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Nietzsche's Philosophy of Conflict and the Logic of Organisational Struggle

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CHAPTER 3

THE EARLY NIETZSCHE ON THE STRUGGLE FOR ORGANISATION

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Over the previous two chapters, we have analysed Nietzsche's thoughts concerning two conceptually distinct forms of conflict – namely, *Vernichtungskampf* and *Wettkampf*. However, this division of conflict into two discrete kinds implies a dichotomy that is at odds with Nietzsche's rejection of binary oppositions (“[m]an darf [...] zweifeln, [...] ob es Gegensätze überhaupt giebt” [JGB 2]).¹ As I will argue in the following two chapters, consistent with his suspicion of any dualism, closer scrutiny reveals that Nietzsche's thoughts on conflict in fact cannot be divided into a neat dichotomy of measured and unmeasured struggle; rather, if we explore the lacuna left by the previous chapters, we uncover a third fundamental species of

¹ See also JGB 24: “Mag nämlich auch die Sprache, hier wie anderwärts, nicht über ihre Plumpheit hinauskönnen und fortfahren, von Gegensätzen zu reden, wo es nur Grade und mancherlei Feinheit der Stufen giebt [...]” NL 9[91] 12.384: “Es giebt keine Gegensätze: nur von denen der Logik her haben wir den Begriff des Gegensatzes – und von denen aus fälschlich in die Dinge übertragen.” In NL 9[121] 12.406, Nietzsche then indicates that it is imperative “[d]aß man die Gegensätze herausnimmt aus den Dingen, nachdem man begreift, daß wir sie hineingelegt haben.” See also FW 112, where, contesting the objective validity of the cause and effect opposition, Nietzsche argues that reality is a “continuum” and that “eine solche Zweiheit giebt es wahrscheinlich nie”. See also WS 67. See also Müller-Lauter, *Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of his Philosophy*, trans. by David J. Parent (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), pp.10f.

struggle – one that cannot be subsumed under the heading of either *Wettkampf* or *Vernichtungskampf*.

As should now be clear, for Nietzsche, agonal struggle presupposes the approximate equality of the relata at variance with one another; however, we have also remarked that he deems this kind equality an exceptional rarity. If for Nietzsche, as for Schopenhauer and Heraclitus, “alles Geschehen ist ein Kampf” (NL 1[92] 12.33), we have to ask ourselves: what type(s) of conflict does Nietzsche think define(s) relations of *in*-equality? And what type(s) of conflict does he think *should* define such relations? In light of his wider criticisms of *Vernichtungskampf*, and the very limited conditions under which he endorses such conflict, it would be surprising if he recommended destructive relations. Such observations should further motivate us to probe the possible existence of categories of conflict that do not fit the *Vernichtungskampf*–*Wettkampf* dichotomy, which Nietzsche himself sets up in CV 5.

In a note written while reading Roux’s *Kampf der Theile des Organismus*, Nietzsche gives us an indication as to what types of conflict might define relations of inequality: namely, “Kampf mit Zerstörung oder Assimilation des Schwächeren” (NL 7[86] 10.272). And, to be sure, in 1886, he states that under conditions of inequality, “stoßen zwei zu verschiedene Macht-Quanten auf einander, so greift das stärkere über nach dem schwächeren zu dessen fortgesetzter Schwächung, bis endlich Unterwerfung, Anpassung, Einordnung, Einverleibung eintritt” (NL 5[82] 12.221). Reading this in conjunction with JGB 259, it becomes evident that the type of conflict that takes place in lieu of the struggle for the “Zerstörung” of subordinate forces is one directed at their incorporation and exploitation: “wesentlich Aneignung, Verletzung, Überwältigung des Fremden und Schwächeren, Unterdrückung, Härte, Aufzwingung eigener Formen, Einverleibung und mindestens, mildestens, Ausbeutung”. The principal thesis that I defend over the following two chapters is that, in formulating alternatives to harmfully unmeasured

conflict, Nietzsche also posits a measured species of struggle that does not fit under the rubric of agonal conflict – namely, what I will call *incorporative* conflict.²

My secondary thesis, however, will be that although this species of conflict is measured, it is inextricably associated with, and even conditioned by, an unmeasured form of struggle that cannot be subsumed under the concept of *Vernichtungskampf* – namely, that directed towards the excretion or repulsion of that which is harmful. As mentioned in the introduction, we find this expressed in his calls for a “Kampf [zu ausscheiden] [...] gewaltsam eingepflanzter fremder Elemente” (GT 23 1.149); or again later in his designating the “Trieb etwas zurückzustoßen” a fundamental drive of nature (NL 36[21] 11.560); or at the end of his working life, in his warning that a society, just like any organism, must “ausschneiden” its “entartenden Theilen” (NL 23[1] 13.600). Although I acknowledge the fact that these processes are of course not entirely co-extensive, I will be referring to them all under the umbrella term *exclusionary* conflict, since the verb “to exclude” can signify both the action of shutting external entities out, as well as that of expelling internal ones.³

The *combination* of these two forms of struggle – i.e. incorporative (measured) and exclusionary (unmeasured) struggle – is what I will then refer to with the overarching term “organisational” struggle. I have termed it thus, since both of these conflictual processes are similarly directed at the expansion and strengthening of the internal hierarchy that Nietzsche views as essential to any vital organisation. Although the above quotes make clear that this form of conflict is perhaps most discernable in Nietzsche’s later writings, in this chapter, I will contend that it already plays a pivotal role in his early writings, particularly during the period of UB (1873-6). Subsequently, in Chapter 4, I will then inquire into how organisational conflict features in his later writings.

² For “incorporation”, Nietzsche tends to use either *Einverleibung* or *Assimilation*. I will be treating both of these terms under the heading of incorporation.

³ See entry for “exclude, v.”, OED.

In the first place, this chapter is a *normative* study aimed at expounding the grounds on which Nietzsche valorises organisational struggle. I maintain that in UB and the *Nachlass* from this period, he presents organisational conflict as a remedy for a destructive form of struggle he thinks threatens modern individuals, societies and cultures alike. In his own words, in modernity, “[wir] sehen [...] alles feindselig gegen einander und alle edlen Kräfte in gegenseitigem aufreibendem Vernichtungskrieg” (NL 30[8] 7.734). However, his diagnosis remains obscure and difficult to pin down; indeed, during this period of his thought, his complaints about the problem of disgregation do not only concern *social* disgregation, but are multifaceted and split across a number of ontological domains. For example, as we shall see, we find Nietzsche describing such conflict at the axiological level of our ethical values, the subjective level of our behavioural inclinations, and at the cultural level of our aesthetic tastes, and so on. Thus, with a view to better understanding his remedy (i.e. organisational struggle), I begin by dissecting his complex diagnosis of this crisis (Section 1).

Having delineated the problem identified by Nietzsche, I then turn to the solutions he proposes to this state of disgregation (Section 2). Insofar as he views modernity as a maelstrom of mutually neutralising forces, which we have just seen him describe as a *Vernichtungskrieg*, we might want to draw an analogy between this and the *Vernichtungskampf* he depicts in CV 5. Given this apparent analogy then, it would make sense to look toward the *Wettkampf* as the principal remedy or alternative to this widespread condition of measurelessness. Indeed, it has previously been claimed that Nietzsche conceives of his idealised vision of the Greek agon as a socio-culturally *unifying* principle of organisation.⁴ Moreover, as we saw in the

⁴ See Christa Davis Acampora, “Naturalism and Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology”, in Keith Ansell-Pearson (ed.), *A Companion to Nietzsche* (London: Blackwell, 2006), pp.314–34. In her treatment of the agon, Acampora emphasises how, for Nietzsche, “competitive relations serve as an organising force of culture by bringing together diverse elements [and] coordinating heterogeneous interests” (p.327). See also Müller (forthcoming, 2017), “Die Etablierung der Polis und die Institutionalisierung des Agonalwesens bilden einen wechselseitigen Zusammenhang” (p.14). Müller also states that “Nietzsches idealtypische Vorstellung einer agonalen Situation setzt eine Pluralität von Begabten und Ambitionierten

previous chapter, his agonistic democrat readers have claimed that he proposes a model of social organisation founded on the “agonistic” co-existence of discordant values – i.e. a society that, rather than being based on the domination or suppression of dissonant values, is characterised by an agonistic ethos of respectful and egalitarian engagement with those holding opposed values.⁵ Comparably, at the level of the subject, it has also been asserted that Nietzsche’s normative ideal is a self in which the various drives of the individual are said to be in a state of struggle analogous to his vision of the ancient Greek agon (indeed, this manner of talking about Nietzsche’s ideal self has become common currency in the critical literature).⁶ And to be sure, UB itself has frequently been interpreted as an example of Nietzsche

voraus. Erst deren Gegeneinanderagieren erzeugt und variiert die dynamischen Verhältnisse der griechischen Lebenswelt. Die autonome Polis ist somit vor allem ein Produkt agonaler Selbstdisziplinierung” (p.18). Yunus Tuncel, in *Agon in Nietzsche* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2013) has also defended this position (see ch.6).

⁵ See e.g. William Connolly, *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* (Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 2002) (p.171): “It is pertinent to underline again that this advocate of ‘nobility of many kinds’ and ‘the spiritualization of enmity’ does not demand that every noble practice of artistry endorse the same fundamental interpretation of being he himself embraces. While he contests many who endorse, say, Christian love, Buddhist compassion, Judaic responsibility to a nameless divinity, or the Kantian presumption of pure practical reason, Nietzsche at his best [...] seeks to establish noble relations of agonistic respect between the carriers of such alternative faiths, as participants in each come to terms with the contestability of their fundamental faith in an affirmative rather than resentful way.” See also David Owen (1995): “[F]or Nietzsche, tolerance for other views, a willingness to engage with them in an open and fair-minded way, is a condition of claiming to hold one’s own beliefs to be true. [...] [T]his position commits citizens to a form of society which is characterised by the cultivation of the conditions of honest and just argument between free and equal citizens” (pp.161-2).

⁶ Hatab, for example refers to Nietzsche’s “agonistic psychology”. See Lawrence Hatab, “Breaking the Contract Theory: The Individual and the Law in Nietzsche’s *Genealogy*”, in Herman Siemens and Vasti Roodt (eds.), *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche’s Legacy for Political Thought* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), pp.169-90 (p.173). Douglas Burnham, entry for “Agon”, in *The Nietzsche Dictionary* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015): “[S]ince the individual self is comprised of a multiplicity of drives, an agonistic ‘society’ is also found within the self” (p.16). Ken Gemes, “Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation”, *JNS*, 38(1) (2009), 38-59: “Nietzsche often emphasizes the need for a kind of agonal struggle between the drives”. Gemes also states that he does “not believe that there is genuine conflict between the Nietzschean ideal of a unified self and the Nietzschean ideal of a self engaged in agonal struggle” (p.56, fn.21; see also pp.49-52, where Gemes repeatedly refers to Nietzsche’s vision of an “agonal struggle between drives”). See also Honig (1993), p.229.

agonally struggling against his times, or at least inciting his readers to do so.⁷ In this chapter, then, these agonal interpretations of Nietzsche's early philosophy will constitute my primary polemical target.

The real stumbling block for these unifying visions of Nietzsche's agon is not merely the lack of textual evidence, but the fact that his portrayals of healthy unified cultures and individuals are dominated by a form of instrumentalisation that is incompatible with his conception of agonal conflict. Thus, in UB, he endeavours to persuade us of the need for a "Beherrschung" and "Unterordnung" of the historical influence of other cultures (i.e. their values and ideals).⁸ He then speaks of "die zwingende und herrschende Uebergewalt" required to shape the self into a "harmonisches System von Bewegungen" (UB III 2 1.342). In UB III, as commentators such as Rawls have noted, he apparently advocates an aristocratic strain of perfectionism, endorsing the oppression of the majority in the name of a cultural elite: "wie erhält dein, des Einzelnen Leben den höchsten Werth, die tiefste Bedeutung? [...] Gewiss nur dadurch, dass du zum Vortheile der seltensten und werthvollsten Exemplare lebst [...]" (UB III 6 1.384).⁹ Contrary to the agonistic reading of Nietzsche's thought, I will therefore argue that he consistently

⁷ See e.g. Herman Siemens, "Agonal Configurations in the *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*", *Nietzsche-Studien*, 30 (2001a), 80-106. Vanessa Lemm has argued that, contrary to the overly individualistic political philosophies of Rawls and Cavell, Nietzsche's vision of freedom is inherently public and characterised by agonal struggle – that is, "a public struggle (*agon*) between the individual and society". See Vanessa Lemm, "Is Nietzsche a Perfectionist? Rawls, Cavell, and the Politics of Culture in Nietzsche's 'Schopenhauer as Educator,'" *JNS*, 34 (2007), 5-27 (p.14). See also Nathalie Lachance "Nietzsche's Ethics of Reading: Education in a Postmodern World", in Horst Hutter and Eli Friedland (eds.), *Nietzsche's Therapeutic Teaching: For Individuals and Culture* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp.31-46. Lachance states: "If there is an agon in Schopenhauer as Educator, it is [...] between Nietzsche and the academic world" (p.35).

⁸ See UB II 4 1.271: "[J]eder Mensch und jedes Volk braucht je nach seinen Zielen, Kräften und Nöthen eine gewisse Kenntniss der Vergangenheit, [...] [aber] immer nur zum Zweck des Lebens und also auch unter der Herrschaft und obersten Führung dieses Zweckes." See also UB II 1 1.257: "Die historische Bildung ist vielmehr nur im Gefolge einer mächtigen neuen Lebensströmung, einer werdenden Cultur zum Beispiel, etwas Heilsames und Zukunft-Verheissendes, also nur dann, wenn sie von einer höheren Kraft beherrscht und geführt wird und nicht selber herrscht und führt."

⁹ Quoted in Rawls (1971), p.325.

recommends an ongoing struggle to establish, sustain and renew *instrumental hierarchies* – that is, an un-agonistic, organisational form of conflict, which he thinks can remedy the problem of disintegration. Yet insofar as this is conceived as a struggle to *preserve* the overpowered entity in an exploited subordinate state, I propose that it should nonetheless be designated a *measured* form of conflict.

However, as we try to ascertain more precisely *what* organisational conflict is, and hence what *exactly* Nietzsche is commending, the agonistic reading can be found to face yet another serious difficulty. The issue is that the measured struggle promoted by Nietzsche in UB is inseparable from his calls for a form of struggle that is distinctly unmeasured – i.e. *exclusionary* conflict. This is the unmeasured (though not necessarily destructive) struggle to be rid of all engagement with a given entity. Thus, in UB II he lauds the “kämpfenden, ausscheidenden, zertheilenden Macht” of the German youth of his day (UB II 10 1.331) as well as promoting the “vergessen” of superfluous cultural influences in such a way that they are “nicht mehr da, der Horizont ist geschlossen und ganz” (UB II 1 1.251). He then advocates a similarly unmeasured species of conflict with respect to spiritual or psychological entities, such as desires, instincts and behavioural inclinations. In UB, for example, Nietzsche (albeit warily) affirms the necessity of critical history, and the (albeit difficult) “Vernichtung” of outdated traditions – by which he means the struggle to impose “eine neue Gewöhnung, einen neuen Instinct, eine zweite Natur an, *so dass die erste Natur abdorrt*” (UB II 3 1.270; my italics).

This presents us with two questions, to which I will proffer solutions in the course of this chapter. First, *what* could Nietzsche mean by *Ausscheidung* and *Vernichtung* in the context of *geistig* entities such as values, behavioural dispositions, and aesthetic preferences? Second, how can we bring this promotion of unmeasured conflict into accord with his simultaneous promotion of measured, incorporative conflict? Is there not a contradiction here? With respect to the latter issue, I will demonstrate that which of these two approaches he recommends depends upon our evaluation of the entity in question; furthermore, by employing the model of organisational conflict, we will be able to make coherent sense of *both*

his calls to measured *and* unmeasured struggle as part of a single organisational impetus.

Another obstacle that the descriptive aspect of our study needs to tackle, concerns the fact that, as we have seen in the previous chapters, Nietzsche's conception of both PDC and agonism undergo a profound shift as he repudiates Schopenhauerian metaphysics and develops his conception of the world as will to power. Over the next two chapters, it will become evident that this is no less true of organisational conflict. Indeed, I will draw on UB in order to show that the model of organisational conflict prescribed by the early Nietzsche is fundamentally grounded in a quasi-Schopenhauerian *Weltanschauung*. The reason for this is that his prescription demands that we each gain an insight into a metaphysically essential aspect of our self (the "wahre Ursinn und Grundstoff [seines] Wesens" [UB III 1 1.341]), and a realisation that man (particularly the genius *qua* the paragon of man) represents the final end towards which nature strives ("sie [Natur] sich zum Menschen hindrängt" [UB III 6 1.385]). For Nietzsche, conscious knowledge of these quasi-Schopenhauerian metaphysical truths serves as a fixed archimedean point from which we can engage in the struggle for organisation. In Section 2, we will see that Nietzsche posits such metaphysical bases as a precondition of incorporative conflict on account of the fact that he is operating with a largely Schopenhauerian model of how health is conditioned by a struggle for organisation.

Yet what happens when he abandons his Schopenhauerian heritage? My contention in Section 3 is that Nietzsche's repudiation of metaphysics undermines the model of organisational conflict he develops in UB to the point that it becomes wholly untenable. This will present us with the problematic to be resolved in the Chapter 4: can Nietzsche formulate a model of organisational conflict that does not rely on these dubious metaphysical foundations?

3.2. THE CRISIS OF CULTURAL DISINTEGRATION

Nietzsche reproaches the Germans in UB I for having fallen into the delusion (“Wahn”) or error (“Irrthum”) that the defeat of the French in the Franco-Prussian War was as much cultural as it was martial. He deems the Germans deluded for believing themselves to have any real culture whatsoever. Indeed, he castigates them for being cultural philistines (“Bildungsphilister”) and barbarians (“Barbaren”), who are, in truth, fundamentally opposed to culture.¹⁰ The military victory over France bred, according to Nietzsche, an attitude of self-congratulatory complacency: “[J]edermann [ist] überzeugt [...], dass es eines Kampfes [...] gar nicht mehr bedürfe, dass vielmehr das Meiste so schön wie möglich geordnet [...] sei” (UB I 1 1.161).

But to what kind of cultural *Kampf* is Nietzsche rallying his countrymen? What is it a struggle *against*? And what is it a struggle *for*? With respect to these queries, his oft-cited definition of culture, and its contrary, barbarism, is instructive:

Kultur ist vor allem Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen Lebensäusserungen eines Volkes. Vieles Wissen und Gelernthaben ist aber weder ein nothwendiges Mittel der Kultur, noch ein Zeichen derselben und verträgt sich nöthigenfalls auf das beste mit dem Gegensatze der Kultur, der Barbarei, das heisst: der Stillosigkeit oder dem chaotischen Durcheinander aller Stile. (UB I 1.163)¹¹

Evidently, he believes the Germans must fight *for* some kind of cultural unity (“Einheit”) and, contrariwise, *against* the incoherence (“chaotisch[es]

¹⁰ See UB I 2 1.166: “[D]ie systematische und zur Herrschaft gebrachte Philisterei [in Deutschland] ist deshalb, weil sie System hat, noch nicht Kultur und nicht einmal schlechte Kultur, sondern immer nur das Gegenstück derselben, nämlich dauerhaft begründete Barbarei.”

¹¹ See also UB II 4 1.274, where Nietzsche reiterates this definition of culture: “Die Cultur eines Volkes als der Gegensatz jener Barbarei ist einmal, wie ich meine, mit einigem Rechte, als Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen Lebensäusserungen eines Volkes bezeichnet worden”.

Durcheinander”) of modern Germany’s bric-a-brac pastiche culture (what he calls “jene moderne Jahrmarkts-Buntheit [UB I 1 1.163]). Indeed, in the opening section of UB I, the essentials of Nietzsche’s rhetorical strategy are already fully discernible. He commences by creating an ideal normative vision of a true unified culture, then he indicates that the Germans do not possess this unity despite their beliefs to the contrary. It is an attempt to awaken his readers to the fact that unity is a task, not a given.¹² He accordingly reprimands Germany’s pseudo-culture on account of its being “zerbröckelt” (UB II 10 1.329) and in a state of “atomistische Chaos” (UB III 4 1.367). Needless to say, then, Nietzsche valorises cultural unity; but before we analyse the nature of this ideal unity, we should ask: what would its counterpart, “der Stillosigkeit oder dem chaotischen Durcheinander aller Stile”, actually look like? And *why* does he vilify this condition?

As he repeatedly states throughout the early period, one of the root causes of modern fragmentation is an imprudent policy with respect to knowledge accumulation. This manifests itself as both the tendency of individuals to amass an excess of historical *Wissenschaft* and the superficiality of the German approach to

¹² In this respect, Nietzsche follows thinkers such as Schiller and Wagner in pronouncing Germans and German culture to be pathologically lacking in cultural wholeness. See Friedrich Schiller, *Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2010), Brief VI (p.22): “Die Kultur selbst war es, welche der neuern Menschheit diese Wunde schlug. Sobald auf der einen Seite die erweiterte Erfahrung und das bestimmtere Denken eine schärfere Scheidung der Wissenschaften, auf der andern das verwickeltere Uhrwerk der Staaten eine strengere Absonderung der Stände und Geschäfte nothwendig machte, so zerriß auch der innere Bund der menschlichen Natur, und ein verderblicher Streit entzweite ihre harmonischen Kräfte.” On the struggle of art and science, see also Brief IX, p.34. See also Richard Wagner, *Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft* (Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1850), where he claims that the German *Volk* has been divided by a pernicious egoism and the pursuit of luxury. He also claims that science has become divorced from life (§2). As a remedy to this, he states that “der Bruderkuß, der diesen Bund besiegelt, wird das gemeinsame Kunstwerk der Zukunft sein” (p.14). He further maintains that the various domains of art have become “splintered”, and that his tragic artwork of the future can reunite them. It should also be borne in mind, that Germany had been undergoing a long and arduous process of unification, and that it was at this time still a relatively inchoate nation-state, having only officially emerged from an assemblage of largely autonomous provinces in 1871, after the Franco-Prussian War.

education, or *Bildung*.¹³ Nietzsche indicts the Germans for esteeming the inordinate consumption of knowledge, with little thought as to the utility of this knowledge – that is, for believing that “nur dadurch, dass wir uns mit fremden Zeiten, Sitten, Künsten, Philosophien, Religionen, Erkenntnissen anfüllen und überfüllen, werden wir zu etwas Beachtungswerthem, nämlich zu wandelnden Encyclopädien” (UB II 4 1.273-4).¹⁴ Such immoderate and indiscriminate accumulation of sundry knowledge is the essence of philistinism according to Nietzsche. However, amassing knowledge does not strike us as harmful or disintegrative *per se*. So why does he deem it a pathology? and how does it relate to fragmentation?

