# JOURNAL *of* MEDITERRANEAN *and* BALKAN INTELLIGENCE

Cross-Domain Approaches to Intelligence Analysis

Guest Editors: *Daniela Bacheș-Torres & Efren R. Torres-Bacheș*

RIEAS

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The Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) based in Athens, Greece, publishes the Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence (JMBI), which is an international postgraduate academic led-scholarly publication focused on the field of intelligence, counterintelligence, terrorism, counterterrorism, geopolitics and international relations. In the global society we live today, it is important more than ever to work together in order to solve our common problems. The JMBI aims to provide opportunity to young postgraduate scholar to prepare for careers in academic, government, journalism as well as in the private sector. The JMBI is committed to provide an outlet for reasoned intellectual study and the Editorial Team of the Journal hopes to ignite a blaze of future success.

EDITORIAL OFFICE

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The history of Intelligence: Future Prospects

[i]Constant (C.W.) HIJZEN

Abstract

Recently, several flaws in the intelligence studies have been designated. It lacks a proper body of knowledge, it lacks theories, and it fails to be 'cumulative'. In order to become more academic, intelligence studies should therefore build 'more theories', it is often heard. In this article, it is argued that in addition to this social scientific answer, historians should come up with their own solutions. They can contribute to a body of knowledge and interact with the historiography; however, for this purpose, they have to transcend the particular details of their findings, and interpret their results in the light of a set of core questions or themes, in order to let other benefit from their work.

Keywords: intelligence historiography; study of intelligence; missing dimension; historians; key debates.

Introduction

Intelligence historians and intelligence analysts generally agree that history plays an important role in their work. Establishing more precisely what role intelligence history could and should play in the academic discipline of the intelligence studies, as well as in the practice of intelligence analysis, has been scrutinized less often, however. In this article, it will be argued that – in order to increase the value of historical research for the study and practice of intelligence – historians will need to strive to relate their work to more general themes within the intelligence field.

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The main point that will be made is that historians will need to analyze their research in the light of broader questions, instead of predominantly in terms of their particular cases; this also involves the implications for intelligence analysis that will be touched upon at the end of the article.

The following example from Dutch intelligence history shows that even a particular event raises questions that relate to themes and topics discussed more broadly within the intelligence studies. On 22 November 1918, Han Fabius, the head of the military intelligence section of the Dutch General Staff, wrote a letter to several police chiefs and a few commanders of the military police. He proposed to establish a civil security service, which was meant to become active after martial law had been replaced with the civilian administration in peacetime again. Because the end of the Great War caused civil unrest and toppling governments everywhere, Fabius and other elements of the Dutch establishment feared that the 'revolutionary steamroller' would inevitably push on westward – for what reason, after all, would revolution stop at the Dutch border, if Russia, Albania, and Germany had already fallen prey to it[1].

Fabius argued, therefore, that a security service should be established under the General Staff of the Dutch army (for the very pragmatic reason that during the First World War intelligence and security activities had been developed there) and he asked the police commissioners, who were to become the primary intelligence producers for the security service, for their opinion. Unexpectedly, they were not very enthusiastic about the idea. Fabius was entering a 'perilous domain', they anticipated.[2]

Karel Henri Broekhoff, an Amsterdam police inspector with whom Fabius had worked closely when in November 1918 revolution appeared to be coming to the Netherlands, was Fabius' most pronounced critic. If the security-service-to-be was to fight the revolutionary threat, a threat that manifested itself out in the *open* - after all, revolutionaries held public meetings, their candidates were publicly known, and their propaganda was widely distributed - then establishing a *secret* service was not an answer to the problem, Broekhoff argued. Secondly, he objected, if Fabius would pursue this anyway, the number of people that had to be involved would soon be so large, that it would be impossible to keep the security service's existence a secret. Broekhoff himself now had some experience in collecting political intelligence in Amsterdam, and he had worked with a very large number of workers, journalists, and police officers. It would hence become public knowledge that the state was spying on its own citizens. This, finally, would have a counterproductive result, Broekhoff wrote Fabius: if society would learn that the state was meddling, mixing, and interfering in the lives of innocent citizens, who were not suspected of committing a crime, then radical socialists (and more broadly, the extremist fringes of the workers' movement) would undoubtedly make use of it for their propaganda, Broekhoff argued. Their narrative would be that the state, already under pressure since November

