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Margana, S.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE FATE OF TWO REBEL FAMILIES IN JAVA'S OOSTHOEK: THE FALL OF MALANG AND LUMAJANG in 1767

Introduction

Eighteenth-century Java was ravaged by a multitude of troubles. Interwoven conflicts composed of succession, war, and rebellion propelled Mataram to the verge of disintegration. It was also a period in which the intrusion of the Dutch East India Company exerted an extraordinary significance in shaping features of Javanese politics.¹ The Treaties of Giyanti (1755) and Salatiga (1757) formally ended the conflict in Central Java, but did not usher in a period of untrammelled peace. A few of the dissident parties fled to the eastern parts of Java, where they united with other rebellious factions and diaspora groups from various regions in the Indonesian Archipelago. Among these dissenter parties were the families of *Pangeran* Singasari and the descendants of Surapati, who had found a safe haven in Malang and Lumajang.

This chapter describes the events in the conquest of Malang and Lumajang by the VOC in 1767-1768, and the strategy deployed by the Company in conquering this region. It also examines to what extent any local resistance was opposed to its policy of subjugation and how smoothly the collaboration between the Company and indigenous

¹ Several historians have devoted themselves to study this age of troubles. Most of them concentrate on the events which took place in Central Java, especially before the partition of the state of Mataram, completed in 1757. P. J. E. Louw, *De derde Javaansche successie-oorlog, 1746-1755* (Batavia: Albrecht & Rusche, 1889); H. J. de Graaf, *De Moord op Kapitein Françoise Tack* (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1935) and Ann Kumar, *Surapati Man and Legend: A Study of Three Babad Traditions* (Leiden: Brill, 1976) both deal with the seventeenth century events; W. G. J. Rummelink, *The Chinese War and the Collapse of the Javanese State, 1725-1743* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994); M. C. Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy in Java, 1677-1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the Early Kartasura Period*, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993); Luc Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch Tiger: The Dutch East Indies Company and the North-East Coast of Java, 1680-1743* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996).

soldiers worked. The discussion ends with the emergence of an idea of revivalism and its roots spread by the local people in their endorsement of the resistance against the Company and the implacable Dutch policy which set out to eliminate the descendants of Singasari and Surapati from the politics of Java.

Two Rebel Families

Singasari or Prabujaka was the son of Amangkurat IV (1719-1726) of Mataram. During the Third Javanese War of Succession (1749-1757), he joined the rebellion of his half-brothers, Mangkubumi, and *Raden Mas Said* (Mangkunagara). When his brothers accepted the Dutch idea of the partition of the state, which was implemented in 1755 and 1757, he resolved to continue his opposition. To do this most effectively, he retreated to Malang in the company of his son, Raden Mas. In Malang, he allied himself with the Regent, Malayakusuma, whose sister he had married. The latter was one the descendants of Surapati, a Balinese adventurer who is described in the Dutch records as an escaped slave who later assisted the Dutch to end the resistance of the Sultan of Banten. The Banten War paved the way for Surapati to gain entry into Dutch military circles. He was awarded a high military rank, which was uncommon among the Company soldiers of indigenous origin, and underwent Western military training. His dispute with a Dutch officer, Willem Kuffeler, and his involvement in the assassination of Captain François Tack in Kartasura transformed him into the most wanted enemy of the VOC in Java. In 1686, he fled to Pasuruan and set up his own *kraton*, as a virtually independent ruler. When the First Javanese War of Succession broke out in 1704, he fought on the side of *Susubunan* Amangkurat III or *Susubunan Mas* against Pakubuwana I who was supported by the Company. He died in 1705 after suffering a serious wound during the last battle against the Dutch-Javanese coalition forces in Bangil. In East Java, the descendants of Surapati remained at large, and most of them retreated to Malang, Lumajang and the surrounding areas. They continued their resistance until the Dutch military campaign into *Java's Oosthoek* in 1767-68.

M. C. Ricklefs, who has analysed the history of the division of Mataram, describes the events at the end of the Singasari rebellion in Malang as the 'end of an era', an atmosphere heightened by supernatural events. This view is derived from the perspective of

Central Javanese historiography, as described in two Javanese chronicles, the *Babad Tanah Jawi* and the *Babad Prayud*. Ricklefs also argues that the rebellion of Singasari was a protest reaction to the partition of the Javanese state. The prince was the only figure who was still concerned with the idea of the unification the Javanese state, which by that time had been largely given up by the newly established rulers, Mangkubumi and Mangkunagara. The joint war against Singasari waged by the Sultan and *Susuhunan*, therefore, was an endeavour to implement permanently the Central Javanese *modus vivendi* of state division initiated by the Dutch as an interim solution to the problems besetting Java.²

The collaboration between Singasari and Malayakusuma in Malang was actually the revival of an old alliance between both families which had been established sixty years before. The revival of this alliance aroused more apprehension in the Company. This is borne witness to by the fact that the involvement of Surapati and his descendants in a number of prominent events occurring from the very west to the eastern most tip of Java are well documented in the VOC archives: starting from the Banten troubles (1678); the assassination of Captain Tack and dozens of Dutch soldiers at Kartasura (1686); the Javanese Succession Wars (1704-1708, 1717-1719, 1749-1757); up to the rebellion of Wilis (1768) and the Pseudo-Wilis (1772-1723) in Blambangan. It is remarkable that during these years of turmoil, Surapati and his descendants were always to be found opposing the Company, which is described by Kumar as being of a consistency rare among Javanese aristocratic families. Kumar, who analyses the life of Surapati on the basis of three Javanese chronicles, concludes that, for part of his life, Surapati had been transformed into an epic figure, his true past obscured, but his future greatness discernible through the folds of legend.³ The families

² M. C. Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi: The History of the Division of Java*, (London-New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 138.

³ About Surapati's early years, see Leonard Blussé, *Bitter Bonds: A Colonial Divorce Drama of the Seventeenth Century*, (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2002), 56; for Surapati's picture see page 23. Kumar and De Graaf have been attracted to the role of Surapati in Javanese politics. Both historians start from different angles, but rely on similar sorts of material. Both writers made a different assessment of the sources that they used, but draw a virtual identically similar conclusion, namely that the Kartasura' incident which led to the death of Commissioner Tack was the outcome of a conspiracy between Surapati and some of the anti-Dutch elements in *kraton* circles, including the *Susuhunan* himself. Kumar, *Surapati Man and Legend*, 21.

of Surapati and Singasari had succeeded in keeping alive the spirit of opposition from generation to generation.

The Fall of Lumajang

The main goal of the Dutch military expedition to Malang and Lumajang was to end the rebellion of the obdurate Prince of Mataram, Singasari, who was also known as Prabujaka, and his son Raden Mas. However, in this military campaign the Dutch had to confront more than they had bargained for, as they also had to engage with the descendants of Surapati who had seized control of Lumajang, Malang, Antang, and Porong. Some important figures associated with Surapati were the Regent of Lumajang, Kartanagara (his grandson), and the Regent of Malang, Malayakusuma (another grandson), Tirtanagara alias Mas Tong (Malayakusuma's brother), Kartayuda (the Chief of Panayungan), Natayuda (the Chief of Porong), and *Mas* Pangulu (Malang). Before the expedition was actually mounted, the Dutch were already conversant with the alliance between the descendants of Surapati and Prabujaka. Indeed, some diplomatic approaches were made to prevent the war, or if possible, to subjugate them without a single bullet being fired.

