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Hawks and doves. Democratic peace theory revisited

Bakker, F.E.

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Author: Bakker, F.E.

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Chapter 7 A Case Study: Thatcher the Hawk

7.1 An interpretative case study

The experiments from the preceding chapters show that hawkish decision-makers are more war-prone than dovish decision-makers during severe interstate conflicts. These results stand in contrast with democratic peace theory that argues that shared liberal democratic norms and institutions can decrease war-proneness of decision-makers and that the absence of those norms and institutions within at least one of both states during an interstate conflict on the brink of war will increase their war-proneness. This chapter aims to take the experimental results of chapter 5 and compare these with evidence of a case to illustrate how the experimental results work out in the real world.

For this purpose, the decision-making process of British prime minister Margaret Thatcher leading to the Falklands War with Argentina is selected for an interpretative case study, to use Lijphart's categorization (1975, p. 692). The aim is thus not to build a new theory, but to use the general pattern that was found to 'throw light on a case' (Lijphart, 1975, p. 692) and come to a better understanding of what these patterns might mean. The theoretical value of this case study is therefore neglectable, but the case does serve the purpose of illustrating the soundness of the experimental results. The research question of this chapter is thus can the hawkishness of Thatcher explain the outcome of the conflict between the UK²⁸ and Argentina, the Falklands War?

The case is thus selected on the parameters that are informed by the results of the earlier chapters. The core argument for selecting the Falklands War as a case is that many factors are relevant to the experimental study. Most importantly, regarding the aim of this chapter, the main decision-maker of Britain, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (hereafter Thatcher), was a pre-dominant leader (Heffernan, 2003, p. 366) with a hawkish stance, as will be elaborated more in depth below. Moreover, democratic peace theorists would argue that the escalation of the interstate conflict between the UK and Argentina into a war would be evident. The UK was (and still is) a consolidated liberal democracy²⁹ (Kesselman et al., 2006, pp. 135-150), and Argentina was at the time an autocracy³⁰ (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 190-200). It will, therefore, be a less-likely case to expect hawkishness to be the main explanatory factor for the decision to go to war and will thus be informative in what respect the hawkishness of Thatcher played a role in her decision to start a war with Argentina in relation to the regime-type. Also, being the result of an ongoing interstate conflict, the Falklands War fits the described interstate conflict of the experiments quite well.

²⁸ The names UK and Britain will be used interchangeably.

²⁹ Established sources confirm this classification. Britain is ranked in 1982 a 10 (=democracy) within the Polity IV project

³⁰ Established sources confirm this classification. Argentina in 1982 ranked an -8 (=autocracy) within the Polity IV project.

A more practical reason for the case selection is the availability of the data. The Falklands War is well documented, scholars have captured the conflict between Britain and Argentina based on all materials available including all classified government materials (Freedman, 2004; Hastings & Jenkins, 1987). Also, the history leading up to the conflict is well documented from both sides. In 2012 most classified governmental documents of the Brits were unclassified, which gives the opportunity to have access to some primary sources about the decision-making process (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1991-2016). Moreover, last but not least, Margaret Thatcher is a well documented and researched political leader (Aitken, 2013; Crichlow, 2006; Dyson, 2008; Moore, 2013; Steinberg, 2008). Not in the least because Thatcher herself published memoirs (Thatcher, 1995), including a chapter about the Falklands War which she also published separately in 2012 under the title *Thatcher's War* (Thatcher, 1995, pp. 173-235).

7.2 Tracing the mechanisms

Process tracing methodology is used to illustrate the relationship between the hawkishness of decision-makers and their willingness to attack. Process tracing is “an analytical tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence” (Collier, 2011, p. 824) that focuses on specific moments in time and links these together to show how an independent variable has influenced the dependent variable (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 4; Collier, 2011, p. 824; George & Bennett, 2005, p. 206). In other words, by studying a case in depth but focused on particular theoretically determined crucial elements -rather than all elements-, a rich illustration of the process underlying a mechanism can be described.

Process tracing can be used in several ways (see: Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 13-14; Collier, 2011, pp. 826-827) depending on the research question at hand. Although this chapter will merely illustrate how the mechanism could be detected within the case, it will use the logic of theory-testing process tracing. This type of process tracing can be used if the independent and dependent variable are known, and there is at least an ‘existing conjecture about a plausible causal mechanism’ between these variables (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 14), for which the experiments have provided. To do so, the causal mechanism needs to be conceptualized, including the specifics surrounding the hypothesized mechanism. After that, case-specific predictions are made to operationalize the mechanism, after which the empirical evidence is used to trace if the hypothesized process indeed occurred as expected (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 56-58).

This chapter will study the mechanisms suggested by the robust results of the experiments among decision-makers: 1) The influence of hawkishness on the willingness of decision-makers to attack the opponent during a severe interstate conflict, and 2) the influence of the use of power by the opponent on the willingness of decision-makers to attack the opponent during a severe interstate conflict. Regarding the first mechanism: the experimental results show that individually held beliefs mainly guide decision-makers during conflict resolution. The more hawkish

beliefs they hold, the more willing they are to go to war. Regardless of the regime they are socialized in and regardless of the regime-type of their opponents. These results lead to the expectation that a hawkish decision-maker will be more likely to attack the opponent during a severe interstate conflict than a dovish decision-maker.

Regarding the second mechanism: the experimental results show, however less strongly than the first mechanism, that the use of power by the opponent also influenced decision-makers. If the opponent used hard power over soft power, decision-makers were more likely to attack than when the opponent used soft power. The factor hawkishness and use of power of the opponent showed to be of independent influence on decision-makers, the empirical results did not indicate an interaction effect. Thus, both factors will be studied for their separate influence on decision-makers during a severe interstate conflict.

7.3 Conceptualization

The conceptualization of the mechanisms, the independent variables, and the dependent variable, as well as the specifics surrounding the expected mechanisms, relies on the empirical results of chapter 5. The logic below thus follows in its conceptualization the specifics of the experiment that led to the empirically detected causal mechanism.

Decision-makers during a severe interstate conflict with other states need information about all factors surrounding the conflict before they can decide how to proceed. The information they gather will create a perception of threat. This threat perception leads their decisions regarding conflict resolution. When the interstate conflict is enduring and severe (meaning: a military confrontation can seriously be expected), the question is what influences decision-makers to decide to attack the opponent. In other words: what heightens the threat of the conflict as perceived by decision-makers that the option to attack is a likely decision? Following chapter 5, the proposition is that decision-makers, just like all individuals, hold specific beliefs. Also beliefs regarding the best way to resolve interstate conflicts. Often, it is assumed that contextual factors or the nature of the conflict guide decision-makers to want to use military force towards the opponent; how the opponent behaves creates the threat.

The interstate conflict deals with an issue over territory to which both parties feel they have a legitimate claim. The conflict has been going on for quite some time, and there have been many attempts to come to a resolution. However, every time both parties have failed to come to an agreement. The main decision-makers have to decide now what to do to resolve the conflict in the by them desired direction.

Based on the experimental results, this chapter expects that decision-makers hold beliefs about conflict resolution that can be placed on a continuum of hawkishness and dovishness (Braumoeller, 1997; Kahneman & Renshon, 2007; Klugman, 1985). On one side of the continuum, we find the doves, individuals who believe that conflicts should be solved by cooperation, negotiation and peaceful behavior. Doves believe that violence will bring about more violence and therefore one should behave as we want others to behave. To decrease the threat of an

opponent during a conflict, one needs to take a non-threatening position (Colaresi, 2004). On the opposite side of the continuum, we find the hawks. These individuals believe that conflicts should be resolved with the use of force, by threatening others with our strengths and capabilities to force the other party to surrender to us and diminish the threat of the opponent in that way. Hawks typically see the use of force and power as a legitimate option, whereas doves intrinsically prefer to continue to speak and not use any force (Klugman, 1985, pp. 579-580). Hawks perceive the threat of a severe conflict independently of contextual factors, in contrast to the expectations of other theories such as democratic peace theory. The belief seems to be more intrinsic to the decision-maker and less influenced by the (assessment of the) structure around the decision-makers.

During a severe and stalled interstate conflict, hawkish beliefs held by decision-makers can explain why they opt for an attack on the opponent and thereby might start what later be called a war. A hawkish leader, guided by a belief that force is the best way to respond to threats to diminish that threat, will, whatever information about the conflict is provided, lean towards an attack. All information is weighted by the beliefs of the decision-maker rather than by contextual factors, such as the behavior or the regime-type of the opposing state, and these beliefs shape the perception of the hawkish decision-maker. Other factors do not seem to matter but are rather moments in time in which the hawkishness is iterated, however not influenced or inflamed by these factors. In other words, a hawkish leader would have come to the same decision to attack during a severe interstate conflict, independently of the behavior and regime-type of the other state. Specifically, hawkish decision-makers will not refer to the regime-type of the opponent to justify their decision to attack, but rather to the general belief that force is intrinsically necessary to resolve a conflict with another state during a deadlock and severe conflict.

One contextual factor seems to be of independent influence on the decision-making process, and that is the use of power by the opponent. When the decision-maker understands that the other party is using hard power to resolve the conflict, this is a likely trigger for the decision-makers to want to use force. This is alike for all decision-makers, not particularly for hawkish decision-makers. The use of hard power is basically a state that prepares for war. Troops are mobilized, ships are prepared for battle, military exercises are conducted, preferably close to the borders of the opponent. An opponent preparing for war triggers a reaction to get into war.

