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Nietzsche's Philosophy of Conflict and the Logic of Organisational Struggle

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INTRODUCTION

Ai! let strife and rancour
perish from the lives of gods and men...
(Homer, *Iliad*, XVIII, l.107)¹

One must realize that war is shared and
Conflict is Justice,
and that all things come to pass [...] in accordance with conflict.
(Heraclitus, fragment LXXXII)²

The disagreement between Heraclitus and Homer's Achilles depicted in our epigraph clearly reveals the ancient origins of the philosophical theme with which this thesis will be concerned – namely, conflict. The prevalence of this theme throughout the subsequent history of philosophy further indicates that our desire to understand the nature of conflict is deeply rooted in our nature as thinking beings; indeed, it represents a leitmotif running through the works of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Heidegger, to name but a few. At some level, most of us are undoubtedly inclined to agree with Achilles insofar as we take war to be harmful and strive to resolve the various personal conflicts that arise in our lives in the sincere belief that we will be better off for doing so. Nonetheless, we can also no doubt appreciate Heraclitus' argument in favour of conflict insofar as it is hard to deny that struggle represents an essential part of the natural world and that our most valued achievements are usually wrought of contention either with others or ourselves. But

¹ Homer, *Iliad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

² Charles Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.67.

does this make Achilles naïve for yearning to bring an end to the kind of strife depicted in the *Iliad*?

As the OED tells us, the term “conflict” is a Latinate term, “the participial stem of *confligēre* to strike together, clash, conflict, contend, fight [...], < *con-* together + *fligēre* to strike”. Under this broad notion of “striking together”, we also have the general definition of conflict as a “prolonged struggle”; then a more specific, physical definition of it as “fighting, contending with arms, martial strife”; a psychological definition that describes it as a “mental or spiritual struggle within a man”; and an epistemological or ideological definition of it as the “clashing or variance of opposed principles, statements, arguments, etc.”; finally, we find a non-anthropomorphic definition of conflict as the “[d]ashing together, collision, or violent mutual impact of physical bodies”, or “the strife of natural forces”.³ It thus becomes quickly apparent that Heraclitus’ quarrel with Homer presents us with a false dichotomy – conflict is neither simply “good” nor “bad” *per se*. It is rather a complex concept used to index a wide range of relations, each of which may be said to have good or bad effects depending on the circumstances in which they occur and the standpoint of the individual making the relevant value judgement.⁴

Before we approach the first task of assessing the *value* of conflict and the ways in which we might go about cultivating “good” conflict and suppressing “bad” conflict, we thus need to designate as clearly as possible what we *mean* by conflict. Insofar as this demands drawing a clear conceptual map of the notion of conflict, and critically assessing the justifications for why we might value particular forms of conflict over others, our endeavour is an unambiguously philosophical one. In the following thesis, I will be arguing not just that Nietzsche should be considered among the wealth of philosophers to have engaged with these problems, but that he has contributed a great deal more to resolving them than has hitherto been

³ OED, “conflict, n.” and “conflict, v.”

⁴ And indeed, a closer examination of the opposition of Heraclitus and Homer’s Achilles reveals that they are largely talking about different forms of conflict, though an investigation of this is not our current purpose.

acknowledged. This said, fully appreciating Nietzsche's contribution demands extensive interpretive work. In this introduction, I will briefly make the case for why this interpretive work is so exigent before giving an outline of the overall structure of the thesis.