In the first diplomatic contact, Kartanagara showed his willingness to co-operate with the Dutch. He promised not to shelter or assist Prabujaka and other enemies of the Company.⁴ Unwilling to accept this graciously, the Dutch wanted him to display a more compliant attitude. The Dutch Commander of Pasuruan, Captain Casper Lodewijk Tropponegro, made a further approach by urging the Chief of Banger, Puspakusuma, to induce Kartanagara to submit to the Company. Responding to this request, Puspakusuma wrote to Kartanagara, advising him to seize the opportunity to benefit from the good will of the Governor of Semarang, who was now prepared to forget the past and forgive all the transgressions committed by Kartanagara's ancestor (Surapati). The Governor was keen to see Regent of Lumajang to come to Panarukan or Banger to show his allegiance to the Company. Puspakusuma assured him that the Governor would treat him well and would not break his word if he

⁴ VOC 3215, Copy missive written by the Governor of Semarang to the Regent of Lumajang, Kartanagara, 31 March 1767, 153-154.

came to the Dutch fortress.⁵ But Kartanagara came up with an unexpected reply. He ignored the advice, and stated:

I have received your letter and understand the content thereof, in which you advised me to submit to the Company, (and) my answer is that I cannot do it because God [Allah] does not will it.⁶

A second letter containing an overt threat was sent. If Kartanagara and his brother (Kartayuda) should fail to come to Pasuruan, Lumajang would be attacked. Kartanagara reacted instantly, adopting an even more offended tone, he pulled his *keris* (dagger) out, and vowed to fight the Company if it should venture there. The Dutch Emissary, *Mantri Wiralaksana*, explained that the *keris* was a heirloom inherited from Kartanagara's grand father, Surapati. His brother, Kartayuda, displayed a similar reaction, stating that his resistance was God's will.⁷

Kartanagara realized that sooner or later the Dutch would attack Lumajang. He sent his warriors to patrol the Banger-Lumajang border and set up barricades and traps along the route to Lumajang.⁸ They also attacked the VOC forward post at Adiraga.⁹ The Dutch Governor in Semarang reacted to this offensive movement by discarding the diplomatic approach, and decided forthwith to subjugate Lumajang by force. Some endeavours were made to prevent Kartanagara and his followers from fleeing to Malang or other places in order to build up their reserves. The Governor ordered Kartanagara be taken dead or

⁵ VOC 2315, Copy translation of the Javanese letter written by *Ngabehi Puspakusuma* of Banger to the Regent of Lumajang, Kartanagara, presented in March 1767, 149-150.

⁶ 'Uw Edele briefje wel ontvangen hebbende, heb ik daar uijt gesien dat Uw Edele mij aan recommandeert om mij aan de Compagnie te onderwerpen, zo dient daar op in antwoord dat ik sulks niet doen kan, alsoo dat God niet hebbe wil'. VOC 2315, Copy translated of letter written by *Raden Kartanagara* of Lumajang to *Ngabehi Puspakusuma* of Banger, 29 March 1767, 151.

⁷ Kartanagara was not the son of Surapati, as asserted by Ann Kumar, but his grandson. This is proven by Kartanagara's letter. 'Dat hij een kris van den Keijser en als een erfdeel van zijn groot vader Soera Pattij ontfangen had, welkers punt hij tegens de Company soude emplojeeren als het daar op aanquam'. VOC 2315, Report by *Mantri Wiralaksana* of Banger, presented in Surabaya 30 March 1767, 151-153.

⁸ Ibid. 153.

⁹ VOC 2315, Extract missive written by the *Gezaghebber* of Java's North-East Coast, Coop à Groen, to Governor Johannes Vos of Semarang, 10 April 1767

alive.¹⁰ The *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya instructed the Dutch commander in Blambangan, Captain Blanke, to send more European and Madurese soldiers to support the expedition.



In Surabaya, Governor of Semarang discussed the plan to attack Malang with the *Gezaghebber* and the Regent of Surabaya (Coll. KBG 63, National Library Jakarta)

Meanwhile the Regent of Malang, Malayakusuma, was consumed by anxiety about the Dutch plan to attack Lumajang. He realized that his father, Kartanagara, was too old and too weak to resist the Dutch coalition forces. He tried to find a way to prevent the invasion through enlisting the help of the Regent of Pasuruan, Nitinagara, who had a close relationship with the *Gezagheber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen. Nitinagara, who was the son-in-law of Kartanagara, was thought to be good-hearted enough to take it upon himself to negotiate with the *Gezaghebber* and persuade him to revoke his plan to invade Lumajang.¹¹ At the same time Malayakusuma would induce his father to punish the Lumajang trouble-makers who had attacked the Dutch post at Adiraga. He also promised to be responsible for his father's obligation

¹⁰ VOC 3215, Extract of letter written by Governor Johannes Vos to the *Gezaghebber* of North-East Coast of Java, Coop à Groen, 15 April 1767.

¹¹ VOC 3215, Copy of translated letter from the Regent of Malang, Malayakusuma, to the *Tumenggung* of Pasuruan, Nitinagara, 30 April 1767, 204-5.

to deliver token tribute (*een stukje hout of een enkele blad*) to the Company.¹²

Nitinagara was in dilemma. Should he fail to save Kartanagara, he would be regarded as a disobedient child who lacked respect for his father-in-law. Yet, in the international context, he could not renege on his allegiance to the Company. Aware of this double-edged plight, the Governor of Semarang suggested that Nitinagara should invent a pretext, saying that he dare not convey Malayakusuma's request to the *Gezaghebber* because, if he did so, Pasuruan would be attacked. He also suggested that the die was cast and the decision had been made by the Governor in Semarang, and therefore the attack on Lumajang was a foregone conclusion. Kartanagara's offensive action would never be condoned by the Company. Lumajang would be occupied and Kartanagara would be dismissed from his position. If Malayakusuma wanted to see his father survive, he should advise him to leave Lumajang and submit to the Company.¹³

Malayakusuma was disappointed in Nitinagara's attitude, but he persisted in his efforts to convince the Dutch of the sincerity of the latter's intentions. When the VOC envoys, *Mantri* Wirakasa and Hartamanggala, visited him in Malang, he did his best to reassure them that he would not interfere with any subject of the Company if his request concerning his father was honoured. But, should the Company ignore it, he would undertake further action. He promised to send his *Mantri*, Waneng Pati, to meet the Dutch Commander in Pasuruan to assure the Dutch of his good intentions, and at the same time, he would also send a messenger to Lumajang in an endeavour to induce his father to stop his offensive actions as long as the Company did not harm him in any way. Malayakusuma asked the two envoys to tell his brother Nitinagara to clear away all the barricades and ambushes planted by Kartanagara on the main road from the Tengger Highlands to Lumajang.¹⁴

¹² VOC 3215, Copy of translated letter from the Regent of Malang, Malayakusuma, to the *Tumenggung* of Pasuruan, Nitinagara, 30 April 1767, 205-6.

¹³ In his letter to Nitinagara, *Gezaghebber* Coop à Groen said that Governor Vos had suggested Nitinagara make up a pretext saying that he did not dare to talk about Malayakusuma's request with the *Gezaghebber*. VOC 3215, Letter from the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya to the Regent of Pasuruan, Nitinagara, 30 April 1767, 206-7.

