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Hawks and doves. Democratic peace theory revisited

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Chapter 4 Liberal Norms in the US, Russia & China

4.1 Liberal norms for democratic peace studies

The so-called normative explanation claims that liberal norms, imbued within individuals living in liberal democracies, are responsible for the democratic peace (Danilovic & Clare, 2007; Dixon, 1994; Dixon & Senese, 2002, p. 549; Geva et al., 1993; Geva & Hanson, 1999; Jakobsen et al., 2016; Johns & Davies, 2012; Kahl, 1998; Z. Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 625; Mintz & Geva, 1993; Mousseau, 1997; Owen, 1994; Rawls, 1999; Ray, 1995; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Rousseau, 2005, pp. 27-28; Rummel, 1983; Tomz & Weeks, 2013; Van Belle, 1997; Weart, 1998, pp. 75-93). These studies argue that liberal norms are the crucial factor that creates peace between liberal democracies but, as explained in chapter 2, their empirical results are not based on a clear conceptualization of what liberal norms entail, nor is the expected mechanism clearly theorized. Even more, these studies have not measured liberal norms to study their presence and hypothesized influence but only assumed these norms to be present and influencing.

This chapter aims to investigate this assumption and see to what extent liberal norms are present or absent among individuals of different regime-types. It tests hypothesis 4: *Decision-makers, born and raised in a consolidated liberal democracy, have internalized liberal norms in contrast to decision-makers who are not born and raised in a liberal democracy.* To test this hypothesis, liberal norms need to be conceptualized based on the theoretical arguments of these studies. Since, as discussed above, their theoretical justification rests on the liberal philosophy of Kant (see e.g. Maoz & Russett 1993, p. 625), this study conceptualizes liberal norms accordingly. This concept is used to operationalize liberal norms and subsequently measure the level of liberal norms among representative samples of the US, China, and Russia. Moreover, the level of liberal norms among the student samples of these three countries are also measured.

4.2 Conceptualization of liberal norms

Norms

A norm is, generally speaking, a standard of behavior within a particular group or society. Everybody within that society knows the norm and understands how to behave according to that norm. That shared knowledge offers a control within the society on the individual actors to comply with that norm. Said differently, a “norm concerning a specific action exists when the socially defined right to control the action is held not by the actor but by others” (Coleman, 1990, p. 243). The control of others does not have to be obviously present, after some time the norm can become internalized and actions of an actor will be less consciously which will make the actor himself able to control his actions according to the norm (Coleman, 1990, p. 243).

However, without the control of other members of the society, the norm would not have come into existence nor become internalized. That makes a norm the product of a social system and thus a concept that exists at macro-level. A norm can exist at macro-level, however, because it is constituted by individuals who act in a specific way under the influence of their society (Coleman, 1990, pp. 13, 241).

A norm is constituted when individuals within a group behave in a way that is in their right but affects other individuals within the same group (negatively), and when the effects of this behavior (also called externalities) “cannot be overcome by simple transactions that would put control in the hands of those experiencing the externalities” (Coleman, 1990, p. 251). Thus, a norm arises when individuals within a society have to work out an arrangement to overcome possible problems coming forth of the behavior of a sub-group of society. The norms inform individuals how to behave appropriately in a particular situation (March & Olsen, 1989, pp. 23, 160-162). Norms thereby differ not that much from legal norms (laws) with the difference that legal norms are formal institutions, whereas social norms are informal institutions. The informal institution furthermore socializes the individuals into habitualized behavior, a routine, which helps individuals to behave according to beliefs and values from which they are not always consciously aware (Scott, 2001, pp. 67, 80). In other words, a norm firstly dictates what should be believed, but after being exposed to such a norm for a longer period, it is expected to become a belief. Which notion resonates with the expectations of democratic peace theory about liberal norms. Therefore the expectation is that a social norm reflects the beliefs and values of the society. These beliefs and values also can also be formed by political institutions that were established with the intention to create these beliefs and values. Consequently, the presence of norms within a society must be observable in the behavior of individuals.

Liberalism

Although liberalism might be considered an ideology, it would be better to argue that liberalism is a family of related ideologies that share an emphasis on the freedom of the individual. Liberals assume individuals to be rational, self-interested, and competitive, and therefore capable of determining what is in their own best interest and live accordingly as long as they do not interfere with the freedom of other individuals. Liberals believe that all individuals should be free, and equal opportunities to live their lives as they please.

A liberal society is a society of free, rational and self-serving individuals whom all have the right to be completely free as long as they do not harm others. The genesis of these societies is explained with social contract theory. Social contract theory is based on the premise that individuals who are freely pursuing their interests will unavoidably get into conflicts with others. To overcome potentially violent conflicts, a mutual agreement between individuals is made to establish a common authority that enforces common rules to protect all in the society. Those common rules should guarantee the liberties of all individuals equally and protect the basic rights of life, liberty, and property. Within liberal theory, we can make a rough

distinction between two strands of liberalism, one that emphasizes the absolute value of liberal principles and the other that emphasizes the relative value of liberal principles.

