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Political elites and foreign policy : democratization in Indonesia

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Political Elites and Foreign Policy: Democratization in Indonesia

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Onderwerp van deze studie is de rol van politieke elites in de totstandkoming van de buitenlandse politiek van Indonesië, in het bijzonder ten tijde van het presidentschap van Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004). Doel van de studie is niet alleen te achterhalen welke invloed diverse elitegroeperingen op regeringsbeslissingen van het betrokken land hebben uitgeoefend, maar ook om bij te dragen tot de vergroting van het algemene inzicht in het belang van binnenlandse factoren voor het buitenlands beleid van landen die het pad van de democratisering zijn ingeslagen. Na een grondige bespreking van relevante theoretische benaderingen die in de leer der internationale betrekkingen zijn ontwikkeld, wordt hiertoe een analysekader ontworpen. De benodigde onderzoeksgegevens worden geput uit officiële documenten, secundaire bronnen en een groot aantal mondelinge vraaggesprekken. De elitegroeperingen die worden onderscheiden zijn: 1. vertegenwoordigers uit de samenleving (academische deskundigen, nieuwsmedia, niet-gouvernementele organisaties en religieuze groepen), 2. volksvertegenwoordigers, 3. hoge militairen en 4. hoge ambtenaren. Vier gevallen van controversiële besluiten worden onderzocht: 1. de kritische reactie van Indonesië op de Amerikaanse inval in Afghanistan, 2. de spanningen tussen Indonesië en Maleisië over de behandeling van illegale Indonesische werknemers in Maleisië, 3. het omstreden bezoek van de Australische minister-president Howard aan Indonesië (februari 2002) en 4. de – in Indonesië hevig betwiste - aanwezigheid van Megawati bij de onafhankelijkheidsceremonie van Oost-Timor (mei 2002).

Een belangrijke uitkomst van het onderzoek is dat de elitegroeperingen die buiten het regeringsapparaat (en het leger) staan, weliswaar invloedrijk zijn in het stadium waarin het beleid wordt geformuleerd, maar weinig gewicht in de schaal leggen wanneer het aankomt op de uitvoering van besluiten. Deze bevinding kan verrassend worden genoemd omdat zij indruist tegen de gangbare opinie van zowel theoretici als beleidsmakers over de betekenis van het parlement en maatschappelijke groeperingen ter verklaring van het buitenlands beleid van landen die nog niet lang geleden hebben gekozen voor de democratie. Een andere conclusie is dat de ideologie van het nationalisme door alle onderscheiden elitegroepen wordt omarmd, behalve door de groep van hoge ambtenaren die officieel met de voorbereiding en uitvoering van besluiten is belast. Ondanks de wisseling van het politieke regime in Indonesië na de afzetting van president Soeharto (1998) blijft deze groep ervan overtuigd dat *Realpolitik* de beste grondslag vormt voor een buitenlandse politiek die rekening houdt met internationale afhankelijkheden en de machtsverhoudingen in de wereld.

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I dedicate this book to Mom.

AW

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 **Rationale and Research Strategy**

Foreign policy making has always been within the domain of the highest ranked political elites such as the heads of state, heads of governments, and their foreign ministers and, possibly, defense ministers. This can be observed anywhere in the world and throughout history. Although the concept of democratization has existed for decades,[1] the concept of a democratization that is attributed to globalization has surfaced less than a decade ago, just as globalization has become prevalent as manifested by further advances in technology, transportation, and telecommunications. And as a coinciding result, countries around the world such as Indonesia[2], Malaysia[3], Bhutan[4], and Morocco[5] are experiencing democratization. In this context, democratization can be defined as the smooth non-violent political transformation of a state resulting in a peaceful change of government whereby the power that was originally sourced from an all-powerful person at the apex of the political structure is diffused within that state's new political and societal structure that now contains an unprecedented system of checks and balances of power.

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[1] According to the then Comparative Democratization Project at Stanford University (democracy.stanford.edu, accessed 10 December 2008), 'Since the third wave of democratization began in 1974, more than 60 countries in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa have made transitions from authoritarian regimes (of varying duration and repressiveness) to some form of democracy (however tentative and partial) … This wave of democratization, the greatest to date in the world system, represents a sea change in international relations and comparative politics.'

[2] Structural economic and political crisis led President Suharto to resign his 32-year tenure to pave the way for Vice-President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (German university educated culminating with a doctorate from Aachen) to become President of Indonesia on 21 May 1998. President Habibie then enacted policies that set off the democratization process for Indonesia. Aspinall and Mitzer (2008) argued that Indonesia's democratic transition was largely the by-product of the regional financial crisis and the IMF stabilization programs gone wrong.

[3] After serving for 22 years in office, Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad retired on 31 October 2003. A figure that is a stark contrast to Mahathir in terms of political clout and personal prowess, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Malaysian university educated with a BA from Malaya) took office after Mahathir's retirement.

[4] Though a absolute monarch, Bhutan's King Jigme Singye Wangchuck has abdicated to pave the way for the politically progressive Crown Prince to be King. The 28-year old Crown Prince Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck (US and British university educated culminating with an MPhil from Oxford) became King of Bhutan on 6 November 2008.

[5] Though also an absolute monarch, Morocco's King Hassan II has groomed his Crown Prince Mohammed (Moroccan and French university educated culminating with a doctorate from Nice) to lead Morocco to become a fully fledged democracy. King Mohammed VI began his reign on 23 July 1999.

The political elite groups that were previously not in power are gaining influence on the foreign policy making process. These groups consist of members of Parliament and civil society that includes academics and non-governmental organizations, interest groups, religious organizations, and the media. And the political elite groups that were usually in power in Indonesia prior to democratization, such as the bureaucrats and the military, are slowly but surely engaging in power sharing with the other elite groups.

To my knowledge this phenomenon has not been empirically studied in detail. This study attempts to do just that. Moreover, this study shall contextualize the findings and, if possible, add to general theory formation on the role of domestic actors in foreign policy making.

This book explores the influence of domestic political elites on the foreign policy making process in democratizing Indonesia, especially during the presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri, and in doing so this book also aims to contribute to the general theory formation on the role of domestic political actors in similar countries.

In this context, there is a particular need to evaluate the role of ideology in foreign policy making because Megawati has been strongly influenced by the nationalist ideology of Soekarnoism. For this purpose a comparative historical analysis must be undertaken of both foreign policy during Guided Democracy where Soekarnoism evidently manifested itself, as well as of foreign policy during *Reformasi* where – although the President may have been ideological during the foreign policy formulation stage – the decisions taken during the implementation state of foreign policy making tended to show elements of pragmatism. Through such a comparative historical analysis, we found that ideology has remained pervasive in foreign policy throughout the period except during the New Order period of 1965 – 1998. Moreover, we must also underline that the competitive domestic political environments that were prevalent during both Guided Democracy and *Reformasi* are in stark contrast to the non-competitive domestic political environment that existed during the leadership of President Suharto in the New Order.

This study explores the following hypotheses. First, domestic political elites were the determinants that influenced the President in deviating from pursuing a foreign policy that is based on nationalist ideology. Second, ideology and the view of the world held by the domestic political elites were the determinants that shaped foreign policy making in democratizing Indonesia. Third, corresponding to the first two hypotheses, the non-governing domestic political elites imparted influence during the implementation stage and not during the formulation stage of foreign policy making.

The results of this study provide the needed empirical evidence in explaining the manner by which domestic political elites influence foreign policy making in democratizing Indonesia, and how such knowledge contributes to the general theory formation on the role of domestic actors in democratizing countries.

Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous and the largest Muslim country with a territory spanning four time zones. And its recent (post-1997) volatile history offers a valuable opportunity for analysis by the scholar. This study uses Indonesia as the country of study and analyzes four foreign policy case studies during the period of *Reformasi* (reformation) after President Suharto left office in 1998.

During *Reformasi* several foreign policy periods could have been submitted for analysis. However, as shall later be explained in more detail, it would be best to conduct this study on the presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri. Consequently, attention shall be placed on the time period from 2001 until 2003 using primary and secondary sources obtained prior and after such period.

The first reason for choosing the Megawati presidency is that of sufficient duration. Given practical considerations of the availability of materials, it was decided that a presidency with sufficient duration is selected. More importantly, the substantive reason for the selection of which presidency to analyze can be found in the ideas of a prominent intellectual in that:

> If the presidencies of Presidents [B.J.] Habibie and [Abdurrahman] Wahid can be said to be the first (preparatory) phase, the presidency of President Megawati [Soekarnoputri] can be regarded as the period of democratic consolidation (Azra 2006, 4).

Azra explained the benefits of looking to this specific presidency as compared to others:

> During the preparatory stage, one might observe that prolonged and inconclusive political conflicts continued to strongly color the Indonesian political scene. During the period of Megawati's presidency, there are already some signs to show that there is a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to institutionalize some crucial aspects of democratic process, which, in the end, will result in a 'consolidated democracy,' which is one stage in the democratic transition in which all the major political actors, parties, organized interests, forces and institutions consider that there is no alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers (Azra 2006, 4-5).

Another reason for choosing the presidency of Megawati is because

this period was the time when society completed its move towards becoming a fully democratic society after decades of authoritarian rule. Consequently, it is at this juncture in the democratization phase that the dynamics of the non-governmental political actors were manifested more prominently in the foreign policy making process.

To put it differently, one may regard Megawati's presidency as a political state of existence in equilibrium, to borrow a term from a state of condition that exists in nature, referring to a stage during a natural chemical process. Nevertheless, democratization is also a process, but one that involves the quest of political animals for power as opposed to that of an inanimate albeit possibly organic process seeking to achieve entropy. Despite the differences between the two, the precondition of being in such a state of equilibrium helps to ensure that inclinations toward making vulgar *coup d'etats* and creating anarchy are almost totally absent. Analysis of foreign policy during this period would then yield better results given that the period under study encompasses the dynamics of relatively stable elements of power as opposed to that which involves idiosyncratic ones. Therefore, for the sake of analysis in theorizing, this equilibrium state as manifested within the overall presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri would be the best choice. This choice, however, presented several complications in terms of substance as well as of methodology.

First, during the early beginnings of the republic Indonesia's foreign policy was highly ideologically inclined towards nationalism. After President Suharto took office, the domestic political environment became non-competitive as the country was steered towards a path whereby nationalistic ideologies (both within the domestic sphere and in foreign policy) were suppressed and the pragmatic anti-Communist foreign policy that focused on economic prosperity at the expense of nationalistic assertiveness was instituted which consequently placed Indonesia in the international political spectrum of leaning towards the West. Only after the rise of *Reformasi* did Indonesia see the rebirth of nationalism, among the many various ideologies to resurface on the national scene. Megawati Soekarnoputri was strongly influenced by the nationalist ideology of her father, Indonesia's founding father Soekarno. Despite arguments pointing to the inconclusive evidence of the effect of ideology on foreign policy, in the case of Indonesia the presence of this ideological influence must be accounted for in the calculus of foreign policy making. As we shall later observe, in Indonesia *raison d'état* (national interest) heavily relies on the elements of ideology for grounding. For simplicity, this study could have focused on the foreign policy during the tenure of the other two *Reformasi* – era presidents, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and Abdurrahman

Wahid. Both presidents were not presumed to have embraced any sort of ideology, which would make analysis simpler. However, as was previously explained, the simplicity obtained would be at the expense of the quality of the results due to the relatively short tenures in office and the unstable phase of *Reformasi* in which both President Habibie and President Wahid governed.

Second, *Reformasi* brought back a competitive domestic political environment that had been gone in Indonesia for over thirty-two years. Historically, Indonesia experienced a similar domestic political environment during the presidency of Soekarno. In contrast, under President Suharto the domestic political environment had been uncompetitive. Keep in mind that the nature of a state's domestic political environment, whether competitive or non-competitive, has a tremendous effect on the purposes and functions of foreign policy. Therefore a comparative historical analysis must be undertaken during the period of both Soekarno's presidency and *Reformasi* to map out the various functions of foreign policy, and to see whether foreign policy remains to be used for domestic political ends or to advance and reflect *raison d'état* (national interest) on the international scene.

Third, nationalist ideologies arose and were effectively used by the charismatic founders of the then newly – 'independent' states to consolidate power against the backdrop of the Cold War. Relations between the power blocs, in fact, rested on ideology. Since then, the world has changed drastically. It seems evident that *Reformasi* was possible due to not only domestic systemic developments but international political developments as well. The resignation of President Suharto had only precipitated an eventuality, and that is the democratization of Indonesia because democratization in previously authoritarian countries was beginning to become a chronic symptom of globalization. Therefore, a proper analysis of democratization must account for the systemic change within the international system and, in particular, how these changes are perceived and/or used by the political elites involved in foreign policy making.

To address these complications, this study shall approach the investigation in the following manner. First, a controlling variable in the investigation in the form of the observed presence of nationalist ideology must be used for this study. After all, one of the purposes of this study is to investigate whether or not pragmatically inclined political elites influenced the foreign policy decisions of a nationalist President. It can be assumed that nationalism tends to induce a foreign policy that is assertive whereas pragmatism tends to induce foreign policy that is accommodative. The tendency of nationalist leaders to embrace and

assert nationalist policies in world politics while leaders that are not so nationalistic tend to follow a foreign policy that is pragmatic in the sense that their foreign policy decisions are dictated more by cost benefit analysis rather than by underlying ideological underpinnings are often observed in practice. Embodying ideology as the controlling variable allows the observer to frame the policy outcome of an ideological President as the default condition while any deviation from this default condition can then be construed as the resultant policy position generated by political groups that embraced a more pragmatic approach towards policy.

Another useful way of analysis would be to divide foreign policy into two phases, that of formulation and that of implementation. Foreign policy implementation involves accounting for the slippage between what has been decided and what had, in fact, been implemented as policy; such slippage includes the deficit in the implementation capabilities and competencies as well (Hill 2003; Clarke and Smith 1989). From the perspective of international relations, the study of foreign policy implementation may be more relevant than the study of foreign policy decision-making (Everts and Walraven (eds) 1989). States do not always do what they say. Such a stray in behavior may be attributed to several factors that are ‘commonly’ found in the practice of foreign policy. Such factors can range from the usual lack of resources, or coercion by a stronger power, to doing things differently due to economic reasons beyond the control of that state’s government. One way to determine whether elites influence foreign policy would be to eliminate the ‘common’ sources of policy change from the analysis so that the focus can remain on the ‘uncommon’ factors that are, in fact, correlated to the influence of elites. In other words, results can be obtained if we can get rid of the noise and get to the gist of the correlation, if any. Once this identification of causal factors has been carried out, the answer as to whether the saliency of elites generates ‘determining influence’ in foreign policy can be sought.

So, the specific objective is to measure the influence and political effectiveness of the elites. In this context, ‘effectiveness’ is best defined as the capacity to achieve one’s will in the political arena (Presthus 1974, 168). And in this study, such influence can be observed in the extent to which a certain interest group or elite can detract or change the direction of foreign policy from what the government has originally declared or had committed to implement. The scope of the imparting of such influence may not necessarily be confined to affecting the overall direction of foreign policy. Instead, influence may manifest within key foreign policy decisions that the foreign policy decision makers must

make. These key decisions, as well as the context that surround the issues involving these decisions, are expected to reveal themselves in the case studies. Hence, pinning the President as a foreign policy decision maker who is inclined to pursue a nationalistic foreign policy while realizing that the implemented policies are, in fact, pragmatic yielded a premise that it was the political elites who persuaded the President to become less assertive in carrying out a nationalistic foreign policy.

Though its effects on foreign policy remain inconclusive, ideology indeed constitutes that control mechanism. The use of ideology as the control factor is necessary in the Indonesian case because of, again, President Megawati's embrace of nationalist ideology *Soekarnoism* in foreign policy making. The use of ideology as the control mechanism ought to explain not only the substance upon which the various political elites base their policy advocacy, but ought to also enable distinction of whether the primary determinants of the policy positions of those elites are either ideological, pragmatic, or simply rhetorically ideological for the sake of establishing the legitimacy of their own power. This 'investigative framework' should then enable us to map out the elements of the domestic political elites, to map out their positions on salient foreign policy issues on an influence-level spectrum, and make inferences as to which political elite groups, if any, influence the final foreign policy decision.

The second purpose of this book is to make a contribution to theory formation about the role of domestic political actors in foreign policy making in democratizing countries. Let us start off with an obvious objective of theory formation, which is to make a contribution to knowledge in general. Lakatos (1970, 175-176) was harsh in describing theories that cannot anticipate other facts as merely 'auxiliary theories.' And should circumstances instead turn this study into an attempt to construct such an 'auxiliary theory,' it should employ the self-evident test of Lakatos's falsification concept whereby if empirical data refutes a theory, the theory must be rejected and a replacement sought (Elman and Elman 2003, 19).

Within the confines of making a contribution to theory formation, another aspiration of this study would not only attempt to understand foreign policy making in democratizing countries, but to provide strategic feedback into the making of foreign policy as well. An attempt is made to help bridge the gap between the knowledge produced by academia and the demands of foreign policy specialists for scholarly knowledge. This is a gap which, despite all efforts, can, however, only be bridged but not eliminated (George and Bennett 2004, 265). In foreign policy making it is useful to have an analytical framework that can project outcomes on the

basis of the information possessed at the present time by decision makers. It goes without saying that decisions are taken after consideration of the probable future outcomes of those decisions. Hence, what decision makers expect to happen depends on the theoretical orientation she or he subscribes to (Chernoff 2005, 30).

And one way by which academic research can be more relevant to policy-making is by placing more focus on the development of middle-range theories that are narrower in scope but closer in type and form to the knowledge needed in policy-making (George and Bennett 2004, 265-266). This perspective in underlining the importance of engaging in practically relevant theory building is also supported by Keohane (1986, 188), Waltz (1986, 336), and Mearsheimer (2001, 10-11).

Having discussed the two objectives of this book, let us proceed with a discussion of how this book is organized. The first chapter discusses which type of theory would be most desirable, and if possible, for this study. The type of theory to be explored would either be explanatory, mid-range, or predictive. Furthermore, the first chapter will also provide an overview of the available theoretical approaches.

Moreover, attention was previously drawn to the more recent general processes of democratization that witnessed the diffusion of power from the few to the many. So, why is the focus of this study on the elites? Hence, this first chapter will also provide a theoretical justification to this study's continuing focus on the political elites as opposed to the focus on the political masses.

The second chapter aims to serve several purposes. The first purpose is to explain the dominant nationalist ideology of *Soekarnoism*, and through its history illustrate the strong influence of this ideology on the foreign policy of Indonesia during the era of Guided Democracy (1959 – 1965). The second purpose of this chapter is to establish the platform upon which to engage in a comparative historical analysis on the functions and purposes of foreign policy. Analysis shall compare the competitive domestic political environment that existed during Guided Democracy and during *Reformasi*. Note the importance of this phenomenon, and especially note its stark contrast from the non-competitive domestic political environment found in the era of the New Order (1965 – 1998). And lastly, the third purpose of the second chapter is to briefly trace Megawati Soekarnoputri's rise to power and to illustrate the influence of *Soekarnoism* on her thinking and on her world-views as reflected in foreign policy goals and tenets.

Once a clear contextual roadmap is constructed from these chapters, the investigation will then proceed into the analysis of the actual domestic political elements of power in the Indonesia of *Reformasi*.

The third chapter describes and analyses both the various elements of political power in Indonesia and the distribution of the powers of the various political elite groups within the foreign policy making structure. The theoretical approach chosen, as explained later towards the end of this first chapter, consists of the marriage of international political considerations and domestic political considerations. The exposition in this third chapter is somewhat comprehensive to illustrate the stark difference between the domestic power structure of *Reformasi* and that during the presidency of Suharto.

The fourth chapter provides not only the substance of the perceptions of the elites toward their international political environment, especially with regard to the presence of external actors such as the major powers, but also the contextual framework of the manner by which nationalist ideology of *Soekarnoism* is viewed and projected onto the international scene. Analysis ought to illuminate the way political elites view the international political environment and its corresponding foreign actors. Their views can then be classified as being either benign or hostile to the *raison d'etat* (national interest) of Indonesia. As is the case with such analysis, a mere exposition of the manner and substance by which the elites perceive the political environment alone is insufficient. Oftentimes, such perceptions are context oriented and are deeply ingrained within the policy issues themselves. Therefore such perceptions must be analyzed within a holistic framework exploring both the issues and the reactions of the elites towards those issues. If the political elites' perceptions of their world is hostile, similar to what was experienced by the elites during the era of Guided Democracy (Weinstein 1976), then elite perceptions can be taken to be the third factor that can be regarded as *ceteris paribus* (other things remain equal) between the studies of elites during Guided Democracy and during *Reformasi*. The first factor was the competitive nature of the domestic political environment. And the second factor was the elite's embrace of *Soekarnoism*, if it were found to be the case. The world-views of the political elites not only form an analytical element in their own right, but are especially useful in pointing out the perceptual determinants of the political elites' positions on the various foreign policy issues.

The fifth chapter discusses the interaction of the various elites throughout four cases of Indonesian foreign policy. From such interaction one can observe the degree of 'influence' imparted by the various political elites on the various issues, and from there inferences can be drawn as to the general effect of certain political elites on the outcome of foreign policy.

The book ends with a sixth and final chapter presenting the

contributions towards theory formation on the role of domestic actors in foreign policy.

Having explained the structure of this book, let us proceed with the first chapter. Before anything, the research design is discussed next. Keeping in mind the theoretical possibilities inherent in this study, we explain why we continue to prioritize the political elites as opposed to the political masses or the middle class.

We then move to an extensive discussion analyzing the various foreign policy explanatory theoretical approaches. We proceed to deciding upon which approach to apply in this study, and correspondingly, which ones should be developed further theoretically, if possible.

1.2 **Research Design**

Theories of foreign policy should be tested by empirical analysis. But why do case studies? According to Yin (2003, 58), not only would 'the demands of a case study burden [one's] intellect, ego, and emotion far greater than those of any other research strategy' due to non-routinized data collection procedure whereby there is a 'continuous interaction between the theoretical issues being studied and the data being collected,' but a case study would be the best research strategy to ask 'how' and 'why' questions over a set of contemporary events whereby the researcher has very little or no control (Yin 2003, 9). The cases chosen should cut across several themes. The themes must encompass issues that are politicized, or belong to the political system (Falkemark 1982, 46). Or, as Dahl puts it, an issue must be the object of conflicting preferences and of material importance (Falkemark 1982, 35).

Employing such parameters, obvious cases would include nationally prominent issues involving the interests of many elements of society. These issues may include banal but strategically important issues for the country, or issues that could be regarded as a crisis. Recalling Dahl's strict test for determining the presence of a ruling elite, implementation thereof requires that a series of concrete cases where key decisions are made be examined (Dahl 1958, 469). Hence, the dynamics of decisions must be analyzed. This step involves paying attention to the saliency of the elites, for saliency is extremely important in shaping organized and structured opinion, and subsequently, the elite perceptions of this opinion. While contents of attitudes and opinions tend to remain stable over time, saliency fluctuates considerably, influencing in turn the 'perception of the

content of opinion' (Everts 2002, 48).

Data for these selected cases shall be primarily obtained by personal interviews with members of the political elite groups (bureaucratic, members of parliament, military, and civil society comprising academic, religious, and interest groups, and media), specifically those who were involved with policy discussions or deliberations. The names of those interviewed are included in the Bibliography of this study.

The purpose of the interviews was to obtain insight into the mind of the particular elites (Harrison 2001, 94), individually or collectively, so that their attitudes and opinions are identified, and, ultimately, their policy preferences on the politicized foreign policy issues under contention can be mapped.

This data is complemented by analysis of articles in major print newspapers and magazines available during the period of study though not necessarily written during that period. To provide a systematic picture of the dynamics of elites in foreign policy making, this study follows the research design described above. Politicized issues are chosen. The positions of the various elites on those issues are mapped. General foreign policy principles and statements are identified. Though its predictive power is inconclusive, for the purposes of constituting a control variable during both the formulation and the implementation phases of foreign policy, ideology is assumed to have been operative, though during the latter phase other factors are to be accounted for as well.

To put such units of analysis within the chosen theoretical framework we shall employ the following setup. Two independent variables are involved. The first independent variable is the political elites' embrace (or non-embrace) of nationalist ideology of *Soekarnoism*, as manifested through the presence of domestic calls for Indonesia to pursue either an assertive or an accommodative foreign policy. The second independent variable is the political elites' views of both the world and of the various political actors in it, which can then be clustered into perceptions of the world and its actors that are either benign, or of a world and its actors that are hostile, to the national interest of Indonesia. The dependent variable is the foreign policy outcome at both the formulation and implementation stages as manifested in the propensity to pursue policies that are either assertive or accommodative. In comparing foreign policies during Guided Democracy and *Reformasi*, two commonalities were observed in both time periods. Firstly, the domestic political environments were competitive for the political elites. Secondly, foreign policy functioned as a tool that the political elites used to compete for political power. As shall later be elaborated, during Guided Democracy foreign policy was used by the elites as a means to increase their powers *vis-à-vis* each other in

getting closer to the President while in *Reformasi* foreign policy was used to consolidate political power. However, in the latter case the political maneuverings must be conducted within the national framework of prioritizing Indonesia's economic recovery from the financial crisis of 1997 whereas during Guided Democracy domestic political efforts were undertaken within the framework of a foreign policy that was to, among other goals, assist in building, if not to outright create, a new world order providing opportunities whereby nations such as Indonesia would not have to be forced to lose their identities by aligning with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Although the study builds upon case studies from one country only, an attempt is made to contribute to more general theory formation and to enable the application of the findings of this study to other countries.

1.3 Elites and Power

Before delving into foreign policy, justification must be provided as to why this study focuses on the elites. In taking influence as a subset of power and in examining the various ways in which influence is distributed in the state, one can understand the rationale behind focusing on the elites in this study.

Foreign policy has for centuries remained within the realm of those elites who are in power. Or as Kegley (2007, 83) put it, 'the course of history is determined by the decisions of the political elites.' Such a situation can be found in both democratic and authoritarian regimes alike. However, to what extent is this time-honored tradition also observed in newly democratizing countries? To what extent does the power to craft foreign policy remain within the domain of the foreign policy elite? Are newly domestically influential members of society gradually getting involved in shaping and even commanding foreign policy? After all, in the history of international relations results achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of their actors (Waltz 1979, 65). Could such a deflection from the original intention of a government's foreign policy in the case of democratizing countries be caused by the rising saliency of the domestic elites?

Matters are more complicated because of the impact of globalization and the linkages that result from it. Gone are the days when the state reigned supreme. Traditional conceptions of sovereignty no longer prevail. Naturally, one must also account for the change in context in which all of this transformation occurs. Globalization is conducive to

interdependence among nations whose embrace leads to the rise of the trading state, replacing the political – military state (Waltz 2000, 14). Rosecrance (1986) and Strange (1996) even suggested that 'the power of the market rivals or surpasses the power of the state' (Waltz 2000, 14). For as van Staden and Vollaard (2002, 183-184) observed, the notion of sovereignty is currently still more appropriate in understanding behavior in the politics of war and peace than in the politics of welfare and human rights. Rosenau (2006, 204) concluded that the 'greater potency of individual, societal, and systemic variables has limited … what governments can accomplish either on the world stage or in their efforts to mobilize domestic publics.' And even empirically in diplomatic practice it has been acknowledged that present day power relations are no longer dictated by military might but, to a significant degree, by economic weight (Wibisono 2007, audience with author). Despite these changes the government remains the 'captain of the ship' holding primary responsibility for the welfare of its citizens (Habibie 2007, interview with author). Given these changes, the need to understand the manner in which domestic political dynamics affect a nation-state's outward policy takes on a new urgency in this transformed global environment. Previous domestic balances of power within many states ceased to exist.

In this context of changed domestic political dynamics due to globalization, two schools of thought exist on the question of how power or influence is distributed: elitist theory and pluralist theory.

Elitist theory espouses that political power is heavily concentrated within a small number of peoples/groups. Throughout history, in civilizations spanning from the East to the West, the 'rule by the few' has prevailed. As put simply by Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, 201), the elite are those with most power in a group, the mid-elite those with less power, and the mass, the least power. One point to note is that it is not the existence or non-existence of this 'elite' group of people that makes a society democratic, but rather how the elites are recruited and how such elites exercise their power (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, 202).

In terms of 20th century academia, such classical elitism is reflected in the works of, among others, the likes of Robert Michels (1968 [1915]), Vilfredo Pareto (1976 [1935]), and Gaetano Mosca (1939 [1896]). Weber (1994) and Schumpeter (1994 [1942]) laid the groundwork for further development. Post-World War II scholars such as Mills (1956) and Domhoff (1967) drawing upon studies of elites in the United States during the Cold War provided a clear elaboration of elite rule. Contemporary observation by Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998) of US elites has shown that class remains the most important barrier to entry to the upper circles of power (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998, 184) and

though diverse, the power elite still consists of the traditional upper third of the social ladder (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998, 6-7).

But is there, in fact, such a thing as political elites? For the benefit of current analysis, Dahl (1958, 466) proposed a strict test in determining the presence of a ruling elite. First, the ruling elites are well defined. Second, there are ample cases where the preferences of the elite are in contradiction to other groups. And third, in those cases the preferences of the elite prevail.

Other scholars have also suggested various ways of addressing the question. Mills (1956, 267-268) postulated the existence of power elites based on:

> … the several coincidences of objective interests between economic, military, and political institutions; the social similarities and the psychological affinities of the [people] who occupy the command posts of these structures … [and] the ramifications, to the point of virtual totality, of the kinds of decisions that are made at the top.

Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998) reaffirm this definition by extending the classification to those who own and manage major corporations, finance the political campaigns of politicians, and serve in government as appointed officials and military leaders. However, the priority underlined by Mills (1956, 305-317) is the capacity of the power elite to shape the political and economic conditions within so that power can be manipulated to their advantage. Such mobilization of interests is conducted in a way that channels the diverse interests of regional and local elites and connects then with those at the national level (Domhoff 1967, 137). And based upon contemporary comparative studies of various countries, Dogan (2003, 4) found that there is a linkage connecting those elites at the summit of power.

However, as shall later be detailed with respect to Asia, Case (2003, 266) found that no country in Southeast Asia fully conform to Mills's definition of the power elite though one finds significant overlap in the accumulation of positions in parties, bureaucracies, militaries, and conglomerates.

Two potential determinants of the elites' behavior that must be taken note of are interests and social background. It has been suggested that the influence of social background upon attitudes is incoherent and non-determinant (Martin 1977, 131), and that the influence of social backgrounds upon policy preferences is low (Martin 1977, 147). However, social background and experience are important in the recruitment of elites and in their political socialization (Martin 1977, 147).

Having determined the relative unimportance of social background, the underlying variable that truly defines a category of an 'elite' consists of the similarity in the interests of the various actors. Within the context of policy making, interests are defined as the policy preferences revealed by the political participation of the actors (Lukes 2005). And Falkemark (1982, 85) interestingly noted that the very concept of interests proved valuable to the political scientist. First, interests can be observed through people's overt actions. Second, such an observation makes it possible for political scientists to employ a factual or non-normative framework by which to analyze interests.

On the opposite side of the debate there is a set of arguments challenging the notion of elites. Pluralist theory stipulates that power is dispersed among citizens and is not concentrated within the hands of just a few people (Dahl 1961) and that citizens can actually 'exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders' (Dahl 1956, 3). Pluralists view that governments, and those in them, are constrained by the competitive party system and interest groups (Hall 2007, 39). Political sociologist Lipset (1960, 7) alluded to Aristotle in providing a reminder of the importance for the survival of states in having the middle class in government:

> And democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has a greater share in government; for when there is no middle class and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end.

Lipset is supported by Mills' (1956, 323) view that the political structure of a democracy requires that the public constitute the 'very seat of sovereignty.' However, McGovern (2007, 31) in alluding to Alexis de Tocqueville's thesis that democracies tend to resemble a 'Tyranny of the Majority,' raised a crucial point in that to preserve liberty even the sovereign popular will of the people requires a constraint similar to the manner by which the constitutionalists had sought to constrain the sovereignty of 18th century ambitious rulers. McGovern referenced to Manin (1997, 8-41) in that in former times the Greeks knew that elections were methods of allocating political offices not to common people, but to members of an elite. Therefore, although originally designed as a forum whereby the will of the people can manifest itself, modern democracy 'could have nothing to do with popular sovereignty in anything other than the mythical sense to which leaders appeal in order to secure popular support' (Cudworth and McGovern 2007, 73). Max Weber's notion of the rule by charismatic leaders under the conditions of party competition, or plebiscitary leadership democracy, was 'the only feasible approximation to a genuine representative democracy' (Denleavy and O'Leary 1987,

142) since the issue under contention was elections and not policy. To augment their arguments, Cudworth and McGovern assimilated the arguments of two scholars. Held (2006) maintained that the underlying issue in elections is the popular appeal of political elites. Schumpeter (1994 [1944]) believed that the part played by the people is not to rule but rather to produce a government and consequently, modern democracy is 'the rule of the politician.'

It is acknowledged then that inequalities in political capital do exist, and that such discrepancies lead to inequalities in the 'capacities and opportunities' for citizens to engage in political participation (Dahl 1985, 54-55). Presthus (1974, 67) underlined the variety of these political resources that are at the disposal of the political elites, which includes legitimization, functional expertise, advantaged socioeconomic status to official roles, political sophistication and access, and, finally, personal commitment. The uneven distribution of control over political resources is attributed to the specialization of functions in society that creates differences in access to such political resources, and differences in inheritances (biological, social, and material), in incentives and goals (Dahl 1984, 50-51). The need to possess political capital in order to obtain access to political participation constitutes a barrier-to-entry among citizens interested in the affairs of the state. The unequal distribution of possession of political capital is often manifested in politics. In fact, political activity involves actors with similar goals struggling to obtain compliance through control over desired resources (Martin 1977, 135). Or, one could look at politics as a contest of strength between those who are trying to bring about change in the prevailing distribution of values, and those who are seeking to preserve it (Falkemark 1982, 152). But in the end, all matters revolve around power as Catlin (1927, 210-211; 262) has reflected upon:

> Politics, as a theoretical study, is concerned with the relations of men, in association and competition, submission and control, in so far as they seek, not the production and consumption of some article, but to have their way with their fellows … What men seek in their political negotiations is power.

The previous discussion examined the components that are at play when the issue of the distribution of power in society is analyzed. Though social background and high social connections are often associated with political elites, the determining variable that actually validates the categorization of elites is, in fact, interest. And though a diffusion of power has occurred in democratizing states from a traditionally executive centric power elite structure to that whereby power is spread across many

institutions within society, it is still the elites of those various groups that presently command influence. Needless to say, in extreme cases even unlikely partners are brought together in a power alliance because of similar interests. This situation tends to emerge due to first, the need for a domestic balance of power whereby the powers of those in government are checked by the elites outside of it, and second, by the fact that the distribution of political resources in a society is unequal and is slanted in favor of the elites, who obtained a large share of that power distribution given their inherent social and material advantages. It is for these general reasons that this study focuses on the elites.

As can later be observed, the previous theoretical discussion with respect to the distribution within a society of such political influence closely relates to the case studies under analysis. As shall later be elaborated, Indonesia went through a transformational leadership phase. Since independence, Indonesia has experienced the era of power of two authoritarian governments. But sudden and drastic reform promulgated a system whereby power was forcefully diffused towards the various elements of society. Its society has become pluralistic. However, despite this diffusion of influence, the elites of those various elements of society continue to possess considerable power and influence.

1.4 Framework for Foreign Policy Analysis

Having discussed the rationale for analyzing elites, we now discuss the various theoretical approaches in analyzing foreign policy. To do so, a brief survey on the ‘state of the art’ and an effort to chart scholarly progress within the field must be made. Once the theoretical landscape has been mapped, endeavors can be seriously attempted to advance beyond the boundaries set by current knowledge.

The instinctive way to best conduct a theoretical survey would be to embrace the multiple levels of analysis framework that was introduced by Singer (1961, 77) as exemplified in the initial promulgation of the concept of international and nation-state levels of analysis. Russett, Starr, and Kinsella (2006, 133-192) took this framework further and delineated six levels of analysis: decision-making individuals, the roles of such individuals, the structures of their government, their society, relations between their nation-state and other international actors, and the world system.

However, this levels-of-analysis framework seems too generic. One can get a better assessment of the situation at hand by adapting this

framework to a specific context i.e. Indonesia. By marrying the multiple levels of analysis framework into the political power structure of Indonesia with respect to foreign policy making, one can get a clearer picture of the possibilities to engage in analysis. The result ought to be a coherent integrative analytical framework that contextualizes the levels of analysis framework to the Indonesian situation.

Returning to the discussion of the power structure in Indonesia, let us first begin with the premise that foreign policy making is a privilege of those in the executive branch of government. In such a case, domestic factors outside this governmental branch are almost irrelevant. Hence, the use of the systemic level of analysis approach would be appropriate for this power structure component. Secondly, one can argue that foreign policy making is, indeed, an affair of the 'elites.' Analysis of this power structure component would entail assessment of the structure of domestic decision makers, and of the decision-makers themselves. The role played by decision makers themselves is, therefore, central to the overall power equation despite the implication that within a wider societal context the role played by the elites would be less relevant. For this situation, it would be useful to employ the decision-making approach. As we analyze this power structure component as well, we find that the set of ideas and values of the decision-makers do indeed play a role in policy making. Though, again, within the wider societal context several issues such as power distribution, access to power, and access to information become less relevant. For analysis, the cognitive or individual level of analysis approach shall be used. And finally, the third and last component of the power structure shows that foreign policy making in Indonesia is a democratic exercise in which elements of society take part in the venture. Consequently, such a view would entail an assessment of domestic actors, settings, and elites. For analysis, the domestic sources of foreign policy approach shall be used.

Given the previous discussion, therefore, out of the possible available levels of analysis four corresponding perspectives need to be discussed at length for the purpose of this study. These four perspectives are the systemic approach, the decision-making approach, the cognitive/individual approach, and the domestic sources approach.

1.4.1 Systemic Level of Analysis

The international systemic level-of-analysis approach underlines the importance of environmental factors as the major determinants of a

state's foreign policy. This approach embraces the notion that, unlike in a domestic power structure whereby power relations are hierarchic, in international politics the relations among states are anarchic in the sense that though they are not chaotic there is no higher power that can prevent states from e.g. attacking each other. Hence, states must have enough power to defend themselves. But how much power is needed by states to survive? There are two fundamentally different perspectives to this issue. The first is espoused by Waltz (1959; 1979), and such perspective essentially states that states ought to pursue power but should be careful as to not become dominant for by becoming so other states will retaliate or form alliances to counter this dominant state. Therefore, according to this perspective, a state that obtains more power does not necessarily accumulate greater security. This perspective entails a number of components.

The first concept is the existence of an organizing principle by which states are ordered on the basis of their capabilities (Keene 2005, 198). States are structured in this manner by virtue of their propensity to constrain and limit each other (Waltz 1979, 100).

The second concept is the notion that the international environment is anarchic (Waltz 1959). Does anarchy imply total chaos? Not necessarily. Bull (1977, 45-47) espoused that due to the absence of a central authority that is able to interpret and enforce the law, individual members of the international society must judge and enforce the law; hence leading to justice that exists despite being 'crude and uncertain.' Another perspective regards anarchy in this context as simply reflected in a world where states are all equal to each other in the sense that in the absence of an all-encompassing authority no state can command others and no state can be compelled to obey others (Waltz 1979, 88). Such a situation induces states to develop their own capabilities to engage in self-help with the rationale that 'in the absence of a supreme authority, there is the constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force' (Waltz 1959, 188).

What does this self-help system entail? Waltz (1979, 118) illustrates it with the following:

> A self-help is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in way that tend toward the creation of balance of power.

The third concept from this perspective is thus the notion of a natural equilibrium whereby states aim to dominate or simply to balance each

other (Waltz 1979, 119). This state of political existence is the balance of power. The very assumption of this concept points to the fourth idea.

The fourth idea is found in the notion that states are rational unitary actors who 'at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination' (Waltz 1979, 118). This major assumption often generates confusion. Critics, and Waltz himself concurs, argue that states do, in fact, vary in size, wealth, and power, and that states pursue many different goals. However, this assumption is incorporated into the theoretical argumentation for the sake of theory construction. Waltz (1979, 119) has made it clear in that these 'assumptions are neither true nor false … [but] that they are essential for the construction of theory.'

The fifth component consists of the proposition that due to the systemic structure of states security becomes the ultimate goal of states, and that power correspondingly becomes merely a means to an end (Waltz 1979, 126). Waltz argued that states seek not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the international system. Hence, relative power becomes the ultimate goal of states.

There, however, a second perspective that is advocated by Mearsheimer (2001). The first component of this perspective entails the premise that the ultimate goal of states is to obtain maximum share of world power at the expense of others with the end goal of becoming a hegemon (Mearsheimer 2001, 2). The rationale is simple:

> States recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power (Mearsheimer 2001, 3).

It is the structure of the international system that propels states to act aggressively toward each other by virtue of fear. Fear from what? Fear from the absence of a central authority governing states and protecting those states from each other, fear from the possession of military capabilities by states, and fear from the inability of states of knowing the intentions of other states (Mearsheimer 2001, 3).

The second element of the perspective advocated by Mearsheimer (2001) is the recognition of the pervasiveness of the role of the great powers in international politics. The reason for this orientation is that the 'fortunes of all states – great powers and smaller powers alike – are determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability' (Mearsheimer 2001, 5). Capability in this context is defined in terms of the ability to be strong enough to fight, though not necessarily beat, the most powerful state in the world while also having

the capability of launching a second nuclear strike as a solid deterrent. If a state, however unlikely, achieves nuclear hegemony, any conventional weapons balance of power would be nullified in the power equation.

The differences between the perspectives advocated by Waltz (1959; 1979) and Mearsheimer (2001) are based solely on determining the amount of power states need to survive. This structural realist approach does not account for whether or not the states themselves are democratic or autocratic, whether they are governed by competent or by incompetent leaders, or whether or not the states embrace a certain culture. In sum, this structural realist approach regards states simply as black boxes where their differences lie only in each state's power capabilities.

1.4.1.1 Assessment of the Systemic Approach

Critics of the systemic approach emphasize, first of all, that other actors in international politics, such as international institutions, do exist in their own right, and acknowledge that there are indeed various non-state-centric interpretations of sovereignty (Keohane 1986A, 24). After all, 'the survival of states is affected as much by the economic forces of globalization and non-military threats as by invading armies and the use of weapons of mass destruction' (van Staden 2007, 35).

Ruggie (1986) observed that the systemic approach fails to account for changes in world politics, while Keohane (1986) seconded Ruggie's failure to account for change argument and underlined the inconsistency of the premise of power maximization with the balance of power concept. In retrospect, these arguments were ill founded given Waltz's (1979, 69) admission that a system theory of international relations does explain continuities, recurrences, and repetitions, but not change.

Critical theorist Cox (1986, 215-216) also pointed out the inability of systemic theory to explain change in world politics, and instead advanced the use of 'historical materialism' to correct the fallacies of neorealism. Waltz (1986, 340) retorted harshly and argued that Cox himself was only able to aspire but not able to delineate such a theory as well.

However, not all the criticisms confront the systemic approach head-on. There are also critiques that rather complement the systemic approach. Stein (1993, 29-59) suggested that it is the self-interests of states that, in turn, lead them to create international regimes. Both Lipson (1993, 60-84) and Milner (1993, 143-169) placed heavy emphasis on how the concept of anarchy has been emphasized at the expense of international interdependence. Though embracing the premise of anarchy as a key feature of the international system, Axelrod and Keohane (1993, 85-115) argued that it is anarchy itself that does indeed lead states to

interact with each other. Neo-liberalists believe in the maximization of absolute gains in that states aim to search for opportunities to cooperate, yielding benefits to all. Although Grieco (1993, 116) believed that international anarchy fosters competition and conflict and, in turn, hinders cooperation among states even when they share common interests, he acknowledged that neo-liberalist arguments do help towards understanding the politics of international cooperation (Grieco 1993A, 335). Notice that these arguments do not refute the thesis that the foreign policy of states is determined by the international system. It is acknowledged that other factors are at work at the international level, and that change in the international system is indeed possible.

The discussion so far has covered the substantive arguments of the systemic approach in the analysis of foreign policy. The next discussion shall focus on the applicability of the systemic approach in analyzing foreign policy. The issue under contention is whether such an approach can be used to predict foreign policy, or merely explain it after the fact.

There are arguments claiming that realism fails to provide a general explanatory theory of international politics or a prescriptive framework for foreign policy despite the success of realism in highlighting the political constraints imposed by international anarchy and human selfishness (Donnelly 2000, 2). One argument posits the ability of the systemic approach in predicting and even explaining as hampered by having the need to separate the levels of analysis and determine its contents (Griffiths 1999, 49). Another argument argues that a high-level theory such as the systemic approach is not specific enough to enable policy makers to select among the various available options (Chernoff 2005, 25). One argument was rather harshly ironic in stating the futility of the systemic approach in that '[the approach] can explain almost any foreign policy event … its great defect is that it tends to do this after the fact, rather than before' (Vasquez 1998, 324).

After consideration of the previous arguments contesting the use of the systemic approach in the analysis of foreign policy, perhaps it is understandable that the structural realist perspective advocated by Waltz (1959; 1979) may be policy irrelevant. After all, Waltz's objective with the *Theory of International Politics* was solely to produce a pure theory of international relations (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, 99). Waltz's policy relevant work is found in his work on nuclear proliferation (Waltz and Sagan 1995). However, the notion in using systemic approach in policy analysis as irrelevant was not shared by the proponents of the structural realist perspective advanced by Mearsheimer (2001). The objective of such structural realism was to predict great-power politics in the twenty-first century (Mearsheimer 2001, 7). Mearsheimer (2001, 8) believed that

social scientists should use their theories to make predictions because doing so helps policy debate.

Even if he introduced his structural realist perspective as a pure theory of international relations, Waltz (1979, 121) nevertheless counter-argued that 'a theory at one level of generality cannot answer questions about matters at a different level of generality.' Waltz acknowledged the possibility and even the tendency for confusion between theories of international politics and of foreign policy. Within this background Waltz (1979, 122) argued the following:

> Balance of power theory is a theory about the [unintended] results produced by the uncoordinated actions of states … [which] makes assumptions about the interests and motives of states, rather than explaining them. What it does explain are the constraints that confine all states. The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the expected reactions of states, but by itself the theory cannot explain those reactions.

1.4.1.2 Applicability of the Systemic Approach

The previous discussion focused on the substantive arguments of the systemic approach. However, the key question for us is whether or not the systemic approach can help explain the foreign policy of a state. In this context, Chernoff (2005, 17) argued:

> Waltz and various other IR theorists do endorse the importance of prediction in theoretical pursuits. While their theories do not generate specific, policy-useful predictions, they do generate predictions … Empirical theories at a high level of generality are typically not anti-predictive. In many instances, they are reasonably seen by their authors as an element in a scientific complex of description, explanation, and prediction, which can aid policy-makers.

However, there is a potent argument to deem inappropriate the use of the systemic approach for the analysis of whether and, if so, to what extent elites of a society influence foreign policy. Despite the recognition that the international system does pose constraints on the behavior of states, systemic factors merely offer a menu of choice rather than determine a specific choice of action unless those constraints are very narrow (Stein 2006, 190). Another perspective reiterating a similar argument acknowledges that the international system cannot explain behavior even though such a system may be a powerful constraint in the context of foreign policy making (Voss 1998, 21-22).

At a first glance, a systemic approach does not seem relevant in

assessing the influence of elites on foreign policy. However, with deeper scrutiny it may still be possible – though perhaps unlikely – that analysts can profitably use the systemic approach for the following reason:

> [Though] each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own internal processes, … its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by the interactions with them (Waltz 1979, 65).

Waltz's insight leads to the conclusion that though the foreign policy of states increases the power position and the capability of states to make alliances, the foreign policy 'menu of choices' from which states pursue remain largely determined by the international system. From the surface of this systemic approach, domestic factors seem irrelevant for the study of foreign policy. However, the systemic approach does not address the uncertainty as to how states should normatively react to these given conditions within their own polities. Hence, there is room for domestic debate, and consequently, the question of how domestic factors impinge on this debate is both relevant and necessary.

1.4.2 The Decision-Making Approach

The premise underlying this theoretical approach is that the *manner in which* decisions are made basically shapes the substance of the decisions themselves. The approach focuses on the influence of the roles of decision-makers on foreign policy. The next section shall also discuss the individual or cognitive approach and shall examine its influence on the process of decision-making in foreign policy. The analyses undertaken by both approaches oscillate between the group level and the individual level of analysis.

Rosenau (1969, 169) argued that 'foreign policy action is a product of decisions, and the way decisions are made may substantially affect their contents.' However, Korany (1986) contested the notion that a nation's foreign policy is constituted by decisions. Korany viewed decisions as merely one part of a country's foreign policy. Decisions are discrete, delimited, and can be isolated from other events. Korany (1986, 39) instead espoused that 'a country's foreign policy … is a continuous, wider phenomenon, embracing general objectives, stated strategy, and a series of routine actions,' and that decisions are best analyzed as sub-part of this whole spectrum. Supporting the argument of Korany, Wallace's analysis of the foreign policy process of the United Kingdom, for example, yielded a conclusion that 'the process of policy-making is less

one of a series of discrete and identifiable decisions than a continuous flow of policy' (Wallace 1975, 5).

The second premise of this approach assumes that the decision unit is not necessarily rational and that its identity is not always unitary but disaggregated. Instead of the usual assumption that decision-makers weigh all options in depth and decide upon those choices that maximize their benefits as rational choice theory posits, decision-makers instead practice what is known as 'satisficing' or 'muddling through,' that is deciding upon an alternative course of action that minimally meets their objectives rather than action that allows utility maximization. Decision makers do this out of their innate inclination to simplify choices. Simon (1959) and Lindblom (1959) introduced this concept.

Building on the notion that decisions are only a part of the whole foreign policy, we proceed with analysis of recent theoretical advances. A voluminous literature has developed on the premise that both decisions and the decision-making process, while clearly not identical, are an important part of foreign policy making.

Among the many available works on bureaucratic politics, those of Morton Halperin (Halperin 1974; Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006) and Graham Allison (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999) occupy a dominant place in the mainstream literature. Moreover, several other scholars engaged in work on bureaucratic politics. Neustadt (1970) employed the concept in the analysis of the alliance behavior between the United States and the United Kingdom. Hilsman (Hilsman et al. 1993) expanded the concept in the analysis of how foreign policy is formulated in the United States. And Destler (1974) emphasized the bureaucratic and organizational aspects of policy as conducted in the United States. In essence, all of these concepts go back to the work of two groups of scholars: Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin et al. ([1962] 2002, 76) who relied on the 'definitions of the situation which we consider to be central to the explanation of state behavior result[ing] from decision-making processes in an organizational context,' and Sprout and Sprout (1965) who differentiated between what would be considered the environments most influenced by 'operational' and 'psychological' factors, respectively. Essentially, these concepts underlined the thesis that the manner in which these two factors influence values, preferences, choices, and decisions depends on the attitudes, perceptions, judgments, and purposes of a state's decision-makers.

Halperin et. al. ([1974] 2006) provided numerous generalizations of bureaucratic behavior as illustrated by mini-cases and snapshots of foreign policy instances from the presidencies of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Allison's model I, dubbed the 'rational actor model', paints

the state as a black box in the form of a rational utility maximizing unitary unit that constantly aims to achieve its goals. This model, however, does not account for the diverse composition of that unit, i.e. the many government departments and agencies, nor does it account for the tendency of those working there to satisfice instead of maximizing utility in light of routines or standard operating procedures. Allison's model II, called the 'organizational process model', argued that the state does not 'choose' but rather that the so-called decisions are, in fact, the non-extraordinary results of regular patterns of behavior exhibited by those working for large organizations. Allison's model III, often used as the benchmark when describing the bureaucratic politics approach, views policy as neither choices nor outputs but merely a result of bargaining between the different key players of the national government. To expound on this model, Allison investigated the perceptions, motivations, positions, power, and maneuvers of the players in the Cuban missile crisis using both the perspectives of the United States and the Soviet Union. In order to explain why a choice was made or why a certain behavior was exhibited, it was necessary to identify 'the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion' (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 257). Essentially, this model exhibited the paradigm that 'where you stand [on an issue] depends on where you sit [in the overall bureaucratic scheme of things]' (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 307).

Remaining within the context of the situation as analyzed by model III, it is also worthwhile to keep in mind that since most high-level foreign policy decisions are made in small groups of between two to seven members, and even smaller in crisis situations (George 1980, 86), there has been much theorizing on the dynamics of policy-making when the number of players concerned on any issue is small.

In small groups, both the distribution of power among the members and the roles that those members play influence the process of how the group operates (Hermann 1978, 69-102). Such decision-making structures do, in fact, matter in foreign policy (Hagan et al. 2001) and such structures or units can take the form of a powerful leader, a single group, or a coalition of autonomous actors (Hermann 2001). Hence, understanding the structure and process in the decision-making unit would enable an understanding of the nature of the decisions produced by the unit.

However, the most discussed theory involves a group with a small number of participants, often referred to as 'small group.' The academic mainstream phenomenon of 'groupthink' has been empirically observed whereby the high stress, high stakes, ambiguous, uncertain, secret, and

risky situations commonly associated with foreign policy decision-making elicit a fear-based emotional response from the participants, resulting in small group dysfunctionality (Janis 1982). Moreover, these kinds of situations were apparently not the only conditions that precipitate groupthink ('t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997). Studies of the meetings of the British cabinet concerning the continuation of Anglo-French appeasement towards Germany in September 1938 (Munich Crisis) found that groupthink occurred in only five of the twelve meetings (Beasley 1998). This observation suggests that small groups are in no way similar or identical and, correspondingly, each small group dynamics is prone to react in a certain way to a certain decision-making style. In cases of group conflict, for example, there is competition to provide the best causal argument concerning an issue such that the winning argument shall form the basis for decision making by the group (Sylvan and Haddad 1998). Another phenomenon that constitutes either an addition or an alternative to groupthink is the 'newgroup syndrome.' Such a syndrome occurs when a group, or groups, is newly formed or when its members are abruptly changed as the group begins working. Such groups tend to possess inclinations of group deliberation that essentially provide serious implications for political decision-making (Stern 1997). Moreover, there is another problem related to the small size of a group. Apart from members having an implicit propensity towards consensus or using the small group as an arena for political competition, members also engage in practices that are not limited to procedural manipulation but to political manipulation as well at various phases of the decision-making process (Hoyt and Garrison 1997).

1.4.2.1 Assessment of the Decision-Making Approach

After discussing the dynamics of small groups, let us discuss Allison's work again. Given the importance and centrality of Allison's work in the field of international relations[6], criticisms were bound to surface. However, such criticisms seem to lack a coherent theme. And consequently, those criticisms instead attack Allison's project from various angles across a wide spectrum of issues. Despite the variety of perspectives from which those criticisms originate, such counter-arguments can be categorized into several themes.

[6] From discussions with a senior US academic, it seemed that when it first came out Graham T Allison's *Essence of Decision* became so influential in academic circles such that Harvard University used the work as the basis by which to grant Allison full academic tenure as Professor of Government.

The first category of criticisms of Allison's work falls under methodological soundness. One argument pointed out the implausibility of the theory's claims that bureaucratic competition, and not the power of the presidency, is responsible for policy outcomes; hence absolving public office holders of the responsibility and accountability for policy (Krasner 1972). The second argument underlined the apparent neglect to the overall political system by the failure by both legislators and the electorate to constrain executive powers up to a point whereby bureaucratic competition can take place (Ball 1974, 79). The third argument acknowledged the theory's power in explaining staff behavior but did not explain the direction and purpose of the political system, an important component that cannot be ignored in policy analysis (Perlmutter 1974). Another argument dealt with the implementation of the theory. Bureaucratic politics models require evidence that is rarely available. Analysts choosing to proceed by employing such models therefore risk imposing the theory on the data as opposed to testing the theory on the data (Caldwell 1977, 99-100).

Another argument, which is the more important within the context of the present study, proposed that analysts would be deprived of the knowledge of whether pressure groups, economic interests, public opinion, and the media influence the decision-making process, or of the ability to even be able to recognize whether such influences exist (Korany 1986, 55).

The second category of criticisms of Allison's work argues the inapplicability of context, especially when applying it to developing countries. One view contended that lack of modernity in developing countries renders the bureaucratic politics approach inapplicable for use in analysis (Hill 1978, 2) while another argued that such analysis might encounter difficulties in using the models because of the relative instability of structure or of form in the organizational processes endemic to developing countries (Migdal 1974, 519). Another argument raised the issue of non-universality in relation to the extensive national security policy-making processes and apparatuses that are present in the United States in comparison to the processes that exist in other countries (Brenner 1976, 332) while another went so far as to sarcastically imply a certainty that such intricate processes exist either in the early 12th century or in the halls of power of the United States (Gray 1974, 290). Another analysis yielded the observation that bureaucracies dominate all foreign policy decisions except in issues that are within the authoritative domain of the top leadership. And even so, the issues that are dealt with at such a high-level are merely 'the tip of the iceberg' (Cottam 1977, 9-10).

The third category of criticisms of Allison's work stresses the need to

incorporate cognitive analysis into the bureaucratic politics approach. The emphasis on bureaucratic politics results in a neglect of the values of those participating in the foreign policy process. The way in which bureaucratic politics can influence policy is determined, in part, by presidential attention and values (Art 1973, 486). Jervis (1976, 28) went further to explain that:

> … what seems to be a clash of bureaucratic interests and stands can often be more fruitfully viewed as a clash among values that are widely held in both the society and the decision-makers' own minds … [hence resulting in the observation that] there is no way to explore the extent to which bureaucratic factors cause the outcome because we have no grounds for claiming that a different constellation of bureaucratic interests and forces would have produced a different result or that the outcome would have been different were there no bureaucracies at all.

Jervis' point is supported by Ball's (1972, 92) statement, 'if US policy is to be explained or changed the target is not the governmental structure but the values of American decision-makers.'

1.4.2.2 Applicability of the Decision-Making Approach

Despite the previous concerns regarding the validity of employing the bureaucratic politics approach in the analysis of foreign policy making, Allison's approach has been praised for its originality in using previously separate approaches in the analysis of one case study (Cornford 1974, 233). Although the bureaucratic politics approach remains one of the most promising theories for explaining foreign policy, such an approach seems inappropriate for the analysis of the influence of elites of a society on that country's foreign policy given that the merits of Allison's work lie in the analysis of how bureaucracies bargain to produce policy. However, should the focus of analysis shift to that of governmental decision-making, especially during a crisis or on issues salient to a presidency, the bureaucratic approach would seem like a suitable framework for analysis.

1.4.3 Cognitive or Individual Approach

The cognitive or individual approach in analyzing political elites in foreign policy making is anchored within the perspective of the individual participants in the decision-making process. The major premise of this approach stipulates that what is important is not the actual reality that decision-makers face, but what those decision-makers think reality is (the

psycho-milieu) within the context of the whole process of how policy is made. In the cognitive approach to foreign policy analysis, individuals and their mental states, therefore, do matter. Or, as Brecher (1972, 11-12) puts it, 'decision-makers act in accordance with their perception of reality, [and] not in response to reality itself.'

A fundamental, albeit natural, consequence of employing this approach would mean accepting the premise that for the purpose of analysis, 'state action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state' (Snyder et al. 2002, 59). Quite simply, analysis of foreign policy must occur at the individual level-of-analysis while at the same time Snyder et al.'s (2002, 58) continued emphasis on the nation-state as the 'significant unit of political action' is employed. In juggling what may seem to be two distinguishably separate levels of analytical focus that may not even be placed on the same analytical plane, we must assume that the concept of 'national interest' remains unitary. There is a need to incorporate Holsti's (1967, 122) term of a 'national role conception' into how policy-makers define the 'general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions [that are] suitable to their state, and of the functions their state should perform in a variety of geographic and issue settings.' Otherwise, it would be impossible to begin analysis when the political players under the microscope of differing levels of analysis have different conceptions of what constitutes *raison d'etat* (national interest). Present-day definition of state interest requires that interests be grouped into: first, those that are derived from the individual state; second, into interests that are shaped in or represented by cooperation with closely associated and allied states; and third, into those interests that are held in common with all of international society (Schoenbaum 2006, viii). Nevertheless, this lack of clarity as to where state interest is properly grouped poses a challenge in the application of this cognitive or individual framework in analyzing foreign policy making.

1.4.3.1 Assessment of the Cognitive Approach

As observed by Korany (1986, 39-40), the cognitive approach dominated the analysis of the foreign policies of the developing world whereby all social processes are eventually reduced to the perceptions and idiosyncracies of the 'great man' (or woman) of utmost power. Why? Korany first explained that the political institutions of the developing world usually revolve around a politically powerful individual. Secondly, competing models are explicitly contextualized to industrialized countries, if not solely to the United States (Allison and Halperin 1972).

Another facet of the cognitive approach that is worth examining,

however, is that its methodology is problematic from the start. The problem lies in the requirement of the approach to acquire information about the 'minds of men,' as Arnold Wolfers (1962, 4) stressed. Policy-makers are known, however, to conceal their true thoughts and recollections (White 1989). Hence, information obtained from them must first be calibrated to account for any possible biases. Even with 'proper' calibration, there is no sure way to filter out dishonest or errant recollections from subjects. The resulting poor quality of data does affect the results of the investigation.

Central to the analysis is the existence of two kinds of factors, one operational and another perceptual. Operational factors are objective factors that are derived from the world as it 'really' exists, whereas perceptual factors are subjective factors that are derived from how decision-makers perceive or develop images of the 'real' world. How are the two types of factors interlinked? Operational factors will only be relevant contingent upon the attitudes, perceptions, judgments, and purposes of a state's decision-makers and how they react to various stimuli (Snyder et al. 2002, 60) whereas the reverberation of influence from the environment to the decision-maker is reciprocated only through such an interaction (Sprout and Sprout 1965, 11). The initial stages of decision-making are important, however. Similar to the previous case of analyzing faulty data, in the case of interlinking both operational and perceptual factors the judgments and inferences made at the beginning of a process, though unfounded or skewed and however nobly made, can influence and constrain subsequent decision-making, affecting the quality of the whole process (Vertzberger 1990, 8).

Examination of both operational and perceptual factors leads to the surfacing of two concepts and related empirical data that appear useful in analysis. Both 'attitudinal prism,' the psychological predisposition of the decision-makers, and 'images of the elite,' the cognitive representation of reality, are useful concepts to employ. Knowledge of these elements allows the analyst to attempt to identify the intent of a country's rivals or partners. After all, states evaluate intentions as well as capabilities to the point that even if relative gains from cooperation were obtained by some opponents, states will not only plan to prepare for whether such gains will be used against them but how likely that would be the case (Keohane 1993, 276).

A prominent work examining the previously discussed concept is that by Brecher (1974) in which he created an input-output foreign policy model consisting of fourteen independent variables encompassing both psychological and operational environments. However, Brecher emphasized the importance of the psychological factors more than the

operational ones. He affirmed that 'elite images [are] the decisive input of a foreign policy system' (Brecher 1972, 11). Though Brecher outlined the topography of the elements within the process of foreign policy decision-making, his study did not provide definitive correlations between the independent variables and the outcomes of policy, falling short especially on the mechanics of how such images actually influence foreign policy.

One innovative perspective would be to combine the bureaucratic approach and the cognitive approach to assess the central dynamics of the policy process (Steinbruner 1975). However, even such a perspective has not yielded concrete results for use in analysis as well. Both approaches toward foreign policy analysis are merely descriptive but not explanatory (Stein 2006, 199). For both approaches to be explanatory, a stringent requirement must be met. The criteria is that a decision-making process must be able to intervene in a foreign policy situation and, in effect, produce different outcomes out of the same foreign policy situation simply by employing different processes of decision-making (Stein 2006, 200). Needless to say, there is no further need to elaborate on the obvious difficulty in fulfilling this stringent requirement.

Another challenge of applying the cognitive approach to the analysis of political elites in foreign policy is the fact that in developing countries, as well as in many industrialized countries, where a prime minister is *primus inter pares* (first among equals) in a decision-making cabinet of ministers, decision-making is often a team exercise. Korany (1986, 171) puts the concept best as, 'the head of state may be the sole decision taker, but he or she is not the sole decision-maker.' After all, there are many groups and individuals 'whispering' to the ears of the leader. Hence, before the leader decides oftentimes the decision has been framed in such a way that a decision has already been made – but not taken. The cognitive approach cannot account for all of this behind the scenes politicking.

However, Walker (1987) supported Holsti's role conception by introducing a role theory that underlines the importance of decision processes and the positions of the decision makers rather than the characteristics of those decision makers. By emphasizing decision making processes and the roles of those who take part in them, one would be more inclined to agree with the notion that changes in policy result not from the change in the decision maker but from changes in the role conceptions (Wittkopf and McCormick 2004, 248). Placing emphasis on the role conceptions, rather than more intuitively on the individual decision makers, constitutes the contribution of the perceptual approach on the analysis of elites in foreign policy.

