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## **Hidden morals, explicit scandals : public values and political corruption in the Netherlands (1748-1813)**

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## 7 Princely Patronage and Patriot Cause (1770s – 1780s)

### 7.1 Introduction

In chapters four and five I discussed how the Patriot period of the 1770s and 1780s witnessed major attempts at administrative and moral reform. In this chapter I provide a second case study against this backdrop. I focus on the criticism the Patriots had on so-called ‘aristocratic’ practices of patronage, nepotism and abuse of office for personal gain in a system of Stadholderly patronage that in many ways dominated the second half of the eighteenth century. In this system (discussed in detail below) the patron Stadholder placed clients in important positions to protect and further his interests. At the same time this often provided these clients with so much power that they themselves became patrons in their own right, often abusing their position for personal gain. In this chapter I will look at the acts of two such officials, Jacob van der Heim (1727 – 1799) in Rotterdam and Hugo Repelaer (1730 – 1804) in Dordrecht.

A fair amount of literature exists on the system of Stadholderly patronage in the second half of the eighteenth century. First and foremost (although written in Dutch) the topic has been explored in great detail by Gabriëls (1989). Despite of this I focus on Stadholderly patronage for two main reasons. First, the cases presented in this chapter form an essential link with the other cases of this study. In the search for changing public values and perceptions of political corruption from 1748 to 1813, the Patriot period is simply not to be missed. Fundamental (administrative, bureaucratic and moral) changes occurred which, although also in part independent and ‘new’, can and should be linked to the previous struggle of the Doelists and to later events in the Batavian period. This does not mean that we are to deny the importance of the Patriot period on its own. We should indeed not regard it merely as a prelude to the French-Batavian period after 1795 (cf. Klein 1995: 3-4). Instead, I argue that in the Patriot period many of the squashed public values of the Doelists regained strength and momentum and that the following French-Batavian period was in many ways a final fulfilment or victory of those values. Second, Stadholderly patronage and the cases in this chapter serve to get a closer and more specific look – from a ‘Johnstonian’ perspective – at the political corruption of the time and the public values that were expressed. This is a valuable contribution to our current understanding of this important period in Dutch political history since the explicit focus on scandals and public values is obviously closely related to, but still different from, existing discussions on political culture and/or institutional system of the time (cf. Gabriëls, 1989; Gosses & Japikse, 1947; Klein, 1995; Van Sas, 1988a, 2005; Schama, 1977; Vijlbrief, 1955). Existing historiography on the Patriot period has, in other words, not spent express, direct or specific attention to changing values of public administration and perceptions of political corruption. Therefore, it is the purpose of this present chapter to find out in more detail (in addition to what I have already discussed in chapter five) which views, values and perceptions were around in the Patriot period and how much change and/or continuity there was in public

value systems. We should wonder, for example, if the period was about realizing new public values (next to reinforcing old ones) and whether there were any fundamental changes in assumptions of what government was or should be about.

In the following I briefly discuss the link between emerging politics of the time and conflicting and changing public value systems. Next, I discuss the system of Stadholderly patronage in more detail as I focus on the (largely informal) system of recommendations in the province of Holland. Then, I turn to the two cases of Van der Heim and Repelaer. The critique on their dealings, the response they got from Patriot reformers as well as from their peers provide much information on changing public values and perceptions of political corruption at the time. I will end with an analysis similar to the other case studies of this book. There I assess the various values and value statements found, compare the sources of values and assess changing values within a wider (historical) institutional context.

## 7.2 Emerging politics, clashing value systems and public value change

Much like the other sub-periods distinguished in this study the Patriot period can be considered an important potential driver of public value change. We can hypothesize how the fundamental institutional changes of the time (those proposed and those actually put into practice) were not just about realizing, for instance, a new organization of town councils. It was also about realizing new ideas and values. Investigating change in public official morality in the Patriot period depends in large part on the emerging politics of the period. Baker for instance wrote how in eighteenth century France, political opinion became “the articulating concept of a new political space with a legitimacy and authority apart from that of the crown” (Baker, 1990: 199). For the Dutch situation (despite the fact that there was no ‘crown’) a similar conclusion can be drawn. As Van Sas (1988b: 18) stated, ‘modern’ politics were invented during the Patriot revolution of 1780-1787. Elsewhere Van Sas (2005: 223) wrote, “to many Dutch the Patriot period was a break from the past, despite the failure of the movement to gain actual power, that was of lasting importance. In the Patriot period the Dutch citizen lost its political innocence. He became ‘politically aware’, whether he wanted or not, regardless of his conviction”. In various publications such as the work of Van der Capellen and the *Herstelling* (see chapter five) a multitude of political issues were indeed discussed as people spoke of ideas and principles such as popular influence, representation, loyalty to and trust in government and the ‘right’ political system.

I explained in chapter five how Patriot best-opinion offered quite radical new perspectives on how public officials ought to behave and where their allegiance should lie. In many ways Patriot best-opinion tried to redefine the ‘political nation’. In this attempt political society was basically divided into ‘democrats’ and ‘aristocrats’. Patriot critique of aristocrats was heard everywhere and was exclusively used in a pejorative sense. The well-known Patriot activist Gerrit Paape (1752 – 1803) remarked how the term was an “iron hand grenade to each’s disposal” (Paape, 1798/2003: 46-47; op cit. in Klein, 1995: 228). Much like the term ‘regent’ nowadays (cf. Te Velde, 2005), it had become a term of abuse, basically referring to anyone who had any power over another and who abused that power in any way. Pieter ‘t Hoen, the writer of the important Patriot periodical *Post van den Neder-Rhijn*, distinguished between ‘conscious’ (people with honest characters but without much insight and with many prejudices) and ‘unconscious’ Aristocrats (those who willingly deceived the people, limited freedom of the

press and favoured their own family and friends over others). While one could find both kinds in both major political camps of the time (i.e., those against and those in favour of a strong Stadholder), the worst ones, according to Patriot ideology, were surely to be found on the Stadholder's side (Klein, 1995: 236). Israel furthermore noted how the Patriot terminology of democrats versus aristocrats was closely linked to the idea of freedom (2007: 14). This was again represented by Paape who wrote that freedom was always in danger from Aristocrats (and clergy) who knew how to manipulate the dependent, indifferent and ignorant burgher (1785: 9, 53, 55). Dependency would – incidentally – be a recurring characteristic of ‘bad’ government. The term Democrat on the other hand had a much more positive connotation and was frequently used by the Patriots to describe themselves. It certainly did not denote any actual influence of the real lower classes or populace (Palmer, 1974, part I: 331), but still meant more inclusion, participation, freedom and ‘popular sovereignty’ of a wider group of people than anything that had previously been proposed.

The terms democrat and aristocrat were central to the Patriot vocabulary of the 1770s and 1780s and pointed, according to De Wit's central thesis (1965, 1974), to the eighteenth century struggle between a powerful anti-Orangist oligarchic regent class of aristocrats on one side and pro-Orange democratic burghers, arguing for national unity, on the other. De Wit's thesis of an unbridgeable social-political gap between regents and burghers has since been often criticised (cf. Klein, 1995: 227-230; Van Sas, 1980; 2005: 20). It is, in short, considered too rigorous and therefore unsatisfactory to describe eighteenth century Dutch social political reality since we can find democrats and aristocrats *among* both regents and burghers. While I agree with the criticism that De Wit's thesis is too rough as a social distinction between groups I also believe this does not negate its use in marking the existence of two (almost ideal-typical) distinct political ideologies that potentially clashed in their visions of right and wrong, or corrupt and not corrupt. In this chapter these ideal-type political ideologies can therefore also be seen as two competing and clashing public value systems (cf. Van Sas, 1988b: 27) something that is discussed below as well.

### 7.3 The Stadholders' patronage as a catalyst for moral reform

In chapter four I discussed how patronage and brokerage were unavoidable and sometimes essential ingredients to make Dutch politics work. Especially in the second half of the eighteenth century these tactics were increasingly employed in competition between different opposing parties in the Republic (Israel, 1998: 1092-1093; Van Eijnatten & Wagenaar, 2007: 13). In chapter five I then discussed how much of Patriot best-opinion critique centred on the system of Stadholderly patronage of the second half of the eighteenth century. Essentially the Stadholder was a patron to clients. Sometimes (outside the province of Holland) these were called Lieutenant-Stadholders. At other times (inside Holland) they were simply called confidants (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 232 for this distinction). Both kinds of confidant acted as extensions of the Stadholder. Notorious examples of Lieutenant-Stadholders were Andries Schimmelpenninck van der Oije (1705 – 1776) in Gelderland (cf. Franken, 1997, 2002; Gabriëls, 1989: 185-190, 496, 499), the family of Van Lynden van Hemmen in the same province, Anthony Adriaan van Iddekinge in Groningen, Willem Carel Hendrik van Lynden van Blitterswijk in Zeeland, and Sigismund van Heiden Hompesch van Ootmarsum in

Overijssel (Van der Capellen's powerful adversary in the latter's fight against the *Drostendiensten*). Utrecht was in the hands of the infamous brothers Pestereers.

The Stadholder would use his confidants to select and appoint people in important offices in various administrative bodies of the Republic. The clients would protect and further the Stadholders' interests on a local level and did so by taking positions themselves, by handing out offices to others and by recommending people for them to the Stadholder (Gabriëls, 1989: 1). Especially in instances where the Stadholder did not have any direct right (mostly in Holland, see below), a system of indirect appointment came into being. The Stadholder would in that case appoint people in office from a short-list (usually itself the result of a contract of correspondence) provided to him by a town council. However, often it became informal custom that the Stadholder was already asked about his preferences *before* the town council would make the short-list. In such a way Stadholderly patronage was dispensed in a system of recommendations in which the Stadholder, as Gabriëls noted (1989: 73), could actively prevent the recommendation of people he did not like and further that of those he did like. A recommendation by the Stadholder was therefore essentially an appointment. The Stadholder would choose people based on the advice of his local representatives who provided him with information and made sure that like-minded (i.e., Orangist) regents would get the positions. In this system it was often near impossible to get offices without help from the Stadholder or his clients (Gabriëls, 1989: 17).

Many Patriots were appalled at how the Stadholder gave offices to members of the nobility or to people from outside towns or provinces which – again – makes it interesting that Van der Capellen himself had once been such an outsider (see chapter five). However, to the Stadholder the system made perfect sense. Bringing in outsiders would increase their loyalty to him and would ensure they could act independent of existing relations or a shared past with older 'native' members of the local administration. The Stadholder would thus use outsiders to develop extensive networks of patronage throughout the Republic in return for which these men would gain power and wealth. The confidants were usually expert power brokers who were skilled in navigating fluent political lines using all means necessary to attain their goals and those of their patron. This meant that high scruples were often not required. To William IV and Anna of Hannover, at least, political convictions were hardly important for becoming a confidant. Past enemies could just as well get the job as long as they performed well (Gabriëls, 1989: 235) and personal affection between patron and client seems not to have been much of a requirement (see on Van der Heim below). Also, lieutenants had money and power and used both to secure loyalty to specific patron interests (Blockmans, 1985: 236) as well as their own purses. Of course, as Gabriëls notes (1989: 153), money and/or power were not always the reason for helping the Stadholder. Ideological or political views could just as well be reasons for them to do what they did.

