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## **Lobbying in Company: Mechanisms of political decision-making and economic interests in the history of Dutch Brazil, 1621-1656**

Tol, J.J.S. van den

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# Lobbying in Company

Mechanisms of political decision-making and economic interests in the  
history of Dutch Brazil, 1621-1656

PROEFSCHRIFT

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Joris Job Sebastiaan van den Tol  
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Promotores:                    prof. dr. C.A.P. Antunes  
                                      prof. dr. W. Klooster (Clark University)

Promotiecommissie:        prof. dr. E. Amann  
                                      dr. M. De Campos Françaço  
                                      prof. dr. M. van Groesen  
                                      prof. dr. G.H. Janssen (Universiteit van Amsterdam)  
                                      dr. A.J.A.M. Schuurman (Wageningen Universiteit)  
                                      dr. G. Vermeesch (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)

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*To my mother*



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## Abbreviations

BMGN	Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden
EIC	English East India Company
NL-HaNA	Nationaal Archief, The Hague, The Netherlands
NL-UtHUA	Het Utrechts Archief, Utrecht, The Netherlands
NL-AsdSAA	Stadsarchief, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
NL-04-0041-000	Tresoar, Leeuwarden, The Netherlands
NNBW	Nieuw Nederlands Biografisch Woordenboek
TSEG	Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis
US-nar	New York State Archives, Albany, NY, United States
VOC	Dutch East India Company
VRBM	Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscript
WIC	Dutch West India Company



## 0. INTRODUCTION

Dark clouds and an extraordinarily thick mist packed over the Scheldt on 5 November 1647 as a small fleet five ships from Brazil entered the river mouth. As a result of the difficult weather conditions, the ships accidentally got stuck in a shallow part of the Wielingen and had to cast anchor while awaiting higher tide. One of the many small ships from the nearby city of Flushing that visited the fleet was asked to deliver a letter with the news of the imminent arrival to the local directors of the West India Company (WIC). Aboard the Brazilian ships were 1,200 chests of prized Portuguese sugar, a near-mutinous crew, and a member of the High Government in Brazil by the name of Hendrick Haecxs. When Haecxs arrived in Flushing the next day around three in the afternoon, he learned that the directors had chartered a yacht to pick him up, but both parties had been unaware that their paths had crossed due to the dark weather, thick mist, and heavy rain.<sup>1</sup>

This brief moment on 5 and 6 November 1647 is illustrative for the history of the WIC-colony in Brazil. The dark clouds foreshadowed the eventual loss of the colony in 1654 following a revolt that started in 1645 and the thick mist symbolizes the limited view the directors in the Republic had of the situation in Brazil. The weather conditions that forced the ships to anchor an extra night just outside the harbor perfectly demonstrate the sometimes limited bandwidth of maneuverability for Haecxs who had crossed the Atlantic to lobby for the relieve of Brazil.<sup>2</sup> Finally, the directors' idea to send a yacht to pick up Haecxs is evidence that good intentions do not necessarily lead to the desired outcome.

This thesis focuses on the history of the WIC in Brazil to study the role of lobbying for political decision-making in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic and argues that lobbying was the primary tool for people to implement, shape, and maintain institutions. Considering this impact, it is astonishing that lobbying has been underappreciated and regularly neglected by historians of all sub-disciplines.<sup>3</sup> It is important to study lobbying in an Atlantic context to highlight the influence of people for institutional development. There

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<sup>1</sup> S.P. l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, lid van den hoogen raad van Brazilië (1645-1654)," *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap Utrecht* 46, no. 1 (1925): 211-212.

<sup>2</sup> For more details on Haecxs' lobby campaign, see Chapter 5.

<sup>3</sup> L.H. Roper, *Advancing Empire: English Interests and Overseas Expansion, 1613-1688* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

certainly has been historiographical attention to popular participation in politics, but most studies have focused on formal-legalistic aspects or on confrontational manifestations rather than cooperative elements.<sup>4</sup>

Since the focus of this thesis is the period of the WIC in Brazil (1630-1654), both Atlantic history and social and economic history are relevant. Lobbying could (and should!) be studied in relation to any topic in history and it is by no means unique to the Dutch colonial experience, but the period in which the WIC ruled Brazil offers a unique insight of a society inside a pressure cooker. In the twenty-four years that the WIC colony existed, it was subject to several major changes that occurred within and around the colony, the Company, and even the highest political levels such as the States General or the Stadtholder. It is a story of enemies becoming friends, and friends becoming enemies, and of protagonists overcoming obstacles and therefore maybe being richer from the experience, but losing everything in the process. The rapid changes in Dutch Brazil lay bare the mechanisms of lobbying as a primary tool for people to structure institutions.

This introduction is divided in four sections. The first section defines lobbying; the second section introduces the conceptual foundation on which this thesis is built and the value of lobbying for historical analysis; the third deals with the historiographical debates that form the backdrop for this thesis; and the fourth and final section brings to the fore the different sources and methodology. The main objective of this thesis is to answer the question: how did individuals structure institutions through lobbying, and why did they choose to lobby instead of other options?

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<sup>4</sup> H.F.K. van Nierop, "Popular Participation in Politics in the Dutch Republic," in *Resistance, Representation and Community*, ed. P. Blicke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); H.F.K. van Nierop, "Private Interests, Public Policies: Petitions in the Dutch Republic," in *The Public and Private in Dutch Culture of the Golden Age*, ed. A.K. Wheelock and A. Seeff (London/Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2000); M. Boone and M.R. Prak, "Rulers, patricians and burghers: The great and the little traditions of urban revolt in the Low Counties," in *A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in European Perspective*, ed. K. Davids and J. Lucassen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); M.R. Prak, "Popular politics before the advent of liberal democracy," *Journal of Early Modern History* 2, no. 3 (1998).

## 0.1. LOBBYING

What is lobbying? Lobbying is defined as the activity by which individuals or organized interests seek contact with political mandataries in an attempt to influence decision-making.<sup>5</sup> I would like to dissociate between *political lobbying* and *soft lobbying*. The difference lies in the relation between the suppliant and the addressee. In the case of soft lobbying, the suppliant requests something that is givable by the addressee; for instance a charter, a patent, money, or a job.<sup>6</sup> Successful soft lobbying always involves a transfer; for example of rights, property, or authority. Political lobbying, on the other hand, does not necessarily require a transfer from one party to the other as it is also possible to lobby for maintaining the status quo or for a regulation. Typically, but not necessarily, there are two conflicting interests when it comes to political lobbying.

Theories of lobbying further make a distinction between direct lobbying and outside lobbying. Direct lobbying has the aim of convincing a majority of decision-makers, whereas outside lobbying has the aim of pressuring a majority of decision-makers through the use of public opinion and to increase popular support for a particular cause. These processes can occur simultaneously, but they are different means and processes to achieve the same goal. There were several ways to direct lobby. Petitioning was an obvious option, but direct lobbying also included employing patronage networks and giving oral presentations to political mandataries. Outside lobbying could take the form of a demonstration, that increased and showed popular support. It 'socialize[d] the conflict'.<sup>7</sup> Mobilizing popular support was an important quality for both powerful and weak lobbyists.

An excellent way of studying outside lobbying in the early modern Dutch Republic is by analyzing pamphlets. In the case of Brazil, for example, there was a heated debate on free

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<sup>5</sup> G. Vermeesch and L. Geervers, "Inleiding," in *Politieke belangenbehartiging in de vroegmoderne Nederlanden: de rol van lobby, petitie, en officiële delegaties in de politieke besluitvorming*, ed. G. Vermeesch and L. Geervers (Maastricht: Shaker Publishing, 2014), 3.

<sup>6</sup> Examples of soft lobbying in Dutch history are quite abundant even though they are not always described as lobbying, see for example P. Knevel, *Het Haagse bureau: Zeventiende-eeuwse ambtenaren tussen staatsbelang en eigenbelang* (Amsterdam: Prometheus/Bert Bakker, 2001); A. Nobel, "'Elc liep met de zijnen inden Hagh': Hollandse dorpbestuurders en hun belangenbehartiging bij de gewestelijke staten, 1568-1700," in *Politieke belangenbehartiging in de vroegmoderne Nederlanden: de rol van lobby, petitie, en officiële delegaties in de politieke besluitvorming*, ed. G. Vermeesch and L. Geervers (Maastricht: Shaker Publishing, 2014).

<sup>7</sup> K. Kollman, *Outside Lobbying: Public opinion and interest group strategies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3-12.

trade versus monopoly in the pamphlets.<sup>8</sup> Pamphlets were a prime vehicle for individuals outside lobbying for their own interests. As various monographs have made clear in recent years, contributing to the public debate in pamphlets was an essential part of politics in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic.<sup>9</sup> Due to a wave of recent publications on pamphlets in the Dutch Republic, and even specifically in relation to Dutch Brazil, pamphlets receive relatively little attention in this thesis. The focus is instead, as can be seen in more detail in chapter 4, the emerging practice of organizing petition drives, by which petitions were signed by an increasing number of individuals. They did, however, not reach the tens of thousands of signatories as in England during the civil war.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, the changing practice of [1] putting one's own signature, and [2] collecting signatures, or canvassing, to show and increase support fundamentally altered the mechanisms of outside lobbying in the first half of the seventeenth century. This shows how petitioning was not only a way of *convincing* the political mandataries, but also a way of *pressuring* political mandataries through public opinion and public discourse, thus making petitioning an essential tool for outside lobbying.

Lobbying is a way of highlighting the influence of people in history. That includes, but is not limited to, 'ordinary' people. Ordinary people are defined by Wayne te Brake as 'those that are excluded from the realm of officialdom; subjects as opposed to rulers'.<sup>11</sup> What makes people 'ordinary', according to te Brake, is their status as political subjects, which may be at odds with their economic, social or cultural position in society. However, the term ordinary might be too restrictive to describe all the actors in this thesis. In particular since the term is associated with other descriptions such as 'commoners', 'folk', 'the vulgar', 'the unlearned'

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<sup>8</sup> J.J.S. van den Tol, "Monopolizing arguments: outside lobbying in the Dutch Republic for free trade to Brazil, 1630-1638," in *Mechanisms of global empire building* ed. A. Polonia and C.A.P. Antunes (Porto: CITCEM/Afrontamento, 2017).

<sup>9</sup> F. Deen, D. Onnekink, and M.H.P. Reinders, eds., *Pamphlets and Politics in the Dutch Republic* (Leiden: Brill, 2011); H.J. Helmers, "The Royalist Republic: literature, politics and religion in the Anglo-Dutch public sphere, 1639-1660" (Unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden University, 2011); J. Pollmann and A. Spicer, eds., *Public Opinion and Changing Identities in the Early Modern Netherlands: Essays in Honour of Alastair Duke* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

<sup>10</sup> For information on English petition drives, see for example: A. Fletcher, *The outbreak of the English civil war* (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), 191-227; W.A. Pettigrew, "Free to Enslave: politics and the escalation of Britain's Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1688-1714," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 64, no. 1 (2007): 11-13.

<sup>11</sup> W. te Brake, *Shaping history: ordinary people in European politics, 1500-1700* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 2.



or 'the lower sort'.<sup>12</sup> In this thesis, these people are the non-mandataries who, like moths gravitating towards a light, seek contact with the political center of decision-makers. The influence of people nuances the importance of for instance the Company or the State.

It should be remembered that lobbying was by no means the only way to demand favorable resolutions; popular collective action would be another notable example. However, typical examples of popular collective action, such as protests, riots, or strikes, are much more discordant than lobbying. In studies of the relationship between subjects and political authority, cooperation has been greatly overlooked.<sup>13</sup> Lobbying, thus, includes the reciprocal, cooperative, and social elements of patronage and clientelism for politics.

Seventeenth-century examples of the mechanisms of patronage and clientelism are reasonably well-known in the literature.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, as discussed above, there is a vast body of literature on pamphlets and the relation with the public sphere.<sup>15</sup> Thirdly, from a formal-legalistic point of view it is established that there was a foundation for the use of petitions, and petitions have been used to describe the position of different social groups – particularly within cities.<sup>16</sup> Even the political success rate of petitions in for instance the city of

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<sup>12</sup> M.C. Jacob and C. Secretan, "Introduction," in *In Praise of Ordinary People: Early Modern Britain and the Dutch Republic*, ed. M.C. Jacob and C. Secretan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 2-3.

<sup>13</sup> A possible explanation might be the relatively high number of Marxist (leaning) scholars in this particular field, see for example: C. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978); R. Dekkers, "Labour conflicts and working-class culture in Early Modern Holland," *International Review of Social History* 35, no. 3 (1990); K. Davids, "Seamen's Organizations and Social Protest in Europe, c. 1300-1825," *International Review of Social History* 39, no. S2 (1994).

<sup>14</sup> G.H. Janssen, *Creaturen van de Macht: Patronage bij Willem Frederik van Nassau (1613-1664)* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005); G.H. Janssen, "Patronage en corruptie: publieke en private rollen van een stadhouder in de Republiek," *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 2, no. 4 (2005); H.F.K. van Nierop, "Willem van Oranje als hoog edelman: patronage in de Habsburgse Nederlanden," *BMGN* 99, no. 4 (1984); L. Kooijmans, *Vriendschap en de kunst van het overleven in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2016).

<sup>15</sup> C.E. Harline, *Pamphlets, printing and political culture in the Early Modern Dutch Republic* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987); G. de Bruin, "Political Pamphleteering and Public Opinion on the Age of De Witt (1653-1672)," in *Pamphlets and Politics in the Dutch Republic*, ed. F. Deen, D. Onnekink, and M.H.P. Reinders (Leiden: Brill, 2011); M.H.P. Reinders, *Gedrukte Chaos: Populisme en moord in het Rampjaar 1672* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2010); M. Stensland, "Peace or no peace? The role of pamphleteering in Public Debate in the run-up to the twelve-year truce," in *Pamphlets and politics in the Dutch Republic*, ed. F. Deen, D. Onnekink, and M.H.P. Reinders (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

<sup>16</sup> Nierop, "Petitions in the Dutch Republic."; G. Vermeesch, "Professional Lobbying in Eighteenth-century Brussels: The Role of Agents in Petitioning the Central Government Institutions in the Habsburg Netherlands," *Journal of Early Modern History* 16, no. 2 (2012); G. Vermeesch, "'Miserabele personen' en hun toegang tot het stadsbestuur. Pro deo petities in achttiende-eeuws Antwerpen," *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 12, no. 4 (2015); G. Vermeesch and L. Geever, eds., *Politieke belangenbehartiging in de vroegmoderne Nederlanden: de rol van lobby, petities, en officiële delegaties*

Amsterdam has been calculated; 40 percent of the petitions resulted in a bylaw, many copying a petition verbatim.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, I am not the first to argue that ‘petitions were a preferred and acceptable vehicle to communicate [political] claims to the authorities’.<sup>18</sup> However, what lobbying adds to the understanding of early-modern political interaction is that it unites these different elements.

That means that it adds the cooperative element to other forms of collective popular participation in politics, it adds the political impact of the discussions in the public sphere, and it adds an important political context to the act of petitioning. In other words, it offers an analysis that goes further than the explanations of personal relations, pamphlets, and petitions which individually cannot fully explain the importance of (ordinary) people for the creation, shaping, and maintenance of institutions. Moreover, the study of lobbying (groups) helps to identify differentiating group interests; a corporation does not have a singular interest, neither do merchants, and neither do colonists for instance.<sup>19</sup> Lobbying alliances demonstrate the transcendental nature of shared interests. Lastly, it is important to provide a definition of lobbying for early-modern historical analysis as the word is typically used as a catch-all term to describe a process in which a historian is unsure how or why something happened exactly.<sup>20</sup>

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*in de politieke besluitvorming*, vol. 13 (Maastricht: Shaker Publishing, 2014); Nobel, "Elc liep met de zijnen."; J. Roelevink, "'t Welck doende etcetera', Lobby bij de Staten-Generaal in de vroege zeventiende eeuw," *Jaarboek Geschiedkundige Vereniging 'Die Haghe'* (1990).

<sup>17</sup> Nierop, "Popular Participation," 285-288.

<sup>18</sup> M.R. Prak, "The people in politics: early modern England and the Dutch Republic compared," in *In Praise of Ordinary People: Early Modern Britain and the Dutch Republic*, ed. M.C. Jacob and C. Secretan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 150.

<sup>19</sup> This differentiates from how for instance Jan Glete described the Republic as ‘a consciously created constitutional framework for the articulation of interest and decision-making, where the socio-economic elite groups had a voice and the elite ran the administration’, see: J. Glete, *War and the state in early modern Europe. Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as fiscal-military states, 1500-1660* (New York/London: Routledge, 2002), 147-148. Glete assumes the local elites and their aggregate interests as too monolithic.

<sup>20</sup> A query on JSTOR for lobbied AND “early modern” resulted in 394 hits, and lobbying AND “early modern” even provided 828 results. Examples of undefined descriptions of lobbying activities include: “In Quebec, Loyalists lobbied the metropolitan government to establish an assembly,” in E. Mancke, “Early Modern Imperial Governance and the Origins of Canadian Political Culture,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique* 32, no. 1 (1999): 17. “More important still, the two founders lobbied for and secured the financial and political support of the French Court of Louis XIII,” in U. Strasser, “Early Modern Nuns and the Feminist Politics of Religion,” *The Journal of Religion* 84, no. 4 (2004): 544. “Londoners were active in support of their beliefs, petitioning, lobbying,

## 0.2. CONCEPTS

Studying lobbying assigns a considerable amount of agency to people. This thesis is primarily concerned with the agency of people for the creation, shaping, implementation and maintenance of institutions. Following the definition of Douglass North, institutions are ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)’.<sup>21</sup> They are ‘the rules of the game’. Institutions are typically used by economists or economic historians to explain the relative economic prosperity between two or more units of analysis; some areas are economically more prosperous than others because they have institutions that are more conducive to economic growth.<sup>22</sup> Although one could make all kinds of arguments against this notion, that is not the point of this thesis. Rather, this thesis is concerned with how institutions change; why do certain institutions exist?

Broadly speaking, there are four explanations for why certain institutions exist: [1] they are the most efficient solution to a problem; [2] they are the result of path-dependent historical trajectories; [3] they are the result of continuous marginal adjustments; or [4] they are the result of revolutions and war. By efficient, economists mean those institutions that require the lowest transaction costs. Transaction costs are ‘costs necessary to establish and maintain any system of rules and rights’.<sup>23</sup> In an example of long-distance-trade, transaction costs are thus not only the cost of a ship or a crew, but also the costs to prevent the crew or sellers from cheating behavior. If institutions are the rules, transaction costs are the costs necessary to maintain the rules. The second explanation is partly a contradiction of the first explanation. It proposes that some institutions exist because they have historically grown or evolved this way. The most well-known example is probably the QWERTY keyboard which initially followed the first theory as it was efficient in ensuring that typewriters would not

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placarding, demonstrating”, V. Harding, "Recent Perspectives on Early Modern London," *The Historical Journal* 47, no. 2 (2004).

<sup>21</sup> D.C. North, "Institutions," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 1 (1991): 97.

<sup>22</sup> Among others, this argument is made by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, *Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty* (London: Profile Books, 2012).

<sup>23</sup> D.W. Allen, "What are transaction costs?," *Research in Law and Economics* 14 (1991); R.H. Coase, "The problem of social cost," *The Journal of Law & Economics* 3 (1960).

get jammed. Despite the technological advances of the computer, the opportunity costs of learning to type on a new keyboard are simply too high to warrant a new keyboard style – despite the 20-40% increased efficiency of those new keyboards.<sup>24</sup> In other words, the typewriter created a path-dependent trajectory for the present-day keyboard. The third explanation is somewhat related to the second. It is a way of explaining incremental change to path-dependent trajectories that builds on existing patterns. Douglass North points specifically to the developmental trajectory of common law, and calls continuous marginal adjustments ‘the dominant way by which societies and economies have evolved’.<sup>25</sup> The fourth example is in a way also related to path dependency, but focuses on drastic changes in the path as the result of war or revolution; these are critical junctures.<sup>26</sup> The Glorious Revolution would be a case in point.<sup>27</sup>

Economic theory ignores the element of power. Political scientist, in attempt to include power in their explanation for institutions, argue that institutions serve the interest of the most powerful group.<sup>28</sup> The economic historian Sheilagh Ogilvie followed a similar logic when she convincingly argued that guilds and its institutions cannot explain the economic growth of certain cities because they do not affect *efficiency* – the size of the economic pie – but *distribution* – the way the pie is divided.<sup>29</sup> However, there are several examples that illustrate that institutions do not necessarily reflect the interest of the most powerful group. Multiple chapters in this thesis showcase how ideology, pragmatism, or the art of the compromise can influence decision-making and as such the institutions they produce.

In order to include lobbying to explain why institutions exist – particularly formal regulations and bylaws as these are the clearest outcome of a decision-making process – this

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<sup>24</sup> P.A. David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," *The American Economic Review* 75, no. 2 (1985).

<sup>25</sup> D.C. North, *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 96-101.

<sup>26</sup> G. Capocchia, "Critical junctures and institutional change," in *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*, ed. J. Mahoney and K. Thelen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 147.

<sup>27</sup> D.C. North and B.R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *The Journal of Economic History* 49, no. 4 (1989). Note that recently this was disputed through an emphasis on the practice of lobbying (without calling it so), see: A.L. Murphy, "Demanding 'credible commitment': public reactions to the failures of the early financial revolution," *The Economic History Review* 66, no. 1 (2012).

<sup>28</sup> F.R. Baumgartner et al., *Lobbying and Policy Change: who wins, who loses, and why* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 20.

<sup>29</sup> S. Ogilvie, *Institutions and European Trade: Merchant guilds, 1000-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3-4.

thesis borrows from Anthony Giddens' structuration theory. Giddens' structuration theory was developed as a 'third way' between studies emphasizing the importance of the structure for the outcome of events, and studies emphasizing the importance of agents for the outcome of events. The theory attempts to integrate human agency in structuralist theories within the social sciences.<sup>30</sup> Structures are the recursive complex set of rules that enable, guide, and limit interaction between actors. Agents, or human actors, are both enabled and limited by structures, while simultaneously shaping that very structure with their actions and the structure being a sum of all their previous actions.<sup>31</sup> This is what Giddens calls the duality of structure; the structure both constitutes and depends on the agent.<sup>32</sup>

Giddens illustrates this abstract concept with the following example. When a man speaks a sentence, he draws upon a complex set of rules that allow him to be understood. The structure of a language creates the (implicit) rules that form the basis for understanding, while the act of speaking refers to the continuous existence of the structure.<sup>33</sup> When a correct sentence is being spoken it is a reproduction of the rules for creating a sentence.<sup>34</sup> This means that when a researcher observes the sentences being spoken he simultaneously observes the structure. The two cannot be seen separately. Structuration is a condition for the reproduction of a system. A system is the reproduced relations between individuals and/or collectivities.<sup>35</sup>

His duality of structure does not deny the influence of structure on the outcome of events, but implies the unalienable relation with human actors. Moreover, it highlights the possibility for agents to change the structure; even the most disruptive changes involve structuration.<sup>36</sup> Giddens dissociates four different types of structural change. [1] Step-by-step change that is inherent to the duality of structure; [2] changes as a result of conflicting social

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<sup>30</sup> Without going into too much detail about the structuralist approach, it can be summarized as emphasizing the structure as determining factor for sociological or historical interactions. Other concepts with a similar meaning are objectivism and determinism.

<sup>31</sup> A. Giddens, *Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 204.

<sup>32</sup> A. Giddens, *The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 19, 25-28.

<sup>33</sup> Q.J. Munters, *Anthony Giddens: een kennismaking met de structuratietheorie* (Wageningen: Landbouwwuniversiteit, 1991), 22.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>36</sup> A. Giddens, *Central problems in social theory: Action, structure and contradiction in social analysis* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1979), 70.

systems; [3] change as a consequence of a change in material resources; and [4] intentional attempts for change by groups or social movements that are aware of the possibilities of structuration.<sup>37</sup> In particular the fourth type of structural change seems relevant to describe how lobbying changes institutions. This obviously does not exclude the other options of happening at the same time.

In order to use Giddens' structuration theory to argue that lobbying is a means of changing institutions, it is important to consider to what extent it is possible to equate North's definition of institutions ('the humanly devised constraints that structure (...) interactions') to Giddens' definition of structure ('rules and resources, organized as properties of social systems'). He defines a (social) system as 'the reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, organized as regular social practices'.<sup>38</sup> It seems that North's informal institutions (e.g. taboos, customs, traditions) are quite similar to what Giddens describes as systems; in particular because of its emphasis on the reproduction of recurring social practices. Moreover, through North's definition of institutions as *humanly devised* constraints there is the implicit acknowledgement that these are the product of social practices. This leaves open the discussion of how similar institutions are to structures?

The primary issue is that Giddens is wary of using 'rules of the game (...) as illustrative of characteristics of social rules'.<sup>39</sup> It is more important to know how to adhere to the rule, he argues, and he adds that 'rules generate (...) practices'. In other words, rules cannot be interpreted as generalizations of what people do. Secondly, Giddens vehemently disagrees that structures are merely constraints as this would imply a binary distinction between freedom and structures, which contradicts his definition of the duality of structure.<sup>40</sup> That being said, North would probably disagree with an interpretation of institutions that overemphasizes the element of constraint, since his institutions also facilitate interactions. The third issue is that Giddens has his own definition of institutions. He describes these as 'the most deeply-layered practices constitutive of social systems'.<sup>41</sup> By deeply-layered, he

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<sup>37</sup> A. Schuurman, "Mensen maken verschil: sociale theorie, historische sociologie en geschiedenis," *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* 22, no. 1 (1996): 176. (Giddens does not summarize these four typologies himself as far as I am aware.)

<sup>38</sup> Giddens, *Central problems*, 66.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 65-66.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 64-65.

refers to the spatial breadth and the temporal duration. In other words, the most deeply-layered practices are those that have the greatest reach in time and space, which should be seen in contrast to the 'timeless snapshots' of structures.<sup>42</sup> This might be the root of the difference between Giddens and North. For North an institution is what structure is for Giddens. As a result, North is of the opinion that institutional change 'typically consists of marginal adjustments'; he sees institutions as sequences of timeless snapshots.<sup>43</sup>

This thesis builds on North's definition of institutions, but aims to integrate human agency, or people, in the explanation of institutional change. Institutions are 'rules and resources' because they simultaneously limit and facilitate human interactions. In North's definition, institutions are the structure. There is some overlap between Giddens' explanation of structural change and North's explanation for institutional change. What Giddens' structuration theory offers to the study of institutional change are the intentional attempts for change by groups or social movements that are aware of the possibilities of structuration. Lobbying in this sense is a case in point of 'intentional attempts for change'. As such, lobbying is a process of structuration and adds people to institutional analysis. Lobbyists are the knowledgeable actors aware of the possibilities of structuration. Lobbying is a social undertaking; it must be carried out and therefore understood within the context of social systems. Lobbying is a way to study the permeability of institutions and is defined as the activity by which individuals or organized interests seek contact with political mandarines in an attempt to influence decision-making.<sup>44</sup>

### 0.3. DEBATES

#### 0.3.1. Interest groups

Influencing decision-making within the British Atlantic is perhaps the best studied field of historical lobbying. As early as 1921 Lilian Penson wrote an article on role of a 'West Indian Interest' in eighteenth-century England and other publications have appeared roughly once

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 198.

<sup>43</sup> North, *Institutions, institutional change*, 83.

<sup>44</sup> Vermeesch and Geevers, "Inleiding," 3.

every decade since the Second World War.<sup>45</sup> Planters and merchants with a financial interest in the Caribbean tried to influence trade policy that involved them through the British Society of West India Merchants. This Caribbean rooted Society became a more formal entity at the end of the eighteenth century when it turned into the West India Committee. Virginia tobacco merchants started lobbying somewhere between 1624 and 1673 and held formal meetings in the 'Virginia Walk' on the London Exchange or in Virginia Coffeehouses once or twice a month until at least 1711.<sup>46</sup> In her study of these Virginia merchant groups, Olson further argues that at least some merchants came to these locations for business such as purchasing insurance or exchanging market information, and not for political purposes. But once inside it was possible for them to be politicized. The leading merchants meanwhile drafted petitions and arranged appearances before the Board of Trade which directed policy regarding British colonies. Because of the opposition by 'a great muster of the tradesmen' that 'talked one after another' in Parliament, raising tobacco duties would successfully be averted more than half of the times it was debated.<sup>47</sup> Both planters in Virginia and the Caribbean and merchants in Britain seem to have been organized rather loosely and with a varying level of formality.<sup>48</sup>

Reflecting the debates among English historians, Dutch historiography has wondered whether the Dutch Atlantic witnessed a similar concentration of lobby groups with different backgrounds but united in a joint interest during the eighteenth century. Piet Emmer was the most prominent to argue that this was not the case.<sup>49</sup> Emmer does not further elaborate on this statement in great detail, but other scholars agree with him and find explanations in either the deeply rooted provincialism with its conflicting interests of different provinces or

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<sup>45</sup> L.M. Penson, "The London West India Interest in the Eighteenth Century," *English Historical Review* 36, no. 1 (1921); D. Hall, *A Brief History of the West India Committee* (Barbados: Caribbean Universities Press, 1971); G. Meroney, "The London Entrepôt Merchants and the Georgia Colony," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (1968).

<sup>46</sup> A. Gilbert Olson, "The Virginia Merchants of London: A Study in eighteenth-century Interest-Group Politics," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (1983): 367.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 369.

<sup>48</sup> A.J. O'Shaughnessy, "The formation of a commercial lobby: The West India interest, British colonial policy and the American Revolution," *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 1 (1997).

<sup>49</sup> P.C. Emmer, *The Dutch in the Atlantic economy, 1580-1880: trade, slavery, and emancipation* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 9.



in the close personal ties between the colonial merchant elite and the political mandataries.<sup>50</sup> The latter is the more questionable of these two explanations. In the first place because this ignores the very large number of petitions sent across the Atlantic and from within the Republic advocating on a wide range of issues. After all, who would waste money, time, and energy in drafting a petition or publishing a pamphlet if close personal ties could result in the same effect? Or who would, even more costly, traverse the Atlantic to present a case in front of the political mandataries? Both of these examples come together in Adriaen van der Donck who travelled from New Netherland to the Republic in 1649.<sup>51</sup> The second reason it is questionable is that the personal ties were not that strong between merchants (or planters) with a West Indian interest and the political elite. This became abundantly clear in the issue of free trade, as discussed in chapter 3. The large foreign population in the colonies, as well as the religious differences between merchants and urban political elite can further serve as a confirmation of weak ties between merchants and the political elite. Moreover, even if there was great overlap between prominent merchants and the political elite, this does not mean that all these merchants shared the same interest.

In the most recent contribution to lobbying interest groups in the Dutch Atlantic, Jessica Roitman and Han Jordaan criticize the Dutch historiography for being too much focused on whether or not there was a West Indian interest similar to the British, and for being too Euro-centric. By Euro-centric they seem to mean that explanations are sought too easily in Europe instead of the colonies. Therefore, they studied a group of merchants based on the island of St. Eustatius in the eighteenth century.<sup>52</sup> Roitman and Jordaan base their choice of this group of merchants on the theoretical foundations of political scientist Gabriel Almond. He distinguishes between institutional interest groups and non-associational interest groups among others. They argue that the WIC is a prime example of an institutionalized interest group, while the Statian merchants belong to the category of non-associational interest

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<sup>50</sup> H. den Heijer, "A public and private Dutch West India interest," in *Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680-1800*, ed. G.J. Oostindie and J.V. Roitman (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014); A. van Stipriaan, *Surinaams contrast: rooibouw en overleven in een Caraïbische plantagekolonie 1750-1863* (Leiden: KITLV uitgeverij, 1993), 31.

<sup>51</sup> R. Shorto, *The island at the center of the world: the epic story of Dutch Manhattan and the forgotten colony that shaped America* (New York: Doubleday, 2004).

<sup>52</sup> J.V. Roitman and H. Jordaan, "Fighting a foregone conclusion: Local interest groups, West Indian merchants, and St. Eustatius, 1780-1810," *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 12, no. 1 (2015): 80-84.

groups because they were neither permanently organized nor was there continuity in their internal structure. Furthermore, the group was linked by their shared geographical location, one of the links (along with kinship, religion, ethnicity, status, or class) articulated by Almond for non-associational interest groups.<sup>53</sup> The lack of formal organization did not make them less successful, though, as they succeeded in preventing a proposed increase in tax tariffs. Contrary to the British, the Dutch colonial interest groups were organized far more diffusely and less formally. This becomes most clear when the Dutch, white creole, and non-Dutch interest groups each petitioned separately, formulated independent proposals for similar new policy, and mobilized their corresponding merchants in the metropole.<sup>54</sup>

Contrary to the case of eighteenth-century St. Eustatius, the seventeenth century witnessed a more mixed background of lobbyists. Therefore, Alison Gilbert Olson's definition of an interest group as a 'group of individuals, conscious of sharing a common concern, cooperating on the borders of power, and seeking to increase their own benefits through bargaining with a political system they accept and influence, but do not attempt to control', seems more useful.<sup>55</sup> In her monograph on the long-eighteenth-century American interests in London, Olson argues for lobbying mechanisms like petitions, printing (public opinion lobbying), personal connections, and control of information. It is, however, not possible to simply apply her approach to the Dutch case. In the first place, because in Britain the Anglican Church had a larger role in advancing particular interests than any religious organization in the Republic, and secondly because the 'management' of Britain's colonial affairs was left largely in the hands of the monarchy between 1660 and 1760.<sup>56</sup> It is, however, noteworthy to emphasize the trans-Atlantic ties that formed a shared interest between merchants and planters, while maintaining a rather loose organizational shape. Especially in the earlier period, at the end of the seventeenth century, the lobbying groups did form a singular social entity, but constituted a spectrum, lumping together 'divers Merchants, Masters of Ships, and others' or 'divers of the Gentry, Merchants and others'.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> G.A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), 75. Cited by Roitman and Jordaan, "Fighting a foregone conclusion," 86-87.

<sup>54</sup> Roitman and Jordaan, "Fighting a foregone conclusion," 90-94.

<sup>55</sup> A. Gilbert Olson, *Making the empire work: London and American interest groups 1690-1790* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 2.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-12.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 42-44.

### 0.3.2. Organization

Historians have long viewed the WIC, like its East Indian counterpart the VOC, as an economic innovation. Its joint-stock system, limited liability, transferability of shares, and contractual agreements allowed these enterprises to economically outcompete other types of merchant organizations. Their success was not based on their monopoly or use of violence, the argument goes, but on their ability to compete on the market.<sup>58</sup> This idea is corroborated by economists studying the twentieth century who argue that data show that societies with open access order outcompete societies with limited access order. The limited access order has a predominance of social relationships organized along personal lines, whereas open access order has widespread impersonal social relationships.<sup>59</sup> The first is an example of adherent organization, the latter an example of contractual organization. This argument by modern economists is thus similar to the argument that impersonal corporations such as the WIC or the English East India Company (EIC) outcompeted personal trading networks that were based on familial, religious, or national connections that limited or overcame traditional problems such as issues of trust or reliable information.<sup>60</sup>

However, historical evidence shows that this transition is neither self-evident nor unambiguous. For example, family networks (adherent organization) remained of great importance for the success of the English Levant Company (contractual organization).<sup>61</sup> Similarly, the Scots formed their own organization within the EIC. After one got in, he included the rest of this personal (patronage) network, which was based on his 'nation',

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<sup>58</sup> N. Steensgaard, *Carracks, caravans and companies. The structural crisis in the European-Asian trade in the early 17th century* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1973); O. Gelderblom, A. de Jong, and J. Jonker, "The Formative Years of the Modern Corporation: The Dutch East India Company VOC, 1602-1623" (paper presented at the ACSGA Seminar, Amsterdam, 06/12/2012 2012). That is not to say that this is uncontested however, see: M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, "The structures of trade in Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Niels Steensgaard's 'Carracks, Caravans, and Companies', the Asian trade revolutions, a critical appraisal," *Mare Luso-Indicum* 4 (1980); M.P.M. Vink, "Between profit and power: The Dutch East India Company and Institutional Early Modernities in the Age of Mercantilism," in *Between the Middle Ages and Modernity*, ed. C.H. Parker and J.H. Bentley (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

<sup>59</sup> D.C. North, J. Wallis, and B.R. Weingast, *Violence and social orders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2-8.

<sup>60</sup> N. Steensgaard, "The Dutch East India Company as an institutional innovation," in *Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism*, ed. Maurice Aymard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

<sup>61</sup> M. Fusaro, "Cooperating mercantile networks in the early modern Mediterranean," *The Economic History Review* 65, no. 2 (2012).

within this contractual organization.<sup>62</sup> Or, as Boyajian has argued, that the Portuguese in Asia largely relied on a network of (predominantly new Christian) private traders who had better information about market demands.<sup>63</sup> Yet, these types of adherent organizations are predominantly organized along the lines of “nations”, religion, ethnicity, empire, or culture, which are all forms that are not inclusive. A remarkable exception to this is the cross-cultural networks of the eighteenth-century Sephardic traders in Livorno described by Francesca Trivellato.<sup>64</sup> She shows how these Jewish merchants cooperated with Christian agents in Lisbon, Hindu merchant-brokers in Goa, and competent individuals rather than kin for the Amsterdam market. While the examples of the English East Indian and Levant Companies raises the question to what extent ‘modern’ contractual organizations are a dramatic shift from traditional forms of organization, the example of Trivellato challenges the notion that extent blood ties or shared identity created bonds that gave traditional forms of organizations a competitive edge. What Trivellato describes as a familiarity of coreligionists, is a form of ‘free agent organization’ by ‘intersectional networks’. These were networks that were self-organized, often pluri-religious, multi-ethnic, and cross-cultural, but more importantly had intersecting interests that they lobbied for together and that operated parallel to tradition adherent networks based on religion or kin. It was exactly this intersecting interest that united them in their undertaking.

These networks were similar to adherent organization because they were not third-party enforced, but free because they were not limited by traditional organizational bounds such as family, religion or ethnicity. Lastly, I would like to emphasize that it remains to be seen whether competition and rivalry created these forms of self-organization, as North, Wallis, and Weingast posit, or rather that it was cooperation and reciprocity that sparked and forged these bonds.

The divide between contractual and adherent organization can be illustrated through an example of contract enforcement. How do parties prevent being cheated by each other when

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<sup>62</sup> G.K. MacGilvary, *East India patronage and the British state: the Scottish elite and politics in the eighteenth century* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008).

<sup>63</sup> J.C. Boyajian, *Portuguese trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008). Though his book and his conclusions received mixed reviews with criticism focusing particularly on his assessment of inter-Asian trade.

<sup>64</sup> F. Trivellato, *The familiarity of strangers: the Sephardic diaspora, Livorno, and crosscultural trade in the early modern period* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009). See also her discussion of the works of Avner Greif in the introduction for a deeper understanding of cross-cultural relations.

doing business? Theory dictates that an adherent organization is made up of a homogenous group, united by kin or religion for example, and that fraudulent behavior would be punished by defamation or exclusion from the rest of the group. In other words, the 'sunk costs' of social capital make faulty behavior very costly and acts as an informal mechanism to keep the partners in check.<sup>65</sup> If the group is heterogeneous trust would be assured through third-party enforcement, though homogenous groups can make use of formal enforcement.<sup>66</sup> Cheating behavior would be punished by fines or imprisonment. As formal enforcement raises the transaction costs (drafting a contract is not free, and neither is suing someone over it) and relies on reliable (efficient) measurement, informal enforcement remained competitive until at least the industrial revolution, argues Douglas Allen.<sup>67</sup> Along a similar line, Avner Greif argued that public-order formal enforcement is implemented (pending availability) when economic agents find these institutions profitable.<sup>68</sup>

The dichotomy in scholarship between adherent (e.g. family) and contractual (e.g. WIC) organization can easily be explained through the availability of sources and data. As the history of European expansion traditionally paralleled the history of the companies and highlighted success stories, the companies became synonymous with (economic) success. It was further beneficial that these large corporations left behind collections of often indexed source material, ready to be used by historians or economists. A similar argument can be made for the contribution attributed to guilds earlier in history. Scholars of alternative narratives relied on archival collections from for example religious orders, family archives, or otherwise homogenous groups. As a consequence, the alternative that historians presented to contractual organizations was adherent organizations, which were based on some sort of common denominator.

To challenge the dichotomy, one can study adherent organizations such as freemasons or Scotts within contractual organizations in order to demonstrate that the divide is not always as straightforward as presumed. Another way is to study other organizational forms,

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<sup>65</sup> D.W. Allen, *The institutional revolution: measurement and the economic emergence of the modern world* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 45-79.

<sup>66</sup> A. Greif, "The Maghribi traders: a reappraisal?," *The Economic History Review* 65.2 (2012).

<sup>67</sup> Allen, *The institutional revolution*.

<sup>68</sup> A. Greif, "Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange," in *Handbook of New Institutional Economics*, ed. C. Ménard and M.M. Shirley (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 776-778.

in particular the free agent organization. However, as the full extent of free agent organization typically leaves limited traces because it did not exclusively rely on contracts, how can one prove its existence? Is it not merely a theoretical possibility unable to be proven? I argue that it is possible that lobbying highlights the existence of these intersectional networks, as it studies an interaction with other organizations that did leave archival traces. Lobbying is just one aspect of such interaction. Court cases would be a notable other example – albeit less cooperative.

### 0.3.3. The Atlantic

Recent scholarship indicates that the Atlantic was an ideal playing ground for free agent organization and intersectional networks. Traditionally the Dutch Atlantic was characterized by quotes such as “the Dutch were not very important in that part of the world”, talking about a Dutch Atlantic “makes as much sense as ‘Dutch Asia’ or the ‘Dutch Mediterranean’”, “the Dutch . . . were not until the nineteenth century an imperial power in any meaningful sense of the word”, or “there was no such thing as the Dutch Atlantic”.<sup>69</sup> However, at least since 2003 this position is no longer widely accepted. Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven edited a volume arguing that despite the failed company there was an abundance of profitable Dutch economic activity in the Atlantic. Simplified, the argument was that the Dutch did in the Atlantic what they did so well in Europe: transporting goods.<sup>70</sup> Dutch merchants did so long before the WIC, and they did so to and from colonies that were not Dutch. The year 2014 witnessed two edited volumes that brought the ‘Dutch’ Atlantic up to par with the historiography of the other Atlantics, in particular the British.<sup>71</sup> The books did not maintain that the Atlantic should be studied outside the company’s spheres, but stressed that the national paradigm was not particularly useful for the Atlantic, and that there was a sort of informal parallel Atlantic that transcended national boundaries. Especially after an

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<sup>69</sup> Emmer, *The Dutch in the Atlantic economy*; P.C. Emmer and W. Klooster, “The Dutch Atlantic, 1600-1800: Expansion without empire,” *Itinerario* 23, no. 2 (1999); A. Pagden, *Lords of all the world: ideologies of empire in Spain, Britain and France, c.1500-c.1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); B. Schmidt, “The Dutch Atlantic: From Provincialism to Globalism,” in *Atlantic History, a Critical Appraisal*, ed. J.P. Greene and P.D. Morgan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>70</sup> J. Postma and V. Enthoven, eds., *Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585-1817* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003); V. Enthoven and M.J. van Ittersum, “The mouse that roars: Dutch Atlantic History,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 10, no. 3 (2006).

<sup>71</sup> M. van Groesen, ed. *The legacy of Dutch Brazil* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); G.J. Oostindie and J.V. Roitman, eds., *Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680-1800* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014).

edited volume on *The British Atlantic World* published in 2002, the general consensus was that – in the words of Bernard Bailyn in the preface – the ‘economic involvement in the Atlantic world far transcended the constraints of its nationalist, mercantilist regulations; it radiated through the entire inter-hemispheric system’.<sup>72</sup> In other words, the various colonies, conquests and captaincies in the territorial Atlantic were not much more than national façades that masked an international, pluri-religious, multi-ethnic, and borderless cooperative reality.<sup>73</sup>

Thus, the historical imagination of the Atlantic changed from a (nationalist) hub-and-spoke-model, where the European hub (center/metropolis) had bilateral connections with its different colonies (periphery), to a spider-web-model where the different peripheries were also connected with each other.<sup>74</sup> This is in the Dutch case illustrated through economic histories, but studies of the Iberian empires showcase a similar poly-centric formation on a political level.<sup>75</sup>

The economic approach fitted very well with the image that was created of the Dutch as carriers of goods to, from, and between colonies. One of the two edited volumes, fittingly called *Dutch Atlantic Connections*, highlighted the interimperial contacts that formed the lines between the various other peripheries in the spider web. The interactions between Dutch and non-Dutch in the Atlantic were, according to different chapters in this book, far-reaching. Silvia Marzagalli went as far as to state that ‘French colonial trade originated, flourished and persisted only through the collaboration of non-French merchants and non-French markets’.<sup>76</sup> The Dutch featured prominently here. Karwan Fatah-Black reiterated Marzagalli’s point in his dissertation where he argued that non-Dutch trade, especially that

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<sup>72</sup> B. Bailyn, "Preface," in *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (2nd edition)*, ed. D. Armitage and M.J. Braddick (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), xv.

<sup>73</sup> W. Klooster, "Inter-Imperial smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800," in *Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1825*, ed. B. Bailyn and P.L. Denault (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); R. Drayton, "Masked Condominia: Pan-European collaboration in the History of Imperialism, c. 1500 to the present" (paper presented at the Workshop Transitions to Modernity, New Haven, 24/09/2012 2012).

<sup>74</sup> D. Hancock, "Self-organized complexity and the emergence of an Atlantic market economy," in *The Atlantic economy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*, ed. P.A. Coclanis (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), 31.

<sup>75</sup> P. Cardim et al., eds., *Polycentric Monarchies: How did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?* (Sussex: Sussex Academic, 2014).

<sup>76</sup> S. Marzagalli, "The French Atlantic and the Dutch, late seventeenth-late eighteenth century," in *The Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680-1800*, ed. J.V. Roitman and G.J. Oostindie (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014), 117.

coming from northern America, was of paramount importance for the colonization of Suriname.<sup>77</sup> For New Netherland, Susanah Romney described these networks that she centered around women as 'intimate', and argued that the 'intimate networks people constructed, rather than actions taken by formal structures or metropolitan authorities, constituted empire'.<sup>78</sup>

And that of course makes sense. Working from the premise that indeed these intersectional networks were of paramount importance to make the Atlantic 'work', it seems at least odd that historians have only considered these as responsive to metropolitan decisions in relation to the making of the Atlantic. At the same time, Oostindie and Roitman wrote in the introduction of *Dutch Atlantic Connections* that 'as much as we may acknowledge that there was room for self-organisation and cross- and interimperial connections, we cannot dismiss the centrality of the metropolitan state and its institutions'.<sup>79</sup> Similarly, Hancock, in his book on the Madeira wine complex, writes that 'producers and distributors responded to mercantilist master plans by taking advantage of the opportunities the plans created, if they created opportunities, and by tolerating, ignoring, or evading them if they did otherwise'.<sup>80</sup> Oostindie, Roitman, and Hancock portray the intersectional networks in the periphery as bystanders primarily reacting to a constantly changing reality imposed on them by a state or other authority operating from the metropolitan center. This presupposes a 'state' or Company that was much stronger and well-defined than it actually was.<sup>81</sup>

This thesis posits that the intersectional networks did not stand by idly as the world changed around them, but instead actively lobbied for their own interests. Important decisions were of course made in the European center, and these decisions were partially

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<sup>77</sup> K. Fatah-Black, *White Lies and Black Markets: Evading metropolitan authority in colonial Suriname, 1650-1800* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2015).

<sup>78</sup> S. Shaw Romney, *New Netherland connections: intimate networks and Atlantic ties in seventeenth-century America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 18.

<sup>79</sup> G.J. Oostindie and J.V. Roitman, "Introduction," in *Dutch Atlantic connections, 1680-1800: linking empires, bridging borders*, ed. G.J. Oostindie and J.V. Roitman (2014), 2.

<sup>80</sup> D. Hancock, *Oceans of wine: Madeira and the emergence of American trade and taste* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), xvii.

<sup>81</sup> Cardim et al., *Polycentric Monarchies*; F. Bethencourt, "Political configurations and local powers," in *Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800*, ed. F. Bethencourt and D.R. Curto, *Political configurations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).



negotiated around geopolitical, military, and economic circumstances.<sup>82</sup> But these decisions were also based on the information that was supplied by the individuals from the periphery. In addition, the individuals actively engaged in the political decision-making process by personally crossing the Atlantic from Brazil to the Dutch Republic to deliver their opinion. Or they submitted petitions to either colonial or metropolitan governments, or even both, thus steering the decision-making. Moreover, they wrote and/or printed pamphlets defending their interests, thus contributing to a public debate that was transatlantic. It needs to be acknowledged, however, that lobbying was not the only form of structuration. Moreover, the lobbying bandwidth, as becomes apparent in chapter 1 for instance, could limit the maneuverability of individuals. Similarly, as Nicholas Cunigan has argued for the WIC colony Brazil, uncontrollable circumstances such as weather conditions could further drastically limit the agency of (particularly colonizing) people on cultural, social, economic, agro-ecological, and geopolitical forces.<sup>83</sup>

In other words, this thesis argues that the (Dutch) Atlantic was the outcome of a permanent process of structuration by lobby groups formed through free agent organization based in cooperative practice and intersecting interests. This means that (aggregates of) people made a difference.

#### 0.4. SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

The largest body of systematically studied primary sources of this thesis is comprised of petitions (*requesten*). Petitions to the States General regarding the possessions of the WIC in the Atlantic can be found in the Liassen WIC in the National Archive in The Hague. It is uncertain what percentage of petitions have survived, but the Liassen are organized per year usually and comprise about fifteen centimeters of loose, sometimes unsorted, folio so what has survived is at least substantial. A petitioner would supplicate his request, and would receive an apostille as answer on the margin of the document as proof of the decision. At

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<sup>82</sup> E. Mancke, "Negotiating an empire: Britain and its overseas peripheries, c. 1550-1780," in *Negotiated empires: centers and peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820*, ed. C. Daniels and M.V. Kennedy (New York/London: Routledge, 2002).

<sup>83</sup> N.J. Cunigan, "Weathering extremes: climate, colonialism, and indigenous resistance in the Dutch Atlantic" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Kansas, 2017).

least, for simple *soft lobbying* this would typically be the case. For *political lobbying*, however, the decision would typically be to 'place the petition in the hands of the commission on West Indian affairs'. As such, the petitions requesting political action have typically survived in the archives and provide a rather complete image of the lobbying through petitions. The effect of petitions can be studied through a consultation of the resolutions of the States General. Initially the resolutions had been part of the general resolutions of the States General, but on 16 April 1638 the High-Mightiness decided to put all resolutions regarding the WIC in a separate book of West Indian resolutions. Separate copies of resolutions on a variety of specific topic related to the WIC can be found throughout the different archives in the Republic, or otherwise as evidence attached to petitions.

Are petitions a trustworthy source? Yes, they were official documents with a limited legal basis and therefore there is less incentive to lie. Moreover, I have not encountered any complaints about individuals lying in petitions. There might have been the occasional exaggeration as part of the rhetorical armor of the petitioner, after all having 'no friends' sounds worse than 'one friend who refused to help me', but on whole petitions are quite trustworthy. Petitions had been largely standardized. A book by Willem van Alphen for standard petitions for the Court of Holland had been printed as early as 1642 and was called *Parrot, or formulary book* and contained a blueprint for petitions on a variety of topics. The title describes the book as 'very useful for those frequenting the courts'. The first example is to receive payment on an obligation, but another example would be a petition for guardianship over minors. A 'new and improved' version came out in 1649 and again in 1658. By 1682, a fifth print was circulating in the Republic and throughout the eighteenth century several updated or reprinted editions would come out.<sup>84</sup> Even though these petitions were supposed to be used for the Court of Holland, the form and style are very similar to the petitions found in the archives of the States General, and demonstrate the standardized form petitions were presented in. Books such as the *Parrot* helped professionals, as well as others, to draft petitions.

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<sup>84</sup> W. van Alphen, *Papegay, ofte Formulier-boeck van alderhande requeste mandamenten, conclusien etc. ghelijck die ghebruyckt ende gepractiseert werden voor de respectieve hoven van iustitie in Hollandt. : Seer nut ende dienstigh alle practisyngs den voorsz hove, ofte andere recht-bancke, frequenterende* ('s-Gravenhage: Johannes Verhoeve, 1642).

Petitions to provincial assemblies and cities showcase a similar uniformity. Even though they are fewer in numbers, they cannot be neglected in the study of political lobbying. In the colonies petitions are typically absent. The colony in North America had a 'book of petitions' which has not survived. Both the colony in North America and Brazil kept their petitions as part of their minutes. However, in contrast to New Netherland, the government in Brazil did not keep originals and only copies. The petitions that were used in the colony for *soft lobbying* have not survived, but remarks in passing about 'receiving several petitions' on a topic without further traces of those petitions indicate that they were used.

Since not much is known about seventeenth-century political petitioning to the States General it was necessary to look at a variety of petitions to the States General and the provincial assemblies beyond the topic of the WIC to understand the role and function of petitions.<sup>85</sup> This suggests that petitions on behalf of multiple people, as well as petitions resulting in a printed document have survived in larger numbers compared to individuals petitioning for a *passport* for example. Both the States General and the provincial States kept requests in separate folders that at this point are at best chronologically organized. Petitions to the States of Holland between 1583 and 1747 for example are seemingly without order stored in four boxes. This suggests that submitted petitions were kept for record keeping, but not regularly consulted.

For this research, the petitions to the States General have been used as a starting point to identify moments of lobbying that were of interest. The resolutions of the States General, in combination with correspondence between the WIC and the States General, correspondence between the States General and the provincial States, cities, or Admiralties, and correspondence between the colony in Brazil and the States General or the WIC have been used to reconstruct lobbying. This of course misses the important element of the informal, and the dimension of the personal contact. As this typically leaves no paper trace it can be hard to identify, but fortunately some personal documents and correspondence have survived to complete this part of the lobbying process. The diary of the Frisian Stadtholder

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<sup>85</sup> Notwithstanding the publications of in particular Van Nierop, Fockema-Andreae and Vermeesch this step was necessary to get a proper understanding of petitioning practice at the States General, see: S.J. Fockema Andreae, *De Nederlandse Staat onder de Republiek* (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1975); Nierop, "Popular Participation."; Nierop, "Petitions in the Dutch Republic."; Vermeesch, "Professional Lobbying."; Vermeesch, "Miserabele personen."; Roelevink, "'t Welck doende etcetera'."

Willem Frederik, for example, helps to understand the power a Stadtholder could wield informally on issues of the WIC. The diary of one of the members of the High Government in Brazil, Hendrick Haecxs, has further been a source of paramount importance to understand the informal control of information and the function of committees around the States General. Other reflections on political tensions could be found in private correspondences that have been made digitally available in recent years. The economic interests of some individuals could be reconstructed through Cátia Antunes' database of seventeenth-century Amsterdam notary deeds.

# 1. LOBBYING FOR THE CREATION OF THE WIC

The Dutch Republic originated from a civil war, masked as a war for independence from the King of Spain, between 1568 and 1648. This Eighty Years' War united the seven provinces in the northern Low Countries, but the young republic was divided on several issues: Was war better than peace for the Republic? Was a republic the best form of government, or should a prince be the head of state? And, what should be the true Protestant form of religion? All these issues came together in struggles for power. Who held power in the Republic, and who had the power to force which decisions? In order to answer these questions, this chapter investigates the governance structure of the Dutch Republic and answers the question what the circumstances were in which the WIC came into being. This is important to understand the rest of this dissertation as it showcases the political context where lobbying occurred. The chapter is complemented by an introduction of the governance structure of the West India Company (WIC) and a brief introduction to the Dutch presence in Brazil.

## 1.1. THE DUTCH REPUBLIC

### 1.1.1. The cities

Cities were historically important in the Low Countries. Most had acquired city rights as the result of a bargaining process with an overlord. As bellicose rulers had required funds for the ever-expanding scale of warfare, local authorities had demanded rights and privileges in exchange for their financial support generated by city taxes.<sup>86</sup> These rights and privileges that generally originated in the Middle Ages were inherited and cherished by future generations and (mostly) respected by subsequent rulers. As the cities in the Low Countries over time became part of Burgundian and subsequently the Habsburg empires, every city had a unique charter.<sup>87</sup> The alleged violation of privileges by the Habsburg King Philip II

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<sup>86</sup> C. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992); C. Tilly and W. Blockmans, eds., *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

<sup>87</sup> W. Blockmans and W. Prevenier, *In de ban van Bourgondië* (Houten: Fibula, 1988), 10-12, 118-124.

(1527-1598) was one of the causes of the Dutch Revolt, as this infringement was deemed tyrannical.

Most inhabitants primarily identified as inhabitants of a city, as they hardly came outside the city walls.<sup>88</sup> Therefore, the city government had an important role in the lives of most inhabitants and were relatively approachable for city burghers. The tasks of the city government, which was a collegiate board, included appointing individuals for an array of jobs such as the administrators of the city's orphanage.<sup>89</sup> From a central council (*raad*, *vroedschap* or *gezworen gemeente*), two to four Burgomasters (*burgemeesters*) were selected who were in charge of the day-to-day administration. The magistracy was comprised of lay judges (*schepenen*) forming a court of justice and a sheriff (*schout*) in charge of criminal prosecution and the execution of sentences.<sup>90</sup> In contemporary texts, the government as well as the judicial bodies are referred to as magistrates. In most cities, the ruler confirmed the Burgomasters from a list of candidates suggested by the central council. Amsterdam is one of the few exceptions of a city that had the privilege of appointing Burgomasters itself. In theory, all men within a certain age range who were burghers of the city (*poorter*) and did not have a close family member on the council, could hold any of the city's public offices. In reality, membership was confined to a few wealthy families.<sup>91</sup> This practice often led to the formation of factions that fought each other for local power.<sup>92</sup> These struggles for power on a city level were predominantly aligned along clientelism networks. The urban elite did not only wield power over the city council. Important positions in other influential bodies of significant stature, such as a church consistory, a large trading company, or the city's orphanage, combined particularly well with membership of the city council in the years that one was not a Burgomaster or when a close family member was already filling a seat.

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<sup>88</sup> S. Groenveld, "'Natie' en 'Patria' bij zestiende-eeuwse Nederlanders," in *Vaderland: een geschiedenis van de vijftiende eeuw tot 1940*, ed. N.C.F. van Sas (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999).

<sup>89</sup> M.A. Ebben, "Twee wegen naar Munster: De besluitvorming over de Vrede van Munster in de Republiek en Spanje," in *Harmonie in Holland: Het poldermodel van 1500 tot nu.*, ed. D. Bos, H. te Velde, and M.A. Ebben (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007), 52-53.

<sup>90</sup> Nierop, "Popular Participation," 273-276.

<sup>91</sup> A. Th. van Deursen, *Een dorp in de polder: Graft in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2013), 165; J. Adams, *The Familial State: Ruling families and merchant capitalism in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

<sup>92</sup> D.J. Roorda, *Partij en factie: de oproeren van 1672 in de steden van Holland en Zeeland, een krachtmeting tussen partijen en facties* (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1978).

One important form of contact between the rulers and the ruled was the petition. City archives regularly contain petitions to the local governments.<sup>93</sup> This mostly involved soft lobbying such as requests for financial aid or petitions by certain religious factions for their own church.<sup>94</sup> The vast majority of petitions submitted to the city councils thus involved local issues that were part of the urban jurisdiction. There was however good reason to petition the Burgomasters for issues that transcended local interests and that involved the supraregional 'commonwealth' (*gemeene best*), since Burgomasters doubled as representatives to provincial or state-wide political bodies.

The Burgomaster's outside role also had consequences for petitioning. For example in 1653, when the Dutch Republic was in the middle of the First Anglo-Dutch War, the WIC directors complained that in Amsterdam at least 'one of the Burgomasters has always been absent as a commissioner here or there', while another was plagued by illness.<sup>95</sup> Considering 'the weakness of the honorable collegiate board', the directors deemed it ill-advised to submit their petition at this time.<sup>96</sup> Weakness, in this case, referred to the limited political clout of these particular Burgomasters. After all, they could, as representatives of the city government, recommend favorably in provincial or state-wide political arenas on issues that belonged to these respective jurisdictions. In 1653, as Cornelis Witsen was bedridden and Frans Banning Cocq was pre-occupied with the war with England, the other two Burgomasters were not considered powerful enough in WIC affairs to recommend these favorably.<sup>97</sup>

In order to understand why the Amsterdam Burgomasters could potentially achieve a favorable decision on a higher political level, it is important to explain how authority was divided on a provincial and state-wide level.

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<sup>93</sup> Vermeesch, "Miserabele personen."

<sup>94</sup> F. Deen, *Publiek debat en propaganda in Amsterdam tijdens de Nederlandse Opstand: Amsterdam 'Moorddam' (1566-1578)* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 71-74.

<sup>95</sup> 'altijt ijmandt van derselver regerende burgemeesteren hier ofte daer gecommitteert ende absent sijn geweest', US-nar, A1810, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, 11:90 (1) [4 November 1653].

<sup>96</sup> 'het collegie geheel swack sijnde', US-nar, A1810, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, 11:90 (1).

<sup>97</sup> In November 1653 the Burgomasters were: Frans Banning Cocq, Nicolaes Corver, Joan van de Poll, Cornelis Witsen. Jan Bicker Gerritsz of the influential Bicker family had started the year as Burgomaster, but had died in May 1653; see: G.W. Kernkamp, *De regeeringe van Amsterdam (1653-1672) - ontworpen door Hans Bontemantel* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1897), 155; J.E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam 1578-1795* (Amsterdam: N. Israel, 1963).

### 1.1.2. Provincial States

The Dutch Republic was officially called the Republic of the Seven United Provinces, a name suggesting the autonomy of the provinces. The base for the institutional framework can be found in the Union of Utrecht (1579). This Union envisioned the provinces as individual entities with their own rights and privileges, but required collectiveness on some issues. For example, alliances and war and peace with foreign powers required unanimity. Taxes and coinage were made uniform. From 1595, when Groningen was added to the collective, the provinces totaled seven. The theoretical starting point was that sovereignty belonged to the people, who transferred this highest authority to a collegiate board of representatives: the provincial states.<sup>98</sup> The states effectively inherited this from the previous rulers, but the Revolt had drastically changed the details of the provincial states.<sup>99</sup>

The seven provinces were Guelders, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Overijssel, Friesland, and Groningen. As can be seen in Figure 1-1, each province had its own unique composition for representation, but as a general rule, they represented localities and the nobility. The provincial assemblies met every couple of months, and day to day administration was in the hands of authorized councils (*Gecommitteerde Raden* or *Gedeputeerde Staten*).<sup>100</sup> The States of Holland were an exception and met, especially later in the seventeenth century, more than 200 days per year.<sup>101</sup> Even though the provincial states could impose taxes, most taxes were generated in the cities. Therefore, the cities had a strong negotiation position within the provincial assemblies.

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<sup>98</sup> S. Groenveld, *Unie-Bestand-Vrede: Drie fundamentele wetten van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2009), 16-18.


<sup>99</sup> J.I. Israel, *De Republiek, 1477-1806* (Franeker: Van Wijnen, 2008), 321.

<sup>100</sup> S. Groenveld, "De institutionele en politieke context," in *Van tresorier tot thesaurier-generaal*, ed. J.Th. Smidt, et al. (Hilversum: Verloren, 1996), 57.

<sup>101</sup> Th. Thomassen, "Instrumenten van de macht: De Staten-Generaal en hun archieven 1576-1796" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2009), 87-90.



Figure 1-1: The institutional basis of the Republic after 1595



The influence of the Amsterdam Burgomasters within the provincial States of Holland was based on two pillars. The first was the city's financial wealth. As Burgomasters of the largest city in Holland and as a major port city in the world, they generated much income through taxes, and thus contributed a considerable share of the provincial budget. This gave Amsterdam a strong negotiation position, and made it an attractive partner for city-alliances. The second pillar for the Amsterdam Burgomaster's influence resulted from the unique position of the Holland nobility (*Ridderschap*). The nobility together had one vote (just like eighteen cities each had one vote) and claimed the right to represent the interests of the rural parts of Holland.<sup>102</sup> As the urban elite of Amsterdam became wealthier, they came in the financial position to acquire seigneuries in the rural areas around their city, or alternatively became financially attractive spouses for impoverished noble families. The aforementioned Frans Banning Cocq was lord of Purmerland and Ilpendam for example.<sup>103</sup> This provided the Amsterdam urban elite with more influence through the vote of the nobility. Moreover, despite their single vote, the nobility had the possibility of steering the vote in the provincial

<sup>102</sup> When Voorne petitioned to send a delegation to the States of Holland in 1579 this was denied because the nobility already represented the countryside. See: H.F.K. van Nierop, *Van ridders tot regenten: de Hollandse adel in de zestiende en de eerste helft van de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1990), 178.

<sup>103</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap*, 406.

assembly because they were the first to cast it.<sup>104</sup> This first vote was considered an 'advice' for the cities, and the vote was subsequently 'concluded' by the Grand Pensionary (*Raadspensionaris*). The Grand Pensionary, who provided legal advice for resolutions, was also the Pensionary of the nobility, and the secretary of the provincial assembly and thus had large influence on what was on the agenda for the meetings and what ended up in the minutes.

Within the provincial States of Zeeland, power was predominantly in the hands of cities. Just like in Holland, the Burgomasters from the cities doubled as delegates to the provincial assembly. The seventh vote in the States of Zeeland was in the hands of the first noble, which was the Marquis of Veere. In theory this was the Stadtholder (see below), but since he was often not able to attend the meetings he appointed a representative.<sup>105</sup> The Stadtholder further yielded power through his task of appointing the City Council in Veere and Flushing; this effectively earned him three of the seven votes.<sup>106</sup> As it was possible to combine offices it was further possible that a considerable share of decision-making power was in the hands of one individual. A good example is Johan de Moor (1576-1644). This WIC director was not only one of the largest investors, but also a member of the city council of Flushing and its representative in the provincial assembly, as well as a member of the Admiralty (see below).<sup>107</sup>

In the other provinces cities had less influence as cities had one joint vote against the nobility or rural quarters in that province. These provincial assemblies met only two or three times yearly and are also referred to as Diets. These were characterized as social events where overlords and farmers met.<sup>108</sup> A Diet (*landdag*, literally land-day) was in fact the prominent form of organization in the Dutch Republic. Guelders, Friesland, Groningen, Overijssel and Drenthe all had a Diet. It is no coincidence that these rural provinces had a

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<sup>104</sup> Nierop, *Van ridders tot regenten*, 179-180.

<sup>105</sup> M.C. 't Hart, "Autonom maar kwetsbaar. De Middelburgse regenten en de opstand van 1651," *De zeventiende eeuw* 9, no. 1 (1993).

<sup>106</sup> A.C. Meijer, *Liefhebbers des vaderlands en de beminders van de commercie* (Middelburg: Zeeuws genootschap der Wetenschappen, [1982]), 25.

<sup>107</sup> I.J.A. Nijenhuis et al., *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal 1626-1630*

(<http://resources.huylgens.knaw.nl/besluitenstatengeneraal1576-1630/BesluitenStaten-generaal1626-165105/09/2015>), [Johan de Moor]; J.I. Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 150-151.

<sup>108</sup> A. Th. van Deursen, "Staatsinstellingen in de noordelijke Nederlanden 1579-1780," in *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, Vol. V*, ed. P.J. Blok (Haarlem: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1980), 383.

governmental structure where the 'lands' came together in their Provincial assemblies with little to no influence for the cities. The power of cities was not a given in Dutch rural provinces. For example, it was only after the Act of Abjuration (1581), in which the Dutch provinces declared themselves independent from the King of Spain, that eleven Frisian cities received one vote – as opposed to three votes for the different rural quarters.<sup>109</sup>

### 1.1.3. States General

The States General were a collegiate board for provincial delegates. They were an intergovernmental body for deliberation between the different provinces rather than a centralized government (see Figure 1-1). Each provincial delegation was led by the highest-ranking individual, the *premier*, who spoke on behalf of the deputies. The States General officially formed the venue where the provincial delegates deliberated on issues of defense, finances and alliances, and war and peace. However, in practice substantially more issues gravitated towards these High-Mightinesses. The seven provinces all held one vote in the States General, but could send as many delegates as they wished. The number of allocated seats was limited however.<sup>110</sup> It was not uncommon for one or two provinces to be entirely absent when no delegates were sent.<sup>111</sup>

Because the States General could not handle all the affairs in a general session they delegated a significant number of affairs to special commissions or *besognes*. The number of members in a commission was set at eight (one for each province plus the Grand Pensionary of Holland), but on average consisted of about five or six. Some of the commissions were secret and did not have to consult the provincial principals. Sometimes they even had the authority to make a decision on behalf of the States General. Larger commissions with more members and representatives of more provinces handled more important issues than smaller commissions. Most of the commissioners were drawn from a pool of fifteen to twenty individuals that held an important share of power in the Dutch Republic.<sup>112</sup> Committees

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<sup>109</sup> R. Fruin, *Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot den val der Republiek* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1901), 247-252.

<sup>110</sup> Guelders and Holland had 6 six seats, Zeeland and Friesland 3, Utrecht, Overijssel, and Groningen two, see: Thomassen, "Instrumenten van de macht," 94-95.

<sup>111</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 321.

<sup>112</sup> Groenveld, "De institutionele en politieke context," 61, 64-65.

were always chaired by the highest-ranking member, who in practice was almost without exception a representative from Guelders, the only duchy within the United Provinces.<sup>113</sup>

Holland paid roughly 58 per cent of the finances of the generality, but that was not its only base of power in the States General. Most of the resolutions of the States General were prepared as concepts in the meetings of the States of Holland.<sup>114</sup> For the most part, Holland tried to convince the other provinces to agree with its policy, but if that would not succeed Holland would often act independently. Holland had no problem promoting its own interests in international affairs such as in the Baltic trade.<sup>115</sup> Because inhabitants from this province were regularly the States General's diplomatic representatives in important European trading locations, they could advance the province's merchant interests as well.

There are two issues that are left out to make Figure 1-1 more comprehensible: the status of the province of Drenthe and the Generality Lands. Drenthe was not a full province. It did have autonomy and a provincial assembly like the other provinces, but it did not have a vote in the States General. The Generality Lands were areas under direct rule of the States General. Because these areas were captured from the Spanish during the Eighty Year's War and cut off from their original governments, sovereignty was claimed by the States General based on the 'right of conquest'. Staats-Brabant and Staats-Vlaanderen (see Figure 1-2) are an example of Generality Lands. The Generality Lands were administered by the Council of State (*Raad van State*). The Council of State was the highest advice council – not an executive council – of the States General. Officially, it also administered financial affairs, treaties with foreign powers, the fortified towns, and the army. However, in practice, diplomacy and foreign affairs were in the hands of the States General.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Thomassen, "Instrumenten van de macht," 99-101.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 87-90.

<sup>115</sup> G. de Bruin, "De soevereiniteit in de republiek: een machtsprobleem," *BMGN* 94, no. 1 (1979): 30.

<sup>116</sup> Fruin, *Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen*, 193-195.

Figure 1-2: The provinces, voting cities, and Generality Lands of the Republic of the United Provinces in 1621.



Source: Erik Odegard

Because each province could send as many delegates as they wished and change who represented them, it was not always clear whom individuals petitioning the States General were to address. There were selected individuals who, in exchange for a fee, could function as brokers.<sup>117</sup> Other interests had their own (semi-)permanent representation in The Hague. For example, merchants trading on the rivers Rhine, Meuse, Waal, and IJssel, were

<sup>117</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 Staten Generaal, inv. nr. 7482, 23-Jul-1652 Request by some merchants, inhabitants of Amsterdam.

represented by Gijsbert Huijssen.<sup>118</sup> It could also happen that what a petitioner wanted to discuss in the meeting was not possible, because something else was already being discussed. An example of this can be found in 1650 when a member of the Lampsins family from Zeeland intended to sway the High-Mightinesses to convey the island of St. Martin to this family. Upon learning that the matters of New Netherland were discussed at that moment the member of the family left without taking any further action.<sup>119</sup>

#### 1.1.4. The Stadtholders

At least since the Burgundian and Habsburg periods, rulers appointed individuals to represent them locally. These place holders (*lieu tenant* in French) were known as Stadtholders, literally holding a city on behalf of a ruler. After the Act of Abjuration (1581) each of the provinces kept the function of Stadtholder, but he was no longer a placeholder for a lord, but became a servant of the provinces. The Stadtholder, as a prince, brought international prestige, and functioned as a mediator between the provinces.<sup>120</sup> As Captain-and Admiral-General the Stadtholder had substantial military power.

Table 1-1: Stadtholders in the Dutch Republic, 1580-1696

Period	Holland	Zeeland	Utrecht	Overijssel	Guelders	Groningen	Friesland
1584-1589	Maurits van Oranje		Adolf van Nieuwenaar			Willem Lodewijk van Nassau-Dillenburg	
1590-1620							
1620-1625							
1625-1632	Frederik-Hendrik van Oranje					Ernst-Casimir van Nassau-Dietz	
1632-1640						Hendrik-Casimir I van Nassau-Dietz	
1640-1647							
1647-1650	Willem II van Oranje					Willem-Frederik van Nassau-Dietz	
1650-1664	First Stadtholderless Period						
1664-1672						Hendrik-Casimir II van Nassau-Dietz	
1672-1675	Willem III van Oranje (until 1702)						
1675-1696							

<sup>118</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 7482, 09-Oct-1652 Memo by the common merchants trading on the river in these lands.

<sup>119</sup> US-nar, A1810, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, 11:18 [16 February 1650].

<sup>120</sup> Groenveld, *Unie-Bestand-Vrede*, 21.

If a Stadtholder<sup>121</sup> was very ambitious and had the necessary personal talents, he could acquire the leadership of the state, on the basis of his leadership of the army and the hereditary prestige that came with the name Nassau. The Stadtholder was not a member of the provincial states (exception made for Zeeland), but he could choose to speak in their meetings whenever he deemed it necessary.<sup>122</sup> Frederik Hendrik was a member of the nobility in Holland after 1637.<sup>123</sup> Through patronage the Stadtholder could stretch his influence well beyond the official paths.<sup>124</sup> However, he always needed the support of the regents, while they did not necessarily need his to govern the Republic, as is well illustrated by the First Stadtholderless Period (1650-1672). The Stadtholder had the power to appoint Burgomasters in certain cities. The local council would suggest a double list of candidates from which the Stadtholder would select who he deemed most capable or loyal. In a society where patron-client relations functioned like money, the Stadtholder could later ask for favors in return.<sup>125</sup>

These favors could also be on behalf of someone else, as can be seen in a recommendation (*voorschrijven*) in 1633. Since the WIC felt they had been waiting for too long for financial subsidies from Utrecht, the Stadtholder Frederik Hendrik sent a request to the States of Utrecht on behalf of the WIC, first on 28 June 1633, and again on 17 December 1634.<sup>126</sup> The most important reason to pay, according to the requests, was that the WIC was beneficial to 'the affairs of the country'. It was not always necessary for a Stadtholder to know details about the request he was recommending.

### 1.1.5. Conflicting powers

Considering how the Republic came into being it was at no point a foregone conclusion that it would end up as a Republic. There were strong voices that advocated a princely lord as sovereign. These voices did not go quiet after failed experiments of offering the sovereignty to foreign lords such as Francis, Duke of Anjou, in 1582 and Robert Dudley, Count of

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<sup>121</sup> If I mention Stadtholder I mean the Stadtholder of Holland etc, the other Stadtholder will be referred to as the Frisian Stadtholder.

<sup>122</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 334; L. Kooijmans, *Liefde in opdracht: het hofleven van Willem Frederik van Nassau* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2000), 17-19.

<sup>123</sup> Nierop, *Van ridders tot regenten*, 178.

<sup>124</sup> Janssen, *Creaturen van de Macht*.

<sup>125</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 334; Janssen, *Creaturen van de Macht*; Kooijmans, *Vriendschap*.

<sup>126</sup> NL-UtHUA 233, inv. 278-4, fol. 337, 348.

Leicester in 1585.<sup>127</sup> Other individuals, opposed to a princely lord, also contested Stadtholders' hereditary office. The advocates of a true Republic where no-one inherited a position would succeed in suspending the position of Stadtholder in the majority of the provinces in 1650. The debates between Republicans (*Staatsgezinden*) and Orangists (*Prinsgezinden*) went on continuously throughout the seventeenth century.

The command of military forces, both naval and land army, was closely related to this issue. The navy was led by an Admiral-General (the Stadtholder) and was organized through several Admiralties. These reported to the States General, making it a Generality body, despite its decentralized operations.<sup>128</sup> There were five admiralty councils: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Noorderkwartier (Hoorn and Enkhuizen), Zeeland (Middelburg), and Friesland (Dokkum – Harlingen after 1644). The fleet, led by these five semi-independently operating councils, was not only in charge of protecting the coast, merchant fleets, and fisheries, but also responsible for collecting its own revenue through customs (*convooi en licenten*).<sup>129</sup> The army was led by the Captain-General. In every province the Stadtholder was the Captain-General. From Maurits onwards the Stadtholder of Holland and Zeeland was also the Captain-General of the Generality, with the Stadtholder of Friesland as his local substitute.<sup>130</sup> The way the command of military forces was structured in the Republic illustrates part of the basis of the Stadtholder's power. This meant that individuals in favor of less influence of the Stadtholders, the republican party, were generally more likely to be in favor of peace than were the supporters of the prince.

The issue of war and peace was ongoing in the northern Netherlands, but debates on this issue were particularly strong in the years around truce or peace negotiations. In the years preceding the signing of the Twelve Year's Truce in 1609 a majority of Dutch language pamphlets dealt with the issue (52,6 per cent in 1608, see Figure 1-3). The anti-peace propaganda was generally published anonymously, but there is a striking resemblance between the arguments in letters written by Stadtholder Maurits and anonymous pamphlets.

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<sup>127</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 235-237; F.G. Oosterhoff, *Leicester and the Netherlands, 1586-1587* (Utrecht: HES, 1988).

<sup>128</sup> Fruin, *Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen*, 199.

<sup>129</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 323-325.


<sup>130</sup> Thomassen, "Instrumenten van de macht," 148-150; Israel, *De Republiek*, 334.



This of course does not mean that it was Maurits himself who penned and spread the pamphlets, but it does indicate that the pro-war campaign had a similar view as the Prince.<sup>131</sup>

In these years there was also a wide selection of pamphlets and petitions to the States of Holland and Zealand from the VOC (the States General’s East India Company chartered in 1602), arguing that this company was not only founded for East Indian trade, but also to attack the revenue and possessions of the Habsburg Crown in Asia.<sup>132</sup> Because of this and the income generating through prized ships, VOC directors also did not support a treaty with the Spanish King and the VOC presented itself as a vital asset in the war against Spain. Surprisingly absent in the discourse were arguments related to the European bulk trade – a type of trade that one would expect to be supportive of the peace because it would open up the trade to the Mediterranean, and lift the trade embargo to the Iberian Peninsula. In fact, financial arguments were not used to support the peace propaganda.<sup>133</sup>

Figure 1-3: Percentage of survived Dutch language pamphlets dealing with war and peace



Source: TEMPO database. These data were compiled by me and Wilko van Dijk, MA.

<sup>131</sup> Stensland, "Peace or no peace?," 234-235.  
<sup>132</sup> Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 70-71.  
<sup>133</sup> Stensland, "Peace or no peace?," 235-238.

After the Truce was signed in 1609, the Dutch army decreased from 60,000 men in 1606 to around 30,000.<sup>134</sup> The decrease in army size effectively diminished the relevance of the Stadtholder. Maurits was well aware of this in the years leading up to the Truce, but the provincial gentry did not support Maurits' plans to continue the war. Therefore, most of the nobility in Utrecht, Guelders and Overijssel supported Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, at the time Grand Pensionary of Holland<sup>135</sup>, plans for a Truce.<sup>136</sup> Even though Maurits initially had some support from Amsterdam and Delft, the Truce was eventually signed in 1609.

The debate regarding war or peace in the Republic did not have to do with pacifist ideals or economic interests. Rather, it had to do with the recurrent issue of power within the Republic. It seems likely that the other provinces supported the Stadtholders out of self-interest rather than Orangist ideology. Seeing as Holland's policies threatened their provincial sovereignty, the Stadtholder and the other provinces were driven into each other's arms.<sup>137</sup>

The second time the Stadtholder, still Maurits, took up an issue with Holland, still led by van Oldenbarnevelt, the issue revolved around religion. Without going into the details of the religious differences between the Remonstrants<sup>138</sup> and the Contraremonstrants, it suffices to say that religious differences formed the ground for the battle between Holland and Maurits, which nearly led to a civil war.<sup>139</sup> The issue between Remonstrants and Contraremonstrants had been a-political for a long time, but it provided popular support for both Maurits and van Oldenbarnevelt. It culminated in a victory for Maurits in 1619 in two ways. Firstly, the Synod of Dordrecht (1619) established the Calvinist religion as the public religion, meaning that the religious doctrine of Arminianism, supported by van Oldenbarnevelt, was considered heresy. Secondly, van Oldenbarnevelt was, for his intentional disruption of the

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<sup>134</sup> J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 42-43.

<sup>135</sup> Technically van Oldenbarnevelt was the Land's Advocate as the title of Land's Advocate changed to Grand Pensionary after 1619, but it is the same role within the system, so for the sake of clarity I chose to call him Grand Pensionary here.

<sup>136</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 30.

<sup>137</sup> Bruin, "Soevereiniteit in de republiek." 33.

<sup>138</sup> An interesting detail related to petitions is that the Remonstrant movement received its name through a petition, or remonstrance, to the States of Holland in June 1610. Even though this petition was not signed, the original draft dated 14 January was signed by forty-four supplicants, see: M. de Vries, "Vierenveertig handtekeningen," in *De remonstrantie 400 jaar*, ed. K. Holtzapffel and M. van Leeuwen (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Meinema, 2010), 35-36.