The latter strand argues that liberal principles should be understood from a utilitarian perspective and make these principles contingent on the ends one wants to achieve. The end is individual freedom, and sometimes the means to that end might be less according to liberal principles. This strand of work is rooted in the work of J.S. Mill, and Adam Smith. Mill argues that with the arrival of representative democracy the state is no longer the enemy of individual freedom, but the majority is. He, therefore, argues in favor of “one very simple principle” (Mill, 1859/2001, p. 13), the harm principle. This principle entails that individuals should be completely free to behave as they like unless they harm others. The single role of the government is, therefore, to safeguard that no harm will be done, but leaves individuals further free, laissez-faire, which recalls the liberal economic ideas of Smith (A. Smith, 1776/2005). Formal institutions play in this strand a much smaller role, and also the moral component is of lesser importance.

The other strand, deontological liberalism, on which most democratic peace theorists rely, argues that liberal principles are independent of context and consequences, and are unnegotiable: even when the cause might be just, the measures need to be just as well. This deontological vision on liberalism is rooted in the ideas of the Enlightenment, in particular in the work of Immanuel Kant, and contemporary philosopher John Rawls. Within democratic peace studies, Kant’s work is central to the argument, many scholars refer to him (e.g. Bakker, 2017; Bennett, 2006; Benoit, 1996; Braumoeller, 1997; Bremer, 1992, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Cederman, 2001; Chan, 1993; Chernoff, 2004; Choi, 2010; Dafoe, 2011; Danilovic & Clare, 2007; Dixon, 1994; Dixon & Senese, 2002; Dorussen & Ward, 2010; Doyle, 1983a, 1983b, 1986, 1997, 2005; Farnham, 2003; Gartzke, 1998; Geis, Brock, & Müller, 2011; Geis & Wagner, 2011; Harrison, 2010; Hayes, 2012; Ronald Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; Ish-Shalom, 2015; Jakobsen et al., 2016; Johns & Davies, 2012; Kinsella, 2005; Levy, 1988; Z. Maoz, 1997; Z. Maoz & Russett, 1993; Morgan & Campbell, 1991; Mousseau, 1997; Rawls, 1999; Ray, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Russett, 1993b, 2005; Russett & Oneal, 2001; Ungerer, 2012; Weart, 1998; Widmaier, 2005; Williams, 2001).

Kant (1789/2013c) argues that individuals who are enabled by their self-established republic to be free and autonomous will not only be able to pursue their interests rationally but also learn to listen to the ‘the moral law inside’: the categorical imperative. That means that people can take other people and their needs, wishes, and freedom, into account. Said differently, people would start to act towards others as they would like these others to treat them. That can only be achieved when people start to tolerate others in the broadest sense and trust them to reciprocate that tolerance (see also Wood, 1999, pp. 284-285, 295-296). These ideas are quite vivid in the work of John Rawls, who describes the process of being rational and reciprocal as reasonable (Rawls, 1999).

Kant realizes that the freedom to follow one's internal moral law is paradoxical; there is no guarantee that people would indeed choose to do so (Kant, 1795/2013a, p. 34; Wood, 1999, p. 283). Kant, therefore, sees a solution in the formal institutions of the republic that could guarantee the rights of individual freedom for everybody in the republic. Institutions, however, that would come forth from these individuals themselves in an attempt to enforce individuals within the republic to behave according to these self-established rights (Wood, 1999, p. 316). Subsequently, he expected that these institutions would cause a socialization process with the practices of tolerance, trust, and reciprocity. Kant sees it as a process of 'moral learning' that would enable people to become 'better people' (Kant, 1795/2013a, pp. 21-29; Wood, 1999, pp. 295-296). The emphasis on institutional arrangements within this strand of liberalism is therefore understandable, although the highest expectation is centering around the liberal norms.

Liberal norms

As explained above, earlier studies into the effect of liberal norms on the support for war has taken the presence of norms for granted. It does not suffice to argue that if liberal institutions are present liberal norms will exist (see e.g. Danilovic & Clare, 2007; Dixon, 1993; Dixon & Senese, 2002; Mousseau, 1997; Van Belle, 1997). Nor does it suffice to argue that stability is an expected effect of liberal norms and can, therefore, be equated to liberal norms (see e.g. Z. Maoz & Russett, 1993; Putnam, 1993). Liberal norms are expected to be a product of a liberal society. So, following Kant's more abstract ideas, what norms can we expect to be present among individuals that are socialized in a liberal society?


Kant expects that individuals could be purely rational they would follow their self-interests firstly and shape their lives as they pleased (Wood, 1999, p. 283). He also expects that over time, while living rationally and autonomously, the experience would teach these rational individuals that it would be in their self-interest to provide the space for others to live autonomously and rationally. Kant trusts that nature would enforce that insight: *fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt*¹⁴, or in other words: he believes that in the end, people preferred peace amongst each other over conflict and survival battles (Wood, 1999, pp. 297-298). This insight would create tolerance towards others to be different, to trust each other despite differences, and a norm of reciprocity of tolerance, trust, and autonomy among the members of the society (Kant, 1795/2013a, pp. 22-28; Wood, 1999, p. 315). He also believes, that for individuals to be able to be rational and reasonable, they should be free from state oppression, and free from each other oppression. Kant expects that a republic with institutions, which reflect and guarantee these processes between members of the republic, will create the freedom necessary for this process (Wood, 1999, p. 316). Thus, following Kant, a liberal society exists of rational individuals that are free from oppression by rulers, that are living their lives autonomously, and foster tolerant and trusting feelings towards others in their society, and moreover expect to have that

¹⁴ Fate guides the willing and drags the unwilling along (free translation)

tolerance, trust, and respect for their autonomy and freedom reciprocated by these others.