Still, many confidants used (or rather abused) their influence in arranging offices for personal gain. As such, the system of recommendations often led to intrigue, abuse of office and nepotism. What essentially united most, if not all, confidants was that they distributed offices to friends and family, increased their wealth using their public offices and ignored or circumvented (collegial) principles of office rotation and seniority on the 'shop floor'. Those who did not agree or were in any way critical of the Stadholder or his confidants were purged, given bad offices (that is: less influential and/or lucrative) or were otherwise bullied into submission (Gabriëls, 1989: 145-149, 152-153; Israel, 1998: 1082-1084). In Patriot opinion the confidants of the Stadholder displayed all sorts of 'corrupt' behaviour such as being haughty,

greedy, wasteful or selfish. For all these reasons the system of Stadholderly patronage and recommendations was despised by many in the Patriot period (Geyl, 1948-1959: 125-126). We have already seen (in chapter five) how Patriot best-opinion fulminated against it.

In Holland the Stadholder and his confidants had less influence on local politics than in the provinces in the periphery of the Republic (Gabriëls, 1989: 17, 232; Klein, 1995: 141). Because of this the Stadholder was forced to mostly recruit his clients via the system of recommendations. While the Holland city regents had long been able to retain their 'true liberty' due to their economic power (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 66-67) even they were forced to bow to the Stadholder from 1747 onwards as he managed to put confidants in important Holland positions. In all eighteen Holland towns with voting rights in the Estates of Holland, the Stadholder appointed members of the town council based on short-lists. In the ten most prominent cities of Holland, the Stadholder furthermore gained the right to appoint people as alderman, mayor or in various other offices. Only some cities, such as Leiden, Haarlem and Amsterdam (Gabriëls, 1989: 73), were sometimes able to dodge the Stadholder's influence in these matters. Other towns, such as Rotterdam and Dordrecht were not. In the following I will discuss two cases of political corruption of confidants in both latter cities to assess what other sources of values than best-opinion had to say on these matters. The two (highly similar) cases deal with of abuse of office by Jacob Van der Heim in Rotterdam and Hugo Repelaer in Dordrecht.

#### 7.4 Cases of political corruption

The scandal surrounding Jacob Van der Heim and Hugo Repelaer is, as was the case in chapter six, affected by the problem that not all sources can always be found at the same time. The cases that follow are mostly viewed from public opinion and shop floor sources (and are also juxtaposed to the best-opinion sources in chapter five) and, generally, lack a view offered by legal codes. This is not surprising given the enormous surge in public pamphlet literature in the Dutch 1780s in which accused and accusers all had a share. At the same time legal codes, including bureaucratic ones, were difficult to find essentially because of the absence of a *Rechtsstaat*. Furthermore, the offences of the Stadholder's confidants were only partly illegal as their functioning was often regulated by informal instead of formal codes. The complicated mix of formal and informal procedures and interpretations of whatever laws there actually were make the entire system quite 'shady' in a legal sense. In either case, the Stadholder's legal rights to appoint people were not very clearly defined and open to interpretation based on ever changing power relations. Despite or perhaps because of this, neither Van der Heim nor Repelaer would be summoned to appear before court. Instead, both were booted out of their administrative bodies by opposition from Patriots outside and their peers within the town councils. While this makes the legal source a somewhat difficult one to take into account, it is compensated by extensive coverage in the other sources of values.

##### *Hugo Repelaer*

Dordrecht was one of the Holland cities in which the Stadholder could recommend and in practice appoint people for offices. In Dordrecht the local confidant of the Stadholder had much power because the rules of seniority were not being obeyed. Instead of seniority, a

contract of correspondence (see chapter four) had been in effect since 1702 (Frijhoff, et al., 1998: 26-27). The contract had divided the forty members of the town council in two classes of twenty regents among whom the various offices were distributed. William IV made sure the contract was kept intact after 1747 but only in form. In reality he would now confer with the ruling mayors (who were not members of the town council but chosen from among its ranks, according to the contract of correspondence) about who would be eligible for which office. The members of the two classes of the town council did not have any influence over this (Gabriëls, 1989, part I: 235; part II (footnotes): 521). As such, the confidant in Dordrecht who suggested to the Stadholder which people to appoint, was not bound by any procedures (such as the contract of correspondence). This gave him much influence and opportunities for personal gain.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, two men competed for the favours of the Stadholder in Dordrecht. The first was Jeronimus Karsseboom (1706 – 1771), a former ‘Loevesteiner’ who had turned into an Orangist with the events of 1747 (Gabriëls, 1989: 235). Despite his original political convictions Karsseboom was given the task of confidant by William IV and Anna to keep them in the loop of events in Dordrecht and to advise them on who to appoint for various offices. Karsseboom exploited his position for personal gain, at least helping out friends and family and acquiring many offices for himself. His actions were openly criticised by other Dordrecht regents after Anna died in 1759 (Gabriëls, 1989: 235-236). Foremost among Karsseboom’s opponents during the 1760s was Hugo Repelaer, a member of one of the leading Dordrecht regent families (Palmen, 1998: 212). He was member of the Dordrecht town council since 1756 and holder of various (highly lucrative) offices ever since. Repelaer tried to take Karsseboom’s place in the 1760s but did not succeed. For a while, therefore, Karsseboom and Repelaer were forced to accept some form of shared power. However, when Karsseboom died in 1771, Repelaer became the one and only confidant of William V in Dordrecht. He was the all-important broker between Dordrecht and the court in The Hague and made sure he acquired all the benefits that came with the job. Repelaer, in the words of many contemporaries (see below) was renowned for his lust to rule. He was alderman (1757 – 1758), bailiff (1766 – 1771) and three-time mayor of Dordrecht (1778 – 1779, 1782 – 1783, 1794). Apart from that he was also Receiver of the ‘Convoeien’ (the right to levy money by the navy from shipping companies for the protection of their merchant ships) and ‘Licenten’ (rights imposed for the transport of goods to enemy territories) (in 1771), Dike warden of the Alblasserwaard and member of Gecommitteerde Raden of Holland (between 1775 and 1777), member of the Court of Audit (in 1782) and Drossaard of Liesveld (1790) (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 4: 1140).

In many ways, at least according to the Patriots and his fellow (excluded) regents in the town council, Repelaer was the personification of the typical Orangist confidant whose only purpose was personal gain and that of his close friends and family in the form of money, office and influence. In 1770, compare one of the pamphlets discussed below (Van Putten, 1782: 9), Repelaer supposedly appointed a friend as Receiver of the Common Means. In 1772, Repelaer has Paulus van der Heim (the son of Rotterdam mayor Jacob van der Heim, see below) appointed by the Estates General as second secretary of the Admiralty of Rotterdam.<sup>30</sup> Since Repelaer and Jacob van der Heim were relatives (their wives were cousins) and both were Stadholderly confidants, this was sometimes (see below) considered nepotism (cf. Gabriëls,

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<sup>30</sup> National Archives The Hague [NL-HaNA], *Family archive Repelaer 1496-1940*, 1.10.70, inv.nr. 20, appendix c.

1989, part VI: 522, footnote 534). Repelaer also asked the Estates-General for his son Ocker Repelaer (1759 – 1832) to be appointed as assistant Receiver of the Convooiën and Licenten in 1779.<sup>31</sup>

Repelaer's actions to recommend his friends and family for offices, his own collection of lucrative offices and his apparent complete disregard for such things as seniority and 'proper' office rotation got him many enemies both within and outside the town council. His actions, according to Gabriëls (1989: 237), were among the main immediate causes of the early Patriot success in Dordrecht to abolish the system of recommendations in August 1782. As such, we could even say that Repelaer seems to have almost single-handedly kick-started the Patriot revolt. Somewhat surprisingly, Repelaer and his followers were allowed to remain in the town council afterwards. They refused however, according to some because the Stadholder would reward them handsomely for their continuous support (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 4) which was indeed what happened when Repelaer was reinstated as the Stadholder's confidant in Dordrecht after 1787. Only with the Batavian Revolution of 1795 would he finally lose all his offices, after a career in public office of forty-three years.

#### *Public values from public opinion sources*

The actions of Repelaer led to agitation and protest from Patriots who expressed their opinions in public pamphlets. The decision by the Dordrecht town council to put an end to the recommendations was, for instance, hailed in the Patriot press on many occasions. One pamphlet provided two laudatory poems on the Patriot move to sideline both Stadholder and Repelaer. The courageous regents (two of which were apparently family members of Repelaer, see Missive, 1782: 12-13) valued freedom over treasure, honour over life. They withstood tyranny and were praised for their virtue, befitting "the grey-haired old man", meaning in this case Johan van Oldenbarnevelt<sup>cxxxii</sup> (*Tweetal lofdichten*, 1782: 3). Now, one of the poems continued, "bribery has been warded off, the chair of the mayors no longer occupied by flatterers. No slave bowing for favour and oppression will any longer approach the honourable council chamber".<sup>cxxxiii</sup> The poem ends with an appeal to squash all the other 'Repelaers' in the many towns of the Republic.<sup>cxxxiv</sup> Clearly, Repelaer was seen as an example of a confidant. Interestingly enough this also signals how the Patriot movement was at heart a truly national movement in the modern sense of the word as the various towns and provinces were explicitly connected through a shared Patriot purpose. This, in turn, denotes quite a wide and relatively new idea of common good and public interest. Similar sentiments appear in another pamphlet and short poem. It spoke of the past in which lust to rule had affected cowardly souls by binding them to own interests with a gilded hand. The oppression that had resulted from this could, however, not survive as soon as the Batavian would awake to turn the tide (*De herstellde vrijheid*, 1782: 2).<sup>cxxxv</sup> Then "one would once again find men in the [town, TK] council, who choose wisdom over slavish honour, despite slander, jeer and defamation" (Ibid., 3).<sup>cxxxvi</sup> Most important in the poem is the attack against arbitrariness which is the result of the many machinations of patronage and nepotism. People appointed in this way have, according to the author, become "alienated from oath and duty", have been muzzled and will stop at nothing to rule in an arbitrary way (Ibid., 3-4).<sup>cxxxvii</sup>

<sup>31</sup> National Archives The Hague [NL-HaNA], *Family archive Repelaer 1496-1940*, 1.10.70, inv.nr. 20

Putting an end to the Stadholderly recommendations in Dordrecht as early as 1782 had repercussions for the entire Republic (see chapter four). The Dordrecht town council (for whatever partisan reasons) radically changed an ‘old’ practice and directly aimed to break the Stadholder’s hold over the city. The public attack on the system boiled down to some fundamental debates on representation, self-interest, public interest and ‘appropriate’ behaviour. Bad regents were to be replaced with good regents and this led to a discussion what both actually meant. In a pamphlet by Johan Bareuth, a Dordrecht preacher, fervent Orangist and moral authority of the day, this central issue is very well illustrated. The pamphlet poses a crucial question: if the regents of Dordrecht acted only out of self-interest (and the author expects they do), what does this say about their morality and principles? To Bareuth the motives of the Patriot regents to depose of Stadholder and confidants were not as pure as the Patriots claimed. He signals a difference between acting out of public or out of personal interest and he concludes that the Patriot regents act according to the latter. They are hypocrites who do not act on behalf of burghers or city but only wish to protect their interests or play a nasty trick on the Stadholder. Here – incidentally – we also find the idea of the Stadholder as a victim of political corruption rather than its cause. Furthermore, the decision to end the recommendations is, according to Bareuth, “useful and necessary in every way” (an interesting point to make for an Orangist!), to ensure that “offices are obtained through rotation and rank [i.e., seniority, TK] without paying heed to the recommendations of the Stadholder”. “But”, Bareuth writes, “the grand question is whether this resolution is brought forth out of self-interest to get a big piece of the pie since now everything is being taken by only a few people, and out of old spite against the house of Orange, or out of true Patriotism” (Bareuth, 1783: 3-4).<sup>cxxxviii</sup>