<sup>139</sup> J. den Tex, "Maurits en Oldenbarnevelt vóór en na Nieuwpoort," *BMGN* 85, no. 1 (1970).

religious and political relations in the Republic, sentenced for treason and publically beheaded.<sup>140</sup> Now that Maurits had defeated Holland in the internal power struggle of the Republic it was not unthinkable that the Stadtholder could be elevated to the Duke of Guelders, and the Count of Holland etcetera. And the possibility of offering sovereignty to a prince of the Nassau house remained up in the air at least until the 1640s. However, the bourgeois regents in Holland held on to enough clout to create a stalemate over this issue of power and sovereignty.<sup>141</sup>

Nevertheless, the struggle over power surfaced clearly once more after the peace with Spain was signed in the Treaty of Munster in 1648. Just like during the Truce in 1609, Holland wanted to roughly half the size of the army which would again limit the Stadtholder's power. Dutch Brazil got dragged into the subsequent struggle for power between Holland and the Stadtholder, William II. He accused Holland of neglecting the WIC's colony in an attempt to increase support in the other provinces. Admiral Witte de With (who had led the rescue fleet, was paid for by the Admiralty of Rotterdam, and had Republican sympathies) was arrested by the Admiralty of Amsterdam on order of the Stadtholder. The Amsterdam magistracy opposed the notion that anyone other than themselves could make arrests within their city walls and released the Admiral. When the prince and the States General tried to bring Witte de With in front of a court-martial, the States of Holland, led by Amsterdam, advocated that it was their jurisdiction, and not the Generality's.<sup>142</sup>

While this event played out, the Stadtholder had six prominent Republicans arrested in The Hague in July 1650 while the Frisian Stadtholder marched to Amsterdam in an attempt to seize the city. This attempt failed because the soldiers became scattered all over the heathlands as a result of a heavy summer storm and were subsequently overtaken by a mail courier from Hamburg who warned the Amsterdam magistracy. These refused to let the Frisian Stadtholder in, but the results of negotiations during the siege included the removal of two of the Stadtholder's main opponents (Cornelis and Andries Bicker) from the city

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<sup>140</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 479-496.

<sup>141</sup> Bruin, "Soevereiniteit in de republiek," 37-40.

<sup>142</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 670.670; C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 221-225.

leadership.<sup>143</sup> Moreover, the Stadtholder could now force the trial of Witte de With in a special court of two judges from every Admiralty. De With was charged with neglect of duty on 259 accounts for which the prosecutor demanded decapitation by sword.<sup>144</sup> In the months that followed, the Stadtholder succeeded in blocking further downsizing of the army, but before William II could unfold the totality of his ambition, he died on 6 November 1650. His son, William III, was born eight days later. Without an heir fit to take the office of Stadtholder, the Republicans seized the opportunity to declare 'The True Freedom' of the Stadtholderless Period that lasted until 1672. Witte de With was released from imprisonment on 16 December 1650, and evaded death in February when he was sentenced to loss of wages.<sup>145</sup>

This example shows how affairs in the Dutch Republic were often, if not always, connected to issues of power and authority. These battles should therefore be taken into account when considering the creation process of the West India Company.

## 1.2. *THE WEST INDIA COMPANY*

Long before the establishment of the WIC, merchants from the Low Countries had been trading to Brazil and in the Atlantic.<sup>146</sup> In 1621, before the WIC had started thinking about trading to Brazil, ships from the United Provinces carried one-third to half of the trade between Brazil and Europe.<sup>147</sup> The principal proponent of the establishment of the WIC was, at least according to himself, Willem Usselinx. Born in Flanders in 1567, he spent some of his early merchant training on the Azores and possibly Brazil, before moving to Middelburg at the age of 24.<sup>148</sup> He was one of many individuals who fled the southern Low Countries for the protestant northern provinces to escape religious prosecution. According to a memory of

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<sup>143</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 659-676.

<sup>144</sup> W.J. van Hoboken, *Witte de With in Brazilië, 1648-1649* (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1955), 268-301.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> C. Ebert, "Dutch Trade with Brazil before the Dutch West India Company, 1587-1621," in *Riches from Atlantic Commerce*, ed. J. Postma and V. Enthoven (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

<sup>147</sup> S.B. Schwartz, *Sovereignty and society in colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and its judges, 1609-1751* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 99.

<sup>148</sup> C.K. Kesler, "Willem Usselinx en de oprichting van de Westindische Compagnie," *De West-Indische Gids* 3, no. 1 (1921/1922): 66.

his own hand, he had started advocating for a chartered Company for the trade in the Americas as early as 1592.<sup>149</sup> Usselinx had a strong vision for the way the Company should operate. He wanted to colonize the parts of South America that had not yet been colonized and the colonies should be settlement colonies that could function as a market for Dutch manufactured goods, and could produce colonial commodities in return. It was a misconception, he argued, to think that riches from the Atlantic only came in the form of silver and gold. Instead, goods such as tobacco, sugar, or cochineal, would provide all the wealth. These goods should not be produced with slave labor, but with paid laborers from Europe – not because there were large moral objections to slavery, but principally because it made more economic sense. The settlement colonies, moreover, should be a Calvinist safe haven in a largely Catholic New World.<sup>150</sup>

Usselinx' profitable slave free Calvinist utopia in the Americas does not exactly anticipate the reality of Dutch presence in the Atlantic. Nevertheless, this 'vision' of Usselinx is generally well-described in the existing literature on the Dutch in the Atlantic.<sup>151</sup> In his 2012 dissertation, Alexander Bick points out that the historiography on the role of Usselinx seems to be in a paradox as it simultaneously ascribes him as a driving force, while also assuming that he had very little influence.<sup>152</sup> In an attempt to solve this, Bick argues that Usselinx' vision of the governance structure of the Company was very influential, while at the same time acknowledging that his vision did not keep up with the later outcome. Bick's approach of looking at the governance structure of the WIC in an attempt to investigate the influence of Usselinx is convincing. What Bick overlooks, however, is the role of parties and factions in the Republic that determined the outcome of the WIC charter. Instead, I posit that Usselinx' actions were dictated by the bandwidth provided by the political circumstances and ongoing power struggles in the Republic.

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<sup>149</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 3-Oct-1644 Memo by Willem Usselinx [scan 008].

<sup>150</sup> W. Klooster, *The Dutch moment: war, trade, and settlement in the seventeenth-century Atlantic world* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 209, 242.

<sup>151</sup> B. Schmidt, *Innocence abroad: the Dutch imagination and the New World, 1570-1670* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 178-184; H. den Heijer, *De Geschiedenis van de WIC* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2002).

<sup>152</sup> A. Bick, "Governing the Free Sea: The Dutch West India Company and Commercial Politics, 1618-1645" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Princeton, 2012), 32.

### 1.2.1. Willem Usselinx

When Usselinx started advocating for a WIC in the late sixteenth century, most merchants thought it was too costly and risky to start such a large endeavor. However, as more merchants ventured into the Atlantic Ocean and local companies for the trade to the West Indies and the Guinea coast emerged, the audience for his plans grew around the year 1600. The VOC was established in the meantime in 1602, demonstrating that large chartered companies were a possibility. While interests for a WIC initially rested predominantly within the province of Zeeland, the States of Holland established a special committee that included Jan Huygen van Linschoten and François Vranck, combining legal and state experience of Vranck with the exploratory expertise of van Linschoten. The committee concluded that there certainly was interest for an Atlantic Company, but that investors wanted to know details before committing large sums of money. Usselinx tried to mobilize interest in Zeeland meanwhile and was selected as a special envoy for the province to negotiate the details of a charter with the Holland representatives.<sup>153</sup>

When considering this charter, it becomes apparent that it was modelled after the VOC charter with a board of seventeen directors from four chambers: Amsterdam, Zeeland, Noorderkwartier, and Meuse. An important change in comparison to the VOC charter was to combat the often-heard complaint that (chief) investors did not have enough influence in the business decisions of the VOC. Therefore, new provisions in the charter safeguarded the interests of the investors by allowing them to inspect the books and more power in company management.<sup>154</sup> While Usselinx maintained his vision of a settlement company supported through state-financed military, the Holland delegation advocated for a company of war financed through trade. The truce negotiations between the northern provinces and the King of Spain pushed back the issue of a company for the Americas as it meant that it was no longer necessary to privatize the war effort in the Atlantic. During the Truce negotiations, Usselinx reached out to Stadtholder Maurits, advocating in favor of a continuation of the war with Spain and open trade to the Americas.<sup>155</sup> The Truce with Spain in 1609 shelved the

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<sup>153</sup> O. van Rees, *Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het einde der achttiende eeuw*, Vol. II (Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon, 1868), 76-78.

<sup>154</sup> Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 99-100.

<sup>155</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 3-Oct-1644 Memo by Willem Usselinx [scan 008].

plans for the WIC for a while, and Usselincx decided to invest in the impoldering of the Beemster.

With support from the Stadtholder, who thought that renewed hostilities with the Spanish could rekindle his military ambitions, Usselincx succeeded in starting a discussion on a WIC again in 1614 despite the general contentment about the Truce. According to his own memorial, Usselincx knew that van Oldenbarnevelt was against the plans and that the Grand Pensionary was convinced that without his approval there would never be a company. Van Oldenbarnevelt thus decided to obstruct the process and to send Usselincx on a Perseusian mission to include the trade to Guinea in the charter. Van Oldenbarnevelt himself, as well as Maurits, had previously attempted to no avail to bring all the Guinea trade into one company. However, after many and long solicitations Usselincx succeeded in convincing the Amsterdam magistracy to include the Guinea trade. Maurits warned Usselincx that this would not be enough for van Oldenbarnevelt, who indeed was not yet convinced.<sup>156</sup> The Grand Pensionary wished to appoint one of the seventeen directors of the Company Board from the ranks of the States General. The city magistrates, moreover, should appoint the directors. Van Oldenbarnevelt, thus, advocated for a strong regent control over Company policy.

For Usselincx, this idea was unacceptable.<sup>157</sup> His draft charter included a Council of the Indies (*Raet van Indien*) modeled after the Spanish Supreme Council for the Indies to govern a WIC. The proposed council would consist of eight to ten 'qualified persons, both nobility and others' balancing expertise in trade and government. Anyone who had invested more than 800,000 guilders would automatically obtain a seat and any remaining seats would be elected by the principal investors. The Prince of Orange (the Stadtholder) should preside over the meetings of the Council of the Indies 'to give it more authority and prestige'.<sup>158</sup> The Company should be in charge of trade while the States General should remain responsible for the administration and governance, and for matters of religion, war, and peace. The state's income of taxes and duties (*convooyen* and *licenten*) should rise from increased trading to the colonies, thus allowing to pay for the added naval expenses. Allowing magistrates to

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<sup>156</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 3-Oct-1644 Memo by Willem Usselincx [scan 008].

<sup>157</sup> C. Ligtenberg, *Willem Usselincx* (Utrecht: Oosthoek, 1915), 82-83.

<sup>158</sup> 'van welcken Raet Syn Princelycke Excellentie behoorde 'thooft te wesen, om dien meer autoriteyts ende aensiens te geven', O. van Rees, "Willem Usselincx," *Vaderlandsche Letteroefeningen* 107, no. 1 (1867): 424.

interfere in trade and business would deter investors, while merchants were incompetent 'to govern, and to make laws and ordinances'. Usselincx' often repeated quoted that 'merchants have profit as their North Star, and desire as their compass' clearly positions him with the Orangists who believed that it was the nobility, or at least studied individuals, that should be in charge of government.<sup>159</sup> Similar sentiments can be found with the Frisian Stadtholder Willem Frederik for example. He remarked that 'one cannot expect anything else than quarrels, affairs, and affronts from merchants, as they do not know to deal with decent people', and that 'merchants only think about benefiting trade, and they do not consider the rest of the country and the nobility', 'republicans and merchants only remember that they need men of quality in times of war'.<sup>160</sup> Alexander van der Capellen, the nobleman from Guelders who in the 1640s and 1650s would have a pivotal position in the States General's committee on West Indian affairs, further published a treatise called 'The ambition of the plebeians over the nobility'.<sup>161</sup> The *ambitione peblejorum* was feared by many nobles, according to van der Capellen, who saw that the power of non-nobles was increasing almost daily. Moreover, when he was considered to succeed Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679, see also following chapters) as Governor-General in Brazil, van der Capellen refused as he knew better than 'to travel so wide in the service of merchants'.<sup>162</sup> Matters of war in particular were an 'affair for people in high regard', Usselincx continued his proposition, as soldiers claimed 'that they would rather die, than serve under merchants'.<sup>163</sup> The party lines between the republicans and Orangists thus clearly come to the fore in their different proposed charters. While van Oldenbarnevelt proposed more influence for the

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<sup>159</sup> 'Cooplieden die de winste tot Noortsterre ende de begeerlickheyt voor compas hebben', *ibid.*; see also: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 9409: 'Remarques op het Octroy van de West-Indische Compagnie aan Haar Ho: Mo: door Willem Usselincx anno 1620 gemaect'.

<sup>160</sup> 'want van de coopluyden heeft hij niet te verwachten als querelen, questiën, affronten, want de coopluyden mit luyden van fatsoen niet om kunnen gaen', J. Visser and G.N. van der Plaat, eds., *Gloria parendi. Dagboeken van Willem Frederik, stadhouder van Friesland, Groningen en Drenthe, 1643-1649, 1651-1654* (Den Haag: Nederlands Historisch Genootschap, 1995), I/79. 'omdat de republiken en coopluyden noit heeren van qualiteit estimeren als in tijt van noot ende oorloch', *ibid.*, I/96. 'De coopluyden dencken nievers op als op de trafijc en die te beneficiëren; voor de rest van het landt en den adel daer sijn [zien] se niet naer om', *ibid.*, VI/228.

<sup>161</sup> J. Jacobs, "Act with the Cunning of a Fox: The Political Dimensions of the Struggle for Hegemony over New Netherland, 1647-1653," (Unpublished Paper). See also C. Gietman, *Republiek van Adel: eer in de Oost-Nederlandse adelscultuur (1555-1702)* (Utrecht: Van Gruting, 2010), 99.

<sup>162</sup> 'soo wijdt over see te gaen in dienst van cooplude', quoted in Gietman, *Republiek van Adel*, 27.

<sup>163</sup> 'dat sy haer liever wilden laten hangen als onder 'tgebiet van de cooplieden na Indien te gaen', Rees, *Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde, Vol. II*, 425.



States General and local magistrates in the appointment of directors, Usselinx chose the side of Maurits and proposed far-reaching influence for the nobility and shareholder advocacy.

Usselinx advocated for more control for shareholders in the company's trading business. The VOC, whose shareholders had repeatedly complained about not having enough influence on company business and no instruments to check the directors' financial claims, served as an example for Usselinx on what should be avoided.<sup>164</sup> Every city or province that invested at least one million guilders could obtain a trading chamber in the charter that Usselinx proposed, and every town that raised 200,000 guilders would be entitled to delegate one or two directors. However, these directors should be elected by investors that had invested at least 1,200 guilders. To become a director, one only needed a minimum investment of 300 guilders. The proposal of the States of Holland stipulated that far higher sums were required for similar influence. A collegiate body elected from the investors would furthermore function as an audit office for imported and exported goods.<sup>165</sup> This demonstrates how important Usselinx deemed to allow merchants to control trade, rather than regents, and how much influence he envisioned for shareholders in the Company as opposed to the vision of van Oldenbarnevelt.

It took Usselinx four months of pleading, and 'extraordinary means', to have his petitions heard by the States of Holland.<sup>166</sup> Van Oldenbarnevelt and the others in the opposition acknowledged that Usselinx was right, according to Usselinx, who further added that this did not mean that van Oldenbarnevelt stopped to delay the creation of such a company. These delaying tactics urged Usselinx to turn to the States General, who were willing to hear him, but then suggested he would turn again to the States of Holland. Usselinx did just that, but despite 'all his labor and ingenuity', he could not get these provincial delegates to discuss his requests. This forced him to travel to Zeeland from where he started writing lengthy letters to the Holland nobility, van Oldenbarnevelt, and each of the cities in Holland. When realizing that he would not be able to sway the States of Holland, Usselinx decided then to erect a provincial company in Zeeland for which he quickly received 800,000 guilders of subscriptions from local investors. With this success, the States

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<sup>164</sup> Rees, "Willem Usselinx," 300.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 302.

<sup>166</sup> 'Dese requeste kreeg ik met een vervolch van omtrent 4 maanden door eene extraordinaris middel eijndelijck gelesen', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 3-Oct-1644 Memory by Willem Usselinx [scan 009].

of Zeeland had sufficient reasons to start laboring for Usselinx' Company at the States General and further instructed an extraordinary deputy at the States of Holland to labor for the same thing.<sup>167</sup> The States General subsequently established a committee to begin working on a WIC in 1617. Despite this committee's warm reception of Usselinx' ideas, Holland remained of the position that a peace with Spain was more favorable than a WIC.<sup>168</sup> Usselinx' financial position was bad due to disappointing results of his Beemster investment and he owed 153,000 guilders to several Amsterdam creditors. One of these creditors, Govaert van Schoonhoven, who was a slave trader on the African coast, offered Usselinx to lower the interest payments if he would stop his efforts to erect a WIC.<sup>169</sup>

Van Oldenbarnevelt thus continued his objection to Usselinx' plans, while Maurits supported his ideas for a chartered company in the Atlantic. After van Oldenbarnevelt's arrest in 1618, his beheading in 1619, and the purge of several Holland City Councils in favor of Arminians, the pro-war faction got more traction in the States General and the States of Holland. Leader of the contra-remonstrant pro-war faction in Holland was the Amsterdammer Reynier Pauw (1564-1636) who had trading experience to Guyana and Brazil.<sup>170</sup> At his initiative, the States of Holland resolved to appoint a committee with representatives of the major trading cities to review the different charter drafts since 1606 and to unite them into one new draft charter for a WIC. The committee completed their task by December 1619 and reported to the States of Holland that Usselinx' proposition was 'not well suited' for the provincial interests, but anyone who was interested could consult it at the registry's office (*griffie*).<sup>171</sup> By January 1620 the States of Holland sent their proposal to the States General for further discussion and it was their draft that would function as the basis of further discussion. Holland's draft charter is significant as even though it is similar to the final charter, there are some crucial differences, as demonstrated by Alexander Bick. First of all, this draft envisioned that the delegate of the States General would preside the meeting of the Board of Directors, providing them with substantial power over agenda setting and control over debates. Furthermore, the States General would, 'instead of a Council of the

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<sup>167</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 3-Oct-1644 Memory by Willem Usselinx [scan 009].

<sup>168</sup> Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 105-106.

<sup>169</sup> Rees, "Willem Usselinx," 294-295; Rees, *Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde*, Vol. II, 470.

<sup>170</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap*, 191.

<sup>171</sup> Rees, "Willem Usselinx," 298.

Indies', have veto power over issues of war within the Company.<sup>172</sup> After a round of discussion by all the provinces the charter was more or less finalized allowing the possibility of an extra director's chamber for polities that could find sufficient investment to establish an independent chamber, and instead of presiding the meetings of the Board of Directors, the States General would help to direct the affairs of the Company at the Board of Directors. There were some political quarrels from Amsterdam delegates who wished to keep the Guinea trade out of the charter and from Noorderkwartier delegates who preferred to keep the salt trade from Punta de Araya (in present-day Venezuela) out.<sup>173</sup> They were under the impression that they did not need the Company's involvement in this trade. After all, they had successfully traded on the other side of the Atlantic before the Truce.<sup>174</sup> The Noorderkwartier initially succeeded, but when investments in the WIC turned out disappointing, the States General decided to include the salt trade in the charter. Moreover, when the Spanish built a stronghold to detect (and prevent) illicit trade in Punta de Araya, it became harder for the merchants from Hoorn and Enkhuizen to continue their trade.<sup>175</sup> On 3 June 1621, the charter for the West India Company was unanimously approved by the States General.<sup>176</sup>

Despite Holland's, and in particular van Oldenbarnevelt's, opposition, Usselinx received more favorable audiences at the States General than at the States of Holland. This can easily be explained through party lines. Usselinx formally aligned himself with Maurits which made reconciliation with van Oldenbarnevelt impossible. However, through Maurits' network Usselinx received more favorable responses in provinces where the nobility had a stronger position power such as Zeeland, Guelders, but also Friesland. The republicans though, were never going to agree to a charter that granted substantial power in the Atlantic to the Prince of Orange through a Council of the Indies. The proposal of the republicans for a WIC charter included the States General as a president instead of the Stadtholder, which

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<sup>172</sup> 'In Staete van desen Raet [van Indien] & datter expendeert wort int' 18 artyckel gesyt dat in saeken van oorlogs op de genoomen resolutie vorsocht sal worden haer ho: mo: approbatye', quoted in Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 108.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, 106-109.

<sup>174</sup> E. Sluiter, "Dutch-Spanish Rivalry in the Caribbean Area, 1594-1609," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 28, no. 2 (1948): 180-181, 191.

<sup>175</sup> Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de WIC*, 30; J.G. van Dillen, *Van Rijkdom en Regenten. Handboek tot de Economische en Sociale Geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de Republiek* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 145-146.

<sup>176</sup> Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 111.

indicates how they viewed their position vis-à-vis the Prince of Orange in the Republic. Common ground was found to provide neither the Stadtholder, nor the States General, with presiding power in a WIC institution. Usselinx antagonized other interests and possible allies through his emphasis on shareholder advocacy. Many holders of public offices in the Republic rejoiced the prospect of a new state-chartered organization that provided them with opportunities to extend their personal clientele networks through new job appointments.<sup>177</sup> It surely was no coincidence that all the fresh WIC directors that the Amsterdam city council appointed came from the intimate social circles of the Amsterdam elite such as Reynier Pauw.<sup>178</sup> Other adversaries of Usselinx' plans included Orangists in rural provinces that loathed the idea of leaving appointments to shareholder democracy. Moreover, the directors of the VOC, who were intimately intertwined with the leadership in the Republic, saw a shareholder advocacy as a dangerous precedent for their own company with its charter due for renegotiation in 1623.<sup>179</sup> This provided another considerable share of the political mandarines with a reason to object to Usselinx plans. Finally, the nail in the coffin of his charter was the plan to establish peaceful settlement colonies in 'unclaimed' territories. The primary common ground between Maurits' Orangists and the 'merchant class' was the war against the Spanish.<sup>180</sup> For the Orangists, the WIC would facilitate opening a new front against the Spanish in the Atlantic that Maurits hoped could alleviate his territorial war effort, while for the merchants it promised riches through the possibility of privateering the illustrious Spanish silver fleet. Usselinx did not (want to) see the limited maneuverability that the Republic offered for the creation of his Company and left the country disappointed in an attempt to find more fertile soil for his ideas with the Swedish King. The common ground between Maurits and the merchant class for the creation of a WIC made it a Company of War, rather than a Company of Trade.

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<sup>177</sup> Ligtenberg, *Willem Usselinx*, 82-86.


<sup>178</sup> C. Lesger, *The rise of the Amsterdam market and information exchange: merchants, commercial expansion and change in the spatial economy of the Low Countries, c. 1550-1630* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 179.

<sup>179</sup> S. van Brakel, *De Hollandsche handelscompagnieën der zeventiende eeuw* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1908), 133-150.

<sup>180</sup> Rees, "Willem Usselinx," 304-305.

## 1.2.2. The lay-out of the WIC

Figure 1-4: The governance structure of the West India Company



The position of Friesland and Groningen is of particular interest for the history of the WIC. The provincial honor of Groningen had been slightly tarnished in 1614 when it had been left out of the *Noordsche Compagnie*, a Holland company chartered for whaling.<sup>181</sup> So when the plans for a WIC were discussed, the provincial States of Groningen sent a delegation to The Hague to negotiate. The States of Holland allowed cooperation from the Groningen delegates, but after they had jointly put something on paper, Holland's provincial assembly brushed aside the proposal of Groningen, and returned to their original draft. The repeated requests of Groningen, joined by Friesland, led the Hollanders to give in: if these northern provinces succeeded in providing half a million in capital, they could have their own director's chamber.<sup>182</sup> Groningen succeeded in bringing up the necessary capital, but Friesland never did. That Friesland failed was largely due to *hubris*, but it formed the basis for a long period of Frisian resentment towards the Company that would resurface in the

<sup>181</sup> Zealand chambers were added in 1616, Friesland chambers only in 1636.

<sup>182</sup> P.J. van Winter, *De Westindische Compagnie ter kamer Stad en Lande* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 4-6.

1630s, the early 1650s, and 1701.<sup>183</sup> Every time the Frisians felt like they could use the WIC as a bargaining chip to gain influence, they did.<sup>184</sup>

The offices of the Company were divided over five chambers: Amsterdam, Zeeland, Maze, Noorderkwartier, and Stad en Lande.<sup>185</sup> Cities or provinces that had not managed to acquire a chamber in the Company were allowed to appoint a director (*bewindhebber*) to every chamber in which they invested 100,000 guilders. The provinces of Utrecht and Gelderland could appoint a director in Amsterdam for example, and the city of Edam could appoint a director in the chamber of Noorderkwartier. The other directors of the chambers were selected by the chamber's city's magistrates from the pool of main investors (*hoofdparticipanten*). In order to qualify as a main investor, one needed to invest 6,000 guilders in Amsterdam or 4,000 guilders in the other chambers. However, there were also a few investor-directors elected by the main investors to control the chamber's policies.<sup>186</sup> Each chamber sent directors to the general board of directors. That board was composed of nineteen people called the *Heeren XIX*. These gentlemen were selected by and from Amsterdam (8), Zeeland (4), Maze (2), Noorderkwartier (2) and Stad en Lande (2). The nineteen gentlemen were completed by a representative from the States General (see Figure 1-4).<sup>187</sup> One director did not necessarily mean one individual, but equaled one vote. Every chamber could send as many directors to the meeting of the board of directors (*Heeren XIX*) as they wished, but they were limited to the allocated number of votes.<sup>188</sup> The Board of Directors convened two to three times a year for several days, and had deputy directors (*gecommiteerde bewindhebbers*) who formed a constant delegation in The Hague to secure the interest of the Company at the *Binnenhof*.

Thus, by 1623 Dutch merchants possessed two companies for the Indies; the VOC for Asia and the WIC for the Americas and Africa. They were of course not the only competitors for overseas riches, but they would prove to be a force to be reckoned with, both in the fields of

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<sup>183</sup> See for example Knuttel 7002: Anonymous, *Vertoogh, over den toestant der West-indische Compagnie* (Rotterdam: Johannes Roon, 1651).

<sup>184</sup> Winter, *WIC ter kamer Stad en Lande*, 10-11.

<sup>185</sup> Maze is Rotterdam and Dordrecht, Noorderkwartier is Enkhuizen and Hoorn, Stad & Lande is Groningen. Amsterdam had initially 20 *bewindhebbers*, Zeeland 12, and the other each had 14, but these numbers would change over time.

<sup>186</sup> Winter, *WIC ter kamer Stad en Lande*, 15-16.

<sup>187</sup> Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de WIC*, 31.

<sup>188</sup> Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 123-125.

trade and war. The plan for the WIC to establish itself in the Atlantic, was laid down in the Grand Design (*Groot Desseyn*). This design consisted of a grand scheme to take over the Southern Atlantic possessions of the Portuguese because since 1580 the Portuguese were included in the Spanish domains through the Union of the Crowns (1580-1640). This meant that Portuguese possessions were, in the rationale of the Republic, a legitimate target in the war with the Habsburg King. The center of these Portuguese possessions was Brazil.<sup>189</sup>

### 1.3. BRAZIL

The colonial commodities that Brazil produced were mainly sugar and a dyewood that produces a deep red dye for the cloth industry. In fact, the name of the country Brazil comes from the words *Terra do Brasil*, or land of Brazil (wood) – even though the initial name of those lands was *Ilha de Vera Cruz*. Sugar and brazilwood had been known in Europe since the Middle Ages, but Brazil provided an option that could produce more of both for a lower price. The sugar plantations and brazilwood logging in the Northeastern part of Brazil for the European market started during the Portuguese colonization.

The Portuguese initially allowed trade by non-subjects. As long as duties were paid, they did not even have to be Catholics to transport the goods from Brazil to Europe. That is, as long as the carriers brought the goods to Lisbon. When Hanseatic traders started bringing goods directly to their own ports non-Iberian involvement became more of an issue. Ten merchants from Hamburg sailed their ships directly to their homeport in 1590.<sup>190</sup> One of these ships and its cargo was collectively owned by three Hamburgers, two Hollanders, and a Portuguese though, so it was not only Hanseatic merchants avoiding the Portuguese ports.<sup>191</sup> The number of ships going directly to cities in northern Germany increased in 1602 to twenty-three.<sup>192</sup> This eventually led to a ban on foreign trade in 1605. Nevertheless, it is

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<sup>189</sup> Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de WIC*, 35-38.

<sup>190</sup> P. Dollinger, *De Hanze: opkomst, bloei en ondergang van een handelsverbond* (Utrecht/Antwerpen: Het Spectrum, 1967), 430.

<sup>191</sup> C.A.P. Antunes, R. Post, and J.P. Salvado, "Het omzeilen van monopoliehandel. Smokkel en belastingontduiking bij de handel in brazielhout, 1500-1674," *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 13, no. 1 (2016); Dollinger, *De Hanze*, 437.

<sup>192</sup> C. Ebert, *Between Empires: Brazilian Sugar in the Early Atlantic Economy, 1550-1630* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 134.

estimated that after 1609 – that is, during the Truce – Dutch merchants imported more than half of the Brazilian sugar, both directly and via Portuguese ports.<sup>193</sup>

A ship destined for Brazil and coming from Europe would have to pass east of the Cape Verde Islands and continue in a southwards direction, potentially even passing the equator until the wind direction would change to east. On that wind, the ships could sail westwards in the direction of Brazil. Depending on the season the current would be northwards, southwards, or still. A ship thus would have to aim either more north or south than its actual destination.<sup>194</sup> This was especially important in the more northern captaincies such as Rio Grande from March to May. Due to a northwards current and a SSE to SE wind it would be impossible to correct a course that was too far to the north. There would be no way back.

In order to capture Brazil from the Portuguese, the WIC sent out an expedition for the conquest of Bahia, the capital of Portuguese Brazil, in the beginning of 1624. The fleet of twenty-six sails commanded by Jacob Willekens arrived at Bahia on 8 May and conquered the city two days later.<sup>195</sup> The news of the conquest of Bahia caused great rejoice in the Republic.<sup>196</sup> The second part of the Grand Design was to also conquer Luanda, the important fortress on the Angolan coast. Piet Heyn, who had been vice-Admiral on the fleet of Willekens, was sent with seven ships to the African coast on 5 August. Willekens himself had left for the Republic to bring the spoils of war, leaving only eleven ships to defend Bahia from a possible Luso-Spanish counter-attack.<sup>197</sup> A Spanish fleet did arrive. It was led by Don Fadrique de Toledo and consisted of fifty-two sails, the largest and strongest fleet to cross the equator until then. After a siege of a month, the WIC soldiers, led by the often-drunk officer Willem Schouten, gave up and were allowed to return to the Republic. A second Dutch fleet, destined to relieve the pressure of the siege in Bahia, was kept in Dutch harbors due to bad winter weather and arrived too late to be of any help. Meanwhile, Piet Heyn had failed in Angola too, only being able to plunder some ships of the coast. Heyn returned to Brazil, but

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<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>194</sup> B.N. Teensma, *Suiker, verfhout en tabak: Het Braziliaanse handboek van Johannes de Laet, 1637. Bezorgd en ingeleid door B.N. Teensma*, vol. 108, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten-Vereeniging (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2009), 55-56.

<sup>195</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 21-23.

<sup>196</sup> M. van Groesen, "Lessons learned: The Second Dutch Conquest of Brazil and the Memory of the First," *Colonial Latin American Review* 20, no. 2 (2011).

<sup>197</sup> Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de WIC*, 38-39.



when confronted with the enormous fleet of Don Fadrique, he was forced to continue his voyage northwards, arriving in Holland at the end of July.<sup>198</sup>

The WIC's endeavor in the southern Atlantic had not only failed, it also depleted the Company's funds. The Company had to bury its ambition as it was laid down in the Grand Design, and changed course. With their last funds, they raised a privateering fleet commanded by Piet Heyn. Cruising off the Brazilian coast he was able to capture twenty-six ships, loaded with more than 2,500 chests of sugar, and tobacco and hides. Through the income the WIC made from Piet Heyn's booty, it was able to equip a fleet of thirty-one sails in the spring of 1628. This fleet with 4,000 men and 689 guns was commanded by Piet Heyn himself, who was now promoted to General, and aimed at capturing one of the Spanish silver-fleets in the Caribbean. On the night of 7 September 1628, Piet Heyn famously succeeded in the Cuban harbor of Matanzas, pouring 8 million guilders worth of silver, and an additional 4 million worth of other goods into the WIC chest.<sup>199</sup>

The WIC now had money to spend again and decided to make another expensive attempt for Brazil. The directors felt they had to move quickly though, as Spanish delegates and the States General attempted to negotiate a peace. Thus, as the VOC had done in the years before 1609, the WIC petitioned to the States General and printed a pamphlet with arguments contributing to the anti-peace lobby in 1629.<sup>200</sup> A peace with Spain and Portugal would greatly limit the execution of the Grand Design. Fortunately for the WIC, the peace negotiations failed. This was largely because of continuing animosity between Holland city councils dating back to the religious dispute between van Oldenbarnevelt and Maurits.<sup>201</sup> The WIC's second attempt for Brazil did not aim for Bahia, but targeted the poorly defended captaincy of Pernambuco.<sup>202</sup> From letters seized in previous campaigns the WIC learned that the fortifications in Olinda and Recife were in a state of disrepair, so a fleet of sixty-seven sails under the command of Hendrick Cornelisz Loncq crossed the Atlantic.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 23-26.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, 28-31.

<sup>200</sup> Knuttel 3909: *Bewindhebbers, Consideratien ende redenen der E, heeren bewind-hebberen, vande geotrojeerde West-Indische Compagnie inde vergaedinghe vande [...] Staten Generael [...] overgelevert, nopende de teghenwoordige deliberatie over den treves met den coning van Hispanjen* (Haarlem: Adriaen Romaan, 1629).

<sup>201</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 563-573.

<sup>202</sup> Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de WIC*, 39.

<sup>203</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 37.

Within two weeks the WIC forces captured Recife and Olinda. They burned down Olinda in 1631 because they deemed it too difficult to defend and they were severely besieged in Recife by guerillas formerly known as Portuguese settlers. Nevertheless, the WIC eventually succeeded in establishing a more permanent bridgehead in Brazil. After successfully breaking through the siege in 1632, the WIC could slowly but steadily expand its territory in Brazil, and the directors could start to think about how to govern the newly acquired colony.<sup>204</sup>

#### 1.4. CONCLUSION

The Dutch Republic was built on traditions and customs originating in de Middle Ages which led to a political structure that was decentralized in nature. As a result, lobbyist in the Republic were required to approach political mandataries on multiple levels. At the same time, the system of representation allowed for 'efficient' lobbying for convincing one individual could resort effects of multiple political levels. Examples of lobbying strategies in this chapter included petitions, personal relations, and pamphlets. The Companies used comparable tactics to people.

Within political system of the Republic there were several issues that limited the formation of lobbying alliances. The most important divider was the ideological party line between republicans and Orangists.<sup>205</sup> This division overlapped to some extent on other issues such as the vision on the role of religion or the nobility in government. However, in case of the latter, the support for Orangists far exceeded the number of members of the nobility in the country. Although some individuals may have supported the societal role of the nobility from a pragmatic or conservative standpoint, an additional explanation are the faction lines that ran through local polities based on clientelism networks. The combination of factions and parties limited the options for alliances of people that tried to lobby.

An example of the difficulties of creating lobbying alliances can be seen in the case of Willem Usselinx' attempts to create a company for the West Indies since the 1590s. After aligning himself with the Stadtholder and thus positioning himself firmly with the Orangists,

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<sup>204</sup> Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de WIC*, 39-41.

<sup>205</sup> Roorda, *Partij en factie*.

he almost by default created opposition from the republicans; in particular van Oldenbarnevelt. Usselinx' vision further failed to expand his alliance by propagating more shareholder advocacy as opposed to clientelist appointments, the Stadtholder as the head of the 'Council of the Indies' as opposed to the States General, and peaceful colonies in 'unclaimed' territories as opposed to conquests at the expense of the Habsburgs. These existing conditions, factions, and party lines provided the bandwidth in which Usselinx, or any other lobbyist, operated as it simultaneously limited and facilitated the maneuverability. That being said, the alliance that led to the creation of the WIC was ultimately forged between supporters of the Orangist party and interests that supported a continued war effort. This example has demonstrated that it was thus important to be knowledgeable on the (im)possibilities of lobbying.



## 2. LOBBYING IN BRAZIL

According to the right of conquest, the WIC was allowed to replace all institutions in Brazil after conquering it from the Portuguese.<sup>206</sup> However, in practice it was more convenient to appropriate some of the existing structures.<sup>207</sup> More importantly, in order to win 'the hearts and minds' of the Portuguese population, the original *senhores d'engenho* were allowed to maintain some of their political bodies and were given privileges such as trade to Europe for the same fees as under Portuguese rule. Winning the hearts and minds was not the only reason though, there was also simply little room to negotiate for the WIC as it needed the Portuguese experience and continuation of sugar production in order to obtain a profitable colony. This did not lead to immediate positive results as many inhabitants remained wary of the new rulers and sugar production lowered compared to previous years, but after the conquest of Paraíba in 1635, the new WIC rulers and the Portuguese plantation owners found a more or less promising way of cohabitation in the Northeastern parts of Brazil. This was in part due to advantageous terms regarding property rights, and the right to bear arms.<sup>208</sup> There were three distinct phases in Brazilian colonial governance for the WIC: 1624/1630-1636 characterized by ad hoc solutions; 1637-1646 dominated by the rule of Johan Maurits; and 1647-1654, marked by the rule of a new High Government (*Hoge Regering*) and the revolt leading to the eventual loss.

This chapter deals with the first two periods, but emphasizes the period of the rule of Johan Maurits because it is a period of relative prosperity, stabilization, and has more available source material. Moreover, especially the last period already receives more attention in the following chapters. This chapter argues that individuals in Brazil had ample opportunity to negotiate the shape of institutions. The negotiation did not only happen between European powers, or between European powers and indigenous powers. Instead,

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<sup>206</sup> D. Armitage, "Introduction," in *Theories of Empire, 1450-1800*, ed. D. Armitage, An expanding world: the European impact on World History 1450-1800 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). Also note that the generality lands were subject to the States General's sovereignty based on the right of conquest. Dutch Brazil is in the archival sources often referred to as the *conquests* in Brazil.

<sup>207</sup> In particular the *Câmaras Municipais* are of interest in this regard, for a more detailed overview which also included the perspective of sugar aristocracy, see: F.T. Luciani, *Municípios e Escabinos: poder local e guerra de restauração no Brasil Holandês (1630-1654)* (São Paulo: Alameda, 2012), 121-161. I would like to thank Mariana Françaço for this reference.

<sup>208</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 53-55.

empire was negotiated on the spot, primarily between the Company and other colonial inhabitants, religious groups or plantation owners.

Negotiation 'on-the-spot' remains an understudied theme for the Dutch experience of empire. While Daniels and Kennedy's *Negotiated Empires* has only one contribution on the Dutch compared to fourteen on the English, French, and Iberians, Belemessous' *Empire by treaty*, focuses on interstate negotiations in Europe that shaped European expansions.<sup>209</sup> Moreover, publications on the subject of colonial negotiations primarily focus on the negotiations between European colonizers and indigenous populations, or the negotiations between the metropolitan center and the colonial periphery.<sup>210</sup> Especially the latter has contributed to an understanding of the 'periphery' as enjoying considerable autonomy. This was partly due to settler dominated colonial governance structures. Secondly, it was the result of the weakness of metropolitan coercive resources which not only forced the companies to negotiate in the colonies, but also forced the states to negotiate with their subjects in Europe.<sup>211</sup> The space for on-the-spot negotiation has been theoretically defined by Richard White as 'middle ground' in 'a world system in which minor agents, allies, and even subjects at the periphery often guide the course of empires'.<sup>212</sup> For the Portuguese colonization of Brazil, Alida Metcalf has expanded this by highlighting the influence and importance of brokers, or what she calls 'go-betweens', who inhabited this middle ground.<sup>213</sup> Lobbyists are a case in point of *transactional go-betweens* that facilitated negotiations between the Company and individuals in the colony. In other words, the literature suggests that on-

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<sup>209</sup> C. Daniels and M. Kennedy, eds., *Negotiated empires: centers and peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820* (New York/London: Routledge, 2002); S. Belmessous, ed. *Empire by treaty: negotiating European expansion, 1600-1900* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

<sup>210</sup> J.P. Greene, *Negotiated authorities: essays in colonial political and constitutional history* (Charlottesville/London: University of Virginia Press, 1994); M. Meuwese, *Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: Dutch-Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595-1674* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012); A. Irigoien and R. Grafe, "Bargaining for absolutism: a Spanish path to Empire and nation building," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 88, no. 2 (2008).

<sup>211</sup> D. Parrott, "From military enterprise to standing armies: war, state, and society in western Europe, 1600-1700," in *European Warfare, 1350-1750*, ed. F. Tallett and D.J.B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); M.J. Braddick and J. Walter, eds., *Negotiating power in early modern society: order, hierarchy and subordination in Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Cardim et al., *Polycentric Monarchies*; Bethencourt, "Political configurations and local powers."

<sup>212</sup> R. White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815. Second Edition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), xxvi-xxvii.

<sup>213</sup> A.C. Metcalf, *Go-betweens and the colonization of Brazil, 1500-1600* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 8-12.

the-spot negotiation of institutions was of paramount importance for the survival of colonial ambitions. This was not different in Dutch Brazil for the WIC as it found itself in a position that required negotiation with the inhabitants that lived in the colony before the conquest. Petitions were but one of many possible avenues of negotiation.

This chapter investigates how inhabitants of Dutch Brazil could succeed in negotiating the institutions that shaped their daily lives through petitions in the colony. It focuses on formal regulations such as regulations on slavery, rather than informal institutions as the latter are difficult to retrace. This chapter starts by chartering the organizational developments of colonial governance in Brazil, before investigating the possibilities of petitioning for colonial institutional change. After an overview of the different categories of petitions in this colony, it investigates two topics in more detail (religion and slavery) as these two were the most important topics in the colony. Lastly, it explains that the organization of colonial governance in this fashion is more practical than more 'top-down' design from the metropolis through a study of the reaction of top-down decision-making.

## 2.1. 1624/1630-1636: AD HOC SOLUTIONS

After creating the 'Great Design', one might expect the WIC to have had a clear plan for the governmental structure of the colonies it aimed to establish. This was not the case – probably because the directors were more concerned with the WIC as a Company of War than with the WIC as a Company of settlement. It was only after the news of the capture of the Bay of All Saints arrived in the Republic in August 1624 that the Board of Directors started to deliberate about the governance structure for Brazil. The so-called 'Concept of Governance' (*Concept van Regieringe*) was ratified by the States General on 1 November 1624 and would apply to all of the WIC's current and future possessions in Brazil.<sup>214</sup> The Concept of Governance was supposed to replace the previous 'instruction letters' (*artikelbrieven*) that accompanied every ship voyage. Instruction letters were intended to administer justice aboard ships, so the Concept of Governance intended to remove jurisdiction from a navy

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<sup>214</sup> H. den Heijer, "Bewindhebbers, gouverneurs en raden van bestuur (Het bestuur van de West-Indische Compagnie in de Republiek en in Brazilië)," in *Brazilië in de Nederlandse archieven (1624-1654): De West-Indische Compagnie, overgekomen brieven en papiersn uit Brazilië en Curaçao*, ed. M.L. Wiesebron (Leiden: 2005), 31.

body to a territorial civic body. The Concept of Governance consisted of seventy-five articles providing regulations for issues including freedom of conscience, protection of property, stipulating the application of Roman-Dutch law<sup>215</sup>, and the layout of the colonial government.<sup>216</sup> The highest political body was to be formed by nine people, but that never materialized because the WIC's possessions in the Bay of All Saints would quickly be lost again.<sup>217</sup>

Before the WIC would set foot on Brazilian soil again, the States General confirmed an adaptation of the Concept of Governance in October 1629. Even though the text differed only marginally from the 1624 version, the Concept of Governance now included all of the current and future territories of the WIC in its charter region and not only Brazil.<sup>218</sup> What remained the same was that the highest political body, the *Political Council*, should consist of nine members representing the different company chambers.<sup>219</sup> Eligible candidates should be born in Republic, or have at least lived there for seven years, of the Reformed religion, and experienced in politics, law, or commerce. Even though they would be selected by the chambers of the WIC, the States General needed to confirm their appointment. The secretary (or *assessor*) of the Council would have to be registered as a notary before departure so that he could draw testaments and other legal documents in the colony.<sup>220</sup> Despite the requirement of nine individuals, the first Political Council only consisted of three civilian members initially, later supplemented by two additional members. They exercised authority over the civilians, whereas Admiral Loncq, an additional member of the Political Council, commanded and administered justice over the army and the navy.<sup>221</sup> Diederick van Waerdenburgh took over this job after Loncq had left, and was given the title of governor. However, van Waerdenburgh would never be allowed to be the presiding member of the Political Council; this function alternated each month between the other members. In the

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<sup>215</sup> The law published in Holland in 1580 that was based on Roman law.

<sup>216</sup> M. van Groesen, "Recht door zee. Ontvoering, mouterij en slavenhandel in Arguin, 1633-1634," in *Het gelijk van de Gouden Eeuw: Recht, onrecht en reputatie in de vroegmoderne Nederlanden*, ed. J. Pollman, H. Cools, and M. van Groesen (Hilversum: Verloren, 2014), 59-60.

<sup>217</sup> Heijer, "Bewindhebbers, gouverneurs en raden van bestuur," 28-30.

<sup>218</sup> Van Groesen is wrong to state that the original Concept was 'greatly expanded', see: Groesen, "Recht door zee," 59. In fact, the number of articles was reduced from 75 to 69.

<sup>219</sup> According to the *negensleutel*: 4 for Amsterdam, 2 for Zeeland, and 1 for the other chambers. See: Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de WIC*, 31.

<sup>220</sup> Article I, II, and III in the Concept of Government.

<sup>221</sup> Heijer, "Bewindhebbers, gouverneurs en raden van bestuur," 32.



case that van Waerdenburgh would be in the field, he would appoint a replacement in the Council. He would tell his replacement a secret password, shared with the president of the Political Council, so that he could be identified as a true replacement. Administration of military justice would be in hands of the governor and court-martial, but criminal affairs that were not military committed by soldiers, 'but punishable through natural, religious, and general laws (...) by anyone from whatever nation, state, or condition' would be administered by the Governor and members of his army detail.<sup>222</sup>

Van Waerdenburgh and the rest of the Political Council mostly disagreed on all issues, and did not succeed in breaking the resistance of the Portuguese soldiers defending the territories of the Portuguese Crown.<sup>223</sup> Consequently, the Board of Directors decided to send two directors, Matthijs van Ceulen (Chamber of Amsterdam) and Johan Gijsseling (Chamber of Zeeland) to Brazil in 1632. They took over both the military and civilian task of the Political Council and employed a more successful and vigorous military offensive action.<sup>224</sup> By the time Gijsseling and van Ceulen returned to the Dutch Republic in September 1634 they had expanded WIC territory significantly.

According to Hermann Wätjen – whose research formed the basis for the works of Charles Boxer, who then together shaped the writing of den Heijer – Gijsseling and van Ceulen installed a Political Council of five members mirroring the five chambers of the WIC: Servatius Carpentier (Norther Quarter), Willem Schotte (Zealand), Jacob Stachouwer (Amsterdam), Balthasar Wyntgens (Maze), and Ippo Eyssens (Groningen).<sup>225</sup> This meant that the governance structure of the colony would have returned to the situation of 1632. However, a report by the Political Council for the States General drafted by Servatius Carpentier in July 1636 paints a slightly different story. Within the 'worldly government', Carpentier makes a distinction between the Political Council with executive functions, and two Court Martials for legal matters over military personnel; one for the army and one for

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<sup>222</sup> Article LI of the Concept of Governance, see also: L. Aitzema, *Saken van Staet en Oorlogh, Vol I, 1621-1632*, vol. 1 (The Hague: Johan Veely, 1669), 1550.

<sup>223</sup> Winter, *WIC ter kamer Stad en Lande*, 119-120.

<sup>224</sup> H. Wätjen, *Das höllandische Kolonialreich in Brasilien. Ein Kapitel aus der Kolonialgeschichte des 17. Jahrhunderts* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1921), 67; Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 53; Heijer, "Bewindhebbers, gouverneurs en raden van bestuur."; Wätjen, *Das höllandische Kolonialreich*, 34.

<sup>225</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 53. (For Carpentier it is stated that he was a member of the Council from 1630 onwards, see NNWB, so it is possible that these are the same five members. Eyssens however was specifically selected for this task by the XIX).

the navy. Within the Political Council each of the five members had their own task. Jacob Stachouwer followed the army. Willem Schotte resided at the Cabo St. Agostino or Serinhaem, governing the lands of Serinhaem up until the Rio de Jangadas. Ippo Eijssens was the governor of the captaincies of Paraíba, Itamaracá, and Rio Grande, while Balthasar Wyntgens and Elias Herckmans (who arrived in 1635) managed affairs in Recife. Thus, the Political Council was not a central body that regularly met. Instead, its members occasionally came together whenever it was deemed necessary. The lower administration, or 'subaltern magistrates' as Carpentier termed them, was in the hands of the Portuguese *câmaras*.<sup>226</sup>

The jurisdiction of religious affairs was in the hands of a Church Council – 'for a long time already' according to Carpentier.<sup>227</sup> This Council was formed by the five Ministers from the Dutch Reformed church, one Minister from the English, French, and German churches, five or six elders, and four deacons. The deacons were responsible for the alms, and the Ministers 'preached in all pureness' so that 'many came eagerly to hear about the word of God'.<sup>228</sup> The military command was in the hands of Sigismund von Schoppe, a Silesian commander on the payroll of the chamber of Groningen.<sup>229</sup> It is stated by Boxer and others that he also had a vote in the Political Council, but the report of 1636 provides no evidence to support that claim.<sup>230</sup>

As the WIC had conquered the whole coastline between Rio Grande and Cabo de St. Agostinho by January 1635 it seemed only a matter of time before the Portuguese would be completely expelled from Brazil. As there were many flashpoints within the Spanish Empire, the appeals for help to Madrid were but one amongst many others from the West Indies, India, Flanders, Italy and the German territories.<sup>231</sup> Moreover, the Spanish Crown allegedly had more interest in the Indian Ocean colonies than in Brazil as far as the Portuguese possessions went.<sup>232</sup> Therefore, help from Spain did not provide further resistance against the WIC offensive. However, different tactical visions between the members of the Political

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<sup>226</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 02-Jul-1636 Report from the Political Council [scan 211-212].

<sup>227</sup> 'Voorts is aldaer voor lange eenen kercken raeth', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, [scan 211].

<sup>228</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, [scan 211].

<sup>229</sup> Winter, *WIC ter kamer Stad en Lande*, 120-121.

<sup>230</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 52-54; Wätjen, *Das holländische Kolonialreich*; Heijer, "Bewindhebbers, gouverneurs en raden van bestuur."

<sup>231</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 54.

<sup>232</sup> Schwartz, *Sovereignty and society*, 96.

Council and Sigismund von Schoppe and his Polish colonel Christoffel Arciszewsky prevented a final push southwards.

The WIC inherited a colonial society in Pernambuco and the other regions under its command that were characterized by both a rural and an 'urbanized' population. Sugar was planted and grown on large rural estates (*fazendas/plantações*) and processed in sugar mills (*engenhos*) that were near rivers and in more or less urbanized regions. Commerce dominated the port cities, but there were shops, brothels, and small trades. An *engenho* was a costly enterprise that required large sums for construction, transport, and labor (enslaved Africans, but also European contract labor and paid free laborers). In the towns, a *câmara* had executive power and was in charge of public order and members of the *câmara* were called *schepenen* in Dutch. The sugar elite from primarily the *engenhos* dominated the *câmaras*, but had a custom of solving most judicial disputes outside the court room.<sup>233</sup> In Portuguese times the members of the *câmara* had been appointed by the governor, a task that after van Waerdenburgh had left was taken over by the members of the political council.

The Political Council argued to the Board of Directors that it needed more military support in the form of 3,600 soldiers to drive out the Portuguese and considered it far from ideal that there were only two permanent members of the Council in Recife.<sup>234</sup> The Board of Directors seemingly did not deem the governance structure of particular importance. If the ad hoc solutions had not made it sufficiently clear, the fact that in the invitation for a meeting 'in the inn this coming Sunday the first of June 1636' and the attached agenda for the meeting there is no mention of the governance structure of the colony, clearly proves that the Board of Directors preferred to discuss other events.<sup>235</sup> The report from the Political Council that arrived in the Republic (together with Carpentier who would further 'stress its importance orally') during the meeting of the Board of Directors put the issue of the colony's governance structure on the table.<sup>236</sup> That is not to say that the Board of Directors settled the issue at this time. But now that it was brought to the fore it appeared on the agenda as the tenth item for

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<sup>233</sup> C.R. Boxer, *Portuguese society in the tropics: the municipal councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda, 1510-1800* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 77-87; Schwartz, *Sovereignty and society*, 95-121.

<sup>234</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, [scan 211-213].

<sup>235</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, [scan 200-204].

<sup>236</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, [scan 214-218].

the next meeting for 8 December 1636.<sup>237</sup> Nevertheless, it would take another meeting in August 1636 before the Board of Directors, following a proposal by Albert Coenraatsz Burgh to appoint Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen.<sup>238</sup> With the arrival of Johan Maurits, the political council transformed from a regionally dispersed organization with its members residing in particular captaincies, to a more centralized body in Recife.

## 2.2. 1637-1646: CONSOLIDATION AND A PRINCE IN THE TROPICS

Johan Maurits was a count, a distant relative of the Stadtholder Frederik Hendrik, and a man of modest military fame. He was appointed for five years as Governor-, Captain-, and Admiral-General and thus united military and civilian authority in his person. Although the title of Governor-General was common practice for the VOC, Johan Maurits was the first and last person in the Atlantic to hold this title.<sup>239</sup> With the Governor-General in 1637 arrived new instructions with 99 articles detailing the new governance structure for various bodies of government.<sup>240</sup> Firstly, the Political Council was replaced by a High and Secret Council, or High Government, of four people. Johan Maurits would preside over the meetings, and the council would have three new members: Adriaen van der Dussen, Matthijs van Ceulen, and Johan Gijsseling, who were all appointed for three years. The High Government had executive power. In the event of a tied vote, Johan Maurits' vote would count double. Secondly, the Political Council got a new function as the court of appeal for criminal and civil justice, and the two financial experts of the Political Council, who in the past had been in charge of paying wages, would assist the High Government in bookkeeping. Over time the name of the Political Council would change to Council of Justice.<sup>241</sup> Lower civil justice would be administered by a body constituted by aldermen (*schepenen*) from the Dutch and Portuguese population. The commonality (*gemeente*) would nominate a triple number of candidates of the white freemen, from which the Governor and High Council selected at

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<sup>237</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, [scan 221-223].

<sup>238</sup> E. Odegard, "Colonial Careers: Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens and career-making in the seventeenth-century Dutch Empire" (Unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden University, 2018).

<sup>239</sup> Peter Stuyvesant, for example, was 'only' Director-General in New Netherland.

<sup>240</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 48.

<sup>241</sup> Heijer, "Bewindhebbers, gouverneurs en raden van bestuur," 36.

least four candidates who would administer civil justice according to 1580 Roman-Dutch law.<sup>242</sup>

The next few years can best be characterized as a period of consolidation. The arrival of Johan Maurits brought relative stability and even territorial expansion for the WIC in Brazil, and the Dutch authority successfully convicted ‘conspiring delinquents’ and ‘lazy inhabitants’ that contributed nothing to the wealth of the colony and were therefore banished to the island of Fernando de Noronha.<sup>243</sup> By 1639 the Council of Justice reached nine members for the first time when Jan Alewijn, Cornelis Nieuwlandt, Adriaen Becker, and Abraham Struijs complemented the already present members. Hendrick de Moucheron was appointed as the new sheriff (*schout*).<sup>244</sup>

Adriaen van der Dussen had crossed the Atlantic back to the Republic in an attempt to further the interests of the High Government in the Republic.<sup>245</sup> The two other members from the High Government requested their return to the Republic too, since their term had come to an end, but the Board of Directors only allowed them to return upon arrival of their successors. But even when these two, Hendrik Hamel and Dirk Codde van den Burgh, arrived, the original members of the High Government still had to remain in Brazil until the financial records were properly accounted for and sent to the Republic.<sup>246</sup> However, the individual responsible for the books, Jacob Aldrichs, had just successfully applied for a seat in the Council of Justice, and his successor, Albert van Breugel, arrived together with Hamel and Codde and it would thus take some time before the financial statements of the colony were successfully sent to the Republic.<sup>247</sup> Even though the Board did not specify why they requested the financial documents, it is understandable that they wished documentation for how was being spent in Brazil. Moreover, it was a task for the Company servants in Brazil to provide accounts. For the Board of Directors this was a last resort to finally obtain the financial statements of the colony. The directors had asked for these statements in every single piece of correspondence in the last four years – with no success. By attaching the fate of Gijsseling’s and van Ceulen’s return to the financial statements, it made sure that the

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<sup>242</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 48, [scan 12-14].

<sup>243</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, [scan 177-189].

<sup>244</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, [scan 257-266].

<sup>245</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, [scan 290-298].

<sup>246</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, [scan 177-189].

<sup>247</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, [scan 177-189].

interests of their servants in the colony (returning) aligned with the interests of the principals in the Republic (providing financial accounts). It is for this reason that the High Government was represented by five individuals (Johan Maurits, and the Council members van Ceulen, Gijsseling, Hamel, and Codde van der Burgh) instead of four when it called together a Diet (*landdag*) on 27 August 1640.

### 2.2.1. The Diet as a colonial tool

The Brazilian Diet of August 1640 was an anomaly never repeated in the history of the WIC's presence in Brazil. It should be stressed that it was at the time not referred to as *Landdag* or Diet in the sources. It is called a 'general meeting' or 'the Portuguese meeting' initially and only called *Landdag* in retrospect when referring back to the meeting.<sup>248</sup> A Diet (*landdag*, literally land-day) was a deliberative assembly on a supra-local level. It was the prominent form of organization in the Dutch Republic. Guelders, Friesland, Groningen, and Drenthe all had a Diet, which was even called *Landdag*. It is no coincidence that these rural provinces had a governmental structure where the 'lands' came together in their Provincial assemblies with little to no influence for the cities. The power of cities was not a given in Dutch rural provinces. It was only after the Act of Abjuration (1581) that eleven Frisian cities received one vote – as opposed to three votes for the different rural districts.<sup>249</sup> In contrast to the Provincial States in Holland and Zeeland that met almost daily, the rural Diets in the Republic met only once or twice a year and were characterized as social events where overlords and farmers met.<sup>250</sup> The VOC also made use of Diets in its colonies such as in Ambon and in Formosa.<sup>251</sup> However, the Diet on Formosa was more of a ceremonial affair intended to stress the Company's rule and might, than a political tool in the hands of the local communities seeking to influence decision-making. Lastly, the WIC colony in New Netherland also had a Diet, which originated in an infamous campaign for a civil

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<sup>248</sup> 'volgens ordre in de gehouden landach beraemt', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scan 1460].

<sup>249</sup> Fruin, *Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen*, 247-252.

<sup>250</sup> Deursen, "Staatsinstellingen in de noordelijke Nederlanden 1579-1780," 383.

<sup>251</sup> F. Valentijn, *Oud en nieuw Oost-Indiën, vervattende een naaukeurige en uitvoerige verhandeling van Nederlands mogentheyd in die gewesten (...)* (Dordrecht/Amsterdam: Joannes van Braam/Gerard onder de Linden, 1726), Vol. II, 110; T. Andrade, "Political spectacle and colonial rule: The *Landdag* on Dutch Taiwan, 1629-1648," *Itinerario* 21, no. 3 (1997).

government by Adriaen van der Donck in 1649, and resulted in ten more Diets in 1653, 1654, 1663, and 1664.<sup>252</sup>

The High Government of Brazil summoned representatives from six different jurisdictions: Mauritsstad, Paraíba, Itamaracá, Iguaraçu, Porto Calvo, and Serinhaem. Each jurisdiction had representatives from a corresponding *câmara* and representatives from one or more commonalities (*gemeente*). The jurisdiction Mauritsstad, for example, had three aldermen from the *câmara*, and representatives from the commonalities Várzea, Cabo, Pojuca, St. Lourens, Moribeeque, St. Amaro, and Paribi and Gegourivi. This made for 55 delegates with Portuguese names for all the jurisdictions. This would suggest that by 1640 only Portuguese and Luso-Brazilians occupied the lower representative bodies. However, already in 1637 there had been Dutch members of different *câmaras*.<sup>253</sup> Therefore, it seems like the Diet was principally a colonial tool to facilitate interactions between the Portuguese inhabitants and the WIC High Government. On the other hand, the High Government had, as the result of a petition from the *câmara* of Olinda, allotted specific hours in their schedule for dealing with 'Portuguese affairs' (Tuesday and Friday between 8-12 in the morning).<sup>254</sup> Thus, it seems that the Diet principally existed to offer *câmaras* that were further from Recife a convenient and centralized moment to discuss 'Portuguese' issues with the High Government.

The session started with all delegates pledging an oath to keep the issues discussed in this meeting private and not even discuss them amongst each other, swearing this by putting two fingers in the air and promising this to God Almighty. None of the participants were allowed to leave for the duration of the meeting without a license from the High Government, and it was not allowed to cast a negative vote on a proposition by the High Government without substantiating it with fundamental arguments. The delegates were also allowed to bring further propositions to the meeting, as long as it was in the interest 'of the commonwealth'. In other words, this Diet was not a forum to air grievances that only concerned the limited relation between ruler and subject or groups of subjects, but it was a

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<sup>252</sup> H. Cornelisse, "'For the best interest of the country", the Landdag of New Netherland: development of a provincial assembly (1649-1664)," *De Halve Maen* 87, no. 3 (2015).

<sup>253</sup> See Chapter 3.

<sup>254</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scan 483].

deliberative body implementing laws that affected the general population ‘in this republic’.<sup>255</sup>

### 2.2.2. The Brazilian Diet of 1640

The High Government started the Diet by saying that it was assured that it was clear to everyone that it was trying to do everything in its power to advance and preserve the interests of inhabitants of Brazil, and to administer good justice. Nevertheless, it was clear to the authorities that some individuals were abusing their power, creating nuisance by insolences, or resorting to thievery and extortion. The root of this problem, the High Government continued, was the ‘little affection the Portuguese inhabitants have for the Dutch nation’.<sup>256</sup> To show the high esteem the High Government had for the Portuguese the government had organized this meeting, inviting the most prominent Portuguese inhabitants in order to remedy the difficulties they had experienced. The High Government reached out a helping hand (*handtreijckeninge* in their own words) to kindle fondness in the Portuguese hearts by proposing five solutions to problems that they were aware of.

The five propositions from the High Government were plans to remedy different threats experienced by the honest, WIC-supporting, Portuguese sugar producers: thieves and bandits, collateral damage from defensive war efforts, burglars, violence by rebellious Portuguese, and abuse of power by WIC servants such as sheriffs and military officers. The Portuguese preferred a solution that allowed more than simply bearing arms. Carrying guns, the Portuguese argued, would only escalate the conflict and increased their risk of dying. Moreover, it was hard to distinguish between thieves and roaming soldiers; how would the Portuguese make sure not to be prosecuted for killing a soldier? Nevertheless, the High Government immediately allowed the Portuguese the right to bear arms and promised to provide guns and ammunition to them, as this would also protect the Dutch from possible encounters with robbers and arsonists.<sup>257</sup> Interestingly enough, the *câmara* of Olinda had already requested and received the right to bear arms to allow the inhabitants to defend

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<sup>255</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 1355-1361].

<sup>256</sup> ‘twelck ons alles dunckt sijn oorspronck principelijck te nemen met de kleine affectie die de portugeesche ingesetenen hebben tot de Nederlantsche natie’, NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scan 1362].

<sup>257</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 1363-1367].



themselves against marooned slaves (*bosnegers*) in 1637.<sup>258</sup> This regulation of bearing arms of 1640 was thus less about bearing arms, but rather about who could be targeted – this now included Europeans.

This solution was accepted, but the representatives from the captaincies of Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Itamaracá stressed that they did so under protest. They agreed that it was a natural affair to protect oneself, and they greatly appreciated the support provided by the High Government. However, they insisted that they could never be asked to use their weapons against the King of Spain, but only for the defense of their own property.<sup>259</sup>

Bearing arms, even when not requested to use against the King of Spain, failed of course to provide a solution to the abuse of power by WIC servants. The High Government emphasized that it was aware of this issue in the administration of justice, and pointed to the evil-mindedness and greed of individual servants. Since the High Government proposed solutions to effectively remove this practice, it demonstrates that they did not think that it was an issue of the WIC servants as a whole, but an issue of aligning the interest of individual agents with that of the High Government. In order to remedy this, Johan Maurits and the High Government drafted new instructions requiring the *schepenen* to keep a record of prosecutable events in their jurisdiction and who they thought was accountable, especially when it involved sheriffs or military officers. This roll would have to be sent to the High Government every three months by each of the *câmaras*.<sup>260</sup> The *câmaras* officially had no jurisdiction over the sheriffs or military personnel, but the roll would provide the necessary coercion to keep the WIC personnel in check as it would provide a record for the High Government of all crimes and misdemeanors. If a military officer or sheriff arrested, or threatened to arrest, an inhabitant, and the inhabitant would complain about mistreatment by this sheriff or military officer, the High Government could check whether indeed the citizen was under investigation or not. If the *schepenen* colluded with the abusive sheriffs or military officers, and the High Government found out, they would be harshly punished. The different delegates unanimously approved of this ordinance.

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<sup>258</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 479-481].

<sup>259</sup> In a Portuguese system, the right to property gave the right to bear arms. However, it made one part of the conscriptive population. The Portuguese population was afraid of being called to arms against a King they (still) considered a universal monarch.

<sup>260</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 1391-1392].

The way in which Company agents were monitored bears a resemblance to the way crews of English navy ships were scrutinized by the lieutenant who was on board.<sup>261</sup> It was as difficult for the English Admiralty to induce their captains to behave in a favorable manner on a ship somewhere in the ocean as it was for the High Government to make their servants behave agreeably in remote captaincies in Brazil. And just like a lieutenant could not be removed or demoted by an individual captain, the *schepenen* could not be removed by the superior (the sheriff was the president of the *câmaras*) they reported on. The creation of the roll thus created an independent mechanism for the High Government to monitor its agents in the field. This example shows how the Portuguese inhabitants of Brazil were important in the creation of institutional solutions for WIC affairs, including that of monitoring WIC personnel.

Following the hopeful solutions for the abovementioned issues, the *câmaras* of Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Itamaracá introduced a petition the next day, 1 September 1640, that was signed by fifty people. It was one of several, possibly staged, petitions by the Portuguese inhabitants requesting Johan Maurits to stay in Brazil indefinitely, and it is one of the very rare petitions that have survived in the minutes of the meetings of the High Government. The petitioners list the reasons why they wanted 'his excellency' to stay. This included his diligent control over military discipline and order, his vigor for the common wealth, love for the community, and the joy of being governed by 'a flawless prince'.<sup>262</sup> This phrase offers some insight into the sentiments of the Portuguese colonial population towards WIC rule. During the Habsburg period, all men who had served in Portuguese Brazil as Governor-General had been members of the military nobility whose social status undoubtedly reinforced their political authority.<sup>263</sup> Just like the nobility in the Republic deemed governance a noble prerogative, the Portuguese inhabitants, especially the nobility of the land, must have loathed the merchant governance structure before Johan Maurits' arrival.<sup>264</sup> Catholic state ideology dictated that 'the king ruled as the head of the body politic, the nobility were the arms that defended it, the clergy the heart that guarded its soul, and the

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<sup>261</sup> Allen, *The institutional revolution*, 132-136.

<sup>262</sup> 'dat hij een prince is verre van alle gebreecken', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 1396-1399].

<sup>263</sup> Schwartz, *Sovereignty and society*, 192-193.

<sup>264</sup> See paragraph 1.2.1.

commoners those who gave it the energy and sustenance to survive'.<sup>265</sup> Merchants, professionals, and artisans belonged amongst the commons and there was thus very little room for merchant regents in Portuguese ideology. In Johan Maurits' arrival, the *câmara* had a governor they could understand.

The petitioners added that they preferred Johan Maurits to remain in office permanently (or at least another term) because he was so attentive to increasing the profit and rents for the illustrious WIC. It seems highly doubtful that the Portuguese were particularly interested in the profitability of the company, suggesting that either this petition was orchestrated or that the Portuguese sensed what would appeal to the board of directors, or perhaps a combination of both. Moreover, in economic terms the WIC offered bottoms to ship their sugar to Europe, and the prices for slaves were, at this point, not too expensive.<sup>266</sup> Either way, the High Government promised that its two members embarking on a ship back to patria, van Ceulen and Gijsseling, would deliver this petition to the directors of the WIC and sing its praises.

The Diet, however, continued the following days with the review of 81 petitions submitted by the various jurisdictions. The Brazilian Diet formalized access of representatives of the various jurisdictions in Brazil to the High Government, which shows that the *câmaras* with their *schepenen* were not merely courts administering lower justice, as stated by Den Heijer.<sup>267</sup> Even though the *câmaras'* second function was not described in the original instructions sent to Brazil with Johan Maurits (see above), the *câmaras* retained their 'Portuguese' function as consultation Councils through which local issues percolated to the colonial administration. Moreover, as will be shown in the next section, the High Government stimulated regulations for, and formalization of petitions to the *câmaras*. This meant that the WIC became increasingly reliant on Portuguese cooperation in effective administration of the colony and that the *câmaras* in Brazil remained a body based on

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<sup>265</sup> S.B. Schwartz, *Sugar plantations in the formation of Brazilian society: Bahia, 1550-1835* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 246.

<sup>266</sup> In 1637 the price of one slave was around 145 reals-of-eight (or around 347 guilders), in 1641 the price of a slave was around 452 guilders (or around 188 reals-of-eight) towards the end of the WIC rule in Brazil the price would go up to 2,000 pounds of sugar (or around 20,000 guilders) in 1654. For 1637 see: NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scan 519], for 1641 see: G.W. Kernkamp, "Brieven van Samuel Blommaert aan den Zweedschen rijkskanselier Axel Oxenstierna, 1635-1641.," *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap Utrecht* 29 (1908): 195. For 1654, see: H. Thomas, *The slave trade: the story of the Atlantic slave trade* (New York/London: Simon & Schuster, 1997), Appendix 4.

<sup>267</sup> Heijer, "Bewindhebbers, gouverneurs en raden van bestuur," 36.

Portuguese traditions for WIC colonial government. Thus, despite the colonial take-over, much of the previous colony remained intact, and the WIC adopted a 'Portuguese' model that they 'Dutchified' in name, but in practice did not change all that much.

### 2.2.3. The 81 petitions of August 1640

Petitions were normally not copied in the minutes of the High Government.<sup>268</sup> It is sometimes mentioned in passing that the Council had received multiple complaints on certain issues, but the complaints themselves are absent from the minutes. Most petitions seem to have been related to soldiers pleading to become freemen.<sup>269</sup> The opening statement in the Diet further show that concerns over thieves, marauding bands, and abuse of power by civil servants were being voiced to the High Government without traces of formal petitions. Anecdotal evidence of petitioning is also scarce. Charles Boxer tells the story by Frei Manuel Calado who published a book in 1648 called *O valeroso Lucideno e triumpho da liberdade*. Calado reports on a deputation of several planters' wives to Johan Maurits requesting a pardon for Dona Jeronima de Almeida who had been condemned for sheltering guerillas. After some courteous exchanges between the Governor-General and the women, Johan Maurits assured them that he would do everything in his power to see that their petition would end favorably and subsequently commuted Almeida's death sentence. The planter's wives had received access to Johan Maurits' court through a broker, Gaspar Dias Ferreira, who apparently received the majority of ninety chests of sugar intended to receive a favorable apostille.<sup>270</sup> Dias Ferreira was one of the *schepenen* in the *câmara* of Mauritsstad, but it is unclear whether he acted in his capacity of public servant or as private individual. It might very well have been a bribe since 'gifts' and bribes were not unheard of in Brazil. João Fernandes Vieira<sup>271</sup> who reminisced that to the Dutch he had 'regularly given bribes and gifts, as well as grandiose banquets, to all the governors and their ministers to keep them happy'.<sup>272</sup> Other anecdotes of petitions to the High Government suggest that the use of a broker was not always necessary, and that individuals often simply 'entered' the meeting

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<sup>268</sup> In contrast to the meeting of the High Council in New Netherland for example.

<sup>269</sup> See April 1637 for example NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 430-471].

<sup>270</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 126-127.


<sup>271</sup> The same as the individual leading the revolt against the WIC in the 1640s.

<sup>272</sup> Quoted in: J. Capistrano de Abreu, *Chapters of Brazil's Colonial History, 1500-1800* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 86.

or ‘appeared’ in front of the High Government. It is not unlikely though that the secretary of the High Government, who doubled as a notary, would ‘prepare’ the different groups for an audience at the meeting.

The 81 petitions to the Diet are divided over the different jurisdictions; Mauritsstad was responsible for the largest share (36.3 percent) with 33 petitions, followed by Iguaraçu (19 petitions), Serinhaem and Porto Calvo (both 9 petitions), Itamaracá and Paraíba (both 8 petitions), and St. Laurens (5 petitions). Not all petitions were presented by a *câmara*. The petitions from Itamaracá seem to have had no representative jurisdiction at all, and like the first five of Mauritsstad, they were presented by the *gemeente*, as were the petitions from St. Laurens. Furthermore, the petitions bearing on the role of the *schepenen* (which are categorized under justice) were not signed by the *schepenen* themselves although they were presented on behalf of the *câmara*. The petitions by Mauritsstad were divided over different topics: religion, justice, war, and police. Unfortunately, the other jurisdictions did not provide a similar subdivision per topic. Therefore, for the purpose of making them comparable, all petitions (including the Mauritsstad petitions) are redivided in six categories: the four original topics, plus ‘regulations’ and ‘finance’. Some of the Mauritsstad petitions that had originally been filed under the topic ‘police’ or ‘justice’ thus received a new category in Graph 2-1.

Graph 2-1 The different categories of the petitions presented at the Diet in August 1640 (n=91)



Source: NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 1400-1429].

In order to explain the different categories each will be illustrated by one or more examples. The financial category is perhaps the most straightforward. One example of this category was a petition to be excused from contribution to the building of bridges by unspecified individuals from Itamaracá. This was to no avail, as the High Government deemed this petition inadmissible. Instead, the delegates were told to address their local *schepenen*. This made sense as the *câmaras* were traditionally responsible for local infrastructure. The existence of inadmissible petitions shows that not all the petitioners were aware of the role and function of the Diet and that the Brazilian petitions were neither exclusively the beginning nor the end of the process of interaction between ruler and subject.

The war category is somewhat questionable as the cases could be categorized as 'regulations' as well, but because all of these petitions dealt with regulations for the army and Mauritsstad already filed them under 'war', all other petitions are also classified as such. These included a petition by the *câmara* of Iguaraçu requesting that WIC soldiers could show more respect when entering Portuguese (Catholic) churches. It was not difficult for the High Government to respond favorably to this request; they went even further and decided to address the issue by forbidding their soldiers to go into Catholic churches altogether. The category of police includes several unrelated issues. One was a petition requesting an arrangement for the payment of the *schepenen* from excises on drinks and the farming of fishing rights on the beach. The petitioners did not have a preference, nor did not want to dictate the High Government what to do, as they suggested that the Council would define the further specifics of this arrangement. The High Government responded that they would revisit this issue in the future to reach a definitive answer. Another petition in this category is one by Mauritsstad requesting the authority on behalf of the High Government to punish individuals for stealing stones designated for the construction of walls. This authority was transferred to the *schepenen*. The second largest category, that of justice, is made up of issues related to the *câmara*. Again, these are to a large extent regulatory issues and could have been filed under 'regulations' as well, but they do include other issues, such as the petition to remove the office of sheriff from Paraíba. The High Government responded negatively. Another request, by Itamaracá, tried to prevent the High Government from replacing their *schepenen* by *schepenen* from Goyana. The Council did not proceed to replace the *schepenen*,

but emphasized that they would keep this option open. The *câmara* of Serinhaem meanwhile received a positive apostille on their petition to remove its sheriff, Jan Blaer, 'as he was a burden for the jurisdiction'. The latter unfortunately is a rare example of extensive deliberation on the apostille the petitioners received, while most of the time the High Government is even more brief in the justification of their decisions.

#### 2.2.4. Petitions for regulations

The petitions regarding regulations and religion deserve more detailed attention as they showcase how institutions in the WIC colony were created through a process of structuration. The petitions regarding regulations include for example a request by the *câmara* of Mauritsstad to publish an ordinance prohibiting outside overnight storage of sugar. The practice of overnight storage, the petitioners argued, was damaging the quality of the sugar. This was not yet noticeable in Brazil, but it was clear to them that the people in Holland would see the difference if the sugar had been wet due to dew. Another regulatory issue for sugar involved the weight and measurements of sugar chests. Every sugar chest stated its weight so that it was possible to determine the *tarra*: the difference between the sugar and the sugar plus chest. Some sugar producers, according to the petition, underreported the weight of their chests, thus artificially boosting the net weight of their sugar. To battle this practice, the petitioners proposed that a register of chest producers be deposited at the *câmaras* and that a requirement be introduced to burn marks onto the chests in order to trace chests to the swindlers. The first issue of regulating overnight storage received a positive decision, but the second issue was deferred for future decision-making.

The weight of the crates has been a contested issue between sugar producers and merchants throughout colonial Brazilian history. Unless an *engenho* had its own saw mill, the wood for the crates would arrive precut, and then assembled by a crater (*caixeiro*).<sup>273</sup> Most crates from Dutch Brazil could hold between 20 and 25 *arrobas* of sugar, but there were outliers of 6.5 or 28 *arrobas*.<sup>274</sup> Crates that were transported for the WIC were branded with the Company logo (GWC), but crates from private traders could have a wide variety of logos resembling whichever *engenho* or particular tenant farmer (*lavrador*) had produced it. Larger producers, such as Gaspar Dias Fereira only exported their own sugar (marked GFD), but


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<sup>273</sup> Schwartz, *Sugar plantations*, 121-122.

<sup>274</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 52 [scans 577-582].

others obtained sugar from a variety of different producers. (See Figure 2-1). The declared quality of the sugar was a second contested issue in Brazil. Higher quality sugar (*brancos*) could be on top of lower quality sugar (*moscovados*) or even rocks. In a case of dispute the planters argued that poor quality, or weight issues were due to poor handling in the port or being exposed to the elements too long. A poor reputation of Brazilian sugar would make it more difficult to sell in Europe. Whereas this argument was put forward by merchants in Lisbon in the case of Portuguese Brazil, it was put forward by the *câmaras* in Dutch Brazil. Moreover, Portuguese Brazil only adopted regulations for branding of crates in 1657, when governor Francisco Barreto issued an order to register individual brands in the *câmara* of Salvador.<sup>275</sup> Thus, this petition to regulate the 'brands' of chests brings up three important issues. Firstly, it highlights that the *câmara* requested regulations to solve disputes with the sugar planters, who tried to hide behind poor handling or exposure to elements. Secondly, it shows that in this particular issue the WIC was in fact ahead of the Portuguese in regards to regulations to improve the reputation of Brazilian sugar for a European market. And thirdly it demonstrates that the *câmara* represented the interests of the *engenhos* and not of the *fazendas* and that the High Government was a legitimate mediator in this dispute.

Figure 2-1: Examples of markings on sugar crates with from left to right: WIC, variety of producers, and Gaspar Dias Ferreira on the ship *Southberg* in 1637.



Source: NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 52 [scans 577-582].

<sup>275</sup> Schwartz, *Sugar plantations*, 123.



Despite the changing façade of the colony in Brazil, the sugar producers succeeded in introducing institutions (formal regulations) that regulated covered storage of sugar to enhance the value, quality, and reputation, and thus the competitiveness of their sugar on a global market. The petitions were not limited to the regulations involving sugar, however. There were also successful petitions for a ban on the slaughter of yearling cows in order to maintain a stable supply of cows and oxen for sugar production in the future.<sup>276</sup> Another example of the bottom-up creation of institutions structuring economic transactions is the proposed limited liability for *senhores de engenhos*, proposed by Itamaracá. This led to the High Government preparing an instruction to limit the claim of creditors to only half of the sugar production and forbid the foreclosure/distress sale (*executeeren*) of sugar factories and its belongings necessary for the production of sugar to repay debt. These types of petitions were also reasonably common in Bahia around the same time, and regulations targeted at limiting the liability were created in an attempt to maintain a yearly flow of sugar.<sup>277</sup>

Furthermore, the petitions in the WIC territories also aimed at regulating access to the political and judicial bodies. Both Iguaraçu and Mauritsstad submitted a request to appoint a solicitor to their *câmaras* to streamline the petitioning process. It regularly happened in several hamlets in their jurisdictions that an event occurred that warranted a petition. The *câmaras* deemed it fair that they would appoint a solicitor that would petition on behalf of those involved, to lower the threshold to submit a petition as the solicitor would know how to petition and who to address. For the *câmara* it would streamline the process as they would have the required information. The request of the two *câmaras* was forwarded to the Board of Directors in the Republic, who decided favorably to this request.<sup>278</sup> Other proposed regulations that aimed to improve access to judicial and political bodies, involved a limit for the cost of judicial and political actions. Again Iguaraçu and Mauritsstad independently petitioned for the same thing. Even though the High Government deferred the issue initially, it appointed a committee that reached a decision early November that was consequently confirmed by the High Government. A decision on a large petition would cost 18 stivers and a normal or small petition 12 stivers. Presenting a request would cost another 12 stivers.

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<sup>276</sup> Oxen and horses were used for the sugar mills, and to transport goods from the sugar fields to the mills, see: Schwartz, *Sovereignty and society*, 112-113.

<sup>277</sup> Schwartz, *Sugar plantations*, 194-196.

<sup>278</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, [scans 5-6].

These costs would have to be paid to the *câmara* where the petition was presented. A solicitor or lawyer could charge one guilder for his efforts in soliciting a petition, and another guilder for listening to the verdict.<sup>279</sup> There are no specifications for drafting and presenting requests for individuals without the means to afford them. A master mason working on a stone bridge in Recife made a little bit over 172 guilders per month, a day laborer and his slave working on a gun mount (*affuit*) earned about six guilders per day, and a Portuguese carpenter made two *patacas* per day.<sup>280</sup> This indicates that access to justice and submitting a petition was neither cheap nor expensive, and seemed open to everyone. The costs of appealing a case (4 to 10 guilders depending on the typology of the case) were too low however, as becomes clear from an advice two years later from the Council of Justice. Too many people were appealing with ‘the slightest shadow of a chance’ in an attempt to delay their final sentencing. Therefore, the High Government adopted a resolution from the States of Holland punishing the pursuit of unfounded appeal cases (*boete van fol appel*).<sup>281</sup> Thus, on the one hand the financial requirements created a threshold preventing the political and judicial bodies to be buried in paperwork, while at the same time the maximum costs of petitions were regulated. This emphasized the importance that both the *câmaras* and High Government attached to the accessibility of their bodies for the people in Brazil. That being said, there is nothing that indicates that non-Europeans had the possibility to petition, and it seems that the *câmara* primarily served the interests of the owners of the *engenhos*.