1. DETERMINING THE *MEANING* OF CONFLICT

In his "Jasagen zu Gegensatz und Krieg" (EH GT 3 6.313), Nietzsche proclaimed himself to be carrying the torch for Heraclitus, "in dessen Nähe überhaupt [ihm] wärmer, [ihm] wohler zu Muthe wird als irgendwo sonst" (EH GT 3 6.312-3). Thus, he celebrates the fact that life ("Leben") "Kampf sein muss" (Z II Selbst-Ueberwindung 4.148), and more specifically, a *Kampf* for the "Überwältigung des Fremden und Schwächeren, [...] Einverleibung und mindestens, mildestens, Ausbeutung" (JGB 259); moreover, he entreats his readers to cherish peace only "als Mittel zu neuen Kriegen" (Z I Kriegsvolk 4.58);⁵ in GT he urges us to engage in a "Kampf mit der Ausscheidung" of the redundant aspects of ourselves and society (GT 23 1.149); he advocates "kriegführen mit sich" (JGB 200); he writes that without *Kampf*, "wird alles schwach, Mensch und Gesellschaft" (NL 11[193] 9.517); and finally, he famously praises the ancient Greek love of "Wettkampf" or "agon" as the basis of their cultural prowess, asserting that "ihre ganze Kunst ist nicht ohne Wettkampf zu denken" (MA 170).

However, foregoing any prejudices we might have about Nietzsche, the object of these exaltations is *prima facie* unclear. Dictionaries of (the history of) German reveal that the noun "Kampf" rivals its English analogue "conflict" in its ambiguity, signifying not only a "physisches (bewaffnetes) Ringen um den Sieg", but also "'Wettkampf' [vor allem] im Sport" and "ideolog[isches] [beziehungsweise] geistiges Ringen".⁶ Perhaps we might think that *Krieg* has a more univocally martial

⁵ See also Z IV Koenige 2 4.307.

⁶ Hermann Paul, *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1992), pp.446-7.

connotation. Indeed, Herman Paul's dictionary describes how it came to replace the late-Medieval German term *urluige* (which could be used to refer to any armed form of conflict); yet Paul also indicates that, historically speaking, *Krieg* had the far more general signification of "jede Art von Feindseligkeit" or "Streit (auch mit Worten)".⁷

What should further deter us from jumping to hasty conclusions regarding the referent of Nietzsche's celebrations of conflict is that the plurivocality described by Paul and DWB is reproduced in Nietzsche's own use of the terms in question. This semantic ambiguity is perhaps most obtrusive when it comes to interpreting his social philosophy. Is his affirmation of *Krieg* an affirmation of murderous, martial struggle? Or is he affirming a non-violent, non-destructive form of conflict analogous to sporting contest or debate? Otherwise put, does Nietzsche controversially propose that we engage in modes of contest that involve the struggle to negate our opponents in an unrestrained, *unmeasured* manner, or in a restrained, *measured* manner? Or is the matter simply unclear and therefore indeterminable? Some, such as Nietzsche's fascistic readers, have taken his discussions of social conflict as unproblematically referring to belligerent conflict; conversely, others have taken the opposite hermeneutic approach, maintaining that even where Nietzsche appears to be most overtly talking about martial conflict, this is not in fact the case – thus, Walter Kaufmann, who staunchly defends this position, asserts that "one may generalize that in most of [Nietzsche's] notorious remarks about 'war' [...] the word is used metaphorically", that is, to symbolise a *spiritual* war.⁸ In the context of the notion of *Wettkampf*, some have then argued that Nietzsche's conception of agonal contest includes violent forms of conflict, where others have read it as a definitively non-violent mode of struggle. And we can bring forth textual evidence to support both of these opposed interpretations.⁹ Likewise, there are texts in which Nietzsche conceives of the exploitative struggle that he thinks constitutes

⁷ Ibid., p.490.

⁸ Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p.386. This issue is examined in ch.1 of this dissertation.

⁹ This is outlined in greater depth in ch.2.

life as a naked, *amoral* and unmeasured form of conflict; yet there are also texts in which he characterises this struggle as intrinsically restrained and in some sense substituting for eliminative modes of opposition. And as we will see, interpreters have tended to emphasise one or the other side of this definition of vital exploitative *Kampf*.¹⁰ Finally, if we scrutinise the “Kampf mit der Ausscheidung” valorised by Nietzsche, we see that he sometimes describes this as a non-destructive act of excretion, which, while exclusive in an unmeasured fashion, is nonetheless conceived as an act of *Freigiebigkeit* that bestows fertilising dung on others (see e.g. NL 11[134] 9.492); yet at other times, he approximates *Ausscheidung* to a process of *eradicating* entities that have become harmful (see e.g. NL 23[1] 13.600).¹¹

