



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

National prestige and economic interest : Dutch diplomacy toward Japan 1850-1863

Kogure, M.

Citation

Kogure, M. (2008, September 25). *National prestige and economic interest : Dutch diplomacy toward Japan 1850-1863*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13149>

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13149>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

**NATIONAL PRESTIGE AND ECONOMIC
INTEREST**
Dutch Diplomacy Towards Japan 1850–1863

Minori Kogure

**NATIONAL PRESTIGE AND ECONOMIC
INTEREST
Dutch Diplomacy Towards Japan 1850–1863**

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus, prof. mr. P.F. van der Heijden,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op donderdag 25 september 2008
klokke 13.45 uur

door
Minori Kogure

geboren te Osaka – Japan
in 1969

Promotiecommissie:

Promotor: Prof. dr. J.L. Blussé van Oud-Alblas

Referent: Prof. dr. H.W. van den Doel

Overige leden: Prof. dr. H. Beukers
Dr. F.P. van der Putten (Clingendael, De Haag)
Dr. W.G.J. R Emmelink (Japan-Nederland Instituut, Tokio)
Dr. H. Moeshart (voorheen Prentenkabinet. UL)
Prof. dr. W.R. van Gulik

Het onderzoek voor deze dissertatie werd gefinancierd door de Isaac Alfred Ailion Foundation, the Canon Foundation, en de Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

© Copyright Shaker Publishing 2008

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.

Printed in The Netherlands.

ISBN 978-90-423-0352-2

Shaker Publishing BV
St. Maartenslaan 26
6221 AX Maastricht
Tel.: 043-3500424
Fax: 043-3255090
[http:// www.shaker.nl](http://www.shaker.nl)

Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

1

Part I:

1. The aim of this study
2. Two problems in the history of diplomatic relations between Japan and Western powers
 - A. The accepted theory which restrains academic study
 - B. The problem of the study of Japan's foreign relations
 1. The problem of the situation of study in Japan
 2. The problem of the situation of study in Western countries.
3. Problems arising from Dutch-Japanese diplomatic history
4. Presumptions against presently accepted theories
 - A. Dutch Imperialism
 - B. Dutch 'National Prestige and Economic Interests' in Japan.
 - C. Traditionalism in Japan.
5. What proof is needed?

Part II: Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era: the fundamentals of Dutch foreign policy in Asia

The general view of Dutch diplomatic history after the Napoleonic Wars

Classic works on Dutch foreign policy

The concept of small power politics

'National prestige and economic interest' in Dutch diplomacy, particularly in relation to colonial policy.

'Dutch Imperialism' – a re-evaluation of Dutch foreign policy

The relevance to the Netherlands of relations with Japan

Chapter 1: The Dutch-British relationship as 'Lords of the East' - from the examination of the Treaty of London

34

The Treaty of London

The First Treaty of London

Return of the Dutch colonies and its problems

The Second Treaty of London

Some noteworthy aspects of the final version of the Treaty of London

Conclusion

Chapter 2: The Dutch-British relationship as ‘Lords of the East’ - from an examination of Japanese affairs in the Treaty of London 55

Japanese Affairs in the Treaties of London

The Dutch sphere of influence in Asia from the British point of view

Relevance of the Treaty of London to Dutch-Japanese relations

Anglo-Dutch versus American interests in Japan

Conclusion

Chapter 3: The history that preceded the opening of Japan - Dutch endeavours in it 66

Dutch diplomacy towards Japan before the 1850s

The repudiation of the letter to announce the accession to the throne of King Willem II and the accompanying presents

The Dutch King’s letter

Conclusion

Chapter 4: Dutch and American Diplomacy towards Japan Before the Opening 81

American diplomacy toward Asia until its Japanese expedition

Dutch diplomacy towards Japan before its opening

Chapter 5: Dutch foreign policy in relation to America’s Asian policy 90

Difficulties in Dutch Far Eastern policy - discord between the home Government in Netherlands and the colonial administration in the Netherlands East Indies.

Japanese expedition by the United States – Commodore Perry

Von Siebold’s proposal for the American diplomacy towards Japan

American request for Dutch support for its expedition to Japan

The Japanese expedition of the United States with a powerful force and the

Dutch reaction to it

Chapter 6: Perry’s arrival in Japan and the desired outcome of the expedition 110

The effect of Perry’s arrival in Japan

The *Bakufu*’s policy

Dutch ‘national prestige and economic interest’ diplomacy towards Japan under

the changed circumstances

Active diplomacy towards Japan by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs

The true story about the presentation of the *Soembing* to Japan

Chapter 7: The endeavour for and success in concluding the Dutch-Japanese treaty 135

The unique Dutch diplomacy towards Japan

From the Dutch-Japanese Provisional Agreement of 1855 and the Dutch-Japanese Treaty of 1856 to the Dutch-Japanese Amended Treaty of 1857

The endeavour to maintain Dutch profits in Japan

Chapter 8: The United Kingdom and the Netherlands as allies in Japan 148

British policy in Asia

Political co-operation and economic competition

Chapter 9: Clashes within the Dutch bureaucracy about Japanese policy 169

Confrontation between the Minister of Colonial Affairs Pahud and the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies Duymaer van Twist

Confrontation between the Chief of 'the Japan Desk' Krabbe and his Minister at the Ministry of Colonial Affairs

The modified policy towards Japan

Trade reform and the Dutch situation in Japan

Criticism of Dutch Government in the Dutch Press

Chapter 10: The Harris Treaty of 1858 185

Harris' endeavour to establish American supremacy in Japan

Disappointment in the Netherlands

Disappointment in Dutch public opinion

Chapter 11: Dutch diplomacy in Japan after the Harris Treaty 204

New developments in Asian diplomatic relations

Public opinion and Dutch diplomacy

Active Dutch diplomacy towards Japan

New-style Dutch diplomacy towards Japan

The Anglo-Dutch -French 'Entente' against the United States

The Von Siebold incident – an obstacle to the Triple Entente

Opinion in the Netherlands about the murder of Heusken
The significance of Triple Entente

Chapter 12: The endeavor to acquire vested rights 226

Deshima as a Dutch bonded warehouse
Criticism in Dutch public opinion about Dutch Government diplomacy
Opinions in business circles about Deshima as a bonded warehouse
The Dutch headquarters remain in Nagasaki, and a sea route is planned between Nagasaki and China
Summary provided by the Minister of Colonial Affairs

Chapter 13: The end of autonomous Dutch diplomacy in Japan 247

Criticism of the Dutch Government diplomacy towards the Japanese delegation
Transfer of Japanese and Chinese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Indifference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Japanese affairs
Decreasing interest in Japanese affairs in the Netherlands

Epilogue 272

Conclusion 276

Bibliography 284

Samenvatting 316

Personal Name Index 319

Acknowledgements

This dissertation is mainly composed of Dutch documents which have been preserved in the *Nationaal Archief* at The Hague. I much appreciate the kindness of the staff and I would like to thank in particular Mr. René Janssen who gave me a lot of useful advice and help. I gratefully thank the following institutions in Holland that provided me with scholarships to carry out the research for this doctoral thesis: Nuffic, the Canon Foundation and the J.I. Ailion Foundation. I personally thank the following persons connected to these institutions: Ms. Corrie Siahaya-Van Nierop, Ms. Suzy Cohen, His Excellency Andreas van Agt, honorary chairman of the Canon Foundation, Mr. R.G. Louw and Dr. Francien van Anrooij of the Ailion Foundation, and Dr. W.J. Vogelsang, my host at CNWS.

I was Research Fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) for three years and I would like to thank the staff members of JSPS and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology who were in charge of this research fellowship. I thank my *alma mater*, Meiji University, which acted as the host institute, especially Prof. Tatsuru Miyake, Prof. Dr. Yoshikatsu Hayashi and Prof. Takashi Nemoto. Also thanks to Prof. Dr. Takao Yamaguchi and Prof. Dr. Takeshi Ito who often visited in the Netherlands for their research and gave me support in my research as well as Prof. Dr. Tetsunori Iwashita of Meikai University. Furthermore I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Yoshinori Yokoyama, Prof. Dr. Yoko Matsui, Prof. Dr. Fuyuko Matsukata and Mr. Naoki Kimura at the Historiographical Institute of Tokyo University who generously gave me their help.

During the long period of study in the Netherlands I went back to Japan several times. On all such occasions Prof. Dr. Chihiro Ishida, the late Prof. Yatomi Iwata, Prof. Dr. Masumi Ôsawa, Mr. Tatsumi Ozeki (my history teacher at high school), Dr. Yasuhiro Doi, Prof. Dr. Eiichi Kato, Prof. Dr. Kazuo Katagiri, Prof. Nobutoshi Kutsuzawa, Prof. Dr. Taichi Sakai, the late Prof. Dr. Tatsusaku Sato, Prof. Mitsuru Hirano, Prof. Dr. Tadashi Yoshida, and last but not least Dr. W.G.J. Remmelink, Ms. Kaoru Yanagisawa and Ms. Hiromi Miyazaki of the *Nichiran Gakkai* (The Japan Netherlands Institute) all encouraged me greatly in my research. Also I thank my Judo-teachers: Mr. Yutaka Yamashita, Mr. Futoshi Matsui and the late Mr. Gingo Kurosu, and my best friend Hidetoshi Yanagisawa. Also, of course, I would like to thank my parents Miyoko and Masurao Kogure, and among my relatives, especially Kane and Kenichi Chigasaki.

It was very important and meaningful to me to discuss my subject with Dutch researchers. This thesis particularly stresses the Dutch-British political relations as allies, because Dr. Jurrien van Goor, who is the pre-eminent authority on Dutch colonial history, advised me that this point of view is not yet sufficiently acknowledged in Dutch history. Also I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Duco Hellema at Utrecht University who gave me useful advice and introduced me to dr. Van Goor.

While studying in the Netherlands I received a lot of encouragement and kindness from many people. I had a good time with my best friends Suk-jae Hummelen, Ingrid Bardon, Peter Lutz and Laetitia Dogon as well as their families, and also René, Els & Vincent and Mrs. Trudie and Mr. Ruud van den Berg. Also I thank Max ter Linden, Eric Ten and Sebastiaan Vardy (former participants of the Japan Prizewinners Program) for their kindness, my good neighbors Susan and Vanessa, and Mrs. Caire Taylor and Mrs. Rosemary Robson who revised the English. I am grateful to Adelinde van der Leeden, Mrs. Miyako Vos, Mr. Masafumi Kunimori, Mrs. Kuniko Förrer and Prof. dr. Matthi Förrer.

In the Leiden cafés De WW and Catena, one of the student associations of Leiden University, I could drown (*verdrinken*) my loneliness in this foreign country thanks to the cheerful and kind staff. Without them I could not have survived. Especially I would like to mention Adri, Hans, Gert, Eef, Edwin, Rob, and Lisette in de WW and Anneke, Arwen, Alex, Boaz, Edwin, Jules, Louise, Leony, Matthijs and Thomas in Catena. I really have to apologize for not mentioning all the names of the wonderful people I met here. However, I wish to thank all of them very much from the bottom of my heart.

I encountered many hardships in finishing this work, in particular the passing away of my Japanese professor, Emeritus Prof. Dr. Madoka Kanai of Tokyo University, formerly the director of the Japan Netherlands Institute. At that time I completely lost the will to continue my research. But, thanks to warm-hearted support of many people, I am now very happy to have accomplished this work.

I dedicate this dissertation to the late Prof. Dr. Madoka Kanai whose support I will never forget, and to my grandparents, Junichi & Kyô, and Sôzô & Tokuko Chigasaki who loved me and were very interested in my study, although all these people are now in Heaven.

Introduction

Part I:

1. The aim of this study

Existing studies of the history of diplomatic relations between Japan and Western countries relating to the opening of Japan (1854) tend to concentrate on a discussion of the role of the great powers, especially Great Britain, the United States, France and Prussia. There are only a few works which explore the diplomatic relations between Japan and the Netherlands, although the Dutch and the Japanese maintained a relationship that predates the opening of Japan by some two centuries. Moreover, Japanese-Dutch relations have been examined principally from the perspective of cultural rather than diplomatic relationships.

This situation is the outcome of the generally negative opinion of Dutch diplomatic power as that of a small power unable to pursue autonomous diplomacy. Certainly the Netherlands was a small country in comparison to Britain, the United States, France and Prussia. However in this period, the Netherlands had vast colonies in Asia, namely the Netherlands East Indies (present-day Indonesia), and ranked second only after Britain in the whole world in terms of the size of its colonies. Thanks to the efficient management of its colonies, the Dutch economy was fairly prosperous at that time.¹ In consideration of this point, it can be noted that existing works scarcely deal with the Dutch influence in Asia, the role of the Netherlands among other Western great powers and its special relationship with Japan.

Given this state of affairs, it would seem difficult to achieve a clear overview of the diplomatic relations between Japan and Western powers, the diplomatic relations between Japan and the Netherlands and Dutch diplomacy towards the Far East. This is the reason this subject should be analyzed thoroughly and discussed at some length.

¹ Richard T. Griffiths, *Industrial Retardation in the Netherlands 1830-1850*, Den Haag, 1979, p.38.

This thesis will attempt to address and to clarify this deficiency, paying particular attention to the following issues and questions in the field of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the period 1850-1863, predominantly on the basis of Dutch primary sources and publications:

1. How can this study lead to a re-interpretation of nineteenth-century modern Dutch history?
2. How did the Netherlands, a small European country, deal with Asian affairs compared to other Western powers in Asia?
3. Why did the Netherlands follow an autonomous and positive diplomacy towards Japan after the arrival of the Americans in Japan?
4. How was the Netherlands able to promote its interests in Japan in the light of the long-standing relationship between both countries?
5. What difficulties were encountered by the Netherlands in dealing with Japanese affairs?
6. Why did the Netherlands prefer to remain in its old settlement Dejima in Nagasaki after the opening of Edo (present-day Tokyo) to foreigners?
7. What plan did the Netherlands have in order to develop its position in the Japanese market?
8. How did the Netherlands promote its interests in Japan with one of the largest countries in the world, the USA, as a rival?
9. How did autonomous, Dutch active diplomacy come to an end?

2. Two problems in the history of diplomatic relations between Japan and Western powers

A. The accepted theory which restrains academic study

At present the number of works about the history of Dutch diplomatic relations with Japan is limited to a small number. What is the reason for this situation? In answer it can be pointed out that there is an accepted 'theory' in these studies. This implies that the Netherlands was not a strong power and consequently was not able to adopt an autonomous diplomacy in Japanese affairs among other major Western powers. Rather, the Netherlands preferred to take care to

maintain good relations with them. Superficially, this way of thinking seems correct and it also coincides with Dutch diplomacy as it is generally accepted at present. It would seem that this accepted theory is the reason that there are only a few studies about the Netherlands and the diplomatic relations between Japan and Western countries. It should be pointed out that this accepted theory has so far not been supported by any academic analysis or discussion.

B. The problem of the study of Japan's foreign relations

Besides the above-mentioned problem, another relevant difficulty can be pointed out which impedes this subject. This problem or difficulty can be illuminated by the study of the situations both in Japan and in Western countries.

1. The problem of the situation of study in Japan

The history of relations between Japan and the Netherlands is contained in studies of Japanese history which have relied mainly on Japanese documents as their sources. Detailed works concerning the activities of the consul-generals and Western nations in Japan tend to have been written using this kind of material, which has been classified and published. Some Japanese literature sources are supported by Western documents, especially those kept in the Public Record Office in Britain and NARA (United States National Archives and Records Administration) in the United States. These works tend mainly to concern the activities of a Western person in Japan. Therefore, through these works it is possible to understand the local situations, for example what was happening in Nagasaki and Yokohama which were open ports, and the relations of the Western powers with the Japanese. However, it is difficult to comprehend what their governments thought about Japanese affairs and what diplomacy they contemplated adopting towards Japan. This circumstance is also hampered by the fact that the literature which has attempted a thorough examination of governmental documents in Western countries is scarce.

2. The problem of the situation of study in Western countries.

In the study of the history of relations between Japan and Western countries, most of the literature sources are largely concerned with the relationship between Japan and Western great powers, especially Great Britain and the United States. As regards Great Britain, the works of Beasley² and Cortazzi³ are very important because they deal with a large number of documents from the British Foreign Office. Moreover, many books, diaries and documents have been published concerning the consuls-general or envoys to Japan. In the United States, the works of Goodman⁴ and Wiley⁵ are noteworthy, because they examine a large number of documents about American foreign policy. Furthermore, there are many detailed studies about documents concerning Perry's (Matthew Calbraith Perry, 1794-1858) expedition to Japan in 1853-1854 and about the foreign consuls-general. Consequently the United States and Great Britain are always emphasized in any discussion of the relationship between Japan and the Western countries.

Another problem with European and American literature on the subject is that it emphasizes British-American relations at the local level. As is well known, anti-foreign sentiments were strong in Japan after its opening and many unfortunate events, such as the murder of foreigners and violent behavior against them, occurred at that time. Since the Japanese authorities had no effective means such as a police force to solve these problems, the foreign powers felt that they needed to co-operate in order to protect their nationals. In this context it should be noted that the British Minister maintained close contacts with the American Consul-General who was stationed in Edo, rather than with the Dutch commissioner who preferred to remain at his headquarters in Nagasaki. Such co-operation almost invariably took place at a local level. Therefore if one were to rely exclusively on this local perspective, it would be difficult to achieve an understanding of the attitude of the European powers towards American attempts to acquire a sphere of influence in Asia.⁶

² W.G. Beasley, *The modern history of Japan*, London, 1963. W.G. Beasley, *Great Britain and the opening of Japan 1834-1858*, Folkestone, 1995(rep.).

³ Hugh Cortazzi (ed.), *British Envoy in Japan 1859-1972*, Folkestone, 2004.

⁴ Grant Kohn Goodman, *The Dutch Impact on Japan (1640-1853)*, Leiden, 1967.

⁵ Peter Booth Wiley with Ichirō Kōrogi, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods – Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan*, New York, 1990.

⁶ If local co-operation between the foreign powers in Japan was to be emphasized, the

In the Netherlands, there are a limited number of works on Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the 1850s, both in the Netherlands and in Japan, that have used the archives of the Dutch Ministry of Colonial Affairs. They include J.A. van der Chijs, *Neêrlands Streven tot Openstelling van Japan voor den Wereldhandel.-uit officieele and grootendeels onuitgegeven bescheiden toegelicht* (Amsterdam, 1867)⁷, and Miyako Vos, *Bakumatsu Dejima Mikôkai Monjo -Donker Curtius Oboegaki* ('An Unpublished Document in Dejima in the Last Tokugawa Era - A Memory of Donker Curtius', Shinjinbutsu ôraisha, Tokyo, 1992) which is the translation of the memoirs of Donker Curtius, the last trade chief on Dejima. Besides these, there are Miyako Vos, *Kaikoku Nihon no Yoake* ('The Daybreak of the Seaborne Japan', Shibunkaku shuppan, Tokyo, 2000), which contains the translated diaries of Commander Gerhardus Fabius (1806-1888), who visited Japan three times and contributed greatly to its modernization, and Herman Stapelkamp, *Gerhardus Fabius 1806-1888* (Amsterdam, 1999), a biography of Fabius. These works are very useful to the study of the history of Dutch-Japanese relations during the 1850s. Stellingwerff, for instance, noted that 'Van der Chijs compiled a detailed work. It is, however, based on the Dutch documents only. Since then, this subject about the opening of Japan has neither been written on in Dutch nor in English. Therefore, the subject is examined in English literature especially as one of American affairs.'⁸ He pointed out that

Dutch activities in Japan should also be taken into consideration. There is a series of works dealing with this aspect available translated from Japanese by M. Vos. See M. Vos, 'J.K. van den Broek no 「Oranda to Nihon I」' in: *Nihon no Yôgaku I* ('Western study in Japan I'), Osaka, 1993, and 'J.K. van den Broek no 「Oranda to Nihon II」' in: *Nihon no Yôgaku II*, Osaka, 1994, which are translated from 'Nederland en Japan - Kantteekeningen bij officieusen tekst' by J.K. van den Broek ('The Netherlands and Japan - Marginalia in official documents') in: *De Tijdspiegel*, The Hague, 1861. See in addition M. Vos, 'Van der Broek no Ibun' ('A relic of Van der Broek') in: *Nihon Yôgakushi no kenkyû IX*, Osaka, 1989, and 'Van der Broek no denshu' ('The lesson by Van der Broek') in: *Nihon Yôgakushi no kenkyû X*, Osaka, 1991, and 'Van der Broek monchaku jiken ('Difficulties with Van der Broek') in: *Nihon no Yôgaku III*, Osaka, 1995.

⁷ Translated into Japanese by Kogure Minori. Sheisu, *Oranda Nihon kaikokuron*, Yûshôdô shuppan, Tokyo, 2004.

⁸ J. Stellingwerff, *Zijne Majesteits Raderstoomschip Soembing overgedragen aan Japan - De drie diplomatieke reizen van kapitein G. Fabius ter opening van Deshima en Nagasaki in 1854, 1855 en*

there are a few Dutch works about this subject. In this light, it is difficult to know what those in charge of the Dutch government thought about Japan or how they intended diplomacy towards Japan to take shape.

It can be argued that the Dutch-Japanese diplomatic relations are concerned with Dutch diplomatic and colonial history. In this research, however, another accepted theory is put forward: the Netherlands East Indies were more important to Dutch Asian affairs than any other business, including Japanese affairs; therefore the Netherlands would not permit itself to become involved in the political affairs after the opening of Japan. As a result of this line of thinking, relations with Japan have not been examined in Dutch diplomatic and colonial history. These studies, however, deal with Chinese or Thai affairs. Japanese affairs are dealt with by the study of the VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie; the United Dutch East India Company).

3. Problems arising from Dutch-Japanese diplomatic history

Three problems in the study of Dutch-Japanese diplomatic history which result in the present situation for the study of Western-Japanese diplomatic history can be pointed out.

1. In general, it is supposed that the Netherlands could not adopt its autonomous diplomacy towards Japan after its opening and that it merely followed the diplomatic measures adopted by other Western great powers. Moreover, this Dutch diplomacy is expressed in the term 'small power politics'. It is commonly applied to the foreign policy of small countries which avoid international political tensions as much as possible, preferring to concentrate their efforts on profitable economic activities such as shipping and trading.⁹

1856, Zutphen, 1988, p.9.

⁹ Yokoyama Yoshinori, 'Nihon no kaikô to Oranda no gaikô- Oranda gaimushô shiron' ('Japan's opening and Dutch diplomacy - an essay based on documents of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs') in: *Ajia no naka no Nihonshi II: Gaikô to sensô* ('A Japanese history in Asia II: Diplomacy and War'), Tôkyôdaigaku shuppankai, 1992. Momose Hiroshi, *Shôkoku* ('Small power'), Iwanami shoten, 1988. Amery Vandenbosch, *The Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A study in small power politics* The Hague, 1959. J.C. Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A study of Dutch foreign policy*, The Hague, 1979.

Furthermore, the Netherlands already enjoyed most-favored-treatment in Japan. Therefore, it seemed that the Netherlands did not need to take the initiative towards Japanese affairs by Western great powers and the Dutch neutrality contributed to the good relationships with them.

2. European and American works mostly describe the history of this subject with an emphasis on British-American relations rather than on the British relationship with either the Netherlands or with France.¹⁰ As a result, the wrong impression, namely that the European countries easily accepted the strategy of the newly-emerging power in Asia, the United States, has been created. This situation is a consequence of the fact that the existing literature on the history of relations between Japan and foreign countries after the opening of Japan has stressed local matters and incidents in Japan. At that time, unfortunate events, such as the murder of foreigners and violent behavior against them, occurred at that time, because an anti-foreign movement achieved a strong sway there after its opening. Unfortunately, the contemporary Japanese authorities could not deal efficiently with these incidents. Consequently all foreign nationals had to join forces to try to deal with these kinds of incidents. Under such circumstances, it can be imagined that the British Consul-General made decisions concerning the Japanese authorities in close co-operation with the American Consul-General in Edo, while the Dutch Consul-General continued to remain aloof in Nagasaki. This was the upshot of the regional situation. Hence, in the present literature, it is difficult to discern the European-American rivalry in Asia.

3. The bulk of the existing literature on the history of relations between Japan and foreign countries after the opening of Japan ignores the viewpoint of the Netherlands. Some unsound reasoning has resulted from this. For instance, Mitani Hiroshi points out that Japan did not yield to Britain, notwithstanding the overwhelming military power of the latter, and that Japanese diplomatic strategy was successful in saving Japan from a war with the British.¹¹ In Japan, there is the theory propounded by Ishii Takashi that the *Bakufu's* policy towards foreign affairs lacked direction; a standpoint opposed by Mitani. It is, however,

¹⁰ See these works concerned in Bibliography.

¹¹ Mitani Hiroshi, *Meiji ishin to nationalism - Bakumatsu no gaikō to seiji hendō* ('Meiji Restoration and Nationalism - Diplomacy in the Bakumatsu and political change'), Yamakawa shuppansha, 1997, p.142

clear that the *Bakufu* certainly lacked skill in its dealings with foreign affairs; it should be kept in mind that the *Bakufu* only just managed to settle the problems for the time being mainly thanks to a few talented Japanese. For example, Moriyama Einosuke (森山栄之助, 小通詞, 1820-1871) could speak a little English. According to Peter Booth Wiley, 'Under MacDonald's tutelage, Moriyama learned to speak English fluently, using correct grammar and with a facility for those letters and syllables that were most difficult for the Japanese. In addition to English, Moriyama, according to the Dutch superintendent, spoke Dutch better than the superintendent himself.'¹² Moreover, 'The opening of trade, however, was spelled out in the official orders for the expedition, and it was central to Perry's mission', Matthew Calbraith Perry, the commander of the American expedition to Japan charged with opening it up, could not talk about trade with the Japanese, because they had already been primed with Hayashi's (林復齋, 1800-1859, 大学頭 head of the university) persuasive argument against Perry's plan.¹³ Thus, the *Bakufu* managed to deal with the problem for the time being. None the less, it is quite difficult to imagine that the *Bakufu* had a fixed principle and would carry out the political reform necessary to the purpose of coping with foreign affairs efficiently. Meanwhile, Ishii Takashi explains that the fundamental guideline of British foreign policy toward Asia at that time was to exert influence employing as few formal means as possible ('cheap Government'), and that because of this Britain did not use its military power against Japan.¹⁴

Examining the question of why no war occurred in Japan at the time of its opening, the answer is that the Japanese owed this to the Netherlands. Since Japan had maintained relations with the Netherlands for such a long time, the European and American powers regarded it as a nation capable of communicating with the West. As an example, Rutherford Alcock (1809-1897) estimated the Dutch contribution to Japan as follows: 'Japan, there seemed reason to believe, was better advised, and better able,

¹² William S. Lewis and Murakami Naojirō, eds., *Ronald MacDonald: The Narrative of His Early Life*, Spokane: The Eastern Washington State Historical Society, 1923. p.209, 225-227, 232. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the God*, p.21.

¹³ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.404.

¹⁴ Ishii Takashi, *Meiji ishin to gaiatsu* ('Meiji Restoration and foreign pressure'), Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1993, p.8.

perhaps, to understand and appreciate the changes which had completely altered the relative positions of Europe and the East. Partly, it would seem, from their greater quickness and attitude for seizing the true meaning and significance of such facts as come before them; but greatly also owing to continued relations they had maintained with the Dutch.' He also mentions the letter from the Dutch king, Willem II (Willem Frederik George Lodewijk, 1792-1849), to the shogun.¹⁵ Britain expected that the Netherlands, its ally on the European continent, would prepare the way for the British in Japan. In addition, the British Government would possibly save on expenditure beyond those parts of Asia where it was already active, while it could. The main reason why Britain did not use its military power against Japan was not the principle of 'cheap Government', nor was it Japanese diplomacy.

Its overriding consideration was that while its ally the Dutch were already negotiating with the Japanese authorities about the opening of Japan, the British Government did not see any necessity to expend military power against Japan. The British Government sometimes informed the Dutch about its plans to display its military power to Japan but this was merely a tactic to stimulate the negotiations aimed at the opening of Japan. Conversely, this British attitude proves that the Netherlands certainly did have a certain level of influence in Asia.¹⁶ Furthermore this opinion was shared by other Western powers. Thus, the Dutch relationships with Japan and the presence of the Netherlands there greatly contributed to the modernization of Japan without war.

4. Presumptions against presently accepted theories

A. Dutch Imperialism

Was the Netherlands a small country which was not able to adopt an effective diplomacy towards Japan among the Western great powers at that time? In any answer it must be remembered that the Netherlands had a vast colony, the

¹⁵ Rutherford Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon: a Narrative of a Three years' Residence in Japan*, 2 volumes, New York, 1863, pp.205-206.

¹⁶ Concerning the Dutch-British relations in Asia, see Chapter 2 and 8.

Netherlands East Indies, in Asia and consequently it was an important power there. Until recently, Dutch foreign policy in Asia has hardly been evaluated. However, the development of a new theory of 'Dutch Imperialism' in Dutch diplomatic and colonial history sheds more light on this aspect and will be discussed in greater detail below. Under such circumstances, Asian affairs were of crucial importance to the Netherlands.

B. Dutch 'National Prestige and Economic Interests' in Japan.

After the opening of Japan, the major Western powers participated in Japanese affairs. The Dutch Government, however, did not relinquish its interests in Japan. The reason was that Japanese affairs were still very important to the Netherlands in order to maintain and expand its influence in Asia in view of its position in the Netherlands East Indies. Japan was special to the Netherlands because of the fact that it was only the Netherlands among all the Western powers which had maintained such a long relationship with Japan during the period of *Sakoku*. This relationship enhanced Dutch prestige as a maritime trading country. In this period, the Netherlands possessed a wealth of accumulated knowledge concerning Japan. Against this background, it seems proper that the Netherlands should want to maintain or indeed strengthen its influence in Japan in view of its affairs in Asia. Until its opening, Japan had firmly set its face against any approach by foreign countries. After the opening, however, Japan adopted a policy of Westernization and completely changed its old way of thinking. Therefore, it wanted to communicate with the West and to acquire Western goods. In this situation, in the period around the opening of Japan, the Netherlands was making large profits from the Cultivation System in the Netherlands East Indies. In order to sell surplus colonial agricultural products, it was necessary to look for a new market. Against this background, as Japan was close to the Netherlands East Indies, it presented an attractive and real new market for the Netherlands.

C. Traditionalism in Japan.

Did Japan regard the Netherlands to be unworthy in comparison to other Western great powers after its opening? In fact, the contrary was true; it was a fact that Japan preferred to strengthen its special relationship with the

Netherlands. Although the country was theoretically open, the old traditional way of thinking remained strong in the *Bakufu*. Moreover, there were many *daimyōs* that were hostile to foreigners. Since it would have been very difficult for the *Bakufu* to carry out any drastic reforms, preference was given to carrying out a gradual reform. Therefore, the tempered Dutch advice and support for the reforms proved convenient for the *Bakufu*. In the *Bakufu*, the opinion reigned that it was worth strengthening the relationships with the Netherlands with its very extensive colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, although it was small-scale in comparison with Britain and the United States. Consequently, within the *Bakufu* there was a plan to introduce Western civilization into Japan gradually through the close relationship with the Netherlands.

Considering these assumptions, it is difficult to imagine either that the Netherlands would have been excluded from Japan by other Western large powers or that the Netherlands would have contemplated abandoning its political and economic interests in the Japanese affairs at any time soon after the opening of Japan. Although this seems self-evident, it is necessary to examine these subjects academically.

5. What proof is needed?

How would it be possible to argue against the present state of studies concerning this subject as a result of these accepted theories? The best method is to examine the Dutch documents thoroughly; these have scarcely been used in most relevant works, whereas American documents are widely used by Goodman and Wiley and British documents by Beasley and Cortazzi.

The documents used in this thesis relating to Japan are documents kept in the secret records (*Geheim Archief*) of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. They are categorized under 'Japanese Affairs' (*Japanse aangelegenheden*), but they have never been collated into a single file in these archives. Whereas the summaries of the regular documents can be seen in the index of the Public Records (*Openbaar Archief*), there is no summary of these secret documents for the period studied here. Because the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was ultimately responsible for relations with Japan at that time, all Dutch documents concerning relations with Japan accumulated in this Ministry. Since the Ministry of Colonial Affairs also dealt with other overseas matters, it

maintained intensive communications with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, which was the main executive institution in the trade with Japan. Documents relating to these communications can also be found in the archives of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. Since the Government of the Netherlands East Indies was in charge of trade with Japan, the Governor-General had the authority to deal with any commercial problems resulting from this trade. In spite of this system, when relations with Japan became increasingly focused on political matters in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Governor-General had no authority to deal with this kind of matter and had to leave decision making to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs in The Hague. In researching Dutch diplomacy towards Japan during the 1850s, it is therefore indispensable to analyze the documents collected by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs in the Netherlands.

Moreover, in this thesis the relationship between Europe and the United States in regard to Japan will be examined not from a local but from an international viewpoint. In this context it is necessary to examine the Dutch perspective in detail. In order to reveal the relevance of this perspective, documents which were produced by the political decision makers in the Dutch Ministry of Colonial Affairs will be examined. The work by Van der Chijs contains many of the same documents which are used in this thesis. However, he uses them specifically to underline his aim to show the Dutch contribution to Japan's international relations.¹⁷

Moreover, in this thesis other Dutch materials such as the minutes of the Dutch parliament as well as journals and newspapers are also referred to. By examining these materials, the views of Dutch persons who were not members of the Dutch Government can be discerned. To this can be added the advantage

¹⁷ See other articles by this author which examine problems in this book from the aspect of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan: 'Bakumatsu oranda tainichi gaikōseisaku no ichishiten 「Oranda Nihon kaikoku ron」 no tegaki genkō kara kōsatsu shita' ('An aspect of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era, with reference to the handwriting of *Neêrlands Streven*) in: *Bulletin of Tsuyama Yōgaku Museum (Itteki - Annals of the Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan)*, Nr. 8, Okayama, 2000, and 'Van der Chijs no 「Oranda Nihon kaikoku ron」 no seiritsu jijō' ('How Van der Chijs wrote *Neêrlands Streven*, with Reference to its Table of Content's list unpublished') in: *Yōgaku 8* ('Annals of the Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan'), Tokyo, 1999.

that it is possible to examine the Dutch Governmental documents critically.

Part II: Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era: the fundamentals of Dutch foreign policy in Asia

Part II aims at re-interpreting Dutch foreign policy in Asia in the nineteenth century and outlines the framework of this thesis, which is based mainly on recent trends in historical research of Dutch foreign policy. Against this background, the chapter will focus on Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era, a topic which will be examined in detail in this thesis on the basis of primary sources. In the course of this examination, a new perspective on nineteenth-century Dutch policy towards Japan will emerge and, from this perspective, relevant historiographical literature will be re-evaluated. In this way, it will be demonstrated that the commonly accepted theory is incompatible with the historical data.

At present, there are few works about Dutch diplomacy in Asia after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, with the exception of those related to works about Dutch colonial history, especially those dealing with the Netherlands East Indies - present-day Indonesia. Works on Dutch diplomacy towards Japan are few and far between either in Japan or in the Netherlands. In Japan, this topic is discussed only as part of the theory of 'small power politics', according to which the Netherlands could not, and did not want, to join the power struggle between the major European powers. This struggle resulted in a balance-of-power system towards which the Netherlands maintained a tradition of 'neutralism' in its international relations within Europe.¹⁸ It seems that this theory of 'small power politics' in Europe was applied to Asian affairs too. In the Netherlands, this theory of 'small powers politics', and the concomitant idea that the Netherlands was only a small country in Europe, as well as the theory of 'Dutch neutrality' (discussed below) have always been accepted without much criticism. The perspective from which Dutch diplomacy is interpreted as an active and autonomous process has been almost entirely

¹⁸ See Duco Hellema, *Neutraliteit & vrijhandel - de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse betrekkingen*, Utrecht, 2001 and works by Momose, Yokoyama.

neglected until recently.

First, this chapter will examine the formation process of the theory of 'Dutch small power politics' by surveying Dutch diplomatic history after the Napoleonic Wars. After this, the recently introduced concept of 'Dutch modern imperialism' as a concept separate from 'Dutch colonialism' will be examined. This concept emerged from the study of Dutch colonial history and considers the development of Dutch diplomacy as an active rather than a passive process. It would appear that it criticizes the concept of 'simple Dutch small power politics' which has been the accepted theory in most historiographical literature. Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to introduce the idea that Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era should be seen as an active process. This is also the central theme of this thesis, and will be applied to a re-examination and re-interpretation of existing literature and views.

The general view of Dutch diplomatic history after the Napoleonic Wars¹⁹

¹⁹ The explanation of each work in this section is based on C.B. Wels, 'De historicus en de constanten in het buitenlands beleid' in: *Lijn in de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland*, 's-Gravenhage, 1984.

Furthermore, see the following works about Dutch diplomatic history that deal with this period:

N.C.F. van Sas, 'De Nederlanden en Europa 1815-1830' in: *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, vol 11 Weesp, 1983, and *Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813-1831*, Groningen, 1985.

See also the following works about Dutch modern diplomatic history:

C. Smit, *Diplomatieke Geschiedenis van Nederland inzonderheid sedert de vesting van het koninkrijk*, 's-Gravenhage, 1950.

Wels, *Aloofness and Neutrality*, Utrecht, 1982.

There are many works about Dutch diplomacy by J.C. Boogman, a historian of Utrecht University. A useful summary of his research can be found in: Boogman, 'Achtergronden, tendenties en tradities van het buitenlands beleid van Nederland (eind zestiende eeuw-1940)' in: E.H. van den Beugel e.a., *Nederlands buitenlandse politiek. Heden en verleden*, Baarn, 1978.

M. Kuitenbrouwer, *Nederland en de opkomst van het moderne Imperialisme Koloniën en buitenlandse politiek 1870-1902*, Amsterdam, 1985 and 'Het imperialisme van een kleine

Classic works on Dutch foreign policy

There appears to be no usable overview of historical research of Dutch foreign policy in the nineteenth century. In a discussion of the main features of works which treat Dutch foreign policy in the nineteenth century, the main keywords and concepts which have been used in research on Dutch diplomatic history since the early nineteenth century will be identified.

To begin with, there is G. W. Vreede's *Een twintigjarige strijd. Volledige verzameling vertogen van G.W. Vreede*, Utrecht, 1869 ('*A Twenty Years' War: Complete Collected Articles by G.W. Vreede*'). Vreede, who during his lifetime was an ardent adversary of the Dutch statesman Johan Rudolf Thorbecke (1798-1872) within his own country, and of Napoleon III (Charles Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, 1808-1873) internationally, supported the basic principle of Dutch foreign policy: that of non-commitment ('*afzijdigheidspolitiek*'). His criticism was aimed particularly at the way in which Dutch foreign relations were shaped. In his opinion, the Netherlands should exhibit a more self-confident appearance, and taking not only the Dutch Republic (1581-1795) but also the Batavian Republic (1795-1806) as an example. Therefore, the downgrading of the diplomatic service which was being systematically and critically propagated by the liberals naturally caused his a great deal of mental anguish.²⁰

Another basic work on Dutch foreign policy which covers three centuries is J.A. van Hamel, *Nederland tusschen de mogendheden De Hoofdtrekken van het buitenlandsch beleid en van de diplomatieke geschiedenis van ons vaderland sinds deszelfs onafhankelijk volksbestaan*, Amsterdam, 1918 ('*The Netherlands between the Great Powers: The Main Features of Dutch Diplomacy and of the Diplomatic History of our Fatherland since National Independence*'). This book became very popular in the inter bellum years and may serve as an important indicator of the way of thinking about Dutch diplomatic tradition and diplomatic tendencies. Van Hamel's argument is that the basic features of Dutch diplomacy applied equally well to the Republican era, the nineteenth century, as to his own time. He

mogendheid: de overzeese expansie van Nederland 1870-1914' in: N.C.F. van Sas (red.), *De kracht van Nederland Internationale positie en buitenlands beleid*, Haarlem, 1991.

²⁰ Wels, 'De historicus', p.12.

propagated the idea that the Netherlands should set a model for international co-existence through neutrality, and that it should promote the principle of international peace and stability. Nevertheless, Van Hamel argued that the Netherlands had to rely on Britain in order to maintain its colonial possessions, which were indispensable to the Dutch position as a middle-size power in its relationship to such countries as France and Prussia with hegemonic tendencies on the European continent. Van Hamel's view was that the Netherlands was a middle-size power at the end of a century in which Dutch neutralism had been affected by major international tensions. This view defined Dutch influence in relation to other European powers.

Professor B.M. Telders, a jurist in Leiden with close ties with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is another relevant author. Possibly with the knowledge and consent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or prompted by it, he protested about the way in which the Dutch policy of neutrality was criticized. Such criticism appeared in English and French newspapers in the inter-war period (1918-1939), and Telders argued that the large powers were helping small countries only in their own interests. Hence, he insisted that the Netherlands should not espouse opportunism and that the neutrality of the Netherlands was not only a right, but also a duty in the interests of Europe. Furthermore, he referred to the traditional features of Dutch foreign policy over the centuries in order to support his argument.²¹

Telders' statements prompted historian P. Geyl of Utrecht to take up his pen.²² Geyl thought that Britain and France did not question the right of the Dutch to be neutral at all, but that they merely questioned whether Dutch neutralism was meaningful, especially in the current situation. Geyl did not agree that the Netherlands had a duty of neutrality in Europe. He criticized the views of Telders, especially the idea that the Netherlands had already chosen a policy of neutrality in 1814. According to Geyl, the Dutch Kingdom of Willem I (Willem Frederik van Oranje-Nassau, 1772-1843, as King Willem I, 1814-40), being unified with Belgium, was intended to serve as a bulwark against France.

This survey of pre-Second World War classic works on Dutch diplomatic

²¹ Wels, 'De historicus', p.15. B.M. Telders, *Nederlands onzijdigheid Grondslagen en gevolgen* ('Dutch Aloofness Basics and Results') 's Gravenhage, 1939

²² P. Geyl, *Nederland en de oorlog: Beschouwingen naar aanleiding van prof. Telders, Nederlands onzijdigheid*, Utrecht, 1939

history shows that the views on Dutch diplomacy depended on the current circumstances in Europe. These discussions make clear that the Netherlands was not seen as a small power at that time, and hence was expected to play a role in the maintaining of the balance of power in Europe. Below, a survey of more recent studies which deal with Dutch diplomacy will be given in order to see how the idea that the Netherlands was a small power came into existence.

The concept of small power politics

The Netherlands temporarily disappeared as an independent state during the Napoleonic Wars (1796-1815). After these wars ended, at the Congress of Vienna (1815), the former Republic of the Netherlands regained its independence and was enlarged by the annexation of the present-day Belgium. Furthermore, the former Dutch colonies in South-East Asia, the vast area which makes up present-day Indonesia, were returned to the Netherlands by the London treaties (1814, 1824) concluded between Britain and the Netherlands. The main motive prompting the British to do this was that they considered Dutch independence pointless to its own policy towards European continent, unless the Netherlands was strong enough to confront France and Prussia and act as a sentry for Britain.

In short, the Netherlands was a full part of the balance of power system in Europe at that period. The neutral Dutch position in this system was not a product of small power politics, but rather of great power politics. The term 'small power politics' is commonly applied to the foreign policy of small countries which avoid international political tensions as much as possible, as they concentrate their efforts on such profitable economic activities as shipping and trading.²³ The traditional Dutch policy of neutrality, dating from the days of the Dutch Republic, may be more accurately called a 'matter of choice' and 'material gain' neutralism. Traditional Dutch international policy was based on a dislike of the power politics of great powers; this policy transformed political affairs into moral ones. This dislike resulted in an anti-continental attitude, which was characterized by - in the words of a Dutch historian²⁴ - 'abstinence

²³ See works by Momose, Yokoyama and Vandenbosch.

²⁴ Boogman, 'Achtergronden', p.227.

and neutrality' ('*onthouding en neutraliteit*') after 1848, that is, abstention from territorial ambitions in Europe. The Netherlands was even prepared to accept a reduction in its territory, if it were to be involved in a struggle with European great powers. The Netherlands nurtured a centuries' old strong desire to be a maritime, mercantile nation, and was less interested in becoming an industrial nation. As a result of the Belgian revolt in 1830, the Kingdom of Netherlands and Belgium were separated. Belgium was the main industrial region and had the far more developed economic infrastructure in the Kingdom at that time. This event virtually halved the territory of the Kingdom and created the notion of Dutch small power politics.

In 1839, the Netherlands was formally reduced to the territory of 'the former Republic of the Seven United Netherlands'.²⁵ It became common to regard the Netherlands not as a second-class country but as a so-called 'small power'.²⁶ Formerly, its existence had been indispensable to maintaining the balance of power system in Europe. After the secession of Belgium, however, the Netherlands lost its power to act autonomously in Europe and hence its independence was compromised. Therefore, it was said that Dutch neutralism could no longer be called a matter of choice. Although the Netherlands still had a vast colonial empire, by which it distinguished itself from other small European countries such as Denmark, the common perception was that it had been demoted to a third-rank power.²⁷ Up to the present, this perception has dominated main stream Dutch historiography. Thus, the concept of Dutch small power politics was born. The moot point whether the Netherlands really became a small power, as it lost its function of bulwark against France, arises here. In this perception, not national power but military strength played the central role. Indeed military strength cannot be ignored, as it was an important issue in international relations at that time. Nevertheless it is important to note that the concept of Dutch small power politics is limited only to the aspect of military strength.

The Netherlands was not interested in intervening in European conflicts or in territorial expansion. However, it seems obvious that the secession of Belgium fundamentally affected Dutch foreign policy, but the new direction

²⁵ J.C.H. Blom, E. Lamberls (red.), *Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden*, Rijswijk, 1993, p.309.

²⁶ Smit, *Diplomatieke Geschiedenis*, p.198.

²⁷ Wels, 'De historicus', p.21.

was wholly compatible with the traditional Dutch ambitions in international relations. A closer look at the attitude of the Dutch towards the secession reveals that 'The stout-hearted fighting they produced against the Belgians was not meant to undo the *de facto* separation, but to obtain a more favorable separation settlement, and of course to put the vain and overbearing Belgians in their place'.²⁸ Originally French influence was predominant in the southern Netherlands. In a pamphlet a Belgian writer even wrote that 'We are French owing to the way of our thinking and the sacrifice made. ... We are French owing to the blood which was shed in the wars of revolution.' In other words some Belgians rather desired to merge with France than with the northern Netherlands.²⁹

Moreover, 'in the Dutch politician Thorbecke's writings the condemnation of the ungrateful Belgians and the joy that henceforth it was no longer necessary to share the same state system with them prevailed. The majority of pamphleteers had a clear answer to the question how the Netherlands should see its future in Europe: they were together as Hollanders again and could do without Europe from now on.'³⁰ In other words, 'the break-up of the Kingdom generally was greeted in the North with relief and delight: the Dutch were pleased to be rid of the restless and rebellious Belgians.'³¹ There is also another side to the Belgian secession which should not be overlooked. It displayed something of the politics of hegemony which were practiced by such great powers as Britain and France in Europe. The Netherlands had no overwhelming desire to recover Belgium. The Dutch-Belgian union was created by Britain, the 'most natural ally' of the Dutch, in order to make the Netherlands a British sentry on the European continent. The minister of Foreign Affairs (Secretaris van Staat vvoor Buitenlandse Zaken) Gijsbert Karel van Hoogendorp (1762-1824) used these words '*onzen natuurlijksten bondgenoot*' in his letter to the sovereign on February 25, 1814. This

²⁸ Boogman, 'The Netherlands in the European Scene 1813-1913' in: C.B. Wels, (eindredactie), *Vaderlands Verleden in Veelvoud, II: 19e-20e eeuw*, Den Haag, 1980, p.62.

²⁹ Hans van der Hoeven, *De Belgische Beroerte – De Tiendaagse Veldtocht en de scheuring der Nederlanden 1830-1839*, Amsterdam, 1973, p.18.

³⁰ Wels, 'De historicus', pp.11-12.

³¹ G.J. Hooykaas, 'De politieke ontwikkeling in Nederland 1830-1840' in: *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, vol 11, Weesp, 1983, p.306.

tellingly expresses the position of Britain towards the Netherlands and shows that Dutch-British relations were considered to be special.³²

The Netherlands had now become involved in the balance of power system in Europe, which it traditionally detested. Then through the territorial reduction caused by the Belgian secession, the Netherlands found that it was able to launch a strong appeal for a new way of asserting its international position. The appeal was both practical and theoretical. Because of its aversion to great power politics and a national character based on Calvinist principles, the Dutch proclaimed that in the new situation it was their moral mission to stay aloof from political conflict in Europe. The Belgian secession enabled the Netherlands to interpret political issues morally. The Netherlands also had good practical reasons to maintain neutrality. The traditional policy of abstaining from territorial ambitions in Europe and the ideal of being engaged in sea-trade could be revitalized unimpeded after the function of acting as a bulwark against France had disappeared.

After 1830, the Netherlands was destined to be a marine mercantile nation which could adapt quickly to new circumstances. This, however, is only one side of the story. As will be shown, the Netherlands was not content with merely being a small country which followed the policy of great powers. This is precisely the reason the Netherlands cannot be considered a small power in Europe. How did the Dutch overcome the disadvantage of being territorially small in order to maintain an independent position in European politics? This will be addressed below.

‘National prestige and economic interest’ in Dutch diplomacy, particularly in relation to colonial policy.

After its separation from Belgium, the Netherlands was reduced to being a small country in the sense that it occupied only a modest territory in Europe. It was, however, still a country with vast colonial possessions, the size of which ranked second only to the British colonial empire. What was the purpose of maintaining such a vast colonial empire, if the country was content with being small in Europe? Having large overseas possessions enabled the Netherlands to

³² Sas, *Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, p.I.

retain influence on the international stage, instead of being confined to the limited role accorded other small countries. It was not only Dutch national prestige among the European powers that would be undermined if the Netherlands ceased to be a major colonial power, the economic interests of the Netherlands would also be affected, because as a consequence it would apparently be impossible for it to participate in the formulation of international economic policy. There could be no denying that diplomats of middle powers were not treated like those of great powers.³³ In this context, the opinion that the maintenance of Netherlands supremacy in South-East Asia had always been closely linked to national prestige is understandable.³⁴

For instance, Willem I established the royal cabinet of curiosities (*'Het koninklijk kabinet van Zeldzaamheden'* 1816) which included rare artifacts obtained in Asia. He used to show them to important persons from foreign countries. S. Legêne has pointed out that this cabinet was helpful as a means for national integration and, also, as a symbol of a strong mercantile nation that maintained relations with the whole world. Thanks to the cabinet, the Dutch international profile was strengthened.³⁵ In order to protect its national prestige in Europe as much as possible, the Netherlands needed to maintain its colonial possessions outside Europe. 'Surely, with its possession of the Netherlands East Indies, the Netherlands is a considerable country' states the explanatory note to the Netherlands East Indies' budget for 1870. The Ministries of the Colonies and of Foreign Affairs fostered an intimate relationship with each other. Nevertheless, the fact that the Ministry of the Colonies was larger than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals how Dutch foreign policy was perceived by the Dutch Government.³⁶

Although the Asian policy of European and American powers in the nineteenth century was important to all these countries, for the Netherlands it was even more so than for the other Western powers in Asia. In the Netherlands, overseas affairs were a means of obviating its position as a small

³³ C.A. Tamse, *Nederland en België in Europa (1859-1871) – De zelfstandigheidspolitiek van twee kleine staten*, Den Haag, 1973, p.4.

³⁴ Reid, *The Contest for North Sumatra*, p.285.

³⁵ Susan Legêne, *De bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel- Japan, Java, Tripoli en Suriname in de negentiende-eeuwse. Nederlandse cultuur van het imperialisme*, Amsterdam, 1998, pp.330-367.

³⁶ Kuitenbrouwer, *Nederland en de opkomst*, p.32.

country in Europe without directly confronting the other European powers. Therefore, its primary concern in Asian affairs was the colonial management of the Netherlands East Indies which contributed greatly to the economy of the mother country. Through effective management, the Netherlands could not only earn big profits and hence develop its economic interests, it also possessed the means to enhance its national prestige as the possessor of a vast colonial empire.

A less attractive consequence of colonial management was that it required major investment. Should, however, the Netherlands have abandoned its colonial possessions, it would have been considered a low-ranking country on a par with Denmark. The Netherlands without the Netherlands East Indies would have been no more than 'a farmer on the North Sea'.³⁷ Outside Europe, the Netherlands pursued a policy that was completely different from its continental policy. It aimed to be 'the first among the second-class powers', while maintaining its aloofness (*afzijdigheid*) from power politics in Europe. From this viewpoint, this attitude may be labeled pragmatic rather than ethical.³⁸ Notwithstanding, Wels argues that after the Belgian secession the Netherlands was reduced to the position of a country of the third rank and that its aloofness did not result from choice but from powerlessness.³⁹ Although it has often been regarded as ethical, the Dutch attitude was not identical to what has been called 'Dutch traditional neutralism', which entailed avoiding problems concerning international politics as much as possible and keeping a distance from international affairs, focusing instead on such profitable activities as shipping and trade. 'The policy of aloofness applied only to Europe. Outside Europe Holland acted with less reserve; in Asia her policy even showed aggressive features.'⁴⁰

The Netherlands displayed an aversion to being involved in the balance

³⁷ J. van Goor, *De Nederlandse Koloniën - Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse expansie 1600-1975*, Den Haag, 1993, p.226.

³⁸ Wels, *Aloofness*, p.16. A. Eyffinger, 'Moraal uit noodzaak – Het Nederlands buitenlands beleid en de internationale rechtsorde', in: R.E. van Ditzhuyzen, A.E. Kersten, A.L.M. van Zeeland, A.C. van der Zwan eds, *Twee honderd jaar Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken*, Den Haag, 1998, p.151.

³⁹ Wels, 'De historicus', p.21.

⁴⁰ Wels, *Aloofness*, p.18.

of power and the struggle for supremacy in Europe; but it is not true that the Netherlands was always indifferent in this regard. If its international interests dictated it should do so, it would join in.⁴¹ To name an example, the Netherlands participated with Britain, France and the United States in the bombardment of Shimonoseki (1864) in Japan. In this incident the Netherlands played an important role. Moreover, according to Wels, 'neutralism and neutrality are entirely different concepts; neutralism has a political content and neutrality has juridical content.'⁴² In this respect, the notion of 'Dutch traditional neutralism' is open to criticism. The 'traditional neutralism' theory does not apply to Dutch foreign policy in the nineteenth century as smoothly as has often been thought. Tamse argues that the voluntary neutral policy of the Netherlands in 1860 accorded with its interest.⁴³

From the perspective outlined above, the problem with the theories of 'small power politics' and 'traditional neutralism' argues that people who believed in small power politics and traditional neutralism considered Dutch foreign policy to be monolithic. Namely, Dutch foreign policy in Europe was different from that pursued in Asia. These theories largely ignore this fact. The Netherlands cannot be treated as a small country and its foreign policy cannot be defined as 'one of traditional neutralism'. Only in Europe did the Netherlands behave as a small power. Because of the existence of the Netherlands East Indies, Dutch diplomacy in Asia did not display the characteristics typical of a small power. Kuitenbrouwer is referring to Fasseur's work, when he states that: 'around the middle of the nineteenth century, the [Dutch colonial] Government [in Batavia] indeed played a decisive role in Dutch expansion. Generally, local administrative officers took the initiative in intervening in the outer territories. These initiatives were often accepted by the Government in Batavia, as a result of which, the Government in The Hague was faced with a *fait accompli*.'⁴⁴

This viewpoint is inextricably linked to the hypothesis that the Netherlands was a small power, but a large one in Asia.⁴⁵ The superpower

⁴¹ C. van Vollenhoven, *Holland's International Policy*, New York, 1919, p.193.

⁴² Wels, *Aloofness*, p.25.

⁴³ Tamse, *Nederland en België in Europa* 1973, p.105.

⁴⁴ Kuitenbrouwer, *Nederland en de opkomst*, p.20.

⁴⁵ J.G. Kikkert, *Koning Willem III*, Utrecht, 1990, p.339.

Great Britain feared Dutch influence in the nineteenth century. For instance, Governor-General Johannes Count van den Bosch (1780-1844) tried to adjust tariffs in favor of Dutch commerce as allowed by Article Two of the London Treaty, which the British had intended would apply only to Java as far north as the southern limit of Atjeh. Such Dutch activities caused Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston (1784-1865), the British Foreign Secretary, great vexation: 'He had already battled with the Dutch for five years over the Java duties and was anxious to avoid a similar situation in Sumatra ...Palmerston also raised Article Six of the London Treaty, which required the approval of The Hague for all Dutch advances in the East. Since none of these appeals to treaty right was conclusive, he was obliged also to bluster in general terms about 'the hostile spirit and tendency of the proceedings of the Dutch authorities in the Indian Seas.'⁴⁶ Moreover the Dutch strength is also shown by the fact that in the Netherlands 'A British proposal to compromise over the interpretation of the London Treaty was not taken up, so that the matter was left at issue.'⁴⁷

Not only were there two sides to Dutch foreign policy: towards Europe and towards Asia, but Dutch diplomacy in Asia had also two sides: one towards colonial matters and one towards commercial matters. Since the Netherlands East Indies were a colonial possession, colonial matters were not regarded as truly foreign issues. On the other hand, commercial matters elsewhere in Asia really were international issues in the eyes of the Netherlands. It would be not an exaggeration to state that Dutch affairs in Asia amounted primarily to the Netherlands' relationship with Japan.⁴⁸ Maintaining and

⁴⁶ 'Palmerston to Disbowe 29 January 1841', Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons 1842, 30. p.145. Also Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons 1842, 30, pp.145-181. See Reid, *The Contest for North Sumatra*, pp.18-19.

⁴⁷ Reid, *The Contest for North Sumatra*, p.20.

⁴⁸ See the following about Dutch diplomacy toward China. Frans-Paul van der Putten, 'Small Powers and Imperialism: the Netherlands in China, 1886-1905' in: *Itinerario*, Leiden, 1996 and *Corporate Behaviour and Political Risk: Dutch Companies in China, 1903-1941*, Leiden, 2001.

In his work, *Tussen Neutraliteit en Imperialisme: De Nederlands-Chinese Betrekkingen van 1863 tot 1901* (Groningen 1966), Frans van Dongen concluded from an international political viewpoint that during that period Dutch diplomacy towards China was 'not a prudent policy but an almost accidental product', but Van der Putten considered that, from a

developing economic interests in Asia in ways that did not require direct rule over foreign countries was of major importance to the Netherlands, because, in that way, it could compensate for its small size. Furthermore, looking back upon Dutch history, this policy seemed appropriate to the Netherlands, as it concurred with the moral international ideal of maintaining good relations with other countries on the basis of commercial profits. Thus, the Netherlands was thought of very highly by other nations because its economy was strong. In general it was thought that the Netherlands could attain a respectable position among other powers because of the economic importance. The colonies were often/almost invariably regarded as the foundation of the Dutch economic importance.⁴⁹

National prestige was an important matter for the Netherlands in overcoming the status of being a small country. Therefore, the Dutch were not satisfied with the profits from their economic activities pure and simple. It makes sense to say that having national prestige strengthens international trust and contributes indirectly to commerce. Japanese affairs with the Netherlands at that period should be seen from this perspective. The prestige brought by the Dutch influence in the Far East and the confidence accompanying it gave the Netherlands the justification to manifest itself as more than a mere second-class country. Through this national prestige, the Netherlands was able to maintain an independent position in Europe among the great powers.

Apart from this aspect, there is one opinion that 'In short, the United Netherlands served a number of functions as an intermediary body; most of these survived when its role as a barrier against France disappeared with the Belgian revolt of 1830. Belgium itself became an intermediary body with various important functions aside from that of being a neutral barrier against France.'⁵⁰ Certainly the Netherlands is smaller than other Western Powers such

political economical viewpoint, it was 'prudent' rather than accidental. He interprets Dutch foreign policy towards China at that period as a product of Dutch imperialism.

⁴⁹ Van Raalte, *Troonredes*, 125; Geyl, '1813 herdacht in 1863', 32 vlg.; *Handelingen, 1860-1861, Tweede Kamer*, 310 and *1865-1866, Tweede Kamer*, 148 (Graaf van Zuylen); *Handelingen, 1851-1852, Tweede Kamer*, 206 (Van Goltstein). See Tamse, *Nederland en België in Europa*, p.90.

⁵⁰ Paul W. Shroeder, 'The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure' in: M.C. Brands, N.C.F. van Sas, B.A.G.M. Tromp (red.), *De Veiligheid van Europa – Aspecten van de ontwikkeling van het Europese statenstelsel*, Rijswijk, pp.84-85.

as the United States, Britain, France and Germany. The Netherlands, however, was placed in a geographically important region in Europe and was the most important country among middle powers.⁵¹ There is, however, another opinion: measures available to a small power are much fewer than those at the disposal of a great power, but if a small power can use them efficiently, it can attain much better results than these of a great power, because the politics of a small power is generally ‘*onverdacht*’ (above suspicion).⁵² Consequently, even if the Netherlands was a small power, it is important not to neglect the fact that the Netherlands could play an important role in Japanese affairs.

‘Dutch Imperialism’ – a re-evaluation of Dutch foreign policy

It has long been recognized that colonial and overseas affairs were very important to the Netherlands. In historical research on Dutch foreign policy in the second half of nineteenth century, especially in the 1870s, Dutch policy towards Indonesia is referred to as ‘Imperialism’. However, it is important not to overlook Dutch expansionist policy before the 1870s.⁵³ The concept of imperialism should be applied generally, not only to Dutch policy in Indonesia but also to the policy with regard to what were known as the Dutch commercial interests in Japan and China. First, the concept of Dutch imperialism will be considered in some detail. After this, its relevance to this dissertation will be examined.

The concept of Dutch Imperialism has emerged from a re-evaluation of modern Dutch diplomatic history. This re-evaluation has been promoted by historians of Utrecht University in particular who represent a long tradition in Dutch modern diplomatic history. Dutch diplomacy was long regarded as

⁵¹ Tamse, *Nederland en België in Europa*, pp.24-25. A. Eyffinger, ‘Moraal uit noodzaak – Het Nederlands buitenlands beleid en de internationale rechtsorde’ in: A.E. Kersten a.o. *Twee honderd jaar*, p.148.

⁵² Constantijn Leopold Patijn(ed.), *Nederlandse Buitenlandse Politiek – aspecten en achtergronden*, 's-Gravenhage, 1970, p.6.

⁵³ Cees Fasseur, *De weg naar het paradijs en andere Indische geschiedenissen*, Amsterdam, 1995, p.47. Obviously, Fasseur is referring specifically to the Dutch expansionist policy in Indonesia, not to other regions in Asia.

virtually ineffectual when it came to the protection of the political interests of the Netherlands. Consequently, until recently modern Dutch diplomatic history was not the subject of any historiographical debate. In truth, the limited extent of Dutch territory in Europe failed to stimulate the expectation that Dutch diplomacy was a relevant factor. This was the appearance that the Netherlands incorporated into its very realistic approach to international relations. If the Netherlands were to have been considered a 'great power', it would inevitably have become involved in various conflicts between the other great powers of Europe. This was entirely contrary to the Dutch national interest. Rothstein has put forward the argument that small powers will not be interfered with by great powers owing to their unimportance, conversely they will not provoke the great powers. He thought that this policy was acceptable to the middle powers.⁵⁴ Until recently, many historians refrained from referring to Dutch foreign policy as modern imperialism, the term commonly being used to indicate the expansionist policies of European and American great powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries based on a huge reservoir of capital coupled with oppressive military force.

This view has long been widely accepted. It has been especially popular among researchers at Leiden University. This is the oldest university in the Netherlands and has produced a large number of civil servants and prominent intellectuals. Research emphasizing the realistic interests of the Netherlands is predominant among Leiden scholars. Colonial studies, that is topics crucial to the Netherlands, have assumed a prominent place in Leiden, and the symbol of this was the former Institute for the History of European Expansion and Global Interaction (*Instituut voor de Geschiedenis van de Europese Expansie en Reactie, IGEER*), which is now incorporated into the Institute for History at Leiden University. In ethnological and cultural research related to the former colonies, the Royal Institute for Language, Geography and Ethnology (*Het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde, KITLV*) is also closely linked to this university.⁵⁵ The National Museum for Ethnology (*Museum voor Volkenkunde*),

⁵⁴ Rothstein, 'Small Powers', 26 vlg., 35 in Tamse, *Nederland en België in Europa*, p.90.

⁵⁵ At first, *KITLV* was established in Delft, where there was a training school for civil servants in the Netherlands East Indies (Delft 1851-61). It moved to the political city of The Hague ('s Gravenhage 1861-1966), and after that, it moved again to Leiden (Leiden 1967-present).

famous for Siebold's (Philipp Franz von Siebold, 1796-1866) collection, is also located in Leiden. Ethnological research has not only studied the specific aspects of geography, race, language, and customs in Asia and Africa, its results were also applied in order to smooth the path of the colonial administration. Furthermore, during the colonial era, it was highly relevant that the Dutch should know whether it was possible to cultivate products required in Europe, known as colonial products, and to sell European industrial products in the colonies. Studies on such topics served an important economic and political purpose.

Against this background, in recent years H.L. Wesseling, the founder of *IGEER*, published a series of articles questioning the existence of Dutch imperialism. He opposed connecting the 'modern imperialism' practiced by the great powers with Dutch foreign policy, since the Netherlands held on to its already existing possessions in Southeast Asia after 1870 without engaging into the scramble for new colonial possessions, and even traded off its possessions in West Africa for recognition of its sovereign rights to all of Sumatra. One other aspect of the Leiden School is that, although imperialism had both good and bad consequences for the colonized peoples, the Dutch were mainly driven by the idea of being *weldoeners* (benefactors) to the Asian people.⁵⁶

It is also possible to detect this Dutch behavior in Japan. A good example is a letter from Johan Willem de Sturler (1777-1855) to the Japanese Governor of Nagasaki which reveals that the Dutch wanted to act as a benefactor to the Japanese. This would also seem to apply to the activities of Siebold.⁵⁷ B.W. Schaper, Wesseling's predecessor in Leiden, asserted that if the term imperialism also applied to the Netherlands, it should be typified as a 'reluctant imperialism'. Therefore he, just as Wesseling, avoided linking the modern imperialism of the great powers with Dutch foreign policy.

However, the recent concept of 'imperialism as a Dutch phenomenon' makes it possible to research Dutch foreign policy as an autonomous process. Furthermore, C. Fasseur has reinterpreted Dutch colonial policy by asserting

⁵⁶ Fukuya Kurihara, 'Von Shīboruto rainichi no kadai to haikei' ('Mission and circumstance of Von Siebold in Japan') in: Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio (red.), *Shīboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindai* ('Von Siebold, the opening of Japan and its modernization'), Zokugunshoruijū kanseisha, 1997, p.16.

⁵⁷ Kurihara, 'Von Shīboruto rainichi no kadai to haikei', p.37.

that around 1830 all Dutch overseas possessions and overseas territories were a burden on the Netherlands and were operating at a loss.⁵⁸ Because of the costs involved, it was entirely out of the question to maintain an oppressive colonial rule based on powerful military force. As a consequence, the Netherlands had no alternative but to govern its colonies by means of building trust and tolerance.⁵⁹ This was what became known as the 'policy of abstinence' (*onthoudingspolitiek*) which enabled the Netherlands to manage its colonies applying as little military force as possible and cutting down expenses as much as possible.⁶⁰ The Dutch managed to maintain a large colonial empire for a long time by skillfully devising ways to co-exist with the indigenous population.

Dutch colonial policy does not seem high-handed and it gives the impression of being reactive rather than following a deliberate scheme. Moreover, it seemed that the Netherlands was obliged to resort to neutralism or small power politics not just in Europe but in Asia as well. Fasseur, however, has pointed out that Dutch colonial policy was completely different from a policy of neutralism. In its colonial empire, the Netherlands always had the option of resorting to military force, when it transpired that peaceful means had been ineffectual.⁶¹ In presenting this explanation, Fasseur corrected the pre-existing interpretation of Dutch colonial policy.

The Netherlands avoided the use of military force as much as possible, not for moral but for practical reasons: to cut down the expenses of colonial management as much as possible. Nevertheless, should this policy turn out to be ineffective, in the end the Dutch could always resort to the use of military force. This was a characteristic feature of the modern imperialism of all of the Western powers. Dutch foreign policy, especially its colonial policy, cannot be explained simply in terms of 'neutralism or small power politics'. Since the Netherlands was not content with being a small power, it did not keep silent about attempts by other powers to acquire influence in certain Indonesian islands. Disputes over the northern half of Borneo can be cited as an example of this.⁶² It is more appropriate to research Dutch imperialism in the general

⁵⁸ Fasseur, *De weg naar het paradijs*, p.48.

⁵⁹ Fasseur, *De weg naar het paradijs*, p.49.

⁶⁰ Fasseur, *De weg naar het paradijs*, p.50.

⁶¹ Fasseur, *De weg naar het paradijs*, p.52.

⁶² Fasseur, *De weg naar het paradijs*, p.55.

context of modern imperialism.

The relevance to the Netherlands of relations with Japan

The preceding analysis of Dutch foreign policy has concentrated on the two-fold aim of Dutch diplomacy: national prestige and economic interest. These two elements can be clearly identified in the Dutch policy towards Asia. Therefore, it is meaningful to research Dutch diplomacy towards Japan on the basis of these aspects, because Japanese affairs were very special to the Netherlands. The Netherlands was the only Western country to maintain trade relations with Japan in the period when the latter was subjected to its policy of seclusion.⁶³ The Netherlands used its commercial relations with Japan to raise its national prestige in Europe. For example, European countries expected Dutch support in Japanese affairs, because the process of the opening of the country was not yet certain. The British Plenipotentiary in The Hague, Ralph Abercromby (2nd Baron Dunfermline, 1803-1868) made the following statement: 'At the same Ball, I have reason to believe, that His Majesty made similar communications [about the Japanese Affairs] to the Secretary of the French Legation in the unavoidable absence of the French Minister, and to the Chargé d'affaires of the United States of North America, - but I [am] not certain whether His Majesty [Dutch King] was able to do so also to the Russian Chargé d'affaires.'⁶⁴ The Dutch king himself explained these affairs to plenipotentiaries of other countries. This is an example illustrating the Dutch pride concerning its role in Japanese Affairs.

⁶³ General works about the history of Dutch-Japanese relation are Kanai Madoka, *Kinsei Nihon to Oranda* ('Modern Japan and the Netherlands'), Hôsôdaigaku shuppankai, 1993 and Morioka Yoshiko, *Sekaishi no naka no Desima - Nichiô tûkôshijô Nagasaki no hatashi ta yakuwari* ('Dejima in world history - The role of Nagasaki in the history of Japan-European relations'), Nagasaki bunkensha, 2001. Specific works on the diplomatic history of modern Japanese-European relations: Tabohashi Kiyoshi, *Zôtei kindai Nihon gaikoku kankeishi* ('A history of Japanese modern relations with foreign countries'), Hara shobô, 1971. A detailed work on Japanese-European relations in the period of Japan's Restoration is, Ishii Takashi, *Nihon kaikokushi* ('A history of Japan opening'), Yoshikawa kôbunkan, 1972.

⁶⁴ FO. 238-118, to F.O. 1857, 4 February 1857, N.16

Namely the relationship with Japan was a reminder of the Dutch time of glory in the VOC period.⁶⁵ Fabius, who went on an expedition to Japan three times, expressed this importance as follows: ‘results in the last year have brought the Netherlands few profits at this moment. This fact, however, is important, that the Netherlands should receive the same benefits that other countries will be granted in Japan. In consideration of the honor accorded the Dutch, the Netherlands shall obtain the most favorable conditions in the future too.’⁶⁶ It is well known that Japanese studies in the Netherlands were the most advanced in the world at that time. Moreover, Dutch was the first Western language in Japan. This was the most important privilege for the Netherlands. In this situation, a remark made by a Japanese person should not surprise us; “However you also know how childish they are, the British as well as the French cannot understand Dutch.”⁶⁷

The Dutch were highly knowledgeable about the Japanese mentality and about customs, and of how to get along with the Japanese. Therefore, in order to maintain their position in the Netherlands East Indies and to expand their influence in other parts of Asia as much as possible, the Dutch considered their diplomatic relations with Japan to be very important. As experts in Japanese affairs, they felt confident that they would be able to exploit their relations with Japan to a wider extent. Seen against this background, it is not surprising that after the opening of Japan, the Netherlands attempted to pursue its economic interests by expanding its position on the Japanese market, with which it was already familiar. For example, after the opening of Japan, the Netherlands tried to satisfy the Japanese demands for the building of ships and sent Dutch naval officers for training purposes to Japan. At that time, the British plenipotentiary observed that ‘Since then however, it appears, that their excellencies the minister for the Colonies, and Foreign Affairs have become impressed with the necessity of pursuing a more decided course of policy towards Japan,- and they have now come up to the more advanced position which His Highness Majesty had himself adopted at the beginning of this year.’⁶⁸

⁶⁵ J.G. Kikkert, *Koning Willem III*, p.394

⁶⁶ Miyako Vos, *Kaikoku Nihon no yoake – Orandakaigun Fabiusu Chûryû nissî*, Shibunkaku (‘Daybreak of Seaborne power Japan’), 2000, p.271.

⁶⁷ M. Vos, *Kaikoku Nihon no yoake*, p.109.

⁶⁸ FO. 238-118, To F.O. 1857, 15 June 1857, N.112

It was most important that the Netherlands regained control of the economic and political administration of the Netherlands East Indies in the 1820s. It has often been said that the Japanese trade was of little interest to the Netherlands and had not been so for a long time, as the profit it yielded was small.⁶⁹ Since 1834, the system of forced cultivation of cash crops, the *cultuurstelsel*, in the Netherlands East Indies began to produce large profits. As a result, Dutch shipbuilding and the shipping needed for transporting the export crops developed rapidly. The number of modern industrial companies in the Netherlands was still very low about 1850.⁷⁰ In this situation, it was logical that new markets for the colonial products of the Netherlands East Indies would be looked for and that the industrialization of the Netherlands was planned and promoted. Against this background, it is easily understandable that at that time the Netherlands hoped to expand its trade with Japan, because Japan was geographically proximate to the Netherlands East Indies and the Dutch had had a long relationship with the Japanese and had held exclusive trading rights.⁷¹ Actually, although it happened only later, after World War I, the Netherlands East Indies did indeed develop an important commercial relationship with Japan. As an example, the Netherlands East Indies had imported cotton exclusively from the Netherlands and Britain before 1914. After World War One, the Netherlands East Indies imported substantial quantities of cotton from Japan too. This development was made possible because Japan was situated at no great distance from the Netherlands East Indies, the cost of Japanese labor was less than that in Europe, and because by this time the quality of Japanese products had improved sufficiently to meet European standards.⁷²

⁶⁹ Kurihara, 'Von Shīboruto rainichi no kadai to haikai', p.50.

⁷⁰ Th. van Tijn en Z.M. Zappij, 'De negentiende eeuw 1813-1914' in: J.H. van Stuijvenberg, (red.), *De economische geschiedenis van Nederland*, Groningen, 1977.

⁷¹ About goods in the Japanese trade, see works by Chihiro Ishida, 'Bakumatuki ni okeru ransen tsuminimono no kisotekikenkyū -Tenpō 15nenn(1844)-Ansei 2nenn(1855) no honkata nimono - ' ('A study of articles brought by Dutch ships in Bakumatsu period'), *Tsurumidaigaku kiyō* no.37, 2000 and 'Nagasakibōeki ni okeru someori yunyū -Bunsei 5 nen(1822) wo tyūshin to site - ' ('A study about import of dyed goods in Nagasaki trade') in: *Bulletin of Tsuyama Yōgaku Museum (Itteki - Annals of the Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan)*, nr.7, Tsuyama Yōgaku siryōkan, 1999.

⁷² *De handel in Manufacturen in Ned.-Indië. - De invoer van Katōenen, zijden, kunstzijden en*

To Dutch national prestige and economic interests, Japan was clearly very important. However, it is important not to overlook the fact that in the nineteenth century the Netherlands had participated in the dividing up of Asia into spheres of influence of the major powers. The Netherlands, in collaboration with its most natural ally, Britain, with whom it shared a common interest in this respect, opposed the emergence of the United States as a great power in Asia. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States pursued an active policy of defending its interests in Asia. For this reason, it is necessary to take into consideration the Dutch-British relationship in Asia. This matter will be taken up in Chapters 1, 2 and 8.

Before examining the main subject, the following should be paid attention to. In this introduction some questions are noted that are relevant to the main subject in this study, the Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era. The answers to these questions will be formulated by using primary sources that will be thoroughly and fully analyzed and examined. The focus of this study will be on Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era. On the basis of historical facts it appears that the unique Dutch-Japanese centuries-old special relationship changed and came to an end after the American expedition to Japan. The reason for incorporating long quotations from many source materials in the text is to enable the reader to become better acquainted with the spirit and contents of these documents.

andere manufacturen in Ned.-Indië en het aandeel van den uitvoer naar Ned.-Indië in de totale exporten van Nederland, Engeland en Japan, Batavia, 1931, p.5.

Chapter 1

The Dutch-British relationship as 'Lords of the East' - from the examination of the Treaty of London

In the introduction, the history of Dutch foreign policy in the nineteenth century was examined, and the importance and the scope of Dutch foreign policy, especially toward Asia, were outlined. Furthermore, relations with Japan were identified as crucial to the aim of the Netherlands which was to preserve its national prestige and economic interests. The Dutch government commenced the pursuit of active diplomacy toward Japan in the 1850s, that is, about the time of the opening of Japan and this matter is the main topic of this book. However, it is also possible to identify the importance to the Netherlands of its relations with Japan before this period. Against this background, Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 will examine the history of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan before the 1850s. When discussing the scope of activity for Dutch diplomacy towards Asia, British-Dutch relations are also a highly relevant factor. So far, the relationship between England and the Netherlands had usually been seen as one of confrontation, especially with regard to Asia. It is commonly understood that the Netherlands was under the protection of England both in Europe and in Asia, and that in the formulation of their foreign policy the Dutch were dominated by the British. Chapters 1, 2 and 8 will examine the relationship between the Netherlands and England in Asia. The Treaty of London, which was concluded at the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1796-1815), will be the focus of Chapters 1 and 2. This will indicate in which sense England was 'the most natural ally' of the Netherlands, and how the British and Dutch co-operated to maintain their position as 'Lords of the East' in Asia.

In Japan, S. Shinobu and A. Saitô examined the return of the Netherlands East Indies by England. The history of modern Japanese foreign relations is provided in K. Tabohashi's works.⁷³ In the Netherlands, I.H.J. Hoek examined

⁷³ Shinobu Seizaburô, *Raffles den* ('A biography of Raffles'), Heibonsha, 1968. Saitô Agu, *Zûhu to Nihon* ('Doeff and Japan'), Kôbunsha, 1922 and his translation, *Zûhu Nihon kaisôroku*

this subject in the history of the restoration of the Dutch authority in its colonies in Asia.⁷⁴ C.M. Smulders made a special analysis of the Second Treaty of London.⁷⁵ P.H. Van der Kemp has scrutinized the London Treaties in a series of articles.⁷⁶ N. Van Sas has investigated the history of Dutch-British relations from the Napoleonic Wars to the Belgian Secession on the basis of primary sources.⁷⁷ W.A. Veenhoven's work is also relevant in this context.⁷⁸ Up to the present, no attempts have been made to examine how the colonial aspects in the Treaty of London related to Japan's foreign relations in the late Tokugawa era. The elements in this treaty that are relevant to colonial affairs in East Asia provide a broad framework for the interpretation of the colonial and foreign policy of European and American powers in Asia. Although Japan, of course, was not a Dutch colony, it is likely that Dutch-Japanese relations were also influenced by the Treaty of London.