Since self-interest, according to Bareuth was indeed the sole motivator of Patriot change, Bareuth could easily show the advantages of the present system, although with a few small adjustments. True Patriotism, according to Bareuth, was selfless and had to be ‘tested’ or measured by the first ‘constitutions’ in which the privileges of Dordrecht’s citizens had been written down. He was, of course, speaking of the restoration of the old privileges of the guilds. In a ‘conservative’ move, reminiscent of a demand once launched by the Doelisten (see chapter five) Bareuth argues how only the guilds have the actual right to appoint people in the town council and, thereby, in high offices. Both old and new Dordrecht town council (before and after 1782) are thus portrayed as oligarchies and both are rejected by the Orangist preacher. The new ‘Patriot’ regents, according to Bareuth, were no better than the old ones as all of them failed to protect the privileges of the citizens. They failed, in the words of Bareuth, to “live up to the great lesson of the conscience, do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you” (Bareuth, 1783: 3).<sup>cxxxix</sup> Has it, asks Bareuth, “been the consideration of duty to uphold the privileges of their cities or the self-interest, advantage and the urge one has to clip the wings of the Stadholder, to take from him what they themselves once gave to him out of lowliness or voluntary will (Bareuth, 1783: 4).<sup>cxl</sup> If the guilds, he continues, enjoy their rights to the fullest then all is right. But if they do not, let then these great Patriots, these champions of freedom, first remove the beam from their own eye before they remove the splinter from the eye of his Majesty” (Bareuth, 1783: 21).<sup>cxli</sup> He urges the Patriots to look at themselves first before blaming the Stadholder. They should, in other words, return power to the citizens and only then “shall they deserve the praise that true Patriots deserve”<sup>cxlii</sup> (Bareuth, 1783: 23). As such, Bareuth voiced a ‘public opinion’ (or is it a best-opinion?) against regency in general.

This must have sounded great; *both* to an Orangist populace and Patriots. It is another example of how meshed arguments and ideas sometimes could sometimes be.

### *Public values from legal sources*

Hugo Repelaer's political career ended (for the time being) as a result of the 1782 decision to stop the recommendations. To assess any formal legal views on the case, it is important to restate however that he was not removed from the council but, instead, chose not to submit to the new regulations. Even though he was formally bound to the instructions that came with his office and could have been judged by a legal standard such as new Patriot town council regulations after 1782 (cf. *Bedenkingen over het aanstellen van regenten*, 1787) or by oaths and instructions (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 269ff), this was not done. Only occasionally can one find any reference to the oath as a legal argument in public opinion pamphlets. Had members of town councils not, as one pamphlet wrote, "obligated themselves with their oath to uphold and protect the rights, privileges, interests of the people and citizens of their city?" (*Intressant vertoog*, 1782: 3). The use of such legal arguments was highly limited. In any case, Repelaer was never legally charged with any criminal offence or summoned to appear before any court.

Several reasons for this can be thought of, which on their own might provide at least a superficial view on the role and importance of legal codes in the case (and that of Van der Heim, see below). First, a court case against Repelaer might simply have been too difficult for the contemporary legal system to handle because Repelaer's actions were not easy to brand as illegal. The system of recommendations in Dordrecht (and Rotterdam) was a strange mix of formal and informal rules and procedures and practices (see also below). Formally the Dordrecht town council had the right to recommend people after which the Stadholder would make a choice. In that sense some of Repelaer's actions (getting offices for friends and family) had indeed been illegal because he circumvented those procedures. Yet the town council of Dordrecht had long since relinquished any real rights to recommend people to the Stadholder and had given the Stadholder (and his confidants) the power to recommend and in effect appoint people in its stead. In that sense the actions of Repelaer (and his fellow confidants across the Republic, see also on Van der Heim below) were not illegal or, in any case, very difficult to regard as such. Second, the fact that the Dordrecht regents had been forced to play the game of Repelaer and Stadholder made them, essentially, accessories to the 'offences' committed, an argument that was, as we have seen, also made by Bareuth. Seeing as the regents were essentially trying to regain power from the Stadholder to again hand out offices among themselves, any legal action might also be turned against them in the future. Third, not formally prosecuting Repelaer must have also been due to his social standing and prestige. Some people certainly were above the (fragmented) law. Court cases and criminal indictments against powerful officials such as Hugo Repelaer were uncommon in the Dutch Republic, a possible sign of both inequality before the law and a lack of 'bureaucratic' principles of administration. In 1782, Repelaer was still a powerful figure with money, connections and offices. Fears for revenge in the case of a possible return of his patron might have kept the other Dordrecht regents from formally accusing and prosecuting him. This was, in hindsight, a wise decision since Repelaer was indeed reinstated as confidant in Dordrecht after 1787. However, the absence of an actual court case, a criminal indictment or any kind of judicial review make it impossible to truly assess any public values from legal codes.

*Public values from shop floor sources*

I now turn to the final source of ‘shop floor’ public values. It should be noted here that in the case of Repelaer (and the one of Van der Heim below), the line between shop floor and other sources of values is particularly difficult to draw. Most pamphlets are either anonymous or from an untraceable author, making it hard to label or categorize a source. Still, some sources can be called ‘shop floor’ based on interpretation of their content. In the following, pamphlets are labelled ‘shop floor’ for various reasons but mostly when authors display detailed and accurate knowledge of how things worked and/or constantly argue for reinstating the old system of correspondence and rotation (which was a typical comment any regent on the shop floor would make) instead of recommendations which they often found arbitrary. Also, documents are likely to be ‘shop floor’ when authors complain about the negative sides of confidant behaviour from the perspective of an excluded regent (such as harming his commercial interests) rather than from the perspective of a disadvantaged populace.

One such shop floor pamphlet focused on the convention of 1782 in which the Dordrecht town council regents had ended the Stadholderly recommendations. According to the anonymous author the town council had simply been forced to do so because of Repelaer’s actions. The author asked why the town council never halted the “arbitrary recommendations in giving offices”<sup>cxliii</sup>, since “Repelaer had done nothing else than betray the trust invested in him by the Stadholder only to get for himself and his family in the most illegal way the favours of government, proven by the number of functions he has gotten out of turn and only because of the favour of the Stadholder” (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 3-4).<sup>cxliv</sup> The use of the word illegal is of course interesting here since explicit legal codes hardly appear in this case. However, illegal is meant here as not following office rotation, i.e., waiting your proper turn. Repelaer’s ploy to get an office for his son Ocker (see before) is also mentioned in the pamphlet but now Repelaer’s schemes to try and get his second son, Johan Repelaer (1760 – 1835) appointed as *Raad en Rentmeester Generaal van Zuid-Holland* (something in which Repelaer seems to have failed) was also mentioned. Repelaer had been so hell-bent on getting offices that, according to the pamphlet, “as soon as anyone gets sick this gentleman is ready to take his position for himself or his children, which is easy for him since the Stadholder has put his faith in him and believes no one loves him [the Stadholder, TK] more and will do more for him in the city of Dordrecht” (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 4).<sup>cxlv</sup> It is noteworthy that the Stadholder does not appear to be considered a guilty party in all this by the author of this pamphlet. Instead he is considered as much a victim as anyone else. Repelaer himself and the lack of action of the Dordrecht town council were to blame.

The author of the pamphlet has good insight into the system of Stadholderly patronage as he then puts his finger on one of the main weaknesses of the system. As soon as the majority of the city regents become unhappy, he writes, the system starts to fail. It might have been a way for him to argue for the return of collegialism and rotation. This, after all, had been the reason why the original contracts of correspondence were so successful. They kept everyone happy in the sure knowledge that the spoils of government would someday be theirs. When that security disappeared with the increasing entrenchment of Stadholderly recommendations, the foundations of the system were in danger. Still, the pamphleteer seems to be saying that having a Stadholderly confidant does not necessarily have to be a bad thing. It only becomes a problem when the confidant overstretches and thereby hurts rather than furthers

the Stadholder's interests (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 5).<sup>cxlvi</sup> As an extension of the Stadholder's power the confidant has to tread carefully between local city regent interests and Stadholderly demands and actions. They were often in a difficult position, having to maintain harmony between a large variety of actors (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 150-152) and Repelaer had according to the pamphlet failed to do so. He had not "used appropriate means to strengthen the harmony between Prince and government". He had "ignored and thwarted all resolute decisions of the government concerning the troubles with England" to please the Stadholder but in fact had "treated the Stadholder with contempt". He had "willingly failed to understand that the regents knew well how bad all this [i.e., finding a solution for the crisis with England; meaning the restoration of the fleet] would be for their personal [commercial, TK] interests but that they did this for the nation's wellbeing (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 5).<sup>cxlvii</sup>

A number of interesting values and value statements can be found here. Maintaining harmony between regents and Stadholder seems highly important, especially when compared to many cases of seventeenth century Dutch political corruption in which corruption essentially meant not maintaining harmony on the shop floor (cf. Hoenderboom, forthcoming; Hoenderboom & Kerckhoff, 2008). Also, the criticism that Repelaer acted selfishly and disregarded the nation's interests is interesting. Repelaer's way of distributing offices was, finally, also unbearable to the pamphleteer. "This is", he wrote, "solely dependent on his arbitrary goodness, to get douceurs [gifts in the form of money, TK], instead of being dependent on the order of government [rotation and seniority, TK]. His authority is accompanied by an unbearable haughtiness and contempt for his fellow regents, claiming to be a man without whom no office in Dordrecht can be acquired (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 5-6).<sup>cxlviii</sup> Again we see critique towards possessing certain 'bad' character traits and not following proper (though not bureaucratic!) procedures. Regents are simply no longer able to know what is going on. All the order and regularity they had been used to (so consistent under the old contracts of correspondence) went out the door in the system of Stadholderly recommendations.

We have already seen that Repelaer, together with five other regents, declined the town council's offer to stay on as its members after 1782 (of the forty members, twenty-six immediately voted in favour and eight would sign later). According to this shop floor pamphlet, they did so because they "only had their short-term interests at heart, because otherwise they would see how the convention [to abolish the recommendations, TK] was good for the citizenry and the government because of the free deliberations it enables"<sup>cxlix</sup> (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 7). The author suspects that the seven were only trying to hold out as long as possible to see which side (Dordrecht regents or Stadholder) would offer them the best deal.<sup>cl</sup> The recalcitrant regents – among whom was also Pieter Pompejus Repelaer, brother of Hugo – in the end refused because of promises by Repelaer and (presumably) the Stadholder of future positions. In a sarcastic note the author writes he hopes that Repelaer "will keep his promise instead of keeping for himself a great portion of all these reserved offices" and that he will still have the power to dispose of them since the Stadholder must at some point realize that it had been Repelaer who destroyed his chances in Dordrecht (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 10).<sup>cli</sup> Then, the author unfolds his vision of the future government of Dordrecht, consisting of "delegates that feel subordinate to the responsibility of their principals, who have freedom loving feelings and display enough resolve to govern their city in accordance with the wishes of their able Pensionary" (this was Cornelis de Gijsselaar, see below) (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 14).<sup>clii</sup> The recommendations had to end to safeguard free deliberations because in that

system “even the most able, powerful and selfless regent will find it hard to serve his country when he is robbed of offices, that should have been his, by cowardly flatterers and courtiers” (*Missive van den heer L.V.J.*, 1782: 15).<sup>cliii</sup> Interestingly, public values of delegation (of authority) and free deliberation had a very particular meaning here. To the shop floor regents this meant being free from the influence of Stadholder and his confidants and had seemingly little to do with popular representation or accountability.

