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'The Eurasian Question' : the colonial position and postcolonial options of colonial mixed ancestry groups from British India, Dutch East Indies and French Indochina compared

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‘The Eurasian Question’

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‘The Eurasian Question’

The colonial position and postcolonial options of colonial mixed ancestry groups from British India, Dutch East Indies and French Indochina compared.

door

LIESBETH ROSEN JACOBSON



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I Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This chapter first introduces the main question. This is followed by several sections that clarify why this question is interesting and relevant, and which key concepts are used in this book. This includes an overview of debates on ‘mixing’ and mixed relationships, both of which are highly contested concepts. Furthermore, the group that takes central stage in this book – the Eurasians – are described and compared to similar groups, such as the Eurafricans. All this leads up to a heuristic framework and a set of working hypotheses, which structure this book. The section on historiography explains what this book adds to the literature. The chapter concludes with sections on method and material, and a brief outline of the rest of the book.

1.2 Main question

The migration of Europeans to the colonies was part of the process of colonisation. Many of these migrants entered into – what were labelled – racially mixed relationships, which were mostly between colonising men and colonised women.¹ When in the mid-twentieth century the European colonial empires in Asia – namely, British India, the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina – fell apart, the populations of mixed ancestry had to choose whether to stay in or leave the former colonies. Both the colonial authorities and the rulers of the newly independent countries viewed these mixed ancestry groups as a problem. This led to large debates before and after decolonisation on what was called, at the time, ‘The Eurasian Problem’, ‘The Eurasian Question’ and ‘The Eurasian Dilemma’.² In the late nineteenth century, this ‘Eurasian Question’ only preoccupied the British middle class living in British India.³ In the following decades there were, however, extensive debates about this issue in all three colonial contexts.⁴ When independence was discussed, the colonisers and the future rulers of the soon to be independent countries developed policies for the Eurasians, which was a challenge as the Eurasians did not form a legal category nor a well-defined or fixed group. There was no consensus on who was to be considered Eurasian, and as a result it was also difficult to establish how many Eurasians there were, or which colonial and postcolonial policies would best deal with them. Once the colonies became independent, the problem became urgent because the Eurasians had to choose between staying in or leaving the former colony.

In this book, I use the terms 'Anglo-Indians', 'Indo-Europeans', and '*Métis*' for the mixed ancestry groups in, respectively, British India, the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina, while I use the term 'Eurasian' to refer to the group as a whole. The labelling and categorisation of the mixed population, currently and at the time, have been highly debated and contested issues, with some people strongly opposing certain labels while advocating others.⁵ I discuss this point at length below. Notwithstanding the debates, I use the term 'Eurasians' throughout this study since that *was* the prevalent term in use at the time.⁶ Categories may be linguistic constructions from a Foucauldian perspective, but their use, especially by policy makers and other state authorities, has concrete societal consequences, because states have the authority to decide who belongs to which group and divide rights accordingly.⁷ Rather than attempting to avoid or abandon particular labels, or to introduce new ones, the way forward, in my view, is to identify how colonial authorities and others (including the Eurasians themselves) categorised people and to explain why this changed over time. I am aware that the term 'Eurasian' may not meet the approval of all readers. Yet, in the absence of another collective term and because scholars continue to use the term in the related historiography, I felt that this was the most appropriate term to consider Anglo-Indians, Indo-Europeans and *Métis* together (see below for a further discussion of the term).

This book deals with the position of Eurasians before and after decolonisation in three colonial settings. Although some of the phenomena I describe happened before 1900, I focus on the period between the end of the nineteenth century and the 1960s. This study is about the position of Eurasians in colonial society, how, when and why their position changed, and to what extent this affected the margins within which they made their choices. The main question is: Which factors determined the margins within which the Eurasians made their choices to stay in or leave the former colony, and why did these factors differ between the three colonies? Sub-questions are: How did state citizenship policies and the Eurasians' sense of belonging affect their decisions to stay or leave? What was the dominant discourse in media and government circles of the Eurasian dilemma? How did this influence state policies?

Debates ran their course through a complicated interplay between Eurasians and their interest organisations, former colonial governments and the governments of the newly independent nations. These discussions revealed a great deal about the form of colonial rule and the categorisations of people. Governments set criteria for acquiring or losing citizenship and rights to stay in the former colony, or to leave for the mother country. In this book, I use the term 'mother country' instead of 'metropolis' or 'metropole' because 'mother country' is the word that is generally used in the literature on colonialism, post-colonialism and decolonisation. The words 'metropolis' or 'metropole' are less suitable given their general meaning of a 'large city'.

I chose British India, the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina as case studies because they were located in the same region. Furthermore, they all were exploitation colonies (with the colonisers exploiting natural resources and labour) rather than settler colonies (such as New Zealand and Australia).⁸ Lastly, these were the most prestigious Asian colonies of the Dutch, British and French empires and they played an important role in the imagination of these empires. They were portrayed in similar

terms as respectively 'Gordel van Smaragd' (Emerald Belt, Dutch East Indies), the 'Jewel in the Crown' (British India) and 'la Perle d'Extrême-Orient' (the Pearl of the Far East, Indochina).⁹ These were the key colonies on which the Eurasian debate focused. I could, for instance, also have included British Malaya, but it did not have the same status as British India in the British Empire and its Eurasian population was not that large.¹⁰

The choice between leaving and staying was not taken at one point in time. Decision-making was a process in which Eurasians pondered the idea of staying or leaving. Little is known about the context or the margins partly resulting from state policies, in which people made their choices and the reasons for making them. It was a process that for some Eurasians took years because conditions, for example criteria for citizenship, changed. Part of the dilemma – staying or leaving – sprang from the 'in-between' position of the Eurasians. I elaborate on this point in the sections below. Debates about the position of Eurasians were intense after 1945, when British India, the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina became independent. However, I also look at the period prior to decolonisation (from around 1900 onwards) because, as I will show, the colonial legacy had an influence on the options Eurasians had and the choices they made. In short, in this book I describe the position of the Eurasians before, during and after decolonisation, and I explain the context in which they made their choices. The Eurasian people themselves and authorities in all three former empires were confronted with a dilemma: what would or should happen to a people sometimes labelled the 'colonial remnants' by European authorities? The goal of this book is to go beyond the conventional national perspective in (post)colonial studies by providing an overarching perspective of the experiences of Eurasians in the period before, during and after decolonisation in Asia. This enables me to highlight unexpected common features and connections between the cases as well as unique national specificities of each single case.

1.3 'Mixing'

European colonialism in Asia – which started well before the nineteenth century – created a population which was regarded as being of mixed ancestry. The issue of mixing led to widespread and long-lasting debates among policy makers, journalists, the Eurasians themselves and others. These debates showed continuity over time. In 1949, the Bishop of Birmingham gave his Galton Lecture to the Eugenics Society in London on the subject of 'Mixed Marriage'. According to the Bishop, mixed marriages generally led to decay, but there was some hope. Under good conditions – and the Bishop specifically mentioned the Eurasians at this point in his speech – mixed races could attain a certain measure of stability, with good qualities of their own.¹¹ The Bishop's speech illustrates the way of thinking about mixing at that time, and in the decades before.

In current academic literature, the concept 'mixed' is contested because it suggests that there *are* 'races' that can be 'mixed'.¹² The notion of 'mixed' draws on the idea that 'races' are real entities, an idea to which the Bishop quoted above, adhered.¹³ 'Race'

is however not a reality, but a social construction. 'Race' is not something, but its use does something.¹⁴ It is a fluid, shifting, situational and relational category of power, similar to and intersecting with gender, class, sexuality and religion.¹⁵ Some authors have addressed this intersection. Ann Laura Stoler and Bart Luttikhuis, for instance, discussed whether race or class was more important in the attempts of mixed people to climb the social ladder in colonial societies.¹⁶ In my view, and as this book will show, class had more prominence in the Dutch East Indies case, while race was more important in the British Indian case. Indochina took the middle road as a young colony. Gender, class, sexuality and religion are not only categories of power, but also of identity. People – in this case Eurasians – use these categories for their self-definition.

All these categories of power and identity work to include and exclude people via discourses and practices (including laws).¹⁷ Categorisation is the key element of governmentality in the Foucauldian sense. According to Foucault, discourse is about the way knowledge is created by power strategies that are hidden in various kinds of texts.¹⁸ The stereotypes that were used in the colonial discourse not only reflected colonial and postcolonial ideas, but also reinforced those stereotypes as a performative power.¹⁹ Categorisations are used to legitimise differences within policies and between groups of people.²⁰ According to Foucault, categorisation does not describe social order but rather shapes and reshapes power relations.²¹ Within the Foucauldian perspective, race, like gender, sexuality, class and religion, are regulatory ideals that were created to discipline and govern.

Part of the literature on 'race' is rather us-oriented and ignores the influence of race on colonisation and genocides around the world. Conceptualisations of race formed the basis for colonialism, genocide and slavery. Europeans ranked themselves as the most advanced race in an invented racial hierarchy and believed this gave them the right to enslave, kill, exploit or educate those whom they ranked lower on the racial ladder. To avoid confusion, it is important to note that the us literature commonly uses the term 'race', while the European literature favours the term 'ethnicity'. There is in essence little difference between the use of these concepts. Both have evolved along the same lines: both were originally perceived as static and real, and over time both were increasingly recognised as social constructions.²²

Debates about race or ethnicity are connected to debates about whiteness.²³ Whiteness is also a construction, along gendered lines, and is created as much by culture, education, class, religion, occupation, and geography as by phenotype.²⁴ In the words of Fanon in his study *The Wretched of the Earth*: 'you are rich because you are white: you are white, because you are rich.'²⁵ In the late colonial period, 'modernity', 'westernisation', and 'whiteness' were interlocking concepts with none of these three having predominance.²⁶ Whiteness was not only about skin colour, some Eurasians could 'pass' themselves off as white if they were well-educated, upper class and Christian. Bhabha uses the word 'mimicry' to describe this imitation of whites. For example, Eurasians mimicked Europeans by wearing European clothes and speaking the coloniser's language perfectly.²⁷

'Race' was used to define some people as inferior and within that perspective, 'mixing' was constructed as a threat.²⁸ Authorities in many countries introduced anti-miscegenation laws to prohibit relationships and marriages that were defined as mixed.²⁹

While the term 'mixed' is frequently related to what is perceived or defined as racial or ethnic difference, debates about mixed relationships in the European context were for a long time mostly about religion. Until the 1960s, the term 'mixed marriage' was widely used in the European context for a marriage between a Catholic and a Protestant. The concept mixed marriage is therefore not static; it is continuously redefined, depending on the geographic, social, political or religious context.³⁰ Central to all definitions of mixed marriages is the perception of difference.³¹ Mixed marriages are treated with suspicion because they call into question the boundaries between the Self and the Other.³²

States claim the right to interfere in the privacy of relationships because the right to citizenship is connected to the idea of nationhood.³³ Ideas regarding citizenship, as we know them today, were formulated in the nineteenth century. In the literature, a distinction is made between discursive and juridical citizenship. Juridical citizenship means that there are people (citizens) who have full rights, and others (non-citizens) who do not.³⁴ Discursive citizenship means that citizens are believed to form a community and share a history, language, phenotypical features, and a religion. Colonisation was pivotal to the formation of discursive national identities.³⁵ Englishness, Frenchness or Dutchness were defined and constructed in contrast to a colonised 'Other'.³⁶ In short: 'They' were everything 'we' were not.³⁷

Rights to citizenship were gendered.³⁸ Women who married non-citizens were described in sexually laden disapproving terms even if they were in a stable monogamous relationship, implying that by crossing one (ethnic) boundary they had also crossed the boundary as to what was morally acceptable.³⁹ Women were accused of adultery, whereby the betrayed party was not the husband, but the group she was felt to belong to.⁴⁰ These women were considered lost to their original community while men who married non-citizens were not. Women were seen as objects of loss and gain, whereas men were seen as losers or conquerors.⁴¹ After their 'mixed' marriage, women were no longer considered to belong to their original 'group' emotionally and often also juridical.⁴²

Ideas about citizenship were reflected in the so-called marriage rule or derivative citizenship. In many countries women (but not men) automatically changed their nationality when they married a partner with a nationality different from their own.⁴³ The laws that deprived women of their citizenship upon marriage dated from the end of the nineteenth century, when nationality became more important. Many countries moved towards the introduction of laws to stop 'mixing'. In the nineteenth century, Western states enforced their ideas about citizenship on their colonies.⁴⁴ Ideas about citizenship were presented as egalitarian,⁴⁵ but in the colonial reality they were not.⁴⁶ In Dutch and French colonies, for example, the so-called native population of the colony was defined as subjects and non-citizens. In 1898, the Mixed Marriage Act came into force in the Dutch East Indies.⁴⁷ A Dutch woman who married a man who belonged to the juridical category of the 'natives', became a native herself, lost her Dutch citizenship, and was subjected to Islamic law. For a Dutch man who married a native woman, the same did not apply. He could however only marry her if she converted to Christianity.⁴⁸ In many colonies Islam and citizenship were constructed as mutually exclusive categories.⁴⁹

1.4 'Mixed' relationships

There are two strands in the literature on mixed relationships. In the first strand, mixed relationships are seen as key markers of assimilation.⁵⁰ In the older American literature assimilation is seen positively, and it implies the disappearance of the group that is to be assimilated. According to Reeves Kennedy, in her 1944 publication, minority groups could sustain intermarriage rates of 30 per cent without succumbing to assimilation.⁵¹ If the percentage was higher, the group ceased to exist as a recognisable entity. That development was seen as positive by the assimilationists. The second strand of literature on mixed relationships focusses on the (semi-)colonial context and does not see mixing and assimilation as positive. The crucial difference between the two is that in the last case the 'whites' are 'at risk' of disappearing.

The problematisation of 'mixing' was not restricted to the formal colonial context. Mixing between blacks and whites in seventeenth century' Virginia and Maryland, for instance, led to the introduction of a statute in 1664 to discourage or prohibit interracial marriage. An informal one-drop rule was introduced in the us South to deal with the growing number of multiracial children. Anyone with a tiny trace of 'black blood' was labelled black. So-called 'mulatto' (derived from the word 'mule') children of enslaved mothers and white fathers were classified as black and remained slaves. Because slavery was built upon the assumption that whites were a superior 'race' and could not be enslaved, this one-drop rule was important to justify the enslavement of people who looked white. After the end of slavery in the United States in 1865, the one-drop rule continued to persist. The Jim Crow laws prohibited interracial marriage between blacks and whites, and this made it necessary to identify who was white and who was black. The informal one-drop rule was codified into law. The census started to deny mixedness and only recognised the categories 'white' and 'black'. People who had previously self-identified as 'mulatto' or 'mixed' were now classified as 'black'.⁵²

In the Caribbean and Latin America there was more recognition of 'mixedness', although authorities were equally worried by the results of mixed sexual relationships. However, there was a subtle difference between the definitions of white and black of originally Iberian whites and the whites of North-West European origin. Whereas in the North-West European colonial and us variant, people defined as 'light coloureds' were not accepted as marriage partners, in the Iberian version a slightly darker norm emerged. Thus, 'light coloureds' in the Iberian version were more often accepted by the white elite. This was probably affected by Iberian-European standards of beauty which integrated Moorish influences.⁵³

In both the Caribbean and Latin America, tables were drafted and illustrations were made to categorise the outcomes of mixed relationships. The word *Casta* was used to refer both to the illustrations – consisting of sixteen little paintings, each depicting forms of mixing – and to the *Casta* system, originally used by the Spaniards to control their colonies. A variety of words was introduced to describe the outcomes of mixing, next to the already introduced *Mulatto*. The children of *Mulattos* and whites were called *Quadroons*, and an *Octroon* was the child of a *Quadroon* and a white. *Mestizos* were the children of whites and Amerindians, and *Zambos* the children of Amerindians and blacks. *Mulattos* and others of mixed origin were seen in the Caribbe-

an and Latin America as a problematic category. In 1685, French colonial authorities in the Caribbean drafted their *Code Noir* which defined status and rights according to race.⁵⁴ White paupers (or *petits blancs*) were seen as equally problematic when it came to maintaining the colonial hierarchy, partly because they were seen as the ones who would not object to mixed relationships. From the seventeenth century onwards, there were fears in the Caribbean that *Mulattos* and others of mixed origin might lead slave rebellions against the western coloniser.

1.5 'Mixing' in the colonies

The issue of racial mixing in the colonial setting and its consequences for citizenship and nationality laws after decolonisation not only played itself out in the former colonies in Asia, but also in other former Dutch, English and French colonies in Africa and the Caribbean.⁵⁵ As said above, the construction of 'race' was crucial to the colonial project, and in all colonial settings 'mixing' was problematised. People who were labelled as being of mixed ancestry occupied an in-between place. Apart from Eurasians there were Eurafricans and others who were the subject of debate, categorisation and concern for colonial authorities before, during and after decolonisation. The responses to the results of 'mixing' differed.

In Hong Kong, both Chinese and British people despised Eurasians. Contemporaries were certain that 'nowhere in the East is the colour line so strictly drawn as in Hong Kong'.⁵⁶ Within the Eurasian community there were tensions between Portuguese Eurasians with strong Catholic ties and Portuguese names, the Chinese Eurasians, who had Chinese names, clothes and observed Chinese customs, and the British Eurasians who led a British lifestyle.⁵⁷ Over the years, the boundaries between these groups blurred. As a result, all of them leaned more towards the British side of their ancestry although they were never really considered white due to colonial racial prejudices.⁵⁸ In February 1942, the Japanese conquered Hong Kong and hundreds of Eurasians were interned.⁵⁹ After the end of Japanese occupation, the Eurasians were granted a period of recuperation in Britain or Australia, and many never returned to Hong Kong. They believed they had more options outside Hong Kong. The Eurasian community largely disappeared. Nowadays no more than 1,000 Eurasians live in what was the British colony of Hong Kong.⁶⁰

Eurasians living in the Malay Strait settlements, which later became the independent countries of Singapore and Malaysia, had forebears from many European countries (including Russia) as well as from India, Burma, Japan, China, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies. In 1931, in the last census which was taken before the Second World War, the Malay Eurasians numbered over 6,900. In 1947 (with a total population of 1.5 million), their numbers had increased to 9,000 people, partly due to new arrivals.⁶¹ The majority of Malay Eurasians did not leave after decolonisation, although a couple of hundred young people left in 'the years of uncertainty' in the 1950s and 1960s. They went to study abroad and did not return.⁶² Upper class Eurasians adapted to the new circumstances by adopting habits that were formerly seen as 'unsuitable', and typical of the 'lower-classes', such as listening to Portuguese folk mu-

sic. They started to identify themselves as 'Portuguese Eurasians'. Paradoxically, these were the people they had considered far below their status in colonial times.⁶³ Overall, the Eurasian community did continue to exist in the post-colonial period.

On Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) there were, from 1815 onwards, descendants of Dutch settlers who formed a rather diverse community with the descendants of the Portuguese and the British on the island. The Portuguese came before the Dutch, and the British arrived after the Dutch rulers had left. Those with Portuguese ancestry were generally lower-class and darker-skinned than those with Dutch and British forefathers. The latter group, who were largely Protestant, confirmed this hierarchy by jealously guarding racial boundaries and distinguishing themselves from the Portuguese Catholics.⁶⁴ The mixed offspring of all these groups – called Burghers – did not depart for a mother country (which could be Portugal, the Netherlands or Britain). Some of them did leave for alternative destinations such as Australia after independence, while others stayed. There is still a distinctive Burgher community in Sri Lanka today.⁶⁵

A group called the Rehoboth Basters lived in South-Africa and later in Namibia, which originated from relationships between Dutch white settler men in the Cape Colony and black native women. 'Basters' is derived from the Dutch word 'bastaard' which means 'crossbreed'. The Basters used this name as a badge of honour. In 1868, they left the Cape Colony and sought to establish the independent Republic of Rehoboth in present-day Namibia. When the Germans colonised South-West Africa (Namibia) they categorised the Basters as natives. They, however, did recruit the Basters for an armed contingent, which fought alongside the Germans during what was later called the Namibian genocide.⁶⁶ Eugen Fischer, a German professor of medicine who is seen as one of the architects of the Holocaust, studied the Basters extensively. He concluded that the Basters were useful to the German colonisers, but that further mixing should be prohibited, and the Basters should not be allowed to reproduce.⁶⁷ In 1912, interracial relations were forbidden in the German colonies. The Basters currently form an ethnic group of 20,000 to 40,000 people in Namibia. They speak Afrikaans and are Calvinists.

In South-Africa and Rhodesia miscegenation was the white settler's greatest fear. If 'mixing', or 'bastardisation' as it was called, was allowed the 'white race' would cease to exist, it was generally feared. Whites who were 'mentally retarded', as well as 'low-grade whites who had no self-respect or racial pride', were the ones who were believed to forge mixed relationships. Segregation laws were introduced to reduce the chances of mixing. The 'coloured' population – as the mixed-race population was labelled – was privileged by the whites over the blacks in terms of education, residence and employment. However, the coloureds were also discriminated against, and as a result these two groups were pushed to more cooperation and alliance. The income of coloureds was also much closer to blacks than to that of whites. A 'return' to the 'mother country' after the end of white dominance was not seen as a possible scenario.⁶⁸

Migration of Europeans to most of the African colonies was recent and on a small scale when compared to the colonies in Asia. At the beginning of the twentieth century miscegenation was disapproved of, and on the eve of independence few people of mixed ancestry – sometimes labelled Eurafricans – moved away. For instance, not many moved from the Congo to Belgium, certainly if we compare the numbers to

the migrations from the Asian colonies.⁶⁹ Belgian colonial authorities only moved children of mixed parentage to the mother country. In the Belgian colonies Ruanda, Urundi and the Congo, authorities separated mixed ancestry children from their indigenous mothers and transferred them to Belgium after decolonisation. The principal reason authorities gave for this separation was that they were concerned about the children's future in the independent countries.⁷⁰

Italy, like Belgium and Germany, was a late and small-scale coloniser. In the early twentieth century, the practice of what was called *madamato* was common in the Italian colony Eritrea. Italian men established temporary domestic and sexual relationships with Eritrean women (referred to as the *madama*). As elsewhere, this resulted in mixed-race children. Italian colonial administrators in response introduced a law to regulate interracial ties between Italians and Eritreans. Having an Italian parent and European racial features could be a reason to grant Italian citizenship. Marriage between an Eritrean man and an Italian woman was forbidden because it was feared that these children would turn against the Italians.⁷¹ Since colonisation was recent, the number of people who were identified or who self-identified as 'mixed' was small, and few moved to Italy after the end of colonisation.

French migration to Algeria was extensive. The French settlers, or *pieds-noirs* – about 1 million in total on the eve of Algerian independence (10 per cent of the population) – had French citizenship. Most were Catholic, while 130,000 were Jewish. The majority had been born in Algeria. They moved to France shortly before and after decolonisation. According to Claire Eldridge, their defining feature was their allegedly indisputable French identity and loyalty.⁷² Almost all *pieds-noirs* left after independence, which was accompanied by extreme violence. Most went to France, while smaller groups migrated to Spain, Australia, the US, Canada, Argentina, Italy and Israel. About 10,000 of them stayed, but most of them left later as well. Their exodus took place despite the guarantees the *pieds-noirs* received regarding their cultural, linguistic and religious rights in the negotiations for independence, which resulted in the 1962 Evian Accords.⁷³ The guarantees that were put into place did not stop them from leaving. Mixing was largely denied.

This brief overview of the literature on 'mixing' shows that it was problematised by authorities in all (semi-) colonial settings. The Eurasians in the three former Asian colonies were at the centre of these debates, and therefore they are the subject of this research. In all three colonies, there were Eurasians who could pass themselves off as Europeans, while others could 'disappear' into the indigenous environment. Eurasians continuously negotiated their place between the European and indigenous colonial society, neither of which were static entities.⁷⁴

1.6 'Eurasians'

From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, colonisers became increasingly concerned about the threat the Eurasians could pose to the racial hierarchies in colonial society. Authorities began to regard racial mixing as more and more problematic.⁷⁵ This change in attitude was partly influenced by the arrival of more European

women. Their arrival was however at the same time also the result of stricter rules regarding mixing. Stricter racial boundaries resulted in larger numbers of European women in the colonies, and the arrival of more women created a (perceived) need for stricter boundaries.⁷⁶ The colonial authorities also felt that they needed the Eurasians as intermediates for their colonial projects. Eurasians were simultaneously included and excluded by authorities. Colonial empires could only exist by emphasising a shared culture, language and history of the colonised people and particularly the Eurasians among them, as convincingly demonstrated by Ann Laura Stoler and Frederic Cooper.⁷⁷ Colonisers could only rule with the help of the in-between category of Eurasians, who held important positions in the service sector and had knowledge about the culture and language of the indigenous people.⁷⁸

Despite the privileges Eurasians enjoyed in the colonial period, they could be considered in the same way that the postcolonial studies theorist Homi Bhabha described colonised indigenous elites: 'almost the same but not quite'.⁷⁹ Eurasians were never considered real Europeans in the colonial context. Even if they had European citizenship, they remained 'blurred copies' – again Bhabha's words to portray colonised indigenous elites – of what was seen as the European ideal.⁸⁰ Eurasians in all three colonies tried to improve their position by imitating the colonisers. As an 'in-between' and hybrid group, they were both discriminated against and privileged at the same time. When colonialism ended, they lost their privileged position, as will be described at length in this book. The European rulers, whom their status had depended on, were gone and the new rulers regarded the Eurasians with suspicion, viewing them as colonial remnants and potential traitors because of their whiteness and support for the former colonisers. If they 'returned' or 'repatriated' to the mother country, to which most of them had never been before, they could be discriminated against because they were not 'white' or western enough.⁸¹ Thus, after decolonisation the Eurasians were either seen as too white in the former colony or not white enough in the former European mother country.⁸² Wherever they decided to settle, they lost their privileged position and experienced downward social mobility.

The labelling and accompanying categorisation of the group which this book describes as Eurasians has led to, and continues to generate, highly emotive debates. Historians have identified the separate category of 'Eurasians' as it was used by authorities and journalists, and by the Eurasians themselves, while largely avoiding the term because it has been seen as reproducing the colonial or authorities' rhetoric.⁸³ I acknowledge that this term sometimes obscures a range of contested categories, which is why I use the terms 'Anglo Indians', 'Indo-Europeans' and 'Métis' when referring individually to British India, the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. Of course, these terms, as is the case with 'Eurasian', generalise and bring together people who may not have self-identified as such but this thesis tries to discover notable similarities and differences in how people of mixed Asian and European ancestry reacted to decolonisation across three Asian colonies. My objective is not to identify the often numerous divergences within these constructed categories, since for instance Taylor, Bosma and Raben, and Stoler have already done this.⁸⁴ Current debates are partly the result of changes in the meaning of these terms over time and from one context to another.⁸⁵

A large number of sometimes rather derogatory terms existed and still exist to describe the Eurasian group, including *Métis*, *liplap*, *sinjo* (male Indo-European), *nonna* (female Indo-European), *half-caste*, *out-cast*, Britasian, Euro-Indian, Indo-Briton, Asiatic Briton, Anglo-Asian, Indo-European, Indo, 'Indische', creole, mestizo, and pseudo-European.⁸⁶ Over time, scholars and policy makers introduced numerous words to describe the group that is here called 'Eurasian'. The introduction of neologisms reflects the fact that earlier words and categories were felt to be inadequate.⁸⁷ Debates came to be more about definitions than about the effect of categorisations. All these terms had a different function for the people concerned and for the 'outsiders' creating the labels (such as policy makers and rulers) in colonial and postcolonial society. They were meant to indicate distinct levels of mixedness connected to a particular place and to rights.⁸⁸

Debates about terms and categorisations continue today and the large number of labels attached to this group is one of its key characteristics. The terms describe the variations and stereotypical images of mixed parentage and accompanying 'whiteness'. From what was seen as almost European at one end of the scale to what was regarded as almost indistinguishable from the indigenous people, at the other.⁸⁹

Rights, in the colonial case, were rights to European citizenship, rights to certain jobs and education, or rights to own land. The authorities that did the labelling changed over time: colonial authorities in the period of colonisation, Japanese authorities during the Second World War in the case of French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, colonial authorities both after the war and after decolonisation, and the new post-colonial regimes.

In colonial society, eight forms of mixing were identified. Most common were the Eurasian children who had a European father and an indigenous mother, and who were referred to as *mestizos*.⁹⁰ Other combinations were children with a European father and a Eurasian mother, a Eurasian father and a European mother, a Eurasian father and a Eurasian mother, a Eurasian father and an indigenous mother, an indigenous father and a Eurasian mother, and an indigenous father and a European mother.⁹¹ This sub-categorisation in the French, British and Dutch colonies built on earlier Portuguese influences in Asia and the distinctions they had made between *mixtiezen* (mixed), *castiezen* (one half Asian ancestry), *puстiezen* (one quarter Asian ancestry) and *christiezen* (one eighth Asian ancestry).⁹² The categorisation and identification of degrees and forms of mixing indicated the importance that was attached to the differences within the Eurasian group. In the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina, Eurasians were included in the legal category of 'Europeans', while in British India they were not. In all three colonial settings, however, formal proof of European – mostly paternal – ancestry was important for categorisation as European or 'native' and thus access to certain rights, both before and after decolonisation.⁹³

Children with an indigenous father and a European mother were highly uncommon in colonial society, but they were extremely worrisome for colonial authorities. These liaisons were especially seen as undermining the colonial project.⁹⁴ In the Dutch East Indies, there were only 40 marriages authorised between a European woman and an indigenous man between the years 1886 and 1897. Yet, these marriages led to the introduction of the *Gemengde Huwelijken Regeling* (Mixed Marriages Act) in 1898. In this

act it was codified that the woman would lose her nationality by intermarriage, and become part of the legal category of 'natives'.⁹⁵ This was already the case under Dutch law, so in fact a separate law was not needed. The introduction of the separate law showed how authorities sought to discourage these marriages and how strong their disapproval was of this kind of relationship.

In the Indochinese case, a letter, which the Minister of Justice wrote to the *procureur général* on 2 February 1917, revealed why French colonial officials were concerned about unions between French women and indigenous men:

They are only drawing attention to our prestige in the indigenous environment, and on the other hand, they are commonly utterly disappointing our compatriots.⁹⁶

Thus, it was about the prestige of the French colonial project in indigenous circles and the potential disappointments this could cause. In addition, the French women who were married to indigenous men were considered by both French and indigenous people as inferior, as 'une femme de seconde rang'.⁹⁷

As I already explained at the beginning of this introduction, there are three groups involved in the process of labelling: firstly, the policymakers and other authorities, secondly, the members of the group that was labelled – Eurasians in this case – and thirdly the 'others'. When it comes to the second group – the 'Eurasians' themselves – their self-identification changed over time. An important shift occurred – described at length in this book – when the migration from the mother countries increased at the end of the nineteenth century and the percentage of women migrating from the mother country increased. In the early colonial period, few Europeans migrated to the colony, and most of those who did were men. They entered into relationships with indigenous women.⁹⁸ Couples did not always marry, and the women could be housekeepers and providers of sexual services at the same time. In the Dutch East Indies, the indigenous housekeeper was called a *njai*. In Indochina, she was called a *congai* and having a concubine was referred to as *encongagement* there.⁹⁹ When their European bride arrived in the colony, European men sent their concubines and children into the *kampong* (the parts of town where the indigenous people lived) without acknowledging the children as their offspring.¹⁰⁰ At the beginning of the twentieth century, more European women came to the colonies. As a result, the boundaries between the colonisers, the colonised people and mixed ancestry groups became sharper.¹⁰¹ The arrival of more Europeans also led to the emancipation of the Eurasians, who started to distinguish themselves as a separate category from both the 'natives' and the more recent European 'newcomers'. It was a way for them to climb the social ladder and experience upward mobility. When the Eurasians emancipated and organised themselves in associations, they emphasised that they belonged to a higher class than the 'native' population. However, when authorities increasingly problematised the 'Eurasian Question' in class terms – putting an emphasis on Eurasian paupers – the label acquired a negative connotation and the Eurasians started to distance themselves from it.

As a third actor, there are the 'others' – non-governmental organisations for instance – who labelled the 'Eurasians' as a separate category. These were, for example, orphanages and child-welfare societies, who designated the 'Eurasians' as a category worth saving. The local, indigenous population also falls within this category. The

Eurasians could become, for instance, low-class civil servants or soldiers, and thus up-holders of the colonial regime. Contemporaries made distinctions within the group. The position of Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies was clearly described by the journalist H.C. Zentgraaff in 1932:

The Indo-group does not form a layer of our society, but stands in it like a vertical figure. The lowest part is among the indigenous people and the top is amongst the best of us.¹⁰²

The heterogeneity of the Anglo-Indian group in British India was similarly identified by a former head of the colonial Post and Telegraph service, Sir Geoffrey Clarke, at a luncheon address during the Anglo-Indian Deputation in 1925, published in *The Anglo-Indian*, the magazine of the Anglo-Indian Association of Southern India:

We are dealing with a community that varies from what I might call a very Anglo community to a very Indian community. There are Anglo-Indians sitting at this table today who are practically Englishmen in thoughts, ideas, habits, customs and everything else: there are other Anglo-Indians who are to all intents and purposes low caste Indians.¹⁰³

In short, 'Eurasians' were definitely perceived to be a certain category in the colonial and post-colonial setting, albeit referred to by a variety of names. The large number of words that was used reflects the hybridity and fluidity of the group, and shifting criteria of those who were doing the categorisation. Because of this heterogeneity, and shifting definitions over time, it was (and still is) impossible to speak of 'the Eurasian class' or 'the Eurasian' people. Terms were temporarily fixed, instead of permanent and static.¹⁰⁴ In my opinion, it is important to use the terms that were used at the time when Eurasian people had to make choices, in the 1940s and 1950s, despite later debates on the use of such terms in other discourses and situations.¹⁰⁵

1.7 The emancipation paradox

As has been observed in the section above, and will be discussed at length in this book, the Eurasians were increasingly seen by state authorities as a separate group from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. They were also seen as such by 'others' (organisations and the indigenous populations), and they self-identified as such. This process of self-identification and identification by others was strengthened in the years before and after decolonisation. Part of this process was that the Eurasians also emancipated as a group and started to claim rights, including the right to have their own homeland, as will be described in the next chapters.

In 2006, Dutch researchers stated to use the word 'integration paradox' to describe how some people with a migrant or minority background feel more discriminated against than others.¹⁰⁶ The key explanation authors provide for this is related to both education and integration. Especially those people with a migrant or minority background that are more integrated – or who are regarded to be more integrated – feel more discriminated. They have done well in school, are well-educated, and do well on the labour market. Those involved however feel that they do not get the chances and opportunities they deserve, and feel they are entitled to for instance better jobs with

higher income. The result is anger and frustration, and for part of the people this means they turn away from the dominant society and undo their integration.

In earlier studies, going back to the 1950s, authors had already used the similar, but not quite the same, concept of the ‘emancipation paradox’ to describe the phenomenon that discrimination against Jews and African-Americans increased when they started to emancipate and claim more rights.¹⁰⁷ When they broke out of segregated communities – moved out specific neighbourhoods, started working outside a restricted number of jobs, married outside what was seen as ‘their’ ethnic group, or tried to join other organisations than their ‘own’ – this was perceived as a threat. Their emancipation led to a backlash and xenophobic responses. Although the phenomena – integration paradox or emancipation paradox – has been observed, both concepts are not discussed at length in the literature. As will become clear in the chapters below, the concept of the ‘emancipation paradox’ does seem to be able to explain both the trajectories taken by the Eurasians, as well as the differences between colonies.

1.8 The numbers

Precisely because the definition of the Eurasians was the subject of debate and was constantly shifting, it is impossible to give precise numbers. At the same time numbers were important to structure debates, and therefore, claim makers always mentioned (sometimes rather randomly) numbers. Based on the numbers that appeared in governmental sources and secondary literature, the minimum and maximum amounts for Eurasians living in all three colonies both before and after decolonisation can be given. As Table 1 shows, the difference is large, depending on who was counting and who was counted as members of the group. Therefore, in Table 1 differences in estimates before and after independence (for example in the case of the Indo-Europeans) can be considerable. Policy makers frequently used these higher or lower figures in the debates on the Eurasian Question, for example when they asked for more money, or for larger numbers of people to be admitted to the mother country. The Dutch sociologist W.F Wertheim in 1947 estimated there were 8 to 9 million Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies. These people however wanted to become invisible by disappearing in the indigenous environment of the postcolonial society. Therefore, they were not easily traceable in any sources and Wertheims statement is hard to prove.

1.9 Working hypotheses

The simple answer to the main question ‘which factors determined the margins within which the Eurasians chose to leave or stay after decolonisation’, is that it depended on who the Eurasians were (their personal factors), and on what limitations they faced or opportunities they had (structural and legal factors).¹⁰⁸ These three clusters of explanatory factors are summarised in Table 2. They serve as the heuristic framework for this study.

TABLE 1 ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF EURASIANS¹⁰⁹

	Before decolonisation		After decolonisation		Left for mother country		Left for elsewhere	
	min	max	min	Max	min	max	min	max
British India	140,422	500,000		300,000	25,000	180,000		**250,000
French Indochina*	25,000	45,000	20,000	100,000	30,000	40,000		
Dutch East-Indies	170,000	240,417	220,000	***9,000,000		300,000		****70,000

* Number of Europeans in French Indochina including many Eurasians

** To Canada, Australia, New Zealand

*** Most would have 'disappeared in the kampong'

**** To US and to Australia

Personal factors included gender, marital status, age, class, education, and religion. As a rule, old people were, for instance, less likely to migrate.¹¹⁰ Class was relevant to the Eurasians' choices because the poor did not have the means to leave, while the rich were likely to stay because they stood to lose too much especially when their wealth was non-transferrable for instance when they owned businesses, property or plantations. The upper-class Eurasians had the money to pay for the expensive trip to Europe or elsewhere. However, they were also more likely to stay and have better options in the newly independent nations, because of their training, language skills and contacts. The majority of the Eurasian people who stayed were likely to have never been to the mother country, so they did not know what to expect when they left. The higher-class Eurasians had often been to the mother country on paid leave, or for study and education.¹¹¹ Paid leave was a right that European employees had, both in private firms and government services in most colonial empires in the late colonial period.¹¹² The well-educated thus had the knowledge, language skills, and contacts that would have made their migration more profitable and therefore more likely. Knowledge, language skills, and contacts could thus work both ways.

Religion was relevant because the Eurasians were generally Christian, which was considered to be part of their Europeanness,¹¹³ while the colonised subjects were generally Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist. Another important personal factor with legal attributes was gender and marital status. The small number of Eurasian women who married indigenous men were more likely to stay after decolonisation, because they lost their European citizenship when they married.¹¹⁴ Indo-European women in the Dutch East Indies who married Dutch men became Dutch and could leave for the Netherlands with their families.¹¹⁵ Eurasians with Dutch, British and French citizenship could leave, while Eurasians without European citizenship faced more hurdles.¹¹⁶

Legal factors which explained the position of the Eurasians included in the first place their legal status under colonialism. Educated, Christian and middle or upper-class Eurasians, who had money and who participated in European circles in the colony were more likely to leave in the period of decolonisation or had better chances to do so because they could pass themselves off as 'white'.¹¹⁷ This Eurasian upper-class saw itself, and was regarded by others, as European and westernised in colonial society. The degree to which Eurasians could pass as 'white' was associated with the

number of European privileges they enjoyed in the colonial period. Nevertheless, not everyone had so many privileges. The Eurasians who had almost disappeared into the indigenous environment before decolonisation were likely to stay. Others, who were more recognisable as being of European ancestry might have stayed because of their attachment to the country of their birth, good (sometimes familial) relations with the indigenous population, or insufficient money to make the trip to the mother country. This was especially true if they had large families, and their passages to the mother country were not paid for by the (former) colonisers.

A last key legal factor relates to bureaucratic regulations and access to citizenship in the mother country and the former colony. It differed according to personal factors such as gender, class, marital status and age. With regard to this factor, I focus on questions such as: Did the Eurasians attain or have European citizenship? Were the Eurasians able to retain part of their former privileges after decolonisation?

Structural factors included the Second World War and Japanese occupation in the Dutch East Indies and to a lesser extent in French Indochina, and the aggression and suspicion towards Eurasians and Europeans during the struggle for independence. In all three colonies, there was violence against Europeans and Eurasians in the period around independence including the period after the Second World War and Japanese occupation. However, the new regime in India was less aggressively towards Anglo-Indians than the new regimes in Indonesia and Indochina, which turned against Indo-Europeans and *Métis*. Hostility towards Indo-Europeans and *Métis* could have encouraged them to leave, whereas the absence of violence against Anglo-Indians in the British India case could have encouraged them to stay. Furthermore, economic opportunities were relevant, such as job prospects and housing in the mother country and in the former colony and the familial and social networks in the former colony and in the mother country. When people started to leave, the Eurasian social infrastructure in the former colonies – schools, newspapers, social clubs and churches – gradually collapsed. This development encouraged even more people to leave. For example, the largest interest organisation of the Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies, the *Indo-Europeesch Verbond* (Indo-European League, IEV), lost many of its members in the 1950s, also because of its transformation into an Indonesian organisation.¹¹⁸ This exodus made the decision to leave more attractive for others. The geo-political situation and the Cold War, which prompted a growing fear of communism gaining a foothold in South-Asia and South-East Asia, also motivated people to leave.

All factors had ‘push’ and ‘pull’ effects: they could keep people in the colony or stimulate them to go. The Eurasians may have been ‘pulled’ towards the mother country about which they had learned and heard so much growing up in the European sphere of the colony. Or they might have been scared away from moving there by stories about discrimination, housing shortages, unemployment rates, rationing and the horribly cold winter of 1947-1948. The final decision was based on both push and pull factors.

The list of factors described above suggests that Eurasians made their decisions rationally. However, in many cases, they chose to stay or to leave in a hurry. This points to a rather high level of uncertainty in their choices. Later, they reconsidered their decisions. This often happened as a result of changing state policies and (unexpected) legal implications. In all three colonies, this process eventually meant an increase in

opportunities either to leave or to stay for Eurasians. For example, most Indo-Europeans in Indonesia decided at a very late stage to stay and to choose Indonesian citizenship. Later, they came to regret this choice. Also in the other colonies, Eurasians reversed their earlier choices. The implications of decolonisation for Eurasians only became clear when the new postcolonial situation became real in the former colonies as well as in the former colonising countries.

TABLE 2 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED EURASIANS' CHOICES

<i>Personal factors</i>	<i>Legal factors</i>	<i>Structural factors</i>
1. Class (economic status)	1. Colonial legal status and ethnicity	1. Socio-historical background, process and length of colonisation
2. Age	2. Bureaucracy: accessibility of citizenship and other governmental regulations.	2. The decolonisation process and aftermath (unrest, rumours, chaos, discrimination by new powers)
3. Education		3. Economic situation/future prospects in mother country and the former colony
4. Religion		4. Disappearance of social infrastructure/social network including familial ties
5. Gender and marital status		5. Geo-political situation e.g. the Cold War

Irrespective of the Eurasians' decision to stay or to leave, they had to adapt to the new circumstances. If they stayed it meant distancing themselves from prejudices towards indigenous people, which had been cultivated for many decades, and separating themselves from their attachment to the mother country.¹¹⁹ If they left for the mother country it meant adapting to the culture of the colonisers, and shedding their indigenous heritage.

1.10 Historiography

There is a wealth of literature on colonialism, post-colonialism and migration. Most of this literature overlooks the subject of the Eurasian Question, or simply assumes that all people with European ancestry left the former colonies after decolonisation.¹²⁰

In general works on colonialism, and the decolonisation process in South and South-East Asia, Eurasians usually formed a small part of the picture painted of a colonial world in transition. Well-known examples of such studies are the standard works by Lou de Jong, Frederic Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, and a more recent study edited by M. Bandeira Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto.¹²¹ Some of these studies take a comparative perspective, encompassing the whole Asian region such as the ones by Paul Kratoska and Milton Osborne.¹²² Their approach has yielded a more complete picture of the commonalities between the histories of all Asian colonies. Other studies describe

the colonial history of one particular colony, and in these studies the authors usually referred to the Eurasians in passing.¹²³ Furthermore, there are some works that deal exclusively with the colonial history of the separate Eurasian groups from a national perspective.¹²⁴ In several of these studies, the authors have highlighted the radical changes with regard to sharper boundaries between population groups and the disapproval of miscegenation, which the arrival of European women brought about in all three colonies.¹²⁵ Ulbe Bosma, however, emphasised continuity, especially in European elite society, which was more oriented towards Europe than Asia throughout the nineteenth century.¹²⁶

Some pioneering studies did compare Eurasian groups on a specific topic such as studies on fictional literature, the myth of the lazy native,¹²⁷ or children of mixed ancestry. David Pomfret's publications exemplify these types of studies.¹²⁸ Other rare examples focused on one empire or two empires in comparative perspective, with specific subgroups of Eurasians as a theme, such as children.¹²⁹ These particular publications have shown the additional value of comparing Eurasians in more colonies.

In addition, there are works related to aspects of the late colonial period leading up to decolonisation, the aftermath of decolonisation and the role of Eurasians in that period in one overarching framework.¹³⁰ These works have analysed a wide range of topics. Some of them were written from a transnational perspective such as the study by Andrea Smith about several groups of postcolonial migrants in Europe, and the volume edited by Els Bogaerts and Remco Raben about aspects of the decolonisation process in several African and Asian colonies. Similar works were written from a 'memory building perspective' and were related to the colonial legacies and traces that were still visible in contemporary times, contributing to an emerging postcolonial debate that came about at different moments in all three countries. They took a longitudinal perspective incorporating colonial and postcolonial times. Examples are books by Gert Oostindie, Maura Kathryn Edwards and Elizabeth Buettner.¹³¹ Buettner took a broad comparative perspective incorporating the colonial heritage of five former European empires: Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France and Portugal.¹³² Recently, some studies in English have appeared about French colonialism and decolonisation in Indochina, but in French colonial studies the focus remained on Algeria and the decolonisation war, its aftermath and the memory thereof in France.¹³³

This book adds to the literature in two important ways. Firstly, it analyses how discourses and policies affected a hybrid group (like the Eurasians) at a moment of dramatic power change. The Eurasian group was never created as a separate legal category in any of the three Asian colonies. People moved in and out of the Eurasian category and therefore people who belonged to the category were repeatedly renamed, and re-categorised. They also redefined themselves in the process of claiming either a European or an indigenous identity and a concomitant place to live.

By focusing on this hybridity as something policy makers and the people living in the colonies used, I show the complex interplay between governments and Eurasians and their associations. I explain the outcomes of the decision-making process of and for Eurasians as resulting from the changing margins within which they made their decisions between staying and leaving.

Second, the process of choosing and labelling in a (post) colonial context has not

been studied from a comparative perspective. Most studies focus on one country (France, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom) and its colony, while there are strong indications that authorities did look towards each other in their attempts to resolve 'the Eurasian Question'.¹³⁴ Ideas about the problem of colonial miscegenation were not as distinct or original as national studies seem to imply. The idea that the (post) colonial history of people of mixed ancestry must be examined from an overarching comparative perspective has been suggested earlier, but so far it has not been carried out.¹³⁵ In the 1990s, there were two conferences in Aix-en-Provence on the differences and similarities between French and British decolonisation.¹³⁶ An important difference was that the French version of colonialism was more ideologically motivated on republican terms than the British equivalent which was of a more pragmatic nature, but the case of the Dutch East Indies was not included in these conferences.¹³⁷

At a conference in Cologne, in 2008, the role of colonial elites, including a considerable number of Eurasians, was identified as a key aspect in explaining the transition from colonial to postcolonial times.¹³⁸ It was a call for more research on the role of Eurasians during decolonisation. This was the period during which ex-colonial authorities and the new rulers had to design special policies for Eurasians, especially regarding their citizenship. These policies of the former imperial powers have probably influenced contemporary immigration policies and accompanying debates.¹³⁹ However, so far, this call has not been properly answered. In my view, Eurasians need to be studied over a longer period before, during and after decolonisation and from a comparative perspective. After all, decolonisation did not mean a clear break but can be better understood as a 'blurred' period. As Simon Gikandi pointed out:

The argument that colonialism has been transcended is patently false, but so is the insistence that, in the former colonies, the culture of colonialism continues to have the same power and presence it had before decolonisation.¹⁴⁰

Thus, my research, in contrast to earlier publications, compares the decision-making process of the diverse group of Eurasians in three former colonies from an international perspective going beyond the conventional national level in (post) colonial studies. A national perspective makes it difficult to discern similarities and differences between colonies. An international perspective can provide a broader, more nuanced and complete view of Eurasians in colonial and postcolonial societies.

My study covers the period before and after decolonisation in order to incorporate the more indirect reasons for the decisions Eurasians made since I am convinced that the exact moment of formal decolonisation was not such a clear watershed as previous historians have often presented it. The framework of policies accorded to Eurasians as a hybrid group was rooted in the colonial period. As noted, in most of the literature it appears that all Eurasians left the (former) colony. By studying the role of Eurasians in the decolonisation period, I highlight a key feature of the transition from colonial to postcolonial times, since without a European colonial project there would never have been a Eurasian population in the colonies.

1.II Method

The method of this book is comparative. The clear benefit of comparing these three case studies is to discover whether Anglo-Indians, Indo-Europeans and *Métis* when faced with the same process – decolonisation – reacted in the same way (leaving/staying) as this will tell us a lot about the British, Dutch and French colonial regimes and the new independent states established in India, Indonesia and Vietnam. According to Jürgen Kocka, the interrelations between cases (also called ‘entangled history’ or ‘*histoire croisée*’) are part of a comparative framework which can help analyse factors that led to similarities or differences between cases.¹⁴¹ Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers described three methods of comparative history in macrosocial enquiry. In one of them, ‘comparative history as the contrast of contexts’, they have pointed out that it is important to analytically separate the cases that are compared.¹⁴² This method has much in common with the comparative approach I use in this book. However, the imperative to choose analytically completely different cases is the most difficult part of this method. I look at three Eurasian groups, and although the contexts were different, these groups were similar and there are clear connections between the cases. Hence, it is fruitful to take a comparative perspective while acknowledging the overall room that Eurasians had to manoeuvre after decolonisation.

In this study, I make a double comparison: I compare and contrast the positions of and possibilities for the Eurasians in British India, the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina before and after decolonisation. This enables me to show, on the one hand, the specificities of the different cases, and on the other hand common patterns and traits more clearly than would have been possible with a study on a national level. As Nancy Green has pointed out, comparing cases is an important tool for going beyond national categories. In addition, it helps us to understand the causes and origins of historical phenomena, in my case the effects of decolonisation for Eurasians. Furthermore, it helps to analyse the specificity and generality of these phenomena.¹⁴³ This study is not a comparison of one European country and its colony before and after independence. Instead, I have chosen a divergent model, comparing three Eurasian groups and their decisions to stay in the former colony or to leave.¹⁴⁴ It sheds new light on the similarities and differences among ‘in-between’ colonial groups in three colonial settings.

Irene Bloemraad has pointed out that migration studies do not make sense if the researcher does not identify non-migrants as a reference group.¹⁴⁵ Not all Eurasians migrated after decolonisation. They form my reference group. I compare the frameworks in which ‘stayers’ and ‘leavers’ in each of the colonial settings made their choices. The methodological approach I used, to reconstruct why people took certain decisions by means of various sources, has been done earlier for other places and time periods, but not for comparative studies about the decolonisation period from a longer-term perspective.¹⁴⁶

A study of all three contexts enables us also to see more clearly the connections between colonies. Colonial authorities in French Indochina, British India and the Dutch East Indies shared ideas and knowledge about how to rule their colonies in general and about Eurasian Question specifically. Imperial administrators carefully studied each other’s strengths and weaknesses. French and Dutch orientalists, for instance,

exchanged scholarly findings about Eastern religious traditions.¹⁴⁷ J.S. Furnivall, a member of the British Indian civil service, carried out research into the Dutch colonial system in the Netherlands Indies in the 1930s. For French Indochina, a colonial administrator – Joseph Chailley-Bert – conducted research in the Dutch East Indies in the years 1901 and 1902.¹⁴⁸ Numerous others saw the benefit of this exchange of information. The French author Bousquet wrote in 1940 that investigations in the Dutch East Indies could benefit the French empire. He also suggested that for Dutch colonisers, it would be highly advantageous to visit the French overseas possessions, in order to share views and to assess each other's practices.¹⁴⁹ Exchange of information also took place at colonial exhibitions, such as the large one that took place in 1931 in the Bois de Vincennes in Paris (to be discussed in chapter 2). I assume that the exchange of ideas continued after decolonisation, which may have resulted in similar policies in the three former colonies especially with regard to their Eurasian populations. In 1938 Henri Bonvicini found in his comparative study that many Indo-Europeans reached high positions in governmental circles and married European women.¹⁵⁰ In 1954, the French Lieutenant Roue wrote a report about the Eurasian problem in which he claimed that the French colonial authorities could learn a lot from the Dutch policy on Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies.¹⁵¹

1.12 Material

This book is based on a large variety of sources. Most important among these were the archival sources from several governmental agencies. For the British Indian case, I used sources from the *British Library*, which included material about the British Nationality Act, the British Cabinet mission and memoranda of the All India Anglo-Indian Association. These were sent to the Statutory Commission, who had to prepare the last Government of India Act in 1935 which turned out to be a predecessor of the first constitution of independent India. Additionally, I found documents about the orphanage and boarding school of *St. Andrews colonial homes* at Kalimpong in Darjeeling.¹⁵² Material about 'the plight of the Anglo-Indians' from the late 1950s and early 1960s, which I found in the *UK National Archives* at Kew Gardens in London, formed an important addition to the sources from the British Library.¹⁵³

For the Dutch East Indies case, I used material from the *National Archives* in The Hague which included files of the archive of the High Commissionership. This was an agency that continued to arrange practical issues for Dutch people who still lived in Indonesia after decolonisation. It was the first agency to which Indo-European people sent requests if they wanted to leave for the Netherlands. I linked data from this archive to files of the same families and persons in the archive of the *NASSI*-movement (*Comité Nationale Actie Steunt Spijtoptanten Indonesië*; Committee National Action Supporting 'Regretting Optants' from Indonesia). *NASSI* wanted to rescue ex-Dutch Indo-European people who had first chosen Indonesian citizenship but later regretted their choice. By linking these two files I could follow the trajectory and the decisions of families and individual persons, and through that I could identify decisive factors for either leaving or staying. Furthermore, I found documents of the

Council of Social Affairs (*Raad voor Sociale Aangelegenheden*) about Indo-Europeans and the advantages and disadvantages of Indonesian citizenship, documents of the Ministry of Social Work that were related to the deterioration in life circumstances of Indo-Europeans, and lastly documents about Dutch education in postcolonial Indonesia in the Dutch National Archives.¹⁵⁴

I also used material from the special collections at the University Library in Leiden, including the periodical of the Indo-European interest organisation of the Dutch East Indies, *Indo-Europeesch Verbond* (IEV), named *Onze Stem* (Our Voice). The IEV published this magazine from its foundation in 1919 until the 'Indonesianisation' of the League in 1956. Furthermore, I used the more general monthly magazine of the Indies community in the period 1956-1965. It was originally called *Onze Brug* (Our Bridge). After 1958, it was renamed *TongTong*, and from 1978 onwards it was known as *Moesson*¹⁵⁵ – and is still printed under that name in the Netherlands. The primary goal of the magazine was to raise awareness among Indo-Europeans for their own specific culture and to prevent that identity from disappearing in the process of assimilation into the new country.¹⁵⁶

Other archival material I drew upon from the special collections department of the Leiden University Library included documents of the youth protection organisation *Pro Juventute*, and documents of orphanages in which Indo-European children lived, such as the famous *Oranje Nassau* institution of Johannes 'Pa' van der Steur. I also utilised the archive of the *Centraal Comité van kerkelijk en particulier initiatief voor sociale zorg ten behoeve van gerepatrieerden* (CCKP, 'Central Committee of clerical and particular initiative for social care for the benefit of repatriates') including the *Stichting Help Onze Mensen in Indonesië* (SHOMI, 'Foundation helps our people in Indonesia') which I found in the *Utrecht Municipal archive*.¹⁵⁷ Lastly, in the *Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie* (NIOD, Dutch Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide studies), I found documents with statements about the status of Eurasians around independence in the Dutch East Indies and British India, written from the perspective of Indo-Europeans.¹⁵⁸

For the French Indochina case, I used material from the *Bibliothèque Nationale de France* (BNF) in Paris, the archive of the *Service historique de défense* in the Chateau de Vincennes in Paris, the *Archives diplomatiques de ministère des affaires étrangères* in Nantes and the *Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer* (ANOM) in Aix-en-Provence, France. The latter archive held material from the archive of the colonial private interest organisation *Fédération des œuvres de l'enfance Française d'Indochine* (FOEFI, Federation of Eurasian children protection organisations of Indochina). The series of reports of the annual general meetings of this central organisation of orphanages were especially interesting. They contained discussions about the criteria for the admittance of Eurasian children to the institutions, the measures taken during the French colonial war (1946-1954) and the policies implemented when the French withdrew from Indochina in 1954.¹⁵⁹ These reports also contained information about the *Convention sur la Nationalité*, criteria for French citizenship implemented in 1955. The FOEFI was connected to the *École d'Enfants de Troupe Eurasiens*, and in the archive of the *Service Historique de Défense* in the Chateau de Vincennes in Paris I found documents which discussed the desirability of such an institution.¹⁶⁰

Lastly, in Vietnam I visited the *Vietnamese National Archives no.1* in Hanoi, the *Vietnamese National Archives no.3* in Ho Chi Minh city and the *Vietnamese National Archives no.4* in Dalat in the central highlands of Vietnam and these archives provided further information on the foundation of the predecessor of the *FOIFI*, the *Fondation Brévié*, and a survey completed by the commission led by Sir Guernut on the *Métis* problem and correspondents who reported on *Métis* children who were still living in the indigenous villages in the countryside.¹⁶¹

I also incorporated articles from newspapers and periodicals into my research (Appendix I lists the articles that are quoted, and provides an overview of the journals that I used for my searches). I searched for specific terms like 'Indo-Europeans', 'Anglo-Indian' and 'Métis' around key moments and issues. For the Dutch case the key moments were independence on 27 December 1949 and the choice of Indonesian citizenship and the anti-Dutch actions on 5 December 1957 (*Zwarte Sinterklaas*). For the French case, I first tried to use the same strategy and searched for 'métis' around the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in April 1954. That did not return any results so I extended the period to incorporate the first half of the twentieth century. For the British case, I searched using the term 'Anglo-Indian' around the independence of India on 15 August 1947 and the ban on Anglo-Indian schools in Bombay in January 1954.

In addition, I analysed 20 novels (see Appendix 2) in which Eurasians were the protagonists. The novels were all published after 1900, because from that period onwards, Eurasians formed a clearly demarcated group in all three colonial contexts.¹⁶² They were written either by Eurasians or by Europeans who were familiar with the colony. The novels were an emic source of information because they contained information about self-identified as well as ascribed features of Eurasians. Some of them were not written by Eurasians but by Europeans who lived or had lived in the colonies.