The most far-reaching petition was a request by the *câmara* of Mauritsstad. It proposed that contracts signed in the period under Spanish rule should be considered under the Spanish law instead of Roman-Dutch law of 1580. This was a petition with potentially far-reaching consequences. The High Government responded that it was not their decision to make, and forwarded this petition to the Board of Directors in the Republic. Unfortunately, it seems that these *Heeren XIX* never responded to this request. It is nevertheless telling that the *câmara* felt at liberty to put the legal foundation of the colony up for debate. This shows once more the great potential for petitions in the making and shaping of colonial institutions. Of all the ten petitions from the Diet that were forwarded to the Board of Directors four had to

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<sup>279</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 1498-1502].


<sup>280</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scans 1064-1066]; NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, [scans 214-239].

<sup>281</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1153].

do with religion, four with justice, and two with regulations. Religion was something that the High Government did have less autonomy than on the issue of regulations.

In contrast to the petition requesting a revision of contracts that did not receive a positive apostille from the Board of Directors, other petitions with potentially far-reaching consequences did. One such petition was to add a Portuguese *schepen* to the Council of Justice when cases that involved Portuguese customs (*gebruicken*) were appealed. Another example was the request by the *câmara* of Mauritsstad to install a Burgomaster or otherwise vice-Burgomaster in the city. Notwithstanding the initial negative response by the High Government, the Board of Directors later decided to create a new office of Burgomaster to 'lighten the workload for the *schepenen*'. However, they did specify that the Burgomasters of Mauritsstad had to be Dutch, from the Reformed religion, and of good standing.<sup>282</sup> Even though the initial petition did not immediately resort the requested effect, it did eventually lead to an alteration in the institutional outline of the colony.

Graph 2-2: The success rate of petitions submitted at the *Landdag* of August 1640



The majority of petitions received a positive decision and petitions receiving 'nihil on their request' even form the smallest category. There is not one type of petitions that stands out in this category and it is reasonably evenly spread. That being said, issues of religion were forwarded rather than responding negatively. Among the petitions that requested the same as a petition of another jurisdiction the majority requested something that had already

<sup>282</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, [scans 5].

received a positive apostille and no distinction was made between the different captaincies as they received the same response to the same requests. All petitions together thus show the permeability of the colonial government for the Portuguese population. Moreover, the two colonial systems of governance seem to have integrated quite well around 1640. Both the issue with the Burgomasters in Mauritsstad, as well as the formalization and regulation of petitioning to the *câmaras* further show how the WIC did not centralize power in the High Government. Instead, both decision-making and judicial power was highly decentralized and was, to a large extent, left in the hands of Portuguese inhabitants. These inhabitants did not always agree, however. Especially on the issue of the planting, rationing, and taxation of manioc the opinions differed greatly. In the Brazilian Diet's discussion of the Brazilian diet, some wanted prohibitions on mandatory cultivation of manioc, while others wanted prohibition of growing manioc for commercialization. This issue was solved by the High Government's response that these issues should be the authority of the lower jurisdictions and not be regulated on a central level. Another highly contested issue in the colony, albeit with more uniformity amongst the districts, was that of religion.

### 2.3. RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

If the order of the presented petitions is any indication of the importance in the eyes the presenters they must have thought religious issues were the most pressing as the *câmara* of Mauritsstad started with five petitions that were filed under religion. Religion was the third most prominent category of petitions overall. Other districts also started with religious themes, and can be summarized as petitions requesting the same issues as Mauritsstad. The only *câmara* not requesting the same religious liberties was that from Iguaraçu. Instead it requested that local children would be allowed to study in Rome and Spain and to accept priestly duties. This request was forwarded to the Board of Directors. A petition to which the High Government did respond requested that Catholic priests be allowed to visit Catholic criminals before the execution of their death penalty. The government's response was rather ambiguous: it 'hoped everybody would abide to the law' in order to prevent people being sentenced to death. Clearly this had not happened yet. This once more emphasizes that petitions from the *câmaras* were not merely responding to current issues or problems, but

that they took a pro-active role in the institutional framework of the colony; actively lobbying occurred to improve the colony.

The issues that were petitioned by the majority of the jurisdictions involved five themes that were presented as four: [1] The introduction of freedom of religion not just in words, but also in practice; [2] Permission to petition the pope for a vicar-general or bishop in Brazil; [3.1] Sending new Catholic priests from Holland to enter the country; [3.2] The arrangement of financial compensation for Catholic priests; [4] Freedom to express religion 'in the streets, in the church, and in public spaces' without being harassed – in particular by army officers. Issues 1, 2, and 3.1 were put in the hands of Gijsseling who was in charge of bringing these issues to a meeting of the Board of Directors. The High Government did decide on issue 3.2 and 4. The apostille on the petition does not indicate what this distinction is based on, but it seems that 3.2 was a local issue, and 4 was something the High Government already knew the WIC's response to. The High Government allocated the *engenho* of Masurepe to the petitioners, who were allowed to use the income it generated to pay for Catholic priests. A tract of land in Paraíba to grow sugar cane was later added.<sup>283</sup> The old sugar mill of Masurepe would come to play a central role in the information network for dissident religious correspondence.<sup>284</sup> Regarding the request permitting Catholics to express their faith in public spaces, the High Government responded firmly and strict: 'The Portuguese are allowed freedom and complete exercise of their religion within the walls of their church', and then added that it would be 'best if they would express their content' to avoid 'other inconveniences'.<sup>285</sup> It should be emphasized that this argument mirrored that of several writings of the Brazilian classis in 1641 almost word for word. This general idea was based on the Calvinist theologian Gisbertus Voetius' opinion on freedom of conscience.<sup>286</sup> Voetius distinguished two 'freedoms' of conscience. The first is just freedom of the mind, often found

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<sup>283</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 1459-1460].

<sup>284</sup> F.L. Schalkwijk, *The reformed church in Dutch Brazil (1630-1654)* (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, 1998), 286-287.

<sup>285</sup> 'De Portugeesen wordt toegestaan de libere ende volcomen exercitie van haer religie, binnen hare kercken. En t is best dat sij sich daermede contenteren om niet eenige andere inconvenientien onderworpen te sijn, daer geen remedie tegen en is', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 1402-1403].

<sup>286</sup> Schalkwijk, *The reformed church*, 290.

in 'Papal' nations according to Voetius. A second type is freedom of private worship of God in the family circle in the domestic sphere, often found in Protestant regions.<sup>287</sup>

The Board of Directors did not respond to the religious petition regarding the freedom of religious belief and the bishopric. The office of vicar-general (of Paraíba and not Dutch Brazil entirely) had existed since 1627; it had not been manned by a representative of the pope, but by father Gaspar Ferreira since 1636.<sup>288</sup> This vicar-general had gained importance after the Dutch had forbidden contact with the Bishop in Bahia in 1635.<sup>289</sup> Because a response from the Board of Directors remained forthcoming, the (Catholic) Portuguese inhabitants petitioned again two years later. This time they combined the request for the liberty of conscience with a request to erect a church in Mauritsstad. Again, the High Government responded that it would forward this decision to the Board of Directors, adding that it would 'recommend favorably' on this request.<sup>290</sup>

### **2.3.1. The power of the church**

As a Church of Dutch origin, the Church in Brazil followed the Church Order of Dordrecht from 1618. The Reformed Church was organized in local consistories (*kerkenraad*), elders (presbyters), and deacons. Transcending the local religious authority was a state-wide classis. The consistory met once a week in Recife and Paraíba under the direction of one of the pastors. The deacons were responsible for poor relief. In the twelve other, smaller churches the deacons took part in the consistory, which met with less regularity. A consistory received its authority from the classis and made decisions by a majority vote. The classis was organized in the beginning of 1636, and was split into two classes six years later; one for Pernambuco and one for Paraíba. This created a synod of these two classes combined. Thus, by 1642 the church hierarchy was local in consistories, regional in classes, and colony-wide in a synod. The High Government relied on a church representative at the synod (political commissioner – which was Codde in 1641) in its dealing with the Reformed

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<sup>287</sup> H.A. Krop, "The General Freedom which All Men Enjoy in a Confessional State. The Language of Politics in the Dutch Republic," in *The Paradoxes of Religious Toleration in Early Modern Political Thought*, ed. J.C. Laursen and M. Villaverde (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2012), 73.

<sup>288</sup> It is unclear if this the same as Gaspar Dias Ferreira, the *schepen* of Mauritsstad.

<sup>289</sup> Schalkwijk, *The reformed church*, 279-280.

<sup>290</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1122].

Church after 1641.<sup>291</sup> In fact, a synod was the only means for the colonial secular government to exercise influence on the Church. The synod in the Republic functioned primarily as a means of answering theological questions that exceeded the expertise of the colonial agents.<sup>292</sup>

The organization of the Church was paid for by the WIC, but special earmarked funds were furnished by the classes of Amsterdam and Walcheren (Zealand), or by churches in the Republic. More often than not, these were churches in WIC chamber cities such as Delft.<sup>293</sup> Because pastors were paid by the WIC, the interests of the Church and the company were often intertwined. The salary of a pastor was almost equal to that of a naval captain. The salaries of church workers were to be paid directly from church patrimony. When the WIC decided to levy an 'ecclesiastical tax' in the form of a small reduction in pay for all other servants, this caused anger in both Brazil and the Republic. This led to a lobby campaign in pamphlets and petitions by churches in Holland to end this policy.<sup>294</sup>

The creation of a Synod aimed at resolving two issues. Firstly, it would limit the time pastors had to spend travelling back and forth to church meetings, facilitating a more expedite handling of church affairs. And secondly, it would provide churches the opportunity to appeal decisions at a higher Council. Moreover, the synod would be permitted direct correspondence with synods in the Republic and the political commissioner was bound to be present. The proposal for the synod was sent to the Republic for approval. For church affairs the Directors of the Company had two commissioners in ecclesiastical matters that met with deputies *ad res indicas* (in Indian affairs) from the classis Amsterdam (four) and the classis Walcheren (six).<sup>295</sup> The Zealanders were principally against a hierarchical ordering of colonial church affairs that was against the Dordrecht Church Order of 1618, and the Amsterdam classis detested the idea that colonial correspondence would now no longer go through them, but directly to the synod in Holland – South-Holland even.

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<sup>291</sup> Schalkwijk, *The reformed church*, 67-88. Adriaen van Bullestrate in 1642, Hendrik Hamel in 1643, and Codde again in 1644, see: L.J. Joosse, *Geloof in de Nieuwe Wereld: ontmoetingen met Afrikanen en Indianen (1600-1700)* (Kampen: Kok, 2008), 469.

<sup>292</sup> D. Noorlander, "Serving God and Mammon: the Reformed Church and the Dutch West India Company in the Atlantic World, 1621-1674" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2011), 47-52.

<sup>293</sup> Pastor Vicent Joachim Soler was sent by the Walloon church in Delft for example.

<sup>294</sup> Schalkwijk, *The reformed church*, 238.

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

This came at a time when Walcheren and Amsterdam were criticized in the Republic for trying to monopolize colonial ecclesiastical affairs. Notwithstanding the negative response in the Republic, the synod of Brazil pushed forward. This bolsters the argument that institutions, including religious institutions, were erected and structured in the colony, and not part of a vision from the metropole.

With the establishment of the synod, the political role of the Church changed as well. The representative of the High Government 'bestowed more authority' to the synod, and established worldly authority over ecclesiastical authority as the synods were convened by the High Government.<sup>296</sup> Moreover, the Church completed a vertical power structure that allowed for petitions to reach the High Government parallel to the political representative bodies. The ecclesiastical bodies availed themselves of special petitions, called *gravamina*, through which it could voice their requests.<sup>297</sup> Even though the authority of the High Government trumped that of the classes or synod, not all issues could be addressed to Johan Maurits and his Council. For example, when Gisbert du Vaux (a suspended minister who was sent to teach indigenous Brazilians about religion in the *aldeia* of São Miguel) raised certain issues, the High Government asked the consistory of Recife for advice on what to do. The consistory responded that this was an issue of the synod and suggested that the High Government should convene a synod to deal with this issue. What exactly Du Vaux addressed originally is unknown, but his writings were characterized as 'very impudent and against all truths' by the consistory, which both in writing and orally expressed its concerns.<sup>298</sup> The synod ruled to dismiss Du Vaux from the ministry and he was put on a ship bound for Holland mid-1643, while Johan Maurits and the Council wondered in an accompanying letter to the Board of Directors 'whether he was completely sane'.<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> Joosse, *Geloof in de Nieuwe Wereld*, 476. NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69 [scans 1133-1135].

<sup>297</sup> Gravamina were originally petitions addressed to representative assemblies in territories of the Holy Roman Empire. In the Dutch context, this is the first and only time I encountered them. For more, see: C. Nubola and A. Würigler, eds., *Bittschriften und Gravamina. Politik, Verwaltung und Justiz in Europa (14.-18. Jahrhundert)* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005).

<sup>298</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69 [scans 1133 and 1148]

<sup>299</sup> Schalkwijk, *The reformed church*, 180.



## 2.4. SLAVERY

A second important theme in the colony of Brazil was that of slavery. An official report on the state of affairs in Brazil from 1639 stated: 'Without these [African] slaves it is impossible to achieve anything in Brazil (...) it is thus necessary that there are slaves. And if anyone finds himself feeling conscience-stricken by this, [these feelings] would merely be unnecessary scruples'.<sup>300</sup> In the minutes of the High Government its members reflected that 'it would be better if the sugar mills would be operated by whites', but that laborers could not be expected from Holland, 'nor from Portugal for that matter'.<sup>301</sup> African slaves were used to work on the plantations, at the sugar mills, in the households of Company employees, for a variety of traditional crafts such as carpentering, bricklaying, and blacksmithing, and as militia.<sup>302</sup> It is estimated that when the WIC conquered part of Brazil from the Portuguese there were about 40,000 slaves working on the plantations in Pernambuco.<sup>303</sup> The WIC inherited an organizational structure of slavery that was created by the Portuguese. The slaves were organized in brotherhoods and they had some, albeit small, hope of being manumitted or otherwise to negotiate the possibility of raising their own social status within a slave hierarchy.<sup>304</sup> Catholicism was used to further tie the slaves to their masters, and after the WIC takeover some (Dutch Protestant) plantation owners even allowed their slaves to build Catholic chapels to prevent slaves from rebelling or deserting.<sup>305</sup> Fighting in a militia provided the African slave with a possibility to petition for

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<sup>300</sup> 'Sonder alsulcke slaven ist niet mogelijk in Brasil iets uyt te rechten: sonder deselve connen gene Ingenhos malen ende gene landen bearbeyt worden, soo dat nootsaeckelijck in Brasil slaven moeten sijn, ende geensints connen geexcuseert werden, ende dat hem yemant hier in beswaert soude vinden, soude maer een onnodige scrupuleusheyd sijn', "Sommer discours over den staet vande vier geconquesteerde capitania's Parnambuco, Itamarica, Paraiba ende Rio Grande, inde noorderdeelen van Brasil," *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap Utrecht* 2, no. 1 (1879): 292-293.

<sup>301</sup> 'Dat wij oock soo wel considereren dat het beter soude sijn, soo de ingenhos door blanck mensen bearbeyt werden, maer dat oock uijt Holland geene apparentie sulcke arbeitsluijden te verwachten sijn, niet meer als uijt Portugael, soo dat men hem van negers sal moeten dienen', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr 68, [scan 504-505].

<sup>302</sup> US-nar, A1810, *Correspondence 1654-1658*, 12:56; NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scans 1064-1066].

<sup>303</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 46, "11 Beschrijving van Noord-Brazilië door Gedion Morris, 22-Oct-1637"; R. Parker Brienen, *Visions of savage paradise: Albert Eckhout, court painter in colonial Dutch Brazil* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 135.

<sup>304</sup> J. Dewulf, "Emulating a Portuguese model: the slave policy of the West India Company and the Dutch Reformed Church in Dutch Brazil (1630-1654) and New Netherland (1614-1664) in comparative perspective," *Journal of Early American History* 4, no. 1 (2014): 9-12.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.* 15.

manumission after several years of loyal service.<sup>306</sup> As a result, the urban spaces in Brazil contained a considerable number of free and manumitted Africans.

The Board of Directors saw no scruples in employing enslaved Africans, legitimizing this by writing that 'it is known that these blacks tolerate the heat of the sun better than us'.<sup>307</sup> Religious legitimization through Protestantism was found in the writings of reverend Godfried Udemans who argued that enslavement was lawful as long as the slaves were not exposed to Iberian Catholicism.<sup>308</sup> The Board of Directors stipulated in 1635, and this was implemented by the High Government in 1637, that it was important that slaves were excused from laboring on Sundays and Holidays so that they could attend Protestant church.<sup>309</sup> At the same time the Board of Directors thought that the number of slaves dying aboard ships was excessive. Their perspective was not a humanitarian one. Instead, they were concerned that captains reported dead slaves to hide their smuggling.<sup>310</sup> Anecdotal evidence from one ship in 1637 suggests that 10 of 188, or 5.3 per cent, died in the Middle Passage.<sup>311</sup> The majority of the 23,163 enslaved Africans that arrived in Brazil between 1636 and 1645 came on WIC ships, but occasionally they came by other means.<sup>312</sup> Some, for example, were supplied by privateers, such as the *St. Poll* from France arriving in Recife in the fall of 1640. The ship had captured a Barbary ship of the coast of La Palma and seized the 56 "Turks" and 10 slaves on board. They had tried to sell these at that island, but a Dutch merchant there told them they could make more money, especially on the "Turks," by bringing them to Brazil.<sup>313</sup>

Enslaving indigenous Brazilians was a different matter, however. Because the struggle for Brazil was partially justified as an attempt to liberate the Brazilian Amerindians from the

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<sup>306</sup> J.A. Gonsalves de Mello, *Nederlanders in Brazilië (1624-1654). De invloed van de Hollandse bezetting op het leven en de cultuur in Noord-Brazilië* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2003 - Originally published in Rio de Janeiro, 1947: *Tempo dos Flamengos: Influência da ocupação holandesa na vida e na cultura do norte do Brasil*), 184, 198n189.

<sup>307</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, 13-Jul-1630.

<sup>308</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*.83.

<sup>309</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, 19-Apr-1635 [scans 154-160]; NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scan 446].

<sup>310</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, 29-Oct-1643; NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, 3-Nov-1644.

<sup>311</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 52, [scan 550] reports that 188 left from Guinea, and NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr 68, [scan 519] reports that 178 arrived.

<sup>312</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 138-139; Wätjen, *Das holländische Kolonialreich*, 311. This number is really close to the TSTD, see R. van Welie, "Slave trading and slavery in the Dutch colonial empire: a global comparison," *Nieuwe Westindische Gids* 82, no. 2 (2008): 60.

<sup>313</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scan 1503].

yoke of the Habsburgs, it was Company policy to liberate indigenous from their Portuguese masters. The Portuguese had not only enslaved Africans from Angola, Guinea, and Cape Verde, but also the Tapuya in the Brazilian captaincy of Maranhão.<sup>314</sup> The latter were bought and sold by the Portuguese 'just like they traded in Angola', according to WIC documents.<sup>315</sup> Enslaving Amerindians was legitimized to the Portuguese principals by presenting Indians as cannibals; it was an act of charity to enslave someone instead of allowing them to be cannibalized by rival groups of Amerindians.<sup>316</sup> In order to liberate the Brazilian Indians from the yoke of the Iberians and in an attempt to make these Amerindians into allies, the Board of Directors had clear instructions for its agents in Brazil that prohibited their enslavement from the early days of the colony. This stance was repeated in 1635 by the States General: 'Brazilians and naturals from that country shall be left in freedom, and not be enslaved in any way whatsoever'.<sup>317</sup> Nevertheless, the Board of Directors felt it was necessary to repeat its message in letters in 1639.<sup>318</sup> When the Directors read in 1641 in the minutes of the High Government that some of the *Potiguar*, or other Amerindians hostile to the Company rule, were allowed to be enslaved, and that some of the children were already sold by Johan Maurits and the members of the Council, they were not amused. The Board reiterated that 'it has always been our opinion, and it still is, to excuse all types of Brazilians from slavery' in an attempt to include them among Company allies.<sup>319</sup>

A shift in this policy occurred as the result of a petition presented at the Diet in 1640. The *câmara* of Paraíba complained that the slaves were so expensive that the planters could not afford enough of them to maintain their sugar output. As a solution the supplicants proposed 'to use Brazilians to support the *blancos*'. The High Government deferred a decision and responded that it would seek more information to resolve this issue.<sup>320</sup> When the petition percolated to the tables of the Board of Directors in 1642, the *Heeren XIX* decided to draft new rules regarding the enslavement of Amerindians. The new regulations

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<sup>314</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 02-Jul-1636 Report from the Political Council, [scan 211].

<sup>315</sup> 'Wat belangt de slaven van Maranhaon, die sijn daer door de Portugesen gehandelt, euen gelijk sij die in Angola handelen', "Sommier discours," 293.

<sup>316</sup> Metcalf, *Go-betweenes*, 177-179.

<sup>317</sup> 'De Brasilianen ende naturellen van de lande sullen in haere vrijheijt warden gelaeten ende in geenderwijse tot slaven worden gemarcht', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 48, [scan 20].

<sup>318</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, 24-Jun-1639.

<sup>319</sup> 'onsen meijningen is altijt geweest, ende is oock noch, om alle soorte van Brasilianen van de slavernije te exhumeren', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, 10-Jul-1641, [scan 359].

<sup>320</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 1421-1422].

stipulated that indigenous who were liberated from the Portuguese yoke, or that had supported the WIC in their fight against the Portuguese, would not be allowed to be enslaved. However, individuals that were captured as a result of wars between different indigenous groups and that were subsequently presented for sale should be bought 'by the Company for the lowest possible price'. After all, enslavement was a better fate for natives than being beaten to death if they would have remained unsold. To retrieve their freedom the enslaved Amerindians should labor for the Company for seven years, or be rented out to others with the stipulation that they be let go after seven years.<sup>321</sup> The Company did not stipulate a rental price.

Another issue that shows a clear relation between a request and regulations involving slaves was a petition from 4 September 1642, when two *schepenen* from Mauritsstad, Halters and Cavalcanti, appeared in the High Government's meeting. On behalf of the rest of the *câmara* they loudly complained about 'the Negroes from Recife and Mauritsstad who, when collecting grass, water, or firewood in the *varzea*, were cutting the sugarcane in order to consume or sell to others', leading to great financial losses for the owners of the sugar cane.<sup>322</sup> This led to the promulgation of an ordinance (*plakkaat*) five days later. Johan Maurits and the other members of the High Government argued that because of 'the daily complaints presented to them' they were forbidding 'the Negroes from Recife and Mauritsstad to collect grass, water, or firewood in the *varzea*' and to cut sugarcane there for themselves or to take it with them, leading to considerable damages for the owners of the sugar cane.<sup>323</sup> If an African was found breaking this new rule he would be publically whipped, unless his master paid a fine: the first time 10, the second time 20, and the third time 50 guilders.<sup>324</sup> This clearly shows how legislation was created through petitions. Not only was the incentive to publish this ordinance provided through the petitions from the *câmara* of Mauritsstad, the ordinance also directly copied the rhetoric and some of the phrases from the petition. Another potential solution that could have prevented the Africans from going into the *varzea* to feed

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<sup>321</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, [scans 22].

<sup>322</sup> 'dat de negros van t Recijff en Mauritsstadt in t halen van gras, water, off branthout doorgaens haer in de rietvelden van de varzea begaven, alwaer sij het riet snijdende om te eeten, en om aen anderen te vercoopen, de labradores groote schade aenbrenghe', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1087].

<sup>323</sup> '(...) alsoo ons dagelicx klachten te vooren comen, dat de negros van het recijff ende Mauritsstad ende van dese omleggende quartieren int haelen van gras, water, en branthout te lande waerts haer in de rietvelden van de varzea (...)', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scans 1106-1107].

<sup>324</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1107].

themselves with sugarcane was to hand out *farinha* to the enslaved Africans. This solution was suggested in the petition too, but discarded by the suppliants because it would increase the price of this staple good too much. The High Government thus also followed the rationale of the petition in the drafting of its ordinance.

#### **2.4.1. Access to institutions for non-Europeans**

Enslaved Africans had virtually no access to the High Government. Whereas in New Netherland twelve slaves jointly (successfully) petitioned to be manumitted as early as 1644, there seems to be no evidence that suggests they had similar possibilities in Brazil.<sup>325</sup> The only times requests involving enslaved Africans are discussed in minutes of the High Government, they are presented by Europeans. An example of this is the request from Jan Claesz Cock, captain of the ship *Leyden* arriving from São Tomé in August 1640. Aboard this ship were 49 slaves who were sold through public auction for cash, bringing in an average of 486 guilders per slave.<sup>326</sup> Captain Cock requested to keep 'two young little negroes' for himself. The High Government replied that keeping them was not allowed, but he could purchase them for 100 guilders 'considering that they were very small'. Colonel Hans Coen (or Koin) was allowed the same for 150 guilders for two slaves.<sup>327</sup> Most likely the colonel and captain requested this for personal reasons rather than on behalf of the enslaved Africans. The reason children could be on board slave ships from the West African Coast in the first place, despite their low resell value in Brazil, was that they could be used as pawns for debts by Africans.<sup>328</sup> Other times children could be born on board, or occasionally empathic captains had saved them from a certain death.<sup>329</sup> Enslaved indigenous Brazilians seem to have had equally little opportunity to obtain access to the High Government.

Free indigenous, however, did have formal paths to the High Government, as becomes clear from an example from 28 August 1642. On that day Johannes Listrij, the sheriff of

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<sup>325</sup> US-nar, A1809, *Council Minutes 1638-1649*, 4:183-184. The names of the slaves are: Paulo Angolo, Big Manuel, Little Manuel, Manuel de Gerrit de Reus, Simon Congo, Antony Portuguese, Gracia, Piter Santomee, Jan Francisco, Little Antony, Jan Fort Orange.

<sup>326</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1015].

<sup>327</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1027].

<sup>328</sup> A.A. Diptee, "African children in the British slave trade during the late eighteenth century," *Slavery and Abolition* 27, no. 2 (2006): 187.

<sup>329</sup> See the anecdote of William Snelgrave in M. Rediker, *The slave ship: a human history* (New York: Viking, 2007).

Itamaracá and commander of the 'Brazilians', stepped into the offices of the High Government. He handed over several petitions dealing with Brazilian affairs, including a suggestion to appoint a Dutch captain 'being a married man of good life' to oversee the indigenous *aldeias* (rural settlements) in order to combat the misuses and disorders there.<sup>330</sup> But he also petitioned on behalf of certain indigenous individuals. This included the leader of the *Tapuya* requesting payment of a piece of cloth valued at 24 guilders and regulations regarding the grazing of private and company cattle.<sup>331</sup> Linen (*lijwaten*), and occasionally some dried fish and farinha, were the usual currency to pay Brazilian military allies. These soldiers received eight yards (*ellen*) of linen and officers received a hat in 'Holland' or 'Spanish' fashion and shoes on top of that. Men and women were paid equally.<sup>332</sup> None of these were major issues, but they do however show how indigenous Brazilians had access to the High Government.

It was also thanks to a petition by a one of the Amerindian leaders, Paraupaba, that the indigenous Brazilians received more authority and autonomy. Paraupaba was one of the eleven Indians accompanying Johan Maurits on his return voyage to the Republic in May 1644. In the Republic, he had an audience with the Board of Directors in November that same year. During this meeting, he was promised more freedom for the Amerindians, and in particular received in writing the stipulation that they would never be enslaved.<sup>333</sup> The meeting of the Board of Directors went as far as to promise that they would 'consider them as Dutch as long as they stayed loyal to this state'.<sup>334</sup> Upon Paraupaba's return in Brazil in March 1645 the High Government drafted a new structure. There would be three *regedores* that were selected from the indigenous Brazilians by Johannes Listrij, who was to become the 'Director of the Brazilians'. *Regedores* had been intermediaries between the Indian nations and the WIC since the early days, but they had been of Dutch origin and appointed by the

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<sup>330</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1044].

<sup>331</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1046-1047].

<sup>332</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, [scans 486, 489]

<sup>333</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5757, 24-11-1644 Copy of the letter of freedoms for the Brazilians, [scan 561-563].

<sup>334</sup> 'ende te houden als Nederlanders soo lange sij in gehoorsaemheijt blijven aen desen staet', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5757, Report on the meeting of the Heeren XIX for the States General, [scan 552].

Board of Directors in the Republic before 1645.<sup>335</sup> Moreover, the indigenous Brazilians could now nominate *schepenen* for their own jurisdiction, and each college of *schepenen* was presided by a *regedor*.<sup>336</sup> Thus, like the authority over the Portuguese inhabitants in 1640, that over the Amerindians was now further decentralized, and formalized through governing bodies by the indigenous population. For its implementation, the WIC made use of Portuguese institutions that had been several decades old. Decisions on who would be selected in these new political bodies were made in Brazil and not, as previously, in the Republic. It should be emphasized here that this change did not come about as a result of a process of bargaining by the indigenous after the WIC failed to establish authority over them. Instead, the WIC saw this as an opportunity to thank their allies in the fight against the Portuguese enemies. This institutional change thus occurred because of lobbying and cooperation.

The examples of slavery and access to governmental bodies in Brazil reinforce the notion that individuals, including Portuguese inhabitants, had a large influence on the implementation and shaping of institutions in WIC Brazil; this explicitly included the institution of slavery. Whether regarding larger issues such as who could be enslaved or smaller issues such as the mobility of enslaved Africans, individuals made a difference.

## 2.5. THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE OF TOP-DOWN DECISION-MAKING

It might of course be a confirmation bias in the sources to argue that individuals made a difference in implementation and shaping of institutions. Petitions were an important tool for influencing institutions, so studying petitions may overemphasize the importance of individuals. Therefore, it is important to delve into the possible consequences of a decision made by the Board of Directors to change institutions in a more top-down fashion through an example from 1642 as it showcases several layers objections to metropolitan decisions. As it is widely known, the WIC was always short on cash and in an attempt to remedy the

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<sup>335</sup> Gerrit Barbier was appointed the *regedor* of the Brazilians in 1635 for example, see: NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 8, 1-Aug-1635.

<sup>336</sup> Meuwese, *Brothers in Arms*, 170-171.

excessive spending in Brazil the Board of Directors looked for ways of limiting spending and increasing revenue.

The solutions proposed by the Board of Directors on 18 April 1642 did not sit well with Johan Maurits, the Council of Justice, and the Reformed ministers. In their letter, the directors wrote that they could not understand why the High Council had been so generous in handing out a total of 52 enslaved Africans to servants of the Company. They referred back to their original instructions, which only allowed certain groups (of higher social status) use of Company slaves. The slaves distributed to other groups should be reclaimed and sold to the highest bidder.<sup>337</sup> In an attempt to create a more financially sustainable colony, the Directors continued, the new policy would be to end rent-free living arrangements, 'both for Ministers (...) and for all other higher and lower officers, and servants of the Company'.<sup>338</sup> Without further ado, the Company should liquidate all of its possessions, excluding the public buildings and warehouses through public auction. In an attempt to encourage peopling the colony 'by the Dutch nation' and to compensate for this new renting arrangement, the Directors decided it was wise to increase the pay for married servants and officers with 25 percent to 200 or 250 guilders. The Council of Justice would henceforth consist of seven instead of nine individuals, so the WIC did not have to pay for replacement of the two recently deceased members.<sup>339</sup>

The public auction of WIC property was executed without delay. After an appraisal of the available lands and buildings, the High Government auctioned 33 lots in Recife and Mauritsstad. This generated a total revenue 153,400 guilders for the WIC. It is not specified how the individuals came up with the money to purchase the lots. One option is that it came out of the wages the WIC owed to them other forms of credit or loans. Another option was that it was paid in installments. An example of the latter also happened in 1637 when Servatius Carpentier bought the *engenho* of Jeronimo Cavalcanti for 60,000 guilders paid in 6 installments in a six-year period. A third option was that the individuals either had the cash, or could obtain a letter of exchange for these amounts from Europe.<sup>340</sup> In either case it

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<sup>337</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, 18-Apr-1642, [scan 16].

<sup>338</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, 18-Apr-1642 [scan 24].

<sup>339</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, 18-Apr-1642 [scan 25].

<sup>340</sup> Matthias Beck drew 3,000 guilders in his capacity as Brazilian agent for Jan Hoeffft for example, see: NL-HaNA, 3.03.02, inv. nr. 669, [scan 226], for the extended sentence see inv. nr. 818, [scan 62]. I would like to thank K.J. Ekama for providing these references.



alleviated the pressure on the WIC accounts. The highest grossing piece of property was one on the Hanendijk overlooking the water, which sold for 14,300 guilders to Maerten Meijndertsz van der Hart. Van der Hart also bought two other properties on the Oude Markt and the Breetlaenstraat. Who he was, remains unknown. Other buyers included members of the Council of Justice, such as Gijsbert de Wit and Hendrick de Moucheron. Matthias Beck bought the priciest lot per square feet (*voet*) in Recife on the Zeestraat for 9,500 guilders. Jacob Hamel, the member of the High Government, also bought some property land of 20 by 54 feet for 1,800 guilders. This plot was in Mauritsstad where the average prices were significantly lower than in Recife, as can be seen in Table 2-1. Most individuals bought only one piece of property, but Gillis van Luffel bought no less than four properties for a total of 16,700 guilders. This earned him the label of ‘house speculant’ by Wätjen.<sup>341</sup>

Table 2-1: Property auction prices Recife / Mauritsstad September 1642

#	Location	width	depth	feet <sup>2</sup>	buyer	price	price/feet <sup>2</sup>
1	Hanendijk	34	35	1.190	Maerten Meijndertsz v.d. Hart	f 14.300,00	f 12,02
2	Pontstraet	19,5	46	897	David Otsenboren	f 7.400,00	f 8,25
3	Pontstraet	19,5	60	1.170	Pieter Jansz van Swol	f 6.500,00	f 5,56
4	Breetlaenstraat	19,5	60	1.170	Hendrik de Moucheron	f 6.000,00	f 5,13
5	Breetlaenstraat	19,5	60	1.170	Gillis van Luffel	f 6.400,00	f 5,47
6	Oude markt	21	23	483	Gillis van Luffel	f 7.000,00	f 14,49
7	Oude markt	21	23	483	Maerten Meijndertsz v.d. Hart	f 5.700,00	f 11,80
8	Heerestraet	20	24	480	Gerrit Bas	f 5.600,00	f 11,67
9	Breetlaenstraat	20	23	460	Maerten Meijndertsz v.d. Hart	f 4.300,00	f 9,35
10	Breetlaenstraat	20	23	460	Samuel Gansepoel	f 6.000,00	f 13,04
11	Heerestraet	25	40	1.000	Hendrik de Moucheron	f 5.500,00	f 5,50
12	Breetlaenstraat	12,67	40	507	Andries Heijm	f 3.500,00	f 6,91
13	Breetlaenstraat	12,67	40	507	Gerrit Maessnoeck, timmerman	f 3.000,00	f 5,92
14	Heerestraet	16	23	368	Jacques van de Velde	f 2.500,00	f 6,79
15	Heerestraet	16	23	368	Godefrij van Wessem	f 2.400,00	f 6,52
16	Heerestraet	16	23	368	Jan Rochelsz Peijlder	f 2.600,00	f 7,07
17	Heerestraet	13,5	40	540	Jacob Baran Fidorem	f 2.600,00	f 4,81
18	No street name	13,5	40	540	Godefrij van Wessem	f 2.500,00	f 4,63
19	No street name	19	40	760	Gijsbert de Wit	f 2.600,00	f 3,42
20	No street name				No buyer	f -	f -
21	Zeestraet	27,5	23	633	Matthias Becx	f 9.500,00	f 15,02
22	Zeestraet	24,5	23	564	Andries Heijm	f 6.000,00	f 10,65
23	Pontstraet	15,5	31	481	Pieter van Heeden	f 3.900,00	f 8,12
24	Pontstraet	18	46	828	Johan Angeram	f 6.500,00	f 7,85
25	Pontstraet	16	46	736	Rens de Mouchij	f 6.900,00	f 9,38
26	Pontstraet	16	46	736	Jan Parent	f 6.800,00	f 9,24
27	Geweldigerstraat	16	45	720	Samuel Wensels	f 5.600,00	f 7,78

<sup>341</sup> Wätjen, *Das höllandische Kolonialreich*, 245-246.

28	Next to the secretary of JM	20	100	2.000	Pieter Marissingh	f 2.500,00	f 1,25	Mauritsstad
29	Next to # 28	20	12	240	Hendrik de Moucheron	f 1.800,00	f 7,50	Mauritsstad
30	Next to # 29	20	54	1.080	Gillis van Luffel	f 1.600,00	f 1,48	Mauritsstad
31	Next to # 30	20	54	1.080	Gillis van Luffel	f 1.700,00	f 1,57	Mauritsstad
32	Next to # 31	20	54	1.080	Jacob Hamel	f 1.800,00	f 1,67	Mauritsstad
33	Next to # 32	20	54	1.080	Casper van Heusden	f 2.400,00	f 2,22	Mauritsstad

Source: NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scans: 1110-1115].

### 2.5.1. Johan Maurits' reaction

The Board of Directors drafted an individual letter to the Governor-General that was sent parallel to the general correspondence. The *Heeren XIX* confirmed the reception of Johan Maurits' two previous letters in which he asked for a termination of his contract and return home. There has been some debate about the sincerity of Johan Maurits' requests to return to the Republic, as he also kept emphasizing the need of his presence in the colony, and the High Government kept forwarding requests of Portuguese inhabitants that did not want him to leave (see above). It seems not unlikely that Johan Maurits provided his principals with ambiguity and two scenarios so nobody's honor was damaged – especially not that of the Governor General himself. If the Board of Directors wanted to terminate his contract, it could justify its decision by referring to Johan Maurits' own request. If the Board preferred to keep him and the high costs that accommodated him in Brazil, it could justify its decision with the argument that it supported the wishes of the Portuguese inhabitants. Because of these two scenarios, the Board of Directors started its letter to Johan Maurits with this predicament. On the one hand the current situation of the colony was in great need for the person of Johan Maurits, and on the other hand they needed to take Johan Maurits' repeated requests in 'good and reasonable consideration'.<sup>342</sup> The Board of Directors found a compromise by requesting Johan Maurits to remain their highest servant for one more year, followed by the promise that he was granted a return to the Republic. The Board did make what it called small alterations to his payment. Instead of the 'free table' Johan Maurits had enjoyed, he

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<sup>342</sup> 'aen de een zijde dat de gestaltenisse van de compagnie geenssints toe en liet den dienst van u Ex:tie persoon te connen missen, maer deselve in soodanige conjuncture van tijden als de gelegentheit doenmaels mede bracht ten hooghste van node te hebben, ende aen de ander zijde goet en billick reguart nemende op het voorsz: versoeck en soo yterativelijck bij missive als mondelinghe rapporten van de gewesen hooge secrete raaden gedaen', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, 18-Apr-1642 [scan 26].

would from now on receive 1,000 guilders a month for his courtly household.<sup>343</sup> These 1,000 guilders were less than half of what Johan Maurits spent on his table per week, and would not even cover the 1,400 jugs of French wine his courtly household consumed every month; let alone the additional 320 jugs of Spanish wine, 680 jugs of beer, or any of the other items.<sup>344</sup> For this last year the directors gave Johan Maurits specific instructions as what to achieve. Since Portugal, after its independence from the Spanish crown (1640), was no longer the enemy of the Republic the size of the army in Brazil could be reduced, the Board of Directors argued. The Directors proposed a new structure of eighteen army companies and corresponding officers – ‘most capable’ and preferably from the Dutch or German nation; thus excusing the English, Scottish and French.<sup>345</sup>

After Johan Maurits had received and read his letter he arrived fuming out of anger at the meeting of the High Government. Whereas the minutes of the meeting are generally quite brief, the reaction of Johan Maurits covers four folios. He started by discrediting the political weight of the letter from the Board of Directors. After all, it contradicted the correspondence he had had with the members of the States General, and should an important and far-reaching decision not be accorded by the highest body? Again, a member of the nobility, in this case Johan Maurits, provides insights in their vision of sovereignty and governance. It was unbecoming for “simple” merchants to dictate a member of the nobility what to do. It is exactly for this reason that the Governor-General preferred to have correspondence with the States General or the Stadtholder and failed to inform the Directors properly.<sup>346</sup> Without the express order of the States General he would not leave his post. And since when was it appropriate to reduce one’s pay after the contract was extended – was it not normal to increase the salary in such a situation? Moreover, the allocated 1,000 guilders was several thousands of guilders short to afford a courtly household ‘for a person of his quality and rank’. He would not even be able to afford his courtly household from his normal income - even if he wanted to. Considering the loss of income through prize money

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<sup>343</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, 18-Apr-1642 [scan 28].

<sup>344</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 56, [scans 1469-1470].

<sup>345</sup> ‘voornamentlijk wel lettende op goede ende bequame officieren soo veele doenlijk van Nederlandtse ende Duijtse natie en excuseert Engelse, Schotten en Fransen’, NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, 18-Apr-1642 [scan 27].

<sup>346</sup> Visser and Plaat, *Gloria parendi*, I/96, see also 79.

now that the treaty with Portugal was signed, he was deprived of another 22,000 guilders yearly.<sup>347</sup>

### **2.5.2. The Reactions from the Council of Justice and the ministers**

The next day a selection from the members of the Council of Justice appeared at the meeting of the High Government. They had received the order from the Board of Directors regarding the termination of rent-free living, and limitation of their pay and use of enslaved Africans. They had discussed the matter amongst each other, and resolved that the best way to proceed was to come to the High Government and orally 'announce that they were of the opinion that they were unable to continue their service in administering justice on these conditions'.<sup>348</sup> This was a breach of contract from the Directors, they argued, and therefore they considered themselves discharged and would from now on live as free burgers unconcerned with Company affairs. The High Government tried to postpone their discharge by requesting that the members of the Council of Justice put their opinion in writing.

The High Government probably did not expect the Council of Justice to return later that same day with a letter in hand that was signed by all its members.<sup>349</sup> In the letter the Council members repeated their opinion, and argued that even though their salary increased to 200 guilders this effectively meant that their financial compensation was more than halved due to the high rent in Recife.<sup>350</sup> Before replying to the Council of Justice, the High Government deemed it better to draft and send a letter to the Ministers, also informing them about the new regulations regarding the financial compensation.

The next day, 21 August 1642, the High Government reacted to the letter from the Council of Justice. The Government deemed it wise to keep the public unaware of 'this confusion', and thought it could convince the Council members to revise their position. Hence it summoned the members of the Council, and warned for the great calamity awaiting Brazil if they persisted in their resolution and adding that it had already received complaints about the maintenance of justice. Therefore it 'friendly admonished and most gravely

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<sup>347</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scans 1017-1022].

<sup>348</sup> 'ende dat sij daer op gesamentlijck geresolveert waeren, sijn Ex:tie en de Heeren Hooge Raeden te coemen aendien en dat sij niet van meeninge waeren op die conditien in haere bedieninge te continueren van de justitie de administreren', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scans: 1024-1025].

<sup>349</sup> President Gijsbert de Wit, and the members Daniel Alberti, Nunno Olferdi, Balthasar van de Voorde, and public attorney Hendrick de Moucheron.

<sup>350</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scans 1026-1027].

requested' the Council members to continue their service.<sup>351</sup> The Council of Justice could not be persuaded, and now emphasized that it thought the way the Board of Directors handled this affair was wholly ill-mannered.<sup>352</sup>

As the Council of Justice stormed out, the united ministers from Recife, Mauritsstad and the French, Anglican, and German Churches came marching in.<sup>353</sup> They also had grave objections to the resolution from the Board of Directors. Quoting Corinthians and other parts of both the New and Old Testament, the Ministers argued that it had been the case throughout time that those preaching God's word received the necessary compensation. Limiting the use of Company slaves was less of an issue for the Ministers as they were only used as servants. However, if the High Government would not find a way of freeing the ministers of their high rent costs, the latter would be forced to say goodbye to Brazil for good.<sup>354</sup> Without resolving anything meaningful, the High Government revisited the issue the next day.

Again, the members of the Council of Justice appeared before the High Government. Johan Maurits and the other honorable members tried to appeal to the Council's responsibility for the greater good. Would its members not consider the impending doom and confusion in Brazil if they continued their strike, in particular considering the many criminals that still needed to be sentenced for serious offences? The Council members would not give in and replied that such disorder was hardly their responsibility, and added that their honor was impugned by this whole affair. In a society where social capital functioned like money, tarnished honor and reputation was the worst possible predicament. The High Government was faced with two groups that were either on strike or otherwise threatening to strike. Without the Council of Justice even willing to negotiate, the High Government felt the pressure of public opinion and had no other option than to give in to the ministers' demands. Johan Maurits and the others resolved that the ministers would be allowed to stay in their houses for the time being because 'they had already received so many complaints about the stagnation of justice and they did not want to upset the people any further' by also

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<sup>351</sup> 'vriendelick vermaent ende op t ernstichste versocht', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1028].

<sup>352</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1028-1029].

<sup>353</sup> Vincent Joachim Soler, Samuel Bachiler, Fredericus Kesselerius, Samuel de Coninck, and Franciscus Plante.

<sup>354</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1029-1030].

obstructing religious service.<sup>355</sup> In other words, they obeyed, but did not comply to the orders of the Board of Directors since on-the-spot information and pressure forced them to make another decision.

With the issue of the ministers solved for the moment, the High Government could now focus its attention on the Council of Justice. In an attempt to let the Council members come to their senses, or at least reduce their anger it let the issue rest for a few days. Before it summoned the Council of Justice again on 28 August 1642, Johan Maurits, Hendrik Hamel, Adriaan van Bullestrate, and Dirk Codde van den Burgh came together to discuss how they could get the Council of Justice back to work, while also complying to the instructions of the Board of Directors. They devised a five-step-plan. First they would try to appeal to the Council's feeling of responsibility. They would pressure them by showing the petitions and complaints they had received in the past few days, and emphasize the necessity of quick conviction for the recently captured wandering illegal traders (*boslopers*).<sup>356</sup> Step two was to ask the Council members if they could maintain their posts while expressing their grievances to the Board of Directors and awaiting replacement. Step three was to offer the Council members the option of moving into the courthouse (*Raadhuis van de Justitie*) and live there free of rent. If these solutions did not work, step four was that the High Government, 'in the power invested in them by the States General, his Highness, and the WIC', would command the Council of Justice to obey the orders from the Board of Directors.<sup>357</sup> If even this would not sway the Council of Justice into obedience, the High Government would 'coerce them with brute force'.<sup>358</sup> This was the ultimate and fifth step.

When the Council of Justice persisted in its standpoint after the third step, the tension rose in the meeting of the High Government. Johan Maurits and the other honorable members had no other options than to command the Council to follow the instructions of the Board of Directors. The councilors obeyed, but remained protesting that these instructions

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<sup>355</sup> 'is goetgevonden om de gemeijnte alrede over het stilstant van de justitie klachtich wesende niet meer te ontrustigen, de predicanten voor als noch in haere oude wooningen te laeten verblijven'

<sup>356</sup> For *boslopers*, see: Shaw Romney, *New Netherland connections*, 138-141.

<sup>357</sup> 'uijt crachte van commissie en instructie aen sijn Ex:tie ende Hooge Raeden gegeven van wegen de heren Staten Generael, sijn Hoocheijt en Generaele Westindische Compagnie'.

<sup>358</sup> 'met de stercke hant constringeren'.

were not in accordance with the original agreement, and alleged that they would seek payment according to their original instructions.<sup>359</sup>

This had resolved the issue of the Council of Justice, but that of the ministers had only been solved temporarily. On the first of September four individuals stepped into the meeting of the High Government: Samuel Halters and Albert van Krengel as presbyters, and Albert Warnsing and Hendrick Haecxs<sup>360</sup> as deacons, together representing the consistory of Mauritsstad and Recife. The consistory had heard from the ministers about the new regulations regarding the costs of rents. They provided a lengthy petition with four reasons why the WIC should reconsider its position on rent-free living for the ministers. Firstly, this was now the only place in the world where ministers were expected to pay for their own rent. Secondly, the rent in Recife was higher than their salaries. Thirdly, the ministers did their work for religious creed and not for greed. And lastly, the consistory was very satisfied with the work the ministers were doing. They gave the High Government these arguments to consider, and added that without God's Church Brazil could not exist, and 'would be cursed instead of blessed'.<sup>361</sup> The High Government responded that it did not possess the power to change decisions from the Board of Directors, but that it deemed it wise to forward the arguments of the consistory to the *Heeren XIX*.

This postponed the issue until the High Government received the letter from the Board of Directors dated 29 October 1643. In this letter they acknowledged the large number of petitions and complaints the High Government received because of the new rent regulations. It was important to them that all ministers received the same treatment. The WIC chamber of Groningen had put pressure on this issue by appointing a new Minister, Lambertus Ritsema, and promising him rent-free living. In negotiating this deal with the chamber it may have helped that Lambertus' brother, Geert, was a main investor and thus had considerable influence, while his other brother, Obbe, was the mint master (*muntmeester*).<sup>362</sup> In order to maintain equality, the Board of Directors proposed that the High Government could build new accommodations, financed according to the *negensleutel*, where all the Ministers could

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<sup>359</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1042-1044].

<sup>360</sup> See also Chapter 5.

<sup>361</sup> 'Ende in plaets van segen veel eer vloeck state te verwachten', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, [scan 1078-1080].

<sup>362</sup> Winter, *WIC ter kamer Stad en Lande*, 28, 41, 224-226.

live together in exchange for a 'reasonable' rent.<sup>363</sup> The High Government would have the decision-making power to appoint a good location for this establishment.

This last section on the possible consequences of top-down decision-making has shown important downsides. Notwithstanding the good intentions of the Board of Directors of increasing the revenue for the company and limiting the expenses in Brazil and thus maintaining the colony, not all solutions were met with approval. Moreover, there seems to have been an extraordinary disconnect between what the Directors in the Republic knew, and what the reality in Brazil was. The High Government did not waste much time auctioning WIC property, and it diligently informed the Council of Justice and the ministers of the new regulations. Neither the High Government, nor the Board of Directors probably foresaw that the Council and Ministers could go on strike. It is hard to say whether the members of the Council of Justice would later (successfully) sue, or threaten to sue, the WIC for a breach of contract and thus still receive (part of) their payment. Considering the tedious process of decision-making in regard to the payment and rent of the ministers, the Council members only obeying the rule under protest, and the fueled anger of Johan Maurits, it can be argued that a top-down decision-making process was in the end costlier (albeit not in the economic sense) for the WIC to rule in this fashion. Allowing participatory decision-making, in which issues percolated through the *câmaras* to the High Government, allowed for more acceptance of the rule of the WIC, and thus cheaper and more efficient governance. However, cheaper governance of course did not automatically equal more profitability for the Company, and it is exactly this tension that came to the fore in the objections to the Board of Director's decision.

Both the case of the ministers, as well as that of the Council of Justice, show a willingness from the High Government to negotiate in decision-making. The strategy employed vis-à-vis the Council started with three scenarios that relied on negotiation. Coercion and use of power were only applied when these scenarios had run dry. In their proposition of building a new accommodation for the ministers, the Board of Directors sought to find a compromise where the ministers could still find affordable housing, while the WIC limited their expenses.

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<sup>363</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 9, 29-Oct-1643, [scan 140-141]



There are two additional interesting points regarding petitions in Brazil. The first point is that petitions could also be used by the High Government in an attempt to pressure the Council of Justice into obedience. Petitions were thus clearly considered a voice of the inhabitants that could be employed not only to convince, but also to apply pressure. As mentioned above, the policy of the High Government was partially influenced by public opinion, but it could also use public opinion to pressure other bodies. The second point is that the petitions and complaints that the High Government wanted to show to the Council of Justice are neither in their minutes, nor in their correspondence, nor in their secret minutes. In other words, there must have been many more petitions than the ones found in the sources. This is not the only occasion on which the High Government casually mentions other petitions it received without any further traces of these petitions in their minutes.

## 2.6. CONCLUSION

After the WIC had conquered the colony in Brazil from the Portuguese they inherited Portuguese political bodies such as the *câmaras*. The integration of the existing governmental infrastructure in the colonial system of the WIC was a process of negotiation largely fueled through petitions. Thus, this chapter has argued that the individuals in Brazil had ample opportunity to implement and influence the institutions of the Dutch Atlantic through negotiations. Clear examples are the formal institutions in the form of regulations. This included institutions of religion, slavery, justice, and trade. Moreover, as a result of the petitions the WIC colony in Brazil actually had regulations that improved the quality of sugar on a global market before the Portuguese, who only adopted these regulations after they had taken over Brazil in the 1650s.

Petitions were the primary vehicle for individuals in Brazil to influence these institutions through a process of structuration. Individuals without formalized access to the highest political body, such as enslaved Africans, relied on go-betweens who allowed these groups “to speak”. It is impossible to assess what made these proxies petition, and to what extent they are at all voicing the concerns of these individuals, and what was lost in translation. For the Portuguese the ‘translation’ became less of an issue as they were allowed Portuguese

representation in the Council of Justice on cases that involved them. This came on top of the Portuguese administering their own lower justice in *câmaras* that were at least partially manned by Portuguese. This last privilege was enjoyed by the Amerindians too after 1645. Petitions triggered these changes in the institutional framework and as such petitions were paramount for the 'working' of the colony.

Allowing individuals the possibility of structuration made sense from a Company point of view too. This participatory form of governance ensured the WIC less resistance to institutional changes. Petitions are a rational, efficient, and sensible option when compared to top-down decisions that could result in a strike such as in 1642. The period 1637-1646 can be characterized as continuing decentralization of authority in Brazil. This was the result of petitions to the High Government, some of which were forwarded to the Board of Directors. Petitions had a high success rate, but not because of their ubiquitous quality. That they were not all of good enough quality, becomes clear of the share of 'inadmissible' petitions. Most likely this was because both the WIC in the Republic and the High Government in Brazil were susceptible to petitions that were presented to them.

The rhetoric of Portuguese petitions appears to often transcend the interest of the individual; either the Company would lose because of lower sugar production, or (all) the sugar owners would be harmed financially. This indicates that the petitions aimed at contributing to a fruitful negotiation rather than only seeking the pursuit of their own interest. That is not to say that they did not primarily promoted regulations that could benefit themselves.

Religious authority created parallel access to the Republic that could be appropriated by the inhabitants in Brazil for the purpose of lobbying. As the classis in Brazil could correspond with the classes in the Republic, this created a parallel stream of information and correspondence that could be employed. The same applies to the correspondence between the Brazilian synod and that in the Republic. It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the WIC chamber of Groningen appointed Ritsema according to the old regulations regarding the payment of his accommodation, but it is not entirely unlikely that it did so because of correspondence coming through the networks of the church. Moreover, their *gravamina* were special interest petitions that carried extra weight in decision-making.

When considering all the discussions above, it becomes apparent that the way in which Dutch Brazil functioned internally was largely a consequence of negotiation. The structuration through petitions allowed inhabitants of the colony a good bargaining position, and the WIC was willing to negotiate. Lobbying, negotiations, and high-rising tensions were of course not exclusive to the colony. The next chapter will demonstrate how conflicting forces went head-to-head in the Republic and sought a release valve in the colony as a decisive mediator.



### 3. TRADING REGULATIONS OR FREE TRADE

Several individuals in this chapter at one point or another expressed their concerns about the rising and intense disagreements between the free trade lobby and the monopoly lobby. The different parties continued for several years to dispute what was better for the colony, the Company, and the common wealth. Even though the debates started off with legalistic or moral arguments, eventually economic arguments decided the political faith of the issue. This chapter investigates the intense (predominantly) metropolitan lobbying campaign on the issue of free trade or monopoly for trade to and from Brazil.

On 15 February 1630, a WIC fleet under the command of Hendrick Lonck attacked the Portuguese in Olinda, a settlement in the captaincy of Pernambuco just north of Recife. Meeting only feeble resistance from the Portuguese commander Mathias de Albuquerque, the WIC army quickly established a base from which to conquer the rest of Northeastern Brazil. Notwithstanding the difficulties in completely expelling the hostile Portuguese for most of the years 1630 and 1631, the *Heeren XIX* started making plans for trade with and settlement of the colony.<sup>364</sup>

Thus, the directors printed the new regulations for the trade to Brazil, confirmed by the charter of the States General in the fall of 1630. Two identical editions were printed: one in Middelburg, and one in Amsterdam.<sup>365</sup> These publications stated that ‘inhabitants of the United Provinces, subjects of the States General, and all Portuguese, Brazilians, and other inhabitants of Brazil obedient to the High Mightinesses and the West India Company’ would be allowed to trade on the Brazilian coast in all goods except brazilwood.<sup>366</sup> Merchants would have to pay a recognition fee though; 50 guilders per ton (*vat* or *tonelada*) of cargo going to Brazil, and 120 guilders per ton of cargo coming from Brazil. One ton equaled 54

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<sup>364</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 36-50.

<sup>365</sup> Knuttel 3998: Anonymous, *West-Indische Compagnie. Articvlen, met approbatie vande [...] Staten Generael [...] beraemt by bewinthebberen vande generale geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie [...] over het open ende vry stellen vanden handel ende negotie op de stad Olinda de Parnambuco* (Amsterdam: P.A. van Ravesteyn, 1630); Knuttel 3999: Anonymous, *West-Indische Compagnie, articvlen met approbatie vande [...] Staten Generael [...] provisionelijck beraemt by bewint-hebberen vande [...] West-Indische Compagnie [...] over het open ende vry stellen vanden handel ende negotie op de stad Olinda de Parnambuco* (Middelburg: Symon Moulert, 1630)..

<sup>366</sup> Kn. 3999: *West-Indische Compagnie, articvlen*, article I.

*arrobas* of sugar.<sup>367</sup> In addition to this, article 9 stipulated that only the WIC was allowed to insure the freight, but that it was a voluntary fee of ten per cent *ad valorem* of the cargo. This had to be paid in cash or in sugar. Any individual interested in moving to the colony could get free transport from the Company, provided they brought ‘proof of virtuous conduct’ and were willing to stay for at least three years.<sup>368</sup> Soldiers were also encouraged to settle in the colony at the end of their service, and the company further promised that all the inhabitants would be considered for public offices – ‘in accordance to their [professional] capacity’.<sup>369</sup> Last but not least, the settlers were promised liberty of conscience, as long as they would keep their beliefs quiet and would not ‘create public scandals with words or actions, but kept their civil peace’.<sup>370</sup> These articles show that from the early beginning the colony in Brazil had a relative tolerant attitude towards both settlers and trade. However, this was not considered an unalienable right, but rather a political concession to maximize profit for the Company.

This chapter shows the details of the decision-making process and lobbying practices in the Brazilian free trade debate thus clarifying the process that has been a mystery in the existing literature.<sup>371</sup> This chapter argues that the decisions were controlled by a small but powerful group in the Republic and that the decisions eventually were based on arguments of economic consequences rather than humanist ideology.<sup>372</sup> At the same time, the decision-making process touched upon issues of authority within the Republic.

### 3.1. THE OPENING MOVES

Despite the advertised advantages for individuals in Brazil and pamphlets celebrating the victorious efforts of the WIC, it would take until 1634 before the colony was peaceful enough

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<sup>367</sup> Ibid., article VI and VII.

<sup>368</sup> ‘goede getuygenis van haren deughdelijcken handel en wandel’, *ibid.*, article XI.

<sup>369</sup> ‘de Compagnie sal mede deselve vorderen, na yders capaciteyt, tot publicque ampten’, *ibid.*, article XII and XIII.

<sup>370</sup> ‘dat niemant van de inwoonders daer te lande in sijn conscientie werde beswaert, mits dat sijn hem stil drage ende geen publijck schandael met woorden of wercken en geve, maer versorgen dat alle, ende een yder in borgerlijke ruste worde onderhouden’, *ibid.*, article XV.

<sup>371</sup> See the unexplained turn of events in Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 75-82.

<sup>372</sup> A. Weststeijn, “Dutch Brazil and the Making of Free Trade Ideology,” in *The Legacy of Dutch Brazil*, ed. M. van Groesen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

to consider serious settlement and profitable plantations.<sup>373</sup> This meant on 12 December 1634 that during the meeting of the *Heeren XIX* a special committee reported their advice on how to regulate trade within the charter area. The committee was formed by Reynier Reael, Willem Bruyn, Pieter van der Velde, Jean Ray, Adriaen van der Dussen, and Edzard Clant. The committee did not formulate any advice for Brazil specifically, but specified that trade to New Netherland, Africa, 'and other places where the Company is trading' should be kept for the Company, while trade to all islands within the charter area and the lands west of the Orinoco river up until the coast of Florida, was allowed to other merchants. The company requested the States General to confirm this decision. The High-Mightinesses decided to entrust the decision to its members Arnhem, Pauw, Vosbergen, Weeda, Swartenberch, Marienburch, en Schatter who made small changes before it was printed and spread on 6 January 1635.<sup>374</sup> This meant that effectively the company monopoly on trade to an from Brazil was reinstated through the initiative of the Board of Directors that felt that the Company should start profiting from increased settlement and stabilized territorial claims.

This did not mean that the issue of Brazilian trade was now resolved as it was point four on the agenda for the next meeting for the *Heeren XIX* on 19 March 1635. What put the item on the agenda was the province of Holland that refused to consent to the new regulations in the meeting of the States General.<sup>375</sup> The objection from Holland also caused other chambers in the Board of Directors to change their mind as they knew very well that opposition from Holland would be tough to counter. The chamber of Zeeland was the only chamber that supported a complete monopoly for the Company, the other chambers favored opening up the trade to other merchants.

The main argument by Zeeland was that free trade conflicted with the original charter. The chamber insisted furthermore that investors had put in their money anticipating a monopoly and were now confronted with different conditions, which it deemed unfair. If all

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<sup>373</sup> Knuttel 3995: D. van Waerdenburgh, *Copie vande missive, gheschreven byden generael Weerdenburch, aende [...] Staten Generael, noopende de veroveringhe vande stadt Olinda de Fernabuco* ('s-Gravenhage: Hillebrant Jacobsz van Wouw, 1630); Knuttel 3996: Anonymous, *Veroveringh van de stadt Olinda, gelegen in de capitania van Phernambuco, door [...] Heyndrick C. Lonck, generael te water ende te lande* (Amsterdam: Hessel Gerrits, 1630); Knuttel 3997: Johannes Baers, *Olinda, ghelegen int landt van Brasil [...] veroverd op den 16. februarij a°. 1630. Onder het beleydt van [...] Henrick Lonck.* (Amsterdam: Hendrick Laurensz, 1630).

<sup>374</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 3-Jan-1635, Extract of the resolutions of the Board of Directors from 12 December 1634.

<sup>375</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 07-Mar-1635, "Poincten van beschrijvinge".

the chambers really favored a free trade company, they should have chartered a free trade company in the first place, argued Zealand. Moreover, if the decision to implement free trade was taken and included the intended clause that one needed WIC shares to trade, the price of shares would rise sharply. This would benefit the shareholders in Amsterdam more, as there were more free traders there to buy the shares than in the other chamber cities, the Zealand chamber argued. After all, at this point the price of WIC shares was already twenty per cent higher in Amsterdam than in Zealand, and the Zealand chamber anticipated that the difference would only increase. The other chambers, advocating free trade, argued that free trade to and from Brazil had been the Company's policy from the start, so that it was not new at all, and Zealand had always approved until now. The other chambers, principally Amsterdam, decided to give in to some of Zealand's objections by agreeing to equally divide the income from recognition fees. Zealand tried to influence the decision by sending a considerable number of additional delegates to the meeting of the *Heeren XIX*. This did not increase their vote, but it did increase their voice. The additional Zealand delegates tried to sway the delegates from the other chambers by informally conferring with them outside the meeting room.<sup>376</sup>

The matter came to a vote and it was only Zealand that voted against free Brazilian trade. Consequently, they refused to sign the minutes of the meeting. Zealand furthermore argued that important decisions could not be made by the meeting of the Board of Directors without a unanimous vote. The 23<sup>rd</sup> article of the WIC charter stipulated that if a chamber had qualms about outvoting any of the other chambers on an important topic the issue should be given to the States General for consideration. The other chambers responded that they did not have any scruples about outvoting Zealand. The delegates from Zealand left angrily, saying that it would be the States of Zealand who would continue to fight this decision.<sup>377</sup>

Part of the problem for the WIC chamber of Zealand was also that the WIC was excluded from paying custom duties to the Admiralties, but that the latter felt entitled to payments from individual merchants trading in the charter area of the Company. Otherwise

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<sup>376</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 02-Oct-1635 Report by Arnhem and Pauw from the meeting of the *Heeren XIX*.

<sup>377</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 02-Oct-1635 Report by Arnhem and Pauw from the meeting of the *Heeren XIX*.



all merchants would claim to trade to Brazil when they left ports in the Republic as it meant that they would be excluded from outgoing duties. As a result, this effectively halved the recognition fee income for the Company as it only received dues from incoming ships when the Admiralty claimed fees on outgoing ships. With half of the potential income gone, the Zeeland chamber felt that the income no longer outweighed giving up the monopoly privilege. By trying to sway the States General to order the Admiralties to give up their claim to custom duties, the main WIC investors from Amsterdam succeeded in removing this particular objection from the Zeeland chamber because the WIC could now also receive recognition on outgoing ships.<sup>378</sup> After successfully doing so on 1 August the proponents of free trade achieved another success on 1 September 1635 when the States General wrote a letter to all WIC chambers announcing free trade.<sup>379</sup> Even though the WIC now received a recognition fee from ships trading to and from their charter area, this did not mean that the chamber Zeeland stopped its attempts to convince the States General to restore the Company's monopoly. The Amsterdam delegation in the States of Holland made their contribution in the 1634 financial support for the WIC of 700,000 guilders dependent of free trade, effectively creating a veto on a company monopoly in the Holland provincial assembly.<sup>380</sup>

The directors from the WIC chamber Zeeland turned to their provincial states, complaining that the WIC's Board of Directors had decided to allow free trade despite Zeeland's objections. If they could convince this provincial assembly they would have a good starting point for further deliberations in the States General and at least one ally who could offer them audience at the States General.<sup>381</sup> The States of Zeeland were apparently susceptible to the argument that free trade would deprive the WIC from income needed for the conquest of more Portuguese territory in Brazil or to resist counter attacks, and decided to send some of the States' delegates to Stadtholder Frederik Hendrik, whose recommendation would provide the Zeeland chamber with a significant amount of extra

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<sup>378</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 01-Sep-1635 request from the main investors from the WIC chamber of Amsterdam.

<sup>379</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 01-Aug-1635 letter to the Admiralties; 01-Sep-1635 letter to the WIC chambers.

<sup>380</sup> A. Langeveld-Kleijn, J.C. Stok, and J.W. Veenendaal-Barth, eds., *Particuliere notulen van de vergaderingen der Staten van Holland 1620-1640 door N. Stellingwerff en S. Schot*, Vol. VII, RGP Grote Serie 252 (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2005), 475.

<sup>381</sup> See also Paragraph 6.5.

status and socio-political capital.<sup>382</sup> The delegates requested that he would recommend them to the States General in order to have their arguments heard by the States General. In his recommendation letter the Stadtholder admitted that he 'had no actual knowledge of this affair', but that he felt nonetheless that the States General should hear Zealand's arguments, consider them with the usual precaution, and to reach a decision that was most favorable for the country.<sup>383</sup> This example shows how the directors of the WIC chamber could use the provincial states to contact the Stadtholder, anticipating that the informal influence of the prince would give them enough clout to change the decision of the States General. The States of Zealand fulfilled its role as broker between subjects and the Stadtholder with flying colors in anticipating that an argument on the (potentially) devastating effect of company's war capacity would ring especially loud with the Stadtholder in his capacity as army leader.

The letter from the Stadtholder was read by the States General on 29 September 1635, and the issue of free trade was debated in the general assembly on 5 October. The States General furthermore received a report from Gerard van Arnhem tot Harsseloe and Jan Gijsbertsz Pauw<sup>384</sup>, their delegates at the meeting of the *Heeren XIX*, summarizing the different arguments. Their report ended with the message that Arnhem and Pauw, as representatives of the States General, had joined the majority vote, and that they now needed a confirmation on this resolution from the States General. The delegates explained that they came to this decision primarily because of the great need of supplies in Brazil, and asked the States General to take that into account. They argued that 'it should be feared that these lavish conquests that have been won with so much effort, honor, and reputation shall be

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<sup>382</sup> See also Chapter 5.

<sup>383</sup> 'Nu en hebben wij van de gelegentheijt deser saecken geene eigentlijcke kennis, hebben des niettemin de vrijheijt genomen van aen u Ho:Mo: desen aff te veerdigen met versoeck dat haer believe op dese saecke nae hare gewonelijcke voorsichticheijt ende moderatie te lesen, nae dat se bevinden sullen voor den meesten dienst van de lande te behoiren', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 29-Sep-1635 letter from Frederik Hendrik.

<sup>384</sup> It does not specify which Pauw is meant here. Jan Gijsbertsz Pauw (?-1638) was delegate for Holland in the States General between 1634 and 1637, and Adriaan Pauw (1585-1653) was as well from 1631 to 1636 in his function as Grand Pensionary of Holland. However, Adriaan was with Johan de Knuyt at the French court negotiating as extraordinary ambassadors on behalf of the Stadtholder Frederik Hendrik from June 1634 to at least until September 1634. It thus seems unlikely that he drafted this report. A treaty was signed in February 1635. See: J.A. Worp, *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens, Vol I (1608-1634)* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1911), 466-467; H.J.M. Nellen, *Hugo Grotius: A Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church and State, 1583 – 1645* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2015), 563-564.

utterly lost' if not supplied with basic needs.<sup>385</sup> The delegates appealed to the fear of losing honor and reputation (through a loss of the colony), rather than to delve into the technical discussion on what was, or was not, allowed according to the WIC charter. The problem was the possibility of losing honor and reputation, the solution was to bring sufficient supplies to Brazil. Since the WIC had difficulties arranging swift and efficient transportation to not only Brazil but also North America, allowing other merchants to trade to and from Brazil seemed the best solution. It meant that the States General could save its reputation and honor, thus preventing a loss, without making any costs. There was no ideology dictating a laissez-faire policy, but it was a pragmatic solution. Interestingly enough the rationale of the report thus highlights the trade to, rather than the trade from, Brazil as a decisive factor to support free trade. On Walcheren around forty per cent of the slave trade expenditure was used for purchasing locally produced goods, which made local suppliers the primary beneficiaries of this trade. It is, therefore, understandable that the seventeenth-century trade to Brazil was at least as important as the trade from the South-American colony.<sup>386</sup> Consequently, the interests of the local suppliers were important to city governments.

It was primarily this report by Arnhem and Pauw that made the States General decide on 5 October 1635 that the Board of Directors of the WIC should convene again and make a decision on the free trade issue. Whatever the directors decided would be affirmed by the States General for the rest of 1635, and for 1636.<sup>387</sup> If the Board of Directors would not be able to do so, all the parties would be requested to write down their arguments which would be presented to the States General and the Stadtholder. Awaiting this decision, the chamber Zeeland would need to allow free traders to use its ships to trade to Brazil.<sup>388</sup> In other words, the States General refused to be dragged into the fight between the WIC chambers and did not take a side in the meeting of the Board of Directors. On the other hand, the High-

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<sup>385</sup> 'is seer te bevresen dat soo royale conqueste met soo veel moeijten eer ende reputatie gewonnen teffens ende te enemael sullen verlooren gaen', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 02-Oct-1635 Report by Arnhem and Pauw from the meeting of the Heeren XIX.

<sup>386</sup> G. de Kok, "Cursed Capital: the Economic Impact of the Transatlantic Slave Trade on Walcheren around 1770," *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 13, no. 3 (2016): 16.

<sup>387</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 05-Oct-1635 Letter to the presiding WIC chamber of Amsterdam.

<sup>388</sup> NL-HaNA, 3.01.04.01, inv. nr. 1358c, 05-Oct-1635 Extract from the Resolutions of the States General; NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 05-Oct-1635 Letter to the WIC chamber of Zeeland.

Mightinesses established their power by enforcing that they did need to confirm the decision.

The fact that the argument presented in the delegates' report made sense from the perspective of the States General does not mean, however, that the decision in the general assembly was made on a purely rational basis. This becomes clear from a memorandum for a representative of Zeeland in that meeting, Johan de Moor. His instructions stated that if a majority of the States General voted against the 'lawful request' of the Zeeland chamber, he should emphasize the impending doom for the company, argue that this was a Company affair and not a Generality affair, and to make sure that this was all in the minutes of the meeting.<sup>389</sup>

Johan de Moor (1576-1644) is an interesting figure in this respect. He not only represented Zeeland in the meeting of the States General (since 1629), but he also represented Flushing in the meetings of the States of Zeeland (since 1633), indicating he was a member of the city council of Flushing. From 1633 to 1644 he was also on the Admiralty board of Zeeland. Moreover, he was a director for the WIC in Zeeland and one of the first and largest investors there, as well as a director of the Northern Company.<sup>390</sup> The Zeeland chamber allowed him to establish a patroonship<sup>391</sup> on Tobago in 1628, but that failed.<sup>392</sup> He had been involved in the establishment of a fort called *Kijkoveral* and a small settlement in Essequibo on the Wild Coast in 1616 together with the wealthy London-based merchant Peter Courteen.<sup>393</sup> However, when De Moor himself, as a Zeeland WIC director, had requested to supply some provisions to this settlement in November 1623 during the second meeting of the Board of Directors, the other directors deemed it not 'tolerable' to breach the WIC monopoly to allow him to trade.<sup>394</sup> In other words, the issue of free trade had a very

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<sup>389</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 05-Oct-1635 Memo for De Moor. These points all feature in the resolution of the States General, so he was successful.

<sup>390</sup> Nijenhuis et al., *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal 1626-1630*, [Johan de Moor]; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 150-151.

<sup>391</sup> A proprietary colony.

<sup>392</sup> J. Venema, *Kiliaen van Rensselaer (1586-1643): designing a New World* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2010), 217-220.

<sup>393</sup> E. Mijers, "A natural partnership? Scotland and Zeeland in the early seventeenth century," in *Shaping the Stuart world, 1603-1714: the Atlantic connection*, ed. A.I Macinnes and A.H. Williamson (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Joosse, *Geloof in de Nieuwe Wereld*, 381-382.

<sup>394</sup> K. Ratelband, *De Westafrikaanse reis van Piet Heyn: 1624-1625*, Werken uitgegeven door de Linschoten-Vereeniging (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2006), ciii-civ.

personal undertone for Johan de Moor and he most likely held a grudge towards some of the other directors. The WIC chamber Zeeland had, through its director Johan de Moor, a direct voice in both the States of Zeeland and the States General, which helps explain the clout the WIC chamber in Zeeland apparently had with its respective provincial political body. Moreover, his personal experience of a strictly enforced monopoly that contributed to the decline of his proprietary colony can help to explain the stubborn position of Zeeland to maintain the monopoly.

It was also Johan de Moor, in his function as chair of the meeting of the States General that same week in October, who had accepted the discussion points and the invitation for the next meeting of the *Heeren XIX* in Amsterdam starting on 8 October 1635. De Moor had replied that the date was problematic for the Zeeland chamber as its directors had to travel home first and consult their principals. It was thus decided to postpone the meeting by one week. However, when that day arrived no delegates from the States General appeared. The Amsterdam directors enquired about this and learned that the general assembly had been unaware of a meeting of the *Heeren XIX*, and had thus not nominated any delegates yet. The Amsterdam directors quickly sent an envoy asking for delegates from the States General to urgently nominate their delegates, especially considering that the delegates from Groningen had been waiting in Amsterdam since the 8<sup>th</sup> for the meeting to start.<sup>395</sup> This incident shows clearly how one individual in a particular position could largely influence the run of affairs. De Moor, being both a WIC director and the chair of that week's meeting of the States General, used his power as chair to keep certain information from reaching the meeting of the States General. What exactly motivated him remains unclear. Perhaps he anticipated that he could influence the selection procedure for the High-Mightinesses' delegates, or perhaps he wanted to increase the pressure on the decision-making process of the Board of Directors. In any case, he succeeded in delaying the meeting of the *Heeren XIX* by several days. As such, de Moor tried to serve his own interests, and those of the WIC chamber of Zeeland, first.

From the fact that the issue of free trade to Brazil was on the agenda for every following meeting of the *Heeren XIX*, it becomes apparent that the directors did not reach an agreement in October 1636. However, because every chamber other than Zeeland supported free trade,

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<sup>395</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 15-Oct-1635 Letter from the WIC chamber of Amsterdam.

and because the States General had ordered Zeeland to allow free traders to use its ships, that meant that effectively free trade was allowed during 1636. This all changed on 27 December 1636 when the States General decided that it would reinstate the Company's monopoly completely. They did so because 'they had realized with great sorrow the terrible effects free trade had had on the empty warehouses in Brazil'.<sup>396</sup> They did not even care to investigate whether this had happened because of malign practices or because of contingencies, but it had to be taken care of immediately. All ships leaving for Brazil after the 27<sup>th</sup> would be impounded and the WIC was responsible to cover possible damages to the private traders. Furthermore, the States General ordered the Company to swiftly resupply the warehouses in Brazil.<sup>397</sup>

The reason the States General reached this decision is because of a very lengthy and detailed anonymous argument why a monopoly was better. In the archive of the States of Holland moreover, there is a seventeen-page abridged version of this same report from November or December 1636. It includes a collection of letters from Brazil to the WIC on several issues, including the free trade or monopoly debate. All the letters came from members of the High Council in Brazil (*Hoge Raad van Brazilië*: Balthasar Wijntgens, Willem Schotte, Ippo Eijssens, Elias Herckmans), the Political Council in Brazil (*Politieke Raad van Brazilië*: P. Serooskercke, Jacob Stachouwer, Jan Robbertsz.), and the Admirals Jan Lichthart and Cornelis Jongeneel. They either wrote letters as members of the ruling council or on their personal title. The letters are unanimous in their advice: the trade should be kept to the Company to prevent the ruin of the colony and the extremely empty warehouses. Robbertsz: 'free traders are no friends of the Company'. Serooskercke: 'the Company is being eaten by the free traders'. Schotte: 'The Hollanders cannot stop their subprime trading (*kladden*) (...) these Amsterdam merchants are one problem, agents from directors another'.<sup>398</sup> The original unabridged report for the States General further asks: 'What are the arguments of the free traders, that have succeeded in obtaining a majority vote in the Board of Directors?'. The

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<sup>396</sup> 'met droefheijt ende groot leetwesen bespeurt de quade effecten die het openstellen van de vrijen handel op Brasil heeft gebaert ten regarde van het ontblooten van de magasijnen van de compagnie' NL-HaNA, 3.01.04.01 Staten van Holland, 1358c, 27-Dec-1636 *Extract from the Resolutions of the States General*.

<sup>397</sup> NL-HaNA, 3.01.04.01, inv. nr. 1358c, 27-Dec-1636 *Extract from the Resolutions of the States General*.

<sup>398</sup> NL-HaNA, 3.01.04.01, inv. nr. 1358c, xx/xx/1636 *Anonymous report concerning the affairs of Brazil, 1636*.

author then presents three ‘well-known’ arguments: [1] Free trade had been offered to the Portuguese in 1630; [2] The free traders and their families would not want to stay in Brazil and no new individuals would want to live there; [3] The task is too large for the WIC to complete by itself. The anonymous author of the report provided a very structured, but mostly lengthy counterargument to these three points, concluding in favor of a Company monopoly because he considered himself ‘not wiser than those living in Brazil, and the impartial merchants, skippers, and honest officers’ who had presented the arguments for a monopoly so clearly already. The States General had been persuaded by this report on what was best for the state, not necessarily what was best for the Company.

### 3.2. *SELECTING THE PLAYING FIELD*

Upon arrival of the news of the decision of the States General to reinstate the Company monopoly at the meeting of the Amsterdam directors, the Amsterdam chamber agreed that it was important they needed to lobby for reopening of the trade. In order to do so, they sent Albert Coenraats Burgh, Pieter Jansz Blauwenhaen, and Eduard Man to the Burgomasters of Amsterdam to point their attention to this issue. Ferdinand Schulenborch and Henrick Hamel were sent to the Board of Directors to prevent the Directors from changing their opinion.<sup>399</sup> Schulenborch and Hamel were very effective at the meeting of the *Heeren XIX* as they resolved on 1 January 1637 to send six delegates to the High-Mightinesses asking for an exception for the monopoly for at least a short period.<sup>400</sup> The gentlemen Albert Coenraats Burgh, Pieter Jansz Blauwenhaen (Amsterdam), Abraham Bisschop (Zealand), Johan de Voocht (Maze), Allart de Groot and Jacob Volckertsz (Norther Quarter) arrived in The Hague on 3 January. At the States General, they presented a letter arguing that there were seventeen ships ready to leave for Brazil that had already paid the recognition fee, and ships that were already loaded with a combination of Company goods and private traders’ goods. The WIC thus asked for a permission for the four ships from Amsterdam, four from Zealand, five from Maze, and four from Norther Quarter to be allowed to leave under the previous free trade conditions. The directors argued that allowing these ships to trade was a more efficient way

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<sup>399</sup> NL-HaNA. 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 14, 31-Dec-1636, [scan 442-443].

<sup>400</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 01/02-Jan-1637 Extract from the Resolutions of the Heeren XIX.

of doing business, but the fact that the Company did not have the financial means to compensate the free traders also played an important role.<sup>401</sup> It is also striking that even the Zeeland chamber had ships from private traders ready to leave for Brazil. This indicates that even though the chamber advocated a monopoly and had considerable clout within the province, there were multiple free traders happy to start trading in the WIC charter area on their own accounts. This indicates that the decision to completely reinstate the WIC monopoly on 27 December 1636 was not anticipated by several traders who had ships in the Atlantic or ready for departure in Dutch harbors. The fact that the Zeeland chamber of the WIC was now the beneficiary of a resolution by the States General, while private merchants in that province had enjoyed the prospect and practice of free trade, changed the dynamic and the character of the debate and lobbying process. Firstly, it changed the playing field, moving the attention to other provincial states than Holland and Zeeland. And secondly, as will become apparent in what follows, it increased the number of lobbyists.

