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Us and Them : inter-cultural trade and the Sephardim, 1595-1640
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Us and Them:
Inter-cultural Trade and the Sephardim, 1595-1640

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Introduction

It was a rather daunting prospect to consider writing a book about the Sephardic merchants of seventeenth century. Although there is some debate about the size of the Sephardic population in Amsterdam, there is a great likelihood that the sheer number of books and papers written about this community will outnumber the actual Sephardim who lived in Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, if they have not done so already. The Sephardim of Amsterdam have fascinated scholars in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries because they seem to offer, as Barbara Tuchman wrote in another context, a distant mirror that can be held up to the lives and issues faced by minority groups, in general, and Jews, specifically, today. The ways in which the Sephardim grappled with the surrounding society, tolerance, the blending of cultures, and the limits of assimilation speak strongly to scholars confronting these very issues in the contemporary world. As Adam Sutcliffe writes, “. . . this chapter in Jewish history looks forward rather than backward The tolerance, ethnic diversity, and economic dynamism of seventeenth-century Amsterdam readily appear to herald the emergence of the modern urban experience.”¹

One part of the modern urban experience is social acceptance, and the Sephardic economic elites of Amsterdam in the seventeenth century were socially and culturally accepted in a way that was probably unique in the Early Modern world. The borders between the Dutch and Sephardim in Amsterdam during this time were permeable. This permeability was aided by the complex identity of the elite Sephardic merchants themselves, many of whom were as much (or more) Iberian, trans-national, and mercantile-oriented than Jewish. The economic and social opportunities for the Sephardim in the Amsterdam of the seventeenth century presage the current discussions surrounding globalization and the formation and maintenance of identity in a multi-cultural world. Everyday contact between the Sephardim and the Dutch in Amsterdam was unremarkable, though it may appear worthy of remark to contemporary scholars who are steeped in the history of pogroms and ghettos.

This everyday contact was not just of a social nature, however. It also meant that there were important economic relationships that were built up between the Sephardim and the Dutch merchants in the midst of whom they lived. For example, in 1602, 38 prominent merchants of Amsterdam signed a petition to the States General of the United Provinces in support of the “Portuguese Nation” in Amsterdam – a “nation” almost entirely composed of

¹ Adam Sutcliffe, “Sephardic Amsterdam and the Myths of Jewish Modernity,” *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, 97, 3 (Summer 2007), 417-437, 418

Sephardim. They urged that the Portuguese Nation continue to receive “the privileges and safeguards . . . from the States General, for the freedom to practice their trade and travel.”² It seems apparent that something more than pure altruism on the part of Dutch merchants might have played a part in their appeal for a ruling in favor of Sephardic merchants. And, in fact, a close examination of available notarial documentation from Amsterdam demonstrates that over half of the signatories of the above-mentioned petition had documented business dealings – many had multiple dealings over the span of many years -- with Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam.³

This petition would, then, seem to be one of many bits of evidence, all of which point to a potent truth ignored by traditional histories of Early Modern trade and trade networks – that trade, and the networks constructed for the pursuit of this trade, were far more fluid and far more open to merchants of varying backgrounds than has heretofore been admitted. It is that idea that is the basis of this work. The aim of this study is to show that economic links between networks comprised of a multiplicity of ethnicities, backgrounds, and/or religions were mutually beneficial and often long-lasting.

² Nationaal Archief Nederland, (henceforth NL-HaNA), Staten General, 1.01.04, Resolutien der Staten van Holland, 3.01.04.01/36/300-301. “op het vast betrouwen van de privilegën en sauegarden, de koopliiden van de Portugeesche Natie bij de Heeren Staten-Generaal, nopende de vrijheid van hun handel vergund en tot verscheiden reizen gecontinueerd.”

³ A note on terminology: Throughout this work, the terms “Sephardim,” “Sephardic Jews,” or “Sephardic Diaspora,” in their broadest sense, to indicate Jews and New Christians of Iberian descent will be used, unless a specific sub-group of the Sephardim, as described below, is being referred to. Etymologically, the term “Sephardim” comes from *Sephard*, meaning Spain in Medieval Hebrew. This is conscious choice to avoid all the ambiguity and inaccuracy, especially around religious belief and expression, which accompanies the use of other terminology in a blanket fashion to incorporate such a diverse group. The term “Jew” or “Jewish” will not be used unless it is to refer to a person or group known to be practicing Judaism. It cannot be assumed that all, or even most, Sephardim were practicing or believing Jews during the chronology under consideration. Moreover, it cannot be taken for granted that all those of Jewish descent were “crypto-Jews” – a term used to denote a set of rituals and beliefs that continued the practice of Judaism in secret when it was not legally permitted. No doubt some Sephardim were crypto-Jews, but by no means all of them were. These issues will be discussed at greater length in Chapter I. *Marrano* was a derogatory term, used mostly in Spain, to refer to those of Jewish descent. “New Christian” or *converso* are terms used to denote those who were “new” to Christianity because of baptism, forced or otherwise. The term *converso* means “converted” and was mostly used in Spain. These multiple, often confusing, terms are used, sometimes inaccurately and inter-changeably, in relation to those with Jewish ancestors from Iberia. Particularly bad at this is José Gonçalves Salvador’s *Os Magnatas do Tráfico Negreiro (Séculos XVI e XVII)*, (São Paulo: Livraria Pioneira Editora, 1981). He uses terms such as “Jews” and “*cristãos novos*” [New Christians] interchangeably, appearing to assume that every *cristão novo* is a Jew. Maria da Graça Mateus Ventura’s *Negreiros Portugueses na Rota das Índias de Castela (1541-1556)*, (Lisbon: Instituto de Cultura Ibero-Atlântico, 1998) refers to “Jews, New Christians or Judaizers” with no attempt to differentiate among these categories or to see how they might overlap. Even so careful an historian as Jonathan Israel, in the title of his collection of essays, *Diasporas Within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews and the World Maritime Empires (1540-1740)*, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), seems to make the implicit assumption that all of the Sephardim about whom he writes are either Jews or Crypto-Jews when, in fact, this was hardly the case.

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The historiography tends to ignore these very real “inter-cultural” interactions.⁴ Certainly, the histories of the Sephardim in the Early Modern period emphasize the close networks based on kinship, shared ethnicity, and commonality of religious experience, as do most histories of any group of merchants in the Early Modern period. These histories tend to overlook the fact that economic relationships that bridged cultures, religions, ethnicities, and the boundaries of the emerging nation-state were invaluable to the conduct of trade in the Early Modern economy. These networks allowed merchants to access not only regions but also sectors that were dominated by merchants of other backgrounds. This study examines some of these inter-cultural networks in detail. It is focused on the Sephardim of Amsterdam and their largely Dutch business associates between the years of 1595 and 1640. It centers on three Sephardic merchants – Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio – and explores the often complex and long-lasting enterprises they conducted with the help of non-Sephardic associates.

This book is predicated upon the idea that newer social and economic perspectives need to be applied to the understanding of Early Modern Sephardic History, specifically, and to Jewish History, generally. The assumption that under-girds this work is that the well-known and long-standing theory of networks based on loose ties is applicable to the Early Modern period, as tested against this case study of the Sephardim in Amsterdam. This theory asserts that loosely-knit networks that connect individuals in a variety of directions, and that encompass friends and acquaintances in a series of non-intersecting groups, may be more efficient in creating opportunities and promoting the defense of economic interests, than might tightly-knit networks, each of whose members knows the rest, all, collectively contributing to the existence of considerable social communication and to a combined pressure to reinforce traditional religious and family values.⁵

An examination of this theory as it relates to the Sephardic merchant community in Amsterdam from 1595 to 1640 was made. This chronology was chosen for several reasons. While this case study could be tested against any number of chronologies, it seemed wise to begin at the beginning of the Sephardic settlement in Amsterdam, which was 1595. Moreover, this chronology incorporates times of peace and of war, both of which could be important considerations for the way in which these networks functioned. Lastly, the end of the

⁴ “Inter-cultural” is used throughout this work, though “cross-cultural” could have been used, as well. A review of the historiography is to be found in Chapter I.

⁵ Elizabeth Bott, *Family and Social Network*, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964; 1st ed., 1957); Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 78 (1973), 1360-1380; Harrison C. White, *Identity and Control: A Structural Theory of Social Action*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992).

chronology under consideration – 1640 – is also the end of Spanish rule of Portugal. Since Iberia and its colonies were the principal hubs of the Sephardic trading networks, political events in Iberia could have had an important influence on the manner in which these networks functioned. Moreover, the Sephardim seem to have been particularly active in Iberian colonial commerce, especially with sugar-rich Brazil, which could have been especially affected by war. Choosing this chronology also means that there remains the possibility of further testing the hypothesis on a later chronology to see if there is a difference between how the networks functioned after the restoration of Portuguese rule.

Political events between Iberian and the Dutch Republic determined not only the overall chronology, but also dictated the time period divisions in the quantitative analyses, as well. The economic interactions are subdivided based on the beginnings of Sephardic settlement in the Dutch Republic until the beginnings of the Twelve Years Truce (1595-1608), then the Twelve Years Truce itself (1609-1621), and, lastly, the resumption of a state of war between the Republic and the Iberian Crown until the end of Spanish rule in Portugal.

But this chronology was not chosen based only on the political events influencing trade relations, important as this consideration was. This chronology also incorporates the time from the first visible Sephardic settlement in the Dutch Republic, and includes the important formative period during which economic and social relationships between the Sephardim, the Dutch, and multiple other immigrant groups, including Protestants from Antwerp and other port cities in the Southern Netherlands, were being built up. Religious and cultural identities were still somewhat fluid, and the stabilization in religious practice and cultural identities, occurring around the mid-seventeenth century, had not taken place. These factors made this chronology an interesting time to study relations of all sorts between different groups.

The petition mentioned above very clearly states that the Amsterdam merchants were petitioning for their fellow merchants of the “Portuguese Nation.” This work, too, will, focus specifically on the Portuguese Sephardim. After the initial expulsion from Spain, described in Chapter II, the Spanish and the Portuguese Sephardim followed different paths, literally and figuratively. They certainly maintained some familial and commercial connections, but were often, though not exclusively, involved in different networks. As will be showed throughout this work, the Portuguese Sephardim identified themselves as belonging to an over-arching Portuguese Diaspora, which included non-Sephardic Portuguese “old Christians.”

It seems clear that the fact that Sephardim were permitted to practice Judaism openly in places such as Amsterdam, Hamburg, Livorno, Venice and Recife meant that there was a

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“return” to this ancestral religion. Nevertheless, the religious situation of the Sephardim remained complex and, sometimes, seemingly contradictory. Sephardic identity was multi-layered and incorporated categories of local provenance, nation, language, migratory patterns, ethnicity, and religion. This complex structure of identity was particularly striking in Sephardim at higher socio-economic levels, who had, such as Manoel Carvalho, Manoel Rodrigues Vega, and Bento Osorio, the merchants under consideration in this book, tended to move easily from one social and religious milieu to another, though they retained their identity as Sephardim as one layer of their multi-faceted identities.

This tendency toward fluidity dissipated by around the mid-seventeenth century, by which time the Sephardim had generally made a decision, explicitly or implicitly, for either Judaism or Catholicism. Thus, the religious identity of Manoel Carvalho, Bento Osorio, and Manoel Rodrigues Vega is a consideration in this work. What these merchants believed, while a fascinating study in and of itself, is mostly unknowable. What will be examined, however, is how they parlayed their multi-faceted identities into membership in various networks. Hence, identity itself is an issue which will be discussed in the following chapters because it has a direct relationship to how networks between merchants of different groups functioned.

Many Portuguese merchants, Sephardim and non-Sephardim alike, had partners and associates who came from other national backgrounds. Antonio Nunez Gramaxo, among the chief Portuguese wholesalers in Seville at the time, maintained long-term partnerships with Richard Sweet of England, Albert Anquelman and Heinrich Selmer, both of Germany, and an unnamed Flemish merchant.⁶ The presence of these non-Portuguese merchants --English, German, Flemish and Castilian – firmly entrenched in Portuguese trading networks, then, raises the issue of network limits. As Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert points out, “It seems that the boundaries of these commercial networks were porous and admitted the existence of relations that bridged different trading nations.”⁷ As Francesca Trivelleto argues, cross-cultural cooperation was essential for the success of the Sephardic networks.⁸

These networks might have been set up in response to the failure of intra-group networks, or as a means to gain access to new markets, sources of supply, credit, and political influence. Whatever the rationale behind their formation, these intra-cultural networks, while by no

⁶ Archivo Histórico Nacional – Madrid (AHN) Inquisición (Inq.) 1611, exp. 17 quoted in Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, “Interdependence and the Collective Pursuit of Profits: Portuguese Commercial Networks in the Early Modern Atlantic.” In D. R. Curto and A. Molho, eds. *Commercial Networks in the Early Modern World*. EUI working papers HEC no. 2002/2 (Florence: European University Institute, 2002), 92

⁷ Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, “Interdependence . . .,” 97

⁸ D. R. Curto and A. Molho, “Introduction,” in D. R. Curto and A. Molho, eds. *Commercial Networks in the Early Modern World*, 11

means infallible, spread the risks inherent in the reliance on merchants from only one group. What is often ignored in the historiography, however, is that inter-cultural networks could reduce risks. These ideas will be further elaborated in the following chapters using Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio as examples of these sorts of porous networks.

The choice of these three merchants as case studies was inspired by Leos Müller's *The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, c. 1640-1800*, in which he chose families that were easily comparable, with his pre-condition of any meaningful comparison being that the cases compared are to some degree similar and at the same time different.⁹ Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio fit this precondition well. They were the same in that they were all active merchants in Amsterdam between 1595 and 1640. They also were all 'global' Sephardic merchants, as will be described at greater length below. However, they also had significant differences between them in order to illustrate the complexities of entrepreneurial behavior. Moreover, due to the complicated nature of Sephardic identity in the Early Modern period, merchants who represented the three main strands of Sephardic religious expression, such as Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio, were picked. Lastly, because Sephardi migration was so varied, the merchants who migrated from different places to the Dutch Republic, as these three merchants did, were chosen.

Manoel Rodrigues Vega was chosen because, of course, he was active in the Dutch Republic in the chronology chosen for the study. He was also chosen, obviously, because he was a 'global' Sephardic merchant. However, he was picked, as well, because he migrated to Amsterdam from Antwerp, and his family had been active and prominent merchants there as part of the Portuguese Factory for several generations. These Sephardic migrants from Antwerp, especially those who maintained their economic and social ties to Antwerp, were an important, but under-studied, group of Sephardic migrants to Amsterdam. Therefore, a merchant who was representative of this migration stream needed to be included in the study. In addition, Rodrigues Vega embodied the 'Christian' nature of Sephardic identity. Since so much of the historiography equates all Sephardim in the Dutch Republic with practicing Jews, it was important to challenge this assumption of Judaic practice on the part of the Sephardic merchants and, thereby, to re-center the Sephardic Diaspora in Amsterdam into the larger Portuguese Diaspora composed of both old and new Christians, as well as of practicing Jews, Catholics, and those whose religiosity and identity were fluid. By choosing a merchant

⁹ Leos Müller, *The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, c. 1640-1800: A Comparative Study of Early-Modern Entrepreneurial Behaviour*, (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1998), 16.

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strongly tied to the Antwerp networks of Portuguese old and new Christians, who was himself not particularly (or at all) involved in Jewish life, a comparison could be made with the behavior of other Sephardic merchants involved in other networks and behaving and identifying in different ways religiously and culturally.

This logic of 'same but different' applied to the choice of Manoel Carvalho, as well. Carvalho was a Sephardic merchant active in the Dutch Republic, roughly between 1595 and 1640. He, however, migrated to Amsterdam from the Portuguese colony of Brazil, which is another under-studied Sephardic migration stream to Amsterdam. His colonial networks could be compared and contrasted to that of the other merchants' more European-based networks. In addition, as a merchant who was, seemingly, only half-heartedly involved in Jewish communal life in Amsterdam, he was chosen since he represented the ambivalent and shifting nature of Sephardic religiosity and identity. Thus, the ways he utilized his network contacts, and the sorts of networks with which he was involved, could be compared with Sephardic merchants who had migrated from other places and who were more (or less) involved in open Jewish life.

Lastly, Bento Osorio was also chosen, in part, based on the criteria of migration and religious practice, in addition to the need to have been active in Amsterdam as a 'global' merchant during the chronology of the study, as well as to have been Sephardic. Osorio typifies the much-studied stream of Sephardic migration to the Dutch Republic, which originated in Portugal. These migrants, like Osorio, came directly to Amsterdam from cities such as Lisbon and Oporto. Moreover, he exemplifies the 'typical' Sephardic merchant described in the historiography, who seized the opportunity to practice Judaism openly if and when given the chance – a chance he was given in Amsterdam. Hence, due to these similarities and differences, his networks could be compared and contrasted with merchants such as Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho who migrated from places other than Portugal. Therefore, they could have worked with different networks or worked within networks in different ways, especially because their identification with, and practice of, Judaism was different from that of Osorio.

Although the employment of a completely random sampling method of the available archival documentation, detailed below, would have been preferable to the somewhat subjective manner in which these merchants were chosen, it was not possible in this study. As Leo Müller found out in his own work, a vital criterion for choosing either an individual merchant or a group of merchants for a study is the amount of archival material available. So, one criteria for the choice of these merchants was that there had to be enough preserved

archival material (enough being defined as +/- 100 documents relating to him) to look into his economic interactions with some degree of depth. Randomly choosing a Sephardic merchant for whom there were only 20 or so preserved records would hardly have given the amount of information needed for this sort of in-depth study.

There were certainly other elite global Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam during the chronology under consideration.¹⁰ These merchants would almost certainly have behaved in similar ways regarding inter-cultural trade as did Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio. Had these other merchants been studied in this book, the precise percentages of the sorts of trade in which they engaged might have been somewhat different, but the overall picture would have been largely the same. In that sense, the choice of Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio was somewhat random from within this pool of global and elite merchants about whom there was at least 100 documents available. And it is at that juncture that the more ineffable qualities of migratory origins and religious identity described above came into play in the choice of merchants to study for this book.

Essentially, then, in the attempt to gain insights into the complexity of the lives and strategies of Sephardic merchants and their risk reduction strategies the specific partnerships of Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio and their networks of relatives, business partners, and correspondents have been chosen for study rather than on a single Sephardic community. Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were chosen because they exemplify many characteristics of elite Sephardic merchants at the time. They were transnational migrants who were often born in Portugal, but who lived most or all of their lives abroad, often in various lands. They are also interesting studies of the multiple ways in which Sephardic identities manifested themselves during the early seventeenth century. Rodrigues Vega was a typical New Christian who exhibited little outward interest in Jewish belief or practice. Carvalho was, for lack of a better term, a lackadaisical Jew, who seems to have affiliated with Judaism only tenuously and, possibly, for economic reasons. Osorio, in turn, typifies the Sephardic merchant who reclaimed his Jewish heritage openly and proudly when allowed to. Moreover, they were, as will be discussed below, wealthy and successful. These merchants belonged to what Cátia Antunes defines as “global players” – merchants “that they had enough financial

¹⁰ Lopo Ramires, Manuel Dias Henriques, James Lopes da Costa, Diego Dias Querido, Jeronimo Rodrigues de Sousa, Garcia Gomes Vitoria, Diogo Nunes Belmonte, Gaspar and Manuel Lopes Homen, Garcia Pimentel, Duarte Fernandes, Francisco Pinto de Brito, Samuel Pallache, or Estevão Cardoso, to name just a few.

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support to pursue their goals and were therefore able to bypass social links and replace or add new economic connections”¹¹

It was important to choose merchants for this study who were successful, which was a major consideration for the choice of Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio as center points for this book. If successful merchants based their networks upon loose ties with associates from varying groups instead of solely on tightly-knit networks of relatives, friends, and co-religionists, then the idea of loose ties could be shown to be correct. However, it is difficult to narrow down what constituted success for an Early Modern merchant. Certainly, material wealth would have been an important component of success. But wealth could come and go in the Early Modern period, just as it can today. Moreover, measuring wealth for merchants is difficult at best. Records are spotty and serial data is lacking. Therefore, other elements needed to be added to the definition of success. Those elements were: a global geographical reach, since merchants with a wide-ranging area of business interests could be assumed to have more resources at their disposal; secondly, the merchants needed to be integrative. Integrating products, regions, and networks set successful merchants apart from other merchants who were less able to integrate, and demonstrated substantial wherewithal. Lastly, a merchant had to be opportunistic. He had to grab opportunities, seize chances, and take risks. Many merchants may have shown one or more of these characteristics, as well as having the ability to bypass standing social links. Moreover, all merchants sought to maximize their profits, whether in the short or the long term. It is all these characteristics in combination with one another, however, that, for the purposes of this book, define a successful merchant, or, in other words, a global player.

This book will endeavor to see if these global merchants – Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio – traded more or less frequently with fellow Sephardim than did the overall group of Sephardic merchants. If these successful global merchants traded as much or more with other Sephardic merchants within intra-group networks, then it would seem that the traditional historiography is correct, and that the theory of loose ties is not applicable to the Sephardim in Amsterdam in the early part of the seventeenth century. If, however, these global merchants traded more frequently outside the Sephardic networks, then the historiography does need to be revisited, and loose ties can be shown to have increased the efficiency of trade works.

The notarial archives of Amsterdam were chosen to be the basis of this study because they are the only place to find enough documentation on the economic interactions between

¹¹ Cátia Antunes, *Globalisation in the Early Modern Period: The Economic Relationship Between Amsterdam and Lisbon, 1640-1705*, (Aksant: Amsterdam, 2004), 129

these Sephardi merchants and their non-Sephardi associates to test the hypothesis of loose ties as a catalyst for increased network efficiency. Furthermore, in the notarial archives, better information on the inter-cultural interactions that was somewhat systematic, chronologically appropriate, and relatively complete was to be found.

As has been seen above, the majority of the sources on the Sephardim come from the Amsterdam Municipal Archives, reflecting the large and important community residing there. However, there were also significant transactions and prominent merchants located in Rotterdam, such as Manoel Rodrigues Vega. To complement the abundant sources in Amsterdam, a small number of contracts relating to the Sephardim located in the Old Notarial archives of Rotterdam's Municipal Archives were used.

The records of the Portuguese Jewish Community of Amsterdam. (Portugees-Israëlietische Gemeente te Amsterdam) were also consulted. As a source of information about the Sephardic merchants themselves, they are invaluable. Their relative wealth by the amount of the obligatory community contribution they made (*finta*), how and if they were involved in the religious community, what conflicts they might have had within the religious community, as well as if they were involved in the larger Sephardic community outside of Amsterdam by membership in communal charitable organizations could all be determined. However enlightening these records are, though, they said little or nothing about the merchants' under consideration's interactions with non-Sephardic merchants. There are passing references to the community as a whole renting property from non-Sephardic merchants or, for instance, the utilization of non-Sephardim to arbitrate disputes, but nothing to make a case either for or against inter-cultural trade and economic activities.

In order to assess the role the Sephardic merchants had, along with their non-Sephardic partners, as political players, as well as to gauge the influence political entities and their decision-making had on Sephardic merchants, some use was made of the records relating to petitions, requests, and rulings of these governing institutions. The vast amount of documentation available made this a nearly impossible task. Therefore, the printed Resolutions of the States General, located in the National Archives of the Netherlands in the Hague, for the years under consideration in this study were examined.¹² In addition, some use was made of the Resolutions to the States of Holland, a constituent body of the larger States General. These records are also to be found in the Hague.

¹² N. Japikse and H.H.P. Rijperman, *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal van 1576 tot 1609*, 14 vls., ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1915-1970) RGP's 26, 33, 41, 43, 47, 51, 55, 57, 62, 71, 85, 92, 101, 131; and A.Th. van Deursen, *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal: Nieuwe reeks, 1610-1670*, 7vls., ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1971-1994), RGP's 135, 151, 152, 176, 187, 208, 223

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In addition to these Dutch archival sources, Portuguese archives were consulted extensively for this study. Many of the Sephardim in Amsterdam had either come from Portugal or had family members still residing in Portugal. Although it is an oft-repeated myth that there was a direct relationship between Inquisitorial persecution and the arrival of Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam, it is true that much information, genealogical and economic, can be found in the Inquisitorial documentation. However, consulting these sources is no easy task. In the National Archives at the Torre do Tombo in Lisbon there are known to be over 40,000 manuscript *processos* (trial records) consisting of around 18,000 from the Inquisition in Lisbon, close to 12,000 from the Inquisition at Évora, approximately 10,500 from the Inquisition at Coimbra, and 35 from the short-lived Inquisition at Oporto. There was also a branch of the Portuguese Inquisition in Goa, India, which accumulated more than 15,000 registered processes between 1561 and 1774, almost all of which have been lost. While the Portuguese Inquisition held hearings in Brazil and carried out arrests there, the prisoners were shipped to Portugal and tried by the Lisbon tribunal. The same was true of other Portuguese colonies such as Angola.

In order to make some of this surfeit of information digestible for the purposes of this study, the published denunciations from the Inquisition's visitations to Brazil were consulted due to the large Sephardic presence there,¹³ as were the original, unpublished records of the visitation to Angola, which also had a substantial Sephardic presence.¹⁴ Only trial records from the Inquisition of Lisbon were consulted, since Lisbon's tribunal was responsible for the overseas territories, with the exception of the above-mentioned tribunal of Goa. While it is more than likely that important Sephardic merchants involved in this book and their families were tried by the tribunals of other cities, there is a greater likelihood that they would have fallen under the Lisbon tribunal, since the Lisbon had such a large population of New Christians, as well as the fact that Lisbon's tribunal covered such a wide-swath of Portugal's overseas empire, in which many New Christians lived. In addition, only trial records of merchants under direct consideration or their known relations or business partners were viewed. Lastly, in Portugal, documents relating to the colonies of Brazil, São Tomé and Príncipe, Cabo Verde, Guinea, and Angola, all of which had Sephardic merchants residing in

¹³ *Primeira visitação do Santo Officio às partes do Brasil pelo Licenciado Heitor Furtado de Mendonça. Denúncias da Bahia 1591-1593* (São Paulo: Paulo Prado, 1925); *Primeira visitação do Santo Officio às partes do Brasil. Denúncias e confissões de Pernambuco 1593-1595*, (Recife: FUNDARPE, 1984); "Livro de Denúncias do Santo Officio na Bahia – 1618," in *Annaes da Bibliotheca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 1927*, Vol. 49, 1936, 75-198

¹⁴ Instituto Arquivos Nacionais, Torre do Tombo (henceforth IAN/TT), Inquisition of Lisbon (henceforth IdL), Book 776

them, were consulted from the *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino* [Overseas Archive] in Lisbon. Likewise, various commercial letters and account books regarding Sephardic merchants were consulted from the State Papers of the Public Records Office in London. The UK's Public Record Office contains a treasure trove of letters from Sephardic merchants which are only provisionally cataloged. A future starting point for more research would be a more thorough perusal of the PRO's holdings. For the purposes of this study, an account book of the sugar trader, Manuel Dias Santiago, was found and consulted at the PRO. Carvalho was mentioned in this ledger, but only in one entry. The published sources of *Lettres marchandes d'Anvers* were also consulted. Essentially, then, although many sources in multiple countries have been consulted in the writing of this book, the hypothesis itself is largely based upon, and supported by, the notarial archives in Amsterdam.

Of course, notarial sources can certainly be problematic. For that matter, all sources can be and are, to some extent, troublesome. For instance, Inquisitorial sources can also be problematic in terms of determining religious belief or identity. Merchant letters can be a wonderful way of learning about economic and social interactions, but are only as reliable as the person writing the letter. One of the problems to be contended with by relying largely on notarial sources is the issue of "skewing" or a "false positive" for inter-cultural trade. Basically, there is a chance that merchants of differing backgrounds; i.e. not related or of the same ethno-religious group, would be more likely to rely on the semi-security provided by recourse to legal entities and institutions such as notaries – a recourse that would not have been perceived as necessary for intra-Sephardi endeavors -- due to the supposed social controls provided by working within an intra-group network. Essentially, then, it could be that this research has brought to light a greater percentage of overall inter-cultural trade versus intra-group trade because intra-group trade was not recorded in documents of any sort, while inter-cultural trade was. Unfortunately, it is not possible to make an estimate of what percentage "off" the conclusions might be due to this skewing based on the notarial archives. What can be said, however, is that the Sephardim of Amsterdam went to the notaries a great deal for their own intra-group transactions. Many of these intra-group transactions that were registered via notaries were conflictual, but many others were not. The Sephardim went to notaries to record freight contracts or partnerships with other Sephardim, so there is basis enough to assert that a valid representation of overall trends in trade interactions via the notarial archives has been recorded.

Local and regional setting is important for the study of notarial documents, and they must be viewed in the context of other documentation, if at all possible, such as personal or

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religious documentation. Clearly, certain notarial deeds can only be understood well if placed in the context of the merchants' account books, letters, religious community documentation such as charitable institutions, decrees, etc., and other governmental documentation. Such information was not to be had, though. Moreover, in the case of recording and proving that merchants of differing backgrounds, such as the Sephardim and their Dutch associates, had very real and often long-lasting economic ties to one another, contrary to the conclusions of much of traditional historiography, it is not necessary to delve further into other sources. The notarial sources were the best way to record the economic transactions between these actors, which was the goal of the book.

This hypothesis is examined both descriptively and statistically in this book. Some inter-cultural trade networks are examined and described. In addition, statistical methods have been employed to round out the narrative accounts of specific networks. A sample of 1317 records of Sephardim in Amsterdam was examined. Six hundred and eight of these records pertained to Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio. The rest of the records – 709, to be exact -- concerned other Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam. These records were classified in one of four ways: 1) Sephardic (abbreviated as “S” in charts and graphs in this study), which means that there is only one merchant mentioned in the document or contract and he is Sephardic; 2) Sephardic-Sephardic (abbreviated as “S/S” in charts and graphs in this study), which means that there were two or more merchants mentioned in the document or contract and they were all Sephardim. This is also termed an intra-cultural interaction; 3) Sephardic-non-Sephardic (abbreviated as “S/NS” in charts and graphs in this study), which means that there was one Sephardic merchant named in the document or contract working with one or more non-Sephardic merchants. This is also termed an inter-cultural interaction or relationship; 4) Sephardic-Sephardic-non-Sephardic (abbreviated as “S/S/NS” in charts and graphs in this study), which means that there were two or more Sephardic merchants named in the document working with one or more non-Sephardic merchants. This is also called an integrated network relationship. Although this configuration is also without a doubt inter-cultural, it was important to distinguish these sorts of associations from purely Sephardic-non-Sephardic interactions because they demonstrate the integration of networks, and illustrate how loose ties between agents within a network functioned.

The vast majority of the records used to create this analysis, as well as for the study as a whole, came from the Card Index of the Notarial Archive at the Amsterdam Municipal Archives. A supplement to these notarial sources were the notarial records (from 1595

through the end of 1627) relating to the Sephardim in Amsterdam that were translated into English and reprinted in *Studia Rosenthaliana*.¹⁵ In addition to these sources, the freight contracts pertaining to the Baltic transcribed from the notaries Jan Franssen Bruyningh and Jacob Meerhout, while not specifically relating to the Sephardim, certainly have contracts involving Sephardic merchants reprinted in them and were employed in this study.¹⁶

¹⁵ “Notarial Records relating to the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam before 1639,” (hereafter known as SR) in *Studia Rosenthaliana: tijdschrift voor joodse wetenschap en geschiedenis in Nederland*, University of Amsterdam, University Library, Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana, 1967-2001

¹⁶ P.H. Winkelman, *Amsterdamse bevrachtingscontracten, wisselprotesten en bodemerijen van de notarissen Jan Franssen Bruyningh, Jacob Meerhout*, 4 vls., 1593-1625, ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1977-1983) Rijks geschiedkundige publicatiën (hereafter RGP) 183-186

Chapter I: Historiography

Permutations of Sephardic Identity

How the Sephardic merchants of Amsterdam in the years between 1595 and 1640 identified themselves would seem relatively peripheral to the purpose of this study which, as the “Introduction” states, is to examine the inter-cultural economic networks of Sephardic merchants. Nevertheless, it is impossible to discuss the trade relations between merchants as being “inter-cultural” until the boundaries of what constituted those cultures are delineated. An important factor in that delineation is how the Sephardic merchants identified themselves, as well as how they were defined by the surrounding society. Thus, the broader issue of how Sephardic merchants viewed themselves, and, as importantly, how they were viewed by the surrounding societies in which they lived, not only religiously, but also socially, ethnically, and culturally, is of significance for their economic behavior, particularly because it concerns the formation and maintenance of networks with non-Sephardim.

There are, essentially, three main currents of thought with regard to the religious identity and behavior of the Sephardim in the Early Modern period, which will be discussed below. The first is that the Sephardim were actually Jews, practicing, if possible, Jewish rituals in secret as crypto-Jews and maintaining the hope of eventually living openly as Jews. The second view is that these people were, in fact, Christians and it was only persecution based on ethnic and economic grounds from the surrounding society that drove some Sephardim into Jewish practice. The third view is a more nuanced view, which posits that identity and belief were fluid and that some Sephardim were, in fact, devout and believing Christians, while others were crypto-Jews who hoped to eventually practice Judaism openly. In addition, this view asserts that many Sephardim alternated between Jewish and Christian identities and practice depending on the circumstances in which they found themselves. Each of the merchants under consideration in this study has been chosen, at least partially, because he embodies one of these currents of thought with regard to the Sephardim – ranging from open Judaism to indifferent Catholicism.

According to the school critical of the notion that those of Jewish descent were actually Jews, made up of scholars such as Ellis Rivkin, but also of Benzion Netanyahu, António José Saraiva, and Martin Cohen, economic and racial rather than religious motivations led to the establishment of the Inquisition at a point where the New Christian population had all but lost touch with its Jewish roots, ironically causing something of a

resurgence of Jewish religious practice and belief in response to this persecution. The ambiguity of the Inquisitorial documentation, combined with the heavy influence of non-religious factors pushing the tribunals to persecution, casts doubt, in the opinion of many scholars, over whether the majority of New Christians did, in fact, secretly adhere to Judaism.¹

Benzion Netanyahu sought to refute the notion that New Christians were crypto-Jews because he believed that this would validate the Inquisition's actions. Netanyahu maintained that "in seeking to identify the whole *Marrano* group with a secret Jewish heresy, the Spanish Inquisition was "operating with a fiction," so much that "it was not a powerful *Marrano* movement that provoked the establishment of the Inquisition, but it was the establishment of the Inquisition that caused the temporary resurgence of the . . . *Marrano* movement."² He used Jewish sources (mainly rabbinical *responsa*) to prove that the majority of New Christians at the time of the establishment of the Inquisition were indeed Christians and that they were persecuted for political and "racial" reasons rather than for religious considerations.³ Marxist historians, such as António José Saraiva, who denied the existence of crypto-Judaism, and who attributed the repression of the New Christians to the State's attempt to eliminate the "capitalistic class," adopted claims similar to that of Netanyahu.⁴

Along these same lines, Ellis Rivkin argued that crypto-Judaism was not real but invented by the Inquisition, which persecuted Jews with trumped up charges of following Jewish rituals in secret.⁵ Reviewing Inquisition testimony, Jerome Friedman has argued that most "records indicate that New Christians were convicted of being secret Jews because they often abstained from pork, used olive oil rather than lard, changed sheets every Friday, called their children by Old Testament names, prayed standing rather than kneeling, or turned to face a wall when hearing of a death." which, he adds, is like accusing people of being Jewish today

¹ Henry Cross, "Commerce and Orthodoxy: A Spanish Response to Portuguese Commercial Penetration in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1580-1640," *The Americas*, 35/2 (1978); Jaime Contreras, "Family and Patronage: The Judeo-Christian Minority in Spain," in Mary Elizabeth Perry and Anne J. Cruz, eds., *Cultural Encounters: The Impact of the Inquisition in Spain and the New World*, (Berkeley: U of California Press, 1991), 128

² Benzion Netanyahu, *The Marranos of Spain: From the Late 14th to the Early 16th Century, According to Contemporary Hebrew Sources*, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 3rd edition, 1999), 3

³ The *Responsa* are known as *She'elot u-Teshuvot* (Hebrew: **שאלות ותשובות** "questions and answers") and are a compendium of written decisions and rulings covering a period of 1,700 years. The questions tend to be centered on practical issues for which there is no clear answer in the codes of law. The *Responsa* works as a supplement to the codes of law and often form a sort of legal precedent, to be consulted in future rulings.

⁴ Antonio José Saraiva, *Inquisição e cristãos-novos*, (Porto: Editorial Nova, 1969)

⁵ Ellis Rivkin, "How Jewish Were the New Christians?" in *Hispania Judaica: Studies on the History, Language, and Literature of the Jews in the Hispanic World, I: History*, Josep M. Sola-Solé, Samuel G. Armistead, and Joseph H. Silverman, eds., (Barcelona: Puvill, 1980), 105-115

because they have been observed “reading *The New York Times*, eating bagels or supporting the American Civil Liberties Union.”⁶

It is Manoel Rodrigues Vega who seems to match most closely the ideas of Rivkin, Saraiva and the others outlined above. Vega does not seem to have been affiliated with any religious group, and seems to have been viewed as much as a Catholic merchant of New Christian descent as he was a Jew by the surrounding society. In fact, Manoel Rodrigues Vega did not affiliate openly with Judaism at all, as far as can be ascertained from the available documentation.⁷ By delving into Rodrigues Vega’s personal history, it will become clear that, though, much has been made of Vega’s settlement in Amsterdam, as the first member of the “Portuguese Nation” to be granted *poorterschap* or citizenship in Amsterdam, he most likely was not a practicing Jew. The fact that Vega was a member of the Portuguese nation has then been equated with Judaism. However, the two were not always equivalent, as Rivkin, Netanyahu, Cohen, and Saraiva described.

The early twentieth century historian of the Sephardic community of Amsterdam, Jacob Zwarts, asserted that Manoel Rodrigues Vega was one and the same as the mysterious Jacob Tirado, one of the first “rabbis” in Amsterdam.⁸ This hypothesis, however, has been refuted definitively.⁹ In fact, there is little evidence of any religious practice of whatever sort on the part of Vega. He does not appear in any of the religious documentation of the Portuguese Jewish community at all, even in passing. Moreover, Vega is not known to have assumed a Jewish name, as was common practice when a Sephardic man or woman professed

⁶ In sum, “the Inquisition took as its test for crypto-Judaism adherence to a variety of ethnic practices common to earlier generations of Spanish Jews rather than actual belief in Judaism.” Jerome Friedman, “Jewish Conversion, the Spanish Pure Blood Laws and Reformation: A Revisionist View of Racial and Religious Anti-Semitism,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 18 (1987), 15

⁷ Luís Vaz Pimentel claimed that he had been circumcised by Rodrigues Vega in Rotterdam in 1612 and that he had attended Jewish services in an attic in Rotterdam along with him, as well. It is difficult to ascertain the veracity of Pimentel’s claims since he changed his story, which was presented to the Inquisition in Lisbon, several times. First he claimed to have been forcibly circumcised by Rodrigues Vega. Later he testified that he had the procedure done voluntarily. Moreover, caution must be used with all claims made to an Inquisitorial court because there was often, though not always, either torture or the threat of torture, the confiscation of goods, etc. tainting the testimony. In light of the fact that Rodrigues Vega did not affiliate with Judaism in Amsterdam, coupled with the fact that Pimentel’s report is the only known report of the outward practice of Judaism on the part of Rodrigues Vega, I take the view that Vaz Pimentel was either fabricating or exaggerating his claims to the Inquisition in order to increase his own importance. Rodrigues Vega was an extremely prominent and well-known New Christian merchant, and, therefore, an easy target. My analysis is bolstered by the fact that Vaz Pimentel later worked as a spy for the Spanish officials in Brussels after he fell into financial difficulties. From Brussels, he sent lists of Portuguese merchants who he claimed were Jews to Spain, including over 200 names in 1618. See, H.P. Salomon, “The Case of Luís Vaz Pimentel: Revelations of Early Jewish Life in Rotterdam from the Portuguese Inquisition Archives,” *Studia Rosenthaliana* 31, ½ (1997), 7-30

⁸ Jacob Zwarts, “De eerste rabbijnen en synagogen van Amsterdam naar archivalische bronnen,” *Bijdragen en mededeelingen van het genootschap voor Joodsche wetenschap in Nederland* IV, (1928), 147-242, 148-166

⁹ For the refutation of Zwarts’ theory, see A.M. Vaz Diaz, “Een verzoek om de Joden in Amsterdam een bepaalde woonplaats aan te wijzen,” *Jaarboek Amstelodamum* XXXV, (1938), 187-188

Judaism publicly. He also moved to Rotterdam relatively early on – in 1606 -- and there was no known openly practicing Jewish community there, though there were supposedly Jews who met at one another's houses for services. In addition, one of Vega's brothers, Gabriel Fernandes (born in Antwerp in 1576)¹⁰ was married to Maria Beece, a daughter of the squire Jan de Beece, a Catholic.¹¹ This marriage would seem to show that the Vega family were members of the Antwerp mercantile elite with enough wealth and social status to marry into the Flemish Catholic landed gentry, and that they were, in fact, perceived as such by the surrounding society. The fact that, in 1618, Gabriel became a member of the Saint Lucas guild, Antwerp's artists' guild, as an employer of silversmiths and painters, points to the fact that he may have been a practicing Catholic and accepted as a Catholic by the guild members, since it was more difficult for those suspected of crypto-Judaism to gain admission to the guilds.¹²

It was not at all uncommon for New Christian families to harbor a variety of religious practice within them, and it seems the Vega family was no exception. Religiously, Manoel Rodrigues Vega does not seem to have practiced much of any religion at all, even the Catholicism that his brother, Gabriel, did seem to profess. The absence of records demonstrating any sort of affiliation with the emerging Jewish community in Amsterdam, coupled with the family's connections to the Catholic landed gentry of Flanders, seems to point to the weak attachment of Rodrigues Vega to Jewish practice or identity. However, by virtue of his membership in the larger Portuguese nation, Vega did have connections with Sephardic merchants who did become founding members of the synagogues in Amsterdam such as Emanuel Rodrigues Espinosa (Spinosa),¹³ to name just one, who was an active participant in the Jewish life of Amsterdam.¹⁴ Thus, Vega seems to have belonged to the larger Portuguese nation in the Amsterdam, while, at the same time, he was not fully integrated into the emerging religious practice of Judaism.

¹⁰ Swetschinski, *Portuguese Jewish Merchants of seventeenth-century Amsterdam: a social profile*, two volumes, Brandeis University, unpublished PhD manuscript, 1980, 153. Gabriel was a merchant in Antwerp except for a short time spent in London from 1604 to 1608. He also made the occasional visit to Holland. In Antwerp, in addition to his membership in the guilds, described in the text above, he was also a broker. Gabriel seems to have died in 1639. See, H. Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567-1648). Zur Geschichte einer Midnerheit*, (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1977), 104, and Edgar R. Samuel, "Portuguese Jews in Jacobean London," *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England* 18 (1958), 180

¹¹ Hans Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567-1648)*, 91

¹² Hans Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen*, 121. All of Gabriel's children (Elisabeth, Raphael, Francisca, and Beatrix.) were baptized. However, since all New Christians were baptized, this does not necessarily prove religious affiliation one way or another.

¹³ GAA, Notarial Archives (hereafter NA), 76/3-4

¹⁴ See, W. Chr. Pieterse, *Livro de Bet Haim*, 25, 34-37, 41, 45, 59, 63, 65, 66, 83, 103, 112, 137, 141, 144, 185

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Netanyahu, Saraiva, Rivkin, Cohen, and Friedman were responding to the post-World War Two historiography which projected the experiences of the twentieth century back to the Early Modern period. For Yizhak Baer, *converso* “and Jews were one people, united by bonds of religion, destiny and messianic hope which in Spain took on unique coloration typical of the people and the country.”¹⁵ Baer’s influential disciple, Haim Beinart, also ignores the distinction between Jew and *converso*, and sees in the Inquisition a paradigm of Jewish survival.

Out of the deeds done to Jews and Conversos alike shines the internal strength of a Jewry rich in spirit and deed, a Jewry that was able to hold its stand against great waves that tried to engulf her. The deeds of those tried by the Inquisition, those who as martyrs sanctified the Name of God, their vicissitudes and sufferings, may serve as beacons of light for Jewry wherever they are.¹⁶

I.S. Révah also sought to show how Jewish sources (including rabbinical *responsa* and autobiographies) testify to the existence of crypto-Judaism among New Christians; in so doing, he also reiterated the argument set forth by Cecil Roth, according to which every crypto-Jew was a “potential Jew.”¹⁷ Thus, it is one of the stranger twists in the history of this debate, as James Shapiro points out, that Jewish historians have eagerly supported the inquisitors’ claim that apostasy was widespread among the *conversos*.¹⁸ It is ironic, then, as Shapiro goes on to say, that victims of the Inquisition asserted their fidelity to Catholicism (to save their lives, family, or property, or simply because it was true), while the inquisitors and Jewish historians since then prefer to believe otherwise.

It is Bento Osorio who most closely fits this prevailing mythology of a Portuguese New Christian merchant who reclaimed his Jewish heritage. Of all the merchants highlighted in this work, Osorio was the most firmly entrenched in the emergent Jewish community in Amsterdam. Bento Osorio affiliated openly with Judaism, and was a prominent member of the

¹⁵ As quoted in Yosef Kaplan, “Haim Beinart and the Historiography of the *Conversos* in Spain,” in *Exile and Diaspora: Studies in the History of the Jewish People Presented to Professor Haim Beinart*, (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1991), 14-15. Kaplan writes that even though Beinart “did not ignore the existence of many Conversos who ‘sought to make every effort to assimilate into the Christian public,’ he accepted the theoretical position of Yizhak Baer, that ‘Conversos and Jews were one people.’” 14-15.

¹⁶ Haim Beinart, “The Conversos Community of Fifteenth-Century Spain,” in R.D. Barnett, ed., *The Sephardi Heritage*, vol. 1, (London: Valentine, Mitchell, 1971), 452

¹⁷ Cecil Roth, *A History of the Marranos*, (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1932). For Révah’s views, see the debate between Israel Salvador Révah and António José Saraiva, reprinted as three appendices in the English translation of Saraiva’s *Inquisição e cristãos-novos*. António José Saraiva, *The Marrano Factory: The Portuguese Inquisition and Its New Christians, 1536-1765*, translated, revised, and augmented by H.P. Salomon and I.S.D. Sassoon, (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 235-341

¹⁸ James Shapiro, *Shakespeare and the Jews*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 6

Bet Jacob synagogue, and, later, was a founder of the synagogue *Bet Israel* in 1618.¹⁹ Moreover, of all the three merchants profiled here, Osorio was the only one who demonstrably used a Jewish name – Baruch. Daniel Levi de Barrios lists Bento Osorio as one of the 16 people who began practicing Judaism publicly in Amsterdam in 1597.²⁰ However, there is no record of Osorio in Amsterdam before 1610.²¹ It is possible that Osorio arrived in the city sometime before 1610 and just does not appear in the notarial archives, but it is doubtful that such a prominent and prolific merchant could have arrived much before the year of 1610 and remained absent in the notarial documentation. Therefore, as Pieterse speculates, it could be that de Barrios, writing more than 50 years after the events in question, may well have been confused and meant that Osorio was a founder of the congregation of *Bet Israel*, which was the case.²²

Osorio was also one of the faction that, in 1618, supported the rabbi of the *Bet Jacob* synagogue, *Haham* Joseph Pardo, which eventually led to the split in the congregation and the founding of the new synagogue – *Bet Israel*.²³ Previously, he had been *parnas* at the *Bet Jacob* synagogue before the congregation split.²⁴ This split was so acrimonious, that an appeal had to be made to the rabbis and *Mahamad* of the congregation *Talmud Tora* in Venice.²⁵ Osorio was obviously of great importance in the congregation as he was named in 1615 as one of the representatives of *Bet Jacob* to bring together the regulations of the two existing congregations, *Bet Jacob* and *Neve Salom*.²⁶ Osorio also represented the *Bet Israel* community several times (1622, 1625, 1630, 1633, and 1634) before the Impost Board of the collective communities.²⁷

¹⁹ Gemeente Archief Amsterdam [Amsterdam Municipal Archives, hereafter GAA], 334 [Portuguese Jewish Community of Amsterdam (Portugees-Israëlietische Gemeente te Amsterdam)]/10/13

²⁰ Daniel Levi de Barrios, “Triumpho del Gobierno Popular,” in Wilhelmina Christina Pieterse, *Daniel Levi de Barrios als Geschiedschrijver van de Portugees-Israëlietische Gemeente te Amsterdam in zijn ‘Triumpho del Gobierno Popular,’* (Amsterdam; Scheltema & Holkema, 1968), 53. It is not clear if de Barrios was referring to the total number of Sephardim in the city at the time, or to the number of Sephardim who were professing Judaism openly.

²¹ See GAA, Notarial Archives (hereafter NA) 62/199; NA 62/189; NA 62/194v; NA 120/178v-179v for notarial acts passed in 1610.

²² Daniel Levi de Barrios, “Triumpho del Gobierno Popular,” 56 and GAA, 334/10/13

²³ D. Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans: The Portuguese Jews of Seventeenth Century Amsterdam*, (London (etc.): Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2000), 173

²⁴ “*Parnas*” comes from the Hebrew for “leader” and was the head of a Jewish community. Often, as was the case in Amsterdam, there was a ruling counsel of “*parnasim*” (Hebrew plural of “*parnas*”). The *parnas* was usually elected. The congregation split due to religious tensions between a more orthodox wing under the leadership of Pardo and the more liberal wing of Abraham Farrar. See, *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing, 1972), VI. 2, 896. It is telling that Osorio chose to support the more orthodox faction.

²⁵ GAA, 334/2

²⁶ Daniel Levi de Barrios, “Triumpho del Gobierno Popular,” 96

²⁷ Wilhelmina Christina Pieterse, *Livro de bet Haim do Kahal Kados de bet Yahacob*, (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1970), 191; GAA, 334/10/129-130. Bento Osorio’s son, David, continued his father’s active involvement in the

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In addition, Osorio was known as a Jew by the surrounding Portuguese society, including both Sephardim and Old Christians. Osorio was accused by the bailiff in Amsterdam, along with Antonio Mendes Cardoso, a Dr. Tenório, and Simaõ Viegas of “. . . try[ing] to bring Christians to Judaism . . .”²⁸ Though Osorio, as has been seen, was a prominent member of the Jewish community in Amsterdam, it is doubtful, however, that Osorio was trying to convert Christians to Judaism. Nevertheless, this accusation highlights that Osorio was perceived as a Jew. He was not just identified as a Jew in the Low Countries, however. One Spaniard wrote, “Of all these Jews, only two are in the secret with the Hollanders. One is named Bento de Osorio . . . the other Lope Ramirez or David Curiel. These give the orders and make the plans for plundering and destroying, thinking by this means to destroy Christianity. It is with this object in view that they try to maintain so many spies in so many cities of Castile, Portugal, Biscay, Brazil, & elsewhere.”²⁹ In this case, it is most likely not any fear for Christianity, but, rather, for the trade in the Spanish Empire that motivated the complaint against Osorio. Nevertheless, these two complaints show that Osorio was perceived as a Jew, both in the Netherlands and within Iberian society.

When Osorio first arrived in Amsterdam in 1610, the Twelve Years Truce had been in effect for a year, and trade between the Iberian Peninsula and the Low Countries was thriving. Therefore, an economic rationale seems to be a straightforward explanation for Osorio’s move. However, another supposition is that, in addition to the compelling economic reasons for Osorio’s move to Amsterdam, there might have been political and religious motivations, as

Jewish community of Amsterdam. Both Bento and David Osorio paid 40 (*florins quarenta*) in charity as members of the *parnassim*. (GAA, 334/13/77-88) In 1638, David and Bento Osorio were signatories to the agreement on collective taxation of the three Sephardic synagogues in Amsterdam. (GAA, NA 728/52) David was president of the congregation *Talmud Tora* in 1639. (GAA, 334/19/95) He was also named as one of the representatives given the task of bringing together the three existing congregations. (GAA, 334/19/77) David was chosen out of the 15 *parnassim* of the three congregations as part of this task. (see, Daniel Levi de Barrios, “Triumpho del Gobierno Popular,” 72) David was either still in this function as *parnassim* or was elected anew in 1648 (GAA, 344/19/229 and 344/19/246). He wrote a letter of support for the installation of Samuel de Caseres as the *sopher* (law writer) in this same year. (GAA, 344/19/245) In 1650 he was a *parnas* for *Talmud Tora* again. (see, J. Meijer, *Encyclopaedia Sefardica Neerlandica*, (Amsterdam: Portugees-Israëlietische Gemeente, 1948), 103). His son, Jacob Aboab Osorio was *parnas* of the same congregation in 1671, 1678 (when he was also treasurer), 1692, 1702, and 1713. (see, J. Meijer, *Encyclopaedia Sefardica*, 104-106. The family continued to be active in the synagogue in the eighteenth century. David Abendana Osorio and David Aboab Osorio were *parnassim* in 1728, 1729, and 1735 (J. Meijer, *Encyclopaedia*, 106-107). After that, the last name Osorio drops out of the records of the synagogue, possibly because the Osorio family moved to the Hague (see, Isaac da Costa, *Noble Families Among the Sephardic Jews*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 95

²⁸ GAA, 334/915 “. . . die gastvrijheid slecht gebruik maakten. Zij probeerden christenen tot het jodendom over te halen en zij stoorden zich niet aan het wettig gezag van de baljuw en de schout en zijn dienaren.” It is not clear if this passage is referring to the conversion of Dutch Calvinists and Catholics or Portuguese New Christians.

²⁹ Quoted in Cyrus Adler, “A Contemporary Memorial Relating to Damages to Spanish Interests in America Done by Jews of Holland (1634),” Translation and transcription from the General Archives of Simancas, Council of the Inquisition, Book 49, Folio 45 “Narrative Showing the Damage Done to His Majesty by the Jews of Holland,” *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, 17 (1909), 45-51, 50

well. It could be that Bento Osorio was under threat by the Inquisition. He could have been denounced, or a friend or family member could have come under Inquisitorial scrutiny, meaning it was only a matter of time before he was called before the Inquisition too. While Inquisitorial persecution did not, by any means, mean certain death, it could very well mean the loss of property. Therefore, it is possible that Bento Osorio was looking for a place to go outside of Portugal. In addition to, or as a corollary to, the possibility of Inquisitorial pressure, is the chance that Bento Osorio may have been looking to settle in a place where he could be an openly practicing Jew. By 1610, there were two Jewish congregations in Amsterdam – *Bet Jacob* and *Neve Shalom*. This was well-known in Iberia, and it is possible that Osorio was seeking an open Jewish life. This theory is bolstered by the fact that Osorio was such an active congregant, first in *Bet Jacob* and, later, in *Bet Israel*, as was described above.

Manoel Carvalho, like Osorio, also affiliated with Judaism, though he does not appear to have been particularly active in the Jewish community, and did not affiliate with Judaism for years after his arrival in Amsterdam, even when it was possible to do so. In fact, he stated in a notarial act passed in 1643 that he came to Amsterdam, “. . . around 40 years ago, but that [he] did not profess the Jewish religion before 1616, though there had been ample opportunity to do so.”³⁰ Thus, he seems to have had a somewhat lackadaisical commitment to the open practice of Judaism. Therefore, Carvalho fits most closely the third view of Sephardic identity, as described above. This view posits that identity and belief were fluid and that some Sephardim were, in fact, devout and believing Christians, while others were crypto-Jews who hoped to eventually practice Judaism openly. In addition, this view asserts that many Sephardim alternated between Jewish and Christian identities and practice depending on the circumstances in which they found themselves.

The fact that he had finally committed to some form of public Judaism did not go unnoticed in Iberia, as he was also listed as living in conformity with Jewish law in Amsterdam by Hector Mendes Bravo in 1617.³¹ In fact, it could be that Carvalho was denounced incorrectly to the Inquisition in Portugal for Jewish practice and that this denouncement spurred his open affiliation to Judaism in Amsterdam, whereas, before, he was content to live on the margins of the community, with the freedom to travel to Portugal and Brazil as a Christian. Whatever the circumstances of his decision to affiliate with Judaism, Carvalho was certainly not an active congregant. Though he lived to be at least 79 years old, if not older (he died sometime after 1643), Carvalho only appears twice in the documentation

³⁰ GAA, NA 1068/120

³¹ Cecil Roth, “The Strange Case of Hector Mendes Bravo,” *Hebrew Union College Annual*, 18 (1944), 235

relating to the religious activities of the Portuguese Jewish community.³² Once was for the contract for the supply of *kosher* meat.³³ The other was when Carvalho was a signatory, along with Diogo Nunes Belmonte, Duarte Saraiva, Simão Lopes Rosa and Francisco Mendes Trancoso, of a letter declaring that they would abide by the payments they had to make to the congregation of *Bet Jacob*.³⁴

Any fervent attachment that Carvalho might have had to Judaism is further called into question by the fact that, as far as can be ascertained, he never took on a Jewish name. Vaz Dias stated that Carvalho's alias was Moses de Caseres, but gives no source.³⁵ None of the notarial acts examined in which Carvalho is mentioned give any alias at all for Carvalho, which sheds some doubt on Vaz Diaz's hypothesis. It is likely that Vaz Dias was referring to the fact that two of Carvalho's siblings, Sara and Jacob, did use the last name de Caseres.³⁶ Nevertheless, there is no evidence to attribute the documented activities of Moses de Caseres to Manoel Carvalho, especially since Sara and Jacob were possibly half-siblings of Carvalho and that, therefore, there was another half-brother named Moses. This hypothesis is bolstered by the fact that Maria de Pas, Carvalho's cousin, left her estate only to Manoel and did not name any other of his siblings as her heirs. At any rate, Jacob, whether the full or half brother of Manoel, could be the same man as Jacomo de Caseres who lived in Holland by 1609 and who had previously resided in Venice for 16 years.³⁷

Thus, it seems that Carvalho was content to live as an ostensibly Catholic merchant of New Christian descent for years before, for whatever combination of reasons, deciding to affiliate with Judaism. He chose to wait to practice Judaism openly, even when he had the chance to do so safely. His religious identity, therefore, seems to have been fluid and shifting and that he alternated between Jewish and Christian identity and religious practice.

However, it is not only, or even primarily, religious practice that defines the Sephardim. As the recent work of Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert shows, the Portuguese Diaspora

³² D. Swetschinski, *Reluctant*, 107-108

³³ SR 436

³⁴ W. Chr. Pieterse, *Livro de Bet Haim*, 14. The only other mention of Carvalho in documentation related to the religious practices of the Amsterdam Jews was when his illegitimate daughter (probably one of two or more illegitimate children), married a Sephardic man in 1648, mostly likely after Carvalho's death. See GAA, DTB [Dooop, Trouw, en Begraafboeken (Baptismal, Marriage, and Burial Books,)] 680-12. The Sephardim of Amsterdam tended to follow Iberian socio-sexual norms rather than rabbinic Jewish norms, meaning that an illegitimate child on the male side, if recognized by the father, could be admitted to the Jewish community. See Miriam Bodian, *Hebrews of the Portuguese Nation: Conversos and Community in Early Modern Amsterdam*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 85-95 and Jessica V. Roitman, "Marriage, migration, and money: The *Santa Companhia de dotar orphãs e donzelas pobres* in the Portuguese Sephardic Diaspora," *Portuguese Studies Review*, Vol. 13, Issue 1 (Summer 2005), 347-367

³⁵ Mentioned in Wilhelmina Christina Pieterse, *Daniel Levi de Barrios*, 57

³⁶ GAA, DTB 668-39

³⁷ SR 359

was tightly connected by economic and social concerns, but also by a mutual identification as Portuguese.³⁸ The Sephardic merchants shared this primary identification as Portuguese. Their background as New Christians, a classification of Portuguese subjects originating from the forced baptisms of 1497 who shared (distant) Jewish ancestry, meant that they had an additional communal identity. This communal identity was not, however, primarily religious. Shared religion, especially in a diaspora group, helps to provide a basis for the formation of values, coherence, social organization, and legitimating authority among the members of the community. For the Sephardim, it was not the religious beliefs of Judaism, *per se*, but, rather, the shared experiences of being part of what became, *de facto*, a separate ethnic group within Portuguese society that formed a component of their group identity.³⁹ Later, in some parts of the Western Diaspora such as Amsterdam, Hamburg, London, and various colonial settlements, some Sephardic merchants also added Judaism to their layers of identity.

Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were, first and foremost, wealthy and prominent Portuguese merchants from a New Christian background. Two of these merchants, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, became, at some point in their lives, affiliated with the open practice of Judaism, as was described above. This open practice of Judaism in Amsterdam has become, for many scholars, the defining component of not only Carvalho and Osorio's identities, but of all the Sephardim in Amsterdam. Further, the conflation of all Sephardim with Jews has been made for the majority of Sephardim in the Western Diaspora, as a whole, including, inaccurately, Rodrigues Vega.⁴⁰ In fact, in the majority of the Notarial contracts in the Amsterdam archives, at least until the latter part of the seventeenth century, the Sephardic merchants are tellingly referred to as nothing more and nothing less than "Portuguese Merchants in Amsterdam." Their religious affiliation is rarely mentioned.

For Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, a large part of their identity was rooted in their economic function, as will be discussed at greater length below. Thus, they had as much, or more, in common with fellow entrepreneurs, regardless of political, religious, or national differences, than they did with the poor Ashkenazi Jews that flooded into Amsterdam as refugees from the Thirty Years War. In this view, it would seem

³⁸ Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

³⁹ T. Shibusami and K.M. Kwan's definition of an ethnic group as, "consisting of those who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtual descent, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others." is being employed in this work. See, T. Shibusami and K.M. Kwam, *Ethnic Stratification*, (New York: MacMillan, 1965), 47

⁴⁰ The dynamics of the Sephardi Diasporas – one to the Orient and one to Western Europe – will be discussed at greater length in Chapter II.

that the school of thought advocated by Ellis Rivkin, which questions the blanket assumption that all New Christians were secret Jews, is correct. Rivkin argues that the New Christians chose a Jewish identity when it suited them because, for example, it was more convenient to be a Jew in Protestant Amsterdam than a Catholic. Rivkin also asserts that the Sephardic merchants were defined by their economic function as entrepreneurs.⁴¹

However, there are overlapping categories of identity among the Sephardic merchants which call the thought of Rivkin, Saraiva, and the scholars who assert a purely economic rationale to the Sephardic merchants' behavior into question. That the Sephardic merchants were identified with, and identified themselves with, their economic function as entrepreneurs is clear. That the majority of New Christians were not Jews is also clear, since only a tiny percentage of New Christians ever chose to migrate to places where they could practice Judaism openly. But, it seems that Rivkin, Saraiva, and the others tend to overlook the fact that the Sephardim's economic function as merchants was combined with their identities as members of the Portuguese Nation of New Christian ancestry. For example, they had a strong sense of solidarity as a trans-national group. So, for instance, the Sephardic merchants of Amsterdam actively supported charitable institutions for poorer Sephardim who were either not successful merchants, or were possibly not merchants at all.⁴² Thus, they did not only identify as merchants, and successful ones at that, though this was a very important component of their identity. They also showed tangible concern for, and affiliation with, other Portuguese of New Christian ancestry – a concern and affiliation that went beyond economic functionality. Moreover, there remains the very real possibility that some merchants, such as Bento Osorio, affiliated with Judaism out of genuine belief in, and desire to, reclaim their ancestral religion, rather than because, as Rivkin asserts, it was better to be a Jew in Protestant Amsterdam than a Catholic.⁴³

For European Jews, the late sixteenth century was a time of unprecedented changes in how collective identity was constituted. As Jonathan Israel puts it, this was a period in which

⁴¹ Ellis Rivkin, *The Shaping of Jewish History: A Radical New Interpretation*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), 140-158 and "Uma Historia de Duas Diasporas," in *Iberica Judaica; Roteiros da Memoria*, Anita Novinsky and Diane Kuperman, eds, (Sao Paulo: Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1996), 267-275

⁴² Tirtsah Levie Bernfeld, "De Financiering van de armenzorg van de Spaans-Portugees joodse gemeenschap in Amsterdam in de Zeventiende en achttiende eeuw," *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis*, 23 (1997) 4, 428-458; Yosef Kaplan, "The Self-Definition of the Sephardi Jews of Western Europe and their Relation to the Alien and the Stranger," in Yosef Kaplan, *An Alternative Path to Modernity: The Sephardi Diaspora in Western Europe*, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 51-77 and Miriam Bodian, "The 'Portuguese' Dowry Societies in Venice and Amsterdam: A Case Study in Communal Differentiation within the Marrano Diaspora," *Italia* 6 (1987), 30-61 and her *The Santa Companhia de dotar orfãos e donzelas pobres in Amsterdam, 1615-1639*, unpublished PhD dissertation, Hebrew University, 1988

⁴³ Ellis Rivkin, *The Shaping of Jewish History* . . . , 140-158 and "Uma Historia de Duas Diasporas," 267-275

“Jewish society, indeed Jewish nationhood” as “something distinct from Jewish religion” was emerging “as much more definite realities than before.”⁴⁴ Israel goes on to say, “The whole hitherto fixed pattern of restricted interaction between western Christendom and the Jews was transformed.”⁴⁵ This total transformation in the concept of what constituted “nationhood” and religious versus cultural identity went part and parcel with the massive conversion of Jews to Christianity, mostly in Iberia, from the thirteenth century onward. These conversions, many of which were forced, had not only created a separate religious, legal, and ethnic category known as “New Christians,” as mentioned above, within the larger population, it had uncovered a problem with the idea of determining religious identity in terms of either assent or by descent.⁴⁶

Thus, the Sephardic New Christians were hardly static religiously. The Sephardim were a sub-group of the larger Portuguese Diaspora and, as such, could be found in all corners of the expanding European world, whether as practicing Jews, crypto-Jews, or as Catholics. In addition, they were, whether by choice or circumstance, part of the larger reconsideration and reorganization of personal identity as separate from religious or national identities and loyalties – a process which had begun with the Protestant Reformation. New Christians challenged prevailing notions of religious identity, and often redefined their identity in ethnic rather than religious terms, which, as Francesca Trivelleto says, “meant enlarging its own borders and yet rendering them more porous.”⁴⁷

As the Inquisition proved, in addition to the life histories just mentioned, it was impossible to know what faith people really professed since it could be disguised. All that could be known was the way in which the society perceived one. Therefore, turning the question of identity around from the solipsistic perspective to the collective viewpoint allows for the assertion that Carvalho and Osorio viewed themselves and were viewed as Jews, at least when they lived in Amsterdam. That being said, it seems possible that Carvalho only affiliated with Judaism because to not be affiliated, in one way or another, with some religion was very difficult in the Early Modern world. Vega, however, does not seem to be defined as a Jew by the surrounding Dutch or the Iberian societies to which he belonged. In fact, it is

⁴⁴ Jonathan Israel, *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550-1750*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 71

⁴⁵ J. Israel, *European Jewry . . .*, 31, 35

⁴⁶ James Shapiro, *Shakespeare and the Jews*, 6

⁴⁷ Francesca Trivellato, *Trading Diasporas and Trading Networks in the Early modern Period: A Sephardic Partnership of Livorno in the Mediterranean, Europe and Portuguese India (ca 1700-1750)*, unpublished dissertation, Brown University, 2004, 20

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only by historians eager to equate the first Portuguese of New Christian descent in Amsterdam with the first Jew in Amsterdam, that Vega is categorized as being Jewish.

Essentially, though, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio acted and were seen like business men, not Jews or potential Jews. Carvalho and Osorio were known by the surrounding society as Jews, but were mostly known as businessmen. Therefore, their principal interest was in acquiring capital and in reducing the risks to their livelihood. They acquired capital and reduced risks by behaving like most other businessmen of the time -- developing and maintaining powerful *clientage* networks formed by joint commercial interests and glued together by participation in collective institutions. But how, exactly, did these networks work?

Theories of Trade in the Early Modern Period

In an attempt to further examine the question of how to explain frequent and long-lasting collaboration between Sephardic and Dutch merchants, the historiography of trade in the Early Modern period will be examined. Merchants, whether part of a diaspora or a network, had to grapple with the high-risk environment of trade in the Early Modern Period.⁴⁸ An Early Modern merchant might face what could be categorized as “natural” risk. Any number of disasters could befall a merchant and his goods as they traveled to their destinations. The chance of problems arising increased with the distance a cargo was traveling, but even cargos staying close to home ran the risk of being damaged or destroyed by flood, drought, ship wreck, and delays due to weather. Part and parcel of these natural risks were the problems associated with the available technology. Communications were slow and, for example, market conditions could change dramatically between the time an order was sent and the time the order arrived, usually via ship. Therefore, information was paramount to the conduct of trade in the Early Modern period and it became important to have a partner or a trusted correspondent in a distant locale to keep an eye on market conditions there, as well as to receive and ship goods. However, it was important that this person be trust-worthy and credible. Furthermore, war raged in various parts of the European continent, as well as in the colonies, which further increased the risk to merchants.

In addition to these very real perils, there was always an element of what could be termed “personal risk” for Early Modern merchants. Since there was a relatively weak institutional

⁴⁸ Much of the following description of the nature of risk in Early Modern trade is drawn from Peter Mathias, “Strategies for Reducing Risk by Entrepreneurs in the Early Modern Period,” in C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, eds., *Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times. Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market*, (The Hague: Stichting Hollandse Historische Reeks, 1995), 5-24

framework for the enforcement of contract rules, there was the constant underlying threat that another merchant could default on a loan, refuse to honor a bill of exchange, abscond with goods or money, or fail to deliver the promised merchandise or services, all of which could severely jeopardize the economic position of a merchant, or even drive him to bankruptcy. And, lastly, the legal, institutional, and political framework was, depending to some extent upon the location, weak. Recourse to these institutions could be uncertain and costly. In short, a peaceful, well-ordered environment in which to conduct business was lacking.

Due to these sorts of risks, there was a high premium placed on trust engendered by personal knowledge of the other merchant, especially familiarity based on kinship or shared religion, ethnicity, and/or nationality. This idea is emphasized again and again in the historiography, whether the works deal with trade in the Early Modern period, in general, or with specific merchants groups such as Quakers, Jews, Scots, and Armenians, to name just a few.⁴⁹ The risk of dealing with unknown individuals helps to explain why traders kept much of their business to their own kind. This risk was mitigated, historians explain, by the social control and formal and informal sanctions exerted by family members and/or members of the same ethno-religious or national group.⁵⁰ The knowledge of personal character and trustworthiness built up over the course of individual commercial transactions was, it is believed, crucial to maintaining a well-run business and this knowledge could most easily be gained through webs of shared relations.⁵¹ Basically, then, a merchant had to behave in a trustworthy and honorable fashion because, if he did not, his family and friends would come

⁴⁹ Although far too much has been written about these groups to cite here, see the following works for an overview of the historiography relating to them: Jacob M. Price, "The great Quaker business families of eighteenth century London: the rise and fall of a sectarian patriciate," and "English Quaker merchants and the war at sea, 1689-1783," in his *Overseas Trade and Traders: Essays on Some Commercial, Financial, and Political Challenges Facing British Atlantic Merchants, 1600-1775*, (Variorum, 1996), chapters 3 and 4; Daniel M. Swetschinski, "Kinship and Commerce: The Foundations of Portuguese Jewish Life in Seventeenth-Century Holland," *Studia Rosenthaliana*, 15, 1, (1981), 52-75; Steve Murdoch *Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603-1746* (Brill, Leiden, 2005); in addition to Michel Aghassian and Keram Kevonian, "The Armenian Merchant Network: Overall Autonomy and Local Integration" in *Merchants, Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era*, Sushil Chaudhury and Michel Morineau, eds., (New York: Cambridge University Press), 74-94, and Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlafits, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglau, eds., *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks: Four Centuries of History*, (Oxford: Berg, 2005) on the Armenians, which has already been cited, see Vahé Baladouni and Margaret Makepeace, eds. *Armenian Merchants of the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries: English East India Company Sources*, (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1998)

⁵⁰ Avner Grief discusses the role of social sanctions in what he terms "collectivist" societies. See, in particular, Grief, "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 102, no. 5, 912-950 and "Impersonal Exchange and the Origins of Markets: From the Community Responsibility System to Individual Legal Responsibility in Pre-modern Europe," in Masahiko Aoki and Yujiro Hayami, eds., *Communities and Markets in Economic Development*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3-41

⁵¹ John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, "Introduction," in *The Early Modern Atlantic Economy*, John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), 1-15, 4

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to know of it, and he would be socially shamed, in addition to facing social, economic, and, possibly, religious sanctions. Moreover, his bad behavior could bring his family and friends into disrepute. Lastly, he could be cut off from his network of support should his behavior become too offensive.

Trade in the Early Modern period was based upon the principle of reciprocity. A merchant who did a favor or a service for someone could and would expect one in return. Knowledge of a merchant's partners and his trust in his partners fostered the interdependency among partners that was one of the basic conditions for trading. Networks of mutual trust were built up on personal recommendations; e.g. if businessman A had a bond of trust and confidence with businessman B, A could recommend a third party, businessman C, in whom he placed his own personal confidence, to B – with B having an obligation through his friendship with A to oblige C provided that it was reasonable, with C then having the obligation of dealing honorably with B or risking his friendship with A. Friends exercised social control, because they suffered from the bad reputation of someone closely connected to them. In fact, merchants often helped their friends who fell on hard times, not just out of sheer altruism, but also in order to protect their own reputation due to their association with the floundering merchant. Therefore, stable and long-lasting networks based on personal knowledge of a fellow merchant (or of his acquaintances) were viewed as risk reduction strategy.

Thus, reputation and trust were the bedrock of commercial dealings in a time of unlimited liability. Since a merchant was dependent on others, and he could not necessarily know everyone personally, he also had to depend on reputation. If a merchant did not have a personal relation with a partner, he had to build trust based on his reputation. This means that reputation was especially important at the beginning of the relationship, and that it was not just an individual matter, but also connected to the reputation of the family, as a whole. A merchant supported not just himself and his nuclear family, but often an extended family, as well. Trade was their source of revenue, as well as the basis for their social position. A merchant who failed in his business endeavors took others along with him in his fall, including other family members, his creditors, who were often family members or friends, as well as his descendents.

Therefore, the most important sanction was to injure someone's reputation, because the loss of reputation meant loss of credit and loss of social position. Hence, it stands to reason that a good name was everything to the Early Modern businessman. It should be noted that reputation was not just for the wealthy. A merchant could be poor and still known for his

respectability and honesty. In fact, it was all the more important that he and his family be known for their respectability and honesty if the merchant was hoping to better himself.

Family provided partners, capital, information, and the structure of business ventures. The bonds of kinship are thought to have helped form a bond which held individuals and families in numerous interrelated enterprises. Merchants often preferred trading with relatives, because they were the people he knew best, and over whom a merchant could wield some amount of control by depending on sanctions within the family structure in order to enforce business commitments, should it become necessary. As one historian put it, “Family-based networks built on trust among partners are thought to have supplied the most effective governance structure as a solution to principal/agent problems and curbing agency and transaction costs.”⁵²

Merchants also tried to consolidate their business relations through marriage. The reciprocal financial obligations of marriage which were embodied in dowries, and the transfer of personal property, to name just a few – and binding agreements of the marriage contract made this institution financially important. Marriage as a contractual arrangement or even as a strategy, and endogamous marriage, in particular among minority groups was a part of merchants’ plans.