Colonial and postcolonial novels are an important and recognised literary genre, which provided information about the colony to audiences in the mother country and in the colony. Moreover, literary texts were pre-eminently used to either legitimise or oppose the colonial project. Thus, colonial and postcolonial fiction was rooted in the colonial experience, and critically engaged with (former) colonial relationships.¹⁶³ Since the sixteenth century in the case of the Dutch East Indies and British India, and since the nineteenth century in the case of Indochina, works of fiction communicated information about the colonies to readers in the European mother countries. Later, they were also read in the colonies themselves. For example, prospective British settlers and colonial officials considered 'Raj Fiction' as a source of information about the British colony.¹⁶⁴ Novels about interracial romances formed a sub-genre. In essence, they were never primarily about India but about the racialisation of romance. Therefore, the genre could not exist without the colonial order. When that ended, the Anglo-Indian romance genre also went into decline.¹⁶⁵

The following example from the famous colonial novel *A Passage to India*, published in 1924, illustrates the value of novels as a historical source. It describes the Anglo-Indian chauffeur, Mr. Harris, in stereotypical terms that were quite normal for British people in British India:

Trying to look and feel like a European, the chauffeur interposed aggressively. He still wore a topi, despite the darkness, and his face, to which the Ruling Race had contributed little beyond bad teeth, peered out of it pathetically, and seemed to say, 'What's it all about? Don't worry me so, you blacks and whites. Here I am, stuck in damn India same as you, and you got to fit me in better than this'.¹⁶⁶

Mr. Harris was a typical example of a Eurasian, growing particularly self-conscious when English and Indians were both present, 'because he did not know to whom he belonged. For a little he was vexed by opposite currents in his blood, then they blended, and he belonged to no one but himself'.¹⁶⁷ At the same time, colonial and some postcolonial novels cherished European hegemony by legitimising the colonial project.¹⁶⁸ In the postcolonial period readers were those people who had lived in the former colony for a longer or shorter period or just those interested in the colonial past and well-written fiction. According to Edward Said, novels were 'immensely important in the formation of imperial attitudes, references and experiences.' Furthermore, they enabled colonised people 'to assert their own identity and the existence of their own history'.¹⁶⁹

All (post) colonial novels addressed the colonial relationship critically and some went a step further and deliberately tried to undercut the discourse that supported the colonial project.¹⁷⁰ The colonial novels provided a stereotypical picture of the former colonial status of Eurasians. The portrayal of Eurasians in the novels had performative power.¹⁷¹ Authors used images from colonial discourse in their novels, and these images influenced and reinforced stereotypes in colonial and postcolonial reality by means of intertextuality with other sources such as newspapers and governmental documents.¹⁷² For example, in the justification of the criteria for admission to the mother country after decolonisation, arguments were used that drew upon the colonial discourse, also expressed in the novels. Eurasians were discouraged from moving to Europe because they would not find a job there as policy makers and authorities found their pace of work to be too 'slow' and too 'eastern'.¹⁷³ These images would have influenced policy makers and others in their responses to the Eurasian Question.

Overall, the colonial discourse in these sources was not a finite set of ideas; it was a series of several colonising discourses, each belonging to a specific historical context, but having important features in common.¹⁷⁴ Colonial discourse influenced the legal legislation in the colonies and through that eventually also the concrete policies that the authorities implemented for Eurasians.¹⁷⁵ The different sources are not isolated pieces of evidence but they are connected by intertextuality between various forms of text as they used similar images and ideas, derived from the same colonial discourse. They complement each other and strengthen the general arguments and findings. The material provided the pieces for the same puzzle which described the margins within which Eurasians made their choices to stay or leave. All the sources that were used were produced by the colonisers, and by the Eurasians. The local people who were colonised were not part of this discourse. It is possible that there was a rather separate discourse in the colonial settings in which the voice of the colonised on the Eurasian Question was reflected. Reconstructing that voice merits a different research project.¹⁷⁶ Most of the material I used was produced by authorities to justify the colonising project, and by Eurasians to make claims.

Oral history has been used as a source in the Dutch, British and French colonial and postcolonial historiography on the Dutch East Indies, British India and French Indochina.¹⁷⁷ However, I did not interview people of mixed ancestry for this book because my research was focused on the margins within which Eurasians took their decisions at the time and not on later memories and reflections. Furthermore, there are only a few people still living who made the choices as adults.

This is not a study about the individual considerations of each person, but about the margins, or ‘the room to manoeuvre’, within which Eurasians made their decisions. My sources provide information about this room to manoeuvre and much less about individual motives. The room to manoeuvre was created by both Eurasians themselves, through their self-identification, how others regarded them, their ascribed motives and the regulations they faced for admission to the mother country and European citizenship. Thus, newspaper articles, magazine articles and documents in governmental archives indicated the attitudes others had vis-à-vis the Eurasians, while the archives of organisations, ego documents and testimonies in other sources represented their self-identification and therefore an *emic* perspective.

1.13 **Structure**

This study is structured chronologically, with some thematic elaborations, especially in the part on the late colonial period. Within each chapter I first look at British India, since this was the colony where all the major social changes happened first. Indeed, the authorities in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina looked at developments in British India as an example to follow. The structure of this book follows the heuristic framework presented in table 2. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the history of the three colonies. Chapter 3 describes the legal position of the Eurasians in the colonies, and the categorisations that were used. Chapter 4 looks at their socio-economic position before 1900. Around 1900 the discourse on the Eurasians changed, as is described in chapter 5. This change affected and was part of a change in their socio-economic position, as described in chapter 6. Authorities in the three colonial settings increasingly started to look at each other. In all three colonies attempts were made to rescue, save and educate the Eurasian children. The attempts to save the children were a key part of the process in which the Eurasians became more visible. They emancipated and organised, as described in chapter 7. The period of decolonisation led to chaos, as described in chapter 8. Chapter 9 describes formal decolonisation, while chapter 10 looks at the consequences for the Eurasians. The Eurasians feared there would be no future for them in the former colonies, but emigration to elsewhere proved difficult. They started to make plans for a common homeland for all Eurasians in New Guinea. The plan showed that the Eurasians had developed a pan-Asian collective identity. Chapter 11 looks at the immediate postcolonial years, and chapter 12 at the measures that were put into place for the protection of the Eurasians, and their reactions to it. Chapter 13 looks at those who stayed. Finally in chapter 14 the conclusions are presented and a connection is made to the larger debates presented above.

2 Historical context

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the origins of the Eurasian populations in British India, the Dutch East Indies, and French Indochina. I focus on the historical background up until the end of the Second World War. The ‘colonial situation’ was in 1963 defined by the French anthropologist Georges Balandier as:

The domination imposed by a foreign minority, ‘racially’ and culturally different, over a materially weaker indigenous majority in the name of racial and cultural superiority.¹

The colonial situation was essentially a set of relations between two different cultures: the colonisers considered theirs to be fast-moving, technologically advanced, and economically powerful, and they regarded the colonised cultures as the opposite.² These relations were not only upheld by force, but also by a series of symbolic justifications and by stereotypical behaviour, which developed into a dominant colonial discourse. The colonial settlers created specific institutions and policies that supported these justifications and behaviour. In other words, these institutions and policies would confirm the discourse that distinguished the coloniser from the colonised people.³ The general system of colonialism worked for policy makers as a discursive framework, which they could adapt to local circumstances in their respective colonies.⁴

2.2 British India: From Company rule, via Sepoy Mutiny to Crown Raj

At the height of the British colonial presence on the Indian subcontinent, the British Empire consisted of the current nations India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and parts of Myanmar (see Figure 1). In fact, the Indian subcontinent contained two ‘Indias’. One third of the Indian subcontinent – scarcely known to any but a few British colonial officials – was fragmented into 562 nominally independent princely states. Two thirds of the continent came under the direct administration of the British Raj and was divided into fourteen provinces, each of which was divided into districts. In these districts, the most powerful man was the district magistrate, also named the deputy commissioner or collector.⁵ Because Burma was for most of the time included in the British Indian empire, the Anglo-Indians had a small ‘sister-group’ of Anglo-Burmese. Burma was ruled by the British as a province of British India from 1886 until Burma’s separation from India in 1937. This independence was based on a new

parliamentary system under a constitution for an independent Burma which was approved in 1935.⁶ I incorporate this separate group in my study especially for the period during which Burma was part of British India, but I do not go into as much detail as I do with the main group of Anglo-Indians.

Similarly, I refer only in passing to the people of mixed ancestry who lived in Ceylon (currently Sri Lanka), who were called, as I mentioned earlier, the Burghers. In the census of 1901, there were also 'India-born' Burghers or Anglo-Indians recorded, because travel between India and the island of Ceylon, which was also a British colony from 1795 onwards, was easy in colonial times.⁷

British India was ruled for two centuries by a trade company in possession of a royal charter, the British East India Company. The British succeeded in winning trading rights at Sura in 1612, which was located to the North of Bombay at the western coast of the Indian subcontinent, and they built a factory on its coast in 1613.⁸ Between 1818 and 1857, the British conquered the whole of India.⁹ Before 1800, it was mostly single men from Europe who went to India and they fathered children of mixed ancestry. Initially, the growth of a Eurasian community was encouraged by the British East India Company because colonial authorities were convinced that Eurasians were loyal supporters of British rule.¹⁰ The development of a mixed ancestry group was not something new on the Indian subcontinent. In British India there was already an established Portuguese presence and a considerable number of Indo-Portuguese *mestizos*.¹¹

The company directors offered financial incentives to their employees to marry indigenous women and have children with them. The idea was to create a Protestant British group to counterbalance the Catholic Portuguese influence. The Portuguese authorities in turn encouraged their subjects to produce Eurasian children whom they hoped would grow up to be loyal servants of the King of Portugal. In that way, the Anglo-Indian community was deliberately created to help establish and preserve British power and presence (and in this period also Portuguese power) in India.¹²

'Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, opinions, morality and intellect'

The Anglo-Indian community became the largest mixed ancestry group in Asia.¹³ The European ancestry of the Anglo-Indian community was not only British but also French, Dutch and Portuguese. However, the largest part of the Anglo-Indian group was of British ancestry and the group was British in its cultural practices.¹⁴ From the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, relationships between indigenous women and British men were increasingly discouraged. At the end of the nineteenth century, they had to be avoided at all costs, even forcibly if necessary. It was generally known that marrying a girl with some Indian blood, would ruin the career of a young British colonial.¹⁵ In 1810, captain Thomas Williamson wrote in his travelogue *East India Vade Mecum* – which was considered essential reading for all British people heading to India – that concubinal relationships were viewed by both Indians and Europeans as 'equally sacred' to marriage.¹⁶ This changed with the Europeanisation of British society in India and the arrival of more British women in the colony from the 1820s onwards. The British communities in India became more self-sufficient, and more isolated from the indigenous society.¹⁷ The creation of a moral civilising mission




Fig. 1 Map of the British Indian Empire from *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Edinburgh Geographical Institute; (Oxford 1909).¹⁸

connected to British superiority, famously associated with Rudyard Kipling's poem 'White man's burden' (1899), was also connected to this development.

The liberal colonial politician Thomas Babington Macaulay insisted in 1835 in his 'minute on education' that Britain's mission was to create not only a class of Indians sufficiently well versed in English to help the British rule their colony but ones

[...] who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in morality and in intellect.¹⁹

In addition, he had trumpeted on that occasion that Indian independence, under the leadership of these educated 'English' Indians would be the greatest day in English history. This class would consist of loyal Anglo-Indians and domiciled Europeans. Anglo-Indians indeed helped to protect British interests and helped them rule an enormous and therefore potentially rebellious country.²⁰ As the Anglo-Indian historian H.A. Stark wrote: 'We formed the wheels, the cranks, the levers of their (British) machinery for government.'²¹ Although Anglo-Indians were rarely in control, they faithfully kept their hands on the levers. This became clear during the Sepoy Mutiny of

1857 when many indigenous people revolted. The Anglo-Indians supported the British and continued doing their work.²² The help of Anglo-Indians was indispensable, because it took the British eighteen months to quash the uprising that had begun at Meerut (a town near New Delhi in Northern India) in May 1857.²³ Later claims made by Anglo-Indians towards the British regarding privileges were always based on their unconditional and loyal support to the British coloniser during the Sepoy Mutiny. After the Mutiny, the British Crown took over rule from the East India Company in 1858 and all people in British India became British subjects. The start of the Crown Raj also marked the implementation of stricter rules, regarding the place of everyone in British Indian society, both juridical and social.²⁴

In general, the Indians treated Anglo-Indians as outsiders, because of their loyalty to the British rulers of India. The British rulers themselves however also looked upon them suspiciously because they considered Anglo-Indians as a threat to the colonial project. They believed that Anglo-Indians might attempt to claim financial or political rights based on their British fathers' position.²⁵ In a collection of colonial memoirs, compiled by C. Allen in 1975, an Anglo-Indian woman herself recounted the treatment they encountered during the Raj (British rule in India):

The Indians looked down on the Anglo-Indians because to them you were neither one nor the other. They used to call us *kutchha butcha*, that is to say, half-baked bread, and depending on the shade of your colour they used to talk about the Anglo-Indian as being *teen pao*, three-quarters, or *adha seer*, half a pound, if you happened to be almost white.²⁶

'It was like moving into a different world'

The British authorities treated Anglo-Indians with contempt and often ridiculed them. This happened for example when they met them at the Railway Institute dances, organised by Anglo-Indians who lived in railway colonies. A British woman remembered:

We'd go to be polite to them and it was like moving into a different world, a much more old-fashioned one, because the girls would never sit with their dancing partners but were always taken back to their parents. I'm afraid we used to rather laugh at them because they seemed to be such frumps. They always seemed to be dressed about several years back and never seemed to quite catch up with modern fashion.²⁷

Regarding the social landscape in British India, the British colonial authorities held on quite firmly to the ideal of 'racial' exclusivity, whereas in the Dutch East Indies, mixed ethnicity, combined with wealth and a social position did not form an obstacle to European status in the creole society of the archipelago.²⁸ In my view, the difference was not so clear-cut and the situation in British India was far more ambiguous than the above-described situation suggests. However, the boundaries between the different population groups were sharper in British India than in the Dutch East Indies. That could also have been caused by the efficient colonial rhetoric at work in the British India context.²⁹ In addition, it was not possible for British men to legally recognise as British the children they had fathered with indigenous women – outside marriage,

whereas such a possibility did exist in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. Therefore, the racial hierarchies were stricter and sharper in British India.³⁰

Before the start of the twentieth century, people of mixed ancestry were always called 'Eurasians' in British India. In colonial society there was a stigma attached to the term 'Eurasian', which in the nineteenth century was taken to refer to the offspring of the lower classes of both British and Indian society.³¹ In order to emphasise their European (or more importantly British) ancestry and avoid this stigma, people within and outside the group campaigned from the end of the nineteenth century onwards to be called 'Anglo-Indian' instead of 'Eurasian'. The term 'Anglo-Indian' was previously used to only refer to colonial British people.³² From the first Indian census of 1911 onwards, people of mixed ancestry were known as 'Anglo-Indians'. Before that time, this term only referred to British people who lived in British India.³³ However, according to a memorandum composed in 1925 by Anglo-Indians to plead for their interests at the statutory commission, it remained impossible to arrive at a definite interpretation of the position of Anglo-Indians from the variety of names that people used to characterise them in India. In 1925, the situation was as follows: for social purposes, they were known as 'Anglo-Indians'. For occupational purposes, they were designated 'Statutory Natives of India', while they were called 'European British Subjects' in the population censuses.³⁴

It was only after 1935 that the term 'Anglo-Indian' acquired a legal connotation and universal currency in the government of India Act.³⁵ The Indian National Congress had its first meeting in 1885. The party campaigned for a form of home rule, which meant a form of self-government, and many educated indigenous people became active in the movement. This was an early incarnation of home rule or self-government, in which many educated indigenous people became active. Together with later political movements such as the first non-cooperation movement (1920), the Civil Disobedience Movement and the Quit India campaign (1942), the Indian National Congress contributed to the achievement of independence.³⁶ A selective part of the Indian elite had gone to the UK for education, just like the Anglo-Indians had. Together with an English education, this had irrevocably helped to hasten the downfall of the British Raj's rule.³⁷ During the Salt March in 1930, which started the Civil Disobedience Movement, Gandhi and 78 followers walked a distance of 375 kilometres to a salt enterprise in Dandi. When he arrived there, he picked up a handful of salt. With that simple act, he broke the salt monopoly of the British colonial government. It was a symbol of the Indian people's refusal to live under British laws and under British rule.³⁸

In 1930, 316,549 British people lived in British India, which represented only 0.09 per cent of the total population.³⁹ Despite an official census count of 140,422 Anglo-Indians, according to president Henry Gidney of the All India Anglo-Indian Association the real number of Anglo-Indians was somewhere between 250,000 and 300,000 in 1941.⁴⁰ These confusing numbers were caused by the vague definition of who was and who was not Anglo-Indian. In 1930, the British convened the first Round Table Conference (RTC) to prepare independence, but it was boycotted by the Indian National Congress. In 1931 and 1932, the British also organised the RTC and in those years Indian National Congress members did participate in the event. It was a special occasion, since Indian parties and Indian leaders of principalities took part on

an equal footing like the British representatives. The Government of India Act of 1935 was largely based on the conversations held at the three Round Table Conferences of the early 1930s.⁴¹

The Act of 1935 ruled that the provinces would be governed almost completely by Indians. The competences of the central legalising council would be extended and this paved the way for an Indian federation with dominion-status within the British Commonwealth.⁴² The Anglo-Indian community made its voice heard during and after these Round Table Conferences. They could do so using the already mentioned memoranda, and with articles in the media such as an article by Henry Gidney about the future of the Anglo-Indian community. In this article, he presented the Anglo-Indians as 'kinsmen and descendants of the British'. In his opinion, because of their adherence and loyalty to all that was British and Western, they were considered as much as foreigners as the British were, and therefore needed job protection for a limited period. Thus, Gidney repeated the most important points from the previous memoranda.⁴³ These efforts of the Anglo-Indians eventually influenced the Government of India Act of 1935 and the subsequent first Constitution of independent India, which turned out to be favourable for the Anglo-Indian community.

During the first months of the Second World War, the Indian Congress leaders, British leaders and indigenous people were determined to remain outside the war. The fall of Rangoon in the former British Indian province of Burma (now Myanmar) to Japan in 1941 changed that passive and neutral attitude. The Congress leaders declared their willingness to cooperate with the British government if the British colonial authorities gave an unequivocal promise that they would grant India complete independence after the war.⁴⁴ Most of British India was not occupied by the Japanese forces during the Second World War apart from Burma. The Japanese brought Dutch, Chinese and British prisoners of war (pows) to Burma to construct the infamous 'Burma railway'. They included a number of Eurasians: Singapore Eurasians with British surnames, some 'Burghers' (of mixed ancestry) from Sri Lanka, and a large contingent of Portuguese Eurasians.⁴⁵ Many of these prisoners died of malaria or beriberi. Approximately 16,000 European pows died, as well as 100,000 Asian forced labourers (called *romusha*).⁴⁶ In Burma, the Anglo-Burmans (Eurasians) relied on their Asian ancestry to survive. For example, they changed their names, spoke Burmese and wore traditional Burmese dress.⁴⁷ Anglo-Burmans who were less able to do so were interned in prison camps by the Japanese, just like the Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies.⁴⁸

Although the province of Bengal (today's West Bengal in India and Bangladesh at the other side of the border with Burma) was not occupied by the Japanese, the Second World War did influence everyday life there, because it functioned as a boundary fortress. For example, the Anglo-Indian schools in Bengal experienced serious problems. They received fewer pupils, because of the departure of parents and children from Calcutta to safer parts of India. There were fewer qualified teachers, since many of them became soldiers, and unqualified teachers were recruited to fill the gaps. A number of schools had to evacuate their staff and students when their buildings were requisitioned by the military to hill-stations or up-country towns. Furthermore, there were financial problems. The school's income was reduced because of falling numbers of pupils and the inability of Anglo-Indian parents to pay their children's fees.⁴⁹

In the rest of British India, the focus remained on the upcoming formal independence. Gandhi initiated a nationwide movement, the 'Quit India Campaign', hoping that his, and his followers' wishes would be recognised by a new central government. This was a reaction to the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps, whom the UK's prime minister, Churchill, sent to India in March 1942. Churchill wanted Cripps to negotiate with nationalist leaders and to relax the fears of a Japanese attack after the unexpected fall of the British stronghold of Singapore to Japan in February 1942.⁵⁰ The Cripps delegation made, according to the British, a generous offer to the Indian Nationalists: the promise of dominion status equal to full independence after the war in exchange for their cooperation during the war. The British considered this necessary for victory.⁵¹ Although he talked to all nationalist leaders in India, Cripps' mission failed. Later, the 'Quit India Campaign' of Gandhi led to an extreme British response; some 2,500 Indians were shot and many thousands were imprisoned including Nehru and Gandhi. The British authorities dismissed Congress and its nationalistic leaders. The news of their imprisonment spread fast and protests erupted within hours on the streets of Bombay with people throwing 'stones and soda water bottles at trains, buses and cars.' Soon after that, students and workers marched down the roads of major cities and small towns shouting Gandhi's mantra 'Quit India' at every person they passed.⁵²

Meanwhile, the absence of Gandhi and Nehru until their release from prison in the spring of 1945 left a political vacuum that was filled by the relatively new Muslim League, led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. It was recognised by the British as being representative of all Muslims living in India. The goal of the league was the foundation of an independent country of 'Pakistan', a separate homeland for India's Muslims.⁵³ This ideology appealed to many Muslims on the subcontinent. The Muslim League warned its followers about the prospect of a Congress-dominated India. They were concerned that Hindu elites would not share power with them, and that Muslims would be marginalised in an independent India.⁵⁴ These ideas were inspired by the fact that Congress, which was theoretically a secular organisation, exploited popular Hindu symbolism and idioms. The Sapru Conciliation Committee of 1944-1945 briefly attempted to keep the Indian subcontinent unified⁵⁵, but did not succeed. Jinnah failed to secure half of the seats for Muslims in Nehru's new interim government. Therefore, he launched the 'Direct Action' campaign in August 1946, which triggered large-scale rioting in northern India. On 13 February 1947, the British Cabinet confirmed that Britain would leave India by June 1947. Lord Louis Mountbatten had made this announcement a precondition of his appointment. Once in office, Mountbatten quickly realised that if Britain wanted to avoid a brutal civil war then there was no alternative but to divide British India into a Hindu part and a Muslim part and to arrange a rapid British exit from India.⁵⁶

The British authorities announced that India would become independent on 15 August 1947. At the same time, the Partition of British India into a Muslim country, Pakistan, and a predominantly Hindu country, India, took place. It is estimated that 12 million people crossed the new national borders: seven million Muslims moved from west India to the new country of Pakistan, and five million Hindus and Sikhs moved east to India. This Partition was accompanied by riots and extreme violence in the border region of the Punjab in the north-western part of the Indian subcontinent. More

than one million people died.⁵⁷ In East-Punjab, where the new border between India and Pakistan was located, Hindu fundamentalists murdered the entire Muslim community, some 500,000 people.⁵⁸ The most serious unrest occurred in the early 1940s in the central northern region of Bihar. In the neighbouring province of Bengal, during the 'Calcutta Killings' of August 1946, at least 6,000 Hindus and Muslims were killed, and more than 100,000 became homeless. However, the aggression was not directed at British or Anglo-Indian shops or other interests. Although the situation during Independence Day on 15 August 1947 and subsequent Partition was extremely tense for Anglo-Indians, the indigenous people did not consider them a primary target. Therefore, some degree of good will and friendship must have been present towards the Anglo-Indians. They may also have been seen as irrelevant.⁵⁹ Since, according to an eyewitness in the 1930s, 'whenever there was a demonstration or some trouble, the AFI or the railwaymen (almost all Anglo-Indians) and they had to go and shoot down these people. So they hated us.'⁶⁰

The violent riots predominantly involved Muslims and Hindus. Perhaps this was because the Anglo-Indians were not an immediate economic threat for Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. Also, their religious identity as Christians appeared to be an important factor for exclusion from Partition violence.⁶¹ Thus, despite discrimination based on race and colour, the colonial reciprocity appeared to have established a small degree of mutual respect between Europeans and Indians. Furthermore, testimonies demonstrate that Indians did not see the British, domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians as a threat or an enemy, but as friends during dangerous times of communal unrest.⁶² An article in the *Manchester Guardian* of 16 August 1947 confirmed this view. It said that Anglo-Indians, alongside Europeans, Chinese and hillmen of Nepal and Tibet had joined in the festivities of Independence Day 'with equal enthusiasm'.⁶³ That did not mean that they were passive onlookers during this turbulent period. There are stories of courageous Anglo-Indians throughout Northern India who assisted Muslims and Hindus who were at risk.⁶⁴

Approximately 50,000 Anglo-Indians migrated in the three decades following the independence of India, half of whom resettled in the UK. Few Anglo-Indians were harmed during Partition, thus only a few Anglo-Indians migrated to Britain immediately.⁶⁵ The main reason for that was that the majority did not feel at risk during the violence, but financial reasons and the lack of British citizenship must also have played a role.⁶⁶ Later, because of stricter immigration regulations in Britain, Anglo-Indians increasingly left for Canada, Australia and New-Zealand.⁶⁷ Other reasons why most Anglo-Indians initially stayed were the elaborate constitutional safeguards which the leaders of the Anglo-Indian association Frank Anthony and Henry Gidney secured. These safeguards consisted of two seats in the *Lok Sabha*, the Indian constituent assembly, Anglo-Indian representation in legislatures of states with an Anglo-Indian population of over 2,000 people, job reservations ('reserved vacancies') for the community in governmental services like the railway services and customs, and educational grants for its schools.⁶⁸ Therefore, the expiration of one of these safeguards in the 1960s – the gradual removal of privileged employment opportunities – was a more important reason to consider emigration to the UK or another country of the British Commonwealth.⁶⁹

2.3 Dutch East Indies: *Cultuurstelsel, Ethische Politiek* and Bersiap

The Dutch ruled over what became known as the Dutch East Indies for almost 350 years. It consisted of the islands of Sumatra, Java, Madura, Kalimantan (Borneo), Celebes (Sulawesi), New Guinea (Irian Barat), Bali, Flores, Lombok, Ambon and small islands to the east of Java (Figure 2). From the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch and their trade company, the *voc* (the United East Indian Company, which was comparable to the British East India Company), established trade stations on the coasts of the Dutch East Indies and obtained a royal charter. They formed peripheral communities. They barely went inland and most of the communities consisted of sojourners living in coastal settlements on Java. Men formed the majority of the European population. Dutch and German sailors, soldiers and merchants outnumbered other nationalities and professions.⁷⁰

Hardly any European women moved to the colony; European men in the Dutch East Indies had relationships with local women. From these unions, the *Indisch* mixed culture sprang.⁷¹ This mixed group was a continuation of the earlier community of Portuguese mestizos, the so-called *Mardijkers* who had originally been Christian slaves in Portuguese service who were caught by the Dutch colonists and later freed. Their mixed offspring were called *mixtiezen* (mixed) and *castiezen* (one half Asian ancestry), *pustiezen* (one quarter Asian ancestry) and *christiezen* (one eighth Asian ancestry).⁷²

The categorisation according to the degree of mixedness is indicative of how mixing and the differences between the gradations of mixing were considered important already in the first decades of colonial rule. As mentioned, European men cohabited with indigenous women, the so-called *njai*. This had advantages for the colonial authorities. For example, the colonists learned the indigenous language more quickly. Furthermore, it was generally believed that the offspring of mixed unions might fare better in the tropical climate than Dutch people, who often became ill and died, or were forced to repatriate to the mother country.⁷³ Later, the *voc* decided to discourage interracial marriages. In 1636, the *voc* leaders in the Netherlands decided that European men who were married to 'black' women were not allowed to return to the Netherlands. Later in the seventeenth century, the *voc* also decided that only white men, and not their indigenous wives, could return to the Netherlands.⁷⁴

Between 1811 and 1815, the Dutch East Indies became a British colony under the leadership of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles.⁷⁵ The visible relationships between Dutch men and indigenous women surprised the British, as did the fact that the elite was married to women who were of partly Asian ancestry. For British people, mixed relationships were by that time unacceptable.⁷⁶ During their rule, the British tried to impose their ideas on the – in their eyes – 'uncivilised' European community of the Dutch East Indies. They also tried to civilise the indigenous population according to British norms.⁷⁷ However, a voice from within the Eurasian community, John William Ricketts used this insight of a more liberal policy in the Dutch East Indies (next to pointing to French, Spanish and Portuguese colonies) to state that 'no inconvenience has resulted from it' and with that advocated for rights for Eurasians.⁷⁸

At the beginning of the twentieth century, after the arrival of more European women, mixed relationships became more contested. In the years between 1880 and 1931,




Fig. 2 Map of the Dutch East Indies ('Insulinde'), Dutch Translation by P.J. Veth of Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago. 'Het land van den orang-oetan en den paradijsvogel'* (Amsterdam 1870-1871).⁷⁹

the number of European women in the Dutch East Indies had increased from a ratio of almost 500 European (including many Indo-European) women to 1000 European men, to 884 European women to 1000 European men in 1931.⁸⁰ At the end of the nineteenth century, Dutch East Indies colonial society was still a true creole and mixed society. Yet more than in British India and French Indochina, Dutch colonialism depended on Europeans with nationalities other than Dutch. There were insufficient Dutch men willing to leave their native country, and even fewer women wanted to leave the Netherlands.⁸¹

However, English-speaking visitors were still amazed by the relatively smooth integration of Indo-Europeans into the Europeans' daily life on Java and the development of an 'Indisch' culture.⁸² Though the disapproval of mixed relationships and mixed offspring only became manifest and open obvious several decades later, already in the 1830s the language heard in the Dutch East Indies Parliament was discriminatory towards Indo-Europeans. In 1835, the commander-in-chief of the Royal Dutch Indies' army Hubert J.J.L. Ridder de Stuers criticised the Indo-Europeans: 'They possess the bad characteristics of the Europeans, combined with those bad features of the Indonesians.'⁸³ From the beginning of the twentieth century, mixedness and intermarriage were disapproved of by colonial society, as expressed by the writer Bas Veth in 1900: 'a mixture is a fatality.'⁸⁴ However, such disapproval did not prevent mixed relationships. In Batavia in 1930, 18 per cent of the marriages involving a European partner were still mixed. Elsewhere in West Java, 28.5 per cent of the marriages were between a European and an indigenous person.⁸⁵

'The Eurasians helped to make colonial rule more powerful in the Dutch East Indies'

After the British intermezzo, the introduction of the *cultuurstelsel* (cultivation system) in the Dutch East Indies marked the transition from a trade colony into an agricultural colony. The Javanese people were forced to produce a fixed amount of cash crops – such as coffee, sugar and tobacco – for the European market, while they earned barely enough to survive.⁸⁶ Until approximately 1870, there were more Indo-Europeans in the European category than people with full European ancestry. After that point, the colonial culture in the Dutch East Indies gradually became more oriented towards Europe. More Europeans came to the colony, and the invention of the telephone and the telegraph and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 brought the Dutch East Indies closer to the Netherlands. More Dutch people came temporarily to the colony instead of permanently, and more people who lived in the colony visited the mother country.⁸⁷ In the second half of the nineteenth century, a total of 15,000 Netherlands-born people departed for the Dutch East Indies.⁸⁸ In 1891, the Cultivation System was abolished and the (agricultural) market was liberalised for western companies. It became more attractive to start a new private (plantation) business in the East.⁸⁹ Rather strikingly and important for this study about categorisation is that under the Agrarian Laws of 1870 Dutch people (or *totoks*), were allowed to own land, while Indo-Europeans were not.⁹⁰

Colonial officials became aware of their responsibility to civilise the indigenous people. This resulted in the *Ethische politiek* ('Ethical politics'), a series of measures which were directed at the improvement and augmentation of education and job possibilities for indigenous people.⁹¹ Earlier, Indo-Europeans had already taken advantage of the enlarged educational opportunities in the colony. At the beginning of the twentieth century they filled all kinds of lower clerical positions in the colonial civil service. As one of the later IEV-leaders described their contribution to colonial development:

The Eurasians did not only contribute to the elaboration of Dutch colonial rule over a wider area but they also helped to make it more powerful in the Dutch East Indies.⁹²

Many members of the Javanese nobility took advantage of the 'ethical' opportunities and in 1908 formed the first indigenous association '*Boedi Oetomo*' in the city of Djokjakarta in mid-Java.⁹³ The name *Boedi Oetomo* can be translated as 'the beautiful pursuit'. This association did not turn against colonialism and did not demand self-government. In that sense, it fit into the 'ethical politics' of the Dutch East Indies government. The first aim was 'to enlighten the Javanese people by harmonious, especially intellectual development'.⁹⁴

The nationalistic movement originated from the organisation *Sarekat Islam*, founded in 1911. This was essentially an Islamic trade organisation, which did not have an aggressive nationalistic agenda. The indigenous people who were active in this organisation were undoubtedly influenced by the Pan-Islamic movement in their moderate nationalist ideology. The goal of Pan-Islamism, which arose after the Japanese had beaten the Russians in the Japanese-Russian war of 1904-1905, was to unify all Muslims under the leadership of the Ottoman 'Caliph' and therefore the Ottomans opposed the colonial presence of western powers in the Muslim world.⁹⁵

In 1927, the first Indonesian political party was founded, the Partai Nasional Indo-

nesia (PNI), which favoured independence from the Netherlands. Ahmed Soekarno a young and charismatic engineer, born in 1901 in Blitar, was chosen as its leader.⁹⁶ In his speeches he frequently referred to the Djojobojo-prophecy which predicted that the white power holders (meaning the Dutch people) would be expelled by yellow-skinned aliens (the Japanese) but that the Indonesians would regain their freedom after the last were gone.⁹⁷ In the last decade before the Second World War, the position of Indo-Europeans deteriorated. In the Dutch East Indies, Indo-Europeans were struck hard by the crisis of the 1930s. The government designed policies such as hill station retreats and fund raisers to prevent poor Europeans from experiencing the living standards of the indigenous people. For the Indo-Europeans there were no such schemes.⁹⁸ The new labour market policy of the government whereby the indigenous population received more job opportunities (in the framework of the ethical politics) made matters worse for Indo-Europeans.⁹⁹

In 1900, the number of Europeans (including Indo-Europeans) in the Dutch East Indies was 60,000 people. In 1930, this number had increased to 240,417, as a result of the arrival of more European men and women. Europeans formed 0.4 per cent of the total population. Most Europeans (80 per cent) lived on Java.¹⁰⁰ These Indo-Europeans were legally recognised as Europeans by their fathers. People of European ancestry who were not recognised by their European father were usually absorbed by the indigenous Indonesian society (the *kampong*) and were not easily recognisable. The total number of Indo-Europeans, including those who had disappeared in the *kampong* was – as was mentioned in chapter 1 – estimated at 8 to 9 million in 1940, according to the sociologist Wertheim.¹⁰¹ This may have been an exaggerated number, but it is important to understand that the large majority of the people classified as European under colonial law was of mixed ancestry and that large numbers of indigenous people with some European ancestry lived in the *kampong*.¹⁰² Wertheim was an important adviser to the Dutch government. Therefore, his estimates of the number of lower-classed Indo-Europeans, living in the *kampong*, were important, for they gave an indication of the potential number of migrants who might want to come from Indonesia to the Netherlands. The number is of importance to the perception of the migration of lower-classed Indo-Europeans as a threat.

In 1954, in the newsletter of the *Nederlands-Indische Bond van Ex-krijgsgevangenen en geinterneerden* (NIBEG, Dutch Indies League of Ex-prisoners of war and internees), the editors wrote that semi-official estimates suggested there were two million people of mixed ancestry living in the Dutch East Indies.¹⁰³ In 1941, according to official numbers, approximately 300,000 Europeans lived in the Dutch East Indies.¹⁰⁴ The indigenous population at that moment was around 60 million people. Thus, according to that estimate one out of 200 people was of European ancestry in the Dutch East Indies.¹⁰⁵ After the Second World War, the number of Europeans living in the Dutch East Indies had decreased to 250,000.¹⁰⁶

‘This Indo-Dutch society currently needs to disappear’

The Japanese troops attacked the Dutch East Indies from 10 January 1942 onwards, starting with an attack on the oil reserves, that were located near the coast of Borneo.

The most important reason for the Japanese attack was the need for raw materials, notably oil and rubber.¹⁰⁷ After the unexpected fall of the British stronghold Singapore to Japan in mid-February 1942 and the destruction of the allied fleet in the Battle of the Java Sea on 28 February, defeat of the western troops (including the Dutch) in the largest part of South-East Asia was inevitable. The Dutch army unconditionally capitulated on 8 March 1942 in Kalidjati, Java.¹⁰⁸

After Japanese troops had occupied the Dutch East Indies in February 1942, they tried to eliminate all western and colonial influences, notably the Dutch ones. They introduced the Japanese time and calendar, and the use of the Dutch language was forbidden. They made the Indonesian language, *Bahasa Indonesia*, and Japanese the two official languages.¹⁰⁹ All European people (including many Eurasians) were interned, similarly to what happened in the neighbouring British colonies in South-East Asia: Singapore, Malaya and Hong Kong.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, the Japanese tried to turn the Indo-Europeans against the Dutch, by offering them privileges in a Japanese-ruled Indonesia. The Japanese could use them for their own political purposes in building up the 'Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere.' Therefore, the majority of Indo-Europeans were allowed to remain outside the camps. In some instances, Indo-Europeans had a choice. Sometimes they could pass as Indonesian and avoid internment, but fair-skinned Indo-Europeans usually could not escape the camps. Life outside the camps was dangerous and complicated. Though they were free, they did not have any income or housing. Many had to sell clothes or furniture to survive; and they lived in constant fear of the *Kempeitai*, the Japanese secret police, who were suspicious of all western-looking people. The Indo-Europeans, in particular, with their assumed divided loyalties, were regarded with suspicion. The *Kempeitai* was infamous for using torture in interrogations.¹¹¹

Another explanation for the considerable number of Indo-Europeans outside the camps was that the many Indo-Europeans working in technical occupations could not easily be replaced. The Japanese needed them for economic and military purposes.¹¹² Despite all the efforts of the Japanese, many Indo-Europeans remained loyal to the Dutch, even those who were living in the indigenous environment.¹¹³ A considerable number of Indo-Europeans were interned with Dutch people in the Japanese camps, usually as prisoners of war and not as civilian internees. Of the total of 300,000 Europeans living in the Dutch East Indies at the start of the war, 100,000 people (including Indo-Europeans) were interned in civilian camps and 40,000 men became prisoners of war.¹¹⁴ Only *asal-oesoel*, the proof of an Asian ancestor, could save Indo-Europeans from internment. In 1942, one Indonesian ancestor was sufficient to remain outside of the camps, but in 1943 this policy was changed. All Indo-Europeans with more than one white ancestor were interned.¹¹⁵

Many Eurasians preferred internment to surviving outside of the camps as aliens under the violent Japanese occupational regime. They thought the camps would provide protection and shelter.¹¹⁶ Before the war most of the Indo-Europeans had done their best to hide their Asian ancestry. Now they used a reverse strategy, and they tried to find an Indonesian ancestor because it seemed to be advantageous to have as many Asian ancestors as possible.¹¹⁷ Indonesians did not escape the brutal treatment of the Japanese. Many of them were mobilised as *romusha* or 'volunteer labourers'.

Skilled workers were taken to do work overseas and much larger numbers of poor labourers were forced to work on specific projects, such as the Burma railroad, where many died. The forced labour disrupted the old structure and the colonial hierarchy of Dutch East Indies society.¹¹⁸

Some Indo-Europeans explicitly chose the Japanese side and tried to persuade other Indo-Europeans to collaborate with the Japanese and their war effort in Indonesia. For example, P.H. van den Eeckhout, an Indo-European who was interned in camp Kesilir in East-Java, founded the so-called *Persaudaraan Asia Golongan Indonesia* (PAGI)-group. This group consisted of Indo-Europeans who had declared their intention to opt for Indonesian citizenship when it would be possible after the war.¹¹⁹ They stressed their Asian ancestry, were loyal to the Japanese cause and advocated for the complete integration of Indo-Europeans into Indonesia. As a privileged group, they lived in separate barracks in the internment camp Kesilir, they only spoke Malay and wore Indonesian clothes.¹²⁰ It is unclear what the exact role of this group was at the time. What can be noted is that Van den Eeckhout and his PAGI group were linked to the Glodok-affair. On 23 January 1945, all Indo-Europeans who the Japanese considered dangerous for Indonesian society had to be arrested. This was the first time that the Japanese authorities specifically targeted Indo-Europeans in their attempts to make Indonesia Asian. In total 669 Indo-European boys and young men were incarcerated in the Glodok prison in the old city centre of Djakarta. About 70 of them died within a few months. Only at the end of July 1945 did the Japanese decide that all Indo-Europeans were to be released from Glodok and sent to a labour camp at Halimoen.¹²¹

Already at an earlier stage, the Indo-European A.Th. Boogaardt, who was loyal to the Japanese cause, had given a radio speech in September 1943 in which he tried to convince the Indo-Europeans of the advantages of giving up their loyalty to the Dutch rulers and supporting the Japanese instead. Another example of a supporter of the Japanese was one of the old founders of the *Indische Partij*, P.F. Dahler, who in 1941 was interviewed by the Japanese press agency Domei. This agency used his viewpoint as propaganda material in an article in a Malayan newspaper, *Tjahaja*, in January 1943: 'Indo-Dutch people must become Indonesian!' In this article, he explains that this command particularly applied to the Indo-Europeans:

The Indo-Dutch, who are still favourable to the IEV, and who have been advised several times from different sides to choose between East and West, but so far have disregarded that advice.¹²²

Dahler had also another clear piece of advice for Indo-Europeans:

This Indo-Dutch society currently needs to disappear from the public society in this country, that is to say that an Indo-Dutch person must not only consider himself Indonesian, but he must also fully become Indonesian. The person who does not want that, must be considered an alien in Indonesia forever.¹²³

Dahler, who had been a former member of the People's Council of the Dutch East Indies was an ardent advocate of Indonesian nationalism. Under Japanese occupation, he was appointed head of the *Kantor Oeroesan Peranakan* (KOP), who took care of affairs concerning Indo-Europeans for the Japanese authorities.¹²⁴

In March 1943, the Japanese initiated a special registration and categorisation procedure for all Indo-Europeans who were still outside the camps on Java. They were divided into eight groups depending on ancestry. A contemporary eyewitness remembers the following division made by the Japanese: 'Group 1: *totok*-father and Indo-European mother; group 2: *totok*-mother and Indo-European father; group 3: Indo-European father and Indo-European mother; group 4: *totok*-father and Indonesian mother; group 5: *totok*-father and *totok*-mother, born in the Dutch East Indies. Thus, this fifth group seems to be of full Dutch ancestry with two *totok* parents. Yet, they were still counted as part of the 'group of mixed ancestry' because of their birth in the colony. Group 6 consists of people with an Indonesian father and *totok*-mother; group 7: Indonesian father and Indo-European mother; and lastly group 8: Indonesian father and mother of another Asian nationality.' On such registration cards the following qualification was indicated: 'This is a child of turbid parents.'¹²⁵

The racial classification was essentially a continuation of the racial colonial hierarchies developed in the nineteenth century in the Dutch East Indies. The only difference was that Asians instead of Dutch *totoks* occupied the top positions in the social ranking. The internees felt this racial reversal intensely, since they became dependent on Indonesians who provided them with food through the barbed wire (*kawat*).¹²⁶ This racial reversal became clearer when after November 1943 the civilian camps were no longer controlled by Japanese civilian authorities, but by Japanese military officials. The camps were rechristened as 'military internment camps' instead of their earlier euphemistic description as 'protected neighbourhoods'. This rebranding as military camps meant stricter rules, less food, and deteriorating living conditions. From September 1944 onwards, when it became clear that Japan was losing the Pacific War, the internees were concentrated in larger camps predominantly on Java. Many internees did not survive in these huge camps or the transportation to them in crowded trains in the final months of the war. There were also a number of Indo-Europeans amongst the internees who were sent to these camps. However, they were a minority, since most Indo-Europeans remained outside the camps, at least on Java.¹²⁷

'You will face a very hard time'

Because being openly and recognisably Dutch was dangerous during Japanese occupation, many Indo-Europeans looked for a reinforcement of their (partly) indigenous background. For example, Indo-European women sent their sons to relatives in the *kampong* or *dessa* (indigenous village) where their families originally came from. For the women, the advantages were that they had fewer mouths to feed, and their sons had a good hiding place. 'Disappearing in the *kampong*' had a positive connotation at that time as opposed to the pre-war period when it was connected to 'verindischen' and 'going native'. Many of these boys hiding in the *kampong* adapted to life in the *dessa* and became Muslim. They married Indonesian women and stayed after the Japanese occupation had ended and after decolonisation.¹²⁸ During the confusing occupation years, however, it remained hard for Indo-Europeans to know who their real friends were and whom they could trust. This uncertainty is conveyed in the memoir of the Indo-European Math Jalhajj who wrote about a meeting with an old Indonesian friend

during Japanese occupation who told him that he would face difficult times in the future:

'You Indo-Europeans make jokes of everything and take matters lightly, despite the distressing position you are in.' Jalhaij asked: 'Distressing position, what do you mean?' 'Look, you are proud and stubborn. Although you were born here out of Indonesian mothers and know Indonesia better than the Netherlands, you keep rejecting every cooperation with the Nippon, because your fathers are *totoks* and you always keep standing behind your fathers. Even worse, most of you don't even have an interest in Indonesian affairs. Exactly because of that you will face a very hard time.'¹²⁹

Two days after the Japanese had capitulated, on 15 August 1945, Soekarno proclaimed Indonesian independence in the backyard of his house in Batavia (renamed Jakarta after independence). A violent and confusing period, the *Bersiap* (which literally meant 'Be ready'), consisting of revolutionary violence in the wake of the Japanese loss, followed in Indonesia, during which Indo-Europeans were a special target. It is estimated that between 25,000 to 30,000 Dutch and Indo-Europeans were killed. It is difficult to give precise numbers for each population group since many were kidnapped or disappeared, and were never found.¹³⁰

In an indirect way, the Japanese prepared the way for the independence of the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch tried to restore colonial rule by carrying out two so-called 'police actions', which was a euphemism for a colonial war. Unrest continued until Indonesian and Dutch authorities agreed on the formal transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia on 27 December 1949.¹³¹ A large number of the *totoks* repatriated to the Netherlands.¹³² In the option period between December 1949 and December 1951, approximately 30,000 Indo-Europeans opted for *Warga Negara* (Indonesian Citizenship). However, in 1951 there were still 136,000 Dutch people in Indonesia, who had not chosen Indonesian citizenship and thus were legally aliens in the newly independent state.¹³³

2.4 French Indochina: A young colonial patchwork of regions and ethnicities

French Indochina was formed from 1856 onwards, when the French annexed the lower Mekong Delta from China (see Figure 3).¹³⁴ In 1858, they had annexed Cochinchina, the most southern part of present-day Vietnam.¹³⁵ By 1876 the French government had claimed all of Cochinchina as a French colony. The French troops used Cochinchina as a base for the conquest of the middle and northern parts of Vietnam.¹³⁶ In 1887, the French founded Indochina, under the name of *Union Indochinoise*. It unified Cambodia, Laos (added in 1893), the Chinese enclave Kwangchow Wan and the three regions that are now in Vietnam: Tonkin in the north, Annam in the middle, and Cochinchina in the south. French Indochina was a colonial invention, a patchwork of regions and ethnicities, governed via different and often conflicting mechanisms, but unified under French control. It included one proper colony – Cochinchina with Saigon as a capital – and four protectorates: Tonkin, Laos, Annam and Cambodia.¹³⁷ It came about as a result of economic interests of the French in the South East Asian region,

rivalry between France and Britain in that area and finally the intervention of French missionaries.¹³⁸ French colonial rule did not erase indigenous hierarchies but placed the French colonial authorities, the *colons*, at the top of the social ladder by using the power strategy of 'divide and rule'.¹³⁹

In Indochina, the offspring from mixed relationships between European men and indigenous women were named *Métis*.¹⁴⁰ Although mixed marriages between European men and indigenous women did occur, the marriages *à la mode du pays* (which were similar to concubinage in the other two cases) were the prevalent form of domestic arrangement among European men throughout Indochina in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹⁴¹ Potential French colonists were given advice about this local practice before they arrived. They were informed that in the house, 'the native woman will have to keep herself entirely in her role and be officially unknown'.¹⁴² But in the 1930s, a Vietnamese writer, Vu Trong Phung, cast doubt on the nature of the marriages in his satirical report *The Industry of Marrying Europeans* in which he described marriages that had according to him a rather 'industrial' nature. He started this report by sketching a scene in a court room in Hanoi in which an indigenous woman answered the question 'What is your occupation?', with 'My occupation is ... marrying Europeans!'¹⁴³

Mixed unions were accepted in the pre-colonial and early colonial era of Indochina, but they became increasingly suspect from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards. Under the leadership of the new governor-general Paul Doumer, who was appointed in 1896, mixed unions came to be seen as an evil phenomenon. He forbade civil servants from entering into marriages with indigenous women, but cohabitation with a *congai* (a Vietnamese concubine) remained common.¹⁴⁴

In the French colonial perception, a *congai* was regarded as belonging to the same category as a 'prostitute'. In Indochina *congais* were expected to have sex with their masters in addition to providing household services.¹⁴⁵

As a result of the strict policy of governor-general Doumer, colonial society denounced mixed people or *Métis* in Indochina. They did so sometimes with even more disdain than the colonisers had towards indigenous people. Therefore, *Métis* developed deep feelings of rancour towards both the French coloniser and the colonised people.¹⁴⁶ Despite the strict (informal) boundaries between groups, French colonial society in Indochina was heterogeneous, including people from other French colonies: Antilleans, people from Réunion, Indians, people from the Vietnamese elite and *Métis*. Another development which contributed to the problematisation of miscegenation was – as elsewhere – the arrival of more French women in Indochina, who accompanied their husbands when they moved to the French colony. In the 1920s, their arrival did not immediately lead to fewer unions between European men and indigenous women.¹⁴⁷ European (mostly French) women had difficulty in adapting to the colony's climate and habits and they felt the rivalry of the *Métis* women on the marriage market. According to a report on the Eurasian problem of 1938, European women were 'instinctively' jealous of the *Métis* women and that led to a greater disapproval of miscegenation and sharper boundaries in colonial society.¹⁴⁸

The French had their own kind of civilising mission: *La mission civilisatrice* coupled with the goal of *mise en valeur* – the economic development of the colonial empire for




Fig. 3 Map of French Indochina (1886) with proposed railway Burma-Siam-China.¹⁴⁹

the benefit of all residents.¹⁵⁰ With reference to the French civilising mission, the influential French politician Jules Ferry said on 28 July 1885:

One can link the system of colonial expansion to three kinds of ideas: economic ideas, ideas on civilisation [...] and ideas of the political and patriotic order. [...] It is the second point that I have to introduce [...] it is the humanitarian and civilising side of the issue [...] The superior races have a right towards the inferior races. I say that they have a right because they have an obligation. They have the obligation to civilise the inferior races [...] But in our time, I stress that the European nations are performing that superior obligation of civilisation with magnificence, with grandeur and honesty.¹⁵¹

'We must respect the blood of France'

The French emphasised the moral and cultural dimension of the colonial project, which stemmed from the old revolutionary French belief in the universal value of its republican civilisation. Linked to this civilising mission was the sentiment that the French colonists (*colons*) considered themselves responsible for the creation of the *Métis* group. The general idea among them was that the phenomenon '*Métis*' was born with the establishment of the colonial domain. Therefore, they felt they had to care for the abandoned and neglected *Métis* children and to assimilate them as 'real' French people into the French group. This was seen as part of the important role the French had to play in all their colonies, including the Asian ones.¹⁵² Already in 1913, the French minister of colonies Lebrun put these ideas forward by issuing a formal demand that the governors general of all French colonies were to raise awareness of the need for European fathers to fulfil their 'duties toward their children born of native women'.¹⁵³ One colonial administrator wrote:

We must respect the blood of France. Be it no more than a drop that flows in all the veins in which it runs, this sole drop should suffice to enoble the rest.¹⁵⁴

The French reference to responsibility was remarkable when compared to the way the other two cases approached the Eurasian offspring of European men and indigenous women. The international colonial exhibition that the French organised in the Bois de Vincennes, Paris, in 1931, reinforced these ideas. The Vincennes exhibition showed the 'great' accomplishments of the French in the South-East-Asian colonies to the metropolitan population in France.¹⁵⁵ Unlike Algeria, Indochina was never a settlement colony. The French population in Indochina never numbered more than 42,000 people. In 1913, the small European community (including *Métis*) in Indochina was estimated to number 23,700 people. In 1929, this number had increased to 40,095 people, because of the influx of more French. That was only 0.2 per cent of the total population of Indochina. In 1937, a survey counted 6,000 Eurasians with French citizenship.¹⁵⁶ In 1940, the total number of indigenous people was just below 23 million. At that time, there were only 517 European women to every 1,000 European men, despite the campaign to attract more French women to Indochina.¹⁵⁷ Amongst others, the female French author Clotilde Chivas-Baron, who had lived in Indochina for four years, supported this campaign. She has written extensively about her experiences during that period.¹⁵⁸ The presence of more French women in Indo-

china was considered an improvement, because the general idea was that the French women would create purer metropolitan French homes with their 'innate French virtues'.¹⁵⁹

When it became connected to the radical Vietnamese youth movement during the late 1920s, the Vietnamese women's movement strongly influenced the Vietnamese nationalist movement. In particular, the movement for women's education had become increasingly nationalistic by 1927. In the 1930s, the colonial government voiced concerns about this strengthened relationship between the Vietnamese nationalist and feminist movements. The connection was mainly via the indigenous environments in which abandoned *Métis* children had to grow up.¹⁶⁰ Nguyen Ai Quoc, the future Ho Chi Minh, established the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1930. From the start, women's rights were part of the ICP's agenda. The ICP counted women among its members, and among other things, sought to improve the conditions of pregnant women and working mothers. Specifically, the party called for women's access to trade union membership, maternity leave, child care at the workplace, maternal rights in cases of divorce, and the prohibition of polygamy and forced marriages. Shortly after the ICP was founded in 1930, the Vietnamese Women's Union, a branch of the Communist Party that was devoted to women's issues, emerged. Women organised trade unions and supported the ICP strikes and uprisings of the 1930s in Northern Annam and Tonkin.¹⁶¹ One of the most well-known uprisings is the 'Yen Bay' Uprising on 10 February 1930, when the Vietnamese nationalist movement attacked the French garrison post at Yen Bay to the North-West of Hanoi. Joined by a significant number of indigenous troops stationed there, Vietnamese nationalists conquered the arms depot and killed a number of French soldiers. Numerous strikes of workers and agricultural manifestations, organised by militant communists, preceded this uprising. The event provoked fierce French repression. The French sentenced 83 indigenous rebels to death and 13 were guillotined in June 1930. The powerful French secret police, *la Sûreté*, was involved and infiltrated various communist organisations and interrogated their members.¹⁶² The images of docile, placid indigenous populations which had been prevalent until this uprising did not equate anymore with the representation of these 'rebels' as fanatical nationalists who were heavily opposed to French colonial rule.¹⁶³

Nationalist aspirations continued in the years that followed, but they did not overcome the repression of the French colonial authorities.¹⁶⁴ Most French *colons* enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle in French quarters of cities like Hanoi and Saigon, or in Indochinese hill stations like Dalat and Yunnan.¹⁶⁵ Indeed, Indochina gained a reputation in France as a country in which the humbler European man could live in luxury and afford a number of servants.¹⁶⁶ Saigon became a diverse city. The French colonial government planned to make Saigon the economic capital of Indochina, and the city attracted many foreign companies and immigrants, including French people, other Europeans, Chinese and Indians from other French colonies such as Martinique, French India and Guadeloupe. These people had already received French citizenship in these areas.¹⁶⁷

In June 1940, Indochina was invaded by Japanese troops, one and a half years before the Dutch East Indies were occupied by Japanese forces. In 1941, the Viet Minh



III. 1 Saigon street scene in front of the theatre in the 1920s.¹⁶⁸

was founded as a front organisation of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). *Viet Minh* was an abbreviation of *Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh*, or National Front for the Independence of Vietnam.¹⁶⁹ It was a merger between the Indochinese communist party and a number of Vietnamese political organisations. The most important goal of the *Viet Minh* was to unite all Vietnamese communist and nationalist forces in a common liberation front against the French and later the Japanese.¹⁷⁰ During Japanese occupation, the Vietnamese communists in the ICP still flitted between two goals: their desire for a post-war independent country that spanned the geographic borders of Indochina, and their wish for an independent Vietnam consisting of Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina.¹⁷¹ In the end, the latter goal was accomplished, and Laos and Cambodia both became independent. After the Japanese surrendered on 15 August 1945, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on 2 September 1945. In this speech, he used quotes from the American declaration of independence.¹⁷²

In French Indochina, the French administration had been left in place by the Japanese occupiers. The central French government in Vichy and its representative in Indochina, Governor General Decoux, found a compromise. The French would retain their power while allowing economic cooperation with the Japanese and Japanese military presence on Indochinese soil.¹⁷³ The French were certain that this was the best way of coming to terms with the new situation, they believed their position in the Far East remained 'toujours forte'. At least, the government wanted people to believe this.

It was also a justification for their continued presence in Indochina after the Japanese were gone.¹⁷⁴ The Japanese saw in the compromise a way of saving valuable military and administrative resources as well as raw materials and food stuffs.¹⁷⁵ In addition, the French feared an Indochinese-Japanese alliance because that would signal the end of 'white superiority' in the eyes of the Indochinese people.¹⁷⁶ The French wanted to implement the so-called 'Brazzaville policy', named after the Brazzaville conference in January-February 1944, where it was first presented. The basis for this new policy was the idea of a Federation or Union, connecting the French mother country and the colonies.¹⁷⁷ After their *coup d'état*, the Japanese removed the entire French administration, before they set up a temporary Vietnamese 'puppet' administration. The Japanese chose to rule through local royalist elites.¹⁷⁸ After the Japanese surrendered, emperor Bao Dai, who had become head of an independent Vietnamese state under Japanese 'protection', abdicated on 25 August 1945, and transferred his power to the new independent Vietnamese government.¹⁷⁹

'One word, I repeat ... one word: independence'

At first, Ho Chi Minh did not see any other option but to negotiate with the French colonial rulers. He offered concessions to the French, agreeing to permit them to return to the north to replace the Chinese. He also agreed that an autonomous Vietnam would be part of the French Union, a loose federation of states, connected to France, comparable to the British Commonwealth. In return, the French offered a referendum on the status of Cochinchina, the southern part of Vietnam. They asked whether this area would re-join Annam and Tonkin in a reunited Vietnamese state or remain a separate French territory. This was all part of the March Agreement of 1946. After this agreement, two further conferences were held: the Dalat preliminary Conference (April-May) and the Fontainebleau conference (July-August). The Dalat Conference was a failure. The French delegation promoted a tight union with one foreign policy, whereas the Vietnamese advocated a loose association of equal states. In fact, the French wanted an Indochinese Federation of five 'free states' with a federal assembly of sixty members, whose main task would be to present a federal budget. The five states were to control their internal affairs, with the important condition that policy topics such as justice, hygiene, social security, economic planning, transport, customs, communications and immigration were to be the responsibility of the French High Commissioner and his federal administration. To the Vietnamese, this was unacceptable, because they realised that the French would only grant them 'second rank' independence. In September 1946, Ho Chi Minh left Paris for the last time, convinced that diplomacy had failed.¹⁸⁰ When Ho Chi Minh told the French former clandestine resistance newspaper *Franc-Tireur* on 15 August 1946 that all that was needed was 'one word, I repeat ... one word: independence', he was asking for the one thing that no French government would have given him at that time.¹⁸¹

In that respect, renaming the old empire the *French Union*, which was part of the Fourth Republican Constitution implemented in October 1946, was too late for a new round of negotiations with the Vietnamese nationalists. This new constitution permitted local peoples to direct their own administration and govern their own affairs

democratically. France, however, would retain control over major state issues, the military and diplomatic policy. Through this system, the Indochinese Federation became an associated state governed by a High Commissioner, who replaced the position of Governor General from the old colonial times.¹⁸² This High Commissioner in Indochina, Emile Bollaert, had already offered the Vietnamese people two concessions. France accepted the unification of the three parts of Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina) within a single state. France offered the new Vietnamese state 'independence' within the French Union, using the Vietnamese word 'doc lap' rather than the French 'indépendance'.¹⁸³ The *Métis* members of *La Mutuelle de l'Indochine* and its allies portrayed the fate of the *Métis* for the French government as symbolic of the imperial future of France in Asia. Eurasians, they wrote, were 'the last French island in Indochina' and they 'assured the durability of the French presence' in the region.¹⁸⁴

Negotiations between the Viet Minh and the French authorities failed, and 'la guerre d'Indochine' or the 'First Indochina War' (also called the 'War of Resistance') began. After almost nine years of guerrilla fighting, and months of heavy fighting with the French troops, the Viet Minh celebrated victory at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954. Dien Bien Phu was a village in the central highlands of Annam, typically called in the French press *le Verdun tropical* referring to the battle near the eponymous town in northern France where so many had died in the First World War.¹⁸⁵ Subsequently, the Geneva Accords arranged the withdrawal of the French from all Indochinese terrain. It also divided Vietnam along the seventeenth parallel, leaving the Viet Minh in control of the north. A regime under the leadership of King Bao Dai, who had returned once again, ruled South-Vietnam. This administration was supported by the United States.¹⁸⁶ The idea was that national elections would be held in 1956 to reunite the Vietnamese country, but these never took place.¹⁸⁷ The 'Partition' into North and South-Vietnam led to the evacuation of 800,000 people from the communist northern part to the capitalist southern part of Vietnam. All these migrants were Catholics, including many Europeans and *Métis* children from child protection institutions, who fled the communist regime ruled by the Viet Minh. The monarchies of Laos and Cambodia (once part of the French Indochinese union) now obtained international protection as neutral independent states.¹⁸⁸ In the end, this complex and explosive situation led to the second Vietnamese war of independence, also referred to as the 'Vietnam war'.

