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**Colonial careers : Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens and career-making in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Empire**  
Odegard, E.L.L.

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# Colonial Careers

Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens and Career-Making in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Empire

Erik Odegard - Leiden University



Cover images, top to bottom and left to right:

Map of Recife-Mauritsstad, NL-HaNA, Collectie Leupe supplement, 4.VELH, inv. no. 619.74

Portrait of Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, Rijksmuseum RP-P-1888-A-12885

Portrait of the Van Goens family, Museum Boijmans van Beuningen, JPK 1 (PK)

Portrait of Rijckloff van Goens as Governor-General, Rijksmuseum SK-A-3766

Map of Colombo, NL-HaNA , Collectie Leupe, 4.VEL, inv. no. 943

# Colonial Careers

Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, Rijckloff Volckertsz. Van Goens and  
Career-Making in the Early Modern Dutch Empire

PROEFSCHRIFT

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                              prof. dr. J.J.L. Gommans

Promotiecommissie   prof. dr. M. van Groesen (Universiteit Leiden)  
                              prof. dr. G.H. Janssen (Universiteit van Amsterdam)  
                              dr. M. de Campos Françaço (Universiteit Leiden)

*To my Family*



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# Introduction

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A disaster of unprecedented scope engulfed the Dutch Republic in the spring and summer of 1672. England declared war in early March, followed by France in early April, and Cologne and Münster in late May. Despite months of sometimes frantic, sometimes lackluster preparations, the disaster spread over the Republic with astonishing rapidity. By June 12, the frontier fortresses on the German Lower Rhine had fallen, while by the end of the month the IJssel Line had collapsed and French troops were rapidly marching west. On July 1, Louis XIV entered Utrecht and celebrated a Catholic mass in the city's cathedral. Although resistance continued in the west and the north, the fall of the remaining four provinces – Zeeland, Friesland, Stad en Lande and, most importantly, Holland – seemed only a matter of time. The story of 1672, the 'year of disasters' (*rampjaar*), which has been extensively studied from a number of vantages, is an important and perhaps the crucial turning point in the history of the early modern Dutch Republic.<sup>1</sup>

This 'year of disasters' is a suitable moment to begin my narrative as it was a moment at which the two men whose careers are the focal point of this dissertation moved in tandem. On June 20, Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, the elderly field-marshal who had been governor of Dutch Brazil for the West India Company (WIC) earlier in his career (1636-1644), occupied Muiden Castle just hours before French troops tried to capture it. This act blocked French access to Amsterdam and secured the northern flank of the new front line of the war: the famous 'waterline',<sup>2</sup> with this action probably preventing the fall of this final defensive line. Nine days earlier, Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens, admiral and commander-in-chief on Ceylon, Malabar and the Coast of Coromandel of the forces of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) west of Malacca, defeated a French fleet in the inner bay of Trincomalee in what was probably the first French defeat of the war.<sup>3</sup> Both men were nearing the end of their respective careers, indeed of their lives. Johan Maurits subsequently died in his garden house in Berg und Tal, near Cleves, in 1679 and was buried there in a specially constructed mausoleum before being interred in the family tomb in Siegen Castle. Van Goens died in Amsterdam in 1682, shortly after returning from Asia. Joan Huydecoper, mayor of Amsterdam and director of the VOC, which Van Goens had served all his life, refused to allow him to be buried in Amsterdam and Van Goens was consequently buried in the *Kloosterkerk* in The Hague.

This anecdote about these two men's roles in the 'year of disasters' of 1672 serves to make two points. In the first place, it shows that the Dutch Republic and the colonial empires administered by its chartered companies were closely connected, and that events in one sphere could have significant consequences in another sphere. In the second place, it illustrates that the careers of two very dissimilar men show some remarkable parallels at this specific point in time. At opposite ends of the earth, the two men were both caught up in the war with France and played important roles in their respective areas of command: Van Goens on Ceylon and the

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<sup>1</sup> J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806* (second edition, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1998) 796-806.

<sup>2</sup> R. Fruin, *De oorlog van 1672* (Groningen 1672) 141.

<sup>3</sup> G.J. Ames, 'Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy of 1664-1674: A Reappraisal', *French Historical Studies* 16:3 (1990) 536-559, 552.

Coromandel Coast of southeastern India, and Johan Maurits in the Dutch army at Muiden and later in Friesland.

This research centers on the careers of these two men: Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679) and Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens (1619-1682). The first served as the governor-general in the WIC's colony in Brazil in 1636-1644, while the second served the VOC virtually his whole life, rising to become governor of Ceylon in the 1660s and 1670s, and ultimately governor-general in Batavia in 1678. Studying, comparing and connecting their careers in the chartered companies will enable me to answer a set of closely related questions on the performance of the companies, on career-making in the early modern Dutch empire, and on that empire more generally. Before concisely formulating the question framing this research, I will introduce the underlying historiography and historical debates.

### Historiography and research question

Founded in 1602 and 1621 respectively, the VOC and WIC represented the Dutch Republic outside Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Over time, these chartered companies have been seen in two very different ways and studied from many different perspectives and vantages. In the first place, economic historians have regularly argued that the companies were the immediate predecessors of today's joint-stock companies.<sup>4</sup> Alternatively, they have been dismissed as crude and inefficient rent-seeking organizations reliant on the application of predatory violence.<sup>5</sup> In the case of the VOC, its archives have been used to write histories of early modern Asia, given that they represent the single greatest collection of sources on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Asia. The WIC, by contrast, has long been seen as the VOC's less-successful younger brother. As large parts of the WIC's records were destroyed in the nineteenth century, the WIC sources have played a much less important role in the historiography of the early modern Atlantic. The loss of the minutes of the WIC's central management, the *Heren XIX*, is a good example of this absence of documentation. While comparable minutes for the VOC allow for a detailed reconstruction of the decision-making process within this company, the lack of these sources for most years of the WIC means a detailed study of decision-making is not possible in this latter case. Indeed, for some years it is even difficult to find out who the directors were.

Over the years, however, both companies came to rule over large territories and populations of settlers and locals, waged war, signed diplomatic treaties and conducted trades over long distances. To effectively oversee these activities, both companies imposed colonial governments based on hierarchical institutions and offices abroad. Collective decision-making by councils headed by a governor or governor-general was a universal feature of early modern Dutch expansion.<sup>6</sup> So how did the companies select the officials who would oversee their trades

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<sup>4</sup> For the corporate form, see: A.M. Carlos and S. Nicholas, "Giants of an Earlier Capitalism": The Chartered Trading Companies as Modern Multinationals', *Business History Review* 62:3 (1988) 398-419, 418-419. See also: N. Steensgaard, 'The Dutch East India Company as an Institutional Innovation', in: M. Aymard (ed.) *Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism / Capitalisme hollandaise et capitalisme mondial* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York and Paris 1982) 235-257.

<sup>5</sup> Den Heijer has criticized the comparison with today's joint-stock companies: H. den Heijer, *De geotrooieerde compagnie : de VOC en de WIC als voorlopers van de naamloze vennootschap* (Kluwer: Amsterdam and Deventer 2005) 211-217. S. Ogilvie, *Institutions and European Trade: Merchant Guilds, 1000-1800* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2011) 404, hinted at the role of violence in the corporate model of the VOC.

<sup>6</sup> J. Jacobs, *The Colony of New Netherland: A Dutch Settlement in Seventeenth-Century America* (Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London 2009) 65.



and rule their colonies on their behalf? This was a sensitive issue: investors in the companies had invested substantial amounts of money (six million guilders in the case of the VOC, and just over seven million in the case of the WIC), and so how could the companies' directors ensure that these funds were properly taken care of by the governors overseas? This problem was compounded by the long distances and slow communications involved, as well as by the substantial plenipotentiary powers that had to be delegated to the overseas administrations if the system was to be made to work. How could the directors ensure that the governors were working for the interests of the company rather than their own private interests? This is a variation on what is known as a *principal-agent* problem; in other words, a problem of trust between two partners in a firm: one – the principal – who invests money, and the other – the agent – who has to manage the firm's assets in a removed location. Studies of this problem and its solutions have sparked a number of debates of importance to this research. I will first address the substantial debate on the issue of *trust* in trade before turning to the debate that has centered specifically on the performance of the chartered trading companies and how they sought to resolve the principal-agent problem.

The ways in which trust was maintained and enforced and the ramifications for the development of medieval and early modern economic institutions have been at the heart of a lively debate among historians. One specific aspect of this debate has focused on the ways in which agency relations could be maintained, with Avner Greif claiming there to be an important distinction between what he termed 'collectivist' and 'individualist' societies. The former, for which he used the example of the Jewish Maghribi traders of North Africa, tended to use only agents from within their own religious group and shared information about any misbehavior by agents among those in the 'in-group'. For them, conflict resolution was thus a matter of reputation and informal settlement of disputes rather than of seeking formal appeals to courts. The medieval merchants of Genoa, by contrast, did not share information with colleagues in Genoa, but instead closely guarded information about agents.<sup>7</sup> The resulting systems of dispute settlement were markedly different and set the two societies on a different path of institutional development. Greif went so far as to argue that the institutional solutions of the Genoese merchants resembled those of modern-day Western countries, while the Maghribi approach resembled the institutional environment of present-day developing countries.<sup>8</sup> Greif's analysis was criticized by Jeremy Edwards and Sheilaigh Ogilvie, who argued that the 'collectivist' mentality asserted by Greif simply did not exist.<sup>9</sup> In the same issue of the *Economic History Review*, Greif responded by reasserting his original conclusions and attacking the method and conclusions of Edwards and Ogilvie. The exact arguments of the debate are less relevant here than the simple observation that this issue of trust in long-distance trade and the effects that the structuring of this trust had on institutional formation have sparked fierce debates in the historiography. Contributing to this debate will thus be a key asset of this research.

Genoese merchants were also the focus of Ricardo Court's study of agency relations in a specific firm. Court argued that sixteenth-century Genoese traders did not need to rely on family members scattered around Europe, but were instead able to construct a network of trustworthy

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<sup>7</sup> A. Greif, 'Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies', *Journal of Political Economy*, 102:5 (1994) 912-950.

<sup>8</sup> This was elaborated in A. Greif, 'The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis', *European Review of Economic History* 4 (2000) 251-284, 278.

<sup>9</sup> J. Edwards and S. Ogilvie, 'Contract enforcement, institutions, and social capital: the Maghribi traders reappraised', *Journal of Economic History* 65:2 (2012) 421-444

agents based on reciprocal trading relations and shared property rights.<sup>10</sup> Suze Zijlstra applied this idea to Dutch long-distance trades to Spain and Surinam, using letters that were preserved owing to the vessel's capture by British privateers or warships. She argued that correspondence was the key instrument in building and sustaining trust between otherwise unrelated business partners separated by great distances, rather than a need to rely on familial ties as a means to ensuring adherence to the interests of the firm.<sup>11</sup> A focus on the letter-writing of merchants as the key to understanding the construction of networks of trusted agents over long distances is also found in Francesca Trivellato's *The Familiarity of Strangers*. Trivellato argues that references in merchants' letters to friendship and familiarity between individuals who did not in fact share any kinship ties were crucial in constructing long-distance networks of trust. Returning to the Dutch case, Peter Mathias argued that reputation was essential to business success. In contrast to Zijlstra, however, he claimed that family ties were key aspects of this reputation as they constituted signifiers for trust and access to capital, credit and information.<sup>12</sup> For the Dutch Republic, too, therefore, there is also disagreement about the nature of the construction of bonds of trust in long-distance trade. Did trade follow family ties, or could merchants effectively create bonds of trust without reference to existing kinship ties? The agency relations within the chartered companies were, of course, of a rather different order from the outset, given that these were relations between salaried employees and their bosses. So how has the issue of agency relations been dealt with in the historiography of the chartered trading companies?

Rather surprisingly, there is not a great body of historiography focusing squarely on the principal-agent problem as applied to the joint-stock companies of the early modern period. The limited scholarship dealing with this question is concerned mainly with examples drawn from England and its overseas companies. Historians have debated the extent to which early modern trading companies were aware of the problems posed by the principal-agent problem and whether they were able to take measures to remedy these issues. Ann Carlos and Stephen Nicholas argued in 1990 that the English Hudson's Bay Company was aware of the principal-agent problem and that its directors were able to take effective measures to improve the situation<sup>13</sup> and protect the company's assets. These included, firstly, making prospective governors put up bonds that would be confiscated if they were caught embezzling or smuggling and, secondly, recruiting personnel from specific geographic areas so as to enforce a tight system of social control in the company's settlements. This was coupled with demands for rigorous accounting of expenses and, lastly, by rewarding good conduct and paying good salaries. In this way, according to Carlos and Nicholas, the problem was tamed.<sup>14</sup>

The question of the chartered companies' ability to resolve or at least mitigate agency problems is a key part of the debate on the efficiency of the companies as economic institutions. The interpretation of Carlos and Nicholas – that the companies were in fact able to mitigate agency problems and were thus efficient economic institutions – was criticized by Stephen Jones

<sup>10</sup> R. Court, "'Januensis Ergo Mercator': Trust and Enforcement in the Business Correspondence of the Brignole Family', *Sixteenth Century Journal* 35:4 (2004) 987-1003, 1001-1003.

<sup>11</sup> S. Zijlstra, 'To Build and Sustain Trust: Long-Distance Correspondence of Dutch Seventeenth-Century Merchants', *Dutch Crossing, Journal of Low Countries Studies* 36:2 (2012) 114-131, 127-128.

<sup>12</sup> Peter Mathias, 'Strategies for Reducing Risk by Entrepreneurs in the Early Modern Period' in: C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (eds.), *Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times, Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market* (The Hague 1995) 5-24, 6.

<sup>13</sup> A.M. Carlos and S. Nicholas, 'Agency Problems in Early Chartered Companies: The Case of the Hudson's Bay Company', *The Journal of Economic History* 50:4 (1990) 853-875.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, 860-874.

and Simon Ville, who argued that rather than representing efficient solutions to a persistent organizational problem, the chartered companies were rent-seeking monopolists committed to distorting the markets for their own benefit. These authors drew upon the literature to support their case, not only with English examples, but also with some from the Dutch sphere. Citing Holden Furber, they argued that many of the thousands upon thousands of pages of documentation sent back to the Netherlands by the VOC were not read before being filed in the company's archives.<sup>15</sup> Interestingly, this exact same reference was also used more recently by Sheilagh Ogilvie in her criticism of the earlier work of Carlos and Nicholas.<sup>16</sup> She, too, argued against the idea that the companies were efficient or competitive. In both cases, the use of this quote from Holden Furber seems an attempt to compensate for the fact that neither Jones and Ville nor Ogilvie reference any Dutch works and thus did not access the primary sources for themselves.<sup>17</sup> By contrast, those historians who have actually worked with Dutch company sources were impressed by the quality of the companies' processing of information.<sup>18</sup> Santhi Hejeebu, working on contract enforcement in the English East India Company (EIC), also included some references to the VOC, but was hampered in this by the absence of literature specially devoted to this problem for the Dutch case. She argued that although many of the mechanisms that Carlos and Nicholas identified for the Hudson's Bay Company were not applied by the EIC, the company was still able to effectively control the actions (in this case: private trade) of its servants by the option of being able to dismiss them and thus taking away the prospect of profitable private trade. Again, the VOC did not naturally follow this pattern since it was much more restrictive of private trade than the EIC.<sup>19</sup> It is noteworthy, however, that the VOC paid its servants more than the EIC, at least in the case of the lower ranks. Hejeebu mentions that, at the low rank of *assistant*, the VOC paid nearly six times more than the EIC paid the equivalent rank.<sup>20</sup> Sadly, the WIC does not merit any reference in this literature.

But the chartered companies were more than just large merchant firms: Philip Stern provocingly argued that the seventeenth-century EIC should be seen primarily as a state in Asia, a 'company-state'.<sup>21</sup> Although this is partially derived from a specific English legal setting of corporations, the term seems eminently applicable to the VOC, while its applicability to the WIC is also a question of great interest. As company-states, the companies – and their governors – were confronted with much more than just business decisions. They also had to navigate issues such as the '*nature of obligations of subjects and rulers, good governance, political economy, jurisdiction, authority, and sovereignty*'.<sup>22</sup> As such, the role of colonial governors was more complex than that of agents for firms involved in long-distance trade, and their performance could be evaluated and criticized on very different parameters. This is a new trend in the historiography, and its application can substantially change our perceptions of the way in which the companies operated.

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<sup>15</sup> S.R.H. Jones and S.P. Ville, 'Efficient Transactors or Rent-Seeking Monopolists? The Rationale for Early Chartered Trading Companies', *The Journal of Economic History* 56:4 (1996) 898-915, 906.

<sup>16</sup> S. Ogilvie, *Institutions and European Trade: Merchant Guilds, 1000-1800* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2011) 357.

<sup>17</sup> The original is given in H. Furber, *Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient* (1976) 191.

<sup>18</sup> C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800* (Hutchinson and Co.: London 1965) 46-47.

<sup>19</sup> S. Hejeebu, 'Contract Enforcement in the English East India Company', *The Journal of Economic History* 65:2 (2005) 496-523, 517-518.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, 502, footnote 26.

<sup>21</sup> P. Stern, *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India* (Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York 2011), especially 3-18.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, 14.

There is a long tradition in the historiography of the companies that has focused on their shipping operations, especially those of the VOC.<sup>23</sup> The output of studies of the Dutch chartered companies is sufficient to fill an entire library. Yet even in a field of research as well covered as that of these companies, there are new questions to be explored, as well as new ideas to be tested. In reviewing the books published to mark the 400<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the VOC in 2002, Femme Gaastra observed that it was to be expected that, in future, the company itself would play more of a second fiddle in the historiography, with the Asian context in which the company operated becoming more prominent.<sup>24</sup> This observation was repeated by Victor Enthoven two years later.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, in the past decade and a half, the use of VOC records to write Asian history has flourished.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, the company has not retreated to the background as much as Gaastra and Enthoven expected. This is partly because of the continuation of some research trends that Gaastra already noted in 2005, and partly the result of the appearance of completely new fields of interest that have thrown up new questions and challenges. Gerrit Knaap, whose recent inaugural lecture is at the forefront of one of these new approaches, convincingly argued that the VOC in Asia derived most of its products not from trade, but from taxation of subjugated populations. We should thus see the company in Asia not primarily as a merchant firm, but rather as a colonial government, much in line with Stern's work.<sup>27</sup>

The study of the WIC, too, has seen important changes over the last decade, as the idea of Atlantic history caught on in Dutch academia. Interestingly, until very recently the way for scholars to argue for an important role for the early modern Dutch Republic in the Atlantic world was to ignore the WIC, with scholarship tending to focus on the 'middleman' role of islands such as Curacao and St. Eustatius in the eighteenth century, and on the myriad connections of a colony such as Surinam to the wider Atlantic world, rather than on the imperial adventure that was Brazil.<sup>28</sup> Ironically, then, Dutch Atlantic history has tried to eliminate the role of this company as far as possible. Additionally, the preference for the eighteenth century was justified in *Dutch Atlantic Connections* by arguing with regard to the history of the period prior to 1680 that '*this story is well-known, often repeated, and the answers to the questions are clear.*'<sup>29</sup> But regardless of the many questions remaining to be answered for the role of the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century, the seventeenth century is not as well-defined and hashed out as the authors argue. In contrast to the post-1680 period, the WIC must be central to any attempt to write a Dutch Atlantic history for this earlier period as it represented a well-defined attempt at the creation of an Atlantic empire that was devised in the company boardrooms, and also overseen and directed from there.

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<sup>23</sup> For example: J.R. Bruijn and F.S. Gaastra, *Dutch-Asiatic shipping in the 17th and 18th centuries* (3 volumes, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1979-1987).

<sup>24</sup> F. Gaastra, 'De neerslag van een jubileumjaar: VOC 2002', *BMGN* 120:4 (2005) 546-561, 559.

<sup>25</sup> V. Enthoven, 'H. den Heijer, De geotrooieerde compagnie. De VOC en de WIC als voorlopers van de naamloze vennootschap' (book review), *BMGN* 122:2 (2007) 275-278, 278.

<sup>26</sup> Largely as a result of the ENCOMPASS and TANAP projects at Leiden University. Both projects resulted in many publications using VOC sources as the basis for writing Asian history.

<sup>27</sup> G. Knaap, *De 'core Business' van de VOC: Markt, macht en mentaliteit vanuit overzees perspectief* (inaugural lecture, Utrecht 2014).

<sup>28</sup> For an excellent recent work on the colony of Surinam and focusing on its place in an Atlantic network, see: K. Fatah-Black, *White lies and black markets: evading metropolitan authority in colonial Suriname, 1650-1800* (Brill: Leiden and Boston 2015).

<sup>29</sup> G. Oostindie and J.V. Roitman, 'Introduction'. in: G. Oostindie and J.V. Roitman (eds.), *Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680-1800: Linking Empires, Bridging Borders* (Brill: Leiden and Boston 2014) 1-24, 3.



Three recent publications have taken up this challenge and returned to the supposedly well-researched seventeenth century with new questions and new perspectives. In *The Dutch Moment*, Wim Klooster reviews the entire period until the late 1670s and argues that this period represented the Dutch bid for empire in the Atlantic. Brazil was central to this experiment and is thus accorded its due weight.<sup>30</sup> What is more, Klooster brings back the warfare and violence that were the cornerstones of this bid for empire and presents the ‘Dutch’ in the Atlantic in a different light: not as middlemen and brokers, but as soldiers, conquerors and iconoclasts. This bid for empire failed, according to Klooster, because of the WIC’s lack of care for the soldiers who were supposed to conquer and protect its colonies.<sup>31</sup> Michiel van Groesen takes a different tack in his recent *Amsterdam’s Atlantic*. Although he, too, focuses on the attempt to conquer Brazil, he concentrates on the print culture and the flow of news across the Atlantic, much as in his earlier work.<sup>32</sup> Through the spread of news maps, pamphlets and publications such as celebratory songs, Van Groesen reconstructs the flow and uses of news from the Atlantic. He convincingly argues that the print culture in Amsterdam had an important impact on the changing perceptions of the colony in Brazil, and these changing perceptions fatally undermined support for the WIC’s attempt at empire.<sup>33</sup> Susanah Shaw Romney, in her slightly older (2014) *New Netherland Connections*, takes a different perspective again. She argues that the empire was constructed as much bottom-up as much as it was top-down and studies the roles of intimate networks in the creation of transatlantic ties in the seventeenth century, focusing primarily on the link between Amsterdam and New Amsterdam.<sup>34</sup> Empire, she argues, was constructed not only in the boardrooms of the companies, but also by ordinary people. In their activities, whether by helping equip men for sea or providing credit to sailors, women in Amsterdam, for example, enabled the large numbers of men required for company service to ship out.<sup>35</sup>

Despite these new studies, there remain substantial lacunae in the historiography available to researchers of the first WIC and especially its colonies in the South Atlantic. There is but one monograph of the WIC’s tenure in Angola, written in the 1940s but only published in 2000.<sup>36</sup> The substantial Portuguese-language historiography on Dutch Brazil written by Brazilian scholars is available to Dutch researchers in translation only in a few cases.<sup>37</sup> Even classic studies such as Evaldo Cabral de Mello’s *Olinda restaurada : guerra e açúcar no nordeste, 1630-1654*, or for the purposes of this study even more pertinent *Nassau: Governador do Brasil holandês* remain untranslated or even available in the Netherlands in Portuguese.<sup>38</sup> More recent work, such as

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<sup>30</sup> W. Klooster, *The Dutch Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World* (Cornell University Press and Leiden University Press: Ithaca and Leiden 2016).

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*, 262.

<sup>32</sup> M. van Groesen, ‘A Week to Remember: Dutch Publishers and the Competition for News from Brazil, 26 August – 2 September 1624’, *Quaerendo* 40 (2010) 26-49.

<sup>33</sup> M. van Groesen, *Amsterdam’s Atlantic: Print Culture and the Making of Dutch Brazil* (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia 2016) 188-198.

<sup>34</sup> S. Shaw Romney, *New Netherland Connections: Intimate Networks and Atlantic Ties in Seventeenth-Century America* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill 2014).

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*; chapter one deal with the role of women in outfitting sailors, 26-65.

<sup>36</sup> K. Ratelband, *Nederlanders in West-Afrika 1600-1650 : Angola, Kongo en São Tomé* (Walburg Pers: Zutphen 2000).

<sup>37</sup> J. A Gonsalves de Mello, *Nederlanders in Brazilië (1624-1654) : de invloed van de Hollandse bezetting op het leven en de cultuur in Noord-Brazilië* (Walburg Pers: Zutphen 2001) and E. Cabral de Mello, *De Braziliaanse affaire : Portugal, de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden en Noord-Oost Brazilië, 1641-1669* (Walburg Pers, Zutphen 2001).

<sup>38</sup> E. Cabral de Mello, *Olinda Restaurada: Guerra e Açúcar no Nordeste, 1630-1654* (Sao Paulo University press: Sao Paulo 1975) would be a good candidate for translation, given the lack of good work on the war in Brazil in Dutch. E.

Bruno Miranda's *Gente de Guerra* has not been translated either. Accessing much of the Brazilian historiography is thus an issue.

Strikingly, the studies of East and West in the Dutch case have largely been conducted separately. There are very few studies on comparisons or connections between activities in Asia and the Americas. Charles Boxer's classic, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800*, remains one of the very few works to compare the worlds of the companies on a thematic level.<sup>39</sup> The more recent *Rijk aan de rand van de wereld*, by Piet Emmer and Jos Gommans, also deals with both East and West, but still retains the geographic division within the structure of the book.<sup>40</sup> There is thus a case to be made for a study dealing with similar questions in the two spheres, with the aim of improving our understanding of the evolution of empire in the different geographic zones and the connections between these zones.

The brief overview presented here of trends in the historiography, of the debates on trust and agency, and of the role of the companies leads naturally to the question that will guide my research: how could individuals attain high office in the service of the chartered companies and, once in office, how could they maintain these positions? This question contains elements of all the points discussed above. Appointing colonial governors created a principal-agent relationship between directors and governor, which was of course a matter of trust. In office, governors in the chartered companies' service were expected to manage trade, but also to wage war, to engage in diplomacy, to speak justice and to rule over colonial populations. Governors, thus, were responsible for the process that created the company-state in practice, overseen at a distance by the directors in the Netherlands. In selecting the two cases at the heart of this research, I will connect and compare these processes in the VOC and the WIC, thus enabling me to argue, in the conclusion to this work, that despite organizational similarities in the Netherlands, the companies worked remarkably differently overseas.

Having introduced the historiographical background giving rise to the research question, I will now detail the theoretical inputs to be used to answer the question at hand. Since this question focuses on the issues of career-making and appointments, the theoretical framework will be built around ideas on the formation of networks in the early modern era, specifically those that have been devised to analyze the formation of networks in the Dutch Republic.

### **Family and friends, politics, patrimonialism and patronage**

The chartered trading companies were extremely important to the cities in which they were located, both in an economic as well as a social sense. Economically, the companies were not just significant because of their direct activities, but also because their demand for ships, equipment and crews created many related economic opportunities. Socially, a directorship on a board of one of the companies became one of the signifiers of social attainment and of inclusion in the regent elite. Given the companies' importance for the urban politics of the Dutch Republic, my theoretical framework will draw heavily on insights derived from studies of politics and state-formation in the Dutch Republic itself. In so doing I will try to balance a view of the institutional world, and the confines it placed on the agents who operated within it, against the ability of

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Cabral de Mello, *Nassau Governador do Brasil holandês* (Companhia das Letras: Sao Paulo 2006) is unavailable even in de Royal Library in The Hague.

<sup>39</sup> C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800* (reprint, Hutchinson: London 1977).

<sup>40</sup> P. Emmer and J. Gommans, *Rijk aan de rand van de wereld: De Geschiedenis van Nederland overzee, 1600-1800* (Bert Bakker: Amsterdam 2012).



individuals to challenge, reinforce or undermine the institutional arrangements in place. Like the individuals studied by David Hancock in his work on the trade in Madeira wine, the governors and directors of the Dutch chartered companies ‘did not live in an atomized, anomic world.’<sup>41</sup> And like Hancock, in his description of producers, traders and consumers of Madeira wine, I will focus on the linkages between individuals and the networks that these linkages created. But I will be hesitant to argue that these networks constituted a ‘self-organized world’.<sup>42</sup> Instead I will argue that the interpersonal networks were so integrated within the company structures that the latter could not have worked without them. Conversely, the personal networks often relied on the company’s structure and organization for their very existence, while the acceptance of new members into a network was often prompted by a change in position within the company hierarchy. In other words, the institutional and personal worlds connected and reinforced each other. As this makes drawing a strict distinction between institutions and agency pointless, I aim instead to argue that, in the case of the career-making of Dutch colonial governors, neither could do without the other. For my theoretical framework, I will draw heavily on a number of scholars whose works, I argue, complement each other. These are Daniel Roorda for his view on factionalism, Julia Adams for her concept of the Dutch Republic as a ‘familial state’, Luuc Kooijmans for his work on friendship, and Jan Glete for his ideas on interest aggregation in the Dutch Republic. Together, the views of these scholars allow for a nuanced theoretical framework encompassing both the creation of interpersonal bonds and the creation of networks, as well as the performance of the companies as institutions.

#### *Institutions and interest aggregation*

The early modern Dutch Republic puzzled contemporary observers and indeed continues to puzzle historians and historical sociologists to this day. Contemporaries and historians alike have generally been quite dismissive of the effectiveness of the governmental structures and organization of government in the Republic. The conflicted nature of sovereignty in the Republic, its multiple and sometimes conflicting layers of governance, and the lack of a centralized ‘head’ all made the Republic stand out from the monarchies of Europe. This view persisted in the historiography until the early 1980s, with historians stressing the inefficiency of the system and the lack of a national framework.<sup>43</sup> This was especially apparent in, for example, naval history, where the ills of the system of multiple admiralties were stressed and formed part of nineteenth- and twentieth-century naval officers’ arguments for a unitary *rijksmarine* and against a separate colonial navy.<sup>44</sup> Past scholarship on the Dutch Republic thus presents us with a view for the period in which it was written. Since the early 1980s, however, this negative view of the Republic has been modified in response to the convergence of a number of separate trends in the historiography. These will be discussed here as they are still instrumental for our present views on the Republic.

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<sup>41</sup> D. Hancock, *Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste* (Yale University Press: New Haven and London 2009) xx.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*, xxiii-xxv.

<sup>43</sup> The 1980s as a pivot in the historiography is made by G. de Bruin, ‘Het politieke bestel van de Republiek: een anomalie in het vroegmodern Europa?’, *BMGN, Low Countries Historical Review* 114:1 (1999) 16-38, 16.

<sup>44</sup> Older generations of naval historians were especially critical of the system of multiple admiralties of the Republic. However, also a more recent historian such as J.R. Bruijn has criticized the divided naval organization, while also mentioning that the federal nature of the Dutch state would have made a central organization difficult to achieve. See: J.R. Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Columbia 1990) 29-39, 99-110, 213-219.

Renewed attention for the military side of the Dutch Revolt and the later wars fought by the Dutch Republic dates back to the 1950s. Within the theory of the ‘military revolution’, crucial importance was attributed to the military reforms of Maurits and Willem Lodewijk and the spread of innovative fortification designs in the early Dutch Republic.<sup>45</sup> Working on the original thesis by Roberts, Geoffrey Parker also explored the spread of the military revolution beyond Europe, again stressing the role of the Republic.<sup>46</sup> This renewed attention for the Republic’s military apparatus also spilled over into the field of politics, statecraft and governance. The perceived success and dynamism of the Republic in military affairs were not compatible with a perception of the Republic as a weak and internally divided entity. Thus, new concepts such as that of the ‘fiscal-military’ state were developed and applied to the Republic.<sup>47</sup> These went further than a merely institutional or formal political history and looked at how policy was made and paid for in practice. The Swedish historian Jan Glete argued that the success of the Republic as a naval and military power should be seen as a *result* of its institutional framework, rather than *despite* it. In describing the process of policy-making, Glete used the term ‘interest aggregation’ to denote the process by which local politics’ influence on central policies (mostly war and peace) and the taxation required to pay for these policies meant that tax discipline in the Republic was high and policies were easily implemented. The scholarship stressing the military strength of the Republic and, by consequence, the strength of the Republic as a state contrasts sharply with those scholars who have stressed the disadvantages of the Dutch system. These include Charles Tilly, who argued that the Republic did not implement permanent state structures for waging war.<sup>48</sup> Glete was able to argue convincingly against this view, pointing out that the Republic was able, in the seventeenth century, to raise larger armies per capita than any of its rivals, and that the fleet of the Republic was often seen as an example to be emulated by other powers.

Glete’s ideas on interest aggregation, which he applied primarily to the admiralty boards, can easily be transposed to the India companies. These companies were composed of various chambers representing a range of different regional interests, and the success or failure of the companies was dictated by their ability to aggregate these diverse interests behind common goals. This also meant that regional interests could play a relatively large role in appointments and dismissals of individual governors. The institutional view of Glete can be nicely complemented by the ideas of Roorda, Adams and Kooijmans, who focused on the way that ties between members of the Dutch elite were created and reinforced.

### *Factions, families and friendship*

The directors occupying the most important seats in the chartered companies were to a very large degree the same individuals who also held seats in the municipal councils where the company chambers were located.<sup>49</sup> Directorships in the companies were a fully integrated part of the local market for prestigious and profitable government jobs. As a result, the same dynamics that

<sup>45</sup> M. Roberts, *The military revolution, 1560-1660* (Belfast 1956).

<sup>46</sup> See: G. Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars* (second revised edition, London, New York and Melbourne 1972), and the first chapter in: G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800* (eleventh edition, Cambridge 2007) 6-44.

<sup>47</sup> The idea of the fiscal-military state has been worked on by many scholars. For a good application of the concept to the Dutch Republic, see: J. Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660* (London 2002) 140-173.

<sup>48</sup> C. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (revised edition, Cambridge and Oxford 1992) 62.

<sup>49</sup> See chapter one.

impacted on the composition of the urban councils also had an effect on directorships and, therefore, on the election or deselection of colonial governors. The work of Daniel Roorda is unavoidable in any study of the politics of the cities of the Dutch Republic. In his 1968 dissertation he argued that the conflicts between different parts of the urban councils in Holland in 1672 were due not to party-political differences, but instead to factional infighting. By this Roorda meant that though opposing parties used the labels of Orangist or States parties, their differences were not primarily inspired by genuinely held ideas on the proper conduct of politics and the nature of sovereignty in the Dutch Republic. Rather, he argued, the opposing parts of the urban councils were factions who fought over control of the urban council because such control would mean that profitable and prestigious jobs would flow to them and their families, rather than to their rivals.<sup>50</sup> Only in abnormal situations of crisis did party politics play a real role.<sup>51</sup> This was the first of a series of articles and books in which Roorda studied the composition of the Republic's elites, their change over time, and newcomers' ability to access the regent elite.<sup>52</sup> Roorda's ideas on the factional nature of Dutch urban politics are of great importance with regard to the companies. In Holland, the fact that burgomasters appointed the company directors meant that changes in the composition of the urban council and the burgomasters ultimately percolated through to the companies and could then impact on the careers of the high colonial governors overseas who had been appointed by the former directors.

The American historical sociologist Julia Adams has devised a model of state-formation that brings together the ideas of Glete and Roorda within a single mold. She argued that the fighting factions in fact represented a system of patriarchy: rule by (male) heads of family. The term 'patrimonialism' derives from Max Weber, who used it to denote the projection of patriarchal systems onto a broader set of social relationships.<sup>53</sup> Patriarchy denotes the domination of the extended household by the male head of the family. The return of patriarchy and the deterioration of the socio-economic position of Dutch women after mid-sixteenth century has been an object of debate.<sup>54</sup> But this debate is less relevant when we look at the elite families of nobles and high regents where patriarchal familial ties were indeed still important and where extended family ties were crucial. To understand patriarchy in this political context, we need to think of families not as merely the supposedly modern 'nuclear family'.<sup>55</sup> As will become apparent, elites in the Republic conceived of their families as larger extended groups and had an acute understanding of the family's history, stretching back centuries in some cases. This conception of family, including its past and its connections and rivalries with other families, allowed for a quite different conception of the role of the self within this larger structure. Acquiring wealth, status and high positions certainly mattered, but of crucial importance was the

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<sup>50</sup> D.J. Roorda, *Partij en Factie: De oproeren van 1672 in de steden van Holland en Zeeland, een krachtmeting tussen partijen en facties* (unaltered reprint, Wolters-Noordhoff: Groningen 1979) 3-6.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibidem*, 7.

<sup>52</sup> H. van Dijk and D.J. Roorda, 'Sociale mobiliteit onder regenten van de Republiek', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 84:2 (1971) 306-328.

<sup>53</sup> For Max Weber on patrimonialism as an 'ideal type' or analytical tool, see, for example, M.M. Charrad and J. Adams, 'Introduction: Patrimonialism, Past and Present', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 636, *Patrimonial Power in the Modern World* (July 2011) 6-15, 7-8.

<sup>54</sup> See: c On page 28, the authors lay out the argument put forward by Tine de Moor and Jan Luiten van Zanden that conditions did indeed worsen.

<sup>55</sup> The role of the nuclear family in Western European and the free choice of partners has been an object of study. Van der Heijden, Nederveen Meerkerk and Schmidt, 'Terugkeer van het patriërchaat?' 30-34 argue that women were relatively free to choose their partner in Early Modern Holland. Crucially, however, arranged marriages still were important amongst the nobility and the elite regent families.

ability to pass on these privileges to subsequent generations so that they, too, could profit from the actions of individuals living in the present. As such, patriarchy requires thinking in terms of extended family groups, with marriage being conceived of as an instrument for making important connections and job-seeking as a way of extending the reputation and income of the family group. According to Adams, elite male heads of households in the Republic came to dominate the institutions of the state. This meant they then had two – sometimes conflicting, sometimes overlapping – goals: to secure the state that afforded them rewarding and honorable employment at all levels of the state, and to maintain and extend the income, wealth and dignity of their families.<sup>56</sup> The operation of the institutions of the state – and, in Adams' view, the companies were a part of this – is thus to a significant extent a result of the patrimonial strategies deployed by elite heads of households. This was, of course, particularly the case as far as the personnel policy was concerned. Adams also distinguishes between state patrimonialism and patronage systems based on the structure of positions within the system.<sup>57</sup> The willingness of local regents and merchants to pay the taxes that underpinned the Dutch navy and army, as signaled by Glete, was thus underpinned by their wish to secure their own positions in that state. The factional infighting that Roorda signaled within the urban councils was a result of the wish of patrimonial heads of families to secure honorable positions for themselves and their offspring, with the companies being an integral part of this world.

Finally, Adams's work on patrimonialism is complemented nicely by the work of Luuc Kooijmans.<sup>58</sup> In focusing on the concept of friendship in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Kooijmans argues that this was used quite differently than at present. Friendship was a transactional, reciprocal relationship, whereby both parties (the friends) expected to profit from the ties that bound them. To survive and thrive, individuals needed a network of friends to help them. These friends, unsurprisingly, were often family members, and friendship within these kinship networks helped younger members of the group to gain experience and starting capital.<sup>59</sup> The process at work behind the friendship studied by Kooijmans is patronage. The importance of the language of friendship in building and reinforcing ties, as studied by Kooijmans, will recur in the discussion of my methodology, given the importance of the message carried by the word 'friendship' (*vriendschap*) in letter-writing.

#### *Patronage and clientage*

Related to the issues of patrimonialism and friendship is that of patronage. Patrimonialism and patronage are two different systems for maintaining unequal but reciprocal social relationships.<sup>60</sup> In its simplest terms, patronage or clientage in the context of the Dutch Republic entailed the relationship between a higher-placed individual (the patron), and a lower-placed individual (the client). The relationship between patron and client was one of reciprocity, with the patron offering, for example, goods, job opportunities or possibilities for advancement to the client who

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<sup>56</sup> Adams, 'The Familial State: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands', *Theory and Society* 23 (1994) 505-539, 505-506.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibidem*, 514.

<sup>58</sup> L. Kooijmans, *Vriendschap en de kunst van het overleven in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Prometheus: Amsterdam 2016).

<sup>59</sup> Kooijmans, *Vriendschap*, 14-19, 59-60.

<sup>60</sup> For an explanation of the difference between the two, see: J. Adams, 'The Familial State', 513-514.

would reciprocate by offering his support and loyalty to the patron.<sup>61</sup> Until recently there were only a few scattered works on the mechanisms of patronage in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic. The work by Geert Janssen on the clientage network of Willem Frederik (1613-1664), stadholder of Friesland, is the most important recent work on patronage in the Netherlands. Although the patronage relations at the court of Willem Frederik were, of course, in a different setting from that of either of the companies, there are a number of important lessons to be drawn from Janssen's work. In the first place, he has shown that clientage in the Republic was split into two distinct spheres: a public or stately sphere versus a private or domestic sphere, with distinct mores of acceptable conduct governing clientage in each sphere.<sup>62</sup> This was the case, for example, in the criteria for religious affiliation. While Willem Frederik maintained a strict line in favoring only Dutch reformed church clients in his role as stadholder, this religious rule was not maintained in his private function as a count.<sup>63</sup> Besides this specificity of the patron-client relationship based on the role assumed by the patron (or client), another important point to be taken from Janssen's work is that patrons could also be clients in a different setting. Willem Frederik, for instance, was a patron when in Friesland, but at the court in The Hague he was a client of 'the boss' (*de Baes*).<sup>64</sup> Instead of studying single patron-client relations, we should therefore be mindful of a possible cascade of such relations, with each relationship stacked on top of another. Another recent study on patronage in the Dutch Republic, by Coen Wilders on the network of stadholder William III (1650-1702), argues that the reciprocal nature of patronage was stronger than an earlier generation of scholars had allowed for. Important clients of the stadholder in Utrecht acted as brokers, passing on requests from their friends and family in the province.<sup>65</sup> Wilders thus speaks of a system of brokerage, which in fact resembled that of the surrounding monarchies. The position of brokers is another example of the importance of choosing the right patron: brokers in the Republic depended on access to their patron for maintaining their own position as patrons to their respective circle of friends and family – or clients.