Similar sentiments reappeared in other shop floor pamphlets of the time. One pamphlet argues how Stadholderly recommendations and patronage had caused political power to move away from its original base, i.e., the cities and their regents. The pamphleteer counters the attempt at centralization apparent from the acts of the Stadholder and his confidants. In short, particularism and ‘bottom-up’ administration were under attack. The language is interesting as the pamphlet states that the cities provide the money and thereby form “the main nerve of the state [...]. When this source is not pure then the entire form of government will be affected. When the central nerve is struck by disease, calamity must follow through all branches of government and its pernicious influence will be felt everywhere” (*Intressant vertoog*, 1782: 4).<sup>cliv</sup> Here (as elsewhere, see chapter eight) ‘classical’ notions of political corruption – in terms of disease, illness or being unwholesome – reappears. It meant moving away (a degeneration) from a state of purity. The corruption of the entire body politic was caused by Stadholderly recommendations and the acts of his confidants “because”, the pamphlet continues, “those regents who obtained office through the Stadholder will not counter him. They will use their opportunities to indulge in their main motives of glory, lust to rule power and self-interest” (*Intressant vertoog*, 1782: 5).<sup>clv</sup> Any beginning to counter this state of affairs has to be reform on a city level since the town councils are the spring from which all other administrative bodies are formed (*Intressant vertoog*, 1782: 12).

Another particularly outspoken shop floor pamphlet was entitled *De legende van Hugo Repelaer* (Van Putten, 1782) written by a man called Gijsbert van Putten. Van Putten does not appear as member of the Dordrecht town council or in any other official office within or outside Dordrecht at the time. Perhaps, because authors often wished to remain anonymous, the name was a pseudonym dedicated to two ‘Patriot’ heroes – incidentally stemming from Dordrecht – Cornelis de Gijsselaar (Gijsbert?) and Cornelis de Witt, whose manor in South-Holland had been in the town of Putten. These men would often (see below) be made to serve as symbols of good Patriot regents. De Gijsselaar (1751 – 1815) was pensionary of Dordrecht between 1778 and 1787 and one of the main Patriot leaders and anti-Orangists of the 1780s alongside Van der Capellen and others (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 10: 309-310). Cornelis De Witt (1623 – 1672) had been a symbol of regent ‘true liberty’ and martyr for this cause ever since he had been murdered by the Orangist populace in the ‘year of disaster’ 1672 together with his brother, Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt (1625 – 1672).

Given his criticism and what is supposedly his reverence for men like Gijsselaar and De Witt, the author was someone close to or at least sympathetic with the regents even though Van Putten does cast his net somewhat wider than that. The pamphlet targets Repelaer in specific as well as the system of Stadholderly patronage in general as it calls upon the citizens to get rid of the Stadholder’s favourites by means of force for the purpose of the common good. They are to be replaced by those “not blinded by the glitter of gold, in whose soul no ignominy can be found” (Van Putten, 1782: 2).<sup>clvi</sup> Repelaer was, of course, one of those regents to be removed because of “the behaviour and character of this lieutenant Stadholder”, a term that was – incidentally – therefore used at the time as well. Several main (bad) characteristics of

Repelaer are emphasized in the pamphlet. First, there is his lack of caution, in the sense of the classic virtue of *prudentia* but also, perhaps, in the sense of adhering to shop floor codes of office rotation and waiting one's turn. Second is his lack of courage, something which the author is sure Repelaer would never acquire beyond mere external display (Van Putten, 1782: 3). Ever since his early childhood, the pamphlet continues, Repelaer's language has been tough but his actions cowardly instead of illustrious with the result that his countrymen have had to stick up for him on many occasions when they did not want him to become a target of slander and contempt (Van Putten, 1782: 4).<sup>clvii</sup> Possibly, the author of the pamphlet was referring here to the fact that Repelaer had failed to overthrow Karsseboom in the 1760s. Repelaer was accused of not being able to fend for himself, which was arguably a desirable characteristic for a city administrator. Repelaer was also accused of adultery and having loose sexual morals when the pamphlet told how, in 1758, he "had married, after several previous love affairs, a loveable, virtuous and God-fearing woman", but that "her piety was a burden to him just like his infidelity with two women had been a nail in her coffin" (Van Putten, 1782: 4).<sup>clviii</sup> Similarly, Repelaer's actions vis-à-vis Karsseboom were a clear sign of the former's corrupt nature. Repelaer, supposedly in a drunk state, once publicly denounced Karsseboom as a villain for which insult he was made to publicly apologise to Karsseboom (Van Putten, 1782: 6). This, according to the pamphlet, was the reason for Repelaer's later lust to rule and his meddling in every affair. His antagonism with Karsseboom led him to want revenge and use every cunning trick or vicious fabrication to this end, "even under the pretext of serving the nation's interest" (Van Putten, 1782: 7).<sup>clix</sup>

Repelaer's lust for offices was another main criticism as the pamphlet states how he is "known throughout the city as a true courtier [in the most pejorative sense of that word, TK] [...] someone willing to do anything to get what he wants, thereby forsaking oath, honour, duty and conscience".<sup>clx</sup> The pamphlet makes much of Repelaer's career and his machinations to acquire offices. It tells of how Repelaer in 1759, after having been a member of the town council only for three years (i.e., rules of seniority are out the door!) displayed "the greatest lust to rule and selfishness after the death of Anna" and "joined several members of the town council that were not pleased with the [city] government [i.e., Karsseboom, TK]". Repelaer, the pamphlet states, used all the "scheming, intrigues or cunning ways that he knew of to get what he wanted".<sup>clxi</sup> While Repelaer was unsuccessful at the time (because Karsseboom was still in power, TK) and the vast majority of regents did not submit to his unbearable lust to rule<sup>clxii</sup>, his early attempts did already show his "seditious mind [...] almost nothing could happen without him interfering and passing judgment with the greatest conceitedness (Van Putten, 1782: 4-5).<sup>clxiii</sup>

Van Putten continues by saying that with the advent of William V in 1766 the time had finally come for Dordrecht to submit to Repelaer's political domination.<sup>clxiv</sup> Repelaer, "always worshipping the rising sun [...] used all his influence to protect and serve the interests of the Stadholder for which the latter fattened him and his friends up, as long as there was no villainy they would not commit.<sup>clxv</sup> Repelaer's political corruption, according to the pamphlet, therefore also became apparent from Repelaer being a 'wind vane' without backbone and/or principles. Furthermore, everything was done by him to get offices "without there being any chance left for the old regents" (Van Putten, 1782: 7-8).<sup>clxvi</sup> Repelaer was in this way being criticised for ignoring the old rules of rotation and seniority under the existing contract of correspondence. On one occasion (in 1770 according to the pamphlet) Repelaer, for instance, supposedly gave the office of Receiver of the Common Means (a lucrative office, see chapter

six) to one of his friends while then mayor Van Ouryk (lawyer at the Courts of Justice in the Hague and later Dordrecht and alderman and mayor of The Hague and later Dordrecht) had ‘rightfully’ claimed this office, first for his son and then for himself (Van Putten, 1782: 9). To Van Putten, the case of Van Ouryk and the (supposed) dealings of Repelaer provides a typical account of machinations in obtaining office in an eighteenth century Holland town. It was portrayed as the kind of cunning and intrigue Stadholderly confidants were renowned and despised for.

The pamphlet describes how Repelaer took the offices of Receiver of Convoeien en Licenten and the Dike wardenship for himself in 1771, as soon as they became vacant (Van Putten, 1782: 9). He had done so despite the fact that Karsseboom had already stipulated (before his death) that his son would get the office of receiver and that Repelaer would ‘only’ get the Dike wardenship. For Repelaer, according to the pamphlet on account of his greed, this was not enough (Ibid., 9).<sup>clxvii</sup> At the same time Repelaer knew he had to tread carefully as “to ask openly for both such considerable offices could cause offence”. To avoid problems, he publicly declares the office should go to mayor Stoop who was himself a member of a long since established Dordrecht regent family (Palmen, 1998: 212) with, incidentally, close ties to the family Repelaer (Schotel, 1998: 15). Stoop wanted it for his nephew Van Puttenbroek. At the same time the pamphlet states that Repelaer, “against all traditions”, assembles a committee containing his friends and relatives and sends it to the Stadholder. The committee’s job is to ask the Stadholder if he would be willing to give the vacant office of Dike warden (which Repelaer already promised to Stoop) “to a capable person”. Apparently the scheme worked. When William asked the committee if they had any particular person in mind they suggested (of course) Hugo Repelaer<sup>clxviii</sup> (Van Putten, 1782: 9). Now Repelaer had publicly promised the office to Stoop but had secretly arranged for the Stadholder to overrule that decision in his own favour. He had shown his devotion to the Stadholder, had seemingly (in public) followed informal rules of seniority but had at the same time gotten the office he wanted.

Van Putten seems to know exactly how things worked as he states that now “the Stadholder was confirmed in his belief to have found such an able and beloved man as his lieutenant Stadholder” and Repelaer “had the opportunity to show his love for the Stadholder to serve him by taking such a demanding task of Dike warden, a job that would only provide a few bags of guilders” [...] and “this shows the extent of the cunning of a human’s heart, when one sacrifices everything to his own interest” (Van Putten, 1782: 10-11).<sup>clxix</sup> Mayor Stoop (the pamphlet reads) felt utterly betrayed in the meantime, especially since he had helped Repelaer to acquire an office (of Dike reeve) for one of Repelaer’s friends only two years earlier in 1769. At the time, Stoop had helped secure the office for Repelaer’s friend “in an unheard-of, unusual, yes to all utterly unknown way, completely going beyond any bounds of honesty”<sup>clxxx</sup> (Van Putten, 1782: 11). This provides interesting views on what are essentially shop floor codes made public. On the one hand Van Putten writes that Stoop himself had ‘gone beyond all bounds of honesty’ in pleasing Repelaer. On the other hand, while Stoop had thus been ‘corrupt’ himself, Repelaer had committed an even greater sin when not returning the favour. To Van Putten (and most likely to Stoop as well) it had been wrong that Repelaer tried to get the job in the first place but it was even worse that he had done so by going against all shop floor codes of collegialism, ‘regent’ honesty and harmony. Political corruption meant not honouring the codes of the shop floor which, simply put, said scratch my back if I scratch yours or as the pamphlet stated: one service is worth another (Van Putten, 1782: 12).<sup>clxxxi</sup>

Van Putten then goes on to state that after Karsseboom's death in 1771, Repelaer had "reached the top, and the entire city had to worship him and dance to his tune: should anyone have the courage to ask for an office without his consent, they would earn his disfavour" (Van Putten, 1782: 11).<sup>clxxii</sup> His lust to rule and meddling knew no bounds. Only his fellow members of the Gecommitteerde Raden (he was a member from 1775 to 1777) were, so it seems, able to outplay Repelaer and keep him in check. On a Provincial level he was therefore not as 'capable' as he would have liked to be which apparently made his reign in Dordrecht all the worse (Van Putten, 1782: 11-12).<sup>clxxiii</sup> Repelaer continued to hand out offices as he pleased to people he could use. Always, so the pamphlet reads, he ensured himself of future support in return for an office which many regents, being the "Judases" they are, happily did (Van Putten, 1782: 12). Van Putten also discusses Repelaer's move to get the Stadholder to appoint his son Ocker (see earlier) as assistant Receiver of the Convooyen in 1779 even though the latter was apparently still in school. Supposedly the Stadholder had in this way wanted to thank Repelaer for safeguarding the office of Dike warden (the one promised to Stoop) for the Orangist camp.