Trade within a family group and marriage was, then, a risk reduction and networking strategy. A merchant and his family cemented alliances with other families who shared business interests. Essentially, then, in the Early Modern world, the most significant factor at play, it is commonly believed, was kinship. Daniel Swetschinski even asserts that, “In sum, kinship constituted the foundation of Early Modern commerce.”⁵³ And, it is true, following in the family business meant that the merchant already had a knowledge of the trade, had already established clients, customers, and suppliers, and had the confidence and trust from these clients, customers, and suppliers that a continuity of business over many years would have built up. In addition, entry into a guild or trading company often depended on family recommendations or relations and such membership could be vital to success in trade. An extension of these family networks was religious networks.

In the case of the Portuguese diaspora and its Sephardic sub-group, trade relations between kin were of great importance.⁵⁴ Moreover, they often married to the second degree (cousins), according to Jewish custom. Thanks to these ties, it was possible to maintain wealth

⁵² Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, “Introduction,” in Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlafits, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglau, eds., *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks*, xviii-xxii, xx

⁵³ Daniel M. Swetschinski, “Kinship and Commerce . . .,” 58-59

⁵⁴ The Portuguese Diaspora will be discussed further in Chapter II

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and resources within one extended family group. The Amsterdam Sephardic merchants shared with one another the costs of transportation, the risks of insurance, and information on ways of circumventing whatever obstacles came their way.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the historiography examined above does not seem to offer an explanation as to why the Sephardic merchants of Amsterdam, specifically Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, also set up efficient trade networks by incorporating non-Sephardic partners (often, but not only, Dutch merchants). This is a point that is mostly ignored by historians working on Sephardic trade, as it is by historians of Early Modern trade, in general. As has been seen, there is a generally accepted view in the historiography of Early Modern trade that networks based upon family and kinship were vital to the conduct of trade. However, there are newer perspectives that are emerging that, if they do not outright challenge these notions, at least provide greater nuance to the way in which trade is perceived. It is within these emerging challenges to the prevailing historiography that this work is situated.

Towards New Perspectives

It is not that anything is, *per se*, erroneous with these views of Early Modern Trade, in general, and Sephardic trade, in particular, that are described above. However, there is an important nuance that is missing – a missing nuance which has been recognized, at least partially, by some historians. It has been known for a long time that there was contact of various sorts between differing groups, and that these contacts occurred on a relatively frequent basis. However, as was seen above, most studies still dwell on the ethnic, linguistic, familial, or national characteristics of diasporas and networks. Nevertheless, some historians have raised questions about the homogeneity of networks' membership, and the degree of inter-cultural exchanges between networks.

Of course, there were always some sort of relations between different groups in the Medieval and Early Modern World. By the late Middle Ages, at least as far as economic contact was concerned, Talmudic prescriptions [on Jewish-gentile contact] were almost completely ignored by Jewish communities in Western Europe, including Iberia. Jewish communities were no longer self-sufficient, and business dealings of all sorts brought Jews and non-Jews into contact. Jews employed Gentiles as servants and as their agents in transferring money, as well as wares and commodities. As Jacob Katz writes, "For a Jew to be

⁵⁵ Daniel Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans . . .*, 159-160

obliged to stay overnight in the house of a Gentile or to eat a meal there was not, perhaps, an everyday occurrence; on the other hand, it was not entirely out of the ordinary. In this way business connections facilitated social contact.”⁵⁶ Furthermore, any disruption in contact with non-Jews could have had major economic repercussions.⁵⁷

As the Middle Ages gave way to the Early Modern period, the relationship between Jew and non-Jew which had prevailed in the Medieval period began to shift. Contacts between Jews and non-Jews increased in frequency and in kind. The sort of contact common in the Middle Ages, which was mostly between merchant and customer or between borrower and lender, began to evolve into a more complex kind of relationship. Jews could now invest their money in various undertakings, which brought them into contact with a greater number of non-Jews. The investment of capital also opened the door for Jews to find new service niches.⁵⁸

It was widely accepted among Jews that international trade was ruled by international practices, and could not always be subject to Jewish religious law.⁵⁹ For instance, Benjamin Arbel, in his study of Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern period, notes that Jews frequently resorted to Venetian courts of law to settle disputes, engaged non-Jews to arbitrate their disputes, used the same financial and commercial instruments as Western merchants, and were involved in shipping and public finance.⁶⁰ These observations would seem to point to the fact that Venetians and Jews operated in the same way, had a common language of communication, and were in constant contact, both on Venetian soil and abroad. According to Arbel, the Jewish merchants in Venice spent the great part of their day outside the Ghetto, in their warehouses at Rialto, at the Rialto banks, in the offices of the Venetian state, on board Venetian vessels, and in all likelihood, in the homes of Venetian citizens and patricians.⁶¹ Even inside the Ghetto, contacts with non-Jews were not infrequent. Arbel’s work centers on the Venetian Jew Hayyim Saruq, who had Venetian, Florentine, Ferrarese and Dalmatian business associates. Saruq also had business connections with Jewish and non-Jewish partners in Constantinople, Ancona and Salò, importing from the Ottoman Empire wool, leather, camlets and alum, conducting credit operations, issuing powers-of-attorney, going to

⁵⁶ Jacob Katz, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 38-39

⁵⁷ Jacob Katz, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance . . .*, 29-30

⁵⁸ Jacob Katz, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance e . . .*, 156

⁵⁹ Aryeh Shmuelevitz, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 129

⁶⁰ Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean*, (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 190-191

⁶¹ Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations . . .*, 190-191

arbitrations, and acquiring bonds of the *Grand Parti* of Lyons, the banking organization that gave credit to the French crown.⁶² It is also significant that Saruq employed a Christian bookkeeper in the Ghetto.⁶³

Arbel believes that the basic nature of international trade is contact between different “worlds.”⁶⁴ The last seems very plausible in view of the presence of the *Marranos*, which blurred to some extent the strong link with Jewish religion, and enabled members of this “modern” cosmopolitan group to feel at home among Jews and Christians alike.⁶⁵ Essentially, then, the practice of commerce is to be in constant contact with others of the same occupation and leads to intercultural exchange.

Raymond Fagel notes the same process when studying Spanish merchants. He writes that, “In order to function properly as an international merchant, one needed furthermore a broader network of merchants from all parts of the European market. On the one hand, these could be members of the kind and city group, but this kind of cohesion was never enough to make a commercial network prosper. The merchant needed to take part in other networks as well. This meant not so much including other merchants of the same nation, for they would have been competitors, but it meant looking for merchants further away.”⁶⁶ This view is shared by David Hancock, who concentrates on the production, circulation, and consumption of Madeira wine in the Early Modern period. Hancock asserts that “important ties that bound people together across imperial boundaries and transformed a collection of independent operatives and operations into a resilient commercial infrastructure.”⁶⁷ Most importantly, Hancock points to the fact that Madeira’s successful trading houses “had to go beyond the base of family, kin, and ethnic relations to more extended personal and business relations.”⁶⁸

Another historian who examines the interactions between different groups in the Early Modern world is Maria Fusaro. She researches commercial networks in the Venetian Mediterranean, with a particular emphasis on the interaction between Greek and English merchants. Her work emphasizes the complex identity of Early Modern merchants. For

⁶² Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations*, . . . 100

⁶³ Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations* . . . , 159

⁶⁴ Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations*, . . . 190-191

⁶⁵ Brian S. Pullan, *The Jews of Europe and the Inquisition of Venice 1550-1670*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 176-177

⁶⁶ Raymond Fagel, “Spanish Merchants in the Low Countries: *Stabilitas Loci* or *Peregrination?*,” *International Trade in the Low Countries (14th-16th Centuries): Merchants, Organisation, Infrastructure*, (Garant: Leuven, 2000), 87-104, 103

⁶⁷ David Hancock, “The Emergence of an Atlantic Network Economy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: The Case of Madeira,” in Diogo Ramada Curto and Anthony Molho, eds., *Commercial Networks in the Early Modern World*, 18-58, 22

⁶⁸ David Hancock, “The Emergence of an Atlantic Network Economy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: The Case of Madeira,” 31

example, Fusaro writes about Anglo-Greek and Greco-Venetian entrepreneurs, whose activities served to bridge linguistic and cultural gaps between groups of merchants in the islands of the Ionian Sea.⁶⁹ She describes the ways in which the different networks of trade collaborated, as well as competed.

Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, like Maria Fusaro, also looks at the heterogeneous nature of networks. He writes that the Portuguese merchants “knit together their networks on a different basis than that posited by neo-classical economic analysis and utilitarian social theory. Interdependence and mutualism defined and created these networks.”⁷⁰ Studnicki-Gizbert believes that the religious affiliation of Portuguese merchants, including the Sephardim, was heterogeneous and fluid, and he makes the important observation that the Portuguese commercial networks included old Christians and those of mixed New and Old Christian ancestry.⁷¹ Since these traders came from a diverse set of cultural, religious, and regional backgrounds, they were not only a heterogeneous group, but also a group that was open to the bridging of geographic and social distance in the formation of their business relationships.⁷² Moreover, adherence to Judaism was not widespread enough to completely under-gird the webs of sociability that bound merchant to merchant.⁷³

Henriette de Bruyn Kops’ recent monograph on the wine and brandy trade between France and the Dutch Republic between 1600 and 1650 underscores the importance of the interconnecting personal networks of Dutch, Sephardic Jewish, and New Christian merchants in Europe. She devotes a whole chapter to the Sephardic role in the trade in spirits.⁷⁴ De Bruyn Kops focuses her study not on Amsterdam, as is the norm for any research touching upon the Sephardim, but, rather, on Rotterdam. She notes that in this city, “the extensive networks of the Dutch and Sephardim . . . were so much intertwined that in many case it is unclear if we are dealing with gentile or Jewish merchants.”⁷⁵ De Bruyn Kops goes on to

⁶⁹ Maria Fusaro, “Commercial Networks of Cooperation in the Venetian Mediterranean: The English and the Greeks, a Case Study,” in Diogo Ramada Curto and Anthony Molho, eds., *Commercial Networks in the Early Modern World*, 121-147. Interestingly, she notes that these groups do not necessarily follow the same pattern in their organization or behavior

⁷⁰ Quoted in Diogo Ramada Curto and Anthony Molho, “Introduction,” *Commercial Networks in the Early Modern World*, 9

⁷¹ Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 71, 73

⁷² Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea*, 68

⁷³ Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea*, 70

⁷⁴ Henriette de Bruyn Kops, *A Spirited Exchange: The Wine and Brandy Trade between France and the Dutch Republic in its Atlantic Framework, 1600-1650*, (Leiden: Brill, 2007), Chapter Five, 244-298

⁷⁵ Henriette de Bruyn Kops, *A Spirited Exchange* . . . , 287

observe that “[there was] a rational, multinational, and above all symbiotic collaboration between Christian, New Christian, and Jewish communities.”⁷⁶

Francesca Trivellato goes beyond the analysis of a specific network or diaspora group and, instead, analyzes cross-cultural merchant networks made up of three different sets of merchants – Jews in Livorno, Italians in Lisbon, and Hindus in Goa in the eighteenth century. She hopes to understand “durable commercial relations” especially among groups who were member of “mercantile communities of different ethnic and religious origins.”⁷⁷ Her analysis leads her to several conclusions about the workings of a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, inter-continental network of private merchants. First, she concludes that, in order to function, such a cross-cultural network “needed to be tightly connected, vast in its geographical breadth, and long-lived.”⁷⁸ Secondly, she concludes, as was the case with the merchants studied by Studnicki-Gizbert, the most important commodity available to the merchants of the network was reputation, a commodity that circulated within the network thanks to the correspondence frequently and regularly exchanged between its members.⁷⁹ Interestingly, she writes that “the adjective ‘cross-cultural’ is itself problematic, because it presumes that more or less clear boundaries between ‘cultures’ can be traced, thus obliterating internal diversity and conflict and assuming fixity over time”⁸⁰ These ideas are an exciting contribution to the study of how groups interacted with one another and formed durable relationships based on trust during a time in which overarching political and judicial institutions could not enforce contracts.

These scholars are not the only ones who have identified the important element of inter-group or inter-cultural trade. Even Daniel Swetschinski, the staunch proponent of the primacy of kinship relations in trade, recognized that no network could operate without “others” included. He writes, “[We cannot] deny the importance of other [non-Sephardic] merchants appearing on the scene, for example the agents and commissioners representing some of the major merchant-banking houses of Lisbon or Antwerp; their relation to their firms was frequently not one of kinship.”⁸¹ He asserts that the interdependence of the entire

⁷⁶ Henriette de Bruyn Kops, *A Spirited Exchange* . . . , 298

⁷⁷ Francesca Trivellato, “Jews of Leghorn, Italians of Lisbon, and Hindus of Goa: Merchant Networks and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period,” in, Diogo Ramada Curto and Anthony Molho, eds., *Commercial Networks in the Early Modern World*, 59-89

⁷⁸ Quoted in Diogo Ramada Curto and Anthony Molho, “Introduction,” 10

⁷⁹ Diogo Ramada Curto and Anthony Molho, “Introduction,” 10

⁸⁰ Quoted in Diogo Ramada Curto and Anthony Molho, “Introduction,” 11

⁸¹ Daniel Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans* . . . , 159-160

Sephardic diaspora cannot be taken for granted and lists some of these non-Sephardic partners for Manoel Rodrigues Vega.⁸²

It is often assumed, as the review of the historiography above has shown, that a sort of familial and kinship conspiracy was formed among Sephardi traders in the Early Modern period.⁸³ Family ties, shared socio-ethnic background, and religion are viewed as the basis of the formation of efficient, successful trade networks during this time.⁸⁴ Jonathan Israel attributes the commercial success of the Sephardim in Early Modern Europe to, “The confidence, trust in trading partners of the same community, and the systematic reduction . . . of transaction costs generated by . . . a religiously and culturally close-knit, international community.”⁸⁵ In this same vein, Daniel Swetschinski wrote of the Sephardim of Amsterdam, “Commerce and kinship appear linked like the chicken and the egg”⁸⁶ And, in fact, Sephardic networks based on kinship were very important for the commercial success of these Sephardic traders, many of whom were scattered along the nodes of the expanding European trading routes.

As the existing literature shows, there is no doubt that the Sephardim between 1595 and 1640 maintained extensive social networks that extended throughout Europe, West Africa, the Americas, and into Asia. They, by and large, practiced endogamous marriage, and formed social, charitable, and religious organizations based upon their religion and ethnicity. Yet, these very real social networks formed within the Sephardic Diaspora were not wholly synonymous with their economic networks, which included non-Sephardic, non-Jewish merchants. In other words, in contrast to what many commentators on trade in the Early

⁸² See Daniel Swetschinski, *The Portuguese Jewish merchants* Volume 2, 736, note 56 for Vega’s contracts with non-Sephardic merchants. However, Swetschinski underestimates the importance of economic relationships with non-Sephardic partners and collaborators.

⁸³ There are numerous books and articles that reinforce this point. To name just a few, see the collection of articles in Jaime Contreras, Bernardo J. García García, and Ignacio Pulido, eds., *Familia, Religión y Negocio: El sefardismo en las relaciones entre el mundo ibérico y los Países Bajos en la Edad Moderna*, (Alcalá: Fundación Carlos Amberes, 2002); Gérard Nahon, “The Portuguese Jewish Nation of Saint-Esprit-Lès Bayonne: The American Dimension,” in Paolo Bernardini and Norman Fiering, eds., *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West, 1450 to 1800*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001), 255-267; and the works of José Gonçalves Salvador, particularly: *Os cristãos-novos e o comércio no Atlântico Meridional (con enfoque nas capitánias do sul 1530-1680)*, (São Paulo: Livraria Pioneira Editora, 1978) and *Os magnatos do tráfico negreiro*.

⁸⁴ The historiography on the importance of familial and religious ties for Early Modern trade networks is enormous. Some of the major works are: Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955); Peter Mathias, “Strategies for Reducing Risk by Entrepreneurs in the Early Modern Period;” Leos Muller, “The Role of the Merchant Network: A Case History of two Swedish Trading Houses, 1650-1800,” in C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, eds., *Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times*, 147-163; Leos Muller, *The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, c. 1640-1800: A Comparative Study of Early Modern Entrepreneurial Behaviour*, (Upsala: Upsala University Press, 1998)

⁸⁵ Jonathan I. Israel, “Introduction,” in Jonathan I. Israel, ed., *Diasporas Within a Diaspora . . .*, 1-39, 2

⁸⁶ Daniel M. Swetschinski, “Kinship and Commerce . . .,” 73

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Modern period assert, the social networks to which the Sephardim belonged were not co-extensive with their economic relationships, as the following chapters will show, especially among the wealthiest group of merchants who did not trade only, or even mainly, with fellow Sephardim.

Heretofore, it has been taken as a given that the Sephardim in the Early Modern period were successful because they were able to engender the trust necessary to work successfully in the unstable trading environment of the Early Modern economy from their family members and those who shared their ethno-religious background. However, such an analysis is based on superficial descriptions of the geographical and genealogical relationships between the Sephardim. Unfortunately, there has been a lack of quantitative investigation into the extent of the economic and social relationships between the Sephardim from 1595 to 1640 that this research seeks to remedy. This study will look at the ways that the “loose ties” the Sephardim had with non-Sephardic merchants were actually as efficient (or, possibly, more efficient) for the conduct of trade than were tightly-knit networks based on shared ethnicity.

Chapter II: Diaspora, Migration, and the Foundations of Inter-cultural Trade

It is important to discuss the history of the Sephardim and their diasporas in order to understand the dynamics of their social and economic relationships.¹ This chapter will do just this, while also placing Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio's economic contacts with the various nodes of the diaspora in context through an overview of the Sephardic diaspora as a whole. The Portuguese (New Christian) diaspora was important for the formation of the identity of Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio. Through the process of being merchants in a diaspora community, they solidified their identities as not just Portuguese, but Portuguese merchants of New Christian ancestry. As successful entrepreneurs in a global context, their identities as global merchants coalesced. Moreover, their wide-ranging dispersion was a means of developing economic contacts and expertise. Often, these economic contacts were with non-Sephardim. Thus, their tightly-knit networks of relations with fellow New Christians became, via the diaspora experience, supplemented by loose ties with non-Sephardic merchants. Hence, diaspora plays an important role economically, not just in terms of identity formation. Therefore, it is important that the general Sephardic diaspora be discussed, as well as exploring the particular backgrounds of Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio.

Theories of Diasporas

Thus far, the terms “network” and “diaspora” have been used interchangeably. While much of what has been written about trade and trading networks, in general, could apply to diasporas and diaspora trading groups, there are some differences between diasporas and trade and trading networks, at least as they are being defined here. A diaspora, drawing on Cohen's definition, is formed by communities living in dispersal who are highly interdependent and who have a shared ethnic, national, and/or religious identity. In contrast, a network is “a collection of actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another.”² This work will utilize the important distinction between “diaspora” and “trade network” made by Francesca Trivelleto. This distinction allows for the study of the ways in which internal

¹ Parts of this chapter have appeared previously in Jessica V. Roitman, “Sephardische Juden im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit,” in K. J. Bade, Pieter C. Emmer, Leo Lucassen, and Jochen Oltmer, eds., *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa. Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2007), 975-981.

² Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, (1998) 24, 57-76, 59.

diaspora solidarities might function in trade relationships, while also acknowledging that trade relationships occurred frequently outside the confines of the diaspora group – relationships that were incorporated in trade networks.³

As the previous pages have shown, the issue of how New Christians identified themselves and how they were identified by the various societies in which they lived was hotly contested in the Early Modern period and continues to be a subject of debate in the modern historiography. In addition, there is a growing body of scholarship which has begun to question the prevailing views of family and friends-based trade in this same period. Only slightly less controversial, at least in the history being written in the past fifty years, is the idea of what, exactly, constitutes a diaspora, how diasporas can or should be studied, and what the role of diasporas were within “host” societies. This debate is of importance to this work because Jews, in general, and the Sephardim, in particular, have traditionally been studied within the context and through the lens of Diaspora, particularly of a Jewish diaspora. Although the debate on the idea of diaspora began in the early 1970s, the past ten years have seen an explosion in scholarship written about the usage, the meaning and the implications of the concept of diaspora.⁴

Traditionally the term diaspora had been used specifically for the Jewish Diaspora after the destruction of the second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE, but had expanded to include groups such as the Armenians or the Huguenots who had been in some way forced into exile or dispersion. These traditional diaspora groups, moreover, were strongly bound together by religion, a bond that came to be implicit in any discussion of diaspora. However, in 1971, Abner Cohen coined the term “trade diaspora” to define “ethnic groups formed by communities living in dispersal and yet highly interdependent, and which defined their membership and spheres of operation in terms of exclusiveness.”⁵ He writes that

A diaspora of this kind is distinct as a type of social grouping in its culture and structure. Its members are culturally distinct from both their society of origin and from the society among which they live. Its organization combines stability of structure but allows a high degree of mobility of personnel . . . It has an informal political organization of its own. .. It tends to be autonomous in its judicial organization . . . its members form a moral community.⁶

³ Francesca Trivellato, *Trading Diasporas and Trading Networks in the Early Modern Period* . . . , 15.

⁴There is far too much literature to be cited here. However, some of the main arguments and debates can be found in the journal *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* and in Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, eds., *Migration, diasporas, and transnationalism*, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999).

⁵ Abner Cohen, “Cultural Strategies in the Organization of Trading Diasporas,” in Claude Meillassoux, ed., *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa: Studies presented and discussed at the Tenth International African Seminar at Fourah Bay College, Freetown, December 1969*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 266-281, 267n1.

⁶ Abner Cohen, “Cultural Strategies in the Organization of Trading Diasporas,” 267n1.

Cohen's terminology stirred up a great deal of debate and discomfort because "diaspora" had traditionally been reserved for the Jewish diaspora with the implication of forced exile."⁷ This is the manner in which the so-called "African Diaspora" composed mostly of slaves and their descendents had also been perceived. Therefore, many commentators preferred to use the terminology "merchant network" since it is devoid of the implicit and explicit connotation of cultural cohesion of "diaspora." And, in fact, according to Cohen's definitions, the term 'trade diaspora' could be applicable to many groups, including, as McCabe points out, the East India Company factors, such as the English in India and the Dutch in Southeast Asia.⁸ Due in part to Cohen's expansion of what constitutes a diaspora, there are now over thirty groups categorized as diasporas.⁹

Cohen's work was drawn upon in the early 1980s by Philip Curtin, who analyzed trading diasporas worldwide from antiquity to the mid-eighteenth century.¹⁰ Curtin incorporated Cohen's conception of trade diasporas as "socially interdependent, but spatially dispersed communities."¹¹ Curtin asserts that diaspora groups "could serve as cross-cultural brokers, helping and encouraging trade between the host society and people of their own origin who moved along the trade routes."¹²

Curtin viewed trade diasporas as historical agents, and this view of trading diasporas as historical agents has served as a catalyst for new historical perspectives. Since Cohen and Curtin, the consideration of diasporas and diaspora trading networks, which were once marginal in academic debates, have come to the fore. In the past, historians focused on "merchant communities" and "foreign nations" within national entities such as the Dutch nation in Bordeaux or the English nation in Antwerp, to name just two examples.¹³ This approach was seen to be a more accurate way to approach the topic, particularly for the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. Moreover, this approach reinforced traditional notions of geographical unity in historical research.¹⁴ However, historians have recently

⁷ Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, "Introduction," xviii.

⁸ Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, "Introduction," xix.

⁹ Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, "Introduction," xviii.

¹⁰ Francesca Trivellato, *Trading Diasporas and Trading Networks in the Early Modern Period*. . . ., 10.

¹¹ Abner Cohen, "Cultural Strategies in the Organization of Trading Diasporas," 2, note 2.

¹² Philip Curtin, *Cross-cultural Trade in World History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2.

¹³ The term "nation" indicated any collective group whose status was legally recognized in the framework of a corporate society and upon which specific rights and limitations were conferred. It also came to be used by the Sephardim to refer to themselves. They often called themselves, and were called, "The Nation" or "The Portuguese Nation" or "Hebrews of the Portuguese Nation" but this is not the use of the term referred in this instance.

¹⁴ For an overview of this topic, see Frédéric Mauro, "Merchant Communities, 1350-1750," in James Tracy, ed., *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 255-286.

begun focusing on the interconnected and trans-national nature of some of these merchant communities such as the Sephardim, but also the Armenians, Indians, Greeks, Huguenots and others.¹⁵ Part of this examination of the role of trans-national and interconnected groups has been the reconsideration of the nation-state as the default model for historical investigation. Moreover, there is a new focus among historians on the role “outsiders” within a society played in the politics of the emerging nation-state.¹⁶

In any discussion of diaspora groups during the Early Modern period, however, these groups are defined, the word “success” appears again and again. What the majority of scholars seem to agree upon is that “trade diasporas,” to use Cohen’s terminology, were commercially successful. This naturally leads historians to question why, exactly, it was that trade diasporas were successful? While there are various permutations in the answers given, three basic themes prevail: Ability to straddle cultural and geographic divides; trust; and religion. These reasons are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and all could be applicable to the Sephardim of Amsterdam.

In fact, Jonathan Israel believes that the Sephardim owed part of their commercial success to their “capacity to span religious and cultural divides as well as continents and oceans, the characteristics which became their chief hallmark during the sixteenth century”¹⁷ The Sephardim were hardly the only group to span cultural divides, however. Greeks and Armenians, as Christians, bridged the gap between the Christian and Islamic worlds.¹⁸ Curtin follows this line of thought in his discussion of cross-cultural brokerage when he discusses

¹⁵ See, for example, Stephen Frederic Dale, *Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600-1750*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); R.C. Nash, “The Huguenot Diaspora and the Development of the Atlantic Economy: Huguenots and the Growth of the South Carolina Economy, 1680-1775,” in Olaf Uwe Janzen, ed., *Merchant Organization and Maritime Trade in the North Atlantic, 1660-1815*, (St. John’s, Newfoundland: International Maritime History Association), 75-105; Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, *The Shah’s Silk for Europe’s Silver: The Eurasian Trade of the Julfa Armenians in Safavid Iran and India (1530-1750)*, (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1999); and Claude Markovits, *The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947: Traders of Sind from Bukhara to Panama*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For a reprint of older essays collected under the rubric of “merchant networks,” see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ed., *Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World*, (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1996).

¹⁶ Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, “Global Ambitions in Diaspora: The Armenians and their Eurasian Silk Trade, 1530-1750,” in *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks*, 27-50. Not only is the role of minority groups in the formation of the nation-state debated, but the very concept of what constitutes a nation-state or, even further, if a nation-state truly exists, is contested. See, for example, Benedict Anderson and Richard O’Gorman, *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, (London: Verso, 2006); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986) to name but a few of the works which grapple with this topic.

¹⁷ Jonathan Israel, “Diasporas Jewish and non-Jewish and the World Maritime Empires,” in *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks*, 3-26,10

¹⁸ V. Kardasis, *Diaspora Merchants in the Black Sea: The Greeks in Southern Russia, 1775-1861*, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001); Michel Aghassian and Keram Kevonian, “The Armenian Merchant Network . . .,” 74-94.

diaspora groups as intermediaries with the language, business, diplomatic and legal skills necessary to handle transactions for a variety of people.¹⁹ While this inter-cultural brokerage element is certainly important, it is also necessary to point out, in the specific case of the Sephardim, that the Dutch merchants with whom they did business did not particularly need the Sephardim as cross-cultural brokers, in the manner in which Curtin defines them. In fact, sometimes the Sephardim used Dutch merchants as their own cross-cultural brokers. For instance, Sephardic merchants would often grant Powers of Attorney to Dutch merchants in other lands, including lands where there are “members” of the Sephardic diaspora in order to negotiate business dealings for them.

In addition to cross-cultural factors, religion and the accompanying culture are also given as reasons for the success of trade diasporas. Much debate has focused on whether intrinsic religious values themselves could be a reason for business success. Most famously, Werner Sombart used Jewish scripture in an attempt to explain Jewish economic success and Max Weber looked to Protestant theology to account for the rise of capitalism. The Christianity of the Armenians is said to be the reason for their economic achievements in the Muslim world. More recently, the philosophies of Confucius have been used to analyze Chinese entrepreneurship. While these views have been largely discredited, what most historians do agree on is that a shared religion, as was mentioned in Chapter I, especially in a diaspora group, helps to provide a basis for the formation of values, coherence, social organization, and legitimating authority among the members of the community. For example, a church or synagogue of a merchant’s fellow countrymen or group in a foreign land would be a place to meet others who shared his background. These places of worship could also be a place to find business and marriage partners from within the community. As Peter Mathias points out, “Minority groups in trade and banking – whether Quakers, Jews, Scots, and all other nationalities – created their own group identities when operating outside their own countries, and when scattered across the globe.”²⁰ Therefore, it is most likely much more the social aspects of religion which helped to establish personal trust than any particular values of a religion, *per se*, which account for that religious group’s economic success.

Diasporas are seen as engendering trust among their members which leads, in turn, to an economic advantage on the part of diaspora group members. Jonathan Israel asserts that the most visible form of this economic advantage is seen in the reduction in transaction costs -

¹⁹ Philip Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*, 182, 197-8.

²⁰ Peter Mathias, “Strategies for Reducing Risk by Entrepreneurs in the Early Modern Period,” 15.

- costs that non-group members would incur.²¹ The combined bonds of family and religious community are believed to have not only minimized transaction costs, but also to have facilitated commercial ventures without the necessity of resorting to judicial or institutional entities, all of which were seen as advantageous to diaspora groups. As Aghassian and Kevonian and other specialists in Armenian commercial history have stressed, what was crucial to their success, as for that of other classic diasporas, was a system of trust supplemented by informal methods of enforcing family, religious and business discipline.²² Basically, then, social ties are vitally important for the study of trade diasporas. The trust engendered by membership in a diaspora group allowed for exchanges to take place despite all the risks inherent in trade in the Early Modern period such as those discussed in Chapter I. Religious and/or local and national affiliations, not to mention kinship, are seen as helping an Early Modern merchant trust a potential partner enough to do business with him.

Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were members of the Sephardic Diaspora, which was a subgroup of the larger Jewish Diaspora but was, as importantly, also a sub-group of the so-called “Portuguese Diaspora” in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Sephardic diaspora members, they transacted business frequently with fellow Sephardim. As part of the larger Portuguese diaspora, they also worked frequently with non-Sephardic “old” Christians, since the Portuguese diaspora was religiously heterogeneous. These business endeavors are not particularly surprising, if what has been written about the efficacy of diasporas is to be believed. But how, then, is it possible to explain the frequent and long-lasting relationships these Sephardic merchants had with Dutch merchants who were in no way, shape, or form part of their diaspora community?

These frequent and long-lasting economic relationships were possible because a diaspora group was not always synonymous with a trade network. As Portuguese New Christian merchants, Bento Osorio, Manoel Carvalho, and Manoel Rodrigues Carvalho belonged to the Portuguese mercantile Diaspora of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. This Portuguese Diaspora was comprised of merchants taking advantage of the expanding European world, in general, and Portugal’s expansion, in particular, to make money. Once the two Iberian crowns were unified in 1580, the Portuguese merchants had unprecedented opportunities in the Spanish colonies, as well.

²¹ Jonathan Israel, “Diasporas Jewish and non-Jewish and the World Maritime Empires,” 9. Unfortunately, Israel offers no concrete examples of this assumed reduction in transactions costs.

²² Michel Aghassian and Keram Kevonian, “The Armenian Merchant Network . . . ,” 74-94.

The emigration from Portugal was not just based on economic motives, however. Some Sephardim fled due to a combination of Inquisitorial pressure and a search for greater religious freedom. Thus, the New Christian's specific ethnic identity within the over-arching Portuguese society filtered down to their diaspora identity, as well. Hence, there was a New Christian sub-group to the Portuguese diaspora with which Osorio, Carvalho, and Rodrigues Vega identified. Though they identified as merchants of the Portuguese Nation of New Christian ancestry, and there was definite group solidarity, their trade networks were not identical to their diaspora group.

Whatever the reason for these merchants' emigration and the formation of their diaspora, though, economic opportunities almost always played an important part in the decision on where to settle. Portugal's economy had begun to slump by the end of the sixteenth century. Meanwhile, opportunities based on colonial trade continued to be attractive, as they had been for the course of the sixteenth century, in Antwerp. More importantly, however, Amsterdam and Hamburg became colonial entrêpôts, a fact that no doubt played an important role in the Sephardic merchants' choice to settle there.

The rest of this chapter will discuss the background of the formation of the initial Sephardic diaspora from Spain. After the initial expulsion from Spain, described below, the Spanish and the Portuguese Sephardim followed different paths, literally and figuratively. They certainly maintained some familial and commercial connections, but were often, though not exclusively, involved in different networks. The Portuguese New Christians developed a very different cultural and religious identity from that of the Sephardim who went to the Ottoman Empire. The dynamics of the Portuguese New Christians' diaspora to North Western Europe will also be examined.

These processes of diaspora and identity formation are important in order to understand the dynamics of the social and economic relationships of the merchants under consideration in this study. The dispersal of not just the specific merchants being studied in this book, but of the Sephardim as a whole, was a means of developing economic contacts and expertise. Often, these economic contacts were with non-Sephardim. Thus, their tightly-knit networks of relations with fellow Sephardim became, via the diaspora experience, supplemented by loose ties with non-Sephardic merchants. Hence, diaspora plays an important role economically, not just in terms of identity formation, though this identity formation is certainly a vital component of the diaspora experience, as well. Therefore, it is important that the general Sephardic diaspora be discussed. As part of this general discussion, Osorio's, Carvalho's, and Rodrigues Vega's relations to the different nodes of the Sephardic

diaspora will be interwoven into the story as a backdrop for the formation of their inter-cultural trading relationships.

General Background

Jews settled in the Iberian Peninsula during antiquity, and were almost certainly present when the Second Temple was still standing in Jerusalem. The Jewish community in Iberia was part of the larger Greco-Roman Jewish milieu for centuries, and was firmly rooted long before large parts of Iberia became Catholic in the sixth century CE. Jews were persecuted under Visigoth rule, as well as during Muslim rule, though there was also relatively peaceful coexistence between Christian, Jewish, and Muslim cultures in Iberia – the much-touted *convivencia*, under Muslim rule, as well. The gradual re-conquest of the Iberian peninsula by Christian rulers heralded outbreaks of violence against Jews and Muslims in the re-conquered territories, such as occurred in Spain in 1391. Portugal, however, had not been the scene of outbreaks of violence against Jews until, in 1449, long after the re-conquest of that country, there was a large-scale attack on the Jewish quarter in Lisbon. Despite this hostility against the Jewish population of Portugal, there is evidence for the growth of Jewish culture during this same period.²³

Expulsion, Conversion and Inquisition

In 1492, Jews were expelled from Castile and Aragon and, relatively soon after, from other Iberian kingdoms such as Navarre in 1498.²⁴ The majority of these initial exiles from Spain migrated along the routes of the Mediterranean, towards North Africa, but especially

²³ For example, there are at least thirty surviving Hebrew manuscripts, many of them illuminated, all made in Lisbon during the last decades of the fifteenth century, and about a dozen printed in Portugal between 1487 and 1495. For more information about the Jews in Portugal, see: M. Kayserling, *História dos Judeus em Portugal*, trans. Gabriele Borchardt Correa da Silva, (São Paulo: Livr. Pioneira, 1971); Joaquim Mendes do Remédios, *Os Judeus em Portugal*, vol. I, (Coimbra: F. França Amado, 1895); Maria José Pimenta Ferro Tavares, *Os Judeus em Portugal no Século XIV*, (Lisbon: Guimarães & Ca, 1970); Maria José Pimenta Ferro Tavares, *Os Judeus em Portugal no Século XV*, (Lisbon: Univ. Nova, Fac. de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, 1981); Academia das Ciências de Lisboa, *Bibliografia Geral Portuguesa*, vol. I, Século XV, (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional de Lisboa, 1941); Artur Anselmo, *Origens da Imprensa em Portugal*, (Lisbon: Imprensa Nac. Casa da Moeda, 1981); Gabrielle Sed-Rajna, *Les manuscrits hébreux de Lisbonne*, (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1970); Thérèse Metzger, *Les manuscrits hébreux copiés et décorés à Lisbonne dans les dernières décennies du XVe siècle*, (Paris: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian and Centro cultural português, 1977); Humberto Carlos Baquero Moreno, “O assalto à Judiaria Grande de Lisboa em Dezembro de 1449,” *Revista de Ciências do Homem da Universidade de Lourenço Marques*, vol. 3, Series A, 1970, 5-51.

²⁴ Benjamin R. Gampel, *The Last Jews on Iberian Soil: Navarrese Jewry 1479/1498*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989)

towards the Italian peninsula and the Ottoman Empire, at the end of the of the fifteenth century and during the early part of the sixteenth century. The vast majority of the Sephardim who remained in the Iberian Peninsula after the Spanish expulsion made the journey on foot to Portugal, where they found refuge upon the payment of a tax. However, a small percentage sailed on small river boats to Portugal, while others walked or sailed via river ways to the Kingdom of Navarre and then later left the Peninsula entirely. In Portugal, the Sephardim joined anywhere from 50,000 – 100,000 of their fellow Portuguese Jews. Little is known of the entry of Spanish exiles into Portugal in 1492. Estimates of the actual numbers of Spanish Jews who migrated to Portugal vary widely – from 30,000 or so on the low end to 120,000 on the high end.²⁵ Portugal and the city-states of the Italian peninsula were the only territories in Western Europe to harbor a large Jewish population after 1492. Of the two, Portugal almost certainly had the larger population – perhaps between 5% and 8% of the total population. Some historians claim that the native Portuguese Jewish communities were disrupted and overwhelmed by the arrival of their Spanish co-religionists.²⁶ This may or may not have been the case, but, under any circumstances, it is difficult to say what such a large influx of immigrants in such a short period of time meant to a country with a total population of somewhat less than one million.²⁷

Only five years later, however, after a decree of expulsion that was never implemented, in March 1497 King Dom. Manoel ordered the forced conversion of all Jews, both the Spanish “newcomers” and the native Portuguese Jews, in Portugal and the seizure of their goods.²⁸ After this decree, the forcible baptism of Jews began. Those Jews who did not flee

²⁵ Abraham Zacuto estimated the total number of Spanish Jewish immigrants to Portugal in 1492 at 120,000. See his, *Sefer Yuhasin*, ed. Herschel Filipowski, (London: Edinburg, 1857), 222a. The figure of 93,000, the most commonly quoted number, is based on the Spanish chronicle of André Bernaldez, cited by João Lúcio d’Azevedo in, *História dos Cristãos-Novos Portugueses*, (Lisbon: Livraria Clássica Editora, 1922), 21. The lowest figure of, “somewhat less than 30,000,” is based on evidence provided by Maria José Pimenta Ferro Tavares, *Os Judeus em Portugal no Século XV*, Chapter 5.

²⁶ According to Kayserling, the Portuguese Jewish communities, consulted by King João II (1481-1495) had opposed the admission of the Spanish Jews. See: M. Kayserling, *História dos Judeus em Portugal*, 97. In several places where the Spanish Jews first settled, separate quarters, synagogues, and cemeteries were created. See Ferro Tavares, *Século XV*, Chapter 5. This separation has led some historians to speculate that the two groups were, at least somewhat, incompatible.

²⁷ João Lúcio d’Azevedo, *Elementos para a História Económica de Portugal (Séculos XII a XVII)*, (Lisbon: INAPA, 1967), 125, 157

²⁸ Tavares, *Século XV*, Chapter 1. The reasoning behind this forced conversion is generally believed to be Manoel’s quest to marry Princess Isabel of Castile, daughter of the Catholic sovereigns, was stipulated that he most first expel all the Jews. Manoel was expected to ascend the Spanish throne were he to marry Isabel, and she did not want the Jews to be free to return to Spain, thereby undoing the expulsion of 1492. Manoel had issued a decree expelling both Jews and Moors (the latter had not been expelled from Spain) in December of 1496, for implementation within ten months. This decree was most likely never meant to be carried out, however. Most historians agree that Manoel wanted to keep the Jews in Portugal and had determined their full integration into a “new” society which would be brought about by the Crown.

were, for the most part, subjected a forced baptism. Therefore, *de facto*, virtually all Jews in Portugal became “New Christians.”²⁹ This term soon came to denote a separate group – a separation that was sometimes reinforced by legal distinctions and sometimes not. An important aspect of the forced conversion, especially in light of the later history of inter-cultural interaction, was Manoel’s policy of forcing “New” and “Old” Christians to intermarry by forbidding marriages between New Christians partners, except through royal dispensation. This policy remained in effect from 1497 to 1507.³⁰ Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, there was a liquidation of the Jewish quarters (*judiarias*) all over Portugal and the mixing of Old and New Christians in these and other quarters, by means of the forced expropriation and exchange of dwellings.³¹ These policies, it should be noted, were not just directed against the Jewish population. For example, the *mourarias* (Moorish quarters), were also liquidated, and the edict of expulsion also officially included the Muslim population.

Though the Jewish religion was declared abolished, all synagogues were closed and expropriated, and the ownership of most Hebrew books was forbidden, religious conformity

²⁹ The citations that follow are drawn from the work of Filipa I. Ribeiro da Silva, *A inquisição em Cabo Verde, Guiné e S. Tomé e Príncipe (1536-1821): contributo para o estudo da política do Santo Ofício nos territórios africanos*, (Lisbon: Univ. Nova de Lisboa, 2002). See H.V. Livermore, *A New History of Portugal*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 134 and Tavares, *Século XV*, “*Conclusão*.” Unfortunately, there are few baptismal or related ecclesiastical records in Portugal until after the Council of Trent in 1563, and none for the fifteenth century, though early Inquisitorial trials of elderly New Christians sometimes provide information. See IAN/TT, IdL, processes 12551, 7777. One important aspect of the forced conversion for the study of specific individuals was that a convert received a new first name and surname. The former was a standard saint’s or Gothic name such as João, Afonso, Pedro, Maria, Catarina, etc. The surname, such as Rodrigues, Nunes, Lopes, etc. most likely was derived from the godfathers who accompanied the converts to the baptismal font. However, in a number of documented cases, well-known Portuguese Jewish last names such as Abravanel, Palacano, and Nahmias continued to be used along with the newly-acquired Christian one well into the sixteenth century. For example, one Amrique Fernandes Abarbanell is documented as farming rents in Lisbon in 1509. See: *Documentos do Arquivo Histórico da Camara Municipal de Lisboa: Livros de Reis*, IV, (Lisbon: Camara Municipal, 1959), 162. Another example would be that of Manoel Mendes Naamias from Beja was named as the Supervisor of Customs (“*feitor de Portos Secos*”) in 1572. See: IAN/TT, IdL process 7549. In a few instances, though, it was the long established hereditary name belonging to the Portuguese nobility. The fifteenth-century compilation of laws known as the *Ordenações Afonsinas* state that, “However those who newly convert to our Holy Faith may take and bear during their lives and pass on to their children only, the family names of any lineages they wish, without any penalty.” Book 5, title 92, section 9, reprinted as, *Ordenações Afonsinas*, Mário Júlio de Almeida Costa and Eduardo Borges Nunes, eds., (Lisbon: Fund. Calouste Gulbenkian, 1984). In Portugal, only the most aristocratic families of the fifteenth century maintained the same last name from one generation to another. Whereas some middle class families began to adopt this custom at the turn of the century, among others, even into the twentieth century, last names varied and often each child of a given couple was given a different surname. See: Iria Gonçalves, “Onomástica pessoal da Lisboa de Quinhentos,” *Boletim Cultural da Junta Distrital de Lisboa*, Second Series, 79-80, 1973-1974, 2-47. Most likely Jews had shared the aristocratic custom of maintaining and transmitting paternally one surname per family. See Tavares, *Século XV*, Chapter IV, however, after the forced conversion, many New Christians gave their children different last names from each other. Many names of towns and some nicknames were also apparently distributed

³⁰ Fernando Filipe Portugal, “O problema judaico no reinado de D. Manuel,” *Armas e Troféus*, 3rd Series, no. 4, 1975, 310-328.

³¹ This aspect of integration, which included the expropriation of Jewish cemeteries which were transformed into pastures, and the removal of the tombstones, which were used for masonry, began to be implemented in 1497, even before the conversion took place. See, Tavares, *Século XV*, “*Conclusão*.”

was not, at first, strictly imposed. Unfortunately, however, there has been no serious investigation into the early religious development of the New Christians. Manoel had decreed that the New Christians would not be persecuted on religious grounds for a period of twenty years, which was later increased to thirty-six years. This time span was designed to allow the entire generation of actual converts to die out and their children, born and raised as Catholics and, in some cases, married to Old Christians, to be completely assimilated and integrated into the “new” Portuguese society.

The current trend in scholarship maintains that there was very little concerted attempt to transmit or perpetuate Jewish traditions during the thirty years of relative liberty of conscience. It is clear from the verifiably authentic documentation available that the great majority of the New Christians, for practical reasons, if for no other, did not wish to revert, at least openly, to Judaism. For example, had the Vatican officially nullified the forced conversion and offered all New Christians who had undergone it the option of returning to their past status, it would have meant the recreation of medieval conditions and the withdrawal of its social and political equality, tenuous though that might have been.³²

New Christians also retained the option of leaving the country. Manoel’s decree of 1507, which was, in part, a reply to the Lisbon massacre of New Christians (as well as some Moors) which took place in April of 1506, is notable for its relative tolerance. It granted all Portuguese full permission to leave the country temporarily or permanently, the right to trade on land or sea, sell property, and freely export money or merchandise to Christian countries. Furthermore, the King promised never to promulgate exceptional legislation for New Christians living Portugal, granted émigrés the right to return without fear of punishment, and made the laws of the realm in their entirety applicable to New Christians.³³ Those New Christians wishing to revert to Judaism left Portugal – an alternative which was, as has been seen above, given to them, since they were free to adopt or re-adopt Judaism elsewhere – but of which very few New Christians availed themselves between 1507 and the late 1530s.³⁴ Judaism had largely vanished from Portugal, but the New Christians, chiefly because of this very designation, retained a corporate identity as Portuguese of New Christians, and an individual identity that could have ranged from devout Catholicism to crypto-Judaism. Those

³² Individual briefs of annulment of the forced baptism were in fact granted by the Vatican. See the letter from Pope Clement VII dated May 20, 1530 to Diogo Pires in, Marino Sanuto, *I Diarii di Marino Sanuto*, (Venice: Stabilimento Visentini av. Federico, 1879-1903), 54, 148.

³³ Decree of March 1, 1507, printed by royal command on May 25, 1773, when it was renewed and all contrary legislation ruled null and void. It was reproduced by Y.H. Yerushalmi in, *The Lisbon Massacre of 1506 and the Royal Image in the Sebet Yehudah*, (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, 1976), 87-89.

³⁴ Ellis Rivkin, *The Shaping of Jewish History*, 140-158.

Portuguese New Christians who were merchants, and many, perhaps most, were, also incorporated a mercantile identity.

Early sixteenth century Portugal offered its New Christian subjects economic and cultural opportunities, without a concomitant Inquisition. As in Spain a century earlier, these opportunities were seized upon by thousands who were no longer constrained by the legal, cultural, and religious restriction that had kept them an ethnic group apart when they were Jews.³⁵ As in Spain, some New Christians occupied prominent positions in the royal administration, while others penetrated the ranks of the middle and upper classes and the clergy. In contrast, though, with late fourteenth century Spanish *conversos*, they found the upper levels of the Church hierarchy closed to them.³⁶

In 1536, King João III (1521-1557) obtained Papal consent for the establishment of an Inquisition in his domains. The New Christians of Portugal were apparently well-integrated into the surrounding society. Moreover, there is no evidence of any large-scale continued practice of Judaism. Crypto-Judaism was almost certainly practiced, but the extent to which it was practiced remains debated. Therefore, João's reasoning for seeking an Inquisition tribunal on Portuguese soil is not altogether clear to scholars. Be that as it may, the first formal *auto-de-fé* was held in 1540 in Lisbon. At an *auto-de-fé* held in Lisbon in 1544, twenty people were executed, which was an all-time record. By the mid-sixteenth century, the tribunals of Lisbon, Évora, Porto, Coimbra, and Goa were in full operation. These three tribunals, except for a brief period of suspended animation from 1674 to 1682, held sway for almost three centuries.

Therefore, Portuguese New Christians began to seek refuge from persecution outside Portugal. Though inquisitorial prosecution was not an explicit order of expulsion, its consequences, such as confiscation of property (inconsistently applied until around 1600), social stigmatization, imprisonment, and the threat of the death penalty, made life in Portugal difficult. Emigration followed the introduction of the Inquisition to Portugal and every new *auto-de-fé* sent new groups of émigrés out of Iberia and towards Western Europe.

³⁵ Benzion Netanyahu, *The Marranos of Spain*

³⁶ Nevertheless, the label, "New Christian" was not applied to converted families of the favored and privileged elite, whose descendants were, thus, theoretically (and often practically) exempt from Inquisitorial persecution. See, Tavares, *Século XV*.

Diaspora

The first large-scale Sephardic migration occurred during the latter part of the fourteenth century, when persecution of Jews in Spain began to intensify. This Sephardic migration then increased exponentially, as was seen above, after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492. This Diaspora was mainly to the Ottoman Empire, while the latter Diaspora from Portugal was focused on Northwestern Europe and Portugal and Spain's overseas colonies. This, in turn, meant that there were actually two separate Sephardic Diasporas – an Oriental and an Occidental one -- that were distinct in impetus, chronology, geography, and patterns of integration and assimilation.

The majority of the initial exiles from Spain and Portugal, as has been seen above, migrated along the Mediterranean, towards North Africa, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire, at the end of the of the fifteenth and early part of the sixteenth century. The Jews of this Oriental Diaspora retained their distinct ethnic and religious identity, including their language and culture, until the destruction of their communities in the twentieth century.³⁷ In contrast to the Oriental Diaspora, the Occidental Diaspora occurred from the end of the sixteenth century, and lasted throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

In spite of these differences, and in spite of the fact that it is the Occidental Diaspora to which Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio belonged, it is important to at least review the background of the Oriental Diaspora. A general understanding of the entirety of the Sephardic diaspora is important for contextualizing both the Sephardic settlement in Amsterdam, in general, and the economic and social behaviors of Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio, specifically. In addition, there were some connections between these two diasporas, which can be seen in the economic relationships of Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio. However, these economic connections were slight, which calls into question the idea of an overarching unity of the Sephardic diaspora, especially economically.

³⁷ Information about the Sephardic Diaspora can be found in the following works: Haim Beinart, "La Diaspora Sefardi en Europa y Especialmente en la Cuenca del Mediterraneo," in *Judios y Cristianos en la Cuenca Mediterránea: Hispania Sacra*, 40 (1988), 911-931; Avigador Levy, *The Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*, (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1992); Jonathan Israel, "Venice, Salonika and the Founding of the Sephardi Diaspora in the North (1574-1621)," *Diasporas Within a Diaspora*, 67-96

The Oriental Diaspora: The Ottoman Domains and North Africa

The immigration of Sephardim to the Ottoman Empire began before 1492, though most of this immigration took place between 1492 and 1512, when Portugal, Navarre, and several Italian States expelled or became increasingly oppressive to their Jewish populations.³⁸ During the beginning phase of immigration, most of the Sephardim settled in Istanbul, Edirne, and Salonika, concentrating in the port cities of the southern Balkans and western Anatolia. By the 1520s and 1530s, Sephardic communities had been founded in towns and cities that had previously had a minor or non-existent Jewish presence.

Ottoman rule, which was characterized by the institutionalization of the administrative and legal systems, aided the material and cultural development of the Sephardim. They were free to travel within the Ottoman domains, which allowed for the emergence of Jewish commercial networks, both within the Empire itself, as well as with Europe, Iran, and India. Although non-Muslims paid higher taxes, were required to wear distinctive clothing, and were obliged to outwardly accept the superiority of Islam and Muslims, Ottoman Jewry became the hub of the Sephardic Diaspora because the Ottoman Empire was relatively tolerant of religious minorities. They recognized their right to their own religious beliefs, and their right to autonomy in their internal affairs. In addition to the freedom of religion and the autonomy to organize their community, the Sephardim could live where they wanted to, were permitted to work in almost every profession, and were allowed to travel whenever and wherever they chose.

Although the various religious and ethnic groups existed peaceably side-by-side, and had business dealings with members of other groups, there were tensions between the different communities and sporadic outbreaks of violence between these groups were not unheard of. Moreover, there was little social and cultural interaction among the various communities. Though all these religious and ethnic groups, including the Sephardim, contributed to the amalgamation of cultures and religions that comprised the Ottoman cultural milieu, it was difficult to move from membership in one group to affiliation with another, and there is little evidence of inter-marriage between Jews and non-Jews, nor of religious conversion.

³⁸ Benjamen Gampel, *Crisis and creativity in the Sephardic World: 1391-1648*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Jonathan Israel, *Diasporas within a Diaspora*; Yosef Kaplan, *An alternative path to modernity*, and Yosef Kaplan, "The Formation of the Western Sephardi Diaspora," in Haham Gaon, ed., *The Sephardic Journey: 1492-1992*, (New York: Yeshiva University, 1992), 136-155 and Avigador Levy, *The Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*

The Sephardim became an active and integral part of Ottoman society, both economically and socially. However, the segregated nature of Ottoman society, while allowing for peaceful business and social interactions, kept each group in their individual place. Within Ottoman Jewish society, however, the Sephardim predominated, and other Jewish groups within the empire adopted their culture. The Sephardim numerically overwhelmed the local Jews. Most of the well-respected rabbis and scholars in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were Sephardim. The Sephardic population was bolstered throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by a constant flow of immigration. This steady stream of new immigrants helped the Sephardim to attain an influential economic position within the Jewish community. The non-Sephardic Jews adopted Sephardic religious and judicial practices. This adoption of Sephardic custom in the ritual and legal spheres was due, in part, to the higher socio-economic level of the Sephardim. However, it also stemmed from the large number of Sephardic rabbis, who dominated both numerically and in terms of learning and experience.

Connections between the Ottoman Empire and the Sephardim of Amsterdam clearly existed, though Ottoman cities certainly played nowhere near the important role in trade for the Amsterdam Sephardim that the Iberian, Baltic, and colonial trades did. In addition, there is little evidence of strong links with fellow Sephardic merchants in the Ottoman domains. For instance, merchants such as Bento Osorio were listed as importers and exporters for the Levant Company. Out of 430 listed importers and exporters, there were 23 Amsterdam Sephardim, including Osorio.³⁹ This company had been established to regulate commerce and collectively pay for the defense and protection of shipping. The Levant Company was run by Dutch Christian merchants, many of whom did business with Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam. These Dutch business associates were major participants, or directors, of the “Directors of the Commerce on the Levant” which was not a trading company *per se*, but, rather, an institution for the organization of convoys for the protection of ships sailing to the Mediterranean. The board of directors was comprised of merchants involved in the Levant

³⁹ Herbert Bloom, *The economic activities of the Jews of Amsterdam in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*, (Williamsport, Pa.: Bayard Press, 1937). These merchants were: Raphael Abandana, Ruy Gomes Barbosa, Duarte Palation, Manuel Benevista, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, Duarto Dias, Manuel Faro, Francisco Feronio, Lopo Hamirus, Manuel Dias de Pas, Daniel Pinto, Manuel Dias Henriques, Menasseh ben Lopo Hamirus, Manuel Dias de Pas, Daniel Pinto, Manuel Dias Henriques, Menasseh ben Israel, Manuel Mendos, Joseph de los Rios, Diego Rodrigos, Jeronimo de Sousa, Symon de Sousa, David de Spinosa, Juda Toro, Salvador Rodrigos, Francisco Vaes de Castro

and who had interests in the Mediterranean trade.⁴⁰ Many of these merchants also had economic relationships with Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam. For example, Albert Schuyt, one of the first directors of the “Levant Company” and the long-time associate of Manoel Carvalho, insured a ship for Diogo Nunes Belmonte sailing from the Guinea Coast of West Africa to Livorno, another ship from Constantinople to Venice, and a third ship from Lisbon to Bahia,⁴¹ as well as having many other transactions with Sephardim, mostly, but not entirely, related to the African and Mediterranean trade.⁴²

Indeed, even before the initiation of the “Directors of the Commerce on the Levant,” Volckert Overlander, who operated from time-to-time with Osorio in the Baltic, was one of the founders of Dutch trade in the Ottoman domains, in 1610 or thereabouts.⁴³ He may have been influential in introducing other Dutch merchants who are mentioned with Overlander in numerous documents regarding the Levant to trade in this region to this trade.⁴⁴ Several of these men wrote a letter to the States General to complain of a ship that had been attacked in 1600, showing that they were partners or formed a sort of rough “company” which later formed the basis of the Directors of the Commerce on the Levant.⁴⁵

Many of the merchants who were important in the Levant trade were also active business partners of Sephardic merchants in the Netherlands. Francois Boudewijn insured shipments for Diogo Nunes Belmonte from Brazil to Portugal and from Constantinople to Venice;⁴⁶ for Mathias Rodrigues concerning shipments to Venice;⁴⁷ for Pascoal Lopes (also with Schuyt);⁴⁸ and for Jeronimo da Sousa for figs from Portugal.⁴⁹ Many of the other merchants named with Overlander in the documents regarding the Levant trade (Gaspar van Ceulen,⁵⁰ Gijsbert Theulincx,⁵¹ Guglielmo Bartoletti,⁵² Jaspas Quingetti,⁵³ Abraham de Linge,

⁴⁰ M.C. Engels, *Merchants, Interlopers, Seamen and Corsairs: The ‘Flemish’ Community in Livorno and Genoa (1615-1635)*, (Hilversum: Verloren, 1997), 59

⁴¹ GAA, NA 258/83; NA 254/301; NA 254/209, respectively

⁴² These Sephardim were: Pascoal Lopes and Diogo Gomes Duarte; Jaime Lopes da Costa and Francisco Lopes; Belchior and Francisco Mendes; Gaspar Rodrigues Nunes and Francisco da Costa Brandão; Gaspar and Manuel Lopes Homem; Juan Goncales. See, GAA, NA 258/82; GAA, NA 113/6v-7v; GAA, NA 253/35v; GAA, NA 378a/339; GAA, NA 425/182v; GAA, NA 258/84; NA 258/83v

⁴³ Klaas Heeringa, *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel*, VI. I, (’s Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1910), (hereafter RGP 9) 154, 424, 429

⁴⁴ RGP 9, 437.

⁴⁵ RGP 9, 32-33. See also, M.C. Engels, *Merchants, Interlopers, Seamen*, 61-62 for a list of the Directors of the Commerce on the Levant.

⁴⁶ GAA, NA 376/180-180v; NA 254/301

⁴⁷ GAA, NA 378a/293

⁴⁸ GAA, NA 258/82

⁴⁹ GAA, NA 377a/114

⁵⁰ GAA, NA 378a/293; NA 114/57v—61; NA 130/147

⁵¹ GAA, NA 378a/293

⁵² GAA, NA 254/108v

Frans Hinlopen⁵⁴ and Salomon Voerknecht,⁵⁵ Overlander's brother-in-law,) follow a similar pattern and had numerous dealings with Sephardic merchants. But the Sephardim do not appear to be participating in the company, or at least as named share-holders. This could be an indication that the Levant trade is not of great importance for the Sephardim, although it could also point to some regulation that prevented official Sephardic participation.

In addition to these, rather distant, connections between the Ottoman Empire and the Sephardic settlement in Amsterdam, Manoel Carvalho drew up at least three freight contracts for ships that had the option of putting into Alexandria, and Ottoman port, but no Sephardic factor is named.⁵⁶ Interestingly, however, there is no surviving documentation attesting to contacts with Sephardic merchants in the Ottoman domains, which does call into question the actual importance of trading associates from a Sephardic background for the Amsterdam Sephardim, at least in the Ottoman domains.

North Africa

North Africa was more connected to the Sephardic settlement in Amsterdam than were the Sephardic communities in the Ottoman Empire. The importance of North Africa and the Barbary Coast increased for the Amsterdam Portuguese after the end of the Twelve Years' Truce and grew throughout the 1620s and 1630s. Therefore, if it was critical to discuss the Sephardim in the Ottoman domains for contextualization, then it is even more important to review the Sephardim in North Africa.

In North Africa, the Sephardim settled in domains under Portuguese rule such as Ceuta, as well as in the independent Kingdom of Morocco and in the Corsair Republics. For example, Salé was a pirate republic along the Barbary Coast, which was the home of a large number of *moriscos* (those of Muslim descent who had lived in Spain) who had been expelled from Spain after 1609. Salé maintained relations with Amsterdam and other cities in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century. The Sephardim of the Low Countries were especially prominent in the Salé-Netherlands route. For example, Duarte and Gaspar Fernandes Vega, brothers of Manoel Rodrigues Vega, issued a power of attorney to Paulus Isaacqz and N.N. Court, merchants of Middelburg, and Cornelis Cornelisz., a Dutch merchant in Salé, to

⁵³ GAA, NA 86/165-166; NA 97/66-66v; NA 111/167-167v; NA 113/119-120; NA 122/94v-95; NA 120/190v-191; NA 126/83-85; NA 197/171v-172; NA 343/85v-86v; NA 196/282v-283; NA 123/7v; NA 62/223; NA 62/464; NA 94/92-92v; NA 123/87v-88; NA 123/88-88v; NA 123/97v-98.

⁵⁴ GAA, NA 127/195; NA 378a/293; NA 378/317

⁵⁵ GAA, NA 106/148v-149; NA 209/7v; NA 645/43v-44; NA 258/82-83; NA 611a/127

⁵⁶ GAA, NA 141/142v; NA 144/151v-153v; NA 149/198-198v

arrange payment for a shipment of haring in Salé.⁵⁷ There they maintained connections with Spain, Portugal, and the United Provinces.⁵⁸

The population of Sephardim in the Spanish and Portuguese forts and cities grew during the late sixteenth to the mid seventeenth century (the Jews were expelled from Oran, for example, in 1669). For instance, in Mazagán, the Jewish population was a sizeable percentage of the total number of around 2,000 people. In 1621, Manoel Carvalho, for example, used his factor in Tunis to conduct trade with Venice.⁵⁹ However, even before the Twelve Years' Truce, North Africa played a role in the trade of the Sephardim. For instance, from 1616 through 1618, Manoel Carvalho sent ships from Amsterdam along the coast of North Africa, and stops in North African ports seem to have been a standard part of his Mediterranean route.⁶⁰ Likewise, Bento Osorio also engaged in trade with the North African ports. For instance, in 1617, he sent a cargo of wheat from Amsterdam to Tangiers, and another load of wheat and wood from Norway to Ceuta.⁶¹ These shipments were only two of many others that Osorio made to North Africa during this time, which included not only the afore-mentioned wheat and wood, but also salt.⁶² Moreover, Osorio's shipments to North Africa continued even after the end of the Twelve Years Truce.⁶³ Interestingly, however, very few of these contracts mention a Sephardic factor or associate in these places. That does not mean that there was not a factor or associate, whether Sephardic or of another background. However, the consistent failure to mention Sephardic associates on "the other end" of the trade route does raise some questions about the extent to which other Sephardim were involved.

Privateers based along the North African coast bought textiles, food, ammunition, and shipbuilding materials. They paid for these goods with the proceeds of their privateering on Atlantic and Mediterranean shipping.⁶⁴ These privateers often enslaved the sailors they captured from these ships, and the Sephardim of Amsterdam were active as intermediaries in

⁵⁷ Gemeente Archief Rotterdam, Oud Notarieel Archief Rotterdam, henceforth GAR/ONA, 38, 34/92.

⁵⁸ Jonathan Israel, "The Jews of Spanish North Africa (1580-1669)," *Diasporas Within a Diaspora*, 151-184 and Jonathan Israel, "Piracy, Trade and Religion: The Jewish Role in the Rise of the Muslim Corsair Republic of Saleh (1624-1666)," in *Diasporas Within a Diaspora*, 291-311.

⁵⁹ GAA, NA 628/351-353

⁶⁰ GAA, NA 149/198-198v, NA 144/151v-153v, NA 379/628

⁶¹ GAA, NA 200/99-99v; NA 109/143-144v

⁶² GAA, NA 109/143-144v; NA 109/148-149v; NA 109/149v-150; NA 109/152v-153; NA 109/152v; NA 109/201v-202v; NA 109/372v-373; NA 151/209v; NA 151/209v-210; NA 109/221v-223; NA 151/209v; NA 625/75-77; NA 154/129v-130; NA 645/247-248; NA 200/99-99v; NA 625/114-116; NA 645/1047-1049; SR 1582

⁶³ GAA, NA 646a/128

⁶⁴ Daniel Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 113-114; H.Z. Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa*, 2 Volumes, (Leiden: Brill, 1974-1981)

ransoming these Dutch sailors enslaved in North Africa, as it was often more profitable to ransom these sailors back to their families than to sell them into slavery.⁶⁵ The price for a sailor usually ran about 400 guilders per person.⁶⁶ The money could be collected from the family directed and then sent through a Sephardic intermediary, or could also have been raised from a variety of persons who would then, presumably, be repaid by the families of the sailors.

The Occidental diaspora

The emigration from the Iberian Peninsula, particularly Portugal, was to Northern Europe, from the latter part of the sixteenth century, and was comprised of *conversos* or “New Christians.” These Sephardim fled due to a combination of Inquisitorial pressure, a search for greater religious freedom, and economic opportunities. Portugal’s economy had begun to slump by the end of the sixteenth century. Meanwhile, opportunities based on colonial trade continued to be attractive, as they had been for the course of the sixteenth century, in Antwerp. The Sephardim of the Occidental Diaspora blended into the cultural milieu of Enlightenment Europe and largely disappeared as a visible ethnic and religious minority in Western Europe by the nineteenth century.⁶⁷

Until well into the eighteenth century the “push” of persecution and the “pull” of economic opportunity as causes of New Christian emigration ran side by side. New Christians left Portugal and, to a smaller extent, Spain, and went to Northwestern Europe, especially the

⁶⁵ See, for example, GAA, NA 1557a/87, 91, 95, 99, 101, 103, 109, 113, 115, 117, 119, 123, 127, 129, 133, 151; NA 1089/111

⁶⁶ GAA, NA 646b/1250-1, cited in Jonathan Israel, “Crypto-Judaism in 17th-Century France,” in *Diasporas within a Diaspora*, 245-268, 264.

⁶⁷ On the assimilation of the Sephardim of the Occidental Diaspora, see, for example, Todd Endelman’s, *Radical Assimilation in Anglo-Jewish History, 1656-1945*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) which deals with England. The causes and extent of assimilation within the British context are hotly debated. David Cesarani and William Rubinstein disagree with Endelman’s conclusions. See, respectively, William D. Rubinstein, *A History of the Jews in the English-Speaking World*, (Great Britain: Basingstoke, 1996), and David Cesarani, “British Jews,” in Rainer Liedtke and Stephan Wendehorst, eds., *The Emancipation of Catholics, Jews and Protestants: Minorities and the Nation State in 19th Century Europe*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 33-55. The dynamics of Sephardic assimilation in other Western European countries, especially the Netherlands, Germany, and France, were the result of a declining population vis-à-vis the Ashkenazi Jews as well as the pressures to assimilate coming from the surrounding society. See Yosef Kaplan, “Wayward New Christians and Stubborn New Jews: The Shaping of a Jewish Identity,” *Jewish History* 8 (1994) {The Robert Cohen Memorial Volume}, 27-41 and “Amsterdam and Ashkenazi Migration in the Seventeenth Century,” *Studia Rosenthaliana* 23, no. 2 (Fall 1989): 22–44 (special issue containing Proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium on the History of the Jews in the Netherlands). The Ashkenazi had a small presence in Amsterdam earlier in the century, but these numbers began to expand rapidly with the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) and East European oppression between 1648 and 1660. Although difficult to ascertain, Kaplan believes the Ashkenazi numbered “no less than 500” in the 1640s.

cities of Amsterdam, Hamburg, London, and a few smaller French towns on the border with Spain. This Diaspora would last from the beginnings of the Portuguese Inquisition in 1536 until nearly two hundred years later, but reached its height in the seventeenth century. The migration reached its highest point numerically in the seventeenth century due to increased inquisitorial pressure in Portugal, as well as the growth of economic opportunities based on the expansion of Europeans to the Americas and the East and West Indies.⁶⁸ The number of these émigrés varied from decade to decade, but the exodus never entirely ceased. It is nearly impossible, however, to estimate the number of Sephardim who went to the Northern European countries, as the Diaspora occurred over nearly 200 years and many Sephardim settled at various times in various locations. For instance, there were approximately 500 Sephardim in Amsterdam by 1612, and that number had grown to around 1,000 in 1620. In 1672, there were nearly 2,500 Sephardim in Amsterdam.⁶⁹ Recent scholarship has revised the number of Sephardim in Amsterdam by the very end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries upwards to 4,000 – 5,000 people.⁷⁰

What further distinguishes the Sephardim who went to Northwestern Europe was the fact that they knew little about their Jewish heritage since they and their families had lived as Christians for, in some cases, five or more generations.⁷¹ Therefore, they were accustomed to mixing with, and living as, non-Jews, an important fact to keep in mind as this story develops. In fact, in many ways the Sephardim of early-modern Western Europe were not particularly different from their Christian neighbors, which may have aided in the development of their inter-cultural economic relationships described in the following chapters.

Northwestern Europe

“The Low Countries” – Antwerp and Amsterdam

It is the Low Countries, especially the United Provinces, which form the central axis of this story.⁷² The Sephardim went to the Hapsburg Netherlands in the mid-to-late sixteenth

⁶⁸ Yosef Kaplan, “The Formation of the Western Sephardic Diaspora” 136-155

⁶⁹ Yosef Kaplan, “The Formation of the Western Sephardic Diaspora” 143.

⁷⁰ Hubert P.H. Nusteling, “The Jews in the Republic of the United Provinces: Origin, Numbers and Dispersion,” in Jonathan Israel and Reinier Salverda, eds., *Dutch Jewry: Its History and Secular Culture (1500-2000)*, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 43-62, 56

⁷¹ Yosef Kaplan, “The Formation of the Western Sephardic Diaspora”

⁷² There is a vast amount of literature about the Sephardim in the Low Countries. The seminal work on the Sephardim in Antwerp remains Hans Pohl’s *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567-1648)*. Eddy Stols’ *De Spaanse Brabanders, of de handelsbetrekkingen der Zuidelijke Nederlanden met de Iberische wereld, 1598-*

century, particularly to Antwerp, due to its central role in the handling and distribution of Portuguese and Spanish colonial products. By 1570, there were around 400 New Christians living in Antwerp.⁷³ Manoel Rodrigues Vega, for example, was most likely born in Antwerp in 1575,⁷⁴ the son of Luis Fernandes (1542-1602)⁷⁵ and Leonora Rodrigues Vega, who had settled in Antwerp around 1572.⁷⁶ Vega's father, Luis Fernandes, was a sugar and spice importer and served as consul of the Portuguese nation of Antwerp in 1583 and every fourth year thereafter until his death.⁷⁷

However, the rebellion of the seven northern provinces of The Netherlands against the Spanish made possible openly Jewish settlement in the northern Netherlands, which had been closed to Jews. When Antwerp fell to the Spanish in 1585, immigrants, including New Christians, fled to the Northern provinces. Many Protestant immigrants fled for reasons of religious freedom. However, many of these immigrants, both Protestants and the Portuguese New Christians, came to the Dutch Republic, particularly Amsterdam, for the economic opportunities offered by this city.⁷⁸ The immigration of Sephardim into the Dutch Republic began, then, in the mid-1580s and was at its height during the mid-seventeenth century. By 1672, the formative period was over and the Dutch Sephardic community was close to its height.

There were several Sephardic merchants who settled in Amsterdam with their families during the mid-1590s before the arrival of the first group of immigrants who came directly from Portugal via ships in 1597. Manoel Rodrigues Vega, for example, settled in Amsterdam about 1595.⁷⁹ On 31 March 1597, Manuel Rodrigues was the first Portuguese merchant to

1648, (Brussels: Palais der Academiën, 1971) is also highly informative. The literature on the Sephardim in the Dutch Republic will be covered throughout the rest of this work, so will not be footnoted here.

⁷³ Yosef Kaplan, "The Formation of . . .," 140

⁷⁴ Jacob Zwarts, "De eerste rabbijnen," 152, note

⁷⁵ Hans Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567-1648)*, 91

⁷⁶ V. Vázquez de Prade, *Lettres marchandes d'Anvers*, VI. I: Introduction, (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960), 214

⁷⁷ H. Pohl, , *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567-1648)*. 91

⁷⁸ There is a lively debate in Dutch historiography about the cause and effect of this immigration. Cle Lesger believes that the knowledge and capital the immigrants from Antwerp brought with them contributed substantially to the rise in economic importance of Amsterdam. See, for example, his *Handel in Amsterdam ten tijde van de Opstand: Kooplieden, commerciële expansie en verandering in de ruimtelijke economie van de Nederlanden ca. 1550-ca. 1630*, (Hilversum: Verloren, 2001). Oscar Gelderblom, in contrast, believes that the majority of immigrants from Antwerp were at the start of their careers and made their fortunes in Amsterdam. See his *Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden en de opkomst van de Amsterdamse stapelmarkt (1578-1630)* , (Hilversum: Verloren, 2000).

⁷⁹ 1595 is the first year that he appears in the notarial archives in Amsterdam. The date of Vega's actual arrival in Amsterdam is a matter of some dispute. Izak Prins speculated that Vega may have been in Amsterdam as early as 1591, based on a remark made by a Dutch agent in London. See Izak Prins, *De Vestiging der Marranen*, 161, n. 7. Daniel Swetschinski disagrees that Vega would have been in Amsterdam this early. See Daniel M. Swetschinski, *The Portuguese Jewish Merchants*, 733, n. 28

become a *poorter* [designation meaning, essentially, a citizen of the city] of Amsterdam.⁸⁰

Vega most likely came to Amsterdam to exploit the new commercial opportunities available there. As the son of a prominent and, it can most likely be assumed, wealthy, family, he was, in one sense, hardly commercially marginal. The relative wealth and prominence of his family meant that he had, at the very least, the expertise to enter the commercial elite of the new city. It was not just Rodrigues Vega who would come to Amsterdam, however.

In 1612, there were nearly 500 Sephardim in Amsterdam. Smaller numbers of Sephardim lived in other cities such as Rotterdam and Middelburg. Around 1606 or so, Rodrigues Vega seems to have moved to Rotterdam, though most of his business enterprises continued to be conducted out of Amsterdam. A great migration to the city occurred during the armistice between Spain and Holland from 1609 to 1620. The waves of New Christian immigration grew stronger from the end of the 1640s and throughout the 1650s. Eventually, the Sephardic community declined due to the large increase in the Ashkenazi population of Amsterdam, but is the period of initial Sephardic settlement and ascendancy in Amsterdam that forms the backdrop of this work.⁸¹

While many immigrants arrived directly from Portugal, there is evidence that a substantial number came from Sephardic communities in Germany, Italy, France, Brazil, and as far a field as Angola. Manoel Carvalho, for instance, came to Amsterdam from Brazil and was at least actively involved in the trade in Amsterdam by 1602.⁸² Bento Osorio was, like Vega and Carvalho, a migrant and an immigrant to the city of Amsterdam. Osorio is mentioned for the first time in Amsterdam in 1610.⁸³ At that time he was already about 50 years old, meaning that he would have been born in 1560.⁸⁴ It is likely that he came from Lisbon, like so many of the Sephardic immigrants to Amsterdam, because one of his

⁸⁰ Izak Prins, *De Vestiging der Marranen in Noord-Nederland*, 176

⁸¹ There is an enormous amount of literature available about the settlement of the Sephardim in the Northern Netherlands. A good general introduction is to be found in J.C.H. Blom, R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld, and I. Schöffer, eds., *Geschiedenis van de Joden in Nederland*, (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995). Some of the major works are as follows: Daniel Swetschinski, *The Portuguese Jewish Merchants of Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam*. This work was later revised and published as, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*; Miriam Bodian, *Hebrews of the Portuguese Nation*; R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld, *De Sefardim in Amsterdam tot 1795. Aspecten van een joods minderheid in een Hollands stad*, (Hilversum: Wilp, 1989); Yosef Kaplan, "The Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam: from forced conversion to a return to Judaism," *Studia Rosenthaliana*, 15(1981), 37-51; and Herman P. Salomon, *Os Primeiros Portugueses de Amsterdão. Documentos do Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, 1595-1606*, (Braga: Barbosa & Xavier, 1983). Earlier works include, Joaquim Mendes dos Remedios, *Os Judeus Portugueses em Amsterdam*, (Coimbra: F. França Amado, 1911); J.S. da Silva Rosa, *Geschiedenis der Portuguesesche Joden te Amsterdam, 1593-1925*, (Amsterdam: M. Hertzberger, 1925); Izak Prins, *De vestiging der Marranen in Noord-Nederland*; and W. Chrs. Pieterse, *Daniel Levi de Barrios*.