Here the Treaty of London will be considered from the viewpoint of Dutch diplomatic history towards Japan. The way in which Dutch relations with Japan were dealt with in this treaty will be outlined, and an endeavour will be made to pinpoint what influence the treaty had on European and American foreign policy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era. Chapter 2 will focus briefly on some noteworthy incidents in Dutch-Japanese relations in the years just prior to the arrival of Commodore Perry.

('A memory of Doeff in Japan'), Shunnansha, 1922, Yūshōdō, (reprinted), 1966. Tabohashi, *Zōtei kindai*.

⁷⁴ I.H.J. Hoek, *Het herstel van het Nederlandsch Gezag over Java en onderhoorigheden in de jaren 1816 tot 1819*, 's Gravenhage, 1862.

⁷⁵ C.M. Smulders, *Geschiedenis en Verklaring van het Tractaat van 17 Maart 1824, te London gesloten tusschen Nederland en Groot Britannië, ter regeling van de wederzijdsche belangen en regten in Oost-Indië*, Utrecht, 1856.

⁷⁶ Over relevant works and historical records including his works written by P.H. van der Kemp, see 'De geschiedenis van het Londensch tractaat van 17 Maart 1824' in: *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indië*⁵⁶, (1904), pp.6-13.

⁷⁷ Van Sas, *Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, and 'De Nederlanden en Europa'.

⁷⁸ Willem Adriaan Veenhoven, *Strijd om Deshima - een onderzoek naar de aanslagen van Amerikaanse, Engelse en Russische zijde op het Nederlandse handelsmonopolie in Japan gedurende de periode 1800-1817*, Leiden, 1950.

The Treaty of London⁷⁹

In 1795, the shock waves of the France Revolution resulted in the collapse of the Dutch Republic that had functioned for over 200 years. Stadtholder Willem V (Willem Batavus, 1748-1806) fled to England with his family when the Batavian Republic (1795-1806) was established by the Dutch Patriots and the French, who occupied the Netherlands at that time. Shortly after his arrival Willem V issued a circular letter, dated at Kew, February 7, 1795, addressed to all governors and administrators of the Dutch colonies in the East and West Indies, ordering them to surrender their territories to the British government, which had promised to return the colonies as soon as the French occupation of the Netherlands would have come to an end. After the Kingdom of the Netherlands under Louis Napoleon (1806-1810), the annexation of this territory by France and the abdication of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was established after the return of the House of Orange, now under Willem VI (as King Willem I), in 1813. The kingdom was given formal recognition by the other European powers at the Congress of Vienna of Vienna in 1815.

The Treaty of London was drawn up in two steps. An initial agreement was signed by Britain and the Netherlands in 1814, while the second and final agreement was signed in 1824. The treaty returned the former colonies in Asia, which had been taken over by Great Britain, to the Netherlands. Not all former Dutch colonies, however, were returned by the British. The Cape colony and the island of Ceylon stayed in English hands. 'Legitimism', the principle of the Congress of Vienna, was modified in various ways to comply with the interests of the European great powers. The treaty demarcated the boundaries of the Dutch and British colonies in Asia anew on the basis of the new power balance in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. In the treaty, the more important colonies in East Asia were an especial issue. Simultaneously, the treaty also specified the rights of the two countries within their colonies.

The First Treaty of London

⁷⁹ Many facts in this chapter were quoted from the following work. Alfred Zimmermann, 'Die Kolonialpolitik der Niederländer' in: *Die Europäischen Kolonien*, Berlin, 1903.

There is a famous story that, as a consequence of the French annexation of the Netherlands and the British occupation of the Dutch colonies, Japan was the only place where the Dutch national flag continued to flutter during the Napoleonic Wars.⁸⁰ In 1813, Napoleon was sent to exile on Elba and peace briefly returned to Europe. As the Netherlands was re-established as an independent country, it was decided that following the Kew agreement its former colonies should be returned.⁸¹ This was regulated in 1814 by the first version of the Treaty of London. The British Government was prompted by various considerations in returning the colonies to the Netherlands. Van der Kemp gives the following summary: 'The general sense of joy in England about the events of 1813 (the defeat of Napoleon at the battle of Leipzig); a special sympathy for the Prince of Orange, who was living outside his country, and his House, and for the hostile attitude of the Netherlands to French rule; political considerations of making our fatherland strong enough to act as a bulwark against the expansionistic tendencies of France through a union with Belgium and through colonial possessions; and finally the idea that showing a dignified self-restraint instead of territorial greed would provide an example for the other powers who wanted to divide Europe according to their own interests. All these factors filled England - in the words of Viscount Castlereagh (Robert Stewart, 2nd Marquess of Londonderry, 1769-1822) - with *an almost romantic desire* to help our fatherland by returning the colonies.'⁸²

In order to acquire such a territorial expansion and to recover its colonies,

⁸⁰ Although this story is very famous, the following needs to be noted: 'That is not entirely correct, for that was also the case in the Gold Coast possessions and the office at Canton'. W. Ph. Coolhaas, *A Critical Survey of Studies on Dutch Colonial History*, 's-Gravenhage, 1960, p.61.

⁸¹ A return of the colonies was promised to the Prince of Orange in the beginning of 1813. Kemp, 'De geschiedenis', p.25. Hoek, *Het herstel*, p.36, 47.

⁸² M.L. van Deventer, *Het Nederlandsch gezag over Java en Onderhoorigheden sedert 1811-verzameling van onuitgegeven stukken uit de koloniale en andere archieven, I 1811-1820*, 's Gravenhage, 1891, p.37. Van der Kemp, 'De geschiedenis', p.25. The same argument is mentioned in Van der Kemp, 'De sluiting van het Londensch Tractaat van 13 Augustus 1814' in: *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Neêrlandsch Indië*. 47 (1897), pp.247-248.

it was obvious that the new Kingdom of the Netherlands should maintain close relations with England. British support was indispensable; in other words, England was 'the most natural ally' for the Dutch king, Willem I. He recognized that the Anglo-Dutch alliance was central to the balance of power on the European continent after the Napoleonic Wars, as it defined the role of his country in 1814 as a bulwark against France and at the same time as '*sentinelle de la Grande Bretagne sur le continent*, (the sentry of Great Britain on the continent)'.⁸³ Willem also wanted 'if possible to bind the Dutch nation more closely forever to Great Britain'.⁸⁴

Moreover, 'His Royal Highness [the Dutch king] admitted that the views which on that question [about Dutch colonies] were not only liberal, as was contingent upon Holland being adequately secured against France, but that they were just and reasonable, with a view to our own security, if they should fail in accomplishing this object.'⁸⁵ Consequently, Willem I admitted that the British Government had taken the initiative regarding the restoration of the colonies.⁸⁶ England expected that effective Dutch management of the colonies would strengthen the economy of the Netherlands and would enable this nation state to participate in the balance of power in Europe. The idea of strengthening the Netherlands against France came from William Pitt (Pitt the Younger, 1759-1806) in England and this idea was confirmed in the Convention of 11 April 1805 in St Petersburg. The then British Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh, agreed with it completely and continued this policy. The restoration of the Netherlands as a medium great power was seen to be advantageous to England.⁸⁷ Therefore, Castlereagh regarded the unification of the Netherlands and Belgium as indispensable to the Netherlands itself and to

⁸³ Van Sas, 'De Nederlanden', p.280.

⁸⁴ Lord Castlereagh to HRH. the Prince Regent. 8 Jan. 1814 in: *Correspondence, Despatches, and other papers, of Viscount Castlereagh, second Marquess of Londonderry*. Edited by his brother, Charles William Vane, Marquess of Londonderry, G.C.B., G.C.H., G.B.E., Etc. third series. Military and Diplomatic in four volumes, London, 1852, p.151.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, p.155, Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool. Hague, 8th January, 1814, Charles William Vane.

⁸⁶ Hoek, *Het herstel*, p.56.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, pp.37-38. p.42. Smulders, *Geschiedenis en Verklaring*, p.10.

Europe as a whole, but in particular to England.⁸⁸

Castlereagh therefore argued that, 'An effectively independent and friendly Dutch state was important to the British in Europe, both as part of the balance of power, and part of the defensive outwork of Britain itself: The Dutch empire overseas was the price to be paid.' He wrote in 1819 that 'a good understanding is to both states more important to their general interests than any question of local policy...the Basis of which, on the part of the British Government, will be to endeavour to provide adequately for the commercial Rights and Interests of British Subjects, without being incidentally drawn into a practical struggle for Military and Political dominion in the eastern seas, with the Government of the Netherlands...'.⁸⁹

Acting as the British plenipotentiary at the Anglo-Dutch negotiations regarding the return of the colonies was Castlereagh. The Dutch side was represented by the Dutch ambassador in London, Hendrik baron Fagel (1765-1838), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anne Willem Carel baron van Nagell van Ampsen (1756-1851), and the Secretary of State, Anton Reinhard Falck (1777-1843). Fagel was referred to as a 'learned statesman' and Van Nagell, who was stubbornly loyal to the house of Orange, was called 'a great lord from Gelderland', while Falck was called 'a moderate calm Excellency'.⁹⁰ Moreover, Gijsbert Karel Count van Hogendorp (1762-1824), the former Foreign Secretary and then Vice-President of the Council of State (Vice-president van Raad van Staat), took part in these negotiations. In spite of their importance to the Netherlands, the deliberations with Britain did not run smoothly. Although England held the political considerations mentioned above, it was not prepared to return the Dutch colonies that had a political and economic importance unconditionally.⁹¹ The Dutch were determined to get rid of British economic

⁸⁸ Hoek, *Het herstel*, p.41.

⁸⁹ Castlereagh to Clancarty, 13 August 1819, F.O. 37/107. See Nicholas Tarling, *The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, Oxford, 1993, p.27.

⁹⁰ Van der Kemp, 'De Sluiting', p.250. Van der Kemp, 'De Geschiedenis', p.18.

⁹¹ The loss of the British commercial interests by the colonial return had already been noticed. Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh, 25 Dec. 1813, and Letter to the Right Hon. Charles James Fox on the Importance of the Colonies situated on the Coast of Guiana, by a British Merchant. London, W.J. and J. Richardson, 1806, in: H.T. Colenbrander, *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840, Vestiging van het*

dominance in their returned colonies in order to restore their power. Therefore, the Dutch Government wanted to enforce a protectionist commercial system. The British Government, however, demanded from the Dutch the same rights it gave to foreign traders in its own colonies.⁹² Castlereagh agreed that ‘with the exception of the Cape⁹³, there was no indisposition to restore the whole, provided Holland could be rendered so effectually independent of France as to make it clear that we were strengthening an ally, and not an enemy.’⁹⁴ It was, however, very undesirable for England to hand over the colonies without provisions that assured access for British commerce.⁹⁵ Castlereagh noted that ‘I deemed it also advisable not to appear to limit the restitutions to be made by Great Britain to French possessions, least it might furnish the enemy with pretence, however untrue, for insinuating that we meant to keep all the Dutch colonies ourselves. It occurred to me after the words ‘*l’intérêt général de l’Europe*’ to insert ‘*et particulièrement de la Hollande*’;... I thought it was expedient to have maintained the interests of Holland in the negotiation on the broader grounds of general policy, than to put them forward as a British object’.⁹⁶

It was also clear that, even if these were very important to it, England could not afford to control all the former Dutch colonies, as these were very extensive. The upshot was that the Netherlands became more important to England as an ally, for as long as France was seen as a threat.⁹⁷ Therefore, the British Government had to avoid becoming seen by the Netherlands as its enemy. Van Nagell, considered that the negotiations ‘*naturellement*’ should be based on the Dutch colonial possessions of 1792.⁹⁸ He instructed Fagel in

Koninkrijk 1813-1815, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën (RGP) 23, ‘s-Gravenhage, 1914, Vol.I, p.13, p.147.

⁹² Lord Bathurst to Lord Clancarty, 21 Jan. 1814 in: *Gedenkstukken*, p.30.

⁹³ ‘The Cape of the Good Hope is excepted as a position connected with the security of our Empire in the East. Memorandum of Cabinet, 26 Dec. 1813 in: *Gedenkstukken*, p.16.

⁹⁴ Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, 6 Febr. 1814 in: *Gedenkstukken*, p.46.

⁹⁵ Lord Liverpool to Lord Clancarty, 21 Jan. 1814 (private) in: *Gedenkstukken*, p.31 and Canning to Lord Castlereagh, 9 Juni 1814 in: *Gedenkstukken*, p.143.

⁹⁶ Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, 4 Febr. 1814 (confidential) in: *Gedenkstukken*, p.40.

⁹⁷ Hoek, *Het herstel*, p.19.

⁹⁸ NA BuZa, 2.05.01, 24, A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Dutch Ambassador in London in 7 June 1814 N66 Secret. (N231 in Verbaal) Van der Kemp, ‘De

England to recover all former colonies except for the Cape colony in southern Africa. England did not consent. In fact, the Dutch attitude aggravated Castlereagh, who saw the Dutch as ungrateful, and the negotiations stalled.⁹⁹ When the negotiations were resumed a little later, they took place in an unfriendly atmosphere.¹⁰⁰ Van Nagell, however, was discontented with the way matters were developing too, because he thought that Dutch interests were being harmed by the British. He then put Falck in charge of the negotiations.¹⁰¹

The first version of the Treaty of London was ratified on August 13, 1814. It stipulated that all Dutch colonies that had existed on January 1, 1803 would be returned. Therefore, Ceylon, which England had occupied in 1795, remained British.¹⁰² In addition, although the Cape colony had been occupied by England only in 1806, it was also not returned 'for our own peace', because the British Government considered it to be of crucial strategic importance.¹⁰³ Castlereagh noted that 'the Cape is of no real commercial value to Holland, not perhaps of much to us. It is, however, a point in favour of which there is a prejudice which inclines the British Nation to attach an importance to it,' moreover 'that the Prince of Orange and his subjects would sacrifice nothing by leaving Great Britain to defend these colonies for the joint commercial advantage of the two nations,'.¹⁰⁴

Dirk Count van Hogendorp (1761-1822), the elder brother of Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp had served in the Government under the Napoleonic regime. He was appointed an adjutant of Napoleon and was created a count in 1810. After the collapse of the Napoleonic regime, he left public life in the Netherlands. However, he discussed the following questions in a note: 'What should be the year of the colonial restitution, 1789 or 1802?' and 'What can the Dutch lose in this matter? If the year was to be 1802, the year of the peace-agreement of Amiens, then Ceylon should belong to England. Then he

sluiting', p.255. 'De Geschiedenis', p.30.

⁹⁹ Van der Kemp, 'De sluiting', p.261.

¹⁰⁰ Van der Kemp, 'De Geschiedenis', pp.30-37.

¹⁰¹ Hoek, *Het herstel*, p.58.

¹⁰² Shinobu, *Raffles den*, p.88.

¹⁰³ Van der Kemp, 'De Geschiedenis', p.28 and 'De sluiting', p.249.

¹⁰⁴ Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty, 30 Juli 1814, p.168, and Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh 4 Aug. 1814 (secret) in: *Gedenkstukken*, Vol.I, p.171

argued that Ceylon was important as an anchorage area, but that the country had already been a nuisance to the Netherlands in the VOC period. Consequently, it cost more to control it than it generated in profit. Concerning the Cape, he considered this settlement to be very important to England that regarded it as a security bulwark for its considerable Asian establishments. Therefore, it was also best for the security and defence of the Dutch Asian establishments if the British maintained this place. Hence, the Dutch should regard British possession of the Cape as beneficial and necessary to the security of Dutch establishments, as if the Dutch themselves were in charge there.¹⁰⁵

The treaty was concluded by a Dutch compromise, because the Netherlands considered it of paramount importance to establish harmonious relations with Britain. Van Nagell was not completely satisfied. He refused to sign the treaty and submitted his resignation to the king, officially declaring that 'the result of the honourable negotiations by Ambassador Fagel cannot be soiled by my signature'. In the end, the treaty was signed not by a minister, but by Fagel.¹⁰⁶ In this matter the Dutch Government compromised with England, because the main consideration for the Netherlands was to maintain a good relationship with England. Consequently the Netherlands had to accept the severe loss of two of its former VOC settlements.¹⁰⁷

Return of the Dutch colonies and its problems

Cornelis Theodorus Elout (1767-1841), Godert Alexander Gerard Philip baron van der Capellen (1778-1848) and Herman Warner Muntinghe (1773-1827) were appointed Commissaries General in charge of the return of the colonies. Somewhat later, admiral Arnold Adriaan Buyskes (1771-1838) was appointed in Muntinghe's stead. Van der Capellen was appointed to assume the office of Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies. Unfortunately, before the Commissaries had the opportunity to depart for Asia, Napoleon returned to France from Elba and their departure had to be postponed, because the troops

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, Memoirs of Dirk van Hogendorp, 17 Juni 1814, pp.600-601.

¹⁰⁶ Van der Kemp, 'De sluiting', pp.269-270.

¹⁰⁷ Th. Stevens, *Van der Capellen's koloniale ambitie op Java - Economisch beleid in een stagnerende conjunctuur 1816-1826*, Amsterdam, 1982, p.60.

and fleets assigned to accompany them had duties to perform in Europe. Finally, at the end of October 1815, the squadron under the command of admiral Buyskes carrying his fellow Commissaries General sailed for the East Indies.

Upon their arrival in Java on 17 April 1816, the delegation immediately faced a difficult problem. The British official, John Fendall (1762-1825), who was in charge of the former Dutch colonies, insisted that he had received no orders about any restitution of the colonies, and he rejected the Dutch demand for any such handing over.¹⁰⁸ Fendall did not receive instructions about this matter from the British Government until 18 June 1816. These he regarded as still insufficient proof, and consequently he thought that he should await instructions from the British East India Company as his direct supreme authority. After receiving instructions from Bengal on 6 July 1816, he fulfilled his duty to restore the colonies and decided that all British activities in the former Dutch colonies would be regarded as officially ended on 1 July 1816. The Dutch commissaries were eventually able to take over power in Batavia on 19 Augustus 1816.

The Dutch committee members were now confronted with a serious problem which had arisen through the actions of the former Lieutenant-Governor of British-occupied Java, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781-1826), who was opposed to the Treaty of London.¹⁰⁹ He nurtured an abiding hatred of the Dutch.¹¹⁰ His experience had taught him that the Dutch were formidable rivals in Asia. He had handed over his charge to Fendall in March 1816 and went back to his mother country. Raffles accentuated the importance of the former Dutch colonies and criticized Dutch colonial policy in the English newspapers. It was not the trade in products from Java that Raffles was primarily interested in, but its geographical position. He particularly pointed out the politico-commercial importance of the island and noted that 'France looked to Java as the point from whence her operations might be most successfully directed, not only against the political ascendancy of England in

¹⁰⁸ This incident is reported in: Elout to Hendrik Fagel, 5 June 1816 in: *Gedenkstukken*, Vol.I, pp.41-42.

¹⁰⁹ His title was translated as *Gouverneur* in the Dutch records. He represented Lord Minto (r. 1807-1813), the Governor-General of India. Shinobu, *Raffles den*, p.114.

¹¹⁰ Reid, *The Contest for North Sumatra*, p.8.

the East, but likewise against her commercial interests both abroad and at home'.¹¹¹ Moreover, he also insisted on the importance of Java in terms of Chinese trade.¹¹² The Malacca- and Sunda Straits provided the sea-lanes for all shipping between China and India, and hence were very important to British trade with China. For these reasons, he considered it very problematical to return Java to the Dutch who were jealous of the English in commerce and were exclusivist in their thinking.¹¹³

This exclusive Dutch attitude is often pointed out in British literature. 'Before its wars with France Britain had challenged the claims of the Dutch to monopoly, as in the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1784' and 'On their (Dutch) return, they sought to renew their treaties and contracts, and this alarmed local British merchants and, more significantly, made British authorities apprehensive about complete Dutch control of the Straits of Malacca.'¹¹⁴ These remarks show the British awareness of the strong Dutch influence in Asia. He considered it indispensable to England to keep hold of the territories that were now being returned to the Netherlands. After he returned to Benkulen on West Sumatra as Lieutenant-Governor in March 1818, he desperately looked for a base against the Dutch Asian policy. The Netherlands possessed control of both routes - the Sunda and Malacca Straits - through which any vessel had to pass en route from South Asia to the Far East and vice versa. In a report entitled 'Our Interests in the Eastern Archipelago' addressed to the President of the Board of Control for India, George Canning (1770-1827), Raffles emphasized that England had no territory whatsoever which could be used as a base between

¹¹¹ Sophia Raffles, *Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, F.R.S. & particularly in the Government of Java, 1811-1816, and Bencoolen and its dependencies, 1817-1824; with details of the commerce and resources of the Eastern Archipelago, and selections from his correspondence*, London, 1830, p.22.

¹¹² *Ibidem*, p.84. The Dutch also recognized that Java was a very useful place in terms of the products and the Chinese trade. D.F. van Alphen aan Hogendorp, Sept. 1814, p.679. Dirk van Hogendorp to Falck, 18 Sept. 1814, p.684. Hogendorp to the Sovereign Prince, 13 Oct. 1814, in: *Gedenkstukken*, Vol.I, p.701.

¹¹³ Raffles, *Memoir*, pp.303-304. In the Netherlands it was noticed that the possession of colonies was not worthwhile under the obvious British superiority. J.A. van Braal to the Commissarissen-Generaal, 28 Sept. 1817 in: *Gedenkstukken*, Vol.I, p.18

¹¹⁴ Tarling, *The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, pp.26-27.

the Cape of Good Hope and China. In addition, there was no port where water and food supplies were guaranteed.¹¹⁵ Therefore, he strongly insisted that securing free passage through the Malacca Straits was of fundamental importance to Britain's political and commercial interests. He set out to create a British base at the island of Singapore, even though this was contrary to the directions laid down by the British Government.¹¹⁶

Of course, the Netherlands strongly protested to England about Raffles' actions. At the beginning, the British Government was critical of Raffles because it considered the maintenance of a good relationship with the Netherlands in Europe to be of paramount importance. At one point Canning considered calling him home. As a result, the British Government officially distanced itself from his actions in the former Dutch colonies.¹¹⁷ Raffles' title kept the title of 'Lieutenant-Governor' in consideration of his earlier position during the Napoleonic Wars, but it was an honorary title and actually meant no more than that he was a commercial resident with no political rights.¹¹⁸

Raffles, however, did not give up his attempts, but, on the contrary, 'had pointed out the legal weakness of the Dutch position in the Archipelago and believed that the British should assure their trade and influence there by themselves establishing settlements and concluding treaties with the native princes.' 'Certainly by 1814 the East India Company had no real interest in the spice trade; nor was it now very much concerned with the Archipelago and with profiting from the operations of the country traders there, since Indian opium now substantially provided for the tea investment at Canton.' However, 'The Indian Government was especially impressed with his emphasis on the importance of protecting the China route. Therefore he gained the authority under which in 1819 he concluded a treaty of friendship with the still independent Sultan of Aceh at one end of the Straits of Malacca and acquired rights to a factory on the island of Singapore at the other.'¹¹⁹ However, this was

¹¹⁵ Shinobu, *Raffles den*, p.280. Raffles, *Memoir*,p.306.

¹¹⁶ Shinobu, *Raffles den*, p.298. Raffles, *Memoir*,p.307.

¹¹⁷ Van der Kemp, 'Fendall's en Raffles' opvatting in het algemeen omtrent het Londensch tractaat van 13 Augustus 1814' in: *Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indië*⁴⁷ (1897), p.403.

¹¹⁸ Van der Kemp, 'Fendall's', p.378, 446.

¹¹⁹ Nicolas Tarling, *Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, Oxford, 1975, p.16.

‘originally not requested by any English Government.’¹²⁰

The Netherlands lodged a vehement protest with England decrying Raffles’ action.¹²¹ However even though the British East India Company made an attempt to do so, it was not able to put an end to his activities in Singapore. The Company then left it to the British Government to deal with Raffles. The Government subsequently declared his act a violation of his instructions and denied all of his actions. In spite of this decision of the British Government, the new settlement in Singapore proved to be as successful as Raffles had hoped. It quickly became clear that Singapore was both a convenient place for shipping and a pleasant place to live. Maintaining this base for one year would, according to him, cost no more than running the establishment at Benkulen for one month. Commerce and shipping traffic grew each day. The number of migrants settling in Singapore had swollen to no less than 10,000 - 12,000 persons by the summer of 1820.¹²² These circumstances brought a change of heart in the British Government. In England, it was noticed that ‘the settlement of Singapore, lately established by Sir Stamford Raffles, being in my opinion, of the utmost importance both in a political and commercial point of view to the British empire, particularly in the event of a war with France, Holland, or America.’ Also, ‘If we retain the settlement of Singapore, great security will be afforded to our China trade in the event of war; for by possessing a naval station at the entrance of the China Sea, no enemy’s cruizers will ever dare to wait off Puloaor to intercept our ships from China.’¹²³ At last Castlereagh decided to demand Singapore from the Netherlands. The Foreign Secretary suspected that the Netherlands intended to monopolize the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, and he regarded this as undesirable for British interests. Therefore, ‘I (Castlereagh) am confident that no wise statesman would advise the King of

¹²⁰ Raymond F. Betts, *The False Dawn European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*, Minneapolis, 1975, p.50.

¹²¹ The Dutch thought that it was impossible to even be neighborly with Raffles, and they could not stop his action directly. Elout to Hendrik Fagel, 29 Maart 1818, p.183. Therefore, the Dutch only prayed that ‘God grant that he should not succeed.’ Elout to Hendrik Fagel, 19 Mei 1820 in: *Gedenkstukken*, Vol.II, p.241.

¹²² Raffles reported that ‘during the first two years and a half, it appears that during that period no less than 2889 vessels have entered at the port.’ Raffles, *Memoir*; p.513.

¹²³. Letter from J. Horsburgh, Raffles, *Memoir*; p.401.

the Netherlands to embark in so hazardous and so impracticable a course of policy [as to take military action against the new British settlement at Singapore].¹²⁴

Namely, 'At the outset of negotiations in 1819, Britain was clear on its two fundamental aims: first, to safeguard British commerce in all South-East Asia save the modest area (Java and the Moluccas) acknowledged as Dutch possessions; secondly, to retain control of the Malacca Straits route to China. For both reasons, Raffles' new settlement in Singapore was valuable. Beyond this, however, Castlereagh sought no territorial gain, and was content for Holland to assert a vague political hegemony over the archipelago in order to exclude more dangerous powers.'¹²⁵ Hence, 'So far as the latter (local British interest) were concerned, the Government could not, it was decided, either 'acquiesce in a practical exclusion' of British commerce from the Archipelago, or in complete Dutch control of the 'keys of the Straits of Malacca'.¹²⁶ Meanwhile, 'It is apparent, for instance, that the normal British anxiety not to disturb the Dutch (plus occasional British pressure on the Dutch), the British wish to keep the archipelagic region free of other major powers.'¹²⁷ Against this background, it seemed of prime importance that 'In London, the Government had seen that new decisions must be taken on the Archipelago. Raffles' schemes must be used, not to overthrow the Dutch empire, but to press upon the Dutch a compromise by which its continuance could be reconciled with local British interests.'¹²⁸

Why did the Netherlands not persist in its attempts to regain all of its former colonies? One of the reasons was that a problem had arisen concerning compensation to England for administrative expenses. According to the first Treaty of London, the colonies would be returned in 1814. The Netherlands, however, had delayed taking back control over them. Consequently, the British demanded compensation for managing what was now once again a Dutch colony. The sum demanded was high and the Dutch Government did not agree with certain details in the method of calculating the expenses. In order to solve this disagreement, the Netherlands and England convened in London in 1820

¹²⁴ Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty, 13 Aug. 1819 (secret) in: *Gedenkstukken*, Vol.I, p.132.

¹²⁵ Reid, *The Contest for North Sumatra*, p.11.

¹²⁶ Tarling, *Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, pp.16-17.

¹²⁷ *Ibidem*, p.3.

¹²⁸ Tarling, *Ibidem* p.16.

for a new round of negotiations.

The Second Treaty of London

The Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh, and the President of the Board of Control for India, Canning, on the British side and the Commissioner-General, C.Th. Elout, and the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Anton Reinhard Falck, on the Dutch side participated in these talks. 'In general terms, M. Elout disclaims any desire on the part of the Netherlands to set up a system of exclusion or one of permission as emanating from them in the Seas with in the Straits of Malacca and Sunda,' and, therefore, Clancarty remarked that 'He appears to me to be a fair man'.¹²⁹ Fagel was 'an intelligent person with a lively and very amiable character' and exerted a great influence in England, as he had lived there for a long time.¹³⁰ Their appointments show that the Dutch monarch hoped the negotiations with England would develop favorably. However, any immediate agreement was out of the question. The negotiations ended when Britain asked for the meetings to be adjourned because the Dutch refused to consider the British proposal that by way of compensation the Dutch would hand over sovereignty over Singapore instead of Billiton. Furthermore, the Netherlands also refused to discuss giving up the other territories demanded by the British, such as the island of Banka near Billiton and Fultha in Bengal. The only consensus reached was that the two countries would allow each other to conduct trade in all of their colonies and they would refrain from acquiring exclusive commercial rights from local sultans. The negotiations did not formally resume until 1823. By then, the Dutch government had recognized that giving up Singapore was unavoidable, and had decided that the Dutch establishments on the Indian Sub-Continent were also expendable. In the Netherlands, some advisors to the King were of the opinion that it would be better to exchange the British establishments in Sumatra for the former VOC establishments in India that were no longer of interest.¹³¹ The motive for these

¹²⁹ Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh, 3 Dec. 1819 (private) in: *Gedenkstukken*, Vol.I, pp.142-143.

¹³⁰ Hoek, *Het herstel*, p.57.

¹³¹ Elout to Hendrik Fagel, 29 Maart 1818 in: *Gedenkstukken*, Vol II, p.183. Smulders,

concessions was that the Dutch believed that it would not be beneficial to them, if their relations with England deteriorated. After Castlereagh, who had openly said that there was no necessity for negotiations with the Netherlands, had committed suicide,¹³² the Dutch Government achieved the resumption of the negotiations in London by persuading Canning, the new Secretary for Foreign Affairs this should be done.

The Minister of Colonial Affairs, Falck, with his nephew, Jhr. Otto Willem Hora Siccama (1805-1879) as his assistant, the Dutch Ambassador in England, Fagel, and a captain of the Netherlands East Indies army, Cornelis Pieter Jacobs Elout (1795-1843), attended the conference in London in late 1823. Elout had been appointed a member of the delegation because Fagel and Falck had no detailed knowledge of colonial matters and completely lacked local experience.¹³³ Initially, the idea was to bring along Elout's father, the former Commissioner-General and current Minister of Finance, C.Th. Elout as plenipotentiary. King Willem I, however, could not manage without him at that time. As a compromise his son, who had served as the former adjutant to Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen on Java, was appointed in his stead.¹³⁴

The main stumbling block continued to be that Britain still demanded compensation for the delay in the resumption of the colonial administration by the Dutch. Moreover England had to make compromise too, because England had to consider the United States. At that time American trade in the East was developing. Therefore support from the Dutch was desirable. 'In any case it was impossible to define the position too elaborately without arousing the jealousy of other powers. The situation in which we and the Dutch stand to each other is part only of our difficulties', wrote George Canning, one of the plenipotentiaries; 'that in which we both stand to the rest of the world as exclusive Lords of East, is one more reason for terminating our relative

Geschiedenis en Verklaring, p.19.

¹³² '...the Foreign Minister, in a fit of mental depression, had committed suicide by severing the carotid artery in his neck.' Montgomery H. Hyde, *The Strange Death of Lord Castlereagh*, London, 1959, p.4.

¹³³ Elout had pointed out that the obscurity of the first Treaty of London resulted in a lack of knowledge of colonies in Europe. Hoek, *Het herstel*, pp.68-69.

¹³⁴ Van der Kemp, 'De Geschiedenis', p.128.

difficulties as soon as we can'.¹³⁵ 'A challenge to the Dutch must be avoided, for it was felt that this might invite the intervention of other major powers in areas flanking the route to China. But too obvious and too close an agreement with the Dutch might provoke other powers to intervene against the two allies.'¹³⁶ This consideration led the British Government to the compromise that 'Without doubt, however, it weighted the decisions in British policy once more in favour of the Dutch.' Also 'the British accepted the spice monopolies in enumerated Moluccan islands.'¹³⁷

Although England had initially demanded 350,000 pounds sterling, by way of compensation, it reduced the bill to 100,000 pounds sterling. When the Dutch delegation refused to accept this amount, the British once again wanted to suspend the negotiations.¹³⁸ The Netherlands tried to solve the situation by proposing to sell a fixed quantity of spices to England and to open the harbours of Tapanuli to British shipping. Nevertheless, Minister C.Th. Elout in the Netherlands was apprehensive about new problems that might result from these proposals. Therefore, he considered that it would be better to pay what the British asked. After a last Dutch proposal to reduce the amount to 50,000 pounds sterling was rejected, the Dutch Government decided to pay the 100,000 pounds sterling.¹³⁹ In this way, the second and final version of the Treaty of London was concluded on March 24, 1824.

Some noteworthy aspects of the final version of the Treaty of London¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Note by Canning on Courtenay's memorandum of 15 January 1824. DR A/31, numbered 8. See Tarling, *Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, p.20.

¹³⁶ *Ibidem*, p.20.

¹³⁷ *Ibidem*, p.19.

¹³⁸ The Dutch complained that the British estimated amount regarding military supplies to be taken over was three times more than the Dutch. Smulders, *Geschiedenis en Verklaring*, p.56.

¹³⁹ This 100,000 pounds sterling was paid from the amount of 8,000,000 gulden regarding the NHM (*Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij*, the Dutch Trading Society) prepared by the Dutch Government. Smulders, *Geschiedenis en Verklaring*, p.144.

¹⁴⁰ C.Th. Elout. (P.J. Elout van Soeterwoude ed.), *Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis der*

Art.1: The Dutch and British nations in their respective colonies in East Asia shall provide each other's trade activities with the most-favoured-nation treatment.

Art.2: The amount of export and import duty to the other party shall not exceed twice as much.

Art.3: Each party shall not have a contract with a country in the East Indies from now on that shall inflict a loss on the other party.

Art.5: Piracy shall be controlled on both sides.

Art.6: The local Governmental officials etc. in East India shall not build a new trading post without the consent of both Governments.

Art.7: Exceptionally the Netherlands shall be allowed to have a monopoly of the spice trade in the Moluccan Islands, Ambon, Banda and Ternate.

Art.8: The Netherlands shall transfer all establishments on the continent of East India to England.

Art.9: The trading post at Fort Marlborough and all British properties in Sumatra shall be transferred to the Netherlands. England shall not build a trading post or make any contracts with a local state there in the future.

Art.12: England possesses Singapore. On the other hand, England shall not build trading posts or make any contracts with the local states in the Carimon Islands, Battam, Bintag, Lingin or any other island in the south of the Singapore Strait.

Art.15: The countries concerned shall not transfer territories or possessions stated in the above-mentioned articles to any other third countries. If one of the countries concerned abandons its land or possessions, these shall be transferred to the other country concerned.

Conclusion

The Treaty of London was aimed at demarcating the sphere of influence between the Netherlands and England and at strengthening their positions,

onderhandelingen met Engeland, betreffende de overzeesche bezittingen, 1820-24, 's Gravenhage, 1863, pp.222-228. Also in the British records, see *British and Foreign State papers 1823-1824* Vol.XI, London.

especially in Southeast Asia. The main premise for the negotiations that led to the treaty was that England should return the Dutch colonies. This was not approached in any 'romantic' way, but as a pragmatic issue that served the interests of both sides.¹⁴¹ The Netherlands regained its colonies not through British courtesy but out of necessity, because England needed a strong Dutch state as a bulwark against enemies on the European continent. The Dutch were regarded as a power not just in Europe but also in Asia. Raffles' persistent resistance to the Dutch policy in East Asia illustrates this.

Namely 'It involved the recognition that the two powers' [The Netherlands and Great Britain] were, in the words of George Canning, one of the negotiators of the treaty of 1824, 'exclusive Lords of the East,' but that one lord was greater than the other.' Also, in the words of Indonesian nationalist Soetan Sjahrir: 'For more than a hundred years no Dutch power over our country and our people has been a by-product of the calculations and decisions of British foreign policy.'¹⁴² As the Netherlands, however, strongly needed England as its protector on the European continent, the Dutch side had undeniably made greater concessions than the British. England acquired full control of the former VOC settlements in India and gained major access rights to the islands of the Netherlands East Indies. Therefore, Britain benefited more from the Treaty of London than the Netherlands. In Britain, however, there were also very critical opinions about the Treaty. *The Times* commented that the British Minister was regarded as having been deceived by the Dutch.¹⁴³ Moreover, the British repeatedly complained; England had made an irreparable mistake in returning Java, which it had occupied with difficulty, to the Netherlands.¹⁴⁴

Consequently 'the conflict in commercial interests between Britain and the

¹⁴¹ Castlereagh remarked that the arrangement of the first Treaty of London was concluded in consideration of real policy. Hoek, *Het herstel*, p.71.

¹⁴² Soetan Sjahrir, *Our Struggle*, trans. B. Anderson, Ithaca: Cornell University, 1968, pp.24-25. See Tarling, *The Fall of Imperial Britain*, pp.27-28.

¹⁴³ Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, p.200.

¹⁴⁴ Willem Johan Cornelis Ridder Huysen van Kattendyke, *Uittreksel uit het dag boek van W.J.C. Ridder H. v. Kattendyke gedurende zijn verblijf in Japan in 1857, 1858 en 1859*, 's Gravenhage, 1860. Mizuta Nobutoshi(trans.) *Nagasaki kaigun denshūjo no hibi*, Heibonsha 1964, p.213.

Netherlands was by no means solved by the Treaty of London of 1824. Holland, in desperate need of revenue, could not be expected to tolerate continued British commercial predominance in its own empire. Yet this could only be curtailed by protectionist measures which certainly infringed the spirit of the Treaty of London, if not always its letter.¹⁴⁵ Against this background, the matter of colonies was later called into question again. Lord Palmerston protested vigorously about the Dutch advance in Sumatra in 1841. 'But the world had changed in twenty years. British commerce was no longer unrivalled in the East. France and America, soon to be followed by Germany and Italy, were ready to dispute the Anglo-Dutch colonial monopoly in Southeast Asia. The unmistakable liberal trend in Dutch commercial policy after 1848 confirmed the view of the Foreign Office that strategic corners of the world were better in Dutch hands than in those of some stronger Power. Thus the Foreign Office gradually shifted its ground, and by 1871 it had abandoned to the Dutch not only the East Coast of Sumatra but Atjeh as well.'¹⁴⁶ This was the Sumatra Treaty of 1871.

This matter shows that 'The relationship of the 'Lords of the East' to other powers was, as Canning had seen, a factor in keeping them – at times disputatiously or reluctantly – together.'¹⁴⁷ Then 'the Netherlands was an independent state within the ambit of international relations: its sovereignty could not be easily openly abused, any more than it could be exercised with complete freedom. In the period up to the 1870s, these issues were not prominent. What that period saw was the working-out of the relationship dissociate by the treaty of 1824 and of its implications for the Indonesian peoples. The two powers were indeed 'exclusive Lords of the East' in another sense besides their relationship with other Europeans.'¹⁴⁸ Moreover, according to Tamse, the Dutch thought that British support was indispensable at times of war in Europe; however, the Netherlands could employ autonomous diplomacy by agreement with the British.¹⁴⁹ Moreover the Netherlands

¹⁴⁵ Reid, *The Contest for North Sumatra*, p.17.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p.52.

¹⁴⁷ Tarling, *The Fall of Imperial Britain*, p.29.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, pp.30-31.

¹⁴⁹ Tamse, *Nederland en België in Europa*, p.25, 108-109.

expected British support for the protection of Indonesia.¹⁵⁰ The Netherlands now had the opportunity to pursue a more autonomous policy than it had originally had with British support.

¹⁵⁰ Tamse, *Ibidem*, pp.28-29.

Chapter 2

The Dutch-British relationship as 'Lords of the East'

- from an examination of Japanese affairs in the Treaty of London

Japanese Affairs in the Treaties of London

This chapter examines the alliance between the Netherlands and England in East Asia and pays special attention to the issues of Japan as a Dutch sphere of influence and the relations between the Netherlands and England at the time of the opening of Japan to foreign trade. Of course, the treaty could settle these issues only to a limited extent, and left many questions open as to how it would be applied in regard to other powers. However, during the late Tokugawa era, European countries respected the Netherlands as the mediator in dealing with Japan. England seemed to prefer that the Netherlands should continue to play this role, for the British Government recognized the difficult nature of relations with Japan arising from the complex nature of Japanese society.

This was demonstrated by the Morrison incident (1837)¹⁵¹ and by the presence of the anti-British feelings in Japan which had resulted from the Phaeton incident (1808). This had flared up when the British ship the *Phaeton* suddenly entered Nagasaki harbour, causing an outrage and throwing the whole city into pandemonium. In the aftermath of this incident, the magistrate of Nagasaki had been forced to commit *seppuku* (suicide) and the domain of Saga, which was responsible for Nagasaki's defence, was also punished. Ishii also points out the British thinking 'which would make the Netherlands the mediator of negotiations for Japanese matters'.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ The American ship Morrison tried to establish contact with Japan through returning shipwrecked Japanese sailors, but it could not even approach the Japanese coast, because it was immediately fired at by the Japanese.

¹⁵² Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushi*, p.175.

The Dutch sphere of influence in Asia from the British point of view

The main purpose of the Treaty of London was to return the Dutch colonies. Therefore, this section will examine various problems that occurred during the negotiations to resolve the relationship between the two colonial powers in Asia. Since England, especially the British Government of India, had noticed the strategic position of the Dutch colonies, it was reluctant to return them.¹⁵³ Nevertheless, political considerations induced the British Government to withdraw from the Dutch colonies.¹⁵⁴ Despite this strategic move, the British Government was loath to give up the economic profits and political benefits that could be reaped from the Netherlands East Indies. Through agreements about the demarcation of Dutch and British colonies in the Indian archipelago, the two Governments attempted to maximize their countries' ability to make commercial profits and to preserve their political power in the region.

From this point of view, did the Treaty of London take into consideration the full extent of the former Dutch sphere of influence in Asia? By focusing on this question, it is possible to understand what were regarded by the British Government as the proper rights of the Netherlands in Asia. The expression used to designate East Asia in the negotiations was 'in the Eastern seas'. Moreover within the two treaty texts, the expression 'in the East Indies (in *Oost-Indië*)' and 'in the East Indies Archipelago (*in den Oostersche Archipel*)' were used. These words do not define the boundary of the accepted Dutch sphere of influence. When Raffles criticized Dutch colonial policy in a British newspaper, he asserted that the Dutch had harmed the British people 'from the Cape to Japan'.¹⁵⁵

This description of the Dutch sphere of influence in Asia included not only the Netherlands East Indies but also Japan. England had no option but to recognize that the Netherlands had a commercial relationship with Japan. On

¹⁵³ Van der Kemp, 'Fendall's', p.361. Initially, the British Government was not interested in the Dutch colonies in Asia at all. Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, p.80.

¹⁵⁴ Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, p.200.

¹⁵⁵ Van der Kemp, 'Fendall's', p.394. According to Nagazumi Akira, *Dutch East India Company*, Kondô shuppansha, 1971, p.50. In the letter of a patent of the Dutch East Indian Company in 1602, its sphere of activities was 'from the Cape to the Magellan strait'.

this basis, it seemed possible that England might have same rights as the Netherlands in Japan after it opened its door to trade with other countries, because the Treaty of London gave England the same rights that the Netherlands had in Asia.

Relevance of the Treaty of London to Dutch-Japanese relations

Was Japan on the agenda of the negotiations in London? Dutch ships had been unable to reach Japan during the Napoleonic Wars. In that period, neutral ships chartered by the Dutch in Batavia, and from 1808 British ships financed trade with British money went to Japan. During the negotiations preceding the 1814 version of the Treaty of London, England claimed this money back from the Netherlands. The Netherlands, however, counter-argued that the English had paid this amount of money on the condition that they receive copper from the Nagasaki authorities. The Dutch Government had no intention of returning the money. On the contrary, the factory chief of Dejima, Hendrik Doeff (1777-1835), who had negotiated with the British during their visit to Nagasaki, suggested instead to claim the money from the British Government, because the British side had not fulfilled its contracts with Japan to the letter.¹⁵⁶

This incident resulted from Raffles' plan for a mission to Japan. Raffles regarded relations with Japan as important. The reason he adduced for his view was that 'with regard to the present Japanese trade, it certainly is by no means equal to that of many neglected countries in Asia, but the principal inducement to make efforts for its continuance is the prospect of it being opened on a more extensive scale',¹⁵⁷ and that 'The Peculiarity of the China trade - the monopoly of the tea - and the uncertainty, with which it was attended, made him (Raffles) desirous of opening the trade with Japan to British merchants.' Therefore, 'To establish a British Factory in Japan, and furnish a population of not less than twenty-five millions with the staple commodities, and with the manufactures of

¹⁵⁶ Elout, *Bijdragen*, p.24-25.

¹⁵⁷ Extract of report by Sir Stamford Raffles made to the Governor General of India from Malacca, dated June 1811 en route to conquer Java in: Paske-Smith M., *Report on Japan to the secret committee of the English East India Company by Sir Stamford Raffles 1812-1816*, Kobe, 1929, p.5.

Great Britain, was in itself a great national object'.¹⁵⁸ He displayed great interest in Japanese mining, in particular with regard to the production of gold and silver.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore he argued: 'But admitting that a connection between Great Britain and Japan might not be attended with all the commercial profits which might be expected from a consideration of the productions of the two countries, would it not, in a political point of view, be the most essential importance to her interest in China, which are acknowledged by all to be so important?'¹⁶⁰ Therefore, with high expectations, he had organized a mission to Japan for the purpose of putting Dejima under the present British authority. Moreover, the mission aimed at obtaining 'every possible information of the nature and resources of the country (Japan) with the means of obtaining a more extensive and advantageous intercourse'.¹⁶¹ For this reason, the ships carried cargo for trade, but 'if it should be found impracticable to open Commerce with the Japanese, to proceed to China, where, as the cargo consists in a great measure of articles which would be saleable in China, it should be more advantageous to the Public Interests to dispose of it than to return with it to Java.'¹⁶² Raffles employed an experienced Dutchman, Willem Wardenaar (dates unknown), the former trade chief/chief merchant on Dejima (1800-1803), because of various possible difficulties concerning the Japanese affairs.

Wardenaar would receive his commission of 20 per cent of the profits of the voyage. The Bengal Government allowed this high commission for the reason that 'with reference to his situation at Java and to the peculiar nature of his appointment, we are satisfied that the reasons which actuated you to accede to these terms were cogent and adequate.'¹⁶³ This fact also makes clear that

¹⁵⁸ Raffles, *Memoir*, p.229.

¹⁵⁹ Appendix B from the *History of Java* by Sir Stamford Raffles published in London in 1817 in: Paske-Smith, *Report on Japan*, pp.234-235.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p.243.

¹⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p.61. Enclosure II to David Ainslie, Esquire. M.D. in letter from Sir Stamford Raffles to the Governor General of India, 23rd. September 1813, enclosing copies of the instructions issued to the various members of the Mission to Japan.

¹⁶² *Ibidem*, p.69. Enclosure VI to the President & the Committee of Supra Cargoes Canton in letter from Sir Stamford Raffles to the Governor General of India, 23rd. September 1813, enclosing copies of the instructions issued to the various members of the Mission to Japan.

¹⁶³ *Ibidem*, pp.18-19. Letter from the Government of India approving the undertaking,

Raffles entertained high expectations of this mission. Since he, however, recognized the difficulty which would confront it, he noted that 'its importance and profits are so great as fully to justify the attempt'.¹⁶⁴ He also received advice relevant to this mission which was carefully prepared about the Japanese character from a Dutchman, Van Braam (probably Jacob Andries van Braam, 1771-1820). For example, he advised 'to send thither a ship that would hoist Dutch colours on her arrival and during her continuance at Japan', and 'To command the ship there should be a captain nominally Dutch'. Therefore he recommended Voorman (dates unknown), 'an able seaman and who has frequently been there'. Moreover, he advised that: 'The crew should be composed of as large a proportion of Dutchmen as it may be found practicable to engage, because all the Japanese that have dealings with the Dutch speak their language. The English seamen going there for the first time should in general be mild and peaceable men, in order to obviate disputes between them and the Japanese which may give rise to unpleasant circumstances.'¹⁶⁵

The history of this mission in Japan has been recorded.¹⁶⁶ Wardenaar, the former chief merchant on Dejima and a Councillor of the Indies, and Anthonie Abraham Cassa (dates unknown), who was to be the new trading chief in Dejima (1813-1814), arrived there on July 2 1813. Until that time, Doeff had been ignorant of the reason why no Dutch ship had appeared for four years, or what the purpose of this mission was. He then found out that Wardenaar had come from Java to claim Dejima for England, having with him a letter from Raffles to prove his authority. Doeff claimed that the Dutch trading post in Japan did not fall under the jurisdiction of the colonial administration in Java. Furthermore, since he had not received a report that proved that his mother country had been

dated 31st. July 1812. Enclosure, copy of a report on the Japan trade by Mr. van Braam a Dutch resident in Calcutta in the service of the East India Company.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p.54. Extract from a letter, dated 30th June 1813, from Sir Stamford Raffles to the Chairman of the East India Company reporting the departure of the two ships, 'Charlotte' and 'Mary' for Japan.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, Letter from the Government of India approving the undertaking, dated 31st. July 1812. pp.21-22. Enclosure, copy of a report on the Japan trade by Mr. van Braam a Dutch resident in Calcutta in the service of the East India Company.

¹⁶⁶ Account based on Hendrik Doeff, *Herinneringen uit Japan*, Haarlem, 1833, translated into Japanese by Saitô, *Zûhu Nihon kaisôroku*, pp.239-309 and Shinobu, *Raffles den*, pp.210-237.

annexed by France, he refused to carry out Raffles' instructions. Wardenaar was the former trading chief in Dejima and had also been responsible for Doeff's promotion to chief merchant and considered himself to be his friend. He looked after Doeff's property in Batavia. At first, Wardenaar tried to persuade Doeff by taking advantage of their old friendship. When he realized that his attempts were unsuccessful, he tried to bribe Doeff with a large amount of money and also the storekeeper Jan Cock Blomhoff (1779-1853, who would be the next trading chief after Cassa) with the promise that he would be promoted to trading chief. In spite of his various ruses, he failed to remove Doeff from his post.

Finally, Wardenaar threatened to report the political changes in Europe and Southeast Asia to the Japanese authorities. To this, Doeff replied that the Japanese fostered anti-British feelings because of the Phaeton incident. Raffles noted that 'These had been very much excited by an unfortunate occurrence with the Phaeton frigate in 1808, in consequence of which the Governor of Nangasaky and five principal officers to the Prince of Tisung, who commanded the Imperial Guards, were ordered to rip themselves up and die, an order that was usually obeyed, and the Prince himself was spiked up for one hundred days in his house, without leave to have his beard shaved; from this cause not only the Prince, but many of the principal Japanese, had sworn to kill every Englishman that fell in their way.'¹⁶⁷ He explained therefore that the Japanese were awaiting an opportunity to retaliate against the British. Doeff also threatened Wardenaar that he would inform the magistrate of Nagasaki that he had deceived the Japanese authorities by pretending to be entering the harbour in a Dutch ship, while his vessel had actually been dispatched by the British authorities in Java. No British ships were allowed to enter Japanese ports. As a consequence, Wardenaar was forced to beg Doeff to guarantee his party's safety.

Five *Ôtsûjij* (chief interpreters, *oppertolk*) who were asked by the Dutch for their advice judged that it was dangerous to report this fact to the magistrate of Nagasaki. They advised pretending the ship was a chartered American vessel. At that time the Dutch trading post on Dejima was 80,269 kobans (Japanese gold plate) in debt, because no Dutch ship had arrived there between 1810 and 1812. The shrewd trading chief Doeff decided to make a deal with Wardenaar in

¹⁶⁷ Raffles, *Memoir*, p.230.

order to pay off this debt. The points of this arrangement are briefly mentioned in Doeff's book *Herinneringen uit Japan* ('Memories from Japan') as follows: that these two British ships were to be regarded as regular merchant ships, therefore Doeff was to receive all the cargo on these ships and to sell it. The British were to pay all debt of the trading post in Japan from 1809 to this year (1813) using the proceeds of these sales, while Doeff was to deliver as much silver as possible to the British; and that 700 pikols of silver were to be paid to Doeff or his representative in Batavia as his reward for arranging this matter.

However, since Doeff had frustrated Raffles' attempts to obtain Dejima, the latter refused to pay.¹⁶⁸ C.Th. Elout wrote about this incident: 'In as far as the problem concerns only the above-mentioned sum of money (that is, the debt Wardenaar had agreed to settle as part of his arrangement with Doeff), it would be better not to let this unpleasant problem result in potentially unpleasant discussions, and to leave the whole matter untouched and to abandon the demand'.¹⁶⁹ He made sure that the incident did not play any further role in relations with Britain. Although the affair is mentioned only briefly in Elout's writings, it is clear that the Netherlands did its best to avoid any reference to matters relating to Japan in the Treaty of London negotiations. The Dutch feared that Britain would demand some conditions concerning Japanese affairs, if the incident - which was only a minor problem - came up in the discussion. The Dutch trade with Japan at that time was not very flourishing, but still the Dutch Government did not want British influence to affect the Dutch trade monopoly in Japan.

Anglo-Dutch versus American interests in Japan

According to Article 1 of the second version of the Treaty of London, the Dutch

¹⁶⁸ Doeff thwarted Raffles' plan for this mission to Japan in the same way of Raffles, whose action was against his Government policy, firstly, to take over Desima, and secondly to proceed to China for trade, in case the trade with Japanese was impossible. This made Raffles furious. After Doeff's return home, he was decorated by his action in this event. It makes clear that his action was highly laudable for the Dutch, because he was the only person able to beat the arrogant Raffles.

¹⁶⁹ Elout, *Bijdragen*, p.25, 29.

and the British granted each other the right of the most favoured nation treatment in each other's Asian colonies. The article confirmed the close relationship between the two colonial powers. Furthermore, Article 15 clearly shows that the two countries were allies rather than just friendly nations, because it stipulated that should either one abandon its territory in Asia, the other would inherit it.¹⁷⁰ The British and the Dutch Governments joined forces in their efforts to stop the increase of potential rival countries in Asia.

American trade with China was carried out by American private merchants but the American Government initially took no action to support this trade by official means. In 1789 - 1790, fourteen American ships entered the harbor of Canton. This is fewer than the number of British ships that visited Canton at the same period: twenty-one owned by the British East India Company plus another forty commissioned from India. The number of American ships is, however, high in comparison with the five Dutch and three Portuguese ships, and the single ship that the French and Danish each sent. Moreover, exports to the United States of tea, China's main export article, amounted to 3,093,200 pounds sterling. In this regard, the United States occupied second place behind Britain, which imported 17,991,032 pounds sterling worth of tea. In the fur trade, the Americans had already overtaken the British in 1795.¹⁷¹ In the Netherlands East Indies, American 'trade with the pepper coast of Sumatra began shortly after 1790 and developed rapidly until by 1820 it probably equalled that of Canton in importance'. 'The Dutch Government was not sympathetic to American trading activities in Java, however, and it attempted to restrict them by means of high import and export duties'.¹⁷²

Although American ships did not enter into the China trade until 1784, they steadily expanded their share in the trade with China.¹⁷³ The most common explanation for the rapid trade expansion of the United States is as

¹⁷⁰ Elout, *Bijdragen*, p.211.

¹⁷¹ Tabohashi, *Zôtei kindai*, pp.291-292. Also Lawrence H. Battistini, *The United States and Asia*, London, 1956, p.13.

¹⁷² Battistini, *The United States and Asia*, p.9.

¹⁷³ Several American ships that were chartered by the Dutch in Batavia came to Japan in the 1795-1809 period. Shunzô Sakamaki, 'Japan and the United States 1790-1853' in: *The Transactions of The Asiatic Society of Japan* 2nd Ser.Vol.X, 1939.

follows. In comparison with the European chartered companies, the American companies were small and flexible, and put enormous effort into keeping their costs down as much as possible. They had no major rivals other than the British East India Company. From the time when they first arrived on the scene in East Asia, the American traders met a positive response from their European counterparts.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, the American merchants observed the regulations set by the Chinese authorities and did not call on the political backing from their own Government. Their actions were amicable and they were greeted in a friendly way by Chinese officials and merchants, who likewise were not interested in creating tensions in international relations.

When British-Chinese relations deteriorated during the 1830s, the United States benefited from this.¹⁷⁵ However, 'the early American traders were at a disadvantage in competing with the rival traders of imperialist nations like Great Britain, France, Portugal and Holland, which had nearby possessions that could be utilized as bases of support.'¹⁷⁶ Naturally, the United States was also interested in obtaining a good staging point in Asia for its Chinese trade. The Netherlands and England were well aware of this and tried to prevent the United States from establishing its influence in Aceh, which was strategically located for the Chinese trade.¹⁷⁷

In this it is possible to see the balance of power among the major Western nations at the time of the opening of Japan. The Chinese trade of European and American powers received a strong impulse after the Opium War. As a consequence of now being free to participate in trade with China, many foreign powers also focused their attention on Japan, which was near to China and a potentially good basis for the trade. Since the Netherlands and England had guaranteed each other's interests in Asia under the Treaty of London, they, and probably other European countries that also respected these regulations, could

¹⁷⁴ American merchants were granted the privilege of participating in the Indian trade by England according to the British-American treaty (Jay treaty) in 1794. Battistini, *The United States and Asia*, p.8.

¹⁷⁵ Tabohashi, *Zôtei kindai*, p.269.

¹⁷⁶ Battistini, *The United States and Asia*, p.14.

¹⁷⁷ In the first decades American ships sailed from the American East coast to Asia. After the occupation of California (1848), a direct trans-pacific route was planned and the opening of Japan was discussed in the United States.

be considered a community with common interests. Van Sas also pointed out the Dutch-British consensus to prevent the political-economic influence of other foreign countries as much as possible and to protect their mutual interests to the east of the Cape of Good Hope through Dutch-British cooperation.¹⁷⁸

There existed a balance of power between the European countries and the United States. Concern with Japan was not very strong in British foreign policy at that time. The main British interests in Asia were related to India and China. England expected to acquire trading rights with Japan from its agreement with the Netherlands, if the Dutch succeeded in opening Japan up for foreign trade.

The United States, however, was seen as a rival and did not expect to acquire similar rights from the Netherlands. While England recognized a Dutch sphere of influence that included Japan, the United States regarded Japan as an independent country. Although it was actually not under Dutch control, the United States wanted to avoid any potential Dutch interference in its attempt to open up Japan. Consequently, the United States chose to use force to make Japan accessible to foreign trade judging that Japan was still untouched by Western powers and suitable as a base for the Chinese trade. An additional reason the American Government had an interest in Japan was whaling. Many American whaling ships fished in Japanese waters and some of these ships were wrecked on the coast of Japan. This had come to the attention of the American Government.

The situation of the Dutch and British trade in Asia should be considered from this perspective. England obtained the right to remain in Singapore in the second draft of the Treaty of London and use it as a base for its Chinese trade (Art. 12). The British Government refused to tolerate the Netherlands monopolizing the sea lanes needed for the British China trade.¹⁷⁹ The final version of the Treaty of London gave England unrestricted access to the Straits of Malacca. Furthermore, the Treaty also eliminated the possibility of either country monopolizing access to its colonies (Art.3). The Netherlands had a stronger tendency to pursue this course and was repeatedly reminded by England of the treaty stipulations. The Dutch monopoly of the spice trade was the only exception to this rule. Apart from this, trade monopolies were banned by the treaty. In spite of this, the colonies were not completely open to the other

¹⁷⁸ Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, p.195.

¹⁷⁹ Elout, *Bijdragen*, p.57. Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, p.194.

country. Both countries could still impose trade duties and thus maintain commercial predominance in their respective colonies.

Conclusion

These treaty articles reveal the resolve underlying Dutch and British colonial policy in Asia to work together as 'Lords of the East'.¹⁸⁰ While protective measures such as tariff rates within a certain range were allowed, a policy that fully eliminated influence of the other side was banned. In this way, when Japan opened its doors to foreign countries, the Netherlands expected to gain privileges granted to its alliance or friendly powers. It was the expectation of the Dutch and British Governments that they would have no problem at all in coming to a mutually beneficial arrangement about the opening of Japan, since they already had this treaty about their joint influence in Asia. 'In the first place, the British Government considered the relation with the Netherlands in the East to be a political issue. A political community of interest was to be a basis upon which a sound commercial competition could be developed. Subjects of the two countries would be allowed in each other's colonies on the grounds of the most favoured nation treatment, and the protection of the own trade was limited to some degree. England thus seemed to have succeeded in creating maximum commercial opportunities with minimum political presence.'¹⁸¹

This scenario, however, collapsed when the United States - as a newly emerging power that was the equal of the main European powers - wanted to re-structure the balance of power in Asia and shattered this arrangement. The United States was in a difficult situation in Asia, because it was a late-comer among the Western powers, and because initially it was prevented from establishing a base in Asia through the skilful and concerted diplomacy of the Netherlands and England. Then, when its trade with China and whaling became more important, the United States felt the necessity to protect its interests by looking for a base somewhere outside the Dutch or British colonies. Against this background, the Americans chose Japan.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, p.195.

¹⁸¹ Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, p.200.

¹⁸² The development of American diplomacy towards Japan is examined from Chapter 4

Chapter 3

The history that preceded the opening of Japan –Dutch endeavours in it

Dutch diplomacy towards Japan before the 1850s

The co-operative relationship between the Netherlands and England in Asia has been outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. The development of this relationship in the context of Japanese affairs will be explored more thoroughly in Chapter 8. In this chapter, the history of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan before the 1850s is surveyed. The main source used will be the book by Jacobus Anne van der Chijs (1831-1905), *Neêrlands streven tot openstelling van Japan voor den wereldhandel* ('The Dutch endeavours to open Japan to international trade', 1867), which records Dutch diplomatic history in Japan in the late Tokugawa era. This is the only such record to have been published in the Netherlands at that time. Moreover, Van der Chijs' work has also been used for another purpose.

After the opening of Japan, the idea in Europe that the Netherlands intended to preserve Japan's system of isolation for its own benefit became widespread. A Dutch civil servant in the Netherlands East Indies, Van der Chijs wrote his book on the basis of official documents in order to refute this rumour and to show the Dutch contribution to the modernization Japanese foreign policy. With this purpose in mind, Van der Chijs set about collecting mainly documents that showed the Dutch contribution and sometimes did not hesitate to change words in documents in order to hide the real intentions of the Dutch.¹⁸³ Consequently, this work exclusively reproduces evidence of the

onwards.

¹⁸³ The following articles discuss the various problems in connection with Van der Chijs' monograph: Kogure Minori, 'A study of Dutch Diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa period with reference to Van der Chijs' *Neêrlands Streven* (1867) in: *Bulletin of The Japan-Netherlands Institute*, Nr. 42, Tokyo, 1997, pp.79-93 and 'How Van der Chijs wrote *Neêrlands Streven*', with Reference to its Table of Content's list unpublished' in: *The Yōgaku*

benevolence of the Netherlands in its policy towards Japan. Re-examining this book in the context of autonomous Dutch diplomacy towards Japan, however, will lay bare the Dutch Government's real policy towards Japan. The two main topics focused on in this chapter are:

1. The sending of an official Dutch letter to announce the accession of Willem II to the throne and the accompanying presents, and
2. The sending of a second Dutch letter, written by King Willem II of the Netherlands.

An examination of these topics will reveal that the Netherlands dealt skilfully with its relations with Japan and considered these to be very important. The scope of the initiatives which the Netherlands would and could take in Japanese affairs after the opening of Japan will be demonstrated.

The repudiation of the letter to announce the accession to the throne of King Willem II and the accompanying presents

In 1840 Willem II became king of the Netherlands. The Dutch trading chief in Deshima, Pieter Albert Bik (1798-1855), was instructed to deliver personally a letter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, Pieter Merkus (1787-1844), to announce this and hand over some presents when he went to Edo.¹⁸⁴ He transmitted this matter to the magistrate of Nagasaki. Initially, the magistrate assumed that the offer would be accepted. However, he then received a letter from the Councillor of the Tokugawa shogunate, Mizuno Tadakuni (水野忠邦 Prince of Echizen, daimyô of Hamamatsu domain, 1794-1851), stating that the letter and the gifts could not be accepted because

Annals of the Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan, Nr.8, Tokyo, 1999, pp.95-113 and 'An aspect of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in late Tokugawa era, with Reference to the handwriting of *Neêrlands Streven* in: *Bulletin of Tsuyama Yôgaku Museum (Itteki - Annals of the Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan)*, Nr. 8, Okayama, 2000, pp.65-84.

¹⁸⁴ This is a so-called Hofreis (*Sanpu*). The Dutch in Japan had to pay their respects to shogun in Edo with gifts, because of their trade.

Japan could not communicate with any foreign countries except Korea and the Ryûkyû. The magistrate communicated this to the Dutch.¹⁸⁵

The Dutch reaction to this was noteworthy. The Dutch Government considered military sanctions against Japan and the withdrawal of the trading post from Deshima in retaliation for the ill-mannered refusal. Yet, despite these Dutch intentions, 'various serious reasons prevented the Government from immediately and forcefully demanding an apology for the impolite treatment suffered by the Japanese. The financial crisis in the mother country made an expensive war with Japan, which would undoubtedly have been the consequence of such an approach, very undesirable.' Therefore, no military sanctions were taken. Moreover, 'the abandonment of Deshima also raised specific objections, because by this action we would have lost all in Japan and obtained nothing. The blemished honour of the nation would not have been restored by this, and if the Japanese Government really desired to maintain relations with any European nation, we would before long be replaced by another country.'¹⁸⁶ Consequently, the idea of withdrawing the trading post also had to be given up. Furthermore, Van der Chijs gave another reason the Netherlands should maintain its relations with Japan. 'Because of a lack of means to use force to make the Japanese Government acknowledge and compensate for its faults, we had to use peaceful methods to draw attention to the offence to us.'¹⁸⁷

At the time of the opening of Japan, other powers forced the Japanese Government to open the country to foreign trade by using or displaying military force in order to obtain a treaty. The Dutch emphasized that they had negotiated without using military force and that they contributed to the opening of Japan at that time. The above, however, exposes the fact that the Dutch also considered using force. It also shows that Japan was important to them, both politically and economically. This was the reason that the Netherlands had maintained the difficult relationship with the - in their eyes - stubborn Japanese for such a long time. In spite of the unpleasant incident of the refusal to accept to the Dutch letter and gifts, the Dutch Government did not sever its relations with Japan.

¹⁸⁵ Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, p.17.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, p.19. NA Koloniën 2.10.01 no. 4310, 12 January 1845 N.34/A, Geheim.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, p.19.

The Dutch King's letter¹⁸⁸

The Japanese authorities realized that they had to reconsider the position of their country in international relations in the aftermath of the First Opium War (1839-42). Hence, in 1842 Japan amended its laws in order to limit the risks that might result from the system of national isolation, the so-called *Sakoku*. Concretely, this 1842 amendment restored the former law of 1806, known as the *Shinsui Kyūyo Rei*, 'the law on supplying firewood and water'. This law allowed that firewood, water, and such necessities should be supplied to foreign ships in trouble that managed to reach the Japanese coast. At that same time, the strict law of 1825, the *Muninen Uchiharai Rei*, 'the law of repelling without two minds' ('without two minds' meaning 'unhesitatingly') was rescinded. This law made it compulsory to fire without hesitation at foreign ships wanting to enter Japan, with the exception of Chinese and Dutch vessels. This is irrefutable evidence that after the First Opium War Japan still wanted to maintain its policy of isolation. The amendment still did not allow foreign ships to be admitted to Japan. The Japanese Government asked the trading chief on Deshima to transmit this amendment to other countries. The trading chief requested that the Government of the Netherlands East Indies instruct him how to deal with this matter.

¹⁸⁸ 'Historical Note about the special mission to Japan in 1844' ('*Nota van het historische der buitengewone zending naar Japan in 1844*') dated 17 December 1851, was written concerning this event and it argues the development. The description mostly coincides with that of the work by Van der Chijs'. NA Koloniën 2.10.01 no. 3218. The mission is discussed by Els M. Jacobs, 'Met alleen woorden als wapen. De Nederlandse poging tot openstelling van Japanse havens voor de internationale handel (1844)' in: *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 105, pp.54-77, 1990; Willem R. van Gulik, 'Gaikōkan Shīboruto – Bakumatsu to Shīboruto no yakuwari' ('Siebold as diplomat, the Bakumatsu period and Siebold's role') in: Josef Kreiner (ed), *Tasogare no Tokugawa Japan* ('Twilight of Tokugawa Japan') – *Shīboruto fūshi no mita Nihon*, Tokyo, 1998; J.R. ter Molen, 'De dagheraut van hooger leven – Een vorstelijk geschenk van koning Willem III aan het Land van de Rijzende Zon' in: E. van den Bent, Ch. Eymael (eds) *Een Vorstelijk Archivaris – Opstellen voor Bernard Woelderink*, Zwolle, 2003.

This letter from the trading chief was handed to the director of Products and Civil Supplies (*Direkteur van Producten en Civiele Magazijn*), J.D. Kruseman (1794-1861). Kruseman decided to exploit this difficult situation in Japan for the purpose of acquiring commercial privileges. Therefore, he advised the Governor-General, Merkus, to send a special mission to Japan and make demands from them under pressure of the threat that the Netherlands would break off its relationship with Japan, if Japan could not grant them. Merkus could not agree to this proposal from Kruseman. He worried about the possible danger to this mission that wanted acquire Dutch commercial advantages. It was possible that Japan might grant privileges to the Netherlands in exchange for its support in the case of a British attack on Japan. In this case, the Netherlands could not turn it down, and this would mean that it could not maintain its neutrality. Also, Merkus thought that England would care nothing for Dutch interests in Japan or for the relationship between the Netherlands and Japan. Consequently, it seemed possible that England would establish an advantageous position in Japan, if the Netherlands maintained its neutrality in a collision between England and Japan. On the other hand, Merkus also foresaw that Japan could not maintain this policy over a long period. In his opinion, Dutch trade with Japan was not yet sufficiently profitable, but it would be possible to expand the Japanese market for Dutch products after Japan had been opened, even if England also entered this market as a competitor. He decided to draw the attention of the Japanese Government to this matter by political means. Merkus advised the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Jean Chrétien baron Baud (1789-1859), to dispatch an envoy to Japan.¹⁸⁹ Kruseman again proposed the dismantling of the trading post from Deshima, a ploy which the former trading chiefs had used repeatedly. The Governor-General, however, did not agree to it, because of the profit reaped from the Japanese trade, an average of fl. 120,000 in 1823-1832, and of fl. 250,000 in 1833-1837.¹⁹⁰ This is a clear-cut clue that the Netherlands maintained Deshima for economic reasons. However, Van der Chijs stressed that Japanese affairs were more politically than economically important to the Netherlands, and it continued to strive to

¹⁸⁹ Jacobs, 'Met alleen woorden als wapen', p. 59. Merkus's letter in NA Koloniën no. 4297, 31 August 1843 N18 in 19 January 1844, Geheim. The same document 19 January 1844, Geheim contains the copy of Kruseman's note.

¹⁹⁰ NA Koloniën, 'Nota zending naar Japan'.

make its unselfish contribution to the opening of Japan. This is a good indication of the nature of his book.

Baud believed that the Japanese Government's request to extend the amendment of 1842 to other countries should not be granted for the time being. However, another reason for sending an envoy was that Minister Baud had decided not to inform other countries of the Japanese legal amendment of 1842, even though Japan had requested this. According to Baud, 'this decree might be considered by other nations to be a strong message to announce the abolition of the isolation system in the near future, and encourage them to send trade missions to Japan immediately. Nevertheless, the admission of the other countries was probably not what was intended by the Japanese Government. The appearance of such missions would provoke conflicts and troubles, from which the Dutch Government wished to shield Japan. Before the Japanese Government was formally warned by the Dutch mission and before a guarantee that the Japanese were willing to listen to such a warning was obtained, we should refrain from taking steps that might provoke premature trade missions to the Japanese coast.'¹⁹¹ Therefore, he proposed this mission to the king.

Willem II, who had a reputation for enjoying luxury and fine objects, was not the person to refuse this kind of mission and he agreed to send the envoy. Major-General Charles baron Nepveu (1791-1871) was instructed to convey a letter written by the king accompanied by some presents to the shogun. This plan shows how the Netherlands procured its 'national prestige and economic interests' in this mission. The Netherlands recognized that the Japanese Government had a very high opinion of the information passed on to it in the 'separate news', therefore it could inform the Japanese of this matter in the conventional way, which they would highly appreciate. The real significance of the mission, however, was that the Dutch would convey the king's letter and gifts to the shogun, and in doing so warn him of the danger. Therefore this mission to Japan 'not only meant exacting sweet revenge on the British, it also polished up Dutch pride and prestige in Europe.'¹⁹² Moreover, this mission was also to deal with the long-pending problems of investigating defences in

¹⁹¹ Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, pp.19-20. NA Koloniën, 23 October 1843 N.435, Zeer Geheim.

¹⁹² Jacobs, 'Met alleen woorden als wapen', p.61.

Java and making a plan for their improvement.¹⁹³ According to Van der Chijs, 'the purpose of this letter was to act completely without self-interest – without having such hidden aims as using the occasion to obtain new benefits for the Netherlands, or to prolong in any way the existing privileges, or to pay attention to any possible consequences for the Netherlands – and to open the eyes of the Japanese Government, out of gratitude for the exclusive hospitality given to the Netherlands, to the political restructuring which was about to take place in regions around Japan, as well as to the dangers to which Japan exposed itself by persisting in maintaining a system of seclusion and denying access to any foreign ships (apart from Dutch or Chinese) that reach the Japanese coast – a practice that runs counter to the European ideas of international law.'¹⁹⁴ To make sure that the mission would succeed, Philipp Franz von Siebold, who was the leading authority on Japanese matters, was ordered to make preparations to ensure that the letter would be well received in Japan.¹⁹⁵ Von Siebold accepted this mission and put forward some suggestions about suitable presents to be taken to Japan.¹⁹⁶ After that, the instruction regarding this mission was sent to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.¹⁹⁷ The Ministry also consulted the former trading chief, Johannes Edewin Nieman (1796-1850) and the former Dutch ambassador in Constantinople, Baron Van Zuijlen van Nievelt (dates unknown) about this matter. The latter offered particular advice about the protocol that European ambassadors observed in Eastern countries.¹⁹⁸

The sending of this letter was kept strictly secret, because 'if the Japanese in some way or another were to have gained more or less complete knowledge of the aims and intentions of the mission, then it would not have been out of the

¹⁹³ *Ibidem*, p.61. NA Koloniën no. 4294, 27 December 1843 N.567/W1, Zeer Geheim. NA Kabinet des Konings 2.02.04 no. 4164, 19 January 1844 N.47 20 January 1844, Zeer Geheim.

¹⁹⁴ Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, pp.20-21. NA Koloniën no. 4294, 23 October 1843 N.435, Zeer Geheim.

¹⁹⁵ Philipp Franz von Siebold, *Met oorkonden gestaafd verhoog van de pogingen door Nederland en Rusland gedaan tot openstelling van Japan voor de scheepvaart en den zeehandel van alle natiën*, Zalt-Bommel, 1854, pp.13-14. NA Koloniën no.4294, 3 November 1843 N.458.

¹⁹⁶ NA Koloniën no.4294, A Letter of 15 November on 20 November N485.

¹⁹⁷ NA Koloniën no.4295, 9 December 1843 N. 523/F1.

¹⁹⁸ NA Koloniën, 'Nota zending naar Japan'. NA Koloniën no.4297, 4 Januarij 1844 N.10, Geheim.

question that the Japanese Government –which would be greatly interested in the aim and intentions of this mission– would have refrained from receiving the mission for reasons that admittedly would be reasonable – for instance, by pointing out the dangerous precedent that accepting the mission would create for Japan, if representatives from other nations were later to follow in its footsteps. Therefore, all that was related to the plan of Minister Baud had to be dealt with in such a manner that no hint of its real purpose would be known, in order to create a reasonable chance that the curiosity of the Japanese would overcome their characteristic behaviour exhibiting caution and inhibition.¹⁹⁹ As a result, even the trading chief in Deshima did not know about the purpose of the mission until he received the letter. Nepveu indicated he wished to be excused from his task and was subsequently dismissed.

The reason for Nepveu's dismissal was that he regarded the military investigation in Java as a secondary issue and the special mission to Japan as the main purpose; moreover he demanded excessive expenses for carrying out this mission. As a result, the German officer, Friedrich Balduin Ludwig Freiherr von Gagern (1794-1848) was appointed. However this mission was also called off. This was because it could not be delayed and to send a mission only to Japan from the Netherlands would be a burdensome expense.²⁰⁰ The mission was also hindered in other ways. After Nepveu's dismissal, it was decided that the trading chief in Deshima should present the king's letter to shogun. Because the letter of the Governor-General about Willem II's accession and the accompanying presents had previously been refused, the Dutch Government now considered the possibility that the king's letter would likewise be repudiated. Directions to the trading chief to prevent this were drafted in the Netherlands East Indies. Then Governor-General Merkus gave the trading chief, Bik, in Deshima instructions, based on the draft of the instruction written by the

¹⁹⁹ Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, pp.21-22. NA Koloniën no.4297, 7 Januari 1844 N.23/A, Geheim.

²⁰⁰ Jacobs, 'Met alleen woorden als wapen', p.67. NA Kabinet des Koning no. 4164, 15 January 1844 on 22 January 1844 M2 (exh.). After that, the Minister of Colonial Affairs reported this matter to the Governor-General. NA Koloniën no. 4297, 20 January 1844 N.50/C. Documents that mention this high expenditure, are NA Koloniën no.4295, 1 December 1843 N.512, Geheim. NA Koloniën no.4296, 27 December 1843 N.567/W1, Zeer Geheim.

Dutch Government. Merkus emphasized that 'if the Japanese were to ask him about the reason for and the purpose of the king's letter, he should reply as concisely and plainly as possible that all that he knew about this letter had already been reported to the Japanese in the separate news, and that only this letter itself could give them the complete information they wanted; [moreover] that he had been informed that the king's letter had no relation whatsoever to the Dutch trade in Japan; [and] that the letter related exclusively to Japan's interests and that it was of the utmost importance to these.'²⁰¹By adopting this tactic, the Dutch hoped to stimulate the curiosity of the Japanese.

