical parody of contemporary rhetoric.⁵⁶ Dionysius could have selected a more typical passage from Plato's work, if he had wished to present a text that could really challenge Demosthenes' superiority.⁵⁷ It is important to realise, however, that Dionysius' aim in this treatise is to present Demosthenes as the greatest model for all rhetorical writing. Thus, Dionysius first argues that the middle style is to be preferred to the grand and simple styles. Next, he points out that among the authors who applied the middle style Demosthenes was the most successful orator. Therefore, Dionysius has to prove that Demosthenes' style is superior to that of two other representatives of the middle style, namely Isocrates and Plato. His analysis of the *Menexenus* serves the purpose of showing that Plato does not in all respects succeed in applying the middle style: in many cases, Plato uses too artificial expressions, which belong to the grand rather than the middle style.⁵⁸ Plato is criticised for his obscurity, his excessive use of figures of speech, in particular the theatrical figures of Gorgias such as antitheses and balanced clauses, his periphrases, and his bombastic language.⁵⁹ Dionysius' objections to Plato's style closely correspond to his criticism of Thucydides' unnatural style (see above). Just as he did with regard to Thucydides, Dionysius also rewrites some sentences from the *Menexenus* in a clearer and more straightforward style.⁶⁰ In *On Demosthenes* 27, Dionysius analyses a sentence from the *Menexenus* that he describes as 'prolonged, grammatically irregular, and having neither force nor coherence' (διὰ μακροῦ τε γὰρ

⁵⁶ See e.g. Blass, *DAB* II (1979³ [1874]) 469 and Walsdorff (1927) 18-21. For the parodic character of the funeral speech in the *Menexenus*, see Blass *DAB* II (1979³ [1874]) 464 and Tsitsiridis (1998) 88-92, who prefers the term 'pastiche'. For Dionysius' analysis of the *Menexenus*, see Clavaud (1980) 25-29, who points to 'le peu d'aptitude de Denys à saisir l'humour de Platon'.

⁵⁷ See Bonner (1939) 67 and Usher (1974) 234 and 359 n. 1. In *Dem.* 23.179,17-23, Dionysius objects to the habit of other critics, who select the worst passage from Plato and compare it with the finest passage from Demosthenes. Dionysius promises that, unlike these other critics, he will draw a fair comparison. The promise turns out to be empty: Dionysius was probably too eager to convince his audience of the superiority of his great model Demosthenes. He may have selected the *Menexenus* because of the popularity of the funeral speech that it contains: see Cicero, *Orator* 151 and cf. Blass, *DAB* II (1979³ [1874]) 469. But it is remarkable how easily Dionysius (*Dem.* 23.180,1-4) rejects the possibility of comparing Demosthenes' speech with Plato's *Apology*: the *Apology* 'never saw even the threshold of a law-court or an open assembly, but was written for another purpose and belongs to the category neither of oratory nor of dialogue.' For a discussion of this 'tantalizingly cryptic' argument, see Reid (1997). Many modern scholars have sharply rejected Dionysius' biased attitude towards Plato. The classicist and composer Diepenbrock (1911) 164, who speaks of a 'dwaling' ('aberration'), belongs to a long tradition of scholars who denounced Dionysius' treatment of Plato. At the beginning of this tradition stands Gnaeus Pompeius Geminus, who forced Dionysius to defend his criticism of Plato in the letter that is addressed to him.

⁵⁸ On Dionysius' evaluation of Plato's style, see Walsdorff (1927) 9-24.

⁵⁹ See *Dem.* 24.183,1-10; *Dem.* 26.187,5-10; *Dem.* 25.184,16-19; *Dem.* 29.192,5-11.

⁶⁰ *Dem.* 24.183,1-10; *Dem.* 27.188,12-189,16.

καὶ ἀκατάλληλον καὶ οὔτε δεινότητα ἔχον οὔτε σύνταξιν).⁶¹ His criticism is mainly directed at the first part of the sentence:⁶²

τῆς δ' εὐγενείας πρῶτον ὑπῆρξε τοῖσδε ἡ (τῶν προγόνων) γένεσις, οὐκ ἔπηλυσ οὔσα οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκγόνους τούτους ἀποφνηαμένη μετοικοῦντας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτόχθονας ...

'The first factor of their nobility was their birth, which was not foreign nor did it reveal these descendants as immigrants to the land, their parents having come from abroad, but as natives (...).'

According to Dionysius, this sentence contains a number of shortcomings, which would not occur in the language of people who practice 'pure language' (καθαρὰ διαλέκτῳ). First, he points to some instances of the abnormal usage of words. For example, Dionysius objects to the combination of γένεσις with ἀποφνηαμένη: 'for it is not *natural* for birth in itself to reveal something' (...), but 'it is we who reveal a statement.'⁶³ Next, he focuses on the grammatical construction:

τίς δὲ βουλόμενος σφάζειν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν, εἰπὼν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ περὶ ταύτης τὸν λόγον ἀποδιδούς ἐπιζεύξειεν ἂν τὸ ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων, τὸ ἀρρενικὸν τῷ θηλυκῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνικῷ τὸ πληθυντικόν;

'What writer who was concerned with preserving the grammatical sequence would first speak of ἡ γένεσις and then, while developing his account of this, connect to it ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων, linking masculine to feminine and plural to singular?'

⁶¹ *Dem.* 27.188,1-189,16. The text is uncertain: σύνταξιν is the reading of one of the MSS, which is followed by Radermacher. Aujac (1988) follows the reading of another manuscript, σαφήνειαν, which may well be correct. Other MSS have a lacuna here.

⁶² Plato, *Menex.* 237b2-c3.

⁶³ *Dem.* 27.189,1-3: οὔτε γὰρ ἡ γένεσις αὐτὴ τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι φύσιν ἔχει ... ἀλλ' ἀποφαινόμεθα μὲν ἡμεῖς τὰ λεκτά ... Dionysius seems to think that ἀποφαίνεσθαι is wrong because he interprets the verb as 'to point out'; Tsitsiridis (1998) 199 translates the word as 'erscheinen lassen', and rejects Dionysius' criticism. Dionysius has two more objections. First, the combination of the word γένεσις with the adjective ἔπηλυσ is obscure, since 'foreign' is an attribute of ourselves, not of our birth. Tsitsiridis (1998) 199 points out that γένεσις ἔπηλυσ is actually not an unusual hypallage. Further, Dionysius objects to Plato's formulation 'birth did not reveal the descendants as immigrants'. He remarks that people cannot be said to be 'immigrants' in the land in which they were born: 'people are only immigrants if they come from elsewhere to the land that receives them.' Dionysius' point seems to be that 'birth' (γένεσις) automatically happens in the land where one is born, so that it necessarily assigns children to the land where they are born. Plato, however, seems to use the word γένεσις in the sense of 'descent' (corresponding to πρόγονων): see Tsitsiridis (1998) 199 and, differently, Aujac (1988) 170.

Dionysius' objection concerns what we would call a *constructio ad sensum*: Plato uses the pronoun σφῶν, as if the subject had been οἱ πρόγονοι, and not ἡ τῶν προγόνων γένεσις.⁶⁴ Of course, we do not have to agree with Dionysius that Plato is wrong in applying this construction. What matters for our purpose is that Dionysius' grammatical terminology proves to be an effective tool in analysing the specific character of a style that he considers unusual and unnatural.⁶⁵ For, instead of merely pointing to the 'unnaturalness' of the composition, as he did in his early works, Dionysius is now able to offer a more precise description of Plato's expression: the combination of a masculine plural with a feminine singular has ruined the ἀκολουθία. As we have pointed out above, the term ἀκολουθία describes a sentence whose construction is grammatically correct and whose words are all put in their proper place.⁶⁶ In some cases, the aspect of word order is dominant, as in *Dem.* 9 (see above), where Dionysius objected to a hyperbaton that splits up the corresponding noun and verb Φίλιππος ... ἀδικεῖ. In other cases, as in *Dem.* 27, it is the other aspect of ἀκολουθία that is more relevant, namely correct syntax: in this case, the point is that Plato has failed to preserve the correct construction. Dionysius proceeds by saying that 'the sentence would have been syntactically correct (κατάλληλος) if Plato had referred back to γένεσις, which was the subject of the sentence (ὑπὲρ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἦν) and had added ἄλλοθεν αὐτῆς ἡκούσης'.⁶⁷ The term κατάλληλος does not so much refer to 'coherence' (Usher), but rather to the syntactic agreement between γένεσις and αὐτῆς. The problem of incongruity could of course also be solved in another way, namely by substituting οἱ πρόγονοι for ἡ τῶν προγόνων γένεσις, so that ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων would agree with the subject of the sentence. Dionysius adopts this second solution and rewrites the sentence with a correct syntactic structure. His metathesis at the same time solves the other shortcomings of the sentence (concerning the abnormal usage of γένεσις), to which Dionysius has objected earlier on (see above):

τῆς δ' εὐγενείας πρῶτον ὑπῆρξαν τοῖσδε οἱ πρόγονοι, οὐχὶ ἐπῆλυδες ὄντες οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκγόνους τούτους ἀποφάναντες μετοικούντας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτόχθονας.

⁶⁴ Cf. Tsitsiridis (1998) 199. In *Amm.* II 13, Dionysius objects to *constructiones ad sensum* in Thucydides: see section 4.4.2.

⁶⁵ Dionysius mentions the word φύσις in *Dem.* 27.189,2.

⁶⁶ Cf. Blank (1982) 27 and Sluiter (1990) 61-62.

⁶⁷ *Dem.* 27.189,9-11: ἦν γὰρ δὴ που κατάλληλος ὁ λόγος, εἰ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν ἀναφέρων, ὑπὲρ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἦν, ἐπέθηκεν· ἄλλοθεν αὐτῆς ἡκούσης.'

Finally, we turn to *On Thucydides*, which belongs to Dionysius' latest works. We have already seen that Dionysius regards Thucydides' style as unnatural, because it deviates from the ordinary use of language.⁶⁸ At the end of *On Thucydides*, Dionysius again summarises the historian's most distinctive qualities in terms of the 'unusual' and 'unnatural': one of the items in a long list of Thucydidean characteristics is the use of 'figures that are awkward and moved away from natural collocation, and which would not even find a place in any kind of poetry' (τοὺς σκαιοὺς καὶ πεπλανημένους ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν συζυγίας καὶ οὐδ' ἐν ἀπάσῃ ποιητικῇ χώραν ἔχοντας σχηματισμούς).⁶⁹ Earlier in the same treatise, Dionysius describes the unnatural composition of Thucydides in a more specific way, by pointing to irregularities in his syntactic constructions. A good example is *Thuc.* 37: in that chapter, Dionysius starts a discussion of the Melian dialogue, and analyses the first sentence of the Melian representatives, which runs as follows:⁷⁰

Ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους οὐ ψέγεται· τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα διαφέροντα αὐτοῦ φαίνεται.

'The reasonableness of instructing each other at leisure is not open to objection. But the acts of war, which are not in the future but already here at hand, manifestly differ from this.'

⁶⁸ See section 4.4. In *On Thucydides*, there are several aspects of Thucydides' work (concerning both style and content) that are described as 'unnatural': (1) in *Thuc.* 11.341,5-7, Dionysius objects to the unnatural order in which Thucydides reports the events, and to the fact that he mentions first the false and then the true cause of the Peloponnesian war: ἡ τε γὰρ φύσις ἀπῆται τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ληθῆ πρό τῶν ψευδῶν λέγεσθαι (cf. *Is.* 11.106,15-16); (2) in *Thuc.* 12.342,1, Dionysius remarks that Thucydides' narrative has an unnatural starting-point: τὸ μὴ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ἀρχήν; (3) in *Thuc.* 24.362,6-7, Dionysius points out that Thucydides changes the natural uses of gender and number, so that the natural word order is ruined: ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία πλανᾶται; (4) in *Thuc.* 53.413,2-4, Dionysius objects to the fact that Thucydides 'figures' stray from the natural order and make the impression of solecisms: τῶν σχημάτων τὸ πεπλανημένον ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίας καὶ τὸ σολοικοφανές. An exception is *Thuc.* 42.398,8-11: in that passage, Dionysius praises the speech of the Plataeans in Thucydides 3.53-59 because it is 'adorned with authentic natural colouring' (ἀληθεῖ δέ τι καὶ φυσικῶ κεκοσμηθῆναι χρώματι). Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides' style should be seen as a contribution to the debate among critics of the first century BC in Rome on the usefulness of Thucydides as a model for the writing of history (see also section 4.4). Dionysius (*Thuc.* 50.409,8-410,7) disagrees with those critics who approve of imitation of Thucydides' style. See Leeman (1955).

⁶⁹ See also section 6.4. The text of the complete list is as follows: *Thuc.* 52.412,6-17: Θουκυδίδου μιμητῆς (οὐδεὶς) ἐγένετο κατὰ ταῦτά γε, καθ' ὃ δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρειν, κατὰ τὴν γλωσσηματικὴν καὶ ἀπρηχαιωμένην καὶ ποιητικὴν καὶ ξένην λέξιν, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ὑπερβατοὺς καὶ πολυπλόκους καὶ ἐξ ἀποκοπῆς πολλὰ σημαίνειν πράγματα βουλομένας καὶ διὰ μακροῦ τὰς ἀποδόσεις λαμβανούσας νοήσεις, καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις κατὰ τοὺς σκαιοὺς καὶ πεπλανημένους ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν συζυγίας καὶ οὐδ' ἐν ἀπάσῃ ποιητικῇ χώραν ἔχοντας σχηματισμούς, ἐξ ὧν ἡ πάντα λυμαιομένη τὰ καλὰ καὶ σκότον παρέχουσα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀσάφεια παρήλθεν εἰς τοὺς λόγους.

⁷⁰ Thucydides 5.86. Dionysius' discussion of the Melian dialogue (Thucydides 5.84-111) covers *Thuc.* 37-41.

The analysis of this sentence adopts the same procedure as that of the passage from the *Menexenus*, which I have discussed above:⁷¹ first, Dionysius points to the grammatical irregularity, subsequently he analyses the exact nature of the incongruence, and finally he rewrites the sentence with a correct syntactical structure.⁷² However, Dionysius' remarks on this text have puzzled modern scholars to a great extent. Dionysius objects to Thucydides' use of the genitive singular αὐτοῦ (ἐνικὸν καὶ κατὰ τὴν γενικὴν ἐσχηματισμένον πτωσιν ... τὸ αὐτοῦ).⁷³ This word, he thinks, fails to preserve the ἀκολουθία, because it does not agree with the feminine singular ἐπιείκεια, 'nor with the accusative plural neuter' (τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε τῷ θηλυκῷ καὶ ἐνικῷ καὶ ὀνομαστικῷ προσαρμοστούμενον σφῆζει τὴν ἀκολουθίαν οὔτε τῷ πληθυντικῷ καὶ οὐδετέρῳ <καὶ> κατὰ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν ἐσχηματισμένῳ πτωσιν). The problem is that Thucydides' sentence does not contain any accusative plural neuter. For that reason, it has been suggested that Dionysius did not read φαίνεται but φαίνετε, and that the 'accusative plural neuter' was τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα διαφέροντα, which would have been the direct object of φαίνετε.⁷⁴ Both Usener and Pavano adopt this conjecture for the text of Dionysius.⁷⁵ Some other scholars think not only that Dionysius read φαίνετε, but also that this was actually what Thucydides himself had written.⁷⁶ But Classen has convincingly argued that this cannot have been the case: Thucydides uses the active verb φαίνειν nowhere else.⁷⁷ In my view, the conjecture φαίνετε is not only wrong for Thucydides', but also for Dionysius' text, for the following reason. In his metathesis, Dionysius rewrites Thucydides' sentence by substituting αὐτῆς for αὐτοῦ, thus making the pronoun agree with ἐπιείκεια; but he does not change anything else, and writes φαίνεται, according to all manuscripts.⁷⁸ Now, if he had read φαίνετε in the first instance, then he should also have written it in his metathesis: there is no reason whatsoever to believe that Dionysius *rewrites* φαίνετε as φαίνεται, for his metathesis exclusively serves the purpose of correcting the supposedly wrong form αὐτοῦ.⁷⁹ Therefore, I think that the

⁷¹ See *Thuc.* 37.389,5-390,3.

⁷² For Dionysius' analysis of this sentence, see also Bonner (1939) 91 and Grube (1950) 107.

⁷³ For Dionysius' classification of αὐτοῦ as either a 'deictic article' or a 'pronoun', see section 3.6.3.

⁷⁴ See Classen (1912) 285: Bücheler suggested the conjecture.

⁷⁵ Usener: *Thuc.* 37.389,7; Pavano (1958) 152.

⁷⁶ Stahl and Van Herwerden read φαίνετε in Thucydides 5.86: see Classen (1912) 285.

⁷⁷ Classen (1912) 285 also argues that φαίνετε would break the parallelism with ψέγεται, but this is not a very strong argument in view of Thucydides' preference for variation.

⁷⁸ *Thuc.* 37.390,1-3: ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους οὐ ψέγεται, τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα διαφέροντα αὐτῆς φαίνεται.

⁷⁹ I agree with Aujac (1991) 99, who reads both times φαίνεται. Pavano (1958) 246 also realises the difficulty of reading φαίνετε in the first instance and φαίνεται in the second and hesitates whether Dionysius consciously or unconsciously misread Thucydides: 'Utrum ille igitur incuriose ap. Thuc. φαίνετε pro φαίνεται re vera legerit, an potius verbum a Thucydide prolutum malitia immutaverit, dubitare licet.'

correctness of the manuscripts should in this case not be doubted: both Dionysius' quotation of Thucydides and his own metathesis contain the form φαίνεται.⁸⁰ What 'accusative neuter plural' did Dionysius then think of? One might consider the possibility that διαφέροντα was used as a transitive verb ('to carry away'), which could be combined with an accusative. However, such a construction would not make any sense, and αὐτά could not be used by itself without agreeing with another word. The conclusion should be that Dionysius was just mistaken in this case, and that he meant to say 'nominative' where he wrote 'accusative'.⁸¹ In any case, his objection to Thucydides' construction is not correct: as many modern commentators have pointed out, the word αὐτοῦ refers to τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους.⁸² But even if Dionysius is wrong, it is worth observing how his method of stylistic analysis has developed.⁸³ The use of syntactic theory and technical terminology has enabled him to put his finger on what he regards as the cause of the alleged unnaturalness of Thucydides' style.

Dionysius states that Thucydides' sentence fails to preserve the ἀκολουθία, and he points out how it should be constructed (σχηματισθείς) in order to be syntactically congruent (κατάλληλος). As I have pointed out before, ἀκολουθία is characteristic of a sentence whose parts occupy their proper places, while at the same time being in grammatical agreement with one another. It is the latter condition of ἀκολουθία that Thucydides has not satisfied, according to Dionysius. In the same passage, we also found another important grammatical term, namely σολοικισμός (solecism), which we already encountered in our discussion of Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* (section 4.4.2). In *Thuc.* 37, Dionysius points out that 'if one would propose to assign Thucydides' sentence to the figures (σχήματα), then one should call all the solecisms (σολοικισμοί) of number and case-usage "figures"'.⁸⁴ The boundaries between figures and solecisms were indeed rather

⁸⁰ See also Pritchett (1975) 123-124. I would like to add that there are some interesting textual uncertainties in this passage, esp. in *Thuc.* 37.389,12-13 (ἔπειτα συνάψας τῷ ἐνικῷ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὀρθὴν ἐξηγνηγμένῳ πτόσιν 'τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα'). The first καὶ is not in all MSS, and ἐξηγνηγμένῳ is an emendation by Sylburg: the MSS have ἐξηγνηγμένα. Thus, perhaps one should read ἔπειτα συνάψας τῷ ἐνικῷ κατὰ τὴν ὀρθὴν ἐξηγνηγμένα πτόσιν 'τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα', in which case Dionysius classifies the neuter plurals as nominatives.

⁸¹ This is of course a solution that I would rather avoid, for I would prefer applying the *principle of charity*. However, it seems that one has to choose between two evils: either one radically changes the text and ignores the unanimity of the MSS at two places (*Thuc.* 37.389,7 and 37.390,3), or one assumes that Dionysius, who was not a grammarian and had presumably obtained his linguistic knowledge only recently, was in this case inaccurate in his use of grammatical terminology.

⁸² See e.g. Classen (1912) 285 and Pritchett (1975) 123.

⁸³ Cf. Bonner (1939) 91.

⁸⁴ *Thuc.* 37.389,7-10: τοῦτο τὸ τελευταῖον εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς σχήμασιν ἀξιῶσει φέρειν, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοι πάντας τοὺς σολοικισμούς, ὅσοι γίνονται παρὰ τοὺς ἀριθμούς καὶ παρὰ τὰς πτώσεις, σχήματα καλῶν;

vague in ancient rhetorical theory. The term σχῆμα has a wide range of meanings, but it specifically refers to a form of expression that deviates from the normal style of speaking.⁸⁵ As such, it refers to both grammatical figures and rhetorical figures (of speech and thought). Now, deviation can be considered either a quality or a mistake: in the former case it is called a σχῆμα, but in the latter case it is called a σολοικισμός.⁸⁶ It is this ambiguous status of deviating expressions, between ‘figures’ and ‘grammatical irregularities’, to which Dionysius refers when objecting to Thucydides’ use of numbers and cases. The term σολοικισμός (or σολοικίζειν) appears five times in Dionysius’ works, all in two treatises belonging to the later period, namely *On Thucydides* and its appendix, the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*.⁸⁷ He uses the word σολοικισμός exclusively to describe Thucydides’ use of language: other authors are never criticised for their σολοικισμοί. In some cases Dionysius explicitly hesitates whether Thucydides’ unusual language is figurative or ungrammatical. Thus, he refers to figures that ‘make the impression of solecisms’.⁸⁸ In four cases, he expresses that same idea by using the adjective σολοικοφανής (‘appearing to be a solecism’) to describe the historian’s constructions (σχηματισμοί).⁸⁹ We can explain this term as follows. On the one hand, Dionysius wants his readers to avoid the obscurity of Thucydides’ style. On the other hand, the authority and status of the historian presumably makes that Dionysius tries to avoid characterising his language as ungrammatical. The term σολοικοφανής is the solution for this ambiguous attitude towards the historian. For Dionysius’ audience the deviating expressions would be solecisms, but when Thucydides uses them they just *make the impression* of being ungrammatical.