¹⁴ VOC 3215, Copy of report given by *Mantri* Wirakasa and Hartamanggala, two envoys of *Tumenggung* Nitinagara of Pasuruan, 30 April 1767, 207-10.

Malayakusuma's hopes of sparing his father were dashed when the Dutch responded to his appeal by sending troops to Lumajang. He decided to have his father conveyed to Malang before the Dutch launched their attack. In the meantime, a few of Kartanagara's followers, Kartayuda (the Chief of Panayungan), Natayuda (Patih of Porong), and the Balinese Wayan Kutang had taken refuge in Malang. Therefore, when the Dutch troops reached Lumajang, they met with no resistance whatsoever. Around sixty people from among Kartanagara's adherents on Mount Semeru surrendered to the Company's troops when these entered the town. Consequently, Lumajang was easily conquered at the end of June 1767. A small mediating post was erected and twelve Europeans and a hundred soldiers from Banger were stationed in this regency.¹⁵

The Fall of Malang

After the fall of Lumajang, the Dutch turned their attention to Malang because most of the rebellious leaders had taken refuge in this regency. Tropponegoro, the commander of this expedition who had been involved in various battles against the descendants of Surapati and Prabujaka, realized that the union of these rebellious leaders posed a more serious threat to the Dutch. He was vindicated in his prediction, as they had maintained their resistance to the Dutch for almost two decades. Two Javanese envoys who were sent to Malang passed on the information that Malayakusuma had recruited 1,500 soldiers to defend Malang from invasion by the Company. Meanwhile, *Raden* Tirtanagara, the younger brother of Malayakusuma, confirmed that the latter had collaborated with Raden Mas, the son of Singasari. Repeating Tirtanagara's words, the envoy stated:

How can I conceal that Raden Mas is here in Malang. You can see his 200 cavalymen standing there. If Lumajang is attacked, he will join forces with my brother, Malayakusuma. He [Tirtanagara] said further, Referring to Raden Mas the green flag has come here to inflict sores to our body.¹⁶

¹⁵ VOC 3215, Missive from Governor Johnnes Vos to Governor-General Petrus Albertus van der Parra and the Council of the Netherlands-Indies, 30 June 1767, 214-48.

¹⁶ 'Hoe zal ik dat kunnen verborgen houden dat Radeen Maas hier in Malang is, gij ziet zijne paerden daer staen zijnde 200 coppen sterk, hij is van gedagte wanneer Lamadjang g'attacqueert word met mijn broeder Maloijo Coesoema zamen af te

To cope with this situation, *Gezaghebber* Coop à Groen contrived a scheme to undermine the enemies' alliance. He tried to exploit Malayakusuma's ambitions. Before the attack on Lumajang, Malayakusuma had displayed a modest demeanour. He fulfilled the *Gezaghebber's* demand for tribute - significant amounts of rice (transported by ten horses), a hundred chickens, *dendeng*, and eight slaves to work at the *logie* (trading post) of the Company. He also had arrested and handed over two of Wayan Kutang's wives (Balinese refugees from Blambangan) and one of his followers.¹⁷ In yet another letter, he gave reassurances that he would not dare to oppose the Company. He said that if he dared to do so it would be as if he were opposing his own lord. He also promised to capture Wayan Kutang and Natayuda.¹⁸ Going even further, he said that he had refused Raden Mas' request that he be given fifty firearms and dozens of horses.¹⁹ Lured into a sense of security by all of these commitments, the *Gezaghebber* now felt he had a good chance to put his plot to damage the collaboration between Prabujaka and Surapati's descendants into operation. He dispatched his envoy, *Encik* Mida, to bring over a hundred soldiers from Surabaya on the pretext of helping Malayakusuma to protect Malang against any troubles which might be brewed by Prabujaka and his adherents. The sending of these soldiers was expected to create an impression among his allies that Malayakusuma had betrayed his fellow-collaborators.²⁰

Although Malayakusuma had refused the military assistance, his attitude had raised some doubts among his adherents. The *Patih* of Porong, Natayuda, left Malang and joined Raden Mas in Antang, whereas Wayan Kutang escaped when he realized that Malayakusuma had captured his wives and his followers. It was also reported that Malayakusuma's father (Kartanagara), the man who had strongly

zaeken,' onder anderen nog zijde, die groene vlieg, menende Radeen Maas, is hier gekomen om ons maar sweeren op onse lichaam toe te brengen'. VOC 3215, As retold by *Mantri* Wirakasa and Hartamanggala; See also Copy of report given by *Mantri* Wirakasa and Hartamanggala, two envoys of *Tumenggung* Nitinagara of Pasuruan, 30 April 1767, 207-10.

¹⁷ VOC 3215, Copy of translated Javanese letter from the Regent of Malang, Malayakusuma, to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, 30 July 1767, 290-1.

¹⁸ VOC 3215, A copy of translated Javanese letter written by *Raden Adipati* Malayakusuma of Malang to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, received on 19 August 1767, 303-4.

¹⁹VOC 3215, A copy of a report made by *Encik* Mida, 9 September 1767, 306-9.

²⁰ VOC 3215, A copy of a report made by *Encik* Mida, 9 September 1767, 306-9.

opposed the Dutch, had passed away and had been buried somewhere to the south of Mount Semeru.²¹ In such circumstances, the *Gezaghebber* could now keep up his pressure on Malayakusuma to show his allegiance. He sent *Encik* Mida to Malayakusuma to convey his final offer: if Malayakusuma really were loyal to the Company he should show it by persuading Raden Mas and Prabujaka in Antang to submit to it. The *Gezaghebber* suggested that Malayakusuma concoct the pretext that Malang would be attacked if Raden Mas and Prabujaka refused to surrender. *Encik* Mida also stated that now, only at one hour's distance from Malang, *Vaandrig* Gondelag with five hundred troops had established a military camp. Nor was this the only threat Captain Tropponegro and his troops were also on their way to Malang and were only waiting for at least three good guides who could show them the best route to Malang and Antang. They hoped that the Regent could help to provide it. The *Gezaghebber* also demanded that Malayakusuma give up a few European deserters who had been living in Malang for ten years.²² Failing this, the Company would not let him live in peace.

Even in this a difficult situation Malayakusuma was still reluctant to fulfil all that the *Gezaghebber* demanded. He argued that if he assisted the Company to attack Raden Mas and Prabujaka in Antang, this would also be regarded as rebellion against the Sultan and *Susubunan* of Mataram. However, he promised to remain loyal to the Company, as a guarantee that he would not join the rebels.²³ Governor Vos in Semarang urged the *Gezaghebber* to take more forceful action to ensure that Malayakusuma would not break his own promise. He suggested to the *Gezaghebber* that he bring Malayakusuma's wife and children to Surabaya as *gijzelaars* (hostage). The Governor said that if

²¹ VOC 3215, Copy of translated Javanese letter from the Regent of Malang, Malayakusuma, to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, 30 July 1767, 292-3.

²² One of these deserters was Soldier Smit, who ran away in 1752. He confessed that he had fallen in love with a *tandak*, a Javanese dancer, and decided to live with her, and he had been forced to convert to Islam. He was punished by the *Raad van Justitie*, and given the death penalty. VOC 3248, Original separate missive from Governor Vos to Batavia, 8 October 1768, 51-69.