At last, the HM Steamship *Bromo* arrived in Batavia carrying seventeen boxes containing the king's letter and the presents for the shogun. These were then trans-shipped to the warship *Palembang*, which left Batavia on 21 July 1844. Since the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Baud, expected that the time needed for the trans-shipment would be short, he had already prepared directions for the commander, H.H.F. Coops (dates unknown), and the trading chief, Bik, in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands East Indies, these directions were slightly altered. The main amendment was that not the trading chief but the naval commander should hand over the letter to the Japanese, because the Japanese respected military men, but not merchants. In his directions, the Minister instructed the commander to make sure that the difference between his warship and the usual merchant vessel would be obvious to the Japanese so that they would recognize that this mission arrived for a special matter. Should the Japanese Government object to the mission, then the commander and his crew were to wait on board until the objection had been resolved. In this manner, the Dutch would show that they were no ordinary merchants. Firm decisions and skilful diplomacy were needed to fulfill this mission.

The merchant vessel *Stad Thiel* arrived in Deshima before the warship on 29 July 1844. Bik, received his first instructions regarding the mission with the king's letter from its crew. In this way, Bik was informed about the character and purpose of the mission, and he initiated negotiations with the magistrate of Nagasaki about this matter.²⁰² After he had expended considerable time and effort, the magistrate agreed to receive the letter from Willem II. The letter was

²⁰¹ Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, pp.23-24. The document containing the instruction to the trading chief in Deshima is NA Koloniën no.4297, 31 January 1844 N.72/E.

²⁰² Tabohashi, *Zôtei kindai*, p.342.

delivered under a strong guard. After the warship had arrived, the Dutch delegation went to the magistrate's office in Nagasaki, helping to create an impression with a brass band. After having accepted the letter, the magistrate declared that it would be sent to Edo and that the next step in the procedure was to wait for a response. After the ceremony, Bik stated his gratitude for the magistrate's efforts. In reply to Bik's words, the magistrate expressed his satisfaction. Unlike what usually happened, communications between the Dutch and the magistrate were carried out not through secretaries of the magistrate's office and translators, but through translators only. The Dutch believed that 'this distinction was as a result of the respect which the Japanese had for the important object [the letter] that was addressed to the emperor. The magistrate acknowledged the great importance of the king's letter by the way in which he received it. Any Japanese customs that could have caused difficulties [for the hand-over procedure] were removed by him.'²⁰³

Having handed over the king's letter, Commander Coops, according to his instructions, gave Bik an envelope with a copy of the king's letter and additional secret instructions. In this letter the king warned Japan that its system of national isolation might bring it into conflict with England. The king stated that he had been motivated to give this warning by the old friendship existing between the Netherlands and Japan.²⁰⁴ He also informed the shogun that the Netherlands was ready to send a reliable person, if he wanted to know about these important matters in greater detail. The letter of the king was significant with regard to the Dutch policy towards Japan, as were the additional secret instructions given the trading chief. These contained four directions.

1. The trading chief should refrain from taking the initiative in matters relating to the political future of Japan.
2. He should indicate to the Japanese that a capable person of high status - as referred to in the king's letter - would be sent from the Netherlands, should Japan ask for this.
3. He was to advise the Japanese Government that it would not be able to

²⁰³ Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, p.47.

²⁰⁴ See the contents of the letter from the king in Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, p.47. The document containing the contents of the king's letter is NA Koloniën no.4299, 9 Maart 1844 N.144/L.

maintain its system of national isolation and that it would be wise to adopt a peaceful and friendly policy, if it wanted to avoid a collision with foreign powers.

4. He was to refrain from using the present situation to obtain commercial privileges for the Dutch because, unlike privileges granted voluntarily, those obtained under pressure would not last very long.²⁰⁵

The king's letter and the additional secret instructions for Bik are undoubted proof that the Dutch had learned much from their relations with Japan in the previous 200 years. They also reveal how important the Dutch Government considered the matter to be. Although the trading chief, Bik, succeeded in obtaining permission for Coops to deliver the king's letter, considerable time passed and difficulties had to be met before he received the formal reply.²⁰⁶ In its reply, the Japanese Government showed no intention of changing the Japanese system of isolation or improving trade relations with foreign nations.

This reply was very cold, because the Japanese Government expected that this reply would be transmitted to the other Western powers. Therefore it had to reply to the Netherlands politely yet coldly.²⁰⁷ None the less, the Minister of Colonial Affairs expressed his satisfaction with the situation to King Willem II: 'The Netherlands has done its duty of warning Japan, out of gratitude for the monopoly enjoyed by the Dutch flag during [the past] two centuries. That the Japanese Government was utterly sensitive to the importance and generosity of Your Majesty's actions can be witnessed from these words [in the reply on behalf of the Shogun of Japan]: He (the king of the Netherlands) has shown a unique and noble benevolence. Our Lord, who is benefiting fully from it, is deeply moved by his recognition of these motives.'²⁰⁸ Van der Chijs also noted that the Japanese response was friendlier than that received by the Russians

²⁰⁵ Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, p.53. NA Koloniën no.4299, 4 Maart 1844 N.133, Geheim.

²⁰⁶ This is explained in detail in Tabohashi, *Zôtei kindai*, p.353 and also see Conrad Totman, *Early Modern Japan*, London, 1993, pp.532-533.

²⁰⁷ Mitani Hiroshi, *Meijiishin to nationalism*, Yamakawa shuppansya, 1997, pp.86-89.

²⁰⁸ Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, p.65. NA Koloniën no.4324, 21 Mei 1846 L.A N.142, Geheim.

who had sent a mission in 1804.²⁰⁹

Concerning this incident, Von Siebold replied to Baud that it was a great success, because it reconfirmed with an unprecedented honour that only the Netherlands could trade with Japan, although this was never achieved.²¹⁰ Baud, however, seemed disappointed with this Japanese reply. Therefore, Jacobs concluded that 'the mission had failed. The Netherlands failed to obtain commercial privileges and boost its prestige. None the less, although it could not 'take the wind out' of the British sails, the Government fulfilled its duty and this mission made an impression on Japan.²¹¹ In this affair the Netherlands had aspired to seize the chance to establish its firm position and to improve its trade in Japan through exploiting the British menace. Namely it wanted to 'take the wind out of the British sails' in its Asian affairs.

Beasley pointed out that this British menace used by the Netherlands was ill founded. He states, 'Thus in the years immediately following the Opium War, the Japanese became convinced that Britain was preparing aggressive action against Japan. The same opinion was current in some parts of Europe. British records of the period, however, provide no evidence of any sudden development of interest in that country.'²¹² Moreover 'The Opium War had not produced as marked an effect in England as it had in Japan, but it had at least made large sections of the British public aware of the affairs of China for the first time.'²¹³

According to Beasley, 'It was, indeed, far more the age of Manchester than of morals in politics. And there were some who objected to political action in China, still more to the use of force, on the grounds that such action could only cause a disruption and diminution of trade.'²¹⁴ He added: 'A Foreign Secretary contemplating negotiations in Japan might well anticipate the same kind of criticism at home, if his actions seemed to depend on the use or threat of

²⁰⁹ His remark is based on NA Koloniën no.4324, 21 Mei 1846 L.A N.142, Geheim.

²¹⁰ Michio Miyazaki, 'Shīboruto no Nihon kaikoku · Kindaika eno kōken' ('Siebold's contribution to the opening of Japan and its modernization'), in: Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio(red.), *Shīboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindaika*, Zokugunshoruijū kanseisha, 1997, p.290.

²¹¹ Jacobs, 'Met alleen woorden als wapen', p.77.

²¹² Beasley, *Great Britain and the opening of Japan 1834-1858*, p.42.

²¹³ Beasley, *Ibidem*, p.45.

²¹⁴ Beasley, *Ibidem*, p.46.

force. Moreover the problem of China and that of Japan differed markedly in one particular. The influence of the 'old China hands' on the China coast itself – the point at which action had to be taken – and the willingness of the Government to endorse, or at least accept, the actions of its representatives there, ensured that the threat to China remained in being for a time. There was no equivalent pressure behind proposals for opening trade with Japan.'²¹⁵ Finally, 'In so far as action depended on merchant opinion, indeed, the Opium War, by concentrating attention more than ever on the China trade, had reduced rather than increased the possibility that Britain would use force to secure the opening of Japan.... Admittedly, a clash between British merchants and Japanese officials would probably have led to Government intervention if the merchants were not obviously in the wrong. Even so, the danger was relatively slight.'²¹⁶

Various opinions exist about this incident. Jacobs concluded that in view of the disappointment of Baud the Netherlands did not succeed in this incident.²¹⁷ Nagazumi Yoko emphasized the success the Dutch did achieve in it.²¹⁸ Matsukata Fuyuko has explored this disagreement.²¹⁹ Her conclusion is that it was partly successful and partly not, but she argues this from a different point of view, saying: 'I do not think that the king or the Minister of Colonies expected that the letter could expand the Dutch trade with Japan and allow Holland to acquire benefits from expanded commerce with Japan. Therefore, they probably were not disappointed that the letter did not lead directly to a greater opening of Japanese contacts with the outside world. For this reason, I do not think that Willem II's letter was simply intended to offer advice to *Bakufu* leaders about the opening the country.'

The Netherlands could not easily send a warship to Japan, because of the Netherlands East Indies' eternal lack of sufficient warships. Moreover, this kind

²¹⁵ Beasley, *Ibidem*, p.49.

²¹⁶ Beasley, *Ibidem*, p.50.

²¹⁷ Jacobs, 'Met alleen woorden als wapen', p.77.

²¹⁸ Nagazumi Yōko, 'Tsūshō no kuni kara tsūshin no kuni he' ('From the country with commercial relationship to the country with friendship') in: *Nihon rekishi*, No.458, 1986.

²¹⁹ Matsukata Fuyuko, 'Seikō ka shippai ka – 1844 nen Oranda kokuō no shinsho' ('Success or Not: King Willem II's letter in 1844'), from the speech of Muse Hall, the University Museum, the University of Tokyo in 19 October 2004.

of activity involved enormous costs. Therefore, the Netherlands would not have been able to undertake this kind of activity without expectations that it could gain some political or economic benefits. Moreover, this Dutch diplomacy was of little use for what happened subsequently in Japan's foreign relations, especially the event of Perry's arrival in Japan in 1853. The Netherlands wanted to use its diplomacy in 1844 in order to refute America's insistence at the time that the Netherlands intended to preserve Japan's system of isolation for its own benefit. But this goal was not reached. From these considerations, this incident was a diplomatic failure.

Although Beasley pointed out that there was little possibility that England would have used military force, he admitted that relations with Japan gained prominence: 'Although the Opium War did not immediately raise the question of Japanese seclusion for British statesmen, it was out of the aftermath of that war that there arose the first official plans for opening trade relations with Japan, the first plans, that is, in which the Foreign Office accepted the idea of active intervention.'²²⁰ Moreover 'Directly and indirectly, references to Japan were becoming quite common, and it is not surprising, therefore, that it should have occurred to Davis [Sir John Davis 1787-1854] that an attempt might be made to open communication with that country.'²²¹

On this point Beasley and scholars who believe in the Manchester Principle are at odds. According to the Manchester Principle, military force should be used only if commerce was interrupted. This is the theory of Robinson and Gallagher, 'By informal means if possible, or by formal annexations when necessary'.²²² England would use military force if Japan stubbornly rejected the conclusion of a commercial treaty. If the Netherlands had recognized this British policy and it had advised Japan to open its country, the criticism of the Netherlands by Beasley is unfounded.

Conclusion

²²⁰ Beasley, *Great Britain and the opening of Japan*, p.55.

²²¹ Beasley, *Ibidem*, p.58.

²²² John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade' in: *The Economic History Review*, Second series, Vol. VI, no. 1 (1953).

This chapter has made clear that the Dutch government dealt skilfully with the difficult Japanese relations and that, while assessing the international situation, it attempted to maintain or even expand its interests in Japan by using the knowledge about Japan that had been gathered in the past centuries. In spite of various difficulties, the Netherlands insisted on continuing its relationship with Japan. Still, so far Dutch diplomacy towards Japan has mostly been regarded as a passive policy.²²³ The facts show that in fact Japan was very important. Relations with Japan were essential to the Netherlands because of the Netherlands East Indies and its 'national prestige and economic interests'.

²²³ Satô Naosuke, *Seiyô bunka juyô no shiteki kenkyû* ('A study of the history of the acceptance of Western culture'), Tôkyôdô shuppan, 1968, p.11.

Chapter 4

Dutch and American Diplomacy towards Japan Before the Opening

American diplomacy toward Asia until its Japanese expedition

The American advance into Asia occurred relatively late. Since steam shipping was expensive, by the middle of the nineteenth century sailing ships were still mainly used in maritime commerce. Most American sailing ships headed for the Indian Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope and proceeded from there either to India or via the Indonesian archipelago to China. The Pacific Ocean remained for a long time the realm of American whalers who spent years on end catching whales and distilling whale oil. These ships sailed as far north as Alaska and the Aleutian islands and occasionally sought provisions and fresh waters in Japan's northernmost islands.

In his novel *Moby Dick* Herman Melville described the whaling, business in detail. The first American is said to have killed a whale in the Pacific in 1788. By the 1820s, when the whale population in the Atlantic was already showing signs of depletion, there were five established whaling grounds in the Pacific, and one of them, soon to be the most productive, was 'on Japan', as the whalers said. Whaling became a multi-million-dollar business, a major component of the American economy. Melville, in his exhaustive description of the industry, estimated that the United States, with the largest whaling industry in the world, employed 18,000 men aboard 700 ships that reaped a harvest of \$7 million annually.²²⁴ Gradually, American shipping was making its mark in the world.²²⁵

²²⁴ William S. Lewis and Murakami Naojirô, eds., *Ronald MacDonald: The Narrative of His Early Life*, Spokane: The Eastern Washington State Historical Society, 1923, p.196, n.217; Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*, New York, 1952, p.107, 109, 478; Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Maritime History of Massachusetts 1783-1860*, Boston, 1979, p.319. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, 1990, p.30.

²²⁵ Hattori Shisô, *Kurofune zengo, shishi to keizai – ta 16 hen*, ('A period of Black ships' arrival in Japan'), Iwanami bunko, 1981, p.55.

In 1848 the United States acquired California. Soon after, San Francisco grew very prosperous thanks to the discovery of gold. This development put the United States in a good position to open up new business opportunities in the Pacific Ocean and in the Far East. Because railways still had to be built and overland traffic was cumbersome and slow, the communications between the east and west coast still depended on the sea link. Originally between 143 and 267 days were required to sail the distance between New York and San Francisco (via Cape Horn), but the genial engineer Donald McKay (1810-1880) designed a clippership, the *Stag Hound*, that sailed the distance in 110 days on its maiden voyage. Later on his master work, the ship *Flying Cloud*, needed only 89 days.

A plan for trans-Pacific steam shipping between Shanghai and San Francisco was devised in order to improve American trade with China. In this project Japan was to play an important role with regard to the coal supplies needed by the steamships, even though at this time Japan was not open to foreign countries. Also with regard to trade and, moreover, to protecting American whaling ships, Japan was assuming greater importance for the United States.²²⁶ Soon after taking possession of California, on 4 May 1848, Thomas Butler King (1800-1864), member of the House of Representatives and chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, submitted a report that advised the establishment of a steamship route from the Pacific coast of the United States to Shanghai and Guangdong.²²⁷

Steamships at this time worked on a one-cylinder system, which produced limited power. Therefore, ships consumed a large quantity of coal. If a ship had no port of call on a long voyage, it could not carry much cargo, because a lot of room had to be reserved for coal. The Japanese archipelago was perfectly situated to supply coal to American steamships en route to and from China.²²⁸ In a report to the governor of Hongkong, the well known German missionary Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff (1803-1851), portrayed Cochin China, Siam, Korea and Japan as independent countries. He pointed out that since

²²⁶ Tanaka Hiroyuki, *Bakumatsu no Ogasawara – Ôbei no hogeisen de sakaeta midori no shima* ('Ogasawara in Bakumatsu period - A Green Island flourished by the American whaling ships'), *Cyûkô shinsho*, 1997, p.88.

²²⁷ 30th Congress, 1st Session Report No.596. See Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushi*, p.20.

²²⁸ Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushi*, p.24.

Japan and Siam maintained only minimal political relations with China, there was a very good possibility to begin trade and conclude a treaty with these two countries.²²⁹ Hence, it seemed obvious that Japan would provide the best ports of call for the supply of necessities such as water and coal.

In January 1849 an American whaling ship, the *Lagoda*, drifted ashore at Matsumae (a place in Hokkaido). As a result of the Japanese treatment of the sailors, the so-called 'Lagoda Incident' triggered a discussion on humanitarian grounds in the United States, where it was regarded as a serious problem and received a lot of attention. Japan's policy of seclusion was heavily criticized in American public opinion.²³⁰ The *Lagoda* Incident prompted an American expedition to Japan.²³¹ According to Wiley, 'Fifteen sailors from the whaler 'Lagoda' out of New Bedford had decided that they could no longer take the harsh treatment of their captain. The mutineers, who ranged in age from nineteen to forty, included the first and second mates and thirteen seamen, nine of whom were Hawaiians.'²³²

Moreover, Wiley points out the importance of whaling in the Japanese seas at that time. The *Lagoda* turned a ninety-eight percent profit on six voyages between 1841 and 1860, including the one during which its men mutinied. In 1846, out of the 945 American vessels that sailed the Pacific, 736 were whalers. Whaling, Melville argued with remarkable prescience, would inevitably bring the United States to Japan: 'If that double-bolted land, Japan, is ever to become hospitable, it is the whale-ship alone to whom the credit will be due; for already she is on the threshold.'²³³

Furthermore, Wiley explains the reason the Americans needed Japan at

²²⁹ Katō Yūzō, *Kurofune ihen – Perī no chosen*, ('Incident of Black ships'), Iwanami shinsho, 1988, pp.25-26.

²³⁰ 32d Congress, 1st Session. S.Ex.Doc.No.59, pp.5-7. See Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushi*, p.27.

²³¹ Aaron Haight Palmer, *Documents and facts illustrating the Origin of the Mission to Japan authorized by Government of the United States, May 10th, 1851; And which finally resulted in the treaty concluded by Commodore M.C. Perry, U.S. Navy with the Japanese commissioners at Kanagawa, Bay of Yedo, on the 31st March, 1854*, Washington, 1857, p.11.

²³² Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.22.

²³³ Lewis and Murakami, *Ronald MacDonald*, p.196, n.217; Melville, *Moby Dick*, p.107, 109, 478; Morison, *The Maritime History of Massachusetts*, p.319. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.30.

that time. 'Though the new clipper ships dashed around Cape Horn, other American merchant and naval vessels still preferred to reach the Orient by way of the Cape of Good Hope, which was a less hazardous route. But this route took one along the southern reaches of the British Empire. British-controlled ports such as Cape Town, Aden, Trincomalee, and Singapore only reminded brashly nationalistic Americans of their decidedly junior status in the world of global power politics. Now the Americans were looking for new routes, via Panama and Nicaragua and across the continent, to their recently-acquired territory on the West Coast and on to the tantalizing markets of China and the whaling grounds of the Pacific Basin. Japan would eventually figure in their ambitions.'²³⁴

This circumstance was related to the plan for 'the route to be taken across the Pacific. The United States would have to build fuel depots at ports along the route across the Pacific to provide coal for the steamers, since they gobbled up fuel at the rate of more than a ton an hour. Hawaii was the first logical place for a fuel depot...To go by a more northern route would take the steamers into fog-bound areas that would be dangerous to navigate and uncomfortable for passengers – like 'the disagreeable atmosphere' for which San Francisco was so notorious. This left only one logical stopover place: 'the island of Nipshon [sic] (in Japan) lies directly on the line from San Francisco to Shanghai.'²³⁵ Against this background, 'Glynn's reports of the ill treatment of the 'Lagoda' crew had reached Washington some time during 1850. In response, both houses of Congress introduced resolutions calling on the executive branch to provide information about what was happening in Japan.'²³⁶

In the wake of the *Lagoda* Incident, mounting an expedition to Japan was seriously discussed in the United States. 'In late January 1851, Perry wrote privately to Graham laying out his preliminary ideas about a strategy for dealing with the Japanese. 'The real object of the expedition,' he explained, 'should be concealed from public view, under a general understanding, that its main purpose will be to examine the usual resorts of our whaling ships, with special reference to their protection, and the opening to them of new ports of refuge and refreshment.' Perry described Nagasaki as the only port at which

²³⁴ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, pp.30-31.

²³⁵ *Ibidem*, p.40.

²³⁶ *Ibidem*, p.79.

foreign vessels were admitted, but noted that the Dutch “though their intrigues” had enough influence to frustrate any other nation’s attempts to enter into negotiations there. For this reason he proposed selecting as a destination for an expedition one or two ports at the other end of the country, but within communicating distance from Edo, such as Matsumae, Hakodate or both.’²³⁷ After all, ‘By virtue of its history and its seaboard, the United States was destined, however, to become an ocean-going commercial power in a world of European empires that boasted great navies.’²³⁸

Against this background, given the commercial circumstances of the United States in that period, it was thought that the United States would dispatch an ambassador to the countries of north-eastern Asia, especially to Japan, in the near future. Moreover, the Dutch Minister-Plenipotentiary in Washington, F.M.W. baron Testa (1806-1882) reported that the name of Aaron Haight Palmer (1779-1863)²³⁹ was mentioned as a suitable person to lead this expedition, when major trading companies in Baltimore submitted a petition which appealed to the President to start immediate diplomatic and commercial ties with the independent countries in East Asia.²⁴⁰ John Middleton Clayton (1796-1856) described Palmer as ‘entitled to more credit for getting up the Japan Expedition than any other man I know of.’²⁴¹

These reports on the opinions of the American commercial world show that the American intentions behind a Japanese expedition were not primarily the spread of Christianity. In March 1851, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a copy of a report that had been written by the Secretary of the U.S. Navy to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. It had been attached to the message of President Millard Fillmore (1800-1874) and outlined the policy of the U.S. navy in the Far East. This policy aimed at the protection and expansion of American commercial interests in East Asia and at the security of the American Pacific Coast. Although the American expedition to Japan was not yet sure, the

²³⁷ *Ibidem*, p.79.

²³⁸ *Ibidem*, p.43.

²³⁹ M. Vos, *Bakumatsu Dejima Mikōkai monjo*, p.212. Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia. A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with reference of China, Japan and Korea in the 19th Century*, New York, 1922, p.252.

²⁴⁰ NA Koloniën, 22 November 1850 no. 319/O1, Geheim.

²⁴¹ Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p.253.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew the attention of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the fact that this plan for an expedition to Japan was not lost sight of in the United States.²⁴²

The United States' plans for its new sea routes took into account the 'British domination of the international mail service, and the weakness of the American navy in comparison to the navy of England.' Consequently, 'in an emergency, the ships [on the route of the international mail service] could be converted to warships.'²⁴³ Therefore, 'Construction of the steamers for these lines was to be varied out under naval supervision so that they could be converted for war use in the event of an emergency.'²⁴⁴ Moreover, 'With the hothouse growth of the California economy and the United States' bid for domination of the China carrying trade, the question of a subsidized steamship line from San Francisco to Shanghai naturally enough surfaced once again while Perry was in Washington in February 1851 planning the Japan expedition.'²⁴⁵ After all, however, it became clear that 'The mail steamships...were turning out to be neither cheap nor efficient.'²⁴⁶

Dutch diplomacy towards Japan before its opening

Before it was widely known in the Netherlands that the American Perry was designated to make a voyage to Japan, many proposals concerning the Dutch trade with Japan can already be discovered in the minutes of the Dutch Parliament and *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië*. As mentioned above, after the Belgian secession, managing colonial and Asian affairs was of primary importance to the economic base of the Netherlands, especially in the matter of preserving Dutch status and prestige in Europe.²⁴⁷ Furthermore, there is no perceivable reason why the Netherlands would not be interested in a form of overseas trade that required only minimal administrative expenses and did not

²⁴² NA Koloniën no.5824, 10 Maart 1851 No.1, Geheim in 15 March 1851 No. 78, Geheim.

²⁴³ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.88.

²⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, pp.89-92.

²⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p.94.

²⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p.95.

²⁴⁷ Wels, *Aloofness*, p.100.

entail other problems related to colonial rule.

In the Kingdom of the Netherlands after the Napoleonic wars, legal jurisdiction on colonial matters was the exclusive prerogative of the king. Consequently, no debates in Parliament were necessary to make decisions about the colonial territories. Only from 1840 onwards did the Dutch Government have to provide detailed information about colonial matters to Parliament. The Minister of Colonial Affairs, J.C. Baud, pursued a rather minimalist colonial policy, which was aimed at getting the figures in colonial trade out of the red. Although before 1850, economic motives had hardly been an incentive for Dutch colonial expansion,²⁴⁸ in Parliament the Liberals were in favour of an expansionist overseas policy which would promote free trade. This pressure resulted in the Government having to amend its overseas policy. After the enactment of the new Constitution of 1848,²⁴⁹ the cabinet was responsible to Parliament for Dutch colonial policy and the Minister of Colonial Affairs took charge of colonial matters. In exchanges of ideas about the colonies, the debate between the Government and the members of Parliament intensified and Dutch colonial policy was gradually ever more greatly influenced by the Parliament.²⁵⁰

In this respect, it is interesting to read the work of Wolter Robert baron van Hoëvell (1812-1879), a liberal in the Dutch Lower House at that time, who favoured an expansionist policy in overseas matters.²⁵¹ He was the editor of

²⁴⁸ Fasseur, *De weg naar het paradijs*, p.53.

²⁴⁹ A riot broke out in Vienna, as a result of the February revolution of 1848 in France. This event induced King Willem II, in his own words, to change his position from being very conservative to very liberal literally overnight (from 12th to 13th March). W.L.M.E. van Leeuwen, *Honderd Jaar Nederland 1848-1948*, Hengelo, 1948, p.52.

²⁵⁰ Legêne, *De bagage van Blomhoff*, p.128.

²⁵¹ Wolter Robert, baron van Hoëvell, was born in Deventer in 1812 and died in The Hague in 1879. He went to the Netherlands East Indies in 1836 as a clergyman. Since he opposed the censorship policy of the Netherlands East Indies' Government, he was dismissed. After his return to the Netherlands in 1849 he became a member of parliament in the lower house and actively advocated the liberalization of the Netherlands East Indies, especially in the *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië*. Through his knowledge of the Netherlands East Indies and his outstanding eloquence, he had much influence also outside parliament; he greatly contributed to the end of the old system of despotic Government in the Dutch colonies. He was a member of the Council of State (Raad van State) from 1862 to 1879. His statements on

Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië ('Journal for the Netherlands East Indies) published by the *Indisch Genootschap* (The Netherlands East Indies Association), and also an active contributor to the journal. Both in Parliament and in his journal, he energetically argued against maintaining a minimalist overseas policy, on the grounds that this harmed Dutch national interests. His very frank utterances on Japanese affairs appear in several places in the parliamentary archives and in his magazine.

The fact that Van Hoëvell had lived in Batavia and had hands-on colonial, experience no doubt encouraged him to form this opinion. Although he had no deep insight into Japanese affairs, it is very interesting to note that he discussed Japan in relation to colonial problems and in the context of the policy of restraint. Opinions like his reveal that multiple options existed for Dutch diplomacy towards Japan at that time. Moreover, it shows that Japanese affairs were actively debated in the Netherlands. The next section will contain an outline of the relevance of Japan to the Netherlands, mainly on the basis of Van Hoëvell's utterances recorded in the Dutch parliamentary archives and in his journal.

Referring to the replacement of the Dutch trade chief in Deshima in 1850, Van Hoëvell argued that 'an efficient merchant' should be appointed as successor. He argued that, since Dutch civil servants engaged in Japanese trade with their own money and enjoying the protection afforded by their rank, they neglected their main duty. Instead of concentrating on Government trade, they paid more attention to their private trade interests. This disgraceful behaviour had eroded the status of the Dutch commercial chiefs. From 1836, the Dutch Government had taken steps to place Japanese trade in the hands of a person who paid commission for this right. Van Hoëvell questioned whether this was sufficiently effective, even though he did acknowledge that at least it raised Japanese respect for Dutch officials somewhat. Although acknowledging the increasing profits, Van Hoëvell still indicated that the changed approach had so far not been at all effective. While he admitted the significance of the Dutch Government's measure of asking King Willem II to give his advice to Japan in his letter in 1844, urging it to open its borders, he considered this measure to be

Dutch colonial affairs in parliament have been collected in: W.R. van Hoëvell, *Parlementaire Redevoeringen over Koloniale Belangen 1849-1854*, Zalt-Bommel, 1862 and *Parlementaire Redevoeringen over Koloniale Belangen 1856-1859*, Zalt-Bommel, 1864.

purely political and pointed out that it would not stop the economic deterioration of Dutch trade with Japan. On the contrary, the decline in profitability was actually increasing. Therefore, he argued that the Dutch Government was not displaying adequate awareness or giving sufficient instructions about raising commercial profits. He said, however, that it was not necessary to separate the pursuit of commercial profits completely from continuing to uphold a sincere and noble policy, and claimed that with a little skill these aims could be combined. Furthermore, he warned that the Dutch monopoly on trade was threatened, because, through the mediation of Chinese traders, Britain had begun indirect trade with Japan: 'probably the Japanese will gradually learn to do without the Dutch goods by using the British.'²⁵²

Moreover, it should be noted that at this time it was being said in the Netherlands that future negotiations with Japan should be facilitated by sending a mission to Edo which should be accompanied by an adequate display of naval power in order to raise respect and imbue reverence.²⁵³ It was well understood in the Netherlands that its position in Japan would hardly be improved if a mission was sent only to Nagasaki which was far from Edo, the political center. Some voices warned that the Netherlands would be supplanted by other countries in Japan, if it did not take a more active stance.

²⁵² *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië 1850*, pp.296-297.

²⁵³ *Ibidem*, p.385.

Chapter 5

Dutch foreign policy in relation to America's Asian policy

The oldest document in the archives of the Dutch Ministry of Colonial Affairs that relates directly to the expedition of the American Commodore Perry to Japan is a secret letter dated 22 November 1850, written by the Minister to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, Jan Jacob Rochussen (r.1845-1851). This document opened a new stage in Dutch diplomacy in Asia.

The document indicates that the Dutch expected that the United States would send a representative to Japan in the near future, because in 1849 the Secretary of State, John Middleton Clayton, had been making plans for such an expedition. It was intended to end Japan's international isolation and to spread Christianity.²⁵⁴ The Dutch Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington, Baron Testa, reported that so far the United States had not yet made a definite decision about engaging in commercial relations with any independent country in Asia.²⁵⁵ The plans were shelved when Clayton resigned after the death of President Zachary Taylor (1784-1850). Meanwhile, Testa believed that Aaron Haight Palmer would assume charge of this plan. He was a businessman in New York and had worked as a director of the American and Foreign Agency from 1830 to 1847. He remained interested in Asian trade: he worked as a broker in foreign trade and drew up a number of reports on this matter for the Department of State during 1846-1849.²⁵⁶

At this time Japan was still showing no signs of relinquishing its policy of *Sakoku*. Therefore, the Bakufu was very anxious about the increase in foreign visits during recent years. These concerns continued to grow, because from

²⁵⁴ NA Koloniën no.5821, 22 November 1850 no. 319/O1, Geheim.

²⁵⁵ NA Koloniën, 2.10.01, no.4357, Testa's letter of 9 October 1848 on 7 November 1849 N.407/S1, Geheim and his letter of 30 October 1849 on 24 November 1849 N.423/U1, Geheim.

²⁵⁶ Palmer, *Documents and facts illustrating the Origin of the Mission to Japan*, p.6, the same sentences can be seen; however the book was written during 1846-1851.

what was referred to as the Dutch 'separate news'²⁵⁷, the Japanese Government knew of the agitation being stirred up by British and American merchants to open Japan to international trade. In response, Japan repealed the strict isolationist law of 1825 and re-adopted the somewhat milder law of 1806 in 1842. The magistrate of Nagasaki asked the Dutch Government, via the trading chief in Deshima, whether it was willing to transmit the notification to other foreign countries that this legal modification was not intended to ease the Japanese policy of seclusion and that Japan still prohibited contacts with foreigners. The magistrate of Nagasaki at the same time handed the translation of the explanation about the amended law to the trading chief, who in his turn suggested to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies that the following year the separate news should report on the British and American attempts to open Japan to trade. He also asked that the news be drawn up with special care, because the Japanese Government greatly valued such information.²⁵⁸

The Governor-General was of the opinion that this request from the magistrate of Nagasaki should be complied with. However, he also considered it to be unwise and unnecessary to issue a definite declaration immediately, for fear that the Netherlands would come into conflict with the other powers.²⁵⁹ However, the Dutch Minister of Colonial Affairs, who agreed that this Japanese demand should be complied with, requested the king's approval for this message to be conveyed to Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Spain, as the matter

²⁵⁷ The Dutch 'separate news' (*apart nieuws*) was reports about political and diplomatic events that occurred in the world. This news was submitted to Japan after the Opium War separately from the conventional news. Activities of the European and American powers in Asia intensified after the war. Therefore Japan was eager to acquire information regarding it. The separate news was drawn up under the supervision of the chief of the General Affairs Bureau (*Algemene Secretarie*) in the Government of the Netherlands East Indies and was signed by the Governor-General from 1846 onwards.

²⁵⁸ NA Koloniën no.5825, 26 March 1851 No. 91. In this letter the former trading chief, Germain Felix Meijlan, mentioned that 'the separate news is the main reason that we are permitted and regarded as a friend in Japan'. Also, the trading chief, Joseph Henrij Levijssohn, wrote that 'it was no difficulty to share this opinion at all'. A similar utterance can also be seen in *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1856-1857*, p.565.

²⁵⁹ NA Koloniën no.5825, 17 February 1851 No. 40.

had already been communicated to England, the United States and France. It was decided not to pass on the Japanese message to England because of the following reason: when the Netherlands transmitted this message to European countries, the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Palmerston - since the report was not received from Japan directly - replied as follows: 'In reply, the Undersigned has to state to Count Gerrit Schimmelpenninck (1794-1863), that Her Majesty's Government request, that the Government of the Netherlands would have the goodness to explain to that of Japan, that, according to the practice of Europe, it is the custom for every independent state to be the organ of its own communications to other states...Her Majesty's Government can not attach *any official character* or *value* to communications coming to it from Japan through any other channel'.²⁶⁰

Difficulties in Dutch Far Eastern policy - discord between the home Government in Netherlands and the colonial administration in the Netherlands East Indies.

Although Dutch-Japanese relations were entering a new phase and the Netherlands were believed to be close to achieving a breakthrough, the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies had different interests in their dealings with Japan. Whereas the Netherlands strongly desired to deal with Japan for the sake of commercial and political interests in the Netherlands itself, the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, especially Rochussen's successor, Governor-General A.J. Duymaer van Twist (r.1851-1856), had little interest in matters relating to Japan.

Duymaer van Twist had not been Prime Minister Thorbecke's first choice as Governor-General. Originally in the formation of his new cabinet Thorbecke had selected George Isaäc Bruce (1803-1850) from his own province, Gelderland, to be Governor-General. Bruce, however, died before he could take up his new office. It was difficult for Thorbecke to find a new candidate. Baud was the most suitable person because of his knowledge of colonial affairs and his ability.

²⁶⁰ NA Koloniën no.5825, 8 March 1851 No. 64/H and 15 March 1851 No. 78. The king's approval was obtained on 17 March 1851 No. 79. (NA Koloniën no.5825). Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands Streven*, pp.69-70.

However, since he was a Conservative, it was expected that his appointment would cause difficulties with the king and the ministers. Therefore, because of the similarity of his and Bruce's political ideas Van Twist was chosen as 'Bruce's Political Twin'. A popular and well known speaker in parliament, where he was appointed president in 1850, this quite sensitive man later on became the victim of the hard-hitting discussions in the press and Parliament in connection with the accusations uttered by the Dutch writer Multatuli against the Cultivation System on Java and the Governor-General in person. He was a moderate conservative; although a reformer in Java itself, he was not the kind of person to be inclined to pursue a strong foreign policy.²⁶¹

He informed the Minister of Colonial Affairs about his opinions in these words: 'The trading chief on Deshima, Frederick Cornelis Rose (1808-1880), had requested that he be allowed to resign after only one year and this had been accepted. Since England and the United States were trying to make contact with Japan, it was very important, and at the same time very difficult, to choose a suitable successor.' It was difficult to explain the reasons for Rose's resignation given the lack of reliable material, however the well known parliamentarian, W.R. van Hoëvell, had insisted that 'an efficient merchant' would be the most suitable successor to the trading chief in Deshima and, at that time, the liberals in Parliament were appealing for an active policy to be pursued in Japan. Since Rose's assumption of office in 1851, his skill in dealing with Japanese affairs had already been called into doubt and his functioning was summed up in the words of Van Hoëvell 'An efficient diplomat is not always a good merchant'.²⁶² On the other hand, it was also said that Rose submitted his resignation because he disliked living in the confined space on Deshima.²⁶³

Furthermore, according to Duymaer van Twist, it would be impossible for the Netherlands to maintain its neutrality should a dispute erupt between Japan and a foreign country. Therefore, he asked: 'Should we take sides with an aggressor and in a sense betray our old friend, or should we take sides with

²⁶¹ W. Verkade, *Thorbecke als Oost-Nederlands patriot*, Zutphen, 1974, pp.218-220. Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, of de Koffievelingen van de Nederlandsche Handel-maatschappij*, Amsterdam, 1860.

²⁶² NA Koloniën no.5831, 21 March 1852 No. 100. *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsche Indië* 1850 (2), p.78.

²⁶³ *De Gids*, Amsterdam, 1868, p.176.

Japan and be obliged to become the enemy of England or the United States?' He believed that the Netherlands should persuade the Japanese Government to acquiesce in the Western demands. Should this prove unsuccessful, 'It would be better to give Japan up completely,' rather than to expose the Netherlands to danger. Duymaer van Twist went on to argue that the commercial profits from the trade with Japan were not large and this trade was maintained mainly out of 'a certain national honour or prestige.' Moreover, he noted that he did not understand what reason people had to boast about this relationship with Japan, because it was common knowledge in every country that, in order to maintain this trade, the Dutch had to suffer very humiliating treatment at the hands of the Japanese. Furthermore, he continued, every country had its doubts about the Netherlands' policy towards Japan and it was generally believed that the Dutch intended to make big profits, while excluding all other countries from Japanese trade. He argued that although this doubt was completely unjustified, it existed.

A fine example of the Americans' misunderstandings over the Netherlands, is the diary of an American sailor, William Cleveland (1777-1842), who visited Nagasaki on a chartered ship in 1800. He mentions that 'The Dutch being the only foreigners, except the Chinese, that are permitted to trade here, have it in their power to prejudice the *Japanders*, against any foreign nation, of whom they may be jealous, but as the Americans hold no place in India, I cannot conceive of any motives of policy that can be offered for diminishing the importance of America unless it is to make the Japanese, think they possess the most extensive Country in the Western World.'²⁶⁴ This example shows that the Americans not only held a prejudice against the Netherlands for a long time, but also believed that the Netherlands had a certain level of influence in Asia.

The British historian W.G. Beasley also supports this view; 'The Dutch and Chinese merchants at Nagasaki were Japan's only regular source of information on world events, and neither were likely to view with sympathy or approval Britain's growing power and influence east of Singapore. The Dutch,

²⁶⁴ Kanai Madoka, 'A Diary of William Cleveland, Captain's Clerk on Board the Massachusetts' in: *Monograph Series 1 Quezon City Institute of Asian Studies*, University of the Philippines, 1965, p.20. It was translated by the same author into Japanese, 'Kansei 12 (1800) Beisen Massachusetts-gô Nihon Nagasaki taizai nikki' in: *Yôgaku* 1, Yasaka shobô, 1993, p.195.

in particular, had long used their special position in Japan to prejudice the officials against possible competitors.’²⁶⁵ Hence, Van Twist’s anxiety was justified in a way. Against this background the Governor-General thought that it would be a good idea to make public the letter from the late King Willem II, advising Japan to open in 1844; it would serve to remove this odour of suspicion hanging over the Dutch. If it resulted in failure, ‘We cannot be blamed for this. The Japanese Government should be forced to adopt another system by military force: we can leave it without a concern about other powers that might be called in and be capable of handling this matter’.²⁶⁶

In response to the Governor-General’s message, the Minister of Colonial Affairs in the Netherlands, Charles Ferdinand Pahud de Montanges (1803-1873), who has been described as ‘an administrator more than a legislator, especially an administrator more than a reformer; a diligent, active administrator, but the administrator more than all other administrators stubbornly attached to the tradition,’²⁶⁷ proposed to the king that the new trading chief in Deshima should be instructed to advise Japan to change its foreign policy. This should be done through a letter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, while a copy of King Willem II’s letter should be transmitted to the United States. At the same time, however, he decided to inform the Governor-General that relations with Japan were not to be broken off, and that the trading factory on Deshima was not to be closed down. In spite of the negative policy towards Japan proposed by Duymaer van Twist, Pahud made a clear case for autonomous diplomacy by the Netherlands.²⁶⁸

Japanese expedition by the United States – Commodore Perry

In the meantime, in the United States a new plan had been made for the proposed Japanese expedition, which was much larger in scale than the first

²⁶⁵ Beasley, *Great Britain and the opening of Japan*, p.40.

²⁶⁶ NA Koloniën no.6562, the semi-official document dated 8 January 1851 from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, on 21 March 1852 No. 100.

²⁶⁷ Van den Doel, *De Stille Macht*, p.61.

²⁶⁸ NA Koloniën no.5831, 21 March 1852 No. 100.

plan. The Dutch document said that, as a result of this change, the commander of the previous plan, John H. Aulick (1789-1873) could not take charge of it and was no longer the preferred choice as its leader, and Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, who was a capable person and was highly experienced, was appointed.²⁶⁹ The real reason for the dismissal of Aulick, however, was his character.²⁷⁰

Perry grew up in a family with a father and an elder brother in the navy. He did important work in modifying the steam engine for use in warships. He became famous as 'the father of the steam navy'.²⁷¹ 'Matthew Calbraith Perry had already proven his mettle as a sailor, diplomat, naval reformer, and advocate of the new steam navy. Perry, too, was personally acquainted with many if not all of the most powerful men in the New York merchant community. His daughter Caroline was married to August Belmont, one of the wealthiest businessmen in the city, and, as a representative of the Navy Department, he had supervised the construction of the mail steamers subsidized by the Federal Government. This job brought him into regular contact with such merchants as Howland and Aspinwall. Perry, moreover, was an avid expansionist who had commanded the Home Squadron, the largest ever assembled, that blockaded and shelled Vera Cruz and ranged up and down the Gulf Coast of Mexico under Fillmore's Whig administration. Meanwhile, this was doing its best to promote more legal and less abrasive forms of expansion, while heading off the aggressive schemes of Manifest Destiny Democrats, filibusters, and slave owners, all of whom were casting covetous eyes at Cuba, Mexico and parts of Central America.'²⁷²

In a description of Perry's character Silas Bent, who served under him in Mexico and Japan, says that: 'He was bluff, positive and stern on duty, and a terror to the ignorant and lazy, but the faithful ones who performed their duties with intelligence and zeal held him in the highest estimation, for they knew his kindness and consideration.' Perry hesitated when he spoke, often searching for

²⁶⁹ NA Koloniën no.5831, A letter of 21 February 1852 from Testa on 21 March 1852 No.100.

²⁷⁰ Tabohashi, *Zôtei kindai*, p.432. Also, Robert Erwin Johnson, *Far China Station-the U.S. Navy in Asian Waters 1800-1898*, Maryland, 1979. See Chapter 4 'The Most Frustrating Cruise' in this work.

²⁷¹ *Yokohamashi-shi*(History of Yokohama city) vol.II, Yokohama, 1958-, p.52.

²⁷² Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.42.

the right word. However though his penmanship, for which he apologized, often verged on the undecipherable, he was a fluent writer and his letters and journals were thoughtful, even on occasion poetic. A religious man who enjoyed a good sermon, he was known for his sulphurous tongue and enjoying a good drink. Perry had always shown a strong intellectual drive and interest in science. On his first cruise to the Mediterranean, he spent his spare time translating a Spanish book and later became fluent in Spanish. He was also a careful student of the weather, winds and currents, as well as botany and of conchology. At sea he made sure that the midshipmen under him were given as full an education as shipboard life permitted. While on shore duty he turned his mental energies toward the improvement of the navy, organizing a naval lyceum, museum, library, and a naval journal at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.²⁷³

Perry had formed an unfavourable impression of the Dutch. 'Perry thought that accounts of [Japanese] prejudice against foreigners were highly exaggerated. He assigned blame for the lack of trade with the outside world to the intrigues of the Dutch, 'who have stopped at nothing, however dishonourable, or degrading to their national character, to effect their object''²⁷⁴ Therefore, he carefully avoided having any contact with the Dutch. However, he did acquire useful information about Japan from Dutch material sources. 'Perry acquired a set of charts from Holland for thirty thousand dollars, including some brought from Japan by Philipp Franz von Siebold.'²⁷⁵

Perry's expedition was supported by a strong naval squadron. It now became clear to the Dutch Government that the United States was getting more serious about the expedition, that it strongly desired to conclude a treaty with Japan and that it was prepared to use military force if Japan rejected the American request for a treaty without sufficient reason.²⁷⁶ Since the United States strongly desired to initiate commercial relations with Japan, the Dutch expected that the United States would justify its attempts to pursue its

²⁷³ William Elliot Griggs, *Matthew Calbraith Perry: A Typical American Naval Officer*, Boston, 1887, p.24. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.51.

²⁷⁴ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.80.

²⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, p.108.

²⁷⁶ NA Koloniën no.5831, A letter of February 21 1852 on 21 March 1852 N.100.

NA Koloniën no.5837, A letter of 21 May 1852 N.601 on 6 January 1853 N2.

economic interests as 'a duty to civilize Japan'.²⁷⁷

Perry's instructions were formulated in a document by C.M. Conrad (1804-1878), the acting Secretary of State. They stated the objects of the expedition as:

1. To effect some permanent arrangement for the protection of American seamen and property wrecked on these Islands, or driven into their ports by stress of weather.
2. Permission for American vessels to enter one or more of their ports in order to obtain supplies of provisions, water, fuel, &, or, in case of disasters, to refit so as to enable them to prosecute their voyage.

It is very desirable to have permission to establish a depot for coal, if not on one of the principal islands, at least on some small uninhabited one, of which, it is said, there are several in their vicinity.

3. The permission to our vessels to enter one or more of their ports for the purpose of disposing of their cargoes by sale or barter.²⁷⁸

Perry should recognize that the Japanese 'are very excited against the English, of whose conquests in the east, and recent invasion of China, they have probably heard.' For this reason, he was to explain that the Americans, though they speak the same language as the English, are 'connected with no Government in Europe' Instead he was to emphasize that the United States was located directly across the ocean where large cities lay within twenty days by steamer from Japan. American commerce in the Pacific was increasing daily. 'That part of the ocean will soon be covered with our vessels,' and Japan and the United States were 'becoming every day nearer and nearer.'²⁷⁹

Perry's personal thoughts about the expedition were expressed in his letter to the Secretary of State for the first time: He placed the expedition in a global strategic context, particularly in relation to the United States' chief rival, Great Britain. Great Britain, Perry explained, was now in possession of the most important fortified points in the East India and China seas, especially in the latter. Singapore covered the southwestern entrance to the China Sea, Hong Kong the northeastern. Borneo, to which the British had set an expedition in 1846, represented an intermediate point. From these fortified positions England

²⁷⁷ NA Koloniën no.5837, A letter of 21May 1852 N. 601 on 6 January 1853 N.2.

²⁷⁸ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, pp.116-117.

²⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, p.117.

was on the verge of 'shutting up at will and controlling the enormous trade of those seas, amounting, it is said, in value to 300,000 tons of shipping, varying cargoes certainly not under £ 15,000,000 sterling.' To prevent the British from monopolizing the China trade, the Americans had to act quickly. Fortunately there were many islands in the western Pacific, including Japan, left untouched by this 'annexing Government,' and these islands lay along the steamer route from California, 'which is destined to become of great importance to the United States.' 'Now that Perry was free of Washington and the controversy surrounding steamship lines, he could state his objectives clearly: ports of refuge for whalers might be the ostensible reason for the Japan expedition, but the United States' global rivalry with England and the need to secure ports on a Pacific steamship line were its real *raisons d'être*.'²⁸⁰

Against this background, the Dutch Government decided to adopt an autonomous diplomatic course towards Japan. The Netherlands did not want to give up its relations with Japan under any circumstance. Therefore, the Government sent directions to the new trading chief on Deshima telling him not to put pressure on the Japanese Government by threatening to break off relations with Japan or to withdraw from Deshima. During the transitional phase of the opening of Japan, no Dutch intervention should occur, unless the integrity and dignity of the Dutch government required such action. Also the Netherlands should not support Japan, if it entered into hostilities with a foreign country. But if mediation [between the warring parties] was asked for, an attempt should be made to reach a desired and satisfying solution.'²⁸¹

Von Siebold's proposal for the American diplomacy towards Japan

While the Netherlands was unable to take definite measures in response to the Japanese expedition of the United States, a new initiative was unexpectedly taken by Ph.F. von Siebold. He explained his proposal to the Minister of Colonial Affairs by saying that the Japanese expedition set out in the American

²⁸⁰ *A Report of the Secretary of the Navy...relative to the naval expedition to Japan*, pp.12-14. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.124.

²⁸¹ NA Koloniën no.5840, This attitude was confirmed on 13 July 1852 N. 243 too.

plan had forced him to take consideration what had occurred between the Netherlands and Japan and he had made the decision to explain his opinion in a memorandum. His proposal was that more direct efforts should be made towards the Japanese Government than the directions already issued to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, thereby trying to gain what the United States wanted to obtain, if necessary, by arms.²⁸² He also explained that, as it looked for opportunities in the new trade the United States would assert its influence in Asia: 'Very important events have taken place in the Chinese and Japanese waters and the northern part of Pacific Ocean in the last ten years. For this reason, the Netherlands has many opportunities to assert its influence with a view to expanding Dutch commerce and maintaining our ancient navigation in this area. The Anglo-Chinese war, the opening of northern harbours in China, the rise of California, the increase in American whaling in the Pacific Ocean are important events, and these happenings form a considerable period in the history of maritime trade and the colonization of the old and new world'. In consideration of these events, he summarized the present problems as follows:

1. Which obligations does the Netherlands have?
2. Is it possible that the Netherlands would be regarded as only a maritime mercantile [and neutral] country in events relating to Japan?
3. What should the Netherlands do?

Examining these issues he stressed that the Netherlands could, and should, give advice to Japan and that it could preserve its national honour, while looking after its commercial and political interests carefully. Furthermore, he suggested that the Netherlands should advise Japan to adopt the principle of general private and free trade in view of the interests of other countries; and that, if necessary, England should obtain the same free trade rights as the Dutch. In addition, the Netherlands should propose a treaty to Japan by which other foreign countries including England and the United States should be granted a commercial relationship with Japan. This was because the British and the Americans would not be able to establish a commercial relationship with it peacefully on account of the ignorance of the Japanese institution and their ways of thinking.²⁸³

²⁸² NA Koloniën no.5831, 8 April 1852 N. 123.

²⁸³ NA Koloniën no.5831, A letter of 21 April 1852 on 22 April 1852 N. 139/R.

Von Siebold wrote in his 'Report of East and South Asia' (*Le Moniteur des Indes orientales et occidentales*) that 'our (Dutch) Government should continue to strive hard to open Japan and for this purpose be kind under these circumstances. Therefore, if Japan was finally opened, our Netherlands would also naturally benefit from this with other powers.' This view implies that the opening of Japan would be in the Dutch interest. To achieve this goal the Dutch government decided to employ Von Siebold as its special advisor on Japan.²⁸⁴

American request for Dutch support for its expedition to Japan

The Minister of Colonial Affairs subsequently put Von Siebold's proposal on the agenda of a cabinet meeting.²⁸⁵ Moreover, he also confirmed the intention not to withdraw from Japan. After the king had given his assent, he instructed the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies as follows: that he was to promote the American efforts to change the Japanese *Sakoku* system and he was to instruct the trading chief on Deshima about this matter. The Japanese reply to William II's letter giving Dutch recommendations to Japan was also reported at the same time.²⁸⁶ The Governor-General, however, was to support the United States only if its peaceful intention was clear. He was also to act within the diplomatic initiative outlined by William II and was not to exceed it. He was not to participate in an American demonstration. The trading chief on Deshima was instructed to follow this instruction very carefully.²⁸⁷

In the meeting many objections to the plan to send a special mission from the Netherlands were raised. As a result, the Instruction to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies was amended: he was to appoint either the new trading chief on Deshima or send a special envoy from Batavia to Japan to carry the Governor-General's letter to the magistrate of Nagasaki. This official advised the Japanese Government on such matters, and

²⁸⁴ Kutsuzawa Nobutaka, 'Dainiji rainichiji ni okeru Shīboruto no gaikōkatsudō' ('Siebold's diplomatic action in his second arrival in Japan'), in Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio (red.), *Shīboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindai*, p.236.

²⁸⁵ NA Koloniën no.5831, 8 April 1852 N.123.

²⁸⁶ NA Koloniën no.4325, 26 June 1846 N.185/B1.

²⁸⁷ NA Koloniën no.5834, 22 July 1852 N.259/H.

the Dutch representative to be appointed was to negotiate the commercial treaty drafted by Von Siebold with him. To demonstrate the disinterestedness of Dutch foreign policy, all sentences that might hint at attempts, however slight, to pursue any new privileges had to be carefully avoided. The representative was also to inform the Japanese Government that the Netherlands would refrain from further contacts with Japan if its advice was to prove useless, as the Netherlands was unselfishly advising Japan at its own risk.²⁸⁸ Later, the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies confirmed to the Minister of Colonial Affairs that, in the message to be conveyed, all sentences regarding Dutch benefits had been deleted; and that topics relating to religion had not been mentioned; moreover it was stressed that the Netherlands had always been the recipient of a most-favoured-nation treatment in Japan.²⁸⁹

The American Government had requested the Dutch Government through the American *chargé d'affaires* in The Hague, George Folsom (1802-1869), to see that the trading chief on Deshima would promote the policy of the American Government and co-operate in the achieving the abolition of the isolation system in Japan. In addition, he also asked for a map of Japan. When he received the reply that the Netherlands had no such map, he emphasized that 'Should the proposed objects, which are of a strictly pacific character, prove successful, it is universally admitted that great advantages would result to all nations interested in the commerce of the East'.²⁹⁰ The Minister of Colonial Affairs saw no objection to honouring the American request regarding the role of the trading chief, as long as the Dutch intervention (*tussenkomst*) should not be seen as arbitration (*arbitrage*),²⁹¹ and as long as the Dutch role could be restricted to a liberal support of the United States in view of Willem II's letter. In short, the Netherlands seriously intended to convey to the Japanese Government the unfortunate consequences if it refused to dismantle the national system of isolation. On the other hand, the Netherlands were also concerned about possible American misunderstandings regarding the Dutch.²⁹²

²⁸⁸ NA Koloniën no.5831, 8 April 1852 N.123. Koloniën no.5837, 6 January 1853 N.2.

²⁸⁹ NA Koloniën no.5837, 6 January 1853 N.2.

²⁹⁰ NA Koloniën no.5834, A letter of 2 July 1852 in 13 July 1852 N.243. The Dutch reply was not believed by the American side.

²⁹¹ NA Koloniën no.5834, 13 July 1852 N.243 and 17 July N.249/F1.

²⁹² NA Koloniën no.5831, A letter of 3 April 1852 on 22 April 1852 N.139/R.

Referring to this possibility, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herman van Sonsbeeck (1796-1865), remarked, for example, that the reports of the humiliating treatment of the Dutch merchants in their customary audience in Edo was written 'in an extremely unpleasant way' in an American newspaper. Furthermore, he pointed out the incorrectness of the reference of United States President Taylor, which intimated that there was an American consul in Batavia.²⁹³

The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies consented to most aspects of the Dutch Government's plan, but he raised objections to the directive requiring the dispatch of two naval ships to Japan in order to enhance Dutch prestige in the region. The Governor-General explained that the Netherlands East Indies' navy was insufficiently equipped to protect the Archipelago and deal with piracy, and, therefore, sending two ships to Japan was impossible. Regarding the dispatch of a new trade chief, he was worried that the United States might easily consider the appointment of a military officer a hostile act, and it might harbour suspicions that the Dutch were informing Japan about European military tactics and teaching it how best to defend itself against foreign aggression. He added that it was difficult to find a high-ranking civil officer, because nobody would be available to take over his duties during his absence. Consequently, it was decided that Jan Hendrik Donker Curtius (1813-1879) would be appointed the new trading chief on Deshima and would be given the necessary mandate to execute this task. Another reason for this decision was that the mediation of the trading chief would be considered acceptable, as the Japanese neither knew about or nor allowed any diplomatic way other than the conventional contacts at Nagasaki.²⁹⁴ This Japanese attitude had been glaringly obvious in the events surrounding the Dutch King's letter in 1844.²⁹⁵

Secret instructions given by the Netherlands East Indies' Government to the trading chief in Deshima were attached to a document dated 6 January 1853, and contained directions for the negotiations with Japan. The most important points were that the chief was never to approve an agreement that could cause difficulties for the Netherlands or degrade the trading post in Deshima (Art. 6);

²⁹³ NA Koloniën no.5829, 22 November 1851 N.303/P1.

²⁹⁴ NA Koloniën no.5837, A letter of 25 June 1852 N.15 on 6 January 1853 N.2.

²⁹⁵ See Chapter 3.

that he was not to leave Japan, even temporarily, unless there was an unavoidable necessity and Dutch honour absolutely demanded this (Art. 9)²⁹⁶. Furthermore, as already mentioned above, it was decided to inform the Japanese Government that the Netherlands would refrain from further contact with Japan, if this altruistic Dutch action was rejected.²⁹⁷

The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies sent the magistrate of Nagasaki a letter stressing the altruistic and noble motives of King Willem II's friendly advice in view of the Dutch-Japanese long-time relations. This letter stated that there was a rumour in Europe that the United States intended to send a mission to Japan with the aim of establishing trade relations; and that Japan could not reject any reasonable demands made by the United States outright, because strength wise it was comparable to 'the strongest power in Europe!' It also said that Japan, even if it were a great power, could not resist the trend of world history; and that if the matter were to be decided by military force, this decision would entail long and bloody fighting; should this be so, the Dutch king was afraid that the Dutch might forsake Japan temporarily.²⁹⁸

The Japanese expedition of the United States with a powerful force and the Dutch reaction to it

The Netherlands collected and analysed information about Perry's expedition through the Dutch Minister to the United States, Testa. This information contributed to the formulation of a new Dutch policy for the Far East. Testa informed his Government of a report by the Secretary of the U.S. Navy that was attached to the President's State of the Union message to Congress.²⁹⁹ It said

²⁹⁶ NA Koloniën N.339 1852 on '6 January 1853 N.2'.

²⁹⁷ NA Koloniën no.5839, 'A letter of 25 June in 1852'.

For a study handling the Japanese activities towards the Americans policy from the perspective of the history of information, since the Dutch information about Perry's arrival came in Japan, Iwashita Tetsunori, *Bakumatsu Nihon no jōhō katsudō – 「Kaikoku」 no jōhōshi* ('Japanese intelligence activities in the late Tokugawa era – the history of information about the opening of the country'), Yūzankaku, 2000.

²⁹⁸ NA Koloniën, 'A letter of 25 June in 1852'.

²⁹⁹ NA Koloniën no.5837, A letter 4 January 1853 on 20 January 1853 N32.

that Perry's squadron was fully armed for a possible confrontation. Although the mission had a peaceful character its stated intention was not to go home until it had succeeded in its purpose; and that the expedition had been strengthened in order to prevent failure.

The military strength of the American squadron was also indicated in the letter from Tailor to Von Siebold. According this letter, 'the squadron was strong enough to make an impression, in case finally military force should be necessary. The squadron consists of eight steam ships and frigates, which are equipped with 230 cannons. You are more able than I to imagine the influence that this kind of extraordinary military power can exert on the Japanese.'³⁰⁰

The map made by the United States named the tip of Kannon Point, *Rubicon Point*,³⁰¹ a designation which shows how serious the purpose of the American squadron was. Meanwhile, Marshall wrote to Perry, 'and it appears to me no effort should be spared to preserve the beneficial and prosperous commerce already open with this great, extensive, and productive country (China)' The Japan expedition, Marshall concluded, was only of secondary importance. China was the most pressing issue.'³⁰² Actually 'Nothing that Marshall could have said could have been more offensive to the commodore (Perry).'³⁰³ Before Perry arrived in the vicinity of Edo, he visited Ryûkyû. Through this visit, 'Perry left the Bonins with the sense of having accomplished one of the major objectives of the expedition, undoubtedly a source of satisfaction this early in his voyages. He had been instructed to locate ports of refuge and sources of supplies for ships sailing the surrounding seas. This he had done at Naha and Port Lloyd. More important, he had found 'suitable stopping places, for a line of mail steamers, which I trust may soon be established between some one of our Pacific ports and China.'³⁰⁴

³⁰⁰ Siebold-Archiv, 'Mittelbiebrach/Brandenstein,Nr.III 1483' in: Miyasaka Masahide, 'Shiboruto to Peri no Amerika Nihon enseitai - Burandenshutain bunsyo wo chûshin ni -' ('Siebold and Perry's expedition'), in Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio (red.), *Shiboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindai*, p.222.

³⁰¹ Katô, *Kurofune ihen*, p.38.

³⁰² *A Report of the Secretary of the Navy...relative to the naval expedition to Japan*, pp.22-23. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.161.

³⁰³ *Ibidem*, p.161.

³⁰⁴ *Ibidem*, pp.211-212.

Testa's report, furthermore, noted that the United States intended to enlarge the reach of its navy on the political consideration that other maritime powers had also reinforced their naval power. It is worth noticing that the Secretary of the U.S. Navy took special pains to point out that the south of the Pacific Ocean would be the stage of many important expeditions ten years on. Testa also mentioned the Russian advance in the Pacific and he directed the attention of the Dutch Government to four expeditions that were being prepared in the United States, as follows:

1. An expedition to explore and open Chinese waters of the North Pacific Ocean and the Bering Strait.
2. An expedition to explore part of the African continent.
3. An expedition to cruise and investigate the Plata and Parana Rivers in South America, which had recently opened to foreign trade.³⁰⁵
4. An expedition to explore the northern shore of Greenland.

It was thought that these expeditions might contribute to international trade, which was being stimulated by the development of new technology and by the advance of other maritime countries into undeveloped areas, especially Asia and Africa, which were expected to act as new reservoirs of commercial activity in the near future. The Russian expeditions are an example of the rapid development of international trade at that time. The attention of the Dutch Government was also drawn by an American expedition under the command of Cadwalader Ringgold (1802-1867) to conduct a hydro-graphic survey in the Indian Ocean, in Chinese and Japanese waters along the sea route between China and California, as well as in the northern Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea area, which American merchant ships frequently visited.³⁰⁶ Acts of American diplomacy in Asia, especially the Perry expedition, were often reported in the Dutch newspapers. This indicates that the Dutch showed a great

³⁰⁵ NA Koloniën 'A letter of 4 January 1853'. The names of places in the third expedition would be considered to be Rio de la Plata and Paraná in South America.

³⁰⁶ NA Koloniën no.5860, A letter of 23 December 1853 N.261/R3 on 14 February 1854 N.50. Since the United States had taken possession of California, it was planning to realize the trans-pacific steamship route. Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushi*, p.42.

interest in them.³⁰⁷

The Dutch Government expended considerable energy in trying to figure out a response to the intended expedition to Japan by the United States. The Government of the Netherlands East Indies, however, disagreed with the plans for Japan that were being made in The Hague. The Governor-General expressed various objections.³⁰⁸ To begin with, he asked the Minister of Colonial Affairs how could he carry out the instruction that he was preparing to fulfil, because the Dutch Government had promised its assistance to the American expedition. Next, the Governor-General, on the advice of the Council of the Netherlands East Indies, asked the Minister about his plan to dispatch a king's ship to Japan with a definite mission. He wanted to know whether he should consider this instruction a definitive order or did it simply authorize him to carry it out, and in the latter case he would assume this authority. He pointed out that the dispatch of a warship under present conditions might arouse suspicions in Japan. Also he gave the Minister a warning that it could harm the negotiations, if these were initiated.³⁰⁹

Van Twist worried that Japan would think that the Netherlands was conspiring with the United States against it. In fact, when Perry negotiated with the Japanese, 'A number of officials from the *san bugyo* (三奉行) offered their own analysis of the situation. It was clear to them that the American and the Dutch were 'in collusion in a cunning plot to betray us.'³¹⁰ This may be construed as a clue that the Japanese had doubts about the Dutch, thinking that

³⁰⁷ In *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, the articles are seen as below, Survey no.247 (*Algemeen overzicht*) dated 7 September 1853; Survey no. 288 dated 18 October 1853; Survey no. 353 dated 22 December 1853; NA Colonies no. 46 dated 15 February 1854; Survey no. 47 dated 16 February 1854; NA Colonies no. 75 dated 16 March 1854; Survey no. 152 dated 3 June 1854; Survey no. 218 dated 9 August 1854; Survey no. 238 dated 29 August 1854; Survey no. 240 dated 31 August 1854; Survey no. 241 dated 1 September 1854; Survey no. 260 dated 20 September 1854; Survey no. 271 dated 1 October 1854; Survey no. 273 dated 3 October 1854; Survey no. 288 dated 18 October 1854; Survey no. 302 dated 1 November 1854; Survey no. 351 dated 20 December 1854; Survey no. 26 dated 26 January 1855; Survey no. 118 dated 29 April 1855; Survey no. 80 dated 21 March 1858 about the report on Perry's death.

³⁰⁸ NA Koloniën no.5834, 17 July 1852 N.249 F1 and 22 July 1852 N.256.

³⁰⁹ NA Koloniën no.5838, A letter of 22 September 1852 on 15 February 1853 N.75.

³¹⁰ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.336.

their only purpose was to protect their own trade interest.³¹¹ This shows that Van Twist's concern was right. Against this background, the Governor-General wrote in his letter to Commodore Perry that he could not give the trading chief on Deshima definite orders urging him to assist the American plan because he had not yet been officially informed. Moreover, he stated that even if the trading chief had succeeded in the negotiations with the Japanese Government, the understanding between the United States and the Netherlands would clearly exert a disadvantageous influence on these negotiations, because the intentions of the United States were not necessarily always peaceful.³¹²

The Minister of Colonial Affairs supplied the Governor-General with a letter to be passed on to Commander Perry in case he should visit Batavia. This letter contained regulations and pointed out what the Netherlands wanted to secure in a possible future treaty with Japan. This was a precaution against the Americans getting the idea that the Dutch Government was intentionally refraining from informing them. Furthermore, the Minister instructed the Governor-General that he was authorized to deal with this matter,³¹³ and that any further steps taken towards the Japanese Government should be in line with the action taken by Willem II in 1844. In this way, the Minister of Colonial Affairs was clearly pursuing an active course of diplomacy towards Japan in his communications with the Governor-General, in spite of the latter's opposition to his views.

The Dutch Government also provided the Governor-General with specific directions regarding the trading chief to be appointed to Nagasaki. The directions stated that he was not to lose sight of the objective of concluding a treaty; and that he should be careful to prevent Japan from granting any privilege or concession to foreign powers which excluded the Netherlands. Furthermore he should do his best to convince Japan that it was in its own interest to abolish the isolation system, and that the Netherlands would continue to give it altruistic advice in this matter. The document continued by instructing the chief that he was to remove any misunderstandings that the

³¹¹ Iwashita Tetsunori, 'Peri kaikô chokuzen ni okeru Date Munenari(伊達宗城) no jôhō katsudô – *Bakumatsu Nihon no jôhō katsudô hoi*' in: *Meiji ishinshi gakkaihô*, No. 36, 2000, p.8.

³¹² NA Koloniën no.5838, A letter of 22 September 1852 N.406 on 22 April 1853 N.162.

³¹³ NA Koloniën no.5838, 22 April 1853 N.162. The word 'authorised' was emphasized by underlining in the document.

Netherlands sought or enjoyed any exclusive privileges that might exist among other foreigners. Furthermore, concerning the Japanese request to obtain a warship from the Netherlands in order to build the Japanese navy, the Dutch Government would do nothing for the time being, however it planned to dispatch a small, unarmed steamship to Japan so as not to damage the relationship.³¹⁴ This measure should be seen in the context of the Crimean War (1853-1856). As the Netherlands took a neutral position in this conflict, it had to avoid becoming involved in a possible collision between England, France and also Russia in Japan.

It was of great importance for the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to avoid coming into conflict with any of the great powers. Moreover, as he had already received a report from the trading chief relevant to the American and Russian intentions to enter Japan, this issue was very real for him. He was not actually in favour of the active diplomacy of the Dutch Government towards Japan, and he requested the Dutch Government to take measures to deal with this matter in consideration of the advice of the Council of the Netherlands East Indies: 'As the Council rightly advises, the supreme Government in the Netherlands has discretion in this matter'. Moreover, he said that 'he restricted himself to waiting for such orders as the home Government might deem necessary.' In other words he left this matter completely to the Dutch Government.³¹⁵ His position in this matter is understandable, because he occupied a subordinate office, but none the less one with far-reaching powers as an executive body in the overseas territories, and the Dutch Government had to rely on this body because of the great distance between Europe and Asia. The lack of enthusiasm, or rather passive resistance, of the Netherlands East Indies Government regarding the policy of the home Government would lead to great difficulties for the realization of an effective Dutch foreign policy towards Japan.

³¹⁴ NA Koloniën no.5861, 19 March 1854 N.101, Zeer Geheim.

³¹⁵ NA Koloniën no.5861, A letter of 23 December 1853 on 20 March 1854 N.103/N, Zeer Geheim.

Chapter 6

Perry's arrival in Japan and the desired outcome of the expedition.

The effect of Perry's arrival in Japan

Japan was forced to open itself to foreign trade and diplomacy after the American-Japanese treaty of 1854. The opening, however, was described as an act of 'gunboat-policy' by President Fillmore.³¹⁶ Perry's action involved steamships, which were at the cutting edge of Western science and technology at that time. The warships deeply impressed a great number of Japanese who witnessed their arrival in Edo Bay. A Japanese guard who was present described how 'four three-masted ships of about 3,000 Koku each, which did not have their sails raised, were moving with perfect freedom, like a bird flying. Suddenly I lost track of them.' This Japanese guardsman, however, was a little off track, because 1000 Koku is about 100 tons. Actually Perry's frigate, Susquehanna, was not three times but about twenty times as large as a ship of 1000 Koku.³¹⁷ It was plain for the Japanese to see that they were technologically and militarily backward and that this situation demanded urgent action. The Tokugawa Bakufu decided to ask for assistance, not from the United States, which had effectuated the opening, but the Netherlands, which had a long-standing relationship with Japan. From the Japanese point of view, the intrusion of Perry into Edo Bay was in 'the rudest possible way'. The behaviour of these American foreigners in Japan infuriated the Japanese, although they had not originally been anti-foreign.³¹⁸

Before his arrival in Edo Bay, Perry did a survey of Uruga. Thereby,

³¹⁶ H.H. van Kol, *De historische Verhouding tusschen Japan en Nederland*, Amsterdam, 1914, p.26.

³¹⁷ Katô, *Kurofune Ihen*, pp.1-3.

³¹⁸ Tokutomi Sohô, *Kinsei Nihon kokumininshi, Kenbeishisetsu to roeitaikeitsuhon - Kaikoku shokihen* ('Japanese modern history, Japanese expedition to the United States and battle between Russia and England'), 1991(rep.), p.7.

‘The Governor, on observing these boats, inquired what they were doing, and when he was told that they were surveying the harbour, he said that it was against the Japanese law to allow of such examinations; to which he received for reply, that the American laws command them, and that Americans were as much bound to obey the American as he was the Japanese laws.’³¹⁹ Uraga, however, was within the territorial waters of Japan. Therefore discussing this incident Ishii observes that: ‘Perry was brave to exclude the unequal international relationship under the policy of seclusion in Japan. However, I think that it is not wrong to say that his reply had a logic, because he did not intend to apply an equal relationship between civilized countries to Japan, but to force it to accept an unequal international relationship.’³²⁰ In the opinion of Perry, Western capitalist powers should bring uncivilized countries within the system of world trade. To achieve this aim, the use of military force was justifiable.³²¹

Perry's arrival in Japan had not only broken Japan's system of national isolation, but it also showed the Japanese how advanced Western civilization and technology were. Perry brought to Japan a model of a steam locomotive, a telescope, a telegraph and other symbols of technical progress. Actually, the steamships on which he arrived were also a product of the latest technology. Perry thought that criticism of the opening of Japan by military force expressed by other countries would be mitigated by this, i.e., by the introduction of Western civilization to the uncivilized country, which Japan, in his view, was. Wiley explains that ‘Perry was determined to present the Japanese with ‘practical evidence of the wonderful development of this country, which will go far to convince them of the fact that sooner or later they must give away to the tide of circumstances and influences which had already begun to serve against the permanency of their absurd and exclusive institutions.’...Perry considered the presentation of gifts as part of a larger commercial strategy. ‘Experience and the history of commerce has shown,’ he wrote, ‘that the introduction among

³¹⁹ S.Ex.Doc.No.34, p.47. Francis L. Hawks, *Narrative of the expedition of an American squadron to the China Seas and Japan, performed in the years 1852, 1853, and 1854 under the command of Commodore M. C. Perry, U.S. navy, compiled from the original notes and journals of Commodore. Perry and his officers*, New York, 1856, p.274.

³²⁰ Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushū*, p.48.

³²¹ *Ibidem*, p.116.

uncivilized and half-civilized people of commodities (in quantities however small) whether of usefulness or ornament, has invariably begotten a desire to obtain larger supplies, and thus the consumption of American products in the East had increased in a very extraordinary degree.'³²²

Essentially the United States justified the opening of Japan with the argument that 'the Anglo-Saxons were a master-race and had a duty to bring 'besotted Oriental Nations into the ranks of civilization.'³²³ According to the Note composed by Perry, he thought that it was better not to conclude a treaty, if he had to make a concession similar to that of the Netherlands. Consequently, his minimum requirement for the treaty was that it would be different from the arrangements with the Dutch.³²⁴

The *Bakufu's* policy

Meanwhile, the Japanese Government (the Tokugawa regime) had no definite policy by which to respond to the American demands. For example, 'Kawaji [Toshiakira] (川路聖謨, 1801-1868) and Tsutsui [Masanori] (筒井政憲, 1778-1859)³²⁵ were ready with a second possibility: they could prolong the negotiations, perhaps for five or ten years, without giving a definitive answer. This strategy of 'keep them hanging on' (*burakashi seisaku*) would give the *Bakufu* time to restore its military power.'³²⁶

Ishii Takashi regarded this inconsistent policy as downright ridiculous, and claimed that the Tokugawa Government followed 'Burakashisaku' (an 'idle policy', that is, neither refusing nor acquiescing in the American demands). Ishii also criticized the strategy of the Tokugawa Government known as 'Abu mo torazu Hati mo torazu Saku' (the strategy of falling between two stools) as 'the absurd measure' which was the most extreme element in this idle policy of the high official, Tokugawa Nariaki (徳川齊昭, 1800-1860), who was put in charge

³²² Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.110.

³²³ London *Times*, 8 April 1852. See Beasley, *Great Britain and the opening of Japan 1834-1858*, pp.88-89.

³²⁴ Katô, *Kurofune ihen*, p.139.

³²⁵ They were in charge of *kaibo gakari* (海防掛, charge of coastal defence).

³²⁶ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.331.

of the efforts to defend the island nation against the encroaching foreigners. Nariaki's plan consisted of two alternatives:

1. Supposedly as firewood, coal, would be supplied in Nagasaki for a period of three years at the beginning of the present year (1854), while it would no longer lease out one of the Ogasawara islands as a coaling station.

Or

Trade would tentatively be carried out by steamship for three years from 1857. This, however, implies that no coal was to be supplied, even if the Americans insisted that steamships needed coal, because the trade would entail the enormous costs in supplying coal.

The Tokugawa Government was to offer these two alternatives and to ask the United States to choose one. If the United States did not agree to do so, there would be no alternative but to suspend the negotiations. The United States would then 'fall between two stools'. This plan was aimed at gaining time and at building up armaments for the purpose of being able in future to negotiate more effectively with foreign countries. Ishii's apt criticism was that such a childish trick would not fool the Americans.³²⁷

Moreover, as another example of the 'idle policy' of the *Bakufu*, there is Sakuma Shōzan's (佐久間象山, 1811-1864, a military strategist) story. 'Sakuma Shōzan had visited the batteries (which in Edo Bay or at Nagasaki) before Perry's arrival and reported that 'their arrangement made no sense and none of them could be depended on as a defence mechanism. Upon discovering this, I unconsciously looked up to Heaven and sighed deeply; I struck my chest and wept for a long time.'³²⁸ At this crucial moment in Japanese history, 'Abe Masahiro (阿部正弘, 1819-1857, 老中 rōjū, senior councillor) was also despondent about the inept performance of the *Bakufu*. He had shown great skill in consulting and placating the various factions, from the hard-line supporters of Tokugawa Nariaki to the foot-dragging bureaucrats in the *kaibogakari*. He had ventured beyond the confines of the *fudai*-dominated enclaves of Edo Castle to build a consensus. But in the end, he had failed in his attempts to fashion and implement an effective policy for dealing with the

³²⁷ Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushi*, pp.80-86.

³²⁸ Sakuma Shōzan, *Seiken-roku* ('Reflections of My Errors'), in de Bary et al., *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, II, p.108. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.232.

feared foreigners.’³²⁹

The Tokugawa regime even asked the Mikado (Emperor) in Kyoto about his views in this important matter. This action was performed not out of respect for the Mikado, but to contain the Nariaki faction. In the course of negotiations with Townsend Harris (1804-1878), according to Sakumu-kizi(昨夢紀事)³³⁰, Nariaki roared that ‘Bittyû (堀田正睦 Hotta Masayoshi, Prince of Bittyû, 1810-1864) and Iga (松平忠固 Matsudaira Tadakata, Prince of Iga, senior councillor, 1802-1890) should commit *hara-kiri* (suicide), and Harris should be beheaded.’³³¹ Nariaki also made sure that Nakahama John Manjirô (中浜万次郎, 1827/28-98) was removed from his position of translator. He sent a letter to Abe, which said that Manjirô was not appropriate, because he had spent too long in the United States.³³² Moreover, ‘In fact, Nariaki had already written secretly to Abe Masahiro suggesting that Hayashi and Ido Iwami be ordered to commit *seppuku* to demonstrate to the Americans that the *Bakufu* would not tolerate ‘careless’ negotiating.’³³³

However, when Nariaki took a closer look at the Perry squadron in Edo Bay, even he lost faith in the usefulness of maintaining a reckless anti-foreign stance. It was said that Fujita Tôko (藤田東湖, 1806-55, 側用人 *sobayônin*, Tokugawa Nariaki’s grand chamberlain) had himself rowed out into Edo Bay secretly at night to investigate the strength of Perry’s steamships. Nariaki, as a member of one of the major Tokugawa cadet houses, was well informed about foreign affairs. Later he asked the *Bakufu* if he might participate in the Japanese mission to the United States with Fujita. It seems that he wanted to gain some real knowledge of the detailed situation there. His request was disavowed by *Bakufu* at that time, and ultimately the mission never went, because Fujita was crushed to death in an earthquake. Until his death in 1860, Nariaki did not change his anti-foreign sentiments because of his pride and vanity.