Liberal norms exist of six different dimensions, freedom of the state, autonomy of life, tolerance, trust and reciprocity towards others. These six dimensions that are inherently intertwined and connected, and theoretically they might seem to overlap. However, each of them has a distinct core attribute that justifies the distinction between these six dimensions. Rationality, for instance, is necessary to be able to become reciprocal of tolerance, however, without feeling free from the state, that tolerance is not possible. Together, these dimensions are expected to create liberal norms that individuals of that liberal society will follow and later on internalize. If enough people within such a society have internalized these norms, they start to believe this is the proper way to act and over time will behave according to that logic of liberal appropriateness. Liberal norms are, therefore, conceptualized by six dimensions: freedom of the state, autonomy of life, tolerance, interpersonal trust, and reciprocity. Figure 4.1 gives an overview of these dimensions.

Figure 4.1 Concept of liberal norms



Rationality is generally understood as individuals acting to pursue their interests to gain maximized utility based on perfect cost-benefit calculations. However, it is convincingly shown that individuals cannot be considered to be fully rational actors because even when they have the intention to act rationally, they are bounded by cognitive limitations and psychological factors (Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1972; Tversky, 1972). In this study, individuals are understood as bounded rational actors, meaning that their ability to maximize utility based on complete and transitive information is bounded by their capabilities and limitations, and psychological influences.

Freedom is a largely discussed and sometimes even contested concept (see a tip of the iceberg: Berlin, 1969; Mill, 1859/2001). Kant, however, has a specific notion of freedom in relation to the creation of liberal norms. He argued that one of the necessary conditions for individuals to be able to be rational is freedom from oppression by a ruler or the state (Kant, 1795/2013a, pp. 9-12). To guarantee this freedom (and thereby the necessary rationality), the state should be a republic and guarantee the freedom of all members of the society, by rights of equality and a rule of law applicable to all (Kant, 1795/2013a, p. 9). Moreover, in a republic by representation, the members of society will have to give their consent to decisions of the state, which also enables them to be rational and free. Kant prefers the republican state form over the democratic state form because in a republic the executive and legislative power would be separated. This separation is necessary, in Kant's view, to make sure that laws of equality are followed, while a truly democratic form could become despotic in nature by a majority stepping on the rights of a minority (Kant, 1795/2013a, p. 11). In the republic, the equality is guaranteed, while at the same time all members have a saying. In other words, to be free of the state in this conceptualization means that individuals are part of the state and its decisions.

Autonomy as a generic concept might seem closely related to freedom, since feeling free and feeling autonomous seems at first sight almost the same. Within studies of individual modernity (Welzel, 2007), for instance, the concept of autonomy is used to describe the individual perception of freedom, which comes down to the feeling of control over life, finances, and freedom of choice. The conceptualization of this study, however, distinguishes between the freedom of the state and the autonomy to define personal life. A necessary distinction because it theoretically hooks into two different aspects of freedom: the freedom of a structure surrounding the agent (the state), and the inherent freedom of an agent (the autonomous life). Individuals can be truly free because they live in a liberal democracy with institutions to guarantee their freedom, but that does not imply that they perceive themselves to be autonomous in life. Of course, it is possible to argue that the better institutions guarantee freedom of the state, the more individuals will have a sense of control over their lives and choices. This argument stresses the need for this distinction. According to Kant, individuals can be rational if they feel free. If they are rational and free, they can act in their self-interest, or: decide autonomously over their lives. Ergo, feeling free from a structure is not the same as the autonomy to decide over personal life. To know whether both intrinsic dimensions of liberal norms are present, we need to distinguish theoretically between these different norms. For this study, autonomy is conceptualized as living an autonomous life.

Tolerance is conceptualized as the willingness to accept the existence of opinions or behavior that are considered objectionable by these citizens (Gibson, 2007). Tolerance is often used as *the* concept of liberal norms, in particular in studies about democratization (Gibson, 2007; Gibson & Duch, 1993; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). Tolerance represents in democratic theory one of the main elements of democracy because it facilitates the equal opportunity of all citizens to let their voices be heard. Democratic institutions that guarantee the positive liberties (Berlin, 1969,

p. 125) are in that sense created to safeguard tolerance. However, the existence of such institutions does not mean per se that tolerance is present within a society. It is therefore not enough to look at formal institutions to understand whether tolerance exists among individuals. Individuals must embrace tolerant behavioral patterns, “an atmosphere of ‘live and let live’” (Z. Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 625) to make sure tolerance exists within a society, it is the presence of tolerant beliefs and values that constitute the concept of tolerance.