⁸⁵ See Lausberg 499. A discussion of Dionysius’ views on figures falls outside the scope of this study. I will restrict myself to a few remarks on the linguistic aspects of σχήματα.

⁸⁶ See Lausberg 498. For the ambiguous status of σχήματα between grammar and rhetoric, see Schenkeveld (1991). For Dionysius’ views on figures of speech and solecisms, see also Schenkeveld (1983) 90-92.

⁸⁷ *Thuc.* 24.362,13-16 (= *Amm.* II 2.424,2-6): see section 4.4.2. *Thuc.* 33.381,6-7: σχήματα, ὧν ἔνια σολοικισμῶν παρέχεται δόξαν, ‘figures some of which have the appearance of solecisms’. *Thuc.* 37.389,9: see above. *Amm.* II 2.424,2-6 (= *Thuc.* 24.362,13-16): see section 4.4.2. *Amm.* II 11.431,9 (σολοικίζειν): see section 4.4.2. In *Comp.* 18.82,6, the word σολοικισμός is part of a citation from Hegesias.

⁸⁸ See *Thuc.* 33.381,6-7 (preceding note).

⁸⁹ *Thuc.* 29.373,2: τὰς τῶν σχηματισμῶν πλοκάς σολοικοφανεῖς, ‘combinations of figures that verge upon solecism’. *Thuc.* 53.413,2-4: τὸ πεπλανημένον ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίας καὶ τὸ σολοικοφανές, ‘that which strays from the natural sequence and that which makes the impression of solecism’. *Thuc.* 55.417,24: τὸ σολοικοφανές ἐν τοῖς σχηματισμοῖς, the apparently ungrammatical construction in his figures’. *Din.* 8.308,3: τοὺς δὲ σολοικοφανεῖς σχηματισμούς, the figures make the impression of solecism’. Dionysius uses the term σολοικοφανής only in his discussions of Thucydides. Σολοικοφανής is further found only in later writers: see Galenus 16.512,3 and Eustathius 630.46. Dionysius’ term σχηματισμός (‘configuration’) refers both to the grammatical formation of a word (with the correct gender, case, number, tense, etc.) and to the formation of clauses and periods: see sections 3.7 and 4.3.1.

Apart from the passage discussed above, there are many more cases in which Dionysius describes Thucydides' deviations (ἐξאלλαγαί) as failing to preserve the ἀκολουθία. In the discussion of the three composition types in *On Composition*, the austere composition type (σύνθεσις αὐστηρά), of which Thucydides is one of the main representatives, is described as 'in many cases neglecting the logical order' (ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπεροπτική τῆς ἀκολουθίας) (see section 4.3.2).⁹⁰ In three cases, Dionysius points out that Thucydides' expressions violate 'the natural order' (ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία).⁹¹

Dionysius' discussions of passages from Demosthenes, Plato and Thucydides allow us to conclude the following. We have seen that in the descriptions of style (and its various aspects) in his earlier works, Dionysius frequently uses the concept of the 'natural' (φυσικόν), arguing that some sentence or composition is or is not written 'according to nature' (κατὰ φύσιν): φύσις is here used as opposed to τέχνη and refers to the expression that imitates the artless language of laymen. This concept remains very important in Dionysius' later works, but he also develops a more effective way of analysing the exact character of what he regards as natural (and unnatural) style, syntax, and word order. There are two things that have brought Dionysius' observations on a higher plane. First, he adopts a grammatical framework, including not only the theory of the parts of speech and its accidentia, but also some interesting ideas on syntax: what he used to label as 'natural' or 'unnatural' can now be described as (ἀ)κατάλληλος, and, what is more, the exact causes of incorrect syntax or illogical word order can be identified. Second, the method of metathesis enables Dionysius to compare a passage that does not preserve the ἀκολουθία with a version whose syntax and word order is clear and correct. In chapter 7 of this study, I will return to the procedure of metathesis. The following section, however, will be devoted to a concept of natural word order that differs from the ideas that we have discussed so far.

5.3. Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order (*Comp.* 5)

In *On Composition* 5, Dionysius reports on an experiment by which he investigated the effects of natural word order.⁹² In this experiment, 'nature' (φύσις) does not refer to everyday language or artless expression, but rather to the rules of logic. In this section, I will examine the philosophical background of Dionysius' discussion. I will first discuss the possible connection between his remarks on Stoic treatises on syntax

⁹⁰ *Comp.* 22.98,2-3.

⁹¹ *Thuc.* 24.362,6, *Thuc.* 53.413,3 and *Amm.* II 2.423,12-13

⁹² On this passage, see also Scaglione (1972) 77-79, Schenkeveld (1983) 85-89, Paximadi (1989) and De Jonge (2001) 160-162.

(*Comp.* 4) on the one hand and his experiment on natural word order (*Comp.* 5) on the other. Then, I will analyse Dionysius' experiment, paying close attention to the philosophical background of the ideas involved in this passage. I will argue that Dionysius' experiment is partly based on the Stoic theory of categories.

5.3.1. The Stoic treatises and Dionysius' natural starting point

Before we turn to a discussion of Dionysius' experiment, we should first consider his remarks at the end of *On Composition* 4. In that passage, Dionysius prepares the way for his investigations into natural word order. First, he comments on the (disappointing) contributions of previous writers to the theory of composition, in particular the Stoic treatises on syntax with their dialectical approach. Subsequently, Dionysius tells us that, disappointed by the Stoic books, he himself tried to find a 'natural starting point' for his investigations. It is important to pay close attention to Dionysius' words in *Comp.* 4, because many scholars have suggested that the Stoic treatises that he mentions are actually the source of the experiment on natural word order in *Comp.* 5.

Having criticised a number of Hellenistic writers (Polybius, Hieronymus, Hegesianax, etc.) for their neglect of the art of composition, Dionysius adds that we should not be surprised about the poor composition of these literary writers: for even philosophers, who publish dialectical treatises (διαλεκτικὰς τέχνας), are inept in the arrangement of their words, and the worst specimens of composition are the works of the Stoic Chrysippus.⁹³ The disappointing quality of the Stoic texts is the more remarkable, Dionysius says, since some of these philosophers themselves made a study of the subject of composition, and even wrote handbooks on the syntax of the parts of speech (τέχνας ... ὑπὲρ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων).⁹⁴ In other words, even those people who studied the syntax (σύνταξις) of the parts of speech did not compose (συντιθέναι) satisfactory texts themselves.⁹⁵ Next, Dionysius turns from practice to theory: he now focuses on predecessors who wrote treatises on the theory of composition. He reports that, when he had decided to write a treatise on composition (σύνθεσις), he first investigated what earlier writers had said about the subject.⁹⁶ In particular, he consulted the works of the Stoic philosophers, because he

⁹³ *Comp.* 4.20,19-21,15 (Chrysippus fr. 25 Dufour). See section 3.3.1.

⁹⁴ *Comp.* 4.21,15-22,3. See section 3.3.1.

⁹⁵ Note that in this passage Dionysius equates σύνταξις with σύνθεσις, which seems to pave the way for his philosophical approach to composition in *Comp.* 5. On σύνταξις and σύνθεσις, see section 5.1.

⁹⁶ *Comp.* 4.22,3-5.

knew that they paid much attention to ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος.⁹⁷ However, it turned out that the Stoic works did not contribute anything useful. The title of the two books by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, *Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν* (*On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech*), turned out to be misleading: Chrysippus' books did not contain a rhetorical, but a dialectical investigation (see also section 3.3.1).⁹⁸ They dealt with 'the combination (σύνταξις) of true and false propositions, possible and impossible ones, propositions that are contingent, changing their truth value, ambiguous ones and others of such a kind'.⁹⁹ Dionysius' judgement is clear: 'These works contribute nothing helpful or useful to civil oratory, at least as far as the attractiveness and beauty of style (ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος ἐρμηνείας) are concerned; and these qualities should be the aim of composition.'¹⁰⁰ Therefore, Dionysius put the Stoic treatises aside (at least, that is what he says), and tried to find a different approach to the art of composition.¹⁰¹

ταύτης μὲν τῆς πραγματείας ἀπέστην, ἐσκόπουν δ' αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑμαυτοῦ γενόμενος, εἴ τινα δυνάμην εὐρεῖν φυσικὴν ἀφορμὴν, ἐπειδὴ παντὸς πράγματος καὶ πάσης ζητήσεως αὕτη δοκεῖ κρατίστη εἶναι ἀρχή.

'I abandoned this enquiry and, independent and relying on myself, I considered whether I could find some natural starting point, since that seems to be the best beginning of every operation and every enquiry.'

So, after he had concluded that the Stoic treatises were useless for his purposes, Dionysius started looking for a φυσικὴ ἀφορμή, 'a natural starting point'. According to Rhys Roberts, the latter words suggest a 'Stoic point of view'.¹⁰² Likewise, Aujac & Lebel remark: 'La recours à la nature est un démarche typiquement stoïcienne.'¹⁰³ However, the search for a natural starting does not necessarily point to Stoic influence. Of course, a Stoic philosopher would have appreciated Dionysius'

⁹⁷ *Comp.* 4.22,5-8.

⁹⁸ *Comp.* 4.22,8-23,1 (Chrysippus fr. 199 Dufour). On Dionysius' reference to Chrysippus' works on syntax, see Kroll (1907) 91 n. 2, Barwick (1957) 21, Frede (1987a) 324-325, Baratin (1989) 217-218, Atherton (1993) 142 n. 7, Luhtala (2000) 24 and Van Ophuijsen (2003) 81 and 93. The misleading character of some philosophical book titles is a phenomenon that also annoyed Antonius in Cicero's *De oratore* 2.61: 'Whenever I happen to come across your philosophers, misled by the labels of their books (because they almost always bear titles derived from familiar and important subjects, for example, on virtue, on justice, on the honorable, on pleasure), then I don't understand a single word — so entangled are they by their narrow and minutely detailed discussions.' (Translation May & Wisse.)

⁹⁹ *Comp.* 4.22,14-17: for the Greek text, see section 3.3.1.

¹⁰⁰ *Comp.* 4.22,18-23,1: for the Greek text, see section 3.3.1.

¹⁰¹ *Comp.* 4.23,1-5.

¹⁰² Rhys Roberts (1910) 97.

¹⁰³ Aujac & Lebel (1981) 204.

method;¹⁰⁴ but many Stoic ideas had become part of the general intellectual discourse of the first century BC, and this is particularly true of the idea that one should take nature as one's model. Besides, the view that one should be guided by nature can be found in almost all Hellenistic philosophies.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, Dionysius' search for a 'natural' point of departure fits into a Stoic context, but it does *in itself* not prove that the experiment concerning natural word order was influenced by Stoic philosophy.

We should notice how strongly Dionysius emphasises that his new approach is his own idea, and that it does not depend on the work done by his predecessors: he abandoned the Stoic treatises, and relying on himself (αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑμαυτοῦ γενόμενος), he looked for a natural starting point. In spite of this clear statement, many scholars have assumed that Dionysius borrowed his chapter on natural word order (*Comp.* 5) from the Stoic sources that he had criticised earlier on.¹⁰⁶ Although I will argue that Dionysius' experiment in *Comp.* 5 is indeed partly based on Stoic views, I do not think that Dionysius copied the entire chapter from Chrysippus, as some scholars have suggested.¹⁰⁷ I rather think that Dionysius combined some Stoic ideas on language with his own rhetorical approach to word order. Before I illuminate my interpretation, I will first point out which indications make us believe that Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word makes use of Stoic ideas. Modern scholars have pointed to three elements in particular, namely the 'natural starting point', the repeated reference to Stoic treatises at the end of *Comp.* 5, and the Stoic terminology of the passage. I will briefly examine the value of these three possible indications.

First, Dionysius does not only speak of a 'natural' starting point, but at the beginning of *Comp.* 5 he also states that the arrangement of words should be 'as nature demands'.¹⁰⁸ As I have already pointed out, this fact is not decisive in itself, since the importance of nature was generally acknowledged among intellectuals of the first century BC. In section 5.2, we have seen that the concept of nature is very prominent in all Dionysius' rhetorical works. The second argument for the Stoic character of the experiment on natural word order concerns the fact that Dionysius refers to the Stoic treatises not only before he turns to his experiment (at the end of *Comp.* 4), but also *after* the passage on natural word order (at the end of *Comp.* 5). There, Dionysius

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Usher (1985) 47 n. 1: 'A theory of which a Stoic theorist would have approved.'

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Pellicer (1966) 267-270.

¹⁰⁶ See Kroll (1907) 91 n. 2, Jensen (1923) 149, Barwick (1957) 21, Pohl (1968) 3, and Schenkeveld (1983) 86: 'Therefore, there is a considerable chance at least that DH has been led to the problem of a natural word order by these Stoic *technai*, if he has not taken over from these his exposition in ch. 5.'

¹⁰⁷ See esp. Kroll (1907) 91 and Barwick (1957) 21.

¹⁰⁸ *Comp.* 5.23,13. See section 5.3.2.

summarises both his study of the dialectical treatises and his own experiment on natural word order together in one concluding remark:¹⁰⁹

διὰ ταύτας μὲν δὴ τὰς αἰτίας τῆς τοιαύτης θεωρίας ἀπέστην. ἐμνήσθην δ' αὐτῶν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ὥς σπουδῆς ἀξίων, καὶ τὰς διαλεκτικὰς παρεθέμην τέχνας οὐχ ὥς ἀναγκαίαις, ἀλλ' ἵνα μηδεὶς δοκῶν ἔχειν τι αὐτὰς χρήσιμον εἰς τὴν παροῦσαν θεωρίαν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῆται εἰδέναι, θηρευθεὶς ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς τῶν πραγματειῶν ὁμοιότητά τινα ἐχούσαις καὶ τῇ δόξῃ τῶν συνταξαμένων αὐτάς.

‘For these reasons I abandoned such a theory. I have recalled these ideas at the present time not because they deserve serious attention, and I have cited the dialectical handbooks not because they are essential reading, but in order to dissuade anyone from supposing that they contain anything useful for the present enquiry, and hence regarding it as important to know about them, because he has been captivated by the titles of their works, which have some affinity with the subject, and by the reputation of their authors.’

The word παρατίθεμαι can mean both ‘to quote’ a text and ‘to cite’ the title of a book.¹¹⁰ Now, does this word refer to the fact that Dionysius has mentioned Chrysippus’ writings on the parts of speech at the end of *Comp.* 4, or does he mean that he has quoted these Stoic texts in *Comp.* 5? On the one hand, it is possible that at the end of *Comp.* 5 Dionysius summarises two useless projects, namely both his study of the Stoic τέχναι and his experiment concerning the natural ordering of the parts of speech. On the other hand, since Dionysius refers in one breath both to the θεωρία on natural word order and to the dialectical handbooks, it seems reasonable to suppose that the theory of natural word order was at least related to the ideas that Dionysius found in the Stoic treatises. This does not necessarily mean that the philosophical handbooks were the ‘source’ of Dionysius’ text. It is also possible that Dionysius borrowed some philosophical ideas from the Stoic τέχναι and that he developed his own theory of natural word order on the basis of these Stoic ideas. In that case, we might say that the Stoic treatises were the *source of inspiration* rather than the source of Dionysius’ experiment in *Comp.* 5. It should be noted that both projects (the study of Stoic works and the experiment concerning natural word order) are rejected for exactly the same reasons: Chrysippus’ treatises turned out not to contain anything useful to civil oratory as far as ‘attractiveness and beauty of expression’ (ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος ἑρμηνείας) was concerned; and, likewise, the experiment on natural word

¹⁰⁹ *Comp.* 5.26,20-27,6.

¹¹⁰ Cf. LSJ s.v. παρατίθημι.

order is abandoned because in many cases the logical rules do not lead to a composition that is pleasing (ἡδεῖα) and beautiful (καλή):¹¹¹ according to Dionysius, attractiveness and beauty are the two aims of composition, and neither the Stoic books on syntax nor the experiment on natural word order could help the future orator to achieve these aims.

Apart from the φυσικὴ ὁμορμή and the summary of the two projects at the end of *Comp.* 5, there is a third indication that makes modern scholars believe that the passage on natural word order is influenced by Stoic ideas: the terminology that Dionysius uses in *Comp.* 5 displays a Stoic flavour. We may especially think of the terms οὐσία, συμβεβηκός, and the pair τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον. Although Ildefonse has interpreted οὐσία and συμβεβηκός as Peripatetic terms, I think that Schenkeveld was right in pointing to the Stoic background of these terms in *Comp.* 5.¹¹² I will discuss these and other relevant terms in the subsequent sections (see especially sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4).

It is on these grounds that scholars have argued that *Comp.* 5 has a Stoic background or, according to some, even a Stoic origin. The three arguments mentioned (the natural starting point, the reference to the Stoic treatises at the end of *Comp.* 5, and the Stoic terminology) are all relevant, but the most important thing, in my view, has so far been ignored. I think that there is one more reason to believe that *Comp.* 5 was inspired by Stoic ideas: I will argue that a number of ‘natural’ (that is, ontological and logical) rules that Dionysius discusses in *Comp.* 5 can only be explained when we take into account the theory of the Stoic categories.¹¹³ Dionysius discusses a number of rules that allegedly determine the word order of the parts of speech: for example, nouns precede verbs, and verbs precede adverbs. Some of these rules can be explained on the basis of Aristotelian logic, but in some cases the Stoic categories account for the order that Dionysius proposes. In particular, the order of pronoun and appellative noun and the order of appellative noun and proper noun seem to be based on the order of the corresponding Stoic categories: substance precedes common quality and common quality precedes individual quality.¹¹⁴ In my discussion of Dionysius’ experiment, I will point out how the Stoic categories are related to the principles that determine Dionysius’ natural word order (see especially sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.6).

¹¹¹ *Comp.* 5.26,17-20.

¹¹² See Ildefonse (1997) 290 and Schenkeveld (1983) 88-89. In *Comp.* 5.23,16 Schenkeveld reads αἰτίαν instead of οὐσίαν: see section 5.3.3.

¹¹³ In De Jonge (2001) 163-164, I have already briefly discussed the connections between Dionysius’ experiment concerning natural word order and the Stoic categories.

¹¹⁴ For the view that pronouns should precede appellative nouns and appellative nouns should precede proper nouns, see *Comp.* 5.26,12-14. See section 5.3.6.

Kroll and Barwick argued that Dionysius copied the entire chapter on natural word order, including the Homeric examples, from Chrysippus' books *Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν*.¹¹⁵ However, although Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order is definitely inspired by Stoic ideas, it is doubtful that *Comp.* 5 as a whole has been taken over from these Stoic treatises. Some aspects of Dionysius' experiment seem to be based on grammatical and rhetorical rather than philosophical ideas.¹¹⁶ Therefore, I believe that Dionysius has combined certain philosophical views from Stoic treatises with theories that he derived from the grammatical and rhetorical traditions, if he did not develop these ideas himself.¹¹⁷ In the course of this study, we have seen that the combining of approaches from different language disciplines is typical of Dionysius' method in general. Besides, this interpretation would avoid making nonsense of Dionysius' claim that he, having abandoned the Stoic sources, independently tried to find a natural starting point.¹¹⁸ In any case, Dionysius' new approach did not lead to the results he had hoped for: right from the start, Dionysius makes clear that he merely reports the experiment concerning natural word order so that no one may think that he omitted it through ignorance: 'Applying myself to certain speculations, I was beginning to think that my operation was making some progress, when I realised that my path was leading me somewhere quite different, and not in the direction I had prescribed for myself, and in which I felt I had to proceed; and so I gave up. I suppose there will be no objection if I touch upon that enquiry also, and state the reasons that caused me to abandon it, so that I may avoid the suspicion of having passed it by through ignorance and not from choice.'¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ Kroll (1907) 91; Barwick (1957) 21. See also Schenkeveld (1983) 86 and Pohl (1968) 79. Freudenburg (1993) 138 thinks that Dionysius has borrowed his Homeric examples in *Comp.* 5 'from some Stoic source now lost'.

¹¹⁶ In particular, Dionysius' chapter on natural word order mentions some parts of speech (ἀντονομασία, ἐπίρρημα) that were distinguished by *grammarians*, but not by the Stoics; it is also doubtful that the Stoics intended their hierarchy of the parts of speech to be expressed in a sentence or Homeric verse: it seems more probable that they argued for a theoretical order than for a practical word order. See section 5.3.7.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Sluiter (1990) 132.

¹¹⁸ *Comp.* 4.23,1-5. See above.

¹¹⁹ *Comp.* 4.23,5-12: ἀψάμενος δὲ τινων θεωρημάτων καὶ δόξας ὁδῶ μοι τὸ πρᾶγμα χωρεῖν ὡς ἔμαθον ἐτέρωσέ ποι ταύτην ἄγουσαν ἐμὲ τὴν ὁδόν, οὐχ ὅποι ἐπορευόμην καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἐλθεῖν, ἀπέστην. κωλύσει δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κακείνης ἀψασθαι τῆς θεωρίας καὶ τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν δι' ὅς ἐξέλιπον αὐτήν, ἵνα μή με δόξη τις ἀγνοίᾳ παρελθεῖν αὐτήν ἀλλὰ προαιρέσει.