1918, was illegitimately harassing the workers. Support for and membership of revolutionary organizations would increase, which would be exactly opposite to Fabius' fundamental idea behind this security service: safeguarding the democratic order against the revolutionary threat.[3]

This correspondence about the rationale of establishing a secret service relates to a recurrent and still topical question in the domain of intelligence and security: why, and how, are intelligence organizations institutionalized and embedded? What are their core functions, what do they do in practice and why do they do that? Who tasks and manages them, who reads their reports, how to oversee whether they do not operate outside the law? What are the dominant threats and enemies these organizations have to counter and how exactly should they do that?

These political, administrative, and managerial questions can be asked by practitioners in order to improve the functioning of the intelligence instrument within the state. But these questions can be asked by historians as well in order to improve our knowledge about the function and practice of intelligence and security services. Historical research on intelligence and security services is of crucial importance with the purpose to understand their contribution to policy and decisions in the present, but especially how they have done so in the past, as Richard Aldrich argues. Historical research helps us to understand how during the Cold War policies were underpinned and legitimated by intelligence, and how 'at the lower levels it was the secret services that formed the front line'. As the same Aldrich emphasizes: 'The Cold War was fought, above all, by the intelligence services'.[4] Even though the Cold War has been influential for the way intelligence and security services around the globe have institutionalized and developed over time, their institutional forms, working practices, organizational models, and divergent positions within the broader democratic state can be markedly different. Even the intelligence communities of the United States and the United Kingdom, which are very akin because of their historical ties, differ in important respects. In the United States, there are currently sixteen separate formal intelligence and security services, in the United Kingdom there are three; consequently – and due to differences in political culture and different histories – the American intelligence community is characterized by 'institutional divisions and rivalries', whilst in the British context 'collegiality' is 'endemic'.[5] As a result, Philip Davies concludes that intelligence 'does not mean the same thing on opposite sides of the Atlantic'.[6] What in both practices is meant when the word 'intelligence' is uttered, differs in terms of practices, reports, processes, and organizations. The 'many different ideas of intelligence', therefore, have 'institutional and operational consequences' that we as historians need to understand.[7]

In order to address these national differences in intelligence institutions and practices, including in intelligence analysis, historians could try to analyze them from a comparative perspective. In the historiography on intelligence and

security services, however, such an approach has not been chosen very often.[8] Generally, historians tend to present stand-alone cases and stick to telling anecdotes.[9] This is partly the consequence of more general problems that the area of intelligence studies is suffering from. In the first place, there is a general lack of theory within this discipline. It is thus not as common as in other academic disciplines, most notably the social sciences, to study intelligence from a theoretical framework.[10] Second, intelligence studies scholars fail in a spatial and temporal way to build on – and position their work vis-á-vis – the work of other and earlier scholars. Intelligence studies is a predominantly an Anglo-Saxon field of inquiry, and so the histories of intelligence and security services outside English speaking countries are studied to a much lesser extent, as is the literature in other languages.[11] In an intellectual sense, the failure to build on each other's work is even more problematic, as Stephen Marrin argues. Marrin's main point is that a lot of research is being done in the intelligence studies, but it fails to become 'cumulative', i.e. it fails to build on its own intellectual history. Researchers are not really debating each other's work, nor do they extensively reflect on the dominant insights in the field. Comparative studies are scarce.[12] Most studies, as Bob de Graaff argues, are of a descriptive nature and focus on a specific part of the intelligence practice, usually on a specific case, which is studied independent of (or not explicitly linked to) its international and national political context.[13]

Towards historians' greater involvement

Many authors addressing these shortcomings plea for advancing the theoretical underpinnings of the intelligence studies.[14] Theories may be important, but certainly not the only way forward in the intelligence studies. Although this social scientific answer to the 'academic deficit' of the intelligence studies may alleviate some of the observed problems, historians can bring something to the table too. Where social scientists seek to understand how intelligence and security services function in general, even 'a theory that can inform intelligence studies everywhere' around the world[15], historians can show how particular organizations have institutionalized, in which contexts, and how they operated the way they did. Historical research could also show why intelligence and security services function as they have done and still do in particular times and places. This enhances our understanding of the intelligence phenomenon in general, without losing relevant contextual factors out of sight.