⁸² Carvalho appears in the Dutch archives in 1602 as one of the owners of a confiscated cargo of sugar belonging to a group of Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants. See RGP 92, 293, number 285, note 2. 12 November 1602.

⁸³ See GAA, NA 62/199; NA 62/189; NA 62/194v; NA 120/178v-179v for notarial acts passed in 1610.

⁸⁴ GAA, NA 646/347 and 963.

daughters, Ana, was born in that city in 1607.⁸⁵ It is not known if he lived in places other than Portugal and Amsterdam, though, as a prominent merchant, he almost surely would have traveled a great deal, even if he had not actually resided in various locations.⁸⁶

France

France was important as an “underground railroad” for Jews fleeing Iberia, even though no Jews were legally allowed there after their expulsion in 1394.⁸⁷ Jews began drifting into the country almost immediately after the Spanish expulsion, but they were forced to live as Catholics and settle primarily in a few places near the Spanish border, most commonly in the border town of St.-Jean-de-Luz, as well as in Bayonne, and Bordeaux.

France served as a first place of refuge for those Sephardim who began fleeing the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisition. Those fleeing Iberia had virtually no choice if they couldn’t get passage on a ship other than to escape via land routes to France. From the middle of the sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth century, settlements by Portuguese merchants who continued to live as New Christians were expanded in Bordeaux and Bayonne, and established in Bidache, Peyrehorade, Labastide-Clairence, and other locations.⁸⁸

These communities were, as Jonathan Israel points out, a sort of bridge between the Iberian New Christian world and the world of the Western Sephardi Diaspora.⁸⁹ They bridged not only the *Marrano*, crypto-Judaic, and Jewish religiosities and experiences, but also served as important nodes in the network between Amsterdam, Northern Europe, and the Iberian peninsula. For example, a principle method of circumventing the Spanish embargo was the inland and overland traffic from France, across the Pyreneese, and into Navarre – a circumnavigation that Sephardim were quite involved in. Many of these goods came from Amsterdam to Bayonne, where they were then transferred to mules and taken over the mountains. Two of the main participants in this trade, Alvaro and Jacome Luis, who lived in Bayonne, were the factors for various Amsterdam merchants, both Sephardim and non-Sephardim alike. Moreover, Alvaro was a member of the Amsterdam-based dowry society,

⁸⁵ GAA, DTB 672/59

⁸⁶ See J.V. Roitman, “Sephardic Journeys . . .”

⁸⁷ The general outline of the discussion relating to the Sephardic Diaspora in Northwestern Europe, as well as much of the information on the specific Sephardi settlements is drawn from: Yosef Kaplan, “The Formation of the Western Sephardic Diaspora,” 136-155.

⁸⁸ For further discussion of the importance of these communities, see Jonathan I. Israel, “Crypto-Judaism in 17th-Century France,” 245-268

⁸⁹ Jonathan Israel, “Crypto-Judaism in 17th Century France,” 245

the *Dotar*, and was responsible for distributing dowries in Southern France.⁹⁰ Therefore, it is clear that these communities in Southern France, small though they were, were of importance to the Amsterdam Sephardic community.

Soon after the establishment of the Inquisition in Portugal, the New Christians sought regularization of their settlement and protection from persecution by petitioning the French government for letters of naturalization. These were granted in 1550 and authorized the New Christians to enter France in order to trade there. They were given the same rights as other subjects of the King, though only as long as were not openly practicing Jews.⁹¹ France became a permanent place of settlement for many Sephardim. Therefore, France was far from being only a way station on the road between Amsterdam, London, or Hamburg, despite the fact that they were not permitted to be openly practicing Jews until the early eighteenth century.

Table 1: Portuguese New Christian Communities in France in 1637

Town	Number of Families	Individuals
Bastide-Clairence	80	400?
Bayonne-Saint Esprit	60	300?
Peyrehorade	40	200
Bordeaux	40	200
Dax	10-12	50?
Rouen	22	110?
Paris	10-12	50?
Nantes	6-7	30?

Source: British Library, Department of Manuscripts Egerton Manuscript 343/259; I.S. Révah, “Les Marranes,” *Revue des Études Juives*, xcvi, (1959/60), 30-77, 66; Jonathan Israel, “Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660” 21; Daniel Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 79. Printed in: Jonathan I. Israel, “Crypto-Judaism in 17th-Century France . . .,” in Jonathan I. Israel, *Diasporas Within a Diaspora*, 245-268, 262

Not only was continental France important for Sephardic settlement, however. The French Caribbean colonies were also of importance. Yet Louis XIV’s *Code Noir* (“Black Code”) banned non-Catholics from living in the territories belonging to the King of France. Though the *Code* was not always strictly enforced, and there were certainly still Sephardim to be found, if only on a temporarily basis, in the French colonies, the overall policy was quite clear – no minorities (including Protestants) in France’s overseas colonies.⁹² Despite the

⁹⁰ Gérard Nahon, *Métropoles et périphéries sefarades d’Occident, Kairouan, Amsterdam, Bayonne, Bordeaux, Jerusalem*, (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1993), 99

⁹¹ Yosef Kaplan, “The Formation of the Western Diaspora,” 137

⁹² Mordechai Arbell, “Jewish Settlements in the French Colonies in the Caribbean (Martinique, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Cayenne) and the ‘Black Code,’” in *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West*, 287-313

provisions of the *Code*, the Sephardim in France itself began to gain greater recognition and rights.⁹³

The Sephardim of France were numerically overwhelmed by the Ashkenazi in the eighteenth century though, geographically, the Ashkenazi tended to settle in the main cities and on France's border with Germany, while the Sephardim were largely in the south-western corner of the country. Only a tiny Sephardic community remained in France by the nineteenth century.

During the seventeenth century, however, France certainly pictured in the trade of the Amsterdam Sephardim, though not to the extent that the Iberian and colonial trades did. Along with the above-mentioned places of settlement on the border with Spain, there was a Sephardic presence in other French cities, as well. For instance, Prins writes that Manoel Rodrigues Vega arrived in Amsterdam from Nantes with his wife and eight children.⁹⁴ Daniel Swetschinski believes he might have been apprenticed with a relative in Nantes, in the same way that one of Manoel's brothers, Rafael, assisted their father in Antwerp.⁹⁵

Manoel Carvalho dealt in sugar brought into La Rochelle, on the Atlantic coast.⁹⁶ He also had contacts with companies in Paris.⁹⁷ Bento Osorio, meanwhile, received bills of exchange that originated in Bordeaux.⁹⁸

⁹³ It is the eighteenth century with is the "Golden Age" for the Sephardim of France. As this period falls outside the chronology of this book, it will not be covered in the text. It should be mentioned, however, that that in the early eighteenth century, the French authorities began to acknowledge these Portuguese as Jews and permitted them to practice Judaism openly. See, Silvia Marzagalli, "Atlantic Trade and Sephardim Merchants in Eighteenth-Century France: The Case of Bordeaux," in *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West*, 268-287. Bayonne and Bordeaux were especially important cities with large Jewish communities, most of which were engaged in trade with France's colonial possessions. In Bordeaux, for example, the community numbered about 1,000 in the eighteenth century, while in Bayonne, the approximately 2,500 Sephardim comprised around one-fifth of the total population. See, Gérard Nahon, "The Portuguese Jewish Nation," in *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West*, 255-267.

⁹⁴ Izak Prins, *De Vestiging der Marranen in Noord-Nederland*, 177. It seems unlikely that Rodrigues Vega would have had eight children when he first settled in Amsterdam in 1595. If the date of Vega's birth given by Zwarts in "De Eerste rabbijnen," 152, note, is correct, then Vega would have only been 20 years old when he arrived in Amsterdam. Even taking into account an early marriage and a phenomenal survival rate, eight children in tow by the age of 20 seems unlikely. It could be that Vega was born earlier than 1575. It could also be that the information about the eight children is erroneous, which seems to me to be more likely, based on the number of factual errors found in Zwarts' work.

⁹⁵ Daniel Swetschinski, *The Portuguese Jewish Merchants*, 154.

⁹⁶ GAA, NA 387/115-117v; NA 405/108-108v; NA 383/511; NA 383/226; NA 381/67

⁹⁷ GAA, NA 949/247, 261

⁹⁸ GAA, NA 773/36-37

Germany

The history of the Sephardim of Germany is really the history of Hamburg at the end of the sixteenth century.⁹⁹ Antwerp was recaptured by Spanish troops in 1585, and a substantial proportion of the city's Portuguese New Christian community migrated to Northwestern Germany, due to the blockade of the port by the Dutch rebels, which, effectively, stymied trade, as well as due to persecution of non-Catholics (or suspected non-Catholics) by the Spanish. The Sephardim who settled in Hamburg at the end of the sixteenth century were generally wealthy merchants with trading connections overseas.

At that time, Hamburg was the major center in northern Europe for the trade in sugar, spices, and other colonial commodities. Hamburg had long been, along with Lübeck, the premier port of the German states. Lübeck was the main port for the lucrative Baltic trade, while Hamburg competed by dealing in colonial commodities. The city council of Hamburg pursued a utilitarian policy of (relative) tolerance for merchants that might be of economic use to them. The Sephardim in Hamburg, for instance, were the first to open up trade with Spain and Portugal. They imported sugar, tobacco, spices, cottons, and other products from the colonies. Moreover, they played a prominent part in the foundation of the Bank of Hamburg. By the late 1580s about a dozen Sephardic families settled in the city, and in 1612 there were 125 adults. A charter granted in 1612 gave the first official approval for Jewish life in Hamburg, although their right to live openly as Jews was limited as they were forbidden to worship publicly within the borders of the city. Permission for residence cost 1,000 Marks for five years. There was also a great deal of migration between Amsterdam and Hamburg. During the Twelve Years' Truce with Spain, many Sephardim from Hamburg moved to Amsterdam, as the economic opportunities there were expanding. Likewise, when the truce ended in 1621, many Sephardim left Amsterdam and went to Hamburg from where they could continue trading with Iberia legally.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ In addition to Yosef Kaplan's "The Formation of the Western Sephardic Diaspora," the information for this section is drawn from: Hermann Kellenbenz, *Sephardim an den unteren Elbe*, (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1958) and Klaus Weber, "Were Merchants More Tolerant? 'Godless Patrons of the Jews' and the Decline of the Sephardi Community in Late Seventeenth-Century Hamburg," David Cesarani and Gemma Romain, eds., *Jews in Port Cities, 1590-1990: Commerce, Community and Cosmopolitanism*, (London: Vallentine-Mitchell, 2005), 77-97

¹⁰⁰ By the end of the seventeenth century the Sephardic community was in decline. A number of well-respected and influential Sephardim had died. When, in 1697, the Senate and the *Bürgerschaft* demanded sizeable annual payments from the Portuguese Jews to stay in Hamburg and rescinded their right to religious practice, some of the wealthy families emigrated to Altona, Ottensen, and Amsterdam. This emigration, when added to the internal strife within the Sephardic community led, in the eighteenth century, to a reduction in the number and influence of the Sephardim in Hamburg.

During the period under consideration in this work, Hamburg was of great importance to the Amsterdam Sephardim. As was mentioned above, Manoel Rodrigues Vega and his associates often shipped Brazilwood and sugar to Hamburg.¹⁰¹ Bento Osorio was also involved in the shipment of Brazilwood to Hamburg.¹⁰² In addition to chartering ships going to Hamburg, he sent ships from Hamburg to the Iberian Peninsula.¹⁰³ Both Rodrigues Vega and Osorio also used Hamburg as a place of credit, and bills of exchange were passed through this city with some degree of frequency.¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile, Osorio also had diamonds, originally from the East Indies, sent to Hamburg.¹⁰⁵

The Italian City States

While the focus of much of the research regarding trade from the Netherlands in the late sixteenth and the seventeenth century has focused on the Baltic and Atlantic, the Mediterranean trade has been somewhat ignored by historians. However, the documents published by K. Heeringa revealed that, by the end of the sixteenth century, anywhere between 100 and 200 Dutch ships each year were involved in the trade with the Italian peninsula.¹⁰⁶ Although these numbers have been disputed by historians, and it certainly is true that the much-touted connections, both social and economic, between the Amsterdam Sephardic settlement and those of the Italian peninsula were less important than has been popularly believed, the Italian city-states, particularly Livorno and Venice were of commercial interest to Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam.¹⁰⁷

The Jewish population of Italy in the sixteenth century was small and scattered.¹⁰⁸ During the second quarter of the sixteenth century, however, New Christian merchants began

¹⁰¹ SR 98

¹⁰² GAA, NA 109/207-209

¹⁰³ GAA, NA 645b/1583-1584

¹⁰⁴ SR 118; 129 and GAA, NA 645/494-495; NA 645b/1424-1427; NA 1497/106; NA 1050/119v-120; NA 151/169v-170, and NA 86/81-81v

¹⁰⁵ GAA, NA 645b/1424-1427

¹⁰⁶ RGP 9; See also, J.H. Kernkamp, "Scheepvaart en handelsbetrekkingen met Italië tijdens de opkomst van de Republiek," in Harm Riel and Hendrik Brugmans, eds., *Economisch-Historische Herdrukken. Zeventien studiën van Nederlanders verzameld door de Vereniging Het Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief ter gelegenheid van haar vijftigjarig bestaan, (1914-1964)*, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), 199-234.

¹⁰⁷ For the debate about the importance, or lack thereof, of trade between the Dutch Republic, see S. Hart, "De Italiëvaart 1590-1620," *Jaarboek Amsteldamum*, LXX (1978), 42-60; P.C. van Royen, "The First Phase of Dutch Straatvaart (1591-1605). Facts and Fiction," *International Journal of Maritime History*, 2 (1990), 69-100; M. Bogucka, "Amsterdam and the Baltic in the first half of the seventeenth century," *Economic History Review*, (1973) 26 (3), 433; and J.I. Israel, *Dutch Primacy in world trade, 1585-1740*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Marie-Christine Engels reviews the debate in her *Merchants, Interlopers, Seamen and Corsairs*, 12-14.

¹⁰⁸ The information in this section is drawn from the following sources: Federica Ruspio, "The Portuguese settlement in Venice in the first half of the seventeenth century," unpublished paper presented at the ESTER

to settle in Ancona, Ferrara, Livorno, and Venice. Some of the *conversos* continued to live as Catholic Christians. Others reverted to Judaism. They were joined in their settlement by Jews from the Near East, who were subjects of the Ottoman Empire and who began to migrate into Italy in order to exploit links in Mediterranean trade.

Ferdinand de Medici invited the New Christians to settle in Pisa-Livorno, and allowed them to live openly as Jews. The Sephardic settlement there thrived. After 1589, Venice allowed New Christian immigration. There they joined other Jewish communities, though throughout most of the seventeenth century, the Sephardim were the most numerous and wealthiest Jewish group in the city.

In Italy, therefore, two major centers of Sephardim emerged during the second half of the sixteenth century and flourished during the seventeenth century: Venice and Livorno. In Venice, there were approximately 1,700 Jews in the 1580s, 2,650 in the 1640s, and 4,000 in the 1660s. The city's Jewish community consisted of three separate congregations of Levantine, Iberian, and Ashkenazi Jews. The Sephardim were not the majority. However, the Sephardic community of Venice was one of the largest populations – along with Antwerp – of the emerging Portuguese Diaspora at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Venice was a mixture of tolerance and intolerance. Jews could live in the city but, from 1516 onwards, their residence was confined to the *Ghetto Nuova*. The Sephardim and all other Jews living in the Ghetto were locked inside at night. Jews were only permitted to work in pawnshops, act as moneylenders, work in the Hebrew printing press, trade in textiles, or practice medicine. Once they left the ghetto they still had to wear distinguishing clothing, such as a yellow circle or scarf. Jews were also faced with high taxes.

The seventeenth century was the Ghetto's golden age; Jewish commerce and scholarship flourished. The Sephardim controlled much of Venice's foreign trade by the mid-1600s, and they gained influence and wealth in the Venetian economy. The economic conditions for the Sephardim, however, deteriorated at the end of the seventeenth century.¹⁰⁹ In contrast to Venice, there was no ghetto in Livorno, nor was distinctive Jewish clothing

Seminar – Port and Maritime History, April 2003; Jonathan Israel, "The *Marrani* in Italy, the Greek Lands and the Ottoman Near East (1540-1580)," in *Diasporas Within a Diaspora*, 41-66 and Jonathan Israel, "Venice, Salonika and the Founding of the Sephardi Diaspora," 67-96; Renata Segre, "Sephardic Settlements in Sixteenth-Century Italy: A Historical and Geographical Survey," in Alisa Meyuhar Ginio, ed., *Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the Mediterranean World after 1492*, (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 112-137; Benjamin Ravid, "A Tale of Three Cities and their *Raison d'Etat*: Ancona, Venice, Livorno, and the Competition for Jewish Merchants in the Sixteenth Century," in *Jews, Christians, and Muslims*, 138-162.

¹⁰⁹ Anti-Jewish feelings were prevalent in the eighteenth century and limitations were placed on Jewish economic activity. The Jewish population decreased from 4,800 in 1655 to 1,700 in 1766 because many prominent families left for Livorno or other port cities. Taxes were high and Sephardi merchants lost their shops between 1714-1718. Finally in 1737, the Jewish community declared bankruptcy.

required. Moreover, Livorno was the only place in Italy where the Catholic counter-reformation reaction against the Jews did not prevail. This was largely due to the fact that, in the sixteenth century, Cosimo I invited foreigners, including New Christians, to come to the new port.

The Jewish population grew from 114, in 1601 to 3,000 by 1689. Jews became the most important foreign nation living in Livorno. Spanish and Portuguese became the official language of Jewish merchants in Livorno and remained so until the late eighteenth century. By the end of the eighteenth century, nearly 5,000 Jews lived in Livorno but, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Sephardim had virtually disappeared and the entire Jewish population had decreased to 2,500. This is most likely the result of the deteriorating economic situation brought about by the Napoleonic wars, which forced the Sephardim to flee to other places.

Manoel Carvalho was one of the largest shippers from Amsterdam to the Italian Peninsula.¹¹⁰ He mostly shipped sugar, but also transported grain and salt. Bento Osorio, better known for his extensive interests in the Baltic trade, appears in the documents as engaged in trade from Amsterdam to Porto and/or Viana in Portugal to load sugar for shipment to Livorno.¹¹¹ Manuel Rodrigues Vega received bills of exchange coming from Pisa,¹¹² Venice,¹¹³ Rome,¹¹⁴ and Florence.¹¹⁵

Spain

Spain and her domestic and foreign policies exerted a powerful influence upon the Sephardim in Amsterdam. During the period under consideration in this study, the crowns of Portugal and Spain were united, with Spain *de facto* controlling politically the regions such as the Spanish Netherlands (Antwerp), Portugal, Brazil, the Spanish Americas, and much of the North African coastal cities where the Sephardim were economically active. Moreover, Spain itself was a trading destination for Sephardic merchants for clandestine commerce, or even for semi-legitimate commerce conducted with the use of aliases and front-men.

¹¹⁰ Simon Hart, "De Italië-vaart, 1590-1620," 56.

¹¹¹ GAA, NA 121/88v-89v

¹¹² GAA, NA 139/119v

¹¹³ GAA, NA 376/658

¹¹⁴ GAA, NA 377/378

¹¹⁵ GAA, NA 133/178-178v

Therefore, it is hardly surprising that some Portuguese New Christians returned to Spain.¹¹⁶ During the union of Spain and Portugal (1580-1640), New Christians went to Spain, since they could not be tried there for any crimes of “Judaizing” committed in Portugal. The Inquisitions in the two countries did exchange information on suspected crypto-Jews, but Spain did not to extradite them. The Portuguese immigrants were suspected of crypto-Judaism by definition, and were regarded as a separate group of Christians – “the portugueses de la nación hebrea” (Portuguese of the Hebrew Nation) or simply “portugueses de la nación” (Portuguese of the Nation) or “homens da nação.” (“Men of the Nation”).

Some Sephardim, after returning to Judaism and living in a Jewish community, went to Spain or other countries where they could not be openly Jewish. Some of the *conversos* who affiliated with Judaism were unwilling to be circumcised for fear that it would limit their possibilities for travel to Spain, Portugal, and the other Catholic countries where Jews were forbidden to live. Many business trips were to countries where Judaism was forbidden, and the travelers had to disguise themselves as Christians.¹¹⁷

Moreover, from the 1620s, there were tremendous economic opportunities to be had at the Spanish Court. For a time, the main financiers of the Spanish Crown were Portuguese bankers, many of whom were New Christians. However, with the fall of Count Duke Olivares, official protection for New Christians came to an end and the Sephardim either parlayed their *converso* identity into a Catholic identity and blended into the surrounding milieu or else left Spain entirely.

It was not only at the Spanish Court that there were tremendous economic opportunities to be had, however. The Spanish colonies were an attractive option for many Sephardim. There was a strong Sephardic presence in New Spain (present-day Mexico), as well as in Peru, the River Plate region of South America (present day Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), and New Granada (present day Colombia and Venezuela). In fact, tribunals of the Inquisition were established in Lima, Cartagena de las Indias, and Mexico City, in part, to

¹¹⁶ Information for this section is drawn from: Maurits A. Ebben, *Zilver, broed en kogels voor de koning: Kredietverlening door Portugese bankiers aan de Spaanse kroon, 1621-1665*, (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1996); J.C. Boyajian, *Portuguese bankers at the court of Spain, 1626-1650*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1983); Jonathan Israel, “Spain and the Dutch Sephardim,” in *Diasporas Within a Diaspora*, 185-244

¹¹⁷ Yosef Kaplan, “The Travels of Portuguese Jews from Amsterdam to the Lands of Idolatry (1644-1724),” in Yosef Kaplan, ed., *Jews and Conversos: Studies in Society and the Inquisition*, (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish Studies: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1985), 197-224.

fight against the suspected Jewish practices of the Sephardic, mostly Portuguese, merchants.¹¹⁸

While Spain itself did not play a particularly important role in the economic and cultural activities of the Amsterdam Sephardim, it was certainly not absent from their dealings either. Manoel Rodrigues Vega was involved in the shipment of pearls to Seville.¹¹⁹ Bento Osorio's sister granted him a power-of-attorney to deal with her business interests in Spain and in the Spanish colony of Guatemala.¹²⁰ Moreover, Osorio shipped Baltic wheat to Cadiz and to Malaga.¹²¹ Sometimes, though, Osorio did not ship the wheat to these Spanish cities but, rather, was paid for shipments of wheat made in North Africa.¹²² In fact, Osorio made a declaration in 1619 regarding the norms for shipping to Spain.¹²³ Manoel Carvalho's cousin, Maria de Pas, died in Madrid, and Carvalho dealt with all the details surrounding her estate, to which he was heir, all of which entailed extensive dealings with Spain.¹²⁴ In addition to this familial connection with Spain, Carvalho sent a ship back to Spain from the Spanish West Indies, where he had shipped slaves.¹²⁵

England

The Jews had been officially expelled from England in 1290, but a small number of New Christians of Spanish and Portuguese origin had lived in London from the late Middle Ages onward.¹²⁶ However, between 1595 and 1640, Sephardic merchants did travel to, and even live in, England, though if they lived there they lived outwardly as Catholics. In the early part of the seventeenth century, Sephardim were attracted to London due to its growing importance in international commerce. They had to live as Catholics outwardly, however, no matter what their particular religious beliefs were. Thus, the motives for members of the

¹¹⁸ There is a great deal written about the Sephardim in present-day Latin America. See, for example, Eva Alexandra Uchmany, "The Participation of New Christians and Crypto-Jews in the Conquest, Colonization, and Trade of Spanish America, 1521-1660," in *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West*, 186-202; Günter Böhm, "Crypto-Jews and New Christians in Colonial Peru and Chile," in *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West*, 203-212.

¹¹⁹ SR 192

¹²⁰ SR 550

¹²¹ GAA, NA 152/65v-66v; NA 155/37v-38; P. H. Winkelman, ed., *Bronnen voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Oostzeehandel in de zeventiende eeuw*, 6 volumes, RGP 133, 161, 178, 184-186, Volumes 4-6 *Amsterdamse bevrachtingscontracten, wisselprotesten en bodemerijen van de notarissen Jan Franssen Bruyningh, Jacob Meerhout e.a., 1601-1625*, (hereafter RGP 184-186), no. 2424 and 2491

¹²² GAA, NA 154/150v-151; NA 109/149v-150

¹²³ GAA, NA 645a/505

¹²⁴ GAA, NA 611a/364v

¹²⁵ GAA, NA 146/199v-200v

¹²⁶ Albert M. Hyamson, *The Sephardim of England: A History of the Spanish and Portuguese Jewish Community, 1492-1951*, (London: Methuen & Co., 1951), 1-23

Sephardic diaspora to migrate to England (though, really, during this time, it was really the city of London that attracted these immigrants) were almost entirely commercial, especially because connections between London, Amsterdam and Hamburg were becoming ever more significant as the seventeenth century progressed.

Estimates vary, but there were possibly as many as 50-100 Sephardim in London before the official re-admission of Jews to England in 1656.¹²⁷ In point of fact, this re-admission was not really official at all, though it is termed as such in the literature. The Sephardim of continental Europe under the leadership of Menasseh ben Israel of Amsterdam, and with the help of New Christians already resident in London, petitioned Oliver Cromwell for a Jewish place of worship. The granting of this place of worship was tantamount to readmission. However, the fact that there was no formal invitation for Jews to enter England, nor was there a revocation of the original order of expulsion, lessened objections to the open presence of Jews in the city.

There were some connections between the Amsterdam Sephardim and London, though connections really began to grow apace after the re-admission of the Jews to England, which falls outside the chronology of this work. For instance, Manoel Rodrigues Vega granted a power-of-attorney to Abraham van Herwyer of London in 1595 to act on his behalf.¹²⁸ Vega also sent a ship to Dartmouth in 1598 to pick up a cargo full of fish to be sent on to Porto.¹²⁹

The Portuguese colonies

The Portuguese Empire was the earliest of the modern European colonial empires, beginning with the capture of Ceuta in North Africa in 1415. Portuguese explorers began exploring the coast of Africa in 1419, in order to find a sea route to the source of the lucrative spice trade. In short order, Vasco da Gama reached India, and by 1500, Pedro Álvares Cabral established the colony of Brazil. In the following decades, they established forts and trading posts which connected Lisbon to Nagasaki, and the empire had become global, bringing great wealth to Portugal.

These colonies and settlements attracted merchants, adventurers, sailors, soldiers, and administrators, as the Portuguese formed a global diaspora. The Sephardim were part of this Portuguese diaspora and, as a group that for historical reasons had been particularly involved

¹²⁷ E.S. Samuel, "Portuguese Jews in Jacobean London," 171-230

¹²⁸ SR 2

¹²⁹ SR 39

in commerce, were found in the nodes of the Portuguese overseas empire which were most mercantile-inclined. Of course, some Sephardim had been exiled to the colonies or were in the colonies because they were fleeing political and religious persecution. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the Sephardim overseas were merchants looking to take advantage of the opportunities the expanding Portuguese empire had to offer. Many of these Sephardic merchants moved frequently, and it was not at all uncommon that a merchant would spend some years in, for example, Guinea or Angola, before moving on to Brazil, and then back to Portugal.

West Africa

Angola

Many New Christians settled on the islands off the west coast of Africa as well as on the coast of the African and Brazilian Atlantic. Historians have known the Sephardic presence in Angola for some time, though little has been uncovered about the details of their settlement in this distant corner of the Portuguese Empire. Despite the privations inherent in settling in such a distant colony, however, some Sephardim chose to go to Angola willingly due to the economic possibilities this colony offered. For example, it is known that the Spanish New Christians trader, Miguel de Horta, moved to Luanda in 1584, when it was little more than a group of ramshackle huts. He stayed there for more than 30 years, working as a trader and merchant.¹³⁰ And de Horta was not the only New Christian in the colony. Duarte Nunes Nogueira, for example was given a slave trading concession in 1601, though not all holders of these concessions (*asientos*) would have actually lived in the colony.¹³¹ However, they most likely would have, at the very least, made frequent visits.

The Sephardic Diaspora, then, clearly extended to Angola.¹³² With these initial waves of immigration came various settlers such as Aires Fernandes. In 1603, Fernandes sent a letter outlining his destitution.¹³³ He lived in Luanda as a slave dealer.¹³⁴ Another New Christian

¹³⁰ José Gonçalves Salvador, *Os cristãos-novos e o comércio no Altântico Meridional: com enfoque nas capitánias do sul : 1530-1680*, (São Paulo: Pioneira, 1978), 309.

¹³¹ Gonçalves Salvador, *Os cristãos-novos . . .*, 309.

¹³² José Augusto Nunes da Silva Horta, "A Inquisição em Angola em Congo: o inquérito de 1596-98 e o papel mediador das justiças locais," in *Arqueologia do Estado: las Jornadas sobre Formas de Organização e exercício dos poderes na Europa do Sul, Séculos XIII-XVIII*, (Lisbon: História & Crítica, 1988), 387-418; José Augusto Nunes da Silva Horta, *Africanos e portugueses na documentação inquisitorial, de Luanda a Mbanza Kongo: 1596-1598*, (Lisbon: Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos descobrimentos Portugueses, 1995); IAN/TT, IdL, Book 776.

¹³³ Padre Antonio Brásio, *Monumenta Missionária Africana*, (henceforth *MMA*), vol. V, First Series, (Lisbon : Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1952-1971), 58.

was the wealthy Lisbon merchant Jorge Roiz Solis, whose family ties linked him to the mercantile elite both inside the Iberian Peninsula and outside. He lived in Angola, as did his relative, Joao Brandão, who went to live there in 1607.¹³⁵ These two, together with Antonio Fernandes d'Elvas, relative of the above-mentioned Solis, supplied slaves to the Americas in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. These merchants also designated agents to "anchor" their businesses in certain areas, and were large landowners, as well. The New Christian community, then, was not insignificant in terms of their economic leverage at the beginning of the 1620s. A confirmation of the large New Christian presence in Angola is found in a letter to the Inquisition of Lisbon by commissioner Padre Jeronimo Vogado, who advised that, "there are in these parts many people of the Hebrew Nation."¹³⁶ These "many people of the Hebrew Nation" were in Angola, just as they were in other Portuguese colonies, to exploit the burgeoning trade in slaves and other colonial goods, though it is possible that religious persecution may have played a role for some Sephardim who went overseas, as well.

Along with these people of the Hebrew Nation who resided in Angola, for greater or lesser amounts of time, were Sephardic merchants who had business interests in Angola. For instance, Manoel Rodrigues Vega and his Flemish associate, Cornelis Snellinck, invested in a voyage to Angola in 1604.¹³⁷ Manoel Carvalho had business interests in Angola, as well. In 1612 he asked five Dutch associates to make a declaration concerning the norms surrounding trade between Portugal, Brazil, and Angola.¹³⁸ It is interesting that these connections to these diaspora locations involved non-Sephardim as much, or more, than they did Sephardic merchants.

Cabo Verde, São Tomé, and the Guinea Rivers

Sephardim chose to settle in Cabo Verde, São Tomé, and in settlements scattered along the Guinea Rivers because, especially in the sixteenth century, they were important links in the Portuguese trading network.¹³⁹ As gateways to the supply of slaves for the

¹³⁴ Aires Fernandes died in São Tomé, leaving behind a small fortune, Salvador Gonçalves, *ibid*.

¹³⁵ Edgar Prestage and Pedro de Azevedo, eds., *Registros Paroquiais de Lisboa, freguesia da Se (1563 a 1610)*, (Coimbra: Imp. da Universidade, 1927), 270, 276, 382.

¹³⁶ Padre Antonio Brásio, *MMA*, vol. V, First Series, 312.

¹³⁷ GAA, NA 98/21v-22

¹³⁸ GAA, NA 197/173-174

¹³⁹ The New Christian presence in these regions is only relatively recently coming to light in the English-speaking historiography. For example, José da Silva and Peter Mark published a work about two Sephardic communities on the West Coast of Africa recently: "Two early seventeenth-century Sephardic communities on Senegal's Petite Côte," *History in Africa : a journal of method*, vol. 31, (2004), 231-256. Tobias Green followed

burgeoning trade in slaves, these Portuguese settlements were of particular interest to traders who hoped to supply the growing demand for slaves in the Americas. Moreover, these settlements also provided access to the supply of lucrative trade goods such as ivory and gold. Lastly, sugar cultivation, particularly on the islands, was a profitable enterprise. Therefore, these regions were attractive to merchants of all stripes, including Sephardic merchants, who were optimizing the European and colonial demand for African products.

It was illegal for New Christians to settle in Guinea without a special license from the King.¹⁴⁰ There was no special license necessary in other Portuguese overseas settlements such as Angola, Brazil, and Goa, however. Nevertheless, any New Christian who had been convicted of “judaizing” did have to have special permission to leave Portugal. Be that as it may, complaints about the New Christians in the region began only a few years after the founding of the Inquisition in Portugal. In fact, the first accusations made to the Inquisition in Lisbon were made against the New Christian community in Cape Verde. These complaints were sent to the Lisbon Inquisition in 1542 – only eight years after the Inquisition’s establishment.¹⁴¹ More accusations followed in 1544.¹⁴² In 1546 came another accusation sent to the Inquisition of Évora from the Ruling Council of the settlement of Ribeira Grande. In these documents, the New Christians were accused of occupying administrative, judicial, and fiscal positions that they were officially not allowed to have. Moreover, they were said to be showing “disrespect to the commercial norms” by not paying customs duties, engaging in illicit trade with the Guinea Coast, and by facilitating the immigration of other New Christians to various overseas locations, including the Guinea Rivers and the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. In the following year, the Governor of Ribeira Grande wrote to the King to relate the administrative situation in the settlement and detailed the threat posed by powerful New Christians in administrative roles. The request by the local authorities for the initiation of an Inquisitorial Tribunal on the island was repeated.¹⁴³

up on this article with “Further Considerations on the Sephardim of the Petite Côte,” *History in Africa: a journal of method*, vol. 32 (2005), 165-183, as well as in his dissertation, *Masters of difference: Creolization and the Jewish presence in Cabo Verde, 1497-1672*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham. These works have brought to light what has been commonly known in the Portuguese literature for some time – that New Christians were not only present as active traders but also as practicing Jews (if the reports and accusations are to be believed) in these African settlements. Some of the non-English literature dealing with this oft-forgotten corner of the Sephardic Diaspora is footnoted in the excellent work of Filipa I. Ribeiro da Silva’s *A inquisição em Cabo Verde, Guiné e S. Tomé e Príncipe (1536-1821)*

¹⁴⁰Cristiano José de Sena Barcelos, *Subsídios para a história de Cabo Verde e Guiné*, 5 volumes, (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1899-1913), volume I, 83.

¹⁴¹Filipa I. Ribeiro da Silva, *A inquisição em Cabo Verde, Guiné e S. Tomé e Príncipe (1536-1821)*

¹⁴²Brásio, *MMA*, 2nd series, vol. II, 372.

¹⁴³See, Filipa I. Ribeiro da Silva, *A inquisição em Cabo Verde, Guiné e S. Tomé e Príncipe (1536-1821)*

Later, in the first half of the seventeenth century, this New Christian presence was further confirmed, as were these New Christians' connections with the Low Countries.¹⁴⁴ In fact, from the first years of the seventeenth century, the authorities on the Guinea Rivers had been alerted to what was, for them, an important problem: the growing number of Jews or New Christians and of their active participation in the trade of the region, usually acting as agents of foreigners, in the region extending from the Guinea Coast to Sierra Leone. One anonymous author in 1612 made note of this problem. He elaborated that 50 Portuguese Jews were in the service of the French, English, and Dutch, and were involved in trade between Recife and Sierra Leone. He even detailed the quantities of merchandize and the specific actions that these agents had been involved with.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, there were multiple complaints that old and new Christians were actively engaged in trade together in this region.¹⁴⁶ It seems clear, then, that the Sephardim were not relying only on their networks of kinsmen and co-religionists for the furtherance of their trading enterprises. In fact, these reports seem to point to a rather well-developed network incorporating Sephardic, French, English, and Dutch merchants, not to mention the Portuguese old Christians. The fact that these networks were documented on the West Coast of Africa does not mean that they were, by any means, exclusive to this region. In fact, as this book shows, networks incorporating merchants of a multitude of backgrounds were common in many places.

Bento Osorio, for example, worked along with another Sephardic merchant in Amsterdam, Diego Vas de Sousa, and several Dutch merchants to charter a trading voyage to Cape Verde in 1619.¹⁴⁷ Pedro Rodrigues Vega, one of the brothers of Manoel Rodrigues Vega, was also involved in the trade with Cape Verde.¹⁴⁸ Pedro traded not only with the Cape Verde islands, but with the Guinea Rivers region of West Africa, as well. For instance, in 1610, Pedro and another brother, Gaspar Fernandes, sailed to Portugal in the Guinea Rivers to trade.¹⁴⁹ Perhaps because of his brothers' connections to the Guinea Rivers, Manoel Rodrigues Vega acted as an interpreter and witness for other Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam interested in trading with this region. In 1611, Manoel helped several Sephardic

¹⁴⁴ Cristiano José de Sena Barcelos, *Subsidios para a historia de Cabo Verde e Guiné*, Volume I, 221, Also, Brásio, MMA, 2nd series, vol. IV, 698.

¹⁴⁵ Anonymous, *Memória e relação do resgate que fazem os fracases, ingleses e flamengos na costa da Guinea, do rio Sanagá à Serra Leoa*," Biblioteca da Ajuda (Lisbon), Manuscript 51-VI, no. 38, fls. 146-147, quoted in António de Almeida Mendes, "Le Rôle de l'Inquisition en Guinée: vicissitudes de presences juives sur la Petite Côte (XVe-XVIIe siècles)," *Revista Lusófona de Ciência das Religiões*, Ano III, 2004, no. 5/6, 137-155, 148.

¹⁴⁶ IAN/TT, IdL, Book 205/117-121, 571-589v and IdL, Book 210/453-459. Thanks to Filipa I. Ribeiro da Silva for help with these references.

¹⁴⁷ SR 1869

¹⁴⁸ SR 431, see also numbers 363, 423, 428, 439, 444, 445

¹⁴⁹ SR 448

merchants arrange a trading voyage on the ship “The Hope” which was destined for Portugal and Joalá.¹⁵⁰ Bento Osorio was also involved in the trade with the West Coast of Africa. In 1623, he took out insurance from several Dutch merchants on a ship sailing from near the Guinea Rivers region to Genoa on the Italian Peninsula.¹⁵¹

Brazil

Though Brazil had been “discovered” by the Portuguese in 1500, there was little interest in this vast mass of land until the French began to show an interest in the Brazilian coastline. In order to counter this French threat, the Portuguese crown began to found settlements, and introduced sugarcane cultivation, cattle raising, and an administrative presence in the colony around 1530. Within two decades, the sugarcane that the colonists had brought from the Portuguese islands off the coast of West Africa spread in the rich soils of the countryside around Salvador in the Northeast of the colony. Sugar became a major colonial trade good, and Europe craved this luxury product. Therefore, Brazil, as the center of the cultivation of sugar at the time, became an attractive location for both Sephardic and non-Sephardic settlement alike.

New Christian settlement in Brazil dates from the first voyages of exploration and settlement. Fernão Noronha, one of the first “captains” of Brazilian territory, was a New Christian.¹⁵² Many historians believe that New Christians transplanted sugar cane from Madeira to Brazil in the early sixteenth century and, indeed, Madeira had a large New Christian population that was actively involved in sugar cultivation.¹⁵³ New Christian foremen and workers are said to have been brought over from Madeira and São Tomé when the first sugar plantations and mills were established in Brazil around 1542. One of the first five *engenhos* (sugar plantation and mill) was owned in 1550 by a New Christian, Diego Dias Fernandes.¹⁵⁴ A large number of the 120 *engenhos* that existed in Brazil in the year 1600 belonged to New Christians, many of whom were also administrators.¹⁵⁵

The Inquisition was never formally introduced in Brazil. From 1580 on (after Portugal was united with Spain), the bishop of Bahia received investigative powers from Lisbon, and

¹⁵⁰ SR 473

¹⁵¹ GAA, NA 697/3-4; NA 691/175-176

¹⁵² Arnold Wiznitzer, *Os Judeus no Brasil Colonial*, (São Paulo: Pioneira, 1960), 4-7.

¹⁵³ Wiznitzer, *Os Judeus . . .*, 7-9 and Novinsky, “Inquisição e Heresias na Ilha da Madeira” in *Actas do I Colóquio Internacional de História da Madeira*

¹⁵⁴ Wiznitzer, *Os Judeus . . .*, 8

¹⁵⁵ José Antonio Gonsalves de Mello, *Gente da Nação: Cristãos-novos e judeus em Pernambuco, 1542-1654*, (Recife: Editora Massangana, 1996), 5- 34

after 1591, the Holy Office in Portugal sent Inquisitional Commissaries to Brazil at intervals. The first commission worked from 1591 to 1593 in Bahia and, afterward until 1595 in Pernambuco.¹⁵⁶ In 1618, a commission again visited Bahia.¹⁵⁷ The investigators of the Inquisition held hearings based on denunciations, and the suspected were arrested and sent to Lisbon to trial. It is important to understand the Iberian political context of these Inquisitorial visits. Patricia Aufderheide suggests that the visits from 1591 to 1593 had to do with Spanish concern for political and social control over its newly acquired colony.¹⁵⁸ Likewise, Eduardo d'Oliveira França and Sonia Siquiera speculate that the visitation in 1618 was provoked by the threat of Dutch naval power and the Jewish presence in the Dutch Republic. The Crown, it is speculated, wanted to assert its social and political control through the arm of the Inquisition.¹⁵⁹

Brazil was also a place of exile for those convicted of crimes in Portugal. It is a pervasive misunderstanding of patterns of New Christians immigration, however, that the majority of New Christians in Brazil were exiled there by the Inquisition. In fact, according to the statistics compiled by Geraldo Pieroni, there were 311 people exiled from Portugal to Brazil for the crime of Judaism over the span of three centuries.¹⁶⁰ This equals a little over 100 people a century or, more clearly stated, one person a year. These statistics would seem to show that New Christians were not coming to the Portuguese colony as a punishment but, rather, in pursuit of economic opportunity. The same would seem to hold true of the other Portuguese colonies, such as those on the West Coast of Africa.

Table 2: Exile to Brazil by Century (sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth)

	16th			17th			18th			Total		
	W	M	T	W	M	T	W	M	T	W	M	T
Judaism	1	3	4	180	88	268	20	19	39	201	110	311
Bigamy	7	7	14	43	16	59	10	5	15	60	28	88
Deceit	16	4	20	9	22	31	3	1	4	28	27	55
Witchcraft	1	1	2	21	12	33	4	4	8	26	17	43

¹⁵⁶ *Primeira visitaç o do Santo Of cio, Denunciaç es da Bahia 1591-1593, and Primeira visitaç o Denunciaç es e confiss es de Pernambuco*

¹⁵⁷ "Livro de Denunciaç es do Santo Of cio na Bahia – 1618," *Annaes da Bibliotheca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro*, 1927, Vol. 49, 1936, 75-198

¹⁵⁸ Patricia Aufderheide, "True Confessions: The Inquisition and Social Attitudes in Brazil at the turn of the Seventeenth Century," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 10 (Winter 1973), 208-240, 212. Spain had acquired the colony when the Spain and Portugal were united between 1580 and 1640.

¹⁵⁹ Eduardo d'Oliveira Frana and Sonia Siquiera, eds. "Segunda visitaç o do Santo Of cio  s partes do Brasil: Livro das confiss es e ratificaç es da Bahia, 1618-1620," *Anais do Museu Paulista* 17 (1963): 121-547, 123-129

¹⁶⁰ Geraldo Pieroni, "Outcasts from the Kingdom" 242-251

Diaspora, Migration, and the Foundations of Inter-cultural Trade

Sodomy	0	1	1	1	23	24	0	0	0	1	24	25
Revelation of secrets	0	7	7	3	7	10	1	0	1	4	14	18
Visions	1	0	1	10	1	11	2	0	2	13	1	14
Blasphemy	0	0	0	1	8	9	0	1	1	1	9	10
Solicitation	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	2	2	0	7	7
Other	0	1	1	3	12	15	0	3	3	3	16	19
Total	26	24	50	271	194	465	40	35	75	337	253	590

Notes: Number of cases analyzed: 590; W= Women, M=Men, T=Total

Source: INT/TT, Inquisition of Coimbra (IdC) 433, Inquisition of Évora (IdE) 434, IdL 435 (Lisbon), printed in, Geraldo Pieroni, "Outcasts from the Kingdom: The Inquisition and the Banishment of New Christians to Brazil," in *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West*, 242-251, 246

New Christians, as has been seen, owned *engenhos*, but were also merchants and middlemen in the trade in sugar and slaves.¹⁶¹ They were not, though, in the majority in either function in the colony. As David Grant Smith points out, around 45% of merchants were New Christians while 55% were of Old Christian background.¹⁶² Stuart Schwartz notes that, of the 41 *engenho* owners whose origins could be uncovered in the period between 1587-92, 12 were held by New Christians.¹⁶³ The apex of New Christian settlement in the colony, however, was under the rule of the Dutch, beginning when the Dutch West India Company captured Recife (Pernambuco) in Northeast Brazil – a key sugar producing region – in 1630 and lasting until 1654. The first synagogue in the Americas was founded in Recife in 1636, and by 1644, the Sephardic population of Dutch Brazil totaled around 1,450 people.¹⁶⁴ After Dutch Brazil fell, however, the open practice of Judaism ceased in the colony. New Christians certainly remained in Brazil, and, possibly, crypto-Judaic rituals remained part of family traditions, but it would not be until the nineteenth century Ashkenazi migration to Brazil that Jews would form a significant part of Brazil's population.

An example of the Sephardic presence in the Portuguese colony of Brazil, and of their connections with the Amsterdam Sephardic settlement would be Manoel Carvalho, the son of Pero Fernandes and Guiomar Henriques, was born in Porto in Portugal in 1565, but spent a good part of his earlier years in Brazil. The family had a long-running connection to Brazil. Carvalho was the grandson of Pedro Alvares Madeiro, who was the owner of 2/3rds of a plantation in Pernambuco, with two sugar mills along the river Camaragibi. Carvalho

¹⁶¹ David Grant Smith, "The Mercantile Class of Portugal and Brazil in the Seventeenth Century: a Socioeconomic Study of the Merchants of Lisbon and Bahia," (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1975)

¹⁶² David Grant Smith, *The Mercantile Class of Portugal and Brazil . . .*, 280

¹⁶³ Stuart B. Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 265

¹⁶⁴ Wiznitzer, *Os Judeus . . .*, 120-38; Arnold Wiznitzer, "The Number of Jews in Dutch Brazil (1630-1654)," *Jewish Social Studies*, xvi, (1954), 107-114; I.S. Emmanuel, "Seventeenth-century Brazilian Jewry: a critical review," *American Jewish Archives*, xiv, (1962), 32-68; Günter Böhm, *Los sefardíes en los dominios holandeses de América del Sur y del Caribe, 1630-1750*, (Frankfurt: Vervuert, 1992)

inherited part of this estate, making him part of the planter class in Brazil.¹⁶⁵ New Christians, like Old Christians, sought to acquire *engenhos* as soon as their wealth permitted.¹⁶⁶ This was not just an economic decision. In fact, the ownership of an *engenho* was not always a wise move economically. However, within Brazilian (and Iberian) society, land ownership conferred social prestige and political influence.¹⁶⁷ Despite this ownership of land, however, New Christians in Brazil, “regardless of their economic assets, [had] their social development arrested at the upper level of the mercantile sector.”¹⁶⁸ Whether because of this arrested social development, or for more straightforward economic reasons (or a combination of the two), Manoel Carvalho moved to Amsterdam, and appears in the archival documentation of the Netherlands by 1602. Later in Amsterdam, Carvalho was known as an expert in the Brazil trade.¹⁶⁹

Carvalho was not the only Sephardic merchant in Amsterdam that was heavily involved in the Brazil trade, mostly in sugar, but also in other products, however. Much of the sugar came via Lisbon, such as the shipment of sugar from Pernambuco belonging to Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Cornelis Snellinck that had first gone to Lisbon, before being shipped on to Amsterdam.¹⁷⁰ Cargoes of both sugar and other products, such as Brazilwood were also sent directly to the Dutch Republic, despite the fact that they had declared Portugal as their destination.¹⁷¹ Manoel Rodrigues Vega also dealt in this trade in Brazilwood along with a consortium of Dutch and Sephardic entrepreneurs such as Cornelis Snellinck and the van Uffelen family. The Brazilwood was sent to Amsterdam as well as to Hamburg.¹⁷² It was certainly not just Rodrigues Vega who was actively involved in the Brazil trade, however. Salomon Voerknecht, a prominent Amsterdam merchant, asked him to make a declaration regarding the norms regarding the trade to and from Brazil in 1617.¹⁷³ Bento Osorio, who was most active in the Baltic trade, was also involved in the lucrative Brazil trade. He sent a ship

¹⁶⁵ GAA, NA 672/5-6

¹⁶⁶ Oliveira França, “Engenhos, Colonização, e Cristãos-Novos,” *Colonização e migração : Anais do IV Simpósio Nacional dos Professores universitários de História*, (São Paulo: Universidad de São Paulo, 1969), 181-241; See also, Anita Novinsky, *Cristãos Novos na Bahia*, (São Paulo: Universidad de São Paulo, 1972).

¹⁶⁷ David Grant Smith and Rae Flory, “Bahian Merchants and Planters in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Nov., 1978), 571-594, 586.

¹⁶⁸ David Grant Smith, *The Mercantile Class of Portugal and Brazil in the Seventeenth Century*, 327-336.

¹⁶⁹ GAA, NA 672/5-6v; NA 671/198-201

¹⁷⁰ SR 72

¹⁷¹ SR 87

¹⁷² Other participants were: Anthoni Kuvelier; Reynier Reyniersz. Merckelback; David Nuyts; Pieter Beltgens; Diogo Dias Querido; Jan Engelsen; Gommer Sprangers, Hendrick Roelant; Hendrick Broen; Hans van Uffelen (Uffele); Nicolas du Gardin; see SR 91; 98; 123; 134; 135; 138; 210; 639

¹⁷³ GAA, NA 645/43v-44

to Portugal and then onwards to Pernambuco in Brazil to pick up a cargo of sugar.¹⁷⁴ In addition, he also owned parts of other shipments of sugar.¹⁷⁵

Goa

The Portuguese claimed Goa in 1510, and proclaimed it the capital of Portuguese India. By 1515, the city had a Luso-Indian population, an administrative structure, and was a center of the Portuguese spice trade. Portuguese merchants, including New Christians, settled in Goa, as well as in other Portuguese-controlled cities such as Cochin, which also had a “native” Jewish population which had been there since ancient times. As early as 1519, King Manoel issued legislation prohibiting the naming of New Christians to the position of judge, town councilor or municipal registrar in Goa. However, he stipulated that those who had already been appointed were not to be dismissed. Therefore, it seems clear that even during the very first years of Portuguese rule, Goa had seen a considerable influx of recently baptized Spanish and Portuguese New Christians.¹⁷⁶ Around 1600, there were around 3,000-5,000 Portuguese and their dependents in Goa, though it is not known what percentage were of New Christian descent.¹⁷⁷

In 1560, a branch of the Portuguese Inquisition, the only one outside of continental Portugal, was established in Goa.¹⁷⁸ Unfortunately, the majority of the 16,000 trial records have been lost. However, other extant documents do allow for some reconstruction of the way in which the Inquisition functioned in Goa.¹⁷⁹ It was set up to not only battle New Christian

¹⁷⁴ GAA, NA 121/88v-89v

¹⁷⁵ GAA, NA 384/89-89v

¹⁷⁶ António José Saraiva, *The Marrano Factory*, 347

¹⁷⁷ James C. Boyajiyian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640*, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 32

¹⁷⁸ For information about the Inquisition in Goa, the firsthand account of a young Frenchman imprisoned by the Goan Inquisition remains a classic. See, *L’Inquisition de Goa. La Relation de Charles Dellon (1687). Étude, édition & notes de Charles Amiel & Anne Lima*, (Paris: Editions Chandeigne-Librairie Portugais, 1997-1998). Other works include: Harold V. Livermore, *A New History of Portugal*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), António Baião, *A Inquisição de Goa, Tentativa de História da sua Origem, Estabelecimento, Evolução e Extinção*, volume I, (Lisbon: Academia das Ciências, 1945); *O ultimo Regimento e o Regimento da Economia da Inquisição de Goa*, Raul Rego, ed., (Lisbon: Biblioteca Nacional, 1983); Anna Cannas da Cunha, *A Inquisição no Estado da Índia, Origens (1539-1560)*, (Lisbon: Arquivos Nacionais-Torre do Tombo, 1995); James C. Boyajiyian, “Goa Inquisition, A New Light on the First 100 Years (1561-1660),” *Purabhilek-Puratatva*, 4, 1986, 1-40; José Alberto Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, “Os Judeus e a expansão portuguesa na Índia durante o século XVI: o exemplo de Isaac do Cairo: Espião e ‘língua’ e ‘Judeu de Cochim de Cima’,” *Arquivos do Centro Cultural Calouste Gulbenkian*, 33, 1994, 137-260; and Alisa Meyuhas Ginio, “The Inquisition and the New Christians: The Case of the Portuguese Inquisition of Goa,” *The Medieval History Journal*, 2, 1, (1999), 1-18

¹⁷⁹ See, for example, the “Reportorio geral de tres mil oito centos processos, que sam todos os despachos neste Sancto Officio de Goa, & mais partes da India do anno de Mil & quinhentos & secenta & hum, que começou o

heresy, but also that of Hinduism and Islam. Despite the particularly fearsome reputation of this branch of the Inquisition, New Christians were actively involved in the trade with the *carreira da Índias*. For example, Bento Osorio invested in the Portuguese Asian trade, especially in diamonds and other precious stones.¹⁸⁰ It was not just Osorio who invested in the East Indies trade, most of which was centered in Goa. Manoel Rodrigues Vega owned shares in various trading voyages to the East Indies.¹⁸¹ Sephardic merchants also imported cotton cloth from India to trade for West African slaves, which were then sent on to Brazil in exchange for sugar.¹⁸²

Conclusion

As can be seen above, the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries were times of great changes for the Portuguese Sephardim. Migration became a widely experienced reality. The Sephardim of this Diaspora viewed themselves as members of the “nation” (*membros da nação*) or “members of the Spanish-Portuguese Nation.” The term *nación* or *nação* referred not only to the Sephardic Jewish Diaspora, but also to the New Christians who remained in other countries, especially Spain or Portugal, whether or not they affiliated with Judaism.¹⁸³ The Portuguese Sephardic “nation” was, therefore, somewhat different from other alien nations. In Early Modern Europe, foreign residents in a city, usually engaged in trade or other economic activities, were identified according to their place of origin. This origin was expressed using the term “nation.” The Sephardic communities were in many respects merchant colonies much like others in Northern Europe, but their collective sense of identity transcending religious and geographical boundaries differentiates them from the other alien trading nations.

While the diaspora experience certainly helped to cement their identity, the foundation of this identity as Portuguese New Christian merchants had been laid in the sixteenth century in Portugal, as was outlined above. Thus, it was less the diaspora itself, and more their experiences in Portugal that cemented their identities. Moreover, as many of the examples for Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio given in this chapter show, a

dito Sancto Officio ate o anno de Mil & seis centos & vinte e tres,” written by the Goan Inquisitor João Delgado Figueira., *Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal*, (henceforth BN), Codice 203

¹⁸⁰ SR 2440

¹⁸¹ SR 105; 132

¹⁸² James C. Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs*, 141, 163-164

¹⁸³ Yosef Kaplan, “The Travels of Portuguese Jews from Amsterdam”

great deal of inter-cultural trade occurred at the nodes of the Sephardic diaspora. Even when fellow Sephardic merchants were available in places like Venice, La Rochelle, or Salé, these merchants often chose to use traders or representatives from a non-Sephardic background to help them in their mercantile endeavors. Not only did these merchants use representatives from other backgrounds, however. In the case of Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho, they actually lived outside of Portugal and almost certainly formed relationships with non-Sephardic merchants in Antwerp and Brazil, respectively. Thus, while the diaspora experience may have solidified their identities as Portuguese New Christian merchants or members of “the nation,” it also spurred on their inter-cultural relationships. Therefore, it is clear that the concept of diaspora as an analytical category is not enough to explain the Sephardic merchants’ economic behavior. Hence, the differentiation made by Francesca Trivelleto between diaspora and trade networks, in which diasporas are not synonymous with trade networks, but in which both can complement the other, is particularly valid for the Sephardim in this study. The next chapter will discuss the business enterprises of Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, many of which, as has been touched upon in this chapter, dealt with places where the Sephardim had settled in diaspora.

Chapter III: The Global Merchants and their Milieu

Shopkeepers, artisans, and tradesmen were not generally classified as merchants in the seventeenth century. Although the term “merchant” originally had meant any trader in goods that were not manufactured or produced by him/herself, from the sixteenth century onwards, the term came to be restricted to wholesale traders, especially those who dealt with foreign countries.¹ Merchants, then, very often had connections outside their place of residence. And having these connections to, and businesses in, foreign places is an important part of the definition of what are being termed “global merchants” in this chapter. But what was it, beyond dealing with foreign locales, that made a merchant a global merchant? But how can this theory of loose ties be shown to apply to the Sephardim of Amsterdam?

The beginning of a definition for what constituted a global merchant was given in the last chapter. They were merchants that were wealthy enough or had enough wherewithal to bypass traditional social linkages and networks and add new ones,² Building on this description, this chapter will broaden the definition of global merchants to encompass merchants who were global, opportunistic, and integrative.³ This chapter will examine the theory of loose ties and its applicability to the Sephardim of Amsterdam by looking at successful merchants and seeing what sort of networks they employed.

The definitions and the role of the global merchants, and how Manuel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio fit this definition of global merchant will be discussed first. As was mentioned in the Introduction, Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were chosen to be studied in-depth because they exemplified many of the characteristics of elite Sephardic merchants at the time. They were transnational migrants who were often born in Portugal, but who lived most or all of their lives abroad, often in various lands, as Chapter II showed. They are also interesting studies of the multiple ways in which Sephardic identities manifested themselves during the early seventeenth century, from New Christian indifference to Judaism on the part of Rodrigues Vega, to a sort of half-hearted Judaism exhibited by Carvalho, to the open reclamation of Jewish faith and tradition by Osorio.

¹ <http://dictionary.oed.com>

² Cátia Antunes, *Globalisation in the Early Modern Period*, 129

³ These terms and some of the following descriptions are drawn from David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London merchants and the integration of the British Atlantic community, 1735-1785*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

Moreover, these merchants were wealthy, successful, and, as a key component of this success, global. The description of the enterprises that defined these merchants as global will not only tie into the overarching idea of loose ties, but will also serve to provide important background information on these merchants' lives and endeavors. This information is particularly important in light of their economic relationships with non-Sephardim, as discussed in the chapters following this one. The chapter will then go on to talk about the particular environment in Amsterdam that attracted and fostered these merchants.

First, however, the question of “Why is this ‘globalness’ important for the discussion of inter-cultural trade amongst the Sephardim in Amsterdam between 1595 and 1640?” must be answered. From the outset, the goal of this book has been to add an important nuance to the traditional historiographical assumption that trade in the Early Modern period was mostly conducted between family and those of the same ethnic and/or religious group. Rather, I assert in this book that there were very real and quite important trade relationships between merchants of different groups, using a case study of the Sephardim and their Dutch and Flemish associates in Amsterdam in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Another important goal of this book is to challenge the idea that trading between family and those of the same ethnic and religious group was the most efficient way to organize trade in the Early Modern period. To demonstrate this, I employ the theory of loose ties, which posits that multiple connections in a variety of directions which encompass friends and acquaintances in a series of non-intersecting groups, may be more efficient in creating opportunities and promoting the defense of economic interests, than might tightly knit networks, each of whose members knows the rest. Put more succinctly, it made good economic sense for merchants to trade outside their familial, ethnic, and religious group because it reduced risk and created opportunities.

But how can this theory of loose ties be shown to apply to the Sephardim of Amsterdam? The simplest way seemed to be to pick successful merchants and see what sort of networks they employed.⁴ This is what I have done by choosing Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio. However, what constituted “success” became another methodological consideration. Wealth, of course, seemed like an obvious component of

⁴ Another way to test the “loose ties” theory would have been to follow a merchant from the inception of his career, before he was wealthy and otherwise successful, to the point at which he achieved this success. By following this merchant “from rags to riches” we could see if networks based on loose ties contributed to that success. Fascinating as this would be, the available documentary evidence makes such an undertaking difficult, at best, since merchants tend, with some exceptions, to appear in the archival records once they've already attained at least a modicum of success. Moreover, the majority of merchants came from merchant families, so would not have been building up networks entirely on their own but, rather, employing their families' contacts.

The Global Merchants and their Milieu

success. And, in fact, all three merchants were quite wealthy, as far as can be ascertained from records such as the *imposta*, the tax imposed by the Jewish community, and the Amsterdam tax registers. There is a lack of serial data from these sources, though, and the quantification of their wealth equally, for all three merchants for the bulk of their careers, was impossible. Moreover, in the Early Modern period, as in the contemporary world, wealth could come and go quite quickly. For instance, Manoel Carvalho went bankrupt at least once during his long career. Furthermore, wealth could be inherited from a merchant's family and might have little or nothing to do with his own trading acumen or the networks he utilized. Therefore, more than just material wealth at any given point in a merchant's life dictated that other criteria in addition to money be used. Hence, using some of David Hancock's criteria for global merchants – global, integrative, and opportunistic -- seemed to offer an attractive alternative to material wealth alone for defining merchants' success.⁵ Furthermore, by isolating global merchants for study, some light might be shed upon the process of their identity formation as Portuguese, as New Christians, as, in some cases, Jews, and as entrepreneurs on a global scale.

At first glance, the term “global” seems relatively straightforward. After all, a “global” overseas merchant would have operations that stretched around the world. However, “global” and “globalization” have become terms fraught with meaning and debate in current historical debate. Therefore, it should be stated at the outset that the term global, within the context of this work, means, simply, that the merchants' operations were not primarily local, provincial, or within the boundaries of the emerging nation-state in which the merchant lived, difficult as those boundaries, especially of the nation-state, are to define. Furthermore, “global” implies that they were involved, to at least some extent, in extra-European trade routes. Essentially then, global means participation in non-local, non-national, trades. As will be seen further in the chapter, however, “global” does not mean that any single merchant maintained contact with all points in the expanding world of international trade, and most focused on a specific region in which he primarily, though not exclusively, traded.

To trade globally, a merchant needed to seize opportunities. Opportunism, in the context of the definition of a global merchant, means, quite simply, exploiting circumstances or opportunities to gain an immediate advantage. These men were opportunistic, and they actively adapted their decisions and actions to the commercial expediency of the moment. They were experimental in seeking opportunities to invest. They were flexible in their

⁵ I am not employing the fourth criteria – marginalization – of Hancock's definition of a global merchant. I believe that marginalization is so relative and so difficult to define, especially as applied to the Sephardic merchants of Amsterdam, that it would confuse rather than clarify the issues surrounding their interactions, intercultural or otherwise.

responses to change. They often dealt in more than one activity, product, or route at once, and they engaged in new enterprises. This definition could apply to any number of merchants. However, the opportunism of Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio stands in contrast to their peers, especially in regard to incorporating or integrating new associates into their commercial networks, but also in employing new technologies and strategies for trade.

It is this trait of what might be, to coin a term, called “integrativeness” that is the final attribute for a global merchant. These global merchants not only integrated associates from other groups into their own networks, but integrated themselves into other networks, as well. As Sephardim they were culturally nimble. They were able to integrate themselves into the Iberian networks, including that of the Portuguese diaspora merchants abroad, many of whom were Old Christians. They were also men on the move, who had lived in multiple places through the course of their careers. Therefore, they came into contact with merchants from many places and of varied backgrounds. These contacts led, in some cases, to integration into new networks. Moreover, they also integrated geographies, trade routes, and products. For instance, they coordinated people, materials, and capital across market sectors and among geographically dispersed areas. Lastly, they diversified and combined the so-called “rich trades” with the commerce in “bulk” goods, which will be discussed below.

It is not just Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio who were global merchants. They have been chosen because they illustrate this concept well, but many merchants, Sephardim and non-Sephardim alike, had some, or all, of the characteristics that are classified here as belonging to “global” merchants. Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio typified these characteristics of global, opportunistic, and integrative behavior. They also are good examples of the different ways in which a global merchant might behave economically. Vega, for instance, integrated the products in which he dealt to a high degree. Carvalho, while dealing in both the “rich” and the “bulk” trades (discussed further below), dealt far more in the “rich” trades, while Osorio, in contrast, traded predominately in “bulk” goods. Nevertheless, they all had some level of diversification in their product assortment. Lastly, these merchants also serve as interesting examples of the complex and multifarious ways in which identity was assumed by Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam – from apparent retention of a New Christian identity on the part of Vega, to indifferent Judaism quite possibly motivated by financial rather than religious concerns on the part of Carvalho, to the active and open embrace of Jewish practice of Osorio. These identities are important for this study, because the ways in which merchants’ identities were manifested had important ramifications for just how inter-cultural their economic interactions were.

The Global Merchants and their Milieu

Global Merchants


In the expanding Early Modern world, it is hard to delineate a specific geographic space. Networks expanded and were not limited to one region or to one specific product. Routes incorporated multiple regions. For example, to talk of “Baltic” trade without incorporating the Atlantic trade in this period is to ignore the important interchange of products originating in one region and being transported to another. The Atlantic, Baltic, and Mediterranean were inter-connected by the exchange of goods and the movement of people and capital. To talk of networks and limit the discussion to only one region is to ignore the way in which networks functioned. They functioned by linking peoples, products, and ideas across geographical boundaries.

Global merchants were at the forefront of these linkages of products and ideas across geographical boundaries. There had always been merchants who had maintained contacts in distant places and transported products across vast spaces. The hallmark of global merchants, in general, and Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio, specifically, is the intensification of these linkages. These merchants’ operations were not primarily local or national and incorporated both intra and extra-European routes. While global does not imply that any one merchant was active in all places in the expanding Early Modern world, within the context of this book it does mean that he had at least some presence in all three of the traditional trade regions connected to Europe – the Baltic, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean.⁶

⁶ Atlantic History is trendy, and there is an ongoing discussion as to what constitutes what has been dubbed “the Atlantic world.” Within the context of this work, Atlantic will simply be a geographical term for the western portion of Europe which borders the Atlantic Ocean. In this work, it will comprise the Western part of Iberia, north and western France, Ireland and the United Kingdom, and the Low Countries. For an excellent overview of current trends in Atlantic History, see Alison Games, “AHR Forum: Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities,” *The American Historical Review*, June 2006
<<http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/111.3/games.html>> (12 Sep. 2008).

Manoel Rodrigues Vega

Graph 1: Vega's Global Reach



Source: Amsterdam Municipal Archives [Gemeente Archief Amsterdam] (hereafter GAA), Notarial Archives (hereafter NA), n=68

As Graph I shows, Vega was most heavily involved in the Atlantic trade, though he had significant dealings in other regions, as well. Although the products that were integral to this global trade will be talked about at greater length later on, it should be noted that Vega was active in shipping Baltic grain to and from Portugal, sugar and brazilwood from Brazil, either to Portugal or directly to the Netherlands and farther a field to the Baltic, as well as sending grain to the Mediterranean and receiving precious stones from the East Indies, usually for sale in Antwerp.

One example might suffice to show the global nature of Vega's commercial dealings. In 1609, a decision was reached by arbitration regarding commissions on various shipments and money due for an inheritance. This document brings to light that Vega was acting as the factor for a merchant in Antwerp, that he had shares in journeys to the East Indies, that glass beads, linen, and pearls of his were being held by a friend in Pernambuco in Brazil, and that he had made accounts in Venice regarding the over-charged commissions.⁷ Thus, in one document, Vega's connections with the East Indies, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean can be

⁷ SR 341

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seen. Of course, there are numerous other examples of the extensive geographical nature of Vega's commercial enterprises. A case in point might be when, in 1602, Vega granted a power of attorney for the receipt of Brazilwood and sugar coming from both Brazil and Oporto in Portugal which was taken to Hamburg and then on to other Baltic ports.⁸ Therefore, it is clear that, while Vega was more prominent in some geographies than in others, his business dealings were not primarily local or national, and that his commerce was global in nature.

Manoel Carvalho

Manoel Carvalho was most active, as Graph II illustrates, in the Atlantic as well as being very involved in the Mediterranean trade, as well. For example, the archivist Simon Hart lists the most frequent shippers to Italy from the Netherlands in the period between 1590 and 1630 (See Appendix 1), which include many associates of Sephardic merchants. Of these 39 largest merchant shippers to the Italian peninsula, one was Manoel Carvalho.⁹ It should be noted that the low percentage of Carvalho's Baltic interactions is somewhat misleading. He did own shares in ships sailing from afar a field as Russia to the Mediterranean, though he was by no means as heavily engaged in chartering ships to sail directly to and from the Baltic as other merchants.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the vast majority of his Mediterranean shipments are for Baltic grain.¹¹


⁸ SR 98

⁹ Simon Hart, "De Italië-vaart, 1590-1620," 56

¹⁰ GAA, NA 625/376-377

¹¹ GAA, NA 106/6v-7; NA 105/44v-45; NA 106/173v-174v; NA 106/205v-206v; NA 108/20-21; NA 107/134-135; NA 113/116-116v, to list just a few.

Graph 2: Carvalho's Global Reach (1602- 1636)



Source: GAA, NA, n=72


Manoel Carvalho was born on the Atlantic coast of Portugal, lived across the Atlantic in Brazil, then moved to the port of Amsterdam, and transported both Baltic and Atlantic products to the Mediterranean. He also, for example, testified about the process of shipping to Angola on the West Coast of Africa, and how to avoid paying taxes and tolls for shipping from Africa, Portugal, and Brazil.¹² Carvalho was also known to have business dealings linking England and Portugal,¹³ and Antwerp, Amsterdam, and Italy.¹⁴ Carvalho, then, was not only focused in his business enterprises on the local or national markets but, rather, was global in outlook and focus.

¹² GAA, NA 197/173-174

¹³ GAA, NA 102/201v-202

¹⁴ GAA, NA 620/596

Graph 3: Osorio's Global Reach (1610-1640)



Source: GAA, NA, n=227

Bento Osorio was known internationally as a large-scale merchant trading with Spain, Portugal, North Africa, the Baltic and the Levant. As Graph VI shows, Osorio was very active as merchant in the Atlantic, the Baltic and the Mediterranean. Bento Osorio was also active in the sugar trades between Portugal, the Netherlands, and Italy. In addition, he shipped wheat, wood, and ammunition from Norway and the Baltic to Tangier and Ceuta.

A few examples of many available might suffice to illustrate the global reach of Bento Osorio. In 1618, Osorio became embroiled in a long-running court case connecting Amsterdam, where Osorio lived, to Tangiers in Algiers, North Africa, where some of the litigants were, with Cadiz, in Spain, where other litigants lived, all of which involved a ship that had left Danzig which was partially financed via money from Antwerp.¹⁵ These kinds of cases emerged when trade connected multiple regions. It was not at all uncommon for Osorio to send ships from Amsterdam to the Baltic to pick up timber and grain, send them to the Atlantic coast of Portugal, on to North Africa or Italy in the Mediterranean, and back to Portugal before returning to Amsterdam.¹⁶ Thus, in these few documents, there is a glimpse of Osorio's connections with the Baltic, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Of course, there are numerous other examples of the extensive geographical nature of Osorio's commercial

¹⁵ GAA, NA 645/247-248

¹⁶ GAA, NA 144/118-119v; NA 109/143-144v; NA 147/86-87v; NA 109/148-149v; NA 109/149v-150; NA 109/152v-153; NA 109/152v; NA 109/221v-223

enterprises. It is clear then, that, while Osorio was more active in some geographies than in others, his business dealings were not primarily local or national, and that his commerce was global in nature.

Illustration 1: The Baltic World in 1617



The hallmark of global merchants, in general, and Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio, specifically, was not only their presence in multiple regions, but their integration of these regions, and of products, networks, and capital. These merchants' operations were not primarily local or national and incorporated both intra and extra-European routes, including the East and West Indies, the Americas, and the West Coast of Africa. A global merchant was not necessarily active in all places at all times. However, he had at least some presence at some time in all three of the traditional trade regions connected to Europe – the Baltic, the Atlantic, (at this time expanding to include Africa and the Americas instead of only the Atlantic coast of Europe), and the Mediterranean. It also meant that they were mobile. As Chapter II showed, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were migrants to the Low Countries, but

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either they or their families had come from other places. They traveled frequently in pursuit of their economic interests.

Integrative merchants

Integration, in general, means to put or bring together parts or elements to form one whole, and this is what global merchants did. They brought together the varying parts of products, geographies, capital, and varying networks to form one whole. The ability to integrate socially and economically (in terms of trade goods and capital) was key for global merchants. A merchant needed to integrate by not only bringing associates from other groups into his own networks, and integrating himself into other networks, as well, but also had to integrate geographies, trade routes, and products. Some merchants dealt in only one trade route, one region, or worked only with one network. Thus, they could not be termed an integrative merchant. Integrative merchants, however, coordinated people, materials, and capital across markets and among geographically dispersed areas. They also diversified and combined the so-called “rich trades” with the commerce in “bulk” goods, which will be discussed below. It is the integration of the composition of their networks, coupled with their diversified commerce, which forms the most important element of the integrative process.

The proceeding section has shown how Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio participated in many regions of the world in their business dealings, making them truly global merchants from a purely geographical perspective. They operated in the Baltic, in the financial centers of Amsterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, and even London, as well as the Atlantic, the Americas, Africa, and the East Indies. Thus, it is clear that these merchants participated in enterprises globally. But geography is not the only measure of integration. These merchants also integrated capital, products, and people.

Manoel Rodrigues Vega

Bills of exchange had been around in one form or another since antiquity. In the Medieval period, they were orders to pay in a foreign port in a foreign currency at some time in the future. They were, essentially, something like modern-day travelers' checks. By the Early Modern Period, bills of exchange had become more complex. They were still a transaction in which a merchant promised to pay the sum borrowed or to pay for goods received at a later date, in a different city, often in a different currency. But these financial

instruments had developed to fulfill four basic functions in the Early Modern period: first, they were a safe way to send money across long distances; secondly, they functioned as a means of payment in trade; thirdly, they were used as a source of credit in lending money by issuing a bill of exchange and when selling a bill of exchange in foreign currencies on credit; fourth, a merchant could benefit from the differences in exchange rates in different places (arbitrage transaction).¹⁷ For all these reasons, bills of exchange became the dominant means of payment in the Early Modern era. These bills represented payments, and merchants named in the bills became stakeholders in the payment process.