²³ VOC 3215, A copy of a translated Javanese letter written by *Raden Adipati* Malayakusuma of Malang to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, received on 19 August 1767, 303-4; VOC 3215, Copy of a letter written by *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya to the Regent of Malang, Malayakusuma, 298-301; VOC 3215, a copy of the report made by *Encik* Mida, 9 September 1767, 306-9; VOC 3215, Copy of a letter written by *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya to the Regent of Malang, Malayakusuma, 22 August 1767, 304-5.

Malayakusuma wanted his family back alive, he would have to surrender Wayan Kutang and Natayuda, and fulfil all the demands mentioned earlier.²⁴

The return of the Dutch envoy, *Encik Mida*, from Malang still left a great deal of unfinished work. The Dutch had failed to persuade the Regent of Malang to support their expedition against the rebels in Antang or to release the European deserters who were held there. *Gezaghebber* Coop à Groen decided to change the plan of action for the expedition. Instead of Antang (Singasari's refuge), an attack on Malang now became the primary objective. The *Gezaghebber* instructed Captain Tropponegro to attack and subsequently arrest the family of Malayakusuma and Kartanagara who were now in Malang. The *Gezaghebber* also permitted him to bring in twenty-five European soldiers under *Vaandrig* Gondelag to support the assault. If Malayakusuma resisted, he should be considered another of the Company's enemies and be exterminated. Captain Tropponegro was also instructed to give information about the planned attack on Malang and the position of the enemies to Lieutenant Wipperman who was now on the south coast of Java with his troops. This was done in the knowledge that it was envisaged that, if the assault on Malang were carried out, the rebels might escape to Lumajang, and then from Lebak onwards to the south coast of Java. With this information, Lieutenant Wipperman and his troops could prepare themselves to prevent it. If this work were accomplished, Tropponegro would clear the way for Gondelag and his troops, who were supposedly in Lebak subjugating the southern villages, to enter Malang to support Tropponegro. Malang should be occupied as long as possible and the attack on Antang could be planned from there. It was also announced that an amount of 1,000 Spanish dollars would be given to anyone who could hand over Raden Mas and Prabujaka, dead or alive, and 500 Spanish dollars for Malayakusuma and his family. Meanwhile in Wirasaba, Captain Hounold with the support of forty-nine Europeans and 500 Surabaya soldiers was ready to support the expedition to Antang.²⁵

Malayakusuma realized that his efforts to convince the Dutch were in vain, and decided to defend Malang by force. Around 800

²⁴ VOC 3215, extract of missive written by Director and Governor of the North-East Coast of Java to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, 5 August 1767, 294-8.

²⁵ VOC 3215, Copy of instructions for Captain Casper Lodewijk Tropponegro, the Commander of the military expedition to Malang and Antang, 20 August 1767, 309-313.

cavalrymen under the leadership of his younger brother, Tirtanagara, were sent out to guard the border between Malang and Lumajang. At the same time, two units of the Dutch coalition forces under Captain Tropponegro and Lieutenant Gondelag had made a pincer movement and approached the city from two different sides. Malayakusuma responded instantly by sending his troops up to the mountainous districts to the east of Malang. By launching guerrilla assaults they tried to prevent the enemy from entering the city. In the afternoon, the Dutch and Madurese troops under Tropponegro arrived in the village Badali and established a military camp there. Tirtanagara's people approached them, but they still kept their distance. On the same afternoon, the Dutch troops continued their march across the Getih, Songsong, and Surak Rivers. At those places, Tirtanagara began launching guerrilla attacks, but this did not produce any significant results. Quite the reverse, many Malang fighters were killed and wounded.²⁶

The attack on Captain Tropponegro was reported to Lieutenant Gondelag who was now also approaching Malang with Surabaya warriors. He decided to move to assist his fellow officer and set off earlier with the European troops. They were followed at some distance by the Surabaya warriors under Jayanagara and Kartawijaya. Precisely at Mount Mandaraka, the Surabaya troops were attacked by Tirtanagara with his 800 cavalrymen. In the ensuing mêlée, they were split up into three groups and many of them were killed and wounded. The Surabaya soldiers were scattered and their guns and ammunition were seized by the enemy. Now Kartawijaya had only 300 soldiers left and they withdrew to their camp at Badali. At this place, the Chief of Tambak Gawe was posted with 100 *pikulan* (bearers) but they ran away when they saw Kartawijaya returning with so many wounds on his body.²⁷ Hundreds of Javanese and Madurese soldiers were killed and wounded in this battle. On the other side, Tirtanagara was also wounded. According to the report, he was shot by the Dutch captain

²⁶ VOC 3215, A copy of a missive from Captain Tropponegro to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, 1 September 1767, 214-5; *See also* VOC 3215, A copy of a missive from J. D. Gondelag to *Gezaghebber* Coop à Groen, 2 September 1767, 317-320; VOC 3215, A copy of a message from *Kebayan* Tambakgawe, under the Second Regent of Malang, 321-323.

²⁷ VOC 3215, A copy of a message from *Kebayan* Tambakgawe, under the Second Regent of Malang, 321-323.

in his shoulder, and one of his children was also killed in that battle.²⁸ When Gondelag arrived with his troops, Tirtanagara and his people had run away. Their pursuers experienced difficulties catching them up, since most of them were mounted, whereas the Company soldiers were only on foot. Some of them remained in Gunung Klap, and the others now patrolled throughout the villages.²⁹ Lieutenant Gondelag and his troops had by now joined up with Tropponegro, but they still lacked firearms and ammunition.³⁰ The battle at Mount Mondaraka had weakened the Company's forces. Tropponegro requested the *Gezaghebber* to dispatch 1,000 more soldiers from Surabaya, but this could not be done, because there were only forty-three Europeans available there. To fulfil the demand, the *Gezaghebber* requested 600 Madurese warriors from the *Panembahan* of Madura.³¹



Tropponegro and Gondelag are reading a letter in the company of a *Tumenggung* and *Rangga* (Coll. KBG 63, National Library Jakarta)

²⁸ VOC 3215, Report of *Kajineman* Tagapati, Wongsu and Daka, the officers of the first and Second Regents of Surabaya, concerning the war between troops of the Company and Malayakusuma, 424-427.

²⁹ VOC 3215, A copy of a missive from Captain Tropponegro to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, 2 September 1767, 316.

³⁰ VOC 3215, A copy of a missive from the Captain Tropponegro to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, 1 September 1767, 214-5; VOC 3215, A copy of a missive written by *Gezaghebber* Coop à Groen to Governor Johannes Vos, 4 September 1767, 327-31.

³¹ VOC 3215, A copy of a missive written by *Gezaghebber* Coop à Groen to Governor Johannes Vos, 4 September 1767, 327-31.