In order to do so, however, intelligence historians have to contribute to intelligence studies in another way than they have so far.[16] Historians of intelligence have written very interesting books and articles on a broad range of particulars of the world of intelligence and security services, stretching from organizational histories to accounts of particular intelligence operations, but as is the case with

the intelligence studies discipline as a whole, they rarely analyze their findings in the light of common themes, problems, approaches, and broader questions.

The way forward within intelligence studies, is not solely social scientific – the answer does not lie exclusively in theorizing, as mentioned above – but is also of historical nature. Historical research can be of added value to our understanding of what intelligence is and does. In order to be relevant for fellow historians and for intelligence studies as a whole, however, intelligence historians should transcend the particulars of their specific research and relate their cases to broader themes and questions. They should reflect on what their archival findings *mean* and answer the question 'so, what?'. To understand how, a deeper reflection on the state of intelligence historiography is necessary.

As mentioned quite often in reflections on intelligence studies, it is well-known that intelligence and security services have been chosen as the object of academic research only recently. Intelligence studies have come into being since the famous Yale professor and intelligence analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Sherman Kent, published his 'Strategic intelligence for American world policy' in 1949.[17] The establishment of the in-house peer-reviewed academic journal 'Studies in intelligence' is described as another important step in the process of 'academization' of intelligence studies.[18] Kent was, however, predominantly interested in professionalizing the trade of intelligence analysis and in order to do so he more or less borrowed the academic practices from the social sciences.[19] He borrowed social scientific insights and practices to establish definitions, concepts, and theories for the intelligence studies.[20]

Professional historians (and political scientists) became involved only decades later. When in the 1970s publications on the role of SIGINT in the Second World War (ULTRA) appeared, and especially since the American year of intelligence (1975), citizens, journalists, and scholars became interested in intelligence and security services.[21] In 1984, nevertheless, the British historians Christopher Andrew and David Dilks described intelligence still as the 'missing dimension' of political and military history. In their book 'The missing dimension: governments and intelligence communities in the twentieth century', Andrew and Dilks argue that historians have largely ignored the role of intelligence and security service in many important historical events, thus omitting an important element in their analysis of decision and policy making.[22] In their attempt to explain where this neglect of the intelligence dimension stemmed from, Andrew and Dilks observed that many of their colleagues were rather hesitant to start doing academic research on intelligence and security services, because in books and movies espionage was depicted in an overly romantic, exciting, and heroic fashion. No one who considered him or herself as a serious, professional historian dared to be associated with this laughable topic, the two authors argued.[23]

More importantly, historians ignored intelligence and security services because they believed that secrecy rendered it impossible to do archival research. This,

however, was a misconception. Blaming contemporary historians for being spoiled – sources are abundantly available in modern times, especially from the twentieth century onwards – the two British authors point out that, although access to archives was indeed more problematic than in other branches of government, it was by no means impossible to study the archives of intelligence organizations. So even though official archives were inaccessible, intelligence documents have ended up elsewhere too. British politicians and high ranked civil servants, for example, regularly brought intelligence documents home, until the Cambridge Five spy ring was uncovered and they became much more security aware. The intelligence historian could therefore explore their personal archives, Andrew points out. The British Secret Intelligence Service furthermore worked in the interwar years under cover organizations, such as the Passport Control Office, the archives of which were accessible to the intelligence historian.[24]