The *Heeren XIX* might have been united on the temporary permission of free trade, but when the chambers of Amsterdam, Maastricht, and Northern Quarter suggested sending a delegation to lobby for a permanent free trade, this was vetoed by Zeeland and Groningen.<sup>402</sup> The fact that Groningen changed sides can be explained through the low amount of recognition fees paid by free traders to the chamber Groningen, making it clear that at least for that chamber; free trade did not generate enough income to allow the company to operate and that local producers in Groningen were not benefiting as much as other regions. Without a mandate from the *XIX*, both the directors and the meeting of the main investors of Amsterdam sent a joint delegation of no less than nine Amsterdam directors and eight main investors. It is important to spend a little more time exploring who these individuals were in order to show the importance of the composition.

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<sup>401</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 03-Jan-1637 Letter from the Heeren XIX.

<sup>402</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 27-Jan-1637 Remonstrance from the WIC chamber of Amsterdam.



Table 3-1: Representatives of the WIC chamber of Amsterdam to the States General in January 1637

Name	Role	Representing/Background
Albert Coenraats Burgh	Director	Amsterdam; City Council; New Netherland
Reijnier Reael	Director	Amsterdam
Johannes de Laet	Director	Leiden
Henrick Hamel	Director	Amsterdam
Jean Raye	Director	Amsterdam; Investor director
Pieter Jansz. Blauwenhaen	Director	Deventer
Ferdinand van Schulenborch	Director	Amsterdam
Eduard Man	Director	Amsterdam
Simon van der Does	Main Investor	Amsterdam; Alderman
Henrick Broen	Main Investor	Amsterdam
Frederick de Bercq	Main Investor	Amsterdam
Kiliaen van Rensselaer	Main Investor	Amsterdam; New Netherland; Investor director
Marcus van Valkenburgh	Main Investor	Amsterdam
Jacques de la Mijne	Main Investor	Amsterdam
Jacques van Hooren	Main Investor	Amsterdam, roots in Zealand and Flanders
Elias de Raet	Main Investor	Amsterdam

Source: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 27-Jan-1637 *Remonstrance from the WIC chamber of Amsterdam*

The most prominent members on this list are probably Burgh, van der Does, and van Rensselaer. The first two held public offices in Amsterdam, while van Rensselaer and Burgh both had shares in the *patroonships* of New Netherland. Kiliaen van Rensselaer was one of the main proponents of the ‘Charter of Freedoms and Exemptions’, granted in 1629, allowing any shareholder in the Company to establish a colony in North America in the name of the Company.<sup>403</sup> That charter also allowed free trade from North America to the Low Countries for these settlers, with the exception of beaver fur, in exchange for a 5 per cent recognition fee. It has been argued that it was in fact van Rensselaer who authored the charter allowing *patroonships* and limited free trade in the WIC charter area. His advice to the company was to ‘open up the country with agriculture, that must be our first step’, because settlement was

<sup>403</sup> Knuttel 4000: Anonymous, *Vryheden by de vergaderinghe van de negentiene vande geotroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie vergunt aen allen den ghenen, die eenighe colonien in Nieu-Nederlandt sullen planten* (Amsterdam: Marten Jansz. Brand, 1630).

an essential tool for a profitable colony.<sup>404</sup> The argument that settlers were of decisive importance for a flourishing colony and could only be attracted by free trade was mirrored by the proponents of free trade in Brazil. The supporters of this ‘colonial argument’ deserve a little more attention.

Van Rensselaer has been called the leader of the ‘colonial faction’ within the WIC by historian Willem Frijhoff. The colonial faction was inspired by the ideals of Usselincx and advocated free trade to proprietary colonies in the Americas. Other members of this faction were Willem van Wely, Samuel Blommaert, Samuel Godijn, Johannes de Laet, Michiel Pauw, Albert Coenraats Burgh, Henrick Hamel, Jonas Witsen, and Pieter Evertsz Hulft from Amsterdam and Gerrit van Arnhem from Guelders. The colonial faction was the primary force behind the *patroonships* in New Netherland, while an opposing faction, the ‘trade faction’, advocated a strict monopoly in beaver and other pelts without the burden of costly colonies in the North America. They had less interest in other goods coming from North America. Members of the trade faction included Marcus de Vogelaer, Marcus van Valckenburg, Cornelis Bicker, Guillelmo Bartolotti, Henrick Broen, Simon van der Does, Daniel van Liebergen and Abraham Oyens.<sup>405</sup> These two factions heavily debated the privileges of the *patroonships* in New Netherland resulting in the trade faction gaining the upper hand after van Rensselaer was forbidden to combine his positions as director and *patroon* in 1631 and was consequently forced to step down as a director. After the trade faction gained control over the WIC they purged the colonial government in New Amsterdam in 1632.<sup>406</sup> Tensions between van Rensselaer and De Vogelaer ran so high that when they met each other by chance on the Dam in Amsterdam in 1633 it nearly escalated into a fist fight. Van Rensselaer reportedly ‘went at De Vogelaer in such a way (...) that he will not soon forget it’.<sup>407</sup> It is thus all the more interesting that these two factions jointly operated on the issue of free trade to Brazil: Burgh, De Laet, Hamel, van Rensselaer, van Valkenburgh, Broen, van der Does represented both factions. There seems no other

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<sup>404</sup> M.W. Goodwin, *Chronicles of America, Vol. VII: Dutch and English on the Hudson: a chronicle of colonial New York* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), 32-33, quote on page 33.

<sup>405</sup> W.Th.M. Frijhoff, *Fulfilling God’s Mission: The Two Worlds of Dominie Everardus Bogardus, 1607-1647* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007), 418-420.

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.*, 421.

<sup>407</sup> O.A. Rink, *Holland on the Hudson: an economic and social history of Dutch New York* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1986), 110.

explanation than that van Valkenburgh and van der Does supported free trade to Brazil because they benefited more through their private trade in sugar and slaves. van der Does was in business with Hans Bultel, whose uncle, Antoine l'Empereur had a son, Theodosius who was the second largest private sugar trader from Brazil in 1637.<sup>408</sup> In other words, even though some opposed free trade to North America, they forged alliances based on interests that propagated free trade to South America.

Other groups were missing in the delegation to the States General, however. Closer examination reveals the absence of several directors from the Amsterdam chamber. As explained earlier, any group that had invested 100,000 guilders in a particular WIC chamber was entitled to its own director. For the Amsterdam chamber those groups were the cities of Leiden, Haarlem, Deventer, and the provinces of Guelders and Utrecht. Who was the representative of Haarlem at this time is unclear. There are two known Haarlem directors; Jacob de Key and Matheus Joyen. The latter is completely unknown, and De Key can be placed in New Netherland in the 1640s, and neither of them appeared in the minutes of the Amsterdam chamber in 1636.<sup>409</sup> The delegate from Guelders, Johan Wentholt, had just been appointed for six years, starting May 1636 – a decision that had already been made by that province on 9 December 1634.<sup>410</sup> The representative of Deventer, Blauwenhaen, was present in the delegation to the States General arguing in favor of free trade, but the representatives of Utrecht, Cornelis van Wijckersloot and Pieter Varlet, were absent from this list as well. This is probably because part of the debate on free trade took place in the Provincial States of Utrecht at the same time.

WIC investors residing in Utrecht petitioned the Provincial States of Utrecht in early February 1637. They wrote that they had 'noticed that some directors paid more attention to their own interest than to that of the Company when they made every effort to keep the trade to Brazil open' for themselves.<sup>411</sup> As has become clear from the example of van der Does above, the personal trading interests of Amsterdam directors regarding trade could

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<sup>408</sup> See Appendix A and Elias, *De vroedschap*, 324-325.

<sup>409</sup> Baptism witness. Need a clear reference here. Now Internet link via google.

<sup>410</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 17-May-1636 Letter from Guelders to the States General.

<sup>411</sup> 'Gemerckt eenige Bewinthebbers, meer lettende op haer particulier, als op het voordeel van de Compagnie, gelaboreert hebben den handel op Brasil open ende aen haer ende den haren te krijgen', W.G. Brill, J.A. Grothe, and J.I.D. Nepveu, eds., *Kroniek van het Historisch genootschap Utrecht*, Vol. XXV (Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon, 1869), 198.

definitely interfere with the interest of the Company. This was against the WIC charter according to the suppliants, as the directors had sworn to maintain the interest of the company. It was now the directors who had made large profits in the free trade to Brazil, alleged the Utrecht investors, which were trying to make the States General revise its position to ban free trade. The suppliants requested that the States of Utrecht instructed their delegates at the States General that the High-Mightinesses maintain the original charter of the WIC. In the margin of the petition the States of Utrecht wrote on 10 February 1637 that they resolved to indeed instruct their delegates according to this request.<sup>412</sup>

Upon hearing this, the directors of the WIC chamber Amsterdam quickly responded. They adduced that the suppliants in the aforementioned petition 'used untruths to smirch the good name and reputation' of the directors. Thus, the Amsterdam directors felt it was necessary to justify their actions to the States of Utrecht. They did not deny that they themselves had profited from the trade to Brazil, they had simply done something that was allowed by the States General and all the necessary fees had always been paid to the Company. In reality, they argued, they had done so in the interest of the Company. The allegations by the Utrecht investors were, in other words, unjust. Moreover, they should have addressed their issues with the Utrecht directors in the Amsterdam chamber rather than with the provincial states.<sup>413</sup> In addition, the WIC chamber of Amsterdam commissioned the two Utrecht directors and the Deventer director (van Wijckersloot, Varlet, and Blauwenhaen) to the meeting of Utrecht's provincial assembly to support their argument.<sup>414</sup>

That this issue surfaced in Utrecht is important for three reasons. Firstly, it shows that the Amsterdam chamber was not undivided on the issue of free trade. Or at least that the Amsterdam investors, who presented themselves unified at the States General, were not settled on the issue. All the Amsterdam directors advocated for free trade and some of the (larger) investors did too, but there was a considerable share of investors with no means of trading to Brazil themselves, that considered themselves disadvantaged by this decision. The Utrecht investors had a different interest than the Amsterdam investors. The representatives at the WIC chamber where they had invested their money, Cornelis van Wijckersloot and

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<sup>412</sup> Ibid., 197-199 Petition by the WIC shareholders residing in Utrecht.

<sup>413</sup> Ibid., 200-202, Letter WIC chamber of Amsterdam to States of Utrecht. .

<sup>414</sup> Ibid., 202-203, Letter of credence by WIC chamber.

Pieter Varlet, sided with the free trade faction. In an attempt to still get their way, the Utrecht investors turned to the States of Utrecht. This brings us to the second reason why this is relevant. The Amsterdam chamber did not want to fight this issue in another arena than the WIC, the States General, and the Stadtholder. In order to do so it declared it was an illegitimate action to turn to the States of Utrecht. This is the third relevant point and shows how issue of sovereignty and legitimacy that originally played on a general level trickled down to debates regarding the WIC. The WIC directors argued that every decision by the *Heeren XIX* had been made 'in concordance, with consent, and in presence of delegates from the High-Mightinesses' and with the highest authority already in agreement, it was unnecessary harmful to the Company to 'disclose the state of affairs to everyone'.<sup>415</sup> Thus, because representatives of the States General had been present, the Board of Directors could appropriate some of the Generality's authority, the directors argued. Effectively, as it advocated to shunt the provincial assembly off on this issue, this was an argument against the particular ambition of the provinces and in favor of more sovereignty for the States General.

It was a new standpoint from the Amsterdam directors to claim that the States of Utrecht were not the place to discuss WIC policy, considering that it had not hindered the directors to petition to the States of Utrecht before. In an undated document that was probably submitted in early 1637, the Amsterdam directors requested that Utrecht delegates would exert themselves in the States General to allow free trade until further advice would arrive from Brazil. Obtaining advice from the colonists in Brazil had been beneficial for the free trade lobby in 1636, so it seemed likely that this would again be the case. However, in that same document the WIC directors also clearly stated that 'this affair, politically, should be a known maxim of state for the Company'.<sup>416</sup> Even though they requested a favorable action from the States of Utrecht, the WIC chamber Amsterdam at the same time stressed that the decision should always be their (political) domain. This was of course a matter of power for

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<sup>415</sup> 'de Compagnie nadeelich soude wesen, aen ydereen int particulier opening van alles te doen, sonderlinge soo alles is geschiet met goetvinden, advoy, ende in presence van de gecommiteerden van hare Hoge Mog.', *ibid.*, 201-202, Letter WIC chamber of Amsterdam to States of Utrecht.

<sup>416</sup> 'Dat de saecke, polityckelijck geconsidereert, een notoir maxime van staet voor de Compagnie moet sijn', *ibid.*, 191-197, Deduction for the States of Utrecht by the WIC directors Amsterdam, quote on 193.

the Amsterdam chamber, but it was also an attempt to limit the playing field for lobbying to the WIC, the States General, and the Stadtholder.<sup>417</sup>

### 3.3. *MAKING IT COUNT*

The seventeen directors and main investors from Amsterdam both delivered their own arguments in favor of free trade to the States General on 30 January 1637. The directors started off with the reasons why originally free trade was decided back when the Company had captured Recife and Olinda in 1630, and complemented this with a numbered list of twelve additional arguments. The 1630 arguments were the same as the arguments delivered to the States of Utrecht, with even some of the sentences directly matching. They repeated the well-known arguments that free trade had already been promised to the Portuguese inhabitants, and that it was not fair to change the rules now.<sup>418</sup> It also included argumentation similar to the ‘colonial faction’ argument used for New Netherland: without settlers to cultivate the land, the colony would never be profitable and free trade (and passage) was the way to attract settlers, and to prevent current settlers from leaving. The settlers would of course also create a market for goods shipped from the Republic. Moreover, the free trade lobby argued, to force the (Portuguese) plantation owners to only sell to and buy from the Company was nothing else than true slavery. And everyone knew that ‘a monopoly is the most odious thing in the world and the most harmful practice of all’.<sup>419</sup> This is a moral argument against free trade, instead of a strictly economic argument. Thus, while claiming a moral high ground, the free trade lobby knew that from an economic standpoint their arguments were most likely not more convincing than the monopolist lobby. The majority of the additional twelve points elaborated on the 1630-arguments, but there was also new reasoning, including the one that the Company should behave like ‘a mother and a

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<sup>417</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 inv. nr. 5754, 02-Jan-1637 Extract Resolutions Heeren XIX.

<sup>418</sup> This had indeed been promised, in fact already in 1625 this regulation was established after the conquest of Bahia. The inhabitants of Brazil were required to pay the same duties as they had during the Portuguese reign and use Company ships for ‘a reasonable freight price’, see the copy from the resolution book of the WIC in the petition of Joseph Israel da Costa, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 12564.5.6.

<sup>419</sup> ‘Wel wetende dat een Monopolium het odieuste dingh is van de werelt ende het schadelijkste bedrijf van alle staten’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 30-Jan-1637 Reasons WIC directors Amsterdam.

wet nurse'. Once again, the free trade lobby appealed to the natural relation, and the moral obligation, for the Republic to nurture its dependent colony. Free trade would provide the solution, while increasing prices through a monopoly for already scanty goods was considered the opposite of mother- or wet-nurse-like behavior. Another important argument was that it would be costlier to maintain a monopoly because not only would the Company have to hire more servants, becoming subject to their disloyalty – 'as they had seen but too often in other places'.

The investors from Amsterdam joined forces with the investors from Norther Quarter for their petition supporting free trade. They submitted their request in person, orally presented their considerations, and enclosed a resolution from the *Heeren XIX* from 18 July 1636 specifying how much of the recognition fees would be paid to the investors.<sup>420</sup>

The Zealand chamber meanwhile employed a lobbying tactic that relied on their political connections and their support in numbers. After the Zealanders had learned that the WIC chamber Amsterdam had no intention of accepting the decision of the States General and that the latter were lobbying for free trade in The Hague, the WIC chamber of Zealand did three things. Firstly, they summoned the main investors in their chamber for a special meeting. Secondly, the Zealanders wrote to the city council of Middelburg that they were worried because the Amsterdam chamber came with the authority of the city council of Amsterdam to The Hague since some of their lobbyists had a double role. They thus requested a recommendation letter from their city in Zealand too, to which the Middelburg city council was happy to oblige.<sup>421</sup> This recommendation provided the Zealand lobbyists with extra authority that could help to counter the weight of the Amsterdam city council. Along the same lines the States of Zealand wrote a letter advising the States General to stay with its decision of 27 December, despite Amsterdam 'employing all their means and techniques to destroy and alter' that decision.<sup>422</sup> The third tactic was to also show their strength in numbers. The summoned meeting by the main investors resolved two things.

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<sup>420</sup> 'Ende dat van dese verhooginge apparte reeckening gehouden sal werden om daer van uijtdeelinghe aen de participanten te doen', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 30-Jan-1637 Reasons WIC investors Amsterdam and Norther Quarter.

<sup>421</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 03-Feb-1637 Letter from the City Council of Middelburg to the States General.

<sup>422</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 03-Feb-1637 Letter from the States of Zealand to the States General.

They delegated three amongst themselves, Lucas Schoorer, Heindrick Soomer, and Johan le Gouche, to go to The Hague to lobby for the monopoly shoulder to shoulder with the regular delegate directors and investors that were in The Hague.<sup>423</sup> Additionally, the meeting crafted a letter of credence (*geloofsbrief*) for these three individuals. In order to increase their weight and to show support for the Zealand trio, fifty-six other investors put their signature on this letter of credence. This meant that the fifty-six individuals that had signed the letter of credence transferred their ‘voice’ to the three lobbyists in The Hague. Furthermore, this letter stated, without providing details, that free trade would ruin the company. Prominent members on the signature list included Guillaume de Zoete van Houthain, Lieutenant-Admiral of Zeeland, Pieter Boudaen Courten, director of the VOC, Northern Company, and New Netherland Company, and multiple other individuals who would in the future become WIC directors or WIC employees in Brazil such as David Baute and Jean Louijs.

What becomes clear from what is described above is that when the chamber Amsterdam employed a certain lobbying technique the chamber Zeeland tried to cancel that advantage by doing the same thing. The Amsterdam chamber tried to bring political weight to the meeting of the States General by sending Amsterdam council members. The Zeeland chamber tried to cancel out this weight by requesting a letter from the city council of Middelburg siding with them. The Middelburg city council explicitly wrote that ‘that is why they requested a letter of recommendation from us, which we cannot refuse’.<sup>424</sup> The Zeeland chamber, worried by the number of delegates the Amsterdam chamber had sent, tried to cancel out that factor by showing an even larger number of supporters amongst Zeeland investors. With these factors more or less balanced out, it came to the power of the argumentation before the States General to reach a decision.

The Zeeland chamber tried a rhetorical trick by arguing that it had presented its arguments which had clearly convinced the States General to reinstate the monopoly, so that it was not necessary – for time saving reasons – to argue that again. When the Zeeland chamber learned that this was insufficient to convince the High-Mightinesses, it presented its argument again in a forty-two-page exposé totaling twenty-two arguments. Again, the

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<sup>423</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 04-Feb-1637 Letter by the Zeeland main investors to the States General.

<sup>424</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 03-Feb-1637 Letter from the City Council of Middelburg to the States General.



chamber of Zeeland copied a technique from the Amsterdam chamber by numbering their argument and trying to exceed Amsterdam's twelve arguments. The numbering of arguments was something that had not happened in the previous years, but it was again something that once more tried to show the support in numbers. This exposé was presented in the name of Zeeland, its main investors, Maze, and Groningen. After Groningen, it was now also the Maze chamber, which had previously supported free trade, that sided with the monopolists.<sup>425</sup> The majority of the arguments in this petition were not new; the monopolists admitted that it was indeed against right of peoples (*recht van alle volkeren*) to limit trade, but it would be wrong to the investors to change the charter. If free trade would be allowed, the WIC would no longer be a trading company, the monopolists argued, and the WIC was never created 'to dispute sovereignty of the King of Spain through war'.<sup>426</sup> A new argument, however, was that the monopolists considered the Portuguese in Brazil lucky as they were allowed to trade at all by their victor.<sup>427</sup> Clearly, in the mind of the monopolists, the WIC still resembled some of the ideals of Usselincx, who had propagated peaceful settlement. If the WIC would secede its monopoly, it had fully become a Company of War comparable to the Admiralties, while the Zealanders envisioned a Company of Trade.

The heart of the matter was that the monopolists wanted to hold on to what was stated in the charter, while the free traders wanted to maintain what was promised by the Board of Directors to the Portuguese when they were conquered. But it was not only about what was right. From the documents, it seems like the Zealanders genuinely did not appreciate that free traders reaped profits while the Company was reduced to warfare financed through recognition fees. On the other hand, the proponents of free trade did not only seek their own interest. It really seems like they too were sincere when they argued that free trade was necessary to attract hard-needed colonists to make the plantations and sugar mills flourish. These opinions were not mutually exclusive; if the Amsterdam chamber had seen a solution to attract colonists while maintaining the Company monopoly, they might have done so. But when it came down to it, they felt that a flourishing colony in the long run outweighed

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<sup>425</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 07-Feb-1637 Reasons Zeeland, Maze, and Groningen chambers for a monopoly.

<sup>426</sup> 'dat de voors: compagnie niet en is geformeert omme door den oorloch met de koning van Spanje te disputeren over de souvereiniteit van de voors: landen'.

<sup>427</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 07-Feb-1637 Reasons Zeeland, Maze, and Groningen chambers for a monopoly, argument 7.

maximizing profits for the company in the short run. That these issues were not mutually exclusive probably explains why the decision-making process by the States General was so far from straight-forward and why they were so susceptible to arguments by both lobbying parties. The end result was that the debate was not about a *laissez-faire* policy versus a mercantilist policy and it neither became a moral question. Instead, with both factions stating that their respective solution was better, the basic question boiled down to: which policy is more profitable for the Company and the common wealth?

### 3.4. *MAKING IT COUNT EVEN MORE*

The monopolists, who apart from the directors from Zealand, Maze, and Groningen now also included the investors from these chambers, provided the first account. It was not the account they had made themselves, but that provided by a special committee on 1 January 1637 after a request by the *Heeren XIX*. The calculations started off with a fictitious amount of 1,350,000 guilders, which would buy a free trader certain goods that were in demand in Brazil. This included wine, oil, barley, tobacco pipes, shirts and various other provisions. According to the calculations, these could be sold for a little over 2,933,271 guilders in Brazil. Not all of this was profit though, as the free traders paid 590,795 guilders in recognition fees and ship rental to the WIC. The almost three million guilders would of course not be paid in cash, but in sugar. This equaled 20,952 chests of sugar of 560 pounds which could be sold for 12 stivers per pound, or 336 guilders per chest.<sup>428</sup> In other words, free traders would buy goods in the Republic for 1,350,000 guilders, which could be sold for just shy of 3,000,000 in Brazil. Those nearly 3 million guilders worth of sugar in Brazil, equaled 7,039,872 guilders resale value in the Republic. Excluding all the purchase costs, insurance costs, leakage, and recognition fees, this accumulated to a net profit of 5,164,128 guilders for the free traders, almost nine times the 590,795 guilders the Company made for this transaction.<sup>429</sup> To make a

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<sup>428</sup> 1 arroba is 28 pounds of sugar; each chest is 70 arrobas so 560 pound. 2,933,271 guilders could buy one 419,040 arrobas of sugar in Brazil according to these calculations.

<sup>429</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 09-Feb-1637 Calculations in favor of a monopoly presented to the States General.

comparison, for the years 1635 and 1636 the WIC received a total of 496,243 guilders in recognition, 83.9 per cent of which was paid in Amsterdam.<sup>430</sup>

It is very well possible that previous versions of this calculation influenced the States General in their decision to reinstate the monopoly on 27 December 1636. The way the documents are arranged in the archive definitely suggests such a theory, as they follow a copy of the outgoing letter announcing the decision of the States General. The fact that the document was presented and confirmed at the meeting of the *Heeren XIX* on 1 January definitely leaves open the option for the circulation of a preliminary draft of the calculation a few days earlier in The Hague.

The Amsterdam chamber and its main investors however had some objections to the calculations presented by the special WIC committee and presented their criticism to the States General three days after the monopolists had provided their accounts. The first objection was that the Company would suffer from 'fraud', just like they were experiencing on a daily basis on the Guinea coast and for which they had almost no remedy.<sup>431</sup> Moreover, the monopolists had overestimated the price for which the sugar could be sold in the Republic. They had added 2 stivers per pound, making realistic pricing 10 stivers per pound instead of 12. This created a difference of 1,173,312 guilders to the net profit. Another mistake made by the monopolists was that they first deducted a twenty per cent leakage, and then calculated insurance costs. This was not correct according to the Amsterdam chamber; it was normal practice to calculate insurance costs first, and then discount for leakage. The twenty per cent was highly optimistic, too, according to free traders. This claim was substantiated with an example of the merchant who tried to ship twelve vats of whale oil (*traan*) and only succeeded in bringing less than two full vats to Brazil. All of this in combination with a fifty per cent profit margin led to completely unrealistic prices for products in Brazil; a pound of cheese would come to 6 stivers in Brazil instead of 3 in the Republic, a jug of wine would be 20 stivers instead of eleven, oil 24 versus 15 stivers, and a six-pound rye bread would be no less than 13 stivers compared to 5 in the Republic. The WIC chamber Amsterdam did not

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<sup>430</sup> Fl. 57.659 for the chamber of Zeeland; Fl. 22.258 for Groningen; Fl. 416.326 for the chamber of Amsterdam. See: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 07-Feb-1637 received recognition in Zeeland, Maze, and Groningen; NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 04-Feb-1637 received recognition in Amsterdam.

<sup>431</sup> 'de frauden die de compagnie als selffs soude handelen bij haare ministers heeft te lijden gelijk se dagelijcx in Guinea ende elders bevinden ende echter qualijck connen remedieren', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 12-Feb-1637 Counter calculations by the WIC chamber of Amsterdam and its investors.

know the prices in Brazil either, but according to the prices following from the profit margins that the monopolists presented, an average soldier or sailor would have to pay twenty-one guilders a month for provisions from their ten-and-a-half-guilder payment for provisions (*mondgelt*). In other words, there would be no market to sell goods this expensively. The company would be forced to sell goods at a loss, and would only be able to make money on the return cargo. The same would be true for the free traders too, continued the Amsterdam chamber, as they would be competing on a free market and thus would not be able to set a price to sell their products for. But that would lead to lower prices for the company and its servants in Brazil.<sup>432</sup>

The next step for the free trade lobby was to prove that it was possible to cover the costs of maintaining a colony in Brazil from the revenue from free trade. They also calculated with the fictitious 1,350,000 guilders. In recognition fees the WIC would receive 651,090 guilders, indeed higher than the monopolists had argued, because the Amsterdam chamber also included a fee on the return freight. Their calculations totaled 14,464 chests of sugar because of lower selling price of commodities in Brazil. The WIC was entitled to twenty per cent of those chests valued at 809.760 guilders. On the other eighty per cent of the sugar chests the free traders would have to pay a recognition fee, convoy, a 'sugar percent', a ten percent fee for the chests, and a three percent fee for the captaincy totaling almost two million guilders. The WIC would maintain its monopoly on brazilwood and 'blacks', and further add revenue from regalia, privateering and some minor small incomes. All in all, this came to 4,250,397 guilders and five stivers. The costs for Brazil on the other hand were 2,676,000 guilders. This paid for 6.000 soldiers, 2.000 sailors, their provisions, 18 large ships, 20 yachts, 27 extra rented ships, ammunition, and maintenance of forts. In other words, the company could make a profit of 1,574,397 guilders under a free trade policy. This amount could increase an additional 532,000 when the lands were brought under complete control of the Company, which henceforth would need only half of the soldiers and sailors.<sup>433</sup>

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<sup>432</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 12-Feb-1637 Counter argument by the WIC chamber of Amsterdam and its investors.

<sup>433</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 21-Feb-1637 Counter calculations by the WIC chamber of Amsterdam and its investors.

Table 3-2: Competing calculations for economic policy in 1637

	Monopoly lobby	Free trade lobby
Goods in Republic	€ 1,350,000.00	€ 1,350,000.00
Goods value in Brazil	€ 2,933,271.00	
Sugar value in Republic	€ 7,039,872.00	
Expenditure	€ 2,000,744.00	
Profit for WIC	€ 5,039,128.00	€ 408,822.00
Recognition REP-BRA		€ 651,090.25
<i>Private trade</i>		€ 4,048,800.00
Sugar fee 20%		€ 809,760.00
Recognition BRA-REP		€ 451,460.00
Convoy		€ 30,316.00
Sugar percent		€ 162,008.00
Chest owner 10%		€ 404,880.00
Captaincy owner 3%		€ 112,000.00
Brasilwood estimate		€ 250,000.00
Regalia		€ 150,000.00
Enslaved Africans (4,000)		€ 400,000.00
Other		€ 400,000.00
Income for WIC	€ 5,039,128.00	€ 4,250,397.25

Source: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754.

To what extent were the prices mentioned by both parties correct? Was Amsterdam right in claiming that the monopolists overestimated the price of sugar by two stivers? That is actually difficult to say. Both of them were right because they did not specify whether they talked about white sugar or moscovados. Both types of sugar came from Brazil. The average price for white sugar in the years 1631-1636 was a little bit over thirteen stivers, while moscovados was just over ten stivers. White sugar (or *blancos*) and moscovados were two types of sugar that were held in the highest regard and thus the most in demand at the refineries in the Republic. The third type, *panella*, was brownish and considered inferior.<sup>434</sup> The WIC chamber Zeeland would in their defense to the recalculations by Amsterdam touch upon the issue of white sugar or moscovados, but only to mention that their price of twelve stivers was not unrealistic considering the fact that moscovados were sold for twelve to

<sup>434</sup> K. Glamann, *Dutch Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 162.

thirteen stivers, and *blancos* for sixteen stivers and up.<sup>435</sup> For the year 1637 this statement was actually true, as can be seen in Table 3-3.

Table 3-3: Sugar prices in the Dutch Republic with East Indian sugar as a comparison

Sugar prices in the Republic in stivers per pound				
Year	Brazilian white sugar	Moscovados	East India <i>kandij</i>	East India <i>poeder</i>
1631	13,40	11,80	-	10,80
1632	14,00	10,80	14,20	10,80
1633	13,40	10,80	9,80	9,20
1634	13,20	10,00	9,80	9,80
1635	13,20	10,20	11,00	9,80
1636	12,00	10,40	11,60	-
1637	17,00	13,40	16,60	-
1638	13,60	10,80	-	10,00
1639	-	-	9,80	6,60
1640	11,00	9,80	12,80	9,40
1641	10,20	7,60	-	7,00
1642	9,20	6,80		
1643	8,80	6,20		
1645	9,20	7,80		
1646	13,00	11,40		
1648	12,00	8,60		
1649	13,20	10,40		
1650	13,40	9,80		
1651	14,60	10,60		
1652	13,80	10,00		
1653	13,20	10,20		
1654	13,80	10,20		

Source: Glamann, *Dutch Asiatic Trade*, 154-157; Posthumus, *Prijsgeschiedenis*, 122-131.

Amsterdam had pointed out that sugar was a difficult commodity to maintain a stable price for. Unlike brazilwood, sugar was grown in other places under Dutch control, such as Formosa and Java, or could be brought to the Republic via Portuguese ports.<sup>436</sup> Even though this is technically true, the sugar prices in Table 3-3 are very consistent. Another argument put forward by the Amsterdam chamber was that there were at most 9.000 chests of sugar being produced in Brazil because the guerilla warfare had destroyed so many plantations

<sup>435</sup> NL- HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 21-Feb-1637 Argument Zeeland, Groningen and Maze with calculation.

<sup>436</sup> T. Andrade, *Lost Colony: The untold story of China's first great victory over the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 52.

and sugar mills. Thus, both the roughly 21,000 chests listed by the special WIC committee and the 14,000 chests listed by Amsterdam were rather optimistic. In the next set of calculations brought to the States General, both the monopolists and the free traders scaled down their sugar revenue to 7,000 chests of sugar. On the same day that Amsterdam had presented their calculations to the States General, it was first Zealand, Groningen, and Maze who handed in their criticism.<sup>437</sup> Two days later, it was now the 23 February 1637, they were followed by Amsterdam.<sup>438</sup> The Amsterdam chamber alleged that the Zealand chamber should have made apologies for all the mistakes they had provided to the States General, and returned to the argument that settlers were necessary in order to increase the so dearly needed production. Settlers were only to be attracted through free trade. Therefore, they now provided a calculation without new settlers and a constant revenue of 7,000 chests of sugar. The cost of maintaining Brazil for two years amounted to 6,058,800. The income for the WIC in the case of free trade would be 127,998 guilders higher than through a monopoly, according to the Amsterdam chamber. This small difference effectively meant a loss of 4.6 or 4.8 million guilders every two years in the case of free trade and monopoly respectively. So both scenarios caused a loss for the Company for the foreseeable future, but the petitioners did not provide further explanations on how to solve that.

Both parties provided very detailed calculations of their preferred proposed policy. Statements regarding the economic effects of proposed policy is something commonly associated with present-day governmental planning agencies, and less with the seventeenth century. Though, there is some historical scholarship on the importance of what William Petty coined 'political arithmetic' in the 1670s. It is argued that there was at least since the medieval period an increased importance to quantitative sources to substantiate government policy. In England, by 1660, calculation increased in popularity for political rhetoric.<sup>439</sup> Concomitantly, 'a new political culture with a deeper interest in political economy and accounting was emerging', according to Jacob Soll. Not only Britain, but also France and Brandenburg-Prussia had started giving political primacy to financial managers.<sup>440</sup> In its

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<sup>437</sup> NL- HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 21-Feb-1637 Argument Zealand, Groningen and Maze with calculation.

<sup>438</sup> NL- HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 23-Feb-1637 Argument Amsterdam with calculation.

<sup>439</sup> Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 223-230.

<sup>440</sup> J. Soll, "Accounting for Government: Holland and the Rise of Political Economy in Seventeenth-Century Europe," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 40, no. 2 (2009): 216.

emphasis on the economic consequences of proposed policy as early as the 1630s, the Dutch Republic was ahead of other European countries. Proponents and opponents of Company monopoly discussed on the details of the price of rye or cheese to dispute each other's calculations and its consequences for the political economy. More importantly, it brought the decision on the free trade issue back to an economic level. This might seem an obvious conclusion, but it contradicts the view that this decision was so firmly rooted in judicial contemplation based on Hugo Grotius' *Mare Liberum* or *jure gentium* arguing that 'free and open trade should be refused to nobody'.<sup>441</sup> There are indeed traces of this type of argument in the different petitions, and it is more prominent in pamphlets, but the lengthy, incredibly detailed, and debated calculations by both parties show that people tried to argue what was best for the Company – or even for the common wealth. It is thus questionable whether Weststeijn's conclusion that 'clearly, the ideological origins of Dutch colonialism in the seventeenth century were deeply rooted in the late humanist culture' stands up to scrutiny when it comes to issue of free trade.<sup>442</sup>

### 3.5. *THE ROLE OF THE AMSTERDAM CITY COUNCIL*

Before making a decision, the States General requested a new report to make sense of the different arguments. Hendrick van der Capellen toe Rijssel and the other delegates of the States General that held a meeting with the different WIC representatives drafted a summary of letters, the arguments by Amsterdam and the other chambers, and included short interviews with other individuals they deemed relevant in their capacity as impartial merchants. This document was handed to the States General on 25 February.<sup>443</sup> The political and military councils in Brazil wrote clearly that they favored a monopoly in order to fill the warehouses of the Company again.<sup>444</sup> The next one they approached were the Amsterdam representatives. They listed eight arguments: 1. The company did not have enough credit to trade; 2. Free traders could better supply the captaincies because they do have credit; 3. Free

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<sup>441</sup> Weststeijn, "Making of Free Trade Ideology," 191-192.

<sup>442</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

<sup>443</sup> NL- HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 25-Feb-1637 Report by mr van der Capellen toe Rijssel and others.

<sup>444</sup> These '13 letters from 9 individuals' must be the same letters as found in the States of Holland archive: NL-HaNA, 3.01.04.01, inv. nr. 1358c, xx/xx/1636 Anonymous report concerning the affairs of Brazil, 1636.



trade would attract more settlers; 4. Free individuals would be better to erect *engenhos* or sugar villages; 5. The WIC had promised free trade to the Portuguese; 6. The WIC needed to treat the Portuguese better than the Spanish did to make them into allies; 7. The Company already earned five to six tons of gold<sup>445</sup> through recognition fees, which could be increased to 2,5 million guilders; 8. Free trade would not only result in break-even, but would lead to profit.

Up next were the representatives of the Zeeland chamber. They provided six reasons: 1. Amsterdam's request was contrary to the WIC charter; 2. Zeeland represented the general interest, not a particular interest of free traders; 3. Brazil would be better cultivated and populated through public order of the WIC than through private traders seeking profit; 4. It would be unlawful to make the WIC pay for war, while the private traders reaped the profits; 5. So far recognition fees had only supplied one tenth of the costs of the colony; 6. If the other chambers did not have enough credit to send goods to the colony, the Zeeland chamber could provide trading credit for the other chambers. There was one condition though, and that was that the provisions would have to be bought in Zeeland.<sup>446</sup> Especially this last point demonstrates how the issue of Brazilian trade was not just about the sugar coming from the colony, but equally about the supply of the goods for the colony. City governments were interested in supporting and protecting the local merchants and craftsmen that provided the Company with goods on the outbound voyage.<sup>447</sup> Considering that 83.9 per cent of the private traders' recognition fees in the previous years had been collected in Amsterdam, it is to be expected that the majority of supplies for the outbound voyage would be purchased in and around Amsterdam.<sup>448</sup> The result of this, (especially) Zeeland feared, was that even though the impact of free trade regulations on the entire economic pie of the Republic would not differ dramatically from monopoly regulations, the regional impact could very well be dramatic. In other words, a fair risk would be *internal*

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<sup>445</sup> 500,000-600,000 guilders

<sup>446</sup> 'mits dat sij strecken aen haer bronnen', NL- HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 25-Feb-1637 Report by mr van der Capellen toe Rijssel and others.

<sup>447</sup> Kok, "Cursed Capital."

<sup>448</sup> Fl. 57.659 for the chamber of Zeeland; Fl. 22.258 for Groningen; Fl. 416.326 for the chamber of Amsterdam. See: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 07-Feb-1637 received recognition in Zeeland, Maze, and Groningen; NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 04-Feb-1637 received recognition in Amsterdam.

*contraction or regional asymmetry* where a larger share of the economic wealth and power base in the Republic could gravitate towards Holland and Amsterdam in particular.<sup>449</sup>

The committee had requested the States General to appoint 'some impartial merchants' and 'investors who were not attached to the free trade'.<sup>450</sup> The committee interviewed the suggested Kiliaen van Rensselaer and George Everhart Klenck, both merchants from Amsterdam. Van Rensselaer has been discussed above. Klenck (1580-1646) was a merchant primarily trading to Russia with a good relationship with the Tsar. He hosted Albert Coenraats Burgh in his Russian residence when Burgh was on his way as ambassador to the Russian court in 1630.<sup>451</sup> Furthermore, in November 1636, Klenck was involved in buying all the VOC's pepper in collaboration with Daniel Godijn and Davind Fransz & Co.<sup>452</sup> All of Klenck's sons later entered into the service of the VOC.<sup>453</sup>

The committee asked the two merchants if they had been involved in private trading to Brazil. They responded that they both were investors in the Amsterdam chamber, but that they had not been trading to Brazil. The committee also asked what they deemed better for the Company: a monopoly or free trade. Van Rensselaer and Klenck responded that the magistracy of Amsterdam was very involved in this case, and that they felt conscience-stricken about speaking without the magistracy's consent. Although, if the States General could free them from the retribution by the Amsterdam magistracy after their statements, they were willing to openly share their opinion based on their experience. Considering this answer, the committee told them that they did not want to get them into trouble for their opinion, so they would not proceed further questioning.<sup>454</sup>

The lobbying activities took an interesting turn with this statement by the two Amsterdam merchants. Firstly, it shows that certain groups, in this case the Amsterdam leadership, with a strong position of power could employ that power for their own interest well beyond the 'official channels'. In this case the fear of retribution from the Amsterdam

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<sup>449</sup> Joh. de Vries, "De economische achteruitgang der Republiek in de achttiende eeuw" (PhD dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 1959), 36-39.

<sup>450</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr 12564.5.6, entry for 21-Feb-1637.

<sup>451</sup> J.H. de Stoppelaer, *Balthasar de Moucheron: een bladzijde uit de Nederlandsche handelsgeschiedenis tijdens den Tachtigjarigen Oorlog* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1901), 69-71.

<sup>452</sup> Glamann, *Dutch Asiatic Trade*, 33.

<sup>453</sup> W. Wijnaendts van Resandt, *De Gezaghebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie op hare Buiten-Comptoiren in Azië* (Amsterdam: Liebaert, 1944), 133-134; Elias, *De vroedschap*, Vol. II, 565.

<sup>454</sup> NL- HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 25-Feb-1637 Report by mr van der Capellen toe Rijssel and others.

leadership was enough for van Rensselaer and Klenck to align with the city's official policy. Considering that van Rensselaer was amongst the eight Amsterdam investors who had openly advocated free trade less than a month earlier it seems likely that that position aligned with the view point of the Amsterdam leadership. This shows the extent of the effect of the city of Amsterdam's informal coercion within the Dutch Republic. It seems like van Rensselaer was little more than a prominent messenger for the Amsterdam leadership's interests. It should be noted that van Rensselaer was not the only one giving ambiguous advice at this time though. Adriaan van der Dussen reportedly signed a general letter together with the rest of the political council advocating free trade, but in a private letter to the WIC chamber Rotterdam he showed to be a supporter of a Company monopoly.<sup>455</sup> Who made up the Amsterdam leadership that influenced van Rensselaer's and Klenck's statements in these years and what can explain their position?

The leadership (*magistraat*) is a bit of an ambiguous term that can either mean the Burgomasters or the city council as a whole. There were five Burgomasters in Amsterdam in 1637: Dirk Bas (1569-1637), Jacob Dircksz de Graeff (1571-1638), Jan Cornelisz Geelvinck (1579-1651), Pieter Pietersz Hasselaer (1583-1651), and Gerard Schaep (1598-1666). Normally there were four Burgomasters, but Dirck Bas died on 17 August 1637 and Elias does not specify which of the four others was the one who replaced him as a Burgomaster.<sup>456</sup> None of the five Burgomasters had personal ties to the WIC. At the same time, two of them, Bas and Hasselaer, were directors for the VOC while being members of the city council. Bas had seven children, two of them were WIC or VOC directors and two of them were married to a VOC or WIC director. De Graeff had five children, one of whom was a VOC director and none were WIC directors. Geelvinck had six children, one of whom was married to a VOC director, and Geelvinck himself had privately traded to the Guinea coast with Jacob Poppen. Hasselaer had a brother who was a VOC director, just like himself, and his father had also been a VOC director until his death in 1616. His father, moreover, had been involved in the Brazil trade before the chartering of the WIC together with Reynier Pauw. Schaep had no brothers or children, but his wife had two sisters. One of the sisters married a WIC director,

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<sup>455</sup> Brill, Grothe, and Nepveu, *Kron. Hist. Gen. Utr.*, XXV, 232 Missive of Artichofsky.

<sup>456</sup> My guess is Gerard Schaep though as he only entered the City Council in 1638. On the other hand, Jacob Backer was a Burgomaster several times without ever being in the Council. So there is no certainty.

the other a VOC director. That WIC director was Michiel Pauw, a son of the aforementioned Reynier Pauw.<sup>457</sup> Michiel Pauw was the *patroon* of an island called Fernando de Noronha off the coast of Brazil and he had traded privately to Brazil in 1618.<sup>458</sup> When considering all the familial ties to the VOC and WIC for the years 1636 and 1637, it becomes clear that the VOC was much better connected to the Amsterdam political elite: 14 connections to the VOC and only 5 to the WIC (see Table 3-4).

Table 3-4: Familial connections to the two main chartered companies for Amsterdam Burgomasters (1636-1637).<sup>459</sup>

First name	Last name	Years		Self		Brother		Child		Father		Son in Law		Father in Law		Brother in Law	
				VOC	WIC	VOC	WIC	VOC	WIC	VOC	WIC	VOC	WIC	VOC	WIC	VOC	WIC
Dirck	Bas	'36	'37	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1,5	1	0	0	0,5	0
Andries	Bicker	'36		1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abraham	Boom	'36		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Jacob	de Graeff		'37	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jan	Geelvinck	'36	'37	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Pieter	Hasselaer		'37	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Gerard	Schaep		'37	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	TOTAL			3	0	2	1	2	1	2	0	2,5	1	0	0	2,5	2

Source: Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam*, and De Laet, *Jaerlijcks Verhael*.

It is not manageable to comprehensibly track the familial ties for all the 35 members of the city council for 1637. However, if we just consider the personal connections to the WIC and VOC of the council members for 1636 and 1637 (totaling 37) a similar pattern emerges: twelve were VOC directors and only three were WIC directors. Those three were Jacob Pietersz Hooghkamer, Simon van der Does, and Albert Coenraats Burgh.<sup>460</sup> In conclusion, the WIC was poorly connected to the magistracy of Amsterdam. This can explain why the magistracy was strongly supporting free trade to Brazil. Both the council and the Burgomasters in 1636-1637 had little natural 'inclination' to support the WIC. This facilitated an easier possibility for the free trade lobby in the city to have their arguments heard.

<sup>457</sup> All these statements come from the personal pages of the mentioned individuals in Elias, *De vroedschap*.

<sup>458</sup> Venema, *Kiliaen van Rensselaer*, 219. Stadsarchief Amsterdam (NL-AsdSAA), 5075 Notaries in Amsterdam, inv. nr. 381 Notaris Jacob and Nicolaes Jacobs, deeds 300 and 360.

<sup>459</sup> 1 point means a director; 0,5 points means an employee of that company.

<sup>460</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap*. passim.

Moreover, while WIC exports would be limited to 4/9<sup>th</sup> of the export to Brazil<sup>461</sup>, the export of free traders benefited Amsterdam and the immediate region for 83.9 per cent. The minutes of both the council and the Burgomasters in these years show not much debate on the issue of trade to Brazil. Issues related to Brazil were limited to the appointment of the new minister Kesselerus<sup>462</sup>, whether the recognition fee on wood should be 25 or 15 per cent<sup>463</sup>, and payment for extraordinary subsidies for the WIC.<sup>464</sup> This indicates that also the WIC investors, or other Amsterdam citizens, who preferred a monopoly did not succeed in obtaining audience with the Amsterdam magistracy and putting this issue on the agenda.

There are of course a few issues with quantifying familial ties to the Companies in this way because they say nothing about the quality or the extent of that tie. For example, Andries Bicker's brother, Cornelis Bicker (1592-1652), is counted as WIC director in Table 3-4, while Elias writes he sold his WIC shares in the late 1620 or early 1630s and consequently started advocating free trade.<sup>465</sup> The Bickers formed the political elite of the Republic in the first half of the seventeenth century. In 1650, a pamphlet characterized their position as follows: 'If you ask, who is director of the East and West India Company; who are the representatives in The Hague at the meetings of the States General? Who are the Burgomasters? Who are the sheriffs? Who lead the civil militia? Who are the dike wardens? Or even if you ask ten other public offices – without a lie, I would always answer the same thing: Bickers. Because the Bickers are all the things.'<sup>466</sup> Another pamphlet alleged that Cornelis traded himself to Brazil after learning about the details of its richness during his directorship. He did so 'in such a way that when there was hardly a chest of sugar to be

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<sup>461</sup> According to the *negen sleutel* the share of each chamber was divided. This was 4/9<sup>th</sup> for Amsterdam, 2/9<sup>th</sup> for Zeeland, and 1/9<sup>th</sup> each for Maze, Norther Quarter, and Groningen.

<sup>462</sup> NL-AsdSAA, 5024 Archive of the Burgomasters, inv. nr 1, 8-Oct-1636.

<sup>463</sup> NL-AsdSAA, 5025 Archive of the Vroedschap, inv. nr 16, fol. 66r-v.

<sup>464</sup> NL-AsdSAA, 5025, inv. nr 16, fol. 108v-109r, 144v.

<sup>465</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap*, xc.

<sup>466</sup> 'vraegt gy, wie is Bewinthebber van de Oost-ende West-Indische Compagnie; wie Afgesonden in den Hage ter Vergaderinge van de Staten? wie Borgermeester ? wie Schepen? wie Coronel van de Borgerije? wie Dijk-graef van het waterrecht? en vraegt noch so vry tienmael van andere Ampten, ende ik sal sonder leugen altijd mogen antwoorden Bickers: want de Bickers sijn alle ding ; waerom ic ooc wel verseekert ben datse by de Amsterdamse Borgerie noit sijn gelieft, maer altijd sijn verdagt en gehaet geweest', Knuttel 6851: [Jacobus Stermont], *Lauweren-krans gevlochten voor syn hoocheyt, Wilhelm [...]. Over sijne eeuwig roembaere handelinghe, gepleegt tot ruste deser Vereenigde Lantschappen, in't jaer 1650.* (np: np, 1650), [D3].

found, his warehouse would be stacked full', allowing him to earn hundreds of thousands of guilders.<sup>467</sup>

Another example is Michiel Pauw (1590-1640), brother in law of Gerard Schaeep. Pauw was indeed a WIC director, but at the same time, according to a testimony of Simon Govartsen in 1623, he had equipped his own ship to trade within both the VOC and WIC charter area. His ship had left Texel to go via Le Havre to the African Gold Coast and the Guinea Coast. From there it rounded the Cape of Good Hope and sailed to Mauritius where it stayed for six months and the crew laboured to acquire ebony. The ships consequently sailed to the West Indian island of Grenada and afterwards returned to Le Havre where the crew was dismissed and paid in Amsterdam. Michiel Pauw had visited the ship with his wife after it had returned to Texel.<sup>468</sup> Apart from the fact that this is a fascinating journey into two charter areas by a director of one of the two Companies, the example of Pauw shows, like Bicker's, that even when a link to a WIC or VOC director quantitatively can be established, this link does not have to be of good quality. That being said, the fact that the number of links to the WIC contrast sharply to the number of links to the VOC is still indicative of the relative poor connection between the WIC and the Amsterdam magistracy.

### 3.6. *DELAYING A DECISION*

Let us return to the report by the committee led by van der Capellen toe Rijssel. The next person they interviewed was Sebastiaan Franck, director in the Maze chamber of Dordrecht. He was willing to explain wat had made his chamber decide in favor of the monopoly. He gave three reasons: 1. The WIC was so poor that no-one was willing to make new investments in this chamber; 2. The investors did not invest to pay for war with recognition fees, but to reap profits after the investment of war; 3. The private traders also traded with our enemies providing them with the means to continue war against us. When Franck was asked what his chamber's position was regarding the population issue in Brazil, the director

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<sup>467</sup> 'wjl hy nu wist waar de meeste winsten op de Kust van Brasil waren te doen, in t byzonder begon te handelen; invoegen dat hy, als er qualik een kist Zuikers by iemand was te vinden, zijn Pakhuis opgestapelt vol had, en zich daar by, in een jaar over de honderd duizend guldens verrijkte', Knuttel 6782: Jan Zoet?, 't *Hollandts rommelzootje, vertoonende de gantsche gelegtheyd van het benaaudt, ontzet, en gewapent Amsterdam* (np: np, 1650), A3v.

<sup>468</sup> NL-AsdSAA, 5075, inv. nr. 747 *Hendrick Bruyningh*, 605.

responded that if that was indeed an issue the WIC should take care of it, and not the private traders.<sup>469</sup>

When the committee asked lieutenant-colonel (*overste luitenant*) Balthasar Bijma, who had served in Brazil, about his opinion, the military man, originally from Groningen, responded that he too favored a company monopoly. When the Spanish still ruled the colony, he continued, they produced 40,000 chests of sugar. Now there were only 5,000 to 6,000 chests of sugar being produced. The Spanish only stationed 500 to 600 soldiers there, while the WIC employed tenfold that number of soldiers. In other words, the soldier-sugar ratio was a lot more profitable for the Spanish than for the WIC. Since the WIC was conducting the war, it should keep all the trade to itself to pay for that. His solution to populate the lands came from his own soldiers. He stated that if the Company allowed soldiers to cultivate the lands, to peddle their wares or to become artisans, while providing fresh recruits to replenish the army, the land could quickly be populated. Bijma further strongly recommended 'the trade in negroes from Angola' who were necessary to rebuild the *engenhos*, and 'that could be expected to be very profitable' for the Company.<sup>470</sup>

Lastly, the directors from the Northern Quarter chamber delivered their report to the committee. They stated that they would prefer a monopoly for the WIC, but that it was not a possible option at that moment since the Company did not have enough credit to equip sufficient ships. Therefore, they considered it useful to get advice from the newly appointed Governor General, Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, and the political council. The WIC chamber from northern Holland concluded that it would accept whatever the States General would decide, and furthermore referred to the arguments presented by both Amsterdam and Zeeland as both held truths.

The States General postponed its decision, following the stance of the WIC chamber from the Northern Quarter, but confirmed that at least for now they were not yet revising their decision of 27 December to maintain a monopoly, but allowed the ships that were in transit or ready for departure to operate under free trade regulations. This decision was

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<sup>469</sup> NL- HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 25-Feb-1637 Report by mr van der Capellen toe Rijssel and others.

<sup>470</sup> 'Recommandeert seer den handel der Negros op Angola dat die tot oprichtinge der Ingenios nodich is en dat daer grote voordelen tot te verwachten sijn', NL- HaNA 1.01.02, 5754, 25-Feb-1637 Report by mr van der Capellen toe Rijssel and others.

made on 27 February based on the report delivered by the Committee van der Capellen.<sup>471</sup> Delaying a decision was a popular tactic for lobbyists. The proverb 'one of these days is none of these days'<sup>472</sup> opened the possibility for new information to arrive to facilitate making the decision. That the States General allowed the ships in transit to arrive in Brazil had been a foregone conclusion since the States of Holland in the meantime had ruled that ships already loaded and ready for Brazil, at least those in Holland that had paid their recognition fee to the WIC, were allowed to sail to Brazil. They thus claimed authority and jurisdiction to decide this matter in their province without depending on the States General.<sup>473</sup> Again, just like had happened in the Utrecht provincial assembly, the issue of free trade to and from Brazil became intertwined with the issue of particularism of the provinces that claimed the maneuverability to decide this independently, versus the States General claiming decision-making power for issues on a supraregional level.

Despite two requests by the Zeeland chamber in March, the States General still did not rule out that they would allow free trade. This postponement of a final decision meant a small victory for the proponents of a monopoly. Either incapable or unwilling to make a decision, the States General looked to the States of Holland for a final advice; the High-Mightinesses wanted their advice before turning their decision into an order.<sup>474</sup> The States General urged the States of Holland that the matter was urgent, but after a week and a half in which nothing happened, the WIC chamber of Zeeland requested that the High-Mightinesses would send a reminder to the States of Holland by 30 March. The States of Holland started their deliberations and asked all the WIC chambers to come before them. They asked them to come a second time, now in the presence of the Stadtholder, but it did not lead to a conclusion. This was because 'the other parties have no other interest than to delay a decision and to gain time', complained the WIC directors of Zeeland to the States General.<sup>475</sup> The States of Holland wanted to await an updated advice from Brazil. The

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<sup>471</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr 12564.5.6, 21-Feb-1637.

<sup>472</sup> Van uitstel komt afstel.

<sup>473</sup> NL- HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 07-Feb-1637 Extract from the Resolutions from the States of Holland.

<sup>474</sup> 'geen depeche laten uitgaan'.

<sup>475</sup> 'noch geen resolutie ofte conclusie connen werden genomen, door het hart ende sterck aen houden van parthijen die nergens anders op aen en leggen noch geen ander oogmerck hebben als te dilajieren ende tijt te winnen, gelijck sij dat in hal haer doen genouchsaem hebben bethoont', NL- HaNA 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 14-Apr-1637 Petition by the WIC chamber of Zeeland.



Zealanders had no doubt what those letters would argue as they were of the opinion that the proponents of free trade had sent individuals to the colony and promised them great rewards if they were to convince the political council to support free trade too. There is no strong evidence that this actually happened, but it is certain that Samuel Blommaert had been made responsible for the administration of this issue's correspondence to and from the colony.<sup>476</sup> Thus, the free trade lobby certainly called suspicion on itself by selecting a prominent director from the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC which left open the possibility that the free trade lobby had plans of controlling information and redacting some of the monopolists' points in the correspondence to Brazil. Blommaert further had private trading interests in the Atlantic. Not only had he traded to the West African coast in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, but he was also professionally acquainted with Albert Coenraadsz Burgh and Kiliaen van Rensselaer through their joint patroonship in North America. Reflecting on the situation and the suspicions of Zealand, Blommaert noticed that 'it is sad that such disagreements exist and I cannot conclude otherwise than that [Zealand's] opinion is fueled by second hand information and sowing the seed of discord'.<sup>477</sup>

In any case, asking the colony to help reach a decision on metropolitan policy completely shifts perceptions on where the center of decision-making power was in the Dutch Atlantic. Brazil, in this respect, is not an isolated incident. For the WIC colony in North America the same issue had surfaced and debates too had focused on settlement versus Company monopoly. Director-General Wouter van Twiller wrote in 1636 to the directors in Amsterdam that if they 'wish[ed] to preserve the country, you must people it with free men', and not just Company personnel.<sup>478</sup> Here too, the initiative for this new policy originated from the colony and intended to influence. Incidentally, the issue on the North American trade had been pushed to the background due to the debates on the same issue for Brazil.<sup>479</sup> Van Rensselaer also complained that the Amsterdam directors were not

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<sup>476</sup> 'Ick helpe de saecke dirigeren, dat men alle bescheeden, die deen en dander dieswegen overlevert, copyelijck soude senden aen Sijn Genaede Graeff Maurits en de hooge secrete Raeden', Kernkamp, "Brieven van Samuel Blommaert," 112-113.

<sup>477</sup> 'Het is verdrietich datter sulcken decisie [dissensie] geraect en ick en can niet anders affmeten, off dat werck wordt door de tweede off dander hant gevoet en het saet van oneenicheyt gesaeyt', *ibid.*, 155.

<sup>478</sup> V.C. Bachman, *Peltries or plantations: the economic policies of the Dutch West India Company in New Netherland, 1623-1639* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1969), 142.

<sup>479</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

available to discuss any other affairs: 'Brazil has caused much trouble since usually most of the directors are out of town and occupied'.<sup>480</sup>

It is true that the disagreement between the monopolists and free traders had risen to such a level that even the States General could not mediate, and that a more external perspective might be the only thing that could help. Moreover, requesting more information, would delay the decision-making process and could possibly help to sway the decision in a certain direction. Furthermore, it also served the purpose to frustrate the opposition. In the almost four months since 27 December that both parties had been lobbying in The Hague the lobbyists 'had been away from their homes and families'.<sup>481</sup> The third function of delaying a decision was that in this fashion everyone would continue as there was a fear, according to Blommaert, on both sides that the opposing party would stop contributing to the WIC if a decision that did not favor them would be reached. By winning some time, at least the colony would not be lost for now.<sup>482</sup>

The effect of the petition by the Zeeland directors was that almost a majority of the States General wanted to once and for all affirm the WIC monopoly in the sugar trade to Brazil. But it was the delegates of the States of Holland in the meeting of the States General that succeeded in convincing the meeting of the High-Mightinesses to wait just a little bit longer. The delegates realized that they had missed the deadline to deliver their advice to the meeting of the general assembly despite several reminders from the States General, but they just needed a little bit more time to deliver their advice.<sup>483</sup> Four days later, on 18 April, the States General wrote to the WIC chamber of Amsterdam that they should call a meeting of the *Heeren XIX* to resolve on how to handle the newly reinstated monopoly for the WIC.<sup>484</sup>

After months of lobbying, machinations by both parties, and delaying tactics by primarily the WIC chambers of Amsterdam and Northern Quarter it looked like a decision

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<sup>480</sup> A.J.F. van Laer, *Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts (VRBM)* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908), 400-401.

<sup>481</sup> NL- HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 14-Apr-1637 Petition by the WIC chamber of Zeeland.

<sup>482</sup> 'het is te beduchten, indien der resolutie genomen mocht worden tegens de opinie van de Camer van Amsterdam, dat die naelaetich souden wesen te senden watter vereyst; en tegens d'opinie van Zeelant uutvallende, dat sy en de camers als Groeningen en Maes, diet met hun houden, naelatich souden wesen de noodige behoeften te senden; daerom ist best door desen middel tijt gewonnen, opdat door disputen de saecken niet verloren gaen', Kernkamp, "Brieven van Samuel Blommaert," 113.

<sup>483</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 14-Apr-1637 Letter to the WIC chamber of Amsterdam.

<sup>484</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 18-Apr-1637 Letter to the WIC chamber of Amsterdam.

was finally reached. The States General told the WIC what to decide and to confirm the decision by the High-Mightinesses in a meeting of the *Heeren XIX*. But lobbying was not only done within the confines of the *Binnenhof* in The Hague. As the Amsterdam directors had written to the States of Utrecht earlier, ‘infraction of the public belief’ was as important. Lobbying, outside lobbying to be precise, happened in pamphlets while the States General decided back and forth between free trade and Company monopoly.

### 3.7. LOBBYING TO AND FROM THE COLONY

The Board of Directors met on the days following 3 May 1637 to close the debate on the issue of free trade.<sup>485</sup> During this meeting, a ship from Brazil arrived that included a letter from Johan Maurits and the High Government. The letter was discussed at the meeting of the *Heeren XIX* on 6 June. The letter gives a detailed account of the ships that had arrived and what they brought, followed by a description of what was currently available in the warehouses. The warehouses did not contain certain goods, primarily basic foodstuffs such as flour. A prized ship from St. Malo that had tried to illegally buy brazilwood had replenished the stocks of wine, but other basic needs were dearly missed.

The next part of the letter dealt with responses to letters from the different chambers that they replied to. One of the letters had come from the chamber of Zeeland. Apparently, Zeeland had in this letter voiced its concern about Amsterdam sending individuals to Brazil to try and convince the political council to side with the free traders. The High Government and the Governor-General took this as an insult: ‘We know what [our] opinion needs to be’, they wrote, continuing that they had no indication of anyone coming with the aim of swaying them to the free trade party.<sup>486</sup> A few paragraphs down they dealt with the issue of free trade. From all the letters dealing with the issue the political council deducted that the debate back in the Republic had reached great heights. They greatly lamented that tensions had grown to such an extent, though they primarily were concerned with the influence the tensions had on the supplies in their warehouses. Furthermore, they understood that a

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<sup>485</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5754, 24-Apr-1637 Invitation for the meeting of the Heeren XIX.

<sup>486</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 52, Letter (copy) from Johan Maurits and councilors to the XIX [scan 260-262].

resolution on the issue was requested from them. They had consulted several unspecified 'others' and they had had a good debate about it, taking this matter very seriously. Their advice contained a great deal of understanding for the political sensitivities. They wrote that the trade should neither be completely for the Company, nor completely free. The Company should keep some of the important goods for itself. The council could not decide on which goods should be maintained as a monopoly, but they did advise that the needs of 'the population should be the main objective because the Company would cease to exist without it'.<sup>487</sup> In other words, the interests of individuals in the colony should trump the interests of the free traders. An advice for an incomplete monopoly was an advice that could potentially appease the monopolist lobby, but at the same time demonstrated that the High Government was not in favor of a monopoly. That the High Government in fact supported free trade becomes further apparent as they wrote that they deemed it important to enclose a translated remonstrance 'in the name of the general people' from the *câmara* of Olinda impugning closed trade, so that 'you can familiarize yourself with the opinion of the inhabitants' of the colony.<sup>488</sup>

The minutes of High Government in Brazil do not provide any evidence as to why it supported free trade, as their deliberations do not delve into the issue. For the year 1637, however, it is possible to reconstruct which individuals in Brazil benefited from the free trade regulations by sending sugar aboard WIC ships to the Republic. The most valuable shipment of sugar was sent by Jacques Hack, who sent 99 chests of *blancos* and 32 chests of *moscavados* aboard six different ships. Hack was also a member of the *câmara* of Olinda, that had sent the letter in support of free trade to the States General and the Board of Directors.<sup>489</sup> From the three other members of the *câmara*, one was Gaspar Dias Ferreira, who sent 70 chests

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
<sup>487</sup> 'de populaties die het principaelste oogmerck moet sijn ende de tegenwoordige advance van de compagnie sonder dewelcke deselve gesustineert wert niet te konnen bestaen betracht werden', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 52, Letter (copy) from Johan Maurits and councilors to the XIX [scan 260-262].

<sup>488</sup> 'Ondertusschen hebben de Senhores van de câmara uijt den nhaem van de generale inwoonders on seen remonstrantie ingegeven inpunderende den geslooten handel; welcke ons goet gedacht heeft te translateeren. Ende u Ed: toe te senden, op dat over u Ed: der inwoorderen meening bekend moeght sijn', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 52, Letter (copy) from Johan Maurits and councilors to the XIX [scan 345].

<sup>489</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 12564.5.6, Translated letter from the *câmara* in Olinda.

of *blancos* and 51 chests of *moscavados* to the Republic. This made him the fifth largest private exporter of sugar on board WIC ships in 1637.<sup>490</sup>

Figure 3-1: The call option for WIC shares in 1629



Source: NL-AsdSAA, 5075, inv. nr. 412a, [scan 215].

Jacques Hack was a relatively recent arrival in Brazil as he had bought options for WIC shares together with Pieter de Bikker in Amsterdam in the summer of 1629 (see Figure 3-1). For an interest of 6 and 6.25 per cent they bought the right to buy shares from Isaac Casteleijn for respectively 178.5 per cent and 170 per cent of its original value of 3,000 guilders. The share value decreased rapidly and Casteleijn died within a year, so Hack and De Bikker had avoided paying until the heirs of Casteleijn sued them at the Amsterdam court in 1635. As he had been in Brazil by then, Jacques was represented by his brother Severijn Hack (?-1636) at court.<sup>491</sup> Severijn was a merchant in Amsterdam and married to Catharina Varlet (1595-1652). Severijn's nephew, through Catharina's brother Caspar<sup>492</sup>, was Abraham Varlet, who was also in Brazil and in 1637 exported 25 chests of *blancos* and 8 chests of *moscavados* and who was married to Maria Hack. Jacques Hack further was a baptismal witness for the oldest son of Severijn, Joris Hack (1620-1665), who married his cousin Anna Varlet (1626-1685) before settling in Virginia. Another brother of Catharina

<sup>490</sup> For this and other mentions of sugar exporters from Brazil, see Appendix A.

<sup>491</sup> NL-AsdSAA, 5075, inv. nr. 412a Notaries Jacob and Nicolaes Jacobs July-September 1635, [scan 212-216].

<sup>492</sup> For Caspar Varlet, see also the petition in Chapter 4.

Varlet was Pieter Varlet (1598-1661) who had lobbied in Utrecht in favor of free trade.<sup>493</sup> Amongst other things, he was an Amsterdam WIC director in 1637 and firmly rooted in the Republic's elite as becomes apparent from his son Cornelis' baptism record in 1639 where Cornelis van Wijkersloot (a VOC and WIC director for Utrecht), Admiral Cornelis Cornelisz Jol, and Admiral Jan Lichthart were godfathers. Pieter Varlet was further a prominent member of the dyers' guild and a silk dyer himself.<sup>494</sup> Brazilwood could be used as a red dye for silk. It becomes evident that the intimately intertwined Varlet-Hack families were one of the principal beneficiaries of the free trade to and from Brazil. In order to chase their own interests, they lobbied on both sides of the Atlantic creating a trans-Atlantic lobbying network. Not only did it allow them to transport the large quantities of sugar from Brazil to the Republic, but furthermore offering them an opportunity to transport a variety of cloth to the colony that could be used to pay the Tupi allies and to barter for *farinha* and other provisions.<sup>495</sup>

Other individuals eagerly using the possibility to ship sugar on board Company ships were Jews such as Michiel Rodrigues Mendes (36 *blancos* – 48 *moscavados*) and Duarte Saraiva (41 *blancos* – 54 *moscavados*), or Company servants and soldiers shipping small quantities such as Elber Crispijns (3 *moscavados*) and Johan Maurits (3 *blancos*). The individuals with the larger quantities or value of sugar, such as Theodosius l'Empereur (91 *blancos* – 41 *moscavados*) and Pedro Lopes de Vera (37 *blancos* – 96 *moscavados*) would in the next few years become members of local *câmaras*, indicating their prominence within Brazilian society.<sup>496</sup> Thus, the individuals in Brazil who benefited from free trade from the colony, and thus most likely supported the measure, were prominent WIC officials, Jews, and the Varlet-Hack family. Moreover, just like in Portuguese Bahia, the sugar 'sector more than any other exerted considerable political pressure both in the colony and in the metropolis'.<sup>497</sup>

The letter by Johan Maurits and the High Government in combination with the unequivocal advice of the population of Brazil was what the chamber of Northern Quarter

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<sup>493</sup> See paragraph 3.2.

<sup>494</sup> See J.G. van Dillen, ed. *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van het bedrijfsleven en het gildewezen van Amsterdam*, RGP Grote Serie ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1929). Further see <http://varletfamily.pbworks.com/w/page/8500469/Introduction>

<sup>495</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.05, inv. nr. 68 *Minutes of the High Government in Brazil*, 11-May-1637.

<sup>496</sup> Gonsalves de Mello, *Nederlanders in Brazilië*, 113n110.

<sup>497</sup> Schwartz, *Sovereignty and society*, 185.

had been waiting for. That is not to say that without this letter they would have accepted a WIC monopoly, but with this advice the Northern Quarter definitely sided with the Amsterdam chamber. This gave the free traders a stronger position within the States of Holland. Together with the letter from the political council came a petition from the *câmara* from Pernambuco originally submitted to the political council and Johan Maurits but addressing the *XIX*, the States General and the Stadtholder. It had been written in Portuguese, but was provided in a translation by Samuel de Carpentier. This petition included the names of 21 Portuguese councilors of the *câmara* and plantation owners requesting to be allowed to trade freely, as they had been allowed previously.<sup>498</sup> This petition is not in the archive of the States General, but it is likely that it reached the High-Mightinesses as a copy is held in the personal archive of the Utrecht delegate Anthony van Hilten (1586-1670).<sup>499</sup>

In the second half of 1637 the lobbying was no longer as fierce as it had been in the first half. Free trade remained prohibited throughout 1637. There were no new arguments to be made, and the lobbying field moved from the center stage to the back stages. The Polish WIC colonel Christoffel Artichefsky arrived in the Republic in June 1637 too.<sup>500</sup> Artichefsky had served in Brazil in the years 1635-1636, and returned to the Republic after the arrival of Johan Maurits. Upon his arrival in the Republic, he felt so uncomfortable that his beloved Company was internally so divided on the issue of free trade that he decided to write a letter to Johan Maurits telling the Governor-General of his considerations in this matter. When the Board of Directors had learned about his arrival he was almost immediately visited by delegates from the WIC chambers Zeeland, Maze, and Groningen. Discovering that he was of a different opinion than they were, they requested him not to speak his mind. Artichefsky tried to appease the situation by not actively seeking audience with the Stadtholder or the States General, but they did not invite him either. He suspected that the latter was the result of some of the WIC directors pressuring the States General to not send an invitation.<sup>501</sup> Most shocked he was by the abusive language and the blasphemy used by both parties.

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<sup>498</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 52/75, Petition by the *câmara* of Pernambuco.

<sup>499</sup> Brill, Grothe, and Nepveu, *Kron. Hist. Gen. Utr*, XXV, 203-205.

<sup>500</sup> He can be placed in Brazil in March 1637 and in Amsterdam in July 1637.

<sup>501</sup> Brill, Grothe, and Nepveu, *Kron. Hist. Gen. Utr*, XXV, 223-225.

Artichefsky brought a little bit of a reality check to the debate. He argued that the 160 *engenhos* specified in the calculations were no longer erect, and that a maximum of maybe 2,000 chests of sugar could be produced in the colony at that moment.<sup>502</sup> He furthermore advised that the political leadership should keep a closer check on van Serooskercke and Jean Robbertsz as they only incited the Zeeland chamber with their wrongful information.<sup>503</sup> That did not mean that the Amsterdam chamber was completely correct in their arguments however, but all in all his advice was that 'it was better to keep the private trade open for now, or forever, or at least until the land would be in a better shape' (...) 'because all the welfare and wellbeing of Brazil rested with its population'.<sup>504</sup> The letter was dated 24 July 1637 in Amsterdam.

It is evident, as Boxer argues, that the letter reached Johan Maurits, as much of the argumentation he used in his letter to the Heeren XIX on 16 January 1638, mirrored that of Artichefsky's.<sup>505</sup> This letter arrived to the States General on 17 March.<sup>506</sup> The Governor-General wrote that if the trade would not be opened, the Portuguese would leave, as they had threatened to leave and 'to let their plants grow and wilder and to stop their *engenhos*, as for closed trade only made them labor for others, similar as the negroes did for them in the mills'.<sup>507</sup> But even these words did not, unlike Boxer's presumption, 'tip the balance in favor of the free-traders'.<sup>508</sup> It did however make the States General decide that the issue needed to be resolved, and that the High-Mightinesses had a role as mediator in the WIC conflict.

It was anonymous inhabitants from the province of Holland that came up with a solution. In a document titled 'proposition of accommodation of the differences regarding the trade to Brazil by good patriots from the Province of Holland' they proposed changes to

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<sup>502</sup> Ibid., 227.

<sup>503</sup> Ibid., 231.

<sup>504</sup> 'Het beste was geweest dat men de particulieren handel nog liever hadde lateen open staen, off eeuwich, off ten minsten totdat t lant in beter staet gebracht waere geweest. Reeden sijn deese: de partijen accorderen daerinne, dat aen de populatie van Brasil allen heyl ende welvaert van de Comp:e hangt', *ibid.*, 232.

<sup>505</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 81.

<sup>506</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5755, 17-Mar-1638 Letter by Johan Maurits to States General.

<sup>507</sup> 'seggende liever alle hare planten te laeten blijven ende verwilderen, haer ingenios stil laeten staen, als onder den gesloten handel alleen hare arbeyt voor anderen te doen ende in gelijkjer slavernie voor die Compagnie te arbeyden als hare negros voor haer in molens arbeyden', B.J.L. de Geer, A.M.C. van Asch van Wyck, and H. Hooft Graafland, eds., *Kroniek van het Historisch genootschap Utrecht, Vol. XI* (Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon, 1855), 68.

<sup>508</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 81.



the charter. This removed one of the main obstacles from the chamber of Zeeland, i.e. that free trade contradicted the original charter. Regarding the details of trade, they followed the original proposition made by Johan Maurits and the political council of May 1637: some goods should be reserved for a Company monopoly, while others were allowed to private traders. Trade in African slaves, brazilwood, and munitions were to be reserved to the Company. Free trade should be allowed for the next three years to inhabitants of the United Provinces provided they were shareholders in the Company. Shareholders that were incapable or unwilling to trade could lease this right to other merchants through licensing. This aimed to preventing a higher price for stocks in Amsterdam than in the other provinces. The inhabitants of Brazil, in this case the Portuguese, were allowed to trade freely to the Republic too without being shareholders in the Company. However, servants of the WIC in Brazil were not allowed to trade at all.<sup>509</sup>

The plan was discussed in a special meeting by the Board of Directors aimed at solving the differences between the chambers. It was called by the States General and only dealt with the Brazilian trade. It was Zeeland that pushed to only discuss Brazilian trade in this meeting in order to prevent other issues becoming entangled with the Brazilian trade debate. The WIC chamber of Zeeland enforced this by only mandating their delegates to resolve on the issue of Brazilian trade.<sup>510</sup> The meeting was held on neutral ground – neither in Zeeland, nor in Amsterdam, but in The Hague – and provided minor changes to the plan by the anonymous Hollanders. The revised resolution was not limited to three years, and every shareholder was allowed one return trip per year and to transport goods proportionate to the number of shares owned. Twelve days later, on 29 April 1638, the States General confirmed this plan.<sup>511</sup>

The issue was now resolved, but chagrin remained with the chamber of Zeeland. They felt they had lost the issue and refused to sign the agreement. Since they were the presiding chamber in 1638 they called a new meeting of the Board of Directors to further discuss the issue.<sup>512</sup> The States General were having none of this and on 19 June 1638 forbade anyone to travel to the meeting until Zeeland had signed the minutes of the previous meeting in The

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<sup>509</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5755, 17-Apr-1638, proposition of accommodation of the differences regarding the trade to Brazil by good patriots from the Province of Holland.

<sup>510</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5755, 14-Apr-1638, Letter States of Zeeland to the States General.

<sup>511</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5755, 29-Apr-1638, Letter from the States General to WIC chambers.

<sup>512</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4845, 12-Jun-1638.

Hague and had removed the issue of trade to Brazil from the agenda of the meeting.<sup>513</sup> This confirms the nearly illegible anonymous meeting scribbles of one of the High-Mightinesses that all provinces supported free trade in one form or another. Even the Zeeland delegates had been convinced by what Johan Maurits had written from Brazil as their position was 'open trade according to the advice of count Maurits'.<sup>514</sup> Effectively this meant that the WIC chamber of Zeeland no longer had support in the States General and these directors realized that they needed to give to the new regulations.<sup>515</sup> Consequently, the third point on the agenda for the following meeting of the Board of Directors on 5 July 1638 became 'to confirm the peace and unity between the different chambers' now that it was restored.<sup>516</sup> That did not mean, however, that Zeeland supported the issue, they simply accepted that further resistance was futile.

### 3.8. CONCLUSION

This episode on the issue of free trade was the most fiercely debated issue in relation to Brazil and the debate showcases several important elements. The first is the relevance of the practice of petitioning for political decision-making in the Dutch Republic; in particular for the issue of political economy. Petitions were without a doubt the primary vehicle for Atlantic interest groups to request changes in regulations. As chapter 2 has demonstrated this for regulations within the colony, this chapter has demonstrated the importance of petitions for trade, the relation between the colony and the metropole, and visions of colonial governance. The primary actors in the debate, the chambers of Amsterdam and Zeeland both made extensive use of petitions to address the States General and the provincial States. Both parties not only used petitions to bring their arguments to the political mandataries, but further appropriated this medium to demonstrate strength and support in numbers. While

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<sup>513</sup> 'Haer Hoog Mog. hebben ons verbot gedaen, dat wy op de vergaderinge niet en sullen verschynen voor en aleeer die van Zeelant de notulen van de voorgaende vergaderinge, in Den Hage gehouden, hebben geteeckent en datse uut de pointen van beschryvinghe laeten eenighe pointen, die daer offgehandelt sijn, toecherende het openstellen van den handel op Brasil', Kernkamp, "Brieven van Samuel Blommaert," 153-154. See also NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, 4845, 19 June 1638.

<sup>514</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 12564.5.6, Undated meeting scribbles from 1637 or 1638.

<sup>515</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4845, 8-Jul-1638.

<sup>516</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5755, 12-May-1638, Agenda for the next meeting of the Heeren XIX.

Amsterdam did this through physical presence while presenting their petition, Zealand made use of signatures of main shareholders to transfer their voice in petitions. Moreover, petitions were an important tool for inhabitants of the colony in Brazil to argue for their interests in the Republic. Even when they could not, or preferred not to, travel across the Atlantic, a petition functioned as a means to make themselves heard. Moreover, petitions demonstrate the diverging interest within either a Company (i.e. between Zealand and Amsterdam) or an individual chamber (i.e. the investors and directors petitioning in Utrecht).

Moreover, outside of all the 'official lobbying' through letters and petitions, this chapter has partly lifted the veil of the informal channels. The Amsterdam city council clearly had a stake in the issue and they coerced some of the States General expert witnesses through informal measures. Also, the letter by Artichefsky to Johan Maurits showed how the WIC directors from both sides approached him immediately after his return from Brazil and tried to influence his opinion. When learning that he supported free trade, Artichefsky suspected, the monopolists succeeded in refusing him access to the States General to explain his view on the Brazilian trade. This shows once more how certain networks in the Republic were able to informally control the decision-making mechanisms to the highest political levels. That does not mean however that the political decision was only dependent on patronage connections. The detailed calculations provided by both proponents and opponents of a WIC monopoly in the trade to Brazil shows that arguments were also considered of importance.

The second important element that this episode has demonstrated is that, through the episode on free trade contestations surfaced regarding sovereignty in the Republic. The provinces were eager to accept petitions on the issue to demonstrate their particularism in a Republic that was becoming increasingly federalist. Moreover, the States General clearly established itself as mediator for conflicts in the Republic at the expense of the Stadtholder. Again thus, the party battle between the Organists and the Republicans features in the background of this issue. Thirdly, the States General claimed a right that exceeded their one voice in the meetings of the nineteen gentlemen when they, for example, ordered the other directors not to travel to Board of Director's meeting until the chamber of Zealand had signed the minutes of the previous meeting. Granted, tensions within the Company had risen to such an exorbitant level that it made people honestly worried about the future of the

conquests in Brazil.<sup>517</sup> And perhaps this warranted extraordinary measures. Yet, in doing so the States General demonstrated that *they* had the authority to do so, and created a precedent that they could hold decisions and the Board of Directors hostage. Effectively, this episode thus informally enlarged the High-Mightinesses' influence on the decision-making process in the Board of Directors. Concomitantly, it stressed the increase of direct sovereignty of the States General over the South Atlantic.

The fourth relevant element that the colony had far-reaching agency in the making of metropolitan decisions on colonial policy. Admittedly, the colonists and the High Government in Brazil were invited to share their opinion on the issue, and their agency was thus dependent on the metropole's admissibility. Nevertheless, it was Johan Maurits' proposition of a "half monopoly" that convinced Zeeland's provincial delegates to concede to (partial) free trade as evidenced through scribbles from the States General. Whether it was his status as a nobleman with on-the-spot expertise that convinced the Zeeland delegation or simply that the delegates simply realized that it was their best scenario remains unknown, but it underlines the agency of individuals in the colony on metropolitan decision-making.

Moreover, the colonial influence is demonstrated through the Varlet-Hack family network that spanned the Atlantic and that succeeded in lobbying in important political bodies on both sides of the ocean. Their experience was shared by prominent Jews in both Recife and Amsterdam. The trans-Atlantic ties of the lobbying attempts of the Varlet-Hack family demonstrates that networks were successful in safeguarding their own interests for colonial trade regulations. While Pieter Varlet and his close friend and colleague Cornelis van Wijckersloot as WIC director lobbied the Utrecht provincial states to safeguard free trade, Jacques Hack as a member of a Brazilian *câmara* succeeded in impugned closed trade 'in the name of the general inhabitants' of the colony.<sup>518</sup> Simultaneously, Jacques Hack and Abraham Varlet, while being only two of the 103 free traders, had a share of 6.45 per cent of the value of all exported sugar from Brazil in 1637.<sup>519</sup>

Lastly, even more than a decade after the charter of the WIC, Zeeland had a radically different view of the tasks of the Company than particularly Amsterdam. While the free

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<sup>517</sup> 'ist best door desen middel tijt gewonnen, opdat door disputen de saecken niet verloren gaen', Kernkamp, "Brieven van Samuel Blommaert," 113.

