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"But We Have To Do Something" : the drivers behind EU crisis management operations

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CHAPTER VI: EUPOL AFGHANISTAN

This chapter analyses the drivers behind the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan, which was set up by the Council of the EU on 30 May 2007. Harking back to the propositions developed in chapter II, it will assess the mission's diplomatic history against these putative underlying drivers. The empirical expectations related to the latter are again analogous to the operation in Bosnia (see introduction to chapter IV). In terms of its specific mandate, the Joint Action establishing EUPOL Afghanistan tasked the mission to 'significantly contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements' and to 'support the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police service, which works in accordance with international standards, within the framework of the rule of law and respects human rights' (Council of the EU 2007a: art. 3). The mission was framed as part of the wider international effort to work towards a 'secure, stable, free, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan' (Council of the EU 2007a: para. 1, 2). How did the EU come to intervene in Afghanistan in this specific shape, again more than five years after the international community originally intervened in the country?

A. BACKGROUND

Afghanistan has been high on the international community's agenda since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the attack, a US-led military coalition, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), intervened in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime and eliminate terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Following the establishment of an interim Afghan government through the Bonn agreement of December 2001, the international community has also embarked on a wider state-building project in Afghanistan. In resolutions 1386 and 1401, the UN Security Council mandated an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as well as a civilian Assistance Mission (UNAMA) to support the interim government. ISAF came under NATO command from August 2003 onwards, and its area of operations has been gradually expanded from Kabul to comprise the entire country by October 2006. Less formally, the G8 in 2002 also divided up the establishment or reform of key Afghan state institutions, which was to be coordinated by 'lead nations': the US for the army, Germany for the police, the UK for counter-narcotics, Italy for the judicial system, and Japan for financing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the various militias (cf. Barley 2008: 55; Wilder 2007: 18-19; Peral 2009: 327).

The Drivers behind EU Crisis Management Operations

The tasks the international community faced were enormous. Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest and least developed countries, featuring high rates of illiteracy and devastated by more than 20 years of civil war. Its government remains highly dependent on external military and financial support, with more than 90% of its budget funded from external sources (cf. Maas 2007: 8). Lack of rapid social progress and governmental legitimacy coupled with a deteriorating security situation led the international community to increasingly correct its initial 'light footprint' approach that had relied on quick devolution to Afghan ownership (cf. Gross 2009: 13; Perito 2009: 2-6). This resurgence in international efforts was however hampered by the lack of a unified international strategy on re-building the state (cf. Barley 2008: 55). The fragmentation of different international actors has thus hampered individual efforts – with various 'lead nations' operating next to a UN mission with a nominal coordination position and overshadowed by the US, which controlled the most important set of resources and strategic levers (cf. Gross 2009: 13-15).

In dealing with its lead in building an Afghan police, Germany in 2002 established the German Police Project Office (GPPO) which focused on training Afghan police, notably by building the Afghan police academy and mentoring senior Afghan police officials (BMI 2010). Modest in scale, the GPPO comprised around 40 German police officers as well as additional experts for specific training measures, underpinned by an annual budget of 12 million Euros (BMI 2010). When the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated from 2005 onwards, this limited, long-term approach however came under criticism from the US (cf. Grono 2009: 3; Kempin and Steinicke 2009: 152; Thruelsen 2010: 83). Frustrated by the lack of German action, the US increasingly became the main donor for training Afghan police (cf. Wilder 2007: 19-21; Grono 2009: 3). According to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), US support to Afghan police rose from 5 million dollars in 2003 to 840 million and 2,7 billion in 2005 and 2007 respectively (GAO 2008: 11). This engagement however was targeted more at procuring additional forces for counter-insurgency rather than building the civilian police that inspired the German efforts (cf. Wilder 2007: x; Gross 2009: 28; Grono 2009: 3-4). Tellingly, responsibility for police-building moved in 2005 from the State Department's to the Pentagon's purview, with police training forming part of OEF (in 2009 it came under NATO responsibility). The scale of US engagement in the police sector, combined with the country's overall weight in Afghanistan, made it unlikely that Germany would be in a position to coordinate these efforts, its presumed task. Rather, the two approaches simply co-existed although they were 'philosophically conflicting' – one attempting to patiently build capacity from the top, the other attempting to produce large numbers as quickly as possible (cf. Murray 2007: 113; ICG 2007e: 8; Thruelsen 2010: 86).

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Germany was not alone in facing such challenges. Italy's engagement in the justice sector (as well as the UK's lead in counter-narcotics and progress on militia disarmament) were similarly troubled (cf. Gross 2009: 37). Their challenges consisted not just in the difficulties of the situation on the ground, but also in the weight and impact of US policies that they found hard to influence. Although EU countries collectively carry a significant share of the burden of attempting to stabilise Afghanistan, the European Union as an actor lacked the commensurate influence (cf. Korski 2009; Buckley 2010). On the one hand, the Union was an important donor, with the Commission alone having committed more than 1,2 billion Euros to Afghanistan for the period of 2002 until March 2008 (cf. Korski 2009: 12). Together with member states contributions, this added up to 3,7 billion for the period until 2006, which made the EU the second largest donor after the US (Gross 2009: 21). On the other hand, the EU as such was hardly visible: its representation was split between rotating EU Council presidencies, an EU Special Representative, and the Commission delegation. Moreover, the Commission has been less visible than the amount of aid that it disbursed suggests because it has only paid for, but not implemented its own programmes. The EU's lack of influence and visibility thus formed a backdrop to reinvigorated EU engagement in Afghanistan.

A last aspect shaping the setting into which EUPOL was going to intervene was the debate between Western capitals about burden-sharing in Afghanistan. While a perennial issue within NATO, it reached renewed relevance when the costs, risks and casualties of the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan began to rise from 2005 onwards. Most EU countries were already active in Afghanistan prior to EUPOL's inception, both as donors and militarily in ISAF, in which 25 out of 27 EU members have taken part (cf. Korski 2009). Yet the US, together with the UK, Canada, the Netherlands and several smaller 'Atlanticist' countries, came to bear the brunt of the fighting (and dying) in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan whereas other governments, notably from the EU's big continental countries, were significantly less engaged (cf. Korski 2009: 3; *The Economist* 2008c). This led to repeated calls for Europeans to do more to support the Alliance's efforts in Afghanistan. Most European governments remained wary of committing more troops though, stressing that progress in Afghanistan required greater focus on civilian engagement instead. Given European electorates' aversion to greater military engagement in the country, observers suspected that 'criticism of the "over-militarized" strategy of the US in Afghanistan is a convenient foil to hide their own limitations' (Korski 2009: 8; see also Kaim 2008). In short, the situation prior to the EU's police mission was characterized by a renewed international focus on Afghanistan, pressure on EU governments to do more, and international

disagreements over the appropriate strategy to address the deteriorating security situation in the country.

B. PUTTING EUPOL AFGHANISTAN ON THE ESDP AGENDA

Ideas for a stronger EU engagement in Afghanistan had been simmering a while before the first exploratory mission was sent to the country during the summer of 2006. A precursor can be found in the proposal of making ISAF 'a European Union force' as Javier Solana put it in support of the Belgian presidency at the EU's Laeken summit in December 2001 (cf. Lobjaskas 2001). Struck down as premature by other EU governments, it came back in a different form once NATO realized ISAF's dependence on stronger civilian engagement in Afghanistan. Many interviewed officials thus attested to US and NATO pressure for greater EU commitment (Interviews with CGS and MS officials; see also Kempin and Steinicke 2009: 153; Dempsey 2008a). A former Bush administration envoy for Afghanistan, for example, wrote in a commentary for the International Herald Tribune in September 2005 that it was time 'to stop asking what NATO can do for the EU, and begin asking what the EU can do for NATO. And Afghanistan is the place to start' (Dobbins 2005). Expectations also arose elsewhere: the International Crisis Group (ICG) recommended in late 2005 to investigate 'the possibility of using European Security and Defence Policy civilian missions in the field of security sector reform', about which it also reported 'very early discussions' (ICG 2005: iii; 11).

Faced with such demands, the November 2005 EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration still mentions only the EU's intention to 'continue to support' work in the police and justice sectors (Council of the EU 2005b: 4). With pressure mounting however, 2006 saw a change in approach. A German official attested to preliminary bilateral discussions, with the UK and the Netherlands, on a potential EU second pillar role in Afghanistan from March 2006 onwards (Interview; Kempin and Steinicke 2009: 153). The EU Council presidency for the first half of the year, Austria, strenuously tried to keep the issue off the EU's agenda since it 'lacked interest in Afghanistan' and wanted to avoid predictably difficult negotiations (Interview with MS official). The subsequent Finnish presidency however was quite happy to take on this issue 'because the political pressure was to do something, to show that Finland is doing something' (Interviews with MS officials). As one official argued, Afghanistan was a thorny issue in Finnish domestic politics, but the Finnish government felt that it needed to offset its very limited military engagement (Interview with MS official).