Their call to historians to take this research seriously was picked up on only a few years later. An important catalyst was the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989. In former communist countries, archives opened up for public use and historical research as a means of coming to terms with the dictatorial past, whilst in the West accountability and transparency were becoming more important. As a result, intelligence and security services began publishing (declassified) annual reports, and more importantly, intelligence archives became more accessible, amongst others in the United States and Great Britain.[25] The Dutch security service (*Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst* or BVD) transferred its archives of one of its predecessors, the transitional Bureau for national security (*Bureau Nationale Veiligheid*, BNV, which existed in 1945 and 1946) to the national archive in The Hague and published its official history in 1995.[26] More recently, intelligence documents from 1946-1952 and 1952-1989 were selected for transfer to the national archives, which has its limits at the same time. Due to the fact that operational information and third-party intelligence is not available to the researcher, the historian will find it difficult to do research on operational efficacy and intelligence liaison. The so-called 'zero files' (*nul-dossiers*), which contained the names and personal data of sources and agents, will never be transferred. The Dutch intelligence community actually has the right to destroy them, fearing that the willingness of sources to cooperate today would diminish if they learn that one day (even if the declassification date would be set a hundred and fifty years later) their names and backgrounds would become public.[27]

The body of knowledge, intelligence historiography, has nevertheless grown since the 1990s. Official histories of MI6[28] and MI5[29] have been published, and important journals such as *Intelligence and National Security* and the *International Journal for Intelligence and Counterintelligence* have been established[30], in the Netherlands (as a Dutch chapter of the *International Intelligence History Association*)[31] the *Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association* has been established, an association of former practitioners and academics, and at several universities research and

academic teaching programs on intelligence have developed, and so the body of knowledge – in terms of definitional debates, the study of intelligence failures, research on practices of oversight – is steadily growing.[32] Scholars in the intelligence studies have moved beyond the aim of fortifying the intelligence practice, and now study a broad range of themes within the field of intelligence and security.[33]

Intelligence historians, specifically, have published on a wide range of topics as well. The First World War remains a field of studies that can be explored more thoroughly,[34] whilst the Second World War has been studied more in-depth. The British codebreakers and their role in the interception of important German communication, as well as the infamous Pearl Harbor attack and the subsequent growth of the American intelligence apparatus have been the object of extensive historical research. The ensuing Cold War has been studied most intensively, although some events, such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, have attracted much more attention than other events. Ever since, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the American invasion in Iraq in 2003 have also been addressed by many contemporary historians.[35]

The missing dimension's missing dimension

Notwithstanding the growth of the body of knowledge, the literature on intelligence history shows several shortcomings. In a geographical sense, to begin with, much of the literature focuses on the Anglo-Saxon world, especially on Great Britain and the United States.[36] Although these are countries with a fascinating intelligence history, smaller countries such as Finland, Belgium, and Slovenia may be as interesting. Secret services outside the Western world have even been ignored to a larger extent.[37]

In a temporal sense, secondly, many historians have exclusively focused on the Cold War era and within this Cold War focus, some perspectives and activities have received substantially less attention. The intelligence activities of the Soviet Union outside the Western world, for example in Africa, have been largely neglected.[38] In addition, many historians have done research on the craft of espionage, more broadly on human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, whilst signals intelligence (SIGINT) has barely been studied.[39] Studying the role of SIGINT, however, may be worthwhile. Politicians tend to appreciate SIGINT more than HUMINT: SIGINT is a less perilous undertaking (no spies physically present in the object country), it is generally quickly available to them, it seems more objective than HUMINT, and it is often unique.[40] The National Security Agency (NSA) delivers the Black Book every 24 hours to the American president, containing the most important decrypts; Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) sends the prime minister and senior cabinet members a comparable Blue Book, and the Dutch prime minister has received SIGINT daily in the Green Edition (*Groene Editie*) for many years.[41]

A different kind of flaw in the historiography on intelligence and security services is the lack of research on the 'soft side' of intelligence and security. Many historians look into interesting intelligence operations of the past, as well as the organizations and their histories, but the views and social backgrounds of the employees of intelligence and security services, their mutual relationships, and their individual careers could be studied more in-depth, since these factors might influence the practice of intelligence analysis.[42] In addition, the public perceptions of intelligence and practices of oversight could be studied more extensively, in order to gain insight in the intelligence culture of a certain country – the institutional forms, cultural context, and social practices of intelligence and security.[43] Historical research should not only focus on what intelligence and security services have done in terms of activities, but also on how this was legitimized in a political and societal sense.[44]