After the battle at Mount Mandaraka, Malayakusuma decided to leave Malang taking with him all of his family and guards. He expected that Singasari and Raden Mas would still be at Wulu Laras, and that he could join them there. Therefore, when Tropponegro and Gondelag finally entered Malang, the city was completely empty and could be occupied without any resistance. The spies who were sent out to gather information brought in a report that Malayakusuma was now in Wulu Laras, the former hiding-place of Prabujaka and Raden Mas. Tropponegro responded instantly by sending 186 Europeans, 500 Madurese and 1,600 warriors from Surabaya, Bangil and Pasuruan under his own command.³² Meanwhile, Lieutenant Gondelag remained in Malang with forty-seven Europeans and 1,000 Surabaya troop to defend the city.³³ Lieutenant Hounold and his troops had also left Jurok Wangi for Antang to support Tropponegro. On the Sultan's territory, there were Javanese soldiers under *Tumenggung* of Wirasaba and in Panaraga some more under *Raden Adipati* Martadinigrat, who were also expected to support the expedition. The Sultan had given a guarantee to prevent the enemy from entering his territories, and if necessary his troops would be sent out to join the Dutch coalition forces. The Dutch desperately needed the services of the Sultan's forces if they were to bring order to the country.³⁴

Tropponegro was very disappointed because he did not find any enemies in Wulu Laras. It seems that Malayakusuma had withdrawn before the Dutch arrived. The only bridge over the Lembal River had been destroyed by the rebels to obstruct passage.³⁵ At this place, the Dutch patrol killed sixteen people, women and children because they refused to say where Malayakusuma and his people were hiding. Nevertheless, the Dutch sortie to Wulu Laras was not completely in vain, because at this place Tropponegro gathered the information that Raden Mas, the son of Singasari, was now at Tutang, near the Kampas River in Rajegwesi.³⁶ He, therefore, decided to take his troops to

³² VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Captain Tropponegro to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, from 8 October 1767, 43-44.

³³ VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Captain Tropponegro to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, from 8 October 1767, 40-42.

³⁴ VOC 3215, Missive from Governor Johannes Vos to Batavia, 7 October 1767, 1-8.

³⁵ VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Captain Tropponegro to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, of 8 October 1767, 40-42.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 40-42.

Rajegwesi and attack Raden Mas there and left Gondelag searching for information about Malayakusuma, who it was thought would flee to the Sultan's territory.

On 9 October 1767, Tropponegro arrived in Batu and made camp there. Before he continued his march to Rajegwesi, he sent the Chief of the Madurese warriors, Kacamanggala, and his people to find out the best route to reach Rajegwesi, but the Madurese returned empty-handed. Many traps had been set up by the rebels. Along the way to Lodalem, Raden Mas and his people had been placing big stones up on the trees.³⁷ Nonetheless the Dutch troops decided cleared out all the traps and with 500 Madurese and thirty-six European soldiers, Tropponegro attacked the position of Raden Mas in Rajegwesi. After a few hours fighting Rajegwesi was taken, but most of the enemies escaped to the south. Raden Mas, who had only sixty men, had been unable to defend his refuge. Rajegwesi was now occupied and a small fortress was built. Tropponegro decided to remain in Rajegwesi for a eight days to collect some food for his troops.³⁸ On the other hand, Lieutenant Hounold with forty-six Europeans and 200 Javanese troops decided to march on to Rajegwesi to support Tropponegro against Raden Mas, but they failed to proceed any further because the *pikulan* were unable to climb the steep hills. On 17 October Hounold withdrew his troops when he heard that Rajegwesi had been taken.³⁹

After the fall of Rajegwesi, Raden Mas fled to the south and joined up with such other leaders as the *Tumenggung* of Antang, Wongsu Nagara, *Mas* Pangulu, and Jaya Kusuma. Now they had reinforced their armies with 2,000 cavalry. They marched back to Malang to take the city. On 18 October, Hounold received information that the rebels who were concealed in the Sultan's territory had returned to Malang.

³⁷ VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Captain Tropponegro to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, of 9 October 1767, 45-47.

³⁸ VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Captain Tropponegro to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, of 10 October 1767, 47-48; VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Captain Tropponegro to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, from 17 October 1767, 47-48; VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Lieutenant Hounold to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, 19 October 1767, 51-53; VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Lieutenant Hounold to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, 24 October 1767, 54-55.

³⁹ VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Lieutenant Hounold to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, 19 October 1767, 51-53; VOC 3215, Copy of a letter from Lieutenant Hounold to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, 24 October 1767, 54-55.

Raden Mas and Prabujaka were supposed to be in Samperak, in the northern part of Lodalem. Meanwhile, Malayakusuma and Tirtanagara were reported to be at Sambi Geger, to the south-west of Samperak. Hounold gave orders to cut off the route to Malang and to attack Malayakusuma and his brother there. The Regent of Kediri had promised to go to Samperak to attack Singasari and Raden Mas there.⁴⁰



Dutch and Javanese coalition troops during the Malang Expedition
(Coll. KBG 63, National Library Jakarta)

On 3 November, the Dutch coalition troops marched from Sarengat to Blitar. At daylight, they arrived at Pagulungan, and in the evening they left for Selagurit to attack the enemy there. A few captives were forced to show the way to Selagurit. They promised to take the Dutch troops by the easiest route, but as might have been expected, they chose a difficult trek through a high valley, which was located about half an hour from Selagurit. There *Raden Adipati* Martadiningrat arrived from Panaraga and asked the Dutch commander to follow him, because he knew a better way to reach their target. But the captives insisted that their way was the best one, and the other one was more difficult, because they would have to cross a

⁴⁰ VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Lieutenant Hounold to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, Coop à Groen, 19 October 1767, 51-53.

big river. But the Adipati insisted that to continue the march he should turn left. In the morning when they were still in the valley they heard drums being beaten, by the enemy side as well as by the Sultan's troops and some shots were fired. The captain and around twelve European soldiers plus one *cannonier* and two *boschieters* and almost eighty Javanese with firearms and pikes under the command of *Raden Tirtakusuma*, the *mantri* of the young Regent of Sarengat, immediately moved on through the wilderness. Then a messenger sent by *Raden Adipati* informed the captain that his master had engaged with the enemy and they had been defeated. Shortly afterwards, a young slave of *Mas Tumenggung Suradirja* came with a message that his master was seriously wounded. Then *Raden Adipati* came with some regents and said that *Mas Tumenggung Suradirdja* had been killed. The Assistant Helmont and Captain Hounold surveyed the battle field, pondering the enemy's position. A few minutes latter they saw a party of people under *Raden Mas*, and from a distance *Raden Adipati* shouted to the Captain that the man who was not using a yellow parasol was *Raden Mas*. The Captain did not reply, but retreated and prepared mortar attack on, but shortly afterwards *Raden Adipati* came and said that the enemies were retreating.⁴¹ In his battle report to the *Gezaghebber*, Hounold confessed that he did not realize that the enemy was so strong. *Raden Mas* was not alone but enjoyed the support of *Tumenggung Wongsanagara*, and other family members of *Malayakusuma*, *Mas Pangulu* and *Jayakusuma*, and had more than 2,000 cavalry at his disposal. Despite this large force he had been surrounded by the Sultan's warriors and hunted into the river, where many soldiers had been swept away. Under the cover of the mortar bombardment, he had escaped to his father *Prabujaka* in *Kalijingga*. The *Susuhunan's* troops had unable to capture him, but around twenty-five of his best cavalymen were captured as well as 1,000 buffaloes, 200 horses, a few firearms, gunpowder, and a collection of pikes and *keris*.⁴²

In this battle, three leaders and three foot soldiers with three *olas* were arrested by the Dutch, and the rest fled. Presumably *Raden Mas* and his troops had made for *Kalijingga*, *Sarengat*. On 5 November, the

⁴¹ VOC 3215, Report on Captain Lieutenant Hounold as provided by translator Helmont, 67-72.

