Collective action : a regulatory focus perspective

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Chapter 1.

General Introduction, Discussion and Conclusion

At the time of this writing, the populations of several North African and Asian countries have just risen up against corrupt and dictatorial regimes. After weeks of protesting, the populations of Tunisia and Egypt have successfully ousted their dictators. In Libya, however, the dictator decided to respond with violence, causing the country to descend into civil war. At the same time, Dutch students are protesting in the Hague against proposed educational reforms that would result in higher tuition fees. A couple of years earlier, youths from the suburbs of Paris, France took to the streets to protest against the disadvantaged societal position of their group. These protests quickly turned violent. Weeks later, when the smoke had settled, thousands of cars had been burned and damage was estimated to be over 200 million Euros (Landler, 2005).

The individuals protesting in these examples have several things in common. First of all, they are members of groups that feel grieved or disadvantaged. Second, they chose to work together with other members of their group in order to change the group's disadvantaged position, a goal they would never be able to achieve as single individuals. In the psychological and sociological literatures this phenomenon of rising up as a group is known as collective action and is defined as cooperative behavior aimed at achieving group goals (Simon et al., 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This form of action can be contrasted with individual action, which is behavior aimed at achieving personal goals. Because collective action often is the only way to achieve important societal goals (such as ousting a dictator), and because collective action can be associated with significant societal costs (as illustrated by the Parisian revolt) it is important to understand how individuals become motivated to engage in collective action (versus individual action) and, once they are committed to the collective goal, to understand how they make a choice between different means that can be used to reach this goal.

In this dissertation, these questions will be addressed using insights gained from work on Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997), a theory that distinguishes between two types of motivation: one that is gain-oriented (promotion focus) and one that is loss-oriented (prevention focus). I will argue and demonstrate (1) that individuals under prevention focus - because they tend to act based on the negative aspects of the context - are more likely than individuals under promotion focus to respond to group-based disadvantage with collective action rather than individual action in most real-world societal contexts. Furthermore, I will argue and demonstrate that because individuals

under prevention focus experience highly important goals as necessities (compared to as desires under promotion focus), they should (2) commit to collective action even when the likelihood that it will succeed is low and (3) consider more hostile, aggressive forms of collective action as justified means when they place high importance on the goal of collective action. By contrast, I will argue and show that adoption of a promotion focus should lead individuals to only engage in collective action when the likelihood that through this action highly important goals will be achieved is high.

However, before we turn to Regulatory Focus Theory, introduce the predictions and discuss the results, we must first consider the ways in which individuals can respond to the disadvantaged position of their social group.

Responding to Collective Disadvantage

Earlier work has identified three dimensions on which responses to collective disadvantage can differ: the individual – collective dimension, the active – passive dimension, and the hostile – benevolent (also called normative – non-normative) dimension (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddamm, 1990). This three-dimensional framework describes how members of disadvantaged groups have to make three choices when deciding how to respond to the disadvantaged position of their group, and that the outcomes of these three decisions determine if, and how they will act. First of all, members of disadvantaged groups have to make a choice between taking individual and collective action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Individual action is aimed at improving the personal societal position of the individual, and can take such forms as pursuing a university degree or asking one's boss for a raise. Collective action, by contrast, is aimed at improving the societal position of the group, not just of the individual, and can take such forms as collective protest and union membership. Thus, to understand the situations in which members of disadvantaged groups decide to take to the streets to engage collective protest, we need to understand why they have chosen to attempt to improve the disadvantaged position of their group instead of merely striving to improve their personal position (the usually preferred strategy, Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

The second dimension, the active – passive dimension, indicates that at some point members of low status groups have to decide how much either individual or collective status improvement is worth to them. The resultant is their level of commitment: the costs they are personally willing to bear in order to further the goal of either personal or collective status improvement. Understanding individuals' level of commitment to the collective goal is important as some forms of collective action require more commitment than others. For example, signing a petition can be considered a relatively low cost, easy form of collective action, and therefore requires little commitment. By contrast, going on a hunger strike can be life threatening and can therefore be considered a high commitment form of collective action. At more intermediate levels of commitment to collective action one might consider volunteering (which costs time and effort) to further a collective goal. To understand individual engagement in different forms of collective action one thus has to keep in mind the different levels of commitment these forms of action require.

Lastly, responses to group-based disadvantage can vary in the extent to which they are hostile or benevolent. There are often individuals or groups (such as dictators and advantaged groups) that can be held responsible for the ingroup's collective disadvantage. In this situation, collective action may be directed at harming the interests of these individuals or groups, not just at furthering the interests of the ingroup. When this is the case, collective action can be considered hostile rather than benevolent. Examples of hostile forms of action are violent rioting (such as the events that unfolded in the Parisian suburbs in 2005) and civil war.

In summary, in order to understand why and how members of disadvantaged groups decide to engage in collective action we have to understand (1) why they did not choose to pursue individual position improvement instead of collective position improvement, (2) the extent to which they are willing to bear personal costs in order to further the collective goal and (3) the extent to which they are willing, or even motivated, to harm the interests of those held responsible for their group's disadvantage.

In this dissertation, I will investigate these issues using insights gained from Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997), a theory that distinguishes between two different types of motivation: promotion focus under which strong motivation is experienced as desire, and prevention focus under which strong motivation is

experienced as necessity. I will argue and demonstrate that understanding individual tendencies towards either promotion focus or prevention focus is critical for understanding the situations under which individuals become committed to collective action and for understanding the means by which they pursue collective goals.

In the following section I will first introduce Regulatory Focus Theory. I will then explain how activation of the promotion and prevention focus affects (1) members of disadvantaged groups' decision between taking in individual and collective action, (2) their level of commitment to collective action, and (3) their choice between taking hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. I will argue that in most real-world societal contexts members of disadvantaged groups under prevention focus will prefer collective action over individual action, whereas adoption of a promotion focus will cause them to prefer individual action over collective action. I will then argue that because individuals under prevention focus perceive important goals as necessities, to the extent they see the goal of collective action as important they (1) should be willing to commit to this goal even if the likelihood that it will be reached is low and (2) should become willing to use more hostile means in pursuit of this goal. By contrast, I will argue that adoption of a promotion focus should lead individuals to only engage in collective action when the likelihood that through this action highly important goals will be achieved is high.

Regulatory Focus Theory

Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997; 1998) distinguishes two motivational systems, promotion focus and prevention focus. Promotion and prevention focus can vary in strength momentarily, depending on the requirements of the situation. However, they also have a strong chronic component that is formed during early childhood (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001; Keller, 2008). The promotion and prevention systems differ in their function, lead to pursuit of different types of goals, to the use of different strategies during goal pursuit, as well as to different emotional reactions to success and failure of goal pursuit. Furthermore - and important for the current dissertation - promotion and prevention focus involve qualitatively different ways in which strong motivation is experienced (Shah & Higgins,

1997; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). Below, I will discuss each of these differences in more detail.

First of all, the promotion and prevention systems serve fundamentally different needs and are consequently associated with different types of goals. The promotion system serves the need for growth and accomplishment. Because this need is best served by the achievement of goals that have a gain/non-gain structure (i.e. goals for which achievement is more positive than non-achievement is negative, ideal goals) activation of the promotion focus motivates goal pursuit when there is opportunity for gain, and inhibits behavior when no opportunities for gain are present. The prevention system, by contrast, serves the individual's need for safety and security. Because the need for safety and security is best served by the achievement of goals with a loss/non-loss structure (i.e. goals for which non-achievement is more negative than achievement is positive, "ought" goals), activation of prevention focus motivates goal pursuit when there is a risk of loss. When loss has been averted, or no risk of loss is experienced, activation of the prevention system inhibits behavior.

Activation of the promotion and prevention systems also differentially affects the way in which individuals pursue their goals (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Goal pursuit under promotion focus typically involves the use of an eager strategy in which matches to desired end states are approached. By contrast, goal pursuit under prevention focus typically involves using a cautious strategy in which mismatches to desired end-states are avoided. This difference in strategy results in two types of bias. Activation of promotion focus gives rise to what is known as "risky" perceptual and behavioral biases. These cause individuals to pay more attention to - and act on - the possibility of positive outcomes than on the risk of negative outcomes. By contrast, activation of the prevention system results in what is known as "conservative" perceptual and behavioral biases. These cause individuals to pay more attention to - and act on - the risk of negative outcomes than the possibility of positive outcomes. Thus, activation of the promotion or the prevention system also affects *how* individuals pursue goals, not just *which* goals are pursued, and creates attentional and behavioral biases towards the positive or the negative, respectively.

Furthermore, promotion and prevention focus are associated with different emotional reactions to success and failure of goal pursuit (Higgins, Bond, Klein, &

Strauman, 1987). While under promotion focus, individuals experience cheerfulness when they are successful in the pursuit of their goals, and dejection when they fail. By contrast, individuals under prevention focus experience feelings of relaxation and quiescence when success is experienced during goal-pursuit, and agitation when they fail.

Lastly, there is a difference in the subjective experience of strong motivation under promotion and prevention focus. When under promotion focus, outcomes that are deemed highly important are viewed with desire. Under prevention focus, by contrast, highly important outcomes are seen as necessities (Higgins, 1997; Scholer, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2008; Scholer et al., 2010; Shah & Higgins, 1997).

In the following sections I will explain how the insights gained from Regulatory Focus Theory can enrich our understanding of (1) individuals' choice to pursue individual-level or collective-level goals, (2) their level of commitment to collective action, and (3) their willingness to engage in hostile forms of collective action. In each of these three sections, I will first outline the predictions and then discuss the results of the studies that were carried out to test these predictions.

The Choice Between Individual Mobility and Collective Action

As explained earlier, to understand disadvantaged group-members' motivation to engage in collective action, we must first understand how they choose between group-level or individual-level goals. Several answers to this question have been offered in the social psychological literature (cf. Ellemers & Van Laar, 2011). For example, work in the social identity tradition has shown that the extent to which individuals identify with their group tends to strengthen their willingness to pursue group-level instead of individual-level goals (Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Work on social identity theory has also identified the degree to which societal group-boundaries are seen as permeable as a primary determinant of the decision between individual and collective action (cf. Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990). The term permeability refers to the extent to which it is possible for members of disadvantaged groups to improve their status individually. Members of disadvantaged groups tend to prefer individual action over

collective action when the social system is considered "open" (i.e. as having a high degree of permeability) and prefer collective action over individual action when the social system is perceived to be closed (i.e. as having a very low degree of permeability) (Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1993; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Lalonde, & Silverman, 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

In most societies, however, group boundaries are not completely open or closed but can be considered semi-permeable (Wright, 2001a). That is, although individual mobility for members of disadvantaged groups is possible in these societies, it is more difficult to achieve for them than for members of advantaged groups. In such semi-permeable systems - also called token systems - members of disadvantaged groups have to choose between taking collective action (to change the system) and individual action (to make use of the limited opportunities the system offers). Surprisingly, research has shown that even when the social system is almost completely impermeable, members of disadvantaged groups still prefer to take individual action over collective action (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 1998; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan, & Dolnik, 2000; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990; Wright & Taylor, 1998; 1999; Wright, 1997).

According to Wright (1997; see also Danaher & Branscombe, 2010; Richard & Wright, 2010), this preference for individual mobility is caused by tokenism's inherent ambiguity. Wright notes that token systems can be viewed in two ways. Viewed in a positive light, token systems provide opportunities for members of low status groups to climb the social ladder. Viewed negatively, however, token systems unfairly advantage members of high status groups over members of low status groups. Thus, as Wright has noted, the extent to which members of low status groups perceive and respond to the positive or the negative aspects of the token system should determine their choice between individual and collective action. To understand how members of disadvantaged groups decide between taking collective and individual action, then, we need to understand *how* they come to perceive, and act on the positive or on the negative aspects of the social system. I propose that individuals' regulatory focus should play an important role in this process. Because the activation of promotion focus has been shown to result in a perceptual and behavioral bias towards the positive, individuals

under promotion focus should be likely to act on the *positive* opportunities for individual mobility that token systems offer, and therefore prefer individual mobility over collective action in such situations. By contrast, because activation of prevention focus has been shown to result in a perceptual and behavioral bias towards the negative, individuals under prevention focus should be likely to act on the *negative*, discriminatory aspects of the token system, and can hence be expected to prefer collective action over individual mobility in such situations.

The results of the two studies reported in Chapter 2 of this dissertation showed support for the prediction that adoption of a promotion focus should lead to more engagement in individual action under condition of tokenism than the adoption of a prevention focus. In both studies, the status system was manipulated to be either impermeable or semi-permeable (tokenism). Study 2.1 showed that individuals under chronic promotion focus had stronger preferences for individual action when the social system was semi-permeable than when it was impermeable. Individuals under chronic prevention focus, by contrast, preferred engaging in collective action over engaging in individual action, irrespective of the level of permeability. In Study 2.2 , regulatory focus was manipulated and behavioral measures of individual and collective action were used. The results of this study showed that individuals under induced promotion focus spent more effort on achieving individual mobility and less effort on collective action when the system was partially open than when it was closed. Individuals under induced prevention focus, by contrast, engaged almost exclusively in collective action, irrespective of the level of induced permeability.

Thus, the results of these two experiments showed that, as predicted, the opportunities for individual mobility that are present in token systems cause individuals under promotion focus to engage in individual action and abandon collective efforts aimed at social change. Adoption of a prevention focus, by contrast, was shown to cause individuals to recognize and act on the negative, group-undermining aspects of such token systems and to try and change them through collective action. Thus, in societal contexts in which ambiguity exists surrounding the appropriateness of individual and collective action, adoption of a prevention focus causes individuals to engage in collective action, whereas adoption of a promotion focus causes them to seek individual mobility.

Commitment to Collective Action

As explained earlier, the second point we must take into account to understand disadvantaged group-members' collective action behavior is their commitment to the collective goal (i.e. the extent to which they are willing to bear personal costs in order to further the collective goal). Goal commitment has long been seen as the result of cost-benefit analyses (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). That is, individuals are thought to commit to goals when they highly value these goals, but then only to the extent that they believe these goals can be achieved. This approach has been applied to the study of collective action as well. In general, research investigating this possibility has shown that members of disadvantaged groups tend to commit to collective action to the extent that they place importance on its goal *and* believe that achievement of this goal through collective action is likely (Klandermans, 1984a; 1984b; 1986; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1998; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

However, other research has demonstrated that these instrumental considerations tend to form rather weak predictors of commitment to collective action, and sometimes do not even relate to commitment to collective action at all (Fox-Cardamone, Hinkle & Hogue, 2000; Fox & Schofield, 1989; Kelly, 1993; Schofield & Pavelchak, 1989; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004, 2005; Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jorger, 2003). Thus, members of low status groups may sometimes commit to collective action even though they do not believe that important goals are likely to be achieved through this action.

I will argue here that differences in promotion and prevention focus among the groups and individuals involved in these actions can explain the relative instability of cost-benefit calculations as predictors of commitment to collective action. As explained before, individuals can perceive goals they deem highly important in two qualitatively distinct ways, depending on whether promotion focus or prevention focus is active. More precisely, research has shown that under promotion focus highly important goals are regarded with desire, whereas under prevention focus they are regarded as necessities (Shah & Higgins, 1997; Scholer, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2008; Scholer, Zou,

Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). This means that - assuming they highly value the goal of collective action - individuals under promotion focus would regard this goal as a desire, whereas individuals under prevention focus would regard it as a necessity. Because promotion oriented individuals regard highly important goals with desire, they should commit to these goals when there are opportunities for furthering them (Shah & Higgins, 1997). By contrast, because prevention oriented individuals regard highly important goals as necessities, they should commit to these goals even if the likelihood that they can be achieved is low. This analysis has important consequences for understanding the situations in which individuals commit to collective action. Specifically, it means that individuals under promotion focus should commit to collective action when they believe it will lead to highly valuable outcomes. By contrast, individuals under prevention focus should commit to collective action when they place high importance on its goal (causing them to see the achievement of this goal as necessary), even if the likelihood that this goal will be achieved is low.

The results of the three studies reported in Chapter 3 of this dissertation showed support for these predictions. Studies 3.1 through 3.3 demonstrated that adoption of a promotion focus, whether chronic or experimentally induced, causes individuals to commit to collective action only when the likelihood that through this action important collective goals will be achieved is high. Also as predicted, the results of these studies showed that individuals under prevention focus commit to collective action when they attach high importance to its goal, regardless of the extent to which they believe that attainment of this goal was likely.

Thus, the results of three experimental studies provided support for our prediction that prevention oriented individuals, because they see important goals as necessities, engage in collective action when they place high importance on its goal, even when the likelihood that this action will be successful is low. Furthermore, the results provided support for our prediction that promotion oriented individuals, who construe important goals as desires, become more instrumental in their decision to engage in collective action the more they place importance on its goal, only becoming willing to participate when the likelihood of success is high.

The Choice Between Hostile and Benevolent Collective Action

As explained earlier, the third point we must take into account to understand disadvantaged group-members' collective action behavior is what determines their choice between hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. Specifically, members of low status groups must decide to what extent they are willing to harm the interests of the ones they hold responsible for their group's disadvantage. When this willingness is high, hostile forms of collective action such as sabotage and terrorism may be seen as justified, or even preferred over more benevolent forms of collective action. Previous research has shown that both laypeople and experienced activists view these hostile forms of collective action as clearly different from the more benevolent ones (Corning & Myers, 2002; Lalonde & Cameron, 1994; Lalonde, Stroink, & Aleem, 2002; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Wolfsfeld, Opp, Dietz, & Green, 1994).