Manoel Rodrigues Vega received (became the drawee or addressee) numerous bills of exchange, which indicate the integrated nature of his credit and capital.¹⁸ For instance, in 1604, a bill of exchange came due for Vega that was first drawn in Pernambuco in Brazil for a sugar payment. This bill was payable to two Dutch merchants – Assuerus van Blocklandt and Hendrick Gijsbertsz. Delff. It was accepted by a Sephardic merchant in Amsterdam, João Castelli, before being addressed to Vega who was in Emden, at the time.¹⁹ Thus, in one bill of exchange, not only can the geographic spread of Vega's activities be seen, (already illustrated previously) but also the connections between Dutch and Sephardic merchants. In this same year of 1604, a bill of exchange was drawn in Porto, in Portugal, payable to Gillis Dodeur, a Dutch merchant. This value was received from Jeronimus Goosseens, another Dutch merchant, who then addressed it João Castelli in Amsterdam, who passed it on to Vega in Hamburg.²⁰ Once again, the connections between Portugal, Amsterdam, and Hamburg, as

¹⁷ Jacques Le Goff, *Kaufleute und Bankiers im Mittelalter*, (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verl., 1989), 70-77

¹⁸ The terminology surrounding bills of exchange can be confusing, at best. The persons involved in a transaction would be:

1) the issuer of the bill, the drawer or drafter who receives money from the remitter. Because of receiving money the issuer was also called taker.

2) the addressee named in the bill or the drawee who had to pay the bill (hence also called the payer). The drawee became the acceptant after accepting the bill of exchange by signing it. If the acceptance was denied, i.e. if the drawee "protested."

3) the beneficiary of the bill, who had to present the bill to the drawee (hence he was also named presenter) and to whom the drawee had to pay the face value of the bill;

4) the deliverer or remitter, who paid the issuer money for the bill he received from him.

The other information included in a bill of exchange would be: the sum of money which the bill of exchange was issued over; the currency the value of the bill had to be repaid in; the exchange rate and the possible coinage the payment had to be effected in; the *usance* or the term of the bill; the date the bill of exchange was issued; and, finally, the signature of the issuer. See, Markus A. Denzel, "The European Bill of Exchange,"

<http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers1/Denzel2.pdf>


¹⁹ SR 144

²⁰ SR 129

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well as of merchants from diverse backgrounds, can be seen in one relatively straightforward bill.

Graph 4: Manoel Rodrigues Vega's Bills of Exchange, 1595-1613




Source: GAA, NA, n=19

All cities named in the bill of exchange are counted in this and the following graphs illustrating bills of exchange. Therefore, the total documents consulted may be less than the numbers given in the graphs.

There are a few striking elements when Vega's bills of exchange are examined. What can be discerned is that Portugal and her colony of Brazil did not appear particularly frequently in Vega's bills of exchange. However, they certainly did dominate in terms of trade routes. This would seem to show, then, that Vega was integrating financial markets with production and consumption markets. Rather, London shows up in fully one-third of Vega's bills of exchange. In addition, Antwerp and Hamburg appear as being integrated into Vega's web of commerce. Perhaps most striking, however, is that only one of the bills of exchange is between Vega and other Sephardic merchants.²¹ The rest of the bills of exchange concern Vega and non-Sephardic merchants, exclusively, or integrated networks of merchants, such as the examples above demonstrate, of Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants doing business with one another.

²¹ GAA, NA 95/63-63v

Graph 5: Vega's Bills of Exchange by Interaction Type, 1595 - 1613



Source: GAA, NA, n=19

It was not only capital that Vega integrated. This capital was used for the trade in products. Traditionally, there has been a dichotomy drawn between the so called “bulk” trades and what has been dubbed the “rich trades.”²² There has also been a lively debate in the historiography as to what brought the most wealth to Amsterdam, with the Sephardim singled out as focusing on the rich trades and, it is implicitly assumed, becoming wealthy on this trade. Whatever the Sephardim from a group perspective may have done, a global merchant would integrate his product assortment and not focus on any one trade, just as he would strive to integrate routes and regions. This is certainly the case for Manoel Rodrigues Vega, as Table 3 shows.

²² Jonathan Israel argues that it was the ability to combine the trade in bulk and rich trades which led to the Netherlands' wealth. However, he believes that the rich trades brought in the most wealth. See his, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). A heated discussion has ensued. See, for example, the articles in *Bijdragen en Mededelingen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 106 (1991), by J.L. van Zanden, “De ‘nieuwe visie’ van Israel,” 451-457; L. Noordegraaf, “Vooruit en achteruit in de handelsgeschiedenis van de Republiek,” 458-468; and J.I. Israel, “The ‘New History’ versus ‘traditional history’ in interpreting Dutch World trade primacy,” 469-479. See also the special addition of *Leidschrift* devoted to this discussion. (1992), number 9. Odette Vlessing discusses the importance of the rich trades for the Sephardim in Amsterdam. Odette Vlessing, “The Portuguese-Jewish Merchant Community in Seventeenth-century Amsterdam,” in C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, eds., *Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times*, 223-243

Table 3: Rich vs. Bulk Trades – Rodrigues Vega, 1595 – 1613

	Number	Percentage
<i>"Rich Trades"</i>		
Silk textiles	5	7%
Sugar and spices	13	19%
Weapons and munitions	1	1%
Jewels	1	1%
Slaves	2	3%
Brazilwood	8	11%
Other (civet, coral, ivory, lacquer, specie,)	10	14%
Subtotal	40	58%
<i>" Bulk Trades"</i>		
Grain, Beans, other food	21	30%
Wood	0	0%
Hides	1	1%
Unworked metal and iron goods	3	3%
Salt	4	6%
Other Baltic goods (cordage, etc.)	1	1%
	30	43%
Total	70	


Source: GAA, NA

Although the majority of the products in which Manoel Rodrigues Vega dealt – nearly 60% -- were drawn from the rich trades, a more than 40% were not. It is clear, then, that Vega was not a specialist in either one particular product, nor in one particular category of trade. Rather, Vega integrated the trade in products coming from the expanding European trade to the Americas and the East Indies, with the traditional European trade in bulk products. This integrated product assortment would seem to tie into Vega's integrated use of capital.

It was noted above that Vega did not seem to have relied particularly heavily upon Sephardic associates, and, when he did, they were almost always part of a larger interaction that included non-Sephardic merchants. His integrated credit networks, discussed above, also illustrated this important point. Graph 6, below, shows how Vega depended on non-Sephardic associates and worked with integrated networks of Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants. Therefore, it is very clear that Vega dealt with non-Sephardic merchants for the furtherance of his business endeavors. Although the number of interactions varies depending on the chronology, what is clear is that integrated networks, whether of only Vega himself with non-Sephardic merchants or of Vega and one or more Sephardic merchants with non-Sephardic merchants were vital to Vega. For example, Manoel Rodrigues Vega granted a power of

attorney to, has bills of exchange drawn on him by, or had goods shipped by Elias van Geel of La Rochelle,²³ Abraham Herwijer²⁴ and Daniel van Harinckhoeck of London,²⁵ Laurens Bacx²⁶ and Adriaen and Gaspar van Nispen of Middelburg,²⁷ Cornelis Snellinck of Amsterdam,²⁸ and Hendrick Hondebeeck, to name just a few of his non-Sephardic associates.²⁹

Graph 6: Manoel Rodrigues Vega's Economic Endeavors by Interaction Type, 1595-1613



Source: GAA, NA, n=125

However, Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants also worked together in integrated networks. Take, for instance, the shipment of woad from Pedro Lopes Peixoto in São Miguel which was co-owned by Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Hans de Schot, as well as by Laurens Joosten Bacx and Steven Groelaet, who were acting on behalf of another Sephardic merchant, Bartholome Sanches who lived in Lisbon.³⁰ De Schot and Bacx were originally from Antwerp which might indicate the integration of networks of newcomers to Amsterdam.

²³ GAA, NA 48/33v-134

²⁴ GAA, NA 48/117v-118

²⁵ GAA, NA 119/22v2-223

²⁶ GAA, NA 48/41v-42; NA 76/144v-146; NA 53/101

²⁷ GAA, NA 53/34v-35; NA 53/78v-79

²⁸ GAA, NA 98/27-28

²⁹ GAA, NA 86/44-44v; NA 54/142v-143

³⁰ SR 6

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Another example would be when Vega gave to Cornelis Snellinck, a merchant from Antwerp, 3/4ths of his share in a cargo that Snellinck was sending to Antonio Nunes, Sephardic merchant, to Bahia in Brazil via Madeira.³¹

As these examples show, Vega brought together parts or elements from varying regions, from diverse product groups, and from different groups together to form an integrated trade network. He coordinated capital in the form of bills of exchange from assorted sources and locations. These bills of exchange also give a first glimpse of the integration of networks of exchange between Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants in varying configurations. Moreover, Vega was hardly limited by the so-called “rich trade” in mostly colonial products. Rather, he integrated the products in which he dealt in order to incorporate both types of trade into his enterprise. Unfortunately, it is not possible to gauge which trade group – bulk or rich – was more profitable. However, the fact that Vega utilized both kinds of trade groups relatively equally implies that they were of similar profitability, at least for him. Thus, Vega not only clearly had important contacts with non-Sephardic merchants, but he was an outstanding example of an integrative merchant. This integration was a key component to his standing as a global merchant. A global merchant was a successful merchant, and, therefore, it seems that, in Vega’s case, a successful merchant would employ integrated networks of associates.

Manoel Carvalho

Manoel Carvalho received bills of exchange that reveal the integrated nature of his credit and capital. For instance, in 1614, a bill of exchange came due for Carvalho that was first drawn in Porto in Portugal. This bill was passed through Rome, Italy and Antwerp, before coming due in Amsterdam.³² Thus, in one bill of exchange, the geographic spread of Carvalho’s activities, which included the Iberian and Italian peninsulas, the financial center of Antwerp, and Amsterdam. A few years earlier, in 1610, Carvalho was the final link in a chain of credit for the purchase of a share in a ship that linked Lisbon, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam. This bill of exchange was first drawn by Joost Benninck in Lisbon, who passed it on to Jaspas Moermans in Rotterdam, who then signed it over to Jan van Dashorts in Amsterdam, where it ended up in the hands of Carvalho.³³ Thus, the integration of Portugal and the United


³¹ SR 137

³² GAA, NA 377/378

³³ GAA, NA 118/72-72v

Provinces, as well as of merchants from diverse backgrounds, can be seen in one relatively straightforward bill.

Graph 7: Manoel Carvalho's Bills of Exchange, 1602-1636




Source: GAA, NA, n=4

Carvalho, as might be expected from his orientation towards the Mediterranean trade, had a preponderance of bills linking the Iberian peninsula with Italy and the Low Countries. Antwerp and Rotterdam appear as being integrated into Carvalho's web of commerce. Carvalho's enterprises seemed to have integrated the financial markets of Amsterdam and Antwerp, as well as integrating the Mediterranean and Iberia. The bills of exchange are evenly distributed between Carvalho and other Sephardic merchants, and Carvalho's non-Sephardic associates. In half the cases, Carvalho was part of a chain of credit involving only other Sephardic merchants. In the half of the cases, however, Carvalho, was part of an integrated network which included either other Sephardi merchants and non-Sephardim, or else several non-Sephardic merchants and Carvalho.³⁴

³⁴ SR 374; GAA, NA 377/342, 378

Graph 8: Carvalho's Bills of Exchange by Interaction Type, 1602-1636



Source: GAA, NA, n=4

It was not only capital that Carvalho integrated. This capital was used for the trade in products. Carvalho was heavily focused on the rich trades, as can be seen in the graph below. However, 1/5th of his products concerned the trade in bulk goods. Since Carvalho was known as an Atlantic merchant and as a merchant heavily involved in the sugar trades, 20% is actually a surprisingly high percentage of trade in bulk products. This, perhaps, indicates that even merchants that were heavily involved in one sort of trade felt the need, if they were globally-oriented enough, to diversify and integrated their product assortment, as Carvalho did.

Table 4: Rich vs. Bulk Trades – Manoel Carvalho

	Number	Percentage
<i>"Rich Trades"</i>		
Silks	1	1%
Sugar and spices	50	72%
Weapons and munitions		
Jewels		
Slaves	1	1%
Brazilwood	1	1%
Other (civet, coral, ivory, lacquer, specie)	2	3%
Subtotal	55	80%
<i>" Bulk Trades"</i>		

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Grain, Beans, other food	11	16%
Wood	1	1%
Hides		
Unworked metal	2	3%
		20%


Source: GAA, NA

It is clear, then, that while Carvalho tended to specialize in the rich trades, he was able to integrate and diversify categories of trade. Rather, Carvalho integrated the trade in products coming from the expanding European trade with the traditional European trade in bulk products.

It was noted above that Carvalho did not rely particularly heavily upon Sephardic associates alone. When he did, they were almost always part of a larger interaction that included non-Sephardic merchants. His integrated credit networks discussed above also illustrated this important point. Graph 9, below, shows how Carvalho depended on non-Sephardi associates and worked with integrated networks of Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants. Although the number of interactions varies depending on the chronology, what is clear is that integrated networks, whether of only Carvalho himself with non-Sephardic merchants or of Carvalho and one or more Sephardic merchants with non-Sephardic merchants were vital to Carvalho. For example, Manoel Carvalho granted a power of attorney to Anthony Villequier. Villequier was a co-owner of multiple shipments of sugar with Albert Schuyt, and also co-owned sugar with, and was insured by, Henri Thibault, as well as having multiple dealings with Samuel van Peenen and Pieter Gilles to name just a few of his non-Sephardic associates.³⁵

³⁵ GAA, NA 387/115-117v; NA 384a/435-436; NA 383/511; NA 383/226; NA 381/196; NA 380/502; NA 380/501

Graph 9: Manoel Carvalho's Economic Endeavors by Interaction Type, 1602-1636



Source: GAA, NA, n=110

The examples mentioned above are for Carvalho himself and non-Sephardic merchants. However, Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants also worked together in integrated networks. Take, for instance, the rather long and involved case involving multiple merchants, both Sephardim and Dutch alike, concerning a shipment of sugar that was taken by pirates to La Rochelle, in France. The sugar was owned by a number of different merchants, Sephardi and non-Sephardi, and was insured by still other merchants. The case wandered through the court system for years and eventually necessitated national government intervention.³⁶ Another example would be the co-ownership of a plantation in Brazil by Carvalho, his son Isaac, and two Sephardic merchants, Pedro Alvares Madeiro and Diego Fernandes with the merchants Symon van der Does, Jan le Gouche, Bartolomeus Hopffer and Christoffel Ayerschettel.³⁷

³⁶ GAA, NA 387/115-117v

³⁷ GAA, NA 672/5-6. It is unclear if these merchants are from the Dutch Republic or from the Spanish Netherlands.

As these examples show, Carvalho brought together parts or elements from varying regions, from diverse product groups, and from different groups together to form an integrated trade network. He coordinated capital in the form of bills of exchange from assorted sources and locations. He was also part of the integration of networks of exchange between Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants in varying configurations. Moreover, though Carvalho was clearly focused in the rich trades, he was not limited by the trade in colonial products, and also dealt in bulk goods. Carvalho integrated the products in which he dealt in order to incorporate both types of trade into his enterprise.


Bento Osorio

Bento Osorio received numerous bills of exchange, which indicate the integrated nature of his credit and capital. For instance, in 1638, a bill of exchange came due for Osorio that was first drawn in Venice in Italy, was passed through an Italian merchant in Seville, before being passed to Osorio in Amsterdam.³⁸ Thus, in one bill of exchange, it can be seen not only the geographic spread of Osorio's activities, which were already illustrated previously. Another bill of exchange, this one from 1618, was also first issued in Venice and wound up with Osorio in Amsterdam after winding its way through the Sephardic merchant Francisco Gomes Henriques, and the Dutch merchants Pieter Coerten, Andries Hendricxsz. de Beyser, the van Casteren brothers, the van Baerle brothers, and one Herman Hesters.³⁹ In this bill of exchange, the geographic distribution as well as the integration of both Dutch and Sephardic merchants can be seen. Once again, the integration of the Italian peninsula with the Low Countries, as well as of merchants from diverse backgrounds can be seen in one relatively straightforward bill.

³⁸ GAA, NA 1498/60

³⁹ GAA, NA 156/59v-60


Graph 10: Bento Osorio's Bills of Exchange, 1610-1640



Source: GAA, NA, n=17

There are a few striking elements when Osorio's bills of exchange are examined. It is not a large sample of bills. Nevertheless, what can be discerned is that Portugal and her colonies did not dominate. Rather, Hamburg and Venice seem to be the financial centers of Osorio's activities. These cities are followed by Antwerp, Bordeaux, Viana, and, surprisingly, Luik in the Southern Netherlands and 's Hertogenbosch in the Dutch Republic. Traditionally, it has been assumed that the trade with, and capital via, Iberia and her colonies was the backbone of Sephardic trade in Amsterdam. In the case of Osorio, at least, this seems not to be the case. Rather, Osorio's enterprises seem to have been integrating the financial markets of Europe, as well as integrating the less prominent cities of Luik and 's Hertogenbosch in the. Perhaps most striking, however, is how many bills of exchange concern an integrated network of Sephardi merchants dealing with non-Sephardi merchants.

Graph 11: Osorio's Bills of Exchange by Interaction Type, 1610-1640



Source: GAA, NA, n=17

It was not only capital that Osorio integrated. This capital was used for the trade in products. Global merchants such as Osorio integrated his product assortment and did not focus on any one trade, just as he strove to integrate routes and regions.

Table 5: Rich vs. Bulk Trades – Bento Osorio, 1610-1640

	Number	Percentage
"Rich Trades"		
Silks	2	1%
Sugar and spices	25	9%
Weapons and munitions	2	1%
Jewels	6	2%
Slaves	1	0%
Brazilwood	5	2%
Other (civet, coral, ivory, lacquer, specie, woad, indigo, tobacco)	7	3%
subtotal	48	17%
"Bulk Trades"		
Grain, Beans, other food	24	9%
Wood	11	4%
Hides	2	1%
Unworked metal	2	1%
Salt	189	68%
Other Baltic goods (cordage, etc.)	4	1%

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232 83%


Source: GAA, NA

The vast majority of the products in which Bento Osorio dealt – 83%-- were drawn from the bulk trades. It is clear, then, that Osorio was a specialist in the trade in bulk products. However, Osorio did deal in a variety of products that are categorized as belonging to the rich trades. Though he seems to have specialized, he did integrate the trade in products coming from the expanding European trade with the traditional European trade in bulk products.

It was noted above that Osorio did not seem to have relied particularly heavily upon Sephardic associates, and, when he did, they were almost always part of a larger interaction that included non-Sephardic merchants. His integrated credit networks discussed above also illustrated this important point. Graph 12 below, shows how Vega depended on non-Sephardi associates and worked with integrated networks of Sephardic and non-Sephardic. Although the number of interactions varies depending on the chronology, what is clear is that integrated networks, whether of only Osorio himself with non-Sephardic merchants or of Osorio and one or more Sephardic merchants with non-Sephardic merchants were vital to Osorio. For example, Guillaume Bartolotti was a co-freighter of a ship, Hillibrant den Otter made declarations on Osorio's behalf and Jacques Nicquet insured cargoes for him.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ GAA, NA 350/81v-82v; NA 645a/505-606; and NA 645b/1582-1584, respectively

Graph 12: Bento Osorio's Economic Endeavors by Interaction Type, 1610-1640



Source: GAA, NA, n=373

However, Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants also worked together in integrated networks. Take, for instance, the salt shipments from Setubal in Portugal brought to the United Provinces, Flanders and the Baltic which were made by Osorio and Andrea Lopes Pinto and consigned to Marcus, Pieter and Abraham Pels.⁴¹ Another example would be the power of attorney issued by Osorio and fellow Sephardic merchants, along with non-Sephardic merchants such as Gaspar Quinget and Daniel de Raedt to recover money owed to them all by Alexander van den Berge.⁴²

As these examples show, Osorio brought together parts or elements from varying regions, from diverse product groups, and from different groups together to form an integrated trade network. He coordinated capital in the form of bills of exchange from assorted sources and locations. These bills of exchange also give a first glimpse of the

⁴¹ SR 1590, 1572, 1571, and 1570

⁴² GAA, NA 611a/114-114v

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integration of networks of exchange between Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants in varying configurations. Moreover, though Osorio concentrated heavily in the trade in bulk goods, he dealt with the “rich trades” in mostly colonial products, as well, though to a lesser extent. Osorio integrated the products in which he dealt in order to incorporate both types of trade into his enterprise.

Integration means to put or bring together parts or elements to form one whole, and this is what global merchants did. They brought together the varying parts of products and geographies to form one global whole. The ability to integrate was key for global merchants. A merchant needed to not only integrate associates from other groups into his own networks, and integrate himself into other networks, as well, but also had to integrate geographies, trade routes, capital, and products. For instance, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio coordinated people, materials, and capital across market sectors and among geographically dispersed areas. They also diversified and combined the so-called “rich trades” with the commerce in “bulk” goods. They integrated capital, people, products, and geographies in innovative ways that pushed them into the category of global merchants.

Vega, for instance, integrated the products in which he dealt to a high degree. Vega was hardly limited by the so-called “rich trade” in mostly colonial products. Rather, he integrated the products in which he dealt in order to incorporate both types of trade into his enterprise. He coordinated capital in the form of bills of exchange from assorted sources and locations. These bills of exchange also give a first glimpse of the integration of networks of exchange between Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants in varying configurations. Thus, Vega not only clearly had important contacts with non-Sephardic merchants, but he was an outstanding example of an integrative merchant. This integration was a key component to his standing as a global merchant. A global merchant was a successful merchant, and, therefore, it seems that, in Vega’s case, a successful merchant would employ integrated networks of associates.

In contrast to Vega, Carvalho, though dealing in both the “rich” and the “bulk” trades dealt far more in the “rich” trades. However, like Vega, he was not limited by the trade in colonial products, as he also dealt in bulk goods, just not to the same extent that Vega did. In addition, also like Vega, he was part of the integration of networks of exchange between Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants in varying configurations, which can be seen in his bills of exchange. Meanwhile, Osorio, in contrast, traded predominately in “bulk” goods. He was a sort of mirror to Carvalho. Whereas about 20% of Carvalho’s trade was in bulk goods

versus 80% in rich goods, Osorio's trade was reversed. He has about 20% of his trade in rich goods and 80% in bulk goods. Despite this focus on one trade or another, both Carvalho and Osorio did integrate their product assortment to some extent. They also used bills of exchange to integrate their networks with non-Sephardim. This integration speaks to their standing as global and, thereby, successful merchants, who were using loose ties with non-Sephardic merchants to bolster their trade enterprises.

Opportunistic Merchants.

Integrating people, materials, products, capital, and routes meant seizing the opportunities available at the time, and exploiting circumstances to gain advantages. Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were opportunistic, and they actively adapted their decisions and actions to the commercial expediency of the moment. They were experimental in seeking opportunities to invest. They were flexible in their responses to change. As has already been shown, they often dealt in more than one activity, product, or route at once, while also engaging in new enterprises. Many merchants could be said to have behaved in similar ways. However, the opportunism of Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio stands in particular contrast to peers due to the sheer amount or intensity with which they engaged in integrating routes, diversifying their product assortment, including experimenting with new products, and employing new technologies, not to mention in regard to incorporating or integrating new associates into their commercial networks.

Manoel Rodrigues Vega

An innovation of the time was the joint-stock company, and Vega, as well as the other merchants being examined in this study, grabbed the opportunities presented by this new form of commercial organization. Within the joint-stock company structure, investors could contribute variable sums of money to fund a venture or series of ventures. In doing so they become joint holders of the trading stock of the company, with a right to share in any profits in proportion to the size of their holding.

Although Vaz Diaz asserts that Vega was an initial shareholder in the Dutch East India Company (VOC), this was not the case. Vega actually owned stock in a so-called "voorcompagnie" [early or precursor company] of the VOC called the *Verenigde*

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Amsterdamse Compagnie (United Amsterdam Company).⁴³ Manoel Rodrigues Vega had invested quite a substantial amount of money in Dutch East India voyages.⁴⁴ In all, his participation in the East India adventure seems to have totaled at least 60,000 fl.⁴⁵

In addition to subscribing to the Amsterdam Company, Vega also owned shares in various independent voyages. This was a technique for financing specific voyages, rather than a company structure, in which multiple ventures were financed. For example, he invested in 12,000 Flemish pound in 1601 for a voyage to the East Indies, and did so again the following year for the sum of 1600 pounds Flem, and these were just a few of the multiple voyages to the East Indies in which Vega invested.⁴⁶ He also traded shares in these voyages in order to repay debts and used these shares in the voyages as a guarantee for money he owed.⁴⁷ Moreover, within two years of the founding of the VOC in 1602, Vega was receiving shares in this new company as payment from Dutch associates such as Dirk van Os, Laurens Baeck, Cornelis Snellinck, and Jan Gerritsz. Parijs.⁴⁸ This despite the fact that van Dillen asserts that, “by 1609, when speculation in the shares in the VOC began, the Sephardim do not seem to appear.”⁴⁹ It is clear that Vega was at the forefront of this new form of capitalism. He saw the opportunities presented not only in the trade in the East Indies, but in the new manner of trading and investing itself – share-holding and the joint stock company.

It was not just the opportunity to trade in company stock that Vega took hold of. He was also active in insuring his cargoes. This was a form of risk reduction that had existed in various forms since antiquity. Bottomry, or loaning a captain money which was to be paid on the safe arrival of the ship, had been common since the Middle Ages, if not before. There is some debate, however, as to when insurance as it is commonly understood today – payment against a premium if the cargo was lost – began to be widely utilized in Amsterdam. The historian O. van Rees asserted that insurance had been regarded with suspicion in Amsterdam as late as 1564.⁵⁰ Historian Violet Barbour stated that, even as late as the early seventeenth

⁴³ J.G. van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de Kamer Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie*, ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 57-58 and J.G. van Dillen, “Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam in de Eerste Helft der Zeventiende Eeuw, I. De Portugeesche Joden, *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 50 (1935), 4-35, 10. There were only two Portuguese subscribers to the VOC when it was set up in 1602, and in 1604 that number had only grown to seven. See also, A.M. Vaz Dias, “De deelname der marranen in het oprichtingskapitaal der Oost-Indische Compagnie,” *Jaarboek van het Genootschap Amsterlodamum*, 33 (1936), 43-58

⁴⁴ SR 111, 132, 170

⁴⁵ Hermann Kellenbenz, *Sephardim an der unteren Elbe*, 453

⁴⁶ SR 105

⁴⁷ SR 105

⁴⁸ SR 132

⁴⁹ J.G. van Dillen, “Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam in de Eerste Helft der Zeventiende Eeuw, 10

⁵⁰ O. van Rees, *Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het einde der achttiende eeuw*, 2 vls., (Utrecht, 1865-1868), vol. I, 118

century, no more than 1% of Dutch shipping and 10% of merchandise was insured.⁵¹ The historians J.A. van Houtte and J.M. Price believe that the picture was not very different in Antwerp or London, respectively.⁵² However, a different view on maritime assurance is given by Henry de Groote, who shows that it was relatively common in Antwerp by the 1560s.⁵³ This is a view shared by the historian Hilario Casado Alonso based on his research on Brugge, which also shows that maritime insurance was utilized by the 1560s there, as well.⁵⁴ Be that as it may, the oldest surviving insurance policy drawn in Holland – probably, though not certainly, in Amsterdam -- is from 1592.⁵⁵ And, despite this debate surrounding how early maritime insurance became common in the Low Countries, Vega and the other merchants under consideration in this study, as well as the Sephardim, in general, seem to have insured their cargoes as a matter of course. And even if Barbour's numbers are off by a relatively wide margin, the fact that the Sephardim so frequently insured their cargoes would seem to be noteworthy. In fact, by 1611, Sephardic merchants were mentioning in their deeds to one another that they were taking out insurance from Dutch merchants regularly, and viewed the payment of the premiums for this insurance as one of the ongoing costs of doing business.⁵⁶

The Sephardim, especially in the early years of their settlement in Amsterdam, dealt largely in agricultural products from Iberia, North Africa, the Iberian Atlantic Islands such as Malaga and the Azores, merchandise to and from the pirate-infested Mediterranean, and, most importantly, sugar, textiles, and other high value products between Brazil, Portugal, the United Provinces, the Italian States, and the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁷ All these routes and products were risky due to the ongoing threat from shipwreck, piracy and privateering, war, and possible damage to costly fabrics and relatively easily spoilable foodstuffs. The resumption of the war with Spain in 1621, and the depredations of Dunkirk privateers on Dutch shipping,

⁵¹ Violet Barbour, "Marine Risks and Insurance in the Seventeenth Century," (1928-1929) I, *Journal of Economic and Business History*, 561-596

⁵² See J. A. van Houtte, *An Economic History of the Low Countries, 800-1800*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977) for Antwerp, and J. M. Price, "Transaction costs: a note on merchant credit and the organization of private trade," 276-297, 283-288 in J.D. Tracy, *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), for London

⁵³ Henry de Groote, *De zeeassurantie te Antwerpen en te Brugge in de zestiende eeuw*, (Antwerp: De Branding, 1975)

⁵⁴ Hilario Casado Alonso, "Los seguros marítimos de Burgos. Observatorio del comercio internacional portugués en el siglo XVI," *Revista da Faculdade de Letras História*, Porto, III Series, vol. 4, 2003, 231-242

⁵⁵ J. IJzerman and E.L.G. den Dooren de Jong, "De Oudste Bekende Hollandsche Zee-assurantie polis (1592)," *Economisch-historisch Jaarboek*, (1930), XVI, 222

⁵⁶ GAA NA 62/218v; GAA NA 125/27v-28v; GAA 376/416-417

⁵⁷ Daniel M. Swetschinski, *The Portuguese Jewish Merchants of Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam*, 619-620, note 31

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furnished convincing arguments in favor of insurance, especially for merchants such as the Sephardim who were so intimately involved in Iberian-related trade.

Vega, for example, took the opportunity to reduce his risk presented by this relatively new form of insurance. In 1599, he settled a claim for insured goods in two ships, the “Nostra Senora de la Victoria” and “Nostra Senora de Lux” from 1597 with Melchior van Dortmont.⁵⁸ In 1598, Vega and his Dutch associate Pieter Symonsz. claimed that the goods aboard the ship the “Sinte Pieter” had been lost and asked his Dutch insurers, Gaspar and Baltazar Coymans, Hans van Gheel, Baltazar Jacot, and Thibaut de Pickere for the sum insured.⁵⁹ Coymans, de Pickere and Jacot, as well as merchants Dirck van Os, Mathijs Jansz. van Straeten, Dirck Alewijn, Gubrecht Wachmans, Jan le Brun, and Conrard Bosserel insured wheat for Vega on the ship “De Rooden Muelen” in 1598.⁶⁰ Vega, then, saw the opportunity provided by insuring cargoes to reduce the risky nature of shipping in this. Moreover, insuring his cargoes gave Vega the chance to work closely with prominent non-Sephardic merchants, many of whom would work with him throughout the years on multiple ventures.

One of these ventures was the Baltic grain trade. Vega (and other Sephardic merchants) seized the opportunity presented by the bad grain harvests in the 1590s in Portugal and the Azores making the country permanently dependent on imported cereals.⁶¹ This dependence, when coupled with the grain needed by the city-states of the Italian peninsula, occasioned the rise of the Amsterdam-Portugal route trading in Baltic grain warehoused in Amsterdam, as well as other goods. In fact, the *Oost* and *Westvaart*, connecting Iberia and the Baltic, absorbed the lion’s share of Dutch shipping capacity.⁶² Despite the traditional historiographical assertion that the Sephardim in Amsterdam participated little or not at all in the Baltic trade, Manoel Rodrigues Vega and other global merchants did maximize the opportunities offered by the Baltic grain trade.⁶³

⁵⁸ SR 53. Van Dortmont was most likely from either the Dutch Republic or from the Spanish Netherlands.

⁵⁹ SR 18

⁶⁰ SR 28

⁶¹ Frédéric Mauro, *Le Portugal le Brésil et l’Atlantique au XVIIe siècle, (1570-1670): étude économique*, (Paris: Foundation Calouste Gulbenkian, Centre Culturel Portugais, 1983), 294-306, 308-317

⁶² De Vries and van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: success, failure, and perseverance of the Dutch economy, 1500-1815*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 373

⁶³ Daniel Swetschinski, in his otherwise detailed study of the Sephardic merchants of Amsterdam, asserts that, “Although direct commercial relations with Norway, Sweden, and the Baltic region were among the most important of Amsterdam generally, Portuguese Jews only sporadically ventured into these areas. Portuguese Jewish inroads in the grain, wood, and iron trade with northern Europe were largely out of the question. Dutch merchants controlled these most important routes upon which the city’s success was founded.” See, Daniel M. Swetschinski, *The Portuguese Jewish Merchants of Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam*, 174. Odette Vlessing, another undisputed expert on the Sephardim of Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, stresses that, while the trade in salt and corn were important to Amsterdam as a whole because of the quantities involved, in terms of profits, the trade in sugar and other “rich” trades were more important, overall. Interestingly, she does not

As Graph 1 above, showed, 21% of Rodrigues Vega's contracts were related to the Baltic, while, as seen in Table 3, a striking 40% of the goods in which Vega dealt were bulk Baltic goods, 30% of which was Baltic grain. In fact, as early as 1596, one year after his arrival in Amsterdam in 1595, Vega had clearly developed business contacts in the Baltic region with non-Sephardim. He granted two Powers of Attorney to Nicolaes and Jeronimo Grisons, merchants in Danzig, to act on his behalf in two separate business matters.⁶⁴ Through the latter part of the 1590s and into the early 1600s, Vega was active in shipping grain (rye, wheat) to Portugal⁶⁵ as well as, in at least one case, to France (La Rochelle), where his non-Sephardi agent, Elias van Geel, took receipt of the grain.⁶⁶

Manuel Rodrigues Vega also saw the opportunity offered by trading colonial goods in the Baltic. He was one of the founding members of a consortium for the trade in brazilwood which included numerous Sephardi and non-Sephardi members. The brazilwood was not just shipped to Amsterdam, but was also shipped directly to Hamburg, the gateway to the Baltic. Vega's correspondent in Hamburg was one Dominicus van Uffele who received the wood for Vega.⁶⁷ Van Uffele was born in Antwerp in 1545. By 1585 he was active as a merchant in Hamburg where he conducted business with Portugal, as well as other locales, on a large scale. Other members of his family traded with Amsterdam.⁶⁸ Manoel Rodrigues Vega saw the opportunity presented by the Baltic trade in grain and other goods and made use of it, while also parlaying these Baltic opportunities into building inter-cultural contacts.

While it is clear that Vega was involved in the trade in Baltic goods, as well as in the colonial products of sugar and Brazilwood, Vega also seized the opportunity to trade in that premier colonial product – slaves. In 1601, long before most Dutch slaving had begun he was part of a lawsuit regarding a “faulty” consignment of slaves.⁶⁹ This shipment of slaves was

discuss the role of Sephardic merchants in the salt and corn trades at all, instead concentrating on the traditional view that Sephardic merchants were largely or primarily involved in the sugar (and other colonial products) trade -- implicitly, arguing, therefore, that the Sephardic trade (the “rich” trade) was ultimately more important than the rather more prosaic Baltic trade. See, Odette Vlessing, “The Portuguese-Jewish Merchant Community in Seventeenth-century Amsterdam,” 223-243

⁶⁴ GAA NA 75/45-46v; See also SR 8 and 9

⁶⁵ GAA NA 53/12; 51v-52; 100; 103v

⁶⁶ GAA NA 83/105-105v; See also SR 60

⁶⁷ GAA NA 55/537v-538, 571-571v; NA 98/28-28v

⁶⁸ GAA NA 55/537v-538; See also Hermann Kellenbenz, *Unternehmerkräfte im Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel, 1590-1625*, (Hamburg: Verlag der Hamburgischen Bücherei, 1954), 226

⁶⁹ For information on the early Dutch slave trade, as well as the role of the Sephardim in this trade, see: Jonathan Israel and Daniel Swetschinski, in J.C.H. Blom, et al., eds., in *The History of the Jews in the Netherlands*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 77-79, 85-112, 399-408; Wim Klooster, “Sephardic Migration and the Growth of European Long-Distance Trade,” *Studia Rosenthalia*, 35 (2001), 2, 121-32; J. Postma and V. Enthoven, eds., *Riches from Atlantic Commerce*, (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 65-67, 205, 368-369; Jelmer Vos, David Eltis, and David Richardson, “The Dutch in the Atlantic World: New Perspectives from the Slave Trade with Particular Reference to the African Origins of the Traffic,” unpublished paper presented at the workshop *The*

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made with his long-time Flemish associate, Cornelis Snellinck.⁷⁰ In 1610, he and Snellinck bought slaves again, this time along with Dutch associate Leonard de Beer.⁷¹ The trade in slaves had been growing throughout the sixteenth century, but had been mostly controlled by the Iberian *asentistas*.⁷² Vega took advantage of the opportunities afforded by the expanding plantation system, as well as the financing and contacts offered by both his Iberian associates in Africa and his Dutch associates in Amsterdam to dabble in this new, risky, but potentially highly profitable “product.”

Manoel Rodrigues Vega was opportunistic, and actively adapted his decisions and commercial activities to meet the challenges and grasp the opportunities available. He was experimental in seeking opportunities to invest, by owning shares in individual voyages, as well as by owning stock in new companies such as the Amsterdam and Dutch East India companies. Moreover, Vega also ventured into industry. He received the lease on a house, free of charge, to set up a silk factory and show the Dutch how to make silk.⁷³ Nothing much seems to have come of this endeavor, however. He was also flexible in his responses to change. As sailing became riskier, he ventured into the relatively new form of risk reduction – insurance – to protect his cargoes. He also saw the opportunities to be had by trading in Baltic grain and integrating his bulk and colonial or “rich” trades. Moreover, Vega took advantage of the chances offered by trading in slaves. Lastly, he integrated his network to include both Sephardic and non-Sephardic associates to make full use of the opportunities presented by multiple partners from a variety of backgrounds.

Manoel Carvalho

Manoel Carvalho, like Manoel Rodrigues Vega, was a merchant on the lookout for new opportunities in the growing markets of Amsterdam. One of these opportunities was the joint-stock company, and, like Vega, as well as the other merchants being examined in this

Transatlantic Slave Trade: New Data and New Interpretations, Emory University, 10-11 December 2004, n. 14; Ernst van den Boogaart and Pieter Emmer, “The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650,” in Henry Gemery and Jan S. Hogendoorn, eds., *The Uncommon Market. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade*, (New York, 1979), 354; and V. Enthoven, “Early Dutch Expansion in the Atlantic Region” in Postma and Enthoven, eds. *Riches from Atlantic Commerce*, 17-47, 43.

⁷⁰ SR 91

⁷¹ SR 449

⁷² An *asentista* is the holder of a contract known as an *asiento* granted by the Crown of Spain and/or Portugal to supply goods and services on behalf of the Crown. The terms are most commonly associated with the slave trade, but there were, for example, *asientos* for the collection of taxes, the supply of wheat to forts, or the supply of salt to the army.

⁷³ H.I. Bloom, *The Economic Activities of the Jews of Amsterdam in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*, (Williamsport, Pa.: Bayard Press, 1937), 33-35

study, he grabbed the opportunities presented by this new form of commercial organization. In 1618, for example, Carvalho sold two shares in the Dutch East India Company. One share was for 2,400 guilders bought from the Enkhuizen Chamber of the Company. The other was for 1,900 guilders from the Amsterdam Chamber. Carvalho then traded these shares on to a Dutch associate, Abraham de Schilder, via a Dutch intermediary, one Ghenet de Jonge.⁷⁴ This example makes clear that Carvalho saw the opportunities to be had in the ownership and the trade in joint-stock company shares. He also must have believed that the East Indies offered interesting opportunities for trade and investment. Moreover, he used this share ownership to promote his connections with Dutch associates.

It was not just the opportunity to trade in company stock that Carvalho took hold of. He was also active in insuring his cargoes. He insured, for example, the ship “Croon” sailing from Venice to Tunis carrying a variety of products including planks, red lead, tartar, silks, lacquer, and wax for 2,500 pounds Fleming.⁷⁵ Carvalho was clearly availing himself of the opportunities offered on the Amsterdam insurance market to cover ships that were not sailing directly to or from Amsterdam itself. This ship was insured for Carvalho by a large number of his Dutch associates, with whom he did business in multiple ventures.⁷⁶ Carvalho also regularly insured his cargoes of sugar coming from Brazil. This was done to reduce the risks inherent in any transatlantic crossing, but especially against piracy. For instance, in one case, 160 cases of sugar were taken by pirates to La Rochelle in France, which his insurers had to pay to recover.⁷⁷

Carvalho insured more than just sugar, however. Manoel Carvalho was also actively involved in exploiting the opportunities offered by the slave trade. In 1617, Carvalho chartered the ship the “St. Michael” sailing to the West Indies with a load of slaves. Carvalho saw the opportunities to be had in the emergent triangular trade and ordered that the proceeds from the slaves be plowed into unspecified “goods.” These goods (assumedly sugar, though this is not specified in the sources) were to be shipped to Spain in the ship “Captain Francisco Ferrera.” It is likely that the money earned on the sale of these goods in Spain would either be returned to Carvalho in Amsterdam by taking advantage of bills of exchange, or else that the

⁷⁴ GAA, NA 611b/509v

⁷⁵ SR 841

⁷⁶ GAA, NA 254/184v-185v. These insurers were: Albert Schuyt; Hendrick Beeckman; Daniel van den Eijnde; Hillebrant den Otter; Francois Boudewijns; Adriaen Andriess., Nicolaes Claesse Everswijn; Barent Sweerts, Jan Jansee Smith, Jacob Jacobsse Bontenos, Pieter Beijens, Pauwels Jansse van Helmont, Dirck Vlack, Jan Battista Bertelotti, Godert Kerckrinck, Willem Pauw; Daniel van Geel; Louis Saulman; Hendrick Beeckman; Jan Jansse van Helmond; Jan van der Straten; Jacob Sijmonsse Louw; Nicolaes Claesse Everswijn; Wijbrant Warwijck; and Gillis Dodeur.

⁷⁷ GAA, NA 622/60v-61v, 67-67v

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proceeds would be used for the purchase of still more goods in Spain to be sold on the Amsterdam market.⁷⁸

Manoel Carvalho also excelled in maximizing the opportunities presented by the Italian peninsula's dependence of Baltic grain. As the Chart from Simon Hart in Appendix I shows, Carvalho was one of the major shippers of grain to the Italian peninsula. Only one correspondent for Carvalho is mentioned in Italy at all, Isaac Israel, in Venice, and it is not known if there was a familial relationship. Both Israel and a non-Sephardic merchant in Venice, Pieter Bauwer, were granted a Power of Attorney by Carvalho and his insurers to sell merchandise that was salvaged from a ship wrecked off the coast of Venice.⁷⁹ Other than working with these insurers, though, Carvalho seems to have taken advantage of these opportunities to sell Baltic grain in Italy on his own, as he had no partners in these voyages. Carvalho also saw the opportunities to be had transporting grain further a field to the Levant, and there are three contracts concerning shipments from Manoel Carvalho that have the option of putting in at the port of Alexandria.⁸⁰

As had been seen above, Manoel Carvalho was opportunistic, and actively adapted his decisions and commercial activities to meet the challenges and grasp the opportunities available. He was experimental in seeking opportunities to invest, by owning shares in the new Dutch East India Company. He was also flexible in his responses to change. As sailing became riskier, he ventured into the relatively new form of risk reduction – insurance – to protect his cargoes. He also saw the opportunities to be had by trading in Baltic grain in Italy and even farther into the Levant and integrated, to some extent, his bulk and colonial or “rich” trades. Moreover, Vega took advantage of the chances offered by trading in slaves. Lastly, he integrated his network to include both Sephardic and non-Sephardic associates to make full use of the opportunities presented by multiple partners from a variety of backgrounds.

Bento Osorio

Like Vega and Carvalho, Osorio took part in the joint-stock companies when they were in their infancy. Osorio, for example, was active in purchasing pepper from the Dutch

⁷⁸ GAA, NA 146/199v-200v

⁷⁹ The insurers were: Jan Jansz. Karel de Jonghe; Jan Jansz. Karel; Bartholomeus Bisschop, Pauwels Bisschop; Pieter Jan Mieusz., Lourens Joosten Baeck (Bax), Jan Coenensz.; Symon Loo; Leonard Pelgroms; Francois Pelgroms, Paulus and Steffano Pelgroms; Jacques Merchijis; Jacob Lucasz. Rotgans. GAA, NA 113/5v-6. These names appear frequently as insurers of the cargoes of Sephardic merchants.

⁸⁰ GAA, NA 141/142v; NA 144/151v-153v; NA 149/198-198v

East India Company.⁸¹ He was also involved in the transfer and trade in East India Company shares.⁸² It was Osorio, however, who saw the opportunities in the West rather than just in the East Indies. For instance, Bento Osorio was a contributor to the initial capital of the West India Company for a sum of 6,000 guilders.⁸³ This made Osorio the largest share-holder of any of the other Sephardic subscribers in an enterprise that was seen as much more risky than investing in the Dutch East India Company.⁸⁴ The large subscription also meant that Osorio became a *hoofparticipanten*, (chief shareholder) of the West India Company.⁸⁵ Osorio also arranged for his business interests to be represented in the new colony, both by Sephardic and non-Sephardic associates.⁸⁶

Osorio used these non-Sephardic associates such as Albert Schuyt, Godert Kerckringh, Adriaen Andriesz., Claes Andriesz., Jan Smit, Barent Swerts, and Luca Claesz. to insure his cargoes. These men, along with associate Jan Stassart insured wheat for Osorio.⁸⁷ These were certainly not the only non-Sephardim who insured cargoes for Osorio. Isaac Coymans insured various Mediterranean cargoes for Osorio in the 1630s.⁸⁸ While insuring cargoes offered the opportunity to both reduce risk and to build connections with non-Sephardic associates, it was not without risk itself. Osorio was involved in a long and contentious case involving the failure to pay out on an insurance claim which took years to resolve.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, Osorio seems to have seen the opportunities inherent in this form of business transaction, as he continued insuring cargoes throughout his life.

Osorio, then, clearly felt that emerging kinds of business techniques such as the joint-stock companies and insurance were opportunities he wanted to take advantage of. But he also grabbed the chance to be involved in the trade in new kinds of products, as well. Tobacco

⁸¹ GAA, NA 420a/176-184v; NA 418a/162-165v

⁸² GAA, NA 1052/63-63v, 71v

⁸³ G. van Dillen, "Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam in de Eerste Helft der Zeventiende Eeuw," 16. There were 18 total Portuguese subscribers to the WIC. Besides Osorio, there were four other Sephardic subscribers who contributed more than f 2000: Francisco Coutinho, f. 4000, Duarte Nunes da Costa f 4000, Francisco Vaz de Leon f 2400 and Diego Fernandes Dias f 2400.

⁸⁴ H. Watjen, *Das Judentum und die Anfänge der modernen Kolonisation: kritische Bemerkungen zu Werner Sombarts "Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben"*, (Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1914), 31-35. Other participants were: Francisco Coutinho, Antônio Nunes Torres, Duarte de Palácios, Francisco Mendes de Medeiros, Francisco Vaz de Leão, Jerônimo Rodrigues Mendes, Francisco Mendes, Miguel de Crasto, Estevão Cardoso, Diogo Fernandes Dias, Duarte Nunes Costa, Jerônimo Rodrigues de Sousa, Simão Rodrigues de Sousa, the widow of Eiomar Henriques, Fernandes Aires Mesurado, Branca de Pina, and Duarte Rodrigues Mendes.

⁸⁵ To be a *hoofparticipant* (chief share-holder or subscriber), the share-holder had to invest at least 6,000 f. In exchange, he received a say in the naming of the directors (*bewindhebbers*), and also the chance to be named a director himself.

⁸⁶ NL-HaNA, Oude West-Indische Compagnie, 1.05.01.01/14.

⁸⁷ SR 3633

⁸⁸ GAA, NA 726/103

⁸⁹ GAA, NA 628/447-449

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had been introduced to Europe in the mid-sixteenth century, but was nothing more than a novelty until the seventeenth century. Osorio was at the forefront in supplying this new luxury item to the Amsterdam market. In 1629, he was accused of non-payment of taxes on tobacco, which was discovered by the Sheriff of Amsterdam in cases in the cellar of his house on the Breestraat.⁹⁰ Seemingly unfazed by these legal difficulties, Osorio continued building a network of Sephardic and non-Sephardic associates who were interested in exploiting the opportunities offered by the craze in smoking tobacco sweeping Amsterdam. In 1631, Osorio entered into an agreement to sell tobacco to the Dutch merchants Gilles Silvester, Pieter de Sterck, Willem Watson and Barent Calder, as well as the Sephardic merchant Diogo Fernandes Dias.⁹¹

Osorio embraced not just new forms of doing business such as joint-stock companies and insurance, and new products, like tobacco, but also saw the opportunities to be had in technological advances. Osorio was a proponent of the new model of Dutch ships, the *fluit* ship. This ship was first built in the Dutch town of Hoorn in 1595, and is credited with the rise of the Dutch over the Iberian empires in the seventeenth century.⁹² For instance, Bento Osorio, his Sephardic partner, Gil Lopes Pinto, and their non-Sephardic associates, Dirck Thomasz. Glimmer, Pieter Reusen, Claes Adriaensz. and Dirck Ysbrantsz. declared to a notary in 1619 that they had been using the *fluit* ships for 20 years to transport grain to Spain, Portugal, and Italy and that these ships were as good as the older *Spiegel* ships.⁹³ There could have been some uncertainty in the larger merchant community of Amsterdam about these ships because, in this same year, Osorio and Pinto, along with Guillame Bartolotti, Hillebrant den Otter, Charles de Lasseur, Jacques Nicquet, Albert Schuyt, Philip Calandrini, Paulo de Willem, and Andries Hendricz., the majority of whom were prominent merchants, declared that they had been using these ships to carry rye and wheat from the Baltic to Portugal and Italy and that, “they are good ships . . . and that they have used them often and there is no need to make any special exception for them or treat them any differently than *spiegel* ships in insurance policies.”⁹⁴ The *fluit* ships were particularly effective because they carried a maximum

⁹⁰ GAA, NA 723/10; NA 847/502-504

⁹¹ GAA, NA 701/68-69


⁹² Robert Voertman, “The Sailing Ship Complex and the Decline of Iberian Maritime Enterprise. Some Neglected Factors in the Analysis of Cultural Change,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 14 (1), 77–88.

⁹³ GAA, NA 645a/474

⁹⁴ GAA, NA 645/505-506 “dat deze fluiten geode schepen zijn. Voorts verklaren zij vaak zulke fluiten bevracht hebben en dat men geen andere bewoordingen gebruikt in de verzekeringspolis van deze fluiten dan in de polis van b.v. een spiegelschip.”

amount of cargo at minimum cost.⁹⁵ Thus, it would seem that Osorio had seen quite early on the opportunities to be had from using the newer model of ship when other merchants were unwilling to take a risk on new forms of technology.

Illustration 2: *Fluit* ships



“De fluitschepen "Geele Fortuyn" en "Liefde"” by Reinier Nooms, 1650
Copyright: Nederlands Scheepvaart Museum

Osorio was opportunistic, and actively adapted his decisions and commercial activities to meet the challenges and grasp the opportunities available. He was experimental in seeking opportunities to invest, by owning shares in the new Dutch East India company, and, more importantly, by becoming a very important investor in the Dutch West India Company. He was also flexible in his responses to change. As sailing became riskier, he ventured into the relatively new form of risk reduction – insurance – to protect his cargoes. Moreover, Osorio saw new ways of carrying his cargoes and grabbed the opportunity to employ the newer *fluit* ship. He saw the opportunities to be had by trading in Baltic grain to Iberia and Italy and was, in fact, one of the largest shippers of Baltic goods to the Iberian peninsula, chartering close to

⁹⁵ P.W. Klein, “De zeventiende eeuw,” in J.H. Stuijvenberg, ed., *De economische Geschiedenis van Nederland*, (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1977), 79-118, 103

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200 ships during a three year period.⁹⁶ He integrated, to some extent, his bulk and colonial or “rich” trades. Moreover, Osorio took advantage of the chances offered by trading in the new product, tobacco. Lastly, he integrated his network to include both Sephardic and non-Sephardic associates to make full use of the opportunities presented by multiple partners from a variety of backgrounds.

Conclusion

Integrating people, materials, products, capital, and routes meant seizing the opportunities available at the time, and exploiting circumstances to gain advantages. Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were opportunistic, and they actively adapted their decisions and actions to the commercial expediency of the moment. They were experimental in seeking opportunities to invest. They all invested in the Dutch East India Company by owning shares in it, for example, while Osorio was an initial subscriber to, and was a chief shareholder in, the Dutch West India Company. Osorio’s participation in the Dutch West India Company might call into question the assumption that Sephardic Jews were unwilling to invest in the West India Company because they had their own trading connections in the Atlantic. However, it could also be that Osorio, as an individual merchant, saw the benefits to be gained from such participation in this chartered company, but that other Sephardic merchants made different choices. Be that as it may, Osorio, Carvalho, and Rodrigues Vega were flexible in their responses to change. They all utilized insurance at a time when it was still relatively uncommon. As has already been shown, they often dealt in more than one activity, product, or route at once, while also engaging in new enterprises. For instance, they all seized the opportunities presented by the Iberian and Mediterranean dependence on Baltic grain and stepped into this profitable trade. Osorio, especially, used to his advantage new maritime technologies to maximize his profits. Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Manoel Carvalho, in turn, saw the opportunities to be had in the emerging slave trade and profited from this. Bento Osorio grabbed his chance with tobacco. But all knew there were opportunities to be had with the trade in new products.

Many merchants of the time could be said to have behaved in similar ways, and some of the non-Sephardic associates of Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio have been mentioned as taking

⁹⁶ GAA, NA 200/63-64

advantage of these opportunities as well. However, what all these men have in common is that their opportunism stands in particular contrast to peers who might not have been willing to risk dealing in new products, use new shipping technologies or take advantage of new commercial instruments such as stock and insurance. More particularly, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio, not to mention their Dutch associates, saw the opportunities to be had by incorporating or integrating new associates into their commercial networks.

Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were what David Hancock terms, “state-of-the-art” entrepreneurs.” Hancock noted, when discussing the London merchants he studies during the eighteenth century, that these “state-of-the-art” entrepreneurs were “commercial practitioners who adopted new practices and products whenever they seemed profitable. Such men were always looking for new techniques to adopt and implement; they were not mired in tradition . . . they were opportunistic in adopting new and useful practices, and in imitating procedures and operations that seemed appropriate.”⁹⁷

Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, and their non-Sephardic associates, were working in an environment of great change, economically and politically. They were also operating in a time of uncertainty and of opportunity. Europe was expanding as never before, and there was a burgeoning demand for new products as well as the more traditional trade stuffs. People were on the move, not only out of Europe, but within Europe. The merchants under consideration in this study had all moved to Amsterdam from elsewhere, and were all newcomers there. At this same time, religion and identity, both in Amsterdam and elsewhere, were often fluid and shifting.

At the beginning of this chapter, the qualities of a “global” merchant were listed: global in terms of geographic reach, integrative, and opportunistic. One of the hallmarks of a global merchant was the ability to link geographical regions, and this was certainly characteristic of Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio. These merchants’ operations were not primarily local or national and incorporated both intra and extra-European routes, including the East and West Indies, the Americas, and the West Coast of Africa. This does not mean, of course, that these merchants were necessarily active in all places at all times. However, they all had at least some presence at some time in all three of the traditional trade regions connected to Europe – the Baltic, the Atlantic, (at this time expanding to include Africa and the Americas instead of only the Atlantic coast of Europe), and the Mediterranean, and were, to varying degrees, at the forefront of global trade.

⁹⁷ David Hancock, *Citizens of the World*, 14

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Another commercial advantage would stem from the ability to integrate products, routes, and networks, provided, of course, that such integration was more profitable than non-integrated, specialized trade. Therefore, integration was the second characteristic of a global merchant. As was stated earlier, integration means to put or bring together parts or elements to form one whole, and this is what global merchants such as Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio did. They brought together the varying parts of products and geographies to form one global whole. A merchant needed to not only integrate associates from other groups into his own networks, and integrate himself into other networks, as well, but also had to integrate geographies, trade routes, and products. For instance, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio coordinated people, materials, and capital across market sectors and among geographically dispersed areas. They also diversified and combined the so-called “rich trades” with the commerce in “bulk” goods. They integrated capital, people, products, and geographies in innovative ways, and, thereby, differentiated themselves from merchants who remained focused on one region, product, source of supply or credit, or market.

They were, above all else, successful merchants. Not only were they, as far as can be ascertained from the archival documentation, wealthy, but they were also global merchants, as the term was defined at the beginning of this chapter. Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were global in outlook and connections. They delved into multiple products and regions, and connected both within the Sephardic community and beyond it. These global merchants lived in a state of flux which offered unprecedented opportunities for merchants with the wherewithal, the connections, and the vision to step out of their traditional family and religious networks to take advantage of new possibilities for trade. That is what these merchants did in Amsterdam. They connected to merchants of all sorts of backgrounds, and maximized these loose ties to their economic advantage. Throughout the course of their careers and of their joint business ventures, these merchants either consolidated their positions as, or grew into, global merchants – merchants that, as Cátia Antunes writes, “. . . were able to bypass social links and replace or add new economic connections”⁹⁸ It is these new economic connections and the way in which these social links worked that will be discussed in the following chapter.

⁹⁸ Cátia Antunes, *Globalisation in the Early Modern Period*, 129.

Chapter IV: Networks in Action

This study has been based on the idea that networks incorporating merchants from a variety of groups were important for the conduct of trade in the Early Modern period. Moreover, it is the premise of this work that these networks which incorporated merchants from a different ethnic and religious groups to form loosely knit networks which connected individuals in various directions could have been more efficient in creating opportunities and promoting the defense of economic interests than tightly-knit networks. Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were successful merchants because they were global in terms of geographic participation, were integrative, and were opportunistic. To paraphrase Hancock yet again, their ventures were not unified organizations, but, rather, loosely bound sets of plans, projects, and ventures that combined their linked networks of partners, relations, dependents, agents, and contacts, many of whom were non-Sephardim. This approach made the system flexible, and enabled this group to control risks and earn profits.¹

This chapter will begin to explore how these loosely knit networks functioned in practice by looking at the interactions between Manoel Rodrigues Carvalho, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, and their primary non-Sephardic associates. First, the definition of “network” will be examined. Next, Amsterdam as the setting in which they worked will be discussed. Lastly, the chapter will also delve into the connections and links between individuals, and the opportunities these connections created. The following chapter will explore more of these inter-cultural network relationships with a larger group of merchants.

Network Terminology

The term “network” and “networks” has been used constantly in this work, but what, exactly, is a network? As has been noted already in Chapter II, the concept of “Diaspora” is not a wholly, or even partially, adequate as an analytical tool for the Sephardim. Therefore, as has also been remarked upon, the notion of “network” seems more useful for understanding long distance trade in the early modern period. This is especially the case when the techniques and organization of this trade are considered, particularly inter-cultural trade relationships, whether these were among the Sephardim or involved other groups. Such a network was

¹ David Hancock, *Citizens of the World*, 14

defined in Chapter I as being “a collection of actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another.”² This is a broader and more encompassing definition than, for instance, Braudel’s, who focused, instead, on geographical dispersion by noting that a commercial network comprised a certain number of individuals or agents located at different points in a circuit or group of circuits. The co-operations, connections and communications among them ensured the continuity and prosperity of trade.³ For Markovits, it was, instead, the circulatory flows within a given network that reflected its dynamism. He writes:

[Network is] a structure through which goods, credit, capital and men circulate regularly across a given space which can vary enormously in terms of both size and accessibility. . . . Goods, but also men (and sometimes women), credit and information circulate. While goods may also circulate widely outside the network (otherwise there would not be any exchange), men, credit and information circulate almost exclusively within it. Most crucial is probably the circulation of information.⁴

Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert does not disagree with Markovits. However, he believes that the Portuguese were exceptions to what Markovits describes. Studnicki-Gizbert writes:

Portuguese merchants did not center their activities in a particular nation-state, region, or city. In this respect they distinguished themselves from most other mercantile communities of the period. Seventeenth-century European merchants generally developed trading structures that formed a hub with a series of spokes branching out to secondary markets. . . . If other merchant communities were defined by hub-and-spokes organizational structure, the Portuguese connected many hubs and many spokes.⁵

While Studnicki-Gizbert makes an interesting, though difficult to prove empirically, point about the de-centered nature of Portuguese networks, the inter-cultural networks of Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were very much centered, in the city of Amsterdam. This “collection of actors” – Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, Bento Osorio and their non-Sephardic Dutch and Flemish partners -- pursued “repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another” mostly based in the city of Amsterdam, though their interests extended far beyond the Amstel. Since these enduring exchange relations occurred mostly in the city of Amsterdam, the next section will focus on

² Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” 59

³ Ferdinand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism: 15th-18th Century*, Vol. 2: *The Wheels of Commerce*, (London: Fontana Press, 1982)

⁴ C. Markovits, *The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947*, 25

⁵ Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea*, 95

providing the background necessary to understand how trade was conducted in this city. Then the specific inter-cultural interactions between merchants in Amsterdam will be explored.

Amsterdam

An English visitor to Amsterdam, Fynes Moryson, described how business was done in Amsterdam in 1592. “The marchants in summer meet upon the Bridge, and in winter they meet in the New Church, in very great number, where they walke in two rankes by couples, one ranke going up, and another going downe, and there is no way to get out of the Church, except they slip out of the doores, when in one of those rankes they passe by them.”⁶ Walking together on the bridge or through the church could be found businessmen of all sorts, who mingled with each other in order to gather the ever important information about the supply and demand of goods, the prices of these goods, and the expected arrival of ships carrying more merchandize and more news. As they walked about, talking to first one merchant, then another, they also exchanged information about newly discovered lands and heard and discussed news about political events, both near and far.⁷ As Moryson describes, in the sixteenth century, the merchants held their “market” on the Eastside of the Nieuwebrug that crossed the Damrak. In bad weather they went to the North side of the Warmoesstraat where they did business under the porches of the houses. Around 1600, in bad weather, they went to the Saint Olof’s Chapel, the Old Church (*Oude Kerk*), and the New Church. (*Nieuwe Kerk*). In 1608, an actual exchange building was built.

⁶ J.N. Jacobsen Jensen, “Moryson’s reis door en zijn karakteristiek van de Nederlanden, 1592-1595,” *Bijdragen en mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap*, 39 (1918), 214-305, 223, quoted in Clé Lesger, “De Wereld als horizon: de economie tussen 1578 en 1650,” in Willem Frijhoff and Maarten Prak, eds., *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam: Centrum van de Wereld, 1578-1650*, (Amsterdam: SUN, 2004), 103-187, 159-160

⁷ Clé Lesger, *Handel in Amsterdam*, chapter 6 and C.A. Davids, “Amsterdam as a centre of learning in the Dutch golden age, c. 1580-1700,” in P. O’Brien, M. Keene, and M. ‘t Hart, eds., *Urban achievement in early modern Europe. Golden ages in Antwerp, Amsterdam and London*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 305-325

Illustration 3: The Courtyard of the Amsterdam Exchange



“De binnenplaats van de beurs te Amsterdam” by Emmanuel de Witte, 1653

Source: Boijmans van Beuningen Museum, Rotterdam

Among these merchants strolling through the center of Amsterdam, talking first with one merchant, chatting next to a potential insurer of a voyage, later exchanging rumors about a ship lost in a storm in the Atlantic with a friend of a friend were Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Bento Osorio, and Manoel Carvalho. They were no doubt walking with other Sephardic immigrants to this emerging entrepôt in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, swapping information about possibilities for business enterprises and news about family and friends in Antwerp, Portugal, Brazil and Venice. But it was not only other Sephardic immigrants with whom they ambled along sharing news and striking up deals. They

promenaded along the streets of Amsterdam's informal market, and, later, within the corridors of the exchange with non-Sephardic associates, the vast majority of whom were also recent immigrants from Antwerp or the Southern Netherlands. Together these men talked about friends and family they both knew from Antwerp, chatted about the latest new product from the Americas, and made agreements.

The merchants walking around the New Church or looking for business in the newly built exchange had found a good environment in which to conduct trade. The legal system for the enforcements of contracts was, when compared with other cities of the age, relatively effective. Aspiring merchants could learn such vital skills as bookkeeping, and Amsterdam had become a hub for nautical and cartographical knowledge. However, it was the exchange that was the nerve center of Amsterdam trade. Except for grain, which had its own exchange, nearly everything that concerned trade was dealt with at the exchange – the chartering of ships, insurance of the contents of ships, the extension and acquisition of credit, arrangements for payments, the rental of warehouse space, and the hiring of employees of all sorts took place at the exchange. There were certain places for certain sorts of transactions, although where those places were is not precisely known.

Illustration 4: The Old Stock Exchange in Amsterdam



“De oude beurs van Amsterdam” by Job Adriaensz. Berckheyde, 1630/1693 Copyright: Das Städel

Amsterdam was attractive not only due to its trade infrastructure, such as the exchange described above. The access to the staple market was good for cooperation between merchants. Large and small scale merchants, from 1578 onwards, could freely move and trade in the staple market. *Prijscouranten* (price sheets) insured that necessary information was freely distributed. These were already being published in the late sixteenth century, and the early seventeenth century saw the emergence of a periodical press.⁸ As important was the business correspondence between merchants and the information exchange on the Stock Exchange. Amsterdam-based merchants and agents usually had the knowledge of the latest developments in all the markets first, which gave them a competitive edge over their colleagues elsewhere. With the expansion of the commodity and cargo trade came the need for services such as brokerage and insurance. The Exchange Bank was instituted in 1609 to try to establish some order in currency rates, but it soon became a deposit bank through which merchants could safely settle their accounts. This, the use of bills of exchange, and the rapidly declining interest rates, greatly facilitated financial transactions and, thereby, helped the expansion of shipping and trade.

Another innovation in Amsterdam was that trade was conducted year-round, which had not been the case in Bruges or Antwerp.⁹ Because of this, brokers were able to bring buyers and sellers together more often. Moreover, partnerships, freight contracts and other forms of associations and share holding schemes meant that even the smallest scale merchants could invest in large-scale trade. Germans, English, and the Portuguese, to name just a few, were welcome in Amsterdam, and had free entry to the city of Amsterdam. New and old Amsterdamers lived next to each other, and there seem to have been little open protest against the immigration into the city. Moreover, for a merchant to build a career in the city, “*poorterschap*” or citizenship, was not always necessary. Of course, citizenship was a significant advantage. A citizen of a city enjoyed judicial, political, social and economic rights that a non-citizen would not have had. For example, important city functions were only open to citizens of the city. Moreover, citizens were eligible for social welfare, such as it was. Perhaps most importantly, citizens could join the guilds that were so important in the seventeenth century.¹⁰ These were the reasons that immigrants such as Manoel Rodrigues Vega, who received citizenship in 1597, the first Portuguese Sephardim to do so, sought to become citizens of Amsterdam. However, it was not citizenship *per se*, but success in

⁸ Clé Lesger, *Handel in Amsterdam*, 77

⁹ Clé Lesger, *Handel in Amsterdam*, 77

¹⁰ Erika Kuijpers and Maarten Prak, “Gevestigden en buitenstaanders,” in *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam*, 189-239, 200

business endeavors that offered the aspiring merchant the possibility of social prominence and prestige, as well as political influence, in a way that was virtually unheard of in most other Early Modern cities.

Due to these factors, immigrants poured into the city from Brabant, Zealand, and German cities, along with the Portuguese Sephardim and the immigrants from Antwerp after the fall of that city to Spanish forces. The latter two groups of newcomers – the Portuguese Sephardim and the immigrants from Antwerp and the Southern Netherlands -- have traditionally received a great deal of attention in the historiography of Amsterdam in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. A merchant elite on par with that of Antwerp or Venice only really emerged in Amsterdam after the Revolt against Spain. Until then, the regents were the wealthiest group. Some of the regents engaged in trade, though relatively modestly in comparison with the aforementioned cities.¹¹ Therefore, immigration, especially of wealthy merchants from Antwerp and of the Portuguese Jews, has been pointed to as the reason for the rise of the merchant elite in Amsterdam. In opposition to this view, Jonathan Israel asserts that the rise of a merchant elite in Amsterdam was not due to a particular group of immigrants, as has often been argued, but due to a restructured economy.¹² Oscar Gelderblom believes that, in fact, the majority of the immigrants from Antwerp to Amsterdam after the fall of Antwerp were young entrepreneurs at the start of their careers in international trade. Though many of them later became wealthy, Gelderblom asserts that this wealth was acquired in Amsterdam, not Antwerp.¹³

Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio as Amsterdam merchants

It could be argued, however, that the relative wealth that a merchant brought with him to Amsterdam was not as important as the trade networks of which he was already a part, since the participation in networks provided opportunities for the continued accumulation of wealth. In the case of the three merchants under consideration in this study, they probably did bring lesser to greater degrees of wealth with them when they immigrated to the city. But they also brought along connections for the furtherance of their trade. In the case of the merchants under consideration in this study, all of whom were migrants and newcomers to Amsterdam, as was detailed in Chapter II, it was Manoel Rodrigues Vega who most fits Gelderblom's

¹¹ Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 344

¹² Jonathan Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade*, 46-71

¹³ Oscar Gelderblom, *Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden*.

profile of a merchant on the make who acquired his wealth in Amsterdam. He came to Amsterdam as a young man of 20. He was originally from Antwerp, like the merchants Gelderblom studied, and, like so many of these merchants, first spent time elsewhere before coming to Amsterdam. In the case of Rodrigues Vega, it was Nantes that was his abode prior to his immigration to Amsterdam. He was at the beginning of his career, which seems to have blossomed in Amsterdam, due, in large part, to his connections with fellow merchants from Antwerp. However, his family was prominent and, likely, wealthy members of the Portuguese factory in Antwerp. Therefore, his was hardly a “rags to riches” story of a fortune made from nothing in Amsterdam, and he brought with him his connections to Antwerp networks comprised of both Iberians and Flemings, mostly of whom were involved in the colonial trade.

Carvalho shares Vega’s profile, although he was somewhat older, around 30, when he came to Amsterdam. However, he came from Brazil. The relative wealth and prominence of his family can not be ascertained, but their ownership of an *engenho* there does seem to point to a relatively high degree of social status. Thus, while he certainly built up his fortune in Amsterdam, he, like Vega, brought with him the connections to networks based largely in Brazil, and expertise in, the Brazilian trade, as well as, most likely, some amount of wealth from his family.

Osorio, in contrast to both Vega and Carvalho, and also in contrast to Gelderblom’s depiction of the immigrants to Amsterdam, was an older man who seems to have already been established as a merchant. Osorio was integrated into the networks of New and Old Christians in Iberia, as well as those the Antwerp-based New Christian networks concerned with the colonial trade. In fact, Osorio fits more closely into Lesger’s vision of immigrant merchants bringing their wealth and expertise to enrich and help build the fortunes of the emerging entrepôt.

This wealth could be acquired relatively readily in Amsterdam due to shifts in the economy of this city. Amsterdam had been dominated in the sixteenth century by the relatively uncomplicated Northern European and Baltic trade. The merchants engaged in this trade were not generally among the elites of the city, politically or socially. The city, instead, was dominated, as was previously noted, by the regent class, who were only peripherally involved in trade. By the time Bento Osorio, Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho and their non-Sephardic associates arrived in Amsterdam, the entire landscape of trade and political influence had begun to shift.

Osorio, Rodrigues Vega, and Carvalho were well-situated to take advantage of these shifts. One of these changes was, for instance, that Amsterdam had beat out Antwerp and

Middelburg in the sixteenth century for the expanding trade in Baltic grains because the magistrate in Amsterdam offered fiscal advantages.¹⁴ Later in the century, Amsterdam evolved from a transit port for grain to a true intermediary between northern and southern Europe.¹⁵ Clé Lesger describes the “external” factors that made Amsterdam an attractive and vital place, including the location and properties of the harbor, especially because the Baltic grain from one year’s harvest could reach the city before the onset of winter, to be exchanged for colonial products from Lisbon, which arrived there at about the same time.¹⁶ It had a large, cheap merchant fleet and few restrictions on trade.

When the resources of local merchants, the migrants from Antwerp, and the Portuguese Sephardim came together in a city that had already developed a lively goods and carrier trade, a virtuous cycle began, according to Lesger. Amsterdam’s market attracted more and more merchants because supply and demand there were varied and plentiful. Not only could parties negotiate favorable deals, they could buy and sell a wide range of wares. This big and varied market also provided the shipping capacity to carry the goods all over Europe and even beyond, thus enabling merchants to trade on a truly international scale. Besides, freightage was relatively cheap, because the market was big enough to dispose of cargoes quickly and to find profitable return cargoes.¹⁷

Thus, it seems that religion, nationality, or wealth (or lack thereof) were not overly obstructive to participation in the city’s international trade. Vega was a “typical” Flemish merchant, young, but from a wealthy and prominent family. Carvalho was a colonial trader who was most likely looking to expand his sugar trade and other enterprises in this growing city. Osorio, in contrast, was an established trader who expanded his operations. Whatever their differences and similarities, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio became active in Amsterdam’s international trade. They did this by not only taking advantage of their family and religious connections in the nodes of the expanding European trade routes, but also by exploiting their connections with non-Sephardic merchants, most of which were built via their links to Antwerp, to combine the commerce in the so-called “rich” trades with that of the bulk trades.

As was seen in Chapter III, Osorio, Rodrigues Vega, and Carvalho dealt in the Baltic, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. They traded in the “rich” products which included silks,

¹⁴ Clé Lesger, “Clusters of achievement: the economy of Amsterdam in its golden age,” in Patrick O’Brien, ed., *Urban Achievement in Early Modern Europe: Golden Ages in Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 63-80, 68. Milja van Tielhof provides some nuance to this view in her *The ‘Mother of all Trades’: The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century*, (Brill: Leiden, 2002), Chapter Three, 67-115.

¹⁵ Lesger, “Clusters,” 68

¹⁶ Lesger, “Clusters,” 73

¹⁷ Lesger, “Clusters,” 76

spices, sugar, and precious stones. However, they were also actively involved in the bulk trades such as woods, hides, and grains. To survive economically in a Diaspora environment, the Sephardim had to maximize the opportunities provided by the structures for trade in Amsterdam by integrating different product groups, but also by incorporating disparate groups of people into their networks. Moreover, they also had to expand into lucrative areas of trade such as the Baltic, even if it meant building on and integrating their existing networks by developing relationships with non-Sephardim.

The Composition of Networks

The Sephardi, in general, and Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, particularly, expanded their networks that they brought with them to Amsterdam to include non-Sephardim. But what, exactly, would such a network look like? How can such connections between Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants be defined? As was seen above, even defining what constitutes a network can be problematic. Frédéric Mauro wrote that, “the boundaries of merchant communities are to be found not so much in space as in the definition itself.”¹⁸ However, finding the boundaries of that definition for an inter-cultural network is difficult. The problem becomes particularly thorny when it becomes evident that there were few partnerships in the legal sense of the word between any merchants at this time. While some few merchants did form official partnerships, usually for a limited amount of time, the vast majority of merchants, whether Sephardi or Dutch, simply joined together for a venture or two, while working with other individuals or groups on other ventures.

There were any number of possibilities for trading ventures available to Sephardi and Dutch merchants alike, as will be discussed in more detail below, and as was described in Chapter III. There were, for instance, investments in specific journeys for trade, or in trading consortia such as the *voorcompagnie* [early or “pre” companies] and the WIC and VOC. These involved (part) ownership of ships or shares in voyages, whether through partnerships involving two or more merchants, or joint-stock companies. It should be noted, though, that the concept of a “firm” was virtually unknown in the seventeenth century. Most merchants operated alone or in two-or three-person partnerships, though they also participated in larger,

¹⁸ Frédéric Mauro, “Merchant communities, 1350-1750,” in James D. Tracy, ed., *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-distance trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 255-286, 255

looser, more informal consortia, as well. Furthermore, partnerships in the seventeenth century could be open-ended, which added to the fluid nature of business ventures.

Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio acted together with merchants, Sephardi or non-Sephardi, only some of the time. Many of their endeavors were conducted independently, albeit along parallel lines. The intermittent nature of these merchants' ventures serves to highlight the problems inherent in seeking to understand the components of an inter-cultural network. Loose ties between merchants served to create opportunities and efficiencies in their networks. However, these same loose ties are often difficult to trace and define. David Hancock, in his study on eighteenth century merchants in London, ran across the same problem in defining interactions. He chose to use the term "associates" and "association" to denote the interactions between these merchants.¹⁹ For the merchants that Hancock studied, just as was the case for Vega, Carvalho, Osorio and the non-Sephardic merchants with whom they dealt, the term "associate" is appropriate since it captures the loose and flexible nature of the business ties better than terms such as "partners" which implies, especially to the modern reader, an official, legally-sanctioned union.²⁰ Thus, borrowing from Hancock's work, the "associate" and "association" will be used to denote the contacts between the Sephardi and non-Sephardi traders.

The cadre of "global" merchants written about in this work lived in Amsterdam between 1595 and 1640 and worked at various times and in a variety of ways with one another, trading on a large scale around the world. The business connections among the associates were flexible and opportunistic. Due to the favorable economic and political situation in Amsterdam during these years, as described above, these merchants could expand their businesses. They were not limited to their standard products, but also sought new markets and products. They were, as Chapter II demonstrated, migrants and members of the Portuguese Diaspora. They were also opportunistic entrepreneurs, who integrated various routes and a plethora of products. All of these characteristics, taken together, mean that they were successful Early Modern merchants. Any merchant could have had one or more of these characteristics, but it the combination of all these traits that made a merchant global and, thereby, successful. Their success is important to document if we are to understand how loose ties between merchants of differing backgrounds create opportunities within networks.

¹⁹ David Hancock, *Citizens of the World*, 9-18

²⁰ David Hancock, *Citizens of the World*, 9-18


Networks in Action

The focus of this work is on three men – Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio. These were men who were global merchants, and were prominent in their social and economic circles of Amsterdam's mercantile community. Their networks, of course, were comprised of family members, fellow Sephardim, but also non-Sephardic merchants. These inter-cultural networks, as Graphs 13, 14, 15, (below), show, that the vast majority of merchants simply joined together for a venture or two, while working with other individuals or groups on other ventures. These infrequent associations are a good example of loose ties, since these occasional ventures brought merchants together with one another and helped them connect with networks in a variety of directions, laying the groundwork for more intensive cooperation should it be efficacious.

The statistics would most likely not be markedly different if they were computed for wholly intra-cultural trade on the part of either the Sephardim or the Dutch merchants. However, as the charts also illustrate clearly, there were one or two non-Sephardic merchants with whom Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio had many interactions, often over a relatively long period of time. This is what sets these global merchants apart from other merchants at the time. They tended to have longer-lasting associations with one or more merchants from outside their ethno-religious group. In addition, of course, there were multiple less frequent associations for between three-to-five ventures of some sort or another. But it is the longer-lasting and more durable associations that best illustrate how loose ties between merchants functioned.

Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Cornelis Snellinck

Graph 13: Manoel Rodrigues Vega’s frequency of interactions with non-Sephardic merchants



Source: GAA, NA

Based on 245 interactions with 137 non-Sephardic merchants

The names of all associates are listed in Appendix II

The chart above illustrates the number of inter-cultural interactions Manoel Rodrigues Vega had with other merchants. The highest number that Vega had with another merchant was 24, or 10% of the total. These frequent interactions were with Cornelis Snellinck. In contrast, Vega had quite frequent one-off interactions with non-Sephardic merchants. He had 101 -- or 41% of the total interactions -- one-time interactions with merchants with whom there is no record of Vega associating with again. Nearly half of Vega’s inter-cultural interactions were with merchants with whom he did business a few times -- between two to eight times. Thus, as the chart above shows, the vast majority of Vega’s non-Sephardic associates dealt with him only once or twice on a various endeavors. This is an interesting illustration of the way in which loose ties worked in networks. Most networks seemed to have been composed of associates who dealt with each other only occasionally and loosely, thus spreading risk and expanding capabilities within the network. With his main associate, Cornelis Snellinck, however, Rodrigues Vega had a long-running collaboration that spanned eleven years -- from 1601 until 1612. This collaboration also spanned a wide geography and a diverse range of products and sorts of interactions. There are a total of 24 recorded

interactions, though there could be far more that were either unrecorded or were not found among the extant archival documentation.

Snellinck came from Antwerp, and it is likely that his association with Vega, or at least knowledge of one another, was born in that city, as Vega and his family were prominent merchants in that city. Furthermore, Snellinck was married to a Portuguese woman named Leonora da Vega (though no known relation to Rodrigues Vega and it is not clear if she was Sephardic or not), so their ties were further bolstered by Snellinck's knowledge of the Portuguese language and his own entry into Portuguese networks. Snellinck is first mentioned in Amsterdam in 1598.²¹ This is two years after Vega arrived in Amsterdam, and a year after Vega received official status as a citizen. Though Vega moved to Rotterdam around 1606, Snellinck stayed in Amsterdam. He lived on the Singel in 1631.²² He died before Jan. 17, 1657.²³

Snellinck occurs several times as co-outfitter of ships bound for Brazil and, on 30 April 1600, he and eight other merchants from the Northern and Southern Netherlands, England, and Portugal set up a partnership for trading with All Souls Bay in Brazil.²⁴ Thus it is clear that Snellinck was heavily involved in the Brazil trade, mostly in sugar, and that he conducted this trade with inter-cultural groups of merchants from various regions and from a variety of backgrounds. This can be seen by the fact that, about 1606, he corresponded with many Portuguese in Lisbon.²⁵ In addition, he was, for instance, given a power of attorney to settle a dispute concerning Brazilwood by the prominent *asentista*, João Nunes Correia.²⁶

Snellinck was also involved in endeavors with the other Sephardic merchants, Manoel Carvalho and Bento Osorio, who are being highlighted in this study. In 1614, for example Snellinck was part of an agreement concerning a pirated shipload of sugar that involved Bento Osorio.²⁷ Snellinck also owed Osorio 100,000 guilders at one point in 1624.²⁸ Manoel Carvalho and Snellinck declared together twice, once in 1617 and, again, in 1618, on behalf of Duarte and Gonçalo Ximenes and the well-known Amsterdam merchant, Salomon Voerknecht, regarding the customs surrounding the shipment of Brazilwood and sugar.²⁹ It seems, however, that Vega was one of his most important Portuguese associates. Their

⁴³ <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

²² <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden/>

²³ SR 91

²⁴ SR 91

²⁵ SR 91

²⁶ SR 18

²⁷ GAA, NA 198/166-167

²⁸ GAA, NA, 646b/963

²⁹ GAA, NA 645/43v-44; NA 645/344-346

dealings together fall under the following general categories: acting on each other's behalf, shared ownership, credit, and joint actions as prominent merchants.

Granting a power of attorney or a right of proxy to someone enabled that person to act on a merchant's behalf. The actions taken on a merchant's behalf by the other persons would then be legally binding. Therefore, the right of proxy or the issuance of a power of attorney gave the receiver of such an entitlement freedom, as well as of authority, for and from the merchant who granted it to him. Thus, there was a great deal of trust implied by the issuance of such permission. In 1604, Rodrigues Vega granted Cornelis Snellinck a general right of proxy to transact business on his behalf, both in Amsterdam and elsewhere.³⁰ A similar right of proxy was granted again this same year by Vega to Snellinck to secure Vega's discharge from a debt.³¹ Later in the year, Snellinck accepted four bills of exchange drawn on Vega in London, which Vega was unable to cover. To save Vega from financial and legal problems, Snellinck accepted the bills for Vega, assumedly with the knowledge that Vega would repay him at a later date.³² And this was not the only time. In 1606, Snellinck stated that he was "satisfied with Vega's word," even though he had no written confirmation of a debt that was owed to him.³³ In fact, Snellinck seemed little bothered by debts to him that Vega had incurred. Snellinck also acted on Vega's behalf regarding Vega's debts to others. In 1605, Snellinck made a declaration in Vega's name to a notary regarding money that Vega owed.³⁴ However, it was not just Snellinck who acted on Rodrigues Vega's account. In 1612, Rodrigues Vega granted a power of attorney to another Sephardic merchant, Alfonso Dias Henriques, and "acting on the orders of Snellinck," Vega authorized the collection of a sum of money.³⁵ Thus, it seems that Snellinck and Vega had enough trust in one another to give each other control over their legal affairs.

As has been seen, many of these authorizations to act on each other's behalf in legal and financial matters concerned debts. These debts were sometimes to other people, but also often between themselves. Snellinck and Rodrigues Vega were, in fact, important sources of relatively short-term credit for one another. For instance, Vega conveyed directly to Snellinck the 2,000 pounds Fleming due to him from the payment of an insurance policy, since "this sum offsets the money still outstanding between them."³⁶ Vega conveyed the sum of 262

³⁰ SR 136

³¹ SR 139

³² SR 160

³³ SR 204

³⁴ SR 181

³⁵ SR 554

³⁶ SR 134

pounds Fleming which he had invested in a voyage to Brazil and Angola to Snellinck, also as payment owed to him.³⁷ In addition, Vega stated in this same deed that Snellinck had paid him entirely for what Snellinck owed him.³⁸ Vega also extended credit to Snellinck to buy 115 chests of sugar in 1604.³⁹

These transactions involved relatively small sums. However, the provision of the ransom for the Admiral of Aragon required the extension of large amounts of credit which were tied up for several years. Snellinck helped Rodrigues Vega come up with the considerable amount of money necessary to ransom the captured Admiral for the Habsburg King. Don Francisco de Mendoza, Admiral of Aragon, was the commander of the Spanish cavalry for the troops under the leadership of Albert of Austria, Archduke of the Southern Netherlands. Don Francisco was taken prisoner during the battle of Nieuwpoort in 1600. The negotiations lasted until May 22, 1602. The most important condition was the release of all Dutch prisoners of war in the Spanish lands. The States General demanded suretyship to guarantee that this condition would also be adhered to by the Spanish after the Admiral was released. On May 17, 1602, Manuel Rodrigues Vega bound himself in his own name and in that of Luis Fernandes, his father, as surety for 50,000 guilders.⁴⁰

In 1603, Vega handed over to Snellinck an 800 guilder share in 10 ships that had sailed to the West Indies in 1599, another share worth 400 guilders for a fleet of five ships which had sailed to the West Indies in 1601, and yet another share for 400 guilders for a different voyage.⁴¹ These shares were given to Snellinck for partial repayment of what Vega owed him for the ransom. Snellinck also managed to come up with 10,000 guilders himself for Vega to use as security for the Admiral's ransom.⁴² In addition, Snellinck helped Vega drum up the rest of the necessary financing for the ransom from other Flemish merchants. For instance, "acting on the advice of Snellinck," Dirck van Os, one of the most prominent of the Flemish émigrés to Amsterdam, and one of the founders of the Dutch East India Company, "placed entirely at the disposal of Vega a share to the value of 550 pounds Fleming in a voyage to the East Indies of four ships which set sail from Zeeland in 1501 and a share to the value of 1250 pounds Fleming in the voyage of 14 ships under Admiral Wijbrand Warijck."⁴³

³⁷ SR 133

³⁸ SR 133

³⁹ SR 142

⁴⁰ See SR 100, 101, 105, 111, 132, 139, 181, and 212; and RGP 92, 1602, no. 32, 39,n.5, 82; 1603, no. 6

⁴¹ SR 105

⁴² SR 212

⁴³ SR 132. For more details about van Os' trade activities, see Oscar Gelderblom, *Zuid Nederlandse kooplieden*, n. 228-235, pp. 160-163; see also: <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>. Dirck van Os was first mentioned in Amsterdam in 1588. He was born in Antwerp about 1557 and died in Amsterdam in 1615. The

These shares were to be used for the financing of Vega's suretyship for the Admiral of Aragon. Moreover, van Os agreed to holding shares and money for Vega as security until Vega was discharged of his obligations to the States General on behalf of the Admiral.⁴⁴ Lastly, he provided 5,000 pounds Fleming of his own money to Vega as a loan to help him scrape together the needed funding.⁴⁵ Thus, it is clear that Snellinck had enough knowledge of, and faith in, Vega to not only provide substantial sums on credit himself, but to arrange for other prominent associates to do so, as well – an action that put his own reputation on the line.

These two merchants of differing backgrounds did more than acting on each others behalf and extending one another credit. They co-owned both trade goods and property. Snellinck and Vega were co-owners of a cargo of sugar and brazilwood that was transported between Brazil and Lisbon in 1601.⁴⁶ This was hardly the only time Snellinck and Vega co-

same year of his arrival in Amsterdam – 1588 -- he married Margriete van der Piet, also from Antwerp. van Os' sister, Judith, was married twice. The first time was to Jan van Valckenborch de jonge. Four years later she married Jean le Brun, also born in Antwerp, who lived on the OZ Voorburgwal. He came to Amsterdam via Middelburg after the fall of Antwerp. His family was prominent in Antwerp. In 1585, Dirck was a captain in the Antwerp citizens' watch. Together with Hendrick Arentsz. Hudde, Reynier Adriaensz. Pau, Jan Jansz. Daerel, Hendrick Buyck, Syvert Sem, Jan Poppen, Pieter Dircksz. Hasselaer and Arent ten Grootenhuys they founded the "Compagnie van Verre" in 1594, of which he was a Director. See, H. Terpstra, "De Nederlandsche voorcompagnieën," in F.W. Stapel, ed., *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië*, 5 vols., (Amsterdam: Joost van den Vondel, 1938-1940), vol. II, 275-475. This made him one of the founders of the North Netherlands trade with Russia and, in 1595 and 1596, he shipped salt from Setúbal in Portugal, among other things, to Archangel in Russia with Isaac le Maire, Marcus de Vogelaar and Pieter van Pulle (Pulle also from Antwerp). Gelderblom, *Zuid Nederlandse kooplieden*, 156. Van Os' business interests were diverse. He was a Director of the VOC's Amsterdam Chamber. See, O. Gelderblom, "De Deelname van Zuid-Nederlandse Kooplieden aan het Openbare Leven van Amsterdam (1578-1650)," in *Ondernemers & Bestuurders: Economie en Politiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in de Late Middeleeuwen en Vroegmoderne Tijd*, C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, eds, (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1999), 237-258, 246. Gelderblom asserts that the Directorship of the VOC was economically motivated because the subscribers from the Southern Netherlands had invested more in the Company than had the investors from the Northern Netherlands. It was in his house on the street "de Nes" in the center of the city that the first subscriptions for the VOC were registered on the 31st of August in 1602. He retained his heavy involvement in the VOC until his death. He was one of the Company's representatives during meetings and negotiations with the English East India Company in 1613 and 1615. In 1607 he was involved in the polderizing of the Beemster, along with Jacob Poppen, Arent ten Grootenhuis, Pieter Boom and other non-Amsterdammers.

His daughter, Maria, married in 1608 when she was 19 to a Middelburger. Another daughter, Margarita, married in 1622 when she was 21 to Phillippe van der Straeten, also from Antwerp. van Os had a son, as well, named Dirck Junior. His son, Dirck van Os, junior, was one of the officials on the Council governing the use of water in the Beemster in 1618. This was an important position to occupy during the time. Another son, Francois married Sara Wijs and built a country home called Zwaansvliet in 1628 that stayed in the family for two centuries. In addition to his children, van Os had a brother, Hendrick, who was a year older than Dirck and who also lived on the OZ Voorburgwal, where their sister Judith had lived. The brothers worked together on their business enterprises. In 1609, 1611 and 1612, the firm Dirck and Hendrick van Os had three pages in the Exchange Bank register, and in 1615, they had five pages. Their registration in the "participation book" of the VOC is in the name of the firm "Dirck and Hendrick van Os," although it is Dirck who features most prominently, and not only in dealings with Sephardic merchants. Govert Dircksz. Vuytiers (Wouters), and Jan Jansz. Carel den Jonge. See, Johan E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795*, vl. I, (Amsterdam: Israel, 1963), 22. van Os bought 12.000 worth of shares in the VOC for Hendrick de Hase, the father of Constantina de Hase, the wife of Jacques Nicquet and Albert Schuyt.

⁴⁴ SR 132

⁴⁵ SR 111

⁴⁶ SR 91

owned shipments of these products. Vega and Snellinck were part of an inter-cultural group which included João Nunes Correia, the Dutch merchants Jan Claesz. Colijn, Jan van Baerle, Jan Lourensz., and the Sephardic merchants Miguel Lopes Homem, Francisco Pinto de Brito, Francisco Mendes, Duarte Saraiva, and Alberto Rodrigues Vega, who jointly owned a shipment of sugar in 1603.⁴⁷ A similar sort of inter-cultural consortium was brought together in 1604 by Snellinck and Rodrigues Vega for the shipment of brazilwood to Hamburg. This venture involved, in addition to Snellinck and Vega, the Flemish merchant Dominicus van Uffele, in Hamburg, and the Sephardic merchant João Castelli. In this same year, Vega and Snellinck also co-owned a $\frac{3}{4}$ share in a cargo of unnamed products shipped via Madeira to Bahia in Brazil.⁴⁸

Thus far, Snellinck and Vega had mostly gone in together to buy sugar and brazilwood. However, they also were joint owners of slaves during the course of their association. In 1601, they were involved in litigation against the captain of a “faulty consignment of slaves.”⁴⁹ They also co-owned 62 slaves on their *engenho* (sugar mill) called “Santo Cosmas” in Bahia in Brazil.⁵⁰ This mill was bought by them in 1610.⁵¹ They seem to have owned it jointly for around two years, until, in 1612, a brother of Manoel, Pedro Rodrigues Vega, bought out Snellinck’s share in the plantation.⁵²

Perhaps because they were both known as some of the foremost of the merchants working on the Brazil trade, both Vega and Snellinck came together on behalf of a fellow merchant. They were asked by one Jan van Baerle to depose to a notary regarding the customs surrounding the payments of tolls to the King of Spain for merchandize coming from Brazil. They both declared in this document that, despite the fact that it was against the law, they had, on several occasions, had ships laden with sugar and brazilwood sail directly from Brazil to the United Provinces, notwithstanding that they had declared Portugal to be their destination. They went on to say that they had done this with the tacit approval and knowledge of the States General.⁵³

The association between Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Cornelis Snellinck was based on the Brazil trade – sugar, brazilwood, and slaves. However, there were also ventures into the East Indies via the trade in shares in voyages going to this region. Moreover, these two

⁴⁷ SR 109

⁴⁸ SR 137

⁴⁹ SR 91

⁵⁰ SR 449

⁵¹ SR 553


⁵² GAA NA 62/343-348v

⁵³ SR 87

merchants traded together in pearls, rubies, and musk.⁵⁴ Thus, they were concerned with the expanding European “rich” trades. No matter what their geographical or product focus was, however, their day-to-day activities as merchants were based on mutual trust and similar goals. Their shared background in the city of Antwerp, and their mutual circles of associates such as Carvalho, Osorio, and van Os, to name just a few, no doubt knitted together their enterprises, which, as has been seen, included acting on each others behalf, extending credit to one another, co-owing cargoes and property, and jointly working as representatives of the Amsterdam merchant community concerned with the colonial trade.

Manoel Carvalho and Albert Schuyt

Graph 14: Manoel Carvalho’s frequency of interactions with non-Sephardic merchants



Source: GAA, NA
 Based on 338 interactions with 145 non-Sephardic associates.
 The names of all associates are listed in Appendix III

Just as was the case for Manoel Rodrigues Vega, and as the chart above shows, the vast majority of Carvalho’s non-Sephardic associates dealt with him only a few times on a given endeavor. Fifty-six percent of his non-Sephardic associates dealt with him between two and fifteen times, while 27% were one-time associations between Carvalho and a non-Sephardic merchant. Seventeen percent of Carvalho’s interactions with non-Sephardic merchants, however, occurred more than twenty times. With his main associate, Albert Schuyt, however, Manoel Carvalho had a long-running collaboration that spanned 18 years –

⁵⁴ SR 192

from 1614 until 1632. This collaboration was centered on the insurance of cargoes and on the co-ownership of sugar. There were a total of 29 recorded interactions, though there could be far more that were either unrecorded or were not found among the extant archival documentation.

Albert Schuyt was one of the few partners of the Sephardim who are highlighted in this work who was born in the Northern Netherlands, though he had strong ties to Antwerp through his second marriage. Carvalho also had connections with Antwerp via his cousin, Maria de Pas. Schuyt was born in Naarden in 1576. He died in Amsterdam in 1632, when he was living on the Herengracht.⁵⁵ He had moved to Amsterdam after his first marriage to Anna Bernard in 1603. He married for the second time to Constantia de Haze, from Antwerp, who was the widow of Jan Nicquet (see below) and the daughter of Hendrick and Clara Coymans.⁵⁶ He had a daughter, Anna, from his first marriage, who married Gerrit Reynst and another daughter, Helena, from his second marriage who married her cousin, Isaac Coymans. Schuyt also had a son, Gijsberto, who was born in 1620.⁵⁷ He was a merchant who dealt in the Italian and Levant trade and worked as an insurer. He is known to have done business with Laurens Joosten van Baeck, among others who were also in business with the Sephardim.⁵⁸ One of these deals with Sephardic merchants is mentioned in P.W. Klein's study of the Tripp family. Schuyt sub-rented a ship he had rented from Elias Tripp to "Jews in Constantinople" who were shipping merchandize to Venice.⁵⁹

It was not just the Jews of Constantinople, however, with whom Schuyt did business. He was well-known as an insurer for Sephardic merchants. Between 1608 and 1627, Schuyt insured at least 15 cargoes for Sephardic merchants other than Manoel Carvalho.⁶⁰ One of these merchants was Bento Osorio. Osorio took out insurance with Albert Schuyt, Jan Stassart, Godert Kerckringh, and Adriaen and Claes Andriesz. for a shipment of wheat.⁶¹ Schuyt was also one of a group of Dutch merchants which included Guillome Bartolotti, Hildebrandt den Otter, Charles de Lasseur, Jacques Nicquet, Philipp Calandrini, Paulo de Willem, and Andries

⁵⁵ Johan E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795*, vl. II, (Amsterdam: Israel, 1963), 1017

⁵⁶ Johannes Gerard van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de Kamer Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie*, ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1958), 141, 209

⁵⁷ Johan E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795*, vl. I, (Amsterdam: Israel, 1963), 260

⁵⁸ GAA, NA 374/92, cited in Johannes Gerard van Dillen, *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis*, Vl. I, 713

⁵⁹ P.W. Klein, *De Trippen in de 17^e Eeuw: Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt*, (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1965), 311

⁶⁰ These merchants were: James Lopes da Costa and Francisco Lopes, SR 280; Gaspar and Manoel Lopes Homem, SR 124; Belchior and Francisco Mendes, SR 630; Juan Gonçales, SR 677, 678; Diogo Nunes Belmonte, SR 684, 689, 695, 870, GAA, NA 646a/227; Pascoal Lopes, SR 708, 709, 716; Diogo Gomes Duarte, SR 708, 709; Gaspar Rodrigues Nunes and Francisco da Costa Brandão, SR 854; Diogo Martins and Sebastiaen Mendes Pimentel, SR 3637; and Guiomar Henriques, SR 3581

⁶¹ SR 3633

Hendricsz. de Beyser who declared on Osorio's behalf twice about the customs regarding wheat shipments from the Baltic region to Portugal and Italy.⁶²

It was Manoel Carvalho, though, with whom Schuyt had the most business dealings. Just as he had insured cargoes for other Sephardic merchants, he also insured cargoes for Manoel Carvalho. In fact, their documented association begins with the insurance of a cargo that sailed from Venice to Tunis and La Goulette in North Africa in 1614. This cargo was carried in the ship "Sta. Anna Bonaventura." This shipment was co-insured by Schuyt and a multitude of other Dutch insurers.⁶³ This large number of co-insurers was not unusual. For instance, the Sephardic merchants found in the database used for this study listed an average of five insurers per deed. However, this number is deceptively low and there were probably many more insurers per cargo and/or ship. Many deeds mention just one insurer, though he is sometimes mentioned as being the "representative for" the other insurers. Likewise, one insurer and his "company," comprised of an unknown number of other merchants, was often mentioned. One example would be the ship known as the "Sinte Pieter" (Saint Peter) which had at least five insurers mentioned in one deed, while five other insurers were named in another deed pertaining to this same ship, meaning that there were at least 10 separate insurers.⁶⁴

Perhaps stemming from their association for the insurance of the vessel in 1614, Carvalho and Schuyt came together again in 1616, for the co-ownership of a cargo of sugar.⁶⁵ This same year, they jointly issued a power of attorney to a Sephardic merchant living in Bordeaux, Antonio Mendes, to follow-up on the whereabouts of this cargo of sugar.⁶⁶ This cargo of sugar originated in Bahia and was taken by pirates to La Rochelle.⁶⁷ All in all, Schuyt and Carvalho co-owned 58 chests of sugar from this voyage.⁶⁸ The total value of another cargo of sugar co-owned by Carvalho and Schuyt, comprised of 102 chests, was 20,000 guilders.⁶⁹ The following year, they went in together on 300 chests of sugar.⁷⁰ In 1618,

⁶² GAA, NA 645/505-506; NA 645a/505

⁶³ NA 254/184v; see also SR 796. The other Dutch insurers were: Hendrick Beeckman; Daniel van den Eijnde; Hillibrant den Otter; François Boudewijns; Adriaen Andriess.; Nicolaes Claesse Everswijn; Barent Sweerts; Jan Jansee Smith; Jacob Jacobsse Bontenos; Pieter Beltens; Pauwels Jansse van Helmont; Dirck Vlack; Jan Battista Bartolott; Godert Kerckrinck; Jan Jansz. Smith; David de l'Hommel; Pieter van Gheel; Jacques van Hanswijck;

⁶⁴ GAA NA 53/36v

⁶⁵ GAA, NA 387/119

⁶⁶ GAA, NA 379/602

⁶⁷ GAA, NA 379/614

⁶⁸ GAA, NA 379/618

⁶⁹ GAA, NA 622/61v-62


⁷⁰ GAA, NA 380/108

they co-owned yet another 160 chests of sugar.⁷¹ In fact, their joint ownership of cargoes of sugar originating in Bahia in Brazil seems to have been so mutually beneficial, that the two merchants continued working together for another 14 years, always for the shipment and sale of sugar.⁷²

The association between Manoel Carvalho and Albert Schuyt was based on the trade in sugar, whether the actual transport of sugar or the insurance of this valuable product. Thus, they were concerned with the expanding European “rich” trades. No matter what their geographical or product focus was, however, their day-to-day activities as merchants were based on mutual trust and similar goals. Their shared background in the city of Amsterdam, and their mutual circles of associates such as Osorio and other prominent merchants, and their ties to the city of Antwerp, no doubt knitted together their enterprises, which, as has been seen, were high value and spanned 18 years.

Bento Osorio, Claes Cornelisz Jut and Dirck Thomasz. Glimmer

Graph 15: Bento Osorio’s frequency of interactions with non-Sephardic merchants, 1610-1640



Source: GAA, NA
Based on 398 interactions with 257 non-Sephardic associates.
The names of all associates are listed in Appendix IV

⁷¹ GAA, NA 381/428

⁷² See, GAA/NA 381/67; NA 383/226, 511; NA 384a/435-436; NA 387/115-117v; NA 405/108-108v

As the chart above shows, the majority of Osorio's non-Sephardic associates dealt with him only a few times on a given endeavor. Forty-eight percent worked with Osorio between two and eight times. A nearly equal percentage dealt with Osorio only once. Five percent of Osorio's recorded interactions with non-Sephardic merchants occurred more than eight times, meaning that Osorio had a non-Sephardic merchant with whom he dealt with more than eight times for five percent of his total interactions. Unlike Rodrigues Vega or Carvalho, however, Osorio did not have one or two non-Sephardic merchants with whom he collaborated on a relatively large-scale. Instead, he had two Dutch associates with whom he dealt somewhat frequently, and another few who appeared less often. With Osorio's two main non-Sephardic associates, Claes Cornelisz Jut and Dirck Thomasz Glimmer, he had collaborations that, in both cases, spanned a few years – from 1618 until 1621 – in the case of Glimmer, and from 1617-1619 in the case of Jut. These associations were, in the case of Jut, centered on the sale of salt. In the case of Thomsz Glimmer, the interactions were more varied. They included permission to act on each others' behalf, and declarations concerning shipments which they co-owned.

Unfortunately, nothing is known of Claes Cornelisz. Jut, other than that he came from Zaandam in North Holland.⁷³ He seems, however, to have been a major trader in salt. He bought entire shiploads of this product from Osorio. In 1617, Jut bought “as much Setúbal salt, as much as could be loaded in the 100 last ship.”⁷⁴ This Dutch merchant bought a similar quantity of salt the following year from Osorio.⁷⁵ In fact, in 1618, Jut bought at least four more entire cargoes of Setúbal salt from Osorio – in total something close to 500 lasts of salt in this year alone.⁷⁶ Perhaps because of these large purchases of salt, there was enough trust between the two merchants for Osorio to sell Jut two shiploads of salt on credit.⁷⁷

⁷³ SR 1353

⁷⁴ GAA, NA 109/142-142v

⁷⁵ GAA, NA 623/81-82

⁷⁶ GAA, NA 623/81-82v, 119v; 240-241

⁷⁷ GAA, NA 109/93v-94v

Illustration 5: Loading Salt in the Cape Verde Islands



“Het inladen van zout op een pinas bij de Kaapverdische eilanden,” by Experiens Sillemans, 1625, Copyright: Nederlands Scheepvaart Museum

Just like Jut, next to nothing is known of Dirck Thomasz Glimmer, other than that he was a registered broker in Amsterdam.⁷⁸ It could be that, in his capacity as a broker, Glimmer came into contact with a variety of merchants, including Sephardic merchants, as Osorio was not the only Sephardic merchant with whom Glimmer had business associations. For instance, in 1621, Glimmer and another Dutch merchant, Willem Cornelisz Ameland, reached an agreement concerning the co-ownership of the ship the “Witte Leeuw” (White Lion) and its cargo with the Sephardic merchants Miguel Esteves de Pina and Thomas Fereira.⁷⁹

Glimmer made multiple declarations on behalf on Osorio over the years. For instance, he was one of the experts who declared in 1619 that the *fluijtschip* was a reliable ship for transporting grain to Spain, Portugal, or Italy.⁸⁰ He was, apparently, chosen by Osorio to make this statement due to his expertise in the shipment of grain to the Mediterranean. Assumedly, Osorio knew him well enough to believe he would be a reliable witness. The year before, in 1618, Glimmer had, at the request of Osorio, made a declaration about what he had heard regarding the fate of 115 lasts of wheat that had been destined for Tangiers in North

⁷⁸ GAA 645a/474

⁷⁹ SR 2358

⁸⁰ GAA, NA 645a/474

Africa. Apparently, this cargo had been taken by pirates off the coast of North Africa.⁸¹ Glimmer had enough knowledge of trade, in general, and Osorio's activities specifically, to have heard about this ship's fate. In fact, Glimmer urged Osorio several times to pay the ransom for the ship, a request that it seems Osorio refused.⁸² Moreover, Glimmer declared once again on Osorio's behalf this year. This time it was regarding the fact that "freights and prices could vary a great deal, and depended a great deal on the time and place."⁸³ Perhaps due to these intensive interactions, in 1621, Osorio granted a power of attorney to Glimmer to act in his place regarding a shipment of brazilwood that had been taken to Hamburg.⁸⁴

The association between Bento Osorio, Claes Cornelisz Jut, and Dirck Thomasz Glimmer was based on the trade in salt and grain, as well as in their shared knowledge of the mercantile environment of Amsterdam, with the exception of one shipment of brazilwood. Thus, they were concerned with the traditional Baltic bulk trades. Interestingly, though, Osorio does not seem to have developed the sort of close-knit and long-lasting associations with non-Sephardic merchants that Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho did. His interactions with Cornelisz Jut and Thomasz Glimmer were certainly important for his mercantile activities, but had nowhere near the frequency and durability that Rodrigues Vega's relationship with Snellinck or Carvalho's association with Schuyt did. This could have any number of reasons. Perhaps Osorio had little need to expand his network to include other merchants, as it is also notable that Osorio is recorded with very few associates of any background, Sephardi or non-Sephardi, whatsoever. It could also be because Osorio most likely had come to Amsterdam directly from Portugal, in contrast to Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho who had spent time in various places and, thereby, had developed contacts with various merchants from diverse backgrounds before coming to Amsterdam. Therefore, it is possible that Osorio had not developed the contacts that allowed for long-term and more intensive inter-cultural interactions. All this is speculation, however. What is notable is that, no matter what their geographical or product focus was, their day-to-day activities as merchants were based on mutual trust and similar goals. Their shared background in the city of Amsterdam, and their mutual circles of associates among both Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants, no doubt knitted together their enterprises.

⁸¹ GAA, NA 109/372v-373

⁸² GAA, NA 645/247-248

⁸³ GAA, NA 645/448-449

⁸⁴ GAA, NA 645b/1424-1427

Conclusion

The charts, above, highlight the fact that inter-cultural networks had a propensity to be loose and shifting. The economic, political, and social structures of the city of Amsterdam, which included immigration, the relatively easy acquisition of citizenship, and a designated place for trade to occur, which facilitated the exchange of information and the ability of merchants to connect easily with one another, meant that merchants of varying backgrounds could come into contact with one another, while merchants with shared connections outside the city of Amsterdam; for example to Antwerp or other places in the Southern Netherlands, not to mention Brazil or Iberia, could become acquainted or renew old ties. The Sephardic merchants being analyzed in this study tended to have one or two main non-Sephardic associates with whom they had multiple endeavors or associations, as was described in greater detail above. The interactions between Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, and their primary non-Sephardic associates, show that their interactions together could vary.

Rodrigues Vega and Cornelis Snellinck acted on each other's behalf, shared ownership of property such as land, slaves, sugar, and brazilwood, extended credit to one another, and were part of joint actions together as prominent merchants. Their association was largely based on the Brazil trade – sugar, brazilwood, and slaves – though it also included endeavors in the East Indies. Their day-to-day activities as merchants were based on mutual trust and similar goals. This trust was particularly highlighted by the fact that Snellinck put Vega and van Os in contact with one another, thereby putting his own reputation on the line. Perhaps this trust came from their shared background in the city of Antwerp – a background that van Os shared, as well. Whatever the case was, their mutual circles of associates such as Carvalho, Osorio, and van Os, to name just a few, no doubt knitted together their enterprises.

Likewise, the association between Manoel Carvalho and Albert Schuyt was based on the trade in sugar, whether the actual transport of sugar or the insurance of this valuable product. Thus, they, too, were concerned with the expanding European “rich” trades. No matter what their geographical or product focus was, however, their day-to-day activities as merchants were based on mutual trust and similar goals. Their shared connections to the city of Antwerp, and their mutual circles of associates in Amsterdam such as Osorio and other prominent merchants, brought together their enterprises, which, as has been seen, were high value and spanned 18 years.

Unlike the associations between Rodrigues Vega, Snellinck, Carvalho, and Schuyt, the association between Bento Osorio, Claes Cornelisz Jut, and Dirck Thomasz Glimmer was not based on the so-called “rich trades.” Rather, it centered on the “bulk” trade in salt and grain, as well as in their shared knowledge of the mercantile environment of Amsterdam. Jut trusted Osorio enough to buy massive quantities of salt from him, while Osorio believed in Jut enough to extend credit to him. Glimmer had enough knowledge of Osorio and his activities to make several legal declarations on his behalf. Osorio also trusted Glimmer enough to give him a power-of-attorney to represent his interests. Thus, their shared background in the city of Amsterdam, and their mutual circles of associates among both Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants, helped them work together. Nevertheless, Osorio did not have the long-lasting and durable associations that Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho had.

This study has been based on the idea that loosely knit networks which connect individuals in various directions can be more efficient in creating opportunities and promoting the defense of economic interests than tightly-knit networks. The loosely knit networks between Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio and their non-Sephardi associates seem to show that there was a primary group of non-Sephardic merchants with whom these men associated. These primary associates connected the Sephardic merchants to networks outside their own ethno-religious group. Snellinck, Schuyt, Glimmer, and Jut worked with their Sephardic associates to further their mutual interests, and helped supply credit, judicial help, expertise, and access to other networks. Thus, connecting to networks outside the Sephardic community was important for creating and opportunities and furthering interests. These merchants’ associations were centered on trade and were founded in trust – enough trust to have the legal authority to act on each other’s behalf, for instance, or to make declarations to a notary concerning the other’s enterprises, or to extend credit. This shows the importance of trust between these merchants, and illustrates the fact that networks were far more encompassing than the theories of “friends and family” might lead scholars to believe, at least among the global merchants.

However, in addition to these primary non-Sephardic merchants with whom they interacted, they also had many interactions with non-Sephardic merchants that were occasional or never repeated. This illustrates how loose the networks were for these global merchants, and in how many directions the networks operated. And these were only the interactions with non-Sephardim. The same sort of irregularity applied to their endeavors with Sephardic merchants. Thus, it seems that they were connecting themselves with many

merchants of various backgrounds for differing amounts of time and for a multitude of purposes.

Beyond this primary group of non-Sephardic associates, Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio also had a few Dutch/Flemish merchants with whom they had several interactions, and the majority were men with whom they dealt with once or twice. Furthermore, these inter-cultural networks were also integrative, as was shown in Chapter III. While many of the measured interactions were between Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio and one or more non-Sephardic merchants, their networks also tended to incorporate two or more Sephardic merchants, working together with one or more non-Sephardic merchants. In addition, the important nature of Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio's less frequent dealings with non-Sephardic merchants should not be dismissed. Lack of frequency did not mean a lack of trust. On the contrary, as was described above, the vast majority of merchants of whatever background, dealt with one another only sporadically. Therefore, some of the other interactions and associations that Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio had with their non-Sephardic associates will be described and detailed at greater length and explored in further detail in the next chapter.

Chapter V: The Importance of the Occasional

Established merchants in Amsterdam, as well as recent immigrants from Antwerp and the Southern Netherlands, and Sephardic merchants ran into one another quite easily. They lived relatively near one another, as Amsterdam was not particularly large at the time, met each other at the stock exchange or in the harbor, and bought each others products. Working only with family members or those of the same ethno-religious group was impossible for merchants who wanted to profit from the expansion of the Dutch staple market described in the previous chapter. Sometimes, as was also shown in the previous chapter, the associations between merchants from different groups were intense and long-lasting.

The majority of any commercial associations during this time were, however, as David Hancock described, loose, shifting, and of a relatively short duration. The research of Oscar Gelderblom confirms Hancock's assertion. Gelderblom has shown that, in $\frac{3}{4}$ of the freight contracts he analyzed, merchants from the Northern and Southern Netherlands (a sort of inter-cultural group), worked together only one or two times.¹ This was also the case, as Graphs 13, 14, and 15 show, for the Sephardic merchants under consideration in this study. Thus, it would seem that occasional associations between merchants during this time period were very much the norm for merchants across geographical, ethnic, and religious lines. These occasional associations are important because they seem to illustrate that merchants were utilizing loose or weak ties with other merchants to spread the risks inherent in relying too heavily upon a few tightly-knit collaborators. Since this was so common, it is important to examine the less frequent or "minor" associates – associates with whom they only once or very infrequently dealt -- of Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio. The ways in which Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio and their minor associates acted on each other's behalf, shared ownership of goods, insured cargoes, and extended credit to one another will be examined in greater depth in this chapter.

¹ Oscar Gelderblom, *Zuid Nederlandse Kooplieden . . .*, 179

Acting on each others' behalf

Manoel Rodrigues Vega

In addition to the powers-of-attorney and right of proxy that Vega had given to his main associate, Cornelis Snellinck, and which Snellinck, in return, had issued to Vega, Manoel Rodrigues Vega granted such authorizations to non-Sephardic associates at least 13 times between the beginning of his settlement in Amsterdam in 1595 and 1610, though there could certainly be more of such documents that have not emerged from the archival documentation. What is striking about these powers-of-attorney is their geographical reach. Vega granted these authorizations to merchants as far a field as London, La Rochelle, Danzig, Emden, and Hamburg, which demonstrates not only the scope of his business enterprises, but also the diversity of his non-Sephardic contacts who were integrated into his network.

For instance, in 1595, not long after Vega's arrival in Amsterdam, he granted a power of attorney to the Dutch merchant, Abraham van Herwyer, who was living in London, to reclaim goods of Vega's which had been seized and taken to England.² Fifteen years later, in 1610, Vega still had interests and contacts among Dutch merchants in London. He granted a power-of-attorney to Daniel van Harinckhoek, another Dutch merchant in London, to demand payment on a bill of exchange from Alexander Bouwens.³ Vega also had contacts in France. In 1595, he issued a power-of-attorney to the well-known Flemish merchant, Elias van Geel, then residing in La Rochelle, to reclaim 20 pieces of "leyden" cloth from the estate of a deceased associate.⁴ Two years later, Vega authorized Nicolaes and Jernomio Grisons, in Danzig, to recover two glass bottles of civet (a kind of musk).⁵ In 1599, Hendrick

² SR 2

³ SR 121

⁴ SR 3. Elias van Geel was the brother of Peter and Maximiliaan van Geel, and the son of Hans van Geel and Maria Coymans, both born in Antwerp. Therefore, he was connected to the wealthy and prominent Coymans family via his mother. In the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the van Geel firm was one of the biggest business houses in Amsterdam. His brother, Peter van Geel, lived in Cologne from 1585-1592, and is first mentioned in Amsterdam in 1598. Pieter van Geel invested 19,200 in the VOC, along with brothers Maximiliaan and Elias. In 1612, their investment in the VOC was at 24.000 while Maximiliaan van Geel's stood at 33.700. The account of the Peter and Elias van Geel firm in the Exchange Bank in 1612 was four pages. As was the case with the VOC investments, the other brother, Maximiliaan, had his own account. In 1615, the brothers' account was three pages long. In the same year, Maximiliaan's account was also three pages. Pieter and Elias van Geel belonged to the signatories of the "adres tot opheffing van het verbod van het kassiersbedrijf." In 1631, Pieter van Geel lived on the North side of the Lauriergracht. See Dr. J.G. van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de Kamer Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie*, ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 153 and <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>. Pieter van Geel was the associate of Manoel Carvalho.

⁵ SR 9

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Hondebeeck, a Dutch merchant in Emden, was granted a power of attorney by Rodrigues Vega to unship sugar consigned to Vega that was to arrive in this city, but also to pay the skipper and to “deal with any other affairs for Vega.”⁶ Hondebeeck and Vega must have worked well together, because Hondebeeck was granted another power of attorney three years later to deal with another legal matter in Emden.⁷

But these actions were not just granted to merchants outside of Amsterdam. For instance, in 1599, Lodewijk Jansz de Pottere was granted a power of attorney by Vega to receive goods and to “take legal action, if necessary.”⁸ This same year, Vega granted a general power of attorney (as opposed to a specific power-of-attorney or right of proxy which was valid for a specific action or case) to the Dutch merchant Hans de Laet Aertsz “to attend to his affairs . . . and, in particular, to receive all bills of exchange coming from Antwerp, Lisbon, Frankfurt, and other places.”⁹ Both Vega and de Laet were from Antwerp and were relatively recent immigrants to the city, as de Laet first appears in the archives in 1588.¹⁰ This further bolsters the notion that valuable connections and relationships built on trust had been formed in Antwerp.

In addition to these powers of attorney described above, Vega granted at least five more authorizations for non-Sephardim to represent his interests in legal matters.¹¹ However, these permissions were given to lawyers working in the law courts of Amsterdam or the United Provinces. Therefore, the importance that can be assigned to these examples of intercultural contact is markedly less than the granting of such a right to a fellow merchant. For one thing, there were no Sephardic lawyers in Amsterdam at the time, so there would have been no option for opting for the use of an intra-group contact. Moreover, these lawyers were providing a service for pay, as opposed to merchants such as De Laet who were doing a favor based on knowledge of, and trust in, a fellow merchant. Though important, these relationships must be viewed differently than interactions between merchants themselves.

⁶ SR 67

⁷ SR 80

⁸ SR 64

⁹ SR 62. Hans de Laet appears in the notarial acts in Amsterdam in the latter part of the sixteenth century as a merchant. He dealt in English cloth. See van Dillen, *Bedrijfsleven*, n. 813. His father was Aert de Laet, “merchant of linens” from Antwerp. See van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister . . .*, 196

¹⁰ See also, <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

¹¹ SR 83; SR 85; SR 122; SR 138; SR 184

Manoel Carvalho

Manoel Carvalho and Isaac Israel granted a power of attorney to a Dutch resident in Venice, Pieter Bauwer, along with their Dutch insurers: Jan Jansz. Karel de Jonghe; Jan Jansz. Karel; Bartholomeus Bisschop, Pauwels Bisschop; Pieter Jan Mieusz.; Lourens Joosten Baeck (Bax), Jan Coenensz.; Symon Loo; Leonard Pelgroms; Francois Pelgroms, Paulus and Steffano Pelgroms; Jacques Merchijs; Jacob Lucasz. Rotgans; and George de Piran, to reclaim goods taken to Venice from a wrecked ship.¹² What is particularly interesting is not only the constellation of Sephardi and Dutch partners in voyages, but also the preference, in both cases, for using a Dutch merchant to act on their behalf to reclaim goods. There were certainly Sephardim available in both La Rochelle and in Venice.¹³ However, if the traditional historiography is to be believed, the Sephardim would surely have chosen to rely on their networks of co-religionists and kin rather than turn to those of a different nationality, religion, and language, especially when granting legal power to act on their behalf. However, the Sephardim opted instead to grant such authority to Dutch merchants. An additional interesting point is how many of the merchants were from Antwerp or the Southern Netherlands.

Jan Jansz. Karel (also spelled Carel, Caerel and Kaerel), for example, was from Brugge and is first mentioned in Amsterdam in 1578.¹⁴ Like Rodrigues Vega, he was involved in the “Compagnie van Verre,” and was also a Director of the Amsterdam Chamber of the Dutch East India Company.¹⁵ Likewise, the Pelgroms family was from Antwerp and came to Amsterdam between 1595 and 1600.¹⁶ Jacques Merchijs (or Mercijs) was another relatively recent immigrant to Amsterdam from the Southern Netherlands. He first appears in the records of this city in 1602.¹⁷ He was a sugar refiner, which would explain his connection with a major supplier of sugar such as Carvalho. He was also a merchant, and was a subscriber to the Dutch East India Company for the sum of 40,000 guilders.¹⁸

¹² GAA, NA 113/5v-6

¹³ For La Rochelle, see, for example, Zosa Szajkowski, “Population Problems of Marranos and Sephardim in France, from the 16th to the 20th Centuries,” *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, Vol. 27, 1958 (1958), 83-105, Yosef Kaplan, *An Alternative Path to Modernity: The Sephardi Diaspora in Western Europe*, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 98, n.91. There is copious literature available about Jews in Venice. To name just one comprehensive volume, see: *Bli Ebrei e Venezia, secoli XIV-XVIII: Atti del Convegno internazionale organizzato dall'Istituto di storia della società e dello stato veneziano della Fondazione Giorgio Cini*, Venice, 5-10 August, 1983, (Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 1987)

¹⁴ <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

¹⁵ Dr. J.G. van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister . . .*, 107

¹⁶ <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>; Dr. J.G. van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister . . .*, 214

¹⁷ <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

¹⁸ Dr. J.G. van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister . . .*, 82

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It is Laurens Joosten Baeck, however, who is the most important of these insurers hailing originally from the Southern Netherlands.¹⁹ Baeck became one of the most prominent merchants who had come to Amsterdam via Middelburg. Baeck most likely drew on their shared Antwerp connections in order to ensure that he has a steady supply of sugar, which his Sephardic associates could provide. He was an associate of not only Carvalho, but also of Vega and Osorio (see Tables II and III in the Appendices), as well as of many other Sephardim, and he repeatedly occurs as an underwriter in the deeds relating to the Sephardim. Due to his economic contacts with various Sephardic merchants, Baeck had a good reputation with them, which may explain why he was often chosen as an arbiter in their disputes.²⁰ It was not just with the Sephardim that Baeck was in good standing. The States General asked the advice of Baeck and several merchants, including Salvador de la Palma, Jacques van Geel, Jan Janssen Coymans, and Hans Bernaerts about the trade situation in 1602.²¹

Not only did Carvalho grant powers of attorney to men such as Baeck, but he was given such an authorization by his Dutch associates. For example, in 1616, Carvalho, along with Albert Schuyt (discussed in the previous chapter), Henri Thibault, and the Portuguese merchant Duarte Esteves de Pina, were given a power of attorney by a large number of Dutch

¹⁹ Baeck was born in 1570 in Stekenen, to the west of Antwerp, and died in Amsterdam in November of 1642. He married the sister of Claes Jacobsz. Harencarspel in 1596. Harencarspel was picked to be a member of the *Vroedschap* in 1618. Elias, *De Vroedschap*, 316-317. Along with Adriaen ten Haeff and Balthasar de Moucheron, he chartered trade expeditions to Asia in the latter part of the sixteenth century. V. Enthoven, "Een Symbiose Tussen Koopman en Regent: De Tweetrapsraket van de opkomst van de Republiek en Zeeland," in *Ondernemers & Bestuurders: Economie en Politiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in de Late Middeleeuwen en Vroegmoderne Tijd*, C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, eds, (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1999), 203-236, 210. In 1602, Baeck invested 1,200 guilders as a shareholder in the Amsterdam Chamber of the Dutch East India Company. However, he invested far more -- in total f 18,000 guilders -- in the Zeeland Chamber of the VOC, and was a Director (*bewindhebber*) of this Chamber. Dr. W.S. Unger, "Het Inschrijvingsregister van de Kamer Zeeland der Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, Medegedeeld door Dr. W.S. Unger," *Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek*, 24 (1950), 1-33, 12, 24-25, and note 7. He worked in the Lastage on the Keizerstraat. Johannes Gerard van Dillen, *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van het bedrijfsleven en het gildewezen van Amsterdam*, VI, II, 1612-1632, ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1929), 463. This may have been where Baeck's sugar refining company with Reijnier Scholier was in 1612, though this enterprise was dissolved relatively quickly and possibly went bankrupt some time thereafter. GAA, NA 127/174-176, 185v-186, cited in Adrianus Hubertus Poelwijk, "*In dienste vant suyckerbacken*" *De Amsterdamse suikernijverheid en haar ondernemers, 1580-1630*, (Hilversum: Verloren, 2003), 100, 159-161. Later, in 1618, Baeck and the Spaniard Francisco Montado joined forces for the refining of sugar. Johannes Gerard Van Dillen, *Bronnen bedrijfsleven en gidewezen*, II, 463. In 1620, his account with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank comprised three folio pages. On the occasion of the taxation of the 200th penny in 1631, he was taxed for 500 guilders, and, thus, estimated to possess a capital of 100,000 guilders. (1631 a tax of ½ of 1% was assessed on all the inhabitants of Amsterdam with an annual income of 100 guilders or more.) At this time, Baeck lived in the house known as, "De Kaij Van 't Dolhuijs Tot De Doelen." <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden/>. His wealth helped him to buy an additional residence -- a country home called "Scheybeeck" near Beverwijk, where the well-known writer, Joost van Vondel, was a guest. His son, Joost Baeck was a good friend of another famous Golden Age writer, Pieter Cornelisz. Hooft. Johannes Gerard van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister . . .*, 206.

²⁰ Adrianus Hubertus Poelwijk, "*In dienste vant suyckerbacken*" *De Amsterdamse suikernijverheid en haar ondernemers, 1580-1630*, (Hilversum: Verloren, 2003), 219

²¹ V. Enthoven, "Een Symbiose Tussen Koopman en Regent: De Tweetrapsraket van de opkomst van de Republiek en Zeeland," 210

merchants who had insured a cargo of sugar co-owned by Carvalho, Schuyt, Thibault, and Esteves de Pina.²² Pieter, Daniel, and Jan van Geel, David d’Hommel,²³ François Wouters,²⁴ Jan Baptista Bartolotti,²⁵ Francisco Mendes, Adriaen Andriesz., Daniel van den Eijnde, as well as a whole host of other merchants, gave Carvalho and the others the power to take care of the legalities surrounding a pirated cargo of sugar. This case would drag on for at least another three years.²⁶ At one point, Carvalho and Schuyt, passed on their power of attorney to the Dutch merchant, Adriaen Cocx, in Paris to continue pursuing the return of the sugar for them.²⁷

Bento Osorio

Osorio was, like Vega and Carvalho, both a grantor and a receiver of powers of attorney to and from Dutch/Flemish associates. In 1614, he was one of a large group of Dutch and Sephardic merchants who granted a power of attorney to Allert and Jan van Eccx, in Rouen.²⁸ France was also the location of the power of attorney Osorio granted to the prominent Flemish merchant, Philip van Geel, who was in Paris at the time. van Geel was authorized to retrieve 16 cases of sugar that had been sent from Rio de Janeiro, in Brazil, to

²² GAA, NA 387/119

²³ A family tree of the l’Hommel family can be found in A. Poelwijk, *In dienste vant suyckerbacken*, 278. David de l’Hommel was a relatively regular associate of Manoel Carvalho. He was originally from Antwerp and was born in 1584. His mother was from the van Uffelen family who were prominent merchants in Hamburg. The van Uffelen family had many contacts with Sephardic merchants. After the fall of that city, his family moved to Hamburg. On July 30, 1608, he married Catalijn van Geel, when he was 24. GAA, DTB 413/20v. Therefore, he became the son-in-law of Pieter van Geel, also an associate of Manoel Carvalho (see below for more information). l’Hommel’s sister, Anna, married Johannes ten Grotenhuys, also from a prominent merchant family. The l’Hommel family was involved in the sugar industry, which, along with their Antwerp connections, no doubt explains their interest in the Sephardic merchants. David l’Hommel lived, at least for a time on the Warmoesstraat in the house called “in de gulden Cop.” Interestingly, Elias mentions that Nicolaas Cocqu asked that de l’Hommel’s parents’ house be checked after they died so that an inventory might be made of their goods, assumedly because they owed him money. This is the same Cocqu who was a co-creditor with Bento Osorio for the debts of Peter Martsz. Coij, the former Consul of the States General in Morocco. GAA, NA 1225/99v-100; NA 1261a/421. Johan E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795*, (Amsterdam: Israel, 1963), 276; Johannes Gerard van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister . . .*, 68. Hermann Kellenbenz, *Unternehmerkräfte im Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel, 1590-1625*, (Hamburg : Verlag der Hamburgischen Bücherei, 1954), 97, 221 and 276.

²⁴ François Wouters was a somewhat regular associate of Manoel Carvalho. He was born in Antwerp. He had at least one sister, Clara Wouters. Wouters is first mentioned in Amsterdam in 1591. In Amsterdam, he lived in the Warmoesstraat. In 1601, he married Ida Adams. Adams was also born in Antwerp. Wouters was connected to the sale of VOC shares in 1610. His account at the Exchange Bank was two pages in 1620. Wouters also invested in the WIC to the sum of 4000 in 1621 See, van Dillen, *Aandeelregister*, 189 and <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

²⁵ The Bartholotti family was actually connected quite strongly with Antwerp. See, van Dillen, *Aandeelregister*, 64 and Elias, *Vroedschap van Amsterdam*, 762

²⁶ GAA, NA 379/602, 614, 633; NA 380/401; NA 382/35

²⁷ GAA, NA 381/428

²⁸ GAA, NA 198/166-167

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Porto, in Portugal.²⁹ However, it was not just France that featured in the activities of Bento Osorio. In 1626, Jan Geurtsz of Amsterdam was authorized to administer the legal affairs of Osorio for an indefinite period of time.³⁰

Osorio was not only a granter of powers of attorney, though. He also received them from Dutch associates to help them take care of their affairs. Guillaume Grevenraet and Bartolomeus Roosendael gave a power of attorney to Osorio in 1635 to help in the recovery of goods and money owed to them by the estate of the deceased Pieter Martsz Coij.³¹ A year later, Olivier van Houten extended a power of attorney to Osorio pursuant to this same case.³²

Conclusion

As the cases described above illustrate, Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio had a plethora of associates to whom they granted a power of attorney or from whom they were given a power of attorney. Some, like Laurens Joosten Baeck, were associates of all three of these merchants, as well as of other Sephardic merchants. Others appear only once in the archives relating to the Sephardic merchants of Amsterdam. What should be emphasized, though, is that granting a power of attorney or a right of proxy to someone enabled that person to act on a merchant's behalf. The actions taken on a merchant's behalf by the other persons would then be legally binding. Therefore, the right of proxy or the issuance of a power of attorney gave the receiver of such an entitlement freedom, as well as of authority, for and from the merchant who granted it to him. Thus, there was a great deal of trust implied by the issuance of such permission. That these important authorizations were exchanged so freely between merchants of differing backgrounds is an important indication of the level of trust between Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants.

Shared ownership and trade

Perhaps it should come as no surprise that there were so many inter-cultural interactions in the realm of trade, though the historiography, as has been seen in Chapter I, ignores this fact. One scholar who has not ignored this fact, Renate Fuks-Mansfeld, believes that the Sephardi knowledge of the Iberian trade, combined with the “developed” trade

²⁹ GAA, NA 384/89-89v

³⁰ SR 3388

³¹ GAA, NA 1225/99v-100

³² GAA, NA 1261a/421

techniques of the established Amsterdam merchants, led to an important synergy between these merchants from differing backgrounds.³³ Of course, this statement presumes that the Sephardim did not know of or utilize “developed” trading techniques, which was clearly not the case. The Sephardim often made use of “developed” techniques of trade, such as joint-stock companies, bills of exchange, and insurance. In fact, as Jonathan Israel writes, “The techniques of Jewish trade, finance, and industry differed not a jot from other trade, finance and industry except in that an oppressive system of state, municipal, and guild restrictions cut the Jews out of much, or most, retail trade and most crafts.”³⁴

Moreover, informal, transnational exchanges were, in fact, a very developed way of conducting trade. And the Sephardim depended for these exchanges, as has been described, on that most developed and important of trading techniques: the trading network. As Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert writes, “They [the Portuguese networks] were geographically extensive, multilateral, and highly interconnected. Seen from this aspect, the networks of the Nation were also open-ended in that they easily spliced into the networks of other trading nations to assure the supply or distribution of commodities.”³⁵ So the Sephardi networks joined the Dutch networks to form associations for the conduct of trade. But Fuks-Mansfeld does make an important point: Sephardi and non-Sephardi, Dutch and Flemish merchants needed one another and traded extensively with one another. Moreover, many of their dealings involved the Iberian trade, about which the Sephardim had a great deal of knowledge.

In fact, long-distance trade was at the core of the Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio’s and their associates’ business enterprises. Their ships (or the ships they chartered) called at Baltic ports (Danzig, Koningsberg, Heyligerhaven, Wangerau, Riga, Trondheim, Romsdal, Allerheiligen, Hohwachter, and Hamburg), French ports (La Rochelle, Dunkirk, Rouen, Le Havre), Portuguese ports (Cascais, Lisbon, Madeira, Porto, Aveiro, Sétubal, Viana, and Faro), at Spanish ports (Malaga, Galicia [specific ports were not mentioned], Cadiz, Seville), ports on or near the Italian peninsula (Livorno, Venice, Sicily, Genoa, Via Reggio, La Spezia, Civitavetia), Levantine ports (Constantinople, Alexandria), North African ports (Tunis, Tangiers, Ceuta), and Bahia and Pernambuco in Brazil. Their cargoes included: textiles, sugar and spices, weapons and munitions, iron goods, jewels and

³³ Renate Gertrud Fuks-Mansfeld, *De Sefardim in Amsterdam tot 1795: Aspecten van de Ontwikkeling van een Joodse Minderheid in een Hollandse Stad*, (unpublished dissertation, 1989, Universiteit Leiden), 83

³⁴ Jonathan Israel, *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550-1750*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 256

³⁵ Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea: Portugal’s Atlantic Diaspora and the Crisis of the Spanish Empire, 1492-1640*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 94

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precious stones, slaves, brazilwood, civet, coral, ivory, dyes, lacquer, wax, specie, fruit, woad, wine, grains, beans, other food sorts, wood, hides, un-worked metals, salt, and cordage.

The freight contracts indicate that the Sephardim were active in trade routes that had been dominated by Dutch merchants from the Northern Netherlands, such as the Baltic trade.³⁶ The same can be said of merchants from the Southern Netherlands.³⁷ Many of these merchants from the Southern Netherlands, as has been seen, worked with Sephardi merchants, with whom they probably had contacts predating their arrival in Amsterdam. Both these groups of newcomers to Amsterdam seem to have taken advantage of the geographic expansion of Europe's trade network. The ever-increasing demand for goods, combined with the inability of these regions to provide enough supplies on their own, led to an integration of Europe due to dependency of each other's produce.³⁸

Manoel Rodrigues Vega

Manuel Rodrigues Vega's is the name that dominates the very early period of Sephardic settlement in the Northern Netherlands. It can be difficult to ascertain the full extent of Vega's trade relationships, however, since most shipments were smaller than that which would take up an entire ship's cargo. It can also be difficult to determine when and to what extent Manoel Rodrigues Vega traded on his own account and when on behalf of others.³⁹ During Vega's stay in Amsterdam he was mainly concerned with shipping to and from Portugal. Though he worked with fellow Sephardim, both relatives and those seemingly unrelated, he formed an early partnership with not only Cornelis Snellinck, as was detailed in Chapter III, but also one Hans de Schot, with whom he had a business relationship spanning at least 10 years. de Schot also had dealings with other Sephardic merchants, as well.⁴⁰

³⁶ Because so much of the information presented below is based upon the available freight contracts in the archives, one quick word of caution is in order. Freight contracts cannot serve as an indication of the total volume of (Sephardic) trade because far from all traffic was organized by contract. For example, a comparison of freight contracts issued with the total figure of shipping through the Sound shows that only about 10% of all ship masters passed a contract before a notary before sailing. See, A.E. Christenen, *Dutch trade to the Baltic about 1600*, (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1941)

³⁷ Gelderblom, *Zuid Nederlandse kooplieden . . .*, 153

³⁸ Lesger, "Clusters," 70

³⁹ Daniel Swetschinski, *The Portuguese Jewish Merchants of Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam*, 156

⁴⁰ These merchants were: Manuel Nunes and Henrique Bernaldes (GAA, NA 53/243v-244) Bartholomeo Sanches (GAA, NA 33/225v-227); Garcia Pimentel (GAA, NA 61/352-353); Gabriel Fernandes (GAA, NA 56/680-682); Manoel Carvalho (NA 645/43v-44); and Duarte en Gonçalo Ximenes (GAA, NA 645/344-346)

De Schot was originally from Antwerp⁴¹ After he left that city, he operated from Hamburg. In 1593 or 1594 he appeared in the records as a merchant of Amsterdam.⁴² Hans de Schot was the agent for Martin Alonço d'Acala. With d'Acala and Ancelmo, de Schot traded mainly with Spain and Portugal, as well as, through contractors, with North and West Africa.⁴³ In the freight contracts published as part of the *Bronnen voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Oostzeehandel in de zeventiende eeuw* series (Sources for the History of the Dutch Baltic Trade in the Seventeenth Century series) he is mentioned 21 times between 1595 and 1602.⁴⁴ He traded with the Baltic region as well as with Spain, Portugal, Africa, Barbary, Madeira and Brazil. Later, he moved to either Staden or Hamburg, where he died in 1620.⁴⁵

Vega and De Schot most likely knew one another from Antwerp, or at least knew of one another from their connections in this city. They seem to have worked together on the trade in woad, a dye wood similar to indigo. In 1596, De Schot notified Vega that his half of the cargo of woad that had been sent from the island of São Miguel in the Azores to them by Pero Lopes Peixoto had arrived.⁴⁶ This woad was also partially owned by Laurens Baeck, Steven Groelaet and Bartolomeo Sanches of Lisbon⁴⁷ This shipment is a prime example of integrated trade networks, as Pero Lopes Peixoto, a Sephardic merchant in the Azores, shipped the woad to Laurens Joosten Baeck, Hans de Schot, Steven Groelaet, and Manoel Rodrigues Vega, merchants originally from Antwerp, one of whom was Sephardi, living in Amsterdam, and a share of this same woad also belonged to the Sephardic merchant Bartolomeo Sanches.⁴⁸

⁴¹ de Schot lived on the Barndesteeg in Amsterdam. He Schot was listed as a sugar refiner in Amsterdam in 1594. NA 46/41v cited in Johannes Gerard van Dillen, *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van Bedrijfsleven*, VI. 1, 510. Hans de Schot had a younger brother by the name of François de Schot. François was listed as a "lakenkoper" [textile merchant] in Antwerp. François had been apprenticed in the house of Jean Calandrini of the well-known merchant family in Staden and later lived in Middelburg. Hans de Schot Hans married Catharina Ancelmo, and, therefore, became the brother-in-law of Antonio Ancelmo. Antonio Ancelmo came from Antwerp, but moved to Hamburg, Stade, and Bremen, before settling in Haarlem outside of Amsterdam. Ancelmo was a Protestant. de Schot was also the brother-in-law of Ferdinando Salvator. After de Schot's death, his sons, Anthony and Leonard, were briefly successful in Hamburg before going bankrupt in 1627. de Schot also had a daughter, Catharina who married Lenard Raye of Limburg. Their daughter, Maria, (de Schot's granddaughter) married Jeronimus Coymans of the well-known merchant family. Johan E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795*, VI. II, 764

⁴² GAA, NA 47/6

⁴³ GAA, NA 53/243v-244

⁴⁴ P.H. Winkelman, *Amsterdamse bevrachtingscontracten, wisselprotesten en bodemerijen van de notarissen Jan Franssen Bruyningh, Jacob Meerhout e.a., 1601-1608*, ('s-Gravenhage : Nijhoff, 1983)

⁴⁵ Johannes Gerard van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister . . .*, 218 and Hermann Kellenbenz, *Unternehmerkräfte im Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel, 1590-1625*, (Hamburg: Verlag der Hamburgischen Bücherei, 1954), 222

⁴⁶ GAA, NA 49/64v-65

⁴⁷ GAA, NA 49/130-130v


⁴⁸ The relations between the Fernandes/Rodrigues Vega family and the Sanches' were close. Aside from the fact that Gaspar Sanches married Gracia Rodrigues Vega, Bartolomeo Sanches in Lisbon figures as Manoel's

The Importance of the Occasional

As Graph 6 showed the majority of Vega's economic interactions were with non-Sephardim. However, a significant proportion were integrated interactions which involved one or more Sephardic merchants dealing with one or more non-Sephardic Dutch/Flemish merchant(s), such as the shipment of woad described above. Another example would be when João Castelli, a Sephardic merchant, formerly of Pernambuco in Brazil, deposed at the request of Vega that part of the brazilwood that had arrived in Hamburg, belonged to Vega. This wood was consigned to Dominicus van Uffele, a prominent merchant from the Southern Netherlands, who lived in Hamburg.⁴⁹

These integrated interactions were more evident in the trade in some goods than in others. For instance, as Graph 16, below, shows, the intersection of Vega and one or more other Sephardi and one or more non-Sephardi merchants was quite evident in the sugar trade, though the majority of Vega's interactions in the sugar trade were, as can be seen, with non-Sephardim.

Graph 16: Manoel Rodrigues Vega's Trade in Sugar by Interaction Type, 1595-1613



Source: GAA, NA, n=12


Because Rodrigues Vega drops out of the records only four years after the Twelve Years Truce begins in 1609, not much information can be gathered from the chronological spread of his trading activities. As the Graph 16, above, shows, inter-cultural and integrated

correspondent. GAA, NA 49/130-130v; NA 76/3-4. Lopo and Antonio Sanches are mentioned in connection with Pedro Rodrigues Vega's plantation in Bahia. GAA, NA 62/210v-211

⁴⁹ GAA NA 55/537v-538

networks were very important for Vega, which is somewhat surprising since sugar was considered to be a product in which the Sephardim had a long history of cultivation of, and trade in. Although Vega did not in any way specialize in sugar, it is clear that inter-cultural relationships were important for his trade in this product. He may have needed an entrée into these networks, or he may have been looking to expand his networks in this product. Likewise, for Vega’s dealing in wood, as Graph 17, below, illustrates, Vega very clearly needs non-Sephardic contacts. He may not have had any previously established Sephardic contacts in this highly Baltic-based trade, in which Sephardic merchants had little experience in. Therefore, he might have sought out non-Sephardic merchants to work with him as he attempted to diversify the products in which he dealt. There might not have been very many other Sephardim who were interested in dealing with this product; hence the low number of integrated and intra-cultural networks. Or Vega could have wanted to monopolize as much of this trade as he could. Lastly, his networks could have simply been sufficient for his needs, and, thus, he had no need to integrate other merchants into them.

Graph 17: Manoel Rodrigues Vega’s Trade in Wood by Interaction Type, 1595-1613




Source: GAA, NA, n=9

The same pattern holds true for Manoel Rodrigues Vega’s participation in the trade in wood. Most of his associates are non-Sephardim, but he was involved in integrated networks, as well. However, he was engaged only peripherally with other Sephardi merchants in the wood trade. In contrast to the sugar and wood trades, however, Vega’s endeavors in the grain

trade appear to be mostly on his own behalf. (See Graph 18, below) There is a slight preference for non-Sephardi partners in this trade over other Sephardim, but it is slight. And integrated networks hardly figure in at all.

Graph 18: Manoel Rodrigues Vega’s Trade in Grain by Interaction Type, 1595-1613



Source: GAA, NA, n=21

Laurens Joosten Baeck, as was described above, was a prominent merchant from the Southern Netherlands who was involved in the sugar trade, as well as various other enterprises, as well. He and Manoel Rodrigues Vega co-owned a shipment of 60 bales of ginger in 1598.⁵⁰ They also dealt with each other in the East Indies trade. In 1605, Vega conveyed to Baeck his share of 550 p. Flem in a voyage to the East Indies which left in 1601. This voyage returned with a captured Spanish carrack called the “Santiago”. In exchange, Baeck paid Vega 160% in cash plus a capital augmented with 1/3 of the capital in pepper that was brought back from this expedition.

Some early shipments of spices other than pepper, as well as metal, and cordage demonstrate more of these inter-cultural trade relationships. For instance, Manuel Rodrigues Vega, himself born in Antwerp and with numerous family members who lived in Antwerp, received spices, cord, iron, and chests for sugar from David de Weert, a Flemish merchant in

⁵⁰ GAA, NA 53/101

Morocco.⁵¹ The goods had been consigned to Gaspar van Nispen, another Flemish merchant.⁵² Several months later, Vega made a deposition on behalf of van Nispen regarding this shipment.⁵³

Thus far, the examples for Manoel Rodrigues Vega's trade associations have focused on the Atlantic and Mediterranean routes. However, despite assertions that the Sephardim were only sporadically involved in Baltic trade and that they did not have the contacts with non-Sephardic merchants necessary to enter the region, Manuel Rodrigues Vega was involved in the trade in Baltic products, as was shown in Chapter II. In fact, fully 40% of the products in which he traded were the traditional bulk goods related to the Baltic trade. Vega was most active in the Baltic trade between 1596 and 1604.⁵⁴ In addition to the powers of attorney granted to merchants in Danzig mentioned above, Vega also sold woad to the Hans de Verne and Hans Staes who were in Danzig.⁵⁵

Illustration 6: The Wood Market in Danzig



“De houtmarkt van Dantzig” by Aegidius Dickmann, 1617, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam

⁵¹ Not much is known about David de Weert. The de Weert family came from Antwerp and married into a family from Emden. See, van Dillen, *He oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de Kamer Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie*, ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 175; and <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

⁵² GAA, NA 53/78v-79. Gaspar van Nispen's brother, Adrian dealt with the Sephardic merchants Duarte and Emanuel Ximenes in Antwerp. For information on the van Nispen family, see Hans Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567-1648)*, 270.

⁵³ GAA, NA 53/153v

⁵⁴ GAA NA 55/537v-538, 571-571v; NA 98/28-28v; NA 81; NA 54/142v-143; NA 93/6-7; NA 95/63-63v; NA 86/44-44v; NA 83/105-105v; NA 88; NA 80; NA 81; NA 53/12, 51v-52, 100-101, 103v; NA 75/45-46v

⁵⁵ SR 8. When de Verne did not pay up, the Grisons, in Danzig, who had previously been granted powers of attorney by Vega, were given an authorization to pursue the matter on Vega's behalf.

The Importance of the Occasional

Whether it was in Danzig, Morocco, the East Indies, or Amsterdam itself, Manoel Rodrigues Vega depended on his connections with non-Sephardic associates to take advantage of the opportunities the expanding Dutch trade offered. He often integrated these non-Sephardic merchants into the networks he had with Sephardi merchants. This was markedly the case with his trade in sugar, perhaps because he also had many Sephardic contacts in the sugar trade. It is a trend that is also discernible in his dealing with wood, but is barely evident at all in the grain trade, possibly because there were relatively few Sephardim involved in the grain trade at the time. Thus, it would appear that Rodrigues Vega was flexible and opportunistic when responding to the commercial realities of the day. He was integrative in terms of product assortment and, clearly, in terms of his networks. Therefore, he was a global merchant by virtue of his wide geographical reach, his opportunism, and his integrativeness.

Not only was Vega a global merchant, however, and not only did he have large-scale, frequent, and long-running partnerships with non-Sephardic associates such as Cornelis Snellinck, as was detailed in Chapter III, but he also depended on merchants such as Hans de Schot, Laurens Joosten Baeck, David de Weert, Gaspar van Nispen, and others not mentioned in this chapter to conduct his far-reaching enterprises. Hence, Rodrigues Vega's networks seem to have been not only inter-cultural, but also based on loose ties with a variety of merchants from a multitude of backgrounds working together to maximize their commercial interests. Particularly note-worthy is the fact that the de Schot, Baeck, de Weert, and van Nispen were all from Antwerp, as was Vega, which could point to a connection based on place of origin which was as important, or more so, than ethno-religious background.

Manoel Carvalho

Manoel Carvalho, was, as Hart demonstrated (Appendix I), one of the major shippers to the Italian Peninsula until 1620. Traditionally, Italian merchants had been the intermediaries in the trade between Northwestern Europe on the one hand, and the Mediterranean, the Middle and Far East on the other. A new trading pattern began to emerge, however, by the early seventeenth century. The Dutch utilized surplus cargo space and competed with the Genoese and Venetians in the intra-Mediterranean carrying trade.⁵⁶ In the Mediterranean, Dutch vessels enjoyed low operating costs, permitting penetration of the

⁵⁶ De Vries and van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy*, 380.

regional carrying trade.⁵⁷ Once Dutch ships had exchanged Northern goods such as manufactured items and/or grain for Iberian silver, salt, or wool for sale on the Italian peninsula and with Mediterranean grain (from Sicily, Greece, and Egypt) for sale in Constantinople and the Spanish and Italian cities. Then the money acquired in Iberia could be used in the Levant for purchases destined for the Amsterdam market.⁵⁸ This new trading pattern, combined with the onset of the Thirty Years' War, ended the Italian and French commercial hegemony in the Mediterranean.⁵⁹ Carvalho was posed to take advantage of the situation, along with his non-Sephardic associates.