The concept of *trust* is quite controversial, due to a close similarity with other concepts, such as confidence, empathy, reciprocity, and respect to name a few (Newton, 2007). As a working definition trust can be conceptualized as “the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests if this is possible” (Newton, 2007, p. 343). Thereby it is distinguished from political trust, which is conceptualized as confidence in politicians and institutions (Newton, 2007, p. 344; Seligman, 2000). Interpersonal trust (sometimes also referred to as moralistic trust (Uslaner, 2002, pp. 4, 17-19)) deals with the trust of strange people that enter their society. Interpersonal trust is therefore not based on personal experiences with friends that create an expectation of trust, or what Uslaner calls ‘strategic trust’ (2002, pp. 4,17), but is more general. Interpersonal trust comes forth from an optimistic view on the world, often paired with the belief that one is in control of its own life (Uslaner, 2002, p. 12). This definition connects with the Kantian belief that the combination of freedom, rationality, and autonomy can create levels of trust, tolerance, and reciprocity. Said differently, although it is very well possible that some people are intrinsically more trusting of strangers (Uslaner, 2002, pp. 12,33), experience with the way a liberal society works (Newton, 2007, p. 344) seems to be able to create interpersonal trust as well.

Reciprocity is closely related to the concept of trust, yet conceptually a distinction can be made between reciprocity and trust. Where trust is a belief that is only part of the individual that feels the trust, is reciprocity dialectical. Reciprocity is defined as the “motivation to repay generous or helpful actions or another individual by adopting actions that are generous or helpful to the other” (Cox, 2004, p. 262), indicating that the behavior of an individual depends on the behavior of others. Axelrod shows that a repeated occurrence of particular behavior can lead to reciprocity of that behavior (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). In other words, experience with the particular behavior of others sets an expected norm, which echoes the notion of the seminal concept of the logic of appropriateness by March and Olsen (March & Olsen, 1989). However, the general notion that reciprocity is a strategy to reward the nice behavior of others and to punish the bad behavior of others does not capture less strategic aspects of reciprocity that also occur. Empirical research shows that people also reciprocate when it is not in their self-interest, neither materially nor through social approval (Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003, p. 253). Gouldner (1960, p. 171) convincingly argues that reciprocity is a universal norm that can be applied within every society rather than a mere strategic vehicle to guide behavior. The application of the norm is not unconditionally, however, but contingent on the

culture of a society (Gouldner, 1960, p. 171). In a society that emphasizes brotherhood, for instance, the norm will be to reciprocate behavior that supports that notion of brotherhood.

Considering reciprocity as a universal norm implies that it is a personally internalized norm (Perugini et al., 2003, p. 253) that subsequently can show variation among individuals. Perugini et al. (2003) distinguish between 1) the *beliefs* one can have in the reciprocity-based behavior of people, and 2) the actual reciprocal *behavior* that can be either positive (as in rewarding) or negative (as in punishing). Reciprocity as an internalized personal norm consists therefore of three dimensions that are related but distinct from each other. The benefit from this concept is that reciprocity can be understood as a personally driven motivation that can explain not only strategic self-interest based behavior but also other reciprocal behavior that might seem irrational or inefficient. For this study, the dimension of belief in reciprocity is essential, whereas the actual (lack of) reciprocal behavior is contingent on the specific action to which it relates. The specific action would be to reciprocate tolerance and trust. Because tolerance and trust are separate dimensions of liberal norms, the belief in reciprocity is necessary, because it allows individuals to connect their beliefs in reciprocity with the belief in tolerance and the belief in trust.

To sum up, the concept of liberal norms is constituted based on six dimensions; (bounded) rationality, freedom, autonomy, tolerance, interpersonal trust, and reciprocity, which are not mutually exclusive but all required to construct liberal norms. The six conceptually different dimensions are dialectical. Although liberal norms is a macro-level concept, the core existence lies at micro-level. Therefore, liberal norms need to be present at the individual level in order to argue that a liberal society exists. Institutional freedom and perceived autonomy are necessary for a rational individual to form beliefs of tolerance, trust, and reciprocity. Yet, one individual is not enough to constitute liberal norms. Within a society, more free, autonomous and rational need to reciprocate tolerance and trust. Thus, liberal norms need the conditions of freedom and autonomy, and sufficient beliefs in tolerance, trust and reciprocity, and enough individuals to share these norms to argue that these beliefs and values have become the standard behavior for the society, namely liberal norms.

4.3 Operationalization of liberal norms

A social norm is supposed to reflect, when socialized by individuals involved over time, particular beliefs and values of the liberal society. Consequently, the presence of norms within a society must be observable in the attitudes of individuals (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 8). The expectation that within liberal democracies most, if not all, members of the liberal democratic society are behaving according to liberal norms underlies democratic peace theory, including the expectation the subsequent expected effect of peacefulness between liberal democracies. This study measures the level of liberal norms of individuals of different political systems and uses the above-developed concept to formulate indicators. It thereby relies on empirical insights that

internalized social norms can be observed through the behavior of individuals (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991, p. 226).

Within the social sciences, it is common to measure attitudes through the use of a questionnaire with either questions or statements (Finkel, Sigelman, & Humphries, 1999). These statements measure on a rating scale how strong an individual agrees or disagrees with such a statement. Also in this research, survey data is used to measure the liberal norms according to the indicators as formulated in table 4.1, except the dimension of reciprocity (which will be explained below).