In the first place, then, our task is *descriptive*. As far as possible, we need to draw a clear conceptual map of the philosophical terrain upon which Nietzsche is manoeuvring. This involves identifying the key forms of conflict with which he is concerned and then enumerating the qualities that he most consistently predicates to each of these. Throughout this thesis, I will be defending the idea that, albeit with a certain degree of interpretive violence, we can usefully divide the principal forms of human conflict advocated by Nietzsche into four groups (though it is important to note that not all of these are mutually exclusive):

1. *Vernichtungskämpfe*: violently unmeasured struggles to the death, in which adversaries vie to physically destroy one another.
2. *Wettkämpfe*: measured, non-violent, non-exploitative struggles between approximately equal individuals or social groups. I will also be referring to these as instances of *agonal* conflict.
3. *Kämpfe um Einverleibung*: measured struggles of individuals or social groups striving to *exploit* weaker entities without destroying them.

¹⁰ This is outlined in ch.3.

¹¹ See ch.3 and ch.4.

4. Unmeasured struggles for exclusion that necessarily accompany the struggle for *Einverleibung* – i.e. the repression (*Unterdrückung*), repulsion (*Zurückstoßen*), excretion (*Ausscheidung*) or destruction (*Vernichtung*, *Zerstörung*) of entities within one's self, social group, or society that have become redundant or harmful.

In Chapters 1 and 2, I will be concerned with conceptually clarifying (1) and (2), both discretely and in their relation to one another; I will then analyse the interrelated forms of conflict described under (3) and (4) in Chapters 3 and 4.

This is of course not an exhaustive typology of the forms of conflict dealt with by Nietzsche (for example, we may also think of anarchic conflict as another category of interest). Indeed, throughout this study, I will be drawing on many of the subsidiary forms of struggle that I have had to sideline in making the above taxonomy; however, I believe that it is through an analysis of the aforementioned quartet of categories that we will be able to obtain the best understanding of Nietzsche's positive normative stance towards conflict.

2. DETERMINING THE *VALUE* OF CONFLICT

In addition to the task of conceptually demarcating these different (though in many ways interrelated and overlapping) forms of conflict, we are faced with the further challenge of determining Nietzsche's normative stance towards each of them. Close inspection of the writings in which he is specific in his use of the concept of conflict reveals that, somewhat confusingly, he can be found to both valorise and denigrate each of these forms of conflict. Thus, in his notorious essay CV 3, where he is indubitably speaking of martial conflict, he confesses to singing a "Päan auf den Krieg" insofar as he declares such conflict to be not only an irreducible aspect of human existence, but one that is fundamental to any healthy culture (CV 3 1.774). On the other hand, in CV 5, he assents to the Greek disavowal of the "böse" Eris

goddess, who symbolises those impulses that provoke men “zum feindseligen Vernichtungskampfe [*sic*]” (CV 5 1.787). In this essay, Nietzsche favours a form of measured conflict he calls “Wettkampf” or, after the ancient Greeks, “Agon”; notwithstanding these affirmative remarks, he also warns that the competitive “agonal” spirit almost invariably led to destructive, socially harmful instances of *stasis* when sanctioned in the political domain (see e.g. WS 226). Moreover, within the artistic domain, Nietzsche claims that agonal conflict bred supradominant individuals – such as Homer, for example – who stifle the contest; hence, his conviction that “[d]as Agonale ist auch die Gefahr bei aller Entwicklung” (NL 5[146] 8.78). We find a similar ambivalence with respect to his views on exploitation. For instance, though he often affirms exploitation as a vital life-process, he also speaks critically of the attempt made by the weak to parasitically unite with the strong and exploit them for purposes of shelter and protection (“*unterschlüpfen*” [NL 36[21] 11.560]). Finally, he also equivocates over the normative status of the struggle to excise (*ausscheiden*) problematic parts of the self and society. Thus, Nietzsche censures the Christian practice of endeavouring to amputate one’s troublesome subjective impulses and to eradicate one’s ideological enemies (GD Moral 1-3); but despite this negative appraisal, he nonetheless calls for us to “*beschneiden*” problematic instincts (GD Streifzüge 41 6.143), and he infamously endorses “*die schonungslose Vernichtung alles Entartenden und Parasitischen*” from society (EH GT 4 6.313).¹²