The *Métis* question became urgent during the First Indochina War, because of the continuous arrival of French soldiers. It only referred to *Métis* children who were also called 'bastards' because they were unrecognised and abandoned by their European fathers. The few children who were born from the legitimate union between a European man and a native woman, or more uncommon, of a European woman and a native man, were not considered a problem in the Indochinese case.¹⁸⁹ Since Indochina was a unified area under French colonial rule, I refer to Indochina as a whole for the colonial period. I focus on Vietnam for the postcolonial period, because of the importance of Vietnam as a *lieu de mémoire* for French colonial nostalgia in the post-war period, in which the *Métis* played an important role.¹⁹⁰

2.5 Comparison and conclusion: Large changes to come

From the historical overview presented above, it is clear that in all three colonies, the composition of colonial populations started to change in the second half of the nineteenth century. This process started earlier in British India, but it was essentially the same in the other two colonies. Over time, more European women arrived and the number of relationships between European men and indigenous women decreased. These white European women were expected to symbolise and live up to the idea of superiority of the European culture.¹⁹¹ Because of their arrival, the percentage of Eurasians among the group of Europeans decreased and gradually the social standing of Eurasians dropped.¹⁹² This change in the composition of the colonial population was not only caused by the arrival of more European women. Infrastructural changes and more emphasis on the colonial civilising mission contributed to the process of bringing the Asian colonies closer to their respective European mother countries as well.

These developments were part of the phenomenon of *Modern Imperialism* which Thomas Lindblad and Elsbeth Locher-Scholten defined as:

The process of acceleration of colonial expansion between 1870 and 1914, in which the division of nearly the whole non-western world resulted in the political domination of western states over these non-western regions.¹⁹³

In this expansionist tendency, Eurasians became a valuable link between the European coloniser and the indigenous people as well as an extension of European power, in colonial institutions such as the civil service, the army and on the plantations.¹⁹⁴

The development of *Modern Imperialism* took different shapes in the three colonies: it was named *Ethische Politiek* in the Dutch East Indies, Kipling's *White Man's Burden* was used in British India and *la Mission Civilisatrice* in French Indochina. The Dutch version was framed in less ideological terms than its Indochinese and British Indian counterparts.¹⁹⁵ The French colonial project, by contrast, was associated with the essential ideals of French republicanism, which included faith in progress through science, the equality of all, and the messianic conviction of France's exceptional destiny as a nation. In other words, the French colonial ideology stressed the moral, cultural and universal value of its civilisation.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, French colonial authorities never made racial categories official and never gave them legal or codified definition, while that did happen in British India and to a lesser extent in the Dutch East Indies. This principle of resistance against racial hierarchies was inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution: liberty, equality and fraternity. The French colonial civilising mission was attached to its universalist principles and focused on civilising and educating the indigenous people through a policy of gradual cultural transformation.¹⁹⁷ In practice, thinking about race did play a role in French Indochina. For example, the nationality of unrecognised *Métis* was specified in a survey as one of the following three categories: the first category was formed by children of the Annamite race and they were classified as French subjects; the second category consisted of children of the white race and they were French citizens and the third category was formed by children of the mixed race and they could become French nationals.¹⁹⁸

Another feature of the French colonial ideology was that it was directed towards

assimilation, whereby colonised peoples were believed to be capable of becoming 'French', and elevated in a cultural, moral and intellectual way, regardless of colour, religion or cultural tradition. Such people were considered *évolués* – those who had 'evolved' to reach a higher stage of civilisation. Proponents of this sort of complete assimilation imagined a single, unified imperial community: 'une nation de cent million d'habitants' (a nation of one hundred million inhabitants).¹⁹⁹ These colonial civilising missions could guide policy making of the former colonial rulers with regard to the admission of Eurasians to the mother countries, for example to 'rescue' them from the native nationalists. But this could also be considered from a contrasting perspective. Once the colonial civilising mission was completed, Eurasians, as domiciled, balanced citizens of the former colony could build up their own country. The way the colonial civilising mission was framed in every separate context determined the importance of other explanatory factors for staying or leaving after decolonisation, such as the colonial status of Eurasians, their class, decolonisation process and aftermath and bureaucracy and accessibility of citizenship rights.

Another difference between the three colonies was that the process of Europeanisation and the turn toward disapproval of mixed relationships took place earlier in British India than in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. The Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 in British India did not only influence British colonial officials but also Dutch colonial authorities. They became worried about the power of the small white European population in the colonies, and more European people were encouraged to settle in the overseas territories.²⁰⁰ Because of the recent date of its settlement, French rule in Indochina in this period is generally depicted as more coercive than British rule in British India and Dutch rule in the Dutch East Indies.²⁰¹

In all three colonies, nationalistic indigenous political parties were formed in the first half of the twentieth century. In British India and the Dutch East Indies, a clear trend was visible in the kind of political parties that were founded. Initially, these political parties were quite moderate and used the possibilities that colonial rule provided, but later, they became more radical. For example, they started leading violent uprisings and demanded independence from the coloniser. In French Indochina, by contrast, the nationalist political parties were more radical from the beginning.

During Japanese occupation, Eurasians in the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina and British Indian province of Burma experienced similar hardships in- and outside internment camps. In the Dutch East Indies and Burma, Eurasians could pass as indigenous people and remain outside the internment camps, provided their skin was dark enough, they wore the right clothes and spoke the indigenous language. Life was full of danger for *Métis* people in French Indochina as well, especially after the Japanese left and the Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh proclaimed independence. The British had prepared the indigenous people on the Indian subcontinent for a peaceful independence. They had organised a series of Round-Table-Conferences in the years 1930-1932. The decolonisation of British India was accompanied by many riots surrounding the Partition of British India into Pakistan and India and the relocations of Hindus to India and Muslims to Pakistan. However, the new regime in India acted less aggressively towards the Anglo-Indians than the new regimes in Indonesia and Indochina towards Indo-Europeans and *Métis*. Anglo-Indians were not a target dur-

ing these riots, but they were sometimes forced to take position in the fights.²⁰² In the end, the Japanese occupation became the prelude to independence. British India was not occupied by Japan, but the Partition of India meant that decolonisation was marked by violence. The partition of Vietnam into a communist North and a capitalist South was politically motivated, and not the result of ethnic or religious tensions, as was the case in India. In short, the decolonisation process in all three colonies, was accompanied by extreme violence. In the Dutch East Indies and Indochina the Eurasians were targeted, which must have been an incentive to leave the former colony. They were a target during the decolonisation wars because of their economic and legal position in the colony. This important aspect of their complicated position is discussed in the next chapter.

3 Legal position

3.1 Introduction

In the course of the nineteenth century, colonial authorities in all three colonies implemented laws regulating the legal position of their colonial populations. Commonly, a distinction was made between Europeans and non-Europeans. The Eurasian populations were sometimes included in the former category, sometimes in the latter. Legislation was built upon the laws of the mother countries. As said in chapter 1, in none of the three colonies did people of mixed ancestry become a separate legal category. This created possibilities as well as difficulties for Eurasians. They could either pass themselves off as European, depending on their skin colour, education, religion and class, or they could be discriminated against when trying to find jobs, enrol in higher education and in general face challenges to build up a life in the colony.

3.2 British India: Disapproval and legal definition of Eurasians/Anglo-Indians

Before the end of the eighteenth century, the British East India company did not make a clear distinction between the mixed population and the British people. Eurasians (later mostly referred to as Anglo-Indians) with upper class British fathers were generally socially accepted, and marriages between lower class British soldiers and indigenous women were also encouraged. Eurasians were usually well-educated, and were given work in support of English activities in colonial India.¹ Because they were not yet discriminated against, Anglo-Indians occupied the vast majority of positions in the colonial civil service and in the army. However, this situation radically changed from the 1780s onwards. For example, in 1786 Eurasian pupils from the Upper Military Orphanage in Calcutta were no longer allowed to travel to England to receive a European education, which had been common practice for the Anglo-Indian children of British officers.²

British authorities generally started to regard Eurasians with suspicion, when the size of the mixed-race population increased. By 1750, Eurasians outnumbered the British people living in India.³ In the late eighteenth century, mixed ancestry peoples in Haiti, Mexico and Peru revolted against colonial power. In British India, this led to the idea that also the Anglo-Indians could pose a threat to the colonial project.⁴ Their loyalty to the British colonial project was also questioned and they were excluded from higher posts and only allowed in clerical pay grades.⁵ In 1790, the East In-

dia Company issued a regulation that classified Anglo-Indians as natives. As natives, they were not allowed to purchase land or live further than ten miles from a company settlement without the approval of the Chief Secretary (a British colonial official).⁶ In 1791, the Company prohibited Anglo-Indians from entering the covenanted (contract-bound) services. This sharp decrease in possibilities for Anglo-Indians occurred at a time when the role of the Company was shifting from a purely mercantile and organisational to a real colonial power. The demarcation of Anglo-Indians as a distinct class was accompanied by the production of derogatory stereotypes such as the Anglo-Indian portrayed as a British lackey who wishes to disown his or her Indian heritage.⁷ These stereotypes and the disapproval of the Anglo-Indian group were reinforced after the arrival of missionaries in India in 1813, who stressed the purity of the British race.⁸ In 1833, officials of the British East India Company implemented a new charter in British India. All positions in the service of the company were now open to all people, regardless of their race or religion. For a short time, this created new opportunities for Anglo-Indians. Later, Eurasians were banned from all senior posts in the civil and military services in British India. The main reason for this was that British rulers were concerned that Eurasians would pose a risk to British security and colonial rule, if they gained military power and became politically organised as a group.⁹ The numerical growth of the Eurasian group in the second half of the eighteenth century made the British colonial elite concerned about the future of their children, since Eurasians could take away the jobs their children might have.¹⁰

The necessity for an interest organisation grew because of the distance that was created between Europeans and Eurasians by the new rules, and because of the increasing number of Eurasians in distress. Prominent men in the Eurasian community formed the first Eurasian associations in Madras and Calcutta.¹¹ In the middle of the nineteenth century, an important development in Anglo-Indian history occurred. Eurasians were preferred for jobs in the emerging Indian railway sector. In 1843, colonial administrator Lord Dalhousie suggested that the large cities of India could be best connected by means of railways. Charles Trevelyan, a respected member of the East India company, suggested that Eurasians would be the best persons to be recruited for laying the railway lines, because they were, according to Trevelyan, sturdily built, mechanically inclined, comparatively well educated, and able to get along with the indigenous people because they spoke local languages. As a result, in India, the railway network was run by British officers with Anglo-Indian and Indian subordinates. The British racial concerns led to the creation of separate railway colonies for the Anglo-Indians and British people respectively.¹² The East Indian Railway company constructed one of the earliest railway colonies at Jamalpur in 1858, and this became a model for others.¹³ In the next half century, the Indian railway network grew from nothing to 23,627 miles of track. In the late colonial period, half of the Anglo-Indian population was employed by or depended upon the railways for their livelihood. Railway colonies thus became Anglo-Indian bulwarks.¹⁴

From 1919 onwards, when the Government of India Act was implemented, the Anglo-Indians became a vaguely defined and demarcated group in British India, but not a legal category. They remained for statutory purposes natives, although they did not consider themselves as such.¹⁵ According to this Act of 1919, 'An Anglo-Indian means

any person being a British subject and resident in British India', who is '(a) Of European descent in the male line or (b) Of mixed Asiatic and non-Asiatic descent whose father, grandfather or more remote ancestor in the male line was born in the continent of Europe, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa or the United States of America and who is not a European.'¹⁶ This law was refined in the Government of India Act of 1935. In that Act, article 366 says:

An Anglo-Indian means a person whose father or any of whose other male progenitors in the male line is or was of European descent but who is domiciled within the territory of India and is or was born within such territory of parents habitually resident therein and not established there for temporary purposes only.¹⁷

Since these practices change with time and place categories like 'Anglo-Indian' were elusive and specifiable only within a given historical and geographic location. Anglo-Indians struggled during the nineteenth and early twentieth century to make claims of membership of the British society. Anglo-Indians spoke English as their mother tongue and were Christian. For them, the UK was 'home' even if they had never left India.¹⁸ The first 'Anglo-Indian' law from 1919 turned out to be a watershed in the lives of Anglo-Indians because it was accompanied by other reforms including *Indianisation*. This meant that more jobs which were traditionally destined for them were granted to Indians. As a result, Anglo-Indians had more difficulties in finding and maintaining employment. They even experienced difficulties in the traditional 'Anglo-Indian' branches in which there were protected jobs granted to them by government after the mutiny of 1857 such as the railways, the mail, the telegraph, the customs and excise departments. Anglo-Indian women continued working as teachers, nurses and office clerks.¹⁹ The loss of jobs (or in other words their economic status) and the fear of losing English as a language, which the Anglo-Indians considered their 'mother tongue' in India was an important reason to leave India in the 1950s and 1960s. This did not mean that these motives had equal weight for all Anglo-Indians. A considerable number of them stayed because of generous constitutional safeguards, that were put into place before the country became independent.²⁰

'Not handicapped by excessive pigmentation'

Although, they had been defined as a group in 1919, Anglo-Indians were still counted in the census of 1931 as European British subjects. It was noted in the report on this census, that Anglo-Indians 'who are not handicapped by excessive pigmentation', had the tendency 'to return themselves as Europeans'. Therefore, the conclusion in the report was that 30,000 Anglo-Indians should be deducted from the total number of European British Subjects in the census, since they passed themselves off as Europeans.²¹ While keeping this in mind, the leader of the Anglo-Indian Association, Henry Gidney wrote in an article of 1934 that there were 175,000 to 200,000 Anglo-Indians living in India at that time.²² It is not surprising that many Anglo-Indians tried to pass themselves off as Europeans. The general idea among the Anglo-Indians was that the earlier generation of Anglo-Indians, going back over one hundred years, came from good stock. However, in the portrayal of the last fifty years, colonial authorities consid-

ered Anglo-Indians as the result of unions between low class Europeans and low-class Indians (including prostitutes). While the general idea was that a part of the Anglo-Indian group was of 'high quality', a large number was depicted as weak. They were seen as having no strength of personality, and as being accustomed to an identity as 'the underdog'.²³ Members of the statutory commission (the Simon Commission) asserted that the lower social layers of the Anglo-Indian community were constantly being filled by Christians of 'doubtful European stock'. According to the Simon Commission, they were often of pure Indian stock, and sought to escape their wretched social position.²⁴ In general, British colonial authorities were not sure whether Europeans domiciled in India were not actually of mixed ancestry, or, if they were even Indian Christians passing themselves off as Europeans.

In addition, there were Anglo-Indian women in the late colonial period, who were usually regarded as even more inferior than the Anglo-Indian men, who took their fate in their own hands. Examples of these confident Anglo-Indian women are Malika Jan and her daughter Gauhar Jan who developed from traditional *Tawa'if* singers into modern-day western-like celebrities. They completely distanced themselves from their Eurasian origins by changing their names, their religion and their lifestyles. By doing this kind of job and passing as Indian women, they could make a good living.²⁵

The status of the Anglo-Indian community was theoretically and legally well-defined but in practice it remained vague. The possibility for British fathers to recognise their children born outside marriage as 'British' did not exist under British Common law. Children born outside marriage could never be British. The Indian Councils Act of 1870 added to the vagueness of the definition of the Anglo-Indian group. According to this Act, Anglo-Indians were for economic purposes 'natives of India by statute'. In 1925, the secretary of state for British India added:

For the purposes of employment under government and inclusion in schemes of *Indianisation*, members of the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled European Community are statutorily Natives of India. For purposes of education and internal security, their status, in so far as it admits of definition, approximates to that of European British subjects.²⁶

Furthermore, Anglo-Indians were sometimes classified by one colonial institution as European, and by the other as native, since these institutions all had different criteria for classification as European. For example, to be included in the European category in the railway services, where many Anglo-Indians worked, one had to prove European parentage in the male and female ancestral lines.²⁷ Anglo-Indians themselves were also aware of the ambiguity of their status in everyday life. As a child, Irene Edwards recalled that:

There were benches, one marked 'Europeans only', one marked 'Indians Only'. There were also the waiting rooms marked 'Europeans Only' and 'Indians Only'. As an Anglo-Indian child I never knew which one to occupy.²⁸

3.3 Dutch East Indies: Equation with Dutch people and mixed marriages act

In the Dutch East Indies, the colonial authorities introduced new legislation regarding different population groups in the colony in 1848. This Dutch East Indies Civil Code was based on the new Dutch civil code of 1838. The principle behind Dutch citizenship in the civil code was *ius soli* (territoriality), which meant if a person was born on the country's soil, he or she automatically became a citizen of that country.²⁹ Since the colonies were seen as Dutch territory, the indigenous population of the colony had 'Dutch citizenship according to civil law'. However, the Dutch Nationality Act of 1850 said that only children of parents who were born in the Netherlands had Dutch citizenship.³⁰ Indigenous people could apply for equation with Dutch people and for Dutch citizenship if they could prove that they lived in a European sphere. A legal distinction was made between the categories 'Europeans and those who were equated with them' and 'indigenous people and those who were equated with them'. Not all 'Europeans' in the colony had Dutch nationality. They could also have for instance British or German citizenship. Most Indo-Europeans legally belonged to the European category.³¹

Women followed the nationality of their husbands, and indigenous women who married Dutch men became Dutch. The children born outside wedlock were 'European' provided they were legally recognised by their European fathers. According to the 1848 Dutch East Indies Civil Code, indigenous mothers did not have any rights over children recognised by a white man. Mothers could be dismissed without reason or payment. In a legal sense, child and mother became strangers to each other. According to law, indigenous mothers could be exchanged among Europeans. That meant that when the men left for the mother country they could 'give' their concubine to another European man. This was common practice, but not regulated by law. The concubine did not have any say or rights.³² Recognised children of Dutch fathers could not be excluded from Dutch citizenship, according to the Dutch government.³³ Until 1848, marriages between Christians and non-Christians were forbidden in the colony. This prohibition stemmed from a decree from 1617. After 1848, religiously mixed marriages were no longer forbidden but they were considered undesirable. European men who lived in concubinage with non-Christian native women could legalise their unions and legally recognise the children born from the relationship.³⁴ In 1854, a change was implemented: the category Foreign Orientals (*Vreemde Oosterlingen*) was introduced in addition to the categories 'Europeans' and 'Indigenous people'.³⁵ In legal terms, 'Eurasian' was still not a separate category. The wealthy and well-educated Indo-Europeans, who usually had Dutch citizenship, were called 'Dutch'. 'Europeans' (including Indo-Europeans who were recognised by their European fathers) were subject to 'European' law, while 'natives' were subject to *adat* (customary) law.³⁶

In 1892, a new Dutch nationality Act replaced the old confusing regulations, which I described above. Indigenous people and Foreign Orientals were now excluded from the Dutch nationality.³⁷ The 'principle of country of birth' (*ius soli*) was replaced by the 'principle of descent' (*ius sanguinis*). Also after 1892 indigenous people could apply for equation with Dutch people if they were Christians, spoke Dutch and had a European education. In other words, if they were seen as suitable for Dutch society.³⁸ When the

application was approved, it was published in the *Staatsblad* ('State's newspaper') and as a result the equated people were commonly called *Staatsblad Europeanen* ('State's paper Europeans').³⁹ People who were equated with Dutch people before 1892 kept their Dutch (European) status. After independence of the Dutch East Indies, this law would become decisive in the *toescheidingsovereenkomst* (law on the allocation of citizenship), which regulated the criteria for Dutch and Indonesian citizenship. This law played a decisive role in the 1950s, when decisions had to be made regarding the ex-Dutch people who had chosen Indonesian citizenship but later regretted their choice, the so-called *spijttoptanten*. If the Indo-Europeans could prove that they (or their parents or grandparents) were 'equated with Europeans' before 1892, their chances for admission to the Netherlands increased considerably. The law was confusing for the people to whom it applied. According to this law, Indo-Europeans who were equated with Europeans after 1892 were not legally Dutch, although they were raised and educated in the same schools and environment as the people who were equated before 1892. The indigenous people became stateless from 1892 onwards. That changed in 1910 when, the 'law on Dutch subject hood' was implemented.⁴⁰ Through this law, indigenous people became 'Dutch subjects non-Dutch people'. They continued to be excluded from public occupations and a lot of other privileges that were reserved for Dutch citizens.⁴¹ In 1898, the colonial authorities tried to regulate the legal consequences of mixed marriages in a special law, mentioned earlier, the *Mixed Marriages Act*. According to this act, European women, if married, followed the nationality of their husbands, both in the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands.⁴² This law hardly made any difference, both legally and in practice. It was largely symbolic.

3.4 French Indochina: status of the métis and possibilities for naturalisation

In Indochina, Eurasians belonged to the European category provided their European fathers had officially recognised them.⁴³ Already in 1889, legislation was implemented regarding the legal status of Eurasians. In that year, the *Code de la Nationalité* gave access to French citizenship according to both the principles of *ius sanguinis* and *ius solis*. The *Code* recognised as French citizens all those children born out of wedlock to a French father and an indigenous mother. The *Code* also regulated that children born to unknown parents on French soil were French. For local colonial authorities in Indochina, this law went too far. It was adjusted in the colonies because the colonial administration could not accept the fact that all abandoned local *Métis* children could be easily assimilated into the French community.⁴⁴ The colonial administrators tended to put the *Métis* in the indigenous category for several reasons. In the first place, indigenous people earned less than French people, and secondly, there were the moral issues connected to mixedness. Many *Métis* were children born out of wedlock. Therefore, racial hierarchical issues played a major role, albeit in practice, not in theory. In all work situations, it was out of the question to let a 'coloured' person have authority over a white person.⁴⁵ In comparison to the British and Dutch colonies in South and Southeast Asia, the French continued to occupy a much higher percentage of middle- and low-level bureaucratic, entrepreneurial, and technical positions in Indochina. For

example, in 1930, Europeans still held 20 per cent of all available government administrative and clerical positions. In 1938, the colonial authorities decided to devote serious attention to training indigenous technical cadres, but six years later, European technicians still outnumbered the Vietnamese.

However, French colonial authorities found that 'European' looking children in an indigenous environment could harm white colonial prestige and destabilise colonial society. In the words of Dr. Barillon in the *Revue de Psychologie Appliquée* (1924-1926):

Because of their genetic irregularity, the *Métis* are incapable of understanding ideas such as family, country, honour, work, frugality, regularity and foresight, ideas that constitute the foundations of the normal social order. [...] Missing the superior faculties of judgment and social control, the *Métis* is the plaything of his passions and the tool of his appetites. In the midst of social crises, it is the *Métis* who gives the signal to revolt and who throws himself headlong into the worst manifestations of violence and anarchy.⁴⁶

From 1924 onwards in Indochina, unfit indigenous mothers with Eurasian children, who were abandoned by their French fathers (usually French soldiers), could lose their maternal rights, whereupon the state acquired guardianship over the child.⁴⁷ In 1940, during a conference about children French *colons* passionately advocated that every child born from a union between an indigenous mother and a French father should become *pupille d'état*. In mainland France, the phrase *pupille de la nation* only applied to a situation in which parents were unable to raise their children.⁴⁸ In 1928, a *décret* was implemented, which defined the status and possibilities of Eurasian people, who were born in Indochina and whose legal parents were unknown. This *décret* of 4 November 1928, named *statut des Métis nés de parents légalement inconnus en Indochine* (regulation of Eurasians, born of parents legally unrecognised in Indochina) set the criteria Eurasians had to meet to be eligible for French citizenship.⁴⁹ It allowed Eurasians who were not recognised by their French fathers to apply for French citizenship, as indicated in the first article of the *décret*:

All individuals, born on the territory of Indochina, from parents of whom one remained legally unknown and presumably of the French race, could obtain, conforming to the dispositions of the present decree, the recognition of the French citizenship.⁵⁰

Further criteria were that they had to prove their fluency in French, and that they followed French cultural practices. The authorities judged the applicants (including many children) by their physical features and by their behaviour. This was formally registered in a medical certificate. It meant that French citizenship was not open to all *Métis*, but that it was granted on the basis of racial criteria.⁵¹ A new *décret* implemented on 4 December 1930 made the criteria for French citizenship even less stringent. The applicant no longer needed to prove that he or she belonged to the French race. Instead the applicant only had to prove his or her non-indigenous status. This made it possible for *Métis* children of French soldiers to apply for French citizenship.⁵² Another *décret* adopted on 24 August 1933 elaborated on the way *Métis* children could acquire French citizenship. The decree pointed out that the decision to grant *Métis* children French citizenship was taken by a court at the request of the Counsel of Prosecution.⁵³ Indigenous people could apply for naturalisation as French citizens although

with great difficulty. Only a few people tried: between 1926 and 1930 there were 160 applications of indigenous people from all five parts of the Indochinese union.⁵⁴

In Cochinchina, Annam and Tonkin, such a procedure had existed since the 1880s, but in 1913 one single act was implemented for the whole *Union Indochinoise* including Laos and Cambodia. The criteria for naturalisation were fluency in French, and having served in the army or in public office for 10 years *avec mérité et dévouement* (with worth and devotion).⁵⁵ The assumption was that their mothers usually found a new French lover after their French fathers had returned to the mother country, and that their Eurasian children were not accepted by the new French companions of their mothers. If members of *Métis* protection organisations considered them 'white and French enough' they were forcibly removed from their mothers and raised in government-led orphanages as 'good' French citizens. Separate schools for *Métis* children were founded for their education.⁵⁶ The authorities declared them 'morally abandoned', according to a French law implemented in the mother country in 1889, which was applied to the colony in 1891. While that law targeted fathers, who had returned to metropolitan France, it was only used by *Métis* child protection organisations to deprive the indigenous mothers in Vietnam of their parental power.⁵⁷

'To save all who belong to our race'

The pro-natalist movement, already present in French political discourse since the end of the nineteenth century, partly caused this radical regulation. French authorities feared that a depopulation trend, *dénatalité*, would undermine France as a military power.⁵⁸ In the period 1890-1894, France registered 4,312,000 deaths versus 4,300,000 births. The number of deaths also exceeded that of births in the years 1890-1892 and in 1895.⁵⁹ Pro-natalists tried to promote the growth of the French population in the mother country. In Indochina, they tried to save abandoned Eurasian children for the French nation. During the First World War, the French population decreased further, and fears regarding depopulation were accompanied by concerns about a decreasing French imperial authority. Between 1914 and 1918, colonial troops had seen French vulnerability. In an undated *circulaire*, probably written in 1915 or 1916, concerns about French deaths on the battlefields of the First World War were expressed:

At the moment when the mother country loses every day a bit more of the blood of her children, it appears to us that our duty is, both from a patriotic as well as a social viewpoint, to double the effort to save all who belong to our race, even though it is only for a minor part.⁶⁰

These considerations led the French colonial government to introduce new policies to remove abandoned French-looking Eurasian children from potential anti-French local Vietnamese influences and resettle them in areas and orphanages where the government could control their upbringing.⁶¹ In 1916, the Resident Superior of Annam advised protection societies in his region 'to remove a child as early as possible from the milieu in which he lives and from the situation of his mother.' In his opinion, it was best to separate *Métis* children from their mothers as soon as they were four or five years old. Later, this minimum age was lowered to 2 years old.⁶²

From the beginning of their colonial project, French colonial officials were convinced that they could learn from other colonial powers how to rule a colony. In 1893, Joseph Chailley-Bert founded together with M. Léon Say and others the *Institut colonial international*. Chailley-Bert thought colonial powers could learn from each other when he saw that British and Dutch colonial officials took an interest in the opium trade in the Saigon area.⁶³ French interest in other colonies culminated in the *exposition coloniale*, in 1931 in the Bois de Vincennes in Paris.⁶⁴ Other colonial powers, including Denmark, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands, were represented at the exhibition. The UK, as the largest imperial power in the world, was however not represented, because of colonial rivalry between the British and the French and because they had hosted their own colonial exhibition a couple of years earlier.

Colonial exhibitions were popular. The Belgians and the British hosted colonial spectacles in Brussels in 1910, and at Wembley in 1924 and 1925. The Netherlands hosted their international colonial exhibition in 1883.⁶⁵ The Germans organised a travelling exhibition, designed to spread knowledge about their colonial project. It showed samples of the goods that the colonies could supply to Germany, as well as graphs, pictures and other visual material.⁶⁶ All countries also put people from the colonies on display. France had already had a colonial exhibition in Paris in 1900. However, the French exhibition of 1931 far exceeded all preceding ones (including the British exhibition) in terms of quality of arrangement, in architecture, and in popular appeal.⁶⁷ The Indochinese part of the exhibition was the largest. African, Asian and West-Indian colonies contributed to the event by building pavilions. The exhibition reflected the desire to showcase French Indochina in France. It was meant to legitimise France's colonial role in South-East Asia. For the French visitor, a wealth of information about the colonies and French achievements were to be found at the exhibition – at a time when the French public knew little about the colonies.⁶⁸

The exhibition focused on the French colonies in South-East Asia, with a life-size recreation of the Cambodian temple of Angkor Wat, which functioned as the exhibition's visual hub, and communicated the centrality of France among all the colonising nations.⁶⁹ A radical shift in the purpose and mission of French colonialism emerged from the exhibition. French colonialism was presented as valuable to humanity worldwide. This belief in the global significance of the French colonial project gave an ethical and durable basis to the French empire, according to the organisers.⁷⁰

The exhibition stirred up the interest in the similarities and differences between neighbouring colonising countries. This growing interest for neighbouring colonies was also shown by the section on 'Europeans in neighbouring countries', in the census of 1931 of the Dutch East Indies.⁷¹ Perceptions of the colonial exhibition of 1931 were not unanimously positive however. The French politician Leon Blum wrote in the newspaper *Populaire* that in the Bois de Vincennes in Paris the most beautiful stairs of Angkor could be seen, but in Indochina itself 'they deport, they kill and capture people'.⁷² The global tendency in the 1930s was gradually to take a more critical stance towards such a celebration of western colonialism connected to progress and the modernisation of so-called 'backward' countries. Anti-colonial movements used the opportunity to organise an anti-colonial exhibition July 1931. This anti-colonial exhibition was an initiative of the international legion, a cooperative body, against im-

perial development and in favour of independence from Western countries. In this legion, the struggle against colonialism was combined with the struggle against capitalism, since it was also part of the international communist organisation Comintern. The Comintern had supporters among the nationalists in many Asian colonies.⁷³

As said, countries looked at each other from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. One English colonial official, who had been based in India and then sent to the Dutch East Indies archipelago, made comparisons between British and Dutch colonial policy towards people of mixed descent. He made it clear that the Dutch policy was exceptional since the Eurasians enjoyed 'every privilege of citizenship' there, including the right to join the army and the public service.⁷⁴ Colonial conferences and exhibitions tried to consolidate a formal pan-European imperial moral and legal order.⁷⁵ At the colonial conference in Brussels in 1923, the French colonial official Maurice Delafosse made the – for that time – remarkable statement that boundaries between colonial peoples must not be drawn on the basis of race but on the basis of education or class.⁷⁶ Colonial authorities hardly noticed the transnational conferences organised by opponents of the colonial project. During the international colonial exhibition in the Bois de Vincennes, Indochinese students and workers demonstrated against the French Republic and its colonial ambitions. In Brussels in February 1927, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammed Hatta, who would later become prominent nationalists in the Dutch East Indies, were present at an anti-colonial gathering.⁷⁷

3.5 Comparison and conclusion: From *Ius soli* to *Ius sanguinis*

There were many connections between colonies, and colonial ideas and concepts were shared among colonial authorities. Western colonial authorities developed similar legal categories in which they subsumed the Eurasians including the idea that the woman followed the nationality of the husband. The only difference was the practical application of these legal classifications. In Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, Eurasians belonged to the legal European category as long as they were recognised by their European fathers, whereas in British India, they could not legally be recognised by their British fathers. Anglo-Indians were sometimes regarded as natives, sometimes as Europeans. There was no formal legal Eurasian category in any of the three colonies. Furthermore, in all three cases, European authorities increasingly worried about the potential revolutionary power of Eurasians. As a result, they developed legislation to limit their possibilities to obtain an influential (political) position. The policy towards Eurasians in the Dutch East Indies was rather lenient in comparison to British India. In general, the status of the Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies was better than that of the Anglo-Indians in British India.⁷⁸ *De Indische Gids* in 1931 in an article labelled 'Indo-Europeaan in Britsch-Indië' (Indo-European in British India) stressed the weak position of Anglo-Indians in representative provincial assemblies and the general ambiguity surrounding their status.⁷⁹ The Europeanisation movement, a common development in all three Asian colonies, worsened the position of Eurasians. It started later in the Dutch East Indies and Indochina than in British India.

The 'young' colony of Indochina stood at the other end of the spectrum and authorities followed a more inclusive policy there than those of the Dutch East Indies and British India. According to an article in *De Indische Gids* from 1931, about the French *décret* of 1928, this law had many commonalities with the possibility of 'equation with Dutch people' in the Dutch East Indies. However, it was based on the idea that Indo-Europeans would prefer European citizenship above indigenous citizenship.⁸⁰ Fears about depopulation in France meant that the French wanted to raise as many abandoned Eurasian children as possible as 'good' French citizens.⁸¹ The French ideals regarding colonialism were also important. The French said they did not only conquer for the sake of material and political gains, but also saw the endeavour as a spiritual and moral conquest. They wanted to assimilate the native Indochinese people into good and loyal Frenchmen, who had patriotic love for the mother country.⁸²

The legal position was an (indirect) motive to leave or in a rare case stay. Among those likely to stay were women who lost their original European citizenship because of their mixed marriage with indigenous men. The laws which regulated the legal position of Eurasians in the colonies, formed the basis for negotiations during the Round Table Conferences before formal decolonisation was signed. How this legal position of Eurasians worked out in colonial practice is discussed in the next chapter on the socio-economic position of Eurasians in the colonial period.

4 Socio-economic position of Eurasians until 1900

4.1 Introduction

In all three colonies, Eurasians were viewed as (more or less) loyal children who needed to be raised as responsible citizens. They were active as an extension of western European colonial rule and worked in low-ranking clerical roles in governmental offices. In these occupations, they earned less than Europeans doing the same jobs, which caused resentment among Eurasians. They did not have the right to possess arable land in any of the colonies, so they could not really become 'rooted' in the tropical soil.

4.2 British India: 'Half-caste' image of Anglo-Indians and pauperism committee

The Anglo-Indians in British India were regarded as an isolated, 'half-caste pariah' group. They were not recognised as British, or incorporated into the indigenous society, and they generally held lower administrative jobs in the colonial civil service.¹ The British colonisers treated Anglo-Indians like they treated the Indians, as 'half grown-up' children who had to be protected by a benevolent and autocratic paternal government. The only difference was that Anglo-Indians were seen by the British colonial authorities as loyal children upon whom they could rely.² Within the caste system, there was no place for the hybrid Anglo-Indian group. They were ranked in the lowest caste. Even when they had dark skin, they could not pass themselves off as indigenous, because of caste restrictions. In addition, Hindu women who married outside the caste system with British *memsahibs* or had relationships with British men were disowned and became social pariahs, as was true for their children. Radical exclusion by indigenous society enforced the attachment of Anglo-Indians to the British side of their ancestry.³ The Anglo-Indian community as a whole was not ranked high in the status system of India, although it was ranked above the 'untouchables'.⁴

Anglo-Indians were regarded as 'half-caste' by the dominant British group, 'no-caste' by the indigenous group, and 'outcast' by other minority groups on the Indian subcontinent. The Anglo-Indians were racially unacceptable to both the Indians and the British, and as a result they tried to buttress their low self-esteem by identifying with the British rulers.⁵ Because of this 'half-caste' image, European families felt ashamed when they learned about a potential marriage with a Eurasian or indigenous

person. Anglo-Indian brides or grooms tried to obscure their origins, even to family members.⁶

The British authorities were concerned about the presence of Anglo-Indian and poor white children living in the indigenous Indian environment as it harmed the credibility of the British colonials. In the British Indian context, Anglo-Indians and poor whites were usually taken together and described as the 'Domiciled' community by the British colonial authorities. They considered them almost inseparable in practice. Orphanages were set up for the Anglo-Indian and poor white children. The oldest institution for Anglo-Indians was St. George's Anglo-Indian School and orphanage, founded by the Church of England. It was originally set up as St Mary's Charity School in Jersey House at Fort St George in 1715. At that time, many British soldiers still married indigenous women. Soldiers died young, either in battle or from disease, and their children became orphans or half-orphans. The orphanage was meant to help these children. Since 1778, St. George's was a combination of an orphanage and a boarding school.⁷ In 1787, the Female Orphan Asylum started, which was the first European girls' school in India.⁸ The military authorities at Fort William also started schools for the children of officers and other military personnel. These included orphanages for Eurasians, since most children of mixed ancestry had a British father working in the armed forces. Numbers increased because the military expanded from a few hundred in mid-eighteenth century British India to 18,000 by 1790.⁹ Two famous eighteenth-century charity schools were started under the sponsorship of a military orphan society founded by major general Kilpatrick in 1783 for the maintenance and education of destitute children from officers and military men of other ranks. At Howrah, this orphan society started two educational institutions: the Upper and Lower Military Orphanages, which were subdivided into a boys' and a girls' institution. The Upper Orphanage was meant for Eurasian children of officers and the Lower one for children of soldiers and non-commissioned officers. The Upper Orphanage was abolished in 1846, because it had become obsolete as all sons of the officers were sent to the UK for their education.¹⁰ When they returned to India they acquired good positions in the Company's service. The teachers at the Lower institution gave their Eurasian pupils a practical, elementary education. The boys were employed in the junior ranks of the Company's service. Girls became domestic servants in the houses of the East India Company officials and Army officers. In addition, British colonials portrayed many of the Eurasian girls as slaves and 'married them off' to lower British colonial officials.¹¹

'Living in scarcely conceivable state of misery and degradation'

At the end of the nineteenth century, the British rulers worried about the growth of a poor white and Eurasian under class. Lord Canning (1812-1862), the first Governor General of British India, was quoted at length in a newspaper:

We shall soon find ourselves embarrassed in all large towns and stations, with a floating population of Indianized English, loosely brought up, and exhibiting the worst qualities of both races. I can hardly imagine a more profitless, unmanageable community than one so

composed. It might be long before it would grow to what could be called a class dangerous to the State; but a very few years will make it, if neglected, a glaring reproach to the Government and to the faith which it will however ignorant and vicious, nominally profess. [...] A single great enterprise, the railways, now support between 5,000 and 6,000 Europeans, including women and children, in Bengal alone, and the last census discloses a European and half-caste population of 83,935 in that one Presidency. A large proportion of these thousands are sunk in the depths of poverty, misery and vice. In the single city of Calcutta the number of arrests of Europeans for vagrancy amounted to 963 in 1871, and the evil has increased so rapidly as to require one stringent Act after another, and to call forth a still sharper law during the present year. The lower classes of half-castes in India lead the life of parish dogs, skulking on the outskirts between the native and the European communities, and branded as noxious animals by both. [...] The Archdeacon of Calcutta summarizes: 'For this vast accumulation of beings bearing English names and nominally professing the Christian faith, no adequate provision has been made by which they can obtain sufficient education to enable them to earn an honest livelihood. The system of public instruction in India was meant for the natives, and not for Europeans and half-castes. The latter may starve or beg, or steal and go to gaol. 'What may be said of this class in Calcutta', writes the Archdeacon, 'holds good of it also at all the great towns of India. There is in every one of them a considerable number of lower class Eurasians, living in scarcely conceivable state of misery and degradation. Though professedly Christian, they know next to nothing about their faith, never attend a place of worship [...] A vast miserable population of Europeans and half castes is growing up in that country unable to earn their bread, ignorant to the rudiments of their religion, a scandal to the white colour, and with the sole career before them of the House of Correction and the gaol.'¹²

As the above newspaper article showed, the British were concerned about the growing Eurasian and poor white community and felt responsible for its existence. This is also illustrated by the following quote from the *Manchester Guardian* from 1892:

Of the Europeans and Eurasians domiciled in Calcutta nearly one-sixth has been traced out to be in actual receipt of charitable relief. Among the Eurasians or persons of mixed descent, the proportion of paupers approaches to nearly one-fourth of the whole community. [British colonial Sir Eliot describes] the widespread pauperism of the descendants of European or mixed parentage as 'an inheritance from the special conditions of the British occupation of India'.¹³

The British installed a pauperism committee, which carried out research on the Calcutta Eurasian and poor white community. Based on this research, an Indian Civil Service officer concluded that most Eurasians were living 'on endowments of their relatives and friends, in convents, in lunatic asylums, in jail or by begging.' In 1912, a conference on the education of the domiciled community in India at Simla concluded that the problem of pauperism and unemployment among the domiciled community was so deeply rooted that the only solution was compulsory education and the institutionalisation of children in special orphanage-style schools. These had already been built from the end of the eighteenth century onwards.¹⁴

Under pressure from the 'Indianisation' movement British colonial officials gradually restricted the preferential treatment of Eurasians regarding jobs from 1924 onwards. Anglo-Indians regarded these jobs as their unalienable right. Sometimes, they had to go to great lengths to secure one of these jobs by proving their non-Asiatic dom-

icile status and strong links to the UK.¹⁵ Anglo-Indians had made themselves indispensable as intermediaries in the lower civil service jobs. They gave the orders and implemented the hard work regimes that Indian workers protested against. Furthermore, Anglo-Indian railway workers were compulsorily enrolled in the Auxiliary Defence Force, which often brutally suppressed strikes.¹⁶ In this way, they helped the British to maintain colonial rule and to run their colony. The British had fewer social contacts with Anglo-Indians in the second half of the nineteenth century than they had before that era. They continued to treat the community as a social unit distinguishable from the larger Indian society, reflecting the tensions of empire as described by Cooper and Stoler.¹⁷ Because they had never developed their own enterprises, Anglo-Indians became dependent upon employment offered to them by the British government.¹⁸

4.3 Dutch East Indies: Social layers in the Indo-European group

In the Dutch East Indies, a minority of the Indo-Europeans were born in the upper social layer of colonial society. Their fathers were high civil servants, doctors or successful entrepreneurs. Frequently, they obtained a university degree in the Netherlands and were no longer identified as Indo-Europeans.¹⁹ Eurasians from the upper middle class had finished Dutch high school and worked as teachers and journalists.²⁰ Illustration 2 testifies this by showing Indo-Europeans, who stood next to a telescope in the relatively wealthy neighbourhood of Weltevreden, Batavia. Yet, these were exceptions. The majority of the fathers of Indo-Europeans belonged to the colonial middle class. They were lower civil servants, soldiers, small entrepreneurs and employees at the agricultural enterprises, mainly the sugar plantations.²¹ Their children became lower civil servants and clerks, for example in the railway service. Lastly, a large part of the Indo-Europeans belonged to the lowest strata of society and they were involved in theft, running brothels and the opium trade. The ordinary soldiers of the Royal Dutch Indies Army were usually also counted among this group.²²

Overall, Indo-Europeans were found in all layers of Dutch East Indies society, except for the uppermost ranks of the government and the army. Only a few Indo-European men could be found in liberal professions. Economically, the Indo-European group was not bound to the 'Indisch' soil. They were 'an extension' of the Western European colonial rule, production and civil service. This intermediate group of 'Indische' boys were seen as forming the pillars of Dutch colonial authority on which the economy and welfare of the archipelago was based.²³ In the archives, no reference was made to the skin colour of Indo-Europeans who worked in the 'Binnenlands Bestuur' (the domestic colonial rule). This proves that racial considerations were not the only distinctive criterion. Class and cultural background were relevant as well.²⁴ In the second half of the nineteenth century, a temporary stay in the Dutch mother country, for example as a teenager at a boarding school, determined the career of Indo-Europeans. Within the group of (Indo) Europeans there was a distinction between those who could and those who could not send their children to the mother country for education.²⁵ In the 1920s and 1930s, approximately 30,000 people, who were born in the Dutch East Indies, stayed in the Netherlands for a shorter or longer period (including



III. 2 Indo-Europeans pose at a telescope in front of a house at the Marinelaan in Weltevreden, Batavia, 1927.²⁶

a considerable number of Indo-Europeans).²⁷ The Indo-Europeans who had completed training or a job or internship in the Netherlands, were eligible for similar jobs in the colony.²⁸

For all Indo-Europeans, but especially the lower-class ones, it was important to stress that they were different from indigenous people. For example, J. Kloppenburg-Versteegh, who was of Indo-European ancestry herself, emphasises in her manual for good housekeeping in the Dutch East Indies that indigenous servants should be held in very low esteem. She explicitly expressed her racism with the words:

In everything you will see that Javanese servants are not like European personnel but only machines. [...] Our servants are like big children.²⁹

4.4 French Indochina: *Métis* as French people of the 'seconde zone'?

In French Indochina, the social status of the *Métis* was as complicated as in the other settings. The policymakers and the *Métis* themselves found it difficult to identify where the *Métis* should be positioned in colonial society. In 1938, a report on the Eurasian problem in Tonkin described this complexity:

We cannot escape this dilemma, whether to assimilate the *Métis*, completely and totally incorporate them in the French society and allow them a training without any limitation of obtaining the highest position like every other French person, or let them form a miserable and dangerous caste.³⁰

In Indochina, there were two types of migrants: the discharged military from the expeditionary corps who stayed on as *colons*, and the French civilians who moved to the colony in search of better work and opportunities.³¹ In Indochina, from the early days of the French conquest, and throughout the colonial period, there was also a steady influx of people from the older French colony Réunion. Some of them pursued successful careers as lawyers, civil servants, and teachers.³² Colonists in Indochina seldom arrived directly from metropolitan France.³³ The movement of modern imperialism, together with construction and infrastructure works and capitalist expansion, brought about significant changes in the composition of the population of Indochina. This progress attracted more middle-class colonists and was accompanied by the French *mission civilisatrice*, and the related ideal of *mise en valeur*. The French not only stressed exploitation and economic development but also the moral and cultural progress of their colonies. This emphasis on the civilising mission was meant as a legitimisation of the colonial project at home.³⁴

The French colonial officials reserved specific jobs for *Métis*, as the British did for the Anglo-Indians. In Indochina, these jobs were in trading and industry. In terms of salary, the *Métis* – like their counterparts in the other settings – earned less than European people performing the same jobs. Colonial officials discussed this issue, since it was generally believed that *Métis* were well adapted to the tropical climate in Indochina. This was a huge advantage for them, as well as for the colonial French employer, because *Métis* were less often ill than the French.³⁵ In addition, they could usually speak the indigenous language well. This was useful in various jobs, including the police and commercial enterprises. In that sense, they were considered a *trait d'union* between the French colonisers and the Vietnamese colonised people. In the 'imperial' survey of the Commission Guernut in 1937, colonial officials of several provinces advocated equal pay and labour conditions for *Métis*. The reason was that many of these naturalised French people were still treated as French people of the *seconde zone*.³⁶ The Eurasian interest organisation *la Mutuelle des Français d'Indochine* promoted equal treatment regarding job allocation and salary. The *Mutuelle*'s magazine *L'Eurafricain* advocated hiring people who were born in the colony, usually *Métis* people, instead of those who directly arrived from the French mother country to Indochina.³⁷

As already mentioned, miscegenation problematised the boundaries between coloniser and colonised in French Indochina. It led to a series of debates on who belonged in the native category and who in the French one. Children born out of wedlock from mixed unions between a French man and a native woman or raised by the father outside of marriage were never considered a problem. These children were considered French citizens by colonial society. They had been recognised by their French fathers or were married to French men and were therefore eligible for jobs in the colonial government and civil services.³⁸ Only children who were abandoned by their French

fathers and had to grow up with their mothers in indigenous society were problematised. They had the legal status of indigenous people and both indigenous and French colonial society rejected them. These *Métis* children were received in orphanages of the *Fondation Brévié* (later *FOEFFI*), because of the fear that this could be a potential destabilising factor in the colonial society of French Indochina.³⁹

4.5 Comparison and conclusion: From 'encouragement' to an 'unhappy lot'

Overall, colonial rulers in all three colonial contexts struggled with 'the Eurasian Question' in the late colonial period. The two older colonies – the Dutch East Indies and British India – had different policies in that respect and those had repercussions for the position of Eurasians on the labour market. Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies could reach a higher social position than Anglo-Indians in British India. From the perspective of many Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies, Anglo-Indians in British India had a much harder, more difficult time under British colonial rule than they had under Dutch colonial rule. A separate Eurasian group such as the Anglo-Indians in British India did not exist in the Dutch East Indies until the start of the twentieth century.⁴⁰ The ideas about miscegenation were more liberal in the Dutch East Indies than in British India. According to Wertheim, the British colonial system had:

[...] the most rigid colour line of all [...] Nowhere in the colonial world are the lines of caste drawn more rigidly: in clubs, residential areas, places of public accommodation, and informal cliques. Nowhere is the taboo on intermarriage stronger and the penalty for infraction more drastic.⁴¹

In the Dutch colony, social relations between indigenous people and Europeans were not at all equal. However, by comparison to British India, the Dutch East Indies seemed to be a zone of exceptional racial tolerance. Eurasians recognised by their European fathers were legally, if not socially, assimilated into the European population.⁴² The Anglo-Indians were categorised as 'natives' and therefore they were regarded as less 'white' than the Indo-Europeans. However, the Indo-Europeans from the Dutch East Indies (especially the paupers) were often said to be a group that was economically as weak as the Eurasians from British India.⁴³ In both former colonial contexts, pauperism committees were formed to examine the problem of poor whites and Eurasians.

Overall, European colonial society and the indigenous community ostracised Eurasians in all colonies, but the Indo-Europeans of the Dutch East Indies were considered to have fewer problems than the *Métis* in French Indochina and the Anglo-Indians in British India.⁴⁴ French colonial rule was generally considered the strictest, but the Anglo-Indians were considered to have the least favourable position according to many contemporaries. Anglo-Indians did not have access to European social circles, while Indo-Europeans could attend European events if they were upper-class.⁴⁵

French colonial rule was considered by some people *plus humaine* (more humane) than the form of colonial rule in the two older colonies. However, in practice this was not necessarily true. Racial boundaries were more strictly maintained in French Indo-

china in comparison with the Dutch East Indies, probably because the French colony was younger.⁴⁶ There is a difference between the colonial rhetoric and the outsider's perspective. In my view, the situation of Eurasians in the three colonial contexts can be placed on a scale: from rather inclusive racial tolerance in the Dutch East Indies, via selective racial tolerance in French Indochina to strict racial hierarchy in British India. A 1955 book illustrates this by stating that while the Dutch East Indies adopted a policy of 'encouragement' regarding the Indo-Europeans, Indochina implemented a policy of 'belated and spotty legal protection' of *Métis* people, and the Anglo-Indians were 'an unhappy lot'.⁴⁷ These ideas influenced the possibilities for Eurasians to receive an education in the mother country, as well as to acquire a job and reach a higher social and economic status. Education and economic status could be decisive when facing the decision between staying or leaving after decolonisation.

5 Changes in the discourse on Eurasians around 1900

5.1 Introduction

In all three colonies, a negative change in the discourse on Eurasians occurred in the late colonial period. The population of mixed ancestry came to be regarded with suspicion, and both Europeans and indigenous people denounced mixedness. This negative portrayal made the Eurasian group more visible in colonial society. The colonial officials set them apart, and as a result the Eurasians started to behave as a separate group, and founded organisations that promoted their interests and demanded rights.

5.2 British India: Set apart as a separate group and acting as one

In British India, the process of westernisation and simultaneous disapproval of mixed relations started before the middle of the nineteenth century. That was earlier than in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. While in the middle of the eighteenth century, 90 per cent of British colonists in British India were married to Indians or Anglo-Indians, one century later this trend was almost nonexistent.¹

British authorities became aware of the wealth that people (including Anglo-Indians) could earn in India. They could profit from them through the exploitation and development of the colony. As mentioned earlier, Eurasians were excluded from the military and civil services of the British East India Company at the end of the eighteenth century, also under influence from the revolt of mixed peoples in Haiti, Mexico and Peru. The direct cause was a power struggle within the higher ranks of the East India Company. Their exclusion meant a deterioration in the standard of living of the Eurasians, and therefore, as the Anglo-Indian historian Goodrich wrote in 1952:

It is hardly surprising that within a few years the Eurasians themselves recognised that they had been set apart as a separate group and began to act as one.²

According to the most well-known leader of the All-India Anglo-Indian Association (AIAIA) in the twentieth century, Frank Anthony, the Anglo-Indian community developed 'distinctive racial-cum-linguistic-cum-natural' characteristics in the second half of the nineteenth century, that included 'certain common customs, manners and cultural affinities, with the supreme bond of English as their mother-tongue'.³ At the same time, a social malaise had already set in among the community as a result of repressive measures taken by the British colonial officials. They identified this social

malaise as a 'Eurasian problem' and this made the community more visible as a distinct minority group.⁴ A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* noted the complicated, tragic position of the Eurasians (or Anglo-Indians) of British India in 1933 by writing:

The history of these people, the 'Eurasians' of a former age, persons of mixed blood with European descent on their fathers' side, is one of the tragedies of racial contact. Shunned by Indians of pure blood, despised by the white, with that arrogant colour prejudice which mounted steadily after the Mutiny, the unfortunate Anglo-Indian found himself cut off entirely from the main economic and social bases of Indian life.⁵

5.3 Dutch East Indies: *Eereschuld* and educational opportunities for the colonised

From 1900 onwards, there was a growing awareness among progressive Dutch people that there was an *Eereschuld* ('a debt of honour') towards the indigenous people of the Dutch East Indies. The liberal member of Parliament C.Th. van Deventer developed this idea in his article *Eereschuld* in the Dutch magazine *De Gids* in 1899.⁶ In 1901, Queen Wilhelmina in her annual address to the nation (*troonrede*) did not merely portray the Dutch East Indies as an exploitation colony, which existed for the benefit of the Dutch people, as she had in previous years, but also for the first time ever she spoke about the civilising duty the Dutch had in the Dutch East Indies.⁷ Her talk marked the beginning of the *Ethische Politiek* ('ethical policy') in the Dutch East Indies. The idea that the indigenous people could not achieve a decent level of civilisation without Dutch leadership guided this policy. The ethical policy strengthened the distinction between the – supposedly – civilised coloniser and uncivilised colonised people. In 1900, the Javanese princess Kartini, an indigenous woman who had received a European education, made use of the new opportunities and opened a school for the daughters of native officials. Teaching was in Dutch and the idea behind the school was, that in the future 'the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands may be ever more closely associated'.⁸

Due to the availability of more educational opportunities for the indigenous population, people within and outside colonial governmental circles felt the need to stress the distinction between coloniser and colonised. Newly arrived *totok* women (with full Dutch ancestry) were 'educated' at the *Koloniale School voor Vrouwen en Meisjes* (Colonial School for Girls and Women) in The Hague (founded in 1920), before they travelled to the Dutch East Indies. The most important lesson at this school was that European women had to live up to 'white' values, norms and prestige. The colonial school urged the women to carry out 'active mothering' in the colony.⁹ Mothering referred to how to treat the indigenous population. According to the school and public opinion, the worst thing that could happen when living in the colony was *verindischen* (losing European traits), which meant adopting the lifestyle of the indigenous people. This resulted in social disapproval and exclusion by European colonial circles.¹⁰ Guidebooks like C.J. Rutten-Pekelharing's *Waaraan moet ik denken? Wat moet*

ik doen? Wenken aan het Hollandsche meisje dat als huisvrouw naar Indië gaat (What to take? What to do? Advice for the Dutch girl going to the Indies as a housewife) gave newcomers a thorough introduction and detailed guidelines about how to manage a household in the colony. This kind of manual reflected the sharpening of boundaries at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Dutch East Indies. European children were not to be given food by servants and instead the mother should feed her children herself. Furthermore, Rutten-Pekelharing advised that European children should not associate too closely with Indonesian servants to avoid learning bad manners.¹¹ There were many *baboes* (nannies) in the late colonial period, and Dutch women were advised to no longer use their services, or less extensively.

Because of increased educational possibilities in the Dutch East Indies, Indo-Europeans could achieve a better position within the colonial government and therefore became an extension of the upper class *totok* colonial society. The lower Indo-European classes were a constant concern for colonial society. They could damage the prestige and superiority of the white colonial elite and revolt against them.¹² One of the solutions was that Indo-European boys would follow military training at a strict military school specifically founded for them in the Javanese garrison town of Gombong. Dutch colonial authorities were certain that a military training would guarantee Indo-European loyalty to the colonial state. The school would produce soldiers for the Royal Dutch colonial army. The curriculum at the school consisted of training in a military atmosphere, with much attention to discipline and order. Similar to boarding schools in the mother countries, not all pupils were happy with this regime. For the younger children in particular, the harshness was hard to bear. In 1879, 85 children ran away from the school in Gombong, which had only a few hundred pupils.¹³

The *Ethische Politiek* provoked a lot of criticism, as expressed by H. Steengracht in an article published in *De Indische Kroniek*. According to him, Indo-Europeans should not make use of all the generous new regulations offered to them by the government: 'because they are just laggards by nature.' Steengracht emphasised the negative characteristics of Indo-Europeans and above all they were, according to him, a *schandvlek* (a smudge) on the character of the western race and nation.¹⁴

5.4 French Indochina: A rejected, isolated and socially unstable category

In Indochina, the process of westernisation and the denouncement of mixedness started in the 1920s.¹⁵ French colonial officials – like their counterparts in other colonies – were continually afraid that abandoned Eurasian boys would become 'déclassé' nationalist rebels as adults and would lead a revolt against French colonial hegemony. In 1920, Charles Gravelle, the president of the Eurasian welfare society in Cambodia, warned that Eurasians in Indochina could follow the example of the Spanish-Filipino *mestizos* who cooperated with Emilio Aguinaldo in their quest for Philippine independence.¹⁶ Furthermore, they were worried about the fate of abandoned Eurasian girls who could damage white prestige by becoming prostitutes. French government officials were generally concerned that abandoned Eurasian children would become a source of white poverty once they were adults in Indochina. They referred to the

Dutch East Indies with its mass of Indo-European paupers, which according to the French officials was numbering 200,000 people.¹⁷ In 1911, journalist Albert Poumourville reported in an article that it was not unthinkable that 'sons of French colonials would pull rickshaws'.¹⁸ This article was meant as a warning. In the colonial ethnography, the *Métis* were viewed as mentally unstable. They were believed to have contradictory inner instincts, and were rejected by both the European and indigenous society. Colonial ethnographers considered them as a rejected, isolated and socially ambiguous category and therefore potentially criminal.¹⁹ One of the solutions the French colonial government suggested in the autumn of 1938 was to raise abandoned Eurasian boys in so-called *Ecoles enfants de troupes Métis* (military schools for Eurasian children). A French lieutenant-colonel had proposed this in 1910.²⁰ The combination of military and civil training at the military school was considered the best way to raise Eurasian boys to be good and loyal Frenchmen.²¹ At the end of their training the pupils were enlisted in the French colonial army for five years. On 27 June 1939, construction of the most important *Ecole de troupes* started in Dalat, the first Indochinese hill station located in the central Highlands of the province of Annam.