Table 4.1 Indicators of liberal norms

Aspect	Indicator
Freedom	Perceived freedom by institutional arrangement
Autonomy	Perceived control over life, finances & freedom of choice
Tolerance	Willingness to accept (also objectionable) behavior or views of others
Trust	Believe that others will not harm you and will look out for your interests
Reciprocity	Belief that taking responsibility for wellbeing of others will repay

This study does not measure the dimension of *Rationality*. It, instead, assumes that individuals are bounded rational actors. Bounded rational individuals aim to maximize, based on a cost-benefit calculation, their interests, however, this calculation is based on incomplete information. The instrumental use of this assumption is backed by sufficient empirical evidence that shows individuals to be bounded rational actors (see for an overview of the existing literature: Conlisk, 1996).

The operationalization of the five remaining dimensions reflects the indicators in table 4.1 but also relies on already existing measures of these dimensions as used in other studies (*Measures of Political Attitudes*, 1999; *World Value Survey 2010-2014*). The aim is to develop a measure of liberal norms to use on existing data of representative samples (of the US, Russia, and China), but also to use on the student samples of the experiments. The comparison of the results between the representative samples and the student samples will be informative to understand how the student samples can be compared to representative samples of their respective countries. The measurement, therefore, rests on existing items within the World Values Survey, to make this comparison possible.

Ideally, a construct including several items should be used to measure each dimension. However, the World Values Survey does not include sufficient items for every dimension to create meaningful scales. Therefore, a single item is used to measure each dimension. These items together, each representing one dimension of liberal norms, are then used as a scale to indicate the measured level of liberal norms for every participant. The choice for a scale based on single items per dimension is

sufficient; a separate analysis shows that the use of multiple items does not necessarily lead to more reliable dimensions.

Data: World Values Survey 2010-2014

The 6th wave (2010-2014) of the World Values Survey is used to operationalize the dimensions freedom, autonomy, tolerance, and trust for representative samples of the US (N = 2232), Russia (N = 2500), and China (N = 2300). Each dimension is operationalized through an item that is most representative for that dimension. The five items together, each representing a dimension of liberal norms, are combined in one construct to measure the level of liberal norms among individuals within the three countries. All items are, if applicable, reversed in the same direction (having the highest score for feeling free, autonomous, trusting and tolerant in the same direction, and vice versa). Most of the items are measured on a 10-point rating scale (ranging from 0-9). Some items are measured on a different scale; these are recalculated to a similar 10-point scale. The choice for the use of single items is based on the availability of items to create scales, as discussed above.

Freedom, for this study, is the feeling of freedom of the state that individuals have. In democratic regimes, individuals can be active members of the political system, which makes them feel empowered and free. In other words, individuals feel that they can influence their political system. This dimension is operationalized by responses to the statement: *"People choose their leaders in free elections"*. Autonomy is understood as the feeling of control over the personal life and finances, which is operationalized by responses to the question *"How much freedom and control you have over your life"*.

Tolerance can be operationalized through statements that probe the willingness to put up with different views and behavior. These differences can be reflected in several aspects of life, such as different lifestyle, religion, ethnic background. Moreover, it is also possible to measure tolerance by probing the willingness to teach children to be tolerant. However, the way most questions within the World Values Survey measure tolerance makes it harder to use these items for this study. For instance, there is a question about what qualities respondents would like to teach their children, with tolerance and respect for others being one of the options. However, this option is not mentioned by the interviewer, but only noted as a binary measure: did respondent mention this quality or not. This item, however informative in different research settings, cannot be used in this research setting. The most straightforward question about tolerance is: *"Do you feel that homosexuality is justifiable?"*. The respondents can answer on a 10-point rating scale to what degree they agree with this statement. However, homosexuality measures only one specific notion of tolerance. To use such an item might bias the measurement more towards progressiveness than that it measures tolerance, while the aim is to measure tolerance as a more broadly conceived concept.

To create such a measure, a new variable is constructed based on an existing question. There is a question whether or not the respondents are willing to live next door to people of other race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and lifestyle. The

interviewer suggests nine different groups, and notes binary if the respondents agree or not. The new variable is calculated based on the number of groups respondents exclude, with nine being the most intolerant and zero the most tolerant. After reversing the direction of the scale, the new variable tolerance indicates the level of tolerance with zero being least tolerant and nine being most tolerant. A correlation check shows that the new variable is significantly correlated ($r = .33, p \leq .000$) with the question about homosexuality, which shows that the new measure for tolerance is usable.

Trust can be operationalized through statements that probe the feeling of trust of people within a neighborhood. There are several questions in the World Values Survey that probe this attitude, however, these question measure different aspects of trust. The concept of trust as laid out above is best reflected by the idea of interpersonal trust, sometimes also called moralistic trust. This conceptualization of trust reflects the attitude to trust strangers that come into personal life even though they might not have shown any reason to trust or distrust them (Uslaner, 2002, pp. 4, 17-19). The question *“How much do you trust people you meet for the first time?”* reflects that concept well.

Reciprocity can be operationalized through statements that probe the willingness to be part of a society in the broadest sense. For instance could be measured whether someone is willing to help others, or willing to contribute to the community and to comply with the norms of the society. However, the World Values Survey does not include any question that can even approximate this attitude. Therefore the dimension of reciprocity is, unfortunately, left out of the analysis of representative samples of the US, Russia, and China.

The measure for liberal norms is created by taking the average of the scores of all four dimensions so that for every participant a new variable of liberal norms indicates their level of liberal norms on a rating scale of 0 (lowest level) to 9 (highest level).