Nietzsche’s chief grievance in UB I is that philistinism obstructs authentic agency, especially aesthetic and ethical agency. Let us begin with the former. Nietzsche asserts that, due to the study of multitudinous languages, literary expression has become a “seelenlosen Wörtermosaik” as writers clumsily employ a strange combination of French and Latin grammatical and rhetorical styles (UB I 11 1.222). Potential artists lack a fixed set of rules and criteria of judgement according to which they could confidently create harmonious works of art: “Es fehlt hier an einem natürlichen Boden, an der künstlerischen Werthschätzung, Behandlung und Ausbildung der mündlichen Rede [um ein guter Schiftsteller zu werden]” (UB I 11 1.220). In lieu of this, they merely imitate other cultures, though in an incoherent manner.¹⁵ Thus, he reprises Schopenhauer’s admiration of the ancients for having

¹³ See GT 13. Here Nietzsche traces this malady back to the Socratic or Alexandrian tendency that overwhelmed the Greeks and disrupted the dynamic and vital interrelation of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. Indeed, Nietzsche portrays Socrates as having instigated an “unerhörte Hochschätzung des Wissens”, and criticises him for being an individual “in dem die logische Natur durch eine Superfötation [...] so excessiv entwickelt ist” (1.89-90). This “Superfötation” of the drive to logical knowledge came at the expense of the instinctive (aesthetic) wisdom (“instinctive Weisheit”) that enabled the creation of Attic tragedy. For more on this theme, see also ST (esp. 1.542).

¹⁴ See also UB I 1 1.163: “Die Formen, Farben, Producte und Curiositäten aller Zeiten und aller Zonen häuft der Deutsche um sich auf und bringt dadurch jene moderne Jahrmarkts-Buntheit hervor, die seine Gelehrten nun wiederum als das ‘Moderne an sich’ zu betrachten und zu formuliren haben”. We also find this diagnosis presaged in GT 23, where Nietzsche talks of the modern condition as a “fieberhaften Suchen, das sich allmählich in ein Pandämonium überallher zusammengehäufter Mythen und Superstitionen verlor” (1.148).

¹⁵ On the problem of *Nachahmung* in UB, see Siemens (2008, pp.86ff).

“eine regelrecht fixirte Sprache mit durchweg festgestellter und treulich beobachteter Grammatik und Orthographie” (UB I 11 1.227).¹⁶ The problem is therefore the absence of a clear set of values and criteria able to guide artistic praxis.

Nietzsche likewise avers that the inordinate accumulation of knowledge has thwarted *ethical* agency – one simply cannot implement all of the ethical models that one has ingested from past cultures due to their being at variance with one another. In UB III, Nietzsche characterises this as the “Hin und Her” generated in the individual on account of the conflict that arises between their antique and Christian ideals:

In diesem Hin und Her zwischen Christlich und Antik, zwischen verschüchterter oder lügnerischer Christlichkeit der Sitte und ebenfalls muthlosem und befangenem Antikisiren lebt der moderne Mensch und befindet sich schlecht dabei; [...] alles dies erzeugt eine Friedlosigkeit, eine Verworrenheit in der modernen Seele, welche sie verurtheilt unfruchtbar und freudelos zu sein. (UB III 2 1.345)

This division paralyses the individual by presenting them with conflicting maxims and models for action.¹⁷ As he states in a preparatory *Nachlass* note for UB II: “Geschichte — schwächt das Handeln und macht blind gegen das Vorbildliche, durch Masse verwirrend” (NL 27[81] 7.611).¹⁸ The individual is caught in a state of vacillation, in which behavioural inclinations mutually frustrate one another, rendering the individual incapable of agency in a manner reminiscent of Buridan’s ass. As he stresses in UB II, the individual has, through this excess of reason, “seinen Instinct vernichtet und verloren”. As a consequence of this alienation from instinct, “das Individuum [wird] zaghaft und unsicher und darf sich nicht mehr glauben” (UB

¹⁶ See also NL 29[47] 7.645-6. Indeed, prior to Socrates’ arrival, Nietzsche describes the Greeks as having forged “das strenge ältere Gesetz der einheitlichen sprachlichen Form” (SGT 1 1.93).

¹⁷ Nietzsche repeatedly refers to the paralyzing effects of the unrestrained pursuit of (historical) knowledge. See e.g. UB II 3 1.268, where antiquarian history is described as paralyzing the man of action (“[sie] lähmt [...] den Handelnden”).

¹⁸ Quoted in Jörg Salaquarda, “Studien zur zweiten unzeitgemässen Betrachtung”, *Nietzsche-Studien*, 13 (1984), 1-45 (p.16).

II 5 1.280). Insofar as this discordance of ends, ideals and values incapacitates the individual, we can comprehend why Nietzsche would warn of the necessity “sie alle zu bezwingen und zu bewältigen, um nicht selbst an ihrem Kampfe zu Grunde zu gehen” (UB II 4 1.272).

The second form of harmful disintegration indexed by Nietzsche concerns the disjunction he believes has arisen between the inner (i.e. private and intellectual) and outer (i.e. public and practical) aspects of modern German life. In UB II 4, he recounts how, as a consequence of the aforementioned inner havoc, modern man has simply abandoned the tiresome struggle of practically implementing his learning, and has instead turned inwards, disregarding the task of making an authentic choice as to how to intercourse with others and present themselves to the outside world.¹⁹ Modern man thus “versinkt in sich selbst, ins Innerliche, das heisst hier nur: in den zusammengehäuften Wust des Erlernten, *das nicht nach aussen wirkt*, der Belehrung, die nicht Leben wird” (UB II 5 1.280; my italics).

Nietzsche accuses the Germans of simply deferring to convention in an effort to circumvent the problem of practically applying this internal bedlam of models:

Sieht man einmal auf's Aeusserliche, so bemerkt man, wie die Austreibung der Instincte durch Historie die Menschen fast zu lauter abstractis und Schatten umgeschaffen hat: keiner wagt mehr seine Person daran, sondern maskirt sich als gebildeter Mann, als Gelehrter, als Dichter, als Politiker. (Ibid.)

In unquestioningly adopting one of these bourgeois mantles, everyone comes to don the same “bürgerliche Universal-Rock” (ibid.) and, likewise, everyone equally comes to suffer from a “Schwäche der Persönlichkeit” insofar as they fail to

¹⁹ UB II 4 1.274: “Daraus entsteht eine Gewöhnung, die wirklichen Dinge nicht mehr ernst zu nehmen, daraus entsteht die ‘schwache Persönlichkeit,’ zufolge deren das Wirkliche, das Bestehende nur einen geringen Eindruck macht; man wird im Aeusserlichen zuletzt immer lässlicher und bequemer [...]”

exteriorise their personal inner life.²⁰ To the extent that everyone follows this policy, however, philistinism generates the *illusion* of cultural unity by generating *uniformity* (“Gleichförmigkeit”, “Uniformität”):

[D]ie Verwechslung in jenem Wahne des Bildungsphilisters daher rühren, dass er überall das gleichförmige Gepräge seiner selbst wiederfindet und nun aus diesem gleichförmigen Gepräge aller “Gebildeten” auf eine Stileinheit der deutschen Bildung, kurz auf eine Kultur schliesst. (UB I 2 1.165)

Modern Germans are therefore consistently philistine (even if they do play different philistine *rôles* within society). Indeed, in the uniformity of its fragmentariness, modern philistinism has a sufficient façade of holism to blind its sufferers to the very cultural sickness afflicting them. But, as Nietzsche emphasises, philistine uniformity and systematicity do not amount to *true* stylistic unity. This is because such pseudo-unity is only achieved through the *exclusion* and *negation* of the creative forces that necessarily underpin any authentic style (“wahre Stil”).²¹ Indeed, Nietzsche charges modern Germans with preferring to apathetically mimic others over proactively constructing authentic, individual modes of acting in the world.²² Moreover, according to his diagnosis, the pressure of conformism is inimical to the emergence of true individuals: as he says at the beginning of UB III, people are often forced to suppress their individuality “[a]us Furcht vor dem Nachbar, welcher die Convention fordert” (UB III 1 1.337).²³ This, then, is what Nietzsche is rebuking when he

²⁰ UB II 5 1.281: “Das Individuum hat sich ins Innerliche zurückgezogen: aussen merkt man nichts mehr davon”.

²¹ Nietzsche calls this the “Ausschliessen und Negiren aller künstlerisch produktiven Formen und Forderungen eines wahren Stils” (UB I 1 1.166). See also UB I 8 1.206, and his criticism of “[uniforme] Glauben”.

²² See UB II 4 1.273: “[W]as wirklich Motiv ist und was als That sichtbar nach aussen tritt, bedeutet dann oft nicht viel mehr als eine gleichgültige Convention, eine klägliche Nachahmung”.

²³ See also UB III 3 1.353: “Wo es mächtige Gesellschaften, Regierungen, Religionen, öffentliche Meinungen gegeben hat, kurz wo je eine Tyrannei war, da hat sie den einsamen Philosophen gehasst”. Furthermore, see his criticism of artistic critique in philistine culture in UB II 5 1.285.

laments the “[Gegensatz] von Form und Inhalt, von Innerlichkeit und Convention” (UB II 4 1.278).

The third and final way in which philistine culture has generated fragmentation according to Nietzsche, is that the sheer quantity of history ingested produces a disorienting sense that one exists in a state of pure flux or “becoming”, lacking any fixed points. This is the feeling “von der Flüssigkeit aller Begriffe, Typen und Arten, von dem Mangel aller cardinalen Verschiedenheit zwischen Mensch und Thier” (UB II 5 1.319). Such disorientation and the sense of a loss of higher purpose leads people to embrace a dangerous strain of cynical irony towards the world of action.²⁴ This in turn breeds a socially divisive form of egoistic immoralism as individuals fall back on the one thing of which they are certain: their own personal life-needs. The rapacious and hostile pursuit of personal gain eventuates in a loss of community and the fragmentation of the *Volk*: “das Volk [geht] am egoistischen Kleinen und Elenden, an Verknöcherung und Selbstsucht zu Grunde [...], zuerst nämlich auseinanderfällt und aufhört Volk zu sein” (ibid.).²⁵ In this condition of purely pursuing our baser needs, Nietzsche views humans as being no better than animals.²⁶ Consequently, at this point in his philosophical development, he is highly critical of the affirmation of becoming (in a manner recalling Schopenhauer’s critique of those who embrace the will to live); correspondingly, as will be illuminated, he sought some metaphysically fixed points as a remedy to this malaise.

²⁴ See UB II 5 1.279: “[D]urch dieses Uebermaass [vom historischen Wissen] geräth eine Zeit in die gefährliche Stimmung der Ironie über sich selbst und aus ihr in die noch gefährlichere des Cynismus: in dieser aber reift sie immer mehr einer klugen egoistischen Praxis entgegen, durch welche die Lebenskräfte gelähmt und zuletzt zerstört werden”. See also NL 27[80] 7.611.

²⁵ This is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s characterization, in GT, of the buddhistic anti-socialism and even practical pessimism of those overly exposed to the Dionysian reality of existence. See GT 17 and 23.

²⁶ See UB III 5 7.819-20: “Solange jemand nach dem Leben wie nach einem Glücke verlangt, hat er den Blick noch nicht über den Horizont des Thieres hinausgehoben, nur dass er mit mehr Bewusstsein will, was das Thier im blinden Drange sucht — das heisst, wir verbringen Alle den grössten Theil unsres Daseins in der Thierheit, wir selbst sind die Thiere, welche sinnlos zu leiden scheinen.”

Naturally, this is not an exhaustive reconstruction of Nietzsche's criticisms of modern society in UB. Nonetheless, it amply demonstrates that in UB Nietzsche is deeply preoccupied with the cultural pathology of disintegration on a number of fronts:

- a) The anarchic discordance of models guiding agency;
- b) The diremption of our interior, intellectual world from our external comportment, which has come to be governed by convention;
- c) The social division caused by egoism and the rapacious pursuit of base life-needs.

We should recall the ultimate evaluative standard that Nietzsche is employing at this time – namely, the extent to which a given phenomenon aids or obstructs a generative culture and the production of artistic genius: “eine werdende Cultur und die Erzeugung des Genius — das heisst das Ziel aller Cultur” (UB III 3 1.358).²⁷ Crucially, the various forms of disgregation mentioned above undercut the social and individual conditions of coordination and coherence *that are necessary for genius to arise*. Although there is some equivocation in Nietzsche's use of the term genius (this will be clarified below), it is nonetheless with this end in mind that he thinks concerted social and individual agency, and a coherent basis for aesthetic praxis is exigent. He is therefore staunchly opposed to the Hegelian idea that modern Germans have already achieved a “Vollendung der Weltgeschichte” (UB II 8 1.308) or Hartmann's Whiggish belief that progress is guaranteed by a rational and automatic “Weltprozess” (see e.g. UB II 9 1.311 ff.). In contrast to the idealistic, self-congratulatory and *laissez-faire* attitude that he believes such Hegelianism

²⁷ See also UB III 3 1.363, where he describes the *Genius* as “die höchste Frucht des Lebens”. For more on what Nietzsche means by “Genius” in UB, see James Conant (2000), p.193 and pp.209ff. See also Lemm (2007), p.14. For a wider overview of Nietzsche's concept genius (i.e. one that draws on all phases of his writing), see Herman Siemens (2002), pp.85-91. We will return to the question of genius below.

engenders, he wants to show us that the improvement of our situation is contingent on our actively *fighting* for it: “[N]icht erträumt werden kann jener ideale Zustand, *er muss erkämpft und errungen werden* [...]” (UB II 9 1.317; my italics). We should examine how Nietzsche conceives of this “ideale Zustand”, and the means by which he thinks we can fight to attain it.

3.3. THE PATHS TO *EINHEIT*

How does Nietzsche propose we resolve these three types of disunity? In fact, he offers a number of interconnected solutions. One of the key ways in which they are interconnected, as will become clear, is in their paradigmatic appropriation of Schopenhauer’s conception of healthy organisation *qua* instrumental hierarchy – one that is secured through a struggle for assimilation that is distinctly unagonistic. Thus, I begin by arguing that Nietzsche cannot be said to present the *Wettkampf* as a solution to the problem of disunity. I then delineate Schopenhauer’s unagonistic account of the origins of functional organisation (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) and how Nietzsche employs this in responding to each of the three crises enumerated above.

3.3.1. *WETTKAMPF*

Given both the emphasis on the unifying quality of the *Wettkampf* in the writings of Nietzsche’s contemporaries and predecessors (e.g. Curtius, Burckhardt and Schiller²⁸), as well as the fact that CV 5 was written in the same year that he was

²⁸ For Curtius (1864), the dramaturgical agon had a powerful gathering quality, bringing together artists, musicians, actors, poets, architects (who would design the amphitheatres), and audience for the staging of the production: “Das ganze Volk wurde überall in die Interessen der Kunst hereingezogen” (p.11). Moreover, artists would gather before the *Greek* people (not just that of a single *polis*), which would then judge their work (alongside official

preparing the first *Betrachtung* (1872), we might reasonably expect Nietzsche's positive portrayal of the *Wettkampf* to be proffered as a remedy to the crisis of disgregation. However, in reality, this only serves to make it all the more conspicuous that the unifying quality of the agon has been *suppressed* in CV 5.

Nonetheless, Enrico Müller and Christa Davis Acampora (and to some extent also David Owen) have attributed a strong unifying function to Nietzsche's early conception of the agon.²⁹ The note that is usually cited in support of this position is NL 16[22] 7.402 (one of the preparatory notes for CV 5), in which Nietzsche minimally states: "Die panhellenischen Feste: Einheit der Griechen in den Normen des Wettkampfes". In CV 5, the closest he then comes to attributing a unifying quality to the agon is in his stating that *without* the *Wettkampf*, the Greek *polis* "wird böse und grausam [...] — und dann bedarf es nur eines panischen Schreckens, *um ihn zum Fall zu bringen und zu zerschmettern.*" (CV 5 1.518; my italics). Yet this does not give us any substantive notion of the cohesive effect of agonistic conflict; it merely implies that the Greek state became weak and susceptible to Persian conquest once agonial practices began to decay. According to Nietzsche, the agon certainly had a *strengthening* function, one that gave Greek culture its peculiar

judges, of course) (pp.9-11). The agon (together with religion) thus generated a national identity amidst inter-poleis struggles (DW, p.19). Curtius hoped that cultivating a similar agon within German academia would likewise further the project of German unification.

Similarly, Burckhardt (2014) claims that the Panhellenic games (particularly at Olympia) played a key formative role in both foreclosing war and its divisive effects, and fostering a unitary Greek identity. Panhellenic contests facilitated this by offering a neutral locus for ordinarily hostile tribes to socially interact (vol.4, pp.92-3).

Finally, for Schiller, the Greek agon was an ideal example of what he calls the play drive (*Spieltrieb*). In the activity of non-violent play, Schiller thought that the Greeks managed to synthesise their physicality (associated with what he calls the *Stofftrieb*) and their love of law and form (the *Formtrieb*) (see Schiller [2010], Brief XV, pp.62-4). Without such a unifying practice, Schiller believed that one of these two tendencies – towards materiality/physicality/sensuality on the one hand, and towards abstraction/law/reason on the other – tend to tyrannise and make life either barbarically ordered or barbarically anarchic.

²⁹ See fn. 3. David Owen has also argued that the agon unifies communities insofar as it generates shared norms and standards of excellence. See David Owen, *Maturity and Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason* (London: Routledge, 1994). Owen claims that "[t]he agon is constituted through the ongoing construction, destruction and reconstruction of 'communities of judgement'" (p.77).

greatness; but this strengthening quality was indissociable from its centrifugal force. Indeed, Nietzsche is often concerned with the potentially *disunifying* effects of agonal struggle. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the primary way Nietzsche thought the agon could underwrite social unity was by acting as a flue hole for disunifying energies – i.e. by channelling agonistic conflict *away* from the political sphere.³⁰ We also saw that his early conception of the agon relied on the superordinate forces of religion, law and education to counteract this centrifugal quality of the agon. Organisation can only be maintained, according to Nietzsche, so long as these overarching institutions retain control of the agon.

Perhaps the strongest evidence we have in favour of the idea that Nietzsche understood the agon as a unifying practice is in his lecture GMD, which is not (to the best of my knowledge) cited by any of those defending the idea of the Nietzschean agon as a socially binding force. In this lecture, Nietzsche endorses the “geistvolle” Anselm Feuerbach’s assertion that “Die olympischen Spiele führten die gesonderten Griechenstämme zur politisch religiösen Einheit zusammen” (GMD 1.518). However, in this lecture, Nietzsche’s focus is not on how the form of conflict definitive of the agon united people, so much as how *tragedy* had a socially and aesthetically unifying effect.³¹ Hence, even here, it is not so much measured *conflict* that Nietzsche views as the ground of Greek unity, but communally creating and spectating *tragedy*, which only incidentally took place in the context of the agonal games. For this reason, if we are to locate Nietzsche’s response to the crisis of modern disintegration, we need to look beyond the confines of his thoughts on the agon.

³⁰ See NL 11[186] 9.514-5; compare also NL 30[7] 7.732-3.

³¹ On tragedy’s socially unifying effect, Nietzsche (echoing Wagner) remarks that “Der Grieche flüchtete sich aus der ihm so gewohnten zerstreuten Öffentlichkeit, aus dem Leben in Markt Straße und Gerichtshalle, in die ruhig stimmende, zur Sammlung einladende Feierlichkeit der Theaterhandlung” (GMD 1.520).

3.3.2. SCHOPENHAUER ON CONFLICTUAL ORGANISATION

In trying to analyse Nietzsche's conception of healthy unity in UB, the most fitting point of entry is through Schopenhauer's metaphysics, and particularly his account of how *Zweckmäßigkeit* emerges through conflict as outlined in WWV. PHG clearly evinces that in 1873 Nietzsche was well acquainted with, and even assented to, the description of the world as struggle given in WWV I (esp. §27 and §28).³² Indeed, as I will demonstrate in the subsequent sections, this gives Nietzsche a basic conception of how functional unities emerge out of conflict – a notion he paradigmatically employs throughout UB, albeit with modifications.

According to Schopenhauer, we have experiential access to the *an-sich* of one object – that is, how that object exists beyond all appearance. This object is our own body. On the one hand, we experience our body as a mere object or phenomenon amongst others. Yet we also know it “from the inside”, so to speak, as an indivisible striving, or willing. Schopenhauer argues by analogy that this gives us an insight into the interior or noumenal aspect of all objects; thus, for Schopenhauer, all things in themselves are defined by this very same indivisible striving.³³ Space and time are then the conditions of plurality; and, in a typically Kantian fashion, as opposed to being properties of the world in itself, Schopenhauer conceives of them as a structural framework that *we* project onto the noumenal world as will, thereby transforming it into the world as representation. Hence, the world in itself, being outside of space and time “kennt demnach keine Vielheit, ist folglich einer” (WWV I, §25 p.185). He directly distinguishes this form of unity, which precedes all plurality, from the unity of a concept (which is constructed from a plurality of

³² See PHG §5 1.826, having given an exegesis of Heraclitus' view of reality as struggle, Nietzsche tells us that “Jenen Kampf, der allem Werden eigenthümlich ist, jenen ewigen Wechsel des Sieges schildert wiederum Schopenhauer (Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I S 175)”. Nietzsche then quotes a long section from WWV I §27 as evidence vindicating Heraclitus' worldview.

³³ See WWV I §§19-21.

instances, *post hoc*) or the unity of an individual (which exists in space and time). In distinction to these forms of unity, all things in themselves are *numerically* identical to one another and, furthermore, their unity is ontologically prior to their plurality.³⁴

A similar notion of unity can be ascribed to Schopenhauer's construal of Platonic Ideas. Within Schopenhauer's system, Ideas represent an intermediary between the absolute unity of the world as will and the plurality of the world as representation.³⁵ Like Plato, Schopenhauer reasons that for all the individuals of a given species of phenomena (that is, for every natural kind), there exists an Idea – an essence, model or timeless prototype from which all the individual instantiations of that species are derived.³⁶ Moreover, these Ideas are transcendent, existing outside of space and time, and, as such, are ontologically prior to all objectivity. Like the unity of the will, their unity is not the result of abstraction (from perceived objects) and they are therefore said to possess a "*unitas ante rem*" in contrast to the "*unitas post rem*" of concepts (WWV I §49, p.313).³⁷

As we saw in Chapter 1, these Ideas are described by Schopenhauer as engaged in a fierce and unrelenting struggle at the level of representation. First, they must vie with one another in a zero-sum game over matter, which they require in

³⁴ Schopenhauer employs the simile of the magic lantern to illuminate the relation of plurality and unity in his notion of the world as will and representation: "Wie eine Zauberlaterne viele und mannigfaltige Bilder zeigt, es aber nur eine und die selbe Flamme ist, welche ihnen allen die Sichtbarkeit erteilt; so ist in allen mannigfaltigen Erscheinungen, welche neben einander die Welt füllen, oder nach einander als Begebenheiten sich verdrängen, doch nur der eine Wille das Erscheinende, dessen Sichtbarkeit, Objektivität das Alles ist [...]" (WWV I §28, p.215).

³⁵ For a charitable reading of Schopenhauer's theory of the Idea (or *forms*), see John E. Atwell, *Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995), pp.129-53.

³⁶ As Julian Young has argued, Schopenhauer's understanding of Ideas cannot be equated with that of Plato insofar as Schopenhauer does not reify Ideas as does Plato. See Julian Young, *Schopenhauer* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.129-33 (esp. p.132). Indeed, we may want to look at Schopenhauer's forms as having more in common with Aristotelian essences, which inhere like formulae within objects, directing their development and activity.