On the other hand, however, Wittkopf and McCormick (2004, 256)

argued that the experiences and personalities of policy-makers determine their decision styles and policy choices. This argument, though different from the one discussed before, provided the backdrop by which presidents choose the process by which to decide policy. Two scholars have proceeded along these lines. George (1980) presented three approaches undertaken by presidents to obtain information, expertise, and analytical sources in order to decide on policy, and showed that the president's personality influences not only the course of arrangement that a president chooses, but also how such an arrangement will operate. Preston and Hermann (2004), drawing from theory and evidence in psychology and political science, showed how the characteristics of a president shape his or her choice of foreign policy advisers, the structure of the advisory process, and hence foreign policy itself.

1.4.3.2 Applicability of the Cognitive Approach

The previous discussion covered both the merits and drawbacks of the cognitive approach to the analysis of foreign policy. If the focus of the study were to be on how foreign policy is to be promulgated from a president, or head of government, and her or his closest advisers, and whether a certain advisory process would affect the final outcome, then the perceptual approach would obviously constitute a possible tool by which to analyze such policy dynamics. However, recall that the purpose of this study was to analyze the dynamics and determine the influence, if any, that political elites of a society have on foreign policy. Within this context, the cognitive approach would not have been the most appropriate tool to employ for analysis. Or even if it were pertinent, the cognitive approach would play, at best, a supplementary role.

1.4.4 Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Approach

The domestic sources of foreign policy approach concentrates on the dynamics of policy-making within national boundaries. Under this heading, there are numerous perspectives by which one can proceed with analyses. Analyses include, for example, Rosenau's 'pre-theory' of the relative potencies of whether states are large or small, developed or undeveloped, open or closed politically (Rosenau 2006), the effects of the

elements of national power on foreign policy (Morgenthau et al. 2006), the effect of interest groups on foreign policy (Milner 1997), and the last question of whether or not public opinion matters in foreign policy. The last perspective is based on a view called the 'Almond-Lippmann Consensus' alleging that public opinion on foreign policy issues is volatile and inconsistent, and therefore, does not influence foreign policy (Holsti 1992). Taking these various perspectives as a collective, there is not one theory that fully and comprehensively encompasses all of these perspectives in a coherent manner. Moreover, the unrelated nature of those perspectives does not facilitate attempts to link those perspectives into one cohesive theory. In fact, the only 'quasi-law-like generalization' that has come into being since World War II concerns the relationship between domestic political system and foreign policy in the form of the democratic peace thesis, i.e. that democracies tend to not fight each other (Hudson 2007, 125).

Despite the variety of the types of domestic factors that could be analyzed in a democratic political system, one could systematically categorize these factors under the following headings: the policy preferences among various groups, the domestic power structure, the availability of information, and access to decision-makers (Everts 2008). Given that the focus of this study lies is in assessing national political elites in foreign policy-making, the discussion shall focus on theoretical developments dealing with the extent, if any, by which elements of a society, such as legislators, the military, business groups, religious groups, and others interest groups, wield influence in formulating and implementing foreign policy.

In the assessment of any domestic political context one must pay particular attention to three issues (Milner 1997). The first issue is the polarity of the policy preferences of the political players. The second issue concerns the domestic distribution of information. The third issue is the power distribution among domestic political institutions. From this perspective, the political regime currently in power is only one among the many actors conducting foreign policy. There are potentially other actors such as Parliament, the military, members of civil society such as business, media, and religious groups, and the bureaucracy themselves. Moreover, the possibility of non-domestic actors influencing the domestic politics of a country is often neglected in the analysis. Such players can range from other nation-states, international non-governmental organizations, foreign media, to influential individuals. Despite the presence of foreign influences, such actors may affect policy but do not decide upon the policy of a sovereign country (Hudson 2007, 128). Hence, the priority in this study is to focus analysis primarily on the

domestic factors influencing foreign policy.

Still, a major field of research on complex models of international politics is to account for foreign influences in determining how domestic political influences fit into the overall context of pressures arising from a nation's position in the international system (Hagan 1995, 132). A useful framework by which to analyze the dynamics of foreign policy within the domestic context is to view foreign policy making as a game that is played by the decision makers acting simultaneously on two separate yet interlinked game boards of domestic politics and international politics under the condition that a player acting on one board must account for the considerations derived from the factors inherent on the other board (Putnam 1988). With the understanding of the need to simultaneously account for both domestic and international politics, the next step would be to determine the influence of the domestic actors on foreign policy. Hudson (2007) proposed the five factors of size, proximity, cohesiveness, alignment of policy preferences, and activeness of the actor in question to help determine the influence of the respective actors. The number of people constituting the actor may provide an indicator of the effectiveness and/or influence of such an actor on a particular foreign policy issue.

Though not necessarily always the case, if an actor is close to the foreign policy decision-makers it is likely that the actor has a higher degree of influence upon foreign policy. The issue of the cohesiveness or the fragmentation of the actors allows assessment of not only those actors, but of the relative power of actors grouped together in relation to other groups of foreign policy actors. The more fragmented the actors, the more constraints they must face. For governments that are accountable to their constituencies such constraints lead to a less decisive and ambiguous foreign policy while for governments that are not so accountable those same constraints induce the manifestation of a foreign policy that is more assertive and clear (Hagan 1993). Fragmented regimes are also less likely to cooperate with other countries (Milner 1997). The extent to which the actors share similar views on policy issues influences the degree of political competition among those actors. Furthermore, there is a need to determine whether or not an actor is politically active on an issue. More importantly, there is also a need to obtain confirmation of whether the actor's attitudes are either latent or manifest, only the latter being politically relevant (Everts 2002). When combined, these five factors may help determine the influence of a political actor in foreign policy.

After having identified the influence of specific actors in foreign policy making, it is useful to understand how those actors project their influence in creating tangible policy effects. In imparting the influence, the political actor must manifest its (or their collective) attitudes, which

can be measured on four dimensions: concreteness, specificity, extent of being representative, and the degree of realism (Everts 2002, 45-46). Concreteness entails the actor's real concerns and the salience of its attitudes towards the issues. Specificity entails capturing either specific or general policy preferences. The extent of being representative ensures that the manifestation reflects the true attitudes of the actor concerned, and not merely an isolated incident. And lastly, the degree of realism assesses whether the manifestation of an actor's attitudes has a direct or only an indirect political effect on foreign policy.

Assessment of the influence of political actors and of the manner by which those actors impart their influence is insufficient to understand the dynamics of elites in affecting foreign policy. An understanding of the strategies by which the ruling regime copes with the various domestic political elements is also necessary.

Political actors are essentially motivated to act by their self-interest in preventing harm to one's political career while continuing to secure and remain in power, and in enhancing one's political standing (Van Belle 1993; Bueno de Mesquita 2006). To preserve those self-interests, political actors must use various strategies in confronting and managing the opposition put forth by the other domestic power competitors. The use of these strategies is what effectively links domestic politics with foreign policy. There are three strategies through which the governing regimes can deal with domestic opposition: accommodation, mobilization, and insulation (Hagan 1995, 128). Accommodation is reflected through restraint in foreign policy as exhibited by policy compromises and controversy avoidance. Mobilization involves leaders asserting their own legitimacy and, in turn, mobilizing new support for them and their policies. Examples of mobilization strategies include appealing to nationalism, blaming foreign actors, diverting attention from domestic problems, and underlining the leadership's capacity or track record in successfully handling challenging national security issues. Insulation takes the form of ignoring, deflecting, suppressing, and overriding political opposition.

1.4.4.1 Assessment of the Domestic Sources Approach

Knowing the framework by which to determine the influence of domestic political actors and to analyze the response of regime leadership towards domestic political opposition is insufficient.

One also needs to establish any clear-cut correlations between the characteristics of the political actors and the strategies used by the regime. Some strategies generate results for the regime's leadership while

others simply do not (Hudson 2007). Moreover, how regime leaders perceive and react to public opinion depends on how those leaders view the relationship between such opinion and the available foreign policy options upon which to decide (Foyle 1997).

However, even this behavior is not necessarily always practiced. In producing beliefs and preferences both on policy and on the role of government in society, political elites may highlight the virtues of a culture instead of relying upon factual analysis in obtaining support for a policy preference (Purkitt 1998, 148). Based on a comprehensive assessment of domestic political dynamics in foreign policy and an analysis of various case studies, Hagan (1995, 133) concluded that the driver of the overall direction of foreign policy consists of the core shared beliefs and interests of a nation's political leaders while domestic political debates and grand rhetoric typically involve only the relatively narrow matter of how policy is to be implemented.

1.4.4.2 Applicability of the Domestic Sources Approach

Having assessed the domestic politics approach, there is a strong possibility that such an approach could be used to analyze the effects of elites in foreign policy making. Hagan (1995, 133) has shown that leaders' beliefs and interests ultimately determine the overall direction of policy. Elements of the domestic polity, including elites, affect merely the implementation albeit important phase of policy making.

The factors and the manner by which a political actor accumulates and projects influence are outlined. The various types of strategies that the governing regimes can pursue to counteract a domestic political opponent have been elaborated. The problem with this approach is that such an approach does not have the status of a unified theory per se, but only consists of a list of actors and factors that must be assessed. But despite this drawback, should this approach be employed it would encompass an analytical framework that is sufficiently comprehensive to enable us to understand the dynamics of elites in foreign policy making.

1.5 Analytical Framework Construction and Contribution to Theory Formation

From the various theoretical perspectives and approaches discussed previously and from the discussion of Indonesia as the country under study, the domestic politics approach emerges as probably the best in

providing the theoretical groundwork to explain whether elites influence foreign policy, and the manner and to the extent that they do so (if they do so at all). On the basis of this groundwork, this study shall attempt to construct an analytical framework that better explains the dynamics of such elites in the foreign policy making process.

To summarize, the systemic approach cannot explain any differences and changes in the foreign policy of a state, in this case Indonesia, whose position in the international order has remained relatively constant. A number of plausible objections have also been raised to the bureaucratic politics viewpoint because of its apparent limitations for employing the decision-making approach. There are also objections to employing the individual approach. Individuals do matter, but they are constrained by their environment, a menu of choice, or by certain institutions. And, therefore, the domestic sources approach seemed to be the most promising and the most viable option available.

Moreover, one can derive a certain argument from the international history of Indonesia. One can observe that after the toppling of power of President Suharto in 1998, the political system of Indonesia has become more pluralistic whereby competing political groups and elite groups are assuming a greater part of political power. From this observation, it was natural to look into the increasing influence and impact that domestic groups may have on the direction of Indonesian foreign policy.

As previously stated, the objective of this study is to understand the dynamics of elites during foreign policy making in countries undergoing democratization.

CHAPTER 2 SOEKARNOISM, MEGAWATI, AND FOREIGN POLICY

The objectives of this chapter are to assess the ideology and foreign policy of President Soekarno, and see whether the findings can answer the question of whether or not ideology matters in foreign policy and, if it does, to what extent. The overall focus of this study remains on the foreign policy of post-*Reformasi* Indonesia. However, in order to investigate whether or not foreign policy embraces a national ideology during the tenure of President Megawati, the nationalist ideology of Soekarnoism is used as a benchmark. The extent by which the direction of policy strays from that predicted if a decision maker were to embrace Soekarnoism shows whether in both formulation and implementation of foreign policy the decision maker decides to either implement ideology or embrace *realpolitik*. To investigate the effect of Soekarnoism on foreign policy, a comparative historical approach is to be employed. Two time periods have been chosen for analysis: Indonesian foreign policy during Guided Democracy (1959-1965) and during *Reformasi* (1997-2003). The two main factors that differentiate these two periods are the presence and absence of the Cold War, respectively, and its corresponding power relations among the Major Powers in international politics, and the absence of an authoritarian political leadership. In elaborating on the second point, some would argue that President Soekarno behaved as a dictator during Guided Democracy. However, this study holds a contradictory view in that despite President Soekarno's assertiveness in foreign policy, Indonesia's domestic power structure was competitive during the time with the power balance distributed among the President, the military, and the Communists. Aside from these differentiating factors, the factors taken to be *ceteris paribus* (all else are equal) are the dynamics of foreign policy making which will be elaborated later in this chapter.

This chapter consists of two parts; the first part describes a loosely albeit interrelated body of ideas known as Soekarnoism. Within this first section an examination of the promulgation of Soekarnoism is undertaken alongside a discussion of the manifestation of Soekarnoism in the foreign policy of Indonesia during the era of Guided Democracy. The second part examines briefly the rise of Megawati into national political prominence while also examining how Soekarnoism had heavily influenced Megawati.

2.1 The Relevance of Ideology

This chapter is based on the working hypothesis that ideology leads to general goals in foreign policy. And those general goals correspondingly lead to policy practice as manifested in speeches, acts, and statements. However, the impact of ideology, not just on foreign policy but on other types of policy as well, is inconclusive despite the finding that, for instance, it was ideological leadership that mobilized popular followers in the French, Russian, and Iranian social revolutions (Skocpol 1994, 15). It is important to note the claim of ideology playing a role in foreign policy remains contested.

Leaders are often categorized into *ideologues*, those who embrace ideology no matter what the political situation is, and *pragmatists*, those who transcend ideology and instead embrace the constant equation of power politics. Although widely acknowledged by historians, the assumptions that international power politics and rational considerations prevail and that leaders are able to transcend their ideologies are questionable (Best et al. 2004, 182).

Ideology prevailed when it was intertwined with power during the international politics of the 19th century (Brecher 1969). Ideology in the analysis of international politics experienced an awakening during the 1960's (Carlsnaes 1986) as Holsti (1974, 69) elaborated as follows:

> A third development of the nineteenth century with major consequences on the structure and processes of the European state system was the use of ideological principles and political doctrines as a major motive or guide to foreign policy behavior.

The term ideology should be understood as a description not only of the manner by which foreign policy objectives are shaped, but also the manner by which those objectives are pursued (Thompson and Macridis 1972). As George (2006, 2) puts it, ideology is 'essentially a normative concept, but it also contains explanatory and prescriptive dimensions and sometimes also a predictive one.'

Moreover, there is evidence showing that despite changes in the global system, ideology remains important in structuring attitudes within elite belief systems (Murray and Cowden 1999). Otto Hintze painted the intricate interweaving of ideology with political interest when he argued that:

> All human action arises from a common source … Everywhere, the first

> impulse to social action is given as a rule by real interests, i.e., by political and economic interests. But ideal interests lend wings to these real interests, give them a spiritual meaning, and serve to justify them … Interests without such 'spiritual wings' are lame; but on the other hand, ideas can win out in history only if and insofar as they are associated with real interests (Bendix 1960, 69).

Hintze continued with the argument that:

> In the long run, neither [interests nor ideas] can survive without the other … whenever interests are vigorously pursued, an ideology tends to be developed also to give meaning, re-enforcement and justification to these interests. And this ideology is as 'real' as the real interests themselves, for ideology is an indispensable part of the life process which is expressed in action. And conversely: wherever ideas are to conquer the world; they require the leverage of real interests, although frequently ideas will more or less detract their interests from their original aim (Bendix 1960, 69).

Moreover, ideology can be more ubiquitous and encompassing, and correspondingly less neatly categorized, in the affairs of states. Ideology can fuel the basis of ideas that decision-makers use to make sense out of the perceived anarchy surrounding them (Wendt 1999, 377). In the case of Indonesia, Soekarnoism helped create the circumstances opening up possibilities for Indonesia's foreign policy leadership to act in order to capitalize on opportunities, or to avoid and respond to threats. Ideology can also constitute the very norms and rules used by those in power in guiding a nation through its foreign policy challenges (Kratochwil 1989). However, such constructivist frameworks entail several problematic rationales (Zehfuss 2002).

Despite the many arguments for including ideology as a factor in foreign policy, there are also arguments that not only question the use of ideology in the first place but argue against its use in foreign policy analysis. Carlsnaes (1986, 3-4) was prone to question the very concept of ideology in:

> achiev[ing] prominence despite a remarkable elusiveness in meaning … indeed, the more esteem the term has acquired, the fuzzier its contours seem to have become … [with] the term of the time appears to mean different things to different scholars.

Scholars disagree on the basic properties of ideology (Mullins 1970). Ideology has been likened to a black box and the wisdom of its use in scholarly analysis has been questioned (Sartori 1969). Ideology might be used in the press and the popular media but should not be used when dealing with theories and classifications (Naess et al. 1956).

Some notions of ideology are even contradictory. One notion of ideology consists of a part that is embedded in ideology and another part that is embedded in realism. This happens to be the case with respect to Indonesia, especially so with Soekarnoism.

In explaining the relevance of ideology in contemporary Indonesia I shall mainly rely on the analysis of political analyst Dewi Fortuna Anwar. Anwar has served in a unique position as both an academic and the foreign policy advisor to President B. J. Habibie at a time when major policies were decided upon to set Indonesia on a course of democratization. Anwar (2006, interview with author) placed ideology within the context of the framework of statespeople having to exercise decisions based on *realpolitik*:

> Usually if a political or a leader does not occupy a position of power, he or she can't afford the luxury of having a preference with ideology. But if she or he attains the position of power, she or he will find that her or his ideological preferences have to be tempered with the constraints existing in the international community or the domestic political economic social constraints. And in fact, it could make into a *very very* disastrous political, economic, and security foreign policy if leaders are simply primal in their approaches and grounded by the arts of the possible. After all, politics is the arts of the possible … Therefore, most leaders, if they are rational, tend to be less ideological as they take positions of power.

Reliance on ideology, however, could have disastrous consequences both for domestic politics, and especially for foreign policy. Anwar (2006, interview with author) referred to the characterization of the neo-conservatives in the United States as being too ideological without looking at the reality.

> The [neo-conservatives] continue to see the world according to their own perception of reality without true understanding of the constraints of their own power, of the existence of the other power holders, of the existence of differences of opinions in the world, [but more importantly] the objective reality. So, if a foreign policy [becomes] too ideological [it becomes] ridiculous because foreign policy can become evangelistic while [one comes to terms with reality] as one deals with the world.

In further nailing her arguments, Anwar (2006, interview with author) put the notion into a more colorful but logical manner in referring to the importance of maintaining a strategic balance between ideology and pragmatism in any venture of obtaining power:

> [The same] thing goes for politics, ideology is important only in terms of providing coherence [such] that you have some clear vision of the real

> ‘idealistical’ world that you want to develop. But if you become evangelical in your approach to assume ideology and not pay sufficient attention to the existing constraints of your own political capacity and that of the opposition, for example, to your desire for an ideal world because your ideal world may be other people’s hell … You can either face political disaster, … be thrown out of politics, or act like the United States because you are so powerful [but] you [will] end up having the rest of the world ganging up against you.

Anwar (2006, interview with author) proceeded to argue that in order to achieve a workable policy formula, that policy must be acceptable to the wider public. If the statesperson so chooses, the ability to pursue her or his ideological preferences is very much dependent on the level of support obtained (Anwar 2006, interview with author). She elaborated:

> The lower one’s own political capital, i.e. little support from Parliament or little control of the bureaucracy and public institutions, the lower one’s own capacity to push through one’s agenda. At the end of the day, it is all about one’s political *satisficing*, not satisfying, but *satisficing*.

Anwar provided an encompassing analysis of Soekarno’s balancing between ideology and pragmatism. While Soekarno was more ideological, he was also pragmatic enough to be able to read what was happening in the world because he was an anti-colonialist; he was able to identify which country was anti-colonialist and which country was not, and he subsequently articulated his campaigns based on that world reality. Soekarno pursued such ‘either you are a colonialist or an anti-colonialist’ policy dichotomy despite his strong personal fondness of the United States.

Anwar also espoused that not only Soekarno but Suharto too was influenced by ideology. President Suharto tended to be more pragmatic and not ideological although this is also not entirely true for he was ideological in the sense that he was very anti-communist and anti-revolutionary. Suharto wanted peace, stability, and common development; his ideology was in fact development oriented, and in order to achieve that he pursued a more pragmatic foreign policy (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

To conclude this section: This study acknowledges the ambiguity of the causal effect of ideology on any policy, including foreign policy. Although ideology helps to set policy objectives, it can also be employed as a mere justification for certain policies. However, despite such ambiguity there is at least an indirect link between ideology, general goals, policy practices, and specific actions. And although it is difficult to establish the exact correlation between each component of ideology and

each separate component of specific actions, this does not mean that the two elements are unrelated. Hence, in politics there should be a compromise between ideology and pragmatism; ideology without pragmatism becomes similar to evangelism whereas pragmatism without ideology becomes only ad-hoc-ism. And without a coherent set of ideas by which one can benchmark one's political achievements in a contextual framework, one cannot measure success or failure (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

Therefore, this study embraces the view that ideology may be more influential in certain phases of the foreign policy making process than in other phases. It is within this understanding of the effect of ideology on foreign policy that a discussion of Soekarnoism is undertaken.

2.2 Soekarnoism

Any discussion of Soekarnoism should be based on the political writings of Soekarno himself. The following analysis covers the period of his early pre-independence days to that of his last days in power. Although he created many slogans and concepts during the last decade in power, most of it is based on work he did during his earlier years (Anderson 2001, 16). The analysis of his ideology will provide an understanding of what Soekarno was really after, how he pursued it, and why he chose to pursue it in such a manner. Though most of his tenets originally pertained to the conceptions of statehood, his thought framework also applies to how Soekarno conceived foreign policy.

What kind of entity did Soekarno aim to create? Soekarno did not want to create an ideal form of statehood but rather an ideal new society that forms the basis for struggle. Soekarno argued that by creating a republic that is solid and strong a potential friction between political and economic order is created as well. For with this dichotomy a proletariat with powers to govern through representation in parliament can easily be thrown off onto the streets, jobless, fired from the factory whereby he or she earns a meager wage (Soekarno 1932, 23).

Instead, Soekarno offered what is termed Marhaenism, a term based on the word *marhaen*, which means Indonesian proletariat, poor Indonesian farmers, and other struggling poor people. Marhaenism is socio-nationalism and socio-democracy. Socio-democracy is political democracy and economic democracy. According to Soekarno (1933B, 321), only socio-nationalism can ensure socio-democracy, other nationalisms cannot. Marhaenism provides the basis by which to aspire

for a social and state order whereby:

> the Marhaens would be saved – [and] Marhaenism is the mode of struggle [in] achiev[ing] social and state order [by which] the manner of accomplishing this goal must be revolutionary … hence Marhaenism [are both] the method of struggle and the basis to aspire for the eradication of capitalism and imperialism (Soekarno 1933A, 13-14).

Soekarno (1933B, 320) expounded on the rationale behind his version of state utopia:

> With political democracy and economic democracy, hence across that *golden bridge* Indonesian society can be governed by its own people into salvation – transformed into a society without capitalism and imperialism. With such political and economic democracy, the *Marhaens* can establish a state that is genuinely a people's state – a state where all the affairs of politics and economics are by the people, with the people, and for the people.

Furthermore, Soekarno (1933B, 320) elaborated that:

> It is not a system of feudalism whereby the king is supreme, it is not a constitutional monarchy that [al]though [it] has a parliament, it still needs a king [or a queen], it is not a system of the republic found in France or in the United States which is truly a system of a republic borne out of the 'democracy' of capitalism – but a system of a *politiek-economische republiek* all elements [of which] fall under the rule of the people.

What motivated this struggle? Soekarno (1959, 6) answered with the following:

> In short, we act because we desire an improvement in [our] livelihoods in all sectors and branches [of society] … [and] that this improvement can only be achieved if capitalism and imperialism no longer exist within society.

Soekarno further added that no nation can achieve greatness without national freedom and independence. And as a consequence, no colonialized nation can achieve greatness. Therefore, according to Soekarno (1929, 78) each colonialised nation seeks freedom and independence to attain such greatness.

Soekarno was a romantic in his quest for revolution. Soekarno painted the 'mystique of permanent revolution' with the rationale that revolution is not just a single event but rather a process that goes on for decades. He claimed that this romanticism of struggle is the principal source of strength – and that without it the movement of struggle would have been

crushed a long time ago (Reinhardt 1967, 161).

It is important to stress that by having the ideology of Pancasila as the foundation for the revolution and by being deeply convinced that Pancasila was a cure-for-all political and social panacea, Soekarno perhaps felt that he had obtained moral legitimacy and hence was able to passionately portray the universality of the foundation and soul of the Indonesian struggle as those belonging to a great revolution that is greater than any other revolutions (Soekarno 1960, 52). Soekarno (1960, 54) proceeded to explain that the Indonesian revolution is neither the bourgeoisie revolution of 1789 in France nor the proletariat revolution of 1917 in Russia but a revolution that was 'fundamental and its goal [was] congruent with the social conscience of man.'

Soekarno emphasized that Pancasila fulfilled the needs of humankind and provides a better way to worldly salvation, more so than what have been achieved by the Declaration of Independence of the United States, or the Communist Manifesto. The Declaration of Independence advocated 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' for all humankind even though the pursuit of happiness does not necessarily mean the reality of happiness. On the other hand, the Communist Manifesto illustrated that if proletariats around the world were to unite to destroy capitalism all that they will discover would be freedom from repression and entry into a world of new opportunities.

It is worth noting how Soekarno observed that the Declaration of Independence does not contain social justice (socialism style) and that the Communist Manifesto must be elevated to include the concept of God the Almighty. Soekarno argued that with only the Declaration of Independence and the Communist Manifesto the world finds itself faced with the reality of two power blocks that are suspicious of one another. Such a situation emerged despite the fact that two documents were written by progressives and important contributors toward national liberation in their respective times (Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Thomas Jefferson). In retrospect, Soekarno (1960, 33) admitted that the ideas contained within both Guided Economy and Guided Democracy leaned not only towards socialism but also towards a just and prosperous society.

Soekarno's realization that *realpolitik* was an important requirement for goal achievement had been inspired by the following words of Jawaharlal Nehru:

> And when we act, we must always remember, that our aspirations cannot be attained, [for] as long as we do not have power to force the attainment of those goals … because we are facing enemies who will not relent into conceding to our aspirations, no matter how small. Every one of our

> victories, from the greatest to the smallest, is due to the force of our strength (Soekarno 1933B, 299).

Soekarno added that 'the source of [the nation's] strength is within the spirit and soul of the nation' (Soekarno 1961, 25) and that 'a right cannot be attained by begging, a right can only be attained by struggle' (Soekarno 1960, 43).

Soekarno suggested that political power of freedom and independence are the most important requirements to eradicate imperialism permanently. He stressed that 'there is no other way than to use our power in a lawful manner to strengthen that power' (Soekarno 1929, 107) and explained that what is meant by 'revolutionary' in any struggle is, in fact, the radicalism to achieve swift change (Soekarno 1929, 109). Soekarno (1929, 136) further argued that not only with mass action does the build-up of this power 'become pure,' but that indeed the only way to do it is via *machtsvorming*, which is the cultivation of strength and power 'that is based on radicalism' (Soekarno 1933B, 300).

The motto that Soekarno suggested for embracing the revolutionary struggle is 'non-cooperation', but more aptly 'self-help', or *zelfverwerkelijking* (self-reliance). Pertinent to later discussions on Megawati, such a motto was, he felt, best symbolized by the head of a buffalo. In fact, Soekarno (1933B, 291) was adamant that 'non-cooperation' is one of the basic principles of the struggle in achieving an independent Indonesia.

These elements of achieving Soekarno's societal utopia were instilled into the *Konsepsi Nasional* (National Concept) of governance that comprised of Revolution, Ideology, and National Leadership. Soekarno argued that to carry out great and radical change, one must employ revolution, on the basis of a progressive national ideology, and enacted by a stern national leadership (Soekarno 1961, 30). And he claimed that 'progressive' national ideology consists of the Constitution of 1945 and Manipol/USDEK. Manipol was the acronym for *Manifesto Politik*, which Soekarno argued was a reflection of Panca Sila, while USDEK was the acronym for the five guiding principles of Soekarno's government comprising of the Constitution of 1945, socialism *à la* Indonesia, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and the Indonesian identity. It is this political manifesto, that according to Reinhardt (1967, 101), is 'of great importance in the ideological development of Guided Democracy.'

Given that imperialism tremendously hindered progress as envisioned by Soekarno, it was understandable why he constantly preached about its ills. He believed that rather than simply needing technical skills, capital, and machinery after independence, economic development and affluence were only possible to achieve when a nation has been 'mentally liberated'

from all forms of colonial and neo-colonial liberation (Reinhardt 1967, 161). Soekarno (1933A, 44) warned of the dangers of economic imperialism in that:

> the capacity to produce will be totally decapitated, the ability to create or possess skills and technical prowess will forever be hampered … [both] totally destroyed, extinct forever! Foreign industrial imperialism robs us of the capacity to economically produce, burns our economic capacities to dust, degrades the Indonesian people to a people that will always depend on foreign goods.

Reinhardt (1967, 128, footnote 129) added that while Soekarno was not overly concerned with economics his ideology warned of economic exploitation, especially committed by those colonial powers trying to preserve their economic interests.

On world economic alignment, Soekarno (1960, 41) outlined that the basis of 'free and active' must be reflected in the economic relations with other countries and in having Indonesia not bow to the West nor to the East, for only with a proven non-alignment could the nation be entrusted with keeping the peace in the world.

Indonesian Vice-President Mohammad Hatta supported this view as follows:

> Internal consolidation is the primary task. The government must show evidence of economic and social betterment if it is to offset the influence of agitation by radical circles. A foreign policy that aligned the country with either of the Great Powers would render this internal task infinitely more difficult (Leifer 1983, 29).

Hill (2003) argued that a nation's identity is one of the core concerns of a nation. Below was how President Soekarno (1961, 23) defined the Indonesian identity:

> [Indonesian identity] can be summed up into one all-encompassing concept termed Manipol/USDEK or Indonesian socialism, relations between citizens of Indonesia with the whole human race on the basis of humanity, peace, friendship among nations, justice among nations, free from exploitation and oppression, free from exploitation *de l'homme par l'homme* (of man by man) and from exploitation *de nation par nation* (of nation by nation).

Despite the seemingly never-ending passion for engaging in continuous struggle, Soekarno (1933A, 38-39) offered a reminder that this basis for struggle only applied as long as the Indonesian people are struggling. Once the struggle was successful, then there would be no

more use for this basis of struggle. Such a view had been translated into action during the revolutionary period. Anderson (2001, 13) observed through Soekarno's speeches how Soekarno showed moderation in the sense that he also attempted to appease striking workers, groups supporting social revolution, and groups of 'hardheaded strugglers.'

2.3 Guided Democracy Political Power Structure and Foreign Policy (1959-1965)

An assessment of Indonesian foreign policy under President Soekarno must begin near the end of Parliamentary Democracy and at the start of Guided Democracy, for it is only during this period that Soekarno commands power over foreign policy. Prior to this period there was Parliamentary Democracy whereby the President of the Republic was simply acting as a national figurehead and actual power of foreign policy making was entrusted to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet of Ministers. During Parliamentary Democracy, political competition occurred within the playing field inside of Parliament as the national agenda was rather the result of a contest of dominance among the various political parties of what would constitute 'national' interest. The end of Parliamentary Democracy placed the political playing field outside of Parliament and onto the domestic national stage whereby the players are no longer solely political parties but elements of the political elites.

Guided Democracy is the period when the Constitution of 1945 was reinstalled as the basis for governance. According to President Soekarno, the return to the Constitution of 1945 meant a return to the fervor of revolution. And the aspirations of the revolution of August 1945 entailed an Indonesia that is 'free and eradicated from imperialism, … democratic and free from the remnants of feudalism, … socialist Indonesia, free from capitalism and *exploitation de l'homme par l'homme* (exploitation of man by man)' (Soekarno 1960, 6). Soekarno (1959, 25) advanced Guided Democracy because he wanted:

> a government that is stable … a government with authority, that can carry out its duties in a manner that is calm and firm throughout the years, without having each so and so Wednesday or so and so Saturday to fall by the opposition, a government that can work with peace and principle, not for the interest of foreign capital, but to ensure the welfare of the people.

Soekarno's justification for the transition to Guided Democracy was based on the argument that such a framework for governance was

characteristic of all the original democracies of Asia, and that Guided Democracy was 'special' in that it was a democracy based on the family without the anarchy of liberalism or the autocracy of dictatorship (Soekarno 1959, 24).

Soekarno argued that the greatest achievement of the nation until 1959 had been survival, and that from the year 1955 on, priority should have been on investment in human skills and material investments. He further reasoned that such investments could only have been made in a favorable political environment, and that liberal or parliamentary democracy was not only unfavorable but could even be detrimental to such investments (Soekarno 1960, 4-5). He argued that if *Manifesto Politik* and USDEK had been carried out throughout all fields, the restoration of security (and hence a favorable investment climate) would then be achieved (Soekarno 1960, 36).

At the end of the day, Soekarno (1961, 48) found that the purpose of Indonesia's democracy was:

> To find a synthesis, to find an accumulation of thought and energy to implement the People's Suffering Eradication Mandate (*Amanah Penderitaan Rakyat*), all on the basis of the new order, that is Revolution, Manipol/USDEK, and National Leadership.

In essence, however, the domestic political power structure mostly consisted of the *trias politica* not of the commonly thought combination between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government but rather of the President, the Army, and the strongest political party at the time, the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI or the Indonesian Communist Party). And shall later be elaborated, foreign policy has been used by domestic political competitors in order to gain relative power over each other.

2.4 Soekarnoism on the World Stage

President Soekarno saw Indonesia's foreign policy as guided by the teachings of Pancasila, essentially targeted towards friendship with all nations and towards contributing to the creation of world peace. He continued to say that Indonesia's foreign policy was named 'independent policy' or 'policy of non-alignment.' When others called it 'a policy of neutralism' he offered an immediate rebuttal in that 'this is incorrect [for] Indonesia is not neutral. Indonesia is active. Indonesia is principled' (Soekarno 1960, 41).

However, Leifer (1983, 60) argued that the key of Indonesia's politically successful foreign policy formula was a diplomacy that marketed internationally the nobility and merits of Indonesia's cause. Indonesia's strategy gained the attention of the then Cold War great powers and enticed them to calculate how each of them could benefit by coming to Indonesia's aid.

Quoting Vice-President Mohammad Hatta (1953), Leifer (1983, 29) maintained that:

> Indonesia plays no favorites between the two opposed blocs, and follows its own path through the various international problems. It terms this policy 'independent' and further characterizes it by describing it as independent and 'active.' By active is meant the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace, through endeavors supported, if possible, by the majority of the members of the United Nations.

After the failure of Parliamentary Democracy, President Soekarno shifted Indonesia's foreign policy from a position of non-alignment to one of confrontation. This shift was undertaken within the context of Indonesia's disappointment with the international system and as part of an effort to create a new 'equitable' international system, as shall later be seen.

Hauswedell (1973, 15-16) has provided a concise insight into the dynamics of international politics as new states came into existence after the end of the World War II. After 1945 the newly independent states of Asia and Africa entered a world political playing field built and run by the major powers with the *modus operandi* of the interactions of states. New states found that they did not have a voice in these interactions. To play the game they had to accept inequality and hierarchy as the essential features of the system. They had two choices, either to accept the status quo and employ an evolutionary attempt in achieving their ideal goals, or to reject the rules of the game and build a new one. States that had achieved their independence peacefully opted for the former whereas those who fought and sacrificed much went for the more challenging revolutionary path.

Soekarno made it known how much he valued this distinction in the semi-condescending way he treated countries whose independence was obtained as a 'present' from those who had to struggle. He considered that these countries were not really free from their colonial masters and he admired the courage and sacrifice of fellow leaders who struggled to obtained independence rather than negotiate in the 'comfortable chairs of Whitehall or the Quai d'Orsay' (Hauswedell 1973, 16). Soekarno puts it graphically as:

> We were born in fire. We were not born in the rays of the full moon like other nations. There are other nations whose independence was presented to them. There are other nations who, without any effort on their part, were given independence by the imperialists as a present. Not us, we fought for our independence at the cost of sacrifice. We gained out independence through a tremendous struggle which has no comparison in the world (Leifer 1983, 75).

There were two conflicting groups in the Afro-Asian world. The first group consisted of the non-aligned states under the leadership of India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt, which saw their primary task as the prevention of nuclear war between the superpowers and to further advance the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, and which regarded the issues of colonialism and imperialism as of declining importance while entering the second decade of independence with a priority on economic development. The second group consisted of the anti-imperialist states under the leadership of Indonesia and China with the backing of Pakistan, Ghana, Algeria, Mali, and Guinea who saw their priority as rooting out the international system of capitalism and imperialism before countries could turn attention to their domestic concerns. The latter group warned others that the major dangers to sovereignty were the imperialist military interventions and political subversions, the economic dependency on the former colonial powers, and the penetration of their cultures by the former colonial powers.

2.5 Manifestation of Soekarnoism in Foreign Policy during Guided Democracy

Soekarno's ideology consists of the idea that *Marhaens* would govern when a socio-political-economic utopia is achieved by the defeat of imperialism. He viewed the division in the world as one that is between the oppressed and the oppressors, and between the colonialized and the colonizers. Such a structuralist outlook permeated throughout the motivational rationale behind Indonesia's foreign policy during Guided Democracy.

In achieving the goals of struggle, Soekarno embraced the belief that success is only possible with *machtsvorming* and revolution for only then can the strugglers take back what had been originally been withheld from them by those seeking to preserve their political and economic colonial powers. He also believed that to achieve things in the world one must

always struggle. Hence, Soekarno embraced a confrontationalist stance in implementing Indonesia's foreign policy during Guided Democracy.

In the next sections, we could see that throughout Guided Democracy, these two elements of Soekarnoism had manifested not only at the rhetorical but also at the fundamental level as evident by the strong presence of Soekarnoism in the foreign policy of Indonesia.

2.5.1 Policy Response: NEFOS versus OLDEFOS

The foreign policy doctrine that possibly best reflected Soekarno's ideology was the concept of the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) constantly struggling against the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS). This doctrine was arguably the most dominant political platform from which Soekarno dealt with the events that unravelled before Indonesia on the world stage. The New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) were the newly independent nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the socialist bloc, and the progressive organizations and individuals in the capitalist countries while the Old Established Forces were defined as the old colonialist powers that prevented the development of the new nations, intervened militarily against them, and had infiltrated their cultures. The NEFOS were fighting against Colonialism, Imperialism, Capitalism, and all defenders of the status quo – essentially they wanted to build a new world order without *l'exploitation de nation par nation et de l'homme par l'homme* (exploitation of nation by nation and of man by man).

Essentially, President Soekarno had set out to challenge the forces of NEKOLIM, an acronym coined by Lt. Gen. Ahmad Yani that stood for *ne*ocolonialism, *col*onialism, and *im*perialism. According to Leifer (1983, 57), one of Soekarno's biographers explained that NEKOLIM was the 1960's version of the anti-imperialism of the 1920's whereby direct colonial control was replaced by economic domination or Western political spheres of influence. Soekarno used the background of NEKOLIM to rally Afro-Asian support for Indonesian initiatives to expel Western political presence in the Southeast Asian islands and to promote national unity via his own charismatic leadership (Reinhardt 1967, 202-203).

At the first conference of the non-aligned states, held in Belgrade in September 1961, President Soekarno provided a critique of the structure of the international system that differed from the view held by the Non-aligned Movement, which was essentially the central view of India's Nehru, Egypt's Nasser, and Yugoslavia's Tito:

> Prevailing world opinion … would have us believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict between the great

> powers. I think that is not true. There is conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of man and that is the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination (Leifer 1983, 58).

It is worthwhile to note that Soekarno's ideas for a so-called United Front of all colonized people against their oppressors were, in fact, ingrained in the ruminations that deeply occupied his thoughts during his pre-independence days. After independence, such ideas were simply applied to international politics. In April 1955, in his opening address to the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Soekarno had warned the delegates:

> And I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we in Indonesia and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation (Leifer 1983, 52).

Soekarno continued with:

> Imperialism and colonialism and the continued forcible divisions of nations – I stress those words – is at the root of almost all international and threatening evil in this world of ours. Until these evils of a hated past are ended, there can be no rest or peace in all this world (Leifer 1983, 58).

Reinhardt (1967, 202) observed that the idea behind the NEFOS strategy built on the premise that national independence and victory over colonialism are just the beginning of a long continuous struggle towards achieving 'the just and prosperous society' by warding off attempts by the OLDEFOS to maintain control over the economies of the NEFOS and to insist on the maintenance of subversive military bases. And Modelski (1963, iii-iv) observed that one reason for being able to maintain this mantra was the economic weakness of the new countries. In turn, the doctrine of the New Emerging Forces hence appealed to those fighting imperialism, colonialism, and the Old Order.

The rationale behind non-alignment was, however, that the new states, acting as a third force within a bipolar Cold War global system, would not get entangled but would instead take an active part in mediation and conciliation between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Soekarno espoused a 'new world' without the coexistence of the major powers that is structured along an alignment system based on 'justice' and 'injustice' (Leifer 1983, 58-59), with a corresponding wholly new set of alignments and alliances (Modelski 1963, iv).

The only organizational manifestation of the conception of the

NEFOS versus the OLDEFOS was the permanent Federation of the *Ga*mes of the *N*ew *E*merging *Fo*rces (GANEFO) headquartered in Jakarta with thirty-six members ranging from countries such as China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, Mexico, and of course, Indonesia. The federation's first sporting event was the GANEFO I held in Jakarta on November 1963 with financial support from the Chinese government.

The motivation for holding the GANEFO was the result of a quarrel between Indonesia and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) over the staging of the Fourth Asian Games in Jakarta during August and September 1962, more specifically regarding the refusal by Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs to issue visas to participants from Taiwan and Israel who were considered to be representatives of OLDEFOS (Leifer 1983, 70-71). The IOC withdrew its patronage while the International Amateur Athletics Federation threatened to withdraw recognition if visas were not granted. The Fourth Asian Games opened officially on time but with the absence of delegates from Taiwan and Israel.

The doctrine of the NEFOS is thus an expression of a particular constellation of changing forces as exhibited by the following issues: the conflict between India and China in changing the status of the non-aligned movement and the character of the Afro-Asian solidarity; by the Sino-Soviet dispute altering the position of the 'socialist countries' within the New Emerging Forces framework; and by the delicate balance of forces within the Indonesian political system itself (Modelski 1963, viii).

Eventually due to the inherent contradictions within the NEFOS strategy, the weak capabilities of the alliance partners, and the consequence of international counter-alignments, the materialization of the NEFOS – OLDEFOS concept failed (Hauswedell 1973, 12). Hauswedell (1973, 30) observed that despite its failure, the NEFOS doctrine was the first political manifestation of the growing North – South conflict in world politics that presented a coherent alternative to the Cold War patterns of alignment. Hauswedell (1973, 30) came to the analysis that the emergence of the NEFOS – OLDEFOS paradigm of looking at alignments of power was a radical challenge against the inequalities of the world system brought forth by two Asian powers (China and Indonesia), as manifested through the 'Peking – Jakarta Axis,' while providing a strong enough common denominator for Asian nationalism and anti-imperialism to build a bridge between a bourgeois nationalist and a communist regime.

2.5.2 Policy Response: Djakarta – Phnom Penh – Hanoi – Peking – Pyongyang Axis of Power

In conjunction with Soekarno's propensity towards fighting a continuous struggle against the imperialists, the concept of the 'Axis of Power' linking together North Korea, China, Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Indonesia, eventually developed as a vehicle to advance the anti-imperialism platform onto the world stage. Under the worldwide band-wagoning of New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) against an all-permeating neocolonialism brought forth by the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS), the Axis of Power was intended to become the primary instrument by which NEFOS was to be infused with life throughout East Asia.

President Soekarno's announcement during the Independence Day speech of 1965 establishing the Djakarta – Phnom Penh – Hanoi – Peking – Pyongyang anti-imperialist axis of powers was the culmination of his revolutionary foreign policy. Reinhardt (1967, 227) claimed that such a proclamation officially removed Indonesia from Non – Alignment. Soekarno himself, however, did not seem to really mind for he claimed that 'this axis is the most natural axis, formed by the course of history itself' (Leifer 1983, 105).

Among those present at the Independence Day speech were delegates from North Korea, Viet Nam, and Cambodia. President Soekarno underscored the symbolism of the presence of these delegates as to give the impression that *NASAKOM* (nationalists, religious leaders, and communists) was also present at the announcement:

> Let the imperialists look at the three of us: one who is a Prince (Sihanouk of Cambodia); one who is a Marxist-Leninist (the representative of North Korea) and the other one (Soekarno) is NASAKOM compressed, but all three of them are patriots, all three of them fight imperialism … I am announcing to the whole world, to all friends and foes, that no evil spirit, no Jinn[7], no devil can prevent Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia

[7] To provide context to Soekarno's words, in Islamic belief a Jinn is a 'life-form' that is created by God that takes the form on Earth of a 'spirit.' Jinns can be 'good' or 'evil,' and take up a physical form to that resembling a human (as a person) or an apparition, i.e. without physical form or presence. In the same belief, angels are created from light and are always obedient to God while the devil, or Satan, was created from fire and is always disobedient to God. In Indonesian culture as in other cultures as well, these beings are believed to have possess extraordinary 'powers.' Soekarno's use of these 'spiritual' beings in his speech was for the purpose of supporting this argument that no one, not even these beings, can prevent the 'natural' establishment of the Axis of Powers.

> from becoming friends and uniting in the march towards a New World without *exploitation de l'homme par l'homme* (Reinhardt 1967, 219-220).

Such rhetoric was taken at face value by some Western observers to mean that China and Indonesia have paired up to lead a cohesive North-South anti-imperialist movement to defeat the United States in North Vietnam (Hauswedell 1973, 23-24). Such fears were supplemented by an announcement of increased technical and economic cooperation between China and Indonesia that started speculation of China offering help to Indonesia in developing a nuclear bomb (Reinhardt 1967, 221-222).

However, Soekarno's crafting of the composition of the axis was resented by some too and was construed as a bit misleading on the degree of cooperation and policy coordination these countries had actually achieved. Despite inclusion in the axis, Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk was not happy with such an inclusion, although he continued to maintain close ties with Indonesia during the 1960's (Reinhardt 1967, 249-250). Sihanouk reminded Soekarno that Cambodia's principle was neutrality and that the axis was more image than reality (Hauswedell 1973, 23, footnote 30). However, referring to Butwell (1964, 944), Reinhardt (1967, 250, footnote 35) claims that Soekarno had even solicited Cambodia's support for Maphilindo, a vehicle that was constructed to secure Malay solidarity within the context of the confrontation of Malaysia, as shall be discussed later.

And despite the seemingly cosy relationship with China, the Chinese were also unwilling to have the term of the 'Djakarta – Phnom Penh – Hanoi – Peking – Pyongyang Axis' written into any resolution or communiqué. This can be concluded from Peter Hauswedell's interview with a member of a delegation to China in 1965, Djakarta, February 1972 (Hauswedell 1973, 23, footnote 30).

Two countries did not reject Soekarno's initiative in including them into the Axis: Viet Nam and North Korea. Indonesia has since maintained excellent close relations with these two countries.

Nevertheless, this Axis could have had an effect on international politics if it were not for the fact that the Djakarta – Phnom Penh – Hanoi – Peking –Pyongyang Axis only lasted for less than one month and a half, i.e. until the 30 September 1965 Indonesian *coup d'etat* that was presumably conducted by the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist Party or PKI) whereby several top military officers were kidnapped and assassinated. By that time anti-Chinese sentiment loomed large which led to the attack on the Chinese embassy by Indonesian citizens. Given the prevalence of the anti-communist campaigns throughout the country, the political atmosphere in Indonesia no longer favored relations with China, and hence, the alliance has since practically

ended.

It is worth noting that both the Soviet Union and the United States attempted to cultivate Indonesia's friendship although the international climate was not conducive towards such an exercise. Based on Reinhardt's analysis, such a stance may reflect the emergence of a long-range policy in which a strong Indonesia could ultimately constitute the essential and pivotal link in a future 'Washington – Tokyo – Djakarta – New Delhi – Moscow Axis' for the 'Confrontation of China' (Reinhardt 1967, 255). Reinhardt (1967, 256) also argued that should this alignment come to fruition, in the context of regional leadership and national-regional security Indonesia would still be within the bounds of an 'active and independent' foreign policy.

2.5.3 Policy Response: Confrontation over West Irian

West Irian is a case that clearly showed the dynamics when a *structuralist* viewpoint (expelling an imperialist force out of one's sphere of influence, or more aptly in this case, one's territory) and a *confrontationalist* approach (coercive diplomacy) were joined.

West Irian had been an integral part of the Netherlands East Indies. The Round Table Conference on December 1949 held in The Hague stipulated that the issue of West Irian would be discussed within a year. At the time Indonesia's form of modern political existence was structured into that of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. This form of republic had been a member of the Netherlands –Indonesian Union headed by the Dutch Queen.

With the issue of West Irian still unresolved in 1949 at the Round Table Conference, although there was a stipulation to discuss the issue by 1950, on the third anniversary of the proclamation of independence President Soekarno in 1948 pointed out that:

> The Indonesians have entered the international arena. If not instantly, the world gradually will undoubtedly participate in the settlement of the Indonesian-Dutch conflict. This is what has become the basis of the foreign policy of the Republic (Leifer 1983, xiii).

President Soekarno continued to elaborate that the struggle to free West Irian was part of the struggle to eradicate imperialism and colonialism worldwide and explained that:

> I never said 'let us bring West Irian into the territory of the Republic,' I always say 'let us bring West Irian into the sovereign territory of the Republic.' And that the Indonesian Flag does not fly there is due to the fact that Dutch imperialism is still there (Soekarno 1961, 57-58).

To project the image that he obtained legitimacy from the state, President Soekarno continually referred to the opinion of the Supreme Advisory Council that the policy on the liberalization of West Irian ought to be based on the principle of confrontation of national power with the power of Dutch imperialism-colonialism – 'a confrontation between our *macht* (power) and the *macht* of Dutch imperialism-colonialism' (Soekarno 1960, 43).

Euphoric from having just obtained independence and not seeing progress on the issue of West Irian, in an address commemorating the fifth anniversary of the proclamation of independence President Soekarno announced again that Indonesia would fight to secure the freedom of Irian Jaya if a negotiatied settlement was not achieved by year's end.

Throughout the earlier phase of Indonesian foreign policy (often dubbed Parliamentary Democracy foreign policy) consecutive governments negotiated with the Dutch but this yielded no progress on the issue of West Irian. In August and September of 1956 during his visit to Moscow, President Soekarno negotiated with the Soviet Union for the transfer of arms, and though he never authorized taking West Irian by force, Soekarno used this Soviet alignment to alarm the Western powers and make them feel compelled to put pressure on the Netherlands. In February of 1957 a third Indonesian initiative failed at the United Nations General Assembly. In November 1957, the West Irian issue was under discussion again. But this time President Soekarno engaged in coercive diplomacy and warned that if Indonesia would not be able to achieve its objective by diplomatic means '[she] will use a new way in [her] struggle which will surprise the nations of the world' (Leifer 1983, 47).

At the United Nations Foreign Minister Subandrio explained that Southeast Asia could be a proving battleground for the Cold War should Indonesia be neglected on the West Irian issue – apparently such scare tactic worked and enticed the United States to withhold World War II reconstruction aid to The Netherlands until the latter agree to negotiate with Indonesia (Leifer 1983, 47).

On 29 November 1957 the U.N. resolution failed again to secure a two-thirds majority and the next day an unsuccessful assassination attempt was made on President Soekarno during a public visit to his children's school. As recollected by Leifer (1983, 47), given that in the weeks prior to the voting Dutch enterprises in Indonesia had been boycotted and Dutch residents subjected to intimidation, the assassination attempt sparked anti-Dutch feelings: an official twenty-four hour strike of all Indonesian workers in Dutch enterprises inaugurated extensive acts of expropriation led by the PKI and its allied trade union organization;

Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja placed all Dutch-owned estates and plantations under government control, in effect speeding up expropriation; and the early December 1957 announcement by Minister of Justice G.A. Maengkom of the expulsion or forced repatriation of 50,000 Dutch nationals in three stages as 30,000 more soon ensued encouraged by the offer from The Hague of immediate repatriation.

Four years later U.S. President John F. Kennedy appealed to both Indonesia and the Netherlands to not use force, and in February 1962 U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy travelled to Jakarta and The Hague to promote negotiations between the two sides. Three months earlier, President Soekarno had issued a People's Triple Command authorizing total popular mobilization to 'liberate' West Irian with the setup of a military command and increased infiltration by sea and parachute drops into West Irian while Foreign Minister Subandrio reiterated the prevalence of confrontation in all fields meaning that '[Indonesia] will confront the Dutch hostility with a similar attitude in the political, economic, and if necessary in the military field' (Leifer 1983, 65). In great part due to President Soekarno's ability to use the Soviet arms transfer to add substance to the Republic's rhetoric to go to war, the United States was finally convinced of the political benefits in pressuring the Netherlands into transferring West Irian to Indonesia (Leifer 1983, 68).

On 15 August 1962 an agreement was forged providing an initial transfer of administration to United Nations authority (effective from 1 October 1962) before a final transfer to Indonesian control after 1 May 1963. Indonesia would have to agree to allow a United Nations sanctioned plebiscite or, an 'act of free will,' to be held before the end of 1969 to assess whether the people of West Irian wished to remain part of Indonesia. However, to honor President Soekarno's public promise (made in the annual independence day speech of 1962) that the transfer of West Irian would be achieved before the end of 1962, a compromise was reached in having the Dutch flag replaced by the Indonesian flag to be hoisted right beside the United Nations flag on 31 December 1962 (Leifer 1983, 67). On May 1963 at the final transfer of West Irian, Foreign Minister Subandrio reaffirmed the often re-occurring self-declared universality of President Soekarno's ideology:

> Our diplomacy is founded on 'the cry of the inner hearts' of the majority of mankind. Our policy is based on building for them a new world, of struggling for them a place in the sun, a life with dignity and respectability. In short, our diplomacy runs parallel with the aspirations of the majority of mankind (Modelski 1963, vi).

2.5.4 Policy Response: Confrontation with Malaysia

No foreign policy issue was more complex during Guided Democracy than the Confrontation with Malaysia. It was an issue entailing many elements coagulated in an interdependent manner. Malaysia could be viewed as the epitome of President Soekarno's everlasting quest to eradicate *l'exploitation de nation par nation et de l'homme par l'homme* in the form of ejecting imperialist British power from Indonesia's perceived sphere of influence in unison with a *machtsvorming*–ridden confrontational policy designed to elicit the use of coercive diplomacy.

On 8 December 1962, just five months after the settlement of the West Irian issue, an uprising in the British protected Sultanate of Brunei spilling over onto adjacent Sarawak and Sabah (British North Borneo) provided an opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of a self-declared formation of the state of Malaysia. Malaysia was portrayed as an imperialist devised 'state' whose sole purpose was to perpetuate colonial economic and military interests in Southeast Asia, hence posing a threat to Indonesia. At the same time, the projected federation was depicted as a neo-colonialist scheme seeking to deny the people of North Borneo the right to self-determination. At a meeting of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization in Tanganyika in February 1963, with representatives of Malaya and Singapore absent, Indonesia appealed for support for the 'revolutionary government' headed by Azahari and called for those in attendance to oppose the incorporation of the Borneo territories into Malaysia.

The confrontation with Malaysia issue served a four-pronged strategic interpretation of Indonesian foreign policy: the struggle inherent in Southeast Asia within the context of NEFOS – OLDEFOS, the placement of Indonesia within the hierarchical order of international politics, the external reflection of the domestic political competition of Guided Democracy, and as a reflection of Soekarno's heightened sense of political righteousness. According to Reinhardt (1967, 219) the examination of the Malaysian confrontation within the context of international politics can be divided into two periods: the first extending from September 1963 to mid-summer 1964, when an attempt was made to reach an agreement with Malaysia, and the second when President Soekarno broke all ties except diplomatic with the West and Indonesia closely aligned itself with China. Within the context of confrontation with Malaysia as 'support for the struggle of the people of North Kalimantan [manifested in the] firm attitude of the Indonesian people against colonialism, imperialism, and war' (Leifer 1983, 78), President Soekarno first announced Indonesia's hostility towards Malaysia on 13 February

1963 when he warned that:

> We are being encircled. We do not want to have neo-colonialism in our vicinity. We consider Malaysia as an encirclement of the Indonesian Republic. Malaysia is a product of … neo-colonialism (Reinhardt 1967, 146-147).

The next day Soekarno announced: 'I now declare officially that Indonesia opposes Malaysia' (Reinhardt 1967, 146-147). Leifer (1983, 78) observed how Soekarno claimed that the events in northern Borneo were inseparable from the movement of the New Emerging Forces. President Soekarno continued with the following:

> Malaysia is the product of the brain and efforts of neo-colonialism… mark my words, Malaysia is to protect the safety of tin for the imperialists and Malaysia is to protect the rubber for the imperialists and Malaysia is to protect oil for the imperialists. For this reason, [Indonesia is] determinedly opposed, without any reservation, against Malaysia (Leifer 1983, 79).

On 20 January 1963 Foreign Minister Subandrio publicly provided a justification for confrontation saying that 'Malaya had openly become a henchman of the imperialists and had acted with animosity towards Indonesia' (Leifer 1983, 79) and added in 1964 that 'from the beginning both 'Malaysia' and Malaya had been utilized by the British as instruments to undermine Indonesia's revolution' (Leifer 1983, 75-76). Regional political analyst Donald E. Weatherbee reckoned that Malaysia was the product of the marriage between Malay feudalism and British colonialism in which the reactionary Malay elite, through cooperation with the British, extended its power into northern Borneo (Reinhardt 1967, 200). George McT. Kahin shared a similar view regarding the nature of Malaysia and added that Malaya's 'independence without revolution' was in itself simply an affront for continued colonialism and that there was resentment against a Western power (United Kingdom) determining the political destinies and dictating the boundaries of people ethnically similar to Indonesians. Even Indonesian moderates felt that Jakarta had as much right as Kuala Lumpur to govern Sarawak and Sabah or Northern Borneo (Reinhardt 1967, 199-200). Kahin suggested that President Soekarno likened British policy in north Borneo with the Malino Policy of the Netherlands of which many Indonesians feared that the Dutch hoped to control the largely Java-based republic by ruling through traditional 'feudalist' aristocracies in the outer islands (Reinhardt 1967, 200). Leifer (1983, 75) added that Indonesia's suspicion of Malaysia was due to the latter's and neighboring British colonies record in supporting rebellions against Jakarta in the 1950's and due to the

doomed-to-be-weak-at-the-onset federal structure by allusion to Indonesia's political weakness when it was devised early after independence as a federation as well.

However, the international reactions to Indonesia's effort to seek support for its confrontation policy in the international arena, specifically in the Afro-Asian world, were less than enthusiastic. At the second Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) held in Cairo on October 1964, from which Malaysia was excluded, President Soekarno was unable to obtain approval for the confrontation with Malaysia. At the Afro-Asian Islamic conference held in Bandung on March 1965, from which Malaysia was again excluded, despite claiming the intention of 'storming the last ramparts of imperialism' a draft resolution sponsored by Indonesia and China denouncing the federation received minimal support (Leifer 1983, 104). And at the Tenth Anniversary of the Bandung Conference held in Jakarta on April 1965, not only was attendance by leading figures disappointing, but those who attended refused to interpret the spirit of Afro-Asian solidarity by denouncing Malaysia (Leifer 1983, 104).

At the United Nations Security Council, Indonesia's Permanent Representative, Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro questioned how Indonesia could be labeled as 'aggressive' if the Malaysia that is 'independent and sovereign' did not even exist in the first place (Leifer 1983, 100-101). The council did not vote in favor of Indonesia. The Soviet Union vetoed. Indonesia's condemnation was prevented. But a more decisive event occurred on 30 December 1964 when Malaysia became a member of the United Nations Security Council for one year as part of a gentleman's agreement in return for having let Czechoslovakia serve the first part of a normally two-year term. Against the advice of his foreign minister and without even notifying Indonesia's permanent mission in New York, President Soekarno announced Indonesia's departure from the United Nations because Indonesia considered the United Nations as 'another absurd colonial maneuver' (Leifer 1983, 103). Soekarno might have thought that he was setting an example for other states to follow. However, other Afro-Asian states instead interpreted Soekarno's decision to leave the United Nations as one of gross irresponsibility, leaving Indonesia alone in its plight.

Secondly, within the context of infringements on Indonesia's self-proclaimed sphere of influence, during the first period of confrontation, Indonesia was conditionally willing to negotiate about the idea of Malaysia, albeit with some foreign assistance. Under U.S. President Lyndon Johnson's initiative that was partly motivated by the possibility of the confrontation persisting and by Malaysia requesting assistance

from Australia and New Zealand, which would in turn invoke U.S. obligations under the ANZUS Pact, U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy assisted the resumption of talks between President Soekarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman.

After a rapprochement in Tokyo and after a Summit in Manila, Malaya inevitably conceded and declared an adherence to the principle of self-determination for the peoples of non-self governing territories. Indonesia and the Philippines consequently welcomed the formation of Malaysia provided that the people of North Borneo supported the formation as validated by either the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representatives. Malaya accepted such an independent verification of self-determination as a requirement for obtaining support of Malaysia's existence and agreed upon membership of a grouping based on ties of race and culture – espoused by President Macapagal as a 'Confederation of Nations of Malay Origin' as an alternative to Malaysia but with a common anti-Chinese platform – which coincidentally was also part of the strategy of Indonesian foreign policy (Leifer 1983, 86). This group would later manifest itself into Maphilindo (acronym that stood for *Ma*laysia, *Phil*ippines, and *Indo*nesia), coined by Indonesia's Foreign Minister Subandrio.

However, Indonesia had greater expectations of Maphilindo than the other states. Other than to provide a cooperative framework for solving regional problems peacefully, Maphilindo should entail confirmation of the temporary nature of foreign bases in the area, abstinence from the use of collective defense arrangements to serve the particular interest of the major powers, and reflect a collective desire to assume a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and the security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation. Hence, citing Subandrio (1964, 7) Reinhardt (1967, 210-211) suggested that Indonesia could aptly consider Maphilindo as a substitute for Western power in keeping regional security, in a way resembling an 'Indonesian Monroe Doctrine.' David Mozingo argued that Indonesia accepted Malaysia and Maphilindo with the clear understanding that British and U.S. presence in the region would be replaced by a *Pax Indonesiana* (Reinhardt 1967, 211) with the additional ramification that Indonesia had established a right to be consulted on, and even to veto, all regional developments.

Indeed, Indonesia felt that it was entitled to consultation on regional territorial changes, especially where defense arrangements gave a former colonial power the right to use proximate bases under the perceived false pretense of 'the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia,' as reflected by British retention of a military base in Singapore (Leifer 1983, 80). An official Indonesian government statement released in October 1963 best

elaborated Indonesia's position:

> Such a provision in a bilateral agreement between the United Kingdom and Malaysia which arrogates to itself the right to include other areas beyond those of the contracting parties without the consent of the respective Governments concerned, cannot be interpreted but as having disguised ulterior motives towards the immediate neighbors of the projected Malaysia. For reasons of national security, Indonesia cannot have any alternative but to oppose such a British-Colonial inspired Malaysia (Leifer 1983, 80).

Such geopolitical concerns were also extended to the choice of countries that Indonesia embraced as strategic partners in the venture. Originally, the only diplomatic partner for Indonesia, apart from China, was the Philippines and although diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Malaysia had been broken, Manila's interests were different from those of Jakarta with respect to its relations towards Malaysia. The Philippines advanced a territorial claim to the greater part of the colony of Sabah in June 1962. Moreover, the Philippines was also not enthusiastic of being drawn more directly into the arena of regional confrontation (Leifer 1983, 94).

Ironically, the Philippines was a perceived client of the Old Established Forces in terms of economic structure and external alignment, and in 1963 it had become a party to limited regional association along with Malaya and Thailand within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961, which Indonesia rejected (Leifer 1983, 83). Despite such a less than favorable alignment for Indonesia, the Philippines provided a window of opportunity for President Soekarno to become close with a U.S. ally who shared a similar anti-Malaysia sentiment. In turn, President Soekarno could capitalize on the relationship to obtain economic assistance from the United States (Leifer 1983, 83). With the Philippines active in the dispute, Indonesia could seek to pressure Malaysia as a minority player in a triangle where Indonesia and the Philippines constituted its two other adversaries (Leifer 1983, 84). Such a strategy was implemented consistently as Indonesia attempted to portray Malaysia's illegitimacy at Afro-Asian gatherings and tried to undermine Malaysia in regional negotiations (Leifer 1983, 84).

However, the original common front that Indonesia had with the Philippines was visibly weakened by the announcement on 12 March 1964 of an agreement on the exchange of consular officials between Malaysia and the Philippines. Moreover, when President Diosdado Macapagal went to visit the United States, he eventually spoke out publicly against Indonesia's confrontation policy as armed incursions

began penetrating into the Malayan peninsula.

Somewhat reminiscent of the pre-colonial Sriwijaya – Mataram rivalries, Indonesian nationalist leaders suspected that Malaysia attempted to lure Sumatra away from the Republic into a 'greater Malaya' federation with the rest of the peninsula. Given such sentiments, Reinhardt (1967, 212) reckoned that it would be reasonable to infer from government pronouncements that the purpose of the Confrontation with Malaysia campaign was to create an non-cohesive, 'greater Malay' grouping consisting of a 'free' (and separate) Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Brunei, and Sarawak, which would render the group susceptible to Indonesian political and cultural dominance. According to a prominent scholar on Southeast Asian politics, George McT. Kahin, Indonesia felt that it had a moral right to leadership in Asia – a right even superior to that of India – based on its size, armed power, and revolutionary path to independence; and such a right included hegemony over the areas populated by Malay peoples (Reinhardt 1967, 199-200).