⁴² VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Lieutenant Hounold to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya Coop à Groen, 12 November 1767, 59-60.

Regents of Wirasaba, and Kediri had cut off the way to Sarengat.⁴³ Meanwhile in Antang, Tropponegro and his soldiers were suffering from disease because of a lack of medicine. A few sick Europeans had been sent back to Surabaya to be replaced. Tropponegro requested a reinforcement of thirty to forty European soldiers, because most European soldiers in Jerukwangi were also sick. He needed them to defend Kediri.⁴⁴

A report from Blitar said that Prabujaka had engaged with the Sultan's troops. The leader of the Sultan's troops, the *Ngabehi* of Pace, Suradiwirya, and three other people from Kediri were killed. In this battle three rebels were killed and a few others wounded. This report denied the early rumour which said that Prabujaka had died of starvation. Prabujaka was still alive and remained strong, which was confirmed by the Regent of Pasuruan Nitinagara at the end of November, when he said that he had encountered two Javanese from Malang who claimed to have met Prabujaka. Both men said that Tirtanagara, Sasranagara, and Suryanegara were now in Sela Kopek with 200 men, Raden Mas was in Langsi with 1,000 men. Malayakusuma and *Mas* Sudarma had one hundred. Prabujaka himself and seven leaders were established in Lodalem with 500 men. The Javanese also said that Malayakusuma and his brothers were planning to go to Blambangan making their way along the south coast of Java.⁴⁵ Responding to this information Tropponegro instructed Gondelag, who was now in Malang, to cut off the way to Blambangan, to prevent the enemy fleeing to the east.

On 5 December 1767, Gondelag marched from Ureg-Ureg, and in Gunung Gumba attacked from several directions by Malayakusuma's 500 men-strong cavalry appeared on the scene and attacked. The fighting lasted until eleven o'clock, and the number of casualties on the enemy side could not be determined, but on the Company's side not a single soldier was wounded or killed.⁴⁶ The next day, another battle

⁴³ VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter from Lieutenant Hounold to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya Coop à Groen, 6 November 1767, 57-58.

⁴⁴ VOC 3215, A copy of a letter written by Capatain Tropponegro to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, 31 December 1767, 75-78; VOC 3215, Copy of a letter from Lieutenant Hounold to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya Coop à Groen, 6 November 1767, 55-56.

⁴⁵ VOC 3215, Copy of a letter written by Lieutenant Gondelag to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, 2 December 1767, 79-80.

⁴⁶ VOC 3215, Copy of a letter written by Lieutenant Gondelag to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, 5 December 1767, 81-83.

broke out at Gunung Cangkring, located to the south of Gunung Gomba. Around twenty to fifty of Malayakusuma's fighters, all mounted, attacked. This time the Dutch coalition forces failed to defend their position.⁴⁷ After this battle, Malayakusuma and his family made ready to march to Blambangan and join Wilis there. To reach Blambangan, he planned to follow the route along the south coast of Java from Malang to Lumajang and then to Blambangan.⁴⁸

The End of Singasari and Raden Mas Rebellion

After almost a year of fighting, most of the rebel leaders had been arrested and some of them were killed. On 16 July 1768, Prabujaka surrendered in Dapat, his last refuge, located to the south-east of Lodalem, in the Malang regency.⁴⁹ Raden Mas and Tirtanagara, who were hiding in the same place, succeeded in escaping, but both were badly wounded. In this assault twenty people were killed on the side of Prabujaka and some women and children were captured, among them Prabujaka's wife and children, one of whom attempted to kill Lieutenant Meijer. The first report of the capture of Singasari was delivered by Lieutenant Meijer:

On the 16th of this month we were lucky; we attacked the position of *Pangeran* Prabujaka and Raden Mas and Tirtagara at Dapat, which is located to the south-east of Lodalem, in the mountainous terrain [to the south of Malang]. *Pangeran* [Prabujaka] with his wives, three children and five other women were captured and I have brought them here. Raden Mas and Tirtanagara have not been arrested. They succeeded in escaping [but] with many wounds. Raden Mas was felled by several shots, but he had not yet died. [...] On the enemy side twenty people were dead and many were wounded, but thank God on our side there was not a single man who was killed or wounded. [...] Now, Raden Mas and Tirtanagara no longer know which way to flee, my spy will not rest but keep them in his sight, and I hope they will be caught. Meanwhile I can trust no one here and I should

⁴⁷ VOC 3215, Copy of a letter written by Lieutenant Gondelag to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya, 6 December 1767, 81-84.

⁴⁸ VOC 3215, Copy of a copy letter written by *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya to Lieutenant Wipperman, 6 December 1767, 115-6.

⁴⁹ VOC 3215, Original separate letter from the *Gezaghebber* Coop à Groen to Governor Johannes Vos, 27 July 1768, 27-28

take care for my own life, as this morning the daughter of Pangeran [Prabujaka] tried to kill me with a *keris*.⁵⁰

Prabujaka was caught with his wife, two daughters and his little son. The Dutch coalition forces also arrested the brother of Malayakusuma, *Raden Sastranagara*, and his son and also some women and children belonging to the Malang and Lumajang families. They were sent immediately to Semarang and arrived there on 5 August 1768. The Governor lost no time in forming a special commission, which also included the Regent of Semarang, to decide on a proper punishment for the arrested rebel. Before the commission Prabujaka declared that he would submit to the *Susubunan* of Mataram, although the *Susubunan* himself had sent a strong message to the Governor that the Company should show him no mercy, and banishment should be the first preference. A special request was also proposed by the Sultan, who was keen to see his half-brother brought to Yogyakarta where he himself would mete out his punishment, or otherwise the Company should impose a severe penalty on him.⁵¹

In August 1768, thirty days after the capture of his father, Raden Mas surrendered to the Sultan's troops with his three brothers and two women. A few days before, he was very closely surrounded by the Company's troops in Rawa (currently Tulungagung), but he had still managed to escape. In his final refuge, around Rawa, the Sultan's troops approached him quietly and enticed him to surrender to the Sultan, and promised to let him live. Raden Mas, who was badly

⁵⁰Op 16 deeses het geluk gehad den Pangerang Praboedjoko en Raden Maas benefens Tirtanagara te Dapat, leggende zuijd oost van Lodalm, in 't zuijder gebragte te attackeeren, en den Pangerang benefens desen vrouw en 3 kinder als ook 5 vrouwens gefange te krijgen, en bij mijn herwaards te brengen, Radeen Maas en Tirtanagoro hebben zij niet kunnen krijge dewelke sig door de vlugt gesolveert met het naakte lijf doe, dog veel geweerschoote op haarlieden gedaan en Radeen Maas sijn kleedje en sijn geweer van 't lijf geschoten deselve ook selfs gevallen maar dog nog ontkomen is [...] op 's vijands kant in de 20 doode en veele blesseerte geweest, doe God dank van onse kant niet een man verloren nog gequest is [...] Radeen Maas en Tirtanagara weete nog niet waar die na toe gevlugt, edog staan mijne spions niet stil om haar te verspieden in hoope deselve ook meester te sullen worden. Terwijl deselve hier niet betrouwen en voor mijn leeven moet sorgen, 't welke de dogter van den Pangerang mij deesen morgen met een kris heeft soeken te beneemen. VOC 3248, Copy of a missive from Lieutenant Meijer to *Gezaghebber* Coop à Groen, 20 July 1768, 29-30.