When Repelaer's credit in Dordrecht started to wane in the 1780s he was, according to Van Putten, ever less able to find regents who were willing "to sacrifice honour, oath and duty for their own interest" (Van Putten, 1782: 13). He could find ever less "nourishment for his dishonourable impertinence" (Van Putten, 1782: 13).<sup>clxxiv</sup> Among the reasons mentioned by the pamphlet were Repelaer's Anglophilia and a general drop in revenues from commerce. Fellow regents were, in other words, less likely to put up with Repelaer's scheming the more their own commercial interests dwindled. His disregard for the codes of the shop floor were also to blame, as were his continuous efforts to serve his own interests instead of those of the nation (presumably in the fight against the English). And so, essentially due to the hypocrisy and self serving nature of his fellow regents, Repelaer was ousted from power by the town council (see earlier) "to get rid of the yoke of such a tyrant, to be able to guard with force the wellbeing of the fatherland, their city and freedom and to restore their government constitution which had been so trampled because of cowardly compliance". Now, the pamphlet states, "that salutary and reasonable objective can be attained that every regent in time is [should be] able to taste both the benefits and the burdens of government [in this way] they can prevent cowardly and lowly flatterers to keep offices for their own interest in fixed hands who thereby trample on their duty and oath" (Van Putten, 1782: 14).<sup>clxxv</sup> Essentially (compare the author of the pamphlet "Missive van den heer L.V.J". discussed earlier) the author writes how it is in principle not wrong to reap the benefits of public office, as long as one deserves them. With offices "in fixed hands" the author meant, I believe, that they should be in the hands of the regent oligarchies and should be given to regents based on seniority and rotation. They should not be in the hands of a single actor. Here we see the shop floor self-interest of an excluded regent who wants things to revert back to the stability and security of the old ways.

At the end of the pamphlet Repelaer is contrasted with 'good' Dordrecht regents in past and present. First there was De Witt van Jaarsveld (1696 – 1769), grandson of the murdered Johan de Witt (see earlier) in whom "composure and caution, bravery and wisdom, and honesty and unfeigned fear of God had always gone hand in hand" (Van Putten, 1782: 14-15).<sup>clxxvi</sup> Second, there were (again) Cornelis de Gijsselaar, Adriaan van Zeebergh and Johan van Berckel (two leading Patriot pensionaries of, respectively, Rotterdam and Haarlem). The latter is praised for being "a good soul, able, diligent, honest, firm or resolute and impervious to temptation". On Gijsselaar, the pamphlet continues, "you can count as on a copper wall. You would sooner see him lose his tongue than that he would harm the burdens [duties? TK] [of

office, TK] he has received only to please others” (Van Putten, 1782: 15).<sup>clxxvii</sup> Both De Witt and Gijselaar were furthermore praised for their incorruptibility or unimpeachable integrity. If only the government of Dordrecht was in the hands of such men. Instead, Repelaer and others did everything for their own interest (Van Putten, 1782: 16).<sup>clxxviii</sup>

### *Jacob van der Heim*

Just like Dordrecht, Rotterdam was in the grip of the Stadholder’s confidants for most of the second half of the eighteenth century. In Rotterdam, Jacob van der Heim was the leading local representative and confidant of Stadholder William IV, Princess Anna and later Stadholder William V. Van der Heim was a typical example of a confidant. He was essentially the Hugo Repelaer of Rotterdam (as well as the latter’s relative as we have seen). He was undoubtedly selected as confidant because of the old and strong ties between the Van der Heim family and the house of Orange. Jacob’s father Anthonie van der Heim (1693 – 1746) had been Grand Pensionary of Holland and a staunch Orangist all his life. Jacob van der Heim’s first office of any significance was Secretary of the Admiralty of Rotterdam in 1746. This position along with his connections and family ties brought him in close contact with both Stadholder and his court in the Hague, which Van der Heim indeed frequented. The office brought him close to the Stadholder due to the latter’s interest in naval affairs since the Stadholder was General-Admiral of the Dutch fleet and its highest ranking officer. Van der Heim was also close friends to the Duke of Brunswick (Gabriëls, 1989: 237).

Gabriëls (1989: 237-238) briefly outlines Van der Heim’s career which was truly launched when Anna of Hannover disregarded the usual nomination procedures and circumvented the short-list of Rotterdam. In 1758 she gave Van der Heim a seat in the Rotterdam town council which he would keep until 1795. However, his first term as confidant ended quickly. When Anna died in 1759 Van der Heim was without a patron and his fellow town council members immediately excluded him from obtaining any offices in a quickly drafted new contract of correspondence. Van der Heim would be excluded for the coming seven years until William V assumed full responsibilities as Stadholder in 1766. From that year onwards Van der Heim would be confidant once again. In typical regent fashion, Van der Heim occupied an impressive string of legal, financial, military and ‘charity’ offices in, around and on behalf of Rotterdam during the second half of the eighteenth century (cf. Unger, 1892: 563-564). Foremost among them (besides his seat on the town council) was his position as mayor to which he was appointed by the Stadholder in 1766, an office he would occupy six times. His secretariat of the Admiralty also continued until 1795. Finally, but no less important, Van der Heim was one of the governors of the Rotterdam chamber of the Dutch East India Company from 1759 to 1795.

Van der Heim must have been a talented confidant as he managed to hold on to power for roughly three decades. The fact that his name was apparently mentioned by the Stadholder as candidate of Grand Pensionary of Holland and, also, as clerk (or *registrar*) of the Estates General (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: footnote 540 to part VI) might be proof enough of his talents. On the other hand it seems more likely that the Stadholder only threatened to give such a high office to Van der Heim because he knew of the opposition towards his confidant. Any suggestion that Van der Heim would really get such an office would have startled (which it did) the latter’s many opponents which would make it easier for the Stadholder to get what he

wanted. This can be deduced from the facetious way in which the Stadholder apparently proposed Van der Heim as candidate for Grand pensionary to Philip Jacob van der Goes (1728 – 1789). Van der Goes (cf. Engelbrecht & Poelmans, 1973: 354; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part I: 949) was one of the leading opponents of Van der Heim in the Rotterdam town council (Krämer, 1901-1918, I: 98). He had been one of the driving factors in the removal of Van der Heim in 1782 and the related decision to end the Princely recommendations in Rotterdam. He had also been removed from the town council as a result of his Patriot sympathies in 1788 and was, for all these reasons, the perfect man for the Stadholder to startle into submission.

Van der Heim seems to have served both William and his own interests well and in Rotterdam, as had been the case in Dordrecht, his reign led to much (perceived) abuse of office (see below). In 1782, loathing towards him was mixed with political momentum when the Rotterdam town council, following Dordrecht, decided to end the system of recommendations. Here too, as suggested by Gabriëls (1989: 238), the behaviour of Van der Heim was a major factor in the town council's radical move. They did not waste any time and immediately excluded Van der Heim and six other regents from obtaining offices by means of a new contract of correspondence. At the height of the Patriot movement in 1787 he was even removed from the town council altogether. Only after the Prussians restored the Orangist order and crushed the Patriot revolution (see chapter four) did Van der Heim return to Rotterdam to again be William's confidant. In the end, the Batavian Revolution of 1795 proved to be the final end to his public career. As French troops marched on Rotterdam he fled to Bremen (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part I: 1054) but soon returned to Rotterdam in 1796 where he died in 1799.

Much like Repelaer, Van der Heim used his special relation with the Stadholder to effectively gain control of the Rotterdam town council from 1766 onwards. His privileged position and the power, money and influence derived from his various offices enabled him to dispense patronage and make use of nepotism to get what he wanted. Van der Heim clearly knew how to be both patron (of officials in and around Rotterdam) and client (of William V) and was, all things considered, a powerful man. His nepotism and the fact that he disregarded proper procedures would be a main line of critique (see below). We have already seen, for instance, how his son Paulus had been recommended by his relative and counterpart Hugo Repelaer to the Estates-General to become second secretary of the Admiralty of Rotterdam. Jacob van der Heim had apparently left nothing to chance in this case. Upon his own appointment as secretary he already had it stipulated that his son Paulus would succeed him as (first) secretary when he died, making the office for Paulus a done deal.<sup>32</sup> Repelaer's help to already make Paulus second secretary when Jacob was still alive and would obviously further such endeavours.

Apart from critique on nepotism and circumventing proper procedures on the shop floor (see below) there was also a persistent, though as yet unsubstantiated rumour that Van der Heim had personal gain from his office as secretary of the Admiralty. The five Admiralties of the Dutch Republic were highly autonomous 'semi-private' organizations. They were responsible for equipping the Dutch naval fleet and its maintenance, waged the naval wars of the Republic and protected Dutch trade and commerce across the globe. They also administered affairs on shore, such as shipyards, warehouses and arms depots (Groenveld & Wagenaar, 2011: 111, 122). Because of the importance of the Admiralties for the military and

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<sup>32</sup> Nationaal Archief [NL-NaHA], *Admiraliteitscolleges XXXI Bisdom, 1525-1793*, 1.01.47.21, inv.nr 161.

economic survival of the Republic, their high officials (which Van der Heim as secretary clearly was) were in a position to distribute and control offices, power and large sums of money. It might not come as a surprise that Van der Heim was accused of illegitimately getting his hands on money meant for the construction of war ships by the Rotterdam Admiralty in April 1784. Gijsbert van Hardenbroek (a nobleman from Utrecht and representative to the Estates-General who kept detailed notes and records in a personal diary of things going on in the Republic between 1747 and 1788) provides some information on the matter on several occasions. A first entry on 14 March 1783 (Krämer, 1901-1918, IV: 396-397) tells us how Van der Goes, in rather vague terms, told Van Hardenbroek that “money belonging to the Admiralty was given by Van der Heim and the master of equipping [R.F. van Staveren, TK] and that it had been more than fortunate that matters had not come to a head, because he, Van der Goes, hesitated to go and tell the Stadholder about Van der Heim, D’Escury [a much hated member of Van der Heim’s cabal in Rotterdam, TK] etc”.<sup>clxxxix</sup> Apparently, Van der Goes had discovered something out of the ordinary but was afraid to tell the Stadholder. Perhaps for fear of reprisal.

Unfortunately, it remains unclear who the money was given to by Van der Heim and his master of equipping and what “matters” it exactly concerned. However, a second entry on the topic in Van Hardenbroek’s diary (1901-1918, V: 218-219) of 7 April 1784 provides clues as it speaks more clearly about (possible) transgressions of Van der Heim. This time it is Paulus Gilles (1708 – 1792) (cf. Krämer, 1901-1918, IV: i, v and V: 64, 557), Thesaurier-general of the union from 1769 to 1785, who complains to Van Hardenbroek about the quota’s of the various Admiralties. Gilles declares he wants purity and sincerity with regard to the finances [of the Admiralties, TK]. Van Hardenbroek recounts how Gilles says about Van der Heim: “he makes everything so obscure and confused, that it is impossible to make sense of things. I can achieve more with Bisdom [Dirk Rudolf Wijckerheld Bisdom (1740 – 1814), TK] in one hour as I can in eight days with Van der Heim who as secretary of the Admiralty has drawn immense sums of money from the accepted newly built ships, something he is not entitled to. From now on nothing should be done by the Admiralties without any prior communication by the Council of State, which would keep those bodies in an infinitely better order”.<sup>clxxx</sup> Gilles seems to speak of Van der Heim taking money (contrary to Van der Goes who said he gave money).