It was not the only military school in French Indochina. In Phulang-Thuong, located in the north of Tonkin (in the north of current Vietnam), there was also a military school, although it was not exclusively meant for Eurasian boys. The regime of the military school was characterised by order and discipline. Children were sent away when they misbehaved, when they were seriously ill or if they violated military honour and discipline.²² The criteria for admission were strict and not every *Métis* boy was admitted. The father could be unknown, but it had to be assumed that he was French, whereas the mother was usually Indochinese. French officials could not imagine, let alone tolerate the attendance of the offspring of the opposite kind of union: a French mother and an indigenous father. Children of a French father and a French mother were not admitted either. Boys had to be between 8 and 14 years old when they entered the school, although parents tried to circumvent this rule and get their older sons admitted; boys also had to pass an entrance exam and be in good physical condition, proven by a medical certificate presented by a military doctor. In a typical certificate which had a positive message for the candidate, it was noted that the *Métis* child was 'healthy, strong and with a good constitution'.²³ Many children from the institutions and orphanages did not pass the entrance exam and were not admitted.²⁴

5.5 Comparison and conclusion: A similar process of Europeanisation

As has become clear, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Eurasians had largely come to be seen as 'the source of all evil' by the majority of colonial society in all three colonies.²⁵ More European women arrived in the colonies, and they were expected to live up to western values. Disapproval of miscegenation became more widespread.²⁶ As a result of the arrival of more European women and the increasing disapproval of miscegenation, boundaries between the colonisers, colonised and mixed ancestry groups were more sharply drawn. The process of Europeanisation of the colonies, which started around 1870, accelerated at the beginning of the twentieth century. The

mestizo pioneering culture from the early-modern times gradually gave way to a more western colonial culture in the Dutch East Indies and British India. This development started earlier in British India than in the Dutch East Indies, but also in the Indies archipelago ‘being European’ became the highest ideal in colonial society.

In Indochina, the transformation that started with the arrival of more European women in the colony began later and was less marked than in the Dutch East Indies and British India. This was caused by the recent settlement and the rather small European population. However, the role of French women in the young colony was the same: they were asked to create European or French households.²⁷ The oppositional process of Europeanisation, ‘going native’ or disappearing into indigenous society, was increasingly feared. In all three colonies, this disappearance could happen more easily with Eurasian children, who were not recognised, abandoned by their European fathers and raised in an indigenous environment. Colonial authorities set up orphanages and boarding schools for Eurasians in all three colonies to raise Eurasian children in a European environment and to prevent them from joining revolutionaries or nationalists. In French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, colonial authorities offered Eurasian boys military training to ensure their loyalty to the colonial state. These institutions were usually located at a higher altitude, in the mountains, where the temperature was cooler, far removed from the supposedly injurious influences of the lower plains. The Eurasian children were raised and educated in a western sphere. Therefore, education was important to the decision of Eurasians to stay or to leave the former colony after decolonisation. In addition, the possibilities for Eurasians in the labour market in the three colonies gradually decreased so they started to feel threatened in their possibilities to gain a livelihood.

6 Socio-economic position of Eurasians from 1900 onwards

6.1 Introduction

In the late colonial period, a more or less segregated society came about in all three colonies in which every population group – colonised people, colonisers and the mixed group – had its own place. In British India in particular, this development was clearly visible and a separate social life with associations and clubs for Anglo-Indians developed. In the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina separate spheres for Indo-Europeans and *Métis* people existed as well, but boundaries were easier to cross and were not as sharp as in British India. This chapter describes how authorities of the three colonial settings increasingly started to look at each other. In all three colonial settings attempts were made to rescue, raise and educate Eurasian children.

6.2 British India: Anglo-Indian culture in railway colonies

As has been described above, since the early eighteenth century Anglo-Indians had been excluded from a variety of colonial schools, clubs, and charitable organisations because they were not white enough and did not have legal European status.¹ The British admired the Dutch colonial policy regarding Indo-Europeans; according to one English-speaking journalist, the Dutch were simply 'realists' because they recognised the absurdity of treating Indo-Europeans as a separate 'minority'. In his opinion, the inevitable result of the whole colonial project was hybridity. The journalist judged the 'peculiar snobbery' of the British colonial officials, who banned Eurasians from all European social spaces in both Malaya and India, as narrow-minded.²

Anglo-Indians enjoyed an active, but segregated and isolated, social life away from the rest of British Indian colonial society with their own clubs, especially in the railway colonies where many Anglo-Indians worked. These were the so-called railway institutes which offered dances, parties, theatre nights, cards and bingo. Indians were excluded from Anglo-Indian clubs and Anglo-Indians were in turn excluded from British clubs. The position of Anglo-Indians was marginal.³ Despite these strict unwritten rules, Anglo-Indians mimicked the Europeans perhaps even more than the Indo-Europeans in the Dutch case, hoping to experience at least some upward social mobility. A considerable number of Anglo-Indian girls had affairs with British men, especially during the hot summers, according to one memoir recounted in C. Allen's collection of colonial memories *Tales from the Raj*. However, as soon

as the cold weather started and the 'Fishing Fleet' with 'fresh' British women arrived from Britain, these relationships should be ended – according to public colonial opinion.⁴

The difficult position of Anglo-Indians in British India is strikingly illustrated in the following quotation from the novel *Bhowani Junction*, written by John Masters. The novel is set in the imaginary Anglo-Indian railway colony of Bhowani Junction, some years before independence. Masters, born to British parents in Calcutta in 1914, attended the Royal Military College and served in the army in India. After leaving the army, he moved to the United States and became a writer.⁵ *Bhowani Junction* was published in 1954, shortly after independence. It was loosely connected to a series of other novels, in which members of the Savage family acted as the main characters, but only in the novel *Bhowani Junction* was the protagonist an Anglo-Indian woman.⁶

The following excerpt comes from a conversation between the Anglo-Indian heroine, Victoria Jones, and the Indian Ranjit, in which the latter sketches a rather gloomy future for Anglo-Indians while giving an idea of how Indians perceived Anglo-Indians:

Have you ever met an Englishman who didn't insult you? Haven't your people worked for them for a hundred years? And now how are they going to reward you? You know. They are going to leave you here to us. And what do you think we're going to do? We're going to make you realize that you are Indians, inferior Indians, possibly disloyal Indians, because you've spent a hundred years licking England's boots and kicking us with your own boot that you're so proud of wearing.⁷

British attitudes towards the Anglo-Indians varied, but they were usually disapproving according to Irene Edwards, who was a child during the last decade of the Raj. She claimed that the lower classes welcomed the Anglo-Indians into their clubs and messes. Indeed, these 'poor whites' even married them. But, in her opinion, the higher up the social ladder the greater was the prejudice against the Anglo-Indians.⁸

Despite all these prejudices, the main character of *Bhowani Junction*, Victoria, was convinced that '[t]he English despise us but need us. We despise the Indians but we need them.'⁹ In this way, these sharply-demarcated groups existed in a precarious balance in British Indian colonial society. Lower class British soldiers fought both army regulations and prejudice when they married Eurasian women. The soldiers usually met them at the Railway Institute dances, as one of them recounted to the aforementioned author Allen:

Whenever you were dancing with an Anglo-Indian girl the first thing she did was to assail you with a great puff of garlic and cheap perfume, but you stuck to her, because she was beautiful and in any case probably the only girl available.¹⁰

This image of the Anglo-Indian girl at the railway institute dances tied in with the persistent stereotype that was widespread in Raj fiction and colonial reality that the only goal of an Anglo-Indian woman was to seduce and marry a British man. That was a ticket to the white colonisers' social circles for Anglo-Indian girls. In other words, this was an opportunity for the upward social mobility they longed for and which was quite difficult to achieve in British India.¹¹ In the colonial novel *Combat of Shadows*, written in 1962 by the Indian author Manohar Malgonkar about the life of a British

tea planter at an Indian hill station, the train of thought of the planter's Anglo-Indian mistress illustrates this perception:

Above all, she could never have laid bare to any outsider her own personal dream of becoming someday a sahib's lady, going into the reserved, all-white clubs with her head held high, escorted by an Englishman, without the slightest trace of coloured blood, of bearing blue-eyed, flaxen haired children, of going to London for a dizzy round of the town and to gaze at the King himself, and then of settling down in a cool antiseptic, wholly English suburb, and washing away the contamination of India and Tinapur.¹²

In *Bhowani Junction* the same stereotype was used when the father of Victoria Jones advised his daughter to marry 'up the social ladder': 'You could [...] marry a British officer and then [...] go home. You can say you are partly Spanish.'¹³ In this quote, 'home' means the UK, since many Anglo-Indians saw that as their ultimate home. But Victoria knew quite well that:

[...] we couldn't go Home. We couldn't become English, because we were half Indian. We couldn't become Indian because we were half English. We could only stay where we were and be what we were.¹⁴

The desire of Anglo-Indians to obscure their origins was obvious from the first quotation: being of partly Spanish descent was still considered better than having a partly indigenous ancestry.

'It isn't sunburn that makes us brown, is it?'

Anglo-Indians expressed their mimicry clearly in their obsession with wearing a *topi*, tropical headgear which was associated with the British Indian colonial context,¹⁵ but which did also appear in the two other colonial contexts. Another fragment from the novel *Bhowani Junction* tellingly illustrates this. The Anglo-Indian boyfriend of Victoria Jones, Patrick Taylor, warns her:

Where is your *topi*? You will get all sunburned.' 'I never wear one' she told me. 'But the sun!', Patrick Taylor cried. 'It is the hottest time of the day! You will get all brown!' [...] she said: 'It isn't sunburn that makes us brown, is it?'¹⁶

With that last sentence, Victoria refers to the complex negative image of the Anglo-Indians. This negative image was one of the reasons why there was a campaign against the filming of the novel. The film was set during the difficult transition period before the transfer of power by the British and dealt with the problems it brought for the small Anglo-Indian community that had remained in India.¹⁷

During the first half of the twentieth century, Anglo-Indians were increasingly experiencing direct competition from Indians on the job market, many of whom possessed a superior educational training. This was another reason for Anglo-Indians to resent each other.

Because of this increasing competition, prominent Anglo-Indians sent appeals to the British government for a continuation of the special Anglo-Indian privileges under a new Indian constitution, which had to be designed.¹⁸ Not everyone agreed



III.3 Screenshot from the film *Bhowani Junction* (1956): the British Colonel Savage (the British actor Stewart Granger, left), the Indian Ranjit Kasel (played by the British actor Francis Matthews), Anglo-Indian Victoria Jones (played by the American actress Ava Gardner) and Anglo-Indian Patrick Taylor (played by the British actor Bill Travers).¹⁹

on this solution to the growing poverty among Anglo-Indians and poor whites with whom they were often equated. According to John Macrae in a publication on this problem in Calcutta of 1913:

The ultimate place of the Anglo-Indian is not as one of the governing class, not as a European, but as an integral part of the social system of India, which the European is not.²⁰

In this view, Anglo-Indians had to abandon their links with the British rulers entirely. The Pauperism Committee had already reported in 1892, that it was:

The defects of character more or less connected with this sentiment (of racial pride to be connected to the British) that seriously interfere (d) with Indo-Europeans in the struggle for work.²¹

In the early twentieth century, Anglo-Indians began to look for a 'homeland', a 'province', a 'state' or a newly-created town which they could call their own to escape the difficult in-between colonial situation. In such a location, they would be away from the British, who looked down on them, unless there was a need for them to answer



III. 4 The hill station of Simla (currently known as Shimla) in Northern India nowadays.²²

a call to arms or to supervise the indigenous people. Furthermore, they would be away from the Indians who considered them not only lackeys of the British but, even worse in a 'caste' society, 'outcasts'. In 1905, a first achievement in this respect was reached when the Whitefield settlers' and Residents' Association was formed to cultivate an area called Whitefield. In those days, it was seen as the only settlement that Europeans and Eurasians could call their own.²³ Whitefield is nowadays a suburb of the booming city of Bangalore in southern India and a retirement home for elderly Anglo-Indians is located there.²⁴ Another example of such an agricultural colony was the settlement of ex-soldiers and Anglo-Indians on the Andaman Islands as farmers, with monthly allowances, servants, free clothing, lodgings and land. This so-called 'Andaman Scheme' was meant to relieve the pressure of the economic crisis in the late 1920s.²⁵ A last example of an agricultural project was the construction of the Anglo-Indian village in McCluskieganj (called 'Little England') in the rural east Indian state of Bihar in the early 1930s. Although this project failed and turned out to be an ill-fated utopian separatist dream, it was a scheme that attempted to finally link the Anglo-Indians to the soil of India.²⁶

The number of youngsters who went to Britain as part of their education, was quite large in British India. British parents (and Anglo-Indians who had sufficient means) sent their children to Britain before they could learn the '*chichi*' (or sometimes spelled as '*cheechee*') language: a mix of English and Hindi which was seen as a denigrating marker of Anglo-Indians.²⁷ For Anglo-Indians who could not afford to send their children to the UK, a stay at a boarding school in the highlands in northern India was an

attractive alternative. Also for colonial authorities, the boarding schools were a solution to the growing domiciled poor white and Eurasian population. From the 1880s onwards, they set up a centralised schooling system including Eurasian boarding schools and orphanages in Kalimpong, Simla, Kurseong and Darjeeling at the foot of the Himalayas.²⁸ They provided a dual solution for the 'Eurasian Question': isolation and discipline, by means of education.²⁹ Already in 1860, Bishop Cotton of Calcutta had suggested to the government of India the establishment of hill schools far away from the Indian backstreets and bazaars. Bishop Cotton's School was established in 1859 in hill station Simla. It was argued by other British colonists that in the hills, children would grow up in an almost European climate with all but European features.³⁰ Also for Anglo-Indian orphans, the hill stations provided a good atmosphere to grow up. The hill stations were hedged with British trees and flowers. Fruits and vegetables were cultivated in orchards and vegetable gardens. The buildings looked more like half-timbered Tudor cottages, gingerbread-ornamented Swiss chalets, and other European architectural imports than the veranda-enclosed bungalows which were built in the plains.³¹

A well-known example of a hill institution for Anglo-Indians were the *St. Andrew's colonial homes* set up by Dr. John Anderson Graham, a missionary of the Church of Scotland. He had established this boarding school at the hill station of Kalimpong near Darjeeling in 1900 under the auspices of the Church of Scotland. Graham had travelled to Kalimpong in 1890 as a missionary with the Young Men's Guild and as part of his work he visited tea plantations in Darjeeling and Assam. His chief concern was 'the absence of a hopeful future for the children' who were living at these tea plantations.³² The climate of the hill station of Kalimpong was 'cold enough to develop robustness', according to a report from Graham, whereas it was 'impossible for anyone brought up in the plains to become strong. There is a slackness in the tropics, and no robust ideal concerning work.' The children's daily routines were dominated by work, study and especially discipline. Markers of British respectability and prowess were built into the schooling, as well as activities such as competitive sport, scouting and military cadets.³³ The homes were modelled after William Quarrier's Orphan Homes of Scotland, opened in 1876, which Graham had visited in the 1890s.³⁴

The institution was meant for poor and orphaned domiciled European and Anglo-Indian children who could not be admitted to a fee-paying school. However, Graham's other motive for founding his institution, which he only mentioned in private correspondence, was that he felt those fair-skinned poor and destitute Anglo-Indian children were a disgrace for the UK and Christianity.³⁵ This statement tied in with views expressed by Mr. G.O. Small, himself of Anglo-Indian ancestry, at the Calcutta Inquiry Meeting, 1918: 'If need be, they should, while young, be removed from the undesirable or insanitary surroundings in which they may happen to live.'³⁶ A similar kind of motive for removing children of mixed ancestry from their indigenous mothers was expressed in the Indochinese and Dutch East Indies cases. Its intent was elaborately explained in the prospectus of the *St. Andrew's colonial homes*:

It is a well-known fact that the domiciled community deteriorates in the environments of a tropical country and oriental standards; and the object of the Homes is to break down

the influence of heredity and of such environments, by removing the children at an early age to surroundings which are healthier, both physically and morally, than the towns in the plains.³⁷

Furthermore, they were taught the 'true dignity of manual labour by precept and example.' The boys would receive training in all aspects of farming, as well as carpentry and masonry work, and the girls would be taught household skills for 'suitable' industries.³⁸ This emphasis on manual labour was meant to give them more opportunities in their later lives, so they would be 'fitly educated' and to provide:

[...] suitable openings for the Eurasian and poor European children as will fit them for emigration to the colonies or failing that, will make them more robust for work in India.³⁹

These were rather different jobs from the lowly administrative positions Anglo-Indians traditionally occupied. By the mid-1930s, Graham had sent more than fifty former pupils to New Zealand, eleven to Australia, four to the United States and one to South Africa. In addition to this prospect of emigration, there were also other work opportunities, such as in commerce, manufacturing, the railways and telegraphs. For example, in 1906-1908 about 20 Anglo-Indian boys from the *St. Andrew's colonial homes* were sent to the British training-vessel *The Southampton*, and several of them did succeed in obtaining a career in piloting. The main work for girls was in nursing, but they also became teachers, missionaries, stenographers, typists, or worked in other administrative occupations.⁴⁰

The *St. Andrew's colonial homes* consisted of cottages, each of which housed some 30 children overseen by a 'housemother' who was usually recruited from the UK or Australia. This 'house mother' had the onerous task of moulding 30 children of different origins and ages into one family. The complex was much like a self-sufficient village with 575 children and about 70 employees by 1934.⁴¹ Apart from the cottages there was a school, a chapel and infirmary, as well as industrial training workshops, a gymnasium and an experimental farm.⁴² The regime was strict and corporal punishment was used. But Anglo-Indians who were later asked about their youth at St. Andrew's generally appreciated their experience.⁴³ To cover the costs of the boarding school and orphanage, children from stable, well-to-do families were enrolled as fee-paying pupils, and they were educated alongside the 'FBs' or free boarders who were not required to pay to attend the school. No official distinctions were made between these two groups.⁴⁴ The *St. Andrew's colonial homes* received some money from the British colonial state as orphanages in British India were partly subsidised by the government and partly by private donations.⁴⁵ It was not enough to meet all costs, so Graham used skilful propaganda to attract private donations. He took a personal approach by composing monthly newsletters.⁴⁶

In 1905 there were, in addition to the *St. Andrew's colonial homes*, about 60 other European schools and orphanages situated along the southern slopes of the Himalayas with around 5,400 pupils. This number seems to have increased throughout the years of the late colonial period in British India.⁴⁷ However, most Anglo-Indians lived in the lower parts of the Indian subcontinent, the unhealthy 'plains', throughout the year, either moving between railway colonies every few years, or living on a more permanent basis in cities such as Calcutta (Kolkata), Madras (Chennai), Bombay (Mum-

bai), Bangalore and Lucknow.⁴⁸ The largest Anglo-Indian and European community lived in Calcutta.⁴⁹

The trend among Anglo-Indians to live in the hill stations or at least let their children grow up there was not approved by Governor General Canning, who had drawn a rigid line between the education of Europeans and Anglo-Indians in his minute on education of 1860:

Anglo-Indians would be best served by day schools on the plains, especially since the climate of the hills [...] is held to be injurious to them, if at all weakly.⁵⁰

This line of reasoning was followed by many of the better hill schools, since they often did not admit Anglo-Indians. Despite this effort to restrict the sojourn in the hill stations to the Europeans, the British Indian hill stations had begun to lose their function as British enclaves by 1902. H.H. Risley, secretary to the home department of the government of India, noted: 'There can be no doubt, that there is an increasing tendency on the part of wealthy natives to spend the hot weather in the hills.' Those wealthy natives were often rulers of the indigenous princely states.⁵¹ This trend can be seen as mimicking by the indigenous people. They imitated the British coloniser, just as the Anglo-Indians did.

Burma deserves a separate mention because in Burma, the general conditions of society were different from the situation in the rest of British India. In India, British residents frequently regarded Anglo-Indians as 'a particularly difficult class' while in Burma, the colonial administrators held the local Eurasian group, the Anglo-Burmese, in high esteem. With time, Anglo-Burmans dominated many parts of the colonial government in Burma, such as the railways and port authorities, the education system, the colonial police force and indigenous army units. In contrast to their Anglo-Indian counterparts, they were indeed an influential voice in Burmese colonial society.⁵²

6.3 Dutch East Indies: Mimicry of the European ideal

Around 1900, stricter guidelines regarding dress and the running of a European colonial household were introduced in the Dutch East Indies, in combination with the introduction of a more negative discourse about Indo-Europeans. 'Inside' began to mean 'amongst ourselves' and only inside could people wear a *sarong*, *kabaya* or *slaapbroek* (pyjamas). Politeness dictated that whoever appeared at the front door would be invited into the house. But strangers and friends never came any further than the front gallery and only saw the family 'properly dressed'.⁵³ These rules were not only followed in social circles of the Dutch *totoks*, also Indo-European families from the highest ranks of society adapted to this ideal. Newcomers who had just arrived were often called *totoks parvenus* by the people who had lived for some time in the Dutch East Indies. While many 'import' Dutch people were social outcasts in the Netherlands, they immediately attained a superior position in the Dutch East Indies because of their whiteness. This was based on the colonial hierarchy and they did not have to achieve anything before reaching that superior position.⁵⁴ This mechanism is tellingly described by the Dutch author Bep Vuyk:

The modest man, who embarked in Genoa, has become much more important when he disembarked in Priok. At the moment he left Europe, he became European.⁵⁵

From the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, better educated native people competed with Indo-Europeans for administrative jobs.⁵⁶ The privilege of Indo-Europeans disappeared within a couple of years. Indigenous workers were cheaper than Indo-Europeans and 'fresh' Dutch people from the mother country were better trained than them. For Indo-Europeans there no longer seemed to be a distinct place for them in society. The directors of the railway companies, which were traditionally an important source of work for Indo-Europeans, decided on equal wages for equal labour. This meant that Indo-Europeans would receive the same salary as indigenous people. It was a sensitive degradation for Indo-Europeans.⁵⁷ Already in the nineteenth century, the saying: 'the more dye (i.e. colour), the less pay' was common.⁵⁸ Because of the increased competition of indigenous people in the labour market and sharper boundaries because of the greater influx of people from the mother country, Indo-Europeans tended to hold on more firmly to their European status. They had to 'mimic' the Europeans even more, in a similar way to the British-Indian case, in order to pass themselves off as European at least to a considerable degree. However, through the act of mimicking, Indo-Europeans also denied a part of themselves by conforming to the European discourse about the inferiority and indolence of the indigenous people.⁵⁹

This contradiction is well-expressed by the following quote from the colonial novel *Gerucht en geweld* (Rumour and Violence) written by Bep Vuyk in 1959. Vuyk was born in the Netherlands in 1905. Her mother was a Dutch woman and her father an Indo-European. When she was 25 years old, she left for the Dutch East Indies to work in an orphanage for Indo-European children in Soekaboemi. In 1950, she chose Indonesian citizenship. Five years later, however, her attitude towards the Indonesian Republic had dramatically changed.⁶⁰ She left Indonesia in 1958, after severe difficulties in gaining admission to the Netherlands, because of her former support of Sukarno.⁶¹ In one of her stories, an Indo-European appears who still had a strong colonial attitude shortly after decolonisation. This Indo-European captain worked on the ship on which the protagonist and her husband travelled back to the Netherlands. The captain felt threatened by the new Indonesian rulers and did not want to conform:

At the moment, I am captain for a year and they want to get rid of me. They say I am no good for the new relations; that I cannot conform. I do not wish to conform, I do not want to pretend nothing has happened towards those black blokes, those slow, indolent Asians with their stupid black mugs.⁶²

The protagonist asked the captain: 'What do you have against those blacks, captain, you are black yourself, aren't you?'⁶³ This question touched the core of the 'half-caste pariah' dilemma, which was still relevant after decolonisation.

He took his skin of his underarm between thumb and forefinger and screamed but not at me, with the head thrown far behind, while shrieking to the universe: 'This black skin, my own skin that I would tear off. It is the Asian within me who I hate.'⁶⁴

The changes in colonial society were vividly described in one of the most famous Dutch colonial novels, *De stille kracht* (The hidden force) written by Louis Couperus

and published in 1900. The period in which the profound, above-described changes in colonial society were not yet clearly visible was later named *tempo doeloe*, which became a symbolic metaphor for 'the good old colonial days'.

Louis Couperus was from a family with a rich history in the Dutch colony. He had lived in the Dutch East Indies for some years (1873-1878) and later often travelled there.⁶⁵ *De stille kracht* presented the Dutch-born colonial official Otto van Oudijk and his household, consisting of his Indies-born Dutch wife Leonie and her Indo-European stepchildren Doddy and Theo. Leonie seduced her stepson, Theo, son of her husband's previous relationship with a Javanese woman, and Addy, the Indo-European fiancé of her stepdaughter Doddy. Her husband was ignorant of her affairs while attempting to maintain European habits in his household. Van Oudijk was confronted with an indigenous revolt which in part sprang from his lack of tact with the indigenous population. At the end of the novel, he had gone 'native' and he was happily living with an indigenous woman in a *kampong* (an indigenous village).⁶⁶ The following quote described the exaggerated mimicking 'European' behaviour of the Indo-European inspector Van Helderan, with whom Van Oudijk cooperated. He and his wife banned all things associated with the indigenous lifestyle:

Ida van Helderan was a stereotypical white Indo-European lady. She always tried to act very European, to speak Dutch perfectly. She pretended to speak Malay badly, and she neither liked rice-table, nor roedjak [both typical Indisch dishes] [...] Her husband, the inspector, had never been to Holland. [...] And it was very odd to see, this Creole, apparently fully European, speak Dutch so correctly, that it would almost be genteel compared to the sloppy 'slang' of the mother country.⁶⁷

In a published diary kept by Jan Krijgsman during the Indonesian war of independence, the protagonist met an Indo-European sugar chief who looked back on his life. He described the way he behaved as an Indo-European before the war, passing himself off as European in the same way as Ida van Helderan did, in the following quote:

Realise what an Indo-European is: a descendant of a colonial ancestry [...] We became descendants who lead a life, just as half-hearted as our skin-colour. By God, we are aping the Europeans, since they are the civilised race and an indigenous person remains just an indigenous person, that is how it always was. We are mimicking the Europeans, although we distrust them as thoroughly as they do us. [...] Yet, we did like the Europeans, we drank cocktails and lived in stone houses and called ourselves intellectuals and we avoided the native villages like the plague.⁶⁸

Next to the frustration many Indo-Europeans must have felt, it is clear from the above that they often moved in European as well as indigenous social circles. They felt at ease and made friends in both spheres. In practice, that was sometimes a balancing act, this trying to fit in, as shown by the following quotation from the memoirs of Indo-European S.M. Jalhay, which describe the life of a male Indo-European:

Whenever he met Dutch friends, he felt he had to adapt his mood, thoughts and acts. Greeting madam and sir and shaking hands, because otherwise you would be labelled as 'an Indo from the *kampong*' in advance. Not just coming indoors when not called indoors.



III. 5 Still from the Dutch tv-series *De stille kracht* (1974) with Theo (Willem Nijholt) and Leonie (Pleuni Touw).⁶⁹

Sitting calmly indoors without touching anything, playing games like halma or ludo. Acting very enthusiastically and not showing that you were bored [...] in short everything in the Dutch mode [...] one paid attention to the language you were speaking [...] However, things were more colourful and less complicated with my Javanese friends.⁷⁰

To find a solution for the downward social mobility experienced by many Indo-Europeans, colonisation projects were set up in Sumatra and New-Guinea in the 1920s and 1930s. Most of these projects failed due to a lack of cooperation among settlers. Indo-Europeans were also unwilling to do manual labour.⁷¹ Indo-European girls employed the strategy of hypergamy, just like their Anglo-Indian counterparts. They tried to marry a white man (or a more fair-skinned man) and by doing so climbed up the social ladder in colonial society.⁷²

The influential indigenous nationalist Soetan Sjahrir sketched out the position of the Indo-Europeans quite well in an essay which appeared in 1937:

The continuation of a process of transformation of our society, which was already set in for a long time, initially has given the Indos (Indo-Europeans) a privileged position, but that same process is now cancelling those privileges.⁷³

In 1947, the journalist D.M.G. (Marcel) Koch wrote that *The Eurasian Question* in the Dutch East Indies (and most probably in the other colonies as well) could be brought back to a socio-economic problem, regarding the weakening social and economic position of Eurasians in the colony.⁷⁴

The sharper boundaries, which existed from the beginning of the twentieth cen-



III. 6 Portrait of a group of Indo-Europeans with a car on their way from Tandjong Priok to Tjilintjing (original description: 'Foto, Portret van een groep Indo-Europeanen met een auto op weg van Tandjong Priok naar Tjilintjing'), 1932.⁷⁵

tury between groups in the Dutch East Indies, were particularly visible with regard to where the different groups – the Europeans, Indo-Europeans, Chinese and indigenous people – lived. Spatial segregation emerged in the cities, resulting in separate neighbourhoods for each population group and terms like 'indigenous *kampong*', 'Chinese camp' and 'European quarter' came into use. In the European quarter, the *totoks* lived near each other and near to the Indo-Europeans.⁷⁶ The *kampongs* were essentially located along a belt surrounding the city. The Europeans formed a minority in the cities of the Dutch East Indies: only 25,000 Europeans lived in Batavia in 1927, 20,000 Europeans in Surabaya and 18,000 in Bandung. The total number of Europeans living in the whole archipelago was 240,417.⁷⁷ Eurasians with European status were included in these figures. In 1930, approximately 170,000 Eurasians lived in the Dutch East Indies.⁷⁸ It is impossible to give precise numbers, since the criteria for 'Europeaness' were not the same everywhere. Education in the mother country was an often-heard criterion in the guidebooks, such as *Het Indische Leven* in 1927. In this period, the European ideal became superior. Going to a secondary school in the Dutch East Indies, frequently attended by Indo-Europeans, was seen as a recipe for '*verindischen*', a process of degeneration through which people lost their European characteristics. This process was feared most in European households. An education in the motherland not only prevented the process of *verindischen*, but it also improved future work opportunities. Even though applicants were of mixed ancestry, if they had been educated in the Netherlands, they could attain the same jobs as Dutch people.⁷⁹

Another instrument to structure the order of the Indo-European group was whether one had a right to furlough in the Netherlands. This right became a more important distinctive element when more indigenous people got a better education in the first decades of the twentieth century.⁸⁰ An alternative to education in the mother country

was going to a boarding school at a hill station. These schools were located in higher regions with colder climates and were isolated from indigenous influences. Europeans could bear this climate better than the hot humidity of the low lands. The Dutch East Indies was the first colony worldwide which created such a hill station, called *Buitenzorg* ('free of worries', nowadays known as Bogor), located 60 kilometres from Batavia and connected to it by railroad since 1873.⁸¹ Bandung, which was located at an altitude of 700 meters in the mountainous area of the Preanger (Priangan), became equally popular. This town was surrounded by tea plantations. These isolated places were the ideal spot for schools which sought to (re-)educate Eurasians and prevent them from learning the mixed language of Dutch and Malay: 'pecoh'.⁸²

In the military barracks of the Royal Dutch-Indies Army (KNIL), the societal changes had not started yet. In the garrisons, where the *njai* was called *moentji*, military men still lived with concubines. This practice was only forbidden in 1928.⁸³ After heated discussions among colonial rulers and rulers from The Hague, *moentjis* were still allowed in the first decades of the twentieth century among the military in order to stop prostitution and the spread of venereal diseases.⁸⁴

Many Indo-Europeans were the off-spring of the so-called 'Jannen' (Dutch soldiers named after the common Dutch male first name 'Jan').⁸⁵ When the *moentji* fell pregnant, the Dutch father often abandoned her and her child, condemning them to a life of poverty in the *kampong*. Just as in British India, in 1902 a pauperism committee wrote an elaborate research report on the Indo-European problem. According to the committee, the best way to solve the problem was to raise the Indo-European children in a European way.⁸⁶ This statement was enhanced by a contemporary female writer, Adinda (pseudonym for Thérèse Hoven). She thought the best solution for these children was to take them away from their Javanese mothers. She assumed they would not have a problem with this. According to colonial authorities, Javanese mothers were like animals who only cared for their children when they were young. Similar to what happened in many other colonies (including British India and French Indochina), the Dutch colonial authorities took the radical step of removing children from their mothers in the Dutch East Indies.⁸⁷ Sometimes these children had been recognised by so-called professional 'recognisers'. These were often retired European soldiers who for a couple of bottles of gin were willing to legally declare any child as their offspring.⁸⁸ This fraudulent act did have advantages for the children, who had better chances in their lives when they had a European legal status and surname.

One of the most famous orphanages in the Dutch East Indies was the one started by missionary Johannes van der Steur. His institution was a private initiative and although he received subsidies from the government, his institution was not incorporated into general colonial policy. The first orphanages in the Dutch East Indies had already been built in the days of the Dutch East India Company. The first one was constructed in Batavia, later similar institutions followed in Semarang and other locations. The orphans were taught to be good Christians and received a basic education. The Dutch Protestant Church managed most of these early forms of poor relief and provided care for the orphans. The Parapattan orphanage for European and Indo-European boys and girls was established in Batavia as the first non-church affiliated institution in 1832 by British people belonging to the London (Lay) missionary society.

For many years, it maintained its British character.⁸⁹ In 1850, a report of the Dutch Education Inspector Vinne summarised a widely-held view by European observers of colonially born schoolchildren (both poor white and of mixed ancestry) in the Dutch East Indies:

The limited receptiveness, the extremely low intellectual and mental capacity, the lack of attentiveness, the complete dispirited nature of the children born here and of mixed race; weaknesses and limitations which in part [...] find their origins in nature but to which nevertheless bad upbringing, especially in the early years of childhood, contributed significantly.⁹⁰

This image added to the necessity, colonisers felt, to found more orphanages in which poor and abandoned Indo-European children could be raised.

The seventh-day Adventist Johannes van der Steur went to the Dutch East Indies as a protestant missionary in 1892. Initially he founded a Christian home for Dutch soldiers in the garrison town of Magelang, in East Java. Its purpose was to prevent soldiers from heavy drinking and visiting prostitutes. One evening he was visited by a drunken sergeant who told him that in the *kampong* a mother of four children was living in a destitute situation while the father had just passed away. Van der Steur went to the *kampong* and took the children home with him. This marked the beginning of the famous *Oranje Nassau Gesticht* ('Oranje Nassau' institution) in 1893. Van der Steur's institution wanted to rescue abandoned, neglected children born in the military barracks, and give them a decent European and Christian upbringing. After a short while, the children started to call him 'Dad'. Within two weeks he already had 14 pupils.⁹¹ Not all of them were 'real' orphans. Sometimes Van der Steur went to the *kampong* to take ('rescue') neglected and abandoned children of whom at least one of the parents was still alive. He did not use force like his counterparts in Indochina and British-India. He asked permission from the mothers to 'adopt' their children, but it is questionable as to whether the mother really had a choice.⁹² The pupils did not necessarily have to come from a military environment, all destitute, neglected and abandoned children were welcome at the orphanage. However, it is clear from the archival material that most pupils at the *Oranje Nassau Gesticht* had Dutch soldiers as fathers and indigenous women as mothers.⁹³ According to *De Indische Gids* from 1900: it was most commendable 'to remove the child as early as possible from the influence of indigenous and Malay speaking mothers'.⁹⁴ In the end, 'Pa' van der Steur managed to raise 7,000 abandoned, orphaned and neglected Indo-European children, who became useful and sometimes successful members of Dutch East Indies society.⁹⁵ To accomplish this, he received help from his sister Marie, his brothers Willem and Gijs, his wife Anna Maria Zwager and former pupils from the institution.⁹⁶ He used ingenious marketing techniques to raise money for instance by reporting about the circumstances at the orphanage in the magazine of the orphanage itself, *De Kleine bode van Huis* ('the small journal of the home'). He asked Christians in the Netherlands to donate his age in cents on his birthday.⁹⁷ In that way, the reputation of Indo-Europeans could be improved. This was needed, according to Van der Steur, since the Indo-European offspring from soldiers were usually viewed in a negative way. According to many Europeans, Indo-European children epitomised the ultimate degeneration of

the European population in the colony.⁹⁸ The negative image of Indo-European military personnel spread fast through the colony and soon included other Indo-Europeans, who were not connected to the military force, as well. The concubines (*njaïs*) who were initially considered positively as protectors of the men's well-being were now seen as bearers of ill health and other sinister, negative influences were attributed to them, which they transferred to their offspring: Indo-Europeans.⁹⁹

Yet, Van der Steur did not raise these Indo-European children to become stereotypical humble orphans. He encouraged them to be assertive.¹⁰⁰ Illustration 6 shows a group of rather self-confident looking Indo-European children. Van der Steur was one of the so-called 'early ethics'. They were followers of the early civilising mission or 'ethical' movement in the Dutch East Indies, who believed in an association between East and West. According to early ethics, indigenous children in the orphanage were expected to become 'improved, perfected' Javanese people, but not 'wannabe' Europeans.¹⁰¹

'A half-hearted and half-powerful in-between race'

De Indische Gids portrayed Indo-Europeans as a 'halfslachtig en halfkrachtig tusschenras' (a half-hearted and half-powerful in-between race'). It was an expression they had derived from colonial novels of Louis Couperus. The most important characteristic that was attributed to Indo-Europeans was their temper, which led to jealousy, anger, sensuality and hatred. In *De stille kracht* passion is at the forefront of the story in which it becomes clear that the colonial system cannot be maintained in the end.¹⁰² The general idea was that Indo-Europeans had obtained this passion during their life in the tropical sun which would accelerate the process of ripening and maturing young Indo-Europeans.¹⁰³ To this image of Indo-Europeans in colonial novels other characteristics can be added: inferiority, submission and recklessness.¹⁰⁴ According to Bas Veth in his book *Het leven in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Life in the Dutch Indies) the ultimate symbol of the wicked colonial society of the Dutch East Indies was the lawless Indo-European girl, whose primary goal was to marry a man of full Dutch ancestry.¹⁰⁵ This goal was rather a challenge for her because most Dutch people thought in rather negative terms about the '*nonnaatjes*' (nickname for Indo-European women). The Dutch colonial discourse described the Indo-European woman as someone who 'in her deepest core always remained an indigenous woman'.¹⁰⁶ The danger of marrying an Indo-European woman for the future offspring of Dutch men was well-described by the following saying: 'once you have thrown the coffee through the milk, you will never get it out'.¹⁰⁷ This was an example of the 'one-drop-rule', known from the us context, where one drop of black blood from generations ago would make a person a part of the black community.¹⁰⁸ Once the alleged racial purity was affected by intermarriage, the child was unequivocally subsumed into another category (usually not the European but the indigenous one).¹⁰⁹ This negative stereotyping of the Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies appeared to be stubborn in later discussions about the admission of these people to the Netherlands after the decolonisation of Indonesia.¹¹⁰

6.4 French Indochina: Studying the Dutch East Indies and Jules Chailley-Bert

In the French context, the colonies were seen as a 'dumping ground' for the social outcasts from the mother country. The reputation of the first colonists who went to Indochina was not good. They were regarded as paupers, prostitutes and swindlers. This image began to change around 1900. The new *bonnes colons* were expected to be French men with financial means and knowledge, who could be entrepreneurs and professionals.¹¹¹ Because the French *colons* were inexperienced colonisers in South East Asia they wanted to learn from their neighbour colonies – the Dutch East Indies and British India – about the way a colony could be ruled efficiently. As mentioned earlier, the secretary general of the *Union Colonial Française*, Joseph Chailley-Bert went to the Dutch East Indies in 1901-1902. He wanted to study what the French saw as a successful colonial policy towards Eurasians. Before he started this survey, he had already gone there to study what he referred to as the *vieille et intelligente colonisation* (old and intelligent colonisation) in general.¹¹² He wrote a book about his first trip: *Java et ses habitants*. In the preface to that book, he made his intentions clear: 'the newcomers in the colonisation (and it is clear that the 'newcomer' was France) have an interest to learn from their predecessors, the British and the Dutch.' He dedicated this book to the Dutch old-minister of colonies Sir I.D. Fransen van de Putten, *le ministre réformateur*. Chailley-Bert even proposed to undertake a complete study, which would be named *colonisation comparée* by writing three more books during his lifetime about British India and the Dutch East Indies which would be titled: *La politique et l'administration anglaise aux Indes*, *La politique et l'administration hollandaise dans l'Insulinde* and *La politique et l'administration coloniales de l'Ancien Régime*.¹¹³

As a starting point, Chailley-Bert surveyed Batavia. He asked such questions as: 'From which age are the Eurasian children who are not recognised by their fathers looked after by government institutions?' and 'which nationality is given to these Eurasian children?' In his report, the answer to the first question was that the government did not look after children who were not recognised by their Dutch fathers. Instead, in the Dutch East Indies, there were many different charity institutions (such as orphanages run by religious organisations as well as secular associations) which could only do their work with the help of governmental subsidies. The second question was answered with reference to the nationality law of 1892, which meant that Dutch nationality was not given to these children.¹¹⁴ Above all, the report ascertained that '*la supériorité des procédés de la colonisation hollandaise est incontesté*' (the superiority of the procedures of Dutch colonisation is undisputed).¹¹⁵

Another French colonial administrator, Monsieur A. July, similarly applauded 'the remarkably successful results' of the Eurasian policy implemented in the Dutch East Indies, which did not make use of the legal designation 'Indo-European' as a separate category.¹¹⁶ However, the absence of a separate Indo-European category proved to be difficult because of the fluidity of the Indo-European group, who sometimes belonged to the Europeans, and sometimes to the indigenous people. According to French colonial officials who wrote a report on the Eurasian problem in 1938, there were good reasons for not having a separate *Métis 'mixte'* status or category in French colonial law. This would be too complicated as regards to private law. In addition, it would be

politically impossible in their view. Furthermore, legally speaking a separate caste of pariahs would be created, who would be jealous of the Europeans, and despised by both indigenous and European people.¹¹⁷ This is a remarkable statement since my impression was that the lack of a special Eurasian category was indeed an important cause of the difficult position of Eurasians in colonial times. However, it seemed that at least in the French case, colonial authorities did not implement a separate Eurasian legal category because they believed that it would make things worse.

The explanatory factors from the theoretical frameworks of 'colonial status' and 'bureaucracy' are intermingled here. A third French *colon*, Firmin Jacques Montagne, also enthusiastically advocated the idea of following the Dutch East Indies policy on Eurasians. The Dutch, he asserted, did not only 'safeguard their prestige but also profited from a force that if badly directed, could turn against Dutch domination.' This statement pointed to the already mentioned peculiar balance colonial rulers had to maintain between on the one hand subtle incorporation of their Eurasian and indigenous subjects, while on the other hand upholding an authoritative distance to them. Montagne had heard from a friend who was an administrator at a plantation on Java that Eurasian boys could be better schooled in special military institutions for soldiers or trained for modest jobs in trade or on the plantations.¹¹⁸

That idea was clearly present in an article which appeared on 13 November 1925 in a contemporary French colonial newspaper, *la Dépêche Coloniale*. The author gave strong advice to the French colonial rulers to follow the Dutch in their policy regarding the Indo-Europeans, because it had brought them profit and made the people of mixed ancestry loyal supporters of the colonial enterprise.¹¹⁹ A celebrated commentator took the French colonial enterprise even further: 'one might be surprised that my pen always returns to the words *blanc* or 'European' and never to '*Français*'. The commentator adds: 'in effect colonial solidarity and the obligations that it entails, allies all the peoples of the white races.'¹²⁰

The French policy regarding the *Métis* population was inclusive, as already observed. A contemporary source noted that the French colonial officials had less racial prejudice than British colonial authorities because the French were *jeunes coloniaux* (young colonials).¹²¹ The French government was very concerned about the *Métis* population, and in particular the phenomenon of *reconnaissances frauduleuses* ('false recognitions' of children) was heavily debated at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, professional 'recognisers' were often recruited at the front door of the city hall or even in its offices. The indigenous mothers paid for their 'services'.¹²² In 1918, French authorities formulated a *décret* which gave permission to colonial officials to verify the truth of such 'recognitions'. The decree also regulated that all children recognised by a French citizen would have French civil status, even when they were first recognised by their indigenous parents.¹²³ The French authorities feared that the growing *Métis* group would one day undermine French colonial superiority. The boys would become 'chefs de bande dangereux' and the girls would bring harm to the French colonial project by becoming prostitutes.¹²⁴

In 1913, Charles Gravelle, an orphanage administrator in Cambodia, writing in the *Revue Indochinoise*, stated that the parents of abandoned Eurasians had prostitutes as mothers and their fathers were men who as young soldiers had become involved with

'debauchery', 'opium' and 'oriental vices'. The abandonment of the children proved the father's immorality. The children were considered abandoned, even though their Vietnamese mothers raised them.¹²⁵ Both French military personnel and civilians searched for abandoned and impoverished Eurasian children living with their indigenous mothers. For example, military officials who toured the Vietnamese countryside, reported to the local French colonial officials on cases of Eurasian children living in indigenous villages. The number of abandoned Eurasian children grew as increasing numbers of French soldiers returned to France and subsequently died on the battlefields of the First World War.¹²⁶ On 3 July 1917, the French colonial government introduced a law which recognised the illegitimate children of French fathers killed in the First World War as French citizens. It was first implemented in the mother country. A few weeks later, the French government enacted another law that established a special status for children of fallen French soldiers called *Pupille de la Nation*. Under this law the state legally adopted these children, although many had mothers who were alive and who had not abandoned them.¹²⁷ As already mentioned, in 1924, this law was changed so that 'unfit' Eurasian mothers could lose their maternal rights in Indochina. Their children attained a similar status as *Pupille de la Nation*. Already in June 1917, the Minister of War and the Minister of Colonies decided that Indochinese mothers would raise their recognised and non-recognised Eurasian children until the age of ten. After that the state would institutionalise the children. Some mothers were informed about this institutionalisation and disappeared in an attempt to evade colonial officials.¹²⁸

'The poor woman wishes to give her daughter to the French state'

Kim Lefèvre, a *Métis* author who was raised in an orphanage, was also seized by professional searchers. Kim's father, a French soldier had abandoned her, but her Vietnamese mother tried to provide her with a normal childhood, despite the rejection of mother and child by Vietnamese society. One day, colonial officials forced Kim's mother to send her daughter to an orphanage run by missionaries and to officially renounce her maternal rights so that Kim could be raised as a French citizen.¹²⁹ She wrote in her memoirs about this important moment in her life when her mother had to sign the particular form:

The paper stated that my father was French, that he was forced to follow his regiment, abandoning my mother with a child whom she was not able to raise: that the poor woman wishes to give her daughter to the French state, which is better equipped to prepare her future, and that she renounces all her maternal rights.¹³⁰

Kim felt that she had a triple handicap: she was a woman, the result of an illegitimate union, and of mixed ancestry.¹³¹ Eventually, she was raised in several orphanages in Indochina:

I did not stop to erase, since my childhood, the contempt, the abuse, the hatred sometimes, from a people I considered mine. That is what I reluctantly remember, the humiliating colonisation and the arrogance of white people. I was the impure fruit of the treason of my mother, a Vietnamese woman.¹³²

Kim continued struggling to gain an education. The story ends with the narrator's departure from Vietnam to France, where she could pursue an education.¹³³ It illustrates the deep-felt contempt and disapproval that Eurasians encountered from both colonising and colonised people, despite the inclusive nature of the French colonial rule. This disapproval was also felt by an adult *Métis* who wrote a letter to the president of the *Société d'Assistance aux enfants abandonnés franco-indochinois* in order to become eligible for French citizenship. He stressed the fate of living without a civil status, which he had experienced since childhood and which included both physical and moral sufferings:

I do not belong to any class of the Indochinese society, nobody wants to recognise me as equal, without parents, without friends, I lead a life made up of all sorts of disappointments.¹³⁴

Because the French population was small in Indochina, colonial officials turned to the *Métis* to increase the number of French people living in the colony. Already from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, missionaries set up orphanages to receive abandoned and neglected *Métis* children, such as the order of *Les Soeurs de Saint Paul de Chartres*. Its reverend mother, mère Benjamin, succeeded in setting up an orphanage for *Métis* girls only in 1874.¹³⁵ In each of the provinces of French Indochina, religious and secular organisations for the protection of *Métis* children had been established. They were all linked to the *Jules Brévié Fondation* (about which I say more below), such as the *Société de protection des enfants Métis abandonnés du Tonkin* and the *Société de Protection des Métis d'Annam*. The latter organisation explicitly made a link to the *Jules Brévié Fondation* in its annual report.¹³⁶ The former had executed a name change in 1924. Instead of 'Métis' they used the adverb 'franco-indochinois', since the term 'Métis' had a negative connotation in France. The members of the associated organisations were convinced that most donations for the organisation had to be collected from residents of the mother country. As a result, the name of the *Métis* child protection organisation thus became: *Société d'assistance aux enfants abandonnés Franco-Indochinois*.¹³⁷

All these *Métis* child protection organisations stressed the importance of separating the *Métis* children as early as possible from their mothers before they could develop bad habits. To attain that goal, they had to be no older than two years at the moment of separation. This was especially important for their knowledge of the French language. It was also important for their physical well-being since the majority of the children were malnourished, lived in unhygienic conditions, and their moral upbringing had been neglected. Most often the indigenous mothers were indifferent about their children, according to the leaders of the organisations.¹³⁸ Leaders of the *Métis* children protection organisations felt that a complete separation was necessary. The parents were allowed to visit their children in the institutions, but they could not take the children away with them.¹³⁹ Initially, this complete separation also included departure for France, in order to grow up in an environment without suffering from racial prejudice. However, leaders of the orphanages eventually considered this unfeasible and later impossible due to the communication and transport disruptions as a result of the Second World War and Japanese occupation of Indochina.¹⁴⁰

The *Jules Brévié Fondation* was founded in 1939 under the administrative command of the colonial state as the centralised *Métis* child protection organisation, to which several local *Métis* protection organisations were affiliated. It was named after one of its founders, the (former) French Governor General of Indochina, Jules Brévié, and it was financed by both governmental funds and private donations.¹⁴¹ From the report on the founding meeting of this organisation, it became clear that the idea of this organisation for supporting the education and upbringing of abandoned and neglected *Métis* children was based on aspects of colonial rule that the French had studied in the Dutch East Indies.¹⁴² The foundation of this centralised *Métis* protection organisation was also one of the proposals of the Guernut commission, launched in 1937 by Popular Front minister Leon Blum. This parliamentary commission under the leadership of the radical politician Henri Guernut investigated social and political issues occurring throughout the French empire. It created a new development programme for all French overseas territories. The commission undertook an extensive survey in each Indochinese province. One of the topics was the circumstances under which the *Métis* and their children lived.¹⁴³

They also investigated changes in the number of *Métis*. Not all rulers of the provinces agreed that the number of *Métis* was on the rise as the leaders of the *Métis* protection organisation continued to claim. Some of the provincial rulers, for example those of Khan Hoa (Nha Trang), Bac Lieu (to the south of Ho Chi Minh city) and Tayninh (to the North-west side of Ho Chi Minh City) were convinced that the number of *Métis* was decreasing.¹⁴⁴ What is particularly striking while reading the assessments of the respondents on the *Métis*' condition is the number of references to the situation of the Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies. Their position was often described in extremely positive terms, which did not match the reality on the ground. The reporters obviously did so to bolster the argument about protecting the *Métis* children in Indochina. One example was the claim that the state in the Dutch East Indies adopted all *Métis* children abandoned by their fathers. That was indeed usually the case, but the reality was more nuanced. There was not enough room to house all those *Métis* children in orphanages in the Dutch East Indies. Moreover, Dutch policies were not supported by a strong centralised organisation paid for with public money, as was the case in Indochina.¹⁴⁵

Métis child protection organisations were, from the start, preoccupied with the need to know the precise number of *Métis* children they had to look after. This was difficult to ascertain, since it was almost impossible to search every indigenous village in the Vietnamese countryside for abandoned white-looking *Métis* children. An annual report of the *Fondation Brévié* for 1943, indicates the number of children they had helped (1,231) and the number of children they still had to rescue (313). The report added that the last number was *certainement inférieur à la réalité* (certainly lower than the reality) because according to the report there was a constant increase in births from mixed unions.¹⁴⁶ Already earlier in 1938, it was noted in a general report entitled: *le problème Eurasien au Tonkin* that the figures given for the numbers of *Métis* – recognised or unrecognised – were unreliable. The reasons for this were the large number of indigenous women, the short duration of the liaisons, and the fast succession of the affairs that each Vietnamese woman had with different French soldiers. The unreliable character of the numbers was also apparent from the diverse numbers of *Métis*

collected in different provinces.¹⁴⁷ In that same report, a remarkable reference to the situation in the Dutch East Indies was made. The French author of the report stated that in the Dutch East Indies, the Eurasians not only had high positions, intermarried with Europeans and helped the Dutch colonial authorities to rule their colony, but also did not suffer from any racial prejudice (*aucune préjugé raciale*).¹⁴⁸ This last statement was backed up by reference to the high military commander Van Daalen in the Royal Dutch East Indies Army, who was an Indo-European. Although the example fitted well, the general statement about the absence of racial prejudice was certainly not true (as described above). However, it is interesting that such a claim was made. The Dutch East Indies was presented as the ideal example of a colonial society, which the French sought to emulate.

The capacity of the child protection institutions of the *Fondation Brévié* did not meet the demand of the increasing number of *Métis* children. A preliminary solution to help as many *Métis* as possible was to give the indigenous mother a monthly allowance to help her raise the child: 'secours à domicile' (help at home). At some point the indigenous mothers themselves learned about this financial aid and some of them, who could write in French, started to send request letters to the *Métis* child protection organisations or to the municipal office of big cities like Hanoi.¹⁴⁹ That was also the moment officials of the *Métis* child protection institutions started to question the true intentions of some of the mothers. Eventually, this kind of aid was abolished because indigenous mothers did not always use the money for their *Métis* children but for themselves.¹⁵⁰

'In a deplorable state of dirtiness.'

The initiator Jules Brévié also promoted his organisation by stressing that well-educated Eurasians could not only help to create a permanent French population in Indochina, but also cultivate new territories in Indochina which contributed to a solution to the food shortages caused by the fast population growth in Indochina.¹⁵¹ It appeared that this organisation used rather inclusive laws (such as the *décret* of November 1928) towards *Métis*. It gave each *Métis* child the opportunity to acquire French citizenship. This inclusivity was also indicated by one sentence, expressed by a director of an orphanage in Hanoi, Mr. Dupont, in an elaborate report: the Jules Brévié foundation has 'generous Eurasian politics'.¹⁵²

However, people working for the *Jules Brévié fondation* also employed selection criteria. The children had to undergo a rigorous medical test and their 'Frenchness' (amongst others their physical appearance) was also assessed. Although the French were generous, dubious cases of *métis* children could be 'repaired'. 'Abnormal' children, 'the mentally handicapped and disturbed' were not selected to be educated and raised as French citizens. They were sent to indigenous schools and were destined for a life as a peasant or an artisan.¹⁵³ There were three basic ways by which the *Jules Brévié Foundation* could gain custody of 'abandoned' *Métis* children: In the first place, Vietnamese mothers could voluntarily bring their children to an institution or orphanage connected to the *Jules Brévié Foundation*. Second, the French father could bring a *Métis* child to an orphanage. Lastly, the *Jules Brévié Foundation* searched and seized *Métis*

children in indigenous villages.¹⁵⁴ Initially, men dominated the *Jules Brévié foundation*. It hired white women to search for supposedly 'abandoned' Eurasian children in Vietnamese villages.¹⁵⁵ They usually worked as local correspondents who reported on the worrisome circumstances in which the *Métis* children in their region lived. For example, a local correspondent in Annam reported on a family with *Métis* children, who were found 'in a deplorable state of dirtiness'.¹⁵⁶ After the reporter sent letters to the resident of the region and the *Jules Brévié Foundation*, these children were taken from their mothers. The seizure of children was not illegal because the French colonials considered it to be in the interest of the French colonial state.

The French colonial rule not only arranged for *Métis* children in Indochina to acquire French citizenship but also asked for a pro-active attitude from the Vietnamese mothers. The already mentioned *décret* of 1928 did not only regulate the possibilities to acquire French citizenship. Another part of the *décret* regulated that if a father abandoned his child, the mother had to legally recognise the child. Many indigenous mothers did not know that they were supposed to do this. If they had not done so, the local tribunal (for example in Hanoi) declared the child legally French and appointed the *Jules Brévié Foundation* as a legal guardian. This did not automatically happen for every Eurasian child. In the period 1929-1938, only 182 *Métis* children were declared French citizens. Essentially, the *Jules Brévié Foundation* was manipulating a law primarily intended to give French citizenship to children abandoned by both parents.¹⁵⁷

The organisation cooperated with several schools, including the *École d'enfants de troupe Eurasiens de Dalat*, by sending letters to the leaders of this school in which they proposed potential candidates. Together, these two organisations tried to provide the best upbringing possible for abandoned *Métis* children in the hill station Dalat, in order to prevent them from returning to the indigenous environment.¹⁵⁸ Also other schools and orphanages were founded there, so that *Métis* boys and girls could get a proper education and moral upbringing. In all those schools, speaking French was obligatory, even during Vietnamese lessons.¹⁵⁹

Dalat was the clearest example of a hill station in French Indochina. The French doctor Alexandre Yersin discovered the Lang Bian plateau upon which Dalat was built in 1893. Yersin was a famous doctor who discovered the pestilence bacilli and its cure.¹⁶⁰ The plateau on which Dalat was built had an altitude of 1500 meters and this provided for a moderate climate, with temperatures ranging from 5 to 25 degrees Celsius, with an annual average of 20 degrees.¹⁶¹ Yersin modelled Dalat upon British colonial hill stations like Simla, Kalimpong and Darjeeling.¹⁶² This newly created town grew fast. In 1923, 1500 people lived in Dalat but by 1937, this had risen to 10,000 people. At that time, it had become a provincial centre of political administration and trade for agricultural products from the neighbourhood.¹⁶³ The town's rapid development fit with larger plans to develop Dalat into the colony's summer capital. Under this plan, which had already commenced in 1904, Dalat would serve as a 'European Centre' and 'a counterweight to Vietnamese (indigenous) power'.¹⁶⁴

French authorities established various schools for *Métis* children in Dalat such as the *Couvent des Oiseaux*, which Kim Lefèvre attended, the *Domaine de Marie de Dalat*, an orphanage led by the sisters of charity of Saint Vincent de Paul and the *École d'enfants de troupe Eurasiens*. The *Jules Brévié Foundation* proposed to build another



III. 7 The old railway station of Dalat (not used as such anymore, picture taken by author in June 2016).

new *Métis* institution in Dalat so that the hill station would function as a *centre du groupement Métis* for the whole of Indochina.¹⁶⁵

Dalat's geographic isolation prevented indigenous mothers from reclaiming their *Métis* children. Later on, they found protection there from the Japanese during the Second World War. In addition, the hill station offered abandoned *Métis* children 'a good climate, indispensable to their physical formation', and 'a French milieu that is no less necessary to their moral formation'.¹⁶⁶ Administrators hoped that *Métis* children growing up in Dalat would become fit and strong by playing various kinds of sports, by learning to manage plantations, and by attending French schools. These sorts of activities were also useful with regard to potential future occupations in agriculture. When the unemployment rate among Eurasians began to rise fast in the 1930s and 1940s, plans were made for a 'centre de petite colonisation'. This centre was specifically meant for young Eurasians and would be located in the region of Xuan Loc in the province of Bien Hoa (currently an area to the north west of Ho Chi Minh City).¹⁶⁷ There were also plans for such a centre in the high lands of Tonkin (in the Northern part of Vietnam) and in Traninh (now located in Laos) but those centres were never built.¹⁶⁸

The *Jules Brévié Fondation* also sent children to summer camps (*colonies de vacance*) in resort areas, such as Cap Saint Jacques, Kampot, and areas surrounding Dalat. The *Jules Brévié Fondation* made the town its headquarters for *Métis* orphanages, contributing to Dalat's reputation as the 'town of the youth'.¹⁶⁹ What contributed to this was the presence of the *Petit et Grand Lycée Yersin* in Dalat. These schools followed the French curriculum and were meant to be exclusively for European children. However, they attracted *Métis* children who could pass themselves off as European.¹⁷⁰ Above all, for the Indochinese European social elite, the pursuit of education in metropolitan France still remained the most highly desirable goal.¹⁷¹



III. 8 Couvent des Oiseaux today (picture taken by author in June 2016).

The kind of racial politics applied to abandoned *Métis* children in order to rescue them from the native environment was not limited to French Indochina, it was a widespread phenomenon across French colonies in Africa and Asia.¹⁷² Also in British, Dutch and Belgian colonies in Asia and Africa, the removal of Eurasian children from the indigenous sphere was a common practice and part of the colonial civilising project.¹⁷³ In the Netherlands, in France, and in the UK and commonwealth countries similar 'save the children' movements emerged. This happened in the framework of a general civilising project to raise or re-educate poor street children and their parents, who were seen as members of the 'dangerous classes'.¹⁷⁴ How could the Europeans claim to civilise the indigenous people in the colonies if they were not able to civilise poor children in Western European towns?¹⁷⁵ The belief that orphans and poor children could be 'remoulded' through education, labour and a change of environment in the colonies was consistent with orphan-related polices in the mother countries.¹⁷⁶

6.5 Comparison and conclusion: Protecting and raising Eurasian children

To conclude, during the late colonial period, the process of Europeanisation had developed in all three colonies, and alongside that development, a separate Eurasian social life came into being. The gradual disappearance of this Eurasian social infrastructure after decolonisation represented an additional explanatory factor for why Eurasians left the former colony. To acquire European citizenship became the ideal because it offered the most opportunities for social mobility in the colonies. Governmental officials and representatives of the child protection organisations pressed European fathers to recognise their Eurasian children. False recognitions did occur in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. As a consequence, European fathers of

Eurasians were to be found in both higher and lower strata of the colonial civil service, and in enterprises, but their Eurasian children would never obtain the same status as their fathers.¹⁷⁷ These false recognitions did not happen in British India because, as said earlier, the possibility to recognise Anglo-Indian children as European citizens did not exist there.