³²⁹ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.327.

³³⁰ A note of Matsudaira Yoshinaga(松平慶永, *daimyô* of Fukui domain)’s close adviser, Nakane Yukie(1807-1877).

³³¹ Sakata Seiichi, *Harisu*, p.193.

³³² Iwamoto Yoshiharu(red.), *Shintei kaishû zadan* (‘A talk with Kaishû’), Iwanami bunko, 1983, p.245.

³³³ Watanabe Shûjirô, *Abe Masahiro jiseki I*, 1978, Tokyo, p.222. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.416.

However, in later years he wrote in a letter to Echizen Shungaku (Matsudaira Yoshinaga, 越前松平慶永[春岳] *daimyô* of Echizen domain, 1828-1890) that 'I as an old man retain my stance, but since you are young, you should work hard, while adapting to the new circumstances.' By this time he had admitted the necessity of opening the country.³³⁴ Hence, the *Bakufu* clearly recognized that the present system in Japan should be changed; however it could not set the necessary measures in motion. Therefore, 'those in charge of the Tokugawa regime should be accused of formulating no substantial policy, because they had already acquired information about Perry's mission one year in advance from the Netherlands.'³³⁵

Moreover, the Japanese already had some knowledge about the formidable strength of American warships. 'In July 1846, the American Commodore James Biddle (1783-1848) suddenly appeared off Uraga with two warships. One of them, the *Columbus*, was a mighty ship of the line sporting ninety-two guns. Biddle, despite being knocked down by a Japanese soldier, pressed his proposal for an opening of trade only half-heartedly and then went away. However Abe took careful note of the size and strength of these two formidable warships, which had all but violated the shogun's inner sanctum.'³³⁶

In this situation, the Japanese had to rely on the Dutch. Anxious about Perry's return, the Governors of Nagasaki, Ôsawa [Jôtetsu] (大沢乗哲, 1808-1883) and Mizuno [Tadanori] (水野忠徳) with the translators Nishi [Kichibei] (西吉兵衛, 大通詞, 1812-1855) and Moriyama [Einosuke] went to Deshima to ask Donker Curtius his advice. They stayed there from 1 November to 4 November 1853.³³⁷ Katô concludes that this shows that the position of the Netherlands in Japan, the relationship with Japan and the significance of the Dutch trading chief being stationed in Nagasaki were still very important at that time.³³⁸

Moreover, it is noticeable that it was said in the Netherlands at this time

³³⁴ Yamakawa Kikuei, *Oboegaki bakumatsu no mitohan*, ('Memoir of the domain of Mito in Bakumatsu period'), Iwanami bunko, 1991, p.182.

³³⁵ Yamaguchi Muneyuki, *Peri kaikô zengo - Bakumatsu kaikokushi* ('A history of before and after the period of Perry's arrival'), Perikansha, 1988, p.25.

³³⁶ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, pp.272-273.

³³⁷ Katô, *Kurofune ihen*, p.87.

³³⁸ Katô, *Ibidem*, p.94.

that future negotiations with Japan should be facilitated by sending a mission to Edo, accompanied by sufficient naval power to raise respect and esteem.³³⁹ It was well understood in the Netherlands that its position in Japan would hardly improve if a mission was sent only to Nagasaki because this was situated far away from Edo, the political centre. Some voices warned that the Netherlands would be replaced by other countries in Japan if it did not take a more active stance. The fact that Commodore Perry and his powerful battleships had arrived not in Nagasaki but in Edo is generally considered an original and successful feature of American policy.

However, the idea of doing exactly the same had previously already been mooted in the Netherlands by Van Hoëvell who had made an appeal to consider Japan-related matters highly important. After Perry and his powerful fleet had departed for Japan, Van Hoëvell stated that a nation which was ignorant of the tenets of international law should not be forced into signing a treaty merely on behalf of the interest of the United States. He also did not believe that Perry would be successful in opening Japan by means of military force, which he considered to be unsuited to diplomatic purposes. In 1853 in Parliament Van Hoëvell had actually urged the Dutch Government to resort to military force in its dealings with Japan. Now it seemed that he had changed his mind and he did expect results from the American use of military force. This is an indication that he had little insight into Japanese affairs. Another example of his lack of insight into Japanese affairs was when Van Hoëvell criticized the Government because it had not threatened Japan with the withdrawal of the Dutch factory from Japan and supported this by actually setting such a withdrawal in motion. The Minister of Foreign Affairs ridiculed him by replying that 'It seems to me that this utterance is very strange, the Government had not begun to do so there, even partially.'³⁴⁰

Dutch 'national prestige and economic interest' diplomacy towards Japan under the changed circumstances

The straightforward and aggressive attitude adopted by the Americans was

³³⁹ *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië 1850*, p.385.

³⁴⁰ *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1853-1854*, p.182.

offensive to the Japanese. Therefore the latter came to rely more and more on the kindly Dutch in a solution to their problems.³⁴¹ The progressive group in the Japanese Government was well aware of the country's weakness and technological backwardness. In order to address such serious problems, the first thing that Japan needed was to build up a modern navy. The Japanese informed the Netherlands of their desire to possess steamships. They ordered Dutch steamships and also requested the Netherlands to set up a dry dock for steamships and, after that, to set up a shipyard in Nagasaki so that Japan would be able to build steamships itself. The Dutch Government was delighted with these requests, which would be highly beneficial to Dutch industry.

At that time in the Netherlands, a plan was taking shape to take the initiative in exporting the Western civilization to Japan, as a result of which Japan would come to depend on it. The Dutch also had a plan to teach Japanese about Western civilization in the Dutch language, because, by so doing, Japan would be brought under a strong Dutch influence. In this way, the Netherlands planned to establish a renewed long-term and intimate relationship with Japan.³⁴²

The hoped for Japanese approaches to the Netherlands indeed materialized: 'For a time during the fall [of 1853], Nariaki and the advocates of a strong defence appeared to be gaining ground. In September Abe turned to the Dutch, ordering a steam corvette, fifty-six sailing corvettes, two steamships, a bronze carronade, and three thousand percussion-cap rifles. On October seventeenth, the law forbidding the construction of warships was repealed.'³⁴³

In reaction to these initiatives, The Minister of Colonial Affairs requested King Willem III (Willem Alexander Paul Frederik Lodewijk, 1817-1890; r.1849-1890) to send a steamship, if possible a warship, in addition to the commercial regular ship, to Japan from the Netherlands East Indies. This measure was aimed at increasing the speed with which information regarding important developments in Japan could be acquired, and at promoting the stature of the trading chief's activity in Nagasaki. In general, dispatching a

³⁴¹ M. Vos, 'Van Der Broek no ibun', p.127.

³⁴² *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1855-1856*, p.298.

³⁴³ James Murdoch, *A History of Japan*, New York, 1964, III, Part 2, p.596. Arima Seiho, 'The Western Influence on Japanese Military Science, Shipbuilding, and Navigation', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 19, 1964, p. 131. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.343.

warship to an overseas country was often a way to protect one's own nationals residing there. In this case, however, the sending of a naval vessel was aimed at improving the trading chief's standing with the Japanese. Unlike the other civil servants at the trading post in Nagasaki, the trading chief was treated with respect, but his standing was not very high, because he was seen as a merchant – and merchants were, after all, the lowest class in Japan. Therefore, the Dutch Government believed that future negotiations with the Japanese authorities would stimulate a more favourable course, if the trading chief were to be seen to be directing a warship, thereby showing that he was a person of consequence in his home country.³⁴⁴

In June 1854, three months before the conclusion of the American-Japanese treaty, the Minister of Colonial Affairs instructed the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to send a suitable navy steamship in convoy with the regular annual merchant vessel to Japan.³⁴⁵ In reply to this instruction, the Governor-General wrote that he was unable to spare such a warship away from the Netherlands East Indies, but one could order such a ship and deliver it somewhat later. The Minister of Colonial Affairs considered it important to honour Japanese requests without delay, because it was very anxious that any postponement would give Japan a bad impression that might induce them to make its requests to another country. Therefore, the Minister did not agree with the Governor's opinion. Moreover he said, 'In case a small merchant ship which would be suitable for making the voyage [between Europe and Asia] still is asked for, it is hardly thinkable that the General-Governor of the Netherlands East Indies would feel himself authorised to order such a ship because the term tiny steamer ('klein stoomscheepje') has been used' ³⁴⁶ In this way, the Minister strongly criticized the Governor-General's attitude because he thought that the government of the Netherlands East Indies should try to harmonize its policy with that of the mother county.

The Dutch were greatly pleased by the fact that the Japanese acceptance of Western civilization had resulted in a significant improvement in

³⁴⁴ NA Koloniën no.1861, 15 April 1854 N.132, Zeer Geheim. The Dutch knew that a military person was respected in Japan.

³⁴⁵ NA Koloniën no.1861, 22 April 1854 N.141/R, Zeer Geheim.

³⁴⁶ NA Koloniën no.5864, 18 September 1854 N.345, Geheim.

Dutch-Japanese relations and in new privileges in Nagasaki, without having been required to give a demonstration of military force themselves. They welcomed the fact that the Japanese had acknowledged their relative technological backwardness and were now eager to learn all aspects of European civilization, and, in particular, that the Japanese expected the Dutch to render them the most assistance in this matter. The Dutch Government was of the opinion that it was very important to support Japan's development actively, without showing any hint of hesitation and to seize this opportunity as a way to tighten relations with Japan. Since Japan demanded naval technology in particular, the Dutch Government decided to meet this demand without delay. By helping Japan, the Dutch hoped to raise their political status in Japan as well as the status of the personnel of the Dutch trading post on Deshima. They aspired to achieve the abolition of the close surveillance and isolation of the Deshima post, and that Dutch trade with Japan would expand.

For many years prior to the mid-nineteenth century, Dutch medical doctors on Deshima had taught the Japanese about Western science and technology, especially medical science. This had been highly appreciated by the Japanese,³⁴⁷ a fact well known in the Netherlands. By using a similar approach after the opening of Japan, the Netherlands hoped to achieve a similar level of appreciation in the 1850s. In 1855 the Minister of Colonial Affairs thought that it would also be appropriate to send a portrait of his king to Japan for the purpose of promoting a closer relationship. This was because he had received a report from the trading chief in Nagasaki which said that the chief had had a long talk with high-ranking Japanese officials about the Dutch royal house and had shown them Willem I's portrait.³⁴⁸

The idea of presenting a portrait, not a product of the latest Western technology, while England was going to present a steamboat and the United States a steam locomotive to the shogun, encountered again criticism from the liberal statesman Van Hoëvell: 'That is beautiful proof of the king's personal

³⁴⁷ See H. Beukers, A.M. Luyendijk-Elshout, M.E. van Opstall, F. Vos, *Red-Hair Medicine Dutch-Japanese medical relations*, Amsterdam/Atlanta, 1991. Harm Beukers, *The Mission of Hippocrates in Japan - Philipp Franz von Siebold in his role as medical doctor*, Amsterdam/Leiden, 1996.

³⁴⁸ NA Koloniën no.5867, 28 February 1855 N. 76, Geheim.

interest in this important matter, but it is no Government action.’³⁴⁹ The Minister of Colonial Affairs reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the trading chief would enter into negotiations about a treaty with the Japanese Government, and in anticipation of this development, he requested the chief’s formal title be changed to a more suitable one, because the Japanese had little respect for persons engaged in commerce.³⁵⁰ He pointed out that the authority to conclude an international treaty lay with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in this instance the authority of the Netherlands East Indies colonial administration to conclude treaties with native sovereigns in the Asian region was also considered to apply to Japan. The Government of the Netherlands instructed the trading chief in Deshima that in principle he should not explicitly pursue Dutch profits in his endeavours to expand the Japanese trade. However, it was added that he did not have to refuse an advantageous commercial contract if the Japanese Government itself offered one.

In 1854, Senator Abram van Rijckevorsel (1790-1864) stated in the Dutch Lower House that relations with Japan were a highly important issue in respect to the Dutch moral influence (*onzen zedelijken invloed*) in the Netherlands East Indies. The Minister of Colonial Affairs replied on behalf of the Government that he was not neglecting Japan. He added that the Japanese Government often indicated how highly it thought of Dutch accomplishments, and that it would accept without hesitation that ‘all that it gave to others should also be awarded to the Netherlands’. This is interesting, because this exchange of words showed that Japanese affairs were considered in relation to the Dutch colonial interests in Southeast Asia.

The Dutch Government outlined its policy towards Japan in the Cabinet reply to the address of the king at the state opening of parliament, (*Adres van antwoord op de troonrede*), in 1855. The Government pointed out its assistance to other countries in their relations with Japan and the treaties concluded between them and Japan, and continued by stating that ‘thereby, we have once more re-established the friendship which has existed between us and this country for several centuries. Thereby, we not only showed other maritime nations a proof of our altruism, but also proof of our good relations and friendship with the Japanese shogun. This policy has been rewarded with a good result at present.

³⁴⁹ *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsche Indië 1855*, pp.176-177.

³⁵⁰ NA Koloniën no.5868, 14 March 1855 N.106, Geheim.

This has maintained the peace on this continent and probably - we hope more and more - we shall reap the fruits in industry, trade and shipping.' While Van Rijckevorsel admitted that the policy was a sound one, in his view this Government answer sounded somewhat selfish and one-sided. He pointed out that the general improvement in relations among nations in the Far East, as accomplished by the Netherlands, was not mentioned. He believed the Dutch Government was pursuing an active policy towards Japan and naturally was making efforts to benefit from this. The Government's statement was, he said, understandable in this light. Van Rijckevorsel, however, was afraid that it would elicit criticism from other countries. Furthermore, he wanted to emphasize that the Dutch policy was different from the high-handed policy of safeguarding the self-interest of the other powers.³⁵¹

Active diplomacy towards Japan by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs

The Government considered it very important that the Netherlands take advantage of Japan's strong desire to found its own navy. Therefore, it repeated its instruction to dispatch a steam-powered warship there in order to acquire an advantageous position for the Netherlands in future trade with Japanese. The Netherlands wanted to play a positive role in Japan's modernization with the aim of increasing its influence. It expected that a commercial treaty between Japan and the United States would be concluded in the near future. The outcome of Perry's mission was made public in the American President's annual State of the Union address to Congress. According to a Dutch newspaper it said that 'Through the officers in charge, the expedition to the Japanese Empire was achieved successfully, which was dispatched two years ago for the purpose of establishing the relationship with it. Through this concluded Treaty, ports of the densely populated areas [of Japan] were opened. In order to exert this treaty completely, furthermore the ratification shall be exchanged and the commercial articles shall be stipulated.'³⁵² When this summary of the President's message was immediately reported to Holland by

³⁵¹ *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1855-1856*, p.8.

³⁵² Survey no. 351 on 20 December 1854 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

telegraph, soon thereafter, the complete text was received.

The Dutch displayed a strong interest in the developments following Perry's mission. The afore-mentioned presidential address stated that the United States had succeeded in opening Japan and concluding a treaty of friendship; and that the United States intended to conclude a commercial treaty. When the United States dispatched the mission to Japan, it did not formally announce its intention to establish a commercial relationship with Japan. However, it was widely suspected by the European powers that this was really the Americans' intention. The State of the Union message appeared to confirm this. Among the Western powers, only the Netherlands had the exclusive right to trade with Japan. Therefore, the Dutch merchants involved in this trade in Nagasaki firmly insisted that the government protect and promote their interests against any American advance. The Dutch Government did indeed endeavour to do so by concluding a treaty with Japan that included commercial regulations.

When the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies still voiced his disapproval of the order to dispatch a warship to Japan, the Minister of Colonial Affairs insisted that his instructions be carried out, motivated by reports from Japan stating that it was determined to obtain a steam engine and steamship technology. He did not expect that the amicable situation resulting in the Dutch being asked by the Japanese to provide them with lessons in naval techniques and technology would ever occur again in the future, but that this situation was still open at this moment.³⁵³ Furthermore, the Department of the Navy promised the Minister to deal with the objections of the Government of the Netherlands East Indies that it had too few warships at its disposal, to the best of its ability. In his letter to the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Lieutenant Gerhardus Fabius also emphasized that a steamship should immediately be dispatched, not for trade but to boost the status of the personnel on Deshima, because he was aware that Japan was being very friendly towards the Netherlands at this moment.³⁵⁴ The confidence of the Minister of the Colonial Affairs, C.F. Pahud, and the support and opinions of his colleagues of the Department of the Navy ensured that his plan to dispatch a steamship to Japan was realized. The aim of the Minister of Colonial Affairs seems to have been to

³⁵³ NA Koloniën no.5867, 28 February 1855 N.76.

³⁵⁴ NA Koloniën A letter of 6 February 1855 on 28 February 1855.

make Japan regard the Netherlands in terms of 'Our most natural ally (*Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot*)'. Actually, at that time the Japanese referred to the Netherlands as their 'best friend'.³⁵⁵

For this reason, it was essential that the Netherlands fulfilled Japanese demands and improved the status of the Dutch by displaying its might. As concrete measures, Minister Pahud considered raising the Dutch flag in the open port of Shimoda, presenting the shogun with special gifts, and re-dispatching the naval Lieutenant Fabius, who was highly respected by the Japanese. Pahud further noted that 'Our future in this country is at stake. If the Japanese Government turns to another country, we shall have lost the present opportunity to improve our commercial and political relationship with Japan. It will never occur again.' These words express how crucial this moment was thought to be.³⁵⁶ In addition, this report is also quoted in the work by Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, which however omitted the part in quotation marks. The reason may be that these sentences would have damaged the image of the Dutch altruism which the book was trying to project.³⁵⁷

The Dutch trading chief on Deshima played a significant role as a mediator between Japan and the foreign powers, because the Japanese had little knowledge of how to negotiate with Western powers and, moreover, they had a problem with Western languages. Therefore, the function of the trading chief assumed a political rather than a commercial character. This raised the question of how far the authority of the trading chief to act extended in political affairs. The Minister of Colonial Affairs was of the opinion that his activity was restricted to 'mediation', not 'arbitration'. Moreover, he noted that the title of trading chief was too low for a person charged with dealing with the more important matters that were arising in Japan.³⁵⁸ Minister Pahud had no objection to changing the title of the trading chief on Deshima to 'Consul' or 'Consul-General', given that matters concerning commerce were considered subordinate in Japan. He, however, devised the title of 'Dutch Commissioner' (*Nederlandsche Kommissaris*), because the draft Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1852 explained to the Japanese that the consul did have an interest in commerce and

³⁵⁵ M. Vos, *Kaikoku Nihon no Yoake*, p.332.

³⁵⁶ NA Koloniën '28 February 1855'.

³⁵⁷ See Minori Kogure, 'An aspect of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan', pp.65-84.

³⁵⁸ NA Koloniën no.5867, 28 February 1855 N.76.

he was the head of the foreign merchants. As the change from the trading chief to consul had no meaning to the Japanese who did not have respect for commercial matters, the title was changed to 'Dutch Commissioner'. He was to wear a uniform to show that he was clearly a more important person than a field officer (*hoofdofficier*). Pahud considered that such a uniform would be suitable, because a military person was placed among the higher classes in Japan. After all, the rank of 'Dutch Commissioner' was equivalent to that of a Naval Captain (*Kapitein ter Zee*) and accorded, therefore, the right to wear a proper uniform. However, this privilege was available to him only in Japan.³⁵⁹ Later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially gave Donker Curtius the title of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in order to deal with political matters in Japan.³⁶⁰ Moreover, the Minister of Colonial Affairs noted that it would be necessary to re-organize or expand the trading post on Deshima with the aim of developing Japanese trade. The administration of the Netherlands East Indies was in charge of affairs of Deshima.³⁶¹

In 1855, the view of the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Pahud, regarding Dutch-Japanese relations was as follows: 'The draft treaty of 1852 drawn up by Von Siebold aimed to open Japan in the common interest of free trade. The Netherlands behaved unselfishly in order to benefit other foreign powers as well. As a matter of fact, however, affairs pertaining to Japan were of little concern to us at that time. That is, it was not desirable to maintain the existing state of affairs for the Netherlands, because our place, Deshima, was subjected to many restrictions on trade and produced few profits. A different situation, however, exists at present. The United States and England have acquired open ports through their treaties with Japan. With the exception of the Anglo-Japanese agreement, the United States also gained the privilege enjoyed by the Netherlands, that of a most favoured nation treatment.'³⁶² In other words, Japan had changed its way of thinking and considered Western-style development useful. Moreover, it had chosen the Netherlands to introduce Western civilization. It was therefore important to establish its commercial and

³⁵⁹ NA Koloniën no.5868, 24 March 1855 N.123.

³⁶⁰ NA Koloniën no.5868, A letter of 26 March 1855 on 29 March 1855 N.139/H.

³⁶¹ 'NA Koloniën, 28 February 1855 N. 76.

³⁶² The Dutch ally, England, admitted the vested right of Netherlands in the Japanese-British agreement.

political predominance in Japan in response to its preference for the Netherlands. Furthermore, the report of the trading chief indicated room for a remarkable commercial expansion. Pahud therefore continued: 'We have very essential interests in Japan at present. These should not be sacrificed by an idealistic manifestation of unselfishness.' Referring to the prospect that the United States would open Japan for trade, 'under the present circumstances, it would be contrary to our interest to hasten this moment when the United States would be competing with us [in the Japan market]. We must zealously make use of our opportunity [to expand the relationship with Japan] and the time [which we have at present before the commercial competition with the United States makes inroads] for this preparation. For the time being, however, we should take no action to make others share in our commercial relationship with Japan.'³⁶³

The Minister of Colonial Affairs summarized the issues he thought relevant to relations with Japan in the near future.

1. The securing of the location of the centuries-old Dutch trade in Nagasaki.
2. The freedom for foreign nationals to visit Nagasaki, as well as Shimoda and Hakodate.
3. All privileges that England and the United States gained were to be guaranteed to the Netherlands as well.
4. If a country wanted to conclude a treaty with Japan for the same purpose [as the above-mentioned powers had], the Japanese Government was to declare in advance that it would permit the country to acquire the privilege applicable in above-mentioned Art. 3.

Moreover, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs drew up a Note entitled 'Issues regarding Japan which need to be decided before they can serve as a basis for new proposals to be submitted to the King' (*Punten betreffende de Japansche Zaak, waarop voorafgaande beslissing wordt vereischt, om te dienen als grondslag voor de aan den Koning te doene voorstellen*). This note also contained an overview of the relationship with Japan. The matters brought forward in the note were:

1. Should a steam-powered warship be dispatched to Japan in 1855 again?
2. The delivery of a steam-powered warship to Japan.

³⁶³ The part between single quotation marks was deleted from the work of Van der Chijs at the time of this publication.

3. To grant the negotiator the authority and status needed to conclude a treaty and to approve the subsequent ratification.

These three issues were itemized and later twenty-six further items were examined. The following statements in this note are noteworthy: 'Penal regulations against smuggling are to be carried out strictly, for if we don't do so, this will spoil the credit which at present we should try to acquire even more than before in view of the circumstance that the Japanese are relying on us for support.

Concerning abolishing the *Kambang trade*,³⁶⁴ Donker Curtius was of the opinion that it would be preferable to open it up as freely as possible. However, if this were to prove impossible, the Dutch Government officials were to take over the *Kambang trade*. He suggested that if the Nagasaki trade was to be expanded, the Japanese Government should be allowed to pay a part of the purchase of the ordered warship in kind, because it could not pay the whole amount in gold. The Dutch had obtained from the Japanese the concession that their ships could come to Japan without limitation in order to receive articles delivered in compensation for a warship. Therefore, the Dutch should pay the greatest attention to this moment, since, for the time being at least, active intercourse with Japan was open for several years.'³⁶⁵ Also the Dutch Government believed that the conclusion of a treaty such as the Japanese-American treaty and the Anglo-Japanese treaty could not bring better opportunities to foreign powers than the delivery of a warship ordered by the Japanese Government. Therefore, it noted that the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies as well as the Netherlands should try to take every possible measure to promote Dutch interests in Japan. For this purpose, at least, the sum of 1,500,000 gulden was allocated, and this was subsequently increased twice. Furthermore, the Dutch Government decided to honor the request of the trading chief that various instruments for industrial use and these models were to be collected and handed to the Japanese Government in return for a small sum. Lieutenant Fabius was to be re-dispatched and an engineer well-versed in machine technology was to accompany him, reflecting the insight that

³⁶⁴ The Dutch trade in Japan consisted of two parts, *Honkata trade* (the official trade by the Government) and *Kambang trade* (private trade by individuals such as the trading chief and the other trading house members etc.).

³⁶⁵ NA Koloniën no.5867, 28 February 1855 N. 76.

knowledge regarding mechanics (like chemistry) was very desirable in Japan. The Japanese would pay for the ship with copper; however the price of the copper had to be raised, because the price in the *Honkato trade* was so low that the trading chief called it a 'giveaway price'. The technology lessons to be given by Dutch experts in Japan would be given in Dutch in order to promote the Dutch language there.'

In March 1855 the Dutch Government received an order from the Japanese Government for two steamships. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs contacted the Department of the Navy and proposed that two propeller-driven corvettes were to be built at the expense of the Japanese Government at a private shipyard in the Netherlands, and that a model of these ships would be presented to the shogun. The Dutch Government had to consider the possibility that Japan might become involved in a war during the construction of these corvettes. Under such circumstances these warships could not be handed over to the Japanese. However, it was decided that the Dutch navy would use them should this situation occur. The first ship was to be delivered in 1857, and the Minister decided to promise the second for delivery, if necessary, before 1858. Since he was well aware of the strong Japanese desire to possess a steamship, he wanted to avoid disappointing the Japanese because of a later delivery date, which could mean that they might place their orders with other countries.

The Japanese Government also needed naval specialists. The Minister considered it very important that 'We' should provide Japan with such specialists, lest it should ask another country for a navy specialist. Japan especially wanted to master steam-power technology - the symbol of advanced Western technology at that time. The Dutch were well aware of this. They thought that it would be useful to make a bigger model of the corvette than the scale usual for such models, because this would make the ship's principle more instantly comprehensible to the Japanese. Moreover the Minister decided that a Dutch handbook should be sent with the ships for the purpose of spreading knowledge of the language in Japan. To keep the Japanese patient until they received their much-desired steamship, the Minister thought it important that the Dutch would promise the Japanese to send the model from Batavia to Japan before the end of 1856. He would begin consultations with the Department of the Navy in this matter without delay, while preparing the required formal proposal to the king for the final plan as soon as possible. This is convincing evidence that the Minister of Colonial Affairs considered it most important that

the Netherlands kept its promise and did not disappoint Japan.

The Japanese Government had asked the Dutch for a price list of all types of ships and ship's tackle/equipage (rigging etc.) and for an explanation of these goods too. In the end of March in 1855, Lieutenant Fabius was to leave the Netherlands East Indies to return to Japan. Since the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Pahud, was extremely anxious to exploit this opportunity, he requested the Minister of Navy to respond quickly with his views on the matter.³⁶⁶ The Dutch Government knew that the Japanese Government had politely refused proposals from Britain and the United States that they might have the honour of presenting a steamship to Japan, because it was prepared to talk only with the Netherlands about this matter. As the Dutch Government prized this situation highly, it proposed to present the *Soembing* to Japan. The Dutch Government considered it of great importance to be the first in this matter. It was also afraid that Japan would ask another country, if the Dutch Government did not generously and strenuously support Japanese expectations. The context within which this plan was conceived was the belief that the Dutch economic and political future in Japan was in danger because of this burgeoning situation.³⁶⁷ Moreover, from a report by the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, the Minister of Colonial Affairs had learned that the Dutch trading chief was looking forward to receiving further requests for military supplies from Japan as a part of the coming trade in the new open ports, Shimoda and Hakodate. While this prospect was welcomed in the Netherlands, it would be difficult to satisfy the expected large number of Japanese orders. The Minister recognized that the Netherlands East Indies could not fill all Japanese orders, but he answered the Governor-General explaining that 'I am very pleased that, for the time being, this matter is brought up only as a prospect and there is no problem about waiting for further information about this subject'. He called upon the General-Governor to be vigilant and ready to deal with this matter in the future.³⁶⁸

In consideration of a report from the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, the Minister of Colonial Affairs thought it important that the collection of scientific instruments, models, and the Dutch scientific works be

³⁶⁶ NA Koloniën no.5868, 14 March 1855 N.106.

³⁶⁷ NA Geheim. Koloniën no.5868, 17 March 1855 N.109, Geheim.

³⁶⁸ NA Koloniën no.5868, 24 March 1855 N.123, Geheim.

delivered to Deshima to serve to demonstrate Western supremacy unequivocally to the Japanese.³⁶⁹ This measure was expected not only to increase the number of Japanese orders, but also to raise Japanese respect for the Dutch personnel on Deshima and for the Netherlands itself. This measure, however, was not without its problems. The right of the *Kambang* trade leaseholder, Adrianus Johannes Jacobus de Wolff (dates unknown), would expire only after the trading season of 1856. It would infringe on his rights, if the Government sent scientific instruments. Under the terms of his contract, the Government would not order or receive any article from Japan with the exception of copper, camphor, kimono, objects relevant to natural history and return presents for the Japanese princes.

The Government of the Netherlands East Indies proposed to the Minister of Colonial Affairs that the rights of the leaseholder be purchased and that the Government should take charge of the *Kambang* trade, because the Japanese market had become much more important to the Netherlands and the matter could not be postponed until the end of the contract in 1856.³⁷⁰ Up to then the right to the *Kambang* trade had been auctioned off in Batavia. A private merchant could purchase this right and only he could carry out this trade. Although this document said that this leaseholder was Wolff, his contract had been already transferred to Johannes Robertus Lange (1813-1863) by the apostillic disposition (*Apostillaire dispositie*) of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies on 28 February 1854 N.8. Later the right was purchased from Lange.³⁷¹

The Minister of Colonial Affairs thought that it was essential to take advantage of the Japanese demands for trade and its recent expansion in Nagasaki for the purpose of promoting Dutch political and economic relations with Japan. Taking due note of the proposal of the trading chief on Deshima, the Governor-General and the Council of the Netherlands East Indies had agreed to the abolition of *Kambang* trade. The Minister also shared the opinion that the Dutch Government should take direct charge of all Japanese trade. Consequently it was not possible to lease a part of the trade and to grant the

³⁶⁹ NA Koloniën no.5868, 4 April 1855 N.156, Geheim.

³⁷⁰ NA Koloniën no.5868, A letter of 25 December 1854 on 29 March 1855 N.139/H, Geheim.

³⁷¹ For details regarding *Kambang trade*, see Appendix I 'The history of the abolition of the *Honkata* and *Kambang trades*' in Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, pp.391-413.

right to a third person; the Dutch Government should not be hindered in its purpose or activities by the existence of private concessions. In spite of this decision, the Dutch Government had little knowledge of Japanese trade and could not formulate a coherent plan to organize. Therefore, the Minister noted that under the present circumstances the Dutch Government should carefully choose a person and try to free commercial transactions, which was thought would automatically lead to commercial expansion.³⁷²

The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies agreed to the abolition of the *Kambang* trade, although his reasons were different from that of the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The Governor-General was of the opinion that future Japanese trade should be liberalized as much as possible, even if this meant that the Dutch Government would have to sacrifice its interests. However, he considered this to make sense only after the commercial treaty with Japan had been concluded. Therefore, he thought that until such time a Government official should direct all trade (*Honkata* and *Kambang* trades).³⁷³

Concerning Japanese affairs, the advice of Council of the Netherlands East Indies as stated in a document dated 6 April 1855 was that: 'The old position of our post on Deshima was tantamount to a place of exile for Dutch Government officials. They were only slightly compensated for being isolated by material rewards. This situation has changed in the last several years. Japan's former attitude of doubts about and distrust of the Dutch has been transformed into one of frankness and trust. This outstanding result is to be attributed to the trading chief, Donker Curtius, while the doctor at the trading post, Jan Karel van den Broek (1814-1865) and the naval Lieutenant Fabius, have also greatly contributed to it. We would like to ask the Governor-General to express his deep appreciation to Donker Curtius who made an effort to the Japanese Government grant favors to the Netherlands and the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, and also show this same appreciation to Fabius and Van den Broek who performed outstanding service [on Deshima]. One part of Donker Curtius' endeavors has already succeeded. Consequently, although the Netherlands might be faced with difficulties and sacrifices, it has the prospect of achieving success by strictly obeying the rules of the Japanese isolation system'; furthermore that 'the Netherlands should obtain higher

³⁷² NA Koloniën no.5868, 4 April 1855 N.156.

³⁷³ NA Koloniën no.5868, A letter of 8 February 1855 on 6 April 1855 N.164/K.

profits in Japanese trade than before. Now the abolition of the *Kambang trade* is inevitable, and we are completely in agreement with the opinion of such a wise senior bureaucrat [Donker Curtius].³⁷⁴

Nonetheless the Governor-General still refused to dispatch the *Soembing* and *Gedeh* to Japan, because 'It would be disastrous for the interests of the Netherlands East Indies, however important Japanese affairs may be' to remove steamships from the fleet of the Netherlands East Indies.³⁷⁵

The true story about the presentation of the *Soembing* to Japan

By April 1855, both England and the United States had already offered to present a steamship to Japan as a gift. Since the Netherlands knew this, it seized the initiative in this matter. A wave of criticism about giving the *Soembing* was voiced in Parliament. The argument was that the Netherlands East Indies fleet would be seriously weakened and it would become very difficult to patrol against pirates in that region: it was already very difficult to deal with this problem as it was. The Government replied to such criticism as following: 'Although usually there are ten Dutch navy ships in the Netherlands East Indies, there are now twelve, apart from the *Soembing*...of these twelve ships...some are in need of repairs or supplies, and consequently it can happen that these ships are temporarily unable to perform their duties. It is for this reason that at the moment their performance is less than optimal.' In other words, this problem was not directly related to the presentation of the *Soembing* to Japan. The presence of the navy in the Netherlands East Indies had declined and under these circumstances it was believed that new ships should be constructed, and that it would be better to offer an old ship to Japan.

Since the *Soembing* had been used in the Dutch maritime instruction manoeuvres in Nagasaki and thus was a well-known ship, and because the Japanese eagerly wanted to have a steamship, it, would be a case of 'killing two birds with one stone'. Furthermore, the Government explained that, although

³⁷⁴ NA Koloniën Advice and observation of the Council of the Netherlands East Indies of 29 December 1854 and 23 January 1855 on 6 April 1855 N.164/K.

³⁷⁵ NA Koloniën no.6530, the semi-official letter of 10 June 1855 N.154 from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs.

the Netherlands East Indies would lose the *Soembing*; at that moment the ship the *Amsterdam* was ready to leave right away from the Netherlands in order to take up duties there. The costs of the *Soembing* were to be refunded from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Department of Naval Affairs, which needed a better or newer steamship to replace the *Soembing*, which was verging on the obsolete. The Government also mentioned that it was the custom to exchange presents between the Netherlands and Japan. It hinted that, surely, Japan would reciprocate with a gift of similar worth. Presenting the *Soembing* was done not only out of generosity, but also because other Governments were preparing similar gifts. Furthermore, the need of the Netherlands East Indies' navy for new ships and the experience from Dutch-Japanese diplomatic relations touching upon the exchange of gifts played a role.³⁷⁶ According to another document, the Minister of Colonial Affairs tried to please the Governor-General by stating that the Netherlands East Indies should be better able to deal with its affairs in the future than at present, because it would acquire three more steamships besides the *Amsterdam*, because the mother country was striving to expand the Dutch Navy.³⁷⁷

On 5 October 1855, the presentation of the *Soembing* was carried out with a magnificent ceremony. The Dutch historian Jan Kikkert comments in his biography of King Willem III: 'Fabius taught the custom of flag-raising on a ship to the Japanese on that occasion. Fabius chose the rising-sun flag on a white background, which meant that the local commander was on board. As the result of this event, the national flag of Japan came into existence.'³⁷⁸ Actually, however, when Fabius came to Japan in 1854 for the first time, he received damyô of Satsuma domain, the nephew of the shogun, on board the *Soembing*. At that time, Fabius hoisted the white flag with a red ball, the standard of the Satsuma clan. He received damyô of Hizen domain, one of the family members of Shogun Tokugawa Iesada (徳川家定, 1824-58) in the same way and, moreover, advised the Japanese to hoist the same flag during the

³⁷⁶ *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1855-1856*, p.216, 298. Moreover, the paddle steamer was already considered as outdated at that time.

³⁷⁷ NA Koloniën no.6527, the semi-official letter of 8 September 1855 N.133 from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies. Also NA Koloniën no.5873, 9 December 1855 N.560/V1, Geheim.

³⁷⁸ J. Kikkert, *Koning Willem III*, p.394.

ceremony for the presentation of *Soembing*.³⁷⁹ As a co-incidental result of these circumstances, in September 1854, three months after Perry's return, a *roju* (senior councillor) ordered that the rising-sun flag with a white background should be used on large ships in the future.³⁸⁰ An anecdote exists about the presentation of the *Soembing*. The ship's colored signal lamp was made in England and the name of the manufacturer was inscribed on it in capital letters. The Dutch changed the lamp for that from the *Gedeih*.³⁸¹ This detail shows again that the Netherlands wanted to show its supremacy by obscuring that of England. The Netherlands presented a product of Western technology that Japan anxiously desired to have at that time, and with it introduced one aspect of Western civilization. There was a clear intention behind this. Although the *Soembing* was a gift, Japan would have to depend on the Netherlands in order to maintain it.

Lieutenant Fabius wrote, 'It is no longer necessary to ask an exorbitant price for our goods. Now we can gain fl. 120,000 in profits on rifles. Moreover, we can get fl. 20,450 for 6 million detonators.'³⁸² A Dutch navy detachment had already started to train the Japanese in Nagasaki. Since Japan had clearly recognized the importance of foreign naval assistance, it was expected that it would insist on the continuation of such training. The more Japan depended on the Netherlands, the more the Dutch could obtain in political concessions from Japan. Moreover, the Dutch Government could also expect economic profits by fulfilling Japanese demands. This was the Dutch diplomatic strategy.

Since the signs intimated that this strategy was being successful, the Dutch Government displayed a high degree of confidence with regard to Japan. This confidence and the policy followed in respect of Japan, however, were also being questioned by some. For instance, Thorbecke demanded from the Government a detailed explanation about its statement that 'We trust that the Japanese Government will not lose sight of its old relationship with the Netherlands when it confers privileges on other nations'. He severely criticized this optimistic way of thinking and the Dutch Government's policy, which he

³⁷⁹ Van Gulik, 'De dagheraut van hooger leven', pp.146-147.

³⁸⁰ Katô, *Kurofune ihen*, p.180.

³⁸¹ M. Vos, *Kaikoku Nihon no yoake*, p.117.

³⁸² *Ibidem*, p.124.

considered inappropriate and vague.³⁸³ After Perry had executed a fleet demonstration and created the first breakthrough in 'the Japanese wall', the Dutch Government declared in Parliament that its warning and advice had contributed to this improvement in the West's relations with Japan. Thorbecke, however, had already mentioned that it was 'a fact that was [enormously] influenced by another power rather than by us.', and he expressed his serious concern concerning the present Governmental diplomacy towards Japan.³⁸⁴

³⁸³ *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1855-1856*, p.21.

³⁸⁴ Kleffens, *De internationaalrechtelijke betrekkingen*, p.34. *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1855-1856*, p.22. Kleffens omitted [enormous] (*oneindig*) in his citation.

Chapter 7

The endeavour for and success in concluding the Dutch-Japanese treaty

The unique Dutch diplomacy towards Japan

The Netherlands thought it a matter of the utmost importance to conclude a treaty with Japan, although it already enjoyed privileges that other countries did not have. The Dutch needed a treaty, because the current situation depended on the goodwill of the Japanese Government and was uncertain because of recent developments. The Dutch Government considered it particularly important to specify the improvement of the treatment of the Dutch in Nagasaki in a treaty, in order to enlarge the Dutch commercial interests there. Lieutenant Fabius was therefore assigned the task of concluding the treaty with Japan. He reported that he had been successful in concluding a provisional Dutch-Japanese agreement on 9 November 1855. This news greatly pleased the Minister of Colonial Affairs, who hastened to report it to the king.³⁸⁵ The reports Fabius sent back from his mission to Japan were very extensive.³⁸⁶

At this point it is useful to explore briefly the question of why the Netherlands continued its Japanese trade in spite of the deficit which it brought the Dutch Government year after year. The document '11 March 1856 N.141, Geheim' includes the table of prices for goods imported to Japan in the *Honkata trade* and also the table of prices for the Japanese traders. This table reveals that the price of the Japanese traders' goods was already 3 to 4 times higher than the goods price of the *Honkata trade*. For example, the price of spices was about 20

³⁸⁵ NA Koloniën no.5876, 29 February 1856 N.105A, Geheim. The Minister informed the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies by NA Koloniën no.5876, 4 March 1856 N. 111, Geheim.

³⁸⁶ NA Koloniën no.5876, 11 March 1856 N. 141 and NA Koloniën no.5877, 26 March 1856 N. 159, Geheim. Abridged translations of this report can be seen in M.Vos, *Kaikoku Nihon no yoake*.

times higher at this point. This fact suggests something about another Dutch trade, the *Kambang trade*. It makes clear that the Dutch made higher profits in the *Kambang trade*, which meant in fact that the Netherlands could expect to gain large profits, if the Japanese market were expanded and opened up

On the basis of Fabius' detailed reports, the future of Dutch-Japanese trade was carefully considered at the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. As a guideline for future trade relations, a set of documents was submitted to the king by the Ministries of Colonial and Foreign Affairs. This included two notes entitled, 'Note on the summary of the Japanese documents which arrived in February 1856' and 'Further note on the summary of the Japanese documents received in March 1856', written by H.T. Krabbe. He was in charge of Japanese affairs in Section G, the historical department and library of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (*Historisch bureau en bibliotheek*, the so-called Japan desk '*Japansche afdeeling*'). These documents allowed an overview of the development of Dutch-Japanese relations.³⁸⁷ In their joint report to the king, the Ministers of Colonial and Foreign Affairs presented relations with Japan as an important political issue relevant not only to the colonial empire but also to the Dutch position in Europe. In order to improve Dutch political and commercial status in Japan, the Dutch needed to satisfy the Japanese desires for reform and progress. However, the two Ministers considered it completely reasonable that, for the time being, the Dutch should refrain from any direct measures aimed at opening Japan to free trade. In other words, the Dutch Government decided to expand existing Japanese trade for its own agenda, in order to prepare for the future commercial competition with other powers.

The results obtained and the activities pursued in Japan by the Dutch commissioner, Donker Curtius, and Lieutenant Fabius, and the development of the treaty negotiations are summarized in this report as follows: 'The Dutch commissioner proposed the provisional agreement and concluded it, in consideration of the various difficulties in connection with the treaty negotiations; thus the aims of ensuring the former Dutch privileges in Nagasaki, and of abolishing the isolation of the Dutch on Deshima, and of acquiring individual freedom [for those working there], and of enjoying all rights given to other powers by Japan in the future, was accomplished. Furthermore, since the troublesome commercial procedure for the Dutch in Nagasaki was removed

³⁸⁷ NA Koloniën no.5877, 29 March 1856 N. 162, Geheim.

and the Dutch commissioner was allowed to keep the key to Deshima's water gate, Deshima became, so to speak, a Dutch bonded warehouse (*entrepôt*).³⁸⁸

Furthermore, to obtain a powerful tool for Dutch influence on Japan's development, this report stressed that the Dutch were not only to contribute to Japan materially (steamships etc.) and intellectually (specialists etc.), but also to assert Dutch moral influence (*Zedelijken invloed*) in Japan. The Netherlands thought that it was very important to maintain and increase Dutch influence in Asia by means of placing Japan under Dutch cultural influence, at a time at which it was also strongly supporting the Japanese policy of Europeanization. Moreover, asserting a cultural influence seemed to be a highly effective means of competing with the assistance offered to Japan by such great powers as the British and Americans who would base their support on their material superiority.³⁸⁹ Fabius also stressed the importance of widening the Dutch cultural influence there. He reported that it was important to export Dutch books and spread the Dutch language. He thought that this would promote Dutch industry, because the Japanese would learn about and develop an interest in Western civilization through the medium of Dutch; therefore they would order Western goods from the Netherlands.³⁹⁰

For this reason, the maritime lessons in Nagasaki were given in Dutch. Fabius reported that 'I was pleased to see that a Japanese officer not only commanded the manoeuvres excellently, but also explained them in clear Dutch.'³⁹¹ Fabius, however, was surprised to receive the harbour regulation in English, when he anchored in Hakodate. He reacted as follows: 'I pointed out the fact that a system of Dutch interpreters existed in Japan and the Japanese authorities demanded to receive an unofficial paper written in English. And I refused to accept it and required a paper written in Dutch.' He explained his actions by saying: 'I thought that it would be difficult to maintain the Dutch influence there, and that the Dutch influence established for two centuries might rapidly vanish.' Oblique lines were drawn in this sentence.³⁹² With

³⁸⁸ NA Koloniën '29 March 1856 N. 162, Geheim'.

³⁸⁹ A member of parliament, Van Rijckevorsel, also stressed the importance of Dutch cultural influence. *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1854-1855*, p.100.

³⁹⁰ M. Vos, *Kaikoku Nihon no yoake*, p.242.

³⁹¹ *Ibidem*, p.354.

³⁹² *Ibidem*, p.367.

respect to cultural influence, the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies was in charge of choosing which personnel to dispatch to Japan. Fabius did not wish to discuss illegal affairs: 'I shall not expatiate on disloyal trade or smuggling, which one may find anywhere. If one wishes to risk it without fearing the problems, headaches, and losses that may result from it, it [smuggling] can be done. But that is no [proper] trade and would very much hurt our position in Japan.'³⁹³

The Dutch commissioner requested a warship be dispatched to Nagasaki to maintain public order as the number of merchant ships coming there would increase. This request for the sending warships from the Netherlands Indies to Japan had always encountered the opposition of the Governor-General in Batavia, but the Minister of Colonial Affairs, however, dismissed these objections. The Dutch commissioner was in the position to obtain permission from the Japanese Government for the Dutch trading post to import an unlimited supply of linen products for auction in the *Kambang trade*, because the Dutch were entitled to receiving goods in exchange for the steamship ordered by Japan. The Minister of Colonial Affairs pointed out that it was highly important that in this way the existing monopoly of the Japanese Government monopoly on the trade in European linen products was abolished. The Dutch expected large profits from this trade, because the Dutch commissioner had reported that many such commodities had been sold in 1856, at least 20,000 invoices having been made. It was thought that this trade would create an important market for Dutch textiles in Japan.³⁹⁴

In spite of these expectations, the means for payment for the ship was not decided on immediately. The Dutch commissioner noted that 'Our relations with Japan regarding trade also are perfect, but, especially at present, we should strive to get ahead of other powers in this matter'. Thus the commissioner stressed that the Dutch Government should take active measures to increase trade, and he warned that passive diplomacy would result in losing the present favorable opportunity.³⁹⁵

In order to strengthen the Dutch commercial position, the commissioner discussed the possibility of establishing regular shipping between Nagasaki

³⁹³ NA Koloniën no.5877, A letter of 22 February 1856 on 29 March 1856 N.162.

³⁹⁴ NA Koloniën '29 March 1856 N.162'.

³⁹⁵ NA Koloniën '29 March 1856 N.162'.

and China with the Japanese authorities. Along this route coal, which was abundant in Japan, was to be carried to the open ports in China. Moreover, Donker Curtius was of the opinion that this plan had an even greater importance, because it would lead to establishing a new trade in Asia, as the Dutch would be able to transport Chinese goods regularly to Japan, and of enabling the rapid dispatch of documents regarding Japanese affairs to Europe. At this time relations with Japan were regarded as very important by the Netherlands, and the Dutch Government wanted to obtain these documents as soon as possible for the purpose of formulating its new policy. Donker Curtius requested the Dutch Government to purchase a small steamship and send it to Nagasaki, should Japan not be able to procure a ship for this plan.³⁹⁶ The Minister of Colonial Affairs thought that the plan was attractive, but he could not proceed with it immediately. He pointed out that Donker Curtius had explained this plan completely hypothetically, because the trade in Japanese imports was still uncertain.

The relevance of coal to trade is shown by the fact that a mining engineer was to be dispatched to Japan from the Netherlands East Indies. The era of the steamship had begun, and the demand for coal was increasing rapidly. It was of crucial importance to secure a supply of the coal needed for shipping to and from Japan. This matter was also related to the principal problem in Japan's emerging international trade: there were only a few Japanese export products available. In order to solve this problem and to create a new industry in Japan, coal-mining was seen by the Dutch officials as the key to building up a foreign trade without the expediency of large quantities of silver or gold leaving the country. When the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies reported that no mining engineer was available, the Minister of Colonial Affairs stressed that this matter would be important not only to Japan but also indirectly to Dutch interests. He stressed that 'As the interest seems paramount, the first signatory [the Minister of Colonial Affairs] does not falter in his conviction that some less necessary mining matters in the Netherlands East Indies temporarily have to be made subordinate to this reason.'³⁹⁷

Fabius reported that Japan requested 100,000 guns, and that *Koban* of

³⁹⁶ NA Koloniën no.5883, 7 August 1856 N.450/E1, Geheim.

³⁹⁷ NA Koloniën no.5877, 29 March 1856 N.162, Geheim.

2,000 *ryo* (a currency unit of Japanese gold plate) had been sent to Batavia on the *Gedeih* in order to pay for the two ships ordered by the Japanese Government. Therefore, he pointed out that this was of the greatest importance to Dutch-Japanese political relations. He explained that the speedy solution of this matter was not only important to Japan, but also to Dutch commerce and industry. He stressed especially that these events were of great significance not only to the Netherlands East Indies but also to the Netherlands. As an example to back up his expectations that Dutch commerce and industry would obtain very favourable results in Japan, he mentioned that *damyô* of Hizen domain (Nabeshima Naomasa 鍋島直正, 1814-1871) had requested the construction of a shipyard. Furthermore, taking into account the Dutch Government's concern about the uncertain situation in Japan's foreign trade, he proposed that merchants in Batavia should send various goods recommended by him to Japan by way of a small-scale trial, adding to his comments that he did not think that this trial would in any way be disadvantageous and that it would immediately result in the expansion of the Nagasaki trade.³⁹⁸ Furthermore, he noted that the profits would rise immediately, even if this trade began rather tentatively at first. He also reported that colonial products, especially coffee, could be sold in Japan. His ideas about the organization of the Japanese trade, however, were different to those of the Dutch Government. He thought that this trade should not be monopolized but be free.

From the Dutch-Japanese Provisional Agreement of 1855 and the Dutch-Japanese Treaty of 1856 to the Dutch-Japanese Amended Treaty of 1857

'The Dutch Minister at Deshima, Donker Curtius, kept Edo fully informed of international developments and did his best to exploit Japanese fears to his own advantage. In August 1856 he warned the *Bakufu* (shogunal government) that Britain planned a mission to Japan and advised conclusion of a commercial treaty with Holland to forestall unpleasant surprises, remarking as an added inducement that customs duties would be a useful means of increasing

³⁹⁸ NA Koloniën Letters of 21 and 22 March 1856 on 29 March 1856 N.162 and NA Koloniën no.5946, 5 April 1856 N.U.

Government revenue.’³⁹⁹ The *Bakufu* understood that allowing foreign trade could no longer be avoided. Nevertheless, the influence exuded by the anti-foreign group stood in the way. Under these circumstances, it seemed best for Japan to negotiate with the Netherlands which measures would be appropriate to the process of opening its metaphorical doors. After the Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1856, the Netherlands endeavoured to effectuate a commercial treaty that would grant free trade access to other countries, but the *Bakufu* was reluctant to make any such concession. Therefore, *Opperhoofd* (‘the trading chief’) Donker Curtius proposed a transit trade, in which, on the basis of the system similar to Dutch trade carried out in Nagasaki, the Netherlands would mediate in the trade of other foreign countries with Japan. The magistrate of Nagasaki agreed to this proposal. As a result, an Amended Dutch-Japanese Treaty, supplementing that of 1856 was concluded. ‘It still promised many restrictions on the Dutch freedom of action, but it was much more generous than anything previously considered, permitting trade to an unlimited amount at Nagasaki and Hakodate, to be carried on by private merchants under official supervision and on payment of a considerable duty. Curtius found it very satisfactory.’⁴⁰⁰ The Netherlands regarded the supplementary agreement as the fruit of having given the *Soembing* to shogun, but the Dutch liberals, especially in the lower house, expressed great disappointment at such a meagre result. In their eyes, the outcome was entirely different from the Dutch expectations aroused by the presenting of the *Soembing*. The treaty did not allow the desired Dutch access to Japan on the basis of free trade. It was natural that they were highly critical of the Dutch commissioner in Japan, Donker Curtius.⁴⁰¹ The Minister of Colonial Affairs, Pieter Mijer (1812-1881), who had been a member of the Council of the Netherlands East Indies in 1852-1854, pleaded in his favour: ‘I know him personally as an efficient, careful, and adroit person.’⁴⁰² Van Hoëvell also questioned this outcome.⁴⁰³ After the treaty of 1858 was concluded, Van Hoëvell expressed his regret that ‘we cannot assume that Mr. Donker Curtius, until recently a judge of

³⁹⁹ Beasley, *The modern history of Japan*, p.62.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, p.64.

⁴⁰¹ *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië* 1857, p.207.-; 1860 I, p.166.

⁴⁰² *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1856-1857*, p.423.

⁴⁰³ *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië* 1857, p.207.

the Supreme Court in Java, has any special aptitude for business.’⁴⁰⁴ Although the Netherlands had intended to procure special privileges based on vested rights unique to the Dutch, nothing of this kind was specified. This drew an enormous amount of criticism in Parliament.⁴⁰⁵

None the less, the Dutch Government had succeeded in concluding the first substantial treaty, which included commercial regulations, with Japan. Moreover, the treaty did give certain privileges to the Netherlands. The Dutch Government chose to emphasize only these successful aspects and stated that it would continue to improve relations with Japan, and asserted once again that the treaty was the direct outcome of giving the *Soembing* as a present. Van Hoëvell criticized such Governmental comments by quoting the words of Gijsbertus Martinus van der Linden (1812-1888), Member of Parliament: ‘This agreement is the outcome of our *Soembing*, said Mr. Van der Linden on that occasion. A result that seems to entail no more than that we are allowed to navigate freely through the Bay of Nagasaki without communicating with anyone, that we may fish there at our leisure, and that we may go from Decima to Nagasaki without being accompanied by a Japanese officer!’⁴⁰⁶ Moreover the treaty did make an ambiguous remark that the Dutch could expect further privileges in the future, but Japan only granted these little by little.⁴⁰⁷ Such statements by the Government were hardly convincing. Not much later, in 1858, an incident occurred which made clear how little the Dutch had achieved with their treaty.

Official documents in the Dutch Ministry of Colonial Affairs, however, indicate that the Dutch Government really did feel highly satisfied with the continuation of the restricted trade system, because it meant that the Dutch monopoly in the Japanese market would be protected. Deshima was allowed by the Japanese Government to be used as a kind of Dutch bonded warehouse (entrepôt) for the Nagasaki trade. The Dutch could import goods for the Japanese market or for Dutch consumption on Deshima free of duties. Consequently, the Netherlands would completely control all Japanese foreign

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibidem*, 1860-I, p.167.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, 1860-I, p.166.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, 1857-I, p.209.

⁴⁰⁷ *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1856-1857*, p.423. *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië* 1857, p.207. *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië* 1860 I, p.166.

trade and this greatly, but secretly, pleased the Dutch Government. The Asian head office of the *Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij* (NHM)⁴⁰⁸ in Batavia was pleased with the many privileges accorded to the Netherlands in the provisional agreement, which was intended to result in a Dutch-Japanese treaty. The basis of this agreement was the idea that the restricted trading system, and the Dutch privileged position in it, would be maintained. It fitted admirably with the purpose of 'hunting up new sources for Dutch trade and shipping', precisely the aim of the NHM establishment. Therefore the NHM office in Batavia asked the Governor-General for permission to send colonial products from the Netherlands East Indies and industrial products from Europe to Nagasaki and to charge a person instructed by the NHM with the sale under the control of the Japanese trading post. The NHM was very enthusiastic: 'The NHM did not intend to make huge profits from this expedition and it will, if anything, suffer an initial loss, however if we are prepared not to flinch from a loss, we shall be able to become acquainted with the goods most desirable for export and import in Japan.'⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁸ The NHM was founded in 1824 with a capital of 37 million gulden for the purpose of making the textile industry which was prospering in the southern Netherlands (Belgium) and the commerce and shipping of the northern part co-operate more closely in order to compete with the British industrial exports (cotton fabrics) in the Netherlands East Indies. King Willem I personally invested 4 million guilders and secured an initial payment of the dividend for the first year. After the introduction of the Agricultural Cultivation System on Java in the 1830s the NHM purchased and transported the colonial products and sold them on commission. The company also auctioned the goods in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Middelburg and gained huge profits, especially on coffee and sugar. After the abolition of the Cultivation System on Java, the NHM gradually developed into a bank and, until the mid-twentieth century, owned a large number of plantation enterprises in the Dutch colonies in Asia and South America. It merged with the Twentsche Bank to become ABN Bank (*Algemene Bank Nederland*) in 1964, and eventually, through a merger with AMRO Bank, it became ABN-AMRO Bank. H.W.J. Volmuller (ed), *Nijhoff's Geschiedenis lexicon van Nederland en België*, 's Gravenhage-Antwerpen, pp.416-417.

⁴⁰⁹ NA Koloniën no.5879, A letter of 3 January 1856 from the NHM to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies on 2 May 1856 N.232, Geheim.

The endeavour to maintain Dutch profits in Japan

The director of Products and Civil Storehouse ('Directeur van producten en Civiele Magazijn) at Batavia reacted negatively to the expansion of the Japanese trade.: 'As far as it seems wise in consideration of the interest of this country [The Netherlands] and as long as the Japanese persist in their restrictions on trade, we [the Dutch] can continue the trade at the expense of their Government in the present situation, only if we can obtain suitable Japanese imports in exchange for articles demanded by the Japanese. It is very uncertain whether filling the demands of Japanese lords and consequently booking considerable sums in the *Kambang* fund (*Kambang-fonds*)⁴¹⁰ will lead to making profits, because the Japanese lords try to buy their necessities or the articles which catch their fancy at a bargain rate. There would be no objection to this if the Japanese were to pay for the articles in copper, gold or in the articles highly amenable to us in this trade. These articles, however, can be purchased only from the Japanese by way of the *Kambang trade* at present, and the right is sold off to the *Kambang* lease-holder....The *Kambang* lease-holder is not hurt because he is making profits of 300-400 per cent by dispatching invoices of a comparatively small sum. Therefore, he does not make a loss...On the other hand, the Government will suffer great losses by sending much larger quantities of goods at moderate prices, without the *kambang* privileges.'

For this reason, he advised the Governor-General as follows: 'If Japan recognizes Western superiority and asks the Netherlands for various articles and the Dutch can fulfil all demands, the *Kambang* fund will immediately swell to millions of guilders. It seems inadvisable to expand the trade with Japan to this extent at the expense of the Government. It would be no longer advisable that an enlightened and substantial trade group like the NHM devote its knowledge, experience and funds to the trade in consideration of the interest of the Netherlands. Then, it would be no problem for the Government of the Netherlands East Indies that the NHM carry out this trade independently. However, it is not desirable for the Government of the Netherlands East Indies that the *Kambang trade* be conducted at its expense. This opinion should be

⁴¹⁰ The Profits in the books for the *Kambang trade*. Since the Dutch could not bring this profit out of Japan, they used it for expenses there. M. Vos, *Bakumatsu dejima Mikōkai monjo*, p.43.

transmitted to the Dutch commissioner in Japan, and it is left to your judgment whether he should assure the Japanese authorities that they can acquire their demands most cheaply by private trade.’⁴¹¹

The ideas of the Director of Products and Civil Storehouse found acceptance: the Council of the Netherlands East Indies decided to support the trial of the NHM and to hand over the required information about Japanese trade secretly, because the NHM might not be properly informed about the present condition of the trade.⁴¹² Against this background, the Governor-General decided that, although the Government of the Netherlands East Indies could not admit what the Japanese Government would not admit, this matter should be transmitted to the trading chief on Deshima. It had no objection to co-operation and mediation to this case; furthermore the NHM could send goods to Japan freely at its own risk through the agency of the trading post on Deshima or use no agency at all.⁴¹³ The Governor-General stated that the monopolistic state in the *Kambang trade* was still necessary under the present circumstances as an instrument for forcing the opening up of more harbours in Japan for the private trade and also the trade with other countries.⁴¹⁴ On the other hand, he did hold the view that the monopolistic practices should be eliminated in favour of free trade based on free competition in the near future.

Such inconsistency occurred frequently in Dutch official statements at that time: the Dutch Government did not stop fulfilling Japanese demands, while paradoxically the Government did not intend to comply with Japanese demands as long as the system of isolation was maintained. The hypothetical ideal fostered by the Dutch was based upon the opinion that Japan would come to appreciate foreign trade from its experience with the Dutch, and that this experience would then indirectly contribute to the economic and political reformation of Japan. In practice, however, the Dutch aimed at maximizing

⁴¹¹ NA Koloniën A letter of 21 January from the Director of Product and Civil Stock to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies 1856 on 2 May 1856 N.232.

⁴¹² NA Koloniën A letter of 24 January from the Director of Product and Civil Stock to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies 1856 on 2 May 1856 N.232.

⁴¹³ NA Koloniën, Extract out of the register in resolutions of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies on 22 February 1856 in 2 May 1856 N.232 on 2 May 1856 N.232.

⁴¹⁴ NA Koloniën, ‘A letter of 10 January 1856 on 2 May 1856 N.232’.

trade profits. The Governor-General and Council of the Netherlands East Indies, Donker Curtius, and Fabius all advocated free trade in Japan based on free competition by private merchants as soon as possible. On the other hand, in consideration of large profits made for the Netherlands on this trade, the Minister of Colonial Affairs believed that free trade would not serve the Dutch political and commercial interests in Japan, or Japan's own interests. Therefore, he considered it unsuitable to set Japan immediately on a course of unreserved commercial competition in which only civilian merchants chased profits, because Japanese trade was in a period of transition. He instructed the Governor-General that the Dutch were to refrain from direct diplomacy with Japan, lest a collision should occur with the other foreign countries incited by their jealousy of Dutch privileges in Japan. However, he believed that a contribution should be made to such fields as industry, mining and the like, without neglecting Dutch interests and to work effectively on the expansion of the Dutch commercial policy. The Dutch Government preferred to allow Japanese affairs to develop gradually, and justified this policy by the consideration that 'a gradual transition is completely in the character of the Japanese.'⁴¹⁵ In the latest Instruction from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General, the Minister confirmed the idea that 'we will enable Japan to persevere in its exclusion of foreigners, if we continue to freely accommodate it [in that policy]'... 'We have refrained from engaging in several big transactions, because that would be unwise in the present experimental stage of affairs that our trade with Japan is facing. Yet the necessity has also been shown, that we should make our trade serve the wishes and the needs of Japan, in order to bring about, that the Japanese learn to appreciate [the use of] foreign trade.'⁴¹⁶

This statement is very important. The Netherlands protested strongly against the idea widespread in Europe at the time that the Netherlands intended to preserve the Japanese system of isolation for its own benefit. The contrary was true. The idea was to carefully make the Japanese aware of the profits of foreign trade, without forcing the situation. J.A. van der Chijs, the author of *Neêrlands Streven*, actually wrote that book for the specific purpose of refuting this rumour on the basis of official documents. He meant to emphasize

⁴¹⁵ NA Koloniën no.5878, 8 April 1856 N.196/O, Geheim.

⁴¹⁶ NA Koloniën no.6527, The semi-official letter of 8 May 1856 N.141 from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

the Dutch contribution to the modernization of Japan's foreign policy. The *Royal Institute for the Linguistics, Geography and Ethnology of the Netherlands Indies* at The Hague supported this book that was published with the consent of the Government and dedicated to the Dutch king. However, although Van der Chijs attempted to deny this, the official documents in the archives show that some of these rumours were actually based on the truth. What was happening was that the Dutch were too slow and that too little to convince the others of their basically good intentions.

Chapter 8

The United Kingdom and the Netherlands as allies in Japan

British policy in Asia

According to N. Tarling, during the nineteenth century Britain had only limited needs in South-East Asia and these needs were basically related to needs elsewhere. They applied to such issues as the security for the dominion in India and the trade to China, the command of the Straits of Malacca, a fair share of the trade of the [Indonesian] islands, and, at a later date, the protection of communications with Australia and New Zealand.⁴¹⁷ Diplomatically, England's main concern in Asia was the southern expansion of the Russian empire.

Before the opening of Japan, England had forged a plan to take possession of the tiny Ogasawara Archipelago, which was under Japanese rule.⁴¹⁸ Perry also called at this archipelago in 1853.⁴¹⁹ In 1834, England abolished the exclusive right of the British East India Company to the trade with China, in order to make the trade more efficient. This opened the China trade to competing companies. William John Napier (9th Lord Napier, 1789-1834) was sent by the British to act as trade inspector in China, where informally he also acted as Britain's diplomatic representative. On his arrival, Napier attempted to hand a notice of his arrival to the Governor of Canton, but the Chinese refused to deal with him. This upset England which considered it correct in international relations that a British high official should conduct negotiations on an equal footing with a Chinese high official. The Chinese authorities allowed only written petitions from foreigners to be submitted through Chinese merchants. In response to the British attempt to circumvent

⁴¹⁷ Tarling *The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, p.27.

⁴¹⁸ Tanaka, *Bakumatsu no Ogasawara*, pp.63-65.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p.74.

this rule, China stopped all trade with England and stopped providing food and water for the British trading firms in Canton. Moreover, Chinese soldiers were sent in to surround the British premises. Two British warships sailed up the Pearl River towards Canton to protect British nationals while exchanging fire with Chinese forces. Despite such gunboat diplomacy, China continued its pressure on the British in Canton, and Napier had to cease his attempts to establish direct contact with Chinese officials.⁴²⁰

This incident clearly demonstrated to the British government how important it was to possess a base in the region to which its nationals could safely be evacuated and where a fleet could be concentrated to display military strength. It was at that time that the Ogasawara archipelago attracted the attention of the British, because of its location near to China, Japan and Taiwan. After the Opium Wars, however, the annexation of Hong Kong vitiated this plan. The catalyst of the Opium Wars changed the trading system in China from closed to an open one. In the aftermath, England vigorously increased its trading activities in East Asia. After China, Japan would be a logical next target for British commercial penetration. However, in the years after the Opium Wars China still required plenty of attention from the British, who did not have sufficient resources to send a part of its navy to Japan. Moreover, Britain did not rank the importance of trade with Japan very highly.⁴²¹ As Tarling has pointed out, Britain indeed had taken the initiative in opening up China ten years earlier, but it was now displaying much less interest in opening up Japan.⁴²²

John Davis, the Superintendent of Trade and Governor of Hong Kong, had already recommended sending a mission to Japan in 1845,⁴²³ but a British mission to Japan actually materialized only much later. Moreover, the British were not very optimistic about the possible gains from an active Japanese policy. According to Beasley who has described these plans in detail, Davis was quite willing to leave the China coast to conduct negotiations elsewhere, but instead of Japan, he turned his attention to the plans for opening trade with Cochin China, which had been drawn up at Gützlaff's suggestion in the previous year.

⁴²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp.52-53.

⁴²¹ *Ibidem*, p.88.

⁴²² Tarling, *The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, p.6.

⁴²³ The letter from Davis to Aberdeen on 6 May, FO17/99. Same, 1 August 1845, FO17/100. See Tarling, *Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, p.100.

In November 1846 he wrote to the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, to announce his intention of going to Cochin China in the spring, a project which he considered ‘much more likely to be attended by success than the mission to Japan in which the Americans (James Biddle) have lately so entirely failed.’. Moreover, says Beasley, ‘When, in the summer of 1846, Davis reported his decisions to postpone the Japan expedition because he could not raise enough force to match the French and American missions, he was appealing – though the dispatch was addressed to Lord Aberdeen (4th Earl of Aberdeen, George Hamilton Gordon, 1784-1860) – to all Palmerston’s national prejudice.’...[Yet] ‘This would continue to be impossible until the Foreign Office or the Admiralty decided that the Japan mission was important enough to be given priority over some of the other duties required of the China squadron. There seemed no immediate prospect of any such decision.’⁴²⁴ In other words, the British authorities drew a lesson from Biddle’s failure and decided that nothing should be undertaken in Japan without sufficient naval support.⁴²⁵ Therefore, Tarling remarks, ‘Bowring (Sir John Bowring, 1792-1872) in fact was anxious to attempt the mission to Japan first. He felt it unwise, however, to go without ‘a respectable armament’, and this could not be provided owing to the outbreak of the Crimean War. He decided instead to attempt the easier mission to Siam.’⁴²⁶ This kind of comment is reconfirmed in another document Bowring wrote; ‘I hope if I go to Jeddo I shall obtain other and better conditions; but I must go with a considerable fleet.’⁴²⁷

The British policy towards Japan is further explained by the British Consul in Japan, Alcock, who wrote: ‘The extension and free development of commerce, without costly armaments of war, being the avowed and sole object of our treaties, it would be very important if we could determine, with some degree of certainty, under what conditions and to what extent it may be possible to attain this end in the far East.’ He added ‘To secure new markets without danger of collision or risk of interruption, is the dream of Manchester and the hope of our manufacturing interest generally’⁴²⁸, and continued: ‘There must,

⁴²⁴ Beasley, *Great Britain and the opening of Japan 1834-1858*, p.70.

⁴²⁵ *Ibidem*, p.90.

⁴²⁶ Tarling, *Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, p.114.

⁴²⁷ FO. 238-114, From F.O. 1856-57 October 14 1856, N.79.

⁴²⁸ Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon*, p.358

we have seen, be means of coercion in the background, and to this must be added the known *will and power* to resort to them – if all other means fail to secure the honest fulfilment of the stipulations of Treaties. This implies a possible contingency of collision and war, but there be firmness and discretion in the employment of such means of diplomacy, there is the best chance, which circumstances admit, of avoiding the actual resort to force, or any overt acts of compulsion.’⁴²⁹ His words are a textbook example of the representation of the policy of ‘Free trade Imperialism’: expanding imperialist control ‘By informal means if possible, or by formal annexations when necessary’ in order to achieve free trade.⁴³⁰

Diplomacy towards Japan was not important in England at that time. Certainly, diplomacy towards China was considered more important. Alcock said that the population of India was 130 million, that of China was 300 million and that of Japan was only 30 million. ‘Japanese trade we could very well dispense with,’ he said, adding that: ‘The tea and silk supply can be procured elsewhere....while the profits on any of our manufactures they may take, will probably never pay the cost of a small squadron to protect it.’⁴³¹

In the opinion of Alcock, however, Japan formed part of the ‘chain’ of the British Empire. Because his thoughts on the matter very eloquently voice the British views at the time, a series of quotes from his famous work *The Capital of the Tycoon* will do here: ‘In this chain, not a link can be broken or damaged, even in such an outlying and distant region of the East as Japan, without some danger and prejudice to the whole,’⁴³² ... ‘Western Powers, and we more especially, have great interests in the East, of which Japan is an outpost.’ Therefore, the loss of ‘our prestige in the East’, and ‘any act or course of policy which may serve to indicate either fear or weakness, is calculated to affect the power and the integrity of the whole empire.’ Acquiring knowledge of what is important and what is not about Japan, ‘unfortunately, [...] cannot be decided

⁴²⁹ Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon*, p.374

⁴³⁰ Ishii Kanji, Sekiguchi Yoshiyuki (red.), *Sekaiichiba to bakumatsu kaikô*, 1982, Tôkyôdaigaku shuppankai, p.7.

⁴³¹ Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon*, p.218. Ishii Kanji, Sekiguchi Yoshiyuki (red.), *Sekaiichiba to bakumatsu kaikô*, pp.8-9.

⁴³² *Ibidem*

with exclusive reference to that country.⁴³³

Alcock had noticed that Russia wanted to acquire new territories in East Asia, even though it did not seem much interested in carrying on trade. He insisted that England would maintain a relationship aimed at maintaining Japan as a buffer to oppose the southwards advance of this 'aggressive Maritime Power'. He believed that Russia, if it wished to undertake something against British trade in the China seas and in the Pacific, would try to conquer or annex islands in the Japanese seas: 'the only link wanted to complete *her* chain of empire round the world...there can be little doubt Japan would become a portion of the Russian empire at no distant date, if other European Powers retired.'⁴³⁴ As a consequence, England preferred to maintain smooth relations with Japan, through the good offices of its ally, the Netherlands, which happened to be the only Western power that entertained relations with Japan and which was possibly in the position to open up this country to foreign access. Moreover, in case England ever took action to open Japan, it would take the support of its ally, the Netherlands, for granted.⁴³⁵

When England received information about the conclusion of the Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1856, the British Foreign Secretary, George William Frederick Villiers, 4th Earl of Clarendon (1800-70) asked Abercromby to transmit this sentiment to the Dutch Government, 'You will express to the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs the best thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the communication of these important documents, which have been read with great interest and satisfaction by Her Majesty's Government, who trust that the sound advice, supported by able arguments, of the Netherland Government may lead the Japanese Government to adopt a course of policy more consonant with the interests of Japan and of those Foreign countries with which, sooner or later, Japan must come into relation.'⁴³⁶

Beasley points out that 'British action, it believed, had already eased American difficulties in China. It would in some sense redress the balance,

⁴³³ *Ibidem*

⁴³⁴ *Ibidem*

⁴³⁵ W.A Baud, *De semi-officiële en particuliere briefwisseling tussen J.C. Baud en J.J. Rochussen 1845-1851, - en enige daarop betrekking hebbende andere stukken* (drie delen), 1983, Assen, Deel III, p. 101.

⁴³⁶ FO. 238-117, From F.O. 1857 March 10, 1857.

therefore, if American initiative in Japan broke down the policy of seclusion and thereby made it easier for to establish trade relations. Such a result seemed both probable and desirable.⁴³⁷ Referring to Bowring's dispatch to Japan he says, 'He was ordered to report on the progress and results of the American expedition, but was given no power to negotiate because Sir Samuel George Bonham, 1st Baronet, (1803-1863) already had it and would probably return to duty before any action was needed. James Howard Harris, 3rd Earl of Malmesbury (1807-1889) certainly had no intention of competing with Perry.' Therefore, as far as the British were concerned, 'Her Majesty's Government would be glad to see the trade with Japan open; but they think it better to leave it to the Government of the United States to make the experiment; and if that experiment is successful, Her Majesty's Government can take advantage of its success.'⁴³⁸

There is yet another example of British non-active diplomacy towards Japan in the Aberdeen papers. A memorandum of 1852 noted that 'The American Expedition to Japan is naturally a matter of great interest. Its precise object does not seem to be avowed; but it is scarcely to be supposed that the Government of the United States would incur the expense of setting on foot a larger force than has ever quitted its shores without some commensurate advantage in view.'⁴³⁹

When the first news of Perry's success reached London, this raised some consternation: '1st Baron Edmund Hammond (1802-1890), Addington's [Henry U. Addington] successor as Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, at once drafted a letter to the Admiralty to inform them that Bowring had already received instructions to go to Japan when the opportunity arose; that Perry's success afforded that opportunity; and Stirling (James Stirling naval commander-in-chief of China and the East Indies, 1791-1865), if he had not already done so, should be ordered to provide as large a force as he could spare, since the size of the American and Russian squadrons in Japanese waters made

⁴³⁷ Beasley, *Great Britain and the opening of Japan 1834-1858*, p.87.

⁴³⁸ *Ibidem*, p.93. FO. 17-186, From F.O. 1852 21 July 1852, N.30.

⁴³⁹ The British library, Additional 43248, Aberdeen Papers Vol. CCX presented by The Marques of Aberdeen. 'Foreign Office memorandum on 1852.' In the heading of this paper, is written 'Mr. Hammond's Dep:'.

desirable 'a certain degree of pomp.'⁴⁴⁰ 'The Foreign Office saw American action in Japan not as a model of what should be done but as a guide to how easily results might be achieved. Thus if Biddle's failure contributed to the postponement of Davis' plan, Perry's success on the contrary led to the adoption of Bowring's.'⁴⁴¹

It was agreed that 'Gunboat diplomacy' was necessary to negotiate with Japan. Beasley remarks in this respect: 'The Foreign Office under Clarendon was equally convinced that nothing less than a guard of honor of warships would enable a British diplomat to succeed in negotiations with Japan. The Taiping Rebellion and the Crimean War, both harbingers of new threats to British lives and shipping in China, first made it difficult and then impossible to detach a squadron for the purpose. The mission was again postponed. In theory this postponement was until the spring of 1855.'⁴⁴²

England became involved in Japanese affairs after Japan's opening. It was not active, but assumed a rather reluctant attitude. For instance, 'The first British official representative to reside in Japan was Rutherford Alcock who was appointed as Consul General. He reached Japan in June 1859 and finding that this title did not give him sufficient rank among his diplomatic colleagues assumed the title of 'Plenipotentiary'. The Foreign Office agreed and formally appointed him as 'Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary'. Moreover, 'The British Mission was a very small one and the head of mission had to carry a heavy burden of work.' Furthermore, 'Language was a major problem especially in the 1860s. At first as there were no competent interpreters between Japanese and English interpretation had to be through the medium of Dutch. This fact and the absence of equivalents in Japanese for terms and concepts in common use in English not only meant that conversations took a long time but there were frequent misunderstandings and nuances were missed.'⁴⁴³

Beasley also points out these language problems; 'The Japanese at Nagasaki were no better equipped for communicating in English. Their official interpreters had begun the study of that language early in the nineteenth

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p.99. Foreign Office. *Miscellanea*, Ser. II, vol. 24 Hammond minute of 4 June 1854.

⁴⁴¹ Beasley, *Great Britain and the opening of Japan 1834-1858*, p.102.

⁴⁴² *Ibidem*, p.103.

⁴⁴³ Cortazzi, *British Envoy in Japan 1859-1972*, pp.4-5.

century and attained some proficiency in it, but thereafter they had worked largely at Edo and interest at Nagasaki had waned. By the time of Stirling's arrival the officials there were forced to admit that they had no means of writing in English and could therefore give only verbal replies to his letters. However, Donker Curtius, the Dutch Superintendent at Deshima, knew English well enough to translate the admiral's letters into Dutch, and this made it possible for the Dutch-speaking interpreters attached to the *bugyô's* Office to translate them into Japanese. This method was normally used during the negotiations.'⁴⁴⁴

Cortazzi states that, 'Certainly, it is clear from Alcock's despatches that he was never in doubt about the fact that the development of British trade was a, if not the, major objective of his mission.'⁴⁴⁵ Hence, England regarded it as unimportant to establish British political influence in Japan. Meanwhile Alcock encountered many difficulties, not in the least because Japan was a dangerous place for foreigners. As early as 9 August 1859 he sent a note to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in which he complained that his officers could not walk outside their missions 'without risk of rudeness, offence and ... violence of the most determined and wanton character... These outrages can only be considered as reproach and scandal'. Alcock's protests had no effect.'⁴⁴⁶ 'In November Alcock's servant was attacked before his eyes.' Finally, 'Alcock became so frustrated that on 14 December he addressed a note to the authorities which contained a threat of armed retaliation.' However, 'This earned a rebuke for Alcock from Lord John Russell (1st Earl Russell, 1792-1878), the Foreign Secretary: 'Time and patience may remove many of the difficulties of which you complain...'⁴⁴⁷ Furthermore, in 1861 his legation was attacked in the middle of the night by *rônin* (masterless samurai). 'Alcock was provoked by the appearance after the incident of a Japanese official who called to congratulate him on his escape and prayed him 'to accept a basket of ducks and a jar of sugar in token of amity.' Alcock rejected this peace offering and demanded 'justice

⁴⁴⁴ Admiralty, In Letters, vol. 5640, Diary of Negs., 14 September and 13 October 1854. See Beasley, *Great Britain and the opening of Japan 1834-1858*, p.116.