Although Soekarno had stated that Indonesia had no territorial claim to Malaysia, Reinhardt (1967, 215) believed that Soekarno's allusion to the pre-colonial empire of Majapahit as a 'nationalist state' was more reflective of his true sentiment[8]. Soekarno maintained that at no time that 'my struggle was confined to … the former Dutch held territory … that neither on moral grounds nor on the grounds of international law are we obliged to be the inheritors of the Dutch' (Reinhardt 1967, 214) Soekarno continued with the notion that:

> God has determined that certain parts of the world should form single units, … and when I look at the islands situated between Asia and Australia and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, I understand they are meant to form a single entity [where] … independent Indonesia should extend to Malaya and Papua (Reinhardt 1967, 214).

[8] Within the context of addressing any Indonesian territorial hegemonic ambitions in the region, it is necessary to examine an historical episode set in 1945 prior to the Japanese relinquishment of power over the archipelago to the Allies. A Committee for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Kemerdekaan Indonesia* or BPKI) was established to administer the transfer of sovereignty and to resolve the question of what territory to claim sovereignty upon. Interestingly, over two-thirds (39 out of 66 delegates) voted for a territory beyond the former Dutch East Indies which included in addition to the Dutch colonies all of Borneo, Timor, and New Guinea, and the peninsula of Malaya. The Japanese had the final say on the composition of the new Indonesian state, and on 27 July 1945 at a meeting attended by military administrators from Java, Sumatra, Malaya, and Naval territories of the eastern islands it was decided that Malaya would not be included in the new Indonesian state. Reinhardt (1967, 215 footnote 84) found that Bernard Gordon had access to the Nishimura-Kishi study and that Gordon (1966, 85 footnote 50) discovered that the Japanese were considering only Java and the nearby islands as an independent state; Malaya was never considered to be incorporated into Indonesia partly because of the different stages and patterns of development.

The Confrontation with Malaysia was also a manifestation of President Soekarno's sense of righteousness. After the first tripartite meeting held with Indonesia and the Philippines, Malaysia agreed to hold a United Nations sanctioned plebiscite, or an act of 'free will,' assessing what its citizens wanted in terms of the formation of a new state of Malaysia before receiving recognition for its existence. Controversy began when representatives of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah, and Britain (but not Brunei) reached a final agreement in London in 9 July 1963 for the formation of Malaysia initially scheduled for 31 August 1963 but later revised to 16 September 1963. President Soekarno claimed a breach of faith on the Malaysia Prime Minister's part and that such a date setting was contrary to what had previously been agreed to in Manila.

It was this incident that exacerbated the intensity of the conflict from the original *Konfrontasi dengan Malaysia* (Confrontation with Malaysia) Campaign in becoming a *Ganyang Malaysia* (Crush Malaysia) Campaign with the eventual non-accordance of diplomatic status by Indonesia upon Malaya's ambassador and staff effective on the revised date of Malaysia's inauguration. Thereafter, it was this alleged breach of faith stance on the part of Malaysia that was constantly brought up by President Soekarno in challenging the legitimacy of Malaysia's existence. Soekarno gave the impression that he had been deceived and personally humiliated. As documented by Leifer (1983, 91), Soekarno told one of his biographers that, 'I was infuriated … the Indonesian government had been tricked and made to look like a dummy.' On a note of principle, Soekarno repeated that the fixing of the formation of Malaysia was done irrespective of the outcome of the UN plebiscite (Leifer 1983, 92) – hence the argument that the new state lacked the legitimate credential of support from its own people.

Political matters aside, Indonesia's confrontational stance towards Malaysia had tangible economic implications as well. The revival of active confrontation was accompanied by expropriation of British and Malaysian economic assets, severance of economic ties with the new federation, including Singapore, which meant that half the country's exports were deprived of their traditional outlet to international markets, withholding of all new aid programs to Indonesia by the US Government, suspension by the International Monetary Fund of a US$ 50 million standby credit granted in July, and the cancellation of a special meeting of a Development Assistance Board at which several governments, including that of Japan, had been expected to pledge about US$ 250 million in credits to cover Indonesia's current balance of payment deficit as a measure in support of its stabilization policy.

So far, the political-economic aspects of confrontation were discussed. The military aspect shall now be examined briefly as well. A cross-border military campaign of mixed intensity was carried out for over three years until the end of confrontation was negotiated in the middle of 1966. What made the campaign difficult for Indonesia was that British forces, along with support from Australia and New Zealand and other associate members of the alliance, continued their defense of Malaysia throughout the duration. The leaders of the Indonesian armed forces were even warned by a British threat of an aircraft carrier based air strike. Military training and supplies had been provided from across the Sarawak border in Kalimantan, the Indonesian side of Borneo, but without clear indication that such assistance had been authorized officially from Jakarta (Leifer 1983, 78).

Ironically, President Soekarno had reaffirmed that Indonesia would carry out a policy of confrontation against the Malaysian idea in the political and economic arenas but he had omitted references to any military dimension (Leifer 1983, 79). Foreign Minister Subandrio continued to maintain that the Indonesian government did not enjoy control over the guerillas in North Borneo. Subandrio argued that the guerillas were fighting to liberate against colonialism and imperialism. Subandrio advanced the thesis that the problem of withdrawal was indeed political and not military, and hence he advocated a diplomatic solution based on the spirit of the previously negotiated agreements such as the Manila Agreements. However, it was only following the breach in diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Malaya (and subsequently ‘Malaysia’) that Indonesian troops began to play a greater role in the insurgency although it was effectively contained by British forces.

Although an agreement terminating confrontation was only concluded in Bangkok on 1 June 1966, the dispute was effectively over when President Soekarno no longer held executive power, essentially the moment Parliament stripped him of the title, ‘President-for-Life’ (Leifer 1983, 109). Although General Suharto ultimately ended confrontation, it is worthy to note that a formal commitment to confrontation was actually upheld during the uncertainty on whether Soekarno was still in power (Leifer 1983, 107). And, in fact, confrontation was then even stepped up, at least in declaratory form, both against Malaysia and against imperialism (Leifer 1983, 106). However, on 11 August 1966 Indonesia’s Adam Malik and Malaysia’s Tun Razak signed a final agreement in Jakarta on the normalization of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Malaysia.

2.5.5 Policy Response: Assertiveness towards the United States of America

Given Soekarno's structuralist and confrontationalist outlook on the world, Indonesia's assertiveness towards the United States of America was simply a natural stance given the extensive U.S. involvement in the world developments pertaining to Indonesia, and the fact that the United States was one of the poles in the then bipolar international order of the Cold War. Soekarno's foreign policy assertiveness towards the United States of America can be attributed to three factors: West Irian, Malaysia, and the combination of NEFOS/OLDEFOS and the Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang Axis.

During the negotiations on the transfer of West Irian from the Netherlands to Indonesia, despite U.S. pressure on the Dutch behind the scenes, no US representatives were present. This absence of the Indonesian requested US representatives from the negotiations created the impression that the United States had withdrawn its guarantee to underwrite the agreement. This impression was further exacerbated by the Marshall Plan aid of USD 506 million to the Netherlands in the spring of 1948, and by the nonchalant US positions recorded in the United Nations and votes taken in the UN Security Council.

Hence, although international pressure mainly from the United States and the United Nations greatly assisted the eventual transfer of West Irian, many Indonesians felt that American interests coincided more closely with the colonial powers than with the newer countries (Reinhardt 1967, 51-53).

At the beginning of the Malaysia issue, the United States had been critical of the United Kingdom's insensitivity towards Indonesia and tried to mediate. However, due to its own involvement in Vietnam and sensing that President Soekarno was against all foreign presence in the area, the United States aligned its position with that of the United Kingdom and supported the establishment of Malaysia (Hauswedell 1973, 19-20). Things turned ugly when aid was cut off by the United States after the launch of the Crush Malaysia Campaign in 1963 and President Soekarno blasted the United States with the famously colorful 'go to hell with your aid' retort spoken in the presence of U.S. Ambassador Howard Jones (Reinhardt 1967, 226).

Precipitated by Indonesia's close relations with China, relations with the United States went downhill from then on. The PKI was allowed to boycott U.S. films and seize the U.S. Information Service (USIA) in Yogyakarta. Training and exchange study grants in the United States for Indonesian military officers and technicians were prohibited.

Bureaucratic harassment such as the refusal to handle USIA mail and anti-U.S. demonstrations led to attacks on USIA headquarters in Surabaya and Jakarta and with the eventual closing of USIA presence. U.S. rubber estates and other businesses in Sumatra were taken under control and all foreign-owned oil companies, including three American-owned, were seized. Ellsworth Bunker, the U.S. negotiator during the West Irian transfer and who was later sent again to Indonesia to patch things up, was unsuccessful in restoring friendly relations. Demonstrations and protests at the appointment of U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green, resulted in the attacks on the consulates in Surabaya and Medan within the next two weeks.

In the context of the United States providing support to Malaysia, President Soekarno warned that Indonesia was not responsible for the ensuing deterioration of relations, and in the context of mismanagement of the North Borneo situation, Soekarno chided Michelmore, a U.S. citizen and U.N. Secretary-General U Thant's deputy.

Within the context of NEFOS – OLDEFOS and the Asian axis of power, President Soekarno considered U.S. intervention in Vietnam as aggression and a defiance of the Geneva agreements. Soekarno also charged the United States of intimidating Cambodia, and argued that the United States was behind every threat to Indonesia that had existed since the regional revolts in 1957-1958. This was understandable given earlier U.S. involvement in the PRRI-Permesta rebellion against President Soekarno (Hauswedell 1973, 19-20) and by the shooting down in May 1958 of a former U.S. Air Force officer engaged in a bombing raid over Ambon Harbor in Maluku (Leifer 1983, 50-51).

However, to place the situation into perspective, Indonesia was not only suspicious of the United States but also of Taiwan, the Philippines, the newly independent Malaya, and the British presence in Singapore and Northern Borneo (Leifer 1983, 51). On the basis of Indonesia's stated foreign policy principles one might conclude that Indonesia was indeed engaged in an all-out worldwide struggle against the Western powers. However, further analysis showed a selective approach towards confrontation and a good measure of *realpolitik* in that at the same time Indonesia's relations with Japan, France, the Netherlands, and West Germany were kept at normal levels and even higher in terms of economic relations (Hauswedell 1973, 24).

One speech which best reflected the anti-American stance was President Soekarno's Independence Day address of 1964 entitled *Tahun Vivere Pericoloso* (The Year of Living Dangerously) in which Soekarno condemned US 'aggression' against North Vietnam in the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin raid, called for the speedy reunification of Korea, claimed

that the joint statement issued by US President Johnson and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was 'really too much,' and compared U.S. preference for Malaysia over Indonesia with US policy of preferring Taiwan over Mainland China (Leifer 1983, 99).

While the lending community of the OLDEFOS halted access of funds to Indonesia as the policy of Crush Malaysia progressed, the United States government though withholding military supplies, continued, however, to provide economic assistance of over US$ 70 million a year, including surplus agricultural produce, in order to sustain lines of communication with Indonesia's armed forces, which were regarded as an essential anti-communist bastion perceived to be of critical strategic importance in maritime Southeast Asia (Leifer 1983, 92).

2.6 Soekarno's Foreign Policy as a Basis for Megawati's Foreign Policy

In the first part of this chapter, Soekarnoism and its effects on foreign policy have been set out. Soekarno's ideology and foreign policy, along with the international political environment and alignments, were briefly analyzed. It was apparent from these manifestations of Soekarnoism in Indonesia's foreign policy that Soekarno was indeed a structuralist in outlook and a confrontationalist in approach in his quest for Indonesia's foreign policy goals.

However, apart from illustrating Indonesian foreign policy during the Presidency of Soekarno, the analysis has contemporary relevance with respect to the analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy post-*Reformasi*.

Analysis of Indonesian foreign policy during Liberal Democracy (1945-1957), Guided Democracy (1958-1965), and post-Soekarno or early Suharto period led to the conclusion that while competing elites' images of the dominant international system and their view of Indonesia's place in it were reflected in foreign policy, foreign policy itself was used by the government to influence the domestic competition for political power (Singh 1971, 379). Another observation from the late Soekarno and early Suharto era showed that given the foreign policy elite's perception of the world as hostile, intense domestic political competition drove the country towards an independent foreign policy while a less competitive domestic political environment was conducive towards seeking foreign aid (Weinstein 1976). Moreover, the influences of the international system, more specifically the Cold War power structure and Indonesia's sphere of influence, provided a strong determinant to

Indonesia's foreign policy. Past regional rebellions in Sulawesi and in Sumatra led to the birth of the *Wawasan Nusantara* (Archipelagic Outlook) as decreed by President Soekarno on February 1960. This decree extended the width of territorial waters from three to twelve nautical miles and maintained that all waters, surrounding, between, and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension or width, are integral parts of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

In playing the principal role in freeing the Republic from all forms of colonialism, President Soekarno attempted to extend the influence of Indonesia beyond regional bounds to revise the structure and rules of the international system (Leifer 1983, 52). Confrontation did not only reflect domestic political changes but was intertwined with the process of nation – building in Southeast Asia and post-colonial political readjustment in the area more generally (Reinhardt 1967, 1).

The confrontation policy was shaped not only by the political socialization of Soekarno and the national elite and the complex of thought, later referred to as 'the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution,' but also by the international system within which the nationalists had to operate to realize their aspirations (Hauswedell 1973, 15). Hauswedell (1973, 19) thought that the foreign policy of confrontation tended to isolate Indonesia from the major Western powers, alienate moderate powers in the Afro-Asian group, forge a more solid relationship with socialist anti-imperialist Asian powers like China, North Vietnam, and North Korea while as a consequence place Indonesia's relations with the Soviet Union to thaw.

Sudjatmoko, at the time Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States, provided a suitable synopsis to confrontation:

> It has become quite clear for all our claims to international leadership we ended up with an even greater dependency on foreign credits and with our freedom of action seriously compromised (Leifer 1983, 110).

The government of President Soekarno was clearly aware of the realities of great power politics in the region. And yet Indonesia was able to forge its own foreign policy by constantly attempting to manifest its national ideology of Soekarnoism on the world stage while simultaneously navigating and capitalizing on the opportunities presented by the ongoing Cold War. And up until the pivotal turn of events that led to President Soekarno's removal from office, Indonesia was even seen as successful in its fight to create, along with its allies, a new block of powers that could mediate between the United States and the Soviet Union. This analogy, guided by the doctrine of *Bebas Aktif* (Free and

Active) can later be seen in the exposition of Indonesia's foreign policy after *Reformasi*.

The previous analytical survey of Indonesia's foreign policy during the reign of President Soekarno underlined the tremendous influence of Soekarno as a leader and of the ideology of Soekarnoism into the whole calculus of domestic political power dynamics. However, Indonesia post-*Reformasi* no longer has a dominant political leader, and the exercise of power, including in foreign policy, is diffused among the various political institutions. Nevertheless, as shall later be seen, the interconnectivity of the world by virtue of advances in technology, telecommunications, and transportation fosters a surprising possibility that a common national ideology may still be embraced by the political elites of a democratizing country.

The strong role of foreign policy to balance in the power struggle between the army and the Communist Party during the period of Guided Democracy in 1959-1965 can be likened to the present-day democratic Indonesia brought forth by *Reformasi.* During the tenure of President Soekarno, Indonesia's foreign policy was a means by which to maintain a domestic power balance between the armed forces and the PKI. McCloud (1974, 20) also raised several other arguments posed by other analysts. Palmier (1967, 97) provided an interesting observation in that Indonesia had to maintain a 'balanced' foreign policy to maintain its own unity for it shifted to the right and the government fell in 1952 and it shifted to the left and there was a *coup d'etat.* Singh (1971, 393-394) attributed responsibility for the shift in Indonesia's foreign policy from left to right, surprisingly, to the dynamics of the domestic power balance. Singh argued that the domestic political psychology favored an ideology based on an independent and active foreign policy. Kahin (1964, 263) regarded the inner-outer islands conflicts and the army-Soekarno-PKI balance within the central government to be significant forces in foreign policy making

Weinstein (1969, 29) had a point when he stated that:

> The period of confrontation was less a manifestation of any deep concern about the fate of Malaysia than a symbol used by competitors for power to protect and enhance their own position in the power struggle.

Leifer (1983, 107) posited that confrontation was used as a justification for the pursuit of opposing interests by the armed forces and the PKI in a bitter struggle for domestic political power; in this respect, foreign policy no longer functioned to advance the external interests of the state but rather as means to advance and protect domestic interests. Leifer (1983, 75) also emphasized how informed Indonesian attitudes

towards Malaysia were influenced not only by Soekarno's revolutionary ideology but also by the Republic's actual experience of attaining independence.

And Weinstein (1969, 90) added insight in reasoning that the confrontation with Malaya and the United Kingdom did not end because of any great change in foreign policy goals but rather ended because the conflict ceased to become useful in providing domestic political legitimacy as well as a tool for domestic conflict management and a standard of revolutionary nationalism following the *coup d'etat* attempt in 1965. Gordon (1966, 134) theorized that as long as the army and the Communist Party in Indonesia were still in disagreement about fundamental domestic and foreign policy alternatives, and thus remaining powerful and distinctive subsystems in the domestic political sphere, President Soekarno's latitude in foreign policy was wider than if the views of the former had a deeper mutual tolerance.

Today, as can later be observed foreign policy is also used as an arena for political competition among the various elements of society such as civil society, legislators, the military, and bureaucrats although, needless to say, these groups enjoy varying distribution of power.

And last, the influence of the value system of political elites, especially those of nationalistic and hegemonic tendencies, was forged in the foreign policy of President Soekarno. Reinhardt (1967, 173) argued that such values were more influential than the then rampant 'communist enterprise' in explaining Indonesian politics. Affinity for the glory of the pre-colonial empires of Majapahit and Sriwijaya, and in what was described in the ancient text of *Negarakertagama* in combination with Muhammad Yamin's view of what constituted the 'rightful' territory of Indonesia, played a major influence in directing President Soekarno and the foreign policy elite towards a certain 'expansionistic' policy to achieve a 'Greater *Nusantara*' (Greater Archipelagic State). Reinhardt (1967, 207) suggested that the proposal of Soekarno to hold a Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) to counter the then perceived Western dominated United Nations and Indonesia's solidarity-making style of foreign policy had its roots in political concepts going back to the pre-colonial era and that such traditional quest for a 'microcosmic order that approximates a macrocosmic world order' was reflected in the modern revolutionary policies of the Indonesian government.

As shall be seen later, such a value system is surprisingly also present, if not outright dominant, during the foreign policy making process of Indonesia post-*Reformasi*. The key difference, however, lie in the composition of the political groups that embrace such a value system.

Analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy during the later Suharto

presidency (using policy towards ASEAN as a case study) identified three domestic factors that constituted the underlying variables of foreign policy: interactions of attitudes and political competition, national capability, and self-image (Anwar 1994, 7-8). Two more variables, national leadership and the decision-making process, were proposed (Anggoro 1995, 110). Another set of three factors were identified: the perceptions of elites towards external threats, the political culture of the elites, and how leaders perceive the following: territorial boundaries, the country's role in world affairs, and the country's capabilities due to its limited resources (Suryadinata 1993).

If studies of elites in foreign policy making have already been done, what value will this study bring to the existing literature? Despite having identified the key variables that influence foreign policy making, further exploration of the dynamics by which these factors interact in the actual foreign policy is needed. While some of the studies build upon the works of earlier scholars, overall these findings were not placed within the context of a coherent theoretical framework that can be used to analyze and predict foreign policy. And most importantly, these studies were conducted when the domestic political condition did not reflect conditions of democratization. Studies close to resembling such conditions were those conducted using data from the Liberal Democracy period (1945-1957). However, back then the world was a very different place. Basing current analysis on studies undertaken from that period would render globalization non-existent and assume that the Cold War still existed or had just begun.

The previous discussion has shown that despite the time difference in which foreign policy making is undertaken, the structural framework by which foreign policy is made in the Indonesia of post-*Reformasi* is similar to that during Guided Democracy, as shall later be seen in more detail. The differing factors are again, the lack of a Cold War and the absence of a solid authoritarian political leadership.

With this let us progress with the next phase of our investigation. The second part of this chapter will trace the life events that propelled Megawati Soekarnoputri onto Indonesia's political scene and will illustrate how Soekarnoism permeates in her thinking and policy inclinations.

2.7 Megawati's Rise to National Political Prominence

This section discusses Megawati's rise to political prominence, the

ideological platforms that propelled her into such positions, and who she is as a statesperson. The objective of this chapter is to show that President Soekarno had a dominant role in shaping her ideology and doctrinal bases, and that by virtue of these bases she attracted an electorate that was capable of advancing her into power.

Born in Yogyakarta as Dyah Permata Megawati Setyawati Soekarnoputri on 23 January 1947, Megawati experienced a rather unfortunate childhood. Her early years were marked by the Dutch second 'police action' in the capital of the republic (Yogyakarta). Her mother Fatmawati left her, her sisters, and her brother Guruh in response to Soekarno's marriage to another woman (Hartini). She also experienced Soekarno's marriage to his third, fourth, and fifth wives; and the assassination attempt on President Soekarno at his children's school (Cikini) on 30 November 1957.

Megawati had an interrupted university education partly due to her father's political quarantine resulting in the eventual deterioration of his health. Her adulthood was marked by more tragedy, however as her Air Force lieutenant husband was killed on a mission leaving Megawati and her two children to fend for themselves, and as her marriage to an Egyptian diplomat was embarassingly annulled by virtue of a technicality on the status of her husband's death.

Only since March 1973, when she married Taufik Kiemas, a South Sumatran activist in the Indonesian Nationalist Party student chapter, did she manage to lead a normal and private life for the next thirteen years (1973 – 1986).

In 1986, Soerjadi, the General Chairman of the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* or PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) sought to recruit members of the Soekarno family to garner party support for the April 1987 general elections. PDI was regarded as the party of the proletariat and the prevailing sentiment that lingered in political circles was that there was nostalgia for a figure like Soekarno, and that his perceived virtues in governing the archipelago were missing from Suharto. Soerjadi sought to capitalize on this mood.

In response to Soerjadi's request, both Megawati and her husband ran in the elections for the Indonesian House of Representatives (Parliament). Megawati ran from the Central Java district while Taufik Kiemas from the South Sumatra district. And both won. At the time, they were the only couple to become Members of Parliament (Bahar 1996, 32). Describing her decision, Megawati recounted:

> I had no thoughts of becoming a leader. At the time I felt that since my children were already independent, I might as well become active in politics (McIntyre 1997, 8).

None of the other Soekarno children accepted Soerjadi's offer. The eldest son Guntur did not want to have anything to do with politics, preferring a private life. Younger sisters Rachmawati and Sukmawati refused to join PDI on the grounds that doing so would undermine the perpetuation of the teachings of their father. The youngest, Guruh did not run for parliament despite his positive response to Soerjadi. Guruh supported PDI via crowd pleasing with his musical group *Swara Mahardhika* (Voice of Freedom) performing in PDI parades.

Soerjadi's strategy apparently worked. PDI gained 9,324,708 (about 11 %) of the total votes, an increase from 5,919,702 (8%) of the total votes in 1982. PDI's seats in Parliament rose from 24 in 1982 to 40. Approximately 10.7 million young people came to vote for the first time. However, it cannot be determined from the available data whether PDI's increased votes came primarily from this voter segment although this is quite possible (Liddle 1988, 187).

However, Soerjadi experienced a reversal of fortune. Perceived to have suggested that a two-term limit on presidential tenure be enacted and commented on the high levels of official corruption during the 1992 campaign (McIntyre 1997, 11), Soerjadi's election by acclamation as General Chairman of PDI in Medan on July 1993 was annulled by the Minister of Home Affairs, Yogie S. Memet (Fatah 1999A, 28). Memet wanted to install Budi Harjono as the government's preferred person. Even before the congress the government warned PDI members not to elect a leader with legal troubles, which is suggestive of Soerjadi who was accused of kidnapping several young PDI anti-Soerjadi activists (Fatah 1999A, 28).

Without a leader, one hundred party officials from seventy of the party's 304 branches appealed to Megawati at her home on 11 September 1993 to run for General Chairpersonship of PDI at the forthcoming extraordinary congress. Megawati accepted their appeal.

Thus, on 4 December 1993 at a PDI extraordinary congress, 256 of the 305 party branches declared their support for Megawati as General Chairperson against pressure from Minister Memet to elect Budi Hardjono.

The arguments that provided the backdrop for the election of Megawati as the chairperson of PDI, among others were: first, Megawati was expected to unite the party, and second, she was the daughter of Bung Karno, whose charisma was still unparalleled, she was expected to be able to gather the votes from the *Partai Nasionalis Indonesia* or PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) community which maintains an emotional bond with Soekarno (Alimi 1999, 11). Political analyst Riswandha

Imawan saw that the charisma of her father was precisely her capital to mobilize the masses (Bahar 1996, 152).

Megawati then became the *de facto* leader of the PDI through the party's Extraordinary Congress held in Surabaya on 2-6 December 1993 and the *de jure* leader through the party's National Deliberation in Jakarta a few weeks later on 22-23 December 1993.

However, as time passed, the Minister of Home Affairs and the military leaders wanted to dethrone Megawati by instigating PDI dissidents to hold an extraordinary congress in Medan in June 1996. The Congress was held and effectively removed Megawati as chairperson. The government then installed Soerjadi as the General Chairman, the same Soerjadi it had ejected three years earlier.

Political analysts have not yet reached a conclusive verdict as to how such a reversal of governmental stance could have occurred. One argument is that it was the government in the first place who wanted Soerjadi gone in 1993. If the government did not support Soerjadi this time, then the strategy would backfire, especially for the Home Affairs officials who directly participated in organizing the Medan Congress (Ida 1999A, 137). After all, officials from the Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs of the Department of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia were present in the Congressional Hall. And officials of the party's Central Leadership Council held a meeting with the Director General for Social and Political Affairs of the Department of Home Affairs at the Hotel Elmi in Medan (Fatah 1999A, 29).

On 23 June 1996 Megawati, in a show of force, arrived at PDI headquarters in Jakarta and declared that:

> I am the lawful, legal, and constitutional chairman of the PDI for the 1993-1998 period. That which called itself a 'congress' in Medan is in violation of the party's rules and the constitution (McIntyre 1997, 17).

Megawati indeed had the support of the majority of party members and sympathizers of PDI but did not have the approval of the government. On the other hand, Soerjadi was the General Chairman of PDI since the Medan Congress with support and approval by the government but he was rejected by the majority of party members and sympathizers of PDI. Those who had joined the Medan Congress did so with the realist understanding that no party can survive without the backing of the government rather than some disagreement on principle or some private sentiments (Surbakti 1999, 60).

Why insist on holding a congress if doing so would have the consequence of having the government, in the capacity of the gatekeeper of domestic politics, retract its support towards Megawati? Syamsuddin

Haris provided a number of reasons (Haris 1999, 38). The political landscape had not changed much since the fusion of the different political parties in 1973 whereas due to limited political opportunities, the capture of legislative seats was the only prize for political parties. As a logical consequence of the party politics of the New Order, the government became the sole source and basis for the legitimacy of political parties. The people were thus relegated the passive participation in providing votes during elections.

After her ouster from the PDI leadership, Megawati focused on internally consolidating her party through deliberations and congresses (Sanit 1999, 66). Megawati then chose not to focus the blame on the government's intervention but rather on the impropriety of Soerjadi's actions by bringing him to court. This decision was based on two calculations (Surbakti 1999, 61). First, a realistic acceptance that, with the court not willing to condemn the government, Megawati did not want to stand accused of hindering national development by implicitly taking the government's resources away from other more important matters of development. Second, she wanted to use the court case to strengthen the party's constitution and to cultivate support and instilling party cohesion.

Megawati personally was not regarded as a serious threat by the state but rather her close association with Soekarno's figure. Maggie Ford viewed that the chaos inside PDI during the Megawati era can be attributed to two factors: the incompetence of the PDI leadership to resolve internal conflict and the tendency of the state to excessively intervene in the affairs of political parties (Fatah 1999A, 24).

According to Fatah (1999A, 29-30), the state's perception that Megawati was a threat was based upon several reasons. First, Megawati and the PDI capitalized on the close affinity of Soekarno's figure to attract PDI's traditional political base, especially the PNI masses who had made the switch to Golkar. Second, the 1987 and the 1992 general elections, where the PDI increased its votes by 66 % and 40 %, respectively, had shown that the party had the potential to grow and hence rendered Megawati as the value addition to the competitive advantage held by PDI during Soerjadi. And third, the general election of 1997 was determined mostly by young voters with some voting for the first time. Hence, Megawati was positioned to attract these young voters.

The culmination of Mega's ouster was the violence that resulted when followers from Soerjadi's PDI faction raided Mega's PDI office on 27 July 1996. Between 5 people (government's version) to 23 people (Indonesian Commission on Human Rights' version) were killed and 146 people were injured. From the political psychological aspect of things, such an incident was quite expensive in terms of the loss of trust in

formal political institutions, accumulated riot-prone anger, and collective discontentment (Kaisiepo 1999, 122). Megawati insisted that her followers should avoid violence, though it seems that such proscription was neglected (Ida 1999A, 139).

The way Megawati responded to this incident and to how she chose to pursue the legal means of redress to her toppling from the PDI leadership propelled her on the political stage. Her constituents were no longer limited to the traditional groups of nationalists, *abangan* (moderate Muslims) and non-Muslims. People who would otherwise have ignored politics became interested in it. They expressed sorrow and sympathy towards the plight of Megawati. It also helped that the media took a disproportionate amount of interest in her given her propensity to not speak to journalists. Media coverage on Megawati was widespread ranging from pictures on the cover of magazines and tabloids to articles in serious newspapers.

Then a crucial step was taken in light of the 1997 Parliamentary general elections. The government did not recognize Megawati as the chairperson of PDI nor her cadres as members of PDI. Consequently, Megawati and fellow candidates were not allowed to run for election. Only Soerjadi's candidates were allowed to be placed on the ballot.

Hence, on 22 May 1997 Megawati told a thousand supporters that she would use her right to not vote in the elections and urged others not to do so as well. She reasoned 'what is the use of a victory if the virtues of honesty, sincerity, feeling of security, peace, and the light beaming the aspirations of the people do not shine like the morning sun over the sky of this nation?' (Sumarno 2002, 30).

The strategy worked. PDI fared terribly, winning only 3 % of the votes and only 11 seats in Parliament compared to 11 % in 1987 and 15 % in 1992.

The nomination of Megawati and Amien Rais to the presidency faltered, however, as the members of the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) in its General Assembly of 1998 re-elected President Suharto into his seventh term in office.

A few months thereafter, amidst the riots and ensuing violence President Suharto resigned and his successor President Bacharuddin Habibie welcomed the participation of all segments of society into politics by allowing them to establish political parties pursuant to their own ideologies.

Such an opportunity was capitalized on by Megawati's supporters. On 8-10 October 1998 at the Fifth Congress of the PDI in Bali, Megawati was reinstated as PDI chairperson. However, a more important

congressional decision was also taken. PDI was to strive for the nomination of Megawati Soekarnoputri as the Presidential Candidate during the General Elections of 1999 and the General Assembly of the People's Consultative Assembly, Indonesia's highest legislative body that appoints the President and the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia.

To separate herself from the unpleasant history of the party, on 14 February 1999 at the Senayan Stadium Megawati proclaimed the establishment of a new party, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* or PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle). Pursuant to the consistency of symbolism of the basis of the party, PDIP embraced the symbol of a bull but this time a raging bull with heftier body mass with saliva foam around his snout. Notice the resemblance to Soekarno's symbol of the bull in depicting *machtsvorming* (accumulation of strength). It was this symbol of the fiery bull that was to be widely seen throughout the archipelago in the upcoming months of the general electoral campaigns.

2.8 Megawati as a Politician

Below, a cursory treatment is provided of Megawati's characteristics as a politician. One can see that these attributes were carried over by Megawati when she asssumed the Office of the President of the Republic of Indonesia.

Megawati achieved what no other political party leader ever could during the New Order. She held a formal political position as a legitimate party chairperson, obtained grassroots political support, and became the symbol of the struggle of the people (Fatah 1999B, 96-97). She was the figure in which people placed their political hopes and aspirations. Megawati was able to continue to feed on the people's aspirations by acting as a solidarity maker among the various groupings, ie laborers, farmers, and peasants, much like President Soekarno (Syamsuddin 1999, 9). Moreover, Megawati also attempted to project the image that she is the symbol of the political morality that was non-existent at the time (Fatah 1999B, 98).

Megawati was regarded as the *Ratu Adil* (The Just and Wise Queen) in which the masses rest their hopes for social change, economic and political improvements, and justice by the law (Ida 1999B, 102). The very existence of this concept of the *Ratu Adil* is intriguing considering the country concerned is modern Indonesia and the world's third largest

democracy. Based on an ancient legend that one day such a figure would appear out of nowhere (her imminent rise to national prominence would not have been predictable) to rule over the archipelago in justice and wisdom, the conception of *Ratu Adil* encouraged potential presidential candidates or hopefuls to constantly parade their own personal characteristics and histories as to show to voters the parallel between them and the traits of *Ratu Adil*.

Perhaps the comparison of Megawati to The Just and Wise Queen is because it is rare for a political elite to uphold their principle as Megawati did, for elites usually convey heroic rhetoric without the willingness to sacrifice their strategic positions in economic and political power, especially in terms of legislative seats (Ida 1999B, 104).

Megawati was often dismissed as a mere symbol. Noted journalist Goenawan Muhammad went further in saying that 'suppose she is not the daughter of Bung Karno, she wouldn't be anyone at all, only a housewife with simple thoughts' (McIntyre 1997, 2). Megawati's younger brother Guruh explained in *Forum Keadilan* (15 July 1996, 15) that:

> It's like this, according to my intuition, the Indonesian people still love Bung Karno. But because Bung Karno is already deceased, the people will instinctively support a leader who symbolizes the spirit of Bung Karno, and in this case that is Mbak Mega (McIntyre 1997, 2).

To appreciate the kind of energy derived from the symbolism of Soekarno, Margot Cohen in the *Far Eastern Economic* Review (24 October 1991) described the pervasiveness of President Soekarno's fan appeal even to this day:

> In opinion polls and press interviews, high school and college students talk of the former president's charisma, his bold revolutionary stance, his riveting speeches and the "freedom" he afforded to various political parties … In Blitar, the East Java site of Soekarno's tomb, the former president shares superhero status on T-shirts also printed with Batman. Students surreptitiously trade old recordings of his speeches and look for old textbooks describing his exploits (McIntyre 1997, 8).

A noted Indonesianist, Jeffrey Winters saw during the PDI Congress in Bali in 1998 how the people celebrated Soekarno, going around town with posters of Bung Karno and at times larger than those of Megawati (Sumarno 2002, 39). Winters posited that such a phenomenon cannot be separated by the process of romanticism and nostalgia. Winters elaborated:

> People tend to do that. They always remember the good things and forget

> the bad sides of a person (Sumarno 2002, 39).

Comparing the charisma of Soekarno with the phenomenon of John F. Kennedy in the United States, Winters explained:

> Though I was not born at the time, but if someone were to mention Kennedy, I would feel an aura or something. But if George Washington was mentioned, I would feel nothing (Sumarno 2002, 39).

Benedict Anderson suggested that it is also Megawati's gender that boosted her to leadership:

> … it has to be remembered that Megawati is a girl. And those who are led by old boys become dazed in facing such a woman. They are not used to it as can be seen with the success of Cory Aquino, Aung San Suu Kyi, Benazir Bhutto. They all make their opponents dizzy. This is because a woman can also symbolize purity as she is not the family head, nor a gang leader, nor the head of a conglomerate, nor a general and so on. If for example it had been Guntur [Megawati's older brother] or whoever else that may have appeared as the representative of Bung Karno's spirit, they would not have been as successful as Megawati, that is the important thing (McIntyre 1997, 2).

However, Soekarno instilled into his daughters that gender does not matter in leadership. Soekarno painted a world where matriarchy once governed the lands of the archipelago:

> … in former times before the Dutch came here, we had a large number of female village heads … and leaving aside female village heads, we had queens and female heroes at that time. Up until the beginning of the twentieth century, before South Sulawesi was colonized by the Dutch, for example, … there were still female monarchs. For example, the monarch from Tanete … [who] was a woman … [In] places where there were no Dutch, we still had female monarchs. And especially female heroes. Tjut Nja' Din, a woman from Atjeh. Tjut Mutia, a woman from Aceh. Ratu Wandansari, a woman from East Java. Women, all of them women (Soekarno 1964B, 9).

The argument is that if the Soekarno legacy and being a woman were the determining factors, then why are Megawati's younger sisters Rachmawati and Sukmawati not posed for leadership as well? After all, both are articulate and proud defenders of their father.

Rachmawati wanted to follow her father's example and remain above party loyalties as had been agreed upon by all of Soekarno's children in 1982. Rachmawati believed in perpetuating Soekarno's teachings but not through association with PDI. Rachmawati's views was that she felt

‘nervous if [she] ha[sn’t] carried out the request of [her] late father to perpetuate his teachings’ (McIntyre 1997, 9).

Articulate as well, Sukmawati also wanted to perpetuate Soekarno’s teachings. Not content with PDI’s capacity to carry on those teachings, Sukmawati became active in the Marhaen People’s Movement, an organization established in 1981 by former leaders of the then defunct Indonesian Nationalist Party.

However, what differentiated Megawati from her siblings was her ability to symbolize not only her father and the virtue of purity but also her socially desirable qualities such as decency (McIntyre 1997, 2). People who knew her since childhood described her as having maternal qualities and a stoical disposition (McIntyre 1997, 4). Amien Rais noted that Megawati is lucky to make the most out of what she has naturally been given, and that is as the eldest daughter of Soekarno and as a young politician who is motherly and down to earth (Sumarno 2002, 20-21).

Perhaps the more forceful reason is ironically ingrained in her silence and silent suffering at the hands of the ruling government (McIntyre 1997, 3). Megawati was seen by her supporters as a symbol of courage and of the struggle against the governing power (Sumarno 2002, 24).

Riswandha Imawan believed that the more the government tried to get rid of Megawati, the stronger she became. Had the government at the beginning not attempted to hamper her as much, she may not have been the political phenomenon that she was at the time (Sumarno 2002, 28-29). The now defunct weekly magazine *Asiaweek* argued that ‘the irony [was that] these attacks help perpetuate Megawati’s status as a quiet victim, which only enlarge[d] her appeal to the masses’ (Sumarno 2002, 61).

According to J.A.Denny (1999, 154), the only weakness that Megawati needed to correct was her strength in conceptualizing for in an era of transparent democracy, the possession or lack of such competency can be easily evaluated. Denny argued that it is understandable given that Megawati did not grow up in a tradition of great ideas and intellectual debates.

Her often displayed silence consequently led to the public perception that she lacked the aptitude for great thought. However, this does not seem to be the case.

Responding to critics, Megawati retorted that ‘silence does not mean not thinking’ (McIntyre 1997, 11). Emphasizing the point that there are already too many people talking, Megawati believed that remaining silent in itself is a form of political stance. She uttered:

> I would like to show my concrete stance for the love of my country by remaining silent. However, people started asking, how strange? Little do they know that being silent is a political action in itself (Sumarno 2002,

81). [9]

And at the 26th Anniversary celebration of PDI Perjuangan in Surabaya on 7 March 1999, Megawati further justified her stance:

> These past weeks I chose to remain quiet. This stance is carried out with full intent, because the challenges before us are gigantic and phenomenal. The problems that we face require answers which require reflection, calmness, and clarity of solution. I ask all PDI Perjuangan cadres to understand such position of silence. Force me not to simply speak without meaning and without evidence (Sumarno 2002, 81).

Megawati offered a counterattack to those who attack her stance of silence:

> They speak for whom? If for the people why are there so many of them speaking? This will just confuse the people especially if it is done merely to speak out without giving solutions to the problems that society faces (Sumarno 2002, 82).

Megawati's close comrade in arms at the time from the Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim association in Indonesia, K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, whom she would later succeed as president, attempted to sway critics in explaining that:

> [Megawati] expresses her protest in a silent way; she doesn't say things easily. She's a leader and she leads by not doing anything. That she is not being coopted by the government, that is enough (McIntyre 1997, 15).[10]

Wahid was supported by Laksamana Sukardi, the then treasurer of PDI in believing that 'having the courage to say 'No' is the only requirement for a PDI leader' (McIntyre 1997, 15 footnote 7) One of her main backers in the party and the chief facilitator of her presidential nomination, Aberson Marle Sihaloho, staked his reputation by saying (in translation) that: 'she is strong; she's the only female with guts' (McIntyre 1997, 16). [11]

Her personal traits aside, other analysts, however, argued against the underlying permeation of Soekarnoism in Megawati Soekarnoputri as a

[9] Megawati's comments when she opened the seminar "The Development of the Nation," at the PDI Regional Leadership Council North Sumatra in the city of Medan, 2 March 1999.

[10] Abdurrahman Wahid's interview by Diane Martin on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's *Indian Pacific* radio program, 26 October 1996.

[11] *Forum Keadilan*, 12 February 1996, 100. The original Indonesian is 'Dia orang kuat. Inilah satu-satunya betina yang jantan,' McIntyre's translation: 'she is a strong person; she would be one female with virile courage.'

person, and not as a symbol of the manifestations of many people's aspirations in bringing Soekarnoism back into life. Anwar (2006, interview with author) observed that Megawati is more practical than ideological, and hence is an ideological son of Suharto rather than of Soekarno. And in some issues, such as when giving a warm reception to President Bush in Bali after the US attacks on Afghanistan, there was a possibility that Megawati did not even think deep enough about the implications of her decisions; this neglect could be caused by Megawati's style of governing in that she was not a hands-on type of president (Anwar 2006, interview with author). Sukma (2006, interview with author) supports this observation, saying that he did not believe that Megawati subscribes to the nationalism espoused by her father Soekarno. Both of Megawati's sisters, Rahmawati and Sukmawati, alleged that Megawati has veered off Soekarno's teachings while her assistants say that Megawati did not subscribe to nationalism and Soekarnoism at all. Sukma (2006, interview with author) observed that Megawati's governing style was determined and influenced more by the real situation and less so by Soekarnoism. But Sukma attributed this phenomenon to the domestic political environment including the fact that Parliament was '*very very* assertive,' while also the bureaucracy was 'very assertive,' and given that the Indonesian political structure post-*Reformasi* is such that no one person can dominate the political scene, Megawati's decisions were forged by the political realities that constituted constraints on the policies that she can advance.

Despite the various personal observations providing evidence of both Megawati as a disciple of Soekarnoism and Megawati as a pragmatist, the important barometer is whether or not Soekarnoism is reflected in the foreign policy of the Megawati government. This question shall be considered in later chapters when we analyse the foreign policy cases.

2.9 Megawati's Rise to the Presidency of the Republic of Indonesia

In the 1999 General Elections, Megawati's PDI Perjuangan won the highest number of votes among the 48 participating political parties. PDI Perjuangan captured 34 % of the votes or 153 seats in Parliament, effectively relegating the long-time majority leader Golongan Karya (Golkar) Party to an unprecedented second place. Expectations were understandably high that it was simply a matter of time before she would assume the Presidency. However, it should not be forgotten that in the political system of Indonesia at the time, before its amendment, winning

the General Elections and the MPR General Assembly were two different things. General Elections were the means to send party members to the Parliament (and consequently MPR). Members of MPR would then elect the president and the vice president during the General Assembly in October 1999. PDI Perjuangan had a simple majority (plurality) of votes, but not a single majority. This meant that Mega had to jockey for coalitions within Parliament. She refused to do this.

When elections were called in the MPR in October 1999, PDI Perjuangan failed to elevateMegawati to the presidency. She was defeated by K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid was surprisingly put forward by his rival Amien Rais considering that Wahid was the most palatable candidate for both Megawati and President Habibie, the two leading contenders for the presidency. Not only did PDI Perjuangan fail to obtain the presidency, but it also failed to deliver other party favorites such as Matori Abdul Djalil of Wahid's *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PKB (National Reawakening Party) to become the Chairman of MPR and Sutardjo Surjoguritno of PDI Perjuangan to become the Chairman of DPR. The Reform Faction in Parliament (later known as *Poros Tengah* or Middle Axis Coalition) used by Wahid enabled Amien Rais of *Partai Amanat Nasional* or PAN (National Mandate Party) to become Chairman of MPR and Akbar Tanjung of GOLKAR to become Speaker of Parliament.

The next day, 22 October 1999, the MPR chose between Megawati and Hamzah Haz of *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP (United Development Party), the largest party in the Middle Axis Coalition. Given that Wahid wanted Megawati to be his vice president and that Wahid's Middle Axis Coalition had just won the presidency, the MPR decided to elect Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia.

The tenure of President Abdurrahman Wahid was short, full of controversy, and colored by the *Buloggate and Bruneigate* scandals (which are beyond the scope of this study). Wahid's policies and behavior combined with the prevailing political atmosphere enabled Parliament to issue the First Memorandum, the Second Memorandum, and eventually a recommendation to the MPR to hold a General Assembly for the purpose of seeking accountability from President Wahid.

President Wahid's accountability as President was rejected *in absentia* by the MPR at its General Assembly on 23 July 2001. Wahid's mandate to the MPR as President was terminated and Megawati Soekarnoputri became the fifth President of the Republic of Indonesia.

Megawati was able to complete her entire term in office as President of Indonesia. This can be attributed to two developments. The first, is the

domestic political environment that resulted resulted after the sacking of President Abdurrahman Wahid as recounted by his brother, Salahuddin Wahid (2006, interview with author):

> After Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid] fell there was not a single political party that wanted to sack Mega[wati]. It was so unhealthy for our nation if just having elected a new president and we would change the president immediately again, especially since the laws on direct presidential elections have been passed. This would mean that all party leadership would have a chance at the presidency. The battle is to be fought in 2004. So there was no [efforts made to provide instability to Megawati's presidency].

The second reason was the constitutional amendments undertaken after President Megawati's rise to power. Though discussion of these amendments shall be made in the next chapter, an impression of the heatedness of the political environment can be made from Salahuddin Wahid (2006, interview with author):

> So it has since been difficult to remove the President from office. Almost impossible! This is different from the year 2001. In 2001 we had a pseudo-presidential system whereas the President can easily be removed from office by the MPR, right? From a constitutional viewpoint, during that time it was possible. However, now it's practically impossible. Theoretically it's possible, but practically it's not. So what is there [for current Presidents] to be afraid of?

2.10 Megawati's Beliefs Sets and Soekarnoism

Megawati's political thoughts are very similar to those of her father. There is an underlying similarity on the issues of humanity, justice, and defending the people, especially the proletariats.

When Megawati was only eighteen months old, President Soekarno had already begun to infuse her with his concepts. In getting ahead of himself, he whispered into Megawati's ear:

> Don't look favorably on a marriage proposal from a young man without ideals. [Since] the youths here who do not have ideals, you have no chance [for a good marriage here] (McIntyre 1997, 3).

Megawati admitted that she learned a lot from her father, especially on politics and nationalism. Responding whether she had indeed learned politics since she was a child, Megawati replied:

> My life has been a capitalization of my existing political instincts… because I studied Bung Karno not only as a president but as a leader of the nation as well (Bahar 1996, 34).

Megawati spoke of the times when her father would share with her any developments that needed to be understood (Sumarno 2002, 8). After having meetings with members of his cabinet, the head of the army, and others, Soekarno gave commentaries to his children on the problems at hand. And should any national or international events occur warrant the President's attention, Soekarno would take the time and effort to explain them also to his children.

A confidante of Megawati, Kwik Kian Gie, confirmed the story as he believed that she absorbed many of the deep philosophical thoughts of her father and his ministers regarding the affairs of the state. Such thoughts were often instilled when President Soekarno held his frequent 'Open House' sessions on the veranda in the back garden of the Presidential Palace (Sumarno 2002, 83).

In the 1950's President Soekarno would take Megawati along to meet Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India whose daughter, Indira Gandhi, later became Prime Minister. Megawati had her picture taken with Nehru's grandchildren, among them Rajiv Gandhi, who also later became Prime Minister.

In 1961 during the Non-Block Summit in Belgrade in the former Yugoslavia, a 14 year-old Megawati was being introduced to world leaders. And interacting she did. Given such an early exposure to the world of statecraft, it is no wonder that her political competency had reached maturity by the time she jumped into politics (Sumarno 2002, 8).

Beside learning from President Soekarno, Megawati's experiences while travelling to the regions and learning from her seniors in political life forged a solid education for Megawati (Bahar 1996, 34-35).

Megawati is firm on achieving true independence. Reminiscent of Soekarno's idea of developing the 'total man,' Megawati argued that:

> It is not enough for physical development to occur… what is not less important is the development of the spirit and the state of existence for a nation that is sovereign and self-sufficient (Soekarnoputri 1993, 41).

Megawati then elaborated on the crucial factor of national and character building as to ensure that 'the nation is truly independent, sovereign, and self-sufficient, and not to become a 'copy nation' (Soekarno's term) whereby everything is dictated from outside or a strong country' (Soekarnoputri 1993, 41).

The goal was to get across the pillars of the ‘golden bridge’ (Soekarno’s term) towards a society that is just and prosperous under Panca Sila (Soekarnoputri 1993, 39). And for this to occur, the priority should be on human investment (Soekarnoputri 1993, 43), again a recurring theme in Soekarno’s rhetoric.

The ideas embraced by Megawati are clearly in line with those of her father Soekarno. However, what strikes as odd was when asked about the possibility of rejuvenating Soekarnoism, her reply was:

> Don’t worry about Soekarnoism! I view myself as Megawati, with all the strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, I must not necessarily be identical to Bung Karno. He was a figure in his time (Bahar 1996, 51).

Bahar (1996, 71) found that in a survey conducted by *Editor* Magazine (9 December 1993, 25), among the reasons that people would vote for Megawati was their hope that Megawati could reunite the party (34%) and change the current social condition as to favor the proletariats (45%). Only 4.5% of those surveyed would elect Megawati because they wanted Soekarno’s teachings to be rekindled.

What was ironic was the fact that their primary expectation of what Megawati would becapable of achieving was based precisely on the teachings of Soekarno (Marhaenism). Those surveyed did not understand that their desires for social change have their bases deeply ingrained in Marhaenism.

Megawati’s response can be understood given that popularizing Soekarnoism again could be construed as reviving Marxism back in Indonesia (Bahar 1996, 52). Marxism is feared and its teachings are made illegal in Indonesia.

Even Guruh Soekarnoputra, the youngest Soekarno children, cannot seem but wonder:

> What is to be feared from Soekarnoism? For me, [President Soekarno] was a true and perpetual embracer of Panca Sila. So it seems the reasons to put Megawati at bay were far fetched. If they are hampering her because we are the sons and daughters of Bung Karno, then that is truly naïve. What is the meaning of giving honors for my father as the heroic proclaimer of independence? Why honor him (after his death) if they indeed fear him? (Bahar 1996, 92)

However, it seems that Megawati tried to convince people of that she ought to be judged by her own merits and not as someone who simply bandwagons on the reputation of her father. She elaborated:

> Oh, let them speak about me. Who is actually irrational and has lost

> his/her mind? If charisma were to be my sole strength, would the millions of people supporting continue to do so? They support me because they can think, they can choose on their own, even when they face a risk that is not small. That is a decision that is rational and dynamic. What is not rational is when someone expects change and improvement simply by virtue of a hope for pity (Sumarno 2002, 41).

Despite efforts to distance herself from Soekarnoism, some people of prominence think otherwise. Nurcholis Madjid and Frans Hendra Winata from the Legal Aid Society thought that Megawati still embraced the thought framework of Soekarnoism and that of the military (Sumarno 2002, 57) in a meeting of prominent leaders of non-governmental organizations with former U.S. president Jimmy Carter from the Carter Center. Such a view was attributed to Megawati's rejection of Dwi Fungsi ABRI (dual societal role of the military), of amendments to the Constitution of 1945, and of her rejection of reassessing the structure of the state as to even out the distribution of relations between Jakarta and the regions.

Megawati outlined her strategic economic vision in her party leadership reinstatement speech on 8 October 1998 in Bali. Her vision can be seen as similar to the policy known in Latin America as New Populism, in great contrast to Classical Populism.

New Populism entails aspirations for the growth of both political and economic society that leans towards the people. Such policy is driven by the political elite with the best interest of the proletariat in mind. The target beneficiary of the policy consists of laborers, farmers, villagers, and other proletariats. When the welfare of the proletariats is ensured, the elite can prosper with the growth of the society.

Classical Populism involves nationalistic economic policies and major role of the state in the welfare of the people. The state is active in the economy, giving subsidies and special privileges to small and medium enterprises. The state also protects the domestic economy from foreign products and capital.

On the other hand, New Populism adopts a liberal economic perspective that was once held in contempt by the populists. However, such 'New' Populism stems in fact from the experiences of when populist leaders were in power in Latin America during the 1980's. These leaders, who became heads of state, included Carlos Menem of Argentina, Carlos Salinas of Mexico, and Alberto Fujimori of Peru. Through experience, these leaders found that major government involvement in the economy and protectionism complicated matters; things were prone to corruption and high transaction costs while not enabling the economy to compete internationally (Denny J.A. 1999, 151).

Moreover, being the daughter of Soekarno, Megawati realized that there must be some rhetoric which must counter the domination by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Sudarsono 2006, interview with author). In essence, Megawati was able to merge nationalist idealism with fiscal reality when, upon recommendations by Finance Minister Budiono and Minister and Chairman of the National Development Board Kwik Kian Gie, she decided that Indonesia no longer needed the assistance of the IMF; what was at stake at the time was a blend of the realities involving both nationalism and issues of economic sovereignty, budget decision making, and the economic guidelines imposed by the IMF (Sudarsono 2006, interview with author). Indonesia immediately repaid all outstanding debt and ended the program despite a standing offer from the IMF to continue with various programs (Djumala 2006, interview with author). Sudarsono (2006, interview with author) deemed such a balancing act was a necessity given the temptation of national populism in providing large subsidies for populist programs though he warned that:

> At a certain point a leader can no longer do this due to budget inadequacy. When one puts too much money in populist programs that do not repay the investment, the ramifications will be disastrous. Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can afford to do so because they have petrodollars. Plenty of them. Cuba as well. So their rhetoric is populist. They provide subsidies. At some point, they will face a problem of budget discipline. At the present time, however, doing so is understandable.

Though not a part of the cases to be analyzed in later chapters, President Megawati's decision to terminate Indonesia's involvement in an IMF sponsored economic revitalization program was a show of force to the world that in spite of having to engage in an economic recovery through a difficult road by virtue of the loss of IMF funds, Indonesia was able to stand on its own and to attempt to become self-sufficient. This decision drew parallels with the tenets of Soekarnoism in celebrating the virtues of becoming self-sufficient rather than complacent and dependent on another country.

Given the economic situation at the time, such a decision was surely difficult for President Megawati (as it would haven been for any president of Indonesia at the time), as explained by Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono (2006, interview with author) who held prior cabinet appointments in the fields of education and the environment:

> The United States provides a substantial amount of funds in terms of contributions to the IMF and the World Bank. And both the World Bank's office and the IMF representation office here are determined largely by the

> policy of Washington. So if [Megawati] did not want to balance the budget on the terms imposed by the IMF and the World Bank she will face difficulties. That is the new realities that she faces.

Throughout Megawati's speech, the word 'people' as in *rakyat* (proletariat) was mentioned more than sixty times (Denny J.A. 1999, 151). Assessment of the following excerpts yields an initial impression that Megawati differs from Soekarno in terms of their economic outlooks:

> If under the pressure of the wave of globalization, our economic system must establish an open-market economy, so as a confident nation, we must not be anxious and feel fear. We must win our economic rights without causing distortion to the market economy itself (Denny J.A. 1999, 151).

Megawati continued:

> Therefore, the fears shared by many of the practice of neo-colonialism manifesting through the gates of open markets must not be heeded for such fears will only make us into a nation of weaklings and into those who cannot face reality (Denny J.A. 1999, 151).

However, closer analysis of this view yields that her view on economic policy were indeed aligned with those of Soekarno. Despite the open markets connotation which alluded to capitalism, the driving rationale was the pursuit of welfare for the proletariats.

Business practices during the era of President Suharto entailed elements of the now famous acronym KKN, which stands for *Korupsi Kolusi Nepotisme* (corruption collusion nepotism).

Megawati was adamant in fighting such practices from the start. She believed that 'corruption is a cancer that robs the interests of the many … and that is why a clean and effective government is urgently needed' (Soekarnoputri 1993, 20).

It has been suggested that the receptive stance towards establishing open markets may be attributed to the pressure of *Reformasi* for Megawati to create a business environment that is open and non-KKN based. If one equates Megawati's advocacy of open markets with her advocacy of capitalism, then such a notion is clearly mistaken for capitalism goes against her principles. She expounded that:

> [Indonesia] can never again accept a system or order of society that embraces colonialism, feudalism, communism, and capitalism… from the history of the struggle of the Indonesian nation for four decades since independence it has been proven that all of these systems only impoverish the people and nation of Indonesia (Soekarnoputri 1993, 21).

Megawati clearly underlined the need to put the interests of the people as a first priority. She explained that her fellow countrymen are not only physically hungry but mentally hungry as well. She advocated that to fulfill the latter human rights must be upheld, sufficient education be provided, legal protection be ensured, and the freedom to worship be respected. Megawati emphasized the need to ensure that these imperatives are indeed enacted for the *wong cilik* (little people), such as farmers, laborers, fishermen, and others who are weak economically (Soekarnoputri 1993, 18). Her goal was to struggle so that the '*wong cilik* (little people) can smile, and smile happily' (Soekarnoputri 1993, 22). As a note in reference to the terminology used by Soekarno, the term *wong cilik* is actually a Javanese term for what Soekarno calls *Marhaen.*

2.11 The Goals of Indonesian Foreign Policy

Given that the helm of foreign policy making during Megawati's presidency lay within the Department of Foreign Affairs, it is worthwhile to note which policies the department was expected to enact and implement. The mandate given to the Department of Foreign Affairs was to restore Indonesia's international image, help boost the economy and public welfare, help strengthen national unity, stability and integrity, and preserve the nation's sovereignty. Furthermore, the department was mandated to develop bilateral relations, particularly with countries that are able to boost Indonesia's trade and investment and facilitate economic recovery, and to promote international cooperation that helps to build and maintain world peace. [12]

It became apparent that the foreign policy advocated by Megawati's government was shared by the Indonesian foreign policy elite encouraging a focus on the recovery from the economic, financial, and political crisis in 1997-1998. Or rather, the objectives of Indonesian foreign policy were set according to the needs that arose from the crisis. Though diplomacy was to help in Indonesia's economic recovery, its first priority that arose from the crisis was to forestall the threat of territorial disintegration whereby Indonesia worked with her allies in getting support from all nations towards its territorial integrity, including Aceh and West Papua, and its national sovereignty (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author).

[12] Directorate of Public Diplomacy, Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, www.deplu.go.id

Bandoro (2002, 349) added that the objective of Megawati's foreign policy was to improve the position and reputation of Indonesia in international relations and to instill a national sense of the importance of having stable international relations, especially in expediting national economic recovery. He added that a difficult challenge of her administration was to rebuild Indonesian diplomacy and make itmore prominent, effective, credible, and coherent, and to make the management of foreign policy more transparent. He argued that foreign policy was directly related to national pride, position, and the national role in world politics. Bandoro further argued for the necessity to ensure sensitivity to national sentiment, and that foreign policy was commensurate in importance as domestic policy. He continued that without such an acknowledgement, the agenda, priority, and reputation towards the government's credentials in foreign policy would have been meaningless.

While Bandoro advocated the imposition of Indonesian interests upon the world, other analysts argued that Indonesia should capitalize on what was available in the world to use for the benefit of the country. Sukma (2005, 87) believed that the primary interest of Indonesian foreign policy was to maximize the use of the resources in the international community for the sake of political and economic consolidation within the nation. Fifi (2002, 392) argued that foreign policy must affect international sentiments to become positive towards Indonesia. Meanwhile, Andrea (2002, 409) believed that the implementation of Indonesia foreign policy and diplomacy must be channeled to increase and ensure the cooperation and support of friendly nations and international financial agencies such as the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and others.

Former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (2000, 8) believed that the central challenge of Indonesian diplomacy was to instigate through the international community the rapid recovery from the 1997 financial and economic crisis and to have instituted collective measures to prevent such an occurrence. He believed that the test of Indonesian diplomacy was whether it could achieve that international money markets are regulated would become more transparent and predictable, and whether the international community would be able to address the challenge of 'harness[ing] the tremendous force of globalization and enlist[ing] it in the fight against poverty and for equitable economic progress in the world' (Alatas 2000, 9). According to Alatas (2000, 11-13) success in meeting global challenges depended on how Indonesian diplomacy could accomplish the following national goals to recover and restructure the economy after the 1997 crisis, to safeguard the unity and territorial integrity of the republic, to restore and maintain political stability and

social order, and to deal with the East Timor issue.

The person actually in power at the time, however, believed that such high expectations out of foreign policy in solving all the ills of Indonesia resulting from the crisis was out of proportions. Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) explained that:

> There were expectations that foreign policy can solve the various problems [Indonesia] faced caused by the [socio-economic] crisis. Those expectations were unrealistic. As if foreign policy is expected to magically transform hardships into achivements. [Foreign policy] cannot do that. Not to mention that due to the crisis Indonesia's foreign policy capabilities and resources have become limited. The situation was different from the time during the era of President Suharto with the successes stemming from Indonesia's economic development.

Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) believed that while foreign policy must be used to help Indonesia recover from the crisis, a majority of the actions that must be undertaken were found inside the country; only when domestic progress had been slow and new difficulties arose domestically that attention had instead unrealistically shifted to foreign policy as the bringer of hope.

Moreover, Anwar (2006, interview with author) argued that two fundamental issues constrain the room for maneuver of any Indonesian president. One is the unwillingness to establish a diplomatic relationship with Israel until the issue of Palestine is settled, and, second the need to maintain non-alignment, which means that Indonesia must not ally with only one power. These two issues are enshrined in Indonesian foreign policy tenets, and no Indonesian president will be allowed by domestic constituents to go beyond those (Anwar 2006, interview with author). Any government that goes against these conventional wisdoms would experience a direct backlash from domestic forces.

Indonesia will not have diplomatic relations with Israel, despite the fact that many Arab nations develop relations with Israel unless the Palestinian issue is resolved because Indonesia regards the issue as an issue of illegal occupation. This can be likened to a case of an oppression *of man by man*, Soekarno's reverberating message. So when President Abdurrahman Wahid wanted to visit Israel or entertained the notion of developing direct contacts between Indonesia and Israel, a massive backlash from Muslim activists occurred.

The same reaction could be expected if a government breached non-alignment. During the Sukiman government in the 1950s, a government fell when it was discovered that it had signed a secret treaty establishing a security pact with the United States of America.

There are, in fact, three fundamental issues that constrain any Indonesian president. The third issue is territorial integrity. Sukma (2006, interview with author) analyzed that:

> Indonesia is one of the most highly nationalistic nations when it comes to territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity. [This is attributed to] our struggle [for independence], and also because we know that it is the weakest point of Indonesia at the moment. The threat is real and is right in front of our very eyes. This [circumstances] explains why everyone is quite sensitive on this issue.

In retrospect, it can be inferred that the foreign policy influenced by Soekarno's outward looking trends was constrained by the need to consolidate and place the country on the road to recovery. And while such elements of national power may be out of fashion in light of the emphasis on multilateral initiatives and on conference diplomacy, they still constitute the leverage by which to restore credibility to Indonesia's foreign policy after the crisis of 1998. As illustrated by Lt. Gen. (retired) Agus Widjojo (2006, interview with author):

> Actually, there is nothing new. It's just a question of how capable we are of building competitive advantages within our nation and within our interactions with other nations. Once we do this we will be heard. However, we are still in the strategic phase of transitional democracy. And this phase is encapsulated within the foreign policy framework of Indonesia that strives to restore credibility in building momentum by capitalizing on future opportunities.

2.12 Elements of Soekarnoism in Foreign Policy Formulation

In line with her belief in the need of developing the 'total man,' Megawati placed much emphasis on the protection of sovereignty and national self-sufficiency. Foreign policy under this tenet was to ensure that no outside forces interfere in the affairs of the state, and priority was put on the pursuit of policies that invested in human resources to enable the country to cross the 'pillars of the Golden Bridge into prosperity under Pancasila.' Megawati embraced a foreign economic policy that placed the interests of the proletariats above all others. Despite being friendly to open markets, she insisted that priority remained on the *marhaens*. Such a stance rendered the conclusion that Megawati was a structuralist in international politics in that she basically saw the world as divided between those that are prosperous, strong, and self-sufficient and

those that are poor, weak, and dependent on others. Soekarnoism propelled Megawati to push for Indonesia to become the first while aiding to the cause of the latter.