Data: Student Populations in China, Russia, and the US

During the years 2014 and 2015, student samples in the US, Russia, and China were used to measure the level of liberal norms through the utilization of a questionnaire, attached to the survey experiment that was conducted on these populations (see chapter 5: Experiments in the US, Russia, and China). The participants were 251 undergraduate students from Binghamton University, Binghamton (NY) in the US, 250 undergraduate students from the Higher School of Economics in St Petersburg, Russia, and 280 undergraduate students of the Chinese University for Political Science and Law in Beijing, China. The questionnaire contained several questions related to the experiment, questions to measure control factors, and furthermore questions to measure the positions on the five dimensions of liberal norms, and the positions on the hawk-dove dimension. The items were distributed in a mixed order so that participants would not see a clear or immediate relation between questions. Some items were asked in a different direction than other questions to avoid acquiescence (Krosnick, 1999, pp. 38-39).

All questions are measured on a 7-point rating scale. Also for this data, single¹⁵ items are used to build a construct of liberal norms. This way the results of the student samples can be more easily be compared with the results of the World Values Survey data. The measures for the dimensions freedom, autonomy, and interpersonal trust are similar to the measure in the World Value Survey, but tolerance and reciprocity differ slightly. First of all, reciprocity could not be measured with the World Values Survey data. This dimension is, however, measured among the student samples. As explained above, an indication of reciprocity is the willingness to be part of a society in the broadest sense. That could be operationalized by probing the willingness to help others, the willingness to contribute to the community, and the willingness to comply with the norms of the society based on an imbued consciousness about how one should behave towards others. To measure reciprocity the statement: *“My consciousness guides my decisions about how to behave towards others”* is used.

Secondly, tolerance is measured differently in the student samples. The measure used in the World Values Survey is created out of different answers to one question. To measure tolerance in the student samples, a statement about tolerance is used: *“It is necessary that everyone, regardless of whether I like their views or not, can express themselves freely.”*. This item captures a similarly broad sense of tolerance, just like the measure for the representative samples does. Moreover, when tested whether this item correlates with a tolerance question about homosexuality (like tested in the World Values Survey data) the analysis shows a significant correlation ($r=.18$, $p<.001$).

The other dimensions are measured with items similar to the World Values Survey data. Freedom is operationalized by the responses to the statement: *“People choose their leaders in free elections.* Autonomy is operationalized by the responses to the statement: *“I feel that I have completely free choice and control over my life”*. The dimension of trust is operationalized by the statement: *“In general, I trust other people when I first meet them.”*.

For every participant, the average score of all five items constitutes the measure for the level of liberal norms; every participant scores for the level of liberal norms on a scale of 1 (lowest level) to 7 (highest level).

4.4 Results

The aim of this chapter is to test hypothesis 4: *Decision-makers, born and raised in a consolidated liberal democracy, have internalized liberal norms in contrast to decision-makers who are not born and raised in a liberal democracy.* Table 4.2 shows an overview per dataset of the means of all five dimensions and the resulting level of liberal norms for each country. The range for the levels of liberal norms of the

¹⁵ Also here shows that although all measured items per dimension correlate significantly, they do not necessarily form scales with a high reliability. Therefore is chosen to opt for the single item approach, whereas it does enhance comparative purposes with the World Values Survey data.

World Values Survey data is 0 to 9, the range for the data of the student samples is 1 to 7. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Below the means are discussed.

Table 4.2 Overview means liberal norms*

	WVS (SD)			Students (SD)		
	<i>China</i>	<i>Russia</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>Russia</i>	<i>US</i>
Freedom	6.52 (2.42)	7.28 (2.31)	7.31 (2.38)	4.87 (1.71)	4.22 (1.61)	4.87 (1.43)
Autonomy	6.13 (2.00)	4.95 (2.25)	6.73 (1.81)	4.48 (1.69)	4.41 (1.62)	4.82 (1.52)
Tolerance**	5.51 (1.60)	5.11 (1.78)	6.67 (1.42)	6.26 (.96)	6.14 (1.12)	6.30 (.89)
Trust	2.75 (1.83)	2.68 (2.31)	3.60 (2.13)	3.62 (1.63)	3.17 (1.61)	3.81 (1.62)
Reciprocity	-	-	-	5.79 (1.12)	5.92 (1.37)	5.91 (1.18)
Liberal Norms	5.27 (1.01)	5.00 (1.13)	6.16 (1.10)	5.00 (.83)	4.78 (.73)	5.14 (.71)
N (range)	1725-2300	2166-2479	2143-2232	276-277	235-242	224-226

*Please note that the WVS data is measured on a 10-point scale, the student sample data is measured on a 7-point scale.

**Please note different items are used to measure tolerance in the respective datasets

The midpoint of the scale (in the case of the World Values Survey data: 4.5, in case of the data of the student samples: 4) is used to distinguish between those who endorse liberal norms and those that don't. Although the midpoint is an arbitrary point, since it divides the dimension of liberal norms in two equal halves it seems therefore the most appropriate indication to distinguish between positive and negative liberal norms. Thus: if participants score above the midpoint, they are considered to have a positive level of liberal norms. Subsequently, if they score below the midpoint, they are regarded as having a negative level of liberal norms, meaning: not endorsing liberal norms.