⁴⁴⁵ Cortazzi, *British Envoy in Japan 1859-1972*, p.11.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p.12.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, pp.12-13.

and redress, not ducks or sugar'.⁴⁴⁸

Confronted with these developments, England needed the support of its ally, the Netherlands. Therefore it was necessary for England to maintain a good relationship with the Dutch in Asia. This approach was very different to the relationship that the British had with the French. 'Their rivalry overseas never disappeared entirely after 1815, and flared up on occasion over various issues, such as the slave trade,' 'In a similar way, Britain and the Netherlands remained friends in Europe despite their commercial and colonial rivalries and disputes in the Far East.'⁴⁴⁹

England intended to pursue its interests in Japan, in return providing the Netherlands with advantages in the other Asian regions. A second reason for this attitude was that England was aware of the fact that the Japanese harbored ill feelings toward the British that dated back to the Phaeton Incident of 1808. The delegation that Sir Thomas Raffles sent to Japan in 1813 had already made clear that this incident had done great damage to Anglo-Japanese relations.⁴⁵⁰ England, though the great power in Europe, depended on good relations with the Netherlands in order for the two countries to act jointly as 'Lords of the East'. This British attitude toward Japan suited the interests of the Netherlands. In this policy of a strategic, long-term friendship it was pragmatic to divide responsibilities regarding their common interests in Asia between each other.

It was not always easy to maintain a close relationship. 'Canning had thought that too demonstrative an Anglo-Dutch association might provoke a challenge from others. But it came later than he thought and from other directions. Britain's disposition was to adjust its relationships in so far as that was in keeping with the principles of its foreign policy and the framework which they constituted. In all such cases, the adjustment had to take account of both Britain's interests and Britain's power. But it had also to take account of the connection with the collaborators, through which Britain's power was

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p.13.

⁴⁴⁹ Paul W. Shroeder, 'The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure' in; M.C. Brands, N.C.F. van Sas, B.A.G.M. Tromp (red.), *De Veiligheid van Europa – Aspecten van de ontwikkeling van het Europese statenstelsel*, pp.82-83.

⁴⁵⁰ See Chapter 3.

amplified and its interests served, and that was an intractable task.’⁴⁵¹

In the case of the Anglo-Dutch relationship, yet other difficulties were involved. As Tarling remarks: ‘Two powers in an established pattern of collaboration might wish to react differently to a challenge from outside.’⁴⁵² ‘In departing (from Singapore) Perry noted that with sufficient naval force England could command this entrance to the South China Sea.’⁴⁵³ ‘Social relations between the British and the Americans were amiable enough. But there was mutual suspicion when it came to diplomatic initiatives.’⁴⁵⁴ The American rivalry with England in Asia resulted in strengthening the good relationship between England and the Netherlands. Certainly for the Netherlands, a good relationship with England was indispensable to ward off the American advance.

The Netherlands wanted to maintain its position as the most favored nation in Japan, and was unwilling to acquiesce in other countries being granted more privileges than it already had. At the beginning of the British relationship with Japan after its opening, the British Government asked the Dutch for mediation in the conclusion of its treaty with Japan and it acknowledged Dutch superiority in the first Anglo-Japanese treaty.⁴⁵⁵ Although the British Rear-Admiral Sir James Stirling, who was in charge of the negotiations at that time, at first demanded the same conditions as the Dutch, by virtue of that treaty, the pre-existing privileges of the Dutch and Chinese in Nagasaki were the only privileges which could not be claimed,⁴⁵⁶ because the treaty affirmed the existence of Dutch vested rights in Japan. Consequently, ‘Stirling’s diplomacy was not greeted with enthusiasm [by the British] on the China coast.’ The *China Mail* said, ‘in his preoccupation with this ‘precious treaty’ with Japan, Stirling had neglected the more important duty of protecting

⁴⁵¹ Tarling, p.29.

⁴⁵² *Ibidem*, p.30.

⁴⁵³ Matthew Calbraith Perry, *The Japan Expedition, 1852-1854: The Personal Journal of Matthew C. Perry*, Roger Pineau, ed, Washington, 1968, p.43. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.131.

⁴⁵⁴ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.157.

⁴⁵⁵ NA Koloniën no.5867, 28 February 1855 no.76, Geheim.

⁴⁵⁶ *Correspondence respecting the late Negotiation with Japan*, presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, printed by Harrison and Sons, London, 1856, p.12.

British ships and subjects in China.’⁴⁵⁷

On the one hand England expected Dutch support in Japanese affairs, but on the other hand it kept an eagle eye on Dutch diplomacy. In Bowring’s report on the Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1855 dated 6 December 1855, we find the following critical comments: ‘The steamer “Gedeh” Lieutenant Fabius with the Dutch Royal Commissioner arrived from Japan on Monday last, and it was immediately reported that a treaty of the most satisfactory nature had been closed with the Japanese Government whereby the trade was to be opened to the whole world.’ ‘I was favored by a private friend with a reading of it, and never in my life have I read a more silly and contemptible production. Matters remain exactly almost as they have been for the last 200 years with this exception that the Dutch inhabitants of Desima are to be allowed to enter and circulate freely in the town of Nagasaki without a Japanese guard as - heretofore - and the Factory - buildings on Desima, with the ground on which they stand, become the property of the Dutch at a fixed taxation. The privileges of every kind hitherto enjoyed by the Dutch are confirmed to them and no favors are to be conceded to any other European nation by the Japanese in which the Dutch are not to participate.’ ‘and only one article seems at all to hint at the possibility of a change, the *Opperhoofd*, or head of the Factory being empowered to treat with the Japanese Government on the part of the Dutch in the event of the Emperor of Japan at any future period making new propositions by which further concessions are to be made to the Dutch!!... ‘This is the substance of his famous treaty of which the Dutch have much reason to be heartily ashamed and I am much mistaken if the feeling in Holland is not one of universal disappointment.’... ‘A public sale was held at Desima of the cargoes of the two ships loaded by the two Vessels of - which I enclose particulars, - Everything sold at an enormous price, the Japanese Commissioner having evidently had carte blanche to buy at exorbitant rates.’⁴⁵⁸

Moreover, ‘that report is correct, and that - the Netherland Government in making this repurchase, have had in view the removal of difficulties and impediments in the way of their future negotiation with the Government of Japan, upon questions of Commercial interest.’... ‘I am informed that Lieutenant

⁴⁵⁷ *China Mail*, 25 October 1855. See Beasley, *Great Britain and the opening of Japan 1834-1858*, p.145.

⁴⁵⁸ FO. 238-111, From F.O. 1855-1856, 9 February 1856, N.10 Confidential.

Fabius has received a considerable sum of money from the Japanese Government to be expended by him in the purchase of scientific instruments and Books for the use of the Japanese Government.⁴⁵⁹ Furthermore was also reported that 'Lieutenant Fabius was proceeding to Japan, for the purpose of delivering to the Japanese Government certain articles such as books, scientific instruments and etcetera, which he had been commissioned by them to purchase in Europe, and further, to assist in giving instruction to the Japanese in the practice and principles of steam of Navigation.'⁴⁶⁰

Receiving these kinds of reports, England had to be wary of the Dutch attempt to pursue its own privileges in Japan. These kinds of comments are seen in documents, for example as follows: 'It is true, as is expressed in Art. 6 of the explanations attached to the Dutch Draft, that His Royal Majesty has not expressly stipulated for any particular or exclusion advantages in favour of his own subjects, beyond what is comprised in the engagement that Netherland Subjects, are by Art 6 of the Treaty itself at once to be equalized to the most favoured nations, in the case of Treaties being concluded with Foreign Powers on the Basis of the Dutch Project; - but Your Lordship will not fail to observe that the whole Draft of the Netherland Government is drawn up with a view to the maintenance of a predominating influence on the part of the Netherlands over the Commerce with Japan, and with an intent to exercise a species of tutelary authority over the conduct of the Japanese Government, with respect to the nature of its future relations with other Powers'⁴⁶¹

Moreover the British Government tried to obtain word from the Netherlands that it did not acquire its own privileges in the Japanese affair. The document about a conversation with the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Hague says 'I [Abercromby] recently took an opportunity of referring in the course of conversation with His Excellency Monsieur Gevers d'Endegeest (D.Th. Gevers van Endegeest, 1793-1877), to the intention which Royal Majesty's Government have of extending at a fitting moment our commercial relations with the Empire of Japan, by an additional Treaty with that country.- I at the same time said that Her Majesty's Government confidently expected, whenever they entered upon negotiations with the Empire of Japan. In such a purpose,

⁴⁵⁹ FO. 238-113, To F.O. 1856, The Hague 13th March 1856 N.21.

⁴⁶⁰ FO. 238-113, To F.O. 1856, 11 April 1856, N.46.

⁴⁶¹ FO. 238-113, To F.O. 1856, 11 April 1856, N.46

that the Netherland Authorities on the spot would be ready to assist Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary in carrying out the objects of his mission.' 'he had distinctly stated, that the Government of His Royal Majesty when negotiating such a treaty, disclaimed every intention of wishing to obtain exclusive privileges or advantages for Dutch Commerce, - and that they would see with pleasure the Commerce of Japan thrown open to the world. I terminated this part of our conversation, by stating to His Excellency the satisfaction with which I had learnt the news and intentions of the Netherland Government; and by informing him that I should remind him of his declaration, whenever His Majesty's Government entered upon their negotiations for a treaty of commerce, with the Government of the Emperor of Japan.'⁴⁶²

Another document recording a conversation between the British Plenipotentiary and the Dutch king also says: 'I have now reported to Your Lordship the substance of all that has helped between His Royal Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, and myself, - and I think it results from what has transpired, that both His Royal Majesty and His Minister have unequivocally recorded their intention to repudiate all desire to obtain exclusive advantages in the commerce of this country, and to declare their determination to exert their influence with the Government of Japan, to obtain their acceptance and execution of the principle of free trade.'⁴⁶³

Sometimes England would complain about the Dutch diplomacy towards Japan. After receiving a report from Bowring which stated that 'Your Lordship will observe that it is the object of the Dutch in their proposed treaty to confine the trade to Nagasaki, and to make the nobles the sole instruments of barter. I conceive that such terms ought not to satisfy us, and have no reason to believe they would be acceptable to the Americans. Their practical effect, in my judgment, would be to exclude other nations from a fair participation in the commerce of Japan, and to confine it principally to the Dutch and *the Dutch Government*. The British Foreign Secretary sent to the Plenipotentiary the letter containing the word that 'I have to instruct you to intimate to the Netherlands Government that Her Majesty's Government have no reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Dutch agents in this matter.'⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶² FO. 238-113, To F.O. 1856, 4 December 1856, N.164.

⁴⁶³ FO. 238-118, To F.O. 1857, 4 February 1857, N.16.

⁴⁶⁴ FO. 238-114, From F.O. 1856-57, October 14 1856, N.79

England, however, did not strongly protest against the intervention of the Netherlands in Japanese Affairs, because it did not wish to lose the Dutch support. Even if England complained to the Netherlands of its action in these affairs, it should do it mildly and transmit its desires to the Netherlands, as quoted in the following: 'and I [Clarendon] have to state to you that under the circumstances I am of opinion that it is unnecessary for you to give effect to that instruction; but that you may take an opportunity of saying unofficially to the Netherland minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government intend to extend their commercial relations with Japan, and that they trust that the same friendly feelings which exist between the two Governments will be manifested by their agents towards each other.'⁴⁶⁵ 'The attitude of the British made it possible to adopt *onthouding* (refrain from active intervention) without of course abandoning Dutch claims. Itself not challenging the Dutch, Britain cherished a relationship with them that helped to keep out others, and did not wish to challenge the Dutch.'⁴⁶⁶

In 1864 England negotiated the position of Sumatra with the Netherlands and concluded a second treaty of London. In this context the magazine 'The *Friend of India* had expressed the British feelings: 'If the Dutch would only guarantee free trade we could see them take all Sumatra with indifference. But this they will not do, nor if they promised to do so, could they be trusted.'⁴⁶⁷ This utterance seems to show that this region was not important to England. This is not correct. 'To Britain, North Sumatra was important because it was the mainstay of the commercial prosperity of Penang, and because in the hands of a strong Power it could have commanded the strategic Malacca Straits...England opposed Dutch expansion of its influence there...But the faith of the Foreign Office in this doctrine was weakening, especially in view of the steady liberalization of Dutch commercial policy. In the 1860's London's protests were neither firm nor immediate enough to prevent Holland's advance in the East Coast of Sumatra. The increasing interest of more dangerous Powers in the area made it seem desirable that Holland should be allowed effectively to occupy the island which the 1824 Treaty had seen as its 'sphere of influence'.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁵ FO. 238-114, From F.O. 1856-57, October 28, 1856, N.83.

⁴⁶⁶ Tarling, *The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, p.31.

⁴⁶⁷ *Friend of India* 14 May 1863. See Reid, *The Contest for North Sumatra*, p.54.

⁴⁶⁸ Reid, *The Contest for North Sumatra*, p.284.

Therefore, 'The Colonial Office agreed that a voluntary submission of the Sultan to Holland would be in Britain's interest, since 'Acheen had much better be in the hands of Holland than of France or the United States'.⁴⁶⁹ Here we see again confirmed that England strived to maintain its good relationship with the Netherlands in Asia.

This relationship between the Netherlands and England had existed since the Napoleonic Wars. Tarling explains: 'In the 1840s, the Foreign Office is found taking their part. In the case of the State of Siak on the east coast of Sumatra, the British were faced with a threat of Dutch conquest and, in the absence of any precise stipulation in the treaty of 1824, they attempted to counter this by reviving a treaty with the Sultan made on behalf of the Penang Government in 1818.'⁴⁷⁰ 'Alarmed for the security of their empire, the Dutch sought to strengthen their position in Bali, Lombok, Celebes, Borneo and beyond. The arrangements of 1824 had been further disrupted.'⁴⁷¹ England, however, was prepared to tolerate the Dutch expansion to a large degree. Consequently, 'While the Dutch extended their empire as a means of excluding all major powers from the Archipelago, the British themselves preferred the Dutch to the other major powers.'⁴⁷²

Political co-operation and economic competition

The Dutch treasured their special relationship with their mighty neighbour, Great Britain, the major imperial power in South-East Asia and even in the world.⁴⁷³ Generally speaking, only the points of confrontation between the Netherlands and England in Asia are singled out for emphasis. These were the outcomes of their economic activities in that region. Disputes between the Dutch and the British did occur. Tarling, however, explained their special relationship as follows: 'But the Anglo-Dutch relationship was not destroyed.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p.61. Minute of 30 August 1868, C.O. 22 August 1868, C.O. 273/23.

⁴⁷⁰ Tarling, *Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*. p.21. Palmerston to Brooke, 23 February 1848. Foreign Office. 12/6.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibidem*, p.23.

⁴⁷² *Ibidem*, p.24.

⁴⁷³ *Ibidem*, p.27.

Essentially the British permitted the Dutch to prevail politically in the Indies, while securing economic opportunity and protection for their own strategic interests. In some sense the Dutch were collaborators in a system suited to the objectives of the British: they were 'exclusive Lords of the East,' but though exclusive, they were not equal. Subordination was not always easy to bear, nor superordination easy to restrain.⁴⁷⁴

A report by the Dutch Lieutenant Fabius provides a good example of this situation. On his way to Japan in 1855, he called at Hong Kong for refuelling. His report shows that the British he met there were highly concerned about everything related to the Dutch enterprise in the East. He reported that, to his great surprise, the British Governor Sir John Bowring began talking to him about his duty to present the *Soembing* to Japan; he had thought that no one knew of this except the Dutch authorities concerned.⁴⁷⁵ 'When John Bowring was appointed to succeed Bonham as Superintendent, he was given appropriate powers and instructions to negotiate, when feasible, with Siam, Vietnam and Japan.'⁴⁷⁶ Furthermore, Bowring told him that he had read articles about the report by the Dutch Minister of Colonial Affairs to the king presented in the *Staats Courant* of 12 February 1855 (no.23) with the greatest satisfaction and with great interest, while completely approving of this Dutch policy. Bowring also told Fabius that he intended to leave for Nagasaki within several weeks. The reason was that, in view of British interests in trade, he would amend and expand the first Anglo-Japanese Treaty concluded by Rear-Admiral Stirling in the previous year, and, in principle, make it into a treaty like the one that he concluded with Siam.

Fabius confessed that he had no idea where the British fleet was, that was carefully kept secret. Some said it was in the waters of Japan, while others said that it was on its way to Kamchatka. This secrecy shows that the British remained cautious in their attitude towards the Netherlands.⁴⁷⁷ This by itself

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, p.29.

⁴⁷⁵ This part of the report contains double exclamation marks '!!' to emphasize his great surprise.

⁴⁷⁶ Foreign Office to Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 3 February 1854; Clarendon to Bowring, 13 February 1854. FO17/210. Tarling, *Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, pp.113-114.

⁴⁷⁷ NA Koloniën no.5872, 1 October 1855 no. 470a, Geheim.

was also a sign that the Dutch had a certain level of influence in Asia. For instance, when Alcock looked at the residence of the Dutch trading chief in Nagasaki, he noted that 'the view from the Dutch Commissioner's residence, with its quaint Japanese garden, and fine sweep down the bay towards the entrance, is very charming. As I stood for a few minutes alone on the balcony, there flitted before me a vision of the sort of life these indomitable representatives of the Great Batavian Republic must have led.'⁴⁷⁸ Moreover, the remark by a visiting Italian envoy that the Netherlands East Indies formed a very important center of European civilization, also illustrated Dutch influence in Asia.⁴⁷⁹

The Netherlands had striven to maintain its predominance in Japanese affairs even against its ally, England, especially before the conclusion of the Harris Treaty in 1858. In spite of this fact, it would be a more than hasty conclusion to regard their relations as confrontational. Dutch activities were based on the Anglo-Dutch alliance, and their confrontations had mostly remained restricted to commercial, not political matters. This commercial confrontation has been identified too easily by historians as Anglo-Dutch clashes. This view is in need of a revision. Confrontations in the field of commerce are a matter of competition between countries that have international companies. Such competition can occur anywhere. Besides their commercial competition, the mutual relation of 'most natural ally' that existed between the Netherlands and England in Europe naturally also existed in Asia.

As an example of the close Anglo-Dutch relations in Asia may be mentioned the fact that the trading chief in Japan, Donker Curtius, had several meetings on various Japanese affairs with the British Rear Admiral Sir Michael Seymour (1802-1887) who arrived at Deshima in 1857. Bearing in mind Donker Curtius's report, this 'good relationship' can be witnessed as follows: 'on this occasion, I did not make any secret at all about Dutch policy towards Japan. Especially, I took pains to express to him at length my feeling that the opening of Japan need not cost one single drop of blood, if none of the powers would demand that it take place completely at once, but if they were to expand their

⁴⁷⁸ Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon*, p.142.

⁴⁷⁹ Vittorio F. Arminjon, *Il Giappone e il viaggio della corvetta Magenta nel 1866*, Genova, 1869, Ôkubo Akio (trans.), *Italia shisetsu no Bakumatsu kenbunki* ('A memoir of an Italian envoy in the late Tokugawa era'), Shinjinbutsu ôraisha, 1987, pp.20-21.

relationship with Japan, in stages, just as Japan also shows that it wants to do, which in all probability is the only option that Japan has. This admiral also immediately agreed with the view I expressed that many simultaneous and large commercial operations by various countries would result in disappointment and loss.'

Later, their talk turned to delivering warships and weapons to Japan. Donker Curtius reported as follows about Seymour's utterance: 'in case it should be difficult for the Netherlands to fulfil this kind of Japanese demand from its own industry, orders for warships and steam engines etc. on the account of our trading post here, would undoubtedly be most welcome to the British industry.' Furthermore, Seymour talked about having already actually supplied three steam engines to China, and about going to sell six steam gunboats and sending specialists accompanying them. This plain talking is also a clear indication of Dutch-British relations as allies.

On the other hand, it seemed that Seymour's utterances caused Donker Curtius some anxiety about the advance of British industry into Japan. After the description of this topic in his letter, in which he pointed out that the Dutch inhabitants in Nagasaki disapproved of the results that the Dutch Government had already gained, he noted that 'my position becomes more difficult as the situation advances, and I foresee that, after the departure of these ships, I shall have to request the powerful assistance of Your Excellency in the future.'⁴⁸⁰

It is understandable that both Donker Curtius, who was in charge of the active policy towards Japan at that time, and Fabius were afraid of British economic pressure. These utterances, however, had nothing to do with the Dutch-British political confrontation. It even seemed possible that the Netherlands would leave its special position in Japan to England, if it were to lose its special relationship as 'Japan's special (*onderscheide*) friend'. Nevertheless, if it appeared that if the Netherlands could not meet the Japanese demands after all, it would be desirable that England should step in and not other countries. Concretely, if the newly emerging power in Asia, the United States, which had wedged itself into a position in Japan and did not respect the ancient Dutch-Japanese relationship, came to play this role, it would become much more difficult for the Netherlands to protect its interests in Japan.

⁴⁸⁰ NA Koloniën no.5888, A letter from Donker Curtius to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, 16 September no.52; 9 March 1857 no. 76, Geheim.

Another example is provided by a talk about Japan between the Dutch ambassador in London, Baron A.A. Bentinck van Nijenhuis (1798-1868), and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon. In this talk, the British Secretary spoke to the Dutch ambassador 'of the selflessness of the Dutch diplomacy towards Japan by using the most heart-warming expressions. He, however, added if it was not supported by a demonstration of military power, eminent advice the Dutch gave to Japan would be of no use to the Netherlands or anybody else. He said that it would make more of an impression if we actually paraded several warships before Japanese eyes than if we gave the Japanese Government friendly advice.'⁴⁸¹ In this talk, it was obvious that the Dutch Government recognized that England had a plan to take decisive measures against Japan in due time. England was irritated because the Japanese Government was progressing so slowly in the reform of its foreign policy. Referring to recent incidents in China,⁴⁸² the Ministry of Colonial Affairs instructed the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies that before exchanging opinions with the Government at home, his superior, for the time being he was not to fulfil the Japanese request to add more officers to the Dutch navy detachment in Nagasaki who were instructing the Japanese in knowledge pertaining to the navy.⁴⁸³ This measure resulted from the Dutch concern about relations with England as the 'most natural ally', should the British ever have a 'collision' with Japan.

Moreover, when Lieutenant Fabius reported on his trip to China, he mentioned that 'the British Consul-General in Canton, Lord Elgin (James Bruce 8th Earl of Elgin, 1811-1863), was well informed of the sincerity with which the Dutch Government had promoted the interests of their community in Japan and that England regards it as a duty to promote Dutch interests in China as much as possible'. Furthermore, Fabius reported that the British admiral, Seymour, unexpectedly presented him with a nautical chart, and that Fabius was treated with the highest respect at a party hosted by the upper echelons of the

⁴⁸¹ NA Koloniën no.5889, A letter from the Dutch ambassador to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 20 March no.39 1857 on 25 April 1857 no.199, Geheim. Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, p.235.

⁴⁸² This likely refers to the *Arrow* incident (1856-1860), although this document did not directly mention it.

⁴⁸³ NA Koloniën no.5889, 20 April 1857 no. 192, Geheim.

Government in Hong Kong, and he reported the British statement that 'the British authorities were willing to be of service to the Dutch in this portion of the world'. This is further proof of the close relationship between the Netherlands and England.⁴⁸⁴

A conversation between Abercromby and the Dutch king about the Japanese affairs deserves special attention as Abercromby said the following: 'At this Ball, His Royal Majesty made to me a very earnest and somewhat detailed communication on the subject of Japanese affairs, accompanied by the express request that I should report it to My Government, as having been made by His Royal Majesty in person.' 'His Royal Majesty then entered into various details connected with the state of the relations of this country with the Empire of Japan'. 'The Netherland Government urges that if the Government of Japan are sincerely desirous of adopting into more intimate commercial relations with European states, the principle of free trade (*Libre-échange*) must not only be accepted in theory, but be practically put into action;- for the Netherland Government seek no exclusive advantages or privilege for themselves; but desire to see the commerce of Japan opened freely to all Nations.' 'To these observations I replied that I was certain that Her Majesty's Government would fully appreciate, the frankness of His Majesty's communication; - that Her Majesty's Government. I knew were anxious to increase the commercial relations between Great Britain and Japan; - and that they looked with confidence to His Majesty's Government for their friendly assistance in furthering this object.'⁴⁸⁵ From this conversation it can be assumed that the Dutch king had a great interest in Japanese affairs.

Great Britain tried to hand over its diplomacy concerning the Japanese affairs to the Netherlands and to co-operate on this affair. It also seems that the Netherlands was willing to undertake that task. Another document of the British envoy says: 'I called a few days ago on His Excellency Monsieur Gevers d'Endegeest for the purpose of communicating to him the instructions I had received from Your Lordship in your Dispatch No.17. F:O: 17 inst. in reply to the report which I had had the honour in a former dispatch to make to you, of

⁴⁸⁴ NA Koloniën no.5889, A letter from Lieutenant Fabius in the documents of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs of 25 October 1857 no.39 on 25 November 1857 no.189, Geheim.

⁴⁸⁵ FO. 238-118, To F.O. 1857, 4 February 1857, N.16.

the communication which His Royal Majesty had personally addressed to me on the subject of His Majesty's intended policy in His relations with the Empire of Japan; - and I need not assure Your Lordship of the extreme satisfaction with which the Netherland Minister for F:O: learnt the entire approval which Her Majesty's Government have expressed of the intended views and objects of the Government the Netherlands, with respect to their commercial relations with Japan.'⁴⁸⁶ In these words the co-operative relations pertaining between the Netherlands and England speaks for itself.

The Netherlands had to take the balance of power in Europe carefully into consideration. Needless to say, its Asian policy was closely linked to the political situation in Europe. The extent of Dutch influence in Europe, however, was different from its large sphere of influence in Asia. While the Netherlands maintained a position of neutrality in Europe, its Government, and especially the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, followed an active and autonomous policy in Asia. On the other hand, the Netherlands had to pay due heed to its Western powers in Asia, too, lest a collision might occur. Hence, the Minister of Colonial Affairs instructed the Governor-General of Netherlands East Indies not to deviate from the policy of the home Government, stressing that the Dutch Government maintained a policy of strict neutrality in Europe.⁴⁸⁷ The Governor-General answered that the strengthening of the fleet in the Netherlands East Indies was inevitable in the event the political situation in Europe should become more serious.⁴⁸⁸

This remark made by the Governor-General was a good indication of the real Dutch policy in Asia. When examining the Japanese policy of the Netherlands it is necessary to take into consideration the co-operative relationship between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. To the Dutch, the British were not only the 'most natural ally' in Europe but also collegial 'Lords of the East' in Asia.

⁴⁸⁶ FO. 238-118, To F.O. 1857, 26 February 1857, N.35.

⁴⁸⁷ NA Koloniën no.5906, A letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies on 8 June 1859 no.202, Geheim.

⁴⁸⁸ NA Koloniën no.5908, A letter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs on 23 June 1859 no.227, Geheim.

Chapter 9

Clashes within the Dutch bureaucracy about Japanese policy

Confrontation between the Minister of Colonial Affairs Pahud and the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies Duymaer van Twist

A Dutch-Japanese treaty was expected to be concluded in 1855 by the Dutch Government. This treaty was to specify the Dutch privileges in Nagasaki. The Japanese authorities had declared that Japan regarded the Netherlands and China as its 'relatives' on account of their long relationship, and that they would accord the Dutch more favourable treatment than other nations.⁴⁸⁹ Therefore, the Dutch Government considered this treaty to be the outcome of the fact that the magistrate of Nagasaki had fulfilled the promise of the Japanese authorities, and assumed that the Japanese policy of allowing the Dutch and Chinese to retain their old privileges in Nagasaki had been approved by the magistrate. Prior to this, the vested rights supposedly held by the Dutch were described and specified only in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty thanks to the efforts of Donker Curtius, but such a kind of Dutch privilege had been mentioned in neither the Russo-Japanese nor the Japanese-American treaties. It seems likely that other powers did not mention the Dutch privileges in their treaties, because they did not want to allow anyone privileges in which they could not share. The upshot was that the status of the traditional Dutch rights had become very uncertain. The Japanese Government thought that allowing foreign countries to trade with Japan had become unavoidable by that time. As some within Government regarded the Netherlands as a country that had proved its loyalty, the Japanese Government considered asking the Dutch to investigate which foreign trade policy would be most suitable, charging them with the task of dealing with the other foreign countries on behalf of Japan. In

⁴⁸⁹ From N.331 in the memo of Donker Curtius in M. Vos, *Bakumatsu Dejima Mikōkai Monjo*, p.171. NA Koloniën no.5876, 29 March 1856 N. 162.

this manner, the Government counted on winning Dutch support. A *Rōjū*, Hotta Masayoshi, was appointed the new Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁹⁰ The decision to appoint Hotta, whom Nariaki Tokugawa disliked deeming him a '*Ranpeki*, (Dutch maniac)', as did Shimazu Nariakira(島津斉彬, 1809-1858, *daimyō* of Satsuma domain) and other lords of large domains, is in some ways strange as intense dislike of him was widespread. This conundrum is considered an important issue in Japanese historiography.⁴⁹¹

Whatever the ins and outs, in 1855, the Dutch Government in The Hague was clearly pleased with this report on the Dutch-Japanese treaty. However the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, Duymaer van Twist, was at odds with the opinion of the Dutch home Government. He protested strongly claiming: 'England, the United States and France will use military force against Japan because of the delay in opening the country; each power is jealous of the Netherlands and misunderstands the Dutch relationship with Japan; therefore this provisional agreement and final treaty will only inflate this jealousy and misunderstanding further. The Dutch position in Japan will become very dangerous.' Moreover, the Governor-General requested the Dutch Government to revise its direction for acquiring rights by means of a treaty or an agreement. He was of the opinion that the Netherlands could exert a certain level of influence in Japan, however this advantage was thought to be much larger than it was in reality by the other powers and therefore was a problem. It had no need to conclude any treaty that would guarantee specific rights, because the Netherlands could acquire the same rights given to other powers simply on the basis of the Japanese reliance on the Netherlands.⁴⁹²

The Governor-General was very worried that a conflict might erupt between Japan and other powers. As the lesser of two evils, he proposed that the Dutch should choose to abandon Japan temporarily rather than to expose the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies to danger, if a war should

⁴⁹⁰ Tanabe Taichi, *Bakumatsu gaikōdan* ('A story of diplomacy in the late Tokugawa era'), Toyama shobō (reprinted), 1966, p.40. Ishii, *Nihon Kaikokushū*, p.181.

⁴⁹¹ Aoki Michio and Kawachi Hachirō ed., *Kaikoku* ('The opening of a country'), Yūhikaku, 1985, p.99

⁴⁹² NA Koloniën no.6530, The semi-official letter of 10 December 1855 N.159 from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs.

break out between one of the foreign powers and Japan.⁴⁹³ Thereby, he pointed out that the Netherlands was in danger of straying considerably from its chief aim, even though he admitted that the Dutch Commissioner was striving his utmost to obtain the highest profits for the Netherlands. He explained that the chief aim was to open Japanese harbors to other powers and for private enterprise. He emphasized again that it was impossible to acquire an exclusive treaty and a commercial system to which only the Netherlands had access. Furthermore, he criticized the proclaimed intention of the Dutch Government to pursue its own profits, because he believed that, at present, the Netherlands could not embark on a long-term policy concerning Japan's future or even concerning Dutch commercial relation with Japan. Therefore, he proposed that all countries should be permitted equal rights in Japan, that is, that the Netherlands should not acquire more advantageous rights beyond securing its vested rights. Finally, he finished his letter to the Minister of Colonial Affairs by saying: 'I take the liberty of submitting these considerations to the wiser judgment of Your Excellency.'⁴⁹⁴

The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies was reluctant to pursue an active policy towards Japan, because it entailed great risks. Contrary to the passive posture of the Governor-General on Japanese affairs, the Minister of Colonial Affairs decided to take direct action and send Commander Fabius to Japan for a third time in order to promote Dutch interests there. The Minister thought that the Netherlands should continue to obtain further concessions from Japan for other countries, but it should take care to acquire many more privileges than other countries. He also hoped that an intimate relationship would develop between the Netherlands and Japan.⁴⁹⁵ In spite of his hope, after remarking that 'it would be redundant to state these points in this letter', he had to admit to sharing the previous opinion of the Governor-General, i.e. that the Netherlands should abandon Japan temporarily, in the case there might be a conflict between Japan and one of the other powers, and that it should not

⁴⁹³ NA Koloniën no.6530, The semi-official letter of 1 January 1856 N.160 from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The Minister also wrote his comment 'me too' (*Ik ook*) here.

⁴⁹⁴ A semi-official letter of 1 January 1856 N.160.

⁴⁹⁵ NA Koloniën no.6527, The semi-official letter of 8 February 1856 N.138 from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

lose sight of the chief Dutch aim, namely to abolish the Japanese isolation system and to open its harbors to the private enterprise of foreign countries. He also noted that straying from this aim would be in opposition to the directions of the Dutch Government.⁴⁹⁶

Later, however, the Governor-General declared that 'he was nothing more than an intermediary regarding the Japanese affairs between the Supreme Government and the Dutch agent in Japan.' The Minister of Colonial Affairs, Pahud, replied to this as follows: 'Such comments seem reasonable, as long as the Governor-General executes the commands issued by the Supreme Government'. However, he added to his warning that the Governor-General's remark could be construed as reasonable only in this case, i.e. 'as long as the political relationship between the Netherlands and Japan does not need to amend present principles, namely if these affairs are dealt with appropriately and rationally'; moreover he pointed out that 'The Government of the Netherlands East Indies in all respects can and must possess knowledge of Japanese affairs, because the Dutch home Government could not do this to the same extent; and this knowledge would immediately be utilized to influence the direction of these affairs'. He stressed that 'The Governor-General is far from a mere intermediary. The task of the Governor-General is to supply complete information to the Supreme Government for the purpose of serving the requirement in the instructions about Japanese affairs not only by a statement in writing, but also especially supplying sufficient and motivated considerations and recommendations too.' In this way, he made clear that the Governor-General's duty was to align the policy of the Netherlands East Indies to the policy of the Netherlands.⁴⁹⁷

Furthermore, the Minister expressed his dissatisfaction about the slow handling of Japanese affairs. In his response, however, the Governor-General pointed at the limitations on communication with Japan, and he also explained that it could happen that a whole year might be required to report suitable considerations and advice to the Dutch Government. Hereby he denied having any responsibility for the Minister's complaints.⁴⁹⁸

⁴⁹⁶ NA Koloniën no.6527, The semi-official letter of 8 March 1856 N.139 from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

⁴⁹⁷ NA Koloniën no.5877, 31 March 1856 N.170/L, Geheim.

⁴⁹⁸ NA Koloniën no.5878, The cabinet missive of 6 February N.32 on 8 April 1856 N.196/O,

One month later, the Minister of Colonial Affairs informed the Governor-General that it would seem better to steer a moderate course through the various problems regarding Japanese trade. He expected that the Governor-General would also adopt a moderate attitude, in accordance with the policy of the Supreme Government.⁴⁹⁹ At the same time, in spite of the Minister's intention, the Governor-General made clear to the Minister that: 'The semi-official letter of 8 March has made clear to me that the views of Your Excellency regarding Japanese affairs differ considerably from mine. I regard it as meaningless to return to this matter'. By doing so, he radicalized their confrontation, and he resigned immediately upon making this statement.⁵⁰⁰ Duymaer van Twist had opposed the Minister of Colonial Affairs not just with regard to Japanese Affairs, but had also crossed swords about the management of the colony. The exact details relating to his resignation are not known and will not be speculated on here. At this time, the attitude of the Netherlands East Indies towards the home country was confirmed by Minister Pahud's proposal, and consequently the political principle about the opinion and disposition of the Council of the Netherlands East Indies was decided, and afterwards the resolution to it was passed by royal decree.⁵⁰¹ In this context, it would be fair to say that the serious differences of opinion regarding Japanese affairs between Duymaer van Twist and Pahud are likely to have contributed to the resignation of the Governor-General. Surprisingly, it was Pahud who succeeded him as the new Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

In response to a royal decree, in his capacity as the new Governor-General, Pahud declared to the new Minister of Colonial Affairs, P. Mijer, who had experience of dealing with Japanese affairs from 1852 to 1854 as a member of

Geheim. In this document the Minister of Colonial Affairs replied that he should abandon the desired information if it were to take a whole year.

⁴⁹⁹ NA Koloniën no.6527, The semi-official letter of 8 May 1856 N.141 from the Minister of the Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

⁵⁰⁰ NA Koloniën no.6430, The semi-official letter of 8 May 1856 N.161 from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of the Colonial Affairs.

⁵⁰¹ NA Koloniën no.6527, The semi-official letter of 8 April 1856 N.140 from the Minister of the Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies. This matter was decided by the joint report of the Ministers of Colonial and Foreign Affairs, 8 April 1856 N.196/O, NA Koloniën no.5878.

the Council of the Netherlands East Indies (*Raad van Indië*):⁵⁰² 'I am in agreement with Your Excellency in respect to Japanese affairs'. Consequently he declared himself ready to fulfil the Japanese demands without any limitation.⁵⁰³ In another document Pahud again expressed that he completely agreed with Mijer's opinion about a reciprocal present for the Japanese.⁵⁰⁴ This Dutch Government aim was to harmonize the opinion between the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies. This fact argues that Dutch Asian affairs, especially those pertaining to Japan, were given a much higher priority than has been recognized until now.

At that time, plans were considered to gradually set up arms factories in the Netherlands East Indies, independent of management in the home country. The Minister of Colonial Affairs, however, firmly supported the Minister of War who believed that a small country such as the Netherlands should maintain its existence through the co-operation of various national factories. This could be interpreted to mean that a close relationship between the home country and its colony was deemed very important and that the Government was to take an initiative for trade. ⁵⁰⁵

Confrontation between the Chief of 'the Japan Desk' Krabbe and his Minister at the Ministry of Colonial Affairs

Following on Von Siebold's recommendations about shipping and trade in Japan, the Minister of Colonial Affairs decided to draw up a joint report for the king in collaboration with his colleague in Foreign Affairs, and asked Krabbe of the 'Japan Desk' to prepare this report. Krabbe wrote the report, but he also submitted a memorandum in which he raised strong objections to Von Siebold's proposal and the joint report.⁵⁰⁶ Von Siebold had advised putting

⁵⁰² *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1856-1857*, p.423.

⁵⁰³ NA Koloniën no.6530, The semi-official letter of 10 June 1856 N.165 from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of the Colonial Affairs.

⁵⁰⁴ The semi-official letter of 10 October 1856 N.169 from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of the Colonial Affairs.

⁵⁰⁵ NA Koloniën no.5946, 5 April 1856 N.U.

⁵⁰⁶ NA Koloniën no.5885, A report of 3 November on 20 November 1856 N.669. Von

pressure on Japan, because from his own experience he believed that 'the shrewd and slick Japanese politicians are perfectly well aware that the stipulations in treaties concluded with maritime countries since 1854 are not adequate to cover the development of shipping and trade in the northern Pacific Ocean and even the expectation of civilized maritime commercial nations in the old and new world.' Convinced of his own words, Krabbe strongly opposed this proposal. He was adamant that the opinions of Fabius and Donker Curtius expressed in their latest reports should not be ignored, even if they were slightly over-heated and exaggerated. Moreover, he pointed out that Von Siebold lacked information regarding the latest developments on the ground in Japan and insisted that the current situation in Japan was very different from that in Von Siebold's time: 'His Excellency, as far as I know, has never even looked over our voluminous records of this period to inspect them.' He pointed out that 'the present Dutch position in Japan is regarded as too insignificant, while, on the other hand, its former position had been exaggerated. The present position of the Netherlands is owed to its unceasing advice to Japan and to the cautiously incremental advance in response to Japanese wishes and needs, and by carefully avoiding excessive pressure.'

In other words, the favourable position was attributable to the Dutch policy to systematically adopt an appropriate course that was attuned to the Japanese character. Krabbe noted that the sort of pressure proposed by Von Siebold would be reasonable, only if Japan was willing to listen. He was worried that Japan would turn to other countries to seek satisfaction for its demands, because it now had relations with various great maritime powers. He believed that these maritime powers intended to usurp the Dutch position in Japan as soon as possible, because it seemed that other maritime powers would be perfectly satisfied even with the restricted trade that the Dutch now possessed in Japan, but that this could be expanded considerably.

Furthermore, Krabbe did not agree with Von Siebold's proposal to put private merchants in charge of the Japanese trade of the Dutch Government, even though he thought that the Japanese would be forced against their will to accept free trade in the near future. Krabbe thought that it would be preferable to keep Japan in its system of national isolation, as long as a more favourable situation for the Netherlands could not be achieved. He also proposed that

Siebold's proposal is 21 October 1856 N.613.

military supplies to Japan should be stopped in consideration of the general good, because they were damaging the Dutch reputation. He expected that this measure would ensure other powers of Dutch good will and enable the Netherlands to avoid breaking off its relations with Japan.

The modified policy towards Japan

Since progress in the opening of Japan was not developing as fast as expected, the Dutch Government was worried about the criticism of other powers against the sale of Dutch military technology. In spite of this anxiety, the Dutch did not want to abandon their economic interests in this trade. Therefore, the Dutch Government reconsidered the present policy in order to find ways to achieve the opening of Japan more rapidly. The Government decided that the Dutch naval detachment in Nagasaki should remain there, because this was the express wish of Japan, but that new Japanese requests for military supplies would not be granted. For the time being, no officers or equipment were to be added to the Dutch detachment there. The Hague instructed the Government of the Netherlands East Indies of this new policy and decreed that Batavia should act according to the same policy.⁵⁰⁷ This modified policy was aimed at carefully expanding commercial interests while bearing the sentiments of other powers in mind. This was to be done while preserving what had been achieved by previous efforts and also trying to avoid becoming caught up in conflicts between Japan and other countries.

Trade reform and the Dutch situation in Japan

The Dutch-Japanese Treaty of January 1856 was largely in line with the provisional treaty signed in the previous year. Although the Netherlands succeeded in concluding this treaty, during the negotiations the Dutch noticed a Japanese tendency to reduce the pre-existing concessions and rights. Moreover,

⁵⁰⁷ A report of 3 November on 20 November 1856 N.669 and NA Koloniën no.5886, A letter of 29 November on 2 December 1856 N.704. Furthermore, NA Koloniën no.5887, 19 January 1857 N.33.

the Japanese Government objected to proposals made by the Dutch trading chief for an additional treaty on commercial regulations. This induced the Minister of Colonial Affairs to draw up a joint report for the king in collaboration with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This report was sent to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies so as to instruct him about the new Dutch policy towards Japan. The report contained four important points;

1. To ratify the treaty of January 30 1856 with Japan.
2. To decide that pressure be exerted on Japan.
3. To comment upon the treaty negotiation conducted by Donker Curtius.
4. To continue doing their best to obtain completely free trade in the open ports in Japan.⁵⁰⁸

The second and fourth items relate to the inconsistencies in Dutch policy mentioned earlier. The Dutch Government had so far always attempted to monopolize trade with Japan, but now it decided to assign the task of trading with Japan to private merchants, because private trade (free trade) was about to commence in the other open ports in Japan, Hakodate and Shimoda. The Japanese Government now had the option of importing its goods through other foreign merchants there, if the Dutch Government refused to supply Japan with military technology. Yet, the Dutch trading post in Deshima still seemed to be in a position to bring considerable benefits to the Dutch, because the other open ports would not be able to play a major role in international trade immediately. Therefore, for the time being, the Dutch Government did not regard it as a problem that pressure - by refusing the Japanese requests for arms - would be applied at least temporarily.⁵⁰⁹

The application of pressure depended on three factors: firstly, the Japanese tendency to reduce vested concessions and rights and the tenacity of the old Japanese customs and *their* way of thinking; secondly, the Japanese attitude to the proposed additional treaty on commercial matters, and, thirdly, the Chinese

⁵⁰⁸ NA Koloniën no.6527, The semi-official letter of 8 May 1857 N.154 from the Minister of the Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies. This joint report was dated 20 April 1857 N.192.

⁵⁰⁹ NA Koloniën no.6527, The semi-official letter of 8 May 1856 N.154 from the Minister of the Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

situation in consideration of Japanese and Dutch interests among other great maritime powers. The pressure involved ignoring Japanese orders for military supplies, as long as Japan did not reform its foreign policy and adopt a free trade regime. Moreover, the Dutch Government should refuse to add an artillery and an engineering unit to the Dutch naval detachment in Nagasaki. On the other hand, the Dutch Government decided to send the ships ordered by Japan, to provide maintenance for the *Soembing* and ensure that it stayed in good condition, and to keep the Dutch naval detachment in Nagasaki. The reason for this decision was that the Dutch Government considered it important and necessary to support Japan's intellectual and industrial development. The Dutch Government decided to apply the above-mentioned pressure to Japan, but it added that the Dutch could relieve the pressure at any time, because they did not want to sacrifice their commercial interest by persisting with this pressure.

The damyô of Hizen domain, the Japanese official in charge of Nagasaki's defence, had decreed that the transition from the *Kambang trade* to private merchant trade would be allowed [by the Japanese Government]. Moreover, he had tried to persuade a Dutch captain to sell his ship. Such signals as these led the Dutch to believe that the transition towards a new system of commercial relations would not be a serious problem. At the same time, however, they expected that switching from the *Honkata trade* (the Dutch Government trade) to free trade would meet serious obstacles. The Dutch Government had a plan to liberalize Japan's foreign trade, but it thought that it would only be possible to continue with this trade in certain objects, because the Government dealt only in specific goods. Military supplies, which the Japanese Government frequently asked for, were not to be sold to Japan at all. It seemed improper that any foreign state should supply Japan with such goods, therefore the Dutch Government decided that military supplies were never to be exported under the *Honkata trade*, and it proceeded to find two private companies in the Netherlands that could handle the goods ordered by Japan for the next year. The Government in The Hague accepted Donker Curtius' decision that a mining engineer, Friedrich Ulrich Jacobus Huguenin (1827-1870), remain on Deshima. When Donker Curtius had decided this, he had not yet obtained permission to visit any mine, and moreover his fees had not yet been guaranteed by the Japanese Government. At first, the Dutch Government blamed Donker Curtius for this situation, because it thought that he could

exploit this pressure on Japan, if he did not succeed in obtaining a concession from it. The Netherlands, however, wanted to secure Japanese coal supplies for its planned shipping activities between Japan and China, and to play a prominent role in Japan's overseas exports. Therefore, the Dutch Government acceded to Donker Curtius' decision, albeit with a bad grace. These measures argue that the Netherlands tried to deal with Japan by executing a very carefully designed policy in order to maximize present and future commercial benefits.⁵¹⁰

Krabbe of the Japan Desk pointed out two disappointing developments that occurred in 1856. His observations were transmitted to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, and this event is also an obvious indication that Japanese affairs had become very important to the Netherlands at that time. Krabbe noted that, firstly, given the postal system at that time, it would be impossible for the Dutch Government to send complete directions to the Netherlands East Indies, because it would have great difficulties trying to assemble the necessary information for such orders and, secondly, The Hague was not always fully informed on Japanese affairs. That is why the Governor-General and Council of the Netherlands East Indies continually suffered from a lack of adequate information. Despite his powerlessness to supply proper information, the Minister of Colonial Affairs informed the Governor-General that it was urgent that the Government of the Netherlands East Indies take action with regard to Japan. Pointing out the hitches in gathering intelligence, he said that it was of no use to Japan receiving advice after the matter concerned had already been dealt with. He explained how difficult it was to deal with Japanese affairs in the Netherlands. Since relations with Japan had to be co-ordinated jointly between the Ministries of Colonial and Foreign Affairs, this process was both dilatory and circuitous, and in this way valuable time was lost. Therefore, the Minister stressed the importance of information being sent to Europe immediately after becoming available in Batavia.⁵¹¹ At that time, the Governor-General was Pahud, who

⁵¹⁰ NA Koloniën no.5889, 20 April 1857 N.192, Geheim.

NA Koloniën no.6527, The semi-official letter of 8 May 1856 N.154 from the Minister of the Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

⁵¹¹ NA Koloniën no.6527, The semi-official letter of 8 May 1856 N.154 from the Minister of the Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

was the former Minister of Colonial Affairs and had followed an active policy towards Japan. These two points would seem to lead to the assumption that Pahud would endeavour to fulfill the demands of the Dutch Government. Hence, these exchanges also argue that Japanese affairs were very important for the Netherlands.

Criticism of Dutch Government in the Dutch Press

The Minister of Colonial Affairs was an advocate of taking an active approach in diplomacy towards Japan. However, because he faced considerable opposition, he was unable to carry out such a policy. The opposition to the policy of the Dutch Government came mainly from the liberal section of the public opinion in the Netherlands. In general, the Dutch approach to relations with Japan was passive rather than active. This policy of neutrality created an impression among the informed public that the Dutch Government did not intend to conduct a positive foreign policy for the sake of national interests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not venture beyond taking formal measures, by stationing a representative in Japan or raising his rank to promote trade.⁵¹² Dutch merchants did not regard the activities of the Dutch representative as energetic enough. They criticized the Dutch Government for not protecting Dutch commercial interests.

An interesting example of this is the following newspaper article from *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* of 21 November 1858, which we shall paraphrase and quote from:

The NRC commented on the reply by the Government to a report of the Dutch commission in the Lower House investigating the treaty with Japan. This reply, the newspaper said, contained many unsatisfactory statements and was even erroneous. The Government had ratified the treaty of 30 January in 1856, although it too was disappointed in the treaty. The newspaper now directed its attention to the additional treaty of 16 October in 1857. It had expected 'that the Government would have answered the question of whether we can obtain exports for the imports, in order to consolidate a proper market situation. Since the export of neither gold, silver nor copper is permitted, the merchant has been

⁵¹² *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1^e & 2^e kamer 1860-1861, Eerste Kamer*, p.83, 338.

made completely dependent on the favor of the Japanese Government by the terms of this treaty and the additional treaty. If, despite the forced concession, the Japanese Government which has been coerced into opening its ports and admitting free trade, wants to maintain its system of seclusion, the Government, according to words of our treaty, can suggest Nagasaki as a clearing house for foreign trade accounts and thus the merchants should be able to maintain high prices for their commodities, because it would be impossible for all foreign merchants to participate in the exchange trade. Thereby, a foreign merchant cannot not purchase, but sell. Moreover, a foreign merchant cannot receive the money when he is paid, because he cannot export it. Consequently, such a sale will become an obstacle to the foreign merchant, because he can receive the exports only at an extraordinarily high price. In this situation, even if he could make large profits from his imports, he will still suffer a considerable loss.'

It was clear to the NRC that under these conditions, only if the Japanese Government would be completely benevolent and fair minded, this treaty could realize any results. The opening of the ports occurred only after a protracted resistance by the Japanese while they were desperately needed. Therefore, the hoped fair treatment from the Japanese was quite uncertain. As a result the newspaper remarked that it was not unlikely that the Japanese authorities intended to make the situation appear better than it really was. It added: 'The postscript in the reply of memorandum is the most important part. This says that the Dutch Commissioner in Japan has succeeded in preparing a new commercial treaty with the *Bakufu* in Edo. This treaty allows the opening of new ports and other liberties, among which are the articles for tariffs, the freedom to export of gold and silver coins and the abolition of the Nagasaki clearing house for foreign trade accounts' mediation, etc.'... 'These articles solve many of the problems incurred by the treaty of 1856 and the additional treaty of 1857.' ... 'Treaties with other nations, especially North America and England, have been concluded. As we know, however, it will be a matter of wonder to hear that our Commissioner, in the same way, has succeeded in preparing this commercial treaty with Japan.'... 'Other nations have been able to negotiate with Japan through our good offices. It is not necessary for us to regret that this situation has changed and that the empire has been opened to all nations. On the contrary, we have wished for this outcome for a long time. Thereby, the result of the Dutch Government's endeavor has added a brilliant page to our history.'

But the author of this article could not refrain from ironically remarking that the influence of the Netherlands had suddenly suffered a serious decline. How was this possible? The Netherlands should have been the first nation to learn that the Japanese Government was to give other nations new privileges and be able to conclude a treaty. 'We should have been able to take this into consideration at our leisure. But, on the contrary, we are actually the last nation to hear of it.'... 'Where does the responsibility for this lie?' ... 'Lord Elgin, who went to Japan from China, concluded a treaty with new privileges within three weeks. We have now only the prospect of perhaps gaining the same.'... 'Is not this a little surprising? Although we do not know the facts, did our Government pay the necessary attention to the change in our position in Japan and take it into consideration?' ...

The newspaper then asked whether perhaps a mistake was made in the way in which the Dutch government had presented its case in Japan: 'Japan received us merely as merchants before. Our Commissioner was a chief among merchants in Japanese eyes. Our position changed suddenly. As a result of the Treaty of 1856, our Government abandoned the status of merchant and acts as if it is the supreme Government to the Japanese Government. Should our representative in Japan also have been changed at that time? The Japanese have a custom of dividing rooms up strictly. Can the people think that the same person who has worked as the chief of merchants until today, shall take over as the representative of the supreme Government tomorrow?... While other nations have already concluded a treaty, we are still preparing it. Can the reason be investigated in this respect?' ...

'We rightly abandoned our exclusive right to trade in Japan... but neglected to encourage the Japanese Government to maintain our influence as long as possible, and to make the *Bakufu* in Edo allow our consul or diplomat to be received and asked to be an advisor for negotiations with other nations, when the Japanese Government was making a preliminary declaration for concluding a treaty with all nations... That would have promoted our interests and even our dignity among all nations and also in respect of the Japanese Government.'... 'We will not judge it and will certainly not level accusations at anyone. However, no one will gainsay that it is worthwhile explaining how other nations were able to go ahead of us in concluding a commercial

treaty...'⁵¹³

Japanese affairs were important to the Netherlands from the point of view of its 'national prestige and economic interest'. Therefore, the NRC also strongly refuted articles in foreign newspapers which harmed Dutch prestige. It was particularly irritated by an article in the *North China Herald* which it said was indulging in horseplay, because Lord Elgin had concluded the treaty with Japan.

'It seems that the treaty allows the granting of more privileges to us. We shall be very pleased with this, if it is true. For instance, according to Article 4 of the treaty of 30 January 1856 and Article 39 in that of 16 October 1857, all privileges that are granted to other countries, shall *immediately* be granted to the Netherlands too. Therefore, we have no reason to envy them the fact that other foreign negotiators are happier than ours, because their endeavours also ensure us our privilege. The *North China Herald* must have missed these articles in our treaties. Otherwise, it would not have reported about more privileges being allowed England than to the Netherlands so light heartedly. This bad taste is not all. The newspaper seems to spew malice against the Dutch who excluded the British from Japan for such a long time and so carefully. It seems as if other nations are unaware of the fact that they can conclude their treaties with Japan at present only thanks to the efforts of the Dutch. The Netherlands gave them the opportunity for this and has continuously made strong efforts in this regard since 1844, and has finally succeeded in opening this large country for world trade. This ingratitude is so unfair since the Netherlands has paid no less than fl. 220,000 to achieve this aim in this year. The Netherlands, exclusively for the benefit of the Government, gained fl. 150,000 profits before. The country bore the expense of this trade at that time. It paid about fl. 70,000 for the expense incurred by the factory on Desima. Therefore, the total expenses amount to fl. 220,000.' ... 'The Netherlands made sacrifices to open Japan to trade in the interest of England. The British newspapers, however, pour ridicule on and slander us, although now the country enjoys the fruits of the Dutch sacrifice.'

The NRC noted that the *North China Herald* pointed out as the main element in Lord Elgin's treaty the fixing of the export duty at 5 per cent and the import duty at 20 per cent. The treaty had a list of articles on which the import

⁵¹³ 'Japan' on 21 November 1858 no. 322 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*. This article was reported on the front page.

duty of 5 per cent applied. Among these articles were cotton and woollen goods, which are very important to England, but the newspaper concluded that it could not possibly decide whether this article is more profitable than the articles relevant to the Netherlands before having read the whole treaty. It was clear however that many more exports were mentioned in Lord Elgin's treaty than in the Dutch one. Yet how were the Japanese who cannot export gold or silver, to pay for all those import goods? This point had also been indicated in the report of the Dutch Lower House concerning the treaty of Japan. Under the present conditions the foreign merchants had to sell all imported goods at any price: 'In this case, the opening of Japan will actually lay a trap for merchants who trade in good faith.' ... 'This is a very important issue for merchants. The Government is expected to provide information on this matter, which shall be proper and can promote the trade.' ... 'It is repeated that we should draw not too many conclusions about the truth of the insolent report in the *North China Herald*, before having read the whole treaty concluded by Lord Elgin. Any rights which have been granted the British, however, are also granted to us. Therefore, we do not need to worry that the other nations introduced in Japan by us will harm us.'⁵¹⁴

Thus the NRC concluded that although it was very unhappy about the inept policies of its own government, the English at last had achieved great gains and benefits in their negotiations which luckily also applied to the Dutch merchants in Japan.

⁵¹⁴ 'Japan' on 7 November 1858 no. 308 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*. This article was reported on the front page.

Chapter 10

The Harris Treaty of 1858

Harris' endeavour to establish American supremacy in Japan

From his arrival in Japan (1856), the American envoy Townsend Harris actively pursued negotiations for a new commercial treaty between the United States and Japan, although the Dutch-Japanese treaty allowing trade in Japan had already been concluded. Harris was aware of the fact that both the Netherlands and Russia had concluded a commercial treaty with Japan. Nevertheless, since he believed that these treaties were useless, he said that he would not have taken the trouble of coming to Edo, if he had been content with a restricted form of trade. He demanded free trade and the opening of several ports, including Edo and Osaka.⁵¹⁵

The Dutch Commissioner, Donker Curtius, also negotiated with Japan in attempts to draw up a new treaty. Unsuccessfully, as it turned out. At the time of these negotiations, on 31 July 1858, Lord Elgin, the British High Commissioner to China, arrived in Nagasaki from Shanghai. Harris fully exploited this, presenting the British as a dangerous menace, trying to push for a rapid signing of a treaty. Since this ploy failed, both Donker Curtius and Harris returned to their respective settlements. An American ship, the *Mississippi*, then arrived in Japan bringing information about the recent Anglo-Chinese treaty. Harris exploited this opportunity to prove to the Japanese that Britain was a danger and came back from Shimoda to Edo. Thanks to this warning he finally achieved his aim.⁵¹⁶ The behavior of Harris was regarded as 'greatness of soul' by the Japanese. Moreover, Inoue (Inoue Kiyonao 井上清直, Prince of Shinano, 1809-1867) added that 'the Americans were a very different people from the Dutch. His attitude and negotiations seem to have made a strong impression on the Japanese. Adroitly, Harris persuaded the *Bakufu* officials to accept the treaty by displaying a dignified

⁵¹⁵ Sakata Seiichi, *Harisu* ('A biography of Harris'), Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1987(rep.), p.157.

⁵¹⁶ Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi*, pp.45-46.

attitude and giving clear explanations. For example, referring to Japan's future he said: 'Commerce is the blood, the great source of life of an Empire; look at England. Without trade the people who live in that small county would starve. ... What is it that has made her the mightiest country of the world? Trade!... It is the life, the great activity of nations, and if Japan in employing its resources is opened for commerce, there is no reason why it would not end in a most fortunate condition, the England of Asia.'⁵¹⁷ Shortly after this, Iwase (Iwase Tadanari 岩瀬忠震, 1818-1861) used Harris' words for the purpose of prevailing on *daimyos* to enable the Lords to approve the treaty. Quite obviously, his words made a strong impression on the officers in *Bakufu*.⁵¹⁸

In addition to Harris' clear explanation, 'His frequent references to the aggressive designs of Britain, to which exception might be taken were justified by all too recent events.'⁵¹⁹ Referring to the British menace, Harris strongly insisted that, under the most favourable and honourable conditions, Japan should first conclude the proposed treaty with the United States, which had no escort of warships, because under this treaty with the United States, Japan would be much better able to reject new or excessive requests from other countries that accompanied their request by sending a large fleet.⁵²⁰ He emphasized the British threat by stating that England was planning to go to war with Japan. He also offered America's support by acting as a mediator, if Japan had a clash with European countries. When Harris recognized that the Japanese were unresponsive to all persuasion, he felt very dissatisfied and threatened the Japanese as follows, 'that their treatment of me showed that no negotiations could be carried on with them unless the plenipotentiary was backed by a fleet, and offered them cannon balls for arguments. Poor Shinano listened in evident trepidation.'⁵²¹

⁵¹⁷ Henry Heusken, *Japan Journal 1855-1861*, Translated and edited by Jeannette C. van der Corput and Robert A. Wilson, New Brunswick and New Jersey, 1964, p.174. *Bakumatsu gaikō kankei monjo*, Deel 18, pp.679-680. See Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushū*, p.286.

⁵¹⁸ Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushū*, p.286.

⁵¹⁹ Payson J. Treat, *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan 1853-1895*, California and London, 1932

⁵²⁰ Ishii Kanji, Sekiguchi Yoshiyuki (red.) *Sekaiichiba to bakumatsu kaikō*, p.10.

⁵²¹ Mario Emilio Cosenza, *The complete journal of Townsend Harris, first American Consul General and Minister to Japan*, 1930, p. 496. Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushū*, p.250-256.

Soon after this, he succeeded in concluding the treaty. This treaty meant the end of Dutch monopoly trade in Japan, and was definite proof that the Dutch were no longer Japan's 'special friend'. The news came as a blow to the Dutch Government.

Dickins mentioned that Japan had concluded the treaty with the United States as it had been deceived by false threats made by Harris.⁵²² Moreover, he criticizes Harris, stating that many troubles, which the opening of Japan brought after the long-term policy of seclusion ended, resulted from the indiscreet and selfish policy he pursued.⁵²³ Actually, it still seemed too early to admit to the existence of the treaty in Japan. After its conclusion, 'In reality, at night on 24 June 1858, Nariaki and his son (水戸齊昭夫子, *daimyô* of Mito domain), Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu (一橋慶喜, 1837-1913), Yoshikumi (尾張藩主慶恕, *daimyô* of Owari domain, 1824-1883) and Matsudaira Shungaku called at Edo Castle without any previous announcement. Thereby, Ii Naosuke (井伊直弼, 1815-1860) only repeated "I am so ashamed."⁵²⁴

Did Donker Curtius negotiate less skilfully with Japan in comparison with Harris? This was not the case. W.J.C. *ridder* Huysen van Kattendyke (1816-1866) mentioned that 'Donker Curtius is well acquainted with the Japanese nature. By means of respecting it, he continues to negotiate with Japan. Therefore, he has an influence in Nagasaki as well as in Edo.'⁵²⁵ Moreover, Donker Curtius went to Edo, because Harris' negotiations were not running smoothly. Ishii explained this action as follows: 'it seemed that, while competing with Harris, he would have concluded the commercial treaty with Japan in advance of Harris by exploiting the Dutch 'loyalty'.⁵²⁶ In other words, Donker Curtius' negotiations exerted severe pressure on Harris. Therefore it seems that Harris merely forestalled Donker Curtius by his above-mentioned action.

⁵²² F.V. Dickins, *The life of Sir Harry Parkes, Sometime Her Majesty's Minister to China and Japan*, in two volumes, London, 1894, Takahashi Kenkichi(trans.), *Pâkusu den – Nihon Chûzai no hibi*, Heibonsha, 1984, p.20.

⁵²³ Dickins, *The life of Sir Harry Parkes*, Takahashi, *Pâkusu den*, p.22.

⁵²⁴ Yamakawa, *Oboegaki*, pp.227-228.

⁵²⁵ Kattendyke, *Uittreksel*, Mizuta, pp.60-62.

⁵²⁶ *DaiNihonshiryô*, 5 and 6 in Deel III, pp.1-2. See Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushi*, p357.

Disappointment in the Netherlands

The Netherlands had exploited its special relationship with Japan and preserved its 'national prestige and economic interest'. This special relationship, however, came to an end by the conclusion of the Harris Treaty in 1858. In the past, Japan had had closer relations with the Netherlands than with other powers and it had given the Dutch certain privileges. The Netherlands had been given a pledge by Japan that such privileges would also be granted in the future. The Japanese believed that people generally show more goodwill to blood relatives. Since the Netherlands, with China, had had a long relationship with Japan, the Netherlands was regarded more or less as a blood relative. Also, in respect to foreign relations, the Dutch predominance in Japan had been accepted by the British in the Japanese-British treaty.⁵²⁷ That the Netherlands was greatly valued was also revealed in the Japanese utterance that 'the Dutch were distinguished from other nations and were trusted most by the Japanese Government'.⁵²⁸ Since the opening of Japan, the Dutch Government had been relying on this pledge and patiently persisted in the difficult negotiations with the Japanese Government which was experiencing serious domestic troubles after the country's opening. However, it now became clear that the high Dutch expectations were based on an illusion.

The Netherlands did acquire most-favoured-nation treatment, and was able to enjoy the same rights as granted to the United States in the Harris Treaty. The sticking point was, the status of Deshima as a bonded warehouse, considered a very important vested right by the Dutch, was still unsecured. The Minister of Colonial Affairs proposed postponing the ratification until this point had been clarified by Japan, but the Dutch Government decided to conclude a new treaty without delay. The Ministers of Colonial and Foreign

⁵²⁷ Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, p.179. NA Koloniën, 5878, 2 October N.331 of 'Dagelijksche Aanteekeningen van 29 November 1854 t/m 13 November 1855 behorende tot de missive van den Nederlandschen Kommissaris in Japan van den 10 November 1855 La.T Geheim gericht aan Z.E. den Goeverneur Generaal van Nederlandsch Indië' on 8 April N196/O.

⁵²⁸ Van der Chijs, *Neêrlands streven*, p.125. J.C. Lewe van Middelstum, 'De Openstelling van Japan', *De gids*, 1858, p.69.

Affairs had, on behalf of the king, signed the previous agreement and treaty, but now the signature of the king was required to ratify the new treaty modelled on the American text.⁵²⁹ The Minister of Colonial Affairs requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs to give the necessary consent for the signing of the treaty. Although the form of the treaty was not the correct one, the Minister of Colonial Affairs thought that it would be desirable to prepare the related official documents immediately, because he believed that it would be difficult to require the proper form in negotiations with a country like Japan, which had had few relations with foreign countries until recently.⁵³⁰ Later, the Minister of Colonial Affairs requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs to ask the king to ratify the signature of Donker Curtius in order to conclude the treaty. After his consent, the instrument of ratification would be submitted to the king.⁵³¹ A distinctive feature of the Dutch-Japanese treaty was that it mentioned that books, medicine and steam engines were exempt from import duties; moreover merchant ships, coffee and sugar were subject to a duty of 5 per cent of their value, while other products would be taxed at a 20 per cent duty rate.⁵³²

It was proposed to send Von Siebold to Japan in order to bring the ratification of the Dutch-Japanese additional treaty of 1856, and to promote Dutch commerce there by acting as a representative of the NHM. The Minister of Colonial Affairs anticipated that this measure would strengthen Dutch diplomacy in Japan, but the Ministry of Colonial Affairs strongly opposed the idea. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs explained that it would be difficult for the Japanese to distinguish between Von Siebold's role as a civil employee of the NHM and as an official representative of the Dutch Government. Hence, the Dutch Government tried to realize its plan for free trade in Japan by means of private merchants. Moreover it was worried that Donker Curtius' management of Japanese affairs and his standing with the Japanese authorities might be called into doubt, if the Japanese regarded the sending of Von Siebold as a sign of the Dutch Government's disapproval of his management of Japanese affairs. It might also create the impression that, in the eyes of the Dutch Government, Curtius had failed to supply his Government with full information on Japanese

⁵²⁹ NA Koloniën no.5902, 8 December 1858 N.446, Geheim.

⁵³⁰ NA Koloniën no.5903, 5 January 1859 N.3, Geheim.

⁵³¹ NA Koloniën no.5903, 22 January 1859 N.37, Geheim.

⁵³² Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushi*, p.364.

trade.⁵³³ In spite of this opposition in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, the Minister of Colonial Affairs did not abandon his plan. Requesting the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to inform Donker Curtius of his comment, he expressed his disappointment; the documents he had received shortly before had left him with the impression that Donker Curtius no longer showed the same active and lively concern about ensuring the centuries-old Dutch position in Japan, which had previously characterized his endeavours.⁵³⁴

Until 1858 the Dutch Government had tried to give direction to their policies towards Japan to other countries, while simultaneously attempting to exploit its relations with Japan for its own sake, even if this meant that the opening of Japan to international trade was delayed. Against this background, the Minister of Colonial Affairs expressed his disappointment that 'at present, so to speak, the Netherlands only follows other powers, especially the United States of North America and it is pleased with acquiring the same privilege admitted to other powers....I shall not speak my wish here that the Netherlands should be admitted more privileges than others powers in Japan. These last words show that this would be contradictory to the altruistic Dutch policy pursued up to then. Yet the Minister expected that the Netherlands could acquire one exception, recognition of Deshima as a bonded warehouse. The Minister considered that this Dutch privilege was of importance, because the Netherlands would have a chance to establish a vast market for its colonial products in Asia. In spite of this expectation, he finally expressed his grief saying 'I confess that I would have liked to have seen the Netherlands, as much as the circumstances and our position as a minor power would allow, would lead the way for other powers in Japan, and not merely only follow the flag of others, a situation which has now obviously materialized.'

Moreover, the Minister of Colonial Affairs continued, he did not intend to blame Donker Curtius that not he, but the American Consul-General, had negotiated the new treaty with Japan. He approved of the fact that Donker Curtius had thought it necessary to enter into the conclusion of a new treaty for the purpose of securing the Dutch position of the most-favoured-nation treatment, although he had not been explicitly authorized to do this. On the other hand, the Minister pointed out that a new treaty had been unnecessary,

⁵³³ NA Koloniën no.5903, 9 February 1859 N.62.

⁵³⁴ NA Koloniën no.5904, 25 February 1859 N. 82. This sentence is crossed out.

because the previous treaty had already promised the Dutch the position as the most-favoured-nation in Japan. Therefore, the Minister criticized Donker Curtius saying that 'it would be better to say that he thought he would enter into a new treaty, because the position regulated in the previous treaty could be rectified considerably, improved and should be changed to consolidate a firmer position over a long period of time.'

The Minister of Colonial Affairs also criticized Donker Curtius for the fact that the currency unit used in the Dutch-Japanese treaty was the dollar. While admitting that the dollar was already generally known as the current money in the Japan and China Seas, he commented that Donker Curtius did not need to obey the American negotiator 'like a slave', and, 'if a trifling thing is pointed out', to accept the American currency even in the regulations of payment and reparations. Therefore, the Minister instructed that, at the very least, 'these regulations are to be written in the Dutch currency against the price of the dollar'. Furthermore, he rejected as 'groundless' the comment by Donker Curtius that 'the Netherlands had recently lagged behind others from the political and economic viewpoint in Japan'.

Here, it is important to notice that the influence of the dollar in Asia was being more firmly established: the provisions for payment were expressed in dollars in the Japanese-American treaty. This point seems to have been significant, in spite of having no connection with the most-favored-nation treatment. That is, if the Netherlands had preceded other countries in the currency regulation of the treaty with Japan, the influence accompanying the advantage would have been significant. Actually it is difficult to presume this real influence, however it would have contributed greatly to Dutch 'national prestige and economic interest' in Asia.

Moreover, the Minister of Colonial Affairs did 'not overlook' the matter that Donker Curtius and the Japanese negotiators regarded it as 'unnecessary and strange' to include a similar article as in the Japanese-American treaty in the Dutch-Japanese treaty. The article in the American document said that the United States of America supported the Japanese interests in West European countries and that Japan placed orders in the United States. The Minister feared that the Netherlands would need to double its activities in order not to lag behind the United States in Japan in respect of political influence, trade, and industry, because the United States would exploit the differences between the two agreements in order to promote its own interests over those of the Dutch.

While alluding to this, the Minister could not conceal his opinion of Donker Curtius' report of the latest negotiations and his letters. He pointed out that, although the report and letters did not clearly mention it, it was the plan of the American negotiator that 'the United States conclude a substantial treaty with Japan first and, furthermore, he [Harris] tried to make other countries think as if the United States was the first country which succeeded in an essential treaty of commercial with Japan'. Moreover, he believed that this plan was contrived to conceal the important contribution to the Dutch additional treaty of October 16 1857, i.e., the honour of the Netherlands, which concluded the first commercial agreement with Japan.

Furthermore, the Minister of Colonial Affairs deplored the fact that the Dutch-Japanese additional treaty had been replaced by the new treaty and that Dutch moral influence in Japan would disappear, and that it would be immediately forgotten that the Netherlands was by right the first country that had contracted a commercial agreement. Also the Minister reproached Donker Curtius for making the Japanese regard the treaty of 1858 as a supplement and correction to the agreements of 1856 and 1857, because it was contradictory to the attitude of the Dutch Government, to whom the agreements of 1856 and 1857 were still in effect. The Minister even thought that Donker Curtius might subconsciously be under American influence, from which may have robbed him of his previously firmer attitude and clearer insight.

Having made these remarks, the Minister of Colonial Affairs presented several points of attention for maintaining Dutch predominance in Japan. First, after he mentioned Donker Curtius' view that the new treaty would bring the special situation for the Dutch on Deshima to an end, he pointed out that this view was completely different from what the home government thought, and that this special situation of the Dutch did not conflict with the provisions of the new treaty. Therefore, he was of the opinion that it was very important not only to secure Deshima as the sole privilege for the Dutch, i.e., as a Dutch bonded warehouse, but also to extend it further and to make it a free and unrestricted possession. Therefore the Minister instructed the Governor-General to maintain Deshima as a Dutch bonded warehouse as accepted in the treaty of 1856, for the purpose of securing Dutch profits in Nagasaki.

Furthermore, the Minister noted the abolition of 'the use of a plate with a crucifix [to be trodden on in order to prove that somebody was not a Roman Catholic) in Japan, because it seemed that this matter would have great

significance for Christian countries. The Japanese authorities had always declared that this kind of article would not be specified in the treaty; they insisted that other countries should not intervene in the domestic policy that strictly forbade the introduction and propagation of Christianity. In spite of the Japanese attitude, the Netherlands repeatedly demanded the abolition of the use of this plate with a crucifix, and finally succeeded in acquiring this abolition. Thus in consideration of 'Dutch honour', he regarded it as important that the abolition of the use of the plate with a crucifix should be included in the treaty.

Moreover, the Minister of Colonial Affairs pointed out that neither handicrafts nor wool or cotton were mentioned as goods falling under the 5 per cent tariff specified in Clause 2 of the regulation on tax that was added to the new treaty. The Minister stated that he could not ignore this fact, because the sales of the Dutch textiles in Japan would suffer serious damage if these products were classified in the list contained in Clause 4 (for goods requiring a 20 per cent tariff). While mentioning that the British Lord Elgin had acquired an agreement that England would pay a tariff of 5 per cent for its textiles, he expressed his disappointment: 'I should have informed the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies that the Dutch commissioner be instructed in this and that point in order to use specifically all the articles in our treaty that would be to our benefit'

Consequently, the Minister of Colonial Affairs complained that this new treaty and the actions of Donker Curtius were not desirable at all. Furthermore in his personal opinion, he deplored the fact that the Netherlands had lost its moral and commercial influence in Japan. Referring to moral influence, he noted that the Netherlands had set the course for other powers' policies towards Japan, that it had been ahead of them, and that it had been the most respected country there (*de in Japan meest geeerde mogendheid*), even when this had got the Netherlands into trouble. The Netherlands had played the role of mediator for the other great powers in Japan, being special (*onderscheiding genietende*) to Japan from the political viewpoint. On the other hand, he expressed his disappointment that at present the Netherlands, as it were, 'had been taken in tow by others' and its former pioneering role had shifted to others. Regarding commercial influence, he noted that it seemed to be a obstacle that the new treaty had articles that explicitly forbade the export of rice and wheat; copper was to be sold by auction in Kanagawa first; and keeping Deshima's former position as bonded warehouse might not be supported by the articles of

the new treaty, if the opinion of Donker Curtius were correct.

Finally, the Minister of Colonial Affairs expected that the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies would take the initiative in developing future Dutch trade in Japan on the new commercial stage established by the treaty of 1858, because it was clear that the Dutch merchants in Japan would have to enter into difficult competition with other nations. The Minister hoped that the Dutch could compete with them in the Japanese market with a satisfactory result, only by means of their greater insight and knowledge about Japanese requirements than other nations'. While he completely agreed that the Government should stop all direct interference in Japanese trade as soon as possible, he was of the opinion that it was very important to establish a commercial relationship by connecting Japan closely with the burgeoning trade in the northeastern part of Atjeh in the Netherlands East Indies: a huge profit was expected from that region's colonial products. He planned to build a new Japanese market for colonial products from the Netherlands East Indies. This was the reason he wanted to maintain Deshima as a bonded warehouse.

Donker Curtius had forfeited the trust of the Dutch Government. In a private letter to the Minister of Colonial Affairs, he stated that he was about to request the Governor-General to accept his resignation. It looked as if it would be difficult to find a suitable successor. The Minister had already instructed Commander Van Kattendijke of the Dutch naval detachment in Nagasaki to take over the duties of Donker Curtius temporarily, if the latter was absent or could not deal with his task there. He had, however, not ordered his permanent replacement, and the matter had remained pending since that time. The Minister expressed himself guardedly, but quite clearly, when he asked the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies that 'Your Excellency might think about a suitable successor for Donker Curtius, even if you may not have received his request to be recalled from Japan.'⁵³⁵ Donker Curtius remained in office in Japan until 28 February 1860. His diplomacy towards Japan may not have risen to Dutch expectations but it suited the Japanese. When the treaty negotiations with Harris ran into difficulties, some members of the Tokugawa Government asked for Donker Curtius to act as mediator.⁵³⁶

⁵³⁵ NA Koloniën no.6528, The semi-official letter of 24 February 1859 N.195 from the Minister of the Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

⁵³⁶ Ishii, *Nihon kaikokushi*, p.361.