Thus in July 2006, directly after the start of the Finnish EU Council presidency, a first EU exploratory mission took place (cf. Peral 2009: 327). This was followed in September 2006 by a 'Joint EU Assessment Mission' (JAM), undertaken by the

Commission together with the Council General Secretariat (CGS), with participation notably from German, British, Dutch and Finnish national officials (Interviews with CGS and MS officials). Its report to the Political and Security Council (PSC) encompassed an analysis of Afghanistan's rule of law sector as well as a number of recommendations on strengthening the EU's impact (Council of the EU 2006c: 44-5). In particular, it recommended 'that the EU could consider contributing further to support the police sector through a police mission' (Council of the EU 2007a: para. 4).

What were the drivers behind this development? Undoubtedly, the outside expectations already alluded to played a considerable role. The latter were also reflected within the EU, where the 'Atlanticist' governments with a traditional pro-US stance and the most substantial exposure to fighting in Afghanistan such as the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark pushed the idea of greater EU engagement in Afghanistan (Interviews with CGS and MS officials; cf. Kempin and Steinicke 2009: 153; Gross 2009: 28). One official involved in the deliberations went so far as to argue that 'the idea was forced upon member states, upon the Council Secretariat and the Commission by the UK' (Interview with MS official). Yet several British officials denied that London was the primary instigator. As one of them argued, 'it should have been a British idea' given the UK's investment into stabilizing Afghanistan, but was not – in his view because London was 'rarely' able to formulate and upload British interests in Brussels (Interview). These contradictory assertions suggest that it was perhaps the perception of UK pressure more than an actual initiative from London which helped convince the EU that it needed to do something in Afghanistan.

Beyond the widely shared perception of Anglo-American pressure, many officials also credited the European institutions with substantial voluntarism. Already the EU's first Special Representative for Afghanistan had deplored the EU's lack of visibility in the country, and other observers have noted that EUPOL's inception was partly a consequence of Brussels' wish to address this gap (Klaiber 2007: 10; Wilder 2007: 21). As one CGS official observed when asked about the sources of EUPOL Afghanistan, 'ESDP is where Solana can produce tangible results, whereas with EU diplomacy such as on Iran this is much more difficult, so there is a clear stake for him to have ESDP grow' (Interview). This was also the perception among national diplomats, one of whom recalled that 'when I saw how high-ranking the CGS participation in the JAM was, I knew they were up for mission-shopping' (Interview with MS official). In other words, the Secretariat seemed interested in acquiring the public relations opportunities that visible engagement in Afghanistan promised. This institutional bias for action was further boosted by the interest of the Secretariat's 'political master' at the time, the Finnish EU Council presidency (Interviews with MS officials). Yet again perceptions may have differed from reality. Several CGS officials

explicitly rejected the idea that the Secretariat played an active role in 'acquiring' the mission in Afghanistan. Instead, they emphasized that the assessment mission had been an 'autonomous' initiative of the European Commission which sought to strengthen its role in Afghanistan, and whose exploratory mission the Council Secretariat only joined because it was aware of the interest of some member states (Interview with CGS officials). Indeed, one well-placed official claimed that the Secretariat had internally advised against an ESDP mission in Afghanistan on professional grounds, but complied in view of member states' wishes.

JUSTICE OR POLICE ENGAGEMENT?

Whereas the exact provenance of the first push for an ESDP engagement in Afghanistan remained disputed, it was apparently the confluence of a perception of US interest and EU voluntarism that gave the decisive impulse for getting the debate started. Yet to allow for a coherent approach, the initiative needed the support of at least one of the two 'lead nations' in the police and justice sector respectively. Neither the Italian nor the German government initially took a consistent position towards a possible European takeover of their national projects though. In interpreting their contradictory signals, officials variously emphasized those countries' strategic behaviour or the unintended consequences of their actions in bringing about EUPOL Afghanistan (Interviews with CGS and MS officials).

Originally, many European officials had expected an ESDP engagement in Afghanistan in the realm of justice because that seemed the neediest sector (Interviews with CGS and MS officials; Gross 2009: 37). As one interviewee put it tongue-in-cheek, 'the Italians had understood very early on that it would be impossible to build rule of law in Afghanistan, so they never started trying' (Interview with MS official). The task the Italian government faced was certainly daunting. It was confronted with different and overlapping legal systems as well as a lack of educated and independent judges and prosecutors in Afghanistan (Interviews with MS officials; Gross 2009: 37-8; ICG 2010b: i). Moreover, the differences in judicial traditions between Afghanistan and western countries made it challenging to find appropriate advisors. Another interviewee thus explained that, once the Italian government realized that its justice 'lead' was going nowhere, 'they had the idea that, actually, we Europeanize this one. We could, you know, get more resources, and we could get ourselves out of this black hole' (Interview with MS official). This idea of ESDP action in the domain of justice was also promoted by the EU's Special Representative in Afghanistan (Interview with MS official). Yet after a change in government in Italy in May 2006 it happened to fall out of favour in Rome (Interview with MS official). This was the moment when, according to a number of officials, the idea of ESDP action in Afghanistan took on a life of its own. After Italy's

turnaround on Europeanizing its national lead in justice, they reasoned, everybody suddenly looked at Germany, and the latter thereby fell victim to the Italian change of mind (Interviews with CGS and MS officials).³⁵ These officials hence stressed Berlin's surprise at the Joint Assessment Mission's recommendation of an ESDP police mission because the perception in Germany had been that the JAM's objective had been to look at how to support the Italian efforts in the domain of justice.

This focus on unintended consequences would explain the initial German reticence regarding an ESDP police mission. Other officials however argued that parts of the German government, rather than being the victim of Italian caprice, had been pulling strings all along (Interviews with CGS and MS officials). They presented Berlin's reluctance as the consequence of an internal disagreement rather than surprise. Accordingly, officials in the German Ministry of Interior (MoI) had been eager to protect the reputation of their 'pet project' in Afghanistan, which they saw as implicitly tainted by the attempt to Europeanize it. At the same time, officials in the Foreign Office and the Chancellery had reportedly promoted that idea behind the scenes, attempting to overcome MoI resistance via EU structures. They thus signalled to the Council Secretariat that the report could recommend an ESDP police mission. As one official remarked, had Germany wanted them out, the respective recommendations would not have appeared (Interview with GER official). Due to the MoI's opposition, however, it was 'not easy not to block' the JAM's carefully-worded recommendations which included '*inter alia*, that the EU could consider contributing further to support the police sector through a police mission, and that a fact finding mission could be sent to Afghanistan to explore further the feasibility of such a mission' (Interview with GER official; Council of the EU 2007a: para. (4)).

Comparing the accounts of various German officials, there is little evidence that the German government had promoted an ESDP police mission in Afghanistan prior to the JAM (Interviews). Thus the different emphases interviewees put on German strategic behaviour vs. Berlin being caught up in an EU process likely played out in sequence: the EU institutions' perceived show of interest triggered an internal reevaluation of Germany's national efforts and came to be seen by some officials as an opportunity for passing the lead for police-building to the EU. This attitude however emerged as a response to the perceived interest of British and EU officials in Europeanizing police-building rather than as an originally German strategy. This outside interest was then instrumentalized for overcoming internal resistance, but

³⁵ An Italian official challenged this perception arguing that, while Italy had indeed suggested greater EU engagement in Afghan justice reform, it had not promoted using the ESDP framework for this purpose (Interview).

at the cost of increasing outside expectations that an ESDP police mission was to come about.

The question of the prospective mission's focus on the police or justice sector was however not simply one of ambiguous member state preferences, but was further complicated by inter-institutional issues. The European Commission considered that an engagement in the justice sector belonged to its turf, and that this precluded an ESDP mission (Interviews with CGS and COM officials). This debate took place against the backdrop of the 'ECOWAS case', in which the Commission sued the Council in 2005 over a similar question of institutional prerogatives – and won in 2008 on the grounds that 'there is an encroachment upon Community competences whenever the Council adopts, in the framework of the CFSP, an act which *could* properly have been adopted on the basis of the EC Treaty' (cf. ECJ 2008: para. 36; emphasis added). One fundamental tug of war between the EU institutions related to this 'could' (rather than 'should'), i.e. whether the *possibility* of Commission action prevented the Council from acting (cf. ECJ 2008: para. 52; 60; 61). In a testimony to the House of Lords, the EU's Civilian Operation Commander referred to this case as 'heavy in its consequences' (House of Lords 2008: Q334). He even juxtaposed the civil-military cooperation that much of the literature describes as the great strategic issue of the moment as 'relatively unproblematic' compared to the 'challenge' of 'working with the Commission, which is very jealous of its prerogatives' (House of Lords 2008: Q334). The strategic orientation of the prospective ESDP mission was thus not only a consequence of the attitude adopted by the German and Italian governments, but also owed a lot to EU inter-institutional struggles over competences. According to one testimony, the fight between the Commission and the Council Secretariat was 'at least as fierce' as the one between member states 'because the idea was that there would be also an interface with the Afghani justice, and Commission said that, no way, that's our territory, you have nothing to do with justice, not even an interface' (Interview with CGS official).

To make matters even more complicated, officials invoked a number of other, more instrumental reasons for focusing any eventual ESDP engagement on the police rather than the justice sector: the fact that, in the police sector, there existed a project to build upon; that the EU had more experience with police missions; and that police is a resource more readily available than justice officials (Interviews). As several officials stressed, greater numbers signify greater engagement, irrespective of whether the means are truly adequate to the ends. This logic favours the deployment of soldiers over police and of police over judges because the former are easier to commit and make for more impressive numbers (Interviews with MS officials).