Where, to present, the historiography has chronicled the organisational and operational history of the Dutch security services, the book 'Images of the enemy' (*Vijandbeelden*)[ii] presents the Dutch security services between 1912 and 1992 from a political, societal, and bureaucratic perspective, shifting to the interaction between the security services and their multi-facet environment they work in, in order to understand how this interaction influenced the threat and enemy perceptions, the organization, and the legitimacy of the Dutch Intelligence Community over time. This broad approach provides more insight in the way civil servants, politicians, journalists, and concerned citizens perceived of the intelligence and security services and to what extent they were able to exercise influence over its mandate, powers, tasks, and activities.[45]

The most important flaw in the intelligence historiography, however, is the lack of coherence. This argument applies to the intelligence studies as a whole, as Stephen Marrin also emphasized: scholars in this domain publish all kinds of studies, but the body of literature fails to be cumulative and does not build on its own intellectual history. It is not common practice for intelligence scholars to interact, debate, and extensively respond to each other's work, nor has a common set of questions been developed.[46]

This holds true for intelligence historians specifically. As mentioned before, a large number of historical articles and books are of descriptive nature and focus on stand-alone cases and do not pay much attention to the societal and (international) political context. Comparative studies are rarely conducted.[47] Scholars tend to prefer exciting intelligence operations over seemingly duller institutional comparisons of organizations. And because of that, Philip Davies argues, scholars in this domain wrongly tend to regard intelligence and security services as exotic and unique organizations, to be studied in isolation. To a large extent, intelligence and security services are normal government organizations,

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ii Book published in Dutch by the author – original title

and therefore they have been integrated into government bureaucracies for decades. They interact with less arcane parts of governments and in terms of management, reporting, and culture they resemble 'normal' governmental organizations to a large extent. The lack of attention for this bureaucratic character of intelligence and security services is what Davies describes as the missing dimension's missing dimension.[48]

Prospects for the future

In order to become more than a catalogue of interesting organizational and operational histories, historians of intelligence will need to adapt. In the first place, the discipline as a whole would benefit from more historians becoming involved in research on intelligence and security services.[49] On the one hand, intelligence historians could make their colleagues in, for example, political history and the history of social movements aware of the intelligence dimension of their topics. They could sensitize them and encourage them to be aware of a possible intelligence angle to their topics. On the other, it would be constructive for the discipline of intelligence history if historians from different backgrounds poured into the intelligence and security domain. It seems that many historians are still hesitant to become involved in research on intelligence and security – possibly because of the exact reasons Andrew and Dilks already presented in the 1980s: an overly romantic view of espionage and the idea that sources are lacking. In the Netherlands, a small country of course, no more than a handful of academics is studying the history of intelligence and security.

A first improvement to the field of intelligence history, thus, would be that more historian become involved. When more academics enter the field, they bring with them insights from other historical disciplines, such as political, social, and economic history, and enrich and enhance the central problems and approaches within the historical research on intelligence. They could contribute to formulating a set of core problems and related questions. More historians could also help to professionalize the historical discipline of the intelligence studies by asking methodological questions. Historians are pre-eminently trained to ask heuristic and epistemological questions, which are especially valuable in the domain of intelligence and security. Knowing where to find documents and knowing what you can and cannot claim on the basis of these documents, is of great value in a field of historical research where sources are scarce and manipulation and deception is common.[50] This could help intelligence historians to more structurally reflect on the methodology of their work and exchange views on and experiences with doing research in the archives of intelligence and security services. A discussion about the practice of applying internal and external source criticism, not only in terms of access to sources, but also in terms of interpretation of intelligence documents, would provide the field of intelligence history with a broader academic basis.[51]

Second, to bring the field of intelligence history to the next level, historians could draft a research agenda. In itself this idea is not new. Other authors have also argued to restore the geographical balance by doing more research on other countries than the United States and Great Britain, most notably the non-Western world.[52] From the temporal perspective, of course the Cold War remains a very interesting and in many respects crucial era to be researched[53], but in addition earlier periods of time should be the subject of historical inquiry as well. Finally, the role of SIGINT needs to be addressed more extensively as well.[54]