What is it then that convinces members of disadvantaged groups that more hostile, aggressive means of action are justified? Although to date there has been little research on this topic, the studies that have been carried out suggest that members of low status groups only turn to hostile collective action when their group lacks the power to improve its position in more benevolent ways, or when it is confronted with exceptionally unfair and immoral treatment (Gurr, 1993; Louis et al., 2011; Spears, Scheepers, & Van Zomeren, 2011; Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh, & Siddiqui, in press; Wright et al., 1990a; 1990b). I will argue here that regulatory focus plays an important role in the willingness of members of disadvantaged groups to engage in hostile forms of collective action. As explained before, activation of a prevention focus leads to the experience of strong motivation as the pursuit of a necessity. When pursuing a necessity, it should not matter *how* a goal is achieved, *as long as it is achieved*. This means that individuals under a prevention focus, when they are convinced of the importance of the collective goal, should come to see the achievement of this goal as a necessity, causing them to see any means as justified in order to reach this necessary goal. Promotion focus, by contrast, should not lead to engagement in hostile forms of collective action: As explained before, activation of a promotion focus leads to initiation of goal-pursuit when opportunities for goal advancement are present, and to inhibition of goal pursuit when no opportunities for

goal advancement are present. Hostile forms of collective action typically arise in situations in which there is very little opportunity to further the collective goal (i.e., when the situation is desperate, Tausch et al., in press). In these situations activation of a promotion focus should thus lead to inhibition of the pursuit of the collective goal, rather than to engagement in hostile forms of collective action.

Support for these predictions was obtained in two studies that are reported in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. In these studies, the extent to which participants held a moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group was measured as an indicator of the importance they attached to collective action aimed at redressing their group's disadvantage (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). The results of the two studies offered support for the prediction that individuals under prevention focus, but not individuals under promotion focus, come to see hostile forms of collective action (i.e. vandalism, sabotage) as justified means when they see the goal of collective action as highly important.

Study 4.1 showed that the extent to which participants attached high moral importance to the goal of gender equality increased their support for both benevolent and hostile forms of collective action, but only among individuals with a strong chronic prevention focus. Promotion focus had no effect of the relation between the extent to which participants attached moral importance to gender equality and support for both types of collective action. The results of Study 4.2 replicated the effects of Study 4.1 and additionally showed that individuals under prevention focus who attach strong moral importance to the goal of collective action come to see the ends as justifying the means. More precisely, the results showed that although for individuals under prevention focus the extent to which they experienced strong moral objections to hostile forms of collective action undermined their support for such forms of collective action, this only happened among prevention oriented individuals that did not attach high moral importance to gender equality. When they attached high moral importance to the goal of gender equality, the strength of prevention oriented participants' moral objections to hostile forms of action had no effect on the support for these forms of action. Neither attaching moral importance to the goal of collective action, nor holding moral objections to hostile collective action affected support for either benevolent or hostile collective action among individuals under promotion focus.

Thus, the results of two studies provided support for our prediction that for individuals under prevention focus who attach high (moral) importance to the goal of collective action, this goal is perceived as a necessity, which causes them to see the ends as justifying the means, paving the way for engagement in hostile forms of collective action. Promotion focus had no comparable effect, suggesting that adoption of a promotion focus, leading to an experience of strong motivation as desire, is not associated with engagement in hostile forms of collective action.

Discussion

Together the results of the 7 studies reported in this dissertation point to prevention focus as the motivational system that is most conducive to collective action. Adoption of a prevention focus causes members of low status groups to work towards group status improvement, even if the permeability of the social system permits (token) members of their group to enter the high status group. Furthermore, individuals under prevention commit to collective action when they place importance on its goal, regardless of the likelihood that through this action important social change will be achieved. Individuals under promotion focus tend to be more instrumental in their responses to group-based disadvantage, only preferring collective action when individual action does not seem to provide a viable alternative path to status improvement and then only committing to collective action to the extent that it is expected to be effective.

To some, the prevention oriented commitment to collective action in situations in which its success seems unlikely might seem futile. However, all social movements have to start somewhere, and the individuals working at the roots of these movements must do so in spite of realizing that success, if possible at all, is very distant. Indeed, adoption of the instrumental mentality that was found to be characteristic of promotion focus seems to preclude engagement in collective action under these circumstances. Engaging in collective action in circumstances under which the ingroup seems to lack the power to change its societal position may be important for another reason as well. In this situation, the fact that the ingroup is relatively powerless (for example because of oppression by a high status outgroup, or by a dictatorial regime) creates a very

compelling reason for engaging in collective action in its own right. The instrumental mentality that is characteristic of promotion focus should lead individuals in these circumstances to accept their group's disadvantaged position. In the light of this, the finding that individuals under prevention focus come to see hostile forms of collective action as justified can be seen as something positive. That is, previous research has shown that members of disadvantaged groups only engage in hostile forms of collective action when they lack the power to change their position in democratic (Gurr, 1993), peaceful (Louis et al., 2011) or normative ways (Tausch et al., 2011). The results of the current studies suggest that it would be individuals under prevention focus, not those under promotion focus, who would be the ones to stand up to the oppression of their group by engaging in hostile forms of collective action in these situations.

Theoretical Implications

The results of the studies reported in this dissertation have important theoretical implications. Specifically, the results show how Regulatory Focus Theory can inform predictions made by Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to Social Identity Theory, three socio-structural variables impact on individuals' collective action behavior: the legitimacy, the stability, and the permeability of the status system (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, 2001b). Legitimacy refers to the bases on which status is distributed. When members of disadvantaged groups see these bases as unfair, and thus see the status system as illegitimate, this increases their motivation to change this system through collective action. Stability refers to the extent to which the status system is open to change. Low levels of societal stability tend to cause members of disadvantaged groups to try and achieve social change through collective action. Permeability refers to the extent to which it is possible for members of disadvantaged groups to raise their status individually. Permeability tends to cause members of disadvantaged groups to pursue individual mobility and to abandon collective efforts towards social change.

The resemblance of these socio-structural variables to the independent variables that were under investigation in the studies reported here makes it possible to integrate our findings with Social Identity Theory. First of all, the results of studies 2.1 and 2.2

showed directly how the opportunities for individual mobility that are offered by semi-permeable status systems cause promotion oriented individuals, not prevention oriented individuals, to prefer individual mobility over collective action. Secondly, the stability of the status system can be considered an important indicator of the likelihood that collective action will succeed that was under investigation in Studies 3.1 through 3.3 (Wright, 2001b; 2009). In this light, the results of Studies 3.1 to 3.3 suggest that that adoption of a promotion focus, but not the adoption of a prevention focus, determines the effects of the instability of the status system on the decision to engage in collective action. Finally, because individuals' perceptions of the illegitimacy of the status system depend on the extent to which status distribution is seen as breaking moral rules about how status should be distributed in society, perceptions of illegitimacy should cause individuals to attach moral value to the goal of collective action. This means that illegitimacy of the status system should motivate engagement in collective action among individuals under prevention focus, not among individuals under promotion focus.

The results of the studies also make it possible to integrate Regulatory Focus Theory with the recent Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA, Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). According to this model, there are three distinct motivational pathways that lead members of low status groups to engage in collective action: the perceived injustice of the social system, the efficacy of their group, and the strength of their identification with the group. The perceived injustice of the social system closely resembles Social Identity Theory's concept of illegitimacy and is thought to motivate members of disadvantaged groups to engage in collective action through the emotion of group-based anger (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). The concept of group-efficacy refers to individuals' belief that their group is able to perform the actions needed to achieve social change, thereby complementing SIT's socio-structural variable of instability as an indicator of the likelihood of social change (Wright, 2001b; 2009). Finally, like SIT, SIMCA specified the extent to which individuals identify with their group as an important predictor of members of disadvantaged groups' willingness to engage in collective action. Since injustice and group-efficacy should strongly inform the moral importance and likelihood of social change respectively, it is possible to integrate Regulatory Focus Theory into SIMCA.

More precisely, the pathway of perceived injustice should cause individuals to attach high moral importance to the goal of collective action and thus motivate engagement in collective action among individuals under prevention focus (see also Sassenberg & Hansen, 2007). Furthermore, the results of the studies discussed here suggest that the motivating effects of group-efficacy should depend on the strength of individuals' promotion focus. At present, it is not yet clear how regulatory focus influences the effect of identification on engagement in collective action, and this question thus forms an interesting avenue for further research.

Practical Implications

The results of the studies discussed in this dissertation also have important practical implications. Specifically, they suggest that in most social circumstances, individuals or groups looking to mobilize others into engaging in collective action would do well to frame their message in terms fitting, or even eliciting, a prevention focus (for example by framing its goal as an "ought", highlighting the negative consequences of failing to achieve social change). The results of the current studies suggest that doing so would motivate members of low status groups to (1) prefer collective action even when individual mobility provides a seemingly alternative route to status improvement, and (2) to commit to collective action even when the likelihood that this action will succeed is low. This finding is important because previous research has identified societal permeability (i.e. tokenism, Wright et al., 1990) and low expectations of success (Hornsey et al., 2006) as important reasons for people to abandon collective efforts to achieve social change.

However, in some exceptional situations, individuals committed to collective action and looking to mobilize others to their cause might do well to frame their message in terms fitting, or eliciting, a promotion focus. For example, if it suddenly becomes apparent to people that, contrary to what was previously believed, social change is possible, then taking advantage of the promotion focus might be very effective. For example, the people of Egypt took to the streets en masse when events in the country of Tunisia made it clear that it was possible to achieve social change through collective effort. Framing mobilizing messages in promotion oriented terms (for

example by framing its goal as an "ideal", highlighting the positive consequences of achieving social change) could be very effective in such situations.

Avenues for Further Research

Even though the present work connected regulatory focus to a broad array of predictors of collective action as well as to different outcome variables related to this form of behavior, there are still more ways in which Regulatory Focus Theory can be integrated with work on collective action. First of all, the current work has not examined the relation between regulatory focus and social identification in the decision to engage in collective action. Work on collective action has shown that politicized identification, the extent to which individuals identify with a social movement or with its goals, forms one of the strongest predictors of engagement in collective action behavior (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Mutele, 2007; Sturmer et al., 1998; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Future research could investigate the role of promotion and prevention focus in the way politicized identification motivates collective action. The results of some recent work suggest that specific moral convictions lie at the heart of politicized identities (e.g. a moral conviction about gender equality forms the core of feminist identification, Zaal, Saab, O'Brien, & Barnett, 2011, but see Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, in press). Connecting these findings to the results of Chapter 4, which showed that moral considerations motivate collective action through the prevention system, would thus suggest that politicized identification motivates collective action through the prevention system as well.

Another interesting possibility for future research lies in further integrating Regulatory Focus Theory with work showing that hostile forms of collective action tend to arise only when more benevolent forms of action are deemed to be ineffective (Gurr, 1993; Louis et al., 2011; Tausch et al., in press). In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I show that individuals under a prevention focus who see the goal of collective action as a necessity come to support the use of hostile forms of collective action. However, supporting hostile collective action does not necessarily imply actual participation in this form of behavior. Furthermore, activation of the prevention focus has been shown to cause individuals to become risk averse (Crowe & Higgins), which could demotivate

prevention oriented individuals from engaging in hostile collective action, as this course of action arguably carries considerable risk. However, there is evidence that individuals under prevention focus are not always risk averse. Specifically, work by Scholer and colleagues (2010) has shown that prevention oriented individuals, when pursuing goals they deem necessities, are willing to take risks when safe avenues for goal achievement are closed. This means that prevention oriented individuals, when they construe the goal of collective action as a necessity, should be willing to personally engage in hostile (risky) forms of collective action when benevolent (safe) avenues towards social change are closed. We are currently in the process of investigating this possibility (Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers & Derks, 2011b).

Conclusion

This dissertation discussed the results of a research program that examined the effects of promotion and prevention focus on when and how members of disadvantaged groups decide to engage in collective action. I argued that to be able to answer these questions, we need to understand (1) how members of disadvantaged groups decide between striving for individual and collective status improvement, (2) how they come to commit to collective action, and (3) how they choose between hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. The results of the 7 studies discussed in this dissertation show that knowledge of individual promotion and prevention focus is crucial for understanding members of low status groups' collective action behavior. Specifically, adoption of a promotion focus was shown to make members of disadvantaged groups instrumental in responding to their group's disadvantage, causing them (1) to prefer individual action over collective action when the social system provided opportunities for token mobility, and (2) to only commit to collective action when the likelihood that this action would be successful was high. Promotion focus was unrelated to support for hostile forms of collective action. Adoption of a prevention focus, by contrast was shown to (1) cause members of low status groups to choose collective action, even when individual mobility provided a different route to status improvement. Furthermore, to the extent that the goal of collective action was seen as important, adoption of a prevention focus was shown (2) to cause members of disadvantaged

groups to commit to collective action, even when the likelihood of social change was low, and (3) to come to see hostile forms of collective action as justified means to reach the collective goal. In sum, the results of the current dissertation show a strong connection between the prevention focus and the decision to engage in different forms of collective action.

A note to the reader

The empirical chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 2 to 4) were written as separate journal articles in collaboration with Colette van Laar, Tomas Ståhl, Naomi Ellemers and Belle Derks. As a result, these chapters have been written in the first-person plural and may show some overlap in places. Footnotes are included at the end of each chapter.

Chapter 2.

Responding to tokenism: How promotion and prevention focus affect commitment to collective and individual status improvement [1]

Introduction

Despite strong endorsement of meritocracy beliefs (Ellemers & Van Laar, 2010) in reality most societies offer less opportunities for advancement to members of low status groups (e.g. women, ethnic minorities) than to members of high status groups (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). In these systems (called token systems) social status is distributed partly based on individual merit and partly based on group membership (Wright et al., 1990). This mix between meritocracy and discrimination implies that token systems are ambiguous, and makes it unclear for members of low status groups whether they should try to take advantage of the positive, meritocratic aspects of the social system and pursue individual status improvement, or whether they should address the negative, discriminatory aspects of the system through group status improvement (Wright, 1997). In the current research we investigate how members of disadvantaged groups respond to this ambiguity. We contribute to current insights by connecting knowledge about tokenism with reasoning derived from Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997). We argue that because individuals under promotion focus tend to act upon the positive aspects of a situation, they should be motivated to exploit the advancement opportunities token systems offer and seek individual status improvement. We predict prevention-oriented individuals to be more likely to act on the negative - discriminatory - aspects of the token system. They should therefore be more inclined to pursue collective status improvement.

In the next section, we will explain how the ambiguity of token systems makes it difficult for members of low status groups to decide between pursuing individual or group status improvement. We then connect these concerns to insights derived from Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997) to explain how this helps predict and understand when and why members of low status opt for individual or collective status improvement under token conditions.

Responding to Tokenism

In most societies, a person's social status is not only based on individual merit, but also on group membership (cf. Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Wright et al., 1990).

As a result, members of low status groups tend to receive fewer opportunities for individual status improvement than members of high status groups (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 1998; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan, & Dolnik, 2000; Wright et al., 1990; Wright & Taylor, 1998; 1999). For example, discriminatory practices in hiring and promotion have been shown to make it more difficult for women and ethnic minorities (compared to men and ethnic majorities) to climb the social ladder and raise their status individually (Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia, & Vanneman, 2001; Crow, Folk, & Hartman, 1998; Morrison, & White, 1988; Schwarz, 1971). Social systems in which status improvement opportunities are based both on merit and on group membership, are called token systems and can be distinguished from fully open systems, in which status distribution is based completely on individual merit, as well as closed systems, in which status distribution is completely based on group membership (Wright et al., 1990). Thus, although token systems offer some opportunities for members of low status groups to achieve higher status individually, they still are discriminatory in that they structurally offer more opportunities to members of high status groups.

Token systems thus create ambiguity for members of low status groups regarding the most appropriate way to behave, because they encompass positive, meritocratic features as well as negative, discriminatory characteristics (Wright, 1997). In this way, tokenism creates a dilemma for members of low status groups, as they have to decide whether to exploit the opportunities offered by the social system – and exert effort to raise their personal standing – or to address the discriminatory aspects of the social system - by working towards group status improvement. Our current aim is to examine how individuals decide between pursuing individual or group status improvement under these conditions. Understanding these types of responses to meritocratic status systems is important, not only to predict the strategies specific individuals are likely to follow to pursue status improvement, but also because of the more profound societal consequences of such responses, which can range from acceptance of the social system to rebellion against it.

To anticipate low status group members' preferences for individual-level or group-level status improvement in token systems we need to understand how they make sense of the ambiguity present in such systems (Wright, 1997). This ambiguity allows

individuals to view token systems in two ways. Viewed positively, token systems provide members of low status groups with opportunities for individual status improvement. Viewed negatively however, token systems unfairly disadvantage members of low status groups. To be able to predict how members of low status groups decide between pursuing individual or collective status improvement under conditions of tokenism, one therefore needs to understand how they perceive and respond to the positive and negative aspects of this system (Danaher & Branscombe, 2010; Richard & Wright, 2010; Wright, 1997).

In the next section we introduce regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) as a novel approach to the psychology of tokenism. We argue that adoption of a promotion or a prevention focus is relevant in this sense, as this biases individuals towards acting on the positive or the negative aspects of the token system. This in turn should determine the choice they make between striving for individual or group status improvement.