Although the details of the patronage relations at the courts of the stadholders will have differed from those operating within the companies, there are nevertheless a number of lessons to be drawn from them. A study of the mechanisms and social importance of the patron-client relationship in a large organization comparable to that of the companies is provided by Nicholas Rodger in his classic study of the British navy in the Georgian era.<sup>66</sup> A number of interesting points can be taken from Rodger's analysis of patronage within that navy. In the first place, he argues that patronage was a method of selecting talent, albeit using methods that would currently be frowned upon. This has presented historians with a paradox, which certainly also applies to the careers of the servants of the companies: *'The paradox is clear: how could good men have been selected by a system which, according to the usual modern approach, seems bound to have shown deplorable results?'*<sup>67</sup> Rodger argues that this paradox is based on the false assumption that application of personal

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<sup>61</sup> For this definition of patronage, see: G.H. Janssen, *Creaturen van de Macht: Patronage bij Willem Frederik van Nassau (1613-1664)* (Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam 2005) 12-13.

<sup>62</sup> Ibidem, 212-215, 221.

<sup>63</sup> Ibidem, 221-222.

<sup>64</sup> Ibidem, 223.

<sup>65</sup> C. Wilders, *Patronage in de Provincie: Het Utrechtse netwerk van stadhouder Willem III* (Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam 2015) 177-178.

<sup>66</sup> N.A.M. Rodger, *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (Collins: London 1986) 273-302.

<sup>67</sup> Ibidem, 274.



interest in public service was necessarily wrong and would, in consequence, lead to failure. This was not at all the reality of the eighteenth-century world that he studied. Applying personal interests to the selection of potential officers was a perfectly accepted part of naval service and seems (for Britain at least) to have produced rather excellent officers. For officers, Rodger argues, developing a following of loyal junior officers and skilled lower ratings was an elementary precondition for success: skilled officers were scarce, and waiting for the individuals that the Admiralty and Navy Board would throw their way would not have resulted in the best crews. A good crew was obviously important, given that the best way to gain advancement quickly was success in battle.<sup>68</sup> A somewhat similar point can be made for the companies. Governors tried to develop a loyal following of lower company servants, such as commanders, merchants (*opperkoopmannen*) and bookkeepers, but also captains (*schippers*) and military officers, because skilled subaltern officers who worked together in a harmonious team offered the best chances for governors to succeed in their entrusted command, regardless of whether this involved profitable trade or conquering Portuguese strongholds. Teamwork, as Rodger noted, was of the essence.<sup>69</sup>

However, to attract skilled followers and keep them in his entourage, a captain (or, in our case, a governor) also had to prove that he was able to advance them and help them progress upwards in their own careers. Reciprocity was thus essential: if loyal clients were not rewarded with honorable and profitable assignments of their own – and the chance to develop their own following – they would look for a patron who could secure these advantages. Patron-client relations supposed a strong tie between the prospective patron and his superiors – the Admiralty or, in our case, the company directors – so that clients, too, had a good chance of advancement. Reversely, it was of the essence that patrons only recommended clients for advancement who were actually fitted for the task at hand. If incompetent clients were advanced and duly failed at their new assignments, the patron would lose the trust of his superiors and thus lose the ability to further the careers of his other clients, who would then seek other patrons.

The important flow of information that kept clients aware of the position of their patrons and enabled patrons to justify their selection of men for promotion largely ran in parallel with the official correspondence, Rodger notes.<sup>70</sup> This, too, applies at least in the case of the VOC, where we can see how Van Goens' private correspondence with the company directors ran parallel to the company letters in which the affairs of his clients were discussed. The above leads on naturally to a closer examination of the methods used to select my source material, together with a brief discussion of these sources themselves.

### **Method and hypothesis**

A study of the careers of two colonial governors will, of course, hew close to the life stories of the two men, but without seeking to write a double biography. This section will briefly discuss some methodological issues, focusing on the differences between biographical and prosopographical approaches, and the approach taken in this book. Although I will obviously draw heavily on both approaches, I hope to explain here how my approach to the topic at hand differs. The genre of biography is still very much alive when it comes to the characters of Dutch colonial governors. Besides the biographies of Johan Maurits mentioned below, recent years have seen new works on Peter Stuyvesant and Iman Wilhelm Falck, as well as the excellent biography

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<sup>68</sup> Rodger, *The Wooden World*, 275-276.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibidem*, 283.



of Jan Pieterszoon Coen.<sup>71</sup> The best of these are able to explain much of the history of the companies through the choice of the actor at the heart of the book, and I will draw heavily on Van Goor's biography of Coen in particular. There are a number of reasons, however, why a biographical approach did not lend itself for the present book.

As mentioned before, biographies have previously been written of both men at the heart of this study. Of the two, Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen has received by far more attention. This started as early as 1647, when Caspar Barlaeus published his *Rerum per octennium in Brasilia*, heralding the achievements of Johan Maurits in Brazil.<sup>72</sup> Since the nineteenth century, biographies have appeared in Dutch and German with some regularity.<sup>73</sup> Though Johan Maurits spent only eight years of his life in Brazil, his Brazilian period regularly garners much attention in these works, and indeed is often part of the title, such as in P.J. Bouman's 1947 classic *Johan Maurits, de Braziliaan*.<sup>74</sup> More recently, H.S. van der Straaten and K. Witteveen-Van Lennep have both also written biographies of the former governor of Dutch Brazil.<sup>75</sup> Besides these full-on biographies, there is a slew of works focusing on parts of Johan Maurits' life, or edited volumes of loose contributions centered on the person of Johan Maurits. Particularly interesting in this regard is the volume published by the society supporting the *Mauritsbuis*, the museum now established in Johan Maurits' former house in The Hague. The contributions in this volume focus particularly on his role as a patron of the arts, on his buildings, on his early youth and on how the 'man from Brazil' is perceived.<sup>76</sup> The editors of the volume admittedly addressed some of the lacunae in their foreword, noting that it was particularly disappointing that no-one had been found who could write about Johan Maurits' performance as a military commander.<sup>77</sup> To this, it could be added that it was unfortunate that no-one, not only in that collection of essays but also in the biographies, has written in more depth on the relationship between the governor-general of Dutch Brazil and the directors of the WIC. A persistent problem with many of the biographical accounts of Johan Maurits' life is that they rely heavily on the text of the first work, *Rerum per octennium*. Barlaeus' account of Johan Maurits' tenure in office in Brazil, however, was not a seventeenth-century work of an independent-minded historian. Rather, Barlaeus had been commissioned by Johan Maurits to write a classic epic on his Brazilian period. Johan Maurits was thus fully aware of the contents of the book and also able to influence its contents.<sup>78</sup> This points

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<sup>71</sup> J. Jacobs, *Petrus Stuyvesant: Een levensschets* (Bakker: Amsterdam 2009); F. van Dulm, 'Zonder eigen gewinne en glorie'. *Mr. Iman Wilhelm Falcké (1736-1785), gouverneur en directeur van Ceylon en onderborigheden* (Verloren: Hilversum 2012); J. van Goor, *Jan Pieterszoon Coen, 1587-1629: Koopman-koning in Azië* (Boom: Amsterdam 2015).

<sup>72</sup> C. Barlaeus, *Rerum per octennium in Brasilia et alibi gestarum, sub praefectura ill. Comitis I. Mauritii Nassaviae &c Comitum, Historia* (Johannes Blaeu: Amsterdam 1647), published in a Dutch translation as: S.P. Honoré Naber and Caspar Barlaeus, *Nederlandsch Brazilië onder het bevind van Johan Maurits, Grave van Nassau 1637-1644* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1923).

<sup>73</sup> See footnote 43 for a recent German-language edition.

<sup>74</sup> P.J. Bouman, *Johan Maurits van Nassau, de Braziliaan* (Utrecht 1947).

<sup>75</sup> H.S. van der Straaten, *Maurits de Braziliaan; het levensverhaal van Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, stichter van het Mauritsbuis, gouverneur-generaal van Nederlands-Brazilië, stadhouder van Kleef, 1604-1679*. K. Witteveen-Van Lennep, *Leven als een vorst in de Gouden Eeuw: Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, 1604-1679*.

<sup>76</sup> E. van den Boogaart, H.R. Hoetink and P.J.P. Whitehead (eds), *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, 1604-1679: A humanist prince in Europe and Brazil* (The Hague 1979). This work includes two chapters on the buildings commissioned by Johan Maurits, as well as chapters on his gardens, zoology in Dutch Brazil, science and exoticism, the Dutch vision of Brazil through art, and a Latin epic poem written in his honor, to name just the most eye-catching examples.

<sup>77</sup> H.R. Hoetink and E. van den Boogaart, 'Foreword', in: *Ibidem*, 5.

<sup>78</sup> J. van der Veldt, 'An Autograph Letter of John Maurice of Nassau, Governor of the Dutch Colony in Brazil (1636-1644)', *The Americas* 3:3 (1947) 311-318, 311.

to a potential pitfall, especially with older biographies: they can all too easily turn into works of hero-worship owing to the preferences of the person writing them. A good example in the case of Johan Maurits is his involvement in the Dutch transatlantic slave trade. By ordering the conquest of Elmina in 1638 and of Angola in 1642, Johan Maurits stood at the very beginning of the WIC's trade in enslaved Africans. But this rarely gets a mention in the older biographies as it was not considered an issue at the time they were written. This heavy focus on the arts and Johan Maurits' courtly life is also replicated in more recent historiography, while his performance as a military commander and a governor has so far been afforded much less attention.<sup>79</sup>

Rijckloff van Goens has been at the center of fewer dedicated biographies, and none of these spans his entire life. The oldest of these biographies is J. Aalbers' *Rijckloff van Goens: Commissaris en veldoverste der Oost-Indische Compagnie, en zijn arbeidsveld 1653/54 en 1657/58*.<sup>80</sup> As the title suggests, this work covers only part of Van Goens' long career within the VOC, and focuses on a limited number of aspects. Later, W.M. Ottow wrote two works on Van Goens: the first, *Rijckloff van Goens: De carrière van een diplomaat, 1619-1655*, focused on the early years and his diplomatic missions to the Court of Mataram, while the second covered the period 1657-1662.<sup>81</sup> The weakness of this latter work especially is that it hews too closely to the sources, some of which Van Goens wrote autobiographically, and the figure of Van Goens himself to provide a good perspective on the context in which he operated. In addition, Van Goens features in a larger number of works focusing on the collective of high VOC personnel in Asia, while also featuring as the rival of Adriaan van Reede in the brief biography in J. Heniger's work on Van Reede and the Hortus Malabaricus.<sup>82</sup> Here, too, the proper context needed to understand the enmity between the two men is lacking. Instead, Van Goens is cast as the villain, with the book taking his rival, Adriaan van Reede, as its focus for the botanical work. This points to a trap in biographical accounts, which was explored by Jill Lepore in her essay *Historians Who Love Too Much*.<sup>83</sup>

Lepore's essay argues for a distinction between biography on the one hand and microhistory on the other. At the time, microhistory was not a category that was widely applied in American historical writing. Through four propositions, Lepore argued that there were four important differences between the two approaches and that, as a consequence of these differences, microhistorians were less likely to become too attached to (or too repulsed by) their subjects. Though my research is not cast as either a microhistory or a work of biography, the first of the distinctions made by Lepore is relevant as it highlights some of the choices underlying this work. Her first proposition argued that 'If biography is largely founded on a belief in the singularity and significance of an individual's contribution to history, microhistory is founded

<sup>79</sup> A recent edited volume is: G. Brunn and C. Neutsch (eds.) *Sein Feld war die Welt, Johan Moritz von Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679): Von Siegen über die Niederlande und Brasilien nach Brandenburg* (Waxmann: Münster, New York, Munich and Berlin 2008). This edited volume contains two chapters that focus on the transatlantic slave trade, a novelty, as well as a comparison of Johan Maurits and Jan Pieterszoon Coen, but otherwise replicates older works by focusing – for the Brazilian period – on the court, art and urban planning.

<sup>80</sup> J. Aalbers, *Rijckloff van Goens: Commissaris en veldoverste der Oost-Indische Compagnie, en zijn arbeidsveld 1653/54 en 1657/58* (Groningen 1916).

<sup>81</sup> W.M. Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckerts van Goens: krijgsman, commissaris en regent in dienst van de VOC: archiefstudie over het Europese verlof (1655-1657) en de eerste grote Ceylon-periode (1657-1662): omslagjaren voor de man die van jongs af aan in VOC-verband prachtig carrière maakte, maar die later bitter moeilijk kreeg* (self-published 1996).

<sup>82</sup> J. Heniger, *Hendrik Adriaan van Reede tot Drakenstein (1636-1691) and Hortus Malabaricus: A Contribution to the History of Dutch Colonial Botany* (Balkema: Rotterdam 1986).

<sup>83</sup> J. Lepore, 'Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography', *The Journal of American History* 88:1 (2001) 129-144.

upon the almost opposite assumption: however singular a person's life may be, the value of examining it lies in how it serves as an allegory for the culture as a whole.<sup>84</sup> This sentence nicely summarizes some of the rationale behind the choices made in this research and helps explain why it is not purely biographical. I have chosen Johan Maurits and Rijckloff van Goens not because they themselves are highly important characters – though one could argue that they were – but because studying their careers will help me better analyze the process of career-making within the Dutch chartered companies. Given other parameters for this research, I could have made other choices, for example Peter Stuyvesant for the WIC, and Johannes Speelman for the VOC. My goal, however, is to understand the internal organization and operations of the India companies, not to understand the lives of the two governors themselves in every way. This is not to say that this work will not contain any biographical characteristics; it will, but it will perhaps be more akin to prosopography, or group biography. This is because understanding the trajectory of a career requires not only an understanding of the life and actions of the governors themselves, but also of the composition and networks within the colonial councils in which they operated and the composition of the boards of directors of the companies which they served. Especially this last point will be elaborated upon as it will show more clearly than anything else the limitations placed on the agency of even very powerful colonial governors by factional strife and boardroom politics over which they had no influence. I will thus combine elements of the biographical, prosopographical and microhistorical in an account of the careers of two seventeenth-century Dutch colonial governors that seeks to highlight the ways in which the companies actually operated and that hopes to surprise the reader by showing the alliances of interests that could influence or even dictate policy behind the scenes. This work thus follows Lawrence Goldman's exhortation to historians and biographers alike to '*encourage further attempts at the integration of structural and personal approaches, though always with care, with an eye to the sources, and with an awareness of the limitations of both these ways of writing about the past when taken on their own.*'<sup>85</sup>

In reading the sources, I have paid special attention to those phrases and words used to signify a special kind of relationship. Following Kooijmans, the use of the word *friendship* (*vriendschap*) had important connotations of real or claimed familiarity and connection. Whether *friends* were family members, unrelated patrons or indeed clients, the use of the word shows that the person in question was at least trying to establish a connection.<sup>86</sup> This use of language was studied in another context by Francesca Trivellato in *The Familiarity of Strangers*, which studies cross-cultural trade among Sephardi Jews. She argued that the word *friend* was indeed used between trading partners who not only did not share familial ties, but who also had different faiths, lived on different continents and most likely had never even met. Using the language of friendship, the merchants she studied were able to correspond with Hindu merchants in Goa, as well as with their most trusted agents.<sup>87</sup> I will argue that this same language of friendship and reciprocity was used by the servants of the Dutch chartered trading companies in their correspondence with directors and colleagues. A key difference, however, was that, in this setting, the corresponding parties often were connected by kinship or patronage. In these cases, the language of friendship confirmed and strengthened these ties, or at least that was the object of

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<sup>84</sup> Lepore, 'Reflections', 141.

<sup>85</sup> L. Goldman, 'History and biography', *Historical Research* 89:245 (2016) 399-411, 411.

<sup>86</sup> For use of the word '*vriend*', see L. Kooijmans, *Vriendschap*, 18.

<sup>87</sup> F. Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period* (Yale University Press: New Haven and London 2009) 178-184.

the person using them. This makes it ideal for a close reading of the sources as the terms of friendship, reciprocity and kinship are signals of real ties or attempts to construct them.

Based on the above considerations, I can construct a brief hypothesis of the career-making in the early modern Dutch chartered trading companies that underlies my methodological choices. Careers in the companies were unlike 'regular' long-distance relations because they were much more politicized. This meant that the mechanisms by which trust was built and enforced were quite different from the ways described above. Besides trade and commerce, colonial governors were responsible for governance, sometimes over quite large populations, as well as for warfare and diplomacy. The very size of the companies made their fates highly politically important for the elites within the Dutch Republic. As a result, the familial networks in the Dutch Republics played an important role in the appointments of colonial governors. However, political pressures on these appointments did not mean that they were simply a question of nepotism. Those in a position to promote individuals still had every incentive to choose capable individuals over incompetent ones. This had everything to do with the reciprocal nature of the client-patron relationship: elevation of an incompetent client to high office would reflect badly on the patron if the client failed at his important task. To gain advancement, therefore, one needed a dose of skill or merit, besides good connections giving access to a set of patrimonial or overseas patronage relations that would open the way to further advancement. Early in a career, developing a patron-client relation with powerful superiors was of the essence for individuals starting low in the hierarchy. As a career continued, relationships with the directors became ever more important as the latter reserved the right to appoint candidates to the highest positions. Developing personal connections with the directors in some way or another became ever more important if a person wanted to avoid encountering a 'glass ceiling'. Familial connections could thus prove to be of the essence. Finally, once in a position of considerable power, a successful governor needed to develop patronage relations with his underlings so that he could be assured of backing from loyal subordinates. In addition, it was crucial to control the flow of information to the directors who held the power of dismissal. To this end it was also important to develop good relations with local states and sovereigns or local colonial society as an ill-timed conflict or complaints from colonists could seriously hamper the development and sustainment of a career.

There were thus four sets of relations that were important, depending on the stages of a career: relations with the directors, relations with colonial colleagues, relations with local society and, lastly, relations with other states, companies or sovereigns. These four sets of relations are the factors I will use to analyze the development of the networks that were so crucial for career-making. To analyze these factors I have divided the careers of the two men in question into three parts: career beginning, middle and end. This division is not arbitrary: I argue that not all of these four networks were relevant at the same time in a career, and that different connections were crucial at different moments in a career. To study these networks, a close reading of the sources is essential. I will therefore focus on letters to and from these governors, both of an official and a personal nature. In analyzing these networks, I have used the GEPHI software for visualization. Social network analysis is a key component of this research, but its application has limits. The graphs of the networks I construct are governed by my selection of sources and therefore by my choice of main characters. Therefore, application of such calculations such as node centrality and level of connectedness was less useful for this research. The graphs of the networks should be seen as a way of illustrating the networks studied and in some cases they show the links between important individuals.



### **Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen and Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens: two seventeenth-century governors**

Ultimately, this research will focus on the careers and networks of two Dutch colonial governors. Before continuing with a description and analysis of the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this study, I will briefly sketch the lives of the two men and then turn to the important question of why they were chosen for the study at hand. The two governors chosen represent both the Eastern and the Western halves of what this study will argue was the Dutch empire in the seventeenth century. A wish to draw both parts into one study and examine whether the processes of influence differed between the two companies was my reason for choosing a case from each hemisphere. With this in mind, the choice for Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen was quickly made as he is well-researched, with plenty of secondary works and biographies available. As the purpose of this study is most emphatically not to write a new biography, the existence of biographies of the selected cases was an important consideration as these will help in the archival research and to reconstruct the networks of support both men enjoyed.<sup>88</sup> Interestingly, the earlier biographies of Johan Maurits are all quite positive, thus reinforcing the perception of his tenure as the ‘good period’ of Dutch Brazil. By contrast, Klooster and Van Groesen in their respective recent works are much more critical, thus signaling a shift in the perception of Johan Maurits and to which this research will add.<sup>89</sup> Johan Maurits is also a most interesting case, exceptional in a way, because of being both the only governor-general of Dutch Brazil ever appointed and the only Nassau to venture overseas. High nobility rarely ventured overseas in the Dutch empire, although lower nobility occasionally did so, as this study will point out.<sup>90</sup> This will allow me to compare with the other case chosen for study and to examine whether and, if so, how a noble background made a difference in the way in which the influence of politics intervened in career-making. The fact that Johan Maurits was ultimately dismissed from his position as governor-general<sup>91</sup> is a most important point as the process by which he moved from appointment to dismissal, and the changing opinions of the directors on his suitability for the position, will provide the best insight into the actual processes within the boards of directors and the interests involved. For comparative purposes, therefore, a candidate from the VOC had to be found who was also dismissed, preferably as acrimoniously as possible, given that it is in the chaos of dismissal that the underlying structures will become most clearly visible. The choice was actually quite easy: Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens fitted the bill like no other candidate and provided an interesting contrast with the nobleman Johan Maurits on many levels: Van Goens was the son of a common soldier, born in a Dutch-held fortress on the German Lower Rhine and orphaned at the age of ten, and worked his way through the ranks of the VOC hierarchy in the East to become governor-general in 1678. His tenure in Batavia and, before that, as governor of Ceylon were a crucial period for the VOC as it was then that important questions were being raised about management, private trade, colonization, expansion,

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<sup>88</sup> For biographies of Johan Maurits, see: P.J. Bouman, *Johan Maurits van Nassau, de Braziliaan* (Utrecht 1947) and A.N.J. Fabius, *Johan Maurits, de Braziliaan* (Utrecht 1914). There are many more biographical studies that focus on specific parts of Johan Maurits’ life; these will be examined in chapters 4, 6 and 8.

<sup>89</sup> W. Klooster, *The Dutch Moment*, 65-66. M. van Groesen, *Amsterdam’s Atlantic*, 157-167.

<sup>90</sup> An example of lower nobility serving the companies included Van Reede in the VOC. This puts the Dutch empire in a very different social position from that of the other European empires of the period, all of which had strong participation by nobles.

<sup>91</sup> Though some dispute this point, pointing out that the initial request to leave came from Johan Maurits himself. This point will be addressed in chapter six, which will demonstrate that Johan Maurits did not, in fact, wish to leave Brazil and that his dismissal was most prejudicial to his interests.

and the hierarchy between the Asian colonies. The Van Goens years were transformative for the VOC and will thus show the various interests and networks at play most clearly. The selection means that this is a diachronic study of quite different characters. I posit that this is not a problem as it is the mechanisms behind the appointment of governors that are of interest, rather than the biographies of the men themselves. In their diversity, they will best allow me to analyze the mechanisms of career-making in the seventeenth-century Dutch overseas empire. The two cases are furthermore interesting as both men faced similar problems during their tenures in Brazil and on Ceylon respectively. This – the problem of territorial control and rule by the chartered companies – is an aspect that has so far been neglected because of the focus on commercial and maritime activities. Studying their policies will allow me to make the case that, in contrast to what has sometimes been suggested, the Dutch empire of the seventeenth century was not so different from other European empires. Finally, the careers of the two men reveal more than their individual particularities. Indeed, the mechanisms at work in the career-making process reveal how the early modern Dutch empire worked in practice.

### Sources and selection

The richness of the VOC's records held in The Hague is well-known to historians of early modern Asia. Less well-known, and less well-preserved, are the records of the WIC, also held in The Hague. The documents from these two inventories are at the heart of the chapters to follow. But these are not used in isolation. Besides these official, institutionally created, organized and preserved documents, I have sought recourse, wherever possible, to the richness of the personal archives that complement these institutional pieces, and which are also held in The Hague. Often these collections were formed by directors of the VOC or WIC who kept correspondence or copies of official documents in their private family archives. Collections such as those of the Sweers, Radermacher and Hudde families complement the official documents very well. These collections contain personal letters and papers sent in parallel to the official company correspondence. In some cases, these letters contain sensitive information on interpersonal ties between company servants and directors. The use of these more personal documents allowed me to understand an event or a decision both from the official documents held in the company's archives, as well as from the personal correspondence in which decisions were mentioned, criticized, explained and toned down. This was especially important in the case of Van Goens, where the use of the private correspondence allowed not only a fuller understanding of the networks supporting Van Goens, but also of the person of Van Goens himself. One will search in vain in the VOC's official correspondence for personal touches such as the following extract from a letter sent by Van Goens to his stepdaughter Catherina van Adrichem in December 1670: *'Your sweet sister Esther Ceylonia is also well and happy, and excels above all other children in many talents. She can already speak Dutch well and some Portuguese.'*<sup>92</sup> Both men also left personal archives. In the case of Van Goens these are held in the National Archives in The Hague, while those of Johan Maurits are held in the Royal House Archives in the same city.

Over the course of their careers both men produced copious amounts of paper. In selecting the material for this study I focused in the first place on the moments of tension within the networks that surrounded them. These moments could be identified from a reading of the

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<sup>92</sup> NL-HaNA, Sweers, 1.10.78, inv. no. 2. *'zoo mede u Zoete Suster Esther Ceylonia, die vrolijk is, en boven andre kinderen (Godloff) in veel gaven nijtmunt, kan al goet Hollants en quatt Portugees spreken.'*



secondary literature. At these crucial junctures, a close reading of the sources helped identify these networks by focusing on key phrases and words such as *vriend* (friend) and *patroon* (patron). Additionally, not merely the contents of the texts themselves, but also the layout of the texts were taken into account, with the best example being the notes made by Van Goens in the margins of a letter sent by governor of Ceylon, Van der Meijden, in the early 1660s. These marginal notes, separately dated and signed by Van Goens, showed that the governor could not communicate with the Netherlands without his letters being read and commented upon by his rival, Van Goens.

### Connecting careers, constructing empire

This study will do more, however, than just give an account of two separate careers in the seventeenth-century Dutch empire. It will argue, firstly, that such an empire did in fact exist and deserves to be studied by that name. Anthony Pagden famously argued that the Dutch Republic did not consider itself an empire and that the Netherlands only became an empire in the nineteenth century.<sup>93</sup> But when studying the linked histories of the WIC in Brazil and the VOC in Ceylon, both part of a larger struggle against Spain and Portugal, or (after 1640) only Portugal, it is difficult to ignore the trope of empire. The WIC's war in Brazil was the largest interimperial conflict in the Atlantic in the seventeenth century and was fought out over a quarter of a century, while the VOC succeeded in conquering some of the oldest Portuguese possessions in Asia and displacing the *Estado* as the premier European power in the area. What is more, the personal lives of the men and women who lived through these struggles were closely connected. An excellent example of this is provided by a letter from Salomon Sweers, councilor in the High Government of the Indies and patron of Rijckloff van Goens, in a letter to his brother in 1641. In this letter the first news mentioned was that Sweers had received news from Brazil: the VOC vessel *Lillo* had stopped over in Brazil on the way to Asia and had picked up letters there. These included:

[A] letter from 8 November passed by brother Isack and another of the fourth of the same month by Cousin Coddem from Mauricia from which I have gathered with regret and much sadness that brother Abraham deceased - promoted to captain by Cousin Coddem's benevolent affection - was killed treacherously on August 4, 1641 (God forbid) in the vicinity of St. Paulo Luando on the ship *Enchuijsen* by an Italian traitor with four [balls of] lead in his chest and murdered.<sup>94</sup>

Commerce and conquest in America and Asia were managed by different institutions. To the people, however, who lived in these worlds, they were very much connected. On another level, the companies and their activities were closely intertwined in the Republic itself, where directors of the companies were also mayors of important cities and delegates to the States-General. This overlapping of positions allowed for decision-making and weighing of interests on a global level. The question of empire is referred to throughout the text and will be returned to in more length in the conclusion.

<sup>93</sup> A. Pagden, *Lords of All The World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c.1500-c.1800* (New Haven and London 1995) 4.

<sup>94</sup> NL-HaNA, Sweers, 1.10.78, inv. no. 2 fol. 29. '...een brief vanden 8 november passado door frere Isack ende een ander vanden 4 derselver pr Cousijn Coddem uijt Maurica geschreven waer uijt met leetvesen en onder aller groote droefnis verstaen hebben, hoe dat frere Abraham sal.r door Cousijn Coddens goedertierne genegentheijt tot Cap.n gevordert, den 4 Augustus 1641 (Godt betert) ontrent St. Paulo d' Louando op't schip *Enchuijsen* door een Italiaens verrader seer deerlijck met vier loodedn te gelijc in sijn borst getroffen om hals gebracht ende vermoort is.

The remainder of *Colonial Careers* is divided into seven chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one provides a baseline into the Dutch background: the organization of Dutch politics and the companies in the Netherlands. This chapter draws special attention to the practices of governance and politics, showing that while the different bodies of state and the companies were in theory quite separated, in practice they overlapped because many of the same individuals had a seat in each of them. If we are to look for an early modern Dutch empire, we will find it not in an official body of state, but rather in the combined interests of the individuals who governed both the Dutch state and the companies and who frequently also had substantial interests in the European trades. The remaining six chapters are divided equally between the two cases: three chapters for Van Goens and three for Johan Maurits. Chapter two details Johan Maurits' appointment to Brazil in 1636, pointing out the pervasive influence of domestic politics on this appointment. Chapter three deals with the rise through the ranks of Rijckloff van Goens in the period 1629-1655. It introduces the idea of there being something like a *cursus honorum* in the VOC and launches the concept of 'career-path dependency'. Chapters four and five repeat this pattern, with chapter four focusing on Johan Maurits' tenure in Brazil in 1636-1640, and chapter five on Rijckloff van Goens' tenure on Ceylon in the later 1650s to the late 1660s. A common thread running through these two chapters is trade versus territory. These chapters link up with some of the issues debated in chapter two and, together, reflect that there was at least a school of thought within Dutch overseas governance that was far more concerned with controlling territory rather than trade. Chapters six and seven deal with the two men's dismissal from office by trying to reconstruct the changes in the composition of the company directors between the moment the governors were appointed and the moment they were dismissed. In addition, these two chapters both examine changes in the areas ruled by the companies. Did other company officials turn against the governors and did these officials' critical reports play a role in the governors' dismissals? Could local society influence the decision-making on tenure? Chapter six asks these questions for Johan Maurits, while chapter seven asks them for Rijckloff van Goens. Finally, the conclusion will connect the two stories by comparing the thematic and conceptual issues underlying the three specific stages in these men's careers. From the careers of the two chosen cases I will distill a number of mechanisms that seem to have played an important role in creating and sustaining their careers. This is also the moment at which to reflect further on the divergent fates of the companies that the two men served. To what extent did different methods of selecting talent for the companies' service lead to the different fates of the companies themselves? Finally, the conclusion will present a number of hypotheses that can be used as tests in future research.

# 1. Of Councils and Companies

*Institutions and Agency in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Empire*

Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh was a doctor who had studied medicine in Leiden and who operated a flourishing practice in the ever-growing city of Amsterdam. However, his occupations stretched beyond mere medicine as he had also been a member of the city's council since 1618 and a director of the West India Company (WIC) since at least 1622, as well as being a member of the Council of State in 1639 and a member of the Delegated States of Holland in 1640-1642, and later being a councilor on Amsterdam's Admiralty board in 1644-1647.<sup>95</sup> On February 1, 1643 he was elected as one of the city's four mayors.<sup>96</sup> This was the second time he had been elected as a mayor – having previously held the same position in 1638 – and his election was a personal triumph. Every year the city's council elected four mayors. Unlike many other cities in the province of Holland, or even the rest of the Republic, the Amsterdam council could decide the elections by itself, without needing to obtain the stadholder's consent. Amsterdam was thus the perfect example of a self-ruling urban republic, where the oligarchy ruled the city in its own best interests and also represented those interests at the higher levels of government. In combining his 'day job' and his positions in various bodies of state, Burgh was in many ways a typical embodiment of the oligarchs who ruled the city – and much of the Republic – in the seventeenth century.

Burgh occupied the mayoralty with three colleagues – Jan Cornelis Geelvinck, Gerbrand Claesz. Pancras and Cornelis de Graeff – and the four new mayors did not lose any time in using their newfound position of power to attempt to exclude a bitter rival from future appointments. On February 6, five days after the election, the council voted to appoint former mayor Andries Bicker to a three-year stint as a member of the Delegated States of Holland in The Hague. This was a narrowly veiled attempt by the mayors to rid themselves of the powerful head of the Bicker faction.<sup>97</sup> The Bicker family had been acquiring ever more power and positions in the city and by putting the patrimonial head of the family in The Hague for three years, and thus excluding him from the Amsterdam mayoralty, the new mayors hoped to break the family's power. This behavior is illustrative of Julia Adams's analysis of patrimonial power in the Dutch Republic in her *Familial State*, as discussed in the Introduction. The new mayors of Amsterdam were at the head of the city's government, which was ultimately ruled by a council consisting of a further thirty-one individuals, as shown in Table 1.

<sup>95</sup> Elias, *De Vroedschap van Amsterdam, deel 1* (N. Israel: Amsterdam 1963, reprint) 327-328.

<sup>96</sup> W. Frijhoff, M. Prak and B. Bakker, *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam: Centrum van de wereld, 1578-1650* (SUN: Amsterdam 2004) 242. Elias, *De vroedschap*, 327-328.

<sup>97</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap* XCII.

**Table 1: Mayors and Council Members in Amsterdam, 1643**

ID	Name	Chartered Company	Occupation	Capital
1	<b>Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh (B)</b>	WIC, 1628,	Doctor	
2	<b>Jan Cornelis Geelvinck (B)</b>		Merchant, ship-owner	150,000
3	<b>Gerbrand Claesz. Pancras (B)</b>		Soap boiler	
4	<b>Cornelis de Graeff (B)</b>	VOC, 1640-1643		227,000
5	Dr. Jan ten Grootenhuys		Merchant	100,000
6	Adriaen Pietersz. Raep		Merchant	
7	Simon Willem van der Does	Noordse Comp., WIC, 1625	Merchant, ship-owner	
8	Antony Oetgens van Waveren			130,000
9	Dr. Andries Bicker	VOC, 1641	Merchant	
10	Dr. Nicolaes Tulp		Doctor	280,000
11	Dr. Gerard Schaep, Lord of Kortenhoef			
12	Willem Backer	VOC, 1640-1643		
13	Diederick Tholinx	VOC, 1625-1643	Merchant	
14	Ernst Roeters		Merchant	
15	Pieter Hasselaer Pietersz.	VOC, 1641		
16	Hendrick Reynst	VOC, 1636		
17	Simon de Rijck	VOC, 1625-1643	Merchant	380,000
18	Joan Huydecoper			
19	Allard Cloeck		Merchant	170,000
20	Hendrick Dircksz. Spiegel	VOC, 1659	Soap boiler	
21	Jan Claesz. van Vlooswijck		Merchant	320,000
22	Dr. Frans Banningh Cocq		Lawyer	200,000
23	Mr. Hercules Roch		Lawyer	
24	Wouter Valckenier			
25	Dr. Albert Bas	WIC, 1645	Lawyer	180,000
26	Mr. Gerard Schaep, Pietersz.			
27	Albert Dircksz. Pater	WIC, 1645	Brewer	
28	Mr. Joris Jorisz. Backer	VOC, 1647		
29	Jacob Willekens			
30	Cornelis Jacobsz. Wever			
31	Franck van der Meer			
32	Jacob Claesz. Van Harencaspel	Noordse Comp.		
33	Mr. Wilhelm van Ruytenburgh			
34	Cornelis Witsen	WIC, 1645	Merchant	
35	Roelof Bicker	VOC, 1647		

Source: Elias, *De Vroedschap van Amsterdam, deel 1*, 327-435. The mayors (or burgomasters) in 1643 are shown at the top of the list, with (B) after their names.

Some of the individuals in this list are well known even today: Frans Banningh Cocq, for example, is the main protagonist in Rembrandt's *Nachtwacht*. Likewise, Nicolaes Tulp was

immortalized in Rembrandt's painting of one of his anatomical lessons. Cornelis Witsen had a rather different relationship with the famous painter as it was his demand for repayment of a loan in 1658 that caused Rembrandt's bankruptcy. Burgh meanwhile had had himself immortalized by Thomas de Keyser in his previous role as burgomaster. This was in 1638, when Queen Maria de' Medici visited Amsterdam on the first royal visit to the city, and the four burgomasters regarded the moment as important enough to have it preserved in paint.

**Figure 1:** Thomas de Keyser, *The Four Burgomasters of Amsterdam Learning of the Arrival of Maria de' Medici on September 1, 1638*



Source: Mauritshuis, inv. no. 78. Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh is shown third from the left.

As Table 1 begins to make clear, the members of the Amsterdam city council were not full-time politicians. Besides their roles in civic government, they had 'day jobs' as lawyers, doctors, merchants, ship-owners or soap boilers. They also sat on the boards of directors of the chartered trading and whaling companies. Additionally, albeit not shown in the table, they also combined their day jobs and their roles in the municipal administration and in the local chambers of the companies with positions in provincial and national government. As such, this group of individuals is perfect for the purposes of this chapter: to explain the constitutional structure of the Republic and the relationship between these companies and the state, and to illustrate the interconnectedness of personal and familial agency with these institutional arrangements. This chapter thus seeks to set out a baseline for the reader by describing the institutional arrangements of the Dutch state at its various levels of government in Europe, and the relationship between the state and the chartered companies. However, focusing on these institutional arrangements without integrating a perspective of individual and group agency would lead to a fragmented view



of the early modern Dutch empire. In practice, the disparate and institutionally distinct parts were closely tied together through the personal interests of the individuals who managed them. Thus, while the chartered companies were, formally speaking, organizationally distinct from the admiralty boards and the urban magistracies, they were, in reality, closely connected, given that the same individuals who held sway in the one would often govern the other. Like board interlocks between modern companies, ideas, experiences and strategies, as well as personal antagonisms and familial rivalries, could thus spread between these overlapping parts of the Dutch state and trading companies. This supports the argument that decision-making within these companies and the composition of their boards should be analyzed more from the perspective of (patrimonial) politics than from commerce. This chapter will thus make the case for the existence of a closely interconnected colonial elite with interests in ventures in both East and West and, by consequence, an early modern Dutch colonial empire. At each point of description, various members of the 1643 council of Amsterdam will be presented as examples of how these interlocks could work in practice. The year 1643 has been chosen somewhat randomly; it represents the last full year of Johan Maurits in Brazil, and was also a year in which Rijckloff van Goens progressed to the rank of merchant in the Dutch East India Company (VOC). It was thus a year in which the political composition of the Amsterdam board would have been of consequence to both their careers. Another reason for choosing 1643 was because of the figure of Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh, who had nominated Johan Maurits for the position of Governor-General in Brazil some seven years before.<sup>98</sup> The choice to follow the individuals in the Amsterdam council was inspired not merely by the city's great importance in the Republic, which is sometimes overstated, but also by the fact that Johan Engelbert Elias's seminal work on the council of Amsterdam means it is feasible to do this exercise for Amsterdam, but not for other cities.

This chapter will proceed to examine the structure of the Dutch state from the ground up, starting at the level of the urban and rural administrations, before progressing to the level of the holders of nominal sovereignty or, in other words, the provinces. The Generality and its offices will be examined next, thus setting the stage for a transfer of focus from the Generality to the companies that it chartered. These companies then take us full circle as the examination of their chambers, investors and directors will return us to the level of the cities, which is where this chapter began.

### **Urban politics: parties, factions and family networks**

The creation of a new state in the Northern Netherlands from the 1570s onwards centered in many ways on the urban administrations. At the time, Holland and Zeeland, which were at the heart of the new state, were among the most urbanized parts of Europe. In this new state, a product of resistance to central government, as much power as was feasible was devolved to the city governments, and in the countryside to the nobility and rural councils. Cities were central to the Republic, so much so that Marjolein 't Hart has dubbed it 'a state of fifty-eight cities'.<sup>99</sup> This section will briefly examine day-to-day politics and governance in the cities of the Republic. Drawing from the example of the Amsterdam council of 1643, I will show how individuals were shaped by this institutional mold and how their actions impacted on the institutions. Although

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<sup>98</sup> A point that will be elaborated in chapter two.

<sup>99</sup> M. 't Hart, 'Cities and statemaking in the Dutch Republic', *Theory and Society*, 18:5 (1989) 663-687, 666.

most attention will be devoted to the cities in the west of the country, some examples will be given from city administrations in the east and north so as to show how these administrations differed.

In principle, most cities in the Republic ruled themselves, in effect forming small, self-governing republics. As in the case of Amsterdam in 1643, the burgomasters formed the core of the daily administration. These individuals were chosen by the members of the *vroedschap* or *raad*, for which the English word ‘council’ is the closest approximation. Membership of the council could thus ensure access to the reigns of municipal power. Though membership of the council was itself unpaid, it signified accession to the city’s elite and could allow election to the mayoralty or other lucrative positions, such as the admiralty boards, which would in turn anchor the members’ powers of patronage. The number of councilors varied from city to city: in 1643 Amsterdam had thirty-six, while Leiden had forty, as did Hoorn. Zierikzee in Zeeland had a different arrangement, whereby forty-three positions were held mostly by thirty individuals.<sup>100</sup> Since the council and burgomasters often appointed civic leaders such as the captains of the militia, leaders of the guilds and the *schepenen* (aldermen), a position on the council was a lucrative opportunity to extend the reach of one’s patronage. A position as a burgomaster was even more lucrative from a social capital perspective. In cities with four mayors, each of the four would have a three-month period of the year during which he could appoint individuals to civic positions that became available during that period. In this way, a mayor such as Burgh could use this position to ensure that his clientelage obtained civic positions, thus further cementing his role at the head of these networks. Unsurprisingly, many individuals served as mayor for multiple consecutive periods.<sup>101</sup> Lastly, council members had a role in assigning public works to contractors.<sup>102</sup> The *schepenen* were not necessarily members of the council, although they could be. The *schout* was often a son of a council member and would later ascend to the council himself. In 1643, the *schout* was Joan van Waveren, Lord of Waveren, Botshol and Ruige Wilnis, and the son of council member Antony van Waveren (number eight in Table 1). Joan himself became a council member in 1659.<sup>103</sup> There were more familial connections within the council itself: Roelof Bicker was a younger cousin of Andries Bicker and the same familial relation existed between Gerard Schaep, Pietersz. and Gerard Schaep.