³⁷ See WWV I §25, p.187: "Ich verstehe also unter Idee jede bestimmte und feste Stufe der Objektivation des Willens, sofern er Ding an sich und daher der Vielheit fremd ist, welche Stufen zu den einzelnen Dingen sich allerdings verhalten, wie ihre ewigen Formen, oder ihre Musterbilder."

order to become manifest phenomena. The result of this is what Schopenhauer calls “allgemeine[r] Kampf” (WWV I §27, p.208). Among animals, this battle of the Ideas is most noticeably played out in the struggle for survival, though Schopenhauer also claims that it takes place in the inorganic domain, arguing that even forces are engaged in this struggle when acting on matter. While in Chapter 1 we found that this conflict is indelibly marked by unmeasured, destructive opposition, if we examine what he, after Kant, calls inner and outer *Zweckmäßigkeit*, we find that measured conflict is also integral to Schopenhauer’s *Weltanschauung*.

Kant’s most lucid account of the philosophically problematic nature of *Zweckmäßigkeit* is in his *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, where he asks how we can explain the existence of functionally organised unities. How can we account for self-organising beings (i.e. organisms), in which the parts seem to fit together to serve the interests of the whole (what Kant calls inner *Zweckmäßigkeit*)? And how is it that nature seems to fit together into a harmonious whole, with all the plants and animals supporting one another, with rational human culture standing at the pinnacle of this system (what Kant calls outer *Zweckmäßigkeit*)?³⁸ Kant argues that we simply cannot conceive of how such harmonious wholes could arise in a purely mechanistic universe by sheer coincidence.³⁹ How could the parts, which serve very specific functions with respect to the whole, and also depend on the other parts for their existence, have been created without a pre-existing idea of the whole in the mind of a creator? Kant’s solution is to suggest that, alongside the notion of mechanistic causality, we need to retain the concept of teleological causality as a principle of reflective judgement – that is to say, we must think “*als ob*” they were the product of intelligent design in accordance with final ends.⁴⁰

³⁸ See e.g. KdU, §63 and §67. See also §83, where Kant’s posits culture (“Cultur”) as the final end of nature.

³⁹ As he categorically states with respect to organisms in KdU §66: “Ein organisiertes Produkt der Natur ist das, in welchem alles Zweck und wechselseitig auch Mittel ist. Nichts in ihm ist umsonst, zwecklos, oder einem blinden Naturmechanismus zuzuschreiben” (p.376).

⁴⁰ See KdU §70, where Kant maintains that the following maxim must be taken as a principle of reflective judgement: “Einige Produkte der materiellen Natur können nicht, als nach bloß mechanischen Gesetzen möglich, beurteilt werden (ihre Beurteilung erfordert ein ganz

Schopenhauer, however, arrives at a very different, arguably more dogmatic, conclusion – namely, that the unity of any entity has its ground in the metaphysical unity of its Platonic Idea. Universal struggle is, for Schopenhauer, the turbulent matrix out of which ever higher Ideas enter the world – a process culminating in man, which he calls the “deutlichste und vollkommenste Objektivation” of the will (WWV I §28, p.216). For the Idea of man to become manifest, however, it “mußte begleitet seyn von der Stufenfolge abwärts durch alle Gestaltungen der Thiere, durch das Pflanzenreich, bis zum Unorganischen” – the reason for this is that man needs a world into which he can be born, and the materials for his survival. As such, all the Ideas “ergänzen sich zur vollständigen Objektivation des Willens” (ibid.). Schopenhauer’s Ideas thus form a pyramidal hierarchy, with man standing at its apex. It is important to note that this outer *Zweckmäßigkeit* – understood as a form of unity arising from an antagonism internal to the system – emerges *because phenomena must reflect or embody the unity of the will*, which is itself defined by an inner antagonism.⁴¹

Just as outer *Zweckmäßigkeit*, emerges from the conflict *between* individuals, so, for Schopenhauer, the inner *Zweckmäßigkeit* of organisms is grounded in the conflict *within* individuals. Every organism is a hierarchy of Ideas; indeed, higher Ideas, he tells us, are only able prevail in the struggle by pressing lower Ideas into the service of their higher purpose:

[S]o geht aus diesem Streit die Erscheinung einer hohem Idee hervor, welche die vorhin dagewesenen unvollkommeneren alle überwältigt, jedoch so, daß sie das Wesen derselben auf eine untergeordnete Weise

anderes Gesetz der Kausalität, nämlich das der Endursachen)” (p.387). As he also states in §67, the conception of nature as a “System der Zwecke” “nicht ein Prinzip für die bestimmende, sondern nur für die reflektierende Urteils kraft sei, daß es regulativ und nicht konstitutiv sei, und wir dadurch nur einen Leit faden bekommen, die Naturdinge in Beziehung auf einen Bestimmungsgrund, der schon gegeben ist, nach einer neuen gesetzlichen Ordnung zu betrachten, und die Naturkunde nach einem andern Prinzip, nämlich dem der Endursachen, doch unbeschadet dem des Mechanisms ihrer Kausalität, zu erweitern” (p.379).

⁴¹ See WWV I §28, p.217.

bestehn läßt, indem sie ein Analoges davon in sich aufnimmt (WWV I §27, p.205).

This exploitative, instrumentalising struggle to establish hierarchy is the constitutive ground of every phenomenon: “Kein Sieg ohne Kampf: indem die höhere Idee, oder Willensobjektivation, nur durch Ueberwältigung der niedrigeren hervortreten kann” (ibid., pp.206-7). In the case of an organism, Schopenhauer gives the example of the digestive organs competing against the rest of the body for energy, or the body digesting and exploiting organic matter. He defines the health of the organism as its ability to contain these various conflicts and keep lower Ideas subordinated to the higher purpose of the individual.⁴² The effectiveness with which these lower Ideas are subordinated – that is, the rigor with which the hierarchical organisation is upheld – directly correlates to the degree of health and perfection attained by the phenomenon in question (an idea that finds precedence in Goethe⁴³).

Like Kant, Schopenhauer rejects the idea that we are able to explain the unity of the organism with reference to mechanical laws; though, unlike Kant, he additionally makes the speculative metaphysical claim that this proves the existence of Ideas:

Man [wird] zwar im Organismus die Spuren chemischer und physischer Wirkungsarten nachweisen, aber nie ihn aus diesen erklären können; weil er keineswegs ein durch das vereinigte Wirken solcher Kräfte, also zufällig hervorgebrachtes Phänomen ist, sondern eine höhere Idee, welche sich jene niedrigeren durch überwältigende Assimilation unterworfen hat. (WWV I §27, p.206)

⁴² WWV I §27, p.207: “[D]aher ist das behagliche Gefühl der Gesundheit, welches den Sieg der Idee des sich seiner bewußten Organismus über die physischen und chemischen Gesetze, welche ursprünglich die Säfte des Leibes beherrschen, ausdrückt [...]”

⁴³ See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, “Zur Morphologie” (1817), in *Goethes Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe*, 14 vols (vol.13) (Hamburg: Wegner, 1948), pp.53-520: “Je unvollkommener das Geschöpf ist, desto mehr sind diese Teile einander gleich oder ähnlich, und desto mehr gleichen sie dem Ganzen. Je vollkommener das Geschöpf wird, desto unähnlicher werden die Teile einander. In jenem Falle ist das Ganze den Teilen mehr oder weniger gleich, in diesem das Ganze den Teilen unähnlich. Je ähnlicher die Teile einander sind, desto weniger sind sie einander subordiniert. Die Subordination der Teile deutet auf ein vollkommneres Geschöpf” (p.55).

Organismic unity can only be explained, according to Schopenhauer's abductive reasoning, on the basis of an actively striving metaphysical entity – that is, an Idea. Moreover, this is a process of struggle aimed at subduing and exploiting other Ideas. Yet even when these subaltern Ideas have been pressed into a hierarchy, conflict is nonetheless pervasive within the organism. This is because Ideas are always struggling to break free of their fetters and reassert their independence. Despite the fact they have been forced into “Dienstbarkeit,” lower Ideas “immer noch streben, zur unabhängigen und vollständigen Aeußerung ihres Wesens zu gelangen.” (WWV I §27, p.207). Death therefore often results from the eventual victory of the lower Ideas in their rebellious struggle and the consequent disintegration of the hierarchy which constituted the organism; though it also arises (as mentioned above) as Ideas snatch matter from one another – for example, when organic entities consume one another in order to survive. Just as a victor in battle might sack and enslave a defeated city, the victorious Idea disbands the opposed organism and instrumentalises the Ideas previously organised therein.⁴⁴

It should now be obvious why Schopenhauer holds the view that “wir [sehen] in der Natur überall Streit, Kampf und Wechsel des Sieges” (ibid.). It is imperative to remark that this vision of reality as an unceasing struggle for assimilation forms the basis of Schopenhauer's pessimistic worldview, as well as motivating his advocacy of an ethics of life-denial. As Nietzsche himself observes, Schopenhauer considered such universal strife “ein durchweg entsetzliches, keineswegs beglückendes Phänomen” (PHG 1.826). With respect to its purely descriptive features, however, we can attribute the following characteristics to assimilative struggle:

⁴⁴ As Schopenhauer puts it: “Die deutlichste Sichtbarkeit erreicht dieser allgemeine Kampf in der Thierwelt, welche die Pflanzenwelt zu ihrer Nahrung hat, und in welcher selbst wieder jedes Thier die Beute und Nahrung eines andern wird, d.h. die Materie, in welcher seine Idee sich darstellte, zur Darstellung einer andern abtreten muß, indem jedes Thier sein Daseyn nur durch die beständige Aufhebung eines fremden erhalten kann” (WWV I §27 p.208).

1. Within it, opposed relata (*Ideen*) strive to subjugate their counterparts into a functional hierarchy;
2. Its telos, instrumental hierarchy, is associated with health;
3. It is inextricably associated with unmeasured conflict (*qua* the forced dissolution of existing unities as a means to commandeering their constituent Ideas);
4. It continues within the instrumental hierarchies even once these have been established;
5. It is driven by a species of metaphysically substantial entity (i.e. *Ideen*).

Measured conflict can therefore be described as an essential aspect of the world as representation for Schopenhauer, since Ideas are first and foremost striving to *preserve* the Ideas they overcome, albeit in a condition of servitude. Despite this measure, however, this struggle of higher versus lower Ideas cannot be labelled agonistic due to its being characterised by inequality, instrumentalisation and, despite its measured aim of subjugation, often being conditioned by the destructive process of disbanding existing unities (i.e. instantiations of Ideas). In the following sections, I will elucidate how the various struggles for organisation proposed by Nietzsche in UB paradigmatically fulfil these criteria.

3.3.3. *PLASTISCHE KRAFT*

In UB I, as in CV 5, Nietzsche explicitly rejects militarism as a path to true culture. Contrary to bellicose readings of his thought (such as those of Bäumler, Russel and Dombowsky), he unequivocally states that “[s]trenge Kriegszucht, natürliche Tapferkeit und Ausdauer, Ueberlegenheit der Führer, Einheit und Gehorsam unter den Geführten [sind] Elemente, die *nichts mit der Kultur zu thun haben*” (UB I 1

1.160; my italics). Yet despite this point of overlap, CV 5 and UB do not share a corresponding concern with the *Wettkampf* as a constructive social alternative. Indeed, Nietzsche does not even once mention either the *Wettkampf* or agon in UB, where he is overtly responding to the problem of disgregation. What makes it so surprising that CV 5 and the notion of the *Wettkampf* is the first port of call for commentators seeking to develop a Nietzschean theory of organisation is that we find him giving an explicit (and as we shall see, quite unagonistic) account of how we might unify ourselves socially and individually in UB. While it has been suggested only recently that Nietzsche abandoned Schopenhauer's notion of *Zweckmäßigkeit* as of 1868, we will see that his proposed resolution profoundly resonates with Schopenhauer's thoughts on organisation.⁴⁵ In order to bring this into relief, we should first examine how he suggests we tackle the problem of philistinism.

Despite Nietzsche's critique of over-education, and in particular, the excessive accumulation of historical knowledge of other cultures, it should be highlighted that he does not think that we can do *without* historical knowledge; rather, as he himself emphatically remarks: "das Unhistorische und das Historische ist gleichermaassen für die Gesundheit eines Einzelnen, eines Volkes und einer Cultur nöthig" (UB II 1 1.252). But how can historical learning concretely remedy the problem of disintegration to which its excess, or "hypertrophy", gave rise in the first place? We can begin to tackle this question by expounding the three types of history Nietzsche identifies in UB II, and the ways in which he thinks they can be either advantageous or deleterious to life.

⁴⁵ See Kevin Hill, *Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of his Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Referring to Schopenhauer's conception of *Zweckmäßigkeit*, Hill claims that, "When Nietzsche read Schopenhauer in 1865, he quickly embraced both the metaphysics of the will and the speculative account of teleology that flowed from it. But Nietzsche's early enthusiasm for Schopenhauer's metaphysics soon dimmed, and with it, his ability to make sense of teleology. In 1868, Nietzsche turned to Kant's third Critique to make good this loss" (p.75).

First, Nietzsche describes *monumental* history, a mode of historical praxis that glorifies past individuals and thereby conscripts them as exemplars for future action. The great man of action, “der einen grossen Kampf kämpft, der Vorbilder, Lehrer, Tröster braucht und sie unter seinen Genossen und in der Gegenwart nicht zu finden vermag” (UB II 2 1.258). We might think of Schiller’s idealisation of the Greeks as epitomising this kind of history insofar as he mines the past to provide his present with exemplars for future action.⁴⁶ By looking into the past, one can see the potential, and set a standard, for greatness in the future. Rather than being informed by a desire for preservation, this form of historical practice is driven by the wish for happiness (“Glück”), greatness (“Grosse”) and “den Begriff ‘Mensch’ weiter auszuspannen und schöner zu erfüllen” (UB II 2 1.259). In order to render the past serviceable to the present, however, monumental historians must always elide the parts of it that make an exemplar particular to their historical context – that is, they must always *distort* the past:

Wie viel des Verschiedenen muss, wenn sie jene kräftigende Wirkung thun soll, dabei übersehen, wie gewaltsam muss die Individualität des Vergangenen in eine allgemeine Form hineingezwängt und an allen scharfen Ecken und Linien zu Gunsten der Uebereinstimmung zerbrochen werden! (UB II 2 1.261)

Taken to excess, though, Nietzsche warns that this can lead to the distortion of the past for violent, seditious ends, and even lead to a form of atavism that harmfully impedes progress (“die Werdenden und Wollenden”) (UB II 2 1.263).

Thankfully, antiquarian history, which is more concerned with the faithful documentation of the past, can act as an antidote for this distorting excess. The antiquarian serves life “[i]ndem er das von Alters her Bestehende mit behutsamer Hand pflegt, will er die Bedingungen, unter denen er entstanden ist, für solche bewahren, welche nach ihm entstehen sollen” (UB II 3 1.265). He describes this as a “Festschrauben” “an [...] Gesellen und Umgebungen, an [...] mühselige

⁴⁶ For evidence that Nietzsche himself thought of Schiller in precisely this way, see NL 29[117] 7.684: “Schiller gebrauchte die Historie im monumentalen Sinne”.

Gewohnheit” (UB II 3 1.266). However, the myopic and reverent study of one’s own past comes with its own attendant dangers:

Der antiquarische Sinn eines Menschen, einer Stadtgemeinde, eines ganzen Volkes hat immer ein höchst beschränktes Gesichtsfeld; das Allermeiste nimmt er gar nicht wahr, und das Wenige, was er sieht, sieht er viel zu nahe und isolirt; er kann es nicht messen und nimmt deshalb alles als gleich wichtig und deshalb jedes Einzelne als zu wichtig. Dann giebt es für die Dinge der Vergangenheit keine Werthverschiedenheiten und Proportionen, die den Dingen unter einander wahrhaft gerecht Würden [...]. (UB II 3 1.267)

In stressing that *everything* is good within this narrow range of focus, antiquarian history itself ends up distorting the past by robbing it of its variability in value (“Werthverschiedenheit”) and thereby flattening it. As Catherine Zuckert has observed, “antiquarian preservation changes the very past it would retain”.⁴⁷ Moreover, this fetishistic piety (“Pietät”) of a people towards its traditions and cultural roots eventually means that antiquarian history also constricts growth and progress: “sie versteht eben allein Leben zu bewahren, nicht zu zeugen; deshalb unterschätzt sie immer das werdende” (UB II 3 1.268). Finally, when this mode of historical praxis extends beyond one’s own national roots, it can descend into “das widrige Schauspiel einer blinden Sammelwuth, eines rastlosen Zusammenscharrens alles einmal Dagewesenen” (ibid.) – at which point, it becomes the very quintessence of philistinism.

The final mode of history described by Nietzsche is that of *critical* history, which he presents as an explosive corrective to the conservatism of antiquarian history: “[man] muss die Kraft haben und von Zeit zu Zeit anwenden, eine Vergangenheit zu zerbrechen und aufzulösen, um leben zu können” (UB II 3 1.269).

⁴⁷ This is to say, antiquarian history “does not present historical truth” (despite its pretensions to the contrary). See Catherine Zuckert, “Nature, History and the Self: Friedrich Nietzsche’s Untimely Considerations”, *Nietzsche-Studien*, 5 (1976), 55-82 (pp.61-2). See also Salaquarda (1984), p.20. Indeed, according to Nietzsche, all history can be said to have a distorting effect insofar as “Alles Erinnern ist Vergleichen d.h. Gleichsetzen” (NL 29[29] 7.636).

By denuding the *unjust* origins (e.g., in violence or weakness) of a particular moribund and constrictive social phenomenon (e.g. “eines Privilegiums, einer Kaste, einer Dynastie zum Beispiel”), critical history works to destroy such phenomena and thereby enable the creation of new social orders and traditions – that is, it allows us to supplant an embedded part of our “erste Natur” with a new “zweite Natur”.⁴⁸ Notwithstanding these remarks, Nietzsche is highly doubtful regarding the extent to which this destruction of the disagreeable aspects of our heritage is possible, or even advisable:

[D]ie Thatsache [ist] nicht beseitigt, dass wir aus ihnen herstammen. Wir bringen es im besten Falle zu einem Widerstreite der ererbten, angestammten Natur und unserer Erkenntniss, auch wohl zu einem Kampfe einer neuen strengen Zucht gegen das von Alters her Angezogene und Angeborne, wir pflanzen eine neue Gewöhnung, einen neuen Instinct, eine zweite Natur an, so dass die erste Natur abdorrt. Es ist ein Versuch, sich gleichsam a posteriore eine Vergangenheit zu geben, aus der man stammen möchte, im Gegensatz zu der, aus der man stammt — immer ein gefährlicher Versuch, weil es so schwer ist eine Grenze im Verneinen des Vergangenen zu finden und weil die zweiten Naturen meistens schwächer als die ersten sind. (UB II 3 1.270)

The critical approach, when indulged to excess, harmfully strives for the severance of one’s roots. Moreover, Nietzsche warns that it is hard to place a limit on this destructive activity (“es so schwer ist eine Grenze im Verneinen des Vergangenen zu finden”).⁴⁹ For these reasons, “Menschen oder Zeiten, die auf diese Weise dem Leben dienen, dass sie eine Vergangenheit richten und vernichten, sind immer gefährliche und gefährdete Menschen und Zeiten” (ibid.). Yet, in spite of his

⁴⁸ Nietzsche first describes critical history as the means by which “[d]er Mensch” fulfils his desire “von Noth sich befreien” (NL 29[115] 7.683). See Salaquarda (1984), p.28. Jörg Salaquarda has shown how Nietzsche was influenced by Franz Grillparzer in this respect. See Georg Salaquarda, “‘Er ist fast immer einer der *Unserigen*’: Nietzsche und Grillparzer”, in T. Borsche, F. Gerratana, A. Venturelli (eds.), “*Centauren-Geburten*”: *Wissenschaft, Kunst und Philosophie beim jungen Nietzsche* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994), p.239 and p.245.

⁴⁹ This emphasis on the fact that we often “abstammen” from the parts of our culture that we wish to destroy can be seen as a step away from the position he defends in GT 23, where he suggests that Roman influences should be removed as a failed graft should be amputated from a tree.

reservations, Nietzsche can certainly be said to sanction this destructive act of radical critique, that is, the unmeasured struggle to empty a tradition of its *cachet* by means of divulging its ignominious origins.

These are the potential uses of history for life, which is to say, for preservation (secured by antiquarian history) and flourishing (enabled by critical history and realised by monumental history). As we saw above, Nietzsche does not think man can survive without distorting and exploiting the past for his own purposes. He describes this process of pressing history into the service of one's life-needs as one of *incorporation* ("Einverleibung"):

Je stärkere Wurzeln die innerste Natur eines Menschen hat, um so mehr wird er auch von der Vergangenheit sich aneignen oder anzwängen; und dächte man sich die mächtigste und ungeheuerste Natur, so wäre sie daran zu erkennen, dass es für sie gar keine Grenze des historischen Sinnes geben würde, an der er überwuchernd und schädlich zu wirken vermöchte; alles Vergangene, eigenes und fremdestes, würde sie an sich heran, in sich hineinziehen und gleichsam zu Blut umschaffen. (UB II 1 1.251)

The ability to *exploit* history in order to repair and renew culture in the present – i.e., "Vergangenes und Fremdes umzubilden und einzuverleiben, Wunden auszuheilen, Verlorenes zu ersetzen, zerbrochene Formen aus sich nachzuformen" – is what Nietzsche refers to as "die plastische Kraft eines Menschen, eines Volkes, einer Cultur" (ibid.). What is striking about this early passage in UB is that it seems to be describing the ideal form of history as *monumental* history. The practice of drawing foreign influences into ourselves and then transforming them into our lifeblood ("hineinziehen und gleichsam zu Blut umschaffen"), of forcefully distorting them in the manner of the man of action forging models for himself out of the past, encapsulates his description of monumental history; conversely, it jars with his conception of the piety of antiquarian history, and the destructiveness of critical history. Nietzsche's ideal thus seems to be best represented by monumental history,

kept within bounds by antiquarian and enabled by critical history.⁵⁰ As Jörg Salaquarda has remarked, Nietzsche only added the critical mode of history at a relatively late stage of his preparations for UB II. To be sure, for the most part he planned the essay as an apology for monumental history over and against antiquarian history, which he largely equates with philistinism.⁵¹ In light of this prioritisation, we should now make a closer study of monumental history with two questions in mind: how does this process of instrumentalising the past resolve the problem of disgregation? And can this mode of engagement with history be considered agonal in kind?

Nietzsche takes the pre-Socratic Greeks to have exemplified this ability to incorporate knowledge of past and foreign cultures in their appropriation of Egyptian, Lydian, Indian, Jewish, Oriental, Zoroastrian and Chinese cultural influences. According to Nietzsche, the Greeks aggregated and implemented their knowledge of foreign cultures in accordance with their real needs (“ihre ächten Bedürfnisse”). Among these needs, he specifies the demand to be “glücklich”, “weis und ruhig”,⁵² and to excel one’s neighbours (“[zu schwingen] sich hoch und höher als der Nachbar”).⁵³ This attentiveness to their true needs gave them a standard according to which the fray of foreign influences could then be organised:

⁵⁰ Indeed, Nietzsche sometimes even states that only the monumental (or as he also calls it, the “Klassisch”) form of history truly attends to a culture’s life-needs. See e.g. NL 29[29] 7.636: “Das Lebensbedürfniss verlangt nach dem Klassischen, das Wahrheitsbedürfniss nach dem Antiquarischen. Das Erste behandelt das Vergangne mit Kunst und künstlerischer Verklärungskraft.”