The Self-regulation of Responding to Tokenism

Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) distinguishes between two motivational systems that regulate goal-directed behavior: promotion focus and prevention focus. Promotion and prevention focus serve different needs and differentially affect the way goals are construed and subsequently pursued. Promotion and prevention focus vary in strength both chronically across individuals and momentarily across situations (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, & Ayduk, 2001). Promotion focus functions to serve the need for gowth and accomplishment. Under promotion focus, motivation is experienced as desire, causing success during goal-pursuit to be seen as more positive than failure is seen as negative (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Shah & Higgins, 1997). As a consequence, individuals under promotion focus are strategically inclined to approach positive outcomes, rather than avoiding negative outcomes (Crowe and Higgins, 1997). Prevention focus, by contrast, functions to serve the need for safety and security. Under prevention focus, motivation is experienced as necessity, causing failure of goal-pursuit to be seen as more negative than success is seen as positive. Consequently, adoption of

a prevention focus leads to the strategic inclination to avoid negative outcomes, rather than approaching positive outcomes.

In view of the specific characteristics of these two motivational systems, we argue that activation of a promotion or prevention focus should have important consequences for the way members of low status groups respond to the ambiguity present in token systems and, consequently, for their decision to pursue individual or group status improvement. Because promotion-oriented individuals are strategically inclined to approach positive outcomes they should primarily base their actions on positive aspects of the token system. Likewise, because prevention-oriented individuals are strategically inclined to avoid negative outcomes, their actions should mainly respond to the negative aspects of this system. This bias towards the use of positive or negative cues for action should have especially strong effects in ambiguous situations (i.e. weak situations, Snyder & Ickes, 1985) such as tokenism, where the positive aspects of the situation motivate a fundamentally different course of action than the negative ones. Put differently, when under promotion focus, members of low status groups should be particularly sensitive to the positive aspects of the token system (i.e. the opportunities for individual mobility it provides) and become willing to engage in individual action. When under prevention focus however, members of low status groups should base their behavior on the negative aspects of the token situation (i.e. its restricted nature), causing them to see collective action as the more appropriate course of action. We thus predict that under conditions of tokenism the adoption of a promotion focus should lead to more engagement in efforts towards individual status improvement and less engagement in efforts towards group status improvement than the adoption of a prevention focus. Importantly, when there is no ambiguity about the properties of the situation (e.g., in completely closed conditions) there is no reason to anticipate that action preferences depend on regulatory focus as there is less room for interpretation that would bring to the fore differential sensitivity to specific aspects of the situation.

Overview of the Present Research

Two studies were conducted to test our prediction that regulatory focus determines whether members of low status groups pursue individual or group status improvement under conditions of tokenism. A paradigm was used in which participants were members of a low status group that engaged in a competition with a higher status group. We used different ways to examine our predictions. In Study 2.1, regulatory focus was assessed as a chronic individual difference variable, and participant were asked to indicate their preferences for individual vs. group status improvement. In Study 2.2 , regulatory focus was experimentally manipulated and we assessed actual efforts towards achieving individual and group status improvement. In both studies the permeability of group boundaries was experimentally induced. We contrasted our focal condition where token permeability was allowed with a control condition where group boundaries were completely closed.

Study 2.1

Method

Participants and Design

Eighty-eight female students from Leiden university (M_{age} = 21.65, *SD* = 4.09) participated in this study in exchange for €4.50 or course credit. Promotion vs. prevention focus was assessed as an individual difference variable before the experiment. We manipulated group boundary permeability (closed vs. token) in a between-participants design. Participants' preferences for individual vs. group status improvement served as the dependent variable.

Procedure

Participants were told that they would be taking part in two unrelated studies: a short survey and an experiment. The short survey consisted of our pre-measure of regulatory focus. We measured participants' chronic prevention (α = .81) and promotion focus (α = .68) using the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001) and created a regulatory focus dominance measure by

subtracting the standardized prevention scores from the standardized promotion scores. High scores on this variable indicate a dominant promotion focus, low scores a dominant prevention focus (cf. Sassenberg, Jonas, Shah & Brazy, 2007).

Participants were then informed that the first study was completed and that the second study would now commence. This part of the experiment was introduced as a study on competition between groups. To create different groups, all participants were (ostensibly at random) assigned to a team of 4 individuals (Team B), and told that they were going to compete with another team of 4 (Team A). In reality, no teams were formed and all participants worked individually throughout the entire experiment. To increase involvement in the competition, participants were informed that the winning team would get to take part in a fun and interesting task following the experiment, whereas the losing team would have to take part in a more tedious task (Wright et al., 1990). Participants were then told that the competition would consist of two rounds: a preliminary and a final. To allow for the later manipulation of permeability, participants were informed that the team that would win the preliminary would get the chance to influence the rules of the final.

At this point the preliminary commenced. This round consisted of an anagram-task. Participants tried to solve as many five-letter anagrams (e.g. KTAES [SKATE]) as possible in 3 minutes. To create a status difference between the teams, all participants were then informed that their team had solved slightly less anagrams than the other team and that they had thus lost the preliminary (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993).

To introduce the manipulation of permeability (cf. Ellemers et al., 1997; Wright et al., 1990), participants were told that team A, because it had won the preliminary, would now get to decide whether or not to let one member of the participant's team join team A after the final. If team A would allow this, it was explained, then the members of the participant's team would each have to choose between working for their group (to win the final as a team) and working individually (to gain entry into team A) during the final. If team A would not allow a member of team B to enter their team, participants were told, then they would have no other option but to work for their team if they wanted to win the competition. Finally, all participants were informed that working for themselves during the final would not help their team win the competition, and that

working for their team during the final would not increase their chances of individually entering team A.

At this point the *permeability* of the status difference between the two groups was manipulated. In the *closed* condition, participants were informed that team A had decided not to give the members of Team B the chance to enter team A. In the *token* condition, participants were informed that Team A had decided to let the member of Team B with the highest individual score in the finale enter Team A. Participants were then asked to answer some questions before the final round of the competition would commence. These were the dependent variables.

Measures

All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 9 (*completely agree*).

Manipulation check. The effectiveness of the manipulation of permeability was checked with two items (e.g. “It is possible for a member of my team to enter team A”, $r(88) = .90$, $p < .001$).

Preference for individual vs. group status improvement was measured with six items (e.g. “I intend to solve as many anagrams as possible for myself during the final”, “I intend to solve as many anagrams as possible for my team during the final” [reverse scored], $\alpha = .78$). High scores on this variable indicate a preference for individual status improvement over group status improvement. Participants were then informed that the experiment was finished and the final round of the competition would not take place. They were then fully debriefed, thanked and paid.

Results

Manipulation Check

As intended, an ANOVA on the manipulation check showed that participants in the token condition viewed the intergroup structure as more permeable ($M = 7.35$, $SD = 1.11$) than participants in the closed condition ($M = 3.27$, $SD = 2.56$, $F[1, 87] = 89.51$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .51$).

Preferences for individual vs. group status improvement

Participants' preferences for pursuing individual rather than group status improvement were analyzed using hierarchical linear regression. In step 1, the effect-coded manipulation of permeability (-1 for the closed condition, 1 for the token condition) and the standardized regulatory focus measure were entered. Their interaction term was entered in step 2. The results revealed the predicted interaction between the manipulation of permeability and regulatory focus, $B = 0.37$, $SE = 0.12$, $F(1, 84) = 9.78$, $p = .002$, $\Delta R^2 = .09$, see Figure 2.1. As expected, simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) showed that, in the token condition, chronic promotion focus dominance increased participants' preferences for pursuing individual status improvement over group status improvement, $B = 0.52$, $SE = 0.17$, $F(1, 84) = 9.27$, $p = .002$.,There was no such effect of regulatory focus in the closed condition, $B = -0.22$, $SE = 0.16$, $F(1, 84) = 1.79$, $p = .18$.



Figure 2.1. Individual (vs. group) status improvement strategies as a function of chronic regulatory focus and permeability (Study 2.1).

Discussion

Study 2.1 offered preliminary evidence for our prediction regarding the effect of regulatory focus on the choice between pursuing individual and group status improvement in token systems. As predicted, under conditions of token permeability,

promotion-oriented individuals preferred to pursue more individual status improvement and less group status improvement than individuals under prevention focus. Also as predicted, no such effect of regulatory focus was found when the status hierarchy was closed. Thus, under conditions of token permeability, the adoption of a promotion focus seems to cause members of low status groups to prefer seeking individual status improvement over group status improvement.

This study thus offers initial evidence for our predictions but also has some limitations. First, self-declared preferences for pursuing individual vs. group status improvement that served as the dependent variable in Study 2.1 do not necessarily imply *actual engagement* in efforts towards individual or group status improvement. Second, because regulatory focus was assessed as a chronic individual difference variable in this study, alternative explanations for these results (e.g., due to a third variable that covaries with chronic promotion vs. prevention orientation) can not be ruled out. To be able to draw more unequivocal conclusions, but also with an eye on designing interventions, it would be important to know whether or not the situational adoption of a focus on promotion vs. prevention actually has a causal effect on commitment to individual and group status improvement under token conditions. This is why Study 2.2 included a manipulation of regulatory focus and behavioral measures of engagement in efforts towards individual and group status improvement.

Study 2.2

Method

Participants and Design

Fifty-nine students from Leiden University (51 women, M_{age} = 20.39, *SD* = 5.12) participated in this study in exchange for €4.50 or course credit. They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion or prevention) X 2 (permeability: closed vs. token) experiment. Engagement in efforts towards individual and group status improvement served as the dependent variables.

Procedure

Study 2.2 employed the same procedure as Study 2.1, with the exception of the added manipulation of regulatory focus and the behavioral measures of efforts towards individual and group status improvement. In the first part, we manipulated regulatory focus with an adapted version of the procedure suggested by Higgins and colleagues (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; see also Zaal, Van Laar, Stahl, Ellemers, & Derks, in press, a; in press, b). Participants wrote about what they would ideally like to achieve (*promotion condition*) or felt they ought to achieve (*prevention condition*) in their working life. According to Higgins and colleagues (1994) the priming of ideals leads individuals to adopt a promotion focus, whereas the priming of oughts causes them to adopt a prevention focus. Participants were then informed that the first part of the experiment was completed and that the second part of the experiment would commence. The procedure of the second part of the experiment was the same as in Study 2.1 up to the measurement of the dependent variables.

Measures

The manipulation check of permeability consisted of the same two items as in Study 2.1 ($r(59) = .79$, $p < .001$).

The *perceived difficulty of the anagram task* was measured as a control variable using two items (e.g. "I think the anagram task is very difficult/not difficult at all [reverse scored]", $r(59) = .71$, $p < .001$).

Manipulation check of regulatory focus. The time participants needed to report their (promotion- and prevention-related) emotional states was measured to serve as the check of the regulatory focus manipulation. According to Shah and Higgins (2001), individuals under promotion focus are faster at appraising how cheerful or dejected a stimulus makes them feel, whereas individuals under prevention focus are faster at appraising how quiescent or agitated a stimulus makes them feel. We thus measured participants' promotion-related (*dejection and cheerfulness*) and prevention-related (*agitation and quiescence*) emotions using six items and recorded the time they needed to indicate their answers. We created a measure of regulatory focus by subtracting the mean log-transformed response-times on the promotion emotions items from the mean log-transformed response-times on the prevention emotion items. High scores on this

variable indicate dominant promotion focus, low scores dominant prevention focus (Zaal et al., in press, a).

In contrast to Study 2.1, Study 2.2 also included the final round of the competition. During this round participants had four minutes to solve five-letter anagrams. Before attempting to solve each anagram, participants had to decide whether they wanted to solve this anagram for their personal benefit (to gain entry into Team A) or for the benefit of their team (to win the group competition against Team A). The number of anagrams participants solved for their team and for themselves were recorded and served as the measures of effort invested in individual and group status improvements (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008). Finally, all participants were debriefed, thanked and paid.

Results

Analyses

Both manipulation checks were analyzed with ANOVAs using the manipulations of permeability and regulatory focus as independent variables. Engagement in effort towards individual and group status improvement were analyzed with separate ANCOVAs using the manipulations of permeability and regulatory focus as independent variables and the perceived difficulty of the anagram task as a covariate.[2] Significant interactions were further analyzed with simple effects analyses (Aiken & West, 1991).

Manipulation checks

As intended, the intergroup boundary was seen as more permeable in the token condition (M = 7.16, SD =1.60) than in the closed condition (M = 1.77, SD = 1.37, F[1, 57] = 187.17, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .77$). No other effects emerged (p's > .68). Also as intended, the results of an ANOVA revealed faster responding on the promotion (compared to prevention) emotion items in the promotion condition (M = 0.69, SD = 1.24) than in the prevention condition (M = -.58, SD = 1.56, F[1, 50] = 4.60, p = .04, η^2 = .08).[3] No other effects emerged (p's > .83). Thus, both manipulations were successful.

Effort towards individual status improvement

The results revealed the predicted interaction between the manipulations of regulatory focus and permeability on the number of anagrams participants solved for themselves, $F(1, 54) = 4.44$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$, see Figure 2.2. Analyses showed that in the token condition, induction of a promotion focus caused participants to engage in more efforts aimed at individual status improvement than induction of a prevention focus, $B = 2.64$, $SE = 0.85$, $F(1, 54) = 9.72$, $p = .003$. No effect of regulatory focus on engagement in effort towards individual status improvement was found in the closed condition, $B = 0.16$, $SE = 0.81$, $F(1, 54) < 1$, $p = .84$.



Figure 2.2. Effort towards individual status improvement as a function of the manipulations of permeability and regulatory focus (Study 2.2).

Effort towards group status improvement

The results revealed the predicted interaction between the manipulations of permeability and regulatory focus on the number of anagrams participants solved for their team, $F(1, 54) = 4.78$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$, see Figure 2.3. Analyses showed that in the token condition induction of a prevention focus caused participants to spend more effort on group status improvement than induction of a promotion focus, $B = -4.44$, $SE = 1.19$, $F(1, 54) = 13.87$, $p < .001$. No effect of regulatory focus on engagement in effort towards group status improvement was found in the closed condition, $B = -0.82$, $SE = 1.14$, $F(1, 54) < 1$, $p = .47$.

Discussion

Study 2.2 replicated the results of Study 2.1 and extended them by employing a manipulation (instead of a measure) of regulatory focus and by using behavioral measures of efforts towards individual and group status improvement. The results provided further evidence for the prediction that adoption of a promotion focus leads members of low status groups to pursue individual status improvement instead of group status improvement under conditions of tokenism. The adoption of a prevention focus, by contrast, was shown to cause individuals to commit to group status improvement, even when there were opportunities for individual status improvement as implied in the token system.



Figure 2.3. Effort towards group status improvement as a function of the manipulations of permeability and regulatory focus (Study 2.2).

General Discussion

The current research was designed to investigate the role of regulatory focus in the choice between pursuing individual and group status improvement. Connecting existing insights on token systems with a self-regulation perspective allowed us to provide important new insights into how members of low status groups respond to token

systems in which access to the benefits associated with high social status is restricted. According to earlier work (Danaher & Branscombe, 2010; Wright, 1997), token systems are ambiguous and individuals' choices between pursuing personal or group status improvement in these situations depend on whether they recognize, and act on, the positive aspects or the negative aspects of this ambiguous system. Acting on the positive aspects of the token system, such as the fact that it offers low status group members some opportunities for individual status improvement, leads to the pursuit of individual mobility as a status enhancement strategy. By contrast, acting on the negative, discriminatory aspects of token systems leads to the adoption of collective action as a status enhancement strategy. In the current research, we proposed that promotion and prevention focus represent important mechanisms through which members of low status groups make sense of tokenism's ambiguity. We argued that, compared to those under prevention focus, individuals under promotion focus should be more inclined to base their actions on the positive aspects of the token system and hence should be more likely to engage in efforts towards individual status improvement while they tend to commit less effort towards group status improvement in such token systems. Conversely, we argued that individuals under prevention focus should be more likely than individuals under promotion focus to act on the negative aspects of the system and, consequently, to pursue group status improvement.

To investigate this prediction we used a paradigm in which participants were assigned to an experimentally created low status group that engaged in a competition with a high status outgroup. In Study 2.1 we assessed chronic individual differences in promotion and prevention focus prior to the experiment, manipulated the permeability (closed vs. token) of the high status group's boundary and measured preferences for individual vs. group status improvement as a dependent variable. In Study 2.2, we manipulated regulatory focus as well as the possibility of entering the high status outgroup, and measured actual engagement in efforts directed towards individual and group status improvement. Importantly, because of the experimental nature of the studies and the behavioral nature of the dependent variables employed, we can draw firm causal conclusions about actual engagement in efforts towards individual and group status improvement.

As predicted, under conditions of tokenism participants spent more effort on pursuing individual status improvement and less effort on pursuing group status improvement when promotion focus was chronically dominant (Study 2.1) or experimentally induced (Study 2.2) than when prevention focus was chronically dominant or experimentally induced. No such differences between individuals with a promotion vs. prevention focus were found when the situation was unambiguous – because the boundary of the high status group was closed.

These results have clear implications for both the theory and practice of collective action. First of all, the current research shows that the adoption of a prevention focus can ensure commitment to collective action even in situations in which an individual mobility strategy also appears a seemingly viable alternative strategy towards status improvement. This finding adds to other work that links prevention focus to collective action. More precisely, this work has shown that adoption of a prevention focus (compared to adoption of a promotion focus) makes individuals willing to engage in collective action even when the chances of this action leading to the desired outcome are low (Zaal et al., in press, a). Furthermore, this prior research has shown that prevention-oriented individuals committed to collective action also become willing to engage in more hostile forms of action (Zaal et al., in press, b). Thus, by showing that activation of the prevention focus causes individuals to commit to group status improvement, even when opportunities for individual status improvement exist, the results of the current work complement existing work linking the prevention focus to engagement in collective action.