Unfortunately Gilles is unclear about where the money went. Perhaps Van der Heim simply used too much money for the ships but it seems more likely that he did not use enough of the money that was he was given to work on the fleet and, instead, took some for himself. Truth is we do not know for sure even though some pamphlets (see below) point in the latter direction. What is clear, though, is that Gilles criticised Van der Heim for his behaviour. Similar criticism is found elsewhere too when Van der Hoop (cf. De Smidt, 1996: 132-133), Van der Heim’s successor as Thesaurier-General in 1785, complains that he misses Bisdom (as Fiscal-Attorney for the Rotterdam Admiralty) because now he has to put up with the procrastinations of Van der Heim (Krämer, 1901-1918, V: 556-557) who was still its Secretary. Van der Heim therefore seems to have been criticised by Gilles and others mainly for his shop floor behaviour but the solution, to Gilles at least, was in part to be found in increased ‘bureaucratization’, i.e., better order, better communication and clear lines of responsibility and decision-making.

*Public values from public opinion sources*

For his actions as confidant Van der Heim (like Repelaer) received much criticism from both Patriots and fellow regents. A short poem (*Doornekrans*, 1782) is telling for much of the other public opinion pamphlet literature on Van der Heim. It denounces him as the “murderer of the Batavians’ freedom and robber of their money, blood and honour. It is Jacob van der Heim, that fattened beast, who fears neither hell nor heaven, sold our fatherland to England out of a lust to flatter that Bacchus Orange”. It calls for an attack on Van der Heim “to break his neck and legs, to roll his fat belly through the mud, to feed him to the ravens as a burial”.<sup>clxxxii</sup> Another anonymous pamphlet (*Aan den welgebooren*, 1783) was addressed to Van der Heim, who was “of good birth but of bad character”. It denounces the patronage of the Stadholder and accuses Van der Heim of following the Stadholder to serve his own interests when it says “you risk your life for a drunken Stadholder but you must be senile if you think this will gain you the rule of this land”.<sup>clxxxiii</sup> William V was – incidentally often portrayed as being drunk or with a bottle of wine in his hands. It was a symbol to accentuate his, supposed, inability to rule. In the end the pamphleteer promises that Van der Heim will be punished for his actions because that is “the reward for a traitor who dares betray the Netherlands [called as such, TK]”.

The pamphlet continues saying that “to lead a man to the throne for a hand of gold a man who mingles with ladies and devious whores, whose wife so often sighs at that thought, is truly a villain’s work”.<sup>clxxxiii</sup> The obviously harsh tone of the pamphlet is testament to a kind of critique hitherto deemed unimaginable. To accuse a regent in such a way was daring and tells us something about the level of hatred some people obviously felt towards Van der Heim. The way it spoke of the Stadholder (implicitly at least) was also daring and for this reason the pamphlet itself caused something of a stir. In a reply (*Scherpe nagalm*, 1783) the critique towards Van der Heim was echoed but the (implicit) critique towards the Stadholder was fiercely condemned. William V, in the words of this pamphleteer, was only misled and blinded by the Duke of Brunswick. The pamphlet is another example of the complexity of the Dutch political situation in the 1780s. There were clearly (as we have seen already) those who viewed the Stadholder as a victim of corruption. The author states he “hates Van der Heim but loves the Stadholder with all his heart”<sup>clxxxiv</sup> showing how there were those who were pro-Stadholder but anti-confidant.

Another pamphlet – entitled “The short way to authority and offices” from 1782 – quickly gets to the heart of the Patriot critique on Stadholderly patronage and Van der Heim’s specific role in it. The author provides an account of a dream he had in which he is walking along the various roads that lead to offices. The first road is via the court and its doorman the Duke of Brunswick, the guardian and later main advisor of Stadholder William V and key architect of the system of Princely patronage. On this road capability is not a requirement, only flattery and being a friend of the court (*Het verkorte gezag*, 1782: 7). The second road means hard work, honour and virtue. Throughout the pamphlet the author encounters and speaks to figures who tell him about the vices and virtues of government. Important virtues are valuing the interests of the citizens over one’s own (like a guardian watching over the interests of his pupil) and to teach them honour and virtue instead of obstinacy, haughtiness and licentiousness. In order to obtain offices, various figures hail the merit and qualities or capabilities that administrators should possess. A good regent should serve the nation’s interest, be conscien-

tious and should not turn a blind eye to things to please the Stadholder. He should also be selected based on capability and should choose a clean conscience over the finest gold (*Het verkorte gezag*, 1782: 12-15). The bad regent, on the other hand, displays haughtiness, self-interest, flattery, servility, toadyism and is bribed. A good regent, the pamphlet states, “is pure in his profession in that he is not bribed by gifts, by bags of English guineas to do something to the detriment of his neighbour”.<sup>clxxxv</sup> Van der Heim, D’Escury and Bichon again appear as the typical examples of bad regents. The author writes “then I saw three others, of which one was a fat man, he was Jacob [Van der Heim, TK]; a second one, that was with Van der Heim, wore a big powdered wig *comme un pigeon* [Bichon, TK] as the French would say; the third had on a riding cap or a Calot d’ecury [Collot D’Escury, TK]. This trio aroused my curiosity and I asked Fame [one of the allegoric figures the author encounters in his dream, TK] who they were. They are, he answered, men of name; they have stalled instead of used ships [i.e., harmed the interests of the nation in fighting the English, TK]; they have helped the nation’s enemies [England, TK] and ridiculed themselves; they are low souls who would give up a pure conscience to obtain offices for their children (*Het verkorte gezag*, 1782: 10-11).<sup>clxxxvi</sup> Here we find a hint at possible bad government and political corruption concerning the sailing and equipping of war ships (see earlier) was squarely put in the category of pro- versus anti-English sentiment. Perhaps that was all there was to the accusation as well. As I said before, political corruption to the Patriots could simply mean being pro-English.

Other public pamphlets address various bad character traits of the likes of Van der Heim. One pamphlet criticises Orangist regents, including Van der Heim, who are buddies with the Duke of Brunswick and give themselves offices and money. They are called (and we will find the term more often, see chapter eight), “chameleons [compare wind vanes, TK], changing their colours as often as they please” (*Als't uw belijft een aalmoesje*, 1782: 16-17).<sup>clxxxvii</sup> In typical fashion the pamphlet urges people not to trust these “men of ‘48”, meaning Orangists of 1748, such as Daniel Raap, Laurens van der Meer and Hendrik van Gimnig (see chapters four, five and six and note, again, the ideological and historical continuity between Doelist and Patriot movements) who are mentioned by name. To many Patriots these men symbolized the beginning of the end as their Doelist reforms had failed to bring change and had in effect only consolidated the Stadholder’s power (*Als't uw belijft een aalmoesje*, 1782: 13).<sup>clxxxviii</sup> Intrigue and flattery in order to obtain office are denounced as are bad regents (like Van der Heim) who damage commerce because they only serve personal interests and are on the side of the English. Perhaps the pamphlet is saying here that if Van der Heim had indeed withheld money meant for properly equipping the fleet and thereby protecting the interests of the Stadholder, then commerce might not have been damaged. Such a connection between bad government and decline in commerce and trade was often made. One pamphlet (*Brief van een rechtsgeleerden*, 1784: 13) for instance notes the damage to commerce and trade when “arbitrary rule of a monarch, or of a few aristocrats is made to serve the most important interests of society”.<sup>clxxxix</sup>

A final public opinion pamphlet launches in at the debauchery of Princess Anna and her court including confidants such as Van der Heim. Anna is turned into the Marie Antoinette of the Dutch Republic when the pamphlet states “when one surveys the good characteristics of virtue and wisdom in her [Anna’s, TK] person, then one sees they only pertain to pageantries, galas, lavish dinners and other playfulness, the effect of which will only be the effemination of the nation, further immorality and marred royal lustre that would put an unnecessary weight on the nation’s treasury” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 3-4).<sup>cx</sup> Such idle waste of money is then contrasted with the hardworking citizen when the pamphlet reads how “the good, honest,

hardworking and tireless citizen who is burdened with taxes while his freedom, goods and possessions are left unprotected” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 3-4).<sup>cxci</sup> The confidants, called dependents and flatterers, join forces with Orange for their tyranny to work, “their boisterous nature and luxury make them look down upon the citizen as slaves and forget their equality. The more naughty these confidants are, the more able they are, and the more they hound people, chain them, and herd them as a flock of meek sheep” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 4).<sup>cxcii</sup>

It is not surprising that the people of Rotterdam are urged by the pamphleteer to follow the exemplary lead of cities like Dordrecht in ending the Stadholder’s recommendations. Now is the time to “dispose of cowardice and mend the infringements [...] the cause of most decay and misfortune has been, the carelessness and neglect of several affairs [...]” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 8).<sup>cxci</sup> Just as in the case of Repelaer the pamphlet contrasts ‘bad’ with ‘good’ regents and here too, ‘bad’ Van der Heim is contrasted with “the masculine bravery, the loyalty to the fatherland and the unwavering steadiness of the able pensionary Gijzelaar and the brothers De Witt who should be an example to others” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 3).<sup>cxci</sup> In Dordrecht “people cheer and the names of De Gijzelaar, the De Witt’s of Jaarsveld and other good Patriots are on their tongues. The smallest day labourer praises them, at every meal people from all ranks drink to their wellbeing” (*Ibid.*, 6).<sup>cxci</sup> Gyzelaar is depicted as “the best of good regents, who maintain property, freedom and the rights of the good community and their interests so well, so altogether creditable or deserving and so noble, which lets them be on such good terms with the community” (*Ibid.*, 6).<sup>cxci</sup> Here, serving personal or communal interests are again juxtaposed. There is no doubt that this pamphleteer (and the Patriots in general) preferred to see the latter.

The pamphlet is most direct about the ending of the recommendations in Rotterdam and especially about the role played by Van der Heim and his clique (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: footnote 541). It states how Rotterdam, as yet, does nothing and “as soon as I mention the names of a Van der Heim, a Bichon, a Collot d’Escury, you will know the reason why; these cowardly dependents and gilded slaves [of the Stadholder, TK], who sacrifice civic freedom and burgher interests to caress their ambition and lust to rule, and especially Van der Heim is the disgrace and oppressor of his city”.<sup>cxci</sup> Van der Heim, the pamphlet continues, “this courtier, unworthy of the dignity of being mayor and being of low principles, is not bothered by the complaints of his merchants and burghers” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 12).<sup>cxci</sup> By Van der Heim and his clique “everything is countered if it’s not according to his aims and he knows to overrule the majority of regents” (*Ibid.*, 12-13).<sup>cxci</sup> The author writes how there are still well intentioned regents in the city but they are overpowered by Van der Heim. If only Van der Heim would be gone, things would change. Then the good regents, “these once forced slaves”, would again behave like independent regents, protecting the interests, freedom and rights of the citizens just like they promised in their oath and duty to God”.<sup>cxci</sup> Then “a forced majority [Van der Heim and his cabal, TK] would no longer counter the freedom and attempts at recovery from a good minority [those excluded from government, TK].<sup>cxci</sup> Van der Heim’s politics of appointing people outside of ‘common’ procedures of the town council has to end. As long as Van der Heim is not stopped “Rotterdam and its merchants, burghers [referring to a social class, TK], regents and citizens [referring to inhabitants of a city, TK], will be disgraced by Anglophilia and dishonoured and humiliated in front of the free countrymen of Dordrecht and Schiedam” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 14).<sup>cxci</sup> Again – just as in the case of Repelaer – being pro-English seemed to equal political corruption.