EUPOL's genesis up to the JAM thus was the result partly of strategic action and partly of the unintended consequences of muddling through. Egged on by the 'Atlanticists', the EU had been looking for a greater role in Afghanistan, resulting in a volatile EU process. Rome's change of mind saw Berlin confronted with partners' expectations. Subsequently, some German officials came to perceive this as an opportunity for rescuing its increasingly lacklustre national project. The recommendation of the JAM, to consider an ESDP police mission and send a Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) to that effect, was thus the result of an interaction between Anglo-American pressure, EU institutional interests and inter-institutional turf-fighting, practical considerations, Italian indecision, and interest from parts of the German government – as well as various misperceptions regarding these factors. The mission's early phase thus showed the difficulties for policy-makers to control the ESDP agenda in the face of interaction effects that are hard if not impossible to predict.

FROM THE JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION TO THE FACT-FINDING MISSION

The JAM presented its recommendations in the PSC on 13 October 2006. The PSC then referred the report to its subordinate Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CivCom – responsible for civilian ESDP mission oversight) in order for the latter to formulate a consensual advice on what to do. This produced a divisive debate pitting French against British representatives, with Paris opposing an ESDP engagement in Afghanistan and London strongly arguing in favour (Interviews with CGS and MS officials; cf. Gross 2009: 28). In the words of one witness, 'the French and British were really almost hitting each other, I mean, attacking each other on a personal level because they had [such] strong instructions' (Interview with MS official). Another concurred that he had 'never' seen such verve on the part of his British colleagues, whereas 'the extremely reluctant French' had to be 'dragged' along (Interview with MS official). What was behind these different positions?

The UK's motives in promoting ESDP action related to an assessment in London that the German lead in building police had been ineffective and needed to be shot down or Europeanized (Interview with GER official). This stance was reflected, for example, in a British parliamentary report which concluded that 'the steady progress being made towards the creation of the Afghan National Army stands in sharp contrast to the disappointingly slow pace on police reform, for which Germany was the 'lead nation' before responsibility was transferred to EUPOL. As a consequence, the United States has considered it has no option but to invest a considerable amount of effort and resource in police reform' (House of Commons 2009: 4). Similar assessments were echoed by a number of NATO and US officials,

which repeatedly stressed their disappointment with the state of the Afghan police as opposed to the US-trained army (cf. Dempsey 2006b). The recurrent contrast between the police's and army's condition was probably intended and certainly interpreted as shifting blame onto Berlin's doorstep (cf. Busse 2007a). Yet besides the politics of blame it should also be noted that the British government had come to attach greater priority to Afghanistan than most of its EU counterparts (Interview with UK official; see also House of Commons 2009: 101). In its 2010 election manifesto, the Labour party even lists 'bringing stability to Afghanistan' among the country's top 4 challenges for the next decade – next to global competition, climate change, and an ageing society (Labour 2010: 0:2). That stabilising Afghanistan is effectively declared an absolute security policy priority and used for canvassing voters illustrates the domestic political stakes and explains London's interest in engaging partners' help – as well as its exasperation with Berlin's perceived lack of responsiveness. The German government appeared neither willing to send significantly more troops (to the South of Afghanistan), nor was it quick to expand efforts elsewhere, e.g. by substantially increasing police training.

The view from Paris was rather different. French officials underlined that the EU was not the right player for Afghanistan, stressing the mission's likely difficulties due to country size, the Afghan police's low level of education and the very important activities on the part of the US (Interviews with FRA and GER officials). If Washington spent 1 billion dollars on police in Afghanistan, how could the EU with an overall budget of 250 million for all civilian CFSP activities hope to be of any consequence? Another big and costly mission would only create problems for the EU's capacity and the CFSP budget, especially given the big upcoming EU mission to Kosovo (Interview with FRA official). On the face of it, this reticence was surprising since Paris has been the most important promoter of ESDP in many other instances. In the case of Afghanistan though, Paris clearly had 'different priorities' (Interview with CGS official). The French government reportedly felt that the EU had no authentic and autonomous interest in Afghanistan, and it resented the fact that this operation followed 'NATO logic' rather than 'EU logic' (Interview with French observer). A French diplomat pointedly mentioned the ESDP missions in Iraq and Afghanistan as the two cases (out of more than 20) where 'the value added of the EU is unclear' (Interview).

In its own view, Paris may thus simply have been averse to 'instrumentalizing' ESDP. Officials from other countries however also suspected that the French government, at the time still presided over by Jacques Chirac, did not want to do the Bush administration any favours and valued the opportunity to showcase NATO's inaptitude (Interview with GER official). While the practical arguments against the mission put forward by French representatives turned out to be well-founded and were shared by a number of member states, to traditional US allies Paris' resistance

reeked of Gaullist anti-Americanism. Both London and Paris apparently perceived the debate around an Afghanistan mission in terms of their traditional argument over ESDP's relationship to US and NATO policy, with the former advocating a supporting role and the latter emphasizing EU autonomy.

THE GERMAN DILEMMA

The bitter struggle between France and Britain put Germany into a pivotal position. Not only had it been the notional lead nation in building the Afghan police, it was also gearing up to take over the EU Council presidency in the first half of 2007. Yet according to several eye witnesses, the initial German position in CivCom consisted in sitting on the fence (Interviews with MS and CGS officials; cf. Gross 2009: 28). As one non-German committee member put it, 'the Germans didn't know what to say because the Foreign Office said yes, but the Ministry of the Interior said no. So, I was in a meeting and, depending on the day, the instructions from the German delegate in CivCom, what he said, was totally different, depending on where he got the instructions - until the Chancellor's office decided, imposed that yes, we go the European way' (Interview with MS official).

Whereas the French and British governments defined their position primarily in terms of the Atlanticist-Europeanist divide, this was somewhat different for their German counterpart. Berlin also perceived Anglo-Saxon criticism as a reason for changing tack - indeed, that criticism was shared by some German officials (Interviews). One official thus argued that the national police project had simply failed to evolve, still focusing on Kabul with the 40 police officers that it started with in 2002 - whereas by 2006 the NATO operation had massively expanded in numbers, geographical reach and approach, for example by setting up Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout the country (Interview). While invoking US criticism, he presented the effort to Europeanize the project as an attempt to fulfil rather than shirk German responsibility. Another official emphasized public relation benefits: Europeanization was not only supposed to bring in the additional resources critics called for, but also deflect expected future blame from the German government to the EU (Interview with GER official).

In contrast to Paris and London, Berlin's consideration of transatlantic relations came to be superseded by two domestic factors: first, the prospective Europeanization triggered resentment within the German Ministry of Interior since it was perceived as an indirect admission if not accusation that 'their', national project had failed (Interviews with GER officials). This in turn made the government wary at first to embrace the mission. This reluctance however was counterbalanced by the domestic political need to emphasize the importance of civilian means for

rebuilding Afghanistan, and the role that EUPOL Afghanistan could potentially play in demonstrating Germany's contribution in this respect.

In the end, the internal German tug-of-war was won by those in favour of Europeanizing the German project. The overriding motive was likely the attempt to blunt transatlantic criticism of inadequate German contributions in Afghanistan, which built up further in late 2006 around NATO's Riga summit (Interviews with GER officials; cf. F.A.Z. 2006; Busse 2007a; Gya 2007: 2; Kempin and Steinicke 2009: 153). Due to this criticism, the German government found itself in a dilemma: on the one hand, it felt the need to dispel the idea that Germany was 'free-riding' in Afghanistan because of Berlin's resistance to sending soldiers to the (more dangerous) South of Afghanistan (cf. F.A.Z. 2006). On the other hand, it could hardly respond to US demands for greater engagement in the face of societal and parliamentary disapproval over what was already seen as an overly militarized approach in Afghanistan (cf. Kaim 2008; Harnisch 2010: 64-6).

The easiest way out of this dilemma was to insist that civilian engagement was just as important in addressing the situation in Afghanistan. In the wake of parliamentary debates over German participation in ISAF, the German government has thus sought to dampen domestic criticism by promising to put more emphasis on civilian efforts (cf. Kaim 2008: 616). For this argument to hold, the government needed to defend the German record in this field as well as promise increased commitment. It particularly needed to react to headlines, taken up in the German media, that 'Germany has failed' in building an Afghan police (Busse 2007a). Moreover, the (opposition) Green and liberal parties explicitly demanded greater engagement in the police sector (cf. Bundestag 2006; F.A.Z. 2006). Thus, parts of the German government saw considerable benefits in Europeanizing the German police lead, and instrumentalized Germany's EU presidency and the attendant foreign expectations to overcome internal resistance. In this respect, one German diplomat attested to 'dynamics never before experienced' as British officials proved well briefed on German internal discussions and used this knowledge to relentlessly push for Europeanization (Interview). Resistance within the MoI was thus surmounted by invoking outside pressure and expectations.