Although positions on the council were not formally hereditary, the members of the council co-opted their own members in the event of a vacancy. These were moments of intense factional struggle, with the outcome of votes for new members serving to identify whether old alliances stood firm and could guarantee the continuity of their influence. Even within the tightly-knit familial networks, however, continuation of old alliances was not a given. This was because networks were highly personal, and discord over issues such as religion or the division of an inheritance could create rifts in long-established networks.<sup>104</sup> Coenraed Burgh’s abandonment of

<sup>100</sup> M. Prak, *Gezeten burgers: de elite in een Hollandse stad, Leiden 1700-1780* (De Bataafsche Leeuw: Amsterdam, 1985) 30-31; H. van Dijk and D.J. Roorda, *Het patriciaat van Zierikzee tijdens de republiek* (Koninklijk Zeeuws Genootschap der Wetenschappen: Middelburg 1979) 4-5.

<sup>101</sup> P. Bourdieu, ‘Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital’, in: R. Kreckel (ed.) *Soziale Ungleichheiten (Soziale Welt Sonderband 2)* (Göttingen 1983) 183-198, 191-195.

<sup>102</sup> L. Kooijmans, *Onder regenten: de elite in een Hollandse stad, Hoorn 1700-1780* (De Bataafsche Leeuw: Amsterdam 1985) 29-31.

<sup>103</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam, deel 1*, 509.

<sup>104</sup> Kooijmans illustrates this with the example from the Della Faille family. Of the five sons in the Della Faille household, only Marten remained a Roman Catholic and was thus appointed as his father’s successor at the head of the family business. This was unusual since he was not the eldest son. Kooijmans, *Vriendschap*, 9-10.



the Pauw faction in the 1620s is an example of how networks were not set in stone and of how the individual ideas and preferences of members could make or break them.

In contrast to Amsterdam, some cities could not decide their mayoral or council elections by themselves, but instead had to propose two or sometimes three options to the stadholder or, in the case of Veere and Vlissingen, to the first nobleman of Zeeland, who was also the stadholder.<sup>105</sup> It was only in 1618, 1650 and 1672 that the stadholder in Amsterdam could exert any real influence on the composition of the council. In Holland, the guilds and the urban militias did not have a real vote in urban politics after a 1581 ruling by the States of Holland forbade the councils from seeking the advice and consent of these bodies.<sup>106</sup> In the eastern provinces, a second council (*Gezworen Gemeente*) represented the militias and the guilds, who were elected by their members. Although this *Gezworen Gemeente* elected the mayors from among the council members, intermarriage and patronage meant that the members of the *Gezworen Gemeente* came to be included in the regent classes and so no longer acted as a check on regents' power.<sup>107</sup> Access to urban councils was restricted to the wealthy and well-connected, although even individuals of comparatively humble origins could be included among the regents if they played their cards right. Frans Banningh Cocq, for example, was the son of an apothecary clerk, but rose to the dignity of burgomaster. D.J. Roorda has stressed the importance of well-chosen marriages for this kind of social rise.<sup>108</sup>

### **The provinces: building blocks of the federal state**

In the new state formed after the rebellion against the Habsburg overlord of the Netherlands, sovereignty rested with the provinces, at least nominally. The Provincial States took over all the positions and dignities that had previously been part of the sovereign powers of the Habsburgs in their roles as counts, dukes and so on of the separate provinces. The Provincial States were thus crucial meeting places for discussing the interests and concerns of the cities and rural areas in each province. Issues could either be decided and enacted at a provincial level, or passed on to the Generality for debate among all allies. Certain cities in each province had acquired a vote in their Provincial States, although the exact value of this vote varied from one region to another. In the case of Holland – or, formally, *Holland and West-Friesland* – there were eighteen cities that each cast a single vote in the Provincial States. The nineteenth vote was cast by the delegates of the province's nobility, who were expected to speak on behalf of rural areas, villages and cities without voting rights. The cities with voting rights are shown in Figure 2. It is important to note that Amsterdam's vote was only one among nineteen. To maintain a favorable balance of power in the Provincial States, it was thus in the interests of the Amsterdam regents to form alliances with like-minded regents in other cities. These alliances were often reinforced by marriage ties and regularly assumed a particular party-political affiliation.

Cities could also appoint some of their own representatives to positions in the provincial government. The provinces had a number of important duties, with the first of these being the task of raising capital to pay for expenditure at a general level. Although they often referred the practical side of the matter to the cities or areas of the province, the Provincial States was where

<sup>105</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (corrected edition, Oxford and New York 1998), 488.

<sup>106</sup> De Nijs and Beukers (eds.), *Geschiedenis van Holland*, 25.

<sup>107</sup> Ibidem, 127-128.

<sup>108</sup> D.J. Roorda. 'Eeuw tegen eeuw', in: D.J. Roorda and A.J.C.M. Gabriëls (ed.), *Rond prins en patriciaat: Verspreide opstellen door D.J. Roorda* (Fibula-Van Dishoeck: Weesp 1984) 54-67, 56, 65.

the internal division of this tax burden was negotiated. Rather than being contributed to a general fund, funds for the army were allocated to units specifically put on the provincial repartition. Often, the Provincial States could appoint or propose officers for the units on its repartition. The provinces also had a number of executive roles, including in infrastructural works and some important fortresses or naval ports that were the responsibility of the provincial authorities. These provincial appointments were also well represented in the Amsterdam council of 1643. Coenraetsz. Burgh himself had served as a delegated councilor of the States of Holland in 1640-1642. This delegated council formed the day-to-day government of the province in the periods when the full States was not in session. Burgh also served in the provincial body that oversaw the pilotage and fire beacons for the benefit of navigation.<sup>109</sup> Altogether, there were five individuals in the Amsterdam council of 1643 who served, had served or would in future serve on the delegated council of the province of Holland. Their number included the disgruntled Andries Bicker, who had most definitely not sought the position. Besides Burgh, Cornelis Witsen also served on the committee for fire beacons. Interestingly, the two members of the Schaep family both served in the provincial accounting office, Dr. Gerard Schaep from 1631 to 1633, and Gerard Schaep Pietersz. from 1647 to 1649. The regents of Amsterdam could thus play important roles in the provincial government, alongside their roles in the municipal government. There were, however, some important provincial offices that were beyond their reach, including most notably that of the *landsadvocaat*, later *raadspensionaris*, who was officially the secretary of the meeting of the Holland nobility (the *ridderschap*), but also Holland's deputation to the States-General. The nobility, incidentally, also co-opted its own members, much like the city councils.<sup>110</sup> The *raadspensionaris* was also responsible for compiling the minutes of the meetings of the States of Holland. This combination made it a potentially highly powerful position, certainly if the occupant could back up this power by access to the right networks. This was evident in the case of Johan de Witt, who was able to acquire the support of the powerful Bicker family in Amsterdam by marrying Wendela Bicker.<sup>111</sup>

The members of the Amsterdam council of 1643 were certainly important for the administration of the province, as indeed Amsterdam was important to Holland. But this importance should not be overstated. Marjolein 't Hart expressed it as follows: '*However, though still significant, Amsterdam's share was less than is assumed usually. Amsterdam, too, needed the cooperation of other major cities, or could be checked by a coalition of other cities in Holland.*'<sup>112</sup> This need for cooperation made it highly important to forge alliances of like-minded city magistracies to push through a certain course of action. Marriages, contracts of correspondence or the forging of party affiliations could all serve this end. The change of one urban magistracy, or even one magistrate, could upend such alliances, however, and thus disrupt the voting balance in the entire States of Holland. The companies could also use this system to their advantage, for example to lobby for a favorable vote among the cities.<sup>113</sup> The level of the province was also where some individuals went for support for their

<sup>109</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap*, 327.

<sup>110</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 279.

<sup>111</sup> H.H. Rowen, *John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625-1672* (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1978) 100-101.

<sup>112</sup> M. 't Hart, 'Cities and statemaking in the Dutch Republic, 1580-1680', *Theory and Society* 18:5 (1989) 663-687, 677.

<sup>113</sup> An example of this is shown in the minutes of the Dutch West Indies Company in Amsterdam from February 1635, when two directors were sent to Purmerend, Edam and Monnikendam to further the company's cause. On this occasion they received a positive reply. NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01 inv. no. 14.

business enterprises by seeking provincial monopolies or patents, for example.<sup>114</sup> The province could also support or legitimize organizations representing the interests of a particular branch of the economy. Throughout the 1570s and 1580s, for example, Holland supported the newly founded *College van de grote visserij en baringvaart in Holland en West-Friesland* (committee for the great fisheries and herring fisheries in Holland and West-Friesland) by authorizing it to issue such statutes and rules as it found necessary to promote and protect the fisheries.<sup>115</sup> This willingness to transfer authority over certain branches of economic life to specific supra-local organizations will be encountered again, when we consider the founding of the chartered trading companies. Brielle, Schiedam, Rotterdam, Delft and Enkhuizen could each appoint deputies to the meeting of the committee. These were places where the herring fisheries were of great economic significance, and which enjoyed voting rights in the Provincial States (by reason of which Vlaardingen and Zwartewaal were excluded). Since Amsterdam did not have these rights, there were no entanglements between the members of the 1643 council and the fisheries committee.

Similar patterns of provincial organization prevailed in most other provinces, albeit with some important variations. In Zeeland, the composition of the Provincial States changed quite dramatically as a result of the revolt against the Habsburgs, who had privileged Middelburg over the other cities in the province. In the old States, each of the cities, the first noble and the abbot of the abbey in Middelburg had a vote in the States.<sup>116</sup> After the revolt, however, the first noble, in the form of the stadholder, retained a vote, but this was now only one of seven votes, with the others being given to the cities of Middelburg, Goes, Tholen, Zierikzee, Vlissingen and Veere. Nevertheless, the first noble of Zeeland, always a Nassau stadholder, had considerable power within the cities of Vlissingen and Veere as, in these cities, he was allowed to choose the members of the council. As in Holland, a committee of *Gecommitteerde Raden* was instated for day-to-day management and to prepare the meetings of the full States.<sup>117</sup> Additionally, as in Holland, the years 1618 and 1672 saw an increase in the stadholder's influence on the composition of the urban councils, with the stadholder acquiring the right to elect new members from a list of three candidates.

As a former Duchy, Gelderland was formally the first in rank among the United Provinces, and also illustrates the first important variation on the theme of a meeting of the States with *Gecommitteerde Raden* for day-to-day management. Whereas the Duchy of Gelders was formerly divided into four parts, the province of Gelderland was divided into three administrative districts or quarters: the Quarter of Nijmegen, the Quarter of Veluwe (with Arnhem as its seat) and the Quarter of Zutphen. The fourth part of the old Duchy, Upper Gelders, was located on the Meuse around the cities of Roermond and Geldern. This part remained Spanish after the revolt and so was not associated with the Republic, although the province of Gelderland advocated vociferously for its annexation. The quarters of Gelderland were jointly ruled by the nobility and the cities, each having three votes.<sup>118</sup> The three quarters met at the *landdagen*, where

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<sup>114</sup> The relevant Dutch terms are *octrooi* and *patent*. These could either be given for an invention, such as the late-sixteenth-century invention of the wind-powered sawmill, for which its inventor was granted a patent for several years, or for certain trades, or even for a provincial monopoly on the printing of certain popular books or atlases.

<sup>115</sup> A.P. van Vliet, *Visserij en kapers: De zeevisserij vanuit het Maasmondgebied en de Duinkerker kapers (ca. 1580-1648)* (Stichting Hollandse Historische Reeks: The Hague 1994) 35-38.

<sup>116</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 280. R. Fruin and H.T. Colenbrander, *Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot den val der Republiek* (second revised edition, The Hague 1922) 241-243.

<sup>117</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 281.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibidem*, 283.

the positions the province would take in The Hague were discussed. The internal structure of the province changed after 1672, when the stadholder achieved a greater degree of control by being able to choose the urban magistrates from the usual lists of three candidates.

The only province where the church maintained a vote after the revolt was Utrecht. Although the old chapters of the Catholic church in Utrecht were reformed, they retained a say in the States. After being nominated by the city of Utrecht, the province's delegates were chosen by the smaller cities and the nobility, with the stadholder's consent, and then appointed for life.<sup>119</sup> The second group in the States was the nobility. To be admitted into the nobility, an individual needed to be from the province, of noble descent and in possession of a *ridderhofstad*, a knightly estate. These estates were listed in 1536, when there were considered to be fifty-five such places, a number that increased slightly in later years.<sup>120</sup> The nobility itself elected suitable new members if and when necessary. During the seventeenth century a network of relations came into existence between various noble families from Utrecht, notably the Van Reedes, and factions within the Amsterdam city council. The Van Reede family provided important support for Stadholder William III when Utrecht was readmitted into the Union in 1676. The third vote in the States was formed by the cities, specifically Utrecht and the smaller cities of Amersfoort, Rhenen, Wijk bij Duurstede and Montfoort. In this process of readmission, the stadholder acquired more rights to choose regents from the usual lists of three suggestions.<sup>121</sup>

Early in the revolt Overijssel was a war zone, and this hampered the setting-up of a comprehensive provincial government. Ultimately a combination of Provincial States with Delegated States (comparable with the *Gecommitteerde Raden*) was set up. Votes were divided between the nobility from the three parts of the province, on the one hand, and the three major cities (Deventer, Zwolle and Kampen) voting together, on the other.<sup>122</sup> After 1672, the stadholder acquired the right to choose the urban magistrates, like in Gelderland and Utrecht.

The biggest variation on the theme of provincial government was in Friesland, which had been a 'free lordship' in the later Middle Ages, lacking a single sovereign head. With the revolt, the *Hof* (court) that had been established by the Habsburgs lost power. This power reverted to the rural areas, which were divided into thirty administrative blocks called *Grietenijen*. Through local elections, each *Grietenij* would send two delegates to the meeting of the quarter in which it was located.<sup>123</sup> After the revolt, the province was divided into four administrative 'quarters'; three rural regions represented through the *Grietmannen* Oostergo, Westergo and Zevenwolden, and the eleven cities that together acted as one (see Figure 2).<sup>124</sup> Each quarter cast one vote in the full meeting of the Provincial States.<sup>125</sup> Executive power rested in the Delegated States, organized along the lines of the Holland model. Here, the cities had one third of the votes in reflection of their share of the province's population.<sup>126</sup> The *Grietenij* system changed in 1640, when it was decided to attach votes in local elections to ownership of certain farms. Although this was an

<sup>119</sup> R. Fruin and H.T. Colenbrander, *Geschiedenis der staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot den val der Republiek* (Nijhoff: The Hague 1901) 244-245.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibidem*, 245.

<sup>121</sup> S.J. Fockema Andreae, *De Nederlandse staat onder de republiek* (Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij: Amsterdam 1961) 57.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibidem*, 62.

<sup>123</sup> Fruin, *Geschiedenis der staatsinstellingen*, 248-250.

<sup>124</sup> The eleven cities were Leeuwarden, Dokkum, Franeker, Harlingen, Bolsward, Sneek, Stavoren, Sloten, Workum, IJlst and Hindeloopen.

<sup>125</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 281-282.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibidem*, 282.

attempt to combat corruption in these elections, it had as an unintended consequence the fact that one individual could cast multiple votes if he owned more of the listed farms. This ultimately advanced the creation of a closed political oligarchy.<sup>127</sup> The influence of the rural *Grietmannen* in affairs touching upon overseas trade is revealed by the charter granted by the Provincial States of Friesland in 1642 for the creation of a Frisian East India Company. The men named as the beneficiaries of the charter were predominantly *Grietmannen*, rather than merchants.<sup>128</sup> Finally, Stad en Lande (literally: city and countryside, and sometimes also referred to as Groningen) would occasionally clash with Friesland over dominance among the northern provinces. As a province, Stad en Lande was a new construct that was devised in 1595 after the successful reduction of the city of Groningen in the preceding year. The new province was a construct comprising the formerly pro-Spanish Drenthe city of Groningen and its lands to the east and the (predominantly Frisian) countryside to the north, which had sided with the Republic. In the new Provincial States, each part could cast one vote and so hold the other in balance.

The provinces of the Dutch Republic thus varied in their internal organization. In all the provinces, however, the meetings of the Provincial States (also called *landdagen* in some provinces) served as a platform where local concerns and interests were voiced and negotiated. In some cases, the provinces could take action themselves by offering provincial charters or monopolies, or lending provincial support to organizations that represented the interests of a particular branch of the economy, as in the case of the *College van de grote visserij* in Holland.<sup>129</sup> This latter organization was also of interest as it resembled, in some ways, the transfer of specific authority from the (in this case, provincial) government to a supra-regional body representing a specific set of interests. In short, therefore, the kind of arrangement clearly seen in the chartering of the trading companies, though this took place at the level of the Generality.

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<sup>127</sup> Fruin, *Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen*, 249.

<sup>128</sup> A manuscript version of the charter is kept in the National Archives in The Hague: NL-HaNA 1.01.02, States-General, inv. no. 12563-22.

<sup>129</sup> A.P. van Vliet, *Visserij en kapers: De zeevisserij vanuit het Maasmondgebied en de Duinkerker kapers (ca. 1580-1648)* (Stichting Hollandse Historische Reeks: The Hague 1994) 34-38.



Figure 2: Political map of the Republic in its borders of 1621



Source: Erik Odegard, 2015.

### The Generality

The individual provinces came together in the meetings of the States-General, from which the Dutch central government derived its name: *the Generality*. In many ways the meetings of the States-General replicated the role of the Provincial States. Instead, however, of individual cities and the nobility casting votes, each province had a vote. In theory, if not in practice, each province had an equal vote. But Holland could at times use its large contribution to the Generality budget to force the other provinces to adhere to its views. This budget was used mainly for two things: paying the armed forces and paying the interest on accumulated debts.<sup>130</sup> Most of the decisions taken at the level of the Generality had thus to do with warfare or diplomacy in one way or another. This meant that Holland, which contributed almost sixty

<sup>130</sup> J.L. Price, 'A State Dedicated to War? The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century', in: A. Ayton and J.L. Price, *The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (London and New York 1998)183-200, 190. Price quotes figures gathered by M. 't Hart.

per cent of funds to the Generality, had a strong position in the federal government of the Republic.<sup>131</sup> Indeed, authors have claimed that the province of Holland was in competition with the Generality because a weak Generality meant that the Provincial States had more freedom to set their own course of action. This point of view has been criticized as Holland stood to profit, no less than the others, from effective governance at the level of the Generality.<sup>132</sup> Although decisions on spending were taken by a majority vote in the States-General, the Generality did not enjoy independent rights of taxation. Instead, money to fund agreed expenditure was raised by the individual provinces as they saw fit. The provinces often delegated the matter to cities and other local administrations. This placed considerable power in the hands of bodies, such as the Amsterdam council of 1643, which were responsible for raising ‘the sinews of war’ that would pay for the Republic’s fleets, armies and diplomatic efforts.

These diplomatic efforts were also actively pursued by the members of the Amsterdam council. Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh himself, for example, died in Novgorod in 1647 during his second diplomatic mission to the Court of the Tsar of Muscovy, while having also gone on a diplomatic mission to Denmark in 1639. Besides Burgh, at least four other individuals who had a seat on the Amsterdam council in 1643 undertook diplomatic missions during their careers in the municipal government. The most active in this regard was Andries Bicker, the man banished to the States of Holland in 1643. Two years before, when he was still a mayor, he had undertaken a diplomatic mission to Denmark, Sweden and Poland. Indeed, most of the diplomatic missions undertaken by the Amsterdam council members were to one or more of the Baltic powers. The balance of power in the Baltic was of great importance to the grain trade, which was a cornerstone of Amsterdam’s welfare. The city had thus acquired the right to appoint one of its own as a diplomat when missions to Baltic states were undertaken. This delegation of foreign affairs was not unique to Amsterdam: in the negotiations with England after the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-1674), the VOC was allowed to send a number of its directors to the peace conference as negotiators to ensure the company’s interests were not compromised.<sup>133</sup>

Three members of the Amsterdam council of 1643 also served as delegates to the States-General for Holland at some point in their career, with Andries Bicker taking on this role in 1646-1648, for example. The other important body in the Generality was the Council of State, which oversaw the organization of the army and the fortifications. Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh served on the Council of State in 1643, while Gerard Schaeap, Lord of Kortenhoef, did so in the late 1650s. Service on the Council of State would have brought Burgh into regular contact with Frederik Hendrik, the stadholder and perhaps the single most powerful ‘servant’ of the Generality. Indeed, the 1640s and 1650s were a period when the stadholder’s position in the Dutch political constellation was heavily debated.

### *The Stadholders*

In Habsburg times, the stadholders (literally ‘place-holders’) had been the lord’s representatives in a province when the lord himself was absent. Thus the office should have disappeared with the abjuration of Philip, and the shift of sovereignty to the individual States. This did not happen, however. Instead, the office changed its role and character, and became a prerogative of two

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<sup>131</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 286.

<sup>132</sup> See criticism in: J.C. Boogman, ‘The Union of Utrecht: its genesis and consequences’, *BMGN* 94:3 (1979), 399-400.

<sup>133</sup> Van Dam, *Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, eerste boek, deel 1* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1927) 221.

branches of the Nassau family. In this way, the stadholders provided a courtly aspect in the otherwise strictly republican state. Strictly speaking, the stadholders were appointed by the provinces. As such, there was never just one stadholder for the entire Republic. The phrase ‘stadholderless period’ (as used to describe the period 1650-1672) applies to all provinces except Friesland, which always appointed stadholders from a different branch of the Nassau family than Holland. The ‘western’ stadholder also always held another important office: Captain-General of the army and Admiral-General of the fleet. Although the stadholder rarely ventured out to sea, effective command of the army rested with him. A successful strategist could therefore reinforce his position in the Republic through military victories. The successes of Frederik Hendrik (1584-1647) in the 1620s and 1630s allowed him to make the office of stadholder more royal in pretensions, despite his keeping a considerably smaller court than even minor German electors.<sup>134</sup> The marriage of Frederik Hendrik’s son William II (1626-1650) to the English princess Mary Stuart underlines these semi-royal aspirations. In diplomatic contacts outside Europe, the stadholder was sometimes presented as a royal head of state in order to facilitate diplomatic relations.<sup>135</sup> The stadholders obviously also tried to use their positions of privilege and patronage to further their own familial interests. Their ultimate aim can perhaps be regarded as a wish to achieve a fully hereditary status of the stadholdership and formalization of the semi-monarchical status, an aim that was not achieved until 1813, with the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. To further these goals the stadholders had a potentially valuable and powerful network of patronage relations at their disposal. As we have seen, the stadholders could select members for appointment to the urban councils. They could also support specific factions within city councils. Burgh himself had been installed in 1618 after the intervention of stadholder Maurits (1567-1625), although in this case the appointment did not result in long-term loyalty to the Orangist, counter-remonstrant cause. In addition, as senior field commanders, the stadholders had a decisive say in the appointment of army officers, especially during campaigns. Another valuable patronage tool was the right to appoint commanders of important fortresses. Through their scattered holdings across the Republic, the stadholders could also grant honorable and rewarding positions in places such as Breda, Zeeland (Veere and Vlissingen) and Lingen. The court of the stadholder presented opportunities for patronage as well.<sup>136</sup> The social chess game surrounding appointments becomes all too clear from the diaries of the Frisian stadholder Willem Frederik (1613-1664), who mentioned, for example, that when asked for favors or appointments, he always made the situation seem much more difficult than it actually was. This was meant to induce gratitude in the client and thus ensure the reciprocity that was the foundation of the patron-client relationship.<sup>137</sup> In contrast to other European powers, the stadholders, representing the monarchical element in the *respublica mixta* of the Republic, often had good relations with the various boards of nobility in the provinces.<sup>138</sup> Nobles stood to gain influence on the Generality if they could gain the trust and ear of a strong stadholder. The

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<sup>134</sup> J. Duindam, ‘Tussen tafellaken en servet: Het stadhouderlijk hof in dynastiek Europa’, *BMGN, Low Countries Historical Review* 124:4 (2009) 536-558, 546-547.

<sup>135</sup> M. Meuwese, ‘The States General and the Stadholder: Dutch Diplomatic Practices in the Atlantic World before the West India Company’, *Journal of Early American History* 3 (2013) 43-58.

<sup>136</sup> J. Duindam, ‘Tussen tafellaken en servet: Het stadhouderlijk hof in dynastiek Europa’, *BMGN* 124:4 (2009) 536-558, 549-551.

<sup>137</sup> G.H. Janssen, *Creaturen van de macht: Patronage bij Willem Frederik van Nassau (1613-1664)* (Amsterdam 2005) 11.

<sup>138</sup> For the term *respublica mixta*, see J.D. Tracy, *The Founding of the Dutch Republic: War, Finance, and Politics in Holland 1572-1588* (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) LXI-LXVIII.

Van Reede family, for example, succeeded in doing this after 1672: Johan van Reede van Renswoude became a chief advisor of William III (1650-1702) in the 1670s, and in 1676 announced Utrecht's readmission to the Union from the steps of the Utrecht city hall. In 1688 Godard Adriaan van Reede-Ginkel, from another branch of this large family, followed William to England and was entrusted with military command in Ireland. Success there meant naturalization and ennoblement in England as the first Earl of Athlone. Van Reede-Ginkel was able to combine roles in his native Utrecht with military commands in Flanders and his position as a nobleman in England, which is clear testimony to the value of being a client to a mighty stadholder-king such as William III.

The events of 1672 and the conditions stipulated for the readmission of Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel to the Union considerably reinforced the position of the stadholder. Especially in the three readmitted land provinces, the stadholder's influence was lastingly strengthened, whereas William III encountered difficulties with opposing urban regents in Holland and Zeeland as early as 1673.<sup>139</sup> The army could become a bone of contention between the stadholder, who had an interest in creating a large army whose victories would reflect well on its commander and which would extend his powers of patronage, and the cities that would in large part be required to pay for this army. This issue became especially acute during the 1640s, when it became apparent to many regents in Holland that extending the territory of the Republic would serve only to dilute Holland's weight at the level of the Generality. Thus there existed a conflict of interest between the stadholder and the senior army commanders on the one hand, and the regents of Holland, primarily Amsterdam, on the other. The question of army strength and size will surely have been debated by the council and burgomasters in 1643, although none of these individuals seems to have served on the front as a 'delegate in the field' (the States-General's plenipotentiaries entrusted with advising the army commanders and, where necessary, checking their actions). By contrast, the council of 1643 was very deeply involved in the running of the navy.

*Security at sea: admiralties, directories and private companies*

As mentioned earlier, most of the States-General's energy was directed at the business of war, both on land and at sea. While the army was truly an organ of the Generality, commanded by the stadholder, naval administration presents a rather different picture. Providing safety at sea in the face of the onslaught of Habsburg attacks from the southern Netherlands would prove to be a crucial task for the new state if it was to survive. The focus in the initial phases of the revolt lay on securing Dutch coastal waters. Spain lost control of these waters after the Battle on the Zuiderzee (1573) and the Battle of Bergen op Zoom (1574) and never regained it.<sup>140</sup> This initial period was of great importance as it had a formative effect on the creation of naval institutions in the Republic. Because of the divisions within the nascent Dutch state in these formative years, the single admiralty of the Habsburg lands, established at Veere (whose warehouses and stocks were captured by the rebels early in the revolt), gave way to a much more complicated organization.<sup>141</sup> The localized character of the early years of warfare and the broken connections between the maritime regions resulted in regional admiralty boards being established in various

<sup>139</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 811.

<sup>140</sup> J.P. Sigmond, *Zeemacht in Holland en Zeeland in de zestiende eeuw* (Verloren: Hilversum 2013) 168-172, 202-207.

<sup>141</sup> For the Habsburg admiralty in Veere, see L. Sicking, *Neptune and the Netherlands: State, Economy and War at Sea in the Renaissance* (Brill: Leiden and Boston 2004). For Veere as a naval base, see especially 410-419.



regions and provinces. Ultimately, the province of Holland alone had three admiralties, with the admiralty of *De Maze* (the Meuse), headquartered in Rotterdam, representing the cities of the southern quarter of Holland. This was the oldest and most senior admiralty board, and the most senior admirals in the service of the Republic were consequently always appointed by this admiralty and their flagships were invariably built by De Maze. The admiralty of *Het Noorderkwartier* (the Northern Quarter – Holland north of the IJ), headquartered in Hoorn and Enkhuizen, represented the West-Frisian cities. Lastly, the richest and most important admiralty of the three was headquartered in Amsterdam, the only city to have an admiralty board all for itself. Besides these three boards in Holland, the provinces of Zeeland and Friesland also had admiralties of their own.<sup>142</sup> Although these boards were established in specific regions or towns, they were – importantly – instruments of the Generality, not of the individual cities or provinces. Admiralty boards in one region sometimes placed one or more of their members on other boards to check those boards' actions. In the case of the Amsterdam admiralty, members were sent to the Noorderkwartier and Zeeland, with Gerard Schaep Pietersz. being an outside member of the admiralty of Zeeland in 1643, while Jacob Willekens went to the Noorderkwartier.

Table 2 shows the Amsterdam council members' strong representation on the admiralty board located in that city. Indeed, despite the nominal status of the admiralties as general institutions, they were in practice very much integrated in the urban scene of offices and patrimonial politics. The fact that the Amsterdam city council appointed members to the admiralty boards, and naturally chose from within its own circles, has traditionally been seen as a negative aspect of the Dutch admiralty organization as the local elites had no proper sense of 'national interests' and pursued only their local interests, even at the expense of the interests of the Republic at large.<sup>143</sup> There were certainly many instances of infighting between the admiralties, as well as instances where specific boards' objections to general policies were primarily based on their specific regional interests and position. In the 1630s, for example, the Admiralty of Amsterdam led the fight against the 'general rendezvous' in Goedereede for the fleet of ships blockading Dunkirk. The latter initiative was supported by stadholder Frederik Hendrik, who wanted to create an effective operational port for the fleet. Since the provisioning and maintenance of the fleet would be done in Goedereede, the cities risked losing out on the activity generated by having an admiralty yard within their walls.<sup>144</sup> Another example was Amsterdam's resistance to building larger warships, as proposed by Lieutenant-Admiral Tromp during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654), on the grounds that the city was afraid that the larger ships would not be able to enter or exit its difficult port.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> C.T.F. Thurkow, *De Westfriese Admiraliteit* (Fas Frisiae: Enkhuizen 1945), 7-21, gives an interesting political background to the separation between the admiralties of the Noorderkwartier and Amsterdam.

<sup>143</sup> Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (University of South Carolina Press: Columbia, 1990) 5-12.

<sup>144</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 295.

<sup>145</sup> J.E. Elias, *De vlootbouw in Nederland, 1596-1655* (Noord-Hollandsche uitgeverij: Amsterdam 1933) 99-114.



**Table 2: Members of the Admiralty Boards on the Amsterdam Council in 1643**

ID	Name	Admiralty Board
1	<b>Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh (B)</b>	Amsterdam 1644-1647
2	<b>Jan Cornelis Geelvinck (B)</b>	Amsterdam 1642
3	<b>Gerbrand Claesz. Pancras (B)</b>	
4	<b>Cornelis de Graeff (B)</b>	
5	Dr. Jan ten Grootenhuys	
6	Adriaen Pietersz. Raep	Amsterdam 1621-1624, Noorderkwartier 1628-1639
7	Simon Willem van der Does	
8	Antony Oetgens van Waveren	Amsterdam 1652
9	Dr. Andries Bicker	
10	Dr. Nicolaes Tulp	
11	Dr. Gerard Schaep, Lord of Kortenhoef	
12	Willem Backer	
13	Diederick Tholincx	
14	Ernst Roeters	
15	Pieter Hasselaer Pietersz.	Amsterdam 1640-1643
16	Hendrick Reynst	
17	Simon de Rijck	
18	Joan Huydecoper	Amsterdam 1653
19	Allard Cloeck	
20	Hendrick Dircksz. Spiegel	
21	Jan Claesz. van Vlooswijk	
22	Dr. Frans Banningh Cocq	
23	Mr. Hercules Roch	
24	Wouter Valckenier	
25	Dr. Albert Bas	Amsterdam 1648-1649
26	Mr. Gerard Schaep, Pietersz.	Zeeland 1639-1648
27	Albert Dircksz. Pater	
28	Mr. Joris Jorisz. Backer	
29	Jacob Willekens	Noorderkwartier 1639-1648
30	Cornelis Jacobsz. Wever	
31	Franck van der Meer	
32	Jacob Claesz. Van Harencaspel	Noorderkwartier 1648-1649
33	Mr. Wilhelm van Ruytenburgh	
34	Cornelis Witsen	Amsterdam 1654-1657
35	Roelof Bicker	

Source: Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam deel 1*, 327-435.

Jan Glete has recently criticized these views as being overly pessimistic. Although the organization of the Dutch navy was perhaps inefficient from a modern-day perspective, the organization's dispersed, federal nature was, in Glete's view, highly effective in terms of mobilizing resources for naval warfare. The seventeenth-century Dutch fleet was very large compared to the population of the Republic, and this strength was not explained solely by the

wealth of the Republic. Instead, Glete claimed, the localized nature of the Dutch naval organization, coupled with the strong links between the local regents and the admiralty boards, as well as the clear focus on protecting commerce, meant there was a great willingness among the regional elites and the various merchant groups to pay for the navy.<sup>146</sup> In brief, the regents of Amsterdam and the political and economic alliances in the city that they represented were willing to pay taxes to the admiralties because they themselves were responsible for spending these funds, often in their own city and on their own products and services. This meant, according to Glete, that the Republic could mobilize resources relatively efficiently and thus maintain a strong navy. In Glete's terms, the Republic was good at *interest aggregation*: in other words, at aggregating various local and regional interests behind the interests of the Republic as a whole. Rather than trying to explain Dutch naval successes *despite* its dispersed naval organization, Glete sought to attribute these successes specifically *to* this organization.<sup>147</sup> Although this more positive perception can be seen as an important corrective to the overly negative narratives of older historiography, it should not, in itself, be taken too far: though the interest-aggregation argument works well in explaining the willingness of local merchants to pay the customs duties (*convoyen en licenten*) that provided the regular or 'ordinary' cash flow to the admiralty boards, it did not prevent the frequent clashes in the States-General and the Provincial States about the payment of 'extraordinary' subsidies to equip more warships. Until the fall of Dunkirk in 1646, extra money was needed to provide more escorts and cruisers to stave off privateers. After the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War, extraordinary funds were also voted for in order to construct the larger line of battleships required.<sup>148</sup> The naval organization of the Netherlands should thus be judged on its own merits, without falling into the trap of being either too negative or too positive. Although the organization often worked well, it could also fall victim to internecine strife and inertia. Personal ties were of crucial importance in compelling the boards to cooperate effectively. Johan de Witt stands out as the best example of this in that he was able to effectively coordinate action by the admiralty boards because of having contacts in each of them.<sup>149</sup>

The admiralty boards that were part of the apparatus of the Generality were not, however, the only organizations responsible for safeguarding Dutch commerce in 1643. Three other types of organizations were responsible either for specific geographic areas or for convoying specific trades that were not part of the state at all. The *College van de grote visserij*, which has already been mentioned in another setting, acquired the right to commission escorts (*buisconvoyers*) to the fishing fleets during the 1620s. The local branches of the *College* appointed captains and recruited crews, and were made responsible from 1625 for speaking justice in cases concerning the convoys. Earlier, in 1620, the local branches had already acquired the right to rule on all cases involving damage to the fisheries or fishing vessels.<sup>150</sup> Nor was this the only case of

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<sup>146</sup> P. Brandon, *War, Capital and the Dutch State (1588-1795)* (Brill: Leiden and Boston 2015) 62-63; the first and second annexes on pages 323-385 specify the members of the admiralty boards, their positions in the local administration and their connections to the companies.

<sup>147</sup> For the idea of interest aggregation, see J. Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660* (Routledge: London and New York, 2002) 52-54, 154-155, 167-171.

<sup>148</sup> J. Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860, Volume one* (Almqvist and Wiksell International: Stockholm 1993) 153-154.

<sup>149</sup> Being married to Wendela Bicker connected De Witt to the very influential faction led by the Bicker family in Amsterdam, for example.

<sup>150</sup> A. Bijl, *De Nederlandse convooiendienst 1300-1800: De maritieme bescherming van koopvaardij en zeevisserij tegen piraten en oorlogsgevaar in het verleden* (The Hague 1951) 63-71. Regrettably, there appear to be no monographs on the *Grote visserij*

'privatization' of the task of commerce protection. As losses to Dunkirk privateers mounted in the late 1620s, and with the admiralties stretched to provide sufficient escorts, merchants demanded to be allowed to provide escorts of their own. In the cities of Amsterdam, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Edam, Medemblik and Harlingen local *directies* – urban directories – were consequently formed to equip ships to escort the fleets bound for Norway and the Baltic. These were governed by the burgomasters of the relevant towns, together with representatives from the merchant communities. The costs were covered by extra duties imposed on the merchantmen involved. Thus, the lengthy debates and indecision in the States-General were avoided, and money was found to place extra warships in the water when and where they were needed most.<sup>151</sup> These privately held warships could be mobilized for battlefleet actions when necessary, as in 1639 and 1652, but also for expeditions to 'show the flag', as in Witte de With's voyage to Denmark and the Baltic in 1645.<sup>152</sup> These directories were directly controlled by the urban governments of the cities where they were established. This meant that the Generality and, by extension, the stadholder as the nominal head of both the army and the navy did not enjoy a clear monopoly on violence. If conditions so required, cities and boards such as the *College van de grote visserij* were perfectly able and empowered to organize their own naval forces.

The two chartered companies, the VOC and WIC, were the third type of naval organization operating in addition to the admiralties and the private escorts organized by merchant directories and the fisheries board. These companies were made responsible for protecting their own shipping in their respective charter areas, as well as for organizing their own *offensive* fleets. Consequently, many of the WIC's ships, for example, should not be seen primarily as merchantmen, but rather as warships, and sometimes very large ones at that. The Jupiter (see Figure 3), armed with forty guns, was one of the larger and more heavily armed ships at the Battle of the Downs (October 31, 1639).


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that focus on its role as a supplementary admiralty or court of justice. The more recent works on the Dutch herring fisheries are more interested in the ecological history.

<sup>151</sup> Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy*, 27-28.

<sup>152</sup> G.W. Kernkamp, *De sleutels van de Sont: Het aandeel van de Republiek in den Deensch-Zweedschen oorlog van 1644-1645* (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1890) 323-325.

**Figure 3: The *Jupiter*, a WIC ship, flagship of Cornelis ‘peg-leg’ Jol at the Battle of the Downs (1639)**



Source: National Maritime Museum, Greenwich UK, inv. no. PAI7251.

These examples from the realm of warfare at sea show that the Dutch Republic was a state deeply comfortable with the idea of ‘privatizing’ certain tasks that would in other circumstances be considered as traditionally part of the central state. In the Republic, the Generality could not act by itself as it did not fully control the institutions that were responsible for implementing policy. This meant that, in some instances, it was difficult for the Republic to act as a whole. The institutional solution for this problem was to devolve authority downwards to organizations that allied the interests behind certain activities. This was the case both in the *College van de grote visserij* and that of the chartered companies. The remainder of this chapter will examine the Dutch side of these companies’ organization from an explicitly *political* perspective. I will argue that, in the Dutch case, the chartered company was an institutional solution not to the problem of long-distance trade, but to the problem for a federal Republic of exercising political authority overseas.

### Companies and the state; companies of state

Merchants operating from the Northern Netherlands had been trading with Asia since the mid-1590s. The famous *Eerste Schipvaart* (first voyage) of 1595-1597, though unprofitable, proved that the problems of navigating the long voyage could be overcome. This provided the setting for a boom in Dutch-Asiatic shipping. Within a few years, companies active in the Asian trades were operating in or being founded in Amsterdam, Enkhuizen, Hoorn, Delft and Zeeland. This inevitably caused friction as these companies were all active in the same areas and all chasing after the same products. To give an example: Steven van der Hagen, who sailed to the East in 1599 for the Old Company (of Amsterdam), was instructed ‘always to keep in mind, that the Zeelanders are enemies to our work, and should not be trusted lightly.’<sup>153</sup> The reference to ‘the Zeelanders’ probably means the four ships of the Middelburg Company, which had set sail in 1598. In the longer term, this rivalry caused spice prices in the Netherlands to slump, owing to a sharp rise in the quantities supplied. But even before the commercial effects of competition among Dutch firms became apparent, talks had begun in The Hague to see whether a merger of the Asian trading interests could be effected.<sup>154</sup> The prime motivation for achieving a merged company was thus more political than economic. Rather than representing the invention of a new corporate form, as is often argued for the VOC, the chartering of the new company in 1602 was a careful political compromise that placated all the parties interested in the new trade.<sup>155</sup> The Generality’s interest in this new company was its wish to avoid commercial rivalries between cities and provinces spilling over into everyday politics and the risk of disunion in the Republic.