5.3.2. Natural word order

The central question in Dionysius' experiment on natural word order is the following: will a word order that is based on natural principles always result in an attractive and beautiful composition? In fact, however, Dionysius turns this question around, for his analysis aims to answer another question: is an attractive and beautiful composition always based on natural principles? The answer to the latter question turns out to be that effective composition is in some, but not in all cases in accordance with natural word order. Dionysius concludes, therefore, that the principles of nature are worthless for someone who wants to compose a text.¹²⁰ Dionysius arrives at this conclusion by testing a number of verses from Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (his corpus for this experiment) against the rules of nature.¹²¹ Although Dionysius primarily intends to teach future orators (writers of prose), Homer is his ideal model for this experiment, for several reasons. First, according to Dionysius, prose and poetry are not essentially different: they both aim to achieve the same effects (see section 6.5).¹²² Second, the ancient rhetoricians generally regarded Homer as the great model for authors of both prose and poetry. Moreover, no reader would doubt the beauty of the Homeric poems. Therefore, there was no source that could more easily falsify the correctness of the principles of 'nature': to be in harmony with nature was generally considered to be right; but if Dionysius could show that Homer did not stick to nature, he would automatically prove that the natural principles were not the best guide in the art of composition. The following introduction illuminates the general idea behind the theory of natural word order in Dionysius' experiment.¹²³

Ἐδόκει δὴ μοι τῇ φύσει μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἐπομένους οὕτω δεῖν ἀρμόττειν τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου, ὥς ἐκείνη βούλεται.

'Well, it seemed to me that we, following nature as much as possible, should fit together the parts of speech so as she demands.'

The double character of Dionysius' concept of τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου, which I have discussed in section 3.4, is also relevant in this passage. The μόρια λόγου are here both 'parts of the phrase' and 'word classes', for the focus is on the position of the parts of speech in their context. But, as we will see, Dionysius will be concerned not only with a word order that reflects the *logical* order of nouns, verbs and adverbs, but

¹²⁰ *Comp.* 5.26,16-17: see section 5.3.6.

¹²¹ On the Homeric quotations in Dionysius' *De compositione verborum*, see Calvani Mariotti (1990).

¹²² For Dionysius' views on prose and poetry, see chapter 6 of this study.

¹²³ *Comp.* 5.23,13-15.

also with a word order that mirrors the *chronological* order of the events. Dionysius' expression τῇ φύσει μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἐπομένους has given rise to some interesting speculation. Aujac & Lebel translate these words as follows: 'nous surtout qui nous conformons à la nature', and, in a footnote, they pose the question whether we should interpret this expression as a Stoic profession of faith.¹²⁴ However, Goudriaan has rightly pointed out that the French translation is inaccurate, since Dionysius did not write τῇ φύσει μάλιστα ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἐπομένους.¹²⁵ Apart from that, 'une profession de foi stoïcienne' seems to be impossible for other reasons as well: Dionysius' objections to Chrysippus and other philosophers in *Comp.* 4 are quite incompatible with a supposed adherence to Stoic philosophy. Instead of taking μάλιστα with ἡμᾶς, as Aujac & Lebel do, we could also connect μάλιστα with τῇ φύσει, or with ἐπομένους, as Usher does: 'that we should follow nature as much as possible'.¹²⁶ In any case, although the words τῇ φύσει μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἐπομένους fit into a Stoic context, they do not prove a direct dependence upon Stoic sources: as I have pointed out above (section 5.3.1), the view that one should be in harmony with nature was quite common, and the importance of φύσις in Dionysius' works has sufficiently been shown in section 5.2.¹²⁷

In the course of *Comp.* 5, Dionysius mentions eight natural principles that supposedly determine the order of words in a verse or sentence:

- (1) Nouns precede verbs (*Comp.* 5.23,15-18)
- (2) Verbs precede adverbs (*Comp.* 5.24,15-20)
- (3) Earlier events are mentioned earlier than later events (*Comp.* 5.25,11-14)
- (4) Substantives precede adjectives (*Comp.* 5.26,11-12)
- (5) Appellative nouns precede proper nouns (*Comp.* 5.26,12-13)
- (6) Pronouns precede appellative nouns (*Comp.* 5.26,13-14)
- (7) Indicatives precede other moods (*Comp.* 5.26,14-15)
- (8) Finite verb forms precede infinitives (*Comp.* 5.26,15-16)

Dionysius explains and tests only the first three principles. When he has shown that Homer does not stick to these three rules, he rejects also the remaining five principles,

¹²⁴ Aujac & Lebel 77 (1981) n. 1: 'Est-ce une profession de foi stoïcienne?'

¹²⁵ Goudriaan (1989) 469 n. 3.

¹²⁶ Usher (1982) 47. See also Rhys Roberts (1910) 99: 'that we ought to follow Mother Nature to the utmost'. An investigation into Dionysius' use of μάλιστα does not decide the matter, for in some cases μάλιστα belongs to the preceding word or word group (e.g. *Comp.* 18.84,1), and in other cases it belongs to the following word or word group (e.g. *Comp.* 25.130,13).

¹²⁷ To the many examples listed in section 5.2, add Dionysius' view that selection of words 'naturally' precedes composition: see *Comp.* 2.7,22-8,3.

without examining their validity for his audience. Therefore, it is difficult for us to determine what exactly is ‘natural’ about the last five principles. I will argue that in *Comp.* 5, Dionysius uses the term ‘natural’ (φυσικός) in at least two different ways. First, one of the principles (nr. 3) refers to the *chronological* sequence in which events take place in reality. The rest of the rules adopt a logical concept of nature. The idea behind these rules is that the different *μόρια λόγου* correspond to the different features of entities in reality; the logical (and ontological) hierarchy between these different features of entities (substance, quality, accident) is supposed to be mirrored in the hierarchy of the corresponding parts of speech. Thus, the noun must precede the verb because accident (or predicate) presupposes substance (principle nr. 1), and the verb must precede the adverb because the circumstances of an action presuppose (active or passive) action (principle nr. 2). I will argue that principles nrs. 4 (substantives precede adjectives), 5 (appellative nouns precede proper nouns) and 6 (pronouns precede appellative nouns) are also based on the idea of logical and ontological priority: in my view, the order of these parts of speech rests on the hierarchy of the corresponding Stoic categories. The background of principles nrs 7 (indicatives precede other moods) and 8 (finite verb forms precede infinitives) is more obscure, but it seems possible to explain them in the same way as the others. I will now proceed to discuss the natural principles one by one, giving text, translation and commentary on Dionysius’ views.

5.3.3. Nouns precede verbs

The first rule of nature concerns the order of nouns and verbs:¹²⁸

αὐτίκα τὰ ὀνόματα πρότερα ἡξίουں τάττειν τῶν ῥημάτων (τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλοῦν, τὰ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός, πρότερον δ’ εἶναι τῇ φύσει τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν συμβεβηκότων), ὥς τὰ Ὀμηρικὰ ἔχει ταυτί·

ἄνδρά μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα πολύτροπον¹²⁹

καὶ

μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά¹³⁰

καὶ

ἥελιος δ’ ἀνόρουσε λιπών¹³¹

καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις· ἡγεῖται μὲν γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τὰ ὀνόματα, ἔπεται δὲ τὰ ῥήματα. πιθανὸς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἔδοξεν εἶναί μοι. ἕτερα γοῦν παράσχοι

¹²⁸ *Comp.* 5.23,15-24,15.

¹²⁹ Homer, *Odyssey* 1.1.

¹³⁰ Homer, *Iliad* 1.1.

¹³¹ Homer, *Odyssey* 3.1.

τις ἂν παραδείγματα παρὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ποιητῇ κείμενα ἐναντίως συντεταγμένα ἢ ταῦτα συντέτακται, καλὰ δὲ οὐχ ἦττον καὶ πιθανά. οἶά τινά ἐστι ταῦτα·

κλῦθί μευ αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος Ἀτρυτώνη¹³²

καὶ

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι ...¹³³

μνηῆσαι πατρὸς σείο, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ.¹³⁴

ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἡγεῖται μὲν τὰ ῥήματα, ὑποτέτακται δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα· καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν αἰτιάσαιτο τὴν σύνταξιν ταύτην ὡς ἀηδῆ.

‘For example, I thought that I should place nouns before verbs (since the former indicate the substance, and the latter the accident, and the substance is naturally prior to its accidents). Thus Homer has these lines:

A man — tell me, o Muse, his story, a man of many wiles

And

Wrath, sing, o goddess

And

The sun arose, abandoning

And similar verses: in these lines, the nouns lead, and the verbs follow. The theory is persuasive, but I decided that it was not true. At any rate, one could furnish other examples in the same poet of which the arrangement is the opposite of this, and yet these lines are no less beautiful and convincing. Such lines are these:

Hear me, daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus, the Unwearied

And

Tell me now, ye Muses, who in Olympian mansions dwell

And

Recall your father, godlike Achilles.

For in these examples the verbs lead, and the nouns are placed behind; yet no one would criticise this arrangement as unpleasant.¹³⁵

The order of nouns and verbs is explained in philosophical terms: nouns indicate the substance (οὐσία), while verbs indicate the accident (συμβεβηκός), and the substance (οὐσία) is naturally prior to its accidents (συμβεβηκότα). In *Comp.* 5.23,16, manuscript P reads αἰτίαν instead of the first οὐσίαν. Aujac & Lebel follow the

¹³² Homer, *Iliad* 5.115.

¹³³ Homer, *Iliad* 2.484.

¹³⁴ Homer, *Iliad* 24.486.

¹³⁵ My translation is largely based on that of Usher (1985). However, in my rendering of the Homeric verses I have tried to follow the Greek word order more closely than Usher does, in order to maintain the order of nouns and verbs, verbs and adverbs, etc. For this purpose, I have also consulted the Homer translations by Lattimore (1951) and Murray / Dimock (1995).

reading of P, but Usener prints οὐσίαν (manuscript F).¹³⁶ Schenkeveld also defends the reading of P (αἰτίαν), for the reason that the combination of οὐσία and συμβεβηκός only occurs in later grammatical texts. Schenkeveld points out that the terms αἴτιον (not αἰτία) and συμβεβηκός are mentioned in a fragment of the Stoic philosopher Zeno, which according to Schenkeveld offers a ‘close parallel’ to the text of Dionysius:¹³⁷

Ζήνωνος. Αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ οὐδὲν αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον κατηγορημα· ἀδύνατον δ’ εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἴτιον παρῆναι, οὗ δὲ ἐστὶν αἴτιον μὴ ὑπάρχειν. Τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον τοιαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν· αἴτιόν ἐστι δι’ ὃ γίνεται τι, οἷον διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν γίνεται τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται τὸ ζῆν καὶ διὰ τὴν σωφροσύνην γίνεται τὸ σωφρονεῖν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι σωφροσύνης περί τινα οὔσης μὴ σωφρονεῖν, ἢ ψυχῆς μὴ ζῆν, ἢ φρονήσεως μὴ φρονεῖν.

‘From Zeno: Zeno says that the cause (αἴτιον) is “the thing because of which”: and he says that that of which it is a cause is an accident (συμβεβηκός): and the cause is a body, but the thing of which it is a cause is a predicate. And it is impossible that the cause is present, while the thing of which it is a cause does not exist. The saying has the following meaning: a cause is the thing because of which something happens, as being prudent happens because of prudence and living happens because of the soul and having self-control happens because of self-control. For it is impossible when self-control is present in someone that he does not have self-control, or when there is a soul in someone that he does not live, or when there is prudence in someone, that he is not prudent.’

On the basis of this text, Schenkeveld concludes that *Comp.* 5.23,15-18 contains a ‘reminiscence of what in a Stoic treatise was said about ὄνομα and ῥῆμα’.¹³⁸ This may be true, but I doubt that the passage from Zeno has anything to do with it.¹³⁹ Schenkeveld says: ‘Zeno’s examples (φρόνησις, φρονεῖν) agree with how DH would have classified them.’ However, I think that Dionysius’ classifications are a bit different. According to Dionysius’ statements, the nouns ἀνήρ and μῆνις would

¹³⁶ On the MSS of *On Composition*, see Aujac (1974).

¹³⁷ *FDS* 762. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 79. Although he rightly remarks that αἰτία does not occur in this fragment, Schenkeveld’s quotation of the first sentence of *FDS* 762 ($\approx$ *SVF* I.89) is incorrect, for he prints αἰτίαν instead of αἴτιον.

¹³⁸ Schenkeveld (1983) 79.

¹³⁹ Paximadi (1989) 223-225 has already pointed out that the fragment on Zeno is not the right parallel for Dionysius’ ideas on οὐσία and συμβεβηκός. However, I do not agree with Paximadi’s view that Dionysius’ theory of natural word order is inspired by Peripatetic sources.

indicate the οὐσία (or αἰτία, when we follow Schenkeveld), and ἔννεπε and ᾔειδε would indicate the συμβεβηκός. But is the ‘wrath’ (μῆνις) then a ‘cause’, the consequence of which is the ‘singing’ (ᾔειδε)? And is the ‘man’ (ἄνθρωπος) the cause of the ‘telling’ of a story (ἔννεπε)? In fact, the examples mentioned in the Stoic fragment are not very compatible with the Homeric verses that Dionysius cites. Besides, it is true that manuscript P has αἰτίαν in *Comp.* 5.23,16, but it reads οὐσίαν in the next line (*Comp.* 5.23,17). So, even if one reads αἰτίαν with P, one will have to retain the term οὐσία in the same passage. But the juxtaposition of αἰτία and οὐσία in one sentence does not produce a satisfactory text.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, Schenkeveld too easily equates the terms αἴτιον and αἰτία. In fact, there was an important difference between these terms in Stoic philosophy: according to Chrysippus, an αἰτία is a λόγος of an αἴτιον, or a λόγος about the αἴτιον as αἴτιον.¹⁴¹ Whereas αἴτιον is a (corporeal) cause in the real world, αἰτία is its incorporeal representation in language.¹⁴² Therefore, it would be dangerous to use a fragment on αἴτιον to explain Dionysius’ alleged use of αἰτία. Finally, Schenkeveld’s suggestion that the combination of the terms οὐσία and συμβεβηκός only occurs in later *grammatical* texts may be right, but that does not imply that the combination was not used by earlier thinkers: in any case, Dionysius mentions the combination of οὐσία and συμβεβηκός according to all manuscripts in *Comp.* 5.23,17.

There is a further reason to believe that the term that Dionysius uses is οὐσία (substance) and not αἰτία. There is a remarkable parallel in a passage from the Roman grammarian Priscian. He argues that, in the *theoretical* order of the parts of speech, the noun precedes the verb ‘because the substance (*substantia*) and person of the one who acts or suffers, which is designated through the pronoun or the noun, must naturally be earlier (*prior esse debet naturaliter*) than the act itself (*ipse actus*), which is an accident of the substance (*accidens substantiae*).¹⁴³ Priscian is a relatively late source, but it is clear that he preserves the same idea that we find in Dionysius: the noun precedes the verb because substance (*substantia*) precedes accident (*accidens*). In a context that is similar to that of Priscian, Apollonius Dyscolus argues that the noun precedes the verb because ‘body’ (σῶμα) is prior to ‘disposing or being

¹⁴⁰ See the translation by Aujac & Lebel (1981) 77: ‘les premiers indiquent l’auteur (αἰτία), les seconds l’événement et, par nature, l’être (οὐσία) précède l’événement.’

¹⁴¹ Cf. *FDS* 762 (≈ *SVF* II.336): Αἰτίαν δ’ εἶναι λόγον αἰτίου, ἢ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ αἰτίου.

¹⁴² Cf. Sluiter (1990) 134 n. 368.

¹⁴³ Priscian, *G.L.* III 164,16-21: *Sciendum tamen, quod recta ordinatio exigit, ut pronomen vel nomen praeponatur verbo, ut ‘ego et tu legimus, Virgilius et Cicero scripserunt’, quippe cum substantia et persona ipsius agentis vel patientis, quae per pronomen vel nomen significatur, prior esse debet naturaliter quam ipse actus, qui accidens est substantiae. licet tamen et praepostere ea proferre auctorum usurpatione fretum.* Cf. Weil (1978 [1844]) 18 n. 3.

disposed' (τὸ διατιθέναι καὶ τὸ διατίθεσθαι).¹⁴⁴ Luhtala thinks that Priscian has modified Apollonius' theory, substituting 'Peripatetic colouring' for 'Stoic materialism'.¹⁴⁵ In my view, however, the distinction between substance and accident can be Stoic as well as Peripatetic. Given the fact that Dionysius adopts some specifically Stoic ideas in the course of his experiment concerning natural word order, I would prefer to interpret the distinction between substance and accident also as Stoic. The terms οὐσία and συμβεβηκός appear together not only in Aristotelian but also in Stoic texts. I will briefly discuss the Aristotelian and Stoic background of these terms.¹⁴⁶

Wouters has suggested that the term οὐσία in the definition of the noun in the *Technê Grammatikê* points to Peripatetic influence.¹⁴⁷ We have seen that Dionysius of Halicarnassus' rhetorical works show Aristotelian influence (see sections 1.5 and 3.3.1).¹⁴⁸ Therefore we should not exclude the possibility that his use of the terms οὐσία and συμβεβηκός in *Comp.* 5 has a Peripatetic background. Indeed, Ildefonse has expressed the view that Dionysius' idea on the priority of nouns over verbs is connected to the Aristotelian concept of accident.¹⁴⁹ How does Aristotle use the terms οὐσία and συμβεβηκός?¹⁵⁰ In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle offers a definition of συμβεβηκός: 'Accident (συμβεβηκός) means that which belongs to something and can be truly said of it, but which belongs to it neither necessarily nor for the most part.'¹⁵¹ For example, the finding of a treasure is an accident of someone who is digging a hole for a plant. Elsewhere, Aristotle explains the difference between οὐσία and συμβεβηκός: 'for it is in this way that the "substance" (οὐσία) of a thing is distinguished from the "attribute" (συμβεβηκός) of it; for example, whiteness is an accident of man, in view of the fact that he is white, but he is not just whiteness. If everything were an attribute of something, there would be no first subject of which

¹⁴⁴ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.16.

¹⁴⁵ Luhtala (2005) 86: 'When the noun is said to signify substance and the verb its accidents (...), the description of the principal parts of speech has been reinterpreted in terms of Peripatetic / Platonic philosophy.'

¹⁴⁶ See also section 3.7, where I have discussed the term συμβεβηκότα, which various early sources use for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.

¹⁴⁷ Wouters (1979) 179.

¹⁴⁸ For the Aristotelian influence on Dionysius' rhetorical works, see also Wooten (1994). I do not agree with Pinborg's view that Dionysius' use of the term συμβεβηκότα for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech points to Aristotelian influence: see section 3.7.

¹⁴⁹ Ildefonse (1997) 290. Cf. Luhtala (2005) 87 n. 3.

¹⁵⁰ This is, of course, 'ein weites Feld', and I will only deal with those aspects that are necessary for our understanding of Dionysius. The same *caveat* holds for my discussions of the philosophical terminology in the rest of *Comp.* 5.

¹⁵¹ Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1025a14-19: Συμβεβηκός λέγεται ὃ ὑπάρχει μὲν τινι καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐ μὲντοι οὗτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτε (ὥς) ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, οἷον εἴ τις ὀρύττων φυτῷ βόθρον εὖρε θησαυρόν. The translation is based on Apostle (1966).

something would be attributively a predicate (that is, if “an attribute” always signifies that something is attributively a predicate of a subject).¹⁵² Outside the *Metaphysics*, the term συμβεβηκός also plays a role in Aristotle’s theory of propositions.¹⁵³

The opposition between οὐσία and συμβεβηκός seems to originate in Aristotelian philosophy. However, this does not imply that Dionysius’ use of the terms must be based on Peripatetic sources, for οὐσία and συμβεβηκός also occur in Stoic texts. The word συμβεβηκός is mentioned several times in the Stoic fragments (see section 3.7), and it is explicitly associated with the predicate (κατηγορημα).¹⁵⁴ This use of the term συμβεβηκός reminds us of the fact that the Stoics also use the word σύμβαμα in their grammatical observations. The latter term, which is just like συμβεβηκός derived from the verb συμβαίνω, is used for certain types of predicates.¹⁵⁵ Now, Müller has rightly drawn attention to a passage from Stobaeus, who reports that, according to Chrysippus, only those predicates ‘materially exist’ (ὑπάρχειν) that are συμβεβηκότα:¹⁵⁶

Μόνον δ’ ὑπάρχειν φησὶ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα, τὸν δὲ παρωχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὑφεστάναι μὲν, ὑπάρχειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, εἰ μὴ ὡς καὶ κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνον τὰ συμβεβηκότα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλιμαι ἢ κάθημαι οὐχ ὑπάρχει <...>

‘He [i.e. Chrysippus] says that only the present exists, and that the past and the future subsist but that they do not exist, except in the way in which only the συμβεβηκότα are said to exist as predicates: for example, ‘walking’ exists for me when I walk, but it does not exist when I am lying or when I am sitting down’ ... (*lacuna*)

¹⁵² Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1007a31-36: τούτῳ γὰρ διώρισται οὐσία καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός· τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν λευκὸς ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅπερ λευκόν. εἰ δὲ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται, οὐθὲν ἔσται πρῶτον τὸ καθ’ οὗ, εἰ ἀεὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς σημαίνει τὴν κατηγορίαν. The translation is based on Apostle (1966).