She was constantly aware of the class struggles between the weak and the strong in world affairs, and attempted to pursue policies that tried to mitigate the existing discrepancies stemming from such a world structure. Megawati's personal hardships early in life, her political oppression from rightfully assuming the position of chairperson of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), and her internalization of the principles taught by Soekarno (whereby a person must strive for idealism and one ought to pursue a policy of *machtvorming* should one be oppressed); all of these factors have no doubt moulded Megawati's tendencies when it came to foreign policy. Megawati's foreign policy aspirations were based upon the three pillars of Soekarno's teachings, as summarized by S Wahid (2006, interview with author) as self sufficiency in the economic field, a foreign policy that is Free and Active, and independence in culture.

However, President Megawati also realized that blindly embracing Soekarnoism is not as option that she, as both the head of state and the head of government, could afford. As scrutinized by former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (2006, interview with author):

> It was clear that [President] Mega[wati] is very much influenced by her father's policies … her father's heritage, Soekarnoism. But she realized from the very beginning that the Soekarnoism as practiced by [former President] Soekarno, that was wanted by Rahmawati and another sister [Sukmawati], was impossible in the current world. [Megawati] ran against it. I know from a distance she had a clash with her sister because … her sister was thinking, wrongly I think, that Soekarnoism can be practiced again just like the era of Soekarno. The world has changed. And Indonesia cannot do it anymore. [At the time] the whole world was doing like that, but now not anymore. She knew that Soekarnoism, yes she wanted to oblige, but she knew the limitations. However, within the context of the limitations she did the few things which really made her administration different from the previous one [President Wahid's].

Such observation was supported by Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono (2006, interview with author):

> [Megawati] realizes that the rest of Soekarnoism of the past has to be adapted to the current situation. The core belief about nationalism must be combined with the new realities … [that are] different from 30-40 years ago.

Sudarsono (2006, interview with author) espoused that the revised Soekarnoist nationalism must take into context the new realities of global

and regional politics, and the new Indonesia where many young citizens grew up in totally different circumstances.

Deputy Minister for the Coordination of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs who is responsible for Foreign Affairs[13], Albert Matondang (2006, interview with author), also described the pervasiveness of this kind of an adapted nationalist ideology in Indonesian foreign policy:

> There are various calculations that were made by the Department of Foreign Affairs. And based on our national interest as well. It's not possible for us to embrace the approach of President Soekarno like that in the past, such as 'Go to hell with your aid,' etc. In the past we could but in the present we need to marry nationalism with our national interest. During the era of Soekarno what we did was fitting for that era. I know that among Members of Parliament such a longing for that era persists. Among the government community such longing is also present. But it's not possible for us to embrace the approaches of the past ... in the past during the era of President Soekarno there was much more political nuances. We must calculate the ramifications of being at a crossroads with the United States or with other countries. We also need investment. We need to export to the United States. In this matter I agree that nationalism is important. However, Soekarno himself said that, 'nationalism is not narrow.'

So essentially, Matondang espoused that Indonesia must embrace the principles of nationalism but not blind nationalism as warned by President Soekarno. Though there was a tendency to use the rhetoric prevalent during the era of Guided Democracy, the reality is that Indonesia could not because the priority was for Indonesia to take care of its people (Matondang 2006, interview with author).

Despite her demonstrated embrace of Soekarnoism, Megawati herself questioned whether Soekarnoism is relevant in contemporary times (Sudarsono 2006, interview with author). Sudarsono elaborated:

> How can the legacy of her father really carry on around with present day circumstances? The baggage of her father is also a heavy burden for [Megawati]. She should be positive because she brings the mental framework of her father. But she has to perform in the new realities to manifest such a framework. And her failure to do just that during the second round of presidential electoral campaign paved the way for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to become her successor.

[13] The exact title in Indonesian is *Deputi II untuk Urusan Luar Negeri* (Deputy II for Foreign Affairs) *pada Kementerian Koordinator Politik, Hukum, dan Keamanan Republik Indonesia* (Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia).

Therefore this dilemma seemed to manifest itself in the foreign policy choices embraced by President Megawati. The decisions in foreign policy taken by her may have defied reason when viewed in terms of *realpolitik.* However, for the sake of nostalgia the rationale behind Megawati's decisions regarding thematic policy priorities, such as the hosting of the Asia-Africa Conference to rejuvenate the Bandung Spirit of 1955, and overseas visits made perfect sense. Senior member of Parliament's First Commission Sabam Sirait (2006, interview with author) admitted that:

> The foreign policy that we [Parliament] wanted was concrete. If we celebrate the Asia-Africa Conference [in 2005] we prepare it not just for entertainment but rather as the fiftieth-year anniversary of the spirit of Asia and Africa. Actually it ought to have been prepared as the manifestation of the ten principles from fifty years ago whether or not they are still relevant.

As observed by Alatas (2006, interview with author):

> The [hosting] of the Asia Africa Conference, her visit to North Korea, her visit to India. All the old leaders, all the countries from where came the Non-Aligned leaders. People were asking why she doesn't go to Europe first. Or why didn't she go to the present major powers? But she preferred to go to North Korea, South Korea, India. She went to Eastern Europe. So she showed her penchant tendency towards Soekarnoism.

Given her longing for the principles which Soekarnoism stood for, Megawati would thus by nature be more confrontational, not because she did not want Indonesia to become a good citizen of the international community,[14] but because she was willing to compromise harmony among neighbors and other international stakeholders to instead advance what she deemed as important interests of her country. Sirait (2006, interview with author) expressed his belief that:

> Perhaps it could be viewed as not in style or conservative [especially in this day and age of pragmatism], but we still embrace the principle of a *bebas aktif* foreign policy. We are principled on this basis, and we've demonstrated this in concrete terms. The meaning in practical politics is how we continuously hold high our national interest when engaging in international economic relations and when concluding international agreements.

[14] The requirement for Indonesia is to be a peaceful country, not just in a passive sense but more so in an active contributory manner, is ingrained in the Constitution of 1945. Hence, any offensive military actions undertaken by Indonesia incoherent with its defensive goals can be rendered unconstitutional.

Anwar (2003A, 87-89) argued that Indonesia's foreign policy under Megawati has emphasized development over independence and pragmatism over national sentiments. Moreover, Megawati's foreign policy focused on the need to develop harmonious relations with Indonesia's immediate neighbors, which were important for ensuring Indonesia's own security, and on efforts to mobilize economic resources for Indonesia's economic recovery. And furthermore, besides emphasizing the importance of strong bilateral ties with the United States, Japan, and Europe, Indonesia had also begun to pay more attention to China and India. In fact, Megawati had not made any new foreign policy initiatives despite intensifying diplomatic efforts towards China.

In sum the domestic political environment has changed drastically from that during the Suharto era. The rise of influence among legislators, media, elements of civil society, and the general public has somewhat directed and constrained foreign policy formulation from undertaking romantic and dramatic steps which may draw attention away from the primary goal of economic recovery.

According to Bandoro (2002, 356-358), the immediate challenges in which Megawati's foreign policy could have played a role were the threat of disintegration, economic recovery, and the establishment of law and public order. Bandoro added that foreign policy could also have played a role through its function as a symbol of unity, an outlet to achieve local and national aspirations.

Despite the all-inclusive aspirations in foreign policy, there was an underlying sense in Megawati's government and among the general public that economic recovery remained the dominant priority for Indonesia. There was a public sentiment that Indonesia must remain focused and not delve into ventures which might otherwise compromise the success of its primary goal. Anwar (2003A, 87) observed that:

> Economic needs, therefore, entail a more pragmatic and utilitarian foreign policy, although this policy might be viewed as undignified by those who reminisce about the days of Soekarno's rule when Indonesia dared to challenge the developed world even when it was economically weak.

Soekarno's political legacy in the form of ideology, rhetoric, and political objectives were continually reflected in Megawati's formal positions. President Megawati's 'six-point working program' (Enam Program Kerja) consisted of the following elements: the maintenance of national unity; the continuation of reform and democratization process; the normalization of economic life; the upholding of law, the restoration of security and peace, and the eradication of corruption, collusion, and nepotism; the restoration of Indonesia's international credibility; and the

preparation for the 2004 general elections (Djadijono 2001, 129-130).

Before proceeding to Megawati's interpretation of the doctrine of *bebas aktif* foreign policy, a brief exposition of the way by which the doctrine was interpreted by former President Suharto reveals an interesting perspective. Though based on Soekarnoism, *bebas aktif* was taken to mean the following according to President Suharto:

> [Though Indonesia was the proponent of Non-Alignment], because of the then prevalent Western world's fight against Communism, Indonesia had become an ally against Communism although [President] Suharto still implemented Non-Aligned foreign policy. We were not aligned with the Middle East. We were not aligned with the South African problem. We were not aligned. But on Communism we were aligned against Communism. Simply because Pak [President] Suharto was a staunch anti-communist (Alatas 2006, interview with author).

According to Wirajuda, Indonesia the country has embraced very well the principle of *bebas aktif* (free and active). This independent stance can be compared to that of the era of President Suharto which leaned towards the West while Indonesia was opposed to communism which was dominant in the East; and also compared with the foreign policy direction of President Wahid which tended to lean towards the Islamic countries and also to Israel at the same time. Foreign Minister Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) saw that Indonesia's foreign policy was thus based more on pragmatic approaches, and that ideology was not as relevant. Though in fact, the pursuit of a *bebas aktif* (free and active) foreign policy is one of the most explicit pillars of Indonesian foreign policy, possibly involving ideology in exploring and in engaging an independent and active policy.

Despite this admission that ideology may not have been as influential at certain parts of the foreign policy making process, one could observe how high principles are manifested in rhetoric, especially when it comes to Soekarnoism, and could still influence President Megawati. According to Anggoro (2006, interview with author), it was not difficult to influence President Megawati at the policy formulation level by using a rhetorical approach. Indonesia has adopted a technocratic approach in foreign policy whereby ideas of globalization and interdependence are prevalent within the Department of Foreign Affairs. The difficulty, however, is to conduct particular rhetorics while at the same time giving an impression that Indonesia is showing certain gestures and accommodation in policy orientation. This at times Indonesia has done quite well (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). And one major issue whose close relationship with Soekarnoism cannot be denied is the concept of a *bebas aktif* foreign

policy. Despite some *realpolitik* underlying reasons supporting the pursuit of *bebas aktif*, it is apparent that this aspect of foreign policy was influenced by Soekarnoism.

In fact, President Megawati Soekarnoputri herself sought to continue *Bebas Aktif* and to revitalize the Non-Alignment Movement to provide a backbone support to *Bebas Aktif*. Such a stance could partly be due to Kesowo's (2006, interview with author) advice to President Megawati:

> *Ibu* [Madame], life is not that easy. Domestic problems are enormous. You've got to settle them one by one. The result is not always instant. People will ask what are your achievements. When engaging in politics where the domestic environment is difficult, you need a foreign iniative that will help. So what are you going to revive with the Bandung Spirit [of the Non-Aligned Movement]?

It is this exercise in recrystallizing the Non-Aligned Movement and in rejuvenating the Bandung Spirit of 1955 that tasked President Megawati and allowed her to exhibit elements of Soekarnoism. President Megawati wanted Indonesia to become a leader among the developing countries, and therefore had pushed for the materialization of the Asia Africa Conference in 2005 (Djumala 2006, interview with author), which happened after the start of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's term in office. However, the Cold War no longer existed. The issue fell upon the pending political solution to ASEAN, the Middle East, the Sahara, and East Africa (Kesowo 2006, interview with author). One tangible idea was to construct sub-groups within the Non-Aligned Movement to build bridges to construct and manifest effective cooperation mainly in the economic sector. Megawati's foreign policy ambition to embrace the Non-Aligned Movement and to restore Indonesia's leadership stature in the region was validated by former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (2006, interview with author):

> I can tell you from my personal experience that [Megawati] really wanted to get foreign policy back on track. She called me, for example, and [senior diplomat] Nana [Sutresna]. She said she wanted advice on three issues: [first], on how to strengthen ASEAN and Indonesia's role in ASEAN, [second,] how to strengthen Indonesia's role in the Non-Aligned Movement, and [third,] how to make the Asia-Africa Conference a success. Not just as a showcase but as a concrete success … a concrete tangible achievement by resuscitating economic cooperation between the countries.

Another tangible manifestation of Megawati's policy preferences can be found in the creation of a new directorate at the Department of Foreign Affairs called the Directorate for Technical Cooperation. As the name

implied, what was unprecedented about this directorate was that it was not placed under the Directorate-General for Multilateral Affairs, as is commonly the case judging by the nature of its mandate, but the directorate was placed under the Directorate-General of Public Diplomacy. This organizational structure has a serious ramification as explained by the Head of the Center of Education and Training at the Department of Foreign Affairs Darmansyah Djumala (2006, interview with author):

> Such a placement signals to the world that in the past we used to be associated with countries who asked, who pleaded before multilateral organizations. With [the creation of the Directorate for Technical Cooperation that is placed under the Directorate-General of Public Diplomacy], it shows to the world that we are a nation that is a donor country within our capacities. What is that? It means that we provide aid in terms not of money but [in the form of] internship programs for the diplomats of new countries. We provide agricultural internships for the bureaucrats. These are the ways that we assist other countries.

In a way, this constitutes a major paradigm shift in the way Indonesia engages in aid matters.

This *bebas aktif* (free and active) stance can also be employed to support Indonesia's hedge against the major powers. Former Secretary of State Kesowo (2006, interview with author) elaborates:

> It's like in soccer, only attacking from the right poses problems. We are accused of being human rights abusers, undemocratic. Even our armed forces were embargoed. This is the result of us playing through the right all the time. We're supposed to be non-aligned but apparently we're Western-heavy. So don't just play through the right. We must attack through a frontal formation.

Kesowo (2006, interview with author) further elaborated a *realpolitik* argument for the need to pursue such an approach:

> There are many domestic challenges. During the New Order we have implemented many Western-heavy foreign policies. Therefore let's make [our foreign policy] more balanced. Why is being balanced important? Because dependence on the West is more disadvantageous. When the West becomes upset, we were punished. And in the past they were more often upset. They, especially the United States, were the most effective world police.

The important thing, according to Kesowo is how to manifest a Free and Active foreign policy that is concrete and in choosing friends that are not only from the right.

The *Bebas Aktif* (Free and Active) foreign policy doctrine is simply meant to provide a basis by which to provide an element of certainty and predictability on Indonesia's foreign policy (Anwar 2006, interview with author). The suggestion to President Megawati given by Kesowo (2006, interview with author) was:

> [As in the soccer analogy], don't just attack from the right but also attack from the left. Use the Non-Aligned Movement. They have [UN Security Council] veto powers. Had we been friends with China and Russia we would not have been humiliated by the East Timor issue … that's why Megawati went to China and Russia. And when visiting bring gifts. Buy something from them despite our incapacity to pay and the small amount [involved in the deal].

Senior member of Parliament's First Commission Permadi (2006, interview with author) explained that Free and Active in politics is where Indonesia chooses friends and enemies within the chessgame of international politics. Permadi continued that:

> We [Indonesia] remain independent but active. If the United States regards us as foes, we have a right to ask for help from Russia while at the same time there would be no strings attached. And if Russia doesn't want to help, then we must be independent. Because of that [Indonesia's] military must be strong. And the defense of the people must also be strong.

However, despite some constraints for policy maneuvers, such a strategy has worked for Indonesia as explained by Permadi (2006, interview with author):

> The political constellation after the New Order and *Reformasi* is such that Indonesia exists under the pressure of the United States, whether political, economic, as well as cultural such that an Indonesian president cannot conduct an all out resistance. [She or he] must be accommodative … whether on East Timor, Indonesia – United States relations, or the purchase of weapons. However, Mega[wati] did stand up to [US President George] Bush. [She] bought Sukhoi [fighter aircrafts] from Russia. The United States reacted immediately and lifted the [weapons purchases] embargo [imposed] on Indonesia. That is a history. The US embargo was lifted because Mega[wati] bought Sukhois [tactical fighter aircrafts] from Russia. That is the balance of power. Just like [Megawati's] father, 'you cannot provide it to me, I go to Russia. You do not want to give it to me, I go to China.'

The notion of this doctrine as placed within the contemporary context can be seen in the elaboration by Anwar (2006, interview with author):

> [Indonesia] will not be a country that is simply a cat follower of the major powers. This time we will not be too ideological about it. What we think now is if it is in the best interest of our country, we will do. If it means leaning more towards the Western countries … we'll do so. But it also means that, with the rise of China, India, and Russia, we need to develop relations with them as well. So in that case 'Free' is the freedom to choose what is best for our country. As for 'Active'? Why Indonesia has not been active is due to our own domestic problems. Indonesia could not really afford to dedicate sufficient economic resources and manpower to reach international initiatives. Secondly, if it did there will be domestic criticisms at home. 'Why are you trying to save the world when your own backyard is in fire?' Indonesia would probably find it hard to convince other people because we don't have sufficient capability to project ourselves as a leader. But after Indonesia managed to develop domestic political economic stability, Indonesia began to show some sort of claws in foreign policy [with] her chairmanship of ASEAN in 2003 and her initiative in 2002 to play some role in the Korean peninsula settlement whereby Megawati played on the sentiments of the close relationship between Soekarno and Kim Jong Il's father.

However, another perspective took the presence of the lone superpower as an imminent constraint for the policy options of a country like Indonesia. In stipulating the need to be strong domestically in order to advance national interest, Lt. Gen. (retired) Widjojo (2006, interview with author) explained that:

> The issue now is how to properly define *bebas aktif* in the context of contemporary world politics. Let's focus on just Indonesia first. It needs to be defined because in an unipolar world there is only one option for not being free, and that is if we are 'captured' by the United States. Aligned to the United States. Therefore we won't be free. But there's no other option because the Soviet Union is no longer there. What is the barometer for not getting 'caught'? For, as an example, there is something in foreign policy that cannot be changed with whatever sort of policy … with any strategy … and that is national interest. For me that is a primacy … national interest. And to achieve our national interest we must have strong credibility at home.

Therefore, various elements from Soekarnoism were incorporated in the context of the realities of a world that is much different from the Cold War. In fact, President Soekarno's leadership of foreign policy had occurred not simply during the Cold War, but during the height of the Cold War. The key, as argued by a prominent intellectual, Widjojo (2006, interview with author) is to possess a competitive advantage; and that is what Indonesia does not possess at the present time. Widjojo explained how the maneuvering space for Indonesia has shrunk drastically due to the unipolar political environment arising from US hegemony, as

compared to during the height of the Cold War:

> In order to compete we need competitive advantage. Competitive advantage begins at home. To achieve national interest, we must look at policy. There is Japan, China, and the United States. Alright, we decide to engage China to socialize it internationally. Or we defend China but we must face the United States. How about Japan? Japan is the indispensable nation. Can we say, 'Hey United States, you are wrong!' Can we? It seems not. So the scope whereby we can participate is limited. It was so different during the time of President Soekarno in the Cold War. [Indonesia] at the time can be in the middle. Indonesia did not favor the Soviet Union. Indonesia did not favor the United States. That is why Indonesia built the 'New Emerging Forces' because the future laid upon these nations.

Nevertheless, there is another perspective on the impression of the *bebas aktif* foreign policy enacted by Indonesia. *Kompas* newspaper Editor-in-Chief Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author) explained that:

> Our main problem, especially after *Reformasi*, is due to a foreign policy that is unclear. In principle what is it actually? There's always talk of *bebas aktif* but that concept is still not clear. Indonesia is indeed so 'free' and 'active' as to give the impression that [we] don't have principles. Many cases … show that [Indonesia] does not understand the scope of the matter, what foreign policy ought to be like, and what the overall big-picture context looks like. Such as in placing Indonesia in the context of the problems in the Middle East, what role does Indonesia actually play?

One perspective linked this notion of a directionless foreign policy with developments in the international arena, and attempted to explain why policy participants failed to steer in the right direction. Former Member of Parliament and former PDI-P political strategist Mochtar Buchori (2006, interview with author) explained that:

> In the mind of today's politicians, Indonesia is pictured as an isolated entity. The relationship between Indonesia and the rest of the world is not very clearly perceived … meaning, [that] they never see the relationship between developments in another country to [their own country] and … consequently, they see globalization from the wrong direction, such as being either fanatically nationalistic or regarding globalization as only creating poverty. Both views are not realistic.

In attempting to integrate *bebas aktif* or any other tenets of Indonesian foreign policy into globalization, Buchori (2006, interview with author) proposed an important question:

> You cannot reject globalization, but you can also not fully embrace and deny your own identity. Do we have our own identity? It is a very crucial cultural problem. [Though perhaps not shared] among these politicians, but in the past one thing that I consider very important was to create consciousness of natural identity among the young, through education.

And it is this self-identity for Indonesia that Soekarnoism had attempted to characterize. What is the overall broad picture for Indonesia in world politics? How does Indonesia relate with other nations that used to be former colonies of the major powers at the time? In the past, attempting to hedge against the dictates resulting from the dominance of the major powers, Indonesian foreign policy engaged the nations of Asia and Africa. Together, they formed the international political association of Group of then 77 now 108 plus (G-77) of non-aligned states. Thinking that strength was in the numbers, the developing countries felt they had an edge over the major powers. And then the major powers formed the Group of 7 (G-7). As explained by Matondang (2006, interview with author):

> Oh yes, the G-77 came first. And then G-7 was formed in the 1980's when I was in Tokyo. G-77 encompasses more political statements whereas when the G-7 meets, once they decide, put items on the agenda and decide, the result of the meeting shook the whole world ... at the time our debt can easily increase by USD 500 million when they adjust the exchange rates … debts can suddenly increase without us doing anything.

2.13 Summary

President Megawati's policy preferences were shaped by numerous factors. Among the more prominent seem to be her experience as an oppressed political opposition leader during the Suharto presidency, her fundamental political views and orientations that are derived from her close relationship with her father, Indonesia's founder President Soekarno, and her affinity with the organizational culture, hardships, and victories of the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle). However, in her views on foreign policy and on issues of international affairs the dominant factor seemed to consist of the values and ideals instilled by her father, commonly referred to as Soekarnoism, though her foreign policy decisions may not always have been compatible with her belief system. This discrepancy could be attributed to other factors in the foreign policy implementation phase of policy making, as shall be elaborated in later chapters.

In its pure form Soekarnoism entailed idealist notions of justice in a world full of oppression and domination *of man by man* and *of nation by nation*. In the practice of foreign affairs Soekarnoism focused on treating the United States of America as a manifestation of the constant class conflict in international politics between, as Soekarno called them, the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS) and the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS). Massive military build-ups commensurate with Indonesia's then self-perceived status as a global power to be reckoned with were regarded as a necessity in the conduct of statecraft. President Soekarno instituted the Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang Axis of Powers. Nationalism became a primary doctrine, and a foreign policy of independence became the norm, as reflected in the then famous and colorful 'go to hell with your aid' stance.

President Megawati, on the other hand, established and maintained a friendly and good relationship with the United States and other 'established' forces in a spirit of partnership. Military buildups were suppressed and even discouraged. Attention was shifted to economic development and prosperity. Instead of power-axis orientations, Megawati strove to nurture regional groupings and partnerships. Instead of nationalization or expropriation, she opted for privatization, and even welcomed foreign direct investment.

These two strikingly different foreign policies of the two presidents clearly show a major discrepancy between the policy orientations of Megawati and that of her father despite the fact that both embraced similar political ideologies. Soekarnoism greatly influenced the belief system of Megawati. This suggests that other factors were at play during foreign policy making. The hypothesis of this study emphasizes the dominant role played by the political elites in directing President Megawati's foreign policy towards a course of pragmatism as opposed to that of idealism.

CHAPTER 3 POWER STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Before we can proceed with the analysis using the domestic sources of foreign policy approach and assess the interaction between the elites' worldview and the domestic forces in determining foreign policy, we must first identify and understand the political elites as such, and more importantly, assess the distribution of power within Indonesia as a polity. Hence, this chapter shall discuss the elements of society that play a role in determining foreign policy. But before this discussion an illustration of what *Reformasi* entails, particularly in constitutional terms, is necessary because power, its promulgation and its distribution, among the political elites cannot be separated from the domestic political and constitutional environment in which these actors operate.

3.1 *Reformasi*: Diffusion of Political Power

The process of *Reformasi* (reformation) began in 1997/1998 and changed the country fundamentally. Not only did it end the 32-year tenure of President Suharto, but the momentous and sweeping force also established unprecedented political and legal changes in institutions and embraced new governance frameworks that made the old ways of doing things no longer applicable.

The beginning of *Reformasi* is often alluded to as democratization in Indonesia. As a former cabinet member and Supreme Court Justice observed, 'the elements of a democracy is a government under the law, the independence of the judiciary, and access to justice for the people' (Muladi 2007, audience by author). Rather, one can liken the beginning of *Reformasi* to that of (democratic) chaos combined with political stability. Various views on this can be distinguished. As a former powerful Minister and Secretary of State put it, 'there is no agenda in *Reformasi*. Everyone makes his [or her] agenda, including the President'. Kesowo (2006, interview with author) added that 'the events thereafter resulted from a *Reformasi* that is unclear in content and in priority' The influential head of the mainstream Muslim organization Muhammadiyah aired a familiar complaint in that 'with *Reformasi* there are too many politicians and too few statesmen' (Syamsuddin 2007, audience with author). A highly respected Islamic scholar summarizes the situation in that 'the problem with this country is the incapacity of the state to uphold the law' (Azra 2007, interview with author). A former student and labor

activist (now a socially well-networked physician) observed that '*Reformasi* turned out to be nothing more than a struggle for power' (Djatmoko 2004, 23).

With respect to foreign policy, Anwar (2003A, 89) underlined that foreign policy formulation can no longer be isolated from public scrutiny and that the function was also no longer solely relegated to the executive branch as the legislative branch increasingly plays an important role. She posited that although foreign policy remained the prerogative of the executive, in certain cases Parliament takes a position opposite to that of the government, and that this could reduce the effectiveness of the initiatives carried out by the government. In this regard, Sukma (2003, 8) confirmed that domestic politics had always been, and will continue to be, the primary driving force of Indonesian foreign policy.

Within the context of this chaos Indonesia's democratization process took off. The media became free to publish or broadcast anything they liked. At times, some do so irrespective of the need to uphold the unwritten rule of responsible journalism. New newspapers with popular appeal but otherwise questionable journalistic quality flourished and flooded the market. Parliament became active in the foreign policy domain that was previously inaccessible to them. Members of the civil society began to formally participate in policy formulation sessions, which had been impossible for decades. Elites continue to wage non-military wars through grassroots battles for the hearts and minds of the politically uneducated electorate by the use of complex and artful stratagems within the machinery of party politics to obtain the most prized of possessions in statecraft: power. Despite the massive seemingly sweeping effects of *Reformasi*, a former foreign minister reminded that this trend towards democracy is not only characteristic of Indonesia, but it is happening all over the world (Alatas 2006, interview with author). Alatas explained how:

> After the end of the Cold War, issues of human rights, good governance, and the environment began to resurface again. Such issues are, in fact, nothing new. They were all pushed to the back because of the salience of the fight against Communism.

Hence, the study shall deal with a phenomenon that is not only specific to Indonesia per se, but which is occurring elsewhere as well.

According to Hidayat (2007, 16), *Reformasi* will succeed if the process is supported by four elements of power within society: the military, a dominant informal leadership, the bureaucratic elite, and political parties. Within the context of this study, the concept of a dominant informal leadership can be taken to mean the prevalence of

leaders that exist in civil society. Hence, an analysis of these groups shall be undertaken in this section.

3.2 Civil Society

Civil society in the context of this study refers to the academic, media, non-governmental, and religious elites.

3.2.1 Academia

'Academia' refers to the scholars and policy analysts that are based at universities, research institutes, and think-tanks. Due to the nature of the foreign policy process which involves officials from the national government, most of the academics that are involved in the foreign policy debates and undertake studies of foreign policy issues live in the capital city, Jakarta. Most of these scholars and policy analysts obtained their graduate education outside of the country, mostly from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The dominant university within the foreign policy circles is the Universitas Indonesia, a major national university that is situated close to Jakarta.

Numerous research institutes deal with foreign policy. However, the dominant ones seem to be the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* (Indonesian Institute of Sciences or LIPI). Though not necessarily solely think-tanks as the term defines it, the two institutions that closely resemble think-tanks and whose works are taken into consideration by the foreign policy elite are the *Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional* (LEMHANNAS or National Resilience Institute) whose Governor, a cabinet-level official, reports directly to the President of the Republic of Indonesia and the *Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan* (Policy Analysis and Development Board or BPPK) of the *Departemen Luar Negeri* (Department of Foreign Affairs or DEPLU) whose Head, a director-general level senior career foreign service officer, reports directly to the foreign minister. With the exception of the last two institutions, most of the academics and policy analysts working within the universities and research institutes often take assignments simultaneously from multiple institutions. And even at times, LEMHANNAS and BPPK DEPLU request the services of these academics and policy analysts as well.

To some, LEMHANNAS may seem conservative in its embrace of the

paradigms of nationalism and absolute sovereignty (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). In his view it is important to distinguish between two kinds of sovereignty. Absolute sovereignty, such as when dealing with the issue of territorial integrity, is non-negotiable and must be defended at all cost. However, interdependent sovereignty involves having to accommodate to others, especially when dealing with humanitarian issues that happen inside one's territory such as disaster relief, alleviating the suffering of people, and others. LEMHANNAS tends to provide analysis with the concept of absolute sovereignty whereas other academics easily switch from using one type of the concept of sovereignty to the other in their analysis (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). The institution is a politically neutral think tank that answers only to the President. The institution cannot publicize its opinions or assessment of performance on Presidents. Even if it did, the institution would carry out such research for its internal consumption only.

Though influential, academics know the limits of their feedback in foreign policy making. The task of academics is to write or to publish analyses or to send a policy recommendation to the government. And once their recommendations have been received, their task ends. The important thing is that academics have done their jobs (Juwono 2006, interview with author) and that the policy making process has taken place. Moreover, according to the perspective of some academics, it is better for academics to take part and channel their energies into a constructive activity such as contributing to foreign policy making rather than venting their views and analysis on the wider gamut of topics (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). Nevertheless, academics realize that the two worlds of academia and policy making would be difficult to intertwine for each group possesses a difference in perspective not due to some specific intellectual framework because the environment in which each set of people operate makes it difficult to exactly know what the other side is experiencing (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). And apparently academics are quite realistic as to their expectations of the foreign policy making process as narrated by Anggoro (2006, interview with author):

> I know what role I can play. It would be naïve, I guess, to expect more than simply [to influence foreign policy at] the discussion level of the formulation stage. I cannot expect to have a say in the policy decision because this is the privilege of the bureaucrat.

Despite the inherent limitations on their impact on official decision-making, academia could play a special role in what would normally be

called Track-Two diplomacy, but which is actually 'Track One and a Half,' whereby officials participate in an unofficial capacity to deal with non-state actors (Juwono 2006, interview with author). After all, the rise of Track-Two diplomacy is due to the rise of issues whereby the actions undertaken by a state actor are considerably constrained and even at times limited, such as when pushing a sovereign government to pursue a democratic approach in dealing with its political dissidents given that the suggesting state is bound by the doctrine of non-interference in its obligation of membership of a regional organization.

3.2.2 Media

'Media refers to organized channels of means to communicate to groups of people. Radio, television, newspapers, and the internet are examples of media. In 2003 there were about one thousand independent radio stations in Indonesia. *Reformasi* has brought in greater journalistic freedom and diversity', the rapid growth of which has led to lower ethical and professional standards as manifested in the rise of biased and sensational reporting (Howard et al. 2003, 119). Moreover, there has also been a growth in the number of television stations throughout the archipelago although fewer than radio stations. Among channels of communication however, radio has the widest reach in terms of audience penetration, while in the context of analyzing the elites newspapers are more relevant.

National daily newspapers and weekly news-magazines are the most important news mediums in Indonesia not only because of their long history and influence allowed them to set the political agenda, but also because such medium employs more journalists and concentrates more on news-gathering and dissemination than any other medium (Sen and Hill [2000] 2007, 51). The masses watch television whereas the elites are the ones who read the newspapers. Such media is indeed what influences society at large, whether news with analysis or simply just pictures or video (Juwono 2006, interview with author). Former head of a national television station and senior journalist Agus Parengkuan (2006, interview with author) explained the tendency for people to embrace television rather than newspapers, an observation that is pervasive not just in Indonesia but throughout the world:

> Who reads newspapers nowadays? Television's reach is vast onto the reaches of the villages … and don't forget that our habit of reading is not really practiced. I can turn the television on while having a conversation. But newspapers I must read. I have to make time for it. [Another factor is,] for example, the allocation of advertising. The proportion of advertising budget going into television is 62 %. Newspapers only received 28%. Why

> is the ratio like this? It means that there are way more people who watch television rather than read newspapers.

The media brings foreign policy to people's living rooms. This was much different in previous times (Juwono 2006, interview with author). The media is also important for foreign policy in two ways. First, the media provides information about the world providing a basis for foreign policy making and second, the media provides knowledge of the foreign policy establishment and the aspirations of the other actors on certain issues (Sukma 2006, interview with author). Senior journalist Parengkuan (2006, interview with author) believed that his newspaper, Kompas:

> … doesn't suppress nor does it blow things up out of proportion … we focus more on the actual issues. What is the real problem? We do not fan the flames. And if we suppress the issues, we are a newspaper. What can we do [to survive]? At least we don't add fire to the issue.

Parengkuan (2006, interview with author) added that even if newspapers did inflame the issues, their influence would be negligible, for the instrument that has much influence is television. As for the political elite's behavior in reading newspapers, Parengkuan was also skeptical:

> [Political] elites usually use the television to convey their messages of interest. On the [visual] stage she or he say something to show her or his constituents. In actuality newspapers do not do that. However, if you pay attention during presidential elections, television is always given a priority by candidates … [because] its direct effect is tangible. Why did [current Indonesian president] SBY win? Because he constantly appeared on television. Television and not newspapers. [Newspapers] are usually read by the elite. But even with the elites now as judged by the quality of the those who sit in Parliament, they tend to watch television [instead of reading newspapers].

Among the many existing newspapers that may be influential throughout the archipelago, the ones that are circulated within the capital area are the Indonesian language-based daily newspaper *Kompas* and the English language-based daily newspaper *The Jakarta Post*. *Kompas* is considered Indonesia's most prestigious and largest-selling daily and the largest 'quality' newspaper in Southeast Asia. It earned a reputation for 'analytical depth and polished style' while *The Jakarta Pos*t earned itself a reputation as a 'reliable, professionally produced, and relatively independent' English language newspaper with a readership of affluent, educated, English-literate foreign and domestic business leaders, political opinion-makers, and the diplomatic community (Sen and Hill [2000] 2007, 57-60).

According to Parengkuan (2006, interview with author), the Kompas

daily newspaper's purpose is to:

> Attempt to become a bridge linking the government and its people, or between one group of society with another group of society. And on each issue, we attempt to explain the real elements of the issue within their proper context. So it's to bridge all groups. And at times doing so is not easy, even if we write between the lines … this requires either high intellect or mastery of the Javanese way of doing things [whereby one must not criticize directly and instead use a winded approach in criticizing]

Parengkuan admitted that such an approach towards writing is due to *Kompas*' experience during the era of President Suharto:

> Though President Suharto was authoritarian, we had to get our message across. If we remain writing in terms of black and white, he will not read it. He may even close down the newspaper! So how do we write so that he reads it? And he did read our articles … we can see it in several of his state addresses.

Parengkuan (2006, interview with author) observed that when *Kompas* criticized Presidents Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati they did not care, and that they did not send someone to talk to *Kompas*, to send a general to pay a visit, or to even speak directly to the editor-in-chief as used to happen during the era of President Suharto; only when the president is from the military did these things happen despite the promises and speeches everywhere of the importance of having freedom of the press.

National media including newspapers, television, and radio provide space and time to cover more domestic debates on foreign policy. A prominent constitutional legal expert Todung Mulya Lubis (2003, 107) suggested that 'the press now enjoys unprecedented freedom, so much that news reporting has become very sensational, while the media's role as a government watchdog has been relatively neglected.' Vice-Chairperson and Indonesia's National Commission of Human Rights and former Golkar Party Vice-Presidential candidate Salahuddin Wahid (2006, interview with author) reiterated that the two major problems with reformasi, of the lack of confidence as a nation and the myopic focus on short-term thinking, were not reflected by many of the newspapers and these that do, such as *Kompas* and *Republika*, are influenced, naturally, by their owners and by their editors, not on personal basis but on how they regard these two problems facing Indonesia.

3.2.3 Non-Governmental Organizations

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the context of this study refers to the social movements that include interest groups attempting to influence a specific area of foreign policy. In 2006 the newspaper *Republika* counted that there were roughly between four to seven thousand NGO's operating in Indonesia, especially those who propped up during the undertaking of development projects (Budiardjo 2008, 392). Lubis (2003, 107) argued that the non-governmental organizations are far more influential in the development of post-Suharto Indonesia since they have increasingly become involved in all spheres of Indonesian life. As observed by former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (2006, interview with author):

> NGOs … became more and more assertive in not only domestic policy but also in international relations. This was a global movement. In Indonesia this global movement could not immediately be translated into fact as long as President Suharto was in power. But when President Suharto left office, when *Reformasi* came this global movement also stressed human rights, freedom of the press … the phenomenon was immediately expressed from President Habibie and accentuated by Gus Dur [President Wahid]. So actually President Megawati continued this trend of reform whereby there are more actors than just the government.

NGOs manifest their agenda through the variety of interests that they seek to advance. NGOs operating in Indonesia can be classified into five groups according to a senior NGO activist, Roem Topatimasang. NGOs can pursue their interests in areas of welfare, modernization, *Reformasi*, liberalization and independence, and that of transformation (Herdi 1999, 131-145). Despite their numbers, analysts question their effectiveness in the field of foreign policy should NGOs attempt to influence this area of policy. The effectiveness of NGOs in advancing domestic policy has thus not seem to have been replicated in the country's foreign policy arena.

Taking account their track record and the diversity of issues, a study was undertaken that classified NGOs into five institutionalized network actors (Yulianto 2003, 567). These actors are: *Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* (Indonesian Environmental Assembly or WALHI); International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID), a network of forty-seven Indonesian and fifty-one foreign NGOs focusing on issues of development and Indonesian foreign debt; *Forum Kerjasama Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat* Papua (Non-Governmental Organizations Forum on Papua or FOKER LSM Papua), a network of at least thirty-two NGOs, churches, and academics in Papua that focuses on Papuan social,

political, economic, and cultural issues; *Alliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* (Archipelagic Alliance of Indigenous Society or AMAN), an alliance of various indigenous peoples' organizations and communities from all parts of Indonesia; and *Liga Mahasiswa Nasional untuk Demokrasi* (National Students' League for Democracy or LMND), a network of dozens of mass based student organizations focusing on democracy in Indonesia. In the case of Indonesia and its foreign policy, it did not seem that NGOs even targeted this policy portfolio. Or even if they did, the policy aspirations of NGOs in foreign policy seem limited. And if they did, their impact was ineffective as a pressure group on foreign policy issues; at times they are targeting the wrong audience (Sukma 2006, interview with author). One active NGO kept advancing the argument that Indonesia should refrain from amassing more debt. The group intensified its activities towards the Department of Foreign Affairs and other foreign policy establishments. Little did the group realize that it is in fact lodging a battle at the wrong institutions for such issues are dealt with instead in the Department of Finance, National Development Board, and the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, Finance, and Investments.

Ironically, the policy fields in which NGO's can become active in consists of the general issues that are related to the Asia Pacific region. It is in this sphere of policy area where NGOs can provide recommendations (Juwono 2006, interview with author) they would normally attend international forums relating to Indonesia.

If there are meetings with the Bretton Woods organizations such as the IMF or World Bank then the elites will attempt to advance the viewpoints of the 'mass electorate.' They would hold rallies and participate in numerous international forums to voice the concerns held by the electorate. In due time this will have an influence on foreign policy although the conduct of foreign policy remains an elitist endeavor (Juwono 2006, interview with author). Senior policy maker Albert Matondang (2006, interview with author) put things bluntly:

> Wherever we go we find that foreign policy is not formulated by non-governmental organizations, mass media, or any other institutions that constitute what is often called as Track-Two diplomacy establishments. They can contribute ideas, and the government can take notes of those ideas. But it is governments that manifest those ideas in the form of global foreign policy.

3.2.4 Religious Elites

Religious elites refer to the leaders of religious organizations that actively

participate in foreign policy. Despite embracing secularism in its Constitution, the concept of the Almighty God is manifested in the national ideology of Pancasila which imbues an Indonesian society that lives in a harmonic coexistence of various religious faiths.[15]

Though there is a richness of studies of the dynamics of power and religion in domestic politics, such debate is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the analysis focuses on how the domestic politics of these religious organizations as part of civil society influence foreign policy.

But before proceeding, it should be noted that not all agree that religious groups are part of civil society. Budiman (1990, 365) argues that along with the media, especially the press, and private businesses Muslim organizations can be classified as the most influential civil society sectors. However, many scholars and activists do not include religious organizations in their definition because such organizations exhibit primordialism though certain organizations such as Muhammadiyah are referred to as 'the embryo of civil society' because of their long-time (since pre-independence) role in education and and services to the community (Nyman 2006, 45-46).

Despite the various views on the subject, the participation of religious organizations in politics underscores the importance of the electoral clout held by these organizations. The pairings of presidential and vice-presidential candidates often takes into account the candidates' religious backgrounds. Indonesia is the country with the largest number of Muslims in the world. Consequently, the role of the Muslim community in the issue of foreign policy depends much on the domestic political situation (Perwita 2007, 176). However, the Muslim populations of all of the countries in the Middle-East combined would, in comparison, still dwarf the number of Muslims in Indonesia. Hence the irony that when the issue of Islam is discussed, analysts commonly, though disproportionately, point to the Middle East instead of Indonesia. Therefore, taking the demographic numbers into account, one would naturally be inclined to believe that religion does play a part in the foreign policy of Indonesia.

However, Suryadinata (1996, 160) observed that Islam was not a major factor in foreign policy. For the post-New Order Era, Sukma (2003) also believed that although Islam was a benign factor in post-independence foreign policy, despite Islam's flourishing activity in domestic politics and foreign policy during *Reformasi* Islam retained a secondary role due to its domestic weakness. Even the former head of the

[15] Religion is so important that the actual label of religious faith of either Islam, Christianity, Hindu, or Buddhism is clearly spelled out in every Indonesian citizen's state issued identification card.

largest Islamic organization Nadhlatul Ulama, who had the privilege of governing the country as the president of the republic, confirmed that the foreign policy of Indonesia was solely based on politics and not on Islam (A. Wahid 2006, interview with author).

Despite these attestations, leading Islamic scholar Azyumardi Azra believed that although formally Islam is not in the foreign policy equation of Indonesia, when it comes to issues relating to Islam and Muslims are at the limelight the Indonesian government takes their interests into careful consideration (Perwita 2007, 2). And to confirm the previous point of the correlation of using religion in strengthening a group's political leverage, Perwita (2007, 176) observed that the role of Muslims in foreign policy largely depends on the domestic political situation. Prasetyono (2006, interview with author) also supported the existence of an influence related to religion. He argued that there is an enormous underground pressure from the rise of political Islam that exerts strong influence on the government and through the individual members of Parliament, especially in matters dealing with issues of Islam and the West and the Middle East.[16]

3.3 Parliament

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR or People's Representative Council, House of Representatives, or Parliament) has undergone a systemic transformation from the era of the New Order to that of an institution that has played a major, if not pivotal, role during reformasi in establishing the various legal frameworks and in restructuring the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government in creating a democratic Indonesia (Budiardjo 2008; Pieris 2007; Piliang and Legowo 2006; Rachman 2004; Winarno 2007; Ziegenhain 2008). An institution that used to be seen as a mere rubber stamp during President Suharto's tenure, Parliament is presently regarded as becoming more assertive, though not always correct in its decisions and deliberations (Juwono 2006, interview with author).

[16] 'Political Islam' rose during President Suharto's reign. And such a force was immediately repressed, leading to the flight to Malaysia of the suspected leader of the extreme religious organization Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Bashir, only to return to Indonesia when *Reformasi* started and the existence of 'political Islam' became tolerated. Bashir was tried and imprisoned in the 1980's for various reasons, among those was his support of the establishment of Sharia thus contradicting a secular Indonesian republican laws and not recognizing the then official ideology of Pancasila.

A majestic decision by the DPR through the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (People's Consultative Assembly or MPR) in the process of democratizing the country which significantly tilted the domestic balance of power in Parliament's favor (Budiardjo 2008, 290; Anwar 2005) was to make four sets of amendments to the *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (Constitution of 1945 or UUD 1945).

3.3.1 Structural Reforms by Acts of Parliament and Higher Councils

The first set of amendments was undertaken by the MPR on 19 October 1999. These amendments limited the terms of office of the President and Vice-President to two five-year periods. Moreover, the amendments underscored the legislative powers of Parliament in making laws and stipulated that the President must account for the input of Parliament into account in appointing ambassadors and in receiving foreign ambassadors as well as in providing amnesties. The amendment that the President has to account for Parliament's input, or rather, in having the foreign ambassador, *in absentia*, undergo a 'fit and proper' check prior to getting the *agrément*[17] of the head of mission approved by the government of the receiving country was later on scrapped for had it been allowed to persist, Indonesia would have been the only country in the world to have such a practice. Most, if not all, governments in the world would usually ignore the sending state's request for acceptance, if any, and simply not provide any explanation to the sending state as to why the *agrément* was taking so long to be approved in the event that such governments had reservations in accepting the choice of ambassador proposed by the sending state. Administering a fit and proper test for incoming foreign ambassadors aside, Parliament did indeed hold up ambassadorial appointments proposed by the government, held up budget requests on the belief that the end uses for such funds were excessive and unnecessary, and exercised its powers relating to the foreign policy of the government (Murphy 2005, 260).

The second set of amendments, but irrelevant to this study, undertaken by the MPR on 18 August 2000, outlined the governmental structure of the republic and separated the police from the military. The third set of constitutional amendments was undertaken by the MPR on 10 November 2001. This set encompassed major issues and its elaboration can best be categorized into several parts. The first part explicitly stated that as of the

[17] Approval by the Head of State of the receiving state for the appointment of a named individual as the ambassador by another state, sought in confidence by the Head of State of the sending state prior to the formal nomination or appointment of such an ambassador (Freeman 1997, 8).

constitutional amendments the Republic of Indonesia is to become a *rechtsstaat* (a state where the rule of law reigns supreme) and not a *machtsstaat* (a state where power prevails). The independence of the powers of the judiciary is reaffirmed. And to ensure that efforts to uphold the law and strive towards justice are achieved, two new institutions of the judiciary, the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Commission, were created by this set of constitutional amendments.

Power is instead shifted into the hands of the people and its manifestation shall be governed by the Constitution. Thus, the power of the people, as a collective entity is vested in their representatives in Parliament. This is important because Parliament and the Presidency after the enactment of this constitutional amendment occupy the same level of hierarchy within the national government. The President cannot dissolve Parliament, and in negotiating international treaties the President must obtain the approval of Parliament. And should the President deem it in the interest of better governance to decide to re-invent one of his executive departments, the creation, reform, and dissolution of that government department must be governed by law, and enactment thereof requires the approval of Parliament. Moreover, in terms of the state budget, the President proposes but has to consult Parliament along with another representative body, the Senate as shall later be discussed. Essentially, the finances of state are to be governed by law, which is in the realm of Parliament. So with this set of constitutional amendments Parliament has effectively positioned itself as the provider of 'checks and balances' to the Presidency of the Republic.

Continuing with the recurring theme of establishing a truly representational form of government in the republic, the third set of constitutional amendments created another representative body, the *Dewan Perwakilan Daerah* (Regional Representative Council / Senate or DPD), and an unprecedented rule in the history of the republic, i.e. the direct elections of the President and Vice-President team by the electorate throughout the archipelago. Until then presidents of the republic were merely the mandate holders of the MPR. That is no longer the case. This set of amendments restricted the powers of the MPR to no longer select but only to formally appoint the President and Vice-President after elections. In light of the spirit of direct elections, the MPR undertook the last set of constitutional amendments on 11 August 2002. This set of amendments stipulated that all members of the MPR are no longer political appointees. Gone are the days when representatives of functional groups, the military, and the police were automatically given seats in the MPR. MPR consists only of elected members of the DPR and of the DPD. This set of amendments also stipulated that President and Vice-

President must be elected on the second round of direct elections by a majority vote. And if the President and Vice-President, sequentially or collectively, cannot assume their offices then the republic shall be collectively governed by a presidium that consists of the Minister of Interior Affairs, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense for a period of thirty days only, for thereafter the MPR ought to have already selected a President and Vice-President from the set of candidates who obtained the largest number of votes and the second largest number of votes from the previous Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. Hence, a smooth transition of power that abides by the principle of a truly representative democracy has been written into this set of constitutional amendments. There is no more constitutional leeway for a general to play a major role in the ending of a possible anarchy in the absence of a president and a vice president, to rise to national prominence and consequently to be appointed as president.

3.3.2 Total Transformation of Parliament

From the number and the nature of the constitutional amendments undertaken between 1999 and 2002, one can observe the severity in terms of the structural changes which Indonesia had to undergo to become democratic. To put these changes in a brief historical context, the 1945 Constitution at the time of its promulgation was meant to be a temporary constitution anyway. At the time the idea was to have a constitution that was sufficient to provide the skeleton of the basic structure and governance of a young state until after the recognition of independence was obtained for the young state. However, numerous commissions after the promulgation of the 1950 Constitution could not agree on the changes with debilitating consequences for the governance of the republic until President Soekarno as Head of State finally disbanded all efforts towards constitutional amendment and instead returned Indonesia to the 1945 Constitution to begin an era known as *Democracy Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy). When President Suharto took office in 1968, he sanctified the Preamble and the Body of the 1945 Constitution underlining a strong executive leadership. It took more than thirty years since then for those needed changes in the 1945 Constitution to take place.

It was during that period of 1999 – 2002 that President Megawati Soekarnoputri came into office. That period can be considered the height of *Reformasi*. And the Parliament that was pivotal in the whole process was also the most productive in terms of bills (175 in total) enacted into law in the history of modern Indonesia. And that Parliament still consisted of representatives from the military and the police, which held

38 out of the 500 seats in Parliament.

The Parliament resulting from the 2004 General Elections no longer consisted of political or military appointees. All members earned their seats by winning elections, either individually or through their political parties. The profiles of the members were more commensurate with their positions as representatives of the people. Most members of the 2004 Parliament were better educated than their predecessors.

During *Reformasi* power shifted to the legislature. However, it is important for the purpose of this study to distinguish between the political environments before and after the presidential and vice-presidential direct elections in 2004.

The Parliament of the 1999 General Elections was still part of the MPR that gave the mandate of government to the serving President. Hence, it was the MPR that appointed the President. It was also the first elected Parliament after the New Order. After having promulgated Law Number 4 / 1999 about the organizational structure of the MPR, DPR, and the Regional DPR, the MPR of 1999 consisted of 700 seats with the following distribution: 500 seats from Parliament, 135 seats from the regional representatives of which five were chosen by their respective Regional DPRs or Regional Parliaments from each region, and 65 seats from representatives of functional groups and organizations that were chosen by the General Elections Commission, which consisted of members from the political parties that participated in the 1999 General Elections and members from the government.

3.3.3 Parliament and Foreign Policy

The previous exposition of the dynamics of political parties in Parliament is necessary to understand the attributes of the political forces that a President in power must deal with as he or she governs in the new democratic Indonesia. And any President must be well versed in such the art of dealing with ‘new’ political forces as she or he conducts both domestic and, especially, foreign policy.

And although it is clear that Parliament has primarily an immense importance for national affairs, the issue of foreign policy provides an interesting opportunity for political parties too. Embracing foreign policy in their electoral platforms incur the least political costs while providing great political benefit (Pramono 2007, interview with author). After all, should the player not choose to carry through with the campaign promises after electoral victory, there is no political liability for his or her constituents often forget. However, if the player’s campaign platforms were based on tangible promises, e.g. higher civil service salaries, should

they become victors in an election then his or her constituents would later request that the player honor his or her word.

On this point, those who put Members of Parliament into office are the electorate and Pramono's point lingers true not just in Indonesia, but even in developed countries as well as illustrated by Anwar (2006, interview with author):

> Constituents at large do not pay attention to foreign policy. It is a democratic fallacy to argue that people actually care about foreign policy. They don't! Foreign policy is not an issue that wins or lose votes, except in times of war. If a country is involved in a foreign war, and it leads to economic hardship and people have been killed, then people will pay attention… Otherwise people do not really care about foreign policy. What they care about is, 'why is the President travelling abroad so much?' but they do not have the interest to actually discuss, [let's say], whether or not the policy of non-alignment adds value. The people who discuss that are the talking heads [such] as the academic community, the scholars, and so forth.

Reporting to Parliament also constitutes an opportunity for the executive branch as well. By having Parliament as a medium for projecting a feeling of collective governance the executive can obtain political benefits as well. As observed by Anggoro (2006, interview with author), ministers can be invited anytime by Parliament, or by the First Commission. There will be questions and answer sessions and political hearings whereby the concerned ministers must clarify the rationales for the policy she or he has advocated and decided upon.

Despite the fact that Indonesia embraces a presidential political system, the practice of Parliament in frequently calling government ministers for explanations still lingers. As elaborated by a top government official:

> The responsibility of government is a heavy burden and covers numerous issues. Much time has been spent on convincing those in Senayan (Parliament). And the government cannot ignore them. Complying with Parliament's requests must be done but at the expense of great time and energy. And this is what I dispute, for according to the Constitution of 1945 article 17, ministers do not answer to Parliament but to the President. However, after *Reformasi* it becomes a habit for Parliament that for any matter, no matter how petty, ministers are called. Any minister. If the practice will continue like this then perhaps it's better for Indonesia to embrace the Western Parliamentary system whereby the ministers can just stay in Parliament and policy is made by the permanent secretaries or the secretary-generals of the respective ministries.

The salience of Parliament in foreign policy, or in other issues as well, could be attributed to the newly discovered familiarity with power, as

painted by Salahuddin Wahid (2006, interview with author):

> Regarding the presidential system, from the beginning we actually embraced it. During Pak Harto's [President Suharto's] the system was made such that the general elections were only theatrical plays [18] and Members of Parliament did not have to behave critically but rather become too technical in discussing the state budget, and then constructed the State Guidelines (GBHN) in MPR, and never protested Pak Harto [President Suharto]. When *Reformasi* arrived, they became critical. Very critical, and then things changed so fast, new [political] parties rose up, many members of Parliaments become prominent though many did not fulfill the required [competence] qualifications. What is needed to be realized by members of Parliament is that many of them are not active and don't attend sessions despite their requests for higher welfare (compensation) packages that they say they need in order to provide for their constituents. These [activities] become such that the [political] party becomes competitor to the state. [The motto becomes] 'how to best serve the party' instead of 'how to best serve the country.' The legislators' main task is to no longer prioritize [her or his] party but rather the nation. Actually, legislators are supposed to be statespeople that [happen to be] Members of Parliament. Many of [them] are not yet matured.

For the government the participation in these sessions may entail some political responsibility but does not entail political risk (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). Despite the increase in the political powers of Parliament post-*Reformasi*, Indonesia is indeed a presidential system. Though ministers will perhaps be harshly criticized by Parliament, they cannot be forced to abandon their office because ministerial appointments are the privileges of the President. For the ministers this kind of arrangement is interesting in that when called by Parliament they will have the attitude of, 'I will come to you and there will be no political risk because I only answer to the President anyway' Anggoro (2006, interview with author) also characterized Indonesia's political system as a hybrid, that is 'parliamentary spirit combined with a presidential system.'

Nevertheless, it is also worthwhile to note that the Parliament that congregated after the constitutional amendments undertook its own diplomatic efforts. The portfolio of foreign affairs is vested in the First Commission. However, other commissions of Parliaments undertake numerous trips abroad to engage in advancing their respective agendas. Hence, there is a tendency to upgrade previously 'second-track' diplomacy undertaken by Parliament to that of 'first-track' diplomacy given the seriousness by which members of Parliament undertake their interests and agendas in foreign affairs. Moreover, the Indonesian House

[18] Word used was *sandiwara* meaning theatrical play

of Representatives is a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), an international organization that is reflective of the name in comprising of national parliaments worldwide. And to participate in the IPU and in engaging with other countries, Parliament set up a *Badan Kerjasama Antar Parlemen* (Board for Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation) that is more important than the chairpersons of a fraction or the chairpersons of commissions within the House of Representatives (Buchori 2006, interview with author). All political parties are represented on that board, with the major parties represented on its leadership council. Within the board various committees exist that are associated with a specific country, such as the Committee for Russia, the Committee for Czech Republic, and the Committee for Hungary (Pohan 2006, interview with author).

Despite the initiatives and the noble intentions undertaken by Members of Parliament as they engage in foreign relations, their activities have limited relevance in terms of foreign policy making. When Members of Parliament make visits abroad and convey to the host government certain messages, both the host government and the government from the country of those legislators know that the views expressed are those of the legislative branch, and at times even simply the views of that individual acting in his or her personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the whole Parliament, and definitely not the views of the executive branch. Oftentimes legislators utter certain messages to appease their domestic constituents or to score political points in their electoral districts; and the host government also knows that those messages are not the official policy position of the country from where the legislators come from (Hartono 2006, interview with author). Still, such journeys carried out by Members of Parliament provide valuable policy input for both the home and host governments. According to an interview of a senior official, such phenomena have been observed not only when Indonesian legislators visit other countries such as Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, where there have been cases of human rights abuses against Indonesian nationals, but also when legislators from countries such as the United States and Australia visited Indonesia.

While on many issues legislation is the main responsibility of the legislators, in reality it is still the executive that drives the agenda of government simply due to the fact that the executive branch has more resources than Members of Parliament (Anwar 2006, interview with author). And the same can be said for foreign policy. Legislators tend to be more reactive than proactive not because of personal qualities per se but more because of the way a presidential system of government works; legislators do not dictate where Indonesia's foreign policy should be

heading (Anwar 2006, interview with author). Hence, legislators react to some policies and check the implementation of other policies. Legislators tend to react on issues that they regard as contrary to the nationally accepted norms, such as recognition of Israel until the Palestine issue is settled and totally embracing the United States or its security ally Australia (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

Despite the apparently passive role played by Parliament in foreign policy, it remains important to note of Parliament's power of the purse or the power to block any executive initiatives and policies (Sukma 2006, interview with author). The objective of the executive in working with the legislative is in getting legitimacy. According to Sukma, in order to get legitimacy and working through Parliament the government must conduct consultations, public hearings, exchange of views, working lunches, and similar activities whereas in working through the public the government engages in public diplomacy, hosting of foreign policy breakfasts, and holds conferences, seminars, discussions and so forth with academia.

Suryadinata (2004, 98) highlighted an important point of the realities of post-Suharto presidential power. Keeping in mind that the direct presidential election law does not allow an independent candidate to contest the presidency unless he or she is nominated by a political party which has obtained three percent of the DPR seats or five percent of the valid votes for the DPR, the President must therefore accommodate the opinions of the political party or alliances which helped place the president in office.

The changes in power allocation to Parliament in foreign policy-making due to constitutional amendments, although limited to oversight of ambassadorial appointments, executive foreign policy initiatives, and budgetary control, have important ramifications for the actual foreign policy making itself.

The emerging role of the legislators in policy-making led to some ambiguity such as the appointment of new ambassadors and endorsement for foreign ambassadors to be accredited to Indonesia. Lubis (2003, 109) posited that:

> The ambiguity regarding the relationship between the presidency and the legislature is one of the most fundamental weakness of the 1945 Constitution. The rising power of the DPR/MPR is not only because the First Amendment (1999) and Second Amendment (2000) of the 1945 Constitution have taken away many of the President's prerogatives, but also because politically, the President's political party or support base is so weak under recent arrangements that he or she is unable to control a working majority in the DPR/MPR. In short, Indonesia is experiencing a power shift from the executive to the legislative branch of government.

Moreover, the rise of Parliament's power also led to ambiguity of its role in policy and their stance towards policy advocated by the executive branch. In an interview a former senior legislator argued that at times the principle by which Parliament choose to either support or reject executive policy initiative is by virtue of subjective egoism:

> What is the role of Parliament? When in power … Parliament does not always support the government. But when in opposition it doesn't mean that Parliament must constantly reject everything. But the task of Parliament is to be beside the Government, I think. But in cases where the government made a decision is that right, we will support it. But if in our opinion government has taken a decision that is not really right, we will correct it. [All of this power euphoria] is only a technicality of position, a form of [power] demarcation and [should] not [have reflected the level of] cooperation. [However,] this concept of [power sharing] is still too foreign for the friends in Parliament.

A thirty plus year veteran of Parliament who is also a Member of the First Commission, Sabam Sirait (2006, interview with author) thought that for a major issue, such as the separation of a province like East Timor for example, Parliament and the People's Consulative Assembly (MPR) must deliberate and decide on it, not individuals in the executive branch; moreover, the supremacy of Parliament and of MPR must prevail if the government is to behave constitutionally because *Reformasi* has begun and the law shall prevail.

As for the Parliament's respect towards the institution of the Presidency (and Vice-Presidency) and the Cabinet, Sirait (2006, interview with author) argued that although oftentimes there is a major disagreement on mostly domestic issues, Parliament continued to respect the executive branch, especially the office of the President. And when the time comes to express a no confidence vote, such as during the accountability speech of President B.J. Habibie, Parliament votes according to its conscience (Sirait 2006, interview with author) and let it be known that it did not approve of the President's performance.

Despite the reactive, checking and balancing, and funding roles of Parliament post-*Reformasi*, the freedom for members of Parliament to conduct foreign relations is guaranteed by a much more democratic state. Members of Parliament can freely express their views and undertake trips abroad on their own accord. This new legislative is in stark contrast to the era when the New Order was in full force. A Senior Member of Parliament who is also a member of the First Commission Sabam Sirait (2006, interview with author) recalled how for decades:

> Should a Member of Parliament wanted to attend an international

> conference for Parliamentarian worldwide, any of the United Nations conferences, they must first obtain materials from the government, especially the Department of Foreign Affairs, and then the materials must be checked by the secret police KOPKAMTIB [19] for approval. That was an extra-military power more powerful than the military. Already part of the military but with extraordinary powers.

3.4 The Military

Given the history of the republic one would expect that the military play a prevailing role in society. In assessing the present role of the military one must also account, however, for the state of civil-military relations in Indonesia.

3.4.1 *Dwi-Fungsi* Doctrine of the Military

Ever since the war for Indonesia's independence in 1945 the military has been an integral part of Indonesian political life (Crouch 2007). The underlying doctrine allowing for such an active role in politics by the military is *dwi-fungsi* (dual-function). The basis behind *dwi-fungsi* is rooted in what was originally promulgated by General A.H. Nasution as the Middle-Way Concept on 12 November 1958:

> … the Indonesian Armed Forces [are] not just the 'civilian tool' like in the Western Countries, nor a military regime which dominates the state power, but as one of many forces in society, the force driving the people's struggle that works together with the other forces of the people (Rinakit 2005, 19).

Re-emphasizing the same principle, General Ali Murtopo who later went on to establish the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, confirmed in 1974 the reasoning behind the argument that the military was best placed to govern Indonesia. Murtopo recounted of how:

> From the history of our country we can conclude that it is only because of the presence of ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) that the disintegration heading towards the destruction of our country could be avoided several times.

[19] KOPKAMTIB is an acronym for *Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), an organization set-up by the military originally to counter the presence of the Communist Party in Indonesia but after 1968 when the Communists were no longer thought to be in the country continued its mandate of collecting intelligence on Indonesian citizens and monitoring their activities for subversive motives, essentially acting as a secret police. The then Major General Suharto was its Commander from 1965 until 1969.

> Historically speaking ABRI is the only group in society which was born together with the new institution, namely, the state based on Pancasila … It is because ABRI has the ability and tradition to overcome group ideologies and interests that makes it the leader of the country (Rinakit 2005, 30).

Rinakit (2005, 30) believed that *Dwi-Fungsi* was indeed a political ideology and legitimization of the armed forces from the early start. Such a political ideology provided the armed forces with the leeway to be involved in both socio-economic and political affairs. It would have been different had *Dwi-Fungsi* been either an operational or a corporate ideology where scope for its political role was limited.

Over the years the elites within the armed forces did, in fact, occupy high positions in the bureaucracy and beyond. Following Jenkins (1984, 23-52), Rinakit (2005, 8) elaborated that top military officers held positions as cabinet ministers, secretary-generals and director-generals of important governmental departments, ambassadors, governors, mayors, sub-district and village heads, as well as senior positions in public firms, state enterprises, and private companies.

3.4.2 Military Reform

Despite the prevalence of the military in Indonesian political life, once *Reformasi* began to take off the military decided to put an end in its own involvement in political life. It was, in fact, the military itself that thought that their behavior was overstepping the original intention behind the *dwi-fungsi* doctrine. The then Chief of Staff for social political affairs to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (presently President of the Republic of Indonesia) believed that even in politics and in national daily life there had been a distortion in the traditional role of the military (Chrisnandi 2007, 106). Yudhoyono described that reforming the military had not been a sole endeavor for the Chief of Staff for Political and Social Affairs but the intention of many other top generals in the military too. Without intending to exclude many others, Yudhoyono mentioned the likes of Lieut. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Maj. Gen. Sudrajat, the late Lieut. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Lieut. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, and lastly, General Wiranto, whose support to the initiative was unparalleled in importance given his position as the then Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Chrisnandi 2007, 108).