According to several officials, it was the fact that Germany decided to come out in favour of the mission which decided the debate in Brussels (Interviews with MS officials). As a result of continuing French objections, CivCom could not come up with a coherent recommendation as to whether to send a fact-finding mission. Instead, it advised the PSC 'in diplomatic language [...] that there would be both pros and cons' (Interview with MS official). At the political level France however stopped short of vetoing the mission, adopting instead what one official labelled 'unconstructive abstention' (Interview with CGS official). Although a number of

other member states were also critical about the prospective mission's likely success, they remained in France's shadow. One official thus recalled that 'the French did not want it, and they defended themselves for quite a while – and we were also not enthusiastic [...] but in the end it was a political decision, there was a session where the French fell over, and from then on it was clear' (Interview with MS official).

This begs the question why Paris came to tolerate a mission whose strategic objective – supporting a struggling NATO operation – it resented. One French diplomat reasoned that, with France opposing a 'civilian arm' for NATO, it was difficult to argue that the EU should not engage in that area either (Interview). The principal argument, he argued, was however that Paris did not want to oppose the strong wish of a number of the other member states (Interview). In particular, it wanted to show support to the incoming German Council presidency, and it was Berlin's shift from unconvinced to supportive which came to change the balance for the French government (Interview). As Paris felt there was not that much at stake for itself, it subordinated its opposition to this particular mission to its interest in a good relationship with Germany and other EU partners (Interview).

C. PREPARING EUPOL AFGHANISTAN

Following the Fact-Finding Mission to Afghanistan from 27 November to 14 December 2006, the Council approved the Crisis Management Concept for Afghanistan on 12 February 2007 (Council of the EU 2007a: para. 5). From then on, planning went remarkably quickly, with the Joint Action adopted on 30 May stipulating 'a planning phase beginning on 30 May, and an operational phase beginning no later than 15 June 2007' (Council of the EU 2007a: art. 1). In order to fulfil its objective of contributing to 'effective civilian policing', the mission was tasked to 'work on strategy development', 'support the Government of Afghanistan in coherently implementing their strategy', 'improve cohesion and coordination among international actors', and 'support linkages between the police and the wider rule of law' (Council of the EU 2007a: art. 4). Thus, EUPOL's mandate was broad but differed from the German project insofar as it focused less on training but mainly on strategy and coordination (cf. Gross 2009: 30; Kempin and Steinicke 2009: 155; Scholz 2008).

Given the preceding acrimony, the quick leap into action begs the question why the EU set up its mission so quickly. The answer lies in the German position: initially reluctant at the prospect of an ESDP police mission replacing its national police project, the German government shifted towards becoming its strongest supporter in early 2007. At a certain moment, according to a non-German official, Germany

became the 'model student' of the EUPOL supporters, pushing for the biggest possible mission (Interview). Thus, Berlin insisted that only a significantly expanded operation as compared to its national project would justify the transition to an ESDP mission (Interviews with MS officials). The German government's 'adoption' of the mission became visible in a number of facts: the first two heads of missions were German police officers, and the mission initially started out with predominantly German staff (cf. MFA/MOI 2007: 3.). Germany was also the first EU member state whose PRT concluded a 'technical agreement' with EUPOL, and it provided by far the greatest contributions in kind – armoured cars, apartments, and IT equipment, with an aggregate value of 6,7 million Euros – to get the mission started despite the EU procurement problems noted above (MFA/MOI 2007: 1; 6; Bundestag 2007b: 9b); 15). So what caused Berlin to throw its weight behind the mission?

THE ROLE OF THE GERMAN PRESIDENCY

At the beginning of its EU Council presidency, the German government found itself in a quandary: on the one hand, as the process for the EUPOL mission had been set in motion and expectations raised, any attempt to stop it would likely have put the spotlight on the German national police project's shortcomings. Crippling an EU initiative aimed at strengthening rule of law in Afghanistan would moreover have undermined its argument that international engagement in Afghanistan needed to focus more on the civilian side, an argument that was essential for domestic politics (cf. Kaim 2008). On the other hand, the MoI continued to resist this logic due to the implicit blame (on the inter-ministerial clash, see also Loewenstein 2008). Since the resources necessary for the ESDP mission, i.e. policing expertise and staff, were controlled by the MoI, the rest of the government however needed to bring it on board.

Berlin's shift from fence-sitting towards pushing for the biggest possible mission resulted from the compromise reached within the German government that Europeanizing its national project would be acceptable (only) under the condition that a European mission explicitly build on this project and be at least three times bigger than its national project, i.e. 120 police officers (Interview with GER official). Since the German MoI considered its national project the victim of unfair criticism, expansion represented both the only acceptable rationale for replacing it and the 'price' that the ministry demanded for agreeing to an EU mission. Officials in the MoI subsequently justified their resistance by making it known in the German press that they doubted that an EU mission could deliver these resources (cf. Busse 2007b). From the perspective of the rest of the government, this shift in argumentation was preferable to the earlier, principled MoI resistance that forced Germany into fence-sitting. Yet it also heralded expectations that Germany would take primary

responsibility for turning EUPOL into a success, as well as a fixation on numbers that would come back to haunt the mission.

Berlin's commitment to jump-starting EUPOL was a response towards the incentives the German government perceived: first, it was committed to turning this mission into a success of its own rather than any future EU Council presidency (cf. Buckley 2010: 4). EUPOL's inauguration served to demonstrate progress in ESDP under German leadership and the government's ability to set priorities in this policy area. Beyond this self-interest in terms of public relations, officials also maintained that Germany still had a responsibility to help with Afghan police-building (Interview with GER official). Berlin therefore wanted to make sure that it would successfully complete the transition to an ESDP mission as the agenda-setting presidency. Such control seemed advisable in view of the earlier French opposition, but also because the presidency had a disciplining effect on internal critics (Interview with GER official). By turning EUPOL Afghanistan into a (big) success, the government would be able to silence the external critics of its national police-building project (and its limited engagement in Afghanistan more generally) as well as its internal ones which resented Europeanization. Internal and external constraints thus intertwined to get Berlin to redefine its stance regarding Europeanization.

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

Despite Berlin's enthusiasm for EUPOL Afghanistan, the mission's preparation did not proceed smoothly. In part, the difficulties stemmed from the security situation in Afghanistan, which led to significant concern among member states about operational risks and 'force protection' (Interviews with MS officials; cf. Bundestag 2007c: 13008 (B)). In attempting to limit operational risks, the EU imposed strict security guidelines in terms of housing and transport, which in turn made the mission highly dependent on the requisite equipment (cf. Gross 2009: 30; Peral 2009: 334; Buckley 2010: 4). Cumbersome EU procurement procedures however prevented EUPOL from quickly acquiring the housing containers and armoured cars that it needed (Interview with MS official; cf. Buckley 2010: 4; Kempin and Steinicke 2009: 158; Dempsey 2008a; Perito 2009: 10) Although member states realized this problem, no one was going to take potential blame by demanding 'publicly' – i.e. in EU committee – that security restrictions be relaxed. EU governments were moreover slow to second staff that would have been able to address these procurement problems (Interviews with MS officials). This in turn would feed into a vicious circle where other international actors started to discount the mission, lessening the incentive for EU governments to send staff to EUPOL rather than deploy it on a bilateral basis (cf. ICG 2008d: 10; Buckley 2010: 5).

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One touted added value of the mission over the more limited German engagement was supposed to be its deployment across the entire country rather than just a few provinces. Given the security situation in Afghanistan, this outreach depended on protection and support by NATO. Yet drawing up the necessary arrangements proved very burdensome as Turkey blocked official EU-NATO contacts outside the framework of 'Berlin Plus', an arrangement excluding Cypriot representation which the EU therefore does not accept but in narrowly defined circumstances (cf. Bacia 2007; Dempsey 2007b; ICG 2007e: 8).³⁶ This deadlock implied that the EU had to set up arrangements with every Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) whose region it wanted to take up work in 'for information exchange, medical, security and logistical support including accommodation by Regional Commands and PRTs' (Council of the EU 2007a: art. 5, 2). Although NATO had in principle been eager for the EU to come in, this did not necessarily translate into EUPOL being given priority within PRTs – the military often had more pressing tasks at hand. This would further slow down EUPOL's deployment and negatively affect the EU's perception in Afghanistan (cf. Gross 2009: 31).

Apart from the difficulties associated with operating in Afghanistan, EU-internal issues also proved challenging. Just at the time when the mission was to take off, the Council Secretariat was undergoing a process of reorganization, with the introduction of a civilian planning and conduct capability (CPCC). Whereas this reorganization was undertaken specifically with a view to the upcoming, more challenging civilian ESDP missions such as in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the temporal overlap proved damaging because an existing if inadequate structure was broken up just when support was most needed (Interviews with MS officials). Moreover, the embryonic new structures were lacking leadership for some time (Interview with MS official; cf. Bundestag 2008a: 11.). These shortfalls proved particularly severe given the inter-institutional problems that were hampering progress: the European Commission insisted on implementing time-consuming EU tender procedures, and could enforce its vision in this respect due to the financial oversight it has over civilian ESDP missions (see e.g. Council of the EU 2007a: art. 6, 5). In the absence of thorough planning in the Council Secretariat and continuous high-level pressure on the Commission to deliver, administrative support for the mission in Brussels was inadequate (Interview with MS official; cf. Dempsey 2008a). Moreover, nobody was eager to start new turf fights with the Commission over these issues in mid-2007 as the Lisbon Treaty's ratification seemed impending, with officials hoping that its

³⁶ For a more comprehensive discussion of the issues surrounding 'Berlin Plus', see chapter IV on operation Althea.

implementation would quasi-automatically improve inter-institutional issues (cf. Bundestag 2008a: 11.).