This cursory survey should demonstrate the plurality of normative stances that Nietzsche takes towards each of the four main classes of struggle delineated in the previous section. Needless to say, this seeming oscillation represents a significant threat to the practical applicability of Nietzsche’s thoughts on conflict. After all, how are we to incorporate such ostensibly contradictory recommendations into our practical existence? As always with Nietzsche, we might be tempted to attribute this apparent inconsistency to his often flagrant disregard for the principle

¹² See Chapters 3 and 4 for more references.

of non-contradiction, and his desire to impartially scrutinise an object from as many angles as possible – what is often called his “perspectivism”. Such a conclusion, however, would be premature, and should only be permitted as a last resort, after a detailed attempt to identify some systematicity in his thoughts on conflict.

This is not virgin territory. A whole line of interpreters precedes me in my attempt to establish Nietzsche’s normative stance towards conflict. However, rather than striving to render his diverse thoughts on this topic coherent, they tend to latch onto *either* his celebration of measured forms of conflict *or* his advocacy of unmeasured conflict. It is worth making a brief and somewhat simplified reconstruction of these two veins of interpretation.

First there are those who have branded Nietzsche a belligerent thinker who unreservedly exalts unmeasured struggle, and particularly war. These are the proponents of the so-called “hard” Nietzsche. The individual most responsible for inaugurating this reading was his own sister, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, who conscripted him as intellectual support for German aggression in the Great War.¹³ Subsequently, in his book, *Nietzsche der Philosoph und Politiker* (1931), Alfred Bäumler paints Nietzsche as a fascistic thinker, for whom the alternative to European nihilism was a militaristic form of German imperialism. In many ways, Heidegger’s Nietzsche of the 1930s and early 1940s can also be placed in this line of interpretation.¹⁴ No doubt on account of Nietzsche’s association with the fascist movement, anti-fascist thinkers similarly tended to calumny Nietzsche as a diabolical warmonger.¹⁵ This is what I will refer to as the *militaristic* reading of Nietzsche.

While there had often been voices supporting a softer reading of Nietzsche (particularly in France), this had been largely stifled in the Anglophone world of

¹³ For an overview of this influence, see Steven E. Ascheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990* (California: University of California Press, 1994) (see esp. p.142).

¹⁴ For a critical analysis of this aspect of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, see e.g. Julian Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.140ff.

¹⁵ See the introductory sections to ch.1 and ch.2.

Nietzsche scholarship until Walter Kaufmann's game-changing *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist and Antichrist* (1974), which sanitized Nietzsche for those of liberal political persuasions. Kaufmann made two related moves that are pertinent to our current discussion. As already mentioned, he proposed that Nietzsche's commendations of war should be read as metaphorically signifying the *spiritual* war that Nietzsche wanted us to wage against our passions. Continuing this line of interpretation, he then sought to depoliticise Nietzsche altogether, arguing that Nietzsche is first and foremost concerned with private *self*-cultivation, which is centred on the non-destructive sublimation of our impulses.¹⁶ His anti-political reading notwithstanding, Kaufmann also brought Nietzsche's early unpublished essay CV 5, with its marked social dimension, to the attention of Anglophone scholars. This is the essay (to which I have already referred) in which Nietzsche favours limited modes of social competition over and against martial conflict. With this rediscovery, a new line of Nietzsche research was initiated – one that tended to use this essay as a heuristic tool for dissecting Nietzsche's wider philosophical project. These readers, who generally occupy a liberal-democratic standpoint, sought to repoliticise Nietzsche's thought. However, in contrast to the earlier militaristic readings, they tried (and are still trying) to discover a more democratically minded Nietzsche, contending that the notion of contest we find in CV 5 is in fact exemplified in democratic contest. Indeed, they tend to argue that he seeks a *transformation* of unmeasured conflict *into* measured conflict, namely through the establishment of certain democratic political institutions. In this hermeneutic cluster, we find, among others, Christa Davis Acampora, William Connolly, Lawrence Hatab, David Owen, Herman Siemens, Tracy Strong and Alan Schrift. This is what I will be referring to as the agonistic reading of Nietzsche. When grouped with others such as Stanley Cavell, James Conant and Paul Patton (among others), who strive to read a more democratic impetus (though not necessarily an agonistic one) into Nietzsche's works, we might say that these interpreters represent