7.4 Data

To study Thatcher's decision-making process during the interstate conflict with Argentina over the Falklands leading up to the decision to go to war with Argentina, primary and secondary sources are used. The primary data serves to reconstruct the decision-making process, supported by secondary sources. The primary data comes from the Margaret Thatcher Foundation (1991-2016), which has archived all documents of the public life and work of the former Prime Minister. The collection, online published, contains all documents that are relevant to the Falklands' War,

including the in 2012 unclassified and declassified materials of the Falklands War and the Franks Report³¹. Also, the transcripts of speeches, interviews, comments, and Thatcher's answers to the House of Commons³², and foreign (of the US and France) official documents relevant to the case can be traced in the archive of the Thatcher Foundation. The analysis rests on specific documentation, selected with the help of the search function of the archive. The main source is the (top) secret Prime Minister files (PM19/614 through PM19/621) from the period 1-26 April 1982. In addition, all documents archived under 'Falklands' in the period of 1 January 1982 until 15 June 1982 and coded as 'key' and 'major' documents, are used.

The secondary literature about the Falklands War comprises of two comprehensive studies of the Falklands War, which extensively discuss the path leading up to the war, the war itself and its aftermath. These authoritative studies are: "The Battle for the Falklands" by Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins (1987), and "The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War" by Lawrence Freedman (2004). The latter bases itself on full access to all, including the in 2004 still all classified, government documents and materials.

The main secondary source to study Thatchers' beliefs is a personality study of Thatcher executed by Blema Steinberg (2008), supplemented by other studies in which Thatcher was (partly) topic of research (Crichlow, 2006; Dyson, 2008). To thicken the understanding and knowledge of Thatcher, biographical materials are consulted. Thatchers' memoirs "The Downing Street Years" (Thatcher, 1995), an authorized biography "Margaret Thatcher, the Authorized Biography" by Charles Moore (2013), and "Margaret Thatcher, Power and Personality" by Jonathan Aitken (2013). The latter biography serves mainly as supplemental information. It was written after Thatcher's death in 2013 and bases itself on the personal recollection of Aitken, someone who has been close to Thatcher during her years in office. His accounts are personal and based on personal observations and judgments. Therefore, this biography assists in getting deeper insights into the personality and beliefs of Thatcher because it was written by a person who has been in proximity to Thatcher during the Falklands War. It is, due to the personal character of the recollection, never used as single standing evidence but only as support for more official and reliable sources.

7.5 Operationalization & background information

The section below discusses how the factors hawkishness of the decision-maker, severe conflict on the brink of war, and the behavior of the opposing state are operationalized within the case of the Falklands War. Above was already discussed that the UK is operationalized as the liberal democracy, and Argentina at the time as an autocracy.

³¹ After the Falklands' war Thatcher installed Committee of Privy Counselors with Lord Oliver Franks as chairman to study the crisis and war. The results are generally known as the Franks Report.

³² The documents referred to the House of Commons as 'H of C'

Thatcher, the hawkish decision-maker

Margaret Thatcher (1925-2013) became the leader of the British Conservative Party in 1975. After managing the shadow cabinet for four years, she was elected Prime Minister of the UK in 1979. Her election made of Thatcher the very first woman ever to have held the office of Prime Minister in Britain. She was often called 'The Iron Lady', a nickname -once given to her by a Soviet journalist- that she lovingly embraced herself (Thatcher, 1995, p. 184). The rest of the world quickly followed, and the nickname persisted, no doubt due to her firm hand of ruling. Under her premiership, many political and economic changes were implemented, such as major changes in taxation and public spending, and the privatization of many national industries and utilities. It led to protests and strikes within the UK, however, despite the fierce and enduring strikes Thatcher held strong to her beliefs in what was serving Britain and what not. In this sense, she was described as an activist more than anything else, a leader that wanted to do things and not just deliberate to come to a consensus (Steinberg, 2008, pp. 273-274).

Margaret Thatcher was a typical 'conviction' politician. One with clear goals and indefeasible convictions (Steinberg, 2008, p. 8), thereby relying on a rather 'black-and-white' thinking based on few key political beliefs (in particular during the Falklands' crisis) (Dyson, 2008, p. 14). Thatcher was a fighter, someone "to whom beckoning disaster was cause only to double her faith" (Steinberg, 2008, p. 219). She strongly followed her convictions on how the government should function and could react surprised if others had a different view. "Conviction was in her bones and in her mind: to take any step backward would be "absolutely fatal"" (Steinberg, 2008, p. 219). She preferred that the people surrounding her would be on the same page and at the beginning of 1981, she started to move cabinet members around to find herself within a cabinet more of her liking (Steinberg, 2008, pp. 219-220). Thatcher did not like challenges of her power which led her to centralize powers of civil services and local government to her office (Steinberg, 2008, p. 270). She was determined to have everybody in line and follow her political beliefs, thereby ruthlessly 'extinguish any internal or external rivals' (Steinberg, 2008, p. 270).

She held strong control over her cabinet members, by being the active leader and also not hesitating to avoid cabinet discussion of issues or to exclude important cabinet members from important meetings (Steinberg, 2008, p. 271). One of her famous quotes is: "I don't mind how much my ministers talk – as long as they do what I say" (Steinberg, 2008, p. 270). She also kept control by working very hard: she read with scrutiny every word written in documents. Moreover, she personally revised all writings (by herself and others) over and over again until she was satisfied with every detail in it. She was eager to get all information possible, preferably from external sources, and would be involved in all steps of decision-making processes (Steinberg, 2008, pp. 280-283).

Thatcher was not too concerned with being popular, as long as she could control the political settings around her she was content. The only validation Thatcher would seek was that of character: being courageous and brave, something she often emphasized as a character trait about herself (Steinberg, 2008, p. 273).

Thatcher's strong personality and her willingness to stay true to her personal beliefs is considered to have been the leading influence on the actions that the UK took during the conflict with Argentina (Crichlow, 2006, p. 89).

Based on the personality profiling and leadership assessment of Steinberg (Steinberg, 2008, pp. 239-300) Thatcher's main and most influential personality trait was being dominant, directly followed by being contentious and ambitious. Already since childhood, Thatcher knew what she wanted, and why, and would fight to get it. Although she was the second daughter in her family, her politically involved father raised her as if she was his firstborn son. Like her father, politics came naturally to her (Steinberg, 2008, pp. 240-241). Already quite young she had her convictions and would defend them with fierce power, so much even that discussion was almost impossible. Already at a very young age, Thatcher would aim at convincing others rather than discussing ideas with them (Steinberg, 2008, pp. 240-241). Steinberg (2008, pp. 266-270) translates the personality traits of dominance, contentiousness, and ambition into a leadership style that is characterized by ideology and a strong taste for power. Thatcher had a dominant personality with the strong need to survive the world by dominating and controlling that world (Steinberg, 2008, p. 243).

Regarding foreign policy, in Thatcher's early years as Prime Minister she lacked experience and knowledge. This lack stood, however, not in her way to hold firmly to her own beliefs and opinions. She took a powerful role in decision-making, thereby led by her personal beliefs and convictions (Dyson, 2008, p. 81). Dyson (2008) used operational coding of comments made by Thatcher during her interactions with the House of Commons to establish a typology of her basic beliefs of the political world and preferred types of behavior. Based on that he assessed that Thatcher would think of herself as favoring a conditional cooperation strategy of deterrence while predicting that the enemy would use a conditional conflict strategy of compellence (Dyson, 2008, p. 85). Dyson assessed Thatcher as someone who sees herself using threat to deter the opponent and using force if other means are not possible. At the same time, according to Dyson, Thatcher would blame her enemy for being the invoker of her using force.

Based on the different accounts of Thatcher being a politician of conviction and holding headstrong to her own beliefs, and her tendency to react to threats with determination to control the threat, if necessary by force, it can be concluded that Thatcher can be categorized as a hawkish decision-maker. Moreover, although Thatcher was a leader that informed herself also by sources outside of her circles, it was also very clear that if she had made up her mind, she would stick to it and expect everybody else to support her. Something that often also happened. The question is now whether or not the hawkishness of Margaret Thatcher had such an influence that it caused her to decide to go to war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands.

*Enduring interstate conflict*³³

The conflict between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands (hereafter Falklands) a group of 2 larger islands surrounded by about 780 small islands in the South Atlantic, was already quite old. The discovery has been claimed by the Spaniards, the Dutch and the Britons. Who is right remains unclear while several explorers of these countries have documented their discovery of the islands during the 16th century. The first one to set actual foot on the islands was British Captain John Strong, who named the islands after the first Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Falkland. He then left the islands, after documenting the presence of fresh water, geese and ducks and no wood what so ever. During the 18th century, the ownership of the Falklands became the subject of conflict. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 had formally recognized the territorial rights in South America to Spain, leading Spain to conclude that the Falklands belonged to them. However, the Treaty did not withhold the French in 1764 and the British in 1765 to claim the islands as theirs. The French, being allies of Spain in those days, ceded the ownership to the latter in 1767 which left Spain and Great Britain to dispute over the Falklands for decades. After the independence of Argentina in 1816, the dispute continued, now between Argentina and Great Britain with both states believing in the legitimacy of their claim.