In all three colonies, an education in the mother country helped one to become 'European'. For Eurasians, the European style-education at boarding schools at the hill stations was a reasonable alternative in all three colonies. An additional advantage for the colonial authorities was that in these isolated places Eurasian children would not be influenced by negative native influences, including revolutionary, anti-colonial activities. These were locations isolated from the rest of colonial society. Children could easily be prevented from learning languages like 'pecoh' (Dutch East Indies) 'chichi' (British India) or *Tây Bồi*, the 'pidgin French' of Indochina.¹⁷⁸ Authorities were convinced that the perceived danger of mixedness and degeneration could be best prevented by giving Eurasian children a decent upbringing and education. They deemed education the key means to safeguard and advance European values and whiteness.¹⁷⁹ This development was even more present in British India, which was a less liberal and more closed colonial society than the Dutch East Indies. But also in French Indochina in the 1930s, almost every colonial city had an organisation for the protection of abandoned *Métis* children.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, also in French Indochina, hill stations were constructed in the highlands to the north of Saigon, of which Dalat became the most famous. In Dalat, various orphanages, boarding schools and a military school for children of mixed ancestry were established. Although racial boundaries between colonial groups were drawn sharpest in British India, class and education still played a role next to colour, certainly when decolonisation was eminent. Lower-class British colonists with less education did not want to be lumped with Anglo-Indians. But these two groups were often together categorised as the domiciled (poor white) community. This social sphere was distinguished from the rest of colonial society, but in French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies the boundaries were more blurred.

In this period, more transnational links developed between the colonies. The French played an important role in this process. As a 'young' coloniser they wanted to learn from the neighbouring colonies about developing a solid colonial rule in general and a specific policy regarding the *Métis* population and their children. The French colonial government copied legislation the Dutch had implemented for the Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies. For example, they designed a similar model of private welfare societies and orphanages which aimed to educate and care for *Métis* children in order to raise them as 'good' French citizens. They set up agricultural colonies, which the colonial authorities saw as a solution to the common Eurasian problem that they faced. Eventually, the French colonial authorities went a few steps further in their endeavour to avoid the mistakes of the Dutch colonial officials that had created a large white (Indo-European, pauper) underclass.¹⁸¹ They made adaptations to the Eurasians' colonial status. The particular place of Eurasians in the colonial hierarchy became a decisive factor in the choice between leaving or staying. French colonial officials were concerned about *Métis* children in the colony and feared a decline in the number of French people living on the French mainland. That is why they for-

cibly removed 'abandoned' (by their French fathers) Eurasian children from their native mothers. These acts also happened in the other two colonies, but in the French context it was clearly a centralised governmental affair. The leaders of the French orphanges evacuated the children of mixed ancestry to metropolitan France and augmented the French population in this way. This secret seizing of indigenous children also happened in the other colonial contexts, but the French codified it. It resulted in less freedom of choice for the (almost) adult children after decolonisation, although some of them were quite content with their situation, and it prepared the way for generous French citizenship criteria for Eurasians.

7 Eurasian emancipation and the foundation of Eurasian interest organisations

7.1 Introduction

In all three colonies, Eurasians united and founded their own interest organisations and corresponding periodicals in response to the sharper boundaries and negative discourse developing about them in the late colonial period. While the organisational efforts of Eurasians increased their visibility, paradoxically, this added to the negative stereotyping which was already rampant in colonial society. However, their increased visibility also meant they could make their voices better heard. These associations promoted Eurasian interests at large and after a while they achieved more rights and equal opportunities for people of mixed ancestry in the colonies. I have already mentioned a few of these organisations in passing. In this chapter I will discuss them at length.

7.2 British India: The All-India Anglo-Indian Association and discord

In British India, a Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association was founded in 1876.¹ The development of sharper boundaries between population groups in British India at the beginning of the nineteenth century explains this early date. This was almost a century earlier than in the other two colonial contexts. The movement to unite Eurasians had already started at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Even before the mutiny of 1857, a highly-developed group consciousness was present among Anglo-Indians in British India because of the measures the British colonial government had taken in 1790 and 1791. These measures (discussed earlier at length) limited the freedom of movement of Eurasians. As a result, a considerable number of local Anglo-Indian associations came into being. It was clear that the formation of a distinct Anglo-Indian or Eurasian identity was accompanied by the production of derogatory Anglo-Indian stereotypes.² When a group becomes organised, it is more visible to outsiders, and hence more criticised. However, the community formation of Anglo-Indians did not only have negative aspects. Common irritations and complaints about the British government had drawn the group together, but it also had a shared purpose: emancipation and improving chances on the labour market.³

The majority of the Anglo-Indians were pro-British. They were never at the forefront of a so-called 'creole nationalism', which happened in colonies in the West. The Indian National Congress, which was founded in 1885, was supported by thousands

of Indian intellectuals, but not by Anglo-Indians.⁴ On 9 April 1926, representatives of Anglo-Indian groups from different parts of the country attended a conference, during which it was decided that all groups would unite in one overarching organisation: The All-India Anglo-Indian Association (AIAIA). Sir Henry Gidney, the former president of an earlier Anglo-Indian interest organisation, the Bombay Branch of the Anglo-Indian Empire League, became the leader of the new organisation.⁵

One of the first things Sir Henry Gidney did as a leader of the AIAIA was to submit a memorandum to the Indian Statutory Commission (also known as the Simon Commission) in 1928. This committee arranged a series of Round Table Conferences during the years 1930–1932, that prepared a new and progressive Government of India Act which became a blueprint for the first constitution of independent India. All organisations representing minorities living on the Indian subcontinent, including trade organisations and organisations of tea planters, could send their memorandums, containing proposals and requests for the new Government of India Act. They took them into consideration during the Round Table Conferences.⁶ In this way, Indian independence was well-prepared.

The memorandum of the Anglo-Indian association was an elaborate version of the memorandum that it gave to the Right Honourable Secretary of State of India in 1925 and the one it gave to its predecessor in 1923. It stood in a tradition of petitioning and lobbying of the mixed-race community of India, which had started in 1829 when John William Ricketts presented the first petition to East India Government on behalf of the 'East Indians'.⁷ This early effort constructed them as a political group, making them both more vulnerable for discrimination and more receptive to privileges and rights. The 1923 version contained a proposal for separate European schools for Anglo-Indians and a system of scholarships and boarding grants for poor children.⁸ Already in 1825, Anglo-Indians (at the time referred to as 'Eurasians') had made their grievances on the political, social and economic level known to the British Parliament by means of a petition.⁹ Thus, early on, a strong group identity and organisational infrastructure among Anglo-Indians had come about, providing for important preconditions to have a relatively comfortable life in the late colonial period in British India.

The memorandum of 1928, which was signed by Henry Gidney, contained quotas of jobs reserved for Anglo-Indians and educational grants to maintain the unique Anglo-Indian schools also after decolonisation. He blamed the government of British India for encouraging occupational specialisation amongst Anglo-Indians. Furthermore, Gidney claimed that the deterioration in the economic position of the community was not their fault but due to the deliberate policy of the government which favoured other more powerful, indigenous communities through its Indianisation policy instead of Anglo-Indians.¹⁰ Other prominent British people, who played an active role in the colony, also supported the case of the Anglo-Indians before the Statutory Commission. For example, Sir Edward Benthall, leader of the European Chambers of Commerce in India, said that 'the Anglo-Indian community was the greatest debt that England owed to India'.¹¹

'India is in his blood, in the colour of his skin, in his habits'

When Sir Henry Gidney died in 1942, he was succeeded by Sir Frank Anthony who would act as president of the AIAIA for nearly five decades, until his death in 1991.¹² Similar to the IEV in the Dutch East Indies, education was a spearhead of the AIAIA. It was to prepare Anglo-Indian children for a better future than their parents. A stay at a boarding school in a hill station could help in that endeavour: they could be 'kept away from any injurious native influence' in an isolated location with a cool climate.¹³

In an article which appeared in the Anglo-Indian Review in 1944, the then president of the AIAIA, Frank Anthony, described the collective memories that shaped the Anglo-Indian as a human being in relation to India and the hill schools:

India is in his blood, in the colour of his skin, in his habits. It is in his palate and his emotions. The curry and rice we'd miss so badly and the red rhododendrons on the sweeping slopes of the Himalayas in spring. India means a great deal to him.¹⁴

During the long existence of the AIAIA, there was always much criticism and discord among its members about its leadership, its main ethos and the policies it pursued. Many felt that not enough was being done to help the poorest members of the community. They claimed that scholarships were not given to Anglo-Indians who were really in need.¹⁵ Next to that, the Anglo-Indian Association used its local branches to check the genealogical ancestry of prospective members from 1933 onwards. The majority of Anglo-Indians did not accept that they had to prove their mixed ancestry with documents. This resulted in the AIAIA experiencing enormous difficulties trying to attract new members, especially in railway colonies.¹⁶ Therefore, the AIAIA represented only 40 per cent of the Anglo-Indian community. Moreover, there were other Anglo-Indian organisations next to the AIAIA, such as the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled European Association of South India (Madras) and the Union of Anglo-Indian Associations of Travancore-Cochin State (now Kerala). This last organisation offered room to people of other mixed ancestries: Portuguese and Indians, commonly known as Feringhees. Because they had another mother tongue than English – the Malayalam language – they were not welcome in the All India Anglo-Indian Association.¹⁷

Eurasian self-interest organisations were also established in Burma, which the British ruled as a province of British India from 1886 until its separation from British India in 1937. Examples of these organisations were the Anglo-Burmese Association, the Anglo-Burman Union and the Anglo-Burman Council.¹⁸ Until the separation in 1937, they were also part of the All-India Anglo-India Association of India and Burma. In 1928, Sir Henry Gidney wrote in an additional supplementary note to the Indian statutory commission that his organisation had almost 90 branches with a total membership of over 10,000 people representing about 50 per cent of the Anglo-Indian population.¹⁹

7.3 Dutch East Indies: Foundation of several organisations and newspapers

The foundation of several Indo-European interest organisations accompanied the negative change in image building around miscegenation. These developments influenced each other. The organisations could be founded as a result of the negative discourse on people of mixed ancestry and their exclusion by both indigenous and European social circles. Some initiatives to improve the circumstances of Indo-Europeans were taken earlier. Already in 1877, three Indo-European editors started to write for the *Padangsch Handelsblad*, which became the first Indo-European newspaper in the colony. This newspaper developed into an advocate of the interests of the lower classed Indo-Europeans and was critical towards governmental policy. According to the paper, Dutch government was only focused on economic exploitation of the Dutch East Indies.²⁰ In 1892, the first Indo-European association *Soeria Soemirat* (literally translated as the first sunbeam) was created by the Indo-European newspaper *De Telefoon* in Semarang. The founders were inspired by the Eurasian 'Mutual Improvement' society of Singapore. This was an early Eurasian interest organisation and another example of a transnational connection in the South-East Asian colonial world. In 1898, the Indo-European organisation *Indische Bond* (Indisch League) was established. Over the next two years, 4,000 Indo-Europeans became members.²¹

'What they have to complain about [...] is therefore difficult to see'

There were also two Indo-European movements which tried to instigate Indo-European nationalism: *Insulinde* was founded in 1907 and the *Indische Partij* in 1912. One of the founders of the *Indische Partij* was E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, a second cousin of the famous writer of the book *Max Havelaar*, Eduard Douwes Dekker, alias Multatuli. The *Indische Partij* advocated: 'the Dutch East Indies for the Indies people!', which was meant as an early call for independence by giving the people of mixed ancestry the leadership of the independence movement.²² This movement advocated three viewpoints in particular. In the first place, mixed races were always superior to unmixed races. Because both Dutch and Indonesian people were part of very mixed peoples, Indo-Europeans must have had positive characteristics. Secondly, Indo-Europeans were more Indonesian than Dutch. They were from the East and should therefore never choose the side of the colonial government. Lastly, Douwes Dekker predicted that Indo-Europeans together with educated Javanese, would have a leading position in the nationalist movement.²³ The reporter of the *Straits Times* felt that the Eurasian movement might be an example that indigenous people would follow in their own quest for independence:

References have been made from time to time in this paper to the dissatisfaction amongst the natives in Java [...] What many foresaw has, however, come to pass: the natives have awakened to the fact that they have very little to say in the government of the country [...] This cry for emancipation has not been heard for very long and is very evidently a result of the Eurasians in Java recently clamouring for their 'rights'. [...] Now it must not be thought that the Eurasians in the Dutch Indies have no rights; they have the same legal, social and

moral rights as the Dutch and they are very numerous. There are decidedly many more Eurasians than 'whites' and they occupy many of the highest posts in the country. They are also admitted into every social circle and inter-marry with the 'whites'. What they have to complain about in comparison with their brethren in other Eastern colonies is therefore difficult to see. The natives took the Eurasian movement as an example and now the Java Government has its hands very full indeed in keeping down a mooted native rising.²⁴

One year later, in 1913, the centennial commemoration of Dutch freedom from French occupation was also celebrated in the Dutch East Indies. One of the other leaders of the *Indische Partij*, Soewardo, took the opportunity to publish a leaflet entitled: 'when I was a Dutchman.' Soewardo said if he himself were a Dutchman, he would never want to celebrate such an anniversary (100 years of freedom) in a country (the Dutch East Indies) that continued to be occupied 'by us' (the Dutch). Before celebrating, the suppressed people (meaning the Indonesians) had to attain their freedom.²⁵ This was a demand for home rule, in a similar manner to that in British India. In the end, the creole nationalism in the Dutch East Indies failed due to unbridgeable differences in the religious sphere – namely, the Indo-Europeans were mostly Christian and indigenous people were mostly Muslim.²⁶

On 13 July 1919, the *Indo-Europeesch Verbond* was founded, in the words of its founders, 'out of self-defence'.²⁷ At the inaugural meeting, chaired by the prominent Indo-European journalist and editor Karel Zaalberg, the founders stated that the League would position itself in opposition to the older creole nationalistic organisation *Insulinde*. Indigenous people could not become members, but Dutch people could become members as long as they lived in the Dutch East Indies permanently.²⁸ The objective of the IEV was to promote the social and economic interests of Eurasian people of the Dutch East Indies and to lobby the government.²⁹ Membership was restricted to those Europeans who had settled or wanted to settle permanently in the Dutch East Indies, including European families who had lived for many years in the Dutch East Indies.³⁰ From the beginning, internal division and conflicting interests within the League frustrated the goal of maintaining their place in (post)colonial society. This division emerged soon, despite the fact that the necessity of forming one united Indo-European front was explicitly stressed at the foundation meeting. The discord was partly caused by the fact that the board members and most of the editors were from well-to-do Indo-European families, while they wanted to represent the whole Indo-European community. The IEV was based on shared interests and its target audience were various groups and classes of society, but the composition of the board was not representative of the target group.³¹ In the end, only the editor in chief of the *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*, Karel Zaalberg, who had chaired the first meeting of the IEV, came from humble origins.³² Indo-Europeans from the lowest classes were excluded because the membership fee was high.³³ At a conference, members of the department of Makassar proposed to lower the contribution, but this was rejected by the general board. According to the board, it led to too much administrative hassle, and the lower classes were already part of the organisation's supporters, even though they were not members.³⁴ The IEV considered education an important way to improve the situation of its members. It established a large number of schools, both in the plains and at the hill stations, and also developed a well-organised education and funding system, which was

meant to help the lower classed Indo-Europeans achieve a higher position in society.³⁵

From the start, the IEV's main purpose was to reduce the distance between the privileged 'totok' Dutch and the Indo-Europeans and to maintain the hierarchical distinction between Indo-Europeans and indigenous people.³⁶ While this sounds like a political objective, the IEV was rather a 'social-ethnic' association that used politics as a means of achieving its goals.³⁷ Although the IEV was not a true political party, it did have a say in the People's Council of the Dutch East Indies. The People's Council was founded in 1916 as an advisory body to the colonial government. The constitution of 1925 acknowledged the institution as a legislative institution. The fourth People's Council (1927-1931) possessed the same legal powers that western powers had, except for the right of enquiry.³⁸ In 1924, the IEV-chairman Dick de Hoog made a noteworthy remark in a debate with the indigenous member Soeroso on salary issues in the People's Council. The remark illustrated the ethnic and symbolic difference in status between indigenous people and Indo-Europeans. At that moment, many Indo-Europeans were already threatened with downward social mobility, which would reduce their position to that of the indigenous population. De Hoog urged Soeroso to pay less attention to his high principles and more 'to his shoes', because shoes were 'a necessity for the average Indo-European but an undesired luxury for the average Indonesian'.³⁹

At this point in time, Eurasians started to increase their attempts to organise as a separate group at the international level and between the various colonies. An opinion article published in 1934 in *The Straits Times* suggested that the League of Nations should create a homeland for Eurasians in which they could become rooted in the soil as agricultural workers:

The problem of the Eurasian communities in the various colonies and countries in Asia is one deserving of more attention than is being received at present. [...] I wish to voice the Eurasian problem from a higher plane than that of the local political aspirations. I wish to stress the claim of humanity and the right of each race to live its own life.⁴⁰

The Eurasians were defining themselves as a separate race, living in several colonies and now in need for a homeland of their own. According to the newspaper:

The Eurasians have no country of their own, and as they refuse to merge into their maternal race, their existence is going to be a very difficult one in the near future. Like the Jews, they have no home; but unlike the Jews they lack the cement of cohesion which has made the Jews the financial and commercial, not to mention the political directors of practically every nation. The West and the East have been responsible for the birth of this new race and the Dutch, to their credit appear to be the only nation which is conscious of its obligation. If a few Jews are ill-treated or killed in Palestine, there is a world-wide outcry, but the Eurasians are being thrust into degeneracy and extinction by the races responsible for their existence but never a word of protest goes up. It is bad enough that their plight is so precarious, but ministers of religion have added to their disabilities. They have set Eurasians against Eurasians because of differences in religion.⁴¹

The Eurasians appealed to the League of Nations for help to create a homeland. It would be to the benefit of both the East and the West, and it was a plan that should be awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize, according to the newspaper.

In the case of the Eurasian problem, the League can do an immense amount of good which will react to its credit. I doubt if there will be any opposition to any suggested solution, for both East and West will be glad to end the problem which reacts to the credit of neither. The Eurasians must be provided with a home [in New Guinea] and if the League can do this it will pave the way for a satisfactory solution. Such a scheme of colonisation requires a tremendous amount of money, and the Eurasians are as poor as church mice. I suggest that the League initiate a lottery for this special purpose, for the nations must realise that it is far more moral to provide for unwanted nationals than to continue the hypocrisy about the evils of sweepstakes. A solution of the Eurasian problem should merit the Nobel Prize, and provide full scope for some influential individual to exercise his or her charitable instincts.⁴²

In 1936, the moderate nationalist Indonesian member of the People's council Soetardjo handed in a petition to that same body of the People's Council, which called for the establishment of a Round Table Conference. It was meant to put the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies on an equal legal footing.⁴³ At this Round Table Conference, plans would be made to give the Dutch East Indies independent status 'along a road of gradual reform over a 10-year period, or at least such a period as the conference deemed possible.'⁴⁴ The chairman of the IEV, Dick de Hoog favourably considered the Soetardjo petition. All seven IEV members in the People's Council voted in favour.⁴⁵ De Hoog pointed out that the IEV resented the fact that all decisions were made in the Netherlands without taking notice of the wishes of the people living in the Dutch East Indies in general and the wishes of the members of the People's Council in particular. However, De Hoog did not consider it a correct decision to set a definite time-period for the transition. Such a decision should be taken at the Round Table Conference. De Hoog also suggested the establishment of an 'Imperial council' which could mediate in conflicts between the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands and would replace the voice of the Dutch government in the Netherlands.⁴⁶ In 1937, IEV-leader De Hoog stressed once again the difficult in-between position of Indo-Europeans at the IEV-congress. According to him, his organisation was the most 'Indisch' oriented one among the European group and the most Dutch oriented organisation among the Indonesian groups.⁴⁷

7.4 French Indochina: *Métis* organisations linked with Eurafricans

In Indochina, the Eurasian interest organisations were limited in size and they were not as much in the public eye as the people involved had wished for in order to have their demands met. In the only area of the Indochinese federation which was a real colony – Cochinchina in the south – *Métis* formed some organisations but the largest of these, *L'Amicale des Métis*, founded in 1895 and later renamed *Les Français de l'Indochine*, had at most five hundred members. In 1938, this organisation was described as a club consisting of 'fathers of children of whom the mother is of Asian ancestry.' However, *les Français de l'Indochine* only organised a small number of activities.⁴⁸ Shortly before decolonisation, *Métis* leaders founded *La Mutuelle des Français d'Indochine*, which lobbied in favour of the French state remaining in Vietnam. They described themselves as a 'new race [...] born of a union of the French conquer-

or and the Annamite *conquise*' (conquered).⁴⁹ Just like the IEV in the Dutch East Indies, it was not so much a political party but more an aid association. The purpose of the group was to 'unite members through friendly solidarity and mutual assistance.' There also was an equivalent to the Indian National Congress and the People's Council in the Dutch East Indies in Indochina, at least in Vietnam: *le Conseil colonial de la Cochinchine* (colonial council of Cochinchina), founded in 1880. This council met at least twice a year, and took decisions about the budget and managed the domain. The right to vote was limited to French citizens and Vietnamese who paid a considerable amount of land taxes.⁵⁰

La Mutuelle stressed solidarity and sympathy with similar *Métis* groups with Eurafricans in the French African colonies. Because of the link with this group, they could publish articles in the journal of the *Union internationale des Métis*, called *l'Eurafricain*. In this magazine, *Métis* from all French colonies were presented as belonging to a global French family.⁵¹ The policy in Indochina regarding *Métis* was seen as a blue-print for the policy for the *Métis* population (including children) in the African colonies. The *Métis* problem was regarded similarly in French Africa.⁵² Regular references were made to the existence of a *Métis* group in *Afrique Noir* when discussing *le problème des enfants de la colonie* in Indochinese newspapers.⁵³ If the French authorities would not take decisive steps for them in Indochina, it was believed that this would also not happen in the French African territories. In thinking about those steps, they looked at the British and Dutch policies regarding mixed people. They wished that the French would take a similar route and not abandon their subjects.⁵⁴ In addition, *La Mutuelle* tried to create a new political-identity group led by *Métis* in Indochina. They were also known under the name *Les Français d'Indochine*. The group was comprised of mostly Eurasians, with some Vietnamese, Cambodians and French people. They were philanthropists who were concerned about abandoned Eurasians and low-ranking colonial administrators. The organisation's goal was to represent the will of the permanent French population in the colony, which they regarded as consisting of Eurasians and Vietnamese equated with French people. They viewed themselves as a group with a new identity, they argued for equal rights to the French from the mother country, and sought Franco-Vietnamese collaboration. The government regarded them as a political threat and it was exactly this type of movement among *Métis* that made colonial officials anxious.⁵⁵

There were also individual *Métis* people who became active in the Vietnamese opposition against colonial rule. An example is Eugène Dejean de la Batie. He was born from an affair between a high-ranking French diplomat and a Vietnamese shopkeeper in Hanoi. Dejean was recognised by his father and had French citizenship. In his early twenties, he became part of the rising radical Vietnamese opposition to colonial rule. In 1923, he launched the most virulent political opposition newspaper thus far published, *La Cloche Fêlée* (The Broken Bell). However, he suffered from inner conflicts between his French and indigenous identity and eventually he chose to follow the official French republican ideology.⁵⁶

'Owing to their own privileged position, covering two races'

A group of French men married to Vietnamese women was linked to *Les Francais d'Indochine*. They disagreed in the 1930s with the way abandoned *Métis* children were treated. They believed the idea of racial superiority should be discarded and that all *Métis* should be considered real French citizens with the same rights and obligations. This would help to maintain colonial rule in Indochina.⁵⁷ Alternative instruments for community building among *Métis* people in Indochina were periodicals which were specifically directed at them. An example of such a periodical that represented the voice of *les Francais d'Indochine* was the weekly *Blanc et Jaune*, which appeared in Saigon between 1937 and 1940. It promoted specific discourse on Eurasians, that asserted that the place of Eurasians was a *trait d'union* (link) between colonial and indigenous society. *Blanc et Jaune* described itself as the newspaper

[...] for the *Métis* and naturalised Frenchmen who form the indispensable link between France, the protector nation, and Indochina, owing to their own privileged position, covering two races.⁵⁸

The associational activity which achieved more prominence in French Indochina than the above stated initiatives was directed at the protection of abandoned Eurasian children. In all parts of the Indochinese Union, associations which were active in 'protecting' abandoned Eurasian children were founded.⁵⁹ The *Jules Brévié Foundation*, continued its work by secretly seizing 'French and white-looking' children, even during the Japanese occupation. When they separated the children from their mothers, FOE-FI-members worked closely with *l'Assistance Sociale* – a French colonial governmental organisation – that provided assistance in the form of medical care and aid to the poor and injured, irrespective of their race. They were aware that French soldiers had sex with local women. Therefore, *l'Assistance Sociale* returned to military camps nine months to one year after the French military had left and offered assistance to abandoned impoverished Vietnamese mothers of the soldiers' young children.⁶⁰

On 9 March 1945, the Japanese troops committed a *coup d'état*. Ambassador Matsu-moto Shin'ichi, on behalf of the Japanese, visited the French Governor General Decoux at the headquarters of the French government in Saigon, and delivered an ultimatum demanding the surrender of French forces to Japanese command. Decoux was arrested and Japanese troops conquered administrative buildings and public utilities, took over radio stations, telegraph centres, banks and industries, attacked military and police positions and interned French civilians and military authorities.⁶¹ On the night preceding the *coup*, Japanese soldiers surrounded *l'École d'enfants de troupe Eurasiens*, tied up school administrators, and forced them at gunpoint to march out of the school. Later, the Japanese imprisoned them. According to later accounts, the students, using the drills they learned at school, maintained formation, weapons in hand, while the Japanese took over the school. In the weeks after, the Japanese military forced students to complete hard labour.⁶² The *coup* was followed by the dissolution of the *Jules Brévié Foundation* and the colonial-run orphanages for Vietnamese children in January 1946 by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).⁶³

Soon after Japanese occupation, institutional successors of the *Jules Brévié Foundation*

tion were founded, which carried out similar work. These were the *Fondation Eurasienne*, which was founded in 1946, and the *Fédération des Oeuvres de l'Enfance Française d'Indochine* (FOEFI, see further below) founded in 1950.⁶⁴ Their selection criteria for Eurasian children changed somewhat in the course of this period and resulted in a more inclusive racial policy. Before the war, these groups explicitly searched for white-looking Eurasian children and they left the darker-looking children in the indigenous milieu. After the war, political loyalty of Eurasians to the French cause (and therefore continuing presence in Indochina) became more important. Therefore, the selection included darker-looking Eurasian children. This change in French policies was also caused by contemporary developments during the First Indochina War that followed Japanese occupation. For instance, the Vietnamese government started to recruit Eurasian children to join the newly independent Vietnamese nation. Lastly, because France was losing authority in all her colonies, in Africa and Asia alike, French imperial prestige became more important and Eurasian children could contribute to this form of French *gloire* ('glory'). As summarised in a note destined for William Bazé, the president of the FOEFI, the most important recommendation was: 'supporting Eurasians in all circumstances for the profit, the appearance and the prestige of France in Indochina'.⁶⁵ From 1939 onwards, the child protection organisations had financed the education of 20,000 Eurasians, and some 3,000 of these orphans went to boarding schools throughout France.⁶⁶

7.5 Comparison and conclusion: United 'out of self-defence'

In conclusion, a common characteristic of Eurasian associations was the division of opinions and possible policy solutions among their members. The heterogeneous composition of the Eurasian population in all three colonies, caused by class and race considerations alike, led to a more united attitude. This especially applied to the Dutch East Indies and British India, where many Eurasian organisations were established. They were divided and criticised each other severely from the beginning. Also within the organisations there was a lot of division. One of the topics on which there was disagreement was education. However, it was generally seen as an important means to elevate the status of Eurasians. It would give them better job opportunities and prevent them from harming white, European prestige.

In French Indochina, the picture was different because there was less associational activity among Eurasians than in British India and the Dutch East Indies. The reason for this was the young age of the colony, together with the more inclusive French colonial policy regarding *Métis*. The few influential associations in Indochina were focused on care for Eurasian children. They united orphanages and boarding schools under one organisation – the FOEFI. In that way, Eurasian interest organisations in Indochina did indeed influence the ultimate decision of the *Métis* to stay or leave. However, just like the Eurasian interest organisations in British India and the Dutch East Indies, differences in opinion frequently occurred. In the other two cases, the organisations could not do much. Only in Indochina could the child protection organisations really help the *Métis* children to get to France. The Eurasian interest organisa-

tions of the Dutch East Indies did not have much influence when Indonesia became independent, and the organisations from British India had done their most important work (safeguarding rights and privileges) before the actual independence of India. After decolonisation, most of these organisations gradually disappeared. This provides an additional explanatory factor for why people stayed or left: as more Eurasian people left, more organisations disappeared, which led to further out-migration as Eurasians did not feel as represented as previously and their community became increasingly less visible.

8 Chaos and options in the de-colonisation period

8.1 Introduction

On 15 August 1945, atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese capitulated and the Second World War ended in Asia. Soon after, independence was proclaimed in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. From that moment onwards, a confusing, chaotic and violent period for Eurasians began: the *Bersiap* and colonial war in the Dutch East Indies and *La guerre d'Indochine* (the First Indochina War) in French Indochina.¹ Indo-Europeans and *Métis* were explicitly targeted during these violent periods and their status remained uncertain for some time. For many of them, this uncertainty drove them to leave the former colony. Independence in British India, although it was prepared a long time in advance, still came rather unexpectedly. In February 1947, the British Cabinet confirmed that Britain would leave India by June 1948 (and did so by August 1947). Lord Mountbatten decided that there was no alternative to the Partitioning of British India into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India and a rapid exit of the British from India.² The British withdrew even before the violent chaos accompanying Partition broke out. The Anglo-Indians, however, did not form a primary target during the Partition struggles, and therefore most of them wanted to stay in India at least initially.

8.2 British India: A relatively smooth transition

When the Statutory Commission convened in 1930, the president of the AIAIA, Sir Henry Gidney, had already handed in a proposal which advocated that Anglo-Indians should be given job reservations and other rights. Apart from the already mentioned employment reservations in governmental services like the railway, customs, postal and telegraph services, these benefits included representation in State Legislative Assemblies, where their population numbers were high enough, provision of two seats in the *Lok Sabha*, part of India's bicameral parliament, and an allocation of grants for Anglo-Indian schools on the condition that at least 40 per cent of the schools would be made up of non-Anglo-Indian students.³ All these were important incentives for Anglo-Indians to stay in newly independent India. Therefore, in the initial phase after decolonisation, the former colonial status quo was maintained for the majority of the 300,000 Anglo-Indians who were living on the Indian subcontinent. Anglo-Indians, who were not a target during the Partition riots, kept doing the same jobs (mostly in

the railway sector), and continued to live in the same houses in the same neighbourhoods.⁴

Although most Anglo-Indians initially stayed in India, at least 50,000 of them emigrated before 1970. Half of this group resettled in Britain in the late 1940s and 1950s. The majority of those who departed, left India after 1960 when the guarantees for employment ended.⁵ These migrants made their decisions against the advice of Anglo-Indian leaders such as Frank Anthony.⁶ He criticised those Anglo-Indians with fairer skins and argued that they should 'stop aping the British' and think of newly independent India as their home. Already in 1926, Anthony's predecessor, Henry Gidney had stated that Anglo-Indians should 'regard themselves as Indians'. The local press commented on this statement and considered it a thorough 'change of heart' for Anglo-Indians.⁷ However, for many Anglo-Indians, ideas of home revolved around an actual family location, not connected to a specific country, neither the UK nor India. They saw themselves as colonials living in a foreign land which they had chosen as a home. However, in cultural terms, Anglo-Indians kept regarding themselves as British or European people, not as Indians.⁸

While the constitution guaranteed limited minority rights for Anglo-Indians, it also identified the community as having historical affiliations with the British. The constitution emphasised the colonial legacy of the Anglo-Indians in newly independent India, and this could make their adaptation to the newly independent country difficult.⁹ Frank Anthony was often praised for his leadership of the AIAIA. He developed into a skilled mediator of Anglo-Indian and Congress interests. His friendships with the Indian presidents Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi (both from the Congress Party) promoted the interests of the Anglo-Indian community at large.¹⁰ Frank Anthony was closely involved with the negotiations that led to the composition of two sections of the constitution of independent India. These regulated the fundamental right of minorities, including Anglo-Indians, to establish and administer educational institutions of their own choice. He was also involved in the negotiations for two other privileges: continued job reservations and political representation.¹¹ In 1952, Anthony was quoted in an article of the overseas edition of the *Hindustan Times* saying that on the one hand those Anglo-Indians who realised that India was their home would inevitably inspire trust and confidence and have opportunities which they could never hope for in any other country. But on the other hand, he also brought to the fore that:

Anglo-Indians had certain fears particularly about the future of their language and their way of life. The educational policies of states like Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh made it impossible for minorities to maintain education institutions of their choice, as guaranteed under article 30 of the Constitution.¹²

Anthony added that although he was not a Congress Party supporter, there was no alternative to the Congress Party if democracy was to survive in India.¹³

Despite all this praise, Frank Anthony also received a lot of criticism from the Anglo-Indian community. For example, rumour had it that he had never visited a slum where poor Anglo-Indians lived. Many people within and outside the community said that Anthony and the AIAIA were not active enough in helping poor Anglo-Indians. They claimed that scholarships were never granted to the Anglo-Indian poor. Further-

more, they said that the poor themselves were never consulted about what measures they saw as important in overcoming their poverty.¹⁴

8.3 Dutch East Indies: Occupation, war and uncertainty

The Japanese capitulation did not mean instant relief for the internees in the camps. Instead, according to an eyewitness, it led to disaster for a not-yet-defeated people.¹⁵ The arrival of the British liberators took several weeks and in some places even months. When the British troops came, they did not have adequate equipment. They were aware of the anti-colonial atmosphere, but their motto was to distance themselves from the fighting parties. However, they could not maintain order and they became involved in the struggle. The Indonesians considered the British troops as accomplices of the Dutch, who would help to restore colonialism. The British suffered great losses and decided to leave the Dutch East Indies between June and December 1946.¹⁶ Furthermore, the prisons in which hundreds of people were held, including Dutch and Indo-European people, Chinese and indigenous people, did not open their gates. When these people eventually did come out of the prisons, they were incarcerated again in 'protection' camps.¹⁷ Many internees kept relying upon the loyalty of indigenous people, whom they knew personally from before the war. This trust was based on the harmonious circumstances in which they had lived together in households. For many Indonesians, the end of Japanese occupation had an economic consequence: it meant that they could work in European households again.¹⁸ Despite this rather harmonious picture, a more aggressive Dutch colonial mentality was revived in many camps. The Dutch internees expressed this sentiment in texts, e.g.: 'those bloody natives, who do they think they are? We will get even with them! Just you wait!'¹⁹

In the absence of the British troops, the period after the Japanese capitulation turned into an historical abnormality. The Japanese were a defeated army, that could not 'really' surrender and withdraw, but still had to exercise control, since the liberators had not arrived yet. The (Indo-)European internees had to stay in the camps tentatively in order to be protected from young radical nationalists, the *pemoedas* and *pepelopers*. Japanese soldiers, who first had closely guarded the (Indo-)Europeans from fleeing the camps, now confusingly protected them until the British troops came to liberate them.²⁰ The Japanese did not act in a similar way everywhere in Indonesia. In Surabaya, the Japanese let Indonesians disarm them without any resistance, but in Bandung the Japanese fought severely with the Indonesian nationalists. These regional differences show how confusing the immediate post-war period was.²¹

British soldiers were sent to the Dutch East Indies to control areas formerly occupied by Japanese troops.²² In many areas of the Dutch East Indies, these British soldiers were from British India, Gurkhas mostly, who often did no more than disarm the Japanese. They found the situation in the Dutch East Indies, in which the Dutch did not want to give their colony independence, unacceptable. This is understandable from their point of view since the British had already promised and prepared India for independence. The Gurkhas did not want to fight against Soekarno. Things got

worse when numerous of these soldiers deserted and joined the side of the Indonesian revolutionaries.²³

In the chaotic post-war situation, the *pemoedas* and *pelopers* took advantage of the existing power vacuum and patrolled the streets searching for anything Dutch or colonial. Indo-Europeans became 'outlaws' in their eyes and were brutally killed. The harbour town of Surabaya witnessed the most violent and traumatic episode.²⁴ One of several incidents contributing to the escalation was the flag incident. Some Dutch men, anxious to raise the Dutch flag which had been lowered by the Japanese for three and a half years, hoisted their flag on the roof of the former Oranje Hotel in the centre of Surabaya. Numerous armed Indonesians with bamboo spears appeared and stripped the Dutch flag of its blue banner, making it the red and white flag of the Indonesian Republic. Opposite the hotel there was a Red Cross aid post containing several Dutch ex-interned soldiers. When they saw the violation of the Dutch flag, they attacked the *pemoedas* and this led to a bloody fight.²⁵ This incident was the immediate cause of heavy violence directed at Indo-Europeans in Surabaya. Because many Indo-Europeans had remained outside the camps, this made them an easy target during the *Bersiap*-period. Another consequence of not being interned was that Indo-Europeans could not depend on allied help and on evacuation from unsafe areas. The organisation *Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees* (RAPWI) was founded on 18 August 1945, but was only meant for the evacuation of internees from Japanese camps.²⁶ Due to the racist *colour line* (resulting in a radical 'whites-only' policy) in Australia they could not go to that country either. Indo-Europeans were also an easy target because they were regarded as a threatening alternative for the new Indonesian republic. This *Indische* alternative was not a return to colonialism, but instead a decolonised Indonesia in which Indo-Europeans would take the leading roles.²⁷

Dutch propaganda initially depicted the Indonesian uprising as a movement which was Japanese inspired and whose leader ought to be tried as a war criminal for collaboration with the Japanese. Therefore, in some areas on Java, conquered by the nationalists, Indo-Europeans (also those who had stayed outside the camps) were interned again, under the guise of protection from the radical Indonesian nationalists. This time they were guarded by Indonesians, and pre-war colonial roles were turned upside down once again.²⁸ This crisis lasted for months in some parts of Java. Just as Dahler and Boogaardt had tried to convince the Indo-Europeans to join the Asian or Indonesian camp during Japanese occupation, pamphlets again encouraged Indo-Europeans to join the Indonesian camp. Already at the beginning of 1945, Soekarno reassured the Indo-Europeans that their rights as a minority would be guaranteed in independent Indonesia.²⁹

On 25 March 1947, the agreement of Linggadjati (named after a small mountain village in mid-Java) was signed. The Netherlands acknowledged *de facto* the sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic over Java, Madura and Sumatra. Next to that, a draft of a federal nation and a Dutch-Indonesian Union (a sort of Dutch commonwealth) was approved. Although this appeared to be a success, politicians on both sides interpreted the agreement differently. That situation eventually made the agreement unacceptable for both parties. Indonesians also looked at their neighbour's policies in Vietnam. For example, while the Dutch kept insisting that during a transition period

Indonesia would be part of a Dutch commonwealth, the Indonesians wanted to have free-state status, based on their positive impressions of what the French had offered the Vietnamese.³⁰ Not only British, Dutch and French policy makers looked at each other for inspiration, but also indigenous inhabitants of the former colonies regarded the possibilities of their neighbours with interest. In reality, the French authorities had not offered the Vietnamese much more than the Dutch gave the Indonesians. Due to different interpretations of the agreement, the implementation of Linggadjati did not turn out to be a success. On Java in particular, the unrest and brutal actions of *pemoedas* and *pelopors* continued. The Dutch government decided that military action was necessary to restore colonial order in the Dutch East Indies. They had not expected such aggressive Indonesian opposition. In July 1947, the first 'police' action took place under the code name *Operatie Product* (Operation Product), because it was primarily focused on reconquering economically lucrative sites, such as sugar enterprises and factories.³¹ The Dutch colonial rulers presented this as a purely internal problem and framed it in the press as 'police actions'.³² Historians agree that the situation on Java in the period 1945-1949 was a civil, revolutionary war, comparable to the situation in other decolonisation wars such as in French Indochina and Algeria. Recent extensive research has shown that violent conduct was happening on a structural, systematic scale rather than incidentally, which Dutch politicians had asserted earlier.³³ During this period about 44,000 Indo-European and European people with a Dutch passport repatriated to the Netherlands.³⁴

The contemporary eye-witness Jan Krijgsman (already referred to in chapter 4), who has described his experiences as a Dutch soldier in the first 'police' action, could not say whether the violent operations were war acts or just 'police actions' in his memoirs. According to him, 'every outsider is able to understand the subtle difference between a 'police action' and a war; every insider is not capable of doing so' and he considers himself an insider.³⁵ The Indonesians reacted to the first and second 'police action' with guerrilla warfare. The term 'police action' used by Dutch authorities in governmental documents sounds quite euphemistic and in fact the situation in the archipelago could be described as a full-blown war. The Dutch army found it difficult to regain control of areas, since most soldiers did not have any experience or training in guerrilla warfare.

'Within the borders of these isles shall remain a race one calls Indo'

As a result of the Dutch colonial policy of 'divide and rule' there were also rivalries among Indonesians themselves. It was difficult to point out who was the enemy and who was the ally as well as who was a victim and who a perpetrator.³⁶ According to Jan Krijgsman, the guerrilla method was the worst form of war because of the unexpected attacks.³⁷ On one of his expeditions, Jan Krijgsman talked to an old Indo-European head of a sugar factory in Kalitjandi, an area Jan and his fellow soldiers had just conquered. The Indo-European factory chief foresaw great difficulties for Indo-Europeans in the future because of the police actions. Simultaneously, the option of leaving did not seem realistic to him. He noted that:

Within the borders of these isles shall remain a race one calls Indo. Neither white, nor brown. They will be the most distrusted persons of Indonesia, as they have in fact secretly always been. They are not going to Holland, young man, what would they do there? They continue to live and die here. Every bullet you shoot now is a bullet from an Indo-European and every dead person you make now, will soon be at the debit side of the book with the title 'Indo-Europeans'.³⁸

In January 1948, Indonesian and Dutch authorities signed the Renville agreement, which was an outcome of a meeting on the American warship the *uss Renville*. It was a confirmation of the agreement of Linggadjati, which was signed one year earlier. Indonesia would become independent at short notice while Dutch economic interests would be secured in the archipelago.³⁹ However, in December 1948, the Dutch government planned and executed a second 'police' action. Basically, this was meant as an attack on the bulwark of the Indonesian Republicans in Djokjakarta. Dutch soldiers temporarily arrested Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and others.⁴⁰ A threat from the United States to immediately stop Marshall Aid for the Netherlands was needed to end this second 'police' action.⁴¹ In the context of the Cold War, the United States feared that Indonesia would become a communist country if the conflict escalated. Although this was considered by people outside colonial Dutch circles as ordinary warfare, Dutch colonial authorities viewed these actions as similar to the colonial operations they had carried out to conquer far-away areas such as Lombok and Aceh at the end of the nineteenth century.⁴²

Meanwhile, the Indo-European group was divided into a Dutch and Indonesian camp. In 1946, three new Indo-European organisations were founded. They were all to a larger or lesser extent loyal to the Indonesian side. The moderate organisation *Indonesia Merdeka* was established in September 1946. A.W.F. de Rock and Dick Hage became its leaders. In their opinion, every Indo-European in Indonesia was by birth an Indonesian citizen, so it was not necessary to change their name, dress or appearance.⁴³ The more radical counterpart of *Indonesia Merdeka* was the *Badan Oeroesan Peranakan (BOP)*. This organisation encouraged Indo-Europeans to become Indonesian citizens. They had to assimilate as soon as possible into Indonesian society. Indonesian names would help in that assimilation process. Some prominent people decided to change their names. The already mentioned P.F. Dahler changed his name to Amir Dachlan and E.F.E. Douwes Dekker renamed himself Danudirdjo Setiabuddhi. Just before the formal transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949, a third new Indo-European organisation was set up. J.P. Snel together with F. Werbata founded the Indisch Dutch Party in 1948, in which all Indo-Europeans who had accepted the agreement of Linggadjati of November 1946 could join. This treaty was primarily focused on the foundation of a Dutch-Indonesian Union, consisting of a couple of Indonesian states and the Netherlands, similar to the British Commonwealth. Later, the name of the Indisch Dutch Party was changed into *Partai Indo National (PIN, Indo National Party)*. It argued for a second opportunity for Indo-Europeans to opt for Indonesian citizenship at the beginning of the 1950s. The PIN was a purely political party that wanted to dissolve all links with the Netherlands. The IEP evolved into a socio-cultural and ethnic association that wished to maintain connections with the Dutch culture and language. The IEP criticised Snel and its Indisch Dutch Party in its magazine

Onze Stem, describing him as a ‘political adventurer’ who was preventing the Indo-European group from becoming more unified.⁴⁴ Despite this general discord within the Indo-European group, the Indo-Europeans who were living in Semarang came up with a collective resolution against a decision of the government of the Dutch East Indies. They condemned the Dutch declaration of guaranteed civil servant jobs, which turned out to be only applicable to temporary employees with Dutch nationality.⁴⁵

In the meantime, the old orphanage of Johannes van der Steur, *Oranje Nassau Gesticht* in Magelang, had fallen into disrepair. In December 1943, during the Japanese occupation, Japanese officers had captured Van der Steur and interned him. The reason was that he had tried to prevent a number of the older male pupils from doing forced labour for the Japanese. Van der Steur survived Japanese internment but he was so weak that he died a few days after loyal orphans brought him home to his orphanage in Magelang. The successors of Van der Steur, who he himself had appointed as leaders, tried to continue his work. However, in October 1945, Indonesian extremists attacked the institution and most of the remaining Indo-European orphans were imprisoned. The nationalist extremists considered them ‘enemies of the Indonesian Republic’.⁴⁶ What happened after that attack is not entirely clear from archival documents. Representatives of the support organisation in the Netherlands did not agree on the appointment of the successors of Van der Steur. Jan Salmon had an especially negative reputation. They accused him of ‘both financial and pedagogical unreliability’ and fired him. Two other successors, E. Lesilolo and E. Tangkan, of whom the latter was the leader of the girls’ wing, disappeared. This situation was not helpful in the restoration of the institution.⁴⁷ Some representatives and board members of the pre-war institution *Oranje Nassau Gesticht* wrote a report of their journey to the old location of the orphanage in Magelang probably in the spring of 1949. The report is undated, but because other correspondence dated to April 1949 referred to it, it must have been written in that same month. According to the representatives, the site of the old orphanage in Malang was in chaos. The leaders still cared for approximately 200 children who were mainly of Indonesian ancestry, but the remaining buildings were very badly maintained and healthy living conditions were not being upheld.⁴⁸

8.4 French Indochina: From colonial war to international war

After Japanese capitulation, Ho Chi Minh declared and established Vietnam as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945. In the same month, the Viet Minh launched an attack on the neighbourhood of Hérault, where many *Métis* people lived.⁴⁹ Despite these attacks, some *Métis* also joined the revolutionary movement for an independent Vietnam. They probably did not live in that neighbourhood, however.⁵⁰ After August 1945, the Viet Minh took over power in several places, but this did not happen very smoothly in Vietnam and largely failed in the south. In Hanoi, the French were still interned by the Japanese. The Chinese troops, who would liberate them, had yet to arrive. The Viet Minh launched an anti-French campaign which included acts such as blacking out French-language signs and destroying French statues and other colonial symbols. Anti-French slogans appeared everywhere and the

French *tricolore* was nowhere to be seen. Instead, the red flag with the yellow star flew over the large cities of Vietnam.⁵¹ It took another nine years before the French troops left Indochina for good after their humiliating defeat in the battle at Dien Bien Phu in April 1954. One of the reasons for this long decolonisation war was that the French held on to their colonial attitude. They were convinced that the indigenous people could be controlled again and colonial power restored.⁵² But it was not easy; they were fighting an enemy that relied on guerrilla tactics and blended in with the civilian population. This situation presented extraordinary logistical challenges and asked a serious commitment of the soldiers, who were trained for traditional warfare.⁵³

On 24 March 1945, the provisional French government under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle presented its post-war plan for Indochina. This essentially came down to the formation of an Indochinese federation, which would be part of the new French Union. This idea was connected to the policies presented at the conference on French imperial reform, convened in Brazzaville, Congo, in 1944. However, the final Brazzaville declaration stated that 'the eventual constitution, even in the far-off future, of self-government in the colonies is out of the question'.⁵⁴ The negotiations that followed between Ho Chi Minh and French delegates ambiguously concluded that the French government recognised the DRV as a 'free state' within the Indochinese Federation. This was codified in the 6 March accords by Ho Chi Minh and the French representative Jean Sainteny. However, it remained vague how much autonomy the Vietnamese had and how much the French federation would have.⁵⁵ Ho Chi Minh and his DRV had to accept that Chinese troops would be replaced by French troops.⁵⁶

Kim Lefebvre, the *Métis* author, had to leave the orphanage in which she was living as a child because it was located in a warzone. The nuns who ran the orphanage wanted to evacuate Kim and all other *Métis* children to France. However, Kim's mother learned about this plan and collected Kim from the orphanage.⁵⁷ Apparently, there was a way out for *Métis* children (and their parents) who did not see their (children's) future in France and wanted to stay in the former colony. I elaborate on this aspect in the next chapter about the postcolonial period.

8.5 Comparison and conclusion: Prelude to thorough change

In all three colonial contexts, a chaotic and violent period began after the Second World War, which ended with formal political decolonisation. Thousands of Eurasians left with the Europeans, either temporarily to recover from the war experiences, or permanently to start a new life. Violent experiences during the Second World War and decolonisation war in the Dutch East Indies and Indochina were an important reason to leave. In both the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina, Eurasians and Europeans were interned again after Japanese capitulation, because their respective British and Chinese liberators had not yet arrived. In the Dutch East Indies, many Dutch people (including some Indo-Europeans) were sent to the Netherlands or Australia to recuperate. However, Eurasians were not allowed to stay in Australia permanently because of the country's 'whites only' policy.

In French Indochina, most Eurasian children were evacuated because of the war

between the French colonial authorities and the Vietnamese nationalists. Initially they were sent to the southern part of Vietnam, and later to metropolitan France. In British India, mainly internal migrations as a consequence of the Partition took place. Because of elaborate constitutional safeguards, most Anglo-Indians initially stayed. Generous and advantageous bureaucratic regulations made the decision to stay easier, yet some Anglo-Indians left, often helped with money from the AIAIA. This organisation was criticised for only helping 'already well-to-do' Anglo-Indians. Economic status determined the opportunities Anglo-Indians had after decolonisation. Rich Anglo-Indians could decide to stay in newly independent India or move to the UK, whereas poor Anglo-Indians had few choices.

9 Formal political decolonisation and the ‘pull’ of the mother country

9.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the formal conditions of independence, upon which the former colonial authorities and new rulers agreed during gatherings held for that purpose in each of the three colonial contexts: the Round Table Conferences in British India in the years 1930-1932, the Round Table Conference in the Dutch East Indies in the autumn of 1949, and the conference in Geneva in 1955 which ended the Franco-Indochinese conflict, otherwise known as First Indochina War. This chapter also describes the ‘pull’ factors of the European mother countries and other countries of destination the Eurasians migrated to. The former colonisers put safeguards in place to protect Eurasians populations, as well as to stop them from migrating to the mother country.

9.2 India: Generous constitutional safeguards and British betrayal

On the night of 15 August 1947, India became independent. Although initially not much changed for the Anglo-Indians, the end of British rule came for many Anglo-Indians as a shock. Anglo-Indians were called upon to decide where their loyalties lay and what their identity was. Anglo-Indians in ‘Plain Tales from the Raj’, written by Allen, remembered: ‘It was the end of our world [...]. Now we did not know where we were, whether we were Indians or British people or what.’¹ If they had not registered for British citizenship, they automatically became Indian citizens upon independence. They did not have to make a choice. According to an earlier Government of India Act, they were statutorily natives, which amongst other things meant that they could apply for the same jobs as natives.²

Since the Anglo-Indian community was recognised as one of the six minority groups within the Constitution, the community was represented by its nominated members of the Central Legislature in the various state assemblies. Out of the series of Round Table Conferences during the years 1930-1932, the Government of India Act came into being in 1935, the predecessor of the constitution of an independent India. The constitutional safeguards for Anglo-Indians started from the moment India’s constitution was officially implemented on 26 January 1950.³ The reservations for Anglo-Indians for particular jobs in the railways, customs, post and telegraph departments would last for 10 years after the date of implementation. The number of reserved jobs

for Anglo-Indians would gradually decrease every year and would end in the early 1960s. Another constitutional safeguard, the grants for English language education, would also stop at that time. Except for these job reservations and educational grants the other constitutional safeguard of political representation is still in place today. The Anglo-Indians still have two representatives in the Indian Parliament, the *Lok Sabha*, and in several state assemblies.⁴ Furthermore, there are still European schools (formerly known as Anglo-Indian schools) in India that use English as the main language of instruction. Non-Anglo-Indian children increasingly attended these schools after independence. According to an article in the *Manchester Guardian* of April 1955, these privileges were nothing more than what the Anglo-Indians deserved since 'India owes them much'. Furthermore, the author wrote that:

[...] they are used to doing all those jobs that the British and the upper caste Hindus deemed below their dignity and without their technical knowledge successful independence might have been more difficult.⁵

The British authorities disappointed the Anglo-Indians. Just before formal independence the British Cabinet mission visited the Indian subcontinent to make final preparations for Indian independence. The actual job of the Cabinet Mission was to arrange India's orderly transfer to independence. The mission set up an appropriate consultative office to decide upon the Indian postcolonial constitution.⁶ This mission made clear that they would not give the Anglo-Indian community a seat in the interim Indian government. Anglo-Indians felt this to be unfair since the Parsis, a smaller community in numbers than the Anglo-Indians, did acquire a seat in the provisional government. It was said that the Anglo-Indians were numerically four times stronger than the Parsis, and that 'the moral for Anglo-Indians would appear to be that it is only when we begin to acquire a nuisance value that we will secure our rights.'⁷ This statement also refers to the sentiment of deprivation among Anglo-Indians, which had built up since the end of the eighteenth century when the first measures were taken to limit their opportunities. Representatives of the British had expressed their sympathy with the fate of the Anglo-Indians, most notably the former minister of foreign affairs Austen Chamberlain, who stated: 'I do feel that for this particular community we have perhaps, a more direct, a deeper moral responsibility than for any other section of the Indian people.'⁸ Despite these supportive statements, the leader of the AIAIA, Frank Anthony stated in 1947 that the Indian Congress was more willing to give the Anglo-Indians a voice and their rightful place in society than the British were:

While the British administration, which owes an invaluable debt to the Anglo-Indian community, insists on excluding us from the Central Government, Congress, who had a good reason to maintain that Anglo-Indians in serving the British administration had been anti-Congress, made every effort to give Anglo-Indians their proper place in the Government of the country.⁹

As a response to this 'betrayal', Anglo-Indians resigned from all voluntary services that were in any way related or beneficial to the British Indian government. Thus, they no longer provided any assistance or contributed to charitable services set up by the British government.¹⁰ As said, about 50,000 Anglo-Indians migrated to Britain

in the 1940s and 1950s. The most important reasons for doing so were fears that decolonisation would lead to large-scale unemployment, discrimination and exclusion. In addition, the idea that their children would have fewer opportunities in independent India was an important reason for migration.¹¹ It was not easy for these people to move to the UK. They needed to give guarantees about their financial independence in the country of destination to the Indian government when they were domiciled in India. The government of India considered it its responsibility to repatriate them to India in the event of their getting into financial difficulties abroad. This was a remarkable viewpoint from the newly independent rulers, certainly in contrast with the new rulers in the other two former colonies in this study who acted very differently.¹²

Because most Anglo-Indians automatically became Indian citizens, the British authorities did not feel legally responsible for these people anymore. To register for British citizenship under the British Nationality Act of 1948, formal proof of British paternal ancestry was needed. Furthermore, those born out of wedlock were excluded. The deadline was 31 December 1949, which was meant to give the applicants time to provide evidence of a paternal ancestor who had been born in the UK or its colonies.¹³ The time-span was very short and many Anglo-Indians did not manage to collect the evidence in time.

This 1948 Nationality Act was aimed at strengthening Britain's relations with its colonies and former colonies within the Commonwealth by creating migration and settlement rights for all subjects of these territories, irrespective of their colour. Colonial and Commonwealth subjects were British citizens by law and therefore Anglo-Indians could be viewed as internal migrants, or as legal British citizens moving within the empire or the commonwealth.¹⁴ British officials who judged the applications received instructions that the requirements of ancestral and formal written proof needed for UK citizenship might be relaxed 'in the event of an obviously British-rooted family'.¹⁵ In debateable cases the final decision depended to a large degree 'on the skin colour of an applicant or a genealogy in the family bible.' Even 'properly attested hearsay tradition' was acceptable according to these guidelines for the British officials.¹⁶ Despite these more lenient quotes, the bureaucratic obstacles for Anglo-Indians who wanted to migrate to the UK were immense. It was obviously an important reason to postpone departure or to stay in India. For example, a number of Anglo-Indians from the artisan class were technically eligible for entry into the UK because their father or grandfather had been a British soldier, but they could not provide enough formal written evidence to convince the British authorities.¹⁷

The Anglo-Indians not only needed to provide formal proof, but they also needed money to travel to agencies in Delhi, which arranged their departure. They did not need to have British citizenship before departure. The Anglo-Indians could apply for that after living for one year in the UK. The fact that racial classification was in the criteria for admission was kept secret by the government. Nothing was said about it in the explanatory note that accompanied the formal criteria. The racial classification criteria were rooted in the racial hierarchies of the colonial period. Anglo-Indians needed to emphasise their whiteness in order to convince authorities to grant them visas. Authorities used the racial classification to judge requests of Anglo-Indians. The criteria were meant to give British people priority in the event of an emergency because

British authorities feared that the UK might be swamped by Anglo-Indians.¹⁸ It was estimated that two million Anglo-Indians would be able to prove British origin on the parental side. Anglo-Indians appealed to the Society of Genealogists in London to help them find their British ancestors, and they wrote distant relatives to collect information from old church registers. Making the deadline proved difficult for most.¹⁹ Furthermore, although many Anglo-Indians were uncertain about their future, the leaders of the All India Anglo-Indian Association (AIAIA) remained convinced that the best future for Anglo-Indians was in India and not in the UK.²⁰

Invisible immigrants

The British government did not encourage the Eurasian migration to the UK partly because of the arrival of other colonial migrants in the UK at the time.²¹ The Anglo-Indians arrived in a country which also received in the late 1940s and the 1950s, 7000 migrants from the Caribbean, 160,000 Polish ex-service men, 20,000 German ex-prisoners of war, and 80,000 DPs from camps in Europe. The UK furthermore recruited Italian workers because there were shortages in mining, and there were Irish immigrants. The UK encouraged part of its population to leave. Emigrants left with assisted passages to Australia and New Zealand.