¹⁶ Kaufmann (1974), p.306.

what can be called the “soft” Nietzsche. Crucially, these readers often either gloss over the texts in which Nietzsche is most unambiguously bellicose and unmeasured in his prescriptions, or they wilfully ignore these moments by labelling them anomalous, hyperbolic outbursts that should not be included in any serious consideration of his thought.

In response to this tendentious aspect of the soft reading, however, an adapted version of the hard Nietzsche emerged. The chief objective of these readers was to vitiate the growing number of democratic appropriations of Nietzsche’s thought. They contended that the sheer weight of anti-democratic sentiments running through his writings renders such appropriations untenable. They redirected our attention towards the texts in which Nietzsche glorifies war, and they further emphasised his valorisation of an immoral, and often murderous, struggle to exploit and exclude the weak. In this group, we find Bruce Detwiler, Mark Warren, Frederick Appel and Don Dombowsky.¹⁷ These readers tend not to wholly ignore Nietzsche’s more democratic inclinations, nor his interest in the ancient Greek agon; however, they argue that these thoughts are largely confined to the early and middle writings, and so cannot be taken as representative of his mature thought, which they hold to be distinctly pro-aristocratic, if not proto-fascist. I will refer to this reading as the radical aristocratic reading.

Though not all of these commentators fit neatly into the camps to which I have assigned them, this should suffice to illustrate that the secondary literature merely reinstates the discord we originally found in Nietzsche’s texts themselves. They either characterise him as a hard thinker, recommending unmeasured conflict *or* as a soft thinker, endorsing measured conflict. This is the main *aporia* with which the following thesis will be concerned. I will be arguing that neither of these poles of interpretation is adequate to Nietzsche’s thought. Against these readings, my thesis will be that *both the early and the later Nietzsche can be read as valorising both measured and unmeasured social conflict.*

¹⁷ See ch.3.

The crux of my argument will be that the type of conflict Nietzsche prescribes depends on the given conditions. Since he does not positively value any mode of conflict in an unconditional or universal fashion, but rather in a way that is always context-specific, the variegated nature of his prescriptions will be seen to generate no serious contradiction. Identifying these conditions will reveal, particularly in the later period, a considered and cogent set of suggestions regarding how we ought to manage the various forms of conflict in our lives. While I will be focussing on the exegetical task of formulating, in as charitable a manner as possible, a coherent view of Nietzsche's philosophy of conflict, the ultimate aim is that this will also give us a novel set of arguments with which we can critically engage and which we can bring to bear on contemporary debates in ethics and political theory.

3. OUTLINE

In order to defend my thesis that Nietzsche should be read as promoting both measured *and* unmeasured conflict, I employ two argumentative strategies. In the first two chapters, I focus on illuminating how Nietzsche consistently valorises both *Vernichtungskampf* and *Wettkampf*, in both the early and later works. Thus, neither the exclusively measured, agonistic reading, nor the unmeasured, militaristic reading will be found to be adequate descriptions of Nietzsche's early or later thought. In contrast, in the final two chapters, I argue that both the early and the later Nietzsche recommend a *combination* of measured exploitative conflict (incorporation) *and* unmeasured exclusionary conflict as a means to overcoming society's ills. This dual struggle for exploitation and exclusion is what I will broadly call *organisational* conflict. It should be added that in maintaining that there is a parallelism between the early and the later Nietzsche, however, I am by no means suggesting that there is a relation of identity between the two. On the contrary, I will be arguing that Nietzsche's thoughts on conflict undergo a significant transformation between these

two phases due to the combined effect of his repudiation of Schopenhauerian metaphysics and his figuration of the world as will to power.