The claims are rooted firmly in different perspectives on narratives of discovery and history. Argentina relies her claim on the ceding of Spanish territories to Argentina, including the Falklands, which would effectively mean that what once belonged to Spain was now theirs. Britain's claim rests on two pillars: the discovery of the Falklands and the Falkland being up for grabs when Spain withdrew: thereby not acknowledging the ownership of the Falklands automatically being transferred to Argentina. Britain argues that it took control over the Falklands legitimately on January 3rd 1833. The conflict over the Falklands between Argentina and the United Kingdom dates back to that point in time. Although the strategic significance of the islands is limited, with no economic benefits forthcoming and the islands are inhabited by a mere 2000 people, both states position themselves fiercely as owners of the territory. Kids in Argentina are raised with the sentence – which even became a song- “The Malvinas are Argentine” (Hastings & Jenkins, 1987, p. 11), thereby resonating the Argentine feeling that the islands are not and will never be British. On the other end of the world, the British are shoring up their imperial ego: while almost all colonies are retracting themselves from British rule, the Falklanders desperately ask the British to stay. Both Argentina and Britain seemingly have their identities invested in the islands, which makes them continue the conflicts again and again during the 20th century. Britain has considered taking the matter to the International Court of Justice, but never went through while also Argentina preferred to keep the matter out of court.

While in Argentina citizens felt very strong about the identity of the Falklands, in Britain, the Falklands were not on the political agenda let alone under the scrutiny of the public eye. This was also a side effect of the bureaucratic arrangements made.

³³ General description of conflict is based on the work of Freedman (2004) and Hastings and Jenkins (1987)

Once, the Falklands were the responsibility of the Colonial Office, but during the decline of the colonial empire, this responsibility was transferred to different and several bureaucratic organizations to end up at the Foreign Office finally. Moreover, while the secrecy of the Foreign Office was common practice, also the Falklands were kept out of sight, including the (over)sight of parliament. Only a few people were in charge to decide on the Falklands. The UK was not per se keen to keep the Falklands, but the fact that the Falklanders considered themselves British and strongly rejected the idea of ever being Argentine forced the UK to maintain their claim. The UK needed to support the wishes and rights of this small group of British' citizens, in particular, because the Falklanders could rely on a small but influential group of support back in Britain. For Argentine decision-makers, it was clear-cut: the British claim to the Falklands was imperialist and therefore illegitimate and illegal.

The conflict between Argentina and the UK was longstanding and over disputed territory when it climaxed in 1982. Based on the claims of both countries it would be hard to pinpoint exactly the rightful owner of the islands. That makes this conflict suited for the purposes of this research. The Falklands conflict is an enduring interstate conflict over property to which both states might have a legitimate claim, which is an excellent beginning point for analyzing the decision-making process when the conflict reached the brink of war.

To the Brink of War³⁴

Over the years the dispute over the Falklands remained a hot issue for both parties. During the 1950s naval forces were used to settle a quarrel over a scientific post on Antarctic shores (that drew in the Falklands) before the international scientific community agreed to freeze sovereignty over Antarctica. The UK thereby assumed this would lead to a similar treaty over the Falklands, while the Argentinians assumed that this treaty would safeguard them against similar treaties about other disputed territories. In the 1960s, Argentina threw their efforts seriously behind their wish to get the islands under their sovereignty by instituting a 'Malvinas Day', building a national museum about the islands, and by supporting propaganda films and public protests. When Argentina played soccer against the UK during the 1966 World Cup in England and lost, the Argentinians believed that 'the game was rigged and the World Cup stolen from them, just like the Britons did with the Malvinas' (Freedman, 2004, p. 16).

In 1965, the Argentine leaders, who realized that a more multilateral approach would benefit them, asked the UN to push for negotiations between both parties. The UN followed up and the negotiations started one year later. The negotiations would continue on and off over the years until the conflict escalated in 1982. For the UK, believing in the principle of self-determination, it was important that Falklanders would themselves reach a feeling over time that they would like to join Argentina. The UK, therefore, created proposals that could support that process regarding the interests of the islanders. During the early 1970s Argentina seemed open for such

³⁴ General description of conflict is based on the work of Freedman (2004) and Hastings and Jenkins (1987)

proposals. However, the Falklanders who had the actual power of a veto did not trust Argentina to keep their promises to them. They activated their strong support in Britain to rise to their interests, something in which they succeeded. London advised Argentina to start a 'hearts and minds' campaign to sooth the Falklanders over, to which end both parties signed the 1971 Communications Agreement. In the course of this agreement, Argentina started to connect with the Falklands. Tourism from Argentina to the Falklands and vice versa was encouraged, islanders could travel by air and visit hospitals and schools in Argentina and fresh products from Argentina could be imported to the Falklands. The Franks' report shows that the UK Labour government of 1977 was even willing to put sovereignty on the table as an issue for negotiations if it could be combined a leaseback similar to the Hong Kong arrangements. The British government, however, never informed Argentina, they felt that first, the Falklanders would need to agree to such a proposal (Franks, 1983, p. 8).

The relations between the UK and Argentina slightly improved. However, the Argentine leaders did not care too much about the self-determination of the Falklanders. To them, after all, the Falklanders were colonizers. When Peron came back to power in 1973, Argentina returned to a strong sense of nationalism. The 'hearts and minds' approach was off the table. The result was that Argentina gained more power over the Falklanders, while the latter wanted to resist Argentina even more and lost their trust in the British rule. During the Peron years, some military incidents occurred, mobilizing some military forces on both sides but never leading to real clashes or severe incidents. However, it did not improve the feeling of trust, in particular not among the Falklanders.

When Peron³⁵ was overthrown by a military coup of Videla in March 1976, the threat of an Argentine invasion of the Falklands seemed more than ever to become a real threat. The fear was that Argentina might start a more aggressive course to claim the territory, in particular, because Argentina was now lead by a military junta. Indeed, the military threat of Argentina increased in the first years after the coup. Although the actions of the Argentine navy varied based on to the course negotiations would take, they were hard to neglect. By the time Thatcher became Prime Minister of the UK, there was a range of policy options she could decide for. A military defense of the Falklands was one of these options. The new minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Nicholas Ridley, traveled to the Falklands and Argentina in July 1979. He returned with an understanding that the Falklanders wanted the dispute to be frozen at least and solved at best, but without handing over sovereignty to Argentina. Ridley agreed with the Argentine leaders that ambassadors in Buenos Aires and London respectively would be reinstated. However, after leaving Argentina, he received a document with a strongly articulated position of Argentina. The Argentine leaders wanted to continue negotiations about sovereignty as soon as possible, however, the Falklanders could never be brought in as a third party in during negotiations. It brought Lord Carrington, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, to advise Thatcher to continue negotiations that would steer towards a leaseback option. He anticipated that such negotiations would pacify the

³⁵ Isabella Peron, Juan Peron's widow and successor

unpredictable and possibly aggressive behavior of the Argentine leaders, but saw at the same time the need for support for such a road by the Falklanders and British parliament. Thatcher decided to discuss the matter first with the Defense committee. The committee suggested other possible options. One of those was the so-called 'Fortress Falklands': negotiations would cease, and Britain would be prepared to defend the Falklands against whatever action Argentina would take. Intelligence showed that Argentina would likely use military means if they would conclude that Britain was unwilling to negotiate sovereignty and, moreover, that they were capable to do so. Thatcher postponed the decision until she would have settled another issue (in Rhodesia). Later that year Argentina invited the UK to exchange views, Ridley had to decline the invitation since there was no decision made yet.

The negotiations in 1980 and 1981 did not bring both parties closer. Argentina grew more impatient to find a solution that would include sovereignty over the Falklands, while the UK delayed the negotiations to buy more time. For Britain, the consent of the Falklanders was paramount and trying to align views turned out to be quite difficult. The unwillingness of the Falklanders to lean towards an Argentine solution, even not in the distant future, made the British position difficult while Britain refused to come to a solution to which the Falklanders would not agree. Meanwhile, the UK was aware that Argentina's impatience might be sparked by their need to solve domestic troubles. The conflict with Britain could very well be used as a distraction by the Argentine leaders.

The British Ministry of Defense started military contingency planning, which is preparing possible scenarios in response to possible actions Argentina could take, thereby calculating risks, costs, and chances of success. This planning concluded that a response to a possible Argentine invasion of the Falklands would require substantial naval and land forces, and ingenious logistical support. Something that would be very problematic to arrange. When Britain decided to withdraw the naval battleship HMS Endurance (as was earlier planned due to budgetary reasons), it was considered by the Falklanders as a sign of giving up on them. The Argentine press worsened that feeling when they explained the withdrawal as a British gesture towards Argentina.

By the end of 1981 general Galtieri, already Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine army, became President of Argentina. His focus was on the relations with the US, which were improving at the time. Around the same time, the British ambassador in Buenos Aires concluded that the relations of the Falklanders with both Britain and Argentina had waned seriously. The islanders now were in strong favor of the 'Fortress Falklands' option, which would mean a full stop to all talks and negotiations between the UK and Argentina. The ambassador foresaw a rather pessimistic scenario in which the dispute would escalate. The formal British answer was that there would always be support for the defense of the Falklanders. However, they also made clear that it would be quite difficult to do so. After several rounds and decades of negotiations, the conflict escalated by the time 1982 started.