⁵¹ See Salaquarda (1984), p.18. On the emergence and insertion of the critical mode of history into the plan of UB II, see p.28.

⁵² As he says in PHG I 1.807: “[D]as, was sie [die Griechen] lernten, sogleich leben wollten.” See also UB IV 6 1.463: “So benutzen die jetzigen Gelehrten und Philosophen die Weisheit der Inder und Griechen nicht, um in sich weise und ruhig zu werden: ihre Arbeit soll blos dazu dienen, der Gegenwart einen täuschenden Ruf der Weisheit zu verschaffen.” See also NL 8[15] 10.335, where Nietzsche highlights the “Empfindung, mit der jeder Philosoph seine Gegner niederkämpfen wollte — durch den praktischen Beweis, daß er der Glückliche sei.”

⁵³ PHG I 1.806: “[S]ie [die Griechen] haben [...] alle bei anderen Völkern lebende Bildung in sich eingesogen, sie kamen gerade deshalb so weit, weil sie es verstanden den Speer von dort weiter zu schleudern, wo ihn ein anderes Volk liegen ließ [...] und so, wie sie, sollen wir von unsern Nachbarn lernen, zum Leben, nicht zum gelehrtenhaften Erkennen, alles Erlernte als Stütze benutzend, auf der man sich hoch und höher als der Nachbar schwingt.”

Die Griechen lernten allmählich das Chaos zu organisieren, dadurch dass sie sich, nach der delphischen Lehre, auf sich selbst, das heisst auf ihre ächten Bedürfnisse zurück besannen und die Schein-Bedürfnisse absterben liessen. So ergriffen sie wieder von sich Besitz; sie blieben nicht lange die überhäuften Erben und Epigonen des ganzen Orients; sie wurden selbst, nach beschwerlichem Kampfe mit sich selbst, *durch die praktische Auslegung jenes Spruches*, die glücklichsten Bereicherer und Mehrer des ererbten Schatzes und die Erstlinge und Vorbilder aller kommenden Culturvölker. (UB II 10 1.333; my italics)

On the ancient Greek model, knowledge of the past is only retained if it can be *implemented*, if it can be given an instrumental value with respect to the present.⁵⁴ Exemplars from the past – i.e., models and standards for aesthetic and ethical action – are only preserved and taught to subsequent generations to the extent that they can be *implemented* as expedients in the face of current obstacles. For Nietzsche, this criterion of implementability applies not just to historical knowledge, but to knowledge more generally. Thus, he extolls “[jene] [einfache] Mannestreue, die einen Alten zwang, wo er auch war, was er auch trieb, sich als Stoiker zu gebärden, falls er der Stoa einmal Treue zugesagt hatte” (UB II 5 1.282).

According to this account of the struggle for incorporation – the “beschwerliche[.] Kampfe mit sich selbst” – what cannot be applied must be forgotten: “Das was eine solche Natur nicht bezwingt, weiss sie [die Griechen] zu vergessen” (UB II 1 1.251). By this, Nietzsche seems to be saying that we should not revise such knowledge, nor should it form part of the curriculum of education; it should rather be left to recede into oblivion. This is what Nietzsche refers to as the “unhistorische” mode of existence.

At a stroke, this solves problem (a), the disgregation of influences on agency, *and* (b), the disjunction of our inner and outer existence. First, by seeking ways by which to implement knowledge, and by forgetting any knowledge that does

⁵⁴ See his criticism of linguistics and the study of Indian philosophy in UB III 8 1.424: “Man treibt zum Beispiel die sprachlichen Studien eifriger als je, ohne dass man für sich selbst eine strenge Erziehung in Schrift und Rede für nöthig befände. Das indische Alterthum eröffnet seine Thore, und seine Kenner haben zu den unvergänglichen Werken der Inder, zu ihren Philosophien kaum ein andres Verhältniss als ein Thier zur Lyra [...]”

not have pragmatic value, a combination of influences is formed that is wholly suited to one's true aesthetic and ethical needs. Second, in concretely *applying* knowledge, one reunifies one's interior life (of knowledge and belief) with one's exterior existence (in praxis).

But can this “beschwerliche[.] Kampfe mit sich selbst”, which one must undertake in order to synthesise foreign influences, justifiably be called agonal? Despite Nietzsche cursorily mentioning that this struggle is informed by an agonal desire to excel one's neighbours, I would contend that the relation he encourages towards our historical influences is certainly *not* agonal in kind; rather, it is characterised by both *instrumentalisation*, and the unmeasured *exclusion* of certain data in a way that is incompatible with agonal struggle. If we invoke Nietzsche's exposition of the kind of cultural organisation he is proposing, it becomes immediately apparent that the mode of *Kampf* being advocated has little in common with his conception of the agon:

Soll nun das Leben über das Erkennen, über die Wissenschaft, soll das Erkennen über das Leben herrschen? Welche von beiden Gewalten ist die höhere und entscheidende? Niemand wird zweifeln: das Leben ist die höhere, die herrschende Gewalt, denn ein Erkennen, welches das Leben vernichtete, würde sich selbst mit vernichtet haben. (UB II 10 1.331)

The normative thesis that the needs of life ought to dominate (“herrschen”) the pursuit of knowledge is justified by the fact that any other arrangement would, according to Nietzsche, entail eventual death.⁵⁵ He does not advocate an agon between our life-needs and our knowledge of other cultures, but a *Kampf* for a stable, *functional* (i.e. instrumentalising) hierarchy, within which, learning, and what we learn, is wholly subordinated to our instrumental needs. The accent on exploitative

⁵⁵ See also UB II 1 1.257: “Denn bei einem gewissen Uebermaass derselben zerbröckelt und entartet das Leben und zuletzt auch wieder, durch diese Entartung, selbst die Historie”. In UB II 3 1.268, Nietzsche also censures the situation in which “die Historie [dient] dem vergangen Leben so [...], dass sie das Weiterleben und gerade das höhere Leben untergräbt, wenn der historische Sinn das Leben nicht mehr conservirt, sondern mumisirt [...]”.

relations makes it difficult to read an agonistic impetus into UB II. The struggle to incorporate influences within oneself is a process in which, as Vanessa Lemm has aptly phrased it, “the human being appropriates, dominates and rules over the past”.⁵⁶

As Herman Siemens has observed, this bears a striking resemblance to the process of “Übertragung” that is depicted in CV 5. This denotes the process by virtue of which the agonal Greeks managed to “einordnen” their aggressive and destructive natural drives into culturally productive activity.⁵⁷ On the basis of this, Siemens maintains that “[t]he key to Nietzsche’s thought here is a notion of productive and inclusive conflict that he derives from the signature institution of pre-Socratic culture: the contest or agon (*Wettkampf*). It is through a transformative assimilation – or *Übertragung* – of natural, destructive drives that the agon was born.”⁵⁸ However, neither the fact that the agon emerges out of an analogous type of organisational struggle, nor the fact that the resultant organisation is productive, are sufficient conditions for considering such struggle agonistic. Indeed, the “Einordnung” of drives upon which the *agon* is grounded is one that aims at a functional hierarchy, within which destructive energies are enduringly subordinated to, and pressed into the service of, the social whole.⁵⁹ To be sure, the struggle for *Übertragung* (or “Einordnung”⁶⁰) is, like the agonal conflict to which it gives birth, a *non-destructive* (i.e. measured) and productive mode of relation. Notwithstanding, the agon, as I have construed it, is not motivated by the desire to instrumentally command (i.e. “einordnen”) one’s agonistic opponent, as is the case with this

⁵⁶Vanessa Lemm, “Nietzsche, *Einverleibung* and the Politics of Immunity”, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 21 (2013), 3-19 (p.6).

⁵⁷ See NL 16[15] 7.398: “Der Dichter erzieht: die tigerartigen Zerfleischungstriebe der Griechen weiß er zu übertragen in die gute Eris.”

⁵⁸ See Herman Siemens (2001a), p.101.

⁵⁹ NL 21[14] 7.526: “Was ist es, was die mächtigen Triebe in die Bahn der Wohlfahrt bringt? Im Allgemeinen die Liebe. Die Liebe zur Heimatstadt [...]”; NL 16[18] 7.399: “Wie die griechische Natur alle furchtbaren Eigenschaften zu benutzen weiß: die tigerartige Vernichtungswuth (der Stämme usw.) im Wettkampf”.

⁶⁰ See also NL [146] 8.79: “Die Natur, wie sie sich zeigt, wird nicht weggeleugnet, sondern nur eingeorndet, auf bestimmte Culte und Tage beschränkt. [...] [M]an suchte für die Naturkräfte eine mässige Entladung, nicht eine Vernichtung und Verneinung. — Das ganze System von neuer Ordnung ist dann der Staat.”

incorporative mode of conflict. The observation that the agon is preconditioned by a type of organisational struggle, does not justify the equation of these two distinct forms of conflict.

Another way in which UB II resists agonistic readings is in its persistent valorisation of unmeasured conflict. It should now be plain that for Nietzsche there is the need to forget expendable knowledge and thus be rid of its harmful influence. Organisational struggle is therefore *both* the struggle to include useful knowledge within the horizon of one's needs *and* to fully exclude knowledge that one has been identified as redundant. The drawing of any boundary is always an at once inclusive *and* exclusive act. We should further note that this is not an act of exclusion that maintains a conflictual relation with that which has been excluded. It is an instance of complete obfuscation – any excluded value (i.e. guide for action) from another culture is simply “nicht mehr da, der Horizont ist geschlossen und ganz” (UB II 1 1.251).⁶¹ It is also worth adding that this process of exclusion is in no way analogous to ostracism, since the reasoning behind it is not the excessive predominance, or tyrannical effect of a given cultural influence, but simply because that influence fails to fit the needs of the social whole.

Organisational struggle denotes precisely this dual activity of incorporation (measured) and exclusion (unmeasured). Indeed, Nietzsche further emphasises the way in which unmeasured conflict is a prerequisite of the incorporative processes he so values insofar as he exhorts his readers to an unambiguously unmeasured mode of struggle at the end of UBII. Here he appeals to the “Jugend, jenes ersten Geschlechtes von Kämpfern”, the “Schlangentödtern”, who will undertake the urgent and burdensome task that he has set forth in UB II. In naming them “Schlangentödtern”, and in defending their right to “Roheit und Unmässigkeit”, he makes it quite transparent that he is campaigning for anything *but* a measured, agonal mode of conflict:

⁶¹ Drawing on JGB 188, Müller-Lauter (1999) has referred to this as “the healthy tendency to eliminate what could disturb the ‘healthy closedness’ of the horizon [...]” (p.31).

Ihre Mission aber ist es, die Begriffe, die jene Gegenwart von “Gesundheit” und “Bildung” hat, zu erschüttern und Hohn und Hass gegen so hybride Begriffs-Ungeheuer zu erzeugen; und das gewährleistende Anzeichen ihrer eignen kräftigeren Gesundheit soll gerade dies sein, dass sie diese Jugend nämlich, selbst keinen Begriff, kein Parteiwort aus den umlaufenden Wort- und Begriffsmünzen der Gegenwart zur Bezeichnung ihres Wesens gebrauchen kann, sondern nur von einer in ihr thätigen kämpfenden, ausscheidenden, zertheilenden Macht und von einem immer erhöhten Lebensgeföhle in jeder guten Stunde überzeugt wird. (UB II 10 1.331)

The language with which Nietzsche marshals the “Jugend” in this passage can hardly be read as a provocation to measured, agonal conflict. As he himself says earlier in the same section, one sets out on the path to realise true culture “Vor allem dadurch, dass er [der Jugend] einen Aberglauben zerstört, den Glauben an die Nothwendigkeit jener [philisterhaften] Erziehungs-Operation” (UB II 10 1.326). The false and counter-productive belief of antiquarian philistines that the indiscriminate accumulation of knowledge is the only means by which to cultivate the youth – and that such accumulation forms the basis of “Gesundheit” and “Bildung” – is an injurious superstition, which has arisen out of weakness (i.e. a temporary need for self-preservation rather than flourishing). Moreover, this prejudice only further exacerbates the problem of measurelessness (i.e. hypertrophy). On these grounds, then, this fallacious belief must be destroyed (“zerstört”). This is chiefly achieved by generating “Hohn und Hass” against the entrenched convictions that block the project of cultural *Erneuerung*. As such, destruction is figured as a process of *devaluation* or *radical critique*. This accords with DWB, which gives the primary definition of *vernichten* as “für nichts achten, unwerth halten” (the secondary definition, “zu grunde richten”, then only applies in the case of “sinnliche dinge”).⁶² As he indicates in his retrospective appraisal of UB I in 1888-9, the text represents an act of “*schonungsloser* Verachtung” (my italics): “Der erste Angriff [*Betrachtung*] (1873) galt der deutschen Bildung, auf die ich damals schon mit

⁶² See DWB, entry for “vernichten” (vol.25, col.922-5).

schonungsloser Verachtung hinabblickte. Ohne Sinn, ohne Substanz, ohne Ziel: eine bloße ‘öffentliche Meinung’” (EH UB 1 6.316).

But what distinguishes the forms of unmeasured conflict that Nietzsche *advocates* from those that he condemns; for example, the struggle that he associates with Socrates and the destructive drive for knowledge in GT, or the ruinous historical sense, or even the evil Eris of CV 5? ⁶³ In short, these degenerate forms of unmeasured conflict are criticised on account of their being *hostile* to life and culture.⁶⁴ Indeed, the principal effect of excess knowledge is that, as we saw, man “hat seinen Instinct vernichtet und verloren” (UB II 5 1.280), thereby losing his natural self-confidence in action, which leaves him stultified and severely hinders his ability to flourish.⁶⁵ Then in Chapter 1, we established that in CV 5 Nietzsche rebukes the physical *Vernichtungskampf* on account of its culturally detrimental effects.

Contrariwise, the destructive conflict promoted by Nietzsche consistently stimulates *creativity* and *growth*, thereby *-serving the end of promoting life and culture*.⁶⁶ This is a case akin to “justifiable homicide”, particularly murder on grounds of self-defence, where the killing (i.e. destruction) of one’s assailant is permitted on the grounds that he would likely have murdered one, had he not been killed. Thus, Schopenhauer is praised as the “Vernichter kulturfeindlicher Kräfte”

⁶³ See UB II 7 1.295: “Der historische Sinn, wenn er ungebändigt waltet und alle seine Konsequenzen zieht, entwurzelt die Zukunft, weil er die Illusionen zerstört und den bestehenden Dingen ihre Atmosphäre nimmt, in der sie allein leben können.”

⁶⁴ According to Nietzsche, Socrates (and Euripides), in their unlimited propagation of dialectics as a measure of value, strove for the destruction of myth, instinct and Greek tragedy, which were the grounds of Hellenic vitality. NL 1[43] 7.21: “Die griechische Tragödie fand in Sokrates ihre Vernichtung.” See also SGT 1.541-2.

⁶⁵ See UB II 5 1.279: “[D]urch dieses Uebermaass werden die Instincte des Volkes gestört und der Einzelne nicht minder als das Ganze am Reifwerden verhindert”. UB II 5 1.280: The rational man, says Nietzsche, “hat seinen Instinct vernichtet und verloren, er kann nun nicht mehr, dem ‘göttlichen Thiere’ vertrauend, die Zügel hängen lassen, wenn sein Verstand schwankt und sein Weg durch Wüsten führt.”

⁶⁶ See UB II 7 1.295-6. Nietzsche warns that, “[w]enn hinter dem historischen Triebe kein Batrieb wirkt, wenn nicht zerstört und aufgeräumt wird, damit eine bereits in der Hoffnung lebendige Zukunft auf dem befreiten Boden ihr Haus baue, wenn die Gerechtigkeit allein waltet, dann wird der schaffende Instinct entkräftet und entmuthigt.”

(NL 28[6] 7.619) and Nietzsche states that the great productive spirit only aims to condemn (“verurtheilen”) “was für ihn den Lebenden und Lebenzeugenden Vernichtung und Entwürdigung ist [...]” (UB II 4 1.278). On this account, the *Zweckmäßigkeit* of both culture and individuals must, as with Schopenhauer, be established through a combination of measured and unmeasured conflict.

What we may doubt is whether Nietzsche’s attempt to harness destructive force for creative purposes is open to the scepticisms that he himself expresses regarding critical history: will the “Schlangentödtern” Nietzsche calls forth be able to set a limit (*Grenze*) on their *own* destructive activity? But moreover, *can* we moderns supplant the antiquarian model of education? Or is this too deep a part of our first nature, the removal of which would do us irreparable damage?⁶⁷ Whether Nietzsche’s own project can circumvent these obstacles remains a moot point; nonetheless, these caveats should not leave us disaffected. The most dangerous course of action is that of *inaction*. Were we to let life remain dominated by knowledge, at least according to Nietzsche’s logic, we would be effectively condemning ourselves to death.

Nietzsche’s endorsement of organisational struggle can be construed as an attempt to promote a form of conflict that clearly shares three key structural features with Schopenhauer’s notion of assimilative conflict. Thus, the following can be said of Nietzsche’s model of organisational struggle in UB:

1. It is aimed at subjugation (*Überwältigung*) (i.e. that of the three forms of history to the needs of life, and that of the various data of historical knowledge to a person’s or culture’s life-needs);

⁶⁷ Nietzsche registers this problem in UB III 6 1.401-2: “[D]ie Schwierigkeit liegt für die Menschen darin, umzulernen und ein neues Ziel sich zu stecken; und es wird unsägliche Mühe kosten, die Grundgedanken unseres jetzigen Erziehungswesens, das seine Wurzeln im Mittelalter hat, und dem eigentlich der mittelalterliche Gelehrte als Ziel der vollendeten Bildung vorschwebt, mit einem neuen Grundgedanken zu vertauschen.”

2. It is directed towards establishing a top-down instrumental relation (e.g. to render knowledge ancillary to life), which is associated with cultural health (just as it is associated with organismic health for Schopenhauer and Goethe);
3. It necessarily involves unmeasured conflict (i.e. the exclusion of redundant knowledge and beliefs).

One important difference, of course, is that whereas Schopenhauer describes organisational conflict as a naturally occurring process, Nietzsche's depiction of such conflict has a strong normative dimension. Thus, Nietzsche suggests that, within the domain of culture at least, organisational struggle is contingent upon human agents *consciously* striving for synthesis.

We might also argue that Nietzsche's early account of organisational conflict fulfils the fourth distinguishing criterion of Schopenhauer's assimilative conflict – namely, insofar as struggle persists within the resultant hierarchies; thus, each mode of historical practice tends towards hypertrophy and constantly attempts to set itself up independently of the culture's life-needs. Within the healthy culture, there must therefore be a continuous process of reigning the various types of history back into the service of life by deploying the relevant antidote form of history. Like the lower ideas in Schopenhauer's model, historical learning is always pushing to gain independence from life, and must perpetually be brought back into a position of subservience.

On all of the above grounds, I would contest the suggestion that UB II should be primarily be understood as a text which “draws on and extends the agonistic model he earlier describes [in CV 5]”.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, in order to substantiate my

⁶⁸ Acampora (2013), p.39. Acampora argues that the struggle of the different types of history with one another is agonistic in a manner recalling the struggle of the Apollinian and Dionysian in GT: “Just as Nietzsche thinks the Dionysian and the Apollinian must be combined such that their mutual resistance achieves creative results, he argues that the various practices of history must be combined in the interest of creating and serving an affirmative form of life” (p.40). However, though she highlights the moment of mutual

claim that the notion of organisational conflict developed by Nietzsche in UB follows the general structure of Schopenhauer's conception of the struggle for *Zweckmäßigkeit*, it still remains to be seen how it is metaphysically grounded (5.). However, as we turn to the question of self-knowledge as it is worked out in the latter two *Betrachtungen*, these foundations will gradually be exposed to view.

3.3.4. KNOWING THYSELF

In my analysis of UB II, I bracketed out an important concept; namely, that of *self-knowledge*. We can already extrapolate from the above that knowing oneself must be a condition of the organisational conflict outlined in UB II: one must have a clear conception of one's true life-needs and one's *plastische Kraft* in order to know what belongs within (and what should be excluded from) this horizon. Nietzsche thought the Greeks were able to organise themselves only to the extent that they obeyed the Delphic dictum to "know thyself": "das heisst [sich] auf ihre ächten Bedürfnisse zurück besinnen und die Schein-Bedürfnisse absterben liessen" (UB II 10 1.333). In this subsection, I propose that we turn to the final two *Betrachtungen* to get a better picture of *why* this is necessary, and *how* Nietzsche thinks it can be achieved.

James Conant has claimed that "on the whole [Nietzsche] does not talk about [Schopenhauer] very much; and furthermore, the views put forward in [UB III] seem to contradict Schopenhauer's own philosophical views."⁶⁹ However, we should be very careful not to mistake a lack of explicit mention of Schopenhauer in UB III for a lack of presence. Indeed, proper scrutiny reveals that Schopenhauer's thought has a profound structuring influence on UB, in spite of there being some fundamental points of divergence. This goes for Nietzsche's notion of self-knowledge in UB III (and UB IV) just as much as it does for his understanding of how the self is forged

resistance and limitation, Acampora does not pay sufficient attention to the general subordination of historical study to life.

⁶⁹ Conant (2001), p.202, also quoted in Lemm (2007), p.10. See also Stanley Cavell (1990): "Schopenhauer, as everyone notes, is scarcely present in the text" (p.53).

into a purposive unity, which draws heavily on Schopenhauer's notion of *Zweckmäßigkeit*. Indeed, I will now defend the claim that Nietzsche's conception of self-organisation is one that he largely adopts from Schopenhauer, and which correspondingly shares in the metaphysical presuppositions of his predecessor's account of assimilative struggle. It is vital that we acknowledge this inheritance since it reveals just why the solutions Nietzsche presents to (a)-(d) become unsustainable in the later writings (i.e. because of their Schopenhauerian metaphysical presuppositions). To convincingly bring this legacy to light, we should begin by giving a summary of how Schopenhauer thinks that the self is formed into a purposive organisation.

Again following Kant, Schopenhauer distinguishes between intelligible and empirical character.⁷⁰ According to this distinction, the character of the individual has two sides: one that appears to us (our *empirical* character) and one that remains imperceptible (our *intelligible* character). In Kantian terms, we might refer to this as the difference between the phenomenal and noumenal aspects of the self:

[D]er intelligible Charakter jedes Menschen [sei] als ein außerzeitlicher, daher untheilbarer und unveränderlicher Willensakt zu betrachten [...], dessen in Zeit und Raum und allen Formen des Satzes vom Grunde entwickelte und auseinandergezogene Erscheinung der empirische Charakter ist, wie er sich in der ganzen Handlungsweise und im Lebenslaufe dieses Menschen erfahrungsmäßig darstellt. (WWV I §55, p.380)

We each possess a unique character, or will – what Schopenhauer refers to as our peculiar “vollständige Persönlichkeit”.⁷¹ Like all objects, this character – as purely *intelligible* character – is undetermined (i.e. free) since it exists outside of space and

⁷⁰ For an informative comparison of Kant's, Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's views on intelligible character, see Gerhardt (1996), pp.117-24.