A further difficulty related to inter-institutional intricacies was EUPOL's inability to directly finance projects – such as housing, infrastructure or equipment for Afghan police – as this fell under the Commission's prerogative (Interviews with COM and MS officials; cf. Peral 2009: 335; Kempin and Steinicke 2009: 161; Gross 2009: 33-34). Since the mission could not offer material incentives to Afghan counterparts, it found itself in a difficult position to compete for their attention, particularly in a situation where the US was in a rush to spend (cf. ICG 2007e: 9). EUPOL's inability to finance 'goodies' due to legal constraints moreover implied that a number of member states remained active with bilateral programmes carrying out such projects (cf. MFA/MOI 2007: 8.). While these programmes could in principle have supported the mission's standing, keeping different chains of accountability undermined EUPOL's added value in streamlining European efforts (cf. Peral 2009: 334-5). Yet as the next section will detail, EUPOL's shortcomings were most visible with respect to the gap between the EU's announcements regarding staffing and the numbers it actually managed to deliver.

D. IMPLEMENTING EUPOL AFGHANISTAN

Due to the challenges enumerated above, EUPOL Afghanistan got off to a rocky start. As one analyst summarized it, 'EUPOL has suffered from a lack of consensus in Brussels, delayed deployment and recruitment shortages, and a challenging mandate' (Peral 2009: 335). Its first head of mission resigned after only 3 months, reportedly in response to the numerous problems the mission faced and after a fall-out with the EU Special Representative (cf. Dempsey 2007a; Busse 2007b; Perito 2009: 10). By December 2008, the International Crisis Group concluded that EUPOL was 'widely regarded as a disappointment' (ICG 2008d: 10). How can we explain this development in view of the central role that Afghanistan played regarding Western security policy priorities?

Many observers of EUPOL Afghanistan have criticised the mission's small size as well as member states' failure to provide sufficient staff (cf. Vorsamer 2009; Dempsey 2008a; Kempin and Steinicke 2009; ICG 2008d). With a target of 195 international personnel, originally for November 2007 and later extended to the end of March 2008, 80 were in theatre by the end of September 2007 and 95 by early March 2008 – among them disproportionately many Germans and Scandinavians (Interview with GER official; cf. Bundestag 2007b: 1; 2008a: 3; Busse 2007b). The first year thus saw only a slow expansion where even 'Atlanticist' governments such as the UK and the Netherlands dragged their feet. By the end of December 2008, the

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mission was still below its initially targeted strength. While 15 out of 27 member states had seconded personnel, only Germany, the UK, Denmark and Italy had contributed police officers in double digits (CGS 2008b). France, on the other hand, is listed with just one officer, and numerous other countries also remained at the margins. These numbers, 18 months into the mission, show just how slow many EU governments were in responding to repeated calls for contribution that the mission sent out to fill its gaps – 14 calls by the end of 2008 (Korski 2009: 9). They also roughly confirm governments’ preferences as expressed in earlier phases – although they are underwhelming even for the missions supporters:

TABLE 7. NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO EUPOL AFGHANISTAN³⁷

| | 10/ 2007 | 03/ 2008 | 06/ 2008 | 07/ 2008 | 12/ 2008 | 12/ 2008 | 2/ 2009 | 3/ 2009 | 10/ 2009 | 11/ 2010 |
|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Germany | 33 | 27 | 40 | 31 | 31 | 41 | 37 | 44 | 45 | 48 |
| UK | 4 | 4 | 12 | 9 | 14 | 22 | 14 | 15 | 21 | 28 |
| France | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 12 | 7 |
| Austria | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n.s. | 7 |
| Belgium | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | - | 3 | - | - | n.s. | 6 |
| Bulgaria | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n.s. | 2 |
| Cyprus | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n.s. | - |
| Czech Rep. | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | n.s. | 8 |
| Denmark | 1 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 19 | 17 |
| Estonia | - | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | n.s. | 4 |
| Finland | 8 | 9 | 10 | 4 | 3 | 13 | 2 | 7 | 24 | 37 |
| Greece | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | n.s. | 4 |
| Hungary | - | 3 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 | n.s. | 12 |
| Ireland | 2 | 2 | 3 | - | - | 5 | - | - | n.s. | 14 |
| Italy | 5 | 15 | 22 | 16 | 12 | 18 | 12 | 11 | 31 | 16 |
| Latvia | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | n.s. | 2 |

³⁷ Source: Compiled from German and British parliamentary inquiries (Columns 2-4, 7: Bundestag 2007b: 3; 2008a: 4; 2008b: 1; House of Commons 2009: Ev. 98.), EU official documents (Columns 5, 6, 8, 9: CGS 2008c, 2008b; EUPOL Afghanistan 2009b, 2009a), and secondary literature (Column 10: Peral 2009: 328; Column 11: ISIS 2010). Columns 5, 6, 8 and 9 refer to police officers only whereas in columns 2-4, 7, 10 and 11, numbers refer to police officers **and** (contracted) international civilian experts – compare columns 6 and 7.

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| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------|------|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|------|------|
| Lithuania | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | n.s. | 4 |
| Luxemb. | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n.s. | - |
| Malta | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n.s. | - |
| Netherl. | 2 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 11 | 16 | 27 |
| Poland | - | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | n.s. | 5 |
| Portugal | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n.s. | 1 |
| Romania | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | n.s. | 22 |
| Slovakia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n.s. | 2 |
| Slovenia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n.s. | - |
| Spain | 5 | 7 | 12 | 11 | 9 | 11 | 10 | 12 | n.s. | 3 |
| Sweden | 3 | 4 | 10 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 19 | 21 |
| Canada | 1 | 1 | 3 | 11 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 12 | 9 |
| Croatia | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | n.s. | 2 |
| New Zealand | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3 | n.s. | 5 |
| Norway | 1 | - | 2 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 6 | n.s. | 12 |
| Internat. Civilian Experts | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 49 | 58 | n.a. | 60 | 65 | 98 | n.a. |
| Total | 80 | 95 | 157 | 171 | 179 | 174 | 193 | 222 | 268 | 325 |

DOUBLING EUPOL'S SIZE

The fact that EUPOL did not live up to expectations did not escape the mission's principals. In May 2008, the Council concluded that 'the EU is committed to substantially increase its efforts through EUPOL Afghanistan, with the aim of doubling the original number of experts working in the mission' (Council of the EU 2008b: 13.). Concurrently, the Council also committed to full deployment for June 2008, an objective it was bound to miss given the mission's history thus far. Yet the EU found itself under German pressure to raise its ambition regarding EUPOL Afghanistan (Interviews with CGS and MS officials). One Secretariat official laconically remarked that doubling was 'a unilateral decision by the German foreign minister' (Interview). In fact, the initiative can be traced back to February 2008, when the German ministers for foreign and home affairs jointly called for doubling EUPOL's size in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (F.A.Z.), Germany's leading establishment daily (Steinmeier and Schaeuble 2008). This call reflected impatience at the political level with bureaucratic squabbling and was based on the correct assessment that EUPOL Afghanistan needed a boost to be taken seriously in Kabul, Washington and EU capitals. By pushing the EU to raise EUPOL's level of ambition,

the German government evidently hoped to focus EU partners' attention on the mission, but why did it insist on this initiative in the face of near-certain failure?

Berlin's insistence on greater efforts regarding EUPOL was a consequence of domestic political calculations. Asked about the motives behind the initiative, a German official commented that 'one thought one could save the ISAF mandate with one F.A.Z. article. [...] It was only about the ISAF mandate, not even EUPOL' (Interview). The German government was anxious about the parliamentary mandate needed for its military deployment in Afghanistan in the context of domestic perception that Germany drifted too much towards the 'militarized' approach of ISAF (cf. Kaim 2008). It thus sought to show that it took a balanced stance. The logic behind this link can be glanced from the arguments brought forward by the opposition Green party: it chastised the government in November 2007 for a 'fundamental deficit in terms of security policy priorities' since the latter allegedly managed to proffer 500 soldiers for a contentious increase in the national ISAF mandate, but was unable to provide 500 undisputedly needed police officers (Bundestag 2007a: 2.).

THE REACTION TO THE GERMAN INITIATIVE

In view of EUPOL Afghanistan's record of staffing and logistical troubles, many other EU governments and particularly the Council Secretariat stood aghast at the newly raised expectations that the EU was sure to disappoint (Interviews with CGS and MS officials). All interviewed officials criticized the way in which the mission's expansion was brought about, even though they shared the assessment that EUPOL Afghanistan needed to be strengthened (Interviews with CGS and MS officials). As one put it, 'basically everyone' in Brussels opposed the idea of 'doubling', arguing for 'substantially increasing' instead (Interview with MS official). The focus on doubling not only put politics ahead of policy against the advice of the operational planners, but also meant that the EU asked to be measured against these numbers rather than the work it was doing (Interview with MS official). Even the UK, though keen on EU engagement in Afghanistan, initially resisted the initiative and only agreed after several phone calls at ministerial level (Interview with MS official). The Council Secretariat also opposed the idea because of the expected practical problems, despite its general eagerness to promote ESDP. As one diplomat noted, 'it was totally pointless, the CPCC refused, and it is headed by a Dutch, and the Deputy is British, so not exactly some anti-Americans, and they warned, warned, warned – nothing, run over' (Interview with MS official).