Carvalho shipped goods from Amsterdam to the Mediterranean, with stopovers in Tunis, Sousa, Alexandria and Venice and/or Livorno,⁶⁰ as well as ships that stopped in Viana in Portugal, and then sailed onwards to Venice.⁶¹ For example, in 1609, Manoel Carvalho freighted a ship from Viana, with sugar and other, unnamed goods (assumedly salt and, possibly, wool) to Venice.⁶² In Chapter III, Carvalho's long-lasting and frequent dealings with Albert Schuyt were detailed. Although he did not have other non-Sephardic associates who were equal to Schuyt in importance to him, he did utilize non-Sephardic merchants to further his business enterprises. For instance, in 1609, Carvalho, and the Dutch merchants Nicolaes Claessen Evenswijn and Gillis Hoffman had come together to charter a ship to sail to Venice. They later had the course changed and sent the ship to Viana, in Portugal, instead.⁶³

Moreover, he and the Flemish merchant François Wouters, mentioned above for the power of attorney he granted to Carvalho, co-owned multiple cargoes of sugar. Most of these cargoes were also co-owned by Albert Schuyt and several other merchants, both Sephardi and non-Sephardi. They first came together in 1616 and bought 33 chests of sugar.⁶⁴ The following year, they co-owned 102 chests.⁶⁵

Duarte Esteves de Pina, a Sephardic merchant living in Amsterdam, also participated in these purchases of sugar, along with Albert Schuyt, Henri Thibaut, François Wouters, and Manoel Carvalho. This demonstrates that integrated networks of both Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants were of great importance to the conduct of Carvalho's trade. As Graph 19,

⁵⁷ De Vries and van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy*, 380

⁵⁸ De Vries and van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy*, 380.

⁵⁹ J. Israel, *Dutch Primacy* . . . , 97-101

⁶⁰ GAA, NA 144/151v-153; NA 141/142v; NA 140/234-235

⁶¹ GAA, NA 116/44v-45v

⁶² GAA, NA 116/44v-45v; See also NA 116/44vA


⁶³ GAA, NA 116/44v; for information on Hoffman, see, <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

⁶⁴ GAA, NA 379/618; NA 387/119

⁶⁵ GAA, NA 624/15v-16v; NA 380/4

below, shows, Carvalho had far more interactions involving these integrated networks than he did purely intra-group trade or dealing with only non-Sephardim. For instance, Carvalho, Cornelis Claessen, and Juda Chamis, a Sephardic merchant in Venice, co-owned the cargo of a ship that sailed from Venice to Tunis in 1621.⁶⁶ This could have something to do with the fact that Carvalho was a major trader in sugar. The sugar trade already had a strong Sephardic presence in it. And, as was seen above, this same pattern of integrated networks in the sugar trade held true for Manoel Rodrigues Vega, as well. In fact, as Graph 19, below, shows, the overwhelming majority of Carvalho's interactions which had sugar explicitly named in the contract were done with an integrated network of associates. This could also be because Carvalho was possibly looking to expand his networks in the sugar trade, and, therefore, sought to integrate his networks.

Graph 19: Manoel Carvalho's Trade in Sugar



Source: GAA, NA, n=47


This was clearly not the case for grain, however, as Graph 20, below, shows. In fact, it appears that Carvalho traded in grain mostly on his own behalf; a conclusion borne out by Hart's analysis of the available documentation (see Appendix I), which only found one listed associate in the examined documentation for any of Carvalho's Italian shipments. And, as was seen above, Manoel Rodrigues Vega traded grain almost entirely on his own account, too. Interestingly, Carvalho's grain shipments plummet during the Twelve Years Truce. This is possibly due to the fact that, during the Truce years, he could legally focus on the trade in

⁶⁶ GAA, NA 628/351-353

sugar from Brazil – a trade which was difficult to conduct when this Iberian colony and the Dutch Republic were officially at war. Before the Truce, Carvalho might have been working more on the trade in Baltic products – products from lands which were not in conflict with the Dutch Republic (or at least registering the trade in these products). There could have also been a change in the pricing or availability of grain which could explain this drop in Carvalho’s registered trade in the product.

Though the Mediterranean was Carvalho’s specialty, he also dabbled in the Atlantic trade, especially after the end of the 12 years truce, including the part-ownership of sugar plantations in Brazil, which, by this time, had fallen under Dutch control, with both Sephardic and non-Sephardic partners in 1635.⁶⁷ There is at least one case in which Carvalho participated in the Baltic trade. In 1619 he sold fellow Sephardic merchants Manuel Alvares de Campos and Duarte Rodrigues Preto shares in a ship insured by Hendrick Thibaut, a non-Sephardic merchant sailing from Moscow to an unnamed point on the Italian Peninsula.⁶⁸

Graph 20: Manoel Carvalho’s Trade in Grain by Interaction Type, 1602 - 1621



Source: GAA, NA, n=11

Whether it was in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, or the Baltic trades, not to mention Amsterdam itself, Manoel Carvalho depended on his connections with non-Sephardic associates to take advantage of the opportunities the expanding Dutch trade offered. Thus, it

⁶⁷ NA 671/198-201. The part owners were: Symon van der Does; Bartholomeo Hoppfer; Christoffel Ayerschettel; Diego Fernandes; Isaack Carvalho; Pedro Alvares; see also GAA NA 672/6-6v and NA 672/5-6

⁶⁸ GAA, NA 625/376-377

would appear that Carvalho was flexible and opportunistic when responding to the commercial realities of the day. He was integrative in terms of product assortment and, clearly, in terms of his networks. Therefore, he was a global merchant by virtue of his wide geographical reach, his opportunism, and his integrativeness. He often integrated these non-Sephardic merchants into the networks he had with Sephardi merchants. This was markedly the case with his trade in sugar, perhaps because he also had many Sephardic contacts in the sugar trade, and because he may have wanted to expand and strengthen these networks. However, this is not the case at all for the grain trade, possibly because there were relatively few Sephardim involved in the grain trade at the time, or because he had no need for help.

Not only was Carvalho a global merchant with large-scale, frequent, and long-running partnerships with non-Sephardic associates such as Albert Schuyt, as was detailed in Chapter III. He also depended on merchants such Nicolaes Claessen Evenswijn, Gillis Hoffman, Henri Thibaut, and François Wouters and others not mentioned in this chapter to conduct his far-reaching enterprises. Hence, Carvalho's networks seem to have been not only inter-cultural, but also based on loose ties with a variety of merchants from a multitude of backgrounds working together to maximize their commercial interests. Particularly note-worthy is the fact that the Hoffman and Wouters were both from Antwerp. Carvalho had connections to this city via his cousin, Maria de Pas, which could point to a connection based on Antwerp, as well as of a coming together of relative newcomers to the city of Amsterdam, which was as important, or more so, than ethno-religious background.

Bento Osorio

Bento Osorio's settlement in Amsterdam in 1610 signals that port's promotion into the circuit of the major Portuguese merchant bankers.⁶⁹ Bento Osorio, who very rapidly grew to be the wealthiest member of the Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam, was the factor of the de Pinto family in Lisbon. Osorio remained the Amsterdam correspondent of the de Pinto family until at least the 1640s, when the Pintos, who had meanwhile settled in Antwerp, moved to Holland.⁷⁰ Lopes Pinto was the contractor (*asentista*) for salt, brazilwood and of the supplies of the forts of Tangier and Ceuta, two Portuguese garrison towns in North Africa.

⁶⁹ Daniel Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 109

⁷⁰ Swetschinski, *The Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam* . . . 151

According to a deed made on the 20th of November in 1618, Osorio had chartered about 200 ships to ship salt to Holland and the Baltic during the three preceding years for Lopes Pinto.⁷¹

Bento Osorio became the leading merchant among the Portuguese Jews. In the three years between 1616 - 1618, he freighted around 200 ships hauling salt from Setúbal to Flanders, Holland, and the Baltic ports of Riga, Koningsberg, and Danzig, shipping in return rye, wheat, wood, and ammunition either directly from the Baltic region (grain) or Norway (wood), or from Amsterdam to Tangier and Ceuta.⁷² Bento Osorio's capital was estimated at 50,000 guilders, making him one of the wealthiest members of the community.⁷³ In 1641, there were only three accounts in the exchange bank covering more than four pages, one of which was Bento Osorio's.⁷⁴

Illustration 7: The Harbor at Riga



"The Harbor at Riga"

Museum voor de geschiedenis van Riga en Scheepvaart/Riga vestures un kugniecibas muzejs

⁷¹ GAA, NA 109/93; NA 145/137-137v; NA 198/766v-767v

⁷² GAA, NA 200/63-64


⁷³ J.G. van Dillen, "Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam in de eerste helft der Zeventiende Eeuw," *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, I, 1935, 16

⁷⁴ Herbert Bloom, *The economic activities of the Jews of Amsterdam in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*, (Williamsport, Pa.: Bayard Press, 1937),175.

The Importance of the Occasional

As early as 1610, the year he first arrived in Amsterdam, Osorio was freighting grain to Viana and other locations in Portugal and having ships return with sugar.⁷⁵ These ships sailed to and from Amsterdam. In 1611 and 1612, Osorio shipped goods, most likely grain, to Portugal in exchange for sugar.⁷⁶ He also shipped lead and copper.⁷⁷ Osorio seems to have sold his cargoes of salt and sugar in advance to their arrival. For example, he sold at least three cargoes of salt to the Englishman, John Webster, before the ship even left port.⁷⁸ Though, as Graph 21, below, shows, Osorio seemed to mostly ship salt on his own behalf, interactions such as the ones he had with Webster were not particularly unusual. Close to 30% of Osorio's dealings in the salt trade involved at least one non-Sephardic associate.

Graph 21: Bento Osorio's Trade in Salt



Source: GAA, NA, n=189

Of the Sephardim involved in the Baltic trade, Bento Osorio was the most prolific, and, as the sale of large quantities of salt to the non-Sephardic merchant, John Webster, shows, this trade relied upon non-Sephardic associates. In addition to Dirck Thomassen Glimmer and Cornelis Jut, who were profiled in Chapter III, Osorio had important contacts with non-Sephardic merchants such as Hillebrant Schelling, councilor and *ex-echevin* (local official) of Amsterdam, who made an agreement to charter the ship called the “Vergulden Aecker” in 1618. This ship was to sail from Heiligenhafen, to load 50 lasts of wheat, then to proceed to

⁷⁵ GAA NA 120/178v-179v


⁷⁶ GAA NA 124/35-36v; 202-202v

⁷⁷ GAA NA 127/109v-110; NA 129/21

⁷⁸ GAA NA 109/93; NA 143/25v-26v

Hohwacht or Fehmarn to load another 50 lasts of wheat which were to be unloaded in Tangier of Ceuta.⁷⁹ Graph 22, below, indicates that this cargo was no exception to the rule that, when Osorio worked extensively with non-Sephardic associates. In fact, in the grain trade, he worked more with non-Sephardic associates than he is documented as shipping on his own behalf.

Graph 22: Osorio's Trade in Grain



Source: GAA, NA, n=24

In the grain trade, Osorio utilized inter-cultural and integrated networks. Perhaps he had a greater need for these networks. It could be that he had fewer connections in the grain trade than he did in the salt trade and, therefore, needed to expand his networks. At any rate, though Osorio was a merchant who was predominately involved in the Baltic trade, he was engaged in the Atlantic and Mediterranean trades, as well. For instance, in 1623, Bento Osorio, Guillaume Bartolotti, Jan Baptista de Wael; Jan Geurtsz, Thomas en Vincentio Sauli, from Genoa, and François Boudewijns each owned a part of the ship “St. Pieter” which sailed from Genoa to Marseille in France.⁸⁰ Interestingly, Bartolotti had strong connections to the city of Antwerp⁸¹ as did de Wael⁸² and Boudewijns.⁸³ Osorio was married to a member of the Teixeira family, who were prominent Sephardic merchants in the city of Antwerp.

⁷⁹ GAA, NA 152/65v-66v

⁸⁰ GAA, NA 350/81v-82v

⁸¹ van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeel . . .*, 64


⁸² <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

⁸³ van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeel . . .*, 141

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Many of Osorio's Atlantic and Mediterranean shipments that were not directly related to the Baltic salt and grain trades involved sugar. Although Osorio was not by any means the sugar merchant that Carvalho was, he did trade in this product. For example, in 1627, Osorio, the Sephardic merchants Denis Jenes and Manuel Baruch, the Dutch merchants Martin Hurean and Aluise du Bois, and the Venetian merchant known by his last name only, Lucanelli, co-owned 44 cases of sugar and 19 bags of pepper. These were loaded in the ship "De Eenhoorn" which was destined for Venice.⁸⁴ Graph 23, below, illustrates that this shipment was the norm for Osorio. The vast majority of his sugar shipments involved an integrated network of Sephardi and non-Sephardic merchants. This was, as has been seen, also the case for Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Manoel Carvalho, which further bolsters the idea that, in the sugar trade, the Sephardim could use their intra-group networks but also found it efficacious to integrate non-Sephardic merchants into these networks.

Graph 23: Osorio's Trade in Sugar




Source: GAA, NA, n=24

Interestingly, in the wood trade, as Graph 24 shows, below, these integrated networks were marginal to Osorio's trade in this product. In fact, there was only one documented case of Osorio using an integrated network when trading in wood. This was also the case for intra-group networks, as well. But there were far more incidences of Osorio working with non-Sephardi associates to deal in wood. For example, in 1619, Osorio and Nicolaes du Gardijn

⁸⁴ GAA, NA 634/143v-144

worked together to bring a large shipload of wood to Venice.⁸⁵ Du Gardijn, like so many of Osorio's non-Sephardic associates, was from Antwerp.⁸⁶ Perhaps Osorio had no need to integrate his networks for the trade in wood with other Sephardim, as his trade on his own or with the help of non-Sephardic merchants served his needs. It could also be that there was little interest among Sephardi traders in the trade in wood. In addition to all these reasons, it is possible that Osorio hoped to keep as much of the trade in wood to himself as possible.

Graph 24: Osorio's Trade in Wood



Source: GAA, NA, n=16

Overall, it seems that integrated networks, outside the trade in sugar, were of less importance for Osorio than for either Manoel Rodrigues Vega or for Manoel Carvalho. Instead, Osorio depended more on wholly inter-group networks, when he was not listed as the only merchant on the deed. Lagging behind are intra-group networks composed only of other Sephardic merchants, as Graph 12 showed.

Bento Osorio utilized his connections with non-Sephardic associates to take advantage of the opportunities the expanding Dutch trade offered. Osorio was heavily involved in the Baltic trade, and he relied on non-Sephardic suppliers and co-shippers. He integrated these non-Sephardic merchants into the networks he had with Sephardi merchants in the sugar trade, perhaps because he also had many Sephardic contacts in the sugar trade. However, this is not

⁸⁵ GAA, NA 156/195-195v

⁸⁶ Gardijn is first mentioned in Amsterdam in 1593. He is listed as leaving Amsterdam in 1626. See, <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden> and van Dillen, *Het Oudste Aandeel Register . . .*, 197

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the case at all for the grain or the wood and salt trades, possibly because there were relatively few Sephardim involved in these Baltic-based bulk trades at the time. It could also be because his networks were already effective as they were.

Osorio depended on merchants such as John Webster, Hillebrant Schellingen, Guillaume Bartolotti, Jan Baptista de Wael, Jan Geurtsz, Thomas en Vincentio Sauli, François Boudewijns, Martin Hurean, Aluise du Bois, and Nicolaes du Gardijn, as well as others not mentioned in this chapter, to conduct his far-reaching enterprises. Hence, Osorio's networks seem to have been not only inter-cultural, but also based on loose ties with a variety of merchants from a multitude of backgrounds working together to maximize their commercial interests. Particularly note-worthy is the fact that the Bartolotti, de Wael, Boudewijns, and du Gardijn were all either from Antwerp, or strongly connected to this city. Bento Osorio had very strong connections to this city via his wife, Ester Teixeira, who was a member of one of the most prominent Sephardic families in the Southern Low Countries. This could point to a connection based on Antwerp, as well as of a coming together of relative newcomers to the city of Amsterdam, which was as important, or more so, than ethno-religious background.

Conclusion

Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio drew on the experiences they had gained while living outside the Netherlands – in Antwerp, Portugal, France, and Brazil. They took advantage of openings in the market, and utilized contacts they had cultivated from their places of origin, from where they had lived prior to settling in Amsterdam, and in Amsterdam itself, all of which helped them make a place for themselves in Amsterdam's mercantile community. In some cases, they shipped and traded as factors and agents for others. Bento Osorio acted as the factor for Andrea Lopes Pinto, and Rodrigues Vega sometimes acted as a factor for Gaspar Sanches. And, as has been shown, they often represented the interests of other merchants, whether Sephardim or not, on a temporary, or semi-temporary, basis. These connections could have helped to have given them a start, and paved the way for far more lucrative businesses as principals acting on their own account – shipping and trading, in some cases land or plantation ownership, brokerage, and government contracting. It also required a great deal of coordination.

Furthermore, the merchants were not necessarily specialists in a certain product, though they did, as Chapter III indicated, tend to concentrate in either the bulk or the rich trades. Nor were they exclusively involved in one route, though they certainly may have been

more present in one route over another. Carvalho, for example, was mostly present in the Mediterranean trade, while Osorio was a Baltic trader. However, they all heavily supplemented their primary route or product class with other routes and products. Interestingly, the importance of sugar and spices, the products that are traditionally ascribed to the Sephardim, is evident, but less great than other sources would suggest. This is also the case for the merchants from the Southern Netherlands merchants.⁸⁷

It seems that merchants went outside their group for shared ownership for trade for three reasons: 1) when they were unfamiliar and/or not integrated in/with the market in which they wanted to enter, and in which they might not have any trusted associates. The Baltic trade in grain and wood would be an example of this; 2) they had contacts enough within their group but saw the efficacy of augmenting their networks with new members who could help them expand their base of clients, suppliers, and creditors. The sugar trade serves as such an example; 3) they, essentially, saw no real difference between themselves and the merchants from outside their group. Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were, as Chapter III showed, global merchants and they dealt with other global merchants. These merchants had the wealth and status to transcend the boundaries of socio-religious groups. But beyond transcending these groups, per se, there is the very real possibility that, when they looked to each other, they saw another rich merchant rather than a Protestant or a Catholic. They may have seen someone from Antwerp rather than a Sephardi Jew or a Protestant. Thus, they may not have perceived difference, as such, and, therefore, did not view their interactions as going outside their own group.

Insurance

As the analysis of the trade relationships between Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants above at least partially shows, many Sephardim, especially in the early years of their settlement in Amsterdam, dealt in agricultural products from Iberia, North Africa, the Iberian Atlantic Islands such as Malaga and the Azores, merchandise to and from the pirate-infested Mediterranean, and sugar, textiles, and other high value products between Brazil, Portugal, the United Provinces, the Italian States, and the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁸ All these routes and products were risky due to the ongoing threat from shipwreck, piracy and privateering,

⁸⁷ Gelderblom, *Zuid Nederlandse kooplieden . . .* , 148.

⁸⁸ Daniel M. Swetschinski, *The Portuguese Jewish Merchants of Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam . . .* , n.31, 619-620.

war, and possible damage to costly fabrics and relatively easily spoilable foodstuffs. Resumption of war with Spain in 1621 and the depredations of Dunkirk privateers on Dutch shipping, furnished convincing arguments in favor of insurance, especially for merchants such as the Sephardim who were so intimately involved in Iberian-related trade.

Therefore, it is perhaps not a great surprise that the Sephardim were very likely to take out insurance on their voyages. When analyzing the “cross-cultural” economic exchanges of Sephardic merchants with non-Sephardim in the period between 1595 and 1640, the sheer number of maritime insurance-related contacts found in the notarial records of the Amsterdam Municipal Archives would, at least in part, seem to offer a glimpse into the beginnings of inter-cultural economic interaction in Early Modern period. These records show the extent to which Sephardic and non-Sephardic (largely Dutch/Flemish) merchants dealt with each other in a high-risk business environment. More than 100 separate Dutch merchants insured cargoes for close to thirty different Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam as well as for Sephardic merchants further a field.

Amsterdam promulgated an ordinance on insurance on January 31, 1598, by which a chamber of assurance (insurance) was set up for the registration of policies and for determining any controversies which should arise in regard to them.⁸⁹ The Chamber earned the confidence of the business community, and successive revisions of the original ordinance attest to the increasing volume of insurance registered and the greater precision of the chamber’s procedure. For example, the wrangling over the payment of the insurance for the ship the “Drie Coningen” became so contentious that it was ultimately taken to the Chamber of Assurance in Amsterdam, in 1608, the first known record of this occurring in relationship to a Sephardic merchant or merchants.⁹⁰ The case involved a Sephardic merchant, Felipe Dias Vitoria, who had abandoned to the four (or, possibly, more) Dutch insurers his 25% share in the ship “Drie Coningen” “insofar as this . . . exceeds the sum insured.”⁹¹

Two years later, in 1610, Melchior Mendes took a similar case to the Chamber of Assurance when he claims that an unnamed number of insurers will not pay the 2950 p. Flemish pounds that they had insured for the ship “Patientia.”⁹² This same case is found

⁸⁹ Violet Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam in the seventeenth century*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), 33

⁹⁰ GA NA 112/177v-178

⁹¹ GAA NA 112/177-177v

⁹² GAA NA 122/94v-95; GAA NA 120/190v-191; GAA NA 123/7v

winding its way through the courts two years later when 22 separate insurers are mentioned by name.⁹³

In fact, when examining the records relating to maritime insurance during this time, one gets the impression that the fear of fraud was rampant. The insurers seemed to have distrusted the merchants and, in fact, insurance was plagued by all sorts of problems, as was detailed above. Moral hazard was one: insurance encouraged captains to take risks – for example, to take a more hazardous route or to break away from a convoy to get to market first. To contain moral hazard, insurance was generally obtainable for only a fraction of the value of insured goods.⁹⁴ Outright fraud on the part of the insured was not uncommon either – for example, deliberate shipwreck, or taking out insurance after receiving secret news of loss, or insuring the same ship in multiple places with multiple groups of insurers.⁹⁵ One of the other owners of the “Drie Coningen,” mentioned above, the Sephardic merchant Garcia Gomes, had two insurance policies for his 25% share with Dutch merchants.⁹⁶ Twenty years later, in 1628, there were at least three separate insurance policies on the ship “de Eenhoorn” (the Unicorn) sailing to the Azores from Amsterdam.⁹⁷

However, the insurers were hardly free of guilt. Underwriters frequently defaulted. A merchant in financial difficulties could raise large sums by accepting premiums on insurance contracts, which he would then be unable to honor. Perhaps this is why one Dutch insurer was looking for a loophole in his contract and claimed that he wasn't liable for the losses incurred on a ship apparently lost at sea, because, on the policy he signed, he claimed the name of the skipper was Syvert Symonsz., not Symon Syvertsz.⁹⁸ Insurance often served as a form of gambling: it was common for parties with no specific interest in a particular ship to take out insurance on it as a sort of wager. This behavior harmed the reputation of the market, although it could be argued that it performed an economically useful function by facilitating price discovery. Presumably such “gambling” would have been unprofitable unless the premiums quoted were too low. Exact information about losses of ships and cargoes was spotty at best, with hard evidence being difficult to come by, making fraud relatively easy to perpetrate.

⁹³ GAA NA 126/72-73v

⁹⁴ Meir Kohn, “Risk Instruments in the Medieval and Early Modern Economy,” 12. (February 1999). Dartmouth College, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 99-07.

Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=151871> or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.10.2139/ssrn.151871

⁹⁵ Violet Barbour, “Marine risks and insurance in the seventeenth century,” *Journal of Economic and Business History* 1 (4), August, 1929, 561-596.

⁹⁶ GAA NA 112/177v-178v

⁹⁷ GAA NA 397/99

⁹⁸ GAA NA 42/146v

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However, insurance was, in general, still cobbled together by either the merchant himself, who brought together various insurers, or by potential insurers who searched for other merchants with enough financial wherewithal to underwrite a cargo. The insurance business took place at the bourse, alongside other financial transactions, or sometimes, as is seen below, on the streets. The party seeking insurance made out the insurance contract and circulated it among potential underwriters until a sufficient number had signed, though often this process was acted out in reverse, especially earlier on in the chronology. Since individual underwriters would commit only to a relatively small amount – usually no more than 200 florins – a dozen or more were often required. In underwriting itself there was no specialization: merchants, ship-owners, merchant bankers, deposit bankers, and others all underwrote insurance as a sideline to their principal business.⁹⁹ Finally, in 1614, two Amsterdamers formed a partnership for the insurance of ships¹⁰⁰

If for no other reason than the sheer numbers of participants in the nascent maritime insurance industry who were actively interacting with each other, exchanges between Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants surrounding maritime insurance should be viewed as fertile ground for the blooming of fruitful inter-cultural economic relationships. And, in fact, some Dutch merchants insured cargoes for the same Sephardic merchants multiple times over the years, which demonstrates a degree of trust, familiarity, and continuity in their relationships with one another.

In answer to the question of how a Sephardic merchant or, most likely, any merchant in Amsterdam in the early part of the seventeenth century got insurance, a deed from 1610 tells the reader a great deal. A Dutch merchant by the name of Jan Jansz. Smith declared to the notary that, “Manuel Fernandes, Portuguese, came over to him on the Nieuwe Brug and asked him whether he would insure goods for a journey to the Canary Islands.”¹⁰¹ It seems, then, that merchants approached other merchants, literally, on the streets and tried to create a consortium of insurers for their cargoes. As the example above shows, insurance seems to have been a somewhat imprecise proposition during the period defined in this study. Nevertheless, it is an important one because it the primary way in which Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants interacted economically.

⁹⁹ This paragraph paraphrased from Meir Kohn, “Risk Instruments in the Medieval and Early Modern Economy,” 10 (February 1999). Dartmouth College, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 99-07. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=151871> or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.10.2139/ssrn.151871

¹⁰⁰ GAA, NA 611/128

¹⁰¹ GAA NA 196/540-541

Manoel Rodrigues Vega

An example of how vague insurance, especially in the early days, was the claim made by Manoel Rodrigues Vega for the loss of two ships, “Nossa Senhora de Victoria and “Nossa Senhora da Luz” coming from Cochin in India to Lisbon in 1597. This ship was insured by a group of 12 insurers, including Balthazar van Nispen, a prominent Flemish merchant. One Dutch insurer by the name of Melchior van Dortmont in 1597 responded to Manoel Rodrigues Vega regarding the loss of ships sailing from Cochin in India to Lisbon that “*to the best of his knowledge* [italics added], he insured them *if* the ships were in the fleet that is due to put into port and that, if this refers to the previous fleet, he does not consider himself obliged to pay.”¹⁰²

The year before, in 1596, two Dutch merchants, Beerendt Rotgers and Pieter Gerrits Delff had insured just one package of baize, a kind of cloth, for Vega. Vega declared to a notary that this package, which had been carried on the ship the “Sinte Pieter” had been lost off the coast of Portugal. Therefore, Vega requested payment for it.¹⁰³ While this seems like a relatively straightforward claim, the situation was slightly more complicated. It seems that Rotgers and Gerrits Delff insured just the package of baize. Five other insurers – Ghijzelbrecht Bruyninx, Jan Veen, Jan Cornelisz. Visser, Mathijs Jansz, and Cornelis van Bogaerde – had insured unspecified “goods” for Vega on this same ship.¹⁰⁴ This would seem to confirm the fact that there were not only multiple insurers for voyages, but also insurers for various parts of the cargo.

This was the second time that van Veen had insured goods for Vega. He had also insured the previous voyage.¹⁰⁵ Cornelis van Bogaede (or Bogaert) insured cargoes for not only Vega, but also for the Sephardic merchant Diogo Nunes Belmonte, the son-in-law of Bento Osorio.¹⁰⁶ Visser was also a prominent merchant as had subscribed for 1,000 florins to the Dutch East India Company.¹⁰⁷ In fact, it seems that many prominent merchants were involved in the insurance of ships, at least as a sideline to their main business endeavors. For

¹⁰² SR 17. In addition to van Nispen and van Dortmont, the other insurers were: Jan Stevensz; Jacques van Hanswijck; Jan Veen; Guillaume Buys; Pieter Gerritsz Delff; Reynier de Loker; Willem van Campen; Dirck Alewijn; Balthazar Jacot; and Daniel Cambier

¹⁰³ SR 4

¹⁰⁴ SR 21

¹⁰⁵ van Veen was, like Vega, a relative newcomer to Amsterdam. He came from Gouda, and became a citizen of Amsterdam in 1594. See, van Dillen, *Het Oudste Aandeelregister . . .*, 174 and Elias, *de Vroedschap . . .*, 138.

¹⁰⁶ SR 689. Bogaert was also a subscriber to the Amsterdam chamber of the Dutch East India company for 600 florins. See van Dillen, *Het Oudste Aandeelregister . . .*, 249.

¹⁰⁷ van Dillen, *Het Oudste Aandeelregister . . .*, 143.

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instance, in 1598, a consortium of nine prominent Dutch and Flemish merchants insured wheat for Vega on the ship “de Rooden Meulen” (the Red Mill) which was lost at sea.¹⁰⁸

Gaspar Coymans was one of these insurers. The Coymans family were extremely prominent merchants involved in the sugar trade. Members of the family appear 16 times¹⁰⁹ in the documentation relating the Sephardim, including with Carvalho¹¹⁰ and Osorio.¹¹¹ They, like Vega, came from Antwerp originally.¹¹² Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Gaspar Coymans had built upon their knowledge of each other from Antwerp and from Coymans’ insurance of Vega’s cargo and eventually co-owned a cargo of sugar in 1601.¹¹³ This same cargo was also co-owned by Thibaut de Pickere, another insurer of the 1598 East Indian voyage, and, like Vega and Coymans, originally from Antwerp.¹¹⁴ de Pickere also insured a cargo for the Sephardic merchant Alfonso Dias.¹¹⁵ In addition to Coymans and de Pickere, Dirck van Os, yet another recent immigrant from the Southern Netherlands, was an insurer for this voyage. As was detailed in Chapter III, van Os and Vega had worked together in 1601 for the provision of the ransom for the Admiral of Aragon. It could be that they became acquainted through ventures such as this insurance policy. van Os also worked with Carvalho.¹¹⁶ In addition to Carvalho and Vega, Dirck van Os also dealt with Diego Dias Querido and Antonio Dias Tinoco,¹¹⁷ as well as a plethora of other Sephardic merchants.¹¹⁸

Balthazar Jacot joined this group of recent Antwerp immigrants in insuring Vega’s voyage. Jacot arrived in Amsterdam in 1584 and became a citizen of the city in 1591.¹¹⁹ Jacot had also been one of Vega’s insurers of the “Nossa Senhora de Victoria and “Nossa Senhor da Luz” as well as for the “Sinte Pieter.” Insuring for Vega was not the first time he had worked with Sephardic merchants. In 1593, he had belonged to large group of Flemish merchants,

¹⁰⁸ SR 28. These insurers were Gaspar Coymans, Thibaut de Pickere, Dirck van Os, Mathijs Jansz van Straeten, Balthazar Jacot, Dirck Alweijn, Gubrecht Wachmans, Jan le Brun, and Contrad Bossereel

¹⁰⁹ NA 55/679-679v; NA 52/146v; NA 376/416-417; NA 196/282v-283; NA 62/223; NA 126/72-73v; NA 126/84; NA 126/84-85; NA 197/171v-172; NA 258/82; NA 643/119-119v

¹¹⁰ SR 168

¹¹¹ GAA, NA 138/72-73; NA 726/103

¹¹² <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>. See also van Dillen, *Het Oudste Aandeelregister*, 79, 205

¹¹³ SR 91 and GAA, NA 387/115-117v

¹¹⁴ Thibaut van Pickere is first mentioned in Amsterdam in 1584.

<http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

¹¹⁵ SR 18. This cargo was also insured with Gaspar and Baltazar Coymans, Hans van Gheel, and Baltazar Jacot, all émigrés from Antwerp.

¹¹⁶ SR 168

¹¹⁷ GAA, NA 116/2-2v

¹¹⁸ Duarte Fernandes; Francisco Lopes Homem; Ruy Lopes Homem; Belchior Mendes; Tomas Nunes Pina; Francisco Pinto de Brito; Estevão Cardoso (SR 168); James Lopes da Costa and Francisco Lopes (SR 280); Simão de Mercado (SR 335); Gaspar and Manuel Lopes Homem (SR 420); and Pascoal Lopes (SR 708, 716).

¹¹⁹ See van Dillen, *Het Oudste . . .*, 196-197 and <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>.

including a large number who worked with Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio who had insured cargoes for the Ximenes family in Antwerp.¹²⁰ Jacot was the brother-in-law of Dirck Alewijn, another of the insurers on this voyage.¹²¹ Gubrecht Wachmans and Jan le Brun, the other insurers of the 1598 voyage, were also newcomers to Amsterdam. Wachmans had been born in Antwerp, while le Brun had come from Cologne.¹²²

There are several important points to be garnered from these examples. The first is that Manoel Rodrigues Vega clearly believed it to be beneficial to insure his cargoes. The records regarding insurance are almost always of policies that had to be claimed due to the loss of the ship and/or its cargo. However, far more policies were most likely issued than survive in the archives. The second important point is that, at least in the case of Vega, insurance seemed to serve as a first stepping stone or loose tie to more joint business ventures. Perhaps the relatively low risk nature of insurance played a part in this. Casualty risk such as insurance was largely independent of the specific merchant purchasing the insurance. It depended mainly on the route chosen, on the time of year, and on the political situation. Since an underwriter had no need for specific information about the insured, this increased the pool of potential underwriters and made it easier to spread the risk.¹²³ Nevertheless, the merchants were able to come into contact with each other loosely and build the knowledge and trust of and in each other to build the foundation for further associations. Lastly, the vast majority of the insurers were recent arrivals to Amsterdam, mostly from Antwerp. It could be that these recent arrivals were more likely to diversify their business enterprises to include insurance than were more established merchants, either because they were willing to take risks by insuring cargoes that more established merchants were not willing to take in order to establish themselves commercially in their new environment, or because they had experience in the routes and cargoes to be insured so had the knowledge to take measured risks. It could also be, in addition to these factors, that Vega and these insurers knew each other already (or knew of each other) via their home city of Antwerp.

¹²⁰ GAA, NA 45/23. These insurers were: Isaac le Maire; Pieter Lingtens; Arnout Hoffman; Heyndrick de Hase; Jan Poppen; Jan Sijmons. de Jongh; Ghiselbrecht Adriaensz.; Francois van Hove; Hillebrandt den Otter; Hans de Laet Aertsz.; Jacques de Velare; Balthazar Jacot; Hans van Ghell; Hans van Vaerle; Jan Basseliers; Hans van Uffele; Roemer Visscher; Antonio Veluti

¹²¹ See van Dillen, *Het Oudste . . .*, 196-197

¹²² van Dillen, *Het Oudste . . .*, 114, 247

¹²³ Meir Kohn, "Risk Instruments in the Medieval and Early Modern Economy," Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=151871> or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.10.2139/ssrn.151871

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Manoel Carvalho

In 1615, Manoel Carvalho was ordered to pay the underwriters of a cargo that he claimed was lost at sea, after evidence came to light that someone known to him, Giovanni Baptista Sigalla, in Venice, actually sold that same sugar and remitted part of the profits of the sale back to Carvalho in Amsterdam.¹²⁴ He had claimed the money for goods insured in the ship known as “de Croon” (the Crown) that was supposedly captured by French privateers when sailing from Venice to Tunis.¹²⁵ This ship was insured by 16, mostly Flemish, merchants.¹²⁶ As was seen in the last chapter, one of these insurers, Albert Schuyt, was already well-known to Carvalho.

Although it is not necessary to list the background and connections of every insurer for this voyage – the majority were newcomers and of rising prominence in the mercantile community -- two of these insurers should be singled out. Daniel van den Eijnde began with insuring cargoes of sugar for Carvalho in 1614, but was a co-owner of several cargoes of this valuable product from 1616-1620.¹²⁷ van den Eijnde, like so many of the other insurers, was from the Southern Netherlands – Mechelen, outside of Antwerp – and had also lived in La Rochelle in France in 1594. He is first mentioned in Amsterdam in 1608, around the same time that Carvalho arrived in the city (1610).¹²⁸ Another prominent insurer was Hildebrand den Otter. Den Otter worked quite extensively with Bento Osorio, but also with Carvalho. In fact, den Otter had bought one half of a share in the ship the "Engel Gabriel" (Angel Gabriel) for a price of 525 p. Flem in 1610 from Carvalho. Den Otter paid one half in cash and the rest six months later.¹²⁹ Despite these tidbits of information, there is, unfortunately, little known of Den Otter. He is listed as a merchant of Amsterdam, and was the son of Floris den Otter.¹³⁰ Den Otter often acted as insurer for the other Portuguese Jews and was also repeatedly chosen to act as arbiter in their disputes.

What is interesting in the insurance policy mentioned above is that Carvalho, essentially, cheated his insurers and was brought to court over this incident. Not only is

¹²⁴ GAA 139/109v-110

¹²⁵ GAA 254/184v

¹²⁶ Hendrick Beeckman; Daniel van den Eijnde; Hillebrant den Otter; Francois Boudewijns; Adriaen Andriess., Nicolaes Claesse Everswijn; Barent Sweerts, Jan Jansee Smith, Jacob Jacobsse Bontenos, Pieter Beijens, Pauwels Jansse van Helmont, Dirck Vlack, Jan Battista Bartalotti, Godert Kerckrinck, Willem Pauw; Daniel van Geel

¹²⁷ NA 387/119; NA 383/511; NA 254/184v

¹²⁸ <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

¹²⁹ GAA, NA 374/116

¹³⁰ Johan E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795*, Vl. I, (Amsterdam: Israel, 1963), 119

interesting that Carvalho had defrauded his insurers on this voyage, but it is also interesting that they continued to do business together. Carvalho and Schuyt's association began in 1614, and not soon after news of Carvalho's deception came to light. Nevertheless, these two merchants continued trading together until 1632. Thus, it can be concluded that either this cheating was so much the norm that it did not deter further associations since it was expected, or it could be concluded that Carvalho and Schuyt had some further reasons to continue trading together. This was also the case for several other insurers of the ill-fated voyage in 1614. Bartolotti insured another voyage for Carvalho in 1616¹³¹ and again in 1621.¹³² And more examples could be given from the other insurers, as well.

What can be concluded from Carvalho's associations with his insurers? The first is that Manoel Carvalho, like Manoel Rodrigues Vega, clearly believed it to be beneficial to insure his cargoes. The second important point is that insurance could serve as a sort of business entrée for Carvalho and non-Sephardic merchants to loosely come into contact with one another. Perhaps a bit like the case of Vega, for Carvalho, insurance seemed to serve as a loose tie and a first stepping stone to more joint business ventures. Moreover, the fact that these first contacts did not go exceptionally well – Carvalho, in fact, defrauded his insurers – did not serve as a barrier to further associations, either in the realm of insurance or in co-ownership of cargoes and other sorts of interactions. This could be because fraud was expected. Or it could be because these merchants were willing to take the risk of continuing to work with one another. Since, like Carvalho, the vast majority of the insurers were recent arrivals to Amsterdam, mostly from Antwerp, it could be that these recent arrivals were more likely to diversify their business enterprises to include insurance than were more established merchants. It could also be, in addition to this, that Vega and these insurers knew each other already (or knew of each other) via their home city of Antwerp. Thus, they were willing to risk continued interactions.

Bento Osorio

Bento Osorio had multiple dealings with the Insurance Chamber, which, as was mentioned above, had been set up for the registration of policies and for determining any controversies which should arise in regard to them. For instance, in 1622, Osorio came to an agreement with Jasper van Diemen and Jan Arentsz van Naerden, both merchants in

¹³¹ GAA, NA 387/119

¹³² GAA, NA 165/203-204

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Amsterdam, who were owed money by Osorio. This money was to come from the insurance policy issued by Jan Jansz Smit, if the Insurance Chamber ruled that Jansz Smit did, in fact, owe the money to Osorio.¹³³ If the Insurance Chamber ruled against Osorio, Van Diemen and Arentsz van Naerden arranged another payment scheme.

Five years later, in 1627, another case involving Osorio came before the Insurance Chamber. A group of prominent merchants including Jan Stassart, Albert Schuyt, Godert Kerckringh, Adriaen Andriesz, Claes Andriesz, Jan Smit, Barent Sweerts, and Luca Claesz¹³⁴ demanded that Osorio comply with the ruling of the Chamber. These insurers had been ordered to pay a surety on the insurance policy they had offered to Osorio for a shipment of wheat. The interest was 12% a year on the amount of the surety. However, the judicial authorities eventually decided that Osorio should return the surety. The Chamber of Insurance also took up a case involving Osorio in 1632. In this case, Osorio and the Dutch merchant from Amsterdam, Joost Henrix Jansz, claimed that Isack Coymans, of the prominent family of Antwerp émigrés, owed them money on three insurance policies issued for a voyage from Alicante to Venice on a galleon called “Oblistro.”¹³⁵

These cases show how important the Chamber of Insurance had become by the 1620s. It seems to have begun to routinely handle disputes between merchants and their insurers. The Chamber of Assurance also gradually began to set premium rates in Amsterdam as the seventeenth-century progressed, but precise information about premiums is difficult to come by. What is also evident from these cases involving Osorio is that insurance policies had begun to be used as a sort of currency to be exchanged for payment of other debts. The example above is from 1622, but, in fact, Osorio had been involved in this sort of transaction as early as 1618. In this year, fellow Sephardic merchant, Duarte Fernandes, conveyed to Osorio an unnamed number of insurance policies, assumedly in payment for money owed to him.¹³⁶

Conveying insurance policies to another merchant was not the only way to use insurance as a form of payment and credit, however. There was also another, older, type of insurance called “bottomry” which Osorio used, as well. Bottomry bonds were loans to skippers or ship-owners on the security of the vessel and its cargo at relatively high rates of interest, but at the risk that, if the ship was lost, the bond-holder lost all his money. As Milja

¹³³ GAA, NA 628/447-449

¹³⁴ Stassart (also spelled Stassaert) came from Antwerp and first appears in the records of Amsterdam in 1605. <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden>

¹³⁵ GAA, NA 726/103

¹³⁶ GAA, NA 611/421

van Tielhof writes, “Bottomry was a combination of a short-term loan and insurance of the ship alone or the goods alone, or a combination of the two, on which the loan was secured. The ship-owner(s) borrowed a sum of money for the duration of the voyage, a sum which they had only to pay back were the ship and/or goods to arrive undamaged.”¹³⁷ If the ship did not arrive safely, the creditors lost their money. However, if the ship did arrive safely, the ship-owners had to pay back not only the sum they had borrowed, but also the accrued interests. Usually, these sums had to be paid back relatively shortly after the arrival of the ship. If the loans were not repaid, the ship could be seized. This form of insurance was common in shipping in the Baltic, but its popularity seems to have declined after the sixteenth century.¹³⁸

Despite this declining popularity, Osorio offered bottomry loans to Dutch captains with some degree of frequency. For instance, Osorio lent Gerrit Jansen, captain of the “Nachtegael” (Nightingale) 500 guilders “on bottomry conditions.” This bottomry loan was somewhat more complicated than the standard bottomry loan, though. It was to be used “to equip his 3/8th shares in the said ship.” The sum with a premium of 16% was to be deducted from the rate for shipping freight on the ship that Osorio would have to pay.¹³⁹ Osorio also offered a bottomry loan to Captain Jelle Poppes for a journey from Trondheim in Norway to Lisbon, Tangiers or Ceuta in North Africa, back to Portugal for a stop in Sétubal, with a return to Amsterdam.¹⁴⁰

As all these examples show, Osorio clearly believed it to be beneficial to insure his cargoes, as did Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho. In contrast to Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho, though, Osorio seems to have used insurance policies as a sort of currency that could be exchanged in payment for other debts. This could be a reflection of the fact that the insurance market had developed in Amsterdam by the time Osorio had become active as a merchant. This idea is bolstered by the prominence of the Amsterdam Insurance Chamber in the deeds relating to Osorio. It seems that this institution had begun to play an important role for merchants in Amsterdam in legislating rates and in settling disputes.

Another important difference between Osorio and Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho is that Osorio was a lender for bottomry loans to Dutch captains. This is not a function that either Rodrigues Vega or Carvalho is documented as having fulfilled. It could be that Osorio

¹³⁷ Milja van Tielhof, *The Mother of all Trades' The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century*, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 224

¹³⁸ Many of the “bodemerij” contracts found in the Amsterdam notarial archives for the period 1601-1625 are listed in an appendix in P. H. Winkelman, ed., *Bronnen voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Oostzeehandel in de zeventiende eeuw*, 6 volumes, 1588-1625, ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1971-1983).

¹³⁹ SR 1577

¹⁴⁰ GAA, NA 109/152v-153; NA 151/209v; NA 625/114-116

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was wealthy enough – and he was wealthier than either Rodrigues Vega or Carvalho -- to sustain this kind of risk. It could also be that Osorio had the connections in the Baltic trade – the region in which bottomry was still a popular form of insurance. Though Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho certainly dealt in Baltic products and also had a presence in the Baltic trade, they may not have been as integrated into this trade as was Osorio. Therefore, they most likely did not have the personal knowledge of either the captains or the routes risk lending on bottomry conditions.

Conclusion

Though maritime insurance was still relatively uncommon among the general population of merchants in Amsterdam, it was used frequently by Sephardic merchants. Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were, as was detailed above, actively engaged in using maritime insurance. For both Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho, maritime insurance served as an important loose economic tie and, thereby, as a stepping stone for the development of inter-cultural trade relations. Merchants could first become acquainted with one another through the relatively low risk venture of issuing/taking out insurance. If the enterprise went well, or even, upon occasion, if it did not, the merchants could continue working together on other sorts of ventures in the future. Moreover, the majority of the insurers were recent immigrants to Amsterdam, as were the Sephardim. Therefore, it is likely that they knew each other or had connections with one another from other places, particularly Antwerp, to help propel the beginnings of their associations. In addition, it could be that these newcomers were willing to take greater risks, which would include insuring cargoes on long-distance and often dangerous voyages. These were risks that it is possible the more established Amsterdam merchants were not willing to take, especially for newcomers such as Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio.

As time went on, insurance policies began to be used as a sort of currency among merchants. Merchants also began to take recourse to the Amsterdam Insurance Chamber to settle difficulties and disputes that arose from the more frequent use of insurance. Lastly, Osorio maximized his connections in the Baltic trade to offer highly profitable bottomry loans to captains. Overall, the maritime insurance “industry” in Amsterdam offers an important insight into how these global merchants worked. Cargoes were insured to a multitude of locations in the expanding world of commerce and trade. Insurance itself, while not new, was being used a scale heretofore unheard of. Merchants seized the opportunity presented by the

acquisition of maritime insurance to reduce their risks. Furthermore, merchants used the purchase of maritime insurance as a way to connected to other merchants from differing backgrounds in a relatively loose way. Not only were these associations mostly inter-cultural; they also show how having multiple associates from a variety of backgrounds for a number of different endeavors, all connected loosely via the issuance of insurance policies, could create efficiencies in business practices.

Credit

Commercial credit was of vital importance during the Early Modern period. Transferring funds, usually via a bill of exchange, and granting and receiving short and long-term credit were necessary for the conduct of trade. Credit standing and creditworthiness became ever more important for the establishment and continuance of commercial ties as the economy became more complex, especially when that complexity developed in a relatively short time, as was the case in Amsterdam in the early seventeenth century.¹⁴¹ But the granting and receiving of credit had an importance for merchants that extended far beyond its economic necessity. As Craig Muldrew writes, “to be a creditor in an economic sense in the seventeenth century still had a strong social and ethical meaning. Most credit was extended between individual emotional agents, and it meant that you were willing to trust someone to pay you in the future. Similarly, to have credit in a community meant that you could be trusted to pay back you debts.”¹⁴² Basically, then, extending credit to someone communicated a public judgment about that person to other members of the community. As Muldrew goes on to say, “The early modern economy was a system of cultural, as well as material, exchanges in which the central mediating factor was credit or trust.”¹⁴³ If an associate defaulted on his debt, it could force a whole network into bankruptcy, a fact that was well-known among merchants. Thus, the extension of credit, usually in the forms of bills of exchange, but also in the form of direct loans, between Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants is an important factor in the analysis of these inter-cultural relationships.

¹⁴¹ John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, “Introduction,” *The Early Modern Atlantic Economy*, John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), 1-15

¹⁴² Craig Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 3

¹⁴³ Craig Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 4

Manoel Rodrigues Vega

One of the most important examples of the extension of credit involving Manoel Rodrigues Vega has already been described in Chapter III. Vega received extensive loans from Dirck van Os and Laurens Joosten Baeck to help him finance the ransom of the Admiral of Aragon. Vega's credit was vouchsafed by his main non-Sephardic associated, Cornelis Snellinck. However, as has been seen above, Vega and van Os had already known each other before, at least slightly, since van Os had insured a cargo for Vega several years before he lent Vega money. The same could be said of Baeck, who was involved in at least two transactions involving bills of exchange with Vega.

In 1595, most likely almost as soon as Vega arrived in the city of Amsterdam, he asked a notary to go to the house of the Dutch merchants, Hans de Vriese to ask him to honor a bill of exchange. This bill of exchange had been first drawn in Middelburg around two months before. It went through Herman Claesz who then passed it on to Baeck, who signed it over to Vega.¹⁴⁴ The fact that Baeck signed it over to Vega means that he owed him some amount of money, either for goods or services. This is, then, evidence of their early economic interactions.

Two years later, in 1597, Baeck was one of a group of merchants from Antwerp, along with Gaspar van Nispen and his brothers Balthazar and Adriaen who passed bills of exchange to Vega in 1597.¹⁴⁵ This bill of exchange also came through Middelburg. Adriaen van Nispen had also dealt with Vega through bills of exchange issued in Antwerp, as one example from 1598 demonstrates.¹⁴⁶ Vega was not the only Sephardic merchant with whom Gaspar van Nispen dealt during this time, however. Antonio Rodrigues de Melo also received a bill of exchange drawn by Gaspar van Nispen in 1600.¹⁴⁷

Nor were these non-Sephardic merchants Vega's only source of credit in the form of bills of exchange. Hans de Baets appears at least five times as an associate of Manoel Rodrigues Vega in the payment of debts and the extension of credit via bills of exchange.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ SR 1

¹⁴⁵ GAA, NA 76/144v-146

¹⁴⁶ GAA, NA 53/34v-35

¹⁴⁷ GAA, NA 87/43-44

¹⁴⁸ According to Van Dillen, the family was of South Netherlands origin. Van Dillen, *Aandeelregister*, 150. de Baets began to appear in the Amsterdam records between 1594 and 1613. He was married in 1599 to Cathelina Courtens. Hans de Baets had an account of three pages in 1609 at the Exchange Bank, an account of five pages in 1611, which shrunk to four pages in 1612, before doubling to 10 pages in 1615, which would seem to indicate that de Baets was doing well as a merchant. In the "Grootboek" of 1620, the account is eight pages long. His widow and children were taxed the sum of 100 guilders in 1631 and, therefore, had a fortune of f 20.000.

These interactions begin in 1604 and involved a series of bills of exchange drawn in London.¹⁴⁹ Unlike the bills of exchange involving van Os, Baeck, and the van Nispens, all of the bills of exchange including De Baets involved other Sephardic merchants, with no non-Sephardic merchants mentioned.¹⁵⁰ De Baets, was, incidentally, involved with other Sephardic merchants besides Vega via bills of exchange. In 1608, he passed several bills of exchange to Antonio Rodrigues and Fernão Duarte de Moura,¹⁵¹ as well as to the De Mouras and Gaspar Nunes and Henrique Alvares.¹⁵²

Another important creditor of Vega's was Jan Gerritsz Parijs.¹⁵³ Vega and Parijs, for example, were involved in a complicated deal in 1600, in which Parijs bought bonds for Vega on credit.¹⁵⁴ Parijs was, like van Os and Baeck, involved in Vega's dealings with the Admiral of Aragon. As part of this complicated financing scheme, Parijs invested some of Vega's money in his name for voyages to the East Indies.¹⁵⁵ After his venture, Parijs was part of a chain of merchants including Vega, João Castelli, and the Dutch merchants Gillis Dodeur and Jeronimus Goossens.¹⁵⁶

Thus, it would seem that these loose ties with merchants with whom he had interactions only once or only occasionally for the supply of credit were a necessary addition to Vega's network. The credit they provided helped him meet his obligations for providing the ransom for the Admiral of Aragon. The bills of exchange that went back and forth between merchants were a critical link in the business chain. All this serves to illustrate the importance of loose or weak ties to global merchants.

Manoel Carvalho

Manoel Carvalho was also involved in the extension of credit via bills of exchange. In 1610, He received a bill of exchange from the Dutch merchant, Jan van Dashorst, drawn in Rotterdam.¹⁵⁷ He was also a creditor for the Dutch merchant Hans van den Berg. van den

¹⁴⁹ SR 156, 163, 164, 179, 180

¹⁵⁰ These merchants were: João Castelli, Vega's brother, Gabriel Fernandes, and Simão de Mercado.

¹⁵¹ SR 298

¹⁵² SR 302

¹⁵³ Little is known of Parijs. He was not from Amsterdam, but had lived in Amsterdam since 1582. In Amsterdam, he lived on the OZ Achterburgwal. He was a wine dealer and inscribed himself in the VOC for 3.600. It is possible that he is the father of Jan Gerritz., another associate of Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam. See van Dillen, *Het Oudste Aandeelregister* . . . , 159

¹⁵⁴ SR 70

¹⁵⁵ SR 132

¹⁵⁶ SR 129

¹⁵⁷ SR 114

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Berg owed Carvalho 111.6.11 pounds Fleming in 1604.¹⁵⁸ van den Berg was not the only Dutch merchant who used Carvalho as a source of credit. Carvalho was one of a group of Dutch merchants including Jasper Grevenraet, Franck Jansz, Pauwels Sterlincx and Adam Nijs who had lent money to Jacques van Gaelen in 1608.¹⁵⁹

Thus, it would seem that these loose ties with merchants with whom he had interactions only once or only occasionally for the supply of credit were a necessary addition to Carvalho's network. The credit they provided helped him meet his obligations. The bills of exchange that went back and forth between merchants were a critical link in his business chain. All this serves to illustrate the importance of loose or weak ties for Carvalho, specifically, and for global merchants, in general.

Bento Osorio

Osorio was also a provider of credit to Dutch merchants. He was one of a group of merchants including Antonio van Surck Jasperszoon and François Wouters who were owed money by Reijnier Scholier.¹⁶⁰ When the complicated case involving this money was resolved, part of the money Scholier owed was given to Osorio's old associate, Hillebrand den Otter. In addition to this sort of credit, Osorio appears frequently in bills of exchange passing through Amsterdam.

For instance, 2,500 Venetian ducats were passed via a bill of exchange from Venice to Osorio via the Dutch merchant Andries Hendricxsz de Beyser. This money was sent by Jacomo and Thomas van Casteren, Dutch merchants in Venice.¹⁶¹ Venice seems to have been an important source of credit for Osorio, because, in 1623, he received more bills of exchange from this city. This time, the bill passed through an integrated network of merchants including the Dutch merchants Isaac Piollie and Pieter, Hendrick and Guillaume van de Putte and the Sephardic merchants known by their last names – Gomes and Ramires.¹⁶²

Integrated credit networks were important for Osorio. Such a bill of exchange came from Antwerp and included the Sephardic merchant Martin Sanches and the non-Sephardim Pierre de Point in 1616.¹⁶³ The following year, Antwerp was again the origin of such a bill of exchange which included the Sephardic merchants, other than Osorio, Manoel and Diogo

¹⁵⁸ SR 168

¹⁵⁹ SR 203

¹⁶⁰ GAA, NA 138/72-73

¹⁶¹ GAA, NA 156/59v-60

¹⁶² GAA, NA 170/61

¹⁶³ GAA, NA 145/92v-93

Fernandes and Francisco and Alvaro Carillo, as well as the Dutch merchant Jan van der Sterren.¹⁶⁴ The same sort of network was in play in 1621 when Osorio, Francisco Godines and Jan de la Faille were part of a credit network including the non-Sephardim Willem van Gele, Reijnier de Fijneman, and Henry Herlele which came from Antwerp.¹⁶⁵

Thus, it would seem that these loose ties with merchants with whom he had interactions only once or only occasionally for the supply of credit were a necessary addition to Osorio's network. The credit they provided helped him meet his obligations. The bills of exchange that went back and forth between merchants were a critical link in the business chain. All this serves to illustrate the importance of loose or weak ties to global merchants.

As these examples drawn from the economic lives of Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio show, merchants were perpetually involved in webs of credit that denoted economic and social dependency. These interactions linked merchants and their associates into integrated networks linked together by reciprocal bonds of trust and obligation. As networks grew, and as transactions began to occur at an intensified rate over ever longer distances, it became much less likely that other merchants would have a personal knowledge of another's reliability. Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio, however, could draw upon their knowledge of both Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants, and their loose ties with multiple merchants, many of whom they knew via their various connections in Antwerp. And, thereby, trust involved in the extension of credit became, as Muldrew writes, "a sort of knowledge which could be communicated through chains of friends and business associates, and became the basis of deciding who could then be added to structural chains of obligation."¹⁶⁶

Conclusion

All merchants had to make a choice between protecting their interests and risk reduction and expanding their business (which can be seen as a sort of risk reduction, as well). The merchants who wanted to expand their business had to make new contacts. They also had to deal with the impact that political events had upon their business enterprises. The cooperation tended to be most intensive when it concerned trade to far-flung places. Nevertheless, cooperation of all sorts was of great importance to Manoel Rodrigues Vega,

¹⁶⁴ GAA, NA 150/168-168v

¹⁶⁵ GAA, NA 628/302-304

¹⁶⁶ Craig Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 152

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Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio. They cooperated with each other and with other Sephardim, but also with merchants who were Dutch and Flemish. Chapter III highlighted some of the more intensive associations. However, even the less frequent associations between Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were imperative to their success as global merchants.

The majority of merchants, Sephardi and non-Sephardi alike, were not, of course, global merchants. However, those that were global merchants often found each other, as newcomers to the city of Amsterdam, and exploited the opportunities available to them. They granted each other the right of proxy or issued powers of attorney to give their associates the freedom to act on his behalf in a legally binding way. There was a great deal of trust implied by the issuance of such permission. That these important authorizations were exchanged so freely between merchants of differing backgrounds is an important indication of the level of trust between Sephardi and non-Sephardi merchants.

Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio also drew on the experiences they had gained while living outside the Dutch Republic – in Antwerp, Portugal, France, and Brazil. They took advantage of openings in the market, and utilized contacts they had cultivated from their places of origin, from where they had lived prior to settling in Amsterdam, and in Amsterdam itself, all of which helped them make a place for themselves in Amsterdam's mercantile community. It should not be concluded necessarily that those who entered into the "newer" or colonial trades or who integrated their trade routes/markets and products did so more readily than did the established elite merely because they had fewer alternatives. They were, perhaps, better prepared than the old elite to properly develop the existing possibilities due to their prior knowledge of, and experience, in these routes.

One of these possibilities was maritime insurance. It was used frequently, however, by the Sephardic merchants Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, which stands to reason given their propensity for long-distance trade. In some cases, maritime insurance served as an important stepping stone for the development of inter-cultural trade relations. Moreover, the majority of the insurers were recent immigrants to Amsterdam, as were the Sephardim. Therefore, it is likely that they had loose ties to one another already, and knew each other or had connections with one another from other places, particularly Antwerp. These loose ties helped to propel the beginnings of their associations. In addition, it could be that these newcomers were willing to take greater risks, which would include insuring cargoes on long-distance and often dangerous voyages. These were risks that it is possible the more

established Amsterdam merchants were not willing to take, especially for newcomers such as Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio.

These merchants would extend credit, conduct trade, and have their cargoes insured with merchants they only dealt with once or twice. It seems that these occasional associations were important additions to their primary inter-cultural consortiums, as well as to their intra-group trade. They used these associations to gain access to new markets, supplement their networks by attaching themselves to, and integrating themselves into, new networks, which also served as a risk reduction strategy. This would seem to show that loose ties were an effective tool for the conduct of trade.

Be that as it may, it does seem clear that Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were global merchants in terms of the geographic reach of their activities, opportunistic in terms of maximizing the possibilities to be had by trade from a base in Amsterdam, and integrative in terms of the product assortment with which they traded. Perhaps most importantly, however, they were integrative in terms of combining membership in a variety of networks to maximize their efficiency as merchants. These characteristics made them global merchants. As global merchants they were successful, and part of this success was fostered by their utilization of loose ties. As the chapter has shown, they had multiple interactions with a variety of merchants of varying backgrounds spanning all sorts of types of mercantile behavior. These ties with a number of different merchants, as has been detailed helped them to work in regions in which they might not have otherwise been able to effectively operate, spread risks by co-owning ships and cargoes, and by representing each other when issues needed to be resolved in distant places. Thus, loose ties seem to have helped these merchants succeed.

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Chapter VI – The 1602 Sugar Confiscation – A Case Study in Inter-cultural Lobbying and Influence

Thus far, the Sephardim and their Dutch associates have largely been discussed as though they existed in a vacuum that only included their trade relations. However, this is hardly a complete picture. Numerous resolutions had been promulgated in Portugal regarding the “New Christians” and their freedom (or lack thereof) to travel outside the country.¹ Furthermore, there had been a great deal of back and forth between the Spanish monarchy and the Dutch Republic regarding the Sephardim. For example, Spanish concern with the Sephardim in Amsterdam began as early as 1605 when the so-called “general pardon” was issued. This edict eased travel restrictions on New Christians traveling outside Iberia. This Spanish concern only intensified during the Twelve Years Truce, and the Sephardim became a bone of contention between the Spanish Crown and the Dutch Republic.

The Sephardim were viewed by the Spanish as being a key factor in the Dutch intra-European carrying trade, as well as in contributing to Dutch prosperity and colonial expansion.² As these examples show, much of this international wrangling was regarding trade, and the Spanish tried to intervene in Dutch domestic politics in order to stymie the growth of the Sephardic community and their role in trade in the Dutch Republic. For instance, the King considered trying to “inflame the resentment and ill-feeling ordinary Christians felt against the Jews in the Netherlands” in order to have them expelled.³ Even more direct was Philip III’s minister in Brussels, the Marqués del Guadaleste, who tried “by secret means” to intervene in the debate in Amsterdam about the privileges and status of the Jews, and he worked to strengthen the opposition of Calvinist clergy to the construction of a synagogue.⁴

Trade, then, was always affected by political events for the Sephardim. In fact, some scholars have argued that it was the convergence of various political events which

¹ There were at least six promulgations preventing New Christians from leaving Portugal, with subsequent revocations. These were in 1532, 1535, 1547, 1567, 1573, 1580, and 1610. See J. Lúcio de Azevedo, *História dos Cristãos-Novos Portugueses*, (Lisbon: Clássica Editora, 1989), 3rd edition, 497-499

² Jonathan Israel, “Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660,” *Studia Rosenthaliana*, (1978), 1-61, 1-2

³ Jonathan Israel, “Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660,” *Diasporas within a Diaspora*, 193

⁴ Jonathan Israel, “Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660,” *Diasporas within a Diaspora*, 196

led to the economic rise of the Sephardim in the Dutch Republic.⁵ However, the Sephardim were hardly passive victims of prevailing political winds, either in Iberia or in the Dutch Republic. The significant political role of trade networks composed of differing religious and ethnic groups such as the Sephardim and their Dutch associates is often minimized in scholarship. Historiographies based on narratives of national achievement have been somewhat reluctant to acknowledge non-national influences such as trade networks composed of various groups, in their political processes.⁶ But, as the historian Ina Baghdiantz McCabe points out, these networks, “were not merely cross-cultural brokers, they were building considerable political and economic spheres of influence for their own interests.”⁷

McCabe’s remarks certainly held true for the Sephardim. They actively sought to influence political decision-making in their favor. For example, the political influence of certain Sephardim was well-known, both within the time-frame of this book and outside. For instance, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa was the Agent of the Portuguese King in The Hague.⁸ His father, Duarte Nunes da Costa, had been Agent for the Crown of Portugal in Hamburg from 1641 until he died in 1664.⁹ Manoel Rodrigues Vega was asked to provide the surety for the release of the Admiral of Aragon, as was mentioned in Chapter IV, and thus was well-known as a political player in both the Republic and in Iberia. The provision of the ransom for the captured Admiral of the Habsburg King, Don Francisco

⁵ Jonathan Israel, “The Economic Contribution of Dutch Sephardi Jewry to Holland’s Golden Age, 1595-1713,” *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 96, (1983), 505-535

⁶ Jonathan Israel, “Diasporas Jewish and non-Jewish and the World Maritime Empires,” in Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlafits, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglau, eds., *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks: Four Centuries of History*, (Oxford: Berg, 2005), 3-26, 8

⁷ Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, “Introduction,” in Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlafits, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglau, eds., *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks: Four Centuries of History*, (Oxford: Berg, 2005), xviii-xxii, xix. See also, Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, “Trading Diaspora, State Building and the Idea of National Interest,” in *Views from the Edge: Essays in Honour of Richard W. Bulliet*, (New York: Columbia Middle-East Institute, Columbia University Press, 2003), 18-37

⁸ See Jonathan Israel, “An Amsterdam Jewish Merchant of the Golden Age: Jeronimo Nunes da Costa (1620-1697), Agent of Portugal in the Dutch Republic,” *Studia Rosenthaliana*, (1984), 21-41; Jonathan Israel, “The Diplomatic Career of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa: an Episode in Dutch-Portuguese Relations of the Seventeenth Century,” *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 98 (1983), 167-90; and Daniel Swetschinski, “An Amsterdam Jewish merchant-Diplomat: Jeronimo Nunes da Costa (1620-1697), Agent of the King of Portugal,” in *Neveh Ya’akov. Jubilee Volume presented to Dr. Jaap Meijer on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday*, Lea Dasberg and Jonathan N. Cohen, eds., (Assen: van Gorcum, 1982), 3-30

⁹ Jonathan Israel, “Duarte Nunes da Costa (Jacob Curiel), of Hamburg, Sephardi Nobleman and Communal Leader (1585-1664),” *Studia Rosenthaliana*, 21, 1 (1987), 14-35

de Mendonça, who had been taken prisoner during the battle of Nieuwpoort in 1600, meant that all Dutch prisoners of war in the Spanish lands were released, as was the Admiral himself. Rodrigues Vega was the intermediary in these delicate negotiations between the Spanish Crown and the Dutch Republic and earned political clout by playing this role of negotiator and financier.

One of the most well-known cases, which falls outside the chronology being examined in this book, was when Sephardic merchants lobbied successfully in 1654 and 1655 against the anti-Jewish measures taken by Peter Stuyvesant, Governor of New Netherland.¹⁰ As the focus of this book is inter-cultural interactions, this chapter will examine another circumstance in which lobbying as a method of political influence was used. In the case under consideration in this chapter, Sephardi merchants and their non-Sephardic associates joined together as an interest group to lobby for their mutual interests.¹¹ They lobbied local authorities, as well as governing institutions, in order to have their sugar returned to them. This sugar was seized from three Portuguese ships sailing off the coast of Portugal as a prize of war by Dutch ships. Thus, this chapter will discuss the Sephardim and their Dutch associates as an interest group who engaged in lobbying for their interests.

Lobbying and interest groups in the seventeenth century

Seventeenth-century contemporaries did not use the term “interest group” at all. It is only in retrospect that historians have given their actions a categorical label. One of the earliest such categorizations was made by James Madison, writing in the early nineteenth century. Madison cautioned in the *Federalist Papers* against what he termed “factions.” He wrote, “By faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a

¹⁰ About the Jews in New Amsterdam and their relationship with Peter Stuyvesant, see: Paul R. Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, eds., *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History* (Oxford University Press, 1980); Eli Faber, *A Time for Planting: The First Migration, 1654-1820* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Morris U. Schappes, *A Documentary History of the Jews of the United States, 1654-1875*, 3rd ed. (New York: Schocken, 1971); and Jacob Radar Marcus, *The American Jew, 1585-1990* (Carlson Publishing Inc., 1995)

¹¹ This case that will be analyzed involves a variety of prominent Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants, including Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Manoel Carvalho. It does not involve Bento Osorio, though some of his relatives by marriage in Antwerp are involved. Osorio was still in Lisbon at the time this case was being played out in the Dutch Republic and he has no recorded involvement in the case.

majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest . . .”¹² Though Madison used the term “faction,” it seems clear that he was referring to something similar to what might now be termed an interest group. Since Madison, however, scholars have not reached any agreement as to the precise meaning of “interest group.”

An interest group is, according to political scientists in the twentieth century, “an organized body of individuals who share some goals and who try to influence public policy.”¹³ The historian Alison Gilbert Olson proposes a similar definition for groups in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Olson defines an interest group as, “A group of individuals, conscious of sharing a common concern, cooperating on the borders of power, and seeking to increase their own benefits through bargaining with a political system they accept and influence but do not attempt to control. . . They sought from government not a monopoly of particular political authority, trade, or souls, but, rather, a guarantee that they might safely participate in a competitive environment”¹⁴

Interest groups, however, were not generally institutionalized, though certain institutions such as guilds could be said to have functioned as an institutionalized interest group. The majority of these individuals sharing a common concern and cooperating on the borders of power to bargain with a political system came together based on a particular interest, and then dispersed when their attempts at influencing decisions and events either succeeded or failed. Thus, they were not generally long-lasting or officially organized groups. Instead, they tended to be loose consortiums of people, often, but not always, of merchants, who joined together to work in the defense of their interests in a particular matter.

Any attempt by an interest group to influence the outcome of political events could be said to be lobbying.¹⁵ Lobbying could be aimed at any institution of government, from the lowest to the highest bodies. Various tactics could fall under the rubric of “lobbying,” but it was petitioning that was the main form of lobbying in the seventeenth

¹² James Madison, “Federalist 10,” *The Federalist Papers*, (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, 1961), 78.

¹³ Jeffrey M. Berry, *The Interest Group Society*, (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), 5.

¹⁴ Alison Gilbert Olson, *Making the Empire Work: London and American Interest Groups, 1690-1790*, (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 2-3

¹⁵ Jeffrey M. Berry, *The Interest Group Society*, (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), 6.

century. In fact, submitting petitions was, “the most widespread and approved form of political activity in early modern Europe.”¹⁶ Petitions could be submitted by or on behalf of like-minded individuals in pursuit of some common goal. As the historian Christopher Friedrichs writes, “A group petition was by definition political, for the authorities always had to weigh the possible disadvantages of approving the request against the potential dangers of rejecting it.”¹⁷ The historian Ian Archer’s study of London lobbies in the later sixteenth century emphasizes how responsive those in authority were to pressure from below.¹⁸

To summarize, then, an interest group, as the term is being utilized in this chapter, is an association of people who share a common interest.¹⁹ Such a group cooperated and sought to increase their own benefits through bargaining with a political system. Such a group may or may not be formalized or institutionalized. In the case of the interest group comprised of the Sephardic merchants and their Dutch associates, to be discussed below, there was no institutionalization of the group. Moreover, as their common interest was limited to one event – the confiscation of a valuable cargo of sugar – the duration of the group’s common interest and, thereby, its existence itself, was quite limited. An interest group, in general, could employ various mechanisms to promote its common interests. In the particular case of the interest group which formed for the negotiation over a cargo of sugar, lobbying (bargaining with a political system) by the use of petitions was the main mechanism used to promote its interests. It seems that the authorities in Amsterdam were also quite responsive to this pressure from below, as will be discussed further.

The Governmental Context

Before exploring the way in which Sephardic merchants and their Dutch associates worked as an interest group to lobby for their collective interests, a brief outline of the governmental context in which this interest group lobbied should be

¹⁶ Christopher R. Friedrichs, *Urban Politics in Early Modern Europe*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 38.

¹⁷ Christopher R. Friedrichs, *Urban Politics in Early Modern Europe*, 38

¹⁸ Ian Archer, “The London Lobbies in the Later Sixteenth Century,” *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (mar., 1988), 17-44.

¹⁹ For the purposes of this chapter, interest group and lobbying group are interchangeable terms.

given.²⁰ The United Provinces of the Netherlands was a confederation of seven provinces – Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, Groningen and Friesland – in which each province operated its own independent government. Each province was governed by the Provincial States and the main executive official was a stadholder (*stadhouder*). The primary administrative body of the Provincial States was the Commissioned Councilors (*Geocommitteerde Raden*). The Land's Advocate / Council Pensionary was also an important position in the States General and the Provincial States.

Within each of the provinces, the towns were also largely self-governing. At the city level, local, provincial and federal questions were discussed within the elite-dominated council (*vroedschap*), which sent instructions to their representative in the provincial States (*Staten*). Amsterdam had four mayors (*burgermeesters*) who exerted considerable influence. They were responsible for the day-to-day affairs of Amsterdam, as well as being liaisons with the authorities of the province of Holland. They presided over the council, as well as over the militia companies. They served for a year, but could be re-elected after a year out of office. That meant, in practice, that powerful men could serve as a mayor multiple times.

Moreover, the mayor and the ruling council were keenly aware of the huge importance of trade for Amsterdam's economy. They were, therefore, sensitive to the needs of merchants such as the Sephardim and their Dutch associates. Wealthy merchants and entrepreneurs, individually or collectively, addressed petitions to the magistrates, arguing for their interests. Because Amsterdam brought in around half of the tax revenue for the province of Holland, and a quarter of the Dutch Republic's tax revenue as a whole, the city played a vital role provincially and in the States General on a national level. The mayors of Amsterdam, therefore, could and did try to influence the issues that fell under the purview of the States General, such as foreign policy.²¹ Essentially, then, a cause which gained the support of the mayors of Amsterdam had a good chance of being favorably dealt with on a provincial or national level.

²⁰ Henk van Nierop, "Politics and the People of Amsterdam," in Peter van Kessel and Elisja Schulte, eds., *Rome and Amsterdam: Two Growing cities in Seventeenth-Century Europe*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997), 156-167, 158-161

²¹ Maarten Hell, "De oude Geuzen en de Opstand: Politiek en lokaal bestuur in tijd van oorlog en expansie, 1578-165" in *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam, Centrum van de Wereld, 1578-1650*, Maarten Prak and Willem Frijhoff, eds., Volume II, I, (Amsterdam: Sun, 2004), 241-298, 247

At the provincial level, representatives of the city elites and the nobility met in these States assemblies to make decisions. Administration and decision-making between sessions were left to standing committees (*Gocommitteerde Raden*) or Delegated States elected by the States. The federal government was called the States General. Under the States General were a variety of administrative bodies, such as the Council of States (*Raad van State*) and, importantly for this chapter, the Admiralty Colleges. The admiralty colleges were one of the principal administrative arms of the Generality. These colleges were responsible for administering the navy, collecting customs, maintaining guard boats on rivers and estuaries, building warships, recruiting naval seamen, enforcing (and advising on) the States General's regulation of shipping and fisheries, and for the adjudication of captured ships, crews, and cargoes.²² These colleges were located in Amsterdam, Rotterdam (South Holland), Hoorn and Enkhuizen (the North Quarter), Middelburg (Zeeland), and Dokkum (Friesland). Although each admiralty college acted independently in appointments of officers and seamen recruitment, the Lieutenant-Admiral and Vice-Admirals of Holland and Zeeland were selected by the Provincial States. Stadholders were admirals of Holland and Zeeland, and the Commander-in-Chief was appointed by the States General.