Disappointment in Dutch public opinion

Donker Curtius' diplomacy as well that of another Dutch representative was criticized in the Dutch press as well. In general, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs pursued an active diplomacy towards Japan, but this did not satisfy the Dutch nation. Dutch representatives did not take their own initiatives in negotiating relations with Japan, because they regarded co-operation and harmony with representatives of other Western powers, especially the British and French, as their priority. The Minister for Colonial affairs was not alone in his criticism of Donker Curtius, public opinion was also scathing.⁵³⁷

This was expressed publicly in *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* which stated that the Japanese had already fully mastered English and that they used English in speaking as well as in writing. Consequently, Dutch, the former foreign official language, was no longer used there. Hence, the article questioned whether it could be said that the Dutch Commissioner had paid careful attention to this development in the course of his duty. Moreover, judging from an argument of the Dutch merchants in Japan, the newspaper questioned whether the Dutch Commissioner's reply was true, namely that he had already long been expecting this situation (i.e. non-fulfilment of treaty), when he protested about the non-fulfilment of the treaty of 4 July. Thus, the article was highly sceptical about why, if his reply were true, he allowed the return of the Dutch warship, the *Bali*, whose threatening presence could have promoted his position during the negotiations with Japan.

Furthermore, the article levelled more accusations at the Dutch Commissioner by introducing a report dated 15 July 1859 sent by a Dutch merchant in Kanagawa. The report says as follows: 'Donker Curtius in Desima did not think that Japan would honour the treaty on 4 July. He, however, allowed the departure of the warship, the *Bali*, because he wanted 'to insist on the fulfilment of the treaty to Japan without using military force'. Since a Dutch merchant in Desima heard that the British Consul-General, Sir Rutherford Alcock, and the American Consul-General, Harris, would go to Kanagawa by warship, he also decided to go there. Since he did not know about the

⁵³⁷ 'Colonies' on 2 January 1860 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

appointment of the Dutch Consul in Kanagawa, he asked Donker Curtius about this matter. Donker Curtius answered that 'Mister Alcock will take care of the Dutch interests under his supervision.' The merchants thought that this answer was laconic and was very remarkable, because, before his departure, Donker Curtius had already known about the appointment of Van Polsbroek (Jhr. Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek, 1833-1916) as the Vice-Consul. Why did Donker Curtius not tell him about the appointment in Deshima? The new Vice-Consul Van Polsbroek would guard the Dutch interests, while the nation would be under supervision of other nations. The merchant guessed that it was a plan hatched by Donker Curtius to stop the Dutch from going to Kanagawa. He asked the following questions: 'Does the measure benefit Dutch industrial interests? Does Donker Curtius want British linen to drive Dutch linen out? Does he want the Japanese to forget the national flag that they have known for centuries and respect more than other nations?' These were the critical words he chose to express his suspicions about the Dutch Commissioner's behaviour.

Furthermore, the merchant pointed out the fact that Yokohama had become the site of the foreign settlement instead of Kanagawa. Therefore, he stressed that Donker Curtius in Desima had already decided that Japan would not fulfil the treaty on the promised day. The Japanese Government had allowed the temporary establishment of a consulate in Kanagawa. The merchant mentioned the fact that the magistrate of Nagasaki, however, told Donker Curtius that the Government would not allow this before 1862, and passed the sarcastic remark that 'Of course, this Japanese friend is delighted with this utterance and is content with it'.

On the basis of these circumstances he reported that 'the Dutch merchants greatly respect the actions of the British Consul-General, Alcock, in Edo, because it is clear that his firm conduct must indicate the right direction to the Japanese. Regrettably the Netherlands is not participating in the co-operative endeavour'. Therefore, he expressed his regretful feeling, 'We should thank other nations that we are guaranteed to gain privileges after them. What a regrettable situation! The Dutch security is under their supervision.'

'Van Polsbroek in Kanagawa takes a firm line with the magistrate of Kanagawa. It is regrettable that he has won no confidence in Edo and he cannot make the Japanese there listen to his voice. However, he actively takes care of the interests of Dutch merchants more than Donker Curtius in Desima' Then, the merchant mentioned his expectation of Van Polsbroek's future activity. He

noticed an important fact; 'The Vice-Consul is stationed in Kanagawa. Therefore, he has the privilege of being able to negotiate directly with the magistrate of Kanagawa where the new trade was expected. This privilege is granted the Dutch Commissioner on Desima only in special opportunities. 'Again it may be noted how important is for the representative to show firm behaviour.' He pointed out the importance of the personal relationships and the character of the representative with regard to local circumstances.

Moreover, he noted that the Vice-Consul always attended the audience in full dress; at least he always carried his sword, which the Japanese respect. He, however, deplored that 'I saw that the Dutch Commissioner returned from an audience on a Russia ship, who wore less than ordinary clothes and a *meunier* hat.' It was actually highly important for the Netherlands to increase its self-assurance and prestige amongst the Japanese, because the Dutch had always been seen as merely lowly merchants there. It had been an important Instruction from the Dutch Government that they behave so. These remarks reveal that Donker Curtius had neglected this part of his job. Moreover, the merchant continued; 'The American and British Consuls-General went to Kanagawa by warship, on which their flags were flying with suitable splendour. To the Japanese surprise, the Dutch Consul arrived there like a tourist by a merchant ship chartered from a Batavia merchant. We should thank the coincidence that the Dutch ships, the *Atlante*, the *Prinses Charlotte* and the *Schiller* could fire the necessary salute for the flag-raising. It seems that our Dutch influence has been lost. It is not surprising that the words *one Thail* were printed in a new bill on Deshima in place of the former *een Thail*.' He lamented the fact that Donker Curtius did not have the stuff that representatives are made of.

He remarked that the commercial situation in Kanagawa and Yokohama was uncertain, and doubts that merchants in Osaka could buy goods in Nagasaki, because their small merchant ships could not ply the dangerous southern Sea of Japan. As long as Osaka was not open for trade, Nagasaki was the best place for it to take place at present. This remark is important, because it expresses the opinion that the Dutch had lost their influence in Japan, as they preferred to cling on in Nagasaki. This opinion is right in a way, but it would be too facile to accept it as the only reason. It is necessary to take the contemporary situation into consideration.

Not only was Donker Curtius the object of aspersions, but his successor

as as Dutch Consul-General in Japan, Mr Jan Karel de Wit (1819-1884,) was also accused. An article dated 28 June 1860 in *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*⁵³⁸ states that the new Consul-General, De Wit, had succeeded Donker Curtius. The article goes on to express its surprise that De Wit is to remain in Nagasaki, while other foreign consuls have settled in Kanagawa near Edo. Pursuing this line, it says; 'Nagasaki was the very place of banishment and imprisonment for foreigners (the Dutch and Chinese); at this time, this situation has changed and it is no longer necessary to be restricted to remaining there; therefore, the best move would be to discard the hoary custom; in other words, from a political and economic point of view, the new Consul-General should settle himself in the new open port; this is why England and especially the United States have driven Dutch influence out of Japan in a short period. The reason for this has been the fact that with their acumen and proper diplomacy the British and American Consuls-General have chosen a good settlement; therefore, the Dutch Commissioner in Japan should settle in Kanagawa as soon as possible after its opening and he should be a leader in promoting its opening: This is emerging as the general opinion in Japan.'

The article introduces a piece of a research report compiled by the Dutch head of an important company in Japan, who carried it out to acquire commercial expansion and interests there. He criticizes the Dutch Government diplomacy in his conclusion, asserting as evidence that it was obvious the Dutch had been very rapidly and seriously estranged from Japan. Donker Curtius objected that the research report was unfair. While the article says that both parties seem to have proper grounds for objections, it, however, mentions; 'that it is the most unpleasant for the Netherlands that the Japanese mission went first not to the Netherlands but the United States; moreover, in view of letters from Japan, it generally seems that the Commissioner, who is going to retire, could have dealt with this matter more correctly and could have attained the honour that the first Japanese mission had been to the Netherlands; as yet the author was unaware of the principles of the new Consul-General, but he was happy for the Dutch in Japan that a change in representative had occurred.'

When it is all said and done, the article only evaluated the change of representatives as a good aspect of the Dutch diplomacy towards Japan. The

⁵³⁸ 'Colonies' on 28 June 1860 no. 177 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

criticism was not just aimed personally against Donker Curtius, it also railed against the measures of the Dutch Government. At that time, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs had a plan to establish a big new market in Asia by connecting Nagasaki with Shanghai by ship, and also in the future by connecting this shipping line with the Netherlands East Indies. This was the reason the Dutch representative was based in Nagasaki, even though other representatives settled in Edo and Kanagawa in its vicinity. People who were unaware of the subtleties of this Dutch Government plan regarded this matter as the symbol of negative Dutch diplomacy towards Japan. This being so it is incorrect to say that this Dutch diplomatic measure was wrong.

It was clear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not always carry out autonomous diplomacy among major Western powers. This sort of diplomacy would have been unwelcome to the nation. For this reason, it seems that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs also ploughed the same furrow. In general, the negative strategy pursued in Dutch diplomacy was strongly criticized by its contemporaries. One article about the Dutch diplomacy claimed as follows: 'A small power, whose military can hardly be held by other European powers in awe, needs shrewder and more careful diplomacy than that of the stronger powers in order to protect its rights and interests. Such diplomacy ensures the smaller power does not often become embroiled in the European affairs. Moreover, as the need becomes less, the smaller power should direct its [desire for] peace more strictly. Such diplomacy is highly beneficial, especially to our merchant country, and can promote material peace. We, however, have so far found it unsatisfactory. We cannot discern a positive diplomacy. Diplomacy is always neglected, when it can be shown to be important to our interests and it should be promoted.'

After the above-mentioned introduction, the incident about the German customs union is mentioned. It says;

'When some confusion occurred in the German union, this offered an opportunity for us to acquire a member nation, Limburg from this union. We did not take advantage of it. If we had been able to exploit irreconcilable demands fully among the members of this union, we could have obtained the repeal of duty in the Rhineland. Although the Dutch Lower House did pay some attention to this affair, eventually it let this opportunity slip. When an agreement to build a permanent bridge in Cologne was presented in the Dutch Lower house, the chamber persuaded the Government to demand the repeal of

duty in Rhine. In reply to this affair, the Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it had been impossible to demand the repeal or reduction in duty at that time, because not Prussia but Hessen and Nassau had objected to it. There was the opportunity for us to gain the repeal from Hessen, this opportunity, however, was neglected.' Moreover, this kind of negative character of the Dutch foreign policy is criticized not only in Europe, but also in Asia as below.

'As the second example, Japan will be mentioned. Through our endeavour, Japan has been opened for other European countries. We were a sole country that maintained a friendship with the Emperor. All countries had to contact Japan via us. This country was scarcely opened, when the diplomacies of other nations drove us away. The United States and England pushed us aside. They were able to arrange that the Japanese mission should go first to their country. We have not even been told in Japan, although we were there as if we were at home. Our influence has been completely lost there. In this way, our foreign policy budget achieves very few results.'⁵³⁹

In the meantime, an article that defended the Dutch diplomacy was also published in this newspaper. The contributor was a Hague solicitor, Jhr. J.K.W. Quarles van Ufford (1818-1902) . He worked as an Assistant Secretary (adjunct-commissie) in the Home Office (Binnenlandse Zaken) in the period from 1850 to 1855. Therefore, although not officially, it can be assumed that he voiced the Government's views. As an introduction, he mentions that; 'I would like to answer the question in *het Bijblad van de Economist*, who concluded the first treaty with Japan?; moreover, I cannot refrain from also answering an article concerning this matter written by Van Hoëvell in the August issue of *Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië*'

Quarles stated that the honour should accrue to the Netherlands in this matter. Van Hoëvell criticized the Government but without adducing any kind of reason. The Government made an endeavour to put the Japanese trade in 'hands of civilian merchants as soon as possible after the conclusion of the Dutch-Japanese supplementary treaty in 16 October 1857 which he considered a commercial treaty. Moreover, the Dutch Commissioner had planned that the commercial treaty should also apply to other nations.'

Van Hoëvell believed that the fact that the Japanese mission went first not to the Netherlands but to the United States showed the inadequacy of

⁵³⁹ 'Our diplomacy' on 7 August 1860 no. 217 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*.

Dutch diplomacy, but this insinuation was clearly wrong. The Japanese mission to the United States did not mean to show ‘an honour to the President of the United States’ and an honour to this country more than to the Netherlands.’⁵⁴⁰

Van Hoëvell blamed the Government for this event, because he thought that the Netherlands had lost its special relationship with Japan. Quarles, however, argued as follows:

‘This event happened only because the American representative insisted on exchanging the instruments of the ratification of the America-Japanese treaty of 1858. Whereas when Donker Curtius as well as other representatives concluded the same treaties, they did not insist on exchanging instruments of ratification. This was the upshot of an American aim. He wanted to seize the leading place that the Netherlands had occupied in Japan. Therefore the United States wanted to afford the Japanese mission the opportunity to show American power and greatness. It can be said that this was an American endeavour. If I openly have to admit that Perry’s impolite words and cannons contributed to the conclusion of the first treaty with Japan more than our endeavour of persuasion in Japan, I advise that we should provide against the hard competition in Japan from the point of view of moral and material matters. It is easily possible to admit that the situation in Japan would have scarcely changed, if the Perry’s expedition had not occurred and we had continued to persuade the Japanese to open its country, while Perry’s expedition, however, did not deprive the Netherlands of the Dutch endeavour to open Japan from 1844 on and of the honour of having concluded the first essential commercial treaty with Japan.’

‘Why did Donker Curtius not make arrangements to exchange instruments of the ratification in the Netherlands? I can say that it would have been possible for him, because he, unlike the American Consul-General, could obtain the same conditions treaty without the support of military force. He could easily make arrangements to exchange instruments of the ratification in the Netherlands. He, however, taking the same way that only an intelligent negotiator in his position could take, did not do so. If the Japanese mission had arrived in the Netherlands, it would have visited different countries in Europe and compare the Netherlands with other European powers. It seems that this would not have improved our power and our image among the Japanese either.

⁵⁴⁰ About the Japanese delegation to the United States. See Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nihonkokuminshi*.

The Japanese mission's visit to Europe would attract demerit rather than merit. The United States that always occupies the strongest position in the China seas and can easily send ships from San Francisco, can easily fit out a steamship for a mission to Japan. Meanwhile, it is difficult for the Netherlands to detach a ship from the Netherlands East Indies' fleet, even for a short period, in order to show its flag in Japan. Would the Dutch Government and the Parliament permit the use of one of its few warships in the Netherlands East Indies for the Japanese mission over a long period? It is not necessary for us to send a steamship all the way from the Netherlands, because this is nothing but a display. Whose responsibility is the large expense of this mission that would be incurred by the participants during their sojourn? Namely, according to the American example, we should assume all the expenses.'

'In consideration of these matters, Donker Curtius, indirectly the Government, did not insist that a Japanese mission should come to the Netherlands, and for this he should not earn criticism but applause, because it was already well known that the Japanese Government had wanted to postpone for a long time the effectuation of that treaty. Therefore, it is clear that the Japanese mission to the United States has no meaning of 'showing honour and respect' to the United States. Therefore, said Quarles, Van Hoëvell's argument is unsound.'⁵⁴¹

It is understandable that Quarles, as a former government official, wanted to refute Van Hoëvell's criticism of the Dutch Government diplomacy. His argument, however, does not represent official Dutch Government diplomacy. It is a big mistake that no merit would accrue to the Netherlands in bringing a Japanese mission on a visit, because then the mission would have noticed that the Netherlands is a small power. A Japanese mission was dispatched to Europe in 1862. The mission had no plans to visit the Netherlands. The Dutch Government, however, succeeded in persuading the mission to come to the country. Seizing this opportunity, the Japanese Government sent young people to the Netherlands in order to learn about European civilization.

Neither Van Hoëvell nor Quarles had a good insight into Japanese affairs. These two persons actually had a short-sighted discussion with each other.⁵⁴²

⁵⁴¹ 'Contribution – One word to Van Hoëvell' on 26 August 1860 no. 236 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

⁵⁴² Their discussion can be seen in 'Contribution' on 29 October no. 300 1860 in: *Nieuwe*

These articles show the critical stance taken by the newspaper. Here follows another one which introduced a letter to the Minister of Colonial Affairs from Dutch merchants in Japan that describes the unpleasant situation in Kanagawa. The newspaper comments on this letter as follows: 'These gentlemen mostly forget the difficulties that shall ensue at the beginning. As if they were living in Java or the Netherlands, they wish that things would soon be better in Japan, a nation wanted them to leave rather than to remain in this country. They have to endure difficulties and unpleasantness, if they, according to their – intelligent and laudable – will, want to make large profits. Otherwise, anybody can be their competitors.'⁵⁴³

The article is also interesting, because as it mentions here; 'A separate report appeared on the 20th of this month which criticized that the Vice-Consul in Kanagawa for not having shown a determined attitude toward the Japanese authorities for the purpose of promoting Dutch commercial interests. There is no evidence to back up this criticism. However, it is fully refuted by different reports from this and other newspapers. Every newspaper praises this vice-consul highly for his eagerness, while he is being criticized about the present defects. Many people who have been unlucky in other regions of Japan go to Kanagawa. Since they expect to find the putative gold mountain in the place, they often are disappointed...Therefore, their jealousies are stirred up against fellow countrymen who are happier.'⁵⁴⁴

Rotterdamsche Courant.

⁵⁴³ 'Colonies' on 28 November 1860 no. 316 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant.*

⁵⁴⁴ 'Contribution' on 30 November 1860 no. 332 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant.*

Chapter 11

Dutch diplomacy in Japan after the Harris Treaty

New developments in Asian diplomatic relations

By now it was clear that the Netherlands had lost its special position in Japan. It, however, did not give up Japanese affairs, because these were an important factor in Dutch Asian policy. In reality, the Netherlands had completely lost all its influence there. Therefore, it planned to develop a new autonomous diplomacy towards Japan and the rest of Asia.

Japanese affairs were very important to the Netherlands in connection with its national prestige and its economic interests. The Netherlands still fostered an expectation that it could make large profits in the Asian markets. This was based on the construction of the Suez Canal. This canal would make the distance from Europe to Asia much shorter.⁵⁴⁵ Although the Suez Canal was opened only in 1869, the plan was already being taken into consideration at this time, and it gave a strong inducement to increase commercial profits in Asia. Then, although the opening of Japan was not sufficiently developed at that time, in consideration of the trends in world trade, the Minister of Colonial Affairs instructed the General-Governor of the Netherlands East Indies to deliver goods to Japan and to search out potential export articles.⁵⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Netherlands had actual proof to support its expectation of commercial profits to be made in Japanese trade. It was already receiving many orders for various articles from Japan. It was also reported that a fourth

⁵⁴⁵ NA Koloniën no.5889, A letter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs on 8 January 1857 no.149, Geheim. In this document, it was said that this construction would be divided in the Netherlands, England and France and through it the Dutch industry in Egypt was beginning to be increasingly valued.

⁵⁴⁶ NA Koloniën no.5877, A letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies on 6 July 1856 no.166, Geheim.

merchant ship would be required for the Japanese trade.⁵⁴⁷ If this expanded as much as the Dutch expected, i.e., if Japan itself, at that moment still hesitating to expand its market, should be willing to do so, it was thought that the Netherlands would be able to acquire huge profits from the trade. For this reason, Dutch 'national interests and economic interests' were actively followed in such a policy before the treaty of 1858.

After the treaty of 1858, it became customary in Dutch Government circles to point out that the Dutch policy toward Japan had never included the use of military force, that the method of persuasion had invariably been used, and that the Netherlands had peacefully contributed to the opening of Japan not only for itself but also for the benefit of other countries.⁵⁴⁸ In the Dutch Parliament, however, the liberals repeatedly stated their disappointment in the Government's policy. Since the Netherlands had lost its centuries-old special relationship with Japan, these critics argued that it was time to adopt a new policy for Japan.⁵⁴⁹ They pointed out that the great powers England, the United States, and France began to follow an active policy towards Japan. England had engaged in the Arrow (Second Opium) War in China, the Crimean War with Russia and had been catapulted into the Indian Mutiny in India, and France also had been engaged in the first two conflicts and had dispatched troops to Indo China in the 1850s but the Netherlands had maintained neutrality in the Crimean War.⁵⁵⁰ Especially after the Belgian secession, the Netherlands avoided international conflicts in Europe as much as possible, preferring to develop as a maritime mercantile nation.

Against this background, Dutch diplomacy in Japan should be considered in the context of its Asian policy in the nineteenth century. It has become clear that the Netherlands had high expectations of its relationship with Japan. The most important issue for the Netherlands in Asia was the Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands could maintain its national prestige

⁵⁴⁷ NA Koloniën no.5888, A letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies in 10 July 1857 no.180, Geheim. NA Koloniën no.5889, A letter of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs on 8 September 1857 no.160, Geheim.

⁵⁴⁸ *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1858-1859*, p.432.

⁵⁴⁹ *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië 1860 I*, pp.167-168.

⁵⁵⁰ Kleffens, *De internationaalrechtelijke betrekkingen*, p.39.

and economic interests only by successful colonial management. There was, however, no reason for the Netherlands as a maritime mercantile nation not to develop a major interest in trade.⁵⁵¹ Japan was a very suitable target for Dutch foreign policy, because the Dutch had a long-standing relationship with it and was very well acquainted with its customs. Besides this, there were also great expectations of the trade with China, in particular as a new market for colonial products from the Netherlands East Indies. It was also the beginning of the era of the steamship. Japan could play an important role in international maritime trade as a supplier of coal, especially for the Chinese market. Besides coal, Japan was thought to have abundant supplies of gold, silver and copper. The exploitation of these resources was expected to yield big profits. The Member of Parliament Harm Stolte (1797-1859) reminded the Government of the importance of Japanese trade, saying that ‘Would it be too bold to assume that Japan will be still a second California and a second New Holland in respect of the production of gold?’⁵⁵²

In 1859, the Dutch Government sent Ph. F. von Siebold to Japan. Up till then his advice had seldom been heeded in its diplomacy towards Japan, but now his role was to promote commerce and act as advisor to the NHM. It seems that the Dutch Government hoped for a final chance to improve its position in Japan.⁵⁵³ In short, the Netherlands did not give up its ambitions in Japanese affairs right away, as it has generally been thought, when the other European countries and the United States successfully entered the Japanese market.⁵⁵⁴ If the Dutch would give up this market easily in the face of other great powers entering into it, it would be difficult to explain the present Dutch economic activity all over the world. The British Consul-General Sir Rutherford Alcock

⁵⁵¹ According to Kuitenbrouwer, ‘the political and economical impulses for expansion were too weak to result in a changing in the Dutch policy of aloofness’ at that period. Kuitenbrouwer, *Nederland en de opkomst*, p.28.

⁵⁵² *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1856-1857*, p.566.

⁵⁵³ *Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1856-1857*, p.566. Concerning Von Siebold's activities in Dutch-Japanese relations, see J. Mac Lean, ‘Philipp Franz von Siebold and the opening of Japan, 1843-1866’, *Philipp Franz von Siebold*, in: *A contribution to the study of the Historical Relations between Japan and the Netherlands*, The Netherlands Association for Japanese Studies, Leiden, 1978.

⁵⁵⁴ NA Koloniën no.5839, A letter dated 25 June 1852 N.15 on 6 January 1853 N.2.

said that the Netherlands 'often wanted to play a role as a large influence for the realization of the opening of Japan'.⁵⁵⁵

Public opinion and Dutch diplomacy

In *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* the freedom of trade in connection with the Japanese affairs, was discussed as follows:

'For a while foreign nations have regarded the Netherlands as an extremely greedy monopolist. Before 1848, foreign newspapers and magazines recounted only Dutch desires to make a fortune at the cost of other nations. Therefore public opinion was a headwind against us. The capital that the Dutch had gathered through diligent industry and hard work was regarded as plunder from other nations in foreign countries. It was clear that this situation greatly damaged our commercial interests. Countries that competed with us in transit or other trades wanted to exploit this opinion against us in every respect.'...

'The Governments prior to 1848 underestimated public opinion. They did not encourage public opinion to be positive towards us in Europe. Therefore, other nations thought ill of us. Because of the small issues concerning the sea (jusqu' à la mer), measures on immigration and so on, we have aroused the antipathy of other nations. However, it should be admitted that our trading regulations have introduced various liberal modifications before 1848. This fact can reverse the opinion against us. Unfortunately we have failed to make other nations aware of this fact. Therefore, Germany and other countries still regarded us as the leech of the trading countries.'...

'After 1848 this situation changed. Public opinion was looked upon as a strong doctrine that could not be neglected. Therefore we bravely took the road to liberalism and took heed of public opinion. As a result the former slander against us stopped.'...

'The treaty with Japan could have improved our position among European merchants. We strove for a long time to persuade Japan, as it was important to trade, to discard its policy of seclusion, not only for ourselves, but also for all nations in the world. We strongly supported the attempts of Russia,

⁵⁵⁵ Rutherford Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon: A Narrative of a three years' residence in Japan*, Japanese translation by Yamaguchi Kôsaku, *Taikun no miyako I*, Iwanami shoten, p.163.

England and the United States. Finally the world realized the opening of this large market. The Netherlands should earn the gratitude of the world for this. We had already insisted that the Japanese Government open its country during the reign of Willem II. Since then, we did not cease in these kinds of endeavours until this aim was achieved.’...

‘The more these Dutch endeavours are admired in world trade, the more the fruits will be collected. Once European civilization has been introduced in Japan, the enlightened Dutch behaviour towards Japan will soon be valued more and more.’...

‘We are singing a hymn in our own praises in a way. Nevertheless, we have let our opponents in foreign countries speak ill of us for a long time. Although they have long taunted us, they do not allow us to bring explicit evidence to clarify their misunderstandings of us. We, however, ignore this fact.’...

‘We are the first to have allowed the freedom of shipping on the Rhine. With reference to the Navigation Act, we are one of the first to have followed the British example. Only a few countries have introduced a tariff rate as low as ours. We opened Japan for the sake not only of our interests, but also of world trade.’...

‘Will you please let us know whether this evidence which we might use to show our liberalism as against the protectionism in most European countries is correct or not.’⁵⁵⁶...

Moreover, a British newspaper criticized Dutch protectionism against foreign trade in their colonies. Another article in *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* refuted this by comparing British colonial policies with those of the Dutch, and showing that the Dutch trading measures in their colonies are the same as the British. Therefore, the article concluded that the British criticism was unfair, and badly informed. The author concluded by saying: ‘It is always heard that the British newspapers boast that England opened China not only for herself, but also for all the world. We, however, opened Japan at in a gentler manner not only for ourselves, but also for the trade of all nations.’⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵⁶ ‘Japan’ on 19 March 1858 no. 78 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*. This article was reported on the front page.

⁵⁵⁷ ‘The Colonial Policy of England and the Netherlands’ on 14 October 1860 no. 284 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

The Dutch contribution to the opening of Japan is stressed in articles such as the review article of Van Kattendyke's published diary. He had been the Dutch commander of the navy detachment in Nagasaki.⁵⁵⁸ This article stressed the importance of the diary, because all civilized countries were interested in the country at that time: 'If this book provides evidence that the Dutch still have 'the oldest letter (priority)' among the good Japanese at present too, although this fact hopefully should not exert a bad influence on us, this fact will apply salve to our national wound that was made by the American boast and the narrow-minded negligence of great powers. We thank Van Kattendyke for his service. He wanted to devote himself to this service and he actually did so. In conclusion we hope that he will make timely use of his abundant knowledge about Japan and its culture for the sake of the general good.'

This article demonstrates the Dutch wish at that time. Namely the Netherlands should continue to compete with the large powers in Japanese affairs and, if possible, it would win back its former status in Japan. The author of this review shows the Dutch pride and interest in the Japanese affairs and refutes the slander on the Dutch diplomacy by citing several proofs to the contrary.

Active Dutch diplomacy towards Japan

Donker Curtius reported that the United States had concluded a treaty with Ryûkyû and that American ships were entering the port there. The Dutch colonial administration in Batavia considered it important that the Netherlands should respond to this new development by also showing its presence in the Ryûkyû area, for the purpose of protecting its diplomatic and commercial interests in Japan. Ryûkyû was under the authority of the daimyô of Satsuma domain. Therefore, the Dutch immediately wanted to enter into a contract with this feudal lord. The Council of the Netherlands East Indies advised that this kind of interest in Japan should be expanded without delay, and a plan was made to send the warship the *Ardjoeno* from the Netherlands East Indies to the Japanese Sea.⁵⁵⁹ In The Hague the Minister of Colonial Affairs strongly

⁵⁵⁸ 'Contribution' on 10 November 1860 no. 312 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

⁵⁵⁹ NA Koloniën no.5904, 2 October 1858 N.501 and Extract out of the register of

supported this plan, and he instructed the Governor-General that, if possible, the Act of Ratification of the treaty of 18 August 1858 should be carried to Nagasaki on this ship.

The treaty of 1858 made it necessary to send a diplomat to Japan. The Council of the Netherlands East Indies advised that Donker Curtius was to be appointed by order of the king. The motive was that it would not be necessary to modify the management of Japanese affairs between the Ministry of Colonial Affairs and the Government of Batavia, if Donker Curtius was appointed in this way. According to this scheme, it was hoped that Donker Curtius would be the Consul-General and diplomat. Donker Curtius, however, had no intention of taking up this position, but stated that he wanted to go back to the Netherlands at the end of 1859. Consequently, the Government of the Netherlands East Indies proposed appointing Van Kattendijke, who was Donker Curtius' deputy.⁵⁶⁰ Declining to this proposal by the Netherlands East Indies, Van Kattendijke stated that he also did not want to remain in Japan for more than two years from 1858.⁵⁶¹ The Governor-General then advised the Minister of Colonial Affairs that, for the time being, it was not necessary to appoint a person in this matter, as long as England, Russia and the United State had also not yet taken the measure of sending a diplomat. However, he mentioned that the Netherlands should not lag behind other powers in its diplomatic relations with Japan.⁵⁶² The Minister basically agreed to this, but he noted that Kanagawa would be an exception, because trade was expected to expand there rapidly. He also added that he believed that subsequently Edo and Osaka would also become very important in international trade. Furthermore, he asked the Governor-General to reorganize the staff in Nagasaki.⁵⁶³

New-style Dutch diplomacy towards Japan

resolutions of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies dated 24 October 1858 on 25 February 1859 N.83/G.

⁵⁶⁰ NA Koloniën no.5907, Advice and observation of the Council of the Netherlands East Indies dated 15 March 1859 on 24 June 1859 N.248/x.

⁵⁶¹ NA Koloniën no. 5907, A letter of 15 October 1858 on 24 June 1859 N.248/x.

⁵⁶² NA Koloniën no. 5907, A letter of 6 April 1859 on 24 June 1859 N.248/x.

⁵⁶³ NA Koloniën no. 5907, 24 June 1859 N.248/x.

The Netherlands also tried to play a role in Japan's foreign relations after the treaty of 1858, and, meeting this challenge, a new style of diplomacy was developed towards Japan in order to protect its interests there. The underlying reason was that the Netherlands was actually making huge profits in its Japanese trade. For example, the report of the trade balance in 1857-58 year issued by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies says that the gross earnings in commerce ('*Koophandel*') of the Netherlands East Indies of fl.5,699,109 contained fl.762,399 from Japan in 1857 and that gross earning of fl.5,186,407 contained fl.755,823 from Japan in 1858.⁵⁶⁴ The report also stated that Dutch influence in Asia, especially in Japan, was very important to the Netherlands East Indies. A symbolic event in this new-style Dutch diplomacy was to send the 'Japanese expert', Von Siebold, to Japan, in spite of the consternation this move aroused in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. Moreover, the Dutch Government took care to see that its contribution to the development of Japan's foreign relations was widely propagated. Quietly confident, it had looked forward to the publication of the above-mentioned '*Neêrlands streven*' by Van der Chijs.⁵⁶⁵ At a later stage, Japan invited what were known as *Oyatoi Gaikokujin* (foreign experts, literally 'foreign employees') from various foreign countries for the purpose of transferring the knowledge of Western culture. Japan also requested such persons from the Netherlands. The Dutch Government fulfilled this request with pleasure. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs expected that the Dutch new-style diplomacy towards the future Dutch-Japanese relations would develop successfully.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁴ NA Koloniën no.5899, 24 March 1858 N.197.

⁵⁶⁵ NA Koloniën no.6531, The semi-official letter of 13 July 1861 N.277 from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies also expressed his expectation that he would take great interest in it. NA Koloniën no.6531, The semi-official letter of 6 September 1861 N.23 from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs.

⁵⁶⁶ NA BuZa no.3142, 10 May 1862 N.30. This document says that the Netherlands had not completely lost 'Prism' yet.

The Anglo-Dutch -French 'Entente' against the United States

Dutch diplomacy in Japan inevitably had to change course as a result of the Harris Treaty of 1858. Until then the Netherlands had taken advantage of its long-standing relationship with Japan and tried to maintain, or rather to expand, its influence. Moreover, through the channel of this diplomacy it also intended to expand its own privileges and interests in the other Asian regions. One example of this Dutch diplomacy can be mentioned, namely a provision about learning the Japanese language and Japanese studies was added to the Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1858. T. Ishii has described this provision as a 'unique regulation' and it is one that argues that the Netherlands intended to maintain and expand its influence in Japan in a different way to those chosen by other major Western powers.⁵⁶⁷

The Harris Treaty was a clear signal that Japan no longer considered the Netherlands the first among the foreign countries. In spite of this situation, as a power having interests in Japan, the Netherlands had to acquiesce in this and find ways to deal with this matter. However, how could it deal with Japanese affairs in relation to such major Western powers as England, France, Prussia and the United States? How could it compete against the mighty United States in the Japanese market, which was a stranger in Asia and did not respect the long-standing Dutch-Japanese relationship? The Netherlands as a European power looked for co-operation with other European powers after 1858. It looked to its 'most natural ally' England first and also to France which was actively pursuing its interests in Asian affairs. It had to choose its moment though, finding a time when France was not in discord with either the Netherlands or England.

After the treaty of 1858, the Netherlands continued to pursue its active diplomacy towards Japan in view of its commercial and political interests in Asia. It did so through the 'Anglo-Dutch-French Entente' in Japanese affairs, an European alliance, which the Netherlands suggested in order to oppose the challenge of the United States that had newly emerged in Asia and was equal to the strongest country in Europe. While Japanese affairs were important for the Netherlands in connection with its national prestige, commercial considerations, its economic interest, were highly important too. Moreover, at that time, the

⁵⁶⁷ Ishii, *Nihon Kaikokushi*, p.366.

Netherlands anticipated that it could make large profits in the Asian markets once the Suez canal would be ready.

Japan was opened to foreign intercourse, nevertheless a campaign calling for the expulsion of foreigners (*Jōi*) grew stronger there day by day. Therefore, the Edo *Bakufu* requested Western countries to postpone the implementation of the treaty of 1858 until this campaign had calmed down. The Japanese Government tried to soothe the unrest by forcing foreign countries to accept this postponement. Consequently, the Government would be able to show a group, which was against the opening of Japan and which considered it disgraceful simply to follow the demands of foreign countries, its autonomous diplomatic attitude. Out of consideration for the Japanese Emperor, who resided in nearby Kyoto, the opening of the ports of Hyogo and Osaka was also postponed.⁵⁶⁸

Concerning this matter, the Minister of Colonial Affairs forwarded a letter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies (dated 29 October 1861 no.974/1) with his own remarks to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The documents state the opinion of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, as follows: the Governor-General had received a letter in which the Tycoon (shogun) requested the postponement of the opening of the harbours, but he considered it unwise to amend the Edo Treaty (the treaties of 1858) as the Japanese were demanding. The Council of the Netherlands East Indies was of the opinion that it could accept the Japanese request but insisted that Dutch warships be allowed to enter the harbours mentioned in this treaty after the short term allowed for the opening of cities. It called upon the Japanese Government to suppress any incident arising from the aversion to foreigners, and to carefully upkeep the good relationships with the signatory powers of a treaty. Hence, the Netherlands East Indies advised the Dutch Government to adopt a strong position opposing the Japanese request. The Minister of Colonial Affairs, James Loudon (1824-1900), however, did not entirely agree with this proposal.

Minister Loudon's opinion was that the Dutch reply should not put the Japanese Government into a difficult position, because it was actually moving in the right direction. Moreover, to some extent, the considerations of England and France in this issue would be reflected in this Dutch reply. That is, if the

⁵⁶⁸ Fukuchi, *Bakumatsu suibōron*, pp.201-202.

Dutch decision met with the disapproval of other powers, it would put the Netherlands at a disadvantage. The Minister underlined the importance of the relations with England and France in this remark; 'In view of the closer relationship between Mr De Wit and the representatives of England and France, it is natural that the Dutch Government should take into account the reactions of both above-mentioned countries.'

On the other hand, the Minister also showed some Dutch autonomy in his opinion. The British Government had acquiesced in the Japanese request and agreed to postpone the opening of harbours for seven years, but had demanded it be able to carry on trade in Tsushima and on the opposite shore of the Korean Peninsula. Tsushima was an important place as it was a stepping-stone to China. When Russia tried to occupy this island after the treaty of 1858, England opposed this Russian plan.⁵⁶⁹ Loudon considered it unwise that the Dutch Government follow the British decision in this issue at present. The reasons were that a postponement of seven years seemed over long and not conducive to helping the Japanese Government control the aversion towards foreigners from the West of its nationals. It did concede that the one-year term that had been proposed by the American and British representatives was too short and, if the plan were pushed, the same problem might repeat itself. Therefore, the Minister thought that it was advisable to avoid adopting this measure, and that the postponement of about two or three years might be the correct middle course. This may be considered proof that the Netherlands was not absolutely dependent on Franco-British decisions.

Minister of Colonial Affairs Loudon was of the opinion that the Dutch should get another concession than the British would receive. He believed it would be in Dutch interest if 'the Netherlands should perform better in the agreement about Deshima as a free bonded warehouse' and 'if all interference by the Japanese authorities in commercial dealings with foreigners in the open ports' would be terminated. He considered it to be useful that the signatory powers with Japan should understand each other's policy regarding Japanese affairs. Then, he asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to relay the ideas of the French Government to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, because the Dutch Government wanted to take a final decision about this issue, whereas Japanese

⁵⁶⁹ See Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi*, 1991.

affairs were still obfuscated.⁵⁷⁰

This document proves that the Netherlands did not take its own decisions about Japanese affairs lightly. What was decided always reflected the decisions of other Western powers. In order to protect Dutch interests, however, the Netherlands strove to have its demands reflected in the policies of other powers towards Japan as much as possible through general consent. This was definitely the new Dutch policy after 1858, and shows that it is impossible to maintain that the Netherlands only followed the path set by other powers in the development of Japanese affairs. In truth it should be called a very realistic policy, which avoided criticism and averted a serious failure in its policy. It ran up against problems because the attitude of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was at variance with that of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs gave the following answer to the above-mentioned letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs: the sentiments of the Japanese Government for the Netherlands are obvious from its kind deeds, especially in view of the latest report... in the present atmosphere of open competition between the great powers for Japanese trade, the sole chance for the Netherlands to hold and establish its influence is to adopt a very friendly attitude and depend on the continual wise and careful behavior of its agents and subjects in that country [Japan]. If such a measure unexpectedly ends in failure, the Netherlands should follow the measures taken by other governments in respect of Japan, because Dutch power is insufficient to secure a lasting predominance in Japan by force.

This reply makes it clear that the Minister of Foreign Affairs wanted at all costs to avoid putting the Netherlands into an awkward position in Europe through the failure of its diplomacy.⁵⁷¹

⁵⁷⁰ The number of documents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as follows:

2.05.01,

3141: from February 1852 to October 1859.

3142: from October 1859 to June 1862.

3143: from June 1862 to July 1863.

NA BuZa, 14 January N.11 on 16 January 1862 N.10.

⁵⁷¹ NA BuZa, 29 January 1862 N.30. This letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Colonial Affairs could not be found in the index of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. The copy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was used here.

Seeking a solution to this situation, the Minister of Colonial Affairs proposed the idea of a Dutch-British-French 'Entente'. He had a plan to secure and to pursue Dutch interests in Japan in the safest and most effective way through supple co-operation with its closest great powers in Europe. The United States was excluded from this plan, because, 'On the one hand in general its [American] behaviour militates against us, and in particular its representative's behavior in Japan towards his British, French and Dutch colleagues gives little cause to involve him, especially in this matter. On the other hand, it may serve a useful purpose in preventing exacerbating susceptibilities and consequently more decisive opposition from the side of the American Consul, if we were to advise him of the steps we have taken either now or after our proposals have been accepted in London and in Paris.'⁵⁷²

After deliberation in the Cabinet meeting, the Minister of Colonial Affairs corrected the draft report of Ministers of Colonial and Foreign Affairs to the King dated on 5 March 1862. In general, the points of this report to the King were approved at the Cabinet meeting. Nevertheless, a guiding principle to be followed towards the Japanese Government in the enforcement of the Dutch-Japanese treaty was decided at this meeting. In the first place, the Netherlands would firmly hold on to its rights acquired under this treaty when measures were taken in London and Paris in the interest of the Entente. In the second place, the United States of America would not be informed of its participation in this plan, but only of what should occur as a result of the Entente.⁵⁷³ Dutch rivalry against the United States shows clearly. The Netherlands intended to establish a kind of European alliance in Japanese Affairs. This Dutch plan demonstrates that the Government wanted to retrieve its honour and regain its interest in Japanese Affairs. After this revision, the Ministers of Colonial and Foreign Affairs submitted this report to the king.⁵⁷⁴ The majority of the contents coincided with the above-mentioned document dated 16 January 1862 (N.10).

⁵⁷² NA BuZa, 5 March 1862 N.27. A letter from the Minister of Colonials Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁷³ NA BuZa, 24 March 1862 N.7. A letter dated 20 March 1862 N.24 from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁷⁴ NA BuZa, 4 April 1862 N.4. The report to the king dated 5 March 1862 N.27 by the Ministers of Colonial and Foreign Affairs dated 3 April 1862 N.89.

The Von Siebold incident – an obstacle to the Triple Entente

At this point it is essential to mention a particular event, namely Von Siebold's banishment from Edo which is mentioned in this same report. Von Siebold's banishment can also be considered a result of the Anglo- Dutch- French Triple Entente. As a representative of the NHM, Von Siebold was stationed in Japan. He had been deported from Japan after what became known as the Von Siebold Incident of 1825. This banishment was rescinded by the treaty of 1858. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs wanted to recover the dominant position in Japan of the Dutch after it had been lost because of this treaty. Therefore, the Ministry had sent Von Siebold, the expert on Japan.⁵⁷⁵ In this letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the king, Von Siebold was mentioned as follows: 'One can accept that in Europe nobody can be found who has made such a particular study of Japanese laws, morals and usages as Von Siebold has done.'⁵⁷⁶

As he was very proud of his knowledge of Japanese Affairs, Von Siebold thought that he would be sent there and be appointed as Consul-General.⁵⁷⁷ Even after Von Siebold had been expelled because he had bought maps of Japan and Korea drawn by Inô Tadataka from the court astronomer, Takahashi Kageyasu, he was still respected by many Japanese as their former teacher in various branches of scientific knowledge. After Von Siebold's return to Japan, he actively pursued his own Japanese policy. However, he was about to undergo a rude awakening.

The murder of a Dutchman in American service, Harry C.T. Heusken (1832-61) in Edo in 1861 was symptomatic of the fact how dangerous Edo was for foreigners at that time. Von Siebold, however, seemingly took no notice of this and eagerly taught European technology and civilization to the Japanese researchers there.⁵⁷⁸ Nevertheless, inklings of the problems encountered by

⁵⁷⁵ NA Koloniën no.3142, 3 April no. 152, Geheim.

⁵⁷⁶ Mac Lean, 'Philipp Franz von Siebold and the opening of Japan, 1843-1866', p.59.

⁵⁷⁷ Kutsuzawa, 'Dainiji rainichiji ni okeru Shīboruto no gaikōkatsudō', p.237.

⁵⁷⁸ Von Hans korner, 'Die Wurzburger Siebold. Eine Gelehrtenfamilie des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, Mit 87 Bildnissen und 55 Abbildungen', Leipzig 1967, Takeuchi Seiichi (trans.), *Shīboruto Fūshiden*, ('A biography of Siebold and his son'), Sōzōsha, 1973,

foreigners in Japan did filter down to him. To the extent that Von Siebold even wrote an essay about these incidents. It was published and could be found in the Dutch newspaper too. Here follow the contents of that piece in a nutshell:

Concerning the series of assaults on foreigners, foreign representatives criticized the indifferent attitude of the Japanese government. Von Siebold also consulted with the Japanese Representative of Foreign Affairs about this issue. He pointed out that it was necessary not only to search the culprits, but also to pursue the reasons and motives of these kinds of crimes. Although this official promised to take action, Von Siebold, did not believe that this would add up to anything. He commented that according to this Japanese official. 'Japan is composed of many domains. Each *daimyō* rules his domain autonomously...In this country, some *daimyō* close their domain and do not admit any kind of outside investigation access. Moreover there are many temples and shrines in Japan. Every criminal who pretends to be a pilgrim, a mendicant monk or a priest can easily find a hiding place among them. In this situation, it is difficult or almost impossible for the *Bakufu* to find a culprit. On many occasions it has already happened that even a vicious criminal such as a parricide could not be found. At present, it has only proved possible to arrest a few criminals. Furthermore, the *Bakufu* is expected to pursue and investigate the reason and motive for the murder.'

Von Siebold argued that it was very difficult for the *Bakufu* to solve these kinds of problem because of the nature of the political system in Japan: 'After the conclusion of the first treaty on 31 March 1854, the *Bakufu* had a serious problem. Some influential exclusionists had either left politics or changed their viewpoint. It has been confirmed to the Japanese people that it is impossible to struggle current trends in the world. The *Bakufu* is doing its best to fulfil the terms of the treaties and to protect foreigners to order to promote the interests of Japan and trade. In spite of these positive situations, however, the biggest obstacle is public opinion in Japan. It is undeniable that leaders of national parties and fanatical believers in the old system have strengthened various rumours and have deepened the former Japanese prejudice towards foreigners. Naturally, the present political situation and recent painful bloody affairs in Japan are the outcome of this situation.'...

Von Siebold remarked that the *Bakufu* had been able to maintain peace in

the country for over 200 years, not by force but by the spirit of the law. The Japanese nation deeply respected the law and the legislator and it would not be easy to change the national way of thinking immediately by force. He therefore believed that the foreign representatives should modify their opinions, shed their doubts about the Japanese, and reduce their requests and suppress their dissatisfaction with the *Bakufu* in these conditions. Because it should be clear to anyone that the *Bakufu* could not be held responsible for all these extraordinary incidents. He concluded: 'Therefore the *Bakufu* is making real endeavours to establish new credit among foreigners in order to improve the present situation in Japan.'⁵⁷⁹

Von Siebold analyzed the reason for the series of assaults on foreigners and the reaction of the *Bakufu* by looking at the political system and the history in Japan. He remained favourably inclined towards Japan, but the other foreign nations were adamant that the *Bakufu* should prevent this kind of accident. In their opinion the failure of the Bakufu to take measures against these murderous attacks showed that the political system had already collapsed. Consequently, Von Siebold's opinion of Japan did not agree with the views held by other foreign countries.

As a result of all this, the Japanese authorities did not pay much heed to the Dutch Consul-General in Japan, De Wit. Von Siebold had told the magistrate of Nagasaki that De Wit was a moderate person, but that he did not understand Japanese affairs, and that therefore the Governor-General in the Netherlands East Indies had asked him to advise De Wit on these matters.⁵⁸⁰ De Wit clearly was not amused by Von Siebold's behaviour and reported to his Government how much trouble he experienced on account of him.⁵⁸¹ As a result of this Von Siebold was recalled. In Japan there was sympathy for Von Siebold, and it was said that De Wit had ordered Von Siebold to leave Japan because he was jealous of his fame.⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁹ 'The attack on the British mission in Edo – considered from the historical and political aspects by Siebold as Kolonal bij den algem. Staf van het Nederl. Ind. Leger' on 14 and 16 November 1861 no. 315 and 317 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

⁵⁸⁰ Kutsuzawa, 'Dainiji rainichiji ni okeru Shīboruto no gaikōkatsudō', p.238.

⁵⁸¹ NA BuZa, 11 June 1862 N.21. A letter from the Dutch Consul-General on Deshima to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies dated 2 January 1862.

⁵⁸² See Kure Shūzō, *Shīboruto sensei, Sono shōgai oyobi kōgyō* ('Teacher Von Siebold, his life

In other quarters it was remarked that Von Siebold, although he held the title of colonel in the Netherlands East Indies army and was an official adviser to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, he was in reality Pro-Russian. Moreover, if Von Siebold were to remain longer in Japan, the Japanese Government might think that the Netherlands supported this Japanese plan to admit that Nagasaki should be the only free port in Japan and this was contrary to Dutch interests. Furthermore, it was worried that its own diplomatic course was contradicted. Therefore the Dutch Government thought that the time had come to make a decision.⁵⁸³ Although all this may have been true, I believe, that this affair should be seen as the inevitable result of the principle of Dutch co-operation with England and France, the Entente, which did not leave space for such independent behaviour. Von Siebold disliked England and France, in spite of the Dutch plan for an Entente, and in addition he was pro-Russian.⁵⁸⁴ The banishment of the Japanese expert Von Siebold is a clear indication of how important this Entente was considered to be in the Netherlands.

Russia itself, however, did not believe either the Dutch or Von Siebold's opinions. After the opening of Japan, Russia sent Yevfimy Vasilyevich Putyatin (1803-1883) to Japan. In his instruction he was told to pay courtesy to the Dutch, but he should not believe them too much; He should not ask the Dutch to mediate during the negotiations with the Japanese Government. Russia still doubted the Netherlands after the incident of Nikolai Petrovitch Rezanov (1764-1807) in 1804.⁵⁸⁵ Therefore, when Putyatin's mission arrived in Nagasaki and negotiated with Japan, he politely declined the proposal of the magistrates of Nagasaki that he be supported by the Dutch.⁵⁸⁶ Von Siebold suggested that

and contribution'), Heibonsha (3 volumes, reprinted), 1967-68. Shuzo Kure, *Philipp Franz von Siebold Leben und Werk*, Deutsche, wesentlich vermehrte und ergänzte Ausgabe, bearbeitet von Friedrich M. Trautz, Herausgegeben von Hartmut Walravens, Vol.1, Monographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien der Philipp-Franz-von-Siebold-Stiftung, 1996, p.369.

⁵⁸³ Kutsuzawa, 'Dainiji rainichiji ni okeru Shīboruto no gaikōkatsudō', p.252.

⁵⁸⁴ See Mac Lean, p.72.

⁵⁸⁵ Yasuda Kōichi, 'Roshia no Nihon kaikokukōshō to Shīboruto' ('Russian negotiations with Japan about its opening and Siebold'), in: Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio (ed.), *Shīboruto to Nihon no Kaikoku*, p.168.

⁵⁸⁶ Yasuda, 'Roshia no Nihon kaikokukōshō to shīboruto', p.178.

Nagasaki should be the sole port for trade in Japan. However, in his letter to the Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senyavin, dated December 16, Putyatin reported that 'Generally, I cannot follow Von Siebold's advice. It would not be preferable for Russia to choose the port of Nagasaki as we would have to compete with the Dutch there. Also, the Japanese in Nagasaki used to apply an insulting pressure on foreigners during negotiations....'⁵⁸⁷ Von Siebold returned to Europe. After that, he tried to promote his plans with Napoleon III in France. This proved a forlorn hope and he died while residing in Munich in October 1866.⁵⁸⁸

Opinion in the Netherlands about the murder of Heusken

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant which frequently discussed Japanese affairs as we have seen, also devoted much attention to the murder of the Dutchman Harry Heusken, who had served as the interpreter of the American envoy. Here follow some excerpts:

'Heusken had a moderate character and the Foreign Consuls in Edo were proud of him. He was born in Amsterdam and he went to Japan with Harris in 1855 as a Dutch translator. He had a good command of Japanese. He could speak and understand it as well as the Japanese. Therefore, in the negotiations the Japanese could not ask whether Heusken could understand. This much irritated the Japanese diplomats. Moreover, he had worked as the translator for England, France and more recently Prussia...Heusken hunted down every source to locate problems [that might stall the diplomacy] in Japan. His logical method of negotiation was very difficult for the Japanese, who were very sceptical and faithless, to cope with as they could not deny his logic. They hated him and as a consequence, they murdered him. He was sacrificed for his firm confidence and eagerness.'

After these sentences, the article went on to criticize the involvement of the Japanese Government in this incident. Foreign Representatives left Edo for

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, p.188.

⁵⁸⁸ Miyazaki Michio, 'Shīboruto no Nihonkaikoku kindaika heno kōken' ('Siebold's contribution to the opening of Japan and its modernization'), in: Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio(red.), *Shīboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindaika*, p. 305.

Yokohama in order to show their strong opprobrium to the Japanese government. However, only Harris did not leave Edo. The article comments on this issue, as below.

‘Harris’ behaviour is incomprehensible. He remains in Edo alone, even though his fellow-national has been murdered. After the death of Heusken, Harris hatched a wonderful ploy that he (Heusken) should revert to being Dutch again. Heusken had been born in Amsterdam and had never acquired American nationality. Under Dutch law, however, a Dutch person cannot work for a foreign military service or a foreign government without the assent of the Dutch king. Hence Heusken had forfeited his Dutch nationality. Therefore Harris wanted to exploit this wonderful plan to make him Dutch again because he wanted to circumvent this situation. However it did not work. After all, American diplomacy is very special in Japan. Therefore if a linguist should want to express this kind of American diplomacy in words, he would have to create new words for it.’⁵⁸⁹

Harry Heusken, had indeed greatly contributed to the handling of the Japanese affairs of the United States, the strong rival of the Netherlands in the negotiations with Japan. This article in the NRC daily displays how complicated the evaluation in Europe of the extremely intricate and critical situation in Japan had become.

After the murder of Heusken, the Dutch Vice-Consul in Edo, Van Polsbroek took charge of the Entente’s relations and left Edo with the British and France representatives. Van Polsbroek had worked in the Netherlands East Indies before he went to Nagasaki as a secretary to Donker Curtius. He was promoted to Consul and became well acquainted with Japanese affairs. He was generally thought of as an independently minded person: ‘Since he recognized that the Japanese government attached importance to England, the United States, France and Russia and thought little of the Netherlands, he always adopted measures to maintain Dutch influence by co-operating with England and France.’⁵⁹⁰ This impression is indeed confirmed by his diary. De Graeff had a fresh look at the developments within Japanese society and he was very

⁵⁸⁹ ‘Colonies’ on 14 May 1861 no. 132 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

⁵⁹⁰ Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi*, p.335-336. H.J. Moeshart (ed), *Journaal van Jonkheer Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek, 1857-1870, Belevnissen van een Nederlands diplomaat in het negentiende eeuwse Japan*, Assen, 1987.

unhappy with the passive behaviour of Consul-General De Wit in Nagasaki.

Harris remained in Edo alone, because he did not want to force the *Bakufu* into a tight corner, saying, 'Since I have changed the system of seclusion that continued over 200 years, this has aroused anti-foreign feeling among the Japanese. Therefore the United States has to strongly support the Japanese government in order to reach its aim: its opening.'

Reminiscing about those days, one of the mounted policemen, Ebara Soroku (江原素六, 1842-1922) said that Harris did not stop his daily customary ride from his consulate (Zenpuku Temple in Azabu 麻布の善福寺) to Ohoribata (城濠端) throughout this dangerous period. On every occasion, a group of mounted policemen (別手組) was obliged to escort him in a cluster.⁵⁹¹ Harris therefore was remaining in Edo alone.

The credit and popularity of Harris carried more and more weight with the Japanese. Finally, the Japanese always asked his advice in difficult diplomatic problems.⁵⁹² 'When Harris returned to his country, the shogun conferred a Japanese sword on him. Later, Harris presented it to General Grant, 'who saved our fatherland, the United States, from devastation in the Civil War.'⁵⁹³ The Japanese Government granted ten thousand taels of silver to Heusken's mother.⁵⁹⁴

The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the British Government that the Dutch Government wished to reach as strong a mutual understanding as possible among the representatives of the signatory powers to the treaty in Edo. The British Government completely agreed with this proposal and promised to offer information concerning Japan to the Dutch Government. On this occasion, the Dutch ambassador in London, Bentinck, advised his government to inform the British that the Netherlands was generally in agreement with the decisions of the British Cabinet.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹¹ *Ebara Sorokuden*. See Sakata, *Harisu*, pp.249-250.

⁵⁹² Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi*, p.336.

⁵⁹³ Sakata, *Harisu*, p.252.

⁵⁹⁴ Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi*, p.339.

⁵⁹⁵ NA BuZa, on 29 April 1862 N16 (exh.). A letter from Bentinck to the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 25 1862 N82.

The significance of Triple Entente

In 1862 the European signatory powers to the treaty with Japan were waiting for the Japanese envoy to arrive in Europe. The British Foreign Secretary, Russell, had received a letter from the plenipotentiary in Edo, Alcock, which reported that it would be impossible to start new negotiations with this envoy. In view of this information, the British Government informed Bentinck that it had no intention of negotiating with the Japanese envoy and it would receive the envoy warmly, but only ceremonially. Furthermore, it informed him that it would be very pleased for its government to know that the Dutch representative would co-operate with the British and French representatives.⁵⁹⁶ As a result of this letter, the Dutch Government informed the French Government about this plan forged by the Entente.⁵⁹⁷

Because the Netherlands took the initiative in the Triple Entente, by examining only Dutch documents concerning this issue, it may be difficult to recognize how much importance the other major powers England and France attached to it. In view of the British reply to this Dutch plan for the Entente, it does not seem that England considered this Entente very important. But in consideration of the difficult situation for Western powers in Japan at that time, I believe this Entente was useful to both England and France. After the opening of Japan, the Japanese Government experienced many problems inside and outside its country. Inside Japan, the anti-foreign movement had to be suppressed, and outside, it had to deal with the many demands made by the Western powers. In particular, it was very difficult for the Japanese Government to deal with the multifarious demands made by various countries immediately. In this situation, the most effective course was for Western powers to decide upon common demands for Japan, because its Government would more easily agree to these cut.and.dried demands by the West.

Certainly, the 'Entente' was the best means for the Netherlands to secure its own interests in Japan. It should be remembered that the Netherlands was afraid of completely losing its influence in Japan, if its own diplomacy should unexpectedly cause a disagreement with other great powers and it suffered a serious failure. Such a disaster should be avoided at all costs as long as the aim

⁵⁹⁶ NA BuZa, 22 April 1862 N82 on 29 April 1862 N16 (exh.).

⁵⁹⁷ NA BuZa, 30 April 1862 N.5 on 30 April 1862 N6 (exh.).

of the Netherlands was to restore its former influence in Japan, or rather expand it by exploiting what remained of the friendly sentiments towards the Netherlands.

The Netherlands, however, tried not to become involved in the political side of Japanese affairs with great Western powers, and took measures to restrict its Japanese affairs to trade, because Japan was very important as a new market for colonial products from the Netherlands East Indies, or indeed for all its Asian trade, especially the Chinese trade that had recently been revitalized, including the markets of Korea and Russia. Setting its sights firmly on this policy, the Dutch Government dealt only with political problems in Japan when these happened to concern trade. Hence, the Netherlands concentrated on its own trade in Japan and tried to make as much profit there as much as possible, while maintaining its relationship on the basis of the 'Entente' with England and France. In such a situation, the Dutch bonded warehouse in Deshima became the most important issue for the Netherlands.

Chapter 12

The endeavor to acquire vested rights

Deshima as a Dutch bonded warehouse

Mindful of the relationship enshrined in the Dutch-British-French triple Entente, the Netherlands avoided as much as possible political issues that might lead to difficulties in Japanese affairs. Of course, the Netherlands tried to increase its profits on trade. An example of this Dutch diplomacy towards Japan is that the Dutch Government tried to acquire of bonded warehouse for Deshima for goods imported by the Dutch. Since Deshima was leased, this artificial island was not Dutch property, even though the Dutch did have exclusive use of the island in the period of seclusion, the so-called *Sakoku*. After the opening of Japan, the function of Deshima changed according to the conventions and treaties that were concluded between the Netherlands and Japan.

The development in the function of Deshima will be analyzed briefly. The Dutch Government wanted to conclude a treaty with Japan in order to secure its interests on the basis of its long relationship. On the other hand, the Japanese Government was always reluctant to take this step. After a temporary agreement between the Netherlands and Japan that was concluded in advance of the treaty, the Dutch-Japanese treaty was finally concluded in 1856. The Dutch Government acknowledged that Deshima had the function of a bonded warehouse in these agreements. The following year the supplementary Treaty of 1857, which became part of the treaty of 1856, was concluded. This treaty contained commercial regulations, which stipulated that the trade would be carried out in such a way as to expand the existing trade in Nagasaki. Nevertheless, the regulations did not restrict the amount of trade and the number of ships, and also admitted the free trade of other foreign countries. It seemed that the Dutch right to Deshima would offer a great advantage in the Japanese market and that this was the sole privilege that the Dutch could derive from the long relationship with Japan. The Dutch Government intended to increase profits in Japanese trade and in other markets in Asia too, by exploiting this right. However, differences arose on both sides about the interpretation of

the stipulation regarding Deshima in the additional Dutch-Japanese treaty. The Dutch Government continued its efforts to ensure this old Dutch privilege after the treaties of 1858 which had regulated free trade and had no provision for privileges for particular countries.

Criticism in Dutch public opinion about Dutch Government diplomacy

Dutch public opinion exerted a strong influence on the endeavors of the Dutch Government to maintain its position in Japan. The nation was greatly disappointed in the Dutch diplomacy towards Japan. This was illustrated in various ways either in journals or in letters written by the business communities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. An article with the ironic title 'Altruistic Policy in Japan' in *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië*, pointed out that the editor of this journal had advised the Government to follow different course of diplomacy towards Japan. This advice had been arrogantly rejected with the statement that the Netherlands should exercise its initiative in civilizing the Japanese nation and not in pursuing its own interests by setting a good example with 'Altruistic Policy'. As a result the Dutch government had expressed no desire for anything and no monopoly on trade, but only expected a reasonable return for the shown kindness. The author of this article concluded that this doctrine had been propagated in vain. He decried that opportunities had been missed: 'Actually our position in Japan was ideal for making profits during the abolition of its seclusion. Only the Netherlands among all the European powers had been admitted into Japan for over two centuries. The Dutch language was the sole European language there and only Dutch goods and our national flag were admissible in the Japanese markets and its ports. England and the United States were not concerned about entering Japan, when the Japanese Government changed its opinion and came to believe that civilized counties should be admitted into Japan.' ... 'What a great position could we have acquired at that time!

Curiously enough owing to the inflexible diplomacy pursued by the Ministers of Colonial Affairs towards Japan, the Netherlands was among the countries that were admitted into Japan, the last to have concluded a treaty. .. 'Various new facts come to light every day. We do not want to repeat

previous history. Nevertheless we have to remember the very fact that although a temporary treaty with Japan was submitted to our representative, our privileges fell far short of those that were granted to other countries. After a long time we managed to acquire the same conditions as other countries, while we gave Japan a huge present and fulfilled a great number of Japanese demands. The more contact the Japanese had with Western civilization, the more they demanded from us. Although the Netherlands gave the Japanese more things than other powers did, it acquired less in return. While the slogan 'Our navy is in decline' was making a most painful impression on the Government and the whole population, a warship of ours -the Soembing-was presented to Japan free of charge. All this expense, including that of other presents, made heavy inroads into the budget of the Netherlands East Indies. Someone says that the Japanese had incurred millions of guilders' worth of debts to us. Even so, our officers, engineers and soldiers were sent to Japan in order to transfer technology. The *Kambang trade* was sold for a few tons of gold belonging to the leaseholder.' Rather dramatically this author asked: 'After all what did we gain?'

He then went on to criticize that the first Japanese mission overseas departed for the United States for the purpose of exchanging instruments of ratification and not to the Netherlands, and that the English language was driving Dutch more and more out of Japan. The debts that had been incurred by the Japanese at Nagasaki were in this author's eyes another problem:

'If the Japanese need something, they ask the Dutch Commissioner, namely 'the Chief Merchant', as the Dutch representative is known, for it. What should we assume from this? We had been endeavoring to take the initiative in transferring Western civilization to Japan for a very long time. The Japanese Government purchased ships, machines, books and many goods from the Netherlands. This was at the expense of the Netherlands East Indies budget. When the budget was discussed a few years ago, a statesman asked the Minister of Colonial Affairs whether it was true that we were owed a large sum by the Japanese Government, and whether it was so difficult to collect such debts. The Minister of Colonial Affairs could not deny the latter and he answered that we had insisted on the payment of this sum. This year, in the report concerning the budget, the same issue was raised again. What was the answer? 'The signatory regrettably has to report. We received bad news about the payment of the Japanese Government debts...Therefore, Batavia suffered a

loss..... ”

‘From this report it is to be understood that the Dutch Government receives glasses and dishes from the Japanese Government and so on in exchange for Dutch articles. The Japanese still regard us as a merchant or broker whom they need not respect... Anyhow, what a shame! We have sacrificed our trade. Camphor and copper were once sent to the Netherlands. However, at present... We repeat the words of Van der Linden, the Governor-General in the Netherlands East Indies should pass on to the Dutch Commissioner ‘Oh, do not send any more glasses or dishes!’

‘We may be reading this conclusion with a laugh. Nevertheless it is a very important issue. That the Japanese treat us badly unfortunately results from our diplomacy. Meanwhile Japan does not always clear off its debts to us. The income of the Netherlands East Indies has considerably decreased, while Java has many costly matters. Under these circumstances the Japanese Government invites us into the garden and makes us recommend our wise ‘Altruistic Policy’.

‘Although we reiterate it, the responsibility rests with the colonial administration that always takes half measures and is incompetent in its affairs. The North Americans, the British and French sent a fleet to India. The Netherlands poured a great deal of wealth into the reconstruction of its navy. However, only one ship, the *Groningen*, appeared there; not to represent us but to work for the Japanese. The Dutch Commissioner in Japan, Donker Curtius, was ‘the chief of the Dutch merchants’ before. We insisted on his replacement, when Japan took another political direction. The Netherlands should be represented in Japan in another way. What happened next? His title was changed. The person, however, still held a very low rank. This measure had a bitter outcome, because appearance is very important in all Asian countries including Japan. Therefore, the Dutchman is always a merchant or a broker in their eyes. In short, the appearance has not been changed.’

‘Now finally two persons with another title have been sent to Japan. We have reported a few remarks about this recent appointment. We had hoped that a political representative and an expert in commerce should be in Japan, in consideration of our commercial interests. This did not happen. Meanwhile, thanks to it, we once again have realized how important this affair was to us. Our Government purchased the right of leaseholder in the *Kambang* trade in order to abolish the Japanese monopoly trade and to open its trade to civil

merchants. This trade should have eliminated self-sacrifice. What did we see? A petition had already been submitted to the Government a long time ago. The important merchants and the representatives in Japan asked the Minister of Colonial Affairs to give them more protection. Actually their position is unenviable. A few covetous Western investments aroused Japanese anger. The low level of trade in Japan has led to a dangerous situation. The Japanese Government did not want to open its ports and demanded a retraction of some compromises to do with currency. In fact the Japanese Government seriously damaged its relations with foreign countries and trade. Some Europeans have been murdered. On the pretext of protection, the Japanese keep other Europeans under severe control and in isolation. Two Dutch captains have also been murdered. Under these circumstances our trade in Japan needs the firm support and protection of our Government. The importance of support is clear from the second address concerning this trade in the Lower House which is published in this newspaper today.'

'How should we view this affair? The author bitterly asked after having poured out all this criticism against the government: 'We shall not stop repeating that the people in charge of the Government did not promote our interests in Japan properly. It is regrettable that we have to confirm our present situation. Our Japanese trade could have led to a splendid future. Probably, however, it is too late. Meanwhile, we cannot do anything about it. Our position in Japan may be lost at present. Dutch commerce and industry had great expectations of the opening of Japan to world trade. Recently an entrepreneur sent two ships loaded up with articles directly there. Unless our Government, however, seriously adopts a positive measure as soon as possible, trade will not flourish until the opening of Japan is an accomplished fact. This present situation frightens people. Hence the failures of Government officials are damaging the National Treasury. If the good behavior of our representatives can usher in a profitable dawn for our colonial interests and it is not too late, people can probably also do something about our affairs in Japan. The petition of our nationals in Japan should under no circumstances go unheeded.'⁵⁹⁸ This author was not the only one to vent his gall in frustration. Also the business community in the Netherlands and Japan commented on the failure of Dutch politics.

⁵⁹⁸ 'Unselfish Policy in Japan' on 21 January 1861 no. 21 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*.

Opinions in business circles about Deshima as a bonded warehouse

After the treaties of 1858 had been concluded, it became impossible for the Netherlands to pursue its own privileges won on the basis of its long relationship. Under these circumstances, how would one be able to attain the aim of turning Deshima into a bonded warehouse? This question will be examined below. The Minister of Colonial Affairs asked business circles their opinions about this matter. In reply to his request, the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Amsterdam expressed his opinion as follows: 'Naturally, in the first place -as your Excellency pointed out- placing our goods in bond here has been taken into consideration. This would be very valuable for our trade, if the Japanese Government itself would undertake the construction of bonded warehouses in every opened harbor, from where goods could be freely imported and exported at its own expense. Such a measure would generally provide a great convenience for this trade and it would offer a great advantage; it would set the rule, which the Japanese Government had failed to implement anyhow, that every merchant can place his goods, as it were, in a civilian bonded warehouse, null and void.

The lack of regulations concerning such bonded warehouses is a large lacuna that should be dealt with in present treaties, and our Government would act not only to its own advantage, but also in the interest of other European countries, if the construction of such bonded warehouses were officially requested of Japan. Our first step would be to request the support of your Excellency for this general regulation. At the same time, we would also want to add the regulation that the island, *Deshima*, should be clearly treated as a bonded warehouse.

We share the opinion of your Excellency on this matter. So far, we see no reason to abandon the favorable position in Japan that our long commercial intercourse with Japan has given us in comparison to the other European nations completely. We would not act in the best interest of our trade, if we did not exploit the position which we *de facto* have obtained. Indeed, we do not intend to establish even one regulation in which only the goods from the Netherlands or the Dutch colonies would enjoy this privilege. Such a limitation

is not appropriate in the current times. No, we only wish that Deshima will be given the status of a bonded warehouse, so that the Dutch can freely import and export all goods from Deshima. At the same time, it is necessary to take into consideration that the free commercial intercourse with Nagasaki is not disturbed. This briefly is our opinion about placing goods in a bonded warehouse in Japan. In case, suitable measures for these two demands not be found, we would still wish that the paid tariff was at least returned in case of re-export.'

Thereupon the president of the chamber of commerce asked the minister to promote, the issue of the opening of Osaka.: 'The advantageous position of this city on the shores of the Inland Sea as well as the circumstances in which rich merchants live and that a canal connects the city with the immense, populous city Miaco are the reasons the opening of Osaka to general trade is very important. The commercial policy is the measure which makes the traffic fruitful for both parties.'⁵⁹⁹

The president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Rotterdam also pointed out the importance of a bonded warehouse in order to simplify commercial transactions. He advised the Minister of Colonial Affairs that 'It would probably be unfeasible and inadvisable to require this right of a bonded warehouse exclusively for the Netherlands, because it would stir up extreme envy among other countries. If anything, this measure will succeed through the co-operation with great seaborne powers.' He also pointed out the importance of Osaka rather than of Edo. Besides, he claimed that it was necessary to station one or more warships in the Japanese waters, because it was very difficult to maintain even the slightest Dutch influence in Japan without them. Moreover, since Dutch shipping in Chinese waters was increasing, he demanded that the Dutch naval force in these waters be reinforced in order to suppress pirates and to make the Dutch name familiar there.⁶⁰⁰ His request to reinforce the Dutch naval force in Chinese waters was based on this situation, that the Netherlands

⁵⁹⁹ NA BuZa, 6 June 1862 N16 (exh.). A letter from the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Amsterdam to the Minister of Colonial Affairs dated 24 April 1862 on 26 April 1862 N23.

⁶⁰⁰ NA BuZa, 6 June 1862 N16 (exh.). A letter from the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Rotterdam to the Minister of Colonial Affairs dated 25 April 1862 on 28 April 1862 N27.

did not have the same rights in China as England, the United States, France, or even Prussia and even the Hanseatic cities which seemed to have little connection with commerce in the regions.⁶⁰¹

Having received these requests from the presidents of the two most important Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs also consulted the NHM. The NHM replied to his questions and, furthermore, submitted a lengthy report to him.

Concerning the bonded warehouse which was only granted to the Netherlands under the Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1856, the president of the NHM answered that he felt that it was always the principle of treaties concluded with Japan by the Dutch Government that privileges conceded to other countries should also be enjoyed by the Netherlands. Therefore he regarded it as inadvisable to acquire exclusive privileges as specified by the article provided in the former treaty, but never applied in reality.' The NHM highly valued the idea that the Japanese Government would establish a bonded warehouse in its open ports, which was the next question of the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The reason was that the idea was considered useful not only to the Netherlands but also to the signatory powers of a treaty with Japan. The NHM also pointed out that Japanese trade was very important on account of Japan being close to China.⁶⁰²

This lengthy NHM report was written in preparation for the negotiations with the Japanese mission which would also be visiting the Netherlands soon. The NHM wrote that it welcomed the prospect of availing itself of the presence of this mission in the interest of trade between the Netherlands and Japan. Regarding the openings of the ports in Japan, the NHM was of the opinion that the postponement in the opening of Niigata, would not entail great losses. Neither had the NHM had objections to postponing the opening of Edo on account of the antipathy towards foreigners there at present, and in view of the prospect that the Dutch trade would develop on a large scale from Kanagawa

⁶⁰¹ NA BuZa, 6 June 1862 N16 (exh.). A letter from the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Rotterdam to the Minister of Colonial Affairs dated 17 January 1862 on 28 April 1862 N27.

⁶⁰² NA BuZa, 6 June 1862 N16 (exh.). A letter from the NHM to the Minister of Colonial Affairs dated 5 May 1862 N29 on 6 May 1862 N32. This letter might have been written by the then president E.P. de Monchy.

near in Edo. On the other hand, the NHM greatly welcomed the opening of Hyôgo and Ôsaka for trade, because these places were located in the most productive regions, that produced silk, tea, oil etc., and their locations were suitable to shipping. Here the same arguments were used as those already uttered by the presidents of the chambers of commerce. The swift opening of Ôsaka would have a great advantage, because domestic transportation was so expensive that it has prevented the sale of products of Dutch commerce and industry:

‘These products can be distributed throughout the country from Osaka less expensively. Furthermore, the importance of the Dutch import trade in these regions is obvious from the fact that twelve ships arrived here directly from the Netherlands and two from Java, filled to capacity with Dutch industrial products, in two and a half years. Moreover, Dutch ships sail these seas frequently and effectively. Since there is no danger in Hyogo and Osaka, we wish the Government would promote these openings. We are acquainted with the system of intimidation which the Japanese Government is wont to use. The Japanese Government exaggerates the danger of contingencies and attributes its refusal to open these harbors to our security.’⁶⁰³

The NHM saw Osaka as the Japanese commercial city *par excellence*. Since this point was worthy of serious consideration, the NHM asked the Minister of Colonial Affairs how long Japan proposed to postpone the opening of the two harbors.

Regarding the English proposal to open a harbor at Tsushima near Korea, the NHM believed that the British Government proposed this concession ‘more in the British political interest than in its economic interest.’ England aimed at opening that harbor to hold Russia in check⁶⁰⁴

On the subject of the bonded warehouse, the NHM said that it would be preferable to encourage the establishment of a national bonded warehouse by the Japanese Government, rather than of a civilian bonded warehouse as had been suggested by the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The NHM was of the opinion that it would be appropriate to the Dutch to demand that as many

⁶⁰³ NA BuZa, 19 July 1862 N12 (exh.). A letter from a Dutch merchant in Yokohama to the Minister of Colonial Affairs dated 15 April 1862 N29 on 18 July 1862 N20.

⁶⁰⁴ NA BuZa, 2 December 1861 N1 (exh.), Geheim. A letter from Oliphant to the British Consul Hammond in Shanghai dated 8 September 1861.

commercial obstacles be removed as possible in places which were already opened for foreigners in Japan, if the Japanese wish was granted that the opening of new harbors were postponed. Therefore, it was suggested that 'We might draw attention to the lack of sufficient suitable landing places in Yokohama (Kanagawa).'

Regarding tariffs the following was remarked: 'We must acknowledge that for some articles, which include linen, the import articles are to be regarded as very reasonable, as they do not exceed 5 per cent. All goods were subject to a 20 per cent tariff, except some goods of a little lower tariff mentioned in the treaty and the liquor at a 35 per cent tariff.' The NHM considered glass, china, medical supplies, horn, soap as well as all products produced in the archipelago of the Netherlands East Indies as Dutch export goods, and it noted that 'by the increase in trade which is expected for colonial products, it would not seem improper that a tax cut be introduced, at least for some goods, and it is highly suitable that the Dutch Government should make an effort in this direction, because not only has it set the example of a generous tariff rate to the other European nations for several years, but also is trying to apply the system of generous tariff to markets of the Netherlands East Indies as much as possible.'

Furthermore, the NHM pointed out to the Minister of Colonial Affairs the following problem relevant to the Japanese trade: 'While the Netherlands has lost a privilege that we enjoyed for several centuries through the abolition of the exclusive trading rights in Nagasaki, [and moreover] competition with other nations has arisen through the opening of this harbor in which every nation is free to do its utmost, surely it need not surprise us that Russia, England, France, and America have already immediately overshadowed the Netherlands by the large scale of their trade and their display of force. Furthermore, if against our wishes and expectations the necessity should occur to enforce the demands of foreign countries through the display of force and through military intimidation, the Netherlands shall always occupy an extremely subordinate rank.' The NHM appealed to the Minister for demonstrations of Dutch naval power in Japanese waters.

At the end of this report, the NHM set out a future course for a unique Dutch diplomacy towards Japan: 'It is fortunate that our nation carries some weight in another area. We allude to the area of the arts and sciences. It offers a better foundation for international relations than getting things done by the use

of sheer force. The Japanese owe their experience of European civilization exclusively to our nation: both its navy and its steam engine were shaped by us, and so was the knowledge of medicine and shipbuilding. It is inevitable that materials of scientific and artificial knowledge will flow [into Japan] which were acquired only by our agency before, proportionately as the relation with foreign nations increases. Besides this precedence, which will never lose its value, however, we still possess the privilege that up to present the Dutch language is the only [foreign] language known. It is the native language, so to speak, in the intellectual world of Japan, and it shall retain a certain predominance for many more years. It is surely an honorable task to maintain this influence and to retain as many teachers as possible in Japan, including in fields other than shipbuilding, military affairs, and mining. Therefore, we were extremely gratified that the Japanese Government applied to us through the agency of our representative to acquire a master shipbuilder and an engineer from the Netherlands last year. We flatter ourselves that we have fulfilled these requests. It seems that we may understand from this request that the Netherlands has not yet completely lost its cachet in Japan. At present, it seems that the Dutch have lost the opportunity to maintain or expand this influence by formal means, because the regulation of the relationship between the Dutch and Japanese Governments was changed. We do believe, however, that ways can be found to be active in this spirit indirectly.'