The reluctance of EUPOL's erstwhile promoters, the UK and the Council Secretariat, shows that the drive to expand the mission came what may was not simply a function of US pressure, but related to the domestic political incentives in Germany.

Berlin's fixation on increasing the mission's level of ambition suggests that it believed that it could achieve one of two results: either pressure partners into greater efforts and thereby live up to its promise to take responsibility for police-building, or at least show that the EU rather than Germany was to blame. In fact, one German official privately argued that the objective in setting up the mission had been to enable Germany to say two years later that 'bilaterally we are providing good training, but the EU's coordination, well, difficult' (Interview). While an EU success was the preferred option, Berlin at a minimum wanted to make clear that it had done its part and that potential blame lay with the EU and other member states. Despite virtually unanimous opposition, the German government thus insisted on the objective of doubling EUPOL's size, and EU partners subsequently gave in to German pressure. France, formerly the most outspoken critic of this engagement, was just about to start its Council presidency and, to avoid trouble, eventually adopted the position of 'whatever comes is fine for us' (Interview with GER official).

CONTRIBUTIONS V. IMPACT

The debate about doubling EUPOL's size continued the dubious focus on numerical input which tends to emphasize demonstrating commitment over achieving impact. With a view to the latter, EUPOL Afghanistan could have represented a major improvement even in the absence of significant expansion, by better coordinating (non-US) international police actors. Most of these actors were in fact European, but given EUPOL's constraints due to its botched start and its inherent limitations regarding project work, streamlining proved difficult. On the one hand, the mission's struggle with administrative hurdles and its pre-occupation with 'force protection' kept it from focusing on its key task, i.e. strategy development (Interview with CGS official; cf. Buckley 2010: 4). On the other hand, with major EU countries maintaining national police support projects, EUPOL continued to face difficulties to achieve recognition as the actor responsible for coordinating international strategy in the field of policing (cf. ICG 2008d: 10; Peral 2009: 334-335). Furthermore, the mission was not helped by the fact that the US all but ignored its efforts. Whereas EUPOL notably aimed at strengthening the Secretariat underpinning the International Policing Coordination Board, the intended mechanism for greater coordination among donors and Afghan authorities, the US did not assign any permanent staff to this Secretariat until the end of 2008 (cf. ICG 2008d: 11).

Whereas a number of observers have compared EUPOL's numbers with the 2500 police trainers the US is using to train the police's rank and file (cf. Boege 2009; Dempsey 2008a), this is somewhat misleading. It is plainly more difficult to enlist suitably experienced police officers which can credibly mentor the higher echelons of the Afghan police hierarchy than to procure military police to offer courses in

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survival training to police recruits. The latter are pivotal given the security situation in Afghanistan, but such training simply makes for more impressive numbers and draws on resources that are far more easily available. Moreover, EU member states also contribute hundreds of personnel to such basic training, but on a national basis or in the framework of NATO's training mission. Clearly, it would not have been helpful to subsume them under EUPOL's umbrella simply to increase EU numbers, and it is to the EU's credit that it has not attempted to do so.

The above caveats notwithstanding, the EU has to accept some blame for the mission's flawed perception. First, by focusing on numerical benchmarks only to miss them later on, the Union invited observers to measure the mission's performance against these. Secondly, despite the specific quality the mission sought to deliver, it could have used more people. While the required capabilities were limited in supply, their availability for this mission was at least partly a function of incentives for the relevant domestic authorities as the differences across EU member states and comparisons to other civilian missions show. Although the rule of law mission in Kosovo faced recruitment problems of its own, it attracted far more secondments than EUPOL Afghanistan. Moreover, the EU's efforts are not *inherently* limited to the strategic level; the mission's focus on contributing to effective civilian policing arrangements could logically also be supported by monitoring and mentoring at lower levels. While there is no point in duplicating US and NATO work, Afghanistan offered sufficient opportunities for greater contributions. Most importantly however, as a consequence of the emphasis on demonstrating commitment, the mission initially lacked a clear sense of purpose and thus failed to engage its partners in Afghanistan.

WHITHER EUPOL AFGHANISTAN?

Most interviewed officials emphasized that EUPOL had had a false start but expressed cautious optimism for the future. They assigned the mission's problems mainly to overly rushed planning, lack of inter-institutional coherence at the time, and the inherent difficulties of entering Afghanistan at such a late point of the international intervention. As the importance of these problems has come to recede over time, they argued that the mission's outlook was improving. Many of the mission's bureaucratic hurdles simply needed time to be addressed. While the mission continued to fall short of the targeted 400 police officers, it had grown by early 2011 to incorporate more than 300 international staff, with contributions coming from 23 EU countries as well as 4 'third states' (CGS 2010; Gros-Verheyde 2011b). The old cleavages haunting the mission, i.e. the debate on whether EU support for NATO and US policy was appropriate, appeared to have subsided. Moreover, the mission managed to create a somewhat broader sense of shared

responsibility among international police-building actors in Afghanistan (cf. Bundestag 2008c: 37; Islam and Gross 2009: 3; Buckley 2010: 5).

The prolongation of EUPOL's mandate in May 2010 for another 3 years also addressed some of the issues that had troubled EUPOL: the assistance for the Afghan government has been specified; a project cell has been created to coordinate and facilitate projects in the police sector even though the latter are still carried out under third parties' responsibility; and the mission's ability to reach down to the operational level has been codified (Council of the EU 2010: art. 3-4). However, significant challenges remain, both regarding the weakness of the Afghan side as well as with a view to commitment and coordination within the EU and regarding other international actors. Most important among them is that the mission is operating in the broader context of a justice system which – at the end of 2010 and thus 9 years after the original intervention – was still judged to be 'in a catastrophic state of disrepair' and where the International Crisis Group saw the need to urge Western governments once again to '[r]elocate rule of law support at the centre of the counter-insurgency strategy' (ICG 2010b: i; iii).

E. PROXIMATE DRIVERS BEHIND EUPOL AFGHANISTAN

As this chapter has detailed, EUPOL Afghanistan was the result of a number of overlapping but partly contradictory factors. The idea for EUPOL initially arose out of the perceived need to give support to NATO in Afghanistan, promoted in particular by the UK as well as the Netherlands and Finland. This rationale triggered the opposition of France – but also of other member states such as Austria and Greece – that resented ESDP's agenda being set by NATO and the US or regarded Afghanistan as none of their business. The question of support to NATO however became intertwined with two other drivers: first, an EU institutional interest in sharpening the Union's profile in Afghanistan. This led the Commission to explore options for greater EU engagement, and the Council Secretariat to join the latter's assessment mission. This visible display of interest in turn helped set in motion a process which created significant expectations and momentum regarding an eventual ESDP engagement. Secondly, ideas about setting up an ESDP mission in Afghanistan interacted with considerations in Rome and Berlin as to how to address their 'lead nation' status in Afghan policing and justice. Initially both governments did not display a clear preference as to whether to 'Europeanize' their respective tasks. In the wake of the momentum for an ESDP mission, the German government however decided that a European operation presented an opportunity to infuse police-building with renewed vigour and to deflect future criticism whereas opposition would have entailed considerable risks with respect to the government's ability to justify its Afghanistan policy.

In view of these overlapping processes, it is difficult to deduce straightforward theoretical conclusions from EUPOL Afghanistan's early phase. While several EU actors were interested in making a stronger and more visible European contribution to state-building in Afghanistan, the reasons for this impetus varied: they related to security policy priorities, the constraints arising from the existence of an 'ESDP machine', and the attempt to strike a balance between the needs of the situation in Afghanistan, alliance politics, and the constraints of domestic politics. Although these motives were reflected across EU governments, their relative weight and specification differed. Both the French and the British government viewed the mission primarily in terms of their relationship to the US and NATO. Whereas London sought the EU's support for the latter, France insisted that the EU not be instrumentalized for helping NATO. This discrepancy was in line with traditional differences in security policy, i.e. the British desire to keep America involved in European security affairs versus the French championing of European 'autonomy' (see e.g. Howorth 2000; Stahl et al. 2004; Schoutheete 2004: 51-57). This tension however came to be overshadowed by Berlin's role.

THE GERMAN PREDICAMENT

As in the case of Britain and France, the German government was influenced by NATO's interest in a stronger civilian partner. Berlin's position however came to be formulated primarily with a view to addressing two criticisms the government faced: on the one hand, it sought to avoid blame for its relatively limited engagement in Afghanistan, including in building an Afghan police force. This was to reassure the public that the government was not sacrificing the longer-term national interest of good relations with NATO allies and Washington in particular. After all, a close transatlantic relationship forms a key aspect of German strategic culture (cf. Giegerich 2006: 133-136; Harnisch 2010: 62). For this purpose, Berlin needed to show that it was constructive and responsible, doing its share for the wider Western project of stabilising and transforming Afghanistan. On the other hand, the German government hoped to contain domestic criticism of an 'overly militarized' approach by NATO in Afghanistan. Emphasizing civilian engagement served to comfort the public that the government did not sell out to a US agenda, and that it attempted to shape international events in line with domestic values. For this purpose, Berlin attempted to keep its distance from America's war-waging in Afghanistan and to emphasize the importance of police-building. In short, the German government sought to demonstrate that it effectively defended domestic preferences in keeping military engagement limited, yet without giving allies justified grounds for criticism.