⁵¹VOC 3248, Original separate letter from Governor Johannes Vos to Batavia, 5 August 1768, 31- 34.

wounded, finally surrendered and went along with them to Yogyakarta. On the way to Yogyakarta Raden Mas three-year-old brother died, and the Sultan gave instructions that he be buried in Pasar Gede. The Sultan informed the Governor of Semarang of the capture of Raden Mas and his brothers, and requested the latter to forgive Raden Mas and his family. The Sultan also expressed his intention to keep Raden Mas, or at least his youngest brother who was still a teenager, in Yogyakarta. This the Governor vetoed, exercising courtesy and tact, and argued that Raden Mas was actually much more dangerous than his father, Prabujaka, and deserved to be punished by the Company. Pressure had persistently been exercised on the Sultan for almost a decade to induce his half-brother and family to submit peacefully. Should he fail, he would risk his new throne. The Sultan had no reason to defend his half-brother's family, who had been the greatest concern since Singasari's rebellion, in negotiating a fully peaceful solution to the whole conflict in the court of Mataram after the state division in 1755 and 1757. After a few indecisive battles waged by his troops against Singasari, this could be counted the final effort by the Sultan, if not to repay his half-brother's favour in the past, then at least to protect part of his family from ultimate punishment by the Company. He sent Raden Mas and his brothers to Semarang under the escort of *Pangeran* Jayakusuma, *Tumenggung* Kartinagara and Lieutenant Reigers. The surrender of Raden Mas and his brothers was done on the ship the '*t Huis ten Donk*', where his mother and other brothers as well as some of his father's followers were also imprisoned. Meanwhile, Prabujaka himself in the company of his two daughters and a teenage son were sent to Batavia on the ship *De Erfprins*.⁵²

The Death of Malayakusuma

Lieutenant Gondelag accompanied by six Europeans and several indigenous troops continued the work of pursuing Malayakusuma along the south coast of Java. The latest information said that Malayakusuma and his family had concealed themselves in Blandit, located to the south-west of Malang. After a week's march, Gondelag reached Blandit where no one was to be found except an old man

⁵² On the ship the '*t Huis ten Donk*', was also Wilis, the *Pangeran* of Blambangan, who had been captured earlier. VOC 3248, Original apart missive from Governor Vos to Batavia 30 August 1768, 35-40.

named Trunala, one of Malayakusuma's followers. From this man they heard that Malayakusuma had left his latest shelter three weeks earlier. They continued their search to the west, and finally they discovered him with his family, most of them women and children, in Sabak near Lodalem. Without offspring resistance, Malayakusuma surrendered and handed over his weapons. On 7 November, on the way to Malang, the soldiers decided to take a rest on the beach, and at this place Malayakusuma found an opportunity to express his revulsion. He took a pike and killed Corporal Smid van Stam. The commander of the soldier from Surabaya tried to intervene and took away the fallen pike, but suddenly one of the *punakawan* jumped at Malayakusuma with a *keris* in his hands and killed him. Malayakusuma's body was thrown into the sea, whereas the body of Smid was buried there. On 12 November they arrived at Wanalapa, where two of Malayakusuma's young children were assassinated, and the rest, six women, one child and one slave, were sent to Surabaya.⁵³

Meanwhile, Tirtanagara had been detained by the Company troops under *Vaandrig* Mirop in Antang. In Blambangan other family members of Kartayuda, the Regent of Lumajang, *Raden* Tirtakusuma and *Raden* Nurdin (sons), and Selakandaga (brother-in-law) Ekalaya (son-in-law) and Natapura, were arrested. The last two were descendants of Surapati. On the other side of Malang, *Mas* Brahim (the brother of Kartanagara, the son of Surapati), Jayanagara and Suranagara (the brother of Malayakusuma) and their families had been detained as well.⁵⁴

The Return of Malayakusuma

The families of Surapati and Singasari had played a special role in the whole conflict in Central and East Java, which dragged on fitfully for almost a century. They showed greater perseverance in keeping alive their spirit of resistance against the Company than other members of the Javanese elite. The Dutch authorities had also taken more oppressive measures in dealing with both families. In the case of Surapati's family, the Dutch adopted the idea of *tumpes kelor*, which

⁵³ VOC 3248, Copy missive from Lieutenant Jan Daniel Gondelag, Commander of Malang, to the Governor and Director of Java's *Oosthoek*, 16 November 1768, 8-10.

⁵⁴ VOC 3248, Original apart missive from Governor Vos to Batavia 30 August 1768, 35-40.

means to cut off, root and branch. This was a blanket death penalty imposed on a family as a whole in acts of political subversion, such as rebellion. Kumar asserts that the Dutch military expedition to Java's *Oosthoek* was aimed at the extermination of the descendants of Surapati, and the determination to remove them permanently from the politics of Java.⁵⁵ Although Malang and Lumajang had fallen under Company control, Surapati's descendants continued to be hunted down. A few reports mention that after the fall of both regencies, the rest of Surapati's descendants concealed themselves in the Sultan's territory. The Dutch authorities in Semarang responded to this information by appealing to the Sultan to take the necessary measures to pursue them. Two years after the fall of Malang, the Sultan's troops succeeded in capturing twenty-one people from the Malang and Lumajang families (for the names of these prisoners, see Appendix 3).⁵⁶ These twenty-one people were the last group of Surapati's descendants to be handed over to the Company, but it was believed that there were even more families and adherents who were still hiding somewhere in Central and East Java.

It seems that the policy of the Company of clearing Java of the Surapati family could not eradicate the adoration felt for this famous rebel by the people of Malang. Ten years after the fall of Malang, an effort to revive the greatness of this family and to rebuild the spirit of resistance against the Dutch authority was made. The Dutch authorities in the *Oosthoek* were alarmed by a rumour of the 'return' of Malayakusuma, the former Regent of Malang, who was believed have been killed in 1768. This rumour was brought by a Javanese named Singatrana, the former *punakawan* (servant) of Malayakusuma, who claimed he had seen the latter and had even had a conversation with him.⁵⁷ This man claimed that when Malang was defeated by the Company, he accompanied Malayakusuma in his escape to the village of Lebak in Malang regency before his master moved to Bangil. There, Malayakusuma concealed himself in the village of Kesiman, within the Jipang regency. Seven months later, Singatrana was visited by a *mata-mata* (spy) from Surabaya named Wira Seta. The latter asked him about

⁵⁵ Kumar, *Surapati Man and Legend*.

⁵⁶ VOC 3307, List of names of the descendants of Surapati who were arrested in the Sultan's territory in 1770.