*Behavior of Argentina: invasion & hard use of power*³⁶

On 20 December 1981 Argentine vessels landed on South Georgia, British territory south of the Falklands. The British warned them, and they left. The Argentine leaders claimed that they did not know about the landing. Thatcher wrote in her memoirs that this incident would not have been so unsettling if Argentina would have left it at that (Thatcher, 1995, p. 177). However, on 27 January 1982, the British Ambassador received a document outlining the Argentine position in the dispute: it claimed sovereignty over the Falklands, and pushed for negotiations that would lead to a rapid, peaceful, and definite British recognition of that claim. The document also discussed the Argentine view of the voice of the Falklanders and stipulated that even the UN only referred to the British and Argentine claims and that therefore the dispute was confined to those states only³⁷.

The UK responded that it also wished to come to a quick and peaceful solution that would take all interests, including the Falklanders' wishes and interests to heart. These communications led to the agreement to talk in New York by the end of February. In the weeks up to the talks, the Argentine press kept iterating how the Falklands would finally return to Argentina and that the government would be willing to use force to achieve that goal if the talks would lead to nothing. The Argentine press also expressed the expectation that the US would come to the aid of Argentina in their legitimacy of the territorial claim of the Falklands. One of the issues discussed at the New York talks was the request of the UK to act more from a mutual trust position. The British negotiator, Richard Luce, indicated that the behavior of Argentina was not helpful to achieve such trust. Unauthorized overflights of the islands and dependencies, an offer of the Magellanes Este blockade, speculation in the Argentine press that military action was imminent, a few of the examples that Luce mentioned³⁸.

During the talks, it came apparent that Argentina was pushing for a fast timetable, while the UK, wishing to bring about all parties involved, preferred to take time. The talks, however, proceeded and openings on both sides were welcomed. Agreed upon was to keep all details from the audience until both governments would have considered all information. At the end of the talks, they issued a joined communiqué that stated that both countries had expressed their wish to settle the dispute peacefully. However, on the same day, a unilateral communiqué was issued by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This communiqué exposed all details of the negotiations and expressed the Argentine confidence that an important step to settle the dispute as soon as possible was set. Moreover, Argentina voiced her right to take other measures if a solution would turn out to be against Argentina's interests.

36 General description of conflict is based on the work of Freedman (2004) and Hastings and Jenkins (1987)

37 Fern minute to Ure in response to Argentine Bout de Papier (<http://fc95d419f4478b3b6e5f-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.r87.cf1.rackcdn.com/23B5271DE17F4CBEB36613796CC3BFC9.pd>)

38 Anglo-Argentine ministerial talks on the Falkland Islands, New York, 26/27 February 1982; second day, third session. (<http://fc95d419f4478b3b6e5f-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.r87.cf1.rackcdn.com/50960EB93361449F9271C726EDC269F4.pd>)

Britain took this unilateral communique as an implicit threat by Argentina. The Argentine press also felt this way and started to speculate about what actions Argentina could take. Argentina, however, denied that its government had wanted to threaten Britain in any way. Later intelligence reports showed that the communiqué was issued on the orders of the president (Franks, 1983, paragraph 159).

Argentina, however, started to shore up the use of power and decided that if there was no response by the British government concerning their wishes to speed up the timeline, they would stop all air and sea services to the Falklands (Franks, 1983, paragraph 159). Britain issued a statement that the UK was willing to continue the negotiations as agreed upon in New York if Argentina would stop threatening, and publicly agree with the course of friendly negotiations (Franks, 1983, paragraph 187). New intelligence showed that Argentina was hardening her position (Franks, 1983, paragraph 190). Again there was a landing of metal scrapers in South Georgia. The UK decided to send the HMS Endurance, which was stationed in the area, to evacuate the Argentinians off South Georgia. Argentine warships were deployed to the area of HMS Endurance. Close to the Endurance, an Argentine scientific vessel was detected, which seemed a bit suspicious. The Argentine movements led the Britons to believe that if the HMS Endurance evacuated the Argentine metal scrapers, a naval reaction of Argentina would follow (Franks, 1983, paragraph 194). Because HMS Endurance was a lightly armed patrol vessel, its instructions were withdrawn. On 31 March 1982, intelligence reached Thatcher, stating that an Argentine fleet was at sea, seemingly on their way to invade the Falklands, which indeed occurred on 2 April 1982. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands³⁹.

The actions of Argentina in these last months leading up to their invasion of the Falklands is characterized by a build-up of the use of hard power. After the strong threats through diplomatic means, the Argentine leaders took more and more action. The unauthorized overflights, the landings on South Georgia, the battleships in reaction to the movements of the HMS Endurance showed that the use of hard power was effective. The actual invasion on 2 April 1982 was indeed of the highest invasive nature. Thereby the behavior of Argentina can be categorized as an invasion, and by the use of hard power.

7.6 Results

Hawkishness & the use of hard power

Does this case illustrate how Thatcher's hawkishness influenced her decision to go to war with Argentina? Moreover, does it illustrate how the use of hard power by Argentina also influenced Thatcher's decision? The results below focus on a few specific moments in time in which hawkishness and the use of power mattered in the decision-making process. The question that rings in mind for every instance is, would the outcome have been different if Thatcher would have been a dove? Alternatively, in

³⁹ Restricted document FCO note, 2 April 1982 (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122845>)

case of the use of power, would the decision have been different if Argentina would not have used hard power?

First of all, regarding the Falklands conflict Thatcher had made up her mind, seemingly based on specific beliefs of how to deal with the conflict. From different records becomes clear that her stance towards the conflict was hawkish. When Thatcher was just installed as Prime Minister in 1979, she invited two of her most senior cabinet members and their wives over for dinner. Lord Carrington, Foreign Secretary under Thatcher, was one of them and came to speak about the Falklands. He remarked that the best possible way out of the conflict might be the leaseback option. This remark triggered a reaction of Thatcher in outrage, supposedly banging on the table while loud-voiced arguing that Britain would never have to give up her territories, and thereby denouncing the attitude of the Foreign Office (Aitken, 2013, p. 321). This reaction seems to be reflected in her reaction to the letter Carrington send her on 20 September 1979 about the possible solutions and arguing for the leaseback option: "I cannot possibly agree to the line the Foreign Secretary is proposing. Nor would it get through the H of C⁴⁰ - let alone the Parliamentary Party" (Moore, 2013, p. 658). She further emphasized the right of the islanders to not agree, and the problems she would foresee in the leaseback option – "As in Hong Kong – the 99 yr lease comes to an end & causes problems" (Moore, 2013, p. 658). When Carrington still pursued the leaseback option and wrote amongst other things that the Argentine claim was also a matter of national honor and machismo, Thatcher reacted: "According to the Foreign Office our national honour doesn't seem to matter!?" (Moore, 2013, p. 658), after which she urged him not to take any action in the direction of negotiating a leaseback or any other form in which sovereignty would be transferred to Argentina.

These records, which show events that took place before the conflict reached the brink of war, show the clear opinion Thatcher held about the Falklands: these were British and should stay British. These records also show that she was unwilling to negotiate anything different than what she believed to be right, which is an indication that Thatcher indeed was a leader that held strong to what she believed. Dyson argues that his analysis of Thatcher's operational coding scheme during the Falkland crisis shows that from the moment that Thatcher decided to use military force she was unwilling to go back to the negotiation table (Dyson, 2008, p. 88). This can also be read as a hawkish position: the unwillingness to alter the dynamics between the two countries by other means than military force points in the direction of hawkishness affecting decision-making. The analysis below aims to illustrate that hawkishness played a significant role in Thatcher's decision-making, and moreover how the use of hard power by Argentina also played a role in that process.

The New York negotiations between Britain and Argentina on 26/27 February 1982 are the starting point for the analysis of the decision-making process during the Falkland crisis. For Thatcher, the unilateral communiqué issued by the Argentinians in February after the New York talks was the signal that Britain needed to make

⁴⁰ Thatcher means the House of Commons with H of C.

contingency⁴¹ plans (Franks, 1983, paragraph 152; Hastings & Jenkins, 1987, p. 67; Thatcher, 1995, p. 177). This decision indicates that Thatcher felt threatened by the discrepancy between the amicable words of Argentina during the talks, and the threats Argentina later exposed in the unilateral communiqué. Although in retrospect Thatcher claimed that she did not yet expect a full-blown invasion by Argentina until it actually happened (Thatcher, 1995, p. 179), the decision to prepare for the possible use of military force shows at least that Thatcher felt threatened and that she responded from her hawkish belief that a threat must be countered with force. And thus, she prepared.