The newly chartered company was also entrusted with looking after its own defense. This served a threefold goal for the Republic. Firstly, the admiralties would not be burdened with protecting the company’s shipping in Asia. Secondly, the future VOC was turned into a self-financing instrument of the global war against the Republic’s Habsburg foe. Thirdly, it meant there was now a reservoir of large, well-armed warships that could be mobilized in times of crisis. Indeed, many of the admiralties’ largest ships were transferred to the new company in the following decades, leaving the admiralties to focus on smaller ships for cruising and escorting in European waters. In this way, the VOC became the Republic’s representative in Asia, and it is worth contemplating what alternative constructions could have looked like. Although direct diplomacy from the Generality would have been possible, the interests in Asia were not spread equally between all provinces, but were instead concentrated in the maritime provinces of Holland and Zeeland. Using the Generality budget to pay for entanglements in Asia could thus have angered the land provinces, which were still at the frontline of the war against Spain. Delegating authority to a self-financing company was thus politically more prudent. This background is confirmed by the internal structures of both the VOC and the WIC, being their cameral organization.

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<sup>153</sup> J. Aalbers, *Rijckloff van Goens. Commissaris en veldoverste der Oost-Indische Compagnie, en zijn arbeidsveld 1653/54 en 1657/58* (Groningen 1916) 3.

<sup>154</sup> J.G. van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de kamer Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Nijhoff: The Hague 1958) 12-13.

<sup>155</sup> Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, 23. Steensgaard, ‘The Dutch East India Company as an Institutional Innovation’, in: M. Aymard (ed.), *Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1982) 235-257, 239.



*Chambers of the companies*

Both companies were organized along lines that will immediately seem familiar from the earlier discussion of the Republic's political organization. Instead of creating a single company centered in a single city, the companies were themselves federal entities, resembling the Republic itself. The VOC was in fact a merger between existing companies that had already sailed to Asia or were in the process of organizing such voyages.<sup>156</sup> The urban interests behind these ventures were protected by establishing a *chamber* in each relevant city: Amsterdam, Middelburg, Rotterdam, Delft, Hoorn and Enkhuizen. Although the 'united company' that was set up in this way did not take over the capital of the previous companies, it did build on the existing infrastructure and know-how by, for example, offering a position in the VOC's ranks of directors to the directors of the existing companies, with their numbers gradually being reduced to the numbers prescribed by the united company's charter. As the charter itself has previously been examined in depth, this will not be repeated here. However, the common assertion that the VOC was the first modern joint-stock company has been criticized by Henk den Heijer as this assertion rests purely on the way that the capital was raised.<sup>157</sup> It is noteworthy, however, that the majority of the stipulations in the VOC charter of 1602 dealt with the organization of the company in the Netherlands.<sup>158</sup> Apparently, organizing intercontinental trade was deemed less cumbersome than ensuring equity between the various trading towns in Holland and Zeeland. The company was organized in 'chambers', each of which had its own shipyards, auctions and directors. The company as a whole thus comprised a joint venture of these chambers. Operating as a single company in one city, as in the case of the East India Company in London, would have been impossible in the Dutch political context. Jan Glete's idea of interest aggregation can be fruitfully applied to the chartering of the VOC. Aggregating sufficient political interests behind the company required allowing multiple cities and regions in Holland and Zeeland to join the new company. In turn, this aggregation of interests protected the Republic's monopoly on trade with Asia, which was a condition for the company to operate as a political and military representative of the whole Republic in Asia.

In the view of Femme Gaastra, the chambers of the VOC can be seen as the executive arm of the company, responsible for fulfilling the orders issued by the central management (the *Heren XVII*, named after the number of directors on this body).<sup>159</sup> This represents an evolution of the original relations between the chambers, as laid down in the charter of 1602. Initially the VOC resembled a loose joint venture of five independent municipal companies. During the first charter period (1602-1623), however, this strong division caused the smaller chambers to encounter liquidity problems and, as a result, the company gradually became a much more coherent whole.<sup>160</sup>

The cameral organization of the WIC followed slightly different lines than the VOC, and this had certain important ramifications. The WIC's organization did not build on previous firms and neither, significantly, did it adopt earlier firms' directors. As a result, it failed to integrate

<sup>156</sup> J.G. van Dillen, *Van rijkdom en regenten: Handboek tot de economische en sociale geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de republiek* (The Hague 1970) 111-122.

<sup>157</sup> H. den Heijer, *De geotrooieerde Compagnie: De VOC en de WIC als voorlopers van de naamloze vennootschap* (Kluwer: Deventer 2005) 213-217.

<sup>158</sup> Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC* (seventh revised edition, Zutphen 2002) 20.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibidem*, 159.

<sup>160</sup> R. Schalk, J. Jonkers and O. Gelderblom, 'Schipperen op de Aziatische vaart: De financiering van de VOC kamer Enkhuizen 1602-1622, *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 127:4 (2012) 3-27.

some of the knowledge and experience of trade and warfare in the Atlantic that was already available in the Republic. The question also arose as to where chambers should be located, with the initial drafts of charters mentioning only four chambers: in Amsterdam, the Noorderkwartier, De Maze and Zeeland.<sup>161</sup> Friesland had been ignored in the creation of the VOC in 1602, and now the province, alongside Stad en Lande, lobbied for the WIC to include a northern chamber. This met resistance from Reinier Pauw, one of the burgomasters of Amsterdam and who also represented that city in the States-General. The weakening of his position in Amsterdam was probably, therefore, the reason for his ultimately consenting to a northern chamber for the WIC, as long as the northerners could muster half a million guilders to fund the company.<sup>162</sup> This set the scene for some northern infighting, the result of which was that the city of Groningen, after raising the necessary capital, was granted the fifth chamber.<sup>163</sup> This was only one of multiple problems faced by the new chambers of the company, and which included fierce infighting in the Noorderkwartier about how shipbuilding should be divided between the participating cities.<sup>164</sup> Similar divisions had to be overcome in the formation of the chambers of Zeeland and de Maze, with the latter having separate sub-chambers in Dordrecht, Delft and Rotterdam. Ironically, since the chamber would later be headquartered in Rotterdam, Dordrecht and Delft contributed more to the chamber.<sup>165</sup>

The question thus arises as to whether Gaastra's observation about the chambers of the VOC in relation to the central management is also true for the WIC. The answer, unambiguously, is 'no'. Rather than drawing closer together over time, as happened with the VOC, the WIC increasingly fractured into its constituent parts: the chambers. This even spilled over into the overseas world, where specific chambers were allocated responsibility for specific colonies. Zeeland administered the Wild Coast and Tobago, and New Amsterdam had exclusive responsibility for managing the possessions in New Netherland, while in 1628 all chambers received exclusive trading rights along the coast of West Africa.<sup>166</sup> This tendency to fracture is also borne out in the archives of the States-General, which contain many complaints from one chamber of the company against one or more others. A good example is the conflict over the distribution of gold from the Gold Coast of Africa in the 1640s.<sup>167</sup> This disagreement centered on the question of whether all the chambers should share in the proceeds from the incoming gold, or only those that had sent the ships to Africa. Amsterdam claimed the gold since it arrived on Amsterdam vessels, but Zeeland disagreed, arguing that Amsterdam had not sent its share of ships to Brazil. This conflict eventually ended up in the Generality's lap as the chambers were unable to resolve it internally.

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<sup>161</sup> Hallema, 'Friesland en de voormalige Compagnieën voor den handel op Oost en West', *West-Indische Gids* XV:1 (1934) 81-96, 89-90.

<sup>162</sup> P.J. van Winter, *De Westindische Compagnie ter kamer Stad en Lande* (The Hague 1978) 6.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibidem*, 7-8.

<sup>164</sup> A. Bick, *Governing the Free Sea: The Dutch West India Company and Commercial Politics, 1618-1645* (unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton 2012) 113.

<sup>165</sup> C. van Lintum, 'De kamer der West-Indische Compagnie te Delft', *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde* 63:1 (1910) 93-108, 99-100.

<sup>166</sup> P. Emmer, 'West India Company', in: L. Blussé and F. Gaastra (eds.) *Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien Régime* (Leiden 1981) 71-96, 78.

<sup>167</sup> HaNa 1.01.02 States-General inv. no. 12564.23, *Extract uit de resoluties van de Staten-Generaal over de verdeling van het goud pas aangekomen uit Guinee*.

**Figure 4: Map of the Dutch Republic showing chamber cities of VOC and WIC and cities with directors**




Source: Erik Odegard, 2015. Based on the description in Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, and Den Heijer, *De geschiedenis van de WIC*. The Republic (1621 borders), showing the cities with a stake in either or both of the chartered companies. Red denotes VOC involvement, while blue denotes WIC involvement. Chamber headquarters are underlined in the respective company colors. Cities with a directorship are connected by colored lines to the chamber headquarters in which they had a seat.

#### *Directors and investors: a colonial elite*

In their procedure for electing directors, the companies were clearly influenced by the way in which appointments to the magistracies of the cities of Holland were made. In the event of a vacancy at the VOC, the remaining directors would propose three new potential candidates. Under the charter, the Provincial States of Holland and Zeeland would then choose a new director from these three; in other words, the same kind of mechanism for nominations in *drietallen* (groups of three) as already seen in the discussions of the urban magistrates. In Holland, this authority was quickly devolved by the States to the magistrates of the cities with a company chamber. In the case of Zeeland, this did not happen until 1646 because the cities of Middelburg,

Veere and Vlissingen were previously in disagreement on how to divide the directorships of the chamber.<sup>168</sup> Ultimately, therefore, city councils were in charge of electing new directors of the companies. This meant that although the institutions of the companies and the city councils were organizationally distinct, in practice they overlapped to a considerable degree. Of the thirty-five identified members of the Amsterdam council of 1643, no fewer than seventeen were directors of the VOC, the WIC or the chartered whaling company at some point in their career. It is interesting to note that the VOC was much better represented among these individuals than the WIC. In 1643, seven members of the council were also VOC directors (orange dots in fig. 5), while only three WIC directors were also members of the council (yellow-green nodes). Two of these directors, Simon Willem van der Does and Jacob Claesz. Van Harencaspel, were also directors of the Noordse Compagnie, the chartered whaling company. It would be worthwhile making these analyses for longer periods to see whether the VOC was consistently much better represented on the Amsterdam council than the WIC.

**Figure 5: Connections between the city council of Amsterdam and the three chartered companies (VOC, WIC and Noordse Compagnie)**



Source: Erik Odegard 2016. Image made with Gephi software. Based on Elias, *De Vroedschap van Amsterdam, deel 1*, passim.

Gaastra has drawn attention to the fact that the company chambers' close associations with the urban elites carried the risk that directors would increasingly be drawn from the ranks of rentier

<sup>168</sup> Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, 31.



regents, instead of active merchants. Various attempts were made to reduce this risk by pledging to appoint merchants at the next possible opportunity.<sup>169</sup> Given, however, the important political ramifications of holding a directorship, these attempts were destined to be futile. Ironically, they were initiated by individuals who themselves owed their positions to their political connections.

However, there was also another risk arising through the close association of company and urban interests. The city councils in the Republic were vulnerable to occasional systemic shocks, as seen in 1618, 1650 and most clearly in 1672-74. City councils were occasionally purged for reasons relating to internal politics of the Republic. The dismissal of council members in the cities could also mean loss of their positions in the companies, or in their subsequent replacement by members of the newly dominant factions. Indeed, the great political upheavals of the seventeenth century greatly affected the composition of the boards, most notably in 1672.<sup>170</sup> The regent elite's close association with the company management, as is apparent from the Amsterdam council of 1643, holds true for other cities as well. In the case of the VOC chamber in Rotterdam, for example, twenty-nine of the forty-eight directors who were appointed between 1602 and 1700 were mayors of the city.<sup>171</sup> This close association between municipal levels of government and the VOC did, of course, create grounds for a range of complaints, as will be made apparent in the section on the *participanten*. The Amsterdam chamber consequently instated a rule in the early 1680s that no more than half of the company's directors were allowed to sit on the city council, and this rule was followed until 1700 at least.<sup>172</sup> Arthur Weststeijn has argued that some in the Republic saw this close association as a threat to the institutions of state, with the company being able to behave as if it were a 'state within a state' and subverting rules for its own benefit.<sup>173</sup> But is also possible that this influence worked in the opposite direction, and so from the city councils to the companies.

The elite composition of the VOC directors also entailed another risk, and specifically the risk of how normal investors could know whether the directors were actually looking after the company properly and not fleecing the investors. The policy of the *Heren XVII* in the early years to plow back all the profits from Asia into the company attracted considerable criticism. This included criticism of the lack of proper dividend payments and the decision not to liquidate the company after ten years, as had been planned in the charter. However, the critics encountered the following problem: all the places they could have turned to with their criticism, whether in municipal government, in the admiralties, the provinces or the Generality, were occupied by directors of the company. This gave rise to the following complaint: '*If we complain to the Gentlemen of the Cities Schepenbanken, there are the Directors, as a formal party [in function]. To the Admiralties, there are the Directors. To the States-General, there are the States-General and the Directors at the same time and in the same place, as a formal party.*'<sup>174</sup>

This criticism mounted in the years leading up to the renewal of the VOC's charter in 1622, with the printing of many pamphlets and counter-pamphlets advocating the cause of the

<sup>169</sup> Ibidem, 31-32.

<sup>170</sup> F. Gaastra, *Bewind en beleid bij de VOC 1672-1702* (Walburg Pers: Zutphen 1989) 33-41.

<sup>171</sup> Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, 32.

<sup>172</sup> Ibidem, 32-32.

<sup>173</sup> A. Weststeijn, 'The VOC as a Company-State: Debating Seventeenth-Century Dutch Colonial Expansion', *Itinerario* 38:01 (2014) 13-34, 22.

<sup>174</sup> As quoted [*translation: EO*] in: Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, 34. '*Soo wij klagen aan de Heeren van Steden en Scheep Bancken, daar sitten Benwinthebbers, Formele Party. Aan de Admiraliteyten, daar sijn Benwinthebebrs. Aan Staten-Generaal, daar vindt men Staten-Generaal en Benwinthebebrs tegelijck, en op eenen tijt, Formele Party.*



directors or the investors.<sup>175</sup> This was a formative period for both companies as the debates on the rights of shareholders and the powers of the directors had a significant effect on the way in which the WIC's charter was drawn up, while the VOC's charter was modified upon its renewal in 1623 so as to appease shareholders who wanted a say in the company's management. In *The First Imperial Age*, Scammel has the following to say about this episode: 'When the VOC's charter came up for its first renewal the unseasonable views of shareholders seeking a say in its affairs were declared treasonable by the state.'<sup>176</sup> But this assertion is not, in fact, true. The charter was modified in two ways: the directors' payment system was changed, and three new committees, consisting of main shareholders, were instituted to control the actions of the directors. Main shareholders (*Hoofdparticipanten*) were those who had invested the minimal amount needed to be eligible for election to a director's position (6000 guilders in Amsterdam and 3000 guilders in the smaller chambers). The first of these committees (the *rekeningopnemers*) was responsible for checking the general accounts, which were drawn up every four years, starting in 1622. These accounts were intended to provide shareholders with a better understanding of the company's finances. The second committee (the *keurvorsten*, or electors) operated in each chamber and had to compose the list of three nominees from which a new director would be chosen in the event of a vacancy. The final and most important new body was the nine-man committee of *Bëëdigde Hoofdparticipanten*, or 'sworn main investors'. As well as being present at all meetings of the *Heren XVII* and able to cast an advisory vote, these investors obviously reported back to the other investors on what had been discussed at the meetings. The first two of these new committees were elected by all the investors in the company, while only the other main investors elected the third committee.<sup>177</sup>

The initial appointment of directors to the WIC chambers was more difficult than in the case of the VOC. Whereas the VOC started out with established local networks and appointed the directors of the merging firms as its first directors, the WIC not only had to raise capital, but also to devise a system for appointing directors. The provision in the charter that any city that subscribed for at least 100,000 guilders could obtain a directorship in a chamber is a clear indication that the WIC tried to reach out to new potential investors, outside the chamber cities.<sup>178</sup> Indeed, the city of Deventer was able to obtain a directorship in the Amsterdam chamber in this way.<sup>179</sup> On another level, and using the analysis of Glete, this provision may also be seen as an attempt at interest aggregation behind the goals of the new company. As warfare was to be an important task of the company, broad political support would be essential. The formation of chambers was also a highly political act as the chambers did not represent solely their own interests, but broader provincial or regional interests as well. Thus Zeeland's chamber had to accommodate the bickering cities of Middelburg, Vlissingen, Veere and Tholen, while De Maze's chamber represented not only Rotterdam, but also Delft, Delfshaven and Dordrecht, and the Noorderkwartier chamber contained not only Hoorn and Enkhuizen, but also Alkmaar, Medemblik, Edam and Purmerend. Within these composite chambers, a mechanism had to be found for allocating directorships, as well as for dividing shipbuilding and victualing activities.

<sup>175</sup> Examples include: *Placcaet ieghens seecker famens libel, geintituleert, Nootwendigh discours, ofte Vertoogh aende [...] Staten Generael, vande participanten der Oost-Indische Compagnie, tegen de bewinthebbers*, Koninklijk Bibliotheek, pfl 3349 and *Korte aemysinghe der bewinthebbers regeringe*, Koninklijke Bibliotheek pfl 3353.

<sup>176</sup> G.V. Scammel, *The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion c.1400-1715* (London and New York 1989) 102.

<sup>177</sup> Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, 35-36.

<sup>178</sup> A. Bick, *Governing the Free Sea: The Dutch West India Company and Commercial Politics, 1618-1645* (unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton 2012) 111.

<sup>179</sup> J. Acquoy, *Deventer's participatie in de West-Indische Compagnie* (Deventer 1922) 11-12.

The WIC charter included some important differences compared with the stipulations concerning directors in the VOC charter. In the first place, the provinces in which the chambers were situated had the right to choose directors from a list of three candidates (each of whom was a *hoofdparticipant*) compiled by the other *hoofdparticipanten*.<sup>180</sup> As in the case of the VOC, the States quickly delegated this authority to the cities. This was a direct response to the conflict between the directors and main investors of the VOC, which attracted a lot of attention at that time. For the same reason, the larger chambers introduced a new office: the *hoofdparticipant-bewindhebber* (main investor – director). These men, one from Zeeland and one from Amsterdam, were elected by the directors of those chambers from the usual list of three nominated by the other main investors.<sup>181</sup> The main investors of these two chambers also held regular meetings to discuss the company's affairs. The minutes of these meetings represent a valuable addition to those of the chambers and the central management (the *Heren XIX*).

#### *The central management; XVII and XIX*

The central management of the VOC and WIC comprised the meetings of the 'Gentlemen Seventeen' and the 'Gentlemen Nineteen', or XVII and XIX for short, respectively. In principle, these central boards of management set policy for implementation by the chambers. Although practice generally followed principle in the case of the VOC, the chambers proved more willful in the case of the WIC. The VOC's body of seventeen directors met three times a year for periods of up to five weeks. During these meetings the reports from the East were read and the voyages for that year prepared. The central management would then issue instructions for the chambers to put into practice. The XVII met for six consecutive years in Amsterdam, and subsequently in Middelburg for two years. Since the XVII did not have any independent staff but instead relied on the host chamber's personnel, the site of the meetings was of great importance. Voting by the XVII was divided among the chambers, with eight seats for Amsterdam, four for Zeeland and one for each of the smaller chambers. The seventeenth vote was cast by one of the smaller chambers.<sup>182</sup> The only permanent employee of the XVII was the secretary. Since this individual could occupy the position for long periods and so become the 'institutional memory' of the XVII, he could become very powerful indeed. Pieter van Dam, whom we shall yet encounter, held the position from 1652 until his death in 1706 and was perhaps the most powerful occupant of the role. Indeed, since Van Dam read all the incoming letters, he may have been the best-informed person in the Netherlands on the situation in Asia.<sup>183</sup>

The WIC equivalent of the *Heren XVII* was the *Heren XIX*. However, the composition and role of this body differed from the VOC's practice in certain significant ways. Like its counterpart, the WIC central body was composed of the delegates of the chambers constituting the company, based on a division into nine parts (*negensleutel*). Under this system, Amsterdam delegated eight directors to the meetings of the XIX, Zeeland four and the other chambers two each. The final seat was taken by a delegate of the States-General, which had invested in the company as a stock-holder.<sup>184</sup> This contrasts with the Generality's involvement in the VOC. In 1602 and later years, the Generality had supported the VOC by providing loans, ships and

<sup>180</sup> Acquoy, *Deventer's participatie*, 6.

<sup>181</sup> Bick, *Governing the Free Sea*, 113.

<sup>182</sup> Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, 154.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibidem*, 151.

<sup>184</sup> Den Heijer, *De geschiedenis van de WIC*, 31.

cannon, but did not become a shareholder itself. It is likely that the slow sale of WIC shares prompted the Generality to buy shares in 1621. Alexander Bick has studied the composition of the XIX in greater detail and asked ‘How many is nineteen?’, given that there were always more than nineteen people at the ‘meetings of the nineteen’. Although multiple delegates cast a single vote, they all participated in the discussions, which of course increased the influence of the faction they represented.<sup>185</sup> A good example is the single vote that the representative of the States-General could cast. At the meeting of the XIX in February 1638, the States-General were represented by nine men jointly able to cast a single vote.<sup>186</sup> This lends credence to the claim by Henk den Heijer that the Generality’s influence on the management of the company increased as the latter’s prospects became more troubled.<sup>187</sup>

What cannot be accepted, however, is his statement that the WIC’s central management greatly resembled that of the VOC and that the main difference between the two lay in the composition of the charter areas.<sup>188</sup> Despite the similarities on paper, there was a great difference in how the two bodies, the XVII for the VOC and the XIX for the WIC, evolved over time. By the time the WIC was chartered in 1621, the VOC’s central management had become a central managerial body that set general policies, determined the size of fleets sent to Asia and declared the dividends to be paid out to shareholders.<sup>189</sup> This was a slow, evolutionary process that took place during the first charter period of the VOC. In the initial charter granted in 1602, the VOC had not been much more than a joint venture of five independent firms. However, the evolution of the XVII allowed the chambers to forward money and goods to each other so that all would pay and receive their fair share.<sup>190</sup> This contrasts sharply with the role played by the XIX in the case of the WIC. Whereas the XVII had been able to overcome provincial and urban differences, the WIC was unable to do so, and the chambers frequently clashed on issues relating to payments of fleets and dividing the trade goods received. To resolve the disagreements between them, the chambers turned to the States-General directly, thus giving the latter an even greater say in the management of the company than before. Plans to reform the WIC in the late 1640s and early 1650s went so far as to state that ‘*the problems which have developed here in the management of the company, have principally had their origins from the fact that the respective chambers have not been held to their responsibilities, and the resolutions, made at the meetings of the XIX, have not been duly observed*’ [translation: EO].<sup>191</sup> Over time the WIC fractured along the lines of the chambers, with the main chambers of Amsterdam and Zeeland administering separate regions of the Atlantic charter area.<sup>192</sup> The only affair that was truly undertaken by the company as a whole was the attack on the Portuguese South Atlantic system, which gave an extra sense of importance to this affair, as we shall see. At the same time, the fracturing of the company made it more difficult to manage this joint effort

<sup>185</sup> Bick, *Governing the Free Sea*, 121-127.

<sup>186</sup> NL-HaNA 1.01.02, States-General, inv. no. 12564.6.

<sup>187</sup> Den Heijer, *De geschiedenis van de WIC*, 33.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibidem*, 33-34.

<sup>189</sup> R. Schalk, J. Jonkers and O. Gelderblom, ‘Schippers op de Aziatische vaart: De financiering van de VOC kamer Enkhuizen 1602-1622, *bmg* – *Low Countries Historical Review* 127:4 (2012) 3-27, 24-26.

<sup>190</sup> Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, 159.

<sup>191</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, inv.no 12564-37, ‘De meeste swaricheyden, derwelcke hier te landen, inde directive vande Compagnie sijn ontstaen, hebben principalijck daer uyt haer oorspronck gehadt, dat de respective Cameren vande selve Comp. niet genoechsaaam tot hunne deivoir sijn gehouden, ende de resolutien bij de vergadering vande XIX.e succesvelijcken genomen, niet naer behooren hebben geobserveert.’

<sup>192</sup> P.C. Emmer, ‘The West India Company, 1621-1791: Dutch or Atlantic?’, in: L. Blussé and F. Gaastra (eds.) *Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien Régime* (Leiden University Press: Leiden 1981) 71-96, 78-79.

properly. The WIC, far more so than the VOC, remained a joint venture of local interests that were less aggregated behind a central goal than in the case of the VOC. In practice, therefore, the companies' similar organizational models hid considerable differences.

### Conclusion

This chapter has laid the groundwork for understanding the actions of the representatives of the early modern Dutch trading companies overseas by looking at the way in which the Republic itself functioned. By integrating the example of the Amsterdam council of 1643 in a perspective of the political and institutional organization of the Republic and the companies, it has shown that while the various bodies of state and companies were institutionally quite distinct, they were in practice closely intertwined since the same individuals were often in charge. The links between the various levels of government, from the city councils to the Generality and the companies, were composed of the *personal* networks of individuals. Although these individuals were confined in their freedom of action by institutions, both of an organizational nature and in the form of the norms and unspoken agreements that structured personal relations, their actions helped shape these institutions. Rather than a fruitless 'either or' debate on the primacy of institutions or agency, this chapter shows the interactive nature of agency and institutions: individuals were shaped in their behavior by the institutional world in which they operated, while their actions in turn also helped shape the institutions, either reinforcing them or weakening them. In this interconnected world, personal connections were crucial. Family and friendship were the channels through which political power, privilege, as well as ideas and capital flowed. Networks of power that were constituted around familial interests in the cities of the Republic also inhabited the directorships of the chartered companies. The chartered companies were devised as political compromises, aggregating the interests of different regions and cities behind a single goal, without encumbering the political process of the entire Republic. This transfer of competencies from the state to a collective of interests fits a pattern in Dutch state formation. It echoes the transfer of powers from the state to bodies such as the *College van de grote visserij* and the directories. In the case of the companies this transfer of powers was attached to a specific geographic scope, and not limited to a certain set of activities. Since the Generality did not have the institutions to forge a colonial policy, 'outsourcing' this to private, self-financed organizations was a sensible solution. These points have various consequences, as shown in the careers of Rijckloff van Goens and Johan Maurits discussed in the subsequent chapters. The companies were political constructs, and their internal conflicts should be seen as a reflection of larger political conflicts, as much as they were a reflection of commerce and trade proper. In making a career overseas, servants of the companies had to be aware of the political conflicts within and between the chambers, which for a very large part overlapped with the political conflicts in the chamber cities, their provinces and the Generality itself. Ingratiating themselves with specific factions within the urban oligarchies that dominated the councils and the companies could result in a meteoric rise through the companies' ranks. Given the closed-off nature of the urban oligarchies, it is interesting to observe whether a successful career in the companies could result in social mobility, whether in a single lifespan, or 'multigenerational' social mobility.<sup>193</sup> Given the importance of family as noted by Adams, the multigenerational aspect might be of great

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<sup>193</sup> For the concept of multigenerational social mobility, see: P. Burke, *History and Social Theory* (Polity Press: Cambridge 1992)63-67.

importance indeed. However, the close connection to Dutch domestic politics also had a dark side: political crises in the Republic that were themselves unconnected to the companies could also be quickly transmitted through these networks to the worlds of the companies, with potentially dire consequences for the careers of the servants of the companies overseas, as the following chapter will make clear.



## 2. Appointing a stadholder for Brazil

*Governing Dutch Brazil, September 1634 – September 1636*

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This chapter explores the appointment of Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen to the position of governor-general of Brazil. Although the person of Maurits is one of the most studied aspects of Dutch Brazil, this particular episode has received only scant attention in the literature. His appointment raises an interesting and important question: why did the WIC appoint to its most valuable colony, and its main hope for commercial success, a man who not only had never been overseas before, but who also had no experience in managerial or government positions and who was so inexperienced in commerce and finances that he had nearly bankrupted himself in building a new stately house in the center of The Hague? This is the question that needs to be answered adequately before we can understand the appointment of Johan Maurits to the governor-generalship of Brazil. In answering this question, this chapter also explores the various ideas on how to organize colonial government that were prevalent in the WIC in the mid-1630s. Additionally, it briefly addresses the comparison with the office of the governor-general in the VOC's Asian domain, and argues that this was in fact a very different position from that held by Johan Maurits. Finally, the chapter will answer the question of which example, if any, the WIC modeled its Brazilian administration on in the summer of 1636.

This chapter thus devotes attention to the specific meetings of WIC directors and main shareholders (*hoofdparticipanten*) in the two-year period from summer 1634 until the appointment of Johan Maurits in August 1636. I will draw mostly from the secret minutes of the meetings of the XIX in summer 1636, when it was decided that Maurits should be asked to take on the role.<sup>194</sup> Although these minutes provide valuable insight into the way in which the XIX decided to opt for Maurits, they are unfortunately written in a very concise form. This means that the exact reasons for choosing Maurits have not been recorded, although the minutes *do* record that an argument for this choice was made in this meeting. The reconstruction of Maurits' appointment is thus a process of analysis, interpretation and argumentation, rather than the result of finding a previously unknown source stating such reasons.

This chapter argues that we should look at the appointment procedure from two sides: supply and demand. The latter side of this equation concerns what the WIC required of a governor-general. These requirements, I argue, were twofold. On the one hand, the Brazilian realities of the WIC demanded a man who could act as a neutral intermediary between the army commanders and the political councils. The Dutch political realities, on the other hand, demanded a man whose appointment could be interpreted as representing WIC support for the pro-war party surrounding the court of the stadholder. The position of the WIC in the political landscape changed in the mid-1630s, with profound effects for both company and governor.

The supply side is the person of Maurits and his qualities and shortcomings. Unfortunately we do not know whether the XIX considered other men for the job. However, since no others are mentioned by name, even in the secret minutes, this seems unlikely. I will argue that Johan Maurits filled both the Brazilian and the Dutch requirements very well, despite the seeming disadvantages of having no experience overseas or in commerce. The qualities Johan Maurits had to offer were thus at the intersection of the demands of the different branches of the

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<sup>194</sup> To be found in NL-HaNA 1.05.01.01, OWIC, inv. no. 2.

WIC. As a result, he was appointed. Interpreting Johan Maurits' appointment as the result of two different sets of demands will also help us to understand why, and the way in which, he was called home in 1642.

This chapter first explores the various ways in which the WIC tried to establish a government for its Brazilian colony in the period 1630-1636. It then turns to the Dutch Republic to analyze the Dutch requirements, the person of Johan Maurits and the procedure that was followed in summer 1636, and which resulted in Johan Maurits of Nassau-Siegen being appointed to the position of governor-, admiral- and captain-general of the 'Brazilian Coasts'.

### **Company government in Brazil, 1630-1636**

The original charter of the WIC had envisioned the institution of a governor-general responsible for all the WIC's colonies (then yet to be acquired) in the Atlantic Basin, along the lines of the office just established by the VOC in Asia. By the time the WIC took Bahia in 1624, however, a less centralized model had been implemented. This perhaps reflected a realization on the part of the company directors that the newly acquired colonies, ranging from New Netherland in the north to Brazil in the south, could not be well administered by a central government in the Americas. The new arrangement envisioned a nine-member council, with a rotating presidency mirrored on the XIX themselves. This already shows that the WIC moved away from the VOC model of colonial administration quite quickly. Rather than implementing a powerful central colonial administration that could potentially serve as a counterweight to the influence of the directors back home, the WIC opted for a council whose members were directly appointed by the chambers, rather than by the XIX. This is an early indication that the WIC struggled to entrust its servants in the colonies with power and indeed found it difficult to act as a single entity, as the influence of the individual chambers suggests. The quick loss of the colony precluded implementation of this system.<sup>195</sup>

When the WIC's forces took Olinda and Recife in 1630, the task of creating a system of governance for the new colony was one of the first to be undertaken, based on the 1624 model for Bahia. Throughout the next six years, the company struggled to find an acceptable and workable formula in Brazil to effectively pursue the war against the Portuguese, as well as profitably manage the sugar-producing lands. Initially the XIX had decided that management of the colony would be left in the hands of a 'political council' of nine members, who would take decisions on a majority basis. These nine seats would be divided among the chambers in the Republic, based on the same rules governing voting powers in the XIX (the *negensteutel*).<sup>196</sup> This, in turn, was based on the *ordre van Regieringe* of 1629. This latter document would affect *all* WIC colonies in the Atlantic by placing the civilian administration of the colonies in the hands of civilian councils appointed by the XIX and pledging allegiance to the States-General.<sup>197</sup> This already illustrates that, in the case of the WIC, governance of the colonies was much more closely intertwined with the corporate governance of the WIC *in* the Republic. This was in marked contrast to the VOC, as we shall see. The shorter distances and the opportunities to receive information from the Atlantic in a continual stream, rather than only at certain periods of the year, perhaps serve as an explanation for this difference. This kind of direct involvement of the

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<sup>195</sup> A. Bick, *Governing the Free Sea: The Dutch West India Company and Commercial Politics, 1618-1645* (Unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton 2012) 142.

<sup>196</sup> Den Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de WIC*, 43.

<sup>197</sup> Den Heijer, 'Bewindhebbers, gouverneurs en raden van bestuur', 32.

company directors was feasible in the Atlantic, but impossible in Asia. As a result, the WIC looked more to the Republic than to its Asian sister for inspiration on how to govern its colonies. In addition, the council was, in practice, never fully manned and never had more than five civilian members.<sup>198</sup>

For nine months, from January 1633 until September 1633, the governance of the colony was entrusted to two delegated directors, Matthias van Ceulen (Amsterdam chamber) and Johan Gijsselingh (Zeeland chamber).<sup>199</sup> They were appointed because of the difficulties experienced by the company in Brazil and the perceived need for more empowered government. The tenure of Gijsselingh and Van Ceulen coincided with a change in the fortunes of the WIC in Brazil. With the help of former Portuguese slaves who had run away from the Portuguese forces surrounding Recife, the WIC army was able to end the Portuguese stranglehold and 'break out'. In late 1633, the company's forces took the important fort at the mouth of the Rio Grande do Norte. This fort was renamed Fort Ceulen in honor of the director. Army affairs were then increasingly left to the gifted duo of Sigismund von Schoppe and Christoffel Arciszewski. The territory under the company's control gradually expanded throughout 1633 and 1634, until it stretched from Cape Santo Agostinho in the south to the Rio Grande in the north. Additionally and crucially, increasing numbers of *plantadores* were persuaded to return to their plantations. By the time Van Ceulen and Gijsselingh returned to the Republic in September 1634, the colony finally seemed set for a bright future. Governance was left in the hands of a new political council, while Von Schoppe was named commander-in-chief of the army, with the title of governor.

However, things took a turn for the worse in late 1635, when a Spanish fleet of thirty sailing under Don Luis de Rojas y Borgia arrived in Brazil and disembarked troops at Jaraguá. These troops reinitiated guerilla warfare against the WIC lands, especially targeting sugar plantations and sugar mills. At the same time, the political council became embroiled in internal disagreements about the best response and continually bickered with the army commander, Sigismund von Schoppe,<sup>200</sup> who advocated an aggressive policy. In his view, the only way to counter the guerilla warfare was to strike south and attack the guerilla bases in the captaincy of Porto Calvo. Although the civilian council nominally accepted his proposal, excuses were continually found to postpone such a move. The risks of an offensive strategy deterred the civilian council from adopting Von Schoppe's strategy. Rather than ending the war by going on the offensive, the council preferred to defend the areas already conquered and to deploy the troops in exhausting counter-guerilla operations. Consequently, many soldiers were transferred from the army to civilian or maritime activities.<sup>201</sup> At a certain point it became clear that if the dispute between the civilian and army command were to be resolved, the government of Brazil needed to be altered. This issue was discussed again in summer 1635, with the minutes of the meetings of the Amsterdam chamber recording the following on July 5 of that year:

*Has been approved, once mr. Conradus has returned, to convene a separate meeting to discuss the government of Brazil.*<sup>202</sup>

<sup>198</sup> Den Heijer, 'Bewindhebbers, gouverneurs en raden van bestuur', 32.

<sup>199</sup> Den Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de WIC*, 43. Van Ceulen's first name is spelled in a number of different ways in the sources: Matthias, Mathias and Matthijs. I have chosen to use the first spelling throughout the text.

<sup>200</sup> Ibidem, 65-66.

<sup>201</sup> Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 65.

<sup>202</sup> NL-HaNA 1.05.01.01 OWIC, inv. no. 14, *Notulen van de kamer Amsterdam, Januari 1635-December 1636*.

Although minutes for this meeting unfortunately no longer exist, we do know that, on July 19, the idea of again sending specially empowered directors to the colony was contemplated, but apparently rejected.<sup>203</sup> The discussion on sending directors back to Brazil was not confined to the Amsterdam chamber, with the minutes of the meetings of the main shareholders (*hoofdparticipanten*) in the Zeeland chamber from the same period revealing that the idea was voiced there as early as January 1635. By March of that year, the *hoofdparticipanten* recommended sending director Gijsselingh back to Brazil.<sup>204</sup> However, although the company's two major chambers were thus in accord, no decision was reached, and the new administration for Brazil would have to wait another year.

This same period also saw some early experiments in the regulation of trade. Private trade for the company's stockholders (on company ships) had been allowed in 1634, but was banned again two years later, mainly due to pressure from the chambers in Zeeland, De Maze, and Stad en Lande.<sup>205</sup> These chambers were the most likely to lose out if free trade was allowed, given that most trade with Brazil would then be conducted from Holland – or, more specifically, Amsterdam – and the Noorderkwartier. This underlines the WIC's importance as a mechanism for peripheral regions to secure a captive market overseas.

This provided the context in which Arciszewski's proposal for a stronger, one-headed leadership was finally accepted. Arciszewski was a Polish nobleman who had served in the States' army before enlisting in the WIC. He had been in Brazil from the start, arriving with the fleet of 1630. Ever since 1631, Arciszewski had advocated appointing a strong governor to command the army and navy and who would also have a powerful say in civilian administration. His argument was based on his personal experience of the inability of military and civilian company officials to work together, with both sides of the WIC's administration of the colony frequently clashing over strategy and their respective jurisdictions.

The choice of a new governor was, therefore, a sensitive matter. Choosing one of the two colonels (Von Schoppe or Arciszewski) already in Brazil could cause tensions between these two military men, while it would perhaps also be unwise to promote one of the old council members to such an elevated position. These Brazilian realities thus advocated for a newcomer in Brazil, but from such a social background that his position would be accepted by those who had served in Brazil for a long time, especially Von Schoppe and Arciszewski. What was required was a person with military experience, but also with enough authority to overawe the civilian council.

### **Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen: a German nobleman in the Dutch army**

Johan Maurits (then thirty-two years old) was a remarkable choice for appointment to high colonial office in Brazil in 1636, although his perceived successes in office tend to overshadow this fact. The original reasons for choosing him are given short shrift in the literature. Boxer, for example, writes the following:

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<sup>203</sup> As appears in the minutes of the chamber of Amsterdam on July 19, 1635. NL-HaNA 1.05.01.01 OWIC, inv. no. 14, *Notulen van de kamer Amsterdam, Januari 1635-December 1636*, folio 51 recto.

<sup>204</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, OWIC, inv. no. 34, folio 53 recto.

<sup>205</sup> P.J. van Winter, *De Westindische Compagnie ter kamer Stad en Lande* (The Hague 1978) 79.

*‘We do not know how many people the Heeren XIX considered in this connection before they made their final choice; but we do know that after consultation with the States-General and the stadtholder, their choice fell on Johan Maurits, count of Nassau-Siegen.’*<sup>206</sup>

Johan Maurits was born in Dillenburg in 1604, the thirteenth child of Jan VII of Nassau-Siegen and his first child by his second marriage.<sup>207</sup> This high number of siblings caused acute problems within the family in later years as the estate had to be divided among them, thus precluding a handsome inheritance for Johan Maurits. Having so many children also weighed heavily on the income of Jan VII, who had already been impoverished by his support for the war against Spain. Johan Maurits consequently received little formal schooling before the family’s money ran out and, as a result, he entered the army in 1620, aged sixteen.<sup>208</sup> His father was the son of John the Elder, the elder brother of William the Silent, and so his first cousins included both the stadholders Maurits and Frederik Hendrik. This link with Frederik Hendrik seems to have been of crucial importance to the future career of Johan Maurits. As a young officer in the army, he spent the summer months on campaign, and the winter months at the stadholderly court in The Hague, where he continued his studies and mingled with high society.<sup>209</sup>

We should not be deceived by the family name, however, as there were circumstances mitigating against Johan Maurits’ success. In the first place, the fact that the family estate did not lie in the Republic meant that the family did not qualify to be admitted to the *ridderschap* of any province. This closed the door for exercising political influence and working through the provincial networks of self-advancement. The family’s impoverished state also meant that there was no hope of buying a title (or *ridderbofstad*) in another province. Johan Maurits was therefore unable to use the Provincial States. This was a serious problem as officer appointments and promotions in the army were often decided by the province on whose *repartitie* the particular company was paid.<sup>210</sup> The Nassau name should not, therefore, deceive us; unlike the stadholders, the Nassau-Siegen family had very limited political power and thus limited access to the patronage relations that could ensure advancement. His relationship with the stadholders was thus the only road open to Johan Maurits, and this proved critical in his rapid advancement in the army. Both more senior positions (colonel and higher) and field appointments could be decided on by the stadholder without conferring with the provinces. Thus, Johan Maurits was quickly promoted by his relatives, from pikeman in the guard of Frisian stadholder Willem Lodewijk in 1619, to cavalryman in 1620, captain in 1624, lieutenant-colonel in 1626 and full colonel in 1629.<sup>211</sup>

Johan Maurits was present at various important sieges and battles during this period, including the sieges of Oldenzaal (1626), Grol (1627), ’s Hertogenbosch (1629), Venlo, Roermond and Maastricht (1632), and Rheinberg (1633), besides numerous small skirmishes.<sup>212</sup> His great breakthrough came in 1636, during the Siege of Schenkenschanz. This border fortress

<sup>206</sup> *Ibidem*, 66.