Given this objective, the most direct criticism the German government needed to address related to its prior efforts in building the Afghan police. The leading German

daily claimed in November 2007 that the German police-building project in Afghanistan was changing into a 'heap of embarrassments which damage Germany's standing' (Carstens 2007). Although generally close to the Christian Democrats to which both the chancellor and the responsible minister of home affairs belonged, the paper went on to argue that the credibility of the chancellor herself was now at stake. The parliamentary opposition also focused on the shortcomings in this sector and, between 2007 and 2010, made no less than 7 written inquiries that focused on police-training in Afghanistan. Criticism was even voiced by the German military, with one general publicly referring to the German police training scheme in Afghanistan as 'a miserable failure' (Loewenstein 2008; Dempsey 2008b). This domestic criticism was partly a consequence of the international one. It was however the latter's domestic reverberation that was awkward for the government insofar as it potentially undermined trust into its competence in foreign policy matters, in particular regarding Germany's self-conception as a useful and reliable Western ally.

Such criticism may seem to be of limited relevance. It was threatening however insofar as it undermined the government's narrative that presented its police-building efforts in Afghanistan as a substantial and recognized contribution. This in turn served to rebut both Anglo-American allegations that Berlin was shirking its responsibilities, reproaches which also reverberated domestically, and domestic criticism that the government simply followed the 'militarized' US strategy. EUPOL's success was thus needed to underline domestically and internationally that Germany's emphasis on civilian policing had been right all along, that German efforts had been effective, and that greater efforts in this domain were what was needed (cf. Bundestag 2007c: 13008 (D); 13014 (D); 13015 (B)). Demonstrating credible civilian engagement was moreover necessary for ensuring continued parliamentary support for Germany's military engagement in Afghanistan (cf. Kaim 2008: 616; Harnisch 2010: 64-7). As a security policy expert noted, 'German political elites continue to be fundamentally sceptical about the usefulness of force. The broad consensus is that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won militarily but that it must be won by civilian means only' (Kaim 2008: 617). It was for catering to this domestic constituency that Germany insisted on doubling EUPOL's size.

Promoting stronger engagement in police-building as a better alternative to military action was not limited to German opposition politicians: in the run-up to the 2009 federal elections, a parliamentary spokesman for the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) also demanded a doubling of police trainers for Afghanistan (again) in order to shift priority from military to police engagement and allow for early withdrawal (cf. F.A.Z. 2009). This demand rings rather populist in view of the fact that CSU-ruled Bavaria agreed to send its first police officers to Afghanistan only in November 2009 (cf. Vorsamer 2009; Bundestag 2008a: 24.b)). Yet it shows that demanding greater

efforts at police-building was seen as domestically appealing in Germany. That the political risks of taking police off the street at home and endangering them abroad were simultaneously shunned as long as possible underlines that politics rather than policy informed such demands.

By focusing on police-building, Berlin attempted to balance the need of appearing to be a responsible ally and of containing any potential fallout from the military operation in Afghanistan. Under these two conditions, both too much and too little support to NATO's ISAF mission entailed domestic political risks for the government: to appear either as too subservient to an unloved US administration or as recklessly opportunistic by endangering a pivotal foreign policy relationship. The easiest way of containing both risks consisted in arguing that increasing civilian engagement was what Afghanistan (and hence the US) truly needed. The chancellor, visiting Afghanistan in November 2007, thus underlined that military, police and civilian reconstruction were equally important and that 'if there is one area where Germany should do more, then it is for the time being in police-building' (Bundeskanzleramt 2007).

THE ROLE OF ESDP STRUCTURES

Whereas the debate over the desirability of an ESDP mission in Afghanistan was decided among member state governments, the Council Secretariat also weighed in. According to several interviewees, it actively supported the idea for a mission in Afghanistan, despite some internal criticism (Interviews with GCS and MS officials). The latter was partly due to the fear that the EU might overreach. In the absence of a proper civilian headquarters capability, was Afghanistan not too challenging a theatre? Other Council Secretariat officials, however, saw these internal challenges precisely as a means to push and test the new structures (Interview with FRA official), and the external challenges as an enormous opportunity for the EU: with a military solution in Afghanistan increasingly questionable, the EU could demonstrate its value-added (Interview with CGS official). Raising the stakes for ESDP moreover fitted the Secretariat's general interest in proactively 'always hunting for more' (Interview with COM official). Both French and German sources thus described the Secretariat as 'fully in line with the UK position' of promoting EUPOL, adding that the responsible director in the CGS 'had listened well to London' (Interviews).

The Secretariat was able to help push EUPOL Afghanistan onto the ESDP agenda by invoking outside expectations. The perception of institutional pressure, of the need to come up with something, probably helped to convince the German government that Europeanization was hard to avoid (Interviews with CGS and GER officials) – although this was partly a consequence of German collusion. Similarly, when the Fact-Finding Mission on the feasibility of an ESDP mission came back with its report,

the Council Secretariat explicitly argued that ‘now that the EU had climbed up the diving board with everybody captivated, it also had to jump’ (Interview with FRA official). In other words, once the prospect of an ESDP intervention in Afghanistan had been raised, it was difficult to put the genie back into the bottle. This put pressure on EU governments to agree on something and to avoid giving the impression of obstructionism lest their limited national contribution in Afghanistan attract blame. While it is difficult to gauge the exact impact of the Secretariat’s engagement, the latter’s interest apparently helped in bringing about a shift in the need for justification from those who wanted to do something to those who did not. This institutional bias for action combined with the importance of preference intensity, i.e. that those who wanted to do something were more committed than those who preferred inaction (and remained free not to contribute), may explain why ‘doing something’ was the ESDP default mode once a government had brought an idea to the table.

The fact that EU governments committed to an endeavour they proved insufficiently dedicated to might also indicate functionalist pressures arising out of the existence of the ESDP framework. The latter may have led them to arrive, by default, at a decision they in fact had not supported but only insufficiently opposed. Indeed, such pressures played a role in creating momentum once the talk of the town had led to expectations of action. As a counterfactual, the mission would hardly have taken place in the absence of an ESDP institutional structure geared towards taking the subsequent step – those unconvinced of the mission’s merits would likely have ‘opted out’ early on, thereby casting doubt on Berlin’s precondition of significantly enhanced engagement. The ESDP framework thus proved instrumental in overcoming a certain level of inertia and opposition when it came to authorizing a mission. However, it was not decisive, and EUPOL’s subsequent development showed that these pressures were much less effective in ensuring commitment to a mission that has not enjoyed fully-fledged support. The EU institutions’ limited influence was also underlined when the decision was taken to double the size of the mission against its pleading, and despite significant support for the Council Secretariat on the part of other member states.

TRIUMPH OF A LACK OF WILL?

To many observers, EUPOL’s relative lack of resources – especially compared to US numbers – underlined that EU governments’ political will was very limited (cf. Vorsamer 2009; Dempsey 2008a; Kempin and Steinicke 2009). The International Herald Tribune underlined that whereas EU countries had more than 2 million police officers, ‘even after much cajoling and shaming by the United States and NATO, they have still managed to muster only 150 to send to Afghanistan’ (Dempsey

2008a). This criticism was also mirrored on the other side of the Atlantic, where German newspapers compared EUPOL's 151 police officers with the 2500 US police trainers (cf. Boege 2009; see also Blechschmidt 2008; Loewenstein 2008; Vorsamer 2009). This ostensible lack of effort comes into even sharper relief once we consider that much of the early contributions did not involve extra personnel, but came down to 're-hatting' officers already on the ground in a national capacity (cf. ICG 2007e: 8).

The principal problem that all EU governments faced was the mobilisation of national bureaucracies which are not *per se* foreign policy oriented, such as police officers. Few EU member states have structurally addressed this issue yet, making quick contributions dependent on sufficient incentives for the line ministries in each case (cf. House of Lords 2008: Q335). Apart from the specific difficulties EUPOL Afghanistan faced, governments cannot command police officers to go on a mission the way troops can be deployed, but rather need to persuade them. The structural nature of this hurdle (as well as the institutional difficulties described above) implies that it is a bit too easy to deduce from EUPOL's failings that EU governments simply lacked the political will to act, as a number of observers have argued or implied (cf. Kempin and Steinicke 2009; Dempsey 2008a; Buckley 2010; Vorsamer 2009). Yet EU governments could have surmounted many of these obstacles in a shorter time span by rapidly seconding personnel, instructing national PRTs to quickly sign agreements with EUPOL and making crucial equipment available on a bilateral basis – in short, by prioritising support for the mission within domestic bureaucracies.