The arrival of the 7000 West-Indians between 1948 and 1951 led to much more debates in the UK than the arrival of about 50,000 Anglo-Indians. The arrival of the West-Indians led to riots and protests. The Anglo-Indians were regarded as rather invisible in the UK. They had British surnames and Christian first names, were adherents to the Christian faith, wore Western style clothes, and spoke English. They did not join the larger South Asian population in the UK which has migrated to the UK earlier which mainly consisted of sailors.²² The Anglo-Indians started to arrive when bread was still rationed, and when there were coal shortages during the very cold winter of 1947-1948. During the war, 4 million houses (a third of the total number of houses) had been destroyed or damaged. From the 1950s onwards, however, the UK experienced economic growth, and a generous welfare and health system was put into place. In the UK some people worried about falling birth rates and they feared labour shortages.²³ Debates started about the British people's ability to absorb 'other peoples'. In most of these debates it was assumed that these immigrants would be white, and from continental Europe rather than from the (former) colonies. The new stock should come from 'European Voluntary Workers', as the Poles were called, rather than from an import of 'Jamaican Unemployed', as the West-Indians were referred to. Overall, most people in Britain knew or cared little about the former colonies or the new Commonwealth countries. A British survey in the 1950s showed that many people in the UK were unable to name one of Britain's (former) colonies.²⁴

Until 1962 migrants from the Commonwealth (which included India and Pakistan) could come to the UK as Commonwealth citizens. After 1962, a voucher system was introduced which restricted migration and favoured people with professional and technical qualifications. It severely restricted options for the Anglo-Indians, who were still in India. Anglo-Indians increasingly chose other British Commonwealth countries, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. From the late 1960s onwards, Can-

ada relaxed its restrictive 'whites only' policy. Australia also relaxed its 'whites only' immigration legislation in 1964. A migrant wanting to go to Australia had to show that 'he' was 'by appearance, education, upbringing, outlook, mode of dress and way of living, that he is capable of ready integration into the Australian community'. 'No overriding importance' was attached to the criterium of appearance. The immigrants no longer had to be white.²⁵

Despite the fact that many Anglo-Indians initially stayed in independent India, there were also Anglo-Indians who longed for a separate homeland, just like some Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies. The Anglo-Indian advocates of such a homeland, united in the Eurasian Collectivist Party, even proposed a separate state in British New Guinea (the eastern part of which was at that time part of Australia) just like the Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies who attempted to make West New Guinea their homeland.²⁶ This Eurasian Collectivist Party was only a small group but it had far-reaching ambitions. They themselves proclaimed in their letter paper that they had branches in India, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, and Indonesia. Furthermore, they stated that they were 'pioneers of scheme for the emigration of the Eurasians of the East to New Guinea', 'Publishers of "Vanguard"', and 'a progressive Eurasian Socialist Party dedicated to the Eurasian people's right to self-determination in an extra-territorial National Homeland of their own'.²⁷ Despite these grand ideas, the Anglo-Indians never achieved the level of financial state support required for the foundation of even a small settlement.²⁸

9.3 Indonesia: Choosing Indonesian citizenship?

The transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia took place on 27 December 1949. The decisive prologue was the Van Rijen-Roem agreement of 7 May 1949 which ended all hostilities between Dutch and Indonesian troops throughout the archipelago. The Dutch returned the whole Sultanate of Djokjakarta (an Indonesian nationalist republican bulwark) to the republican nationalists and the Indonesians agreed to participate in a Round Table Conference (RTC) to prepare for the independence of Indonesia.²⁹ The Dutch diplomat Van Rijen had been appointed in March 1949 to negotiate with the Indonesians about the conditions of independence. His goal was to maintain Dutch economic interests in the Dutch East Indies. Even on the Indonesian side, he was admired for his 'statesmanlike' performance.³⁰ Before sovereignty could be transferred, the conditions for independence, including the position of Indo-Europeans in independent Indonesia, had to be negotiated during the RTC in the autumn of 1949. Other topics on which the participants of the conference agreed were education, languages and religious freedom, and the Union Statute, which meant that Indonesia would become part of a sort of Dutch commonwealth or Dutch-Indonesian Union, modelled on the British one. A memorandum of 30 points summarised the interests of the Dutch minority group including the Indo-Europeans. This group present at the RTC was divided and did not speak with one voice. Therefore, due to time pressure not all aspects could be covered during the conference, and this was to the disadvantage of the Indo-Europeans.³¹

In the so-called ‘toescheidingsovereenkomst’ (agreement on allocation) of nationalities the representatives of Indonesia and the Netherlands agreed upon an option period of two years. Between December 1949 and December 1951, adult Indo-Europeans who had lived for at least 6 months in Indonesia could choose Indonesian citizenship or retain Dutch citizenship.³² The Indonesians implemented their *Indonesianisasi* programme in the first months of 1950³³, which meant that Indonesians got preferential treatment when jobs were allocated. Thereupon 30,000 Dutch people left for the Netherlands or another country such as the United States.³⁴ Many of them were Indo-Europeans. The criteria for Dutch citizenship were strict. Only those Indo-Europeans, who could prove that they descended from a forefather who was Dutch or ‘equated with Europeans’ before 1 July 1893, were eligible for Dutch citizenship and thus admission to the Netherlands. The people who were equated after that date were not legally Dutch and did not have the right to opt for Dutch citizenship. The group that was eligible for Dutch citizenship consisted of 16,000 people.³⁵ At the end of the option period in December 1951, only 13,739 heads of household had opted for Indonesian citizenship (approximately 40,000 people when all household members were included). However, at the beginning of 1952, 142,000 Dutch people (including Indo-Europeans and other Europeans) were still living in Indonesia, meaning that many Indo-Europeans had not chosen Indonesian citizenship.³⁶

One of the negotiators present at the RTC, the president of the employer’s organisation of the civil servants A.F.J. de Rosario, had the impression that the Indonesian delegation had more sympathy for the fate of the Indo-Europeans than the Dutch delegation.³⁷ Hence, a member of the Indonesian parliament, G. Schmitz, gave pragmatic advice. He stated that for Indo-Europeans who had to choose between Indonesian or Dutch citizenship only three questions mattered: Where does one wish to spend the rest of one’s life? Can someone’s children live here without adopting Indonesian citizenship? What does one have in mind for their children’s future? In his opinion, the answer to the first question would be for many Indo-Europeans ‘in Indonesia’. And the answer to the other two questions would be: staying as an alien in Indonesia would be extremely difficult, especially for the next generation.³⁸ These general answers clearly pointed to the option of staying in Indonesia. The largest private interest organisation of the Indo-Europeans, the IEV, also advocated for choosing Indonesian citizenship and staying. They had made a remarkable switch from the Dutch to the Indonesian side during the immediate post-war years. Yet, from different sides within and outside the Indo-European group, people said that the option period of two years was too short for Indo-Europeans to make this complicated choice. The Dutch government promoted a longer option period as well as the opportunity to reconsider and cancel earlier made choices.³⁹ As the old commissioner of Medan, H.W.J. Sonius said, choosing Indonesian citizenship meant a step down the social ladder for many Indo-Europeans.⁴⁰ They had to sacrifice their ideal of raising their children in a Dutch, western sphere with western education, which would have given them the chance to acquire a decent position in a western business.

In the opinion of Sonius, this was a complicated psychological dilemma, and Indonesians as well as Dutch politicians should give Indo-Europeans more time to make up their minds.⁴¹ Another reason for this was that opting for Indonesian citizenship

felt for them like an act of treason towards the Netherlands. The fact that many had been active in the Dutch military service and had fought against Indonesians, also played a role. Furthermore, having Dutch nationality was for Indo-Europeans one of the few remaining ways to feel superior to Indonesians. When they lost Dutch citizenship, they feared being disfavoured by the Indonesian government. In addition, the memory of the *Bersiap*-period, during which the Indo-Europeans had a particularly difficult time, was still a recent, vivid memory at the beginning of the 1950s. Indo-Europeans feared they would be the first victims of a new 'anti-colonial' campaign.⁴² However, the Indonesian government did not want to extend the option period or give an opportunity to reconsider the choice.⁴³ According to the Indonesians the least valuable and most difficult part of the Indo-European group would probably choose Indonesian citizenship. The better educated and wealthier Indo-Europeans had already departed for the Netherlands or planned to do so.⁴⁴

In 1932, the researcher W.M.F. Mansvelt pointed out that these were critical times for the Indo-European group and that for most of them, except for the highest strata of the group (to which the IEV-board also belonged), a reduction in welfare was imminent.⁴⁵ In that respect, the switch of the IEV to the Indonesian side was quite late. Only in the second year after the Japanese occupation did they apparently come to realise that the future lives of Indo-Europeans would be better in Indonesia. From this point on the IEV passionately promoted their new stance through their magazine *Onze Stem* ('Our Voice'). In an article from 31 December 1950, which was about the dilemma of staying or leaving, a clear answer was given: 'on this point we are not in doubt: simply become an Indonesian citizen and courageously start from the beginning.'⁴⁶ To support their argument, *Onze Stem* published articles about the negative experiences of Indo-Europeans in the Netherlands. In one of these articles, which appeared in 1953, they quoted a letter of an Indo-European:

Here follows a quotation from a letter of an Indo, who had departed for the Netherlands without having arranged anything, who ignored all advice, which was given to him to find his future in his country of birth.⁴⁷

In the letter, the Indo-European explained, that he should never have gone to the Netherlands. The factors 'colonial status' and 'class' seem to be decisive for staying in Indonesia. The IEV may have exaggerated when it claimed that all Indo-Europeans experienced a hard time in the Netherlands, but newspapers such as *De Locomotief* and *De Nieuwsgier* also reported the difficult circumstances that Indo-Europeans encountered in the Netherlands. In these articles, Indo-Europeans expressed their regret at migrating to the Netherlands.⁴⁸ For many of them, it was difficult to build up a new life and find a suitable job.⁴⁹ Despite the effort that the IEV made to advocate their viewpoint, many Indo-Europeans disagreed, and as a result the number of IEV-members dramatically decreased. For example, the IEV-department of Bandung was the largest one in 1947 with 1,500 members. In 1949, only 560 members were left, the others had gone to the Netherlands or cancelled their membership.⁵⁰ The IEV-branch 'Groot Batavia' (Large Batavia) publicly announced that it could not agree with the viewpoint of the main board of the IEV.⁵¹

The majority of the IEV-members had lost trust in the leaders of the organisation.

They increasingly joined associations that encouraged migration to the last remaining Dutch colonial possession of New Guinea as an alternative for migration to the Netherlands. Already in 1951, colonial officials did not consider the IEV as representative for the Indo-Europeans.⁵² Despite much resistance from both within and outside the association, the IEV-leaders held firm. For them, Indo-Europeans had to make the best of a bad situation by staying in newly independent Indonesia. Managing to maintain their current economic position would already be a success in itself. Therefore, they published advice for the Indo-European community in *Onze Stem* only a couple of days before the formal transfer of sovereignty in December 1949:

Do not continue watching passively, waiting and criticising, but accept the inevitable and be pro-active, then, the less pleasant change of our status of [extension of the] old-fashioned colonial [i.e. Dutch] oppressor as active, appreciated and influential minority (in the newly independent Indonesian society) would be bearable.⁵³

Dutch government officials expected that most Indo-Europeans would opt for Indonesian citizenship. Therefore, they adopted 'a flexible line of behaviour', as stated by the government in Dutch parliament in 1949, whereby they would accept as Dutch citizens all people who had:

proof of fulfilment of military service in the Dutch East Indies, membership in pre-war public bodies and the possession of pre-war Dutch passports.⁵⁴

The Dutch introduced this more flexible approach, because it remained difficult for Indo-Europeans to provide proof of Dutch ancestry. One reason for this was that much of the pre-war civil administration was destroyed during the Japanese occupation and the chaotic war after the Japanese capitulation. However, when it became clear that most Eurasians wanted to leave Indonesia, this lenient attitude with regard to who was admitted to the former Dutch mother country changed. The Dutch government sent instructions to Dutch officials in Indonesia saying that the interpretation of the previous guidelines had been too lenient and that stricter controls were necessary to determine who was Dutch and who should be allowed to come to the Netherlands.⁵⁵ In 1954, these guidelines were made more lenient again under the influence of the increasing number of requests and public opinion. For example, not having guaranteed housing, maintenance and the possibility to pay back the costs of travel were no longer reasons to turn down the requests, whereas that was certainly the case earlier. Thus, on the one hand, the authorities considered the future interests of the children an important factor in the decision to grant admission, in contrast to the previous criteria in which this was deemed unimportant.⁵⁶ On the other hand, the Dutch government was concerned that an exodus of Dutch people (including Indo-Europeans) to the Netherlands would aggravate unemployment and housing shortages. Authorities in the Netherlands felt that the country was overpopulated and encouraged 400,000 Dutch people to emigrate to countries like Canada and Australia and paid for their transport.⁵⁷

This statement about the overpopulation of the Netherlands was also made by the Dutch High Commissioner of Indonesia, A.Th. Lamping. The position of High Commissioner was created especially, in order to let the Dutch hold a privileged place in

the diplomatic sphere in Indonesia. This meant that they could easily arrange matters for the Dutch people who still lived in Indonesia. Three weeks before the end of the option period, in a radio speech broadcast in December 1951, Lamping strongly encouraged Indo-Europeans to opt for Indonesian citizenship (called *Warga Negara*). He declared that the Dutch government considered the choice of Indonesian citizenship by those Dutch 'who were oriented to this country, the most natural solution.' He said that while the choice of nationality was completely personal, individuals should 'not let themselves be moved by sentiments and impulses but rather by common sense and a feeling of responsibility'.⁵⁸ Lamping's speech was criticised in an article in the influential colonial newspaper *De Nieuwsgier*, which resented the 'soothing talk about sentiment' and pointed out that 'a strong feeling of nationality was always a question of sentiment' and that if this feeling had not been present among the Indo-Europeans, their 'whole attitude during the past 50 years would have been impossible'.⁵⁹ The article stressed the sudden reversal of nationality, which was for Indo-Europeans at that moment according to the article's reporter 'still a bit more than a birth right which one could swap casually for a pot of lentils'.⁶⁰ It was the responsibility of the Dutch colonial system that brought most Indo-Europeans Dutch nationality. Dutch nationality had been an important privilege in the colonial period, but had become an unbearable burden after decolonisation.

Whereas the IEF passionately defended choosing Indonesian citizenship and encouraging people to stay, another organisation with many Indo-Europeans among its members, the *Bond van Oud-Steurtjes* (the league of old pupils of the Oranje Nassau institution of Johannes van der Steur) was neutral in its viewpoint. The magazine of this organisation (*de Bode*) only stressed its

good advice for all those who are laden with worries: Do not let these worries overwhelm you, maintain your self-confidence, don't let yourself be guided by the infamous inferiority complex, which is so often imputed to Indos (Indo-Europeans).⁶¹

Among the most important reasons for choosing Indonesian citizenship and staying in Indonesia was the hope for a prosperous economic future. Indo-Europeans cited the natural riches of Indonesia and its need for trained personnel as reasons for staying.⁶² Furthermore, they knew nothing about the situation in the Netherlands. Would they have a good future there? They knew that many Dutch people were preparing for emigration to the United States, Australia, New Zealand or Canada. This enforced the idea that there was no place for them in the Netherlands.⁶³ Many Indo-Europeans were still thinking in colonial terms. They simply could not believe that the Indonesians could develop their country themselves, so they felt they had to stay to help them build up their country. The opportunities for Indo-Europeans in Indonesia would be greater if they became Indonesian citizens than if they kept their Dutch nationality, because they would be a 'foreigner'. Only those who had chosen Indonesian citizenship would be able to continue working in the Indonesian governmental services on a permanent basis or to transfer from the Royal Dutch Indies Army to the Indonesian armed forces.⁶⁴

To a country in ruins

Dutch authorities in the late 1940s, felt that the Netherlands, with a population of 10 million, was overpopulated. They therefore encouraged and financed the emigration of 400,000 Dutch people, mostly to Australia and Canada.⁶⁵ Authorities tried to discourage the arrival of Indo-Europeans, and from what the Indo-Europeans could read in newspapers prospects in the Netherlands were not attractive. The Indo-Europeans came to the Netherlands when the country was recovering from a war in which 230,000 to 330,000 people died. There was 26 billion guilders in damages, the country had been looted, and many Dutch had suffered hardship.⁶⁶ There were food and housing shortages, and a return of the pre-war unemployment was feared.

The articles in newspapers, the speeches, television programmes and publications of the Indo-European lobby emphasised that the Indo-Europeans were part of Dutch society. Indo-Europeans should be allowed to come to the Netherlands if they were regarded as sufficiently 'Dutch by appearance'.⁶⁷ The Indo-Europeans, who did move to the Netherlands, had what Gert Oostindie coined as a 'post-colonial bonus'.⁶⁸ They had Dutch nationality, spoke Dutch, grew up in the same school system, and knew the culture of the mother country. There was however also, according to Charlotte Laarman, a post-colonial malus.⁶⁹ This means that the negative stereotypes that were developed in the colonial context did affect the Indo-Europeans in the Netherlands. Since they were born and raised in the tropics, they were presumed to be 'eastern' in orientation. Dutch policy makers used words like 'indolent' and 'lethargic' to describe the group. They designed assimilation policies in order to adapt the 'repatriates' to Dutch society. The children were sent to adjustment classes, and the women to cooking classes, where they were taught frugality. They were told not to waste fuel, they were taught how to manage a household without staff, and how to cook Dutch style.⁷⁰ The Indo-Europeans were depicted as physically frail and vulnerable, and unable to deal with the cold Dutch weather. The military base Budel was transformed into a camp in which 9500 of the 'repatriates' were housed, albeit not all at the same time. After the camp experience of many Indo-Europeans under Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies, this was not an attractive foresight.⁷¹

Dutch authorities hoped that 50,000 people from the Dutch East Indies, would be willing to move to the Dutch colony Surinam. The plan failed because the Indo-Europeans were not interested.⁷² A plan for migration to the US had more success.⁷³ The US had put pressure on the Netherlands to end its colonial regime in the Dutch East Indies, because the USSR equated (neo-)colonialism with capitalism. In the contemporary cold war context, the USSR sought to convince countries on the brink of independence to seek help from the USSR rather than from the US.⁷⁴ The Dutch put pressure on the US to take some of the repatriates because the US had pushed for Indonesia's independence. In 1953, the US introduced its Refugee Act. The US quota system, which was introduced in the 1920s, only allowed 1648 Dutch people to migrate to the US annually. The Refugee Act made 1700 extra visa available. Under the Pastore-Walter Act I and II (respectively introduced in 1958 and 1960) another 9000 extra visa were made available to the Dutch refugees. Since visas were made available to entire families the number of people able to migrate was much larger than the above mentioned num-

ber of visa. The Indo-Europeans used these possibilities. They had to migrate to the Netherlands first, and find a us sponsor, before they could migrate to the us. Sponsors could be churches, and individuals. Mrs. De Ruyter, for example, wrote to the widow of the former us president, who proved willing to sponsor her and her family.⁷⁵

The us was an attractive alternative to the Indo-Europeans. The Dutch East Indies were more advanced when it came to music and fashion than the Netherlands, and were more oriented towards the us already before the Second World War. In the us press, the possibilities for the Indo-Europeans were applauded. In a letter to *The New York Times* it was said:

Many of us may have disagreed in the past with Congressman Francis Walter's views on immigration, but I'm sure that all of us are applauding his successful plea [...] for admitting to the United States thousands of Dutch refugees from Indonesia. These victims of self-destructive Indonesian chauvinism could not be integrated without hardship into the economy of the overpopulated Netherlands.⁷⁶

Overall, the Netherlands was not presented as an attractive option for the Indo-Europeans. The us seemed to offer more possibilities, but only to a small number of people.

9.4 Vietnam: Ceasefire and *Convention sur la nationalité*

After the end of the Japanese occupation and the *coup d'état*, French military forces bombed the port of Haiphong in the North-Eastern part of Vietnam in November 1946. This was followed in December by the Viet Minh attacks on French civilians and soldiers in Hanoi.⁷⁷ On 22 December 1946, while the Viet Minh fought in Hanoi, the Standing Committee of the ICP issued a statement to party members calling for a war of national resistance against the French colonial regime.⁷⁸ The First Indochina War can be divided into two phases: the first lasted from 1946 until the end of 1949, and the second from 1950 until 1954. The first phase was characterised by reconquering areas that the French had lost. In other words, the French attempted to restore colonial power. Soon enough, the French found out that the guerrilla warfare tactics of the Viet Minh made it impossible to restore control. Therefore, this goal was regarded as unfeasible and impractical. In reality, both sides used harsh interrogation methods, torture, and the torching of villages to intimidate combatants and civilians, and acquire information.⁷⁹ The second phase was influenced by the Cold War geopolitical context, the internationalisation of the war, and the concomitant fear of communism and was characterised by more traditional military engagements.⁸⁰ The very last month of the First Indochina War during the spring of 1954 was characterised by intense fighting.⁸¹ The turmoil could well have motivated *Métis* people to leave.

During the period between 21 December 1946 and 5 March 1947, the leader of the Viet Minh, Ho Chi Minh, made seven appeals to the French troops for a ceasefire. He was unsuccessful. Part of the reason for the failure to negotiate a ceasefire was that the French government was divided on the issue, with some favouring negotiations with the Viet Minh, and others proposing military aggression. The unstable situation in Indochina was reflected in France: several governments succeeded each other be-

tween 1945 and 1954; misinformation and miscommunication were instrumental in the war's escalation.⁸² It soon became clear that the French troops had a clear advantage when it came to weapons and could take and hold any area they wanted. By contrast, the Viet Minh held a considerable advantage in manpower because they were better at recruiting soldiers locally. The war became a low-scale, guerrilla-like affair of patrols, ambushes and small-unit actions. The French held most cities and the Viet Minh dominated the mountainous countryside and remote areas. In June 1948, the French signed the Halong Bay accords, formed a provisional government, the unified non-communist 'state of Vietnam', which was deliberately set in opposition to Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam.⁸³ In March 1949, the French authorities signed an agreement with former emperor Bao Dai, according to which the French gave Vietnam its 'independence' as an associated state under the leadership of Bao Dai within the French Union. This concession did not have the reinforcing effect on the war effort the French hoped for. The war entered the second more international and dangerous phase.⁸⁴ In the midst of this confusing and unstable situation, the private *Métis* interest organisation *La Mutuelle de Français d'Indochine* tried to safeguard the future of its adult members with an appeal to employers to give priority to *Métis* in the allocation of jobs in the case of equal suitability between *Métis* people and Vietnamese candidates.⁸⁵

The later American president John F. Kennedy – then a young member of the American congress – and his family visited Vietnam in 1951. In their assessments of the war effort, confusing ideas about the purpose of the First Indochina War abounded. Was the ultimate goal of the war effort to restore colonialism or to combat communism? John F. Kennedy said: 'we are not here to help the French maintain colonial rule, but to stop the communists'. By contrast, his brother Robert Kennedy said: 'we are here to help the French maintain colonies'. And he added: 'The French proved to be mostly suspicious of us intentions'.⁸⁶ Also the Vietnamese nationalists had an (albeit slightly unbalanced) double agenda, fighting against imperialism coupled with a socialist revolution. At the Second National Congress of the ICP (later renamed the Vietnamese Workers Party, vwp), held in February 1951, the vwp was formally re-established. In his keynote, the new party leader Truong Chinh declared that the vwp would play a leading role in the Vietnamese revolution, while ideologically following a Marxist-Leninist path. Although the fight against imperialism held priority over anti-feudal taxes, Chinh confirmed that once the French had been defeated, a new government would be set up under clear party leadership. The party would gradually change the country with the help of a socialist revolution.⁸⁷

In the course of the 1940s, orphanages and other child protection institutions in Tonkin had closed their doors because of the Japanese occupation.⁸⁸ When after Japanese occupation the heavy fighting between French and Vietnamese troops continued, almost all *Métis*, consisting of thousands of adults and children, fled to the south. Later, the *Métis* children were transported to reception centres, the so-called *foyers*, set up for them in the southern part of France.



III. 9 Métis boys in the reception centre of Cholon (part of Saigon), undated.⁸⁹

The *foyers* were divided into girls' and boys' centres. For example, the *foyers* at St. Rambert and Bugeay were only meant for girls, and the *foyers* at Vouvray and Semblancay were meant for boys.⁹⁰ Adult *Métis*, if they agreed, could also be evacuated to the southern part of Vietnam and be repatriated to France. This happened on a large scale, even though people at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were concerned about the fact that the majority of unemployed people among colonial migrants were Eurasians.⁹¹ They feared that their mixed ancestry would make it more difficult for them to find a decent job in France. A considerable number of Vietnamese women travelled alone with their *Métis* children, because they had become widows during the war.⁹² A couple of hundred *rapatriés* of the first generation, predominantly Vietnamese women, who did not have the means to support themselves at the time, could not really integrate into French society according to local politicians of the locations where they were received after their arrival in France. They were French citizens, but they transplanted their Vietnamese life style to the reception centres. They created a true Asian, Vietnamese atmosphere there.⁹³

Almost all *Métis* children were eligible for French citizenship according to the already mentioned *décret* of 1928 and the *Convention sur la nationalité* of 1955 (when they were 18 years or older). The *Métis* simply had to prove that they were of French ancestry. A 'French', white and European appearance helped to prove that as well as a French education, upbringing and fluency in French. However, none of these features was indispensable for acquiring French citizenship.⁹⁴ Not even written proof of French ancestry was necessary, while that was a crucial condition in the British and Dutch contexts. This meant that children of soldiers who did not have French nationality could apply for French citizenship. Because most of the children eligible for French nationality were not recognised by their French fathers, they were given a new

name that was similar but not the same as that of their fathers. For example, the *Métis* child protection organisation *FOEFI* changed the names of its pupils from Vietnamese to French, or reversed the order of the French names (so René Robert became Robert René). In other cases, the name of the father was reversed (Henri Francois was the son of Francois Henri). Renaming the children was a part of the transformation process the *FOEFI* undertook. This process destroyed the children's links to their past, as names connected them to their maternal family, culture, and ancestral heritage.⁹⁵ Obviously, while the actions of the *FOEFI* gave many *Métis* valuable opportunities in life, it also could be a particularly painful process. The colonial status of *Métis* as defined in the *décret* of 1928 in this manner strongly influenced the inclusive policy of the French government to repatriate almost all *Métis* children and adults to France.

Following the *Convention sur la nationalité* of 1955, the new Vietnamese government offered naturalised *Métis*, of whom many had become French citizens, the chance to reclaim their Vietnamese citizenship.⁹⁶ An additional complicating factor for *Métis* was the regulation from the 1955 *Convention* which forced those who had acquired French citizenship prior to 1949 to choose before 15 February 1956 whether to retain French citizenship or choose Vietnamese citizenship. This was a difficult choice for *Métis* people. Those born after 1949 were automatically granted Vietnamese citizenship.⁹⁷ Some adult *Métis* choose Vietnamese citizenship, because they came under the influence of nationalists while in orphanages. They spoke Vietnamese amongst themselves and sometimes ran away when they discovered that repatriation to France was eminent.⁹⁸ The opportunity for *Métis* people to choose French or Vietnamese citizenship became an important factor informing the decision-making process of *Métis* people in newly independent Vietnam.

The Vietnamese, as well as the French government, tried to win 'the hearts and minds' of people living in the Vietnamese countryside, including *Métis* children, by offering poverty relief and child care programmes. If the Vietnamese government won the loyalties of abandoned Eurasian children of French and imperial soldiers, the children would pose a threat to French authority and prestige in the colony during the first Indochina War.⁹⁹ This threat was strengthened by the generous citizenship criteria, which the Vietnamese granted the Eurasians. Applicants had to adhere to Vietnamese culture and speak Vietnamese. This was similar to the requirements made on those who wanted to become French. There was however one important difference. The DRV demanded political loyalty from their new citizens, and it explicitly questioned the loyalty of non-Vietnamese and *Métis* people to the newly independent Vietnamese state.¹⁰⁰ According to French colonial authorities, Vietnamese authorities secretly and automatically forced Vietnamese citizenship upon the *Métis*.¹⁰¹

From camps to camps

Repatriation to France was not without obstacles. France, like the Netherlands, had suffered severe losses during the Second World War. Half a million hectares of land needed to be de-mined, 400,000 buildings had to be rebuild and two million buildings were damaged. Infrastructure like ports, train tracks, roads and bridges had been destroyed and supplies could not easily be distributed. Rationing continued until

1949. The disintegration of the French Empire did not only lead to wars in Indochina but also to bloody uprisings in Madagascar and Cameroon and the brutal war in Algeria (1956-1962). The arrival of the *pieds-noirs* from Algeria received much more attention in the press than that of the people coming from French Indochina. The *pieds-noirs* formed strong organisations that made effective claims for rights in France, while those from Indochina did not.

The repatriates from Indochina could mostly not immediately leave for France after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. First, they were placed in military camps in Saigon, where the new Vietnamese authorities watched them distrustfully. From 1956 onwards, almost all of them embarked on ships heading for reception centres or *Centres d'Accueil* in France.¹⁰² These camps continued to exist for years. More than half of the male residents (56 per cent) living in the *Centres d'Accueil* were of Eurasian ancestry and nearly three quarters of all children who were living there were of mixed ancestry (74.4 per cent).¹⁰³ The people were encouraged to leave the camps as soon as they found a job. The administrators of the camp considered all luxurious items such as televisions or washing machines suspicious. The idea was that one could only afford those items when they had a decent job, and if they had such a job the subsidised camp residence was no longer needed. Many of the younger *Métis* managed to leave the camps in due time. Only the older Vietnamese women, the handicapped and other 'inassimilable people' stayed, some of whom even until today.¹⁰⁴

9.5 Comparison and conclusion: 'It was the end of our world'

Both the Dutch and British metropolitan governments were initially reluctant to admit people of mixed ancestry from the former colonies into their countries. Important reasons were housing shortages and the fear of a return to pre-war unemployment. The idea that 'eastern' people would not fit in also played a role. In both cases, bureaucratic hurdles had to be taken before Eurasians from the former Dutch East Indies and British India could come to the Netherlands and the UK. For the Anglo-Indians as well as for the Indo-Europeans this added to the atmosphere of deprivation and discontent, which was on the rise since the late colonial period. This also added to the inferiority complex which all three Eurasian groups were believed to have and to which many authors at the time referred. They were often considered Europeans, but never completely.¹⁰⁵ In France, there were, by contrast, fewer concerns about housing or unemployment. This situation could also be attributed to the fact that the number of repatriates was not that large, and because it occurred at a time when the post-war recovery was fully underway, and there were shortages of labour in France. This was not the case in the Netherlands and the UK in the late 1940s. Since the repatriates were mostly children in the French case, age mattered, as did religion and education. The decision to transport all children of mixed ancestry to France was influenced by the violent decolonisation process in Indochina. Next to that, the geopolitical context was important because the *Métis* were fleeing a communist regime at a time when the Cold War dominated international relations. In addition, the decision of the older *Métis* to migrate was motivated by their former place in the colonial hierarchy. With this

colonial etiquette, they were certain there was no place for them in newly independent Indochina. An alternative, like the Indo-Europeans and Anglo-Indians had with their potential new homeland of respectively New Guinea, was less relevant to the *Métis* people in the Indochinese case because by that time this option had pended out.

An important difference between the Dutch and British Eurasians were the privileges that Anglo-Indians secured during the series of Round Table Conferences in 1931. Not only were jobs for Anglo-Indians guaranteed but also other rights such as representation in Parliament and provincial legislatures and educational grants for education in English. In addition, Anglo-Indians automatically became Indian citizens when independence was declared. They did not have to make a choice like the Eurasians in the Dutch East Indies case. The IEV, in its periodical *Onze Stem*, noted that the Anglo-Indians who stayed in large numbers in India after decolonisation were a good example for Indo-Europeans: 'In India, one does not find the phenomenon that a large group of Eurasians did not accept the Indian nationality like here.'¹⁰⁶ But 'not accepting' was not possible in India when one automatically became an Indian citizen.

In all three cases, policy makers usually approached the Eurasian group as families of Eurasian people, and this was related to the dominant discourse.¹⁰⁷ The male head of the household had to apply for visas and citizenship for himself and his wife and children. This tied in with the principle that the wife always followed the citizenship of her husband.¹⁰⁸

In the Dutch case, Indo-Europeans were traumatised by their experiences during the Japanese occupation and the *Bersiap*. Therefore, the inclination to leave was stronger than in the British case. At the Round Table Conference in autumn 1949 the conditions for the independence of Indonesia were negotiated. Both sides made a large number of promises, but in the 1950s, the Indonesian government unilaterally broke them whereas in India they remained firmly in place after independence. The regulations of the French government to grant the *Métis* French citizenship (and therefore admission to France) were more generous and written proof of European ancestry was not essential. The decolonisation of Indochina happened relatively late in comparison with the other two cases because the French coupled their struggle to maintain colonial power with an anti-communist fight for which they gained American support.

The American support became clear in the last stage of the First Indochina War in the summer of 1953, when approximately 70 per cent of the costs of the war were paid by the Americans.¹⁰⁹ The first Americans had arrived in Vietnam in 1950, as part of the United States Military Assistance Advisory group charged with training the South Vietnamese Army.¹¹⁰ In Indonesia, the opposite happened: the Dutch lost their colony to non-communist Indonesian nationalists and were under diplomatic pressure from the international community, especially the United States. The Americans were more focused on Vietnam and deemed Indonesia to be insulated by water from the 'so-called' domino effect (which would lead to all neighbouring countries becoming communist in the South-East Asian region). However, the United States later feared the communist exploitation of anti-colonialism and the Security Council passed a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Indonesia.¹¹¹ It demanded the release of

all republican prisoners, the reopening of negotiations based on previous agreements, and an early date on which the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia would take place.¹¹² In both the Dutch and French cases, some Eurasian people regretted their decision to move to the mother country and wanted to return to the former colony. They felt discriminated against.

10 Socio-economic circumstances for Eurasians after decolonisation

10.1 Introduction

For the majority of the people of mixed ancestry in the three former Asian colonies, not much changed immediately after decolonisation. After some time, however, they began to experience profound changes in society, most notably downward social mobility: they lost their jobs and houses. However, this did not mean that all Eurasians wanted to leave immediately for the mother country.

10.2 India: Bureaucratic obstacles and status decline

In the first years after independence, Anglo-Indians succeeded in maintaining most of their characteristics as a separate community. A number of important political issues were at stake for the Anglo-Indian community in the initial postcolonial period. First, there was the survival of Anglo-Indian schools, including the ones at the hill stations. Secondly, there was the continued use of English in governmental circles, schools and at universities. Connected to that was a third point: the choice of a national language and its effect on the use of English in India.¹ These issues contributed to an uncertain atmosphere among Anglo-Indians. Therefore, after a while, many wished to leave for the UK. But in order to be admitted to the UK, they had to overcome a number of bureaucratic hurdles. It is difficult to assess how burdensome these bureaucratic obstacles were. From the correspondence between the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) and the British High Commissionership in Delhi, it did not become clear how the strict governmental rules on immigration of Anglo-Indians were implemented in practice. For example, one governmental official of the Ministry of Health wrote:

We do not think it is desirable that they should be given any encouragement to come here. As you know there is an acute shortage of housing accommodation, and our experience of those who have already arrived is that because of racial and other reasons they are extremely difficult to place in employment, and therefore seem likely to remain a burden on the Exchequer.²

In this letter, the governmental official provided justifications that also featured in the Dutch East Indies case: shortage of housing and jobs, and racial tensions. This direc-

tive that Anglo-Indians should not be encouraged to migrate to the UK was repeated in several letters.³ By contrast, another governmental official wrote:

Our general policy is not to put any obstacle in their way provided that they can pay their expenses. In the event of an anti-European movement developing in India, Anglo-Indians would inevitably suffer.⁴

In 1958, however, the governmental officials seemed to have changed their mind regarding the plight of Anglo-Indians. They showed their satisfaction in their letters when it turned out that the Indian government placed various obstacles in the way of Anglo-Indians wishing to leave for the UK. For example, one official from the Commonwealth Relations Office wrote the following lines to the High Commissionership in Delhi about Anglo-Indians, which point to that sentiment:

The difficulty of making them into active and useful members of our society is still great. Hence we should not be displeased to see Anglo-Indians experiencing difficulty obtaining travel documents to emigrate from India.⁵

But the British High Commissionership also observed that Anglo-Indians experienced extensive difficulty in integrating into independent India. In a letter from the High Commissioner to the Commonwealth Relations Office in Britain, it was made quite clear that the Anglo-Indians were a problematic community:

[...] little sign of them yet being effectively integrated. Some of course have done so and whilst retaining Western habits regard themselves as Indian citizens and have thrown in their lot with India: there are many such in the Indian army.

Despite these difficulties, most Anglo-Indians wanted to leave for the UK, according to the official:

The more they drop in the social scale, the more they want to migrate, but then it is less possible to do so. [They will be] discriminated against in Indian firms. Do not do much to help themselves.⁶

After the job reservations for Anglo-Indians came to an end in the 1960s, there was chronic unemployment amongst Anglo-Indian men. Anglo-Indian women became reluctant to marry men from their own community. The average Indian considered them also as lazy and poorly educated. These ideas reflected earlier oriental stereotypes of the colonised 'other'.⁷ The lack of education among Anglo-Indian men could be explained by the reserved government jobs which made it unnecessary for an Anglo-Indian to have qualifications for a superior position. A tradition of minimal education was present among Anglo-Indians, especially among the men. Furthermore, most Anglo-Indian families maintained a western style of living which was more expensive than an Indian lifestyle. This usually left less money for education. As a result, the status of many Anglo-Indians dropped in the postcolonial years. Of the 120,000 Anglo-Indians who were still living in India in the 1980s, it was estimated that approximately one third was living below the poverty line.⁸ This was enforced by the fact that those who stayed were too poor to migrate.

10.3 Indonesia: The Westerling affair and New Guinea as an alternative destination

In the first years after independence, Dutch companies were still very active in Indonesia and some Dutch people continued to occupy privileged positions in these businesses. The fact that the former Dutch coloniser was still in charge in many places influenced daily affairs and caused frustration and resentment among the Indonesians. The *Indonesianisasi* programme, that was implemented from 1950 onwards, meant that Dutch companies had to employ Indonesians for the majority of their posts, including the higher ones.⁹ Dutch companies initiated this policy quite rapidly to avoid accusations from the Indonesians that they continued to employ Dutch citizens in high positions. Dutch multinationals such as Shell and Unilever tried to encourage some Eurasians to stay and to choose Indonesian citizenship in order to be able to keep them as capable and reliable employees.¹⁰ For Indo-Europeans who had not become Indonesian citizens in the option period, it was increasingly difficult to find or hold a job in the immediate postcolonial period. As a result of inflation, the daily lives of Indo-Europeans deteriorated significantly. The primary necessities became more expensive.¹¹ This led to increased unrest among Indonesians. They blamed the remaining Dutch and Indo-European people for their problems. Furthermore, there was not a stable Indonesian government. Yet, according to the special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, the general tendency among Europeans was to stay in Indonesia:

Dutch and other European and Chinese business men are not willing to leave a country so obdurately prosperous. On the contrary, Batavia's pre war population of about 700,000 has nearly doubled since it became Jakarta. This is partly due to a big refugee influx of Europeans and Eurasians from burnt-out sugar mills and tea and coffee plantations. But it is also due to a prevailing determination to hang on, hoping for the best while fearing the worst. [...] There was an unprecedented wave of anti-European sentiment after the Westerling affair. This could flare disastrously in the event of another attempted coup by dissident Dutch and Eurasian groups.¹²

The Westerling affair was a failed *coup d'état* by the former captain of the Royal Dutch Indies Army Raymond Westerling on 23 January 1950. It increased tensions between Indonesians, Eurasians and Dutch.¹³ With his own private military organisation, APRA (Angketan Perang Ratu Adil), which consisted of colonial soldiers of the 'special forces' from the Royal Dutch Indies Army, Westerling conquered strategic buildings in the mountainous area surrounding Bandung. It was unclear what the purpose of his *coup* was, although Westerling himself explicitly declared that his actions were directed at the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army) and not at the Republic of Indonesia.¹⁴ It was unclear how many supporters he had. Indonesian-Dutch relations further deteriorated after the attempted *coup*. Several years later, this culminated in large-scale anti-Dutch actions on 5 December 1957. On this day, which was later renamed *Zwarte Sinterklaas* (Black Santa Claus), all Dutch people (including Indo-Europeans with obvious Dutch ancestry) were declared enemies of the Indonesian state. They were forced to leave the country and all Dutch companies were na-

tionalised.¹⁵ People with Dutch citizenship started to leave in large numbers. *The New York Times* wrote on Christmas Day:

For thousands of Dutch nationals here, today was more than just another Christmas in Indonesia. It was the last Dec. 25 many of them would be spending in this equatorial country in which they were born. They are preparing to leave for the Netherlands, a land they do not know. "What is snow?" a 7-year-old boy asked. [...] an estimated total of 20,000 of the 46,000 Dutch nationals living in Indonesia [...] are Eurasians. [...] The Netherlands is a place they have heard about in their bilingual homes but never seen. Now these people are being uprooted. They are being forced to change countries, something they would hardly have done by choice.¹⁶

As mentioned above, the IEV urged its members to choose Indonesian citizenship. This was a remarkable switch for the organisation, since it had always been loyal to Dutch colonial rule during its entire existence in the colonial period. They started their reorientation process towards the Indonesian side from 1946 onwards. On 31 August 1946, the chairman, Eduard Doppie Wermuth wrote an article entitled 'Reorientation' in *Onze Stem*. His main argument was that Indo-European interests were in Indonesia. The IEV-delegation, present at the Round Table Conference in the autumn of 1949, declared that the Indo-Europeans were racially and economically linked to Indonesia.¹⁷ Despite this clear call, a number of prominent IEV-leaders such as Wermuth, De Rozario and Blaauw did not wait until the end of the option period and left for the Netherlands before December 1951. There, they became active in the (later separated) Dutch branch of the IEV, the *Vereniging Indische Nederlanders* (VIN, Association Indisch Dutch). They could leave because they were relatively rich. Their move made them unreliable in the eyes of other Indo-Europeans. The relatively wealthy situation of almost all the IEV-leaders could have a reverse effect: the switch to the Indonesian side was affordable. The majority however felt too attached to Dutch culture. The IEV-leaders were usually professionals such as lawyers and doctors, so they did not have to depend on the few remaining Dutch businesses in Indonesia or the Indonesian government for survival.¹⁸ Part of the reorientation process was to rename the IEV in 1951: *Gabungan Indo Untuk Kesatuan Indonesia* or *Indo-Eenheids Verbond* (Indo Unity League, IEV).¹⁹

Due to the IEV's radical new policy, numerous IEV departments closed down when the number of members slumped. Former members considered the new policy of the IEV as a 'betrayal'. Only Indonesian citizens could now become members of the IEV; members with Dutch citizenship were no longer accepted.²⁰ In 1959, in *Tong Tong*, editor-in-chief Tjalie Robinson characterised this radical policy as a split in the League, after which the unity in the organisation never returned.²¹ As mentioned above, despite all efforts of both the IEV and the Dutch government, Indo-Europeans did not opt in large numbers for Indonesian citizenship. People who made this choice were generally part of the middle classes and felt attached to the Indonesian archipelago as their land of birth and hoped to be able to keep their job, business or property.²² Their choice was motivated by their old colonial status and class. Next to that, they were attracted to the prospect of a prosperous economic future in Indonesia and they wanted to expand old Dutch businesses. In this respect, Indo-Europeans also pointed to the natural riches of Indonesia and to its need for trained personnel. Since most Indo-Eu-

Europeans had never been to the Netherlands, they could not imagine how they would fare in the mother country. Above all, they felt they would have greater opportunities in Indonesia as Indonesian citizens than as Dutch 'foreigners'.²³ Only those Indo-Europeans who chose Indonesian citizenship would be able to continue in governmental service on a permanent basis or in the Indonesian armed forces. Several large (former Dutch) companies threatened to dismiss Indo-European employees who did not opt for Indonesian citizenship. The Netherlands did not present an attractive alternative, with its cold climate, different culture, and its housing shortage.

The constitutional guarantees negotiated during the Round Table Conference were also an important reason to choose Indonesian citizenship and stay, although these did not turn out to be of much value for the Indo-Europeans who stayed and became *Warga Negara*. In the provisional Indonesian constitution of 1949, it was stated in article 7 that: 'all citizens of Indonesia are entitled to equal treatment and protection of the law', in article 18: 'everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion', and in article 100: 'Chinese, European and Arab minority groups should be represented in the House of Representatives by at least nine, six, and three members respectively'.²⁴ These articles were bureaucratic considerations, that seemed to be favourable for Indo-Europeans at the beginning of the postcolonial period but later proved to be of no value when they fell by the wayside.

'We Eurasians should have a home of our own'

In the 'New Guinea associations', to which old IEF-members increasingly turned, New Guinea was presented as an alternative destination to the Netherlands. New Guinea was an option for those who could not prove Dutch ancestry, for those who did not have enough money for the journey and who did not have family or other connections in the Netherlands. The motives for moving to New Guinea were elaborately explained in a newspaper article by an officer of the Netherlands Immigration Office in Singapore:

Under the changing conditions in the Dutch-Malay Archipelago, thousands of Europeans and Eurasians felt themselves more and more out of place there, Mr. M.F. Ruitenbach, an officer of the Netherlands Immigration Office in Singapore told the *Sunday Times* yesterday. [...] 'Most of them are used to life in the tropics, and do not want to go back to Holland or other parts of Europe because they know that the market there is already over-crowded with trained people in every field', he added. 'So their aim is to retain one area of the whole Archipelago for themselves where they can keep their own European culture and continue to engage in pioneering work.' Mr. Ruitenbach said he had been a member of an organisation formed for this purpose in Batavia called the Nederlands Indische Transmigratie New Guinea. This organisation had about 8,000 members and was growing stronger. It has asked the Dutch Government for an assurance that Dutch New Guinea would be retained as a European stronghold free from domination by Indonesian elements. It had also asked the Government for financial assistance for Europeans and Eurasians from other parts of the Archipelago who were willing to go to New Guinea as pioneers. 'The Dutch Government has replied that it is willing to assist in the scheme when law and order is firmly re-established in the N.E.I (Netherlands East Indies, i.e. Dutch East Indies).'²⁵

However, the aspirations of Indo-Europeans to build an Indo-European homeland in New Guinea failed just like similar attempts to start an agricultural colony on Sumatra, especially designed for Indo-Europeans, had failed earlier in the colonial period. This was partly due to a lack of governmental support, but it also turned out that Indo-Europeans were not the ideal type of agricultural colonists. They were not accustomed to doing heavy physical work and agricultural labour.²⁶ The general idea behind the migration to New Guinea showed what many Indo-Europeans desired. Most Eurasians wanted to live in their own country without coping with their colonial 'in-between' position which meant social and political pressure from the Indonesians as well as the Dutch.²⁷

An article from the *Indian Daily Mail* from 1946 highlighted the advantages of migration to New Guinea for Eurasians:

Victims of revolution and economic dislocation, most Eurasians see their only hope for future security in emigration to an underpopulated land where they can begin life anew. Dutch New Guinea was selected as their goal. [...] There would be no colour bar. It was fear of discrimination that led Eurasian leaders to abandon earlier hopes for settlement in Australia, South Africa or the United States. The climate is tropical, much like that to which the Eurasians have been accustomed. Best of all, the U.S. Army's great wartime base of Hollandia has been returned to Dutch control. Eurasian leaders believe it may ultimately become the metropolitan centre for their settlement area.²⁸

The Indian Daily Mail went on to explain that the Eurasians had few options.

Behind the Eurasian willingness to join the world's displaced millions is an unhappy story. Legally and politically, persons of mixed European and Asiatic blood have the full status of Dutch citizens in the Indies. Social discrimination exists only in a very limited degree – less perhaps, than anywhere else in Asia. But two forces are driving the Eurasians to emigration. The first is political. Often called 'more Dutch than the Hollanders' the Eurasians have opposed the Indonesian nationalists bitterly during the past year of revolution. Now they are convinced that the current political negotiations will result in some degree of formal recognition of the revolutionary Indonesian Republic's authority over Java. Probably they are correct. Dutch officials privately admit as much. Under an Indonesian-dominated Republic the Eurasians feel they will be faced by economic and political discrimination. As proof they point to the 13,000 Eurasians interned by the Republic after Japan's surrender. [...] Economic pressures which have been developing for years also have influenced the Eurasian's decision. For centuries they held a virtual monopoly of white collar jobs – clerical posts and minor civil service positions. In recent years educated Indonesians and Chinese have taken those jobs from them steadily. Agriculture could have been a substitute. It was not because the Indies law which forbids anyone but Indonesians to own land. [...] High Dutch officials point to the failure of a 1930 New Guinea colonization effort.²⁹

The Washington Post published an article that was almost verbatim the same under the heading: 'New Guinea, pesthole to Yanks, is 'Canaan' to 250,000 Eurasians'. According to this article New Guinea was 'the land cursed as a jungled nightmare by American soldiers'. The paper added:

Only Brazil still figures as an alternative to Dutch New Guinea in the Eurasians' plans. A minority plan to make the long trip to South America instead of joining their fellows in New Guinea.³⁰

The above excerpt from the *Indian Daily Mail* about a Dutch East Indies shows the clear interconnections between the former colonies in the South East Asian region. This interconnection was demonstrated even more by the fact that not only Indo-Europeans from the Dutch East Indies but also Eurasians from neighbouring British colonies such as Malaya, India, Ceylon and Burma attempted to make New Guinea their new homeland. This indicated that a sort of collective identity had come into existence across the whole region. *The Straits Times*, a newspaper printed in Singapore wrote already in 1939:

The Eurasian problem can only be solved by providing them with a HOME of their own. There are over 300,000 Eurasians in British possessions in the East, and 90 per cent of these are doomed to enforce degeneration.³¹

The paper made a comparison to the fate of European Jews:

Britain has spent an enormous amount of money, and also lives, to provide a home for the Jews. [...] The Jews are not British subjects, and yet so much is done on their behalf. The Eurasians are blood relations, and yet nothing is done for them. There is plenty of room in New Guinea for a Eurasian colony. Thousands of Eurasians youths in India, Ceylon, Burma, Hongkong and Malay are unemployed, and these should be sent as the pioneers to Eurasia. The land is sparsely peopled, and the natives could be given a large reservation in which they could live their own lives without interference. [...] We Eurasians should have a home of our own, for we have a right to live according to our economic status and in a manner free from external repression.³²

The Eurasians from Singapore had the same problems as the Eurasians from the Dutch East Indies. They were not used to working on the land, because they were not allowed to own land in the colonies they lived in:

As for Singapore Eurasians desiring [...] 'to participate in the material advantages of shaping their own destinies without hindrance from extraneous sources' [...] the fact that they know nothing of man's primary occupation, namely, husbandry or making the earth yield fruit in the sweat or their brow, this constitutes a first disability against their even attempting, much less succeeding in founding such a 'home' [...] And here we strike the root cause of the ever-growing menace of the unsolved Eurasian problem – the divorce of the Eurasian from the land.³³

In 1948, 74 Eurasians from Malaya were ready to settle in New Guinea but apparently the cooperation with the Dutch authorities and fellow-Eurasians fell through, because they were eventually not admitted. According to the *Singapore Free Press*:

The board of the Eurasian Union at Batavia of which Dr. E.D. Wermuth is the chairman has officially stated that he 'knows nothing' of a Mr. Loth who is reported to be in Malaya and is discussing with Eurasians in Malaya the question of colonising Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea [...] Mr. Loth stated in Malaya that the chairman of the Eurasian Union at

Batavia, Dr. Wermuth, would request financial aid for this scheme from the Dutch government. [...] The board of the Eurasian Union has announced that it knows nothing of these promises made by Mr. Loth or about any discussion on this subject being held in Singapore. Seventy-four Malayan Eurasians, who applied to go to Hollandia under Mr. Loth's scheme were ready to leave on March 8, when a press statement issued by the Dutch Consulate-General warned them to consider their next move as they had not applied for visas and would be refused permission to land on Dutch soil by the immigration authorities. [...] Preparatory to leaving Singapore, many of the Malayan Eurasians had resigned from their jobs, while some had sold all their belongings.³⁴

Meanwhile, the Indo-Europeans became more divided amongst themselves in the Dutch East Indies. In the early 1950s, four former leaders of the PIN founded their own political party *Partai Demokrasi Indo* (Indo Democratic Party). This new party demanded equal rights for people of mixed ancestry. In addition, they established a federation for the 'removal of minorities' as a goal so that all minorities would be treated equally in Indonesian society. This federation consisted of two parts: *Gerakan Indo Warganegara Indonesia*, which was situated in Jakarta and Bandung, and *Panita Sementara untuk mengha puskan Perasaan sebagai Minoriteit antara Golongan Indo Belanda di Indonesia*, which was located in Semarang in East Java.³⁵ These new associational activities provided the social infrastructure needed for Indo-European people who had decided to stay in independent Indonesia. However, within a few years these organisations would also disappear, because Indo-European people continued to leave for the Netherlands, New Guinea or other countries.

The hope of creating a Eurasian homeland in New Guinea continued for years. In 1959, *The Irish Times* wrote that in New Guinea the Eurasians were treated as Europeans.

In Holland, they would be worse off economically, would be living in a completely alien climate, and, they think, could not be integrated as well as they are in New Guinea. For the Eurasians, Holland is a foreign country. [...] The Indonesians [...] seem to feel more hostile, if that is possible, to Eurasians than to people of pure Dutch blood.³⁶

The last orphans

The European-led orphanages from the colonial period in the Dutch East Indies including the orphanage of 'Pa' van der Steur, experienced difficulties during the first years after independence. Many questions had to be dealt with including: 'What should be done about Indo-European children? And which children should be taken care of? Should only Indo-European children born in the colonial period be included? Or should it also apply to Indo-European children who were the result of unions between Dutch soldiers fighting in the decolonisation war and indigenous women? And what about Indonesian orphans?³⁷ The most complicated issue was whether the staff of the orphanage of Van der Steur could continue caring for children at its old location. The old institution in Magelang was liberated by Dutch troops in 1948. As a result of its bad, decrepit state and the fact that the approximately 200 remaining children had suffered so much mentally and physically during the war and the years after Japanese occupation, the board decided to evacuate them to Jakarta. The story went

that the remaining children showed their admiration for their former caretaker by carrying the chair in which Van der Steur always sat, with them.³⁸ They were brought to an old building in Djatinegara, one of the suburbs of Jakarta (in colonial times known as 'Mr. Cornelis'). However, this place soon turned out to be too small for them.³⁹

A couple of months later, another orphanage in the surrounding area of Jakarta was taken over by the Van der Steur foundation, in order to receive more abandoned children.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Indonesian authorities had nationalised the old location at Magelang, and the orphanage had been turned into an Islamic institution, receiving 'Javanese beggar children' according to representatives of the Van der Steur organisation.⁴¹ A secret report, written by a nephew of Van der Steur documented the – in his opinion – deplorable, immoral state of the institution, the children and the leaders. He also critically considered the board of the institution in Indonesia as 'non-existent', incapable and certainly 'non-influential'.⁴²

10.4 Vietnam: William Bazé and the continued activities of the FOEFI

In contrast to the other contexts, Indochina had not yet been decolonised in 1950. The First Indochina war between the French colonial authorities and Vietnamese nationalists continued until 1954. Between September 1945 and July 1954, almost half a million French people and people from other French colonies had fought in Vietnam as part of the French forces of the Far East.⁴³ Although many French were involved in this war, it was largely overshadowed in the French collective memory by the Second World War which preceded it and the Algerian war and the Second Indochina War (with American involvement) after.⁴⁴ The president of FOEFI, the child protection organisation of Indochina, William Bazé, of mixed ancestry himself, was concerned about the potential danger of abandoned *Métis* children, who had been raised in an indigenous environment. In addition to his presidency of the FOEFI, Bazé was also advisor to the French Union in Indochina and president of another Eurasian self-interest organisation *La Mutuelle de Francais d'Indochine*, which promoted the interests of adult *Métis* in Indochina. He was a strong advocate of the *Métis* cause in general, for both adults and children, as is shown by the many references to him in governmental correspondence and newspaper reports in the *Archives diplomatiques des Ministères des affaires étrangères*.⁴⁵ His name also often appeared in other governmental agencies. This indicates that Bazé was an influential person, since these references were usually positive. However, sometimes people involved with the French government regarded his organisation, FOEFI, with suspicion, as was the case with one member of the *Commission interministérielle pour les rapatriés d'Indochine* in 1958. The members of this commission said that they were 'very scared of relations with that association' and that they 'don't have any means of control nor any authority over that undertaking.' Another member of this *Commission* thought that the FOEFI received too many subsidies, whereas William Bazé always stressed the shortage of money for his organisation, which made it impossible to help all poor, abandoned *Métis* children.⁴⁶ In addition, his militant attitude was openly criticised, because he was for example strongly advocating the *Métis* case, but was ignoring the other French *rapatriés*.⁴⁷

However, the efforts of Bazé proved to be effective. In numerous general notes and reports about the problem of the 'rapatriement' of French citizens from Indochina, the *FOEFI* and the *Métis* children were mentioned separately. Meanwhile, more and more French troops had gone back to France and they left thousands of western looking *Métis* behind in the locations where they had lived temporarily. Because of the continuous arrival of new French troops in the colony, the number of neglected and abandoned *Métis* children kept growing. In 1950, there were already 100,000 *Métis* children and William Bazé estimated that this number would reach 500,000 in 10 years and one million in 25 years if the trend continued.⁴⁸

The old colonial ideas about Eurasians representing a threat to white prestige re-emerged, notably because these children grew up in an indigenous environment. Often their mothers feared stigmatisation because they had a child fathered by a French soldier. In other words, according to Henri Sambuc, member of the *French Academie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer*, in a speech from 1950, *Métis* children were living outside both indigenous society and European society. Furthermore, in Sambuc's opinion, because of their acquaintances among the indigenous population and their knowledge of the indigenous language, they could easily become revolutionaries.⁴⁹ Because of this threat and the predicted large growth in the number of Eurasians, William Bazé advocated financial support from the French colonial state to receive these neglected and abandoned children in orphanages. This also applied to cases in which the mothers of *Métis* children were still alive.⁵⁰ After the French left Vietnam, Bazé employed the presence of *Métis* children left behind in Vietnam to criticise France's role as a supporter of the United States after 1954 in the Second Indochina War. Moreover, with that criticism he justified sending children and grandchildren of Frenchmen to France, often without the approval of their Vietnamese mothers.⁵¹ The most important reason for the French to keep sending *Métis* children back to the mother country was of a moral nature: French authorities considered them French and felt responsible for their upbringing.⁵²

Before decolonisation in the late 1940s, the *École de Troupe d'Enfants Eurasiens* started to also admit Afro-Asian and Indo-Asian children. Furthermore, by July 1947, the school did not only accept children born of Asian mothers and French fathers, but also children born to French mothers and Asian fathers. In 1948, the school dropped the word 'Eurasians' from its name and officially became an *École d'Enfants de Troupes*, probably to reflect its new, racially open admission policy.⁵³

A 1943 decree by Governor General Decoux had given the *Jules Brévié Fondation* (the predecessor of the *FOEFI*) the legal means to remove Eurasian children from their mothers. This decree was an adaptation of the *pupille de la nation*-law of 1917, but was specifically meant for *Métis* children: '*Pupille de la nation Eurasien*', which could offer *pupille* status to any *Métis* child, who regardless of the French father's military contributions, had been physically or morally abandoned by their parents or who 'did not receive an education or decent upbringing'.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the decree declared that any child of unknown parents – whether abandoned, not recognised by the European father or born of parents who could not maintain paternal power as defined in a colonial law of 1891 – was an orphan. Thus, he or she was to be adopted by the state, would be given a legal guardian and placed under the care of an orphanage of the *Ju-*

les Brévié Fondation. This law made it impossible for an indigenous mother to reclaim her child.⁵⁵

There were two ways that the *Métis* children could be received in *FOEFL* institutions. Either impoverished Vietnamese mothers themselves brought their Eurasian children to *FOEFL* orphanages, or the group already mentioned, the organisation *l'Action Sociale*, actively sought them out. With prior knowledge that French military men regularly had sex with local women, *l'Action Sociale* would return to military camps nine months to one year after the French soldiers had left and offered assistance to impoverished indigenous mothers who had given birth to *Métis* children. Then, the welfare agent of *l'Action Sociale* would offer the mothers the option of placing their children in *FOEFL* orphanages, with the understanding that the children would be educated at the *L'Ecole d'Enfants de Troupes Eurasiens* in Dalat.⁵⁶ This scenario sounds as if the mothers really had a choice, but usually they did not know what sending their children to the orphanages really meant. The mothers often did not realise that in consenting to this they lost their parental rights. It is not clear how many children were taken to orphanages against their mothers' wishes. In most instances, government agents who searched for *Métis* in villages tried to convince the mothers to place their children in the orphanages voluntarily. The removal of the children did happen under pressure, but not always entirely involuntarily.⁵⁷ On a number of occasions *FOEFL* board members mentioned in their reports at the annual meetings that indigenous Vietnamese mothers coped remarkably well with the arrival of an unplanned baby from a French man. The reason for their indifference towards their children was that they were reassured that they could always send them to a *FOEFL* orphanage. Therefore, members of *FOEFL* remarked that: 'The *FOEFL* is a charity and not a hotel.'⁵⁸

In the report of the annual *FOEFL* meeting of 1952, the author of the piece also made clear that it was not a sacrifice for every mother to hand over her child to a *FOEFL* institution instead of looking after it herself. This phenomenon is referred to under the heading 'the danger of mothers' and it mentions some Vietnamese mothers who put little effort into tracking down the French fathers of their children and instead relied on the *FOEFL* to take care of their children.⁵⁹ According to the author of the report, some indigenous mothers were indifferent about giving birth to a mixed child and voluntarily brought the baby to an *FOEFL* institution to give it a proper upbringing. However, for other mothers abandoning their children was a huge sacrifice or they changed their mind after a while according to annual reports of the *FOEFL*. Therefore, from 1953 onwards, mothers had to sign a contract when they requested care for their *Métis* children. In the contract, it was stipulated that they could not interfere with their child's upbringing. Furthermore, it was codified that they would respect the visiting times of the orphanage and that they could not take back their children in the middle of the school year without severe measures, such as paying the costs of the upbringing, their food and education. Women who insisted upon reclaiming their children would not be able to re-enrol them and would have to reimburse *FOEFL* for all expenses made for their education so far.⁶⁰ Initially this contract also took the form of a handwritten note by the Vietnamese mother, in which she promised to reimburse all costs for her child when the child did not obey the rules of discipline.⁶¹ A year later this contract was elaborated upon. Mothers had to sign a

certificat de décharge (a certificate de resignation) when they handed over their children. This document meant that the *FOEFI* had the right to send the child to France or another country of the French colonial union for its training without the consent of the mother.⁶²

In 1954, the annual meeting was postponed until September due to the heavy fighting between French and Vietnamese troops in Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954. It was noted during the *FOEFI* meeting in September that in the Dien Bien Phu battle one former *Métis* orphan was killed, another one disappeared, and two were taken hostage.⁶³ This concurrence of events, a meeting of a Eurasian interest organisation, and heavy violence that also affected *Métis* demonstrated how the violent process of decolonisation and its aftermath affected French policy towards Eurasians. The colonial status of *Métis* also played a role in the decision-making process. These factors guided the *FOEFI* in taking the decision to repatriate almost all *Métis* children to France.