After the second Argentine landing⁴² of metal scrapers on South Georgia on 20 March 1982, Thatcher decided to send a nuclear-powered submarine to the area. Plans were made to send another one soon, and in her memoirs Thatcher reveals that she was “not too displeased when the news of the decision leaked” (Thatcher, 1995, p. 178) because she thought “my instinct was that the time had come to show the Argentines that we meant business” (Thatcher, 1995, p. 178). This latter remark indicates that Thatcher wanted to show British teeth in response to the threatening words of Argentina: the sending of a nuclear-powered submarine was not simply a measure of precaution; it was a clear message of threat to Argentina. Thatcher’s reaction is another indication of a hawkish stance. Would Thatcher have been a dove; she might have responded differently. Thatcher’s response to the minute⁴³ she received on 25 March 1982 from Carrington stresses that notion. In this minute Carrington articulated that the aim must be to negotiate and that a message to Argentina must encompass the conditions necessary for Britain to be able to resume negotiations, a course of action that Carrington favored. The minute continued with a contingency planning in case Argentina would stop all services to the islands. Thatcher responded with an authorization⁴⁴ to carry forward with the contingency planning, without mentioning anything about the conditions to resume negotiations. The minutes of the meeting⁴⁵ of the Defense Operations Executive on 30 March 1982 show that intelligence about naval movements of the Argentine fleet was available. Britain needed to send a task force in the direction of the South Atlantic. The briefing prepared for Thatcher⁴⁶ by Armstrong confirmed that assessment. This example shows that Carrington favored a peaceful outcome and pleaded for negotiations. Would Thatcher have been a dove, it would have been more plausible that she would have at least responded to that suggestion by her Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and probably discussed what conditions would be appropriate. The fact that she ignored that point completely shows her hawkish stance.

⁴¹ Contingency plans are scenarios to prepare for possible (military) actions during interstate conflicts

⁴² FCO to Port Stanley: illegal landing, 20 March 1982
(<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122486>)

⁴³ Carrington minute to Thatcher, 24 March 1982.
(<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118382>)

⁴⁴ Answer Thatcher to minute, 25 March 1982. (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118536>)

⁴⁵ Minutes of meeting Defense Operations Executive, 30 March 1982.

(<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118539>)

⁴⁶ Armstrong briefing, 31 March 1982. (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122494>)

The next day, 31 March 1982, intelligence reached Thatcher stating that an Argentine fleet was at sea, seemingly on the way to invade the Falklands (Freedman, 2004, p. 84). That evening the Chief of the Naval Staff, Henry Leach, arrived at the Ministry of Defense. He called it a 'stroke of luck' that Thatcher was also there, while he expected that Defense Minister John Nott 'wouldn't move' (Aitken, 2013, p. 666). Leach told them that he could assemble and deploy a task force within 48 hours (Freedman, 2004, p. 184). Thatcher describes in her memoirs how her outrage and determination to do something were supported by the calm demeanor of Leach and that his presence gave her relief and the confidence that Britain could get back the islands (Thatcher, 1995, p. 179). Aitken, who was present at the meeting, describes how the confident answers of Leach seemed to be exactly what Thatcher wanted to hear, as he interpreters a 'half smile' of Thatcher as such (Aitken, 2013, p. 667). During this meeting, Thatcher agreed immediately with the composition of a task force that would be able to deploy in 48 hours. She decided to be ready for a possible military dispute with Argentina.

Thatcher also sent a message⁴⁷ to US President Reagan, with the urgent request⁴⁸ to speak to General Galtieri and get him off the brink, to which Reagan agreed (Thatcher, 1995, pp. 179-180). Despite Reagan's⁴⁹ efforts, Galtieri was unwilling to listen. Thatcher wrote in her memoirs that Galtieri did not answer Reagan until the invasion could not be stopped anymore (Thatcher, 1995, p. 180). On 2 April 1982, a British Antarctic Survey vessel intercepted Falkland Island radio broadcasts saying that Argentines had landed and concluded: "We must accept this as confirmation of an Argentine landing"⁵⁰. In a cabinet meeting^{51 52} later that day Thatcher got her cabinet behind her decision to send out the task force to the South Atlantic and ordered the first part of the fleet to be deployed. In the course of these events, Thatcher was led by hawkish beliefs that determined the steps she took. If she had believed that negotiations would be able to decrease the hostilities, there would have been an option to make that attempt at this point. Whether it would have been successful or not, a dove would have wanted to try at least.

The records above show that Argentina was building up threat, first by words, then by actions, and even military actions. That was an increase in the use of hard power. Thatcher reacted to that with a clear awareness that she had to get ready for the use of force. The possibility of negotiations, or use diplomatic means, other than a request to Reagan to talk some sense into Galtieri, was not used or suggested. All British action was aiming at the use of force, which indicates that the perception of threat was very high. These records show that the use of hard power by Argentina created a high sense of threat by Thatcher. Moreover, her hawkish beliefs that conflicts should be solved by showing strength and force created the type of actions

⁴⁷ Letter of Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, 31 March 1982. (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122493>)

⁴⁸ FCO to UKMIS New York, 31 March 1982. (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118431>)

⁴⁹ Diary of Jim Rentschler, 1 April 1982. (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114319>)

⁵⁰ Restricted document FCO note, 2 April 1982 (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122845>)

⁵¹ Restricted document FCO note, 2 April 1982 (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122268>)

⁵² Minutes of full Cabinet meeting, 2 April 1982. (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122269>)

for which she decided. The decisions made by Thatcher were, therefore, also in response to the use of hard power by Argentina.

Thatcher was convinced that the UN should not be too deeply involved. Due to the Cold War, she feared that the UN "Security Council might attempt to force unsatisfactory terms upon us" (Thatcher, 1995, p. 182). Thatcher and British UN ambassador Anthony Parsons decided to try to get a UNSC resolution. After several calls with the heads of state of France and Jordan⁵³ (Thatcher, 1995, pp. 182-183) they managed to get resolution UNSCR 502⁵⁴ that stated that Argentina should immediately and unconditionally withdraw from the Falklands. That same day Thatcher also debated in the House of Commons. She was very aware of the fact that she would have to convince the members of parliament that the British response would be of force and effect, she even called it the "most difficult task I ever had to face" (Thatcher, 1995, p. 183). She knew that the House was divided over the issue and she wanted to gain their support as long as possible, and moreover show unity towards the world and Argentina. She wanted to get support for the task force, and the possibility to use military force: "I felt in my bones that the Argentinians would never withdraw without a fight and anything less than a withdrawal was unacceptable to the country and certainly to me" (Thatcher, 1995, p. 184). Her speech shows an inclination to defend her hawkish stance towards the conflict; Thatcher aims to convey that a forceful solution is the most plausible option:

"By late afternoon yesterday it became clear that an Argentine invasion had taken place and that the lawful British Government of the islands had been usurped. I am sure that the whole House will join me in condemning totally this unprovoked aggression by the Government of Argentina against British territory. [Hon. Members: "Hear, hear" .] It has not a shred of justification and not a scrap of legality. [...] That is the background against which we have to make decisions and to consider what action we can best take. [...] The Government have now decided that a large task force will sail as soon as all preparations are complete. [...] I stress that I cannot foretell what orders the task force will receive as it proceeds. That will depend on the situation at the time. [...] The United Nations Security Council met again yesterday and will continue its discussions today. [Laughter.] Opposition Members laugh. They would have been the first to urge a meeting of the Security Council if we had not called one. They would have been the first to urge restraint and to urge a solution to the problem by diplomatic means. They would have been the first to accuse us of saber rattling and war mongering. [...] We shall be reviewing the situation and be ready to take further steps that we deem appropriate and we shall, of course, report to the House. [...] The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island race. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. They are few in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her Majesty's Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right. That will be our

⁵³ See also Top secret PM file 1-5 April 1982: PREM19/614 , p. 158, 145

⁵⁴ UNSCR 502, 3 April 1982. (<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/435/26/IMG/NR043526.pdf?OpenElement>)

hope and our endeavor and, I believe, the resolve of every Member of the House.”⁵⁵

Thatcher managed to get the support from the parliament. The comment in Thatcher autobiography that she expected a fight from the Argentines is a strong indication of Thatcher's hawkish beliefs. She seemed to believe that there was no other option than to fight with Argentina. Separate from the actual actions that were occurring at that moment in time, Thatcher held to her beliefs and described these as an intuitive knowledge.

The (in 2012 unclassified) top secret file⁵⁶ of the Prime Minister's office of the period of 1-5 April 1982 shows that immediately after the knowledge of the Argentine invasion all diplomatic relations with Argentina were terminated. Moreover, all ships under British flag were advised to stay clear from Argentine ports and seas, in particular the Falklands area⁵⁷. Messages were sent to the countries in the Common Wealth⁵⁸ to ask for their condemnation of the invasion, and their support to urge also other countries to condemn the action of Argentina. Meanwhile, a hostile encounter between an Argentine vessel and HMS Endurance had taken place, in which the Argentines demanded surrender from the Endurance⁵⁹. The commander of the Endurance had refused. On 5 April⁶⁰, Thatcher was informed that 7 British marines were captured and that by now Argentina had installed 3000 troops into the Falklands, which was almost double the number of inhabitants of the islands. Thatcher received support from several heads of state who condemned the actions of Argentina, although some of them only privately⁶¹. Besides the support, however, the documents also show that Thatcher was pressured to resolve the conflict with Argentina peacefully and to not use military force^{62 63} (Thatcher, 1995, pp. 190-192). Through the PM office, all countries in the Common Wealth were suggested⁶⁴ heartily to end all economic and diplomatic relations with Argentina, as far as they did not yet already. A similar request⁶⁵ was sent to all allies. These records show that Thatcher was, on the one hand, proceeding with using Britain's teeth, and, on the other hand, collecting support for that pathway domestically as well as internationally. It indicates that Thatcher was on a hawkish path, willing to use force towards Argentina, and seeking support to make that pathway as clear and easy as possible.