Such a decision was indeed a major dilemma for General Wiranto. As recalled by Yudhoyono, on the one hand General Wiranto had an emotional relationship with President Suharto because the former had

been the latter's adjutant, but on the other hand Wiranto also had a commitment towards change and would like to listen to the voice of the Indonesian people (Chrisnandi 2007, 109).

Despite the support from the major figures in the military, there were still skeptics of *Reformasi* within Tentara Nasional Indonesia (National Soldier of Indonesia or TNI). The Commander of the Military Region Jaya during 1997-1998 responsible for the defense and security for the capital city Jakarta and its surrounding suburbs and present-day Secretary-General of the Department of Defense Lieut. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin believed that the TNI was still the foundation of the nation (Chrisnandi 2007, 123). Yudhoyono too faced numerous and widespread resistance from his seniors and former leadership of the military. They warned Yudhoyono not to make too many fundamental changes for *dwi-fungsi*, and saw the birth of TNI as a basic issue. Hence extreme care must be taken when carrying out *Reformasi* (Chrisnandi 2007, 107). Present-day chief of the State Intelligence Board, Lieut. Gen. (retired) Syamsir Siregar, reinforced the notion at the turn of the century that it wasn't necessary for people to force the military to return to the barracks, so to speak, for judging from history without the military there would be no Indonesia (Rinakit 2005, 115). Siregar's point is a reflection of the worry that the military have of the rising supremacy of civilians.

The military is worried that the civilian leadership could not guarantee two key points that provided for the stability of the republic (Rinakit 2005, 221-223). The first was the survival of the Pancasila ideology and the Constitution of 1945 as the basic legal foundation. Given the rise in the political power of the political parties, it was no surprise that such a worry was warranted. Several political parties, such as the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB or the Moon and Star Party), Partai Keadilan (PK or the Justice Party), and the Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD or the Democratic People's Party) embrace Islam, and lastly, Socialism as the party's ideology. The concern was repeated by General Wiranto that the then highest legislative council, the MPR, was extremely contaminated, to use his word, with the various political interests encompassing many ideologies (Chrisnandi 2007, 125). The second key issue was the survival of Indonesia as a unitary geographical state, commonly known as *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (NKRI or the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). The pressures towards regional autonomy were great. Areas such as South Sulawesi, West Java, Banten, and Aceh wanted the implementation of the Islamic Syariah Law. Several others wanted their own national governments. As a socio-political force that transcends these various interests, the military aspires to be able to continue to safeguard the unity of the republic.

The military took an active stride to connect with the public during the debate concerning *Reformasi* of the military. The military leadership held dialogues with members of the public and the university community in various cities during March 1998 During those meetings the military leadership communicated its desire to engage only in gradual internal military reform as to not allow the possibility of national instability (Chrisnandi 2005, 8).

Despite the resistance especially from within its own ranks, the military finally enacted *Reformasi* on 1 April 1999 in the form of an official decision issued by the Headquarters of the TNI. The doctrine of *dwi-fungsi* ceased to exist. The military would have no further role in the social and political affairs of the state. This had major ramifications for the military organizational units at the provincial, regional, and even village levels. The practice of *kekaryaan* or of the secondment of high military officers to civilian posts would no longer be continued. The military would no longer be represented in Parliament. The liquidation of all security related socio-political organizations within the various regional military commands were carried out. Such a step was manifested in the change of the Chief of the Staff for Socio-Political Affairs into the Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs. The *Dewan Sosial Politik Pusat* (WANSOSPOLPUS or the Central Council for Socio-Political Affairs) and the *Dewan Social Politik Daerah* (WANSOSPOLDA or the Regional Council for Socio-Political Affairs) were abolished. In fact, there has been a separation between the police who was to be responsible for security and the military, who was to be responsible for external defense. The long-standing political affiliation with the Golkar Party was replaced by the embrace of a neutral stance toward all political parties. The name change occurred from *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (ABRI or the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) which carries heavy connotations of the New Order campaigns of integrating the military with society by the introduction of many programs such as *ABRI Masuk Desa* (ABRI Entering the Village) to that of the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI or the National Soldier of Indonesia) to provide an analogy with the military's role during the revolution, when TNI was the people's army.. However, one change did strike a strong chord. And that was the introduction of a new military doctrine.

Taken to be analyzed together with its views on reform (Mabes ABRI 1998), the new paradigm of the military as reflected in the military's white paper (Mabes TNI 1999) is somewhat reminiscent of the role that it had played in Indonesia's history. This new doctrine would address the concern brought forth by Maj. Gen. Djoko Besariman, former Senior Advisor to the Commander of TNI and former chief of the Army's Staff

and Command School, of the military itself having to reform its culture. It was argued that they must be more subservient to the law and to regulations (Chrisnandi 2007, 120). The new paradigm essentially changed the socio-political role of the military from that of a control role to a more influencing role, and in influencing from that of a direct into an indirect influence, and sharing the socio-political role with civilians in integrating the defense and non-defense roles. This new paradigm constitutes TNI's fourth paradigm since independence. Originally, during General Sudirman's leadership, the TNI was the people's army having both territorial and fighter functions. During General Nasution's leadership, the TNI had a social and political role, though not as dominant as ABRI's social and political role during General Suharto's leadership. And with the new paradigm, TNI is back as a people's army again. Despite the various paradigms, it was interesting to note that throughout history the military's self perception stayed constant as that of revolutionary soldiers (Rinakit 2005, 103).

3.4.3 Military Reform Sustainability

Indonesia has undertaken a *Reformasi* that probably cannot be turned back in time. However, will the *Reformasi* undertaken by the military be sustainable? Providing an answer to this question is a key as to whether the military is an elite group on the basis of an *ad hoc* and temporary phase of governance or on the basis of a long-term stable new power structure in Indonesian politics. The nature of the circumstances of the analysis shall have an impact on the resulting findings of this study.

One way to determine the sustainability of the military reforms would be to analyze the underlying causes of such reforms. According to Lieut. Gen. Agus Widjojo and former Head of the State Intelligence Board Lieut. Gen. Z.A. Maulani, there were three reasons why Wiranto and his cadre of generals redefined the military's socio-political role (Rinakit 2005, 102-104). The first reason was the change in the global strategic environment that required the military to change and the country to engage in a demilitarization which was congruent with democratization or be left out of the global community. The second reason was the increasingly fierce competition requiring the capitalization of civilians and their value added managerial and technical skills, which a military repositioning of its socio-political role would enhance. The third reason was the reaction from better educated citizens whom regard the socio-political role of the military as extending beyond its mandated duty of defending the nation.

At the time Lieut. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had similar

reasons for embracing change (Chrisnandi 2007, 106). His realization of the extent that the military had exceeded its mandated duties, even within the doctrine of *dwi-fungsi*, in combination with his realization of the ideal structure of the civil-military relationship and the aspirations within the larger society of the need for the military to engage in reform led Yudhoyono, in his official capacity as the military's chief of socio-political affairs, to spearhead the military reform campaign.

However, stressing external impetuses for internal reform of the military ignores the complexity of institutional causes for such drivers of change. Due to the limited availability of command posts and the increasing number of graduates from the military academies, command tenures were too short for officers to have a comprehensive understanding of their command posts which, in combination with the military's financial mismanagement, limited the effectiveness of the military in doing its job by virtue of a tendency to engage in paternalistic rivalries (Rinakit (2005, 104-105).

Despite the newly self-proclaimed role in socio-political affairs, former military officers still play a role in the governance of the republic. The significance of this phenomenon is related to the argument by Mietzner (2006, 44) that in courting active military leaders any elected president, whether a former general or civilian, would seek the support of the armed forces and, in turn, protect the fundamental interests of the military. This argument is based on the following argument by Razak (2004) as referenced by Mietzner in that:

> … [though] it has always been debated whether a retired military or police officer is considered a civilian or military man … [however] it is difficult to believe that a retired military or police officer has no emotional links or organizational loyalty to their previous institution (Mietzner 2006, 44).

During the emergence of new political parties in 1999 and 2004, there was no dearth of parties that were led by or involved retired generals. Some examples were Gen. (retired) Edi Sudradjat in Partai Keadilan and Persatuan Indonesia (Justice and Indonesian Unity Party), Gen. (retired) R. Hartono in Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (Functional Caring for the Nation Party), Lieut. Gen. (retired) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party) while Lieut. Gen. (retired) Budi Harsono was the Secretary-General of Golongan Karya (Functional Group Party), Lieut. Gen. (retired) Yunus Yosfiah as the Secretary-General of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party), Maj. Gen. (retired) Theo Syafei in charge of the research arm of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), and Maj. Gen. (retired) Suwarno as the Chairman of the Central Council of the Partai

Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party).

President Abdurrahman Wahid installed six top military in his cabinet. General Wiranto was appointed as the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs while also holding the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Meanwhile, four former generals and a former admiral were placed in key ministries. Agum Gumelar became Minister of Transportation. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became the Minister for Energy and Mines, Soerjadi Soedirdja the Minister of Home Affairs, Luhut Pandjaitan as the Minister of Trade, and Freddy Numberi as the Minister of State Apparatus.

President Megawati also retained several generals in her cabinet: retired Lieut. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, retired Lieut. Gen. Hari Sabarno as the Minister of Home Affairs, and elevated the Head of the State Intelligence Board to that of a cabinet level, led by retired Lieut. Gen. A.M. Hendropriyono. Megawati tended to become closer to the military partly due to the intrastate fighting in Aceh for she believed that there should be no concession to the separatists (Alatas 2006, interview with author).

Despite the public statements of no longer closely engaging itself in socio-political affairs that had been communicated by the military, these cabinet appointments show that some remnants of the military were still active in the governance of the republic. However, for the purpose of analysis their military affiliation was not taken into account given that these cabinet ministers are under oath to serve the interest of the republic and not that of any specific group, i.e. their previous institutions. After all, should any of these cabinet members fail to deliver in advancing the agenda of the President that is in the interest of the republic, the President can simply ask the concerned minister to tender his or her resignation.

The other active service top military officers, however, may or may not exert influence towards policy. In this context, one can look at the way that the military influence policy by acting either as a spoiler who opposes a leader’s policies, a critical supporter of a leader’s policies, or as a political tool that is used by a leader to support his or her policies. Rinakit (2005, 38-54) observed how the military underwent a role transformation from initially being a spoiler in the earlier years of the republic after independence, to a critical supporter during the transition from the Presidency of Soekarno to Suharto, and to a political tool during the last one and a half decade of the presidency of Suharto.

3.4.4 Military Involvement in Domestic and Foreign Policy Making

During and after *Reformasi*, the previous discussion of the proper role played by the military in policy making was still inconclusive. Despite the *de facto* affiliation of former political personnel in political affairs, the military's New Paradigm has made it difficult for active serving members, to become involved in governance. The key objective of the military has since then been on making itself more professional and subordinate to civilian rule. This has been the case for domestic policy. However, let us investigate how this applies to foreign policy.

As elaborated by Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono (2006, interview with author), though foreign policy is led by the foreign minister, in terms of substance:

> Responsibility for defense issues fell on both the TNI Headquarters and the Department of Defense, collectively. [Prior to *Reformasi*] in terms of tactical response, TNI Headquarters was responsible. Since December 2005, policy-making responsibility has been moved to the Department of Defense. Policy, strategy, and management are now managed at the Department of Defense. Funding issues are all dealt with in one gate, and that is the Department of Defense. But [this phenomenon happened] only now. But before, during the tenure of Defense Ministers Matori Abdul Djalil and Mahfud MD, practically all matters were dealt with at the TNI Headquarters. At this time the budget of the Department of Defense is larger than that of the TNI Headquarters. Previously, the budget of TNI Headquarters was larger than that of the Department of Defense. This shows a shift in supremacy in terms of budgeting …

In line with its behavior in the domestic sphere, the military have also receded from participating in foreign policy (Alatas; Sukma; Anwar 2006, interviews with author). According to Sukma, the military should not get involved in foreign policy issues because defense policy should be driven by foreign policy considerations. And such thinking has generally been accepted by the military, as manifested in the Defense White Paper of the year 2003 whereby Indonesia's first line of defense is, in fact, diplomacy since the country lacked formidable defense capabilities (Sukma 2006, interview with author).

In terms of foreign policy, prior to the promulgation of the New Paradigm within the structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs there used to be a longstanding position called the Director-General for Social and Cultural Affairs which most often was held by a one-star general. Since *Reformasi* with the restructuring of the Department of Foreign Affairs this directorate-general ceased to exist.

During the New Order, many, and at times all, ambassadors of

Indonesia to Southeast Asian nations and to key Asian and Western countries were from the military. Since *Reformasi* the distribution of ambassadorships held by high-level military officers has declined. But these changes were already underway before *Reformasi* during the period when President Suharto wanted to reduce the role of the military to use it as a political tool for the president to control the country.

Today, roughly from one-third to about half of all ambassadorships is distributed between career foreign service officers and political appointees consisting of former generals, but also ministers, and prominent members of parliament. Again, even generals or admirals that are appointed as ambassadors after *Reformasi* must undergo a 'fit and proper' evaluation by Parliament. Hence, they can no longer simply represent the interests of their former institutions, but instead, if they want to proceed to become ambassadors, must be prepared to justify their appointment by showing the mindset and competency of an Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia and not that of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces.

Similar to the diplomatic practices of many countries, other than in ambassadorial capacities present-day top-rank military personnel that are directly active in the implementation of foreign policy serve either as a military adviser at the permanent mission to the United Nations or as defense attachés to diplomatic posts where the military relationship between Indonesia and the country warrants representation at the level of brigadier-general or above. The defense attachés of many other diplomatic posts are usually a colonel, or a brigadier-general in larger diplomatic posts, from either one of the military services. And likewise, as present in many militaries around the world, within the Headquarters of the Armed Forces and at the Department of Defense highly ranked military officers deal with the issues of foreign relations within the operational framework as shall later be discussed. The military of *Reformasi* performs a supporting function *vis-à-vis* the other governmental entities in the making of foreign policy.

3.5 The Bureaucracy

Like many other governments around the world, the bureaucratic machinery that exists to support the operations of the government in Indonesia constitutes the institutional memory that records decades of the manner of governance. Or as a former senior legislator and Megawati's former political strategist puts it, 'When political chaos occurs, the

bureaucracy is always intact' (Buchori 2006, interview with author). Given the 'natural' inclination of bureaucracies to maintain the status quo for the interest of self – preservation, one would best refrain from jumping into such consensus when analyzing the bureaucracy in Indonesia post-*Reformasi*. The term bureaucracy is normally interpreted to mean the machinery that supports whoever is in power but contrary to this common practice, in the context of this study the bureaucracy refers to the senior bureaucrats who, by virtue of engaging either directly or indirectly in presumably non-conflict of interest bearing political activities outside the scope of their official job descriptions, are elevated to power through their positions in the cabinet. These officials, despite their long bureaucratic experience, have attributes that add value to the leaders of the government that recruited them. Though their official status in occupying those cabinet positions is that of a political appointee, for the context of this study the nature of their professional background means that they should be classified as a member of the bureaucracy.

Reformasi provided the opportunity for all branches of government to engage in re-organization and reform themselves in many ways of operating, and many government institutions undertook massive reforms as well. In fact, individuals serving in the cabinet were required to sign a contract stating their willingness to be 'loyal, honest, hard-working, giving priority to state and national interests over parties' interests, and to be free from corruption and misconduct' as to be role models for the civil service and to the people (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata 2005, 131).

Moreover, during the New Order a doctrine of mono-loyalty was embraced throughout the bureaucracy. All civil servants, from the secretary-generals and director-generals to the lowest official on the pecking order, were required to be a member of the political function group of *Golongan Karya* (GOLKAR). GOLKAR contested and won most of the parliamentary elections with the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (Indonesian Democratic Party or PDI) and *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party or PPP). After *Reformasi*, although Indonesia became a presidential system, cabinet members are no longer automatically members of GOLKAR. Civil servants and the serving members of the armed forces and the police are not allowed to become involved in any political activity. The objective was to make the state apparatus politically neutral.

Despite the changes in governmental structures and procedures, Juwono (2006, interview with author) believed that foreign policy has always been and remains elitist. The difference is that post-*Reformasi* the foreign ministry is open to suggestions and policy recommendations, especially so with Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda (Juwono 2006,

interview with author). Whenever the foreign minister is in the capital he holds so-called foreign policy breakfast meetings. The idea is to encapsulate the various views from all sectors of society into the policy formulation. And likewise, to explain to a wider constituency within Indonesia the foreign policy course undertaken by the government (Sukma 2006, interview with author). Though the intention is to embrace the various points of views, these breakfast meetings are by invitation only, however, and are targeted towards the elites within the respective societal groups, and especially those from academia and other policy analysis institutions (Juwono 2006, interview with author). There is also a tendency that civil societies are appearing to represent the interests of the 'mass electorate' thinking that such a representation constitutes the non-elitist view on international issues (Juwono 2006, interview with author). In any case, such accommodationist approaches became effective and were frequently used by the foreign minister (Sukma 2006, interview with author).

3.5.1 Key Governmental Establishments in Foreign Policy

During the New Order of President Suharto, the *State Secretariat* was the core of the bureaucracy of the central government. All major policies had to go through the Secretary of State. Things went so far that by the 1980's all goods and services used by all government institutions had to go through the State Secretariat (Hidayat 2007, 64), including the purchase of weapons and the distribution of agricultural aid. Moreover, the State Secretariat acted as the manager of the office of President Suharto, and thus policy and business interests were often mixed in that institution. Staff members of the State Secretariat received a far superior compensation compared to that of the other governmental institutions to ensure their loyalty to the powers of the status quo (Hidayat 2007, 65).

President Abdurrahman Wahid thought that this system was a hindrance to governance reform and consequently took the decision to reform this key institution thoroughly. He changed its structure and function leading ultimately to the breaking up of the State Secretariat into five separate institutions. The State Secretariat was separated into various institutions led, respectively, by the Secretary of State, Cabinet Secretary, Presidential Secretary, Military Secretary, and the Secretary of Government. During Megawati's presidency, she inherited the governmental structure of the Secretariat of State from President Wahid. She replaced Wahid's Secretary of State with Bambang Kesowo, her Chief of Staff when she was Vice-President.

Though not within the confines of the State Secretariat, the position of the *Minister of Defense* and the *Commander of the Armed Forces* has

traditionally been held by one person, usually a four-star general. President Wahid separated those two offices and installed a civilian, Juwono Sudarsono, as Minister of Defense. He was later replaced by another civilian, Mahfud M.D. During Megawati's presidency, the office of the Minister of Defense has also been filled by a civilian, Matori Abdul Djalil, who, however, was not able to carry out his duties for three years due to his illness. Prior to these appointments it had been forty years since a civilian last filled the post of the Minister of Defense.

According to Sukma (2006, interview with author), there is only one institution that can provide reason in foreign policy by virtue of having the personnel with the experience to carry out diplomatic assignments and who have been engaged in understanding the dynamic international environment in which Indonesia carries out its foreign policy. During Megawati's governance, the *Department of Foreign Affairs* as the front-liner for Indonesian diplomacy had undergone organizational restructuring to face both international and domestic factors. The Department understood that diplomacy was no longer solely the projection of national interests abroad but must also get itself involved in the communication of international developments back home (Vermonte 2005, 36).

It is worthy to note that the two most prominent members of the cabinet on the issue of foreign policy were the *Minister for Foreign Affairs* who, until the time of appointment, was a senior Foreign Service Officer (FSO) serving as Director-General for Political Affairs at the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the *Minister and Secretary of State* who, until the time of appointment was a senior Civil Service Officer (CSO) with extensive experience in the State Secretariat who was seconded to become the Chief of the Secretariat of the Vice-President.

Despite the individual and political nature of these ministerial appointments, it is nonetheless warranted that these ministers reflect decades of experience as bureaucrats in the Department of Foreign Affairs and in the Secretariat of State, respectfully.

In terms of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the year 2003 proved to be a pivotal time and massive reforms were undertaken. Despite the numerous initiatives undertaken by the department to ensure its alignment with the mission and vision of Indonesia's foreign policy in the era of democratization, the following changes should be noted.

Recognizing the need to stay in touch with members of the various stakeholders in government and society and to be responsive to the needs of Indonesia's citizens, the Department of Foreign Affairs created the position of the Department Spokesperson (usually though not always concurrently serving as the Chief of Staff and Head of the Office of the

Minister), the Director for Public Diplomacy, and the Director for the Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Legal Entities. With the establishment of these new directorates, a new permanent forum for communication between non-state actors and the government was created whereas before these changes the modes of communication was based on personal relationships, which were at times problematic due to the differences in personality between those in government and those in academia (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). Perhaps the creation of these new lines of communication with the general public could be attributed to a general make-over of the organizational culture of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Prior to *Reformasi*, access to those in the bureaucracy was limited by ideological constraints such as the attitude that, 'I am in government and therefore I know better than you outside of the foreign policy making process' whereas presently such constraints on accessing bureaucrats are attributed only to the technicalities of scheduling (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). The establishment of the directorate of public information signifies that the government now goes to the people, and not the other way around. Staff of this directorate routinely travels throughout the archipelago conducting discussions on foreign policy while inviting local leaders. Such exercises are effective in accommodating societal groups in major cities throughout the country (Sukma 2006, interview with author). These trips serve the two purposes of getting a feel of the people's, or rather the elites and their aspirations throughout the archipelago on foreign policy issues while at the same time providing the opportunity to explain to them the world and why the government is undertaking certain direction and initiatives in its foreign policy (Sukma 2006, interview with author).

In terms of decision making on foreign policy formulation and implementation, a new structure has been created. Prior to 2003 the Minister for Foreign Affairs[20] was assisted by the various director-generals for the respective functional portfolios of political, economic, and socio-cultural affairs. The formulation and implementation of policy in the specific policy arenas were relegated to the directors responsible for the specific major regions, i.e. Europe, East Asia and the Pacific, etc., and for international organizations. The Secretary–General acted as the chief operating officer of the Department, so to speak, dealing mostly

[20] The educational backgrounds of the decision-makers reflect upon the manner by which these officials see the world and propose foreign policy. Therefore a brief coverage of this issue is undertaken here. Both the Secretary of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs received their graduate education in the United States. The foreign minister undertook his master's in law and diplomacy and doctorate in law at The Fletcher School of Tufts University and at the University of Virginia, respectively while both the foreign minister and the state secretary undertook their master's degrees at Harvard Law School.

with the operational and administrative aspects of foreign policy. The area portfolios were managed by the many bureaus with the leadership of each directorate led by a director.

The reforms undertaken within the Department aligned the management of the foreign policy issues according to both regional and forum-based criteria. Hence, the portfolios of the Director-General for Foreign Economic Relations and the Director-General for Socio-Cultural Affairs were integrated into the regional and forum-based organizations. Among the many first-echelon positions, the Minister for Foreign Affairs after the reform is assisted in policy formulation and implementation by the Director-General for Asia-Pacific and Africa, the Director-General for Americas and Europe, and the Director-General for Multilateral Affairs.[21] Each encompasses the political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects of foreign policy that belong to the respective bilateral geographical and multilateral international-organizations based forums. The office of the Director-General for ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Cooperation remains unchanged for the office is partly governed by an ASEAN-based agreement for each ASEAN member to have a national secretariat that is led by a Director-General. However, the Secretary-General has undertaken a new responsibility by acting as the highest ranked official that attends the Senior-Officials' Meetings (SOM) held within the framework of ASEAN.[22] In terms of the specific policy arenas which are still headed by the directors, the directorate of European affairs has been divided into two directorates, that of Western European Affairs and that of Eastern European Affairs. More divisions can be seen within the specific policy arenas dealing with international organizations. The

[21] While still on the subject of educational backgrounds, the two most senior officials supporting the foreign minister on the bilateral foreign policy making process at the Department of Foreign Affairs (Director-General for Asia Pacific and Africa and Director-General for Americas and Europe) both obtained their Master of Arts in international relations degree at a U.S. university (SAIS of The Johns Hopkins University) as well. The former proceeded to undertake another master's degree in political economy and a doctorate in international political economy from The Ohio State University.

[22] Through Presidential Decrees Number 20 and Number 21 Year 2008 dated 10 March 2008 the President of the Republic of Indonesia has created the position of the Deputy Foreign Minister within the Department of Foreign Affairs. The second-highest foreign policy official is both a member of the Cabinet and an actively serving Foreign Service Officer - not a political appointee. Approximately five months later on 28 August 2008 the President of Indonesia has appointed Indonesian Ambassador to Vienna Triyono Wibowo (for both bilateral and multilateral accreditations) as Deputy Foreign Minister. Deputy Foreign Minister Wibowo was sworn into office on 11 September 2008 by Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda. These developments are indeed beyond the time period under analysis by this study. However, this development is discussed because of the strategic ramification for Indonesia's foreign policy. After *Reformasi* such developments in governing has become not so few. To put things into context, for Indonesia the position of the Deputy Foreign Minister is not without precedent. The post existed in the period of Parliamentary Democracy, during the early years of President Soekarno's term in office. In relation to ASEAN, it has yet been publicly announced as of 15 October 2008 at what level, if any, the Deputy Foreign Minister will participate in its sessions.

directorate of international organizations that previously dealt with United Nations affairs has been abolished and its mandate has been taken over by three different directorates dealing with political and security, economic and environmental affairs, and human rights and global issues. This massive reorganization clearly produced deep ramifications not only on the skill expectancies of diplomats in mustering the ability to exercise not just a functional competency but a multitude of competencies, but also the nature of the policy recommendations submitted and discussed to the Foreign Minister.

3.6 Structure and Process of Foreign Policy Making

As Rezasyah (1995, 249) observed, before *Reformasi*, foreign and defense issues were within the primary realm of the Indonesian bureaucracy, with the President himself standing at the apex of a centralized mechanism possessing the sole power of decision-making. Formal decisions were made and implemented through established bureaucratic institutions by virtue of intra-bureaucratic competition. The authority of the President was both personal and institutional, while the authority of the top office holders was derived from their personal relationship with the President and with former holders of their respective offices. And any foreign policy matter that was not handled by the President was handled by the bureaucrats close to the President, and at the time they were dominated by the military (Sirait 2006, interview with author). As nicely summed up by Anwar (2006, interview with author):

> During the Suharto era we have an idea of how the foreign policy is going to be. Well, we knew because Suharto said so. Who was influential? We don't know. Nobody dared to say this is so and so's idea. So who made the policy during Suharto's time? Suharto made the policy during Suharto's era.

However, with respect to foreign economic issues, actors tended to become more diversified. Even though the state's dominance under the Presidential leadership still prevailed, decisions made were based on concerted strategies between the bureaucracy, local business community, foreign capital, and the global rule regulating international labor.

After *Reformasi* the power structure experienced numerous changes. Taking office after President Suharto resigned, President B.J. Habibie had the incumbent Foreign Minister Ali Alatas as his principal advisor on foreign policy. However, President Habibie was also open to advice from

the academic Dewi Fortuna Anwar. A veteran political scientist specializing in international politics at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Anwar was Habibie's foreign policy aide when he was Vice-President. Given the volatile political environment at the domestic as well as the international level as the issue of East Timor came into the limelight, Habibie also tended to listen to Anwar when he became President.

When President Wahid assumed office, his Foreign Minister was one of his most trusted advisors from the same political party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB or the National Reawakening Party). With a doctorate from the United States and a stint as a visiting professor at Harvard University, Alwi Shihab was an intellectual asset for President Wahid. However, Shihab's specialization was in Islamic theology. Moreover, President Wahid often required the presence of Foreign Minister Shihab at domestic political events. Hence, the details on foreign policy had to be relegated to the career bureaucrats at the Department of Foreign Affairs.

When Megawati Soekarnoputri assumed the presidency, she was firm in sticking to the portfolios of her respective ministers. Unlike the foreign policy under Suharto that was dominated by the executive branch of government, Megawati listened to and accommodated domestic constituents and political players. The government of Megawati was sensitive to the aspirations of the political leaders, including legislators, and representatives of bureaucratic institutions. Such accommodation by Megawati was reflected dominantly in policy-making at the implementation-level.

However, in terms of foreign policy more authority was placed primarily on the Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, a career foreign service officer, more so than had been the case in previous presidential administrations (Anwar 2003B, 6). The Foreign Minister would be the President's most trusted foreign policy advisor and take the lead in terms of recommending foreign policy initiatives (Alatas; Anwar; Matondang; Sudarsono; S Wahid 2006, interviews with author). However, this arrangement was not only due to the trust by the President in the respective foreign minister but constituted a behavior that can be observed across all of policy portfolios; Megawati very much trusted her ministers (Buchori; Suryopratomo; S Wahid 2006, interviews with author). Megawati's party rival Golkar's former Vice-Presidential candidate Salahuddin Wahid (2006, interview with author) believed, however, that:

> A president should not rely [too heavily] on [her/his] ministers. A president ought to have a position and the ministers should then implement

> the president's prerogative. Why this way? [It should not be the other way around whereby] the president follows [his or her] ministers. What if the ministers differ, then the president shall get confused … in general, in my opinion, foreign policy is more complicated than domestic politics. Wide ramifications. Domestic politics is much more simple whereas factors influencing our foreign policy that we cannot control are many such that Bu[Madame] Mega[wati] really relied on her foreign minister in decisions involving foreign policy.

Since Minister Wirajuda returned Indonesia's foreign policy back to the New Order in terms of aligning priorities according to the spheres of influence concept, Anwar (2003, 6) likened the foreign policy of President Megawati to that of President Suharto. And for other issues of international relevance President Megawati relied almost entirely on the State Secretary, Bambang Kesowo (Mizuno 2003, 146). Though the foreign minister took the lead in foreign policy, in terms of substance in dealing with economic issues the respective ministers with related portfolios, such as the Minister of Trade, Minister of Industry, Minister of Finance, and others, would be the point person in the team. For matters related to security issues, the point person of the foreign policy team would be *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI or Indonesian Armed Forces) Headquarters (Sudarsono 2006, interview with author).

For foreign policy making the President is assisted by the relevant ministers. In the case of President Megawati Soekarnoputri, the mandate for foreign policy fell on the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Analysts regarded Megawati as not too well versed in foreign policy issues (Anwar; Sukma 2006, interviews with author). However, those who worked closely with her observed that in foreign policy President Megawati had 'quite a firm view about some of the things that she thought ought to be done' (Alatas 2006, interview with author).

An example of how she engaged in decision-making was during a cabinet meeting when discussing what to do with the businessmen who embezzled trillions out of state funds, whether to jail them and let the state lose its funds or ask them to return the money but give them freedom. She would introduce the question, ask the respective cabinet ministers for their opinions, and afterwards make the decision and announce it to cabinet in the following: 'I [Megawati], as President of the Republic of Indonesia have decided that those who embezzle state funds must return the money so that it can be used to fund development and to make our people prosper … of course there is a compromise in that the perpetrators are set free but at least the funds are returned' (Parengkuan 2006, interview with author). Such an approach defied conventional legal practice of dealing with thieves but showed the extent by which

pragmatism was embraced in some issues by President Megawati.

Other ministers when speaking out on foreign policy issues of their concern at cabinet meetings would most likely be heard by the president but the president would still ask the foreign minister to act upon the latter's best judgment (Anwar; Sukma; Wirajuda 2006, interviews with author). Characteristic of President Megawati, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) explained that:

> [In terms of addressing policy portfolios] President Megawati is quite disciplined … in viewing issues with respect to their respective [ministerial] portfolios. So she is not easily swayed to listen to comments from others regarding foreign policy. She will refer to the issue by saying, 'this is the portion of the foreign minister.' So getting interference from others in the cabinet would not be easy. She often reverts by saying [to the other ministers], 'please discuss with [the foreign minister]', or 'I would like to hear what the foreign minister has to say on this issue.' This [style of governance] helps in foreign policy decision making. There is not so much chaos nor confusion [23].

Such response was a reflection of the commonly held conventional wisdom among policy analysts that foreign policy during the Presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri was managed by the foreign minister as the leading figure. This response was not due to the phenomenon of interview bias by which subjects accord to themselves more importance than what they actually exercise in the course of policy making. Responding to how much influence in terms of percentage was actually exercised by the foreign minister, Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) elaborated as follows:

> I would not put it in the form of percentage. I thought I have full confidence in managing the foreign policy decision and decision making process and its operationalization with the trust and confidence from the part of [President Megawati] to me … with trust mean[ing due to the] excellent relations and, in a way, also to her inclination to agree on many of the foreign policy prescription that I submit to her. In many ways I have no difficulties in terms of policy recommendations for her to accept. [Again] she is very strict in observing the policy portfolio allocation discipline mentioned earlier. She says, 'This is the portion of the foreign minister. If you have a different opinion you talk to him.' There were clear rules on how we [cabinet ministers] interacted.

[23] Original term used by Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda was *simpang siur*.

Despite the dominance of the Department of Foreign Affairs in foreign policy, Deputy Coordinating Minister Albert Matondang (2006, interview with author) rightly put the fact in the proper context:

> Post-*Reformasi* although there is democratization, the essential element of foreign policy is determined and formulated by the Department of Foreign Affairs. And such policy recommendation is conveyed to the President, and then the President decides. But after the President has decided, the policy is no longer that of the Department of Foreign Affairs. It's the decision of the national leader ... but the preparation of the materials was from the Department of Foreign Affairs. And even I know that until now that is the case. But when the policy is conveyed to the leaders, then it's the policy of the national leaders. It is no longer that of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Cost and benefit calculations have already been done.

Kompas Editor-in-Chief Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author) confirmed his view that at the end, the decision-maker is the leader of the nation. Former influential Secretary of State Bambang Kesowo (2006, interview with author) reiterated how it is the President of the Republic of Indonesia that decides on foreign policy. Kesowo (2006, interview with author) conveyed the following to President Megawati:

> You are the one who decides in foreign policy … what foreign policy is and how it is to be implemented. Foreign minister? What foreign minister? As assistant to the President the foreign minister only helps to formulate policy. But to decide, that is the prerogative of the President.

President Megawati was also assisted by the Coordinating-Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. The Coordinating Minister, however, has a portfolio that not only covers the foreign policy, but also many other aspects of policy entailing the security and defense of the republic[24]. Hence, the minister could not give priority solely to foreign

[24] The Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs coordinates the policy portfolios across the following governmental institutions: Department of Interior Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Defense, Department of Law and Human Rights, Office of the Attorney-General, Department of Transportation, Department of Oceans and Fisheries, Department of Communication and Information, National Police, Armed Forces, and the State Intelligence Board. In the opinion of the author, the Coordinating Ministers (or perhaps aptly termed as Senior Ministers for the Coordination of the respective functional policy portfolios) each constitutes a leg in a tripod Prime Ministership linking the Cabinet (appointed officials by the President that can be appointed not necessarily by sole virtue of professional competency and achievement but rather by the President's domestic political and future electoral considerations) and the President and Vice-President (elected officials by the people). In Indonesia's pre-Republican past, after the death of Prime Minister Gadjah Mada in 1364, King Hayam Wuruk split Gadjah Mada's former premiership into four separate ministries. To the knowledge of the author, the Coordinating Ministry 'system' had began with the Third Development Cabinet during the presidency of Suharto, and had been implemented ever since.

policy. Though at times incredibly influential, the Minister and Secretary of State had a wider spectrum of issues under his portfolio that does not only allow priority to be given to foreign policy but also to other more urgent issues that lie before the state.

This delegation of foreign policy to her ministers by President Megawati was not necessarily by design as she tended to leave the management of the government to her ministers. And with respect to foreign policy, this managerial style privileged the Department of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, President Megawati did not have too many bureaucratic non-structural political advisors due to the lack of laws allowing incoming presidents to bring in their own staff of advisors (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

Beyond the power structural changes that correspond to the idiosyncracies of the different presidents, the emergence of two pieces of important legislation played a key role in framing the conduct and assigning responsibility for foreign policy among the various actors at the national, regional, municipal, second-track, and other levels actively engaged in foreign relations. Undang-Undang (UU or Law) 37 Year 1999 and Law 24 of 2000 were promulgated in the House of Representatives upon the recommendation and the submission of the draft bill by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Sabam Sirait (2006, interview with author), a senior legislator and member of the First Commission of the House of Representatives, believed that the promulgation of this bill would ensure that the foreign policy process runs smoothly and takes account the views of Parliament, especially when it comes to approving foreign loan programs that Indonesia was about to enter. Part of the reason for Parliament's support was its trauma during the New Order where it had been bypassed when it came for Indonesia to undertake new foreign debt.

There are currently three Ministers for Policy Coordination having responsibility for three policy arenas. Other than for political, legal, and security affairs, there is also the Coordinating Minister for Economics Affairs and the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare. The former coordinates policy across the following institutions: Department of Finance, Department of Agriculture, Department of Forestry, Department of Transportation, Department of Labor and Transmigration, Department of Industry, Department of Trade, Department of Energy and Mineral Resources, Department of Public Works, Department of Oceans and Fisheries, State Ministry for Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises, State Ministry for Research and Technology, State Ministry for the Underdeveloped Areas, and the State Ministry of State Enterprises. The latter coordinates policy across the following institutions: Department of Health, Department of National Education, Department of Social Affairs, Department of Religious Affairs, Department of Culture and Tourism, State Ministry for the Environment, State Ministry for the Empowerment of Women, State Ministry for the Optimization of State Apparatus, State Ministry for Public Housing, State Ministry for Youth and Sports Affairs, and other relevant governmental institutions. As evident from this discussion, the ministerial oversights at times overlap. This discussion was undertaken to provide a background for those unfamiliar with the structure of the Government of Indonesia.

Despite the tremendous increase in foreign relations activities undertaken by the many domestic actors, these laws ensure that the foreign policy of the country would remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Any citizen of Indonesia can engage in business, legal, financial, and cultural relations with people from other countries. But foreign policy remains within the exclusive realm of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Other ministers may sign agreements on behalf of the republic but only after obtaining the full powers of treaty making similar to a power of attorney from the foreign minister. Heads of delegations to international conventions, including cabinet members, must obtain the power of attorney (or Full Powers) from the foreign minister. Hence, these laws ensure that irrespective of who is in power in the future, Indonesia's Minister for Foreign Affairs assumes the role of *primus inter pares* (first among equals) for the responsibility of foreign policy making. Senior diplomat Hazairin Pohan (2006, interview with author) explained the policy implications of these laws:

> The foreign minister has an authority on the basis of these laws [UU37/1999 and UU24/2000] to be the entry point [in foreign policy] of when to start, when to stop, and what to initiate … [the Department of Foreign Affairs or DEPLU] cannot do everything because the nature and the landscape [of international relations] have now changed … such that it's now more complicated and sophisticated. [So] we must ensure that DEPLU must remain within the two functions of 'to lead' and 'to coordinate' … in what would constitute Indonesian foreign policy … and in fact we do more of 'to lead' and 'to coordinate.'

It turned out that the idea to formally institute a national law giving the Department of Foreign Affairs an exclusive monopoly in foreign policy making was not the result of *Reformasi*. In fact, to do so did not stem from the fall of President Suharto and the corresponding surge in the autonomy of civil society groups and so forth. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in 1994-1995 was accommodative on the issues of human rights. The government's approaches to environmental issues were also accommodative during that time (Anggoro 2006, interview with author).

However, perhaps the Department of Foreign Affairs is concerned with the way foreign relations is undertaken, especially with the rise and frequency of the heads of regional or provincial governments in undertaking trips abroad – a solution perhaps might one day be for the Department of Foreign Affairs to establish a regional office in the respective areas within the archipelago (Anggoro 2006, interview with author).

Despite the impression that all powers in foreign policy making have

been relegated to the foreign minister, the reality has not been up to par with that impression. In fact, even the foreign minister himself realized that since *Reformasi* numerous actors participate in the policy-making process. Long holding a monopoly in the foreign policy making process during the New Order of President Suharto after *Reformasi*, the executive branch of government must be sensitive to the diffusion of power accorded to Parliament and to the public as represented by civil societies and non-governmental organizations. There is also a diffusion of power from the executive branch of government to the legislative branch of government, i.e. Parliament in foreign policy making (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author). And this power diffusion is indeed reflected in the manner by which foreign policy is made as illustrated by diplomat Eko Hartono (2006, interview with author):

> Prior to *Reformasi*, our foreign policy tended to employ a top-down approach that, in terms of efficiency, was quick. However, this approach did not account for the inputs of non-state actors. Presently, with democracy and *Reformasi*, we are asked to incorporate views from all elements and components of society. The result is that the foreign policy decision-making process remains incomplete until we can get everyone's views.

In addition to having a prolonged policy making process, the nature of diplomacy is also forced to change. 'In the past, [diplomats] were the front liners only to the outside world. However, nowadays we must also be able to explain to the domestic constituents and to assist in the implementation of the various international conventions that we signed' (Hartono 2006, interview with author). However, this relationship after *Reformasi* ensured the achieving of Indonesia's national interest as illustrated by senior policy maker and diplomat Hazairin Pohan (2006, interview with author):

> In the past we didn't consult with other departments nor state institutions except perhaps the office of the President and the Department of Defense … now we must consult [the others] … we actually do not have an obligation to inform others but we have an interest in requesting feedback or input to be incorporated in our foreign policy.

Another factor that made foreign policy making during *Reformasi* complicated, as explained by Megawati's Secretary of State Bambang Kesowo (2006, interview with author), is the uncertainty of where to take the country forward:

> What happened occurred because of the uncertainty of the prime causes.

> *Reformasi* has to be understood in terms of prime causes. It is unclear to everybody. Not what *Reformasi* is but what is the substance of *Reformasi*. To what direction [is Indonesia] going? What needs to be reformed? What are the priorities? When to act on those priorities? That is why when helping the President, minister formulates and implements policy. But foreign policy is the President's domain, and not the ministers'.

Editor-in-Chief of *Kompas*, Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author) attributed the supposedly ambiguous content of foreign policy to the indecisiveness of the leaders to stand firm for fear of being seen as hindering *Reformasi* :

> Since 1998 the lingering problem is unassertiveness. Being assertive is construed as a government stance that is autocratic. In a democratic government, there is no place for such a stance. Being strong is not allowed. That is a wrong interpretation! This would mean that a democratic state cannot have a strong government. As long as [its stance] is aligned with the rule of law, [a government] must be firm in asserting its sovereignty. [But] we are afraid. After *Reformasi*, people in Indonesia are afraid of being called non-reformist. Everyone would like to say that, 'I am a reformer' … so in both domestic and foreign policy, the absence of courage in those policies is not due to the lack of courage or the incapacity of the decision-maker, but more so because of this [dilemma of being seen as a non-reformist].

One explanation for this diverging set of priorities is nature of society that has for too long been dominated by an authoritarian regime and that all of a sudden during *Reformasi* was tasked with revolutionarily reducing the country's democratic deficit in a short time in order to get the country on the course to economic recovery and political stability. Hence, the attempt within the various institutions to make up for this democratic deficit led to many instances of longing for rights that exceed the corresponding duty for responsibility among domestic actors. And this observation applied to both domestic and foreign policy making. As the discussion when President Megawati confided to a veteran senior member of Parliament of her own political party:

> [Megawati reflected] How are we going to get through all of this? Some say that things have gotten out of control. There have been lots of overdosage in terms of people's quest for their rights. Parliamentary democracy has experienced an overdosage, right? Freedom of the press as well. [The legislator replied] Let's just let time determine. We will find the equilibrium from all of this. After people have obtained back their rights, then they will think again about their responsibilities … however, the process will not be easy … nor short (Sirait 2006, interview with author).

After all, this overdoses of democratic control resulted from a thirty-year enforced absence of political parties at the village level (Sirait 2006, interview with author). The government's party, Golkar, was operating at the villages. And so were the military. Both the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (Indonesian Democratic Party or PDI) and the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (Unity and Development Party or PPP) were, however, not allowed to penetrate the villages during the New Order. As a result, there was no regeneration of informal leadership at the village level; even during the period of Dutch colonialism these informal leaders were maintained though they had not to be anti-Dutch, of course (Sirait 2006, interview with author). It is partly due to the path towards the equilibrium whereby the euphoria towards newly founded power will wane that the Indonesia post-*Reformasi* pose a major challenge on how to conduct not only domestic policy but foreign policy as well.

And one irony of Indonesia's new governmental structure is the diffusion of accountability in the minds of legislators and executives that results from the combination of a presidential system coupled with a strong parliament. Foreign Minister Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) explained that:

> The problem with our government is that we have a presidential system but with a parliament that is increasingly dominant. We don't have a government with a certain number of seats in Parliament that support the government's policy. Unlike in the United Kingdom whereby the Labor Party [at the time of the interview in 2006] with a majority voice supports the government. Whatever policy the government proposes in Parliament, for sure the majority will support. In Indonesia, we have to struggle on our own. There's no such ruling groups in Parliament, no caucuses in Parliament. So cabinet ministers, including myself, must resort to debating with legislators from the President's own political party, PDI-P, not to mention with those from other [if not opposing] parties. This is the typical problem we have until today.

Such a pseudo separation of powers phenomenon is further exacerbated by a lack of a national platform, as elucidated by Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author):

> Everyone feels that she or he has a right to speak. But what is our problem is that we do not have a national platform, a national platform by which we honor as [something that] we've agreed as a nation, including when dealing with foreign policy. Everyone interprets things differently. Again, there is a [lingering] fear towards certain groups such that the government becomes weak. But Mega's [Megawati's] ambiguous foreign policy is caused by this.

Moreover, policy makers need to especially account for the major and fundamental changes in the international environment (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author). And though the role of the media in the specific foreign policy cases shall be outlined in later chapters, an effort is taken here to explain how media in general provide the bridge between the international environment, domestic political situation, and the foreign policy process. Therefore, the media elite group, though simply just one of the four elite groups under scrutiny in this study, constitutes a special group because of its unique role in agenda-setting Taking this role into account, *Kompas* Chief Editor Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author) illustrated how in the past foreign policy was a reflection of the external environment:

> Although Pak Harto [Suharto] was repressive, he greatly took input from the media seriously. He calculated his policy [on the basis of what he read] in the newspaper. He really paid attention. [One can] see where foreign policy is heading. But come again as to the difference between Pak Harto [Suharto] and Ibu Mega [Megawati]. Pak Harto listens to the media but he has his own direction for foreign policy, 'I want this … I would like to play a role in this … In ASEAN I would like to be active like this. [I want] a strong military, a strong economy, and etc.' Which country at the time didn't look at Indonesia as a new giant or an Asian tiger? Right? So foreign policy reflects the reality in the international environment.

Though Suryopratomo admitted that at times the ranks from Megawati's party asked permission to include the recommendations published in *Kompas* newspaper in her policy speeches and into her policy deliberations, which led to accusations that *Kompas* was the supporter of President Megawati (denied by *Kompas* with the rebuttal that Megawati was the one who listened to the newspaper's recommendations), Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author) acknowledged that the role of media is important during the formulation stage of foreign policy for:

> Media can only field the issues in many sectors such as judicial, legislative, and executive issues. Media can become a tool for reflection and to field things that are not right. And even provide alternative solutions. But for something that must be implemented, media still has its limits and it cannot wander into that territory.

From the media's point of view, the media and the foreign policy establishment formed a symbiosis, as found in other democracies such as the United States, for example, when the Secretary of State requires media support on certain issues Suryopratomo 2006 (interview with

author went ahead that:

> Relations between us and Pak Hassan [Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda] are actually very well. So it's reciprocal. We also do not express our pure views [in the newspaper]. At times Pak Hassan would speak to us about the background of certain issues, and we would attempt to formulate a solution to that. Now once the material has been formulated and mounted in *Kompas*, usually Ibu [Madame] Mega [Megawati] becomes more convinced. And when Pak Hassan moves ahead with the concept then the concept can be implemented. So the policy concept endorsement team would say something like, 'Madam, this is only my idea but the media also supported it. Ibu [Madame] Mega would then say, 'all right, if that's the case then I will implement it.'

Two things were important to this pseudo joint approach in foreign policy making. *Kompas* had to place primacy on the national interest during this exercise and must strive to come up with ideas and present a comprehensive overview of the issue within the context of framing it in the national interest, and second, the newspaper had to convey the message in a non-vulgar and indirect way to render the articles suitable or desirable for consumption by the foreign policy decision makers. And in Indonesia, ensuring that the second part happen is very important as illustrated by Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author):

> Now, we can [write] in a straightforward manner. Our writing can be more assertive and courageous. In the past when conveying criticism, we must always remember that it is more important for the criticism to have been relayed rather than have a misunderstanding in the receipt of that criticism. So the way [to convey sensitive things] in Indonesia becomes very important.

Such freedom of expression is perhaps indicative of a much greater phenomenon in a democratizing Indonesia. Essentially, in the era of post-*Reformasi* the government's accountability is greater than that during the New Order (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author). Matondang (2006, interview with author) observed that:

> Everything nowadays is more transparent. More accountable in the formulation and in the implementation of foreign policy, whereas in the past we would only know the general overview but not the details. Presently, we know the details [of policy]. Parliament knows about a certain treaty with a certain country, even before the treaty is signed. Parliament knows about defense cooperation with certain countries, and so forth.

Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author) further elaborated on the need for an inclusive foreign policy making process encompassing

especially the media:

> From the aspect of democracy, accountability becomes something that is very important. And each stage of the policy cannot be decided upon in a closed manner. [The process] must be open. If [the policy maker] wants to be open and would like to know the reaction from society, [the policy maker] must listen to the voice of the media. [The policy maker] must also share with the media. In constructing the background context for issues, this is something that is generally done by the media. The media always obtains the background about many issues. For example, during the era of [Foreign Minister] Pak Alatas [Ali Alatas] and Pak [Foreign Minister] Mochtar Kusumaatmajda there is a meeting every Friday. With [Foreign Minister] Pak Hassan [Wirajuda] the meeting is once a month called the Foreign Policy Breakfast Meeting.

In major industrialized countries, foreign policy making entails the comprehensive management of diplomacy, economic strength, and military power. However, in the case of Indonesia, when faced with an external traditional security threat, the response of the bureaucratic framework would still put the military at the front line of policy responsibility.[25]

Despite the apparent fair distribution in responsibility for foreign policy making within the republic, the conduct of foreign policy in Indonesia remains within the exclusive domain of the political elites (Juwono; Anggoro; Anwar 2006, interviews with author). According to Anggoro, at the end of the day state institutions continue to hold the primary position in terms of having more authority than the other elite groups and non-state actors or non-governmental groups which can only help to shape the policy agenda and exert some influence on the policy discourse. When analyzing academics it is important to distinguish the stage of the foreign policy making process that is under analysis, such as agenda setting or involvement, engagement, and participation in the discussion of the formulation of foreign policy, which is now much more open than in the past (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). The reason the Minister for Foreign Affairs accommodates the factions of society through their invitation to the Foreign Policy Breakfasts is twofold: first, to ensure a more comprehensive policy by taking into account views that

[25] Understandably so, primary responsibility for national defense policy rests on the Minister of Defense. However, the foreign minister is involved as a member or a staff of the teams led by either the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs during the formulation phase of defense policy or by the President during the operational phase in case of a state of emergency though the foreign minister is not involved nor is the Department of Foreign Affairs even considered for inclusion in the coordination of the various mechanisms for the cooperation of the different state institutions in the development and implementation of the defense and security of the country (Bakrie 2007, 140-143).

cannot otherwise be obtained if the brief was to remain within the bureaucrats, and second, to ensure support from those societal groups at the formulation stage such that during implementation the government can confidently state that those groups have been briefed earlier (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

However, the bottom line is that power is still vested in the bureaucrats, or more specifically the foreign minister (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). Nonetheless, the power to set the agenda is a powerful privilege to possess. And it remains to be seen whether state institutions continue to dominate foreign policy making as this study shall reveal.

3.7 Summary

After having identified the salient political elite groups in Indonesia and mapped the political power distribution among them, we shall proceed with the manner by which those elites view the international political environment surrounding them in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

4.1 External Political Environment

The external environment is an important component of elite perceptions. Especially in a politically heterogeneous society like Indonesia, these perceptions may even dominate reason or the reality of the external international political environment. Hence, this chapter shall discuss the worldview of the elites in terms of the geopolitical reality of the international relations of Indonesia. Analysis of the evolution of intra-regional interactions is quite relevant for foreign policy making because such interactions determine how external actors and events are perceived in the region, which in turn shapes the impact of those actors and events on the region as a whole (Acharya 2000, 13).

Two components of (Indonesian) foreign policy dynamics can be distinguished: that of formulation of (general) policies and that of implementation. Decision-making at the formulation level has its own dynamics in which several factors play significant roles. This chapter shall therefore focus on the dynamics of Indonesian foreign policy at the formulation level.

One might ask, if the focus of this investigation lies in the domestic sources of foreign policy, is an examination of the worldview of the political elites even necessary? This question actually leads to a debate that pervades in the social sciences but is beyond the scope of this study: the agency-structure debate. Essentially, the debate focuses on whether international political actors within a structure (domestic actors within a state) can act without interference or constraints from the international political system or whether the international political structure constrains or even dictates what domestic actors can do (Friedman and Starr 1997; Wight 2006). Given that the primary focus of this study was to investigate the influence of political elites, by default a decision has been taken which embraces the primacy of agency instead of structure in foreign policy making.

Moreover, the accounting of the international system is in alignment with the domestic sources of foreign policy approach. Recall the previous discussion that a major field of research in international politics is how to account for foreign influences in determining how domestic political influences fit into the overall context of pressures arising from a nation's position in the international system (Hagan 1995, 132) One can view

foreign policy making as a game that is played by those acting simultaneously on two separate yet interlinked game boards of domestic politics and international politics under the condition that a player acting on one board must account for the considerations derived from the factors inherent in the other board (Putnam 1988). Moreover, in the practice of statecraft, consideration of the international political environment does indeed play a role in foreign policy making. Former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (2006, interview with author) reminded that 'because what happened in Indonesia did not happen in a vacuum … we are constantly influenced by the outside world.' Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) believed that policy makers need to especially account for the major and fundamental changes in the international environment

Therefore, this chapter shall investigate how the political elites think about the international political environment of Indonesia. The findings will then provide a basis for the next phase of the study.

In addressing her pragmatic needs towards policy making, Megawati took into consideration developments in bilateral, regional, and global politics. These developments influenced her foreign policy decision-making. As painted by Megawati's foreign minister:

> Megawati is not Soekarno. Megawati accedes to power and undertakes policy in an era and in an environment that are different from those of Soekarno. Among others, there is an element of pragmatism that is derived from the demands of different national as well as international environment by which policy is to be made (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author).

During Megawati's tenure, the international political landscape in Southeast Asia was influenced by the strategic interactions between China, Japan, and the United States. As shall later be elaborated, analysts saw the China – United States dyad as the key determinant in Asia. However, the notion of such dyad may have placed the policy emphasis on East Asia rather than on Southeast Asia.

In Southeast Asia, the relation between China and Japan seemed to matter most as the two strive for greater influence. The regional landscape was ever more dynamic with the rise of India as an emerging regional power and also the growing interest of Russia in Southeast Asian affairs. While the growing role of these great and medium power states is important, the peace and stability of the region, and consequently that of Indonesia, was influenced by three more immediate and pressing issues. The first was the potential for a disastrous conflict concerning territorial claims in the South China Sea. The second was the catastrophe that could

arise should tensions escalate between China and the United States over Taiwan. And the third issue was the uncertainty over the construction of a new regional power order emanating from the dialogue between North Korea and South Korea. Should these three issues blow up beyond proportions or in the case of the Koreas if unity would be achieved, Indonesia will find itself in a new international political world.

The interplay between these factors of influence takes up the foreign policy space of Indonesia. Whatever 'space' remains, that is the only available room for Indonesia to maneuver in the regional and international political landscape. This available policy space must be understood in terms of existing dyadic relationships among the great powers, which seek to extend their influence upon Indonesia and the region.

This policy space constitutes the arena in which political elites are competing for influence. Each element of the political elite groups will attempt to enlarge or at least maintain its share of the policy space. Therefore, it is important to analyze the interaction of all of these factors to understand how Indonesian foreign policy is constructed at the formulation level.

Indonesia's response to these regional political stimuli was carried out primarily through forms of pluri-lateral cooperation such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Southwest Pacific Forum, Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines East Asia Growth Area (BIMPEAGA), Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Growth Triangle (IMTGT), and Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Growth Triangle (IMSGT). These responses were systematically elaborated in a framework based on the concept of concentric circles of national interest.

The following pages shall discuss each element of the challenges posed to Indonesia's foreign policy space and the subsequent responses to overcome these challenges.

4.2 Regional political and security situation

During the period of Megawati's presidency, regional security faced three major challenges: first, the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, second,the threat of nuclear proliferation in East and South Asia, and finally, the relations among the great powers.

The East Asian security environment was determined principally by the triangular United States – China – Japan relationship, and especially by the key relationship between the United States and China. Singh

(1999, 13) saw the US-China relationship as a source of much longer-term uncertainty for East Asia. Although ASEAN member countries have a combined population of over 500 million, its combined economic and military power and potential is small in relation to the major powers.
Such a view accounts for the strategic rivalry between the two powers and their different visions of a stable East Asia; for the Americans one based on the existing bilateral alliances with five regional countries, for China without those alliances. In fact, China became more open in its condemnation of America's alliances in Asia (Singh 1999, 13). In the Asia-Pacific area there has been an increasing pressure for countries in a potential conflict situation to engage each other bilaterally and shun the 'assistance' of countries that were not directly involved in the situation. This would clearly have undermined the main multilateral co-operative security mechanism in the region, the twenty–two member ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). All along ARF was the sole existing framework by which dialogue and confidence building could be developed among the Asia-Pacific countries.

According to Singh (1999, 16), the central strategic issue in the Asia-Pacific region during the first half of the twenty-first century is the peaceful management of the rise of China, and to a lesser extent of the rise of a more 'normal' Japan. Singh argued that without the backing of U.S. power for co-operative security, the long and complex transition would not have been well managed.

An issue of contention that may be a bomb-in-waiting consists of the multiple territorial claims lodged by many countries in the South China Sea, and more specifically on the Spratly Islands. The claims lodged by all the parties are weak because no claimant has been able to demonstrate continuous and effective occupation, administration, and control, as well as acquiescence by other claimants, terms dictated under international law in establishing territorial claims of sovereignty (Singh 1999, 50). International legal principles turned out to insufficient to resolve the competing sovereignty claims to the Spratly Islands.

Of the countries involved, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and Singapore are parties to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia have signed but have not yet ratified it. As a non-state political entity (if one embraces the point of view that it belongs to China), Taiwan is not eligible to be a party to the convention. Countries that are awaiting formal ratification are obliged to act in a manner in full compliance with the spirit and objectives of the treaty. Many countries regarded the Convention as analogous to customary international law governing issues of the ocean. Even the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ruled that

certain parts of the Convention are now customary international law. The notion of applying the Convention in resolving the dispute may have to confront the reality that not all the claimants are party to the Convention and commonly applied norms may not apply to regional circumstances.

According to Singh (1999, 60), most international observers believe China's claims to Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is weak in international law. Analysts have contemplated the solution of joint-development of the area as a way to avoid conflict once the idea of temporarily neglecting the sovereignty aspect of the situation for the sake of obtaining peace was embraced as feasible. Singh (2001, 20-21) believed that most Southeast Asian governments are realistic and would seek to balance relations with China with those with other powers. However, he argued that such line of thinking is unapt for ASEAN countries that share a border with China. For example, Vietnam has a strong tradition of independence and a past history of animosity towards China. Another example is Myanmar's situation due to its strong sense of independence. Singh argued that it is likely that Myanmar would not be too dependent on China once other options become available.

ASEAN governments strongly believe that increasing the interdependence of the Chinese economy with that of Southeast Asia and the rest of the world has the effect of giving Beijing a stake in the peace and stability of the region. ASEAN states recognize the continuing U.S. strategic presence in the region as a stabilizing element necessary for economic development; as such they are making themselves available in various ways to help the United States retain a military presence in East Asia (Storey 2000, 165).

Malaysia and Brunei also have maritime territorial disputes with China. But together with Indonesia they prefer to manage the rise of China through the expansion of economic ties and by relying as much as possible on their own military capabilities. According to Chung's (2004, 38-39) analysis, though these countries do not oppose an American presence in the region they have not favored a balance of power approach to the maintenance of regional stability. Chung continued with the notion that this would have to mean that regional countries must rely on the uncertain guarantees of the major powers for their security.

In this context, during the past three decades Indonesia and Malaysia have sought the eventual neutralization of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Malaysia and Indonesia may have allowed U.S. warships to make port calls or access to repair facilities, they were not prepared to grant the U.S. navy any base facilities (Chung 2004, 39, footnote 12). Nevertheless, Indonesia has allowed U.S. naval vessels access to repair facilities at Surabaya.

It is clear that China and Japan contend for Southeast Asia as a sphere of influence. To put it in perspective, when asked whether China and Japan were both attempting to expand their sphere of influence in Indonesia, a senior legislator from the First Commission of Parliament, Sabam Sirait (2006, interview with author) bluntly painted the picture:

> They are not trying … they have conquered! And this is not a dramatization. Explained in the manner of a writer, since the 1970s from our front door to the kitchen entered Japan. Now things have changed. China not only has entered through our front door but to the extent that the tools we use are made by them, and cheaply. In the 1950s-1960s when Japan's quality products were low who would have been interested? But now, Japan's political power is regarded as widespread. Then comes China. Japan will influence with quality products though it tries to lower prices. It is competing against China. They both have influenced us tremendously.

To combat maritime piracy, particularly in the Strait of Malacca, Japan proposed regional joint exercises and patrols involving Japanese coastguard vessels. China strongly opposed the plan (Singh 2001, 22).

During Megawati's tenure, the three great powers that matter most to Southeast Asia – the United States, China, and Japan – remained focused more on Northeast than on Southeast Asia. The most important great power relationship in East Asia, between the United States and China, is rather fragile and un-cemented. Japan was faced with economic stagnation and was politically unwilling or unable to assert itself. Russia became increasingly interested diplomatically in Asia while India too placed more attention to Southeast Asia in light of the region's acknowledgement of India's status as an emerging power in Asia (Singh 2001, 4).

Daljit Singh believed that no great power relationship is more important to Southeast Asia than the one that exists between Washington and Beijing. However, the relationship was essentially fragile and unstable because of the Taiwan problem and different perceptions of each other's role and intentions in Asia (Singh 2001, 14). The United States felt increasingly that China does not accept the notion that East Asia is large enough for both of them, and that it wants the United States to be evicted from Asia. On the other hand, there was a growing feeling in China, and especially in the Chinese military, that the United States wanted to curb the rise of China and has consequently embarked on a policy of containment.

One event that sparked a new geopolitical recalculation among policy-makers in regards to the architecture of international politics in Asia was the historic North – Korea and South – Korea summit, despite

present changes in circumstance whereby these two countries are at the brink of war. In an interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review, Francis Fukuyama claimed at the time in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (10 August 2000, page 21) that:

> There is obviously going to be a huge realignment in terms of alliances in Northeast Asia if reunification happens … the current system (of) parallel alliances with Korea and Japan is probably going to fall apart. The need for an American presence in both countries is going to diminish substantially. Japan … is going to be pushed almost inevitably towards a more independent defense posture (Singh 2001, 24, footnote 24).

One view from the Indonesian military establishment regarding the reunification of North Korea and South Korea states:

> [That] it is part of the question of whether Japan is comfortable with the United States unifying the Koreas. Should later on the leadership of North Korea implode, the fear is to ensure that the instability will not spill over to the rest of Northeast Asia as to propel Japan to act in securing the region. [The worry is on] the competitiveness of a unified Korea because in the long run it will become a much more immediate economic threat than China is to Japan. Simply because of the efficiencies obtained if they reunite (Sudarsono 2006, interview with author).

On the military aspects of Korean reunification, a top official in the military establishment believed that:

> [Such a prospect would likely] create a vacuum in the whole problem between China and Japan. The United States is now useful for China in case the Japanese is down. Useful for the Japanese for it kills the Chinese. Useful for the South Koreans because it keeps the North Koreans away. They realize the very important role of the United States, but with the rise of China and the rise of Japan and Korea, there are new balancing forces now … politically, economically, and strategically … that must be accounted for

The Korean reunification issue or a conflict between the two, though a concern, does not seem to be a priority for ASEAN, for most ASEAN countries do not have direct interest in the talks. However, the issue concerns Indonesia which has relations with both Seoul and Pyongyang. In fact, Indonesia is close to both countries but more so due to the personal relationship between President Megawati and President Kim Jong Il for they used to dance together frequently when they were younger during the era of President Soekarno (Sukma 2006, interview with author). It is because of the existence of this special relationship that Indonesia was able to make diplomatic gains with respect to opening the

lines of communication between the two Koreas and in engaging in talks with North Korea over its nuclear plans though the resulting impasse remained beyond Indonesia's control; even the multi-partite negotiations involving the major powers had yet to produce any tangible result (Sukma 2006, interview with author). It is worthy to note that both North Korea and South Korea wanted President Megawati to become the mediator in uniting these two countries (Permadi 2006, interview with author). Former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (2006, interview with author) clarified on the attempts of President Megawati in putting these issues in Indonesia's national interest:

> These are old problems … I mean these problems were there even before [President] Mega[wati] came to office. But Mega[wati] actually thought she could play a role in bringing North Korea and South Korea together because of her father's relationship with Kim Il-sung which I think was nostalgic, it was more a sentimentalist view … it turned out now that we hardly play any influence on that, not to mention the six-partite powers.