In rapid succession the author raises various interesting points. He has economic arguments to get rid of Van der Heim and clearly equates the individual well-being of merchants/regents (traditionally the backbone of a Dutch city, see chapter four) with that of the common good. On ‘proper’ administration the pamphlet says that it would be infinitely better when the citizenry would rule as with one voice, to counter a “lack of spirit, indifference being caused by ambition, lust to rule, self-interest, incapability, cowardice, narrow-mindedness, family interests and other such despicable motives” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 15).<sup>cciii</sup> The fatherland, the pamphlet continues, now needs men like Gijselaar and Van der Capellen, “men who are true to their country, acknowledge their citizens as free and decent, and protect and serve the good community’s rights, privileges and precious interests, against all infractions, neglect and indifferent treatment, in a bold way, according to their oath and duty [...]. There are such bold regents and heroes who for freedom and citizens’ prosperity are willing to sacrifice everything, and will never allow people to be the victim of tyranny.<sup>cciv</sup> They will counter characteristics of bad administration, being (again) lust to rule, boastful and ambiguous behaviour, dependence, indifference, narrow-mindedness of judgement and addiction to a few [a cabal? TK]. Instead, they will (like Gijselaar) use “wisdom, tact, eloquence, courage and persistence, combining the virtues of Brutus and Cicero, comparable to De Wit in virtue, to Barneveld in loyalty” (*Missive van een Haagsch Patriot*, 1782: 30-31).<sup>ccv</sup>

#### *Public values from legal sources*

As far as values from legal sources are concerned, the case of Van der Heim has many similarities with that of Repelaer. Here too hardly any values or value statements from legal sources can be found. Van der Heim, like Repelaer, was not prosecuted for any specific acts of political corruption after he had been pushed out of the town council in 1782. His fellow regents simply made a new contract of correspondence and got rid of him based on Patriot public opinion and shop floor codes (see below). Van der Heim’s machinations in Rotterdam politics and even his alleged malversations with the sale of warships were apparently not deemed enough reason for any judicial review, undoubtedly for similar reasons as in the case of Repelaer. The fact that Van der Heim had been appointed to the town council by Anna in 1759 in complete disregard for the usual nomination procedures had made his seat ‘illegal’ in the eyes of his fellow regents but this specific argument does not appear in the sources viewed, which leaves us without many legal points of view on the case from which we can deduce public values or value statements concerning the corruption of Van der Heim. While it was brought up in public opinion sources that Van der Heim had violated his oath of office (which can be construed as a legal argument) this was not part of any official deliberation. Still, what is interesting about the affair concerning alleged personal benefit from the sale of war ships is that Gilles (as we have seen) at least argued for improved bureaucratic control by the Raad van State. Also, the fact that any malversations by Van der Heim were in the end *not* investigated again points to a possible structural incompetence of the legal system to attack such practices from powerful Stadholderly confidants head on. This is, for instance, how we might interpret Van der Goes’ unwillingness or inability to notify the Stadholder.

Eventually Van der Heim would still be targeted immediately after the revolution of 1795 (see chapters four and eight) but more for ‘party-political’ reasons than anything else. Renting (1964: 275-277) tells us how on 6 January 1795 the Rotterdam town council charged

three of its citizens to draft a report on the whereabouts of former Orangist regents who were now in exile. They were also to execute plans already devised by the Provisional Representatives of Holland in February 1795 to sequester the goods of those former regents. Van der Heim was among those targeted and on 6 April 1795 (while he was still in Bremen) the final decision was made to indeed confiscate his possessions. Only due to an appeal before the Court of Holland by his sons did he manage to avoid this. Instead he was forced to provide a sum of money for a new ‘loan’ to the Provisional Representatives. The move to prosecute Van der Heim, while legal in the strict sense of the word, was essentially politically motivated and did not constitute anything like a formal legal investigation or court case, not least because the investigation was, in the end, not even carried out. Van der Heim was simply being targeted for being an Orangist and having forsaken to do the right (i.e., Patriot) thing.

#### *Public values from shop floor sources*

On the shop floor, finally, there was some interesting direct criticism from Van der Heim’s peers – as we have already partly seen in some public opinion sources. One critic was the Stadholder himself. I already wrote how the Stadholder essentially used the idea of appointing Van der Heim in a high office as political leverage in his power struggle with some opposing Rotterdam regents. Apart from any such motives the Stadholder really did not seem to have been too charmed by his confidant, at least on a personal level. Van Hardenbroek (1901-1918, I: 91, 98; IV: 113, 125) notes, for instance, how on various occasions the Stadholder had told people that he did not really want Van der Heim as Grand Pensionary, mostly because of continued requests of his family for “one office or another” and because Van der Heim was “far too long-winded and laborious in his speaking and writing”.<sup>ccvi</sup> It was an opinion, as we have seen, that was shared by Van der Goes and Gilles. Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp (1762 – 1834) also agreed (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: footnote 540 to part VI) when he apparently once said how “M(onsieur) van der Heim n’a pas les vues très-étendues, et avec beaucoup de capacité et de connoissances, avec un grand pouvoir sur lui-même, il a l’esprit rétréci, il est servilement attaché aux anciennes costumes et il paroît manquer absolument cette générosité, cette grandeur d’ame, qui confondent la politique et la morale, l’homme d’état et l’homme de bien” (Van Hogendorp, 1866-1903, part III: 21-22).<sup>ccvii</sup> Van Hogendorp thus characterises Van der Heim by a lack of vision, narrow-mindedness and, tellingly, as being stuck in old ways. Furthermore, according to Van Hogendorp, he confuses politics and morality, or the statesman and the good man.

Van der Heim was not just contested in court circles. In the Rotterdam town council he was contested even more. Of course, we can easily deduce this from his removal from the town council by his peers whenever the political circumstances allowed for it (in 1759 after the death of Anna, in 1782 with the end of the recommendations and, finally, in 1795 with the arrival of the French). His unpopularity also becomes apparent from other statements written down by Van Hardenbroek. Van der Goes, as we know one of the local opponents of Van der Heim in the town council of Rotterdam and fellow governor of the Rotterdam chamber of the East Indian Company (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part I: 949), had, according to Van Hardenbroek (1901-1918, part I: 98), dared to complain to the Stadholder about the “far reaching credit of Van der Heim in Rotterdam, how he abused it, making more enemies than friends for his highness, as did Bichon and d’Escury, who pulled everything close to them, by which his

highness lost his influence”.<sup>ccviii</sup> Clearly Van der Goes wants the Stadholder to think about one of the negative effects of the Stadholderly recommendations, that his confidants could also become too powerful. Similarly, Van der Goes (Krämer, 1901-1918, part IV: 433) had tried (but failed) to explain to the Stadholder how some in the Rotterdam town council were against Van der Heim, but that they did not know how to tell the Stadholder.<sup>ccix</sup> Again we see the a pro-Stadholder but anti-confidant stance on the shop floor.

Another view from the shop floor is offered by some investigations that were launched by the Patriot Provisional Representatives of Holland in 1796 into the dealings of the Orangist regents of the past eight years. Much like the other prosecution of Van der Heim in 1795 (see earlier) this was a politically motivated move on the part of the Batavians to prosecute their former adversaries. This time a group of twenty-nine members of the so-called *Committee to investigate the political and financial behaviour of the members of the previous administration in Holland* were charged by the Provisional Representatives from 14 April 1795 until 28 January 1796 (when it was replaced by a new committee that worked until 28 June 1796) to try and deal with any (Orangist) regent wrongdoing in the past (cf. Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 22: 23-24). While the committee presented a report on 15 May 1796, it did not generate any results (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 5: 415-416), mostly because both committees were essentially shut down prematurely and a real investigation never got off the ground. Its members, among whom Gerrit Paape (the new Patriot leader in Dordrecht) and Reinier Leendert Bouwens (1755 – 1798) were, however, highly disappointed and would openly criticise the decision to stop the investigation.

Especially Bouwens seems to have had an axe to grind. This former Patriot regent from Amsterdam had been dismissed after the Orangist crackdown of 1787. He had been banned from the province of Holland for his attempt to stop the Prussian army from entering Amsterdam, by inundating land around the city even after the official decision had been made not to resist the Prussian troops. He thus became one of the many Patriot emigrants in France who returned in 1795, making his motives for investigating the Orangists who had banned him at least dubious. At the very least, this explains his outright anger at the decision to stop the investigations. The publicised thoughts of Bouwens on the matter provide interesting shop floor perspectives. Bouwens (1797: 33-34) for instance focuses on the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war and blames the “most scandalous management during the war, and the neglect of the navy of the state which they [the Orangist regents, TK] should have been maintained in a respectable way, as the preservation of our commerce is the foremost source of our commonwealth”.<sup>ccx</sup> Van der Heim is then made into an example of this behaviour. As one of the governors of the East Indian Company of Rotterdam, the “now fugitive Secretary Van der Heim” was, again, accused of neglecting the fleet in favour of Orangist (i.e., pro-English) interests.

Van der Heim was held responsible for putting out to sea two ships (one commercial and one military) which “could have been saved if only they [Van der Heim, TK] had wanted it. Instead they chose, that is premeditated, to let these ships fall into the hands of the English”.<sup>ccxi</sup> Van der Heim had deliberately failed to use common sense to serve his pro-English point of view. “This story”, Bouwens continues, “serves to show how the former regents openly favoured that pernicious system to help England [...]”.<sup>ccxii</sup> Such accusations launched at Van der Heim for neglecting the fleet are interesting in relation to the accusations of profiting ‘personally’ from his work as Secretary of the Admiralty in dealing with (not) equipping the fleet. Perhaps, as was the case in some public-opinion views on the matter,

personal profit had a more ideological meaning here: i.e., not harming the Stadholder's relations with the English and not protecting the traditional commercial interests of the (Rotterdam) regents.

## 7.5 Analysis and concluding remarks

In the following I offer a brief synopsis of the main values and value statements found in the case. Then I provide an analysis of the main lines of arguments and the found values and value statements through a comparison of the different sources of values. Finally I will address questions of change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption in the context of wider institutional developments in the Patriot period.

### *Public values and value statements in the case*

The scandal of this chapter offers an extensive amount of public values and value statements with which public official behaviour was condemned or supported. While, interestingly, the actual word corruption has not been encountered in any of the sources, there were many terms to describe instances which we can, for practical purposes at least, label as such. On a very rudimentary level, we can find many personal characteristics that public officials should or (more often) should not possess. When taken together both positive and negative characteristics provide quite a detailed picture of the 'ideal' public official. Good ones should, most notably, have a clean conscience and a good soul and be impervious to temptation. They should be diligent, eloquent, persistent or firm, bold, brave and courageous and at the same time be honest, reasonable, resolute, resolved, sincere, composed, conscientious, pious, cautious or prudent. Another important value (at least on the shop floor, see below) was maintaining harmony among the group of regents by following old procedures of rotation and seniority. Next to such positive statements and values we can find a string of negative ones. Foremost among them are being a courtier, a flatterer, a coward or someone with loose sexual morals. Such pejorative terms (compare also self-interest, degeneration, monarchy and slavery) were used to analyze and describe the political reality of the second half of the eighteenth century (cf. Klein, 1995: 149) and were juxtaposed with positive terms such as patriot, virtue, unity, republic and freedom. This was, of course, in line with general Patriot (best-opinion) ideology that considered the royal pretensions of the Stadholder as being a foreign element in a Republic, which could only lead to haughtiness, lust to rule, extravagance and wasteful behaviour. Other negative values and value statements included being boastful, boisterous, conceited, deceitful, dishonourable, indifferent, long-winded, meddling, narrow-minded, obstinate, seditious and/or scheming.