The current data also have important implications for the practice of collective action. More specifically, they suggest that individuals interested in mobilizing others to the cause of group status improvement in token systems would do well to frame their messages in prevention-oriented terms (e.g. by presenting their goals as oughts rather than ideals). This should lead the targets of such messages to adopt a prevention focus, making it less likely that they will be seduced by the possibility of individual status improvement and abandon efforts towards group status improvement. By contrast, framing the collective action's goal in promotion-oriented terms (e.g. by framing it as an ideal) should be less effective, as this should cause those who consider supporting

the group to adopt a promotion focus and put them at risk of being lured away from engaging in collective action by the possibility of individual status improvement.

Conclusion

The results of two experiments showed that adoption of a promotion focus leads members of a low status group to pursue individual status improvement under conditions of token permeability, whereas the adoption of a prevention focus causes them to pursue group status improvement. No effects of promotion and prevention focus were observed when the properties of the status system were unambiguous, as group boundaries were closed. These results show how recognizing the distinction between promotion and prevention orientations can help us understand how low status group members make sense of token situations, as they focus on different situational aspects and the (im-)possibilities for status improvement these imply as a way to decide which course of action to adopt.

Footnotes

[1] This chapter is based on Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, and Derks (2011a)

[2] The measures of engagement in efforts towards group and individual status improvement would be interdependent when all participants would complete the same number of anagrams. Instead, these two measures were only modestly correlated ($r(59) = -.44$, $p < .001$), indicating that effort exerted not only refers to the choices made for each anagram (i.e., to work at individual vs. group status improvement) but also to the number of anagrams solved during the four minutes they were allotted. To make sure that these differences were due to participants' level of motivation, not their level of ability, we controlled for perceived difficulty of the anagram task in these analyses.

[3] Although we analyzed the log-transformed mean response latencies, we report the untransformed mean response latencies and their standard deviations (in seconds) here in order to facilitate interpretation of the results.

Chapter 3.

Social change as an important goal or likely outcome:
How regulatory focus affects commitment to collective action [4]

Introduction

Sometimes members of disadvantaged groups are willing to face overwhelming odds to improve their group's position. An example is the recent uprising in Burma. Although the Burmese regime - a military junta - violently quashes any threat to its power and protest has very little chance of success, still in 2007 hundreds of thousands of Burmese citizens took to the streets to protest against their government. At other times, people's motivation to engage in collective action appears more instrumental; they participate only when they believe that collective action will help achieve social change. For example, in the context of union activism, the perceived likelihood that collective action will achieve its desired goal has been found to be a strong predictor of participation in collective action (Flood, 1993; Klandermans, 1984a, 1984b, 1986). Thus, previous work has established that some instances of collective action are driven by the perceived likelihood that they will succeed, whereas others are driven by the importance attached to their goal (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & Van Dijk, 2009). Building on these insights, the purpose of the present research is to examine *when* and *why* collective action is driven by instrumental motives or by the perceived importance of its goal. More specifically, we aim to address this question using insights from regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997; Shah & Higgins, 1997). We will show that for individuals under promotion focus, the motivation to engage in collective action is driven by the likelihood that through this action important social change will be achieved. By contrast, we will show that for individuals under prevention focus the motivation to engage in collective action is unaffected by the likelihood of social change, provided its goal is deemed sufficiently important.

In the next section, we will discuss existing work on the motivation to engage in collective action. We then introduce regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) and explain how insights relevant to self-regulation can advance our understanding of individual motivation to engage in collective action.

Individual Motivation to Engage in Collective Action

Collective action - cooperative effort towards group goals - can be a powerful instrument for low status groups to increase their social status (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Previous research has demonstrated that perceiving one's group as being disadvantaged increases an individual's motivation to engage in collective action aimed at improving the group's relative position (Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2002; Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Thus, the disadvantaged position of a social group is likely to increase the importance group members attach to social change and to elicit their motivation to engage in collective action.

Nevertheless, even when they recognize the disadvantaged position of their group, members of low status groups do not always perceive collective action as an attractive option (Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright & Taylor, 1998). One reason for this is that they may not believe that collective action will result in the desired social change. Research exploring this possibility has found that the perceived likelihood that collective action will result in social change generally increases the motivation to engage in collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). However, there are also a number of studies that have failed to find support for this relationship (e.g., Fox-Cardamone, Hinkle & Hogue, 2000; Fox & Schofield, 1989; Schofield & Pavelchak, 1989). Likewise, research among real-world collective activists has not consistently shown that the perceived likelihood of social change is a strong predictor of enduring commitment to collective action (Kelly, 1993; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004, 2005; Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jorger, 2003). Thus, individuals' commitment to collective action is not always determined by how likely they perceive that through this action important social change will be achieved. This raises the question as to when individuals commit to collective action, and why sometimes they may be willing to do so regardless of the perceived likelihood that this action will lead to social change. We propose that the principles outlined by regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) can help answer this question.

A Self-regulation Approach to Engagement in Collective Action

Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between two motivational systems that regulate goal-directed behaviour: promotion focus and prevention focus. Activation of the promotion and prevention foci differentially affects the way in which goals are construed (i.e. as ideals or as oughts respectively), the preferred strategies for pursuing these goals (i.e. through approach or avoidance), and the emotional reactions associated with success and failure (cheerfulness and dejection vs. quiescence and agitation). The strength of promotion and prevention focus varies both chronically across individuals and momentarily across situations (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, & Ayduk, 2001). Adoption of a promotion focus indicates a concern with gain and the achievement of growth and accomplishment goals. Individuals under promotion focus construe goals as ideals, or as maximal goals that they would ideally like to accomplish, and initiate goal pursuit when they perceive opportunities for goal-advancement (Shah & Higgins, 1997). By contrast, a prevention focus indicates a concern with safety and the fulfilment of duties and responsibilities. Individuals under prevention focus construe goals as "oughts", or as minimal goals that should be accomplished, and initiate goal-pursuit out of a sense of necessity (Shah & Higgins, 1997).

We connect to current insights on promotion and prevention orientation to predict when, and for which individuals, the importance and/or the likelihood of social change motivate engagement in collective action aimed at achieving this change. Individuals under promotion focus should be inclined to construe social change as a maximal aspiration they would ideally like to accomplish, which affords them flexibility in waiting for opportunities for goal advancement. As a result, individuals under promotion focus initiate goal-pursuit based on opportunity for goal-advancement rather than out of necessity (Shah & Higgins, 1997). Thus, when social change increases in perceived importance, individuals under promotion focus should therefore become more attentive to opportunities for attaining this goal. Provided they believe that social change is important, individuals under promotion focus should be motivated to engage in collective action by the perception that achievement of its goal is likely (*Hypothesis 1*).

By contrast, under prevention orientation, individuals should construe social change as a minimally acceptable outcome. When such a minimal goal increases in importance, it becomes a necessity that must be pursued regardless of the expected outcome (Shah & Higgins, 1997). Thus, individuals under prevention orientation should construe the achievement of highly important social change as a necessity, which should cause them to pursue this change, even if the likelihood that it will be achieved is low. When the perceived importance of social change is relatively low (i.e., when social change is not seen as a necessity), prevention oriented individuals should be more sensitive to the likelihood of social change in their decision to engage in collective action. In this case investing in unsuccessful collective action should represent a loss of time and effort, whereas engagement in successful collective action should be considered a safe investment. Thus we predict that individuals under prevention focus should be motivated to pursue social change when they see it as highly important. This should be the case even if the perceived likelihood that this goal will be achieved is low. When social change is deemed relatively unimportant, individuals under prevention focus should only be motivated to engage in collective action to the extent that they believe that the likelihood of social change is high (*Hypothesis 2*).

Overview of the Present Research

To test these predictions we conducted three studies. We used a paradigm in which women were made aware of the unfair treatment of their gender-group in work situations. They were told that because of gender discrimination, women earn less and receive fewer opportunities for job-advancement than men. To give participants the possibility to take a stance against this discrimination, a collective action group was then introduced (in actuality this group was fictitious). The extent to which the participants were actually willing to commit themselves to collective action was measured through the support they gave to the collective action group on its (bogus) website.

Across the three studies we used different ways to examine the prediction that regulatory focus influences the way in which the importance and likelihood of social change affect commitment to collective action. In Study 3.1, we assessed chronic

individual differences in regulatory focus and naturally occurring variations in the perceived importance of the collective action group's goal, while manipulating the likelihood that the goal would be reached. In Study 3.2, we assessed chronic individual differences in regulatory focus in a different way and experimentally manipulated both the importance of the group's goal and the likelihood that this goal would be achieved. Finally, In Study 3.3 we manipulated regulatory focus, and assessed naturally occurring differences in the importance of the group's goal and perceived likelihood that the goal would be achieved. Thus, across the three studies all independent variables were manipulated at least once, allowing us to rule out alternative causal interpretations of the results. In all three studies participants' commitment to collective action served as the dependent variable.

Study 3.1

Method

Participants and Design

Eighty-two female undergraduate students from Leiden University (M_{age} = 19.65, *SD* = 2.33), participated in exchange for €3 or course credit. They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a one-factor (likelihood that the collective action group would reach its goal: high vs. low) between-participants design. Participants' chronic regulatory focus and the importance they placed on the goal of the collective action group were measured and treated as independent variables. Commitment to collective action formed the dependent variable.

Procedure

Participants were told that they would be taking part in two unrelated studies: a short survey and an experiment. The survey consisted of the pre-measure of regulatory focus. Participants' chronic promotion and prevention focus were assessed with the RFQ-Proverb Questionnaire (Van Stekelenburg, 2006). Six items assessed promotion strength (e.g., "Nothing ventured, nothing gained.", α = .75) and six items prevention strength (e.g., "Cobbler, stick to thy last, α = .54). We created a regulatory focus dominance measure by subtracting the standardized scores on the prevention scale from

the standardized scores on the promotion scale (Keller & Bless, 2006; Sassenberg, Jonas, Shah & Brazy, 2007). High values on this measure indicated a dominant promotion focus; low values a dominant prevention focus.

Participants were then informed that the first study was completed and that the second study would now commence. Subsequently, participants read a research report supposedly written by two well-known Dutch research organizations. In reality, this report was constructed to make participants aware of the disadvantaged position of their group (women) in work situations. Participants read that women earn approximately 7 percent less than men for the same work, and receive fewer opportunities for job advancement. Finally, participants read a pamphlet in which a collective action group presented a plan to counter the discrimination women face in work situations (in actuality the group was fictitious). In the pamphlet the collective action group asked the participants to indicate their support on its website.

To manipulate the likelihood that the collective action group would reach its goal, we varied the contents of the research report and the collective action group's pamphlet. In the high likelihood condition, participants read that initiatives against gender discrimination in work situations tend to have considerable effects and that the collective action group expected to achieve its goals. In the low likelihood condition, participants read that initiatives against gender discrimination in work situations tend to be low in success and that the collective action group expected the achievement of its goals to be quite difficult.

Measures

All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 9 (*completely agree*), unless otherwise indicated.

Manipulation check. The perceived likelihood that the collective action group would be successful was measured with a single item ("I think the collective action group will be successful in its struggle against gender discrimination in work situations").

The importance participants attached to the goal of the collective action group was measured with four items (e.g., "I think it's very important to counter gender discrimination in work situations", $M = 7.43$, $SD = 0.92$, $\alpha = .85$).

Commitment to collective action. Participants were then connected to the (fictitious) website of the collective action group. There they could choose to support the collective action group by 1) signing a petition, 2) becoming a member of the group, and/or 3) signing up for participation in a demonstration by the group against gender discrimination. These items were constructed to measure collective action at increasing levels of commitment, thus forming a cumulative Guttman scale (Guttman, 1947). Analyses confirmed the Guttman nature of the scale.[5] Therefore, we summed the number of ways in which each participant chose to support the collective action group to form the measure of commitment to collective action (Green, 1956; Kelloway & Barling, 1993).

Results

Manipulation Check

As intended, an ANOVA on the manipulation check showed that participants in the high likelihood condition expected the collective action group to be significantly more successful (M = 6.93, SD = 1.03) than participants in the low likelihood condition (M = 6.34, SD = 0.99, $F(1, 87) = 6.85$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$).

Commitment to collective action

The data for the commitment to collective action measure were analyzed with hierarchical multiple regression using the effect-coded likelihood manipulation, the standardized regulatory focus dominance and importance scales and their two- and three-way interactions as predictors. The three-way interaction between the likelihood manipulation and the regulatory focus dominance and importance scales was significant ($B = .26$, $SE = .08$, $F(1, 74) = 11.55$, $p = .001$, $\Delta R^2 = .12$). We used simple slope analysis to break down this three-way interaction (Aiken & West, 1991). The results revealed the predicted interaction between the importance of the collective action group's goal and the likelihood that this goal would be achieved among individuals under promotion focus ($B = .34$, $SE = .10$, $F(1, 74) = 11.85$, $p < .001$, Figure 3.1). As expected (*Hypothesis 1*), for individuals under promotion focus who placed high importance (+1 SD) on the goal of the collective action group, commitment to collective action was higher in the high likelihood condition than in the low likelihood condition

(*B* = .30, *SE* = .12, *F*(1, 74) = 6.75, *p* = .01). When they placed low importance (-1 SD) on the goal of the collective action group, commitment to collective action was actually lower in the high likelihood condition than in the low likelihood condition (*B* = -.39, *SE* = .15, *F*(1, 74) = 6.80, *p* = .01).



Figure 3.1. Commitment to collective action as a function of the importance of social change and the manipulation of the likelihood of social change for individuals with a dominant promotion orientation (Study 3.1).



Figure 3.2. Commitment to collective action as a function of the importance of social change and the manipulation of the likelihood of social change for individuals with a dominant prevention orientation (Study 3.1).

For individuals under prevention focus the results revealed a different interaction between importance and likelihood (*B* = -.18, *SE* = .10, *F*(1, 74) = 3.58, *p* = .06, Figure 3.2). As predicted (*Hypothesis 2*), when individuals under prevention focus placed high

importance on the goal of the collective action group, there was no effect of the likelihood that the collective action group would be successful (B = -.13, SE = .13, F(1, 74) = 0.99, p = .32). Only individuals under prevention focus who placed low importance (-1 SD) on the goal displayed slightly more commitment to collective action in the high likelihood condition than in the low likelihood condition (B = .24, SE = .14, F(1, 74) = 3.15, p = .08).

Discussion

The results of this first study offer support for the prediction that regulatory focus influences how the importance and likelihood of social change affect individuals' motivation to engage in collective action. As expected, for individuals under a dominant promotion focus, the likelihood that collective action would be successful increased commitment to collective action, provided that its goal was seen as important. By contrast, individuals under a dominant prevention focus who perceived the goal of the collective action group as important were willing to support the group regardless of the likelihood that it would be successful. For these individuals, the likelihood that the collective action group would be successful only (slightly) increased commitment to collective action when relatively low importance was placed on its goal. In addition to these predicted effects, there was also an unanticipated observation. For individuals under a dominant promotion focus who placed relatively little importance on the collective action group's goal, commitment to collective action was actually lowered by the perceived likelihood that this goal might be achieved. We expected perceived likelihood to have less of an effect in this situation but not necessarily to lower commitment to collective action. We will assess the reliability of this unexpected finding in Studies 3.2 and 3.3.

Importantly, because two of the independent variables (regulatory focus and the importance of the collective action group's goal) were assessed as naturally occurring differences between participants, the usual objections to making causal inferences based on (partial) correlational data apply to this study. Therefore, in Study 3.2 we experimentally manipulated both the importance of the collective action group's goal and the likelihood that this goal would be achieved. In addition, we used a different measure of regulatory focus to obtain convergent support for our predictions.

Study 3.2

Method

Participants and Design

One hundred and fifty-three female undergraduate students from Leiden University (M_{age} = 20.39, *SD* = 2.29) participated in exchange for €3.50 or course credit. They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (importance of the collective action group's goal: high vs. low) X 2 (likelihood that this goal would be achieved: high vs. low) between-participants factorial design. Participants' regulatory focus was measured as an independent variable prior to the experiment.

Procedure

We used the same procedure as in Study 3.1, with two differences. First, we used a different measure to assess regulatory focus. Second, we manipulated - rather than measured - the importance placed on the goal of the collective action group. We used the same manipulation of the likelihood that the collective action group would reach its goal as in Study 3.1. As in Study 3.1, participants were informed that they would be taking part in two unrelated studies: a short survey and an experiment.

The short survey consisted of the pre-measure of regulatory focus. Participants' chronic promotion and prevention focus were measured using eight items taken from the Lockwood scale (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002). Four items assessed promotion strength (e.g., "I often think about the person I would ideally like to be in the future", α = .66). and four items prevention strength (e.g., "I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my life", α = .61). As in Study 3.1, we calculated a regulatory focus dominance measure by subtracting the standardized prevention scores from the standardized promotion scores.

Participants then read the research report about the unfair treatment of women in work situations. After this, we manipulated the importance placed on the collective action group's goal. Research on the behaviour–attitude link (cf., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Janis & King, 1954; King and Janis, 1956) has shown that individuals- when presenting a persuasive argument- adapt their private opinions in the direction of the position they argue. We used this as the basis for the importance manipulation.

Participants wrote a short paragraph in which they argued either in favour of (high importance condition) or against (low importance condition) the importance of striving for gender equality in work situations (the goal of the collective action group). Next, participants read the collective action group's pamphlet and completed the dependent measures.

Measures

All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 9 (*completely agree*), unless otherwise indicated.