<sup>207</sup> M.E.H.N. Mout, ‘The Youth of Johan Maurits and aristocratic culture in the early seventeenth century’, in: E. van den Boogaart, H.R. Hoetink and P.J.P. Whitehead (eds.), *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen: A Humanist Prince in Europe and Brazil, Essays on the occasion of the tercentenary of his death* (The Hague 1979) 12-38, 13.

<sup>208</sup> P.J. Bouman, *Johan Maurits van Nassau, de Braziliaan* (Utrecht 1947) 6-8.

<sup>209</sup> Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 68.

<sup>210</sup> Olaf van Nimwegen, *‘Deser landen krijchsvolck’: Het Staatse leger en de militaire revoluties (1588-1688)*, (Amsterdam 2006) 34-35.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibidem*, 36.

<sup>212</sup> Bouman, *Johan Maurits*, 12-15.



at the forks of the Rhine had been taken by the Spaniards by surprise. Its crucial position in the German-Dutch border lands and its domination of all upstream river navigation meant it was imperative for this fortress to be recaptured as soon as possible. From early August 1635 until mid-April 1636, therefore, the Dutch army besieged the fortress. Commanding the operations was Count Willem van Nassau-Siegen, assisted by his half-brother, Johan Maurits.<sup>213</sup>

The fortress finally fell on April 18, after an attack led by Johan Maurits. This success made him a famous man in the Republic.<sup>214</sup> Importantly for his future career, he also met the young Elector of Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm, when the latter visited the siege works. Back in 1632, however, and even before this newfound fame, Johan Maurits had acquired a plot of land in the center of The Hague, where he had begun building a stately home. The house, the Mauritshuis, was to become both an icon of seventeenth-century Dutch architecture and the reason for Johan Maurits' near-bankruptcy in 1636.<sup>215</sup> The architect, probably Jacob van Campen, had been allowed a great deal of freedom in designing the house, and this drove up the costs. Johan Maurits had inherited a third of the lands of Siegen in 1623 and he may have overestimated his income from this source.<sup>216</sup> During the previous years, Johan Maurits had spent much of the winter months – the off-season for military campaigns – at the stadholder's court in The Hague, where he had come into contact with important people such as Constantijn Huygens, the secretary of the stadholder and who became a personal friend and neighbor. Crucially, the meetings of the XIX were also held in The Hague and this allowed a quick conclusion to the negotiations in 1636, when Johan Maurits was offered the governorship of Brazil.

### Appointing Maurits: the Dutch side

Johan Maurits thus had some experience as a field commander at a junior level, and may have received training in strategy and tactics from his brother and the stadholder. There were, however, many junior field commanders in the Dutch army. What made Johan Maurits special was his close link to the stadholder, Frederik Hendrik. The question then becomes why the WIC thought association with the stadholder was important in the first place. To understand this we first need to understand the political and military situation in the Republic in the mid-1630s and the role and ambitions of Frederik Hendrik.

The military situation in the Republic had stabilized after the siege of 's Hertogenbosch in 1629. The Spanish counterattack through the Veluwe and to Amersfoort in an attempt to force the lifting of the siege was the last time Spanish troops managed to achieve a foothold in the core of the Republic. The Spanish taking of Schenkenschanz in 1635 proved stillborn because of the large Dutch counterattack throughout the winter of 1635-1636. With the situation at the front slowly stabilizing, the war went into a new phase, with lower stakes. No longer was the war being fought over the very survival of the Republic itself, but more over the conclusion of a treaty on the most profitable possible terms. This also marked the end of the period of major successes for Fredrik Hendrik, who had earned his nickname *Stedendwinger* (taker of cities) because of the successes in the early period of his stadholdership.

<sup>213</sup> G. de Werd, *Schenkenschanz: de sleutel van den hollandschen tuin* (Cleves 1986) 49. For a general strategic background, see: Olaf van Nimwegen, *'Deser landen krijchsvolk': Het Staatse leger en de militaire revoluties, 1588-1688* (Amsterdam 2006) 208.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibidem*, 55-56.

<sup>215</sup> For the architecture of the Mauritshuis, see: J.J. Terwen, 'The buildings of Johan Maurits van Nassau', in: Boogaart, Hoetink and Whitehead (eds.), *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen*, 55-141.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibidem* 9, 19.

The military stability on land in the 1630s set the stage for some important political battles in city halls, the Provincial States and the States-General about the conduct and proper goals of the war, the size of the army, and the navy's importance in protecting against the increasingly damaging depredations of the privateers from Dunkirk. The WIC had been founded in large part to pursue the war against the Iberian enemies in the Atlantic. More so than in the case of the VOC, the WIC was a product of war and intended to make war.<sup>217</sup> The company's privileges with regard to the use of force in its charter area placed it in the position of an acting admiralty for that area since it was also allowed to hand out letters of marque on its own authority. By giving the company the right to defend its own shipping, the admiralties were spared the responsibility of operating in Atlantic waters, thus allowing them to focus on the convoy battles and cruises against Dunkirkers. The war also provided an opportunity for the WIC to attack Iberian shipping and colonies, thus offering an important source of income for the company.<sup>218</sup> Brazil was at the heart of the company directors' vision for their South Atlantic shot at empire and profitability. For this, continuation of the war was a crucial precondition. The WIC directors were thus more inclined to support the pro-war factions surrounding the stadholder. This sentiment was especially marked in the province of Zeeland, a hotbed of both Calvinist activity and Orangism. However the ending of the threat to the very existence of the Republic put the WIC in an adversarial position with regard to the increasingly high numbers of merchants who suffered heavily at the hands of the Dunkirk privateers and who favored a negotiated peace. This increasingly served to isolate the WIC from mainstream merchant society in a way not encountered by the VOC. This also meant that the WIC faced increasing political opposition as its position in the South Atlantic became direr.

Although these developments were still well in the future in 1636, the background to the appointment of Johan Maurits is becoming increasingly clear. Johan Maurits was mentioned for the first time by name in the secret minutes of the meeting of the XIX on July 28, 1636:

*Monday July 28, 1636*

*In opening the meeting mr. Conradus gave a speech stating that it should be inquired upon which conditions gen. Count Maurits van Nassau should be willing to let himself be employed by the West India Company as Governor-, Admiral- and Captain-General of the Brazilian Coasts. He also gave the circumstances under which he had formed his opinion [that Maurits should be chosen]. It was approved that this should be undertaken with alacrity.<sup>219</sup>*

Unfortunately, though the minutes say that 'Conradus' (the Latinized version of Albert Coenraets Burgh) gave his opinion as to why Johan Maurits should be asked, this opinion itself has not been recorded. It must have been a convincing case, however, as the meeting agreed that Johan Maurits should be asked. It was further agreed upon that all members of the meeting should remain silent on this decision and that '*it being a matter of pure management, no consultation* [with the

<sup>217</sup> P. Emmer, 'The West India Company: 1621-1791: Dutch or Atlantic?', in: L. Blussé and F. Gaastra, *Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas trading Companies during the Ancien Régime* (Leiden University Press: Leiden 1981) 71-95, 72-73.

<sup>218</sup> Between 1623 and 1636, the WIC captured 547 Iberian ships, valued at 7 million guilders and with cargoes worth another 45 million guilders. Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 66.

<sup>219</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01 OWIC, inv. no. 2, page 153. *Secrete Notulen van de Heeren XIX*, page 253. '*Bij de heer Conradus opening gedaen sijnde, dat sijne Gen[ade] Graeff Maurits van Nassau beboort versocht sijnde op redel. Conditien sijn persoon wel mocht laten imployeren in dienst van West Ind. Comp. als Gouverneur Adm. Ende Cap.n Generael van Brasilsche Custen ende van circumstantien waerdoor sijn E. sulcks opinie hadde geconcipieert. Is goetgevonden opde gevoebelijckste voet sulcx te onderstaen.*'

separate chambers] *was required*.<sup>220</sup> The decision to appoint Johan Maurits to the position of ‘governor-, admiral- and captain-general’ of Brazil was taken solely by the XIX, without consulting the chambers on this issue.

It is worth examining the background of the men at the meeting of the XIX to see whether their personal backgrounds can tell us something more about their reasons for choosing Johan Maurits. Table 3 gives the names of delegates at the meetings of the XIX in the summer of 1636. The column ‘Remarks’ provides additional information on the individuals’ involvement with the new governmental model for Brazil.

**Table 3: Individuals present at the meetings of the *Heren XIX* in summer 1636**

Name	Chamber	Remarks
G. van Arnhem	States-General	Signed contract with Maurits
Albert Coenraets Burgh (Conradi)	Amsterdam	Proposed Johan Maurits as governor-general; signed contract with Johan Maurits and councils
Reynier Reael	Amsterdam	Signed contracts with councils
Pieter Duvelaer	Zeeland	Signed contract with Maurits and councils
Johan Raijt	?	
Jan van der Marct	Amsterdam	Signed contract with councils
Johan Gijsselingh	Zeeland	Became member of the council in Brazil
Pieter van de Velde	Zeeland	
Cornelis Nicolai	De Maze	Signed contract with Maurits and with councils
Hogehoeck	Amsterdam	
Eduart Man	Amsterdam	
P. Varlot	?	
Daniel van Liebergen	Amsterdam	
Adriaen van der Dussen	De Maze	Became member of the council in Brazil
P. Ben	Hoorn	Signed contract with Maurits
Johan de Laet	Amsterdam/Leiden	Signed contract with Maurits
Christoffer van Ewsum	Stad en Lande	Signed contract with Maurits
Pieter Evertsz. Hulft	Amsterdam	
Matthias van Ceulen	Amsterdam	Became member of the council in Brazil

Source: NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01 OWIC, inv. no. 2, *Secrete Notulen van de Heeren XIX*, for July and August 1636.

Although this list is not comprehensive, it gives an initial indication of the men responsible for appointing Maurits. Crucially, as they themselves had decided that this was purely a matter of management, they did not consult with the directors of their respective chambers. The answer to the question of why Johan Maurits was chosen should consequently be sought within this restricted circle. The figure of Dr. Albert Coenraets Burgh (also Coenraetsz/Coenraed/Conradi)

<sup>220</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01 OWIC, inv. no. 2, p. 153. ‘...als sijnde een saecke van pure directie, verstont hier in geen ruggespraek behoorde gehouden te worden.’

looms especially large as he was the person who had proposed Johan Maurits in the first place. Having encountered Burgh in chapter one, this is an apt place to provide some more detail. Burgh (a member of the Amsterdam city council from 1618 to 1647) was in many ways a typical Amsterdam regent and occupied many different positions throughout his career in municipal, provincial and generality offices. Besides being a WIC director he was, for instance, a captain of the militia, a curator of the *illustere schole* (the later University of Amsterdam), a mayor of Amsterdam in 1638, a deputy of the States of Holland for the pilotage and fire beacons on the Zuiderzee, a member of the Council of State in 1639, a member of the board of the Amsterdam in 1644-1647 and an extraordinary ambassador to Muscovy in 1647, where he died. Crucially, he started his career in the administration of the city of Amsterdam (as a council member) in November 1618, when he was appointed by stadholder Maurits.<sup>221</sup> At first glance, this may seem a crucial clue. After all, the men who were appointed by Maurits in 1618 were supposed to be fierce counter-remonstrants, loyal to Orange and pro-war, as well as being opponents of the states-party of Hooft and Van Oldenbarnevelt, who favored remonstrant (or Arminian) theology, were amenable to peace with Spain and argued for the rights of provincial and municipal government against the Generality and the stadholder. Burgh, however, seems to have been an exception. He owed his appointment to his familial ties to Pauw, of whom he was a second cousin.<sup>222</sup> Pauw, the powerful burgomaster of Amsterdam, had worked with Maurits to purge the council. However, Burgh turned on the counter-remonstrant faction in the council as it was he who, in 1625, encouraged Joost van den Vondel to compose *Palamedes*, a tragedy on the execution of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt.<sup>223</sup> This was just one of many changes of opinion displayed by Burgh as although he was one of the primary supporters of the *Assurantiecompagnie* in 1628-29, by 1634 he had become an important opponent.<sup>224</sup> Why then did Burgh support Johan Maurits? The lack of details on the dealings of Burgh (which has frustrated generations of historians) and the absence of more precise records of the meetings of the XIX means that no watertight answer can be given. But we can still present a convincing hypothesis of possible reasons for Burgh to nominate Johan Maurits. The first of these is the evolving relationship between the figure of the stadholder and the city of Amsterdam. Frederik Hendrik was less rigid than his predecessor, Maurits, in religious affairs and came to support the council in 1628 in stifling protests by counter-remonstrant factions within the city.<sup>225</sup> As a result, the faction led by the intermarried families of Bicker and De Graeff were firmly installed as the dominant factions in Amsterdam until 1666.<sup>226</sup> Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh deftly managed this transition.

Until the second half of the 1630s, the relationship between Frederik Hendrik and the council in Amsterdam was comparatively cordial. The appointment of Johan Maurits to Brazil could consequently be construed as an attempt by an Amsterdam regent and WIC director to show support for the stadholder and perhaps as repayment of services rendered. However, Frederik Hendrik also had a more personal connection to Coenraetsz. Burgh as he was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the proposed *Assurantiecompagnie* of 1629. Burgh, along with three other merchants (Elias Trip, Hans van Loon and Henrick Broen), had submitted a draft charter

<sup>221</sup> J.E. Elias, *De Vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795, deel 1* (reprint, Amsterdam 1963) 327.

<sup>222</sup> Ibidem, LXX.

<sup>223</sup> Van Cleef Bachman, *Peltries or Plantations: The Economic Policies of the Dutch West India Company in New Netherland 1623-1639* (Baltimore and London 1969) 164.

<sup>224</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam, deel 1*, 327-328.

<sup>225</sup> *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam*, 269.

<sup>226</sup> Ibidem. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam* LXXXIII-LXXXIV.

for this company in December 1628.<sup>227</sup> The historiography of this proposed company is somewhat divided, depending on the author's background. The company proposed always bringing to sea sixty escorts to escort Dutch merchantmen in European waters from Dunkirk privateers. In return for this service, all merchantmen entering and departing the Netherlands would have to buy maritime insurance from the company, and the company would also be granted a monopoly on Dutch trade along the North Coast of Africa and the Levant until Smyrna, as well as the Greek Islands, with the right to build fortifications, conduct diplomacy and so on; in other words, all the usual perks of a Dutch chartered company. In his naval history, Elias focused on the maritime insurance and warship-equipping side of the proposal, while Klein focused on the connections with the established Levant traders who were dissatisfied with the performance of the *directive van de Levantsche handel*, chiefly Elias Trip.<sup>228</sup> Klein suggests that the other proponents used Burgh, who was better-connected politically, as a broker to advance their ideas since he, unlike the others, did not fit the profile of being engaged in the Levant trade.<sup>229</sup> Although Frederik Hendrik enthusiastically supported the idea, it was stifled in 1629 by opposition from most cities in Holland, including Amsterdam. The issue of the *Assurantiecompanie* thus also presents itself as a case of factional strife in which an underlying faction not well represented in the council attempted to gain control of a vast slice of Dutch trade and commerce, as well as the important financial instrument of naval insurance.<sup>230</sup> Yet by the time the plan was proposed again in 1634, Burgh had evolved into one of its main opponents.<sup>231</sup> This may have reflected his changing position in the Amsterdam council and which would see him elected mayor four years later – clearly he had by then gained the trust of the dominant Bicker-De Graeff faction. The appointment of Johan Maurits to Brazil could thus also be seen as part of the personal political maneuvering of Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh, who tried to balance his position in Amsterdam with currying the favor of the stadholder. Although these assertions cannot be proved as there is simply not enough material about Burgh to be conclusive, they do place the appointment of Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen to 'governor-, admiral- and captain-general of Brazil' in a more complex political and economic environment.

These titles are themselves quite revealing as they closely mimic the stadholder's official title of captain-general of the army and admiral-general of the fleet. The way the office of the governor-general of Brazil was conceived consequently owes more to army hierarchy and the stadholderate than to the governor-generalship in the VOC area, where the office was less strongly military in orientation and more mercantile and commercial. This suggests that the WIC did *not* take the idea of appointing a governor-general from the VOC. Rather than 'translating' this office from the VOC's Asian world, it can be argued that the WIC's governor-general was a translation of the Dutch office of the stadholder. This background may also help explain why a Nassau was chosen for the job.

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<sup>227</sup> '1628-29. Concept van eene Compagnie van Assurantie en van haar Octrooi', *Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht*, 23 (Kemink en Zoon, Utrecht 1867), 138-178.

<sup>228</sup> Elias, *Schetsen*, deel 1, 122-128. P.W. Klein, *De Trippen in de 17e eeuw: Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt* (Van Gorcum: Assen 1965) 317-320.

<sup>229</sup> Klein, *De Trippen in De 17e Eeuw* 319-320.

<sup>230</sup> Of the four men, only Burgh had a seat on the council.

<sup>231</sup> P.J. Blok, 'Koopmansadviezen aangaande het plan tot oprichting eener compagnie van assurantie. 1629-1635', *Bijdragen en mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht, een-en-twintigste deel* (Amsterdam 1900) 1-160, 143-150.



Indeed, the office of the stadholder is much more important for understanding the dynamics *within* the WIC than it is in the case of the VOC. The stadholder served as the head of the military in the Republic, while many officers in the WIC army had served in the States' army before joining the WIC. Some, like Johan Maurits, retained their army commissions while serving the WIC, thus providing the stadholder with a direct link to high WIC officials. The stadholder could also serve as a platform through which WIC subjects and servants could voice their frustration about the directors' management. This had happened in the year leading up to the appointment of Maurits, when the political councils in Recife had sent one of their own, Carpentier, to the Republic with three letters, one each for the company directors, the States-General and the stadholder. In these letters of February 21, 1636, the councils in Brazil complained about being forgotten and ignored by the company's management. The letter to the stadholder thus contained the following explanation for their petition to the stadholder:

*'For our lords and masters the honorable directors of the West India Company have, either through inability or negligence, let this grand wholesome conquest deteriorate, not sending such quantities of people, of ships, of supplies and ammunition, of money and merchandise, and all that is very necessary for the conservation of this great conquest. Therefore we have so repeatedly written, lamented and prayed so many times.'*<sup>232</sup>

The stadholder was thus already involved in Brazilian affairs even before the appointment of Maurits. It could make sense, therefore, for the company directors to choose someone close to Frederik Hendrik so that the stadholder would effectively push for support for the company with the Generality and the admiralties.

From then onwards, things moved quickly. The minutes reveal that, by August 5, a select committee had spoken to Johan Maurits, had sought and received the approval of the stadholder, had talked to the States-General about Johan Maurits retaining his army position, and had also drafted a contract for him.<sup>233</sup> Although the minutes of the meetings of the XIX suggest Johan Maurits to be largely a passive party, this is likely a reflection of the institutional nature of the sources. Johan Maurits' insistence that he should retain his army commission shows that he was in fact quite shrewd. Not only did retaining his position mean that he would have a job upon return to the Netherlands, but also that in the years to come he would not simply serve the WIC, but also the Generality. Johan Maurits used this to great avail to argue for his continued correspondence with both the States-General and the stadholder, against the wishes of the XIX. This was highly significant, as will become apparent in chapters six and eight. In addition, by August 5, a contract for the newly selected *Hooghe en Secrete Raden* (the High and Secret Council), which would work with Maurits, had been drafted. The choice of council members is again revealing: both Johan Gijsselingh and Matthias van Ceulen were appointed, as was Adriaen van der Dussen. Johan Maurits would thus be assisted in Brazil by three directors of the company, representing the three biggest chambers: Amsterdam, Zeeland and De Maze. In addition, two of these men (Gijsselingh and Van Ceulen) had been in Brazil before. Even, therefore, in appointing a powerful governor who would centralize government in the colony, the company's separate

<sup>232</sup> NL-HaNA 1.05.01.01 OWIC, inv. no. 51, item 38, letter of the Recife council to Frederik Hendrik, February 21, 1636.

<sup>233</sup> NL-HaNA 1.05.01.01 OWIC, inv. no. 2, p. 255. *Secrete notulen van de Heeren XIX*, July 1636.

chambers tried to exert their influence in the colony. Johan Maurits would thus be backed up by men directly representing the interests of the chambers.

It is especially interesting to see that the XIX were in close contact with both the stadholder and the States-General during the process of appointing Johan Maurits and the new council. The speed at which the process took place is also astounding when one considers the normally very long-drawn-out decision-making process in the WIC's central organ. By late August 1636, Maurits had set sail for Brazil with four ships.<sup>234</sup> The fact that this was fewer than the thirty-two ships initially promised to him would become typical of the relationship between motherland and colony in the coming years: grand promises of help and support, but meager actual support.

### **Commanders, directors and governors-general**

From the appointment procedure it already becomes apparent that the WIC may have designed its office of governor-general primarily to suit its candidate, rather than looking for a candidate to fill a pre-existing vacancy. It is worthwhile testing this hypothesis, however, by comparing the office of Johan Maurits to other high WIC commands and the VOC's office of governor-general to see what the differences and similarities were between his position and that of other high colonial officers in the service of the Dutch chartered companies. This section will therefore compare the powers granted to Johan Maurits as governor-general of Brazil to the powers devolved to the VOC's governors-general, as well as to the composition of councils in other WIC colonies in the mid-1630s so as to identify any models that may have influenced the company in designing the office of the governor-general of Brazil.

In describing the exploits of Johan Maurits in Brazil, a comparison is often made with the VOC's governors-general in Batavia, as the following quote illustrates:

*To compare Jan Pieterszoon Coen and Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen with one another is to place a burgher focused on trade and profit against a humanistically educated and military skilled nobleman, related to the Orange stadholders.*<sup>235</sup>

Although the comparison between Johan Maurits and Coen may seem puzzling at first glance, this comparison with the VOC governors-general has been made more often in the literature.<sup>236</sup> The main point of this comparison often seems to be to elevate Johan Maurits to the role of a 'humanist prince in the New World', while disparaging other Dutch colonial administrators.<sup>237</sup> A well-known and especially disparaging evaluation of the role of the governor-general in Asia is given by Scammel in his well-known work *The First Imperial Age*:

<sup>234</sup> Casper Barlaeus and S.P. L'Honoré Naber, *Nederlandsch Brazilië* (Dutch translation of the *Rerum per Octennium...*, The Hague 1923) 38.

<sup>235</sup> Horst Lademacher, 'Jan Pieterszoon Coen und Johann Moritz van Nassau-Siegen – Vergleich zweier Exponenten früher niederländischer Kolonialpolitik', in: G. Brunn and C. Neutsch, *Sein Feld war die Welt: Johann Moritz van Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679), Von Siegen über die Niederlande und Brasilien nach Brandenburg* (Münster 2008), 93-104, 93. 'Jan Pieterszoon Coen und Johann Moritz van Nassau-Siegen miteinander zu vergleichen heißt einen auf Handel und Gewinn geeichten Bürger einem mit den oranischen Statthaltern verwandten, humanistisch gebildeten und militärisch geübten Adligen gegenüberzustellen.'

<sup>236</sup> Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 66.

<sup>237</sup> The phrase 'a humanist prince in the New World' also derives from Boxer.

*His [the governor-general] rule was authoritarian, not to say absolute, with the city's 'free burghers' denied, on Company orders, any elected representation. The governor-general controlled that army of clerks and book-keepers an empire of commerce demanded and such small groups of colonists as VOC policy permitted. The heads of the various Asian factories, commanders of forts and residents at the courts of local rulers bound to the Company by treaty were all supposedly under his authority.*<sup>238</sup>

According to Scammel, the VOC's governor-general had near-absolute vice-regal powers, unchecked by others. Closer examination of the VOC's governmental model reveals this claim, however, to be largely untrue. Lower-ranking servants of the company were not bound to the governor-general personally, but instead to the High Government of the Indies as a whole (consisting of the governor-general and the council of the Indies). The instruction of 1617, which regulated the relations within the council, stipulated that the governor-general would act as president of the council of the Indies. Until 1646, this council was composed of five ordinary members, in addition to four extraordinary members commanding outlying posts such as Ambon, Banda, Coromandel and Tayoan (Taiwan).<sup>239</sup> Though the governor-general presided over this council, he could not ignore its opinion. Decisions were taken by a majority vote, and the governor-general could thus be outvoted. It was only if votes were tied that the governor-general had the privilege of forcing a decision by casting a double vote. In some cases, the council did indeed systematically oppose the governor-general and force his resignation.<sup>240</sup> In other words, rather than allowing for absolute rule by the governor-general, the VOC's governmental model offered some checks and balances on the power of its most important servant.<sup>241</sup>

In comparing the office of the governor-general in Batavia with that of Johan Maurits in Recife, there are some notable differences. Firstly, Maurits had only three council members to work with. This made the tie-breaking double vote all the more valuable: Johan Maurits needed only one council member on his side in order to get his way. Secondly, Johan Maurits was personally the commander-in-chief of the army and naval forces in Brazil, and allowed to appoint army officers on campaign.<sup>242</sup> The VOC, by contrast, had originally designated the command over the army and navy to two separate councilors in its High Government. As a rule, the VOC's governor-general did not leave Batavia to lead the troops in the field, whereas although Maurits was checked by a council, the small size of this council meant that the governor-general was all the more powerful. Unifying the role of president of the council and commander-in-chief of the army and navy thus represented a clear break with the VOC model, as did the size of the council. We may thus reject the claim that the office of Maurits was modeled on the VOC position of the same name. Did the WIC, then, draw inspiration from its other Atlantic possessions?

When comparing the office of Johan Maurits with other WIC commands, the first striking thing is the difference in nomenclature: Maurits was the only governor-general that the WIC ever appointed; other areas under the WIC's control had to make do with a vice-director, director or director-general. This reflects the importance of Brazil in the WIC's plans, and

<sup>238</sup> G.V. Scammel, *The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion c.1400-1715* (Cambridge 1989) 155.

<sup>239</sup> J. Aalbers, *Rijckloff van Goens: Commissaris en veldoverste der Oost-Indische Compagnie, en zijn arbeidsveld. 1653/54 en 1657/58* (Groningen 1916) 12-13.

<sup>240</sup> This happened to Rijckloff van Goens during his tenure as governor-general in 1677-1681.

<sup>241</sup> F. Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC* (7<sup>th</sup> revised edition, Zutphen 2002) 66.

<sup>242</sup> Though not the officers of troops in fortresses; these officers were appointed by the council as a whole.

perhaps also the higher status of Johan Maurits as an individual. It is important to keep in mind that, in 1636, the WIC controlled very little territory in Africa: only Fort Nassau on the Gold Coast, and the island of Gorée. In the Americas meanwhile there was the vast but sparsely populated territory of New Netherland in the north, and scattered holdings in the Caribbean: Bonaire had been taken in 1633 and resorted under New Netherland; Curacao had been conquered a year later, followed by Aruba in 1636; Tobago was colonized in 1632, but this was a private venture of the Lampsins family of Zeeland; of the Leeward islands, Saba had been taken in 1632 and St Eustatius in 1636, while the WIC had also had interests in the Virgin Islands since 1625. In addition, there were private ventures on the 'Wild Coast' of the Guyanas, mostly from Zeeland. This list is thus not an impressive showcase for a WIC empire in the Atlantic in the mid-1630s. In addition, many of these proprietary colonies were attacked by Spain in the years to come (including Tobago, the Virgin Islands and St. Maarten in the 1640s). The WIC also contemplated whether some of its conquests, for example Curacao, should be retained.<sup>243</sup> This underlines that the weight of the WIC's attention in 1636 was directed to the South Atlantic, where it hoped to extend its possessions in Brazil and attack the Portuguese in Angola and on the Gold Coast. The one exception was the colony of New Netherland in North America, which was supposed to be integrated into the South Atlantic system as a supplier of grain to the plantation colonies in Brazil.<sup>244</sup> A comparison of the position of the governor-general of Brazil with that of the director of New Netherland can thus perhaps best highlight some of the similarities between these two offices, as well as some of the things that made the office of governor-, admiral- and captain-general exceptional.

Although, by the mid-1630s, the colony of New Netherland was still small and of relatively limited significance to the WIC, it could have served as a model for the administration of Brazil. Since 1625, responsibility for governing the North American colony had been entrusted to a director and a council. This council was initially composed of four men besides the director, but this number quickly increased to nine. Additionally, captains of WIC ships visiting the colony had a seat and a vote on the council during their stay in the colony.<sup>245</sup> Although this latter provision met with resistance from the colonists, who were only allowed two seats on the council, the provision was maintained until 1647.<sup>246</sup> The director and council were collectively responsible for governance, and on occasions the director was outvoted by the council.<sup>247</sup> Although there are few documents still extant on the organization of governance in the North American colony's early years, there were clearly some important differences between this and the government of Brazil, with the most important of these being, again, the size of the council. The small size of the High and Secret Council in Brazil put Johan Maurits in a very privileged position compared to his contemporary colonial colleagues. This difference would have been immediately apparent through the titles of captain and admiral-general that were bestowed on Johan Maurits in addition to that of governor-general.

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<sup>243</sup> For example, NL-HaNA 1.05.01.01 OWIC, inv. no. 34, fol. 52 recto. The minutes of the *hoofdparticipanten* of Zeeland mention that it was in their opinion best to abandon the island.

<sup>244</sup> J. Jacobs, *Een zegenrijk gewest: Nieuw-Nederland in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam 1999), 194.

<sup>245</sup> *Ibidem*, 108-109.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibidem*, 111.

<sup>247</sup> J. Jacobs, *The Colony of New Netherland: A Dutch Settlement in Seventeenth-Century America* (Ithaca and London, 2009) 65.

## Conclusion

The appointment of Johan Maurits to the position of ‘governor-, admiral- and captain-general of the Brazilian Coasts’ was the result of processes that had been underway ever since the capture of Recife and Olinda back in 1630. The WIC had struggled to find a governmental model that would work in the troubled conditions of Brazil. The progression of different models and the back-and-forth discussions on the issue provide a fascinating insight into the goals, objectives and worries of the company directors. They also provide insight into the ideological aspects of the WIC’s overseas administration. This insight touches on questions of identity and citizenship in the colonial context that have not been discussed in full in this chapter, but are worth examining in future research. Throughout the early 1630s the WIC tried to govern Brazil from the Republic, or at least to make Brazilian governance conform to Dutch models, as testified to by the fact that the chamber division of the seats in the original political council in Recife in 1630-1633 was based on the same nine-fold division used in the Netherlands. When this council proved ineffective, the directors sent two of their own to govern the colony. The tenure of these two men, Van Ceulen and Gijsselingh, was a unique period in early modern Dutch colonial administration as it was the only time when the two worlds of company governance – Dutch and colonial – overlapped. The fact that the issue of sending plenipotentiary directors to the colony was debated again in the summer of 1635 shows that the experiment was deemed successful enough to be worth repeating. Indeed, the council appointed in summer 1636 to serve alongside Johan Maurits was staffed solely by company directors, including Van Ceulen and Gijsselingh. The fierce criticism emanating from Brazil, both targeted at the way Brazil was governed, as well as at the company directors and their perceived lack of interest in Brazil, may have been an important consideration in drafting a fundamental change in Brazil and opting for a more powerful governor. This was not merely a question of internal company policy as, from an early stage, the Brazilian administration had lobbied with both the States-General and the stadholder. This latter figure loomed especially large in the appointment procedure for Brazil and seems to have provided a template for the new governor.

Much of the literature links the position created for Johan Maurits to that of the governors-general in the VOC Asian world. This chapter has argued that the comparison with the VOC is not enlightening as, in practice, these two functions operated quite differently, despite sharing the same name. The VOC’s governor-general in Asia had to deal with a more powerful and larger council and thus had to try to find a consensus among a majority of the council. In addition, and unlike Johan Maurits, the VOC’s governor-general did not enjoy direct control over the company’s armed forces. By contrast, Johan Maurits was in a far more powerful position vis-à-vis his three-man council.

The comparison with the administration of New Netherland has shown that this was not a direct model for Brazilian government either. Although the governance model of a council, headed by a director or governor of sorts, was widespread in the early modern Dutch colonial empire, the exact configuration of the Brazilian case is unique. This chapter has argued that the figure of the stadholder may have served as inspiration for the role of Johan Maurits. Indeed, the position of Johan Maurits as a German nobleman fits well with such a role. The title conferred on Johan Maurits also resembled that of the stadholder. Rather than modeling its highest office on the VOC’s governor-general, who in fact acted more as a main strategist and bookkeeper-in-chief, the WIC modeled its highest office in Brazil on that of the stadholder by combining civil and military function in one person. The importance of this military aspect of Maurits’ position



should be heavily emphasized. The abundance of literature on his more cultural achievements, including architecture, botany, zoology, astronomy and religious tolerance, tends to overshadow his role as a military man.<sup>248</sup> For a seventeenth-century nobleman, warfare and support of the arts were, of course, part and parcel of a public performance. Emphasizing the role of Johan Maurits as a military man is not, therefore, to negate or deny the importance of his cultural exploits in displaying his power and position, but serves rather to rectify a historiography that has for too long been unbalanced in the other direction. This military side was the most important part of his job, however. Groomed by his higher-placed family members for high command, Johan Maurits could play the part of commander-in-chief of army and navy in Brazil, while also being able to fulfill the more civil side of his assignment. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Wätjen, whose work continues to be at the genesis of the literature on Dutch Brazil, talked about the *statthalterschaft*, rather than a form of governorship.<sup>249</sup>

This interpretation of the appointment and position of Maurits should also inform our understanding of the WIC in the mid-1630s. The close association with the office of the stadholder suggests that the WIC directors saw themselves as part of the pro-war faction in the Republic. Close association with the stadholder, which was achieved by appointing a Nassau to command in Brazil, could be seen by the directors as attractive for several reasons. The WIC directors thought the company stood to gain more from continuation of the war than from a peace settlement, with the memory of Piet Hein's capture of the silver fleet still fresh in everyone's mind. Meanwhile there were still many lands that could be conquered from the Portuguese in the South Atlantic, including preferably Angola as, crucially, the WIC still needed access to enslaved Africans to have any chance of making the sugar plantations in Brazil work. The appointment of Johan Maurits stresses the military side of the assignment. The WIC had originally been conceived as a combination of a war-making/privateering and a trading/settling hybrid, with separate accounts for each types of activity.<sup>250</sup> By the mid-1630s, however, its bellicose role had overshadowed the other half of the company's corporate identity. Thus a choice for continued war, along with support of the stadholder, was vital. This would have crucial and long-lasting effects on the company's future prospects. Indeed its choice for the warring party increasingly put the company at loggerheads with many of the merchants in the Republic, who were suffering heavily at the hands of Dunkirk privateers. Merchant opinion in the cities of Holland, and especially Amsterdam, increasingly came to demand an end to the conflict. This proved catastrophic for the WIC in later years, when it became more and more dependent on support from the Dutch state. Johan Maurits thus represents a case where an individual could capitalize on existing ties – to the stadholder – to achieve a prestigious promotion. This contrasts sharply with the early career in the VOC of Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens, who, rather than capitalizing on existing networks to achieve a high position immediately upon entry into the company, demonstrated the active networking that was a prerequisite for a successful career for those from a modest background.

<sup>248</sup> In recent years, attention has focused especially on the religious aspect; see, for example, Israel, J. and S.B. Schwartz, *The Expansion of Tolerance: Religion in Dutch Brazil (1624-1654)* (Amsterdam 2007).

<sup>249</sup> H. Wätjen, *Das Holländische Kolonialreich in Brasilien* (The Hague and Gotha, 1921) 74.

<sup>250</sup> From the charter of the company, point XVI: 'Datmen alle ses Jaaren sal maecken generaele Reeckeninge van alle vuytreedingen ende retouren, mitsgaders van winste ende verlies van de Compagnie, Te weeten een van negotie, ende een vandeer oorloge elck apart.'

### 3. Rising through the ranks

*The early career of Rijckloff van Goens, 1629-1655*

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This chapter will examine the early career of Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens in Asia in the period 1629-1655. This early period of Van Goens' career is a striking example of a meteoric rise throughout the VOC's ranks by a man from a relatively low background. It thus forms an interesting contrast with the appointment of Johan Maurits to the governorship of Brazil, as explored in the previous chapter. Johan Maurits, a high (though impoverished) nobleman, was appointed to a high office within the colonial hierarchy of the WIC on the basis of his networks and experience within the Republic itself. Rijckloff van Goens, by contrast, built his career step-by-step within the VOC's Asian hierarchy, advancing from a lowly position to the rank of a member of the Council of the Indies and commander of the homeward-bound fleet in 1654-1655. The early career of Van Goens can be used to test a number of hypotheses, as the ways in which he achieved this advancement will reveal the internal structure of the company in Asia. How could an orphan in the company's service rise so far through the ranks? Were familial ties important, as we would expect if we accept Adams's thesis, or was the VOC a meritocratic organization? If family ties were important, as we can reasonably expect, given their role in career-making in the Netherlands itself and as chapter two has already shown, what kinds of ties were important and how could new ties be forged? The early career of Van Goens is also interesting as it took place completely in the Indies and thus contrasts with the appointment of Johan Maurits, as detailed in the previous chapter, in that it was less likely to be affected by factional struggles within and between the VOC's chambers and by Dutch domestic politics.

This chapter will argue that to get ahead within the company in Asia, skill alone was not enough, one also needed connections. This meant that ambitious company servants needed to familiarize themselves with the worlds of patronage and patrimonialism in the VOC's Asian empire. At the lower levels of the company's ranks in which Van Goens operated until the early 1650s, it was still possible to make a career without strong support from factions within the VOC in the Netherlands. But this became progressively more difficult as Van Goens rose through the ranks. This chapter will therefore conclude with his trip to the Netherlands in 1654-1655. This heralded a new phase of his career as he would henceforth enjoy the backing of important factions within the VOC, especially in the Amsterdam chamber. The chapter will rely primarily on the application of Julia Adams's theory on patrimonialism to the case of the VOC *in Asia*. The familial networks within the company will, for the first time, be examined here in some detail, thus shedding light not only on Van Goens' career, but also on the careers of others like him. Examining these networks will also help explain the patterns of illegal private trade within the VOC during that period.

#### **Rijckloff van Goens: a career in fast-forward**

This chapter will not examine every phase of Van Goens' career in Asia in the period 1629-1655 in equal detail. The following section will provide a brief overview of the progress of his career before turning to address the important questions that this trajectory raises. After the death of his parents in 1629-1630, Rijckloff van Goens remained in Batavia in the care of his uncle, Boycke Boyckes van Goens. And it was his uncle who got him his first job as junior assistant of Arent Gardenijs on the Coromandel Coast in 1632. Starting from this lowly position, Van Goens

advanced through the ranks rapidly, rising to company servant without rank in Batavia at a salary of 12 guilders a month in 1636, to assistant a year later and to junior merchant in 1639. Three years later, in October 1642, he was promoted to the position of merchant (*koopman*), and in February 1645 became the provisional head of the payments office in Batavia (*soldijcomptoir*). A year later he was elevated to the rank befitting this position and made chief merchant (*opperkoopman*). He appears to have fulfilled these duties satisfactorily as he was subsequently sent to Jambi, a VOC post on Sumatra, as the new head. During this time in Jambi, he also made his first trip to Mataram as *secunde*, or second-in-command, of the diplomatic mission. In 1649, he cruised with four ships in the Sunda Straits, hoping to apprehend a convoy of four Genoese ships that had been built and manned in the Netherlands. Although Van Goens did not personally catch the ships, he did gain admission to the Council of Justice in Batavia. In 1649, he once again went to Mataram, but now as the head of the diplomatic mission. Mataram was important to the VOC since it was Batavia's largest neighbor and supplied almost all the rice consumed in the city. Relations with Mataram were often tense, with the kingdom having besieged Batavia as recently as 1629, the year Van Goens had originally arrived in Asia. By 1650, the High Government was so impressed by the now thirty-one-year-old Van Goens that he was sent to the VOC establishment in Siam, where he was supposed to replace the head of the loge, who was deemed untrustworthy, and also to go through the books and get all the accounts in order.<sup>251</sup> After his return from Siam, Van Goens went to Mataram twice more, in 1651 and 1652, while also serving as the first chief merchant of the castle in Batavia. In 1653, Van Goens was sent to the West, commanding a fleet intended to combat the Portuguese in the waters around Goa and Ceylon. This mission was a success and, having destroyed five Portuguese galleons off Goa, Van Goens was admitted to the Council of the Indies in 1653. The next year, he was discharged with full honors and sailed to the Netherlands as the commander of the homeward-bound fleet, arriving in 1655.<sup>252</sup>

The important question raised by this brief description of this successful VOC servant's career is, of course, how? Or, in other words, how was a lowly orphan able to advance through the ranks to become a member of the Council of the Indies, the supreme governing council of the VOC in Asia? There are a number of possible answers to this question. In the first place, if the VOC was strictly a meritocracy, Van Goens must have been exceptionally skilled. The VOC, however, was obviously not a meritocracy, with connections and networks also playing a role in career advancement, even though some of the literature has perhaps overstated the role of having friends in high places. In *The First Imperial Age*, for example, Scammell has the following to say about the VOC's appointment procedures: '*In that time-honoured style which has ruined many a business[,] the directors of the Dutch VOC nominated their talentless friends and relations to Company posts in Asia.*'<sup>253</sup> This statement is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it obviously overstates its case as Van Goens did not know any directors and, until 1655, built his career wholly in Asia, and very successfully at that. This points to the fact that the little scholarship there is on persons within the company, and especially of their career paths, is focused on the directors in the Republic, rather than on the 'men on the spot' in Asia. Secondly, the quotation hits on the two social

<sup>251</sup> NL-HaNA 1.10.32, Van Goens, inv. no. 9, appointment to Siam.

<sup>252</sup> For a brief overview of the career of Van Goens in this period, see: W.M. Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckertsz van Goens: De carrier van een diplomat, 1619-1655* (Utrecht 1954). Ottow follows rather closely the personal memoir of Van Goens, which was written for his children upon his return to Asia in 1656, in NL-HaNA, 1.10.32, Van Goens, inv. no. 6.