⁷¹ See WWV I §26, p.188: “Auf den obern Stufen der Objektivität des Willens sehn wir die Individualität bedeutend hervortreten, besonders beim Menschen, als die große Verschiedenheit individueller Charaktere, d.h. als vollständige Persönlichkeit, schon äußerlich ausgedrückt durch stark gezeichnete individuelle Physiognomie, welche die gesammte Korporisation mitbegreift.”

time and is therefore not subject to the laws of causality. This is what Schopenhauer also calls our “individuellen Willen[.]” (WWV I §55, p.382). However, our character appears – i.e. as our empirical character – when we make decisions and act, which is to say when it has to realise itself in the realm of space and time. Nonetheless, for Schopenhauer, each individual’s character is, in its essence, unchanging – indeed, just as there are Platonic ideas (“Ideen”) for each distinct natural kind, Schopenhauer states that there is a separate Platonic Idea for each person’s individual character; hence, at the moment of birth, a person’s “Wandel [ist schon] fest bestimmt [...] und [bleibt] sich bis ans Ende im Wesentlichen gleich” (ibid., p.384).⁷² As such, when a person’s character is presented with a given conflict of motives, that person will only ever resolve upon one particular path and is completely determined according to the principle of sufficient reason which governs their empirical character. For example, one’s character determines how egoistic or altruistic one is. Schopenhauer explains that although people might appear to change, this is merely because they have new knowledge about how to better attain their goals. Thus, on this view, an egoistic man might appear to act more altruistically, but only because he has become convinced by the religious dogma that such behaviour will grant him an eternal afterlife of paradise. His altruistic behaviour is, according to Schopenhauer, therefore just as egoistically determined as before (ibid., p.295).

This brings us to the third type of character identified by Schopenhauer – *acquired* character (“erworbener Charakter”). Schopenhauer claims that through successive acts we are able to glean a progressively more comprehensive picture of our unique empirical character. As such, we can be in states of relative knowledge or ignorance regarding our empirical character – in particular, regarding our unique strengths and weaknesses. Man finds in himself, says Schopenhauer, “zu allen, noch so verschiedenen menschlichen Anstrengungen und Kräften die Anlagen” (ibid.,

⁷² See WWV I §45, p.300, where Schopenhauer states that “jeder Mensch gewissermaßen eine ganz eigenthümliche Idee darstellt.”

p.396). In order to know which of these to pursue, it is essential that we achieve conscious knowledge of our peculiar character:

Können wir uns dazu nicht entschließen, sondern greifen, wie Kinder auf dem Jahrmarkt, nach Allem was uns im Vorübergehn reizt; dann ist dies das verkehrte Bestreben, die Linie unsers Wegs in eine Fläche zu verwandeln: wir laufen sodann im Zickzack, irrlichterliren hin und her und gelangen zu nichts. [...] Darum ist das bloße Wollen und auch Können an sich noch nicht zureichend, sondern ein Mensch muß auch wissen, was er will, und wissen, was er kann: erst so wird er Charakter zeigen, und erst dann kann er etwas Rechtes vollbringen. (Ibid., pp.396-7)

To fruitfully follow a certain path in life – that is, for our life to trace a directed line rather than dissipating into a “Fläche” of caprice and haphazard dilettantism – some impulses must “ganz unterdrückt werden” (ibid.). Through knowledge of our empirical character (particularly our personal strengths and weaknesses) we learn which of these must be suppressed. This enables us to follow the path dictated by our character with determination and efficacy. Prefiguring Nietzsche’s criticism of bourgeois imitation, Schopenhauer also reserves particular disdain for those who, in lieu of proper self-understanding, merely attempt to ape others (usually out of envy of their successes): “Nachahmung fremder Eigenschaften und Eigenthümlichkeiten ist viel schimpflicher, als das Tragen fremder Kleider: denn es ist das Urtheil der eigenen Werthlosigkeit von sich selbst ausgesprochen” (ibid., p.400). Not only is this inherently reprehensible, but it also frequently results in disappointment insofar as it lures individuals to undertake projects for which, in terms of their personality, they are ill-equipped (ibid., p.401).

What I wish to highlight in this summary of Schopenhauer is the fact that the process of attaining self-knowledge depends on an essentialist conception of the self as a unique and unchanging metaphysical essence – that is, as an *Idea*. It is only epistemological access to this self that enables us to avert the pitfalls of imitation and caprice; this is how one might, according to Schopenhauer, follow Pindar’s

command to “become who one is”. But how is this account operative in Nietzsche’s vision of how one ought to approach the problem of synthesising one’s self?

On one level, Nietzsche is openly sceptical regarding the notion of acquired character, particularly since he opens UB III by casting doubt on the very possibility of self-knowledge:

Aber wie finden wir uns selbst wieder? Wie kann sich der Mensch kennen? Er ist eine dunkle und verhüllte Sache; und wenn der Hase sieben Häute hat, so kann der Mensch sich sieben mal siebzig abziehen und wird doch nicht sagen können “das bist du nun wirklich, das ist nicht mehr Schaale.” (UB III 1 1.340)

How can we ever be certain that we have obtained insight into our *true* needs and capacities and not merely those which *appear* so? Or that our own self-understanding has not itself been infiltrated by convention – are we not convention through and through?⁷³ What sense does it make to speak of a core, essential self if it can never be intuited? Do such doubts not throw the foundation of his entire organisational project into question?

To be sure, Nietzsche also shows a marked desire to move away from a substantial, essentialist conception of the self. Though he maintains that each of us is a “Unicum”, we are not so in the sense of an Idea – i.e. a *unitas ante rem*. Rather, we are “ein so wunderbar buntes Mancherlei zusammenschüttelt zum Einerlei” (UB III 1 1.337). Moreover, even in 1865, Nietzsche criticises Schopenhauer’s notion of empirical character insofar as he thinks conceiving of character as something fixed and determined negates the possibility of a normative philosophy aimed at *changing* the individual.⁷⁴

⁷³ In his concern with convention in UB III, the influence of Emerson is striking. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, “On Self-Reliance”, in Joel Myerson (ed.), *Transcendentalism: A Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 318–39. On the relation of Nietzsche and Emerson, see Conant (2000, pp.31ff) and Cavell (1990).

⁷⁴ See KGW I/5, p.276: “Man wirft der Schopenhauerischen Ethik vor, daß sie keine imperative Form habe: Das Ding was die Philosophen Charakter nennen, ist eine unheilbare Krankheit. Eine imperative Ethik ist eine solche, welche mit den Krankheitssymptomen zu thun hat und indem sie gegen diese kämpft, den Glauben hat den einheitlichen Grundstock, das Urübel zu Beseitigen.”

However, despite his misgivings, in UB IV, Nietzsche signals that he *at least in part* assents to Schopenhauer's notion of character; though he still makes significant additions to the theory:

Es wäre sonderbar, wenn Das, was Jemand am besten kann und am liebsten thut, nicht auch in der gesamten Gestaltung seines Lebens wieder sichtbar würde; vielmehr muss bei Menschen von hervorragender Befähigung das Leben nicht nur, wie bei Jedermann, zum Abbild des Charakters, sondern vor Allem auch zum Abbild des Intellectes und seines eigensten Vermögens werden. (UB IV 2 1.435)

Character *is* realised with absolute necessity and automaticity, for Nietzsche – there is no point in trying to change or shape it, our life is an ineluctable “Abbild” thereof. However, he appears to hold a notion of *acquired* character that depends on the discovery of something other than our character – that is, one's *intellect* and “eigensten Vermögens”, of which one's life can *also* be an “Abbild”, though it is not necessarily so. Whereas for Schopenhauer, acquired character is portrayed as something that certain people simply do attain while others do not, for Nietzsche, acquired character is a *task*, as will become more apparent as we continue.

So far, confusingly, we have seen Nietzsche reject and then partially adopt with significant modifications, Schopenhauer's essentialist notion of the self. However, this should not distract us from the strong vein of essentialist metaphysics running through UB. Let us recall his criticism, in UB I and II, of *Weltanschauungen* that affirm becoming on the grounds that they issue in a pernicious form of egoism. Indeed, Herman Siemens has remarked the “total repudiation of becoming in UB III 4 [...], and the advice ‘to destroy all that is becoming [...].’”⁷⁵ While we should certainly acknowledge the incipient reservations Nietzsche expresses towards the Schopenhauerian conception of subjectivity in UB, I now want to foreground the numerous moments in the text where he can be said to quite uncritically adopt just such an essentialist conception of the self.

⁷⁵ Siemens (2009), p.92 (quoting UB III 4 1.375).

Thus, in UB, we find that he valorises the struggle to gain insight into a metaphysically essential part of our character – one that lies beneath the “Mancherlei” of our self and that largely mirrors Schopenhauer’s notion of empirical character. Moreover, he retains a firm faith in the possibility of obtaining knowledge of this deeper self. Indeed, Nietzsche maintains that people such as Schopenhauer and Wagner have achieved just such self-knowledge. He further speaks praisingly of the way in which Schopenhauer was governed (“waltet”) by his “platonische Idee” (UB III 5 1.376), implying that this is a condition that we do not automatically enjoy. As the previous section (UB III 4) indicates, Schopenhauer’s character was defined by the tenacious pursuit of truth, and the willingness to consciously sacrifice happiness for this goal. Perhaps an even more Schopenhauerian moment in UB is to be found in Nietzsche’s description of Wagner in UB IV:

[V]on dem Augenblicke an, wo die in ihm herrschende Leidenschaft ihrer selber bewusst wird und seine ganze Natur zusammenfasst: damit ist dann das Tastende, Schweifende, das Wuchern der Nebenschösslinge abgethan, und in den verschlungensten Wegen und Wandelungen, in dem oft abenteuerlichen Bogenwurfe seiner Pläne waltet eine einzige innere Gesetzlichkeit, ein Wille, aus dem sie erklärbar sind [...]. (UB IV 2 1.435)

Nietzsche adduces Schopenhauer and Wagner as evidence that the discovery of some deeper self (our Platonic *Idee*, inner *Gesetzlichkeit* or *Wille*) is a real possibility. It is precisely in their having grasped this core self that they educate us – they personally evince the possibility of accomplishing this task and, in setting a precedent, thereby inspire us to undertake the challenge ourselves: “Deine wahren Erzieher und Bildner verrathen dir, was *der wahre Ursinn und Grundstoff deines Wesens ist, etwas durchaus Unerziehbares und Unbildbares*, aber jedenfalls schwer Zugängliches, Gebundenes, Gelähmtes” (UB III 1 1.341; my italics).

Not only does Nietzsche disclose that he holds self-knowledge to be possible in these texts, but he also reveals that the self accessed through such knowledge is comparable to Schopenhauer’s metaphysical notion of the empirical character: it is an unchanging essence. Throughout UB III and IV, he employs a panoply of terms

to refer to this inner essence: “innere Gesetzlichkeit”, “der Kern seines Wesens”, the “Wahres Wesen”, “persönlichen Willens”, “eigentliches Selbst”, and so on.⁷⁶ But how can we concretely go about gaining epistemological access to this self? To be sure, Nietzsche gives his readers a very practicable account of just how they can set about achieving this:

Die junge Seele sehe auf das Leben zurück mit der Frage: was hast du bis jetzt wahrhaft geliebt, was hat deine Seele hinangezogen, was hat sie beherrscht und zugleich beglückt? Stelle dir die Reihe dieser verehrten Gegenstände vor dir auf, und vielleicht ergeben sie dir, durch ihr Wesen und ihre Folge, ein Gesetz, das Grundgesetz deines eigentlichen Selbst. Vergleiche diese Gegenstände, sieh, wie einer den andern ergänzt, erweitert, überbietet, verklärt, wie sie eine Stufenleiter bilden, auf welcher du bis jetzt zu dir selbst hingeklettert bist; denn dein wahres Wesen liegt nicht tief verborgen in dir, sondern unermesslich hoch über dir oder wenigstens über dem, was du gewöhnlich als dein Ich nimmst. (UB III 1 1.340)

Introspection enables us to identify our highest joys. By comparing these past delights, Nietzsche believes that we will come to see that they form a ladder, or what we might call a *Rangordnung* (again in contrast to the hypertrophied antiquarian who fails to differentiate in apportioning value to the past). Nietzsche’s thesis is that this reveals an inner law expressing the trajectory of our ideal self-development, which thus provides us with a conception of a higher self towards which we can consciously aim. Note that this inner law is a law directing our *development* or progress – it never describes ourselves *as we are*. We can think of this law as

⁷⁶ Other commentators have also noted the fact that Nietzsche holds an essentialist conception of the self in UB. See e.g. Nuno Nabias, “The Individual and Individuality in Nietzsche”, in K. A. Pearson (ed.), *A Companion to Nietzsche* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp.76-94 (pp.78-80). Nabias underscores the analogy between the Schopenhauerian notion of character and Nietzsche’s conception of the self in UB; however, he does not bring out how this underpins Nietzsche’s early organizational project. See also Robert Miner, “Nietzsche’s Fourfold Conception of the Self”, *Inquiry*, 54(4) (2011), 337-360 (pp.339ff.). Although Miner does not draw the Schopenhauerian comparison, he tries to argue that this essentialist notion of the self persists throughout Nietzsche’s writings. See also Frank Chouraqui, *Ambiguity and the Absolute: Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty on the Question of Truth* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), who likewise notes the parallelism between Nietzsche’s notion of will and Schopenhauer’s notion of character (p.86).

analogous to an algebraic formula, which shows the pattern in an existing series, and thereby allows us to deduce how the series should continue for higher values, without actually having any content of its own. Certainly, in dynamising the notion of the essential self, Nietzsche has once again adapted the Schopenhauerian model; nonetheless – and this is what is imperative for my argument – he retains the idea of a metaphysically fixed kernel lying at the heart of the self, as well as the idea that we can gain epistemological access to this kernel.

But *why* is this discovery of an inner trajectory of value to Nietzsche? Echoing the structure of UB II, this self-knowledge forms the basis for organising the wider self into a “harmonische Ganzheit” and “vielstimmigen Zusammenklang” (UB III 2 1.342). The end result should be someone

[...] in denen alles, Erkennen, Begehren, Lieben, Hassen, nach einem Mittelpunkte, einer Wurzelkraft hinstrebt und wo gerade durch die zwingende und herrschende Uebergewalt dieses lebendigen Centrums ein harmonisches System von Bewegungen hin und her, auf und nieder gebildet wird [...]. (UB III 2 1.342)

Once the ideal trajectory of our self has been deduced, it functions as a “Cardinalkraft” “Wurzelkraft”, or “Mittelpunkte” under which all our other capacities can be organised.⁷⁷ As such, the discovery of our inner law gives us the fundament needed to synthesise our “Erkennen, Begehren, Lieben, Hassen” into a stable and coherent structure. Nietzsche depicts this central point or force, not merely as the cornerstone of self-organisation, but also as the organising force itself “die zwingende und herrschende Uebergewalt”. As an example of the antithesis (“Gegenbild”) of Wagner, Nietzsche describes Goethe (the poet, novelist, painter and courtier) as someone who “wie ein viel verzweigtes Stromnetz erscheint, welches aber seine ganze Kraft nicht zu Meere trägt, sondern mindestens ebensoviel

⁷⁷ See also NL 30[9] 7.734: “[...] Harmonie [ist] da, wenn alles auf einen Mittelpunkt, auf eine Cardinalkraft bezogen ist, nicht wenn zahlreiche schwache Kräfte zugleich spielen.”

auf seinen Wegen und Krümmungen verliert und verstreut, als es am Ausgange mit sich führt” (UB IV 3 1.442).

This overpowering of one’s impulses, which is unequivocally advocated by Nietzsche in UB, cannot defensibly be called agonistic since it is characterised by the rather unagonistic process of exploitatively subordinating those impulses under a single force. The concept of such a “lebendige[s] Centrum” is profoundly at odds with the decentred pluralism of Nietzsche’s agonism, according to which the strongest exist in constellations defined by mutual limitation (das “Wettspiel der Kräfte”), and any single superordinate force is forcibly removed by means of ostracism.⁷⁸

Schopenhauer saw *truth* (“Wahrheit”) as his goal, and Nietzsche reveres the way in which his predecessor tenaciously devoted himself to the pursuit of this goal, especially given the fact that Schopenhauer did so in a fashion that was completely opposed to the scholars of his day, who only sought truth to the extent that it brought them academic honours.⁷⁹ But, according to Nietzsche, in his irreverent pursuit of truth he was forced to deny and destroy conventional beliefs, prejudices and falsehoods. Once again resonating with the model of assimilation expounded in UB II, this process of overpowering is not merely a measured, inclusive process of coordinating our inclinations into an effective hierarchical structure; rather, in addition to this, it is a process of *exclusion*, a “Wegräumung alles Unkrauts, Schuttwerks, Gewürms, das die zarten Keime der Pflanzen antasten will” (UB III 1 1.341). The target of this attack is the dross of prejudice, convention and the vulgar pressures of society. For this reason, “[darf] der Genius sich nicht fürchten, in den feindseligsten Widerspruch mit den bestehenden Formen und Ordnungen zu treten, wenn er die höhere Ordnung und Wahrheit, die in ihm lebt, an’s Licht herausheben will” (UB III 3 1.351). This is a hostile act of rejecting convention in favour of

⁷⁸ Vanessa Lemm (against Cavell) has also argued that the relation of one’s exemplar or ideal self to the rest of one’s self is not one of equality. See Lemm (2007), p.21.

⁷⁹ UB III 7 1.411: “Es gehörte zu den herrlichen Bedingungen seiner Existenz, dass er wirklich einer solchen Aufgabe, gemäss seinem Wahlspruche *vitam impendere vero*, leben konnte und dass keine eigentliche Gemeinheit der Lebensnoth ihn niederzwang [...]”.

“Wahrheit und Ehrlichkeit” (UB III 3 1.354). As we already witnessed above, convention prevents the potential genius from attaining fruition; thus, in struggling against this, “bekämpft er das, was ihn hindert, gross zu sein”:

Daraus folgt, dass seine Feindschaft im Grunde gerade gegen das gerichtet ist, was zwar an ihm selbst, was aber nicht eigentlich er selbst ist, nämlich gegen das unreine Durch- und Nebeneinander von Unmischbarem und ewig Unvereinbarem [...]. So strebte Schopenhauer, schon von früher Jugend an, jener falschen, eiteln und unwürdigen Mutter, der Zeit, entgegen, und indem er sie gleichsam aus sich auswies, reinigte und heilte er sein Wesen und fand sich selbst in seiner ihm zugehörigen Gesundheit und Reinheit wieder. (UB III 3 1.362)

The primary means by which Schopenhauer “zerstört” was, according to Nietzsche, radical critique – i.e. *denial* (“Verneinung”). To be sure, Nietzsche explicitly describes the “Vernichtung” performed by Schopenhauer in terms of an act of “Verneinung” of the doxa of his day (UB III 3 1.364 and 4 1.372). The false belief Nietzsche thinks Schopenhauer most effectively dispelled was the idea that happiness represents the goal for which we should strive. Schopenhauer revealed the pursuit of happiness to be a futile endeavour – one driven by ignorance of the fact that all such striving ever brings us is a cycle of painful desire, momentary satisfaction, and boredom followed by the re-emergence of painful yearning.⁸⁰ He therefore devalued such beliefs by denuding their foundations in myopia and naïveté. Indeed, we might view Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer as launching a distinctly unmeasured struggle against the belief in, and impulse for, enduring happiness.⁸¹

⁸⁰ See NL 35[12] 7.812, where Nietzsche speaks of “[d]er Philosoph als der wahre Widersacher der Verweltlichung, als der Zerstörer jedes scheinbaren und verführerischen Glücks und alles dessen, was ein solches Glück verspricht, der Staaten, Revolutionen, Reichthümer, Ehren, Wissenschaften, Kirchen unter den Menschen [...]”. As he quotes Schopenhauer as saying in UB III 4 1.373: “Ein glückliches Leben ist unmöglich: das Höchste, was der Mensch erlangen kann, ist ein heroischer Lebenslauf.”

⁸¹ Indeed, Nietzsche talks of Schopenhauer as having destroyed his own “Erdenglück”. See UB III 4 1.372: “Gewiss, [Schopenhauer] vernichtet sein Erdenglück durch seine Tapferkeit, er muss selbst den Menschen, die er liebt, den Institutionen, aus deren Schoosse er hervorgegangen ist, feindlich sein [...]”.

Again, this exclusive or destructive activity is to be distinguished from the forms of destructiveness disparaged by Nietzsche; namely, insofar as, in overcoming “das unreine Durch- und Nebeneinander von Unmischbarem”, it facilitates *health* (“Gesundheit”) and healing: “es giebt eine Art zu verneinen und zu zerstören, welche gerade der Ausfluss jener mächtigen Sehnsucht nach Heiligung und Errettung ist, als deren erster philosophischer Lehrer Schopenhauer unter uns entheiligte” (UB III 4 1.372).⁸²

Nietzsche presents Schopenhauer as his educator because he is manifest evidence of someone who has been able to achieve the aforementioned integration of the various parts of his self. As such, he writes for himself and not for others, and cannot be said to imitate the French style: “Niemand an ihm das nachgemachte gleichsam übersilberte Scheinfranzosenthum [...] entdecken wird” (UB III 2 1.347). There is an honesty (“Ehrlichkeit”) to his writing, a “Natürlichkeit, wie sie Menschen haben, die in sich zu Hause [...] sind”. He is also a *whole* individual: “einmal ein ganzes, einstimmiges, in eignen Angeln hängendes und bewegtes, unbefangenes und ungehemmtes Naturwesen” (UB III 2 1.350).

Like Schopenhauer, then, Nietzsche views the discovery of our inner self as a source of purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) and increased efficacy; however, whereas Schopenhauer merely emphasises the way in which this revelation gives us a basis for the *Unterdrückung* of distracting impulses, Nietzsche accents the way in which it can act as a fulcrum around which our forces can be *synthesised and further cultivated* (in the service of this higher goal). The ideal educator, says Nietzsche, should not merely create harmonious order under the dominant “Wurzelkraft”, but they should also “alle vorhandenen Kräfte heranziehe[n] [und] pflege[n]” (UB III 2 1.342).

⁸² Hence, Nietzsche refers to Schopenhauer as the “befreiender Zerstörer” in a number of notes. See NL 34[36] 7.803; NL 34[43] 7.807. Indeed, Nietzsche approximates Schopenhauer to the critical form of history (whereas Rousseau stands for monumental history, and Goethe for antiquarian history) (see UB III 4 1.369ff.). See also Zuckert (1976), pp.71-6.

In this way, the ordering Nietzsche seeks to establish is not one that simply forces our inclinations into passive submission to our higher selves; rather, this order is the very means by which those forces can be stimulated and held in ever greater and more fecund degrees of tension. We only have to look to his characterisation of Wagner and Wagner's music in UB IV to see how intrinsic continued tension is to the hierarchical order advocated by Nietzsche:

Sturm und Feuer nehmen bei ihm [Wagner] die zwingende Gewalt eines persönlichen Willens an. Ueber allen den tönenden Individuen und dem Kampfe ihrer Leidenschaften, über dem ganzen Strudel von Gegensätzen, schwebt, mit höchster Besonnenheit, ein übermächtiger symphonischer Verstand, welcher aus dem Kriege fortwährend die Eintracht gebiert: Wagner's Musik als Ganzes ist ein Abbild der Welt, sowie diese von dem grossen ephesischen Philosophen verstanden wurde, als eine Harmonie, welche der Streit aus sich zeugt [...]. (UB IV 9 1.494)

Thus, this dominating centre should not be construed as suppressing conflict between the forces that it harmonises, but as actually enabling, sustaining and maximising this conflict, while reasserting itself in a continuous manner, insofar as it prevents this struggle from becoming internecine.