Liberal norms in the World Values Survey study

Based on representative samples of China, Russia, and the US respectively, table 4.2 shows the means of the dimensions freedom, autonomy, tolerance, and trust, followed by the mean level of liberal norms.

The first noticeable result is that the US sample scores with 6.16 on average positive on liberal norms. Moreover, the US sample scores on average the highest on liberal norms in general, and on every separate dimension as well. With the midpoint of 4.5 in mind, however, the average levels of China (M = 5.27, SD = 1.01) and Russia (M = 5.00, SD = 1.13) do not differ that much from the US (M = 6.16, SD = 1.10) score. The differences in the means are significant, though, and that effect is rather large (F(2, 6006.15) = 676.55, p < .001, r = .43), as also visible in figure 4.2. Thus,

there is a significant and substantive difference between the means of each country. The question is, does hypothesis 4, generated by the expectations of democratic peace theory regarding the presence of liberal norms, find support?

Figure 4.2 WVS: Liberal norms (mean) by country



Error bars indicate 95% confidence interval

At first sight, the results indicate that the by democratic peace posited assumption that liberal democracy US would imbue liberal norms among its citizens finds support. The assumption that individuals within other regime-types do not have liberal norms imbued, however, is not. The US representative sample indeed scores higher than the representative samples of Russia and China, and it scores above the midpoint on the level of liberal norms. Although a mean of 6.16 is not the highest score as might be expected when 9 is the highest level, the score is positive and thus can be regarded as anticipated by theory.

However, the second part of the hypothesis posits that decision-makers who are not born and raised within liberal democracies are lacking these liberal norms does not find support. Although there is a significant and substantive difference on average between the three representative samples, the level of liberal norms in China and Russia is not much lower than the level in the US. More importantly, the levels of Russia and China are not that low to conclude that liberal norms are absent within

these countries. Both samples of individuals born and raised within non-liberal democratic regimes show to score on average well above the midpoint of 4.5, the point that distinguishes between liberal and illiberal norms. Thus, liberal norms are present in all three representative samples, and all on a level that indicates that liberal norms cannot be an outcome of a socialization process that exists only in liberal democracies.

Furthermore, the US, Russia, and China alike, the levels of liberal norms show to be varying strongly amongst individuals in a similar fashion. All three representative samples show to approximate a normally distributed variation (see figure 4.4), which indicates that levels of liberal norms are individually based and differing amongst individuals rather than indicating a homogenous effect of exposure to liberal norms within a specific regime-type. Moreover, the standard deviations are quite similar. Resulting from these findings among representative samples of the US, Russia, and China, liberal norms do exist within liberal democracies, but also within regime-types different from liberal democracy.

The average level of liberal norms shows to be the lowest in the Russia sample. Based on the theoretical expectations of democratic peace theory, liberal norms are socialized within liberal democracies over time, and therefore could be expected that within the mixed nature of a hybrid regime a particular level of liberal norms could have been imbued already that should show significantly higher than individuals from an autocratic regime. The Russian sample scores significantly lower than the Chinese sample ($F(2, 6006.15) = 676.55, p < .001, r = .43$) who supposedly have never been exposed to these liberal norms, and thereby these results support the finding above that the level of liberal norms is not related to regime-type.


In other words, liberal norms exist indeed, but not as a result of a socialization process by a political regime and neither only in liberal democracies. Liberal norms seem to be more individually based and individually varying, separate from any super-structure such as a political regime.

Liberal norms in the student populations

Based on student samples of China, Russia and the US respectively, table 4.2 shows the means of the dimensions freedom, autonomy, tolerance, trust, and reciprocity, followed by the mean of the level of liberal norms. Also here the US sample scores with 5.14 on average the highest in liberal norms and above the midpoint between liberal and illiberal norms of 4. Moreover, the US sample scores on average the highest on liberal norms in general, and on every separate dimension as well (except reciprocity on which the Russian student sample scores the same as the US student sample).

The average levels of China ($M=5.00, SD=.83$) and Russia ($M = 4.78, SD=.73$) differ slightly (but significantly) from the US ($M= 5.14, SD=.71$) score when we consider the midpoint of 4. There is a significant difference between the average scores, but only between the US sample and China sample on the one hand and Russian sample on the other hand ($F(2, 734) = 13.2, p \leq .001, r = .18$). The effect size is small.


Figure 4.3 Students: Liberal norms (mean) by country



Error bars indicate 95% confidence interval

The findings of the student samples show us the same results as the representative samples: liberal norms are present in all three samples, and all samples score on average on a level well above the midpoint. Furthermore, the levels of liberal norms are varying strongly within each sample; in every sample, participants range between both poles of the scales. Moreover, all samples show to approximate a normally distributed variation and an average that lies above the midpoint. Also here, the standard deviations are fairly similar. This pattern of variation is moreover similar to the patterns of the representative samples in all three countries. Thus, also the student samples of the US, Russia, and China show variation of liberal norms instead of the expected homogeneous effect of exposure to liberal norms by a specific regime-type. That variation shows to be similar to the representative samples. This finding indicates that the level of liberal norms cannot be a result of a socialization process by liberal democracy.