Their reluctance to cut corners revealed that many EU governments did not in fact attach utmost importance to this mission, despite official proclamations to the contrary. EUPOL Afghanistan simply did not command sufficient political attention outside of Brussels and Berlin, a self-reinforcing process when the mission failed to impress its mark. As one Kabul observer commented, '[t]he military mission commands most of the governments' attention, and drives their national priorities; the EU is fighting a losing battle for the attention of European capitals' (Buckley 2010: 3). This is hardly surprising given that, as one diplomat put it, '[m]any member states regard the mission as a possibility to accommodate US pressure without having to send troops' (Interview with GER official).

The absence of urgency in many EU capitals regarding EUPOL's development was rational insofar as the blame for EUPOL's failings was likely to fall on the EU as an entity and/or Germany, rather than on individual EU governments. The rush to establish the mission under the German presidency likely contributed to a perception in EU capitals that EUPOL Afghanistan essentially was a German mission. This lack of wider ownership was reinforced by German insistence on the close link between the mission and the earlier national project. One interviewee thus emphasized that 'once Germany agreed to the mission, it became very German'

(Interview with CGS official). Another concurred that ‘the challenge for the EU was to ensure this was an EU mission, not just a German mission’ (Interview with CGS official). Whereas such a strong German imprint had been necessary to build support within the German MoI, it likely encouraged other governments to see primary responsibility for mission success as incumbent on Berlin. The EU official in charge of civilian operations warned that such a lack of responsibility might actually become symptomatic for the latter: ‘[t]here is a danger that we will see the great number of civilian missions that we have now embarked upon as nice things, nice to have, nice to show, but not as something very important for either ourselves or for the countries concerned, more a political gesture’ (House of Lords 2008: Q308). Apparently, many EU governments regarded EUPOL Afghanistan as just such a gesture, giving them little reason to press domestic bureaucracies for prioritizing its support.

F. CONCLUSION

What does the above melange of factors suggest with respect to the mission’s underlying drivers? The differing motives and strenuous consensus that was eventually achieved make it clear that there was no collectively shared impetus behind EUPOL Afghanistan. To the extent that the mission’s genesis responded to pressures from the international level, it served to accommodate US and NATO concerns about a lack of progress in building the Afghan police necessary for an eventual withdrawal of Western troops. Although there is no direct evidence that the US instigated the mission, the latter was clearly seen by many EU governments as a gesture towards NATO and the US. As one diplomat put it, ‘even those who wanted to go wanted it to be nice to the Americans, or because one does not wish to be in Iraq – so the motives were not honest motives, we do something sensible for Afghanistan, but it was, we have to do this mission, full stop’ (Interview with MS official). Not surprisingly, the mission was therefore primarily supported by countries with a particularly transatlantic outlook – and most interviewed officials remembered the UK as the most vociferous by far in arguing for EUPOL Afghanistan.

The pro-American orientation of this mission was reflected in French and British governments’ positions, which mirrored the broader attitudes the two countries have taken vis-à-vis ESDP. Whereas Britain wanted to use the ESDP for supporting NATO and the US, France was interested in keeping the former away from the latter. The French position of ‘unconstructive abstention’ could thus be taken as an indication of balancing intentions although this reluctance may equally have been a way of signalling at home that France continued to pursue an independent foreign policy. After all, any balancing intentions would sit uneasily with France’s continued participation in the US-led NATO operation in Afghanistan. Moreover, the French

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government decided not to prevent EUPOL Afghanistan. Instead, it allowed the EU to embark on this mission whose purpose was in part the hope that this would please Washington. Even if that impetus turned out to be limited insofar as it did not translate into political will to undertake much additional effort, the fact that the Atlanticist position prevailed contradicts the proposition that ESDP can be characterized as a Gaullist instrument for balancing against the US.

By contrast, there is some evidence for the second proposition, that EUPOL Afghanistan served to promote the EU's liberal values. A liberal aspiration underpins the mission's objective, namely to contribute to 'effective civilian policing arrangements [...] within the framework of the rule of law and respect[ing] human rights' (Council of the EU 2007a: art. 3). Moreover, it also follows from the explicit embrace of a 'civilian policing model' as opposed to instrumentalizing the police as auxiliaries against the insurgency (cf. Wilder 2007: x; Gross 2009: 13-14; Grono 2009: 3-4; Friesendorf 2009; ICG 2007e: 7-9). However, the targeting of the police was primarily the result of a political opportunity due to Afghan needs in this sector and the previous German lead in this area. More importantly, the political rationale focused on demonstrating engagement in Afghanistan and avoiding blame, and it featured only limited efforts to put these high-minded objectives into practice. The invocation of liberal values thus rings somewhat hollow against the backdrop of the limited efforts EU governments devoted to strengthening rule of law – especially if compared to their significantly greater investments into stability in the form of ISAF contributions. In short, it was opportunity and convenience more than liberal impetus that shaped the Union's intervention in Afghanistan.

The third proposition suggested that EUPOL Afghanistan may have been part of a larger strategy to advance European integration by way of strengthening the EU's visibility on the global stage. Indeed, the search for an 'EU security identity' played some role insofar as the EU institutions were aiming for greater EU visibility in Afghanistan. Joining the Commission in its assessment mission with a view to acquiring a new sphere of activity, the Secretariat subsequently gave political support to the Finnish and German Council presidencies against French opposition and widespread scepticism. It also helped to create the perception of inevitability that the diving board analogy evoked. Yet whereas this aspect played a role in limiting some member states' resistance, the decisive factor for France to give up its opposition was its decision not to veto a project that Germany evidently supported. Similarly, the Secretariat would hardly have pressed its case had Germany voiced clear opposition. In other words, the European institutions were important in shifting the incentive structure between action and inaction at the EU level, but this was decisive only to the extent that EU governments acquiesced or avoided taking decisions. As to member states' own motivations, there is little to suggest that they saddled the EU with this mission so as to enhance the latter's security brand or even

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to increase the appeal of European integration. For this to be plausible, the Union would have had to give proof of far greater unity of purpose – and member states far more willing to solicit publicity for this mission rather than their national projects. Instead, EU governments never allowed the Union to take centre-place in Afghanistan and did not go out of their way to ensure the latter's success.

This brings us to the fourth proposition, namely that EU governments may have sought to leverage EUPOL Afghanistan for domestic political ends. There is only limited direct evidence for this proposition, but national positions correlated with domestic preferences – from Britain's interest in leveraging the EU for support of British foreign policy priorities and its special relationship to France's insistence on decision-making autonomy. In particular, German policy with respect to EUPOL Afghanistan was informed by the attempt to reconcile two conflicting emphases of its 'national security culture' – being a reliable ally while avoiding the use of force to the extent possible (cf. Giegerich 2006: 137-140; Meyer 2006: 69-71; similarly, Kaim 2007: 200). By transforming its national police project into a European mission, Berlin solicited implicit international legitimisation for its earlier work, flaunted its willingness to bear a greater share of international responsibility, and emphasized the civilian character of its Afghanistan engagement. It thereby demonstrated its conformity with domestic expectations regarding foreign policy behaviour, and reduced the political risks that could have arisen from the perception that it shirked responsibility or aligned itself with the strategy of an unpopular American president. Europeanization moreover allowed it to share the costs and blame for potential future problems.

The German position was thus driven by the objective to illustrate its contribution to stabilising Afghanistan while remaining in sync with society's preference for civilian action. This can plausibly be explained as a function of domestic politics, but the emphasis on policing could also be interpreted as an attempt to defend 'the national interest' by minimizing national costs under the constraints of superpower expectations. EUPOL would then primarily have served to fend off US pressure for costlier military engagement in (Southern) Afghanistan. It thus comes down to the question whether the German government primarily attempted to convince Washington or its domestic public of the value of its police-building efforts. Given the mission's relative lack of impact, the latter is the more plausible intended audience. The indifference the US showed towards EUPOL also indicates that it did not consider this mission an important strategic asset in stabilising Afghanistan (cf. ICG 2008d: 11). If the US all but ignored EUPOL, how would Germany hope to get credit for the mission in Washington? It is admittedly risky to deduce from a policy's ineffectiveness that there was no serious commitment to the latter. After all, the German government did invest into the mission, not just by being the biggest contributor in terms of staff and resources, but also by pushing for the mission's

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expansion and repeatedly affirming its responsibility. Yet the fact that these efforts were undertaken primarily with a view to domestic debates about ISAF indicates that, for the German government, domestic politics was the primary consideration. Moreover, the fact that most other EU governments felt less compelled to act although they were likely subject to comparable US pressure indicates that the explanation resides in the particularities of how US expectations came to impact on German politics.

In sum, the mission is easiest to square with the proposition that it served to respond to domestic expectations. Governments tailored their positions according to what seemed easiest to defend domestically, and the intergovernmental conflicts regarding EUPOL that this chapter detailed mirrored these diverging societal expectations. The German government as the crucial player in this mission sought to limit the domestic political risks its engagement in Afghanistan engendered, i.e. it used its emphasis on police-building as a shield against the anticipated potential criticisms that it was too close to the unpopular US counter-insurgency or too coward to carry its fair part of the burden of international security. As for the French and British governments, the audience of their positioning is less clear, but the discussion chapter will argue that their 'geo-strategic' motives also relate less to relative power than to domestic expectations. Before we turn to that issue, however, the following chapter will address the fourth and final case of this study: the EU's intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic.