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Cultivating trust : how do public policies become trusted

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CHAPTER 4

Structural Agricultural Policies

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyzes a set of policies best summarized as structural agricultural policies. These were formulated in the period right after the Second World War. They were initially aimed at short-term problems. In due time, however, various long-run policies were formulated that aimed at a fast modernisation of the Dutch agriculture. One of the key-figures in this period was the minister of agriculture, *Sicco Mansholt*.

In *Section 4.2*, I will first discuss why many politicians and state-officials started trusting him during the war, and how his words and activities resulted in trust for his policies after the war. This discussion is followed with an analysis about the relations between farmer-representatives in *Section 4.3*. *Section 4.4* examines how collective trust was established for common restructuring policies such as the efficiency improvement plans and the restructuring of small farms. This is followed in *Section 4.5* with an analysis of land-restructuring policies such as the land-consolidation projects. *Section 4.6* investigates how trust was established for social-economic policies such as housekeeping and accounting. Finally, this chapter ends in *Section 4.7* with an illustration about a farmer representative who, unlike most farmers, did not come to trust the structural agricultural policies after the Second World War.

Every section and subsection consists of a new analysis, which means that eleven analyses have been made. That is, they deal with either the application of part A or part B of the initial theoretical framework. I added an A or B to the headings of the sections to clarify whether they discuss the process of trust (A), or one of the four social mechanisms which establish collective trust (B). Just as in *Chapter 3*, the textual interpretations and the hermeneutical dialogue between the texts and the concepts (steps 2 and 3 of the hermeneutical circle, see *Section 2.6*) are integrated into the main texts of the sections. The sub-interpretations (step 4) are presented under the heading "discussion and notes" subsection at the end of each section. For the sake of readability, the summaries of the analyses are provided in *Appendix A*, not within the actual text.

4.2 MANSHOLT AND FOOD-SUPPLY

Introduction

An analysis of the post-War agricultural policies is incomplete without a proper presentation of the first minister of agriculture in this period, *Sicco Mansholt* (1908-1995). He was extremely influential in the restoration of Dutch agriculture after the War. Just as with the analyses of Elema and Van den Elsen in *Chapter 3*, personal characteristics seem to have contributed to the establishment of trust.

The first policy Mansholt established trust for among farmers and politicians concerned the quick restoration of the national food-supply. The need for this policy was clear, and he did not meet much imposition with its proposal and implementation. Mansholt also had long-term policy programs, which required much more persuasion to realize. These programs became known as the structural agricultural policies. The following sub-sections, however, deal first with the ways Mansholt became trusted as a minister of agriculture, and how trust was produced for his food-supply regulations. From *Section 4.4* onwards the long-term programs will be discussed.

4.2.1 Trusting Mansholt (A)

As mentioned in *Chapter 2*, trust is established when individuals are provided with *good* reasons. The trusting of Mansholt as the new minister of agriculture among the political was primarily due to his resistance against the Nazis during the Second World War. After his return from the Dutch East-Indies in 1937, Mansholt settled down as a farmer in the newly reclaimed polder, the *Wieringermeer* (De Zeeuw, Van Dalen, and De Graaf 1997, 14). From this desolate place, Mansholt organised various activities against the Nazis such as collecting information, and distributing weapons and underground newspapers. Moreover, his wife provided shelter to many individuals hiding for the Nazis. Among them were various leaders of the socialist party such as the the mayor of the city of Haarlem, Reinalda.

Mansholt especially became known for his leading role in the establishment of a national network that supplied food to the resistance. Supported by his cousin S. Louwes, who had remained director-general for food-supply during the war, he illegally organised food-rallies and distributed food nation-wide. Louwes gave him the necessary documents to pass by Nazi checkpoints. Mansholt's activities were important to many people in need including some prominent politicians. One of them, for instance, was Willem Drees who had become the socialist party leader in 1939 and would later become the prime-minister in 1948 (Van Merriënboer 1991, 705). He was immediately impressed by Mansholt's management skills (De Zeeuw *et al.* 1997, 15).

When the war ended on 5 May 1945, the Dutch queen Wilhelmina asked the socialists Schermerhorn and Drees to establish a national government. She wanted this government to contain people that had remained in the Netherlands during the war,

and had participated in the resistance. Impressed by his ability to organise the food-supply, Schermerhorn and Drees asked Mansholt to become minister of agriculture, fisheries and food-supply.

Initially Mansholt did not want to accept the job. But since the Germans had inundated the *Wieringermeer* (April 1945), which had flooded his farm, he decided to do it for two years. With the economy in a deplorable state and many people having suffered from hunger in the winter of 1944, Mansholt was confronted with shortages of everything. His primary concern, therefore, was to restore the food-supply. He proceeded with his war-time tasks: providing and distributing food. Mansholt even wanted to call his department, the department of food-supply, agriculture and fisheries, rather than the other way around, although this never happened. He provided food for the whole nation and, in contrast to the years before, had the freedom to do so, which made him enthusiastic. In his words: 'I had the time of my life' (Jaspers 1991, 132). Instead of staying on for two years, Mansholt remained minister of agriculture for twelve years, and functioned as the European commissioner for agriculture from 1958 until 1972.¹

Discussion and notes

Just as in the analyses of Van den Elsen and Elema, the discussion of Mansholt shows that trust for a specific person seems to depend on that person's character and, especially in this case, on his reputation. He enjoyed this reputation in the eyes of the political elite because of his actions during the war.

Validation of a person's character and reputation differs from person to person. Whether specific character qualities are defined as trustworthy seems to depend on the way a situation is interpreted by the others, the trustors. The queen, for example, considered individuals who had participated in the resistance and had not fled, trustworthy to run the country. Schermerhorn and Drees, on the other hand, asked Mansholt because they considered his skills to run a food-supply organisation most important.

4.2.2 Food-supply (B)

Mansholt's view that the restoration of the national food-supply had to be given top-priority was commonly shared by others. The general post-war crisis had resulted in a strong national solidarity. The texts about this period show many statements of individuals expressing themselves in the we-mode.

Leading representatives of the Catholic farmer association, for example, urged their members to fully co-operate with state-officials. 'The food-supply in our cities is alarming. *We* have to take every possible action to prevent the starvation of our nation.

1. Between 1972 and 1973, Mansholt even became interim chairman of the European Commission for a short period.

Therefore, a heavy duty is laid upon *our* farmers to loyally co-operate' (circular letter 01/12/1944 in Duffhues 1996, 174). The Catholic farmer association even went so far as to call any failure by farmers to deliver their products to the distribution-organisations a 'crime' (Duffhues 1996, 174).

All parties saw the necessity of a quick restoration of the food-supply. They underlined the importance of co-operation between farmers and public officials, and the implementation of strict distribution regulations. Three days after the new government was installed on 24 June 1945, prime-minister Schermerhorn expressed his trust in the joint efforts to restore the national food-supply on the radio. 'We trust that we will succeed to secure the national food-supply, by co-operating with our farmers' (Van den Brink 1990, 39).

The restoration of the national food-supply, called for strict regulations, which were generally supported by Members of Parliament (MPs) and farmer spokespersons. The government's first official policy outline, which contained a small paragraph on agriculture, was discussed in parliament on 25 January 1946. The most pressing short term problem was the shortage of foreign currencies to buy food (Van Merriënboer 1991, 702). In order to secure the food-supply Mansholt therefore decided to stimulate agricultural production. This turned out to be difficult because many farms were destroyed or inundated after the War (Duffhues 1996, 174).² Furthermore, the areas available for agriculture did not produce sufficiently due to the lack of fertilisers. Hence, Mansholt believed that for the whole year of 1946 the food-supply would be insufficient (Duynstee and Bosmans 1977, 455). He therefore proposed a large set of strict distribution regulations (Van den Brink 1990, 37-39).

The MPs supported these strict food-supply regulations. Except from some criticism about the organisations that executed the distribution, the policy itself was "undisputed" (Bogaarts 1989, 1537). In order to prevent a high rise in inflation, the government decided to control the prices of primary products. This not only resulted in cheap food, it also produced low wage demands in all other economic sectors, and a rise of the Dutch food exports.³ Because the consumer prices were kept below the production costs, farmers were compensated by the government. They obtained prices for their products that were based on calculations of the average production costs plus a profit of 20%. The difference between the consumer's and the farmer's price was levelled

2. There is much discussion on how bad the situation was. Although many farms, cattle and machinery were indeed destroyed, many scholars emphasize that the real problem was the destruction of the infrastructure (Van Merriënboer 1991, 701; Bogaarts 1989, 1535; Andela 2000, 31).

3. The prices in the Netherlands were 20% below the world market prices (Stuyvenberg 1950, 204).

by the so-called exchange equalisation fund.⁴ These policy regulations are generally known as the price and income system (*cf. Section 4.4.2*).

Without much dispute, parliament accepted laws that entailed severe penalties for farmers who acted against the strict distribution and production regulations. For example, if farmers were negligent concerning the fight against certain insects, they faced long-time imprisonment. Farmers also accepted many centralising regulations and the attendant penalty rules such as the regulation of prices, obligatory deliveries, grow- and production rules, the control of ground- and rent prices and the control of imports and exports (Van Merriënboer 1991, 701; Bogaarts 1989, 1508).

Discussion and notes

For the above discussion, the crisis social mechanism delivers the most plausible explanation for individuals expressing themselves in a we-mode and acting accordingly. Associations, politicians and individual farmers all emphasized the restoration of the food-supply as the way to overcome the crisis. They were consequently willing to accept strict regulations implemented by a strong central government.

The effect of this crisis was that individual actors all defined their actions as part of the larger general objective to overcome it. The strict food-supply regulations were only accepted as a part of the general collective intentionality to overcome this crisis. Hence, a crisis can establish collective trust for far reaching policy-regulations.

4.3 CORPORATIST INSTITUTIONS

Mansholt considered the cooperation between his departement and the various farmer organisations, as well as the solidarity between the different farmer organisations as essential elements to successful post-war policies. Spokespersons of the farmer representative organisations had the same opinion about this issue, and had already been organising themselves during the war. They had discussed how to collaborate and how to represent their organisations once the Nazis left.

This sub-section analyses these discussions and illustrates how the participants came to trust the ideas of corporatism as a means to represent themselves. *Section 4.3.1* explains the concept of corporatism and discusses how the individual participants came to trust the ideas on *corporatism*. *Section 4.3.2* looks at the establishment of collective trust. The summaries of these analyses are presented in tables A3 and A4 of *Appendix A*.

4. In Dutch: *Landbouw-egalisatie fonds* or LEF. This fund was the follow-up of the crisis-fund established in the 1930s. The organisation that made the calculations was called the Agricultural Economics Research Institute or LEI (*Landbouw Economisch Instituut*).

4.3.1 The ideas about corporatism (A)

By 1941, the Germans had incorporated the ideologically based farmers associations (KNLC, KNBTB, and CBTB) in their national-socialist *Landstand*.⁵ Nearly all members resigned because they did not want to be involved in Nazi-guided institutions. This left the associations as empty shells. During the war, however, the 'ex'-chairmen regularly met in secret to discuss and formulate plans concerning the development of new co-operative frameworks. From 1942 onwards, the following individuals were involved: M. Ruppert (Christian agricultural labour union) C.J. van der Ploeg (Catholic agricultural labour union), H.D. Louwes and J. Vet (KNLC), G.J. Heymeijer (KNBTB), W. Rip (CBTB) and S.L. Louwes (director-general for food-supply of the department of agriculture and fisheries) (Smits 1996, 161).

The following sub-sections discuss the idea of corporatism and the reasons these individuals put forward to promote corporatism and corporatist organisations.

Reasons for supporting corporatism

The Catholics wanted a society based on the principle of subsidiarity. That is, they wanted a society in which individuals organised themselves in small communities. These had to consist of people with common objectives such as the employees and the employers of a company. In the same way, the Catholics wanted farmers and their employees to be organised in these so-called corporatist organisations. They would then have a certain degree of autonomy to regulate and steer an agricultural sub-community. Nonetheless, the farmers and their employees, like other corporatist institutions, would also have to respect the encompassing structures of society; they therefore had to be legally regulated by the government (Banning 1990, 44-75).

The Protestants also supported the idea of a corporatist-structured society, although their ideological motivations were somewhat different from the Catholics. They desired more autonomy for the corporatist bodies. For the protestants, every community had to have its own identity and sovereignty, which was not to be overruled by the government or any other sub-community. That is, they wanted all communities to emerge from the bottom-up. Government was only to serve as a regulator for possible conflicts between the "circles of society", as the Protestants called these communities (Banning 1990, 80-107). Notwithstanding these philosophical differences, the elites of both religious groups were strongly motivated to push these ideas about autonomy and co-operation further after the war.

The Liberals were also inclined to support these ideas for autonomy, but for more opportunistic reasons. They had always resented the rise of the ideologically based

5. These were the *Koninklijke Nederlandse Landbouw Comite* (Royal Dutch Agricultural Committee), *Katholieke Nederlands Boeren- en Tuindersbond* (Catholic Dutch Farmers- and Gardeners Association), and the *Christelijke Boeren- en Tuindersbond* (Christian Farmers- and Gardeners Association).

farmer organisations, and therefore wanted to establish a joint framework for them.⁶ The chairman of the liberal farmer association, H.D. Louwes, expressed this support for an unitary organisation at a national level. Such an organisation had to have 'large sovereignty and the ability to formulate and implement public binding legal regulations, which would be communicated to farmers and gardeners and controlled by a network of provincial and local organisations' (Speeches H.D. Louwes 1947, 309 in: Smits 1996, 161).

Risks and uncertainties

Although the Catholics and Protestants wanted an agricultural community based on corporatist ideas, they feared however, for major uncertainties and risks. Foremost they feared a loss of identity if only corporatist organisations would be established after the war. These fears were expressed, for example, by Van Dal, the church advisor of one of the largest regional departments of the Catholic association (the NCB): 'The corporatist organisation may execute the tasks of the government, it should, however not take over the tasks of the farmer associations' (Duffhues 1996, 252). The associations therefore pleaded to re-install themselves after the war besides the new corporatist organisations. In other words, the associations did not suspend the risk of losing ones' identity and therefore did not trust the corporatist organisation unconditionally (Smits 1996, 161-163).

As a consequence of these fears, a new corporatist network with public authority was established, as well as all three farmer associations. The board of the top-level corporatist organisation, however, consisted of members from all three farmer associations, added with representatives of the employees. The three associations continued to discuss and deliberate over moral and ethical issues, and, as a consequence, also help develop social, economic and technical policies. For instance, they maintained their responsibility for education and consultation because in their views consultants interfered with the daily activities of the farmer, implying the presence of ethical issues (Smits 1996, 160).

The corporatist organisations were institutions steered by the farmers, traders, and representatives of the retail-industry. They were involved in the formulation and execution of rules and regulations concerning their specific product-branch. Hence, for each type of production a specific corporatist trade-organisation was created. For example, the dairy farmers, their employees, the milk-factories, the dairy retailers and the export companies were all represented in the dairy trade-organisation, or the *productschap zuivel*. It had various tasks such as regulating the degrees of fat, prices, and the names

6. Thus, in some sense, the liberals did have ideological reasons: they wanted to abolish the pillarized society and build new societal structures. This was known as the idea of the societal breakthrough (KNLC, 157)

for cheeses. The overall co-ordination between the different trade organisations was done by the *Landbouwschap*. This institution, in turn, fell under the command of another corporatist organisation, the Social and Economic Council (SER). It organised all economic activities of the Netherlands in accordance with corporatism.

Discussion and notes

The above analysis illustrates that the individual representatives from the different farmer associations had varying interpretations about the organisation of society. All three, however, supported the idea of corporatism. They expressed, in their own words and in accordance with their own background set of intentional states, their favourable expectations towards it. In other words, they trusted, to a certain extent, this idea of corporatism. The Protestants, Catholics and Liberals had different backgrounds and, accordingly, different *good* reasons to come to trust corporatist organisations. Whereas the Protestants and Catholics wanted to establish them for ideological reasons, the Liberals gave their support only for a pragmatic reason: eliminating societal fragmentation.

Some risks and uncertainties were suspended, but only to a certain extent by the Catholics and Protestants. In such a case, the analysis shows two general consequences. First, if risks or uncertainties are not completely suspended, ideas, policies or, in this case, institutions seem to result in compromises. Second, it can result in the imposition of extra securities. In this case, the existent institutions remained in tact while the new organisations were vested with less responsibilities.

4.3.2 United we stand (B)

The individual farmer representatives involved in the secret deliberations during the Second World War seemed to believe that they were “in it” together. This solidarity, which was already planted in the economic crisis of the 1930s was furthered during the war and the post-war crisis. In 1940, the Catholic leader Heymeijer stated, for example, that ‘the alliances between employers and employees are in no other occupation so naturally interwoven as they are in the agricultural companies’ (Smits 1996, 160). The liberal H.D. Louwes also expressed such solidarity between farmers: ‘The rural communities in hamlets, villages or polders all root in a solidarity of the same fate, that is, working together on the same ground, under the same skies and with the same struggle against nature and destiny’ (Speeches of H.D. Louwes 1947, 305 in: Smits 1996, 160). All participants of the secret consultations during the war sensed an historic opportunity to establish a ‘real societal community’ (Smits 1996, 161).

Many MPs as well as minister Mansholt expressed such support for the collective intentions of farmers and their formation of new corporatist institutions. The socialist MP Van der Sluis was ‘even pleasantly surprised that conservative farmers were open to

new ideas!' (Duynstee and Bosmans 1977, 459).⁷ Mansholt, being a farmer, expressed himself in the we-mode: 'During the war we have luckily retained one thing, that is, the preparedness of *our* farmers and gardeners to fight the struggle anew. We have luckily kept the large experience and know-how of our farmers and gardeners' (Kamerstukken II 1945-1946, 123, nr. 2).

Collective actions

The post-war corporatist organisations are generally considered as continuations of the crisis-organisations established in the 1930s. The director-general of the food-supply, S. Louwes, used these organisations for food-distribution during the war. In parliament, Mansholt deliberately stated that these existing organisations formed a sound basis on which to structure Dutch agricultural society. 'There are sufficient organisations; the government does not have to implement a complete new state-guided network' (Duynstee and Bosmans 1977, 459). In other words, Mansholt suggested to have the existent collective trust in the crisis-organisations transferred, or coupled, to the initiatives of the farmer associations (*ibid.*; Van der Woude 2000, 54).

On the day of liberation, 5 May 1945, the three farmer associations confirmed a collective intentionality by establishing their first joint institution, the organisation bureau for agriculture. It was chaired by Heymeijer (KNBTB), Rip (CBTB) and Vet (KNLC). On 24 May, they also decided to form the Foundation for Agriculture, which contained three representatives from each farmer association as well as representatives from the agricultural employee organisations. It was officially founded 2 July 1945. Before its official start, Mansholt had already promised he would recognise this new organisation as the representative body for all Dutch farmers (Van der Woude 2000, 56). Thus, the foundation would also legally represent the farmers that were not a member of one of the farmer or employee associations.⁸

On 5 July 1945, Mansholt invited the foundation of agriculture's board members to his department and informed them they could begin planning the establishment of a top level corporatist organisation with public authority. From that moment on, the minister deliberated with the members of the foundation on a monthly basis. All policies and regulations were first discussed with them before implementation. In 1954, the foundation of agriculture was transformed into a national corporatist institutions: the *Landbouwschap*. The corporatist network attached to this body extended rapidly. It not only resulted in a dense network of many sub-organisations involved with differ-

7. During the war, many Dutch politicians and intellectuals wanted to get rid of the pillarized structure of Dutch Society. The initiative to do so, known as the breakthrough, came from the socialists. Corporatist organisations could be considered as a means to this end. This is what Van der Sluis was referring to.

8. The membership of the associations was high. They represented 200,000 of the 350,000 farmers (105,000 Liberals, 76,000 Catholics and 19,000 Protestants), and 74,000 of the 123,000 land labourers (Vermeulen 1989, 7).

ent trade and production areas, it was also involved with the implementation of less popular policies.

The collective expectations about the corporatist organisations contributed to the increase of the agricultural civil society. Some figures illustrate that the density of we-modes was rising. That is, they reveal that many initiatives were taken to establish corporatist bodies, and that the amount of corporatist trade-organisations increased rapidly. In the first year that corporatism was legally settled, 20 organisations were founded. In 1965 this number had increased to 56 (Bakker 1995, 41-43).

The ideologically based farmer associations, however, did not trust the corporatist organisation to the extent that they concurred with the liberal (KNLC) request to eliminate their own associations (*cf. Section 4.3.1*). On the contrary, they wanted to safeguard their identity by strengthening their own institutions as well. As a consequence, the amount of Catholic and Protestant organisations, such as sell- and purchase organisations, linked to their associations also increased (Smits 1996, 169). *Figure 3.1 (Chapter 3)* illustrates this steep rise for the Catholic based organisations linked to the KNBTB in the period after the Second World War.

Discussion and notes

The social mechanisms of crisis and coupling seem to provide understanding for how collective expectations with regards to the corporatist organisations were established. Due to the economic crisis of the 1930s and the post-war crisis, farmers and other related actors came to realize their interdependence. Hence, they started thinking and expressing themselves in the we-mode, and acted accordingly.

The farmer representatives and Mansholt seem to have assumed that the pre-existent trust among farmers for the food-supply organisations could be transferred to the new targets of trust: the new corporatist organisations. They coupled the existing source of trust, the war food-supply organisations, to a new target, the corporatist organisations.

Section 4.3.2 teaches us that several social mechanisms can be triggered at the same time. The post-war collective intentionality is both explained by the crisis and coupling social mechanisms. This observation is in line with the work of agrarian history scholars who posit that the establishment of the large, post-war, farmer interest network was the result of both post-war reconstruction policies and the foundation of corporatist organisations (Van der Woude 2000, 56). This study shows that the foundation of the corporatist organisations was facilitated by organisations established previously in the war and in the 1930s crisis.

4.4 STRUCTURE POLICIES

Mansholt, while restoring the national food-supply, promised the Dutch they would never experience hunger again. To meet this goal, Dutch agriculture had to become a strong, resilient economic sector and Mansholt therefore prepared long-term policy plans, which became known as the structural agricultural policies.

In *Section 4.4.1* I will analyse how Mansholt initially established trust for these long-term policy plans. This is followed in *Section 4.4.2* with an analysis about how collective trust was established for a specific long term policy, the so-called small farmers policy. Finally, *Section 4.4.3* contains an illustration about how the process of trust can fail if risks and uncertainties are not suspended

4.4.1 Rationalisation policies (A)

Directly after the war Mansholt held a pessimistic view about the future of Dutch agriculture. Although the prime minister Beel had expressed the government's trust in farmers, Mansholt was rather dejected (Van den Brink 1990, 36, 39). In one of his first statements to parliament, he referred to the many problems Dutch farmers were coping with (Vermeulen 1989, 16). He was especially concerned about two developments that had occurred during the war: the changes in international markets and the development of new hi-tech production-methods in countries not damaged by the war. He desperately wanted to prevent Dutch farmers from losing out in the international competition.⁹

Mansholt's first policy paper proposed rules and regulations to deal with the short term problem of the food-shortage. This was no surprise. The minister, however, also communicated his views about the prospects of Dutch agriculture (Van Merriënboer 1991, 704). During the discussion in parliament about these prospects on 29 January 1946, Mansholt stated that Dutch agriculture needed restructuring to meet international competition, especially from England, the United States, Canada, New-Zealand and Australia (Duynstee and Bosmans 1977, 456). Farmers were not only in need of the government's financial support as in the 1930s, but knowledge about 'which direction Dutch agriculture was to be going' (*ibid.*; Vermeulen 1989, 15).

In order to meet international competition, Mansholt stated that agricultural prices had to be as low as possible. Low food prices were already considered an important tool to deal with short term problems; even more important, however, was to keep the production costs as low as possible in order to produce cheap competitive products for international markets. He therefore proposed a program that contained

9. Mansholt believed that only by international cooperation European agriculture would be able to prevent large economic depressions (as in the nineteen thirties). He therefore was a great supporter of the international cooperation in the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations.

large rationalisation projects, such as the subsidization of land consolidation as well as the intention to switch from extensive to intensive agriculture.¹⁰ The main reason provided by Mansholt to establish trust for his structure policies, was his fear of being outdone by international competition (*ibid*).

The minister saw in his plans low costs and rising productivity as an absolute necessity for establishing a competitive agricultural sector. The MPs largely agreed with his plans and gave him full support. Similarly, many of Mansholt's other laws and regulations did not face much dispute in parliament (Bogaarts 1989, 1507). It agreed, for instance, with the minister that the rationalisation of production should include: education, research and consultation programs, mechanisation, the termination of animal diseases, projects to improve the cattle quality, the restructuring of small mixed farms, and land-reclamation and consolidation projects. Especially consolidation projects were favoured. 'All MPs strongly insisted to impose land-consolidation policies' (Duynstee and Bosmans 1977, 456-457). Only two MPs, Van den Heuvel and Bierema, experienced some trouble in suspending the uncertainties associated with large consolidation projects. They feared unrest in the rural areas and therefore plead for more moderate projects.

While the MPs generally supported Mansholt's plans for the rationalisation of production, the farmers did not care for them initially. They complained about the low fixed prices and the many restrictive supply regulations. Most importantly, however, they felt public officials and their associations were not looking into their primary concern, namely practical tools and machinery such as cloths, boots, pitch-forks, shovels, bicycles and bicycle tires. Consequently, the farmers protested against the leaders of their associations and public officials. They were more concerned with day-to-day hardships rather than long term-policy plans (Duffhues 1996, 175-176).

Mansholt dismissed these complaints as too short-sighted. According to him, the farmers did not sufficiently realise the urgency of the economic situation and the necessity to adapt to the changing international market situation (*ibid.*). In other words, to convince the farmers to support his policies, the minister pointed out the broader context of their situation. In order to ameliorate this broader situation, the rationalisation of production was needed. Once these plans materialized, farmers started supporting them.

Figure 4.1 illustrates that the minister was successful in establishing trust for his rationalisation policies. It shows the rationalization of the production by means of the use of various, in those days, new and innovative machineries.

10. Land consolidation is the uniting of small pieces of land into larger areas by means of exchanges.




Figure 4.1 Mechanisation (Andela 2000, 45; Van den Brink 1990, 24)

Discussion and notes

Noteworthy is the way in which Mansholt put forth his view about the future of Dutch agriculture. He presented his large restructuring plans at a time when ordinary farmers were still struggling to overcome many daily hardships. Although the farmers pressed these short-term issues, the minister continued to emphasize his long-term perspective. By doing this, he eliminated criticism to his short-term policies in two ways. First, they were overshadowed by his views of long-term policy problems. Second, farmers paid more attention to their daily problems rather than concern themselves with Mansholt's long-term policies and possible alternatives.

4.4.2 Small farmers policies (B)

Introduction

One of the most supported aspects of the rationalisation programs was the land consolidation projects. Their aim was to swap small lots of land between neighbouring farmers to create larger lots of land. This was to increase production efficiency. Another similar policy, however, which was aimed at the the enlargement of small mixed family farms, resulted in political and social upheaval. This issue became known as the so-called small-farmers problem.

In the following sub-sections, I analyse how the established trust for Mansholt's land-consolidation programs and price- and income policies became coupled to the much disputed small farm enlargements policy. The discussion shows the consolidation programs and price- and income policies incorporated the necessity for small farm enlargement.

Restructuring small farms?

When Mansholt stated that farmers need a minimum of eight hectares to improve cost efficiency in November 1945, several MPs responded sceptically. The Catholic MP Ruyter, for instance, asked the minister whether he intended to buy out all farms less than a certain size, and nationalise the ground in order to give it to the already large and rich farmers. He labelled Mansholt's plan as a 'cold-restructure', which 'came like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky'. (Duynstee and Bosmans 1977, 457). Ruyter used "cold restructure" for he feared that the minister would lower the price support payments, which would result in the termination of many small farms.

In his response, the minister contended he did not seek such radical measures. He only claimed to argue that the most inefficient farms were the smaller farms, which both held a few animals and grew crops, and usually had five hectares or less. His intention, however, was not to terminate them, as in a cold-restructure. On the contrary, by means of land consolidation, he wanted to strengthen these small farms and improve their production efficiency. Only small farms still not profitable after the land consolidation programs were to be added to larger farms. Since especially the Catholics supported small family farms (for religious-ethical reasons), the land-consolidation projects were strongly supported, but the associations remained off the restructure plans for small farms (Smits 1996, 176-177; Duynstee and Bosmans 1977, 457). In 1947, a committee from the Catholic farmer association and the Catholic political party, underlined the importance of the consolidation policies for small farmers, but rejected a hasty reorganisation of small farms (Smits 1996, 176).

After first communicating the potential restructuring of small farms, the issue continued to be an important political and societal stumbling block. Especially in the Catholic South, farmers, their leaders and the church persisted in their opposition to policies that undermined small family farms. These were preferred because they were thought to increase "religious joy, diligence and offspring". Consequently, the Catholic association pled for special, protective regulations. 'Society cannot do without this group of self-employed farmers because this group represents the best part of society religiously and zealously, and stands between the capitalists and the proletarians' (Andela 2000, 34). Despite Catholic opposition, most state officials and consultants advised farmers to specialise and enlarge. For all parties to stand behind the enlargement of small inefficient farms took years.

Establishing trust through land consolidation policies

Mansholt knew he had little political space to operate in. A top-down imposition of structural policies would antagonise large groups of small farmers. In order to establish trust and solve this fragile situation, Mansholt was forced to take a detour: He made the reorganisation of small farms merely an implicit goal within the general rationalisation and land-consolidation programs.

As previously described, Mansholt had stated that he did not want to eliminate small farmers, but rather support them through increasing their size and scale by means of land-consolidation projects. He had presented these projects as a means to keep small farms alive and improve their efficiency step by step. Many actors, MPs and farmer representatives had already given support to these policies. As a consequence of these land consolidation projects, larger lots were created, which enabled the use of larger machines. In order to make these machines profitable, farmers had to obtain more ground; that is, they had to enlarge their farms. Hence, a policy that was highly supported, the land consolidation project, led to the acceptance of an outcome that was initially not supported: the restructuring of small farms.

Establishing trust through price and income policies

Support for the restructuring of small farms was not only established through land consolidation, it was also assisted through the price and income policies. Through these policies, small farmers were slowly pushed forward to enlarge their businesses. Let me elaborate more on this policy. The price and income policies called for maximum consumer prices and minimum producer prices. As said previously, the maximum consumer prices were essential to maintaining low wages. But since the government wanted to repair the food-supply first, the government imposed export levies, which constrained the export opportunities of the farmers. For their co-operation, Dutch farmers obtained guaranteed minimum prices for their products.¹¹

Until the early 1960s, farmers and the associations trusted these price and income policies mainly because the incomes of farmers increased at the same speed as in all other sectors. Many discussions were raised, however, about the standard size of a farm, which was important because it had become the basis for calculating the minimum guaranteed prices.¹² Especially in the Catholic south, the church favoured small family farms for ideological reasons. They were, however, difficult to maintain because supplementing labour for capital had become increasingly difficult for small family farms. Labour had become more expensive while families had gotten smaller. Hence, the only possible way to increase productivity was by expanding production. And since this was done by new, expensive technologies, farmers were forced to specialise for making these techniques remunerative. This then resulted in a reorganisation of the small farmers. Most of them specialized in pigs because these did not require large

11. Initially, all agricultural products were guaranteed minimum prices. But after 1951, only basic products such as wheat, sugar beets, potatoes and milk enjoyed them.

12. For all agricultural products, the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) calculated so-called target prices that were considered sufficient to earn a fair income on an average size farm. (Smits 1996, 172; Krijger 1991, 7; De Hoogh, 1994, 9). See also *Section 5.3*.

tracts of land (see further *Section 6.2*). Some, however, did not wish to specialize and stopped farming altogether.¹³

The results of the coupling

The land consolidation policy and the regulation of incomes and prices forced small farmers to enlarge their lots of land. By imposing these two policies, Mansholt acquired their support for the reorganisation of small farms. Although it seems as if the minister tricked them into it, the farmers and their associations really expressed their support in due time. In 1947, for example, the land-consolidation policies were wholeheartedly supported by the Catholic association: 'Only praise for Mansholt's small-farmer policy' (Duffhues 1996, 194). Similarly, the price and income policies were highly praised. Both policies, however, eventually implied the reorganisation of small farms and a drainage of labour from agriculture. Mansholt, however, deliberately avoided to mention this (Bogaarts 1989, 1552-1553). In other words, the policies were coupled by the minister and through this, risks and uncertainties that came along with the re-organisation policy were suspended. In the 1950s and 60s, after the land consolidation and price and income policies had taken effect, the reorganisation of small farms was openly discussed and supported, also by the Catholics (Duffhues 1996, 205). *Figure 4.2* illustrates the success of this reorganisation policy.

Discussion and notes

After the Second World War, Mansholt tried to gain support for the restructuring of small farms. His efficiency arguments, however, were not supported by the leaders of the Catholic farm associations. Being aware of this situation, the minister incorporated




Figure 4.2 Enlargement of farms (Van den Brink 1990, 24)

13. In the 1960s, farmers that continued were called "blijvers" whereas those that terminated their businesses were "wijkers."

the small farms restructuring program into the already existent rationalisation policies, especially the land consolidation and price and income policies, which were already widely supported. As a result, the restructuring of small farms also became accepted and, in due time, even supported by the Catholic farmers as well.

Two patterns are observed in the steps Mansholt took to establish trust for his small farms policy. First, he avoided formulating direct regulations to restructure them. Instead, he presented his policies as a way to maintain small farms and to improve their competitive position. Through this detour, the farmers started slowly doing what the minister wanted in the first place: enlarging their farms. In due time this transformation was fully supported. Second, as has been noted by many other scholars as well, Mansholt first presented far reaching plans and then, after criticism, watered them down to a form which was much more supported (Duynstee and Bosmans 1977, 457; Van Merriënboer 1991, 705). This characteristic course of action will be further elaborated on in *Section 5.4*.

4.4.3 The first large restructuring plans (A)

This section illustrates how the process of trust can fail; that is, it shows that trust will not be established if risks and uncertainties are not suspended. The case for analysis concerns the first large restructuring plans.

The first policy plan of the government after the Second World War (11 December 1945) stated the intention to develop an integrated agricultural investment program. This plan was initiated in September 1945 by the director-general for ground-use and agricultural restoration, Staf. It not only focused on economic recovery but also on other policy issues such as landscape planning and large scale mechanisation.

This plan covered the period between 1947 and 1953 and, besides the land consolidation programs, called for large scale investments in new machinery, subsidies for storage and transportation, soil improvement, investments in fertilisers, stock expansion, subsidies for improving the retail infrastructure and the modernisation of the fishery fleet (Van den Brink 1990, 44). Mansholt was very enthusiastic about the plan and communicated its contents to MPs, spokespersons and farmers in various meetings. He also had it added to the Queen's annual speech to the country in 1947.

MPs were, however, sceptical about the plan. They believed it was too early for such investments and doubted whether they would indeed contribute to structural development in the agricultural sector. Moreover, the parliamentarians argued that farmers did not have the required funds to participate. Hence, they did not believe the investments were to be given the same priority as the price and income policies, advised the minister to first focus on establishing a sufficient income for farmers. Some socioeconomic experts also pointed out the many uncertainties in the policy plan. Its budgetary calculations were too optimistic and not sufficiently documented.

In short, the government's view about the policy plan was not shared and its uncertainties were not suspended. As a consequence, the plan was not officially laid down in a policy statement. Large scale mechanisation projects were only introduced after the income position of farmers had sufficiently improved (Van den Brink 1990, 59).

4.5 LANDSCAPE-PLANNING

This section introduces a first analysis of the examples social mechanism. As suggested in *Chapter 2*, the assumption is that examples can help to suspend risks and uncertainties (*cf. Section 2.5*). At the same time, the exposition of the same example to groups of individuals may also evoke a switch to the *we-mode*. *Section 4.5.1* analyses how the landscaping pioneers initially failed to establish trust for their plans, while *Section 4.5.2*, in contrast, shows how a successful example resulted in favourable expectations about the integrated landscape plans.

4.5.1 Integrated landscape-planning(A)

Land consolidation plans were promoted during the economic recession of the 1930s. Land re-allotment in agricultural areas was considered as 'a means to provide a new basis for sound business' (Andela 2000, 51). The Second World War, however, disturbed these plans. But after the war, interest and favourable expectations about them was re-kindled. The first re-allotment projects started after the war as part of the Netherlands' reconstruction plans.

Consider the example of Blitterswijk, a small town in the South-East of the Netherlands. Many roads, bridges and waterways were destroyed during the fights of 1944. The local council for land consolidation decided to combine the town's reconstruction with large scale improvements of the surrounding agricultural areas. Country roads were broadened and paved; other roads were closed and ploughed; small streams were deepened and, if possible, straightened; areas were re-allotted and hedges grubbed (Andela 2000, 56). In other parts of the Netherlands, the country-side was similarly restructured. These efforts were generally supported because they provided jobs and contributed to the rationalization of the agriculture (*ibid.* 64-65)

The nation-wide reconstruction efforts also had negative consequences; many characteristic landscape elements disappeared. This consequence had already been recognized when land consolidation plans were first presented in the 1930s. At this time, a protestgroup with many prominent persons, such as the writer Jac.P.Thijssse and the biologists Tienhoven and Weevers, objected against these types of reconsolidating projects or against, what they called, the 'terror of utilitarianism' (*ibid.* 69). Although

this group had some small successes in the 1930s, the government already reclaimed many areas of wasteland at this time.

During the war (and after), an advisory committee of joint nature-conservation groups, the so-called committee Weevers, continued to protest against the losses of characteristic nature and landscape elements. At this time, an expert in geodesy, Benthem, became inspired by the ideas of Thijsse and others. After the war, he landed in a job at the central organisation for land-reclamation, and strongly pleaded to couple reclamation-projects to nature- and landscape-planning. Minister Mansholt, however, although he supported nature- and landscape planning, gave priority to the rationalisation of agriculture. Consequently Benthem had to hold back his intentions for integrating both policies.

The committee Weever's reasons for preserving characteristic landscape elements did not stand up to arguments for rationalization and land-consolidation policies among public policy officials. Besides, farmers were also rather sceptical about landscape preservation. Hence, no co-operation between consolidation-engineers and landscape-planners was established. In the early years after the Second World War, they had different interpretations about the priorities of agricultural policies. 'The implementation of technical projects by engineers did not allow much space for integrated planning. Food-supply and the important role agriculture played in the restoration of the whole Dutch economy during the first years after the war, constrained the ideas of landscape-planning; agricultural interest got priority (*ibid.* 74). A much heard statement of the time was: 'The land-reclamation works cannot and must not be stopped' (*ibid.* 77).

Discussion and notes

The above case shows that different interpretations about events or situations can compete with each other. The dominant interpretation after the Second World War was that the food-supply had to be restored, and that the agricultural infrastructure had to be improved and restructured. The other interpretation, that characteristic landscape elements had to be preserved, was overruled by the former.

The geodesy specialist, Benthem, did try to couple the policy of landscape planning with the strongly trusted restructuring policies. He wanted to make it "part of the game" (*cf. Section 3.5*). This coupling failed probably because of his timing. Other more pressing problems such as food-security and economic recovery were more important.

4.5.2 The example of Walcheren (A/B)

Although most initial attempts to integrate landscaping and consolidation plans failed, some reconstructions projects did succeed in doing so. A notable example is

the reconstruction of the Walcheren peninsula in the southwest of the Netherlands. It became an example for many other integrated projects.

In 1944, the allied forces bombed Walcheren destroying dikes, infrastructure and various villages. Consequently, many areas were flooded. The water created deep creeks in the fields (Andela and Bosma 1995, 281-289). After the war, the devastation in Walcheren presented an opportunity to not only to restore, but also to improve Walcheren's social-economic structure. One of the most pressing pre-war problems, for instance, was the large fragmentation of the fields: 15,000 hectares were divided over more than 31,000 lots. The exceptional devastation gave the ability to address such problems (Andela 2000, 81).

Imposing land-restructure

Because nearly everything had to be rebuilt, the committee leading Walcheren's reconstruction contained various experts such as city-planners, technical agricultural engineers, landscape-planners, industrial engineers and recreational experts.¹⁴ Because the government deemed the existing land-consolidation bill from 1934 insufficient for this large project, it formulated a new bill especially for Walcheren (Duynstee and Bosmans 1977, 458). The bill not only covered agricultural issues, but also pertained to recreation and nature preservation (Andela 2000, 80-81). Most importantly, the bill contained an obligatory land reconsolidation-program (Bogaarts 1989, 1550; Andela 2000, 91). This meant that the committee was able to impose reorganisations, which resulted in the enlargement of farms and arable lots (Andela 2000, 33). Farmers that terminated their business in Walcheren were offered new lots in the nearly finished land-reclamation projects in the *Noordoostpolders*: 118 farmers moved.

The initiatives in Walcheren exemplified a new method of land-consolidation. Coupling engineering and landscape-planning resulted in new roads and larger lots furnished with trees and plants characteristic to the peninsula. This provided benefits to farmers as well as tourists and the environment. 'Never before was so much sound agricultural soil sacrificed for landscape and recreation' (*ibid.* 84). By coupling preservation and restoration of the landscape in Walcheren's restructuring, the ideas of prominent intellectuals and biologists such as Thijsse and Benthem were realized. In due time, these ideas became institutionalised in various bills and policy-regulations. Although the coupling of Walcheren's reconstruction to landscape planning (and the conservation of nature) was prominent in putting the latter ideas on the policy agenda, not much evidence shows that farmers had arrived at favourable expectations for them. Most farmers in Walcheren thought of the restructuring as an improvement because, after the war, they only had emergency stables and salty fields on which nothing would grow. Every small change was thus considered as an improvement. Some

14. Benthem was also in this committee.

farmers, however, complained that the new roads passed their stables too closely or that they would make the value of their properties decline.

The reconsolidating committee did not, however, change its plans in response to criticism about the land-consolidation or landscaping plans (Andela 2000, 91). It was able to stay on its own course by the authority of the special Walcheren bill. The “acceptance” of the plans as it was formulated by the Walcheren consolidating committee amongst farmers, was the result of the emergency situation and legal coercion.

Although the farmers of Walcheren were somewhat sceptical of the reconstruction in the beginning, they became more enthusiastic over time. Straightend and enlarged fields, improved roads and drainage-systems had made working on the land easier for them.

The outcomes of the policy

The experiment in Walcheren had major impact on other reconstruction projects in the Netherlands. Its success showed that it was possible to integrate consolidation projects and landscape planning. It became the national example of successful restructuring and served to convince other steering committees in formulating comparable plans (*ibid.* 31). The national broadcasting association even made a film about the influence of Walcheren’s reconstruction upon the daily lives of its farmers. The scholar Andela concluded that ‘a regional reality was met with national approval’ (*ibid.* 91). In 1954 landscape planning became an integral part of the general land-consolidation bill.

Discussion and notes

In contrast to the case in *Section 4.5.1*, landscape planning was successfully coupled to reconstruction plans after the war. One important difference between the two cases explains this. The destruction in Walcheren was much larger than in the rest of the Netherlands. The landscape had been completely washed away and therefore new landscape-elements were desired. Hence, both policies were essential. In the rest of the Netherlands, however, most natural landscape elements such as bushes, trees and hedges were still in place. Here, they were considered as obstacles rather than valuable additions to the landscape.

The analysis of the Walcheren experiment seems, at first hand, to contain a paradox. The trust for Walcheren’s reconstruction was namely acquired in a coercive setting; this would contradict to the nature of trust. A closer look, however, shows that trust was only established *after* farmers had seen the results of the integrated plan. Even though coercion was used to produce these results, it was the results with respect to the re-allotment of fields and the new landscape furniture which served as reasons for trust, not the coercive policy. That is, providing the farmers *good* reasons first required implementation of the plan.

4.6 SOCIAL-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE POLICIES (A/B)

Besides supporting the landscape reconstruction, farmers were also stimulated to improve their business efficiencies after the war. This section illustrates how trust was established among large groups of individual farmers for various socio-economic activities so that they would improve their business efficiencies. Mainly, trust was acquired through the instructors and consultants of the farmer associations and organisations who coaxed farmers with examples of successful, modern production-techniques.

Improving business economics

Education and consultation had already proved to be successful tools in convincing farmers to modernize during the crises of 1880s and 1930s. Hence, they were once again considered after the war. In 1951, the state-instructor Penders said that 'the Dutch farmer is and ought to be world-champion in production efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore it is obvious that the Dutch farmer should be offered a sound and solid consultant-service' (Andela 2000, 128). Research, consultation and education were considered essential to renewing agriculture (Manders, Dijkhuizen, and Swierstra 1984, 77).

Before the Second World War, research and education mainly focused on increasing production and reducing costs. Artificial fertilizers were promoted as well as the use of high quality animal food. Moreover, consultants advised farmers to improve their production-methods by buying mechanic milking machines and other machines. This focus continued after the war supplemented by the propaganda for land-consolidation projects (Andela 2000, 128).

Improving housekeeping

Unlike before the war, however, these rationalization-policies, as they would later be called not only focused on the technical elements of farming, but also on the social structure of peasant families. Especially the sociologist Hofstee contributed to the analysis of sociological variables that would improve production. He claimed that farmers needed to change their mentality in addition to production techniques. Both Penders and Hofstee acquired these ideas in the United States of America when they were shown successful projects geared towards changing the psyche of farmers (*ibid.* 128-132).

After their return from the United States, Penders and Hofstee used many ideas they had learned there. They gave lectures to public and private agricultural consultants about rationalized business and housing management. Many of their ideas were inspired by the scientific management views of Taylor and Gilbreth. The consultants they trained, organised field-experiments, family-courses, and household efficiency programs for farmers' wives, to show them how to run a farm efficiently. They even

created standardized farms under coherent architecture, created a few model-farms and established some model villages. One of these model villages became known as the 'miracle of Kerkhoven'. It entailed the improvement of various farmhouses in one village combined with the modernization of housekeeping and production-methods.

Inspired by American planning ideas, the farmer wives in Kerkhoven were instructed to improve their daily activities, such as cleaning, sewing and ironing. They also obtained modern kitchens and were taught how to organize cupboards and storerooms.¹⁵ All farmhouses obtained closed bedrooms with sufficient daylight and ventilation instead of the traditional open sleeping places. Showers were installed or improved. Stables were modernized and hovels torn down. Many farm houses got electricity, sewers and water-pumps. Farmer wives were also instructed concerning personal hygiene, food, clothing and religious well-being. The latter lessons were of course organized by the farmer associations. In due time, many farmer families turned out to be happier (*ibid.* 136).

Local farmer associations from all over the Netherlands organized excursions to the model-villages for farmers and their wives to show improvements they could make in their own. The excursions worked and many farmers started deliberating and planning the improvement of their own villages. Hofstee had particularly hoped for this group-effect (*ibid.* 139, 141). The new initiatives by farmer communities were usually supported and stimulated by local farmer associations. Andela therefore concluded that especially the role of the associations was significant in the successful modernization of the country-side.

Discussion and notes

After the war, the government tried to use examples to establish trust among farmers for the modernisation of their farms. That is, they wanted farmers to copy the improvements that were first presented in the model-villages, and later in the houses of the pioneering farmers. These examples had to 'radiate' their influence over a whole local region (Karel 2000, 76). Policy makers and rural sociologists, such as Hofstee assumed that individual farmers, would modernize their farms in line with the modern ideas of rational farming (see, for example, Glas and Zwemmer 1958; Wouters 1958). In the texts, however, I found only little "evidence" of individuals switching from an I-mode to a we-mode because of these examples. For instance, utterances such as "we should also do this or that" were not found in the texts.

In her analysis, Andela suggests that especially the local leaders of the farmer associations 'who were already trusted by the farmers', played a major role in the mod-

15. Pictures of these kitchens are available in Andela 2000, 135,138. These pictures resemble the pictures that were taken by Lilian Gilbreth, available on <http://gilbrethnetwork.tripod.com/kitpics1.html> Last accessed 22/04/2004.

ernization of farming (2000, 141, 142, 151). These leaders stimulated the farmers to visit the model villages. Moreover, they organised exhibitions and invited the farmers to take part in courses. In other words, only when farmers were stimulated by local representatives of the farmer associations did they show a willingness to modernize according to the government's examples. Hence, the example mechanism did not appear to work in this case study. At least, I did not find evidence for this in the selected texts.

Although I did not find evidence for the example-mechanism as such, the examples given by the consultants however had their effects on establishing trust. The use of examples was more like a "tactic" to establish trust. Individual farmers and their wives became convinced when seeing the model villages and experiments, and therefore supported the rationalisation projects. This effect, refers to part A of the theory, while the example-mechanism refers to part B of my initial framework. In other words, the examples should be considered as persuasive arguments and *good* reasons to support the policies, rather than an explanation about the switch from an I to a we-mode.

4.7 DISTRUSTED STRUCTURAL POLICIES (A)

This section, provides a case analysis in which trust was not only not established for some policies but had even resulted in distrust. In it the actions of a peculiar individual farmer are studied who had conflicting views with farmer representatives and the farmer associations, over policy issues. He arrived at *unfavourable* expectations about many policies.

As mentioned in *Sections 4.2 and 4.3*, most farmers supported the food-supply regulations and the newly established corporatist organisations. They believed the after war crisis was a reason to co-operate. Not every farmer shared this view, however, notably those organised by *boer Koekoek*. They did not see themselves as part of the same game all the other farmers were playing. In contrast, Koekoek's group promoted the disentanglement of government bodies, associations and organisations.

While many farmers shuddered at the very thought of liberalisation, Koekoek considered the increasing interference of the government and the farmer organisations as a problem (Van Merriënboer 1991, 700, 702). He had various reasons for this sentiment, but the foremost was his distrust for the leading individuals from the established farmer-associations.

Koekoek distrusted the chairmen of the Protestant farmer associations because he had some bad experiences with them during the war. 'I just had had such bad experiences with that type of people. (...) I have learned a lot. Before the war I had already noticed that they were hypocrites. (...) But during the war, I suddenly woke up and realised that they were just pretending that they were against the Nazi-Germans; in

reality, they did not dare to take risks. And after the war, it was just the same (...) Those people were still in charge and decided what we had to do. I did not trust them at all' (Bartmans 1966, 35). Because Koekoek did not trust the chairmen, he also distrusted the associations and the initiatives they took after the war.

Koekoek hoped that the crisis and war regulations would be lifted after the war so that 'everything was free again (...) Those members of the CBTB, however regained their positions after the war. I [koekoek] disliked that. We thought that we would be free; that we did not have to deal with them again, with them controlling everything. The CBTB and all other associations supported those ideas [i.e. the creation of corporatist organisations, GB], because they held all the positions to themselves. Then I said to myself: This is no longer acceptable. Imagine that it would go on like this. Then we will never be liberated!' (*ibid.* 1966, 36).

According to Koekoek, the establishment of corporatist organisations meant a re-establishment of power for people he did not trust. In contrast to the chairmen of the farmers associations who suspended their uncertainties to a certain extent (*cf. Section 4.3.*), Koekoek emphasized the risks that came along with these organisations. 'The *landbouwschap* [the corporatist top-level organisation, GB] is a dictatorial institution because of its obligatory contribution. It is not an organ of co-operation, it works against agriculture. It does not further the interests of farmers; mark my words: the minister will ignore its advices completely!' (*ibid.* 40).

The rural sociologist Nooij also mentioned that Koekoek did not trust the farmers associations and the corporatist organisations because he did not feel represented by his own Protestant farmer association. He was a member of a small ultra-orthodox church whereas the CBTB mainly represented farmers from modest Protestant movements. Hence, Koekoek did not feel it was a trustworthy authority that could allow him to change his interpretations and suspend his uncertainties. His support was, therefore, primarily among these ultra-orthodox Christians (Nooij 1969, 214).

As a result of his distrust for the new corporatist organisations, Koekoek founded his Free Farmers association in 1946. Later, in 1958, he established his own political party: the farmers party (BP: *Boerenpartij*). It was suspicious about nearly all the initiatives of the government and the corporatist organisations. Koekoek's party did not support the general structure policies and, consequently, attracted mostly small and poor farmers who were the most victimised by them. When Koekoek refused to pay his obligatory contribution to the corporatist institution, the *landbouwschap*, he was considered to be an hero and many of the small farmers voted for him in the election of 1963. His electoral support increased further when he also supported farmers who had refused to pay their contributions as well and were extradited from their farms by the police (known as the incident of Hollandsche Veld, March 1963). In 1967 he gained seven seats in parliament.

Discussion and notes

The case of Koekoek illustrates the possible actions of individuals who do not share a certain dominant background set of intentional states. Instead of suspending risks and uncertainties, they emphasize them. Koekoek, for example, noted the strong control of a small group of individuals. According to his interpretation, this small group of individuals held all the power. And if they maintained that power, farmers would never be liberated. By emphasizing this risk, he not only tried to persuade others to become suspicious about this small group, but also tried to win support for his view that the government had to stop interfering with the day to day business of farmers.

Koekoek's actions resulted in the contradictory situation that many small farmers who were not able to abide by the structure policies started supporting his party (the BP: *Boerenpartij*). They saw Koekoek's party as a platform to express their discontent. Nonetheless, the party and its voters were not entirely in line. The BP wanted to totally terminate the government's meddling in farmer affairs whereas most small farmers demanded much more (financial) support from the government. Hence, the BP obtained the image that it represented the interests of small farmers, that it stood up for the underdog. If the party policies would have been implemented, however, the financial situation of small farmers would have deteriorated much further (Nooij 1969, 216). Apparently, Koekoek's communication of disagreement and distrust about government policies attracted individuals who disliked them too, but for other reasons. Hence, in some cases the communication of distrust may gain voters for a party irrespective of the platform.

4.8 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

In this section, I discuss the new theoretical findings about both parts of the theory. *Section 4.8.1* provides an overview of all the ways we encountered in the previous sections about how trust is established (the A-set of concepts). The findings about the social mechanisms explaining collective trust are presented in *Section 4.8.2* (the B-set of concepts). Some notes about the integration of both theoretical parts conclude this chapter.

4.8.1 The process of trust (part A of the theoretical framework)

This chapter has presented analyses of various policies established after the Second World War: the food-supply policies, the rationalisation policies, corporatism, the small farmers problem, integrated agricultural planning, landscape-planning and the socio-economic policies. Generally speaking, the early years after the Second World War were a period of restoration. The reasons and arguments provided for policies were mainly in terms of overcoming the emergency situation. Ministers, MPs, chair-

men of the farmer associations, church leaders and farmers all shared the view that the emergency situation had to be overcome as fast as possible. Consequently, risks and uncertainties concerning the strict regulations were easily suspended by the MPs ('undisputed policy') and leading figures of the farmer associations ('act loyally').

Tactics for establishing trust?

In the analysis of the different policies, a variety of specific actions were observed and discussed, which strongly resemble trust-establishing tactics. That is, they were either used to establish trust from individuals for a specific *interpretation* or to *suspend* certain risks and uncertainties. Especially the actions of minister Mansholt illustrate these tactics:

1. Mansholt communicated his ideas on long-term structural policies when farmers were still overcoming short-term problems. As a consequence, the risks and uncertainties of his interpretation were not well known at the grass-roots level. They were simply worried about other things. This made his long-term policies more readily acceptable.
2. Mansholt avoided discussing the potential consequences of the rationalisation and price and income policies. As a result, the risks and uncertainties that came along with them were obscured.
3. Mansholt was known for his habit of introducing radical policy plans, which were then, during deliberations, watered down to more realistic proportions. In the end, the policy that came out of these deliberations was much more supported.
4. Mansholt used the land consolidation policy as a trojan horse to get his plans for the restructuring of small farm accepted and implemented.

The word "tactics" implies that Mansholt did the above actions deliberately, knowing how they would influence trust among others (*cf. Section 3.5*). Whether this is actually the case is difficult to conclude.

Reason-giving

This chapter has shown that establishing trust is a process which requires reasons in line with the interpretations of the trustors. Many reasons were, for example, provided for the founding of the corporatist organisations. The Catholics and Protestants had ideological religious reasons while Liberals had more practical ones. Mansholt trusted them because he considered these new organisations as the continuation of the food distribution organisations of the Second World War. Finally, all involved actors trusted each other on a personal level due to long time association on a regular basis. This provided trust to the common experiment with corporatist organisations. Similarly to the trust given to corporatist organisations, a variety of reasons can be enumerated for

the trust in Mansholt by so many parties. His experience during the war and his reputation, for example, provided *good* reasons for the prime minister. Others trusted him because he was family (H.D. Louwes and S.L. Louwes). Farmer representatives trusted him because Mansholt was a 'farmer among farmers' (Van Merriënboer 1991, 705).

The reasons that individuals provide for trusting seem to have one common background: all are based on some existing source of trust. That is, every interpretation (at least, in this study) that leads to trust seems to contain on a previously established source of trust. Usually this source is some kind of authority, such as an ideology, an expert network, a family tie or a legal system. These sources are part of the background intentional states, as discussed in the theoretical *Section 2.4*. Hence, if one wants to establish trust for something or someone, he should refer to such an existing source of trust.

When an unknown person communicates a new policy and has neither the ability to place it within the context of an existing policy nor a firm position of authority, his personality is the only essential existing source of trust. In such a situation, his personality then serves as the last resort. With the deterioration of authority, the blurring boundaries between positions and the fast changing policy plans of modern society, I believe that this "last resort" will become increasingly important. That is, successful leadership in terms of establishing trust will be increasingly dependent on a person's character. A similar argument is made by Seligman (1997, 83).

Furthermore, just as in *Chapter 3*, the analyses in this chapter show that individuals with different (ideological) backgrounds can come to trust the same targets. Protestants, Catholics and Liberals, for example, generally promoted the idea of corporatism, or at least some kind of form of co-operative self-governance. A precondition for such agreement seems to be that all involved parties should have the freedom and opportunity to suspend the associated risks and uncertainties on their own terms. This implies, for example, that no one party should dominate the deliberation process. This prevents that the only *good* reasons given are from the dominant one. When one party does dominate the proceedings, other parties will only hear this dominant interpretation which may make them indifferent or even cynical.

Failing to establish trust

This chapter contains several cases in which trust was not established. These seem to show that "trusting and distrusting" are not black and white categories. Instead, trust and distrust are merely the extremes of some linear trust function, and a person can be anywhere between the two. Consider, for example, that risks and uncertainties are partially suspendable. Catholics and Protestants supported the idea of corporatism, but feared a loss of identity if too many tasks and responsibilities were transferred to the corporatist bodies. As a result, they maintained their ideologically based associa-

tions. Hence, Catholics and Protestants did not completely trust or distrust corporatist organizations, but were at some level in between.

The case of farmer Koekoek shows a situation of distrust. First of all, he did not share the general interpretation that the government had to interfere in societal life, but actually promoted the opposite position (i.e. the termination of state interference). Koekoek did so by deliberately and vigorously stipulating the risks and uncertainties that came along with the dominant views of the elite.

Finally note that distrust of a certain interpretation about an event or situation, for whatever reasons, can lead to the foundation of institutions. In Koekoek's case, for instance, a diverse group of farmers distrusted the official policies for various reasons, and consequently founded a new political party to express their discontent.

4.8.2 The social mechanisms (part B of the theoretical framework)

In this chapter both the coupling and examples social mechanism are discussed. The coupling mechanism was observed in *Sections 4.3.2* and *4.4.2* and the examples mechanism in *Sections 4.5.2* and *Section 4.6*.

The coupling social mechanism

The coupling mechanism differs from the other three because it does not explain how collective trust is established, but only how already existent collective expectations spill over to other things. I provided two examples of this mechanism. First, it was illustrated by the transfer of the collective trust for the food-supply organisations onto the newly founded corporatist organisations (*Section 4.3.2*). Second, the coupling mechanism was shown by the transmittance of the collective trust for land consolidation onto the landscaping plans (*Section 4.4.2*).

In the first case, the collective expectation was that the crisis organisations from the 1930s would help to avoid large economic dramas. Individual actions and expectations were derived from this single collective expectation. During and after the Second World War, the representatives added to this expectation, that these national organisations would be steered by themselves, not the government. They wanted corporatist organisations vested with legal authority. Thus, collective trust for the crisis-organisation was transferred to the post-war corporatist organisations. In the end, the farmer representatives had singular expectations about the new corporatist organisations only as part of a collective expectation about their ability to organise themselves.

The same mechanism goes for the way collective expectations about land consolidation were transposed to the integrated landscape, modernization and restructuring policies. It started with the collective intentional expectation that the country had to be rebuilt as soon as possible. These expectations, however, were easily extended onto land consolidation and, in due time, onto modernization (in terms of integrated landscape planning, rationalisation, and the enlargement of small farms).

Thusfar, I have been discussing from which target trust has been transferred. The question that remains to be discussed is how trust is transferred from one target to another. This has to do with the integration of both parts of my initial theoretical framework. As mentioned in *Section 4.8.1*, one of the most important reasons why individuals trust something or someone is due to some previously established source of trust. In the case of coupling, the reason that individuals transfer their trust from one target onto another is the previously established collective trust itself. Individuals in such a situation think, "we have been doing this together, we could also do that together". The experiences during the "game of rebuilding the national food-supply", became a reason itself for many farmers and state officials to move onto another, usually more broader collective target: the complete modernization of agriculture. Hence, the coupling mechanism is a process in which individuals evaluate previously established collective trust to decide about undertaking some other risk.

The examples social mechanism

Finally, some notes should be made about the examples mechanism. In this study, I assumed that this mechanism explains, just as the crisis and diffusion mechanisms, how individuals start trusting collectively. However, in *Section 4.6*, I questioned whether the provision of examples triggers such a process. The examples of *Section 4.6* were used to inspire individual farmers towards modernizing their farms. Thus, the provision of examples belongs, at least, in the analysis of the A-set of concepts. Yet, this does not mean they inspired collective expectations. The provision of examples produced a collective outcome, modernization, but not a we-mode of thinking. The actor that was an enthusiastic promoter of the modernization examples, the sociologist Hofstee, already pointed at this. Rather than inspiring a we-mode of thinking, examples can result in a competition between the individuals who are exposed to them. They might want to imitate the things that are shown and evoke some envy among their neighbours. As a result, the example is imitated by the others. This mechanism is also known as 'wolf-pack behaviour' or 'rational imitation' (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 306).