Finally, the NHM emphasized that the status of the Dutch representative in Japan should not be inferior to those of other countries, especially the French, British, and American ones. It worried that trouble might occur in collaboration with other representatives because of this problem. Moreover, the NHM pointed out the importance of Deshima: 'Because the branch at Deshima offers the Dutch so many conveniences, it is understandable that they have a certain predilection for it. This branch, however, need not suffer under a change of seat for the Dutch representative.' For this reason, the NHM noted that 'The only difference will be that our representative, instead of being posted in a remote corner of Japan and receiving only occasional messages from the center of diplomatic world, shall henceforth be able to give his instructions to the consul or vice-consul in Deshima, Kanagawa and elsewhere. Since we also highly value the security and the interests of the residents at Deshima, these shall never be at risk at all through a reorganization based on our report about

Deshima.⁶⁰⁵

Requests lodged by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the NHM regarding Dutch trade in Japan make clear that the Netherlands had surely lost its past privileges and that its influence had grown weaker; however, vestiges of the special influence that only the Dutch had still remained, and the Netherlands intended to maintain and expand such a special influence as much as possible, and by doing so expected to gain commercial profits. These business circles were of the opinion that they did not intend to pursue the Dutch national privilege, but their own economic interests in Japanese affairs, therefore, they were not going to take big risks in an attempt to expand the market. They had answered the questions put by the Minister of Colonial Affairs on the basis of their economic interests, which is quite understandable.

The ways of these business circles, however, were at variance with those of the Minister of Colonial Affairs. He wanted to acquire 'economic interests' in the Japanese market, and also to safeguard the Dutch 'national privilege' in the additional treaty of 1857. Even the Consul-General in Japan, De Wit, who was supposed to watch over Dutch national privilege, had also reported that 'It seemed better to me not to conceal the matter of the bonded warehouse, but to try directly to gain a privilege for all harbors, which should not be restricted to Deshima. This would have more chance of success.'⁶⁰⁶ Therefore, these reports were likely to greatly disappoint the Minister.

The Dutch headquarters remain in Nagasaki, and a sea route is planned between Nagasaki and China

Despite everything, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was determined to secure Dutch predominance and its privileges in Nagasaki, and to turn the city into a center for the Dutch Asian trade. The unequivocal proof of this intention is found in a report by De Wit. He reported that 'Trade is very active in Nagasaki,

⁶⁰⁵ NA BuZa, 6 June 1862 N16 (exh.). A letter from the NHM to the Minister of Colonial Affairs dated 10 May 1862 N30 on 12 May 1862 N88.

⁶⁰⁶NA BuZa, 18 June 1862 N19 (exh.). A letter from the Dutch Consul-General to the governor-general of the Netherlands East Indies dated 18 February 1862 on 17 June 1862 N32.

owing especially to the export of goods to Shanghai for the Chinese market such as coal, charcoal, wood, fish, and marine products in the last month.’ Japanese trade was closely linked to Chinese trade. The Netherlands had a plan to establish a Nagasaki-Shanghai route for shipping. It was expected that in the future it would become easier to bring Chinese products to Japan and Japanese products to China. Moreover, this line could develop into a large Dutch trading area in Asia by connecting the markets of the Netherlands East Indies, Russia and Korea.⁶⁰⁷ In finding an answer to the reason the Netherlands continued to have its headquarters in Nagasaki, there was and still is the following explanation in Japan: ‘After the opening of Japan, the Netherlands continued to maintain its headquarters in Nagasaki where it had been for 200 years. The reason was that the Netherlands East Indies only rarely took an interest in the international politics that had to do with Japan and that the Consul-General in Japan was something of a coward and, moreover, was unwilling to undertake an excessive burden.’⁶⁰⁸

It was suggested that Consul-General De Wit remained in Nagasaki because he did not like Japan and was frightened of being assaulted like other foreigners.⁶⁰⁹ Certainly, the importance of Nagasaki was lost, after Yokohama was rapidly developed.⁶¹⁰ There is evidence to suggest that this development advanced more swiftly than the Dutch had expected. Be that as it may, this decision to settle in Nagasaki was an outcome of Dutch Asian policy at that time. The Dutch had good reasons for it, which have already been explained in the report of the Dutch merchant in Chapter 10. Checkland has also pointed out the geographical advantage of Nagasaki, but she says that ‘By the 1870s, in commercial terms Nagasaki was losing ground. Its residents believed that this was the fault of the Japanese officials there.’⁶¹¹ This Dutch policy was also

⁶⁰⁷ NA BuZa, 17 June 1862 N41 (exh.). A report in April by the Dutch Consul-General on 16 June 1862 N8.

⁶⁰⁸ *Nihon kingendaishi-1, Ishin henkaku to kindai Nihon* (‘A modern and contemporary history of Japan-1, Meiji Restoration and modern Japan’), Iwanami shoten, 1993, p.84.

⁶⁰⁹ Moeshart, *Journaal van Jonkheer Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek 1857-1870*, 1987, p.19.

⁶¹⁰ H. Bosma, ‘Kômô-jin, Roodharige vreemdelingen op Deshima’ in: J. Vrieze(red.), *Kômô-jin, Roodharige vreemdelingen op Deshima – Nagasaki prenten en schilderijen uit de 18^e en 19^e eeuw*, Amsterdam, 1983, p.16.

⁶¹¹ Foreigners claimed that ‘the Guard houses erected last year are unworthy attempts to

justified by the comment of the Swiss Consul Rudolf Lindau (1829-1910), that 'Nagasaki, the large commercial center next to Shanghai, is the place where Europeans making plans to visit the Japanese coasts can prepare their journey in the most suitable conditions.'⁶¹² On the basis of this Asian policy, the Netherlands refrained from taking political initiatives in Japanese affairs, trying instead to have its opinions reflected in British and French policies and, through this, to gain as much commercial profit as possible.

There are various good contemporary reports about Nagasaki, stating not only that 'Nagasaki is one of the most beautiful harbors'⁶¹³ but also that 'In 1860, the trade of Nagasaki remarkably increased.'⁶¹⁴ Conversely, elsewhere there were pejorative comments made about Yokohama and Kanagawa, for instance, that 'Kanagawa is not a good port, because the depth of water in the coast is shallow, these places have an advantage as one of post-towns in the Japanese national road.'⁶¹⁵ This also shows that those involved were not quite sure which place would be best for international trade in the future. This fact should be taken into consideration.

At that time, the plan to connect Nagasaki with China by trade was mentioned in the report by De Wit: 'The plan of the Japanese Government to connect [Nagasaki] with China for commercial relations which I have reported, has still not been carried out; first a Dutch ship was employed for the purpose of taking a committee of Japanese officials to Shanghai. In the meanwhile, it was sent there temporarily with a load of coal and charcoal. However, since the Japanese Government in Edo has not confirmed this committee, the charter of this ship was canceled. Nevertheless, it seems that the plan might be revived. A British ship has been already purchased in Nagasaki at the expense of the

restore the old Desima system'. Nagasaki Express, no.80, 22 July 1871, Prefecture Library, Nagasaki; Olive Checkland, *Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 1868-1912*, London, 1989, p.94.

⁶¹² Rudolph Lindau, *Un voyage autour du Japon*, 1864, Morimoto Hideo(trans), *Suisu Ryōji kara mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, ('Japan in the late Tokugawa era by a Swiss consul'), Shinjinbutsu ōraisha, 1986, p.68.

⁶¹³ Robert Fortune, *Yedo and Peking, 1863*, translated by Miyake Kaoru, *Bakumatsu Nihon tanhōki - Edo to Peking*, Kōdansya gakujujutsubunko, 1997, pp.26-27.

⁶¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p.42.

⁶¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp.48-49.

Japanese Government, which the Japanese intend to turn to this purpose.’⁶¹⁶

While the plan for the Shanghai-Nagasaki line did not work out too well, Dutch trade in Japan was actually very good. In the overall total amount of its Japanese trade, the Netherlands stood second place, next to England.⁶¹⁷ De Wit reported that the Japanese Government had ordered a warship with a steam engine of 350 hp and its accessories from the Dutch Government. On this occasion, he added to his same report that ‘I am pleased to be able to inform your Excellency of this proof of the good relationship between Japan and the Netherlands.’ After this sentence, De Wit continued with the following sentence: ‘...., while, moreover, the desire to preserve [this good relationship] is obvious from the announcement which I received at same time, namely, that the Japanese Government is intending to send some young people to the Netherlands before long in order to study shipbuilding there for a certain period.’⁶¹⁸ This report by De Wit must surely have pleased the Netherlands. Later De Wit received an order for various plants. About this order he wrote that ‘Your Excellency will probably be of the opinion that it may promote good relations, if this request were to be fulfilled by the Government.’ He also wrote that he dared to demand to receive the order about this matter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.⁶¹⁹

From this evidence, it seemed that the Netherlands would take advantage of the special feelings that still remained in Japan. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs, at least, did have such a plan. However, other institutions in the Netherlands did not share this opinion. Therefore, against its will, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs refrained from promoting its original view and acquiesced in the opinions of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁶¹⁶ NA BuZa, 17 June 1862 N41 (exh.). A report in April by the Dutch Consul-General on 16 June 1862 N8.

⁶¹⁷ NA BuZa, 29 April 1862 N16 (exh.).

⁶¹⁸ NA BuZa, 17 June 1862 N24 (exh.). A letter from the Dutch Consul-General in Japan to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies dated 3 April 1862 on 12 June 1862 N47.

⁶¹⁹ NA BuZa, 4 July 1862 N6 (exh.). A letter dated 3 July 1862 N.3.

Summary provided by the Minister of Colonial Affairs

In consultation with the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Amsterdam and Rotterdam and with the NHM, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs made a detailed report, entitled 'Points concerning which demands or requests will have to be made to Japan in the interest of the proper implementation of the treaties, or, more generally, the promotion of good relations with the Japan empire'. Since, from now on, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would take charge of Japanese affairs, as decided at the Cabinet meeting, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs sent this report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the government agency concerned.⁶²⁰

This report was made on the basis of the above-mentioned consultations with the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the NHM, and a common report by the ministries of Colonial and of Foreign Affairs dated 20 March 1862.⁶²¹ For this reason, most of its contents coincided with the earlier documents. The report said that the 'Entente' with England and France was important in order to formulate a policy towards the demand of the Japanese Government for the postponement of the opening of Edo, Osaka, and Hyogo. Although this policy was mentioned in the earlier document, in this report the Dutch Government confirmed that the Netherlands should try to obtain some concessions from Japan in exchange for the concessions it had made to Japan in the matter of the requested Postponement of the port openings, and the Dutch decision would more or less depend on other countries. On the other hand, since the term of postponement conceded by the British was too long, *for the time being*, it was considered unwise for the Dutch to approve of this British proposal.⁶²² The Dutch Government decided not to follow other powers' decisions that were not profitable for either the Netherlands or Japan. Hence, the Netherlands was not merely content to follow in the footsteps of great powers. Concerning an earlier demand by the British that a harbor near

⁶²⁰ NA BuZa, 11 June 1862 N21 (exh.). A report entitled: 'Punten, waaromtrent aan Japan vorderingen te doen of verlangens kenbaar te maken zijn in het belang van eene behoorlijke uitvoering der Tractaten of meer algemeen ter bevordering van goede betrekkingen met het Japansche Rijk' on 6 June 1862 N16.

⁶²¹ NA BuZa, 24 March 1862 (exh.) N21.

⁶²² The italicized words are stressed by being underlined in the original document.

Tsushima or Korea be opened as compensation for the postponement of the opening of Hyogo and Osaka, the Dutch Government thought that England would no longer insist on Tsushima, now that Russia had abandoned its settlement there.

Concerning the Dutch bonded warehouse, which was after all the most important issue for the Netherlands, the report states the following: Deshima already has the character of such a bonded warehouse. As instances of proof, it cites Article 18 of the provisional treaty dated 18 November 1855 and Article 17 dated 30 January 1856, where it is mentioned that ‘The inspection of goods only takes place when these goods are imported from Deshima to Japan or are carried from Japan to Deshima as has been the conventional way so far, and not when these goods are carried from ships to Deshima or from Deshima aboard the ships’. Referring to the development of treaty negotiations, the report says that ‘Although the then commissioner [Donker Curtius] had declared he attached great value to the position of Deshima as a bonded warehouse, this Article 17 of the former treaty was not inserted [into the treaty of 1858]. Moreover, it caused some surprise and dissatisfaction in the Dutch Government, all the more so, because it was asserted from this commissioner’s side that the Edo treaty of 1858 had abolished the special position of Deshima. The Government does acquiesce in this [Donker Curtius’] assertion...At the end of last year [1861], the Dutch Government again instructed the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to inquire whether Article 17 of the treaty of 1856 was still considered valid, or whether the principle of a civilian bonded warehouse had been approved and regulated by further consent of the Japanese Government.⁶²³ This is an indication that the Dutch have a good reason to suppose that they would be able to appeal to Article 17, should it prove necessary to do so. People in the Netherlands, however, regard the former special position of Deshima as having been *de facto* abolished.’

This last sentence seems to have been the outcome of the advice given by the NHM and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry that considered adhering to this privilege not very desirable. Referring to the Japanese position regarding the bonded warehouse of Deshima, the report by De Wit says:

‘I [De Wit] pointed out to the magistrate of Nagasaki that the most important point regarding Article 17 was that he, at the time when the new

⁶²³ In the margin, the note ‘the first is considered to be desirable by far’ is added.

treaty came into effect, had admitted a civilian bonded warehouse on Deshima, and that he had thus demonstrated that he regarded this principle as valid. Consequently, other measures had always been taken temporarily, on account of temporary circumstances such as the removal of the Land- and Water gate [on Deshima]. The reply [of the Japanese Government], however, was that it had not been its intention to admit the principle, since it had always been convinced that that sort of thing was not consistent with the articles of the new treaty; and that it had only admitted the civilian bonded warehouse in order to facilitate trade in general, not only for the Dutch on Deshima, but also for all other foreigners in Nagasaki, and then this measure could never be considered as a temporary substitute for, or as the result of the former position of Deshima. - [and moreover] that the Japanese Government made haste to repudiate and withdraw this measure, because its Government had established general regulations about this matter in view of all the articles in the new treaty, and these regulations conflicted with this measure. - that formerly Deshima, closed as it was by the Land-and Water Gates which offered protection against smuggling, could be considered a ship, but since Article 2 of the new treaty removed these gates, the former position on Deshima is naturally abolished; [and] furthermore, that the Japanese Government would have added an exception to the commercial regulations in this sense, should it would have had the intention to continue the former position of Deshima under the new treaty. And finally, that the Japanese Government had wanted to maintain the whole treaty of 1856 as a commemorative document, merely because of its solemn Preamble, but the Japanese Government thinks that all matters were satisfactorily regulated in the later treaty. Therefore, such a measure should have been specially inserted in the later treaty, if the Japanese had wanted to maintain a special privilege for the Netherlands.'

Even though the reply De Wit received from the Japanese authorities was negative, he remarked that 'although my attempts in the main issue have not succeeded, yet I flatter myself that they have done some good, namely, that they have made the Japanese Government generally aware of the idea of a bonded warehouse. If the Dutch Government relinquished its policy to make the Japanese Government accept the special position of Deshima, and required instead that a bonded warehouse for trade should be established in all open ports, I do not believe that there shall be any reason to regret the loss of a

privilege on Deshima.⁶²⁴

This situation made the Minister of Colonial Affairs cogitate that 'By reverting to the present [arrangements], it would seem as if something new was required which was exclusively in the Dutch interest'. Therefore, he remarked that 'this militates against the advice of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Amsterdam and Rotterdam and of the NHM. In their recommendations, a preference was expressed for the suggestion that had been made in the course of the consultation, to promote, the establishment of bonded warehouses in all Japanese ports that were opened to trade on a wider scale. Should this idea be realized it would be rewarded with a high estimation [by other countries] of trade, especially if it was executed as much as possible in accordance with regulations admissible to civilized nations in this matter. If the Netherlands - either immediately or, in view of the Entente with England and France that had been formed in principle, after consultation with these countries - proposes the condition of the establishment of the national bonded warehouses as a concession for the postponement of the execution of Article 2 in the treaty [of 1858] to the Japanese Government, then the Netherlands would surely have to be considered as acting in the spirit of the altruistic policy which it had pursued towards Japan for a considerable time, and as promoting the interests of trade in general.' As a consequence, although it seems to have been against his will, the Minister wrote that 'preferably no such conditions should be imposed as would be in the general interest, leaving aside, for the time being, as something to be dealt with separately, such conditions as would be in the exclusive interest of the Netherlands.'⁶²⁵

A few days later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a report entitled 'In treaties concluded with Japan [the following] has been agreed:' to the Dutch Cabinet in order to obtain assent for these above-mentioned measures as national policy. The content of this report coincides with that of the

⁶²⁴ NA BuZa, 24 November 1862 N11 (exh.). A report by the Dutch Consul-General in Japan to the General-Governor of the Netherlands East Indies dated 7 August 1862 on 22 November 1862 N28.

⁶²⁵ NA BuZa, 11 June 1862 N21 (exh.). A report: 'Punten, waaromtrent aan Japan vorderingen te doen of verlangens kenbaar te maken zijn in het belang van eene behoorlijke uitvoering der Tractaten of meer algemeen ter bevordering van goede betrekkingen met het Japansche Rijk' on 6 June 1862 N16.

report of 11 June 1862 N.21.⁶²⁶ This report says that the Dutch Government would co-operate with other powers in Japanese affairs again, but it did not need to abide by decisions which were not in the best interests of the Netherlands or of Japan. The following statements that express the Dutch diplomatic attitude are important: 'In consideration of the Japanese preference for the Netherlands (which is clear from the orders placed here and from the plan to send young people here in order to learn shipbuilding), it would be advisable for the Netherlands to show some measure of compliance. This compliance would not harm us relative to the other powers, because Article 9 of the treaty (most-favored-nation treatment) always remains in force.' Therefore, it was decided that 'If we take into account the British concession [to the Japanese demand for the postponement of the opening of its harbors] at present and the small force which we can have at our disposal to maintain our rights, it would be hardly in agreement with a good policy to persist obstinately in insisting on the rights acquired by the former treaties [of 1856 and 1857].' The proposals of the Dutch Government, as formulated in a Dutch Cabinet document of 25 July 1862, were a reaction to the fact that the treaties of 1856 and 1857 had never been put into effect. The document has an attached table in which the Dutch demands listed are compared to those of the British. This table makes it easy to understand the differences in their demands.⁶²⁷

This matter, however, came to a sudden end, because the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Ministry of Colonial Affairs that the matter of the bonded warehouse on Deshima would have to be settled by accepting the principle of a bonded warehouse in all open ports in Japan. Moreover, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that 'it would be desirable that, as of 1 January 1863, the Dutch Government no longer pay the rent for the ground and buildings on Deshima, but that the rent should be paid to the Japanese Government by the civilian merchants who use them'; furthermore that 'a definite decision that buildings on Deshima belonging to the Dutch Government were no longer necessary, would probably be made, because the Consul-General would be appointed to Edo.'⁶²⁸

⁶²⁶ A report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Dutch Cabinet.

⁶²⁷ A report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Dutch Cabinet.

⁶²⁸ NA BuZa, 26 July 1862 N29 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Colonial Affairs.

Later the Minister of Foreign Affairs also informed the Ministry of Colonial Affairs that 'it seems to me, also in accordance with talks with your Excellency about this matter, that both these articles⁶²⁹ have to be considered superseded, since Deshima had been open to any settlement [by foreigners] through the removal of the gates, and Dutch ships to Deshima like [ships of] other foreigners in Nagasaki are cleared and pay duties there.' Therefore, he accepted the principle of the establishment of a bonded warehouse in all open ports, while the Netherlands would not insist on the maintenance of the bonded warehouse on Deshima in the negotiation with the Japanese delegation. At the end of this document, he wrote that 'if in his negotiations about this matter, Mr De Wit could succeed in the persuading the Japanese Government to begin implementing on Deshima at present what the Japanese delegation promised among other nations to the British Government, namely establishing a s bonded warehouse in all open ports, he would thereby contribute greatly to trade.'⁶³⁰ Thereupon the Minister of Colonial Affairs decided to inform the Consul in Japan of the Minister of Foreign Affairs' opinion.⁶³¹

⁶²⁹ Article 14 and 18. These articles specify the recognition of the whole of Deshima as a bonded warehouse.

⁶³⁰ NA BuZa, 11 December 1862 N26 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Colonial Affairs.

⁶³¹ NA BuZa, 24 December 1862 N7 (exh.). A letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 22 December 1862 N10.

Chapter 13

The end of autonomous Dutch diplomacy in Japan

What was it that, as of 1 January 1863, swept away the acquisition of a bonded warehouse on Deshima as a diplomatic goal of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs towards Japan? It was the change of the charge of Japanese affairs from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thereby, Dutch diplomacy towards Japan reached a turning point.

The matter had already been discussed before in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. It was then decided that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs would assume responsibility for Asian affairs too in future, because it was more efficient that the Netherlands East Indies deal with these affairs.⁶³² The matter was put on the agenda again by the series of treaties concluded in 1858 between Western countries and Japan. The reason was that formal diplomatic channels were necessary for drawing up and negotiating treaties. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had actually carried out the negotiations for the postponement of the treaty with the Japanese delegation to Europe (1862-63) which had visited the Netherlands.⁶³³

Criticism of the Dutch Government diplomacy towards the Japanese delegation

The Japanese delegation had no plan to visit the Netherlands. Since the Netherlands, however, regarded the relationship with Japan as important, it persuaded the delegation to visit the country at the expense of the Netherlands. In some respects, the population was supportive of the Dutch Government's action in this matter. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had encountered bitter criticism from the nation in general and from statesmen for its method of

⁶³² NA Koloniën no.5898, 17 April 1858 N.153, Geheim.

⁶³³ Regarding this delegation in detail, see Miyanaga Takashi, *Bunkiyū ninen no yōroppa hōkoku* ('A report on Europe in 2 Bunkiyū (1862)'), Shinchō sensho, 1989.

negotiation with the Japanese delegation. The article on the debate in Parliament written about by H. Nijgh of Rotterdam could be read in the NRC newspaper the next day. The content of the debate was mostly a rehashing of what was published as a supplement in the *Nederlandsche Staats-Courant* (*Bijblad van de Nederlandsche Staats-Courant*), namely, *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1e & 2e kamer*. The greatest part of it, however, was summarized. Therefore, the series of relevant discussions from the *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1e & 2e kamer* will be examined more in detail below.

W. Baron Van Lynden was the parliamentarian who took the word and posed various questions about the visit of the Japanese delegation which had visited the Netherlands that summer. The aim of this delegation was to discuss the amendment to the Dutch-Japanese treaty. The Netherlands certainly had taken good care of the Japanese delegation. When the delegation was received at The Hague, the Government decorated the town with Japanese and Dutch flags. Three flags carried the crests of three important members in the delegation which showed that some prior research had been made into their backgrounds. The delegation was served Japanese tea and presented with documents written in Japanese. The Japanese visitors were filled with admiration and very satisfied with their treatment. Regrettably the result, however, was questioned by the general public. The delegation remained for a long time in Holland before it departed for other countries with the same aim to seek amendments to the signed treaty. Baron Van Lynden wanted to know from the Government 'whether this was really the true aim of the delegation and, if this is right, whether the aim was achieved.'

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jhr. Paul Therèse van der Maesen de Sombreff (1827-1902) admitted that the aim of the Japanese Government was the amendment of the treaty and he answered by and large as noted below,

'The Dutch Government agreed to the request of the Japanese Government that we would attempt not to upset the Japanese nation's feelings by alluding to the greatly changed situation in which the treaty came in effect. Also other European powers that have concluded treaties with Japan have agreed to this or will do so. Other requests were not agreed to by the Netherlands or England either, because these were not concerned with the nation's sentiments and it was clear that the Japanese Government wanted to repeal its trade or to take the decision to repeal unilaterally. We agreed that the Article about the opening of ports in the treaty would be postponed for a period. England decided that

the period would be five years. The Netherlands did not specify a particular period, because this development is still unsure in this present situation.⁶³⁴

The Dutch Government has formed a 'Triple Entente between the Netherlands, England and France'. The Dutch Government respected its relationship with these two powers, because it did not want to lose its interests in its Japanese affairs through any discord with major European powers. Moreover, it intended to oppose the common enemy in the Japanese affairs, the United States. England agreed that the period of postponement should be five years. The Netherlands, however, would not accept this period. It is proof that the Netherlands did not always follow the decisions of other great powers. Meanwhile, it was also a clear signal that the management of the Triple Entente was difficult.

In addition to the above-mentioned question, Jhr. Willem Boreel van Hogelanden (1800-1883) criticized the Government, saying that the second complaint leveled against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was about the behavior of the Government towards the Japanese delegation. The Government was quite aware of the aim of the delegation and had already planned not to accede to the request of the delegation at once. The delegation was none the less enthusiastically received in the Netherlands causing its members to misinterpret the reception and assume that the Dutch would honor their demands. Yet after all those banquets in The Hague and other places, the delegation recognized that this visit to the Netherlands was a failure and would have to leave without achieving its aim. According to Boreel, the Japanese visitors 'had left the Netherlands disappointed, displeased, and angered, instead of appreciating the special treatment and the great deal of expense dispensed in the Netherlands.'⁶³⁵

Then Willem Anne baron Schimmelpenninck van der Oije (1800-1872) took the rostrum, saying that he did not know much about Japan, and that it was not his idea to adopt a different policy from Holland's mighty neighbors. But he still had a problem: 'The Netherlands used to be an ally of Japan. Namely we were the sole European power that had not been excluded like other Europeans from Japan and had maintained a relationship with it. In short, we were a pioneer who introduced Japan to all Europeans. Therefore, we had

⁶³⁴ *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1^e & 2^e kamer 1862-1863, Tweede Kamer*; p.26.

⁶³⁵ *Ibidem*, p.90.

the appointed task of adopting autonomous measures. I, however, am not angry about this non-fulfillment. If I have to believe the answer of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, especially the assertion that the delegation was content with this visit to the Netherlands, I am not infuriated about it. Certainly I could not understand what was actually requested from the Japanese delegation, if I had not been well informed on this issue.’⁶³⁶ The gist of Schimmelpenninck’s remarks was to criticize Dutch diplomacy towards Japan for its lack of clarity and indecisiveness, even if so far he himself had shown little interest in Japanese affairs.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that the Japanese delegation had been received in the same way as other Asian delegations, with the same etiquette as that which would be accorded Dutch representatives in another country. There was nothing wrong with that. How could one insist that all requests of the Japanese delegation should be granted in view of the old relationship with Japan, especially as they wished to repeal the treaty. France had sent them to England without appending any reply and in England the same situation would repeat itself, unless a special person with a special charge for Japanese affairs would arrive far from Asia. The minister said: ‘We were already aware that one of this delegation’s requests was to postpone the opening of ports. We were still ignorant of the other requests. Moreover, this problem was the kind of matter on which we could not make a decision without being informed of the opinions of other powers. Therefore the decision was postponed. This measure has never put our good relationships with Japan in an awkward situation, because the Japanese have clearly expressed their content to this Government in words and writing.’⁶³⁷

The remarks of the Minister of Foreign Affairs can be taken as truly representative of the Government. However, because they were rather commonplace, they seemed less credible and were criticized. The liberal parliamentarian M.H. Godefroi(1813-1882)then joined the discussion by saying something about the government’s attitude towards the Japanese delegation. How come one was not better prepared about its intentions?

‘The delegation visited France and England before arriving here. It seems that what it had attained in these places was known. The delegation came here and

⁶³⁶ *Ibidem*, p.96.

⁶³⁷ *Ibidem*, p.110.

remained for a considerable time. What happened to it? We allowed the Japanese delegation leave without results. At first it was uncertain if this is what had really happened. Therefore the information about this matter was sought in the Parliament. The Minister answered that our reply had not been presented while the Japanese delegation was still here. His answer could confirm to us the fact that the Government allowed the delegation to leave without achieving any result. It is a considerable heedless blunder. Moreover this conduct has made an indecisive and unstable impression on us. Also it seems that the Japanese delegation gained the same impression. That is, although the delegation was very content with its reception by the Dutch nation, it was not satisfied with the Government's attitude. In view of this fact, this impression is even more regrettable, because this indiscretion has occurred in the relationship with the nation which had respected our country and in which country we had won honor. This honor should have been maintained and strengthened through a firm attitude with the delegation.'... 'Why did the Government allow the delegation leave? Beforehand, the Government was desirous of acquiring information about places where the Japanese delegation was intending to visit and submit the proposals. The delegation visited two major powers, France and England. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and our diplomats were extremely keen to acquire information about it. The answers of France and England to the proposals were already known. We could have known the answers, indeed we *should have*, because, if this were not so, is our diplomacy functioning? The Minister's reply to the question as to why the Government allowed the delegation leave without an answer is no adequate reason.'... 'If this situation had occurred because the Government wanted to learn the decisions of other countries, it is all the more incomprehensible. What sort of result is this? The Government did not act as the other countries had. It would be eminently sensible to follow the guideline of other countries in Japanese political affairs. A wise policy intimates to us to co-operate with other countries like ours that have political and commercial relationships with Japan. If we, however, do not pursue such a wise policy, we have to go our own way. The major power, England, agreed to the Japanese proposal for postponing the opening of ports for a certain period. We, however, abandoned our right *without agreeing to the period*. The Minister of Foreign Affairs does have the decency to mention this measure. He, however, tries to justify it with an inadequate reason.'... 'The Government explained that we did not want to miss

a good opportunity. Needless to say, it is an illusion for us to assume that we would be able to acquire what other countries could not demand, while the postponement agreed to by other countries is still valid. If we have an adequate reason, do we adopt pressure measures against Japan or is it possible to do so? I do not think so. I think it wrong that the Government has departed from the guidelines of the other countries. It would be a wise political decision to follow the guideline. It is regrettable that evidence of the pursuit of a wise policy in our foreign affairs is not visible in this matter at all.⁶³⁸

Looking back on what Godefroi brought forward, one can only say that his opinions had much to recommend. The Netherlands formed 'a Triple Entente with England and France' in its Japanese affairs. As a result of this Entente, the Netherlands wanted to collect information about the affairs pertaining to England and France as soon as possible and it informed them of its plan, expecting that their plan would be reflected by the Dutch demands. This maneuver was to ensure that the Netherlands avoided bearing the brunt in the affair, namely of running into difficulties with large European powers, and it would obtain its rights safely. In this respect, there was some problem that the Government could not gain all the proper information it needed from these powers. According to the Dutch documents, the Netherlands did take an initiative in this matter. It thought that five years as the period of postponement was too long and half this period would be acceptable. Therefore, the Netherlands did not set the term of the postponement at the former time. The Netherlands was anxious to ascertain the decisions of major Western Powers, such as the UK, and especially French and Russia but at that time these had not yet crystallized. These kinds of mistakes, or rather passive and negative attitudes in Dutch foreign policy, were harshly criticized.

But there were also some parliamentarians who defended the Government. Christianus Joannes Antonius Heydenrijck (1832-1911), the depute from Nijmegen, did so by remarking that in the case of the postponement of the ports the Dutch government first wanted to ascertain the attitude of its allies. He saw no problem there: 'Moreover, as it was said, the Japanese delegation recognized that we wanted to ascertain the attitude of other countries. None the less, would it cause any harm were we ourselves to take an autonomous decision in this?'

⁶³⁸ *Ibidem*, pp.128-129.

Heydenrijck's opinion deserves some attention, as it is indicative of an evasion of responsibility. By this ploy, he was saying that should diplomacy in a matter not succeed, the Government did not need to bear the responsibility for it, because the matter was not important. This is in relation to the pursuit of Dutch diplomacy in Japanese affairs. Consequently this way of thought was an elaboration of the prevailing theory, that 'because the Netherlands East Indies was the most important region for the Netherlands in Asia. Japanese affairs did not hold much interest for it.' It seems that this way of thinking has not been eradicated up to the present day. It was, however, erroneous because Japanese affairs were in my view very important to the Netherlands.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs was also forced to reply to a series of critical questions about the Japanese delegation in the Netherlands. What he had to say is summarized as below. 'Finally I will say something about the Japanese. The Member of Parliament from Amsterdam maliciously told me that the Government attitude towards the Japanese delegation was disappointing. His argument was, however, vague. He stated that the Japanese delegation had visited England and France, before it came to The Hague. Therefore in his opinion we should have known what both these countries had agreed with the delegation through the normal diplomatic channels and we should have adopted the decisions of other countries. This argument is the outcome of his ignorance of the matter. When the Japanese delegation left France, as when they left for Russia over the border of the Netherlands, it still had not yet received the decisions of the French. The Japanese delegation only finally learned what the French Government would agree to, when it returned from St Petersburg.'

The minister affirmed that England had agreed to the Japanese request. This fact was widely known the Netherlands. On the one hand, the parliamentarian said that the Netherlands should have co-operated with other countries. On the other hand, he suggested that in this case the Netherlands also could have chosen its own way. This is what the Netherlands actually had done.

'Indeed we did want to know what other countries had agreed to in the Japanese requests. If we had known, it would have been possible for us to make our decision. Under these circumstances the Netherlands assumed an autonomous attitude, because this was best suited most of its interests. We did not set the term of the postponement to the five years set by England. We never forced Japan to grant us more privileges than other countries', because it had

set its face against the most favored nation treatment. Through our representative in Japan, however, we have maintained the chance to insist that the Japanese Government will adopt every measure to promote the opening of its country for foreign countries. The role as the pioneer in Japan has ever been ours, because we introduced European civilization to Japan. We are still endeavoring to fulfill the task'...Finally the minister said that the government was loyally cooperating with the other two European countries in acquiescing in the postponement of ports, but that it still adopted a degree of autonomous diplomacy by insisting on another, shorter term in this matter.⁶³⁹

The reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs may seem to have been quite reasonable, but it was a typical response from a government, that could not defend a really autonomous Dutch policy in this case. Therefore, Godefroi returned to the issue of the Government's attitude towards the Japanese delegation. 'I notice the lack of a firm attitude in the fact that the government allowed the delegation leave without making it come up to the starting line. Our Government was already informed about the Japanese requests and the British decision on this matter too. Consequently the Government could indeed have replied to these Japanese requests during their stay here. Under this circumstance no reply was made. This fact must have made an indecisive impression on this delegation.'... 'I regret this fact, especially when our former relationship with Japan to which the Minister himself alluded to in his speech is taken into consideration. A firm attitude should have demanded the requests of the delegation here were given a response. I persist in this point. Not to respond to the Japanese requests even after their departure is not evidence of a wise policy. This was made worse, because the Government relinquished following an independent course while it dithered waiting for the decisions of other countries. At present how has the Minister concluded this matter? His answer implies that we wanted to maintain our right not to set a term in order to retain a degree of pressure on Japan. This Minister, however, did not reply to my question of whether we could or would adopt this pressure or not. Therefore, although the Netherlands did not set a term for the postponement, we put ourselves of being towed into line(*à la remorque*)by the countries that did set a term. Because, as long as this postponement continues, we cannot, or will not, do anything independently to fulfill the treaty without co-operation with other

⁶³⁹ *Ibidem*, pp.143-144.

countries. In this matter, in these negotiations and the subsequent decisions, when it is all said and done, in each and every aspect, a firm and discreet attitude is conspicuous by its absence. Since this Minister detailed the measure for this matter with the discussion about Article 5, I shall not go into this foreign system at present.’⁶⁴⁰

Certainly, Godefroi struck the Government at its most vulnerable point. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to set a two- or three-year term for the postponement. It was not sure whether Japan would fulfill the treaty after the term. Therefore, it could not set a definite term if it wanted to avoid repeating the same problem later. If, however, it was to be avoided that the Japanese delegation should regard this Dutch attitude as vague and indecisive, that is, the Japanese Government formed the impression that the Netherlands was a dependent state which always had to follow the major European powers, then it would have been better if the Netherlands had not held back in this respect and had clearly stated its own autonomous demands.

Actually the British Plenipotentiary in The Hague had these thoughts on the matter: ‘The Netherland Government have not yet given an answer to the Japanese proposals and as the Envoys consider it necessary that they should receive one at the Hague they have decided on leaving tomorrow for Berlin and St. Petersburg, and will return to the Hague after their visit to these courts in the hope that by that time the Netherland Government may be prepared to give them an answer but they can accept as satisfactorily.’⁶⁴¹

Moreover, in Paragraph 9 in the interim report by the committee of reporters (*Voorloopige Verslagen der Commissiën van Rapporteurs*) the above-mentioned discussion is summarized. The conclusion says that an awkward situation might occur without this pressure, if the Dutch were to make a new demand on Japan; and the Netherlands could properly offer the same compromise as the British, since a strong maritime power such as England had set the term.⁶⁴² In Paragraph 9 in the subsequent memorandum of reply to the interim report by the committee of reporters (*Memoriën van Beantwoording van het Voorloopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs*) details of the Japanese delegation in the Netherlands are mentioned. The version of what occurred is

⁶⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p.146.

⁶⁴¹ FO. 238-127, To F.O. 1862, 14 July 1862, N.104.

⁶⁴² *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1^e & 2^e kamer 1862-1863, Tweede Kamer*; p.262.

the same as that presented by the Government. Moreover, the record says that the expense for lodgings and the reception of the Japanese delegation should be borne not by the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by that of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs in this year.⁶⁴³ From 1863, Chinese and Japanese affairs were to be transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, the decision seems to have been that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs should be charged with the responsibility for the Japanese affairs until 1863. To be saddled with this expense was unsatisfactory to the Minister of Colonial Affairs, because he was not in a position to negotiate with the delegation and his plan to derive benefit for the Netherlands did not succeed.

The transition of the responsibility for Japanese and Chinese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which so far had shown little interest in Asian affairs, was inspired by the criticism leveled by merchants about the negative style of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan and the disappointment in Japanese affairs in the Government. At that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave an *exposé* of the matter in which it stated that: 'The Government settled this problem because it is useful that the consulates in China and Japan shall fall under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, it is desirable that our consuls in these countries should continue to follow the orders of the Governor-General in the Netherlands East Indies. This seems appropriate for the efficient running of matters. The present situation is changed in as far as the political reports from consuls shall be sent not to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs but to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'⁶⁴⁴ and 'It seems unnecessary for the Government to change the position of consul in Japan, until the situation in Japan is more tranquil. It, if anything, is more desirable for the sake of efficiency that the consul in Japan is under the direction of the Governor-General in the Netherlands East Indies.'⁶⁴⁵ Hence, the Ministry was taking the opportunity to stress that there would be no internal changes to the consulate in Japan for the time being.

Later, in order to introduce some changes in the Dutch relationship with Japan, which was awkward for the Netherlands because some Western powers felt that the Dutch had been prepared to endure demeaning treatment for the

⁶⁴³ *Ibidem*, p.348(1).

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p.400.

⁶⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p.414.

sake of financial gain, the Ministry mentioned that 'It seems necessary that the Netherlands control the relationships between our Government and the Japanese and that this affair be put under the discretion of the Dutch Government. It is also completely desirable for other reasons. Only if the Dutch representative is directly responsible to the Dutch Government, can his proper influence and true significance as representative be acquired. Some Members of Parliament report that the Dutch representative shall assume a more autonomous diplomatic character in Japan than those in other regions at this moment.'⁶⁴⁶

This remark contradicted the former plan. Later on, with regard to this matter the Government mentioned, 'It does not seem that an opportunity to establish a good relationship with Japan is any more lost at present than it was before. The Netherlands has repeatedly advised Japan to relinquish its system of seclusion and to have relationships with all civilized countries. We have had to wave farewell to thoughts of Dutch superiority in Japan with the giving of our advice which Japan gradually followed. The importance of the Dutch-Japanese relationship in comparison with the relationship between other countries and Japan depends on the fact that Dutch entrepreneurs and merchants can seek there a market for their goods, and also on the degree to which they know that they can carry on profitable trade. The opinion expressed in the paragraph concerned has strayed far from that which urges that the good old relationship could be kept in Japan, only if self-interests are promoted. Otherwise, it never seems that the Dutch Consul-General is neglected by us in comparison with other representative of signatory countries in Japan. The Government, however, always considers that this issue is solved when we instruct the representative to settle in Edo. The correspondingly higher rank of the British, France and American representatives has not been accorded him. When this plan goes into effect, the relationship of the Dutch representative with the Government shall be changed. Consequently, the Netherlands shall deal with Japanese affairs and the Dutch representative shall be directly under the charge of the Dutch Government..... In future, the directions concerning the Japanese and Chinese affairs shall be entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.'⁶⁴⁷

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p.805.

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p.841-842.

These remarks show the changing of the plan about the transition of Japanese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In short, these remarks reflect the decline in interest in Japanese Affairs. This is understandable, because, especially after the establishment of the Entente, it was crucial that the Dutch Government co-operate with the other signatory powers to the Japanese treaties on this matter. Against this background, the Dutch Government would have considered it impossible for the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to have been able to pursue an autonomous Dutch diplomacy towards Japan, especially should it militate against the interests of other powers.

Transfer of Japanese and Chinese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

This matter was taken up in a letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 16 June (1862 N.52). Written at the top of this document, in pencil, are the words ‘Transfer Japanese and Chinese Affairs to this Department’.⁶⁴⁸ In this letter, the Minister of Colonial Affairs set out as important subjects, whether the Dutch representative could stay in Edo and whether he should be given a higher position than at present, in accordance with the positions of other representatives of countries which had concluded the treaty with Japan. The Minister of Colonial Affairs explained that a memorandum had been drawn up on these subjects entitled ‘Memorandum on the issue that the Dutch representative does not reside in Edo with the same status as the representatives of any of the other signatory countries to the treaty’. Furthermore, he added that he could not refrain from expressing his hopes for the future in view of the colonial interests, on the occasion of the transfer of Japanese and Chinese Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his letter, the Minister of Colonial Affairs explained his expectations to the Minister of Foreign Affairs item by item:

‘a. General relations between Japan and China with the Netherlands East Indies.

What kind of a relationship between the Netherlands, Japan and China is good

⁶⁴⁸ Furthermore, ‘to deal with’ (te behandelen) is written in pencil.

or desirable? There is no doubt that the Netherlands East Indies will continue to have a good relationship, especially with China, because such a relationship is the best way to promote the interests of the Netherlands East Indies in Japan and China appropriately; and that the Dutch representatives in both countries will not only receive sufficient information on important matters, but will also serve the Government of the Netherlands East Indies for the purpose of informing this Government of matters relevant to its interests that occurred in Japan and China.

b. A naval force shall be stationed in China or in Japan in order to show the [national] flag and to protect our nation, or should the need arise to make protests, or bring pressure on the Japanese Government in treaty negotiations.

Up to the present, warships for service in Japanese and Chinese affairs have been borrowed from the fleet under the command of the Governor-General in the Netherlands East Indies. The expenses have been partly paid from the budget of the Netherlands East Indies. This regulation is consistent with the fact that the direction of Japanese and Chinese affairs were resting with the Governor-General.

Now the question arises how this matter can be regulated in the future: without burdening the budget of the Netherlands East Indies with extra expenditure, especially that it should not be expected to meet any more, without trespassing on the authority of the Governor-General in his right to command the naval forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies; and without weakening the authority of either the commander of the fleet in the Netherlands East Indies or the Governor-General.

This matter should be discussed between Your Excellency and the Minister of the Navy.

c. Terms of employment.

The personnel of the consulate-general in Japan shall be considered as being in the employ of the Netherlands East Indies in every respect; they will continue to be officials of the Netherlands East Indies with all the rights and duties thereof. To some extent, the Dutch consuls in China shall also be considered officials of the Netherlands East Indies. The expenses, which are charged to the Dutch Government, will be allocated from the budget of the Netherlands East Indies. Your Excellency will be cognizant with the amount for the current year

from the enclosed extract of the budget. The Governor-General should be given timely information of the consequences which the transition of Japanese and Chinese affairs will entail also in respect to the personnel, and consequently when the personnel, especially personnel assigned to Japan, can again be considered available for other duties; when the appropriations for the Japan and China assignments at present included in the budget of the Netherlands East Indies will be removed from its budget.

d. Exchanged documents regarding Chinese and Japanese affairs.

In dealing with Chinese and Japanese affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will need to know what has been done previously. Many of the relevant documents have already been reported to Your Excellency's Ministry in the course of the last year. When Your Excellency will take charge of Japanese and Chinese affairs, these questions will arise: whether Your Excellency desires an arrangement to be made regarding the availability to his department of what has been found in the archives of the Department of Colonial Affairs concerning Japan and China, and whether it is not desirable that the principal clerk of the Department of Colonial Affairs, whose duties now have consisted mostly of drawing up the documents sent out by this Department, be transferred to the Department of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁴⁹

In this fashion, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various problems connected with the transition to its Ministry of the responsibility for Japanese and Chinese affairs. It should, however, be pointed out that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was not to leave these affairs completely to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This measure resulted from the changed nature of Dutch relations with Japan and China, especially after the treaty of 1858. The relations were no longer a section of the colonial affairs of the Netherlands East Indies, and therefore, it was no longer appropriate that the Netherlands East Indies, although it was the executive organ of Japanese and Chinese affairs under the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, should continue to deal with them not in the interests of the Netherlands East Indies, but of the Netherlands. Moreover, this situation was inefficient, because

⁶⁴⁹ NA BuZa, 16 June 1862 N52 (exh.). A letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 15 June 1862 N1.

it required double consultation on these matters, that is, between the Netherlands East Indies and the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, and between the Ministry of Colonial Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, the Minister of Colonial Affairs proposed that the Dutch Government should take over the direction of these Asian affairs. As a result of this measure, the Government would be able to deal with these matters more quickly and smoothly. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs would be able to pare down its budget, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would share the sundry expenses which the Netherlands East Indies had borne until then. This, however, was not acceptable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and matters took a turn that militated against the intentions of the Minister of Colonial Affairs.

In reply, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to take over the drafting of the Royal Decree and the joint report on this matter to the king by the Ministers of Colonial and Foreign Affairs.⁶⁵⁰ The Minister of Colonial Affairs acquiesced in submitting this joint report to the king, while agreeing that the Minister of Foreign Affairs should take the initiative in dealing with this matter. The Minister of Colonial Affairs expressed his intention that he begin consultation on this matter with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after the king had assented in principle of the joint report.⁶⁵¹

By submitting this joint report to the king, the two Ministers requested for the king's assent in this matter as following: 'The relations between Western countries and China and Japan have increased considerably as a result of the events of recent years. It is expected that these relations will expand considerably in future. This situation has called this country's attention to the necessity of securing good relations with China and Japan. In recent years Dutch traders have begun to send trading expeditions to China and Japan and they will continue their efforts to promote the sale of Dutch industrial products in China and Japan. Consequently, from the commercial aspect, Dutch relations with Japan and China are less and less a matter of the interest to the

⁶⁵⁰ NA BuZa, 16 July 1862 N52 (exh.). A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Colonial Affairs on 14 July 1862 N34.

⁶⁵¹ NA BuZa, 16 July 1862 N7 (exh.). A letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 16 July 1862 N51.

Netherlands East Indies, and have become more and more a matter of the interest of the Netherlands. The direction of the relations with Japan and China can therefore no longer be left to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, but must come to lie with Your Majesty's government. The Governor-General has continually asked the opinion of the supreme government about what measures to take to deal with matters which have occurred in these countries, although a part of responsibility for Japanese and Chinese affairs was left with him, according to your Majesty's Cabinet resolution of 17 June 1858 (N.47). Furthermore, the conclusion of treaties with countries such as China and Japan requires the king's authorization and the appointment of a plenipotentiary.'

The king's letter of approval, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already drawn up, says that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take over the charge of Japanese and Chinese affairs, and the appointment, promotion, dismissal of the personnel too.⁶⁵² Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Minister of Colonial Affairs that the present Dutch officials in China and Japan would have to be transferred to the Dutch Government because these officials would lose their status as employees of the government of the Netherlands East Indies. They would have to be reappointed on new salary-scales and so forth and the removal of the Consulate-General from Nagasaki to Edo would be discussed.⁶⁵³ This joint report was submitted to the king.⁶⁵⁴ The Royal Decree on this matter formally determined that Japanese and Chinese affairs should be taken over by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁵⁵

After the promulgation of the Royal Decree, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the Ministry of Colonial Affairs for an explanation of the issues pertinent to this matter. The Minister of Colonial Affairs explained these issues item by item. These issues are summarized, as following:

⁶⁵² NA BuZa, 17 July 1862 N7 (exh.). A letter from the Ministers of Foreign and Colonial Affairs to the king on 15 July 1862 N34.

⁶⁵³ NA BuZa, 19 July 1862 N31 (exh.). A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Colonial Affairs.

⁶⁵⁴ NA BuZa, 24 July 1862 N7 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 21 July 1862 N20.

⁶⁵⁵ NA BuZa, 26 July 1862 N7 (exh.). A document dated 25 July 1862 N49.

‘a. Consul-Generals and Consuls in Japan and China respectively
Consul-Generals and Consuls shall take their instructions directly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their position shall be not for the handling of colonial matters but for those of the Netherlands. Consequently, Dutch representatives in the countries of East Asia shall serve the general interests of the Netherlands in future. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs intends that Japanese and Chinese affairs be expanded rather than reduced. Concerning a curtailment of expenditure, however, it is suggested that the positions of the chief clerk (*‘kanselier’*) and of the interpreter of the Consul-General in Japan can be unified into one position.

b. The revenue to be assigned.
It seems that the budget of the representative in China cannot be reduced, since the life-style in China requires a large amount. The budget of the Netherlands East Indies does not cover the expenses of the Consul-General in Japan and the Consulate-General is to be transferred to Edo. A memorandum has already been submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it is explained that the Consul-General in Japan shall assume the same high status as that of other representatives of the signatory powers to a treaty. It will be possible to economize on the expense of the personnel. It would be difficult to reduce the expenditure as our representative should assume the same position as that of the British and French representatives, because a life of Edo entails many more expenses than that in Nagasaki.

c. Expenses of moving the Consulate-General to Edo
The voyage from Nagasaki to Edo would entail few expenses. On the other hand, it would be extremely expensive if a warship stationed in Japan is used for this purpose.

d. The rent of the building of the Consulate-General in Edo
The Ministry of Colonial Affairs had received De Wit’s monthly report for July which mentioned this matter, but it has not received any more recent reports from him.’

Besides these above-mentioned issues, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs demanded that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would comply with the limits of

the budget for 1863 which had been already approved. Therefore, it was mentioned that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take over the expense of 6500 guilders for the publication of a Dutch-English-Japanese dictionary, and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would include this matter in its budget; furthermore, that new regulations should be enacted with regard to a salary for Professor Johan Joseph Hoffmann (1805-1878), who was a Japanese interpreter in the Netherlands East Indies and the first professor of Japanese at Leiden University (appointed in 1855) at that time, as well as paying for the tuition fees of the Japanese interpreter of whom Hoffmann took charge.⁶⁵⁶

As presented above, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs explained some issues of this transition but it pertinently insisted on its rights in view of its personnel and its interests. This measure should benefit not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also the Minister of Colonial Affairs. In response to these requests of the Minister of Colonial Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent it a letter, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to discuss some points regarding this matter in more detail. This letter said first that the date of the transition of responsibility would be agreed as January 1 1863; secondly, no special pension would be granted to persons whose duties would be changed from the aegis of the Netherlands East Indies to that of the Dutch government; thirdly, concerning the Dutch-English-Japanese dictionary which had been begun as an initiative of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, the said ministry should continue to bear the expense in the future, because this project benefited exclusively the interests of the Netherlands East Indies; and lastly, the training of the Chinese interpreters would be left to Hoffmann in the budget of the Netherlands East Indies, although his position as a Japanese interpreter in the Netherlands East Indies would be abolished after consultation with the Ministry of Colonial Affairs.⁶⁵⁷

It is clear that this letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not meet

⁶⁵⁶ NA BuZa, 28 July 1862 N12 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 26 July 1862 N31.

⁶⁵⁷ NA BuZa, 2 August 1862 N24 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs.

The post of Hoffman as the Japanese interpreter of the Netherlands East Indies was abolished. NA BuZa, 8 October 1862 N3 (exh.). A document from Willem III on 30 September 1862 N84.

the demands of the Ministry of Colonial affairs. It seems that the latter was disappointed with this reply but had no choice other than to follow the decision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Colonial Affairs informed the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies of the following: the rent of Deshima and of the buildings there would no longer be paid for by the Dutch Government, and, therefore, the civilians who used them would pay this directly to the Japanese Government, if possible, from 1 January 1863; that, at the same time, the Dutch Government buildings on Deshima would be no longer of use to this Government, as the Dutch consulate in Japan would be transferred from there to Edo; furthermore, that the Dutch could not demand the right to a bonded warehouse just for this small island, because the principle of a bonded warehouse in all open ports in Japan was accepted.⁶⁵⁸

Indifference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Japanese affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected many of the demands made by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs in this matter. This is quite understandable, because these demands were simply not in the interests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Conversely, it is also understandable that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs would endeavor to take care of its own interests and its personnel. Despite its best intentions in this field, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not deal in a gentlemanly way with the personnel, but stuck strictly

⁶⁵⁸ NA BuZa, 9 August 1862 N9 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 7 August 1862 N40.

This instruction from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies can be seen in the attached data of a Document of 7 August 1862 N.14 in NA BuZa, 9 August 1862 N9 (exh.).

Furthermore, the secret Cabinet document which the Minister of Colonial Affairs directly sent to the Consul-General in Japan according to the intention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs can be seen as the attached document of NA BuZa, 16 August 1862 N1 (exh.) on 14 August 1862, A letter from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The document mainly describes the treatment of the consulate personnel and its salary and pension.

to the established regulations, bearing its own interests firmly in mind. Moreover, the attitude displayed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that this Ministry did not consider Japanese affairs as having any great importance to the Netherlands. Such an attitude towards Japanese Affairs as that adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands, which pursued the interests only in Europe, is comprehensible. Another good example that makes this attitude clear is that when treaties with Japan were gazetted in *het Staatsblad* ('the National State Journal'), the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Minister of Colonial Affairs that he wished him to assume the responsibility for publishing the treaties of 1856 and of 1858; moreover, that it seemed to be superfluous to publish the additional treaty of 1857 in the journal, because it had been nullified by the treaty concluded in 1858.⁶⁵⁹

Although the Minister of Colonial Affairs complied with the other measures taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this matter, in this case he expressed his strict objection to these remarks as follows: 'I must respect your opinions, but I should observe the following remarks about this point that I alone should adduce the necessary proposal on publication in *het Staatsblad* to the king to draw it to his attention. The Minister of Colonial Affairs has exclusively been concerned with Japanese affairs, because their management was placed entirely in his hands. In spite of this above-mentioned situation, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs did consult with his colleague in Foreign Affairs about Japanese matters and all documents concerned have been countersigned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Another remark which should be made is that to carry out your proposal would deviate from customary rules, if I am not mistaken. I mean that the essential Royal Decree has always been proposed only by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in all the numerous cases of publication of treaties in *het Staatsblad*. Therefore, I must ask whether these remarks should not induce Your Excellency at least to lend your co-operation to publication in *het Staatsblad*, if Your Excellency is indeed of the opinion that you can not, in your own name, make the required proposals. Although I seize this opportunity to take the liberty to express the wish that your thoughts may help to bring to a speedy conclusion the matter of consular jurisdiction which has been pending for such a long time, I must say that I fail to see how in this

⁶⁵⁹ NA BuZa, 28 August 1862 N20 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs.

matter a reason may be found for Your Excellency to refuse to co-operate in publishing in the *het Staatsblad* the treaties that have been concluded with a former Japanese regime.⁶⁶⁰

Furthermore, in contradiction of the opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs which was that it was unnecessary for the additional articles of 1857 to appear in *het Staatsblad*, the Minister of Colonial Affairs has explained that this additional treaty actually had effect as a part of the treaty of 1856 until the treaty of 1858 was ratified. He also strongly asserted that this treaty had a special significance and it could be justified by the facts; firstly, that this treaty contained the regulation that Deshima be a bonded warehouse and secondly that this regulation was the step towards free trade. Therefore, the Minister stressed that the Netherlands could be proud of this additional treaty as the first commercial treaty with Japan, because foreigners intending to trade with Japan could enjoy the benefits of this treaty's regulations, namely, they could enter Nagasaki to trade, before the treaty of 1858 came into effect. In consideration of these facts, the Minister of Colonial Affairs strongly insisted on the special significance of these former treaties. Therefore, this is expressed in his last words of this letter; that 'If I cannot unexpectedly obtain co-operation from Your Excellency in the publication of the treaties discussed in *het Staatsblad*, I shall subject this matter to the issue of the Cabinet.'⁶⁶¹

It seems that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was not willing to approve the transfer of responsibility for Japanese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because Japanese affairs actually had a close relation with its colonies in Asia and, moreover, was a special issue in its Ministry, in particular from the viewpoint of Dutch 'National prestige and economic interests'. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs, however, had to understand that the Dutch Government should deal with Japanese affairs for the sake not of the Netherlands East Indies, but of the Netherlands itself, especially after the treaty of 1858. Therefore, the Ministry had to give up dealing with this affair, and that this measure was essential. On the other hand, the Ministry intended to co-operate with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in this affair also in the future. Moreover in this transference, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs wished to

⁶⁶⁰ NA BuZa, 30 September 1862 N1 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 27 September 1862 N197.

⁶⁶¹ NA BuZa, 30 September 1862 N1 (exh.).

emphasize its former distinguished service in its handling of difficult Japanese affairs. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no consideration at all for its wishes. In the above-mentioned letter (27 September 1862), the deep disgruntlement of the Minister of Colonial Affairs is obvious.

Through the transference of the charge of important Dutch-Asian affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the same reason, the management of relations with Siam was also handed over to this Ministry. This was established by Royal Decree. For this purpose, the joint report to the king by the Ministers of Colonial and Foreign Affairs was drawn up again.⁶⁶² This matter was formally approved by Royal Decree on 4 December 1862.⁶⁶³ The standard explanation for these transfers in Dutch-Asian affairs is always 'for the sake of the interests of the Netherlands in Europe'.⁶⁶⁴ The Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, had few interests in Asian affairs. Consequently, autonomous Dutch diplomacy towards Asia, as the Ministry of Colonial Affairs had conducted it, disappeared completely. It was thereafter entrusted to the diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which regarded co-operation with the European countries as most important.

The pursuance of such negative diplomacy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the structure accorded to it, elicited at the time criticism from all over the nation. The parliamentary historian C.A. Tamse has also pointed out the inadequacy of the quality of the staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its negligence in promoting economic interests in the 1860s.⁶⁶⁵ In an article with the title 'Our examination system for diplomats' in the NRC of 23 October 1862 the selection of diplomats by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was criticized as follows:⁶⁶⁶ 'The examination for the service is not open to the public. In actual fact it does not seem that men of ability are appointed. Applicants who obtain a doctorate are exempted from the examination. However, a doctorate does not

⁶⁶² NA BuZa, 25 November 1862 N5 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 24 November 1862.

⁶⁶³ NA BuZa, 5 December 1862 N2 (exh.).

⁶⁶⁴ NA BuZa, 21 January 1863 N2 (exh.). Such words can be seen in a letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Consul-General in Japan on 27 September 1862 N197 too.

⁶⁶⁵ Tamse, *Nederland en België in Europa*, pp.114-116.

⁶⁶⁶ 'Our examination for diplomat' on 23 October 1862 no. 293 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

guarantee capacity as a diplomat. Hence, sons of the aristocracy, who have obtained a doctorate academically, do not even have the knowledge required of an ordinary lawyer. In reality, these people work in our diplomatic corps without taking any further examination or tests. The examiners should not accept unqualified applicants, even if they do come from an aristocratic background. If the examination, however, is not open to the public, influential distinguished families will adopt various means to acquire appointments for their sons. Therefore, the examiners find themselves in a most awkward situation. As a result, the Netherlands is increasingly acquiring poorly qualified diplomats. In a nutshell, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the refuge for sons of our aristocracy who cannot obtain work anywhere else. The Netherlands, which needs qualified and shrewd diplomats, is faced with the fact that interest in foreign affairs is more and more neglected. Therefore, it is necessary: 1, the examination shall be open to the public; 2, strict examinations for diplomats; 3, stricter examinations, when they are transferred to the legation staff’.

Moreover, another article titled ‘Contribution – the activity of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ criticized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for always being late in issuing directives; not all Dutch consulates were provided with information from the Government in the right way; and therefore, sometimes a consulate had to obtain information from the civilian merchants. Moreover, this same problem happened repeatedly without measures being taken to prevent it.⁶⁶⁷

Decreasing interest in Japanese affairs in the Netherlands

It seems that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had problems with adopting diplomatic measures. Certainly, Japanese affairs posed a difficult problem for the Government at that time. The trade in Japan was expanding rapidly. The situation, however, was uncertain, because the *Bakufu* could not find a solution to the problems concerning foreign and internal affairs. Murders of foreigners occurred frequently. In this situation, demonstrations by the Dutch navy were strongly desired by the Dutch merchants in Japan as a means to protect the nation as well as to heighten Dutch prestige in Asia. The Government

⁶⁶⁷ ‘Contribution’ on 6 November 1862 no. 307 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

dispatched warships to Japan in order to fulfil this request. The Minister of Foreign Affairs reported the development of the Japanese Affairs in the Lower House in 1864. *Graaf* (Duke) C.T. Van Lijnden van Sandenburg (1826-1885) replied to it as follows:

‘At the end of the report concerning the Japanese affairs, the Government mentions that the *Citadel van Antwerpen* and the *Djambi* arrived at Japan to assist in making ourselves felt there. ‘Meanwhile, in the relationship with the naval power in the Netherlands East Indies, the Ministry of Navy has adopted the measure to strengthen our military force in Japan, because it unexpectedly had to take an urgent measure. Now I should like to pose the Government some questions; how far should the military force be strengthened; what is the perspective aim; whether we will co-operate in British and French diplomacy; whether we shall remain in our centuries-old position in Japan. Our relationship with Japan is not the same as that of the British and French.’⁶⁶⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied as summarized below.

‘This Government, as well as other European Governments, is unquestionably dealing with developments in Japan. In general, our long and good relationship with Japan was reaffirmed by the treaty of 1858. Thanks to our old relationship with Japan, which existed before the treaties of England and the United States were concluded, the Japanese Government shows us consideration. This is more than obvious because it shows various evidences of the friendship and shows a preference for our industry. The Dutch Government recognizes that our interests demand this good relationship be maintained....

Generally, if negotiations with Japan are conducted to maintain the rights set out in the treaty, the Member of Parliament from Arnhem regards this as necessary to benefit the interests especially of the Netherlands, and however, to benefit the same interests of all Europeans in Japan. This, however, is not the case. This policy is not new to the Netherlands. Hence, with the aim of promoting good relationships between Japan and Europe, we shall continue to pursue the guidelines which King Willem II used to follow. The Netherlands will co-operate with other countries, if Dutch prestige is promoted by their measures. Regarding to this necessary reinforcement of our military force, I point out the reference to chapters concerning the Navy, the Army and the Colonies, because more detailed information shall be provided from Ministers

⁶⁶⁸ *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1^e & 2^e kamer 1863-1864, Tweede Kamer*; p.170.

in charge of them than I am able to.’⁶⁶⁹

In short, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought highly of the idea of co-operating with the European great powers. As a result, through this transference of Japanese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch diplomacy in Japan underwent a complete change. Autonomous Dutch diplomacy in Japan had drawn to a close.

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p.178(3).

Epilogue

By the 1860s, the long tradition of intimate relations between the Netherlands and Japan had become a relic of a bygone age. The transition of Japanese affairs from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs marks the end of autonomous Dutch diplomacy in Japan. Besides this measure, as matters stood, it seemed very unlikely that the Netherlands would be able to pursue its policy of autonomous diplomacy towards Japan after the treaty of 1858; or rather it seemed unnecessary to do so. Japan continued to order steamships and requested technical experts from the Netherlands too.⁶⁷⁰ Furthermore, it sent young people there in order to learn the techniques of modern shipbuilding and the principles of Western law and other useful skills. These were fruits of Dutch diplomacy, because the Dutch Government invited a Japanese delegation to visit the Netherlands at its expense. On this occasion the delegation visited factories in the main cities and assessed the level of technology as very high.⁶⁷¹ The Dutch Government was very pleased with the fact that Japan was requesting the Netherlands as well as other Western great powers to help with its Westernization. Actually at that time, Dutch activities had a great influence in Japan. Hendrik Hardes, who was a member of the Dutch maritime teaching program in Nagasaki, remained in Japan after the program had ended. He contributed greatly to the establishment of modern Japanese industry.⁶⁷² These circumstances seem to be an indication that the long-standing Dutch-Japanese relations appeared set to continue, even if the Dutch Government did not actively encourage it. However, in spite of this expectation, the relationship faded away as time passed.

Meanwhile, however, even if the Dutch Government would have wanted to adopt active measures towards Japan, a difficult situation was looming. A

⁶⁷⁰ H. Beukers, L. Blussé, R. Eggink, *Leraar onder de Japanners – Brieven van dr. K.W. Gratama betreffende zijn verblijf in Japan 1866-1871*, Amsterdam, 1987.

⁶⁷¹ See 'Domestic affairs' on 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 29 June and 1, 4, 10, 15, 18 July 1862 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

⁶⁷² Kusumoto Juichi, *Nagasaki seitetsujo – Nihonkindai Kōgyō no sōshi, Cyūkō shinsho* ('Steelworks of Nagasaki'), 1992.

wave of anti-foreign sentiment swept through Japan. Incidents arising from this movement greatly disappointed Western people. Under the headline 'General survey' a Javanese newspaper reported: 'Political affairs in Japan are still dangerous and an anti-foreign movement also still strongly prevails. At present we live in a politically insignificant time for the colonies, because difficult incidents or important events are absent. The recent blow (the incident of Shimonoseki) has resulted in dull trade. Trade is not getting better.' ... 'The question should be posed whether Japan could be of use as a gateway to our colonies... Shall this affair add honour to the mother country? Moreover, shall this affair finally make profits for the mother country? We are looking for an expected remedy just like a medical doctor would prescribe. In the Netherlands we observe with interest the harmful results of grappling with this affair for the Netherlands East Indies. Moreover we see Ministers of Colonial Affairs appear and then rapidly resign. When we observe the continuous changes in government, and the sound of golden harp strings, that is, Will surplus in the Netherlands put the welfare, interests and prosperity of the Netherlands East Indies aside? We will not agree completely with the opinion of some of the more anxious elements in this country, but we have to agree in principle: 'Behold, when the storm rages in this mother country, colonies are shaken here and there as if a reed in a desert.' ...⁶⁷³

It seems that this article expresses contemporary common Dutch opinion. The colonial affairs in the Netherlands East Indies, that were expected to make big profits if effectively managed, were much more important than Japanese affairs that offered dubious trade benefits. This way of thinking, namely Japanese affairs were secondary to the Netherlands, grew in popularity and is still accepted at present. Meanwhile, it has already been reported that 'according to the Dutch representative in Japan, after the incident concerned [the incident of Shimonoseki], the Netherlands was not as highly esteemed in Japan as before.'⁶⁷⁴

Moreover, Dutch diplomacy towards the United States concerning the Japanese affairs was supported by some historical coincidences. For example, after the conclusion of the Japan-American treaty in 1854, steamships had not

⁶⁷³ 'Colonies' on 27 April 1863 no. 116 in: *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*.

⁶⁷⁴ *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1^e & 2^e kamer 1863-1864, Tweede Kamer*; p.650.

yet crossed the Pacific Ocean.⁶⁷⁵ Furthermore, it seemed that the results of Perry's expedition to Japan were not greeted with universal approval.⁶⁷⁶ 'As Perry was to find out, from Washington the Ryûkyûs and Japan appeared of little consequence, and his plans for quasi-colonies, protectorates over a number of Asian nations, and a strong regional presence to counter the threat of a 'British monopoly' of East Asia were neither understood, nor if they were, welcomed.'⁶⁷⁷ The low level of interest in Asian affairs resulted from the domestic problems concerning slavery in the United States.⁶⁷⁸ Then, 'If the government was not going to recognize his achievements, then Perry would himself.'⁶⁷⁹ Perry decided to publish accounts of the expedition. 'The criticism most often leveled at Perry was that he failed to negotiate a commercial treaty with the Japanese.'⁶⁸⁰ After all, Harris had concluded a commercial treaty in 1858. However, the domestic problems in the United States worsened.

The main country concerned in the opening of Japan was the United States. In the first year of trade in Yokohama, however, 80 per cent of all its trade was done by England.⁶⁸¹ Moreover, the number of British offices of foreign trading firms was fifty-one, while they grew only to eighty-five in the period of 1859-1868. Japanese trade was monopolized by the British merchants.⁶⁸² Bearing this fact in mind, it can be assumed that the Dutch-British-French Triple Entente plan against the United States succeeded.

It was said that the Netherlands had more influence in Japan than other foreign countries in the early years of the Meiji period. After that, however, its influence rapidly dwindled.⁶⁸³ It was symbolic to withdraw from Deshima in Nagasaki as a result of the Dutch-Japanese treaty. Questions were asked about why the Dutch Consul-General should leave Deshima, which had been a special

⁶⁷⁵ Hattori, *Kurofune zengo*, p.60.

⁶⁷⁶ Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.450

⁶⁷⁷ 'A Report of the Secretary of the Navy... relative to the naval expedition to Japan', pp.108-110. See Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*, p.451.

⁶⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, pp.455-456.

⁶⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, p.457.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p.466.

⁶⁸¹ Hattori, *Kurofune zengo*, p.60.

⁶⁸² *Ibidem*, p.116.

⁶⁸³ Kol, *De historische Verhouding*, p.24.

place for the Dutch for over two centuries.⁶⁸⁴ Thereby, ‘This event tore our old letters with Japan to pieces’.⁶⁸⁵ The special relationship between the Netherlands and Japan was completely a thing of the past. It, however, seems right that the Dutch contribution to the opening of Japan should not be forgotten.⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁸⁴ *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1^e & 2^e kamer 1863-1864, Tweede Kamer*, p.230.

⁶⁸⁵ W.A. van Rees, ‘Japansche Geschiedenis, politiek en zeden’ (‘History of Japan, politics and culture’), *De Gids*, Amsterdam, 1868, p.203.

⁶⁸⁶ Kol, *De historische Verhouding*, pp.43-47.

Conclusion

This thesis discusses Dutch diplomacy with respect to Japan in the period 1850-1863, predominately on the basis of Dutch primary sources and works. The principal aim of this study was to analyze the role of the Netherlands in the opening of Japan from the point of view of its foreign relations with other Western powers and with Japan in this period. So far this was a subject that attracted little attention. Dutch diplomacy towards Japan has been discussed in connection with the theorem of neutrality and free trade that is generally accepted in the Netherlands. In this light, such diplomacy was regarded as a passive and defensive. This study, however, examines Dutch diplomacy towards Japan from the theory of Dutch imperialism, in which the Dutch diplomacy can be re-interpreted as autonomous and positive.

In the middle of nineteenth century, the Netherlands had vast colonies in Asia, namely the Netherlands East Indies (present-day Indonesia), and ranked second only to England in the whole world in terms of the size of its colonies. The Netherlands, however, was not regarded as one of great powers in this period, because in Europe the realm was not large in comparison with other Western powers. Moreover, the Netherlands had a marked aversion to the power politics of Western great powers and it rigidly maintained a policy of neutrality towards them. This policy was combined with the economic theory of a free trade regime. Furthermore, adopting a humanitarian viewpoint, the Netherlands propagated not an expansive military but a peace-loving principle in its colonial policy. The upshot of this was that Dutch influence did not look powerful in the international relations. In this context, it was accepted among the Western great powers that the Netherlands would or could adopt no autonomous diplomacy. Accordingly Dutch diplomacy in the nineteenth century was characterized as an endeavour to pursue neutrality and a free trade regime.

As a corollary to this accepted theory of the Dutch foreign policy in the nineteenth century, up to the present Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the middle of this century has never been thoroughly examined academically. The prevailing view was accepted fairly uncritically; after the opening of Japan in 1854 the Netherlands would or could not adopt an autonomous diplomatic

course towards Japan at variance from that of the Western great powers; and consequently thereafter Dutch influence in Japan soon evaporated. Moreover it seemed to be readily accepted that the Netherlands had little interest in Japanese affair, because the main Dutch interests in Asia were tied up in the Netherlands East Indies. Given this background there are few works that address Dutch diplomacy in Japan in the Netherlands.

The recent theory of Dutch imperialism in which the Netherlands also adopted its own particular kind of imperialist policy has afforded an opportunity to re-interpret Dutch diplomacy in the Far East as a more autonomous process. In general, Dutch diplomacy was regarded as peaceable and based on the principles of humanism. Such an interpretation is sometimes wide of the mark. The Netherlands in its colonial policy did not resort to undertaking military expansion in the middle of the nineteenth century, because this was unnecessary: its peaceful policy worked effectively enough. It should, however, not be overlooked that the Netherlands always had the option of resorting to military force when peaceful means turned out to be ineffectual. Concerned with profit, the Netherlands strove to maximize profits in the colonies, while trying avoiding acquiring an aggressive image. Bearing in mind that the Netherlands could formulate a policy to maximize profits, it would indeed be fair to say that this country was adopting a course of autonomous diplomacy. In this respect it is important to recognize that the Netherlands should be regarded as a middle-size power and that it participated in the political and economic interests of the Western great powers. This thesis re-interprets Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the context of international relations in Asia in this period. It argues that the Dutch diplomacy in Japan should be regarded as an autonomous and active policy.

It was only the Netherlands among Western powers that had maintained a commercial relationship with Japan during what was known as the *Sakoku* period (1641-1854). This fact of its very nature meant that Japanese affair were special to the Netherlands. The significance of its relationship with Japan can be fully understood from the aspect of national prestige and economic interest. Territorially speaking, the Netherlands still is a small country in Europe but the special Dutch commercial relations with Japan recall the Dutch proud past as a great maritime power. Moreover only the Netherlands possessed the various collections of rare Japanese articles in its Museums and also had been able acquire knowledge of Japanese matters

because of this unique trade link. Therefore in this period Japanese studies in the Netherlands were the most advanced in the world which to a certain extent gave the Netherlands a prestige among other Western powers.

In reality the Dutch relationship with Japan had even more significance in view of both political benefits and economic profits. The first was related to maintenance of the international influence in Asia in order to manage the Netherlands East Indies most effectively. As far as the economic profit was concerned, the central issue was the system of forced cultivation of cash crops, the '*cultuurstelsel*', the Cultivation System which Governor-General Van den Bosch introduced there in 1831. The system worked very well and produced large profits. Consequently new markets for the colonial products of the Netherlands East Indies were sought and the Netherlands hoped to expand its trade in these with Japan, because of its geographical proximity to the colony. Against this background the Dutch relationship with Japan was one of most important contemporary issues in terms of political and economic interests. As a matter of course, the Netherlands dealt positively with the affair, when it learned about the plans to send an American mission to Japan around 1850.

The main features of this thesis are;

1, A re-interpretation of the Dutch diplomacy towards Japan

Dutch foreign policy depended enormously on circumstances in Europe. For this reason Dutch diplomacy is generally not regarded as autonomous. This somewhat negative image is indiscriminately applied to all domains of its diplomatic relations. Therefore, Dutch diplomacy towards Japan has also never been discussed as one which followed an autonomous path. This thesis accentuates the autonomous Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the context of Western imperialism in Asia. This is discussed principally on the basis of Dutch primary sources and works. The outcome unequivocally shows that the Netherlands did adopt an autonomous diplomatic course towards Japan, and that the relationship with Japan was special and one of the most important concerns of this country in view of its Asian interests.

2, The feasibility of the Dutch diplomacy in Asia in the context of the Dutch-British relations.

In the nineteenth century the Netherlands was a small country in Europe compared with the Western great powers. At the same time the Netherlands was a great colonial power, but lacked sufficient military force to secure the colonies. The navy of the Netherlands East Indies was too small to effectuate an effective management of the Indonesian Archipelago. This has led to the assumption that there was little opportunity left for the Netherlands to play an influential role in Japanese foreign relations too. In this context, this thesis has examined Dutch relations with England which the Netherlands regarded as 'our most natural ally' in Europe, and has demonstrated conclusively that, in co-operation with England, the Netherlands did adopt an autonomous diplomacy in Asia to a certain extent. England had a preference for co-operating with the Netherlands rather than other European countries in its Asian affairs. This relationship resulted from the political situation in Europe and also from the special relation deriving from their mutual status as 'Lords of the East' in Asia. Until recently, the relationship between the Netherlands and England in the middle of nineteenth century was generally regarded as one of confrontations. The analysis adduced in this thesis, however suggests that this matter should be understood as a mixture of political co-operation and economic competition. Secure in its co-operation with England, the Netherlands could pursue its interests in Asia as much as it wanted to, even in the situation in which the USA as an aggressive newcomer and other Western great powers made a palpable entrance on the scene.

3. Autonomous, active Dutch diplomacy towards Japan - in relation to the USA

The Netherlands adopted an autonomous, active course of diplomacy towards Japan when apprehension was raised about the possibility that the USA was aiming to break the unique commercial relationship between the Netherlands and Japan. The Netherlands did not contemplate abandoning its interests in Japan when it was confronted with the American intrusion. Using Dutch primary sources this thesis offers solid proof that Japanese affairs were of the

utmost importance to the Netherlands from the point of view of its national prestige and economic interests, and in this context it discusses how the Netherlands adopted autonomous, active diplomacy towards Japan quite separate from that of the new imperialistic powers gathering around Japan.

4, The feasibility of adopting autonomous, active diplomacy towards Japan by the Netherlands.

One important question arises from the accepted theory on the matter of whether or not the Netherlands could become a good partner for Japan after its opening; and whether or not Japan could fully depend on the Dutch support. The Netherlands was a relative small power and it had had to endure a humble position in Japan before the opening of this country to international trade. This situation, however, changed completely after the opening of Japan. By coming into contact with the Western civilization, the Japanese realized that their country was underdeveloped. By the same token, the political leaders chose to adopt the path of modernization on the model of Europe and strove to acquire knowledge of the Western civilization. Japanese traditionalism, however, was still very strong and it was very difficult for the Government to reform its country. In this situation, Western large powers, not least the USA, continued to make demands that it liberalize itself even further on Japan. These were exorbitant demands in the eyes of the contemporary Japanese. Against this background the anti-foreign movement in Japan began to assume particular form. The Dutch diplomatic measures, however, were relatively acceptable to the Japanese, because they were compiled taking Japanese policy and custom into proper consideration. This peaceable Dutch diplomatic behaviour was very attractive to Japan. The Netherlands belonged to the Western world and appeared to be counted among the large colonial powers because it possessed the Netherlands East Indies. As a result, Japan asked the Netherlands as an old and confidential friend to support this country in its reconstruction and modernization. This thesis discusses this topic and demonstrates that the Netherlands had a well-grounded opportunity to adopt an autonomous course of diplomacy towards Japan in order to establish and to expand its influence and interests there.

5, The difficulties in adopting Dutch diplomacy towards Japan – the confrontation between the Minister of Colonial Affairs and the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

The Ministry of Colonial Affairs in the Netherlands was ultimately responsible for the diplomacy towards Japan. The Government of the Netherlands East Indies, as an executive organ in an overseas territory, could deal only with the commercial matters concerning Japan. The Government in Batavia was subordinate to The Hague in matter pertaining to political affairs concerning Japan. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs pursued a positive diplomacy towards Japan when Duymaer van Twist was Governor-General. He, however, had no interest in Japanese affairs and would have preferred to adopt a passive course of diplomacy towards it. Consequently a confrontation between The Hague and Batavia took place and thereafter Duymaer van Twist tendered his resignation. Remarkably enough, the then Minister of Colonial Affairs, Pahud de Montanges, himself became the new Governor-General. This fact seems to indicate that Japanese Affairs were highly important to the Netherlands at that time.