¹⁵³ See Aristotle, *Int.* 21a5-14 (cf. *Cat.* 7a25-41). Here, Aristotle points out that if two propositions about the same subject are true, a combination of the two will not necessarily be true. For example, if it is true to say that ‘a man is white’ and that ‘a man is musical’, it does not follow that ‘musical is white’; and even if that is true, ‘musical white’ is not one thing. For ‘musical’ and ‘white’ are not essential, but they only belong to the subject ‘man’ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (‘accidentally’). See also Whitaker (1996) 153: ‘subjects and predicates which are only clusters of accidents should not be considered as forming unities: the fact that they can be said to hold separately therefore does not imply that they can [may] be said to hold together.’

¹⁵⁴ See *FDS* 762 (cited above), *FDS* 746 (bodily accidents), *FDS* 695 (predicates).

¹⁵⁵ See *FDS* 696 (Diogenes Laertius VII.64), where the introduction of the συμβάματα is followed by a lacuna in our text. See also *FDS* 789-799. Luhtala (2000) 94-100 points out that συμβάματα (‘congruities’) are ‘congruent’ predicates, which means that the nominative case corresponds to a simple predicate (e.g. οὗτος περιπατεῖ). Müller (1943) 54-55 points out that every case of the congruity between a nominative case and a predicate (active, passive, or neuter) is a σύμβαμα.

¹⁵⁶ Stobaeus, *Anthologium* I.8.42 (106,5-23 Wachsmuth). Cf. Müller (1943) 60-61.

The Stoics use the verb ὑπάρχειν ('to exist') only for material things: the immaterial things (namely κενόν, τόπος, χρόνος and λεκτόν, void, place, time and 'sayable') are 'something' (τι), but they do not 'exist' (ὑπάρχειν); they can at the most be said to 'subsist' (ὑφίστασθαι).¹⁵⁷ Unfortunately, there is a lacuna at the end of the text of Stobaeus; but Müller has convincingly argued that Chrysippus could have added that, unlike the συμβεβηκότα, the συμβάματα do *not* 'materially exist' (ὑπάρχειν).¹⁵⁸ In other words, there are two types (or rather aspects) of predicates (κατηγορήματα): on the one hand, there is the συμβεβηκός, which represents the predicate in the physical world: it is that which is said about something *qua* physical fact.¹⁵⁹ On the other hand, there is the σύμβαμα, which represents the predicate in the field of λόγος: it is that which is said about something *qua* λεκτόν.¹⁶⁰ The λεκτόν is immaterial and can therefore not be said to 'exist'. The following example may illuminate the difference between συμβεβηκός and σύμβαμα: in the factual event that Socrates walks, 'walking' is a συμβεβηκός; in the spoken sentence Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, however, περιπατεῖ is a σύμβαμα.¹⁶¹

Before I point out how this Stoic concept of συμβεβηκός corresponds to Dionysius' use of the term in *Comp.* 5, I will first add some words on the Stoic use of the term οὐσία, which, according to Dionysius' statements, is prior to συμβεβηκός. According to Stoic ontology, there are two principles, namely the active principle, which is the divine λόγος, and the passive principle, which is the οὐσία (substance). These principles constitute the basis of all entities in reality:¹⁶²

Δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν.

'They [the Stoics] hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is substance without quality,

¹⁵⁷ See *SVF* II.329-332. Cf. Long & Sedley (1987 I) 162-166. The term 'to subsist' (which Galen, *SVF* II.322, regards as a case of 'over-refined linguistic quibbling of some philosophers') is illuminated by Long & Sedley (1987 I) 164: 'There's such a thing as a rainbow, and such a character as Mickey Mouse, but they don't actually *exist*.'

¹⁵⁸ Müller (1943) 60-61: 'Man könnte sinngemäss fortfahren: ein ὑπάρχειν kommt dagegen nicht denjenigen κατηγορήματα zu, die συμβάματα sind, d.h. den Praedikaten im Satz im Bereich der menschlichen Rede.'

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Müller (1943) 60. See also Ildefonse (1997) 173.

¹⁶⁰ For the Stoic λεκτόν, see Sluiter (2000a).

¹⁶¹ Cf. Müller (1943) 60.

¹⁶² *FDS* 744 (= Diogenes Laertius VII.134).

that is matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God.’¹⁶³

Οὐσία (substance) is also the first ‘category’, which is sometimes also named ὑποκείμενον (substrate).¹⁶⁴ Through the divine πνεῦμα, the οὐσία, which is in itself without quality (ἄποιον), receives a certain quality (ποιόν), the second category; the third category is the disposition (πῶς ἔχον), and the fourth category is the relative disposition (πρὸς τί πως ἔχον). The exact meaning of these four ‘categories’ is a complex problem, but it seems clear that the Stoics used them both in their dialectical and in their physical observations.¹⁶⁵ In other words, the categories are both logical and ontological items, and each entity belongs to all categories, consisting of substance and quality with a certain disposition.¹⁶⁶ The categories are used as headings that make it possible to analyse and describe the entities that exist in reality.¹⁶⁷

Coming back to Dionysius, we can now better understand the philosophical background of his ideas on the order of noun and verb. According to Dionysius, a noun indicates the οὐσία, whereas a verb indicates the συμβεβηκός and substance is prior to accidents. If my interpretation of the Stoic use of συμβεβηκός is correct, it seems reasonable to believe that the Stoics would say that accident in reality (συμβεβηκός) presupposes substance (οὐσία): according to Müller’s explanation, a συμβεβηκός is the physical representation of the (incorporeal) predicate, which would be said *about* an entity. The entity itself is designated by a noun: the noun refers to quality (ποιόν), which in its turn belongs to substance (οὐσία). In this way, it seems possible to connect Dionysius’ statement to Stoic theories. It is true that the priority of substance over accident could in itself be based on Aristotelian ideas on accident, such as we have discussed above.¹⁶⁸ However, in view of the natural rules that Dionysius will discuss in the remaining part of *Comp.* 5 (see especially sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.6), it is more probable that Dionysius’ statement about nouns and verbs rests on Stoic views on οὐσία and συμβεβηκός. For not only the latter terms, but also the expression τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον can be related to Stoic philosophy (see *FDS* 744

¹⁶³ The translation is by Hicks (1925).

¹⁶⁴ For the Stoic theory of ‘categories’ (which the Stoics did not call categories), see *FDS* 827-873. See also Long & Sedley (1987 I) 165-166, who, referring to Simplicius’ γένη in *SVF* II.369, point out that the ‘categories’ are actually *genera* of the existent.

¹⁶⁵ On the Stoic categories, see Rist (1969) 152-172, Long (1974) 160-163, Sandbach (1975) 93-94, Hülser (1987 III) 1008-1009 and Menn (1999) 215-247. On the connection between the Stoic categories and grammatical theory, see Luhtala (2005) 21-22.

¹⁶⁶ See L&S 28A6.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. De Jonge (2001) 163.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Ildefonse (1997) 290.

above), and the order of pronouns and common nouns and the order of common and proper nouns will turn out to be based on the Stoic categories.

When we focus on Dionysius' experiment, we observe that he mentions three Homeric lines that support the natural order of nouns and verbs, after which he quotes three other verses in which the opposite order (verbs precede nouns) is used. It is interesting to notice that the nouns (ὀνόματα) in the first three examples include one nominative (ἥελιος) and two accusatives (ἄνδρα and μῆνιν).¹⁶⁹ In the three counterexamples, all nouns are vocatives: τέκος (or Ἀτρυτώνη), Μοῦσαι and Ἀχιλλεῦ. In other words, Dionysius does not care about the syntactic functions that the various nouns perform in the sentence: the οὐσία indicated by a noun is not necessarily the 'subject' of the sentence: in antiquity, the concept of syntactic subject is not used. Therefore, Baldwin was wrong in stating that Dionysius argues for 'putting the subject before the predicate'.¹⁷⁰ Modern readers would presumably not see much difference between the word order in ἄνδρά μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα πολύτροπον (*Od.* 1.1) and μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά (*Il.* 1.1) on the one hand, and κλυθί μευ αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος Ἀτρυτώνη (*Il.* 5.115) and ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι (*Il.* 2.484) on the other hand: in all these verses, an imperative verb is followed by a vocative expression. For Dionysius, however, the first position in the verse seems to be the most important thing: the first three examples all start with a noun, whereas the three counterexamples start with a verb. Dionysius' formulation also indicates that the examples are chosen because they *start* with nouns or verbs: in the first three examples, the nouns 'lead the way' (ἡγείται μὲν γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τὰ ὀνόματα), while in the three counterexamples the verbs 'lead the way' (ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἡγείται μὲν τὰ ῥήματα). Except for one (ἀνόρουσε), all verbs in the six examples are imperatives. Perhaps Dionysius' refutation would have been more convincing if he had also given one example of the order verb - noun with an indicative instead of an imperative. But for Dionysius the three counterexamples sufficiently prove that the first natural principle (nouns precede verbs) is πιθανός, but not ἀληθής. The difference between a πιθανός and an ἀληθής λόγος is a rhetorical

¹⁶⁹ We have already observed (section 3.6.1) that Dionysius uses the term ὄνομα here in a general sense: it includes both appellative nouns (like ἥελιος, ἄνδρα and μῆνιν) and proper nouns (Μοῦσαι and Ἀχιλλεῦ). The sixth noun is either τέκος or Ἀτρυτώνη, or perhaps Dionysius includes both of these words among the nouns that are 'placed behind'. As I have pointed out, Dionysius only adopts the distinction between ὄνομα and προσηγορία when it is relevant. Thus, ὄνομα can refer either to a noun in general or to a proper noun: the latter is only the case when a proper noun is regarded as opposed to an appellative noun. We may add that the classification of Μοῦσαι and Ἀχιλλεῦ as ὀνόματα proves that Schenkeveld (1983) 72 is wrong in suggesting that Dionysius never classifies proper nouns.

¹⁷⁰ Baldwin (1959) 110.

topos, to which Dionysius appears to allude.¹⁷¹ His conclusion is, then, that nobody would criticise the arrangement (τὴν σύνταξιν) of the counterexamples. In Dionysius' works, the term σύνταξις is rather unusual in the sense of 'composition' or 'arrangement', for which he normally uses the term σύνθεσις. For the Stoics, however, σύνταξις was the normal term, which also appears in the title of Chrysippus' works mentioned in *Comp.* 4 (see sections 1.5, 3.3.2 and 5.3.2). Later grammarians like Apollonius Dyscolus also wrote treatises *Περὶ συντάξεως*, but rhetoricians use the term less frequently.¹⁷² Therefore, the occurrence of the term in this passage might be another indication that Dionysius' experiment is based on ideas that originate in either Stoic philosophy or technical grammar (which was in its turn influenced by Stoic ideas).

5.3.4. Verbs precede adverbs

Dionysius' second natural rule demands that verbs precede adverbs:¹⁷³

ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἄμεινον ἐδόκουν εἶναι τὰ ῥήματα προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων, ἐπειδὴ πρότερόν ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον τῶν συνεδρευόντων αὐτοῖς, τρόπου λέγω καὶ τόπου καὶ χρόνου καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων, ἃ δὴ καλοῦμεν ἐπιρρήματα, παραδείγμασι χρώμενος τούτοις·

τύπτε δ' ἐπιστροφάδην, τῶν δὲ στόνος ὠρνυτ' ἀεικῆς ...¹⁷⁴

ἦριπε δ' ἐξοπίσω, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχὴν ἐκάπυσσεν ...¹⁷⁵

ἐκλίνθη δ' ἐτέρωσε, δέπας δὲ οἱ ἔκπεσε χειρός.¹⁷⁶

ἐν ἅπασιν γὰρ δὴ τούτοις ὕστερα τέτακται [ἅμα] τῶν ῥημάτων τὰ ἐπιρρήματα. καὶ τοῦτο πιθανὸν μὲν ὥς τὸ πρῶτον, οὐκ ἀληθὲς δὲ ὥς οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο. τάδε γὰρ δὴ παρὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ποιητῇ ἐναντίως εἴρηται·

βοτρυδὸν δὲ πέτονται ἐπ' ἄνθεσιν εἰαρινοῖσι ...¹⁷⁷

σήμερον ἄνδρα φάοσδε μογοστόκος Εἰλείθυια | ἐκφανεῖ.¹⁷⁸

ἄρ' οὖν τι χεῖρω γέγονε τὰ ποιήματα ὑποταχθέντων τοῖς ἐπιρρήμασι τῶν ῥημάτων; οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 204.

¹⁷² On the terms σύνθεσις and σύνταξις, see Donnet (1967).

¹⁷³ *Comp.* 5.24,15-25,11.

¹⁷⁴ *Iliad* 21.20.

¹⁷⁵ *Iliad* 22.467.

¹⁷⁶ *Odyssey* 22.17.

¹⁷⁷ *Iliad* 2.89.

¹⁷⁸ *Iliad* 19.103-104.

‘Besides, I thought that it was better to place verbs before adverbs, since that which acts or is acted upon is prior to the things that accompany them, I mean circumstances of manner, place, time, and the like, which we call adverbs. I relied on the following examples:

He struck in a circle around him, and their shameful groaning rose (...)

She fell backward and gasped her life breath from her (...)

He fell to one side, and the cup fell from his hand.

In all these cases the adverbs are placed after the verbs. This principle, like the first one, is also persuasive, but it is just as untrue as that one. For the following verses, in the same poet, have been expressed in the opposite way:

In clusters together they fly above the flowers of spring (...)

Today Eileithyia of women’s child-pains shall bring forth a man to light.

Well, are the verses at all inferior when the verbs have been placed after the adverbs? No one would say so.’

Just like the first principle, the second principle of natural word order is based on a logical priority: τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον (‘that which acts or is acted upon’) naturally precedes τὰ συνεδρεύοντα αὐτοῖς (‘the things that accompany them’). To start with the latter term, τὰ συνεδρεύοντα is often found in medical treatises, where it refers to the ‘symptoms’ of diseases.¹⁷⁹ The term is not found in technical grammatical texts, but ‘Longinus’ uses the verb συνεδρεύω when discussing how one can make style sublime by choosing and combining certain ‘constituent features’ and circumstances from reality.¹⁸⁰

οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πᾶσι τοῖς πράγμασι φύσει συνεδρεύει τινὰ μόρια ταῖς ὕλαις συνυπάρχοντα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης γένοιτ’ ἂν ἡμῖν ὕψους αἷτιον τὸ τῶν ἐμφερομένων ἐκλέγειν αἰεὶ τὰ καιριώτατα καὶ ταῦτα τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐπισυνθέσει καθάπερ ἓν τι σῶμα ποιεῖν δύνασθαι.

‘Since with all things there are associated certain elements, inherent in their substance, it follows of necessity that we shall find one factor of sublimity in a consistently happy choice of these constituent elements, and in the power of combining them together as it were into an organic whole.’¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ See Gippert (1997) 1060 on Galenus.

¹⁸⁰ ‘Longinus’, *Subl.* 10.1.

¹⁸¹ The translation is by W.H. Fyfe / Donald Russell (1995).

‘Longinus’ illustrates his point with the famous poem Sappho fr. 31 (φαίνεται μοι κῆνος ...). In that poem, he argues, Sappho has excellently expressed the emotions that ‘accompany’ (συμβαίνοντα) the passion of love, emotions that she has taken from the ‘attendant symptoms’ (ἐκ τῶν παρεπομένων) and from real life (ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας).¹⁸² Thus, like Dionysius, ‘Longinus’ uses the word συνεδρεύω with regard to the circumstances that accompany certain events in reality. Interestingly, ‘Longinus’ also uses the terms συμβαίνοντα and παρεπόμενα in this context. These words, too, point to certain ‘accidental features’: in grammatical texts, both συμβαίνω and παρέπομαι are used for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech, as we have seen in section 3.7. The word συμβαίνοντα is, of course, derived from the same verb as the term συμβεβηκός, which we have encountered in Dionysius’ discussion of the first principle of natural word order (section 5.3.3). The passage from *On the Sublime*, then, seems to reveal that the word συνεδρεύω belongs to the same word field as συμβαίνοντα, συμβεβηκότα and παρεπόμενα: all these words are related to the idea of a distinction between substance (cf. ‘Longinus’ ὕλαις) on the one hand, and accidents or attributes on the other hand.

Another parallel for τὰ συνεδρεύοντα is found in the treatise under discussion, namely in *On Composition* 16. In that passage, Dionysius deals with the combination of letters and syllables. He tells us that ‘(...) attractiveness of language is due to words, syllables and letters that please the ear by virtue of some affinity; and that the difference in detail between these, through which are revealed the characters, feelings, dispositions and actions of persons and their attendant qualities (... τὰ ἔργα τῶν προσώπων καὶ τὰ συνεδρεύοντα τούτοις) are made what they are through the original grouping of the letters.’¹⁸³ Again, the expression τὰ συνεδρεύοντα refers to the accompanying accidents of ‘actions’ (ἔργα), and perhaps also those of characters (ἦθη), feelings (πάθη) and dispositions (διαθέσεις). Thus in *Comp.* 16, τὰ συνεδρεύοντα are connected with (at least) ‘actions’ (ἔργα). In *Comp.* 5 they are

¹⁸² ‘Longinus’, *Subl.* 10.1: οἷον ἡ Σαπφὼ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ταῖς ἐρωτικαῖς μανίαις παθήματα ἐκ τῶν παρεπομένων καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτῆς ἐκάστοτε λαμβάνει. ‘Sappho, for instance, never fails to take the emotions incident to the passion of love from its attendant symptoms and from real life.’ Cf. Russell (1964) 100.

¹⁸³ *Comp.* 16.63,11-18: ἡδεῖαν δὲ διάλεκτον ἐκ τῶν ἡδυνόντων τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ παραπλήσιον ὀνομάτων τε καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ γραμμάτων, τάς τε κατὰ μέρος ἐν τούτοις διαφοράς, καθ’ ὧς δηλοῦται τὰ τε ἦθη καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῶν προσώπων καὶ τὰ συνεδρεύοντα τούτοις, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κατασκευῆς τῶν γραμμάτων γίνεσθαι τοιαύτας. Usher (1985) translates ‘actions and the attendant qualities of the persons described’, but I prefer ‘actions of persons and the attendant qualities [of those actions]’: in my view, the pronoun τούτοις in τὰ συνεδρεύοντα τούτοις refers back to τὰ ἔργα (or to the entire word group τὰ τε ἦθη καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα), while τῶν προσώπων must be connected with τὰ ἔργα (and the rest), *not* with τὰ συνεδρεύοντα. Cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 116: ‘les actions des personnages et toutes les circonstances annexes’.

connected with τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον ('that which acts or is acted upon'), and although this expression seems to designate the *subject* of an action, Dionysius appears to be thinking of the *action itself*. For strictly speaking, verbs do not indicate 'that which acts or is acted upon', but rather 'the acting or being acted upon': τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Correspondingly, Aujac & Lebel (1981) have silently 'corrected' Dionysius in their translation: 'par nature, ce que l'on fait ou ce que l'on subit est antérieur aux circonstances (...)'.¹⁸⁴ Again, the background of Dionysius' terminology may be either Aristotelian or Stoic. We will discuss both possibilities.

Aristotle includes ποιεῖν ('acting') and πάσχειν ('being affected') among his ten categories: 'of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance (οὐσία) or quantity (ποσόν) or quality (ποιόν) or relation (πρός τι) or where (πού) or when (ποτέ) or being in a position (κεῖσθαι) or being in a condition (ἔχειν) or doing (ποιεῖν) or being affected (πάσχειν)'.¹⁸⁵ Examples of 'doing' (ποιεῖν) are '(he) is cutting' (τέμνει) or '(he) is burning' (καίει), while examples of 'being affected' (πάσχειν) are '(he) is being cut' (τέμνεται) or '(he) is being burned' (καίεται).¹⁸⁶ Aristotle's examples would more or less fit the ideas of Dionysius, who also points to verbs as the words that indicate τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον.

The expression that Dionysius uses, τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, also reminds us of the two Stoic principles, which I have mentioned above (section 5.3.3): the Stoics distinguish between the active principle (τὸ ποιοῦν), namely the divine λόγος, and the passive principle (τὸ πάσχον), namely substance without quality.¹⁸⁷ Apart from that, the Stoics also use the terms ποιεῖν and πάσχειν in order to distinguish between physical objects and immaterial things (such as the λεκτόν). Only material objects (σώματα) are able to act or to be acted upon.¹⁸⁸ Besides, the terms ποιεῖν and πάσχειν are not only used in the ontology of the Stoics, but they also play a role in their logic and semantics. Ποιεῖν and πάσχειν seem to be connected to the 'active' or 'direct' (ὀρθά) predicates and the 'passive' or 'reversed' (ὑπτία) predicates respectively, although the

¹⁸⁴ Aujac & Lebel (1981) 78.

¹⁸⁵ Aristotle, *Cat.* 1b25-27: Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἥτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρὸς τι ἢ πού ἢ ποτέ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. My translation is based on Cooke (1949) and Ackrill (1963).

¹⁸⁶ Aristotle, *Cat.* 2a3-4. Aristotle returns to these categories in *Cat.* 11b1-8. For ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, see also *Physica* 225b1ff. and *De generatione et corruptione* 322b11.

¹⁸⁷ *FDS* 744 (Diogenes Laertius VII.134); see section 5.3.3.