What is, however, more important than a fixed list of topics, is that intelligence history needs to become more cumulative. In order to do so, in the words of John Lewis Gaddis they 'have to devote less time to cataloguing operations and expend more effort in demonstrating how it made things different'.[55] To this aim, historians should do more comparative research and should try to relate their empirical findings to central themes, which could also be addressed by other intelligence historians. One way to take this to the next level is to look at 'intelligence systems'[56] or 'intelligence cultures' from an historical perspective, terms respectively coined by Michael Warner and Philip Davies, which could be used as a lens to study particular cases, in particular places and specific timeframes, and could therefore be used to analyze the meaning of a particular case in the light of a broader theme, problem, or question, which is already addressed in the literature. Such an exercise helps us to strengthen our understanding of the way intelligence and security services are formed and transformed in different contexts.

History's contribution to strengthening intelligence cultures

The term 'intelligence culture' was coined by the British scholar Philip Davies. An intelligence culture comprises the institutional forms, cultural context, and social practices of intelligence and security. This corresponds with a broader trend within international relations and the security studies, which increasingly sheds light on norms and identity politics.[57] Davies observed that, although in many Western countries the essential functions of intelligence and security services are the same – they all to a larger or lesser extent collect, process, and analyze specific information, which they disseminate to other branches of government who can act upon it –, the intelligence practice can be notably different in different countries. Not only are for example the American and British organizational, judicial, and institutional structures markedly different, but also the convictions, concepts, values, and norms that lie behind the customs and practices of the people and organizations involved can be rather different. As a result, not only the institutional arrangements, but the essential meaning of 'intelligence' is different in both countries, Davies argues.[58]

Philip Davies, Kevin O'Connell[59], Michael Warner[60] and Isabelle Duijvestein have therefore advocated that cultural aspects should be higher on the research agenda

of the intelligence studies.[61] Bob de Graaff and James Nyce have edited a book on European intelligence cultures, exploring in quite a number of (also East and Central) European countries which cultural and social variables help explain 'how intelligence processes are conducted and legitimized in a particular country'.[62]

The concept of national intelligence cultures is a useful instrument for the discipline of intelligence history. It serves to study the historical formation and transformation of intelligence cultures in different times and places, and allows historians to understand changing and different functions and meanings of intelligence.[63] Historians should answer the question 'so, what?' by zooming out in their analysis of their particular cases. To what extent did the operation under study reflect a broader intelligence culture, in what sense what did it contribute to the national security policies? More broadly, historians should seek an answer to questions, such as:

- What difference did the intelligence and security services make?[64]
- Who, in the specific country that is studied, is politically responsible for the intelligence and security services, who manages them, who gets to set their priorities and requirements, and who receives their reports and briefings?
- To what extent does new archival research shed new light on prevailing insights?
- To what extent should the classics be amended, altered, or rewritten altogether?[65]
- What was the added value of intelligence in a certain situation, how did people go about using or ignoring it?
- What role did it eventually play?
- How did politicians perceive of their secret services; to what extent did they think their activities were useful to them? And if they deemed them useful, then in what way?
- Why did, for example, Margaret Thatcher rely heavily on the security service and the secret intelligence service for her decision making, whilst Helmut Kohl was mistrustful of his intelligence apparatus? And how to account for the fact that Mitterrand encouraged his intelligence services to conduct technical operations against other heads of state, whilst Chirac fired two intelligence chiefs on the day he became president?[66]

These kinds of questions should be addressed, even when researching very particular intelligence operations from a distant past, in order to improve our understanding of how societies and states relate to their intelligence and security services and how intelligence practices develop over time. To this purpose, it would be worthwhile to draft a list of core questions, comparable to the questions

suggested above, which of course can be amended and changed over time. These could focus on intelligence and security services as bureaucratic organizations: find out with whom they frequently interacted, what kind of reports they produced and who were the recipients of those reports and briefings, which political and bureaucratic management styles prevailed, what kind of opinions members of parliament had of their secret services and how citizens perceived the added value of intelligence and security services.[67] The intelligence historian should no longer solely try to uncover the missing dimension, but he or she should try to shed light on the ideological, political, cultural, and social practices associated with intelligence and security.[68]