10.5 Comparison and conclusion: *Rapatriés*, returning home or *Warga Negara*?

In both the Dutch East Indies and British India, life initially remained largely the same for Eurasians who had decided to stay, although many Indo-Europeans had experienced horrendous things during the decolonisation war in Indonesia between 1945 and 1949. However, for the Indo-Europeans who had stayed in Indonesia, after five relatively calm years, circumstances quickly worsened. Thousands wanted to leave after all. In their efforts to be admitted to the Netherlands, their former colonial status and concomitant mixed ancestry played a role. Next to that, bureaucratic regulations were important, since formal proof of Dutch ancestry was a key factor in the bureaucratic procedures leading to departure for the Netherlands. Class and related economic status were also important in the decision for both staying and leaving, since having more resources could be advantageous in both instances.

The situation in the Dutch East Indies contrasted sharply with that in British India. There, thanks to a thorough preparation and the presence of representatives of Anglo-Indians next to colonial authorities and Indian nationalists at the series of Round Table Conferences, Anglo-Indians had been acknowledged as an Indian minority. They kept their guaranteed governmental jobs and education on a European basis until the 1960s.

If Anglo-Indians wanted to migrate to the UK, they encountered similar difficulties as the Indo-Europeans who wanted to go to the Netherlands. Both the British and the Dutch governments attempted to curtail this migration because of housing shortages, fears of unemployment, the doubt authorities had regarding Eurasians' work ethic, and the likelihood that they might become a public charge. Both the economic situation in the mother country and the economic situation in the former colony were important for the decisions of Eurasians. Opportunities to acquire European citizenship were also crucial.

In Vietnam, the repatriation programme focused on children of mixed ancestry who were regarded as sufficiently 'French' to be evacuated to metropolitan France.

The small European group of French ancestry had already been repatriated after the Japanese occupation and before the decolonisation war started. In both Vietnam and Indonesia, the former colonial governments felt responsible for the children of mixed ancestry still in the colony. While the French were even more concerned about Eurasian children than the Dutch, in the end, in both cases, children were removed without the consent of their mothers.

II The postcolonial years

II.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss how relations between former colonisers and former colonies developed after decolonisation. For the Eurasians and for the authorities of newly independent countries, this was an uncertain period full of confusion and ever-changing circumstances, as described in earlier chapters. The new rulers had to govern countries with diverse ethnic, religious, linguistic and political groups. They had to do this within an increasingly unstable South-East- and South Asian region and in the context of the Cold War. The Korean War (1950-1953) ended with a divided Korea, with a communist country in the north and a capitalist country supported by the US in the south.¹ The Hungarian Revolt and the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the Cuban Revolution of 1959 heightened Cold War tensions.² The end of colonialism in Algeria was accompanied by a long and bloody war (1954-1962).³ The struggle between the US and the USSR in the 1950s and 1960s, led to confrontations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. One of the bloodiest of these was the Vietnam War (1955-1975). In 1966, the Johnson administration sent more than 500,000 US troops to Vietnam. When President Richard Nixon was inaugurated in January 1969, he promised 'peace with honor' and the end of the Vietnam War.⁴

Relations between former colonisers and former colonies changed frequently. In this chapter, I examine the ways these relations influenced the opportunities of the Eurasians had.

II.2 India: Less rights, more incentives to leave

After independence, most Anglo-Indians still occupied the middle or lower classes in India.⁵ As already mentioned, for a large number of Anglo-Indians, the end of the job reservations in the 1960s was an important incentive to leave. A smaller number of Eurasians had already left earlier because of the loss of jobs and networks.⁶ Next to that, their westernised upbringing had made them feel uncomfortable in India when the British left. A retired IT professional who arrived in the UK in 1961 from Bombay said: 'We were westernised in our outlook and habits. So, culturally, we chose to come here. We felt that life here would be an extension of our lives in India.'⁷

The Anglo-Indian stayers lost their position in the highest echelons of society, but Anglo-Indian stereotypes, formed during the colonial period, continued to play a role

for them in the postcolonial period, both in a positive and negative sense. One of these stereotypes, which is still part of the popular discourse on Anglo-Indians, was particularly persistent in the postcolonial period. This prominent example was the negative stereotype of the Anglo-Indian woman as a 'whore', derived from a typology developed by researcher Glenn D'Cruz in: the 'seven deadly stereotypes' of Anglo-Indians. These stereotypes could be found both in colonial reality and in popular literature.⁸ In *Eve's Weekly*, an Indian magazine aimed at women, the editors regularly referred to this stereotype of the Anglo-Indian women. The portrayal of Anglo-Indian women in films was always problematic, according to representatives of the group itself. It is interesting to note that white actresses rather than Anglo-Indian women usually played the parts of Anglo-Indians in Indian films after decolonisation, while Anglo-Indian actresses, who were fair-skinned and could therefore pass themselves off as white, played the roles of British women. This reversal in roles was probably meant as a disapproving sign of western values and lifestyle.⁹ But the stereotypical portrayal also returned in the type of roles Anglo-Indians played. For example, this portrayal returned in an article on the role of the 'vamp' in Indian movies in the 1970s. This is not exactly a portrayal of 'a whore', but it is at least an image of an independent woman which the average Indian woman considered as rather intimidating:

For ages, film productions have formulated the prototype of the vamp, she has fair skin, [is] curvaceous, provocative, she smokes, drinks, reveals her cleavage and is very bad, in contrast to the heroine who is very good. In short, she is an Anglo-Indian woman.¹⁰

Despite the negative stereotype, many Indians accepted Anglo-Indian girls as marriage partners after decolonisation. Increasing westernisation and urbanisation of India, combined with the eradication of caste taboos and discrimination also caused this development.¹¹

In January 1954, the government of the Indian state of Bombay (currently Mumbai, the province and city have the same name) issued a directive banning non-Anglo-Indian students from attending schools with English as the language of instruction (mostly Anglo-Indian schools). Anthony, the leader of the AIAIA, advised school leaders to ignore the regulation, which he saw as both an attack on the status of the English language, and an erosion of minority rights including the rights of his own Anglo-Indian community.¹² Later, in February 1954, the government's order was declared invalid by the high court of Bombay because it was deemed unconstitutional. According to Article 29 of the Indian constitution, all citizens had the right to choose for their children any educational institution, and all educational institutions were financially supported by the state. Furthermore, an educational institution, which the state had recognised, could not restrict admission to members of a particular religion, race, caste or language group.¹³

Meanwhile, in Kalimpong, in the lower Himalayas, the St. Andrew's colonial homes continued to function as an orphanage for neglected and abandoned Anglo-Indian children.¹⁴ They were renamed Dr. Graham's Homes in 1942, after Dr. Graham had died.¹⁵ Like all other Anglo-Indian schools in India, the homes had to reorient themselves after independence. Indian languages became an important and compulsory part of the curriculum. All pupils in Anglo-Indian schools were com-

elled to learn one Indian language and they had to pass a language test before they could progress to the next grade.¹⁶ Indian history supplemented European history, and courses in Asian geography and India geography were added. More and more Indian children entered the schools. In 1954 non-Europeans joined the staff. The education followed the British curriculum, also after independence.¹⁷ Another important feature of the homes remained unchanged until 1962: until that year all pupils of the homes did not have shoes. They went barefoot to emphasise their ordinary Indian status.¹⁸

The most important reasons why Anglo-Indians chose to leave India from the 1960s onwards were increasing unemployment rates after the end of job reservations, the closure of large international companies and the potential removal of English as a national language. The last factor became a reality in 1965, when English was replaced by Hindi.¹⁹ Together with the political uncertainty after the death of the first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964 these were major reasons for leaving. The situation deteriorated during the 'Emergency' period in the mid-1970s, in which time Nehru's daughter and successor, Indira Gandhi, led her authoritarian and repressive regime in India.²⁰ Another reason for leaving were attempts to introduce regional languages in Anglo-Indian schools.

Between 1961 and 1971, the number of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants in the UK rose considerably, from 112,000 people in 1961 to 516,000 in 1971, and 1,037,000 in 1981 (including members of the South Asian community who were born in the UK).²¹ Because of the absence of a separate Anglo-Indian category, it is not clear how many of these were Anglo-Indians.

11.3 Indonesia: Increasing hostility and second chances for Indo-Europeans

During a gathering with the *Indo-Europeesch Verbond* (IEV) in 1956, Soekarno had assured Indo-Europeans that they did not need to worry about their future in Indonesia. In his view, they were the brethren of the Indonesian people. He, however, broke his promise, because in that same year the Indonesian authorities cancelled the union agreements made with the Dutch authorities at the Round Table Conference in the fall of 1949.²² Indo-Europeans had partly based their decision to stay and opt for Indonesian citizenship on these concessions. This cancellation happened as a result of increasing tensions around the future of New Guinea, which at that moment still remained a Dutch colony, but which the Indonesians saw as part of their country. A severe anti-Dutch atmosphere developed in Indonesia, the walls of houses of Dutch or Indo-European people were plastered with slogans and anti-Dutch demonstrations took place, which expressed a severe hatred of whites.²³

From the mid-1950s onwards, Indo-European people who had become Indonesian citizens increasingly experienced discrimination, at work as well as in the allocation of housing and in their daily life in general. On top of that, from 1953 onwards, Indonesian nationalists began witch hunts against Dutch nationals in Indonesia. Shopkeepers, hotel employees, and taxi drivers refused to perform services for Dutch nationals and fair-skinned Indo-Europeans. In addition, they refused to give food to Dutch

families as part of the 'economic blockade'.²⁴ They were considered second class citizens, classified after the so-called 'asli' Indonesians, the real Indonesian residents.²⁵ This worsening of their daily lives led many Indo-Europeans who had initially opted for Indonesian citizenship to regret their choice and seek to regain Dutch nationality and leave for the Netherlands. That proved to be a long-term procedure, since the Dutch government was initially unwilling to admit these people.²⁶ In 1958, all seven Dutch commissionerships throughout the Indonesian archipelago closed. The High Commissionership of Jakarta remained the only Dutch diplomatic post in Indonesia. In 1960, the High Commissionership of Jakarta also closed and all remaining diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia were broken off.²⁷ After the formal transfer of New Guinea from the Netherlands to Indonesia in 1963, and after severe pressure from the United Nations on the Dutch, the diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia were restored and the Dutch embassy (in the immediate postcolonial period named the High Commissionership) in the Indonesian capital Jakarta was reopened.²⁸

During this chaotic period, it was not clear for many Indo-Europeans if a future was still possible for them in Indonesia. Prejudices, inherited from the colonial period, increased the ambivalence and chaos, especially for Indo-European women. One of the persistent stereotypes from the colonial period was that they were chasing after European men, because only that would give them access to privileges and wealth. Because of this unflattering and uncertain status, they were easily replaceable as a wife according to stereotypes of Indo-Europeans which were common in the colonial period.²⁹ It seems hardly surprising that Indo-European women in particular wanted to escape the context in which these stereotypes had been formed.

For Dutch and Indo-European people (who had not opted for Indonesian citizenship) achieving a Dutch education and the right to this special form of education was an important reason for staying in Indonesia. It was seen as the ultimate proof that maintenance of Dutch culture was possible in postcolonial Indonesia. The IEV and the *Stichting voor Nederlands Onderwijs* (SNO, the foundation for Dutch Education) offered this kind of education. The two sorts of Dutch education they offered were quite different. The SNO was founded by Dutch businessmen with support from the Dutch government to give their children a decent Dutch education in order to give them the opportunity to follow Dutch secondary education after returning to the Netherlands.³⁰ Therefore, their 'concordant' education followed the Dutch curriculum.³¹ This foundation established the so-called *aanpassingsonderwijs* ('adaptation education'). The adaptation education was a means to postpone the final decision between staying and leaving at least until the mid-1950s. This particular form of education indicated that decisions about staying or leaving were not made at one single point in time. Because lessons were given in Dutch in the first three years of the primary education and in *Bahasa Indonesia* in the last three years, it remained possible to join the educational system in the Netherlands at a later stage. Therefore, critics labelled it *aarzelingsonderwijs* ('hesitation education').³² The IEV was one of these critics. The kind of education offered by the SNO was, according to them, just a 'masked' form of *concordant onderwijs* ('concordant education'). Its aim of:

Keeping open the way to the Indonesian as well as to the Dutch society, is neither one thing nor the other: that it comes down, educationally technically speaking, to a masked and deteriorated concordant education with some Bahasa Indonesia, with whom it is considered that children of Dutch Indos, of whom it can be assumed that they will assimilate into the Indonesian society, will be adapted to that society.³³

In this way, by criticising the SNO, the IEF promoted its own education as a better alternative and a reason to choose Indonesian citizenship and to stay in Indonesia. Indeed, many Dutch parents sent their children to the IEF schools for another reason. They could not afford the normal school fee required for the concordant school, which exclusively followed the Dutch curriculum.

Many parents and members of the SNO still heavily criticised the IEF for its stand-point. Due to its inconsistent policies, members of the SNO regarded the IEF-education in correspondence as 'weak in organisational matters' and an 'inconvenient partner' to cooperate with.³⁴ These and other factors resulted in the introduction of local educational initiatives such as the foundation of schools like the Foundation *Associatie* (Association) in Surabaya and Semarang. In Semarang, a specific distinction between *omschakelingsonderwijs* ('conversion education') and *aanpassingsonderwijs* ('adaptation education') was made. The former was directed at children who were expected to assimilate completely into Indonesian society and the latter was directed at those children who would *perhaps* stay in Indonesia.³⁵ Later, the director of the SNO proposed another division in these schools for *blijverskinderen* (children of stayers), which came down to a similar distinction, namely a 'Dutch' and an 'Indonesian' form of the last two classes of primary education. According to the director, this was needed because many Dutch and Indo-Europeans were becoming more and more convinced in the years after 1955 that their future was not in Indonesia.³⁶

11.4 Vietnam: Becoming 'real' French capitalists or Vietnamese communists

In the early 1950s, the First Indochina War continued between French forces and the Vietnamese until the French lost the final battle in Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954. In February 1950, the US Truman administration granted diplomatic recognition to the Bao Dai government, which many Vietnamese people considered a 'puppet government' under control of the French in the *Union Colonial Francaise*. In May 1950, the Americans decided to provide the French with military and economic assistance for the war they were fighting against the Viet Minh of Ho Chi Minh.³⁷ As already mentioned, French Indochina became independent in 1954. From that moment onwards, Vietnam was divided into two countries, North and South Vietnam, separated by the seventeenth parallel.³⁸

In 1954, Cambodia and Laos, which were once part of the greater *Union Colonial Francaise* in Indochina, became independent countries. While decolonisation from the Netherlands led to a united Indonesian archipelago, decolonisation from France resulted in three separate countries.³⁹ The possibilities for maintaining or rejecting French or Vietnamese nationality for the population of mixed ancestry were established in an official law. This was negotiated at the conference that ended the First

Indochina War and led to the Geneva Accords in 1955.⁴⁰ *La Convention sur la nationalité* was officially implemented on 16 August 1955. For *Métis* people, the *Convention* ensured that the children of French fathers became legally French from the age of 18 years onwards and that Eurasians from unknown (but presumably French) fathers could apply for French (or Vietnamese) naturalisation from the same age. The children from French settlers could change their minds as well and become Vietnamese citizens. In Article 6 of the *Convention*, this was formulated in the following way:

Having the nationality [meaning the French nationality] with the possibility of opting for Vietnamese nationality, the people who were more than eighteen years old on the date the present convention becomes valid, with legitimate or natural ancestry: 1. Born of a father originally from Vietnam and a French mother. 2. Born of a French father and a mother who was originally from Vietnam. 3. Born of parents who were both born of a father originally of Vietnam and a French mother, or born of a French father and a mother who was originally from Vietnam. 4. Born in Vietnam of an unknown father and a mother originally from Vietnam, presumably of French nationality and recognised by the tribunals as being of French nationality.⁴¹

Despite the liberal sound of this convention, inspectors of the *FOEFTI* still forcibly removed Eurasian children from their indigenous mothers. The opposite however also occurred: Sometimes *FOEFTI* inspectors sent back 'impossible' and untreatable children to their families. The people at *FOEFTI* justified their actions by pointing to the new rules of the *Convention*. Under these rules, it was necessary that the colonial tribunals recognised the presumed Frenchness of *Métis* children. According to worried *FOEFTI*-inspectors, *le type eurasien le plus caractérisé* (the most characteristic Eurasian type) would no longer receive any help. But, indeed, these children were in desperate need of support:

These are exactly the orphans and abandoned children without French civil status, the result of casual relationships between European soldiers (French men, Germans, Italians, Hungarians) [...] and Vietnamese women.⁴²

In addition, in the evacuation scheme of the institutions, full Eurasian orphans were allowed to 'repatriate' first to France, followed by half-orphans.⁴³ Therefore, even though the policy was inclusive in French Indochina, a colonial heritage of racial classifications continued to play a role in the selection process. Moreover, not all pupils departed at once for France. In 1957, there were still 1,258 *FOEFTI* pupils living in former French Indochina, of which 1,166 *Métis* children were assisted at home. In 1961, there were still 1,500 *Métis*, who were assisted by the *FOEFTI*. Their Vietnamese mothers received a monthly allowance, until the children were selected to leave for France.⁴⁴ This allowance was stopped after continually lowering the age of the children up until which the mother could claim it: in 1957, it was stopped when the children were 15 years old, in 1958 when the children were 10 years old, and in 1959 when the children were 8 years old. The reasons for lowering the age were financial, as well as the colonial idea that the earlier the *Métis* children would leave their Vietnamese environment, the more likely that the French education and instruction would succeed. In 1963, the number of children for whom the mothers received a

monthly allowance in former French Indochina had dropped to 17 *Métis* children only.⁴⁵

Not all *Métis* children living in the institutions or at their parents' houses, were eager to leave for France. Documents from the archive of the *École d'enfants de troupe de Dalat* discussing the evacuation of its pupils to France also confirmed this. The documents show a number of instances when mothers chose to keep their children in Vietnam and when older children had 'voted with their feet' and had run away from the military school. The documents mainly consisted of correspondence between the leaders of the school and the board of the army in Indochina since it was funded by the military budget of the French state since 1 January 1952.⁴⁶ For example, a letter of the commandant of the military school sent to the general of the army in January 1956, indicated that a mother wished to withdraw her son from the school when all other children would be repatriated to France. The initial plan was that the children would go to France in December 1955 but the date was postponed until 2 February 1956 due to administrative issues.⁴⁷ This had to do with the increase in applications for the school in the last months before the departure to the mother country was planned. This increased interest in the military school proved, according to the school administrators, that many *Métis* children (or their parents) apparently wanted to be trained as French soldiers at military schools in France. In a series of letters, colonial officials discussed whether and how it would be possible to continue the recruitment of *Métis* children after decolonisation, because of a potential shortage of French soldiers in France.⁴⁸

Most of the children who had run away from the military school were reported to have anti-French sentiments, according to letters from the commandant to the higher army staff. For example, the commandant described the pupil Jean Nguyen Cung Tam as having an anti-French spirit and openly pretending to not be French. Another pupil sent a letter to the managers of the school in October 1955 stating that he was attending the school against his will.⁴⁹ The school took measures to avoid more children running away, but they acknowledged that the older children, who were nearly eighteen, kept in touch with people from outside the school. In addition, it was noted by the leaders of the school, that the majority of the children spoke French badly and spoke Vietnamese amongst themselves. In the tense circumstances of that time, just one year and a half after the defeat of the French troops, it was not surprising that more children ran away before the summer holidays.⁵⁰ In addition to the violence accompanying decolonisation, the geopolitical situation with increasing fears about communism from the west played a role in directing the choices of the children at this stage in Indochina. They were either joining the Vietnamese nationalists and communism or running away from them to become 'real' capitalist French people in France.

11.5 Comparison and conclusion: The geopolitical context

In all three former colonial contexts, circumstances deteriorated for Eurasians after independence. The economic situation facing many Eurasians worsened and this made more of them want to leave. In Indonesia and Vietnam, this development started in the mid-1950s, just at the moment the former wanted to secure internal unity

by excommunicating all remaining Dutch people and businesses, and the latter entered the Cold War. In India (and Pakistan), conditions worsened at the beginning of the 1960s when the job reservations for Anglo-Indians ended. The number of Anglo-Indians who left increased from that moment onwards. This meant a decrease in community identification which was related to the explanatory factor 'disappearance of infrastructure'. That caused the closure of most clubs and organisations where Anglo-Indians met. When more Anglo-Indians left the community, the remaining associations and clubs shrunk and this in itself became a reason for leaving.⁵¹ This factor played a role in the other two colonies as well. In the Dutch East Indies, *Zwarte Sinterklaas* marked the beginning of a period in which everything that reminded the Indonesians of colonialism became suspicious. Debates among Indonesians about Dutchness and colonial heritage diverted attention away from the internal problems of the young independent state. In Indochina, almost all *Métis* could leave if they wanted because of the lenient and inclusive admission procedure of France. As discussed in the previous subchapter, French authorities were generally more welcoming towards migrants than Britain and the Netherlands because of the small number of *Métis* present in Vietnam and the more advantageous economic position of the French state in the mid-1950s compared to Britain and the Netherlands in the late 1940s. The generous policies of French authorities were based on the old French fear of depopulation and republican ideals of equality and universalism. Lastly, in all three cases, pragmatic reasons like the need for workers to make more economic growth possible also played a role.

With the arrival of the Americans and the beginning of the Second Indochina War another mixed ancestry group came into being: the Amerasian children, the descendants of liaisons between Vietnamese women and American soldiers. Just like the *Métis* from the colonial period and Eurasians born during the First Indochina War, Amerasians grew up in poverty as 'half-breed' outcasts on the edges of Vietnamese society. In the contemporary Vietnamese discourse they were called the 'dust of life'.⁵² Vietnamese people denied them education and employment opportunities because they were seen as the children of collaborators. Many were abandoned, not only by their American fathers, but also by their mothers and other caretakers. Some survived as street children in Ho Chi Minh city, others lived with their families in rural villages.⁵³ According to the former Vietnamese correspondent of *Time*, the difference between Vietnamese Eurasians and Amerasians can be described as follows:

The French intermarried. They went native and took care of their offspring like the Americans never did. The Eurasians were of great social utility to the French, as soldiers and administrators. This is why they suffered reprisals after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and it helps explain why Amerasians, although in a very different position, suffered similar consequences after 1975.⁵⁴

Of this Amerasian group many children were adopted by American families.⁵⁵ In the same period, a considerable number of *Métis* people born in colonial Vietnam also came to France after the fall of Saigon in 1975. After their arrival they were surprised to find that the earlier, generous French policy no longer existed. For example, they could not lay claim to any rights deriving from the *Convention sur la nationalité* of 1955.⁵⁶

12 Special policies for Eurasians and the Eurasian reactions

12.1 Introduction

In all three colonies, both European authorities and new indigenous authorities designed and implemented special policies and regulations for Eurasians, regarding admission to the former mother countries and related citizenship criteria. In this chapter, I describe the reactions of Eurasians to these policies and whether they made use of them or just ignored them.

12.2 India: No special British provisions and new Anglo-Indian schools

As already observed, next to the reservations for jobs in government service and educational grants, the new Indian rulers inserted special non-permanent provisions for Anglo-Indians in the first constitution of independent India. That meant that two seats in the *Lok Sabha* (Indian Parliament) were reserved as well as seats in several state legislatures for representatives of the Anglo-Indian community. They got this reservation in the context of the so-called *Poona Pact* (1932), under which Dalits (the lowest caste in India) also got reserved seats.¹ The first two Anglo-Indian representatives in the Indian parliament of 499 seats were Frank Anthony, leader of the All-India Anglo-Indian Association and A.E.T. Barrow.² Except for the job reservations and educational grants which expired over the course of the 1960s, the seats in legislatures are – remarkably – still in possession of the Anglo-Indian community today.³ Many hoped that during the Round Table Conferences, the British authorities would make special provisions for Anglo-Indians to leave for the UK in an assisted passage scheme. But they did not make these provisions, to the disappointment of the Anglo-Indian Association. Frank Anthony even pointed in a promotion and lobby publication *Will Britain tarnish her honor?* to the Dutch East Indies and the way the Dutch treated the Indo-Europeans ‘liberally and as complete equals’. By contrast, the Anglo-Indians had been ‘accorded a cold stepmotherly treatment’.⁴ Even though that was not the truth, the discursive, almost propagandistic effect was clear for British people in the mother country as well as in India.

However, some Anglo-Indians managed to migrate to the UK with the help of an assisted passage scheme. Most of these migrants only left after they had applied for British citizenship. However, as was mentioned above, that was not necessary. As a rule, British people were given preference above Anglo-Indians in this scheme. According

to British government officials, they had to be 'rescued' from the former colony in this emergency period. In the end, the scheme only helped 3,600 people to migrate to the UK in the period between 1947 and 1958.⁵ That was a rather small number in comparison to the Netherlands, where during the aftermath of decolonisation approximately 25,000 Indo-Europeans who regretted their initial decision to stay and choose Indonesian citizenship were admitted to the Netherlands via an assisted passage scheme.⁶

With regard to education, the Hartog Committee, an auxiliary committee of the Simon Commission (the statutory commission preparing the Round Table Conferences of the early 1930s in India), made recommendations to modify the system of Anglo-Indian education already in 1929. Most orphanages destined for Anglo-Indians in British India were also boarding schools. The Hartog committee advocated the retention of the general system of Anglo-Indian education, but suggested a closer connection with the general system of Indian education because the general criticism from Indian officials was that the teachers of Anglo-Indian institutions tended to 'denationalise' their pupils. One of them said: 'Your schools are excellent. They are the best in the country. But we cannot help looking on them as foreign. The Indian atmosphere is missing.'⁷ Thus, according to the Hartog Committee, the main problem was how to make the necessary connection with India, without losing the essential characteristics of an Anglo-Indian education: its Christian culture, its English language, its discipline, its social organisations and its sports and its games.⁸ In the late 1940s, a growing demand for places at Anglo-Indian schools among Indian parents became noticeable. Therefore, new regulations from the government stated that Anglo-Indian schools were required to reserve a minimum of 40 per cent of the available places for non-Anglo-Indians instead of the 25 per cent which had been in place until then. The majority of schools limited the admission of non-Anglo-Indian children to 40 per cent and reserved the remaining 60 per cent for Anglo-Indian children. Others, and especially the more expensive hill schools, did not place any limitation on the admission of non-Anglo-Indians. The consequence of this decision was that gradually a predominance of well-to-do non-Anglo-Indians and only a small percentage of 'real' Anglo-Indians attended these schools.⁹

12.3 *Indonesia: Spijtoptanten and the fate of the 'Steurtjes'*

After *Zwarte Sinterklaas*, on 5 December 1957, the situation for Indo-Europeans who had chosen Indonesian citizenship became increasingly problematic. When many lost their jobs, and faced discrimination, they regretted their choice and wanted to leave the country.¹⁰ They first applied for visas at the High Commissionership of Jakarta, but this application was not successful in most cases because of the reluctant attitude of the Dutch government to permit these people to enter the Netherlands. According to Dutch politicians, they would not fit into Dutch society with their slow labour pace and other 'Eastern characteristics'.¹¹ In that way, they fell between two stools, according to Dutch governmental advisors.¹² In the years between 1954 and 1957, some organisations tried to help the Indo-Europeans who were still in Indonesia. For example, *Stichting Helpt Onze Mensen in Indonesië* (SHOMI, Foundation Help

our People in Indonesia) wanted to provide local help and assistance in the repatriation procedure.¹³ From 1960 onwards, they could turn to the committee of *Nationale Actie Steunt Spijtoptanten Indonesië* (NASSI, 'National Action Supports Regretting Optants Indonesia'). The NASSI was a lobby and action group that mediated in the visa application procedure for *spijtoptanten* by giving the applicants advice and pleading for them in the permanent parliament committee of the Dutch government which discussed the repatriation of people from the former colony.¹⁴

I have analysed 110 dossiers from *spijtoptanten* ('regretting optants'), who applied for visas for the Netherlands at the office of the High Commissionership in Djakarta and when that did not succeed sent requests to the NASSI-movement. I found dossiers with the same name in both collections in the National Archives in The Hague. That gave me the possibility to follow the trajectory of families or individuals in their attempts to leave Indonesia and regain Dutch nationality. After thoroughly analysing the two archives, it became clear that the motive of 'work and career' (29 of the 110 dossiers), combined with the motive of 'gaining a livelihood/work' (25/110) were the most frequently mentioned reasons why many Indo-Europeans regretted their decision to opt for Indonesian citizenship and wanted to leave the country as soon as possible. These two motives were similar, which made the importance of work such a decisive factor for leaving. The Cold War and the threat of communism were mentioned less frequently as reasons for leaving. This was probably the case because Indonesia just like India, preferred a foreign policy of neutralism and non-alignment (the famous 'third way') in the Cold War.¹⁵ The Indonesian prime minister, Sutan Sjahrir, explained his rejection of Vietnamese requests to create a Southeast Asian regional (communist) group after the Second World War in the following way:

Ho Chi Minh is facing the French who will resist him for a very long time. Ho is also dependent on the support of the communists, who are very powerful in the independence movement which is not the case with us. If we ally ourselves with Ho Chi Minh, we will weaken ourselves and delay independence.¹⁶

Also, the offer of the Indian president Nehru was quite modest. He only gave the Vietnamese nationalist movement 'moral' support.¹⁷ From these observations, I deduce that the geopolitical factor of the Cold War was not that important in the explanation of the choice of Eurasians for staying or leaving the former colony. The famous domino theory, or fear of communism, was not as relevant for Eurasians as it was for Americans.

The reasons for the initial choice for staying and opting for Indonesian citizenship were also mentioned in these letters and requests. In particular, the information the Indo-Europeans got from the Dutch government in the person of the High Commissioner Lamping in his radio speech was mentioned as a reason for their initial stay in their letters and requests (in 29 of the 110 letters). The reasons of 'attachment to the land' and 'marriage with an Indonesian' were mentioned less (respectively in 9 and 10 of the 110 letters).¹⁸ Many tried to come to the Netherlands later as so-called *spijtoptanten* (regretting optants), since they received special treatment as ex-Dutch citizens and did not have to follow the more complicated route of 'ordinary' aliens. They acquired this name since they regretted their earlier choice of opting for Indonesian

citizenship at the end of the option period in 1951.¹⁹ Departure to the Netherlands was difficult, because they were no longer Dutch. Some Indo-European women entered a marriage of convenience with a Dutch man to obtain Dutch citizenship in order to leave and be admitted to the Netherlands. If the Indo-European woman did not want to stay in the former colony, she could decide to perform a sham divorce from her indigenous husband in order to regain her Dutch citizenship.²⁰ Authorities knew about this strategy. They received instructions to grant them admission only if they were certain that the marriages and divorces did not take place with the sole purpose of getting to the Netherlands.²¹

After many requests had been turned down, the NASSI carried out an aggressive lobbying campaign, and the government designed a special arrangement for the *spijtoptanten*. They gained the possibility to leave Indonesia through a financial advance from the government (*rijksvoorschot*).²² Legally speaking the Netherlands did not have to admit the *spijtoptanten*, but after a while the government felt morally obliged to do so due to the pressure in newspapers and from lobby groups.²³ People from within and outside the government made sure their voices were heard. These were usually people working at the remaining High Commissionership and regional commissionerships in Indonesia who expressed their criticism of the policies in correspondence. For example, in a letter of October 1953, a social advisor from the High Commissionership in Djakarta voiced his concern about the strict application of the criteria for admission to the prepaid passage scheme and the restrictions, even in cases when the applicants could obviously be admitted. Furthermore, he pointed out the difficulty that the judging institution in the Netherlands had of forming a clear, accurate picture of the situation in Indonesia for the people involved, 'while one also fears, that once in one case permission is granted, the stream of analogous or approximately analogous cases would not be stopped anymore.' At the end of his letter, the advisor proposed 'to concentrate on a better demarcation of the cases or categories in which making an exception is to be wished for.'²⁴ A number of the visa applicants were not yet adults when their fathers opted for Indonesian citizenship.²⁵ The government officials had to keep this important aspect in mind. In short, the *spijtoptanten* issue was a clear example of changing policy categories being influenced by a radical power transition period.

After the anti-Dutch actions and *Zwarte Sinterklaas*, it became clear that the Ministry of Justice, which formally decided on the requests, worked with another, updated list of criteria to select *spijtoptanten*. These were: first, they had to have a connection with the Netherlands, for example they or their parents had to have been born in the Netherlands, or they had to have lived there for more than 10 years. Second, they had to be in an emergency situation both physically and materially. Third, they had to have the ability to become assimilated in the Netherlands, for example because they spoke Dutch or they had friends or relatives in the Netherlands. They should also be Christians. The fourth criterion was the lack of incriminating data. The last criterion was that the Ministry used a fixed quota of *spijtoptanten*, which was only increased a couple of times.²⁶

Amongst this group of *spijtoptanten* were many Indo-European children from European-run orphanages. Representatives of a number of them, united in a board of the protestant orphanages in Indonesia, said that a large group of Indo-European chil-

dren found it difficult to adapt to the new circumstances of independent Indonesia. Already in 1950, they had made plans to receive these children under certain conditions in the Netherlands.²⁷ These conditions sounded surprisingly similar to the governmental criteria mentioned above and included the stipulations that they must be hard to raise, and they could not easily adapt to the new situation in Indonesia. Moreover, they had to have one or two European parents, they should not have other family in the former colony, because authorities hoped that no attachment to the old colony meant easier assimilation into Dutch society. Furthermore, they had to have been interned during Japanese occupation. In other words: they had to have had traumatic experiences during the Second World War. Lastly, they had to be 14 years or older.²⁸ Probably also because of exceptions to these rules, the exact number of children involved in this repatriation scheme was not clear.

A considerable number of 'Steurtjes', old pupils from the famous institution of Johannes 'Pa' (dad) van der Steur, applied for visas to the Netherlands in the late 1950s. They had a fair chance of being granted a visa since they could claim that they had experienced a Dutch upbringing and education. Proving their Dutch ancestry with formal documents turned out to be more difficult.²⁹ The leaders of the institution had applied for Indonesian citizenship for most of them, since they were minors during the option period at the beginning of the 1950s. But already at the time they took the decision, the leaders expressed their moral doubts about it.³⁰

Local correspondents of the NASSI committee, who were still living in Indonesia during that period, helped. For example, the older unmarried Miss Ter Kuile assisted many of these Indo-European children who had remained behind in European-led orphanages in Semarang and its surroundings to get out of Indonesia. The story of these 'outlawed children' was reported in the Dutch newspaper *De Telegraaf* in which it was clearly explained how inexorably strict the Dutch law was:

Who is the Dutch father? Unknown – then no permit to come to the safe Netherlands. Not recognised by the Dutch father – then no permit. The law is unrelenting. Exceptions are not made!³¹

Miss Ter Kuile was the head of the so-called *Team Pengaran Warga Negara Belanda* that was officially allowed to do its work by the Indonesian head of the military command of Semarang. It was a continuation of the old colonial 'council for social and societal matters' that had been based in Semarang.³² Amongst others, they helped the remaining ex-Dutch people and children in Semarang and its surroundings to arrange their departure for the Netherlands. Ter Kuile knew from first-hand experience how difficult the situation in Indonesia was for the ex-Dutch people. This must have given her authority in the eyes of the governmental officials in The Hague as well as in the eyes of the *Spijtoptanten* who asked for her help. Other local correspondents were missionaries or managers of homes for the elderly and orphanages. For example, Ms. G. Smid, the manager of the home for the elderly called *Tempelhof* (Temple courtyard) in Bandung wrote testimonies describing the deplorable state in which many Indo-Europeans who applied for visas lived. These testimonies accompanied the requests *spijtoptanten* wrote with the help of the NASSI-action committee to the High Commissionership. The Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands eventually made its judgment

on the basis of these requests.³³ The permanent parliamentary committee on repatriation, took the final decision. This committee consisted of five members of parliament and was the last institution that could still plead for the case of *spijtoptanten*, if all other requests had been turned down. They had the right to inspect the dossiers of the applying *spijtoptanten* which the department of immigration affairs had created.³⁴ In this committee, NASSI-member Miss J.J.Th. Ten Broecke Hoekstra had a seat, and she personally knew Ter Kuile. This personal connection probably made a huge difference for Indo-European people, who sent requests for visas. If Indo-Europeans were eventually allowed to go to the Netherlands they were first housed in contract pensions. The owners of these houses received an allowance for their maintenance.³⁵

12.4 Vietnam: Large-scale repatriation and positive French image of Dutch policies

As part of the Geneva accords, French troops and northern civilians who wanted to move to either the southern or the northern part of Vietnam were granted 300 days to complete their travels before the partition between north and south came into effect. The most important reason for evacuation to South-Vietnam (and after that to France) was the fear of communism. However, other factors – such as the land reform campaign during the period 1953-1956 (an exact copy of the Chinese Maoist Land Reform of the years 1946-1952), the brutality of the ongoing war and the long-term consequences of the Great Famine of 1945 – also played a role in the decision to evacuate.³⁶ Earlier on, there had been periods of unrest related to the rice production as well, but this famine affected the whole country, and up to two million are thought to have died. The large-scale food crisis was caused by a socio-economic crisis, in which several devastating events came together: floods, which destroyed the harvest and transportation networks, drought, increased demographic pressures, and the war.³⁷

Between the end of the First Indochina War and 1965, the French government repatriated 30,000 to 45,000 French citizens (including Eurasians) and at least 4,500 Eurasian children to France. Initially, approximately 7,000 *Métis* remained in Vietnam. They experienced difficulties, since the Vietnamese detested them for their previous involvement in the French colonial bureaucracy. In the last months of 1954, and throughout 1955, the president of South-Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, launched a hate campaign against Eurasians, similar to the one in Indonesia in December 1957.³⁸

Thus, these tens of thousands of repatriates did not all leave at the same time. The total number of French people leaving Vietnam in the years 1955 and 1956 was 1,710, and among them were 486 Eurasians. However, the withdrawal of the whole French *Corps Expéditionnaire* after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 took several years. That is why there were still children of mixed ancestry born after 1954. Next to that, in South-Vietnam a number of French people (including *Métis*) stayed on after that date. But for these people, life became continually more difficult, since every foreigner who was older than 15 years had to pay an additional tax. In addition, there were not enough places at schools that had instruction in the French language. These were both reasons for Vietnamese mothers to consider repatriation at a later stage.

So, even during the Têt Offensive in 1968, an important and decisive battle of the Second Vietnam War, 585 French people were repatriated.³⁹ There were other reasons too. In 1956, it became obligatory to allocate occupations in middle management exclusively to Vietnamese people. This obligation led to the situation that after a while only French people working in executive positions would stay in Vietnam. Not only the loss of jobs, but also the economic recession and heavy inflation, related to the above-mentioned Great Famine, drove many people with some French ancestry to leave. Therefore, French officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reassured the French government that the repatriation of French people of whom the presence in Vietnam had become *inutile* (useless) had to be continued with financial help from the French state.⁴⁰

The positive image French colonial authorities had of the Dutch colonial policy regarding Eurasians in the Dutch East Indies probably influenced the generous French policy regarding *Métis*. This image appears in several letters and texts, suggesting it was an accepted view among French governmental officials. For example, the French Lieutenant Roue, who wrote a report about the Eurasian problem in 1954, took the Dutch policy on Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies as an admirable example from which the French colonial authorities could learn a lot. In my opinion, Roue gave too positive a picture. He was fully convinced that Dutch colonial authorities tolerated unions between European men and indigenous women in the Dutch East Indies. Furthermore, he thought that Indo-Europeans had the same rights as Dutch citizens. In addition, the French lieutenant was certain that in 1945, 1.5 million Indo-Europeans lived in the Dutch East Indies. In my view, this is a highly-exaggerated number since the relevant sources talk about a maximum number of roughly 240,000 Indo-Europeans⁴¹ (see also Table 1 in chapter 1). In some sources, French colonial policy makers made references to the British policy in India towards Anglo-Indians, which was also portrayed as an ideal example to follow.⁴² The emergence of these references to both the Dutch East Indies and British India was most probably caused by the fact that Indochina was a relatively young colony in comparison to the other two.

Although the colonial era was over after 1954, the French wanted to maintain some cultural influence in the southern part of Vietnam. They succeeded in this endeavour and the presence of French culture continued via education, cultural exchanges, aid programmes, trade, and language courses. Its influence is still visible in the maintenance of monumental colonial buildings today.⁴³ Furthermore, the Eurasian children who remained behind in the orphanages were also seen as a continuation of French influence in Vietnam, at least when they had the right to follow education in the French language.⁴⁴ The hope was that the maternal ties of the *Métis* children to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, could re-create for France a situation in the former colony similar to that of French Canada (Quebec), where descendants of French migrants have maintained strong cultural ties to France. These cultural ties were most visible in the fact that French was still the main language in French Canada. But the members of the *FOEFI* were more concerned about the lack of attention the French government officials paid to the *Métis*. In that situation, according to them, 'the ultimate abandonment, that from France itself' would follow.⁴⁵

In the northern part of Vietnam, the development of a postcolonial culture acceler-

ated after 1954 as the DRV set up research organisations (like an Institute of History) to write their own histories that articulated a Vietnamese-centred view of the past. The Ministry of Culture and the communist worker's party encouraged the development of new cultural discourses and practices to replace old colonial ideas.⁴⁶ Meanwhile in the South, France saw a steady decline in the number of French books, journals, and newspapers imported by the people from South-Vietnam from 1954 to 1956. By 1956 these imports measured only half of the number imported in 1954. By the 1960s, however, Franco-South Vietnamese relations had undergone an enormous improvement. For example, French enterprises in South Vietnam maintained their positions and French exports to Vietnam began to increase. In 1960, 15,000 French people were still in South Vietnam, of whom 300 were teachers, and the others worked in 500 French firms.⁴⁷ This is a completely different picture from the Indonesian one where all Dutch colonial influence was banned and disappeared after 1957. Because there was still some French influence noticeable in Vietnam, it can be expected that some *Métis* people chose to stay in the former colony. Some did, but the majority of the *Métis* left for France, mainly because of the war-like situation, discrimination from the indigenous people and the fact that it was relatively easy to get French citizenship.

12.5 Comparison and conclusion: Regretting and postponing decisions

To conclude, in the immediate postcolonial years, not much changed in Indonesia, just like the situation in newly independent India. However, in the mid-1950s, the aftermath of decolonisation took a rather dramatic turn when many ex-Dutch people (*spijtoptanten*) wanted to leave for the Netherlands. They wanted to have their Dutch citizenship restored, as it turned out that Indo-Europeans who took the decision to become Indonesian citizens had collectively viewed the policy of the new Indonesian power holders rather naively, considering later developments. In the beginning, they were too credulous. However, after the Indonesians cancelled the agreements of the Round Table Conference and the anti-Dutch atmosphere intensified as a result of *Zwarte Sinterklaas* and the unrest surrounding New Guinea, many Indo-Europeans wanted to leave. They requested visas from the High Commissionership in Jakarta. Because most jobs were exclusively reserved for indigenous people, also the loss of jobs or the impossibility of getting a proper job was an important reason to leave in all three colonies. Although the Dutch government was initially unwilling to help their ex-compatriots, under pressure from many ex-colonials and other sympathisers, eventually the authorities set up an assisted passage scheme. Therefore, most *spijtoptanten* did eventually come to the Netherlands. A similar assisted passage scheme was also introduced in the British case, but it was used considerably less than in the Dutch case because the necessity to leave India was not as urgent for most Anglo-Indians in the 1950s. The new Indian power holders did stick to the constitutional safeguards of the Anglo-Indians, which is related to the explanatory factor 'bureaucratic regulations'. An anti-European atmosphere did not emerge in the same way as it occurred in Indonesia.

Anti-European hostility did develop in Vietnam, at least in the northern part. This was not only a reaction to the former French coloniser but also a struggle for commu-

nism by Vietnamese nationalists against western capitalists. But Eurasians were not affected to a large extent by this pro-communist struggle, since they had either been evacuated to the southern part of Vietnam or they had already moved to France. Most of the people who left for France, had never been there before. In a similar vein to the Anglo-Indians of British India and the Indo-Europeans of the Dutch East Indies, they were not repatriates in the literal sense of the word. The French postcolonial policy (with self-evident roots in colonial acts) regarding *Métis* can be typified as exceptionally inclusive, in comparison with the aloof attitude of both the Dutch and British politicians. Thus, bureaucratic regulations proved to be decisive in the choice to leave Vietnam for France. The French policies were particularly focused on the fate of the *Métis* children in independent Vietnam, while that was less the case in British India and the Dutch East Indies. Ideas about the way the Dutch treated their Indo-European population influenced the French in their policy making. This was presented in their documents as a generous attitude, as if all Indo-Europeans could be happily received in the Netherlands. But the French image was too positive and idealistic.⁴⁸

13 Those who stayed (after 1960)

13.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the period from 1960 until 1975, and focusses on those who stayed in the former colonies. Although they were almost invisible in the primary sources, a considerable number of Eurasians did stay in the former colonies. It is comprehensible that they did not leave many traces in archives since they wanted to become invisible in order to build up a life in the newly independent countries.

13.2 India: Too poor or too old to leave

The Anglo-Indians who chose to stay after most members of the community had left in the 1960s and 1970s were often the ones who were too poor or too old to leave. These people usually lived, and in some cases are still living, in primitive housing without sanitation or running water. Anglo-Indian retirement homes have gradually become poorer and more isolated from Indian society. These were once grand, atmospheric buildings, but they have been neglected and poorly maintained since decolonisation. There was no money for restoration, since the residents had little financial means. Usually they only paid a small amount of rent (equivalent to about \$65) each month to live there.¹

Furthermore, the Anglo-Indian stayers felt abandoned by the All-India Anglo-Indian Association (AIAIA), which according to them only gave assistance to wealthy community members who did not really need the support. Many of the older Anglo-Indians continued to live in the colonial past, reliving memories of the good old days of the British colonial period in India, the *Raj*.² For example, Wright described in 1997 the existence of a community called the Grant Govan Homes which comprised eight cottages, seven of which were homes for seven aging Anglo-Indian families. These families gathered in the cottages for meals, games, and to remember the past. It was a very small community but it remained a British island in the middle of Delhi.³ In line with these observations, for many Anglo-Indians, the immediate post-war years were confusing and they often remained resentful of the attitude of the British authorities towards them during that period. An Anglo-Indian who looked back at the role of the British colonial government in the settling of the colonial period, highlighted the complicated 'in-between position' that Anglo-Indians occupied:

We were a very important part of the British Raj. And looking back you feel that they didn't really treat us very fairly. They used us. We were the buffer between the Indians and the British in the early days, and we continued to be the buffer. And when the time came the British didn't want us, the Indians didn't want us.⁴

This complicated 'in-between position' of the Anglo-Indians in the colonial period also determined their condition in postcolonial India. A Eurasian from the former British colony Malay (today's Malaysia) also described the feeling of abandonment by the British coloniser well:

The fact was that the colonials could pack up and go home; their made-in-the-heat-of-the-moment lust children and love children had to stay on, mixed bloods in an Asian world, aliens without a heritage, the eternal fence-sitters so precariously balanced.⁵

Because of the rules the British government implemented to curtail the immigration of Anglo-Indians to the UK from the early 1960s onwards, not all of them could go there. This was certainly the case in the late 1960s and 1970s when the regulations for admission to the UK became even more stringent. Instead of the UK, Anglo-Indians increasingly left for other parts of the British Commonwealth, including the white dominions.⁶ After 1967, when Australia had dropped its whites-only policy, immigration from India to Australia rapidly increased.⁷ At least initially, Australian authorities gave Anglo-Indians priority on the basis of 'their Christian identity and British-like values and behavioural patterns'.⁸ In this case, colonial status and religion were an advantage in the admission procedure to Australia. However, the most important reason was that most Anglo-Indians were protestant or catholic. For them, Christian festivals such as Christmas, Easter, and Lent were important moments on the annual calendar, and that made them different to the Indian migrants.⁹

After 1960, a large group of Anglo-Indians migrated out of India. The most important reason for this migration, next to the abolishment of the job reservations, was family reunification, since earlier mainly young men had moved.¹⁰ Some of them migrated first to Britain and then – from the moment Australian immigration policies made their arrival possible up to twenty years later – to Australia. Others directly migrated elsewhere, particularly to Australia in the mid-1960s and 1970s, and also to Canada, New Zealand and the United States.¹¹

After Partition, Pakistan was further divided into West Pakistan and East Pakistan. East Pakistan (Bangladesh) came into being after elections showed the demand for more autonomy among many people living in East Pakistan. East Pakistan's government proclaimed independence in March 1971, after which civil war broke out. Large-scale support from Indian troops soon led to the defeat and surrender of West Pakistani troops and East Pakistan became the independent country of Bangladesh in that same year. An estimated 1 million Bengalis were killed in that short war and it was not until 1974 that Pakistan recognised the independent state of Bangladesh.¹²

'It's their fluency in English that makes it easy for them'

In cities like Bangalore, Jaipur as well as in Delhi and Mumbai, Eurasian organisations continued to exist. Nowadays, each of these branches still has a couple of hun-

dred members and they also have strong links with Anglo-Indian communities worldwide. They organised international reunions, and journals and memoirs have been exchanged among the communities globally. However, among Anglo-Indians themselves in India, the option 'Leaving for the homeland the UK' was the norm for many years. If they chose to stay in India, people were surprised and they expected them to provide reasons for that decision, according to researcher Robyn Andrews.¹³

Those Anglo-Indians who stayed on in India eventually lost the constitutional privileges to which they had become accustomed during colonial times. From that moment onwards, their inability to speak Hindi or other Indian languages caused difficulties in their search for employment. However, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, their future prospects regarding work opportunities improved. As opposed to earlier times, the fortunes of younger Anglo-Indians were on the rise according to the Anglo-Indian lawmaker Mr. O'Brien.¹⁴ Their English skills and what can be described as their 'Western bearing' make them attractive employees for multinationals and Indian outsourcing companies. Samuel Moses, a recruitment consultant with Catalyst Consulting Services, an employment agency in Calcutta, agreed. 'It's their fluency in English that makes it easy for them to get positions in multinationals and customer care positions in call centres', he said.¹⁵ These are better positions than the average Indian worker achieved. Just like what happened in the Vietnamese case with the continuing French influence, the British maintained some cultural influence in India. Next to the language, there was the heritage of a sports culture with Anglo-Indians as its representatives. Throughout the twentieth century, many members of the Indian and Pakistani national sports teams in hockey and cricket were of Anglo-Indian ancestry, as was the case in other former British colonies like Malaya.¹⁶ This predominance of Eurasians in sports teams in former British colonies was almost certainly caused by their lifestyle in the former railway colonies or other service enclaves of the colonial period. In these contexts, there were always passionate sports players available, who participated in a rather 'incessant round' of hockey, cricket, soccer, and other sports and leisure activities.¹⁷

By 1982, half of the Anglo-Indian population had migrated out of India.¹⁸ The large number of migrants did not result in a loss of contact between community members. In Chennai (formerly Madras), for example, there has been a constant informal exchange of information within families and the Anglo-Indian community in Chennai itself and abroad. This phenomenon also occurred in other cities with a considerable group of Anglo-Indians. The Anglo-Indians helped each other with filling out the application forms for visas.¹⁹ However, for most of them, it remained a matter of luck whether they were eventually admitted to the UK (or one of the Commonwealth countries, notably Australia). For example, a number of Anglo-Indians managed to get into Australia of whom the Australian authorities said that they were work shy and lacked skills and experiences. Such reports frustrated Anglo-Indians with better prospects whose visa application forms were rejected. The most important motives for these later migrations were for education and better economic opportunities for young Anglo-Indians.²⁰

Both in India and abroad, the Anglo-Indians managed to maintain a separate, independent culture. This culture was based on several identity markers: culinary tradi-

tions (in particular curry) and the use of particular words from Hindi combined with English. This characteristic of English-as-a first-language or the Anglo-Indian mother tongue remained striking as a distinctive Anglo-Indian identity marker in an overwhelmingly Hindu Indian world.²¹

13.3 Indonesia: Help for the Indo-Europeans who stayed behind

After a long and violent struggle between Indonesians and Dutch people, rhetorical warfare and interference by the United Nations, the sovereignty over New Guinea, the last remaining overseas Dutch possession in Asia, was transferred to Indonesia in May 1963.

The immigration and assisted passage scheme for *spijtoptanten* stopped on 1 April 1964. Indo-European people who had opted for Indonesian citizenship but who regretted their choice and wanted to leave had to hand in their application form before that date.²² After that date, they would be treated by the immigration and naturalisation department as 'ordinary' aliens, which meant that they had less chances to be admitted than before as *spijtoptanten*.²³ The idea behind this deadline was that all applications of *spijtoptanten* should be concluded by 1 January 1965. However, in the end, it took longer, because when the deadline of the scheme came closer, Indo-Europeans handed in a lot of new requests.²⁴ For these people, next to discrimination, loss of jobs and housing, the disappearance of Dutch associations, education and clubs played a role too. The simple fact that more and more Dutch and Indo-European friends and family who also attended the same clubs left caused the demise of these clubs.²⁵ In addition, declining numbers of pupils, meant that Dutch education could not uphold its existence anymore.²⁶ These two developments happened simultaneously and reinforced each other. People felt less comfortable in a continually hostile environment without their own clubs and social circles. However, 1,000 to 2,000 ex-Dutch people of mixed ancestry never got the chance to go to the Netherlands and had to stay on in Indonesia. They led a difficult life in Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty. Some of them lived on the streets, others in modest slum housing and some eventually made a modest living. However, they did not feel any connection with the Netherlands.²⁷ Nowadays the younger generation of Indonesians of mixed ancestry (for whom their western ancestry was not only Dutch but could also be English or Australian), has also been racially stereotyped. However, unlike what happened in the colonial period and just after decolonisation, this stereotyping takes a rather positive form as they are the preferred photo models and actors for advertisements and the entertainment industry. This specific kind of stereotyping has also stimulated the sales of skin whitening products containing dangerous carcinogens, which were promoted by typically 'Indo' looking models who had this desired natural 'honey-milk' (caramel) coloured skin.²⁸

Although a few thousand people wanted to go to the Netherlands if it was possible, they could not because of practical reasons. These included bad communication links, not knowing about the possibility to apply for visas or that the deadline for applications for the assisted passage scheme had already passed. Others did not have enough money to travel to Jakarta to appear in person before the administrators at

the Dutch embassy, who had to judge their application in the last phase. In fact, during the last years of the scheme, applicants had to report in person to the Dutch diplomatic agency. This suggested that even in the 1960s, appearance was important for the approval of visa requests.²⁹

The 1,000-2,000 Indo-European people who stayed behind is an estimate I based on the 900 people the Dutch relief organisation *Hulp aan Landgenoten in Indonesië* (HALIN, 'Help to fellow countrymen in Indonesia') helped in 2008. At that time, many of the people with Dutch ancestry who voluntarily or involuntarily stayed behind in Indonesia had died or did not know about the possibility of getting financial support from HALIN.³⁰ Next to this scheme, in the Netherlands gradually more voices of people who demanded financial compensation were heard. These voices came from mostly Indo-European people who had lost everything in the Second World War and the *Bersiap* period, whether as a soldier or a civilian. However, the Dutch government was not willing to grant financial compensation until the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Indonesian government was also not cooperative.³¹

In Indonesia, there was not so much continuity between Eurasian interest organisations during the colonial period and the postcolonial period. The only exception was *Onze Brug* ('our bridge'), a magazine that Indo-Europeans based in New Guinea founded in 1956. A foundation with the same name published the periodical. Originally, it only focused on the Indo-European people who left Indonesia for New Guinea. The magazine literally aimed to build a 'bridge' between Indonesia and New Guinea. The Dutch government hoped that New Guinea would become a new home for Indo-Europeans who had become '*personae non gratae*' in Indonesia.³² From May 1957 onwards, the famous Indo-European spokesman Tjalie Robinson started to write for this magazine. As editor-in-chief he called on Indo-European people to send their own stories and opinions to the magazine. He also broadened the target group of the magazine: from only Indo-Europeans who had moved to New Guinea to also Indo-Europeans who had left Indonesia for places all around the world. Many Indo-Europeans who had initially chosen to live in the Netherlands preferred a more tropical climate. Hence, they migrated for a second time, for example to the United States, specifically Southern California. Many Indo-Europeans considered migrating somewhere else as an attractive alternative because of the unfriendly treatment they encountered in the Netherlands, their so-called 'fatherland'. Next to the United States, they found their way to Australia, Brazil and Canada.³³ Since *Onze Brug* was also sent to those parts of the world, this was a potential readers' audience of hundreds of thousands of repatriates.³⁴ The magazine *Onze Brug* changed its name into *Tong Tong* in 1958 and its subscriptions rose to a peak in 1961 with 11,000 readers. In that same year, the subtitle of the magazine was coined: 'the only Indisch magazine in the world.'³⁵

'I chose to stay with my mother in Indonesia'

Many Indo-Europeans considered leaving Indonesia as the best option after decolonisation. This was in sharp contrast to the earlier voiced opinion of the IEV which tried to convince Indo-Europeans to stay in Indonesia and to opt for Indonesian citizenship. In general, Indo-Europeans considered those fellow mixed people who had stayed be-

hind as having bad luck. In addition, they assumed that the stayers had quite a difficult time in independent Indonesia. Yet, several eye witness accounts have appeared of Indo-European people who have been perfectly satisfied with their choice of staying in Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty. For example, one older Indo-European man was clear in his opinion in the early 1990s: 'I stay here. I belong to this people. I stay here, whoever is ruling the country: white, brown, yellow, I don't care.'³⁶ Another Indo-European man said something similar about his choice in the same article of 1990:

They have tried to convince me to come to the Netherlands, but sometimes I am quite a man of principles. Here, I am born and bred, and have become as I am now. For what should I have to let down this country?³⁷

Another example of a conscious choice for a life in independent Indonesia is one of the Indo-European children who was interrogated by the mediator Miss Ter Kuile, a woman who was working for an aid agency involved in social matters in Semarang after decolonisation. Ter Kuile asked an Indo-European girl whether she wanted to go to the Netherlands. She said she no longer wanted to go to the Netherlands because, above all, the sisters of a monastery had received her in such a caring and hospitable way. She said:

I had the sisters, I thought, and many friends over there, but I was also worried how that would work out, living in the Netherlands. When I was in secondary school, another five children were sent back to the Netherlands. I also refused to go to the Netherlands at that moment, because I had made even more friends and because I was not sure that I could find my father there. Also, because I did not have brothers and sisters – I was an only child – I chose to stay with my mother in Indonesia.³⁸

In this quote, the social environment of this Indo-European girl clearly played a role. For many other repatriates, the disappearance of social infrastructure, associations and clubs was a decisive explanatory factor for leaving. However, in this case, it was exactly the other way around: the friends of this girl and the insecure social situation in the Netherlands were enough to cause her to stay in Indonesia.