<sup>253</sup> G.V. Scammell, *The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion 1500-1715* (London 1989) 95.

relations that were indeed important to cultivate: patronage and patrimonial ties. This chapter will apply the ideas articulated in chapters 1 and 2 to the early career of Van Goens so as to explain how it was possible for him to enjoy the career he did. To that end, the chapter is divided into six sections, each focusing on a different aspect of Van Goens' career trajectory. As these sections are also ordered chronologically, they follow one another in a logical fashion. The first section will examine Van Goens' position as an orphan in Batavia and the importance of having close family around him. The second section will detail the early connections made on the Coromandel Coast and in Batavia from a patronage perspective. Marriage and the forging of familial links are the main focus in the third section. The ideas on patrimonialism developed by, for example, Julia Adams for the Dutch Republic will be applied here to the VOC in Asia. The insights from sections two and three will be combined in section four in order to explore the network among high officials in Batavia in the early 1640s. Van Goens tried and, I will argue, succeeded in becoming part of this high-placed network. The fifth section will take a different approach by examining the various kinds of assignments that a rising VOC official had to fulfill, focusing on Van Goens' diplomatic and military missions in the late 1640s and early 1650. The sixth section will examine Van Goens' trip to the Netherlands in 1654-1656, arguing that the forging of close personal ties with the company directors was of crucial importance for moving a career to the next level. This section will also provide a background to the appointment of Van Goens as commander-in-chief (*veldoverste*) on Ceylon in 1656, which will be examined in chapter seven.

### **An orphan in the company's care, 1629-1633**

*'On October 3, 1629, I sailed with my dear parents to Batavia on the ship Buren'.<sup>254</sup>* Thus Van Goens starts the narrative of his move to Batavia in 1629, at the tender age of ten. This move would determine the further course of his life. His father, a cavalry officer in the Dutch garrison in Rees on the German Lower Rhine, had decided to enlist with the company at the urging of his brother, Boyckes Rijckloff van Goens, who had moved to Batavia earlier that decade. Van Goens senior would be employed in the company's army at Batavia, in the rank of *commandeur*. Arriving in Batavia on July 10, 1629, the family had just had time to settle into their new environment when, on August 22, the King of Mataram started the now famous Siege of Batavia. This immediately put Van Goens' father in the front line. Things, however, turned out very differently for the family than initially expected as Van Goens senior died only five days later. In the memoir written for his children in the mid-1650s, Van Goens junior described it thus: *August 27, 1629. My beloved father died after having been in the country only for the duration of a month and 17 days.*<sup>255</sup>

Unfortunately, Van Goens does not mention what the cause of his father's death was: enemy action, or sickness. After his father's death, the family probably moved in with Rijckloff's uncle, Boyckes van Goens. However, Rijckloff's mother Hillegond did not last long either: *July 25, 1630. My dear mother Hillegond Jacobs of Franeker died, leaving me an orphan without parents in a strange land without any special inheritance but the hope of God's blessing.*<sup>256</sup> Thus, by the summer of 1630, Rijckloff van Goens had become orphaned in Batavia, aged slightly older than ten. He was the orphan of a soldier; however, not just any soldier. This statement merits some explanation, given that the status of his deceased parents may help shed some light on the success of Van Goens' future career. His father, Volckert van Goens, had been a cavalry officer in the States' army in

<sup>254</sup> NL-HaNA, Collectie van Goens, inv. no. 6, unfoliated, page 1.

<sup>255</sup> Ibidem, 2.

<sup>256</sup> Ibidem, 2.

Rees. However, as the VOC's armed forces did not include a cavalry component, with the exception of the mounted guard of the Governor-General, Van Goens' senior would be likely to have been employed as an officer in the guard of Coen himself. This was a rather more prestigious task than regular soldiering in the VOC's service, and it may have ensured the young Van Goens would have come to the attention of the governor-general, had Jan Pieterszoon Coen not died a month later, in September 1629.<sup>257</sup> Nevertheless, it is still possible that the father's position may have furthered the ease with which his son was later able to obtain a position in the company.

Despite the death of both his parents Rijckloff still had some family left in Batavia: his uncle and the latter's family. Since Batavia did not yet have an orphan board (though it did have orphan masters), it is likely that the young Van Goens was entrusted to the care of his uncle, Boyckes van Goens.<sup>258</sup> Indeed, Van Goens' memoir confirms that it was his uncle who got him his first assignment:

*Anno 1631*

*On the ninth of May, through the recommendation of my uncle, I sailed with the ship Prins Willem from Batavia to the Coast Coromandel at the service of Arent Gardenijs, extra-ordinary council of the Indies and Governor on the Coast, who has been a good mentor to me.*<sup>259</sup>

The young Van Goens thus served as the assistant of Arent Gardenijs, the Governor of the Coromandel Coast. At this point, before the rise of the Bengal trade and the establishment of the VOC on Ceylon and Malabar, Coromandel was easily the most important of the VOC's Western commands, along with Surat and Persia, and its governor was a powerful figure within the company. So while Rijckloff did not stand to inherit much after his parents died, and could not profit from networks or ties forged by them, he did have the crucial advantage of having his uncle already established in Batavia. Indeed, his uncle succeeded in getting the young Rijckloff his first job, involving working for an important man, and with it the opportunity to make his own contacts and his own way in the world.

### **Coromandel and Batavia, forging crucial links**

Van Goens did not stay on the Coromandel Coast for long as Arent Gardenijs was called back in 1632, accused of private trade. Van Goens subsequently returned to Batavia in 1634 with Gardenijs' successor, who also stood accused of private trade, which was prohibited to the company's personnel. Both men for whom Van Goens worked on the Coromandel Coast were, therefore, accused of private trade. Crucially, however, both men were acquitted and continued their careers within the VOC. This was not unusual within the VOC; many members of the High Government were accused of private trade, but subsequently acquitted. As these high-placed company officials' networks of support may help to explain this pattern, this would make a good topic for future research.

Arent Gardenijs was called back from the Coromandel Coast in 1632, put on trial in Batavia, acquitted of all charges and then promoted to second-in-command at Ambon in 1635.<sup>260</sup>

<sup>257</sup> Van Goor, *Jan Pieterszoon Coen*, 507.

<sup>258</sup> Part of the archives of the Batavia orphan board are to be found in the Dutch National Archives in The Hague, albeit only from 1700 onwards. The remainder is still with the ANRI in Jakarta and has not been accessed.

<sup>259</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.10.32, Collectie van Goens, inv. no. 6, unfoliated, page 2.



Gardenijs had been removed from office after an inspection of the books and warehouses at Pulicat revealed shortcomings. So how did he manage to be acquitted? A likely answer lies in the fact that he was married to Geertruyt Buys, a sister of the wife of governor-general Jacques Specx.<sup>261</sup> This familial connection probably protected Gardenijs from being convicted, and may also prove an alternative connection of Van Goens to the higher circles of power in Batavia. Indeed, Van Goens was very positive about Gardenijs in his memoir, and the latter may have helped him to get a job as an assistant in the warehouses after his return to Batavia in 1634, given that Gardenijs did not leave Batavia for Ambon until the next year. It is also interesting to note that, according to Van Goens himself, he left for Batavia with Gardenijs in 1632, even though Ottow has made it clear that Van Goens did not, in fact, leave the Coromandel Coast until two years later, likely serving Gardenijs's successor David Pietersz.<sup>262</sup> While in Batavia, Van Goens worked for Jacob de With, chief merchant of the castle of Batavia and who later became governor of Coromandel himself.<sup>263</sup> By 1634, therefore, Van Goens was established in a job in Batavia that paid him a salary of 300 guilders a year.<sup>264</sup> Five years later, he was promoted to *onderkoopman* or junior merchant. He had now reached a point in life where he could support a family. This was of crucial importance for those wishing to advance within the VOC in Asia, as will be argued in the next section.

### **The importance of marrying up: marriage as a career-making tool**

By mid-1640 Van Goens was legally an adult, having turned twenty-one that June, and so allowed to marry. That same year, on September 13, he proceeded to marry Jacomina Roosegaard Jacobsdochter.<sup>265</sup> This marriage is interesting as it highlights a common career-making strategy – marrying an older widow – seen among many young officials in the VOC's Asian empire. The importance of marriage as a social tool has been somewhat understated in the case of the seventeenth-century VOC, although much more research has been done on the Republic itself. This section will explore some of the theoretical insights on the role of marriage that have been developed in relation to the Dutch Republic and will apply them to the VOC in Asia, focusing on the marriage of Van Goens. Can the idea of patrimonialism, as developed for the Republic, also be fruitfully applied to the VOC in Asia?

Julia Adams's ideas on patrimonialism in Dutch politics were discussed at some length in the introduction. She defined it as '*an image or ideology of paternal rule that may link familial with macropolitical, economic, or other sociocultural practices.*' The relevance of the study of this patriarchy is that '*they help determine how political alliances are formed and how power is transferred, how new members of the elite are recruited, how political rule is legitimated, and when it founders.*'<sup>266</sup> If it is possible to apply her insights on the role of patrimonialism in Dutch metropolitan politics, we should seek to understand the VOC's internal networking as being akin to the politics of familial factions in the Republic. This would contrast with scholarship that seeks to explain the chartered companies primarily in commercial terms and as very large shipping firms. Indeed, I argue that Van Goens'

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<sup>260</sup> W. Wijnaendts van Resandt, *De Gezaghebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie op hare buiten-comptoiren in Azië* (Amsterdam 1944) 93.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibidem*, 94.

<sup>262</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.10.32, Collectie van Goens inv. no. 6, unfoliated, page 2.

<sup>263</sup> Wijnaendts van Resandt, *De Gezaghebbers*, 98.

<sup>264</sup> Nieuw Nederlands Biografisch Woordenboek, 588.

<sup>265</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.10.32, Collectie van Goens, inv. no. 6, unfoliated, page 3.

<sup>266</sup> Adams, *Familial state*, 32.

early career is an excellent example of the importance of forging the right familial connections. Although the company's official correspondence from Asia to Europe may resemble the functional commercial letter-writing that was supposed to build trust, as discussed in the introduction, the company operated internally as if it were a Dutch municipal council, with factions vying for advancement of their members and clients, and where marrying into a strong network could mean a sudden improvement in fortunes. Strong ties to a familial network in Asia could mean not only advancement, but also access to profitable illegal trading networks held together by the high trust between family members and the costs to one's reputation of betraying one's family network. For the company, though, this was not all bad either. These networks worked *within* the company – indeed, could only work within the company – since it was individuals' role as company officials that saw them scattered across Asia and thus in a position to conduct profitable trades. It can be hypothesized, therefore, that the members of such networks, albeit often engaged in private trade, were at the same time working hard for the company's best interests since the latter's success would also mean their personal success and advancement, and a good performance in Asia would ease their ability to ultimately move back to the Netherlands with their gains and ascend into the local regent community.

Marriage was, therefore, an important social tool in the case of the colonial elites in the VOC's Asian empire. Besides the question of love between individuals, it was an important way for family groups to link themselves to other company elites. Alternatively, junior officials could try to marry into powerful families or become the clients of powerful men by marriage. There were a few recurrent themes in this respect, including the theme of two men marrying two sisters (*verzwanering*), which was also known in the Republic itself. Alternatively there was the pattern of two men marrying each other's sisters. A case that seems typical for the VOC's Asian world was the marriage of a younger man to an older widow. Marion Peters, who studied 'VOC women' on the Coromandel Coast in the seventeenth century, noted that it was common for the widow of a governor or commander who died in office to marry his successor.<sup>267</sup> She attributed this to the scarcity of potential mates on the Coromandel Coast. But if we combine her work with other research on the role of women in the illegal trading activities of VOC officials, it seems more likely that marrying the widow of one's predecessor was a way of allowing illegal trades to continue (with an influx of new capital) and, at a stroke, to enable the new governor to develop a whole new network of contacts.<sup>268</sup> A variation on this theme was for a junior official to marry the widow of a higher-ranking man. This could help the younger man to gain contacts within higher ranks who might still know their former colleague's widow. However, this strategy could also backfire, as is shown by the eighteenth-century case of the young VOC engineer and artillery officer Elias Paravicini de Capelli, who married the widow of the former governor of Ceylon, Iman Falck. In a letter to his brother in the Netherlands, he complained that his marriage was seen by others as unsuitable because the social distance between the two partners was regarded as

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<sup>267</sup> M. Peters, 'VOC-vrouwen op de Kust van Coromandel in India', *Jaarboek voor het Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie* 58 (2004) 68-105, 83.

<sup>268</sup> Femme Gaastra mentions the role of women in the illegal trades of the Batavia elites, presenting the story of the wife of governor-general Maetsuijcker who was caught smuggling Japanese gold to Surat in exchange for diamonds. Maetsuijcker got off by claiming one could not expect a woman to know all the rules. This was a rather convenient excuse as he was responsible for his wife's actions. In reality, the committee that reviewed the case was probably also engaged in the same activities. See: F. Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid*. (Zutphen 1989). Leonard Blussé also deals briefly with the role of the Batavia women in: L. Blussé, *Bitters Bruid: een koloniaal huwelijksdrama in de gouden eeuw* (Amsterdam 1997).

too great. Elias also mentioned hearing rumors that he only married his wife for the substantial fortune left to her by her previous husband.<sup>269</sup> There seems thus to have been a certain ‘bandwidth’ for social rise through marriage as, in this particular case, the effect of the marriage on the man involved was negative: he was seen by his peers and superiors as overstepping his boundaries. In many other cases, however, the effect will have been positive, as the new husband would have been able to forge new ties through his wife. For the women involved, the prospect of continued social status and the ability to continue trading activities may also have been important reasons for remarrying. This, however, is a topic for future research.

Another question that has not yet been addressed is the women’s role in picking their new husbands. If insights from gender studies are to be fruitfully applied, the perspective of the women involved also needs to be taken into account. This is often difficult to do since most sources available were written by men. However, there are some remarks that can be made. When marrying a widow, a younger official had to take care to present himself in the best possible light as his prospective spouse was likely to be free to accept or decline his offer. This means that reputation, income and being good at one’s job were likely to be important attributes for finding a good match. Widows such as Jacomina Roosegaard thus functioned as ‘gatekeepers’: their ability to select new husbands involved a process of weeding out drunk, incompetent and abusive candidates. The example of the marriage of Cornelia van Neijenroode to the inept and abusive Joan Bitter in 1676 shows the dire consequences of getting it wrong.<sup>270</sup> This selection process also held true for Van Goens, who married Jacomina Roosegaard in 1640. She was three years his senior and the widow of Jan Lievensz., who had been a lieutenant in the army at Batavia.<sup>271</sup> The marriage facilitated Van Goens’ entry into the social world around the High Government itself, as the baptismal records of the five children resulting from the marriage over the next six years show and as will be explored in the next section.

### **The old boys’ network: Sweers, Van Vliet, Coyett and Caron**

His marriage, in 1640, to Jacomina Roosegaard enabled Van Goens to gain access to a new network of support. This is apparent from the baptismal records of his children, as shown in Table 4. Standing witness to a child’s baptism was a privilege reserved for close friends or family, and the witnesses thus reveal who was close to the Van Goenses, or whom the couple wished to be close to.<sup>272</sup> In their study of the selection of godparents in eighteenth-century Óbidos (Portugal), Joaquim Ramos de Carvalho and Ana Isabel Ribeiro use the term ‘spiritual kinship’, which they identify as ‘*a form of kinship that derives from the participation in certain sacraments*’.<sup>273</sup> The most important of these sacraments was baptism and the election of godparents. The selection of godparents reveals both the aspirations of the parents and the stature of the elected godparents, as well as the ties that were not possible (because certain people were not chosen). Although there are as yet no similar studies for a Protestant Dutch setting, it seems useful to apply the term

<sup>269</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.01.50, Stadhoudelijke Secretarie, inv. no. 1229, *Brief van de majoor van de artillerie op Ceilon, E. Paravicini de Capelli, aan zijn broer, B.E. Paravicini de Capelli, betreffende de bezwaren tegen zijn bevordering tot kolonel en de beschuldigingen tegen hem geuit door Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden van Indië, met bijlagen, afschriften. 1791*

<sup>270</sup> The case of Cornelia van Neijenroode is perhaps the most famous Dutch divorce case of the seventeenth century. The story is told in: L. Blussé, *Bitters Bruid: Een koloniaal huwelijksdrama in de Gouden Eeuw* (Balans: Amsterdam 1997).

<sup>271</sup> Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckertsz van Goens*, 38.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibidem*, 39.

<sup>273</sup> J.R. de Carvalho and A.I. Ribeiro, ‘Using Network Analysis on Parish Registers: How Spiritual Kinship Uncovers Social Structure’, in: J.R. de Carvalho (ed.), *Bridging the Gaps: sources, methodology and approaches to religion in history* (Pisa University Press: Pisa 2008) 171-186, 172.

here. The selection of witnesses for the baptism of the Van Goens children thus reveals the aspired spiritual kinship that Van Goens tried to create between his children, himself and the witnesses.

**Table 4: Witnesses to the baptism of Rijckloff van Goens' children, 1641-1646**

Child	Date of baptism	Witness 1	Witness 2	Witness 3	Witness 4	Witness 5
Volckert (I)	June 30, 1641	Boyckes van Goens (abs.)	Jacob Leenderts	Pieter Mesdagh	Maria Strijd	Aeltje van de Camer
<b>Rijckloff</b>	June 19, 1642	Cornelis van der Lijn	Adriaen van Liesvelt	Jan de Waert	Adriana Mesdagh	Jolina Hillenius
Jacob	Sept. 13, 1643	Simon van Alphen	Gerrit van Harm	Boyckes van Goens (abs.)	Claesje Jacobs (abs.)	?
<b>Volckert (II)</b>	Oct. 30, 1644	Johannes de Stercke	Caterina Sweers	Gerrit Holliger	Petronella Woudenaer	?
Francoise	Oct. 11, 1646	Ds. V. Candidus	Susanna Boudaen	Johan Verpoorten	Juff. Horst	?

Source: NL-HaNA, Collectie van Goens, inv.no. 6, p. 3-4. (abs. = absentee witness)

There are a number of striking names in the baptismal records to show that Van Goens, who was not appointed chief merchant until October 1646, did indeed have access to the higher levels of Batavian society. Cornelis van der Lijn, for example, was a member of the Council of the Indies in 1641, became director-general a year later and governor-general in 1646-1650.<sup>274</sup> In the council, Van der Lijn worked closely with Francois Caron, perhaps best known for his service in the French East India Company.<sup>275</sup> Caron was married to Constantia Boudaen, whose sister, Susanna Boudaen, was a witness to the baptism of Van Goens' daughter Francoise in 1646. Susanna Boudaen herself was married to Frederick Coyett, best known today for being responsible for the surrender of Fort Zeelandia on Formosa (Taiwan) to the Chinese in 1662.<sup>276</sup> In the 1640s, Coyett was a member of the Council of the Indies in Batavia. Although he was later sentenced to death for his role in the loss of Formosa, this sentence was commuted into life-long imprisonment at Banda. It is unsurprising that Van Goens argued for the release of Coyett in the 1670s. Catherina Sweers, who was a witness to the baptism of Volckert (II) in 1644, was the sister of Salomon Sweers, himself a powerful member of the Council, and married Jeremias van Vliet in 1642. Van Vliet had previously served in Siam and had three daughters with a local woman, Osoet Pegua.<sup>277</sup> When Van Vliet left Siam in 1642 to marry Catherina Sweers and accept his new command in Malacca, Osoet Pegua refused to let their daughters go with him. This caused a year-

<sup>274</sup> Stapel, *Gouverneurs-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië* (The Hague 1941) 25.

<sup>275</sup> G.J. Ames, 'Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy of 1664-1674: A Reappraisal', *French Historical Studies* 16:3 (Spring, 1990) 536-559, 540-541.


<sup>276</sup> W.Ph Coolhaas, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel II: 1639-1655* (Martinus Nijhoff: Den Haag 1964) 268.

<sup>277</sup> C. Baker (ed.), *Van Vliet's Siam* (Silkworm: Chiang Mai 2005) 29-30.



long standoff between the former lovers. Since Osoet Pegua was well-connected at the Siamese court, there was little that Van Vliet could do. When Van Goens was in Siam in 1650, he proposed that the company should abduct the girls. The proposal was not acted upon, however, since the diplomatic repercussions would have been severe.<sup>278</sup> Although Van Vliet was charged, in 1645, with illegal private trade and found guilty on all charges, he was allowed to maintain his position in the High Government and ultimately repatriated with full honors in 1646. It is likely that this mild treatment was the result of his close connections to the powerful Salomon Sweers, his brother-in-law.

**Figure 6: Ties between Van Goens's baptism witnesses**



Source: Erik Odegard, 2015. The collegial ties between individuals who served together in the Council of the Indies in the early 1640s are shown in red.

Salomon Sweers was one of the power-brokers within the High Government in the mid-1640s and, as will be made apparent, continued to play an important role outside the official VOC structure by maintaining correspondence with important VOC governors, including Van Goens himself, well into the 1670s. The personal archives of Sweers for this period have been preserved. Interestingly, these were the joint archives of Salomon Sweers, Jan van Vliet (son of Jeremias) and Jacques Specx (acting governor-general in 1629-1632 and the brother-in-law of Arent Gardenijs).<sup>279</sup> These archives allow a reconstruction of the network of correspondents. This will be done in chapter seven as most of the material deals with the 1660s and 70s.

Salomon Sweers was forced to leave the company in 1646, after falling out with Cornelis van der Lijn, with whom he had been serving on the High Government. Old charges of private trade were brought up again after the two men got into a fight at a dinner at Sweers' house in

<sup>278</sup> Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckertsz van Goens*, 110-111.

<sup>279</sup> NL-HaNA, Sweers, 1.10.78, blok A, *Stukken van Salomon Sweers, Jeremias van Vliet en Jacques Specx*.



1645. The position of Sweers is interesting, however, as he clearly retained an acute insight into the company's affairs through his network of correspondents and was also closely involved in the plans for the French company in which Francois Caron became active.<sup>280</sup>

This, then, was the network of which Van Goens slowly became a part, as is apparent from his letters to Sweers in the years to the early 1670s. The fact that most of the men in this network were charged with private trade and forced to return to the Netherlands at some point makes the longevity of their networks within the company interesting in itself, and this, too, will be explored in chapter seven. But did these ties help Van Goens in this phase of his career? It is likely that they did as Van Goens was steadily promoted through the ranks. It is important to note the incremental nature of his steps on the ladder: only after Van Goens had proven his competence at one level, was he promoted to the next. This is entirely logical as it was not in his patrons' interests to promote him to a high level and run the risk that he would be unable to deliver. The reciprocity of the patron-client relationship is crucial. At this stage, Van der Lijn, whom Van Goens chose as a baptismal witness for his son in 1642, was especially significant. The important promotions that Van Goens was awarded in subsequent years, including his promotion to chief merchant in February 1646, and his appointment to inspect and overhaul the establishment in Siam in September 1650, were both signed by Van der Lijn, and indeed only by Van der Lijn.<sup>281</sup> Knowing the people who were responsible for advancement and promotions was likely to be a real advantage for getting these promotions. Van Goens' quick strides through the hierarchy, which were achieved despite official statutes banning promotions in the middle of service contracts, were thus in all likelihood due to his network of support within the High Government of the Indies.

### **Diplomatic missions and military command: career selling points?**

By mid-1648, Van Goens was established as head of the trade loge of Jambi, the Sumatran pepper center. His career then took an important turn, when he was sent as the assistant of Sebalt Wonderer on a diplomatic mission to the court of Mataram, the largest and most powerful of the Javanese kingdoms neighboring Batavia. Van Goens aptly summarized the tenuous relationship between the VOC and Mataram: '*Anno 1648. May 26<sup>th</sup>, I was sent as the first ambassador to the Sousoubounan [king] of Mataram to sign a peace treaty with him. Mataram had always been our bitterest foe that was to be feared at Batavia.*'<sup>282</sup> Van Goens slightly inflated his own sense of self-importance here as he was not in fact the head of the mission, but only second-in-command. After this first mission in May 1648, Van Goens went to the court of Mataram no fewer than four times over the next six years. These missions shaped his reputation as an able diplomat and launched his career on a new trajectory, away from trade-oriented assignments and more towards diplomacy and warfare. This transition would prove significant as it gave Van Goens credibility later on and made it reasonable to entrust him with military command. By 1653, Van Goens has been assigned a temporary seat on the Council of the Indies (*raad extraordinaris*).<sup>283</sup> The diplomatic missions in the late 1640s and early 1650s thus seem to have played a vital role in the development of

<sup>280</sup> See the files on the French company in the Sweers papers: NL-HaNA, Sweers, 1.10.78, inv. no. 5, fol. 280-283, *Concept van project-artikelen tot oprichting van eene Fransche Compagnie van Oost-Indië met Hollandsche participatie. Ongedateerd.* The archive states it is the handwriting of Sweers himself. There are also papers on a new cooperative French-Dutch company in inv. no. 4.

<sup>281</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.10.32, Collectie Van Goens, inv. nos. 7 and 9.

<sup>282</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.10.32, Collectie Van Goens, inv. no. 6, unfoliated, p. 5.

<sup>283</sup> Ottow, *Rijckloff van Goens*, 189.

Van Goens' career. These missions were important for another reason as well: the accounts of his missions to the Mataram court were published in the Netherlands under the title of *Javaense Reyse* (Javanese Travels) in 1656, and this work set many stereotypes that continued to haunt Dutch colonial perceptions of Java and the Javanese until the very end of the colonial empire in the East in the twentieth century. It is interesting that this manuscript had significant implications for future VOC policy in the East as Van Goens consciously tried to use his reputation as the 'Mataram-expert' to steer policy discussions in the Republic in a new direction.<sup>284</sup> The diplomatic missions to Mataram themselves have already been studied quite extensively. Indeed, they are one of the most studied aspects of Van Goens' career. This section will therefore take a different approach and, rather than examining the missions themselves in any great detail, will contemplate the effect they had on Van Goens' career trajectory. Another important development to take into account here is the earliest military missions on which Van Goens was sent, firstly to cruise in the Sunda Straits to intercept ships from the Genoese East India Company, which the VOC considered interlopers, and, rather more spectacularly, to Ceylon and Goa in 1652-1653.<sup>285</sup>

Diplomacy, along with trade and warfare, was one of the broad skillsets in which company officials needed to become experienced in order to advance to high command. Of course, an individual could rarely do all these things at once. In the case of Van Goens, there was a clear progression from trade (office jobs in Batavia) to diplomacy (Mataram) and then to warfare. The VOC and Mataram had signed a treaty in 1646, and this brittle peace had to be reinforced by sending an annual envoy to Mataram. Van Goens' skill as an ambassador strengthened his position, both in relation to the High Government and in relation to the XVII. This latter aspect will be examined in the next section. After these successful diplomatic missions, Van Goens was sent back to India for the first time since leaving the Coromandel Coast in the 1630s. His task was to inspect the VOC establishments on the west coast of India (Surat and Wingurla), as well as Ceylon. In addition, he was to attack Portuguese shipping near Goa.<sup>286</sup> This mission was successfully completed, with five Portuguese galleons being destroyed on the roadsteads of Goa.<sup>287</sup> It also gave Van Goens the first taste of Ceylon and would inform the opinions he voiced to the directors in the Republic in the mid-1650s.


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<sup>284</sup> R. van Goens and D. de Wever (ed.), *Javaense Reyse* (Amsterdam 1995) 119-120.

<sup>285</sup> For the Genoese ships, see: Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckerts van Goens*, 88-98 and T.A. Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559-1684* (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 2005) 130.

<sup>286</sup> J. Aalbers, *Rijcklof van Goens, Commissaris en veldoverste der oost indische compagnie, en zijn arbeidsveld 1653/54 en 1657/58* (Groningen 1916) 87-96.

<sup>287</sup> Ottow, *Rijcklof van Goens*, 171-175.

**Figure 7: Map of Java and the Kingdom of Mataram in the early 1640s**

Erik Odegard, 2016. Political map of Java in the first half of the seventeenth century, showing the expansion of Mataram until 1645 and the borders of the VOC's lands around Batavia in that year.

### Career consolidation in the Republic

The early phase of Van Goens' career culminated in his appointment to the commander of the homeward-bound fleet in 1654. In itself, commanding the homeward-bound fleet was an honorary position. Of greatest importance, however, was the fact that the commander of the fleet was expected to meet the XVII and deliver a report on the state of the company in Asia. This enabled Van Goens to develop personal relations with directors, thus becoming their client and a patron to others if he chose to return to Asia. Secondly, it allowed him to present his views on the condition of the company in Asia, and his personal views on how this could be improved. Van Goens' report on his diplomatic missions to Mataram has already been briefly mentioned. Darja de Wever argues that Van Goens was now able to present himself to the XVII as the expert on Mataram. This report, according to De Wever, was a way for Van Goens to argue that good relations with King Amangkurat I were no guarantee for profitable relations and that only extension of the company's force of arms would provide such a guarantee.<sup>288</sup>

The analysis published in the *Javaense Reyse* fits seamlessly with the report on the state of the company in Asia that Van Goens submitted to the company directors in September 1655.<sup>289</sup> In this latter report, he presented the state of the company in the starkest terms, focusing on the wars the company was fighting and stressing the need for reinforcements and offensive actions. This line was perhaps most clearly laid out in the case of Ceylon, where Van Goens remarked '... *That I am of the opinion that with God's help it is possible to beat the Portuguese off of the island in two years, if only a thousand soldiers are added to those already there.*'<sup>290</sup> This was to become a theme for Van Goens in the coming years as, after returning to Asia in 1657, he continued to hark on about the need for conquests and offensive action, with Ceylon becoming ever more important in his vision for the VOC in Asia and ultimately more important even than Batavia, at least in his imagination. After the final conquest of Ceylon in 1658, he moved his sights to Malabar and the Coromandel Coast, as will be further explored in chapters seven and nine.

<sup>288</sup> D. de Wever, 'Ambassades aen den Soudouhouan Mattaram, machtigste coninck van 't eijlant Groot Java', *De VOC-gezantschapsreizen van Rijklof van Goens en zijn voorgangers*, *Indische Letteren* 11 (Alphen aan den Rijn 1996) 31-43, 41.

<sup>289</sup> P.A. van Leupe, 'Rapport Van Goens', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 4<sup>de</sup> Deel, 1<sup>ste</sup>/2<sup>de</sup> Afl. (1855) 141-180.

<sup>290</sup> *Ibidem*, 149.

There was also another reason why visiting the Republic was useful: it allowed for making personal contacts with the directors themselves. In subsequent years, criticism of Van Goens' policies on Ceylon, as voiced by 'Batavia', often fell on deaf ears as the directors were positively disposed towards him. This is likely a result of his talking to the directors themselves. Although the ties forged during this occasion are somewhat difficult to trace, Van Goens' personal memoir provides some clues. He mentions that Cornelis Weylandt in Amsterdam would take care of his children, who remained in the Netherlands when Van Goens left to return to Asia in 1657.<sup>291</sup> Weylandt was the former chief of the Surat establishment, having journeyed to the Mughal court in 1642. He remained active in the VOC's Amsterdam chamber<sup>292</sup> and proved to be a reliable correspondent in Amsterdam in the subsequent years. The first request for Van Goens to return to Asia came from the Zeeland chamber, but the Amsterdam directors then joined in, too.

Yet another important reason for visiting the Netherlands was money. Van Goens was allowed to transfer a small fortune of 100,000 guilders to his account in the Netherlands. As this amount of money was enough to set him up for life, his decision to rejoin the VOC was not inspired by want or lack of money.<sup>293</sup> This fortune also indicates that Van Goens himself had dabbled in private trade, which was nominally forbidden to VOC servants. In order to grasp the magnitude of this sum: as first merchant in the castle in Batavia, to which he had been appointed in March 1651, he earned 2200 guilders a year. At that rate of income, acquiring 100,000 guilders would have taken him over forty-five years, assuming that no money at all was spent. Although Van Goens clearly must have profited from various deals and trades, there is no clear evidence as to what these were – which is testimony to his skill in conducting them, if nothing more. Despite this handsome nest egg, Van Goens returned to Asia in 1657 at the head of fleet and army and with the aim of completing the conquest of Ceylon, which was then entering its final phase after the successful, albeit costly siege of Colombo. The second half of Van Goens' career was thus dominated to a much greater extent than before by warfare and conquest, and these issues will be taken up again in chapters five and seven.

### Conclusion and comparison

This chapter has examined the early phase of Rijckloff van Goens' career in Asia until his return to the Dutch Republic in the mid-1650s. The main question examined, namely how Van Goens was able to achieve such a successful career from quite humble beginnings, is relevant for a number of reasons. In the first place, the trajectory that Van Goens enjoyed in his early career, and especially the networks that he became part of, exerted a significant influence on his later actions and views, both on Ceylon in the 1650s to the 1670s, and in Batavia in 1675-1681. This, in turn, is important because it was largely the actions and choices of Van Goens that would determine the policies of the VOC and its posture in South Asia over the next century or more, as will be argued in chapters seven and nine. Up until the end of the war with Kandy in 1766, VOC officials on Ceylon labored in the shadow of Van Goens. It is thus worthwhile contemplating whether there was something like 'career path dependency', whereby earlier choices and previously formed opinions to a large extent determined actions and responses in

<sup>291</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.10.32, Van Goens, inv. no. 6, unfoliated, p. 8.

<sup>292</sup> A.J. Bernet Kempers, 'Een Hollandsch gezantschap naar den Groot-Mogol in 1662', *De Gids* 100 (1936) 215-231, 221.

<sup>293</sup> The capital of Van Goens sr. is estimated to have been 500,000 guilders: K. Zandvliet, C. Lesger and R. Paulien (eds.), *De 250 rijksten van de Gouden Eeuw* (Rijksmuseum: Amsterdam 2006) 85. Ottow, *Rijckloff van Goens, Carriere van een diplomaat*, 198-199.

later career settings and new circumstances. This seems relevant in the case of Van Goens, who formed his views on the stance to be adopted by the VOC against local kingdoms during his missions to Mataram and Siam in the 1640s and 1650s. The report delivered by Van Goens to the XVII in 1655 can also be seen in the light of these experiences and, as will be argued in the chapters dealing with the Ceylonese period, the views that Van Goens formed of Mataram aligned very well with the views on Kandy and the Malabar kingdoms that he voiced in subsequent decades. Van Goens' early career is thus crucial to understanding the later policies pursued during his tenure in South Asia.

In the second place, Van Goens' early career is a relevant study because it sheds light on the social interactions within the VOC elite in Batavia in the 1640s and 1650s. Although the networks in Batavia have been addressed in various biographies, their role has not been clearly conceptualized. This chapter has shown that these networks were indeed crucial for career advancement, and this point would be well worth developing in future research. In addition, the existing literature often views the High Government from too great a distance, as it was viewed by company directors in the Netherlands. This bias towards the Dutch side of operations precludes a sufficient understanding of the way in which the company in Asia actually operated. To the members of the High Government, personal and familial gain took precedence over questions of company profitability, efficiency or directors' concerns about corruption. This fundamental disconnect needs, however, to be understood if the operations of the company are to be made sense of. For the VOC servants in the East, their social world of inter-company relations was of the greatest importance as this allowed them to enrich themselves and to get away with it. This chapter has shown that all the higher officials with whom Van Goens became entangled were charged with breaking company statutes on private trade on one or more occasions during their careers. Indeed, Van Goens himself had to answer questions on his conduct during his inspection of Surat in the 1650s. Viewing these actions, from the Dutch perspective, as infringements of the company's monopolistic privileges and, therefore, as 'corruption' would, however, be counter-productive. In the patrimonial system that was the VOC, individuals could very well simultaneously serve both the company and themselves. Indeed, knowing the unwritten boundaries in this world was probably an important skill to be mastered for future advancement.

Comparing the early career of Van Goens with the procedure for appointing Johan Maurits, as discussed in chapter four, it is obviously the differences that catch our attention first. Rather than looking at one event, this chapter has discussed Van Goens' career over a protracted period of time. Unlike Johan Maurits, Van Goens had to start at the bottom of the ladder and work his way up. Johan Maurits came from a background of high nobility, with natural contacts to some of the most powerful individuals in the Republic, including the stadholder himself, but also the latter's influential secretary, Constantijn Huygens. Van Goens, on the other hand, had no contacts with the VOC directors or the elite in the Republic during the early phase of his career and could not rely on his Dutch contacts for support.

Looking into these differences in more detail allows some interesting comparisons to be made. Firstly, the early career of Van Goens in the Indies puts the radical choice of the WIC directors to seek a complete outsider into sharper focus. Van Goens was prepared for high offices in the VOC through the diversity of his assignments in his early years as a merchant, diplomat and soldier. Moreover, he was but one of a whole generation of men who grew up in the company's service and whose first recommendation for higher office within the company,



and accession to the networks that would make upward social mobility possible, was their prior experience.

The WIC chose an outsider to lead its most important colony, based on his connections in the Republic and his performance in one siege. This contrasted with the VOC, which did not appoint governor-generals directly from the Netherlands, but always from the members of the Council of the Indies. Men, in other words, who had gained invaluable experience in running the company's then rapidly expanding empire in Asia, as well as becoming integrated in the networks that bound the company's servants together. The VOC was thus able to use the networks within the company in Asia to scout for talent, with the selection of its high officials consequently being less inspired by the political and patrimonial realities of the Netherlands. Being 'parachuted' into Brazil meant a steep learning curve for Johan Maurits, and we can hypothesize whether appointing a nobleman-outsider to the company's highest colonial office did not also communicate to its mid-ranking and assorted high officers overseas that there were ranks that were effectively out of their reach, thus possibly aggravating problems with embezzlement and graft.

The mechanisms by which the two men were able to gain backing in the early periods of their careers were also quite different. In the case of Van Goens, the conscious construction of familial ties through marriage and baptism was, I have argued, of the greatest importance. What is striking in the case of Johan Maurits is that he *did not marry*. This is less surprising, however, when we consider that he came equipped, at birth, with a fully-fledged set of powerful familial ties. Put rather mechanically, therefore, there was less need for him to marry. Having built his career in the Indies, Van Goens returned to the Netherlands in 1654. This was a very significant move as it brought him into direct contact with the company directors, with whom he was able to forge both personal and professional ties. The comparison between the two men will thus be more balanced in the following chapters as I can now compare their networks across the full spectrum of directors, colonial colleagues and rivals, local society, opponents and local states.

## 4. Becoming ‘The Brazilian’

*Johan Maurits as a military commander in Brazil, 1636-1640*

This chapter will explore the tenure of Johan Maurits in Brazil in the period 1636-1640, with a special focus on his performance as a military commander. The start of the period under examination is marked by his appointment to the governor-generalship of Brazil by the XIX in the summer of 1636, while the end of the period is marked by the Portuguese assertion of independence from the Habsburg crown in 1640. This event had enormous repercussions for the entire South Atlantic system in general, and the position and future prospects of the Dutch colony in Brazil in particular. Johan Maurits’ final years in Brazil (1640-1644), including his dismissal in 1642, will be dealt with in chapter eight. This chapter thus deals with what is commonly seen in the literature as the ‘good’ period of Dutch Brazil, and on which scholarly attention for Johan Maurits’ tenure in Brazil has tended to focus. As Johan Maurits arrived in Brazil with an entourage of scholars, scientists and artists, scholars have generally chosen to concentrate on his cultural projects, including the first paintings of the New World, by Frans Post and Albert Eckhout, which attracted great attention in Europe.<sup>294</sup> These projects also included the first astronomical observatory in the Americas, which was built by Georg Marckgraf, who also cooperated with Willem Piso and Johannes de Laet on the monumental *De Historia Naturalis Brasiliae*, which remained the standard work on Brazilian flora and fauna until Humboldt’s work in the nineteenth century.<sup>295</sup> Towards the end of this period, Johan Maurits initiated some of the building projects for which he became well known: two palaces near Recife, bridges connecting the peninsula of Recife proper with the island of António Vaz, and the construction of a new city on that island. This new city was intended to provide more space for (cheap) housing as Recife was overcrowded and, at the time, one of the most expensive locations on earth.<sup>296</sup> It was built on part of the former *Grootkwartier*, the military camp established after the conquest of Recife in 1630. Johan Maurits extended the urban plan of this town further south and dubbed the whole ensemble *Mauritsstad*, or *Mauritia*, for obvious reasons. It was reported to have been designed by famous Dutch architect Pieter Post, who had also worked on the Mauritshuis in The Hague along with Van Campen and the brother of the famous painter Frans Post.<sup>297</sup> The urban design of this city has also been studied extensively,<sup>298</sup> with the aptly named *Jodenstraat* (Jews’ Street) having, for example, the first synagogue in the Americas. Maurits’ *Vrijburg* palace contained in its grounds a botanical garden, as well as the first zoo in the

<sup>294</sup> J.D. North, ‘Georg Marckgraf: An Astronomer in the New World’, in: E. Boogaart, H.R. Hoetink and P.J.P. Whitehead (eds.), *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen 1604-1679* (The Hague 1979) 394-423, 394, 403, 408-416.

<sup>295</sup> P.J.P. Whitehead, ‘Georg Marckgraf and Brazilian Zoology’, in: *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen 1604-1679*, 424-471, 424.

<sup>296</sup> Wätjen, *Das Niederländische Kolonialreich*, 244-245.

<sup>297</sup> There is some debate as to when Pieter Post went to Brazil and how long he stayed there. See: J.J. Terwen, ‘The buildings of Johan Maurits’, in: *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen 1604-1679* (The Hague 1979) 54-141, 87-88.