Sabam Sirait (2006, interview with author) illustrated how President Megawati used simple language and not some long-winded arguments to convince the concerned parties:

> With the President of South Korea, [Megawati] would simply say, 'you must meet with the President of North Korea.' And with the President of North Korea, she said, 'you are both Asians, and you are younger than the South Korean president. As Asians you must negotiate and settle your differences, please meet each other, don't allow yourselves to be continually exploited by other people.'

In relation to the other Asian powers, Alatas (2006, interview with author) further explained that though:

> [these powers] are very kind to [Megawati], they are very friendly towards her, but in real terms things are very difficult. On China, [Megawati] didn't have much. On India, she didn't have much of a particular view. China … is seen by Indonesia as an opportunity as much as a challenge. And that she wanted to have warmer relations with India … she started it, but again …

Despite the obvious limits on what a Megawati government could do to resolve these regional tensions, the gravity of the situation surpasses the interests of any one state. The concern was not just conflict between these two nations alone but more on the ramifications of such a conflict (Anwar 2006, interview with author):

> There is a concern of a break out of conflict in the region, which could have very negative consequences on regional politics and on the regional economy. It might destroy trade flows. South Korea will be badly affected remembering South Korea's role in the economic development of other countries. There is a major concern of a disruption in shipping if the missile is launched. That will destroy the peace with the Japanese, Taiwanese, Chinese, and the Hong Kong businesspeople shipping to the region. That will not only disrupt the ASEAN economy but also the East Asian economy as well. But there is also a concern of North Korea truly developing nuclear weapon and missile launching capabilities. Japan, not South Korea, is generally worried because Japan is a target. And Japan will clearly react by arming themselves. And that will have very negative consequences because it will lead to heightened arms race. And here you are talking about the nuclear weapons of countries.

Sukma (2006, interview with author) added that conflict in Northeast Asia will have important economic ramification for Southeast Asia because the the economies of Northeast Asia are the engine of economic growth in ASEAN. In fact, the ramifications of conflict in this region are astounding as delineated by Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono (2006, interview with author):

> Korea, China, and Japan underwrite the US current account deficit that is around USD 600 billion a year by virtue of their connection via investment, trade, and financial transactions. The United States is the most productive economy at this time but it is also the most consumptive in importing goods from these three countries, irrespective of its links with Europe. This has been going on for 10-15 years now. Hence, that's how important those three economies are. Moreover, their energy resources pass through [Indonesia's] straits [via sea lanes of communication]. That is why the United States has an interest in seeing an Indonesia that is stable politically, economically, and militarily. Militarily stable by cooperating with other countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. But not too powerful that Indonesia can leverage against the United States but also not too weak that Indonesia collapses. That is why we must look at the power mix from not just American presence but Japanese and Chinese presence as well.

Hence, the new regional power structure has consequences for the relevance of not only U.S. military deployment in the region but the interaction between other major military powers as well. Analysts recognize the tangible benefits of U.S. – Japan military alliance. However, in terms of forward deployment such an alliance has serious limitations.

An interesting note is that in 2000 Vietnam was the only Southeast Asian country to be visited by the U.S. President. Indonesia, the largest

country in the region, received little U.S. attention except for issues like democratization and human rights. Yet Singh provided a reminder that a fragmentation of Indonesia or a descent into chaos could have significant implications for U.S. interests, especially given the fact that Indonesia straddles strategic waterways linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Singh 2001, 18).

It can be inferred that the stability and development of Indonesia is determined, among others, by the dynamics of influences of the United States, China, India, Japan, and the North – South Korea dialogue, and the future of the Taiwan issue with China.

4.2.1 China

One of the challenges for governments in the Asia – Pacific is the peaceful management of the rise of China. China's rise as a great power arouses anxieties in Southeast Asia given its size, growing wealth and power, and geographical location. The underlying issue here is whether China will remain benign Singh (2001, 20) was uncertain about the answer given the domestic economic, political, and leadership changes that China will face in the future. Singh reckoned that how others, principally the United States, manage their relations with China will also have an influence. Given China's growing nationalism, great power ambitions and rhetoric, and its extraordinary claims to the South China Sea, it is likely that China will become more assertive.

Some believe that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is too divided on the issue. Sukma argued that there were several variations on the same theme in relation to how to capitalize on China's rise. Some strongly believe in China's rise in the future and underlined the need for ASEAN to accommodate China; some have even suggested that ASEAN should ignore Japan. As for Indonesia, Sukma (2006, interview with author) argued that Indonesia's stance towards China should remain cautious given the following:

> [Indonesia] is still worried about the uncertainty of China in the future. I think we are not sure yet whether China will continue to be a positive major power. Because if we look at the history of the major powers … any new power that rises will change the existing world order. They want to have new rules, establish new norms that will benefit them more. From the Turkish Empire to the British Empire they have all defined international order and set the rules. More so with the American Empire, with the Washington Consensus and the establishment of the Bretton Woods Institutions… [essentially] setting all the new rules. China has been saying that the current regional and global order is not just. So they have to be changed. New rules. New norms. You see? This always happens. We are

> not sure when China becomes a superpower what that new world order will be like.

Lt. Gen. (retired) Agus Widjojo (2006, interview with author) also supported this apprehension:

> At this time China is happy with the economic growth in its pockets of regions. The real question is to what extent can China control the balance between its East Coast with its Western regions. But if they are able to maintain the balance and they feel that they can manage the potential for conflict domestically, then we need to become alert because they can engage for the long-term. For the time being that has not been the case. But we must be on the watch because if in the future China feels confident in handling domestic problems, they will begin to attend to their interests beyond their borders.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, at the time Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs in President Megawati's government, when asked about this at a Forbes CEO Conference in 2006 responded in the following manner, as described by the Editor-in-Chief of the English language daily newspaper *The Jakarta Post* and former Ambassador to Australia Sabam Siagian (2006, interview with author):

> Well, in some case we are competing with China. And in some cases we are benefiting from China. So Indonesia's position is that we follow the growth of our two neighboring giants, India and China, and try to find opportunities that are beneficial for us.

Therefore, it is no wonder that ASEAN members are not simply acquiescing in China's 'peaceful rise,' but rather exercise caution and accept the need felt by the United States to maintain a central role in regional security (Huxley 2005, 16). In effect, the continuing U.S. security interest in Southeast Asia as shown by a substantial military presence relieved Southeast Asian governments of immediate concern over China's increasing security-related activity. Furthermore, 9/11 brought forth a détente between the United States and China, which also relieved Southeast Asian states from worrying about the competition between the two for influence.

As long as relations between China and the United States remain balanced, Southeast Asian governments will not have to choose sides. After all, these governments would like to maintain positive relations with both powers. However, an escalation of tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan could disrupt this major power equilibrium. If the situation becomes conflict-ridden, alliances and the

policy of pursuing a two-pronged strategy by Southeast Asian governments of approaching both China and the United States would probably unravel quickly. Regional security would then quickly destabilize. Any efforts to counter this phenomenon, should it occur, would have to resort to the efforts of the regional governments themselves. And in such a situation it would not be in the interest of any other external major power to intervene. Even the roles of 'second-tier' powers such as Japan, India, and perhaps Australia would be limited.

Essentially, the Taiwan issue is a delicate situation for Indonesia. Sukma (2006, interview with author) painted the overall scenario well. Indonesia recognizes that Taiwan is an integral part of China. All is well if Indonesia's foreign policy is limited in scope to just the two worlds of Beijing and Taipei. But if China is provoked and invades Taiwan and the United States is obliged to provide military support for Taiwan, then, Japan is also obliged to provide logistical support to the United States. This will anger China. If this situation occurs, then all affairs that are related to trade and investment in East Asia will be threatened.

Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono (2006, interview with author) saw potential conflicts arising from China attacking Taiwan and the tension between North Korea and South Korea as:

> … more to do with the increasing need of China to secure its energy supplies. Not just the straits, not just the Caspian Sea, but also the immediate water in Northeast Asia. That is why friction between China and Japan is now very dangerous. The problem with Taiwan is more historical because China would like to reclaim Taiwan as a province of China. Two China into one system. Now there is one China in two systems.

In all practicality, however, no one would have an interest in seeing China going to war over Taiwan. Anwar (2006, interview with author) provided one of the clearest explanations on the issue:

> China does not want to go to war with the United States against which it cannot win over Taiwan. China knows that if … an irresponsible politician in Taiwan declared independence, China will have no choice except to attack Taiwan. Why? Because it has said so, so many times. If Taiwan declares independence and China does not act militarily, China will lose all credibility because China will then be regarded as a toothless tiger, a paper tiger. Nobody will take China seriously. The United States will not want to fight China because the former's economy is very linked to the latter's. No one will win the war. Both sides will lose. But Taiwan will have no choice but to come and ask for assistance because there is a specific language in the legislation that 'the United States will come to Taiwan's aid.' If the United States does not come to Taiwan's assistance

> then nobody will trust the United States as a reliable partner. The value of having an alliance with the United States as a sole superpower will be diminished if when the time comes to tap that alliance the US does not deliver. China is unlikely to jeopardize its economic gains and political and diplomatic standings that it enjoys because of Taiwan. The same goes for the other side. The United States unlikely wants to jeopardize the security of Asia Pacific and its economic interests to fight over Taiwan.

With respect to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949[26] that is supported by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter [27] which essentially states that an attack on one member is an attack on the other members, invoked as a justification for the US retaliation of the 2001 bombings in New York and Washington, another invocation of that clause should the United States, in defending Taiwan, be attacked by China, would also provide an almost impossible scenario for the countries involved. Though 9/11 has been the only time when Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty had been revoked successfully, scenarios involving NATO and invocation of Article 5 of the Treaty were not ruled out in the event of a conflict between China and the United States.[28]

Anwar (2006, interview with author) illustrated the interwoven dilemma in that:

> None of the countries would want to have a war with China because their economic interests are so close. The French regard China as its biggest market for its crops. The British also have economic relations with China. So nobody really wants to do this. And Southeast Asia, and not just Indonesia, will not want to have to choose between Washington and Beijing. So if they go to war against each other, no country would say, 'we will not fight against the United States in support of Beijing' because that

[26] Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that: 'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.'

[27] Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter- national peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.'

[28] Informal discussions with military members of the Dutch Permanent Mission to NATO, Brussels, April - May 2005, within the context of visit arranged by *Instituut Clingendael*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

> would only incur the wrath of China. They will be the target of China. But no one will say, 'we will not want to fight Beijing in support of the United States' because that would make the United States angry.

Irrespective of its power capabilities, Indonesia cannot do any more on this issue. This glass ceiling is due to the remnants of the Cold War whereby the major powers have significant interests such that it is difficult for ASEAN,or Indonesia to actively resolve the issue (Sukma 2006, interview with author). The best that Indonesia can informally do is to tell Taiwan to 'not make any provocations … don't rock the boat – de facto you are independent anyway and the *status quo* makes everyone happy because it is beneficial to all' (Sukma 2006, interview with author). Hence, Indonesia will not provoke China and asks Taiwan not to provoke China as well; Taiwan realizes that (Sukma 2006, interview with author).

With respect to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), China's behavior has remained a paradox. Singh has observed that though China embraced the forum's confidence building agenda, it opposed the involvement of multilateral forums like the ARF or outside third parties in the South China Sea disputes. China's position was that the South China Sea issues should be discussed only by the involved parties, and even then only on a bilateral basis (Singh 1999, 16-17: 47). Despite such an opposition, China took the initiative in November 2004 to establish the ARF Security Policy Conference for senior defense officials, which convened for the first time in Beijing (Huxley 2005, 22, footnote 22). [29]

Two things, however, stand out from China's claims. First, it is the only great power among the other claimants. Second, while others claim certain islands or certain parts of the sea, China claimed the whole of the South China Sea, manifested in its well-known U-shaped line extending almost to the Natuna Islands. Included in such a claim were all the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, islands that are also claimed in their entirety or in part by Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei Darusalam. It was this complicated situation which led Daljit Singh to conclude that it would be extremely difficult for ASEAN to strike a balance in the influence of the major powers in Southeast Asia.[30]

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[29] People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 'Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue's Remarks on the First ARF Conference on Security Policy,' 26 October 2004, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t167107.htm, accessed 31 December 2004 by Huxley.

[30] This is due to the fact that one of them, a potential superpower, not only shares land borders with Southeast Asia but also has extensive territorial claims in the 'maritime heartland of Southeast Asia' (Singh 2001, 26). Though on the basis of history China is unlikely to become an expansionist power, history has also shown that China has at times pursued a coercive policy, the use of which depends on contemporary geopolitical dynamics, domestic factors, growing nationalism, and the possession of power projection capabilities into Southeast Asia. Though coercion does not necessarily mean the use

With regard to the Taiwan issue, China expected that Southeast Asian countries embrace the One China policy. However, when high ranking officials from Taiwan were sent to explain the reasons for holding a referendum, according to Chung (2004, 42) they were received in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines in January 2004. Among individual Southeast Asian countries, China is closest to Myanmar. Such a tendency, along with China's increasing influence on the other two Indochina countries as Laos and Cambodia, may be attributed in part to a common concern about U.S. policies or about dissidents linked to the United States (Singh 2001, 19-20).As in the past, Southeast Asian governments have been worried that China might interfere in their domestic politics by influencing the local Chinese communities. Hence, as a preemptive policy, China kept repeating that it adheres to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries while respecting the right of countries to choose their own political systems (Chung 2004, 46).

In response to the international order whereby the United States acts as the hegemonic power, China attempts to counter-strike by promoting multi-polarization. To achieve this objective, China must forge a united front with like-minded powers such as Russia and embrace others in Asia, particularly India and ASEAN, which might be inclined to make an alliance with the United States. If China succeeds it can then concentrate its energies on dealing with the United States over the Taiwan issue (Singh 2001, 15).

Tim Huxley argued that China's intensifying engagement with ASEAN was just a part of Beijing's broader strategy of multilateralism in Asia as a whole. Huxley (2005, 16) argued that the aim was to increase China's clout as a regional security player at the expense of the United States by leveraging China's growing economic and diplomatic stature.

And when the United States faced difficulties in maintaining its influence, China seemed determined to become an important strategic player in Southeast Asia. Huxley (2005, 15-16) argued that any doubts wielded by the governments of the region have quickly dissipated since 1990's. Such confirmation of China's power is underscored by China's more sophisticated diplomacy as epitomized by its New Security Policy and newly found enthusiasm for multilateralism, its geo-strategic patience

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of force, history has recorded instances when China believed that force was necessary to advance its interests (Singh 1999, 18: 24). In 1974, China used force to seize the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam when it no longer enjoyed U.S. protection. In 1988, China also used force to capture some Vietnamese held positions in the Spratly Islands when it became clear that the Soviet Union would not come to Vietnam's assistance.

as marked by its less assertive policy in relation to territorial claims in the Spratly Islands, and its increasingly growing economic leverage.

In November 2004, the two agreements on trade and dispute settlement signed at the ASEAN – China summit solidified economic relations by institutionalizing them. The agreement had its conceptual base in the 2002 Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation establishing an ASEAN – China Free Trade Area by the year 2010. In line with progress on the economic front, developments in the security front had also been forged. An agreement in October 2004 regarding the ASEAN – China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Security was followed by a detailed 'Plan of Action' in November 2004 (Huxley 2005, 22, footnote 21). [31]

China figures large in Indonesia's concerns over possible future outside threats to its economic interests and sovereignty. China is hungry for the energy and natural resources of Indonesia (Sukma 2006, interview with author). Meanwhile, Indonesia has a large territorial claim on the oil and natural gas rich Natuna Islands that is encapsulated by the South China Sea, all of which is claimed by China. It was therefore understandable that the scenario for the Indonesian Armed Forces' last major multi-service training exercise focused on the Natuna Islands. The exercise tested possible operations to regain the islands from 'an outside invading force' (Haseman 1999, 129).

Could Indonesia's accommodation towards China be attributed to Megawati's longing for the legacy of her father's close relationship with the Eastern Giant or could it be simply pragmatism at its best? Anwar (2006, interview with author) pointed out that Indonesia's relationship with China was coupled by coincidence that Indonesia and the rest of the world all want to be close to China because China is an important emerging economic power. If China was not emerging as an important economic power then it would be unlikely for Megawati to try to develop that kind of relations with China even though her father was close to China, for Megawati is not that ideological (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

Besides, China is in the process of trying to build a positive association with ASEAN countries. China is aware that it is on the right track in its dealings with the region, and aware of the suspicion of other countries of its behavior should it, in the future, become a superpower, and that is the reason China is capitalizing on the South China Sea issue, for example, to show to the world that 'look, we are trying to solve this

[31] Chairman's Statement of the 8th ASEAN + China Summit, Vientiane, 29 November 2004, Association of Southeast Asian Nations website, http://www.aseansec.org/16749.htm, accessed 3 January 2005 by Huxley.

problem through diplomatic and peaceful ways' (Sukma 2006, interview with author). ASEAN was able to convince China of subscribing to the Code of Conduct in 1992 requiring party to the South China Sea contention to resolve differences in a peaceful way; at the time China thought that succumbing to the demands of ASEAN was in its best interest and therefore China became a signatory (Sukma 2006, interview with author). China's subscription to the Code of Conduct would dampen fears by the other regional powers of China's perceived latent offensive intent, provide an opportunity to become a *de facto* Asian leader by virtue of having shown to the world of its commitment to play by the rules of the region, and to develop its stake in the new integrated political community of the Asia Pacific region.

The above analysis has clearly shown the importance of China within the realm of international politics with respect to Southeast Asia and with respect to Indonesia in particular. Indonesia is greatly affected by the repercussions that arise as a result of China's balancing behavior *vis-à-vis* the United States by virtue of such behavior's role in chiseling the sculptural design of regional politics. The realm of policy possibilities for Indonesia is further constrained by the possible ramifications of China's territorial interest in the South China Sea. And again, any changes to the regional order as a result of the issue of China's stance on Taiwan will certainly affect Indonesia's foreign policy.

4.2.2 United States

In the scheme of international politics in Southeast Asia, the United States acts not only as the dyadic rival of China but also in its own right as a superpower holding interests in the region.

The United States acts not only as the guarantor of security and stability in Southeast Asia, but it is the first or second most important trading and investing country, together with Japan (Chung 2004, 42). This is despite China's increasing economic role in Southeast Asia.

The United States has provided economic and technical aid to Indonesia, both bilaterally and through multilateral forums such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In terms of fulfilling defense requirements, ever since the fall of President Soekarno most of Indonesia's military equipment or supplies has been sourced from the United States or its allies. This is in stark contrast to Soekarno's era when one could say that Indonesia was a military emulator of the Soviet Union.

Knowing the intricacies of the potential explosive situation in South China Sea, as well asl China's dominant player status in the architecture, the United States tried to assert its presence. Statements issued by U.S.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and other senior US Officials put pressure on ASEAN nations to move forward with a firm decision to resolve the situation. The United States did not view a standstill coupled with behind – the – scenes bilateral negotiations between the claimants to the Spratly Islands and to the South China Sea as a viable solution to the situation. It wanted a clear-cut transparent resolution fearing that an ambiguous 'solution' might provide leeway for a crisis to become manifest.

In November 2004, an Asia Foundation report suggested that a more coordinated U.S. strategy for Southeast Asia should involve greater use of 'soft power' (Huxley 2005, 22, footnote 19). [32] Ideas mentioned in the report took the form of annual U.S. – ASEAN summit meetings, a U.S. – ASEAN free trade agreement, and a major initiative to engage Southeast Asian Muslims.

The United States undertook several financial initiatives symbolic of its intention toward Indonesia. It announced in September 2004 that it would provide US$ 157 million to improve basic education provision in Indonesia as part of a US$ 468 million aid package over five years (Huxley 2005, 22, footnote 20). [33] This momentum was maintained when the United States showedits generosity in leading and funding relief and reconstruction efforts when the tsunami hit Aceh. The appointment of former U.S. President Bill Clinton as the U.N. Secretary-General Special Representative to take the lead on this issue provided much political goodwill for the United States as the former president was liked in Indonesia.

An unpleasant experience that still lingers in the minds of many Indonesians occurred when the referendum in East Timor was held. A U.S. Navy helicopter carrier, the *Belleau Wood*, carrying 900 U.S. Marines from the Okinawa-based 31st Expeditionary Unit, was sent to deter the Indonesian navy from hindering International Forces for East Timor (INTERFET) operations. The U.S. cruiser *Mobile Bay* also helped deter the Indonesian Navy from intercepting coalition ships (Lim 2005, 87). Such initiatives by the United States sent off the impression that the superpower was prepared to undermine Indonesia's sovereignty, even within Indonesia's own territory.

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[32] The Asia Foundation, 'America's Role in Asia: Summary of Findings,' Recommendation of the Asian Working Group, http://www.asiafoundation.org/News/Ara/asianviews.html, accessed 1 January 2005 by Huxley.

[33] U.S. Agency for International Development, 'U.S. and Indonesian Governments Sign US$ 468 Million Pact to Improve Water, Schools, Health, Nutrition, and Environment,' USAID website, 2 September 2004, as accessed by Huxley. http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2004/pr040902.html, accessed 3 January 2005 by Huxley.

The issue of international terrorism resonated and triggered an increase of the intensity of relations between Indonesia and the United States (Smith 2003, 108-109). The Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States helped to overcome U.S. Congressional barriers preventing the restoration of military to military relations between the Indonesia and the United States, despite earlier attempts by the Bush Administration to expedite the restoration of normal military relations. The Leahy Amendment forbid extending U.S. military assistance to militaries deemed to have committed infringements of human rights. The approach undertaken by the United States in its fight against terrorism placed emphasis on the military aspects as opposed to addressing the conditions which made terrorism more likely. Indonesia offered little resistance to the offer of technical assistance and hence helped to create conditions which made cooperation easy.

In 2002, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Indonesia and announced aid of US$ 50 million over three years to assist Indonesia in counter-terrorist operations. Such assistance would usually go to the Army. The assistance, however, was not extended wholeheartedly. The United States itself had reservations concerning the Indonesian military's newly found respect for human rights. However, the United States could not afford to face the consequences of terrorist advances if these were due to the under-capacity of Indonesia's police force. This dilemma was reflected in the words of U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce, 'if this [wider military-to-military relations] comes to pass, this does not represent a clean bill of health for past TNI actions which continue to be of concern to us' (Smith 2003, 109, footnote 18).[34] In short, such changes of U.S. policy towards Southeast Asian in general and Indonesia in particular constituted developments that had to be taken into account in Megawati's foreign policy.

However, not all agree on this issue. According to Anggoro (2006, interview with author), the relationship between the United States and Indonesia is dominated more by other issues than by the issue of terrorism. The numerous protests outside the US Embassy in Jakarta were not attributed to US policy towards Indonesia but to US policies toward some other regions of the world that are beyond the control of Indonesia, mostly in the Middle East (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). Anggoro observed that those anti-American sentiments were 'artificial' and suggested that the protests at the US embassy should not worry officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs nor at the US Department of State for they were not protests on bilateral issues. Things would have

[34] Associated Press, 'U.S. Ambassador: Aid To Indonesian Military To Support Reform,' 7 August 2002.

been different if the issues would involve the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and the United States becausethen it would have been easier for the Indonesian foreign policy officials to speak to their US counterparts.

Despite the presumably 'artificial' nature of those protests having such protests would actually be beneficial to the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs. As envisioned by Anggoro (2006, interview with author), such protests would give a tool to the Indonesian foreign policy officials to accost their counterparts at the US Department of State in the following manner:

> Hey this [issue] is serious. Don't make a lot of noise in Indonesia. You have to restrain your behavior in Indonesia. It already creates a problem to our government if you keep pressuring us to [do this or that]. [Frankly we are] not quite sure that our government will be able to deliver …

Despite the obvious hard-power asymmetry between the United States, which is a superpower while Indonesia, though large in geography, remains a (major) developing country, the United States began to regard its relationship with Indonesia as embodying mutual benefits as opposed to simply that of an 'aid and against communism' relationship of the yesteryears. By the mid-1990's analysts began to classify Indonesia as a 'pivotal' state (Chase, Hill, and Kennedy 1999). Supporting the interest of the United States in that it wanted no other power or concert of powers to dominate South East Asia, the then US Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord saw Indonesia's soft-power security potential as 'a positive force for promoting regional and global goals' (Bresnan 1999, 30).

In putting the United States within the context of the network of power plays alongside Russia and, more importantly, China in the Asia-Pacific region, there is a need to cursorily examine the views of the elites inside the United States. According to Sukma (2006, interview with author), two competing viewpoints existed regarding China. Congress was cautious about China whereas the members of the administration, though divided, mostly saw China as an opportunity and as a stakeholder that the United States can work with. Both sides emphasized the pervasively increasing competition with China. Hence, the US hedging against China by steeping up its engagement with ASEAN as became evident by the US appointment of an ambassador for ASEAN, the first ASEAN dialogue partner to undertake this initiative, and by the allocation of millions of US dollars towards the strengthening of ASEAN (Sukma 2006, interview with author).

Despite the presence of many powers in the region, Defense Minister

Juwono Sudarsono contextualized the power of the United States, both economic and military, into the foreign policy space of Indonesia:

> The Americans don't realize how pervasively powerful and influential they are. Especially since the dissolution of the Soviet Union that power discrepancy is astounding. The European Communities itself, 30 countries, has combined economy of USD 12 trillion [compared to the US single economy of USD 12.5 trillion]. Japan, the next biggest single economy is worth USD 4.5 trillion (Sudarsono 2006, interview with author).

Sudarsono (2006, interview with author) continued that:

> In the past, the sun never sets on The British Empire.[35] Today, the sun never sets on the back of an American GI (general infantryman). Throughout the world there are US military bases covering presence or remnants from the hotspots of the past for various reasons. In Korea. In Germany. Especially the US Central Military Command with its base, ironically, in Florida but its area of responsibility is in the Middle East. That is how powerful they are.

Former military strategist Lt. Gen. (retired) Agus Widjojo regarded the presence of the United States as the sole superpower as a constraint in Indonesia's foreign policy leeway:

> Indonesia is straddled between two conditions. At home, democratic values are built such as transparency, checks and balances through Parliament, control by society, and policy-making on the basis of consultation. A democratic transition. We have already undertaken that. Whereas in the world of international politics there is no democracy. Only power politics. Thus, inside we are developing a democracy and when we go out things are in such a stark contrast. Once we go beyond our borders, we get hit by the bullet of the United States, sort to speak. Unless we convince them that, 'you need to fear us,' there is nothing to be feared by the United States (Widjojo 2006, interview with author).

The indirect influence of the United States can also be felt in constraining the policy positions taken by the domestic political elites. In other words, foreign policy can be influential enough to influence how the domestic political cards are played. And not the other way around as it is usually

[35] Referring to the era of the distant past of *Pax Britannia* when Britain did, in fact, ruled the waves and one part of its territories and colonies is always consecutively exposed to the sun as the earth rotates around it. The defense minister spent considerable time in London as a Ph.D. student at the London School of Economics and Political Science and later as Indonesian Ambassador to the Court of St. James.

the case. As Lt. Gen. Widjojo (2006, interview with author) continued that with the present unipolar system dominated by the United States:

> All states are judged according to their international relations with the United States because at the present time it is the world police. The key issue is actually how a state can play acceptably to the United States while also to domestic constituents. This is the real issue. And then through the transition to democracy via domestic politics, especially Megawati, it is imperative to remember that Megawati is supported by political parties, and that this fact is used more frequently for domestic political objectives. Hence, domestic politics in large part is determined by the foreign minister at the Department of Foreign Affairs.

4.2.3 Russia

Megawati visited Russia in 2003 as part of a ten-day East European trip. The unique part of this visit was that it coincided with the U.S.-led war against Iraq that had been launched despite the opposition of three other major powers, including Russia, in the United Nations. Indonesia and Russia shared the same position on the attack on Iraq. Moreover, Indonesia had to look for new sources of arms supplies, as there was an embargo on arms sales to Indonesia by the United States because of alleged human rights abuses ten years earlier (Bandoro 2003).

Megawati was successful in securing arms for Indonesia. A notable purchase was that of the Sukhoi fighter aircraft, whose means of procurement later became a controversy. At the conclusion of the visit, Megawati stated in Moscow that Indonesia and Russia would cooperate in a ‘project of joint production in the military industry’ (Suryadinata 2004, 102). Megawati visited a number of former Eastern-bloc countries such as the Russian Federation to try to balance the image that Indonesia leans towards the United States and other Western powers, and show that it is still ‘free and active’. At the practical level nothing materialized from these visits, however; there were many promises of arms purchases but the fact remains that, aside from the Sukhoi purchases, Indonesia did not buy more weapons (Anggoro 2006, interview with author).

As to the interests of Russia, President Vladimir Putin of Russia had made it clear that Russia has a diplomatic role to play in Asia, especially in Northeast Asia (Singh 2001, 22). Russian – U.S. relations had not been good from the time of the Clinton Administration mainly due to the policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion. For Russia, it made sense to hedge the Asian connection by establishing solid relations with Southeast Asia. And the rational way to proceed would be to pursue relations with the largest nation in the region, Indonesia.

Moreover, one has to keep in mind that Russia is, in fact, the former

Soviet Union. Russia is both an Atlantic power and a Pacific power, just like the United States. Anwar (2006, interview with author) explained that the Soviet Union already used to have a basis in Southeast Asia. At one time, Indonesia was one of the largest importers of Russian made military products. Vietnam was also under the influence of the Soviet Union (as well as of China). Only after the Cold War did Russia lose its influence due to its own domestic constraints. For Russia, there is a legitimate interest in the region particularly in the Sea Lines of Communication (Anwar 2006, interview with author). The scenario is such that:

> If China emerges as the largest regional power and if China has the dictating rule over the sea lanes of communications that would be very troubling for Russia and for Japan. That's why all of these countries feel the need to develop a close relationship with China. Not just because of the potential of the Chinese mainland, but also in the potential of Chinese power to rule the sea and exclude them from the use of, for example, the South China Seas.

Even though the presence of Russia in the region is relatively limited compared to that of the United States and China, Russia's political maneuvers remained influential for Megawati's foreign policy. However, this has changed with the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Indonesia during the Presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Megawati's successor.

4.2.4 Japan

After the Cold War ended, there is domestic political pressure assisted by suggestions from non-Japanese elements that Japan is becoming a 'normal' Asian global power. However, Tim Huxley reckoned that any emerging power projection capability will likely take the form of an alliance with the United States. Huxley (2005, 17) argued that it is unlikely that Japan will become an autonomous military actor. However, Lt. Gen. (retired) Agus Widjojo (2006, interview with author) provided a similar assessment albeit on the basis of the decline of Japanese nationalism:

> Japan at the moment is put at bay because they are under the influence of the United States. On the other hand, such influence means that Japan resonates the interests of the United States. But on the other hand, if they become autonomous from the United States, what will Japan be like? Is the young generation becoming more modern meaning neglecting or toning down their *samurai*-istic and militaristic attitudes of the past? Are

> we going to see such a change? No. But also, from where do they obtain their sources of economic strength? And it seems that Japan is slightly losing its grips on the economy. As long as Japan is still guided by the United States, I think such a framework would be a venue for Japan to channel its existing potential despite the observation that Japan's nationalistic developments are beginning to wane.

Japan's military renaissance was propelled by the rise of China, but more specifically it was precipitated by the uncertainty over the intentions of North Korea with its alleged possession of nuclear warheads. North Korea test fired some missiles into Japanese airspace. Some have argued that Japan's Constitution stipulating use for defense-only military ought to be amended to accommodate the new security reality. Further elaboration is needed on this point. Anwar (2006, interview with author) underlined the reality of Japan's power potential:

> One cannot dismiss the fact that Japan is the world's second largest economy. It can change its Constitution. Japan can easily become a strong military power. It's military budget is very big despite the limitation of 1% of their GDP. But their GDP is very big. And its Self-Defense Forces are very professional and very well equipped. Japan has plutonium and uranium in large amounts. If one day it decides to build a nuclear weapon, it has the capacity to do so without too much effort. So, don't be fooled by Japan especially the fact that Japan's constraint is only political and constitutional in nature. Constitutions are mandates. Capacity is reality. Japan has the capacity.

In less technical terms but as an historical visualization of the significance of Japan to Indonesia, Salahuddin Wahid (2006, interview with author) gave his impression:

> The power that I cannot predict is Japan. Although they don't have offensive formation soldiers, their so-called Self-Defense forces have high military capabilities. And if you look at the high spirit of the Japanese, if they want to transform themselves to become an effective military, they will not experience any problems. And they [the Japanese] still have the spirit or ambition[36] to rule the world. If that occurs, then we can be conquered. And in war, that is legitimate.

Another strategic concern of Japan is to secure its energy supplies. The bulk of Japan's energy supplies is shipped via the Strait of Malacca. And in the past decade, piracy in the Strait has occurred more frequently. Hence, Japan suggested joint 'Ocean Peacekeeping' (OPK) patrols to

[36] Word used was *semangat* to mean spirit or ambition.

Southeast Asian governments as a way to combat piracy (Hughes 2004, 119-121). Despite the material benefits derived from such an offer, the responses of Southeast Asian governments, especially those responsible for the security of the strait (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) were unenthusiastic. Indonesia and Malaysia believed that responsibility for the Strait was to be undertaken only by these littoral states and not by other external powers. However, despite such a lukewarm response, Japanese Defense Agency Director-General Shigeru Ishiba reiterated the idea at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2004 (Huxley 2005, 22, footnote 24). [37]

Japan's strategic initiative in Southeast Asia affected Megawati's foreign policy. However, such influence was not attributed to Japan's military power per se but rather due to Japan's economic power in determining the domestic economic structure of Indonesia.

4.2.5 India

India's emergence as an Asian power was received with mixed feelings by the powers of Southeast Asia. In essence, some see India as a counterbalance against China, though surprisingly not against Japan. In fact, Japan has also joined the coalition to neutralize the 'peaceful rise' of China. Some states have even taken steps to solidify relationships with India. India, Japan, and the only ASEAN country Vietnam discussed to engage in an informal security cooperation. Indian Defense Minister George Fernandez visited both countries in 2000. These three states share strategic concerns about China. Although unhappy with India's status as a nuclear power, Japan has acknowledged that fact and endorsed India in playing the role to protect sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean that are economically crucial for Japan (Singh 2001, 23).

Some have challenged India's capacity to play a major role in the politics of Southeast Asia. Sukma (2006, interview with author) simply regarded India as not a real issue yet. Kripa Sridharan (2001, 80) argued that two of India's pillars of power, its politics and economy, in fact hinder the country from projecting power in the region. Sridharan argued that India exhausts much energy and effort in keeping its domestic political situation intact. Moreover, he argued that foreign investment and other foreign players were turned off by India's relatively closed and heavily regulated economy. Sridharan concluded that these two factors

[37] Speech by Minister of State for Defense H.E. Shigeru Ishiba at the IISS Asia Security Conference, Singapore, 5 June 2004, International Institute for Strategic Studies website, http://www.iiss.org/shangri-la.php, accessed 5 January 2005 by Huxley.

prevent India's involvement in the international politics of Southeast Asia. However, what may be regarded as perhaps the most pessimistic outlook of India can be found in Satu Limaye's observation. When Limaye asked in 2003 about India's possible role in the wider Asian region, a senior Southeast Asian official said it would have one, 'if India was still around' (Limaye 2003, 50).[38]

Despite domestic challenges, India also faced external challenges when approaching Southeast Asia. Satu Limaye (2003, 44-45) believed that these factors hinder optimal India – Southeast Asian relationship. First, there was a perception among the governments of Southeast Asia that India's behavior is like that of a 'regional bully' towards its small neighbors.[39] Second, a lack of solidarity and cooperation among the nations of South Asia was observed. This observation yields the impression that India, as a power in its own right, was neither able to command leadership nor to obtain consensus among its neighbors in order to regionally unite. Third, perhaps the most dominant hindrance to optimal India – ASEAN relations is the India-Pakistan dispute, including Kashmir.

India's domestic political and economic challenges, its relations with its immediate neighbors, and the neutralization effect of India's power against China are factors that downplayed the resistance of the governments of Southeast Asia towards India's rise. Huxley (2005, 17) has observed that as in the cases of China and Japan, India's growing role in the security of Southeast Asia paralleled India's efforts to grow economically and consequently to foster commercial relations. And responding to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's pronouncements that Indonesia will monitor the rise of China and India, senior journalist and former Ambassador to Australia Sabam Siagian (2006, interview with author) said that Indonesia needed to focus more on India not only because of the history of Indian support for Indonesia's independence struggle but more so because India is a democracy and has two economic sectors that Indonesia can concentrate on: the pharmaceutical industry and information technology.

India has secured agreement to materialize its security intentions. In October 2003, India and Singapore signed a bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement. In 2005 India and Singapore held their first

[38] Satu Limaye's personal conversation with official in June 2002.

[39] As observed by Lumaye (2003, 44-45), according to Sridharan this was especially true around the time of India's initial rapprochement with Southeast Asia in the early 1990's. India had then dispatched peacekeeping troops to Sri Lanka, participated militarily in quelling a coup in the Maldives, and embroiled in a dispute with land-locked Nepal regarding a trade and transit treaty. Southeast Asian have also reportedly been troubled by India's unwillingness to 'follow the example of post-Suharto Indonesia by eschewing an overtly assertive role despite its size.'

naval exercise in the South China Sea. In September 2004, India and Malaysia held discussions on enhanced maritime security cooperation followed by Indian naval patrols in the Strait of Malacca (Huxley 2005, 23). Such activity was expanded to include Myanmar. However, the relationship with Myanmar was more intense. In October 2004 India signed a memorandum with Myanmar on security cooperation. This was followed by coordinated bilateral military operations against Manipur and Naga rebels operating on the borders of the two countries' (Huxley 2005, 17-18). Given the closeness of Myanmar to China, India perhaps had calculated the importance of first securing stability and territorial integrity within its borders before attempting to compete in a contest of power projection onto Southeast Asia.

Another reason to consider India as a contending power affecting Indonesia is the fact that India is a country that has left huge cultural and religious imprints in Southeast Asia (Anwar 2006, interview with author). Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia all have Hindu-Buddhist influence (Anwar 2006, interview with author). Indonesia has many Hindu temples while Borobudur is the largest Budhist temple in the world. Hinduism and Buddhism still have influence in Indonesia's cultural identity; so India would not be regarded as a totally strange power in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

There have also been arguments, however, undermining India's role in the international politics of Southeast Asia, and the subsequent implication for India's relations with Indonesia. Even if such arguments were valid, at the very least India has the minimum capacity and great potential to balance China within the region. India's attempts to exert influence in Southeast Asia and the dynamics of India's relations dynamics with China and its immediate neighbors must be accounted for in determining the freedom of maneuver of Indonesia.

4.3 Policy Responses

Indonesia's external environment consisted of challenging elements that are worth respecting in terms of power relations in their own right and when those elements interact to construct international political architectures and demands. China alone and in relation to the United States, India, and Japan in their respective dyadic interactions consumes the attention and energy of Indonesia foreign policy makers. In addition to this dynamic background there is Japan whose military existence is

only visible if the United States is placed into the picture.

These three powers create multiple possibilities of challenges for Indonesia. The regional political situation is conducive to the rise of challenging issues: the issue of South China Sea multiple party claimants, the issue of China and United States relations with respect to Taiwan, and the dialogue between North Korea and South Korea that can either yield peace, and redraw the entire political map of East Asia, or perhaps cause the first deployment of nuclear weapons long after the devastating tragedies at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. All of these pose major challenges for Indonesia.

Indonesia's stance has been to not take sides in either of the dyadic relationships of China with Japan and with the United States. Indonesia insists that differences between them be resolved within a multilateral security framework. Initially, however, aligning power into a multilateral framework brought its own share of problems. During the setting up of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), one of the initial difficulties of socializing China into a multilateral framework mindset was its suspicion that the ARF is a manifestation of US hegemony, although after experiencing ARF China is now one of the proud supporters of ASEAN leadership in the multilateral security regime (Sukma 2006, interview with author).

In relation to the dyads of China and Japan, Sukma (2006, interview with author) illustrated the rationale when applied to Indonesia's policy in dealing with the rivalry between China and Japan:

> There is a feeling among the Japanese that we are now starting to ignore them and starting to become closer to China. There is such an impression. For me we must clarify to both China and Japan that China is a new friend but it doesn't mean that we will leave our old friend. Why not? Now, [Indonesia] needs Japan. In fact, we need them more at the moment. But we might need China more in 10 to 15 years if the economic development in China continues to grow steadily. Knowing how to reconcile our present interests with our future interests is the biggest challenge in our foreign policy towards China and Japan.

Such a policy dilemma was evident during the discussion of the United Nations Security Council reform initiatives to which Indonesia did not know how to respond. Indonesia chose Model A out of the two UN. Security Council reform alternatives [40] proposed by the High-Level Panel

[40] Model A and the other alternative, Model B, both involve a distribution of seats among the four major regional areas. These two models do not suggest the change of the composition of the current regional groups. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto power stipulated, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats that are divided among the regional areas whereas

on Threats, Challenges, and Change as to not offend Japan nor China, although Japan was disappointed while China was happy with Indonesia's 'abstention' (Sukma 2006, interview with author). To add insult to injury, the complexity is colored even more with the presence of India and Russia on the map. Though their intentions are to balance the presence of the major powers, as powers in their own right both India and Russia, alone and in strategic interactions with other existing powers in Southeast Asia, can add items to the already full menu of challenges that Indonesia must face. All of these challenges occupy room in the Indonesia foreign policy space, constraining the options that Indonesia can pursue in international politics.

Though it was once the de-facto leader of Southeast Asia, the Indonesia of Megawati responded to these challenges by varying levels of cooperation. Such cooperation is manifested through ASEAN, Southwest Pacific Forum, and the many plurilateral growth triangles and areas forged between the various nations of Southeast Asia as mentioned earlier.

However, there is a view that while significant attention must be allocated to multilateral issues, these - though important - only yielded longer-term and perceivably indirect benefits for Indonesia. Another view stipulated that Indonesia's primary interests are different from those of other countries such as Australia, and are served by paying attention to Indonesia's own territory and region instead of making investments in other more indirect and intangible issues such as North Korea and the Middle East (Prasetyono 2006, interview with author). Illegal fishing, logging, cross border trade costed Indonesia USD 20 billion a year, not to mention the amount of world trade at stake (USD 300 billion with 60,000 ships going a year through the Malacca Straits and USD 40 billion with 15,000 ships a year going through the Lombok Straits) (Prasetyono 2006, interview with author). Hence, the slogan famously conferred to Indonesia of lying between 'Two Continents and Two Seas' encapsulates both security and economic aspects of legitimate state interest (Prasetyono 2006, interview with author). With such a vast territory spread out through four time zones separated by water, Indonesia cannot help but to accept that major powers are inevitably interested in exerting

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Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent and non-renewable seat that is divided among the major regional areas. Neither models change the veto power configuration of the council. Adoption of Model A would have paved the way for the strongest contenders at the time (Brazil, Germany, and Japan) to obtain permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council. For the geopolitical chessboard in Asia, Japan's admission as a permanent member would rattle China and balance the security order in Asia.

their influence to protect their own interests within the Indonesian archipelago (Prasetyono 2006, interview with author).

Given Indonesia's geographic and political environments, the modalities available to Indonesia for resisting domination by a major power are as follow as explained by Prasetyono (2006, interview with author):

> First, Indonesia develops multilateralism. Or Indonesia creates a balance of power. So this is a rather extreme interpretation from what is termed as *politik bebas aktif* (free and active politics). So *politik bebas aktif* is not just about norms but it is really about the limited options available to [Indonesia]. So Indonesia cannot make alliances. Because once you make an alliance, the situation no longer entails solely norms, and other powers who have an interest in the archipelago will regard Indonesia as an enemy. That is natural. But if Indonesia's territory is not too important and other powers do not have an interest in it, then if Indonesia makes an alliance with whomever no one will care.

Hence according to Prasetyono the focus of Indonesia's foreign policy must be in its own territory and in the region. Important international developments must be addressed and responded to but not form the bulk nor the framework of Indonesia's foreign policy (Prasetyono 2006, interview with author).

4.3.1 ASEAN

Despite its internal problems during the transition period from *Reformasi* to normalcy, Indonesia remained active in its foreign policy. Still, President Megawati's 16 August 2004 presidential state address to Indonesia's Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives) made little reference to foreign policy. Such a stance could be attributed to the prevailing domestic political and economic problems that demanded more of the President's attention, and whose resolution (or attempt thereof) would generate more credit for her administration. However, ASEAN is mentioned by Megawati in connection to the reawakening of Indonesia's leadership in the region:

> In ASEAN, which constitutes a priority in the conduct of our foreign policy, Indonesia was once again able to show its leadership. The success of Indonesia, during the 9th Summit, in preparing the Bali Concord II has strengthened the role, commitment, and the leadership of Indonesia within ASEAN (Weatherbee 2005, 150).

ASEAN was the cornerstone of Suharto's foreign policy, and it was

also that of Megawati. The Ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali held on the 7-8 October 2003 initiated the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community. In June 2003, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Phnom Penh, Indonesia took the initiative to introduce the concept of an ASEAN Security Community to make ASEAN into a tool to create a zone of peace and prosperity. It proposed the use of legal mechanisms instead of the use of force to resolve bilateral disputes and sought to develop a 'habit of trust' (Suryadinata 2004, 102). Indonesia's leadership was recognized by fellow ASEAN members. At the June 2004 annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the foreign ministers acknowledged Indonesia's role for 'developing and elaborating the ASEAN Security Community' (Weatherbee 2005, 161).[41] Dewi Fortuna Anwar in *Tempo* Magazine (13 October 2003) deemed that:

> This new initiative signals Indonesia's return to normalcy. Once again, Indonesia is making a bid to affirm its position and role as a key member of ASEAN (Suryadinata 2004, 103).

Such a role was manifested in the signing of the ASEAN Bali Concord II in October 2003. The agreement opened the door to develop a more integrated regional community and encouraged neighboring countries to adopt many of the Association's goals and values (Stubbs 2004, 3). Anthony Smith (2004, 423) saw that:

> The Bali Summit witnessed Indonesia's re-emergence to the role of group leader, or at least demonstrated Jakarta's desire to begin to steer the direction of the grouping again.

ASEAN was established for two purposes, according to Prasetyono (2006, interview with author). First, it was created to manage relations between countries in the Southeast Asian region such that a set of norms is promulgated such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation which includes the Code of Conduct. Second, ASEAN was created to find modalities by which to accommodate the interests of external powers. According to Sukma (2006, interview with author), ASEAN is a unique venue which combines balance of power and cooperative security in a way that is not found in standard textbooks.

ASEAN tries to combine institutional liberalism with balance of power realism. In fact, ASEAN has been successful in bringing in the three largest and most powerful states in Asia (China, India, and Japan)

[41] Joint Communiqué of the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 29-30 June 2004, http: // www.aseansec.org / 16193.htm, accessed by Weatherbee.

under its umbrella in the form of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). As noted by Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda at the Bali Meetings, there are now 'almost three billion people grouped under the same rules of good conduct' (Stubbs 2004, 16). Not only has such a conglomeration of politics, economics, and social and cultural relations led to greater integration of institutions, ASEAN, as observed by Richard Stubbs, has also nurtured the development of a vast network of personal contacts linking the foreign policy-making structures of individual members to their counterparts around the region (Stubbs 2004, 15).

Despite the importance placed by Southeast Asian nations on ASEAN, the framework has not fully been reliable when it comes to sensitive issues. After all, ASEAN had no experience in preventive diplomacy, let alone in offering a solution for ASEAN was only functional in confidence building among the nations in the region (Sukma 2006, interview with author). One example is East Timor. During the chaos surrounding East Timor's independence from Indonesia, ASEAN regarded the issue of East Timor as an internal matter for Indonesia, to solve by itself. ASEAN's other founding members – Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines saw a stable Indonesia as the essence of ASEAN. Such a traditional view of ASEAN was supported too by the positions taken by the newer entrants to ASEAN – Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia – which are opposed to humanitarian intervention and allot most importance to state sovereignty (Sebastian and Smith 2000, 79).

The second sensitive issue facing ASEAN consists of the multiple claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. ASEAN countries were not able to achieve a common position or an understanding among themselves on their respective claims in the Spratly. However, ASEAN countries did prepare and try to get China committed to a draft Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. It was presented to China at the ASEAN + 3 meeting in Manila in November 1999. China said that it would study the document. Even if China were to accept the document without revision, which then seemed unlikely, the Code would probably not have materially affected the situation in the South China Sea (Singh 1999, 23, footnote 18).

The third issue which ASEAN, through its ASEAN Regional Forum, had not diffused was the tension over security in the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and its test firing into Japanese airspace proved that ASEAN remained toothless in reshaping regional order when confronted with realist power-based factors.

As with all things, a proper indicator would be to judge its performance over time. Taking the analysis of Daljit Singh over a period

of two years, readers can observe a formative trend. In 1999 Singh believed that:

> ASEAN will live on because it is the only vehicle that gives Southeast Asia a collective voice and some bargaining power vis-à-vis the great powers (Singh 1999, 12).

However in 2001 Singh realized that with greater diversity of interests in the ten-member Association and the fact that the newer members are only partially in the market economy:

> ASEAN will continue to lack cohesion, making it difficult for the Association to act as a diplomatic community, as it was able to do in the 1980's, to secure its common interests in relation to outside forces, however defined, and especially the major external political and economic powers (Singh 2001, 10).

Anwar (2006, interview with author) placed the geopolitical importance of the region into perspective. Although a strategically located area, Southeast Asia has always been a transit area and not a primary destination. Anwar explained that Southeast Asia is not the primary theatre of geopolitics despite the fact that it is here that the biggest power, the United States, has to contact and to balance the power of other emerging powers in the region such as China, the Soviet Union, and Japan. The primary theaters of geopolitics have always been Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East. Anwar (2006, interview with author) elaborated:

> And Southeast Asia due to its composition of several small and medium countries have not been the most important global power. So in that sense, Southeast Asia will always be second-tier. If you have ranks of nations, Southeast Asian countries will never be at the head of the table. The head table will be occupied by countries such as the United States, China, India. Maybe one day Indonesia, but not the Southeast Asian countries. If Indonesia develops such a power potential, it will one day [be at the head table].

There was a controversial suggestion that Latin America, especially during the Cold War, has been the 'backyard' of the United States in terms of power projection. Taking this suggestion to Southeast Asia, Anwar (2006, interview with author) argued that it is a misnomer for the region. Southeast Asia is actually the 'front-yard' where many passersby can come and leave their imprints. A 'backyard' is where a passerby cannot really come in easily. Linking this concept to regional power dynamics in Southeast Asia, Anwar (2006, interview with author)

explained that:

> Southeast Asia is a kind of front-yard where the major powers, if possible, would like to have their state of influence at the maximum or an alliance with the region at a maximum. Or at a minimum, they want to deny the presence of other powers that would exclude their own presence. So no country, no major countries want any other power to have exclusionary rights in Southeast Asia. That situation has been enjoyed and maximized by the region by opening relations to all the countries and not aligning the region to form an alignment with one particular power or another.

Consistent with the belief of Southeast Asian leaders that China's political ambitions within the region could be muted through its participation in the economic ventures of the region, ASEAN leaders agreed at the Seventh ASEAN Summit in November 2001 to pursue the idea of a free trade agreement (FTA) between ASEAN and China within the next ten years. The irony was that this idea was first offered by China's Prime Minister Zhu Rongji at the Fourth Informal ASEAN Summit held in Singapore on 22 – 25 November 2000 (Hew 2002, 40, footnote 11).

Despite the seemingly numerous problems of ASEAN, Indonesian political elites continued to believe in the utility and importance of the organization (Sukma 2006, interview with author). During the transitional period of *Reformasi* more attention was given to solving domestic problems, and this resulted in complaints from its neighbors that Indonesia was not paying sufficient attention to its foreign policy in ASEAN. At that time the elites developed a sense that the country has a role to play in the region; and hence the taking of the lead by the Department of Foreign Affairs and academia as Indonesia took the chairmanship of ASEAN by the introduction of the concept (and subsequent adoption) of the ASEAN Security Community (Sukma 2006, interview with author). The fact of the matter is that the existing security mechanism for the whole Asia Pacific region (ASEAN Regional Forum) involving the major powers exists solely in the framework of ASEAN. ASEAN can therefore be construed as the manager of regional order not due to its material power per se but more due to the fact that the major powers cannot agree on undertaking a leadership role in the region; hence relegating that leadership role to ASEAN (Sukma 2006, interview with author). And Indonesia, despite its domestic problems, remains a very important player in ASEAN.

From the previous discussion it may seem that in terms of resolving potential conflicts inherent in Asia such as the situation in the South China Sea, the nuclear weapons situation in North Korea, and the chaos

in East Timor, ASEAN as an operational framework faced challenging hurdles in making progress. However, when viewed in terms of how ASEAN was able to appease and rein in the major conflict-prone powers under the umbrella of a 'we feeling' sense of community under the auspices of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ASEAN has proved its value in keeping stability and peace in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, under the pretext of this umbrella sense of security, was apt to make ASEAN a way to respond to the challenging international political environment.

4.3.2 Southwest Pacific Forum

Sub-regional challenges can create instability in regions around Indonesia. For example, separatist threats from Pan Melanesia towards Papua may undermine the territorial integrity of Indonesia. It is for this reason that Indonesia wanted to nurture cooperation and create a stable and dynamic sub-region that ensures the development of Indonesia.

In 2000 during a visit to the ASEAN Summit in Singapore, President Abdurrahman Wahid announced that a new regional body should be formed to accommodate co-operation with states to the east of Indonesia, including East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and Australia. Though Wahid had unveiled the idea before, this time Indonesia obtained the support of Australia in following the concept into implementation (Smith 2003, 111). In 2002 the idea took shape. The six member countries of the 'Southwest Pacific Forum' – Australia, East Timor, Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines – held their first annual meeting in Indonesia, in August 2002. Indonesian Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, provided the following rationale:

> The geographic reality tells us that we live with our neighbors and there is a need to closely interact with each other regarding certain issues of mutual concern (Smith 2003, 111).[42]

Wirajuda listed co-operation in security, border issues, transnational terrorism and crime, economic issues, and 'culture' as areas of 'mutual concern' (Smith 2003, 111).

The construction of the Southwest Pacific Forum had shown another way in which Indonesia attempted to respond to the regional challenges of international power politics with clear ramifications for the territorial integrity and stability of Indonesia.

[42] Agence France Presse, 'Six Countries agree to set up Southwest Pacific Forum,' 9 June 2002.

4.3.3 Concentric Circles

ASEAN and the Southwest Pacific Forum are two of the main regional groupings by which Indonesia uses to respond to the global challenges inherent in its external environment. To better conceptualize such 'few' and 'prioritized' goals, the Department of Foreign Affairs went even further in prioritizing by giving emphasis to specific issues, as visualized by a series of concentric circles.

The concept was conceived of as part of a strategy to forge Indonesia's place in international politics. The initial baseline of the framework accommodated varying perspectives on what constitutes a benchmark for putting issues as priorities. The security paradigm embraces the concept of ordering things based on geographical orientations. And interestingly this paradigm was embraced by the Megawati government to dictate the strategic foreign policy orientations.

The concentric circle approach consists of multiple circles. The first circle, which constitutes a major pillar of Indonesia's foreign policy, consists (in decreasing importance) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and eastern and southern neighbors as shown in engagement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the Southwest Pacific Dialogue, and the Tripartite Consultation between Indonesia, Australia, and Timor-Leste.

The second circle consists of ASEAN + 3 (Japan, China, and South Korea), and beyond these nations, the United States and the European Union (major economic partners of Indonesia).

The third circle consists of cooperation with like-minded developing countries, as in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Group of 77. Beyond this cooperation, Indonesia is supportive to Palestine's quest to establish an independent state and Indonesia strives to bridge the gap between the developed and the developing countries by playing active roles in forums such as NAM, OIC, G-15, G-77, and D-8.

And the fourth circle consists of strengthening multilateralism through the United Nations by rejecting unilateralism and emphasizing the central role of the United Nations in resolving issues of international peace and security.

This concentric circle approach was articulated under Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja whereby Indonesia focused on certain key regional and global institutions of which Indonesia was already a member (Anwar 2006, interview with author). Moreover, such an approach was based on geographical considerations. At the time President Suharto's focus was on domestic and regional political stability. This

policy necessitated the focusing first on ASEAN and second on the Asia Pacific region and third on all the others countries and international organizations. However, a geopolitical paradigm dominates in this approach.

As for a geo-economic take on the situation, this concentric circle approach is irrelevant. For foreign economic relations, the reality has been more bilateral in nature resembling the notion of a hub and spoke arrangement whereby Indonesia is the spoke and the other more economically advanced countries are the hubs (Anwar 2006, interview with author). Previously, Japan played a dominant in the foreign economic relations of Indonesia. Presently, China and India together with the United States must be accounted for in the economic circle of Indonesia (Anwar 2006, interview with author). In any case, the analysis of economics and politics can no longer properly be carried out separately. Politics and economics are dynamically intertwined. As illustrated by Anwar (2006, interview with author):

> Even when they talk about politics, they now talk about economics. When they talk about economics, they talk about politics. In the old days in ASEAN, they only talk about politics and very little talk about economics. But now, even when there is a meeting about security, they talk about trade. When they talk about trade, they talk about security. The intertwining between the two issues are now much greater. And also the potential of these countries to expand their economies together are also much greater. So we now see a beginning of a trend whereby Indonesia views the region more in a holistic manner. It no longer compartmentalizes whether an issue is a security or an economic entity. For example, every time Jakarta looks at Beijing it sees a security problem and every time Jakarta looks at Tokyo it sees economic opportunity. Now when we look at China we see a potential security problem but also a lot of potential economic opportunities. When we look at Japan there are still economic opportunities but there is a potential security problem. The situation is now much more complex.

The intention of the Department of Foreign Affairs was to embrace the concentric circle policy priority framework to ensure a foreign policy that is both coherent and results oriented.

4.3.4 President Wahid's Concept of Axis of Power: Indonesia – China – India

As President, Abdurrahman Wahid introduced a concept analogous to the Djakarta – Phnom Penh – Hanoi – Peking – Pyongyang Axis idea promulgated during President Soekarno's time. What was interesting about Wahid's conception was the neglect, whether inadvertent or on

purpose, of sensitivities surrounding these powers. India and China are regional power rivals. Few would understand the idea of putting these two in a single camp (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). Going ahead with this 'strategic triangle' idea might also give the impression that Indonesia is asserting its own role of independence from the United States and its allies such as Australia, although in reality Indonesia's position is far from this (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). According to Sukma (2006, interview with author), progress with this idea would have been messy and at the time no one took the idea seriously.

Nonetheless, President Wahid's foreign policy ventures gave the impression that Indonesia's foreign policy was incoherent and directionless. Alluding to Vice-President Mohammad Hatta's description of Indonesian foreign policy during the height of the Cold War as a ship that is 'navigating between two rocks,' (referring to the Soviet Union and the United States at the time), President Wahid's foreign policy could be likened to a ship 'crashing into all the rocks'[43] (Sukma 2006, interview with author). Foreign policy for Indonesia returned to conventional wisdom only when President Megawati was in office and appointed career diplomat Hassan Wirajuda as Foreign Minister (Alatas; Sukma 2006, interviews with author).

4.4 Summary

In this age of global connectivity supported by advances in telecommunications, technology, and transportation, for the political elites of Indonesia both Soekarnoism and realism seem to prevail in their views on how Indonesia ought to position itself in the world given the realities of the interactions of the major powers in the region.

Many elements of Soekarnoism are ingrained in delineating how foreign policy for Indonesia ought to be undertaken. However, there is a difficulty in translating Soekarnoism when interacting with the major powers and in mapping the foreign policy possibilities for Indonesia. The political elites are realistic in that they can calculate the available maneuver space for Indonesia given the capacity of its set of elements of national power. And yet there seemed to be an aspiration that was not manifested as to push Indonesian foreign policy into greater heights, the

[43] Rizal Sukma's description in Indonesian was 'menabrak-nabrak karang' as in when a ship fails to navigate properly in rough waters.

aspiration to propel the values embedded in Soekarnoism throughout the region, despite the realization of Indonesia's limited capabilities in the pursuit of such foreign policy objectives.

The next chapter shall discuss the reality of how Indonesia decides on how to pursue its foreign policy.

CHAPTER 5 POLITICAL ELITES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Having analyzed the various interest groups and discussed the power structure which lies at the basis of the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, we now want to look somewhat more closely at the role of the elites in a number of specific cases. Through these case studies we can see whether and how the various elite groups influence foreign policy. More specifically, this chapter also discusses how those elements interact with each other within the context of the various foreign policy cases during the administration of President Megawati Soekarnoputri. We then see the dynamics of the interaction between the elites and the final product of foreign policy, and from these interactions one can derive a more general picture of the dynamics of both foreign policy formulation and foreign policy implementation.

5.1 Case I. US Attack on Afghanistan

On 11 September 2001, the United States of America was attacked by what was later claimed to be the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. The United States retaliated by seeking what it believed to be the leader masterminding the attacks, Osama bin Laden. U.S. intelligence argued that Bin Laden was hiding in Afghanistan. The United States sought the cooperation of Afghanistan's Taliban Government. When the Taliban refused, or were unable, to hand over bin Laden, the United States invaded Afghanistan to topple the government. With the ruling government out of the way, the United States could then go into the country and conduct an extensive (but so far unsuccessful) search for bin Laden.

One week after the incidents of 9/11 President Megawati communicated the position of Indonesia on this issue during her visit to the White House. She conveyed to President George Bush, Jr. that Indonesia would help the United States in the fight against terrorism. Megawati also stressed, however, the importance that the United States would refrain from engaging in any hasty military retaliation (Azra 2003, 53). And one week after the US military strikes in Afghanistan, at the commemoration of the Ascension Day of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH in October 2001 President Megawati re-emphasized her position clearly alluding to the actions of the United States:

> Violence should not be answered with violence. Whoever commits terror must be punished, but it is unacceptable that someone, a group or even a government – arguing that they are hunting down perpetrators of the terror – attack people or another for whatever reason (Azra 2003, 53).

In an effort towards showing solidarity among Muslims and to encourage the US to reduce its levels of military operations, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda called for the cessation of the military strikes before the Islamic month of Ramadhan began in the middle of November 2001 arguing that:

> … the fasting month of Ramadhan is very important for Muslims to reflect and express solidarity such that it would be tumultuous if military actions were continued in Afghanistan, and [that] prolonged military conflict in Afghanistan would have destabilizing effects on countries with large Muslim populations, like Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia (Azra 2003, 54).

On the occasion of an APEC foreign ministers' conference in 2001, Wirajuda was the only one who raised the issue of the unilateral attack by the United States on a sovereign country and without the authorization of the United Nations (Wirajuda 2006) despite the success of the United States in invoking the right of self defense in the fight on terrorism.

The steps undertaken by both President Megawati and afterwards by Foreign Minister Wirajuda were in line with the doctrine of supporting the oppressed, especially when the sovereignty of a nation, in this case Afghanistan, was undermined by the power asymmetry in international affairs. Indonesia stressed the importance of preventing outside forces from interfering in the affairs of a sovereign state, let alone occupying it.

These arguments did not keep the United States from conducting military operations in Afghanistan. The turning point that made the political elite wonder was the attitude expressed by President Megawati when she chose to accept the visit of President Bush in Bali. A US aircraft carrier group with the accompanying cruisers and destroyers was stationed adjacent to the not so large island, and anchored in Indonesian territorial waters. The salient public issue turned to the embrace of President Bush by President Megawati after the Indonesian position on Afghanistan was ignored. Had things been the other way around, it is not likely that Bush would have accepted let alone embraced the visit of Megawati in the United States.

5.2 Elite Groups and Their Interactions in Case I

Out of the many elite groups, the religious groups tended to be most vocal and active on this issue. There had been the impression that Islamic groups tend to vocalize a hard line position on the issue. However, such impression was attributed to the activity of the few hardliners compared to the passiveness of the many moderates. Chief Editor of *Kompas*, Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author) described the temperament of the domestic political actors towards accommodating certain religious groups:

> At home when confronted with issues related to Islam, our leaders, with the exception of Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid], are so afraid of Islamic groups … [to the effect] that sort to speak, [policy decisions] are actually [done] not for our foreign policy as a nation but rather, [to merely] save his or her own [political] interests when facing off with Islamic fraction groups.

As noted by Azra (2003, 44-47), hardline 'Muslim'[44] groups accused President Megawati of being too soft on the United States. They interpreted her tolerance of the US attacks as animosity towards Islam and its followers. Though the position of the hardliners on the illegality of the bombing by the United States on a fellow Islamic country, Afghanistan, was shared by moderates too, the hardliners believed that the 9/11 tragedy had been used as an umbrella to undertake a Zionist-Western conspiracy against Islam and Muslims in general (Azra 2003, 46-47). It certainly didn't help matters when US President George Bush initially named the US military retaliation against Afghanistan 'Operation Crusader,' changed it to 'Operation Infinite Justice,' and only finally settled on the more secular name of 'Operation Enduring Freedom' (Azra 2003, 46-47).