<sup>518</sup> 'uijt den nhaem van de generale inwoonders', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 52, [scan 345].

<sup>519</sup> Appendix A.

trade lobby advocated for a Company of War that safeguarded the interests of the free trades, Zeeland envisioned a Company of Trade that reaped profits from the initial investment of war. These different visions were a legacy of the struggles during the process of creation of the WIC.<sup>520</sup> However, these different visions of the Company cannot be considered separately from the economic consequences of the different policies. While a monopoly would guarantee 2/9<sup>th</sup> of the exported goods (22.2%) from the Republic to be purchased in Zeeland, free trade only led to 11.6% of goods purchased in and around Middelburg and Flushing. Zeeland only earned 57,659 guilders of a total of 496,240 guilders in recognition fees in, meaning that the value of goods leaving from, and purchased in, these port cities, was less than this chamber had anticipated. Thus, free trade policy increased the share of the economic pie for Amsterdam, but decreased the share of the pie for Zeeland.

The lobby campaign resulted in the establishment of a regulated free trade in Brazil until the end of the colony. The trade in enslaved Africans, Brazilwood, and munitions would be reserved for the Company, while the trades in other goods were opened for Company shareholders in exchange for a recognition fee. It has become apparent that, for example, the intimate network of the Varlet-Hack family was important for the realization of this policy. As a result, these networks and the Company should not be seen as separate. The Varlet-Hack family relied as much on the Company, as the success of the Company relied on networks.<sup>521</sup>

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<sup>520</sup> Chapter 1.

<sup>521</sup> For other examples of this notion, see: Fusaro, "Cooperating mercantile networks in the early modern Mediterranean."; R. Grafe, "On the spatial nature of institutions and the institutional nature of personal networks in the Spanish Atlantic," *Culture & History Digital Journal* 3, no. 1 (2014).



## 4. PETITIONING THE PUBLIC SPHERE

For Brazil, the late 1630s can best be characterized as a calm and relatively prosperous period. The issue of free trade had been mostly settled and under the government of Johan Maurits, the WIC succeeded in expanding its territory. Things changed in 1640 when Portugal declared independence from the Spanish King and João IV, Duke of Braganza, claimed the Crown of Portugal. This meant that the conquest of Portuguese colonial claims could no longer be justified as part of the war against the Spanish King. Moreover, now that Portugal was in a war with Spain as well, Portugal could be considered an ally in the fight against the Habsburg hereditary enemy. Indeed, in 1641, the Dutch Republic and the King of Portugal signed the Treaty of The Hague. Even though this truce officially had a global ambition, the hostilities between the Portuguese and the VOC in India and the WIC in the Atlantic continued. The Treaty of The Hague, thus, had a much more European scope than originally envisioned. The truce meant, however, that when Portuguese plantation owners revolted against the Dutch rule in Brazil in the spring of 1645, the Portuguese King officially did not support and certainly did not claim responsibility for the revolt.<sup>522</sup>

Official reports from Brazil that a revolt had broken out took about sixty days to arrive in Zeeland and rumors about the uprising started filtering into the public sphere. The first rumors made it into the Amsterdam newspapers of Broer Jansz and Jan van Hilten on 2 September 1645, just three days after the news had arrived in Zeeland.<sup>523</sup> Since the WIC chamber of Zeeland was hosting the meeting of the Board of Directors, it was their responsibility to send out an invitation and list of agenda items to be discussed. Already on 11 August they announced a meeting for that same 2 September, but as several delegates arrived late the meeting did not start until 9 September. Three Sephardic Jews living in Amsterdam, Abraham Erude, Joseph Acosta, and Jeronimo Nunes, arrived in Middelburg on the 14<sup>th</sup> to present a petition requesting the continuation of the export of sugar and the protection of the colony in Brazil. The Board of Directors responded that they encouraged

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<sup>522</sup> C. van de Haar, *De diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen de Republiek en Portugal, 1640-1661* (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1961); Klooster, *The Dutch moment*, 77-81.

<sup>523</sup> M. van Groesen, *Amsterdam's Atlantic: Print Culture and the making of Dutch Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 128-129.

the merchants to voice their concerns to the States General and the City Council of Amsterdam.<sup>524</sup> The three merchants indeed would address their concerns to the City Council, who would forward their concerns to the States General. The three Sephardic merchants did not stand alone, they formed an alliance with other Amsterdam merchants for this endeavor. They found no less than 89 other, interested, Amsterdammers to co-sign a petition for a rescue mission to Brazil; a perfect example of outside lobbying through petitions. In order to properly understand the context of this petition it is important to discuss in detail the definition of public opinion, public sphere, and the historiography on group petitions.

The interaction between the public sphere and petitions is studied in this chapter through petitions with multiple signatures. Signatures on petitions underwent a profound change in the late sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century as petitions with multiple signatures increased in popularity. All the petitions in the 'petition affairs' (*Liassen Requesten*) and 'West Indian affairs' of the States General until 1652 have been studied in combination with other affairs (*Liassen*). Moreover, the archives of the Burgomasters of Amsterdam have been consulted for additional evidence of petitions with a high number of signatures. Not all petitions have survived from this period. Apart from entire years that are lost, some specific petitions may have been lost over time as well. In a normal situation, the addressee would write an apostil with a decision on the request and hand back the petition to the suppliant. This means that a large percentage of the petitions would not survive in the archive. However, in cases when there were multiple suppliants it would not be possible to return the petition to one suppliant. In these instances, for example with a request for a patent, the States General would make a new, formal, printed decision and hand that to the suppliants.<sup>525</sup> The original petition would remain with the States General. This means that if there were petitions with one or more signatures, these should be retrievable in the archives. Moreover, since the primary interest of this thesis is the influence of petitions on *political* lobbying (i.e. requesting action or regulation by a political body for which there was no need to hand back the petition with an apostil) these should still be in the archives. In other words, it is highly likely that the archives have an over representation of petitions that requested political action with multiple signatures.

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<sup>524</sup> Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 77.

<sup>525</sup> A copy of such a printed patent (as evidence in another petition) can be found NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv.nr. 7478, 09-Oct-1618, Petition of the kassawerckers.



The Petition of Nobles (*Smeekschrift der Edelen*) is probably the most famous instance of a group petition in Dutch history. On 5 April 1566, two to three hundred noblemen marched into the palace of Margaret of Parma, the governess of the Low Countries, to present a petition requesting the abolition of the anti-heresy legislation. The noblemen that presented this petition later became known as the Compromise of Nobles (*Eedverbond der Edelen*). The petition included an implicit threat of violence in case the demand was not met. Thus, the governess saw no other option than to give in and to postpone further anti-heresy edicts awaiting a final decision from King Philip II.<sup>526</sup> According to a history of the Reformation from 1671, Hendrik van Brederode, the leader of the Compromise of Nobles, triumphantly travelled through Holland in an attempt to acquire signatures for the petition after it had already been presented to Margaret and included an apostil with her answer. 'In Amsterdam, [van Brederode] summoned a large group of burghers in his inn, and they committed themselves to the common freedom, and to sign the Compromise'.<sup>527</sup> A pamphlet further claimed that 'in Brabant alone 40,000 people were willing to sign the petition'.<sup>528</sup> Nevertheless, the original copy of the petition contains no signatures meaning that a group petition in this period did not necessarily have signatures.<sup>529</sup> Perhaps individuals felt uncomfortable signing a petition? One of the individuals present there in that inn in Amsterdam in July 1566, Floris Rodenburg, allegedly 'had scruples about putting his signature on this chapter', even though he supported the cause.<sup>530</sup> However it may be, the practice of signing group petitions changed during the first half of the seventeenth century, transforming the public sphere.

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<sup>526</sup> H.F.K. van Nierop, "A beggars' banquet: the Compromise of the Nobility and the politics of inversion," *European History Quarterly* 21, no. 4 (1991): 419; Israel, *De Republiek*, 154-156.

<sup>527</sup> G. Brandts, *Historie der Reformatie, en andre kerkelyke geschiedenissen, in en ontrent de Nederlanden, Tweede Druk, Vol. I*, vol. I (Amsterdam: Jan Rieuwertsz Hendrik en Dirk Boom, 1677), 318-319; Israel, *De Republiek*, 157.

<sup>528</sup> Deen, *Publiek debat en propaganda*, 69.

<sup>529</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.11.01.01, inv. nr. 1925.

<sup>530</sup> Brandts, *Historie der Reformatie, Vol. I*, I, 319.

#### 4.1. WHAT IS THE PUBLIC SPHERE?

After the publication of the English translation of Habermas's *Habilitationsschrift* 'The structural transformation of the Public Sphere' in 1989, the debate about the origin and characteristics of the public sphere really took off in the Anglophone academic world.<sup>531</sup> Habermas had argued that in the eighteenth century in the bourgeois circles of the London coffee houses, French salons, and German table societies, a new type of public discourse emerged that brought discussions about politics from the private political center to the bourgeois public periphery. It is important to note that the distinction between center and periphery is here strictly non-geographical and that center refers to the political center of decision-making. These debates on political and economic issues later provided the necessary soil for democracy and civil society.

There are, according to Habermas, four key features that define the bourgeois public sphere. Firstly, a disregard of the status of debaters; someone's opinion is not truer because he is a knight or a wealthy merchant. Secondly, the notion that decisions should be based on rational argument. Thirdly, the arenas of discussion were not limited to a place; both in a literal as an abstract sense of the word. Whereas previously the Church or the State held a monopoly of discussion, the public sphere is defined by the opening of new areas of discussion. And fourthly, these places were inclusive in principle. This means that in theory everyone could acquire access to the place of debate and address an auditorium.<sup>532</sup> 'The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public use of their reason'.<sup>533</sup> Habermas's arguments for the origin of the bourgeois public sphere emphasize the hermeneutic relationship between individuals and institutions; the public sphere can only exist through the recursive complex set of actions by individuals.

The level of abstractness in the words of Habermas has prompted other authors to attempt to explain how they use Habermas's concept of a public sphere. A considerable number of authors do not dissociate between 'a' public sphere and the 'bourgeois' public sphere as Habermas's bourgeois public sphere has become synonymous with the public sphere. In the case of the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, with its high rate of

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<sup>531</sup> J. Habermas, *The structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).

<sup>532</sup> C. Calhoun, *Habermas and the public sphere* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 12-13.

<sup>533</sup> Habermas, *The structural transformation*, 27.

urbanization and absence of a ruling monarch, the participation in public discussion became 'bourgeois' (not-noble) very quickly. Therefore, in this chapter, the public sphere is defined as an inclusive publically accessible space where (particularly) political affairs were discussed.

In the Middle Ages, the public side of political affairs had taken the form of 'representative publicity'. The sociologist Craig Calhoun explains that in the Middle Ages publicness had been a status attribute. Representative publicity by the political center, for example lords, was not for the people, but before the people. Through presentation via rituals and symbols, they presented themselves to their subjects, who were not participating in politics but a passive auditorium for the glory of the lords.<sup>534</sup> The Swedish historian Mats Hallenberg concludes that 'there was no distinct political community apart from the king and his court', but that over time there arose an impersonal place without clear authority where politics were discussed; the public sphere.<sup>535</sup> Petitions have been around since at least the Middle Ages, and in themselves, they are not a manifestation of the public sphere; the supplication of a petition reinforces the position of the ruler through a ritual and does not invite the public to participate. However, the process of acquiring signatures on a petition is a testimony of something else. Group signatures on a political petition – even when the number of signatures remained limited – shows public deliberation of political issues. Therefore, a petition with multiple signatures becomes that voice of public opinion on a particular issue.

## 4.2. *THE DUTCH PUBLIC SPHERE*

Habermas's thesis has been under much scrutiny; for the bourgeois character of the public sphere, for the periodization in the eighteenth century, and for the localization in England. The last two can probably best be explained through the notion that historians are eager to attribute the emergence or 'invention' of the public sphere to the time, place, and group that

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<sup>534</sup> Calhoun, *Habermas and the public sphere*, 7-8; Habermas, *The structural transformation*.

<sup>535</sup> M. Hallenberg, "For the wealth of the realm: the transformation of the public sphere in Swedish politics, c. 1434-1650," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 37, no. 5 (2012): 559; Calhoun, *Habermas and the public sphere*, 8.

they are studying as this gives it meaning.<sup>536</sup> In the case of the Dutch Republic the debate regarding the existence or emergence of the public sphere has been focused primarily on printed works.<sup>537</sup> The late sixteenth and seventeenth century Low Countries had a flourishing pamphleteering culture, and a digital database made research on this topic and medium more convenient in the last few years.<sup>538</sup> As a consequence, the past decade witnessed many dissertation-based monographs on pamphlets and the public sphere.

Femke Deen's dissertation deals with public debate and propaganda in Amsterdam in the early years of the Dutch Revolt. She tries to avoid the well-debated issues of the public sphere by describing her study as one of public debate. At the same time, however, she acknowledges that a study of media and opinion cannot ignore Habermas's theory. Her main argument for favoring the use of public debate over the public sphere is that it has been widely acknowledged that the model of a public sphere differs so much from historical reality that it is discredited as a "complete" model for the early modern period.<sup>539</sup> Other dissertations, such as those of Roeland Harms and Michel Reinders, also acknowledge the issues of the public sphere and the Habermasian model but arrive at a different conclusion than Deen. Harms argues that there was indeed a public opinion (what is expressed in the public sphere) in pamphlets.<sup>540</sup> Reinders even specifically points to 1672 when, according to him, for the first time there was a claim to a general and anonymous audience in the public sphere.<sup>541</sup> Helmer Helmers convincingly argues in favor of, what he calls, an Anglo-Scoto-Dutch public sphere between 1639 and 1660. This transnational public sphere functioned as a place for international discursive communities, such as 'Republicans', that were contesting

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<sup>536</sup> J. Pollmann and A. Spicer, "Introduction," in *Public Opinion and Changing Identities in the Early Modern Netherlands. Essays in Honour of Alastair Duke*, ed. J. Pollman and A. Spicer (Leiden: Brill, 2007); A. Pettegree, "Provincial news communication in sixteenth-century Europe," in *Public Opinion and Changing Identities in the Early Modern Netherlands. Essays in Honour of Alastair Duke*, ed. J. Pollman and A. Spicer (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1-3.

<sup>537</sup> Harline, *Pamphlets, printing and political culture*; J. Bloemendal and A. van Dixhoorn, "'De scharpheit van een gladde tong'. Literaire teksten en publieke opinievorming in de vroegmoderne Nederlanden," *BMGN* 125, no. 1 (2010).

<sup>538</sup> <http://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/dutch-pamphlets-online>

<sup>539</sup> Deen, *Publiek debat en propaganda*, 8-11.

<sup>540</sup> R. Harms, *Pamfletten en publieke opinie: massamedia in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 254-255.

<sup>541</sup> M.H.P. Reinders, "Printed Pandemonium: The Power of the Public and the Market for Popular Political Publications in the Early Modern Dutch Republic" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Erasmus University, 2008), 101. The book with the title *Printed Pandemonium: Popular print and politics in the Netherlands 1650-1672* was published by Brill in 2013.

for a specific auditorium; Dutch, English, or Scottish. However, rather than the Habermasian model, he made use of a Hauserian model that rejects a universal public sphere and favors a meaningful production specific to a particular issue and audience.<sup>542</sup> Hauser calls this 'a plurality of spheres within the Public Sphere'.<sup>543</sup> The main argument for this plurality of spheres lies in the shortcomings in Habermas's theory regarding the failure to reach consensus. This dissensus, Hauser argues, is not always the result of distortion, but can also be the result of difference; people cooperate on one issue, while disagreeing on another.<sup>544</sup> 'Invoking audience-specific standards that can accommodate conflicting interests suggests that good reasons are the operative basis for actual consensus forged through the (...) myriad situated meanings of a public sphere'.<sup>545</sup> However, since a petition with multiple signatures is already the outcome of the public sphere instead of the public sphere itself, it is for this chapter important to be aware of multiple public spheres, but at the same time not necessary to dissociate them.

This chapter does not seek to prove the existence or the invention of a public sphere earlier than what other scholars have argued. Nor does it have the ambition to shift the focus away from England and towards the Dutch Republic. Rather, it takes the existence of public spheres in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic for granted and it describes the transformation in the use of petitions, arguing that this change kept abreast with the changes in the public sphere. In other words, it uses the Habermasian theory to account for a transformation in the use of petitions. Sociologist David Zaret provides a very good and concise overview of the different distinctions that have been made to challenge Habermas's explanation for the emergence of the public sphere. He concludes that every different social class has been given agency, just like every conceivable aspect of Protestantism and capitalism has been used to explain the origins of dialectic discourse. That is why he rather

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<sup>542</sup> Helmers, "The Royalist Republic," 26-28. The book with the same title was published with Cambridge UP in 2015.

<sup>543</sup> G.A. Hauser, *Vernacular voices: The rhetoric of publics and public spheres* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 55.

<sup>544</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

<sup>545</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

focusses on the changes in communicative practices for the discourse in the public sphere, thus attributing much influence to the role of printing for the scope and use of petitions.<sup>546</sup>

#### 4.2.1. Pamphlets and Dutch Brazil

Before delving into petitions though, it is important to touch upon the relation between Dutch Brazil and pamphlets as well. Dutch Brazil was a 'hot topic' and the WIC tried to control the narratives of its Atlantic endeavors. In particular around the issue of free trade the debate sparked to unprecedented heights.<sup>547</sup> 'I pray', an anonymous pamphleteer wrote in 1636, 'that other distinguished individuals, who could have written this ten times better than I did, will not be suspected of being the author, but that rather my reasons and arguments will be weight instead of carefully scrutinizing this author'.<sup>548</sup> From experience, the author knew what was going to happen after he had started the public discourse on free trade to Brazil. Pamphlets criticizing his view would try to harm his name or discredit his authority. Instead, the author wanted a productive discussion stemming from his arguments; he wanted a public discourse on free trade to Brazil. Some pamphlets went directly head-to-head, forming a dialogue with each other.<sup>549</sup> Many of the pamphlets contributed to public debate through economic, legal, and moral arguments. There is one pamphlet, however, that deserves more attention than it has received so far.

The debate on free trade was a complicated one – so much has become clear in chapter 3. This posed difficulties for authors of pamphlets that wanted to contribute to this issue. How much does the average member of the audience understand of the details of the free trade debate? One pamphlet succeeded particularly well in making a translation from the political

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<sup>546</sup> D. Zaret, "Petitions and the "invention" of public opinion in the English Revolution," *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 6 (1996): 1501-1502. The primacy of print for this practice was later already challenged for England, see: P. Lake and S. Pincus, "Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England," *Journal of British Studies* 45, no. 2 (2006): 277; P. Hammer, "The smiling crocodile: the earl of Essex and late Elizabethan 'popularity,'" in *The politics of the public sphere in early modern England*, ed. P. Lake and S. Pincus (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 112.

<sup>547</sup> Groesen, *Amsterdam's Atlantic*, 117-123; Tol, "Monopolizing arguments."

<sup>548</sup> 'Bidde derhalven, datmen andere apparente personen, die het thienmaels beter als wel ick hadden kunnen doen, buyten verdacht wille houden, ende vele eer ende meer die redenen ende *argumenta* te ponderen als curieuschicken naer den autheur te vorschen', Knuttel 4425: Anonymous, *Reden van dat die West-Indische Compagnie oft handelinge niet alleen profijtelyck maer oock noodtsaeckelijck is tot behoudnisse van onsen staet* (np: np, 1636).6.

<sup>549</sup> Kn. 7002: *Vertoogh, over den toestant*; Knuttel 4515: Anonymous, *Examen over het vertoogh teghen het onghefondeerde ende schadelijck sluyten der vryen handel in Brasil door een ondersoecker der waerheydt* (np: np, 1637).

arena to the public arena by comparing the debate to a commonly known board game (*verkeersspel*).<sup>550</sup> The main player [the Company] found a loaded opponent [the King of Spain] who quickly lost much of his gold [captaincies in Brazil]. The main player was joined by people on the left and right side. The people on the right side [investors] started participating in the game, gaining some of the profits that should have gone to the main player. The author posited that allowing free trade for the investors who themselves can trade is not even that bad, but 'the worst is (...) that most of the players on the left [non-merchants] (which includes the lame [widows], the cripple [orphans] and the blind [individuals with no knowledge of trading that trusted the WIC directors]) are watching but are getting nothing'.<sup>551</sup> In other words, it is unfair that the WIC investors that did not have the means to enjoy the privileges of free trade, got cheated out of their profits. The author of this pamphlet clearly tried to appeal to the outrage of the readership over the wrong that was done to these defenseless investors. This was not an argument that was supposed to convince decision-makers; it was an argument designed to increase popular support for a cause.

This pamphlet succeeded in translating complicated political issues into an example that could work on the streets and as such contributed to the public sphere. Making this translation was important. As multiple editions of this same pamphlet circulated it can be expected that this particular pamphlet was popular and found broad readership. In Brazil, meanwhile, there was no printer. Even though plans for finding a printer 'for lowest possible costs' were discussed in September 1645, seemingly nothing came of this.<sup>552</sup> As a result, the only pamphlet from Brazil is a manuscript pamphlet that attempted to convince French soldiers in WIC service to desert.<sup>553</sup>

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<sup>550</sup> Knuttel 4582: Anonymous, *Het spel van Brasilien vergeheken by een goedt verkeer-spel* (np: np, 1638); Knuttel 4583: Anonymous, *Het spel van Brasilien, vergeleecken bij een goed verkeer-spel* (np: np, 1638).

<sup>551</sup> 'Maer het swaerste is noch (...) so staen de meeste part van de Maets aen de linker zijde [niet negotianten] (daer onder Lamme [weduwen], Creupele [weesen] en Blinden [blindt in saken van Negotie, sich simpelijck op de Bewindthebbers vertrouwende] ende kijcken toe en krijghen niet', Kn. 4582: *Spel van Brasilien*, 5.

<sup>552</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 26, fol 110r.

<sup>553</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 60, [scan 1].

### 4.3. PETITIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Petitions are an extraordinary source to study early modern exchanges between the political center and the political periphery. The center here refers to the political mandataries, and the periphery to those outside the realm of decision-makers. Of course, petitions were not the only medium for political messages in this period. As mentioned before, pamphlets were a principal device, but also sermons, news, or political ordinances. Daniel Bellingradt, in a case study of Cologne and Hamburg, argued that especially in a city, but also on a larger scale, 'media impulses were used to mobilize public opinion for both political and private purposes'.<sup>554</sup> What makes the petition stand out as a medium is that it is that it moves from the periphery to the center rather than the other way around.<sup>555</sup> Furthermore, petitions are an ideal source to study the political periphery because individuals that are closer to the political center would be more inclined to use other means to request something such as personal relations. This is especially true for the early modern period when patronage and a system of clients were still important for politics.<sup>556</sup> That means that if a topic is discussed in a petition it was *de facto* discussed outside the political center; even if the petitioners had access to the center of the political arena. What makes the Dutch Republic stand out in this period compared to England is that it was no offence in the Low Countries to talk about politics outside the arena of parliament like it was for MPs in England.<sup>557</sup>

Femke Deen identified three types of political exchanges between the center and the periphery that played an important role for the public debate in the early years of the Dutch Revolt. The first is public proclamations. This includes statutes, placards, and letters from prominent individuals that were read out loud in public places. These proclamations had a strong ritualized character that included tolling bells or trumpets that preceded the proclamation. In some cases, these proclamations were even included in religious sermons to expand the scope of a message.<sup>558</sup> The rituals and symbols that were used in proclamations

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<sup>554</sup> D. Bellingradt, "The Early Modern city as a resonating box: media, public opinion, and the urban space of the Holy Roman Empire, Cologne and Hamburg ca. 1700," *Journal of Early Modern History* 16, no. 3 (2012): 205.

<sup>555</sup> Zaret, "Petitions and the "invention" of public opinion," 1498.

<sup>556</sup> Janssen, *Creaturen van de Macht*. See also chapter 5.

<sup>557</sup> Lake and Pincus, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," 276; Zaret, "Petitions and the "invention" of public opinion," 1508.

<sup>558</sup> Deen, *Publiek debat en propaganda*, 59-63.



make it an excellent example of representative publicity in the period before the bourgeois public sphere.

The second type that Deen identifies are the copies of resolutions. Deen found a large collection of manuscript copies of resolutions in the inventories of earthly possessions of prominent Amsterdam individuals in archives. The resolutions originated not only in Amsterdam, but also other cities such as Antwerp. This leads her to conclude that there was most likely some sort of circulation of manuscript copies of political decisions within the Low Countries. Moreover, it is documented that the famous historian Lieuwe van Aitzema ran an illegal news service in the mid-seventeenth century for which he used clerks to make copies of political documents. Other instances have been found of manuscript copies of printed documents, and printed versions of previously circulated manuscript documents.<sup>559</sup> This circulation of resolutions allowed for a potential locus where politics, religion, and economy could be debated in a public sphere. This would confirm the idea put forward by Lake and Pincus that printing was not necessarily central to the public sphere.<sup>560</sup> However, the circulation of manuscript separates was most likely confined to a small and closed off administrative elite. That would mean that this is not a public sphere as the elite is not inclusive in principle. The third type identified by Deen are petitions.

A study of the use, function, transformation, and social implications of petitions in the seventeenth century in the Low Countries is long overdue - not only for a better understanding of the situation in the Republic, but also to allow a comparison to other countries. The English are a case in point.<sup>561</sup> In order to allow for this dialogue, this chapter will primarily engage with David Zaret's article from 1996. Firstly, because it is one of the few articles dealing with petitions in the early modern period, and secondly because Zaret argues for the importance of print for the emergence of a public sphere in England, which my study shows that at least for the Dutch Republic is not true. As a starting point this chapter focusses on the practices of petitioning, especially the canvassing of a petition, and the relation between the development of the petition and the public sphere. In his article, Zaret writes: 'Do petitions have tangible links to opinions held at the individual level, to

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<sup>559</sup> *Ibid.*, 63-66.

<sup>560</sup> Lake and Pincus, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," 277.

<sup>561</sup> Fletcher, *English civil war*, 191-227; Zaret, "Petitions and the "invention" of public opinion."; Pettigrew, "Free to Enslave," 12-15.

discussion and debate in civil society, or are they merely literary productions with no discernible relation to a public sphere?'. This requires a study of the practices of signing and framing a petition.<sup>562</sup> Zaret argues that there was indeed a link between petitions and the public opinion. Moreover, it was a change in communicative practices (the use of print) that allowed for a change in scope and content of petitions, thus transforming the use and the relation to the public sphere. However, this chapter posits that not communicative practices, but rather the use of signatures, changed the relation between petitions and the public sphere. However, first it is important to assess the relevance of print for petitioning in the Dutch Republic.

#### **4.3.1. Printed petitions**

The petition presented by the Compromise of Nobles on 5 April 1566 was afterwards manually copied sevenfold, and divided over seven prominent noblemen. Each one of them was charged with the task of rallying support in the form of signatures, each in their own provinces. The individuals made primarily use of their own family and client networks. Brederode, the main leader of the Compromise, was in charge of Holland and Friesland, but he was not very successful in Friesland, despite the use of the networks of the gentry with Frisian wives. The low number of signatures in the provinces of Zeeland and Groningen may also be due to the lack of familial and cliental ties between the members of the Compromise and the local elites or a disagreement with the contents of the petition.<sup>563</sup> Another tactic the leaders of the Compromise used to increase or show support was the printing of the petition. This was an unprecedented practice for the sixteenth century, and was not rivaled at this scale in other European countries or even in the Dutch Republic until after the 1620s.

Printed petitions became so recognizable and popular that it became a genre for pamphlets, as becomes clear from the imitation of a petition sent allegedly by the wife and children of a famous politician, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, who was in a longtime conflict


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<sup>562</sup> Zaret, "Petitions and the "invention" of public opinion," 1521.

<sup>563</sup> A. Duke, "Dissident propaganda and political organization at the outbreak of the Revolt of the Netherlands," in *Reformation, revolt and civil war in France and the Netherlands, 1555-1585*, ed. P. Benedict, et al. (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1999), 120.

with the Stadtholder.<sup>564</sup> Even though print existed and petitions were printed, the archives of the States General do not contain any printed petitions until the 1670s.<sup>565</sup>

Graph 4-1: The number of printed petitions in the Dutch Republic. Based on queries for 'Reques\*', 'Rekes\*', and 'Petiti\*' in the TEMPO database.<sup>566</sup>



Source: TEMPO database

Back in 1566 and 1567 the printed petitions were a novelty. That the Compromise of Nobles understood the value of a printed version of a manuscript is demonstrated through their use. The petition was translated into French and German, and printed in Brussels, Antwerp, and Vianen. The latter location might seem odd, but Vianen was part of the area where van Brederode had authority as a nobleman.<sup>567</sup> Other editions were printed in Emden amongst other places, and smuggled into the Low Countries. Nicolas du Bar, one of the financial backers of on the most important pamphlets in 1566, ordered 2,000 copies in Dutch, and

<sup>564</sup> Knuttel 2880: Anonymous, *Request, aen de eedele grootmoghende heeren, mijn heeren de Staten van Hollant ende West-Vrieslandt. Van weghen de huysvrouwe ende kinderen vanden heere van Olden-Barneveldt* (np, np, 1619).

<sup>565</sup> See chapter 7.

<sup>566</sup> Other spellings such as 'Rekwe\*', have been omitted because they did not return any results. Results from other words such as 'Remonstranti\*' have been omitted because even though it returns too many hits, the style of a 'Remonstrance' differs from that of a petition or request as it a more general term. It should be noted that the enormous peak in the 1640s is strongly related to the English civil war and contains various translated and original copies of English printed petitions.

<sup>567</sup> Deen, *Publiek debat en propaganda*, 58.

1,500 copies in French from the printer Gilles le Clercq.<sup>568</sup> Evidence from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century indicates that printruns of 1,000 to 1,250 copies were common. These numbers give an idea of the scale of the at least nine different versions of the petition that circulated in print.<sup>569</sup> We should bear in mind that reading was a social activity that people did together, and after one had finished reading the pamphlet was often passed to other people.<sup>570</sup>

Despite this engagement with a public arena, 1566 cannot be deemed the year of the emergence or invention of a public sphere in the Low Countries. Even though the *Smeekschrift* shows clear signs of popular participation in political decision-making, the contributions to the debates were limited to the members of the nobility. The discourse arena was, therefore, not inclusive in principle. Moreover, the delivery of the petition in a procession through Brussels by hundreds of noblemen is a clear example of the display of status. This procession was not for the people, but before the people. When this status was discredited by the *seigneur* of Berlaymont by calling them beggars (*gueux*), referring to their status as lower nobility, the Compromise appropriated this new nickname during a celebratory dinner at the palace of the Count of Culemborg.<sup>571</sup> This happened again in an arena where the ordinary people had neither influence in the discussion, nor access to the arena. The Compromise of Nobles did claim to voice a common concern and function as a broker between 'ordinary people' and a sovereign. At best, however, the Compromise was the gateway between the periphery and the political center. Furthermore, even though van Brederode and other prominent leaders of the Compromise travelled around the country attempting to acquire signatures, they again limited the signatures to members of the nobility, and they did not provide the petition with signatures.

The first time the States General received a petition that was printed was much later, in 1670, when Jacobus Scheltus, a printer, submitted his petition in print.<sup>572</sup> How innovative this practice was becomes clear when we consider that a year before, in 1669, Henricus Hondius, another printer, petitioned for the job of official state printer. Not even his petition was

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<sup>568</sup> Duke, "Dissident propaganda," 123-124.

<sup>569</sup> Harline, *Pamphlets, printing and political culture*, 21.

<sup>570</sup> Groesen, *Amsterdam's Atlantic*, 50.

<sup>571</sup> Nierop, "A beggars' banquet," 419-421.

<sup>572</sup> NL-HaNA, 3.01.04.01 inv. nr. 1371/II, [1670?] Petition by Jacobus Scheltus.

printed, but in manuscript.<sup>573</sup> As will be argued below, the practice of putting multiple signatures on petitions thus occurred well before the introduction of printed petitions, and the printing of petitions therefore did not alter the process of petitioning. However, the printing of a petition after it had been delivered to the States General (or another body) copied its practice from the Compromise of Nobles. This could still increase readership and knowledge while also demonstrating popular support. The development of this practice can be seen in Graph 4-1.

#### 4.4. MULTIPLE SIGNATURES ON PETITIONS

The first places to witness the changing practice of putting signatures on petitions were cities. For obvious reasons; it was easier to organize a petition drive in just one city as compared to a provincial or 'national' level. The first time this happened was in July 1608 in Amsterdam.<sup>574</sup> The petition was signed by no less than sixty merchants and requested the abolition of the prohibition of the use of cashiers (*kassiers*) for financial transactions.<sup>575</sup> This prohibition had been proposed by the States General because cashiers had diluted the gold and silver level in coins (*opwisselen*) to as low as nine per cent, resulting in a loss of faith in the banking system. Moreover, it had occurred more than once that a cashier had no available cash to provide when a merchant requested payment from his account. The cashier would then provide a bank draft (*assignatie*) for another cashier.<sup>576</sup> A strongly worded prohibition had been instated on 12 July 1608 by the Amsterdam City Council. While the Amsterdam merchants acknowledged that the cashiers had created problems, they argued that the service of agents was unavoidable for a smoothly operating trading system, in particular for large transactions. This petition successfully influenced the regulations, as on 29 July the City Council softened three crucial passages.<sup>577</sup> One of the signers of the petition was Dirk van Os, who was one of the men responsible for the erection of the Bank of Amsterdam (*Amsterdamse Wisselbank*) less than half a year later, where money transactions were guaranteed.

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<sup>573</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 inv. nr. 7490, 20-Sep-1669 petition by Henricus Hondius.

<sup>574</sup> Or at least, the first time I could find.

<sup>575</sup> J.G. van Dillen, ed. *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der wisselbanken (Amsterdam, Middelburg, Delft, Rotterdam)* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1925), Vol. I, 14-16.

<sup>576</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 1, 12.

<sup>577</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 16-17.

On 23 July 1628, the same City Council received a petition with even more signatures; around 250 people came together to sign. These Remonstrants requested to practice their own religion in a new church.<sup>578</sup> Even though they would initially not be granted this right, the City Council turned a blind eye towards their conventicle after January 1630.<sup>579</sup> The petition stands out through its neat columns on the back page. The petitioners had divided the back into three equal columns where the signers could put their names (see Figure 4-1)

Figure 4-1: Front and back of the petition requesting a place for the Remonstrant's religion with around 250 signatures



Source: NL-AsdSAA, 612 Archief van de Remonstrantse Gemeente, inv. nr. 290, Stuk bevattende handtekeningen van remonstrantsgezinden (...)

What the petitions for cashier regulations and religious tolerance have in common is not only their multitude of signatures, but also that the groups are quite uniform. This does not mean that they contain the same names. In fact, no signer appeared on both petitions even though both contain a Coymans (Jaspar and Balthazar on the bank petition, and Jeronimo on the religious petition) and the religious petition contains numerous powerful merchants including Willem Usselincx, Joan Huydecoper, and Dirk and Jan Hasselaer that could have

<sup>578</sup> Stadsarchief Amsterdam (NL-AsdSAA), 612 “Archief van de Remonstrantse Gemeente”, inv. nr. 290, “Stuk bevattende handtekeningen van remonstrantsgezinden teradhesie aan het voornemen om enigen hunner een adres tot 'exercitie van religie, inkomen ende relaxatie van predikanten' te laten richten aan burgemeesters en regeerders van Amsterdam. (1628)”.

<sup>579</sup> H.C. Diferee, *Drie eeuwen kerkgeschiedenis* (Amsterdam: N.V. van Holkema & Warendorf's uitgeverij, 1930), 97-98.

an interest in cashier regulations. Uniform in this context means that the petitioners were similar beyond their shared interest. The Remonstrants obviously shared their religion and the petition on the cashiers has one merchant group that is suspiciously absent from the petition: the Portuguese Jews. The absence of the Sephardim makes the group much more homogenous. However, in the case of the Remonstrants it should be noted that the petition included several women. Interestingly enough, they are grouped together in small sets on the signature list. Even more interesting is that each and every one of them identified themselves by being the widow of someone. Grietgen Dirks, widow of Jan Hectorsz Chanu and Haesjen Hendricks, widow of Hendrick Hooft are just two examples. Other than this, the two early examples of group petitions are rather exclusive; the groups are homogenous beyond their shared interest.

#### **4.4.1. Group petitions to the States General**

The oldest dated petition with multiple signatures to the States General (or its predecessors) is from 6 June 1571. It is directed at the Duke of Alva, the successor of Margaret of Parma as the governor of the Low Countries and it contains a request written in French by members of the abbey of Mont-Saint-Éloi to appoint a new abbot because the former one had died.<sup>580</sup> It is signed by six individuals. Six is of course still a limited number, and these six were all members of the same abbey who did not need to go around town soliciting more signatures; the group was exclusive based on their position as members of the abbey.

In 1601 (the northern provinces of the Low Countries had claimed independence from the king of Spain through the Act of Abjuration in the meantime), it was still not common practice to obtain signatures from multiple individuals in order to make claims for a larger body of people. One petition was submitted in this year on behalf of ‘the common merchants of Amsterdam, and some other in the province of Holland, that are trading to Königsberg’.<sup>581</sup> Even though this makes a claim to some sort of larger interest, it is extremely vague, and it is very well possible that the author of this petition used this vagueness as a way of portraying a larger shared interest than there actually was; who were ‘the common (*gemeene*) merchants’? The text is never specific on who these merchants actually were or from which

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<sup>580</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.01.03 inv. nr. 24, 05-Jun-1571 petition from the Abbey of Mont-Saint-Éloi.

<sup>581</sup> ‘Request voor die gemeene coopliden van Amsterdam ende sommige andere van de lande van hollandt, trafficqueerende op conincxbergen’. NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 inv. nr. 7474, [No date], petition from common merchants.

cities they hailed. This is different in a petition from 1639. Here, eight merchants requested the States General to commission someone to estimate the value of their burned ships and cargo. Even though they do not individually sign this petition, each of the merchants is identified in the introduction of the petition: six names were from Rotterdam, one (Sijbrandt Jacobsz) from Amsterdam, and Gerrit Cortes from Schiedam.<sup>582</sup> It is interesting that these merchants succeeded in aligning their interest beyond their own city.

Even though this practice of identifying individuals in a petition by name became increasingly common over the years, it still happened that petitioners identified themselves as a group (i.e. merchants trading to Bordeaux), rather than a collection of individuals (i.e. Jan, Pier, Tjores, and Korneel). This suggests a non-linear development for the importance of corporations for advocating interest.<sup>583</sup> This becomes clear from another petition, also from 1639, by merchants complaining that their cargo aboard twelve small ships (*boeiers*) destined for Rouen was taken by Dunkirk privateers because there was insufficient convoy. Their cargo allegedly was worth over fifteen *tonnen* of gold or 1.5 million guilders. The suppliants identified themselves as 'common merchants trading to Rouen in France, all living in Amsterdam', instead of providing the names of the individuals involved.<sup>584</sup> In this case the merchants did not put any signatures on the petition. Apparently, identifying individuals was not necessary in certain cases of petitioning; a claim to petition on behalf of all merchants in Amsterdam to Rouen was sufficient to add credibility. It is also very well possible that the merchants trading to Rouen had a permanent representative delivering petitions on their behalf. This can be compared to the merchants trading on several Dutch rivers.<sup>585</sup>

After 1645, the practice of petitioning changed and it became more customary to put a signature on a petition. In 1652 for example, the States of Zeeland recommended to the States General a request signed by twenty-three individuals. By this time, the Eighty Years' War

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<sup>582</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 inv. nr. 7480, [no date] petition from eight merchants.

<sup>583</sup> Compare M.R. Prak, "The Dutch Republic as a bourgeois society," *BMGN* 125, no. 2-3 (2010); M.R. Prak, "Corporate politics in the Low Countries: guilds as institutions, 14th to 18th centuries," in *Craft guilds in the early modern Low Countries: work, power and representation*, ed. M.R. Prak, et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

<sup>584</sup> 'gemeene coopliden handelende op Rouaen in Vranckrijck, alle woonende tot Amsterdam' NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 inv. nr. 7480, 08-Oct-1639, petition from merchants trading to Rouen, all living in Amsterdam.

<sup>585</sup> See paragraph 1.1.3



between the Republic and Spain was over, but the Republic was now involved in a new war with England. The petitioners heard that on 27 June a Spanish treasure fleet of twenty-four ships and galleons had been sighted near the Cape of St. Vincent and was on its way back to Cadiz where ships from the Republic would transport some of the cargo, including silver, back to Holland and Zeeland. The petitioners also knew that the Channel was empty of Dutch warships and full of English privateers eager to prize some of this cargo allegedly worth more than 150 *tonnen* of gold or 15 million guilders. If the English would indeed apprehend this cargo, the petitioners argued, this would lead to ‘considerable damages and loss of inhabitants of these provinces’.<sup>586</sup> Thus, the petitioners requested that the States General equip 25 to 30 ships to protect the Dutch fleet. Among the signatures are those of individuals of considerable status such as Adriaen Lampsins and Nicolaes van der Merckt, who amongst other functions were directors of the East India Company (VOC). It is clear that the suppliants tried to convince the States General with a (rational) argument that appealed to a common wealth, or joint interest, which superseded the personal concerns of the petitioners. Moreover, in the introduction, the petitioners identify themselves as ‘merchants, both trading to Spain as well as the ones interested in that’.<sup>587</sup> This leaves open a larger body of individuals that could support the cause, which is in principle inclusive. Furthermore, the way the petition is signed indicates that it was canvassed to different people. Each signature is put down with a different quill and different shade of ink. This would suggest that rather than all these people coming together in one room to draft this petition and then sign it, it seems most likely that the principal petitioner drafted it, and that it was then brought to different interested individuals for signing. After all, who goes around to meetings bringing his own quill and ink? This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that the aforementioned Lampsins and van der Merckt did not sign closely together despite them being in the same place reasonably regularly as directors of the Zeeland chamber of the VOC. Moreover, when comparing another list of signatures, for example a list of Jewish inhabitants in Amsterdam, it becomes apparent that these long lists of names are in the same shade of ink, thus indicating that here the ink and the paper had been kept together.<sup>588</sup>

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<sup>586</sup> ‘merckelijke schade ende verliese der ingesetenen deser landen’. NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 inv. nr. 7482, no date [around June/July 1652] Petition by 23 individuals trading to Spain.

<sup>587</sup> ‘coopluijden zoo trafficquerende op Spaingen als geinteresseerden bij dien’.

<sup>588</sup> NL-AsdSAA, 334, inv. nr. 19, Escamoth A.

Furthermore, compare also Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 and the description below of round robins, which were all signed in the same shade of ink.

By putting down a signature, these individuals indicated to the addressee of the petition that they agreed with the content. The text of the petition is neither tampered with, nor altered in any way after it was drafted. This leaves two options for the way it came into being. Either it was collectively put together by all the petitioners and agreed upon, which would indicate a discussion based on rational argument. Or, after it was drafted, it convinced the individuals that signed the petition through its content, which indicates the decision to sign the petition was based on rational argument. Lastly, the content of the petition deals with the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic. It requests the use of military action by the state. This indicates that state affairs, and state policy, were discussed in the public sphere. However, as is apparent from Renselaer's testimony in Chapter 3 it was very well possible that individuals could be pressured to express a certain opinion. Nevertheless, this does not change the function of the signature on paper as a public display of popular support.

It becomes clear that during the first half of the seventeenth century profound changes had taken place in the use of signatures on petitions. Considering that the request by the Compromise of Nobles had zero signatures at the moment of submission, and that the number of signatures had become more common since then (both at a city and a national level), it is safe to say that the process of acquiring petitions had influenced the public sphere. Canvassing a petition had become a new practice and it became a political tool in the hands of interest groups that attempted to lobby through. It had happened already in for example 1618 and 1625 that large groups of individuals submitting a request to the States General had put their signatures on the request. However, because of the nature of these requests (whose aim is the appointment of a certain individual as Consul because that would be beneficial to the traders) it is something that is not covered in this chapter. It seems that the individual who wanted to become the consul asked prominent others to 'sponsor' his campaign.<sup>589</sup> This makes it more a list of patrons for a client than the manifestation of

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<sup>589</sup> This part of job seeking is not covered in Paul Knevel's monography on bureaucrats. He focusses more on patronage networks for getting a job. See: Knevel, *Het Haagse bureau*.

something resembling a public sphere; these two requests symbolized the interest of the aspiring consul rather than that of a general public.

#### 4.5. *MANAGING INFORMATION OF THE REVOLT IN BRAZIL*

The group petition related to the WIC colony in Brazil was, thus, not the first instance of group petitioning. However, aside from the Remonstrants' petition of 1628 that had around 250 signatures, it certainly stands out because of the number of signatures. The petition was read by the States General on 2 October 1645. By then, the news of the uprising in Brazil had been circulating for exactly one month. During that month, the WIC had already started to influence the decision of the States General and was attempting to control the information and narrative of the events in Brazil.

The meeting of the *Heeren XIX* had started on 9 September by sifting through the information that came from Brazil. The representatives of the States General at this meeting, led by Johan van der Camer, had been instructed by the committee on West Indian Affairs to determine 'how the conquests in Brazil should be restored' and how to convince the provinces to pay for the necessary subsidies.<sup>590</sup> Six of the directors in the meeting were selected to form a special committee to make a decision.<sup>591</sup> The first step was to quickly dispatch a ship with provisions and the dearly needed ammunitions. The next step was to formulate a strategy on how the events in Brazil should be discussed to the States General and thus 'set' the debate. If the dominant narrative would become that the colony was in crisis due to the negligence of the *Heeren XIX* it would be much harder to convince anyone, in particular the provinces, that someone other than the WIC pay for the security of the colony. The committee drafted a budget of 725,925 guilders for the military relief of Brazil and a report that emphasized the empty coffers of the Company due to the expensive conquest of Brazil. It was, of course, also important to emphasize the great prestige the colony presented to the Dutch Republic and the enormous riches to be gained. The next step in the lobbying campaign was to reach out to the Provincial States of the two richest

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<sup>590</sup> Quoted in Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 70.

<sup>591</sup> Adrian van Hecke of Vlissingen, Johannes de Laet and Johan Schuilenborch of Amsterdam, Nicolaes ten Hove of Delft, Claude Simonsz. Dolphyn of Hoorn, and Thobias Ydekinge of Groningen.

provinces: Holland and Zeeland. The delegation for the States of Holland was formed by directors who were not attending the meeting because travelling from the meeting of the Board of Directors in Zeeland would be too time-consuming. Five directors from the Amsterdam chamber, one director from the Zeeland chamber and the Company lawyer arrived in The Hague on 19 September. They first addressed the States General's committee on West Indian Affairs and then the States of Holland two days later. The Directors largely followed the agreed-upon plan from the meeting in Middelburg, but added the suspicion of the Portuguese king's involvement in the revolt, which was a violation of the 1641 Treaty. A few days later, on 26 September, a letter from Fredrik Hendrik arrived, further encouraging the provincial assembly to support the WIC's colony in Brazil. The Stadtholder was encouraged to do so after receiving a visit by the directors Abraham van de Perre and Simon van Beaumont. These two directors were sent on commission by the Board of Directors when they had learned about the Portuguese insurgencies. The Prince had received the delegates and after hearing their request for a 'recommendation' on the Brazilian affair had 'accepted to do this favorably'.<sup>592</sup> The words of the Stadtholder were well-received by the States of Holland and a majority was leaning towards funding a rescue mission. However, Amsterdam repeatedly requested additional time to consider the matter as these city's magistrates were afraid of a deterioration of relations with the Portuguese King João IV.<sup>593</sup>

In an attempt to convince the States General of the role of the Portuguese monarch, the Company's lawyer, Gijsbert Rudolphi, supplied the High-Mightinesses with additional information from other sources than the General Missives. The first was an extract from news that had arrived from Paris. On 17 August, the news had arrived in the French city that the King of Portugal had taken control of Pernambuco. As a consequence, the price of sugar had risen immediately everywhere. The author of the letter had heard from a friend who had a reliable source that the instructions provided to the Portuguese ambassador made clear that João IV at least knew of the upcoming revolt and condoned it, and was probably responsible for instigating it. 'In either case the King cannot claim to be unconnected to this

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<sup>592</sup> 'het welck sijn Hoog:ht: aegenomen heeft favorablijck te doen', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 26, fol.108v.

<sup>593</sup> Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 52-76.

treason.<sup>594</sup> Moreover, after the King had learned that in fact he did not control the whole captaincy of Pernambuco, he provided his ambassador in Paris with new instructions. A second set of information was read by the High-Mightinesses later that same 30 September. It was compiled from 'several missives and other papers, as well as particular advices' that the Board of Directors had received. Most of the information was not new to the members of the States General, but it provided a condensed list of 'talking points' in relation to what the document identified as 'Dutch Brazil'.<sup>595</sup> This included the story of a Portuguese named Carvalho who had refused to sign a document aligning himself with the King of Portugal in exchange for a gold reward and who had subsequently 'caught the eye of [the Portuguese administration in] Bahia'.<sup>596</sup> It again relayed the story of the wedding that was planned on St. John's Day (24 June) where the ringleaders would invite all the members of the High Council and some high officers who would then all be murdered. Moreover, Felipe Camarão and Henrique Dias were leading an army of 4,000 to 5,000 compiled of Portuguese, indigenous Brazilians, and Africans that functioned as support from Bahia for the revolt. More evidence that the revolt was not an isolated incident was found in the words of prominent religious leaders that had traversed back to Lisbon onboard a WIC ship. When the religious leaders were welcomed by high-ranking individuals in the harbor and eagerly asked about the state of Brazil, the clerics had responded: 'at this moment Brazil is under the obedience of our King,' even though the revolt had happened after the departure of the ship.<sup>597</sup> In other words, this memorial reiterated the point that 'it was sufficiently clear' that the Portuguese in Pernambuco had revolted 'neither of their own accord, and neither on their own', but must have received assistance.<sup>598</sup> The symbolism of the wedding on the name day of the Portuguese King surely would not have been lost on the members of the States General.

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<sup>594</sup> 'In allen gevalle ditto Coninck kan hem niet exempteren adhevent te sijn van dit verraet', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 Staten-General, inv. nr. 5758, 30-Sep-1645 "Extract uit een brief uit Parijs" [scan 156].

<sup>595</sup> 'Nederlandsch Brasil', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 30-Sep-1645 Memory from several missives [scan 159].

<sup>596</sup> 't selve datelijck naer de Bahia geadviseert ende de voorn: Carvalho daer door seer in de ooghe geraeckt', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 30-Sep-1645 Memory from several missives [scan 159].

<sup>597</sup> 'huijden is Brasil geheel onder de gehoorsaemheijt van onsen Coninck', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 30-Sep-1645 Memory from several missives [scan 159].

<sup>598</sup> 'Connende uijt de alreede bekende actien genouchsaem bespeurt werden dat de ingesetenen Portugesen in Pernambuco de voors: revolte ende verraderijen niet uijt haer selver noch te op haere eijgen machten alleen hebben bestaen aen te vangen, maer met de hulpe van soodanige als alreede

#### 4.6. PETITIONING THE PUBLIC SPHERE ON BRAZIL

Abraham Erude, Joseph Acosta, and Jeronimo Nunes, the three Sephardic merchants that had petitioned the Board of Directors in Middelburg on 14 September travelled back to Amsterdam. Back in the city they became involved in what was the second biggest petition drive in Amsterdam. The petitioners addressed their first request to the Burgomasters and Council of Amsterdam. In the opening of the petition they identified themselves as ‘the undersigned merchants of this city [of Amsterdam] and interested in the state of Brazil, as well as numerous widows and orphans and others that cannot sign this petition’.<sup>599</sup> This is by far the most inclusive formulation of any of the petitions as the suppliants not only claimed their own agency, but explicitly included everyone that had not been able to sign the petition.

The narrative of the petition reflected the news, rumors, and information that had circulated around the Republic about the Portuguese revolt that had followed the talking points of the WIC. It identified the great treason and murderous plans by the Portuguese or ‘so-called *Christianos Vechos*’ thus immediately dissociating any relation with the Portuguese Jews, or New Christians, in the Brazilian colony. Moreover, the petition remained quite close to the talking points of the West India Company mentioning that the revolt was ‘supported and started by Bahia with soldiers, ships, and ammunition’. This particular passage of the petition was apparently contested as later the word ‘apparently’ was added in front of the sentence.<sup>600</sup> Another talking point the petition copied from the WIC Board of Directors was the inability of the Company to battle the insurgents on their own. The support of the state was necessary because otherwise the ‘damage for the country, insufferable interests of the

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wert aangewesen.’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 30-Sep-1645 Memory from several missives [scan 159].

<sup>599</sup> ‘ondergeschreeven coopliden deser stadt ende geinteresseerdens bij den staet van Brasil, nevens noch ontallijcke weduwen ende wesen ende anderen die niet teijckenen en konnen’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 2-Oct-1645 Petition to the City of Amsterdam [scan 163].

<sup>600</sup> [naar alle apparentie] gestift ende gesticht van die van de Bahia met soldaten, schepen, ende ammonitie van oorloge’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 2-Oct-1645 Petition to the City of Amsterdam [scan 163].

inhabitants here and in particular of those in your honorable city' would be unavoidable.<sup>601</sup> In other words, the suppliants were forced to address themselves to the city's magistracy as their lawful lords and they did not doubt the magistrates would exercise themselves to avoid such a disaster – especially for the inhabitants of Amsterdam. In order to achieve the States' support for Brazil, the suppliants requested a favorable recommendation from the Amsterdam magistrates on this petition to the States General. The Burgomaster and City Council obliged and forwarded the request to the States General where it was read on 2 October. Despite the initial reservation of the Amsterdam delegation in the States of Holland, the City Council now thus actively communicated that it supported the cause.

Who were these petitioners that succeeded in removing Amsterdam's opposition to a rescue fleet? Well, they were with many. A total of 92 'merchants and interested' in the state of Brazil signed the petition. The first to sign the petition was Jacques Belten, a merchant originally from Limburg who had moved to Amsterdam in the first half of the seventeenth century, and lived in the Spinhuissteeg.<sup>602</sup> Other notable figures include Paulus Timmerman and Abraham de Visscher, who were both directors of the chamber of Amsterdam.<sup>603</sup> Timmerman was the second signature on the petition which indicates that he was either the principle drafter, or at least one of the main instigators of the petition. This can explain why the petition remained so close to the talking points of the WIC Board of Directors. Other prominent merchants and individuals in the first columns of the petition include Willem Momma, Guglielmo van der Voort, and Hartman Hartmansz (who is depicted on the famous Rembrandt painting of the anatomical lesson of dr. Tulp) (see Figure 4-2).<sup>604</sup> Of course, the merchants trading in the West Indies were also represented, including Jeremias van Collen,

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<sup>601</sup> 'zoo merckelijcken schade voor t landt, onlijdelijcke interesse van de ingesetenen alhier ende namentlijck van die van uw Ed: Stadt', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, 2-Oct-1645 Petition to the City of Amsterdam [scan 163].

<sup>602</sup> A.J.A. Flament, "Het Journaal van Jacques Belten, koopman te Sittard en later te Amsterdam," *Maasgouw* 8 (1886): 91.

<sup>603</sup> J. Jacobs, "Incompetente autocraten? Bestuurlijke verhoudingen in de zeventiende-eeuwse Nederlandse Atlantische Wereld," *De zeventiende eeuw* 21, no. 1 (2005): 67; Elias, *De vroedschap*, Vol. 1, 246.

<sup>604</sup> J.H. van Eeghen, ed. *Amstelodamum: Maandblad voor de kennis van Amsterdam*, vol. 62 (1975), 136; M. van Gelder, *Trading places: The Netherlandisch merchants in early modern Venice* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2009), 184. For the Rembrandt painting see: <https://rkd.nl/nl/explore/portraits/3048>.

Guillaume Momma, Mattheus Hoeufft, and Caspar Varleth.<sup>605</sup> Two other noteworthy individuals, considering their place in the higher Amsterdam governing echelons are Jan Michielsz Blaeu, famously portrayed in a *schutterstuk* together with Roelof Bicker by Bartholomeus van der Helst, and Isaac Hochepped, who in 1645 was the regent of the Walloon orphanage (*Walenweeshuis*).<sup>606</sup> The latter obviously at least partly represented the investments of the orphans in the WIC.

Since the names are in different shades of ink and written with different quills, it is again likely that all these people were not in the same room while the petition was drafted, but that instead the petition was canvassed throughout the city. Through the names on the signatures list it is possible to reconstruct the route the petition made as it made its way through Amsterdam. The sixth and seventh names on the list are Elias Nuyts and Jean van Gheel. Van Gheel, also a WIC director, lived on the Heerengracht on the corner of the Warmoesgracht.<sup>607</sup> His neighbor was Cornelis Nuyts, a very prominent sugar merchant, and the father of Elias Nuyts, who lived on the Heerengracht with his father.<sup>608</sup> There is no hard evidence to support this, but people canvassing the petition might have been knocking on the doors of these two neighbors in their attempt to find signatures. Cornelis must not have been home, as his signature as well as his brother David's are absent from the petition, despite the investments of the Nuyts family in the WIC.<sup>609</sup> This would suggest that perhaps Elias was home alone as the petitioners visited this house. Further down the list Willem de Bruijn signed in the same hand and on the same line as his son-in-law Willem Momma. De Bruijn lived on the (St. Anthonie) Breestraat in the house that would later become known as the Pinto house.<sup>610</sup> This street connected the old side of Amsterdam to the area where most of the Portuguese Jews lived and where in 1675 the Portuguese Synagogue would be built.

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<sup>605</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap*, Vol. 2, 645; S. Gikandi, "Slavery and the Age of Sensibility," in *Human Bondage in the Cultural Contact Zone*, ed. R. Hörmann and G. Mackenthun (Münster: Waxmann, 2010), 97; A. Johnson, *The Swedish settlements on the Delaware: their history and relation to the Indians, Dutch and English, 1638-1664 : with an account of the South, the New Sweden, and the American companies, and the efforts of Sweden to regain the colony* (New York: Franklin, 1970), 89; Shaw Romney, *New Netherland connections*, 105.

<sup>606</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap*, Vol. 1, 618-619.

<sup>607</sup> The Warmoesgracht was closed up in 1894 and is currently part of the Raadhuisstraat.

<sup>608</sup> A.H. Poelwijk, *"In dienste vant suyckerbacken": De Amsterdamse suikernijverheid en haar ondernemers, 1580-1630* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2003), 88; Elias, *De vroedschap*, Vol. 2, 975-976.

<sup>609</sup> Poelwijk, *"In dienste vant suyckerbacken"*, 169.

<sup>610</sup> Eeghen, *Amstelodamum*, 136.



More than thirty Sephardim signed the petition, including the aforementioned Jeronimo Nunes and other prominent Jews from the community such as Isaac Gabay Henriques and Rui Gomez Fronteira.<sup>611</sup> Underneath most of the Portuguese Jews, and almost at the bottom of the signatures, is the name of the WIC director Abraham de Visscher, who lived on Oudezijds Achterburgwal near the Molensteeg.<sup>612</sup> The petition had returned to the inner city of Amsterdam and was making its way to the City Hall where it was presented to the magistrates of the city.

The canvassing of this petition throughout the city of Amsterdam is an example *par excellence* of outside lobbying. The petition claimed the public sphere to debate the political issue of sending a rescue fleet to Brazil to relieve the colonists from the rebellious population. The debate took place outside the political arena, and on the streets of the city, thus expressing public opinion. Moreover, as can be seen in the addition of the word 'apparently' in relation to the involvement of the Portuguese crown, the text had been debated and slightly altered before reaching the final form in which it was presented to the Amsterdam magistrates and later the States General. A second important argument why this is a good example of outside lobbying is that the petition added no new arguments to the political discourse. Instead, it reproduced the talking points laid out by the Board of Directors. Yet, it succeeded in removing Amsterdam's opposition to a rescue fleet. In other words, the city magistrates were perhaps not convinced by the arguments, but certainly pressured by public opinion expressed in the petition. The 92 signatures that included several prominent members of the city showcased the overwhelming popular support for this cause. The combination of the public element of the petition, the extraordinarily high number of signatures, together with the pressure on political mandataries rather than the rhetorical qualities of the petition makes this petition such an excellent example of outside lobbying.

Furthermore, the petition displays a transcendental alliance of different groups in Amsterdam who came together on this intersecting interest. This alliance was forged between Jews and Christians and between wholesale merchants like Servaes aux Brebis and


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<sup>611</sup> NL-HaNA, 3.03.01.01, inv. nr. 3006, fol 105; M. Bodian, *Hebrews of the Portuguese Nation: Conversos and Community in Early Modern Amsterdam* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 90.

<sup>612</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap*, Vol. 1, 246.

smaller merchants such as David Gansepoel.<sup>613</sup> It also connected these merchants with the Amsterdam regents as well as with people that have been seemingly lost to history books such as Daniel van Broeckhuijsen and Cornelis van der Helm. The carriers of the petition drive succeeded in creating an alliance on this particular issue based on the shared interests of the signers.

Figure 4-2: Portrait of Hartman Hartmansz holding a piece of paper as part of Rembrandt's *The Anatomy Lesson of dr. Nicolaes Tulp*, Oil on canvas, 1632 (Mauritshuis).



Source: mauritshuis.nl

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<sup>613</sup> O. Gelderblom, *Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden en de opkomst van de Amsterdamse stapelmarkt (1578-1630)* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2000), 229; Elias, *De vroedschap*, Vol. 1, 466.

#### 4.7. PETITIONING THE PUBLIC SPHERE ON THE ATLANTIC

The next example of a petition that made use of the public sphere is from 29 July 1650. This petition was sent on behalf of the main and lesser investors of the WIC. In contrast to the previous example it was sent directly to the States General and did not limit itself to either one city or even one province. According to the suppliants of the request, the WIC was paying too much on overhead to be a profitable company: excessive taxes, the high salaries for the Board of Directors, and all the other people on the payroll would cause the company to vanish. Thus, the investors felt it was necessary to petition to the States General now, and to ask them to interfere. After all, the investors, who included many widows and orphans, did not invest for personal gain. No, they did so out of ‘sincere diligence for the state, and prosperity of this country’.<sup>614</sup> Moreover, if the WIC would indeed cease to exist, ‘God forbid, thousands of souls, and subjects of your High-Mightinesses, would be ruined and depraved’.<sup>615</sup> Clearly, the petitioners appealed to the commonwealth of the country in an attempt to bridge personal interest of the supplicants to that of the state at large. In order to solve the first problem, the suppliants suggested that the States General could take over the management of the Company.

The second problem identified in the petition was that the trade on the Guinea Coast was neither monopolized by the Company, nor limited to shareholders and directors, but open to all merchants. The petitioners argued that this denied the WIC much income, and was against the charter originally drafted by the States General. The solution for this problem was to grant ‘the undersigned main and lesser investors, as well as others who would like to sign up, to trade to Guinea’ outside the monopoly of the Company.<sup>616</sup> Indeed, here again the petitioners try to show that they were not only in it for themselves, but that they have a larger, common, interest at heart. Of course, this would predominantly benefit

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<sup>614</sup> ‘uit een oprechte ijver voor den staet ende welvaeren deser lande’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 inv. nr. 5762, 29-Jul-1650, petition by the main and lesser investors of the WIC.

<sup>615</sup> ‘de gemelte compagnie in haere middel, ende de functie soodanich is verswackt dat deselve onmachtig is ende geschapen staet geheelijk te verdwijnen, daer door (dat Godt verhoede) veel duijsenden zielen ende onderdanen van u Ho:Mo: souden werden geruineert ende verdorven’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 inv. nr. 5762, 29-Jul-1650, petition by the main and lesser investors of the WIC.

<sup>616</sup> ‘aen de ondergeteijckende hoofd ende minderparticipanten, als oock de geene die hier neffens noch verder souden gelieven te teijckenen, den voors: handel op Guinea voor anderen buijten de gemelte compagnie sijnde gelieven te vergunnen’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 inv. nr. 5762, 29-Jul-1650, petition by the main and lesser investors of the WIC.

the merchants that signed the petition, but at least they attempted to sell it as if it benefited a larger group of people.

Just like the example from Amsterdam in 1645, the way the petition is signed says something about the way it came into being. In the first place, it is clear that the individuals signed with different ink and different quills, indicating that it was not all signed in one place at the same time. Secondly, by identifying different individuals, it becomes clear that the petition travelled to different cities in an attempt to obtain more signatures. In other words, this petition was clearly canvassed. For example, the first person to sign, Cunera van Luchtenburg, lived in The Hague, on the Lange Voorhout 18.<sup>617</sup> As the wife of a lawyer of the Hof van Holland, Daniel la Main, she was frequenting certain circles with considerable political influence. It is thus interesting that she made use of a petition to achieve her political goals. Other identifiable individuals include Anthony de la Porte, a military solicitor based in The Hague, Johan Sixti, secretary for the Hof van Holland and Burgomaster of The Hague, Cornelis Splinter, member of the Town Council in The Hague, and Nicolaes Loockemans, a silversmith in The Hague.<sup>618</sup> All these individuals are at the beginning of the list with signatures. Then the petition travelled to Middelburg in Zeeland, where amongst other people Jacob Scotte, prosecutor (*Advocaat Fiscaal*) in that city and director for the VOC, Bartholomeus van Panhuijs, member of the Admiralty of Zeeland, and Maria Godin, the mother of Bartholomeus, signed the petition.<sup>619</sup> One of the other individuals to sign in Zeeland, Johan van der Marck, remarks with his signature that he signed 'in absence of his wife's mother, Sara de Trinquet, the wife of Malapert', which might point to the fact that there was some time pressure behind signing this petition. Otherwise they could have waited for de Trinquet herself, or maybe her husband to sign the petition. Whatever the reason might have been, the fact that de Trinquet mandated someone else to sign on her behalf indicates that there had been a previous discussion about this petition.

From Zeeland it then travelled to Dordrecht, where Willem Hallingh signed. From Dordrecht it continued to Leiden, where the list of backers included Franciscus de Laet,

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<sup>617</sup> T. Wijsenbeek-Olthuis, ed. *Het Lange Voorhout: monumenten, mensen, en macht* (Zwolle: Waanders Uitgevers, 1998), 260.

<sup>618</sup> J. de Riemer, *Beschryving van 's Graven-hage* (Delft Reinier Boitet, 1730 - Reprint by Van Stockum 1973), 141-154; U. Thieme and F. Becker, *Allgemeines Lexikon der bildenden Künstler: von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart Vol. 23* (Leipzig: Seeman, 1929), 310.

<sup>619</sup> Valentijn, *Oud en nieuw Oost-Indiën*, 308.

Willem van Kerchem, and Jacob van Spreeuwen.<sup>620</sup> The fact that all these individuals from different places are grouped together with other signatures from the same cities and towns indicates that the petition travelled from place to place. After Leiden, it presumably travelled back to The Hague where it was submitted to the States General for consideration. It is not unlikely that La Porte, who as military solicitor was seasoned in presenting petitions to the States General, delivered the petition.

There are two things that are remarkable about the collection of names on the petition. The first thing is the large number of artists, who were responsible for at least ten per cent of the signatures. Van Spreeuwen and Joan Mijtens were painters, and de Laet and J. van Langenhoven were published authors. These artisans might not directly seem like the typical investors, but – on the other hand – if they were good enough they might have had enough cash to spare and have the right contacts. Moreover, it is possible that they acted on behalf of the St. Luke's guild of painters and other artists and that they pooled money together to invest in a Company that took along painters and scholars to document the colonies. Lastly, it is very likely that Franciscus de Laet from Leiden was the son of Johannes de Laet from Leiden, one of the directors in the Amsterdam chamber of WIC permanently representing Leiden. The second remarkable thing about the individuals that signed the petition, is that it is possible to identify multiple individuals that were sympathetic to the Stadtholder family. The aforementioned Langenhoven wrote a book praising the military qualities of the Stadtholder Fredrik Hendrik.<sup>621</sup> Joan Mijtens was a very prominent painter whose work includes portraits of Maria van Orange Nassau, the daughter of Fredrik Hendrik, and William III of Orange Nassau, the husband of Mary II of England. These portraits were made during the Stadtholderless Period (1650-1672). Another link to the family of the Stadtholder comes via Catharina van den Honert. Her husband was Nicolaas Kien, who had a very good relationship with both the Prince of Orange and the French King.<sup>622</sup> Another link is the aforementioned Cunera van Luchtenburg, who owned a house on Lange Voorhout 18, and

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<sup>620</sup> F. van Mieris and D. van Alphen, *Beschryving der Stad Leyden*, Vol. 3, vol. 3 (Leiden: Cornelis Heyligert en Abraham en Jan Honkoop, 1784), 984.

<sup>621</sup> J. van Langenhoven, *Korte beschrijvinge ofte Iovrnael van de op-treckinge des door-luchtigen Prince van Orangiën* ('s-Gravenhage: Henricus en Guilielmus Hondius, 1633).

<sup>622</sup> A.J. van der Aa, *Biografisch Woordenboek* (Haarlem: J.J. van Brederode, 1862), entry for Nicolaas Kien.

Johan Sixti, on number 16, who had close geographical proximity to Willem Frederik van Nassau-Dietz, the Stadtholder of Friesland, who owned the house on number 17.<sup>623</sup>

It can of course also not be ignored that several petitioners, including the first signature, were women. Moreover, in contrast to the aforementioned Remonstrants' petition they did not sign as 'widows' or 'wives' of men. They signed in their own right and thus claimed their own space in the public sphere on this issue of trade to West Africa. Secondly, even though there is a large number of (traceable) Orangists amongst the signatures, the petition stands out because of its diversity. High society mixed with artists and again several individuals that seem to be lost to the history book. Moreover, individuals came together from several cities; from several provinces even. In other words, this petition is an excellent demonstration of transcendental alliances forged by interests despite their apparent diversity.

#### 4.7.1. Other forms of signatures

It is possible to deduce from the way the signatures on the petition came into being to argue that in fact these petitions reflected the personal opinions of individuals that signed. To stress this point further, it is important to contrast the petitions to two other requests that were signed by even more people. These two requests were sent to the Directorate for the equipment of warships (*Directie ter equipering van oorlogsschepen*) during the first Anglo-Dutch war (1652-1654). The first, complaining that the ship, *De Witte Engel*, was unseaworthy and the captain always drunk, was signed by 57 individuals.<sup>624</sup> The second one, dated 15 October 1652, stated that they had suffered great damages in a battle with the English, making their ship, *Maria*, no longer seaworthy. They thus requested another ship to 'defend the fatherland until the last drop of blood in their bodies'. This one was even signed by 92 individuals.<sup>625</sup>

However, in contrast to the petitions discussed before, these requests are signed in a round-robin, rather than a list. This non-hierarchical setting makes it impossible to identify

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
<sup>623</sup> Wijsenbeek-Olthuis, *Het Lange Voorhout*, 250, 258-260.

<sup>624</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.03.02, inv. nr. 4-II, no date.

<sup>625</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.03.02, inv. nr. 5-I, 15-Oct-1652.

the leader.<sup>626</sup> Moreover, the signatures of the request with 92 individuals are all set in the same handwriting, indicating that it was perhaps less voluntary, and that the decision to sign the document was less based on rational argument (see Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4). This presentation form was also the popular choice in early modern Japan when villages presented collective petitions.<sup>627</sup>

Figure 4-3: The 92 signatures in a round-robin supplied on 15-Oct-1652




Source: NL-HaNA, 1.03.02, inv. nr. 5-I, 15-Oct-1652.

<sup>626</sup> N. Frykman et al., "Mutiny and Maritime Radicalism in the Age of Revolution: An Introduction," in *Mutiny and Maritime Radicalism in the Age of Revolution: A Global Survey (International Review of Social History Special Issue 21)*, ed. N. Frykman, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 6.

<sup>627</sup> J.W. White, *Ikki: social conflict and political protest in Early Modern Japan* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1995), See dust jacket and 142-144.

Figure 4-4: A less organized round-robin



Source: NL-HaNA, 1.03.02, inv. nr. 4-II.

#### 4.8. CONCLUSION

The relation between pressure from public opinion and changed policy is often circumstantial or at best anecdotal. The resolutions from the States General seldom reflect on reading pamphlets or hearing news on the street. It does occasionally happen though that a document specifically justifies its relevance by stating that the author was 'being informed through public rumors'.<sup>628</sup> Michiel van Groesen quotes Arnoldus Buchelius who was intimately acquainted with of the political process in 1637 as another example that demonstrates the relation between policy and the public sphere. The documents that circulated in the Republic 'both in manuscript and in print' were read by the political mandataries before they debated on an issue.<sup>629</sup> Moreover, the example of Amsterdam in this

<sup>628</sup> 'Ende vernemende uijt publijcque geruchten (...)', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5759, 17-May-1647 Memory for mr. van Gent [scan 0373].

<sup>629</sup> Groesen, *Amsterdam's Atlantic*, 121.



chapter showcases the possible connection between pressure from public opinion and a change of policy. In other words, public opinion was important to pressure the political mandataries in their decision-making process.

One could argue that the examples of petition drives presented in this chapter are not very significant because the number of signatures remained rather limited, rarely exceeding more than one hundred signatures. To some extent this is indeed true. After all, these petitions do not yet show the numbers of a century later, in 1758, when the representatives of the States General received six petitions with no less than 650 signatures from merchants from several cities in the Republic.<sup>630</sup> Neither do the signatures reach into the thousands like they did in England in 1642. However, the English number was only reached because of an arms race for the number of signatures between competing factions. The signatures were to a large extent acquired by clergymen who pressed their flock into signing a petition. Over and above this, in several parishes in Essex it was considered sufficient to read the petition out loud, pass the petition by acclamation, and to send in a list of the individuals present.<sup>631</sup> The number of signatures was more considered a proof of how well the faction was organized than proof of popular support for a cause. Nevertheless, the number of signatures is a very useful tool for studying collective mobilization or collective action.<sup>632</sup> The canvassing of petitions, or the organization of a petition drive, clearly shows to what extent interest groups succeeded in mobilizing an alliance of individuals.

This study of the process of acquiring signatures on petitions answers Zaret's question whether these signatures did indeed represent public opinion in the affirmative. Putting signatures on a petition before submitting it is *de facto* happening in the public sphere and is as such an expression of public opinion. Moreover, the limited number of signatures increases the likelihood that these individuals signed because they supported the cause instead of being coerced into putting their signature on paper by a minister or another authority. This chapter has also demonstrated that rallying and expressing support through the canvassing of a petition was an extremely useful tool to outside lobby political bodies. The example of the petition requesting a recommendation from the Amsterdam

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<sup>630</sup> Heijer, "A public and private interest," 166.

<sup>631</sup> Fletcher, *English civil war*, 195.

<sup>632</sup> Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*.

Burgomasters and Council for a rescue fleet to Brazil in 1645 showcases the success of outside lobbying in relation to the Dutch Atlantic.

Contrary to what David Zaret has argued, printing was not a necessary step for the transformation of petitions in the Public Sphere; in particular within a city, manuscript petitions were sufficient for a petition drive. A possible explanation for the relative unimportance of print might be the high rate of literacy in the urban centers of the Republic.<sup>633</sup> Printed documents were easier to read than manuscript documents for individuals with less comprehension of alphabetic writing. If printing was not a necessary step for the transformation of the public sphere, something else should be contributed to this. This chapter argued that the process of putting one's signature on a petition is what transformed the public sphere. When comparing the development in the first half of the seventeenth century to the examples of the sixteenth century it becomes clear the process of collecting signatures is what transformed the petitioning process. Collecting signatures displays the awareness of the power of public opinion for the political decision-making process.

The signatures on the group petitions display transcendental alliances in the sense that they transcend traditional borders and categories. The petitioners came together on the issue that united them whether they were a man, a woman, a Christian, a Jew, a merchant, a regent, a peddler, an Orangist, or a State's supporter. Moreover, these alliances could transcend city, and even provincial, boundaries. It was exactly these transcendental alliances that shaped and influenced the Dutch experience in Brazil and the wider Atlantic. The example of petition from 1645 that succeeded in removing the objections of the city of Amsterdam to a rescue fleet for Brazil is in this regard an excellent case in point. It is important not to overstate its influence though as equipping the ships for Brazil would turn out to be laborious process. On 9 October 1645, the Board of Directors read a report from Pieter Bischoep, the Board's agent in The Hague since the news of the revolt had reached the Republic. In a lengthy report he communicated 'that nothing effective has been resolved yet'.<sup>634</sup> As will become clear in the next chapter, it would take almost two more years before a

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<sup>633</sup> Harline, *Pamphlets, printing and political culture*, 59-60.

<sup>634</sup> 'dat noch niets effectivelijck is geresolveert', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 26, fol. 114r.

fleet would be dispatched as details slowed down the decision-making process, and it became intertwined with the peace negotiations in Münster.



## 5. PERSONAL CONNECTIONS AND DIRECT LOBBYING

In February 1647, Pieter Coets, who was claiming 29,750 guilders from the WIC, sued the Company for its subsidies for a rescue fleet to Brazil at the court in Arnhem. The court ruled in his favor and ordered the quarter of Veluwe to instruct their delegates to ‘annul’ their previous decision and to only consent to the subsidy if Coets could be a preferential creditor. This forced the Provincial delegates of Guelders to retract their original consent to the High-Mightinesses and stalled the decision-making process regarding the relief effort for Brazil. On 18 February, the directors from the WIC appealed to the States General to overrule the decision of the Arnhem court and to create a precedent for further claims. The High-Mightinesses sided with the Amsterdam directors and the crisis was – somewhat – averted.<sup>635</sup> When people claiming arrears to the WIC from the colony in Brazil were inventoried in 1663, Pieter Coets still held a claim from the WIC.<sup>636</sup> This example illustrates the inability of Coets to have a judicial sentence executed through interference. Moreover, it showcases how difficult it could be to reach a decision on the details for the relief effort for Brazil. Even though, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, a decision seemed to have been made in 1645 to send a rescue fleet, it would take until late 1647 before the fleet was dispatched.

It did not help that the winter of 1645 was unusually cold and marked the start of the Maunder Minimum.<sup>637</sup> This put the administrative life of the Dutch Republic to a near standstill and slowed down the final process of decision making on the details for a Brazilian rescue fleet. Nevertheless, the WIC and the States General succeeded in commissioning a new government for the colony to relieve Bullestrate, Bas, and van Hamel from their posts. Meanwhile in Brazil, João Fernandes Vieira continued his ‘guerilla warfare’ besieging Recife from the surrounding rural area. This made assistance from the Republic essential.

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<sup>635</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5759, 3-Apr-1647, Letter from the directors Vogelaer and Man that included appendices with resolutions and correspondence [scan: 40-46].

<sup>636</sup> C.J. Wasch, "Braziliaansche pretensiën," *Maandblad van het Genealogisch-heraldiek genootschap "De Nederlandsche Leeuw"* 5, no. 8 (1887).

<sup>637</sup> G. Parker, "Crisis and Catastrophe: The Global Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Reconsidered," *The American Historical Review* 113 (2008). The Maunder Minimum is a significant low number of sun spots per year.

Alexander Bick has argued that Amsterdam was isolated in its opposition to a rescue fleet.<sup>638</sup> But as the previous chapter has argued, the city was actually persuaded quite quickly through the force of public opinion. From then on it was the province of Friesland that acted as the main adversary since their wish to have a chamber in the VOC and WIC became intertwined with the rescue of Brazil.

This chapter investigates how personal connections were important for lobbying and how individuals succeeded in influencing, slowing down, and obstructing the decision-making process. The previous chapters have demonstrated outside lobbying by means of public opinion, this chapter investigates direct lobbying via personal connections. The main source for this is the private diary of Hendrick Haecxs, member of the High Government in Brazil. He was commissioned by the High Government to deliver a report on the situation in the colony in the summer of 1647. Since he was originally a merchant and not experienced in politics, his diary is full of anecdotes that he found noteworthy or interesting. This makes his diary a rich source to study direct lobbying in relation to the WIC. Moreover, it demonstrates very clearly the importance to control or influence information. Haecxs' journal is complemented with the journal of the Frisian Stadtholder, Willem Frederik van Nassau-Dietz, who also concerned himself with Brazilian affairs. Lastly, this chapter relies on the archives of the States General to determine the effects of the lobbying. Before diving into the narrative of Hendrick Haecxs it is important to understand seventeenth-century notions of personal connections.

## 5.1. PERSONAL CONNECTIONS AND SOCIETAL CAPITAL

In 1984, Henk van Nierop wrote that even though historians tend to agree that patronage or clientelism existed in the early modern period 'a useful definition of the concept of patronage is nowhere to be found in the historiography of this period'.<sup>639</sup> Van Nierop defined patronage as an asymmetric relation between two individuals that benefited both parties. It is personal and goal-oriented; the goal is the reason of the relation and the relation itself is not a goal. This often translates into the term *fidélité* that explains the mental component of

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<sup>638</sup> Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 76-77.

<sup>639</sup> Nierop, "Patronage in de Habsburgse Nederlanden," 652.

this relationship which is intimate and enduring. Nevertheless, patronage can exist without the mental component. The patron has (access to) certain scarcities such as a job, money, protection, or food. The client can offer loyalty, service, and often political support in return.<sup>640</sup> Later in the 1980s Sharon Kettering, studying sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France, laid the basis for many of the studies between patronage and politics. She convincingly showed that patron-client relations were a permanent underlying social structure of early modern politics and that patronage is part and parcel of the early modern state. Patron-client relations were neither exclusive, nor permanent and clients could easily change alliances, or they could belong to several networks at the same time.<sup>641</sup>

Luuc Kooijmans made an important contribution to the study of personal relations in the Dutch early modern period in 1997. In his study of 'friendship' he argued that having friendship relations was essential for maintaining one's position in society and 'societal capital'.<sup>642</sup> He borrowed this term from the Dutch sociologist Cees Schmidt who studied the Teding van Berkhout family and made a three-part distinction for this definition. The first distinction is socio-political capital and describes the influence on local, regional, or national politics. The second is socio-economic capital, which corresponds to financial wealth. The third and last is socio-cultural capital, or the status and prestige of an individual.<sup>643</sup> In other words, socio-political capital, or the influence on political decision-making, is connected to the other forms of capital, and are part of this greater whole of societal capital. Moreover, all of these three elements are social in essence. Building and maintaining a network of relations was essential to wield any form of power in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic. The use of the word 'capital' in this context is, incidentally, not anachronistic in the slightest. In the seventeenth century using capital, and in particular credit, was a way of describing these personal relations.<sup>644</sup> Patronage alone thus does not sufficiently describe the social element of political decision-making in the seventeenth century, and societal capital is more appropriate

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<sup>640</sup> Ibid., 653-654.

<sup>641</sup> S. Kettering, "Patronage and Politics during the Fronde," *French Historical Studies* 14, no. 3 (1986): 409-411.