¹⁸⁸ See *SVF* I.90; I.518; II.363. Cf. Long & Sedley (1987 I) 165: 'Since interaction is exclusively the property of bodies, the Stoics cannot allow these incorporeals to act upon bodies or be acted upon by them. How then do they play a part in the world? No satisfactory discussion of the problem has survived.' For the problematic character of the λεκτόν in this respect (which is incorporeal but nevertheless transfers meaning between speaker and listener), see Sluiter (2000a).

direct evidence for the connection is limited.¹⁸⁹ Apart from ‘direct’ or ‘active’ (ὀρθά) predicates (e.g. ἀκούει, ὀρᾷ) and ‘reversed’ or ‘passive’ (ὑπτία) predicates (e.g. ἀκούομαι, ὀρῶμαι), the Stoics distinguish also ‘neuter’ (οὐδέτερα) predicates (e.g. φρονεῖ, περιπατεῖ).¹⁹⁰ Müller has convincingly analysed the Stoic ideas in the following way: the active predicates signify a ποιεῖν πρὸς τι, the passive predicates signify a πάσχειν ὑπό τινος, and the neuter predicates signify ‘das “reine” ποιεῖν bzw. πασχειν ohne Bezug auf eine πτώσις πλαγία’.¹⁹¹ Each of the three types of predicates corresponds to a nominative case: (1) a κατηγορημα ὀρθόν corresponds to a πτώσις ὀρθή that indicates τὸ ποιοῦν πρὸς τι, (2) a κατηγορημα ὑπτίον corresponds to a πτώσις ὀρθή that indicates τὸ πάσχον ὑπό τινος, and (3) a κατηγορημα οὐδέτερον corresponds to a πτώσις ὀρθή that indicates a ‘pure’ ποιοῦν or πάσχον, that is, an acting or being acted upon without any connection to an oblique case. The correspondence (or congruence’) between the predicate and the πτώσις ὀρθή is called σύμβαμα.¹⁹²

Having taken these Stoic ideas into account, we may well argue that Dionysius’ statement about the priority of τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον over τὰ συνεδρεύοντα reflects Stoic ideas on predicates; but we cannot exclude the possibility that the use of the term τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον is inspired by the Aristotelian categories mentioned earlier. However, in view of the explanation that we will give of some of the remaining principles of natural word order (see section 5.3.6), it seems more probable that Dionysius’ statement is based on Stoic ideas.

In section 3.6.5, I have already discussed the three types of adverbs that Dionysius mentions in this passage: ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου (adverbs of manner), τόπου (place), and χρόνου (time). Here, it should be emphasised that the Stoics did not use the term ἐπίρρημα, but μεσότης for the adverb.¹⁹³ Antipater of Tarsos introduced the term μεσότης in the Stoic theory of the parts of speech. The earlier Stoics, however, including Chrysippus, did not distinguish the adverbs among their μέρη λόγου. For this reason, it seems very unlikely that Dionysius copied the complete passage on natural word order from Chrysippus’ treatises on the syntax of the parts of speech, or from any Stoic source for that matter. Thus, although I think that Dionysius’

¹⁸⁹ See *FDS* 801 and cf. *FDS* 696 (Diogenes Laertius VII.64).

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Müller (1943) 52-62 and Luhtala (2000) 88-100. Luhtala (2000) 88-94 argues that the notion of ‘action’ is almost absent from the sources on the Stoic theory of the predicate for the reason that predicates signify something incorporeal, while ‘acting’ or ‘being acted upon’ is characteristic of bodies alone.

¹⁹¹ Müller (1943) 58.

¹⁹² Cf. Müller (1943) 54-55 and Luhtala (2000) 94-96.

¹⁹³ See Diogenes Laertius VII.57. Cf. section 3.2.

principles of natural word order are somehow based on Stoic ideas, I do not agree with Kroll and Barwick that Chrysippus was the ‘source’ of *Comp.* 5. I rather suppose that Dionysius made use of grammatical ideas (either or not taken from a specific treatise) that were connected with or based on Stoic theories of logic.¹⁹⁴

Just as in his discussion of the first principle Dionysius chose examples that *start* with nouns and verbs respectively, he now chooses verses that start with verbs and adverbs respectively. And again, the principle is rejected, because, though it seems persuasive, it is not true.

5.3.5. Prior in time is prior in word order

The third principle of natural word order is different from the preceding ones. In this case, it is the chronological order of events that is to be reflected in the order of words:¹⁹⁵

ἔτι καὶ τόδε ὄμην δεῖν μὴ παρέργως φυλάττειν, ὅπως τὰ πρότερα τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ τάξει πρότερα λαμβάνηται· οἷά ἐστι ταῦτα·

αὐτὸ ἔρυσαν μὲν πρῶτα καὶ ἔσφαξαν καὶ ἔδειραν¹⁹⁶

καὶ

λίγξε βίος, νευρὴ δὲ μέγ’ ἴαχεν, ἄλτο δ’ οἰστός¹⁹⁷

καὶ

σφαῖραν ἔπειτ’ ἔρριψε μετ’ ἀμφίπολον βασίλεια·

ἀμφιπόλου μὲν ἄμαρτε, βαθείη δ’ ἔμβαλε δίνη.¹⁹⁸

νῆ Δία, φαίη τις ἄν, εἴ γε μὴ καὶ ἄλλα ἦν πολλὰ οὐχ οὕτω συντεταγμένα ποιήματα οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ ταῦτα καλά·

πληῖξε δ’ ἀνασχόμενος σχίζῃ δρυός, ἦν λίπε κείων¹⁹⁹

πρότερον γὰρ δὴ που τὸ ἐπανατείνασθαί ἐστι τοῦ πληῖξαι. καὶ ἔτι

ἤλασεν ἄγχι στάς, πέλεκυς δ’ ἀπέκοψε τένοντας | αὐχενίους²⁰⁰

πρῶτον γὰρ δὴ που προσῆκεν τῷ μέλλοντι τὸν πέλεκυν ἐμβάλλειν εἰς τοὺς τένοντας τοῦ ταύρου τὸ στήναι αὐτοῦ πλησίον.

¹⁹⁴ For the influence of Stoic philosophy on grammarians of the first century BC, see section 3.2 and the literature mentioned there.

¹⁹⁵ *Comp.* 5.25,11-26,11.

¹⁹⁶ *Iliad* 1.459 and 2.422.

¹⁹⁷ *Iliad* 4.125.

¹⁹⁸ *Odyssey* 6.115-116.

¹⁹⁹ *Odyssey* 14.425.

²⁰⁰ *Odyssey* 3.449-450

‘Yet again, I thought that I should never relax my efforts to guard that things that are prior in time should also be taken prior in order, as in the following cases:

First they drew back [the victims’ heads] and slaughtered and skinned them
and

The bow groaned and the string twanged loud and the arrow leapt away
and

*Then the princess threw the ball to a maid:
the maid indeed she missed, but threw it into a deep eddy.*

“Certainly”, someone might say, “if only there were not many other lines not arranged in this order, and yet no less beautiful than these:”

*And he struck, having raised himself up, with an oak-block, which he had left |
uncut*

For evidently the stretching out is prior to the striking. And again:

*He dealt the blow, standing near, and the axe cut through the sinews | of the
neck*

Surely it would fit someone who was about to drive the axe into the bull’s sinews to have taken his stand near it *first*.’

According to Dionysius’ third principle of natural word order, that what is prior in time should also be prior in word order: τὰ πρότερα τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ τάξει πρότερα.²⁰¹ Again, Dionysius proves that Homer sticks to this principle in some, but not in all cases. The term πρότερα in *Comp.* 5.25,13 is used in a different way than πρότερον in *Comp.* 5.23,17 and πρότερον in *Comp.* 5.24,17. When Dionysius stated that the οὐσία is ‘prior’ to τὸ συμβεβηκός and τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον is ‘prior’ to τὰ συνεδρεύοντα, he was referring to a *logical* priority. The formulation τὰ πρότερα τοῖς χρόνοις, however, refers to the *chronological* order of events in reality. These two different ways of using the word πρότερον were already distinguished in Aristotle’s *Categories*.²⁰² Aristotle lists five ways in which people say that one thing is called ‘prior’ to another thing: (1) ‘in respect of time’ (κατὰ χρόνον), when one thing is older than the other; (2) ‘as to implication of existence’ (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν): for example, one is prior to two because two implies one; (3) with regard to some order (κατὰ τινὰ τάξιν), as in sciences and speeches: in grammar the letters are prior to the syllables, and in speeches the introduction is prior to the

²⁰¹ As we have seen in section 5.2, Dionysius frequently expresses the view that in a natural style the order of events as reported corresponds to the order of events in reality: in a more artificial style, the order can be reversed. I add one more example: in *Thuc.* 11.341,5-6, Dionysius objects to the fact that Thucydides departs from the chronological order of the events: ἢ τε γὰρ φύσις ἀπῆται τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων ἄρχειν ... ‘Nature required that prior events should have precedence over later ones (...).’

²⁰² Aristotle, *Cat.* 14a26-b23.

exposition; (4) what is better and more valued (τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον) is also thought to be ‘prior by nature’ (πρότερον τῇ φύσει; this is the strangest use of πρότερον, according to Aristotle); (5) finally, in the case that the existence of one thing implies the other (see nr. 2), that which is the *cause* (τὸ αἷτιον) of the existence of something may also be called ‘naturally prior’ (πρότερον τῇ φύσει). When we compare this list with Dionysius’ first three principles of natural word order, we can observe how Dionysius’ ways of using the term πρότερον correspond to some of the usages mentioned by Aristotle: in the discussion of the first and second principles, Dionysius’ use of the term πρότερον corresponds to Aristotle’s second use: for an accident *implies* a substance, and circumstances of an action *imply* an acting or being acted upon. In his discussion of the third principle, however, Dionysius’ use of πρότερα agrees with Aristotle’s first use: priority in respect of time (κατὰ χρόνον). We do not have to suppose that Dionysius himself was directly thinking of Aristotle’s account of different kinds of priority, for he nowhere makes explicit that he is using the word πρότερον in different ways. However, Aristotle’s distinctions illustrate that Dionysius may have been aware of the fact that he was referring to different types of priority.

In spite of the divergent concepts of priority behind Dionysius’ principles of natural word order, they all presuppose the same underlying idea, namely that language should ideally be a perfect representation of reality. Priorities that exist in reality, whether logically or chronologically, should be similarly expressed in language, so that language perfectly mirrors reality. This idea, which underlies the entire experiment on natural word order, might be related to Stoic views on language: according to the Stoics, there was a mimetic relationship between the form and meaning of the first words (see section 2.5.3). It is remarkable that Dionysius has taken three of the five Homeric examples in this passage from Homeric scenes that deal with the sacrifice of animals. The reason for his selection of these examples is presumably that the various actions of which a sacrifice consists are performed in a clearly fixed sequence. In particular, the killing of the animal and the preparations that lead to it cannot be performed in the opposite order; this fact seems to make the sacrifice scenes particularly useful for Dionysius’ refutation of the third principle of natural word order.

5.3.6. The remaining principles of natural word order

Having tested three principals of natural word order, Dionysius now decides to reject the remaining rules as well, without commenting on them:²⁰³

ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἡξίουں τὰ μὲν ὀνοματικὰ προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιθέτων, τὰ δὲ προσηγορικὰ τῶν ὀνοματικῶν, τὰς δ' ἀντονομασίας τῶν προσηγορικῶν, ἔν τε τοῖς ῥήμασι φυλάττειν, ἵνα τὰ ὀρθὰ τῶν ἐγκλινομένων ἡγῆται καὶ τὰ παρεμφατικὰ τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα διεσάλευεν ἡ πείρα καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἄξια ἀπέφαινε. τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἐγίνετο καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων αὐτοῖς ἡδεῖα ἢ σύνθεσις καὶ καλή, τοτὲ δ' ἐκ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων ἀλλ' ἐναντίων.

‘And still further, I thought it right to put the nouns before the adjectives, the appellative nouns before the proper nouns, and the pronouns before the appellative nouns; and with verbs, to take care that the indicatives should precede the other moods, and finite verb forms the infinitives, and many more similar rules. But the experiment upset all these assumptions and showed them completely worthless. For in some cases the composition was rendered attractive and beautiful by these and similar arrangements, but in other cases not by these but by opposite arrangements.’

I summarise the remaining rules of natural word order:

- (4) Substantives precede adjectives²⁰⁴
- (5) Appellative nouns precede proper nouns
- (6) Pronouns precede appellative nouns
- (7) Indicatives precede other moods
- (8) Finite verb forms precede infinitives

Since Dionysius neither explains these rules nor illustrates them by giving examples, the reader himself has to understand why this particular order of words would be natural. In the present study, it will be argued that the principles (4), (5) and (6) are based on the same logical (and ontological) priority that underlies the principles (1) and (2): they can be explained by taking into account the Stoic theory of categories, which we have already mentioned above (section 5.3.3). The two final principles (7) and (8) are less clear, but I will argue that they can also be explained with the concept of logical priority that underlies most of the other rules.

²⁰³ *Comp.* 5.26,11-20.

²⁰⁴ For Dionysius' use of the term ἐπίθετον, see section 3.6.1. When I translate this term as ‘adjective’, I do not mean to say that the ἐπίθετον is a separate word class for Dionysius. The ἐπίθετον should presumably be classified as an ὄνομα, but its particularity is that it qualifies other nouns.

The fourth principle (τὰ μὲν ὀνομαστικὰ προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιθέτων) can easily be understood on the basis of the explanation that Dionysius has offered concerning the first and second principles. Just like the order noun – verb and the order verb – adverb, the order substantive – adjective seems to be based on the logical priority of substance over accident. If Dionysius had commented on this principle, he could have said that the οὐσία indicated by a substantive is ‘earlier’ than the accident or the quality (ποιόν) indicated by an adjective (ἐπίθετον).²⁰⁵

For the explanation of the fifth principle (τὰ δὲ προσηγορικὰ [προτάττειν] τῶν ὀνομαστικῶν), it is important to remember that the distinction between proper noun (ὄνομα) and appellative noun (προσηγορία) goes back to the Stoic philosophers (see section 3.2). According to the Stoics, προσηγορία (appellative nouns) signify a κοινή ποιότης (common quality), whereas ὀνόματα (proper nouns) signify an ἰδίᾳ ποιότης (individual quality).²⁰⁶ Therefore, Schenkeveld suggests that Dionysius’ rule of putting appellative nouns before proper nouns is based on the order of κοινά - ἴδια, and he adds ‘but I have yet to find an exact parallel’.²⁰⁷ I think that this parallel can be found in the following text, in which Syrianus comments on the Stoic order of common and individual qualities:²⁰⁸

καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τοὺς κοινῶς ποιоὺς πρὸ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται.

‘Even the Stoics place the commonly qualified individuals before the peculiarly qualified individuals.’²⁰⁹

In Stoic philosophy, the ποιόν (‘quality’, or rather ‘the qualified’) is the second of the four ‘categories’:²¹⁰ while the first category (substance) indicates that an entity exists, the second category indicates an entity as a *qualified* substance. The ποιόν consists of two parts, namely the ‘commonly qualified’ (κοινῶς ποιόν) and the ‘peculiarly qualified’ (ἰδίως ποιόν). The former corresponds to appellative nouns (προσηγορία) such as ‘man’ or ‘horse’, while the latter is represented by proper nouns (ὀνόματα).²¹¹ The text cited above tells us that the ‘commonly qualified’ precedes the ‘peculiarly qualified’: so, Socrates is first a man and only then is he Socrates.²¹² We may

²⁰⁵ For the terminology of ὀνομαστικά and ἐπίθετα (substantives and adjectives), see section 3.6.1.

²⁰⁶ *FDS* 536 (Diogenes Laertius VII.58). See also *FDS* 562a-569b.

²⁰⁷ Schenkeveld (1983) 89.

²⁰⁸ *FDS* 849.

²⁰⁹ Translation by Long & Sedley (1987 I) 169.

²¹⁰ See *FDS* 852-865 and Long & Sedley (1987 I) 166-176.

²¹¹ *FDS* 536 (see above).

²¹² Cf. Long & Sedley (1987 I) 173-174: ‘This [i.e. ‘the qualified’] divides up into the “commonly qualified”, i.e. anything as described by a common noun or adjective; and the ‘peculiarly qualified’, i.e. qualitatively unique individuals, as designated by proper names like ‘Socrates’. The former are prior to

conclude that the Stoic theory of the categories explains Dionysius' order of appellative and proper nouns: the order of προσηγορικά and ὀνοματικά is clearly based on the natural order of the corresponding categories, the commonly qualified and the peculiarly qualified.²¹³ It should be noted that this principle could not be explained on the basis of Aristotelian philosophy. This fact sheds light on our interpretation of some of the earlier rules of natural word order, which we were able to explain both from an Aristotelian and from a Stoic perspective. Since it seems to be certain that the order of proper and appellative noun is based on Stoic logic, it is preferable to assume that the order of nouns and verbs (section 5.3.3) and the order of verbs and adverbs (section 5.3.4) are also inspired by Stoic rather than Peripatetic theories.

The sixth principle (τὰς δ' ἀντονομασίας [προτάττειν] τῶν προσηγορικῶν) seems in the first instance difficult to explain. In my view, however, the Stoic theory of the categories can again provide the solution. Why should pronouns precede appellative nouns in particular, and not nouns in general? The answer is probably that Dionysius is thinking of what we call *demonstrative* pronouns, which are normally combined with appellative nouns. The only pronoun that Dionysius classifies as such in his works is indeed a demonstrative pronoun, namely τούτονι in the expression εἰς τούτονι τὸν ἀγῶνα (see sections 3.6.3 and 7.3.2).²¹⁴ Now, the Stoics argued that only a demonstrative reference (δείξις) indicates that something (corporeally) exists in reality: therefore, simple affirmative propositions are only 'definite' (ὀρισμένα) if they contain a demonstrative pronoun.²¹⁵ 'this one is walking' (οὗτος περιπατεῖ), for example, is a definite proposition. 'Someone is walking', however, is an indefinite proposition, while 'Socrates is walking' is an 'intermediate' proposition.²¹⁶ In other words, the demonstrative reference indicates that an entity is a substance (οὐσία). As Long & Sedley put it, 'it [the demonstrative reference] is the most direct way of indicating, without describing, something a speaker knows or believes to exist.'²¹⁷ It seems clear then, that there is a connection between the Stoic part of speech ἄρθρον and the first category, substrate (ὑποκείμενον) or substance (οὐσία): something belongs to the first category if it exists as a material object.²¹⁸ The grammarian

the latter, no doubt because to be a man, or white, is part of what it is to be Socrates, and not vice versa.'

²¹³ For this explanation, see also De Jonge (2001) 164.

²¹⁴ *Comp.* 6.29,20. The quotation is from Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 1.

²¹⁵ *FDS* 916 (= Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* VIII.96-100). Cf. Lloyd (1978) and Graeser (1978) 206.

²¹⁶ For the differences between an ἀξιωμα ὀρισμένον (definite proposition), ἄοριστον (indefinite proposition) and μέσον (intermediate proposition), see *FDS* 916.

²¹⁷ Long & Sedley (1987 I) 207.

²¹⁸ Cf. Luhtala (2000) 81 and De Jonge (2001) 164.

Apollonius Dyscolus seems to preserve the Stoic views on the connection between the parts of speech and the categories: he points out that ‘pronouns (ἀντωνυμῖαι) indicate substance (οὐσίαν), and nouns indicate substance together with quality (οὐσίαν μετὰ ποιότητος)’.²¹⁹ The Stoics did not use the term ἀντωνυμία (or ἀντονομασία) (see section 3.2), but their ἄρθρον probably had exactly the function that Apollonius Dyscolus attributes to the pronoun:²²⁰ by using an ἄρθρον, one assigns something to the first category, thus indicating that it ‘exists’, without saying anything about its quality. Since the ‘substance’ (οὐσία) is ontologically prior to the ‘quality’ (ποιόν), the order of these categories explains why Dionysius suggests putting pronouns before appellative nouns. For pronouns indicate ‘substance’, while appellative nouns indicate the ‘common quality’.²²¹

There are two remaining principles of natural word order in Dionysius’ account, both of which deal with the forms of verbs: ἐν τε τοῖς ῥήμασι φυλάττειν, ἵνα τὰ ὀρθὰ τῶν ἐγκλινομένων ἡγήται καὶ τὰ παρεμφατικὰ τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων (principles 7 and 8). The distinction between ὀρθὰ and ἐγκλινόμενα (or, when we follow P, ἐγκεκλιμένα) has mostly been interpreted as one between indicatives and non-indicatives (see also section 3.8).²²² Steinthal, however, argues that the opposition between ὀρθὰ and ἐγκεκλιμένα is one between *present indicatives* on the one hand and all other tenses and moods on the other hand.²²³ He attempts to equate the distinction between ὀρθὰ and ἐγκεκλιμένα (*Comp.* 5.26,14-15) with the distinction between ὀρθὰ and ὑπτια that Dionysius mentions elsewhere (*Comp.* 6.29,8): with regard to the latter distinction, Steinthal again interprets ὀρθὰ as present indicatives, and ὑπτια (= ἐγκεκλιμένα) as all other tenses and moods. He thinks that τὰ ὑπτια in *Comp.* 6 are divided into moods (ἐγκλίσεις) on the one hand, and tenses (χρόνοι) on the other hand. However, we have already seen that ὀρθὰ and ὑπτια refer to the voices ‘active’ and ‘passive’ (sections 3.8 and 4.3.1).²²⁴ This is the originally Stoic terminology: the Stoics distinguish between active (ὀρθὰ), passive (ὑπτια) and neuter

²¹⁹ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, G.G. II 1, 27,9-10: οὐσίαν σημαίνουσιν αἱ ἀντωνυμῖαι, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐσίαν μετὰ ποιότητος. See also Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, G.G. II 1, 9,9: (ἀντωνυμῖαι) ... οὐσίαν τε μόνον δηλοῦσιν. According to Luhtala (2000) 80, this is the original Stoic definition of the ἄρθρον. See also Pinborg (1975) 114-115.

²²⁰ See Luhtala (2000) 80-82.

²²¹ For this explanation, see also De Jonge (2001) 164.