The Sugar Confiscation of 1602

The facts of the case of the confiscation of a large amount of sugar owned by Sephardi merchants in Antwerp and Amsterdam are relatively straightforward. The Dutch and English had joined together in 1602 to try and disrupt shipping to and from the Iberian Peninsula. This same year, Jacob van Wassenaer (later Count of Wassenaer), Lord of Obdam and later Lieutenant Admiral of Holland, sailed to the Iberian coast with five Dutch ships in support of the English.²³ On the 9th of July, 1602, Obdam captured three Portuguese ships laden with sugar at the mouth of the Tagus River outside Lisbon. However, it soon became clear that much of this sugar belonged to Sephardic merchants

²² Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 295

²³ N. Japikse and H.H. P. Rijperman, eds., *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal van 1576 tot 1609*, ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1915-1970, 1950), VI. 12, 1602-1603, Rijks geschiedkundige publicatie number 92, hereafter RGP 92, nrs. 96-100

living in the Dutch Republic, and a legal controversy ensued – a controversy which ended up pitting the Sephardic merchants, their Dutch business associates, and the mayors of Amsterdam, against the Admiralty college of Rotterdam and the States General.

The approximately 2,500 chests of sugar from the unfortunate São Pedro, Santo Antonio and Nossa Senhora da Piedade, was loaded onto Dutch ships. Olivier van Noort, one of the naval officers, sailed to the Dutch Republic with this sugar. The sugar was to be sent to Rotterdam, though two warships initially escorted the vessels to Middelburg.²⁴ The expedition which captured the sugar had been part of a privateering voyage. Privateers were legally obligated by their commissioning governments to follow established prize court procedure. They were required to bring all seized goods before an established prize court in their home port. It is unclear, in this case, if the home port was Middelburg or Rotterdam. Based on established privateering law, the ships should have returned to their home port first, which would seem to have been Middelburg, since the ships went there first. However, since the Admiralty of Rotterdam, rather than the Admiralty of Middelburg, was seemingly accepted by all parties involved as exerting legitimate authority over the ships and their cargoes, there could have been unknown logistical reasons for the ships to stop in at Middelburg first.

Within the Dutch Republic, the Admiralty colleges adjudicated privateer prizes on behalf of the States-General and the Prince of Orange. First, a captured prize underwent intense scrutiny by the Admiralty authorities, so as to ensure that the prize had been a valid target and that it had been legally apprehended and conveyed.²⁵ If this was the case, the Admiralty officials declared it a “good prize.” The Admiralty’s auctioneer then set a date for a public auction, which was advertised by means of posters and announcements in the local newspapers. To generate more interest, a day was even put aside for the public to come and look over the goods. The States-General had determined in an act dating from 1602 (so it could have been in effect while the case under consideration was being decided) that the division of profits raised from privateer booty was as follows: 12% each to the Province and the sponsoring Admiralty, 6% to the Admiral-General (aka

²⁴ NL-HaNA, Staten General, 1.01.04/9.277

²⁵ E.W. van der Oest, “De Praktijk van de Nederlandse Kaapvaart en Piraterij 1500-1800,” in R.B. Prudhomme van Reine and E.W. van der Oest, eds., *Kapers op de Kust: Nederlandse Kaapvaart en Piraterij 1500-1800*, (Vlissingen: Uitgeverij ADZ, 1991), 25-26

the Stadholder), and the rest to the individual or business concern that had sponsored the privateering venture.²⁶ Despite these seemingly clear-cut rules, however, prize adjudication was a time-consuming and intricate business.²⁷ Moreover, relations with the city governments and the Admiralties could be touchy and their interests could and, as shall be seen in this case, did conflict.²⁸

Per privateering custom, one of the captains of the Dutch vessels, officer van Noort received 20 guilders and 100 *rijksdaalders* to put towards a golden necklace as a reward.²⁹ The States General ordered that an inventory made to make sure that the bounty was shared between the Admiralty of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Holland's "Noorderkwartier" (the cities of Hoorn and Enkhuizen). Amsterdam was to get half and Rotterdam and Holland's Noorderkwartier would each get a quarter of the booty.³⁰ This decision is at odds with the distribution rules that are listed above, since Rotterdam was the presiding Admiralty. It could be that those rules had not yet come into effect when this case was being decided, as it is unclear when in 1602 they were promulgated. It could also be that there was an unknown reason or reasons to ignore these rules. These reasons could be the wealth of the cargo or the anticipation that Amsterdam might argue the case on behalf of her wealthy Sephardic merchants, so an attempt was made to sweeten the deal for the city by giving her Admiralty a greater than customary percentage of the proceeds of the auction of the prize.

Be that as it may, these plans were soon scuppered. On August 31, Portuguese merchants from Amsterdam and Antwerp petitioned the States General for the release of a large number of cases of sugar carried in these ships; both sugar and ships, they stated, belonged to them and to their partners and relatives in the Netherlands and other countries.³¹ A legal controversy ensued concerning part of the shipment. This controversy,

²⁶ Virginia West Lunsford, *Piracy and Privateering in the Golden Age Netherlands*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 17

²⁷ Jaap R. Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 9

²⁸ Jaap R. Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy . . .* , 31

²⁹ RGP 92, nr. 209, note 1

³⁰ RGP 92, nr. 211

³¹ RGP 92, nr. 213

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was, at first glance, little different than that which tended to occur in any prize case.³² In fact, there were multiple protests made by the Portuguese merchants of Amsterdam to the States General about the privateering of ships in which they held shares or in which their goods were shipped. For instance, there had been a similar case involving the Sephardim several years earlier, in 1600, concerning ships taken to England.

In this 1600 case, the Portuguese had received a great deal of help from the Dutch Republic's representatives in England when their ships and cargoes were seized by the English. They had argued that they were neutral parties as residents and *burghers* of the Dutch Republic and not the enemy, despite the fact that their goods were on enemy (Portuguese) ships. Adjudicating cases involving enemy vessels carrying enemy goods was fairly simple—an enemy ship was almost always condemned by the court as a “good prize.”³³ Enemy vessels carrying cargoes owned by neutrals and not destined for an enemy port were a more difficult problem; generally, if the neutrality of the cargo could be proven (and assuming that it was not composed of contraband), it would be returned to its rightful owner.

The States General had strongly protested the seizure of the Sephardic merchants' property, arguing that the cargo was indeed neutral and not composed of contraband³⁴ In the same year of 1602, in which the Sephardic merchants' sugar was seized off Portugal, the English case was finally resolved. The Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam received

³² There is a large body of scholarship regarding the adjudication of prize cases. See, for example, A. Wijffels, “Recht v. Handelsbelangen: Kaapvaartprocessen voor het Londens Admiraliteitshof Onmiddellijk na het Spaans-Engels Vredesverdrag van 1604,” in S. Dauchy, ed., *Ter Overwinning van een Historische Drempelvrees: De Historicus en Juridische Bronnen. Handelingen van het Colloquium* (20 Maart 1992), (Brussels: Wetenschappelijk Comité voor Rechtsgeschiedenis and Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, 1994), 83-93. (With thanks to Dr. Louis Sicking of the University of Leiden for this citation); R. G. Marsden, “The ‘Mashona’ Case and Prize Jurisdiction,” *Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1901), 38-40; Henry J. Bourguignon, *William Scott, Lord Stowell, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, 1798-1828*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); George F. Steckley, “Collisions, Prohibitions, and the Admiralty Court in Seventeenth-Century London,” *Law and History Review*, Spring 2003 <<http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/lhr/21.1/steckley.html>> (10 May 2008); Carl J. Kulsrud, *Maritime Neutrality to 1780: A History of the Main Principles Governing Neutrality and Belligerency to 1780*, (Union, New Jersey: The Law Book Exchange, Ltd., 2000); and Sean T. Perrone, “John Stoughton and the Divina Pastora Prize Case, 1816-1819,” 28 (2008), *Journal of the Early Republic*, 215-241

³³ Philip C. Jessup and Francis Deak, *Neutrality Its History, Economics and Law*. Four Volumes, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1935-36), Volume I, 124, 217

³⁴ See E.S. Samuel, “Portuguese Jews in Jacobean London,” *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, 18 (1953-55), 171-230

letters of recommendation from the States General to the Dutch ambassador in England enabling them to redeem the twelve ships which had been seized by the English on their way back from Brazil two years before.³⁵ However, it was now Dutch ships which had seized expensive goods from Sephardic merchants, and decision makers within the Dutch Republic had a straightforward financial interest in the case if the cargo were to be ruled a “good prize.” Further complicating the issue was that, some, but not all, of the merchants whose goods were seized were *burghers* in Amsterdam.³⁶ Therefore, the 1602 prize case was trickier than the 1600 seizure had been.

The formal protest to the States General made in August of 1602 was made only by an interest group composed of Sephardic merchants. These merchants, however, were some of the best known and wealthiest of the Portuguese merchants in the Low Countries. Nicolas Rodrigues d’Evora, Duarte Ximenes and Antonio Faillero, along with Duarte Fernandes, Francisco Pinto de Britto, Hendrick Garcia, Manoel Rodrigues Vega, and Fernando Mercado, “all merchants of the Portuguese nation, for themselves as well as being authorized by other merchants of this Nation, their correspondents in Portugal and in other places” wrote a long and earnest representation of their case to the States General, and asked that their goods be returned to them, or, at the very least, protected until a final resolution of the case was reached.³⁷ It should be noted that the term “nation” is deceptive. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, “nation” had generally been used since the Middle Ages as a term for any group of foreign merchants who settled in another place to conduct trade. In the case of the Sephardim, “nation,” as Chapter I detailed, acquired an additional meaning, implying a certain trans-national commonality and solidarity based on shared background and descent. The Sephardim were called “merchants of the Portuguese nation” in legal documents in the Dutch Republic for close to a century, despite the fact that many of them were *burghers* of Amsterdam or, later, other Dutch cities.

³⁵ Odette Vlessing, “The Portuguese-Jewish Merchant Community in Seventeenth-century Amsterdam,” 232.

³⁶ It is not clear if the status of *burgher* superseded that of being a member of the Portuguese nation in Amsterdam, or if these merchants could have been considered both *burghers* of Amsterdam and members of the Portuguese nation. In some cities, such as Brugge, the rights and privileges of *burghers* and of members of foreign nations were incompatible, though whether this was the case or not for Amsterdam requires further research.

³⁷ RGP 92, no. 280; Translation by author

Interestingly, Manoel Carvalho and other Sephardic merchants such as Manoel Frances were not named in the initial protest, nor were the non-Sephardic owners of some of the sugar such as Cornelis Snellinck and Johan and Pauwels Bisshop.³⁸ The reason why is not known. It is likely, though, that the merchants chose only the wealthiest and most well-connected merchants for their initial protest, assuming that they would have more influence with the decision-makers. Though Carvalho would later become a prominent and wealthy Sephardic merchant, at this time he was just at the beginning of his career.

The Sephardic merchants based their arguments to the States General on the *sauvegardes* (safeguards) that had been provided to the “Portuguese Nation” by the States General itself in the past. The position of the “Portuguese Nation” in the Republic was controlled by these safeguards given by the States General. The States General had drawn up these safeguards for the Portuguese Nation in order to attract their trade. The first safeguard was given in 1577 after the Pacification of Gent and Brussels. In 1581, after Phillip II came to power in Portugal, which made the Sephardim officially Spanish subjects of Portuguese descent, this initial safeguard was strengthened. The States General gave a safeguard to all Portuguese who, with their wives, children, and household servants, lived in the Dutch Republic or did business in the Republic or who were en route to do so. This included their furniture and trade goods. They were free to live and conduct trade in the Republic, and were free along with their households and their goods to come and go how and when they wanted. What is not acknowledged in this safeguard, however, is the fact that the individual cities within the Dutch Republic retained the right to determine who settled within their boundaries, and not all Dutch cities were willing to accept openly practicing Jews, or even New Christians.³⁹ Be that as it may, their trade with Spain, Portugal, or other places, was governed by the laws of those lands. In essence, these initial documents allowed Portuguese merchants living in the United Provinces and elsewhere the right to trade freely by way of the Netherlands. In

³⁸ RGP 92, no. 285 note 2.

³⁹ Hubert P.H. Nusteling,, “The Jews in the Republic of the United Provinces: Origin, Numbers and Dispersion,” 43-62

this respect they were treated the same as other foreign merchants such as the English, French or Germans.⁴⁰ In fact, the 1581 safeguard contains the following passage:

Yet meaning that as far as shipping on Spain as well as Portugal and other places is concerned, those of the aforesaid Nation will be obliged to behave according to the ordinances and placards which will be drafted by the government of the aforesaid United Provinces.⁴¹

In 1588, after the fall of Antwerp, the safeguard was expanded to those Portuguese who lived in a neutral country or elsewhere outside the Republic. This meant, effectively, that the Portuguese and others could freely trade with the Dutch without fear that their goods or ships would be seized. A further strengthening of the safeguards was made in 1592 to include the Portuguese in Antwerp and others in “enemy” territory.⁴² In a Resolution passed on the 20th of October 1600, after the general trade embargo of 1599, the States General decided further that the Portuguese could trade via Portugal to Brazil.⁴³ Thus, the Sephardim were allowed to reclaim cargoes taken by Dutch privateers that belonged to family members in Lisbon and elsewhere. This was a unique aspect of Dutch privateering law. Most countries’ privateering laws (which gradually grew to be an accepted international body of law in the seventeenth century) allowed, as was mentioned above, for the return of neutral ships and cargoes, but not for the return of cargoes belonging to relatives of neutral participants who were living in enemy territory. It was this Resolution upon which the Sephardim were depending on for the redemption of their sugar.

Within two weeks of the initial protest filed by the Sephardic merchants based on these safeguards and resolutions, particularly the one passed in 1600 which had allowed the Sephardim to trade via Portugal and Brazil. Meanwhile, the Admiralty of Rotterdam had asked the States General for jurisdiction over the case, which the States General was

⁴⁰ Izak Prins, *De Vestiging der Marranen in Noord-Nederland in de Zestiende Eeuw*, 129-132 and 155-159

⁴¹ Quoted in Odette Vlessing, “The Portuguese-Jewish Merchant Community in Seventeenth-century Amsterdam,” 223

⁴² See E.M. Koen, “Duarte Fernandes, Koopman van de Portugese Natie te Amsterdam,” *Studia Rosenthaliana*, (2), 1968, 178-192, 182-183. Copies of the safeguards can be found in NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland, 3.01.04.01/36/308-321

⁴³ RGP 85, Vl. 12, 1600-1601, no. 333

inclined to grant.⁴⁴ Eleven days later, on the 18th of September in 1602, the Admiralty of Rotterdam asked for permission to auction the seized goods, per the regulations regarding privateered goods. The Admiralty argued for a basic reinterpretation of the safeguard of 1592 and the Resolution of 1600. They based their argument on a decree made by the States General on the 2nd of April 1599, which stated that all trade and transport to Spain and Portugal was forbidden.

The Admiralty suggested that a differentiation be made between the Portuguese in Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Antwerp or other “enemy” locations and, on the other side, merchants, captains, ship-owners and crew from the Republic, in addition to the Portuguese and other merchants that lived in the Dutch Republic. The goods of the first group should be auctioned and the proceeds given to those who were consigned by them. The merchants from the second group should get their goods back, though only after they had appealed for them and had offered a guarantee or surety until a judge had ascertained that no “enemy” owned part of them.⁴⁵

This is a tacit acknowledgement that the Sephardic merchants living in the Dutch Republic were under the protection of its laws as legal residents or *burghers*. This also made sense in terms of legal precedents. After all, few merchants in the Dutch Republic would support or buy shares in privateering voyages if their own goods could be confiscated and sold at auction. Furthermore, the Admiralty could have been gambling that the majority of the sugar could be proven to be owned by the relatives of the Sephardim living in enemy territory and that, therefore, it would be forfeited and auctioned to the benefit of the Admiralty.

The Sephardic merchants resisted this suggestion. After all, the 1599 decree had been superseded by the Resolution of 1600, in their opinion. On the 2nd of October, the Admiralty of Rotterdam went further and proposed that a surety had to be offered for the sugar owned by merchants in Hamburg or other neutral places.⁴⁶ In response, the Sephardim turned to a sort of independent commission of experts in Dutch law, probably

⁴⁴ RGP 92, no. 212 The existing documentation is unclear as to the question of from where the ships originated. Though Rotterdam seems to be acknowledged as the home port, which would give its Admiralty jurisdiction over the captured ships and cargoes, the fact that they had to petition the States General for jurisdiction over the case, coupled with the fact that the ships were first taken to Middelburg after their, could cast some doubt on this.

⁴⁵ RGP 92, no. 213

⁴⁶ RGP 92, no. 214

having concluded that the Admiralty of Rotterdam and the States General had a great deal to gain financially by confiscating the sugar and paying little or no restitution on it. In this same month of October 1602, the commission gave the Portuguese written advice regarding this case.⁴⁷

Their opinion was that people or goods that were covered by the safeguards were not subject to confiscation. The Sephardim and their goods had repeatedly been given protection in the Republic. Furthermore, the safeguards had actually been expanded to include not only the Sephardim who lived in neutral lands, but also to include those who lived in “enemy” lands. It is not clear why, precisely, the safeguards had been expanded, though it seems likely that it was to encourage trade. Therefore, their rights were inviolable, though now an expiration date had been placed on the safeguards. These jurists denied unanimously that the proclamation of the 2nd of April 1599 had annulled these safeguards. General declarations had no connection with or influence on the Sephardim, according to the advisory committee, because they were already “specially” privileged. The last resolution, from the year 1600, which had been made at the request of the Sephardim and their correspondents to their benefit during the prize case with England, had not since then been challenged. Therefore, according to the committee, based on the evidence offered, as well as on the precedents of Roman Law, for the well-being of the state of law in the United Provinces, the government of the Republic “in so broad and extensive an interpretation” must, even if it would be contrary to the interests of the Government itself, as well as against the fiscal interests of the government, end the case as quickly as possible.⁴⁸ Essentially, then, they argued that the law, as it stood, was in favor of the Sephardic merchants receiving all their sugar back from the Admiralty of Rotterdam because it could not be considered a “good prize” – a prize subject to legitimate confiscation by privateering vessels.

The States General might not have been moved as much by the appeals to Roman Law as they were to their own fiscal interests. Though the initial offer of the States

⁴⁷ RGP 92, no. 281; These advisors were: R. van Amstelredeam, H. du Weerdt, A. Snoek, E. Dimmer, G. Hamel, A. Goes, I. Verweeren, C. van Buyck, I. van Dijk, P. van Veen, Baccart and Sibrant Oillarts. As is the case with so much in this case, it is not clear if these men formed a sort of standing, independent board of appeals or adjudication, what their precise positions were, why they were considered neutral, and what their interests were or were not in this case. More research is certainly warranted to answer these questions.

⁴⁸ Izak Prins, *De Vestiging der Marranen in Noord-Nederland in de Zestiende Eeuw*, 129-132 and 155-159

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General does not seem to be preserved, there must have been an offer for redemption of the sugar. This is known because the Sephardim responded on the 31st of October 1602 that they did not want to take the offer given by the States General that they pay a ransom of 250,000 guilders to redeem all their sugar. They instead countered with an offer of 200,000 guilders or they would “otherwise proceed with justice in court.” The fact that they countered the States General’s offer with another, lower offer, is interesting. 200,000 guilders was a great deal of money, especially for an interest group who seemed to have the law on their side. Therefore, it could be that the Sephardim were by no means certain that the advice of the committee would be followed, and that they hoped to ransom the sugar at a more affordable rate.

It is at this point, perhaps fearing a loss in court, or wanting to avoid a protracted legal process themselves, that the Sephardim began to involve the other interested parties in their case. This sugar was not only owned by the aforementioned Sephardi merchants (as well as a few non-Sephardi merchants such as Cornelis Snellinck, who also represented other merchants involved in the case), but was insured by a number of Dutch merchants in Amsterdam and Middelburg. Thus, together they shared a common concern – the loss of a great deal of money should the sugar be taken from them – and began to cooperate intensively. Their first step in advocating for their common interest was to turn to the most common form of lobbying in the seventeenth century – petitioning. The insurers petitioned the mayors of Amsterdam for the return of the sugar. The majority of the Sephardic owners of the sugar, as well as their Dutch insurers, were *burghers* and/or residents of Amsterdam. As wealthy merchants, they did hold some power over the election of the mayors in Amsterdam and were, therefore, a sort of constituency. The mayors could be expected to exert themselves on behalf of their city’s merchants. Moreover, as was described above, Amsterdam held a great deal of power in the provincial and national assemblies, by virtue of the high percentage of taxes the city paid into the provincial and national coffers. Thus, if Amsterdam supported the merchants’ cause, they had a much greater chance of a favorable outcome to their case in the provincial and national assemblies.

Thirty-seven insurers addressed a petition to the mayors of Amsterdam in support of the Sephardic merchants.⁴⁹ The vast majority of these insurers were relatively recent immigrants from Antwerp and its environs, while Nicolas Rodrigues d'Evora, Duarte Ximenes and Antonio Faillero still lived in the city of Antwerp. Since neither the Sephardim nor the recent immigrants were eligible to hold public office, an important technique for exerting influence over the local political authorities was joining together for joint protests and cooperative petitions, which tended to include implied threats that the Sephardim would feel compelled to leave the United Provinces, taking their trade and trade connections to the profitable Iberian and colonial trades with them. The non-Sephardic merchants had generally, in the past, joined together with non-immigrant merchants who were native to Amsterdam,⁵⁰ However, in this case, the non-Sephardic merchants, mainly newer immigrants to Amsterdam, cooperated with the Sephardim to exert their influence on the local magistracy by signing a petition with the implied threat of the loss of the Sephardim's wealth and trade connections should the sugar not be returned.

In the petition, these merchants declared that they had “insured the goods that had been confiscated for substantial sums of money.”⁵¹ They had done this, they declared, “based on their trust in the privileges and safeguards that the merchants of the Portuguese nation had received from the Gentlemen of the States General to trade and travel freely.” If the Admiralty allowed the bounty of the ships to be divided as a prize, then they, the petitioners who had insured these goods, would have to pay. The petition goes on to say that it would not just be they, the insurers, who would suffer the material consequences should the confiscation go forward. Rather, it would be the whole Dutch Republic which would be negatively impacted, should the Sephardim feel that their business enterprises were unsafe in the Dutch Republic and leave. In sum, the insurers started out by appealing to the mayors based on their own material well-being which, they implied, would affect Amsterdam's trade as a whole. They then made reference to the legal basis

⁴⁹ These 37 merchants were to become important associates of the Sephardim in Amsterdam in subsequent years. Close to 60% (57%) would do more business with Sephardic merchants. See Appendix V for a list of the signatories of the petition and the Sephardic merchants with whom they did business.

⁵⁰ Oscar Gelderblom, *Zuid Nederlandse Kooplieden . . .*, 241

⁵¹ The petition, from which excerpts are taken in the following pages, can be found in, NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland, 3.01.04.01/36/300-301. Translation from the Dutch by the author.

upon which they had insured these goods, which was the 1600 resolution allowing the Sephardim to trade with Portugal and her colonies. Lastly, they emphasized the importance of this case for the Republic as a whole, perhaps hoping to undermine what could have been seen to have been a legitimate claim on the behalf of the Admiralty of Rotterdam.

This emphasis on the good of the Republic as a whole may seem exaggerated, and perhaps it was. However, the merchants petitioning the mayors of Amsterdam pointed out that, should the confiscation proceed, the Sephardim would no longer feel safe to trade in the Republic. The trade of the Portuguese Nation, “in these lands, of which there is much, is well-known [for its importance] by your honors.” This important trade, the petitioners insinuated, would move to other countries should this case go amiss for the Sephardim. Hamburg and Emden would receive the benefits from their trade instead of Amsterdam. Thus, with the importance of Sephardic trade firmly stated, and the possibility of the loss of the Sephardim to competing cities emphasized, the merchants went on to their ultimate request. This request was quite simple. They asked that “your honors, based on the aforementioned reasons . . . advocate for the [Sephardic merchants] with the Gentlemen of the States General so that the merchants of the Portuguese Nation and others of these lands can trade freely with Brazil, and that in the above-mentioned case [of the confiscation of the sugar] no [monetary] damage will be done to anyone involved.”

The mayors of Amsterdam took the arguments and warnings of the insurers to heart. They could have been swayed by the fear of the loss of revenue and trading opportunities should the implied threat be carried out and the Sephardic merchants leave the Dutch Republic. They could also have been moved by the influence these insurers had within the city itself and the connections they might have had for both trade and the election of the mayors of Amsterdam. Lastly, they could have been hoping to undermine the power of either the Admiralty of Rotterdam or the States General itself. Whatever the reasons or combination of reasons, however, the mayors sent a long and detailed request to the provincial assembly, the States of Holland, in which they exhaustively detailed the 200 year history of the Portuguese Nation in “these lands.”⁵² The mayors of Amsterdam

⁵² NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland, 3.01.04.01/36/302-304. The Portuguese nation had their own chapel in Brugge by 1410, so they had indeed been long-established in the Low Countries, though certainly not as

clearly wanted to emphasize the importance of the Portuguese Nation. The mayors wrote that the Portuguese Nation had conducted, “her business and trade to the great contentment, benefit, and profit of these Netherlands.” They then detailed all the safeguards that had been granted to the Portuguese Nation to place their judicial position on firm footing. They closed by urging that the provincial authorities support the mayors of Amsterdam and, by extension, the Sephardic merchants and their Dutch associates, in exhorting the States General to uphold the explicit promises to the Portuguese Nation made by the promulgation of the multiple safeguards in the sixteenth century. They also requested that the sugar be released.

The exact response of the provincial authorities to this request could not be found in the surviving archival material, though it seems that it was favorable. The provincial authorities of Holland appear to have sent on a copy of the resolution of 1600, which stated that “for the wealth of the land” the Sephardim must be allowed to continue trading freely.⁵³ The mayors of Amsterdam also sent a copy of the request they made to the States of Holland to the States General in order to lobby more effectively for the cause of the Sephardic merchants and their insurers.

While all this lobbying was going on in Amsterdam which was being forwarded on to the provincial assembly, the States General continued to deal with the matter, as well. On the 9th of November, another offer was made by the States General for a price to be paid for the redemption of the sugar.⁵⁴ For the first time, however, mention was made of the insurers of the cargo. It was suggested that the insurers be allowed to redeem the sugar for 100 *daalders* a chest.⁵⁵ This mention of the insurers could be because the first official protest from the insurers had arrived to the States General. In addition to the Amsterdam-based insurers, various merchants from Middelburg had also insured part of

only practicing Jews. Thanks to Dr. Raymond Fagel of the University of Leiden for providing this information.

⁵³ NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland, 3.01.04.01/36/305

⁵⁴ RGP 92, nr. 284

⁵⁵ It is not clear how many chests of sugar of the total the insurers had an interest in. The price of 100 *daalders* a chest is not a good one. Assuming that the document is discussing *rijksdaalders*, which were worth approximately 2.4 gulden at the time, the price of the redemption of a chest of sugar would be 240 gulden per chest. There were approximately 2,500 chests of sugar aboard, meaning that the total redemption costs for the insurers, were they to attempt to redeem all the chests of sugar, would have been 600,000 gulden – far more than the 250,000 gulden redemption price offered to the Sephardim. For the value of *daalders* and gulden in the Seventeenth century, see <http://www.econ.tcu.edu/quinn/finhist/readings/Domestic%20Coinage.pdf>

the cargo for Duarte and Gonçalo Ximenes.⁵⁶ They made a direct protest to the States General itself. Lieven de Moelenaer, who was the representative for Reynout Reynoutsz., Jacques van Necke, Steven and Jan Groullart and Mattheus de la Palma declared that they had insured part of the cargo “for a great sum.” They gave the mark to be found on the chests of sugar that belonged to the Ximenes and requested that the matter be resolved within 10 or 12 days.⁵⁷

Soon thereafter, the petitions from the Amsterdam insurers, with the support of the mayors of Amsterdam, and the tacit support of the provincial authorities in the form of a pointed reminder as to the resolution of 1600, must have been received by the States General. On the 12th of November, the States General immediately released 562 chests of sugar, which could be claimed by merchants and insurers definitively living in Amsterdam and Antwerp.⁵⁸ This sugar was declared not to have been a “good prize” and, therefore, had to be returned to its owners. This sudden about face on the part of the States General, especially given the chronology of events, could be interpreted as a concession to mounting pressure from the interest group composed of the Sephardic merchants and their Dutch insurers, who had lobbied successfully for local and provincial support for their cause. However, it could also be viewed as a strategy of “divide and conquer,” since less than a quarter of the total sugar was released, and the States General could have hoped that those who received their sugar would stop agitating for those who still awaited a verdict on their goods.

In less than a month, more pressure came to bear on the States General for the release of more chests of sugar. On the 6th of December, several more Dutch merchants – Pieter Eeuwoutsz. and Isaac d’Ablijn of Rotterdam and Dirck Reysiender of Amsterdam – urged the States General to resolve the matter of the rest of the approximately 2,000 cases of sugar as quickly as possible.⁵⁹ Pieter Eeuwoutsz. wrote on behalf of Manoel Fernandes de Leon and Isaac d’Ablijn was representing the interests of Gaspar Fernandes. These merchants were living in “enemy” territory – Antwerp and Portugal -- and,

⁵⁶ The Ximenes family was connected to the Andalucian nation in Middelburg. See, Raymond Fagel, *De Hispano-Vlaamse wereld. De contacten tussen Spanjaarden en Nederlanders 1496-1555*, (Brusselles: Koninklijke Bibliotheek Albert I, 1996)

⁵⁷ RGP 92, nr. 282, note 3

⁵⁸ RGP 92, nr. 285

⁵⁹ RGP 92, nr. 286. It is unclear exactly how many cases of sugar there were. Some of the documentation seems to point to more than 2,500 cases.

therefore, sought to have a Dutch merchant represent their claims, hoping that they would then have a better chance of a favorable outcome. Dirck Reysiender wrote on behalf of Gillis Dodeur, his nephew. It is not clear if Dodeur owned some of the sugar or if he was, instead, an insurer. The States General declared that it wanted to “end this business quickly and, therefore, save the Republic money and themselves from further concern in the matter.”

It was not yet resolved on the 17th of January when Cornelis Snellinck and Hendrik Ulens, as factors for Nicolas and Simon d’Evora wrote and requested a resolution to the matter.⁶⁰ Nor was it resolved the following week, on the 23rd of January, when Duarte Fernandes, Francisco Pinto de Britto and Duarte Ximenes strongly requested that a decision be reached.⁶¹ Perhaps a resolution had already been agreed upon, or it could be that these latest volleys from the interest group were the final incentive to force the States General into reaching a decision. In any case, on the 25th of January, the cases of sugar were released. However the Sephardim did have to pay a ransom for the redemption of their sugar. The precise amount that the Sephardim paid for the redemption of their sugar is unclear, though it was most likely between the 200,000 guilders they had offered and the 250,000 guilders the States General had initially demanded.

Conclusion

There is a great deal that is unclear about this case. However, it seems that the Sephardim were allowed to redeem at least 2,500 cases of sugar. Some of the documents indicate that even more than 2,500 cases were redeemed, but exact data is not available. What is clear about the case is that the Sephardim and their Dutch associates shared a common concern – money. Should the sugar be auctioned by the Admiralty of Rotterdam, the Sephardim would lose the profits they could make on the sale of this expensive luxury good. The insurers would have to pay the agreed upon rate for the sugar, and, thereby, lose great sums on money in the process. Thus, they cooperated with one another for the furtherance of their collective goals.

⁶⁰ RGP 92, 610

⁶¹ RGP 92, 610

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Olsen defined an interest group as, “a group of individuals conscious of sharing a common concern, cooperating on the borders of power, and seeking to increase their own benefits through bargaining with a political system they accept and influence but do not attempt to control.” This is precisely what the Sephardim and their Dutch associates did. They shared a common concern – the restitution of the sugar and, ultimately, their own profits. They cooperated for the furtherance of these goals by coordinating their lobbying efforts with local authorities in Amsterdam, provincial authorities and, ultimately, national government institutions. They bargained by going back and forth with the price they found acceptable to pay, once it began to become clear that their arguments based purely on judicial and legal grounds were not going to succeed. Moreover, they exerted pressure on the political decision makers by reminding them again and again of the benefits the Portuguese Nation brought to the Dutch Republic. In addition, they quite explicitly threatened that the Sephardim would leave the Dutch Republic and go to a competing land should they not feel safe to trade. Together they worked together as an inter-cultural interest group to lobby for restitution.

This case makes clear that the Sephardim and their Dutch associates formed an interest group within Dutch society, though one that was only partially able to fulfill its goals of influencing decision making in its favor, since a ransom did have to be paid for the return of the sugar. The general topic of the Sephardim, their Dutch associates, and their relationship to politics and power is far too broad and encompassing to discuss in one chapter. Relations as individuals and as a group are often much too complex to reduce to a clear set of formulations about how the Sephardim related to power and influenced politics in Amsterdam and the Dutch Republic, much less internationally. Yet one assertion can clearly be made. The Sephardic merchants joined with their Dutch associates and attempted to influence political decision-making in their favor.

In fact, they seemed to be able to influence local power quite well in Amsterdam. Due to Amsterdam’s predominance in provincial and national politics, this local influence carried over into all levels of policy-making in the Dutch Republic. In fact, as the historian Jan Glete writes, “The Dutch political system was to an unusually high degree based on the ability of local societies to use the central state in their interest and

coordinate their own activities through the state.”⁶² As Glete goes on to point out, the socio-economic elite ran the state, and they were willing to use their social capital to make the state work. It was a self-evident precondition that the state should act in their interests.⁶³ In the case of the sugar confiscation, the state worked only partially in their interest. However, it could be that the Sephardim felt that they had enough influence to make it worthwhile to stay in the Dutch Republic. On the other hand, it could be that they felt that economically and socially, staying in the Dutch Republic was the best option for them. Therefore, they sought to influence policy-making as a survival mechanism.

⁶² Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 172

⁶³ Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe*, 172

Chapter VII: Theory and Reality

In an attempt to gain insights into the complexity of the lives and strategies of Sephardic merchants, the networks of relatives, business associates, and correspondents of Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Bento Osorio, and Manoel Carvalho have been examined throughout this work. In Chapters IV and V, some of their specific networks with non-Sephardic associates were detailed. Several of these, as described in Chapter IV, were long-lasting associations based on relatively frequent interactions. Others, such as those discussed in Chapter V, were less recurrent, though still important for the overall conduct of the global merchants' trade enterprises. These interactions are compelling evidence that, in contrast to the prevailing theories of Early Modern trade written about in Chapter I, global merchants did, in fact, work closely with associates from outside their own Sephardic group¹. The previous chapters have shown that these Sephardic merchants formed economic associations of various sorts and of varying lengths of time with non-Sephardic, non-Jewish merchants. They extended credit to one another, they insured each others cargoes, they chartered ships together, and participated in the emerging chartered companies with merchants from varying backgrounds.

This still begs the question, however, of whether the very real inter-cultural associations detailed throughout this work were the norm for the global merchants or, rather, were anomalous. The basic theory in the traditional historiography outlined in Chapter I was that one of the most important components, if not the most important element, of the relative success of the Sephardim (or, in fact, any group or any individual merchant) in trade was their utilization of networks based on family and shared ethno-religious background.² The idea

¹ Some of these works (which were also noted in Chapter I) are: Jacob M. Price, "The great Quaker business families of eighteenth century London: the rise and fall of a sectarian patriciate," and "English Quaker merchants and the war at sea, 1689-1783," in his *Overseas Trade and Traders*, (Variorum, 1996), chapters 3 and 4; Daniel M. Swetschinski, "Kinship and Commerce: The Foundations of Portuguese Jewish Life in Seventeenth-Century Holland," *Studia Rosenthaliana*, 15, 1, (1981), 52-75; Steve Murdoch *Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603-1746* (Brill, Leiden, 2005); in addition to Michel Aghassian and Keram Kevonian, "The Armenian Merchant Network: Overall Autonomy and Local Integration" in *Merchants, Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era*, Sushil Chaudhury and Michel Morineau, eds., (New York: Cambridge University Press), 74-94, and Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlafits, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglau, eds., *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks: Four Centuries of History*, (Oxford: Berg, 2005) on the Armenians, and Vahé Baladouni and Margaret Makepeace, eds. *Armenian Merchants of the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries: English East India Company Sources*, (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1998).

² See these works (also noted in Chapter 1): Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955); Peter Mathias, "Strategies for Reducing Risk by Entrepreneurs in the Early Modern Period," in C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, eds., *Entrepreneurs and*

behind this work was to provide nuance to this view by illustrating some inter-cultural associations between Sephardic and Dutch and Flemish merchants. As part of this provision of nuance, it was a goal of this book to test the hypothesis that loose ties were more efficient in creating opportunities and promoting the defense of economic interests, than were tightly knit networks, each of whose members knew the rest.

Defining efficiency and the creation of opportunities, as well as the promotion of common interests was difficult, however. Therefore, successful merchants were chosen to see what sort of networks they employed, with the idea being that successful merchants could be assumed to have been efficient, to have created opportunities, and to have promoted their common interests. But, herein lay another problem – the definition of success. Hence, the framework of global merchants – merchants who were global in geographic reach, opportunistic, and integrative – was employed as the criteria for success. Then it remained to be seen if the global merchants – Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio – traded less frequently with fellow Sephardim than did the overall group of Sephardic merchants. A sample of 1317 records of Sephardim in Amsterdam was examined. Six hundred and eight of these records pertained to Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio. The rest of the records – 709, in fact -- concerned other Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam.

Data Analysis – Methods and conclusions

This hypothesis was tested with statistical methods. Essentially, the idea was that, were the theory that Sephardic merchants became successful in trade due to their utilization of intra-cultural networks true, the global merchants such as Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio, who were some of the most prominent and wealthy of the Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam at the time, would have made particular use of intra-Sephardi networks. This was absolutely not the case. Across the board, these merchants made less use of intra-Sephardi networks than the other Sephardic traders in Amsterdam at the time, as Table 6, below, shows. The average for

entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times. Merchants and industrialists within the orbit of the Dutch Staple Market, (Den Haag: Stichting Hollandse Historische Reeks, 1995), 5-24; Leos Muller, "The Role of the Merchant Network: A Case History of two Swedish Trading Houses, 1650-1800," in C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, eds., *Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times. Merchants and industrialists within the orbit of the Dutch Staple Market*, (Den Haag: Stichting Hollandse Historische Reeks, 1995), 147-163; Leos Muller, *The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, c. 1640-1800: A Comparative Study of Early Modern Entrepreneurial Behaviour*, (Upsala: Upsala University Press, 1998); and Jonathan I. Israel, "Introduction," in Jonathan I. Israel, ed., *Diasporas Within a Diaspora*, 2.

the non-global traders was 27% intra-Sephardi trade. However, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio diverged from this tendency with only 12%, 19% and 14% intra-cultural trade, respectively. The data was systematically analyzed by placing it into a relative perspective. This enabled important but otherwise small absolute differences to be seen in their proper context. The goal was to understand the relative difference of a sort of trade, such as inter-cultural Sephardi-Sephardi trade versus other sorts of trade such as intra-Sephardic trade.

Table 6: Total number of trades according to type of trade and trader

type trade \ trader	random sample	Vega	Osorio	Carvalho	Total
sephardic & sephardic	192	15	52	21	280
sephardic solitary	40	17	161	17	235
sephardic&sephardic&non-sephardic	231	35	95	54	415
sephardic & non-sephardic	246	58	65	18	387
Total	709	125	373	110	1317

Source: GAA. NA

The data in Table 6 is the raw data used in this analysis. It shows the total number of trades by type of trade (intra-cultural (S/S); integrative (S/S/NS); inter-cultural (S/NS) or “solitary,” meaning only one merchant is named (“S”), and by the trader involved -- either one of the global merchants or one of the sample of other Sephardic merchants). The sample of Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam is taken as the “norm” to which the other data is compared. With this data at hand, the assertion that constellations of intra-Sephardic trade were the norm, and were a key component for the success of this group on the Early Modern period, was examined.

Table 7: Total number of trades in rendered in percentage form

type trade \ trader	random sample	Vega	Osorio	Carvalho	total
sephardic & sephardic	27%	12%	14%	19%	21%
sephardic solitary	6%	14%	43%	15%	18%
sephardic&sephardic&non-sephardic	33%	28%	25%	49%	32%
sephardic & non-sephardic	35%	46%	17%	16%	29%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Source: GAA, NA

In order to make the comparison easier all the data from Table 6 was depicted in percentage form in Table 7. When the numbers from the sample of Sephardic merchants as a whole are examined, it is clear that a significant number of interactions were inter-cultural. In

33% of the contracts, a consortium of Sephardic traders did business with non-Sephardic merchants. Moreover, in 35% of all the interactions from the sampled group, a Sephardic trader dealt exclusively with a non-Sephardic trader, exposing him to the “dangers” of trading outside of the confines of family, friends, and members of the same ethno-religious group. This sizeable amount of trading outside of the Sephardic community is a finding that the prevailing theories of Early Modern trade would not have predicted, and serves to cast doubt on the idea that Sephardic merchants depended on each other for the conduct of their trade.

Table 8: Average and standard deviation of the percentage from Table 7

type trade	average	st dev
sephardic & sephardic	18%	7%
sephardic solitary	19%	16%
sephardic&sephardic&non-sephardic	34%	11%
sephardic & non-sephardic	29%	14%

Source: GAA, NA

The data in Table 7 can be further analyzed by a z-score analysis. The analysis basically allows for statements to be made about the structure of the trading pattern of various merchants. A z-score shows how many standard deviations above or below the mean a score is. This is different from the information depicted in Table 8, which shows the standard deviation. A standard deviation itself describes how dispersed (spread out) all of the scores in a group are around the mean. For example, the combined average of intra-cultural interactions is 18% of total interactions. As all the categories of merchants are close to this 18%, the measure of dispersion is a relatively small 7%. The average of the one merchant on his own (solitary) trades is 19%, but this number is skewed because of the high number of Osorio’s trades on his own -- 43%. The other merchants do not trade as much on their own, and, therefore, the standard deviation is relatively high at 16%.

Through a z-score analysis, however, it is possible to see how far the global merchants “stray” from the norm of the sample of other Sephardic merchants, as well as how far they stray from the overall “average.” The z-score is derived by calculating the average percentage of the four categories: the sample, Rodrigues Vega, Bento Osorio and Manoel Carvalho, and its standard deviation. For example, Osorio’s 1.4 divergence is calculated as follows: $1.4 = (43\% \text{ [Osorio’s Sephardic solitary trade]} - 19\% \text{ [average of all Sephardic solitary trade]} / 16 \text{ [the percentage of standard deviation for Sephardic solitary trade]}$. This is a very large z-score, and it indicates Osorio’s trading pattern did not match the average in any way. This same

pattern of divergence applies, in varying degrees, to Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho, as well. Interestingly, each of the four “types” of traders had a single z-score that was particularly divergent. The method assumes a normal distribution, which is statistically acceptable, since the total size of the database is large, and contains 1317 data points. In addition, the sample included large, medium and smaller traders.

Table 9: z-scores of the total number of trades in percentage form

trade type \ trader	random sample	Vega	Osorio	Carvalho
sephardic & sephardic	1.3	-0.9	-0.6	0.2
sephardic solitary	-0.8	-0.4	1.4	-0.2
sephardic&sephardic&non-sephardic	-0.1	-0.5	-0.8	1.4
sephardic & non-sephardic	0.4	1.2	-0.8	-0.9

Source: GAA, NA

The preliminary conclusions that can be drawn from the statistical analysis are that the global merchants had a markedly different trading pattern from the merchants in the sample group. Despite the very real differences between the global merchants, they all had one important aspect in common: global merchants did trade intra-culturally, but this form of trading was not their preferred type of interaction. This is the case in spite of how attractive intra-cultural trade is depicted to be in the historiography outlined in Chapter I.

The data shown above casts serious doubt on the original claim that the distinguishing element of the success of Sephardic merchants is due to their intra-cultural trade. In fact, the data drawn from the sample group indicates that the majority of the economic interactions were done together with non-Sephardic merchants. (33% + 35% = 68%). The data further indicates that Sephardic merchants should not be seen as one homogeneous group. Instead, the very real differences between Sephardic merchants should be considered. From this perspective, the statistical analysis indicates that while the most successful Sephardic merchants; i.e. the global merchants, traded inter-culturally, each had his own particular trading pattern, which distinguished him from both the sampled group, as well as from the other global merchants.

Vega’s main distinguishing element, for example, was that he predominantly traded with non-Sephardic merchants on his own; that is without other Sephardic merchants involved (z-score 1.2). Carvalho’s main trading pattern, in contrast, was characterized by the use of an integrated network of both Sephardic and non-Sephardic traders (z-score 1.4). In that sense, Carvalho was a sort of “bridge” between Rodrigues Vega and the sample group. Like Vega,

Carvalho interacted with non-Sephardic traders, but also more with intra-cultural trade than the other global merchants. (z-score 0.2) Osorio's trading pattern, meanwhile, was unique because he mainly interacted on his own entirely, at least as far as the documentation reveals. This sets him apart from the sample group, as well as from the other two global merchants, as all other types of trading takes place in a group.

A brief analysis of the other z-scores paints a picture of marked differences in trading patterns of the global merchants versus the sample group. The -0.9 of Vega and -0.6 of Osorio indicate they did not trade as much exclusively within their own social group as did the sample group. Interestingly the "solitary" interactions in which only one merchant is mentioned appears very rarely in the sample group, as its z-score is -0.8. Osorio on the other hand, hardly interacted with other merchants, as indicated by the -0.6, -0.8 and -0.8 for the respective "non-solitary" types of trade. Finally, the integrated merchant, Carvalho, preferred to interact with non-Sephardim along with fellow Sephardic merchants as part of the interaction, as is indicated by the z-score of -0.9 .

To sum things up, as Table 9 shows, the global merchants -- Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio -- traded more outside the Sephardic group than the norm or sample group. If the traditional wisdom were correct, that the global merchants would have had z-scores close(r) to zero. They would have traded around the average, and, hence, would have gotten a low z-score. This was not the case. The global merchants had a significantly different trading pattern than did the sample group of merchants. Essentially, once a merchant strayed 1.4 and 1.2 standard deviations away from the average, it was a very strong indication that successful (i.e. global) merchants did not interact mostly within their ethno-religious group, which, in turn, means that this view of Early Modern trade should be re-visited.

The reasons for each merchants' particular divergence from the norm will be discussed at greater length below, though these reasons are hard to definitively determine. This difficulty in determining the reasons for each merchants' particular divergence is not the only challenge the statistical results present. It is also difficult to determine why, exactly, the global merchants had a significantly different trading pattern from the sample group of merchants. Nevertheless, some possible explanations are given below.

This divergent trading pattern on the part of the global merchants could be due to a sort of virtuous cycle of success. If a merchant were successful, he had the wherewithal to move beyond his traditional ethno-religious networks, and formed loose-ties with merchants from other groups. These loose ties with a variety of merchants from divergent backgrounds helped to lower risk and expand opportunities which, in turn, increased the merchants'

success. Another theory could be that some merchants chose to take the perceived risk of moving beyond their ethno-religious group in search of network associates. This risky move might have then have born fruit in the form of successful trading networks. Essentially, it could be either that a merchant was already global and, thereby, successful, so he moved beyond his ethno-religious group for trading associates and this spurred his existing success to greater heights. Or it could be that merchants who were not yet global, or were only somewhat successful, made the choice to connect loosely with merchants outside their Sephardic group, and this decision turned out to be a good one, because they increased the efficiency of their networks. Lastly, it could be that the whole idea of separate cultures is somewhat inaccurate as applied to these merchants. As has been stated earlier in this book, identities were fluid in the this period, and it is entirely possible that merchants identified as much or more with fellow global merchants as they did with members of their ethno-religious group. Thus, it could be that it was not such a big step for them to move outside their the Sephardic group (or, for their associates to move outside their various groups) to look for trading associates, because the difference that contemporary scholars perceive to have existed between merchants groups is, quite simply, an inaccurate projection of contemporary sensibilities on the Early Modern reality.

Whatever the precise reason for the global merchants' diversion from the norm, however, their inter-cultural interactions were likely facilitated by various factors. For example, these merchants lived in Amsterdam, a city which was up and coming. The city was a melting pot of merchants from a large number of backgrounds. Moreover, structures such as the stock exchange certainly provided the opportunities to meet and mingle with merchants of all sorts. In addition, there were a large number of newcomers to the city. These recent immigrants might have needed and wanted to take risks by trading with merchants from other ethno-religious groups, and, therefore, have sought to expand their networks. In addition, these newcomers could have traded inter-culturally because they had been mobile and had come into contact with multiple merchants and numerous networks in their travels. For instance, Carvalho had lived in Brazil and Rodrigues Vega came from Antwerp. The almost certainly connected with non-Sephardic merchants from in these place. These connections were expanded upon, or renewed, in Amsterdam. Notably, Osorio traded the least with other merchants of any stripe, if the contracts pertaining to him are to be interpreted literally, and he probably came to Amsterdam directly from Lisbon.

Now that this broad assertion – that global merchants did not trade significantly more within the Sephardic group -- in fact, quite the opposite – has been proven, some of the

divergences within the overall statistics can be discussed. Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were, as has been seen, highly individual merchants with their own unique motivations, behaviors, and networks. In order to better understand these merchants and how or why they chose to interact with non-Sephardic merchants in various situations, as well as how or why they did and did not conform to the overall trends these figures point to will be examined. Each merchant will be analyzed in greater detail below.

Why Does Manoel Rodrigues Vega trade more with non-Sephardim?

As Table 7, above, shows, Manoel Rodrigues Vega traded much more frequently with non-Sephardic associates than he did either with intra-Sephardic networks or with integrated networks of Sephardic and non-Sephardic merchants. Furthermore, he stands out from amongst the other global merchants, Manoel Carvalho and Bento Osorio, for the amount of his Sephardi-non-Sephardi trade. Forty-six percent of all his contracts were with a non-Sephardic merchant. This is in contrast to only 12% that are intra-cultural, and 14% that are for interactions without another named associate. This 46% has a z-score of 1.2 for Sephardi-non-Sephardi trade, which is a significant amount. Moreover, his purely Sephardic-non-Sephardic contracts were significantly more frequent than his contracts which display an integrated network of associates – Sephardi-Sephardi-non-Sephardi contracts -- which account for 28% of his recorded interactions. Not only were these purely Sephardic-non-Sephardic contracts more frequent, they were important. As was seen in Chapter IV, these interactions included acting on each others behalf, extending one another credit, and co-owning both trade goods and property. Interestingly, Rodrigues Vega did not trade significantly on his own, without an associate, of whatever background.

Why, though, would Rodrigues Vega engage so frequently in direct Sephardic-non-Sephardic trade, especially in contrast with the other global merchants? The answer most likely cannot ever be fully ascertained. However, it seems likely that there were two main reasons for his preponderance of Sephardi-non-Sephardi trade: 1) necessity, or lack thereof; 2) perceived difference, or lack thereof. These reasons will be discussed more fully below.

Manoel Rodrigues Vega had no actual need to trade fall back on the assumed safety of intra-Sephardi networks. Vega was already well-integrated into networks with non-Sephardic merchants via Antwerp and with newcomers from Antwerp. He was already firmly entrenched in the non-Sephardic Antwerp networks with men such as his main associate, Cornelis Snellinck, who was, himself, married to a Portuguese woman, though it is not known

whether or not she was Sephardic. As was mentioned in Chapter II, the Rodrigues Vega family were prominent members of that city's Portuguese community. For example, Vega's father, Luis Fernandes, was a sugar and spice importer and served as consul of the Portuguese nation of Antwerp in 1583 and every fourth year thereafter until his death. One of Vega's brothers, Gabriel Fernandes, was married to Maria Beeckx, a daughter of the squire Jan de Beeckx, a Catholic. This marriage would seem to show that the Vega family were members of the Antwerp mercantile elite with enough wealth and social status to marry into the Flemish Catholic landed gentry.

As the son of a prominent and wealthy family, Manoel Rodrigues Vega had the connections with merchants in Antwerp already in place before he came to Amsterdam. These connections were no doubt strengthened by the time he had spent in Nantes working for the family business. Vega most likely came to Amsterdam to exploit the new commercial opportunities available there, perhaps on behalf of his family. However, since Rodrigues Vega was at the absolute forefront of Sephardic settlement in Amsterdam, even had he sought to work within Sephardic networks in this city, it would have been difficult. Quite simply, there were very few Sephardim with whom he could integrate his networks, even had he felt the need to. However, it does not seem that Rodrigues Vega has much inclination to favor Sephardic networks. He was well-integrated into the networks of the Portuguese Diaspora, as well as of the Protestants in Antwerp, already.

Not only did Vega not do much business with other Sephardim, however. He had few or no connections among the established Amsterdam merchants. In the first five years of Vega's residence in Amsterdam (until 1600), fully a third of his recorded contracts make no mention of any other merchant at all. Forty-two percent were contracts dealing with non-Sephardic merchants, none of whom came from Amsterdam originally. In fact, the vast majority of Vega's commercial associates, as far as it can be ascertained, were recent immigrants from Antwerp such as the van Geel, de Laet, Quinget, Beeckx, de Schot, Coymans, van Os, Jacot, and the van Dortmund families. Therefore, it is clear that these other recent immigrants with whom he did business were most emphatically not other Sephardim in the first five years of Vega's stay in Amsterdam.

In fact, there were only four contracts during these initial five years that were made with other Sephardic merchants exclusively, while another nine contracts were between Vega, another Sephardic merchant, and a non-Sephardic merchant. Granted, as was mentioned above, there were relatively few Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam up to and including 1600 with whom to do business. In addition, some business between Sephardic merchants,

especially with family members, may have been conducted informally, without benefit of formal legal contracts. Nevertheless, it is striking how little either fellow Sephardim, or merchants from the Northern Netherlands, figured into Vega's enterprises.

These figures quoted above are for the initial five years of Vega's residence in Amsterdam. However, if the entirety of Vega's commercial career, as far as it has come to light via the available archival material, is examined, the picture does not change dramatically. As Table 7 demonstrates, Vega does not seem to have relied particularly heavily upon Sephardic associates, and, when he did, they were almost always part of a larger interaction that included non-Sephardic merchants, as well. This lack of intra-Sephardic trade, then, does not just include the early years of Vega's settlement in Amsterdam, when there were few other Sephardic merchants with whom to do business. Rather, the absence of notable levels of intra-Sephardic trade can be seen during the entirety of Vega's recorded career, during which time Sephardic merchants flooded into the city of Amsterdam. Thus, it was clearly not just a lack of available Sephardic merchants that kept Rodrigues Vega away from his fellow Sephardim as business associates. Instead, it seems much more likely that, as has been seen, Rodrigues Vega was already firmly integrated into the non-Sephardic networks of Antwerp-based merchants (or those who had emigrated from Antwerp) and had little or no need for intra-Sephardi networks.

This claim is further bolstered by the fact that Rodrigues Vega was also involved in a variety of trade routes and a number of products. As Chapter III showed, Vega was relatively equally involved in the so-called "rich" trade in products such as sugar, slaves, and other colonial goods and the "bulk" trades of grains, salt, etc. He had no real specialization in terms of trade goods. This lack of specialization would seem to point to the fact that he had little or no need to expand his networks in order to enter into the trade in a new sort of product, or to focus more heavily upon such a product. Rodrigues Vega's existing networks were more than sufficient to accommodate his trade in products such as sugar and other spices and various grains.

Not only were Vega's existing networks adequate in terms of the supply, distribution, and sale of the products in which Vega dealt, however. His networks already supplied sufficient geographical coverage to meet Rodrigues Vega's needs. Vega's established networks were based in Antwerp, or utilized emigrants from Antwerp. Though only 5% of his contracts specifically named Antwerp, it is hardly surprising that close to half of Vega's contracts pertained to the Atlantic, since Antwerp was the distribution point for colonial goods coming in via the expanding Atlantic world.

For instance, Antwerp was the intersection for three routes for the development of its contacts in the Atlantic region – the “Escalda Occidental”, the Dunkirk route, along with Dover, which was a free/neutral port, which provided transport to the mercenaries in Dunkirk. The third route went from Antwerp to the northern French ports. Antwerp was also a hinge between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. During the sixteenth century the city was an important link in the chain of traffic between the Atlantic and the North of Europe.³

Moreover, the *asientos* for the Atlantic region were paid in Antwerp, and Antwerp formed an important nexus in the international payment traffic between Venice, Lyon, Amsterdam, and Hamburg.⁴ One of the reasons Antwerp flourished in the first place was the Portuguese factory that was established there. This Portuguese “colony” in Antwerp, of whom Rodrigues Vega’s family were members, dealt in the burgeoning trade from Asia and West Africa. Antwerp preserved, until the middle of the seventeenth century, its importance as a capital market for the cities of London, Amsterdam, and Hamburg, all of which utilized its services and the commercial networks Antwerp had with the Iberian Peninsula. Antwerp enjoyed, as a *dispositionsplatz*, a flourishing money market. It was the most important exchange place in all of the Southern Low countries.⁵

Essentially, then, Antwerp was able to maintain a quadruple function during the sixteenth century. Firstly, it was a *Dispositionsplatz*, meaning that transactions occurred in the city, without the products actually physically being there (with the notable exception of English cloth).⁶ Secondly, it was a center for the distribution of luxury goods, many of which were arriving from the East and West Indies. Thirdly, it was the largest port in the Southern Low Countries (for distribution and transit). Lastly, the city functioned as a capital market. All this was possible thanks to the maintenance of an exit market, principally with Southern Europe and, thanks to the existence of a group, surprisingly numerous, of companies with ample funds, almost all linked by family ties or friendships with the Flemish Diaspora.⁷

Many of these members of the Flemish Diaspora were in Amsterdam. Actually, Rodrigues Vega was a member of this Flemish Diaspora, just as his non-Sephardic associates

³ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, (London, 1972), 203

⁴ Roland Baetens, *De nazomer van Antwerpens welvaart: De diaspora en het handelshuis De Grootte tijdens de eerste helft der 17de eeuw*, (Brussels: Gemeentekrediet van België, 1976), 258

⁵ R. Baetens, *De nazomer . . .*, 100, 243-244, 249 and Eddy Stols, *De Spaanse Brabanders, of de handelsbetrekkingen der Zuidelijke Nederlanden met de Iberische wereld, 1598-1648*, volume I, (Brussels: Palais der Academiën, 1971), 326-327

⁶ Victor Enthoven, “From Sea Beggars to Admiralty: The Dutch Navy after Lepanto,”

<http://www.assostoria.it/Armisovrano/Enthoven.pdf>

⁷ Roland Baetens, *De nazomer . . .*, 99-100, 268-269

were, which added another layer to his multi-faceted identity. This also might lend support to the idea that the perceived difference that contemporary scholars have regarding New Christians such as Vega, especially those who came from Antwerp, and members of the Flemish diaspora, did not really exist. Be that as it may, the Flemish merchants were already firmly engaged in maximizing the possibilities of Antwerp as a money market, as well as its role as a center for the distribution of Atlantic goods. This function as an entrepôt for Atlantic goods slowly began to shift to Amsterdam, possibly helped by Northern European acquisitions in the Atlantic. This could explain Rodrigues Vega's move to the city on the Amstel. Whatever the case, Vega remained active in the Atlantic trade – a trade in which he could continue to make the most of his networks from Antwerp which were already rooted in this trade, while also continuing to integrate his regions and product assortment to include the Baltic (and Baltic goods) and the Mediterranean .

Vega's networks from Antwerp, most of which were engaged in the Atlantic trade, were largely non-Sephardic. He had no need to use networks of fellow Sephardim for the supply, distribution, or sale of the products in which he was interested. Moreover, he had no need to incorporate other Sephardim in his networks to expand his geographical focus. He had access to Antwerp and the Atlantic already via his connections with non-Sephardi merchants. Thus, there was no necessity for him to incorporate intra-Sephardi networks. However, this whole argument is premised upon the idea that Manoel Rodrigues Vega would have somehow preferred to use intra-Sephardi networks had there been a compelling economic necessity. The argument is, essentially, predicated upon the idea that Vega saw himself as a Sephardic merchant rather than a Flemish merchant.

As the discussion in Chapter I showed, any labeling of an historical personage's identity is fraught with uncertainty, at best. Nothing definitive can be said and no proof can be given. Yet there are strong signs that Manoel Rodrigues Vega saw himself at least as much as a Flemish Diaspora merchant as he did a Sephardic merchant. For instance, Vega was, as far as can be ascertained, not involved in the organized Jewish life in the Low Countries at all, with the exception of the highly suspect claims made by Vaz Pimentel to the Inquisition, as described in Chapter I. He had no need to be for business reasons and, apparently, had no compelling desire to affiliate with Judaism based on his faith. Vega was not a Protestant, as were the majority of the recent immigrants from the Southern Netherlands (and other areas). There is no evidence that Vega was a practicing Catholic, either. However, the fact that, in 1618, Vega's brother, Gabriel, who had married into the landed Catholic gentry in Antwerp, and became a member of the Saint Lucas guild, Antwerp's artists' guild, as an employer of

silversmiths and painters, points to the fact that Gabriel may have been a practicing Catholic and accepted as a Catholic by the guild members, since it was more difficult for those suspected of crypto-Judaism to gain admission to the guilds. This could say something about Gabriel's self-identity, but also about the family's identity, including Rodrigues Vega's.

It was not at all uncommon for New Christian families to harbor a variety of religious practices within them, and it seems the Vega family could have been no exception. At any rate, much has been made of Vega's settlement in Amsterdam, as the first member of the "Portuguese Nation" to be granted *poorterschap* or citizenship in Amsterdam. The fact that Vega was a member of the Portuguese nation has then been equated with Judaism. However, as has been seen in Chapter I, the two were not always equivalent. It could be that historians assumed both a Jewish religiosity, but also a sense of Sephardic identity, on the part of Rodrigues Vega that simply did not exist based solely on his New Christian ancestry – ironically, the same logic used by the Inquisition.

There is little evidence of any religious practice of whatever sort on the part of Vega. He does not appear in any of the religious documentation of the Portuguese Jewish community at all, even in passing. Moreover, Vega is not known to have assumed a Jewish name, as was common practice when a Sephardic man or woman professed Judaism publicly. He also moved to Rotterdam relatively early on – in 1606 -- and there was no known openly practicing Jewish community there, other than the community meeting in an attic described by Vaz Pimentel in his suspect testimony. Religiously, Manoel Rodrigues Vega does not seem to have practiced much of any religion at all. The absence of records demonstrating any sort of affiliation with the emerging Jewish community in Amsterdam, coupled with the family's connections to the Catholic landed gentry of Flanders, seems to point to the weak attachment of Rodrigues Vega to Jewish practice or identity. New Christians had a long history of inter-marriage with Old Christians, and the marriage can be seen in this light. However, there were certainly options for Gabriel to marry a New Christian or, even, a practicing Jew. He chose not to, which points to a tenuous or non-existent connection to either New Christian or Jewish identity. Thus, it could very well be that one of Vega's reasons for engaging so strongly in Sephardi-non-Sephardi trade is that he did not acknowledge or accept any sort of difference between himself and the majority of the non-Sephardim with whom he traded. Thus, for Vega, there was nothing special or exceptional about trading outside the Sephardic networks since he did not identify as such to begin with.

Why does Carvalho trade so intensively with integrated networks?

As Table 7, above, shows, Manoel Carvalho traded much more frequently within a network which included both fellow Sephardim and non-Sephardic associates than he did in other sorts of network configurations. He utilized such networks much more frequently than he did either intra-Sephardic networks or a network with purely non-Sephardic merchants. Carvalho definitely stands out from amongst the other global merchants, Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Bento Osorio, for the amount of his integrated Sephardi-Sephardi-non-Sephardi trade. Forty-nine percent of all his contracts were within a network of one or more other Sephardi merchants with one or more non-Sephardic merchant(s). Clearly, then, he felt that integrated networks were efficacious for the conduct of his trade. This is in contrast to only 19% of his contracts that were intra-cultural, 16% that are purely inter-cultural, and 15% that are for interactions without another named associate. It seems, then, the intra-cultural networks were not particularly useful or necessary for him. Likewise, purely inter-cultural networks with one or more non-Sephardic merchants were also not of great use to him either. This 49% is a standard deviation of 1.4 from the mean for Sephardi-Sephardi-non-Sephardi trade. Thus, Carvalho did not trade at significant rates on his own, without an associate, of whatever sort. Nor did he trade a great deal purely within the Sephardic group. Lastly, he did not trade considerably with non-Sephardic merchants without other Sephardim involved.

Why, though, would Manoel Carvalho engage so frequently in integrated Sephardic-Sephardic-non-Sephardic trade, especially in contrast with the other global merchants? As was the case with Manoel Rodrigues Vega, the answer most likely cannot ever be fully ascertained. However, it seems likely that there were two main reasons for his preponderance of integrated Sephardi-Sephardi-non-Sephardi trade: 1) necessity; 2) a fluid identity that fluctuate between that of a New Christian colonial entrepreneur, and a Sephardic Jewish merchant. These reasons will be discussed more fully below.

Carvalho was much more present in integrated trade networks. He tended to maximize his contacts with Sephardim, while also bringing in non-Sephardic associates, as well. This could be due to the fact that he already had a firm basis in Sephardi networks. However, because of the routes in which he was involved, mostly the Atlantic, as well as his trade in sugar, Carvalho most likely needed to expand beyond his basis in Sephardi networks and bring in non-Sephardi associates to continue to expand his trade in this region and in this product once he moved to Amsterdam. Unlike Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho was not securely integrated into the Antwerp-based networks. These networks in Antwerp, as

was described above, were important for the sale and distribution of colonial products such as sugar. Moreover, Antwerp had been the gateway for financing and conducting Atlantic trade of all sorts. Thus, Carvalho needed to integrate himself into these networks, while also retaining his own previously established Sephardi networks, if he was to continue to flourish commercially.

Although Carvalho's cousin, Maria de Pas, had been married to an Antwerp Sephardic Portuguese, Andre Dias,⁸ she left Antwerp for Venice when her first husband died. Carvalho could have kept up some of the Antwerp connections via his cousin, Maria, even after she left the city, but he most likely needed to continue to expand his connections. Carvalho specialized in sugar, and 72% of contracts relating to Carvalho are for the trade in this product. The sugar trade was an enterprise in which the Sephardim were already highly visible in the sixteenth century.⁹ Though Carvalho had been born in Porto in Portugal, he spent a good part of his earlier years in Brazil before moving to the Low Countries. Brazil was the center of sugar production and trade. As a New Christian in Portugal and Brazil he would have already been connected to, and integrated in, the New Christian social and economic networks.¹⁰ Carvalho was the grandson of Pedro Alvares Madeiro, who was the owner of 2/3rds of a plantation in Pernambuco, with two sugar mills, in Brazil along the river Camaragibi. Carvalho inherited part of this estate, making him part of the planter class in Brazil. Thus, he already had both connections with the substantial Sephardic networks focused on the sugar trade in Brazil, as well as experience in interacting with non-Sephardic, Old Christians in the colony, many of whom were also landowners.

These networks for the Atlantic trade in mostly Brazilian sugar would serve Carvalho in good stead when he moved to Amsterdam. Although Swetschinski states that Carvalho settled in Amsterdam in 1604, he was listed as a merchant of Amsterdam in 1602 in the case

⁸ GAA, NA 620/596

⁹ See, for example, Ernst Pijning, "New Christians as Sugar Cultivators and Traders in the Portuguese Atlantic, 1450-1800," in *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West*, 485-500. In this same volume, see also, J.C. Boyajian, "New Christians and Jews in the Sugar Trade," 471-484 and Pieter C. Emmer, "The Jewish Moment and the Two Expansion Systems in the Atlantic, 1580-1650," 501-516. See also, Stuart B. Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society, Bahia, 1550-1835*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

¹⁰ There is a vast literature about the New Christians in Brazil. See, for example, Anita Novinsky, *Cristãos Novos na Bahia*, (São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, 1972), José Antonio Gonsalves de Mello, *Gente da nação: cristãos-novos e judeus em Pernambuco 1542-1654*, (Recife: Massangana, 1989); Hersch W. Asbaum, *A saga do judeu brasileiro: a presença judaica em Terras de Santa Cruz*, (São Paulo: Edições Inteligentes, 2000); Arnold Wiznitzer, *Os judeus no Brasil Colonial*, (São Paulo: Livraria Pioneira/Edusp, 1966), and the numerous works of José Gonçalves Salvador, such as, *Cristãos-novos, jesuítas e Inquisição*, (São Paulo: Livraria Pioneira/Edusp, 1969); *Cristãos-Novos e o Comércio no Atlântico Meridional*, (São Paulo: Pioneira, 1978); *Cristãos-Novos em Minas Gerais Durante o Ciclo do Ouro*, (São Paulo: Livraria Pioneira Editora, 1992); *Os Cristãos-Novos: Povoamento e Conquista do Solo Brasileiro*, (São Paulo: Liv. Pioneira, 1976); and *Os magnatas do tráfico negreiro: séculos XVI e XVII*, (São Paulo: Livraria Pioneira Editora, 1981)

of the sugar confiscated in 1602, described in Chapter VI.¹¹ In the first three years of his residence in Amsterdam, he, like Vega, seemed to have been finding his way in regard to his commercial networks. He traded mostly on his own account, a pattern which did not continue later on, though he also worked with Sephardic and non-Sephardic associates. This could be because he was not yet integrated into any Amsterdam-based networks. It could also be because he was trading on behalf of merchants outside of Amsterdam, most likely in Brazil or Portugal, who do not appear in the documentation.

Whatever the case, Carvalho had few connections among the established merchants native to Amsterdam. Sixty-five percent of his total contracts list non-Sephardic merchants (combined S/S/NS and S/NS). Only one of these non-Sephardic merchants, Albert Schuyt, was originally from the Northern Netherlands, and even Schuyt was not from Amsterdam itself. In fact, the vast majority of Carvalho's commercial associates, as far as it can be ascertained, were relatively recent immigrants from Antwerp, and Schuyt himself was strongly connected to merchants from Antwerp through his second marriage to Constantia de Haze. The De Haze family were heavily involved in the sugar trade.¹²

This focus on merchants from Antwerp as new associates to integrate into his network seems to point to a few things. It would seem to indicate the importance of Antwerp. The fact that Carvalho was seeking to expand his networks with the important sugar-trading families who originated in Antwerp shows that these merchants were known to have the connections and expertise in the Atlantic sugar trade. It could also be that, as was the case with Vega, there were relatively few Sephardim in Amsterdam with whom to do business, so Carvalho began to expand and supplement his networks with non-Sephardim. Lastly, it could point to a sort of "new-comers solidarity" in Amsterdam. Both the Sephardim such as Carvalho and the Antwerp émigrés were newcomers to Amsterdam. Neither group had the connections with established merchants in Amsterdam. Therefore, they might have naturally turned towards one another, especially since many Sephardim, as well as many Antwerp immigrants, were active in the Atlantic sugar trade

As a newcomer to Amsterdam who wanted to continue expanding his trade in sugar, while also branching out into the trade in grains and other Baltic goods which he shipped to

¹¹ Daniel Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans* . . . , 108 and RGP 92, 293

¹² For instance, Carvalho dealt with members of the following families from the Southern Netherlands: Laurens Joosten Baeck, David de l'Hommel, Pieter Gillis, François Wouters, and Pieter van Geel. See: <http://amsterdammerchants.niwi.knaw.nl:8080/kooplieden> and Johannes Gerard van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister*. Constantia de Haze was from Antwerp and was the widow of Jan Nicquet (and the daughter of Hendrick and Clara Coymans. See, Johannes Gerard van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister* . . . 141, 209

the Mediterranean, Carvalho needed to integrate his networks by including non-Sephardic associates such as his main associate, Albert Schuyt. Schuyt, as has already been mentioned, had strong connections via his wife to the prominent sugar-trading families in Antwerp. Schuyt was, perhaps, interested in working with Carvalho in order to expand and integrate his own networks, especially in Brazil, where Carvalho came from. At any rate, Carvalho mostly used his integrated networks, as the graphs in Chapter III illustrate, for the financing of his trading enterprises via bills of exchange. He also relied on integrated networks to insure his shipments. Importantly, the integrated networks also helped him access goods such as grain that he had not heretofore dealt in.

Thus, it seems clear that Carvalho depended on Sephardi-Sephardi-non-Sephardi networks, at least partially, out of necessity. As a newcomer to Amsterdam trading in Atlantic sugar, he may have found that his purely intra-Sephardic networks were not adequate to trade from his new home. He, instead, may have discovered that he needed to draw upon the Antwerp's expertise in the sugar trade to help with the financing and distribution of this product. Carvalho also clearly saw the advantages to be had in the transport of Baltic grain to the Italian peninsula. He, therefore, may have had enough Sephardic associates on the Italian end of the enterprise due to the large and established Sephardic communities in the Italian city-states. However, he most likely did not have the entree into the supply markets for Baltic grain. Hence, Carvalho began to supplement his networks with non-Sephardim who could help in these vital areas.

In addition to these very real economic motivations for the integration of his networks, there are some signs to point to the fact that Carvalho was particularly open to the inclusion of non-Sephardim in his networks. Carvalho had been used to associating with Portuguese "old" Christians in Brazil. All New Christians or Sephardim in Brazil would have been, to some extent. However, Carvalho, as the owner of a sizeable plantation would have been used to associating with the planter class. There were many New Christians who were landowners, as land ownership implied social status. However, there were also many non-Sephardic *engenho* owners, as well. Moreover, Carvalho was rather lackadaisically associated with the open and active practice of Judaism in Amsterdam.

Manoel Carvalho was only marginally associated with the Jewish community in Amsterdam. He was in no hurry to make any sort of open declaration of Judaism, though there was ample opportunity to do so. In a notarial deed from 1643, he stated that though he arrived in Amsterdam forty years before (app. 1604), he had made no profession of his

Judaism until 1616.¹³ Carvalho was certainly not an active congregant in any of the synagogues in Amsterdam. Though he lived to be at least 79 years old, if not older, Carvalho only appears twice in the documentation relating to the religious activities of the Portuguese Jewish community. Once was for the supply of *kosher* meat. The other was when Carvalho signed a letter regarding payments to be made to the congregation of *Bet Haim*.¹⁴

Any fervent attachment that Carvalho might have had to Judaism is further called into question by the fact that, as far as can be ascertained, he never took on a Jewish name. Moreover, Carvalho had an illegitimate daughter whom he recognized with a Dutch woman. She later married a Sephardic Jewish man in Amsterdam in 1648, probably after Carvalho's death.¹⁵ That Sephardic men had romantic liaisons with Dutch women was not unusual. Though it was officially prohibited by law, Sephardic men were as likely as any other men to engage in sexual relationships with prostitutes and their house servants.¹⁶ Nor was it particularly unusual that some of these liaisons resulted in pregnancy. However, in the vast majority of these cases, the Sephardic man paid a set amount upfront for the costs incurred by the pregnancy, as well as a certain amount for the maintenance of the child. In turn, the Dutch woman generally committed to leave the man alone in exchange for the one-time payment.¹⁷

Within the Sephardic community, illegitimate children could be recognized by their fathers. In addition, the Sephardim of Amsterdam tended to follow Iberian socio-sexual norms rather than rabbinic Jewish norms, meaning that an illegitimate child on the male side, if recognized by the father, could be admitted to the Jewish community even though his/her mother was not Jewish. Nevertheless, such recognition was relatively infrequent. The fact that Carvalho clearly kept up some sort of relationship with his half-Dutch illegitimate daughter shows that he was not totally closed to the non-Sephardic world. As was previously mentioned, most Sephardic men who had an illegitimate child with a Dutch woman simply paid for the "problem" to go away. Thus, the fact that Carvalho maintained this relationship with his daughter points to an openness to the non-Sephardic community in ways that were not only economic. However, despite Carvalho's rather unenthusiastic participation in the Jewish community in Amsterdam, he clearly found it important that even his illegitimate daughter be recognized as part of the Sephardic community by ensuring that she married a Sephardic man. These examples, then, would seem to show that Carvalho relied so heavily on

¹³ GAA, NA 1068/120

¹⁴ W. Chr. Pieterse, *Livro de Bet Haim*, 14

¹⁵ GAA, DTB 680/12

¹⁶ Daniel Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 14, 217

¹⁷ See, for example, SR 124 and 844; GAA, NA 376, 595, 618; NA 377, 50, 52; NA 379, 436; NA 62, 490; GAA, DTB 668/7; DTB 942/372 (for the illegitimate children of Sephardic men)

Sephardi-Sephardi-non-Sephardi network for both reason related to the products and routes in which he was engaged, as well as an openness to the non-Sephardic world based on past experience and his own religious ambivalence.