<sup>298</sup> There is a large amount of literature on the design of Mauritsstad, including H. van Nederveen Meerkerk, ‘Eine neue Stadt in der Neuen Welt. Wie die Idee zur Stadt wuchs’, in: G. Brunn and C. Neusch (eds.), *Sein Feld war die Welt: Johan Moritz von Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679): Von Siegen über die Niederlande und Brasilien nach Brandenburg* (Munster, New York, Munich and Berlin 2008) 105-122, and the chapter on Recife in the (flawed) R. van Oers, *Dutch town planning overseas during VOC and WIC rule (1600-1800)* (Zutphen 2000) 139-149.

Americas.<sup>299</sup> There are thus a large number of 'firsts' connected to Johan Maurits' stay in Brazil, most of which have been well studied in isolation.

However, this scholarship – focusing on art, urban design, architecture, botany and other sciences and religion, particularly religious toleration – is almost completely disconnected from the 'other history' of Dutch Brazil as there are, as yet, very few works on the actual governance of the colony or, perhaps more crucially still, the conduct of war in the colony. For almost its entire existence, the WIC colony in Brazil was a warzone, and a plantation economy dependent on the large-scale employment of enslaved African labor. By focusing on the fine arts and sciences, we thus run the risk of ignoring the fundamentally violent nature of the WIC's colonial project in Brazil. This matters deeply to the study of the career of Johan Maurits. Chapter two asserted that his position in Brazil can best be understood as that of a stadholder, with his title – captain-general of the army and admiral-general of the fleet – mimicking that of the stadholder in the Netherlands. In judging the success or failure of Johan Maurits as a governor-general, the XIX thus looked firstly at the success of military operations in Brazil. The point is not to ignore the artistic, architectural and scientific achievements in Brazil. Given the fact that Johan Maurits took the trouble to establish a circle of artists and scientists around him, this was important to him. The point is rather to connect these affairs to the governance of the colony. I argue that the artistic projects, especially the architectural achievements were important as they became symbols of the power of 'the Count in Brazil'. The artistic and scientific achievements of Dutch Brazil should thus be seen as an integral part of Johan Maurits' attempt to recreate an acceptably nobleman's court and entourage in Brazil.<sup>300</sup> This aspect will be returned to in chapter six, when the bridge-building efforts of Johan Maurits are reexamined.

Ultimate success in the colony depended on three interlinked sets of operations. The colony could firstly only be made profitable if the countryside was pacified and cleared of bands of rebels, and guerilla fighters were defeated or expelled from WIC-controlled territory. This would require operations in the south of the colony to establish a feasible border with Portuguese Brazil ruled from Bahia. Secondly, only by occupying Bahia itself could the WIC break Luso-Brazilian resistance once and for all. Thirdly, profitability of the colony depended on the sugar plantations, which could operate only if provided with an enslaved African workforce. To maintain the viability of the sugar industry thus required capturing one or more of the ports from which these enslaved Africans were transported across the Atlantic; either in Guinea, but preferably in Angola. As military success was crucial to the economic success of the colony and the profitability of the entire WIC, we can reasonably assume that Johan Maurits would be judged first and foremost on the conduct of the war. It is surprising, therefore, that there is hardly any literature on the conduct of the war in Brazil, with notable exceptions being an article by Benjamin Teensma on the WIC's intelligence network in Brazil, and the text of a much older address by S.P. L'Honoré-Naber from 1930.<sup>301</sup> Given the vast amount of literature on the figure

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<sup>299</sup> The gardens of Johan Maurits are studied in detail in: W. Diederhofen, 'Johan Maurits and his Gardens', in: *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen 1604-1679* (The Hague 1979) 197-236, with 197-200 discussing the garden at Vrijburg. See also: M.A. da Silva and M.M. Alcides, 'Collecting and Framing the Wilderness: The Garden of Johan Maurits (1604-79) in North-East Brazil', *Garden History*, 30:2 (2002) 153-176.

<sup>300</sup> For a brief discussion of the importance of architectural details for defining status in Europe's nobility, see: J. Duindam, *Myths of Power* (Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam 1995) 13-15.

<sup>301</sup> B. Teensma, 'Nederlands-Braziliaans militair inlichtingenwerk van de West-Indische Compagnie, 1629-1654', 277-312. S.P. L'Honoré-Naber, *De West-Indische Compagnie in Brazilië en Guinee: De verrichtingen harer Zeemacht. Haar Ondergang in Brazilië bij gebrek aan Strijdmiddelen te Water* (Speech delivered to the *Onze Vloot* society, March 13, 1930).

of Johan Maurits – who, it must be remembered, served as a soldier for most of his life – it is surprising to find not a single article focusing on his performance as a military commander. Although art and architecture have tended to 'crowd out' warfare as a point of focus, Johan Maurits in Brazil should be seen firstly as a military commander, and was certainly seen as such by the XIX. He himself would have seen his military role as part of his overall identity as a nobleman. For Johan Maurits, therefore, warfare and the establishment of his court in Brazil went hand in hand.

The previous paragraph used the term 'court' to describe the household of Johan Maurits in Brazil. And this seems the correct term to use, given that much of what is unique about Dutch Brazil in comparison with other contemporary Dutch colonies derives from the fact that the governor-general of Brazil was a nobleman (in itself quite rare in the Dutch case) who established himself in courtly fashion, surrounded by a retinue of followers and supporters. As the previous chapter on Johan Maurits argued, the main reason for him to accept the job in the first place was probably his inability to support proper courtly style in The Hague. Once established in Brazil, therefore, he lost no time in establishing a proper nobleman's court. A thorough analysis of his career in Brazil should thus synthesize the courtly aspects, of which support for the arts and sciences was a part, with the military and economic life of the colony. Overshadowing all of this was the difficult relationship between the Dutch leaders of the colony and the majority of its population, who were still Catholic Portuguese. An important question, therefore, is whether the ostentatious display of a nobleman's patronage and splendor had an effect in placating the Portuguese inhabitants of the colony?

This chapter will thus focus on two aspects of Johan Maurits' tenure in Brazil in the period 1636-1640: the creation of his court, and his performance as commander-in-chief of the WIC's South Atlantic forces. Together, these two aspects of his early tenure reveal much of his career trajectory, as well as the colony's specific history. The creation of a nobleman's court in Brazil explains many of Johan Maurits' reasons for taking the position in the first place, even though this inevitably brought him into conflict with the WIC directors, as well as the formal WIC hierarchy in Brazil. The second aspect concerns Johan Maurits' performance as a military commander. This will require examining a number of different aspects of command: not only his personal and tactical command of troops (and ships) in the field (or at sea), but also his strategic direction and operational leadership, as well as grasping the importance of logistics management, and Johan Maurits' willingness and ability to delegate tasks to subordinates. A closer examination of the 'Artichewsky affair' will make clear that this last point could prove especially problematic.<sup>302</sup> As these questions are very poorly covered in the literature, they must be answered primarily by turning to the sources themselves. This aspect contrasts with the establishment of Johan Maurits' court, for which the vast literature on his art, architecture, gardening and urban design can be fruitfully consulted, albeit with a different focus. Rather than looking at these cultural projects themselves, I will study their social impact on the WIC elite in Brazil and argue that the creation of a nobleman's court in Recife allowed Johan Maurits to take on a different role from that of governor-general of the WIC. In the competition between the two, Johan Maurits, Count of Nassau-Siegen, with a court in Recife, increasingly won out over Johan Maurits, Governor-General of Dutch Brazil on behalf of the West India Company. This

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<sup>302</sup> In referring to the Polish nobleman Christoffel Artichewsky, I have chosen the spelling of the name that seems most used, alternatives used in the literature and the sources include Atichefsky, Arciszewski, Artichofsky.

tendency continued in the second half of his tenure in Brazil, which is dealt with in chapter six. In a final section of this chapter, I will examine the relations between the various branches of the WIC's administration in Brazil, and the changing relations between the High and Secret Council (including Johan Maurits) and the XIX in the Netherlands.

### **Establishing a nobleman's court in the New World**

Fundamental to any understanding of the governorship and career of Johan Maurits must be the realization that once in Brazil, he set about to recreate a European nobleman's court in the New World. Within the seventeenth-century Dutch colonial context, this was a unique experiment, although comparisons with the symbolism and style of Iberian colonial governors may reveal interesting parallels. The creation of a court – at the expense of the WIC – on a scale that Johan Maurits could not possibly hope to afford back home (whether in The Hague or Siegen) is highly indicative of his social aims. The court he established served a variety of ends. On the one hand, it has been argued, it helped to appease the Portuguese inhabitants of the colony, who are thought to have been more accepting of noble rule, a form of government that they at least recognized. On the other hand, it also served to promote Johan Maurits as a politician in his own right, independent of his role as governor-general in the service of the WIC. The courtly entourage also strengthens the interpretation, as argued in chapter two, of Johan Maurits' office in Brazil being modeled on that of the stadholder in the Republic. In terms of style and symbolism, there was a very clear difference between the *court* of the governor of Brazil, and other centers of colonial governance, such as that set up by Van Goens in Colombo in the 1660s and 1670s (examined in chapters five and seven).

Johan Maurits' court in Brazil comprised various different aspects. Artistic patronage, as already mentioned, was one, and this has received its due share of scholarly attention. Another aspect, and perhaps more importantly for Johan Maurits' performance in Brazil, was the fact that the 'free table' allowed Johan Maurits to act as patron to important individuals in the colony. Article eleven of the contract between Maurits and the XIX stipulated a monthly salary of 1500 guilders, along with 6000 guilders in one-off equipment costs, and a '*free table for his Grace [Johan Maurits] and his retinue*'.<sup>303</sup> Although this last condition seems like something of an afterthought in the contract, it would cost the company dearly. A list drawn up in November 1641 clearly show the supplies consumed by Johan Maurits' court, with forty-two specified entries, ranging from French and Spanish wines, beer and brandy, to raisins, various spices and almonds.<sup>304</sup> In all, the court of Johan Maurits consumed supplies worth 9000 guilders per month, which was six times the monthly salary he received and clearly shows the importance of the contractual agreement for the company to pay Johan Maurits' expense account. This small line in the contract enabled him to keep a much grander court than would have been possible if he had been required to pay for it himself. This huge outlay on food became a matter of contention between Johan Maurits and the XIX as the latter found this sum to be excessively high. For the social construction of a court, however, the free table was crucial as it allowed Johan Maurits to tie individuals to him as a private person, rather than to him in his official capacity. This in turn helped him to subsume the government of Brazil within the sphere of his private court, which

<sup>303</sup> '*de vrije tafel soo voor sijn Gen als sijn gevolg*', NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 2 page 255 and following.

<sup>304</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 56, unfoliated piece 248b, scan 1469-1470.



was itself a subsidiary of the stadholderly court.<sup>305</sup> Johan Maurits was thus able to support a large following at the expense of the WIC and so reinforce his own position in the colony.

The next step in building a court was the construction of accommodation fit for a nobleman-governor. Initially, Johan Maurits found accommodation in one of the houses in Recife itself. This house was recorded by Zacharias Wagenaer in his *Thierbuch* (see Figure 8).


**Figure 8: Johan Maurits’ house in Recife**



Source: Zacharias Wagenaer, *Thierbuch*.

This accommodation proved, however, to be too small – partly because the meetings of the High Council were held there – and not stately enough for the needs of Johan Maurits. Rather than a modified town house, he wanted a true palace, complete with gardens and zoo. As Recife itself was too crowded to build anything on this scale, Johan Maurits’ palace became part of the new city to be constructed on the island of Antônio Vaz, across the river from Recife. Starting in 1639, construction thus began on a new palace, named *Vrijburg* (see Figure 9).

<sup>305</sup> Johan Maurits, for example, later referred to Constantijn Huygens, the powerful secretary of the stadholder, as ‘always having been his patron’: J.A. de Worp, *De briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens 1608-1687*, Johan Maurits to Huygens, 31-1-1645, part 4, p. 123. J. Adamson (ed.), *The Princely Courts of Europe*, introduction.

**Figure 9: Vrijburg Palace**

Source: *Gezicht op paleis Vrijburg*, ca. 1636-1644, Jan van Brosterhuyzen, after Frans Jansz. Post, 1645-1647. Rijksmuseum: BI-1892-3415-41.

This would be a true nobleman's palace and proved a suitable setting for a courtly display of power. Although the actual design of the building has been the center of some debate, the analysis by J.J. Terwen will be followed here as it is still the most thorough reconstruction of the building.<sup>306</sup> The actual design need not concern us here; the costs of construction, however, are another matter. J.J. Terwen mentions that the costs of building Vrijburg amounted to 600,000 guilders.<sup>307</sup> Terwen argues that Johan Maurits would have paid for this himself, with 2% of the plunder from military campaigns. This hardly seems realistic: a 2% yield of 600,000 guilders presupposes a total yield from plunder of no less than thirty million guilders. To place this sum in context: the famous 'silver fleet', the *Flota* captured by Piet Hein at Matanzas in 1628, yielded an estimated eleven or twelve million guilders. Even if the company's books showed this amount of plunder to have been taken from the enemy (which is by no means certain), most of these spoils of war were not in ready cash in the form of valuable metals, but rather in land, sugar mills and slaves. These could not easily be turned into useful products or revenue for building a palace. It is likely, therefore, that the company had to bear the costs of Johan Maurits' construction efforts, either directly or by forwarding the cash to him. This interpretation is borne out by a later letter from the XIX dated August 3, 1643, in which the directors of the company wrote the following: 'We find our missive of June 19, 1642 on the use of materials and labor of the company for his Excellency's

<sup>306</sup>J. Terwen, 'The buildings of Johan Maurits', in: *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen 1604-1679* (The Hague 1979) 54-141, 89-98.

<sup>307</sup>H. Wätjen, *Das holländische Kolonialreich in Brasilien: Ein Kapitel aus der Kolonialgeschichte des 17. Jahrhunderts* (The Hague and Gotha, 1921) 123; E. Larsen, *Frans Post: Interprète du Brésil* (Amsterdam and Rio de Janeiro 1962), 21-22.

*private use not followed satisfactorily.*<sup>308</sup> I will argue in chapter eight that Johan Maurits returned from Brazil in 1644 virtually bankrupt because of the costs of his building projects. The disputes over the payment of his share in the prize money from Brazil, and which led him to pursue a court case against the company in the 1650s, will be discussed later on.

Besides a physical court with palaces, gardens and a zoo, the creation of a true nobleman's court required the creation of social mechanisms of control so that the Count of Nassau-Siegen could tie the colonial elite to himself, rather than to the official hierarchy of the WIC. Building stately palaces, gardens and a zoo underlined the elevated position of Johan Maurits in Brazil. These were the symbols of his power and, though unproductive from the company's point of view, crucial for Johan Maurits. In this case, the roles of Johan Maurits, the Governor-General of Brazil, clashed with those of Johan Maurits, the Count of Nassau-Siegen (residing in Recife). By surrounding himself with artists and 'scientists', Johan Maurits made a powerful statement about his social position and aspirations. This clash of roles became a problem for the company, however, as Johan Maurits drew other company officials into his private orbit. This will be illustrated later in this chapter, when the 'Artichewsky case' will be discussed. First, however, I will discuss the performance of Johan Maurits in what was perhaps his most important role: that of commander-in-chief of the WIC's armed forces in Brazil.

### Commanding the army of Brazil

Perhaps the most important task for Johan Maurits in Brazil was the command of the company's armed forces stationed there. As argued in chapter two, Johan Maurits had been appointed to the position because the XIX needed an experienced soldier to take over and win its war against the Habsburg crown in Brazil. Although Johan Maurits was a professional soldier throughout his career, it is striking to note that there are no studies of his performance as a military commander. Hoetink and Van den Boogaart stated in their introduction to the 1979 work *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen 1604-1679: Essays on the tercentenary of his death* that 'The absence of an article on Johan Maurits as a military commander is particularly regrettable.'<sup>309</sup> This lack of serious scholarship on his military career is replicated in virtually all other works. The 2004 collection *Johan Moritz von Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679) der Brasilianer: Ausbruch in neue Welten* presents a very general review of his military career before and after his departure for Brazil,<sup>310</sup> while Olaf van Nimwegen provides a more detailed review of his performance as a military commander during the 'Munster War' in 1664-1666.<sup>311</sup> There is no scholarship, however, on Johan Maurits' performance as a military commander in Brazil, which is somewhat surprising as this was his most important task. Indeed, there is very little work at all on the actual conduct of the war in Brazil. The recent volume in the NIMH series on Dutch military history, *Oorlogen overzee*, admittedly provides a handy overview of operations in Brazil, but is still quite minimal, based as it is on available secondary literature.<sup>312</sup> A

<sup>308</sup> NL-HaNA 1.05.01.01 OWIC, inv. no. 9, page 112-113. Dutch original: 'gene voors. is, soo vinden wij onse voors. missive vanden 19 junij 1642 niet ten genoegte voldaan te weeten over de materialen en arbeidsluijden vande Com.ie die sijne Ex.tie tot sijnen particulieren dienst gebruyct...'

<sup>309</sup> H.R. Hoetink, E. van den Boogaart 'Foreword', in: *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen 1604-1679* (The Hague 1979), 5.

<sup>310</sup> Wolfgang Degenhardt, 'Eine Karriere in den Niederlanden' 16-25 and Wolfgang Degenhardt, 'Im Dienst des Kurfürsten und der Republik der Niederlande' 38-49, in: *Johan Moritz von Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679) der Brasilianer: Ausbruch in neue Welten* (Siegen 2003).

<sup>311</sup> O. van Nimwegen, 'Deser landen krijchsvolck': *het Staatse leger en de militaire revoluties (1588-1688)* (Bakker: Amsterdam 2006) 347-354.

<sup>312</sup> G. Knaap, H. den Heijer, *Oorlogen overzee: militair optreden door compagnie en staat buiten Europa 1595-1814* (2015) 286-289.



possible explanation for this absence may be that most of the scholars working on Johan Maurits and Dutch Brazil have been more interested in the architectural and art history perspectives than in his military performance. For my purposes, however, the performance of Johan Maurits as commander-in-chief, or ‘Captain- and Admiral-General of Brazil’, as his contract puts it, is crucial, given that the conduct of the war was the primary basis on which the XIX assessed his performance. And although the WIC achieved some notable successes during Johan Maurits’ tenure in Brazil, it was the conduct of the war that resulted in the first tensions between the directors and their governor.

*Operations: from Porto Calvo to the Siege of Bahia, 1637-1638*

Arriving in Brazil in January 1637, Johan Maurits found the colony to be in a precarious military situation. Immediately after the occupation of Recife in 1630, the Portuguese had retreated inland and were waging a guerrilla war against the WIC forces in Recife, and this stranglehold could only gradually be broken. The Brazilian-Portuguese forces were using a combination of light troops for lightning attacks on the inland sugar mills and coastal forts. These forts provided the troops with rallying points and, more importantly, served as the logistical ‘anchors’ for the guerilla operations that were effectively coordinated from the Arraial do Bom Jesus, inland from Recife. This inland fortification was resupplied from Portuguese forts on the coast: Reis Magos on the Rio Grande and Joao Pessoa on the Paráiba river to the north, and Cabo de Santo Agostinho and Porto Calvo in the south. Effective suppression of the inland warfare was required in order to secure the sugar lands (and these lands were the reason the WIC was interested in Brazil in the first place), and this demanded a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, mobile forces were needed to round up and pursue bands of guerillas inland and to secure the important sugar mills. This mobile warfare against the lighter-equipped Brazilian-Portuguese forces, who had a better understanding of the local topography, could only succeed, however, if accompanied by simultaneous efforts to reduce the Portuguese coastal fortifications that functioned as logistic bases for the inland warfare. Supplies, men and weapons from Bahia were funneled through these forts to the inland areas. The northern flank of Recife had been secured in 1633-1634, with the capture of Fort Reis Magos (renamed Fort Ceulen by order of the WIC director in Brazil Matthijs van Ceulen) and the fort at the mouth of the Paráiba river (renamed Frederiksstad).<sup>313</sup> These successes were followed in 1635 by the siege and capture of the Arraial do Bom Jesus by Christoffel Artichewsky.<sup>314</sup> The attention of both the WIC and the Brazilian-Portuguese forces then turned south to the forts at Cabo de Santo Agostinho, Porto Calvo, Rio d’Alagoa, Rio São Francisco and, ultimately, Bahia.

Even before the arrival of Johan Maurits, WIC forces under Von Schoppe and Artichewsky had operated in the area and had captured – and lost – the fort at Porto Calvo, while retaining fortifications at Paripueira and Santo Agostinho. Porto Calvo now became the fulcrum of the fight in the south. It was the supply base for the Brazilian-Portuguese forces operating in

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<sup>313</sup> J.C.M. Warnsinck, *Christoffel Artichewsky, Poolsch krijgsoverste in dienst van de West-Indische Compagnie in Brazilië 1630-1639: een proeve tot eerberstel* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1937) 10-11. This account by Warnsinck of the fight between Johan Maurits and Christoffel Artichewsky was published at the same time in: J. de Laet, S.P. L’Honoré-Naber and J.C.M. Warnsinck, *Iaerlijck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie in derthien Boecken. Vierde deel, boek XI-XIII (1634-1636)* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1937) XXV-LXXII. For clarity’s sake, I will refer only to the separately published book. M. Meuwese, *Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade. Dutch – Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595-1674* (Leiden 2012) 143.

<sup>314</sup> Warnsinck, *Christoffel Artichewsky*, 11-13.

the rear of the Dutch coastal forts as far north as Recife. Artichewsky spent much of the summer and fall of 1636 chasing these guerillas, but could not convince the Political Council in Recife that the only lasting way to pacify the countryside was to capture the supply base at Porto Calvo. Instead of composing a concentrated striking force, the Political Council preferred to scatter the army in garrisons and smaller counter-guerilla operations. This changed, however, with the arrival of Johan Maurits in Brazil in January 1637.

When Johan Maurits arrived, he placed the new troops he brought with him in the existing garrisons and combined the more experienced troops into a mobile force, and then moved south against Porto Calvo.<sup>315</sup> This was the only militarily viable way to deal with the guerilla warfare. As the WIC's troops could not capture the small bands of Luso-Brazilian troops inland, it was only by applying the aspects of warfare in which the WIC had an advantage – siege warfare and naval operations – that the WIC could hope to win. Operations against the fort started on February 18, 1637, and on March 3 the fort capitulated.<sup>316</sup> The Brazilian-Portuguese (Spanish) forces under Bagnuolo quickly retreated south, a retreat that turned into flight.<sup>317</sup> This effectively cut off the guerilla fighters in the north from reinforcements and forced them to retreat south. Large stocks of war-making material were captured at Porto Calvo, including the heavy weapons needed for siege warfare. The list of the loot included three 24-pounder cannons, two 22-pounders, one 18-pounder, nine 10-pounders, four heavy siege mortars, large supplies of gunpowder and shot, and a total of 372 mortar grenades.<sup>318</sup> The WIC's forces also marched south and erected a fort at Penedo on the Rio São Francisco to mark the southern border of the WIC territory.<sup>319</sup> This fort was named *Fort Maurits*, after the new governor-general. For the time being, this secured the border of the WIC's Brazilian domains in the south. Ultimately, however, only the capture of Bahia could end all Portuguese resistance in the north of Brazil. In summer 1637, therefore, Bahia was at the center of much intelligence-gathering, with Dutch spies trying to ascertain the strength of the troops and the disposition of fortifications in the area.<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>315</sup> NL-HaNA States-General, 1.01.02, inv. no. 9217, unfoliated, page 1.

<sup>316</sup> See the articles on the capitulation in: NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02, inv. no. 9217, page 6..

<sup>317</sup> Wätjen, *Das holländische Kolonialreich*, 80.

<sup>318</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.0.5.01.01, inv. no. 53, item 6.

<sup>319</sup> Maurits and Hoge Raad to the XIX, May 6, 1637 NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 52, piece 58, page 2.

<sup>320</sup> B.N. Teensma, 'Nederlands-Braziliaans militair inlichtingenwerk van de West-Indische Compagnie, 1629-1654', in: V. Enthoven, H. den Heijer and H. Jordaan, *Geweld in de West: Een militaire geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Atlantische wereld, 1600-1800* (Leiden and Boston 2013) 277-311, 295.



Figure 10: Map of northeastern Brazil showing the important forts and cities



Source: Erik Odegard, 2016.

Another point of interest was the Portuguese forts on the Gold Coast and Angola. Castelo da Mina ('Elmina'), which had already twice been attacked in vain by Dutch forces, was the focus of a large expedition of a thousand men sent from Brazil in July-August 1637.<sup>321</sup> This, it was hoped,

<sup>321</sup> For earlier attempts to capture Elmina, see: H. den Heijer, 'Het 'Groot Desseyn' en de aanval op Elmina in 1625', in: *Gevel in de West*, 217-243. See also: Meuwese, *Brothers in arms*, 300-301.

would reinforce the WIC's position in the trade of enslaved Africans to Brazil. Without the regular shipment of enslaved African labor, the sugar plantations and sugar mills could not operate and the WIC would never be able to make a profit. Although, in our perception, the stimulation of the transatlantic slave trade does not fit well with the idea of Johan Maurits as an enlightened, benevolent ruler, this would not have solicited censure or opprobrium at the time. Rather than reflecting upon Johan Maurits, the lack of attention for his role in setting up the Dutch slave trade reflects more on his biographers, who have always been uncomfortable with his role in this trade. Benjamin Teensma has shown that this tendency even stretches back to Barlaeus: the *Rerum per octennium* puts the percentage of enslaved Africans who died during the Middle Passage at 1525 out of 64,000, or 2.38 per cent, and this figure is also quoted in Johan Maurits' *Vertoogh* of 1644. A comparison with the original shows, however, that the percentage there was put at 25. However, this apparently did not suit Johan Maurits' publication strategy.<sup>322</sup>

The successes of the Siege of Porto Calvo and the expedition to the Rio San Francisco in summer 1637 were achieved with Johan Maurits at the head of the WIC's field army. This shows him in a guise – field commander – not seen after the failure at Bahia the following year. At the time Johan Maurits was still assisted by the 'old guard' of WIC commanders: Sigismund von Schoppe, Christoffel Artichewsky and Admiral Lichthart, all experienced in warfare in Brazil and Brazilian waters.<sup>323</sup> His arrival in Brazil proved the breakthrough for a strategy that these men had been advocating for years: concentrated offensive warfare intended to seize the Portuguese coastal strongholds. Though it is doubtful whether Johan Maurits was responsible for the logistical and operational planning of these expeditions, he is credited with breaking the impasse between the military commanders and the Political Council, and recognizing the sense of the strategy proposed by the above commanders. But the Porto Calvo campaign also saw the beginnings of discontent between Johan Maurits and one of his military officers, Christoffel Artichewsky.<sup>324</sup> Johan Maurits was eager to take the credit for the success of the Porto Calvo campaign, mentioning the siege, the captured artillery and the construction of the fort at Penedo in a letter to stadholder Frederik Hendrik on April 18, 1637.<sup>325</sup> The year 1637 was the year of great successes, with the fall of Porto Calvo and the extension of the company's lands to Rio São Francisco enabling a pacification of the hinterlands of the more northern captaincies under WIC control. In August of that same year, a nine-ship expeditionary force also succeeded in capturing Elmina on the other side of the Atlantic, thus making the WIC, at a stroke, the dominant European power on the Gold Coast.

After the successes at Rio Grande and Porto Calvo, some directors urged Johan Maurits to make an attempt at Bahia itself.<sup>326</sup> He set about this in April 1638, with a total force of 4600 men (including a thousand Amerindians) on thirty ships. As the garrison of Bahia actually outnumbered the attacking force, hermetically sealing the city off from the outside and starving it proved ineffectual, while, rather surprisingly, there were not enough heavy siege weapons – heavy mortars and guns – available to bombard the city into surrender. This resulted from a lack of

<sup>322</sup> Barlaeus and L'Honoré-Naber, *Nederlandsch Brazilië*, 407. B. Teensma, 'Nederlands-Braziliaans militair inlichtingennetwerk', 294.

<sup>323</sup> Warnsinck, *Christoffel Artichewsky*, 25.

<sup>324</sup> B. Brommer, H. den Heijer (eds.), *Grote Atlas van de West-Indische Compagnie, Deel I: De Oude WIC, 1621-1674* (Atlas Maior, Voorburg 2011) 270.

<sup>325</sup> G. Groen van Prinsterer, *Archives ou correspondance inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau, deuxième série, tome III* (Utrecht 1859) 93-96.

<sup>326</sup> C. Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil* 85-86.

planning and foresight as there were sufficient numbers of heavy guns available in Recife, not to mention the guns that had been captured at Porto Calve earlier that year. Johan Maurits decided on a storm attack – always the most uncertain undertaking in siege warfare – in the night of 17-18 May 1638. Although coming close to succeeding, this attack ultimately failed, and the WIC forces retreated the following week.<sup>327</sup> The failure to take Bahia was perhaps the most serious military blow during Johan Maurits' tenure in Brazil as the fall of this city would have resulted in the collapse of Portuguese Brazil. Charles Boxer described the period from 1637 onwards as a struggle between the two cities of Bahia and Recife. The fall of Bahia was the only way for this struggle to end in a WIC victory. Failure at Bahia consequently meant that the war continued, and sustaining this war effort meant that logistical efforts became an increasingly pressing problem. To make matters worse, a joint Spanish-Portuguese fleet was being prepared in 1638 to sail concurrently with the large armada under Oquendo.

### Force size and logistics

The strength of the WIC's army in Brazil varied somewhat over the period owing to combat and other losses, the repatriation of troops who had served their contracts, and the arrival of reinforcements. Although its actual strength briefly reached 6000 men shortly after the arrival of Johan Maurits in Brazil, and Adriaen van der Dussen listed the available troops as 6191 in his document to the XIX composed upon his return to the Netherlands in 1639,<sup>328</sup> even the smaller force size of some 3000-5000 men available in Brazil throughout the late 1630s and into the 1640s proffered persistent challenges to the WIC in terms of logistics. This exposes a very different aspect of command from the direct tactical direction of battles or sieges, or the relations with subaltern commanders. Logistics was indeed the persistent Achilles heel of the WIC's operations in Brazil, and things got steadily worse during the late 1630s and into the 1640s.

Recife was the main port of Dutch Brazil and housed the central stores of ammunition, food, building materials and so on. Its port was the main node in the WIC's shipping network connecting the colony to the Netherlands. Food, clothing, money, weapons, ammunition and building materials all had to be transported from Recife to the outlying garrisons. Dutch Brazil could not actually feed itself; forcing the planters to plant sufficient manioc failed after the High and Secret Council lowered the price paid to planters in the late 1630s.<sup>329</sup> Food thus had to be supplied all the way from Europe, along with everything else; even wood for construction came from Europe. Although this may seem puzzling, labor shortages meant it was probably difficult to obtain local wood. On both legs of this journey – the long-distance one from the Netherlands and the shorter run from Recife to the outlying garrisons – the WIC encountered difficulties. The main problem on the transatlantic leg of the journey was the poor condition some ships were in when leaving the Netherlands, with the result that many of the naval stores brought to Recife promptly had to be used to repair those ships themselves, thus giving the directors a completely wrong perspective on the actual level of supplies available in Brazil. And this was compounded

<sup>327</sup> Ibidem, 87.

<sup>328</sup> Miranda, *Gente de Guerra*, 191, states there to have been 4500 men in Brazil in 1635; to these would be added the 1200 men that Johan Maurits brought with him on his arrival to Brazil in early 1637. The attrition rate is clearly shown by the fact that, by February 1639, there were barely 4000 troops in Brazil. 6000 names in 1637: NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.0.5.01.01, inv. no. 52. Van der Dussen: NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 46.

<sup>329</sup> 'Apologie van Artichofsky tegen de beschuldiging van den Raad van Brazilië, ingeleverd aan de Staten-Generaal in Augustus 1639', *Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht*, 25 (Kemink en Zoon, Utrecht 1869) 351-393, 358.

by a lack of proper administration in Recife itself. It is striking that many authors have noted the problems in the warehouses (embezzlement, and loss of supplies due to aging), but no-one has addressed the fact that it was the responsibility of the High and Secret Council to oversee proper administration of the colony. Chapter eight will elaborate on some of the issues concerning graft and corruption. However, it is entirely feasible and consistent, from a theoretical point of view, that Johan Maurits would grant offices in the army magazines to faithful followers who were allowed to partake of the spoils as part of his courtly project. Most authors agree that 'corruption' became a steadily worse problem in the late 1630s and early 1640s, but argue that this was *despite* the governor-general's best efforts, rather than *because* of the social effects of his courtly project.

Supplying the army in Brazil was in any event a daunting prospect. As Wim Klooster argued, the Luso-Dutch War in Brazil was the largest interimperial conflict in the Americas in the seventeenth century. A good indication of the army's requirements in Brazil is given by a list of required supplies from March 1639.<sup>330</sup> Although this list states only the requirements for arms, ammunition and tools, it still gives a good indication of the scale of the transatlantic logistical link. Among other things, the army needed the following in March 1639: 800 arquebuses, 300 muskets, 1000 pikes, 600 swords and 300 swivel guns, but also 1000 wheelbarrows, 300 heavy axes, 600 spades, 6 copper forms for casting musket balls, and 2 large bellows for the smithy. On top of all this, there was a large requirement for gunpowder and ammunition, with at least 40,000 pounds of gunpowder being requested, as well as at least 80,000 fuses (for guns and muskets), 200 sheepskins for making bore-snakes (used to clean guns after firing) and 18,500 rounds of shot for various bores of cannon.

Distributing supplies from Recife to the garrisons required a different fleet and thus ran into different problems. Most of the outlying fortifications, except for Itamaracá, were on rivers that were inaccessible for seagoing vessels. Fort Maurits on the Rio São Francisco, for example, lay several miles inland, and while the river was of a good depth there, its estuary was much shallower and silted. What was required, therefore, was a capable small-ship fleet of vessels seaworthy enough to make the passage from Recife to the various river mouths, yet shallow enough to pass the bars on the rivers, as well as sufficiently well-armed for riverine warfare. This was sorely lacking as the WIC did not operate any shipyards in Brazil. In marked contrast to the multiple VOC shipyards at Onrust (Batavia), Cochin, Galle and Colombo, the WIC proved unable to operate a single yard in Brazil. Consequently, there was a great lack of small vessels able to resupply the outlying garrisons.<sup>331</sup> Even the smaller force of 3000-5000 men available in Brazil posed imposing logistical, organizational and operational problems for the military staff there; as a result, increasing numbers of complaints were received from the late 1630s onwards about the supply of food to outlying garrisons.

Even before the news of the failure of the attack on Bahia had arrived, the XIX had taken the initiative to send sizable reinforcements to Brazil. The person chosen to lead a regiment of 1200 men was Christoffel Artichewsky, who had returned to Brazil the previous year. This seemed a fortunate choice for many reasons; Artichewsky and Johan Maurits had worked together before, and the former was one of the company's most experienced field commanders. However, Artichewsky's mission caused a falling-out between the two men and probably played a large part in the souring of relations between the governor-general and the XIX.<sup>332</sup>

<sup>330</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01, inv. no. 54, *Lijst van 't gene alhier opt alderspondigste gerequireert werde.*

<sup>331</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 54.2, Johan Maurits and the High Council to the XIX, March 5, 1639

<sup>332</sup> Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 90-91.



### The Artichewsky case

Even before the news of the failure at Bahia had percolated through to the company directors in the Republic, they had been concerned about the state of the army in Brazil. Johan Maurits had sent scathing reports about the size of the forces available to him in his first letters back to the XIX, and the directors were now planning to rectify these defects. Once again it was Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh who took the initiative and came up with the idea of approaching Christoffel Artichewsky, the experienced officer who had returned from Brazil, for the second time, in 1637.<sup>333</sup> Originally a Polish nobleman, Artichewsky served with the Dutch Republican army at the siege of 's Hertogenbosch in 1629. He may even have met Johan Maurits there, since the latter also served in the army at 's Hertogenbosch, although there are no records of a meeting of the two future rivals. Artichewsky had sailed with the original invasion fleet that captured Olinda and Recife in 1630. Although he was repatriated in 1633, he returned in 1634 and was appointed commander-in-chief of the army in Brazil by the XIX.<sup>334</sup> Once in Brazil he was confronted with the fact that Sigismund von Schoppe had just been appointed by the Political Council in the same rank (colonel) and with the same prerogatives as Artichewsky. The latter unhesitatingly fell into the role of subordinate to the former until August 1637, when he railed against the management of the colony and the war effort by the Political Council. Lucia Warner Xavier has argued that the policy of religious toleration was actually introduced by Artichewsky in the conditions he stipulated on the surrender of Itamaracá in 1634.<sup>335</sup> In 1637, Artichewsky, together with Von Schoppe and Lichthart, assisted Johan Maurits in the campaign against Porto Calvo. Departing after this notable success, Artichewsky left behind a lengthy memoir containing advice on managing the colony for the new governor-general.<sup>336</sup>

The discord between Artichewsky and Johan Maurits cuts to the core of the problems faced by Dutch Brazil, as well as highlighting the challenges facing Johan Maurits in his role as the WIC's governor-general in Brazil. The crisis that ensued upon Artichewsky's return in 1639 was described in detail by Warnsinck, and also mentioned by Werner Xavier.<sup>337</sup> The *Historisch Genootschap Utrecht* published Artichewsky's *Apologie* in the nineteenth century.<sup>338</sup> Authors such as Boxer, Wätjen and Netscher all put the blame for the discord between the two men on Artichewsky, who is described as having been ambitious, jealous and spiteful towards Johan Maurits.<sup>339</sup> What is missing from these accounts so far is an understanding of the way the conflict impacted on Johan Maurits' career. To understand this, and so also to understand how the conflict affected the WIC and, at the same time, reflected its position in Brazil, a brief account of

<sup>333</sup> Warnsinck, *Christoffel Artichewsky*, 23. This account by Warnsinck of the fight between Johan Maurits and Christoffel Artichewsky was published at the same time in: J. de Laet, S.P. L'Honoré-Naber and J.C.M. Warnsinck, *Iaerlijk Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geootroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie in derthien Boecken. Vierde deel, boek XI-XIII (1634-1636)* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1937) XXV-LXXII. For clarity's sake, I will refer only to the separately published book.

<sup>334</sup> Warnsinck, *Christoffel Artichewsky*, 7-8.

<sup>335</sup> L.F. Werner Xavier, 'Het gebruik van egodocumenten en Nederlands Brazilië: de Memorie van kolonel Christoffel Arciszewski', in: M. Wiesenbron (ed.) *Brazilië in de Nederlandse archieven/O Brasil em arquivos neerlandeses (1624-1654): Mauritiana, vol. 3* (CNWS, Leiden 2008) 128-149, 134.

<sup>336</sup> Published in: 'Memorie, door den Kolonnel Artichofsky, bij zijn vertrek uit Brazilië in 1637 overgeleverd aan Graaf Maurits en zijnen geheimen Raad', *Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht*, 25 (Kemink en Zoon, Utrecht 1869) 253-350.

<sup>337</sup> Werner Xavier, 'de Memorie van kolonel Christoffel Arciszewski', 136.

<sup>338</sup> 'Apologie van Artichofsky tegen de beschuldiging van den Raad van Brazilië, ingeleverd aan de Staten-Generaal in Augustus 1639', *Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht*, 25 (Kemink en Zoon, Utrecht 1869) 351-392.

<sup>339</sup> For example, Netscher, *Les Hollandais*, 101. 'ce Polonais nourrissait une vieille haine contre Maurice'.



the discord between Artichewsky and Johan Maurits first needs to be provided. Artichewsky's admonitions against the Political Council's rule in Brazil have been dealt with in chapter two. His criticism helped convince the WIC directors that a more unified command structure was needed for the colony to flourish. This interpretation is strengthened by Artichewsky's later close relations with two of the most important directors, Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh and Johannes de Laet. The latter made grateful use of Artichewsky's reports on the inland warfare in 1634-1636 in his *Jaerlijckx Verhael*.<sup>340</sup> Burgh, as we have already seen, was the driving force both behind Johan Maurits' appointment in 1636 and Christoffel Artichewsky's new appointment to Brazil in 1639. These three men, the two directors of the Amsterdam chamber and the Polish nobleman, also found each other in their views on free trade. In his lengthy report on the state of Brazil, written shortly before his departure in March 1639, Artichewsky advocated opening the trade with Brazil to all comers. This aligned perfectly with the trade debates between Amsterdam and Zeeland of 1636-1638.<sup>341</sup> Artichewsky's report may even have influenced Johan Maurits in his decision to support free trade. But it is also entirely possible that Johan Maurits may have come up with this support by himself. In any event, the directors of the Amsterdam chamber had every reason to look kindly on their Polish colonel. By 1638-1639, however, Johan Maurits had a number of reasons for disliking the successful commander and actually wrote to the directors in 1637 asking them not to return Artichewsky to Brazil.<sup>342</sup>

What then were Johan Maurits' reasons for disliking Artichewsky and arguing against his return to Brazil? Traditionally, blame for the conflict between the two men has been laid on Artichewsky's shoulders. It has been argued that, in his arrogance and ambition, Artichewsky tried to usurp Johan Maurits' position, although a number of authors dispute this.<sup>343</sup> My interpretation aligns with the latter and argues that Johan Maurits wanted to be rid of Artichewsky because the colonel's presence played on Johan Maurits' own insecurities as a military commander. To understand this view, we need to return to the Porto Calvo campaign. Artichewsky, Von Schoppe and Lichthart had convinced Johan Maurits of the necessity of attacking Porto Calvo, which they had been advocating throughout the previous year. The fort subsequently fell, and in March Christoffel Artichewsky returned to the Netherlands. It was during the Porto Calvo campaign, however, that the first signs were seen that Johan Maurits was not the skilled tactician that he had been made out to be. These included the mentioning by the writer of the anonymous coast description of Brazil that:

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<sup>340</sup> De Laet, Naber and Warnsinck, *Jaerlijckx Verhael, Vierde deel*, XXXVI, 142-149. The map used by De Laet was based on an original drawn by Artichewsky himself.