²²² See Schenkeveld (1983) 84, Usher (1985) 53. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 80 offer a less specific translation: ‘que les formes simples précèdent les formes infléchies (...)’.

²²³ Steinthal (1891 II) 274.

²²⁴ I agree with Schenkeveld (1983) 84, who argues that the distinction between ὀρθὰ and ὑπτια (*Comp.* 6.29,8) is one of ‘gender’ [i.e. voice] alone, whereas the distinction between ὀρθὰ and ἐγκεκλιμένα (*Comp.* 5.26,14-15) ‘may well be one of indicatives v. non-indicatives’.

(οὐδέτερα) predicates.²²⁵ Although their theory of predicates was not taken over, it seems that their terminology for ‘active’ and ‘passive’ influenced the scholars of other language disciplines. I conclude that Steinthal was wrong in equating ἐγκεκλιμένα with ὕπτια. But how should we then interpret the distinction between ὀρθά and ἐγκεκλιμένα (or ἐγκλινόμενα) in *Comp.* 5? In grammatical texts, the distinction between ὀρθός and ἐγκλινόμενος (ἐγκεκλιμένος) normally refers to the opposition between the nominative case and the oblique cases of the nominal parts of speech.²²⁶ But since Dionysius explicitly refers to the order of the ‘direct’ and ‘inflected’ forms of *verbs* (not nouns), it is clear that he is not thinking of the nominative and oblique cases.²²⁷ In *Comp.* 6 however, Dionysius tells us that some people refer to the ἐγκλίσεις (moods) as ‘verbal cases’ (πτώσεις ῥηματικᾶς) (see sections 3.8 and 4.3.1).²²⁸ We have related Dionysius’ remark to Macrobius’ statement that the Stoics call the indicative *modum rectum*, thus comparing the indicative to the nominative.²²⁹ All this seems to support the interpretation of ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα as indicatives (the ‘direct case’ of the verb) and other moods (‘oblique cases’) respectively.

Before elucidating my interpretation of ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα as indicatives and non-indicatives, I will briefly mention one other explanation that might seem to be attractive:²³⁰ one might suppose that ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα refer to the active verbs and other voices respectively. The term ἐγκλινόμενα is not attested in this sense, but the use of ὀρθά in the sense of ‘active’ is very common in Stoic logic, which, as we have seen, distinguishes between active (ὀρθά), passive (ὕπτια) and neuter

²²⁵ See Müller (1943) 52-59 and Luhtala (2000) 94-96. In my view, Steinthal (1891 II) 274 is wrong in thinking that, in *Comp.* 6.29,7-12, Dionysius proceeds from more general items (non-indicatives) to more specific items (first moods and then tenses): ‘da er aber (...) vom Allgemeinen ins Besondere hinabsteigend von den ὕπτια zu den ἐγκλίσεις und dann zu den διαφοραὶ χρόνων gelangt (...)’. In fact, Dionysius deals with three equally specific *accidentia*, all of which he presents at the *same* level, namely voices, moods, and tenses: see section 4.3.1.

²²⁶ In Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* II.106, αἱ ἐγκλινόμεναι πτώσεις are the inflected cases of the pronoun. In *Synt.* I.49, τῶν ἐγκλινομένων (textual variant κλινομένων) are ‘declinables’ (nouns etc.) as opposed to ἄκλιτα, i.e. words that do not have inflection (namely letters, such as α). Further, ὀρθόν and ἐγκεκλιμένον are found in discussions of rhetorical exercises (*progymnasmata*), indicating two out of five ‘forms of narratives’ (σχήματα διηγημάτων): the ὀρθὸν ἀποφαντικὸν σχῆμα only uses the nominative case, whereas the ἀποφαντικὸν ἐγκεκλιμένον σχῆμα uses also the other cases. See Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata* 2.4,21-5,9 Rabe.

²²⁷ In some instances, Dionysius also refers to participles as ῥήματα (see section 3.6.2), but it is unlikely that he is thinking of the cases of participles here.

²²⁸ *Comp.* 6.29,9-10.

²²⁹ Macrobius, *De diff.*, G.L. V, 611,36. Cf. Schenkeveld (1984) 335.

²³⁰ In theories of accentuation, ὀρθός and ἐγκλινόμενος form a common pair, referring to accented words and enclitic words respectively: ὁ ὀρθὸς τονός or ἡ ὀρθὴ τάσις is the ‘straight’, that is acute accent, which is opposed to ὁ ἐγκλινόμενος τονός or ἡ ἐγκλινόμενη τάσις, the grave accent. But this distinction is irrelevant to Dionysius’ discussion of word order.

(οὐδέτερα) predicates.²³¹ At the level of λέξις, the three predicate types correspond to three types of constructions, namely (1) a ῥῆμα (verb) with an oblique case, (2) a ῥῆμα (verb) with ὑπό and an oblique case, and (3) an intransitive ῥῆμα (verb), without an oblique case.²³² Is it possible that Dionysius' ὀρθά are 'active' verbs, and that the ἐγκλινόμενα correspond to passives?²³³ A difficulty of this interpretation is that, in Stoic logic, passive and intransitive verbs are not regarded as 'inflected' (ἐγκλινόμενα) forms of the active forms: the terms ὀρθά, ὑπτία and οὐδέτερα do not refer to the *forms* of words, but to the meaning that they carry.²³⁴ In technical grammar, however, the terms ὀρθή (= ἐνεργητική διάθεσις) and ὑπτία (= παθητική διάθεσις) might be taken to refer not only to the meaning but also to the forms of active and passive verbs.²³⁵ Thus, the passive voice and the middle voice (e.g. ἐλύθην, λύομαι) might be considered inflected forms of the active verb form (e.g. λύω). In this context we should also mention the fact that in certain sources, the nominative case (πτῶσις ὀρθή), 'which indicates the substance' is associated with the *active* verbs (ῥήματα ὀρθά).²³⁶ It seems, then, that we should not directly exclude the possibility that Dionysius' seventh principle of natural word order (τὰ ὀρθὰ τῶν ἐγκλινομένων ἡγῆται) refers to the order of active verb forms and the other voices; nevertheless, I will not follow this interpretation, for reasons to be given below.²³⁷

To summarise, Dionysius' ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα (or ἐγκεκλιμένα) could theoretically refer to either active and non-active verbs, or indicatives and non-indicatives. As I pointed out above, I will here adopt the interpretation of these terms as indicatives and non-indicatives. The following arguments are decisive. First, Dionysius' view that the moods (ἐγκλίσεις) are 'verbal cases' (see above and section 3.8) supports the interpretation of ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα as indicatives and other

²³¹ The active predicate indicates a ποιεῖν πρὸς τι, the passive predicate indicates a πάσχειν ὑπό τινος, and the neuter predicate indicates a pure acting or being acted upon.

²³² Cf. Müller (1943) 66-70.

²³³ The middle voice was not yet distinguished in Dionysius' time: see section 3.8. and the literature mentioned there.

²³⁴ Cf. Müller (1943) 67: 'Die Verb-Form selbst hat also nichts mit der Kennzeichnung als "Aktiv" zu tun: διαλέγεται τινι ist Aktiv!'

²³⁵ See Rijksbaron (1986) 433. For ῥήματα ὀρθά and ὑπτία, see Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 548,34-37. For ὀρθή and ὑπτία διάθεσις, see Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 247,10-13 and *G.G.* I 3, 401,1-10.

²³⁶ Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 546,5-14 (= *FDS* 780). On this text, see Luhtala (2000) 105-107. See also Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 230,24-30.

²³⁷ Another possibility, not mentioned yet, would be that ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα refer to the present tense and other tenses respectively. According to Aristotle, *Int.* 16b16-18, only present tenses are really 'verbs', whereas past and future tenses are 'cases of the verb' (see above and section 3.8). Ildefonse (1997) 205-210 observes that there are parallels between the Stoic theory of cases and the theory of tenses. As far as I know, however, the terms ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα are never used in the context of tenses. The suggestion of Steinthal (1891 II) 274 that the opposition is between *present*-indicatives and all other tenses and moods is based on the wrong assumption that the ὀρθά (as opposed to ὑπτία) in *Comp.* 6.29,8 are *present* indicatives: see above and section 3.8.

moods:²³⁸ Dionysius seems to have borrowed the terms of the ‘direct’ and ‘inflected’ cases of nominal parts of speech for the moods of verbs. Second, the rule that indicatives should precede the other moods would fit with the other logical principles that Dionysius mentions: the idea that underlies the supposed order indicatives – non-indicatives would probably be that indicatives refer to a situation that exists in reality, whereas subjunctives, imperatives and optatives refer to situations that do not ‘exist’, but are only hypothetical, wished (prayed), or commanded. Thus, the seventh principle of Dionysius’ experiment concerning natural word order could be interpreted in accordance with the rules that indicate the priority of substance over accident. But there is a third argument. Important evidence that supports my interpretation comes from Priscian. According to the Roman grammarian, the indicative is (in a theoretical list) the *first* mood because, unlike the other moods, it designates the substance or essence of the content (*substantiam sive essentiam rei significat*):²³⁹ therefore, the indicative may be compared to the nominative, which takes the first place among the cases.²⁴⁰ Priscian’s views correspond to Macrobius’ information about the Stoics, who are said to have regarded the indicative as *modum rectum* and to have related it with the nominative as the ‘direct case’. We may conclude that the statements of Macrobius and Priscian strongly suggest that Dionysius’ order of ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα is based on Stoic view that the indicative, which indicates substance, is the first of the moods. Just like most other principals of natural word order, this order is based on the logical precedence of substance over accidents.

Finally, there is the natural order of παρεμφατικά and ἀπαρέμφατα (principle nr. 8). Manuscript F reads τὰ παρεμφατικά τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων, whereas P has τὰ ἀπαρεμφατικά τῶν παρεμφατικῶν. With Usener and Aujac, I adopt the order of F, because the word ἀπαρεμφατικός (only in P) is not attested in any ancient Greek text, whereas ἀπαρέμφατος is the normal grammatical term for ‘infinitive’. The form

²³⁸ The grammatical term for indicative is ὀριστική (ἐγκλισις) or ὀριστικόν.

²³⁹ The term *res* is presumably a translation of πρᾶγμα, which refers to the content (meaning) of verbs: see Sluiter (2000a).

²⁴⁰ Priscianus, *Inst.* VIII.12.63, *G.L.* II, 421,20-422,2: *Indicativus, quo indicamus vel definimus, quid agitur a nobis vel ab aliis, qui ideo primus ponitur, quia perfectus est in omnibus tam personis quam temporibus et quia ex ipso omnes modi accipiunt regulam et derivativa nomina sive verba vel participia ex hoc nascuntur, (...) et quia prima positio verbi, quae videtur ab ipsa natura esse prolata, in hoc est modo, quemadmodum in nominibus est casus nominativus, et quia substantiam sive essentiam rei significat, quod in aliis modis non est. Neque enim qui imperat neque qui optat neque qui dubitat in subiunctivo substantiam actus vel passionis significat, sed tantummodo varias animi voluntates de re carente substantia. Deinde hunc primum auctoritas doctissimorum tradidit modum in declinatione verborum.* Cf. Steinthal (1891 II) 288. It is possible that Priscian draws on a discussion in Apollonius’ *On Verbs*, which contained a passage on the order of the moods: see Lallot (1997 II) 193 n. 148 and see below.

ἀπαρεμφατικά seems to be either a mistake or the hypercorrection by a scribe who wanted to give the two words the same ending.²⁴¹ Apart from Dionysius of Halicarnassus (who uses the word only in *Comp.* 5.26,15), Apollonius Dyscolus seems to be the only ancient author in whose works the word παρεμφατικός has been preserved.²⁴² Apollonius, however, never uses παρεμφατικός on its own, but always in combination with an object in the genitive: παρεμφατικός τινος means ‘indicative of something’, such as person (προσώπου), place (τόπου), or manner (ποιότητας).²⁴³ But what do Dionysius’ παρεμφατικά (‘co-indicatives’) indicate?²⁴⁴ The other technical term that he mentions here, ἀπαρέμφατον, leads us to the answer. The term ἀπαρέμφατον, which literally means ‘not-co-indicative’, is the word that Apollonius Dyscolus and other grammarians use as their technical term for the ‘infinitive’. The infinitive is ‘not-co-indicative’ for the reason that it does *not indicate anything except for* the minimal verbal *accidentia*: unlike the finite verb forms, the infinitive does *not* express person and number, but it does express the general verbal *accidentia* tense (χρόνος) and voice (διάθεσις).²⁴⁵ Concerning these matters, Apollonius Dyscolus states the following.²⁴⁶

Ἰδιον οὖν ῥήματός ἐστιν ἐν ἰδίῳι μετασχηματισμοῖς διάφορος χρόνος διάθεσις τε ἢ ἐνεργητικὴ καὶ παθητικὴ καὶ ἔτι ἡ μέση· ὧν πάντων μετέλαβεν τὸ γενικώτατον

²⁴¹ Schenkeveld (1983) 89 wrongly states that the order of F is παρεμφατικά – ἀπαρεμφατικά: it is παρεμφατικά – ἀπαρέμφατα. The shorter form (ἀπαρέμφατα) corresponds to the term that grammarians use for the ‘infinitive’, while the longer form (ἀπαρεμφατικά) is not attested in any other text. Further, Schenkeveld (1983) 86 n. 75 incorrectly suggests that Aujac & Lebel (1981) adopt the order of P. In fact, Aujac & Lebel read παρεμφατικά – ἀπαρέμφατα (F), just like Usener.

²⁴² For Apollonius Dyscolus’ use of παρεμφατικός, παρέμφασις and παρεμφαίνειν, see Van Ophuijsen (1993) 764-767.

²⁴³ For παρεμφατικά προσώπου, see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, G.G. II 1, 63,10. For παρεμφατικά τόπου, see *Adv.*, G.G. II 1, 180,20. For ποιότητος παρεμφατικών, see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.*, G.G. II 1, 205,3-4. Cf. Schneider, G.G. II 3, 242 (*index vocabulorum*): παρεμφατικός τινος *indicans alqd.* See also Van Ophuijsen (1993) 766-767, who translates the term as ‘co-indicative’. He points out that the prefix παρα- in παρεμφατικός can mean either ‘besides another subject’ (i.e. besides another subject that indicates something) or ‘besides another object’ (i.e. besides another object that is indicated).

²⁴⁴ Παρεμφατικός does not seem to be equivalent to the mood ‘indicative’ (at least, it does not refer to this mood *alone*), for which Apollonius Dyscolus uses the term ὀριστική (ἔγκλισις) or ὀριστικὸν (ῥήμα).

²⁴⁵ Cf. Steinthal (1891 II) 286, Lallot (1997 II) 192 n. 143 and Sluiter (1990) 86-87. On the history of the term ἀπαρέμφατον, which is probably of Stoic origin, see also Matthaios (1999) 361-362. It is possible that Aristarchus was the first who used the term for the infinitive: in fr. 72 Matthaios, Aristonicus reports that Aristarchus pointed to the *infinitivus pro imperativo* (τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον instead of τὸ προστακτικόν) in *Iliad* 3.459. But we cannot prove that the use of these terms in the scholia can be traced back to Aristarchus himself. This problem is connected to the status of Aristonicus as a source for Aristarchus (see Matthaios [1999] 43-46). Aristonicus, who was active in the Augustan period, preserved parts of Aristarchus’ ὑπομνήματα, but it is possible that he added his own terminology. See esp. Matthaios (1999) 45.

²⁴⁶ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntaxis* III.60.

ῥῆμα, λέγω τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον, ἐπεὶ εἵπερ τῇ φύσει ἦν ἀπαρέμφατον, πῶς ταῦτα παρεμφαίνει;

‘The essential features of a verb lie in the special inflections for different tenses and diatheses [voices] — active, passive and middle. The most general verb form, the infinitive [‘non-(co)-indicative’], has part in all of these features. For if the infinitive was really naturally ‘non-indicative’, how could it indicate these?’²⁴⁷

Apollonius’ explanation of the term ‘infinitive’ makes clear that it is called ἀπαρέμφατος (ἔγκλισις) because it does *not* indicate the *accidentia* that are expressed by finite verb forms (indicative, subjunctive, optative and imperative), namely number and person. Therefore, I think that we are justified in concluding that Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ opposition between παρεμφατικά and ἀπαρέμφατα is an opposition between ‘finite verb forms’ and ‘infinitives’.²⁴⁸ Dionysius’ παρεμφατικά are those verbal forms that indicate number and person, namely the forms of the indicative, subjunctive, optative and imperative. Apollonius’ ideas on the infinitive may also provide the explanation for the *order* of παρεμφατικά and ἀπαρέμφατα that Dionysius suggests: finite verb forms co-indicate number and person, while infinitives only indicate voice and tense: thus, the finite verb forms point to the existence of one or more persons (I, you, he, etc.), and indirectly indicate ‘substance’.²⁴⁹ When we interpret the order of finite verb forms and infinitives in this way, we are able to connect the last principle ((ἡγήται) τὰ παρεμφατικά τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων) with the logical rules that Dionysius discussed earlier in his experiment concerning natural word order: again, those words that (indirectly) point to a substance precede the forms that only point to certain accidents.²⁵⁰

Apollonius Dyscolus himself also discusses the place of the infinitive in the order of the verbal moods. Unlike Dionysius, however, Apollonius does not refer to the order

²⁴⁷ I have adapted the translation of Householder (1981).

²⁴⁸ Cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 80, Usher (1985) 53, Aujac (1992) 258. See also Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, G.G. II 1, 63,9-11, where ἀπαρέμφατος and παρεμφατικός (προσώπου) appear in the same context: καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων, ἅπερ ἀντωνυμίας συντασσόμενα παρεμφατικὰ γίνεται προσώπου· τὸ γὰρ ‘ἐμὲ γράφειν’ πρώτου καὶ τὸ ‘σὲ γράφειν’ δευτέρου. ‘This is also clear from the infinitives, which become indicative of person when they are constructed with a pronoun: for “ἐμὲ γράφειν” [“that I write”] indicates the first person, and “σὲ γράφειν” [“that you write”] indicates the second person.’

²⁴⁹ See also Ildefonse (1997) 199 on the Stoic views concerning the difference between predicates and infinitives: ‘(...) si tout prédicat est un prédicat déterminé, l’infinitif n’est pas encore un prédicat; abstrait de toute actualité sensible, abstrait de toute combinaison syntaxique, il est le prédicat en tant qu’il n’*existe* pas.’

²⁵⁰ In De Jonge (2001) 160, I interpreted the order of παρεμφατικά and ἀπαρέμφατα as ‘indicatives before infinitives’, but I now think that it should be ‘finite verb forms before infinitives’.

of the infinitive and other moods in a sentence, but rather to a *theoretical* order, according to which the moods should be treated in a grammar. In his *Syntax*, Apollonius points out that indicatives, optatives and the other moods are ‘subtypes of the general verb’ (τὰ ὑπόλοιπα εἶδη τοῦ γενικοῦ ῥήματος), the general verb itself being the infinitive.²⁵¹ Therefore, the infinitive is the basis for each of the other moods: in fact, every verbal form of one of the moods corresponds to a combination of the infinitive with a word that conveys the meaning of the particular mood. For example, περιπατῶ (‘I am walking’; indicative) corresponds to ὀρισάμην περιπατεῖν (‘I indicated that I was walking’), while περιπατοῦμι (‘may I walk’; optative) corresponds to ἠϋξάμην περιπατεῖν (‘I prayed that I would walk’), etc.²⁵² In other words, the infinitive is the basis of all the other moods, and therefore it occupies the first place in the hierarchy of verbal forms. Apollonius also tells us that he has not forgotten that he has argued elsewhere that the indicative (and not the infinitive) is the primary verb form:²⁵³ he has now changed his mind about the order of the moods, although he still allows that, for pedagogical reasons, the indicative is treated first, in spite of the fact that it is not the primary mood.²⁵⁴ It is the infinitive that takes the first place. Lallot has suggested that Apollonius’ change of mind may be related to the fact that in an earlier period he was interested in morphological aspects, whereas in the *Syntax* he focused on the syntactical functions of moods.²⁵⁵ It is interesting that Apollonius compares the relationship between the infinitive and the other moods on the one hand to that of the primary word forms (τὰ πρωτότυπα) and the derived word forms (τῶν παραγωγῶν) on the other hand. This seems to suggest that the infinitives are not only theoretically prior to the other moods, but that they have also been invented earlier; in the same way, the primary word forms are supposed to have

²⁵¹ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III.60.

²⁵² Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III.61.

²⁵³ Apollonius probably defended this order of moods in his work *On Verbs*. Choeroboscus, who read this work, reports that Apollonius’ order of moods was indicative, infinitive, optative, imperative, subjunctive: see Lallot (1997 II) 193 n. 148.

²⁵⁴ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntax* III.62: Οὐ λήλησμαι ὡς ἐν ἑτέροις συμφερόμενός τις τὴν ὀριστικὴν ἔγκλισιν παρεδεχόμεν ὡς πρωτεύουσαν τῶν ἄλλων. ἀλλ’ οὖν γε ἡ ἀκριβὴς ἐξέτασις τοῦ λόγου κατηνάγκασε τὸ μεταθέσθαι, συγχωρουμένου ἐκείνου, ὡς δεόντως ἀπὸ τῆς ὀριστικῆς ἐγκλίσεως ἀρχόμεθα, οὐχ ὡς πρώτης οὔσης, ὡς δὲ ἐκφανεστάτης οὔσης καὶ πολλῆς καὶ δυναμένης διδάξαι καὶ τὰς ἐγγενομένας συνεμπτώσεις καὶ τὰ ἐγγεγόμενα πάθη καὶ παραγωγάς, οὐδὲ τοῦ τοιούτου μαχομένου, καθὼ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐλλειπεστέρα ἢ ἀπαρέμφοτος ἔγκλισις, εἴγε καὶ τὰ πρωτότυπα τῶν λέξεων ἐν ἐλάττονι καταγίνεται ὕλη τῶν παραγωγῶν. ‘I have not forgotten that I elsewhere picked the indicative as the primary verb form, in agreement with other scholars. But a more careful study of the argument has forced me to change my mind, although I allow that we begin [discussion of the verbal system] necessarily with the indicative mood, not because it is indeed primary, but because it is the most transparent, occurs frequently and can teach us the occurring similarities of form, phonological changes and derivations; the fact that the infinitive does not have the same richness of forms is not incompatible with the fact that it occupies the first place, for primary forms of words are also less bulky than derivatives.’ I have adapted the translation of Householder (1981).