6, The plan to establish the new economic relationship between China (Shanghai) – Japan (Nagasaki) – the Netherlands East Indies.

The capital city of Japan, Edo (present-day Tokyo) was opened to foreigners after the country had made itself accessible. The Western great powers lost little time in establishing diplomatic representatives there. The Dutch diplomatic agent, however, continued to reside in Nagasaki which had been the Dutch settlement for such a long time. Up to now, this fact was regarded as evidence that the Netherlands was not particularly bothered about Japanese affairs. Moreover, it was thought that this kind of Dutch perfunctory, passive diplomatic behaviour had damaged its interests in Japan. Such opinions tend to overlook the Dutch plan to establish a new large market linking Shanghai – Nagasaki – the Netherlands East Indies. This plan was originally prompted by a request from the Japanese Government that the Netherlands should take charge of regularly transporting Chinese articles to Japan. Consequently, this

decision to remain in Nagasaki was taken with due consideration of the political and economic implications. While limiting the political struggles among other Western powers, by dint of satisfying Japanese commercial demands, the Netherlands should have been able to establish a new, large market in Asia with its centre at its old settlement, Nagasaki, a port situated very favourably in relation to China and the Netherlands East Indies, and it made great strides towards maximizing its economic profits there.

7, Deshima as a Dutch bonded warehouse

It became more difficult for the Netherlands to exploit its privilege based on the basis of its centuries-old special relationship with Japan after the Japan-America treaty of 1858. Nevertheless then too the Netherlands stuck to its privilege as the vested right and strove to realize it. Its design was to transform Deshima into a Dutch bonded warehouse. This plan grew from the Japanese concession to the Netherlands which allowed it to bring articles to Deshima tax-free. The Netherlands wanted to promote the Japanese trade and the future Asian large market as effectively as possible by exploiting this right. This thesis sets out this plan in the context of the autonomous, active Dutch diplomacy towards Japan.

8, The Triple Entente between the Netherlands, England and France in relation to the USA

The establishment of the Triple Entente between the Netherlands, England and France was born of a Dutch proposal. The aim of the Netherlands was that Japanese affairs could be smoothly managed with the co-operation of these three countries only. Therefore the Netherlands did not ask the USA to participate in it. The Netherlands regarded the latter as a newcomer in Asia that did not respect the Dutch vested position in Japan. The Netherlands, however, recognized that it could not oppose the USA alone, because 'The United States of *North America* can compare with one of the greatest countries in *Europe*'.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸⁷ NA Koloniën no 5837, Opmerkingen van Raad van Indië naar de gouverneur-generaal, den 25 Junij 1852 Batavia in 6 Januarij 1853 (Exh) N.2, Geheim.

Therefore, the Dutch Government invented this skilful, concerted diplomacy with some of the great European powers. Because the Netherlands adhered to the principle of maintaining its position in Japan, this study argues that the Netherlands adopted an active diplomacy towards it.

9, The Transfer of Japanese affairs from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Western powers built a diplomatic and commercial relationship with Japan by concluding the treaty in 1858. In this instance it was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that negotiated with a Japanese mission that visited in the Netherlands in 1862. Although the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was officially responsible for Japanese affairs, the relationship with other countries concerning the Japanese affairs impinged so closely on the terrain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it felt it should take over Far Eastern policy. In principle it was preferable that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should deal with the Japanese affairs, because the relationship with Japan had become a matter of interest not only to the Netherlands East Indies but also to the Netherlands and its position in the European and wider international arena. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs had adopted an active diplomacy towards Japan. After this transfer, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs would also co-operate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in dealing with Japan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had little interest in Asian affairs. As a result, this ministry eradicated the influence of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs in Japanese Affairs and adopted a passive policy towards this country, keeping a weather eye on the attitudes of the other Western great powers. This thesis sets out the course of this process and describes how autonomous, active Dutch diplomacy towards Japan came to end. By analyzing primary sources, this thesis demonstrates that the special relationship between the Netherlands and Japan became completely a thing of the past after this transfer.

Bibliography

Readers who would like to check the contents of most of the original sources cited in this monograph can consult the electronic version <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/dspace/handle/1887/9744>. This collection contains dissertations of PhD students affiliated to Leiden University.

Materials

The Netherlands

Nationaal Archief, Den Haag.

Archief van het Kabinet des Konings

Archief van het Ministerie van Koloniën

Archief van het Ministerie van Buitenland Zaken

Archief van de Ministerraad

Archief van de Nederlandsche Faktorij in Japan

Archief van de Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij

Stamboeken van Indische Ambtenaren

Stamboeken van de Koninklijke Marine

Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Den Haag

Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1^e&2^e kamer

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant

Het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlnadsch Indie (KITVL), Leiden.

Westerse Handschriften en Archivalia H105

England

The National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew, London.

FO238, Foreign Office: Consulate and Legation, Netherlands: General Correspondence

The British Library, London

Additional 43248, Aberdeen Papers Vol.CCX presented by The Marquess of Aberdeen. 'Foreign Office memorandum on 1852'

Indonesia

Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta.

Archief Japan Bundel 77

Published primary sources

The Congressional Globe, New series containing Sketches of the Debates and Proceedings of the First session of the Thirty-first Congress, Volume XXI Part I, City of Washington printed at the office of John G. Rives, 1850.

The Congressional Globe: containing The Debates, Proceedings and Laws, of the First session of the Thirty-second Congress, Volume XXIV - Part I. City of Washington: printed at the office of John G. Rives, 1852.

Convention between Her Majesty and The Emperor of Japan. Signed at Nagasaki, in the English and Japanese languages, October 14, 1854. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1856, London, printed by Harrison and Sons.

Correspondence respecting the late Negotiation with Japan. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1856, London, printed by Harrison and Sons.

Great Britain Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State papers 1823-1824 Vol.XI*, London.

Gaimushô (外務省), *Nihon gaikô nenpyô narabini shuyôbunsho*, (『日本外交年表並主要文書』, 'A chronological table of Japanese diplomacy and its materials'), Harashobô (原書房), 1965.

Tôkyôdaigaku Shiryôhensanjo (red.), *Bakumatsu gaikoku kankei monjû* (『幕末外国関係文書』, 'Diplomatic documents in Bakumatsu period'), Tôkyôdaigaku shuppankai (東京大学出版会), 1910-.

De handel in Manufacturen in Ned.-Indië (Trade of Manufactures in Nederlands Indies) – *De invoer van Katoenen, zijden, kunstzijden en andere manufacturen in Ned.-Indië en het aandeel van den uitvoer naar Ned.-Indië in de totale exporten van Nederland, Engeland en Japan*, Batavia, 1931.

Historical documents relating to Japan in foreign countries: An inventory of microfilm acquisitions in the Historiographical Institute (Shiryôhensanjo), the University of Tokyo, Vols. I-V. the Netherlands. Parts I-V. Tokyo, 1963-66. 5 vols.

Alcock, Rutherford, *The Capital of the Tycoon: a Narrative of a Three years' Residence in Japan*, 2 vols, New York, 1683.

Arminjon, Vittorio.F., *Il Giappone e il viaggio della corvetta Magenta nel 1866*, Genova, 1869

Arminjon, V.F., *Il Giappone e il viaggio della corvetta Magenta nel 1866*, in Japanese Ôkubo Akio (trans.), *Italia shisetsu no bakumatsu kenbunki* (『イタリア使節の幕末見聞記』, 'A memoir of an Italian ambassador in the late Tokugawa era'), Shinjinbutsu ôraisha (新人物往来社), 1987.

Baud, W.A., *De semi-officiële en particuliere briefwisseling tussen J.C. Baud en J.J. Rochussen 1845-1851, - en enige daarop betrekking hebbende andere stukken(drie*

delen), Assen, 1983.

Beasley, W.G., *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy 1853-1868*, London, 1955.

Boerma, J.J. Westendorp, *Briefwisseling tussen J. van den Bosch en J.C. Baud 1829-1832 en 1834-1836*, Utrecht, 1956.

Castlereagh, *Correspondence, Despatches, and other papers, of Viscount Castlereagh, second Marquess of Londonderry. Edited by his brother, Charles William Vane, Marquess of Londonderry, G.C.B., G.C.H., G.B.E., Etc. third series. Military and Diplomatic in four volumes IX.*, London, 1852.

Chijs, J. A., van der, *Neêrlands Streven tot Openstelling van Japan voor den Wereldhandel.-uit officieele, grootendeels onuitgegeven bescheiden toegelicht*, Amsterdam, 1867.

Colenbrander H.T., *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840 uitgegeven, zevende deel, Vestiging van het Koninkrijk 1813-1815, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën (RGP) 23*, 's-Gravenhage, 1914.

Colenbrander, H.T., *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840, achtste deel, Regeering van Willem I. 1815-1825 I, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën (RGP) 25*, 's-Gravenhage, 1915.

Colenbrander H.T., *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840, achtste deel, Regeering van Willem I. 1815-1825 II, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën (RGP) 27*, 's-Gravenhage, 1915.

Cosenza, Mario Emilio, *The complete journal of Townsend Harris first American Consul General and Minister to Japan*, Tuttle, 1930.

Fortune, Robert, Miyake Kaoru(trans.), *Bakumatsu Nihon tanbôki – Edo to Peking* (『幕末日本探訪記 - 江戸と北京』, 'A report of Japan in the Bakumatsu period – Edo and Beijing'), Kôdansha gakujutsubunko(講談社学術文庫), 1997.

Doeff, Hendrik, *Herinneringen uit Japan*, Haarlem, 1833.

Gerretson, F.C. en Coolhaas, W. Ph., *Particuliere Briefwisseling tussen J. van den Bosch en D.J. de Eerens 1834-1840 en enige daarop betrekking hebbende andere stukken*, Groningen, 1960.

Hawks, Francis L., *Narrative of the expedition of an American squadron to the China Seas and Japan, performed in the years 1852, 1853, and 1854 under the command of Commodore M. C. Perry, U.S. navy / comp. from the original notes and journals of Commod. P. and his officers*, New York, 1856.

Heusken, Henry, *Japan Journal 1855-1861*, Translated and edited by Jeannette C. van der Corput and Robert A. Wilson, New Brunswick and New Jersey, 1964.

Hoëvell, W.R. van, *Parlementaire Redevoeringen over Koloniale Belangen 1849-1854* Zalt-Bommel, 1862 and *Parlementaire Redevoeringen over Koloniale Belangen 1856-1859*, Zalt-Bommel, 1864.

Huysen van Kattendyke, Willem Johan Cornelis, Ridder, *Uittreksel uit het dagboek van W.J.C. Ridder H. v. Kattendyke gedurende zijn verblijf in Japan in 1857, 1858 en 1859*, 's Gravenhage 1860, Mizuta Nobutoshi(水田信利) (trans.), *Nagasaki kaigun densyū jo no hibi*(『長崎海軍伝習所の日々』, 'A memory of Dutch maritime lessons in Nagasaki'), Heibonsha(平凡社), 1964.

Lindau, Rudolf, *Un voyage autour du Japon*, 1864, Morimoto Hideo(trans), *Suisu ryōji kara mita bakumatsu Nihon*, (『スイス領事から見た幕末日本』, 'A report of Japan in the late Tokugawa era by a Swiss consul'), Shinjinbutsu ōraisha, 1986.

Nicolai, Nakamura Kennosuke(trans.), *Nikolai no mita Bakumatsu Nihon*, (『ニコライの見た幕末日本』, 'A report of Japan by Nicolai'), Kōdansha gakujutsubunko, 1979.

Palmer, Aaron Haight, *Documents and facts illustrating the Origin of the Mission to Japan authorized by Government of the United States, May 10th, 1851; And which finally resulted in the treaty concluded by Commodore M.C. Perry, U.S. Navy with the Japanese commissioners at Kanagawa, Bay of Yedo, on the 31st March, 1854*,

Washington, 1857.

Posthumus, N.W., *Documenten betreffende de Buitenlandsche handelspolitiek van Nederland in de negentiende eeuw(zes delen)*, 's-Gravenhage, 1919.

Raffles, Sophia, *Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stanford Raffles, F.R.S. &c. particularly in the government of Java, 1811-1816, and Bencoolen and its dependencies, 1817-1824; with details of the commerce and resources of the Eastern Archipelago, and selections from his correspondence*, London, 1830.

Pahud, Charles Ferdinand, *Rapport aan Zijne Majesteit den Koning over de Japansche Aangelegenheden*, 's Gravenhage, 1855.

Saitô Agu, *Zûhu Nihon kaisôroku*, (『ズーフ日本回想録』, 'A memory of Doeff in Japan'), Shunnansha (駿南社), 1922, Yûshôdô, (reprinted), 1966.

Vos, Miyako(フォス・美弥子), 'J.K. van den Broek no 「Oranda to Nihon I」' (J.K. ファン・デン・ブルックの「オランダと日本 I」), *Nihon no Yôgaku I* (『日本の洋学 I』, Western study in Japan I), Osaka, 1993,

Vos, Miyako, 'J.K. van den Broek no 「Oranda to Nihon II」', *Nihon no Yôgaku II*, Osaka, 1994, (trans), 'Nederland en Japan - Kantteekeningen bij officieusen tekst' by J.K. van den Broek (The Netherlands and Japan - Marginalia in official documents), *De Tijdspiegel*, The Hague, 1861.

Vos, Miyako, *Bakumatsu Dejima Mikôkai Monjo -Donker Curtius Oboegaki* (『幕末出島未公開文書 - ドンケル・クルチウス覚え書』, 'An Unpublished Document in Dejima in the Last Tokugawa Era - A Memory of Donker Curtius'), Shinjinbutsu ôraisha, 1992.

Vos, Miyako, *Kaikoku Nihon no Yoake - Orandakaigun Fabiusu tyûryû nissi* (『開国日本の夜明け - オランダ海軍ファビウス駐留日誌』, 'Daybreak of Seaborne power Japan - Memoirs of Dutch marine officer Fabius in Japan'), Sibunkaku(思文閣), 2000.

Yokoyama, Yoshinori, 'Dutch-Japanese Relations during the Bakumatsu Period:

The Monthly Reports of J.K. de Wit', *Journal of The Japan-Netherlands Institute*
Vol. V, Tokyo, 1993.

General Surveys

Battistini, Lawrence H., *The United States and Asia*, London, 1956.

Chamberlain, Basil Hall, *Things Japanese being Notes on various subjects connected
with Japan for the use of travelers and others*, London, 1905.

Cullen, L.M., *A History of Japan, 1582-1941 – Internal and External Worlds*,
Cambridge, 2003.

Geurts, P.A.M., Janssen, A.E.M., *Geschiedschrijving in Nederland Deel I-II*, Den
Haag, 1981.

Kawasaki Seirô (川崎晴朗), *Bakumatsu no tyûnichi gaikôkan • ryôjikan* (『幕末の駐
日外交官・領事官』, 'Diplomats and Consulates in Japan in Bakumatsu period'),
Yûshôdôsyuppan, 1988.

Meerssche, Paul van de, *Internationale politiek 1815-1945 – Overzicht en
interpretaties*, Leuven/Amersfoort, 1998.

Momose Hiroshi (百瀬宏), *Shôkoku* (『小国』, 'Small power'), Iwanami shoten (岩
波書店), 1988.

Hoeven, Hans van der, *De Belgische Beroerte – De Tiendaagse Veldtocht en de
scheuring der Nederlanden 1830-1839*, Amsterdam, 1973.

Satô Naosuke (佐藤直助), *Seiyô bunka juyô no shiteki kenkyû* (『西洋文化受容の史
的研究』, 'A study of the history of the acceptance of Western culture'),
Tôkyôdôshuppan (東京堂出版), 1968.

Schuiling, R., *Nederland – Handboek der aardrijkskunde*, Zwolle, 1936.

Sked, Alan(ed.), *Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848*, London, 1979.

Shibahara Takuji (芝原拓自), *Sekaishi no naka no Meijiishin* (『世界史のなかの明治維新』, 'A significance of Meiji Restoration in World History'), Iwanami shinsho (岩波新書), 1977.

Schroeder, Paul W., 'The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure', Brands, M.C., Sas, N.C.F. van, Tromp, B.A.G.M. (red.), *De Veiligheid van Europa - Aspecten van de ontwikkeling van het Europese statenstelsel*, Rijswijk:The Netherlands, 1991.

Volmuller, H.W.J., (ed.), *Nijhoffs Geschiedenis lexicon Nederland en België*, 's Gravenhage-Antwerpen.

Imperialism

Betts, Raymond F., *The False Dawn European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*, Minneapolis, 1975.

Fieldhouse, D.K., *Economics and Empire 1830-1914*, London, 1973.

Gallagher, John and Robinson, Ronald, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *The Economic History Review*, Second series, Vol. VI, no. 1 (1953).

Goor, J. van (red.), *Imperialisme in de Marge - De afronding van Nederlands-Indië*, Utrecht, 1986.

Kuitenbouwer, Maarten, 'Het imperialisme-debat in de Nederlandse geschiedschrijving', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* No.35b, 1988.

Porter, Andrew, *European Imperialism 1860-1914*, London, 1994.

Treaty of London

Coolhaas, W. Ph., *Het Regeerings Reglement van 1827 – Het werk van 1818 aan de ervaring getoetst*, Utrecht, 1936.

Elout, C. Th., (P.J. Elout van Soeterwoude ed) *Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis der onderhandelingen met Engeland, betreffende de overzeesche bezittingen, 1820-24.*, 's Gravenhage 1863.

Hoek, I.H.J., *Het herstel van het Nederlandsch Gezag over Java en onderhoorigheden in de jaren 1816 tot 1819*, 's Gravenhage, 1862.

Horst, D. van der, *Van Republiek tot Koninkrijk – De vormende jaren van Anton Reinhard Falck 1777-1813*, Amsterdam/Dieren, 1985.

Kemp, P.H. van der, 'De sluiting van het Londensch Tractaat van 13 Augustus 1814', *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indië* 47, Amsterdam Frederik Muller, 1897.

Kemp, P.H. van der, 'De geschiedenis van het Londensch tractaat van 17 Maart 1824', *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indië* 56, Amsterdam, 1904.

Renier, G.J., *Great Britain and the Establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1813-1815 – a study in British foreign policy*, London, 1930.

Zimmermann, Alfred, *Die Europäischen Kolonien*, Berlin, 1903.

Smulders, C.M., *Geschiedenis en Verklaring van het Tractaat van 17 Maart 1824, te London gesloten tusschen Nederland en Groot Britannië, ter regering van de wederzijdsche belangen en regten in Oost-Indië*, Utrecht, 1856.

Stevens, Th., *Van der Capellen's koloniale ambitie op Java – Economisch beleid in een stagnerende conjunctuur 1816-1826*, Amsterdam, 1982.

Dutch diplomatic history

Boogman, J.C., 'Achtergronden, tendenties en tradities van het buitenlands beleid van Nederland (eind zestiende eeuw-1940)', Beugel, E.H. van den, e.a., *Nederlands buitenlandse politiek. Heden en verleden*, Baan, 1978.

Boogman, J.C., 'The Netherlands in the European Scene 1813-1913', Wels, C.B. (eindredactie), *Vaderlands Verleden in Veelvoud, II: 19e-20e eeuw*, Den Haag, 1980.

Dongen, Frans van, *Tussen Neutraliteit en Imperialisme: De Nederlands-Chinese Betrekkingen van 1863 tot 1901*, Groningen, 1966.

Everts, Philip(ed.), *Dilemma's in de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland*, Leiden, 1996.

Eyffinger A., 'Moraal uit noodzaak – Het Nederlands buitenlands beleid en de internationale rechtsorde', Kersten, A.E., Zeeland, A.L.M. van, Zwan, A.C. van der, *Twee honderd jaar Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken*, onder redactie van R.E. van Ditzhuyzen, Den Haag, 1998. p.151.

Geyl, P., *Nederland en de oorlog: Beschouwingen naar aanleiding van prof. Telders 'Nederlands onzijdigheid'*, Utrecht, 1939

Geyl. P., *Eenheid en Tweeheid in de Nederlanden*, Lochem, 1946.

Hellema, Duco Andele, *Neutraliteit & vrijhandel - de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse betrekkingen*, Utrecht, 2001.

Hamel, J.A. van, *Nederland tusschen de Mogendheden*, Amsterdam, 1918.

Hamel, J.A. van, *Vaderlandsche Voetsporen*, Amsterdam, 1942.

Hoeven, Hans van der, *De Belgische Beroerte – De Tiendaagse Veldtocht en de scheuring der Nederlanden 1830-1839*, Amsterdam, 1973.

Hooykaas, G.J., 'De politieke ontwikkeling in Nederland 1830-1840', *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 11*, Weesp, 1983.

Jurriaanse, M.W., *De Nederlandse Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken 1813-1900*, Den Haag, 1974.

Kemseke, Peter van, *Diplomatieke Cultuur*, Leuven 2000.

Kol, H.H. van, *De historische Verhouding tusschen Japan en Nederland*, Amsterdam, 1914.

Kuitenbrouwer, M., 'Het imperialisme van een kleine mogendheid : de overzeese expansie van Nederland 1870-1914', Sas, N.C.F. van (red.), *De kracht van Nederland Internationale positie en buitenlands beleid*, Haarlem, 1991.

Legêne, Susan, *De bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel- Japan, Java, Tripoli en Suriname in de negentiende-eeuwse Nederlandse cultuur van het imperialisme*, Amsterdam, 1998.

Schokking, J.J. (red.), *Nederland, Europa en de wereld; ons buitenlands beleid in discussie*, Meppel, 1970.

Patijn, Constantijn Leopold (ed.), *Nederlandse Buitenlandse Politiek – aspecten en achtergronden*, 's-Gravenhage, 1970.

Putten, Frans-Paul van der, 'Small Powers and Imperialism: the Netherlands in China, 1886-1905', *Itinerario*, Leiden, 1996.

Putten, Frans-Paul van der, *Corporate Behaviour and Political Risk: Dutch Companies in China, 1903-1941*, Leiden, 2001.

Sas, N.C.F. van, 'De Nederlanden en Europa 1815-1830', *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 11 Weesp, 1983.

Sas, N.C.F. van, *Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813-1831*, Groningen, 1985.

Smit, C., *Diplomatieke Geschiedenis van Nederland inzonderheid sedert de vesting van het koninkrijk*, 's-Gravenhage, 1950.

Vandenbosch, Amery, *The Dutch foreign policy since 1815: A study in small power politics*, The Hague, 1959.

Vollenhoven, C. van, *Holland's International Policy*, New York, 1919.

Voorhoeve, J.C., *Peace, profits and principles. A study of Dutch foreign policy*, The Hague, 1979.

Wels, C.B., *Aloofness and neutrality*, Utrecht, 1982

Wels, C.B., 'De historicus en de constanten in het buitenlands beleid', *Lijn in de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland*, 's-Gravenhage, 1984.

Westermann, J.C., *The Netherlands and the United States – Their relations in the beginning of the nineteenth century*, The Hague, 1935

Zwaan J.P. Kleiweg de, *Oude Betrekkingen tusschen Nederland en Japan*, Amsterdam, 1918.

Dutch history

Abeling, Joris, *Teloorgang en wederopstanding van de Nederlandse monarchie (1848-1898)*, Amsterdam, 1996.

Aerts, Remieg, Böhl, Herman de Liagre, Rooy, Piet de, Velde, Henk te, *Land van Klein Gebaren – Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-1990*, Nijmegen 1999.

Blom, J.C.H., Lamberts, E. (eds), *Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden*, Rijswijk, 1993.

Colenbrander, H.T., *Willem II Koning der Nederlanden*, Amsterdam, 1938.

Griffiths, Richard T., *Industrial Retardation in the Netherlands 1830-1850*, Den Haag, 1979.

- Holst, Henriëtte Roland, *Kapitaal en Arbeid in Nederland*, Nijmegen, 1977(rep.).
- Horst, Han van der, *Nederland – De vaderlandse geschiedenis van de prehistorie tot nu*, Amsterdam, 2000.
- Jansen, Michael, *De industriële ontwikkeling in Nederland 1800-1850*, Amsterdam, 1999.
- Kiers, Jantinus, *De Bevelen des Konings – De verhouding van Koning, Minister en Landvoogd historisch verklaard*, Utrecht, 1938.
- Kikkert, J.G., *Koning Willem III*, Utrecht, 1990.
- Kikkert, J.G., *Geen revolutie in Nederland – Impressies van Nederland tussen de Franse tijd en de Eerste Wereldoorlog 1813-1914*, Haarlem, 1992.
- Lademacher, Horst, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, Utrecht, 1983.
- Leeuwen, W.L.M.E. van, *Honderd Jaar Nederland 1848-1948*, Hengelo, 1948.
- Offermans Paul, *Geschiedenis van het Gewone Volk van Nederland*, Nijmegen, 1975.
- Ritter, P.H., *Eene halve eeuw 1848-1898 – Nederland onder de regeering van Koning Willem den derde en het regentschap van Koningin Emma*, Amsterdam, 1898. p.146-148.
- Pots, Roel, *Cultuur, koningen en democraten Overheid & cultuur in Nederland*, 2000.
- Tamse, C.A.(red), *De Monarchie in Nederland*, Amsterdam/Brussel, 1980.
- Tamse, C.A., *Nederland en België in Europa (1859-1871) – De zelfstandigheidspolitiek van twee kleine staten*, Den Haag, 1973.
- Tijn, Th. van, Zappij, Z.M., ‘De negentiende eeuw 1813-1914’, in Stuijvenberg, J.H. van (red.), *De economische geschiedenis van Nederland*, Groningen, 1977.

Verkade, W., *Thorbecke als Oost-Nederlands patriot*, Zutphen, 1974.

Welderen, W.J. van, *Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederland 1849-1891*, 's Gravenhage, 1905.

Wessels, Marius, *De Nederlandse traditie van vrijheid – Een vruchtbare voedingsbodem voor de hervormingen van 1848*, Assen, 1998.

Zwart, Jan A.J., *Duymaer van Twist – Een historisch-liberaal staatman 1809-1887*, Utrecht, 1939.

The Netherlands East Indies

Angelino, A.D.A. de Kat, *Staatkundig Beleid en Bestuurszorg in Nederlandsch-Indië*, 's-Gravenhage, 1930.

Baudet, H., 'Nederland en de rang van Denemarken' in Fasseur C.(samengesteld en ingeleid), *Geld en geweten – Een bundel opstellen over anderhalve eeuw Nederlands bestuur in de Indonesische archipel Deel II*, 1980, Den Haag.

Boomgaard, P., Noordegraaf, L., Vries, H. de, Zappey, W.M.(red.), *Exercities in ons verleden – Twaalf opstellen over de economische en sociale geschiedenis van Nederland en koloniën 1800-1950*, Assen, 1981.

Bosch, P.A. Roeper, *De verhouding tusschen Japan en Nederlandsche-Indië*, Amsterdam, 1918.

Breman, Jan, *Koelies, Planters en Koloniale Politiek – Het Arbeidsregime op de grootlandbouwondernemingen aan Sumatra's oostkust in het begin van de twintigste eeuw*, Dordrecht, 1987.

Coolhaas, W. Ph., *A critical survey of studies on Dutch colonial history*, 's-Gravenhage, 1960.

Couperus, J.R., *Een Woord ter gelegenheid der op handen zijnde ontmoeting der oud Gouverneurs-Generaal J.J. Rochussen en Mr. A.J. Duijmaer van Twist*, 's Gravenhage, 1860.

Deventer, M.L. van, *Het Nederlandsch gezag over Java en Onderhoorigheden sedert 1811- verzameling van onuitgegeven stukken uit de koloniale en andere archieven, I 1811-1820*, 's Gravenhage, 1891,

Diepenhorst, P.A., *Onze strijd in de Staten-Generaal deel II A. Kiesrecht- B. Koloniale Politiek*, Amsterdam, 1929.

Doel, H.W. van den, *De Stille Macht – Het Europese binnenlands bestuur op Java en Madoera, 1808-1942*, Amsterdam, 1994.

Fasseur, Cees, *Indischgasten*, Amsterdam, 1996.

Fasseur, Cees, *De weg naar het paradijs en andere Indische geschiedenissen*, Amsterdam, 1995.

Graaff, Bob de, *Kalm temidden van woedende Golven – Het ministerie van Koloniën en zijn taakomgeving 1912-1940*, Den Haag, 1997.

Groeneboer, Kees, *Weg tot het Westen – Het Nederlands voor Indië 1600-1950*, Leiden, 1993.

Goor, J. van, *De Nederlandse koloniën - Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse expansie 1600-1975*, Den Haag, 1993.

Gouda, Frances, *Dutch Culture Overseas – Colonial practice in the Netherlands Indies 1900-1942*, Amsterdam, 1995.

Jong, Janny de, *Van batig slot naar ereschuld – De discussie over de financiële verhouding tussen Nederland en Indië en de hervorming van de Nederlandse koloniale politiek 1860*, Den Haag, 1989.

Kuitenbrouwer, M., *Nederland en de opkomst van het moderne Imperialisme kolonien en buitenlandse politiek 1870-1902*, Amsterdam, 1985

Nieuwenhuys, Rob, *Mirror of the Indies – A History of Dutch Colonial Literature*, Singapore, 1999.

Pahud, *Het bestuur van den afgetreden landvoogd over Nederl. Oost-Indie – getoetst aan eenige feiten*, Rotterdam, 1862.

Reid, Anthony, *The Contest for North Sumatra – Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain 1858-1898*, New York, 1969.

Stapel, F.W., *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië*, Amsterdam, 1943(tweeden druk).

Stevens Th., *Van der Capellen's koloniale ambitie op Java – Economisch beleid in een stagnerende conjunctuur 1816-1826*, Amsterdam, 1982.

Tarling Nicholas, *Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, London, 1975.

Tarling Nicholas, *The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia*, Oxford, 1993.

VOC and Dutch trade

Blussé, Leonard & Moor, Jaap de, *Nederlanders Overzee – De eerste vijftig jaar 1600-1650*, Franeker, 1983.

Blussé, Leonard, *Visible Cities, Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans*, Cambridge, Mass., 2008.

Boxer, C.R., *Jan Compagnie in Oorlog en Vrede – Beknopte geschiedenis van de VOC*, Lochem, 1977.

Boxer, C.R., *The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800*, London, 1965.

Goor, J. van (ed.), *Trading Companies in Asia 1600-1830*, Utrecht, 1986.

Gaastra, F.S., *De Geschiedenis van de VOC*, Bussum, 1982.

Van Eyck van Heslinga, E.S., *Van Compagnie naar Koopvaardij – De scheepvaartverbinding van de Bataafse Republiek met de koloniën in Azië 1795-1806*, Amsterdam, 1988.

Hyma, Albert, *The Dutch in the Far East – A history of The Dutch commercial and colonial empire*, Michigan, 1942.

Hongsheng, Cai., Blussé, Leonard (et al.), *航行珠江 Sailing to the Pearl River – Dutch Enterprise in South China 1600-2000*, Guangzhou, 2004.

Ishida Chihiro (石田千尋), 'Bakumatuki ni okeru ransen tuminimono no kisoteki kenkyû – Tenpô 15 (1844) ~ Ansei 2 (1855) no honkata nimono - ' ('幕末期における蘭船積荷物の基礎的研究 - 天保 15 年(1844) ~ 安政 2 年(1855)の本方荷物 - ', 'A study of articles brought by Dutch ships in Bakumatsu period'), *Tsurumidaigaku kiyô* no.37, 2000.

Ishida Chiro, 'Nagasakibôeki ni okeru someoriyunyû – Bunsei 5 nen(1822) wo tyûshintosite - ' ('長崎貿易における染織輸入', 'A study about import of dyed goods in Nagasaki trade' - 文政 5 年(1822)を中心にして -), *Bulletin of Tsuyama Yôgaku Museum (Itteki - Annals of the Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan)*, Nr. 7, Tsuyama Yôgaku siryôhkan (津山洋学史料館), 1999.

Kimura Naoki (木村直樹), '17seiki tyuyoh bakuhansei kokka no ikokusen taisaku' ('17 世紀中葉幕藩制国家の異国船対策', 'Control of foreign ships in a country of political system consisting of bakufu and daimyo in the middle of seventeenth century'), *Shigaku zasshi* (『史学雑誌』) no.109, 2000.

Kimura Noaki, '17seiki kohhan no bakuhankenryoku to taigaijôhō – 1673nenn ritângôziken wo megutte - ' ('17 世紀後半の幕藩権力と対外情報 - 一六七三年リターン号事件をめぐる', 'A study about authorities of Bakufu and daimyo and information about foreign affairs – About the incident of *Return* in 1673'), *Kinsei* (『きんせい』), 1998.

Kuiper, J. Feenstra, *Japan en de Buitenwereld in de achttiende eeuw*, 's-Gravenhage, 1921.

Mansvelt, W.M.F., *Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij*, Haarlem,

Meilink-Roelofs, M.A.P., e.a., *De V.O.C. in Azië*, Fibula, 1976.

Nagazumi Akira (永積昭), *Dutch East India Company*, Kondô shuppansha (近藤出版社), 1971.

Nagazumi Akira, *Oranda higashi indo gaisha* (VOC), (『オランダ東インド会社 (VOC)』, the United Netherlands Chartered East India Company), *Kôdansha gakujuts ubunko*, 2000.

Nagazumi Yôko (永積洋子), 'Oranda shôkan no wakini bôeki ni tsuite - Shôkanyô Meiran no setsuritu sita kojimbôeki kyôkai (1826-1830) (『オランダ商館の脇荷貿易について - 商館長メイランの設立した個人貿易協会 (1826 - 1830 年)』, 'Private trade about Dutch trading post in Dejima - Private trade association established by the Dutch trading chief Meijlan (1826-1830)', *Nihon rekishi* (『日本歴史』, 'Journal of Japanese history'), Tokyo, 1979

Nagazumi Yôko, *Shuin sen* (『朱印船』, 'Ship with sailing permit'), Yoshikawa kohbunkan, 2001.

Oosterwijk, Bram, *Koning van de Koopvaart - Anthony van Hoboken (1756-1850)*, Amsterdam, 1996.

Paul, H., *Nederlanders in Japan 1600-1854 - De VOC op Desjima*, Weesp, 1984.

Ross, R, Winius, G.D. (eds), *All of one Company - The VOC in biographical perspective*, Utrecht, 1986.

History related to England

Dickins, F.V., *The life of Sir Harry Parkes, Sometime Her Majesty's Minister to China and Japan*, in two volumes, London, 1894, Takahashi Kenkichi(高橋健吉 trans.), *Pakusu den- Nihon thûzai no hibi* (『パークス伝 - 日本駐在の日々』, 'A biography of Parkes - His life in Japan'), Heibonsya, 1984.

Hyde, Montgomery H., *The strange death of Lord Castlereagh*, London, 1959.

Paske-Smith M., *Report on Japan to the secret committee of the English East India Company by Sir Stanford Raffles 1812-1816*, Kobe, 1929.

Shinobu Seizaburô(信夫清三郎), *Raffuruzu den* (『ラッフルズ伝』, 'A bibliography of Raffles'), Heibonsha, 1968.

History related to the United States

Dennett, Tyler, *Americans in Eastern Asia. A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with reference of China, Japan and Korea in the 19th Century*, New York, 1922.

Kanai Madoka(金井 圓), 'A Diary of William Cleveland, Captain's Clerk on Board the Massachusetts', *Monograph Series 1. Quezon City Institute of Asian Studies*, University of the Philippines, 1965.

Katô Yûzô, *Kurofune ihen - Perî no chôsen*,(『黒船異変 - ペリーの挑戦』, 'Incident of Black ship - a challenge of Perry') Iwanami shinsho, 1988.

Melville, Herman, *Moby Dick*, New York, 1851.

Ôe Shinobu (大江志乃夫), *Perî kantai daikôkaiki* (『ペリー艦隊大航海記』, 'A logbook of Perry's expedition'), Rippûshobô (立風書房), 1994.

Payson J. Treat, *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan 1853-1895*, California and London, 1932.

Sakata Seiichi(坂田精一), *Harisu* (『ハリス』, 'A biography of Harris'), Yoshikawa

kôbunkan, 1987(rep.).

Shunzô Sakamaki, 'Japan and the United States 1790-1853', *The Transactions of The Asiatic Society of Japan, 2nd Ser. Vol.X*, 1939.

Reischauer, Edwin O., *The United States and Japan*, Cambridge, 1965.

Walworth, Arthur, *Black ships off Japan - The story of Commodore Perry's Expedition*, New York, 1946.

Wiley, Peter Booth with Ichiro Korogi, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods - Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan*, New York, 1990.

Yamaguchi Muneyuki (山口宗之), *Peri raikô zengo - Bakumatsu kaikokushi* (『ペリ-来航前後 - 幕末開国史』, 'A history of before and after the period of Perry's arrival'), Perikansha (ペリカン社), 1988.

Relations history of Japan with Western countries

Aoki Michio and Kawachi Hachirô ed. (青木美智男、河内八郎), *Kaikoku* (『開国』, 'The opening of a country'), Yûhikaku (有斐閣), 1985.

Banno Jyunji, Miyachi Masato, Takamura Naosuke, Yasuda Hiroshi, Watanabe Osamu (坂野潤治、宮地正人、高村直助、安田 浩、渡辺 治), *Nihon kingendaishi-1, Ishin henkaku to kindai Nihon* (『日本近現代史1 維新変革と近代日本』, 'A modern and contemporary history of Japan-1, Meiji Restoration and modern Japan'), Iwanami shoten, 1993.

Beasley, W.G., *The Modern History of Japan*, London, 1963.

Beasley, W.G., *Great Britain and the opening of Japan 1834-1858*, Folkestone, 1995(rep.).

Beukers Harm, *The Mission of Hippocrates in Japan - Philipp Franz von Siebold in his role as medical doctor*, Amsterdam/Leiden, 1996.

Beukers, H., Luyendijk-Elshout, A.M., Opstall M.E. van, Vos, F., Red-Hair Medicine Dutch-Japanese medical relations, Amsterdam/Atlanta, 1991.

Beukers, H., Blussé, L., Eggink, R., *Leraar onder de Japanners – Brieven van dr. K.W. Gratama betreffende zijn verblijf in Japan 1866-1871*, Amsterdam, 1987.

Bosma, H., 'Kômô-jin, Roodharige vreemdelingen op Deshima', Vrieze (red.) J., *Kômô-jin, Roodharige vreemdelingen op Deshima – Nagasaki prenten en schilderijen uit de 18^e en 19^e eeuw*, Amsterdam, 1983.

Checkland, Olive, *Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 1868-1912*, London, 1989.

Cortazzi, Hugh(ed.), *British Envoy in Japan 1859-1972*, Folkestone, 2004.

Dalhuisen, L.G., Geest, H.J.M., van der(red.), *Deshima, een factorij in Japan*, Gottmer Educatief, Bloemendaal, 1985.

Doren, J.B.J., *De openstelling van Japan voor de vreemde natiën in 1856 – volgens zoowel uitgegevene, als niet uitgegevene bronnen*, Amsterdam, 1861.

Fujii Tetsuhiro (藤井哲博), *Nagasaki kaigun denshûjo- Jûkyûseiki tôzaibunka no setten* (『長崎海軍伝習所 - 十九世紀東西文化の接点』, 'Dutch maritime lessons in Nagasaki – A point of contact between Western and Eastan culture'), Chûkô shinsho, 1991.

Fujimoto Rei, 'The investigation on Jan Hendrik Donker Curtius' (in Japanese), *Bulletin of the Japan-Netherlands Institute* (『日蘭学会会誌』 *Nichiran gakkaishi*) Vol.21, Tokyo, 1986.

Fujiwara Akira, Imai Seiichi, Uno Shunichi, Awaya Kentaroh (藤原 彰、今井 清一、宇野 俊一、栗屋 憲太郎 red.), *Nihon kindai no kyozô to jitsuzô – Kaikoku~nichirosensô 1* (『日本近代の虚像と実像 - 開国 ~ 日露戦争』, 'A false and real image in a history of modern Japan - From the opning to Japan-Russia war'), Ôtsukishoten (大月書店), 1990.

Fuse Shôichi (布施昌一), *Shîboruto no Nihonshi* (『シーボルトの日本史』, 'Siebold in a Japanese history'), Mokujusha (木耳社), 1988.

Greene, D.C., 'Correspondence between William II of Holland and the Shogun of Japan, A.D. 1844', *TAS*34-4, 1907:122.

Gulik, Willem R. van, 'Gaikôkan Shîboruto - Bakumatsu to Shîboruto no yakuwari' (『外交官シーボルト - 幕末とシーボルトの役割』, 'Siebold as diplomat'), Josef Kreiner(ed.), *Tasogare no tokugawa Japan - Shîboruto fûshi no mita Nihon* (『黄昏のトクガワジャパン』, 'Twilight of Tokugawa Japan - Japan that Siebold and his son saw'), NHK bukku (NHK ブックス), Tokyo, 1998.

Gulik, Willem R. van, *A Distant Court Journey - Dutch traders visit the Shogun of Japan*, Amsterdam, 2000.

Gulik, Willem R. van, 'De dagheraut van hooger leven - Een vorstelijk geschenk van koning Willem III aan het Land van de Rijzende Zon', Molen, J.R. ter, Bent, E. van den, Eymael, C., Renting, A.D., Spliethoff, M.E., *Een Vorstelijk Archivaris - Opstellen voor Bernard Woelderink*, Zwolle, 2003.

Hattori Shisô, *Kurofunezengo-Shisi to keizai*, Iwanamibunko, 1981.

Hesselink, R.H., *Twee spiegels op Cambang - een portret van de Japanners in de negentiende eeuw naar Nederlandse ooggetuigenverslagen*, Utrecht, 1984.

Ishii Kanji, Sekiguchi Yoshiyuki (石井寛治、関口尚志 red.), *Sekaishijô to bakumatsu kaikô* (『世界市場と幕末開港』, 'World market and the opening of a country in Bakumatsu period'), Tôkyôdaigaku shuppankai, 1982.

Ishii Takashi (石井 孝), *Meiji ishin to gaiatsu* (『明治維新と外圧』, 'Meiji Restoration and foreign pressure'), Yoshikawa kôbunkan, 1993.

Ishii Takashi, *Gakusetsu hihan Meiji ishinron* (『学説批判 明治維新論』, 'A criticism of theory of Meiji Restoration'), Yoshikawa kôbunkan, 1961.

Ishii Takashi, *Nihon kaikokushi* (『日本開国史』, 'A history of Japan opening'),

Yoshikawa kôbunkan, 1972.

Iwamoto Yoshiharu(巖本 善治 red.), *Shintei Kaishû zadan* (『新訂 海舟座談』, ‘A talk of Kaisyû’), Iwanami shinsho, 1937(rep. 1983).

Iwashita Tetsunori(岩下哲典), ‘Edojidai ni okeru shirohata ninshiki to 「Perî no shirohata」」 (『江戸時代における白旗認識とペリーの白旗』, ‘A general understanding of white flag in Japan and ‘the one of Perry’ in Edo period’), *Aoyamashigaku* (『青山史学』) 21, 2003.

Iwashita Tetsunori, *Bakumatsu Nihon no jôhō katsudō – 「Kaikoku」 no Jôhōshi* (『幕末日本の情報活動 - 「開国」の情報史』, ‘Japanese intelligence activities in the late Tokugawa era – the history of information about the opening of the country’), Yûzankaku(雄山閣), 2000.

Iwashita Tetsunori, ‘Perî raikō chokuzen ni okeru Date Munenari(伊達宗城) no jôhō katsudō – *Bakumatsu Nihon no jôhō katsudō hoi* (『ペリー来航直前における伊達宗城の情報活動 - 幕末日本の情報活動補遺』, ‘Intelligence activities of Date Munenari just before Perry’s arrival - A supplement of *Japanese intelligence activities in the late Tokugawa era*’), *Meijiishinshi gakkaihō* (『明治維新史学会報』), No. 36, 2000.

Jacobs, Els M., ‘Met alleen woorden als wapen. De Nederlandse poging tot openstelling van Japanse havens voor de internationale handel(1844)’, *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 105, Utrecht, 1990.

Kanai Madoka, *Kinsei Nihon to Oranda* (『近世日本とオランダ』, ‘Modern Japan and the Netherlands’), Hôsôdaigaku shuppankai, 1993.

Kanai Madoka, ‘Bunsei 3nen 9gatsu no Nagasaki Dejima no shirôto shibai – Nihon no fû to zoku’ (『文政3年9月の長崎出島の素人芝居』, ‘A play by Dutch amateur performers at Dejima in Nagasaki in September of 1820 – Customs of Japan’), *Tsukubanesha*(つくばね社), 2000.

Kogure Minori(小暮実徳), ‘A study of Dutch Diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa period with reference to Van der Chijs’s *Neêrlands Streven*

(1867)('ファン・デル・シェイスの『オランダ日本開国論』 その書誌的説明と本書の1852年までの問題点への検討), *Bulletin of The Japan-Netherlands Institute*, Nr. 42, Tokyo, 1997

Kogure Minori, 'Van der Chijs no 「Oranda Nihon kaikoku ron」 no seiritu jijô' ('ファン・デル・シェイスの『オランダ日本開国論』の成立事情) How Van der Chijs wrote *Neêrlands Streven*, with Reference to its Table of Content's list unpublished), *Yôgaku* 8 ('Annals of the Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan'), Tokyo, 1999.

Kogure Minori, 'Bakumatsu oranda tainichi gaikôseisaku no ichi shiten 「Oranda Nihon kaikoku ron」 no tegaki genkô kara kôsatsu shita' ('幕末オランダ対日外交政策の一視点 - 『オランダ日本開国論』の手書き原稿から考察した), 'An aspect of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in late Tokugawa era, with Reference to the handwriting of *Neêrlands Streven*'), *Bulletin of Tsuyama Yôgaku Museum (Itte)* - Annals of the Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan), Nr. 8, Okayama, 2000.

Kol, H.H. van, *De historische Verhouding tusschen Japan en Nederland*, Amsterdam, 1914.

Korner, Hans von, *Die Wurzburger Siebold. Eine Gelehrtenfamilie des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, Mit 87 Bildnissen und 55 Abbildungen*, Leipzig 1967, Takeuchi Seiichi(竹内精一 trans.), *Shîboruto fûshien* ('シーボルト父子伝', 'A biography of Siebold and his son'), Sôzôsha, 1973.

Kure Shûzô(呉秀三), *Shîboruto sensei, Sono shôgai oyobi Kôgyô* ('シーボルト先生 - その生涯及び功業'), 'Teacher Von Siebold, his life and contribution'), Heibonsya(3 volume, reprinted), 1967-68.

Kure Shuzo, *Philipp Franz von Siebold Leben und Werk, Deutsche, wesentlich vermehrte und ergänzte Ausgabe, bearbeitet von Friedrich M. Trautz*, Herausgegeben von Hartmut Walravens, Vol.1, Monographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien der Philipp-Franz-von-Siebold-Stiftung, 1996.

Kurihara Fukuya(栗原福也), 'Von Shîboruto rainichi no kadai to haikai' ('フオ

ン・シーボルト来日の課題と背景』, 'Mission and circumstance of Von Siebold in Japan'), Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio(箭内健次、宮崎道生 red.), *Shīboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindai* (『シーボルトと日本の開国 近代化』, Siebold and the opening of Japan and its modernization), Zoku gunshoruiju kanseisha, 1997.

Kutsuzawa Nobutoshi(沓沢宣賢), 'Shīboruto torai hyakushūnen kinensai ni kansuru ichikōsatsu- Gaimushō gaikōshiryōkan shozō siryō wo chūshinni-' (『シーボルト渡来百年記念祭に関する一考察 - 外務省外交史料館所蔵史料を中心に - 』, 'A study about the 100th anniversary of Sibold's arrival in Japan - by examination of documents in the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan'), *Narutaki kiyō*(『鳴滝紀要』)No.6, 1996.

Kutsuzawa Nobutaka, 'Dainiji rainichiji ni okeru Shīboruto no gaikōkatsudō' (『第二次来日時におけるシーボルトの外交活動』, 'Siebold's diplomatic action in his second arrival in Japan') in Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio(red.), *Shīboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindai*.

Kutsuzawa Nobutaka, 'The Activities of Philipp Franz von Siebold During His Second Stay in Japan, Particularly His Diplomatic Activities in Nagasaki, Yōkohama and Edo', Thiede, A., Hiki, Y., Keil, G., *Philipp Franz von Siebold and His Era - Prerequisites, Developments, Consequences and Perspectives*, 1999, Springer.

Kutsuzawa Nobutaka, 'Shīboruto kenkyūshi gaikan - Wagakuni oyobi gaikoku ni okeru kenkyū no ato wo kaeriminagara -' (『シーボルト研究史概観 - 我が国および外国における研究の跡を顧みながら - 』, 'A survey of studies concerning Siebold - in view of the development of this study in Japan and foreign countries'), *Kikan Nihon shisōshi*(『季刊日本思想史』)No.55, 1999.

Kutsuzawa Nobutaka, 'Shīboruto to Nihon kenkyū' (『シーボルトと日本研究』, 'Sibold and his Japanese study'), Katō Yasushi(加藤泰 ed.), *Chi no kindai wo yomitoku*(『知の近代を読み解く』), 2001.

Kutsuzawa Nobutaka, 'Shīboruto to Nihon igaku' (『シーボルトと日本医学』, 'Siebold and Japanese medical science'), Isiyama Yoshikazu(石山禎一 ed.), *Shin Shīboruto kenkyū I - Shizenkagaku · igaku hen*(『新・シーボルト研究 - 自然科学・

医学篇』, ‘Present studies concerning Siebold – the volume of natural and medical science’), Yasakashobô (八坂書房), 2003.

Kutsuzawa Nobutaka, ‘Shîboruto no igakukankeishi · siryô ni tuite’ (‘シーボルトの医学関係史・史料について’, ‘A medical history and materials concerning Siebold’), Isiyama Yoshikazu(ed.), *Shin Shîboruto kenkyû I – Shizenkagaku · igaku hen*, Yasakashobô, 2003.

Kutsuzawa Nobutaka, ‘1861nen tôzenji jiken ni kansuru ichi siryô’ (‘1861年東禪寺事件に関する一史料’, ‘A document about tohzenji’s incident in 1861’), Isiyama Yoshikazu(ed.), *Shin Shîboruto kenkyû II – Shakai · bunka · geijutsu hen* (‘新・シーボルト研究 II - 社会・文化・芸術篇’, ‘Present studies concerning Siebold – the volume of society, culture and art’), Yasakashobô, 2003.

Kutsuzawa Nobutaka, ‘Shîboruto kenkyûshi gaikan – Saikin no kenkyû dôkô wo chûshin ni -’ (‘シーボルト研究史概観 - 最近の研究動向を中心に -’, ‘A survey of studies concerning Siebold - in view of especially the present works’), Isiyama Yoshikazu(ed.), *Shin Shîboruto kenkyû II – syakai · bunka · geijutsu hen*, Yasakashobô, 2003.

MacLean, J., ‘Philipp Franz von Siebold and the opening of Japan, 1843-1866, *Philipp Franz von Siebold, A contribution to the study of the Historical Relations between Japan and the Netherlands*, The Netherlands Association for Japanese Studies, Leiden, 1978.

MacLean, J., ‘De betekenis van Jan Karel van den Broek (1814-1865) t.a.v. de introductie van de westerse technologie in Japan’, *De Ingenieur*, NR30/31, 1975.

Maritiem Museum, *350 jaar Nederland-Japan*, Rotterdam, 1960.

Matsui Yôko (松井洋子), ‘Indonesia kokuritsu kôbunshokan shozô orandajidai shiryô ni tsuite – Nihonkankei bunsho wo chûshin ni -’ (‘インドネシア国立公文書館所蔵オランダ時代史料について - 日本関係文書を中心に’, ‘A study of documents in the Dutch period in National Archive of Indonesia – especially for documents concerning Japan’), *Tôkyôdaigaku shiryôhensanjo kiyô* No.11 (‘東京大学史料編纂所紀要’), 2001.

Matsukata Fuyuko (松方冬子), 'Fûsetsugaki izen no Orandazin ni yoru jôhôteikyô ni tsuite' ('風説書以前のオランダ人による情報提供について', 'A study of Dutch provision of information in Japan before the establishment of Dutch apart news'), *Tôkyôdaigaku shiryôhensanjo kiyô*No.9, 1999.

Matsukata Fuyuko, '1840-45 no betsudan Fûsetsugaki ranbuntekisuto' ('1840 - 45 年の別段風説書蘭文テキスト', 'Dutch texts of Dutch special apart news during 1840-45'), *Nihonrekishi*No.632, 2001.

Matsukata Fuyuko, 'Maboroshi no 1845 betsudan Fûsetsugaki to sono jôhôgen (Joh)' ('幻の 1845 年別段風説書とその情報源・上', 'Complete Japanese translation of Dutch special apart news in 1845) (first half)', *Nichiran gakkaikaishi* No.49, 2002.

Matsukata Fuyuko, 'Maboroshi no 1845 betsudan Fûsetsugaki to sono jôhôgen (Ge)' ('Complete Japanese translation of Dutch special apart news in 1845 (second half)'), *Nitiran gakkaikaishi*No.50, 2002.

Matsukata Fuyuko, *Seikô ka shippai ka - 1844 Oranda kokuô no shinsho* (『成功か失敗か - 1844 年オランダ国王の新書』, 'Success or Not - King Willem II's letter in 1844'), Speech, the University Museum, the University of Tokyo in 19 October 2004.

Mitani Hiroshi (三谷 博), *Meijiishin to Nationalism - Bakumatsu no gaikô to seiji hendô* (『明治維新とナショナリズム - 幕末の外交と政治変動』, 'Meiji Restoration and Nationalism - the diplomacy and political movement in Bakumatsu period'), Yamakawa syuppansya, 1997.

Miyanaga Takashi (宮永 孝), *Bunkyû Ninen no Yôroppa Hôkoku* (『文久二年のヨーロッパ報告』, 'A report on Europe in 2 Bunkyû(1862)'), Shinchô sensho (新潮選書), 1989.

Miyasaka Masahide (宮坂正英), 'Shîboruto to Perî no Amerika Nihon enseitai - Burandenshutain bunsho wo chûshin ni -' ('シーボルトとペリーのアメリカ日本遠征隊 - ブランデンシュタイン文書を中心に -), 'Siebold and Perry's expedition - by

examination of Brandenstein's documents'), Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio(red.), *Shīboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindaika*.

Miyazaki Michio, 'Shīboruto no Nihon kaikoku kindaika heno kōken' (「シーボルトの日本開国近代化への貢献」, 'Siebold's contribution to the opening of Japan and its modernization'), Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio(red.), *Shīboruto to Nihon no kaikoku*.

Mizuta Nobutoshi (水田信利), *Bakumatsu ni okeru wagakaigun to Oranda* (『幕末における我が海軍とオランダ』, 'Japanese navy and the Netherlands in Bakumatsu period'), Yūshūkai (有終會), 1929.

Morioka Yoshiko (森岡美子), *Sekaishi no naka no Dejima- Nichiō tūkōshijō Nagasaki no hatashi ta yakuwari* (『世界史の中の出島 - 日欧通行史上長崎の果たした役割』, 'Dejima in world history - the role of Nagasaki in the history of Japan-Europe relations'), Nagasaki bunkensha (長崎文献社), 2001.

Middelstum, J.C. Lewe van, 'De Openstelling van Japan', *De Gids*, 1858.

Moeshart, Herman J., *Een miskend geneesheer - Dr. J.K. van den Broek en de overdracht van kennis van westerse technologie in Japan 1853-1857*, Amsterdam, 2003.

Moeshart, Herman J., *Journaal van Jonkheer Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek 1857-1870 - Belevnissen van een Nederlands diplomaat in het negentiende eeuwse Japan*, Assen/Maastricht, 1987.

Nagao Masanori, 'Philipp Frans von Siebold's Dutch Dairy of the Year 1861' (in Japanese), *Bulletin of the Japan-Netherlands Institute* Vol.10, Tokyo, 1985.

Nagazumi Yōko, 'Improvements in Dutch Language Skills and the Russian Question in Japan: 1739-1805', *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, No.55, The Tōyō Bunko:Tokyo, 1997.

Nagazumi Yōko, 'Tūshō no kunikara tūshin no kuni he', (「通商の国から通信の国へ」, 'From a country for trade to a country for communication') *Nihonrekishi*

(『日本歴史』), No.458, 1986.

Nishizawa Mihoko(西澤美穂子), 'Peri raikôzengo no nichiran kôshô – Oranda shôkanchô Curuchius no katsudô wo chûshin ni –(「ペリー来航前後の日蘭交渉 - オランダ商館長クルチウスの活動を中心に」, 'Dutch-Japanese relations about the period of Perry's arrival in Japan – in the focus of the activities of Dutch commercial chief Donker Curtius in Nagasaki'), *Sensyûshigaku*(『専修史学』) No.30, 1999.

Nypels, G., *Japan-Nederland in Oost-Azië – Eene militaire studie*, Haarlem, 1899.

Osatake Takeki(尾佐竹 猛), *Bakumatsu kengai shisetsu monogatari*(『幕末遣外使節物語』, 'Story of Japanese expedition to foreign countries in Bakumatsu period'), Banrikaku shobô(万里閣書房), 1929 (Kôdansha gakujutsubunko, rep. 1989).

Opstall, Margot E. van, en Vos, Frits, en Gulik, Willem van, en Vries, de Jan, *Vier eeuwen Nederland-Japan – Kunst-Wetenschap-Taal-Handel*, Lochem, 1983.

Pierson, J.L. Jr., *De openstelling van Japan – Rede uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleeraar in de Japansche taal en letterkunde aan de rijks universiteit te Utrecht op den 1en november 1930*, Utrecht.

Poelgeest, L. van, *Japane Besognes – Nederland en Japan 1945-1975*, Den Haag, 1999.

Querido, A., 'Dutch Transfer of knowledge through Deshima – The Role of the Dutch in Japan's Scientific and Technological Development during the Edo Period', *The Transactions of The Asiatic Society of Japan* Vol.XVIII, Tokyo, 1983.

Rees, W.A. van, 'Japansche Geshiedenis, politiek en zeden' ('History of Japan, politics and culture'), *De Gids*, Amsterdam, 1868.

Saitô Agu, *Zûhu to Nihon*(『ツーフと日本』, 'Doeff and Japan'), Kôbunkan(廣文館), 1922.

Siebold, Philipp Franz von, *Met oorkonden gestaafd vertoog van de pogingen door Nederland en Rusland gedaan tot openstelling van Japan voor de scheepvaart en den zeehandel van alle natiën*, Zalt-Bommel, 1854.

Stellingwerff, J., *De Diepe wateren van Nagasaki – Nederlands-Japanse betrekkingen sedert de stichting van Deshima*, Franeker, 1983.

Stellingwerff, J., *Zijne Majesteits Raderstoomschip Soembing overgedragen aan Japan – De drie diplomatieke reizen van kapitein G. Fabius ter opening van Deshima en Nagasaki in 1854, 1855 en 1856*, Zutphen, 1988.

Stapel, F.W., *Japan en Nederland tot de openstelling van Japan voor den wereldhandel*, in KITVL.

Swart, Jacob(red.), ‘Rapport aan Z.M. den Koning van Zijne Excellence: den Minister van Kolonien, betrekkelijk de Nederlandsche bemoeijingen en handelingen in Japan’, *Verhandelingen en Berichten betrekkelijk het Zeewezen, de Zeevaartkunde en de daarmede in verband staande wetenschappen*, Amsterdam, 1855.

Tabohashi Kiyoshi(田保橋潔), *Zôtei kindai Nihon gaikoku kankeishi* (『増訂近代日本外国関係史』, ‘A history of Japanese modern relations with foreign countries’), Harashobô(原書房), 1971.

Tanabe Taichi(田辺太一), *Bakumatsu gaikô dan* (『幕末外交談』, ‘A story of diplomacy in the late Tokugawa era’), Toyamashobô(富山書房 rep.), 1966.

Tanaka Hiroyuki(田中弘之), *Bakumatsu no ogasawara – Ôbei no hogeisen de sakaeta midori no shima*, (『幕末の小笠原 - 欧米の捕鯨船で栄えた緑の島』, ‘Ogasawara in Bakumatsu period - A green island that made its large money from Western whaling ships’), Chûkô shinsho(中公新書), 1997.

Tokutomi Sohô(徳富蘇峰), *Kinsei Nihon kokumininshi, kenbei shisetsu to roei taiketsuhen- Kaikoku shokihen-*, (『近世日本国民史 遣米使節と露英対決篇』, ‘Japanese modern history, Japanese expedition to the United States and battle between Russia and England - a volume of early years of the Japan’s opening’),

Kôdansya gakujutsubunko, 1991(rep.).

Veenhoven, Willem Adriaan, *Strijd om Deshima - een onderzoek naar de aanslagen van amerikaanse, engelse en russische zijde op het nederlandse handelsmonopolie in japan gedurende de periode 1800-1817*, Leiden, 1950.

Vigden Nakanishi Michiko, 'The Correspondence between Jan Hendrik Donker Curtius and Townsend Harris' (in Japanese), *Bulletin of the Japan-Netherlands Institute* Vol.23, Tokyo, 1987.

Vos, Miyako, 'Van der Broek no ibun' (『ファン・デン・ブルックの遺文』, 'A relic of Van der Broek'), *Nihon Yôgakushi no kenkyû IX* (『日本洋学史の研究 IX』), Osaka, 1989.

Vos, Miyako, 'Van der Broek no Denshû' (『ファン・デン・ブルックの伝習』, 'The lesson by Van der Broek'), *Nihon Yôgakushi no kenkyû X*, Osaka, 1991.

Vos Miyako, 'Van der Broek montyaku jiken' (『ファン・デン・ブルック悶着事件』, 'Difficulties with Van der Broek'), *Ronshû Nihon no Yôgaku III* (『論集 日本の洋学 III』), Osaka, 1995.

Vos, Miyako, 'Bakumatsuki no orandago・hihongo jijô I' (『幕末期のオランダ語・日本語事情』, 'A study of the situation about Dutch and Japanese in Bakumatsu period'), *Ronshû Nihon no Yôgaku IV*, Seibundô (清文堂), 1997.

Vos, Miyako, 'Bakumatsuki no orandago・Nihongo jijô II', *Ronshû Nihon no Yôgaku V*, Seibundô, 2000.

Yanai Kenji, Numata Jirô (沼田次郎), *Kaigaikôshôshi no shiten 2* (『海外交渉史の視点 2』, 'An aspect of Japanese relation history with foreign countries'), *Nihonshoseki* (日本書籍), 1976.

Yamakawa Kikue (山川菊栄), *Oboegaki bakumatsu no Mitohan* (『覚書 幕末の水戸藩』, 'Memoir of the domain of Mito in Bakumatsu period'), Iwanami bunko, 1991.

Yasuda Kôichi (保田孝一), 'Roshia no Nihon kaikoku kôshô to Shîboruto' ('ロシアの日本開国交渉とシーボルト', 'Russian negotiation with Japan about its opening and Siebold'), Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio (red.), *Shîboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindaiika*.

Yokoyama Yoshinori (横山伊徳), 'Nihon no kaikô to Oranda no gaikô - Oranda gaimushô shiron' ('日本の開港とオランダの外交 - オランダ外務省試論' ('The opening of Japan and Dutch diplomacy - an essay based on documents of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs'), *Ajia no naka no Nihonshi, II: Gaikô to sensô* ('A Japanese history in Asia, II: Diplomacy and War'), Tôkyôdaigaku shuppankai, 1992.

Yokoyama Yoshinori, 'Nihon no kaikoku to Ryûkyû' ('日本の開国と琉球', 'The opening of Japan and Ryûkyû'), *Atarashî Kinseishi 2 kokka to taigaikankei* ('新しい近世史 2 国家と対外関係'), 'Present studies concerning modern history 2 Countries and foreign relationships'), Shinjinbutsu ôraisha, 1996.

Zwaan, J.P. Kleiweg de, *Oude Betrekkingen tusschen Nederland en Japan*, Amsterdam, 1918.

Miscellaneous

Komatsu Shigeo (小松重男), *Bakumatsu ongoku bugyô no nikki - Oniwaban kawamura nagataka no shôgai* ('幕末遠国奉行の日記 - 御庭番川村修就の生涯'), 'A dairy of Magistrates far from Edo - a life of Kawamura Nagataka'), Chûkô shinsho, 1989.

Kusumoto Jyuichi (楠本寿一), *Nagasaki seitetsujo - Nihon kindaikogyô no sôshi* ('長崎製鉄所 - 日本近代工業の創始'), 'Steelworks of Nagasaki - The foundation of Japanese modern industry'), Chûkô shinsho, 1992.

Toyama Mikio (外山幹夫), *Nagasaki bugyô - Edo bakufu no mimi to me* ('長崎奉行 - 江戸幕府の耳と目'), 'Nagasaki magistrate - Ears and eyes of Tokugawa government'), Chûkô shinsho, 1988.

Yokohamashi shi 2 (『横浜市史』, History of Yokohama), Yokohama, 1989-2004.

Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift behandelt het Nederlandse diplomatieke beleid ten opzichte van Japan van 1850 tot en met 1863, en is met name gebaseerd op onderzoek van Nederlandse bronnen en literatuur. Het hoofddoel van deze studie is het verrichten van een analyse van de rol die Nederland gespeeld heeft in de toenmalige buitenlandse betrekkingen van Japan, een onderwerp dat tot nu toe weinig aandacht heeft gekregen. Het Nederlandse diplomatieke beleid ten opzichte van Japan wordt van oudsher gezien als voortkomende uit de principes van neutraliteit en vrijhandel, en als gevolg daarvan als een voornamelijk passieve, defensieve politiek. Deze studie echter plaatst het Nederlandse Japan-beleid in de context van het imperialisme, en evalueert het als een zelfstandige en actieve diplomatie.

In het midden van de negentiende eeuw was Nederland - na Engeland - de tweede koloniale mogendheid in de wereld, dankzij het bezit van Nederlands Indië, het tegenwoordige Indonesië. Maar doordat Nederland zelf klein van omvang is - in vergelijking met andere Europese staten - wordt het land zelden gezien als een van de vooraanstaande koloniale mogendheden van deze periode. Hierbij zij aangetekend dat Nederland bewust niet meedeed aan de vigerende Europese machtspolitiek die was gebaseerd op concurrentie tussen de grote staten. In plaats daarvan streefde het land naar strikte handhaving van de neutraliteit. Dit politieke streven werd gecombineerd met het volgen van een economisch beleid van vrijhandel. Bovendien propageerde Nederland het humanitaire uitgangspunt van een vreedzame, niet op militaire expansie gerichte, koloniale politiek. Als gevolg van dit buitenlandse beleid werd de Nederlandse invloed internationaal niet als groot gezien. In deze context ligt de aanname voor de hand dat Nederland ten opzichte van de grote mogendheden geen zelfstandig buitenlands beleid wilde of kon volgen. De Nederlandse diplomatie van de negentiende eeuw wordt daarom doorgaans gekarakteriseerd door het streven naar neutraliteit en vrijhandel.

Door het bestaan van deze overkoepelende visie op de Nederlandse diplomatieke geschiedenis in de negentiende eeuw is tot nu toe het beleid naar Japan in het midden van negentiende eeuw niet het onderwerp geweest van serieus academisch onderzoek. Altijd is aangenomen dat Nederland na de

opening van Japan in 1854 geen autonome diplomatie wilde of kon volgen ten opzichte van de grote mogendheden, en dat dientengevolge de Nederlandse invloed in Japan snel verdween. Door de aanname dat betrekkingen met Japan volledig onbelangrijk waren in vergelijking met het Nederlandse koloniale belang in Nederlands Indië, zijn er in Nederland nauwelijks studies verricht naar de Nederlandse diplomatie ten opzichte van Japan.

Recente inzichten in de rol van Nederland als imperialistische mogendheid leiden echter ertoe de Nederlandse diplomatie in Azië opnieuw te evalueren als een meer autonoom proces. Traditioneel wordt vaak gewezen op de humanitaire principes waarop het vreedzame Nederlandse buitenlandse beleid gestoeld zou zijn. Deze visie is echter niet altijd correct. Nederlandse koloniale beleid was in het midden van de negentiende eeuw niet gericht op militaire expansie, omdat dit ook niet nodig was: een vreedzame politiek was al voldoende effectief. Dit verhult het feit dat Nederland wel steeds militaire machtsmiddelen achter de hand had en kon inzetten wanneer een vreedzame politiek uiteindelijk geen uitkomst bood. Nederland slaagde erin in zijn Indië-beleid het eigen belang te maximaliseren, en tegelijk een agressief imago te vermijden. Het feit dat Nederland in staat was het beleid te voeren dat voor zichzelf de meeste voordelen brachten kan gezien worden als een uiting van een autonomie in het buitenlandse beleid. Dit benadrukt de noodzaak Nederland te beschouwen als een middelgrote mogendheid, die deel uitmaakte van de groep van Westerse mogendheden. Dit proefschrift biedt een nieuwe beoordeling van de Nederlandse diplomatie ten opzichte van Japan in de context van de toenmalige internationale betrekkingen in Azië. Deze studie betoogt dat het Nederlandse beleid betreffende Japan als een autonome, actieve politiek moet worden gezien.

Tijdens de periode van Japans afzijdigheid (1641-1854) had Nederland als enig Westerse land commerciële betrekkingen met Japan. Dit maakte de betrekkingen met Japan voor Nederland bijzonder. De betekenis voor Nederland van deze speciale relatie met Japan kan het beste worden begrepen uit het oogpunt van nationaal prestige en economische belang. In territoriaal opzicht is Nederland een klein land in Europa. Maar de bijzondere Nederlandse handelsrelatie met Japan herinnerde aan het trotse Nederlandse verleden als grote maritieme mogendheid. Bovendien verschaftte het bezit van diverse collecties van zeldzame Japanse producten en het voortbrengen van academische verhandelingen over Japan Nederland een grote invloed op de

beeldvorming over Japan in Europa, en daarmee een zeker aanzien en prestige.

Tevens was de relatie met Japan belangrijk voor Nederland in verband met meer tastbare politieke en economische belangen. In politiek opzicht was het uitoefenen van invloed in de internationale betrekkingen in Azië voor Nederland van belang ten einde zijn beheer van Nederlands Indië te kunnen handhaven. Wat betreft de economische belangen stond het cultuurstelsel centraal, dat op Java door Gouverneur-Generaal Van den Bos was ingevoerd en dat resulteerde in een sterke toename van de productie en export naar Europa van tropische landbouwproducten. In het midden van de negentiende eeuw leverde dit cultuurstelsel Nederland een enorm 'batig slot' op. Tegen deze achtergrond werden door het Nederlandse bestuur plannen gemaakt om nieuwe markten voor deze producten te zoeken. Daarvoor was Japan een geschikte optie omdat het relatief dichtbij Nederlands Indië was gesitueerd en een grote bevolking had. Het was in deze context, waarin de relatie met Japan voor Nederland aanzienlijke politieke en economische belangen vertegenwoordigde, dat Nederland rond 1850 werd geconfronteerd met plannen van de Verenigde Staten om een missie naar Japan te sturen, met als doel de openstelling van dit rijk voor de internationale handel.

Personal Name Index

A

Abe Masahiro, 114-116,118
Abercromby, 2nd Baron Dunfermline, Ralph Abercromby, 30,152,159,167
Aberdeen, 4th Earl of Aberdeen, George Hamilton Gordon, 151,154,286
Addington, Henry U., 154
Alcock, Sir Rutherford, 8,151-153,155,156,164,197,207,225,287
Aulick, John H., 97

B

Baud, Jean Chrétien baron Baud, 70-72,74,75,78,79,88,93,287,288
Bentinck, A.A. baron Bentinck van Nijenhuis, 166,224,225
Biddle, James, 116,151,155
Bik, Pieter Albert, 68,75-77
Blomhoff, Jan Cock, 60,295
Bonham, 1st Baronet, Sir Samuel George, 154,164
Bosch, Johannes Count van den Bosch, 24,279,288
Bowring, Sir John, 151,154,155,159,161,164
Braam, Jacob Andries van, 59
Bruce, George Isaac, 93,94
Broek, Jan Karel van den, 131,290,310,312,315
Buyskes, Arnold Adriaan, 42,43

C

Canning, George, 44,45,48,49,52,53,157
Capellen, Godert Alexander Gerard Philip, baron van der Capellen, 42,49,293,300
Cassa, Anthonie Abraham, 59,60
Castlereagh, Viscount Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, 2nd Marquess of Londonderry, 37-40,41,46-49,288,302

Clarendon, 4th Earl of Clarendon, George William Villiers, 153,155,162,167
Clayton, John Middleton, 86,91
Cleveland, William, 95,303
Conrad, C. M., 99
Coops, H.H.F., 75-77

D

Davis, Sir John, 80,150,151,155
Doeff, Hendrik, 57,59,60,61,288,290,313
Donker Curtius, Jan Hendrik, 5,104,116,125,127,131,132, 137,140-142,147,
156,165,166,170,176,178-180,186,188,190-200,202,203,210,211,223,230,243,290,305,
312,314

E

Ebara Soroku (江原素六), 224
Elgin, 8th Earl of Elgin, James Bruce, 167,183-186,194
Elout, Cornelis Theodorus, 42,48,49,50,61,292
Elout, Cornelis Pieter Jacobs, 49

F

Fabius, Gerhardus, 5,31,123,124,127,129,131,133,134,136-140,147,159,160, 164,
166,167,172,176,290,314
Falck, Anton Reinhard, 39,41,48,49,293
Fagel, Hendrik baron Fagel, 39,40,42,48,49
Fendall, John, 43
Fillmore, Millard, 86,97,111
Folsom, George, 103
Fujita Tôko (藤田東湖), 115

G

Gagern, Friedrich Balduin Ludwig Freiherr von Gagern, 74
Godefroi, M.H., 251,253,255,256

Gutzlaff, Karl Friedrich August, 83,151

H

Hammond, 1st Baron Hammond, Edmund, 154

Hardes, Hendrik, 273

Harris, Townsend,

115,165,186-189,193,195,197,205,213,222-224,275,288,303,314

Heusken, Harry C.T., 218,222-224,289

Heydenrijck, Christianus Joannes Antonius, 253,254

Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu (一橋慶喜), 188

Hoëvell, Wolter Robert baron van Hoëvell, 88,89,94,117,120,142,143,201,
202,203,289

Hoffmann, Johan Joseph, 265

Hogelanden, Jhr. Willem Boreel van, 250

Hogendorp, Dirk Count van, 41

Hogendorp, Gijsbert Karel Count van, 39,41

Hotta Masayoshi (堀田正睦), 115,171

Huguenin, Friedrich Ulrich Jacobus, 179

I

Ii Naosuke (井伊直弼), 188

Inoue Kiyonao (井上清直), 186

Iwase Tadanari (岩瀬忠震), 187

J

Manjirô, John (中浜万次郎, Nakahama Manjirô), 115

K

Kattendyke, W.J.C. ridder Huysen van Kattendyke, 188,210,289

Kawaji Toshiakira (川路聖謨), 113

King, Thomas Butler, 82

Krabbe, H.T., 136,174,175,179

Kruseman, J.D., 70

L

Lange, Johannes Robertus, 129

Linden, Gijsbertus Martinus van der, 142,229

Lindau, Rudolf, 239,288

Lijnden van Sandenburg, C.T. *Graaf*(Duke) van Lijnden van Sandenburg, 270

Loudon, Jhr. James, 213,214

M

McKay, Donald, 82

Malmesbury, 3rd Earl of Malmesbury, James Howard Harris, 153

Matsudaira Shungaku (越前松平慶永[春岳]), 115,187

Matsudaira Tadakata (松平忠固), 114

Merkus, Pieter, 67,70,73,74

Mijer, Pieter, 141,173,174

Mizuno Tadakuni (水野忠邦), 67

Mizuno Tadanori (水野忠徳), 115

Moriyama Einosuke (森山栄之助), 8,115

Muntinghe, Herman Warner, 42

N

Nabeshima Naomasa (鍋島直正), 140

Nagell, Anne Willem Carel baron van Nagell van Ampsen, 39,40-42

Napoleon III, Charles Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, 15

Napier, 9th Lord Napier, William John, 148,149

Nepveu, Charles baron Nepveu, 71,73

Nieman, Johannes Edewin, 72

Nievelt, baron van Zuijlen van Nievelt, 72,

Nishi Kichibei (西吉兵衛), 115

O

Ôsawa Jôtetsu (大沢秉哲) , 115

P

Pahud de Montanges, Charles Ferdinand, 95,122-125,128,169,172-174,179, 180, 281,289,198

Palmerston, 3rd Viscount, Henry John Temple, 24,53,92,150

Palmer, Aaron Haight, 85,90,288

Perry, Matthew Calbraith, 4,8,35,79,84,86,90,95,96,97-99,104,105,106,107, 108,110-112,113,114,115,116,121,133,148,153,154,157,274,201,274,288,302,303,305, 306,310,311

Pitt, William, 38,

Polsbroek, Jhr. Dick de Graeff van, 196,222,311

Putyatin, Evfimii Vasilierich, 220,221

R

Raffles, Sir Thomas Stamford, 43-47,52,56-61,156,289,301,302

Rezanov, Nikolai Petrovitch, 220

Ringgold, Cadwalader, 106

Rijckevorsel, Abram van, 120,121

Rose, Frederik Cornelis, 93

Russell, 1st Earl Russell, John, 155,224

S

Sakuma Shôzan (佐久間象山), 113

Senyavin, 221

Seymour, Sir Michael, 164,165,166

Siebold, Philipp Franz von, 28,72,77,97,99,101,102,105,124,174,175, 189, 206, 211,217-220,221,303-305,307-312,314

Siccama, Jhr. Otto Willem Hora, 49

Shimazu Nariakira (島津斉彬), 170

Schimmelpenninck, Gerrit, Count Schimmelpenninck, 92,

Schimmelpenninck van der Oije, Willem Anne baron Schimmelpenninck van der Oije, 249,250

Sombreff, Jhr. Paul Therèse van der Maesen de, 248

Sonsbeeck, Herman van, 103

Stirling, Sir James, 153,155,157,163

Sturler, Johan Willem de, 28

T

Testa, baron F.M.W., 85,90,104,106

Tsutsui Masanori (筒井政憲), 112

Tokugawa Nariaki (徳川斉昭), 112,113,114,117,170,187

Tokugawa Yoshikumi (徳川慶恕), 187

U

Ufford, Jhr. J.K.W. Quarles van, 200-202

V

Voorman, 59

W

Wardenaar, Willem, 58-61

Willem VI, Willem Frederik van Oranje-Nassau, Willem I as the king, 16,21,36,38,49,287,

Willem II, Willem Frederik George Lodewijk, 9, 67,71,73,74,76,78,88,95, 102,104,108,119,270,295,

Willem V, Batavus, 36,

Willem III, Willem Alexander Paul Frederik Lodewijk, 117,132,208,296,

Wit, Jan Karel de, 198,214,219,223,237-240,242,243,246,263

Wolff, Adrianus Johannes Jacobus de, 129