We can now see that all of the criteria defining Schopenhauer's notion of assimilative conflict have been fulfilled by Nietzsche's account of the organisational struggle for self-cultivation:

1. The aim of the struggle is the subjugation (of diverting impulses) and the establishment of functional hierarchy;
2. Instrumental hierarchy is associated with (psychological) health;
3. The struggle is inseparable from an unmeasured mode of conflict (i.e. the radical critique of misguided beliefs);
4. The struggle persists within the resultant hierarchies;

5. The process is driven by (or at least founded upon) a metaphysical entity (i.e. the self *qua* essence).

Nonetheless, in relation to (5), it should be underscored that Nietzsche *dynamises* this subjective essence, reconceiving of it as a *developmental law* in opposition to Schopenhauer's more static portrayal of empirical character (though it should also be added that this dynamism renders it no less metaphysical and unchanging at its core).

With this, we have now unpacked how Nietzsche proposes we resolve disintegration at an individual level, and how this is rooted in a quasi-Schopenhauerian *Weltanschauung*. What remains to be seen, however, is how Nietzsche suggests we resolve this problem at the level of the collective.

3.3.5. COMMON PURPOSE

In UB II, Nietzsche suggests that the solution to the problem of disgregative egoism, which was seen to be caused by an excess of historical learning, is what he calls “das Überhistorische”. Drawing on Schopenhauer, he argues that art and religion grant us metaphysical insight into the truth of reality, thereby giving us the existential foothold we require in order to avoid slipping into the stream of becoming and, with this, disillusioned egoism. Myth and art (which, of course, acts as a vehicle for myth) are therefore framed as the antidotes to the excesses of historical learning by virtue of the fact that they give “dem Dasein den Charakter des Ewigen und Gleichbedeutenden” (UB II 10 1.330).⁸³ Nietzsche was certainly probing the

⁸³ In this thought, Nietzsche is undoubtedly reprising Schopenhauer's conception of “die metaphysische Bedürfniß”, a notion with which he was certainly familiar (see e.g. letter to Carl von Gersdorff, 07.04.1866 [KGB I/2, p.120]). Schopenhauer argues that, as consolation for their knowledge of death, “und neben diesem die Betrachtung des Leidens und der Noth des Lebens” (WWV II §17, p.186), humans require some form of metaphysical explanation and justification of the world. As a means to this, humans turn to metaphysics which, as either philosophy or religion, “über die Natur, oder die gegebene Erscheinung der Dinge, hinausgeht, um Aufschluß zu ertheilen über Das, wodurch jene, in einem oder dem andern

unifying qualities of religion and art during this period of his thought – stating at one point that “[z]um Organisiren des Chaotischen eignet sich Kunst und Religion” (NL 29[192] 7.708).⁸⁴ However, while they appear to counteract disenchantment with the world, and the socially divisive effects of such disenchantment, it is unclear in UB what *active* role they play in binding the community together.⁸⁵

Indeed, by UB III, Nietzsche seeks to found cultural coherence on quite different, though nonetheless metaphysical, bases. In this subsection, I will therefore focus on UB III in order to elucidate how the “Kampf für die Kultur” (UB III 6 1.386) – i.e. the struggle to synthesise society into a cultural unity – to which Nietzsche rallies his readers, can be considered analogous to Schopenhauer’s notion of assimilative conflict. As will become evident, Nietzsche’s cultural *Kampf* is aimed at the hierarchical organisation of society around a higher, metaphysically

Sinne, bedingt wäre; oder, populär zu reden, über Das, was hinter der Natur steckt und sie möglich macht” (ibid., p.189). Like philosophical metaphysics, religions, says Schopenhauer, deal with an “Ordnung der Dinge an sich” (ibid., p.192). He states that religion is able to communicate the metaphysical truth of reality by means of *allegory* (*sensu allegorico*), where philosophy does so through deductive argumentation (*sensus proprio*). Different religions accomplish this to differing extents, according to Schopenhauer, and indeed, “Der Werth einer Religion wird demnach abhängen von dem größern oder geringern Gehalt an Wahrheit, den sie, unter dem Schleier der Allegorie” (WWV II §17, p.195). Ordinary people simply do not have time for philosophy, and so religious dogma leads them to the ethical and metaphysical conclusions to which philosophical reflection leads in a more thorough sense. Religion thereby functions as a consolation for life’s pain by granting ordinary people an insight into a higher world that transcends that of appearance. Thus, in this section of WWV II, he praises the verisimilitude of pessimistic religions such as Buddhism and Christianity, as well as the fact that they show their followers the need for redemption.

⁸⁴ Interestingly, in “Über Staat und Religion”, Wagner appropriates Schopenhauer’s notion of the metaphysical need and tries to show how religious belief can help the state achieve its *Zweck*, which Wagner describes as the generation of *stability*: “[S]o stellt das religiöse Dogma die andere, bisher unerkannte Welt dar, und zwar mit solch’ unfehlbarer Sicherheit und Bestimmtheit, daß der Religiöse, dem sie aufgegangen ist, hierüber in die unerschütterlichste, tiefbeseligendste Ruhe geräth.” See Richard Wagner (1911), p.22.

⁸⁵ My reading therefore opposes Julian Young’s communitarian interpretation of Nietzsche. Young emphasizes the overlap between Nietzsche’s and Wagner’s theories regarding how mythology (and the art that conveys that mythology) contribute to social unity. See Julian Young, *Friedrich Nietzsche: A philosophical Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.113-9; “Nietzsche: The Long View”, in Julian Young (ed.), *Individual and Community in Nietzsche’s Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) pp.7-30 (esp. pp.10-15).

grounded goal (*Zweckmäßigkeit*): the “Erzeugung der Genius”. Whereas commentators are in the habit of referring to the struggle against modern pseudo-culture promoted in UB III as an agon, my contention is that it should first and foremost be categorised as an instance of organisational conflict.⁸⁶

Nietzsche is at pains to convince us that acknowledging our need to strive for our higher (integrated) self does not just impose *solitary* duties upon us, but also those of a distinctly *social* kind. Furthermore, as we can see from the following quote, he envisages the collective acknowledgement of these duties as having a socially binding effect:

[J]ene neuen Pflichten sind nicht die Pflichten eines Vereinsamten, man gehört vielmehr mit ihnen in eine mächtige Gemeinsamkeit hinein, welche [...] *durch einen Grundgedanken zusammengehalten wird*. Es ist dies der Grundgedanke der Kultur, in sofern diese jedem Einzelnen von uns nur Eine Aufgabe zu stellen weiss: die Erzeugung des Philosophen, des Künstlers und des Heiligen in uns und ausser uns zu fördern und dadurch an der Vollendung der Natur zu arbeiten.” (UB III 5 1.381-2; my italics)

It is our assenting to this *Grundgedanken* of generating genius that motivates our joining the “Kampf für die Kultur”. Nietzsche’s solution is no doubt based on Wagner’s belief that a “Volk” is defined by “der Inbegriff aller Derjenigen, welche eine gemeinschaftliche Noth empfinden.”⁸⁷ For Wagner, the egoistic pursuit of luxury in modernity has resulted in an unhealthy strain of social incoherence, and it is only by reconnecting with our shared need for a culturally renewing form of art (“das Kunstwerk der Zukunft”) that we will be able to replace this mere “Zusammenhang” of individuals with true community. Recognition of this common need will, Wagner informs us, convert this aggregate of egoists into a “selige[.] Harmonie der Natur” – i.e. it is the path to our “Erlösung aus [unserer] egoistischen

⁸⁶ See fn.7.

⁸⁷ Wagner (1850), p.8. See also *ibid.*, pp.214-5, where Wagner refers to the “künstlerischen Genossenschaft, die zu keinem anderen Zwecke, als zu dem der Befriedigung gemeinschaftlichen Kunstdranges sich vereinigt”.

Verzauberung”.⁸⁸ For Wagner, the panacea is the artwork of the future, the making of which demands bringing both artists and the community into free association with one another, and which hence represents the “Bruderkuß” simultaneously produced by, and uniting, the *Volk*.⁸⁹

Nietzsche, however, is not so easily equated with the socialist aspirations of the early Wagner (as we saw in our treatment of CV 3 in Chapter 1). Indeed, there is a deep equivocation in Nietzsche’s conception of this socially binding need – an equivocation that can be traced back to his slippage between two conflicting definitions of genius. On the one hand, he employs the Kantian idea of genius as a “Naturgabe” or “angeborene Gemütsanlage (ingenium), durch welche die Natur der Kunst die Regel gibt” – one which only a minority of gifted individuals possess (KdU §46, p.307) (a conception of genius that reaches fever pitch in the later Wagner). This definition roughly accords with contemporary usage in English. I will call this *elite* genius (since it is the inborn privilege of an elite minority). On the other hand, following Romantics such as Byron and Emerson, Nietzsche develops a more global, and evenly distributed conception of genius. According to this understanding of genius, the term denotes the capacity for originality, authenticity and receptivity to nature, which inheres in everyone, without exception. Thus, Emerson proclaims to all of his readers that “[g]enius is the power to labor better [...]. Deserve thy genius; exalt it.”⁹⁰ This is what I will refer to as the *global* conception of genius. However, and this is what is most problematic, Nietzsche presents the propagation of these two different types of genius as a single, coherent task – that is, he talks of generating genius “in uns”, and of generating genius “ausser uns” as “Eine Aufgabe”. But can these really be equated as simply as Nietzsche

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp.20-2. Likewise, we find the image of the genius as the individual who unites society in Emerson’s writings. See Perry Miller, “Emersonian Genius and the American Democracy”, *The New England Quarterly*, 26 (1) (1953), 27-44.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.14.

⁹⁰ Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Transcendentalist”, in *The Prose Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 2 vols (Boston: Fields, Osgood & co., 1870), vol.1, pp.177-94 (p.188).

implies? Is culture truly being united around a single need according to Nietzsche's proposed solution to social disunity?

In favour of reading these as *two separate* tasks, we might look at the two dominant (though cursory) political interpretations of UB III – those of Rawls and Cavell. Rawls reads UB III as evidence that Nietzsche endorsed a perfectionist political arrangement according to which “it is the sole principle of a teleological theory directing society to arrange institutions and to define the duties and obligations of individuals so as to maximise the achievement of human excellence in art, science, and culture.”⁹¹ According to this picture of Nietzsche's perfectionism, individuals sacrifice their personal self-development for the sake of expediting the elite genius of others. And certainly, there are texts that support this reading quite categorically, such as where Nietzsche states that

[...] die Menschheit soll fortwährend daran arbeiten, einzelne grosse Menschen zu erzeugen — und dies und nichts Anderes sonst ist ihre Aufgabe [...]. Denn die Frage lautet doch so: wie erhält dein, des Einzelnen Leben den höchsten Werth, die tiefste Bedeutung? [...] Gewiss nur dadurch, dass du zum Vortheile der seltensten und werthvollsten Exemplare lebst, nicht aber zum Vortheile der Meisten, das heisst, der, einzeln genommen, werthlosesten Exemplare. (UB III 6 1.383-4)

Yet Cavell, and following in his wake, Conant, argue that Nietzsche is *not* proposing that we dedicate ourselves to serving a minority of individuals capable of achieving elite genius: “the ‘something higher and more human’ in question is not – not necessarily and in a sense not ever – that of someone *else*, but a further or eventual position of the self now dissatisfied with itself.”⁹² And to be sure, we can adduce passages to support this reading, such as where Nietzsche states that culture is “das

⁹¹ Rawls (1971), p.325.

⁹² Cavell (1990), p.52. See also Conant (2001), p.203; see also p.225: “‘Genius’ figures in Nietzsche's vocabulary as the term for a ‘productive uniqueness’ each of us harbors [...]. Nietzsche does not seek to ‘maximize’ genius (in the way that Rawls [...]) [imagines]) *because the only species of genius that concerns him is one that is already perfectly distributed*” (p.225; my italics).

Kind der Selbsterkenntniss jedes Einzelnen und des Ungenügens an sich” (UB III 6 1.385). This quite unambiguously implies that culture is not the product of an elite who are only able to strive for perfection by virtue of the servitude of others who themselves must sacrifice their own personal projects of self-cultivation to serve this goal; rather, it is the child of the concurrent self-perfecting activity of *all* the members of society. According to both Cavell and Conant, this vision is associated with a healthy, egalitarian, democracy as opposed to the aristocratic elitism that Rawls reads into UB III.⁹³

If the readings of Cavell and Conant are correct, this would vitiate my claim that Nietzsche is operating with an ideal of social organisation based on Schopenhauer’s vision of *zweckmäßig* organisation, within which hierarchy (i.e. inequality) and instrumentalisation were found to be integral. So how can we explain the strong emphasis in UB III on *self*-development and *global* genius if, as I will argue, he is above all concerned with our serving the end of generating elite genius? And *what* is the goal for which we are supposed to be striving and that is supposed to be binding us together – the cultivation of *my* global genius? Or the cultivation of *others’* elite genius? Or are these mutually complementary? Finally, in what manner is this goal supposed to bind us together – in a hierarchical or an egalitarian fashion? If we are to understand how Nietzsche proposes to resolve the problem of social disunity, it is essential that we answer these questions.

Let us begin by examining the justifications Nietzsche gives for why we ought to serve the end of generating elite genius. This will reveal that the task of generating elite genius “ausser uns” *is* in fact the priority for Nietzsche; yet we will

⁹³ See Cavell (1990), p.50. As Cavell argues, only a democratic society embraces the kind of value experimentation necessary for self-perfectionism; thus, “Only within the possibility of democracy is one committed to living with, or against, such culture. This may well produce personal tastes and private choices that are, let us say, exclusive, even esoteric. Then my question is whether this exclusiveness might be not just tolerated but treasured by the friends of democracy.” See also Conant (2001), pp.226ff. For a comparison of Cavell’s and Rawls’ distinct strains of perfectionism, see Paul Patton, “Cavell and Rawls on the Conversation of Justice: Moral versus Political Perfectionism”, *Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies*, 2 (2014), 54-74.

also witness how this task is complemented by, though not coextensive with, the pursuit of global genius. In the final sections of UB III, Nietzsche proffers two arguments for why we ought to endeavour to cultivate elite genius beyond ourselves. The first argument is what I will call the *interdependency* argument, and requires little more than the realisation that we must each strive to become elite geniuses ourselves. According to this argument, Nietzsche suggests that it is in our own personal interest – insofar as we strive to become elite geniuses – to create a social environment that fosters the cultivation of this type of genius in others. This is because our personal struggle to attain elite genius requires the aid of other elite geniuses. Pulling ourselves out of the stream of our ordinary, animal state of egoistic striving and identifying higher goals is absolutely necessary for the cultivation of elite genius according to Nietzsche. But this is an arduous task and we can usually only achieve it temporarily. In order to emerge from this state, we ourselves must call on the aid of others: “wir müssen gehoben werden – und wer sind die, welche uns heben?” (UB III 5 1.380). The answer to Nietzsche’s question is: *our exemplars*, those who offer us a concrete vision of the elite genius that we seek to attain. As such, we are always in need of exemplars (i.e. educators), and it serves our own interests to cultivate them.

Furthermore, in creating an environment in which elite geniuses are able to achieve *their* highest potential, Nietzsche states that we simultaneously create an environment in which *we* can independently strive to attain *our* highest potential:

[Kultur] will, um die Nutzenanwendung auf den Schopenhauerischen Menschen zu machen, dass wir seine immer neue Erzeugung vorbereiten und fördern, indem wir das ihr Feindselige kennen lernen und aus dem Wege räumen — kurz dass wir gegen Alles unermüdlich ankämpfen, was uns um die höchste Erfüllung unserer Existenz brachte, indem es uns hinderte, solche Schopenhauerische Menschen selber zu werden. — (UB III 5 1.383)

In order to progress towards our *own* genius (whether global or elite), we must necessarily foster the social conditions that facilitate the creation of the elite genius (i.e. the Schopenhauerian man). This implies a fairly simple synchronicity of egoistic

and collective goals. This argument works as a motivation for prospective elite geniuses to further the ends of other (prospective) elite geniuses. But what about those individuals that know themselves to be wholly incapable of realising the heights of elite genius? Surely the social arrangement that is most suited to their needs is quite distinct from that which suits the generation of elite genius? Would these individuals not favour a society constructed to support the cultivation of global genius *up to the point that the majority can achieve it*? How can Nietzsche persuade such individuals, who are well aware that their interests do not perfectly align with those of the elite genius, to sacrifice their comforts for the attainment of this higher, cultural goal, which seems to be quite obviously at odds with their own interests?

This brings us to the second argument for the cultivation of elite genius “ausser uns”, which I will call the *natural purposes* argument. This is intended to motivate those falling outside of the group of individuals who consider themselves prospective elite geniuses. To convince this remaining majority, then, Nietzsche holds that the elite genius – be they the philosopher, artist or saint – *is the highest end of nature*, and thus it is only in collectively pursuing this end that less capable individuals can realise their highest calling. Otherwise put, it is only in contributing to the fruition of elite genius that the majority realise their own global genius. Nietzsche argues that the elite genius is the highest goal of nature on account of the fact that “die Natur überhaupt der Erkenntniss bedarf” (UB III 5 1.379) and it is only through the elite genius that this kind of knowledge of nature is attained. It is through the self-knowledge endowed by the artist, saint and philosopher, that nature achieves its own redemption (“Erlösung”); indeed, it is by these very means that “die gesammte Natur [hinderängt] sich zu ihrer Erlösung” (UB III 5 1.380).

As it stands, this argument will strike modern ears as at best esoteric, and at worst, simply uncogent; however, it rests upon an admixture of Hegel, Kant and Schopenhauer that, in Nietzsche’s day, would have seemed within the bounds of philosophical propriety. In Hegel we find the idea that the telos of *Geist* – i.e. the rationality or logos of the universe – is the attainment of self-understanding through

the reflection of rational beings.⁹⁴ Similarly, in KdU, Kant suggests that human culture (and the rational thought that it facilitates) represents the ultimate end (*Zweck*) of nature.⁹⁵ The notion of redemption from animal striving as the highest end of human existence is then unmistakably Schopenhauerian, emerging from his view of the world as fundamentally defined by painful yearning – that is, as the egoistic pursuit of the will to live. We, as willing agents, partake in the suffering of the world as will, yet Schopenhauer thinks we can also escape from this state of anguish (i.e. attain redemption) in a number of different ways. Thus, the artist grants us a disinterested view of the ideal forms of nature and thereby releases us (temporarily) from time and the painful cycle of willing; the philosopher, who gives us abstract knowledge that striving is futile, can similarly free us from this cycle of desire⁹⁶; and likewise, through religious insight, individuals can gain intuitive knowledge of this futility and adopt a saintly ethic of life-denial.⁹⁷

Obviously, one reason we might immediately object to this amalgam of Hegel and Schopenhauer is on account of the vehemence with which Schopenhauer rejects the idea that any natural purposes can be ascribed to the world “in itself” – i.e. as will, which is just a “blinder Drang”.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, at the level of representation he does think that nature exhibits teleological order; indeed, we have already seen this in his conception of the hierarchy of Platonic Ideas, at the summit of which stood

⁹⁴ For a succinct summary of this, see Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp.89ff. (esp. p.92).

⁹⁵ See KdU §83, p.431.

⁹⁶ See WWV I §54, p.374: “die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben, zeigt sich, wenn auf jene Erkenntniß das Wollen endet, indem sodann nicht mehr die erkannten einzelnen Erscheinungen als Motive des Wollens wirken, sondern die ganze, durch Auffassung der Ideen erwachsene Erkenntniß des Wesens der Welt, die den Willen spiegelt, zum Quietiv des Willens wird und so der Wille frei sich selbst aufhebt.”

⁹⁷ See WWV I §68, p.493: “Vielleicht ist also hier zum ersten Male, abstrakt und rein von allem Mythischen, das innere Wesen der Heiligkeit, Selbstverleugnung, Ertödtung des Eigenwillens, Askesis, ausgesprochen als Verneinung des Willens zum Leben, eintretend, nachdem ihm die vollendete Erkenntniß seines eigenen Wesens zum Quietiv alles Wollens geworden.”

⁹⁸ See WWV II §26.

man. Likewise, in his discussion of the purpose of the artist, we find Schopenhauer using distinctly teleological language to describe nature:

[D]ie wirklichen Objekte [sind] fast immer nur sehr mangelhafte Exemplare der in ihnen sich darstellenden Idee: daher der Genius der Phantasie bedarf, um in den Dingen nicht Das zu sehn, was die Natur wirklich gebildet hat, sondern was sie zu bilden sich bemühte, aber, wegen des im vorigen Buche erwähnten Kampfes ihrer Formen unter einander, nicht zu Stande brachte. (WWV I §36, p.254)⁹⁹

In an analogous fashion, Nietzsche does not believe that nature can achieve its end (of producing elite geniuses) unaided, despite its struggling toward this goal; thus, he holds it to be necessary “dass an Stelle jenes ‘dunklen Drangs’ endlich einmal ein bewusstes Wollen gesetzt werde” (UB III 6 1.387). This is what he calls the “metaphysische Bedeutung der Kultur” (UB III 6 1.401). Culture’s true *raison d’être* is to expedite nature’s otherwise ineffective efforts at realising genius. Nietzsche therefore commends those who

[...] fast überall [begegnen] der Natur in ihrer Noth [...], wie sie sich zum Menschen hindrängt, wie sie schmerzlich das Werk wieder missrathen fühlt, wie ihr dennoch überall die wundervollsten Ansätze, Züge und Formen gelingen: so dass die Menschen, mit denen wir leben, einem Trümmerfelde der kostbarsten bildnerischen Entwürfe gleichen, wo alles uns entgegenruft: kommt, hilft, vollendet, bringt zusammen, was zusammengehört, wir sehnen uns unermesslich, ganz zu werden. (UB III 6 1.386)¹⁰⁰

There is evidently a strong parallel between Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideas, and Nietzsche’s conception of the elite genius. Just as Schopenhauer’s artistic genius

⁹⁹ For another instance of Schopenhauer speaking of the world as will as striving for a very particular end, see also WWV I §27, p.205: “[Dieser] Vorgang eben nur aus der Identität des erscheinenden Willens in allen Ideen und aus seinem Streben zu immer höherer Objektivation begreiflich ist.” Compare also Wagner (1850): “Das Volk also wird die Erlösung vollbringen, indem es sich genügt und zugleich seine eigenen Feinde erlöst. Sein Verfahren wird das Unwillkürliche der Natur sein: mit der Nothwendigkeit elementarischen Waltens wird es den Zusammenhang zerreißen, der einzig die Bedingungen der Herrschaft der Unnatur ausmacht” (p.21).

¹⁰⁰ For the reappearance of this idea in the later writings, see NL 10[111] 12.519-20.

reveals the ideal Platonic forms that nature itself is unable to manifest, Nietzsche views the role of culture as that of facilitating the realisation of ideal human types (i.e. elite geniuses), towards which nature itself can only haphazardly strain.

The natural purposes argument can therefore be phrased as follows: given that nature's highest goal is the production of elite genius, it is *our* goal to assist nature in achieving this, *even if we are without hope of becoming elite geniuses ourselves*. Although Nietzsche maintains that this requires the sacrifice of our egoistic goals for the sake of the elite genius – “ein *Einzelner* dies Opfer forderte” (UB III 6 1.384; my italics) – on the whole, he contends that we stand to gain by acceding to this metaphysical duty. He assures us that knowing ourselves to be facilitating this goal, even if we cannot ourselves achieve it, will endow our lives with a deep and invaluable significance:

Nicht Wenige, auch aus der Reihe der zweiten und dritten Begabungen, sind zu diesem Mithelfen bestimmt und kommen nur in der Unterwerfung unter eine solche Bestimmung zu dem Gefühl, einer Pflicht zu leben und mit Ziel und Bedeutung zu leben. Jetzt aber werden gerade diese Begabungen von den verführerischen Stimmen jener modischen “Kultur” aus ihrer Bahn abgelenkt und ihrem Instinkte entfremdet; an ihre eigensüchtigen Regungen, an ihre Schwächen und Eitelkeiten richtet sich diese Versuchung [...]. (UB III 6 1.403)

Though “[e]s [...] eine Ungereimtheit [scheint], dass der Mensch eines andern Menschen wegen da sein sollte” (ibid.), Nietzsche maintains that it is only by serving elite genius that we realise nature's highest purposes and, thereby, our own highest capacities. In striving to fulfil this external purpose in ever more effective ways, then, we concurrently work towards maximising our inner, global genius.

Pace Rawls, therefore, Nietzsche does not view serving elite genius as a sacrifice or injustice for those incapable of attaining it themselves; namely, because it is by these very means that less gifted individuals maximise what we might call their self-contentedness. He further implies that ordinary people may develop a sense of kinship, “einer innerlichen Verwandtschaft und Verwachsenheit”, with the elite genius. “Denn es gibt Menschen,” says Nietzsche, “welche es als ihre Noth

empfinden, wenn sie diesen [den Genius] mühselig ringen und in Gefahr, sich selbst zu zerstören, sehen” (UB III 6 1.403). Ordinary people may therefore stave off distress, and even secure happiness and a sense of existential purpose, through the realisation of elite genius. On the other hand, Cavell’s reading is arguably more fallacious than that of Rawls since the only way Nietzsche thinks that most people strive to attain their highest self is in their subjection to the goal of propagating elite genius.¹⁰¹ To be sure, *neither* the reading of Rawls *nor* that of Cavell is adequate – the entire either/or approach is misguided. The error in both cases hinges on their assumption that in setting the generation of genius as the task of society, Nietzsche is working with one or the other of the aforementioned definitions of genius, whereas Nietzsche draws on *both* conceptions and understands their pursuit to be not just compatible, but mutually complimentary.

In formulating these common goals, Nietzsche proves himself to be fulfilling what he maintains is the ideal function of the philosopher; namely, “ein Bündniss der bindenden Kraft sein, als Arzt der Kultur” (NL 30[8] 7.734).¹⁰² The identification of a common purpose acts as the foundation for establishing social organisation, and presents people with an alternative to their quotidian life of divisive, egoistic struggle, in which “der persönliche Sieg ist das Ziel” (UB III 6 1.395). As has been demonstrated, it is the attainment of *elite* genius that constitutes the ultimate goal of humanity and which is intended to have the strongest socially

¹⁰¹ Though Cavell (1990) remarks that Nietzsche leaves himself “unguarded” with respect to elitist or aristocratic readings, he fails to satisfactorily account for these passages (though he does do so with respect to similar passages in Emerson) (see pp.53-4). To further buttress my refutation of Cavell, we might also turn to the early *Nachlass*, where Nietzsche very unambiguously states that “[d]as Glück des Einzelnen im Staate wird untergeordnet dem Gesamtwohl: was heisst das? Nicht dass die Minoritäten benutzt werden zum Wohle der Majoritäten. Sondern dass die Einzelnen dem Wohle der höchsten Einzelnen untergeordnet werden, dem Wohle der höchsten Exemplare. Die höchsten Einzelnen sind die schöpferischen Menschen, sei es die besten moralischen oder sonst im grossen Sinne nützlichen, also die reinsten Typen und Verbesserer der Menschheit. Nicht die Existenz eines Staates um jeden Preis, sondern dass die höchsten Exemplare in ihm leben können und schaffen können, ist das Ziel des Gemeinwesens” (NL 30[8] 7.733).

¹⁰² As he says in an adjacent note, the state “muss alle binden durch ein gemeinsames Ziel”, and it is the task of the philosopher to provide this *Ziel* (NL 30[7] 7.732).

binding effect. Whether we are capable of achieving elite genius or not, Nietzsche provides us with a prudential reason for joining the concerted struggle to help generate such genius.

At this point, we can see that the struggle for culture that Nietzsche is advocating embodies three of the criteria of the assimilative conflict we found in Schopenhauer. First, this conflict aims at the establishment of a functional hierarchy in which one group of individuals (“aus der Reihe der zweiten und dritten Begabungen”) labour to serve the superordinate ends of another group (i.e. that of elite geniuses and *prospective* elite geniuses). Indeed, insofar as this is the case, this cannot be said to be an agonistic relation, which as we saw, presupposes non-instrumentalisation and approximate equality.¹⁰³ (This said, we should note that Nietzsche is often ambivalent regarding the status of elite geniuses as ends in themselves insofar as he often describes them as a means either to furthering humanity in a general sense, or giving purpose to the ancillary individuals serving them.¹⁰⁴) Second, since Nietzsche conceives of this end as being promoted by the “Artzt der Kultur”, we can soundly infer that he associates it with health. Third, we have also discerned that this struggle for social organisation is metaphysically grounded: first, both the interdependency and natural purposes arguments are dependent on the same form of metaphysical self-knowledge that was outlined in the previous subsection (it is only this that opens up a new circle of social *Pflichte*). But moreover, we have also seen that the natural purposes argument is premised on a teleological picture of nature. But what about the perpetuation of conflict within the resultant hierarchies? And the necessity of unmeasured conflict? If we take a broader look at the kind of social struggle to which Nietzsche is exhorting us in UB III, it will become evident that this has more in common with Schopenhauer’s model of assimilative conflict than has hitherto been demonstrated.

¹⁰³ Vanessa Lemm (2007) has, *pace* Cavell, also observed the lack of equality between educator and pupil – i.e. between the individual and the exemplar – in UB III (see p.21).

¹⁰⁴ See NL 30[8] 7.733, where Nietzsche describes the elite genius as the “Verbesserer der Menschheit”.

Up until now, Nietzsche's suggestions have remained on a highly abstract plane. Accordingly, it is difficult to ascertain what he is concretely urging us to do. And indeed, more generally, what is bound to leave any reader of UB III nonplussed having surveyed the Rawls-Cavell debate is the absence of any coherent, positive political blueprint in the text. He refrains from associating his cultural vision with either an elitist, aristocratic society (as he did in CV 3) or some mode of democratic organisation. So what kind of social praxis is Nietzsche proposing?

Certainly, he does make a number of positive proposals. First, he quite minimally calls for the creation of a space for cultivating elite genius, one that is shielded from demands extraneous to this goal. The prospective elite genius should neither have to serve the ends of others – be these the fiscal needs of the wealthy, or the needs of the state in its struggle with other nation-states – nor have to be concerned with having to provide for himself (“kein Zwang zum Brod-Erwerben” [UB III 8 1.411]). Regarding the former, Nietzsche is critical of the social condition in which everyone “[kämpft] in Reih’ und Glied” for the utilitarian ends of the state, and where cultural institutions are merely conscripted to serve these ends.¹⁰⁵ In opposition to this conception of the purpose of cultural institutions, however, Nietzsche speaks of a “kleinere Schaar” (UB III 6 1.402) who view such institutions as serving a quite different purpose:

[S]ie selber will, an der Schutzwehr einer festen Organisation, verhüten, dass sie durch jenen Schwarm weggeschwemmt und auseinander getrieben werde, dass ihre Einzelnen in allzufrüher Erschöpfung hinschwänden oder gar von ihrer grossen Aufgabe abspänstig gemacht werden. (Ibid.)

Nietzsche views the ordered crowd and the republic of geniuses as perfectly compatible, but only where culture acts as a harbour sheltering the free activity of genius from the utilitarian demands of the crowd. Nietzsche's vision is one in which

¹⁰⁵ Nietzsche warns of the damaging effects of subordinating culture to “die Selbstsucht der Erwerbenden” or “die Selbstsucht des Staates” (UB III 6 1.388).

culture is *embedded within*, though nonetheless insulated from, the *Gemeinschaft* and its vulgar demands.¹⁰⁶

With respect to philosophical genius, one way Nietzsche envisions this being concretely achieved is through the complete purging of philosophy from the university system, where Nietzsche thinks it has been both subordinated to the needs of the state and rendered ridiculous.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, Nietzsche calls it a “Forderung der Kultur”

[D]er Philosophie jede staatliche und akademische Anerkennung zu entziehn und überhaupt Staat und Akademie der für sie unlösbaren Aufgaben zu entheben, zwischen wahrer und scheinbarer Philosophie zu unterscheiden. Lasst die Philosophen immerhin wild wachsen [...] — ihr sollt Wunderdinge erleben! (UB III 8 1.422)¹⁰⁸

The programme outlined in this text is one of ring-fencing a space for philosophical practice to proceed undisturbed by society’s utilitarian demands. In his desire to purify philosophy, we further uncover the quite unmeasured aspiration to negate academic philosophy. Indeed, the “Kampf für die Kultur und die Feindseligkeit gegen Einflüsse, Gewohnheiten, Gesetze, Einrichtungen, in welchen er nicht sein Ziel wiedererkennt: die Erzeugung des Genius” is often characterised by the impetus towards an unmeasured negation of cultural traditions and institutions.¹⁰⁹ Wagner is accordingly celebrated for having entered into the “*feindseligsten* Widerspruch mit

¹⁰⁶ Indeed, Nietzsche refers to this as the “Refugium der Kultur” (NL 30[7] 7.733).

¹⁰⁷ UB III 6 1.421: “Aber zugegeben dass diese Schaar von schlechten Philosophen lächerlich ist — und wer wird es nicht zugeben? — in wiefern sind sie denn auch schädlich? Kurz geantwortet: dadurch dass sie die Philosophie zu einer lächerlichen Sache machen. [...]”

¹⁰⁸ See also UB III 8 1.411: “Damit sind einige Bedingungen genannt, unter denen der philosophische Genius in unserer Zeit trotz der schädlichen Gegenwirkungen wenigstens entstehen kann: freie Männlichkeit des Charakters, frühzeitige Menschenkenntniss, keine gelehrte Erziehung, keine patriotische Einklemmung, kein Zwang zum Brod-Erwerben, keine Beziehung zum Staate — kurz Freiheit und immer wieder Freiheit: dasselbe wunderbare und gefährliche Element, in welchem die griechischen Philosophen aufwachsen durften.”

¹⁰⁹ See also BA Vorrede, where Nietzsche states that “Vielleicht liegt zwischen ihr und der Gegenwart die Vernichtung des Gymnasiums, vielleicht selbst die Vernichtung der Universität oder mindestens eine so totale Umgestaltung der eben genannten Bildungsanstalten” (1.648).

den bestehenden Formen und Ordnungen” (UB III 6 1.351; my italics). This struggle is *superlatively hostile* towards those forms and cultural orders that frustrate the generation of genius. On account of this endorsement of immoderate hostility, it is therefore misrepresentative to refer to Nietzsche’s proposed “Kampf für die Kultur” as an agon of individuals against society.¹¹⁰ As has been illuminated, Nietzsche undertakes a radical critique of academic philosophy, one that he hopes will be practically implemented in such a way as to bring about the abolishment of philosophy departments in universities *tout court*. This must then be followed, he instructs us, by a perpetual process of “Läuterung”, whereby any encroachment of political and economic demands into the cultural refuge of the genius is promptly thwarted. Even once the necessary hierarchy has been erected, then, the struggle is not over, indeed, it is *never* over. Nietzsche’s “Kampf für die Kultur” is a *constant* process of struggling against social structures that are inimical to the development of elite genius. Contrary to Rawls and Cavell, both aristocracy and democracy are therefore compatible with this vision so long as they serve the maintenance of the cultural sanctuary in which prospective elite geniuses can freely experiment and cultivate themselves.

We can therefore conclude that Nietzsche’s struggle for the ideal social organisation (i.e. that which is maximally able to generate genius) in UB is, in its essentials, analogous to Schopenhauer’s vision of the struggle for *zweckmäßig* organisation:

1. It is a struggle aimed at functional hierarchy;
2. This hierarchy is associated with health;
3. It is inextricable from unmeasured conflict;

¹¹⁰ Vanessa Lemm (2007) has argued that, in opposition to the overly individualistic political philosophies of Rawls and Cavell, Nietzsche’s vision of freedom is inherently public; indeed, she conceives of this freedom as constituted by means of “a public struggle (*agon*) between the individual and society” (p.14).

4. The struggle persists within the resultant hierarchies (namely, as a struggle to maintain this hierarchy through perpetual “Läuterung”);
5. It is driven, or at least conditioned, by *two* metaphysically substantial entities (i.e. the self *qua* unchanging *Kern*, and nature *qua* quasi-Schopenhauerian teleological will).

The kind of conflictual praxis he suggests we engage in if we wish to solve these problems, however, is paradigmatically both unagonistic and non-violent. Indeed, we now have a comprehensive overview of how Nietzsche proposed to solve the three problems of disintegration analysed in Section 1. With respect to the disorganisation of the self (a), Nietzsche proposes an unagonistic struggle to *subordinate* and *instrumentalise* the knowledge, values, traditions and habits that we have acquired from other cultures through learning, thereby forming them into an integrated whole that facilitates agency. He proposes that we do this by testing each such culturally acquired phenomenon to determine whether or not it serves our true life-needs. By imposing order on these dissonant social and psychological phenomena, and forcing them into a harmony able to serve the life-needs of the individual and culture, they become *practically applicable*, and thus the paralysis of our agency is overcome, convention is subverted, and the diremption of our inner (intellectual) life and our outer (practical) life is overcome (b). Though in UB I and II he has already set the essential need as that of generating a truly productive culture – that is, one able to bring elite genius into existence – in UB III, he comprehensively expands upon this and further attempts to justify this higher goal, explicitly invoking it as a means to persuading individuals to abandon egoism and cooperatively apply themselves to the project of generating elite genius (c).

While this integrative struggle can be considered measured insofar as it aims to preserve that which is overcome, Nietzsche also persistently emphasises the need for *unmeasured* struggle, which is to say the ferociously hostile assault on habits, opinions, traditions and institutions that are deemed incompatible with the unification of culture around the task of producing elite genius. Indeed, in EH,

Nietzsche describes the *Betrachtungen* as “durchaus Kriegerisch”, and as a series of “Attentaten”, and even as a “duel”.¹¹¹ This unrestrained hostility is not at any point aimed at individuals, however, in the sense of a violent physical *Vernichtungskampf*, but at *geistige* phenomena and social institutions. It is therefore best conceived as an aggressive variety of social reform and radical critique.

If Nietzsche genuinely deems both instrumentalisation and destructive critique to be indispensable aspects of the “Kampf für die Kultur”, labelling this struggle agonistic is not only misleading but potentially detrimental with respect to the project of cultural *Erneuerung*. This is because it risks softening the task that he believes is demanded of us – one of radical critique and social reorganisation, in which certain institutions, cultural traditions and beliefs are either forcefully subordinated to higher purposes or eradicated altogether. In place of agonistic interpretations of his socially unificatory project, I have suggested that we therefore think of the form of conflict Nietzsche is paradigmatically encouraging throughout UB as *organisational* conflict. That is, a mode of struggle aimed at establishing and maintaining functional hierarchies – one that comprises of both measured and unmeasured conflict: measured insofar as it preserves that which is subordinated within a new unity, and unmeasured insofar as it involves the destruction of outdated modes of organisation and the *doxa* that shore up such moribund conventions.

On these grounds, I have proposed that we view Nietzsche’s recommended remedies through the lens of Schopenhauer’s philosophy – in particular the latter’s notion of universal conflict as a struggle for *assimilation*. Needless to say, there are many points of divergence between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The most striking perhaps, is that for Nietzsche, the struggle for organisation is not determined in the same way as for Schopenhauer. For Nietzsche, our attaining higher degrees of organisation, either as individuals or as a society, is *contingent*, and depends upon our concerted *conscious* effort; in contrast, for Schopenhauer, such organisation is

¹¹¹ See EH UB 1 6.316-9. “Mein Paradies ist ‘unter dem Schatten meines Schwertes’... Im Grunde hatte ich eine Maxime Stendhals practicirt: er rãth an, seinen Eintritt in die Gesellschaft mit einem Duell zu machen” (6.319).

in a sense an automatic process guaranteed by the metaphysical structure of reality. In addition to this though, the unmeasured conflict that conditions Nietzsche's model of organisational struggle is more *excretory* in kind, as compared with that which informs Schopenhauer's model, which is more digestive in kind. Nietzsche figures this as a process of jettisoning that which has become redundant or harmful, even if this does sometimes take the form of outright eradication; conversely, for Schopenhauer, it is depicted as a process of breaking down existing unities in order to exploit their constituent parts. This can be interpreted as an attempt on Nietzsche's part to give Schopenhauer's apathetic account of organisation a socially galvanising dimension.

I have now brought to light the two irrefutably metaphysical foundations of Nietzsche's unificatory project. The more important of these is undoubtedly the unchanging, essentialist conception of character that he deploys in UB – indeed, knowledge of this aspect of the self is imperative to Nietzsche's early organisational project. Second, we have also witnessed Nietzsche relying on a teleological vision of nature as striving (and largely failing) to spawn geniuses, an idea that is couched in a melange of Schopenhauerian, Hegelian, Wagnerian and Kantian *Weltanschauungen*. Yet, as I have already partly outlined in Chapter 1, even in the late 1860s, Nietzsche was becoming disaffected with metaphysics, and in MA this descended into an outright rejection. Indeed, we should briefly survey precisely why the particular metaphysical foundations he deploys in UB become untenable for him as he develops his critique of metaphysics. This will bring into sharp relief why he is consequently forced to formulate a quite novel approach to the problem of disunity in his later writings.

3.4. NIETZSCHE *CONTRA* METAPHYSICS

There are of course many aspects of UB that Nietzsche had come to reject by MA (and indeed, in his unpublished writings, even before MA), though his rejection of the elite genius as an exemplar at the pinnacle of society is perhaps most vociferous.¹¹² Yet as we will see in the final chapter, Nietzsche arguably reprises this ideal in the later works in his conception of the higher individual. In this section, however, I will examine Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysics, which is far more enduring than his rejection of genius. In particular, I will contend that he launches a veritable "Krieg ohne Pulver" against the metaphysical premises of UB's synthetic project. Indeed, already in 1868, in his planned dissertation entitled "Begriff des Organischen seit Kant", Nietzsche had begun to directly attack the idea that the apparent *Zweckmäßigkeit* of organisms and nature had any metaphysical basis. Moreover, in the very same year, as I demonstrated in Chapter 1, he embarked upon a searching critique of Schopenhauerian metaphysics. Then again in 1872, in WL, he rejects the idea that ideal "forms" (such as Plato's Ideas) have any reality beyond the confines of the human intellect. We might accordingly view UB as Nietzsche's last effort to salvage some form of quasi-Schopenhauerian metaphysics. But from MA onwards, the various criticisms of metaphysics that he had been incubating in repressed form within the *Nachlass* are given full vent. We should now examine how this aspect of his philosophical development bears upon his synthesising project.

¹¹² See e.g. VM 99 and 173. See also MA 164. This notion is also clearly rejected in CV 5.

3.4.1. NIETZSCHE'S GENERAL REPUDIATION OF METAPHYSICS

The essentials of Nietzsche's philosophical apostasy from Schopenhauer have already been delineated in Chapter 1, where we saw that, in "Zu Schopenhauer" and MA, Nietzsche criticises the idea that one could ascribe any properties to the world in itself: to describe the world in itself as an eternal, unified and free (i.e. undetermined) "Wille" is to transgress the Kantian critical ban. His criticism is that unity is a category of *human* experience, and so cannot be soundly predicated to the world in itself, which is supposed to signify the world beyond all human experience:

[S]ie [Einheit, Ewigkeit und Freiheit] alle sind sammt und sonders unzertrennlich mit unsrer Organisation verknüpft, so daß es völlig zweifelhaft ist, ob sie außerhalb der menschlichen Erkenntnißsphaere überhaupt eine Bedeutung haben. (KGW I/4, pp.424-5)

Even though Schopenhauer is at pains to point out that the unity of the will is incomparable to worldly unities insofar as it is beyond all plurality, Nietzsche's argument is that beyond the world of appearance, the concept of unity has no sense and is moreover misleadingly anthropomorphic. His argument is that Schopenhauer simply makes too many inductively inferred, positive claims about the world in itself, which Nietzsche maintains is just "ein durchaus dunkles unfafßbares X" (ibid., p.423). In MA 16, Nietzsche then asserts that "in der Erscheinung eben durchaus nicht das Ding an sich erscheine, und von jener auf dieses jeder Schluss abzulehnen sei." This is a position that Nietzsche later radicalises – urging us to completely abandon the idealist notion of an unconditioned, "wahre" world lying behind the merely "scheinbare" world in which we live – namely, on account of its being completely inaccessible and so devoid of use ("zu Nichts mehr nützlich" [GD Fabel 6.81]¹¹³) or on account of its being self-contradictory ("Dass [...] 'unmittelbare

¹¹³ See e.g. GD Fable 6.81: "Die wahre Welt haben wir abgeschafft: welche Welt blieb übrig? die scheinbare vielleicht?... Aber nein! mit der wahren Welt haben wir auch die scheinbare

Gewissheit', ebenso wie 'absolute Erkenntniss' und 'Ding an sich', eine *contradictio in adjecto* in sich schliesst, werde ich hundertmal wiederholen" [JGB 16]). This immediately rules out the possibility of religion, myth or art granting us a suprahistorical refuge by putting us in touch with the metaphysical truth of reality, since, not only is it a logical impossibility, but even if it were possible, it could not be known by *any* means.¹¹⁴ But let us now inquire how, in his renunciation of metaphysical speculation, he specifically rejects the essentialist conceptions of the self and nature that were found to be fundamental to his synthetic project in UB.

3.4.2. REFUTING THE EXISTENCE OF THE ESSENTIAL SELF

Nietzsche pejoratively labels Platonic Ideas a "Volksbewußtsein" (NL 7[97] 7.160), and already in WL, composed in the same year as UB I (1873), he contests the belief that natural kinds have any existence beyond the specifically human world. Closer inspection of nature, he argues, reveals it to be a conglomeration of irreducibly

abgeschafft!" As he also says in FW 354, "wir 'erkennen' bei weitem nicht genug, um auch nur so scheiden [zwischen das 'Ding an sich' und die Erscheinung] zu dürfen."