Manipulation checks. The perceived importance of the collective action group's goal was measured with a single item ("I think countering gender discrimination in work situations is not crucial" [reverse scored]). The perceived likelihood that the collective action group would reach its goal was measured in the same way as in Study 3.1.

Commitment to collective action. As in Study 3.1, participants were connected to the (fictitious) website of the collective action group. There they could choose to support the collective action group by 1) signing a petition, 2) signing up for the action group's newsletter (item added in Study 3.2), 3) becoming a member of the action group, and/or 4) signing up for participation in a demonstration against gender discrimination (items ordered from low to high commitment). Analyses confirmed the Guttman nature of the scale.[6] We thus summed the number of ways in which each participant chose to support the collective action group to form the measure of commitment to collective action.

Results

Manipulation checks

As intended, an importance × likelihood ANOVA on the manipulation check of importance showed that participants in the high importance conditions reported placing more importance on the goal of the collective action group (M = 8.01, SD = 1.17) than participants in the low importance conditions (M = 7.51, SD = 1.45, $F(1, 149) = 6.13$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$). No other effects emerged (p's > .30).

An importance × likelihood ANOVA on the manipulation check of likelihood showed that participants in the low likelihood conditions reported a somewhat lower perceived likelihood that the collective action group would reach its goal (M = 5.96, SD = 1.46) than did participants in the high likelihood conditions (M = 6.40, SD = 1.33, $F(1, 149) = 3.80$, $p = .06$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$). No other effects emerged (p's > .66).

Commitment to collective action

The results for the commitment to collective action measure were analyzed in the same way as in Study 3.1. As expected, the three-way interaction between the regulatory focus dominance scale and the manipulations of importance and likelihood was significant (B = .17, SE = .06, $F(1, 145) = 8.54$, $p = .004$, $\Delta R^2 = .05$). Simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, 1991), revealed the predicted interaction (*Hypothesis 1*) between the importance and likelihood of social change among individuals under promotion focus (B = .15, SE = .08, $F(1, 145) = 3.50$, $p = .06$, $\Delta R^2 = .02$, Figure 3.3). As expected, the likelihood that the collective action group would reach its goal increased commitment to collective action among individuals under promotion focus in the high importance condition (B = .28, SE =.14, $F(1, 74) = 4.04$, $p = .05$) but not in the low importance condition (B = -.02, SE = .09, $F(1, 71) < 1$, $p = .84$).



Figure 3.3. Commitment to collective action as a function of the manipulations of the importance and likelihood of social change for individuals with a dominant promotion orientation (Study 3.2).

As in Study 3.1, we found a different interaction between importance and likelihood among individuals under prevention orientation (B = -.18, SE = .07, F(1, 145) = 6.02, p = .02, ΔR^2 = .04, Figure 3.4). As expected (*Hypothesis 2*), among individuals under prevention focus who placed high importance on the collective action group's goal, the likelihood that this goal could be achieved did not increase (and even slightly decreased) commitment to collective action (B = -.21, SE = .11, F(1, 74) = 3.59, p = .06). Among individuals under prevention focus who placed low importance on the collective action group's goal, the likelihood of social change did not reliably affect commitment to collective action (B = .15, SE = .09, F(1, 71) = 2.60, p = .11).



Figure 3.4. Commitment to collective action as a function of the manipulations of the importance and likelihood of social change for individuals with a dominant prevention orientation (Study 3.2).

Discussion

The results of this study offer additional support for the prediction that individuals' regulatory focus influences the way in which the importance and likelihood of social change affect commitment to collective action. As predicted, individuals under promotion focus were motivated to engage in collective action by the perceived likelihood that it would be successful, provided they perceived its goal as important. Also as predicted, among individuals under prevention focus who placed high importance on the collective action group's goal, the likelihood of social change did not

increase commitment to collective action. For both individuals under promotion and prevention focus, the likelihood of social change had no effect on commitment to collective action when low importance was attached to the goal of the collective action group. Thus, the unexpected negative effect of the likelihood that the collective action group would be successful that was found among individuals under promotion focus in Study 3.1 did not emerge in Study 3.2.

Study 3.2 extends the results of Study 3.1 by showing the causal role that the perceived importance of social change plays in individual commitment to collective action. Also, Study 3.2 demonstrates similar results as Study 3.1 using a different measure of regulatory focus, attesting to the robustness of these findings. However, we wished to demonstrate that inducing a promotion or prevention focus would be sufficient to produce the same results. Therefore we conducted a third study in which regulatory focus was experimentally manipulated.

Study 3.3

Method

Participants and Design

Fifty-two female undergraduate students from Leiden University (M_{age} = 20.86, *SD* = 3.02), participated in exchange for €3 or course credit. They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a one-factor (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) between-participants design. The perceived importance of the collective action group's goal and the likelihood that this goal would be achieved were measured as independent variables.

Procedure

We used the same procedure as in Studies 3.1 and 3.2, with two exceptions. First, we manipulated - instead of measured - regulatory focus. Second, this time we measured - instead of manipulated - the importance and likelihood of social change.

We manipulated regulatory focus with an adapted version of the procedure suggested by Higgins and colleagues (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Prior to being presented with the other materials, participants wrote about what they would

ideally like to (promotion condition) or felt they ought to (prevention condition) achieve in their working life. According to Higgins and colleagues (1994) the priming of ideals causes individuals to adopt a promotion focus, whereas the priming of oughts causes individuals to adopt a prevention focus.

Participants then read the same research report about the disadvantaged position of women in work situation as in Studies 3.1 and 3.2. The time they needed to report their (promotion- and prevention-related) emotional reactions to this information served as the check of the regulatory focus manipulation. According to Shah and Higgins (2001), individuals under promotion focus are faster at appraising how cheerful or dejected a stimulus makes them feel, whereas individuals under prevention focus are faster at appraising how quiescent or agitated a stimulus makes them feel. We thus measured participants' promotion-related (*dejection and cheerfulness*) and prevention-related (*agitation and quiescence*) emotions using six items and recorded the time they needed to indicate their answers to serve as the manipulation check of regulatory focus.

Measures

All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 9 (*completely agree*), unless otherwise indicated.

The importance participants placed on the collective action group's goal was assessed with three items (e.g., "I think it is very important to counter gender discrimination in work situations", $M = 7.51$, $SD = 1.22$, $\alpha = .88$).

The likelihood that the collective action group would be successful was assessed with six items (e.g., "I think the collective action group will be successful in their struggle against gender discrimination in work situations, $M = 6.13$, $SD = 1.03$, $\alpha = .76$).

*Commitment to collective actio*n was measured and treated in the same way as in Study 3.2.[7]

Results

Manipulation Check

We created promotion- and prevention-latency scores by log-transforming response times on the promotion-related (cheerfulness and dejection) and prevention related (agitation and quiescence) emotion items (cf., Shah & Higgins, 2001). We then

created a regulatory focus measure by subtracting the promotion latency scores from the prevention latency scores (with high scores indicating faster responding to the promotion items than to the prevention items which signifies promotion dominance) and analyzed the effect of the manipulation of regulatory focus on this variable using ANOVA. As intended, the results revealed stronger promotion focus (and weaker prevention focus) in the promotion condition (M = 0.44, SD = 1.38) than in the prevention condition (M = -0.46, SD = 1.44, $F(1, 50) = 5.27$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .10$).[8]

Commitment to Collective Action

The results for the commitment to collective action measure were analyzed in the same way as in Studies 3.1 and 3.2. Three participants had to be excluded from these analyses because they indicated doubting the authenticity of the collective action group's website.[9] As in Studies 3.1 and 3.2, the three-way interaction between the manipulation of regulatory focus and the importance and likelihood scales was significant (B = .51, SE = .17, $F(1, 41) = 8.87$, $p = .005$, $\Delta R^2 = .12$). In the promotion condition, we found the predicted interaction (*Hypothesis 2*) between the importance and likelihood of social change (B = .19, SE = .09, $F(1, 21) = 4.97$, $p = .04$, $\Delta R^2 = .09$, Figure 3.5). As expected, in the promotion condition, the perceived likelihood that the collective action group would be successful increased commitment to collective action among participants who attached high importance (+1 SD) to the group's goal (B = .34, SE = .14, $F(1, 21) = 5.92$, $p = .02$), whereas it had no effect on commitment to collective action among participants who attached low importance (-1 SD) to the group's goal (B = -.04, SE = .12, $F(1, 21) < 1$, $p = .73$).

In the prevention condition, the results revealed a different interaction between the importance and likelihood measures (B = -.82, SE = .40, $F(1, 20) = 4.32$, $p = .05$, ΔR^2 = .15, Figure 3.6). As expected (*Hypothesis 1*), in the prevention condition, commitment to collective action among participants who placed high importance (+1 SD) on the collective action group's goal did not depend on the likelihood that this group would be successful (B = -.05, SE = .33, $F(1, 20) < 1$, $p = .88$), whereas it did among participants who placed low importance (-1 SD) on the group's goal (B = 1.60, SE = .60, $F(1, 20) = 7.06$, $p = .02$).



Figure 3.5. Commitment to collective action as a function of the importance and likelihood of social change in the promotion condition (Study 3.3).



Figure 3.6. Commitment to collective action as a function of the importance and likelihood of social change in the promotion condition (Study 3.3).

Discussion

Study 3.3 provided additional support for our prediction that regulatory focus influences the way in which the importance and likelihood of social change affect commitment to collective action. As hypothesized, individuals under promotion focus were motivated to engage in collective action by the perceived likelihood that it would be successful, provided that they perceived its goal as highly important. The likelihood that the collective action group's goal would be achieved had no effect on commitment to collective action among individuals under promotion focus who perceived the

group's goal as unimportant. Also as predicted, individuals under prevention focus who placed high importance on the goal of the collective action group were willing to commit to collective action regardless of the perceived likelihood that this group would reach its goal. Among individuals under prevention focus who placed relatively little importance on the collective action group's goal, commitment to collective action was increased by the likelihood that this goal would be accomplished.

Study 3.3 replicates and extends the results of Studies 3.1 and 3.2 by showing that the same results can be obtained using an experimental manipulation of regulatory focus, thereby demonstrating the causal influence of regulatory focus on how the decision to commit to collective action is made. Together with Studies 3.1 and 3.2, Study 3.3 thus confirms that the impact of the importance and likelihood of social change on commitment to collective action depends on the individuals' regulatory focus.

General Discussion

The current research was designed to investigate the effect of regulatory focus on individuals' motivation to engage in collective action. Taking a self-regulatory perspective allows us to provide new insights into the predictors of the motivation to engage in collective action. We argued that because individuals under promotion focus initiate goal-pursuit when they see opportunities for goal-advancement, they would engage in collective action when they both placed high importance on its goal *and* believed attainment of this goal to be likely. By contrast, because individuals under prevention focus initiate goal pursuit when they see goal-attainment as necessary, we expected that they would engage in collective action when attached high importance to the goal of the collective action, regardless of the perceived likelihood that this action would be successful. Individuals under prevention focus who placed relatively low importance on the goal of social change were expected to engage in collective action only to the extent that they believed it likely that this action would reach its goal (i.e., when goal attainment is assured).

To investigate these predictions, we used a paradigm in which women were made aware of the unfair treatment of their group in work situations. Across three studies, we used different ways to investigate the prediction that regulatory focus

influences the way in which the importance and likelihood of social change affect individuals' motivation to engage in collective action. In Study 3.1, we assessed chronic individual differences in regulatory focus and in the perceived importance attached to a collective action group's goal, while manipulating the likelihood that this goal could be achieved through collective action. In Study 3.2, we used a different instrument to assess regulatory focus and manipulated both the perceived importance of the collective action group's goal and the likelihood that this goal would be achieved. Finally, in Study 3.3, we manipulated regulatory focus. Because across studies each independent variable was manipulated at least once, alternative causal explanations of the results can be ruled out.

Importantly, we used a behavioural measure of commitment to collective action. In all studies, the extent to which participants were actually willing to commit to collective action (e.g., by signing a petition, by becoming a member of the collective action group) served as our dependent variable. The results of the current studies thus reflect actual engagement in collective action, and not attitudes or intentions as is common in research on collective action.

The results offer consistent support for our predictions. In all studies, individuals under promotion focus who attached importance to an action group's goal were motivated to support this group to the degree that they perceived that the group would be successful in achieving this change. Additionally, in all studies we found that among individuals under prevention focus who placed high importance on the collective action group's goal, support for this group did not depend on the likelihood that the group would reach its goal. Only when they placed relatively little importance on the collective action group's goal did the likelihood that this goal would be achieved affect prevention oriented individuals' engagement in collective action.[10]

Implications

These results show that not all individuals decide in the same way whether to engage in collective action or not. Individuals under promotion focus become motivated to engage in collective action by the perception that through collective action important social change is likely to be achieved. By contrast, attaching high importance to the goal

of the collective action made prevention oriented individuals less instrumental in their decision to engage in this action.

Importantly, the current research sheds light on inconsistencies in previous work surrounding the effect of the likelihood of social change on the motivation to engage in collective action (cf., Hornsey et al., 2006; Kelly, 1993). Specifically, the likelihood of social change has consistently been shown to be strong predictor of union activism (e.g., Flood, 1993; Klandermans, 1984a; 1984b; 1986), but not of anti-nuclear activism (e.g., Fox-Cardamone et al., 2000; Fox & Schofield, 1989; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Schofield & Pavelchak, 1989) The current results may offer an explanation for this inconsistency. Specifically, engagement in anti-nuclear collective action serves the need for safety, and should as such be regulated by the prevention system. This would explain why the likelihood of social change has not been found to be a strong motivator of this form of action. By contrast, engagement in union activism aimed at attaining employee benefits could be considered behaviour that serves the need for growth, and as such should be regulated by the promotion system. This explains why the likelihood that through this action important goals will be achieved has been found to be a strong predictor of engagement in union activism.

Furthermore, the current work suggests that depending on the societal context in which collective action takes place, different ways of trying to motivate people to participate will be most effective. By framing their message in either promotion or prevention terms collective action groups can influence their potential followers into adopting either a promotion or prevention focus. The results of the current studies suggest that doing so should also influence the basis on which these potential followers decide whether or not to engage in collective action. Specifically, in contexts in which the achievement of social change seems unlikely or even impossible (for example because of insufficient support or oppression by another social group), activist groups that frame their message in prevention terms, (e.g., by presenting social change as a minimally acceptable outcome), are likely to be most effective in attracting followers. By contrast, activist groups that frame their message in promotion terms (e.g., by presenting social change as a maximal ideal outcome) will be most effective in attracting followers when the achievement of social change seems likely. The present findings also suggest that activist groups adopting a promotion frame in their

mobilization attempts would do well to also convey both the importance of their goal and the likelihood that this goal can be achieved in their communications. By contrast, when they use a prevention frame, emphasizing the importance of the collective goal should be enough.

Limitations and directions for future research

The current work investigated the role of regulatory focus in the way instrumental considerations motivate collective action. In doing so, it complements work that suggests that prevention (but not promotion) oriented individuals are motivated to engage in collective action by perceptions of group-based injustice or immorality (Sassenberg, & Hansen, 2007; Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, in press, b). In terms of theoretical integration, these results show how regulatory focus fits into the model by Van Zomeren and colleagues (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fisher, & Leach, 2004) in which instrumental considerations and perceptions of group-based injustice are held to form two distinct routes to engagement in collective action. However, instrumental and justice motives only form two of several possible pathways to engagement in collective action. Previous work has also identified collective identification and ideology as motives for engaging in collective action (Simon et al., 1998; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). A fruitful path for future research may therefore be to examine how regulatory focus relates to these pathways.

In the current studies we focused on a specific class of collective action. Specifically, the forms of behaviour considered in the present studies can all be seen as normative collective action (Wright, 2001b). Previous research has identified non-normative forms of collective action, such as engaging in violent protest, as an alternative way to achieve social change. These are clearly distinct from more normative and peaceful forms such as examined here (Corning & Myers, 2002; Lalonde & Cameron, 1994; Lalonde, Stroink, & Aleem, 2002; Wolfsfeld, Opp, Dietz, & Green, 1994). An interesting issue for further research would therefore be to examine how the choice is made between normative and non-normative forms of collective action, and to what extent differences in regulatory focus impact on this choice. For example, prevention oriented individuals who perceive social change as highly important (i.e. as a necessity) might become willing to use more drastic forms of action and pursue this

goal “by any means necessary”. Two studies investigating this possibility are presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation..

Conclusion

In conclusion, the results of three studies showed that regulatory focus influences how the importance and likelihood of social change affect individual commitment to collective action. For individuals under promotion focus, the likelihood that important social change will be achieved is the primary concern in their decision to engage in collective action. By contrast, as the goal of social change increases in importance, individuals under prevention focus become less concerned about the likelihood of achieving the goal when deciding whether or not to engage in collective action. Together the results show that both the likelihood and the importance of social change affect commitment to collective action, but in different ways depending on whether individuals are under promotion or prevention focus.

Footnotes

[4] This chapter is based on Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, and Derks (in press, a)

[5] As in earlier work that used a Guttman scale to assess commitment to collective action (Kelloway & Barling, 1993), we assessed the quality of the Guttman scale by calculating its coefficients of reproducibility (Guttman, 1947), and scalability *H* (Mokken & Lewis, 1982; Van Schuur, 2003), and by fitting to it the structure assumed by the Guttman scale model: the Simplex (Guttman, 1954). Coefficients of reproducibility exceeding .90, coefficients of scalability exceeding .40, and good fit to the Simplex model indicate high quality Guttman scales. The measure showed a high coefficient of reproducibility (.99), a high degree of scalability (*H* = .69), and a good fit to the Simplex model ($\chi^2(1, N = 82) = .33$, $p = .57$, NNFI = 1, CFI = 1, RMSEA = 0).