On 6 April, a War Cabinet was installed (Freedman, 2004, pp. 21-22) to monitor all political and military actions. Carrington had resigned, thereby taking full

⁵⁵ House of Common Speech 3 April 1982: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104910>

⁵⁶ Top secret PM file 1-5 April 1982: PREM19/614

(http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/1982/PREM19_list7984.asp)

⁵⁷ Top secret PM file 1-5 April 1982: PREM19/614, p. 214

(http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/1982/PREM19_list7984.asp)

⁵⁸ Top secret PM file 1-5 April 1982: PREM19/614, p. 186

(http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/1982/PREM19_list7984.asp)

⁵⁹ Top secret PM file 1-5 April 1982: PREM19/614, p. 144

⁶⁰ Top secret PM file 1-5 April 1982: PREM19/614, p. 14

⁶¹ Top secret PM file 1-5 April 1982: PREM19/614, p. 52

⁶² Top secret PM file 1-5 April 1982: PREM19/614, see e.g. pp. 8-12, 15-16, 33-36, 41,142

⁶³ Secret PM file 6-8 April 1982: PREM19/615, pp. 150-174

⁶⁴ Secret PM file 6-8 April 1982: PREM19/615, pp. 214-221

⁶⁵ Secret PM file 6-8 April 1982: PREM19/615, p. 205

responsibility for the unpreparedness of the British army, and Thatcher replaced him with Francis Pym (Thatcher, 1995, pp. 185-187). Nott's request to resign was refused by Thatcher because she believed that it would stand in the way of the only thing that mattered at that moment: "victory" (Thatcher, 1995, p. 186). The nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) was expected to arrive at the Falklands on 11 April. The task force was well on its way and could arrive at earliest on 24 April. The question was now: what would their instructions be?⁶⁶ Communications⁶⁷ with the US shows that Britain was strongly pressured to resolve the conflict peacefully. The same records show that Thatcher repeatedly stated the unwillingness to return to the negotiation table without Argentina's withdrawal of the Falklands. Meanwhile, the US press was perceived⁶⁸ by Britain in their favor, which was seen as a strong aspect of support despite the appeasing words of US Secretary of State Alexander Haig who was urging for returning to the negotiation table.

A briefing on 6 April showed that, although the British army was unprepared (because far away from the Southern Atlantic), the naval forces had the capacity to respond with military force⁶⁹. Through Germany, information arrived that showed that Argentine rear-admiral Girling had requested to speak with a German military attaché⁷⁰ in Rio de Janeiro. The admiral told him that Argentina was considering cutting the ties with the US because it seemed that the US was leaning towards Britain. If that turned out to be true, Argentina would seek support from the Soviet Union. The Argentine admiral also stated that Argentina would be willing to negotiate and even withdraw from the Falklands, if Argentine sovereignty would not be a part of negotiations, but a given. He also stressed that Argentina was willing and capable of using force. At the same time, intelligence showed that within Argentina it seemed that the Argentine leaders were using the conflict to look strong, while there were a lot of domestic problems⁷¹. On 8 April Haig visited London and discussed the Falklands conflict with Thatcher. The minutes⁷² show that he was pressing for a peaceful solution by returning to the negotiation table, but Thatcher kept strong and argued that Argentina would have to leave the Falklands firstly before the topic of negotiations could even be suggested (Thatcher, 1995, p. 193). Haig left for Argentina and returned to Thatcher on 12 April, attempting to come to a solution in which negotiations would guide instead of military force. Thatcher maintained her stance towards Argentina: First, leave the islands. She did listen, however, patiently to the proposals of Haig, even when she thought they were "full of holes" (Thatcher, 1995, p. 195). Haig, who was in contact with Argentina, was sent back and forth by Argentina and 'infuriating him with their uncooperativeness and changing moods' (Hastings & Jenkins, 1987, p. 140). For Thatcher this period was not one of real negotiations, in her opinion, it was used by the Argentinians to give themselves a military advantage

⁶⁶ Secret PM file 6-8 April 1982: PREM19/615, pp. 227-231
(http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/PRM19_list7984.asp)

⁶⁷ Secret PM file 6-8 April 1982: PREM19/615, pp. 189-201

⁶⁸ Secret PM file 6-8 April 1982: PREM19/615, pp. 71-75

⁶⁹ Secret PM file 6-8 April 1982: PREM19/615, pp. 148-149

⁷⁰ Secret PM file 6-8 April 1982: PREM19/615, pp. 113-115

⁷¹ Secret PM file 6-8 April 1982: PREM19/615, pp. 55-56

⁷² Secret PM file 6-8 April 1982: PREM19/615, pp. 32-41

(Thatcher, 1995, p. 203). On 20 April Haig sent a message to Thatcher that showed his hopelessness to come to an accord. He wrote: "It is imperative that you maintain military pressure. I see no other way of bringing the Argentines to a position satisfactory to you."⁷³ He repeated this message during a meeting in New York with Pym⁷⁴.

These records show that Thatcher held strong to her convictions, however, she was also willing to give Haig a chance to follow a dovish⁷⁵ pathway. This willingness does not indicate that Thatcher herself followed a more dovish path. She kept her line and conviction and was sure that Argentina played with Haig to prepare more strongly for war. However, of course, Thatcher felt the need to show courtesy to her closest ally to take their efforts seriously. Thereby, many other countries next to the US had urged for peaceful solutions, so she had to appear at least willing to solve the conflict peacefully. Moreover, she had the time, while Britain could not get into any battle with Argentina before the task force would have arrived. Based on these insights, it rather seemed that her patient but steady course finally led the dovish Haig to the camp of more hawkish inclinations.

Meanwhile, the task force had arrived at Ascension, an island close by the Falklands. Battle groups were sent from there to South Georgia, in case action would be required (Hastings & Jenkins, 1987, p. 154). On 20 April, after the reception of the junta that they would never give up their sovereignty claim the War Cabinet decided that South Georgia would be recovered by Britain and subsequently informed Haig with a telegram (Thatcher, 1995, p. 204). In the telegram with the orders to inform Haig, it was advised to emphasize that this decision was in line with Haig's advice to keep the military pressure on Argentina.

On 24 April Pym, who just returned from meetings with Haig in Washington DC, brought new proposals to Thatcher for negotiations. Pym felt that Britain should agree. Thatcher was outraged by the proposals and insisted that every word would be examined carefully. For five hours she sat on the proposal, together with Attorney-General. However, in discussion with Pym, they could not agree. When the War Cabinet assembled, Pym still advised them to agree with the proposals. Thatcher simply repeated her efforts and took them step by step through the proposal, thereby showing them every bit of objections she had. She argued that self-determination of the Falklanders was the guiding directive, that Britain was giving in too much if they would agree with these terms. One important issue bothered her. The agreement dictated that at the moment the agreement would be signed, the British task force would have to turn around immediately, a demand that she did not trust (Moore, 2013, p. 691; Thatcher, 1995, p. 207). She wanted to break off the negotiations that the US was favoring. The War Cabinet agreed with her. Since Argentina had already declared that Argentina and Britain were 'technically at war'⁷⁶, there would be war until Argentina would leave the islands. In her memoirs she stated: 'I could not have stayed as Prime Minister had the War Cabinet accepted Francis Pym's proposals. I

⁷³ Top secret PM file 20-22 April 1982: PREM19/620, pp. 235-237

⁷⁴ Top secret PM file 20-22 April 1982: PREM19/620, p. 38

⁷⁵ Interestingly, Hastings and Jenkins (1987) call the chapter discussing this process 'Haig's doves'

⁷⁶ Secret PM file 23-26 April 1982: PREM19/621, p. 76

would have resigned.” (Thatcher, 1995, p. 208). They immediately informed Haig⁷⁷ that unless Argentina withdrew from the Falklands, Britain would continue. The latter statement of Thatcher is typical for her hawkish and determined stance during the Falklands conflict.

On 25 April, South Georgia was recovered, and the landed battle group started operations against Argentine forces (Hastings & Jenkins, 1987, p. 165). They thought that Argentina might be more willing to withdraw from the Falklands⁷⁸. After John Nott reading the press statement, Thatcher did not take any questions from the press and simply stated: “Rejoice”⁷⁹. The next day, the War Cabinet declared a Total Exclusion Zone of 200 nautical miles radius, in which the rules of engagement would apply (Thatcher, 1995, p. 209). A few days later, on 30 April, the task force arrived in the zone, and the next day the battle began with an Argentine attack on the task force (Thatcher, 1995, p. 212). The Falklands War was an empirical fact.

The records above show that Thatcher was a determined, consequent leader, from the beginning on she had the strong conviction that the only way out of this conflict was through the use of force. She refused to start any negotiations before her most paramount condition was met: Argentina must withdraw. Since Argentina never did, it seems that she was supported in her belief that the use of force would lead to a settlement of the conflict. In that sense she was right. The war went on until on 14 June 1982 Argentine troops surrendered to Britain. Britain had won the war. In total 907 people died during the war, from which 258 British (from which three civilians) and 649 Argentinians (from which 16 civilians).