Figure 4.4 Levels of liberal norms in the US, Russia, and China



When we look at the patterns between the representative samples and the student samples of the three countries, as shown in figure 4.4, we can see the similarity in patterns between samples within the countries. Indeed, the US student sample scores a bit lower on liberal norms than the representative sample, and the Chinese student sample scores a bit higher than the representative sample, which seems to be due to a difference in the scores on tolerance between the representative samples and the student samples. The US student sample shows on average to be less tolerant than the representative sample, and the Russian and Chinese students show to be more tolerant than their representative samples. Moreover, the dimension of reciprocity could only be measured among the students. Having that said, a similar pattern is detectable. A pattern that shows that liberal norms are present in all samples, and varying in a similar vein over the populations, student sample and representative samples alike. Although it would lead too far to extrapolate the finding of similar patterns of liberal norms among representative and student samples to indicate that the students might be similar in all aspects of this study, these patterns do give some indication that the results of these student samples have explanatory power that might stretch beyond their own samples.

4.5 Conclusion

Democratic peace theory roots in the assumption that liberal democracy imbues liberal norms among its members by a socialization process that is lacking within other regimes. These theories thereby posit that liberal norms are only prevalent in liberal democracies and are absent within other regime-types. The hypothesis derived from these theoretical expectations is hypothesis 4, *Decision-makers, born and raised in a consolidated liberal democracy, have internalized liberal norms in contrast to decision-makers who are not born and raised in a liberal democracy*. In this chapter, liberal norms are measured among representative samples of the US, Russia, and China to test hypothesis 4. The results show that this hypothesis finds only limited support.

Democratic peace theory is partly right. Liberal norms indeed exist within a liberal democracy, such as the US. Also, the level of liberal norms in the US is, on average, significantly higher than in other regime-types. These findings thus support hypothesis 4. However, the results show that also within other non-democratic regime-types, such as the hybrid regime in Russia and the autocratic regime in China, liberal norms exist. There are differences, on average, but the averages of all three samples show to have positive scores on liberal norms. Thus, it can be concluded that liberal norms also prevail within non-democratic regimes. Moreover, the representative samples of all three countries, the US included, show similar patterns of more or less normally distributed varying levels of liberal norms within all three regime-types. Also the standard deviations, respectively, show to be fairly similar. The general conclusion is thus that whether or not individuals adhere to liberal norms is individually based rather than imposed and socialized by a super-structure

of a political regime. The results show that the assumption of democratic peace theory that liberal norms only exist within liberal democracies cannot be used as such.

This insight is important for democratic peace theory, which are built on the assumption that liberal norms are a direct outcome of being born and raised within liberal democracies. As argued above, this assumption is founded in normative expectations about the role liberal democracy plays in the process of moral learning: over time individuals living in liberal democracies will increasingly adhere to liberal norms. Liberal scholars take that socialization process for a fact rather than an empirical question, and therefore they do not measure but assume the actual presence and absence of liberal norms among democratic and autocratic populations.

The results of this chapter show that liberal norms are present to a similarly varying degree within different kinds of regime-type. Moreover, the results show that there is no empirical ground to argue that there must be a socialization process of moral learning within liberal democracies. Firstly, the US is one of the oldest and most consistently bottom-up built liberal democracies of the world, and although the representative sample of the US scored on average higher than the comparable samples in Russia and China, the average score of the US was not in the higher part of the measurement scale. Secondly, the Russian sample, whose hybrid regime might expect to generate a higher level of liberal norms than any autocratic regime (see e.g. Braumoeller, 1997) because the members of the political system in Russia would have been exposed to a limited extent to some liberal norms, does not score higher but scores lower than the individuals in the Chinese sample who are expected not to have been socialized with liberal norms. The fact that liberal norms are present in general, even when liberal democratic institutions are absent, and supposedly a liberal political culture as well, might indicate that these values are not per se connected to a particular regime-type that imbues these norms, but that these norms exist among human beings, with different levels even. The most important indication in that respect is that democratic peace theorists might be putting too much emphasis on the philosophical idea that liberal democracy raises people to be morally better people, and thereby ignore the strengths that might be present among individuals on their own to be 'morally better'. The results indicate that it might be simply human to feel free, autonomous, tolerant, trusting and reciprocal by, from and towards others, and in varying degrees, without needing a liberal democracy to create those norms.

Whatever that may be, the next step in this research is to study in what way the level of liberal norms, among other theoretically important factors, are of influence on decision-makers in the willingness to go to war. If these norms indeed seem to have an influence, also within Russia and China, it might be that indeed the institutions of democracy have a function in translating preferences forthcoming of these liberal norms towards the decision to go to war or not. However, to get more insight into that mechanism, more data needs to be considered.

In the next chapter, the same student samples are used to study what factors influence decision-makers to decide to go to war with another state. As mentioned in chapter 3, for several theoretical and practical reasons students are used here as

proxies for decision-makers. The results of the current chapter show that there is another legitimate reason for the use of student samples: similar patterns of variation are visible between the representative samples and the student samples of each country. It would lead too far to extrapolate the finding of similar patterns of liberal norms among representative and student samples to indicate that the students might be similar in all aspects of this study. However, these patterns do give some indication that the results of these student samples might have explanatory power that might stretch beyond their own samples. The next chapter will study the influence of several factors on the willingness of decision-makers to go to war.