[6] The commitment to collective action scale showed good reproducibility (.99) and scalability (*H* = .44), and fitted well to the Simplex structure ($\chi^2(3, N = 153) = 3.58$, $p = .31$, NNFI = .94, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .04).

[7] The commitment to collective action scale showed good reproducibility (.99) and scalability (*H* = .80), and fitted well to the Simplex structure ($\chi^2(3, N = 49) = 1.19$, $p = .75$, NNFI = 1, CFI = 1, RMSEA = 0).

[8] We report the untransformed mean response latencies and their standard deviations here in order to facilitate interpretation of the results.

[9] Including these participants in the analyses did not substantially alter the results (three-way interaction $p = .006$).

[10] Although likelihood did not significantly increase commitment to collective action in Study 3.2 among prevention oriented individuals who placed relatively low importance on the collective action group's goal, meta-analysis of this effect (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) showed that it was reliable across the three studies ($r = .23$, $SE = .09$, $Z = 2.56$, $p = .01$).

Chapter 4:

By any means necessary:
The effects of regulatory focus and moral conviction on hostile and benevolent forms of collective action [11]

Introduction

In late 2005, youths from the poor suburban housing projects of Paris took to the streets to protest against their seemingly hopeless position. These protests quickly turned violent. Rioting soon spread to other French cities. At the end of the civil unrest, weeks later, thousands of cars had been burned and damage was estimated to be over $230 million (Landler, 2005). As this example demonstrates, people sometimes respond to the disadvantaged position of their group by engaging in violent protests and riots. At other times they do so by participating in more peaceful forms of protest. In the current research we investigate how individuals decide between taking peaceful vs. more violent forms of collective action from the perspective of regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997). By taking a self-regulatory perspective in our investigation of collective action, we aim to provide a further understanding of when and why members of low status groups sometimes choose to go beyond the rules of society, or even beyond what they themselves would normally find morally acceptable, to try to improve their group's disadvantaged position.

We argue that perceiving immoral treatment of the ingroup should form a strong motivation to engage in collective action among prevention-oriented individuals but not among promotion-oriented individuals. Crucially, we propose that a prevention orientation entails the kind of rationality in which strong motivation is experienced as necessity. This "necessity" is predicted to cause the prevention-oriented - when they hold a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group - to perceive any means as justified in order to achieve group status improvement. This should also be true for those means that are intended to harm the interests of those held responsible for the group's disadvantage: hostile or non-normative forms of collective action (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

In the next section we discuss hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. We then turn to work on moral conviction and regulatory focus and explain how integrating insights from these fields can help further our understanding of the willingness to engage in hostile and benevolent forms of collective action.

Hostile and Benevolent Forms of Collective Action

Collective action – cooperative effort towards group status improvement– can be a powerful instrument for low status groups to improve their societal position (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In the last decades, a large volume of social psychological research has attempted to identify factors that motivate members of low status groups to engage in this form of behaviour (cf. Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Klandermans, 1984; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Simon et al., 1998; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). This research has taught us much about the conditions under which low status group members become motivated to improve the societal position of their group. However, most of this work has focused on the motivation to engage in relatively benevolent responses to group-based disadvantage, such as signing petitions, participating in peaceful demonstrations and aligning oneself with legitimate political movements. In doing so, social psychological research has provided less insight into the willingness to engage in more hostile forms of collective action that are explicitly aimed at harming the interests of those held responsible for the group's disadvantage, such as committing acts of vandalism and participating in riots (Brewer, 1999, but see Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 2005; Reicher & Levine, 1994; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990a; 1990b; Wright & Taylor, 1998 for notable exceptions, see Gurr, 1993 for a sociological account).

Importantly, previous work has found that both activists and lay people perceive these hostile forms of collective action to be clearly distinct from the more benevolent ones, indicating that individuals committed to collective action are not always willing to turn to hostile means such as rioting and vandalism to reach their goals (Corning & Myers, 2002; Lalonde & Cameron, 1994; Lalonde, Stroink, & Aleem, 2002; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Wolfsfeld, Opp, Dietz, & Green, 1994). What is it that makes some members of low status groups decide that achievement of group status improvement justifies the use of these extreme, hostile means? Existing research on this topic suggests that people may only become willing to engage in hostile forms of collective action when their group is confronted with exceptionally unfair and immoral treatment (Wright et al., 1990a; 1990b). For this reason we believe that in order to understand the willingness to take hostile forms of collective action we must first

examine the role of morality in the decision to engage in collective action in more detail.

Moral Conviction

The extent to which individuals hold a moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group should form a strong motivator of collective action. The term moral conviction refers to a strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka, 2002; Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). Moral convictions differ from other strong, but non-moral attitudes in that they are seen as universally applicable truths. For example, the preference for one form of music over another can be a strong attitude, but as a matter of personal taste or opinion it is not a moral attitude (Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2009). By contrast, attitudes about issues such as abortion, ethnic cleansing and murder are usually considered "moral" in nature in that they refer to the distinction between right and wrong. Individuals holding these moral attitudes 1) believe that their stance reflects what is objectively right, not just personal opinion, 2) contend that others, regardless of their background, should share their stance on these issues and, 3) experience feelings of anger when confronted with what is seen as "immorality" (Skitka et al., 2005). Moreover, moral conviction, more than other types of attitudes, carries within it the obligation to act (Skitka et al., 2005), and is even seen to justify aggression against those who do not share the same moral convictions (Mullen & Skitka, 2006). We apply these individual-level findings to understand group-level concerns. Based on these findings we argue that when group members who hold a moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group are confronted with unfair group-based treatment, they should experience group-based anger and feel an inner obligation to act against the disadvantage (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, in press). Both of these experiences are considered to be strong motivators of collective action (Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jörger, 2003; Van Zomeren, et al., 2004).

However, we do not believe that having a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group motivates actual engagement in collective action for all individuals or in all situations. In the next section we will argue that because moral

considerations function as “oughts” (Higgins, 1987; Skitka, 2003), their motivating force should depend on the strength of individuals’ prevention focus. We will then argue that prevention-oriented individuals who engage in collective action out of their moral convictions about the fair treatment of their group view the goal of this behaviour as a necessity, causing them to see the ends as justifying the means and paving the way for hostile forms of collective action.

A Self-Regulation Approach to Collective Action

Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) distinguishes between two motivational systems that regulate goal directed behaviour: the prevention system and the promotion system. These systems affect which kinds of goals are pursued and how the motivation to pursue these goals is experienced. Prevention and promotion focus vary in strength both chronically across individuals and momentarily across situations (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, & Ayduk, 2001).

We argue that holding a moral conviction about the fair treatment of one’s group should predict engagement in collective action in response to group-based disadvantage among individuals with a strong prevention focus. Furthermore, we argue that this moral conviction should be less important in determining the way individuals with a weak prevention focus or individuals with a promotion focus respond to group-based disadvantage. Adoption of a prevention focus indicates a concern with safety and the fulfilment of duties and responsibilities, also referred to as “oughts”. Under prevention focus, strong motivation is experienced as the necessity of goal attainment, which causes unsuccessful goal pursuit to be seen as more negative than successful pursuit is seen as positive (Higgins, 1987; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Shah & Higgins, 1997). Notably, moral considerations function as “oughts” (Higgins, 1987; Skitka, 2003; Skitka & Mullen, 2002), as immorality is judged to be more negative than morality is judged to be positive (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; 1989). Viewed in this way, moral conviction forms the strong motivation to pursue specific prevention-relevant goals. The fact that moral considerations function as oughts implies that the motivating effects of moral convictions should depend on the strength of the individual’s prevention focus. Thus, we predict that holding a moral conviction about

the fair treatment of one's group should motivate collective action to redress to group-based disadvantage among individuals with a strong prevention focus but not among individuals with a weak prevention focus (*Hypothesis 1*).

By contrast, adoption of a promotion focus indicates a concern with gain and the achievement of growth and accomplishment goals rather than duties and responsibilities. Promotion-oriented individuals are motivated to pursue ideals, or maximal goals. A promotion orientation involves experiencing strong motivation as desire which causes successful goal pursuit to be seen as more positive than unsuccessful pursuit is seen as negative. (Higgins, 1987; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Shah & Higgins, 1997). Thus, because moral considerations function as "oughts" and not as "ideals", we don't anticipate that holding a moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group should motivate collective action to redress group-based disadvantage among individuals under promotion focus.

Hostile Forms of Collective Action

We propose that holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group should cause prevention-oriented individuals to overcome normative objections (and even their own moral objections) to hostile forms of collective action. Prevention-oriented individuals construe strong goals, such as those mandated by moral conviction, as necessities (Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010; Shah & Higgins, 1997; Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, in press, a). When pursuing a goal of which the achievement is seen as a necessity, it should not matter how this goal is achieved, as long as it is achieved. This means that prevention-oriented individuals (but not promotion-oriented individuals) who hold a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group should consider hostile forms of collective action as justified means to a necessary end. Thus, we predict that for prevention-oriented individuals, holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group should motivate support for hostile forms of collective action (*Hypothesis 2*).

Overview of the Studies

Two studies were conducted to test the predictions concerning individual prevention focus and engagement in different forms of collective action. We used a paradigm in which women were made aware of the discrimination of their group in work situations. They were then asked to indicate their support for several hostile and benevolent forms of collective reactions to this discrimination (Corning & Myers, 2002; Wolfsfeld, Opp, Dietz, & Green, 1994). The extent to which participants supported these hostile and benevolent forms of collective action served as the dependent variable in both studies.

We used different ways to examine how support for hostile and benevolent forms of collective reactions to social discrimination among women is affected by regulatory focus and by the strength of their moral conviction about the equality between men and women. In Study 4.1, chronic individual differences in promotion and prevention focus and the strength of participants' moral conviction about the equality between men and women were assessed as independent variables. In Study 4.2, we used a situational induction of regulatory focus, instead of assessing it as an individual difference variable, and again assessed naturally occurring variations in the strength of participants' moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group as an independent variable. In addition, we included an assessment of moral objection to hostile forms of collective action as a potential moderator.

Study 4.1

Method

Participants

One hundred and eighty-two female undergraduate students from Leiden University (M_{age} = 20.44, SD = 2.24) participated for €3 or course credit.

Procedure

Participants were informed that they would be taking part in two unrelated studies: a short survey and an experiment. The short survey consisted of our pre-

measure of regulatory focus. We measured participants' chronic promotion (α = .81) and prevention focus (α = .76) with a shortened version of the Lockwood scale (Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002).[12] Participants were then informed that the first study was completed and that the second study would now commence. Next, they read a research report supposedly written by two well-known Dutch research organizations, which was constructed to make participants aware of the disadvantaged position of their group (women) in work situations. Participants read that women earn approximately 7 percent less than men for the same work, and receive fewer opportunities for job advancement.

Measures

All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 9 (*completely agree*). The correlations between the measures are included in Table 4.1.

The strength of participants' moral conviction about gender equality was measured using five items (e.g. "Equality between men and women is part of the core of my moral convictions", α = .76).

Support for benevolent forms of collective action was measured by asking participants to report the extent to which they supported four different types of benevolent collective action (e.g. "Becoming a member of a collective action group that takes a stance against gender discrimination", α = .92).

Support for hostile forms of collective action was measured by asking participants to report the extent to which they supported four different types of hostile (and illegal) action (e.g. "Committing sabotage within discriminating organizations", α = .78).[13]

Results

We used hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypothesis that prevention focus influences the effect of the strength of the moral conviction about gender equality on support for hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. For the analyses of both dependent variables the standardized promotion and prevention measures and the standardized measure of moral conviction about the gender equality were entered into

the analysis in the first step. In the second step, the two two-way interaction terms between the moral conviction measure and each of the regulatory focus measures were included.

Table 4.1. *Correlations between measures (Study 4.1)*

	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Prevention focus	.12	.14	.25***	.14
2. Promotion focus		.28***	.12	.03
3. Moral conviction about gender equality			.26***	.31***
4. Support for benevolent collective action				.37***
5. Support for hostile collective action				

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Support for benevolent forms of collective action

Analysis of the support for benevolent forms of collective action showed the predicted interaction between prevention focus and the strength of participants' moral conviction about gender equality, $B = .23$, $SE = .10$, $F(1, 176) = 5.47$, $p = .02$, $\Delta R^2 = .03$, see Figure 4.1. Simple slope analyses of this effect (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that the strength of participants' moral conviction about gender equality increased support for benevolent forms of collective action among participants high in prevention focus (+1 *SD*), $B = .54$, $SE = .13$, $F(1, 176) = 16.10$, $p < .001$, but not among participants low in prevention focus, (-1 *SD*), $B = .09$, $SE = .16$, $F(1, 176) < 1$, $p = .56$. Promotion focus was unrelated to support for benevolent forms of collective action, $B = .02$, $SE = .11$, $F(1, 176) < 1$, $p = .84$, as was its interaction with the strength of participants' moral conviction about gender equality, $B = -.11$, $SE = .09$, $F(1, 176) = 1.47$, $p = .23$.

Support for Hostile forms of Collective Action

Analysis of the support for hostile forms of collective action measure showed the predicted interaction between prevention focus and the strength of participants' moral conviction about gender equality, $B = .30$, $SE = .10$, $F(1, 176) = 8.29$, $p = .004$,

ΔR^2 = .04, see Figure 4.2. As expected, simple slope analyses revealed that the strength of participants' moral conviction about gender equality increased support for hostile forms of collective action among individuals high in prevention focus, (+1 *SD*), *B* = .73, *SE* = .14, *F*(1, 178) = 26.82, *p* < .001, but not among participants low in prevention focus, (-1 *SD*), *B* = .13, *SE* = .16, *F* < 1. Promotion focus was unrelated to support for hostile forms of collective action, *B* = -.12, *SE* = .12, *F*(1, 176) = 1.05, *p* = .31, as was its interaction with the strength of participants' moral conviction about gender equality, *B* = -.01, *SE* = .09, *F* < 1.



Figure 4.1. Support for benevolent forms of collective action as a function of prevention focus and the strength of the moral conviction about the gender equality (Study 4.1).



Figure 4.2. Support for hostile forms of collective action as a function of prevention focus and the strength of the moral conviction about gender equality (Study 4.1).

Discussion and Introduction to Study 4.2

The results of this first study provide initial evidence for the hypothesis that support for both hostile and benevolent forms of collective action in response to social discrimination can best be seen as prevention-oriented response to perceived immorality. As expected, among participants high in prevention focus, the strength of moral conviction about gender equality increased endorsement of both hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. Among participants with low prevention focus, the strength of this moral conviction had no effect on the endorsement of either form of collective action. Also as expected, promotion focus did not influence the relation between the strength of the moral conviction about gender equality and the support for either form of collective action.

However this first study does have some limitations. First of all, the fact that regulatory focus was assessed, rather than manipulated, leaves open another explanation of the results. Previous work has shown that becoming aware of being a member of a disadvantaged group in itself can cause individuals to adopt a prevention focus (Oyserman, Uskul, Yoder, Nesse & Williams, 2007; Seibt & Forster, 2004). Therefore, it could be the chronic awareness of being a member of a disadvantaged group, rather than the chronic prevention focus resulting from it, that causes support for hostile forms of collective action when this disadvantage is seen as immoral. In addition, recent work has identified some shortcomings of the Lockwood scale that was used as a measure of regulatory focus in Study 4.1 (Summerville & Roese, 2008). For these reasons a different, experimental, operationalisation of regulatory focus was employed in Study 4.2

A second concern with the current study is that, based on its results, we cannot yet rule out that it is the *perceived importance* of countering gender inequality rather than the *moral conviction* with which this goal is pursued, that is responsible for the effects (cf. Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). For this reason, we controlled for the effects of the perceived importance of countering gender inequality when examining the influence of moral convictions in Study 4.2.

In addition, an important question that is left unanswered by Study 4.1 concerns the moral objections people may have against hostile forms of collective action. If prevention-oriented individuals base their decision of whether or not to support hostile

forms of collective action on moral reasoning, then at the same time these individuals may be deterred from the use of such forms of collective action by the perception that these behaviours are immoral. While we acknowledge this possibility, we also argue that moral objections to hostile forms of collective action will not always decrease support for this form of action among prevention-oriented individuals. More specifically, we argue that for prevention-oriented individuals strong motivation (such as the motivation to pursue gender equality for those who hold this goal with moral conviction) is experienced as necessity of goal attainment (Shah & Higgins, 1997; Zaal et al., in press, a). We argue that this perceived necessity of goal attainment may supersede moral objections to the way these goals are pursued, causing individuals to believe that *in this particular instance* the use of "immoral" hostile forms of collective action is justified. Therefore, we predict that holding moral objections to hostile forms of collective action should decrease support for these forms of action among prevention-oriented individuals without a strong moral conviction about gender equality, but not among prevention-oriented individuals holding a strong moral conviction about gender equality. Among individuals under promotion focus, neither the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action nor the strength of moral convictions about gender equality were expected to influence support for hostile forms of collective action. These predictions were investigated in Study 4.2.