During the war, Thatcher also held publicly strong to her demand: Argentina had to leave the Falkland Islands because these were British soil. She left no room for any negotiations or compromises: Argentina had to leave. In her public speeches and interviews, she made this crystal clear. Just after the invasion of the Falklands, in a radio interview⁸⁰ for ITN regarding the stepping back of the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, she expressed her strong belief in a successful outcome by the use of military force:

“I am not talking about failure, I am talking about my supreme confidence in the British fleet ... superlative ships, excellent equipment, the most highly trained professional group of men, the most honourable and brave members of her majesty's service. Failure? Do you remember what Queen Victoria once said? “Failure—the possibilities do not exist”. That is the way we must look at it, with all our professionalism, all our flair and every single bit of native cunning, every single bit of professionalism and all our equipment and we must go out calmly, quietly, to succeed.”

In an interview⁸¹ for the BBC radio on 19 May 1982 she made that very clear:

⁷⁷ Secret PM file 23-26 April 1982: PREM19/621, p. 62-63

⁷⁸ Secret PM file 23-26 April 1982: PREM19/621, p. 10

⁷⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGxsLbK9FOA>

⁸⁰ Interview with ITN, 5 April 1982. (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104913>)

⁸¹ Interview with BBC Radio, Jimmy Young Programme, 19 May 1982. (<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104784>)

"I think first the Argentine troops have to leave the Islands. They were the invaders. If they are allowed to stay, there will be many other countries who will look and say "Ah, Ah, look you can take someone else's territory by force and it doesn't matter what United Nations Resolutions there are, no-one will actually put the invader off." I entirely agree. Invasion must not be seen to pay. Otherwise we shall have all sorts of boundaries changed by force and you'll get a kind of international anarchy.",

Moreover, in response to a question whether the British would push Argentina into the hands of the Soviets due to the aggressive behavior of the UK and that negotiations could be seen as a better option:

"The idea that we have absolutely no military activity unless negotiations fail is patently wrong. The raid on Pebble Island was a tremendous success. A Commando raid on Pebble Island—a colossal success. We haven't just been sitting back waiting for negotiations, that would be only too easy a ploy for the Argentinians, and there are signs that that's what they're trying to do: saying, "All right brothers, don't you do anything while we negotiate and then you can rely on us to carry on the negotiations while your people are having a pretty difficult time of it in the South Atlantic". So we're not going to be trapped by that one. So his suggestion that you can't do anything while there are negotiations is patently wrong. We've been carrying on doing what we believe is best and you've seen many of the results. Now what was the second one—shall we throw the whole of Latin America into the arms of the Soviets? What, merely by standing up for the rights of British people? Do you know Jimmy, I believe that we eventually shall succeed and the Argentines will leave."

This latter remark shows the decisiveness of Thatcher, based on her belief that negotiations were not an option and the only way out of the conflict and a definite settlement was to use force. This point was also emphasized in this remark during the same interview: "I doubt very much whether there will be another rapid invasion if we succeed in dealing with this one properly, with the Argentinians leaving the Islands." In a speech to the Conservative Women's Conference on 26 May 1982, Thatcher accounted for the war in a way that shows her hawkish stance:

"It would be a betrayal of our fighting men and of the Islanders if we had continued merely to talk, when talk alone was getting nowhere. And so, seven weeks to the day after the invasion, we moved to recover by force what was taken from us by force"⁸²,

And: "Surely we, of all people, have learned the lesson of history: that to appease an aggressor is to invite aggression elsewhere, and on an ever-increasing scale?". Her words indicate the belief that negotiations are futile in the case of a large threat, and that attempts to make peace with a large threat lead to more violence. Even more than expressing her hawkish belief, she also indicates from where this belief might (partly) stem. With the explicit rejection of appeasement of aggressors, she seems to refer to the appeasement policy towards Hitler in the 1930s by the British

⁸² Speech for the Conservative Women's Conference 26 May 1982.
(<http://www.margareththatcher.org/document/104948>)

government and indicates that she, as leader of the present government believes that aggression needs to be countered with aggression.

The importance of her public expressions is that there is the notion of accountability. Public appearances of political leaders in any form are specifically meant to inform the public and to account for the actions taken. In doing so, Thatcher accounts for the decision to use military force on her beliefs that interstate conflicts on the brink of war need to be solved with the use of force because she believes that negotiations will make things only worse. In other words, Thatcher accounts for her decisions, based on a hawkish belief, thereby assuming that her belief is the right way to look at the matter.

What was the role of the use of power during this conflict? As described above, Argentina increased the use of power in the weeks leading up to the escalation. Also in the period after the invasion of the Falklands and before the war started, Argentina continued to use hard power. The unofficially approved landing of Argentine metal scrapers on South Georgia, the unilateral communiqué after explicit agreement to release a mutual press statement, And in particular the wording of this communiqué, the sending of vessels to the HMS Endurance, the Argentine fleet on its way to Falkland. All examples discussed above show a steep increase in the use of power.

It seems that the effect of the use of power influenced the perception of threat of Thatcher. When Argentina, just after the New York talks, issued a unilateral communiqué seems the moment that Thatcher's perception of threat was triggered, since that was the moment she instructed the beginning of contingency plans. From that moment on, Thatcher held a firm hand on the conflict and showed doubts about negotiations and a greater emphasis on the British sovereignty.

However, Britain also used hard power. Thatcher deployed already quite early in the conflict a nuclear-powered submarine. Moreover, when that news leaked, Thatcher was secretly welcoming that leak because she wanted to send the Argentinians a clear message, as she revealed in her memoirs. It goes beyond the scope of this research, but it could be argued that if the use of power has affected Thatcher, it also might have affected the Argentine leaders. This understanding puts the use of power in the same light as was discovered in the preceding chapters: contextual factors seem to be part of strategies in response to actions of the other more than an overall generalizable factor.

Is it possible to distinguish between the effect of the use of power and the effect of hawkishness? The results of chapter 5 established that hawkishness and the use of power both influence the decision-making process, but do not interact. In this real-world case, it is hard to disentangle these factors. Due to the actions and words of Argentina, it was likely that a hawkish leader would react with the wish to prepare for a possible military encounter. On the other hand, a dovish leader could also have concluded that it was paramount to at least prepare for different scenario's, maybe even with an option for the use of force. The most important notion arising from this case is that both factors played a significant role. The use of power did trigger a perception of threat that influenced decision-making. Likewise, in a much stronger sense, did the hawkishness from Thatcher. The case of decision-making process

leading to the Falklands War is therefore a good illustration of the mechanisms that were detected by the experimental approach.

7.7 Possible challenges

This chapter aimed to illustrate how the hawkishness of a decision-maker can influence the decision-making process during a severe interstate conflict and thereby illustrate how the mechanism found through the use of experiments might play out in a real-world case. However, this dissertation also aimed at investigating the assumptions of democratic peace theory. A liberal challenge to the results of this real-world case study could be that the regime-type of Argentina, which was authoritarian, had affected the threat perception of Thatcher and that therefore the war started. Thus, although regime-type as an influencing factor was not explicitly investigated as an independent variable, the analysis did 'cast the net widely for an alternative explanation' (Checkel & Bennett, 2015, p. 261). In other words: the possibility that the regime-types of Argentina and Britain mattered for the decision-making process was not ruled out, and any remark about regime-type was noted.

During the analysis became, however, clear that the regime-type of Argentina was hardly ever mentioned as a reason to go to war with Argentina. The focus was more on the actual behavior of Argentina, and on how to interpret that behavior. The materials show that the hawkish lens of Thatcher interpreted Argentina's behavior as very threatening. In Thatcher's memoirs, written many years later, she briefly refers to regime-type: "We knew that they were unpredictable and unstable and that a dictatorship might not behave in ways we would consider rational" (Thatcher, 1995, p. 179). This remark shows that the Argentine regime-type played a role in her perception of the opponent. However, it is only one of few remark in her memoirs and are aimed at a justification of her decision in retrospect. Within the classified documents that capture the decision-making process the mentioning of regime-type is practically absent. This absence indicates that regime-type did not trigger Thatcher's decision to go to war at that time. So, if regime-type mattered at all, it must have been to a limited extent, and without a strong focus.

Although the official records show hardly any mentioning of regime-type, the analysis of Thatcher's public statements showed something different. In particular, the statements that Thatcher aimed at the public during the crisis and the war in an attempt to justify the war refer relatively more to the fact that Argentina was a dictatorship. Moreover, the regime-type of Argentina was suggested as a reason for the war. Earlier research shows that the democratic peace is often used within publicly aimed rhetoric of Western leaders in an attempt to get the public opinion behind them (Avtalyon-Bakker, 2013; Burgos, 2008; Ish-Shalom, 2006, 2015; Russett, 2005). These studies show how leaders justify going to war by emphasizing the nondemocratic nature of the opponent, thereby implying that this nondemocratic nature equals aggressiveness. As discussed in the theoretical chapters, the aggressiveness of nondemocracies is merely an assumption made by democratic peace theory that has become conventional wisdom (Ish-Shalom, 2006). Thatcher

also used this assumption of the aggressive dictatorships as a justification for the war with Argentina. In an interview on BBC 2 Radio, she said on 19 May 1982:

“We are a democratic country. We believe that power and strength comes from the people. They are a dictatorship. And of course this is a tremendous gap. I mean, they say “look, who determines the interests of the people, the Government determines the interests of the people.” We say “but don't you think the people ought to have some say in their future?”⁸³

However, in that same interview, she also stressed many other reasons for the war. The fact that the Falkland Islands are British:

“I think first the Argentine troops have to leave the Islands. They were the invaders. [...] Also those Falkland Islanders are British people. You know there are only forty Argentinians in that Island and not all of them permanent residents. They are British people—some of them have been there far longer than some of their counter-parts in Argentina. The families have been there far longer.”