In Chapter 1, my focus is on *Vernichtungskampf* and, more specifically, war. Against his agonistic readers, I contend that Nietzsche gives various arguments, throughout the corpus, as to why we ought to esteem mortal forms of combat. However, my further contention will be that, particularly in the early period, many of these arguments are underpinned by an ontology of destructive conflict that is at odds with the logic of Nietzsche's agonistic project. Whereas the agonists see Nietzsche as calling for the *transformation* of destructive conflict, I call attention to both early and late texts in which he holds destructive conflict to be the result of a cathartic release of an *essentially* destructive metaphysical force – an idea he largely inherits from Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will. Nonetheless, I maintain that the agonists are correct to identify a strong critique of murderous conflict in Nietzsche and, moreover, a belief that this kind of conflict can be transformed into more productive forms of contest. Indeed, I argue that his readings in the natural sciences in the 1880s, and his concomitant development of the notion of the world as will to power, lead him to redescribe physically destructive conflict as the *contingent* expression of a polymorphous impetus to release pent-up energy and establish relations of exploitation. Even within his mature worldview, however, he still gives a number of arguments for why we ought to positively value *Vernichtungskampf* under very limited conditions. Though this chapter will have carved out a coherent ontological space for Nietzsche's transformative project (since now the energy behind destructive impulses *can* be given alternative outlets), I nonetheless conclude that there remains a substantial portion of Nietzsche's thought that cannot be explained in agonistic terms.

Having examined the concept of *Vernichtungskampf* in Nietzsche's thought, I then consider its counterconcept in Chapter 2, namely, *Wettkampf* or agon. Against the militaristic and radical aristocratic readings, I justify the claim that Nietzsche consistently values agonal relations, understood as a measured form of non-exploitative and non-destructive conflict that takes place between approximately

equal adversaries. Before doing so, however, I survey the striking lack of consensus among current interpretations of Nietzsche's agonism. First, as has been intimated above, it is unclear what Nietzsche *means* by *Wettkampf*. Some claim that it is a wholly non-violent form of conflict, whereas others deem it to be inclusive of certain kinds of *Vernichtungskampf*. Furthermore, there is disagreement as to the social conditions under which he thinks agonial relations are possible and desirable. Some maintain that Nietzsche at least implicitly supports the idea that such relations can, and should, be democratically realised across the whole of society; contrariwise, others argue that according to Nietzsche, agonism should only be endorsed, and indeed is only truly possible, in the context of an elite minority of equals. Finally, commentators dispute the means by which this transformation can be effected and maintained. Some defend the idea that Nietzsche's agonism is secured by a self-initiated change of attitude towards one's opponents, while others submit that agonial relations can only be realised by means of establishing a balance of powers, within which individuals or groups are too equally matched to overpower one another. I invoke Nietzsche's contemporaries – namely, Jacob Burckhardt, Ernst Curtius and George Grote – in an effort to demonstrate that these various impasses can be overcome by means of a historically contextualised understanding of the agon. I conclude this chapter by affirming that both the early and the later Nietzsche can be said to valorise the agon and that therefore the wholly unmeasured reading (be it militaristic or radical aristocratic) does not bear scrutiny.