Why does Osorio seem to eschew networks altogether?

As Table 7, above, shows, Bento Osorio traded much more frequently on his own, without another recorded associate of any sort, than he did with intra-Sephardi networks, inter-cultural groups, or integrated Sephardi-non-Sephardi networks. He clearly stands out from amongst the other global merchants, Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Manoel Carvalho, for the amount of “single merchant” trade. Forty-three percent of all his contracts have no other listed merchant associate. This is in contrast to only 14% that are intra-cultural, and 25% that include both other Sephardic merchants as well as non-Sephardic associates. Seventeen percent of Osorio’s contracts are for purely inter-cultural trade. This 43% is a z-score of 1.4 from the mean for Sephardi trade (meaning contracts in which only one merchant is mentioned). Thus, Osorio is a merchant who, while he does utilize other merchants of various backgrounds to conduct his trade, does not generally rely on other merchants.

Why, though, would Osorio engage so frequently in trade on his own, or at least without another named merchant, especially in contrast with the other global merchants? Just like with Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Manoel Carvalho, the exact answer most likely cannot ever be fully ascertained. However, it seems likely that there were two main reasons for his preponderance of trade without another merchant involved: 1) lack of necessity; 2) he was not actually trading on his own at all. These reasons will be discussed more fully below.

Osorio was already 50 years old and an established merchant when he came to Amsterdam. His father had been a member of the Order of Santiago in Portugal. Membership in such an order said something about the members’ financial, political, and social wherewithal. The military orders, such as the Order of Santiago, were officially off-limits to New Christians. A *habilitacão* or investigation of the purity of an applicant’s blood (meaning that the applicant can not have had any Jewish ancestry) was required for admission. However, in many of the military orders, enough social and economic power could ensure a clean *habilitacão* despite New Christian ancestry.

The Order had begun as an early Medieval chivalric order. By the mid-fourteenth century, however, the administration of the Order was in the hands of members of the Royal Family until, in 1551, the Crown itself became the Grand Master of the Order. Thereafter, a

Royal Council was established with judicial power to administer the affairs of the Order. Entrance into the Order as a knight, and the concession of a command, with its sometimes large revenues, became an important aim for those wanting to obtain social status within Portuguese society. Meanwhile, the grand-mastership of the Order gave the Crown an important way in which to reward services without resorting to taxation or otherwise utilizing scarce Crown resources.¹⁸ Moreover, when the Spanish Habsburgs ascended the Portuguese throne in 1580, they began to use membership in the Order in order to obtain or confirm loyalty to their reign among their Portuguese subjects. Essentially, then, membership in the Order was a way for social climbers to “arrive.” That his father was a member in this order is a strong indication that the Osorio family were wealthy and prominent merchants who were looking for social advancement in Iberia. Additionally, it is an indication that the Crown had hoped to procure the loyalty of the Osorio family.

As a wealthy and prominent New Christian in Portugal, Osorio would have been forged strong economic and social links within the existing New Christian networks, as well as, most likely, within the “old” Christian Portuguese mercantile networks. For instance, the Osorio family were linked to important and wealthy New Christians in Portugal such as the de Pintos (who later moved to Antwerp and then to Amsterdam in the 1640s). In fact, Osorio was the factor for the de Pinto family in Amsterdam, both while they lived in Portugal, and, afterwards, when they settled in Antwerp. Thus, the preponderance of “solitary” trade on Osorio’s part is most likely misleading. It is most likely that many of the contracts in which Osorio appears as the only merchant listed were actually interactions with the de Pinto family.

Bento Osorio was, like Vega and Carvalho, a migrant and an immigrant to the city of Amsterdam. It is likely that Osorio came directly from Lisbon because one of his daughters, Ana, was born in that city in 1607.¹⁹ Vega, in contrast, came to Amsterdam after having left Antwerp to live in Nantes, while Carvalho, who was born in Portugal, had spent years in Brazil before moving to Amsterdam. The fact that Osorio had not lived in other locations before coming to Amsterdam, unlike the other global merchants, could be an indication that he had not had any need to leave Portugal before then. Carvalho and Vega might have been on the move because they were looking for opportunities to expand their business enterprises

¹⁸ Eutimio Sastre Santos, *La Orden de Santiago y su Regla*, (Madrid: Editorial de la Universidad Complutense, 1981); Francis A. Dutra, , *Evolution of the Portuguese Order of Santiago, 1492-1600*, *Mediterranean Studies*, IV (1994), 63-72 and his *The Order of Santiago and the Estado da India, 1498-1750*, in *The Portuguese in the Pacific: International Colloquium on the Portuguese in the Pacific*, Santa Barbara, 1993, F. Dutra and João Camilo dos Santos, eds., (Santa Barbara, California: Center for Portuguese Studies, Univ. of California, 1995), 287-304

¹⁹ GAA, DTB 672/59

and to make their fortunes. This could be a reason that Osorio moved to Amsterdam, as well, but that he chose to wait until the risks were lessened. Once peace was ensured with the Truce in 1609, trade between the Dutch Republic and Iberia could boom as never before. Osorio was likely posed to take advantage of this political development for his economic gain.

In fact, Osorio first arrived in Amsterdam in 1610.²⁰ By 1610, the Twelve Years Truce had been in effect for a year, and trade between the Iberian Peninsula and the Low Countries was thriving. Therefore, an economic rationale seems to be a straightforward explanation for Osorio's move. However, another supposition is that, in addition to the compelling economic reasons for Osorio's move to Amsterdam, there might have been political and religious motivations, as well. It could be that Bento Osorio was under threat by the Inquisition. He could have been denounced, or a friend or family member could have come under Inquisitorial scrutiny, meaning it was only a matter of time before he was called before the Inquisition too. While Inquisitorial persecution did not, by any means, mean certain death, it could very well mean the loss of property. Therefore, it is possible that Bento Osorio was looking for a place to go outside of Portugal. In addition to, or as a corollary to, the possibility of Inquisitorial pressure, is the chance that Bento Osorio may have been looking to settle in a place where he could be an openly practicing Jew. By 1610, there were two Jewish congregations in Amsterdam – *Bet Jacob* and *Neve Shalom*. This was well-known in Iberia, and it is possible that Osorio was seeking an open Jewish life. This theory is bolstered by the fact that Osorio was such an active congregant, first in *Bet Jacob* and, later, in *Bet Israel*.

Bento Osorio was known internationally as a merchant trading with Spain, Portugal, North Africa, the Baltic and the Levant. In fact, he was so well-known in Spain for the extent of his trading enterprises that he was denounced in public pamphlets for the injury he was doing to Spanish interests.²¹ As the graphs in Chapter III show, Osorio was very active as a trader in the Atlantic, the Baltic and the Mediterranean, as well as locally in Amsterdam. Bento Osorio was also active in the sugar trades between Portugal, the Netherlands, and Italy. In addition, he shipped wheat, wood, and ammunition from Norway and the Baltic to Tangier and Ceuta. Osorio, then, when he arrived in Amsterdam, was well-connected, wealthy, and had chosen a felicitous time period to move to this city. Thus, Osorio was a merchant with the financial wherewithal to pursue his trading ventures on his own, and did not need the

²⁰ See GAA, NA 62/199; NA 62/189; NA 62/194v; NA 120/178v-179v for notarial acts passed in 1610.

²¹ Cyrus Adler, "A Contemporary Memorial Relating to Damages to Spanish Interests in America Done by Jews of Holland (1634)," Translation and transcription from the General Archives of Simancas, Council of the Inquisition, Book 49, Folio 45 "Narrative Showing the Damage Done to His Majesty by the Jews of Holland," *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, 17 (1909), 45-51, 50

financing or contacts that other merchants found necessary. Nevertheless, pursuing trade by one's self was highly unusual among merchants in the Early Modern period. Therefore, while some of these contracts were no doubt for Osorio on his own, a large number were also likely to have been trading ventures done in association with de Pinto family, but that de Pinto does not appear in the contract itself.

Since the de Pinto family were New Christians who later practiced Judaism in Amsterdam, it seems that Bento Osorio could actually be a representative of the "typical" Jewish merchant of the Early Modern period who chose to trade with fellow Jews and to reclaim his Jewish ancestry when it was possible to do so. Osorio seems to have had no need to affiliate with Judaism in order to integrate himself within the Jewish networks, as he was already firmly entrenched in his network with the de Pinto family. In fact, when Osorio did trade with others, he traded less with purely intra-Sephardic networks (with the exception of the contracts that are categorized as "solitary" but can be estimated to be in association with de Pinto) than he did with non-Sephardim. This intra-Sephardi trade with the de Pinto family does not take away from the importance of Osorio's inter-cultural trade, however. For instance, other than the estimated, but impossible to assess, intra-Sephardi trade as a factor of the de Pinto family, Osorio hardly used intra-Sephardi networks, despite being, off all the merchants highlighted in this work, the most firmly entrenched in the emergent Jewish community in Amsterdam. This is illustrated by the fact that Osorio, unlike Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho, used a Jewish name – Baruch.

As was mentioned in Chapter I, Osorio was also *parnas* at the *Bet Jacob* synagogue before the congregation split. He was one of the founders of the new synagogue – *Bet Israel*. Osorio was obviously of great importance in the congregation as he was named in 1615 as one of the representatives of Bet Jacob to bring together the regulations of the two existing congregations, Bet Jacob and Neve Salom. Osorio also represented the Bet Israel community several times (1622, 1625, 1630, 1633, and 1634) before the Impost Board of the collective communities. Furthermore, Osorio's descendents continued to remain active in the Jewish congregations of Amsterdam until the eighteenth century.

Illustration 8: The Portuguese Synagogue in Amsterdam



“Der Joden Tempel of Sinagoge,” engraver unknown, 1650/1700
Copyright: Joods Historisch Museum, collectie Jaap van Velzen

As the examples given above demonstrate, Osorio, of the global merchants profiled in this study, was the only one who was unambiguously affiliated with Judaism. This clear identification with Judaism might provide one explanation (along with commercial concerns) as to why he chose to move to Amsterdam, despite the fact that he seems to have been firmly established commercially in Portugal. Perhaps he, more so than the other global merchants, wanted to practice Judaism openly. Osorio certainly had no need for additional intra-Sephardi networks, since he was already working with the de Pinto family. In fact, he continued to trade either on his own, or in association with the de Pinto family, for most of his career. If he did trade with others, he tended to use non-Sephardim far more than he did with fellow Sephardim once he was in Amsterdam. Therefore, affiliating with Judaism in Amsterdam does not seem to have been a commercial decision. Bento Osorio, in the end, seems to have wanted to be a practicing Jew. Meanwhile, he continued to appear in the records as trading on his own because he was the factor for the de Pintos in Lisbon. The contracts, then, are most likely at least partially misleading. No doubt Osorio did trade a great deal on his own because he had no need, either in terms of product or of routes, to expand his networks. But he also most likely traded on behalf of the de Pintos in an intra-cultural constellation.

As Tables 6-8 show, inter-cultural associations were not anomalous for the global merchants. The traditional historiography outlined in Chapter I was that one of the most important components, if not the most important element, of the relative success of the Sephardim (or, in fact, any group or any individual merchant) in trade was their utilization of networks based family and shared ethno-religious background. However, the global merchants – Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio – did not trade more within their networks than the overall group of Sephardic merchants, with the possible exception of Osorio, who worked as a factor for the de Pinto family. Even in the case of Osorio, however, it is impossible to tell how much of his trade was truly on his own behalf, and how much was intra-Sephardic. Furthermore, other than the possibility that a portion of Osorio’s recorded “solitary” trading pattern was, in fact, intra-cultural, there are few other Sephardic associates that regularly appear in Osorio’s contracts. Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio, who were some of the most prominent and wealthy of the Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam at the time, did not make particular use of intra-Sephardi networks. In fact, these global merchants traded significantly less within their own Sephardi group than did other Sephardi merchants. Therefore, intra-cultural or intra-group trade could not and was not the reason for their relative success as merchants.

And Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were successful merchants. Not only were they wealthy, in so far as their wealth is measurable, but they were also global merchants, who had a wide geographic reach, were opportunistic, and were integrative. They stood out from among the other Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam at the time. They appear so frequently in the documents because they conducted a great deal of trade and they left behind many contracts. They were global merchants because they had an extensive geographical reach, while also being, to a greater or lesser degree, opportunistic and integrative. These qualities meant that they were in a good position to come into contact with merchants from outside their own Sephardic group, and could maximize the business opportunities that these contacts gave them. In general, these merchants went outside their own Sephardic networks for three reasons: 1) when they were unfamiliar and/or not integrated in/with the market in which they wanted to enter, and in which they might not have any trusted associates. 2) when they had contacts enough within their group but saw the efficacy of augmenting their networks with new members who could help them expand their base of clients, suppliers, and creditors; 3) if or when they, essentially, saw no real difference between themselves and the merchants from outside their group.

As these examples illustrate, however, each merchant behaved differently depending on his particular individual circumstances. They all seemed to have eschewed intra-Sephardi networks at a far greater rate than the sampling of other Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam at the time, with due note given to the difficulty in interpreting how much of a role Osorio's duties as factor for the de Pinto family played in his overall trading patterns. Beyond this basic and very important similarity, though, they showed markedly dissimilar behavior. Manoel Rodrigues Vega traded much more frequently directly with non-Sephardim than did Carvalho or Osorio. This was likely due to the products and routes in which he was active, his family connections in Antwerp, and, possibly, his own perception of difference, or lack thereof. Manoel Carvalho, on the other hand, traded much more actively in a constellation of fellow Sephardim and non-Sephardic associates. This was also likely due to the products and routes in which he was interested. In addition, it could have been due to fluid identity on his part that led to an openness to non-Sephardic partners. Lastly, Bento Osorio traded mostly on his own behalf, if the documentation is to be believed, though it is likely that many of these contracts are actually manifestations of intra-cultural trade as he was a factor for the Sephardic de Pinto family. He was an established and wealthy merchant before he came to Amsterdam. Furthermore, he arrived in Amsterdam during a time of peace and economic prosperity. Therefore, he had little need to trade with other merchants of any background except for the de Pintos. Despite the fact that Osorio was the only really committed Jew of any of the global merchants, even he did not rely extensively on intra-Sephardi networks, other than what can be guessed to have been the share of the de Pintos in his overall trade percentages. In short, Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio as global merchants, were not dependent for their success on intra-Sephardi networks.

This would seem to illustrate that the theory of loose ties, in which merchants are connected to each other in variety of directions, such as Rodrigues Vega's associations with Cornelis Snellinck, or Manoel Carvalho's many one-off or occasional associations with non-Sephardic merchants, may have been more efficient by, for example, expanding networks in new trade regions and products, and utilizing new technologies such as the *fluitschip*, than might tightly-knit networks. These tightly-knit networks, such as intra-Sephardi networks, in which each of the members knew the rest, contributed to pressure to reinforce traditional religious and family values. This reinforcement of traditional religious and family values might have, in turn, stymied the efficiency of networks. It could have, for example, led merchants to trust family members and fellow Sephardim unwisely. If a brother-in-law absconded with the family's money or passed bills of exchange that a merchant was unable to

honor, it could bring down the entire network. Thus, loose-ties and inter-cultural networks served not only to increase efficiencies in networks, but also, possibly, to reduce risks for merchants.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this book, the intense interest in the Sephardim of seventeenth century Amsterdam was described. This group, overwhelmingly composed of merchants, has fascinated scholars in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries because they seem to hold up a distant mirror to the lives and issues faced by minority groups today. The ways in which the Sephardim grappled with the surrounding society, tolerance, the blending of cultures, and the limits and lure of assimilation speak strongly to scholars seeking to understand these same issues in the contemporary world. Moreover, Amsterdam itself in the seventeenth century seemed to act as a sort of multi-cultural beacon of tolerance and co-existence that presages the modern urban experience, further fascinating scholars.

The Sephardic economic elites of Amsterdam in the seventeenth century such as Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were socially and culturally accepted in a way that was unique in the Early Modern world, though later this acceptance would be mimicked, to a greater or lesser degree, in cities such as Bayonne, Bordeaux, Hamburg, and London. Everyday contact between the Sephardim and the Dutch in Amsterdam was unremarkable. This contact meant that there were important economic relationships that were built up between the Sephardim and the Dutch merchants in the midst of whom they lived, or that relationships that had existed in other parts of the world were renewed in Amsterdam. Essentially, then, the borders between the Dutch and Sephardim in Amsterdam during this time was permeable. This permeability was aided by the complex identity of the elite Sephardic merchants themselves, many of whom were as much (or more) Iberian, trans-national, and mercantile-oriented than Jewish, and were not noticeably different in appearance or, in many ways, behavior from non-Sephardic Iberian merchants in the Netherlands.

These complex identities came about for a variety of reasons. The late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries were times of great changes for the Portuguese Sephardim. Migration and diaspora became a widely experienced reality. The Sephardim of this diaspora viewed themselves as members of the “nation” (*membros da nação*) or “members of the Spanish-Portuguese Nation.” The term *nación* or *nação* referred not only to the Sephardic Jewish Diaspora, but also to the New Christians who remained in other countries, especially Spain or Portugal, whether or not they affiliated with Judaism. The Portuguese Sephardic “nation” was, therefore, somewhat different from other alien nations. The Sephardic communities were in

many respects merchant colonies much like others in Northern Europe, but their collective sense of identity transcending religious and geographical boundaries differentiates them from the other alien trading nations.

While the diaspora experience certainly helped to bolster their identity, the foundation of this identity as Portuguese New Christian merchants had been laid in the sixteenth century in Portugal. Thus, it was less the diaspora itself, and more their experiences in Portugal that cemented their identities. Moreover, as many of the examples for Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio given in this book show, a great deal of inter-cultural trade occurred at the nodes of the Sephardic diaspora. Even when fellow Sephardic merchants were available in places like Venice, La Rochelle, or Salé, these merchants often chose to use traders or representatives from a non-Sephardic background to help them in their mercantile endeavors. Not only did these merchants use representatives from other backgrounds, however. In the case of Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho, they actually lived outside of Portugal and almost certainly formed relationships with non-Sephardic merchants in Antwerp and Brazil, respectively. Thus, while the diaspora experience may have solidified their identities as Portuguese New Christian merchants or members of “the nation,” it also spurred on their loose ties in inter-cultural relationships. Therefore, it is clear that the concept of diaspora as an analytical category is not enough to explain the Sephardic merchants’ economic behavior. Hence, the differentiation made by Francesca Trivelleto between diaspora and trade networks, in which diasporas are not synonymous with trade networks, but in which both can complement the other, was particularly valid for the Sephardim in this study.

Essentially, the communal identity of the Sephardic merchants was not primarily religious. Shared religion, especially in a diaspora group, helps to provide a basis for the formation of values, coherence, social organization, and legitimating authority among the members of the community. For the Sephardim, it was not the religious beliefs of Judaism, *per se*, but, rather, the shared experiences of being part of what became, *de facto*, a separate ethnic group within Portuguese society that formed a component of their group identity. Later, in some parts of the Western Diaspora such as Amsterdam, Hamburg, London, and various colonial settlements, some Sephardic merchants also added Judaism to their layers of identity. Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were, first and foremost, wealthy and prominent Portuguese merchants from a New Christian background. However, for these merchants, a large part of their identity was rooted in their economic function. Thus, they had as much, or more, in common with fellow entrepreneurs, regardless of political, religious, or national differences, than they did with the poor Ashkenazi Jews.

Nevertheless, two of these merchants, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, became, at some point in their lives, affiliated with the open practice of Judaism. This open practice of Judaism in Amsterdam has become, for many scholars, the defining component of not only Carvalho and Osorio's identities, but of all the Sephardim in Amsterdam. Further, the conflation of all Sephardim with Jews has been made for the majority of Sephardim in the Western Diaspora, as a whole, including, inaccurately, Manoel Rodrigues Vega.

It was not as Jews but, rather, as entrepreneurs with broad and integrated networks for the trade in sought-after goods, that the Sephardic merchants, in general, and Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, specifically, sought to optimize their trading potential by increasing their efficiency and reducing their risks using their previously acquired experience in certain branches of the intra-European and intercontinental trades. They did this by employing loose-ties with other merchants, such as those they had made while living or traveling in other place. These loose ties helped form networks that connected individuals in a variety of directions. These networks were more efficient than were tightly-knit networks.

The existing historiography of trade in the Early Modern period tends to ignore these loose ties and the "inter-cultural" interactions they led to. Certainly, the histories of the Sephardim in the Early Modern period emphasize the close networks based on kinship, shared ethnicity, and commonality of religious experience, as do most histories of any group of merchants in the Early Modern period. These histories tend to overlook the fact that loose ties embodied in economic relationships that bridged cultures, religions, ethnicities, and the boundaries of the emerging nation-state were invaluable to the conduct of trade in the Early Modern economy. These networks allowed merchants to access not only regions but also sectors that were dominated by merchants of other backgrounds.

This same historiography tends to assume that a sort of familial and kinship conspiracy was formed among Sephardic traders in the Early Modern period. Family ties, shared socio-ethnic background, and religion are viewed as the basis of the formation of efficient, successful trade networks during this time. The Sephardim did, by and large, practice endogamous marriage, and formed social, charitable, and religious organizations based upon their religion and ethnicity. Yet, these very real social networks formed within the Sephardic Diaspora were not synonymous with their economic networks, which included non-Sephardic, non-Jewish merchants, as this book proves. In other words, in contrast to what many commentators on trade in the Early Modern period assert, and what this book has shown, is that the social networks to which the Sephardim belonged were not co-extensive

with their economic relationships, especially among the most successful group, the global merchants, who did not trade only, or even mainly, with fellow Sephardim.

Heretofore, it has been taken as a given that the Sephardim in the Early Modern period were successful because they were able to engender the trust necessary to work successfully in the unstable trading environment of the Early Modern economy from their family members and those who shared their ethno-religious background. However, such an analysis was based on superficial descriptions of the geographical and genealogical relationships between the Sephardim. What this book has shown, rather, is that there were very real and important inter-cultural associations between merchants from a variety of backgrounds, all working together to optimize their networks' efficiencies.

For instance, Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were all, as has been shown, part of the Portuguese New Christian diaspora, and all came from outside of Amsterdam. This put them on the outside of the already established social and economic networks within the city. Thus, their commercial ventures were, at least initially, often undertaken on their own or with other recent immigrants rather than with members of the already existing mercantile elite. Interestingly, it seemed to make little or no difference if the recent immigrants were fellow Sephardic merchants or not. Moreover, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio straddled several social groups and cultures. This straddling of groups and cultures, however, seems to have helped rather than hindered their economic enterprises. Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were either wealthy when they arrived in Amsterdam, or became wealthy there. They were members of the Iberian elite, either on the Iberian peninsula, in her colonies, or as part of the trading "nations" abroad. Thus, they were well-connected and poised to take advantage of the economic possibilities offered by the Iberian trade. In addition, they were members of the New Christian sub-group of the larger Portuguese diaspora. There is no doubt that this was, depending on the prevailing political and religious winds, a marginalized sub-group, but one that still managed to maximize its marginalization economically and socially. Lastly, though they were not fully integrated into the culture of Amsterdam merchants, they parlayed their newcomer and outsider status into an advantage by optimizing their connections with other recent newcomers to the city, whether these other newcomers were fellow Sephardim or, as was more often the case, not, and they formed new networks of global merchants.

The qualities of a "global" merchant were listed in Chapter III. He was global in terms of geographic reach, integrative, and opportunistic. One of the hallmarks of a global merchant was the ability to link geographical regions, and this was certainly characteristic of Vega,

Carvalho, and Osorio. These merchants' operations were not primarily local or national and incorporated both intra and extra-European routes, including the East and West Indies, the Americas, and the West Coast of Africa. This does not mean, of course, that these merchants were necessarily active in all places at all times. However, they all had at least some presence at some time in all three of the traditional trade regions connected to Europe – the Baltic, the Atlantic, (at this time expanding to include Africa and the Americas instead of only the Atlantic coast of Europe), and the Mediterranean, and were, to varying degrees, at the forefront of global trade, for reasons other than their employment of trade networks based on solely on kinship and ethnicity.

Global merchants such as Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio also integrated products, routes, and networks. Therefore, integration was the second characteristic of a global merchant. As was stated earlier, integration means to put or bring together parts or elements to form one whole, and this is what global merchants such as Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio did. They brought together the varying parts of products and geographies to form one global whole. This had nothing to do with their religion and ethnicity and everything to do with their expertise in various trade routes and products, as well as their ability to join multiple networks simultaneously. A merchant needed to not only integrate associates from other groups into his own networks, and integrate himself into other networks, as well, but also had to integrate geographies, trade routes, and products. For instance, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio coordinated people, materials, and capital across market sectors and among geographically dispersed areas. They also diversified and combined the so-called “rich trades” with the commerce in “bulk” goods. They integrated capital, people, products, and geographies in innovative ways, and, thereby, differentiated themselves from merchants who remained focused on one region, product, source of supply or credit, or market.

Integrating people, materials, products, capital, and routes meant seizing the opportunities available at the time, and exploiting circumstances to gain advantages. Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio were opportunistic, and they actively adapted their decisions and actions to the commercial expediency of the moment. They were experimental in seeking opportunities to invest. They all invested in the Dutch East India Company by owning shares in it, for example, while Osorio was an initial subscriber to, and was a chief shareholder in, the Dutch West India Company. They were flexible in their responses to change. They all utilized insurance at a time when it was still relatively uncommon. As has already been shown in Chapter II, they often dealt in more than one activity, product, or route at once, while also engaging in new enterprises. For instance, they

all seized the opportunities presented by the Iberian and Mediterranean dependence on Baltic grain and stepped into this profitable trade. Osorio, especially, used to his advantage new maritime technologies such as the *fluijtschip* to maximize his profits. Manoel Rodrigues Vega and Manoel Carvalho, in turn, saw the opportunities to be had in the emerging slave trade and profited from this. Bento Osorio grabbed his chance with tobacco. But all knew there were opportunities to be had with the trade in new products.

Many merchants of the time could be said to have behaved in similar ways, and some of the non-Sephardic associates of Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio have been mentioned as taking advantage of these opportunities as well. However, what all these men had in common is that their opportunism stands in particular contrast to peers who might not have been willing to risk dealing in new products, use new shipping technologies or take advantage of new commercial instruments such as stock and insurance. More particularly, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio saw the opportunities to be had by incorporating or integrating new associates into their commercial networks, whatever these associates' backgrounds, religions, or ethnicities were.

These global merchants not only had a global presence, were integrative, and opportunistic. They were, above all else, successful merchants. Not only were they, as far as can be ascertained from the archival documentation, wealthy, but they were also global merchants, Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were global in outlook and connections. They delved into multiple products and regions, and connected both within the Sephardic community and beyond it. These global merchants lived in a state of flux which offered unprecedented opportunities for merchants with the wherewithal, the connections, and the vision to step out of their traditional family and religious networks to take advantage of new possibilities for trade. That is what these merchants did in Amsterdam. They connected to merchants of all sorts of backgrounds, and maximized these loose ties to their economic advantage. Throughout the course of their careers and of their joint business ventures, these merchants either consolidated their positions as, or grew into, global merchants – merchants that, as were able to bypass social links and replace or add new economic connections.

These new economic connections to inter-cultural networks had a propensity to be loose and shifting. The economic, political, and social structures of the city of Amsterdam, which included immigration, the relatively easy acquisition of citizenship, and a designated place for trade to occur, which facilitated the exchange of information and the ability of merchants to connect easily with one another, meant that merchants of varying backgrounds could come into contact with one another, while merchants with shared connections outside

the city of Amsterdam; for example to Antwerp or other places in the Southern Netherlands, not to mention Brazil or Iberia, could become acquainted or renew old ties. The Sephardic merchants being analyzed in this study tended to have one or two main non-Sephardic associates with whom they had multiple endeavors or associations. The interactions between Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio, and their primary non-Sephardic associates, show that their interactions together could vary. Rodrigues Vega and Cornelis Snellinck acted on each other's behalf, shared ownership of property such as land, slaves, sugar, and brazilwood, extended credit to one another, and were part of joint actions together as prominent merchants. Their association was largely based on the Brazil trade – sugar, brazilwood, and slaves – though it also included endeavors in the East Indies. Their day-to-day activities as merchants were based on mutual trust and similar goals. This trust was particularly highlighted by the fact that Snellinck put Vega and van Os in contact with one another, thereby putting his own reputation on the line. Perhaps this trust came from their shared background in the city of Antwerp – a background that van Os shared, as well. Whatever the case was, their mutual circles of associates such as Carvalho, Osorio, and van Os, to name just a few, no doubt knitted together their enterprises.

Likewise, the association between Manoel Carvalho and Albert Schuyt was based on the trade in sugar, whether the actual transport of sugar or the insurance of this valuable product. Thus, they, too, were concerned with the expanding European “rich” trades. Their shared connections to the city of Antwerp, and their mutual circles of associates in Amsterdam such as Osorio and other prominent merchants, brought together their enterprises, which, as has been seen, were high value and spanned 18 years. Unlike the associations between Rodrigues Vega, Snellinck, Carvalho, and Schuyt, the association between Bento Osorio, Claes Cornelisz Jut, and Dirck Thomasz Glimmer was not based on the so-called “rich trades.” Rather, it centered on the “bulk” trade in salt and grain, as well as in their shared knowledge of the mercantile environment of Amsterdam. Jut trusted Osorio enough to buy massive quantities of salt from him, while Osorio believed in Jut enough to extend credit to him. Glimmer had enough knowledge of Osorio and his activities to make several legal declarations on his behalf. Osorio also trusted Glimmer enough to give him a power-of-attorney to represent his interests.

The loosely knit networks between Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio and their non-Sephardi associates consisted of a primary group of non-Sephardic merchants with whom these men associated. These primary associates connected the Sephardic merchants to networks outside their own ethno-religious group. Snellinck, Schuyt,

Glimmer, and Jut worked with their Sephardic associates to further their mutual interests, and helped supply credit, judicial help, expertise, and access to other networks. Thus, connecting to networks outside the Sephardic community was important for creating and opportunities and furthering interests. These merchants' associations were centered on trade and were founded in trust – enough trust to have the legal authority to act on each other's behalf, for instance, or to make declarations to a notary concerning the other's enterprises, or to extend credit. This shows the importance of trust between these merchants, and illustrates the fact that networks were far more encompassing than the theories of “friends and family” might lead scholars to believe, at least among the global merchants.

Beyond this primary group of non-Sephardic associates, Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio also had a few Dutch/Flemish merchants with whom they had several interactions, and the majority were men with whom they dealt with once or twice. Furthermore, these inter-cultural networks were also integrative. While many of the measured interactions were between Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio and one or more non-Sephardic merchants, their networks also tended to incorporate two or more Sephardic merchants, working together with one or more non-Sephardic merchants. In addition, the important nature of Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio's less frequent dealings with non-Sephardic merchants should not be dismissed. Lack of frequency did not mean a lack of trust. On the contrary, the vast majority of merchants of whatever background, dealt with one another only sporadically. This illustrates how loose the networks were for these global merchants, and in how many directions the networks operated. And these were only the interactions with non-Sephardim. The same sort of irregularity applied to their endeavors with Sephardic merchants. Thus, it seems that they were connecting themselves with many merchants of various backgrounds for differing amounts of time and for a multitude of purposes. Indeed, the less frequent associations between Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio were imperative to their success as global merchants.

What was also imperative to their success and goals was the effective negotiation of the ever-shifting political winds. Although the chronology chosen for this study was made with an eye towards the political events of the day, the chronology actually seemed to have had very little effect on the Sephardic merchants' inter-cultural trade. Trade of all sorts boomed during the Truce years and declined afterwards, but the growth in inter-cultural trade continued apace, regardless of states of war or peace. However, this is not to say that politics played no role in the relationships between Sephardic merchants and their non-Sephardic associates. As the case of the sugar confiscation of 1602 highlighted in Chapter VI showed,

Sephardic merchants formed effective lobbying groups with their non-Sephardic associates for the furtherance of their goals.

These merchants shared a common concern – the restitution of their sugar and, ultimately, their own profits. They cooperated in order to achieve these goals by coordinating their lobbying efforts with local authorities in Amsterdam, provincial authorities and, ultimately, national government institutions. They bargained by going back and forth with the price they found acceptable to pay. Moreover, they exerted pressure on the political decision makers by reminding them again and again of the benefits the Sephardim brought to the Dutch Republic. In addition, they quite explicitly threatened that the Sephardim would leave the Dutch Republic and go to a competing land should they not feel safe to trade. Together they worked together as a cross-cultural interest group to lobby for restitution – an interest group that seems to have been quite effective.

What this book has shown is that inter-cultural associations were not anomalous for global merchants. The traditional historiography outlined in Chapter I was that one of the most important components, if not the most important element, of the relative success of the Sephardim (or, in fact, any group or any individual merchant) in trade was their utilization of networks based family and shared ethno-religious background. However, the global merchants – Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio – did not trade more within their networks than the overall group of Sephardic merchants, with the possible exception of Osorio, who worked as a factor for the de Pinto family. Even in the case of Osorio, however, it is impossible to tell how much of his trade was truly on his own behalf, and how much was intra-Sephardic. Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio, who were some of the most prominent and wealthy of the Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam at the time, did not make particular use of intra-Sephardi networks. In fact, these global merchants traded significantly less within their own Sephardi group than did other Sephardi merchants. Therefore, intra-cultural or intra-group trade could not and was not the reason for their relative success as merchants.

In general, these merchants went outside their own Sephardic networks for three reasons: 1) when they were unfamiliar and/or not integrated in/with the market in which they wanted to enter, and in which they might not have any trusted associates. 2) when they had contacts enough within their group but saw the efficacy of augmenting their networks with new members who could help them expand their base of clients, suppliers, and creditors. 3) if or when they, essentially, saw no real difference between themselves and the merchants from outside their group.

Each merchant behaved differently depending on his particular individual circumstances. They all seemed to have eschewed intra-Sephardi networks at a far greater rate than the sampling of other Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam at the time, with due note given to the difficulty in interpreting how much of a role Osorio's duties as factor for the de Pinto family played in his overall trading patterns. Beyond this basic and very important similarity, though, they showed markedly dissimilar behavior. Manoel Rodrigues Vega traded much more frequently directly with non-Sephardim than did Carvalho or Osorio. This was likely due to the products and routes in which he was active, his family connections in Antwerp, and, possibly, his own perception of difference, or lack thereof. Manoel Carvalho, on the other hand, traded much more actively in a constellation of fellow Sephardim and non-Sephardic associates. This was also likely due to the products and routes in which he was interested. In addition, it could have been due to an openness to non-Sephardic partners and a fluid perception of his own identity. Lastly, Bento Osorio traded mostly on his own behalf, if the documentation is to be believed, though it is likely that many of these contracts are actually manifestations of intra-cultural trade as he was a factor for the Sephardic de Pinto family. He was an established and wealthy merchant before he came to Amsterdam. Furthermore, he arrived in Amsterdam during a time of peace and economic prosperity. Therefore, he had little need to trade with other merchants of any background except for the de Pintos. Despite the fact that Osorio was the only really committed Jew of any of the global merchants, even he did not rely extensively on intra-Sephardi networks, other than what can be guessed to have been the share of the de Pintos in his overall trade percentages. In short, Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio as global merchants, were not dependent for their success on intra-Sephardi networks.

All of these points would seem to illustrate that the theory of loose ties, such as Rodrigues Vega's associations with Cornelis Snellinck, or Manoel Carvalho's many one-off or occasional associations with non-Sephardic merchants, may have, indeed, been more efficient than tightly-knit networks might have been. These tightly-knit networks could have, for example, led merchants to trust family members and fellow Sephardim unwisely. If a brother-in-law absconded with the family's money or passed bills of exchange that a merchant was unable to honor, it could bring down the entire network. Thus, loose-ties and inter-cultural networks served not only to increase efficiencies in networks, but also, possibly, to reduce risks for merchant.

Summary

This book adds an important nuance to the traditional historiographical assumption that trade in the Early Modern period was mostly conducted between family and those of the same ethnic and/or religious group. Rather, it is the assertion of this book, that there were very real and quite important trade relationships between merchants of different groups, and the book uses a case study of the Sephardim and their Dutch and Flemish associates in Amsterdam in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries to prove this assertion. Furthermore, this book challenges the idea that trading between family and those of the same ethnic and religious group was the most efficient way to organize trade in the Early Modern period. To demonstrate this, the book employs the theory of loose ties, which posits that multiple connections in a variety of directions which encompass friends and acquaintances in a series of non-intersecting groups, may be more efficient in creating opportunities and promoting the defense of economic interests, than might tightly knit networks, each of whose members knows the rest. Put more succinctly, this book shows that it made good economic sense for merchants to trade outside their familial, ethnic, and religious group because it reduced risk and created opportunities.

Traditional histories of Early Modern trade and trade networks have ignored a potent truth -- that trade, and the networks constructed for the pursuit of this trade, were far more fluid and far more open to merchants of varying backgrounds than has heretofore been admitted. It is this idea that undergirds this work. This study shows that economic links between networks comprised of a multiplicity of ethnicities, backgrounds, and/or religions were mutually beneficial and often long-lasting by delving deeply into the networks employed by three Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam between 1595 and 1640 – Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio.

A close examination of the economic interactions and relationships of these three merchants showed several important things. First and foremost, these merchants traded more frequently outside of Sephardic networks than they did within intra-group networks. As they were highly successful merchants (with success defined as not just wealth, but as a global reach, coupled with an integration of products for trade and an intense

opportunism) some credit for their success as merchants should be attributed to their employment of inter-cultural networks. The second main point to come to the fore is that these merchants had a core group of non-Sephardic business associates with whom they had long-lasting and intensive economic exchanges. However, also of great importance were their more occasional economic interactions with non-Sephardic merchants for activities like acting on each others' behalf in business dealings, shared ownership of cargoes and other goods, the provision of insurance, and the supply of short and long-term credit. Part and parcel of these active inter-cultural networks was the fact that these merchants worked together to lobby local, provincial, and national governmental entities for the furtherance of their joint economic aims.

Beyond providing clear and detailed evidence of the workings of inter-cultural networks, this book asserts that the concept of Diaspora as an analytical category is not enough to explain the Sephardic merchants' economic behavior, and employs Francesca Trivelleto's differentiation between Diaspora and trade network, in which diasporas are not seen as being synonymous with trade networks, though they can overlap and complement one another. While exploring the Western Sephardic Diaspora, the book gives biographical background on Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho, and Osorio, and suggests that many of their inter-cultural trade connections were formed outside Amsterdam, particularly in Antwerp. Furthermore, the book asserts that, contrary to prevailing views on the topic, these merchants were as likely to identify as elite, global merchants as they were to identify as Jews. This was particularly the case for merchants like Rodrigues Vega and Carvalho, as the book shows, who were born outside Portugal or who had lived most of their lives outside Portugal before coming to Amsterdam.

In general, the book shows that these merchants went outside their own Sephardic networks for three reasons: 1) when they were unfamiliar and/or not integrated in/with the market in which they wanted to enter, and in which they might not have any trusted associates; 2) when they had contacts enough within their group but saw the efficacy of augmenting their networks with new members who could help them expand their base of clients, suppliers, and creditors; 3) if or when they, essentially, saw no real difference between themselves and the merchants from outside their group. However, each merchant behaved differently depending on his particular individual circumstances.

Nonetheless, they all seemed to have eschewed intra-Sephardi networks at a far greater rate than the sampling of other Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam at the time,

Samenvatting

Kooplieden van diverse etnische en religieuze groepen vormden succesvolle handelsnetwerken in de Vroeg Moderne periode. De traditionele geschiedenis van handel in deze Vroeg Moderne periode schrijft over relatief gesloten netwerken, echter handel en handelsnetwerken stonden veel meer open voor handelaren van diverse achtergrond dan men dacht. Dat is wat dit boek wil aantonen.

In de Vroeg Moderne periode bestonden er langdurige zakelijke relaties tussen handelaren van uiteenlopende bevolkingsgroepen. Een aantal voorbeelden van Sefardische handelaren en hun Hollandse en Vlaamse zakenrelaties zullen deze stelling onderbouwen. Drie Sefardische kooplieden die tussen 1595 en 1640 in Amsterdam woonden, zullen in dit boek centraal staan: Manoel Rodrigues Vega, Manoel Carvalho, and Bento Osorio.

Op basis van bronnenonderzoek verwerpt het boek de aloude theorie dat handel tussen familie en leden van de zelfde etnische en religieuze groep de meest efficiënte vorm van handel in de Vroeg Moderne periode vormde. Hiervoor in de plaats presenteert het boek de theorie van de “losse banden”, die stelt dat meerdere connecties in diverse richtingen, waaronder juist ook vrienden en kennissen uit andere bevolkingsgroepen, de meeste kansen bood op winstgevende handel in de Vroeg Moderne periode. Dit in tegenstelling tot een dominantie van handel binnen homogene groepen, waarin iedereen elkaar kende. Handel tussen verschillende bevolkingsgroepen bracht allen voordeel en is aldus gebaseerd op rationele economische overwegingen.

Het onderzoek van de economische interactie en relaties tussen de drie voornoemde handelaren bracht een aantal belangrijke feiten aan het licht. Zo deden deze handelaren meer zaken *buiten* hun eigen Sefardische netwerk dan daar binnen. De drie verdienden hun fortuin niet met een enkel product op een enkele handelsroute. In tegendeel, hun brede geografische spreiding, de diversiteit van producten, maar juist ook hun uitgebreide groep van Sefardische en niet Sefardische contacten, droegen alle bij aan hun succes. Het is belangrijk te onderkennen dat deze niet - Sefardische contacten een diepgaand en langdurig karakter hadden. Niet alleen werd er gezamenlijk zaken gedaan, bronnenonderzoek bracht bijvoorbeeld ook aan het licht dat zij in diverse situaties elkaar

vertegenwoordigden. Een interessante vorm van hechte samenwerking was de intensieve lobby om diverse lokale, provinciale en nationale overheden ertoe te bewegen hun gezamenlijke economische belangen ter harte te nemen.

Het concept van de Joodse Diaspora blijkt niet voldoende om het economische gedrag van de Sefardische kooplieden te beschrijven. Het boek gebruikt Francesca Trivelleto's differentiatie tussen Diaspora en handelsnetwerk, waarin diaspora's niet synoniem zijn met handelsnetwerken, al kunnen deze elkaar natuurlijk wel (gedeeltelijk) overlappen. Het boek verkent de Westerse Sefardische diaspora en verschaft de biografische achtergrond van Rodrigues Vega, Carvalho en Osorio. Veel van hun interculturele handelscontacten waren reeds buiten Amsterdam gelegd, met name in Antwerpen. Dit boek stelt daarnaast dat, in tegenstelling tot de geldende theorieën over het onderwerp, deze handelaren zich net zoals Sefardische Joden identificeerden met de groeiende wereldwijd opererende handelselite. Dit gold met name voor zakenlieden als Rodrigues Vega en Carvalho, die buiten het 'thuisland' Portugal geboren waren of anders het grootste deel van hun leven buiten Portugal gewoond hadden, vóordat ze naar Amsterdam kwamen.

Het boek laat zien dat er drie redenen waren waarom deze kooplieden buiten hun eigen Sefardische netwerken handelden: 1) wanneer ze onbekend waren met de markten waarop ze zich wilden begeven en daar geen vertrouwde contacten hadden; 2) wanneer ze hun contacten wilden uitbreiden met handelaren die andere afnemers, toeleveranciers en financiers hadden; 3) wanneer ze eigenlijk geen verschil meer zagen tussen henzelf en andere handelaren buiten hun etnische groep. De onderzochte handelaren waren alle drie heel verschillende personen. Zo was Osorio waarschijnlijk een onaangenaam persoon. Echter, ze vertoonden allen de opmerkelijke overeenkomst dat ze bijzonder succesvol in zaken waren en dat ze veel vaker dan doorsnee Sefardische Joden meer handelden buiten het Sefardische netwerk dan daarbinnen.

Appendix 1: Largest Shippers to the Mediterranean, 1590-1620

Shippers	Total shipments	Alone	With a partner
Jasper Quinget	201	197	4
Jan en Philippo Calandrini	91	25	66
Guillelmo Bartolotti	66	42	24
Caspar van Ceulen	63	35	28
Isaac la Maire	56	42	14
Willem Willems	49	48	1
Salomon Voorknecht	45	13	32
Charles (de) Latfeur	42	--	42
Andries van der Meulen	42	1	41
Andries Hendricxss de Beijser	39	39	--
Jan Munter	36	19	17
Jan Benoijt	34	--	34
Daniel Colpijn	34	--	34
Jan Gerritsen Hooft	34	16	18
Jan Jans Corver	33	25	8
Gijsbert Tholincx	32	4	28
Jonas Witsen	31	31	--
Wessel Schenck	30	25	5
Pieter Lintgens	29	27	2
Alexander van den Berge	28	6	22
Volckert Overlander	28	24	4
Jacques Velaer de Jonge	25	25	--
Jacques Carbeel	23	1	22
Isaac Poullie	22	---	22
Guilliaume van de Putte	22	---	22
Sijon Lus	21	17	4
Abraham van Lemens	19	15	4
Jacques Nicquet	19	10	9
Marcus de Vogelaer	19	17	2
Paulo de Wilhelm	19	5	14
Francois Boudewijns	18	12	6
Abraham de Ligne	18	4	14
Hans van Uffele	17	15	2
Anthoni de Cuijper	16	8	8
Dirck van Os	16	8	8
Jacques Bernardt	15	11	4
Jan le Bruijn	13	11	2
Gerard Rijnst	13	5	8
Manoel Carvalho	12	11	1
Total	1370	794	576

Source: Simon Hart, "De Italië-vaart, 1590-1620," *Jaarboek Amstelodamum* 70 (1978), 42-60, 56.

Appendix 2: Associates of Manoel Rodrigues Vega, 1597-1613

Name of Merchant	Number of Interactions	Relative importance to the overall total (%)
Cornelis Snellinck	24	10%
Dirck van Os	8	3%
Laurens Becx	7	3%
Hans de Baets	5	2%
Jan Colijn	4	2%
Hans de Schot	4	2%
Hans de Verne	4	2%
Jan Gerritsz. Parijs	4	2%
Hans de Laet Aertsz.	3	1%
Lodewijk Jansz. de Pottere	3	1%
Marten Papenbroeck	3	1%
Pieter Gerritsz. Delff	3	1%
Nicolaes Caret	3	1%
Hillibrandt den Otter	3	1%
Hans Staes	3	1%
Jaspar van Nispen	3	1%
Balthasar van Nispen	3	1%
Ghijzelbrecht Bruynincx	3	1%
Hendrick Jansz. Swol	3	1%
Jan van Baerle	3	1%
Dominicus van Uffele	2	1%
Elias van Geel	2	1%
Hendrick Hondebeeck	2	1%
Jaspar Quinget	2	1%
Maerten Bitter	2	1%
Hendrick Gijsbetsz. Delff	2	1%
Jacques de Keyser van Bollant	2	1%
Nicolaes Grisons	2	1%
Jeronimo Grisons	2	1%
Pieter Symonsz.	2	1%
Jan Veen	2	1%
Melchior van Dortmont	2	1%
Dirck Alewijn	2	1%
Balthazar Jacot	2	1%
Mathijs Jansz. (van Straeten)	2	1%
David de Weert	2	1%

Us and Them: Inter-cultural Trade and the Sephardim, 1595-1640

Name of Merchant	Number of Interactions	Relative importance to the overall total (%)
Hans Volt	2	1%
Cornelis Hermisz.	2	1%
Leonard de Beer	2	1%
Simon Jansz. Fortuyn	2	1%
Thibaut de Pickere	2	1%
Peter Lintgens	2	1%
Jan Claesz. Cloeck	2	1%
Elbert Lucasz.	2	1%
Jacob Schaep	1	0.5%
Joost van Peenen	1	0.5%
François de Witte	1	0.5%
Joachim Dircsz.	1	0.5%
Assuerus van Blocklandt	1	0.5%
Lucas Michielsz.	1	0.5%
Hans de Vries	1	0.5%
Tenneken de Briese	1	0.5%
Herman Claesz.	1	0.5%
Dominicus Douure	1	0.5%
Abraham van Herwyer	1	0.5%
Lancelot de Vogel	1	0.5%
Steven Groelaet	1	0.5%
Matheo de Renzi	1	0.5%
Hans van Solt	1	0.5%
Harmen Heesters	1	0.5%
Guillaume Key	1	0.5%
Guillaume Courten	1	0.5%
Jacques Arnout van Rijssele	1	0.5%
Jan van Dale	1	0.5%
Samuel Desbouvrie	1	0.5%
Huybrecht de Vynckere	1	0.5%
Jan le Febure	1	0.5%
Christiaen Wickesberg	1	0.5%
Jacques de Candele	1	0.5%
Jan de Bot	1	0.5%
François van der Willigen	1	0.5%
Guillaume Annuyaulx	1	0.5%
Hans Pieters	1	0.5%
Hans Unger	1	0.5%
Matheus Lange	1	0.5%
Hans van Strepen	1	0.5%
Adriaen van Nispen	1	0.5%
Pieter Bornon (Bournon)	1	0.5%

Appendices

Name of Merchant	Number of Interactions	Relative importance to the overall total (%)
Jan Symonsz.	1	0.5%
Jan Stevensz.	1	0.5%
Jacques van Hanswijck	1	0.5%
Guillaume Buys	1	0.5%
Reynier de Loker	1	0.5%
Willem van Campen	1	0.5%
Daniel Cambier	1	0.5%
Daniel de Mares	1	0.5%
Steven van den Castele	1	0.5%
Jan Cornelisz. Visser	1	0.5%
Cornelis van Bogaerde	1	0.5%
Hans de Weert	1	0.5%
Roelandt de Weert	1	0.5%
Peter Coymans	1	0.5%
Gaspar Coymans	1	0.5%
Gubrecht Wachmans	1	0.5%
Jan le Brun	1	0.5%
Conrad Bosserel	1	0.5%
Jeronimus Wonderaer	1	0.5%
Daniel van Harinckhoeck	1	0.5%
Alexander Bouwens	1	0.5%
Pieter Claesz. Baer	1	0.5%
Jan van Baerle	1	0.5%
Hendrick de Hase	1	0.5%
Nicolaes Gruel	1	0.5%
Antonio de Cuyper	1	0.5%
Jan Schodder	1	0.5%
Boudewijn Crijnsz.	1	0.5%
Jan Joachimsz.	1	0.5%
Adriaen Eeuwoutsz.	1	0.5%
Louis del Becque	1	0.5%
Jan Poppen	1	0.5%
Screvel Adriaensz.	1	0.5%
Lammorael, Count of Egmont	1	0.5%
Hans Gras	1	0.5%
Beerendt Rotgers	1	0.5%
Joost Brest	1	0.5%
Jan Evertsen	1	0.5%
Albert Fransen	1	0.5%
Jacob van Scharlaecken	1	0.5%
Claes Status	1	0.5%
Heinrich Beckmann	1	0.5%

Us and Them: Inter-cultural Trade and the Sephardim, 1595-1640

Name of Merchant	Number of Interactions	Relative importance to the overall total (%)
Jan Beyaert	1	0.5%
Artus van der Voorde	1	0.5%
Robert Chatvelt	1	0.5%
Nicolaes Sijs	1	0.5%
Jan Bisschop	1	0.5%
Samuel Bisschop	1	0.5%
Gregory Niderhoffer	1	0.5%
Diego Niderhoffer	1	0.5%
Dirck Rodenburch	1	0.5%
Harmen Rodenburch	1	0.5%
Gillis Dodeur	1	0.5%
Jeronimus Goossens	1	0.5%
Pieter Belten	1	0.5%
Jan Lourensz.	1	0.5%
Pieter Bodaert	1	0.5%
Gillis du Pluys	1	0.5%
Claes Claesz.	1	0.5%

Source: GAA, NA

Based on 245 interactions with 137 non-Sephardic merchants

Appendix 3: Associates of Manoel Carvalho, 1602-1636

Name of Merchant	Number of Interactions	Relative importance to the overall total (%)
Albert Schuyt	29	9%
Henri Thibault	29	9%
Samuel van Peenen	15	4%
Nicolas le Forestier	10	3%
David de l'Hommel	9	3%
Anthonij Villequier	8	2%
Pieter Gilles	7	2%
Françios Wouters	6	2%
Johan l'Hermitte	5	1%
Symon van der Does	5	1%
Bartolomeus Hopffer	5	1%
Christoffel Ayerschettel	5	1%
Hans Jorisz. Hontom	5	1%
Ibel Henricx	5	1%
Laurens Joosten Baeck (Bax)	4	1%
Pieter van Geel	4	1%
Daniel van den Eijnde	4	1%
Jan Janse Smith	4	1%
Jan le Gouche	4	1%
Roelant van de Perre	4	1%
Jan van Erpecum	4	1%
Nicolaes Claessen Evenswijn	3	1%
Lucas van de Venne	3	1%
Vincen Fransz. Bayert	3	1%
Daniel van Geel	3	1%
Adriaen Andriess.	3	1%
Jan Battista Bartollotti	3	1%
Salomon Voerknecht	3	1%
Pieter van Beeck	3	1%
Anthoni Slichers	3	1%
Leonard Ranst	3	1%
Jean Stassaert	3	1%
Pauwels Sterlincx	2	0.5%
Adam Nijs	2	0.5%
Giovanni Baptista Sigalla	2	0.5%
Hillebrandt den Otter	2	0.5%
Pieter Beltgens	2	0.5%
Johan van Geel	2	0.5%

Us and Them: Inter-cultural Trade and the Sephardim, 1595-1640

Hendrick Beeckman	2	0.5%
Pieter Beijens	2	0.5%
Jan Jansse van Helmond	2	0.5%
Godert Kerckrinck	2	0.5%
Gillis Dodeur	2	0.5%
Alexander van den Berge	2	0.5%
Joost van Peenen	2	0.5%
Jan Frans de Vries	2	0.5%
Jehan Raije	2	0.5%
Jan Pickout	2	0.5%
Anthoni Schot	2	0.5%
Pieter Brant	2	0.5%
Pieter Franz.	2	0.5%
Cornelis Snellinck	2	0.5%
Jacques van Gaelen	1	0.5%
Jasper Grevenraet	1	0.5%
Franck Jansz.	1	0.5%
Jan Jansz. Karel de Jonghe	1	0.5%
Jan Jansz. Karel	1	0.5%
Bartholomeus Bisschop	1	0.5%
Pauwels Bisschop	1	0.5%
Samuel Bisschop	1	0.5%
Pieter Jan Mieusz.	1	0.5%
Jan Coenensz.	1	0.5%
Symon Loo	1	0.5%
Leonard Pelgroms	1	0.5%
François Pelgroms	1	0.5%
Paulus Pelgroms	1	0.5%
Steffano Pelgroms	1	0.5%
Jacques Merchijs	1	0.5%
Jacob Lucasz. Rotgans	1	0.5%
George de Piran	1	0.5%
Pieter Bauwer	1	0.5%
Jan van Dashorst	1	0.5%
Pieter Claesz. Roockersz.	1	0.5%
Jaspar Moermans	1	0.5%
Joost Benninck	1	0.5%
Herman Heesters	1	0.5%
Jacomo van Casteren	1	0.5%
Thomas van Casteren	1	0.5%
Gillis Hooftman	1	0.5%
Joris Adiaensz.	1	0.5%
Pieter du Molijn	1	0.5%
Pieter Backelerot	1	0.5%
Claes Dircksz.	1	0.5%

Appendices

Philip van Geel	1	0.5%
François Boudewijns	1	0.5%
Barent Sweerts	1	0.5%
Jacob Jacobsse Bontenos	1	0.5%
Pauwels Jansse van Helmont	1	0.5%
Dirck Vlack	1	0.5%
Willem Pauw	1	0.5%
Jeuriaen Timmerman	1	0.5%
Louis Saulman	1	0.5%
Jan van der Straten	1	0.5%
Jacob Sijnonse Louw	1	0.5%
Wijbrant Warwijck	1	0.5%
Arnoult van Liebergen	1	0.5%
David Lalouel	1	0.5%
Pieter Coymans	1	0.5%
Leonard Rans	1	0.5%
Anthony van Leeuw	1	0.5%
Cornelis Willemsz. Wiltschut	1	0.5%
Cornelis Claessen	1	0.5%
Hendrik van Ghenet de Jonge	1	0.5%
Abraham de Schilder	1	0.5%
Adriaen Cocx	1	0.5%
Harmen Albertsz. Kistemaker	1	0.5%
Elias Trip	1	0.5%
Jacob de Gijsselaer	1	0.5%
Lucas van Peenen	1	0.5%
Carel van Peenen	1	0.5%
Hendrick Hendricksen	1	0.5%
Bartholomeus Classendeen	1	0.5%
Margriet le Vasseur	1	0.5%
Daniel Gillis	1	0.5%
Willem Cornelisz.	1	0.5%
Jacques van Hanswijck	1	0.5%
Jan Bicker	1	0.5%
Lambert van Erp	1	0.5%
N.D.W. Rogiers	1	0.5%
Marte van den Heuvel	1	0.5%
Sameul Trezel	1	0.5%
Aert Spieringh	1	0.5%
Adriaen Spieringh	1	0.5%
Jaspar van Eyndhoven	1	0.5%

Us and Them: Inter-cultural Trade and the Sephardim, 1595-1640

Adriaen van der Tock	1	0.5%
Adriaen Molenijser	1	0.5%
Gelijm Aleman	1	0.5%
Elijas Ouvre	1	0.5%
Jaspar Anthonio	1	0.5%
Arent van der Burch	1	0.5%
Reyer Cornelisz.	1	0.5%
Hans van den Berg	1	0.5%
Pieter van Leyden	1	0.5%
Balthasar Coymans	1	0.5%
Dirck van Os	1	0.5%
Nicolaes Seys	1	0.5%
Pieter de la Palma	1	0.5%
Marcus de la Palma	1	0.5%
Matheus de la Palma	1	0.5%
Balthasar van de Voorde	1	0.5%
Louis de le Beque	1	0.5%
Hendrick Voet	1	0.5%

Source: GAA, NA

Based on 338 interactions with 145 non-Sephardic associates

Appendix 4: Associates of Bento Osorio, 1610-1640

Name of Merchant	Number of Interactions	Relative importance to the overall total (%)
Dirck Thomassen Glimmer	9	2%
Thijs Jansz. Bol	9	2%
Claes Cornelisz. Jut	8	2%
Hillebrant den Otter	7	2%
Jelle Poppes	6	2%
Hendrick Woutersz. (van Veen)	5	1%
Thijs Syvertsz.	5	1%
Marcus Pels	4	1%
Pieter Pels	4	1%
Jacques Niquet	4	1%
Albert Schuyt	4	1%
Cornelis Cornelisz. Jonge Fortuyn	4	1%
Anna Rieuwerts	4	1%
Pieter Belten	4	1%
Laurens Joosten Baeck (Bax or Bacx)	4	1%
Abraham Pels	3	1%
Guillaume Bartolotti	3	1%
Andries Hendricxsz. de Bijser	3	1%
Antonio van Surck Jaspersz.	3	1%
Jan Webster	3	1%
Jan IJsbrantsz. Dommer	3	1%
Hendrick Jansz. Dommer	3	1%
Aert Spieringh	3	1%
Jan de Nocquere	3	1%
Merten van de Moere	3	1%
Claes Pietersz. Nooms	3	1%
Jacob Poppen	3	1%
Peter Martsz. Coij	3	1%
Samuel van Peenen	3	1%
Pieter Cornelisz. (van Marcken)	2	0.5%
Hillebrant Schellingen	2	0.5%
Roeland van Haeren	2	0.5%
Cornelis Jansz.	2	0.5%
Charles de Latseur	2	0.5%

Us and Them: Inter-cultural Trade and the Sephardim, 1595-1640

Phillipo Calandrini	2	0.5%
Paulo de Willem	2	0.5%
Godert Kerckringh	2	0.5%
Adriaen Andriesz.	2	0.5%
Jan Smit	2	0.5%
Barent Sweerts	2	0.5%
Jan Geurtsz.	2	0.5%
Cornelis Snellinck	2	0.5%
Pieter van Geel	2	0.5%
Henrik Thibaut	2	0.5%
Nicolaes du Gardijn	2	0.5%
Jelmer Sijvertsz.	2	0.5%
Jacob Jansz.	2	0.5%
Olfert Pietersen Pet	2	0.5%
Hans Nielsen	2	0.5%
Andries Oudewagen	2	0.5%
Michiel Lucasz.	2	0.5%
Volckert Fongersz.	2	0.5%
Jan de la Faille	2	0.5%
Willem van Gele	2	0.5%
Reijnier de Fijneman	2	0.5%
Henry Herlele	2	0.5%
Pieter Andriesz. Valaen	2	0.5%
Jan Arentz. Van Naerden	2	0.5%
Jan Janz. Smit	2	0.5%
Pieter Jansz. Moutmaecker	2	0.5%
Philip Colijns Jochemsz.	2	0.5%
Harman van der Teeklen	2	0.5%
Jan Ras	2	0.5%
Guillaume Grevenraet	2	0.5%
Bartolomeus Roosendael	2	0.5%
Olivier van Houten	2	0.5%
Francisco van IJperseel	2	0.5%
Arent Dircksz. Bosch	2	0.5%
Pieter Gillis	2	0.5%
Martin Hurean	1	0.5%
Aluise du Bois	1	0.5%
Andreas Lucanelli	1	0.5%
Jacob Marcusz.	1	0.5%
Elias Pels	1	0.5%
Pieter Pauwelsen	1	0.5%
Jacob Martsz. Botman	1	0.5%
Paulus van der Laan	1	0.5%
Thomas Compar	1	0.5%
Ruys Class	1	0.5%

Appendices

Jan de Bruyn	1	0.5%
Jan Stassart	1	0.5%
Claes Andriesz.	1	0.5%
Luca Claesz.	1	0.5%
Frans van Poppendam	1	0.5%
Albert van Eccx	1	0.5%
Jan van Eccx	1	0.5%
Volckert Vlaming	1	0.5%
Salomon Voerknecht	1	0.5%
Eduardo van Surck	1	0.5%
Dirck van Offenberch	1	0.5%
Philip van Gheel	1	0.5%
David de l'Hommel	1	0.5%
Peter Beyens	1	0.5%
Jan Jansz. Frohart	1	0.5%
Jacob Jansz. Vrije	1	0.5%
Peter Hustard	1	0.5%
Jaspar Rubin	1	0.5%
Sipriano Estrelini	1	0.5%
Vokert Nanningsh	1	0.5%
Pieter Mathijsz.	1	0.5%
Lucas Jacobsz.	1	0.5%
Arent Hem	1	0.5%
Jan Gerritsz. Hooft	1	0.5%
Pauwels Buys	1	0.5%
Cornelis Pietersz. Can	1	0.5%
Jan Holsher	1	0.5%
Jan van der Mille	1	0.5%
Cornelis Maiaonaert	1	0.5%
Hendrick van Erp	1	0.5%
Christoffel Rindflees	1	0.5%
Antonio Gerritsz.	1	0.5%
Jaspar Coyman	1	0.5%
Isack Coymans	1	0.5%
Franchoijs Wouters	1	0.5%
Jan Andriaenz. Cant	1	0.5%
Jan Martin de Oude	1	0.5%
Cornelis van Davelaer	1	0.5%
Alexander van den Berge	1	0.5%
Jaspar Quinget	1	0.5%
Daniel de Raedt	1	0.5%
Claes Jansz. Bruijningh	1	0.5%
Pieter Claesz. Cod	1	0.5%
Aeryaen Breman	1	0.5%
Hendrick Philipsz. van	1	0.5%

Us and Them: Inter-cultural Trade and the Sephardim, 1595-1640

Maseijck		
Pierre de Point	1	0.5%
Philip Castel	1	0.5%
Daniel van Haemckhoeck	1	0.5%
Jan Sijmensen Gijsen	1	0.5%
Douwe Cornelisz.	1	0.5%
Jan Martsen	1	0.5%
Sijbrant Gijsbertsen Appelman	1	0.5%
Jan van den Einde de Jonge	1	0.5%
Jan Jansen van Avenhorn	1	0.5%
Pieter Cornelissen Schepper	1	0.5%
Claes Rechtersen	1	0.5%
Cornelis Jansz. Buijsman	1	0.5%
Cornelis Jansen Goutsblom	1	0.5%
Lambert Pietersz.	1	0.5%
Hidde Pietersz. van Hem	1	0.5%
Claes Mertsen	1	0.5%
Jan Jacobsz. Hopper	1	0.5%
Gerrit Hertoch	1	0.5%
Jan Reijmersen	1	0.5%
Jan Gerritsz. Bogaert	1	0.5%
Herman Tholincx	1	0.5%
Claes Maertsen Mammer	1	0.5%
Jons Nons	1	0.5%
Cornelis van Vijven	1	0.5%
Albert Remmetsen	1	0.5%
Cornelis Minnesen	1	0.5%
CornelisAlbertsen	1	0.5%
Dirck Claesz.	1	0.5%
Outger Luytsen	1	0.5%
Ime Hiddes	1	0.5%
Govert Cornelissen	1	0.5%
Jan Jansz. Theyes	1	0.5%
Jacob Thijsen	1	0.5%
Jan Gilles	1	0.5%
Charles Remi	1	0.5%
Pieter Coerten	1	0.5%
Jacomo van Casteren	1	0.5%
Thomaso van Casteren	1	0.5%
Jan van Baerle	1	0.5%
David van Baerle	1	0.5%
Herman Hesters	1	0.5%
Pieter Reusen	1	0.5%
Claes Adriaensz.	1	0.5%

Appendices

Willem van Trier	1	0.5%
Thomas Marinus	1	0.5%
Mathijs van Erpenbeek	1	0.5%
Pieter Sonnemans	1	0.5%
Mathijs Coenen	1	0.5%
Gaspar van Wickevoort	1	0.5%
Martin Debet	1	0.5%
Jacob Sybrantsz.	1	0.5%
Dirck Hermansz.	1	0.5%
Abraham van Beeck	1	0.5%
Joos van Beeck	1	0.5%
Nicolaes Ruts	1	0.5%
Tonis Valerius	1	0.5%
Adriaan de Otheusden	1	0.5%
Jasper van Diemen	1	0.5%
Cors Ijsbrantsz.	1	0.5%
Cornelis Huijbrechtsz. Paets	1	0.5%
Marten Paets	1	0.5%
Willem Janssen	1	0.5%
Hans Franx	1	0.5%
Emanuel van Basserode	1	0.5%
Jan Baptista de Wael	1	0.5%
Thomas Sauli	1	0.5%
Vincentio Sauli	1	0.5%
François Boudewijns	1	0.5%
Guillaume van de Putte	1	0.5%
Pieter van de Putte	1	0.5%
Hendrick van de Putte	1	0.5%
Isaac Poillie	1	0.5%
Joannes de Renialme	1	0.5%
Jacob van Halewijn	1	0.5%
Maarten van Halewijn	1	0.5%
Michiel Faes	1	0.5%
Jeremias Noiret	1	0.5%
Renier Schaep	1	0.5%
Isack van Dale	1	0.5%
Jacob Verwou	1	0.5%
Johan Tengnagel	1	0.5%
Balthasar Hendricksz. Kerhem	1	0.5%
Johan ten Grotenhuijs	1	0.5%
Arnoult van Liebergen	1	0.5%
Wouter de Hertog	1	0.5%
Gerrit Verstegen	1	0.5%

Us and Them: Inter-cultural Trade and the Sephardim, 1595-1640

Dirck Corver	1	0.5%
Gilles Silvester	1	0.5%
Pieter de Sterck	1	0.5%
Willem Watson	1	0.5%
Barent Calder	1	0.5%
Reijnier Pauw de Jonge	1	0.5%
Nicolaes Pauw	1	0.5%
Ridder Heer van Bennenbroek	1	0.5%
Joost Henrix Jansz.	1	0.5%
Hendrick Brouwer	1	0.5%
Nicolaes Pelsser	1	0.5%
Philip Philipsz. Van Goch	1	0.5%
Nicolaes Cocqu	1	0.5%
Cornelis Claasz. d'Arckel	1	0.5%
Hendrick Bolleman	1	0.5%
Sebastiaen Bolleman	1	0.5%
Cornelis Michielsz. Blauw	1	0.5%
Josias Marischal	1	0.5%
Nicolas Coccus	1	0.5%
Laurens d'Anglo	1	0.5%
Maurits Komme de Jonge	1	0.5%
Gerrit Kock	1	0.5%
Jeuriaen Hanners	1	0.5%
Peter Lus	1	0.5%
Martin van Hoorenbeecq	1	0.5%
Heijndrick van Zutphen	1	0.5%
Arent Meurs	1	0.5%
Jan Kuijsten	1	0.5%
Adriaen Jacobsz. van Noort	1	0.5%
Jan Jansz. van Delft	1	0.5%
Gerrit Jansen	1	0.5%
Denis Jansz.	1	0.5%
Harman Bockman	1	0.5%
Jan Symensz. Rijp	1	0.5%
Adriaen Rijser	1	0.5%
Gerrit de Beer	1	0.5%
Leonart de Beer	1	0.5%
Jacques du Bary	1	0.5%
Jan Pickout	1	0.5%
Jochem Jochemsz.	1	0.5%
Jan Thinart	1	0.5%
Laurens Bondius van Groenewegen	1	0.5%
Willem Smit	1	0.5%

Appendices

Robert Sainthill	1	0.5%
Willem Muijman	1	0.5%
Jan Pietersz.	1	0.5%

Source: GAA, NA

Based on 398 interactions with 257 non-Sephardic associates

Appendix 5: Dutch signatories of the 1602 petition to the burgomasters of Amsterdam and their relationships with Sephardic merchants

Signed by

Dutch Signatory	# of Transactions with Sephardi Merchants	Name of Sephardic Merchants
Klaas Andriesz.	12	Bento Osorio; James Lopes da Costa; Francisco Lopes; Diego Dias Querido; Antonio Dias Tinoco; Belchior Mendes; Francisco Mendes; Duarte Esteves de Pina; Diogo da Silva (x2); Francisco Ribeiro; Jeronimo Rodrigues de Sousa; Manoel Thomas; Daniel de Olanda; David de Palestrino; Duarte Fernandes; Manuel Lopes Nunes
Alexander van den Berge	8	Manoel Carvalho; Diego Dias Querido; James Lopes da Costa; Francisco Lopes; Simão de Mercado; Garcia Gomes Vitoria; Guiomar Henriques; Belchior Mendes
Barthelomeus Bisschop	5	Manoel Carvalho; Isaac Israel; Simão de Mercado; Mathias Rodrigues; Diogo Nunes Belmonte; Gaspar and Manuel Lopes Homen
Cornelis van der Bogaerde	4	Manoel Rodrigues Vega; Belchior Mendes; Diogo Nunes Belmonte; Pascoal Lopes
Jan le Brun	1	Manoel Rodrigues Vega
Gijsbrecht Brunninghs	1	Manoel Rodrigues Vega
Christoffel Dircksz. Pruys	2	Guiomar Henriques; Garcia Gomes
Jan Cornelisz. (Visser)	3	Manoel Rodrigues Vega; Belchior Mendes; Diogo da Silva
S. Coymans		

Melchior van Dortmont	1	Manoel Rodrigues Vega
Jan Foppen	0	
Klaas Gerbrandtsz.	1	Garcia Pimentel
Jacques van Hanswijck	10	Manuel Rodrigues Vega; Manoel Carvalho; Duarte Fernandes; Francisco Nunes Homem; Simão de Mercado; Diogo Nunes Belmonte (x2); Belchior Mendes; Garcia Gomes Vitoria; Juan Goncales; Daniel de Olanda; David de Palestrino;
Idas Horst	0	
Thymen Jacobsz. (Hinlopen)	3	Mathias Rodrigues; Jeronimo Rodrigues de Sousa; Guilhelmo de Salinas
Alewijn Jacot	0	
Balthazar Jacot	4	Manoel Rodrigues Vega; Alfonso Dias; Ximenes & Co.
Jan Jansz. Karel (de Jonghe)	9	Francisco Pinto de Brito; Simão de Mercado; Belchior Mendes; Manuel Carvalho; Isaac Israel; James Lopes da Costa; Francisco Lopes; Garcia Gomes; Andreas Ximenes; Samuel Pallache; Diego Dias Querido; Garcia Gomes Vitoria
Jacq. Kerkeel	0	
Egbert Klaesz.	0	
Salomon le Maire	0 (but 7 for Isaac le Maire)	
Koningh Schellinger	0	
Pieter Jansz. Montmalier	0	
Isaac Omerop	0	
Jan "oom" Klaesz.	0	
Dirck van Os	6	Manoel Carvalho; Manoel Rodrigues Vega; Duarte Fernandes; Francisco Lopes Homem; Ruy Lopes Homem; Belchior Mendes; Tomas Nunes Pina; Francisco Pinto de Brito;

Us and Them: Inter-cultural Trade and the Sephardim, 1595-1640

		Estevão Cardoso; James Lopes da Costa; Francisco Lopes; Diego Dias Querido; Antonio Dias Tinoco; Gaspar and Manuel Lopes Homem
Joost van Peenen	2	Manoel Rodrigues Vega; Duarte and Gonsalo Ximenes;
Francois Pelgroms	1	Manoel Carvalho; Isaac Israel
Herman Pelgroms	0	
Leonard Pelgroms	1	Manoel Carvalho; Isaac Israel
Frederiksz. Rob	0	
Gerrit Romans	0	
Dirck Strijcker	0	
Willem Thibaut de Piequene	2	Manoel Rodrigues Vega; Alfonso Dias
Jacore Thymonshove	0	
Jorgen Timmerman	7	Belchior Mendes (x2); Francisco Mendes; Duarte Esteves de Pina; Gaspar and Manuel Lopes Homem; Diogo da Silva; Diogo Nunes Belmonte (x2);
Pieter Wildbraedt	0	
Francois Woutersz.	8	Manoel Carvalho; Jeronimo Rodrigues de Sousa; Pascoal Lopes;

Source: NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland, 3.01.04.01/36/300-301 and GAA, Card Index

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Jessica Vance Roitman studied Philosophy and Comparative Religion at Maryville College (Maryville, TN USA) where she was a Presidential Scholar, received a National Endowment for the Humanities Younger Scholars grant, and graduated *Magna Cum Laude* with a Bachelor of Arts degree. She received her Master of Arts in Latin American History and Literature from Vanderbilt University (Nashville, TN USA) where she was a Harold Stirling Vanderbilt Scholar, was awarded a Foreign Language and Area Studies Grant by the US government to study Portuguese in Brazil, and also graduated *Magna cum Laude*. Between 2003 and 2008 she was an AIO at the University of Leiden. In addition to her dissertation work, she published extensively in international journals, essay collections and encyclopedias. She also co-edited, along with her supervisor, Professor Dr. P.C. Emmer, *A Deus ex Machina Revisited: Atlantic Colonial Trade and European Economic Development*, (Leiden: Brill, 2006). In the Spring of 2009 she was the Selma Ruben Fellow at the Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies, University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, PA USA). Per 1 September 2009 she will begin work at Birkbeck College, University of London (London, United Kingdom) on an NWO Rubicon Fellowship.