In the case of Indo-Europeans who left for the former Dutch mother country, a remarkable shift in mentality can be discerned. The central orientation towards Europe, developed in the colonial period a long time ago, started to give way to an increased interest in their Indonesian ancestry. This became part of a newly created migrant identity. Related to that, the process of '*verindischen*', which was clearly taboo for the generation who was born and bred in the Dutch East Indies, seem to have been judged more positively in the last couple of decades. Following from that, the feeling of shame towards their Indonesian forebears, in particular the Indonesian grandmother, seemed to have disappeared.³⁹

13.4 Vietnam: Transition from French to American control

The Vietnamese situation changed rapidly after the Geneva agreements of 1954. The former part of Indochina became the stage for the international conflict between capi-

talism and communism. The Ngo Dinh Diem government in South-Vietnam and the American Eisenhower administration replaced the French presence in Vietnam. The Americans chose this strategy because they thought that an anti-communist and an anti-colonial alternative would not work at the same time. The transition from French to American control in South-Vietnam was a remarkable transition from the old-fashioned French ruling culture of variety (a specific kind of the well-known colonial strategy 'divide and rule') to a new American neo-colonial and informal ruling model. The United States tried to put forward the idea that it was pursuing a moral mission by continuing the war in South-Vietnam against the communist bloc in the north, based on ideas of generosity, benevolence, and protection. They framed it as a sort of continuation of the French colonial civilising mission which was functioning prior to the Geneva agreement during the colonial period.⁴⁰ The Second Indochina War between the United States and the radical Viet Minh waged from 1955 onwards through the Vietnamese area until the definitive fall of Saigon (nowadays officially known as Ho Chi Minh city) in 1975.⁴¹ This was an attempt by the United States to stop the rise of international communism because they feared that a domino effect would result in communist countries in the whole South-East Asian region.

While the war was fought on their old territories, the French managed to maintain some cultural influence in (South) Vietnam, even in the tumultuous 1950s, as I described earlier. Part of the reason for the escalation of the conflict was that none of the parties was completely content with the Geneva accords. The French had lost 58,000 soldiers in the First Indochina War, and were looking for a way to recover. The Americans, who had come out of Korea victorious, wished to repeat their success in overthrowing a communist power elsewhere in the world. The North Vietnamese nationalists were not satisfied with the Partition of the country at the seventeenth parallel. They wished to take more land and aimed to go down as far as the twelfth parallel. The South Vietnamese thought they had lost control over the whole of Vietnam, of which they claimed to be the natural inheritor through their king Bao Dai. All these unfulfilled wishes set the stage for another conflict. In essence, the Geneva Accords of 1954 only created a temporary truce to an ongoing conflict.⁴²

By 1960, Franco-South Vietnamese relations had improved. French enterprises in South Vietnam maintained their positions, and French exports to Vietnam began to increase. Three French organisations continued to provide technical and cultural assistance in 1959. These included the French cultural and religious mission, the mission of technical and economic assistance, and a group of professors at the University of Saigon. In December 1960, the French organised a successful exhibition in Saigon of French books and journals, which made clear to the French that they had not lost any of their cultural influence in Vietnam.⁴³

One of the remarkable features of the already mentioned inclusive French policy regarding the acquisition of French citizenship was the long period (from 1956 until at least 1982) that the French government continued to accept citizenship requests from *Métis*. These came from both children and adults who wanted to migrate to France. However, this did not mean that every *Métis* from Indochina who applied for citizenship was accepted by the French authorities.

In 1955, the French government had already acknowledged that the instability and

insecurity of the regime of Saigon was detrimental to *Métis* people. Therefore, they advocated a fast repatriation. At the same time, they stated that their adaptation was more difficult than the adaptation of French people from the mother country. *Métis* had often had little education, spoke French badly and had already been without employment in Vietnam for a long time.⁴⁴ At various times, the *FOEFL* petitioned the French government to save more *Métis* children from Vietnam, but the French government was often too reluctant to give in. They still searched for *Métis* children and used defunct colonial laws to justify separating them from their mothers and sending them to France. The sometimes-harsh policies of the *FOEFL* towards uncooperative mothers raised doubts with the French diplomatic mission in Saigon and it threatened France's reputation with the Vietnamese people.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, until 1976, the *FOEFL* continued to receive subsidies from the French government. But also after that date, from 1977 until its discontinuance in 1983, the *FOEFL* continued to help the remaining *Métis* children in Vietnam and France without any funding from the French government.⁴⁶ Only four years after the discontinuance of the original *FOEFL*, the organisation was re-founded in 1987 in the old reception centre for *Métis* children at Semblancay. Its new name became *Association FOEFL* and its goal was to keep the old friendship linkages alive. These personal connections had come about in the reception centres just after the *Métis* children had arrived in France.⁴⁷

'French paternity is rather easily established'

As in the other cases, it is difficult to say how many people with mixed French-Vietnamese origin stayed in Vietnam. Those who stayed were affected by the departure of others. A Frenchwoman, who was interviewed in 1970 and who came to Vietnam in 1929, said there were few Eurasians left:

In 1954, the huge French community began to shrink and many of her best customers left. [...] Saigon? Ah, it was paradise when I came here, a paradise. And now – well, look at it. It is not even clean.⁴⁸

Although many of the French had left, there still was a French Institute in Saigon, which offered courses in spoken French and organised cultural events. French culture persisted to some measure, also after decolonisation.

The Institute, which is directed by the Foreign Ministry in Paris and has smaller centres in Dallat and Nhatrang, claims an enrolment of over 15,000 a year in Saigon for four-month courses in spoken French. There are also French movies, concerts, a reading room that seats over 2000, a library of more than 40,000 books, most of which may be taken home, and a collection of 1,000 records. There are 430 French professors teaching in South Vietnam, 96 of them in Vietnamese schools. There are five primary and secondary schools completely run and subsidized by the French Government for children aged 6 to 17 and with an estimated enrolment of 7,240, mostly Vietnamese. France spends almost \$4 million a year to maintain and staff the schools and cultural centers.⁴⁹

In 1973 *The Washington Post* interviewed Eurasians, who were still in Vietnam. An old man said 'It takes much courage to do certain things, but it takes more courage to accept things as they are.'⁵⁰ A young Eurasian added:

These people could no longer adapt themselves to France. They have an obsession of place – they can't leave Vietnam. Here they're distinguished. They still have privileges because they are white. If they went to France, no one would pay any attention to them – they would be anonymous.⁵¹

Overall, it was difficult to find traces of *Métis* people remaining in Vietnam after 1954. Nearly all left and those who chose to stay probably did not want to be known as people of partly French ancestry in postcolonial independent Vietnam. The majority of them had integrated into mainstream Vietnamese society. Others might have passed as the successors of the *Métis*, the Amerasians, offspring of relationships between Vietnamese women and American soldiers. Although almost all *Métis* seem to have left, it was plausible that some refugees with partly French (or American) ancestry were among the boat people who fled the communist regime after the fall of Saigon, which ended the Vietnam War in 1975. This exodus included a couple of thousand Amerasian orphans who were adopted by American and European families.⁵² The inclusive and lenient French policies also continued in the postcolonial period in Vietnam. *The New York Times* described the position of the group at length:

There was a time not long ago when some Vietnamese cities offered up children who resembled the thousands of children of mixed American and Vietnamese background who now haunt this city. They were the offspring of French soldiers and civilians. [...] they were fair-skinned or dark-eyed, black or blue-eyed. The French who lived here and fought the Vietminh until 1954 came from France and from the colonial territories. Now there are untold numbers of Vietnamese who want to leave this country forever. A fraction of them, amounting to thousands and perhaps tens of thousands, are descended from Frenchmen and Americans. The half-French are now older and fewer, but they are still leaving with other refugees and are settling in France. [...] The differences between the two countries' current policies toward the children they left behind are even more closely followed here than in the United States.⁵³

According to *The New York Times*, the US was not admitting the offspring of American soldiers.

American paternity of the sort that confers citizenship is hard to establish. By contrast, French paternity is rather easily established and gets a Vietnamese to France [...]. A claimant of French paternity is first asked for documentary proof [...] such evidence can include marriage licenses, birth certificates, official statements, that parents were living together, letters, photographs, and so forth. If French paternity is thus proved, the claimant may acquire dual French citizenship with or without a father's statement. And many such Frenchmen have left Vietnam over the past two decades.⁵⁴

Heritage tours and the wish to return

After 1986, when the most severe communist regulations were relaxed in Vietnam, so-called 'heritage tours' were organised for *Métis*. During these journeys, a number of former *Métis* pupils of the organisation *FOEFL* decided to spend the rest of their lives in Vietnam. They usually let holiday accommodation such as rooms and apartments to French tourists, and they prefer old *FOEFL* orphans or members as their guests.⁵⁵ It was sometimes difficult for them to adapt to postcolonial life in Vietnam. The lan-

guage was an especially difficult barrier to integration to overcome. *Métis* people used to speak a mixed language of Vietnamese and French among each other which was called *Tchêts*. *Métis* spoke the kind of Vietnamese language spoken in the 1960s, which has been 'frozen in time' in the Vietnamese communities in France. People living in Vietnam can understand it but it sounds strange to their ears.⁵⁶

Written proof of *Métis* people who stayed with their Vietnamese mothers after decolonisation of Indochina in 1954 is rare. Vietnamese people generally considered them unreliable according to the former Vietnamese journalist for the American magazine *Time* and – later discovered – spy Pham Xuan An:

In Vietnam no one trusts *Métis*, they know too much. They pass for Europeans while staring at the world through Asian eyes. They are spies in the houses of their fathers and mothers. They are useful but treacherous.⁵⁷

In this respect, both the colonial status and the generous citizenship criteria negotiated as part of the bureaucratic regulations at the Round Table Conferences played a role. Despite the generous French policies, the 40,000 *Métis* people who left for France occupied an ambiguous position as 'repatriates' in reception centres in southern France. The story of the *Métis* was not well-known among the general French public. Veterans' organisations like the *Association nationale des anciens et amis de l'Indochine* (the National Association of Veterans and Friends of Indochina) have lobbied for greater state-led commemoration of the Indochina War, but their story has been largely forgotten as there was more public attention for the vast number of repatriates from Algeria who came to France after the Algerian War.⁵⁸ Additionally, a considerable number of the Vietnamese women who arrived in France with their *Métis* children wanted to return to Vietnam in the immediate years after arriving in France. They found out that the French authorities at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were irritated about their plans. The French authorities feared that they would be discredited, especially in the eyes of the Vietnamese authorities since they had taken so much trouble to bring these people to the mother country. Life in Vietnam would not have been easy for them. The Vietnamese women had to have a residence permit, which was only granted when they had a job and guaranteed repatriation (back to France).

However, after a while the Ministry realised that for these women their stay in the mother country was useless and they had no chance of integrating into French society.⁵⁹ Until 1981, the French government was the owner and primary financer of the reception centres for *Métis*.⁶⁰

13.5 Comparison and conclusion: The 'honey-milk coloured' skin in postcolonial times

In all three colonies, the definite end of colonialism took much longer than the signing of the formal act of independence alone. The formal decolonisation was followed by a brutal aftermath in different forms, in British India with the Partition and in the Dutch East Indies and Indochina with a brutal war of independence. Therefore, this was an important explanatory factor for Eurasians in the decision process to stay or leave.

In the former British and Dutch colony, the people of mixed ancestry who stayed behind were usually too old or too poor to migrate. They were already retired or did not have the money to pay for the journey to the mother country or another country. After decolonisation, most of these people lived in difficult and poor circumstances. They could not prove their eligibility for migration to the former European mother country. In the Dutch East Indies, the government eventually set up a special assisted repatriation scheme for *spijtoptanten*. This happened after lobby and pressure groups placed extensive pressure on the Dutch government, and it had already stopped on 31 March 1964, without any follow-up. For many older Eurasians, this date came too early, because they only heard about the existence of the scheme later on. This trajectory sharply contrasts with the situation of the *Métis*. The French case formed an exception since the *Métis* were all relatively easily accepted as French citizens in the French mother country. Nevertheless, the older Vietnamese mothers of *Métis* children who could not easily find a job outside the reception centres have lived an outsider's life in French society. The few *Métis* who did not leave for France and stayed in Vietnam, probably had a strong connection with their Vietnamese ancestry, which they expressed in their ability to speak Vietnamese, the place where they lived and their familiarity with Vietnamese culture. Otherwise they must have looked too 'Eastern' in the eyes of French authorities who selected the *Métis* who could repatriate or had strong objections against a move to France and could therefore easily integrate into Vietnamese society.

Most of the stayers eventually led a relatively happy life in the former colonies. Although in all three contexts, there were indications that discrimination against them occurred on a large scale, in the first years after decolonisation. Anglo-Indians faced the least adversity from the Indian people. In more recent years, they were even preferred as employees, because of their western lifestyle and English language skills. Also in Indonesia, Indo-Europeans currently have a more positive image, and are preferred in the media and entertainment business. In Indochina, *Métis* people were sometimes regarded with suspicion, but since many of them have emigrated to France, the local people must have developed some kind of tolerance towards the remaining small group of *Métis* including the ones who have returned from France more recently. A similar development happened in the Dutch East Indies although the pace was slower. The average Indonesian still regarded Indo-Europeans as connected to the former Dutch coloniser in some way in the first years following independence, but that attitude also faded as time went by.

I4 Discussion and conclusion

I4.1 Introduction

This book was about how Eurasians made their choices. The main question this book sought to answer was: What were the margins within which the Eurasians made their choices to stay or leave the former colonies of British India, the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina and why did these margins differ across the three contexts? In this book, I analysed the factors that determined these margins, and the choices the Eurasians made. Based on extensive archival research in several countries, I compared the colonial position of Eurasians in the three colonies and the options for Eurasians before and after decolonisation to understand why the margins, within which they made their choices, differed between the colonies.

Debates on the right labels and terms for ‘Eurasians’ occurred frequently while I was carrying out my research: What is the correct label? Who is an Eurasian? Who self-defined as such? It clearly is a controversial issue now, as it was at the time when the ‘Eurasian Question’ was at the centre of debates. The answers to these questions also determined the size of the group. Eurasians could pass themselves off as European or as indigenous depending on their skin colour, class, religion and education. In the period covered in this book, people repeatedly self-defined, or were re-defined by others. This process of repeated redefinition became important at the moment of decolonisation when the margins within which the Eurasians chose between their Asian and European ancestry shifted. Simultaneously, the labels used for people of mixed ancestry changed as well as the number of people who were defined as Eurasians. People were granted or claimed rights depending on how they were defined or how they defined themselves.

This chapter summarises the sub-conclusions of the various chapters. It starts with general remarks regarding the advantage of the comparative perspective offered.

I4.2 The comparative perspective

The comparative approach of this study has highlighted unique characteristics of each colony in settling the Eurasian Question, as well as striking and unexpected connections and similarities between the colonies. In contrast to comparative works on colonialism and decolonisation, such as Elizabeth Buettner’s inspirational study *Europe after empire*, I focused on the consequences of decolonisation for the Eurasians

specifically.¹ The process of community formation of Eurasians was described in earlier studies for the three Eurasian groups separately, as discussed at length in the beginning of this book. My study adds to this literature via my comparative approach which resulted in a common picture of 1) the ways colonising countries attempted to learn from each other in designing specific policies for Eurasians; 2) how minorities belonging to a particular ruling system coped with a dramatic power transition (de-colonisation); and 3) how newly independent states dealt with an in-between minority associated with the former colonisers.

Colonial authorities considered the three Asian colonies discussed here as the crown jewels of their colonial project. In the other European colonies in Asia, a Eurasian Question was defined in a similar way. Eurasian groups did emerge there and they emancipated like the Eurasians described in this book did. Eurasians were in touch with each other throughout Asia. In the French, British and Dutch Caribbean there were no mixed ancestry groups who self-identified or emancipated, or were labelled in a similar manner as the Eurasians were. In French Algeria mixing was uncommon, denied and hidden. In the other African colonies, mixed relationships did lead to a small and recognised Eurafrican population. The European colonisers in some of the colonies in Africa focused on 'saving' the children born from mixed relations by removing them from their mothers, and their countries of birth. In short, mixed relationships were common in almost all colonial settings but only in the Asian colonies did a Eurasian Question become rather prominent.

The comparative approach taken in this book showed how this Eurasian Question developed along similar lines in all three colonies. The issue became more prominent after the arrival of larger numbers of European women in all three colonies. The problem came to be seen as urgent when the Eurasian population was hit hard by the interwar economic crisis and increased competition from the indigenous population on the labour market. Authorities in all three colonies looked at each other for inspiration and guidance. Colonial civil servants travelled between the colonies, and ideas were exchanged at colonial exhibitions. An idea of a common 'Eurasian Question', which was related to a shared, but vague definition of the Eurasian group, developed and strengthened because of these connections.

What this book especially made clear was that the positive strategy of emancipation through self-representation that the Eurasians started in the late colonial period to a certain extent backfired, and this determined the postcolonial possibilities. This emancipation paradox describes the process in which Eurasians emancipated, demanded rights and became more visible as a group, and because of that were also more discriminated against. The emancipation paradox occurred in all three colonial settings. How it differed per colony, is highlighted in the sections below. In the last section, the emancipation paradox is addressed in more detail.

14.3 The heuristic framework revisited

In the introduction of this book, I presented a heuristic framework with twelve factors, which might have shaped the context in which the Eurasians made choices. For

the purpose of clarity, Table 2 is repeated here. The twelve factors listed below defined the framework in which the Eurasians made their choices at the individual and collective level. This framework was based on a large number of publications, which were discussed in the introduction to this book. My comparative research built on this literature. I took – in contrast to much of the existing literature – an explicit longitudinal approach and included both the period before and after decolonisation. This longer timespan enabled me to present a completer picture, and to identify the emancipation paradox, and its consequences for the possibilities of Eurasians.

TABLE 2 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED EURASIANS' CHOICES

<i>Personal factors</i>	<i>Legal factors</i>	<i>Structural factors</i>
1. Class (economic status)	1. Colonial legal status and ethnicity	1. Socio-historical background, process and length of colonisation
2. Age	2. Bureaucracy: accessibility of citizenship and other governmental regulations.	2. The decolonisation process and aftermath (unrest, rumours, chaos, discrimination by new powers)
3. Education		3. Economic situation/future prospects in mother country and the former colony
4. Religion		4. Disappearance of social infrastructure/social network including familial ties
5. Gender and marital status		5. Geo-political situation e.g. the Cold War

This book adds to the debate on the function and use of racial hierarchies in (post) colonial society. The colonial legal status of Eurasians was key to the position of Eurasians in the colonial hierarchy. This status was interacting with the level of violence involving Eurasians during the decolonisation processes in all three colonies. It was the most important explanatory factor when it comes to the framework in which Eurasians made their choices. Eurasians were heavily targeted in the violence accompanying decolonisation in the Dutch East Indies and Indochina, and as a result they all wanted to leave. Eurasians were not so much targeted in India during partition, and therefore most Anglo-Indians initially stayed. Anglo-Indians had secured postcolonial legal privileges. This leads to the observation that Eurasians were only targeted in places where they had no legal safeguards or were their safeguards were not respected (as was the case in French Indochina and in the Dutch East Indies).

The historical context

The Eurasian group came into existence, as described in chapter 2, as a result of migrations from Europe to the colonies in Asia, and the relationships between European men and indigenous women. In British India, mixed relationships were common from the start of the colonial project. However, in the middle of the nineteenth

century, the British implemented anti-miscegenation laws. Mixed relationships were as a result seldom legalised via marriage, and Eurasians were excluded from the British legal system as well as from the Indian caste system. The Eurasian population was potentially large in British India, depending on the definition. The Dutch East Indies was also – like British India – an old colony, and mixed relationships were as common as in British India. These relationships were condoned, much to the dismay of the British, when they took possession of the Dutch East Indies for a brief period at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The mixed population was large and important to the Dutch colonial project. The Dutch felt responsible towards the Indo-European population and framed this responsibility in terms of debt. In French Indochina, the Eurasian community was smaller and newer. This study showed how French authorities copied their 'Eurasian' policies from the British and the Dutch.

From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, colonial authorities in all three colonies feared that Eurasians would undermine colonialism. In all three cases, the composition of colonial populations started to change in the second half of the nineteenth century. This process started earlier in British India, but it was a similar process in the other two colonies. White European women, who started to arrive in larger numbers towards the end of the nineteenth century, were expected to live up to the idea of superiority of the European culture. The women arrived in the period of *Modern Imperialism* when ideas regarding the *Ethische Politiek* in the Dutch East Indies, the *White Man's Burden* in British India and *la Mission Civilisatrice* in French Indochina reshaped colonialism. The Dutch version of modern imperialism was less ideological than its Indochinese and British Indian counterparts. In the French view the colonised people would eventually be able to become 'French' once they had 'evolved' to a higher stage of civilisation. In the other settings, this was seen as less of an option. In all three cases authorities struggled with defining the group both before and after decolonisation. Authorities needed the Eurasians for their colonial project, as intermediates between Europeans and indigenous people. Eurasians tried to be as European as possible but never attained European status. This ambivalent situation led to inclusion and exclusion at the same time; a positive image of Eurasians as loyal colonial subjects was created, as well as a negative image as potential traitors. This in-between position gave the Eurasians a privileged position because they could make demands in return for their loyalty to the colonisers.

The legal position

Western colonial authorities developed similar legal categories in which they subsumed the Eurasians, as described in chapter 3. In Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, Eurasians belonged to the legal European category as long as they were recognised by their European fathers, whereas in British India, legal recognition outside marriage was not an option. In all three colonies, Eurasian women could acquire European citizenship via marriage to a European man. Anglo-Indians were sometimes regarded as natives, sometimes as Europeans. There was no formal legal Eurasian category in any of the three colonies. Furthermore, in all three cases, European authorities increasingly worried about the potential revolutionary power of Eurasians.

As a result, they developed legislation to limit their possibilities to obtain an influential (usually political) position. The policy towards Eurasians in the Dutch East Indies was rather lenient in comparison to British India. In general, the status of the Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies was better than that of the Anglo-Indians in British India. The Europeanisation movement – a common development in all three Asian colonies – worsened the position of Eurasians. It started later in the Dutch East Indies and Indochina than in British India. The ‘young’ colony of Indochina followed a more inclusive policy there than those of the Dutch East Indies and British India. Fears about depopulation in France meant that the French wanted to raise as many abandoned Eurasian children as possible as ‘good’ French citizens.

The legal position was not only related to the level of violence involving Eurasians during the decolonisation processes but also in another way an (indirect) motive to leave or in a rare case to stay. Among those likely to stay were women who lost their European citizenship because of their marriage with indigenous men. The laws which regulated the legal position of Eurasians in the colonies, formed the basis for negotiations during the Round Table Conferences before formal decolonisation. They were influencing the postcolonial legal position of the Eurasians.

The socio-economic position, changes in the discourse and saving the children

Indo-Europeans in the Dutch East Indies could reach a higher social position than Anglo-Indians in British India, as described in chapters 4 to 6. According to Indo-Europeans, the Anglo-Indians had a much harder time under British colonial rule than they themselves had under Dutch rule. Indo-Europeans were considered to have fewer problems than the *Métis* in French Indochina and the Anglo-Indians in British India. Acquiring formal European citizenship became an ideal because it offered the best opportunities for social mobility in the colonies.

At the end of the nineteenth century, European colonisers became increasingly concerned about the potential threat of Eurasians. Eurasian children were especially seen as at risk and as a threat. Authorities pressed European fathers to recognise their Eurasian children. False recognitions occurred in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina, and these lead to debates about who was an Eurasian and who was not. In all three colonies, an educational stay in the mother country helped one to become more ‘European’. A European style-education at boarding schools at the hill stations was considered the best alternative if a stay in Europe was not an option.

One of the key findings of my study is the striking similarity between the systems that were set up in all three colonies to save the Eurasian children. Colonial authorities in all three colonies set up orphanages and boarding schools to raise Eurasian children in a European environment. In French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, colonial authorities offered Eurasian boys a military training hoping to ensure their loyalty to the colonial state. The institutions that were created were usually located at a higher altitude, where the temperature was cooler, and which were far removed from the assumed negative influences of the lower plains. The children were removed to a semi-European environment: it was the closest they could get to European countries,

without actually leaving the colony. It was a policy which strongly set the children apart from others.

In all three colonies, Eurasian children were removed from their mothers, but only in Indochina this was a centralised governmental affair. The differences between the three colonies were most clearly reflected in the similar education projects they developed. White paupers living in the large cities were seen as a problem in all three colonies because they could undermine the colonial project. The colonisers could not claim to bring civilisation if part of their 'own' group lived in dire straits. The Eurasians were included in the definition of the white pauper problem. They were seen as the colonisers problem. Impoverished Eurasian children did not reflect well on the colonisers status. White pauper children and Eurasian children were both removed from their families and brought up in boarding schools. In the British case the schooling system developed early and expanded rapidly. This schooling became a right of the Eurasian population and continued after decolonisation. It was part of the early British preparation for independence. In the French case, the system developed late, but it was institutionalised rapidly. Children were sometimes removed by force from their families. *Métis* school children were almost all 'repatriated' to France shortly before and after decolonisation. The Dutch East Indies held the middle ground. The Dutch developed the schooling system late in the colonial period. Dutch authorities did so in an informal way and never as fully as it was done in British India. The Eurasians tried to hold on to their right to education in Dutch after decolonisation but it never became an established right, as occurred in India. Overall, the policies for Eurasian children were central to defining the Eurasians as a specific group.

Eurasian emancipation

From the early twentieth century onwards, Eurasians increasingly self-organised as a separate group, especially in the Dutch East Indies and British India, as described in chapter 7. Rather strong transnational links developed between the colonies because the French as 'young' colonisers wanted to learn from the policies in neighbouring colonies. One of the most interesting things to come out of this research is that not only the policy makers but also the Eurasian groups in the colonies increasingly looked at each other across borders. In part their activities were a response to the British preparations for independence. The Eurasians in British India organised, claimed and were granted separate rights early on. The British authorities started to prepare for India's independence before the Second World War and the well-organised Anglo-Indians managed to get elaborate postcolonial guarantees. The personal connections between the leaders of the Anglo-Indian Association and the leaders of independent India helped to ensure the continuation of colonial privileges after independence. In Indochina, the Eurasian population was smaller because colonisation was recent. As a result, the *Métis* had little time to organise and claim rights. Eurasians in the Dutch East Indies also received only limited rights. The Dutch started to prepare late and half-heartedly for independence, and the Eurasians managed to guarantee few postcolonial rights.

In all cases, Eurasian organisations sought to safeguard rights and privileges before

independence. Part of the Eurasian group claimed a joint identity as Eurasians regardless of their countries of birth. Eurasians arranged gatherings and travelled between the colonies. My study showed that in the 1930s, they rather strikingly claimed New Guinea as the homeland and self-identified as a 'race'. In order to achieve their goal of getting a separate homeland, they compared themselves to the Jews, who were also without a homeland. They even appealed to the League of Nations to endorse their rights as a separate people. It was to no avail. After Indonesia's independence, a small group of Eurasians from the Dutch East Indies tried to put these ideas into practice, and moved to New Guinea, which was still a Dutch colony at the time. The endeavour failed, and most of these Eurasians left for the Netherlands and other destinations outside Indonesia after a few years.

In British India, the Eurasian organisational infrastructure included schools, job reservations, railroad colonies and institute dances, as well as strong lobby organisations, and their publications. Because many of the Eurasians stayed after India's independence, this infrastructure eroded only slowly. In the Dutch East Indies, the Eurasian organisational infrastructure did not develop as strongly, as Eurasians were not separated from Europeans as much as in British India. Their organisations eroded rapidly when many of the Europeans and Eurasians left after independence. This erosion stimulated those who had not yet left, to depart as well. In French Indochina, there was even less of a separate Eurasian infrastructure than in the Dutch East Indies, so its disappearance was not that important as a motive for leaving, as it was in the two other cases.

Chaos, decolonisation and the 'pull' of the mother country

After the Second World War, thousands of Eurasians left the (former) colonies with the Europeans, as described in chapters 8 and 9. In Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, Eurasian emancipation was halted during Japanese occupation when many Eurasians found that it was better to be Asian than European. In all three settings, the Eurasians redefined themselves during the war and denied their 'Europeaness'. In the Dutch East Indies and in French Indochina, Eurasians and Europeans were interned during the Japanese occupation and again after the Japanese capitulation. Violence in the Dutch East Indies and Indochina was an important reason to leave. In the British case, there was no Japanese occupation and there was no violent war of independence. The decolonisation of British India was however followed by the partition of India and the massive relocations of Hindus to India and Muslims to Pakistan. The new regime in India acted less aggressively towards the Anglo-Indians than the new regimes in Indonesia and Indochina did towards Indo-Europeans and *Métis*. The partition of India did lead to the division of the British Indian Army, the Royal Indian Navy, the Indian Civil Service, and the railways (all sectors in which Anglo-Indians mostly worked). Furthermore, the partition caused the displacement of 14 million people and the death of an estimated several hundred thousand to two million people. This violence and displacement, of course, also affected the Anglo-Indians.

Options to leave were restricted for the Eurasians because Australia, Canada and South-Africa had colour bars or white policies, and the US had quotas. Anglo-Indi-

ans could not leave for the UK because they did not have British citizenship after a change in British citizenship law in 1948. When their preferential rights expired in the 1960s, many left after all, mostly to the UK, but also to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, where restrictions had been lifted in the meantime.

In British India, most Anglo-Indians initially stayed because of constitutional safeguards. Both the Dutch and the British governments were reluctant to admit people of mixed ancestry because of housing shortages and the fear of a return to pre-war unemployment. They also claimed that 'Eastern' people would not fit in. Via newspapers and personal contacts the Eurasians knew about the situation in the mother countries. They knew that hundreds of thousands of people were leaving the UK and the Netherlands via assisted passage schemes to mostly Australia and Canada. They knew about housing shortages and rationing, and they knew about the weather and the lukewarm welcome some had received. Eurasian organisations in India and Indonesia also actively discouraged their departure. In both the Dutch and French cases, some Eurasian people regretted their decision to move to the mother country and wanted to return to the former colony. They felt discriminated against.

An important difference between the Dutch and British Eurasians were the privileges that Anglo-Indians secured during the series of Round Table Conferences in 1931. Not only were jobs for Anglo-Indians guaranteed but also other rights such as representation in Parliament and provincial legislatures, and educational grants for education in English were assured. Anglo-Indians automatically became Indian citizens when independence was declared and thus they did not have to make a choice like the Eurasians in the Dutch East Indies case had to do. In the Dutch case, Indo-Europeans were traumatised by their experiences during the Japanese occupation and the *Bersiap*. Therefore, the urge to leave was stronger than in the British case. At the Round Table Conference of 1949 the conditions for the independence of Indonesia were negotiated. Both sides made a large number of promises, but in the 1950s, the Indonesian government unilaterally broke them, whereas in India they remained in place after Independence. The regulations of the French government to grant the *Métis* French citizenship (and therefore admission to France) were more generous and written proof of European ancestry was not required.

Overall, the quality of legal safeguards provided for Eurasians contributed to the level of violence that Eurasians experienced. Therefore, it is not either the legal factor or the threat of violence that affected Eurasians' decision but rather how one affected the other. The legal safeguards preceded and in many ways dictated the threat of violence. These differences and how Eurasians were treated provide some insightful clues as to how these newly independent regimes would develop in subsequent years. In India, where Anglo-Indians remained in large numbers and encountered little violence, democracy remained intact and a functioning and relatively fair legal system developed. In Indonesia, from where the vast majority of Eurasians departed, an authoritarian regime with a questionable legal system emerged. In Vietnam, where most of those who identified as *Métis* left, the country became more chaotic (and in the north, more authoritarian) as civil war spread.

The position of the Eurasians after independence

In all three former colonial contexts, circumstances deteriorated for Eurasians after Independence, as described in the chapters 10 to 13. In Indonesia and Vietnam this development started in the mid-1950s, while in India it started only in the 1960s. For the Indo-Europeans who had stayed in Indonesia, circumstances quickly worsened. Thousands wanted to leave after all, but they were largely unable to do so because of the restrictions put into place by Dutch authorities. In India – as said – the Anglo-Indians had been recognised as a minority and they kept privileges until the 1960s. From Vietnam, the small Eurasian group repatriated to France had less hurdles to overcome.

After the Indonesians cancelled the agreements of the Round Table Conference, anti-Dutch sentiments intensified and many Indo-Europeans wanted to leave after all. The Dutch government was initially unwilling to help them, but after severe public pressure it did set up an assisted passage scheme. A similar assisted passage scheme was introduced in the British case, but it was used less than in the Dutch case because the necessity to leave India was not felt as urgently and permission was difficult to attain. The French postcolonial policy regarding *Métis* was rather inclusive, in comparison with the aloof attitude of both the Dutch and British authorities.

In the former British and Dutch colony, the people of mixed ancestry who stayed behind were usually too old or too poor to leave. In all three contexts, there were some indications of discrimination against those who stayed, especially in the first years after decolonisation. Anglo-Indians in recent years became preferred employees, because of their English language skills. Also in Indonesia, Indo-Europeans currently have a more positive image and receive preferential treatment in the media and entertainment business. In Indochina, very few *Métis* people stayed and, as in the other cases, sharp edges wore off with time.

14.4 The emancipation paradox

As this study showed, being Eurasian could take various forms, but the Eurasian group in all three colonies followed similar steps in terms of the demarcation of the group, their emancipation and their accrual of rights via organisations. The Eurasian 'child' policies lay at the basis of this emancipation and enforced it. Eurasian self-representations led to more claims for rights and more visibility, but also to more discrimination: the emancipation paradox, as defined above. The introduction of the emancipation paradox – which so far has been seldom studied – as an explanation for the construction of the framework in which the Eurasians made their choices, is the main theoretical contribution this study makes. The positive process of emancipation in the sense of lobbying for rights equal to the Europeans led to the negative process of discrimination because of their enhanced visibility. That did not only happen in the eyes of the European authorities but also in the perspective of the indigenous people, who through their own emancipation became competitors on the labour market. The development of the legal position of Eurasians in the colonial hierarchy also interacted

with this paradox. The connections between the colonies strengthened the formation of the Eurasian group in all three colonies. The emancipation paradox determined the place of Eurasians in postcolonial society and their postcolonial possibilities. This position was characterised by the continued redefinition, hybridity and feelings of deprivation. In particular, this gained prominence at the moment of decolonisation when Eurasians in all three colonies had to find a place in a new constellation.

In British India, the emancipation paradox was the most explicit. There, Eurasians formed their own representative groups early. They organised, claimed and gained rights. This strategy later backfired, however. On the one hand, they became a group that was separated further from the British, and had therefore less opportunities to migrate to the UK after independence. On the other hand, the strictly demarcated place of Anglo-Indians in the colony with few possibilities for upward mobility led to elaborate constitutional rights in the immediate postcolonial years. In French Indochina, Eurasians started to demand rights late. They received few separate rights, were set less apart from the colonisers, and the majority of the group could migrate to France. In the Dutch East Indies, Eurasians organised and demanded access to certain rights later than in British India. After they had organised themselves, they received fewer rights than their counterparts in British India. A larger number could still migrate after decolonisation. In short, the Eurasians from British India who emancipated most and at an early stage mainly stayed, while the Eurasians from French Indochina only emancipated late and left in large numbers.

The margins within which Eurasians made their choice between staying in the former colony or leaving were determined by the factors described above. Violence, decreasing economic opportunities and the crumbling organisational infrastructure were reasons to leave. Those who stayed were too old, had no money, no European citizenship, and no contacts. The rights the Eurasians had and received after the conditions of independence were agreed upon resulted from the emancipation paradox. The strength of the paradox as an explanatory factor could be tested by looking at other former colonies in Asia such as Hong Kong and Malaya, where there were also Eurasians communities, as well as at settings in which no similar emancipatory trajectory developed. It emphasises the need for more comparative colonial and postcolonial research. My thesis was mainly based on governmental archives. Future research could take the *emic* perspective as a starting point and use *ego-documents*, interviews and other personal sources. Future research could also look more closely at how the indigenous population saw the Eurasians, and how their emancipation from the position of a former colonised people was related to the emancipation of the Eurasians.

Appendices

Appendix 1 *Cited articles from newspaper and periodicals*

In Dutch: *Java-bode*, *De Locomotief*, *De Nieuwsier*, *Onze Stem*, *Tong Tong*, *NIBEG-orgaan*.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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123 NIOD, 5083: P.F. Dahler: 'Indo-Nederlanders moeten Indonesiër worden!': *Deze Indo-Nederlandse samenleving dient thans uit de openbare samenleving hier te lande te verdwijnen, dat wil zeggen, dat een Indo-Nederlander (se) zich niet alleen als een Indonesiër (se) moet beschouwen, doch ook moet hij (zij) volledig Indonesiër (se) worden. Degene die dat niet willen moeten voorgoed als een vreemdeling (e) in Indonesië beschouwd worden.*

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Chapter 3 Legal position

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60 VNNA 4, RSA no. 4835: Dossier relatif aux status de la société de protection des enfants Métis de l'Annam années 1900-1918. Le comité de la Société de protection des Métis abandonnés de l'Annam (Hué) à monsieur le Représentant de l'Amicale des services civils des commis en Annam, undated, presumably written in 1915-1916. *Au moment où la Mère Patrie perd chaque jour un peu plus du sang de ses enfants, il nous a semblé que notre devoir était, en ce placant au point de vue patriotique comme au point de vue social, de redoubler d'efforts pour sauver tous ceux qui se rattachent à notre race, ne fut ce que donc une part minime.*

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63 J. Chailley-Bert, *Java et ses habitants* (Paris 1900) viii.

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73 Bloembergen, *De koloniale vertoning*, 275.

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75 Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of empire*, 28, 209. Another example of these imperial connections is the British report of the colonial situation in the Dutch East Indies: J.W.B. Money, *Java; or how to manage a colony. Showing a practical solution of the questions now affecting British India* (London 1861).

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81 Stoler, *Carnal knowledge*, 82.

82 Bousquet, *A French view*, 112, 113.

Chapter 4 Socio-economic position of Eurasians until 1900

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2 Younger, *Anglo-Indians*, 112.

3 Simon, *Un village franco-indochinois*, 68; D'Cruz, *Midnight's orphans*, 82.

4 Gist and Wright, *Marginality and identity*, 88.

5 Younger, *Anglo-Indians*, 113; Blunt, *Domicile and diaspora*, 9-10; A.D. Grimshaw, 'The Anglo-Indian community. The integration of a marginal Group', *The Journal of Asian Studies* 18:2 (1959) 227-240, 230; Bear, *Lines of the nation*.

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7 Muthiah and MacLure, *The Anglo-Indians*, 66.

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11 D'Souza, *Anglo-Indian Education*, 63; Jayawardena, *Erasure of the Euro-Asian*, 75.

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16 Bear, 'Public genealogies', 373; Stark, *Hostages to India*, 51.

17 Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of empire*, 3.

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28 Ibidem, 107.

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32 Ha, *French women*, 103.

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Chapter 5 Changes in the discourse on Eurasians around 1900

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Chapter 6 Socio-economic position of Eurasians from 1900 onwards

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41 Graham, 'The education of the Anglo-Indian child', 31-32; Minto, *Graham*, 66.

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52 Burnett, 'A history of the Anglo-Burmese community', 3.

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55 W.F. Wertheim, 'Koloniaal racisme in Indonesië. Ons onverwerkt verleden?', *De Gids* 154 (1991) 367-385, 367. *De bescheiden man, die zich te Genua heeft ingescheept, is vele graden belangrijker geworden wanneer hij te Priok aan wal stapt... Op het moment dat hij Europa verliet is hij Europeaan geworden.*

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63 *Wat hebt u tegen die zwarte, kapitein, u bent toch zelf ook zwart?* from: Vuyk, *Gerucht*, 58.

64 *Hij vatte het vel van zijn onderarm tussen duim en wijsvinger en schreeuwde, maar niet naar mij, met het hoofd ver naar achter geworpen het heilig toekrijsend: 'Dit zwarte vel, mijn eigen vel dat ik zou willen afscheuren. Het is de Aziaat in mijzelf die ik haat'.* from: Vuyk, *Gerucht*, 58.

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68 *Besef een klein moment, nu, wat een Indo-Europeaan is: een telg van een koloniaal voorgeslacht [...] Wij werden telgen die een leven leidden, even halfslachtig als onze huidskeur... Bij God, wij apen de Europeanen na, want zij zijn het beschaafde ras en een inlander is maar een inlander, zo was het toch altijd. Wij apen de Europeanen na, hoewel we ze even grondig wantrouwen als zij ons! [...] Toch deden wij als Europeanen: wij dronken splitjes en woonden in stenen huizen en noemden ons intellectueel en wij meden de kampongs als de pest*, from: G.J. Vermeulen, *Dagboek van een halve mens* (Leiden 1951) 62-63.

69 NL-HaNA_2.24.01.05_0_926-1363, <http://www.gahetna.nl/collectie/afbeeldingen/fotocollectie/zoeken/weergave/detail/q/id/ac218180-dob4-102d-bc18-003048976d84> (29-11-2017)

70 Als hij met Hollandse vrienden omging, dan had hij het gevoel dat ik mijn gemoed, mijn denken, doen en laten hierbij aan moest passen. Mevrouw en mijnheer groeten en handjes geven, want anders werd je al bij voorbaat als kampongindo bestempeld. Niet zomaar naar binnen gaan als je niet naar binnen werd geroepen. Rustig blijven zitten binnenshuis en nergens aankomen, spelletjes doen als halma of mens-erger-je-niet. Zeer enthousiast doen en niet laten blijken, dat je je zat te vervelen. [...] Kortom alles op de Nederlandse toer [...] Er werd gelet op de taal die je sprak. [...] Kleurrijker en ongecompliceerder ging het daarentegen toe bij mijn Javaanse vrienden. From: Jalhay, *Tussen blank en bruin*, 53.

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78 Jansen van Galen, *Afscheid van de koloniën*, 119.

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80 Ibidem, 194.

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84 P. Groen, 'Zedelijkheid en martialiteit. Het kazerneconcubinaat in Nederlands-Indië', in: M. Bloembergen and R. Raben (eds.), *Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief. Wegen naar het nieuwe Indië 1890-1950* (Leiden 2009) 25-51, 40; Baay, *De njai*, 141.

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86 *Rapport der pauperisme-commissie, ingesteld bij artikel 2 van het regeeringsbesluit van 29 juni 1902 no 9* (Batavia 1903); V. van de Loo, *Johannes 'Pa' van der Steur (1865-1945): zijn leven, zijn werk en zijn Steurtjes* (The Hague 2015) 106.

87 Coté, 'Romancing the Indies', 149; See also: Stoler, *Carnal knowledge*, 69-70.

88 Van der Kroef, 'The Eurasian minority', 486.

89 Bosma and Raben, *Being Dutch in the Indies*, 241.

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91 Van der Meer, 'Dag Pa, Ik wil er in, bij Van der Steur', 9, 24.

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130 K. Lefèvre, *Métisse blanche* (Paris 1989) 48, 'Le papier attestait que mon père était bien français, qu'il avait été forcé de suivre son régiment en laissant ma mère avec une enfant qu'elle était incapable d'élever convenablement: que la pauvre femme désirait faire don de sa fille à l'État français qui, mieux qu'elle, saurait lui préparer un avenir. (...) à renoncer à tous ses droits maternels.'

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132 Lefebvre, *Métisse blanche*, 345. Je n'avais cessé, depuis mon enfance, d'essuyer du mépris, des rejets, de la haine parfois, de la part d'un peuple que je considérais comme mien. C'est que je rappelais, à mon corps défendant, l'humiliante colonisation et l'arrogance du Blanc. J'étais le fruit impur de la trahison de ma mère, une Vietnamienne.'

133 I. Thuy Pelaud, 'Metisse Blanche' Kim Lefevre and Transnational Space', in: J. Brennan, *Mixed race literature* (Stanford 2002) 122-136, 123.

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Chapter 7 Eurasian emancipation and the foundation of Eurasian interest organisations

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Chapter 8 Chaos and options in the decolonisation period

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36 S. Scagliola, 'The silences and myths of a "dirty war": Coming to terms with the Dutch-Indonesian Decolonisation War (1945-1949)', *European Review of History* 14:2 (2007) 235-262, 240, 243.

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38 Binnen deze eilandengrenzen zal een ras achterblijven dat men Indo noemt. Niet blank, niet bruin. Zij zullen de meest gewantrouwde wezens van Indonesië zijn- zoals zij in feite en heimelijk altijd zijn geweest. Zij gaan niet naar Holland, jongeman wat zouden zij er doen? Zij leven hier voort en zij sterven hier voort. Elke kogel die jij nu afschiet is een kogel van een Indo-Europeaan en elke dode die jij nu maakt zal straks op de debetzijsche van het boekwerk staat dat tot titel draagt: Indo-Europeanen, from: Vermeulen, *Dagboek*, 63.

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50 Bass, *The spy who loved us*, 39.

51 Gunn, *Rice wars in colonial Vietnam*, 216.

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Chapter 9 Formal political decolonisation and the 'pull' of the mother country

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Chapter 10 Socio-economic circumstances for Eurasians after decolonisation

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Chapter 12 Special policies for Eurasians and the Eurasian reactions

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Chapter 13 Those who stayed (after 1960)

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Hier ben ik geboren en getogen, en geworden zoals ik nu ben. Waarvoor moet ik dit land in de steek laten?’, uit: P. Pattynama, ‘Ik woon hier en ik hoor hier. Indo’s in Indonesie. Hoe is het hun vergaan?’, *Pasar-krant* (1996) 8-9:9.

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54 Campbell, ‘Vietnam’s Amerasians drift in sea of indifference’.

55 Many examples can be found in the magazine of the modern association FOEFI, *Grain de Riz*.

56 Rolland, *Petits Viet-Nams*, 34. <http://www.rapatries-vietnam.org/documents-harkis-franco-indochinois.php> (18-04-2016).

57 Bass, *The spy who loved us*, 234.

58 M.K. Edwards, ‘The national association of veterans and friends of Indochina: Commemoration of the Indochina War and the “positive” role of colonialism’, *Hagar: Studies in Culture, Polity and Identities* 9:2 (2010) 30-48, 31.

59 Archives diplomatiques, Consulat General Saigon Série A, 590PO/A, article 206, Assistance aux Français, secours aux Français. Note 17 June 1959, Letter 17 April 1969, ‘Return of repatriates to Vietnam’ and letter 1 August 1959, ‘problems posed by the repatriation of French men of Eurasian or Asian origin’.

60 <http://www.rapatries-vietnam.org/documents-harkis-franco-indochinois.php> (13-04-2016).

Chapter 14 Discussion and conclusion

1 Buettner, *Europe after empire*.

List of abbreviations

AIAIA	All India Anglo-Indian Association
ANOM	Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer
APRA	Angketan Perang Ratu Adil (Westerling's private army)
BL	British Library
BNF	Bibliothèque Nationale de France
CCKP	Centraal Comité van kerkelijk en particulier initiatief voor sociale zorg ten behoeve van gerepatrieerden
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
FOEFI	Fédération des œuvres de l'enfance Française d'Indochine
Fonds RST	Fonds Résident de Supérieur de Tonkin
Fonds RSA	Fonds Résident de Supérieur d'Annam
Fonds GGI	Fonds Gouverneur Général d'Indochine
HALIN	Hulp aan Landgenoten in Indonesië
IEV	Indo-Europeesch Verbond/Indo-Eenheids Verbond (from 1951 onwards)
ICP	Indochinese Communist Party
KITLV	Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
KOP	Kantor Oeroesan Peranakan
NASSI	Comité Nationale Actie Steunt Spijtoptanten Indonesië
NIBEG	Nederlands-Indische Bond van Ex-krijgsgevangenen en Geïnterneerden
NIOD	Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie
NL-HaNA	Nationaal Archief, Den Haag
PAGI	Pesaudaraan Asia Golongan Indonesia
PIN	Partai Indo National
PNI	Partai National Indonesia
POW	Prisoner of War
RAPWI	Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees
RTC	Ronde Tafel Conferentie/Round Table Conference
SHD	Service Historique de Défense (Chateau de Vincennes, Paris)
SHOMI	Stichting Helpt Onze Mensen in Indonesië
SNO	Stichting voor Nederlands Onderwijs
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia
UA	Utrechts Archief
ULL	University Library Leiden
Viet Minh	Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh (National Front for the Independence of Vietnam)
VWP	Vietnamese Workers Party
VNNA 1	Vietnamese National Archives no. 1
VNNA 3	Vietnamese National Archives no. 3
VNNA 4	Vietnamese National Archives no. 4

Archives

France:

Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer Aix-en-Provence (ANOM): Zone générique: FP, Cote: 90APC/89, Archives FOEFI.

Bibliotheque Nationale de France (BNF): typoscript of J. Roue, *Les Métis de l'Union française. Le problème des Eurasiens* (Paris 1954), microfiche of H. Bonvicini, *Enfants de la colonie* (Saigon 1938), Annual reports of the Société D'Assistance Aux Enfants Franco-Indochinois (Hanoi) and Société d'assistance aux enfants Franco-Indochinois du Cambodge, magazine *L'Eurafricain*.

Archive of the Service Historique de Défense, Salle de lecture Louis XIV, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris (SHD, Vincennes): from the series 10H, especially, 327, 1108, 1109, 1111, 1112.

Archives diplomatiques des Ministères des affaires étrangères, Consulat General Saigon Série A, 590PO/A.

Vietnam:

Vietnamese National Archives no. 1 (VNNAI), Hanoi, Fonds de Maire de Hanoi (Fonds MH), Fonds Résident Supérieur de Tonkin (Fonds RST) and Fonds Gouverneur Général d'Indochina (Fonds GGI).

Vietnamese National Archives no.4, Dalat (VNNA 4), Fonds Résidence supérieure de l'Annam (RSA).

United Kingdom:

British Library, St. Pancras, London, (BL): India Office Records and European Manuscripts.

National Archives, Kew Gardens, London (National Archives Kew), DO 196/76 Anglo-Indians, 1960 and DO 35/6163, Plight of Anglo-Indians in Pakistan and India, 1953-1958.

The Netherlands:

Nationaal Archief, The Hague (NL-HaNA): Hoge Commissariaat Indonesië (Jakarta) entry number 2.05.189, Nationale Actie Steunt Spijttoptanten Indonesië (NASSI), 1949-1969 entry number 2.20.27, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Nederlands Commissariaat te Makassar (Indonesië), entry number 2.05.61.04, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Nederlands Commissariaat te Soerabaja (Indonesië), 1950-1957, and entry number 2.05.61.08, Stichting Nederlands Onderwijs Indonesië, entry number 2.20.30.

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Het Utrechts Archief (UA), archive of the *Centraal Comité van kerkelijk en particulier initiatief voor sociale zorg ten behoeve van gerepatrieerden* (CCKP, 'Central Committee of clerical and particular initiative for social care for the benefit of repatriates'), entry number 1405, inventory number 42, Stichting Helpt Onze Mensen in Indonesië (SHOMI) and entry number 1422, inventory number 412, Stukken betreffende de voortzetting van het charitatieve werk van J. van der Steur te Magedang door de protestantse kerk van Nederlands-Indië 1945-1950.

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Dutch summary

Debatten over de juiste terminologie voor ‘Eurasians’, het hoofdonderwerp van dit boek, kwamen tijdens dit onderzoek vaak voor: Wat is het juiste label? Wie is een Euraziaat, of wie definieert zichzelf als zodanig? Dit zijn controversiële kwesties die direct verband houden met de hoofdvraag van dit proefschrift: Wat waren de kaders waarbinnen de Euraziaten hun keuzes maakten wat betreft het blijven in of het verlaten van hun vroegere koloniën Brits Indië, Nederlands-Indië en Frans-Indochina? Waarom verschilden die kaders? In dit boek heb ik de factoren geanalyseerd die deze kaders bepalen. Daartoe vergeleek ik de koloniale positie van Euraziaten in de drie koloniën en hun opties na dekolonisatie om te begrijpen waarom deze kaders verschilden. De vergelijkende aanpak van deze studie leidde tot de ontdekking van unieke kenmerken van elke kolonie evenals opvallende verbindingen en overeenkomsten tussen de Euraziatische groepen en de koloniale autoriteiten in de drie koloniën bij het oplossen van ‘the Eurasian Question’.

De sleutel tot de koloniale status van Euraziaten en hun plaats in de koloniale hiëarchie was de hybriditeit van de groep. De groep is ontstaan als gevolg van migratie vanuit Europa naar Azië en relaties tussen Europese mannen en inheemse vrouwen. Ze konden doorgaan voor Europees of inheems, afhankelijk van factoren zoals huidskleur, klasse en opleiding. In de periode die dit boek omvat – 1900 tot 1970 – definiëerden en herdefiniëerden mensen zichzelf herhaaldelijk als Europees of inheems of werden ze door anderen op die manier gedefinieerd. Een belangrijk moment in dit proces van constante definitie en zelfdefinitie was de dekolonisatie. Op dat moment verschoven de kaders waarbinnen de Euraziaten kozen tussen hun Aziatische of Europese afkomst. Daarnaast veranderden de etiketten die voor de mensen van gemengde afkomst werden gebruikt, en daarmee ook het aantal mensen die in de Euraziatische groep waren opgenomen of juist werden uitgesloten.

Het proces van definitie en herdefinitie begon toen de Europese migratie – en dus ook de komst van meer Europese vrouwen – naar de Aziatische kolonies aan het einde van de negentiende eeuw toenam. In dezelfde periode was de wereldwijde economische crisis en ontstond er meer concurrentie tussen de inheemse bevolking en de Euraziaten op de arbeidsmarkt. Euraziaten konden daardoor geen geschikte baan meer vinden en werden onderdeel van de groeiende groep arme Europeanen in de grote steden van de koloniën. De reactie van de Euraziaten hierop was emancipatie als een groep. Ze richtten hun eigen organisaties op die tijdschriften en kranten uitgaven en pleitten voor meer gelijke rechten zoals de Europeanen. Als gevolg daarvan werden ze zichtbaarder en koloniale autoriteiten definieerden hen explicieter en negatiever

als aparte groep in alle drie koloniën. Overheden maakten echter nooit een aparte juridische categorie in het beleid voor de Euraziaten. Tegelijkertijd begonnen de koloniale autoriteiten de Euraziatische groep als een potentieel probleem te beschouwen. Om dit probleem op te lossen, gaven zij bepaalde rechten aan de Euraziaten, maar ze namen ook veel maatregelen om hun mogelijkheden te beperken. Euraziaten werden en voelden zich gediscrimineerd.

Deze studie liet zien dat in bijna alle kolonies wereldwijd een tussengroep van gemengd Europees en inheemse afkomst ontstond. Hoewel die groepen van gemengde afkomst in al die plaatsen zeer verschillend waren, volgde de Euraziatische groep in de drie Aziatische koloniën in deze studie een soortgelijke ontwikkeling in de afbakening van de groep en emancipatie door de oprichting van belangenorganisaties. Door het verkennen van connecties tussen de koloniën en door de totstandkoming van de Euraziatische groep in alle drie de kolonies te vergelijken, kon ik daarin een gemeenschappelijk patroon van het tegenovergestelde, negatieve, discriminerende effect van een positief bedoelde emancipatie strategie onderscheiden: de emancipatie-paradox.

Uit mijn vergelijkend onderzoek bleek dat in alle drie de Aziatische koloniën een soortgelijke paradoxale situatie ontstond. Het positieve proces van emancipatie werd gekoppeld aan een negatief discriminatieproces dat zich door een grotere zichtbaarheid van de Euraziatische groep kon ontwikkelen. De bijzondere positie van Euraziaten in de koloniale hiërarchie hing samen met en bepaalde mede deze paradoxale situatie. Deze paradox van ‘emancipatie en discriminatie’ bepaalde de specifieke positie van de Euraziaten in de postkoloniale samenleving en hun postkoloniale mogelijkheden. Deze positie werd gekenmerkt door het eerdergenoemde proces van herdefiniëring en hybriditeit en gevoelens van achterstelling.

In Brits Indië was deze paradox groter dan in Nederlands-Indië en Frans Indochina. Daar organiseerden Euraziaten zich vroeg en eisten ze succesvol meer rechten. Daardoor kwamen ze aan de ene kant als groep meer apart van de Britten te staan, en hadden daarom ook minder mogelijkheden om met hen naar het Verenigd Koninkrijk te migreren na de onafhankelijkheid. Aan de andere kant, leidde de strikte, afgebakte plaats van Anglo-Indians in de kolonie met weinig mogelijkheden voor opwaartse mobiliteit uiteindelijk tot uitgebreide grondwettelijke rechten voor Euraziaten in India in de jaren direct na dekolonisatie. In Frans Indochina, begonnen Euraziaten laat met het eisen van rechten. Ze kregen weinig rechten en werden minder apart gezet van de kolonisatoren. Daarom kon de meerderheid van de groep uiteindelijk naar Frankrijk migreren. In Nederlands-Indië, begonnen Euraziaten later met het oprichten van organisaties en het claimen van rechten dan in Brits-Indië. Nadat ze zich hadden georganiseerd, kregen ze ook minder rechten dan de Euraziaten in Brits-Indië. Wel kon een groter aantal van hen migreren naar Nederland na de onafhankelijkheid.

De kaders waarbinnen Euraziaten hun keuzes maakten tussen in de voormalige kolonie blijven of vertrekken, kunnen het beste verklaard worden door de hierboven beschreven koloniale emancipatie-paradox en de gewelddadige aard van het dekolonisatieproces en zijn nasleep. Terwijl in Indonesië en Vietnam, dekolonisatie vijandig en gewelddadig verliep voor Euraziaten, raakte het geweld dat in India gepaard ging met de onafhankelijkheid en de opdeling, de Euraziaten niet.

Dit tegenstrijdige model van gemeenschapsvorming en -afbrokkeling in de voor-

malige koloniën zou getest kunnen worden voor andere voormalige koloniën in Azië. Dat Euraziaten een eigen vorm van verbondenheid overzee ontwikkelden en allerlei soorten van verbindingen en overeenkomsten wereldwijd hadden, kan dienen als een algemene aanbeveling voor meer vergelijkend koloniaal en postkoloniaal onderzoek.

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