Also the wish of the Falklanders to remain under British rule she connects to democracy:

“If the Falkland Islanders said “look, we want an arrangement with Argentina” and that was the wishes of the Falkland Islanders, that also we would have to consider, that again is what self-determination and consulting the people is. I mean, here, all the power which I have, comes from the people. If they were to say that. I personally think that after they have had this terrible experience of invasion the last thing they will want to do is to have close association with the Argentinians. It's just like the Channel Islands during the last war. They wouldn't easily have invited the Germans back.”

Just like the danger of Argentina collaborating with the Soviet Block:

“Well, if you look at Argentina, Argentines have already done quite a bit of tucking up with the Soviets as far as trade is concerned. You know full well that after Afghanistan the Americans put a grain embargo on sales to Soviet Union. What happened? The wheat was sold to the Soviet Union by the Argentines. Wheat and beef and 80 per cent of their food exports now go to the Soviet Union. So they have already got a very considerable relationship with the Soviet Union in food and that gives them a terrific balance of payments as far as the Russians are concerned. And what can the Russians supply then with? Not very much save arms, so they have already got that. There already is, and the United States is very much aware of, the Peronistas, whose whole thesis is very similar to that of the Soviet Union and who use similar tactics. That is there already, but I do not believe that if you talk about the whole of Latin America, what Britain is doing by standing up for British people in the Falklands, and by standing up for international law, will throw South America into the hands of the Soviets. Rather they will see Britain, and the Western world too, stands up for her own democracies; and they will see it as a strengthening of democracy.”

⁸³ <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104784>

On the Conference for Conservative Women on 26 May 1982, Thatcher used her speech to provide a full account of all reasons to go to war with Argentina. At that time, there were already casualties, which probably made the need for a sound explanation important. Her full speech included a timeline of events and a detailed description of all efforts Britain made to remain peaceful. Within that context, Thatcher said:

“For decades, the peoples of the Falkland Islands had enjoyed peace—with freedom,—peace with justice, peace with democracy. They are our people and let no one doubt our profound longing for peace. But that peace was shattered by a wanton act of armed aggression by Argentina in blatant violation of international law. And everything that has happened since has stemmed from the invasion by the military dictatorship of Argentina. And sometimes I feel people need reminding of that fact more often. We want peace restored. But we want it with the same freedom, justice and democracy that the Islanders previously enjoyed.”

During this speech, Thatcher referred again to the aggression of Argentina, the unwillingness of the Falklanders to belong to another country than Britain, and the fear of Argentina being incorporated into the Soviet block.

It seems that the referral to the regime-type of Argentina occurred mainly within public speeches, and with a clear aim to get public support. Also noteworthy is that Thatcher connects the mentioning of the regime-types to the Cold War, in which all democracies balance with a few non-democratic allies against the non-democratic and dangerous Soviet Union. In that sense, the references to democracy and non-democracy are more in line with realist arguments, who state that during the Cold War, all interstate conflicts should be understood from a system-level perspective.

Besides to the liberal challenge, another challenge to this illustration is possible. The invasion of the Falklands by Argentina did play an important role in the Falkland War, while an invasion showed to be a factor of no significant influence in the experiments. The analysis above indicates that Thatcher, hawkish or not, almost certainly would not have attacked Argentina if this country would have stayed clear from the Falklands, or any other British territory. This challenge does not mean that the results and conclusions above are invalid. The analysis of Thatcher's decision-making process shows that it was her hawkishness that strongly influenced her decision to attack. The question in this respect would be: would Thatcher have attacked after the Argentine invasion if she would have been a dove? The answer to this question might be, based on the analysis above, a careful 'no'. Moreover, the invasion of the Falklands by Argentina might be not similar enough to match the invasion by *Other Country* in the experiment. The experiment described an enduring conflict over a disputed area of resources, to which both parties seemed to have a legitimate claim. An area that was, however, uninhabited. The enduring conflict over the Falklands was indeed over disputed territory, with both parties feeling that their claim was legitimate. However, the Falklands do not have any resources that might be valuable to either country, but the territory is inhabited. The inhabitants are not only mostly British but also explicitly did not want to become Argentinians. This latter

aspect differs from the hypothetical scenario in the experimental setting, and might, therefore, explain this aspect of the decision-making process that led to the Falklands War. This insight strengthens the conclusion of chapter 6 that contextual factors matter but rather ad hoc and specific to the context of the conflict and the environment of the decision-makers than in a generalizable pattern.

7.8 Conclusion

This case illustrates how the findings of the experiments in chapter 5 can play out in the real world. The experimental results in chapter 5 showed that when decision-makers are in an enduring and severe interstate conflict that seems to be stuck and dangerous for already some time, hawkish beliefs of the decision-makers will be the factor that can explain why decision-makers opt for an attack. Moreover, based on the same experimental results, it was expected that when the opponent uses hard power, decision-makers will also be more likely to opt for an attack.

The crisis between Argentina and Britain over the Falkland Islands was selected as an interpretative case study. The analysis focused on the decision-making process of Prime Minister Thatcher to illustrate the mechanisms. Based on secondary studies, Thatcher showed to be a hawk. An analysis of the most important government documents of that period shows that Thatcher was the main decision-maker and that her hawkishness guided her decisions about the course to take during the conflict with Argentina. So were her interactions with the War Cabinet and other actors. Also the use of power, in experimental results found to be a contextual factor, shows in the example of the Falklands War to have been of influence on the decision-making process of Thatcher when Argentina used hard power.

Regarding the regime-type, from which democratic peace theory argues that opponents sharing democratic regimes can decrease the threat of war and opponents not sharing democratic regimes can increase the threat of war, there are no clear instances that show that the regime-type of Argentina played a significant role in Thatcher's threat perception. She did mention Argentina's regime-type for the eyes and ears of the public, such as use in speeches, interviews, and memoirs. However, behind the scenes, the regime-type was not mentioned in significant meaning or frequency, nor by Thatcher, neither by her advisors.

With this illustration, the experimental finding that the hawkishness of decision-makers influences their decisions during the resolution of an interstate conflict finds more credibility. Based on the results, it could be argued that the conflict over the Falklands might have ended differently if Thatcher would have been a dove. It is not to say that the war would not have occurred, but it might have been plausible that negotiations could have prevented or at least postponed the use of military force.

This illustration of the experimental results through the use of a real-world case supports the argument of this study that the individual level matters in international relations, as well as the argument that theories of international relations need to incorporate the individual level. More often than not these theories

rely on structural explanations that play out on an aggregated level, thereby assuming the individual decision-makers as within a black box. The case study in this chapter shows the relevance of studying the individual level more systematically. It moreover shows how relevant experimental results can be: without the understanding that hawkish beliefs might have affected Thatcher's decision-making process, the realist conclusion could have been that the Cold War had dictated the decisions, or the liberal conclusion could have been that the regime-type of Argentina had blocked any peaceful outcome.

The illustration how important Thatcher's personal beliefs were for here decision-making process increase the credibility of the experimental results increase. In her memoirs Thatcher describes how she felt at the beginning of the escalation: "I felt in my bones that the Argentinians would never withdraw without a fight" (Thatcher, 1995, p. 184). She had initially a very strong belief that she needed to fight, and that belief seems to have been guided more by her personal beliefs than about any structure or context outside of her. Like Jervis (among others) has argued: what you believe (expect) is what you get (Jervis, 1976). Hawkish beliefs affect decision-making. Of course, hawkishness alone will not likely cause a war when there are no other factors involved. A hawk must be triggered first before the wish to retaliate will occur.

The case study did illustrate that the contextual factors of the behavior of Argentina mattered, however, not necessarily while interacting with hawkishness. The use of hard power by Argentina indeed affected Thatcher to want to prepare for war. Just like the fact that Argentina invaded the Falklands did: the invasion was the driving force of the whole conflict: Thatcher wanted to throw Argentina off the Islands. It seems probable to state that Thatcher perceived the invasion as such a high threat that she prepared for war, and that without Argentina invading the Falklands, it would have been different. However, turning this insight around: if Thatcher would have been a dove, it is not immediately evident that she would have attacked. She might have lent her ear more to the doves around her, in particular Alexander Haig, the secretary of State of Thatcher's main and strongest ally, who made many dovish attempts to settle the conflict without a fight.

This case study offers illustrative supports to the experimental findings that the hawkishness of decision-makers is a rather stable factor of influence, whereas contextual factors play a different role. How these factors relate to each other and might enhance each other, is reason for further research.