### *Comparing sources of values*

Further analysis allows us to discuss public values in part based on the source of values in which they were uttered. Criticism against Stadholderly patronage and recommendations in general and against men like Repelaer and Van der Heim in particular, clearly allowed a complex variety of groups to present their arguments, protect their interests and argue with those who disagreed. Various groups in the Patriot period (in part representing different

sources of values) opposed each other on a number of fundamental administrative, political and moral issues. Between and within the various sources or ‘groups’ that were represented in the case, there were often different voices and arguments to be heard. Still, some coherent and persistent lines of argument can be distinguished if only because regents sometimes seemed to accuse each other of similar bad practices but as soon as they were in power all this was forgotten and they committed similar ‘crimes’.

A first set of characteristics of bad – i.e., corrupt – government was mainly about arbitrary and therefore uncontrollable rule. It was a criticism with various meanings depending on context. On the shop floor it meant that Stadholder, confidants and their cabals were able to do as they pleased without consultation and were able to exclude some from office. Excluded fellow regents were not happy about Repelaer and Van der Heim because they disregarded the principle of harmony, i.e., existing formal and informal procedures and regulations such as contracts of correspondence and rotation via seniority. Circumventing these procedures and regulations meant that Stadholder, confidants and their cabals fundamentally disrupted long established ways of maintaining harmony between, first, competing groups in city and/or provincial governments and, second, between city and provincial governments and Stadholder. In shop floor regent opinion, the core of Dutch political organization – characterised by collegialism, particularism and compromise (see chapter four) – was therefore threatened by the illness or disease of political corruption and bad government. They believed that free deliberation (mentioned as such and referring to collegial practices) was better than bundling power in one person or only a few people and that offices should be given to people who have a right to them (i.e., through seniority and rotation). This meant, as mentioned earlier, that on the shop floor, values such as free deliberation and delegation of authority had little to do with popular representation and/or participation and accountability to ‘the people’ as Patriot best-opinion, for instance, suggested. Instead the shop floor regents wanted to return to ‘true liberty’ and be free from the influence of Stadholder and his confidants.

Best- and public opinion seemed to agree with this shop floor stance against violating old administrative principles or mechanisms, but for different reasons. Both sources cast a wider net as best- and public opinion considered breaking old procedures as detrimental to the general political and communal well-being of the Republic. They saw contracts of correspondence, seniority and rotation as leading to oligarchy, closed-off politics and arbitrary rule. Best- and public opinion, then, took the shop floor argument against Stadholderly patronage and recommendations one crucial step further as the shop floor still regarded these mechanisms as crucial for maintaining harmony among the regent group (compare the forthcoming dissertation of Michel Hoenderboom on the period 1650 – 1750). Public and best- opinion, however, saw these mechanisms increasingly as detrimental to ‘community’ well-being. They did not care about preserving regent oligarchy and this, I argue, is where morality on the shop floor and in best- and public opinion fundamentally clashed. On the shop floor the once excluded regents simply wanted to go back to the stability and security of the old ways. There were no calls for such things as participation, popular sovereignty or bureaucratization. This led best- and public opinion sources to state that the Stadholder, his clique and the regents with their ‘true liberty’ had *all* paralyzed the political system.

A second set of characteristics of ‘bad’ (corrupt) government was mainly about dependence – expressed through flattery and servitude – on personal interests in patron-client relationships. Again there is a distinction between shop floor sources and the other two (legal sources not taken into account for reasons mentioned). To excluded regents on the shop floor

being dependent on either Stadholder or confidant was a bad thing because it made you submissive (a term used as such) to another's views and demands. This, so it seems, was regarded as the end (the corruption) of regent 'true liberty'. Yet, here too, the other sources cast a wider net. There, dependence on anything other than the community, public interest or the nation's well-being (all terms used as such) was a bad thing. To best- and public opinion, dependence of regents on Stadholder, confidants and each other meant that the interests of the people or the wider community were no longer served. This is visible, for instance, in the thought of Van der Capellen – in the end the most prominent Patriot best-opinion ideologue – who saw 'aristocratic morality' as the complete subjugation to the Stadholder's whims; a morality that consisted of pleasing him only for personal gain (cf. Klein, 1995: 144; Zwitter, 1987: 52).

As such, in this second 'set', public values emerged that dealt with an elementary distinction between serving public and private interests, whereby the latter could (according to shop floor) or could not (according to best- and public opinion) interfere with the execution of a public office. On the shop floor, after all, a certain amount of self serving (sharing in the spoils of administration) was perfectly acceptable and even believed to be a prerequisite for proper administration. In best- and public opinion, on the other hand, serving one's own (financial or social) interests was wrong whichever way you looked at it. It meant, simply put, that administrators were not performing their duties and were quite simply traitors to the common good only to make some money. To best- and public opinion self-interest was solely used as a pejorative term and was constantly juxtaposed to complementary terms such as the common good, the nation's interest, the nations' well-being or the (good and hard working) community. Selfish 'tyranny', 'wallowing in luxury' and 'lust to rule' were simply juxtaposed to the supposed altruism of good government by men like Gijsselaar, De Witt and/or Oldebarnevelt who became symbols of public officials loyal to nation, society, fatherland and the interests of the people.

This fundamental distinction between the sources of values on public and private interests and a more narrow or a wider net also becomes apparent from different views on an 'Anglophile attitude'. This was condemned on shop floor and in public- and best-opinion but again for different reasons. The shop floor seemed to worry more about the apparent failure of Van der Heim to properly equip ships because of its effect on their own personal, commercial, interests. The other sources (again) debated such an issue in wider terms of harming public interests and the common good. Finally, self-interest could sometimes mean nepotism. Here too a distinction between sources can be made. While several public opinion pamphlets did not consider handing out offices to family members to be acceptable, the issue seems not to have been raised on the shop floor at all.

### *Change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption*

When we survey the case some questions concerning change and continuity of public values and perceptions of corruption still need to be discussed. First there is the question whether the vocabulary that was used was new or, rather, consisted of similar elements with new or reemphasized meaning. As Broersma (2005: 225) noted, many terms and accusations were of course politically motivated. Patriots purposefully used a quickly evolving political press and arena of public opinion to rally support. At the same time Patriot ideals of administrative

reform (and perceptions of political corruption?) were to a large extent sincere; so much so that, as Schama put it (1977: 102), their major liability was “their unheeding attachment to the letter and the spirit of those ideas [such as representative government and popular political participation, TK], which diluted the concentration of their strength and compromised the effectiveness of their organization”. Their ideals and values were also either new or reemphasized. Emphasis on community, common good, public interest, representation and accountability were certainly more prominent than before and sometimes gained new meaning. The Patriot concept of community and with it ideas on political corruption seem, for instance, to have been wider than those held by the Doelists before. The novelty of the Patriot political ideology (mostly expressed in best- and public opinion) becomes apparent from the fact that their ideas were considered completely alien to existing administration. This we can deduce from the simple fact that Orangist adversaries such as Elie Luzac (cf. Velema, 1992, 1993) or R.M. van Goens (see for Van Goens’ political thought Klein, 1995: 197-206) claimed that the Patriots had, in the words of Israel (2007: 15), “totally subverted the true Dutch constitution, past and present, by dragging in wholly extraneous abstract principles”. Strong opposition from Orangists as well as the shop floor and the failure (ironically!) of any of the Patriot measures to really take effect, also in part show the novelty of Patriot ideology.

A second and related question is whether any of this new or reemphasized language reflected a real change in moral attitude in the Patriot period. On a practical level of changing morality in town councils and provincial governing bodies, the Patriot cause does not appear to have had much lasting effect. Some cities witnessed a temporary changing of the guard around 1782 and 1787 – such as in Dordrecht and Rotterdam, but also the new Patriot town council in a city like Utrecht (cf. De Bruin, 1986) – but this was not translated in much moral change. Many (if not all?) of these new or purged town councils continued with established practices and ‘old’ ways. This is because, as we have seen, practices such as rotation, seniority, patronage and nepotism were still not considered to be bad things on the shop floor as long as all regents would benefit. It is also because the legal system was not willing or able to control or curb this shop floor attitude.

On a more ideological (best- and public opinion) level, however, the cases above certainly show a more lasting change in moral attitude. These sources of values increasingly considered ‘old’ ways of doing things to be unacceptable. In this way Patriot ideology proved to be a crucial contribution to the later reforms of the French-Batavian era after 1795. Between the two periods there was indeed a “genuine continuity of ideas and practice” (Schama, 1977: 68). The Patriots of the 1780s (many of whom would after all later be Batavians, see chapters four, five and eight) did in fact lay the groundwork for a lasting public value system in and following the French-Batavian era.

When we acknowledge that established practices were indeed fundamentally questioned by certain parties and that there was a fundamental difference between various sources of values, a third and final question arises. In ‘Johnstonian’ terms, the question is whether we see a clash of different value systems and whether we can see that some sources of values were more potent drivers of public value change? A first obvious thing to notice is the lack of any public values from legal sources. The absence of legal codes (i.e., the fact that men like Van der Heim and Repelaer were not subjected to any form of judicial action) might show that legal codes lagged behind the codes in other sources. While undoubtedly also due to the kind of scandal, specific circumstances of legal inequality and an unfortunate lack of material, it is also a sign of a blurred boundary between formal (bureaucratic) and informal (face-to-face or shop

floor) rules and practices of the time and of the absence of – as mentioned – a *Rechtsstaat*. This, I argue, is corroborated by a striking general lack of legal values (consider justice, equality or ‘due process’) in any of the other three sources. Apart from a few very general ‘bureaucratic’ statements (such as neutrality or adherence to oath and instruction) they simply did not seem to play any significant role. This is important as the apparent absence of legal codes from which to deduce any moral arguments is proof of the fact that strictly legal definitions of political corruption are not always feasible or useful. It also proves the use of the heuristics of this current study in that it also allows us to see what is *not* there.

The lack of interest from all parties in bureaucratic measures to counter political corruption is also revealing. Whereas best-opinion (compare the *Herstelling* discussed in chapter five) and, occasionally, public opinion did make a case for bureaucratic measures, these were hardly represented in shop floor sources. This means that high ranking officials as Van der Heim and Repelaer were not really embedded in any bureaucratic structures of discipline and control, something that seems to have changed in the Batavian period (see chapter eight). Finally, a lack of references to religious views by the various sources is interesting as well. Not even the preacher Bareuth used references to the bible or religion when he argued his case for reform. With legal and/or bureaucratic and religious values (in a way) ruled out, this still leaves us with other sources. First, the codes of the shop floor seemed to have been crucial in ‘conservative’ efforts to keep to old and mostly informal values, rules and regulations. This shows a remarkable resemblance to many cases from the seventeenth and early eighteenth century (cf. Hoenderboom, forthcoming) in which debates were equally about maintaining harmony on the shop floor as the all-important rule to uphold. Yet, one of the most interesting things about the cases discussed in this chapter is that the sources of best- and public opinion (indeed due to their growing importance in the period) now became truly dominant drivers of value change and started to offer crucially different views as opposed to the shop floor. There emerged ethical monism, a concept I will explore in greater detail in chapters eight and nine. Both best- and public opinion sources fundamentally questioned and disrupted the continuity of administrative practices and existing morality of maintaining harmony on the shop floor. If we have to describe this clash of value systems in any way perhaps the terms ‘aristocratic’ (meaning regent shop floor) and ‘democratic’ (meaning best- and public opinion) are not so bad after all. In the next chapter we will see just how these old ‘aristocratic’ practices would be fundamentally tossed aside, precisely as a result of major political, democratic and bureaucratic changes in the French-Batavian period.