<sup>642</sup> Kooijmans, *Vriendschap*, 14-19.

<sup>643</sup> C. Schmidt, *Om de eer van de familie. Het geslacht Teding van Berkhout 1500-1950* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1986), 9-14. In contrast to Bourdieu's interpretation of social capital, societal capital is less associated with the (re)production of social inequality.

<sup>644</sup> Kooijmans, *Vriendschap*, 18n19.

to describe the complex structure of intimate personal relations that could influence political decision-making.

Sending and receiving gifts was one way of 'attachment' to another person.<sup>645</sup> If the receiver accepted the gift he or she was 'imbonded' (*verobligeren*) to the giver. It was, however, possible to reject or return a gift. Joan Huydecoper (1625-1704), who was a prominent Amsterdam Burgomaster and a director of the VOC for example, once returned a 'joyful monkey' because it had broken a small table and glassware. Moreover, as a father of six he was already 'well provided with talking monkeys'.<sup>646</sup> Huydecoper kept a detailed daily register (*dagregister*) of his visits and societal capital. In 1659, he made a balance sheet of 'gifts received' and 'gifts sent' and he carefully noted people to whom he had a bond relation and people he was unbonded to (*disobligatie*). One of the people on the latter list was Jan Vos (1610-1667), a poet who had 'disgusted' Huydecoper at a concert on 28 August 1659, and had behaved like an 'impertinent beast' less than half a year later.<sup>647</sup> Individuals in this category would be received without food or drink for example, to show them their position.

Despite the examples mentioned above, Geert Janssen rightfully noted in the introduction to his book on patronage at the court of the Frisian Stadtholder Willem Frederik (1613-1664) that in contrast to the French and English cases, early modern Dutch clientelism remains largely unstudied.<sup>648</sup> He attributes this to the view of the Republic as a tolerant, egalitarian, and bourgeois society, that contrasted with the surrounding monarchies. He describes eloquently how the Frisian Stadtholder, like Huydecoper, kept an account book where he managed his social capital. A Stadtholder had the power to appoint certain political positions, such as Burgomasters or provincial deputies. In return, the Stadtholder could later ask for favors; this was part of the imbonded relation. It was not always the case that his clients behaved properly. For example, Willem Frederik noted in his account book: 'N.B. Do not forget that Wydefelt did not thank me, after I appointed Ziercksma based on

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<sup>645</sup> There is a vast body of literature on gift-giving in the Early Modern period. For a thorough introduction, see I.K. Ben-Amos, *The culture of giving: informal support and gift-exchange in early modern England* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). For an overview of literature on gift-giving in relation to Johan Maurits and Brazil, M. Françoze, "Global connections: Johan Maurits of Nassa-Siegen's collection of curiosities," in *The legacy of Dutch Brazil*, ed. M. van Groesen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 105-110.

<sup>646</sup> 'dog redelijck van spreckende apen' was voorzien, Kooijmans, *Vriendschap*, 150.

<sup>647</sup> N. Geerdink, *Dichters en verdiensten: De sociale verankering van het dichterschap van Jan Vos (1610-1667)* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2012), 83-84.

<sup>648</sup> Janssen, *Creaturen van de Macht*, 15.



Wydefelt's recommendation'.<sup>649</sup> The Count suspected that Zierckma considered it revenge to not appoint one of his other friends, Haubois, as provincial deputy. What makes the Frisian Stadtholder further stand out is that he was also an intermediary who brokered between the Holland Stadtholder and his own clients.

That even a bourgeois society had numerous accounts of clientelism becomes further evident from Paul Knevel's book on civil servants in the seventeenth century. Even during the period of 'true freedom' when there was no Stadtholder in the majority of the provinces (1650-1672), there are many examples of the use of societal capital. Knevel, for example, introduces two examples in which Johan de Witt, the famous Grand Pensionary (r. 1653-1672), was approached for a job. The first happened in 1654, when Hieronymus van Beverning expressed his interest in the office of *Thesaurier-Generaal*. De Witt wrote to van Beverning that in order to land him the job De Witt would 'exert all his powers, and employ [societal] credit and friends'.<sup>650</sup> Information on how to employ credit and friends is shown in the second case, in which Johan de Witt three years later advised his father, Jacob (1589-1674), on how to get selected as the *Rekenmeester* of Holland. Jacob would have to inform his close friends of his ambitions, and Johan and Cornelis (the brother of Johan) would instruct their network, both political and social, to vouch for Jacob. Furthermore, it was important that the salutation in letters was done correctly, and Johan 'deemed it also not inexpedient' if Jacob would contact former colleagues from his diplomatic mission to Denmark.<sup>651</sup> Johan also provided his father with a list of names in different cities on who to contact and of family members who could use their own network. Their cousin Fannius would be going on commission to North Holland on behalf of the city of Brielle anyway, so that would certainly not harm their cause. In the city of Schoonhoven, Johan did not know anybody, but he told his father to ask around within the magistracy of Dordrecht (where Jacob was a member of the council) because there surely would be someone who was acquainted, or even connected through marriage, with someone in that city.<sup>652</sup> The potential network for Jacob consisted of family, friends, acquaintances, former colleagues, friends of family, family of friends, and

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<sup>649</sup> 'N.B. Niet te vergeten, dat my Wydefelt niet bedanckt heeft, dat ick op sijn recomandatie Zierckma heb een ampt gegeven', quoted in *ibid.*, 111.

<sup>650</sup> 'alle onse crachten in te spannen, ende alle credit en vrunden te employeren', R. Fruin, ed. *Brieven van Johan de Witt, dl. 1 (1650-1657)* (Amsterdam: 1906), 143; Knevel, *Het Haagse bureau*, 61.

<sup>651</sup> 'ick meyne dat sulx niet ondienstig wesen soude', Fruin, *Brieven van Johan de Witt, dl. 1*, 476.,

<sup>652</sup> *Ibid.*, 477.

even acquaintances of close colleagues – who were probably either family or friends anyway. One has to take into account that family was an elastic concept in this period. Some people even called people that were eight degrees removed still kin, and Johan de Witt certainly had a similar notion of family.<sup>653</sup> On 4 May, a little over two months after the initial correspondence between Johan and his father, the States of Holland voted on the matter and Jacob de Witt became the new *Rekenmeester*.

The last piece of advice that Johan gave his father was to send a letter to Franco Riccen, councilor (*Raadsheer*) of the High Court of Holland and Zeeland, and ask what more was desired – if anything – from Jacob to have the decision go his way.<sup>654</sup> This suggests that a small bribe or a token of appreciation was not uncommon to get the desired result. However, for people in the seventeenth century, there was a sharp contrast between a gift out of appreciation and a bribe to achieve a goal.<sup>655</sup> Similarly, it made Huydecoper angry when he received the request from a cousin in the East Indies to be appointed as extraordinary council of the Indies in exchange for two full years of wages. ‘I must admit that I have never encountered a more annoying, more scandalous case’, Huydecoper responded to his cousin. He should have known better than to imply that his uncle was so poor that he was forced to sell offices and ‘thus tarnish my good name and fame with such a disgusting and disallowed rent-seeking’.<sup>656</sup> The Frisian Stadtholder, however, supposedly spent ‘notable sums’ to acquire the Stadtholderhip of Groningen.<sup>657</sup> Furthermore, his diary shows a more cavalier use of bribes and corruption. During the peace negotiations in Münster, for example, French diplomats allegedly paid up to 16,000 guilders to delay a resolution from the States General. Amsterdam supposedly was ‘not corruptible’, but the French had another 80,000 guilders and ‘wanted to exert all their credit’ to sway the rest of the province of Holland.<sup>658</sup> The

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<sup>653</sup> Adams, *The Familial State*, 77.

<sup>654</sup> Fruin, *Brieven van Johan de Witt*, dl. 1, 479.

<sup>655</sup> Knevel, *Het Haagse bureau*, 162; N. Japikse, "Cornelisch Musch en de corruptie van zijn tijd," *De Gids* 71, no. x (1907): 504-505.

<sup>656</sup> ‘Ick moet bekennen dat mijn noijdt ergerlijcker, noch schandeleuser saeck is voorgekomen’ (...) ‘en gevolgelijck mijn goede naem en faem door soo een vuijl en ongeoorlooft gewin komen te besoedelen’, Kooijmans, *Vriendschap*, 157-158.

<sup>657</sup> Janssen, *Creaturen van de Macht*, 28.

<sup>658</sup> ‘Seide oock dat Vranckrijck geweldich mit gelt hier in 't landt speulde en wel 15 à 16 duysent gulden voor een resolutie gaf, dat hij niet koste weten wat se aen Amsterdam gaven, omdat die niet corruptibel waeren, dat Brasset noch 80 duysent gulden uyt Vranckrijck verwachtete, om hier te

Stadtholder also describes how among Frisian provincial delegates votes were sold for about 6,000 guilders.<sup>659</sup> The acceptability of offering favors, jobs, or votes in exchange for financial compensation was thus not fully uniform in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic.<sup>660</sup>

The use of societal capital and patronage was not limited to bourgeois regents, nor to the nobility, nor to the *ius patronatus* of clerics.<sup>661</sup> Merchants also needed to know how to manage their societal capital in order to distinguish between the 'us' they traded with, and the 'them' they did not trade with. Business transactions relied on trust, and marriage was one strategy to consolidate business relations and to increase trust and profit. The entire family typically relied on the success of the business and merchants therefore tried to limit their risks to avoid jeopardizing the societal and financial capital of their friends, family members, descendants, and creditors. Trust and societal capital are in the literature on merchants referred to as 'reputation' and managing societal capital equaled managing one's reputation.<sup>662</sup> There is further evidence to support that lower classes also knew how to manage their societal capital. The gardener and wet nurse of the aforementioned Huydecoper, for example, also successfully employed their societal capital to obtain favors for themselves or their friends and family; functioning as broker for their clients.<sup>663</sup> Extensive networks of patronage are what D.J. Roorda termed 'factions' in his 1961 dissertation. Factions are created by local (urban) elites and their followers. Their bondedness is based on each individual self-interest. Factions are contrasted with parties which are as large as possible supraregional congregations based on more or less idealistic foundations instead of self-interest.<sup>664</sup>

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distribueren, soodat se nu al haer credijt sullen aenwenden om Hollandt op haer sijde te kriegen', Visser and Plaat, *Gloria parendi*, IV/213.

<sup>659</sup> 'Yijtsma seide mij, dat Jacob Stevens 6000 gulden ahn Zijr Claesen had gepresenteert voor sijn stem', *ibid.*, IV/252.

<sup>660</sup> See also the special issue on Early Modern corruption in the Low Countries between 1400 and 1800 in the *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 2.4 (2005).

<sup>661</sup> Nierop, "Patronage in de Habsburgse Nederlanden," 653.

<sup>662</sup> L. Kooijmans, "Risk and reputation: on the mentality of merchants in the early modern period," in *Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times*, ed. C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (Den Haag: Stichting Hollandse Historische Reeks, 1995).

<sup>663</sup> Kooijmans, *Vriendschap*, 158-160.

<sup>664</sup> Roorda, *Partij en factie*, 2-4.

Although not the focus of this chapter, there is also evidence that suggests that employing societal credit was not limited to males.<sup>665</sup> This suggests that there is broad support the claim that ‘patronage and clientage are so pervasive that proving the existence of patronage relationships in any given early modern social system is often doing no more than proving the obvious’.<sup>666</sup> Though this claim is predominantly based on case studies of monarchical societies, it seems that the Republic was not different in this matter.

How to move forward from the observation that patronage and societal capital were a way of life for early modern people? One solution could be to study patronage in a comparative perspective; how does male or female societal capital differ, or how are the French different from the Dutch. Another question could be: *why* did patronage exist at all? Douglas Allen, an economist, argues that it existed simply because it was the most efficient institution to remove uncertainty in human interaction. In other words, patronage existed because it had the lowest transaction costs when assessing someone’s reputation and could efficiently align the interests of the monarch with the interests of his clients. Only when other, reliable, more efficient, institutions to measure someone’s reliability came up, Allen argues, was patronage largely replaced.<sup>667</sup>

Consequently, patronage and employing societal credit is not ‘proven’ in this chapter. Rather, it is accepted as a reality that everyone, including an organization such as the WIC, needed to live with when they were lobbying. It is, in a sense, an explanatory tool. For example, it explains why the Board of Directors asked the States General’s representatives to employ their societal credit ‘both in their public and their private capacity’ to save the company.<sup>668</sup> It can also explain why the WIC sometimes employed certain individuals. In 1650 the Amsterdam directors wrote to the colony in New Netherland that they employed Francis Deckers as supercargo on board the *Fortuijn*. Deckers was a cousin of Gijsbrecht van der Hoolck, a representative of Utrecht in the meetings of the States General and a prominent

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<sup>665</sup> J.L. Hocking, "Aristocratic women at the late Elizabethan court: politics, patronage, and power" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Adelaide, 2015).

<sup>666</sup> R.G. Asch, "Introduction," in *Princes, patronage, and the nobility: the court at the beginning of the modern age*, ed. R.G. Asch and A.M. Birke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 18.

<sup>667</sup> Allen, *The institutional revolution*.

<sup>668</sup> ‘oock de aenwesende heeren gecommitt[eerd]e van hare ho: mo: versocht met alle goed officien de Intentie van de comp: te seconderen het welcke by hare Ed: aengenomen ys te does met alle middeln redennen ende motiven al omme soo int publicq als in het particulier’, quoted in Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 73.

member of its commission for West Indian affairs. The Amsterdam director thus urged Stuyvesant to appoint Deckers in the North American colony 'for we desire to captivate [van der Hoolck's] favor by all means'.<sup>669</sup>

Three years later, during the first Anglo-Dutch War, the WIC directors in Amsterdam complained that there was no-one in the Amsterdam City Council that could further their interests. At least 'one of the Burgomasters has always been absent as a commissioner here or there', while another was plagued by illness.<sup>670</sup> Considering 'the weakness of the honorable collegiate board', the directors deemed it ill-advised to submit their request at this time.<sup>671</sup> Clearly, the WIC directors deemed their personal connection to the remaining two Burgomasters (Joan van de Poll and Nicolaes Corver) not strong enough to trust them to further the WIC's interests, or, alternatively, the societal capital of van de Poll and Corver in The Hague was not enough to achieve anything meaningful. Either way it underlines the point that personal connections and societal capital were paramount to achieve anything in the political system of the Dutch Republic. Thus patronage and societal capital were a reality that help explain why Brazil was lost and help to understand the world in which early modern lobbyists operated.

## 5.2. APPOINTING A NEW HIGH GOVERNMENT IN BRAZIL

The States General had not only consented to send a rescue mission to Brazil in 1645, they also confirmed a new High Government. This new government would consist of four members and a president. The selection procedure had started on 14 April 1645. The Board of Directors had poached several individuals, but most people did not aspire to an Atlantic adventure or preferred to continue their current position, as was the case with the Burgomaster of Groningen. As president, the WIC was able to select Wolter van Schonenborch, then Groningen's deputy to the States General. The position of president had given rise to a battle of interests, and many individuals were eager to put their clients in a

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<sup>669</sup> C. Gehring, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, vol. XI, New Netherland Document Series (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 93-94.

<sup>670</sup> 'altijt iemandt van derselver regerende burgemeesteren hier ofte daer gecommiteert ende absent sijn geweest', New York State Archives, Albany, NY (US-nar), A1810, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, 11:90 (1) [4 November 1653].

<sup>671</sup> 'het collegie geheel swack sijnde', US-nar, A1810, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, 11:90 (1).

powerful position in Brazil. The name of Jacques Specx, a former high-ranking VOC official and subsequently director in the Amsterdam chamber, circulated, as well as the names of Albert Ruyl, Nanning de Keyser, and Hendrik van der Capellen. Especially the last one is interesting in this regard. He came from a noble Guelders family and his brother and father were investors in the WIC. He was also a trusted adviser of Stadtholder Frederik Hendrik.<sup>672</sup> Nevertheless, the Stadtholder preferred to send Johan Kuin as his client to Brazil.<sup>673</sup> That enabled the Groningen chamber to further its interest through the selection of Wolter van Schonenborch.

On 27 June, one director from the Amsterdam chamber, Carel Loten, further reported to the Board of Directors that two people had promised to accept the function of ordinary member: Michiel van Goch, Pensionary (*Stadspensionaris*) of the city of Flushing, and Simon van Beaumont, secretary (*secretaris*) of Dordrecht. The problem, however, was that ‘these persons are more experienced in government and politics than they were in trade’.<sup>674</sup> After all, with the WIC financial reserves in a continuous state of worry, merchant expertise would not be a bad thing for the government of the colony. Thus, for the two remaining positions they appointed Abraham Trouwers, a director from the Amsterdam chamber, and Hendrick Haecxs.

Haecxs was a nobody. The best way to illustrate that is through the note the States General received to remind them to formally appoint the five new members of the High Government. The note is brief, but introduces the five individuals in their relevant capacity. Wolter van Schonenborgh was ‘former Burgomaster of the city of Groningen and delegate on behalf of the province of Groningen at the meeting of the States General’. Michiel van Goch was ‘*Raadspensionaris* for the city of Flushing’, Simon van Beaumont a ‘lawyer of the WIC’, and Abraham Trouwers was ‘director and delegate to the Company’s general auditor’s office (*Rekenkamer*)’. By contrast, Hendrick Haecxs had no description whatsoever to add societal credit to his persona; he was a nobody.<sup>675</sup> What is known about him is also rather limited. He lived in Amsterdam but was originally German. He had been a private trader in Recife in the

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<sup>672</sup> Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 139-155.

<sup>673</sup> Visser and Plaat, *Gloria parendi*, V/210.

<sup>674</sup> ‘personen meer ervaren in t stuck van regering en polityc, als wel in de coopmanschap’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.07 inv. nr. 12564.17, 27-Jun-1645 “Extract van de vergadering van de Heren XIX”.

<sup>675</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5758, xx-Nov-1645, “Memorie dienende om de commissien haer Hooge Mogende te depecheren voor de heeren...” [scan 176].

late 1630s and early 1640s. The Brazilian historian Gonsalves de Mello characterizes him as an usurer requesting interest rates as high as 42 per cent per year, but also as someone who emancipated his enslaved housekeeper Juliana and her daughter Domingas after eight years of loyal service.<sup>676</sup>

Haecxs had been a guest at the wedding of Joseph Coymans (1621-1677) the Younger and Jacomina Trip (1622-1678) on 29 June 1645. Jacomina was the daughter of the famous merchant Elias Trip (1570-1636) and Joseph was the grandson of the illustrious merchant Baltasar Coymans (1555-1634). Their marriage was just one of the many alliances that the Coymans and Trip families forged in this period. Decades later, Joseph and his brother Balthasar would be involved in the *asiento* for the Spanish slave trade.<sup>677</sup> That Haecxs was attending this wedding demonstrates that he had at least some societal capital through his merchant career, despite never having obtained any public offices before he was appointed to Brazil.

At the wedding Haecxs was approached by Daniel Bernart, who poached him on behalf of Jacob Pergens, a director in the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC, who wanted to know if he would be interested in a membership of the High Government in Brazil. A few days later, on 5 July, Haecxs had a more formal appointment with Carel Loten and two other delegates from the Board of Directors who told him that the Board had unanimously accepted to send Haecxs an invitation. This was strange and surprising to Haecxs as he did not know any of the gentlemen, and they did not know him either. 'Do not worry,' Loten responded rather mysteriously, 'let it be enough that we know you through not knowing you'.<sup>678</sup> Haecxs realized very well that he would be risking his 'entire honor and reputation' when he accepted the position, and thus requested a few days to consider the offer and talk with some friends. Haecxs did accept the position within a day though after receiving positive advice from his friends. When he travelled to Zeeland to meet the rest of the Board of Directors on 19 September the news about the revolt had already broken.<sup>679</sup> The diary does not mention

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<sup>676</sup> Gonsalves de Mello, *Nederlanders in Brazilië*, 156, 191.

<sup>677</sup> The two sisters of Jacomina married a member of the Coymans family: Balthasar Coymans (1589-1657) married Maria Trip (1619-1683); Johannes Coymans (1601-1657) married Sophia Trip (1614-1679).

<sup>678</sup> 'Laetet u genoech wesen, dat wij u niet kennende kennen', l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 149-150.

<sup>679</sup> See chapter 4.

any worry about the state of Brazil until 27 November though, when two more ships arrived bringing an update on the situation. On 12 December, he went to see Wolter Schonenborch because he had heard rumors that Schonenborch was reconsidering his acceptance of the task in Brazil. Schonenborch confirmed to him that, indeed, the day before he had notified the Board of Directors that he was no longer interested in the position. Haecxs wrote to his future colleague van Beaumont that he too was of the opinion that Brazil would be assisted better by 'sending soldiers rather than regents'. When the WIC directors learned about this letter they summoned him, and started providing him with a bribe (*steekpenning*) in order to stop him from discouraging his colleagues. One of the directors further asked him bluntly if he preferred to stay in the Republic or if he would want to go without further conditions, to which Haecxs replied that he was happy that they offered him a way out. This quick response surprised the Board of Directors and they emphasized the bad reputation a refusal would bring him. Haecxs consulted again with some friends, who complimented him on speaking his mind to the WIC, and in the end helped him realize that it would be better for everyone if he would accept the position in the High Government of Brazil.<sup>680</sup> Schonenborch eventually also backtracked on his earlier decision to give up on the position, and all five dispatched for Brazil on 9 May 1646, arriving in Recife on 11 August 1646. The five would quickly transform into a foursome after the untimely death of Abraham Trouwers.

Haecxs was a political nobody without any previous experience in public office. He had some understanding of social conventions in the higher societal arenas. He was well aware of his societal capital and, more importantly, how accepting the task in Brazil could potentially risk his capital and his honor. Even though he had planned to retire from travelling and enjoy his life and friendships in the Republic, the WIC succeeded in convincing him to accept the job. The first challenge for his reputation came after the news arrived in November 1645 that the situation had deteriorated in Brazil. However, by remaining willing to accept the job, he surprised the Directors with his 'courage', which increased his societal capital in the long run.

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<sup>680</sup> l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 150-156.



### 5.3. BACKGROUND ISSUES

That the High Government of Brazil felt that they could not sufficiently trust the directors to advocate the needs of the colony in the Dutch Republic becomes clear from the journal of Hendrick Haecxs. After the High Government was only just able to withstand an attack of about 2,000 soldiers around 3 o'clock at night, the High Government decided to draw straws on 10 August 1647 and to send one of their members to the Republic to lobby for military relief.<sup>681</sup> This individual, Hendrick Haecxs, would 'plainly argue the distress and fear in which the conquest of Brazil was currently finding itself'.<sup>682</sup> Haecxs left Brazil on 3 September to arrive in Zeeland on the evening of 5 November 1647. Haecsx arrived in a country that was politically far from peaceful and facing two main issues that had become intertwined with the rescue for Brazil.

#### 5.3.1. Peace negotiations in Münster

During the first half of the year 1647 the States General had been occupied with peace negotiations with Spain that would eventually culminate in the Treaty of Münster in 1648. The rescue of Brazil had become part of the negotiations on the peace issue between representatives of Holland and Zeeland.<sup>683</sup> In short, Zeeland wanted to continue war with Spain, and spend more money to save the colony. Holland, on the other hand, considered Brazil a failed project, and thought it was a waste to spent money there, preferring a peace with the Spanish crown. The first reason was that merchants from Holland were traditionally more involved in the European trade than Zeeland merchants, meaning that the rank and file of the 'Holland party' could profit from a peace with Spain. Secondly, the Stadtholder derived much power from his position as the leader of the army. A peace with Spain would decrease the necessity of a large army, thus limiting the powerbase of the Stadtholder. The continuous party struggle between Orangists and State-supporters thus played a role in the peace negotiations as well. What further complicated the issue was the province of Friesland that sided with Zeeland, not because of party lines, but because it was only willing to support a rescue of Brazil in exchange for its own chamber in the WIC (this issue will be visited in more detail below).

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<sup>681</sup> Ibid., 218.

<sup>682</sup> Ibid., 188-189.

<sup>683</sup> J.J. Poelhekke, *De vrede van Munster* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1948), 455-457.

When representatives of Zeeland proposed more money and an army for the rescue of Brazil, they received support from the land provinces. This meant that they had a majority in the States General and that in theory this plan could be set in motion. However, Holland was opposed and without the financial support from the province that paid more than half of the budget, it was vain hope to think that they could rally the necessary capital. In order to force Holland to side with the rescue party, Zeeland brought the peace negotiations in Münster to the table. Matters of war and peace required a unanimous decision from all the provinces, and Zeeland was threatening to refuse to sign the peace treaty if Holland did not pay for the rescue of Brazil. This created a standoff on both issues that was solved when Zeeland agreed to a peace with the Spanish crown on 29 July 1647, and Holland to financially support a rescue fleet to Brazil a few days later. All provinces now supported the rescue for Brazil and the Peace of Westphalia – except Friesland.<sup>684</sup> Both decisions were formalized by the States General on 10 August 1647.<sup>685</sup> It can indeed be called ironic that this happened on the same day that the High Government of Brazil decided to send one its members as a representative to lobby for the rescue of Brazil.

### 5.3.2. A Frisian chamber in the WIC

The second issue was the position of the province of Friesland. The province had always wanted to have an independent chamber in the WIC, as well as the VOC. There had been no principal objections to the province obtaining their own WIC chamber at the charter negotiations in 1621, but as the Frisians were unable to raise the required 500,000 guilders to establish the chamber, it had been solely Groningen that had a WIC chamber in the north of the Republic. A second attempt by the Frisians to negotiate their own chamber in 1630 again failed because of insufficient funds. By the time the WIC charter had needed to be renegotiated in 1644 the Frisians decided against this, according to Den Heijer, because of the dire situation of the Company. However, as will become clear from what follows, the Frisians tried to obtain a chamber again in 1647. When the charter of the VOC needed to be

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<sup>684</sup> Tresoar (NL-04-0041-000), 7, inv. nr. 659, "Uittreksels uit de resoluties van de Staten-Generaal betreffende West-Indische zaken".

<sup>685</sup> H. den Heijer, "Het recht van de sterkste in de polder. Politieke en economische strijd tussen Amsterdam en Zeeland over de kwestie Brazilië, 1630-1654," in *Harmonie in Holland: Het poldermodel van 1500 tot nu*, ed. D. Bos, M.A. Ebben, and H. te Velde (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007), 86-87; Hoboken, *Witte de With*, 6-9, 18-24.

renewed, so Frisian investors offered 1,4 million guilders in the Company in exchange for chamber VOC. This was double the nominal value of the shares of the VOC and thus seems a good deal at first sight. However, the shares were at that moment traded at the Amsterdam Exchange for fivefold the nominal value and the Frisians thus wanted something for nothing. The Frisians in the end obtained the right to appoint one of the directors in the VOC chamber of Amsterdam in return for their support. This Frisian episode was part of a greater plan to merge the VOC and WIC into one company for all the oceans. This was a bad deal for the VOC, which, in contrast to the WIC, was quite profitable. The VOC succeeded in buying off the merger plan for 1,5 million guilders.<sup>686</sup>

This, however, did not mean that the Frisians now supported the rescue mission for the WIC. The States General had received a letter from Cornelis Haubois, a Frisian delegate, who relayed the information to them that 'there is no affection for the Brazialian affair, principally because the Province is not included in the charter of the VOC when that expired'. 'Thus, it will not be possible to achieve anything favorable or fruitful for the WIC'.<sup>687</sup> The High-Mightinesses therefore decided to commission three of their own (Hendrik van Eck, Frans Dirksz Meerman, and Roelof van Langen) to Friesland in an attempt to secure the necessary funds. Moreover, they immediately wrote a letter to the Frisian Stadtholder, who was at that moment in The Hague. In the letter, they requested that Willem Frederik 'would go through the trouble' to recommend to the province to 'align itself with the other six provinces'.<sup>688</sup> Or, as the Count noted in his private diary: the States General 'requested that I would go to Friesland to support the West Indian affair'. His diary further provides evidence that beyond the States General several individuals, including Philip Ernst Vegelin van Claerbergen (his secretary) and Cornelis van Beveren (a member of the States General, see also below), also requested this from the Stadtholder in their private capacity. This shows how the States General also relied on the societal capital of their members to move political

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<sup>686</sup> H. den Heijer, "Plannen voor samenvoeging van de VOC en WIC," *Tijdschrift voor Zeegegeschiedenis* 13, no. 2 (1994): 119-120.

<sup>687</sup> 'daer bevinde gans geen genegentheijt wegens de saecke van Brazijl. Ende dat principelijck omdat men de provincie niet heeft ingelaten in het octroij van Oostindien doen het was geexpereert, soo dat ick bij dese gelegentheijt niet en sijt iets vruchtbaerlijckx uut te rechten tot profit van de Westindische Comp:', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5759, 15-Sep-1647 letter from Cornelis Haubois [scan 134-135].

<sup>688</sup> 'ende neffens d'andere ses provincies te willen conformeren' (...) 'oock sijne hoocheijt [...] de moeijte te willen nemen', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5759, 15-Sep-1647 letter to Count Willem van Nassau [scan 327-328].

affairs in the Dutch Republic and that at least one individual had asked Vegelin to function as a power broker for access to the Frisian Stadtholder.

Willem Frederik was not immediately convinced of the mission and showed the letters to Amalia van Solms, the recently widowed mother of the Holland Stadtholder Willem II. The message of the States General did not please her. She did not want Willem Frederik to leave her court and advised against it. Frederik Hendrik thus wrote only to Vegelin that he received the letter 'without anything else'.<sup>689</sup> The three delegates from the States General (Eck, Meerman, and van Langen) meanwhile travelled to Friesland. When the Stadtholder arrived there late September 1647 they approached him and spoke with him, again, on the affairs of the West Indies for two days in a row and how they had not been able to receive an audience. The Frisian Stadtholder considered it some more and brought it up with the agenda committee of the Provincial assembly (*Mindergetal*). This told him 'they did not feel like it'.<sup>690</sup> So Willem Frederik started to mediate between the parties by inviting them both for a meal, which softened the attitude of the *Mindergetal*, and a few days later he was able to note that the three delegates from the States General visited him and were 'jolly'.<sup>691</sup>

Now that the Provincial Diet was considering support for the mission in Brazil, the High-Mightinesses' delegates had some time to work on their relationship with the Stadtholder. Eck was the first to visit the Stadtholder on 5 October 1647. Together they looked at the Count's horses and went for a stroll around the city while discussing international politics and the peace negotiations in Münster. The next day Meerman went for a horse ride around the city with the Stadtholder, who noted that afterwards 'we became good friends'. The two new friends and van Langen met each other over dinner at a local Frisian regent that same evening. Here the Stadtholder and Meerman 'became even better friends'. Van Langen's father and the father of the Frisian Stadtholder (Ernst Casimir van Nassau-Dietz; 1573-1632) had been good friends during their lifetime, 'so therefore [they] also became even better friends'. Subsequently, Meerman and van Langen started, presumably drunk, praising the Stadtholder's reputation and virtue, claiming that he was

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<sup>689</sup> Visser and Plaat, *Gloria parendi*, V/231.

<sup>690</sup> 'daer se geen sinn toe hadden', *ibid.*, V/238-239.

<sup>691</sup> *Ibid.*, V/250-251.

loved all over the world, wishing that Willem II was so upbeat as his Frisian relative. And so, they talked and drank until two in the morning.<sup>692</sup>

The next few days the Frisian Stadtholder received numerous visits from deputies from cities and rural quarters asking his opinion on West Indian affairs. He recommended favorably to all of them and asked other influential Frisian regents too to recommend favorably on the affairs on his behalf. All of them obliged amicably to the request. On 8 October, the Provincial assembly had consented to half of the requested sum in exchange for a Frisian chamber in the WIC. This greatly upset the delegates of the States General. It was primarily the quarter of Oostergo that was blocking further negotiations and forbade its delegates to consent to the money for Brazil. The Stadtholder complained about the situation in his diary and noted about the Frisians that they were ‘a weird people, villainous, tumultuous, stubborn and libelous’.<sup>693</sup> Oostergo’s stubbornness can partly be explained through the resentment and jealousy over who was in the Frisian committee for East Indian affairs; Oostergo was not represented. Willem Frederik sought a solution and presented an ultimatum to the quarter of Oostergo that they either could change their mind, or leave the decision to the discretion of their delegates (who were willing to sign). Now Oostergo requested to propose their supported candidates in two municipalities (*Grietenij*) in return. The Stadtholder simply told them he was not going to consider anyone if they did not consent to pay the money requested by the States General. The Stadtholder noted in his diary that this would be his last attempt and that he did not even care who became mayor (*Grietman*) in the end; ‘I do this in my official capacity to bring peace to the country’ and not because of a personal stake in the matter.<sup>694</sup> This apparently worked as a few days later Willem Frederik went to sign the resolution that consented to pay for the rescue of Brazil on

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<sup>692</sup> ‘Meermans reedt mit mij te peerdt om de wal, en wierden wij goede vrunden. - Dess avonts adt ick bij Sminia en bleef tot twe uir, en wierden Meerman en ick noch beter vrunden. Langens vaeder en mijn vaeder waeren heel goede vrunden geweest, en daerom wierden wij oock noch beter vrunden; hij bedanckte al sijn geluck noch aen mijn heer vaeder saliger. Presen mijn goede renommé en deuchden, seyden dat kost mij noch eens goedt doen bij wijlen en tijden en dat ick bij alle de werelt gelieft wass en bemindt. Men wost niet, hoe het mit S.H. gaen kost, en bij sijn ooverlijden had ick groote kans. Meermans seyde hij wold dat S.H. van mijn humeur wass, en soo prateden wij den geheelen avondt (...); the next morning Willem Frederik noted that he did not have a hangover ‘wass heel niet gealtereert van het drincken’, *ibid.*, V/253.

<sup>693</sup> ‘want het iss hier wonderlijck volck, vylain, veranderlijck, hoofdich en heel quaetspreeckent’.

<sup>694</sup> ‘Ick stelle het voor om bestewil, ick hebber geen insicht in, nae dit sal ick er niet meer in doen; dat ick doe, dat geschiet amptshalven om het landt in ruste te herstellen, dan oft Walta of Sicksma gritman iss, dat iss mij all eens, gelijk oock Scheltinga of Hans Lijckelma’

23 October.<sup>695</sup> For the Frisians the issue of colonial ambitions of course was not completely settled, but Willem Frederik noted in his diary one year later that, based on the report Aernout Gijssels, he was toying with the idea of aligning the Frisian aspirations with either France or Brandenburg.<sup>696</sup>

The gentlemen Eck, Meerman and van Langen had returned to The Hague before this resolution had taken its final shape, but had spoken highly of the actions of Willem Frederik to the other High-Mightinesses. The general assembly promptly drafted a letter for the Frisian Count and thanked him for ‘the good efforts’ the Stadtholder had made to ‘favor the WIC and the rescue of Brazil’.<sup>697</sup> This was all part of the proper political etiquette. This Frisian episode demonstrates perfectly how socio-political capital could be employed for certain political means in an attempt to influence decision-making and also how important it was to properly manage one’s societal capital.

It is somewhat mindboggling that part of the money for the rescue of Brazil had become dependent on whether someone named Scheltinga or Lijckelma was elected *Grietman* of Baarderadeel. This story perfectly underlines how decisions can come down to personal vendettas and jealousy. Here, in *het Landtshuys* in Leeuwarden the Frisian experiences of the adventures in the Atlantic were reduced to whose client obtained a seat in a Frisian rural municipality. There was no ideology, no ‘great design’ or a ‘lawful war against a Catholic enemy’; the WIC conquests in Brazil had been reduced to a faction battle that was fueled by resentment over the loss of a VOC chamber.

#### 5.4. CONTROL OF INFORMATION

The importance of information in from the colony became clear as soon as Haecxs disembarked in Flushing. Not only were the Zeeland WIC directors eager to treat him to a nice meal and hear from him, but also Zeeland privateers that were active of the Brazilian coast tried to meet with him – which Haecxs politely declined. When he travelled to Middelburg the next day, other WIC directors were already waiting for him. The president

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<sup>695</sup> Visser and Plaat, *Gloria parendi*, V/255-262.

<sup>696</sup> ‘lass dat werck van Oostyndiën van Gijssels, ‘twelck tuschen Vranckrijck en Chur-Brandenburch solde geopserveert worden, en hadden geerne de Vriesen dahrbij’, *ibid.*, 6/160.

<sup>697</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5759, 24-Oct-1647, to the Lord count Willem van Nassau [scan 339].

of this WIC chamber, van de Perre, was eager to hear from him, but after a brief description of the current situation in Brazil, Haecxs was forced to tell them that his main mission was to deliver his reports, letters, and writings to the Board of Directors, the States General, and the Stadtholder.<sup>698</sup> These three organizations were important because they were the primary actors that could control or decide on the military support for the colony.

Via Dordrecht and Rotterdam, Haecxs travelled to The Hague, arriving after two days on Sunday 10 November at eleven in the morning. He took residence in the '*Doelen*', where he encountered two deputy directors (*gecommitteerde bewindhebbers*): one from Amsterdam, Ferdinand Schulenborch, and one from Zeeland, Pieter Moorthamer. Haecxs asked if they could call a meeting of the deputy directors so he could deliver his reports. They wasted no time and that same afternoon there was an *ad hoc* meeting where apart from the aforementioned two directors, Nicolaas ten Hove, from the Rotterdam chamber, Harmen Willemsen, from the Enkhuizen chamber, Johan Ruffelaer from Groningen, and the lawyer of the Company, Gijsbert Rudolphi were present. It becomes clear that, no matter where he went, people were eager to meet Haecxs and to hear from him.

After the necessary ceremonies, Haecxs started his exposé on the colony in Brazil. He warned the meeting that the conquests in Brazil would be quickly lost if nothing changed; military support was needed more now than in 1645. The directors were – in the words of Haecxs – 'baffled' by this news. However, when Haecxs asked if he could deliver his reports to this meeting, the lawyer replied that unfortunately this meeting did not have the necessary quorum to legally accept his reports. Thus, Rudolphi suggested that Haecxs would come back the next day.<sup>699</sup> As will become clear from what happened the next days, this *ad hoc* meeting on the Sunday afternoon functioned as a tool for several powerful individuals in the Republic to control the information that Haecxs was bringing from Brazil in order to influence the decision-making process in the Dutch Republic. This emphasizes, that control of information by the WIC did not just occur in the world of news, but was also of paramount importance for the political arena.<sup>700</sup>

When that same Sunday Haecxs returned to his accommodation at the *Doelen*, another individual was waiting for him: Hendrick Thibault, one of the Burgomasters of Middelburg.

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<sup>698</sup> l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 211-213.

<sup>699</sup> Ibid., 214-215.

<sup>700</sup> See chapter 4, and Groesen, *Amsterdam's Atlantic*.

Thibault was one of the most influential regents in the province of Zeeland, being the placeholder for Stadtholder Willem II (r. 1647-1650) in the meetings of the States of Zeeland.<sup>701</sup> He was also an investor in the WIC, involved in Zeeland privateering as a ship owner, and a land speculator.<sup>702</sup> Thibault came to him with a message from three members of the States General. These were Jacob Veth, Rutger Huijgens, and Hendrick van der Capellen.<sup>703</sup> These three gentlemen were closely involved with the WIC on behalf of the States General as members of the committee 'for Brazilian affairs' or 'West Indian affairs', or as representative of the States General in a meeting of Board of Directors.<sup>704</sup>

Thibault communicated to Haecxs that Veth, Huijgens, and van der Capellen asked Haecxs to soften the tone in his report before he would present it to the States General. Apparently, before Haecxs had shown his official report to anyone, the information had filtered up to members of the States General. In fact, these members of the States General were so worried about what they had heard through the unofficial channels that they came to Haecxs with the request of toning down his report. Because of the peace negotiations in Münster, the members of the States General did not want to cause too much pressure on the internal relations of the States General. Veth, Huijgens, and van der Capellen were afraid that worrisome news from Brazil could cause representatives of certain provinces to no longer agree to a lasting peace with Spain.<sup>705</sup>

Because (reliable) information was scarce, being able to control the information was a vital tool to influence the decision-making process. If the situation of Brazil would be worse than (especially) the Province of Holland thought, the province might decide that it was a lost cause and spending money would be a waste. This would not only impact the rescue of Brazil, but could very well have a spill-over in the peace negotiations in Münster. Haecxs

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<sup>701</sup> As the representative of the 'first noble' (Eerste Edele) he was able to appoint the magistracy in Veere and Flushing and was the first to speak in the provincial states of Zeeland.

<sup>702</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 833; Hart, "Autonoom maar kwetsbaar," 55-56.

<sup>703</sup> In his journal Haecxs does not provide a first name for van der Capellen from Overijssel. It is likely that he means Alexander van der Capellen, who was the chair of the special WIC committee in the States General in the month of November 1647. In that case Overijssel is a small mistake and it should be Gelderland. Alexander was preceded by his brother, Hendrik van der Capellen, so in theory it could also be him. See also: J. Jacobs, "De frustratie van Adriaen van der Donck, kolonist in Nieuw-Nederland," *Holland* 31, no. 2 (1999): 84. For Alexander van der Capellen as chair in November 1647, see NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4845, fol 287r.

<sup>704</sup> For special committees see chapter 1.

<sup>705</sup> l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 215.



writes in his journal that 'even though the honorable gentlemen knew and understood that I came here with great worries and plenty of reasons to complain', the three gentlemen succeeded in convincing Haecxs of the importance of toning down his report.<sup>706</sup> When Haecxs proposed a revised report the next morning, the three representatives approved.<sup>707</sup> Unfortunately the original report no longer survives, but the toned-down version already relays how the people in Recife did not dare to leave the fort. The only information that is missing in the new report, but that does percolate through the rest of Haecxs' diary is how close the colony was to being lost, and the report never mentions that a certain number of soldiers was required.

Seeing as his report was now approved for presentation by the members of the States General, Haecxs went on his way to the general meeting that same Monday 11 November. Upon arriving there he was told that the meeting was busy with other important things, so he could not be granted an audience. Instead, he was invited to present his report at the special committee for Brazilian affairs that was having a meeting in one of the two antechambers adjacent to the general meeting hall.<sup>708</sup> Upon entering the room Haecxs saw the familiar faces of van der Capellen (president), Veth, and Huijgens, and the new faces of Cornelis van Beveren from Dordrecht, and Gijsbrecht van der Hoolck from Utrecht – all members of the States General. It is impossible to reconstruct party lines for individuals, but it seems telling that the three High-Mightinesses that Haecxs had already met the day before all came from 'Orangist' provinces, and/or had provable links to the Stadtholders such as van der Capellen (see above). Dordrecht on the other hand was in Holland where the State party was firmly in the saddle. Thus, it should not be ruled out that it was the Orangist party that succeeded in steering the information stream. The representatives from the WIC were also present in this meeting. Unsurprisingly, these were the directors Schulenborch, Moorthamer, Ten Hove, Willemsen, en Ruffelaer. In other words, the official report that the representatives from Dordrecht and Utrecht would receive was perhaps new for them, but every other member in this meeting was well aware that this was a toned-down version that was far from portraying reality. It must thus have been surprising for Haecxs when, after he

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<sup>706</sup> 'Hoewel Haere Ed. wel wisten en alle reets hadden verstaen, dat Ick met groote becommeringe overquam en redenen genoech hadde om te clagen'.

<sup>707</sup> l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 215-221.

<sup>708</sup> Knevel, *Het Haagse bureau*, 13-14.

sat down at the end of the table, the president van der Capellen who had approved Haecxs' report that same morning asked him if he 'had something to present to the gentlemen', and 'what was the actual reason for Haecxs' trans-Atlantic journey'?<sup>709</sup> The present deputies of the States General were asked by the general assembly – van der Capellen could not do enough to emphasize their busy and important affairs once more – to hear from Haecxs. The delegate from the High Government in Brazil started a rough sketch of the miserable conditions in Brazil. Just as he was getting up to steam, a messenger entered the room requesting the presence of the members of the States General in the general assembly. The rest of Haecxs' exposé would have to wait until the next day.

Everybody rose up from their seat, but in the informal standing van der Capellen approached Haecxs with questions. Was he aware of the decision by the High-Mightinesses from the 10 August to honor the WIC's request and send 6,000 men to Brazil? And did he think this would be enough? Haecxs replied that he indeed had learned with great joy of the decision by the States General, but because a journey across the Atlantic lasted roughly twelve weeks, he did not know this when he left. In response to the question whether 6,000 soldiers would be enough, Haecxs replied that even if the States General would be able to raise 6,000 men, and an additional 2,000 sailors, and if this would be combined with 1,750 WIC recruits, it would be questionable if it would be enough to save the colony. He argued that one third of the soldiers would die, desert, get sick, get cripple or be unable to fight in general. Van der Capellen answered that he thought these estimates were a little steep, but he had to leave and asked Haecxs to keep himself available the next day to meet the general assembly of the States General.<sup>710</sup> This is most likely the issue that Haecxs needed to tone down. The States General had previously already consented to 6,000 soldiers, despite Johan Maurits' recommendation of 12,000.<sup>711</sup> Through this informal question by van der Capellen, it seems that the committee had sufficient faith in Haecxs not to compromise the peace negotiations in Münster by mentioning a higher number of soldiers for Brazil. It also appears that Haecxs picked up on the 'subtle hint' of van der Capellen that the committee opined that the proposed soldiers, sailors, and recruits were sufficient to assist Brazil.

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<sup>709</sup> '[Had hij] haere Ho. Mo. ijets aen te dienen', 'Wat [was] doch eijgentlijck d'oorzaecke' van Haecxs' 'overcomste'?

<sup>710</sup> l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 221-222.

<sup>711</sup> Hoboken, *Witte de With*, 37-46.

Later that same evening Haecxs was visited at this accommodation at the *Doelen* once more. The abovementioned deputy directors, together with a director from Amsterdam, Johannes de Laet. Apparently with de Laet the meeting did meet the quorum because they now accepted Haecxs' report and other papers, and requested Haecxs to make an additional three copies to be presented at the States General, the Stadtholder, and the meeting of the Board of Directors.<sup>712</sup>

The next day, Haecxs was expected at the meeting of the High-Mightinesses at nine in the morning, attended by roughly twenty provincial delegates. Haecxs was asked to wait a little while in one of the two antechambers, but was shortly afterwards called into the large meeting hall. Haecxs' arrival was accompanied by a letter of credence from the rest of the High Government urging the High-Mightinesses to listen to him as if he was the entire council.<sup>713</sup> After providing an oral account, he handed in his written reports. The members of the States General asked him several questions assisted with a map of Brazil. The tension rose slightly when Jacob Cats, the Grand Pensionary (*Raadspensionaris*) of Holland, asked why the WIC did not offer more assistance to the High Government in establishing a fort on *Punto das Baleas*. Johannes de Laet responded: 'My lord, you are well familiar with our inabilities'.<sup>714</sup> And that was the end of it.<sup>715</sup> The general meeting then thanked Haecxs and he left. The assembly then briefly deliberated and resolved to put the decision in the hands of the special committee on West Indian affairs.<sup>716</sup>

The first thing that becomes clear from this part of Haecxs' story is that the distance between Brazil and the Dutch Republic made everybody very interested in what he had to say; there was a hunger for first-hand information. Secondly, it shows how the control of this information was essential for influencing the decision-making process in the States General. Even though the decision to send a rescue fleet to Brazil had formally already been taken, the individuals in the special committee on Brazilian affairs were actively trying to manipulate the information that was going to be presented at the general meeting. The committee thus did not just filter the information, but also tried to manipulate it.

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<sup>712</sup> l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 223.

<sup>713</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5759, 12-Nov-1647 letter from the High Government in Brazil [scan 199-200].

<sup>714</sup> 'Mijn Heer, U is ons onvermogen wel bekend'.

<sup>715</sup> l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 223-224.

<sup>716</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4845, fol. 287-287r.

## 5.5. PERSONAL RELATIONS

Because Haecxs was such a nobody and inexperienced in political affairs, his journal is full of little bits and pieces of information on the practice of lobbying that he considered worthy of writing down. At the States General for example, he noted how a clerk put three chairs, with cushions, opposite the president for him and the two WIC directors that introduced him at the general assembly. The president told them to take a seat, and put on their hat. As soon as Haecxs got up to deliver his exposé, the entire meeting ushered him to sit back down and to keep his hat in his hand.<sup>717</sup> This was different at the States of Holland. Haecxs noted, indeed, almost complained, in his journal that he was not offered any chair at the States of Holland, let alone a chair with cushions. Moreover, no-one asked him to put his hat back on. On the other hand, his interlocutors did listen very attentively, and he was back outside within two hours.<sup>718</sup> Combining these two bits of information it seems that it was not uncommon for an oral presentation at the States General to last several hours, and it must have been boisterous and noisy while individuals gave their presentation there or delivered a petition.

After visiting the States of Holland, Haecxs continued his journey to the Stadtholder, Willem II (1626-1650) on 12 November. It is quite exceptional that de Laet and Haecxs received an audience by the Stadtholder in this period. From the diary of the Frisian Stadtholder it becomes clear that Willem II was, possibly due to the recent death of his father, behaving oddly in this period: 'He hardly gives anyone audiences and does not think of prostitutes, games, or hunting. This provides him with neither love, nor [societal] credit, nor glory from the people', according to Willem Frederik.<sup>719</sup> Haecxs writes how the Stadtholder himself came to open the door, and sent his page out of the room when they started talking. They started off by exchanging civilities; Haecxs expressed his condolences about Willem's father, Frederik Hendrik, who had died in March of that year, and Willem remarked how swiftly Haecxs' travel across the Atlantic had been. Only after the exchange of pleasantries, Haecxs brought up the dire situation in Brazil. He provided the Stadtholder

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<sup>717</sup> l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 224.

<sup>718</sup> *Ibid.*, 225.

<sup>719</sup> 'S.H. stelt sich vreemt ahn, doet niet mit fatsoen af, gheeft niemandt haest audiëntie, denck niet als op hoeren, speulen ofte jaeghen, 'twelck hem geen liefde, credijt noch loff gheeft bij het volck', Visser and Plaat, *Gloria parendi*, V/233-234.

with an oral presentation that was an abridged version of what he had told the States General and the States of Holland. In contrast to the States of Holland, Willem II did receive a written report, just like the States General. During all of this both Haecxs and the Stadtholder had not sat down, and all of them keeping their hats in their hands. Haecxs writes in his journal that this limited him in expressing his reverence to the Stadtholder. He tried to overcome this limitation by emphasizing his respect in his spoken words. This sorted the desired effect, as Willem II told him: 'It is reasonable that the company receives support, I promise you that I will exert myself'.<sup>720</sup>

Even though the personal relation here was forged through a broker, Johannes de Laet, the words of Willem II's commitment highlight the intimate personal relation that was established. 'I promise you' emphasizes the personal commitment of the Stadtholder to Haecxs. He did not promise this to the Company or to the people in Brazil, but instead to the individual in front of him. Moreover, the words 'I will exert myself' further underline the personal bond that the Stadtholder created here, promising to contribute his societal capital. Less than one week later the States General wrote to all the Provinces and to each of the chambers of the WIC that they 'took no other state affair as much to heart as the advancement of the relief of Brazil' and therefore had ordered the Admiralties to prepare the required ships.<sup>721</sup>

After his visit to the Stadtholder, Haecxs returned to a meeting of the deputy directors of the WIC. They had studied the details of the report and reached the conclusion that the High Government was complaining a lot. Did they not appreciate the efforts made by the directors? The directors had to leave 'their houses and families for six, eight, even ten weeks at a time', to visit 'the States General and the Stadtholder night and day' in an attempt to rescue Brazil. Haecxs needed 'to believe them, that they were not sitting idly by'.<sup>722</sup> This was not just rhetoric. Johannes de Laet also emphasized in personal correspondence in 1643 that

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<sup>720</sup> 'Het is billick dat de Compagnie in dese extremiteijt haest werde geholpen, Ick beloove U dat Ick het mijne daer toe sal contribuieren', l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 225-226.

<sup>721</sup> 'dat ons over alle andere lantssaecken niet meerder ter herten gaet als de bevordering van het secours van Brazijl', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5759, 17-Nov-1647 letter to all the Provinces; 19-Nov-1647 letter to all the chambers of the WIC [scans 347-350].

<sup>722</sup> 'huijsen en familien dicwils 6, 8, ja 10 weken' moeten verlaten, om 'nacht en dach bij Haere Ho. Mo. en Sijn Hoogheijd' de redding van Brazilië mogelijk te maken. Wilde Haecxs dan niet 'vrijelijck gelooven, dat wij hier ooc niet stille hebben gestaen', l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 226-227.

he had been busy travelling back and forth to The Hague all summer and could 'not promise myself any rest'.<sup>723</sup> At the meeting De Laet asked Haecxs if he had the idea that he could resort more effect at the States General than de deputy directors and Board of Directors. Haecxs avoided answering this question directly by stating that hardly any of the High-Mightinesses had a sense about the reality of Brazil, so Haecxs' expertise was necessary to cure the cancer of the company. After some mutual recriminations about poor quality meat and idleness in exchange for 800 guilders a month, the dispute was settled by some Rhine wine provided by Schulenborch.<sup>724</sup> When Haecxs visited the presiding WIC chamber of Amsterdam a few days later, one of the Amsterdam directors, Isaac van Beeck, also asked if Haecxs 'was of the opinion that his presence and soliciting with the High-Mightinesses could possibly have more effect than the efforts undertaken by the deputy directors?'.<sup>725</sup> The tarnished relation between the directors and Haecxs or the High Government surfaced once more on 16 December when Haecxs paid a third visit to the States General. This time he came to voice concerns on behalf of the soldiers, sailors, and officers that were about to leave for Brazil. Not only were their weapons of poor quality, but they also lacked ammunition. Moreover, despite falling short of the targeted 6,000 soldiers, it was muggy and cramped on the ships and there were insufficient beds. The Board of Directors let Haecxs know that they did not appreciate him telling this to the States General without consulting them, or letting them know first.<sup>726</sup>

The repeatedly expressed frustration about the way Haecxs operated shows first of all that Haecxs and the rest of the High Government of Brazil were in the dark about the *decorum* of lobbying. Furthermore, they were unaware of the unwritten rules and hierarchy within the WIC for making contact with the States General and the Stadtholder. The High Government was supposed to report to the presiding chamber and/or the Board of Directors, who in turn would direct their deputies in The Hague. By sidestepping this procedure, Haecxs clearly annoyed some of the individuals involved; it was a no-confidence motion. And this questioned the reputation and societal credit of the Board of Directors, effectively

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<sup>723</sup> Bick, "Governing the Free Sea," 80.

<sup>724</sup> l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 228-230.

<sup>725</sup> 'vermeijnde dat [sijn] presentie ontrent de solicitatien bij haer Ho. Mo. meer soude connen uijtwercken als alle debvoiren, soo bij d'Hrn. Gecommitteerdens der XIX wierden aengewent', *ibid.*, 241.

<sup>726</sup> *Ibid.*, 251-255.

making that criticism very personal. It also created perhaps a scary precedent that people would start to cross the Atlantic more often to lobby for the Brazilian interests. This happened indeed, as can be seen in the following chapters. With these individuals providing their point of view, it would become more difficult for the Board of Directors to present their narrative and to control the flow of information. Already they complained that the people in the streets were often more in the know about what happened in Brazil than they were.

The question remains whether this was a successful lobby campaign by Haecxs. It is hard to measure because the resolution to send a rescue fleet to Brazil was already passed before Haecxs arrived. Perhaps it should even be considered a failure. After all, despite Haecxs' presence, the States General could only supply 5,700 of the promised 6,000 soldiers, and the WIC only 425 of the intended 1,350 recruits. This was despite the pamphlets that were trying to attract soldiers by describing beaches plentiful of fish, excellent hospitals in case of illness, and the promise that 'ashore and on the beach (...) one could earn a decent penny with very little effort'.<sup>727</sup> It is impossible to assess whether Haecxs had any positive influence on this disappointing result. What can be measured is the effect of Haecxs last visit to the general assembly of the High-Mightinesses when he complained about the abysmal quality of weapons and lodging for the soldiers. The solution by States General was to not pay the supplier. This was good from their perspective, but of course did not help those trying to save the colony. Poor weapons that were not paid for remained poor weapons. The High Government and other inhabitants in Brazil must have considered it useful and effective to send one of themselves to the States General as they did it again in 1652, 1653, 1654, and 1656 – as will be clear from the next two chapters.<sup>728</sup>

Apart from the social norms that become apparent from Haecxs' account, such as holding the hat in your hand and standing or sitting while giving a presentation, the journal reveals another detail about personal direct lobbying. It could be of importance to have a contact person that introduced you. These were Johannes de Laet and Pieter Moorthamer when Haecxs was introduced to the States General, but De Laet also stayed with Haecxs for

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<sup>727</sup> 'int Landt ende aen Strant (...) met weynich arbeyt een goede stuyver te verdienen', Van Alphen 195: Staten-Generaal, *Beneficien voor de Soldaten gaende naer Brasil* ('s-Gravenhage: De weduwe ende erfgename van wijlen Hillebrant Jacobsz van Wouw, 1647).

<sup>728</sup> See also: L. Hulsman, "Brazilian Indians in the Dutch Republic: The remonstrances of Antonio Parapupa to the States General in 1654 and 1656," *Itinerario* 29, no. 1 (2005).

his visit to the Stadtholder. Through the connections made in the WIC, Haecxs was able to 'use' some of the societal capital of the WIC directors.

## 5.6. CONCLUSION

The decision to send a rescue fleet to Brazil was connected to other political issues which limited the bandwidth for lobbying. There were interests that tried to use the fleet to Brazil to obtain favors in other arenas ranging from the peace negotiations in Münster to personal vendettas over jobs or money. This meant that the decision to send a rescue fleet was also created in a delicate equilibrium, which new information from the colony about its worrisome state threatened to upset. Thus, when Hendrick Haecxs arrived in the Republic it was of paramount importance that his story did not shift this fragile balance. This explains why the committee for West Indian affairs and the deputy directors of the WIC jointly labored to have Haecxs tone down his report. If he would have told the general meeting that the planned 6,000 soldiers would not be enough, Holland might backtrack on its consent for the rescue fleet, which could disturb the peace negotiations.

The entire episode surrounding the decision to dispatch a rescue fleet further demonstrated the need of societal capital, and in particular socio-political capital, for direct lobbying in the early modern Republic. Haecxs needed the societal capital of Johannes de Laet to introduce him to the States General, the States of Holland, and the Stadtholder. He added know-how on the proper *decorum* and credibility to the societal nobody of Hendrik Haecxs. To what extent direct lobbying relied on personal relations becomes further apparent through the words of Stadtholder Willem II that emphasized the personal relation between the two men. The States General as a body, as well as their delegates, also relied on societal capital. They politely asked the Frisian Stadtholder Willem Frederik to employ his societal capital for the West Indian affairs in Friesland. The personal relations between the High-Mightinesses' delegates and the Count were further strengthened over social activities such as walking, horse riding, and of course drinking. The delegates returned the favor of the Count's company and hospitality by reporting positively to their colleagues at the States General even though at that time his efforts had not yielded any results. Within Friesland Willem Frederik employed the societal capital through his personal connections by 'recommending favorably' on the Brazilian affair. However, when push came to shove he



employed his power not through his personal means, but through his capacity as Stadtholder, and he made a point about writing this in his diary.

The direct lobbying through personal connections brings to light that, even though lobbying was the main tool for people, a surplus of societal capital could increase one's chances. Societal capital was essential to help obtain access and to request and deliver favors. Patronage structures influenced the decision-making process and showcase that often political decisions were averse to ideology or great plans. In the end, a large share of the people cared more about private goals like becoming *grietman* of a rural municipality in Friesland or obtaining their money than they cared about the great contribution the Brazilian colony was making to the prestige of the Dutch Republic, or how profitable it was for the commonwealth. Direct lobbying by making use of personal connections and societal capital demonstrates how difficult it was, or at least could be, to navigate all these small interests.

Finally, studying the personal connections and accounting for the societal capital demonstrate the importance of humans, human interactions, and social behavior for the reality of political decision-making. The result of these people coming together and lobbying for a rescue mission was that a fleet led by Admiral Witte Cornelisz de With left for Brazil at the end of the year 1647. As such, people *did* make a difference for the course of history.



## 6. THE LAST HOPE, 1652-1654

Hendrick Haecxs returned to Brazil on board the fleet led by Admiral Witte Cornelisz de With, leaving Zeeland on 26 December 1647. Even though Haecxs had labored to have the rescue fleet leave before the winter would set in, it had already been below freezing temperatures in early December.<sup>729</sup> The fleet arrived at Recife on 18 March, and was greeted by a volley. The so dearly longed-for rescue fleet had finally arrived in Brazil, but it soon became clear that Admiral de With and the High Government in Brazil had opposing plans. While the High Government favored an attack over land, de With favored an offensive against the Portuguese in Bahia. The High Government pushed its decision leading to the first battle of Guararapes. Even though the WIC had an army of 4,000-5,000 men against a Luso-Brazilian power of 2,300-3,000, the WIC lost the battle, leaving around 500 souls on the battlefield, and another 500 wounded, while the Luso-Brazilians only reported 80 deaths and 400 injured. The soldiers ran back to Recife shouting that only swift payment of wages could force them back on the battlefield. After this mutiny was settled with some wine and two months' wages, one of the Colonels remarked that 'we live here like animals, and will die like pigs'.<sup>730</sup>

Indeed, many of the WIC soldiers eventually would not return from Brazil alive. The tropical climate, diseases, and of course warfare killed nearly half of the employed soldiers. The scarcity of food supplies further tested the mental and physical limits of the WIC soldiers. The rescue mission of Witte de With was not a huge success.<sup>731</sup> Over the course of the next few years the colony spiraled into an ever deteriorating situation going without food supplies for weeks at the time. The low point for the WIC in Brazil, at least in military terms, happened in February 1649, when the WIC army fought a decisive second battle at the Guararapes Mountains.

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<sup>729</sup> 'het soo sterck begon te vriesen, dat met alle geweld het ijs stucken slaende en breeckende', l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 243.

<sup>730</sup> Quoted in Hoboken, *Witte de With*, 92.

<sup>731</sup> This was in part due to his myriad examples of tactlessness which worsened the relation between him and the High Government. The actions of de With have been documented in much detail previous scholarship, so they will not form the center of this chapter, see: C.R. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá and the struggle for Brazil and Angola 1602-1686* (London: The Athlone Press, 1952), 250-261; Hoboken, *Witte de With*.

This chapter investigates the lobbying through petitions in an attempt to help answer the question why the States General did not succeed in sending a final rescue fleet to Brazil between 1652 and 1654. Moreover, it demonstrates the (im)possibilities of petitions in the Republic.

## 6.1. *THE SECOND BATTLE OF GUARARAPES*

In the days leading up to 19 February 1649 there was little to suggest that the WIC was about to lose a decisive battle to the Portuguese. The minutes of the meeting of the High Government discuss the prison, which was too small to house all Portuguese prisoners, organizing more efficient payment for the soldiers, and the possibility of using defecting enslaved Africans of the Portuguese as spies.<sup>732</sup> Moreover, according to their superiors, the soldiers had returned ‘encouraged by the raid on Bahia’ between December 1648 and January 1649.<sup>733</sup> Nevertheless, the army leadership was aware that their principals in the Republic demanded more success. Their clearly stated aim was to not only safeguard the possessions in Brazil, but also to ‘damage the enemy in order to facilitate peace negotiations’ with the Portuguese.<sup>734</sup> The WIC colony in Brazil was an important bargaining chip in the Portuguese-Dutch diplomatic relations.

In order to further damage the Portuguese, von Schoppe floated the idea of making a move on Rio de Janeiro. This idea was rejected by the High Government, which preferred facing the enemy nearby. Their main argument was that they were confident that additional troops would arrive, allowing an attack on Rio in the future.<sup>735</sup> As such, the decision was made to march 3,510 men on the evening of 17 February, and try to engage the enemy head-on for a second time at the Guararapes Mountains.<sup>736</sup> After the WIC army had found a favorable position on top of the mountains, a Portuguese army of 2,600, led by Francisco Barreto, arrived on the 18th and took positions in the shielded lower areas. As the night fell,

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<sup>732</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 73, 14-Feb-1649; 17-Apr-1649 [scan 240-256].

<sup>733</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 76, 04-Feb-1649 [scan 475].

<sup>734</sup> ‘(...) oock wel succederende den vijandt werdende affbreuck toegebracht, sulcx de vreedehandeling in t vaderlandt sal comen te faciliteren’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.05.01, inv. nr. 76, 04-Feb-1649 [scan 476].

<sup>735</sup> NL-HaNA, , 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 76, 04-Feb-1649 [scan 477].

<sup>736</sup> 3.060 soldiers, 200 indigenous Brazilians, and 250 sailors.

nothing happened. The next morning the WIC troops, led by van den Brinck as von Schoppe's foot wound prohibited the latter to leave Recife, tried to engage the Portuguese troops. The more tactically gifted Barreto only had to wait until the sun would create an unbearable situation for the WIC army. As the WIC retreated towards the sea, Barreto attacked them in the back. Notwithstanding its perceived 'good spirits', the WIC army quickly resorted to a disorganized flight. The tired and sunburned soldiers who remained were killed by the Portuguese. If the Portuguese had not subsequently looted instead of chasing the soldiers who fled to Recife, almost the entire WIC army could have been obliterated. Nevertheless, almost one third of the WIC soldiers did not return from this battle: 957 deaths and 89 captured, and this included more than one hundred officers.<sup>737</sup> Many others were wounded: after the battle, the WIC had only 4,230 soldiers of their original 6,000 left, 385 of which were incapacitated.<sup>738</sup> The fresh widows and orphans who had travelled with their soldier-husbands to Brazil found themselves now stuck there. Without a head of the household bringing in income, they were unable to pay for their journey back home aboard a ship. In an attempt to feed themselves and their children, the widows needed to support themselves in a 'dishonest fashion', as one observer called it euphemistically.<sup>739</sup> Other women were condemned to live a 'godless and scandalous life' by living with men who were not their husbands.<sup>740</sup>

This battle, that was advocated against by the army commanders but pushed forward by the High Government under pressure of their principals in the Republic, forced the WIC into a more defensive policy in Brazil from this point onwards. It did not help the reputation of the High Government that one of its members allegedly immediately after the battle said that 'without this defeat it would have been impossible to supply the others with sufficient food'.<sup>741</sup> The historian Naber questioned the reliability of this statement in a footnote, and van Hoboken also kept some distance. However, this point was reiterated in a letter to the States General in which the High Government wrote that if it had not been for the dead soldiers that no longer consumed food, 'hunger would have driven us in the arms of the

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<sup>737</sup> Van Hoboken, *Witte de With*, 148-150.

<sup>738</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5761, Report on the soldiers in Brazil.

<sup>739</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5761, 07-Aug-1649, Extract from a letter from an officer in Recife.

<sup>740</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 60, 11-Jul-1645 Extract from the court case against Aeltgen Cornelisz.

<sup>741</sup> S.P. l'Honoré Naber, "'t Leven en bedrieff van vice-admiraal de With, zaliger'," *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap Utrecht* 47, no. 1 (1926): 136.

enemy'.<sup>742</sup> There was certainly some truth to this statement. After all, the following years the colony struggled to feed all the inhabitants of Dutch Brazil. Together, they failed to produce sufficient staple foods locally, while the supply of provisions from the Republic was far from reliable, which was partially a consequence of the dwindling faith in the potential of the colony in Brazil. This faith was certainly not strengthened by the circulation of a printed list of the names of all the dead officers.<sup>743</sup>

## 6.2. WHY WAS BRAZIL LOST?

Did the revolt of 1645, or this second battle of Guararapes in 1649 create a path-dependent trajectory culminating in the loss of Brazil? According to the contemporary author Pierre Moreau the loss of Brazil was inescapable. The Dutch owned the less profitable lands in Brazil, while the Portuguese had all the good areas. Furthermore, the Dutch did not have enough infrastructure to provide for their troops (including clothing, food, and ammunition), whereas the Portuguese did. Thus, no matter how much the Dutch would have put into the colony, it was a lost cause from the start. Every added cost would have meant an added loss for the Company.<sup>744</sup> Other contemporaries argued that the WIC was bound to decline because of its heavy spending within the Republic. The many directors, bookkeepers, and servants that the Company employed were an extravagance that prohibited the Company of efficiently and profitably managing a colony.<sup>745</sup>

In more modern historiography everyone agrees that without a revolt from the Portuguese plantation owners the colony would have never been lost. Therefore, explanations that have been offered for the loss of Brazil can be broadly divided in two groups. Firstly, the historians that try to explain the revolt, and secondly the historians that explain the success of the revolt. As a consequence, the historians that try to explain the

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<sup>742</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5761, 31-Aug-1649, Letter from High Council to States General. Hoboken found the same quote in other correspondence, see: Hoboken, *Witte de With*, 151-152.

<sup>743</sup> Knuttel 6465: Anonymous, *Lyste vande hoge ende lage officieren, mitsgaders de gemeene soldaten, dewelcke in Batalie teghens de Portugiesen aen den Bergh van de Guararapes (3 mijl van 't Recif) doot zijn gebleven op den 19 Februarius 1649* (np: np, [1649]).

<sup>744</sup> P. Moreau, *Klare en waarachtige beschryving van de leste Beroerten en Afoal der Portugezen in Brasil. Door J.H. Glazemaker vertaalt* (Amsterdam: Jan Hendriksz en Jan Rieuwertsz, 1652), 88-89.

<sup>745</sup> Klooster, *The Dutch moment*, 84.

revolt, explain the loss of Brazil from a more 'Brazilian-centric' standpoint, while historians explaining the success of the revolt maintain a more 'Euro-centric' view on events.

The reasons for the revolt offered by early twentieth-century Brazilian historiography adhering to a more Romantic tradition of nationalistic scholarship are that the WIC colonial leadership was unsuccessful in winning the hearts and minds of the majority of the people that lived in the colony. The Dutch were a common enemy who united the Portuguese, Indians, Africans, and everyone in between in a strife for Divine Liberty. 'Our side won' from 'the invaders' as Abreu phrased it.<sup>746</sup> The reason the Dutch forts fell to the Luso-Brazilians was thus partly ignorance of the WIC and its inability to establish durable relations with the various Amerindian groups.<sup>747</sup> Moreover, the Dutch were considered too external, creating a unique alliance of the different ethnicities in Brazil. Something resembling a proto-Brazilian identity was allegedly already in place in the seventeenth century. Therefore, the Brazilian problem for the Dutch was the lack of harmony between the Brazilians and the Dutch. Since the Dutch felt superior to the Brazilians it was impossible to create a peaceful and successful colony; the Dutch just used the Brazilians to enrich themselves.<sup>748</sup> This is similar to another, more pragmatic, explanation. The leaders of the revolt allegedly saw the revolt as a solution to the debt they owed to private traders and the WIC. That they owed money is definitely true, and the WIC certainly was aware that it played a role in the incentive to revolt. However, as Wim Klooster has argued, this does not explain why non-elites, who were not indebted to the WIC, supported the revolt.<sup>749</sup> Both the proto-nationalist motivations and the economic reasons for the revolt are not entirely convincing. Thus, it seems that the reason for the popular support for revolt was egged on by the Portuguese King João IV and that the determination of the Luso-Brazilians (whatever their motivation) was primarily responsible for their eventual success.<sup>750</sup>

The Portuguese support, as well as private French and English ships providing the uprising with weapons and ammunitions, partly explain the success of the revolt. However,

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<sup>746</sup> Capistrano de Abreu, *Chapters of Brazil's Colonial History, 1500-1800*, 87.

<sup>747</sup> P.C. Emmer and J. Gommans, *Rijk aan de rand van de wereld* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2012), 219.

<sup>748</sup> Gonsalves de Mello, *Nederlanders in Brazilië*, 242-246.

<sup>749</sup> Klooster, *The Dutch moment*, 77.

<sup>750</sup> C.A.P. Antunes, *Globalisation in the early modern period: The economic relationship between Amsterdam and Lisbon, 1640-1705* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2004), 149; F. Ribeiro da Silva, *Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa. Empires, Merchants and the Atlantic System, 1580-1674* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 330-331.

can the success of the revolt perhaps be explained as a result of disregard by the Dutch? At least since the eighteenth century the Dutch reminisced about their 'neglected' Brazil (*verzuimd*).<sup>751</sup> This implies that if the WIC or the States General had wanted to, they could have saved the colony. According to this view, the explanation for the loss of the colony should thus be sought in European factors. The first European-centric element is the machinations of the Portuguese ambassador Sousa Coutinho in The Hague.<sup>752</sup> These slowed down a quick and decisive action and succeeded in driving a wedge between different stakeholders within the Republic as a peace with Portugal promised a large part of Brazil without incurring any further military expenses on behalf of the Provinces. This point is reiterated by the Brazilian historian Cabral de Mello who agreed on the agency of the Portuguese diplomacy, but specifically pointed out how the First Anglo-Dutch War created the right setting for the Portuguese to apply this pressure.<sup>753</sup> This war with England is the second important European element brought forward to explain the success of the revolt. Because the Dutch were preoccupied with equipping a war fleet in the North Sea to fight the English, there was simply less available capital and fewer ships, sailors, and soldiers to alleviate Brazil. Moreover, the Dutch privateers who had moved their sphere of action to Brazil after the Dunkirker pirates had capitulated in 1646, now switched back to European waters to hunt the English.<sup>754</sup> This meant not only that the Portuguese could more freely ship people and ammunition from Europe to Brazil and that the Portuguese could reap profits from Brazilian sugar that no longer was seized by privateers, but also that the WIC saw their income from privateering reduced.

According to Charles Boxer there is just one player to blame for the inability of the States General to save Brazil: the town of Amsterdam. If Amsterdam had consented to find the money to either block the Tagus river or take Bahia, or perhaps even both, before the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War, the revolt probably would not have succeeded,

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<sup>751</sup> Groesen, *Amsterdam's Atlantic*, 187-188.

<sup>752</sup> E. Prestage, *The diplomatic relations of Portugal with France, England, and Holland from 1640 to 1668* (Watford: Voss & Michael, 1925), 209.

<sup>753</sup> While Amsterdam merchants profited more from the intra-European trade in peace times, Zeeland profited more from privateering enemy ships, see further: E. Cabral de Mello, *De Braziliaanse Affaire. Portugal, de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden en Noord-Oost Brazilië, 1641-1669* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2005 - Originally published in Rio de Janeiro, 1998: *O Negócio do Brasil. Portugal, os Países Baixos e o Nordeste, 1641-1669*), 61-70, 119-121.

<sup>754</sup> Klooster, *The Dutch moment*, 87-88.



Boxer argues. He points out that that none of the other European powers were in the position or condition to assist the Portuguese.<sup>755</sup> To what extent Amsterdam action would have prevented the success of the revolt is of course speculative, but John Elliott and other historians after Boxer nevertheless reiterate the argument that the WIC's failure to obtain sufficient support from the city of Amsterdam led to the downfall of the colony.<sup>756</sup>

Why the city chose not to support an aggressive policy against Portugal is usually ascribed to strong trading interests.<sup>757</sup> While merchants from Amsterdam were dominant in the European trade between the Baltic and the Mediterranean, merchants from Zeeland benefited more from privateering and Atlantic commodities. The province of Holland, supporting its Amsterdam merchants, thus preferred a peaceful relationship with Portugal to facilitate easy European trade, while Zeeland, supporting its privateers as well as its WIC chamber, preferred a more hostile approach. This explanation is, however, not altogether convincing as these two trading routes should not be considered separately. The privateering spoils brought to the Republic, for example sugar, were not just for the Dutch market, but were transported to other parts of Europe. Merchants from the Dutch Republic were carrying 98 per cent of all the sugar transported to the Baltic in the beginning of the seventeenth century.<sup>758</sup> Colonial commodities were just as much part and parcel of European trade as salt, wine, and wheat were.

As has become clear from the historiographical overview above, the inability of the WIC alone cannot explain the success of the revolt. Yet, as the dominant explanation that Amsterdam alone was responsible for the forbearance and acquittal of the rescue fleet in the 1650s is altogether insufficient it is important to consider how lobbyists tried to influence the decision-making in this period.

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<sup>755</sup> France was facing the *fronde*, England the aftermath of the Civil War, and Sweden was licking the German wounds of the Thirty Years' War, see: Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 255-258.

<sup>756</sup> Israel, *De Republiek*, 663-664, 670, 788, 1033-1035; Dillen, *Rijkdom en Regenten*, 157; J.H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716* (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 355.

<sup>757</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 217-219.

<sup>758</sup> J.J.S. van den Tol, "De handel met de vijand: Het economisch belang van smokkel en Spaanse handelsembargo's voor de Republiek in het begin van de zeventiende eeuw," *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 13, no. 1 (2016): 63.

### 6.3. THE DELEGATES FROM BRAZIL

The news of growing tensions between the Dutch Republic and England worried the population in Brazil. In a letter dated 8 July, two days before English parliament officially declared war on the Dutch, the High Government expressed its concerns. On the one hand, because it feared that a possible war with England would weigh heavily on the naval power of the Dutch Republic, pushing the needs of Brazil to the background. And on the other hand, because hostilities in the North Sea and the Channel would limit the possibilities of shipping provisions to colony.<sup>759</sup> This demonstrates that at this point the colonists considered themselves almost completely dependent on European affairs, emphasizing that the political mandarines in the Dutch Republic decided their fate. The High Council had ways of supplying the colony with modest amounts of corn (*'milho'*) from the island Fernando de Noronha and fruit from Itamaraca, but completely relied on support from the Dutch Republic to restore peace in the colony.<sup>760</sup> However, the soldiers were first to be supplied, and the rest of the population only came second. When the latest shipment of corn had spoiled due to seawater and the fruit harvests were lower than ever before due to a two-year lasting drought in Brazil, the people in Recife were excited to see the ship *King David* arrive with provisions from the Dutch Republic. When the population realized that the ship brought nothing but beer, wine, and spirits, an angry mob of women and children headed to the houses of the High Government while weeping and shouting: 'Bread! Bread!'. Upon realizing that it was the regents in the Republic who abandoned them, the civilian population in Brazil thought of a plan.<sup>761</sup>

Through their court of Sheriff and Aldermen (*Schout en Schepenen*) the population submitted a petition to the High Government requesting to send a delegation to the Republic to request assistance.<sup>762</sup> This request had been submitted to the High Government in

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<sup>759</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 67, 8-Jul-1652 Letter from the High Government to the Board of Directors [scan 133].

<sup>760</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 67, 12-Aug-1652 Letter from the High Government to the Board of Directors [scan 196].

<sup>761</sup> 'in grooten getalle aen de huijsen van de regenten sijn gecomen, vrouwen ende kinderen alle schreijende ende roepende "Broot, broot!" ende geen broot connende becomende, roepende weklage over den heeren regenten in het vaderlandt van de welke sich verlaten bevonden', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 67, 13-Jul-1652 Letter from the High Government to the Board of Directors [scan 151].

<sup>762</sup> For information on the lower councils in Brazil in this period, see chapter 1 and 2.

previous years, but had always been denied. This time, the High Government realized that the colony was at the mercy of the decision-making in the Republic and that it would not hurt their cause to add some Brazilian lobbyists to remind the High-Mightinesses and Board of Directors of the Brazilian affair when tensions were rising between England and the Dutch Republic. The mission of the delegates ‘from the two nations of Jews and Christians’ was to demonstrate the miserable state of the colony and that it was no longer an option to balance on the verge of death. The three gentlemen selected to form the “Delegates of Brazil” were Jasper van Heussen, an alderman of Mauritsstad, Jacob Hamel, secretary of the court of sheriff and aldermen, and Abraham de Azevedo, a Jewish merchant in Recife and prominent member of the Jewish community.<sup>763</sup> In later years van Heussen would serve as the director-general for the WIC on the African Gold Coast. Before Hamel had been appointed as secretary of the sheriff and aldermen, he had been a notary in Recife.<sup>764</sup> This means that he had both training and experience in drafting and submitting petitions.

The three delegates left Brazil in August 1652 with a letter of recommendation from the High Government, and arrived in the Dutch Republic on 15 October 1652. It was their task ‘to present the miserable and pitiful state of the country and the people’, and ‘to request the necessities and means that would release this misery’.<sup>765</sup> The members of the High Council furthermore asked that the High-Mightinesses would decide favorably on the requests from the delegates from Brazil. Between 13 December 1652 and the 28 May 1654, the delegates submitted no less than 29 requests to the lofty members of the States General, as can be seen in Table 6-1. There was apparently a very clear hierarchy between the three men, as they always sign their requests in the same order. Even when one of them was not present and not all of them signed they maintain their order. It is interesting to note though that Jasper van Heussen, who held a public office and was the first to sign - indicating that he would be the first in the hierarchy – was never the sole signatory, whereas Jacob Hamel and Abraham

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<sup>763</sup> Unfortunately, not a lot more is known about the three individuals. It is likely that Jacob Hamel is related to Hendrik Hamel, one of the member of the High Council during the tenure of Johan Maurits. Both of the Hamels served in the militia of the city of Recife and Mauritsstad during the 1640s. See the minutes of the High and Secret Council, for example, NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 69, 21-Aug-1641 [scan 305].

<sup>764</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 68, 10-Nov-1640 [scan 1510].

<sup>765</sup> ‘aldaer voor te dragen den miserabilen ende jammerlijcke toestant van dese landen ende volckeren ende voorts uwe Ho:Mo: te versoecken de gerequireerde secoursen ende middelen waervoor eenmael uijt dese miserie mochten verlost werden’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5763 15-Oct-1652 Letter from the High Government to the States General.

de Azevedo do seem to have been trusted to submit requests by themselves ‘on behalf of all the delegates of Brazil’.

Table 6-1: Requests sent to the States General by the delegates of Brazil 1652-1654

	Suppliant 1	Suppliant 2	Suppliant 3
<b>1652</b>			
13-dec	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
18-dec	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
<b>1653</b>			
17-jan	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
4-feb	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
27-feb	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
1-mar	Hamel		
6-mar	Azevedo		
19-mar	Azevedo		
21-mar	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
3-apr	van Heussen	Azevedo	
14-apr	Hamel		
21-apr	Hamel	Azevedo	
13-may	van Heussen		
14-may	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
28-may	Hamel	Azevedo	
21-jun	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
3-jul	Azevedo		
24-jul	Hamel	Azevedo	
31-jul	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
23-oct	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
3-dec	Hamel		
<b>1654</b>			
26-jan	Hamel	Azevedo	
12-feb	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
20-feb	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
27-feb	van Heussen	Hamel	Azevedo
21-mrt	Hamel	Azevedo	
5-may	van Heussen	Azevedo	
5-may	van Heussen	Azevedo	
28-may	Hamel		

Source: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5763-5764.