History and the intelligence analyst

This 'academization' of intelligence history does not only benefit (professional) historians; it could be an advantage to intelligence analysts too. Historical consciousness, for one, is needed to understand the development of the trade of intelligence analysis. As pointed out by John H. Hedley, the development of intelligence analysis as a trade was the product of the enveloping Cold War: with the rise of the American 'national security state' came a need for 'global information', which 'would need to cover not just enemy military forces but also political and economic developments worldwide' – a need that drove the institutionalization of intelligence analysis and the professionalization of the trade.[69]

More importantly, however, history can benefit intelligence analysts in terms of content. This is not standing practice, however. The renowned intelligence historian Christopher Andrew argues that we, humans in the present – and with us current intelligence analysts –, suffer from a 'delusion' that convinces us that 'what is newest is necessarily most advanced'. Andrew challenges analysts therefore to learn from 'longer-term intelligence experience' instead.[70]

Analysts themselves agree that studying history can help improve the quality of their analysis. As a former CIA analyst with forty years of experience put it:

> 'An understanding of history and culture is key to coming to grips with the assumptions that underpin much of our analysis. And I am not talking about our history and culture, but the history and culture of the countries we work on *as the people and leaders of those countries understand them*. Every analyst—regardless of discipline or role—needs a deep appreciation of how a people see themselves, their historical ambitions, and their grievances. For analysts focused on foreign leaders, or politics, or economics, it is essential that they understand how power is acquired, the preferred way of exercising power, and the acceptable and unacceptable uses of power, as well as the defining life experiences of the key actors in the countries they specialize in.'[71]

The same applies to counterintelligence, a domain in which historical spy cases can and have been very useful to understand the modus operandi, intentions, and capabilities of opposing intelligence services. In the Netherlands, for example, the post war counterintelligence and security service, lacking an intelligence position on Soviet intelligence activities in the Netherlands, started out with reading everything the authorities had written about agent networks run by Soviet intelligence services before the Second World War. But in other domains lessons can be learned from specific situations as well, Erik J. Dahl argues.[72] For these reasons, history – and more specifically historical cases – seem to play an important role in intelligence analysis, also in their training programs.[73]

Besides providing relevant 'historical facts', an historical way of thinking might be beneficial to intelligence analysis as well. Historical research benefits intelligence analysts by helping him or her to 'discern what the story is, instead of what the problem is; it helps to determine the who, what, when, where, how and the why of a narrative'. At the same time, there are epistemological impediments to history's use to the intelligence analyst: history is multi-interpretable, it is uncertain (and historians can be wrong), and it is incomplete.[74] The same applies to intelligence analysis as a whole, in which analysts continuously run the risk of inferring 'direct cause-and-effect relationships' in their estimates, where reality turns out to be more complex, Cyrus H. Peake argues. In his view, an analyst

> 'with historical perspective will be on guard against the error of extending a narrow unilinear analysis of a current situation into a general forecast, of automatically extending, for example, the analysis of an economic situation to cover the political and psychological future, on the mistaken assumption that economic laws determine the course of human affairs.'[75]

In other words, the intelligence analyst with an historical mind-set could write better analyses. Historians such as Peter Jackson support this argument, pointing out that the professional skills that historians have developed can be useful to intelligence analysts too. Historians, just as intelligence analysts, are trained to apply thorough source criticism and they continually ask methodological and epistemological questions: they reflect on the steps in the argument, the context and trustworthiness of knowledge. The historian knows that nothing speaks for itself, and that 'how it really was' depends on one's perspective on past events – skills that the intelligence analyst can use as much as the professional historian.[76]