²⁵⁵ Lallot (1997 II) 193-194 n. 149.

existed earlier than the derived word forms. In his discussion of the (theoretical) order of the parts of speech, Apollonius also uses the argument that some parts of speech ‘were invented earlier’ than other parts of speech.²⁵⁶ In those cases, chronological priority corresponds to the hierarchical priority in the list of the parts of speech.

5.3.7. Stoic logic and Dionysius’ experiment concerning natural word order

In the preceding sections, I have tried to illuminate the theoretical background of the principles of natural word order that Dionysius mentions in *De compositione verborum* 5. I have not only attempted to reconstruct the philosophical ideas that underlie the terminology that he uses, but also to supply an explanation for those rules that Dionysius himself does not illustrate. The experiment concerning natural word order as a whole shows a particular view on the relation between language and reality. The entire experiment is based on the implicit idea that language should represent reality as close as possible: therefore, it is supposed that priorities that exist in reality should also be expressed in the order of words.

The eight principles that Dionysius mentions refer to at least two different types of priority. The third principle (prior in time is prior in word order) supposes that the chronological order of events in reality should correspond to the order in which these events are reported in language. Most other principles (1, 2, 4, 5, 6; presumably also 7 and 8) refer to a logical and ontological priority, which differentiates between more and less essential features of an entity or situation. Dionysius himself provides the explanation for two of the principles: (1) nouns precede verbs because an accident (συμβεβηκός) presupposes a substance (οὐσία), and (2) verbs precede adverbs because circumstances (συνεδρεύοντα) presuppose acting or being acted upon. I have argued that the order of (4) substantive and adjective, (5) appellative noun and proper noun and (6) pronoun and appellative noun should also be explained as based on a logical and ontological priority. Concerning the order of (7) indicatives and other moods and (8) finite verb forms and infinitives, we cannot be absolutely certain about the reason why these orders are natural. However, I have suggested that these principles, too, may be based on the idea that those verbal forms that (indirectly) indicate substance in reality are prior to other forms: the indicative points to the action of something or someone existent in the real world, other moods indicate the action that is only hypothetical, wished, or commanded, while infinitives do not indicate person and number, so that they do not point to any substance at all. The two types of

²⁵⁶ See Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.21 and I.25-26. Cf. De Jonge (2001) 162 and Grintser (2002) 91-92.

priority to which Dionysius refers correspond, as we have seen (section 5.3.5), to some of the different uses of the word ‘prior’ (πρότερον) that Aristotle distinguished in his *Categories*.

Our analysis of Dionysius’ principles of natural word order has shown that these principles depend to a large extent on Stoic ideas. Two principles (appellative nouns precede proper nouns and pronouns precede appellative nouns) can only be explained by taking into account the Stoic categories. The order of the Stoic categories (substance, common quality, individual quality, disposition and relative disposition) underlies the natural order of the parts of speech (pronoun, appellative noun, proper noun, verb) as Dionysius presents it. The order of substantives and adjectives, indicatives and other moods, and finite verbs and infinitives can also be related to Stoic ontology. It is certain, then, that Dionysius’ experiment concerning natural word order has a Stoic background.

However, the Stoic character of the chapter on natural word order does not imply that Dionysius borrowed or copied that chapter from Stoic sources. As we have seen before, some modern scholars (in particular Barwick and Kroll) have suggested that Dionysius took *Comp.* 5 over from Chrysippus’ treatises *Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν* (*On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech*). As I have pointed out in section 5.3.1, these scholars use three arguments that would indicate Dionysius’ dependence of Stoic sources. I will now briefly re-examine these three supposed indications. (1) First, there is the reference to the *διαλεκτικὰ τέχνηαι* at the end of *Comp.* 5:²⁵⁷ when he has rejected the theory of natural word order, Dionysius mentions both the experiment on natural word order and the dialectical treatises in one breath, telling us that he only mentioned them so that nobody, misled by the titles of the dialectical works, would think that they contained anything useful for the theory of rhetorical composition. This remark might indicate that Dionysius has borrowed the theories of natural word order from the Stoic treatises. However, in an earlier passage, he has claimed that he had put the Stoic works on syntax aside, and that he *himself* had looked for a natural starting point.²⁵⁸ If we take this remark seriously, we may also conclude that, at the end of *Comp.* 5, Dionysius summarises two unsuccessful projects, namely the experiment concerning natural word order on the one hand, and the study of the Stoic treatises on the other hand. (2) It has also been thought that the search for a natural starting point betrays the Stoic origin of *Comp.* 5. However, the idea that nature should be the guide and model for everything was a

²⁵⁷ *Comp.* 5.26,21-27,6.

²⁵⁸ *Comp.* 4.23,1-5.

common idea among intellectuals of the first century BC, and it does not necessarily point to a Stoic source. Besides, Dionysius points to the importance of nature in a number of other passages of his rhetorical works: this seems to be a general view of Dionysius rather than the sign of a specific Stoic theory. (3) Finally, scholars have suggested that the terminology of *Comp. 5* proves the Stoic origin of the chapter.²⁵⁹ It is true that οὐσία, συμβεβηκός and τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον can probably be traced back to Stoic philosophy, as I have shown. However, Dionysius also uses a number of grammatical terms that did not have a place in Stoic logic. The Stoic system of the μέρη λόγου did not include the ἀντονομασία (or ἀντωνυμία), and the Stoics called the adverb μεσότης, not ἐπίρρημα (see sections 3.2 and 3.6.5). These facts weaken the argument that the entire chapter *Comp. 5* was taken over from Chrysippus. Further, it is doubtful whether the Stoics themselves would have discussed the order of the parts of speech in a sentence or Homeric verse. Although Frede thinks that Dionysius' words imply that the Stoics dealt with practical word order in their works on syntax, we can also imagine that the Stoics merely argued for a natural hierarchy of the parts of speech (namely pronoun, appellative noun, proper noun, verb, adverb), without implying that this should be the word order of a Greek sentence.²⁶⁰ In that case, Dionysius would have adopted a Stoic idea on the natural hierarchy of the parts of speech, which he himself applied to the order of words in Homeric verse: according to this interpretation, Dionysius would have gone one step further than the Stoics, by giving a *rhetorical* application to their philosophical hierarchy of the parts of speech.

I conclude that, although the experiment concerning natural word order is to a large extent based on Stoic ideas (especially their theory of categories), it is unlikely that Dionysius directly copied this passage from a Stoic source. The chapter on natural word order combines Stoic philosophical and technical grammatical ideas with a rhetorical approach to composition. In any case, the experiment did not lead to the results that Dionysius had hoped for. It turned out that the beauty of Homeric verse did not depend on the adoption of the principles of nature. Therefore, Dionysius rejected the theory: nature may be a good guide, but Homer is the best.

²⁵⁹ According to Pohl (1968) 79, the Homeric examples are also an indication for the Stoic origin of *Comp. 5*. She regards Pseudo-Plutarch, *On Homer* as a parallel. However, not only Stoic philosophers, but also grammarians and rhetoricians constantly used Homer as their main text of reference.

²⁶⁰ Frede (1987a) 324-325.

5.4. Natural word order according to ‘Demetrius’, ‘Longinus’, and Quintilian

The concept of a natural word order does not only appear in the work of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but also in that of other rhetoricians, literary critics and grammarians. Although the concept of natural word order is widespread in ancient rhetorical texts, there are interesting differences between the views of various rhetoricians, critics and grammarians. In this section, I will briefly discuss the ideas on natural word order of three ancient colleagues of Dionysius: ‘Demetrius’ (5.4.1), ‘Longinus’ (5.4.2) and Quintilian (5.4.3).

5.4.1. Natural word order according to ‘Demetrius’

The rhetorician ‘Demetrius’ discusses ‘the natural order of words’ (ἡ φυσικὴ τάξις τῶν ὀνομάτων) in his account of the simple style (χαρακτήρ ἰσχνός):²⁶¹

(199) Καὶ ὅλως τῇ φυσικῇ τάξει τῶν ὀνομάτων χρηστέον, ὥς τὸ “Ἐπίδαμνός ἐστι πόλις ἐν δεξιᾷ ἐσπλέοντι εἰς τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον”.²⁶² πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὠνόμασται τὸ περὶ οὗ, δεύτερον δὲ ὃ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι πόλις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐφεξῆς. (200) Γίγνοιτο μὲν οὖν ἂν καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, ὥς τὸ “Ἔστι πόλις Ἐφύρη.”²⁶³ οὐ γὰρ πάντη ταύτην δοκιμάζομεν τὴν τάξιν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἑτέραν ἀποδοκιμάζομεν, καθὰ ἐκτιθέμεθα μόνον τὸ φυσικὸν εἶδος τῆς τάξεως. (201) Ἐν δὲ τοῖς διηγήμασιν ἥτοι ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρθῆς ἀρκτέον· “Ἐπίδαμνός ἐστι πόλις,” ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς, ὥς τὸ “λέγεται Ἐπίδαμνον τὴν πόλιν.” αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι πτώσεις ἀσάφειάν τινα παρέξουσιν καὶ βάσανον τῷ τε λέγοντι αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ ἀκούοντι.

‘(199) In general, follow the natural word order, for example “Epidamnos is a city on your right as you sail into the Ionian gulf.” The subject is mentioned first, then what it is (it is a city), then the rest follows. (200) The order can also be reversed, for example “There is a city, Ephra.” We do not rigidly approve the one nor condemn the other order; we are simply setting out the natural way to arrange words. (201) In narrative passages begin either with the nominative case (e.g. “Epidamnos is a city”) or with the accusative (e.g. “It is said that the city Epidamnos...”). Use of the other cases will cause some obscurity and torture for the actual speaker and also the listener.’²⁶⁴

²⁶¹ ‘Demetrius’, *Eloc.* 199-201. For date and authorship of ‘Demetrius’, *On Style*, see the literature mentioned in section 1.5.

²⁶² Thucydides 1.24.1

²⁶³ Homer, *Iliad* 6.152.

²⁶⁴ The translation is by Innes (1995).

Unlike Dionysius of Halicarnassus, ‘Demetrius’ presents an account of natural word order that is pragmatic rather than grammatical. ‘Demetrius’ states that one should first mention τὸ περὶ οὗ, ‘the matter about which’: the topic.²⁶⁵ This approach to word order strikingly resembles the descriptions of Greek word order that have been developed in recent years. In particular, ‘Demetrius’ formulation reminds us of the ideas of Helma Dik, who has argued that a Greek sentence normally starts with the ‘Topic’.²⁶⁶ In Functional Grammar, the Topic presents ‘the entity “about” which the predication predicates something in the given setting’.²⁶⁷ Whereas Dionysius’ natural word order in *Comp.* 5 was determined by logical and chronological arguments, ‘Demetrius’ φυσικὴ τάξις seems to be entirely based on pragmatic considerations, which aim to present the information clearly to the audience.²⁶⁸ Even his grammatical statements on the use of the cases (*Eloc.* 201) are not based on logical ideas, but only on the rhetorical view that one should always (at least in the simple style) avoid obscurity (ἀσάφεια): the use of other cases than the nominative and accusative at the beginning of a sentence would torture both speaker and listener.²⁶⁹ In short, ‘Demetrius’ perspective, which concentrates on the clear communication and presentation of a narrative, is completely different from the logical perspective that determines Dionysius’ experiment in *Comp.* 5.

Another difference between ‘Demetrius’ and Dionysius is related to these divergent approaches, namely the position that the theory of a natural word order occupies in their work. Dionysius’ experiment concerning natural word order falls outside his actual treatment of composition, since he rejects the natural principles *before* he starts his discussion of the functions, means and aims of σύνθεσις. ‘Demetrius’, however, deals with natural word order in his treatment of the simple style.²⁷⁰ The simple style

²⁶⁵ Dover (1960) 9 wrongly states that ‘Demetrius’ argues for the order ‘subject – verb’, which he compares to Dionysius’ remark (*Comp.* 5) on the order of nouns and verbs. Although he acknowledges that ‘Demetrius’ remark on τὸ περὶ οὗ and ὃ τοῦτο ἐστὶν does not mean that ‘the syntactical subject precedes the syntactical predicate’, Dover fails to observe the fundamental difference between the grammatical approach of Dionysius and the pragmatic approach of ‘Demetrius’.

²⁶⁶ Dik (1995) 12. I emphasise that I do not claim that the theories of ‘Demetrius’ and Dik are the same: there are many differences, and ‘Demetrius’ does not use the expression τὸ περὶ οὗ in the technical sense in which Dik uses the term ‘Topic’. My point is rather that *if* one looks at ancient theory from a modern perspective, it is ‘Demetrius’ whose views are most *similar* to the modern pragmatic views on word order. A comparison with modern pragmatic theory can help us to see the differences between ‘Demetrius’ and Dionysius, but we should not read modern theories into ‘Demetrius’ text.

²⁶⁷ Simon C. Dik (1978) 19.

²⁶⁸ The emendation by Piero Vettori (1499-1585) in *Eloc.* 199 (φυσικῇ τάξει instead of φύσει καὶ) is without any doubt correct, as the formulation in *Eloc.* 200 (τὸ φυσικὸν εἶδος τῆς τάξεως) indicates.

²⁶⁹ ‘Demetrius’ metathesis of Thucydides 1.24.1 (*Eloc.* 201), which makes the sentence start with the accusative instead of the nominative, seems to reflect the exercises (*progymnasmata*) that were used in schools of rhetoric: see section 7.3.2.

²⁷⁰ It is important to remember that ‘Demetrius’ views on natural word order are part of his discussion of the simple style: he does not say that every sentence in any passage should start with τὸ περὶ οὗ.

(χαρακτήρ ἰσχνός) differs from the other styles in the use of normal words and clear constructions. In some cases, ‘Demetrius’ describes the simple style with the term συνήθης, which means ‘usual’, ‘customary’, or ‘familiar’.²⁷¹ It seems clear, then, that his ‘natural word order’ is nothing more than the word order of everyday language. While hyperbaton fits the elevated style, the φυσικὴ τάξις is appropriate for the simple style.²⁷² In other words, ‘Demetrius’ concept of ‘nature’ does not correspond to the concept of ‘nature’ in Dionysius’ *Comp.* 5 but rather to his use of φύσις in other parts of his work (see section 5.2). In Dionysius’ experiment, the natural order represented logical and chronological priorities that can be found in reality. In ‘Demetrius’ account, however, ‘natural’ means ‘normal’ and ‘unmodified’, and his natural order contributes to the clarity of the information that is to be communicated.

It should be noted that ‘Demetrius’ does not strictly adhere to the natural order of words, but makes clear that the reversed order is also allowed. This attitude points to a similarity between ‘Demetrius’ and Dionysius: both rhetoricians conclude, on the basis of literary examples, that there is more than one possible word order. And in both accounts, Homer is the authority that proves that one should not rigidly stick to one single arrangement of words.

5.4.2. Natural word order according to ‘Longinus’

‘Longinus’, the author of *On the Sublime*, touches on the subject of natural word order in his discussion of hyperbaton:²⁷³

‘Longinus’, *On the Sublime* 22.1:

Τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ιδέας καὶ τὰ ὑπερβατὰ θετέον. ἔστι δὲ λέξεων ἢ νοήσεων ἐκ τοῦ κατ’ ἀκολουθίαν κεκινημένη τάξις καὶ οἷονεῖ <...> χαρακτήρ ἐναγωνίου πάθους ἀληθέστατος. ὥς γὰρ οἱ τῷ ὄντι ὀργιζόμενοι ἢ φοβούμενοι ἢ ἀγανακτοῦντες ἢ ὑπὸ ζηλοτυπίας ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς (πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀναρίθμητα πάθη καὶ οὐδ’ ἂν εἰπεῖν τις ὅποσα δύναίτο) ἐκάστοτε παραπίπτοντες ἄλλα προθέμενοι πολλάκις ἐπ’ ἄλλα μεταπηδῶσι, μέσα τινὰ παρεμβάλλοντες ἀλόγως, εἴτ’ αὖθις ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ἀνακυκλοῦντες καὶ πάντα πρὸς τῆς ἀγωνίας, ὥς ὑπ’ ἀστάτου πνεύματος, τῇδε κάκεισε ἀγχιστρόφως ἀντισπώμενοι τὰς λέξεις τὰς νοήσεις τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν

Therefore, I do not agree with the analysis of Weil (1978 [1844]) 14, who remarks that ‘Demetrius’ ‘uses exaggerated expressions to establish a theory which he has not himself practiced in the treatise which contains it.’

²⁷¹ See esp. ‘Demetrius’, *Eloc.* 60 and 190.

²⁷² Cf. Rhys Roberts (1969) 245.

²⁷³ For date and authorship of ‘Longinus’, *On the Sublime*, see the literature mentioned in section 1.5.

εἶρμόυ παντοίως πρὸς μυρίας τροπὰς ἐναλλάττουσι τάξιν, οὕτως παρὰ τοῖς ἀρίστοις συγγραφεῦσι διὰ τῶν ὑπερβατῶν ἢ μίμησις ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα φέρεται. τότε γὰρ ἡ τέχνη τέλειος ἡνίκ’ ἂν φύσις εἶναι δοκῇ, ἢ δ’ αὖ φύσις ἐπιτυχῆς ὅταν λανθάνουσιν περιέχῃ τὴν τέχνην.

‘In the same category we must place hyperbaton. This figure consists in arranging words and thoughts out of the logical sequence, and is, as it were, the truest mark of vehement emotion. Just as people who are really angry or frightened or indignant, or are carried away by jealousy or some other feeling — there are countless emotions, no one can say how many — often put forward one point and then spring off to another, irrationally inserting some remark, and then wheel round again to their original position and are all the time dragged rapidly about, this way and that, by their excitement, as by a constantly veering wind, and vary their words, thoughts and the order that springs from the natural sequence in innumerable ways — so, too, in the best prose writers the use of hyperbata allows imitation to approach the effects of nature. For art is only perfect when it looks like nature and nature succeeds only when she conceals latent art.’²⁷⁴

The obscurity of this exposition on hyperbaton is not only caused by ‘Longinus’ illustration of this figure by a *leçon par l’exemple*, but also by the fact that he uses the term ‘nature’ in two different ways.²⁷⁵ We have seen that for ‘Demetrius’ the ‘natural’ order was in fact the usual and unmodified word order. Likewise, ‘Longinus’ regards hyperbaton as a *departure* from the ‘logical order’ (ἀκολουθία) or from ‘the order that springs from the natural sequence’ (τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶρμόυ τάξιν).²⁷⁶ On the other hand, the departure *itself* is also a natural phenomenon, both in reality and in language: the order in reality can be disturbed by a veering wind; in language, inversion of the natural order occurs when people speak with emotion.²⁷⁷ Thus, when prose writers consciously use the figure of hyperbaton, they in fact *imitate* ‘the effects of nature’ (τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα): their artistic use of hyperbaton imitates the natural type of expression of people who are carried away by emotion.²⁷⁸ The difference between the approaches of ‘Demetrius’ and ‘Longinus’ concerning natural word order can be explained in the following way. ‘Longinus’ is interested in the ‘sublime’

²⁷⁴ The translation is based on those of Russell (1964) 138 and Fyfe / Russell (1995).

²⁷⁵ On theory and example in ‘Longinus’ and ‘Demetrius’, see Innes (2002).

²⁷⁶ For the term ἀκολουθία, see Sluiter (1990) 13-16 and section 5.2 of this study.

²⁷⁷ The view that emotions influence the order of words is also found in the works of French grammarians of the eighteenth century, who borrowed their ideas partly from ‘Longinus’ and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. See Scaglione (1972) 222-282.

²⁷⁸ Compare Dionysius’ idea (*Is.* 16.114,9-13) that natural style is the product of art imitating nature: see section 5.2.

(ὕψος) rather than in different styles of writing. In *On the Sublime*, he lists five sources of the sublime: great thoughts, strong emotion, figures of thought and speech, noble diction and dignified word arrangement.²⁷⁹ The exposition of hyperbaton (*Subl.* 22) is part of the discussion of figures (*Subl.* 16-29), but it is clear that for ‘Longinus’ this figure is also related to emotion and dignified composition: thus, hyperbaton is for several reasons a very effective technique for writers who want to achieve sublime expression. Therefore, the deviant word order is much more interesting for ‘Longinus’ than the φυσικὴ τάξις that ‘Demetrius’ assigned to the simple style. It seems that ‘Longinus’ has made an effort to prove that hyperbaton, although it differs from the ‘natural’ order in a strict sense, is in fact *not unnatural*:²⁸⁰ the idealistic view of nature (φύσις), according to which everything that is good is also natural, seems to have caused ‘Longinus’ to state that the order of words that is normally considered to be deviant, is in fact in agreement with nature.²⁸¹

Just like Dionysius, ‘Longinus’ uses a terminology that is philosophically coloured. Terms like ἀκολουθία (see section 5.2 above) and εἰρμός are typically Stoic; and so is the word ἡνωμένα, which occurs in the subsequent passage, where ‘Longinus’ adds that hyperbaton is used to separate τὰ φύσει ἡνωμένα (‘things that are unite by nature’).²⁸² In Stoic philosophy, the word εἰρμός occurs in the discussion of fate: fate (εἰμαρμένη) is a ‘concatenation of causes’ (εἰρμός αἰτιῶν), which is explained as ‘an inescapable ordering and interconnexion’ (τάξις καὶ ἐπισύνδεσις ἀπαράβατος).²⁸³ The Stoics thought that a certain rational order, which was created by the divine λόγος, was present in the entire cosmos.²⁸⁴ The words τάξις, ἀκολουθία and εἰρμός refer to this rational order, indicating that each thing follows logically from another thing (see also section 5.2).²⁸⁵ These philosophical ideas seem to have left some traces in ‘Longinus’ terminology. When he mentions ‘the (word) order that springs from the natural sequence’ (τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰρμοῦ τάξιν), ‘Longinus’ seems to be

²⁷⁹ *Subl.* 8.1.