¹¹⁴ Nietzsche emphatically exclaims in MA 110 that "noch nie hat eine Religion, weder mittelbar, noch unmittelbar, weder als Dogma, noch als Gleichniss, eine Wahrheit enthalten. Denn aus der Angst und dem Bedürfniss ist eine jede geboren, auf Irrgängen der Vernunft hat sie sich in's Dasein geschlichen" (MA 110; see also MA 10). Religion may once have fulfilled the human need for consolation, and even contributed to social organisation (MA 472), but Nietzsche tells us that these needs can be eradicated: "diese selbst kann man schwächen und ausrotten" (MA 27); he thus advises that we destroy this need rather than continue to be burdened by the regressive metaphysical and moral errors of religion. He also abandons the idea of art as facilitating organisation by granting individuals a consoling insight into the fixed truth of reality. Clearly attacking both Schopenhauer and Wagner, Nietzsche states in MA 146 that "[d]er Künstler hat in Hinsicht auf das Erkennen der Wahrheiten eine schwächere Moralität, als der Denker: er will sich die glänzenden, tief sinnigen Deutungen des Lebens durchaus nicht nehmen lassen und wehrt sich gegen nüchterne, schlichte Methoden und Resultate". In this aphorism, Nietzsche criticises the artist precisely on account of his preference for "das [...] Mythische" (in lieu of more effective means of discerning "Wahrheiten") indicating just how far he has moved away from his earlier position where together, art and myth offered the only point of access for most people to the *unhistorische* timeless truths of reality. See also MA 145 and 150.

unique cases. Humans then abstract from the differences between roughly comparable cases to create “natural” kinds. Eliding the differences between the members of these approximate man-made groups

[...] erweckt nun die Vorstellung, als ob es in der Natur ausser den Blättern etwas gäbe, das “Blatt” wäre, etwa eine Urform [...]. Das Uebersehen des Individuellen und Wirklichen giebt uns den Begriff, wie es uns auch die Form giebt, wohingegen die Natur keine Formen und Begriffe, also auch keine Gattungen kennt, sondern nur ein für uns unzugängliches und undefinirbares X. Denn auch unser Gegensatz von Individuum und Gattung ist anthropomorphisch und entstammt nicht dem Wesen der Dinge [...]. (WL 1.880)¹¹⁵

For Nietzsche, in contrast to Schopenhauer, there is *only unitas post rem*. The belief that there exist “Urformen” in nature is a fallacious inductive inference. Individual objects are not copies (“Abbilde”) but unique instances, even if they do often exhibit points of resemblance with other objects.

Still later, Nietzsche censures Schopenhauer’s conception of “Ideas” for being just as “dunkel, ungewiss [und] ahnungsvoll” as that of Hegel or Schelling (WA 6.36).¹¹⁶ But later in FW 372, “Warum wir keine Idealisten sind”, Nietzsche rejects the “[kalte] Reiche der ‘Ideen’”, less because of its epistemological status, so much as by reason of the harm it does to our senses, insofar as all idealism devalues the senses. His rejection is no longer premised on the falsity of Ideas (i.e. their lack of correspondence to a “real” world) *per se*, but more on the fact that they are *more* misleading than the senses: “die Ideen schlimmere Verführerinnen seien als die

¹¹⁵ See also MA 14, where Nietzsche states that “[...] so oft, verbürgt die Einheit des Wortes Nichts für die Einheit der Sache.”

¹¹⁶ See also NL 41[59] 7.592, where Nietzsche critiques the Platonic notion of Ideas: “Ein Ding, dem ein Begriff genau entspricht, wäre ohne Herkunft. Plato’s Irrthum von den ewigen Ideen.” Another relevant note in this context is NL 3[124] 9.87, in which Nietzsche not only criticises Plato’s theory of the forms (“Plato mußte es noch erleben, daß die Lehre von den Ideen von einem helleren und umfänglicheren Geiste, als er war, widerlegt wurde”), but also refers to Schopenhauer’s philosophy as fantastical: “Einem so ingrimmigen und herrschsüchtigen Menschen, wie Schopenhauer war, kann man Glück wünschen, daß er es nicht errathen hat, wie kurz der Triumph seiner Philosophie sein solle und wie bald alle Prachtstücke seiner Erfindung als Trugbilder erkannt würden.”

Sinne". As we read on, we see that Ideas do not tempt us away from objective reality, for Nietzsche, but rather life – they promote a “beständige Blässer-werden —, die immer idealischer ausgelegte Entsinnlichung”. Nietzsche maintains that Plato developed his realm of the forms as a means of controlling his overly powerful senses (“übermächtigen Sinnen”, which Nietzsche associates with *health*). In the case of us moderns, however, Nietzsche implies that our senses are starved (“[v]ielleicht sind wir Modernen nur nicht gesund genug, um Plato’s Idealismus nöthig zu haben”). Whereas they were a salubrious remedy for Plato’s healthy superabundance, for us, they merely exacerbate our state of impoverishment.

Given these criticisms, it should be plain that Nietzsche could not sustain the idea that it was by means of discovering his “platonische Idee” – the metaphysical *Kern* of his self – that Schopenhauer was able to synthesise himself (UB III 5 1.376). Nor could he coherently maintain the subtextual belief that the elite genius is an embodiment of the ideal form of the human, which nature is always clumsily failing to realise. Nonetheless, though these criticisms of idealism entail the rejection of Schopenhauer’s Platonism, they only indirectly critique the idea of the core self upon which Nietzsche relies in UB, and on which he in fact launches a more explicit attack. In MA, for example, he unequivocally rejects the Schopenhauerian idea of “unveränderliche[r] Charakter” as a false inference from the relative stability of an individual’s character across a single lifetime (MA 41), and he further discourages each of us from treating ourselves “als starres, beständiges, Eines Individuum” (MA 618).¹¹⁷

Likewise, Nietzsche comes to view humans as subjecting the irreducibly unique experiences that they have of their own will to the same process of simplification and elision that produced the illusion of the forms.¹¹⁸ Indeed, he refutes Schopenhauer’s notion of empirical character. For Nietzsche, closer scrutiny

¹¹⁷ On the fluidity of character in Nietzsche, see also Alexander Nehamas, *Life as Literature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p.159.

¹¹⁸ See VM 5, where Nietzsche speaks of “das Wort ‘Wille’, welches Schopenhauer zur gemeinsamen Bezeichnung vieler menschlicher Zustände umbildete [...]” See also MA 14, 18, and M 115.

always reveals acts of willing to be comprised of a *complex* constellation of physiological processes and affects, which we then misconstrue as a simple unity (see e.g. FW 127). Likewise, later in JGB 19, he rebuts Schopenhauer's conception of the will as a simple phenomenon, arguing instead that all willing is the result of the combined activity of multitudinous affects (hence, "Wollen scheint [ihm] vor Allem etwas Complicirtes").

In M, as part of his attack on the notion of moral responsibility, Nietzsche also completely rejects the idea of a subject to which moral deserts could be attributed (see e.g. M 115). Rather, what we call the "Subjekt", "Selbst", "Ego", or "Ich" is just a multiplicity of interrelated drives. In M, at any rate, a drive designates an appetite or behavioural inclination. In this period alone, he names a panoply of drives – for example, a drive "nach Ruhe" (M 109), "nach Auszeichnung" (M 113), "der Anhänglichkeit und Fürsorge für Andere" (M 143), "zur Erkenntniß" (M 429); but there is then also the "Geschlechtstrieb" (see e.g. NL 11[16] 9.447), an "Eigenthumstrieb", a "Nahrungstrieb" (NL 11[47] 9.459), and a "Rachetrieb" (FW 49). It is a combination of just such drives "die [constituiren] sein Wesen" (M 119). We will return to Nietzsche's conception of drives later; for now, suffice it to say that, on Nietzsche account, the self is nothing more than a constellation of such drives – a position that he maintains throughout the later period, referring to the soul ("Seele") in JGB 12 as a "Gesellschaftsbau der Triebe und Affekte".¹¹⁹ Though Nietzsche's deflationary attacks on the notion of a unified, atomistic self are often simply asserted, his argument for the composite nature of both the will and the self is based on what he calls "[v]orsichtiger" self-observation (recalling Hume).¹²⁰ Thus,

¹¹⁹ See also JGB 6, 9, 19. For an excellent analysis of the texts concerning Nietzsche's fictionalism *vis-à-vis* the self, see Sebastian Gardner, "Nietzsche, the Self, and the Disunity of Philosophical Reason", in K. Gemes and S. May (eds.), *Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.1-32 (pp.2-5).

¹²⁰ In this sense, Nietzsche's critique of subjectivity bears many parallels with that of Hume. See NL 10[19] 12.465: "'Subjekt' ist die Fiktion, als ob viele gleiche Zustände an uns die Wirkung Eines Substrats wären: aber wir haben erst die 'Gleichheit' dieser Zustände geschaffen; das Gleichsetzen und Zurechtmachen derselben ist der Thatbestand, nicht die Gleichheit (— diese ist vielmehr zu leugnen —)". See also NL 6[70] 9.213: "[W]ie die Triebe im Kampfe sind, ist das Gefühl des Ich immer am stärksten dort, wo gerade das Übergewicht

in JGB 17, Nietzsche takes issue with the Cartesian “proof” of the self *qua res cogitans*, contending that we are only aware of the process (“Vorgang”) or activity (“Thätigkeit”) of thinking and that the existence of a self or “Ich” *doing* this thinking is a most dubious inductive inference – thus, he labels the “Ich” “eine Annahme, eine Behauptung” and “eine Fälschung des Thatbestandes” (JGB 17).¹²¹ This negates the possibility of our being able to look back over our past joys in order to access “das Grundgesetz [unseres] eigentlichen Selbst”, which is fundamental to the synthetic project outlined in UB III.

There is no self over and above our impulses and appetites that we could call our “eigentliches Selbst”. Most importantly, when we think we are combatting the vehemence of a drive, it is *never* from the position of an “authentic” self that we do so:

Während “wir” uns also über die Heftigkeit eines Triebes zu beklagen meinen, ist es im Grunde ein Trieb, welcher über einen anderen klagt; das heisst: die Wahrnehmung des Leidens an einer solchen Heftigkeit setzt voraus, dass es einen ebenso heftigen oder noch heftigeren anderen Trieb giebt, und dass ein Kampf bevorsteht, in welchem unser Intellect Partei nehmen muss. (M 119)

This means that there is no way one could possibly organise oneself from the standpoint of some impulse that could be considered authentic to one’s self –

ist”. Compare David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (London: John Noon, 1739), T 1.4.6.15: “The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects.” Though Hume, unlike Nietzsche, believes in atomistic perceptions as the basis of experience.

¹²¹ JGB 17: “Es denkt: aber dass dies ‘es’ gerade jenes alte berühmte ‘Ich’ sei, ist, milde geredet, nur eine Annahme, eine Behauptung, vor Allem keine ‘unmittelbare Gewissheit’. Zuletzt ist schon mit diesem ‘es denkt’ zu viel gethan: schon dies ‘es’ enthält eine Auslegung des Vorgangs und gehört nicht zum Vorgange selbst. Man schliesst hier nach der grammatischen Gewohnheit ‘Denken ist eine Thätigkeit, zu jeder Thätigkeit gehört Einer, der thätig ist, folglich —.’” See also NL 7[60]12.315, where Nietzsche states that the idea of the substantial self “ist nichts

Gegebenes, sondern etwas Hinzu-Erdichtetes, Dahinter-Gestecktes.” As Gardner (2009) argues (quite convincingly), Nietzsche does not seriously consider Kant’s rejoinder to Hume in the first *Kritik*.

namely, because there is no self over and above the drives. Nietzsche thus debunks his earlier conviction that our struggle to order the various influences on our agency should be founded upon the disclosure of our “*eigentliches Selbst*”.

Why have we constructed the fiction of a unified self? Why does Nietzsche think “I” have fictionalised myself so that “I” believe myself to be a unified entity? In short, he believes some notion of the self to be necessary for survival. Nietzsche refers to this simplification of the self as both “*nützlich*” and as a “*Lebensbedingung*” insofar as it enables our survival by rendering the chaotic multiplicity of (interior) reality manageable.¹²² However, Nietzsche thinks this self has been hypostatised from a useful fiction into a metaphysical entity, which in turn has become “*die Grundvoraussetzung*” of life-denying religious doctrine (especially, “*der christlichen Lehre*”) (JGB 54) – particularly insofar as it posits a stable self that can be held morally accountable for its actions. In Chapter 4, we will expound why Nietzsche disparages such doctrines, and accordingly, it will become clearer why he would negatively value any “*Grundvoraussetzung[en]*” thereof.

Alongside this, he radicalises his scepticism regarding the kind of self-knowledge that is presupposed by UB III, where although he doubted whether we could find our authentic self, he nonetheless asserted that we could discern an ideal direction in which the self wills and develops (its “*innere Gesetzlichkeit*”). Thus, in M 115, “*Das sogenannte ‘Ich’*”, Nietzsche argues that the self of which one is conscious is only the self in its extreme states – the finer nuances always escape observation. Thus, “[w]ir sind Alle nicht *Das*, als was wir nach den Zuständen

¹²² See e.g. NL 40[21] 11.639: “Das direkte Befragen des Subjekts über das Subjekt, und alle Selbst-Bespiegelung des Geistes hat darin seine Gefahren, daß es für seine Thätigkeit nützlich und wichtig sein könnte, sich falsch zu interpretiren.” See also NL 38[3] 11.597, where Nietzsche describes the self as an “*unentbehrlich[e]*” fiction. See also NL 9[144] 12.148, where he suggests that such processes of simplification are a precondition of human existence: “Man soll diese *Nöthigung*, Begriffe, Gattungen, Formen, Zwecke, Gesetze — ‘*eine Welt der identischen Fälle*’ — zu bilden, nicht so verstehn, als ob wir damit die *wahre Welt* zu fixiren im Stande wären; sondern als *Nöthigung*, uns eine Welt zurechtzumachen, bei der *unsre Existenz* ermöglicht wird — wir schaffen damit eine Welt, die berechenbar, vereinfacht, verständlich usw. für uns ist.” See also NL 11[270] 9.545.

erscheinen, für die wir allein Bewusstsein und Worte — und folglich Lob und Tadel — haben”. In M 119, the practical consequences of this are brought to the fore:

Wie weit Einer seine Selbstkenntniss auch treiben mag, Nichts kann doch unvollständiger sein, als das Bild der gesammten Triebe, die sein Wesen constituiren. Kaum dass er die gröberer beim Namen nennen kann: ihre Zahl und Stärke, ihre Ebbe und Fluth, ihr Spiel und Widerspiel unter einander, *und vor Allem die Gesetze ihrer Ernährung bleiben ihm ganz unbekannt.* (M 119; my italics)

And later, in FW 354, Nietzsche theorises that (self-)consciousness only evolved to the extent that it helped humans identify and *communicate* their needs; likewise, we only developed language to the degree that it served the same end. Everything of which we can become conscious is, according to Nietzsche, “in Bezug auf Gemeinschafts- und Heerden-Nützlichkeit fein entwickelt”, and therefore, he continues,

Jeder von uns, beim besten Willen, [wird] sich selbst so individuell wie möglich zu verstehen, “sich selbst zu kennen”, doch immer nur gerade das Nicht-Individuelle an sich zum Bewusstsein bringen [...], sein “Durchschnittliches” [...]. (FW 354).

Nietzsche concludes from this that we *only* have access to “der oberflächlichste, der schlechteste Theil” of ourselves. The kind of self-knowledge demanded by Nietzsche’s synthesising project in UB is therefore rendered impossible on two fronts: first, there is no “Kern”, “Platonische Idee”, “persönlicher Wille”, “individuellen Willen[.]”, “innere Gesetzlichkeit” or “eigentliches Selbst” to be known according to Nietzsche. Second, even if there was a unique and “wahre Ursinn und Grundstoff [unseres] Wesens” (UB III 1 1.341), no prospective educator could lead us to consciousness of this due to the evolutionary origins of our faculties of self-knowledge. Indeed, it is *only* possible for one to know the shallowest, most commonplace aspects of oneself.

3.4.3. REFUTING TELEOLOGY IN NATURE

The quietus to Nietzsche's early synthesising project is his rejection of teleological conceptions of nature. Already in 1868, in a plan for a dissertation he intended to write on Kant's conception of teleology, he argues that "äußere Zweckmäßigkeit ist eine Täuschung" (KGW I/4 62[12], p.553). Here he asserts that "[d]ie Zweckmäßigkeit des Organischen, die Gesetzmäßigkeit des Unorganischen ist von unserm Verstande in die Natur heineingebracht" (KGW I/4 62[7], p.551).¹²³ He further states that "Ordnung u. Unordnu<n>g giebt es nicht in der Natur" (KGW I/4 62[19], p.555) and "Zweckmäßigkeit ist unsere Idee" (KGW I/4 62[34], p.562). He also makes the Empedoclean point that "der Zufall kann die schönste Melodie finden" (KGW I/4 62[12], p.553). Thus, at this stage, he holds that pure mechanism and coincidence *can* explain the emergence of organisms in all their complexity.¹²⁴ Contrary to Kant, this *is* conceivable and there is therefore no real need to posit teleological causality as a principle of reflective judgement. Nietzsche contends that Kant was only forced to posit the *Zweckmäßigkeit* of nature owing to a lack of imagination.¹²⁵ Purposiveness is merely a false induction from the given fact that, in nature, we identify "eine Methode zur Erreichung des Zweckes oder richtiger: wir sehen die Existenz und ihre Mittel und schließen, das diese Mittel zweckmäßig sind" (KGW I/4 62[15], p.554). Finally, Nietzsche identifies a great practical value ("einen praktischen Werth") in "[d]ie Beseitigung der Teleologie": "Es kommt nur darauf an den Begriff einer höheren Vernunft abzulehnen: so sind wir schon zufrieden" (KGW I/4 62[16], p.554).

¹²³ In making this argument, he draws on Schopenhauer's criticisms of outer *Zweckmäßigkeit* in §26 of WWV II. See also Claudia Crawford, *The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory of Language* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), pp.105-27. On Nietzsche's critique of teleology, see Lawrence Hatab (2005), pp.61-3; Günter Abel, *Nietzsche: die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998), pp.133-40 and pp.439-41.

¹²⁴ See KGW I/4 62[27], p.559: "der Mechanismus verbunden mit dem Casualismus giebt diese Möglichkeit."

¹²⁵ Thus, Nietzsche states in KGW I/4 62[27], p.559, that "[e]s ist nur nötig eine coordinirte Möglichkeit aufzuweisen, um das Zwingende der Vorstellung Kants zu beseitigen."

In MA, however, the sentiment lying behind these disjointed preparatory notes is developed into a more coherent series of attacks on the notion of teleological causality. In MA 2, for example, he criticises philosophers for characterising the human as an unchanging *aeterna veritas*, and for believing that by understanding man as he currently is we can deduce the purpose of every other thing in existence (in the manner of those defending the idea of outer *Zweckmäßigkeit*). However, according to Nietzsche, man is not a *fait accompli* but is himself in a state of becoming; thus, “die ganze Teleologie ist darauf gebaut, dass man vom Menschen der letzten vier Jahrtausende als von einem ewigen redet.” In opposition to this, he states that “es giebt keine ewigen Thatsachen: sowie es keine absoluten Wahrheiten giebt.” In light of this, one cannot state that nature’s final purpose is to eternally engender geniuses according to a single ideal mould, since (Nietzsche implies), humans as we know them will transform into some quite different form of life in the future.¹²⁶ Thus, the Schopenhauerian man cannot be conceived as its highest goal.

Likewise, in FW 109, Nietzsche adopts a similar line of argumentation, claiming that the order we identify in the world immediately surrounding us is most probably a local coincidence, and that we cannot extrapolate from this that the universe and nature is an ordered, end orientated whole. Indeed, Nietzsche contradicts this ordered vision by claiming that “Der Gesamt-Charakter der Welt ist dagegen in alle Ewigkeit Chaos” insofar as it lacks all “Ordnung, Gliederung, Form, Schönheit, Weisheit, und wie alle unsere ästhetischen Menschlichkeiten heissen”. The ordered world in which we happen to live is merely an exception (“Ausnahme”) and, he explicitly adds (in what seems like a subtle allusion to UB III) that “die Ausnahmen sind nicht das geheime Ziel”. To suggest that nature (i.e. “das All”) “strebt” for a goal is a “Vermenschlichung” to which we are not

¹²⁶ See also MA 38, in which Nietzsche states that both *Wissenschaft* and nature “kennt keine Rücksichten auf letzte Zwecke”. Accordingly, as Günter Abel (1998) has pointed out, Nietzsche begins to stress that humans must posit their goals for themselves – that is “die Menschen [müssen] selber sich ökumenische, die ganze Erde umspannende Ziele stellen” (p.137, quoting MA 25).

permitted.¹²⁷ There are no *Zwecke* in nature (“es [gibt] keine Zwecke”), only pure necessity (“Notwendigkeit”).¹²⁸ The vision of the world as being in a lapsarian condition of suffering from which it needs to be messianically redeemed is a vestige of Christian-idealist thought (such ideas are “Schatten Gottes”) – a charge that very directly bears upon Nietzsche’s interpretation of the “metaphysische Bedeutung der Cultur”.

Though Nietzsche does sometimes fall back into a way of talking about nature in terms of *teloi*, generally speaking he persistently rejects the idea of nature as striving towards an end after UB.¹²⁹ The underlying critique of FW 109 persists in Nietzsche’s later thought and is even quite clearly recapitulated in GD, where he very clearly states that man is “nicht die Folge einer eignen Absicht, eines Willens, eines Zwecks, mit ihm wird nicht der Versuch gemacht, ein ‘Ideal von Mensch’ [...] zu erreichen. Wir haben den Begriff ‘Zweck’ erfunden: in der Realität fehlt der Zweck...” (GD Irrthümer 8 6.96). The paradigmatic strategy used by Nietzsche to debunk this worldview is that it commits an anthropomorphic fallacy in projecting onto nature the kinds of ends, moral values and modes of activity that are peculiar to humans. The consequence of this rejection of final natural ends is that Nietzsche can no longer cogently invoke the natural purposes argument as a means of justifying the cooperation of society in the name of the higher goal of generating elite genius.

3.5. CONCLUSION

We have seen that Nietzsche presents a broadly Schopenhauerian model of organisational conflict as a remedy to the problem of disintegration. Though this has

¹²⁷ With respect to this point, as well as Nietzsche’s general rejection of Schopenhauer’s veiled teleology, NL 4[310] 9.177 represents an important note.

¹²⁸ See also M 122.

¹²⁹ For an instance of Nietzsche slipping back into teleological language, see GM II 1 5.291: “Ein Thier heranzüchten, das versprechen darf— ist das nicht gerade jene paradoxe Aufgabe selbst, welche sich die Natur in Hinsicht auf den Menschen gestellt hat?”

already been recapitulated above, it is worth emphasising the fact that we found this model to be founded on two key metaphysical presuppositions: (A) there is an essential component to the self (to which we have epistemological access); and (B) nature acts according to ends (albeit inefficiently). However, we have witnessed that he rejects both the possibility of self-knowledge and the idea of natural teleology to such an extent that the essential metaphysical fundamentals of his early synthetic programme are left irreparably undermined. Indeed, he had already begun to undercut these premises in the *Nachlass* well before the publication of UB. I have thus suggested that we read UB as his last attempt to remain within a Schopenhauerian philosophical framework, until in MA he publicly pulls the temple down upon his earlier synthetic project. As such, the questions with which we should now enter the final chapter are as follows: does the crisis of disintegrative conflict disappear from Nietzsche's later writings? If not (as I will argue), what new fundamentals does he construct in order to ground his new synthetic project?