By the end of Chapter 2, I will have discredited attempts to understand Nietzsche's normative project exclusively in terms of either a violently unmeasured or an agonistically measured struggle, both of which Nietzsche only valorises under very specific and rarely occurring conditions. In Chapters 3 and 4, I turn to UB and the later writings (1884-8) respectively so as to demonstrate how Nietzsche describes a conceptually unique form of conflict – *viz.* organisational struggle – that fails to fit the *Vernichtungskampf*—*Wettkampf* dichotomy. I further maintain that he prescribes this in a far more general manner than either *Vernichtungskampf* or *Wettkampf* as a solution to the pathology he sees plaguing modernity. I open both

chapters by arguing that this pathology should be understood as a problem of disgregation between the parts of the organisation in question – i.e. the behavioural impulses that go to make up our self, or the citizens and social groups of which society is composed. In both chapters, I maintain that the principal remedy that Nietzsche recommends for this condition is a measured struggle for the exploitation or *Einverleibung* of that which is serviceable, and an unmeasured struggle for the exclusion of that which is harmful. Together, these two conflictual processes compose the struggle to order discordant elements of the self or society into a functional hierarchy. Against the radical aristocrats, who describe exploitation as an unmeasured mode of relation, my contention is that Nietzsche's conception of healthy exploitation is consistently measured. To support this thesis, I underscore how he describes such exploitation as a symbiotic relation in which the exploiter aims to preserve the exploited. On the other hand, I contest the softer readers who see the measured struggle for exploitation as *replacing* unmeasured forms of struggle – a claim that is defended at the level of the self by the sublimational readers (e.g. Walter Kaufmann and Ken Gemes), and agonistic readers at the socio-political level. In opposition to these, I maintain that, though the struggle for *Einverleibung* and exploitation should be understood as measured, it must also be understood as preconditioned by unmeasured conflictual processes aimed at the exclusion of that which is harmful or superfluous. In substantiating this argument, I seek to fully analyse the dual logic (of incorporation and exclusion) that constitutes the total economy of organisational struggle.

In Chapter 3, I examine how Nietzsche initially configures this dichotomous struggle for organisation in UB. I argue that he adopts a quasi-Schopenhauerian descriptive model of how healthy organisation arises, which presupposes the existence of metaphysical essences or *Ideas* teleologically organising the entities by means of selectively overpowering and assimilating the opposed entities that they need in order to fully realise themselves. My claim is that this is a measured process insofar as what is incorporated is *preserved* in a position of subservience to the Idea. I then argue that Nietzsche applies this abstract model to the concrete problems of

individual and social disintegration. To this end, I explicate his quasi-Schopenhauerian belief that gaining insight into the Ideas that are striving to guide our individual and collective development is a precondition of our actively fostering this struggle for organisation. Yet, in contrast to Schopenhauer, we will also witness Nietzsche placing a far greater emphasis on the way in which this assimilation is necessarily married to a struggle for the exclusion and excretion of the superfluous or incompatible aspects of the self and culture.

I conclude Chapter 3 by demonstrating how the metaphysical claims demanded by Nietzsche's early synthetic project are rendered impossible by his rejection of metaphysics; thus, in Chapter 4, I examine how the later Nietzsche reconceives of the foundations of organisational struggle in light of this development. I reconstruct how he develops a descriptive model of healthy organisation that draws on the natural sciences and is purged of metaphysics – namely, in his account of the world as will to power. According to this model of healthy life, purposeful organisation is figured as the result of certain forces within the self or society contingently taking control of the aggregate in question and struggling to organise its parts in accordance with their higher aspirations. Again, however, this shaping will be seen to consist in a dual process of, on the one hand, a measured struggle to incorporate useful entities within a hierarchy and, on the other, an unmeasured struggle to excrete or exclude those that fail to fit within this ordering. Whereas in UB this process was said to be initiated by means of gaining metaphysical insight into our essential selves or the essence of society, I conclude Chapter 4 by arguing that Nietzsche shifts his position so that it is now a purely immanent insight into the world *qua* will to power that enables us to initiate the two-sided struggle for organisation.

By way of conclusion, I summarise how the majority of Nietzsche's mature thoughts on conflict fit into a coherent whole; that is, how he can be said to prescribe agonistic, incorporative and destructive or exclusionary forms of conflict under quite separate, and compatible, sets of conditions. I then tally the various ways in which Nietzsche, and our study of his thought, warns that misconceiving of conflict can

have a seriously detrimental impact on one's practical existence. In tandem with this, I close by gesturing towards how we might positively reformulate our conception of conflict in light of our findings.