Though they were few in numbers, these hardliners were successful in exerting domestic political influence. Given the passivity of the

[44] Given the rampant misuse of the terminologies associated with Islam, a clarification is in order. Based on the author's reading of The Holy Qur'an as translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Islam by definition means 'peace through submission to The Almighty.' Muslims are by definition those who embrace this doctrine. This doctrine requires belief (Kalimat Syahadah) not only in the One Deity (God or Allah) but also belief and respect in the twenty-five prophets of Islam, whom include Adam, David, Solomon, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad and the teachings of those prophets in their own times as also part of Islam. Those who embrace those teachings in the past are often referred to as 'the People of the Book,' the Book referring to the Torah and the Injil preached by Moses and Jesus, respectively. Hence, those who exhibit behavior contrary to this tenet of the doctrine, i.e. exhibiting hatred towards other faiths, killing innocent lives, etc, by definition cannot be referred to as Muslims.

majority of Muslims who can be categorized as 'moderates,' the media picked up the statements of the more vocal hardliners. As further told by Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author):

> Within the Islamic groups community, they continue to maintain a harsh outlook towards Megawati … and remember that during that time, the problem lied in that though [largest Islamic organizations] Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) embrace different views from the [hardliner] Islamic groups, [both Muhammadiyah and NU] were silent majority and didn't want to take a stand. They are safety players as well. If Megawati thinks about the safety of her window of policy options, she needed to ensure that she gets the domestic political support of these [hardline] groups. Now the question is how come those small hardline groups got the attention and became influential? … because in principle, Megawati did not know what she wanted [in terms of how to deal with the Islamic groups].

As observed by Azra (2003, 50-51) in response to the hardliners the heads and eminent persons of Indonesia's two largest Islamic groups placed the fuming reaction of Muslims in Indonesia and their inclination to engage in 'jihad'[45] in their proper contexts and in correspondingly reasonable proportionality. This stance stemmed in part from a call by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI or Indonesian Ulama Council) to engage in jihad against the US attack on Afghanistan. Hasyim Muzadi, chairman of Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), believed that 9/11 was a human tragedy and not one of religion, and argued that the incident should not be transformed into a religious conflict. Muzadi also explained that jihad does not always mean holy war and insisted that the NU does not recruit members for jihad in Afghanistan to fight against the United States. Muzadi further added reason albeit by use of an overfabricated example and invited prospective jihadis to think, 'if we cut our relations with the United States, our country's economy would collapse in less than two weeks … then who will be responsible?' (Azra 2003, 52). An intellectual and leader of the Muhammadiyah Islamic organization, Ahmad Syafii Maarif refused to allow Muhammadiyah's involvement in radical actions. Maarif criticized the use of the word 'jihad' by the MUI since its use would only incite and

[45] Again, due to frequent misuse of the word 'jihad' a clarification is warranted. Jihad means 'to struggle' for truth. It does not mean 'holy war' as frequently found in popular media. According to a Harvard (Doctor of Education) educated PDI-P intellectual whose father and grandfather was a Kyai (religious leader) Buchori (2006) was brought up in an environment whereby 'every deed [one] performs in [his or her] life is dedicated to God.' Hence, jihad in its proper context can be taken to mean these deeds when performed in the fight for truth. Hence, by definition, for a Muslim the writing of these footnotes can be construed as acts of jihad.

provoke the emotions of Muslims, leading to radicalism. Ironically, Muhammadiyah's chairman Din Syamsuddin justified the use of the word 'jihad' by the MUI precisely for the same reason, to correct the widespread misperception that 'jihad' always connotes physical war. Salahuddin Wahid, who was Vice-Chairman of the National Commission on Human Rights with an affiliation to the Nahdlatul Ulama by virtue of being the brother of former President Abdurrahman Wahid, dissuaded Indonesians who wanted to go and fight in Afghanistan arguing that not only would the presence of Indonesians in Afghanistan cause problems for the Afghans but it would be better to show solidarity for fellow Muslims by sending food, clothes, and other supplies instead (Azra 2003, 51-52).

Vice President Hamzah Haz, whose electoral support base is formed by the 'Islamic' – based political party of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (National Development Party), pressured the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to support Indonesia's call for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan to end before the holy month of Ramadhan. He was surprised to find out that no OIC member country had raised the issue with the exception of those who expressed concern over the losses of civilian lives due to the military operations, without taking issue with the military operations per se (Azra 2003, 54). Despite efforts to counter the US attack on Afghanistan, Haz believed that the rallies would do more damage economically and image-wise to Indonesia. Haz expressed in his own words that:

> I am pleading once again for the rallies to stop. As Vice-President and coming from a Muslim-based party, I understand the feelings of Muslims, but I am concerned whenever a rally turns violent (Azra 2003, 54-55)

Without distracting from the flow of ideas in this section, it is worth noting one key theme that should prevail in any analysis of religious elite group on foreign policy making, which is that for many Muslims, Islamic beliefs and rituals are one thing, political behavior is another (Azra 2003, 64). According to Ramakrishna (2004, 56), some scholars believe that while Islam is a faith, radical Islam is a political ideology, and therefore one must make a distinction between Islam the faith and radical Islam the ideology.

One of the 'touchstone' issues to arise was a political aspiration espoused by those hardliners and manifested in the desire of establishing a pan Islamic state across Southeast Asia (Fealy 2004, 106-107). Referring to Salim (2000, 10), according to Azra (2003, 64) none of the prominent political leaders whose base is the Muslim electorate, such as former President Abdurrahman Wahid, former Chairman of the People's

Consultative Assembly (MPR) Amien Rais, former Secretary of State Yusril Ihra Mahendra, Vice-Chairman of the MPR Andi Mapetahang Fatwa, Deputy Chairman of the National Commission of Human Rights Salahuddin Wahid, and many others have declared that either they or their political parties wished to establish an Indonesian Islamic state. In fact, Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid went further to say that an Islamic state has no precedent in 'Islamic' history with Rais explicitly stating that Muslims are not bound by any religious obligations to establish one (Azra 2003, 64). He alluded to the similar notion of how anyone can be more Catholic than the Pope. Moreover, the heads of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, Hasyim Muzadi and Ahmad Syafii Maarif, respectively, also dismissed the idea of an Indonesian Islamic state (Azra 2003, 64).

But what was interesting was the attention given by these moderate Islamic religious leaders to the foreign policy making process. Hardliners wanted the Megawati government to cut off diplomatic relations. And the domestic political environment seemed to support their longing for an international standing of Indonesia that is more independent of the United States, as observed by Fealy (2004, 118). Polls repeatedly showed that the majority of the respondents believed that Western nations, especially the United States, were using the terrorism pretext to entrench their economic and geo-strategic hegemony. However, moderate Muslim leaders actually pushed Megawati's government to explain its position on the US military operations in Afghanistan to not only the United States and its allies to avoid misunderstandings, but also to hardline Muslim groups in Indonesia (Azra 2003, 52). Hasyim Muzadi urged the government to explain to its domestic constituents, targeting especially the Muslim hardliners, the constraints it faced when responding to the US attacks on Afghanistan while Ahmad Syafii Maarif urged the government to address Indonesia's foreign allies such as the United States and other Western nations about the domestic political constraints that Indonesia faces in accommodating those countries (Azra 2003, 52). Megawati's deputy, Vice-President Hamzah Haz, emphasized the need of placating domestic constituents in saying that the Indonesian government had to take into account the 'interests, sensitivities, and feelings' of Indonesian Muslims (Azra 2003, 54-55).

Due to the systematic and coherent response of the moderate Muslim elites in supporting the actions by the government of President Megawati in reacting to the US attacks on Afghanistan, hardline Muslim groups seem to have lost their momentum to carry on their fight (Azra 2003, 53). Especially after the arrest of the Bali Bombing suspects, some hardliner 'Muslim' paramilitary groups such as the Laskar Front Pembela Islam

and the Laskar Jihad even disbanded voluntarily (Suryadinata 2004, 92). Despite these events, according to Suryadinata (2004, 92) the paramilitary youth groups with affiliations to major political parties that were still in government ironically did not disband themselves.

The political elite factions that are taken into account by those in government are the domestic religious groups and members of Parliament. The issue of an alleged illegitimate attack by a superpower on a sovereign state was mixed with the issue of terrorism and with domestic pressure of ensuring that foreign powers do not get involved with Indonesia's policy on dealing with terrorism.

The first issue to be grappled with was the notion among domestic constituents that the issue of devoting attention to terrorism was brought forth by foreign powers, especially by the United States as it had experienced the tragedies of 9/11. It was difficult for Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda to convince domestic elites that terrorism is homegrown in Indonesia too and that Indonesia's anti-terrorism policy was not dictated by the United States. Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) pointed out that acts of terrorism were committed by both Indonesians and non-Indonesians in 1999, 2000, and 2001. These homegrown phenomena could be linked to other regional and international terrorist organizations by virtue of globalization. According to Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono, Established Islam refused to publicly condemn the violence attributed to Street Islam because the former needed the latter's electoral support for the 2004 elections; Sudarsono also reckoned with the fear of Established Islam that any action against Street Islam would be perceived as 'attacking Islam,' hence Established Islam's propensity to becoming a hostage to political gangsterism (Suryadinata 2004, 92). The dynamics of how domestic Islamic groups provide feedback to policy-makers came across as rather skewed. The majority of Muslims in Indonesia can be categorized as moderate. However, these moderates tended to keep silent on issues of tremendous contention. The moderates, who are in fact the majority, constituted a silent majority; their voices kept to themselves resulting in drowning their positions by the megaphone effect of the vocal positions of the few extremists. That is why though Indonesian policy on the War on Terror for the short term remained on mark, the middle to long term success in the War on Terror depends heavily on the capacity building of these overwhelmingly majority 'Islamic moderates' to express their views (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author).

If the views of the extremists are nowhere as close to that of the majority moderates, and if such views pose a threat to the security of Indonesia, why can't the government tackle those extremists? The answer

to this question can be found in the political and legal landscape changes that precisely defined, by virtue of *Reformasi*, a new societally open Indonesia. Arbitrary arrest for reasons of national security cannot be performed. In responding to an insinuation by a former prime minister from a neighboring island that Indonesia was not doing enough to contain the threat from domestic elements of terrorism, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) elaborated:

> In the 'new' Indonesia we cannot detain people indefinitely. We have to have strong evidence for our police to arrest them. To request our police to arrest them and hold them indefinitely like what Singapore is doing under its Internal Security Act is something that our neighbors have difficulties to understand … to understand the 'new' concept of Indonesia that is very much different than before 1998-1999 … Thus it is difficult for an authoritarian Singapore to understand us, a new democratic Indonesia.

Hence, it is because of this 'new' environment whereby domestic political elites can openly project their influence onto society that Indonesia had to struggle internally to manifest a well supported foreign policy position on the US attack on Afghanistan and, consequently, had to deal with the related issue of terrorism as propounded by the architects of that attack.

The difficulty of explaining the issue to domestic religious groups was also experienced in Parliament. In February 2002, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda reportedly remarked how the Cabinet 'laughed' at the suggestions from other countries that there might have been a threat from within Indonesia from radical Islamic groups (Smith 2003, 115). Despite forceful and persistent pleas by the foreign minister, other members of the cabinet hesitated to take action due to the need for sensitivity to domestic constituents that had not accepted the fact that Indonesia had a real threat of terrorism (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author). Moreover, it did not help in the context of aggressively pursuing the 'War on Terror' that the United States prevented Indonesian access to Hambali, the Jemaah Islamiyah leader arrested a few weeks before the sentence on Abu Bakar Bashir was passed. The foreign minister argued that without access to Hambali, there was not enough proof to link Abu Bakar Bashir with the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization (Suryadinata 2004, 90). Bashir is seen as the leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah. The concept of home – grown terrorism is difficult to grasp for domestic constituents, for the fight against terrorism and the overall 'War on Terror' initiatives were easily associated with the United States of America only (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author).

One explanation may have brought truth to the myth that the US

President took other leaders' viewpoints into account when deciding on a major policy. As put by Anwar (2006, interview with author):

> I think it is a bit presumptuous to say that [US President George] Bush's invasion attack on Afghanistan is a personal attack on Megawati [or that] Indonesia even enters into the calculation. I don't think that Bush even considers Megawati … until things go really wrong for [the United States], then they will want to pay attention more to what other Muslim countries would say … I don't think that they are really willing to change their fundamental foreign policy because of the advice of another country. They really have to have a slap on their faces [where they] suffer the domestic consequences like their soldiers getting killed, the increasing [global] opposition against them, increasing attacks towards them. Only then would they be willing to think that maybe what they did was wrong. But even then, I never heard Bush actually admitting that what he did was ever wrong.

According to Anwar (2006, interview with author), US President Bush's foreign policy was more ideological in the belief of the idea of fighting evil while promoting freedom by means of war.

The stance undertaken by Indonesia was relatively harsh and strong compared to the stance expressed by other countries after the United States unilateral attack on Afghanistan without the legitimacy provided nor the authority granted by the United Nations Security Council. There were two forces running in parallel in response to the 9/11 attacks. The first force is the United States-led and United Kingdom-supported military operation that was code-named *Operation Enduring Freedom* established specifically to hunt down Osama bin Laden, contain and eradicate Al-Qaeda, and topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The impetus of this idea was US President George Bush's doctrine that terrorists and nations that harbor them constitute the same entity. Such view was often exemplified with the famous quote, 'either you are with us or you are against us.'[46] Irrespective of whether or not the rise of the Taliban into government after the power vacuum that was left after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was legitimate or represented the *popular will* of the people of Afghanistan, a unilateral invasion upon a sovereign country did not go well with many countries around the world at the time. In fact, though the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1368 (2001)

[46] An interesting observation about this President Bush's doctrine is the parallel with the policy stance undertaken by the superpowers during The Cold War. The United States then (and apparently now) embraced the doctrine of 'if you are not with us then you are against us' whereas the then Soviet Union embraced quite the opposite doctrine of 'if you are not against us then you are with us.' Note the inclusiveness clause ingrained within the Soviet's position as compared to the exclusiveness tendency of the US position.

immediately after 9/11 stipulating its 'readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,' the Council can only do so 'in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.' The supremacy of international law is clearly held in high esteem within the UN Charter, and as such would therefore not condone the invasion of a sovereign country by another without legal basis for such an action. It is no wonder that the international community, then and now, is of the view that US and UK invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequently, continued presence of their troops were unjustified.[47]

Any resemblance of an 'internationalization' of force can be found in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that was established by the UN Security Council on December 2001 via UNSC Resolution 1386 (stipulating initial ISAF mandate of 6 months) whose subsequent two-year mandate was the protection of Kabul and surrounding areas from factions such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other warlords. Note that the objective of the creation of this force was to smoothen the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Administration that was headed by now President Hamid Karzai. Only in October 2003 did the UN Security Council expanded ISAF's mandate to secure the whole of Afghanistan. Due to the difficulty in finding countries willing to assume

[47] In a 47-nation June 2007 survey of global public opinion, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found considerable opposition to U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan. Only in just 4 out of the 47 countries surveyed was there a majority that favored keeping foreign troops: the U.S. (50%), Israel (59%), Ghana (50%), and Kenya (60%). In 41 of the 47 countries, pluralities want U.S. and NATO troops out of Afghanistan as soon as possible. In 32 out of 47 countries, clear majorities want U.S. and NATO troops out of Afghanistan as soon as possible. Majorities in 7 out of 12 NATO member countries say troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible. A smaller 24-nation Pew Global Attitudes survey in June 2008 similarly found that majorities or pluralities in 21 of 24 countries want the U.S. and NATO to remove their troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible. Only in 3 out of the 24 countries - the United States (50%), Australia (60%), and Britain (48%) - did public opinion lean more toward keeping troops there until the situation has stabilized. Since that June 2008 global survey, however, public opinion in Australia and Britain has also diverged from that in the U.S., and a majority of Australians and Britons now want their troops to be brought home from Afghanistan. A September 2008 poll found that 56% of Australians oppose the continuation of their country's military involvement in Afghanistan, while 42% support it. A November 2008 poll found that 68% of Britons want their troops withdrawn within the next 12 months. In the United States, a September 2008 Pew survey found that 61% of Americans wanted U.S. troops to stay until the situation has stabilized, while 33% wanted them removed as soon as possible. Public opinion at the beginning of the war also reflected this dichotomy between the United States and most other countries. When the invasion began in October 2001, polls indicated that about 88% of Americans and about 65% of Britons backed military action in Afghanistan. On the other hand, a large-scale 37-nation poll of world opinion carried out by Gallup International in late September 2001, found that large majorities in most countries favored a legal response, in the form of extradition and trial, over a military response to 9/11: Only in just 3 countries out of the 37 surveyed - the United States, Israel, and India - did majorities favor military action in Afghanistan. In 34 out of the 37 countries surveyed, the survey found many clear and size-able majorities that did not favor military action: in the United Kingdom (75%), France (67%), Switzerland (87%), Czech Republic (64%), Lithuania (83%), Panama (80%), Mexico (94%), and other countries. The previous information was accessed on 19 March 2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_(2001–present)

lead nation status that is often coupled with a correspondingly commensurate level of troop contribution, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed leadership of the force in 2003.

Given the reluctance of nations to support the US and UK invasion on Afghanistan, at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference in Shanghai in late October 2001 Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda was the only one who raised the issue of the US attack on Afghanistan; no other delegate had even mentioned Afghanistan – they got to the issue in a convoluted way (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author). However, such a strong stance was not taken in regard to the expected reason of aligning with Islamic solidarity or the like *per se*. Instead, the firm stance in responding to the US attack was based on the principle of *bebas aktif* (free and active) foreign policy. As illustrated by Wirajuda:

> In international forums [Indonesia] was capable of carrying out free and active foreign policy that was interpreted as [Indonesia's] capability of taking a position and expressing a policy view that is derived solely from [Indonesia's] foreign policy, [and not a position dictated] by others. We agreed to combat terrorism. We agreed to combine the foreign policies of nations in combating terrorism … in fact this was our position on the evening on 11 September 2001 [after the tragedies]. However, as a follow-up [to all of this] without the authorization of the United Nations and in a unilateral manner when the United States undertook a military action [against Afghanistan], we were very firm in our position … [this] was a test of our *bebas aktif* (free and active) foreign policy.

There were several reasons for Megawati's decision to accommodate President Bush in Bali despite her requests and the requests of Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda not to attack Afghanistan and specifically not to attack during the Islamic Holy Month of Ramadhan.

One of these reasons was the dilemma that President Megawati was faced with the impossible choice of jeopardizing Indonesia's own national interest or to advocate a global issue that is worthy for Indonesia to stand up on the world forum. Anwar (2006, interview with author) placed the dilemma under scrutiny:

> Indonesia as the largest Muslim country and a country with the clear stance on occupation and military domination by a foreign country has a very clear idea of what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. But at the same time, Indonesia also believes that the government is responsible for the well-being of the Indonesian people at large. And the well-being of the people include providing sufficient jobs, ensuring that investment comes to the country, ensure that education is taken care of, ensure that public security is taken care of and the government has to look around where to

> get all of that most lacking of resources for the country. On the one hand the United States is this empire with world domination particularly in the Middle East. And secondly, it is a country that is consistently very generous to Indonesia. [Not to mention that] it is Indonesia's largest export market, it is one of the biggest source of investment in the country, it is also a country that has always been quick in assisting Indonesia when Indonesia faces disasters like the tsunami.

Salahuddin Wahid (2006, interview with author), former Golkar Vice-Presidential candidate and brother of the former President Abdurrahman Wahid - who was backed Islamic groups explained how the issue with Afghanistan, and later with Iraq and currently with Palestine as well, is unrelated to religion but rather to politics. Wahid even confronted that even neighboring Arab countries did not care. This view reinforced his belief that foreign policy decisions were made on the basis of politics and not of Islam. (Wahid, 2006, interview with author)

Anwar (2006, interview with author), again, placed the dilemma under a rational evaluation to test whether Indonesia's justification for pursuing certain policy stances hold up to reason:

> Who are the biggest donors to Indonesia? Is it the Islamic countries? Or the non-Muslim countries? Who is the largest market for Indonesia? Where do most Indonesian students go to study? Do they go to the Middle East or do they go to the Western countries whose foreign policies we don't like? These are the issues that have to be considered by the government, and … it could be very wrong for the government if in shaping its policy it only weighs one consideration at the expense of others. The government has to put all these considerations on the table and start to prioritize [while] what Megawati did was quite rational. On one hand Megawati made a very public articulation in Indonesia's standpoint regarding Afghanistan and Iraq. That Indonesia opposes militarism. But at the same time, Indonesia recognizes that it is a country that wants to develop close relations with all other countries that can be of assistance to it. And the United States remains to be the country of significant power to Indonesia which Indonesia cannot ignore.

Deputy Minister for the Coordination of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Albert Matondang (2006, interview with author) delineated a similar outlook with respect to the United States:

> Judged from the standards of President Soekarno, the decision to accommodate US President George Bush in Bali or for President Megawati to go to the United States, in my opinion, cannot be put at fault. National interest was the basis upon which those decisions were made. And I know that President Megawati inherited nationalism but, in my opinion, she prioritized the national interest. And once the recommendation was submitted by the foreign minister, Megawati

deliberated and decided which action is the best.

The views of the policy makers were also embraced by the media. Senior journalist Parengkuan (2006, interview with author) elucidated:

> Why? Because [Indonesia] is economically dependent [to the United States]. I think it was because of the same reason that Megawati visited the United States in 2001 … on terrorism [President] Megawati was so committed. The perpetrators of the Bali Bombing were all captured. She fought those terrorists. And of course she will fight terrorism but if in another country like Afghanistan then that's not our territory. But here, of course she will go fight those terrorists.

The Vice-Chairperson of Indonesia's National Commission of Human Rights and former Vice-Presidential Candidate from Golkar, Salahuddin Wahid (2006, interview with author) saw Indonesia's position as a result of a lack of confidence due to the limitations of national capabilities:

> Foreign policy is not unrelated to our domestic political interests. It's a reflection of our policies. And it's a reflection of our capability such that we no longer feel confident, do not have dignity, and are simply unable. Perhaps our situation was indeed that bad, so weak, such that we're not confident, cannot take a position. We are so reliant on the United States, asks for the pity from the United States, and [sought] US assistance whether or not direct, such that we're unable to convey what we think about the United States. We cannot express our position accordingly. Hence, it was such that towards [US President George] Bush, our stance was like that.

A long-time PDI-P loyalist and senior Member of Parliament and member of the First Commission of the House of Representatives, Permadi (2006, interview with author) placed the situation within the context of pure power politics among nations while reminiscing the age of Soekarno:

> The figure of Bung Karno [Soekarno] is a figure that is very strong and extraordinary.[48] He embraced politics that made Indonesia great. To turn Indonesian people to become just and prosperous. He wanted to free [us] from the political influence of both America [the United States] and Russia [the Soviet Union] … [and then demise of] Indonesia came under [President] Suharto. [Our] foreign policy was diminished because of Suharto. And in this state of destruction, it was not possible for Mega[wati] to force herself like Soekarno [in engaging] *konfrontasi* [confrontation] … Mega[wati] faces the threats of embargo, attacks, [the

[48] Actual words used were *luar biasa hebatnya* to mean awesome or incredibly awesome.

> issue of] Papua, [the issue of] Aceh, and all sort of problems. So Megawati has to accommodate. If she doesn't, then she'll also be overwhelmed like Iraq, Afghanistan and others.

Chief Editor of *Kompas* Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author) believed that despite the flurry of state interests intersecting within the issue of terrorism, the media's role was crucial in the whole debate:

> In foreign policy, let's say, in the fight against terror, we need to voice the national interest. We need to show our position and where we stand. Terrorism violates humanity. So if we're to condemn then don't just condemn the perpetrator but more so the actions that violate humanity. In issues like this, our basis principle in *Kompas* is that humanity is more important than his or her background, what ethnic group is the perpetrators, etc. But once humanity is what he or she endangers, we need to fight for it. That is the prime role of the media.

As to the issue of whether by accommodating its own interests Indonesia somewhat betrays its perceived role as the advocate of principles of respect for the sovereignty of nations and advocate solidarity with the rest of the Muslim world[49], Anwar (2006, interview with author) explained that:

> It would be totally unacceptable if an Indonesian president would be willing to throw Indonesia's economic future overboard over Indonesia's standpoint in the Palestinian issue or our standpoint in Afghanistan and Iraq. But we know that many of these Middle-Eastern countries have very close relations with the United States and some of them stand behind the United States on some issues. Some people say that there are some inconsistencies in our foreign policy. But compared to these countries Indonesia has been very consistent. Of not opening diplomatic relations with Israel because our sympathy towards the Palestinian issue, how many 'Islamic' countries in the Middle-East have diplomatic relations with Israel? Therefore, in this sense Indonesia has to be balanced in its approach.

As to the criticism that Indonesia's foreign policy is not as *sterk* (strong) as during the Cold War, Anwar (2006, interview with author) elaborated on the need to focus foreign policy on the goals that are important to the country and not simply an exercise to achieve a short-term favoritism in public opinion:

[49] As a comparison, the number of all the self-proclaimed Muslims in Indonesia put together exceeds the number of Muslims in all of the Middle-East combined. The irony is that when the media and academia refers to the Muslim world, they tend to predominantly reference the Middle East while neglecting Indonesia.

> [Indonesia] has managed its foreign policy quite well although some people are unhappy with the foreign policy and see it as less manly and [a] less rigorous foreign policy. But at the end of the day the success of Indonesia's foreign policy is judged by how the country is better of [and] not [by whether] the country has more quotes or headlines in the newspapers. At the end of the day what are you dedicating your foreign policy to? If all you want is to have this celebrity status or authority depending on other sectors, [then] maybe the best way to do it is to take a provocative stance. But if you believe that your foreign policy should also be a part of the government's overall national policy you also have to consider the standing of the people, the standing of the country, and so on. Only then will foreign policy become successful.

Anwar's recipe for a successful foreign policy is the need to first assist in helping to achieve the government's own domestic priorities and secondly the ability to create greater respect from one's immediate neighbors first, which will be most likely also result in greater respect in the international arena. Essentially, 'if people recognize you but they don't respect you, [this is not] a success in foreign policy' (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono supported such a *realpolitik* basis for Indonesia's foreign policy despite the attempt by Indonesia to help create a world order based on some noble although intangible principles derived from Soekarnoism. Sudarsono (2006, interview with author) recognized that:

> [Megawati] understood that Indonesia's economic recovery depended on US support. Recognizing the United States as the most powerful economy in the world, [Indonesia] should accept that [US President George] Bush must be accommodated, irrespective of his actions especially after the Iraq War. It is the US ability to produce USD 12.5 trillion [per year]. The US defense budget is USD 400 billion, which is more than the next 20 countries put together, including Russia, China, India, Britain, France, and Germany. It's that simple.

As for US actions that may seem to have invalidated the principles espoused by the Non-Aligned Movement, in which elements of Soekarnoism are clearly embedded, the defense minister attributed such defiance of values put forth by weaker states as merely due to the raw power of the United States. Sudarsono (2006, interview with author) did not agree with the rhetoric of the Non-Aligned world regarding US unilateral actions:

> It is the American inequalities. It's the inequities of American power: political, scientific, and military. The United States is simply too powerful.

> The United States has outgrown the United Nations, which was established in 1945, because it is too powerful economically, too powerful politically and culturally. So basically the more powerful is a state the less it is legitimate politically because there is an action and reaction phenomenon towards the so-called American hegemony.

The former Secretary of State Bambang Kesowo characterized Non-Alignment as something of a principle; it did not mean that Indonesia must end diplomatic relations or must be confrontational for the stance is not negative but positive. It should be underlined, he felt, that Non-Alignment did not also mean a leaning towards the United States even if the United States is a superpower or a power that punishes (Kesowo 2006, interview with author).

Kesowo provided context to the meetings between President Megawati Soekarnoputri and US President George Bush. Megawati's visit to Washington, D.C., was upon an invitation by then US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick. President Bush had praised Megawati's presidency and her history of perseverance as embodied in her role in the struggle for democracy during the New Order. Although the platform for democratization began as the basis for the Indonesia – United States relationship, the issue of terrorism later dominated the relationship. And to put the visits into perspective, President Megawati had already met US President George Bush on four separate occasions during this period: at the White House, at the United Nations in New York when she spoke out against terrorism, in Los Cabos, Mexico when she attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, and in Bali end of 2003 or early 2004.

Many in the higher levels of both the US and Indonesian governments are convinced that Indonesia constituted an important factor in US foreign policy. As explained by Kesowo (2006, interview with author):

> In the War on Terror Indonesia is important. Not so much because both Indonesia and the United States are victims of terror but more so because Indonesia provides proof that fighting terror does not mean fighting Islam. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country. So it is important to be seen that [President] Bush visited Indonesia. For [President] Bush, it is also important. [Moreover,] for Indonesia we also have an interest. We insisted [that the summit takes place] in Bali. For the ASEAN Summit we held it in Bali to demonstrate that Bali is secure and that things are normal.

And due to having the primary purpose of fulfilling the previously described reasons of *realpolitik*, even a very short meeting given the elaborate advance preparations in months before the meeting was

sufficient. As illustrated by Kesowo (2006, interview with author):

> But even one hour is okay. It's already good for everyone. Good for Indonesia in that the meeting demonstrated to the world that Bali is okay. And good for the United States in that the meeting demonstrated to the world that War on Terror is not [the same as] War on Islam.

Despite the intention to put the two countries at par, the power asymmetry between the United States and Indonesia was too much to overcome. Sensing that war in the form of a planned US attack on Afghanistan was approaching, President Megawati's visit to the United Nations had both principled and self-interested motives. Indonesia had already lived in terror before the events of 9/11 and Bali, as appeared in the bombings of Borobudur, Bank Central Asia, and Cikini (Kesowo 2006, interview with author). The key difference was the motives of the perpetrators.

President Megawati's intentions were to use the momentum at the United Nations to get at the root causes of terrorism by urging the involved major powers to engage in an introspection of their own policies and stances towards the issue of the Occupied Territories in the Middle East. This strategy was risky for if the implementation was mismanaged a revolution could occur in Indonesia due to possible interpretation that fighting terror is synonymous with fighting Islam (Kesowo 2006, interview with author).

And it was also risky for Indonesia because the courage demonstrated by President Megawati could be interpreted critically by the United States. This could bring the United States to re-evaluate its relationship with the Megawati government and reassess its benefits despite US need for Indonesia's continued cooperation and the US acknowledgement of the role played by Indonesia due to a similar experience with terrorism (Kesowo 2006, interview with author).[50]

So Megawati in a way had to make compromises on issues that could be seen as deviation of Soekarnoist policies. In the face of the real foreign policy situation with respect to how to deal with the United States, President Megawati had to compromise although she expressed

[50] According to Kesowo (2006), to guard that Megawati's UN speech yielded its desired effects, the speech was embargoed, especially after numerous interventions by many people on the first draft of the speech. Only five hours before President Megawati was due to speak at the United Nations was the speech officially released. At the Indonesian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, Secretary of State Bambang Kesowo doubled checked at the last minute to ensure that the draft did not offend the United States. Hence, it was clear that many in Indonesia wanted to exert their influence in Indonesia's position ahead of the US plans to attack Afghanistan.

sentimental references to the past teachings and era of President Soekarno. Alatas (2006, interview with author) elaborated:

> Though the trip [to Washington, D.C.] was originally planned for some time, [President] Megawati went to the United States just as 9/11 had just occurred. She represented the first few countries to arrive there after the tragedies. And she had to support [the United States] on the fight against terrorism even after having expressed Indonesia's opinion in that on the method of attacking terror Indonesia begs to differ. Indonesia did not agree to fight against terrorism by bombing or invading another country. We were not supportive of the [military] campaign against Afghanistan. And we were even more assertive when it came to [the US attack on] Iraq. So for a long time we had difficulties with the Americans. The United States was not very happy with our fight against terrorism because we were not strong enough … [in that] they supported Singapore and Malaysia more because those countries still had the power to arrest people without a warrant. By this time Indonesia had already democratized. Ironic. But then in the United States as well they must sacrifice democracy in the fight against terrorism.

5.3 Case II. The Tension between Indonesia and Malaysia

Bilateral tensions sometimes arise between Indonesia and her closest neighbors. Hence, similar to the experiences with Malaysia during the Soekarno era, Megawati's government experience with Malaysia was just as compounded and complex. There were several issues of contention (Smith 2003, 111).

The first contentious issue deals with the manner in which Malaysia treated the many illegal Indonesian workers in Malaysia. In 2002 Malaysia announced a 31 July deadline for illegal immigrants to leave the country. Anyone then still working or staying illegally would be subjected to corporal punishment such as flogging, fined up to Malaysian Ringgit 10,000 (EUR 1,950 or USD 3,100), or jailed for a maximum of five years. A month later, the Malaysian government enacted the amended Immigration Act and began indeed to discipline illegal workers. Four Indonesians were caned and imprisoned. Deportations were normal but in this case such form of punishment was the harshest imposed on illegal alien residents. As a result, tens of thousands of Indonesians left Malaysia. This sudden migration became a crisis for Indonesia because of the logistical nightmare involved with tens of thousands of her own citizens suddenly arriving in a faraway camp due to the fact that many lacked the funds to go home.

Many Indonesians became angry. Protesters held violent rallies at the

Malaysian Embassy, tearing down its gates. Malaysian visitors were targeted by customs officials. Transmigration Minister Jacob Nuwa Wea even considered resigning due to his inability to make progress with the situation (Smith 2003, 111). However, the minister may have been provoking the situation himself when he encouraged illegal Indonesian citizens in Malaysia who were mistreated by police to stand up for their rights and fight back; this mass behavior resulted in riots committed by Indonesians in Malaysia (Sukma 2006, interview with author). It is then no wonder that Malaysia, urged by domestic pressure, resorted to forced deportation of Indonesian illegal workers.

The buck-passing got under way to such an extent that in late August 2002, Malaysia's Foreign Minister, Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, held Amien Rais, the Chairman of the then highest legislative body (MPR) in Indonesia, responsible for provocative statements criticizing the Malaysian government and stirring public opinion. Minister Albar even urged Rais to see to it that the latter's countrymen entered Malaysia legally (Smith 2003, 111).

However, Malaysia in the end chose to back down on this issue, since around ninety percent of construction workers in Malaysia are Indonesians. Malaysia began to face a crisis in its construction industry right after the enactment of the amended immigration law.

The second issue of contention between Indonesia and Malaysia was when the International Court of Justice awarded the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan to Malaysia in a 16-1 decision. The Indonesian public reacted fiercely and was in shock. The government of Indonesia, however, made it clear that it would abide by the court's decision.

The third rift between Indonesia and Malaysia was the perceived ambiguity of Malaysia's behavior with respect to the 'war on terror.' Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad had been vehemently opposed to the war in Afghanistan, even more so than Megawati. The Prime Minister's rhetoric was targeted towards US unilateralism and its role in the Middle East. However, Malaysia agreed to host an anti-terrorism center resulting from a conversation by US President George Bush, Jr., to Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad at the sidelines of the 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit. The center would be open to all members of ASEAN. However, Malaysia had to dismiss suggestions that the center would welcome the deployment of US military personnel. Malaysia clarified that US involvement would be limited to the provision of expertise, training, and equipment. Analyst Chin Kin Wah emphasized that economic fundamentals underlined the importance of the United States as Malaysia's largest foreign investor and trading partner (Wah 2003, 12-13). The diplomatic practice in ASEAN

whenever an external power is to become involved militarily in the region is to consult with the other members first before going ahead with the plan. Members who do not conduct themselves according to this norm can usually expect to receive cool reactions from the other members.

The fourth issue of contention was Malaysia's behavior as a founding member of ASEAN towards establishing peace in the South China Sea, an area known for its many disputed multi-nation territorial claims. Malaysia did two things that gave the impression that the country's conduct was unbecoming to of a founding nation of ASEAN.

First, Malaysia constructed a two-storey concrete building and a helipad (with a ramification in international law via the principle of *effectivités*, or effective authority) on Investigator Shoal. It just happens that this piece of land is also claimed by The Philippines, as well as by the People's Republic and the Republic of China, and possibly by Viet Nam. According to Daljit Singh (1999, 48) this unilateral action by Malaysia had several implications. It undermined the solidarity of ASEAN on territorial issues *vis-à-vis* China. Some even suspected that Malaysia cut a side deal with China at the expense of ASEAN (Singh 1999, 48). Moreover, Malaysia's action violated and may have fatally undermined the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea and the Bandung Statement, pillars of peace in the region and the manner by which such peace is to be attained. Furthermore, in terms of international law and also of political gestures the actions undertaken by Malaysia may provide a precedent for the other claimants, particularly The Philippines.

The second thing that Malaysia did was to deliberately undermine the peace-building capabilities of ASEAN by refusing continually to discuss this territorial issue at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Instead, Malaysia supported China's argument that issues related to the South China Sea should not be on the agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), although this is the main if not the only all-inclusive multilateral cooperative security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the issue was put on the ASEAN agenda (Anwar 2006, interview with author) and in practice, the ARF serves a useful purpose by building political and security bridges between the states of Asia-Pacific (Singh 1999, 15). Malaysia opposed the draft code arguing that the document was more like a treaty and that consequently each article had to be carefully studied (Singh 1999, 48). However, it is noteworthy that the ASEAN Regional Forum has many other members apart from those involved in the dispute, such as Mexico, Peru, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, hence perhaps a bilateral engagement approach would be the best way forward (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

Although these four issues were salient in the relations between

Indonesia and Malaysia, the issue that generated most reactions from the elites and the public was the combination of the forced deportation of illegal Indonesian workers and Indonesia's loss of the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan to Malaysia. However, Malaysia treatment towards illegal Indonesian migrants predominated.

This incident lingered so intensely in the minds of not just the Indonesian elites but the public as well that even five years after the initial assertive stance undertaken by the Malaysian government in deporting illegal migrants the issue still flared up again. This time, the cause of the tension was that the wife of the Cultural Attaché of the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur was held for two hours at the side of the street after being suspected to be an illegal migrant. During a raid by a group of the 500,000 member 'volunteer' [51]security force named RELA asking foreigners for passports, the person instead, as is customary for diplomats outside of their home countries, produced a Diplomatic Identification Card issued by the Malaysian government. The RELA officer did not recognize the card and held her for two hours at the roadside. Indonesia protested to Malaysia. Initial reports said that the person was 'detained.' However, it forced both the Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak and RELA Director-General Zaidon Asmuni to clarify that, according to Najib, 'the report is incorrect. She was not detained. RELA officers took some time to verify her diplomatic pass.' [52] In any case, reaction from the Indonesian public was fierce, as shall be elaborated.

5.4 Elite Groups and Their Interactions in Case II

These issues, though separate in context and in the time of events, taken together created an atmosphere in which the complex relations between Indonesia and Malaysia required careful handling by policy-makers. However, the issue that proved pivotal in the relationship between these two countries was the forceful eviction of the countless numbers of illegal

[51] According to Jalil Hamid in a piece written for Reuters 10 October 2007, the Malaysian government pays each RELA member 4 Ringgit (USD 1.18) an hour for participating in the raids. Wearing green uniforms and yellow berets, RELA groups launch raids everyday to trap illegal immigrants since the group's founding in 2005. New York-based Human Rights Watch has described RELA as a vigilante force set up to target foreigners. With Malaysians reluctant to take up menial jobs, there are nearly 3 million foreigners working in Malaysia, chiefly from Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, some illegally.

[52] Ahmad Pathoni, 'Indonesian MPs Urge Action Against Malaysia.' Reuters. Tuesday 9 October 2007.

Indonesian workers. And for this reason this section shall focus on the dynamics of the elites on this issue.

Many in Jakarta were critical of the harsh manner in which the Malaysian government treated illegal Indonesian workers. There had been reports of massive arrests and flogging as punishment. Anwar (2006, interview with author) painted the multi-dimensional complexity of this issue. First, Indonesia recognized Malaysia's sovereignty, and the latter's right to deal with illegal persons entering the country in the manner that it sees fit. Indonesia also recognized the fact that its own citizens were entering another country illegally. Second, though upset, Indonesia didn't want to cut relations with Malaysia because of the lack of employment opportunities at home. Indonesia wanted to resume sending workers to Malaysia (albeit legally) It was important for Indonesia in terms of economic growth and in terms of the repatriated funds (though no known inquiry exists into the actual amount sent home by these workers) and to help get its economy moving forward again. Third, Malaysia also needed those workers to boost its own economy. After all, as these illegal workers were sent back to Indonesia, Malaysia's key construction and palm oil production suffered as a result. This economic necessity made it difficult for Indonesia to be tough towards another country's undesirable treatment of its citizens, such as Malaysia and Saudi Arabia where Indonesian workers were also mistreated, executed, and so forth. It is here that one can observe the discrepancy between principled grand standing and pragmatic reality (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

Another perspective of the complexity of the conflict was provided by Sukma (2006, interview with author). First, there was an initial attempt by the political elites to give a nationalistic flavor on this issue and Indonesia's response. However, they soon realized that Indonesia contributed to this problem itself by its inability to provide jobs at home. Second, the Malaysian government had, in fact, extended the deadline for the illegals to return back twice for a total of three months. The Malaysian government wanted those who were illegal to go back and file proper immigration documents before returning to Malaysia. It was after this deadline that the Malaysian immigration authorities started to crack down on illegals. In fact, according to Kesowo (2006, interview with author), every country takes strong action against illegal migrants, Indonesia included. He continued that 'Indonesia punishes illegals, putting them in Sumba Island for sentencing, and extradites those without citizenship from Indonesia.' The reason there had not been much publicity to the affairs was due to the fact that Indonesia was the country of transit, and not the country of destination, and that the number of

illegal migrants number less than one hundred, according to Kesowo (2006, interview with author).[53]

To view this decision in the proper context, one should note that the Malaysian government was also under tremendous domestic political pressure because of suggestions that the increasing criminality in Malaysia was caused by illegal workers and those coming from rural areas. Third, as for the inhumane manner of punishment, i.e. the whipping and the caning, allegedly committed by Malaysia, Indonesia can be seen as guilty of the same thing. Chairman of MPR Amien Rais felt strongly about the inhumane aspects of caning and whipping and conveyed his views to Malaysia. But a few months later, caning and whipping were instituted as a legitimate form of punishment for professional gamblers in Indonesia (Sukma 2006, interview with author). So the third point had lost its relevance. Just as in any market, the labor market works if there's a supply and demand for such labor. Malaysia could, however, have done more to ensure that their citizens do not hire illegal workers (Sukma 2006, interview with author).

To put the labor migration circumstances and the issue of Indonesian illegal workers in Malaysia on the national radar into context, one former minister described the underlying cause of the problem as, 'simply demographic,' and argued that Indonesia must accept the facts. In the view of Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono (2006, interview with author), who was partly responsible for national security as well given his ministerial portfolio:

> There were too many people who were unemployed because of the crisis that happened in 1998. Some go abroad to Hong Kong. Some to Malaysia. Some to Singapore. These include professionals as well.

To go up one level up in terms of the analysis pole, Sudarsono (2006, interview with author) illustrated that things were indeed incredibly difficult for Indonesia and that the situation with the illegal migrants could not, in all fairness, be attributed to President Megawati:

> The reality was that of high unemployment, pervasive poverty, and the need to alleviate some of the problems of despair from those who have low-incomes. This situation cannot be blamed on [Megawati] because the crisis happened in 1998. Indonesia tanked 40-50%. Its currency, the

[53] For a geographical span as large as Indonesia in having 17,508 plus islands occupying four time zones and given the law enforcement institutional capability of the government, it is the author's estimation that the number offered by the former Secretary of State might only include illegal migrants who have been identified and placed under custody, and did not include the possibly many still at large both in the wide urban centers and rural areas of Indonesia.

> Rupiah, also fell 75%. In fact, the most severely hit economy during the crisis was Indonesia. Other countries fell at the most 50%. Malaysia perhaps fell 15%. Singapore 12%. But Indonesia … fell 70%. The Rupiah fell from 2,200 Rp/USD to 15,000 Rp/USD in just six months. Can you imagine [the devastation caused by all of this]?

The emotional pictures of seeing, via the media, the difficult and painful travel of hundreds of thousands of people who had trouble, due to lack of means, to return after being evicted from Malaysia propelled this issue to national prominence. Images of the devastating living conditions under which these people had to live in the temporary holding facility at Nunukan, Kalimantan, waiting to be transported back to Indonesia were broadcast in prime time national television.

These emotions ran deep in policy-making and were not only confined to the issue of reacting to the manner in which Indonesian illegal migrants were treated in Malaysia, but also prevailed in other issues as well, such as Indonesia's relations with Australia, as shall be explained in later sections.

Reacting to these emotions, however, Indonesian Members of Parliament were not composed on the issue, either at the time, and especially five years later after the detainment of the wife of the Cultural Attaché at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur discussed above.

Yusril Ihza Mahendra, former Indonesian Secretary of State and Deputy Chairman of Parliament's influential First Commission that deals with foreign and security affairs, referring to the treatment of Indonesians in Malaysia and suggesting that the Indonesian government should issue a travel warning against Indonesians going to Malaysia explained the situation as follows:

> Things like these happen again and again. If we stay silent they [Malaysians] will think we Indonesians are stupid … We must take strong action that sends a clear message that we are angry. [54]

The chairman of the influential First Commission of Parliament, Theo Sambuaga said that 'ties between the two countries were hurt because of Malaysian "arrogance" and he urged the two countries' leaders to meet to sort out the problems,' adding that the Malaysian media also painted a negative stereotype of Indonesians in Malaysia.[55]

Another member of the First Commission brought up two fundamental issues that are brought up on center stage by the illegal migrant worker issue. The first is the need of Indonesia to stand to other

[54] Ahmad Pathoni, 'Indonesian MPs Urge Action Against Malaysia.' Reuters. Tuesday 9 October 2007.
[55] Ahmad Pathoni, 'Indonesian MPs Urge Action Against Malaysia.' Reuters. Tuesday 9 October 2007.

countries and asserting its right to protect its own citizens. Sirait (2006, interview with author) believed that:

> Every nation on earth's is judged firstly by its [ability to protect its own] people … the United States also foremost thinks about its people … But as long as the concerned person is an citizen of the Republic of Indonesia, it is imperative that she or he be protected [by Indonesia]. Because if she or he was not protected, then she or he would not be proud of being an Indonesian citizen. We need to be proud to be Indonesian citizens. So Indonesian migrant workers in Singapore, in Malaysia, in Hong Kong, and in the Middle East, for them to have to experience such indignity at the hands of other countries, they do not feel that they are protected.

As for the alleged harsh manner in which Malaysia has treated illegal migrants from Indonesia, Sirait attributed the problem to fundamental issues of the past and of the Indonesian government's past policies. Past policies pointed out the government's lack of anticipation of the socio-economic problems that could be caused by Indonesia's dependence on Malaysia. Sirait argued strongly that past mismanagement by Indonesia led to a dependency on Malaysia that could have been avoided:

> Why didn't we [Indonesia] react? Why did we instead sell [palm oil] plantations on the cheap to the Malaysians? Why isn't this the focus of the issue? Why did we let ourselves to become ripped off for decades by Malaysia in the political economy of tin and rubber? Why didn't we build our own tin and rubber capabilities … such that the political economy of those industries does not depend on Malaysia [for exports and for absorbing our hundreds of thousands of laborers in their plantations]?

A similar outlook was also embraced by senior journalist Agus Parengkuan (2006, interview with author):

> As with Malaysia, at the time [Indonesia] did not fully anticipate nor did we accommodated the fundamental problem. However, if compared to the era of Soekarno whereby [Indonesia] would say 'Go to hell with your aid' or instigate the 'Crush Malaysia' campaign the world has since changed dramatically. Or if we say 'Crush Malaysia' the ones who benefit would [actually] be the Malaysians. If people are afraid to invest here and Malaysia is stable, investors would go there. People would openly express aggression [towards another country or peoples], investors get scared.

Such views, though reminiscent of past assertiveness by Indonesia, were also aired by a die hard nationalist senior legislator from Megawati's political party who is also a member of Parliament's powerful First Commission, Permadi (2006, interview with author):

> Crush Malaysia, we are the ones that will get crushed! During Soekarno's time, Malaysia would come to learn from Indonesia. Our teachers were taken to teach [there]. *Koperasi* (cooperatives) were taught there. Now we learn from Malaysia. How proud was Mahathir Muhammad when called, 'The Little Soekarno.' We have the Big Soekarno, how come do we go and learn from Malaysia? Become subservient to Malaysia? [Via] Malaysia terrorists such as Azhari and Nurdin M. Top came destroying Indonesia. How come? We [Indonesia] did not do anything. Yesterday an Indonesian fisherman was shot dead by Malaysia. We can only protest. Diplomatic protest. During Bung Karno's [Soekarno's] time, Malaysia would have been crushed. Malaysia would have been attacked. Because we had weapons. We were strong. We had dignity. Now we are weak. [56]

However, *Kompas* Editor-in-Chief Suryopratomo (2006, interview with author) argued that the underlying problem was the lack of direction in Indonesia's foreign policy and that the corresponding policy actions merely reflected such misdirection. He concluded:

> Essentially after *Reformasi* the vision of our leaders on foreign policy is uncertain. What is our foreign policy? We seem to just follow the crowd. We merely follow the big crowd and not having principle upon where to take a position and where we can actually voice our position. The result is that in time, [foreign policy] becomes too loose … As in the case of Malaysia, we ought to have a position and what constituted a problem was that we didn't have a deterrent. But if I were to pinpoint the problems, number one, it's because we have no vision [of foreign policy], this is the most serious. Secondly, we lack deterrents. In our current never-ending economic crisis we do not have enough pride to assert that we are a nation that possesses dignity and a firm stance on issues. It is more due to our lack of economic and military strength that we can be easily manipulated on numerous occasions.

A former senior legislator and Megawati's former political strategist, Mochtar Buchori (2006, interview with author) reflected on the importance of having policy direction among political leaders:

> Soekarno knew exactly what he wants. You can agree with some of his policies and disagree with the others, but he knew exactly what he wanted. I do not think that … today's politician in general … has that kind of picture. Do they know what they want for Indonesia in the future? Do they know what kind of Indonesia they would like to build in the future? Their view is myopic. If there is [no vision], there is no decision, and consequently there will not be a consistent domestic policy nor will there be a consistent foreign policy. From there is the evidence of the

[56] Word used was *hancur* meaning literally 'destroyed' but the use of that word would have been confusing. Hence, the use of the word 'weak.'

> inconsistent policy of [President] Megawati as an ad hoc reaction to the situation she is confronting at a particular time.

Part of the reason why emotions ran high in the tensions between Malaysia can be found in the notion that, by virtue of a common Malay-based heritage, nations of the 'same brotherhood' should treat each other with respect. As elaborated by Bambang Kesowo (2006, interview with author), the emotions associated with this issue had nothing to do with the Non-Aligned Movement but more with the desire by Indonesia for Malaysia to treat the workers with the ASEAN Spirit and Malay Brotherhood that encompasses respect for humanity.

Megawati's former political strategist Mochtar Buchori (2006, interview with author) explained that:

> The depth of the problem, the forced evictions, was not realized by [the Malaysians] as an issue that is more than just a regular problem. It was not just a matter of illegality. It is cultural. It is hostility. It is a very complex problem. The same Malay heritage, the same the majority are Muslims, how can they find it in their hearts to do such a thing? The decision-maker was [Malaysian Prime Minister] Mahathir. And Mahathir at the time is in top condition. So he didn't care. And this is what is not realized by Indonesian politicians … what it means to be treated like this. This is one extraordinary insult. But why didn't [Indonesia] protest?

Part of the reason for the neglect by Indonesia may be attributed to the low socio-economic class of those who were evicted and to the low bargaining position of Indonesia at the time given its domestic economic crisis. Buchori (2006, interview with author) provided the context as follows:

> All of this happened because we were desperate.[57] Had we been rich, surely we will not be treated like that. If our migrant workers were not housemaids, were not plantation workers, the treatment will not be like that. But because those who were illegally staying were rejects from Indonesian society, who even in Indonesia could not get jobs, so they were treated like that. But whatever was the case, those are our people whom we must protect and defend to the best of our capability. I view this as an insult … especially since several of those migrants lost their lives.

However, Matondang (2006, interview with author) explained that it was perhaps unrealistic for Indonesia to expect such a treatment of her citizens considering that the economic strengths and competitiveness of Indonesia and Malaysia were so unequal:

[57] Word used was *melarat* or impecunious, a word that is difficult for many to relate to. Hence, the alternative meaning is used.

> In the Malaysian case we should not give in to the Malay brotherhood spirit. We often relent when we're called 'brother.' If we're needed we're called 'brother' but when not 'brother' is thrown out. So we must be rational in seeing this. Why was Malaysia able to return our illegal migrant workers? Because they no longer needed us. Our labor force has been there since the 1980's. They've served well in building the palm oil plantations, in building the many skyscrapers.

In light of the volatile emotionally charged domestic environment, policy makers had to approach the issue carefully and rationally, as explicated by Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) in the following manner:

> Following the reform process in 1999, our emotions in viewing and facing problems are quite high. Very high. Partly due to constraints imposed by the crisis and due to a strong tendency to blame others. So with such high emotions, it was not easy to manage [Indonesia's] bilateral relations with [her] neighbors, with Australia, with Singapore, with Malaysia, and even with The Philippines at one point … with Indonesian citizens imprisoned there. There is a tendency for emotion to become inherent in crisis situations … generally in Parliament and also in the general public at large … Had the approach been emotional, what would have happened is that [Indonesia] would have cut-off relations with Australia, with Singapore, with Malaysia, with The Philippines. So in other words, what [Indonesia] has done is to employ the rational approach as to contradict with the public's emotional stance.

The foreign minister assessed the emotionally charged domestic political situation in grappling with the issues of Malaysia and, as shall later be seen of Australia, and the corresponding course of action in the following way:

> Emotions ran high in Parliament and throughout the general public at large. It is due to such milieu that we must always be careful in managing differences. Diplomacy is about how to manage differences. Managing commonalities is much easier. The key is to how to manage differences as to not have those differences elevate to become serious conflicts (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author).

Responding to calls by members of Parliament to cutoff diplomatic relations with Malaysia, the Indonesian foreign minister believed that the onus of responsibility for foreign policy lay not with members of Parliament but rather on his shoulders (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author) and on the shoulders of the government (Kesowo 2006, interview with author). In the foreign minister's view:

> With a rational approach, [the foreign minister] conveyed to legislators that for them it is easy to condemn and to press for the cut-off of diplomatic relations. But not for [the foreign minister] … because [the foreign minister] is the one that must calculate all aspects in order to safeguard [Indonesia's] bilateral relations with another country (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author).

With respect to the illegal migrants issue with Malaysia, given that the manner by which Malaysia treated the illegal Indonesian migrants was perceived to involve the dignity of Indonesians, the foreign minister experienced difficulties in conveying the other side of the story to members of the political elites or to even put the whole situation within a balanced context:

> Out of the 1.4 million [Indonesian] workers in Malaysia, half of them were illegals. It was not easy to convince [Indonesia's] public that what had been done by Malaysia to capture, punish, and expel [Indonesian] illegal workers. Remember that those who were legal there was no problem. What our public failed to realize was that we would have done the same. Foreigners who arrive and work without a valid working visa, we would have done the same. So we must respect the process that others expect of us to respect because we expect them to respect the process in Indonesia. It is not easy. But again, this is a rational approach. What [Indonesia] has done is to analyze and to manage the process as best as we could (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author).

Given the limitations to possible action by the Indonesian government, the government could only take steps to alleviate the suffering of those involved, by sending in Indonesian Air Force C-130 Hercules Transport Aircrafts, Indonesian Naval Vessels, and managing the crisis in a highly sensitive manner (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author). Attention was given to bringing home the illegal workers in a timely and orderly manner; even as of 2006, several years after the incidents of Malaysia's assertion, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights was still organizing the provision of some 60,000 people who were still not registered (Sudarsono 2006, interview with author). After all, the logistics of providing papers to the workers at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur was massive requiring the hiring of extra staff and the filling of a large hall; the issue was dealing with thousands of workers that came from the plantations and the factories when the raids were undertaken (Siagian 2006, interview with author).

The tension between Indonesia and Malaysia, and specifically the role of the elites in the making of foreign policy of Indonesia towards Malaysia, had been confined to the initial reaction and rhetorical

expressions of assertiveness. With the exception of the political group in power (the bureaucratic elites), all of the political groups pushed the government to become more assertive in protesting to Malaysia and for taking a more assertive stance if Malaysia did not accommodate Indonesian government demands. The accommodative stance advocated by the bureaucratic elites and enacted on the basis of rationality as opposed to emotions persuaded the leadership of the other political groups to eventually accept that the main priority at the time was to safely return Indonesian nationals home as soon as possible.

5.5 Case III. Megawati's Reception of Australian PM John Howard Despite Massive Domestic Opposition

Despite opposition from leaders of the legislative branch, who accused Australia of giving support to separatist movements in East Timor, Aceh, and West Irian, President Megawati had welcomed Australian Prime Minister John Howard's show of good will with his visit to Indonesia in February 2002. Let us explore the wide-spanning circumstances preceding Megawati's decision.

Indonesian – Australian relations have been affected by numerous factors. However, in Australia the factors that seem to dominate were the Australian attitudes towards Asia and its domestic political dynamics, from which resulted its policy towards Indonesia.

The Rector of the United Nations University, Ramesh Thakur, suggested that:

> Few Australians deal with Asia with a sense of humility … many approach Asia from a sense of innate superiority and arrogance. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the vexed issue of human right (Hogue 2001, 67).

As is usually the case, those in power in parliamentary democracies, the government is usually more restrained than the opposition in publicly declaring a stance on sensitive issues such as, in this case, human rights. Hence, many in the Asian international community were surprised (Osborne 1999, 62) when Prime Minister John Howard commented when former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was removed from office and put in jail for charges of corruption and sexual molestation (charges which Ibrahim repeatedly rejected as politically motivated to undermine his candidacy for the premiership when Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad would retire). To put Howard's

policies into context on the issue of human rights, his own and his predecessor's (Paul Keating) governments had made the promotion of human rights part of Australia's foreign policy, with Keating engaging in even stronger rhetoric (Hogue 2001, 59-67).

Moreover, another example of a lack of sensitivity exhibited by John Howard and evidence of a long-standing critical attitude towards the region occurred during the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which in Indonesia's case was a more encompassing crisis. Surrounded by neighbors that were economically devastated and again, and some not only economically, Prime Minister John Howard proudly declared that Australia was '[then] the strong man of Asia' (Beeson 2001, 53).

Australian attitudes towards Asia, in general, are perhaps also affected by the fact that the country was excluded from the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), a parallel in political and economic significance to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (in which Australia is included as a Pacific country). Many other countries are included in both regional groupings. This exclusion may have triggered an Australian insecurity complex that could cascade into other areas of policy.

Perhaps domestic political constraints may have also driven Prime Minister John Howard in his policy direction. However, from his preceding electoral success, the prime minister learned that there are no votes to be obtained from foreign policy issues, and that little political gain can be achieved by prioritizing Asian relations (Beeson 2001, 48).

In terms of foreign policy towards its largest neighbor, Australia faced diverse challenges. Initially, Australia's opposition Labor Party called for East Timor to be granted full independence. In the light of the changing political environment in Indonesia the then just re-elected Conservative government of Australia had also adopted the same policy.

Australia did intervene. It commanded the military non-administrative mission, the so-called the International Force on East Timor (INTERFET) prior to the United Nations taking over military responsibility on 23 February 2000. The result of this policy led Indonesia to unilaterally cancel on 16 September 1999 the 1995 Australia – Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (Sebastian and Smith 2000, 80). Putting this into context, Australia only intervened upon approval of Indonesia and the United Nations despite also facing substantial domestic pressure over the government's failure to prevent violence in East Timor and over the its role in the breakdown of the security relationship with Indonesia (Hogue 2001, 63-64).

Worried about the increased threat from terrorism, Australia pursued greater security cooperation with a few Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia. However, the potential presence of a foreign

country's military in the region was viewed by many with suspicion (Huxley 2005, 22). In December 2004, Indonesia and Malaysia were astonished about Australia's announcement of a planned 'military identification zone' that was aimed at pre-empting a maritime terrorist threat from up to 1,000 nautical miles from Australia. Indonesian senior politicians presumed that Indonesia was the target (Smith 2003, 109). The territory of both Indonesia and Malaysia falls within this 1,000 nautical mile (1,852 km) radius, especially if missiles were to be placed on Christmas Island, an Australian island located approximately 500 km slightly south of Indonesia's capital city of Jakarta. However, this issue was watered down by both Vice-President Hamzah Haz and Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda who regarded Prime Minister John Howard's outline of developing Australia's preemptive strike capability as merely rhetoric (Smith 2003, 109). Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono met with his Australian counterpart, Robert Hill, over this issue and discussed the matter 'objectively' (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). Instead, Indonesia 'strongly' protested the arrests by the Australian Government of a number of Indonesian nationals accused of having links to the radical group Jemaah Islamiyah (Smith 2003, 109).

These events illustrate the manner by which Australia positions Indonesia in its foreign policy. The events span over a time period of several years. However, what sparked the strong reaction in the House of Representatives in Jakarta when Prime Minister John Howard did visit Jakarta in February 2002.

5.6 Elite Groups and Their Interactions in Case III

According to Anwar, Indonesia had been annoyed a number of times by what seemed to be Australian interference in Indonesian domestic affairs, whether carried out by the state or by Australia's civil society. On the East Timor issue, both the government and civil society of Australia, especially the non-governmental organizations, church groups, and the media, had been very active in supporting the East Timorese in becoming independent from Indonesia (Anwar 2006, interview with author). On the issue of secessionists seeking to push Papua to become independent from Indonesia, the government of Australia recognizes Indonesian sovereignty over Papua but some of the media, non-governmental organizations, and the academics in Australia have been active in supporting the Free Papua Movement.

In the case of Aceh, however, the Australians did not support the

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) and neither have Australian activists been paying attention to the separatist movement of Aceh. One reason could be the religious difference between Aceh and Australia. Anwar (2006, interview with author) reckoned that Aceh would like to separate and become an Islamic state whereas Australians have religious sympathies for both East Timor and Papua which are both non-Muslim.

Megawati was indeed annoyed at one point by Prime Minister John Howard but at the same time she realized that the relationship was not just a personal relationship. The fact is that Indonesia and Australia are close neighbors and will remain so regardless whoever is in power in the two countries. Anwar (2006, interview with author) reiterated that, again, the parallel to Suharto's pragmatic approach to international relations was embraced by Megawati in ensuring a harmonious and peaceful cooperation among neighbors for if Indonesia wants to develop a peaceful and stable environment it needs to have a good neighborly relationship with its surrounding neighbors.

Australia was shocked by the reaction of Indonesia (Sukma 2006, interview with author). Any issue surrounding Indonesia's territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity gets noticed by many at the highest levels of Indonesian political elites.

Indonesian was willing to take a firm stance over an issue that it deemed important. However, it approached those decisions with a mixture of principle and pragmatism. After a certain period of time, Indonesia is pragmatic enough to say that 'the show must go on' (Anwar 2006, interview with author). Non-negotiable issues entail those concerning sovereignty and national territorial integrity whereas those where Indonesia can be pragmatic about concern regional stability, community development, and Indonesia's economic development.

Despite the issues concerned in most tense situations, it is worthy to note that the relationship between Indonesia and Australia is special. As observed by Anwar (2006, interview with author) there are two countries at which Indonesia is quick to take offense compared to others. These two countries are Australia and The Netherlands. Indonesia is quicker to express its dissatisfaction with these two countries compared to, say, the United States. The last time that Indonesia had recalled its Ambassador to the United States was during the Soekarno era (despite recurring perceptions of US interference in Indonesian domestic affairs). The reason, according to Anwar (2006, interview with author) has been the Indonesian recognition of the asymmetry of power. However, the same recognition is extended to Australia but since Indonesia recognized that Australia needs the relationship with Indonesia more than Indonesia

needs relations with Australia, Indonesia can afford to be quick at taking offense when it becomes upset with Australia

Media initially reported on the meeting between Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono with Australian Defense Minister Robert Hill with flavor. It was initially reported that Minister Sudarsono told Minister Hill that 'there is nothing to worry about Australia … if the Australians were trying to use Indonesia or were attempting to engage in action under the pretext of self-defense, Indonesia will deploy its ships whereas what actually happened was a regular cordial meeting (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). And to be specific as to which media may have yielded influence, Parengkuan (2006, interview with author) elaborated that:

> The ones who nurtured emotions are television and not newspapers, especially when we speak about our relations with Australia. It is particularly so when television broadcasts demonstrations of 'Go to Hell, Australia,' or shows when we're trampled upon by Australia … our emotions will certainly react … basically we [newspapers] do not make people angry. We comprehensively attempt to explain the situation at hand … this is the actual problem, etc. We won't say, 'You must do demonstrations.' But our actions will not have much influence. Television provides the influence.