A lobbying campaign of this scale would obviously be costly and neither the delegates themselves nor the High Government in Brazil had the means to pay for such a mission. The

High Government could (and did) request the Board of Directors to offer practical assistance to the Delegates on their mission, but nothing more. The solution from the people in Recife was to organize a voluntary collection. Everybody donated as much as they could miss to support the delegates during their mission in the Republic.<sup>766</sup> Not just the three delegates devoted themselves to the cause, but all inhabitants voluntarily ‘invested’ in the mission. This demonstrates to what extent this particular lobbying campaign was a form of colonial popular participation in political decision-making in the metropole. Moreover, this participation transcended the more traditional and conflictual forms of popular participation such as protest in the streets. Instead, Jews and Christians came together in an attempt to influence the political centers through lobbying.

#### 6.4. REQUESTING A RESOLUTION FROM THE STATES GENERAL

No requests have survived from the period between the arrival of the delegates on 15 October 1652 and their first petition from 13 December that same year. However, it should be noted that the archives for these months are particularly patchy. Nevertheless, their first petition already mentions their gratitude towards the High-Mightinesses for the States General’s intention to dispatch a rescue fleet. What worried the delegates, though, were the rumors ‘that are increasing by the day’ that the Republic was about to enter a treaty with the Portuguese Crown dividing the captaincies in Brazil. Some of these lands originally belonged to the WIC, the delegates argued, and therefore they proposed detailed plans for what would happen to the different possessions in those areas.<sup>767</sup> A few days later, on 18 December, they wrote to the States General again. The reason the delegates sought contact was that they had received a letter from Gilles Venant, a former WIC commander on the island Fernando de Noronha in Brazil who wrote from Hamburg.<sup>768</sup> He wrote that ‘some Jews and recently arrived Portuguese’ were making plans to liberate Brazil from the Dutch.

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<sup>766</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 67, 12-Aug-1652 Letter from the High Government to the Board of Directors [scan 198-199].

<sup>767</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5763, 13-Dec-1652 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

<sup>768</sup> Venant had also petitioned the High Government 1645 requesting assistance in the plantation of Indigo in Brazil, see NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 60, 1-Mar-1645 Request by Gilles Venant [scan 151-158]. For its success, see also: J. Nieuhof, *Gedenkweerdige Brasiliaense zee- en lant-reize* (Amsterdam: De weduwe van Jacob van Meurs, 1682), 204.

The conspirators had asked him to join in, and to provide them with detailed information about the situation in Brazil. Venant was willing to function as a spy, but wanted a decision from the delegates, who in their turn wanted a decision from the States General.<sup>769</sup> It seems perhaps a bit odd that his offer to function as a spy would be directed to the delegates from Brazil rather than directly to the *Heeren XIX* or the States General. However, it did help the delegates by providing them with an excuse to send a new request to the High-Mightinesses. In the last paragraph, the delegates remind the States General of the still pending decision from the assembly of a rescue fleet to Brazil despite their good intentions. Moreover, the delegates hoped that a report that there were plans by (European) Portuguese to attack Dutch Brazil could potentially speed up the decision-making process and increase the size of the rescue fleet.

In their next request, on 17 January 1653, the delegates used a similar tactic. They formally requested the States General to make a decision. They repeated the argument that was already present in the writings of the High Government that even a decision not to save Brazil would be better than to remain in uncertainty. They complained that, despite their efforts for the past three months, nothing had happened. They proceeded to invoke the sense of responsibility of the High-Mightinesses and used *pathos* to convince the States General to reach a decision: 'Please, consider the foreboding doom and utmost extremities in which the loyal souls and their women and children have found themselves'.<sup>770</sup> This quote highlights the way the delegates considered their role in the events; it was not their fault as they had 'found themselves' in this situation. Even though it was not their fault, their trials were extreme nonetheless. It was thus responsibility of the High-Mightinesses to provide assistance for the colony as their 'negligence or delay' could lead to 'inconvenience and doom for the Fatherland'.<sup>771</sup> In a similar way, the delegates also tried to appeal to what they called the 'fatherliness' of the States General: 'we pray you again so very humble, and beg

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<sup>769</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5763 18-Dec-1652 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

<sup>770</sup> 'Overweecht doch de uiterste periculen ende extremiteijten daerinne althans die getrouwe zielen ende haere ende onse vrouwen ende kinderen sijn geraeckt', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 17-Jan-1653 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

<sup>771</sup> 'de onheijlen ende inconvenienten die ons lieve Vaderlandt door nalaticheijt ofte dilajj souden kunnen overkomen', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 17-Jan-1653 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

your High-Mightinesses, to consider your fatherliness'.<sup>772</sup> This further underlines the rhetorical strategy of the delegates to emphasize the dependency relation between the colony and the Republic. Just like a father needed to provide for his child, the States General needed to provide for its colony. Economic arguments are completely absent from this petition. Instead, the request mentions 'merciful eyes' of the High-Mightinesses that can see the 'many thousand loyal subjects' which they hope would lead to 'compassion'.<sup>773</sup> Now that the colony was no longer providing any real economic value to the Republic and the Company, the delegates realized they needed *pathos* arguments to appeal to the 'fatherly' responsibilities of the States General. This highlighted the dependency relation of the colony and emphasized its inability to take care of itself.

Even after this request, and another request by the delegates of Brazil on 4 February to send a deputation on behalf of the States General to the non-paying province of Friesland, it took the High and Mightinesses until 17 February to reach a decision.<sup>774</sup> Apart from an extraordinary subsidy of 310,000 guilders, the States General also ordered six larger and two smaller war ships. The way the Republic was set up meant that the task of equipping war ships was divided over five different Admiralties, located in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Harlingen, Middelburg, and Noorderkwartier (Hoorn and Enkhuizen). The ships for Brazil were divided according to bearing power of each of the Admiralties. Amsterdam was assigned to pay for two larger and one smaller ship for example. Normally, building, equipping, and maintaining ships by the Admiralties would be paid from the *convooien* (a fee paid per ship for convoys to protect them from privateers) and *licenten* (a fee that allowed merchants to conduct trade). However, in times of war the States General could decide on an extra subsidy that was earmarked for building ships.<sup>775</sup> This extraordinary subsidy was not paid from the normal income from *convooien* and *licenten*, but all the individual provinces needed to contribute to their local Admiralty according to a specific distribution code.

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<sup>772</sup> 'omme nogmaels in alle ootmoedicheijt te bidden ende smeecken, uwe Ho:Mo: gelieven eenmael vaderlijck te overwegen', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 17-Jan-1653 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

<sup>773</sup> 'haer barmhertige oogten te slaen over sooveel duijssenden getrouwe onderdanen van man, vrouwen, kinderen, weduwen, wesen, ende van den Brasiliaense natie, medelijden met deselve te hebben', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 17-Jan-1653 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

<sup>774</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 4-Feb-1653 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

<sup>775</sup> P. Brandon, "Masters of War. State, capital, and military enterprise in the Dutch cycle of accumulation (1600-1795)" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 2013), 57-61.

Table 6-2: Subsidies for Brazil by the States General

Year	Subsidies	Aim	Paid in 1651	Not Paid in 1651	% Unpaid
1645	f 700,000.00	General subsidy	f 700,000.00		0%
1646	f 700,000.00	General subsidy	f 700,000.00		0%
1647	f 700,000.00	General subsidy	f 700,000.00		0%
1647	f 886,584.00	6.000 army men	f 756,924.44	f 129,659.56	15%
1647	f 600,000.00	12 ships Brazil fleet	f 381,337.36	f 218,662.64	36%
1647	f 77,320.00	Weapons for the 6.000 army men	f 64,464.12	f 12,855.88	17%
1647	f 764,708.38	Three years of sailors and ships		f 764,708.38	100%
1647	f 3,028,612.38	TOTAL 1647	f 1,902,725.92	f 1,125,886.46	37%
1648	f 700,000.00	General subsidy	f 700,000.00		0%
1648	f 700,000.00	Particular subsidy	f 648,178.53	f 51,821.47	7%
1648	f 1,400,000.00	TOTAL 1648	f 1,348,178.53	f 51,821.47	4%
1649	f 1,200,000.00	Occupation of Brazil and 1 year of army costs	f 1,200,000.00		0%
1650	f 787,012.00	Buying provisions and 1 year of army costs (2,800 soldiers)	f 300,000.00	f 487,012.00	62%
1651	f 787,012.00	General subsidy		f 787,012.00	100%
1651	f 1,200,000.00	Particular subsidy for second rescue fleet		f 1,200,000.00	100%
1645-1651	f 9,802,636.38	Brazil and WIC	f 6,150,904.45	f 3,651,731.93	37%

Source: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02 inv. nr. 5763, 12-Dec-1651, *State of payments*.

The decision to make the provinces responsible for providing the money was, considering the recent past, a dangerous move from the States General. This can, for example, be seen in the case of the army of 6,000 men sent to Brazil after the lobbying done by Hendrick Haecxs in 1647.<sup>776</sup> The special committee on WIC affairs drafted a memorandum dealing with the question why these soldiers still had not been paid in 1652. The committee concluded that in principle the WIC was responsible for paying the soldiers. However, the Board of Directors never received the promised extraordinary subsidies from the provinces to pay for the soldiers. Despite ‘the years and years of soliciting’ by the WIC directors, some of the provinces still did not pay for their share of the distribution code.<sup>777</sup> It is therefore not surprising that the States of Holland wrote that ‘they are willing to promptly come up with their quota, provided that the other provinces are pleased to do the same’ when they learned

<sup>776</sup> See chapter 5.

<sup>777</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, xx-xx-1652 (after May 1652).



who were paying for the extra ships commissioned to the Admiralties.<sup>778</sup> At this moment, Holland still had to pay 43,500 guilders, and Friesland had paid nothing of their share of 86,160 guilders. Based on the yearly accounts for both provinces it becomes clear that they chose not to pay rather than that they were unable to. Not all years have survived with similar completeness, but for example in 1651 Holland had a positive balance of more than 800,000 guilders, and Friesland almost 75,000.<sup>779</sup> Of course it is important to take into account that the provinces probably had more debts than just their subsidies to the WIC, and that these funds were also needed to pay for budget deficits in prior years.

The decision of the States General to fit out six ships and two yachts marked the next phase of the activities by the delegates of Brazil. Over the next months they were primarily busy attempting to speed up the process of equipping the ships. This can be seen in Table 6-1 as it became less regular for all of the delegates would be in The Hague to present their requests to the High and Mightinesses together because one or more of them would be away to lobby the Admiralties or meetings of one of the provinces.

## 6.5. A DELEGATION TO FRIESLAND

Now that the States General had resolved to order the ships for the rescue of Brazil the delegates took it upon themselves to streamline the process of equipping the ships. From the resolutions of the States General it becomes apparent that throughout January and February 1653 there was a constant 'buzz' on the state of Brazil. Not only the delegates from Brazil were lobbying the High-Mightinesses, representatives of the army were also regularly present to seek payments of arrears, and there were several individuals that saw military career opportunities in the new mission.<sup>780</sup> One week, however, there was an almost

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<sup>778</sup> 'Zij bereijst sijn der selver quote daer inne promptelijck te doen sumeren, versoeckende dat d'andere provintien van gelijcken gelieven te doen', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 30-Feb-1653 missive from the Holland deputies.

<sup>779</sup> C. Trompetter, *Gewestelijke financiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, Deel VI: Friesland*, vol. 106, RGP Kleine Serie (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2007), 69-70; R. Liesker and W. Fritschy, *Gewestelijke financiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, Deel IV: Holland*, vol. 100, RGP Kleine Serie (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2004), 154.

<sup>780</sup> One of these was Boetius Schaeff, see: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 18-Feb-1653 Request from Boetius Schaeff.

deafening silence on the Brazilian affairs in the meeting hall of the States General. Between Monday 27 January and Sunday 2 February only two issues related to the WIC were discussed in the General Assembly.

What can explain such an anomaly? It seems that the president of the meeting, in that week Hans van Wijckel, was unreceptive to affairs related to the WIC. It should come as no surprise that van Wijckel represented Friesland, in particular the quarter of Oostergo, at the meeting of the States General.<sup>781</sup> The deputy directors of the WIC in The Hague would sometimes remark in their notes that a particular president was unwilling to receive them and that they would have to wait for a later moment.<sup>782</sup> In other words, the previous weeks when Frederik van Reede tot Renswoude (Holland) or Jacob Veth (Zealand) had been president, or the following weeks when Willem Ripperda (Overijssel) or Johan Schulenborgh (Groningen) presided over the meeting, the delegation of Friesland merely refused to consent to decisions relating to the WIC until they would receive their own WIC chamber. However, when the Frisian delegation provided the president for the States General it seems that they actively tried to obstruct discussing matters relating to the Atlantic.

The following week, during the chairmanship of Ripperda, the delegates from Brazil thus expressed their concerns that the province of Friesland would not provide the necessary funds. Therefore, the delegates wrote to the States General that they were happy to learn that the High-Mightinesses had decided to comply with the delegates' request from 4 February to send a delegation to the meeting of the Provincial States of Friesland. As detailed in Chapter 5 the States General had done so in 1647 and afterwards had sent special envoys on West Indian affairs to Friesland in 1649, 1651, and 1652.<sup>783</sup> If Friesland maintained its refusal to pay for the WIC, the delegates were worried that it would lead to a delay in the rigging of the ships. This, they argued, would mean a loss of conquests in Brazil and great sorrow for the 'many thousand souls and loyal subjects' of the States General.<sup>784</sup> Again the delegates thus appealed to the States General by using a *pathos* argument, emphasizing the dependency on

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<sup>781</sup> See *Repertorium van Ambtsdragers* via <http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/repertoriumambtsdragersambtenaren1428-1861/app/personen/4635> consulted on 8 June 2017.

<sup>782</sup> For example: NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 3, fol 54r.

<sup>783</sup> See NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 9412, Collected reports of the deputations to Friesland.

<sup>784</sup> 'tot groote droefheijt ende mogelijk totale ruine ende verlies van die waerdige conquesten en sooveel duijsenden rampsaelige sielen, getrouwe onderdanen van uwe Ho:Mo:', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 4-Feb-1653 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

the States General and Dutch decision-making for the colonists. The High-Mightinesses sent Johan Schulenborgh, Godert Adriaan van Reede tot Amerongen, en Willem Linteloo to Friesland.<sup>785</sup> The delegates further offered their services to accompany the delegation requesting the Frisian Diet 'to take pity on' the colonists in Brazil. This part of the request was not immediately granted, but the delegates would eventually, on 20 February, receive their recommendation letter from the States General.<sup>786</sup> A week later the delegates expressed their gratitude and received a positive response to their additional petition to the States General to ask the Frisian Stadtholder to lobby for the Brazilian affair as 'the interest of his Excellency would have great effect'.<sup>787</sup> It must have been well-known to the delegates how successful the Count's efforts had been in 1647 and having the Stadtholder and his societal capital on their side could just give them the small advantage they would need.

With the three gentlemen of the States General ready for a mission, a recommendation letter for the Brazilian Delegates, and the High-Mightiness's letter to the Frisian Stadtholder it seemed that the lobby team for the Frisian Diet was at full strength and well on time before the Diet would close again. The delegates heard worrisome rumors though. Willem van Linteloo had still not arrived in The Hague to depart for Friesland and it was uncertain if he would be travelling on his own to Friesland straight from his residence in Gelderland. Time was of the essence, so the delegates requested the States General to create a provision that the two other gentlemen would be given the necessary credentials to lobby on behalf of all three. The High-Mightinesses granted this request and two days later, on 3 March, the apologies for not arriving in The Hague from Linteloo were indeed received by the States General. The apologies were accepted.<sup>788</sup> This small episode demonstrates to what extent the three Brazilian delegates were in touch with the political news in the Republic and how they were attempting to speed up the process. Their main concern at this point was to remove any obstacles that could slow down the rescue fleet for Brazil. The delegates had just successfully won two days for the Frisian lobby campaign by requesting a resolution before the official letter with Linteloo's apologies arrived.

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<sup>785</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 49r.

<sup>786</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 53r.

<sup>787</sup> 'opdat door sijn Excellentie interessie het versoeck wegens die ellendige ende uitgemergelde gemeente van Brasil beeter tot effect mach gebracht worden', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 27-Feb-1653 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

<sup>788</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 53v-54r.

### 6.5.1. The report from the Friesland commission

Before the apologies from Linteloo arrived, the gentlemen van Reede and Schulenborgh had already departed for Friesland via Haarlem and Amsterdam on 2 March. In their report, the two gentlemen remarked how eager the WIC directors in Amsterdam were to help them to get to Friesland offering their ship to sail across the *Zuiderzee*. Upon arrival in Leeuwarden, they learned that the Frisian Diet would continue for at least a few more days, but that the meeting of the Groningen provincial assembly would quickly come to a close. They therefore decided to travel to Groningen first. Instead of addressing the issues in Brazil, they started with discussing the war with England, urging the province to pay its share. The meeting thanked the two gentlemen for all they had done and resolved to take a decision the next day that would firstly be good for God's church, and secondly for the commonwealth. The Frisian mission had thus also been tasked with discussing the naval war with England with the Groningen province. That is not to say that these two issues were necessarily intertwined. The issue of Brazil was not discussed in Groningen.

On 9 March van Reede and Schulenborgh received a letter from the High-Mightinesses to also pay a visit to the Frisian Admiralty so they left to go to the city of Harlingen. Their route from Groningen to Harlingen went through Leeuwarden, and 'upon passing through Leeuwarden, we decided to give our regards to the Stadholder of Friesland'.<sup>789</sup> In this short and *ad hoc* meeting with the Stadholder they excused themselves for not yet having provided the States General's recommendation letters regarding the affairs of Brazil. Their apology indicates that the Stadholder had already wanted to advocate for the Brazilian case, but that this was postponed in absence of this letter. They promised Willem Frederik to provide the recommendation after their return from Harlingen. They did 'as much as is possible' at the Admiralty Board, but because none of its members (except for one who was in bed sick) were there they quickly returned to Leeuwarden. As they found the meeting of the Provincial States already in session and the issue of Brazil not on the agenda, they decided to pay the Stadholder an extra visit and deliver him the recommendation from the States General. The Stadholder thanked them multiple times for the honor shown to him in this

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<sup>789</sup> 'door Leeuwarden passerende hebbende wij goetgevonden sijn Excellentie Graef Willem, Stadhouder van Vrieslant te gaen salueren', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 15-Apr-1653 Report from van Reede and Schulenborgh.

missive and promised them to promote the cause of Brazil with his office and personal effort, expressing his regret that it had not been more effective up till now. The next day they were received by the Frisian Diet.

At this meeting, they presented the letter from the High Mightinesses, arguing that despite all the good reasons presented to them, the States of Friesland still had not paid for the rescue of Brazil. This was why they came for the fifth time now to present their cause.<sup>790</sup> They started by repeating the arguments the Frisian had heard the previous times. Firstly, it would be unfair to the investors if the WIC was not saved by the Republic, despite the investors counting on this, and having promised this to the investors in the past. The renewal of the charter had signaled the High-Mightinesses' commitment to the WIC. Secondly, thanks to the good work that the WIC had done in harming the possessions of the Spanish king in the past, the Republic had a moral obligation to aid the WIC in this time of need. The delegation of the States General thus did not copy the arguments of the Brazilian delegates. Instead, they urged the Frisian Diet to align itself with the other six provinces to show gratitude to the WIC for its past efforts. Without the WIC there would not have been a peace with the Spanish crown, they argued. The fate of the many thousands of poor souls in Brazil that had been mentioned in the appeals to the States General did not translate to the arguments of the commission. If the Frisians would have to take pity on anyone, according to the States General, it should be the poor investors that ran the risk of losing it all if the colony would be lost. To conclude they presented the Frisian convention with three options: 1. Leave the colony despite all the blood spilled and efforts undertaken by the subjects of the Dutch Republic; 2. Negotiate a peace with the king of Portugal and end up with a smaller colony; 3. Beating the Portuguese ('which is about time') and restore the colony to its former glory.<sup>791</sup> After having presented this letter and a second letter about paying for the ships for the war against England, van Reede and Schulenborgh continued to orally advocate the significance and interest of Brazil.

After a long debate the members of the Provincial State returned to the two gentlemen and told them that there was more interest in the war against England than in saving Brazil amongst the Mightinesses of Friesland. That is, unless there would be an extra directorate's

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<sup>790</sup> After 1647, 1649, 1651, and 1652.

<sup>791</sup> 'twelck meer als tijt is', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 15-Apr-1653 Report from van Reede and Schulenborgh.

chamber for the WIC in Friesland and the lay-out of the board of the Company would be drastically revised. Subsequently, the secretary of the Provincial meeting handed them an excerpt of the resolution of the Provincial States. In the resolution van Reede and Schulenborgh could read that the Mightinesses of Friesland were of the opinion that the representatives of the States General came with an insufficient mandate and margin to negotiate with the States of Friesland. However, they would gladly receive a new delegation that would be sufficiently mandated. As the Diet would come to a close the next day the two gentlemen did not pursue the issue any further. Before returning to The Hague, the two gentlemen paid one last visit to Stadholder Willem Frederik, who once more emphasized how sorry he was about the entire situation.<sup>792</sup>

The lobbying mission to Friesland in 1653 arrived in full strength. The States General sent a delegation that included a prominent nobleman in the person of van Reede, goodwill from a northern province through Schulenborgh (who was from Groningen), and the authority of the Republic's only Duchy through Linteloo, who was represented through the other two. The lobby further included both the office and the personal efforts of the Frisian Stadtholder. The majority of the other provinces did not have a Stadtholder in this period, but the (political) power of the Frisian Stadtholder remained as strong as ever in the early 1650s. Even though he had stated at the outbreak of the first Anglo-Dutch war that 'one can see clearly that merchants are not good politicians', saving the WIC colony in Brazil was important for international politics.<sup>793</sup> The Brazilian delegates left no trace of their visit to Friesland, but it is apparent from the resolution of the Frisian Diet on 12 March<sup>794</sup> that their efforts had little to no effect for the Diet remained of the opinion that in exchange for support the province needed its own WIC chamber. Does that mean that the rescue mission for Brazil failed here '*op t Landtshuijs*' in Leeuwarden on 12 March? No, as the share of Friesland was relatively modest in comparison to the total of the other six provinces together, their refusal to consent to the subsidies for the WIC was not necessarily detrimental. Their efforts demonstrated that the Brazilian delegates had tried to sway Friesland, but there was no way to persuade that province. By reconfirming the Frisian refusal to pay, this issue did not need

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<sup>792</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 15-Apr-1653 Report from van Reede and Schulenborgh.

<sup>793</sup> Janssen, *Creaturen van de Macht*, 198-199.

<sup>794</sup> The resolution is dated 2 March in the 'old style' calendar. The individuals signing the resolution were Scheltema and Bouricius for Oostergoo, van Haren and Gerrits for Westergoo, Scheltinga and van Aerssen for Zevenwolden, and Simonides and Intiema for the cities.

to be debated any further. There was, however, another issue that the delegates needed to solve. Abraham de Azevedo had remained behind in Holland and noticed that the Amsterdam admiralty was slacking in fitting out its share of the ships. In absence of his colleagues, Azevedo had started petitioning the States General on 6 March to urge the admiralties to deliver the necessary ships. This marked the second stage of the delegates' attempts of removing obstacles for the Brazilian rescue fleet and to speed up the process.

## 6.6. *SPEEDING UP THE ADMIRALTIES*

The delegates had submitted a request to the Admiralty of Amsterdam on 4 March to act in accordance with the resolution of the States General to prepare two larger and one smaller war ship for the rescue of Brazil. The Admiralty had responded that this touched upon what they had written to the States General on 25 February. Thus, according to the Admiralty Board, the suppliants would have to address themselves to the States General rather than the Admiralty. Thus, Abraham de Azevedo drafted a request to express his 'great distress' and to request the High-Mightiness on 6 March to instruct the Admiralty of Amsterdam 'to rig out the two ships and a yacht quickly and without postponement'.<sup>795</sup> The lofty members looked at the request, discussed it briefly, and then responded that they deemed that they had already urged the Amsterdam Admiralty to equip the ships, so that no further action was required. They changed their minds one week later though, and then resolved to urge all of the Admiralties to start preparing the ships.<sup>796</sup>

However, less than one week later, on 19 March, the delegates of Brazil returned to the States General with a new request. Even though the High-Mightinesses had sent new letters urging the Admiralties to equip the ships, the delegates felt they needed to complain about the slow progress of the ship building. The Admiralty of Amsterdam was no longer alone in postponing the rigging of the ships, but was now accompanied by the Admiralty of Rotterdam. The letter from 13 March requesting the Brazilian ships had been one of eight letters the States General sent to the Rotterdam Admiralty that day. Since this missive did

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<sup>795</sup> 'omme op t spoedichst sonder uitstel de voors: twee schepen en een jacht metten aenckeren van dien toe te', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 6-Mar-1653 Request from the Delegates of Brazil.

<sup>796</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 54r-54v.

not contain a direct response to the Admiralty's latest letter on the matter they decided not to do anything with the letter of the High-Mightinesses.<sup>797</sup> It was thus thanks to the Brazilian delegates that the Admiralty's argument that they had no suitable ships arrived in The Hague. Again, the delegates took on the role of streamliners of the decision-making process in the Republic.

That did not mean, however, that the issue now had been solved as the delegates presented themselves again on 3 April to the States General claiming that not all that much had changed. Time and time again the High-Mightinesses obliged to their requests and sent letters to the different Admiralties urging them to equip the ships. Because the delegates streamlined communications between the different bodies in the Republic, the number and frequency of letters the Admiralties received from The Hague increased. First the Admiralty Board of Rotterdam complained in their minutes that they 'received one order after the other from the States General' and that it was 'one thing now, and something else the next time'.<sup>798</sup> The Admiralty of Amsterdam also made it clear that they did not appreciate the many letters the States General sent them.<sup>799</sup> In informal conversations, the Rotterdam Board further made it clear to the delegates that 'even if the States General wrote one-hundred letters' they would get the same response.<sup>800</sup> Both the Amsterdam and Rotterdam Admiralty repeated that the main problem at this point was finding the necessary funds for purchasing and equipping the ships.<sup>801</sup> Moreover, ships were scarce as many were employed for privateering during the war with England.<sup>802</sup> The Brazilian delegates realized that their requests to the States General to send letters to the different Admiralty Boards were not getting them any further. Their appeals for 'fatherly care' had not lost its effectiveness, as the States General

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<sup>797</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.46, Admiraliteitscolleges, inv. nr. 148, *Resolutions of the Meuse Admiralty 1653*, fol. 111v.

<sup>798</sup> 'De wijle men bevind dat men hier daglicx ordre op ordre van haer Ho:Mo: becompt, nu tottet een, dan tottet ander te versorgen, van t gene aen dit collegie behoorende, den dienste van den lande vereijsse', NL-HaNA, 1.01.46, inv. nr. 148, fol. 115v.

<sup>799</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 58v.

<sup>800</sup> 'Al quamen er hondert brieven van u Ho:Mo:', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 29-Nov-1653  
Request from the delegates from Brazil.

<sup>801</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.46, inv. nr. 148, fol. 115v-116r.

<sup>802</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 58v.



were very willing to send one letter after the other.<sup>803</sup> The delegates, in other words, needed a new strategy to try and convince the Admiralties to follow their instructions.

The next time the delegates petitioned the States General they therefore requested that the High-Mightinesses would commission some of their own to the Admiralties. The Admiralty of Amsterdam still refused to build the ships. The delegates suggested to have the gentlemen Halewijn Halewijns and Matthias Schooff 'recommend in the most serious manner possible' the affairs of Brazil.<sup>804</sup> These two gentlemen were the States' deputies on sea affairs in Holland and thus had experience in the dealing with the Amsterdam Admiralty. Again, the States General responded positively to this request and to instruct the two gentlemen to 'push and advance the rigging of the ships by al means'.<sup>805</sup>

A week later, on 21 April, the delegates had news from the Admiralty of Rotterdam. There, the delegates had insisted that there should be no further delay in the rigging of the ships. The Admiralty of Rotterdam replied that it had no ships that were suitable for Brazil, but that it was planning on buying the ship *Sphera Mundi* from Marinus de Clerq. However, this still did not please the delegates. They considered the *Sphera Mundi*, a flute ship, unsuitable for Brazil. Therefore, they asked the States General to order the Admiralty of Rotterdam to buy a frigate, such as the one Joris Brest in Rotterdam had. The delegates further reported more news from Amsterdam. The local Admiralty was still postponing the rigging of their ships. Therefore, the delegates requested again that the States General would use its representatives at the Admiralty Board, all the more because there was again news from Portugal that a fleet was ready to sail to Brazil.<sup>806</sup> Upon hearing this request, the States General also decided to dispatch two deputies to the Rotterdam Admiralty: Johan van der Meijden and Nicolaes Verbolth.<sup>807</sup>

Van der Meijden, a former Burgomaster of Rotterdam, and Verbolth operated vigorously and decisively. They bought a ship from Adriaen Joosten for 8,000 guilders and

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<sup>803</sup> 'haer voorgemelte trouwe onderdanen haer barmhartige ooge soodanich over te slaen van door vaderlijcke goede voorsorge', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 3-Apr-1653 Request from the delegates from Brazil.

<sup>804</sup> 'op het serieuste doenlijck te recommanderen', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 14-Apr-1653 Request from the delegates from Brazil.

<sup>805</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 59v-60r.

<sup>806</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764 21-Apr-1653 Request from the delegates from Brazil.

<sup>807</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 61v.

ordered the Rotterdam Admiralty to equip the ship for Brazil.<sup>808</sup> Joosten was the master shipwright (*meester scheepstimmerman*) of the Admiralty, so it seems unlikely that the Admiralty would have had no option of contacting him for this ship. Admittedly, the ship was not immediately ready for departure and needed some work on the inside to prepare it for crew and captain. However, after months of dragging its feet the Admiralty now finally had started working on a ship. This small episode demonstrates that the States General acknowledged that they needed a new strategy to make the Admiralties act as requested. The letters had clearly not resulted in the required outcome, but the actions of deputies van der Meijden and Verbolth were achieving something. However, this was just one ship, and the Admiralty was responsible for two.

The delegates of Brazil stayed out of touch with the High-Mightinesses for a while after these requests. However, they clearly kept a finger on the pulse of what was going on in the Republic and visited the different Admiralties.<sup>809</sup> The delegates had joined forces with two WIC directors during their visit to the Amsterdam Admiralty. In their description of the situation in Brazil, the delegates emphasized the hardship and bad conditions for the ‘good subjects’ in Brazil. Thus, ‘in the name and on behalf of all the miserable souls’ they requested the Amsterdam Admiralty to equip their share of the ships.<sup>810</sup> They used the same main arguments as they had used in Friesland, but they did not appeal to any fatherliness of the Admiralty Board towards the colony in Brazil like they had done to the States General. Instead, they tried to guilt trip the Board members by telling them that ‘we cannot believe that it would be agreeable to you that the colony would be lost due to your delays’.<sup>811</sup> The delegates told the Amsterdam Admiralty that all the other Admiralties were delivering their share for the Brazilian ships, they had ‘no doubts’ that within fourteen days the other ships would be ready. The delegates appealed to the possible fear of the Admiralty of receiving the blame of the colony would be lost. Instead of emphasizing possible advantages for the Admiralty, the delegates choose a strategy of appealing to fear of receiving the blame.

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<sup>808</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 63r-v.

<sup>809</sup> Though, no evidence from the archives of the Admiralties indicates their presence there.

<sup>810</sup> ‘Ende inde naem ende van wegen die ellendige zielen te versoucken, bidden ende smeecken’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 14-May-1653 Request from the delegates from Brazil.

<sup>811</sup> ‘niet connen geloven dat u E:Mo: aengenaem soude sijn dat door dileij veroorsaect zoude connen werden het verlies van soo voortreffelijcke conquesten’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 14-May-1653 Request from the delegates from Brazil.

The Admiralty Board responded that it was difficult for them as they were still lacking ships and money to meet the demand. Therefore, they sought to write to the High-Mightinesses with a plan to solve this predicament. They were willing, if the States General agreed to this, to find the ships amongst the 100 ships under the command of Admiral Tromp who was fighting the English. After all, the WIC directors deserved 'to finally see effect of their lengthy solicitations'.<sup>812</sup> It seemed that after all this time there was finally momentum for the Brazilian affair. The Admiralty Board now pushed the issue, and forced the States General to make a choice. They needed to either prioritize the war with England, or to prioritize the fleet for Brazil. Moreover, it was also a smart solution for the financial problem of equipping a fleet for Brazil. All the provinces had consented to pay for a fleet against the English, so that had made money available to build or buy ships – even Friesland paid their share.

The delegates took it upon themselves to deliver the missive from the Amsterdam Admiralty and attached all these document to their petition to the States General as they realized the momentum of the Amsterdam Admiralty moving towards their requests. They requested the States General to quickly respond to the missive of the Admiralty so that they could return with an answer 'this same night'. They added though that they would understand if the States General did not mean to obtain the ships from the Tromp fleet as it could threaten the security of the country. The minutes of the States General show unusual long notes on the deliberation. The High-Mightinesses followed the lead of the Amsterdam Admiralty and resolved that at the earliest convenience the Admiralty Board should equip two ships and a yacht and bring them under the flag of Admiral Tromp. 'And then, when they have arrived there, and not a moment earlier, the Admiralty shall eagerly recall these ships and bring them under the command of the fleet destined for Brazil'.<sup>813</sup>

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<sup>812</sup> 'ten eijnde de meer gemelte bewindhebbern door haer langdurige sollicitatien dienaengaende gedaen eenmael tot het effect van hun versouck mogen geraecken', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 14-May-1653 Request from the delegates from Brazil.

<sup>813</sup> 'ten spoedichsten willen equiperen twee schepen ende een jacht van oorloge ende de selve in allerijle sende nonder de vlagge van de gemelte Lt: Adm: Tromp. Ende soo wanneer die aldaer sullen wesen gearriveert ende eerder niet, sal t meergemelte collegie die gerne van daer mogen revoceren die onder de gem: vlote jegenwoordige dienst doende ende mede destineert zijn nae Brazil om also aen de reijse derwaerts te vorderen met en nevens die van de andere collegien ter Admiraliteit daertoe mede gestedineert', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 65r-v.

It was a political solution for a financial problem. Friesland would come up short for their share in the rescue fleet, but they – as well as the other provinces – had consented to pay for a fleet for the war with England. These earmarked funds would now be used to equip ships for the fleet against England. Technically this adhered to the instructions for the way the money was to be spent. However, they found a loophole by circumventing the instructions *after* it had arrived at the fleet of Tromp. The Admiralty was only inclined to do so, after they were confronted by the risk of receiving the blame for losing Brazil. This detail shines a new light on the connection between the loss of Brazil and the first Anglo-Dutch War. Instead of being distractive, the war with England actually provided an opportunity for the Dutch Republic to find additional funds to equip a rescue fleet for Brazil. When one month later the Admiralty had prepared the ships for the cost of 75,000 guilders they requested again the formal instructions from the States General to recall the ships after they had arrived at the fleet of Tromp. In their correspondence, they particularly mentioned that they wanted to avoid being accused of neglect in the future. This demonstrates how effective this particular argument of the delegates had been.<sup>814</sup> The province of Groningen meanwhile reported that it would grant an extraordinary subsidy for the Admiralty of Harlingen in order to avoid this Admiralty also missing the funds for the Brazilian fleet.<sup>815</sup>

It seemed that the chance of success was increasing for the Brazilian delegates. The States General had consented to support the Brazilian colony, and had tirelessly labored in writing and through delegations to try and force the different bodies in the Republic to align themselves for this cause. The province of Friesland was not convinced and refused to pay any more money for the WIC unless it would receive its own chamber. The Admiralty of Zeeland had never made a problem of supplying the ships, and now that the Admiralty of Harlingen received a special subsidy from the province of Groningen and that the Admiralty of Amsterdam was aligning itself with the cause of Brazil, it seemed like not much could go wrong for the lobbying efforts of the Brazilian delegates in the Dutch Republic. In the colony, though, sizeable groups of people had starting leaving in February. The slaves on the island of Fernando de Noronha, realizing that Brazil was being abandoned, had started a revolt attempting to kill all the men and children and enslaving the women. The army in

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<sup>814</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 14-Jun-1653 Missive from the Amsterdam Admiralty.

<sup>815</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 68v.

Pernambuco was also feared by the population. Since the soldiers had been malnourished for a long time and were behind on their pay, the civilians feared that they might also take matters into their own hands soon. The delegates realized very well that their lobbying might be a nuisance for the States General: 'it has been a sorrow oftentimes that (as commissioners) we have been forced to trouble your High-Mightinesses in their important affairs so many times'. They thus very humbly requested the States General to agree to a resolution that would avoid further lengthy correspondence to the different admiralties and that would result in the expedient preparation of the ships for Brazil.<sup>816</sup>

### 6.7. SEIZING MOMENTUM

The ship of Adriaen Joosten that had been bought for the Rotterdam Admiralty needed much internal work to prepare it for its purpose. The Rotterdam Admiralty wrote the States General that it requested additional funds to do this. The response of the High-Mightinesses is telling as they delegated a decision to one of its special committees: that of sea affairs. This committee was in charge of the naval administration and, in that capacity, was coordinating the fleet preparation for the first Anglo-Dutch war. The States General were thus hoping that again funds that were earmarked for the war against England could be somehow re-appropriated for the war in Brazil. The Rotterdam Admiralty was not exaggerating when it wrote that it did not have the funds to prepare the ships. Indeed, the coffers of the Admiralty were nearly empty. Its minutes show that its debts were increasing and its payments often delayed. Its solvency was so 'suspicious' that it had 'no clue how to obtain sufficient credit for a decent price'.<sup>817</sup>

The Admiralty of Noorderkwartier had not received much attention from the Brazilian delegates until July 1653. Since its share in the total ships was modest in comparison to that of Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Zeeland, the delegates had focused their attention on the main suppliers first. On 8 July, the delegates orally requested the States General to send a

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<sup>816</sup> 'Dat ons meenichmael leet is geweest dat wij (commissarishalven) soo veel maelen genootsaecht waeren u Ho:Mo: in haer swaerwichtige besoignes te importuneren', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 21-Jun-1653 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

<sup>817</sup> 'in zulcx verdacht gemaect dat men voorteaen geen raet en weet, om ons credijt tot behoerlijcke prijs te becomen', NL-HaNA, 1.01.46, inv. nr. 148, fol. 115v-116r.

letter encouraging the Admiralty to finalize equipping its ships. The High-Mightinesses obliged.<sup>818</sup> This did not immediately result much effect, so on 17 July the delegates reported to the States General again. They did so because Noorderkwartier had sent its own deputies to the States General, and the Brazilian delegates wanted to remind the High-Mightinesses of the worrisome state of Brazil, and to counterbalance the Noorderkwartier deputation. The Brazilian delegates wrote that not only had the Admiralty of Noorderkwartier not yet started equipping its war ship, it had also ‘made some difficulties’ about doing it all.<sup>819</sup> The States General sided with the Brazilian delegates and commissioned a delegation to visit the Admiralty and to urge it to equip their share of the Brazilian fleet.<sup>820</sup> The commission consisted of again Godert van Reede tot Amerongen, and another man named de Schele. Once more it becomes apparent how the pro-active lobbying by the Brazilian delegates succeeded in countering the Admiralty’s protests before they were even addressed to the States General, and how the States General again consented to send a commission to lobby an Admiralty.

In Rotterdam meanwhile, the Brazilian delegates learned that the ship was ready and the delegates could hardly hide their excitement about this when they communicated this to the States General. The captain of the ship moreover, was working hard to prepare for departure as soon as possible. The obstacle, though, was that he could not get the money to hire sailors and crews. He had petitioned the Admiralty, but as had become apparent above, it had neither cash nor credit to assist him. The Brazilian delegates thus assisted him in turning to the States General for financial assistance, thus smoothing the process of decision-making.<sup>821</sup> The States General responded positively and consented to find the required money to hire his crew.<sup>822</sup> This did not mean however, that the share of the Rotterdam Admiralty in the Brazilian fleet was completely ready for departure. For one, the sailors did not have any muskets yet. This issue was only solved more than two months later when the States of Zeeland promised to equip this ship with muskets.<sup>823</sup> Secondly, the second ship the Admiralty needed to provide was still not ready.

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<sup>818</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 71v-72r.

<sup>819</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 17-Jul-1653 Request from the delegates from Brazil.

<sup>820</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 72v.

<sup>821</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 24-Jul-1653 Request from the delegates from Brazil.

<sup>822</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 73v.

<sup>823</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 78r.

Things continued to move slowly, and the delegates continued to function as special messengers between the States General and other bodies in the Dutch Republic in an attempt to smooth the process. In September, though, still no real advancements had been made. The Board of Directors of the WIC thus expressed its disappointment to the States General that from the promised six larger and two smaller ships, only one – from the Admiralty of Zeeland – was ready.<sup>824</sup> The WIC directors in Amsterdam further requested a recommendation to go to Friesland, which they received.<sup>825</sup> The States General sent a letter to the Diet of Friesland, announcing that representatives of the WIC would be visiting them to talk about the possibilities of a Frisian chamber, and in the meeting of the Board of Directors detailed plans for an eighth chamber were drawn up. However, on two occasions, the States General received a letter in which the Frisian Diet related that they received the announcement of a WIC mission going to Friesland, but that – unfortunately – the Diet was coming to a close soon. Therefore, it could not be discussed until the next meeting. In other words, a trip to Friesland would be fruitless and a waste of resources and time.<sup>826</sup>

## 6.8. *PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE*

Despite all of this, the delegates must have felt that things were moving in the right direction and that a fleet for Brazil would be dispatched soon because they brought new issues to the Board of Directors and the States General. Abraham de Azevedo, on behalf of seven other Jewish merchants, requested a better position for the Jewish nation in Brazil in a meeting with the Board of Directors.<sup>827</sup> The Jewish nation requested ‘the same advantages as the Dutch nation for shop keeping, trade, crafts, and all other means to sustain oneself’ as a reward for their loyalty as Dutch subjects.<sup>828</sup> In traditional fashion the Board of Directors

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<sup>824</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, xx-Nov-1653 Copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors of the WIC.

<sup>825</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 74r.

<sup>826</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, xx-Oct-1653; NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 74v.

<sup>827</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, xx-Nov-1653 Copy minutes Board of Directors.

<sup>828</sup> ‘dat de voorsz: joodse natie in brasil sal genieten deselve voordelen ende beneficien van winckelen, neringen, ambachten, hantwercken, negotien, ende alle andere middelen omme haer onderhout aldaer te becoomen ende gereputeert als alle andere ingesetenen ende inwoonderen van de Nederlandsche natie ten eijnde sij tegens alle ongelegentheden versekert ende niet voor gesepareert mogen gehouden worden’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, xx-Nov-1653 Copy minutes Board of Directors.

postponed a decision until a yet to be defined moment in the future. The same rhetoric of favors being granted in reward for loyalty can be seen in a petition from the Board of Aldermen of Recife and Mauritsstad.

It was a historical precedent, the Board of Aldermen argued, that when a civil population on a town or city had succeeded in protecting itself from being overtaken by an enemy that that population was rewarded with privileges or advantages. This was a way for a prince of sovereign to express his gratitude. This was indeed the case in, for example, Friesland where the cities obtained a vote in the Frisian Diet in exchange for their efforts during the Dutch Revolt. The commonality (*gemeente*) of Recife proposed a list of 27 privileges that they would like to obtain in return for their perseverance under hardship. The privileges ranged from receiving their own Council (*vroedschap*) that would select their own Burgomasters, to the city's own legal jurisdiction, and to a lower impost on beer that had gone sour. The 27<sup>th</sup> privilege the petition requested was that the Jewish nation would enjoy 'the same privileges and regulations as within the city of Amsterdam'.<sup>829</sup> This aligns well with the petition by Azevedo on behalf of the Jewish community described above. That the Jews and other inhabitants of Recife came together in drafting this petition for increased authority and autonomy further underlines how they transcended traditional borders of religion and came together to form an alliance when addressing themselves to their superiors in the Dutch Republic. The (far-reaching) privileges for the Jewish were supported by the non-Jewish population in Recife. Moreover, the Jewish nation in Amsterdam joined their cause and independently petitioned for the same affair to the Board of Directors.<sup>830</sup> This shows how the interests of the population of Recife intersected with those of the Jewish population on both sides of the Atlantic.

Another important privilege the commonality requested was to erect guilds that would play an important role in the financing of the new urban authority. Apart from the continued loyalty the inhabitants of Recife further proposed to take care of important infrastructure in the city such as the bridge that connected Recife to Mauritsstad. One issue, though, as the commonality addressed in the 14<sup>th</sup> point, was that 'most [inhabitants] are merchants rather

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<sup>829</sup> 'de selve privilegien ende bepalingen en als die binnen der stede Amsterdam sijn genietende', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 67, 3-Aug-1652 Concept petition from the Board of Aldermen of Mauritsstad [scan 174].

<sup>830</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, xx-Nov-1653 Copy minutes Board of Directors, d. 30-Sep-1653.



than jurists or politicians'.<sup>831</sup> A solution would be to appoint a capable Pensionary that could advise the city magistracy. In a separate petition, the commonality showed that they had their eyes on Jacob Hamel, who had faithfully carried out his duties as secretary of the city for over twelve years.<sup>832</sup> The delegates had kept this petition, dated 13 August 1652, with them for the entirety of their stay in the Republic but had awaited this moment, more than a year later in September 1653, to deliver it to the States General. The delegates must have thought that the rescue fleet was close to departure and powerful enough to save the colony. The delegates started to plan for the future. The Board of Directors also started planning for the future and drafted instructions for a yet to be appointed new High Government that would need to be comprised of a Governor-General and three ordinary members. In other words, it seemed like most people involved started planning for the future as they anticipated that Brazil would soon be rescued.

## 6.9. *IT IS ALL ABOUT THE MONEY*

In November 1653, the delegates brought bad news from the Admiralty of Rotterdam. Some of the promised funds still had not arrived. Further enquiries at the Receiver General confirmed that not all provinces had provided their share.<sup>833</sup> The delegates, however, were no longer alone in their attempts to smooth the decision-making process. They were now joined by Michiel van Goch, whose resignation as member of the High Government in Brazil had just been accepted by the Board of Directors, and Otto Keye and Cornelis Caroen, who were representing the interests of the army in Brazil. This meant that the lobbying forces had expanded their alliance to the military and a politician, but that did not mean that the worries of the delegates were over. On 3 December 1653, the delegates wrote to the States General that its letter to the Admiralty of Rotterdam had not produced any meaningful results. The delegates then added they had been fighting for a rescue fleet to Brazil for over thirteen months now. They had not stopped laboring for the Brazilian cause by streamlining the correspondences between the various bodies in the Republic. However, by now they had

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<sup>831</sup> 'dewijl meesten deel meer negotianten dan jurispudenten ofte politici sijn', NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 67, 3-Aug-1652 Concept petition from the Board of Aldermen of Mauritsstad [scan 172].

<sup>832</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 4-Sep-1653 Request from the Board of Aldermen in Brazil.

<sup>833</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 29-Nov-1653 Request from the inhabitants of Brazil.

gotten desperate and despondent: 'It will not be possible that we continue this tedious soliciting in the same manner much longer'.<sup>834</sup> The positive vibe that the delegates had portrayed in September had nearly died out a few months later. Five days later, on 8 December, the States General resolved to allocate special funds for the equipping of the ships.

Further uplifting news arrived from the northern tip of Holland when the Admiralty of Noorderkwartier reported on 22 December that, following the 30,000 guilders from the States General, it was indeed in the process of rigging a ship for Brazil. Unfortunately, it would not be in the water before the frost would set in.<sup>835</sup> It was this time the Admiralty of Noorderkwartier, rather than the Brazilian delegates, that suggested that the States General would urge the Admiralties in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Noorderkwartier to coordinate the dispatch of their ships so that they could be ready around the same time. Moreover, it is telling that this letter arrived through 'normal' correspondence and that the delegates did not function as a special broker to deliver this message.

The delegates meanwhile were predominantly occupied in Rotterdam still, where they now lobbied for Adriaen Joosten to receive the promised 8,000 guilders for his ship. That nine months later the master shipwright from Rotterdam had still not obtained the money that was promised to him, makes clear how difficult it was for the different bodies in the Republic in these years to find the necessary funds to equip the ships. While last time the States General had requested to committee on sea affairs to 'find' the money to him, the High-Mightinesses now ordered this committee to pay him.<sup>836</sup> On 5 May, the delegates were happy to report to the States General that ships were ready in Noorderkwartier and Amsterdam. A ship from Groningen was soon to be ready as well. The only Admiralty that was causing problems still, was Rotterdam, that still had not finished equipping their second ship in the share of the Brazil fleet. Thus, the delegates requested the States General to provide the required 10,000 guilders for the Admiralty of Rotterdam.<sup>837</sup> The States General obliged and further appointed a captain for the Rotterdam ship to make sure that by the time

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<sup>834</sup> 'Ende niet mogelijk dat wij op dien voet in deselve tedieuse sollicitatien langer continueren', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 03-Dec-1653 Request from the delegates from Brazil.

<sup>835</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 22-Dec-1653 Missive from the Admiralty of Noorderkwartier.

<sup>836</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5765, 26-Jan-1654 Request from the delegates from Brazil; NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 88v.

<sup>837</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5765, 5-May-1654 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

the money arrived the captain would be ready to leave as well.<sup>838</sup> The instruction letter for the fleet had also been prepared, so nothing stood in the way of a successful departure of the rescue fleet for Brazil.<sup>839</sup>

It would all be in vain, as on 22 May the first news reports that the colony had been lost arrived in the Netherlands. The WIC directors who reported this to the States General were non-committal as they were awaiting official reports, but everyone had to admit that this result had been in the air for some time, so that it was not all that unlikely to be true.<sup>840</sup> Not long afterwards they learned that on 26 January the High Government had signed the capitulation of the colony without much of a fight. Even though the warehouses were actually supplied for ten to twelve months, the Portuguese blockade of Recife was far from water tight, and the residents of Recife had helped to restore the batteries on the waterfront, the soldiers had been so disheartened that hardly any resistance had been provided.<sup>841</sup>

### 6.9.1. It is about the people

The lobbying mission of the delegates from Brazil did not concern itself with the Admiralty of Zeeland. Zeeland had been the first to have its ships ready, so it made sense from a pragmatic point of view that they concerned themselves with the Admiralties that were slower in equipping their ships. The Zeeland Admiralty, moreover, was the only Admiralty that had a board member who was also a WIC director. This individual also had a function administering the day-to-day business of the provincial assembly of Zeeland as *gecommitteerde raad*. His name was Johan Gijsseling and, more importantly, he had been a member of the High Government of Brazil in the early years of the colony. Undoubtedly his past in the Brazilian colony not only had earned him a golden chain (handed to him by Jacob Hamel) and a 25,000 guilders bonus on top of his salary, but also had left him with intimate personal ties and memories in the colony.<sup>842</sup> Although there is no hard evidence that Johan

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<sup>838</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 4846, fol. 97r.

<sup>839</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5765, 10-Feb-1654 Instructions for the Brazilian fleet.

<sup>840</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 22-May-1654 Missive from the WIC directors.

<sup>841</sup> Klooster, *The Dutch moment*, 89-90; Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 236-242.

<sup>842</sup> 'hebben door den Advocaet Hamel doen schencken ende aen den hals hangen aen den Heer Mathijs van Ceulen ende de Heer Iohan Gyselinck, elck een gouden keten weerdigh elck 2000 Guldens. Boven dien noch elck 25000 Guld. aen Gelde boven haer bedongen maent-gelt ende dat voor haeren goeden dienst aen de Compagnie in Brasiliën ghedaen', *Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c.*, no. 29 (21 July 1635).

Gijsseling was (singlehandedly) responsible for the swift decision in Zeeland to equip its share of the ships for Brazil or for the decision to supply the muskets to the Rotterdam Admiralty, it was certainly convenient for the WIC to have an individual so close to the decision-making process.

The Admiralty of Amsterdam had the idea of re-purposing the ships destined for the fleet of Admiral Tromp for the fleet for Brazil. The minutes do not provide a definitive answer as to where the idea originated. The primary change in 1653 was that Frans Hendriksz Herberts replaced Cornelis Cornelisz de Lange as the Gouda representative in the Amsterdam Admiralty Board after the death of the de Lange on 27 March. However, it would be too much 'drawing bullseyes around bullet holes' to conclude that it was Herberts who proposed this idea. In any case, it should be remembered that, just like with the mission of Hendrik Haecxs in the previous chapter, personal relations and societal capital remained important for political decision-making. And the individuals on a board could have far-reaching influence on the final decisions as became clear in the case when Friesland presided over the meeting of the States General. It is without a doubt that Gijsseling, as a member of the Admiralty, a deputy of the States of Zeeland, and a director of the WIC combined important functions that helped sway a board in favor of the WIC.

## 6.10. *THE LOSS OF BRAZIL*

The lobbying campaign of the delegates from Brazil provides a unique insight into the decision-making process in the Dutch Republic in the final years of the colony in Brazil. What becomes apparent through the repeated petitions, in particular the descriptions by the delegates of their interactions with other bodies in the Republic, is that the delegates circled around the offices of the various organizations in the Republic even when the archives of those organizations show no trace of the delegates. 'All the pathetic and touching remonstrances brought to the collegiate boards both oral and writing', as the delegates described their process, did thus not necessarily leave a trace in all the archives.<sup>843</sup> In

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<sup>843</sup> 'alle erbermelijcke ende beweechlijcke soo schriftelijcke als mondelinge remonstrantien bij ons deselve collegien toegebracht', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 23-Oct-1653 Request from the delegates of Brazil.

particular the Admiralty of Rotterdam, where the delegates must have spent countless hours, does not mention Azevedo, Hamel, or Heussen, while they do mention 'the many widows, mothers, and other close friends' that petitioned them.<sup>844</sup> This suggests that there were most likely many more lobbyists active in the Dutch Republic than what can be presently be accounted for through archival evidence. Lobbying was, thus, probably even more important than this chapter suggests.

Following the lobbying trajectory of the delegates furthermore helps to answer the question why Brazil was lost. The regular interactions between the delegates and the States General, and in particular the latter's willingness to send yet another letter or another delegation when requested, demonstrates that the States General cannot be hold responsible for the loss of Brazil. The High-Mightinesses generally did what the delegates requested in their petitions and their minutes show their willingness to 'push' for the rescue of Brazil when necessary. Other correspondences underline that everyone agreed that saving Brazil was important, but perhaps that the urgency was not always clear to those in the Republic. They understood that conditions in the colony were harsh, but rumors about a Portuguese fleet 'about to depart' to take Recife had been circulating for several years and did not seem that urgent. The Portuguese King was not considered a particularly powerful enemy and Portugal was still involved in the Restoration War with Spain (1640-1668). As one contemporary pamphlet put it: 'the Portuguese even run the risk to be taken by the Spaniards, which is a very urgent threat'.<sup>845</sup> It seems that no other pamphlets on the issue of Brazil have been published between 1652 and 1654, which suggests that the delegates did not engage in outside lobbying. The public sphere was largely concerned with the war with England in these years, which provided the opportunity for the delegates to operate almost 'under the cover' of this urgent affair quietly laboring for a Brazilian rescue fleet in the political sphere.

The only province to really object to supporting the WIC in Brazil was Friesland. They withheld their payments for a rescue fleet pending their own chamber in the WIC. They had

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<sup>844</sup> 'veele weduwen, moeders, en andere naeste vrinden', NL-HaNA, 1.01.46, inv. nr. 148, fol. 116r.

<sup>845</sup> 'En de Portugiesen lopen selfs perijckel door de Spagnaerden bemaghtight te worden, 't welck haer seer drycht', Knuttel 7454: Anonymous, *West-Indisch Discours, verhandelende de West-Indische saecken. Hoe die weder verbeteret mogen worden, ten besten der gemeente en 't seekerst voor de Compagnie. Generalijck ontworpen by maniere van samen-spraeck tusschen een Middelburger en Haegenaer* (no place: no printer, 1653), 9.

been requesting this since anyone could remember, but it should be granted to the Frisians that for a very short time it seemed that they would finally obtain their chamber. The meeting of the Board of Directors in the fall of 1653 created detailed plans for a Frisian chamber, and the plans for a newly created WIC Audit Office (*Rekenkamer*) stipulated that it would exist of seven individuals, 'or eight persons, if a Frisian chamber shall be added'.<sup>846</sup> This should, however, primarily be seen as a sign of the willingness of the other chambers to save Brazil as they, particularly the chamber of Amsterdam, had always objected to a Frisian chamber. It was of course financially disappointing that Friesland did not consent to pay for the rescue of Brazil, but the roughly 30,000 guilders of Friesland (just under ten per cent) paled in comparison to the several millions of debts of the WIC. Moreover, after the province of Groningen offered to guarantee the pay for the Frisian Admiralty for the ships this pressure was largely removed.

Money was the issue though that made the Rotterdam Admiralty not deliver the requested ships for the Brazilian fleet. Money typically came late in the Republic, but that would generally be bridged through short-term credit and would not necessarily lead to large problems. However, due to the first Anglo-Dutch War and the requested fleet of 100 ships, the Rotterdam Admiralty that already used all their credit. They already were late on their payments to several suppliers who 'scolded' them 'because they did not deliver on their words'.<sup>847</sup> The only solution was 'a big sum of money', as one can read in the minutes of the Rotterdam Admiralty. It is too simple though to blame the loss of Brazil on the war with England. As became apparent through the Amsterdam Admiralty's solution to the lack of money, the funds for the war with England actually provided an opportunity to find the funds for the Brazilian fleet. The loss of Brazil is undoubtedly entangled with the first Anglo-Dutch War and certainly provided a distraction in The Hague, but it also created opportunities that otherwise would not have been available; the war provided the solution for the problem it created.

Brazil was lost because the Admiralties were unable to quickly provide the required ships. This was not due to slow decision-making or the decentralized nature of the Dutch

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<sup>846</sup> 'Ende soo wanneer de provincie van Vrieslant mede een camer sal werden toegevoecht, sal t voorm: collegie bestaen in 8 personen, waervan dito camer mede eene sal committeeren', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, xx-Nov-1653 Copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors of the WIC.

<sup>847</sup> 'soo hard aangemaent ende om dat men niet en conde presteren het woort', NL-HaNA, 1.01.46, inv. nr. 148, fol. 116r.

Republic, but was simply due to lack of funds. The shortage of funds existed because the Dutch Republic was insufficiently able to efficiently raise the required capital. This partly happened because not everyone considered the Portuguese an enemy to take seriously and therefore did not necessarily prioritize the Brazilian affair over other affairs, or considered the Brazilian rescue fleet an opportune moment to renegotiate the structure of the WIC. The second reason was that the Dutch Republic, like other European states in this period, had insufficiently succeeded in streamlining the state budget; the financial revolution had not yet been fully completed. It was easy for the States General to promise the funds in an extraordinary subsidy, but it was not easy for the provinces to raise the required capital through taxes.

## *6.11. CONCLUSION*

Like chapter 5, this chapter has focused on individuals crossing the Atlantic to lobby for their interest. In the time between the two lobby missions much had changed and the colony was in extremely dire straits, yet the practice of crossing the Atlantic remained the same. This highlights the apparent success attributed by the individuals in Brazil to the mission of Haecxs. After all, for a last resort, this was their mechanism of choice. This demonstrates the confidence the population in Brazil had for this lobby mission.

The episode of the Brazilian delegates demonstrates that petitions were used to convince political mandataries, and also to streamline the communications in the Republic. Moreover, it highlights the research potential of studying a lobbying campaign up close for new insights in historical events. Thirdly, this chapter demonstrates that petitions could function as a viable alternative to employing societal capital for lobbying. None of the three gentlemen that formed the delegates of Brazil were of the highest societal orders. Nevertheless, the mandate by the population in Brazil in combination with the medium of petitions allowed the delegates access to the meetings of the States General. The High-Mightinesses functioned as a lever for access to the Frisian Stadtholder. Thus, through petitions the (representatives of) the general inhabitants of Brazil obtained influence beyond the medium itself, and as such petitions could complement other lobbying options.

It was a unique campaign as it is the only instance of an interest group petitioning the different bodies in the Dutch Republic for a single cause so many times. The lobbying group was created for this purpose and was dissolved after the Brazilian colony was lost. The second reason why this lobbying campaign was unique is that it was financed through the collection of funds from the commonality in Recife. Petitioning was an expensive endeavor, but the population came together to provide the necessary funds when the WIC unable to provide financial support. Moreover, the lobbying campaign united the Christian and Jewish population in Recife in a lobby alliance that on certain issues branched out to the Jewish population in Amsterdam forming a trans-Atlantic coalition.

The trace of petitions left by the delegates highlights both the difficulties of lobbying for the delegates as well as the potential of their strategy. On the one hand, they realized that their repetitive petitions could be perceived as a nuisance to the people they addressed themselves to. 'We find ourselves forced to bother your High-Mightinesses once again', the delegates would write for example.<sup>848</sup> On the other hand, by being on top of the political developments in the Republic they did succeed in smoothing the internal process of communication and thus information exchange and decision-making in the Republic. An example of this process indeed functioning very well, occurred when they proactively sought a decision from the States General if indeed Linteloo would not arrive in The Hague on time to leave for the mission to Friesland, by which the delegates gained at least two days.

In regard to their strategies, the delegates prioritized obtaining a favorable resolution from the States General, and subsequently tried to expedite the execution of that resolution with the different Admiralties. They identified (potential) obstacles and had a problem-oriented approach. They prioritized obstacles with a potential big impact over obstacles with a high chance of success. That means that they first addressed the issue of the Frisian province not consenting to pay for the WIC colony, and then prioritized the Admiralty of Amsterdam (who needed to provide the largest number of ships) over for example the Admiralty of Noorderkwartier. In addressing the different bodies in the Republic, they employed different rhetorical strategies. There was a coherent center of their arguments that emphasized the horrible state in Brazil, but each body had their own independent focus.

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<sup>848</sup> 'Soo vinden wij ons uit hoochdringenden noot geperst uwe Ho:mo: nochmaels moeijelijck te vallen', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 23-Oct-1653 Request from the delegates of Brazil.



When addressing the States General for example, they repeatedly emphasized the 'fatherly' responsibilities that the Republic had over its colonies. When they addressed the Amsterdam Admiralty, on the other hand, the delegates emphasized the potential blame the Admiralty would receive if Brazil would be lost due to this Admiralty's delay.

The Brazilian delegate's lobby campaign, and by extent their petitions, made a measurable difference. Even though the colony was eventually lost, the delegates can be credited for the relative speed of the decision-making process and rigging of the ships. Notwithstanding the structural limitations, on this occasion monetary demands for the first Anglo-Dutch War, the delegates succeeded in smoothing the internal communications of the Republic. In the end, it was this war that provided the political solution for the economic problem. The petitioners succeeded in adapting to the structural limitations and continued their campaign for the maintenance of Dutch colonial institutions in Brazil through military support. The delegates' medium of choice was a collection petitions. It was the petition that provided access to political arenas – especially when the delegates would not have had the societal capital required for repeated audiences. Through the petitions, the delegates made a tangible difference, seizing the opportunities that were available to them.



## 7. LOBBYING FOR MONEY IN THE AFTERMATH OF DUTCH BRAZIL

The return of soldiers and sailors from Brazil to the Republic marked the end of the largest military campaign in the Atlantic of the seventeenth century.<sup>849</sup> Not everyone returned of course. Some colonels and other higher military, especially those married to local women, had decided to defect to the Portuguese during the revolt because they deemed it 'inconvenient' to continue to fight and preferred to take care of their goods, sugar mills, and family instead of 'fighting to the last man'.<sup>850</sup> Other Europeans fled to WIC settlements in North America or the Carribean. About two hundred of the Brazilian allies fled to colonies in Guyana, and another group settled in St. Christophe and later Tobago.<sup>851</sup> Those who continued to fight were, after their surrender, robbed of most of their possessions. They were not even able to take their scarce remaining belongings back to the Republic. In one account of the return voyage, the entire deck of a ship leaving for patria was covered with people. After sufficient drinking water was brought on board for all these people, the ship was so top heavy that it was deemed unsafe to go to sea. A solution was found in throwing overboard some of the personal belongings of the passengers and more than 500 pounds of brazilwood.<sup>852</sup> Another account confirms that because of lack of space on board the ships and 'unreasonableness of the captains' the travelers had to leave everything behind on their homeward trip.<sup>853</sup>

How did soldiers claim arrears after their return from Brazil? What were their options? This may seem a straightforward question, but the events that occurred in The Hague after the

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<sup>849</sup> Compare for example V. Enthoven, H. den Heijer, and H. Jordaan, eds., *Geweld in de West: een militaire geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Atlantische wereld, 1600-1800* (Lieden/Boston: Brill, 2013); Klooster, *The Dutch moment*, 115.

<sup>850</sup> For example Casper van der Ley, colonel, and Johan Hick, lieutenant-colonel, Job Hick and Wenzel Smit, lieutenants, and Albert Gerritsz Wedda, captain, decided to surrender. See: M. van den Broek, *Journal ofte Historiæse Beschrijvinge van Matheus van den Broeck van 'tgeen hij selfs ghesien ende waerachtigh gebeurt is, wegen 't begin ende revolte van de Portugese in Brasiel, als mede de conditie en het overgaen van de forten aldaer* (Amsterdam: Gerrit van Goedesbergen, 1651), 17.

<sup>851</sup> Klooster, *The Dutch moment*, 90-91.

<sup>852</sup> l'Honoré Naber, "Het dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs," 301-303.

<sup>853</sup> 'Ende voor soo veel noch bij den vijandt wiert overgelaeten, hadden sij supplianten geen geneegentheit het selven te vervoeren; soo door ongelegentheit van schepen als onredelijkheit der schippers', NL-AsdSAA, 5028, inv. nr. 540E5: "Verzoekschriften van voormalige ingezetenen van en belanghebbenden in Brazilië".

loss of Brazil show that this was not as easy as it seemed. Studying petitions requesting payment by soldiers and officers alike shows the interconnected importance of military personnel as laborers, the possibility for association and collective action, and the possibilities and impossibilities of petitions. For this chapter, it is important to realize that wages are not just simply wages; they were part of the total aggregate of income for soldiers overseas. Other sources of income included transatlantic smuggling as well as peddling trade.<sup>854</sup> Moreover, it was not just the soldiers who relied on the payment of wages. There was a secondary market for WIC employees' future earnings which were transferrable via power of attorney.<sup>855</sup> Soldiers were often required to acquire their own firelocks and other war material, but not everyone had the means and thus required borrowed money from relatives of their crimp.<sup>856</sup> Their future earnings would form the collateral, which partly explains how a secondary market for future WIC earnings came into existence.<sup>857</sup>

How was the payment of soldiers' wages organized? There were several different systems for the organization of army pay in Early Modern Europe. What they generally had in common was the problem of financing early modern warfare as it was difficult for employers to find the necessary funds to pay wages on time. A second problem was the incentive for one or more individuals to increase the number of soldiers on paper in comparison to the "real" soldiers in order to pocket the difference in pay.<sup>858</sup> The system of the Dutch Republic is generally heralded as being both more efficient and flexible compared to that of its contemporary rivals. Soldiers, as well as sailors, were generally paid on time.<sup>859</sup> In the system of the Dutch Republic army captains were responsible for the upkeep of their units and were paid for the number of men in their unit. The captains received this money from a military solicitor who advanced the wages while soliciting payments by the various

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<sup>854</sup> M. Fusaro et al., "Entrepreneurs at sea: trading practices, legal opportunities and early modern globalization," *The International Journal of Maritime History* 28, no. 4 (2016): 776.

<sup>855</sup> *Ibid.*, 779.

<sup>856</sup> For example, Jan Jansz. Cuyper from Delft borrowed 150 guilders from his brother in law Pieter Cornelisz from Delft when Jan left as a soldier for Brazil in 1639. Pieter could draft two months' wages each year from the WIC on Jan's behalf. See: Stadsarchief Rotterdam (NL-RtSA), 18 Notarissen te Rotterdam, inv. nr. 135, Act 254.

<sup>857</sup> Klooster, *The Dutch moment*, 117.

<sup>858</sup> G. Parker, *Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-1659* (London: Collins, 1979), 160-161; D. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter 4.

<sup>859</sup> Dekkers, "Labour conflicts," 385.

provinces.<sup>860</sup> The solicitors were businessmen of some wealth who earned a profit by receiving a monthly sum from the army unit for their services as well as interest in case a province was late on its payment. This business became common practice during the Twelve Years' Truce (1609-1621) and by 1624-1659 there were dozens of different military solicitors.<sup>861</sup> A benefit of this system for the soldiers was that the burden of not receiving any pay was in this way deflected to civilian individuals instead of soldiers.

When studying soldiers claiming arrears, is it possible to consider them as laborers seeking their payments? For a long time, the activities of soldiers were not regarded as work by labor historians. The output of soldiers was considered destructive. Work, on the contrary, was an activity yielding surplus value. However, in 2013, an edited volume building on earlier work by Jan Lucassen and Bruce Scates made a convincing case that what soldiers do actually constitutes work.<sup>862</sup> Firstly, because soldiers spent the majority of their time in barracks which allowed them to also do some work in nearby agriculture or infrastructure. Secondly, because (ideally) the end result of warfare is territorial gain, and (in a premodern economy) territorial growth equals economic growth.<sup>863</sup> While Zürcher acknowledges the exceptionality of soldiers, he concluded that 'ultimately an army is built on the factors of capital and labor just like any other industry'. The claims of soldiers' wages should thus be considered as laborers claiming wages. The collective actions of salaried workers, including soldiers and sailors, ranged from peaceful negotiations to lively protests and ritualized violence.<sup>864</sup> This seems to confirm David Parrott's argument that military organization should not be considered 'as some exclusive prerogative of would-be absolute monarchs, but as a sphere of negotiation between rulers and their subjects'.<sup>865</sup>

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<sup>860</sup> O. van Nimwegen, "The transformation of army organisation in early-modern western Europe, c. 1500-1789," in *European Warfare, 1350-1750*, ed. F. Tallett and D.J.B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 169-171.

<sup>861</sup> Brandon, "Masters of War," 67-70, 215.

<sup>862</sup> J. Lucassen, "The Other Proletarians: Seasonal Labourers, Mercenaries and Miners," *International Review of Social History* 39, no. S2 (1994); B. Scates, "The price of war: labour historians confront military history," *Labour History* 84 (2003).

<sup>863</sup> E.J. Zürcher, "Introduction," in *Fighting for a living: A Comparative History of Military Labour 1500-2000*, ed. E.J. Zürcher (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 11.

<sup>864</sup> C. Lis and H. Soly, "'An Irresistible Phalanx': Journeymen Associations in Western Europe, 1300-1800," *International Review of Social History* 39, no. S2 (1994): 13.

<sup>865</sup> Parrott, "War, state, and society," 87.

What were the options for soldiers that sought arrear payments? The WIC as well as the VOC were, in contrast to the States General, notoriously late on their payments. This led to riots in 1629, 1635, 1652, and 1678.<sup>866</sup> The sailors' revolt for pay of 1652 is of particular interest as it shows a sophisticated level of organization; something that resembles collective action. The sailors used an inn near the West India Company offices as a sort of "war room" from where they organized their actions.<sup>867</sup> Similarly, in 1678, around one hundred women armed with makeshift weapons demonstrated in front of a house in Amsterdam where sailors for the Danish fleet were recruited. The wives' requests for payment to their husbands before the recruitment for a new campaign were regarded well-grounded by the city government, which ordered swift payment by the recruitment officer.<sup>868</sup> Wives and mothers were not the only ones claiming arrears though. The Rotterdam Admiralty further specified 'undertakers or delivers of the deceased and wounded officers and sailors' that protested for money the Admiralty was unable to pay.<sup>869</sup> Riot and revolt were one option for (families of) soldiers or sailors seeking to express their grievances, mutiny and desertion were another. In the army there was surprisingly little mutiny, but relatively high rates of desertion.<sup>870</sup>

Desertion by soldiers in the Atlantic, especially in Dutch Brazil, was relatively high compared to Europe.<sup>871</sup> It is a little bit of a mystery as to why this is the case. Wim Klooster suggests that the absence of a military solicitor might explain the difference.<sup>872</sup> However, as will be clear from the rest of this chapter, that is not entirely true as there were several military solicitors looking after several divisions of the army in Brazil.<sup>873</sup> An alternative explanation might be that it was a combination of the extreme dire perspectives, absence of farmland that could be pillaged or looted, and the possibility of receiving a signing fee when defecting to the Portuguese enemy.

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<sup>866</sup> Dekkers, "Labour conflicts," 406.

<sup>867</sup> Davids, "Seamen's Organizations," 162.

<sup>868</sup> Dekkers, "Labour conflicts," 406-407.

<sup>869</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.46, inv. nr. 148, fol. 116r.

<sup>870</sup> Lucassen, "The Other Proletarians," 185.

<sup>871</sup> K. Fatah-Black, "Desertion by sailors, slaves and soldiers in the Dutch Atlantic, c. 1600-1800," in *Desertion in the Early Modern World: a comparative history*, ed. M. van Rossum and J. Kamp (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 102-105.

<sup>872</sup> W. Klooster, "Marteling, mouterij en beeldenstorm: militair geweld in de Nederlandse Atlantische wereld, 1624-1654," in *Geweld in de West: een militaire geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Atlantische wereld, 1600-1800*, ed. H. Jordaan, H. den Heijer, and V. Enthoven (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 336-337.

<sup>873</sup> Other than de la Porte, this included de Cock for example.

An alternative to riots, mutiny, and desertion was to go on strike. In 1635, for example, the soldiers on Curaçao requested extra pay for their activities as lumberjacks and construction workers on the fortifications. When the colonial government refused this request, they promptly went on strike. The sting was taken out of the situation by the commander through a promise of plenty of Spanish wine.<sup>874</sup> As demonstrated in chapter 6, the soldiers in Brazil also refused to go back on the battlefield after the first battle of Guararapes unless they would receive their wages.<sup>875</sup> In comparison to riots, revolts, strikes, and mutiny, desertion is much less of a collective undertaking. However, individual or paired desertions could occasionally lead to small groups, or even collectives, deserting.<sup>876</sup> Zürcher generalizes that collective action amongst soldiers is something that might correlate to soldiers from an urban background, while desertion seems to be linked to soldiers with a rural background.<sup>877</sup>

A fifth option was to go to court, an option that historians of the Early Modern period have hardly explored. A book chapter by Andrea Addobbati, focusing on seventeenth-century Livorno, casts some light as to why this might be the case. He states that most agreements between employers and wage workers were settled orally, thus leaving very little archival traces.<sup>878</sup> One of the examples he found concerns 41 sailors who collectively sued Captain William Ell in 1657 for his debts.<sup>879</sup> Richard Blakemore has provided an overview of wage litigation by sailors in England from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The behavior in court of wage laborers in this period should be understood from ‘within the legal system, not outside, or against it’, according to Blakemore.<sup>880</sup> Moreover, he shows that collective law suits were possible in the English legal system – as long as the case

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<sup>874</sup> Klooster, "Marteling, muiterij en beeldenstorm," 335.

<sup>875</sup> Chapter 6. See also: Hoboken, *Witte de With*, 92.

<sup>876</sup> J. Kamp and M. van Rossum, "Introduction: Leaving work across the world," in *Desertion in the Early Modern World*, ed. M. van Rossum and J. Kamp (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 10.

<sup>877</sup> Zürcher, "Introduction," 41.

<sup>878</sup> A. Addobbati, "Until the Very Last Nail: English Seafaring and Wage Litigation in Seventeenth-Century Livorno," in *Law, labour, and empire: comparative perspectives on seafarers, c. 1500-1800*, ed. M. Fusaro, et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 43.

<sup>879</sup> *Ibid.*, 47-49.

<sup>880</sup> R.J. Blakemore, "The Legal World of English Sailors, c. 1575–1729," in *Law, labour and empire: comparative perspectives on seafarers, c. 1500-1800*, ed. M. Fusaro, et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 101-102. Especially Rediker had argued that seafarers preferred to take matters into their own hands, bypassing the legal system. See: M. Rediker, *Between the devil and the deep blue sea: merchant seamen, pirates, and the Anglo-American maritime world, 1700-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 149-151.

was heard in a court administering civil law and not common law. Thus, there was a preference from the 1670s onwards, to go to the Court of Admiralty instead of the mariners' court. Moreover, two-thirds of the law suits for wages involved groups of sailors, combining all social levels and intelligent cooperation in witness reports to maximize their chance of success.<sup>881</sup> Virtually nothing on Dutch wage litigation in this period has been published.<sup>882</sup> Moreover, there is no secondary literature on the possibility of joint court cases within the early modern legal system in the Dutch Republic. It seems though that at least since Charles V (r. 1506-1555) it was possible to join an ongoing lawsuit (*interventie ende voegen*).<sup>883</sup> Moreover, there were no regulations that prohibited having power of attorney (*procuratie*) for multiple people. Regulations for the clerk of the court (*griffier*) stipulated that it would cost eight stivers (as opposed to four) to have power of attorney for several people, indicating that it was something that was affordable.<sup>884</sup> Anecdotal evidence from the pleading records (*dingtaalregisters*) of the Court of Aldermen in Amsterdam between 1700-1730 suggests that it was not uncommon for one person to litigate on behalf of multiple individuals that subsequently shared in the outcome.<sup>885</sup> Nevertheless, the soldiers returning from Brazil claiming their arrears evidently preferred petitioning over a court case.

Lobbying for wages of soldiers was part of a system of negotiation between employer and employee, as well as between ruler and subject. In this arena of negotiations, in particular on negotiations regarding arrear payments, the subject of petitions seems to have been generally overlooked by scholars of labor history. The soldiers from Brazil were of course not the only employees to petition for salaries. Jan van Huis, who had translated documents from Latin, French, Spanish, English, and Italian to Dutch for the States General, petitioned no less than three times for his financial compensation. For his argument, he relied on the proverb 'labor must be rewarded'.<sup>886</sup> A second example is from the bodes of the

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<sup>881</sup> Blakemore, "The Legal World," 112-116.

<sup>882</sup> Personal correspondence with C.M. (Marco) in 't Veld from the VUB, who further provided with me with references below.

<sup>883</sup> P. Merulæ, *Manier van procederen, in de provintien van Holland, Zeeland ende West-Vriesland, belangende civile zaaken* (Delft: Adriaan Beman, 1705), 445-446.

<sup>884</sup> *Ibid.*, 273-285, 689.

<sup>885</sup> This was a third option on top of *procuratie* or *interventie*, according to personal correspondence with C.M. in 't Veld from the VUB.

<sup>886</sup> 'spreekwoord als Aerbeijt moet geloont sijn', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 7482, xx-xx-1652 Request by J. van Huis.



States General that requested payment when they performed duties for the Stadtholder.<sup>887</sup> These two examples illustrate that it was not uncommon for laborers to petition for their wages, and that this detailed study of the lobby by soldiers returning can be fruitful as a starting point for a general idea of lobbying for wages. This chapters investigates how the soldiers sought arrear wages through petitions.

## 7.1. RETURN TO THE REPUBLIC

Upon arrival in the Republic in July 1654, the members of the High Council and the generals of the military corps were arrested pending trial for treason. None of the cases really came off the ground. Boxer alleges that this was because 'it was the authorities in Holland, rather than their subordinates in Recife who were primarily responsible' for the loss of Brazil.<sup>888</sup> Whether or not the responsibility laid with the principals in the Republic is not at stake here, but Boxer's argument can be substantiated with a petition filed in 1655 to the Court Martial by A. van Adrichem. He filed the petition on behalf of Sigismund von Schoppe who requested an 'expedite decision' from the Court Martial and a 'definitive sentence', because he deemed it unjust to accuse someone and hold them in jail without sentencing them.<sup>889</sup> He received a rather mild sentence: forfeiture of pay from the date of the surrender.<sup>890</sup> An additional 32 army officers from all over Europe and their corresponding soldiers were summoned to appear at the Court Martial on 7 May 1655 and received the same sentence.<sup>891</sup> The members of the High Council were also investigated, but since their guilt could not be proven they received their freedom.<sup>892</sup> In a lengthy plea, the High Council argued that it had been tough on them too to make the decisions they made, including the departure from Brazil. Several times the situations had been so dire and the Company warehouses had been so empty, that they 'feared to go on the streets, as people shouted: "Bacon! Pork meat!"' to

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<sup>887</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 7478, 4-Oct-1618 Request for the bodes of the States General and Council of State.

<sup>888</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 243.

<sup>889</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5765, Request on behalf of von Schoppe by A. van Adrichem [01-May-1655].

<sup>890</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 244.

<sup>891</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5765, Summon for Court Martial [22-Mar-1655].

<sup>892</sup> Wätjen, *Das höllandische Kolonialreich*, 175-176.

them.<sup>893</sup> Their decision to buy low quality Muscovite bacon instead of ‘normal Dutch bacon’ was thus given in by pressure through public opinion.

The 6,000 soldiers who had been sent to relieve Brazil in 1647 were hired by the States General, and not by the WIC. The bond of loyalty between the recruits and the States General was confirmed through a printed oath that was circulated among the men. However, as early as July 1649, the army had sent a representative across the Atlantic in the person of Colonel Guillaume de Haulthain in company of Simon van Beaumont from the High Council to administer their interests in The Hague.<sup>894</sup> Very quickly van Beaumont started reporting increasingly worrisome news from the colony though as he wrote that the soldiers and other inhabitants in Brazil found themselves stuck ‘between the merciless enemy and perishing of hunger’.<sup>895</sup>

## 7.2. CLAIMING WAGES

Claiming wages for soldiers who had been active in Brazil was a tiresome activity. Before Colonel Haulthuin had returned to Brazil in 1649 with twelve ships, he had received the promise of prompt payment for the soldiers. Since none of the promised pennies arrived, the army in Brazil decided to send a letter to the States General in 1650 requesting payment. Again, it neither received payment, nor heard anything from the States General. It was as if the military sollicitors ‘knocked on a dead man’s door’.<sup>896</sup> With the soldiers’ and captain’s pockets almost empty, and given the inability to obtain sufficient credit in Brazil, the army decided again to dispatch representatives across the Atlantic in an attempt to find credit, advancement of payments, or acceptance of bills of exchange on past earnings. They sent Pieter Keerweer, who joined forces with rittmaster Hendrik Adolf van Louhuijsen (representing colonel von Schoppe), and lawyer Johan de Cock (representing colonel Haulthuin). The three contacted several military sollicitors that they approached for credit in

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<sup>893</sup> ‘wij sijn tot verscheijden malen in sodanigen extremiteijt geweest dat de straten naulijcx meer hebben durven gebruijcken, werdende achteraeen geroepen: ‘speckvleijsch, speckvleijsch’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 09-Oct-1654 Defence by the High Council.

<sup>894</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5761, 21-Jun-1649 Letter from Sigismund von Schoppe to the States General.