²⁸⁰ Quintilian (*Inst.* 9.4.26) seems to struggle with the same problem, and he therefore emphasises that hyperbaton, although it departs from the *naturalis ordo*, belongs to the tropes and figures, ‘which are good features’ (*virtutes*): see section 5.4.3.

²⁸¹ For a discussion of ‘realistic’ and ‘idealistic’ views of nature, see Boswell (1980) 11-13. See also De Jonge (2001) 161-162.

²⁸² *Subl.* 22.3: ‘Thucydides is even more [than Herodotus] a master in the use of hyperbata to separate ideas which are naturally one and indivisible.’ For ἡνωμένα, see *SVF* II.368 and Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.10 and II.149 (ἡνωμένα as *composita*).

²⁸³ *SVF* II.917. See L&S 55J.

²⁸⁴ Cf. Sluiter (1990) 13-14: ‘The Stoa believes that a divine λόγος permeates the whole cosmos as a supreme rational principle, creating order everywhere. This rational order may be indicated by the terms ἀκολουθία and τάξις, τάξις representing the structural orderliness itself, i.e. the fact that one thing follows another, ἀκολουθία adding the idea that one thing follows *from* another, i.e. introducing a notion of causal nexus. Often, however, these words seem to be used as mere synonyms.’

²⁸⁵ See *SVF* II.920.

thinking of a use of language that perfectly mirrors the reality to which it refers. In this respect, his concept of natural word order corresponds to that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who, as we have seen, experimented with verses that reflected as much as possible the logical order of things in reality.

In the rhetorical debate on the natural order of words, ‘Longinus’ takes a special stand. We recall that Dionysius of Halicarnassus altogether rejected his logical concept of natural word order, because it turned out to be useless. ‘Demetrius’ adopted ἡ φυσικὴ τάξις in his rhetorical theory: for him, natural word order was identical with the unmodified word order of normal language, which belonged to the simple style. ‘Longinus’, however, goes even further. He agrees that there is a certain normal or logical order that can be called ‘natural’, but at the same time he argues that the *departure* and *variation* from the normal order is also in a certain way in agreement with nature: thus, the unnatural order (both in reality and in language) is in fact also natural.

5.4.3. Natural word order according to Quintilian

Having dealt with three different approaches to natural word order found in Greek rhetoric and literary criticism, we finally turn to Roman theory. Quintilian’s treatment of *naturalis ordo* is part of his account on *compositio*. According to Quintilian, composition consists of three necessary elements, namely word order (*ordo*), linkage (*iunctura*) and rhythm (*numerus*).²⁸⁶ In his discussion of *ordo*, Quintilian first explains that ‘sentences should grow and rise’ (*augeri enim debent sententiae et insurgere*): stronger words should follow weaker words, so that the sentence does not end in an anticlimax. Next, there follows a passage on natural word order:²⁸⁷

(23) *Est et alius naturalis ordo, ut ‘uiros ac feminas’, ‘diem ac noctem’, ‘ortum et occasum’ dicas potius, quamquam et²⁸⁸ retrorsum.* (24) *Quaedam ordine permutato fiunt superuacua, ut ‘fratres gemini’: nam si ‘gemini’ praecesserint, ‘fratres’ addere non est necesse. Illa nimia quorundam fuit observatio, ut uocabula uerbis, uerba rursus aduerbiis, nomina adpositis et pronomina<a nomin>ibus²⁸⁹ essent priora: nam fit contra quoque frequenter non indecore.* (25) *Nec non et illud nimiae superstitionis, uti quaeque sint tempore, ea facere etiam ordine priora, non quin frequenter sit hoc*

²⁸⁶ Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.22.

²⁸⁷ Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.23-27.

²⁸⁸ The reading of A is *quamquam et*. In some MSS this reading has been corrected into *quam*: see below.

²⁸⁹ I adopt Naylor’s conjecture *pronomina nominibus* for *pronominibus* (A). See Naylor (1923).

melius, sed quia interim plus ualent ante gesta ideoque leuioribus superponenda sunt.
 (26) *Verbo sensum cludere multo, si compositio patiat, optimum est: in uerbis enim sermonis uis est. Si id asperum erit, cedit haec ratio numeris, ut fit apud summos Graecos Latinosque oratores frequentissime. Sine dubio erit omne quod non cludet hyperbaton, sed ipsum hoc inter tropos uel figuras, quae sunt uirtutes, receptum est.*
 (27) *Non enim ad pedes uerba dimensa sunt, ideoque ex loco transferuntur in locum, ut iungantur quo congruunt maxime, sicut in structura saxorum rudium etiam ipsa enormitas inuenit cui adplicari et in quo possit insistere. Felicissimus tamen sermo est cui et rectus ordo et apta iunctura et cum his numerus oportune cadens contigit.*

‘(23) There is also a natural order: “men and women”, “day and night”, “rising and setting”, though the reverse does occur also. (24) Some words become superfluous when you change the order. Take *fratres gemini*, “twin brothers”: if *gemini* has come first, there is no need to add *fratres*. The rule given by some theorists, that nouns should precede verbs, verbs adverbs, nouns adjectives, and pronouns nouns, is much too rigid, for the contrary order is often excellent. (25) Another piece of gross superstition is the idea that as things come first in time, so they should also come first in order. It is not that this is not frequently the better course, but earlier events are sometimes more important and so have to be given a position of climax over the less significant. (26) If composition allows, it is much best to end with a verb, for the force of language is in the verbs. If this proves harsh, the principle will give way to rhythm, as often happens in the greatest orators, both Greek and Latin. Of course, every verb which does not come at the end will give us a hyperbaton; but this itself counts as a trope or a figure, and these are good features. (27) The point is that words are not measured according to metrical feet; they are therefore moved from one place to another so as to join where they fit best, just as, in constructions made of unhewn stones, the irregularity itself suggests the right stones which each piece can fit or rest upon. However the most successful style is that in which natural order, well-fitting linkage and appropriate rhythm are all found.’

Quintilian’s treatment of word order has been described as ‘scanty and unsystematic’.²⁹⁰ I do not agree with this conclusion, at least not as far as his discussion of *naturalis ordo* is concerned. Part of the confusion on the side of modern interpreters may have been caused by the fact that Quintilian is doing two things at the same time. On the one hand, he seems to be reacting to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose logical principles of natural word order are refuted in *Inst.* 9.4.24-25. On the other hand, Quintilian himself offers a more pragmatic account of natural word order,

²⁹⁰ Naylor (1923) 156.

which is closely connected to his earlier view that ‘sentences should grow’, and which implies that the most forceful words should be placed at the end of the sentence. We will first deal with Quintilian’s refutation of the rigid, logical principles of natural word order that he probably found in Dionysius, and next with his own, more pragmatic ideas.

In *Inst.* 9.4.24, Quintilian rejects the theory of ‘certain people’ (*quorundam*) that nouns should precede verbs, verbs adverbs, substantives adjectives, and pronouns nouns: ‘for the contrary order is often not unbecoming’ (*nam fit contra quoque frequenter non indecore*). This passage appears like a perfect summary of Dionysius’ chapter on natural word order, where, as we have seen, Homeric verses proved that beauty and attractiveness do not depend on the order of grammatical unities. According to the manuscripts, the idea of some people was that ‘nouns should be placed before adjectives and pronouns’ (*nomina adpositis et pronomibus essent priora*). However, if we compare this statement with Dionysius’ rule τὰς δ’ ἀντονομασίας <προτάττειν> τῶν προσηγορικῶν, we will easily see that Naylor’s simple correction (... *pronomina nominibus essent priora*) is without any doubt correct.²⁹¹ It seems clear, then, that Quintilian’s *quorundam observatio* (‘the theory of some people’) refers directly to Dionysius’ experiment concerning natural word order. Quintilian refers to Dionysius three times in total, and two of these references occur in book 9 of the *Institutio oratoria*, namely in the sections on figures and on prose rhythm.²⁹² Besides, Quintilian’s comparison between rhetorical composition and a construction of stones (*structura saxorum*, *Inst.* 9.4.27) seems to be based on the analogy that Dionysius draws in *Comp.* 6 (see below).

Apart from the grammatical rules (nouns before verbs, verbs before adverbs, etc.), Quintilian also refutes Dionysius’ third principle of natural word order, according to which things that are prior in time should also be prior in word order (see section 5.3.5 above). Quintilian’s formulation (*uti quaeque sint tempore, ea facere etiam ordine priora*) closely resembles Dionysius’ rule: ὅπως τὰ πρότερα τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ τάξει πρότερα λαμβάνηται.²⁹³ Like Dionysius, Quintilian rejects this piece of ‘superstition’, but his argument has often been misunderstood. He states that the idea that word order should follow the chronological sequence of events is wrong, *non quin frequenter sit hoc melius, sed quia interim plus valent ante gesta ideoque*

²⁹¹ Naylor (1923) 156-157. As far as I know, Russell (2001) is the only edition that has adopted Naylor’s conjecture. The edition by Winterbottom (Oxford 1970) follows the MSS at this point.

²⁹² Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.1.16; 9.3.89 (figures); 9.4.88 (prose rhythm). Dionysius is not mentioned in *Inst.* 10, but Quintilian’s reading list is presumably largely based on Dionysius’ *On Imitation*.

²⁹³ *Comp.* 5.25,11-12. See section 5.3.5.

leuioribus superponenda sunt. Many modern scholars have thought that *superponere* means ‘to put before’.²⁹⁴ Thus, according to Scaglione, Quintilian states that ‘certain events which occurred earlier must be mentioned first not really for that reason [sc. that they occurred earlier], but because they happen to be more important’.²⁹⁵ This interpretation is wrong, for *superponere* does not mean ‘to place before’, but ‘to place after’.²⁹⁶ In fact, Quintilian says that earlier events, if they are more important, should be placed *after* the later events: this argumentation perfectly fits his view that stronger words should be placed at the end of a sentence, and that sentences should ‘grow and rise’.²⁹⁷ Again, Quintilian prefers a *pragmatic* approach to the ‘superstitious’ idea that language should perfectly mirror the order of reality. For Quintilian, word order is not the representation of a logical or chronological order in the real world; it should not be based on priorities that exist in reality, but rather on the requirements of clear communication and on the rhetorical effects that one wishes to achieve. Quintilian is more explicit about this kind of considerations than Dionysius. The differences between the approaches of the two rhetoricians are of course also related to the fact that they focus on two different languages: it should be noted that Quintilian’s view that the most important information should be placed at the end of the sentence fits only Latin, and not Greek syntax.²⁹⁸

Quintilian rejects the logical and chronological principles that Dionysius discussed in *Comp.* 5, but he also expresses his own views on *naturalis ordo*. To begin with, Quintilian refers to a number of fixed expressions, each of which consists of two opposed notions: ‘men and women’, ‘day and night’, and ‘rising and setting’. Why is the word order in these expressions natural? In the first instance, the answer seems to be that this is the *customary* way of speaking. But there might be still another factor at work, namely the implicit view that in each of the formulas mentioned a positive notion precedes a negative notion. In that case, this implicit idea of natural order would correspond to one of the distinctions that Aristotle made concerning the use of the word ‘prior’ (which we have discussed in section 5.3.5 above):²⁹⁹ Aristotle tells us that ‘what is better and more valued’ (τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον) is often thought

²⁹⁴ Cf. Butler (1921) 521 (‘placed before’) and Cousin (1978) 238 (‘les placer avant’).

²⁹⁵ Scaglione (1972) 76.

²⁹⁶ For the meaning of *superponere* (‘to place after’), see Quintilian, *Inst.* 8.4.6 and cf. Lewis & Short (1993 [1879]) s.v. *superpono*. The translations of Watson (1876) 217 (‘to be put after’) and Russell (2001) 175 (see above) are correct.

²⁹⁷ Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.4.23 (see above).

²⁹⁸ In his discussion of Latin word order, Pinkster (1990) 178-184 considers the possibility that the final position of a sentence is reserved for Focus constituents. Pinkster indeed shows (178-179) that non-finite verb constituents in the final position of a sentence often contain ‘salient information’, but he decides that more research on this subject is needed.

²⁹⁹ Aristotle, *Cat.* 14a26-b23.

to be ‘prior by nature’ (πρότερον τῇ φύσει). We have already seen that Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ principles corresponded to two other usages of the word ‘prior’ that Aristotle distinguishes. Whether the order of *uiros ac feminas*, *diem ac noctem* and *ortum et occasum* is based only on customary usage or on a supposed priority of positive over negative notions, it is clear that Quintilian does not rigidly stick to this ‘natural’ order of words. Just like ‘Demetrius’ (καὶ τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, *Eloc.* 200), Quintilian explicitly mentions that the reversed order is also possible: *quamquam et retrorsum*.³⁰⁰

Next, Quintilian remarks that, in some cases, change of the natural word order will make certain words superfluous: *fratres gemini* seems to be the natural order, because after *gemini* the word *frates* is not anymore necessary. Dionysius of Halicarnassus did not discuss this aspect of word order, but it is possible that Quintilian’s remark is somehow related to Dionysius’ order of appellative and proper nouns.³⁰¹ *Gemini* is not a proper noun, but it is more specific than *fratres*. Dionysius’ order of appellative noun and proper noun was, as we have seen, based on the Stoic idea that the ‘commonly qualified individuals’ precede ‘the peculiarly qualified individuals’.³⁰² It is possible that Quintilian thought that the order of appellative nouns and proper nouns, mentioned by Dionysius, was based on the idea that a general qualification would become superfluous (*supervacua*) if a more specific qualification preceded it. If this is true, Quintilian’s example of ‘twins’ and ‘brothers’ may be considered a reformulation of Dionysius’ rule concerning appellative and proper nouns.

Having rejected the useless grammatical rules that Dionysius had tested in his experiment, Quintilian draws up a grammatical principle of his own, which is particularly appropriate to the Latin language:³⁰³ verbs should be placed at the end of the sentence, ‘because the force of language is in the verbs’ (*in verbis enim sermonis*

³⁰⁰ Some manuscripts have corrected *quamquam et* into *quam* (‘rather than’), a reading that is adopted by Butler (1921) 518 (‘in preference to the reversed order’). However, *quamquam et* is definitely correct: just like Dionysius and ‘Demetrius’, Quintilian states that the reversed (not natural) order is also possible.

³⁰¹ *Comp.* 5.26,12-13 (τὰ δὲ προσηγορικὰ προτάττειν τῶν ὀνομαστικῶν): see section 5.3.6.

³⁰² *FDS* 849: see section 5.3.6.

³⁰³ *Inst.* 9.4.26. It is not entirely clear whether this section is still part of Quintilian’s discussion of *natural* word order. It is possible that only *Inst.* 9.4.23-25 deals with natural order, and that *Inst.* 9.4.26ff. contains remarks on *ordo* in general. However, I think that *rectus ordo* in *Inst.* 9.4.27 (cf. *Inst.* 2.5.11) is identical with *naturalis ordo* in *Inst.* 9.4.23. Besides, we have seen that ‘Longinus’ (*Subl.* 22.1) also discusses natural word order in the context of hyperbaton. Therefore I believe that natural word order is the subject of the whole passage *Inst.* 9.4.23-28.

vis est).³⁰⁴ By consequence, he adds, every sentence that does not end with a verb will be a case of hyperbaton. But Quintilian hastens to say that hyperbaton belongs to the tropes or figures, which are ‘good features’ (*virtutes*). Here, Quintilian seems to struggle with the same problem as ‘Longinus’: if hyperbaton is a departure from the *natural* order, it might easily appear to be wrong. ‘Longinus’ solved the problem by pointing out that the deviant order is also natural (since it occurs when people are moved by emotions); in a similar way, Quintilian emphasises that hyperbaton is a *virtus*, and that it occurs in the greatest orators, both Greek and Latin.³⁰⁵ We may compare the passages in which Dionysius hesitates whether a deviating expression is a figure or a solecism (section 5.2). It is for the sake of rhythm that one could break the rule of ending the sentence with a verb, according to Quintilian. His argumentation for the precedence of rhythm over natural word order strongly reminds us of Dionysius’ ideas on prose rhythm. Words have to be transposed from one place to another for the reason that ‘they are not measured according to metrical feet’ (*non ad pedes verba dimensa sunt*).³⁰⁶ This statement is then illustrated with the analogy of a construction of unhewd stones (*structura saxorum rudium*), which evokes Dionysius’ views on the architectural character of composition (see sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2).³⁰⁷ Quintilian concludes that the ideal style is the one in which the three aspects of composition, *rectus ordo*, ‘well-fitting linkage’ (*apta iunctura*) and ‘appropriate rhythm’ (*cum his numerus oportune cadens*) are all present. *Rectus ordo* seems to be identical with the *naturalis ordo*.³⁰⁸ Another passage where the expression *rectus ordo* occurs suggests that this is the normal and unmodified order of words, as it occurs in everyday language.³⁰⁹ Thus, for Quintilian, natural word order seems to be the unmodified and customary order of words: *rectus ordo* entails that verbs are placed at the end of the sentence, but the order can be changed for the sake of rhythm and effective linkage (*iunctura*).

To conclude this discussion, I would like to emphasise that Quintilian’s view on the position of verbs is not based on any *logical* consideration, but rather on the more general idea that in Latin the most significant information should have its place at the

³⁰⁴ For the position of the verb in the Latin sentence, see Linde (1923). See also Pinkster (1990) 168-169 and 178-179, who reports that in Caesar the finite verb occupies the final position in 84% of the main sentences, whereas the percentage is much lower in writers such as Cicero and Varro.

³⁰⁵ In *Inst.* 9.4.28, Quintilian adds that not all hyperbata (*transgressionones*) are to be recommended: some are too long (see also *Inst.* 8.6.67) and others are too free.

³⁰⁶ Quintilian rightly observes that the metrical feet that are used in composition often exceed the boundaries of words, a fact that Dionysius (*Comp.* 17-18) does not always take into account when illustrating different rhythms with single words. Cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 211 n. 3.

³⁰⁷ See *Comp.* 6.28,5ff. and *Comp.* 22.96,16-19.

³⁰⁸ Cf. Butler (1921) 521 and Russell (2001) 175, who both translate it as ‘natural order’.

³⁰⁹ In *Inst.* 2.5.11, *rectus ordo* is opposed to *sermo deflexus*.

end of the sentence.³¹⁰ In other words, Quintilian, just like ‘Demetrius’, presents a *pragmatic* account of natural word order, which may indeed be regarded as more useful for rhetorical writing than the logical approach that Dionysius of Halicarnassus had proven to be wrong.

5.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ views on natural style and syntax in general, and natural word order in particular. I have distinguished between two concepts of the ‘natural’ that we find in Dionysius’ works.

First, we have dealt with Dionysius’ general ideas on natural style, syntax and word order. We have seen that ‘the natural’ (τὸ φυσικόν) is a central concept throughout his works. Many aspects of texts are described in terms of ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’, both on the level of thoughts and on the level of expression. Dionysius frequently objects to a style that he regards as unnatural, by which he means that a writer deviates too much from normal usage; this can be the case both in vocabulary and in aspects of word order and syntax. In Dionysius’ view, orators should always make themselves clear, and not only to the intellectual few. In his later works, Dionysius adopts a grammatical framework, including ideas on ἀκολουθία and ὁ κατάλληλος λόγος which enables him to analyse more closely the particular aspects of unnatural compositions. At the same time, he usefully applies the method of metathesis, by which he is able to point out the exact differences between a deviating and a more customary style.

Next, we have focused on *On Composition* 5, in which Dionysius uses a different concept of natural word order. Here, word order is mainly determined by the rules of logic and ontology. I have argued that Dionysius’ experiment on natural word order is largely inspired by Stoic ideas on language. In particular, the order of the Stoic categories seems to underlie the supposedly natural order of the parts of speech in *Comp.* 5. Finally, we have compared Dionysius’ views with the ideas of three other critics and rhetoricians. This comparison has once more made it clear that the term ‘nature’ can be used in very different ways. ‘Demetrius’ takes a more pragmatic approach to the concept of natural word order than Dionysius. ‘Longinus’ is determined to show that deviating word order is in fact also natural. And Quintilian not only rejects the ‘superstitious’ ideas with which Dionysius experimented, but also argues for a word order that is rhetorically efficient.

³¹⁰ See *Inst.* 9.4.29-31.

Our examinations in this chapter have clearly illustrated the close connections between grammar, philosophy and rhetoric in Dionysius' works. In *On Composition* 5, Dionysius decides to reject the logical approach to the problem of word order. But his analyses of style in other parts of his work make use of a grammatical apparatus that foreshadows the syntactic work of Apollonius Dyscolus. It has become manifest that Dionysius' discussions of natural style and syntax are built on a sophisticated knowledge of linguistic matters, which combines ideas from grammar and Stoic philosophy. With this observation we conclude our investigations into Dionysius' use of the parts of speech, which has been the object of our attention in chapters 3-5. In order to illuminate Dionysius' integration of language disciplines further, we will now turn to his views on prose, poetry and poetic prose.