⁵⁷ VOC 3528, Report by Javanese Singatrana, the former *punakawan* of Raden Adipati Malayakusuma, Semarang 10 August 1778, 201-3; VOC 3528, Report by Bapa Legowo, the village Chief of Gerbo in Pasuruan, 7 September 1778, 203-4.

the rumour that *Raden Adipati* (Malayakusuma) was still alive. Singatrana confirmed this and said that Malayakusuma had hidden on Gunung Welirang, in the highlands of Tengger. He confessed also that he had met and spoken to him a year before, when he was looking for sulphur around that place. Malayakusuma urged him to keep his meeting with him secret.⁵⁸ Later, Singatrana was taken to the *Gezaghebber* of Surabaya and was ordered by the *Gezaghebber* to investigate the rumour. In the company of Resamanggala and Maisagalaga, he went to the village of Gerba in Tengger area. There they met *Demang* Legawa⁵⁹ (village chief), who indicated the hiding-place of Malayakusuma on Mount Selarawa, near Mount Ciri. The Chief also described to them the physical characteristics of the former Regent, and said that on the left side of his head there was a bald patch. *Bapak* Legawa refused to venture to that place, because he dared not to disobey the Regent of Pasuruan's order instructing him not to let anyone go there. Attempting to reach a compromise, the Chief agreed to accompany them as far as the village of Prajetna. In this village, they met *Bapak* Gelam, who assured them that *Raden Adipati* (Malayakusuma) was still alive and was now living in Selarawa under the protection of a *tapa*, named Amongderma. The meeting with *Bapak* Gelam had assured them that Malayakusuma was still alive, and Singatrana and his friends returned to Surabaya.

⁵⁸ VOC 3528, Report by Javanese Singatrana, the former *punakawan* of *Raden Adipati* Malayakusuma, Semarang 10 August 1778, 201-3

⁵⁹ *Bapak* Legawa explained that, in December 1777, he had been invited by *Bapak* Sembru, *petinggi* (village Chief) of the village of Made. The chief said that the former Regent of Malang, Malayakusuma, and two of his followers, *Raden Cilik* and *Raden Natapura*, were being concealed by a *tapa* (religious teacher) named Amongderma in the village of Ciri. *Bapak* Legawa reported this news to the *demang* of the village Mertasari, named Rediyuda. The latter said that he could not say anything since the former Regent was concealed and protected, and that it was a matter of fact that no one in his village dared to deal with this matter, including Rediyuda himself, because he had been trusted by the Regent of Pasuruan to be in charge of that village. Two months later, *Bapak* Legawa and two fellow villagers, *Bapak* Lampa and *Bapak* Tamia was sent by his chief to fetch rattan in the forest, which meant they had to pass through the village of Ciri where the former Regent and his followers were concealed. In that village they encountered Amongderma, Malayakusuma's protector. The man said that no one would be allowed to meet and talk to the former Regent. VOC 3528, Report by *Bapak* Legawa, the village Chief of Gerba in the district of Pasuruan, 7 September 1778, 203-4

Governor Van der Burgh responded to the rumour cautiously:

As his death had been confirmed, therefore there is so little [evidence] to assume that he himself had been hiding for almost ten years in the Company territory near by his old residence and place of refuge in Malang without being discovered or recruiting new followers, or being involved in the latest trouble in Blambangan. I cannot believe this without convincing evidence that the Regent of Pasuruan *Adipati* Nitidiningrat, who is completely loyal and has shown the Company many attachments, has concealed the enemy of the Company and Java, the dangerous descendant of Surapati, especially as he himself was fully aware of what would happen to him and his children if he disappointed and betrayed the Company.⁶⁰

Despite these misgivings, the Governor did not underestimate the rumour and instructed *Gezaghebber* Van der Niepoort to make a further investigation. He was worried that if this rumour swelled it could take on a life of its own and disturb the peaceful situation in Java. The Governor also suspected that perhaps someone else had tried to adopt Malayakusuma's name in an effort to mobilize people of Malang to rise against the Company. His suspicion was expressed in his letter to the Governor-General at Batavia.

The last rebelling chief of Malang, Malayakusuma who, according to the separate missive of my predecessor here (currently the Honourable Ordinary Council Johannes Vos) to the Honourable Company dated 30 January 1768, had died and about whom since then we have never been informed or heard anything, is still alive and he is hiding on Mount Tengger near his former bolt hole in Malang. However, I still do not believe it, and I suspect that somebody else from that pernicious family has adopted his name and is searching for followers and waiting for an

⁶⁰ omdat als zijn dood gefungeerd, het dan eeven zoo min te veronderstellen is dat hij zich bij na 10 jaaren stil en opgehouden zoude hebben op compagnies territoir nabij zijn oude schuil en verblijf plaats Malang zonder in al die tijd ontdekt te worden, of nieuwe aanhang te maaken dan wel zich te hebben gemengd in de laaste Balemboangsche troubelen, als ik zonder overtuigende bewijs in het denkbeeld vallen kan, dat Passourouangs regent den Adipattij Nitidiningrat, die zoo veele blijken van trouwe en attachement aan de Compagnie gegeven heeft, zig hier vergeeten, en deezen aards vijand van de Compagnie en voor Java gevaarlijken afstammeling van Soeropattij schuil en onderhouden zoude, alzoo hij zich daar uit immers niets anders belooven kan, als s'Compagnies misnoegen en het disfortuin, zoo niet ongeluk van hem en zijne kinderen. VOC 3528, Governor Johannes Robbert van der Burgh to *Gezaghebber* R. F. van der Niepoort, 11 August 1778, 205-207.

opportunity to rebel. I have instructed the *Gezaghebber* Van der Niepoort as I stated in my letter dated 11 August, to make an investigation.⁶¹

Following the instructions of the Governor, the *Gezaghebber* sent all the witnesses to Lieutenant Van Rijcke in Pasuruan for further interrogation. There is no specific report available about the outcome of this investigation, but a few weeks later *Gezaghebber* Van der Niepoort mentioned the case briefly in his long missive to Governor Burg. The *Gezaghebber* mentioned that the man who was believed to be Malayakusuma was actually *Pangeran* Serang, a Central Javanese prince who had travelled to Malang. The said prince was determined to attack the Dutch settlement in Pasuruan with the help of the people of Malang.⁶²

It is not an easy task to determine the identity of the above mentioned prince, because the *Gezaghebber's* letter only mentions that the prince came from the *vorstenlanden* (Principalities). This means that the man could have been a family member of the *Susuhunan*, Sultan, or Mangkunagara. In the history of Java, the name *Pangeran* Serang also appears again in 1825, during the Java War (1825-30). This person was one of the Sultan's relatives who fought for *Pangeran* Dipanegara and died in 1827. It is very doubtful whether the *Pangeran* Serang who appeared in Malang in 1778 was the same person.

⁶¹ Het laaste weerspannige hoofd van Malang, Malajoe Coesoema, die volgens aparte missive van mijn predecesseur in het bestier alhier, den tegenwoordigen Heer Raad ordinair Johannes Vos, aan Uwe Hoog Edele de dato 30 Januarij 1768 aangekomen was, en van wien men ook sedert niets vernomen of gehoord heeft, nog in leven zoude zijn, en hem ophouden in het Tenggersche gebergte, en digt bij zijn oude schuilnest te Malang, want ofschoon ik daar aan nog geen geloof kan slaan, stelle ik egter, dat er iemand anders, van die schadelijke familie moet schuilen, die deeze naam aangenomen heeft, aanhang zoekt, en na geleegentheid wagt deeze of geene coup te doen, en heb ik ook daarom bij brief van den 11 Augustus jongstleeden, den gezaghebber Van der Niepoort opgedragen het doen van nader onderzoek. VOC 3528, J. R. van der Burgh to Governor General Reiner de Klerk, 12 September 1778, 184-185.

⁶² Copy of a letter written by *Opperkoopman* R. F. van der Niepoort to J. R. van der Burgh, Surabaya 1 September 1778, VOC 3528; *See also* VOC 3528, J. R. van der Burgh to Governor-General Reiner de Klerk, 12 September 1778.