For this reason, the way forward for intelligence historians might also benefit intelligence analysts. An example is the concept of intelligence cultures that intelligence historians might use to reflect on the findings of their particular cases. For intelligence analysts, this concept might show, for example, that 'intelligence analysis' might mean something else in Belgium than in the Netherlands. Philip Davies has argued in this light, for example, that the British characteristic of

collegiality might make British analysts fall back 'on common assumptions and institutional orthodoxies in formulating assessments'. American intelligence analysis might on the other hand be influenced by turf wars and aversion of compromise, presenting their consumers with 'a plurality of opinions', even resulting in 'analysis paralysis'.[77]

Conclusion

Historians studying intelligence and security services should, to put it briefly, expand their horizon. They should broaden the scope of their research, discuss the methodological basis of this specific field of interest more extensively, and draft a research agenda and, more importantly, a core set of questions that allows them to discuss each other's findings, no matter how different they are in temporal and geographical terms. Only then it will be possible to improve our common understanding of what intelligence and security means in practice, and how it is being put into tangible and concrete organizations, activities, words, and deeds.

In the Dutch case, presented in the introduction, in which the institutionalization of a civil security service went hand-in-hand with an intensive discussion, historians should reflect on these arguments as a means to understand the formation and transformation of the Dutch 'intelligence culture'. Historians should explore why the military officers and police inspectors involved argued for or against the establishment of such a service, how the resistance to Fabius' plans fitted within the broader political and bureaucratic culture of the Netherlands at the time. It should be addressed what the added value of this new instrument for the state would be, what the security service practically did, and who it benefitted in terms of information advantage. It could also be asked to what extent this influenced the development of intelligence analysis, which in the Netherlands only came to fruition in the Cold War. All this can then be linked to one of the core questions of the broader research agenda for intelligence historians, such as: why, and how, do states institutionalize and maintain intelligence organizations? By trying to answer that, insights from the Dutch case are then made accessible for future research on comparable cases. This would make the historiography on intelligence and security services much more cumulative, which would be a major step forward.

This applies to academic historians, studying the history of intelligence and security services, but also to intelligence analysts practicing the trade today. Intelligence analysts who know how to benefit from historical insights, applying 'lessons learnt' in their analysis, can prevent cognitive bias and can contribute to qualitatively better analysis. Official historians could help intelligence analysts, as long as these historians have full access, are free to 'make whatever deductions consistent' with their archival findings, and that they deal with the entire intelligence cycle.[78] There is, to conclude, a broader interest to take the

academic study of intelligence history more seriously. Time has come to care about the future of intelligence history. Instead of 'painstakingly piecing together lost worlds from pottery fragments, scraps of manuscripts, and faded inscriptions on broken steles', as Michael Warner puts it, intelligence historians can now take their field of inquiry tot the next level.[79] Intelligence historians should always ask themselves what their sources tell them about a phenomenon, topic, or theme that is more broadly researched in the intelligence studies. Only then will future research be more beneficial to our general understanding of this complex world of intelligence and security.

Endnotes:

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11_ E.g. 'P.H.J. Davies en K.C. Gustafson, 'An agenda for the comparative study of intelligence: yet another missing dimension', in: P.H.J. Davies en K.C. Gustafson (red.), *Intelligence elsewhere. Spies and espionage outside the Anglosphere* (Washington 2013) 3-12, there 8-9.

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*13_* B.G.J. de Graaff, *De ontbrekende dimensie: intelligence binnen de studie van internationale betrekkingen* [The missing dimension: intelligence in the study of international relations] (2 March 2012) (Utrecht 2012) 13-14.

*14_* E.g. M.Warner, 'Building a theory of intelligence systems', in: G.F. Treverton en W. Agrell (red.), *National intelligence systems. Current research and future prospects* (New York 2009) 11-37: 11-12; P. Gill, 'Theories of intelligence: where are we, where should we go and how might we proceed?', in: Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence theory: key questions and debates* (London and New York 2009) 208-226, there 222-223.

*15_* Cf. P. Gill, 'Theories of intelligence: where are we, where should we go and how might we proceed?', in: Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian, Intelligence theory: key questions and debates (Londen en New York 2009) 208-226, there 223.

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