The concern of Australia that was partly addressed by the arming of its Northern Territory was North Korea, more specifically if North Korea were to possess a nuclear capability and the fear that the country would experience political instability and if those weapons would then be transferred to some terrorist groups. The other concern was with illegal immigration. Australia wanted to negotiate the right to engage in interdiction beyond its territorial seas (Sukma 2006, interview with author).

The reactions of the elites in Indonesia were as varied as their backgrounds. Those with a military background seemed to agree with the Australian military identification zone concept and maintained a low profile (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). As casually explained by Widjojo (2006, interview with author):

> We were able to understand [Prime Minister John] Howard's thinking. Actually, we should have also been able to provide a solution to counter his plans. For example, [Howard] uttered that there is a threat from the north. Though he did not specifically say that such a threat is derived from Indonesia, however it can understood if he is worried about an Indonesia that is volatile or unstable. But [he should also realize that] it is not possible to be attacked by [Indonesia]. That is just not possible. And even if [Indonesia] attacks, it would be similar to those undertaken by Japan in

the 1940-1942.

Meanwhile, those in the Department of Foreign Affairs and those in the media are more reactive and maintained a high profile of their position on this issue (Anggoro 2006, interview with author).

Moreover, it has also been acknowledged that the reaction from the elites that were attributed to the actions of Australia were fielded with the understanding that certain policies, especially those related to Indonesia, are steps undertaken by the Australian government to appease public opinion or to upgrade the government's position in Parliament and, as is likely the case, in general elections. Lt. Gen. (retired) Agus Widjojo (2006, interview with author) observed in this connection that foreign policy coming from Canberra must be analyzed within this context.

Just as had been the case with Malaysia, in responding to calls by members of Parliament to cutoff diplomatic relations with Australia, the Indonesian foreign minister believed that the onus of responsibility for foreign policy lay not with members of Parliament but rather on his shoulders (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author) and on the shoulders of the government (Kesowo 2006, interview with author). As elaborated by Kesowo:

> Foreign policy is not within the mandate of Parliament. Parliament opposed limited humanitarian intervention. The government accepted. Parliament despised [58] the message sent off by Australia such that it gave the impression that Indonesia was the loser … Parliament has its First Commission [in charge of foreign and security affairs]. That is okay. But we must think of the widespread relations at stake. [Think of the] bilateral relations [between the two countries]. We should not behave in a weird manner within the international community because then we will be regarded as an outcast or we would behave wrongly. So we should not give the opportunity [for the international community] to punish us.

However, there was another perspective in the First Commission of Parliament. A senior Member of Parliament, Sabam Sirait (2006, interview with author) shifted the primacy of the problem whether Indonesia, in this case President Megawati, ought to have welcomed Prime Minister John Howard or not but rather whether and how Indonesia should react to Australian policies that undermined Indonesia's position, Indonesia should, as he preferred, simply cut off Australia's access to the something which is important to that country's commercial

[58] Actual word used was *benci*, meaning 'hated' or 'intensely disliked' when used in this context.

life, such as limiting access to Australian vessels that go through the Lombok Straits. Sirait added that:

> [Whether or not Megawati accepts Howard] will not change the world map. Australia is our neighbor. We have conflicts with Australia. Alright, but that is what being neighbors is all about … [you must remember that] in history in 1947-1948 the laborers of Australia were supporting Indonesia for independence. They held a strike in order that the Dutch ships that brought weapons into Indonesia could not sail. You must remember that.

And as a senior legislator whose tenure in Parliament is longer than those of MPR Chairman Amien Rais and Speaker of Parliament Akbar Tanjung, Sirait believed that:

> The problem of whether Amien Rais or Akbar Tanjung did not want to see John Howard is all part of national politics that must get the attention of the President. But that doesn't mean that the President must follow whatever that is said by Amien Rais or Akbar Tanjung.

And just as had been the case in dealing with Malaysia, the way to approach emotionally charged issues where much was at stake and concerned sensitive relations between close neighbors was to employ the rational approach. In doing so, policy-makers were able to contextualize the issue and, in turn, elevate it to a regional issue whereby the modus of resolution no longer was concentrated within Indonesia and its domestic elements but more on the interaction between those states that are affected by the issue. Hence, in responding to legislators who urged the government to cut off relations with Australia due to the issue of, for example, illegal migrants the foreign minister responded that:

> The issue of illegal migrants is not a bilateral relationship with Australia *per se* but rather, with a rational approach, we can see that such an issue constitutes an international issue with a solution that involves countries of origin, countries of transit, i.e. Indonesia, and countries of destination, i.e. Australia and New Zealand. Because of the nature of those issues let's sit together then. [Indonesia] took constructive step to arrange a regional conference in overcoming the issue of illegal migrants rather than to make the issue into a bilateral one between Indonesia and Australia. This is a rational approach. With this, one can see that the situation has become critical become there is a general election in Australia. The debate has been turned into that which involves a bilateral issue by shifting the argument into, 'Indonesia has not been responsible, etc' (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author)

In responding to members of Parliament, specifically members of the

First Commission of the House of Representatives, the foreign minister underlined the importance of employing a rational approach and in putting the issues into perspective and in analytical balance:

> With Australia, you don't need a foreign minister to lead a foreign policy in severing relations. But take into account [Indonesia's] trade with Australia that is worth AUD 8 billion. How many [Indonesian] companies depend on that trade and how many thousands of workers who depend on this export to Australia, especially in a time of crisis when [Indonesia] needs more people to become employed. Think twice before simply deciding to cut off diplomatic relations given that the consequences [Indonesia] must bear. Secondly, with 18,000 [Indonesian] students in Australia who used to study in the United States because it's cheaper and takes less time to study in Australia, who would protect them if [Indonesia] cut [its] diplomatic relations? This is all part of the rational approach. It's not that easy to conduct foreign policy in an environment where people are emotionally charged (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author).

Senior journalist Agus Parengkuan (2006, interview with author) shared a similar rationale in justifying Indonesia's relationship with Australia:

> Our relations with Australia is often 'on' and 'off.' It will continue to be like this. Now it's on a high note. But in the future, it will continue to be volatile. We tend to think beyond the reality. We will never be a nation that is to be feared by Australia. So I say we must respect one another. The economic development over there is around USD 20,000 per capita while ours is only USD 1,500. Even that, I'm not so sure if it's really USD 1,500. So … to criticize, it's okay. It entails our dignity. But if we say, 'cut off relations,' that would be too emotional. How can diplomatic relations simply be based on emotions? To me that is a faulty reason if that had been the case.

Anggoro (2006, interview with author) attributed the volatile relationship between Indonesia and Australia to the search of both countries for their identity.

Though those at the top level of policy making may attempt to project a nationalistic or even a provocative theme in foreign policy, there is in fact no consistency in behavior because the people in the legislature, and in the general public as well, who checks the power of those in public offices, know that the world keeps changing (Anggoro 2006, interview with author). And a state that is insecure of its own identity, would find it difficult to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its place in the world. However, there is also a view which sees relations as simply based on power considerations. Chief Editor of *Kompas* Suryopratomo (2006,

interview with author) elaborated:

> Let's compare with the past. Bung Karno [Soekarno] was more assertive, 'Go to hell with your aid.' *Very* assertive. [And] Pak Harto [Suharto] with Australia, right? Australia respects [or would think twice] because militarily we were very strong. However, after the crisis, we have a weakened government, there's neither an effective nor a strong government, [all of which] make us weak in real terms. People will see that we have no capabilities …

After the Bali Bombing, MPR Chairperson Amien Rais really tried hard to persuade members of the Indonesian elite to sympathize with Australia, and urged the Indonesian government that both countries should 'not dwell on [their] differences' in the tragic situation. Since then Prime Minister John Howard took frequent trips to Indonesia. The Bali Bombing, in fact, softened the hard-line stance of Megawati for both Indonesia and Australia had a collective problem on their plates (Sukma 2006, interview with author).

5.7 Case IV. Megawati's Attendance at the Independence of East Timor

To provide the necessary background to the political circumstances surrounding the independence of East Timor from what used to be an integral province of the Republic of Indonesia, a brief discussion of humanitarian intervention follows below, keeping in mind that despite the importance of this topic, further deliberation on humanitarian intervention is necessary.

At the time preceding East Timor's independence, more states in the world opposed rather than supported the concept of humanitarian intervention. Hence, it is also unlikely that the international community will always act collectively to prevent humanitarian crises wherever and whenever they occur. Sebastian and Smith (2000, 66-67) observed that there are key limitations to effective humanitarian intervention. These are finite resources, political, economic, or military, to tackle global problems. Moreover, support for the intervention must not only be obtained from the host population but also from the home population of the states that are sending troops. Furthermore, there is always the need to avoid a wider regional, or worse, a global war. Hence, it is important to obtain the support of the permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, without which no intervention could proceed, and also

that a speedy victory is achieved. One should note that two members of the UN Security Council, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, oppose humanitarian intervention in another state's affairs irrespective of the circumstances. However, in 2005 at the High-Level Plenary of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (or commonly referred to as the World Summit 2005) the Heads of States and Governments did support the principle of the responsibility of individual states to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity ('the responsibility to protect'). In any case, Sebastian and Smith (2000, 66-67) conclude that the track record of humanitarian intervention is both diffuse and inconsistent. The U.S. intervention in Haiti to reassert democracy failed. After the intervention of 1999 ethnic tensions still resurface in Kosovo. Despite the hundreds of thousands saved from the introduction of food aid in Somalia, substantial chaos surrounded the circumstances of the attempt to put a clan leader on trial.

The 'international' humanitarian intervention conducted on behalf of the people of East Timor also yielded both challenges and opportunities to what had been originally intended by the international community as a sincere effort to restore order and peace during the turbulent political transition towards East Timor's independence.

One of the things recommended by the United Nations was a referendum for the East Timorese to decide on their future. However, in the ballot there was not an option for East Timor to be fully integrated with Indonesia (irrespective of whether or not there had been considerable support for this option). Those who wanted to become part of Indonesia could only settle for the next best option, which was autonomy (Sebastian and Smith 2000, 72). This skewing of the referendum outcome had considerable implications for the situation of Indonesia's political leaders.

At the time, the presidential and vice-presidential contenders, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri, respectively, were undecided as to whether they ought to support the outcome or to even the referendum to be held in the first place. Megawati was vehemently opposed to the independence of East Timor before the referendum. She was also publicly supported by large numbers of pro-Indonesian supporters in East Timor who vouched for her and her party (Sebastian and Smith 2000, 82).

With an already democratized MPR fully preoccupied with the judgment on President B.J. Habibie's accountability report, the 1976 MPR decision to incorporate East Timor into Indonesia was reversed unanimously without debate shortly before midnight on 19 October 1999

by members of the Council (Crouch 2000, 123)

The referendum took place, and it was decided that the people of East Timor wanted to become a part of new country. East Timor is Indonesia no more.

Coming to power two months after the referendum, Abdurrahman Wahid wanted a cooperative relationship between Indonesia and the new country (Hill 2001, 83). In fact, not only did President Wahid end the hostility towards East Timor, he also welcomed the East Timorese leader, Xanana Gusmao, as a friend whereas Gusmao had previously been Suharto's and Habibie's prisoner (Crouch 2000, 127).

The domestic political situation proved to be a tipping point for President Wahid. After an adventurous twenty-two months in office, he was impeached by the MPR, and Megawati Soekarnoputri was installed as President.

During Megawati's presidency, East Timor transformed itself from a province of Indonesia into a new country. A few weeks after the general elections in East Timor, President Megawati met East Timorese leaders for the first time. As Vice-President, she had refused to meet with them or with associated United Nations personnel (Smith 2002, 65).

Finally on the Independence Day of the Republic of Indonesia, 17 August 2001, President Megawati made a formal statement of recognition of East Timor's sovereignty. This statement ended speculation that she might attempt to destabilize the young country, given that good relations with Indonesia would be crucial for the future of East Timor (Smith 2002, 65). East Timor would have to secure transport through sea lanes, cross-border trade, access to the Oecussi district whereby one must cross through Indonesian territory[59], migration of people including refugees, possible trials for past purported past atrocities, and to secure a general sense of security Without Indonesian support East Timor would have achieved none of these goals .

President Megawati's ultimate recognition of East Timor's sovereignty was marked when she chose to attend the independence ceremony in person. Also in attendance was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, and former US President Bill Clinton. Megawati could have chosen to send Vice-President Hamzah Haz instead. China and other countries sent their foreign ministers.

Megawati's visit lasted for one hour and she was accompanied by seven of her ministers. However, to provide security for the Indonesian president, Indonesia's military, the TNI, had announced the standby deployment of a joint task force of 2,000 troops, six warships,

[59] The Oecussi district, located west of East Timor, is surrounded by the Indonesian province of West Timor.

amphibious tanks, and jet fighters at Kupang in the Indonesian province of West Timor (Smith 2003, 110). A regional commander insisted that all of these precautions were necessary to ensure that, in his words, 'not even an ant will touch her,' though the scale of such a force deployment might well be interpreted as a military show of power (Smith 2003, 110).

President Megawati's reputation as a staunch nationalist was well known. Yet, she chose to attend the independence ceremony herself which, as a symbolic gesture, carried significant ramifications. An inquiry into the reasons for her decision is called for.

5.8 Elite Groups and Their Interactions in Case IV

According to Anwar, Megawati was criticized by many people for her lack of understanding that East Timor was in fact a different case from Papua and Aceh. East Timor had never been part of the Netherlands East Indies. Only later did Megawati begin to understand that political reality. And once East Timor was recognized as a separate country from Indonesia, this was a reality that Megawati, despite a strong dislike towards it, had to accept. So, Megawati embraced the 'it's better to develop good neighborly than confrontational relations' approach towards East Timor and consequently decided to attend East Timor's independence ceremony. In this respect, Megawati was ideologically more aligned to Suharto than to Soekarno (Anwar 2006, interview with author).

Moreover, Anwar argued that Megawati's was pragmatic and realistic enough to say that:

> The problem of East Timor is a problem of the past. She might not like the process of East Timor getting independent, but she recognized that Indonesia and East Timor will have to coexist. And she wants to show the world that Indonesia is big enough to accept that. This had not made Megawati smaller, but made her bigger in the eyes of the international community. She was seen as a good stateswoman. So in that sense, Indonesia showed maturity in its relations with her neighbors. East Timor, though a former province, is now an independent state. And Indonesia respects that.

The two elite groups that were active in this issue were the group from Parliament and the military.

Overall, Parliament was suspicious of progress with East Timor. According to Mizuno (2003, 142), the general hostile attitude exemplified by the Indonesian political elite towards issues that they regard as an

infringement of national sovereignty constituted a hurdle for the East Timor administration to proceed with Indonesian relations. Moreover, referring to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between Indonesia and East Timor smoothening an investigation of past conduct by state apparatus, Members of Parliament argued that the MOU was not legally binding because it had not been approved by the DPR (Mizuno 2003, 142). It seemed that the DPR's increased involvement in influencing foreign policy decision-making process was focused on decisions which involve 'foreign intervention' (Mizuno 2003, 147).

Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that support from Parliament was needed to prevent any executive initiatives in foreign policy. According to Mizuno (2003, 147), the DPR and especially the First Commission is one of the biggest obstacles to Indonesia – East Timor cooperation. Examples of its negative stance are the Commission's continuing criticisms of UNTAET, the Commission's support for hardline Timorese causes, and its request that Megawati should not attend the independence ceremony in East Timor.

Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, who earned much credit from the East Timorese by his efforts to mend the relationship between Indonesia and East Timor and at the same time with Australia, was criticized by Members of Parliament for being 'too conciliatory.' According to Mizuno (2003, 147), the East Timor issue was used by the politicians in DPR as a valuable political commodity to enhance their power in national decision-making.

As President Megawati prepared to visit East Timor for its independence celebrations on 20 May 2002, a large number of senior politicians publicly oppose the state visit (Smith 2003, 110). These included the Speaker of the House of Parliament, Akbar Tanjung, and the Speaker of the MPR, Amien Rais. In fact, Rais wavered a few times on the issue. In 1999 he had said that he would support the outcome of the referendum, but in 2002 he first opposed Megawati's visit and only changed his position a week before Megawati's departure saying that the visit was Megawati's right to do (Smith 2003, 110).

Sabam Sirait (2006, interview with author) simply relented to the fact in the case of East Timor:

> The fact is that East Timor has already separated from us. That is the political reality. What is the use of going against a position whereby that province has been allowed a referendum? Why not from the beginning that President [Habibie at the time] refrain from giving the province the choice of separating from us?

The media also sounded a similar echo. A former president-director

of a major television company who joined *Kompas*, Agus Parengkuan (2006, interview with author), put the emotion surrounding East Timor into its proper historical context:

> I often times differ with [President] Habibie. But on the issue of East Timor I agree with him. Why? Because it was an annexation! The Republic of Indonesia, historically speaking, was the former Netherlands East Indies. East Timor has never been a part of the Netherlands East Indies. So they say, and in 1975 the United States gave the green light and we became anti-communist and participated so that [East Timor] did not became a Communist base. But [now] we're neglected by the United States. [I can't understand][60] why we agreed to be used by the United States at the time? Why did we allowed ourselves?

However, Parengkuan gave a more principled rationale:

> [Indonesian occupation of East Timor] was against our Constitution. We must erase colonialism off of this earth. We were occupying East Timor! [East Timor], legally speaking, was not part of the Netherlands East Indies. Never! Papua, yes. [Papua] was part of it. Aceh, yes. But not East Timor.

He went on to concede to reality:

> The fact was that [East Timor] became independent. All heads of state came.[61] [Former US President] Clinton as well came. Are we not going to attend? Sooner or later we will go there. It's our nearest neighbor. So in my opinion I can accept [Mega's visit] for the sake of neighborly relations. It's okay.

With respect to the military, a few hard-line officers with combat experience in East Timor and other troubled regions and with Kopassus (Special Forces) backgrounds occupied the top posts in the Army and acted as Megawati's special advisors. There was a sense that Megawati owed a debt to the military for her rise to the presidency and she appreciated the military for sharing a similarly nationalistic outlook (Mizuno 2003, 146). There is also another viewpoint that the military was used by the civilian political elite when challenging the President (Mizuno 2003, 147).

But despite impressions of the military's involvement, the fact is that by the time of President Megawati's visit the military had undertaken its

[60] The word used was *kok* as in expressing unbelievability as to why subservient behavior was pursued.
[61] Those who did not sent in representatives though Parengkuan's use of 'all' was to convey an imagery of the international political significance of East Timor's independence ceremony.

structural reforms and accepted become subservient to civilian rule. However, becoming subservient and becoming part of the state in terms of solely an instrument of national defense does not mean that the military has become passive when it comes to protecting the domestic affairs of the republic. An example would be – though military to military relations are welcomed – what the head of the TNI General Endriartono said about foreign assistance to the Indonesian military, i.e. that this should not involve interference in the national affairs of Indonesia (Smith 2003, 116).

The bureaucrats, however, took a different route. In employing the rational approach, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda (2006, interview with author) believed that Indonesia must develop good relations with East Timor. And not just any relations but relations that were conciliatory with respect to the recent past in terms of alleged human rights abuses committed in the former Indonesian province of East Timor and relations that are forward looking by virtue of the many lingering residual issues to be resolved after East Timor's independence such as borders, government and private assets, and refugees.

Secretary of State Bambang Kesowo (2006, interview with author) believed that President Megawati was faced with a political fact in that '[President] Habibie had decided [for the issue to be placed under a referendum] and the United Nations was already there. What would the international community think if [Indonesia] behaved strangely?'

President Megawati also seemed to hide her nationalist tendencies when she acknowledged the birth of the new nation of East Timor to the following effect as conveyed to Kesowo (2006, interview with author):

> By virtue of reality in legal and political terms [East Timor] is already its own nation. We have no other choice than to behave like a good neighbor. We must show a behavior that is 'sportive' [62] and righteous because all of this resulted from process and fact. What kind of a nation are we if we are to pursue narrow sentiments. As disappointed and sad as we were [63], when it comes to foreign policy that is another matter … Are we true to ourselves if foreign policy is used to support and is only conducted in order to strengthen the politics of domestic affairs?

President Megawati's stance showed a clear departure from her previously well guarded and tightly held nationalist convictions. Prior to East Timor's severing of ties as a province of Indonesia, Megawati made a clear signal to the then President B.J. Habibie that the government had

[62] The word used was *ikhlas* meaning submit, relent, or to 'let go'
[63] The term used was '*sesakit-sakit hati kita*'

no powers to simply release the province just like that without the support of the People's Consultative Assembly (Alatas; Djumala 2006, interviews with author). She insisted on making the release of territories from the republic difficult and requiring the customary checks on political power in order to do so.

PDI-P's chief of political strategy and former English speechwriter of Megawati, Mochtar Buchori (2006, interview with author) believed that President Megawati should have at least delegated her attendance. And given these positions, it was not strange that Former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (2006, interview with author) was indeed surprised over the decision by President Megawati to attend the ceremony:

> I was a bit surprised because I knew that she was so fiercely against [East Timor's independence] and I think she was opposed to [President] Habibie's policies ... I think [the decision to attend] was part of the necessary policy compromises that she had to make based on reality.

The Vice-Chairperson of the National Commission of Human Rights and former Golkar Vice-Presidential Candidate, Salahuddin Wahid (2006, interview with author) expressed a view held by many in that:

> I was also confused. If Bu [Madame] Mega[wati] as Vice-President did not want to [embrace East Timor], the logic goes that she as President should also not want to do so. She ought to [have sent her Vice-President instead] for that is one way in which to save face. So personally she might not want to but as the Head of Government she must respect and acknowledge East Timor and hence she should have sent her deputy.

Aside from outstanding bilateral issues between Indonesia and East Timor, the approach to constructively engage with East Timor arose from an acknowledgement of reality on the part of Indonesia. As difficult as the separation of East Timor from Indonesia may have been, the fact is that in 1999 the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) of Indonesia had accepted the separation of East Timor in its decree (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author). Not to mention that, it was East Timor that suggested to drop the wording of 'reconciliation' into the present day Commission of Truth and Friendship because it was believed that in recent years relations between Indonesia and East Timor had already been a reconciliation (although it had been Indonesia's initiative). Hence, though a need remains to inquire what actually happened in 1999 during the alleged human rights abuses in East Timor, the approach taken in managing bilateral relations between the two countries ought to lead towards friendship. It was within this 'neighborly' relationship framework that such an exercise was embraced, beginning with the

attendance of President Megawati at the independence ceremony of East Timor (Wirajuda 2006, interview with author). Indonesia's stance at that time was best captured by Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono (2006, interview with author), 'we lost a province, but we gained a friend in East Timor.'

5.9 Summary and Tabular Analysis

These four cases studies provided the empirical evidence for the investigation how political elites influence foreign policy making in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia as well as to provide the platform upon which attempts to contribute to theoretical constructs can be made. The last section of this chapter analyzes the general empirical evidence within the theoretical framework of the domestic sources of foreign policy approach as presented in Chapter 1. One way to facilitate such an endeavor is to construct a matrix in order to ease analysis. However, doing so, though valuable in teaching and understanding complex issues, would not only limit the amount of detail such representation is able to show, but may also distort the facts (Wight 2002). Despite this argument, the conduct of tabular analysis in the following pages seems to constitute a useful attempt to systematically simplify the results as to assist in the achievement of the primary objectives of this book. The contribution of this whole study to the domestic sources of foreign policy approach theoretical literature will then be discussed in the next and final chapter.

One approach to conduct the analysis is to use the several elements of the body of knowledge that was previously discussed in the domestic factors of foreign policy approach and which provide a skeletal framework. We can then build from there.

The scale system of the tabular analysis is based on a qualitative scaling that consists either of *low, medium, high,* or *not-applicable (N/A)* weightings. The *not-applicable* weighting is given to factors or conditions that were non-existent or to actors who did not participate in the issue under analysis. The allocation of such weightings is based on assessment of the situations and perceptions of the political elites active in the case studies described in previous chapters. While the process of giving weights is essentially subjective I have tried to be as objective as possible. This attempt at objectivity is reflected in the manner by which the weightings have been assigned, i.e. immediately after having prepared the narrative of the case study. The purpose of the exercise is to simplify and summarize the empirical observations and to align the observations

with the analytical framework derived from the theoretical frameworks discussed within the domestic sources of foreign policy approach. Note that the actual results of the empirical analysis have remained constant and were not susceptible to such subjective treatment or analysis.

Though a comprehensive discussion of the literature on the domestic sources of foreign policy approach was conducted in chapter 1 (see Section 1.4.4), to simplify the empirical results only a few studies from that discussion shall be used. The rationale is that the objective of this study is to construct a framework for understanding foreign policy making. And though the section on the domestic sources approach encompasses the full range of literature on that approach, not all of the previously discussed literature is necessary or relevant to the construction of the analytical framework pertinent to this study. Therefore, in order to undertake the exercise three studies have been chosen as the base by which to conduct the analysis.

The first element of this framework is based on Milner's (1997) work who argued that in the assessment of any domestic political context one must pay particular attention to the following three issues: 1) the polarity of the policy preferences of the political players, 2) the domestic distribution of information, and 3) the power distribution among domestic political institutions. Stipulations for analysis of the policy making *context* are clearly made here. Milner's work expanded the relevance of the policy making process to elements of the contextual background in which the process is made.

The second element of this framework is based on Hudson's (2007) proposal to account for five factors in determining the influence of the domestic actors on foreign policy. As previously discussed, these five factors are size, proximity, cohesiveness, alignment of policy preferences, and activeness of the actors in question. With respect to *size*, the number of people constituting the actor may provide an indicator of the effectiveness and/or influence of such an actor on a particular foreign policy issue. In terms of *proximity* of the actor to the foreign policy decision making positions, higher proximity is generally though not necessarily positively correlated with the degree of influence of that actor upon foreign policy. With respect to the *cohesiveness* of the actor, or on the contrary the fragmentation of the actor, the analysis should include not only assess this actor but also the relative power of the actor or actors grouped together in relation to other groups of foreign policy actors. The more fragmented the actors, the more constraints they must face. As previously discussed, Hagan (1993) found that for governments that are accountable to their constituencies such constraints lead to a less decisive and ambiguous foreign policy while for governments that are not so

accountable those same constraints induce a foreign policy that is more assertive and clear. Moreover, Milner (1997) had also found that fragmented regimes are also less likely to cooperate with other countries. The factor of cohesiveness is highly linked to that of the alignment of policy preferences among the actors. In terms of the *alignment of policy preferences* among the political actors, the extent to which the actors share similar views on policy issues influences the degree of political competition among those actors. The higher the intra-group political competition, the less likely the groups are to form an alliance among each other which could overcome their differences to propose an agreed-upon policy platform to the ruling group. Hence the political bickering and/or dialogue would be among themselves and not with the ruling group the political intercourse of which then would constitute a 'normal' mode of operation in a burgeoning democracy. And as with the last factor, the *activeness* of the political actor, though there is a need to determine whether or not an actor is politically active on an issue, it is rather more important, as found by Everts (2002), to obtain confirmation of whether the actor's attitudes are either latent or manifest with only the latter being politically relevant. Incorporating all five factors into the second element within the analytical framework may help determine, or at least subjectively measure, the influence of a political actor in foreign policy.

The third element of the analytical framework to be constructed on the basis of empirical observation arising from this study consists of understanding the manner by which the political actor tangibly imparts her/his influence. Everts (2002, 45-46) found that in imparting influence, the political actor must manifest its (or their collective) attitudes which can be measured on four dimensions: concreteness, specificity, representativeness, and the degree of realism. As has been previously discussed, *concreteness* entails the actor's real concerns and the salience of its attitudes towards the issues. *Specificity* entails capturing either specific or general policy preferences. *Representativeness* ensures that the manifestation reflects the true attitudes of the actor concerned and not an isolated incident. The *degree of realism* assesses whether the manifestation of an actor's attitudes has a direct or only an indirect political effect in foreign policy.

These three theoretical elements within the constructed analytical framework only provide an assessment of the influence of the various political actors. Understanding *influence* in itself does not suffice for an understanding of the dynamics of political elites in affecting foreign policy. Further discussion in achieving the goal of this study shall be undertaken in the next, and concluding, chapter including a discussion of the strategies by which the ruling regime aims to cope with the various

domestic political elements. However, for summarizing the empirical observations obtained from the four case studies the previously discussed three theoretical elements are sufficient. And discussion thereof shall take place in the next sections.

5.9.1 Case I – US Attack on Afghanistan

Indonesia's warm reception of US President George Bush after the US invasion on Afghanistan despite Megawati's request to not invade another sovereign country without solid proof of the country's participation in terrorism is the first case to be analyzed. From the table shown below one can observe that during foreign policy *formulation*, information is widely distributed given the saliency of the issue. Each political group had also been able to manifest its self-perceived role in a democracy by becoming assertive and issuing public statements expressing its views on the issue. There was a richness of policy positions among the various political groups.

ISSUES FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS: FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Milner (1997) CASE I	POLARITY OF POLICY PREFERENCES	DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION	INSTITUTIONAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	N / A	N / A	N / A
Religious Elites	high	high	medium
Media	low	high	low
Academics	medium	high	medium
PARLIAMENT	medium	high	high
MILITARY	N / A	N / A	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high

However, during foreign policy *implementation* the distribution of information is restricted by virtue of the process of foreign policy making with the bureaucracy essentially taking the lead in policy. And the positions of the various political groups tended to coagulate in becoming unison. Divergence in views waned while extreme viewpoints, especially the radical religious groups, subsided as the leaders of the mainstream group took charge of the group's policy position and rebutted the vocal minority in that extremist calls for hostile policy do not reflect the desires of the majority. And even after dialogue with the ruling political group Parliament's strong stance subsided as well. Note that the military and the NGOs were not active in this case.

ISSUES FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS : FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

	POLARITY OF POLICY PREFERENCES	DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION	INSTITUTIONAL POWER DISTRIBUTION
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	N / A	N / A	N / A
Religious Elites	low	medium	low
Media	low	medium	low
Academics	low	medium	low
PARLIAMENT	medium	medium	medium
MILITARY	N / A	N / A	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high

An observation worth noting in all of the cases is that the attributes of the various political actors themselves change with respect to the issue. As can be seen from the table below (and later in succeeding tables), size, proximity, cohesiveness, alignment, and activeness are changing variables depending on the issues the political groups face. Hence, the attributes of apolitical groups do not remain constant. In the first case, one can observe how the 'determinants of influence' of certain groups change between foreign policy formulation and foreign policy implementation. Within civil society, the religious elites first expressed a policy position that accounted from the gamut of its membership, including the extremists, and then embraced a single mainstream position that excluded the extremists due to the latter's diminished outspokenness. Parliament rescinded its tenacity in protesting against the government.

DETERMINANTS OF INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL ACTOR

FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

Hudson (2007) **CASE I**

	SIZE	PROXIMITY	COHESIVENESS	ALIGNMENT	ACTIVENESS
CIVIL SOCIETY					
NGO's	low	low	low	low	low
Religious Elites	high	medium	low	low	high
Media	low	low	mecium	medium	high
Academics	low	low	mecium	medium	low
PARLIAMENT	medium	high	mecium	medium	high
MILITARY	low	low	low	low	low
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high	high	high

DETERMINANTS OF INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL ACTOR FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

	SIZE	PROXIMITY	COHESIVENESS	ALIGNMENT	ACTIVENESS
CIVIL SOCIETY					
NGO's	low	low	low	low	low
Religious Elites	medium	low	high	medium	low
Media	low	low	medium	medium	high
Academics	low	low	medium	medium	low
PARLIAMENT	medium	high	medium	low	medium
MILITARY	low	low	low	low	low
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high	high	high

A difficult attribute to measure due to its subjective nature, the dimensions of the attitudes manifested by political actors to tangibly project influence on foreign policy can be seen from the table below. One can observe how the religious elites gradually retracted their salience towards their hardline positions during the transition from foreign policy formulation to implementation and how Parliament remained constant in its attitudes throughout the process. However, note the attitudes exhibited by NGOs and the military. During foreign policy formulation NGOs did not make their positions clear nor did NGOs seem to have had a strong policy preference as reflected by the inability to capture both the representativeness and degree of realism of their attitudes for this study. A similar phenomenon was exhibited by the military in that its almost non-presence in the foreign policy making process led to a minimal output that could be captured by this study. And the attitudes they exhibited were even only registered under the specificity and degree of realism dimensions of their attitudes, However, during foreign policy implementation when control over the process was in the hands of the bureaucracy, both the NGOs and the military seemed to have their attitudes cut out for them by virtue of a default in situational constraints. Since implementation had been carried out by the bureaucracy, the attitudinal dimensions of the NGOs and the military have been limited to scoring *lows* over all of the four dimensions and a *high* representativeness in the lack of attitude, respectively.

ATTITUDES OF POLITICAL ACTOR INFLUENCE DIMENSIONS
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Everts (2002) **CASE I**

	CONCRETENESS	SPECIFICITY	REPRESENTATIVENESS	DEGREE OF REALISM
CIVIL SOCIETY				
NGO's	low	low	N / A	N / A
Religious Elites	high	high	low	high
Media	low	low	high	medium
Academics	medium	low	low	high
PARLIAMENT	high	high	medium	high
MILITARY	N / A	low	N / A	medium
BUREAUCRACY	low	medium	high	high

ATTITUDES OF POLITICAL ACTOR INFLUENCE DIMENSIONS
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

	CONCRETENESS	SPECIFICITY	REPRESENTATIVENESS	DEGREE OF REALISM
CIVIL SOCIETY				
NGO's	low	low	low	low
Religious Elites	medium	low	high	low
Media	high	medium	high	high
Academics	medium	medium	high	medium
PARLIAMENT	high	high	medium	high
MILITARY	N / A	N / A	high	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	high	medium	high	high

5.9.2 Case II – The Tension between Indonesia and Malaysia

The second case dealt with the fact that Indonesia continued to accommodate Malaysia despite strong domestic political opposition towards that policy. Though there were numerous causes for the hostile domestic sentiment towards Malaysia, this study focused specifically on Malaysia's ill treatment of Indonesian workers who were illegally staying in Malaysia. On this issue, both NGOs and the media were focused such that their policy positions, and consequently their policy preferences (resulting in a *low* polarity in policy preferences), reflected such a stance. This study did not observe any policy preferences of the religious elites or the military.

ISSUES FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS : FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Milner (1997) **CASE II**	**POLARITY OF POLICY PREFERENCES**	**DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION**	**INSTITUTIONAL POWER DISTRIBUTION**
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	low	high	low
Religious Elites	N / A	N / A	N / A
Media	low	high	low
Academics	medium	medium	low
PARLIAMENT	high	high	high
MILITARY	N / A	N / A	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	low	medium	high

The interesting thing about this case is the static reading of the foreign policy making context as the process progressed from the formulation stage to the implementation stage. Notice that the polarity of policy preferences, distribution of information, and institutional power distribution remained the same for all the political groups. One possible explanation could be the highly charged emotional content of the issue for Indonesia at the time. This euphoria was pervasive and shared among all throughout society in Indonesia, elites and the masses alike.

ISSUES FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS : FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

	POLARITY OF POLICY PREFERENCES	**DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION**	**INSTITUTIONAL POWER DISTRIBUTION**
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	low	high	low
Religious Elites	N / A	N / A	N / A
Media	low	high	low
Academics	medium	medium	low
PARLIAMENT	high	high	high
MILITARY	N / A	N / A	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	low	medium	high

As for the factors that help determine the influence of political actors, the content of those determinants for each political actor varies according to the stage of the foreign policy making process. The determinants for the NGO's and the religious elites stayed constant during both foreign policy formulation and implementation processes. However, the religious elites seemed to have taken a low profile in the issue and the position of the NGOs was not in alignment with that of the other political groups which tried to persuade the government to pursue a more assertive policy towards Malaysia. NGOs instead focused their attention on caring for the

welfare of the thousands who were stranded in the make-shift base camps after having been expelled from Malaysia. Though vocal and critical, Parliament eventually lost its nationalist fervor despite its early diffusion of interests though in the formulation phase of foreign policy its members joined forces and became an avid policy challenger to the government.

DETERMINANTS OF INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL ACTOR

FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Hudson (2007) **CASE II**

	SIZE	PROXIMITY	COHESIVENESS	ALIGNMENT	ACTIVENESS
CIVIL SOCIETY					
NGO's	high	medium	high	high	high
Religious Elites	low	low	low	low	low
Media	medium	low	low	low	high
Academics	medium	low	medium	low	medium
PARLIAMENT	medium	high	medium	medium	high
MILITARY	low	low	low	low	low
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high	high	low

DETERMINANTS OF INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL ACTOR
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

	SIZE	PROXIMITY	COHESIVENESS	ALIGNMENT	ACTIVENESS
CIVIL SOCIETY					
NGO's	high	medium	high	high	high
Religious Elites	low	low	low	low	low
Media	high	low	low	low	high
Academics	medium	low	low	low	low
PARLIAMENT	high	high	high	high	high
MILITARY	low	low	low	low	low
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high	high	high

In terms of the manifestations of the attitudes of the political actors towards foreign policy, the media, NGOs, Parliament, the military, and the bureaucracy maintained the same composition of dimensions from foreign policy formulation to implementation. Exceptions were found in academia but due to academics' diffusion of attitudes towards the issue later on. And again, for the religious elites at the formulation stage it was clear that they did not take part in the discourse while in the implementation stage religious elites (though not all) had also not taken part in the discussion. A possible explanation of this observation could be the high emotional content prevailing in this issue.

ATTITUDES OF POLITICAL ACTOR INFLUENCE DIMENSIONS
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Everts (2002) **CASE II**

	CONCRETENESS	SPECIFICITY	REPRESENTATIVENESS	DEGREE OF REALISM
CIVIL SOCIETY				
NGO's	high	high	high	high
Religious Elites	low	low	high	low
Media	high	medium	high	high
Academics	medium	medium	high	medium
PARLIAMENT	high	high	high	high
MILITARY	low	low	high	low
BUREAUCRACY	high	high	high	high

ATTITUDES OF POLITICAL ACTOR INFLUENCE DIMENSIONS
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

	CONCRETENESS	SPECIFICITY	REPRESENTATIVENESS	DEGREE OF REALISM
CIVIL SOCIETY				
NGO's	high	high	high	high
Religious Elites	low	low	low	low
Media	high	medium	high	high
Academics	medium	medium	medium	medium
PARLIAMENT	high	high	high	high
MILITARY	low	low	high	low
BUREAUCRACY	high	high	high	high

5.9.3 Case III – Megawati's Reception of Australian PM John Howard

The third case concerned President Megawati's decision to receive Australian Prime Minister John Howard despite staunch domestic opposition, especially from Parliament, against receiving the Prime Minister. This case basically was a political jostling match between Parliament and the Government with the media and the academics practically sitting on the sidelines. NGOs, religious elites, and the military were apparently left out of the playing field. In judging the transformation using Milner's (1997) three issues for conducting domestic policy context analysis, in this case none of the parameters of these issues changed for any of the political actors from foreign policy formulation to foreign policy implementation.

ISSUES FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS : FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Milner (1997) **CASE III**	**POLARITY OF POLICY PREFERENCES**	**DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION**	**INSTITUTIONAL POWER DISTRIBUTION**
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	N / A	N / A	N / A
Religious Elites	N / A	N / A	N / A
Media	medium	high	low
Academics	medium	medium	low
PARLIAMENT	low	high	high
MILITARY	N / A	N / A	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high

As evident from these tables, the two most suitable sparring partners for the political joust match are Parliament and the Bureaucracy, both having *low* polarity of policy preferences among each of their groups while maintaining *high* distribution of information and a *high* institutional power base. Even if the media and academics had an institutional power base (which they do not), the presence of polarity of policy preferences among themselves coupled with mixed levels of information distribution would make them weaker political groups in the debate on this issue.

ISSUES FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS : FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

	POLARITY OF POLICY PREFERENCES	**DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION**	**INSTITUTIONAL POWER DISTRIBUTION**
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	N / A	N / A	N / A
Religious Elites	N / A	N / A	N / A
Media	medium	high	low
Academics	medium	medium	low
PARLIAMENT	low	high	high
MILITARY	N / A	N / A	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high

After having assessed the policy making context, further work must be undertaken in analyzing the five determinants in the influence of the political actor.

DETERMINANTS OF INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL ACTOR
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

Hudson (2007) **CASE III**

	SIZE	PROXIMITY	COHESIVENESS	ALIGNMENT	ACTIVENESS
CIVIL SOCIETY					
NGO's	low	low	low	low	low
Religious Elites	low	low	low	low	low
Media	low	low	low	low	medium
Academics	medium	medium	low	low	low
PARLIAMENT	low	high	high	high	high
MILITARY	low	low	low	low	low
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high	high	medium

As one can observe, the weightings given to the various determinants reflect the fact that NGOs, religious elites, and the military did not play a role in the policy deliberations. One can also observe that the media and the academics remained active during both foreign policy formulation and implementation stages. Both the media and the academics became more active as the foreign policy implementation (Megawati's warm reception of Prime Minister Howard) took effect. Parliament, on the other hand, retained its influence configuration to match those of the bureaucrats. In fact, Parliament was even more active during the formulation stage, which led to higher activity by the bureaucrats to respond and to correspondingly project policy influence at the implementation stage.

DETERMINANTS OF INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL ACTOR
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

	SIZE	PROXIMITY	COHESIVENESS	ALIGNMENT	ACTIVENESS
CIVIL SOCIETY					
NGO's	low	low	low	low	low
Religious Elites	low	low	low	low	low
Media	medium	low	medium	medium	high
Academics	medium	medium	medium	medium	medium
PARLIAMENT	low	high	high	high	high
MILITARY	low	low	low	low	low
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high	high	high

The last equation of the analytical framework entails accounting for the dimensions of attitude manifestation as the political actor imparts its influence.

ATTITUDES OF POLITICAL ACTOR INFLUENCE DIMENSIONS
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Everts (2002) **CASE III**

	CONCRETENESS	SPECIFICITY	REPRESENTATIVENESS	DEGREE OF REALISM
CIVIL SOCIETY				
NGO's	low	low	high	low
Religious Elites	low	low	high	low
Media	medium	low	high	low
Academics	medium	medium	high	medium
PARLIAMENT	high	high	high	high
MILITARY	low	low	high	low
BUREAUCRACY	high	high	high	high

It is evident from the tables that during foreign policy formulation and foreign policy implementation both Parliament and Bureaucracy scored the highest weights in the 'critical' influence dimension of concreteness, specificity, and degree of realism. These scores signify how well these two political groups impart their influence upon each other and the other political groups.

ATTITUDES OF POLITICAL ACTOR INFLUENCE DIMENSIONS
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

	CONCRETENESS	SPECIFICITY	REPRESENTATIVENESS	DEGREE OF REALISM
CIVIL SOCIETY				
NGO's	low	low	high	low
Religious Elites	low	low	high	low
Media	low	medium	high	low
Academics	high	high	medium	low
PARLIAMENT	high	high	high	high
MILITARY	low	low	high	low
BUREAUCRACY	high	high	high	high

5.9.4 Case IV – Megawati's Attendance at East Timor's Independence

The fourth case concerned the issue of whether President Megawati should attend East Timor's independence ceremony despite her personal affinity towards territorial integrity. Assessment of the context by which the foreign policy process is undertaken indicates that there does not seem to be any policy interest expressed by NGOs and the religious elites.

ISSUES FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS : FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Milner (1997) **CASE IV**	**POLARITY OF POLICY PREFERENCES**	**DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION**	**INSTITUTIONAL POWER DISTRIBUTION**
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	N / A	N / A	N / A
Religious Elites	N / A	N / A	N / A
Media	medium	high	medium
Academics	low	high	low
PARLIAMENT	medium	high	high
MILITARY	medium	high	low
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high

Media and academics expressed a medium level of policy interest whereas just as in the previous case, Parliament and the bureaucracy express high interest. And though the military has a policy preference, in the analyzed domestic political power structure the military does not have institutional power. Moving to foreign policy implementation the members of Parliament polarized in their policy preferences compared to the less segmented bureaucracy. Segmentation in policy resulted from the later realization that recognition of the infant state of East Timor was an eventuality for Indonesia, despite the possible emotional hardship in recognition.

ISSUES FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS : FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

	POLARITY OF POLICY PREFERENCES	**DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION**	**INSTITUTIONAL POWER DISTRIBUTION**
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	N / A	N / A	N / A
Religious Elites	N / A	N / A	N / A
Media	low	high	low
Academics	medium	high	low
PARLIAMENT	high	high	high
MILITARY	low	high	low
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high

After the analysis of the contextual background of foreign policy making, the determinants of influence of the political actors shall be analyzed.

DETERMINANTS OF INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL ACTOR
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

Hudson (2007) **CASE IV**

	SIZE	PROXIMITY	COHESIVENESS	ALIGNMENT	ACTIVENESS
CIVIL SOCIETY					
NGO's	low	low	low	low	low
Religious Elites	low	low	low	low	low
Media	medium	low	low	low	low
Academics	medium	medium	low	low	medium
PARLIAMENT	medium	high	low	low	low
MILITARY	medium	high	high	high	medium
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high	high	medium

In assessing the various determinants, during foreign policy formulation it seemed that the military and the bureaucracy shared similar 'strength' for influencing policy outcomes. After all, for the military East Timor provided a mixed history. Irrespective from whose version of history one approaches the issue, the military has been active in East Timor for decades. Note that all other political groups may be regarded as passive in terms of influence determinants.

DETERMINANTS OF INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL ACTOR
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

	SIZE	PROXIMITY	COHESIVENESS	ALIGNMENT	ACTIVENESS
CIVIL SOCIETY					
NGO's	low	low	low	low	low
Religious Elites	low	low	low	low	low
Media	medium	medium	medium	medium	medium
Academics	medium	low	low	low	low
PARLIAMENT	medium	high	high	medium	medium
MILITARY	low	medium	medium	medium	medium
BUREAUCRACY	low	high	high	high	high

However, during foreign policy implementation Parliament's capacity to influence (on the basis of the determinants of influence approach) reached a similar level to that of the military. And the media also became salient surrounding Megawati's visit to East Timor's independence ceremony. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy reached *high* weightings in most of the determinants of influence during foreign policy implementation.

The last element of the analytical framework entails an analysis of the dimensions by which the political actors manifest their attitudes into tangible policy preferences.

ATTITUDES OF POLITICAL ACTOR INFLUENCE DIMENSIONS
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Everts (2002) **CASE IV**

	CONCRETENESS	SPECIFICITY	REPRESENTATIVENESS	DEGREE OF REALISM
CIVIL SOCIETY				
NGO's	high	high	medium	medium
Religious Elites	low	low	high	low
Media	high	medium	high	low
Academics	high	high	high	medium
PARLIAMENT	medium	medium	high	high
MILITARY	low	low	high	high
BUREAUCRACY	high	high	high	high

An examination of these dimensions during both foreign policy formulation and foreign policy implementation yields the observation that even from the very beginning the bureaucracy was well entrenched to suggest, defend, and carry out its own policy prescriptions. The bureaucracy's four dimensions of concreteness, specificity, representativeness, and degree of realism in manifesting its attitudes towards foreign policy scored higher than the other political groups. The bureaucracy retained such parameters during both phases of foreign policy making. Parliament was a viable challenger until the policy reached its implementation stage and arguments vindicating the eventuality of President Megawati in having to visit East Timor began to surface throughout Parliament. Parliament's policy attitudes then waned and its interests became less concrete.

ATTITUDES OF POLITICAL ACTOR INFLUENCE DIMENSIONS
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

	CONCRETENESS	SPECIFICITY	REPRESENTATIVENESS	DEGREE OF REALISM
CIVIL SOCIETY				
NGO's	high	high	medium	medium
Religious Elites	low	low	high	low
Media	medium	medium	high	low
Academics	low	low	high	low
PARLIAMENT	low	medium	high	high
MILITARY	low	low	high	low
BUREAUCRACY	high	high	high	high

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

6.1 Influence of the Political Elites on the Foreign Policy-Making Process

This study explored the extent of the influence of elites on the making of foreign policy in a democratizing country. Four theoretical approaches (systemic, decision-making, cognitive, and domestic politics) were assessed. In this investigation the domestic politics approach was chosen as the preferred theoretical framework to further theory formation. Within this approach, it was stipulated that it is the elites who would influence foreign policy should the possibility exist for them to do so. It has also been hypothesized that the shared beliefs and interests of political leaders determine the overall direction of foreign policy while domestic political pressures may influence foreign policy implementation.

This study showed that political elites do influence the foreign policy-making process in Indonesia post–*Reformasi*. In fact, for the case of Indonesia domestic political elites especially those in power (but surprisingly for a democratizing country not those not in power) indeed influenced a nationalism-prone President in pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy instead. It is worthwhile to note that the non-governing political elites did not impart influence during the implementation but instead during the formulation of foreign policy. One would expect that democratization would diffuse the implementation phase of foreign policy making. And, consequently, it was also surprising that the governing bureaucratic elites were the influential ones during foreign policy implementation in a democratizing country because one would expect that the bureaucratic elites would lose influence after *Reformasi* and become more similar in their interests to the other political groups.

The type of issue under contention, i.e. whether the issue entails national dignity, the emotional level of the actors to that issue, and the cohesiveness and the alignment of policy preferences of the elite group, determines the interaction of the various elite groups and, consequently, their influence on the foreign policy process. In *Reformasi* the proximity and activeness of the actors, though successful in getting attention to the issue, do not seem to have much effect on foreign policy making. The reason is that the government engages in extensive accommodation of the political elites. Very few acts of mobilization and almost no insulation attempts were made by the government in the cases concerned.

Moreover, the domestic distribution of power played a major role in

the exertion of influence in foreign policy. *Reformasi*, though internally driven, stripped power away from the military and gave more influence to civil society. Furthermore, through self-reforming initiatives Parliament was able to acquire more power, specifically the power of the purse. Despite the diffusion of power in foreign policy making, executive privilege still prevailed. In all the cases the recommendations of the bureaucrats led to the pursuit of foreign policy in the direction suggested by them. The other non-executive foreign policy related branch of government (Parliament) and civil society, despite obtaining more exposure to the foreign policy making process, acknowledged the pivotal role played by the bureaucrats and acknowledged the limits of their influence in the process. Only the military elite experienced a decline in influence in foreign policy making.

6.2 Contribution to the Dynamics of Elites in the Foreign Policy-Making Process

This study has attempted to contribute to theory formation on the manner by which elites impart their influence on foreign policy making. It was hypothesized that the influence of the elites varies throughout the foreign policy process. Elites are assumed to influence the formulation stage of the process by virtue of their ideological underpinnings and to influence the implementation stage of the process by virtue of their perceptions. Moreover, within such theoretical framework, the source and manner by which elites obtain their influence should also be examined. Such a configuration should be mapped within the model of elites in foreign policy making. This model of elites in foreign policy making constitutes the main contribution of this study.

Against this background, a coherent analytical framework has to be constructed. Such a framework would be able to paint the dynamics of how elites influence both foreign policy formulation and foreign policy implementation. However, the attempt to enable the framework to offer predictions of elites and foreign policy making through knowledge of the ways by which elites are influential, and the methods by which they impart their influence, leaves much opportunity for future scholars to pursue.

In any case before proceeding to a discussion of a theoretical framework it is necessary to summarize the empirical results. We shall assess how the elites view their political environments, both domestic and external. The reason for this exercise is found in Putnam's (1988) study

which emphasized that a useful framework to analyze the dynamics of foreign policy within the domestic context is to view foreign policy making as a game with actors playing simultaneously on two separate yet interlinked game boards of domestic as well as international politics under the condition that a player acting on one board must account for the considerations derived from the factors inherent to the other. Following this framework, the manner by which the political elites view both their domestic and external environments must be taken into account.

PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL ELITES TOWARDS POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Putnam (1988) **CASE I**

	DOMESTIC	EXTERNAL
CIVIL SOCIETY		
NGO's	N / A	N / A
Religious Elites	competitive	competitive
Media	non-competitive	non-competitive
Academics	competitive	competitive
PARLIAMENT	competitive	competitive
MILITARY	N / A	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	competitive	non-competitive

In the case of President Megawati's warm reception of US President George Bush, aside from the media all the other political groups regarded both the domestic and external political environment as competitive. The bureaucratic elite regarded the external environment as non-competitive in the sense that, in addition to advancing Indonesia's interests, the world provides an opportunity for the spirit of collaboration among countries and regional groupings to be manifested and to flourish so that problems and tensions can be collectively resolved. The media basically had a monopoly on the political elites without challengers from abroad with *Kompas* and *The Jakarta Post* continuing their dominance.

PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL ELITES TOWARDS POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Putnam (1988) **CASE II**

	DOMESTIC	EXTERNAL
CIVIL SOCIETY		
NGO's	competitive	competitive
Religious Elites	N / A	N / A
Media	competitive	competitive
Academics	competitive	competitive
PARLIAMENT	competitive	competitive
MILITARY	N / A	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	competitive	competitive

In the second case, in which there was tension between Indonesia and Malaysia that arose from the perceivably harsh manner by which the latter implemented its policy of deportation of illegal workers, as seen

from the table above all participating political groups regarded both domestic and external political environments as competitive. Over this issue, the media experienced competition as well due to the cross-sectoral nature of the issue. Not just the political elites but the general public as well was concerned about this issue. However, no readings of the perception of the religious elites or the military were captured by this study.

PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL ELITES TOWARDS POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Putnam (1988) **CASE III**

	DOMESTIC	EXTERNAL
CIVIL SOCIETY		
NGO's	non-competitive	non-competitive
Religious Elites	non-competitive	non-competitive
Media	competitive	non-competitive
Academics	competitive	competitive
PARLIAMENT	competitive	competitive
MILITARY	N / A	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	competitive	competitive

In the third issue concerning President Megawati's decision to warmly receive Australian Prime Minister John Howard despite heavy opposition from Parliament, one can observe that the military was not involved in the issue. Moreover, NGOs and the religious elites were also not involved in the debate of the issue. This case was essentially a tug of war contest between Parliament and the bureaucracy with both political groups maintaining their policy positions resulting in that Prime Minister Howard was not received by any of the leadership from Parliament.

PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL ELITES TOWARDS POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Putnam (1988) **CASE IV**

	DOMESTIC	EXTERNAL
CIVIL SOCIETY		
NGO's	non-competitive	non-competitive
Religious Elites	non-competitive	non-competitive
Media	competitive	non-competitive
Academics	competitive	non-competitive
PARLIAMENT	competitive	competitive
MILITARY	N / A	N / A
BUREAUCRACY	competitive	competitive

In the fourth case concerning President Megawati's decision to attend the independence ceremony of East Timor, one can observe that both Parliament and the bureaucracy maintained the view that their external political environment was competitive. At that moment in history the facts pointed to the eventuality of the independence of East Timor. Hence, as described in the previous chapter, after reflection by the

political elites their policy positions had softened to pave the way for Megawati's visit to the ceremony.

Once it is established how political elites view their political environments, another variable must be accounted for. And that is the strategies by which the ruling regime, in this case the bureaucratic elites succeed in overcoming domestic opposition from the other political elite groups. As has been discussed previously, to preserve their self-interests political actors must confront and manage the opposition put forth by other domestic competitors for power using various strategies.

The use of these strategies is what effectively links domestic politics with foreign policy. Hagan (1995, 128) proposed three strategies by which the governing regimes can deal with domestic opposition: accommodation, mobilization, and insulation. From the discussion of the case studies, one can observe that the ruling political group, the bureaucratic elite, employed a uniform strategy in overcoming domestic foreign policy opposition with the exception of the military. The bureaucrats employed an accommodation strategy early on in the various policy debates to obtain the endorsement and support of the other political groups.

Due to this strategy one can see in the following four tables the uniformity in results for civil society and Parliament. In dealing with the military, in the four case studies the governing political elite (the bureaucrats) has instead mobilized the military. Given the military's propensity at the time to transform itself into a professional service, the military readily accepted the bureaucrats' call for mobilization.

STRATEGIES OF RULING REGIME IN CONFRONTING OPPOSITION
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

Hagan (2002) **CASE I**

TARGET	ACCOMMODATION	MOBILIZATION	INSULATION
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's			
Religious Elites			
Media			
Academics			
PARLIAMENT			
MILITARY			
BUREAUCRACY			

STRATEGIES OF RULING REGIME IN CONFRONTING OPPOSITION
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

Hagan (2002) **CASE II**

TARGET	ACCOMMODATION	MOBILIZATION	INSULATION
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's			
Religious Elites			
Media			
Academics			
PARLIAMENT			
MILITARY			
BUREAUCRACY			

STRATEGIES OF RULING REGIME IN CONFRONTING OPPOSITION
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

Hagan (2002) **CASE III**

TARGET	ACCOMMODATION	MOBILIZATION	INSULATION
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's			
Religious Elites			
Media			
Academics			
PARLIAMENT			
MILITARY			
BUREAUCRACY			

STRATEGIES OF RULING REGIME IN CONFRONTING OPPOSITION
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

Hagan (2002) **CASE IV**

TARGET	ACCOMMODATION	MOBILIZATION	INSULATION
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's			
Religious Elites			
Media			
Academics			
PARLIAMENT			
MILITARY			
BUREAUCRACY			

The following model arose from this study: In a democratizing country, the nationalistic nature of an issue and the emotional level ascribed to the issue by the elite group, and the cohesiveness and the alignment of policy preferences of the elites on the issue influence the foreign policy formulation process if the government engages in accommodation. In the foreign policy implementation stage of the policy

making process, the bureaucrats possessing executive privilege and power by being in government continue to prevail in foreign policy making.

This phenomenon was contrary to what had originally been hypothesized. Non-governmental elites were predicted, incorrectly it now appears, to exert major influence on foreign policy making.

This study did not offer an explanation of what would happen if the bureaucratic elite chose not to engage in accommodation but in the conventional strategies of mobilization and insulation, as is commonly done in developing countries. The foreign policy making mechanisms in Indonesia post-*Reformasi* have become open. The government of Indonesia in this period of study went out of its way to invite 'public' participation (in the form of selected targeted elites from Parliament, the military, and civil society) and to reach out to political elites throughout the country. However, in the end the government still decides which foreign policy actions to decide upon and to implement.

If the government under study was not as open and did not go out of its way to reach the various elite groups in society nor tried to accommodate the interests of those elites, the results would certainly have been different.

Therefore, the *contribution to knowledge* to the literature on the domestic sources of foreign policy approach is as follows:

> In a democratizing country where governing bureaucratic elites take steps to accommodate domestic political opposition during the formulation stage of foreign policy making, for issues in which the non-governing political elites view the external actor or actors to a foreign policy issue as hostile towards the national interest of the country the governing bureaucratic elites are able to steer foreign policy towards the direction of what is, according to the bureaucratic elites, to the best interest of the country they are governing.

In order to understand the process of foreign policy making, the study had to employed a detailed case study research methodology. The success of this exercise was made by sacrificing the preceding construction of a generalized theoretical model able to explain foreign policy making. The result of this study yielded an analysis of how political elites view the world and consequently interact with each other in the foreign policy making process in Indonesia.

6.3 Ambiguities of Nationalist Ideology in Foreign Policy-Making

As an integral part of the process of investigating political elite dynamics in foreign policy making in democratizing countries this study acknowledged the ambiguity of the causal effect of ideology on any policy including foreign policy. Or for that matter, whether there is in fact any causal impact of ideology on foreign policy. Although ideology helps set policy objectives, at times it is employed as a mere justification to engage in certain policies. However, despite such ambiguity there appears to have been an indirect link between ideology, general goals, policy practices, and specific actions. But the fact that it is difficult to compartmentalize the exact correlation between each component of ideology to each component of specific actions does not mean that the two elements are unrelated.

Therefore, this study embraces the view that ideology may be influential in certain phases of the foreign policy making process rather than in other phases. One possibility could be ideology's dominant role in foreign policy formulation while in the foreign policy implementation phase of the policy making process ideology takes a subordinate role to other factors such as the bureaucracy or the perceptions and values of the elites. In fact, a tabular summary of the empirical evidence can be found as follows:

POLICY INCLINATIONS DUE TO IDEOLOGY

CASE I	FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION	FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION	ACTUAL FOREIGN POLICY
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	N / A	N / A	accommodative
Religious Elites	accommodative	accommodative	
Media	assertive	assertive	
Academics	accommodative	accommodative	
PARLIAMENT	assertive	accommodative	
MILITARY	N / A	N / A	
BUREAUCRACY	accommodative	accommodative	

Note that in the first case study when President Megawati warmly received US President George Bush after US invasion of Afghanistan despite repeated pleas by Megawati to not invade a sovereign country without solid proof of Afghanistan's role in committing terrorism, Parliament was persuaded to take a less assertive stand against the United States while the media had remained constant in its position towards the issue. One can observe that Parliament's staunch policy position has been swayed to become accommodative to be aligned with the policy position

of the ruling elite, and that is the bureaucrats.

POLICY INCLINATIONS DUE TO IDEOLOGY

CASE II	FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION	FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION	ACTUAL FOREIGN POLICY
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	assertive	assertive	accommodative
Religious Elites	N / A	N / A	
Media	assertive	assertive	
Academics	accommodative	accommodative	
PARLIAMENT	assertive	assertive	
MILITARY	N / A	N / A	
BUREAUCRACY	accommodative	accommodative	

In the second case when Indonesia remained accommodative towards Malaysia after the latter's ill treatment of the former's illegal workers overstaying in Malaysia, one can observe that despite assertive policy positions undertaken by NGOs, the media, and Parliament, the actual foreign policy implemented was accommodative. Two political groups espoused such a stance: the media and the bureaucrats. But since the media is not a policy maker, the correlation of influence toward the final policy can be attributed to the bureaucratic elite.

POLICY INCLINATIONS DUE TO IDEOLOGY

CASE III	FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION	FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION	ACTUAL FOREIGN POLICY
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	N / A	N / A	accommodative
Religious Elites	N / A	N / A	
Media	assertive	accommodative	
Academics	accommodative	accommodative	
PARLIAMENT	assertive	assertive	
MILITARY	N / A	N / A	
BUREAUCRACY	assertive	accommodative	

In the third case when President Megawati warmly received Australian Prime Minister John Howard despite staunch and vehement resistance by the leadership of Parliament to accept his visit, one can observe that the NGOs, the religious elites, and the military were not active on this issue. With the media and the academics pursuing an accommodative stance, this case essentially revealed a political tug of war between Parliament and the bureaucratic elite. The actual foreign policy implemented showed that the bureaucracy exercised its influence more effectively than Parliament.

POLICY INCLINATIONS DUE TO IDEOLOGY

CASE IV	FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION	FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION	ACTUAL FOREIGN POLICY
CIVIL SOCIETY			
NGO's	N / A	N / A	accommodative
Religious Elites	N / A	N / A	
Media	assertive	assertive	
Academics	accommodative	accommodative	
PARLIAMENT	assertive	assertive	
MILITARY	assertive	accommodative	
BUREAUCRACY	accommodative	accommodative	

This fourth and last case dealt with President Megawati's decision to visit the independence ceremony of East Timor despite Parliament's assertiveness in persuading President Megawati from not going to the ceremony. Given the mixed history between the military and East Timor (though initially the military was reluctant to allow its Command-in-Chief to be present at the ceremony), the military's current passive stance (even in expressing its reluctance) in foreign policy making and the military's support in protecting President Megawati once the decision had been taken to visit East Timor led the military to be classified as accommodative. Since this was essentially a symbolic although politically a very important symbolic matter, NGOs and religious elites did not participate in the debate. The media's assertiveness fell on deaf ears just as Parliament's attempt to prevent the President from going was also ineffective.

From the analyses of the dynamics of elite interaction and their influence on the foreign policy making process in Indonesia, it can be observed that nationalist ideology play a role in foreign policy formulation but not in foreign policy implementation. Despite the dilemmas and pressure from societal elite groups, those in power continue to decide on the basis of *realpolitik* and what is perceived to be in the best interest of the country that they govern. In the case of Indonesia, ideology provided the background, an aspiration, and a guidance for foreign policy but not the basis on which decisions are taken.

Therefore the *contribution to knowledge* of the role of ideology in foreign policy making:

> During the presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri, ideology (as manifested in the calls for an assertive foreign policy) was influential at the formulation stage of foreign policy making but not at the

implementation stage of foreign policy making, which was observed to have been pragmatic (as manifested in an accommodative foreign policy).

6.4 Abstract

In the investigation, the domestic sources of foreign policy analytical framework were used to analyze the dynamics of elites in foreign policy making. After analyses of the results of mostly personal interviews and historical materials, it was determined that political elites do matter in foreign policy making. However, the elite group that mattered most was still the bureaucratic elite. The non-governing political elites were influential in foreign policy making during the formulation stage but not in the implementation stage. This finding was surprising and was contrary to what has been at the onset embraced by conventional wisdom among policy analysts and policy makers in the analysis of foreign policy in democratizing countries. With democratization, it was thought at the outset that the non-governmental political elites such as Parliament, members of the civil society such as religious, academia, and media, and the military both each as a group and collectively as being not in executive power play a significant role in influencing foreign policy. Moreover, it was found that nationalist ideology, though adapted to the contemporary situation, is embraced by everyone else except by the decision makers when making foreign policy decisions. Decision makers continue to embrace *realpolitik* as the basis upon which to decide on foreign policy. However, ideology was instrumental during the formulation phase of foreign policy making for the four political elite groups under study.

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