Study 4.2

Method

Participants and Design

One hundred and fifty-one female undergraduate students from Leiden University (M_{age} = 20.30, *SD* = 2.28) participated for €3.50 or course credit. They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a one-factor (regulatory focus: promotion or prevention) between-participants experiment. The strength of participants' moral convictions about gender equality and the strength of their moral objections to hostile forms of collective action were measured as independent variables. As in Study 4.1, support for benevolent (behavioural) and hostile forms of collective action served as the dependent variables.[15]

Procedure

We used the same procedure as in Study 4.1, with two differences. First, we manipulated (instead of measured) participants' regulatory focus. Second, we included a measure of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action. We manipulated regulatory focus with an adapted version of the procedure suggested by Higgins and colleagues (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Zaal et al., in press, a). Prior to being presented with the other materials, participants wrote about what they would ideally like to (promotion condition) or felt they ought to (prevention condition) achieve in their working life. According to Higgins and colleagues (1994) the priming of ideals leads individuals to adopt a promotion focus, whereas the priming of oughts causes individuals to adopt a prevention focus. Participants then read the same research report about the discrimination of women in work situations as in Study 4,1.

Measures

All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 9 (*completely agree*) unless otherwise reported. The correlations between the measures are included in Table 4.2.

The importance of countering gender inequality was measured with three items (e.g. "Countering gender discrimination is very important to me", $\alpha = .85$).

The strength of moral conviction about the gender equality was measured with five items (e.g. "Equality between men and women is part of the core of my moral convictions", $\alpha = .72$). [14]

Moral objections to hostile forms of collective action were measured with four items (e.g. "Harming the interests of organizations that discriminate is morally objectionable", $\alpha = .63$).

To measure *support for benevolent collective action,* we gave participants the option to sign a petition calling for measures against gender discrimination within organizations.

Support for hostile forms of collective action was measured by asking participants to report the extent to which they supported five different forms of hostile action (e.g. "Committing sabotage at discriminating organizations", $\alpha = .71$).

Table 4.2. *Correlations between measures (Study 4.2)*

	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Moral conviction about gender equality	.43***	-.03.	27***	.23**
2. Importance of countering gender inequality		-.16	.21*	.17*
3. Moral objections to hostile collective action			-.17*	-.04
4. Support for hostile collective action				.20*
5. Signed the petition (benevolent collective action)				

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Results

Manipulation Check

To check whether or not the manipulation of regulatory focus was successful, seven judges, who were blind to condition, independently rated the focus of the paragraphs that the participants wrote as -1 (prevention-oriented), 0 (unclear), or +1 (promotion-oriented). The judgments showed a very high degree of consistency (α = .94) and were thus collapsed into a single bipolar variable which reflects the mean judgment of the coders. High scores on this variable indicate promotion-oriented paragraphs, low scores prevention-oriented paragraphs. Analysis of variance showed that the essays of participants in the promotion condition, M = .75, SD = .31, were coded as significantly more promotion focused (and thus also as less prevention focused) than those of participants in the prevention condition, M = -.57, SD = .59, $F(1, 149) = 301.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .67$. We therefore concluded that the manipulation of regulatory focus was successful.

Benevolent Collective Action

Benevolent collective action (signing the petition) was analyzed using logistic regression. Ninety-six participants (out of a total of 151) signed the petition (64%). The effect-coded manipulation of regulatory focus (-1 for the prevention condition, 1 for the promotion condition), the standardized moral conviction scale and their interaction term were entered into the analysis. To rule out the possibility that the importance of

countering gender inequality - instead of the strength of participants' moral conviction about gender equality - could be responsible for the effects, we entered into the analysis this variable and its interaction with the manipulation of regulatory focus (see Yzerbyt, Muller & Judd, 2004).[16] The results revealed the predicted interaction between the strength of participants' moral conviction about gender equality and the manipulation of regulatory focus, *Hypothesis 1*, $B = -.52$, $SE = .23$, χ^2 (1) = 5.20, $p = .02$, see Figure 4.3. As anticipated, moral conviction increased the odds of signing the petition among participants in the prevention condition, $B = 1.08$, $SE = .38$, χ^2 (1) = 8.22, $p = .004$, but not among participants in the promotion condition, $B = .05$, $SE = .25$, χ^2 (1) = 0.04, $p = .84$. No other effects reached significance, p's > .22.[17]



Figure 4.3. The predicted probability of signing the petition as a function of the strength of the moral conviction about gender equality in the promotion and prevention conditions (Study 4.2).

Support for Hostile Forms of Collective Action

Support for hostile forms of collective action was analyzed using regression analysis. The effect-coded manipulation, the standardized moral conviction and moral objection scales, as well as their two- and three-way interaction terms were entered into the analysis as independent variables. We entered the standardized measure of the importance of countering gender inequality and its two- and three-way interactions with

the manipulation of regulatory focus and the strength of moral objection measure into the analysis as covariates.[18]

The results revealed a three-way interaction between the manipulation of regulatory focus, the strength of moral conviction about gender equality and the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action on the support for these forms of action, B = -.25, SE = .11, $F(1, 139) = 5.07$, p = .03, ΔR^2 = .03. To break down this interaction, we performed two additional regression analyses: one for the promotion condition and one for the prevention condition. In both of these analyses, we entered the strength of moral conviction about gender equality, the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action, and their interaction term into the analysis while controlling for the effect of the perceived importance of countering gender inequality and its interaction with the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action. The results revealed the predicted interaction in the prevention condition between the strength of moral conviction about gender equality and the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action on the support for these forms of action, B = .47, SE = .16, $F(1, 64) = 8.57$, p = .005, ΔR^2 = .08, see Figure 4.4.



Figure 4.4. Support for hostile forms of collective action as a function of the strength of moral objections to these forms of action and the strength of moral conviction about gender equality in the prevention condition (Study 4.2).

Simple slope analyses showed that in the prevention condition, moral objections to hostile forms collective action only decreased support for these forms of action

among individuals with weak moral conviction about gender equality, B = -1.01, SE = .25, $F(1, 64) = 16.81$, $p < .001$. As hypothesized, moral objections to hostile forms of collective action did not affect support for these forms of action among individuals with a strong moral conviction about gender equality, B = -.08, SE = .21, $F < 1$. In the promotion condition, support for hostile forms of collective action was influenced neither by the strength of moral conviction about gender equality, nor by the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action, nor by their interaction (all F's < 1). Importantly, neither the perceived importance of countering gender inequality, nor any of its interactions with the manipulation of regulatory focus and/or with the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action were significantly related to the support for these forms of collective action, all F's < 1.87, p's > .17. Thus, the results reported above cannot be attributed to differences in the perceived importance of countering gender inequality.

Discussion

The results of Study 4.2 provide additional evidence for the prediction that support for hostile and benevolent forms of collective action in response to social discrimination can best be seen as a prevention-oriented responses to perceived immorality. As predicted, holding a strong moral conviction about gender equality was shown to cause individuals under prevention focus to support benevolent as well as hostile forms of collective action, even when they perceived hostile forms of collective action as immoral. Among individuals under promotion focus, neither holding a strong moral conviction about gender equality, nor holding moral objections to hostile forms of collective action affected support for either benevolent or hostile forms of collective action. These findings are in line with our argument that the ends justify the means for prevention-oriented individuals with a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group.

Study 4.2 thus extends the results of Study 4.1 by showing that the different responses of promotion and prevention-oriented individuals can be obtained using a manipulation of regulatory focus instead of a measure. In addition, we were able to rule out the possibility that it is the importance of countering gender inequality rather than the moral conviction with which this goal is held that causes the observed effects.

Moreover, this second study extends the results of the previous study by taking into account the strength of participants' moral objections to hostile forms of collective action.

General Discussion

The current studies were designed to investigate the effects of regulatory focus on the way moral considerations motivate hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. Previous research has already shown that moral convictions can motivate people to engage in benevolent forms collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, in press). With the current studies, we build on and extend these findings by demonstrating that moral considerations also motivate hostile forms of collective action and by elucidating why this is the case. We argued that because moral considerations function as "oughts" (i.e. goals of which non-achievement is seen as more negative than achievement is seen as positive; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989), they should affect behaviour through the prevention self-regulatory system. Furthermore, because a prevention focus involves construing strong goals (such as those mandated by moral conviction) as necessities (Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010; Shah & Higgins, 1997; Zaal et al., in press, a), we argued that the effects of holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group should cause the prevention-oriented to perceive any means to be justified in order to reach the necessary goal. Thus, we predicted that prevention-oriented individuals (but not promotion-oriented individuals) who hold a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group would be willing to support hostile forms of collective action, even when they themselves would consider these forms of action immoral.

We examined these predictions in two studies. As predicted, the results of both studies showed that moral convictions motivate both hostile and benevolent forms of collective action through the prevention self-regulatory system. When the prevention system was chronically active (Study 4.1) or experimentally activated (Study 4.2), holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group increased support for hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. By contrast, when the prevention system was chronically inactive (Study 4.1) or when a promotion focus was

induced (Study 4.2), holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group had no effect on support for either form of action. In addition, and as predicted, Study 4.2 showed that for prevention-oriented individuals holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group overrides moral objections to hostile forms of collective action. More specifically, prevention-oriented individuals with a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group supported hostile forms of collective action even when they perceived these forms as being immoral. Thus, for them the ends appeared to justify the means.

Implications

The present work provides a deeper understanding of individuals' willingness to engage in hostile forms of collective action. The results of the studies reported in this contribution suggest that violent, hostile forms of collective action may be better understood as prevention-oriented responses to what is perceived as immoral treatment of the ingroup. Prevention-oriented individuals construe strong goals (such as those mandated by moral conviction) as necessities, which causes them to become insensitive to objections to the way these goals are pursued. When prevention-oriented individuals come to believe that their group is treated in an immoral way, they become highly motivated to rectify this situation. Because under prevention focus strong motivation is experienced as necessity (instead of as "desire" for individuals under promotion focus) prevention-oriented individuals become insensitive to moral objections to the way group status improvement is pursued, paving the way for the occurrence of hostile forms of collective action such as terrorism (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).

On a practical level, the results of the present work show that there may be risks associated with using moral arguments to promote collective action. More precisely, because moral considerations affect behaviour through the prevention system, those swayed by moral argumentation will come to see the collective goal more as a necessity than as a desire, paving the way for the use of hostile means in pursuit of this goal. Activists who use moral argumentation to mobilize others for their cause may thus inadvertently create the conditions that facilitate the occurrence of hostile forms of collective action. Alternatively, activists could consider framing their moral message in

terms fitting a promotion focus (i.e. by presenting it as representing a maximal goal, [Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009]). This should cause those mobilized to see the goal of collective action less as a necessity, thereby decreasing the likelihood that hostile forms of collective action will be undertaken. However, this approach may have drawbacks of its own. Because goal commitment under promotion focus depends heavily on expectations of success (Shah & Higgins, 1997), trying to motivate collective action through reframing its moral goal in promotion-oriented terms should only be effective when the likelihood that collective action will succeed is high (Zaal et al., in press, a), a precondition that is rarely met (Hornsey et al., 2006).

Applying regulatory focus theory to the study of the motivation to engage in collective action appears to be a fruitful endeavour on a broader theoretical level as well. In recent years, the collective action literature has benefited greatly from work investigating the relative strength of different motivators (e.g. instrumentality, perceptions of injustice and different forms of social identification) on commitment to collective action (e.g. Kelly, 1993; Stürmer & Simon, 2005; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). A logical next step would be to investigate the situations under which, and the individuals for whom, some factors form stronger motivators of collective action than others, or have different effects on some than on others. Understanding the self-regulatory processes underlying the motivation to engage in collective action promises to be especially important in this next theoretical step. For example, in our own work (Zaal et al., in press, a) we have shown that the distinction between promotion and prevention focus helps to understand how instrumental motives affect the decision to engage in collective action. More precisely, this work has shown that instrumental considerations (i.e. those relating to the expectation that collective action will succeed or not) only motivate promotion-oriented (and not prevention-oriented) individuals to engage in collective action, providing an explanation for inconsistent support for the role of instrumental considerations in the motivation to engage in collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). The present work complements these findings by showing that perceptions of injustice and immorality motivate prevention-oriented (and not promotion-oriented) individuals to engage in collective action (see also Sassenberg & Hansen, 2007). Together, these strands of research show how regulatory focus nicely fits into the perspective proposed by Van Zomeren and

colleagues (2004) in which perceptions of injustice and instrumental considerations are held to form two separate motivational paths to engagement in collective action.

In this research we investigated individuals' support for hostile forms of collective action on behalf of their group. This does not necessarily imply that our results generalize to *personal* engagement in hostile forms of collective action. Actively engaging in (vs. passively supporting) hostile forms of collective action may involve additional risk. Previous research has suggested that a prevention focus involves an aversion towards risk (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Because of this risk aversion, it could be that prevention-oriented individuals personally refrain from engaging in hostile forms of collective action, even if they support them. While this may seem plausible, recent work has shown that prevention-oriented individuals are not always risk averse (Scholer, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2008; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). More specifically, prevention-oriented individuals, when pursuing goals they deem necessities, are willing to take risks if taking risks is the only way to reach their goal. If, as we claim, prevention-oriented individuals construe the goal of collective action as a necessity when they hold this goal with moral conviction, then they should be willing to personally engage in hostile (risky) forms of collective action when benevolent (safe) avenues towards social change are closed. Importantly, research has found hostile forms of collective action to occur precisely in these situations (Gurr, 1993; Louis et al., 2011; Spears, Scheepers, & Van Zomeren, 2011; Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh, & Siddiqui, in press). Thus, because they see social change as a necessity, prevention-oriented individuals with a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group should be especially likely to actually engage in hostile forms of collective action in these situations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the results of two studies demonstrated that regulatory focus affects the extent to which holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group leads individuals to become willing to support both hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. Holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group motivated individuals under prevention focus, but not individuals under promotion focus, to engage in benevolent collective action. Furthermore, prevention

(but not promotion) oriented individuals holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group were also willing to support more extreme, hostile forms of collective action. This was even the case when these same individuals viewed these hostile forms of collective action as inherently immoral. Thus for prevention-oriented individuals the ends (social change) appeared to justify the means (hostile forms of collective action).

Footnotes

[11] This chapter is based on Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, and Derks (in press, b)

[12] Confirmatory factor analyses showed that the promotion and prevention scales could be empirically distinguished. The proposed two-factor structure fit better than the one-factor structure ($\Delta\chi^2 = 211$, $\Delta df = 1$, $p < .001$).

[13] Confirmatory factor analyses showed that the support for hostile and benevolent collective action scales could be empirically distinguished. The proposed two-factor structure fit better than the one-factor structure ($\Delta\chi^2 = 168$, $\Delta df = 1$, $p < .001$).

[14] Confirmatory factor analyses showed that the scales measuring the moral conviction of gender equality and the importance of countering gender inequality could be empirically distinguished. The proposed two-factor structure fit better than the one-factor structure ($\Delta\chi^2 = 60$, $\Delta df = 1$, $p < .001$).

[15] Because of methodological difficulties associated with assessing personal engagement in actual hostile forms of collective action under controlled circumstances, we could not measure this as a behavioural variable.

[16] Not including the importance of countering gender inequality and its interaction with regulatory focus does not substantially alter the results (focus x moral conviction interaction, $p = .007$).

[17] Benevolent collective action was unrelated to moral objections to hostile forms of collective action ($r(151) = .04$, $p = .66$) and to any of its interactions with the other independent variables ($p > .79$), attesting to the fact that signing the petition was not seen as hostile. The interaction between the manipulation of regulatory focus and moral conviction on the odds of signing the petition was not further qualified by moral objections to hostile forms of collective action (three-way interaction $p = .93$).

[18] Not including the importance of countering gender inequality and its interactions with the manipulation of regulatory focus and the measure of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action makes the hypothesized three-way interaction marginally significant ($p = .08$). However, in the prevention condition the predicted interaction between the measures of moral conviction and moral objections to

hostile forms of collective action is still significant (p = .01) and the separate lines consistent with predictions.

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Samenvatting

2011 was het jaar van het collectieve protest. Tijdens de Arabische lente kwamen de inwoners van verschillende landen in de Arabische wereld (Tunesië, Egypte, Libië, Syrië, Bahrein, Jemen) in opstand tegen de dictatoriale regimes in die landen. Nederlandse studenten protesteerden tegen bezuinigingen in het universitair onderwijs, scholieren protesteerden tegen de "ophokplicht" in het middelbaar onderwijs, Britten uit de lagere sociale klassen trokken gezamenlijk de straat op om te plunderen en een wereldwijde "Occupy" beweging werd gevormd om te protesteren tegen de oneerlijke verdeling van welvaart. Wat bezielt mensen die aan deze vormen van protest deelnemen? Snappen ze niet dat het protest eigenlijk net zo veel kans van slagen heeft zonder hen als met hen, en dat het dus eigenlijk logischer is om niet protesteren en om anderen het vuile werk op te laten knappen? Snappen ze niet dat protesteren toch eigenlijk weinig zin heeft? Of protesteren ze omdat ze geloven dat ze samen juist wél kans hebben op succes? En wat bezielt extremisten die naar geweld en wapens grijpen om hun doelen te bereiken? In dit proefschrift ga ik op zoek naar antwoorden op deze vragen.