<sup>895</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5761, 09-Aug-1649 Missive from Simon van Beaumont.

<sup>896</sup> ‘dat mede al voor een dootmans deure is geclopt’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, , 10-Jul-1653 Remonstrance from the Brazil militia.

the Republic, but found no-one willing to pay advances in order for the army 'to keep their heads above water'.<sup>897</sup> van Louhuijsen, De Cock, and Keerweer were able to achieve was a joint effort with a designated lobbyist, or military solicitor, for the officers in Brazil: Anthony de la Porte. He did not supply them with credit or advances for the soldiers, but he did promise to advocate on their behalf. This confirms the notion in the literature that military solicitors not just provided credit, but also looked after the interests of whoever they represented.<sup>898</sup>

There is not much information available on de la Porte other than that he had been the solicitor of the officers in Brazil from at least as early as October 1648, and that he later became the secretary of the Generality Mint.<sup>899</sup> Van Louhuijsen en de la Porte presented one petition together in 1652 in which they accused the States General and the Council of State of no longer caring for the military in Brazil, and that all they did was redirecting them to the WIC. Notwithstanding the advice by the Committee of West Indian Affairs to pay for the soldiers, the provinces did not take any action.<sup>900</sup> Moreover, the States of Holland refused to pay any further shares until the other provinces had paid theirs. The province had held this position in relation to the WIC on and off since 1634, but it was not just Holland that was behind on WIC payments. When the States General inventoried the status of payments in 1649, none of the provinces had paid more than half of their shares of subsidies to the WIC. Three of the provinces (Friesland, Overijssel, and Guelders) had even paid less than a quarter of their dues. Friesland maintained its position that it wanted a director's chamber and Overijssel demanded a general redress of the Company in exchange for their subsidies. Though, the other provinces seemingly did not demand something in return for their financial support.<sup>901</sup> The result was that by September 1652, the payment in arrears for the soldiers accumulated to 2,379,293.78 guilders, of which only 816,998.58 (34.4 per cent) had

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<sup>897</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 10-Jul-1653 Remonstrance from the Brazil militia.

<sup>898</sup> Nimwegen, "Transformation of army organisation," 170-171.

<sup>899</sup> Knuttel 7872: Anonymous, *Corte en bondige deductie van redenen, dienende tot narechtinge aen hare Hoog Mogenden de Heeren (...)* ('s-Gravenhage: Henricus Hondius, 1657), 49-50; A.A.J. Scheffers, "Om de kwaliteit van het geld: Het toezicht op de muntproductie in de Republiek en de voorziening van kleingeld in Holland en West-Friesland in de achttiende eeuw" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Leiden Univeristy, 2013), 152.

<sup>900</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 7482, 05-Sep-1652 Petition from Louhuijsen and de la Porte.

<sup>901</sup> Klooster, *The Dutch moment*, 136-138.

been raised thus far. The 1,200,000 for which the Generality would negotiate a loan was far from complete too, as they had only obtained 76,806.25 guilders (6.4 per cent) so far.

The documents do not clarify why van Louhuijsen, De Cock, and Keerweer were unable to obtain credit or advances. One reason might be that at this point it was generally expected that the colony would be lost no matter what. Stories about hunger and deprivation amongst the soldiers had been circulating in the Republic even before these soldiers were shipped out.<sup>902</sup> The news of the loss of the second battle at Guararapes most likely did not fund any further confidence. However, whether or not the colony would be saved in the end would not necessarily compromise the financial commitment of a military solicitor. Instead, the way this army in Brazil was financed might explain the hesitation. The generality army, or the Dutch States Army, would be paid directly from provincial revenues through a repartition share.<sup>903</sup> The army for Brazil, however, was financed from the generality budget. Although the share of the budget would be divided according to the same repartition system, a military solicitor that advanced pay or provided credit would have to obtain payment from the Receiver-General instead of a provincial treasury (*comptoir*). First of all, this would delay payments even more than normally, but secondly the generality had many more creditors queueing up to get paid. This meant that advancing wages for soldiers in Brazil was a much riskier investment than the wages of soldiers in the Republic.

On 27 September 1652 Anthonij de la Porte sent a letter to the officers in Brazil, in which he stated that unless any order to pay would be issued, the soldiers should not perform any further military actions.<sup>904</sup> In other words, the army's broker suggested that the army should go on strike if the wages would remain unpaid. This indicates that soldiers' collective action (such as strike) was not always as spontaneous or a bottom-up process. Instead, it suggests that the soldiers and officers, or at least the experienced military solicitor, realized that going on strike in Brazil was a powerful tool for arrear payment negotiation.

Because of the unwillingness of the States General to follow up on its promise of payment, the merchants that had been selling to the soldiers on the credit of their future wages were instructed by their principals in the Republic to stop their services. Bills of exchange were refused and sent back 'with protest'. As a result, the private traders no longer

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<sup>902</sup> Klooster, "Marteling, muieterij en beeldenstorm," 334.

<sup>903</sup> Brandon, "Masters of War," 67.

<sup>904</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 10-Jul-1653 Remonstrance from the Brazil militia.

visited Brazil, making the situation for the soldiers as well as the civilians even more dire. For eleven weeks in a row the soldiers went without bread, beer, wine, meat, bacon, butter, cheese, and oil, surviving of a combination of two pitchers (*kannen*) of manioc and brackish water.<sup>905</sup> With soldiers fainting by the hundreds, the officers offered their resignation to the High Council. Instead, the Council offered the army one last attempt to lobby in the Republic in hope of better days. Therefore, they dispatched two captains, Otto Keye and Cornelis Caron, who arrived at the States General in July 1653.

The soldiers who had returned to the Republic during these years because they were wounded and incapable of fighting were perhaps more fortunate than their colleagues who remained in Brazil. The friends, widows, and orphans who had said goodbye to their friends, husbands, and fathers and who had remained behind in the Republic jointly petitioned on 24 September 1649 after they had learned who had died in the second battle of Guararapes. The beneficiaries of a soldier named Diederick Saffou received the lowest amount, 45 guilders, while those of Lieutenant Colonel Lowerecht received 4,330.25 guilders.<sup>906</sup> Wives of sailors in Brazil petitioned the Admiralty for payment around the same period, but received only half of their husbands' salaries. They turned to the States General for assistance who swiftly ordered payment. Nevertheless, the president of the States General complained two months later that the sailor wives had visited his house demanding payment and the return of their husbands.<sup>907</sup> Another petition for the payment of the soldiers mentions 'the swarm of widows, wives, and children in The Hague' who demanded payment on behalf of their breadwinners.<sup>908</sup>

Soldiers who survived and returned, approached their WIC chambers for payment, which responded that they were not the ones that had to pay them, but did provide them with proof of employment. The soldiers then turned to the Receiver-General who also sent them home without money. Ultimately, they turned to the States General, as was the case with four soldiers who all requested amounts between forty and eighty guilders, and who had found a lawyer that drafted a petition for them free of charge.<sup>909</sup> Other soldiers also

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<sup>905</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 10-Jul-1653 Remonstrance from the Brazil militia.

<sup>906</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5761, 24-Sep-1649 Petition of the widows, orphans, and friends of the deaths in Brazil.

<sup>907</sup> W. Klooster, "De bootsgezellen van Brazilië," *Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis* 33, no. 2 (2014).

<sup>908</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 04-Apr-1653 Petition from the Brazil militia.

<sup>909</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5761, 22-Nov-1649 Petition four soldiers from Brazil.

petitioned the States General, received a positive apostille, and took their petition to the Receiver-General to receive their cash. Those are obviously no longer in the archive, but an advice by the Council of State reveals that the many soldiers petitioning the States General were considered an inconvenience. Therefore, argued the Council of State, the States General should adopt a resolution allowing payments to returning soldiers, so that the Receiver-General was charged to make payments to these poor souls.<sup>910</sup> When five soldiers and officers who had been captured by the Portuguese at Guararapes in February 1649 finally made it to the Republic in March 1651 and petitioned for salary, the States General turned to the Council of State once again. The Council of State responded, in January 1653, that honoring similar requests by other soldiers and officers in the past had created the precedent of payment for these supplicants as well. However, the Council of State also suggested that the States General should in the future no longer accept these types of petitions as to not spend too much time on such requests.<sup>911</sup>

When Mathijs Borger, a freed corporal, from Den Bosch and Nicolas Periso, a sailor from the Champagne region, returned to the Republic on 9 March 1653 and they requested their payment, the States General postponed a decision.<sup>912</sup> Neither of the two would subsequently receive their payment, and neither would those serving in the army that was still in Brazil when they returned. In fact, their fight for payment would continue the following years.

### 7.3. *TRAVEL PENNIES*

It took until April 1656 until the money was actually found to pay the soldiers. As soon as this news became public, the soldiers and officers in The Hague jointly petitioned to receive their pay before Easter that same year.<sup>913</sup> Then they found out that they had to claim their wages in the WIC chamber that had 'paid' their monthly allowance for the last seven years in Brazil. This was a solution to prevent soldiers from claiming their wages in multiple

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<sup>910</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5761, 24-Nov-1649 Advice from the Council of State.

<sup>911</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 17-Jan-1653 Advice from the Council of State on the petition of five soldiers.

<sup>912</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 20-Mar-1653 Petition from an unpaid corporal; NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5764, 20-Mar-1653 Petition from an unpaid sailor.

<sup>913</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, xx-Apr-1656 Petition from the present officers and soldiers from Brazil.

locations, and to prevent the Exchequer's office from being flooded by petitions. It also had the consequence that it functioned as a threshold for recruits who were seeking their payment. Furthermore, it was an added bonus that it was considered a humiliating punishment for the soldiers who had lost 'the royal conquests in Brazil'.<sup>914</sup>

In order to understand the severity of this threshold it is important to imagine the situation of the soldiers upon their return in the Republic. For several months in Brazil they had been undernourished and the latest reports alleged that the WIC had only sent clothes for twenty-five percent of the soldiers. They had spent several weeks on overcrowded ships *en route* to Europe. Most of them originated from towns outside the Republic and could therefore not rely on city welfare or a social network to supply them with funds for travel or for clothes to dress themselves. The soldiers relied on the States General to support them in their quest for payment. Therefore, the *Binnenhof* swarmed with barely dressed, nearly starved soldiers petitioning for a 'travel penny' (*reispenning* – a small note of credit that would allow travel to a specific location). Some of the notes on small torn-off pieces of paper that functioned as a reminder for the States General to make a decision on an earlier petition, serve as a testimony of the number of petitions. Moreover, the high pressure of work as a result of the large number of petitions can be seen in a reminder of a petition that apparently had gotten lost on the desks of the States General's clerks.<sup>915</sup>

The petitions for travel pennies peaked in November 1656. In a way, these petitions are different from most petitions discussed in this dissertation as they do not lobby for a policy change, but deal with a one-on-one relation between the ruler and subject. The subject (soldier) requested something (a travel penny) from the ruler (States General). Moreover, a large part of the soldiers was not as literate as the other petitioners that supplicated their request to the States General. Furthermore, these petitions provide the only tangible evidence on the petitions itself that it passed through someone's hand before being read in the meeting. The petitions were submitted with a small noted stating *pro deo* or *gratis* in the corner of the paper; indicating it was submitted free of fees.

The majority of petitions for travel pennies was submitted by groups of individuals. The largest group is that of eleven lower officers (Sergeants, Corporals, and Cadets (*Adelborst*))

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<sup>914</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 20-Nov-1656 Petition by Stoffel Tomassen and Adriaen Pauwels.

<sup>915</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 20-Nov-1656 Reminder to resolve on a petition for the States General.

who all had to travel to Zeeland and made use of a solicitor that drafted their petition free of charge.<sup>916</sup> It is striking that the petitioners are very heterogeneous. Soldiers could petition together with officers for example. Besides, travel pennies for different WIC chambers could be combined in one petition. Jacob Terlij from Schotland was a Sergeant who petitioned together with Hendrick Bamburgh for example.<sup>917</sup> Furthermore, people with different backgrounds came together to petition: Francois Mittrij from France who had to travel to Zeeland petitioned together with William Crauw from England who had to travel to Hoorn.<sup>918</sup> Considering that 64 per cent of the recruits was not Dutch it is perhaps unsurprising that joint petitions contained more than one nationality.<sup>919</sup> Nevertheless, one petition included no less than three different 'nationalities': Lambert Mathijsz from Liège, Pieter Courenge from La Rochelle, and Hans Nieuborch from Lübeck.<sup>920</sup> It is possible that these soldiers and officers teamed up because they had served in the same regiment. However, another example shows a corporal and a soldier who each served under different captains.<sup>921</sup> One might expect the lawyers and solicitors who drafted some of the petitions to function as a central point that combined several individuals in one petition, but as several petitions were handed in on the same day this seems an unlikely explanation. Therefore, these petitions show the army networks that transcended army divisions, language barriers, religion, and army hierarchy.

This point is further substantiated by petitions from innkeepers who requested payment for housing military personnel from Brazil during their solicitations.<sup>922</sup> In particular a petition from Engeltje Jans de With from Amsterdam is interesting in this respect. She requested close to twelve thousand guilders for hosting fifteen members of the Brazilian military. 'Her' army officers and soldiers came from the WIC chambers in Amsterdam,

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<sup>916</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 13-Nov-1656 Petition for a travel penny from eleven lower officers.

<sup>917</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 15-Nov-1656 Petition for a travel penny from Jacob Terlij and Hendrick Bamburgh.

<sup>918</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 13-Nov-1656 Petition for a travel penny from Francois Mittrij and William Crauw.

<sup>919</sup> B.R.F. Miranda, "Gente de Guerra. Origem, cotidiano e resistência dos soldados do exército da companhia das Índias Ocidentais no Brasil (1630-1654)" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2011), 387.

<sup>920</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 13-Nov-1656 Petition for a travel penny from Lambert Mathijsz, Pieter Courenge, and Hans Nieuborch.

<sup>921</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 13-Nov-1656 Petition for a travel penny from Jan Jansz van Amersfoort and Hendrick Maertensz.

<sup>922</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 13-Nov-1656 Petition from several inn keepers in The Hague.



Zealand, and Delft, originated in different countries in Europe, their different expenditures show a widespread hierarchy, and they had returned on board of different ships.<sup>923</sup> In other words, there was seemingly nothing that organically connected them. What united these men of different geographical regions, religions, regiments, ships, languages, and social class was their shared interest for payment of their army wages. This is in contrast to for example a *vaandrig* (relatively high officer), sergeant, a writer, and two soldiers who were captured together by the Portuguese and jointly petitioned.<sup>924</sup> They were united through their shared experience of being captured, which further provided them with the same narrative.

That being said, the petitioners did not go outside their job categories. Even though the abovementioned innkeepers shared the same interests as the army men of Brazil, they did not join forces. Though, this might be explained through the fact that the innkeepers were petitioning for incurred debts, not for arrear payments. When provisions contractors, suppliers of bricks, a baker, or the owner of a fishing boat petitioned for incurred debts, they did not join forces either.<sup>925</sup>

#### 7.4. SHARED FEATURES

What the petitions for travel pennies have in common is their rhetoric. They emphasize their large efforts in delivering the petition. Benjamin van Sijgen, a captain, made a total of five visits to the *Binnenhof* to present his petition for example.<sup>926</sup> They also emphasized their hardship and dire situation. We are ‘in such a state that we have neither money, nor clothes, nor linen to clean ourselves or cover our naked bodies’, one petition emphasized.<sup>927</sup> A majority of petitions included variations on the words ‘naked and barren’ and ‘without a stiver in this world’.<sup>928</sup> It was furthermore advisable for soldiers to emphasize that they had

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<sup>923</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 11-Apr-1656 Petition from Engeltgen Jansz de With to the WIC committee of the States General,.

<sup>924</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5763, xx-Dec-1652 Memory on a petition from five captured militaries.

<sup>925</sup> Klooster, *The Dutch moment*, 90-92.

<sup>926</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 13-Nov-1656 Petition from Benjamin van Sijgen.

<sup>927</sup> ‘in sodanigen staet dat noch gelt, noch cleederen, off linnen om haer te verschoonen off haere naeckte leden te bedecken’, NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 13-Nov-1656 Petition for a travel penny from Francois Mittrij and William Crauw.

<sup>928</sup> Examples include: ‘sijn naeckt ende bloot, sonder eenen stuijver in handen te hebben’ NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 13-Nov-1656, Petition for a travel penny from Collaert Teerlin van Vlaenderen,

not automatically turned to the States General to obtain travel pennies but had sought other solutions first. Michel Chevalier, a soldier, emphasized for example that he 'was a stranger to this country that did not have any friends' and therefore turned to the States General.<sup>929</sup>

Other army men, such as the soldier and cadet Hans Quacker and Albert Jansz van Quackelburgh had during the winter found a warm refuge in the homes of the widows Janneke Gerrits and Diewertje Jans in Amsterdam who had even advanced them around 45 guilders each. Apparently, Quacker and van Quackelburgh had most likely not relied on a circle of friends though, as the two widows complained that the soldiers had left without paying them back after receiving their salary.<sup>930</sup>

Following an advice from the Council of State, the States General negotiated a fund of 100,000 guilders that it used discretionary to relieve some of the creditors of soldiers, and some of the soldiers themselves. Engeltje Jans de With for example withdrew guilders from the accounts of some of the soldiers she hosted.<sup>931</sup> Engeltje Jans de With only had to wait for two weeks after her petition to receive payment, and the same was true for a doctor named Matheus Grausius who received just over 1,437 guilders after his petition. Others, however, waited almost two years since they started petitioning. For example the sixteen 'higher and lower officers, and the general soldiers' who jointly petitioned in December 1654.<sup>932</sup> Willem van Lobbrecht, a lieutenant-colonel, received just under 4,282 guilders, Otto van IJlem, a captain, received just over 1,552 guilders, and Coert Schlesing, a cornet (*vaandrig*), received 804 guilders – to give three examples of the petitioners that received pay.<sup>933</sup> On average the Receiver General paid out 897 guilders per person.

In sum, access to the States General for soldiers of little means was guaranteed by lawyers who drafted petitions *pro deo* on their behalf, although generally speaking

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Rogier Kindt van Marcken, and Adam Wijnandts van Haarlem; 'naect ende beroijt sonder een stuijver in de werelt te hebben', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 13-Nov-1656 Petition for a travel penny from Lambert Mathijsz, Pieter Courenge, and Hans Nieuborch.

<sup>929</sup> 'van alle wereltsche middelen berooft, ende niets heeft om van te leven, oock bij geene herbergier crediet can bekomen alsmede zijnde een vreemdeling die alhier geen eenige vrienden heeft', NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 19-Nov-1656 Petition for a travel penny from Michel Chevalier.

<sup>930</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 09-Nov-1656 Petition from Janneke Gerrits and Diewertje Jans.


<sup>931</sup> In the account books it can be seen that 257 guilders and 16 stivers were drawn at the expense of Sijmon Lievens van Leeuwarden, which is the exact amount that Engeltje requested on his behalf, see: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 25-Apr-1656 Overview of payments for soldiers.

<sup>932</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5765, 03-Dec-1654 Petition by sixteen army men.

<sup>933</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5766, 25-Apr-1656 Overview of payments for soldiers.

individuals and groups did not require a professional to petition correctly. Moreover, the members of the former army in Brazil who petitioned were very heterogeneous and had nothing else that united them other than their shared interest. Even though the army had a long tradition of military solicitors that dealt with the States General on their behalf and the solicitors initially had a strict divide who lobbied for whom, the later petitions show a great sense of cross-class solidarity across different nationalities. This cross-class solidarity had already existed in Brazil, but was discouraged and later even punished by the High Council.<sup>934</sup> Captains and military in more senior ranks are absent from the petitions for travel pennies, but it is unlikely that this was because of a lack of solidarity. Instead, the higher ranking military officers probably did not rely on the States General for credit to travel to another city to claim their wages.

Figure 7-1: Sixteen signatures on the petition on 3 December 1654



Source: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5765, 03-Dec-1654 Petition by sixteen army men.

<sup>934</sup> Kn. 7872: Corte en bondige deductie van redenen, 20.

## 7.5. THE PRINTED PETITION FROM THE ARMY

The unity portrayed in the petitions delivered to the States General was in sharp contrast to the petition that was printed by the army lobby in September 1657. This petition was euphemistically called a 'short and brief deduction of reasons (...)', but is in reality 51 pages long and lists 160 points.<sup>935</sup> At first sight, this petition seems very innovative. On the title page, it reads: 'delivered on the \_\_\_\_ of September 1657', with an open space where an individual that handed in the petition could fill in the day that the petition was delivered to the States General. It is not difficult to imagine hundreds or thousands of copies of this petition handed to soldiers and officers who had to fill in the date and sign at the end, and could hand this over to the States General. A printed petition for individuals requesting the same goal was unprecedented at this time.

The petition was printed by Henricus Hondius junior, the son of a printer with the same name.<sup>936</sup> Hondius had settled in The Hague, in due course becoming the States General's official printer, after his return from Brazil where he had been a sugar planter.<sup>937</sup> His petition from 1669 seems to be the actual first printed petition delivered to the States General.<sup>938</sup> This practice was subsequently copied by others, but apparently only by professional printers with the means and modes of production to efficiently create a printed petition.<sup>939</sup> The absence of a printed petition from the Brazilian army in the archives of the States General, in combination with the presence of other printed petitions only more than a decade later that were limited to petitions from printers, gives reason to believe that the petition was never intended to be handed to the States General, but instead served to influence the public opinion and was thus part of outside lobbying.

What did the petition try to achieve? It said to represent the captains, lieutenants, and cornets who had served in Brazil and requested their pay until the end of their commission instead of the day they surrendered to the Portuguese. It had been three years since the army

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<sup>935</sup> Ibid.

<sup>936</sup> M. Keblusek, *Boeken in de hofstad: Haagse boekcultuur in de Gouden Eeuw* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1997), 29.

<sup>937</sup> Meuwese, *Brothers in Arms*, 185. See also: <https://rkd.nl/nl/explore/artists/436828> .

<sup>938</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 7490, 20/09/1669 Petition by Hendrick Hondius.

<sup>939</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 7490, xx/xx/[1670] Petition by Johannes Ramazeyn; NL-HaNA, 3.01.04.01, inv. nr. 1371-II, xx/xx/[1670] Petition by Jacobus Scheltus.

had returned from Brazil, but this was one of the issues that still had not been resolved. It starts off with a brief history of the efforts by the army to receive their pay: the commissions of Haulthain in 1649 and Keye and Caroen in 1653, and joint petitions in September and December 1654. After the States General had corresponded with the Board of Directors they decided to reject further petitions dealing with the details or conditions of the payment of the army in Brazil. Notwithstanding the tireless efforts from the petitioners, it was only on the first of August 1657, that the High Mightinesses responded once again. The officers hoped for a positive resolution, but learned that the States General had decided to pay them in unpassable and unknown currency that none of the creditors accepted. Therefore, the petitioners found themselves forced to hand a petition to each of the lords of the States General outside of the meetings in order to explain their case.<sup>940</sup>

One of the primary issues was the decision to pay the army in light money (*licht geld* or Brazilian Guilders) instead of heavy money (*heavy money* or Dutch Guilders). Different versions of light and heavy guilders were used throughout the different Dutch colonies, and they were considered unnecessarily complicated.<sup>941</sup> It suffices to remember that Brazilian guilders were worth roughly twenty-five per cent less than Dutch guilders. It is of course understandable that the Brazilian soldiers and officers were not excited when they found out that the guilders they would be paid in were light and not heavy – making their pay cut twenty-five percent. They deemed this unlawful because they were hired by the state, and not by the Company. Therefore, the defense of the WIC that the soldiers in Brazil had always been paid in light money did not fly. The petitioners' resentment increased when they learned that the High Council was paid more in Brazilian guilders to compensate for the loss in value. Michiel van Goch received 2,480 Brazilian guilders which was the same as 2,000 guilders from Holland. It had been von Schoppe who had negotiated the payment plan with the High Council. The officers and soldiers became further enraged when they found out that von Schoppe had insisted on payment in heavy money for himself, the colonels, the lieutenant-colonels, and majors.

This was not the only criticism the petition voiced against the military and colonial leadership. Other criticism focused specifically on Hendrick Haecxs, 'one of the Gods of

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<sup>940</sup> Kn. 7872: Corte en bondige deductie van redenen, 2-5.

<sup>941</sup> F.S. Gaastra, *De Geschiedenis van de VOC* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2002), 144-149.

Recife'. The petitioners alleged that he was a usurer who had withdrawn 20,000 guilders from the WIC on top of his normal payment. This money he had used to supply the soldiers with credit instead of salary. Moreover, when the abovementioned captain Benjamin van Sijgen suggested that Haecx – a former commercial agent in Moscow – had probably something to do with the abysmal Muscovite bacon, van Sijgen was promptly incarcerated for slander. The petition is loaded with this kind of (what we would call today) populist rhetoric, positioning poor soldiers vis-à-vis the elite. It was, in the words of the petitioners, 'an unchristian divide practiced by the High Council' where they 'took what belonged to the regiments and gave it to themselves and the higher officers' instead.<sup>942</sup> This aspect further supports the idea that the targeted audience of this petition was not the States General, but that it aimed to influence public opinion.

The third issue tackled in this petition was that the army allowances (*mondgeld*) had been paid in light money by the WIC. The question this brought to the fore was whether allowances should be considered salary or not. The trajectory of this debate reveals an interesting aspect of decision-making in the Republic. A few soldiers who had been captured by the Portuguese at the second battle of Guararapes had addressed themselves to the States General to receive their pay initially in 1651. The states had put the petition in the hands of the commission for West Indian Affairs. As the committee could not easily reach a decision they went to the States of Holland for advice.<sup>943</sup> The provincial assembly examined all the relevant documents and concluded that the Council of State should have a final say in this. This council in turn re-examined all the documents. It decided that because the advertisements to attract soldiers made no distinction between light and heavy money in their description of the allowances and wages and because the wages were paid in heavy money, the allowances should be paid in heavy money as well.<sup>944</sup> Six years later, the petitioners expressed their dismay about the States General still not adopting this advice.

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<sup>942</sup> 'het on-christelijck onderscheijft bij de hooge regeringe gepracticeert (...) wat een groote en ongehoorde on-rechtveerdicheijt zy den remonstranten hebben ontrocken, het gene sy aen haer eyghen selven, ende de hoofden reghementen hebben ghegeven', Kn. 7872: Corte en bondige deductie van redenen, 15.

<sup>943</sup> Note: Willem Paets, or Paedts, was the Burgomaster of Leiden and the father in law of the registrar of the States General: Nicolaas Coenraadsz Ruysch. P.J. Blok, P.C. Molhuysen, and F.H. Kossmann, eds., *Nieuw Nederlands Biografisch Woordenboek* (Leiden: 1903), [Nicolaas Coenraadsz Ruysch].

<sup>944</sup> Kn. 7872: Corte en bondige deductie van redenen, 43-44.

What makes the printed petition of additional interest is that it supports its argument with facts. At the end of the argument there are 12 appendices with authenticated copies from petitions, resolutions, and testimonies in front of notaries. In addition to this, the petition included several anecdotes in the text. The most striking anecdotal evidence the petitioners included is that of a comparable case that was brought to court in La Rochelle in France in 1653. Not only was it a similar case, it even included the same defendants. As the ship *Prins Hendrick te Peert* from the WIC chamber Delft returned from Guinea on the African coast it found itself in danger because of the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654). In order to protect the cargo, the captain Govert Corsten Zant sought refuge in the harbor of La Rochelle. While waiting for the war to end, his principals in the Republic ordered him to fire the crew in order to save money. When the captain tried to pay the crew in local, French, money, which was worth thirty per cent less than money from Holland, the crew protested and sued the captain. A judge in La Rochelle ruled that a captain should pay his crew in the currency of the place where they were hired and left from.<sup>945</sup> With examples like these, the petitioners tried to show the uniform, natural, and self-evident claims they made. This was combined with a repetitive rhetoric of, and an appeal to, Christian compassion. This once more emphasized the obvious 'right of the Remonstrants'. By this they did not mean the right to petition (although that is never disputed either), but instead their rightful claim according to customs, natural law, and Christian values.

## 7.6. CONCLUSION

Why did the soldiers choose to lobby instead of going to court to receive their pay? The first reason is that the military had a long tradition of employing military solicitors to act as brokers between the army and their commissioners. The second reason, which also becomes clear from the petition, is that it remained a mystery to the petitioners why they did not yet receive their salary in heavy money (instead of light money), and for the period that ended the day of their return in the Republic (instead of the day of surrender in Brazil). The third reason is that petitioning was normal practice for arrear payments. Soldiers were not the only ones, but their practice was shared by ministers, comforters of the sick, surgeons, clerks,

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<sup>945</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

and even a street sweeper seeking payment of their salaries.<sup>946</sup> There had been plenty of successful lobbying in the past resulting in resolutions to pay the petitioning soldiers and officers. Yet, not enough came through. This was not a lobby to influence decision-making, but a lobby to enforce a previous decision; it was a lobby to honor a contract. The fourth reason, and this is more speculative, is that it was more convenient to petition than to go to court, and probably cheaper considering that petitions could be drafted *pro deo*.

It seems likely that from 1657 onwards the lower officers were stuck in the middle. Even before leaving Brazil, the higher officers had through von Schoppe arranged payment in heavy money, but the middle to lower officers and soldiers were left out of this arrangement – notwithstanding the decisions by the States General and advices from bodies such as the Council of State. The soldiers and lower officers such as sergeants had no other option than to accept a twenty-five per cent pay cut, because ‘beggars aren’t choosers’ – literally. After several years below subsistence, as becomes clear from the petitions for travel pennies, the soldiers were happy to receive whatever they could get their hands on. The captains, lieutenants, and cornets had the means to not immediately accept the payment conditions and tried to achieve more through outside lobbying in a printed petition.

When comparing the search for arrear payments from the soldiers to other wage laborers seeking their wages it appears that soldiers indeed can be considered laborers.<sup>947</sup> By the time they arrived in the Republic it was too late for strikes, desertion, or mutiny to express their grievances. It was quite surprising that the soldiers did not resort to riots. While still in Brazil desertion happened regularly. Mutiny would not have solved their problem of arrear payments as they were far away in Brazil and relied on support to get home. Those who did not rely on support to get back to Europe, such as sailors, were more likely to rise in mutiny. Strikes were considered, and also encouraged by strategists in the Republic, but these did not put enough weight in the scale to force swift payment. The absence of riots by naked and hungry soldiers at the *Binnenhof* is perhaps most surprising in this regard, especially when considering the intersectional solidarity shown in the petitions. The sailors’ revolt of 1652 in Amsterdam resulted in both a pardon ‘to keep the citizens quiet and

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<sup>946</sup> Winter, *WIC ter kamer Stad en Lande*, 38-41.

<sup>947</sup> Zürcher, "Introduction."



preserve public order' and eventually in payment of their wages.<sup>948</sup> The petitions did not even contain an implicit threat of violence if its requests were not met, even though the implicit threat of a strike was mentioned in earlier petitions. Without starting a collective court case, the only non-violent option for the soldiers was to petition collectively.

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<sup>948</sup> H. de Schepper and M. Vrolijk, "The Other Face of Struggle Against Violence: Peace and Order by Clemency in the Netherlands, 1500-1650," in *Janus at the millennium : perspectives on time in the culture of the Netherlands* ed. T.F. Shannon and J.P. Snapper (Dallas: University Press of America, 2004), 286.



## MAKING THE COMPANY WORK

*'Ever since, the Remonstrants have walked to The Hague, solicited, remonstrated, maintained, prayed, and begged with tears in their eyes'.<sup>949</sup>*

Intersectional networks of aggregate interests did not stand idly by as the world changed around them but instead actively lobbied for their own interests. Important decisions were made in the European center, and these decisions were partially negotiated around geopolitical, military, and economic circumstances. However, these decisions were also based on the information that was supplied by the individuals from the (colonial) periphery. In addition, colonial individuals actively engaged in the political decision-making process by physically crossing the Atlantic from Brazil to the Dutch Republic to deliver their opinion. They submitted petitions to colonial or metropolitan governments, or even both, thus steering decision-making process. As a result, policy-making was not exclusive to The Hague, but stretched to include other provinces and even the Atlantic Ocean. In this regard, the political system was polycentric. Moreover, lobbying individuals wrote and/or printed pamphlets defending their interests, thus contributing to a public debate in an attempt to influence decision-making. This thesis argues that the Dutch colony in Brazil was the outcome of a permanent process of structuration by lobby groups formed through free agent organization based in cooperative practice and intersecting interests. This means that aggregates of people made a difference. Concomitantly, this underscores the role of human agency for institutions.

People made a difference for the implementation, shape, and maintenance of Dutch Brazil through lobbying. Lobbying allowed these people to influence decision-making and their influence is most apparent when it comes to formal institutions such as regulations. Institutions are *'humanly devised constraints'* that structure human interaction.<sup>950</sup> This implies that people, whether as individuals or as members of a network, were part and parcel of the Dutch colonial experience. Moreover, this thesis demonstrates that the colony in Brazil, and

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<sup>949</sup> 'Sedert welken tijt, de Remonstranten wederomme geduyrich henen hebben gelopen, gesolliciteert, geremonstreert, aengehouden, gesmeeckt ende met de tranen in de ooghen ghebeden (...)', Kn. 7872: Corte en bondige deductie van redenen, 28.

<sup>950</sup> North, "Institutions," 97.

to some extent the wider Atlantic, was not exclusively a project of great designers, political elites, or enlightened thinkers. Instead, it was the product of individuals who wanted to become *Grietman* in Friesland, of individuals that could mold colonial institutions in accordance to their interest, and of individuals trapped in historical grudges or party lines. In other words, these individuals should not be seen separately from the Company as they were an integral part of its success and failure.

The effect of lobbying for the realization and implementation of institutions can for example be seen in the erection of the WIC. Although it is easy to discredit Usselinx' vision of a colonizing company for the Atlantic as utopian and unrealistic, the result of the WIC was largely influenced by his vision for the Company's structure. That his vision was not realized in all its elements was less caused by an unrealistic vision, than it was the outcome of a failure to forge political alliances. In other words, it was the result of structural limitations which Usselinx was insufficiently able to navigate. Within the colony, the WIC adopted a colonial structure that relied heavily on pre-existing Portuguese bodies such as the *câmara*. This was primarily because the Company had very little room to negotiate and relied on cooperation from existing organizational forms to make the colony a success. In practice, its Portuguese inhabitants succeeded in allocating specific time slots for the High Government to deal with current Portuguese affairs. At the same time, the Portuguese inhabitants were reliant on of the Company's realization of the importance to facilitate lobbying. Despite all the potential of lobbying there were always structural limitations to the bandwidth of maneuverability which has become especially apparent in less successful lobbying campaigns.

The shape of institutions was structured in both the colony and the metropole. A clear example in the colonial sphere is the change of regulations for the enslavement of Amerindians in 1642. Even though the Board of Directors of the WIC and the regents in the States General repeatedly demonstrated their conviction that only enslaved Africans should be part of the enslaved labor force, the *senhores* of Dutch Brazil succeeded in changing this regulation. Within the colony, lobbyists provided the argumentation for, and wording of, an ordinance forbidding enslaved Africans access to certain areas to collect grass, water, or firewood. This clearly demonstrates the relation between petitions and formal institutions. Moreover, when it comes to trading regulations, the population in Dutch Brazil succeeded in

lobbying the High Government to introduce regulations that sought to improve the quality and global competitiveness of Brazilian sugar. Interestingly enough, these trading regulations were adopted by the Portuguese only after the colonial façade changed back from Dutch to Portuguese. Within the metropolitan sphere, the implementation and shaping of institutions of political economy were also the result of lobbying. When diverging interests went head-to-head in the Republic with some preferring a Company monopoly and others preferring free trade with recognition fees, the political arena formed a battleground for lobbying interest groups. Both parties used economic, legal, and moral arguments and provided extremely detailed calculations to prove their policy was economically more rewarding. Even though colonial subjects were invited to demonstrate their preference on this matter, and as such the “peripheral” colony became the center of the political interest, the States General established itself as the center of political decision-making within the Republic. As a result, the shape of institutions in both the Republic and the colony in Brazil was the result of structuration through lobbying.

Furthermore, lobbying was often the tool of choice for the maintenance of institutions. The lobbying campaigns for military assistance demonstrate this clearly. The drawn-out process that culminated in the loss of Brazil was characterized by repeated lobbying campaigns for military support from the metropole. The decisions following these campaigns were structurally limited by other circumstances such as the availability of resources and other political events. Nevertheless, the fact that military support was eventually organized demonstrates that lobbying was a successful tool to achieve the maintenance of institutions. Even though lobbying for the rescue of Brazil united people in both the colony and the metropole, it is striking that individuals in the colony preferred to use their resources to lobby for a continuation of a Dutch façade. The lobby campaign of 1652-1653 demonstrates the commitment and the faith entrusted to the lobbyists by the inhabitants of Brazil for the maintenance of institutions. This was evidenced by the fact that the campaign was in fact financed by donations from the inhabitants of Brazil.

These lobbying campaigns for implementing, shaping, and maintaining institutions were inclusive in principal. That is to say, lobbying campaigns were open to free people, for there is no evidence that the enslaved population had access to political bodies at all. The Catholic Portuguese, Brazilian Amerindian, and Jewish population on the other hand had

comparable access to the political arenas as Protestant Dutch inhabitants in Brazil. One Amerindian delegation even had an audience with the States General. Moreover, as argued above, the Portuguese inhabitants had a crucial role for the shaping of institutions relating to the preservation of sugar, and, for example, a regulation aimed at preventing fraudulent practices. Limitations for lobbyists were more structural in nature. Access to the political arena could be prohibited. Moreover, limited funds or other political circumstances, such as the peace treaty in Munster, could limit the bandwidth of maneuverability for lobbyists. However, these limitations applied equally to lobbyists and political mandataries.

From the perspective of the Company or the States General it made sense to facilitate lobbying even when, for example, there was no legal obligation to accept petitions. Policies and regulations that resulted from popular participation were more likely to boast a larger foundation of support than decisions introduced by the political mandataries. This does not necessarily mean that decisions that were the result of lobbying were always met with universal approval, as is well demonstrated by the intense lobbying campaign in the Republic over trade regulations in the late 1630s. However, the anger in Brazil in response to the Company's decision to reduce expenditure in the colony, is a clear indication of the possible pitfalls of more "top-down" decision-making. Policy changes involving the employees of the university that were not the result of a lobbying process evidently ran the risk of strikes and resignations from the employees and subjects. An additional benefit of allowing lobbying is that it facilitated the integration and implementation of Portuguese know-how and institutions in the newly conquered Dutch colony.

It often occurred that lobbying took place on an individual level, but individuals could just as easily form a lobbying alliance. These alliances of aggregate interests are of particular relevance as they demonstrate the intersecting interests that could transcend sectional boundaries of gender, kinship, class, religion, 'nationality', and geography. As such, these alliances shaped the institutions of Dutch Brazil in an attempt to further their shared interests. However, alliances were not exclusively forged between heterogeneous individuals. An intimate network such as the Varlet-Hack family, which obtained seats in important bodies such as the *câmara* and the Board of Directors, succeeded in advancing its own interests for trading regulations in the late 1630s. These lobbying alliances, whether

based on traditional boundaries or otherwise, were essential to the success and failure of Dutch Brazil and were an integral part of the colonial experience.

Kollman's theory of lobbying suggest that interest groups can use direct lobbying as well as outside lobbying strategies.<sup>951</sup> In the seventeenth century, direct lobbying manifested itself via petitions, presentations and correspondence. Petitions were of paramount importance in facilitating the interaction between (ordinary) people and political mandataries. Outside lobbying occurred in pamphlets and displays of social unrest in the streets, as well as petition drives. Petition drives, and the practice of multiple individuals signing petitions to support a cause, transformed the public sphere and created a new form of lobbying in the Dutch Republic. Political mandataries had predominantly feared public opinion and a petition drive was a way of mobilizing public opinion for lobbying purposes. A petition drive demonstrated the popular support for the issue addressed in the petition. An excellent example of the influence of public opinion for the decision-making process is the city of Amsterdam, where a petition drive led the city to remove its objection to send a rescue fleet to Brazil in 1645.

Moreover, it is imperative to emphasize and include the role of personal relations and the use of societal capital in seventeenth century lobbying. Hendrick Haecxs, for example, needed the societal capital of Johannes de Laet to introduce him to the States General, the States of Holland, and the Stadtholder. Furthermore, the Frisian Stadtholder Willem Frederik employed his personal connections in order to put forward his favorable recommendations regarding the Brazilian affair. Willem Frederik did not have any personal stake in the matter, but acted in his 'official capacity' as Stadtholder, who needed to manage his societal capital. On another occasion, Stadtholder Fredrik Hendrik recommended favorably without 'actual knowledge of this affair'. This further demonstrates the necessity of societal credit in lobbying, since the content of the lobbying campaign was of secondary importance to the lobbyist's personal relations. Thus, Kollman's analytical framework for the twentieth century should include the role of personal relations and societal capital in the early modern period.

At the same time, controlling the flow of information was a tool that could be instrumentalized by all interested parties. The Board of Directors relied on information provided by the colonies. The directors often complained about the slow stream of

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<sup>951</sup> Kollman, *Outside Lobbying*.

information coming from Brazil and that the people in the street were faster and more accurately informed than the Board was through official channels. It was also important to control the information that was percolating to the meetings of the States General. The diary of Hendrick Haecxs provides an excellent example of how the committee on West Indian affairs of the States General and a subset of the directors together succeeded in convincing Haecxs to tone down his report in order not to frustrate peace negotiations in Munster. Because reliable information was often scarce, the ability to control the flow of information was a vital tool for influencing the decision-making process. When the delegates of Brazil lobbied for a rescue campaign in 1652 and 1653, a large part of their time was devoted to streamlining information exchange between the different political bodies. Even though they did not produce the information, they attempted to control the flow of information to further their own interests. As a result, the control of information was important for lobbyists and political mandataries alike.

Lobbying offers a perspective of human agency for the development of institutions. Institutions did not solely exist because they were more efficient; they also existed because they were the product of structuration by knowledgeable individuals. Lobbying was a more cooperative form of interaction between people and political mandataries than, for example, going to court. While several people remarked how tense the situation was between the two competing factions during the lobby campaign on trading regulations in the late 1630s, none of the two parties went to court, but lobbied instead. Moreover, lobbying offered a better chance of success than going to court. When Pieter Coets obtained a court ruling reversing the delegates of the quarter of Veluwe to nullify their approval of Guelders' delegates consent for a relief effort for Brazil in February 1647, the States General simply overruled the court's decision. In other words, appealing political decisions in a court could result in an appeal by opponents to a political body that overruled the earlier decision of the court. Political lobbying on the other hand – as is demonstrated in this thesis – had recurrently proven itself capable of facilitating institutional change and was an accessible way of doing so.

While war and revolutions could prompt changes in institutions, not all institutional alterations happened organically or incrementally. Hence, it needs to be emphasized that institutional change was also the result of structuration through lobbying. Even though



people also lobbied for marginal adjustments in regulations, the chapter on trading regulations demonstrates that lobbying had the potential of influencing far-reaching institutions of political economy that transformed the reality of many people with an interest in Brazil or the wider Dutch Atlantic. Lobbying was a form of structuration, and petitions, public opinion, and personal relations were the carriers of the interactions between lobbyists and political mandataries. The lobbying campaigns were often the result of individuals allied through their shared interests. These shared interests shaped the colony in Brazil. The lobbyists ensured that the Company operated, and that it operated to accommodate their interests. In other words, lobbying made the Company work.



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## SUMMARY IN DUTCH

### **Atlantische Lobby-alliantie: Politieke besluitvorming en economische belangen in de geschiedenis van Nederlands Brazilië, 1621-1656.**

De zeventiende-eeuwse geschiedenis van de West-Indische Compagnie (WIC) en de Nederlandse kolonie in Brazilië is er een van lobbyen. Vanaf het eerste moment dat er sprake was van de oprichting van een WIC (1621) tot de terugkeer van soldaten na het verlies van Brazilië (1656) die probeerden hun salaris te krijgen, speelden lobbyende belangen een belangrijke rol bij de politieke besluitvorming. Immers, individuen in zowel de kolonie als in Europa stonden vanzelfsprekend niet passief aan de zijlijn terwijl reguleringen over hen werden uitgestort, maar probeerden actief de besluitvorming te beïnvloeden. De lobbyende individuen werkten vaak samen met anderen om hun belangen veilig te stellen en hadden zo veel invloed op het succes en mislukken van de Nederlandse kolonie in Brazilië. Deze invloed van samenwerkende individuen stelt het belang van grote organisaties in de Europese metropool ter discussie voor het creëren, vormgeven, en onderhouden koloniale instituties. Met andere woorden, via lobbyen hadden individuen veel handelingsvermogen en invloed op de koloniale ervaring van de Republiek in het zeventiende-eeuwse Atlantisch gebied.

Dit proefschrift heeft een chronologische ordening waarbij elk hoofdstuk bovendien verschillende thema's behandelt. Hoofdstuk 1 begint met een overzicht van de verschillende politieke instellingen in de Republiek en de ordening van de WIC. Hieruit blijkt al dat de gedecentraliseerde structuur van de Republiek zich uitermate goed leende voor beïnvloeding, maar tegelijkertijd kennis en kunde vereiste. Immers, de ene week was persoon *x* een provincie vertegenwoordigen in de Staten-Generaal, terwijl de volgende week persoon *y* zitting had in de vergaderingen. Als voorbeeld van lobbyen voor de creatie van de WIC wordt Willem Usselinx (1567-1647) geïntroduceerd. Hoewel Usselinx wel enige bekendheid geniet als eerste pleitbezorger van de oprichting van een WIC, heeft de literatuur meer aandacht voor zijn utopische koloniale visie, dan voor zijn lobbypraktijken. Het voorbeeld van Usselinx laat bovendien goed zien hoe onderliggende structuren in de Republiek de bewegingsvrijheid voor een individu konden beperken. De rivaliteit tussen

Orangisten en Staatsgezinden beperkte de mogelijkheid voor Usselinx om succesvolle lobby-allianties te smeden. Doordat Usselinx zich formeel had gelieerd met Stadhouder Maurits, beperkte dit als vanzelf zijn lobbymogelijkheden, en werd hij actief tegen gewerkt door Van Oldenbarnevelt. Ondanks de steun van de Stadhouder, slaagde Usselinx er niet in steun van edellieden te verwerven door zijn pleidooi voor verregaande inspraak voor de aandeelhouders in het benoemen van de Compagnie's functionarissen. Bovendien was zijn standpunt voor vreedzame kolonisatie in tegenspraak met de verbindende steun voor oorlogsvoering in het Atlantisch gebied tegen Habsburgse erfvijand. Usselinx kon of wilde de beperkingen voor zijn utopische visie niet accepteren en als gevolg daarvan was zijn handelingsvermogen beperkt door de bestaande structuren zoals partijen en facties.

Nadat de Staten-Generaal in 1621 het octrooi voor de West-Indische Compagnie verleenden, waarin relatief weinig over was gebleven van Usselinx' visie, maakte de WIC een eerste poging de Portugese kolonie in Brazilië in te lijven in 1624. Het kortstondige succes van enkele maanden in Bahia zorgde ervoor dat de Compagnie niet veel financiële slagkracht over had om nieuwe, kostbare, risicovolle, pogingen te ondernemen om de territoriale bezittingen van de Spaanse koning te veroveren. Als vanzelf zorgde dit ervoor dat de WIC een veredelde Atlantische kaapvaartcompagnie werd die het met name had voorzien op volgeladen retourvloten. In 1628 zorgde een succesvolle maritieme onderneming in de Slag in de Baai van Matanzas, beter bekend als de verovering van de zilvervloot, onder leiding van Piet Heyn ervoor dat de oorlogskas van de Compagnie weer goed gevuld was. De uitreding van een nieuwe vloot met Brazilië als bestemming, slaagde er in 1630 in meer vaste voet aan de grond te krijgen in Recife. Aanvankelijk werd het koloniale bestuur vooral gekenmerkt door *ad hoc* oplossingen, maar met name met de komst van Johan-Maurits van Nassau-Siegen als eerste (en laatste) Gouverneur-Generaal in 1637, kreeg het koloniale bestuur in Brazilië meer concrete vormen en terugkerende patronen. De invulling van politieke verantwoordelijkheid bouwde voort op bestaande Portugese patronen (zoals *câmaras* als lokale vertegenwoordiging), maar had ook Hollandse kenmerken zoals de functies van schouten en schepenen. Het lokale bestuur in Brazilië was dus een hybride vorm tussen Portugese en Hollandse bestuurlijke tradities. In deze periode breidde de territoriale aanspraak van de WIC in Brazilië zich uit naar de kapiteinschappen ten noorden van de Rio Grande.

In Hoofdstuk 2 verschuift het perspectief van de Republiek naar Brazilië, om lobbyen “op de grond” in de kolonie te bestuderen. Het hoofdstuk bevestigt grotendeels de visie in de bestaande literatuur over andere koloniale rijken dan de Nederlandse; de ‘periferie’ had verregaande autonomie ten opzichte van het Europese centrum en er was ‘speelruimte’ (*Middle Ground*) waarin interactie tussen koloniaal bestuur en koloniale inwoners plaatsvond. De van oorsprong Portugese bevolking in de WIC-kolonie in Brazilië krijgt in het bijzonder aandacht in dit hoofdstuk. In augustus 1640 organiseerde het hoogste koloniale bestuur in Brazilië, onder leiding van Gouverneur-Generaal Johan Maurits, een Landdag waarin Portugese afgevaardigden hun verzoeken konden indienen. De verschillende *câmaras* en gemeentes dienden in totaal 81 petitieën in over diverse onderwerpen. Met name de petitieën om nieuwe regelingen verdienden speciale aandacht. Zo slaagden de indieners van petitieën er onder andere in om de regelgeving omtrent het brandmerken van suikerkisten te veranderen met als doel fraude te beperken, en leidde het verder tot bijvoorbeeld een verbod op het ‘s nachts buiten opslaan van suiker met als doel de kwaliteit te waarborgen. Ook werd naar aanleiding van petitieën regelgeving geïntroduceerd die de aansprakelijkheid van suikerproducenten voor hun schulden moest beperken. Andere petitieën gingen over de rol van (publieke) religie en de kerk.

Een petitie met verregaande gevolgen was het verzoek om de oorspronkelijke bevolking in Brazilië te mogen gebruiken voor slavenarbeid. Dit lag gevoelig aangezien de WIC het idee om Brazilië te veroveren deels legitimeerden als bevrijding van de inheemse bevolking van het juk der Portugezen. Niet alleen omdat de Portugezen deels tot slaaf gemaakte Amerindianen gebruikte, maar ook om de bevolking te ontdoen van de last van katholicisme. Men was er weliswaar van overtuigd dat het beter zou zijn als de suikermolens door ‘blanck mensen’ zou worden bediend, maar aangezien de aankomst van arbeiders uit Europa niet viel te verwachten, was een bezwaar tegen het gebruik van slavenarbeid uit sub-Sahara Afrika ‘onnodige scrupuleusheyt’ - aldus een rapport uit 1639. Zowel de bewindhebbers van de WIC en de leden van de Staten-Generaal hadden herhaaldelijk duidelijk gemaakt dat slavenarbeid door de inheemse bevolking niet toegestaan moest worden. Toen, twee jaar nadat het was ingediend in 1640, de petitie op de burelen van de bewindhebbers van de WIC terecht was gekomen, veranderde de houding van de bestuurders. De volkeren die bevrijd waren van de Portugezen, of die als bondgenoot van de

WIC opereerden konden nog steeds niet tot slaaf gemaakt worden, maar de Amerindianen die als gevolg van interne oorlogen als slaaf aan de WIC werden aangeboden, konden voor de laagst mogelijke prijs worden gekocht en gedurende zeven jaar als slaaf te werk gesteld worden. Dit laat zien hoe door middel van petitie de Portugese bevolking verregaande invloed kon hebben op het beleid van de WIC in Brazilië. Andere niet-Europese inwoners van de WIC-kolonie hadden ook toegang tot het bestuur. De Amerindiaanse bondgenoten hadden via tussenpersonen (*regedores*) toegang tot het bestuur. De enige groep die ogenscheinlijk geen mogelijkheid hadden om te lobbyen, waren de slaven.

Het is makkelijk om te zeggen dat op basis van deze voorbeelden de individuen in Brazilië verregaande invloed hadden op de implementatie van het koloniale beleid van de WIC en dat dus dat heel belangrijk was voor het succes en mislukken van het WIC-beleid. Echter, op basis van een voorbeeld over beleid dat in de Republiek werd bepaald, wordt duidelijk dat beleid dat in de Republiek werd ontworpen op veel tegenstand kon rekenen. Het ging zelfs zo ver dat verschillende functionarissen dreigden op te stappen en effectief in staking gingen uit onvrede over het bezuinigende beleid dat door de Heren XIX werd opgelegd. Dit maakt duidelijk dat het ook voor de WIC een aantrekkelijke optie was om de inwoners in Brazilië te betrekken bij de regelgeving in de kolonie.

In het derde hoofdstuk verschuift de focus weer wat meer naar de Republiek en in het bijzonder het verhitte debat over de regelgeving voor de handel tussen Europa en de kolonie in Brazilië. Centraal stond de vraag of de WIC een monopolie op deze handel moet hebben, of dat de handel vrijgegeven moest worden voor meer handelaren. De voornaamste kempfanen die hier tegenover elkaar stonden waren de WIC-kamer Amsterdam en de WIC-kamer Zeeland. De Zeelanders waren voorstander van een monopolie, en de Amsterdammers waren voorstander van een meer handelaren toelaten in de handel. Hoewel dit een binaire tegenstelling lijkt, lag de basis van dit conflict niet primair in principiële verschillende opvattingen over economie of economische groei. De Amsterdammers wilden een vrijere vorm van handel in een poging meer kolonisten te verleiden zich in Brazilië te vestigen. De Zeelanders wilden een monopolie omdat dat aanvankelijk beloofd was aan de investeerders. In het lobbyen gingen beide partijen er hard in; er werden grote delegaties gestuurd en mensen werden onder druk gezet om verklaringen af te leggen die bepaalde belanghebbenden wel goed uit kwamen en anderen niet, en werd geprobeerd de lobby-

arena's te beperken. Bovendien leverde beide partijen gedetailleerde berekeningen aan waaruit zou moeten blijken dat hun voorgestelde beleid beter was vanuit een economisch perspectief. Het blijkt dan ook dat de handelsregulering vooral bedoeld was om de thuismarkt te steunen en dat beide partijen minder geïnteresseerd waren in waar de koloniale goederen precies naartoe gingen. Zeeland was met name bang dat een ongereguleerde markt zou leiden van het verschuiven van de uitgaande handel naar Amsterdam.

Nadat de stofwolven rond het vrijhandelsdebat waren opgetrokken, brak een relatief rustige periode aan waarin de WIC erin slaagde het territorium verder uit te breiden onder leiding van Gouverneur-Generaal Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen. Na zijn vertrek brak er een opstand uit onder een deel van de Portugese bevolking. De WIC had onvoldoende slagkracht om de opstand effectief de kop in te drukken, dus het was aan de Staten-Generaal om te besluiten óf en hoeveel soldaten er gestuurd zouden moeten worden om de kolonie voor de WIC te behouden.

In het vierde hoofdstuk wordt deze campagne geanalyseerd vanuit het perspectief van *outside lobbyen*. Bij *outside lobbyen* gaat het niet om het overtuigen van de personen die het besluit nemen, maar om het druk uit oefenen op het besluitvormingsproces. In dit hoofdstuk gaat het om druk uitoefenen door middel van de publieke opinie, en worden collectieve petitie's gebruikt om de participatie in de publieke sfeer in beeld te brengen. Hoewel de focus specifiek 1 petitie is, wordt dit gecontextualiseerd met andere groeps petitie's en gezamenlijke petitie's naar de Staten-Generaal. De petitie die centraal staat was ondertekent door 92 individuen. Doordat verschillende soorten inkt zijn gebruikt, evenals verschillende soorten veren, is het duidelijk dat de petitie niet op één plek is gebleven. Immers, wie gaat overal naartoe met zijn eigen inkt? Door de namen op de petitie te volgen en deze te linken aan beschikbare informatie over woonadressen in de zeventiende eeuw, is het mogelijk het spoor van de petitie door Amsterdam te volgen. Via onder andere de Herengracht en de Breestraat werden ook handtekeningen verzameld in de buurt waar een paar jaar later de Portugese Synagoge gebouwd zou worden. De inhoud van de petitie bevatte geen nieuwe informatie of argumenten, maar toch besloten de Burgemeesters van Amsterdam hun mening te veranderen naar aanleiding van deze petitie en werd een reddingsmissie voor Brazilië ondersteund. Kortom, ze werden niet overtuigd, maar door de publieke sfeer onder druk

gezet om hun mening te veranderen. Een tweede voorbeeld van een 'Atlantische' petitie met meerder handtekeningen gaat over de handel op Guinea die zelfs naar meerdere steden reisde. De twee voorbeelden samen laten duidelijk zien dat Joden samen met Christenen ondertekenden, dat mannen samen met vrouwen ondertekenden, en dat de publieke sfeer niet beperkt was tot de muren van een stad. Met andere woorden, deze groepen kwamen samen om hun gedeelde belangen, en overstegen zo traditionele grenzen. Bovendien was het printen van een petitie geen noodzakelijke stap in het bespelen van de publieke sfeer.

Ondanks het succes van de petitie duurde het nog enige tijd voordat de reddingsmissie daadwerkelijk vertrok. De Hoge Regering in Brazilië was er niet gerust op dat hun brieven met verzoeken om meer ondersteuning voldoende resultaat boekten, en besloten daarop om een uit hun midden terug naar de Republiek te sturen om te lobbyen. Deze persoon was Hendrick Haecxs. Gedurende zijn reis hield Haecxs een dagboek bij waardoor het duidelijk wordt hoe hij lobbyde. Zijn, en andere, dagboeken staan centraal in het vijfde hoofdstuk dat focust op het belang van persoonlijke relaties.

De missie van Haecxs werd bemoeilijkt door andere belangen die op de achtergrond speelden. De vredesonderhandelingen die uiteindelijk culmineerden in de Vrede van Münster in 1648 waren in 1647 in volle gang en verdeelden de vertegenwoordigers in de Staten-Generaal. Zeeland wilde de vredesonderhandelingen alleen steunen als er een reddingsmissie naar Brazilië werd geregeld – iets waar juist de Hollandse vertegenwoordigers niet om stonden te springen. Bovendien lag Friesland consequent dwars, in het bijzonder omdat ze zich nog altijd gepasseerd voelden doordat ze geen eigen WIC-kamer hadden. Mede hierdoor werd het geld voor de reddingsmissie voor Brazilië uiteindelijk verbonden met een factiestrijd over wie er Grietman in Baarderadeel kon worden.

Het dagboek van Haecxs legt verder prachtig bloot hoe de informele lobbykanalen konden werken. Zo werd hij na aankomst in Den Haag al snel ontboden door een delegatie van WIC-functionarissen. Nadat Haecxs hen had verteld wat hij tegen de Staten-Generaal wilde vertellen, werd hem duidelijk gemaakt dat hij, in verband met de precaire politieke situatie ten aanzien van Münster, zijn rapport af moest zwakken. Een te negatief rapport zou de vredesonderhandelingen beschadigen. Bovendien nam deze kleine vergadering het rapport niet officieel in ontvangst omdat "het vereiste quorum" niet was behaald voor een

officiële vergadering. Nadat Haecxs zijn rapport had afgezwakt werd hij wel ontvangen door de commissie voor Westindische Zaken van de Staten-Generaal, waar bleek dat het overgrote deel van de vergadering dezelfde personen waren als die de dag daarvoor hem onder druk hadden gezet om de toon van zijn rapport af te zwakken. De voorzitter vroeg, bijkans smalend, of Haecxs misschien iets had aan te dienen voor de vergadering, en wat de reden voor zijn Atlantische overtocht was. Haecxs stak van wal, maar voordat hij zijn verhaal af kon maken werd de commissie (zonder Haecxs) ontboden in de plenaire vergadering. In het informele deel waarin iedereen opstond, kwam de voorzitter naar Haecxs toe met de vraag of 6,000 soldaten genoeg waren. Haecxs benadrukte dat een groot deel dood zou gaan of op een andere manier ongeschikt zou zijn, waarop de voorzitter antwoordde dat Haecxs' schatting van een derde wel erg hoog was. Ondersteund door Johannes de Laet bezocht Haecxs verder nog de Staten van Holland en de Stadhouder. Wat het dagboek bovenal duidelijk naar voren brengt is een uniek inkijkje in het informele deel van het lobbyproces.

Terwijl Haecxs terugkeerde aan boord van de reddingsvloot onder leiding van Witte de With, ging het met de kolonie niet voorspoedig. Twee belangrijke slagen werden verloren en de moraal zakte dieper en dieper. In 1652 was de bevolking zo ontevreden dat ze collecte organiseerden om zelf drie gedelegeerden naar de Republiek te zenden om te lobbyen: Jasper van Heussen, Abraham de Azevedo, en Jacob Hamel. De drie hadden het niet makkelijk, maar lobbyden enorm hard voor de kolonie. Hoewel ze erin slaagden de noodzaak duidelijk te maken, waren ze daarna vooral bezig het proces glad te strijken door de communicatie te bespoedigen. Desalniettemin was hun moeite uiteindelijk niet voldoende om de kolonie te redden voor de WIC. Begin 1654 bereikte het bericht dat de Portugezen de kolonie hadden terugveroverd de Republiek. De voornaamste reden waarom een nieuwe reddingsmissie uitbleef was dat het geld er simpelweg niet was om meer schepen uit te redden. Zelfs de truc om zes schepen die eigenlijk bedoeld waren voor de eerste Engelse Zeeoorlog te gebruiken voor Brazilië leverde niet genoeg op.

Na het verlies van de kolonie keerden de soldaten arm, mager, en soms zelfs naakt terug in de Republiek. Vanaf dat moment waren zij nog lange tijd bezig te lobbyen om hun achterstallige salaris te krijgen. Hun petitie, die deels gezamenlijke petitie waren, laten zien hoe ze lobby-allianties vormden die traditionele grenzen overschreden. Het waren onder

andere soldaten die met hogere legerfunctionarissen samen petitioneerden; het waren Fransen die met Duitsers of Schotten samen petitioneerden; het waren soldaten uit verschillende legeronderdelen die samen petitioneerden. Bovendien waren de soldaten het eerste voorbeeld dat ik heb kunnen vinden van het gebruik van een geprinte petitie waarop alleen de datum ingevuld moest worden. Echter, omdat er geen enkele geprinte petitie terug te vinden is in het archief van de Staten-Generaal, is het heel goed mogelijk dat dit vooral bedoeld was als een pamflet om de publieke opinie te beïnvloeden.

De intersectionele verbanden die samen lobby-allianties vormden in de zeventiende eeuw, waren van groot belang voor het vormgeven van instituties en regelgeving. Dit laat zien dat mensen wel degelijk verschil maakten.



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## CURRICULUM VITAE

Joris van den Tol (Rotterdam, 1987) grew up in Amsterdam and obtained a Gymnasium diploma at the St. Ignatiusgymnasium in 2006. He started studying History at the University of Amsterdam in 2007; completing his BA in 2011 and his MA in Early Modern History in 2012. That same year in October, he started his PhD project under supervision of Cátia Antunes within the Institute for History at Leiden University as part of the NWO-funded project called 'Challenging Monopolies'. During his PhD, he published several peer reviewed articles in English and in Dutch in journals and in edited volumes. Since August 2016 he combined finishing his dissertation with a teaching position at the BA International Studies of Leiden University.



Appendix A – Exports from Brazil 1637

Appendix A – Free trade exports from Brazil in 1637

ID	Firstname	Lastname	Ship	Lb	Chests	Chests	Chests	Chests	Pcs	Pcs	Lb	Remark
				Brasilwood	Blancos	Moscavados	Panella	Tabacco	Confiture	Skin	Campeche	
3	Adriaen	Pauwels	Cameel to Hoorn			13						with Gaspar van Heusden
5	Antonio	Gibson	Cameel to Hoorn		1							
7	Jacques	Hack	Cameel to Hoorn		7	11						
9	Antonio	d'Affonseca	Cameel to Hoorn			6						
10	Gaspar	Ruwies	Cameel to Hoorn			1						
12	Isaac	de Rasier	Cameel to Hoorn		17	9						
13	Gaspar Francisco	d'Acosta	Cameel to Hoorn		6	2						
14	Moses	Navarro	Cameel to Hoorn			9						
16	Michiel	Rodrigues Mendes	Cameel to Hoorn		2	8						
17	Domingo	d'Acosta Brandon	Cameel to Hoorn			2						
18	Samuel	de Casto	Cameel to Hoorn			1						
20	Abraham Francois	Cabbeljau	Cameel to Hoorn		12	2						
21	Balthazar	de Fonseca	Cameel to Hoorn		8	4						
23	Theodosio	L'empereur	Cameel to Hoorn		12	4		2				
24	Gaspar Dias	Fereira	Cameel to Hoorn		6							
27	Willem	Bierboom	Cameel to Hoorn			2						
31	Jacob	van Leijden	Cameel to Hoorn		6	4						
37	Bartholomeus	van Ceulen	Cameel to Hoorn		2	4						
38	Louijs	Nunes	Cameel to Hoorn		1	2						
41	Duarte	Sereiva	Cameel to Hoorn		7	6						
43	Pedro Lopes	de Vera	Cameel to Hoorn		1	13	2					
44	Huijbrecht en Francois	Cloet	Cameel to Hoorn		3	1						
52	Joost	van den Boogaert	Cameel to Hoorn		14	4						
54	Christoffel	Aijrschottel	Cameel to Hoorn		2	1						
58	Westindische	Compagnie	Cameel to Hoorn	14650	22	10	1					514 Olifantstanden
60	David	Gabay	Cameel to Hoorn		1							
61	Jan en Cornelis	van Oolen	Cameel to Hoorn			7	3					
66	Roelant	de Carpentier	Cameel to Hoorn		11	2						

Appendix A – Free trade exports from Brazil in 1637

70	Louijs	Heijns	Cameel to Hoorn			1		1				
76	Pieter	Sulin de Jonge	Cameel to Hoorn		2							
82	Elbert Gerrits	Smient	Cameel to Hoorn		10	1						
86	Jacob	Dirksz Vluggge	Cameel to Hoorn			2		4				
89	David	Bourges	Cameel to Hoorn			1						
90	Ubbo	Ritsema	Cameel to Hoorn		3	6						
91	Abraham	der Heussen	Cameel to Hoorn		3	4						
92	Isaac	Brasilaj	Cameel to Hoorn		1	1						Slave?
101	Moses	Nunes	Cameel to Hoorn			1						
103	Joao	Vieira	Cameel to Hoorn		2	16	2	2				
104	Johan	Wallet	Cameel to Hoorn		1	8		3				En Co.
3	Adriaen	Pauwels	De Hoope to Zeeland		2							
4	Pieter	Marissinck	De Hoope to Zeeland			4						
9	Anthoni	d'Affonseca	De Hoope to Zeeland		2	1						
12	Isaac	de Rasier	De Hoope to Zeeland		3	4						
14	Moses en Aron	Navarro	De Hoope to Zeeland		3							
16	Miguel	Rodriges Mendes	De Hoope to Zeeland		3							
20	Abraham Francois	Cabbeljau	De Hoope to Zeeland		2							With Matthias Becx
22	Daniel en Nicolaes	de Haen	De Hoope to Zeeland		9	6						
23	Theodosio	L'empereur	De Hoope to Zeeland		4	2						
24	Gaspar Dias	Fereira	De Hoope to Zeeland		4	5	3					
26	Isaac en David	Cohen	De Hoope to Zeeland		11							
39	Thomas	Wallis	De Hoope to Zeeland		8	1		16				
40	Ettienne	Lanquier	De Hoope to Zeeland		15	8		1				
42	Isaac	Coronel	De Hoope to Zeeland		6	2						With Duarto Seraiva
43	Pedro Lopes	de Vera	De Hoope to Zeeland		5	17						
44	Huijbrecht en Francois	Cloet	De Hoope to Zeeland		1							
45	Johannes	Bouck	De Hoope to Zeeland		6	12						
46	Claes	Cornelis	De Hoope to Zeeland		7							

Appendix A – Free trade exports from Brazil in 1637

47	Pieter	Terweijden	De Hoope to Zeeland		5	1							With Gaspar van Sulpar
48	Louijs	Steijns	De Hoope to Zeeland		20	21	1	5	1				
49	Miguel	Heijndricks	De Hoope to Zeeland		20	15					142		
50	Gillis	Coene	De Hoope to Zeeland		2								
51	Jan	Quaclais	De Hoope to Zeeland		3		2	1					
52	Joost	van den Boogaert	De Hoope to Zeeland		12	8							
53	Daniel	d'Autreliau	De Hoope to Zeeland		1								
54	Christoffel	Aijrschottel	De Hoope to Zeeland		1	5	10	1					
55	Johan Maurits	van Nassau Siegen	De Hoope to Zeeland		2								
57	Jacob	Coets	De Hoope to Zeeland		4								
58	Westindische	Compagnie	De Hoope to Zeeland	38175	7	3					1600		
3	Adriaen	Pauwels	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		4	2							with Gaspar van Heusden
7	Jacques	Hack	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		2								
10	Caspar	Ruwies	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		1	2							
12	Isaac	de Rasier	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		11	1							
13	Gaspar Francisco	d'Acosta	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		6	11							
14	Moses	Navarro	Pijnappel to Amsterdam			11							
16	Michiel	Rodriges Mendes	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		2	7							
18	Samuel	de Casto	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		1								
20	Abraham Francois	Cabbeljau	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		14	6							
22	Daniel en Nicolaes	de Haen	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		20	3							with Johan Wallet
23	Theodosio	L'empereur	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		3	5							
24	Gaspar Dias	Fereira	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		20	6							
25	Abraham en David Willemsz	de Vries	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		2	3							
40	Ettienne	Lanquier	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		3	3							
41	Duarte	Seraiva	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		14	8							
43	Pedro Lopes	de Vera	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		1	20							
54	Christoffel	Aijrschottel	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		9	7							
57	Jacob	Coets	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		8	31							



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61	Jan en Cornelis	van Oolen	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		4							
70	Louijs	Heijns	Pijnappel to Amsterdam			4						
82	Elbert Gerrits	Smient	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		7							
83	Elbert	Chrispijnsen	Pijnappel to Amsterdam			3						
84	Fernando	Vale	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		1	1				10		
85	Moses	de Ret	Pijnappel to Amsterdam			1						
86	Jacob	Dirksz Vlugge	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		4	5						
87	Jan	Jacobsz Lobs	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		3							
88	Diego	Dias Branda	Pijnappel to Amsterdam		1	2						to Amsterdam
12	Isaac	de Rasier	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen			3						
14	Moses	Navarro	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen			9						
16	Michiel	Rodriges Mendes	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		2	4						
17	Domingo	d'Acosta Brandon	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen			2						
20	Abraham Francois	Cabbeljau	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		5	11						
22	Daniel en Nicolaes	de Haen	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		20	12						with Johan Wallet
23	Theodosio	L'empereur	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		2	2						
24	Gaspar Dias	Fereira	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		2	1						
35	Marcus	de Puers	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen							163		
43	Pedro Lopes	de Vera	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		1	14						
54	Christoffel	Aijrschottel	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		3	1						
58	Westindische	Compagnie	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen	43750								
63	Abraham	Varlett	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		11							
67	Vincent	Drillenburch	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen			3						
69	Willem	Negenten	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		12	2						En Co.
86	Jacob	Dirksz Vlugge	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		37	13						
91	Abraham	der Heussen	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		19	1						
96	Lambert	Gerritsz van Bercquel	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen		4	5						
97	Johan	de Schippij	Seerobbe to Enkhuizen							37		
1	Louijs	Hains	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		28	14						
3	Adriaen	Pauwels	Soutbergh to Amsterdam						2			

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7	Jacques en Nicolas	Hack	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		12	3			5			
12	Isaac	de Rasier	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		2							
13	Gaspar Francisco	d'Acosta	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		22	12						
14	Moses	Navarro	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		3	4						
16	Michiel	Rodrigues Mendes	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		12	13						
20	Abraham Francois	Cabbeljau	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		2	1						With Matthias Becc
21	Balthazar	d'Affonseca	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		12	11	1					
22	Daniel en Nicolaes	de Haen	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		6	2						
23	Theodosio	L'empereur	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		20	6						
24	Gaspar Dias	Fereira	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		21	10						
26	Isaac en David	Cohen	Soutbergh to Amsterdam			2		1				
28	Gabriel	Castanho	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		2	5						
29	Simon Dias	van Zweden	Soutbergh to Amsterdam			2						
33	Bartholomeus	Pelser	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		2							
36	Bento	Henricquez	Soutbergh to Amsterdam					3				
37	Bartholomeus	van Ceulen	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		13							
38	Louijs	Nunes	Soutbergh to Amsterdam			2						
39	Thomas	Wallis	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		2	5						
41	Duarte	Sereiva	Soutbergh to Amsterdam			2						
42	Isaac	Coronel	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		3							
43	Pedro Lopes	de Vera	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		7	13			1			
44	Huijbrecht	Cloet	Soutbergh to Amsterdam			2						
52	Joost	van den Boogaert	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		2	3						
54	Christoffel	Aijrschottel	Soutbergh to Amsterdam					1				
55	Johan Maurits	van Nassau Siegen	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		1							to Amsterdam
57	Jacob	Coets	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		2							
58	Westindische	Compagnie	Soutbergh to Amsterdam	18600	16	14			5			
63	Abraham	Varlett	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		6	5						
67	Vincent	Drillenburch	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		1	1						
69	Willem	Negenten	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		1	1						En Co

Source: NL-HaNA, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 52.

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74	Jacob	d'Assignie	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		8	6		1	4			With Daniel Couwerd
75	Samuel	Halters	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		3							
76	Pieter	Sulin de Jonge	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		1							
77	Joost	Blijenborch	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		2	2						
78	Hendrick	Cornelis Suijder	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		2	1						
79	Duarte	Figuredo	Soutbergh to Amsterdam			4						
80	Andries	Joons	Soutbergh to Amsterdam					3				
81	Pieter	van Coningsloo	Soutbergh to Amsterdam		1							
3	Adriaen	Pauwels	St. Clara to Maze		4	3						En Co.
7	Jacques	Hack	St. Clara to Maze		52	11				30		
10	Caspar	Ruwies	St. Clara to Maze			1						
12	Isaac	de Rasier	St. Clara to Maze		10	3						
14	Moses	Navarro	St. Clara to Maze			6						
16	Michiel	Rodrigues Mendes	St. Clara to Maze		3	3						
20	Abraham Francois	Cabbeljau	St. Clara to Maze		11	10						
23	Theodosio	L'empereur	St. Clara to Maze		8	7						
24	Gaspar Dias	Fereira	St. Clara to Maze		9	15						
27	Willem	Bierboom	St. Clara to Maze		1	1						with Johan Velthuisen
40	Ettienne	Lanquier	St. Clara to Maze			1						
41	Duarte	Seraiva	St. Clara to Maze		11	12						
43	Pedro Lopes	de Vera	St. Clara to Maze		5	5						
52	Joost	van den Boogaert	St. Clara to Maze		13	4						
57	Jacob	Coets	St. Clara to Maze		13	11						
58	Westindische	Compagnie	St. Clara to Maze	36975								
61	Jan en Cornelis	van Oolen	St. Clara to Maze		10	4						
86	Jacob	Dirksz Vlugge	St. Clara to Maze		15	14						
94	Johan	Schaep	St. Clara to Maze		19	13						En co.
95	Salvador	d'Andrade	St. Clara to Maze			1						
102	Pieter	Meijndertsz	St. Clara to Maze		8	1						Captain of the ship

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102	Pieter	Meijndertsz	St. Clara to Maze		8								Unpaid Captain of the ship
104	Johan	Wallet	St. Clara to Maze		10	4							En Co.
105	Wouter	van de Pels	St. Clara to Maze		1								En Co.
3	Adriaen	Pauwels	St. Jan to Maze		1	1							with Gaspar van Heusden
5	Antonio	Gibson	St. Jan to Maze		2				1				
7	Jacques	Hack	St. Jan to Maze						2				
12	Isaac	de Rasier	St. Jan to Maze		7	5							
13	Gaspar Francisco	d'Acosta	St. Jan to Maze		9	7			1				
14	Moses en Aron	Navarro	St. Jan to Maze			10							
16	Michiel	Rodriges Mendes	St. Jan to Maze		1	2							
20	Abraham Francois	Cabbeljau	St. Jan to Maze		11	5							
21	Balthazar	da Fourequa	St. Jan to Maze		2	3							
23	Theodosio	L'empereur	St. Jan to Maze		17	8							
27	Willem	Bierboom	St. Jan to Maze		2	2							
31	Jacob	van Leijden	St. Jan to Maze		2	1							
33	Bartholomeus	Pelser	St. Jan to Maze		8	5							
35	Marcus	de Puers	St. Jan to Maze		4	4					163		
38	Louijs	Nunes	St. Jan to Maze		2	8							
41	Duarte	Sereiva	St. Jan to Maze		2								
43	Pedro Lopes	de Vera	St. Jan to Maze		12	4							
44	Huijbrecht en Francois	Cloet	St. Jan to Maze		3								
54	Christoffel	Aijrschottel	St. Jan to Maze		3								
58	Westindische	Compagnie	St. Jan to Maze	10200	12	1	2						
61	Jan en Cornelis	van Oolen	St. Jan to Maze		3	1							
63	Abraham	Varlett	St. Jan to Maze		3	3							
65	Juan	de la Faya	St. Jan to Maze			1							
67	Vincent	Drillenburch	St. Jan to Maze			4							
86	Jacob	Dirksz Vlugge	St. Jan to Maze		12	3							
91	Abraham	der Heussen	St. Jan to Maze		5								

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97	Juan	de Schippij	St. Jan to Maze		1							
98	Michiel	Neurenburch	St. Jan to Maze		8	2		8				
99	David	Israel	St. Jan to Maze			1						
100	Pieter	Feullijn	St. Jan to Maze		1	2						
101	Moses	Nunes	St. Jan to Maze			2						
3	Adriaen	Pauwels	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		4	3						
5	Anthonio	Gibson	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		7	4		2				
7	Jacques	Hack	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		12	3						
8	Hans	van der Goes	St. Pieter to Amsterdam							48		With Dirck Brugge
10	Gaspar	Ruwies	St. Pieter to Amsterdam			3						
12	Isaac	de Rasier	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		13	6						
13	Gaspar Francisco	d'Acosta	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		19	8		1				
14	Moses	Navarro	St. Pieter to Amsterdam			14						
16	Michiel	Rodriges Mendes	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		6	6						
17	Domingo	d'Acosta Brandon	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		1	3		1				
20	Abraham Francois	Cabbeljau	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		16	6						With Matthias Becc
21	Balthazar	d'Affonseca	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		4	5						
22	Daniel en Nicolaes	de Haen	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		22	11						
23	Theodosio	L'empereur	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		21	4						
24	Gaspar Dias	Fereira	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		7	9						
27	Willem	Bierboom	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		11	3						with Johan Velthuisen
31	Jacob	van Leijden	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		6	5						
32	Pieter	Seulijn	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		2							
33	Balthazar	Pelser	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		3							Also named Bartholomeus
35	Marcus	de Puers	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		3							
38	Louijs	Nunes	St. Pieter to Amsterdam			4						
41	Duarte	Seraiva	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		7	24		1				
43	Pedro Lopes	de Vera	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		5	10						
54	Christoffel	Aijrschottel	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		15	7						

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58	Westindische	Compagnie	St. Pieter to Amsterdam	34100	8	12						
59	Gaspar	van Heusden	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		3	2						
60	David	Gabay	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		2	1						
61	Jan en Cornelis	van Oolen	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		6	2						
62	Michiel Dias	d'Alvo	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		6	1						
63	Abraham	Varlett	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		5							
64	Pauwels	Vermeulen	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		1	2						
65	Jan	de la Faya	St. Pieter to Amsterdam			1						
66	Roelant	de Carpentier	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		9	1						
67	Vincent	Drillenburch	St. Pieter to Amsterdam						2	34		
68	Antonio	Vieira	St. Pieter to Amsterdam			9	1					
69	Willem	Negenten	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		3							
70	Louijs	Heins	St. Pieter to Amsterdam			3						
71	Jan	Roelofsz	St. Pieter to Amsterdam						1			
72	Wessel	Gerrits	St. Pieter to Amsterdam		1							
73	Domingo	Ribero	St. Pieter to Amsterdam						15			
1	Louijs	Hains	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		11	15		1				
2	Tennis	Jansz	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		4							
3	Adriaen	Pauwels	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		4	1						
4	Pieter	Marissinck	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		3	4						
5	Anthoni	Gibson	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		10	6		1				
6	Josua	Velusives	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam			2		1				
7	Jacques	Hack	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		14	4						
8	Hans	van der Goes	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		2	3				30		With Dirk Brugge
9	Anthoni	d'Affonseca	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		2	1						
10	Gaspar	Ruwies	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam			1						
11	Joost	du Forees	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		1	1						
12	Isack	de Rasier	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		3							
13	Gaspar Francisco	d'Acosta	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		16	4						
14	Moses en Aron	Navarro	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		5	2						

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15	Gosalvo	Novo de Lira	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		2	4						
16	Michiel	Rodrigues Mendes	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		5	5	2					
17	Domingo	d'Acosta Brandon	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam				1					
18	Samuel	de Casto	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam			1						
19	Moses	Rodrigues	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		1							
20	Abraham Francois	Cabbeljau	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		2	1						With Matthias Beck
21	Balthazar	d'Affonseca	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		2	5	3					
22	Daniel en Nicolaes	de Haen	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		3	2						
23	Theodosio	L'empereur	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		4	3						
24	Gaspar Dias	Fereira	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		1	5						
25	Abraham	de Vries	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		4							
26	Isaac en David	Cohen	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		9	1						
27	Willem	Bierboom	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		5			1				
28	Gabriel	Castanho	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		1	3				27		
29	Simon Dias	Suero	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		1	1						
30	Moses	Bendano	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam			2						
31	Jacob	van Leijden	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam			4						
32	Pieter	Seulijn	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		6	3						
33	Bartholomeus	Pelser	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		1							
34	Simon	Rodrigues	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		1	1						
35	Marcus	de Puers	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		1	2						
36	Bento	Henricquez	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		6	2						
37	Bartholomeus	van Ceulen	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		1							
38	Louijs	Nunes	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam			1						
39	Thomas	Wallis	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		4							
40	Ettienne	Lanquier	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		2							
41	Duarte	Seraiva	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam			2						
42	Isaack	Coronel	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam		2				4			
58	Westindische	Compagnie	Westwouderkerck to Amsterdam	51000								44000