De mensen die deel uitmaakten van het protest in de bovenstaande voorbeelden hebben verschillende zaken met elkaar gemeen. Ten eerste delen ze het idee dat hun groep (bestaande uit bijvoorbeeld studenten of Tunesiërs), en daarom ook zij persoonlijk, op een onrechtvaardige manier benadeeld worden door anderen. Ten tweede hebben zij ervoor gekozen om samen te werken met andere mensen die in hetzelfde schuitje zitten om het behalen van hun gemeenschappelijke doelen mogelijk te maken. In de sociaal psychologische en sociologische literatuur wordt dit verschijnsel waarbij mensen handelen om de belangen van hun groep te behartigen collectieve actie genoemd. Omdat collectieve actie vaak de enige manier is om maatschappelijke doelen te bereiken, en gepaard kan gaan met hoge maatschappelijke kosten (bijvoorbeeld wanneer een vreedzame actie uit de hand loopt, of tijdens een gewelddadig protest) is het belangrijk te weten hoe mensen gemotiveerd raken om over te gaan tot collectieve actie en hoe ze vervolgens kiezen om deel te nemen aan vreedzame of gewelddadige vormen van actie. In dit proefschrift doe ik een poging antwoord te geven op deze vragen vanuit het perspectief van de regulatiefocus theorie (1997), een theorie die twee verschillende vormen van motivatie beschrijft, ten eerste de motivatie om doelen te

behalen die men *graag wil behalen* (promotiefocus) en ten tweede de motivatie om doelen te behalen waarvan men vindt dat die behaald *moeten* worden (preventiefocus). Voor ik deze theorie introduceer en uitleg hoe deze ons begrip van collectieve actie kan vergroten is het nodig om wat achtergrondinformatie te geven over de keuzes die mensen moeten maken wanneer ze met collectieve benadeling te maken krijgen.

Reacties op collectieve benadeling

Volgens Wright en collega's (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990a; 1990b, Wright, 2001) krijgen mensen die benadeeld worden op basis van hun groepslidmaatschap te maken met drie keuzes, en is hun reactie op deze benadeling afhankelijk van de uitkomsten van deze keuzes. Ten eerste moeten leden van benadeelde groepen kiezen tussen het nastreven van verbetering van hun eigen positie (individuele actie) en het nastreven van verbetering van de positie van de gehele benadeelde groep waarvan ze lid zijn (collectieve actie). Leden van structureel benadeelde groepen in de samenleving (zoals leden van etnische minderheden) kunnen hun eigen maatschappelijke positie bijvoorbeeld verbeteren door een opleiding te volgen, of vooruit te komen in hun werk. De straat op gaan om te demonstreren tegen discriminatie is een voorbeeld van gedrag dat gericht is op het verbeteren van de maatschappelijke positie van de gehele groep. Om te begrijpen waarom mensen ervoor kiezen om de straat op te gaan om te protesteren (in plaats van zich in te zetten voor bijvoorbeeld hun eigen carrière) moeten we dus allereerst weten hoe zij de keuze hebben gemaakt tussen het nastreven van hun persoonlijke doelen en het nastreven van de doelen van hun groep.

Een tweede keuze die leden van benadeelde groepen moeten maken is te beslissen hoe toegewijd ze zijn aan het doel van collectieve of individuele statusverhoging dat ze hebben gekozen. Het deelnemen aan sommige vormen van collectieve actie (zoals het in hongerstaking gaan) vereist bijvoorbeeld een hogere mate van toewijding dan het deelnemen aan andere vormen van collectieve actie (zoals het tekenen van een petitie). Om te begrijpen waarom sommige mensen in hongerstaking gaan om de belangen van hun groep te dienen terwijl anderen slechts een petitie tekenen om hetzelfde doel te bereiken moeten we dus weten welke factoren bepalen hoe toegewijd mensen zijn aan het collectieve doel.

Ten derde gaan sommige vormen van collectieve actie (zoals gewelddadig protest) gepaard met het schaden van de belangen van degenen die gezien worden als verantwoordelijk voor de benadeelde positie van de groep, terwijl dat niet voor andere vormen geldt (zoals vreedzaam protest). Leden van benadeelde groepen moeten voor zichzelf beslissen in hoeverre ze het schaden van deze anderen gerechtvaardigd vinden in hun streven naar positieverbetering van hun groep.

Dus, om te begrijpen hoe en waarom mensen in actie komen om de belangen van hun groep te behartigen moeten we weten 1) of ze ervoor gekozen hebben om groepsdoelen na te streven in plaats van individuele doelen, 2) hoe toegewijd ze zijn aan deze groepsdoelen, en 3) in welke mate ze vinden dat het schaden van de belangen van degenen die zij verantwoordelijk houden voor de benadeelde positie van de groep gerechtvaardigd is. Hieronder zal ik deze vragen proberen te beantwoorden vanuit het perspectief van de regulatiefocus theorie. Ik zal beargumenteren dat mensen in een preventiefocus (in tegenstelling tot mensen in een promotiefocus) 1) zich minder gemakkelijk laten verleiden tot individuele actie ten koste van collectieve actie. Wanneer ze het doel van collectieve actie als belangrijk zien zullen mensen in een preventiefocus 2) meer toegewijd zijn aan de actie ongeacht de kans van slagen die ze de actie toedichten, en 3) extremere vormen van collectieve actie niet schuwen. Om te kunnen begrijpen waarom dit zo is, zal ik eerst een overzicht van de regulatiefocus theorie geven.

De regulatiefocus theorie

Volgens de regulatiefocus theorie van Higgins (1997; 1998), beschikken mensen over twee verschillende motivationele systemen, promotiefocus en preventiefocus. Deze verschillen van elkaar in functie en leiden tot het nastreven van verschillende soorten doelen, tot het gebruik van verschillende strategieën bij het nastreven van doelen. Ze roepen ook verschillende emotionele reacties op succes en falen op, en zorgen ervoor dat sterke motivatie op verschillende manieren wordt ervaren. Promotie- en preventiefocus variëren van moment tot moment, maar hebben ook een stabiele (chronische) component die wordt gevormd in de kindertijd (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001; Keller, 2008)

De promotiefocus helpt mensen te voldoen aan de behoefte aan groei en ontwikkeling. Activering van de promotiefocus leidt tot gedrag dat is gericht op het behalen van maximale doelen (doelen waarvan het behalen als positiever wordt gezien dan het niet behalen als negatief). Als gevolg hiervan leidt de promotiefocus tot de strategische neiging om toenadering te zoeken tot doelen (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Mensen die succes behalen in een promotiefocus ervaren gevoelens van blijdschap, falen geeft gevoelens van verdriet of teleurstelling (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1987). Motivatie binnen de promotiefocus wordt ervaren als verlangen om een aantrekkelijk doel te bereiken (Shah & Higgins, 1997; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010).

De preventiefocus daarentegen helpt mensen te voldoen aan de behoefte aan veiligheid en zekerheid. Activering van de preventiefocus leidt tot het nastreven van minimale doelen (doelen waarvan het niet behalen als negatiever wordt gezien dan het behalen ervan als positief). Als gevolg hiervan leidt de preventiefocus tot de strategische neiging om alternatieven van doelen te vermijden (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). In een preventiefocus roept succes gevoelens van rust op, terwijl falen gepaard met gevoelens van agitatie (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1987). Tot slot, en belangrijk voor deze samenvatting (en de rest van het proefschrift): een sterke motivatie binnen de preventiefocus wordt ervaren als noodzaak om het gestelde doel te bereiken (Shah & Higgins, 1997; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010).

De keuze tussen individuele actie en collectieve actie

Zoals eerder uitgelegd is het, om te begrijpen hoe en waarom mensen in opstand komen tegen de benadeelde positie van hun groep, belangrijk om te weten hoe zij kiezen tussen het nastreven van verbetering van hun persoonlijke positie en het nastreven van de positie van hun gehele groep. Eerder onderzoek heeft de mate waarin leden van benadeelde groepen gemakkelijk individueel succes kunnen behalen (de permeabiliteit van groepsgrenzen) geïdentificeerd als belangrijke voorspeller van de keuze tussen individuele en collectieve actie (Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990). In situaties waarin er veel mogelijkheden zijn om individueel succes te behalen (men spreekt hier van een open sociaal systeem) kiezen leden van benadeelde groepen over het algemeen eerder voor individuele actie. In situaties waar weinig of geen kansen

op individueel succes bestaan (ook wel: een gesloten sociaal systeem) verkiezen zij eerder collectieve actie boven individuele actie. Vaak echter ligt de werkelijke mate van permeabiliteit tussen die van het open systeem en die van het gesloten systeem in. Leden van benadeelde groepen hebben in dergelijke situaties (men spreekt hier van een token systeem) in principe wel kansen op individueel maatschappelijk succes, maar deze kansen zijn beduidend kleiner dan die van leden van bevoordeelde groepen. (Wright, 1997; Richard & Wright, 2001). In deze gevallen is het voor leden van benadeelde groepen dus moeilijk om te bepalen wat de aangewezen strategie is (collectieve actie of individuele actie). Onderzoek van Wright (1997) laat zien dat leden van benadeelde groepen zich in dergelijke situaties vooral richten op individueel succes ten koste van gezamenlijke pogingen tot collectieve statusverhoging. Volgens Wright (1997; Richard & Wright, 2001) wordt de keuze voor individuele actie in deze situatie veroorzaakt doordat men zich richt op de positieve (meritocratische) aspecten van het systeem en minder aandacht besteedt aan de negatieve (discriminatoire) kanten van het systeem.

In de twee studies die in hoofdstuk twee van dit proefschrift worden besproken heb ik onderzocht of (en hoe) hier wat aan veranderd zou kunnen worden. Het idee achter deze studies was als volgt. Als het probleem is dat mensen zich in hun handelen te veel op de positieve (meritocratische) aspecten van het token systeem richten, is dit wellicht indicatief voor een promotiefocus. Promotiegerichte mensen handelen immers om positieve uitkomsten te benaderen. Het verleggen van hun motivationele oriëntatie naar de preventiefocus zou hun aandacht meer moeten richten op de negatieve (discriminatoire) aspecten van het systeem. Dit zou vervolgens moeten leiden tot meer steun voor collectieve actie tegen de negatieve aspecten van het systeem. In twee experimenten vonden we precies dat. Mensen met een (chronische of door ons geïnduceerde) promotiefocus richtten zich vooral op het verbeteren van hun persoonlijke positie. Ze waren minder gericht op het verbeteren van de positie van hun groep in token situaties dan in een controle conditie waarin geen individueel succes mogelijk was. Voor mensen met een (chronische of geïnduceerde) preventiefocus bleek dit niet het geval. Zij waren vooral gericht op het verbeteren van de positie van hun groep. Het maakte in dit geval niet uit of ze de mogelijkheid kregen hun individuele

positie te verbeteren (zoals in de token conditie) of niet (zoals in de gesloten controle conditie).

Toewijding aan collectieve actie

In de psychologische literatuur wordt aangenomen dat je de mate van toewijding aan een doel kunt berekenen. Dit is mogelijk door de subjectieve waarde van het doel te corrigeren voor de kans dat dit doel behaald zal worden (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). De redenering is dat men bereid is om tijd en energie te steken in het nastreven van doelen waaraan men belang hecht, maar alleen voor zover er een goede kans bestaat deze doelen te behalen. In de collectieve actie literatuur spreekt men in dit verband van het collectieve motief. Men neemt deel aan collectieve actie omdat men waarde hecht aan het verbeteren van de positie van de groep én denkt dat dit doel bereikt kan worden door samenwerking met andere leden van de groep (cf. Klandermans, 1984a). Onderzoek naar actiebereidheid onder activisten laat echter zien dat dit "collectieve motief" niet in alle gevallen een goede voorspeller vormt voor deelname aan collectieve actie (cf. Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jorger, 2003). Dit betekent dat in sommige gevallen mensen bereid zijn om zich toe te wijden aan collectieve actie, zelfs wanneer ze weinig vertrouwen hebben in de goede afloop ervan.

In hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift worden drie onderzoeken besproken die ingaan op deze kwestie. In deze onderzoeken wordt de invloed van regulatiefocus onderzocht op de mate waarin instrumentele overwegingen mensen motiveren tot collectieve actie over te gaan. Het uitgangspunt was dat individuele regulatiefocus bepaalt hoe men sterke motivatie ervaart: als verlangen (bij een promotiefocus) of als verplichting (bij een preventiefocus). Promotiegerichte mensen zien voor hen belangrijke doelen als verlangens, preventiegerichte mensen zien voor hen belangrijke doelen als noodzakelijkheden (cf. Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). Wanneer men waarde hecht aan het doel van collectieve actie, betekent dit dat promotiegerichte mensen dit als verlangen zouden moeten ervaren terwijl preventiegerichte mensen het behalen ervan als noodzaak zouden moeten zien. Noodzakelijke doelen zijn doelen die behaald *moeten* worden, zelfs als de kans op succes gering is. Daarom werd verwacht dat preventiegerichte mensen die veel waarde hechten aan het doel van collectieve actie (en het behalen van dit doel dus als een

noodzaak zien) bereid zouden zijn deze actie te steunen, ongeacht de succeskans ervan. Van promotiegerichte mensen die veel waarde hechten aan het doel van collectieve actie werd daarentegen verwacht dat ze dit doel vooral als een verlangen zouden zien. Met deze visie op collectieve positieverbetering is het verstandig te wachten op goede kansen om dit doel te bereiken. De resultaten van drie onderzoeken waren in overeenstemming met deze voorspellingen. Promotiegerichte mensen bleken vooral toegewijd aan collectieve actie wanneer ze zowel veel waarde aan het doel hechtten als een hoge succesverwachting koesterden. Preventiegerichte mensen bleken toegewijd wanneer ze waarde hechtten aan het doel, ongeacht de verwachting dat het collectieve doel behaald zou kunnen. Dit was het geval wanneer we mensen vergeleken die chronisch verschillen in promotie- en preventiegerichtheid, maar ook wanneer we met instructies tijdens het onderzoek promotie- of preventiegerichtheid induceerden.

De keuze tussen vreedzame en gewelddadige vormen van actie

Zoals eerder uitgelegd zijn sommige vormen van collectieve actie (zoals rellen en sabotage) gericht op het schaden van de belangen van de mensen of groepen die als verantwoordelijk voor de benadeelde positie van de groep worden gezien. Om te begrijpen hoe mensen ertoe komen deel te nemen aan dergelijke extremere vormen van actie is het belangrijk om te begrijpen in welke situaties zij deze vormen van actie als gerechtvaardigd zien.

In hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift worden twee onderzoeken besproken die erop gericht waren deze vraag te beantwoorden. Net als in hoofdstuk 3 waren de voorspellingen gebaseerd op de bevinding dat mensen in een preventiefocus sterke motivatie anders ervaren (nl. als noodzaak) dan mensen in een promotiefocus (die sterke motivatie ervaren als verlangen). Het idee was dat mensen die het behalen van een doel als noodzakelijkheid zien het gebruik van extremere methoden om dit doel te behalen gerechtvaardigd vinden. Dit geldt niet wanneer het doel als een verlangen wordt gezien. Immers, wanneer het behalen van een doel als noodzakelijk wordt gezien, dan maakt het niet uit *hoe* dit doel bereikt wordt, *zolang* het maar bereikt wordt. De voorspelling voor mensen in een preventiefocus was dus dat het belang dat ze aan het doel van collectieve actie hechten het gebruik van extremere, gewelddadigere vormen van collectieve actie

zou moeten rechtvaardigen. Dit zou niet het geval moeten zijn voor mensen in een promotiefocus.

De resultaten van twee onderzoeken waren in overeenstemming met deze voorspellingen. Studie 4.1 liet zien dat alleen voor mensen in een preventiefocus, het belang dat zij hechten aan het collectieve doel ervoor zorgt dat extremere vormen van collectieve actie als gerechtvaardigd worden gezien. De resultaten van Studie 4.2 lieten zien dat dit zelfs geldt wanneer mensen sterke morele bezwaren ervaren tegen het gebruik van deze extremere vormen van actie. Het ervaren van morele bezwaren tegen extremere vormen van collectieve actie weerhield mensen in een preventiefocus ervan dergelijke vormen van actie te steunen, maar alleen zolang zij geen sterk belang hechtten aan het doel van de actie. Mensen in een preventiefocus die veel belang hechtten aan het doel van collectieve actie (en het behalen van dit doel dus als een noodzakelijkheid zagen) steunden deze extremere vormen van actie, zelfs wanneer zij deze vormen normaal gesproken immoreel zouden vinden. Voor hen heiligt het doel dus de middelen.

Conclusie

Samengevat laten de resultaten van de zeven in dit proefschrift gerapporteerde onderzoeken zien dat de preventiefocus de meest geschikte motivationele oriëntatie is voor het bevorderen van deelname aan collectieve actie. Mensen in een preventiefocus bleken - meer dan mensen in een promotiefocus - collectieve actie te verkiezen boven individuele actie, zelfs wanneer individuele positieverbetering een reële mogelijkheid vormt. Wanneer ze voldoende waarde hechten aan het doel van collectieve positieverbetering, zijn mensen in een preventiefocus (maar niet mensen in een promotiefocus) bereid om deel te nemen aan collectieve actie, zelfs wanneer de succeskansen beperkt zijn, of de actievormen extremer zijn dan ze normaal gesproken acceptabel zouden vinden.

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Curriculum Vitae

Maarten Pieter Zaal was born on the 8th of January 1981 in Utrecht, The Netherlands. After finishing high school at Kaj Munk college in Hoofddorp, he spent a year working and travelling the world. In the year 2000 Maarten started studying psychology at Leiden University. His interest in becoming an academic emerged while working on his thesis on the role of social influence in the way members of stigmatized groups recognize, and respond to subtle forms of discrimination under supervision of Sezgin Cihangir and Dr. Manuela Barreto. He obtained his master's degree in social and organizational psychology (cum laude) in 2006. In 2007, Maarten started working as a PhD-student on a project investigating the role of self-regulatory focus in the decision to engage in collective action, which was supervised by Dr. Colette van Laar, Prof. D. Naomi Ellemers, Dr. Tomas Ståhl, and Dr. Belle Derks. The PhD project resulted in the this dissertation. Maarten currently works as a postdoctoral researcher at Leiden University.

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