<sup>341</sup> Of which more in: H. den Heijer, 'Het recht van de sterkste in de polder. Politieke en economische strijd tussen Amsterdam en Zeeland over de kwestie Brazilië, 1630-1654' in: D. Bos, Ebben M.A., Velde H. te (eds.) *Harmonie in Holland. Het poldermodel van 1500 tot nu* (Bert Bakker, Amsterdam 2007) 72-92.

<sup>342</sup> As mentioned in B. Brommer, H. den Heijer and J. Jacobs, *Grote Atlas van de WIC, deel I* (Atlas Maior: Voorburg 2011) 270.

<sup>343</sup> There is a disagreement between Netscher, Wätjen and Boxer on the one hand, and Warnsinck and, more recently, Werner Xavier on the other hand. The latter has argued, correctly in my opinion, that Dutch Brazil was more than just Johan Maurits.

*Approximately a musket shot between the two forts [of Porto Calvo] His Excellency ordered the construction of a third work, beneath the hills on the river on an island in the river. Because this location could be covered by musket shot from the heights above, the same was neglected.*<sup>344</sup>

Henk den Heijer has argued that the author of the coast description was in fact Admiral Lichthart, another of the crucial military commanders in Brazil. Artichewsky's period in the Netherlands in 1637-1639 coincided with the failed attack on Bahia in 1638, during which campaign Johan Maurits' younger brother died. Soldiers in the force also apparently grumbled that such a fiasco would have been avoided if only Artichewsky had been present. This reflects later complaints that Johan Maurits was not a tactically sound commander.<sup>345</sup> Crucially, the campaign against Bahia was the last time that Johan Maurits took to the field in Brazil at the head of the troops. In later campaigns he always sent lower officers to head expeditionary forces. This can be explained in two ways: either simply because no target other than Bahia warranted the personal presence of the governor-general of Dutch Brazil, or because Johan Maurits had learned the lesson that it was better to avoid personal command. In the event of a failure, the expedition commander could be blamed, while a success would still reflect on Johan Maurits' leadership in Brazil. In itself, this would not have been a problem. Selecting capable commanders was surely an important task, and most governor-generals in the VOC did not lead in person either. But Johan Maurits was a nobleman and, what is more, a professional soldier. Owing to a lack of the money needed to bring him up in a more courtly setting and send him to university, he had been trained as a soldier from childhood. Surely, then, these complaints about his leadership must have rankled. In addition, an undermining of his position as a soldier could potentially threaten his position in Brazil. It is also noteworthy that Artichewsky left Brazil in March 1637, immediately after the fall of Porto Calvo in February of that year. This raises the possibility that the two men had already clashed. Regardless of this, Johan Maurits proudly boasted of his success at Porto Calvo to Hendrik Casimir van Nassau-Dietz, detailing the stores captured at Porto Calvo.<sup>346</sup> In another matter, we see Artichewsky also referred to in a conflict between the governor-general of Brazil and the company directors. Johan Maurits had requested a pay raise for Colonel Koin, who had captured Elmina, to the same level enjoyed by Artichewsky before his departure. This request was turned down by the directors.<sup>347</sup> In the letters from Brazil to the Netherlands from May 1637 onwards, Johan Maurits began to moot the idea that the army in Brazil was now strong enough to venture an attack on Bahia itself. At the same time he complained about the state of the army magazines and stores. Apparently spurred on by some individual directors, but without the consent of the full company leadership, Johan Maurits proceeded to command his disastrous venture on Bahia in spring 1638, during which campaign his younger brother died.

In the meantime, Artichewsky had returned to the Netherlands and had made his sketches of the Siege of Porto Calvo available to various Dutch publishers and mapmakers. This

<sup>344</sup> NL-HaNA, Kaarten Leupe, 4.VEL, inv. no. Y. This source was published as: H. den Heijer, *Nederlands-Brazilië in kaart : Nederlanders in het Atlantisch gebied, 1600-1650 : den corte beschrijvinge inhoudende de cust van Brazzil ende meer andre plaetsen* (Walburg Pers: Zutphen 2011).

<sup>345</sup> G.N. van der Plaats (ed.), *Gloria Parendi: Dagboeken van Willem Frederik, stadhouder van Friesland, Groningen en Drenthe 1643-1649, 1651-1654* (Nederlands Historisch Genootschap: The Hague 1995) dagboek 1647, 392. On May 26/June 3, Willem Frederik noted that stadholder Willem II was displeased with Johan Maurits' performance in the field, complaining he did not put out scouts or understand cavalry operations.

<sup>346</sup> Groen van Prinsterer, *Archives ou correspondance inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, 93-95. Johan Maurits to Hendrik Casimir, April 1637.

<sup>347</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC,1.05.01.01 inv. no. 52, unfoliated, scan 723-724. Johan Maurits to the XIX, 15-12-1637.

resulted in a map by Willem Bleau of the siege, as well as the news-map shown in Figure 11. This map is notable for showing small portraits of both Johan Maurits and Christoffel Artichewsky in the upper corners, as well as giving Artichewsky pride of place in the map itself, where he is shown on horseback, spurring on the troops, in the lower right-hand corner. The lively market for Brazilian news and printed maps and imagery in the Republic, as studied by Van Groesen, could thus also be used by officers in Brazil to build their own reputations.<sup>348</sup>

Figure 11: News-map of the Siege of Porto Calvo



Source: B. Brommer, H. den Heijer (eds.) *Grote Atlas van de West-Indische Compagnie, deel 1: de oude WIC, 1621-1674* (Atlas Maior: Voorburg 2011) 273.


If news of this had reached Johan Maurits, it might have turned him further against Artichewsky and led him to believe that the latter was trying to steal his successes. It is noteworthy that

<sup>348</sup> Laid out in the introduction of: Van Groesen, *Amsterdam's Atlantic*, 1-13.



although Artichewsky’s role in the Siege of Porto Calvo is mentioned in Caspar Barlaeus’ account, the beautiful map of the siege contained in the book (Figure 12) does not show his positions at all, even though it does show the movements of the troops under Von Schoppe, Lichthart and Johan Maurits himself.<sup>349</sup>

**Figure 12: The Siege of Porto Calvo according to Johan Maurits**



Source: L'Honoré-Naber, Caspar Barlaeus, *Nederlandsch Brazilië onder het bewind van Johan Maurits, Grave van Nassau 1637-1644* (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1923), between pages 46-47.

Although Barlaeus’ account obviously postdates the later fight between the two men, the rival maps perhaps indicate that the two strong personalities had already clashed during the Siege of Porto Calvo. This would align well with Johan Maurits’ apparent request for Artichewsky *not* to be sent back to Brazil in 1637. Strangely, in the letter to stadholder Frederik Hendrik quoted in Barlaeus, Artichewsky is mentioned as the bearer of the letters and tidings from Brazil. This means that even if the two men clashed, Artichewsky may not have been aware of the fact and was in fact sent to the Republic on a pretext.<sup>350</sup> This was also a common event in VOC Asia, as

<sup>349</sup> L'Honoré-Naber, Caspar Barlaeus, *Nederlandsch Brazilië onder het bewind van Johan Maurits, Grave van Nassau 1637-1644* (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1923), map between pages 46-47.

<sup>350</sup> L'Honoré-Naber, Caspar Barlaeus, *Nederlandsch Brazilië onder het bewind van Johan Maurits*, 52.

will be made apparent in the next chapter. A possible explanation for this could be the frequent clashes between Artichewsky and the Political Council, which now functioned under Johan Maurits and which was praised for its efforts in the *Rerum per octennium*.<sup>351</sup>

In the knowledge, however, that a strong fleet was being readied in Spain and Portugal to recapture lost territories in Brazil, the XIX were looking, by early 1639, for an experienced officer to lead the reinforcements to Brazil. They naturally thought of Christoffel Artichewsky, by far the most experienced when it came to warfare in Brazil. But Artichewsky would not consent lightly to serving the company again. Negotiations started during 1638, even before the XIX had received news of the debacle at Bahia. The procedure to recruit Artichewsky shows considerable parallels with the appointment procedure of Johan Maurits himself. Once again, the initiative was taken by the Amsterdam chamber, while the negotiations were led by none other than Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh, assisted by Johannes de Laet.<sup>352</sup> This is remarkable: the same men who had not only supported, but also initiated Johan Maurits' appointment to Brazil also favored sending back an officer with whom Johan Maurits had difficulty cooperating. This could indicate that certain important directors had growing doubts about the wisdom of appointing Johan Maurits. The contract between Artichewsky and the XIX seems to support this idea as, in effect, it created a check on Johan Maurits' powers. Other directors, meanwhile, had approached the stadholder himself to seek his approval. The initiative was taken after news of Johan Maurits' planned voyage to Bahia was received. This news shocked the XIX as they had not ordered him to undertake this voyage. It later turned out that two chambers had individually written to Johan Maurits and urged him to attack Bahia. This undermined the authority of the XIX. The States-General urged the WIC chambers, in June 1638, not to write to the governor-general of Brazil separately, but instead to leave this in the hands of the XIX.<sup>353</sup> This muddling of the lines of command would have been unthinkable in the case of the VOC. This lends strong support to the idea that it was unresolved deficiencies in the institutional formation of the WIC that made it vulnerable to infighting and strife. By September 1638, the XIX had decided to send reinforcements of '2000 to 3000 men' to Brazil.<sup>354</sup>

#### *The conflict in Brazil*

The contract ultimately signed between the WIC and Artichewsky gave the latter a high degree of independence from the other layers of Brazilian administration. The wish for this was hardly surprising, given his poor relations with the Political Council during his previous service in the colony. Artichewsky was appointed to lead a whole regiment to Brazil; this was to be kept united under his command and separate from the regular chain of command in the army in Brazil. In addition, he was awarded the title of 'General of the artillery', with orders to undertake a proper inspection of the army magazines in Recife so that the XIX would finally know what was actually available in the colony.<sup>355</sup> Artichewsky's appointment can be explained as an attempt by the XIX to rein in an overly powerful governor-general, or at least provide for a check on his actions and reports. It was, thus, a solution to a pressing principal-agent problem. Johan Maurits' announcement that he planned to attack Bahia had shocked the XIX. Clearly, he was not under

<sup>351</sup> Ibidem, 60-61.

<sup>352</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.05.01, OWC, inv. no. 39, entry for August 13, 1638. De Laet, Nicolae and Huijch negotiated with Frederik Hendrik, while Burgh contacted Artichewsky.

<sup>353</sup> NL-HaNA, Staten-Generaal, 1.01.02, inv. no. 4845.

<sup>354</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 39, folio 155.

<sup>355</sup> Warnsinck, *Christoffel Artichewsky*, 31-34.



control, and the High and Secret Council could not rein him in, or maybe the Council was even colluding with him. A powerful military commander with a position independent of Johan Maurits could help reassert the primacy of the XIX over its colony.

The appointment of Artichewsky did, however, undermine the position of Johan Maurits as captain-general of the WIC's armed forces in Brazil. It can be said that in devising the mission by Artichewsky, the XIX did not sufficiently consider the very realistic possibility that the two figures would clash in Brazil. I have already argued that there may have been some residual acrimony between the two men, resulting from the Porto Calvo campaign. Another possibility is that the Political Council, which now operated under Johan Maurits, had vented its frustration about Artichewsky. When the latter left Brazil, he had written to Johan Maurits, '*We have been at loggerheads here for a long time*'.<sup>356</sup> After the failure at Bahia in 1638, there was also another reason for Johan Maurits to resent Artichewsky. Reportedly, both during and after the failure at Bahia, soldiers had complained that if only Artichewsky had been present, the expedition would have been a success.<sup>357</sup> But even without pre-existing tensions between the two men, a conflict would have arisen as a result of the differing privileges agreed in their contracts.

Artichewsky arrived at Recife on March 20, 1639.<sup>358</sup> He left the colony again with the outbound ships in late May, barely two months after his arrival, leaving his regiment behind in Brazil. What had gone wrong? Even at time of Artichewsky's arrival, the tensions between the existing power holders in Brazil – including Johan Maurits – and Artichewsky were made painfully clear: the flag denoting the latter's rank as admiral of the fleet was shot down off the mast of the flagship *Groot Christoffel* on the orders of the High and Secret Council. In Artichewsky's telling of the tale, he was denied a private audience with Johan Maurits, while his former lodgings in Recife had been vacated by Elias Herckmans shortly before Artichewsky's arrival and were bare of furniture and even doors and windows.<sup>359</sup> Artichewsky became ill shortly after arriving in Brazil and remained bedridden for most of his stay. He was thus hampered in his attempts to inspect the artillery magazines. Worst of all, his regiment was quickly dispersed over the many garrisons, while new officers were appointed by Johan Maurits and soldiers given consent to apply for other jobs without Artichewsky's approval. This undermined the latter's entire vision of bringing over a coherent regiment as the core of a field army for offensive operations. Since neither the Council nor Johan Maurits responded to his repeated attempts to discuss these issues, Artichewsky resorted to using his leverage with the WIC directors – especially Burgh – to force the Council and Maurits to accept his position. In May 1639, Artichewsky wrote a draft letter, complaining about his treatment in Brazil, to Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh, and this was presented to a meeting of the High and Secret Council on May 16, 1639. His objective was to allow the Council to formally acknowledge his complaints and to draft a formal reply. The outcome, however, would be rather different.

There are various sources providing a possible explanation of what happened after the meeting of the Council on May 16, 1639. Firstly, there is the draft letter itself, with remarks penned in the margins, probably by Johan Maurits himself. There is also a file containing remarks by Balthasar van de Voorde, a member of the Political Council, on the draft.<sup>360</sup> The personal

<sup>356</sup> 'Memorie door de Kolonnel Artichofsky', 253.

<sup>357</sup> Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 91.

<sup>358</sup> Warnsinck, *Christoffel Artichewsky*, 35.

<sup>359</sup> 'Apologie van Artichofsky', 357.

<sup>360</sup> NL-HaNA 1.05.01.01 OWIC, inv. no. 54, fol. 129.

archive of Johan Maurits includes an anonymous French document defending Johan Maurits and putting the blame on Artichewsky. This document was probably written by the Calvinist minister Soler,<sup>361</sup> who mentioned the affair briefly in his letters, noting that Johan Maurits was affronted that the inspection of the artillery magazines was entrusted to someone else, when he had been arguing for years that this should be done.<sup>362</sup> Then there are the minutes of the meeting of the High Council of Brazil and the joint meeting of the High and Political Councils on the matter. Finally Artichewsky presented his case to the States-General in 1640, after gaining information from the minutes of the Council. This means that one of the directors must have provided this information to him, possibly Burgh or De Laet, to whom Artichewsky dedicated a book in 1643.<sup>363</sup>

Artichewsky noted that Johan Maurits initially reacted furiously to his letter, but calmed down later in the meeting and undertook to look into the matter. By the end of this initial meeting, Artichewsky had good hopes that the problems would be resolved and, as he was still ill, he went back to his lodgings. Two days later, however, he was placed under house arrest for 'insulting his Excellence'. In his study of the affair, Warnsinck argues that it was the Council that had really wanted to get rid of Artichewsky. He argues that its members tried with all their might to rid themselves of this intruder, who had received such notable powers from the directors in the Netherlands.<sup>364</sup> The minutes of the High Council meetings present another picture, however. In the meeting of May 20, Johan Maurits argued that Artichewsky had been sent to spy on him and that the Council needed to choose: Johan Maurits or Artichewsky. This is best understood in Johan Maurits' own words:

*No-one gifted with reasonable intelligence would dare to plan, much less put into practice, such affronts against his government unless he had a great and solid foundations on which he relied. Christoffel Artrishoskij [sic] is held by many to be a wise and careful man, so his actions, taken with such pre-determination, can only have been taken with such support. Which leads me, for my part, to think that Their High Mightinesses, the Prince of Orange or the General West India Company, have developed some mistrust towards my person or my service [...]. From these and such things it is easily deduced what I have mentioned before, and that he Artochofkij [sic] was not just sent to take this charge [General of artillery], but also to check upon my every act, which would have been very pleasant to me, if he Artochofkij had been an honest man and not such a villainous honor-thief, which has not only shown itself now, but also in earlier times.*<sup>365</sup>

<sup>361</sup> Koninklijk Huisarchief, Collectie Johan Maurits, inv. no. 1454, fol. 242-244. *Apologie pour très Magnifique et très excellent Jean Maurice, Conte de Nassau, Gouverneur, Capitaine et Admiral Général en Brésil.*

<sup>362</sup> B. Teensma, *Dutch-Brazil: Vincent Joachim Soler's seventeen letters, 1636-1643* (Editora Index, Rio de Janeiro 1999) 57.

<sup>363</sup> Warnsinck, *Christoffel Artichewsky*, 48.

<sup>364</sup> *Ibidem*, 43.

<sup>365</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 68, fol. 0385. *Niemandt met redelijck vernuft begaeft soude sich durven gedencken veel min int werck te stellen, sulcke affronteuse actien teegens sijne overicheijdt aen te vangen ten ware hij een groot ende vast fundament hadde waer op hij sich verliete, ende steunde, nu wert den Christoffel Artishoskij bij veelen voor een wijs ende voorsichtich man gehouden derhalven oock sulcke actien met sulcken voordacht bij hem niet anders als op sulcken fundament aengevangen sijn, daerim in mijn reguardt, grootel. te bedencken staet dat haer Hoogh Mogentbeeden sijne Hoocheijdt den Heere Prince van Orangien ofte immers de Generale Westindische Comp. eenig groot misvertrouwen, op mijn persoon ende onsen dienst moeten gescheept hebben[...]. Uyt dese ende diergelijcke dingen, is lichtelijck aff te nemen tgeene ick hier vooren verhaelt hebbe, ende dat hij Artichofkij niet alleen gesonden is om dese chaergie te beceden, maer oock om alle mijn doen ende late te Controlleuren, het welcke mij van berten seer aengenaem soude weesen, ende mij geluckich achten, dat deselve aenden dach gebracht, ende mijne meesters bekennt gemaect warden, Indien bij Artichoskij een eerlijck man ende gennen soo villainen eeren dieff ware, het welcke niet alleen nu maer in alle sijne voorgaende tijden gebleecken beeft.*

Tellingly, Johan Maurits thus suspected – reasonably – that some elements of the group that had seen him instated had now turned against him. Artichewsky’s appointment had been approved by the States-General and the stadholder himself. It is surprising, therefore, that Johan Maurits expressed his discontent with his superiors so freely. Artichewsky was also accused of fomenting insubordination among his troops and of the crime of *lesé-majesté* against Johan Maurits. This is striking as it suggests that Johan Maurits saw himself as *majesté* in Dutch Brazil. Given this explosive situation, the High and Secret Council ordered the members of the Political Council to attend a joint session to decide what should be done. The Council’s minutes record that a reconciliation between the two men was attempted, but that Johan Maurits insisted that no apology from Artichewsky could be sufficient to entice him to stay in Brazil with him. Presented with this situation, the High and Political Councils decided in a joint session to send Artichewsky back to the Netherlands.<sup>366</sup> The picture portrayed in the minutes thus differs from Warnsinck’s interpretation of the affair, whereby Johan Maurits was determined from the outset to send Artichewsky home. Warnsinck put most emphasis on the role of the members of the two councils, and it must be remembered that Artichewsky had clashed with the Political Council before. We can question, therefore, whether the council members were really serious in their attempts to reconcile the two men, or whether they were more concerned with putting on a show for the directors in the Republic, given that they often mentioned that they were not inclined to keep Artichewsky in Brazil on his own merits, but rather because some directors had such high regard for him.<sup>367</sup> Johan Maurits’ frustration with Artichewsky’s insistence that his contract in Brazil be honored is palpable from his letter of May 25, 1639 to the directors of the chamber of Zeeland, when he noted: ‘...but no reason could take hold; it was as ever ‘my conditions, my conditions’, as if his conditions should be maintained even at the detriment of the company’.<sup>368</sup> Artichewsky was ordered to leave with the ships departing the next Monday, May 23, and arriving in the Netherlands on July 22.<sup>369</sup> Johan van der Dussen left with the same fleet. He had served his contracted time in the High and Secret Council and was appointed by that Council to present its version of events, as well as its view on the state of Brazil, and to pressure the XIX into appointing new councilors so that Matthijs van Ceulen and Johan Gijselingh could return, too. The appointment of new councilors will be dealt with in chapter six.

#### *The aftermath of the conflict in the Netherlands*

The WIC directors, and especially the Amsterdam chamber, which had contracted Artichewsky, were unpleasantly surprised when he returned to the Netherlands in the summer of 1639. The dismissal of a colonial official specially empowered by the company’s management, and whose contract was supported both by the States-General and by the stadholder, was of course a dangerous act of insubordination on the part of Johan Maurits and the High Council. Although their actions ostensibly carried no consequences, a study of the aftermath of the affair in the Netherlands will show that the affair did in fact have a substantial impact on the WIC. Artichewsky continued to address lengthy letters and memoranda, making his case, to the XIX,

<sup>366</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 68, May 20, 1639, unfoliated, scan 1137-1143. High and Political Council to the XIX.

<sup>367</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>368</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 54, piece 131. Johan Maurits to the chamber of Zeeland, May 25, 1639. *Maer geene redenen konnen platse grijpen, het is al weder bet oude, [‘]mijne conditien, mijne conditien[‘], als off sijne conditien moesten onderhouden werden selffs tot ondiens vande Comp.a...*

<sup>369</sup> Artichewsky Apologie, kroniek Utrecht, 374. and NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 55, item 2.

the States-General and the stadholder. His first response was his lengthy *Apologie*, written in August 1639, shortly after his arrival in the Netherlands, and in which he requested the XIX to accept his version of events and offer recompense of damages, restitution of honor and an attestation stating that he had always acted loyally to both the company and the state.<sup>370</sup> Since Artichewsky had been appointed by the company and the States-General (with the approval of Frederik Hendrik), he needed the consent of both parties to be relieved of his contract and duty. The company, or rather the Amsterdam chamber, needed to issue him with a passport to release him from service. Artichewsky tried to present his *Apologie* to the States-General on August 21, accompanied by WIC director Wilmerdonck, but he was turned down since the States-General had been forewarned by 'the governor-general of Brazil' that this would happen, thus illustrating Johan Maurits' annoying tendency – for the WIC – of keeping the States-General up-to-date on developments in Brazil.<sup>371</sup> When the Amsterdam chamber tried to resolve matters with Artichewsky and issue him with a passport releasing him from service, they were called back by the States-General.<sup>372</sup> In the meantime, Artichewsky had gained insight into the letters sent from Brazil and the copies of the minutes of the High and Secret Council dealing with the case. These prompted him to write another rebuttal, which was presented to the States-General in March 1640. This rebuttal is interesting primarily because of what it exposes of the relations between the WIC chambers, between the WIC and the States-General, and between the Council and Governor-General in Brazil. Artichewsky's complaint was simply added to the archives of the WIC and, puzzlingly, inserted among the letters and papers received from Brazil.<sup>373</sup>

After returning to the Netherlands, Artichewsky turned first to the Amsterdam chamber, asking it to hear his case. Surprisingly, the chamber members refused to make a decision and directed him to the States-General, which, as we have seen, had also refused to hear him in August 1639. The XIX, too, refused to hear him during two consecutive sessions, until he sent the letter to the States-General in March 1640. Despite this poor treatment by the company's directors, Artichewsky was still quite mild in his verdict about them: '*Yet these same people who treat me this way are on the whole honorable fellows, who approve of my actions and who are well-inclined towards me in private. They would gladly do all they could if only they knew that Your High Mightinesses and His Altesse [Frederik Hendrik] would approve.*'<sup>374</sup> This analysis is actually quite likely to be correct; Artichewsky had maintained close ties with the Amsterdam directors by, for example, supporting their push for free trade with Brazil. Later, in 1643, he also dedicated a book to Johannes de Laet. The Amsterdam chamber initiated the attempt to issue him with a passport, while a director of that chamber had also accompanied him when he first approached the States-General in August 1639. His claims about the inner workings and motivations of the directors of the Amsterdam chamber are thus not merely idle speculation. The fact that the States-General had refused him an audience in August – because of information received from Brazil – backs up the claims made by Artichewsky. Since the appointments of high WIC personnel in Brazil, both in the case of Johan Maurits and that of Artichewsky, depended on the permission and cooperation of the States-General and the stadholder, the WIC was hardly in a position to act unilaterally. This was all the

<sup>370</sup> 'Apologie van Artichofsky', 389-390.

<sup>371</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02, inv. no. 4845, fol. 33 recto.

<sup>372</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 55, item two.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>374</sup> *Ibidem*, 'Nochtans deselve die mij soo tracteeren, zijn meest eerlijcke lijdten, die van mij gedaene diensten, voor goed achten, ende voor deselve in prive wel geaffectioneert zijn, oock alles gaern doen souden als sij wijsten, dat Uwe Hoogh Mogentheeden, ende Sijn Altesse een wel gevallen daeraen hebben souden.'



more so since the company was by then heavily reliant on subsidies granted and promised by the Generality. Only if the political alliances supporting the pro-war party in power broke down could the WIC reassert its own policy-making powers. Johan Maurits, for his part, was cleverly able to use this dependent position of the XIX and the chambers of the company to consolidate his own position in Brazil. However, the affair certainly had an impact on the support for Johan Maurits among the WIC directors as the very same men who had taken the decision to nominate Johan Maurits had also initiated Artichewsky's mission. It is unlikely that Burgh, De Laet or Wilmerdonck would have looked kindly on this act of insubordination by the High Council and governor-general in Brazil. This case also underlines the consequences for the WIC of nominating a candidate so enmeshed with the political life of the Republic as Johan Maurits. The role of the stadholder in this entire debacle remains unclear: he had approved both the appointment of Johan Maurits and that of Artichewsky. Although his support for sending Artichewsky back to Brazil in 1639 could be construed as a snub of Johan Maurits, there is no documentary evidence of a rift between the stadholder and Johan Maurits at that point. What is clear, however, is that conflicts in Brazil that threatened the position of Johan Maurits had immediate political repercussions in the Republic itself, thus undermining the independent policy-making powers of the XIX.

### **Trade and government**

As governor-general of Dutch Brazil Johan Maurits had to deal not only with the company's multitude of servants, soldiers, clerks, merchants, scribes, clergy and sailors, but also with the inhabitants of the colony. These can be divided into two general groups: the 'Portuguese', or those people of European (or mixed) descent, who were already present in the colony before the WIC's arrival, and those who arrived after the WIC captured Pernambuco in 1630. This latter category obviously included all the company's personnel, gathered from all over (predominantly Protestant) Europe. One of the major challenges facing the company's government of the colony was, therefore, the need to maintain a religious peace between the various groups comprising the population of the colony: Catholic Portuguese-Brazilians, Reformed Dutchmen, Lutheran German soldiers, Calvinist Scots and Jewish inhabitants of (mainly) Recife. Even before the arrival of Johan Maurits, the directors Van Ceulen and Gijsselingh had imposed a system of religious 'toleration', in the sense that no-one was to be prosecuted for their beliefs.<sup>375</sup> The Portuguese Catholics were granted permission to attend their religious services, as were the Jewish inhabitants of Recife. Interestingly, Protestants of denominations other than Dutch Reformed were not granted this privilege, thus creating the odd situation whereby the nominally conquered Portuguese-Brazilian Catholics enjoyed more religious rights than some Protestant soldiers in the service of the company.<sup>376</sup>

This religious pluralism did not go unchallenged, however. On the Dutch side, there were numerous complaints, both in the Republic and in Brazil, by Reformed clergymen that the WIC's struggle was not just with an enemy state, but also comprised a spiritual fight against the Catholic church and that religious privileges should, therefore, be withdrawn. On the other hand, letters and papers sent from Brazil contained numerous complaints from Portuguese-Brazilians and Dutchmen alike about the position of the Jews in the colony. One such letter, signed both by

<sup>375</sup> J. Israel and J. Schwartz, *The Expansion of Tolerance: Religion in Dutch Brazil (1624-1654)* (Amsterdam 2007) 19.

<sup>376</sup> *Ibidem*, 21-22.



Dutchmen and Portuguese-Brazilians, complained that '*As a consequence the Christians here have already become more spectators of the trade of the Jews than being traders themselves*'. The letter's authors then added:

*Which would not be the case if Your honors would consent to limit the Jews to what is allowed in the fatherland, where they are allowed to live and trade, but certainly not to open any shops or sell anything to the detriment of the Christian community. So it is in all other countries with less freedom [than the Republic] where they are made to wear red hats or yellow eyes on their chest and many other badges so that everyone will be forewarned and will not be robbed or cheated by them.*<sup>377</sup>

The letters and papers from Brazil also include requests in Portuguese to the same effect.<sup>378</sup> It is to the credit of the WIC government of Brazil, and Johan Maurits as well, that it did not give in to this pressure and maintained liberties, both religious and economic, for Jews. Rather than being a principled defense of 'toleration', however, the main reason for tolerating these religious differences was for practical reasons of state. Jewish merchants from the Dutch Republic were one of the few groups actually willing to migrate to the Brazilian colony and were thus important to the company, bringing trade and connections with them. As the WIC could not hope to make the colony profitable without the cooperation of the Portuguese planters, the company realized that the latter should not be antagonized by restricting their religious liberties.<sup>379</sup> Interestingly, the reverend Soler, who was fiercely anti-Jewish, mentioned in his letters that Johan Maurits privately 'hated' the Jews, but could not do anything against them. Though this may not actually have been the case, it would at least show that Johan Maurits was not hesitant to make others believe he agreed with them if that served his own ends.

### **Bookkeeper and manager: the economy of Brazil and the High Council**

The arrival of Johan Maurits in Brazil coincided with a heated debate among the various chambers of the company on the best way to conduct trade with the colony. The newly found stability in the lands of Pernambuco served to focus the minds of the company directors in the Republic on profit, a matter that had until then played second fiddle to the overarching demands of war. In the period 1636-1639 a great debate raged between the chambers on the question of whether trade to Brazil should be open or closed to all except the WIC itself. Free trade in this context was a qualified free trade, with two different types of proponents wanting to allow private merchants access to Brazil. On the one hand, there were those who were willing to give merchants access to Brazil, provided they shipped their products on WIC vessels and paid 'recognition fees' for the privilege. On the other hand, a more radical faction favored giving private merchant ships unrestricted access to Brazil. The latter position was held mostly within

<sup>377</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01 inv. no. 56, unfoliated, item 241. '*In volgen dat de Christenen alreede hier meer spectateurs vande negotie der Jooden geworden sijn als negocijanten*'. '*Het welck soo niet en soude, alst U Ed. gelieven sal de Jooden alleen te bepale inde limiten vant vaderlandt daer het de Jooden wel gepermiteert is te woonen, ende te traficqueren, maer verre ist daer dat haer soude toegelaten worden eenige winckels te oopenen ofte iets met den cleijnen te vercoopen tot nadeel vande christen gemeente, ende soo ist gelijk in in alle andere landen met so veel minder vrijheijt dat mense op de eene plaetse doet dragen roode hoden, op de andere geele oogen op de borst ende meer andere kentecken en om dat een ijder gewaerschout mach sijn tot te sien om van haer niet bestolen off bedroogen te worden.*'

<sup>378</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01, inv. no. 52, unfoliated, item 137.

<sup>379</sup> Joan-Pau Rubiés, 'Epilogue', in: M. van Groesen (ed.), *The Legacy of Dutch Brazil* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2014) 312.

the Amsterdam chamber, and it was the Amsterdam directors who remained the most vociferous defenders of the right of free trade with Brazil. Proponents of open trade argued that the company was far from able to send enough supplies to Brazil in support of its armed forces. The company consequently needed the cooperation of private merchants and had to offer them something in return. Taxed trade by private merchants had the added advantage of removing the risk of conducting business from the WIC and placing the risk of losing valuable stock on the private merchants. Open trade would also be in the interests of the colony's inhabitants and thus help persuade them to stay loyal to the WIC. The Amsterdam chamber was opposed by a coalition of chambers (Zeeland, De Maze, and Stad en Lande), with Zeeland being the principal opponent. These chambers argued that in the years during which private trade had been allowed, too much profit had been earned by private merchants, to the detriment of the company and the inhabitants of Brazil.<sup>380</sup> These opponents argued that the company would make more profit by enforcing its monopoly and that it was, in fact, able to supply its colony in Brazil. Additionally, the smaller chambers felt that their interests would be better served by keeping the commercial and industrial activities associated with WIC shipping in their ports. Free trade was likely to move to Amsterdam. Since the directors were often important local political figures, these local interests cannot be ignored when studying the decision-making on free or closed trade.

Initially, the Amsterdam chamber was able to force through free trade despite Zeeland's objections, but this began to change in 1637. The letter that Christoffel Artichewsky sent to the government and High Council in Brazil in July 1637 provides important insight into these discussions and an inside view on how this question was debated within the company.<sup>381</sup> Artichewsky sent a long report back to Brazil upon his arrival in the Netherlands in summer 1637. He arrived in the middle of heated debates on the issue of trade and was initially loath to make his own views known: *'I was also fearful to insult one or the other of the two sides (both being good friends).'*<sup>382</sup> He was quick, however, to argue in favor of open trade. The numbers that the adherents used in arguing against free trade were fictitious and not based on any understanding of the real situation in Brazil. The Zeelanders projected future incomes from *engenbhos* that had long since been burned by the Portuguese or the Dutch. Zeeland had waged a crafty lobby against free trade among the Generality and the stadholder, using complaints from Brazil about Amsterdam merchants and seeking to paint the Amsterdam directors as self-interested. Artichewsky was particularly outraged by this and argued that men such as De Laet, Arnhem and Conradus (Burgh) were not merchants, but were among the wisest of the directors. This is interesting as it shows Artichewsky's network within the Amsterdam chamber.<sup>383</sup> The lobby against free trade quickly made it known that Artichewsky should not speak his mind about the issue and, to his disappointment, he had no opportunity to talk directly to either the Generality or the stadholder. He was particularly enraged that the anti-free trade lobby had taken its case outside the company, *'as if they did not have a XIX, a senate'*.<sup>384</sup> His comparison of the XIX to the Roman senate is interesting, and typical of the heavily classically-influenced Artichewsky, who used many Roman writers to back up his opinions. He urged Johan Maurits and the Council to make their views on

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<sup>380</sup> 'Missive van den Kolonnel Artichofsky aan Graaf Maurits en den Hoogen Raad in Brazilië, 24 Juli 1637', *Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht, vijf-en-twintigste jaargang, 1869* (Kemink en Zoon: Utrecht 1869) 221-248, 231.

<sup>381</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>382</sup> 'Missive van den Kolonnel Artichofsky', 234.

<sup>383</sup> *Ibidem*, 231.

<sup>384</sup> *Ibidem*, 230.

the topic known to the directors in the Republic so that they could still influence the debate. The letter hints at the start of a trend that would have deleterious effects on company management in the coming decades: infighting between the different chambers. In the discussion on whether to allow free trade, Zeeland convinced the States-General and the stadholder of its point, with the result that the latter two parties intervened, and Johan Maurits received direct orders from the Generality in 1638 to the effect that the trade would henceforth be closed.<sup>385</sup> The reason given for the Generality's intervention was that the XIX could not come to an agreement. This was hardly surprising, given the Zeelanders' conscious blocking of any possible deal. The political process in the Republic thus became involved in the internal management of the company and, once in place, this involvement could not be reversed.

Johan Maurits, to his credit, quickly realized the dire effects of a restrictive trade policy and argued forcefully against closing the trade. In a letter to the States-General in January 1638, he argued that limiting the freedom of commerce, both for Dutch shippers and for the colony's inhabitants, would make the Luso-Brazilian planters long for liberation from the Dutch. Only by carefully minding the interests of the planters could the WIC hope to pacify the colony. Additionally, and rather interestingly, Johan Maurits argued that trade should be free '*according to the law of nations*', an interesting line of argument to take for the most powerful servant of the fiercely monopolistic WIC.<sup>386</sup>

## Conclusion

Johan Maurits was appointed to lead the WIC's armed forces in Brazil. To assess the trajectory of his career, and to see how his principals would have judged his performance, we thus need to look first and foremost at his performance as a military commander. This performance is somewhat difficult to assess since there are different ways to judge military success. As a field commander, Johan Maurits' record was mixed, with success at Porto Calvo and the journey to the Rio São Francisco being offset by failure at Bahia. The complaints by soldiers in the field and the field commanders have also been noted. However, the early period of Johan Maurits' tenure was indubitably successful, with the borders of the WIC's Brazilian colony being extended southward and solidified on the Rio São Francisco. This success proved instrumental in consolidating the WIC's – tenuous – grasp on the sugar-producing lands of Pernambuco. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Portuguese stronghold of Elmina was also taken, thus giving the WIC a more stable foothold on the Gold Coast. These successes would have reflected well on Johan Maurits' performance, and he himself was eager to claim credit for them.

On other fronts, however, there were problems and setbacks. Although the setback at Bahia in 1638 is perhaps the most eye-catching, it is the conflict with Artichefsky that reveals most about the difficulties that would plague Dutch Brazil in the years to come. In the first place, this was, of course, a question of command hierarchies. Could the XIX appoint an officer whose purview encroached upon the privileges extended to Johan Maurits? The directors evidently thought they could. Johan Maurits disagreed, and his dismissal of Artichewsky shows that he was able to back up his position in Brazil with support from members of both councils.

The other element hinted at by Artichewsky's appointment is the XIX's mistrust of how stores and supplies in Brazil were managed by the governor-general and the High and Secret

<sup>385</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02, inv. no. 12564.5.2.

<sup>386</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02, inv. no. 12564.6, unfoliated, Johan Maurits and the High and Secret Council to the States-General, 16 January 1638. '*uijt het recht der volkeren*'.

Council. The logistics of the WIC's war in Brazil presented a substantial challenge. Not only did most supplies have to be shipped from Europe, but they also had to be stored in Recife, and then distributed among the WIC garrisons along the Brazilian Coast and in the interior. These latter challenges seem in fact to have been the most problematic and to have prompted the XIX to send Artichewsky to Brazil to inspect the artillery stores. Johan Maurits' subsequent dismissal of Artichewsky, however, caused great problems in his relationship with members of the Amsterdam chamber. Influential directors such as Burgh and De Laet had remained in touch with Artichewsky and were instrumental in his appointment. They will not have looked kindly upon this act of insubordination by their colonial governor-general.

The other aspect on which this chapter has focused is the creation of Johan Maurits' nobleman's court in Recife. This is a theme that has attracted much attention in the literature, especially from the perspective of the unique artistic output that this court generated. The court of Johan Maurits – 'his Excellency' in the sources – has thus been well studied and celebrated in terms of architecture, paintings, ethnography and botany. However, the courtly project of Johan Maurits also had significant consequences for his position as governor-general of Brazil. This effect was twofold: it changed both his position within the company's Brazilian hierarchy, as well as his relationship with the directors in the Netherlands. In Brazil, Johan Maurits was able, to a considerable extent, to subsume the official WIC hierarchy within the orbit of his court. By making senior personnel – the members of the Political and Secret Councils in the first place – part of his courtly retinue, he was able to counteract their ability – or indeed willingness – to act as a 'check and balance' to his considerable powers. The discussion of the conflict between Johan Maurits and Christoffel Artichewsky shows that the former did not wish to be checked by the authorities in the Republic. The courtly project thus represented an acute principal-agent problem for the directors. Dutch colonial governance was always a collective rather than individual responsibility. Governors and councils made decisions as a collective, and the governor was often no more than the first among equals. But by ensuring that officials, who were theoretically sent to take decisions with him and to check his actions, became tied to him personally, Johan Maurits caused this structure to break down. This may indeed have been a reason for the directors of the Amsterdam chamber to send Artichewsky to Brazil with such wide-ranging powers in 1639. His authority to check the stores of the artillery magazines was considered especially disgraceful by Johan Maurits. This may have been because, in order to tie the WIC's elites to him personally, the governor-general may have turned a blind eye to sales of company goods for personal gain. Indeed, the literature states that the late 1630s was a period of increasing corruption in Dutch Brazil.

Another mechanism by which Johan Maurits was able to construct a colonial elite beholden to him was his clever use of the article in his contract stipulating a free table for him and his retinue. By wining and dining his followers he was able to reward them for good conduct in a city where foodstuffs were famously expensive, and all at the expense of the company. It will come as no surprise, therefore, to hear that when it was ultimately decided to dismiss Johan Maurits, the directors immediately took the opportunity to put an end to his use of company funds for this purpose. While strengthening his position within Brazil, therefore, his courtly project actually undermined his stature among the WIC directors. Theoretically, it would perhaps have been possible for him to use the output of his court to gain the favor of at least some directors by, for example, donating some paintings or sketches or by sending botanical samples to directors who collected art or were interested in botany. However, this does not seem to have

taken place at all. Indeed, Johan Maurits later traded much of his collection in return for royal favors from Denmark and France; in other words, he does not seem to have had any inhibitions about parting with his collection, providing the price was right. This would seem to suggest that Johan Maurits did not see the directors as equals with whom he had to wheel and deal in the same way as he would later do with Louis XIV. This points to the difficulty created for the company by the appointment of a high nobleman to its highest colonial function.

Lastly, by appointing a Nassau as governor-general in Brazil, the WIC had closely attached itself to the party politics of the Dutch Republic. This was in marked contrast to practice in the VOC, where, as we have seen, appointments of colonial personnel followed factional rather than party political lines. This link became increasingly difficult to maintain when the relatively harmonious relationships between the stadholder and urban regents of the 1630s became ever more oppositional during the late 1630s and 40s. By appointing a governor-general whose appointment required the consent of the stadholder and States-General, the WIC had opened the doors for these parties' more direct involvement in management of the colony. These problems will be taken up in chapter six, which will analyze the process leading to the decision to dismiss Johan Maurits in 1642.



## 5. Ceylon: Trade or Territory?

*Van Goens and Ceylon as a challenge to Batavia's dominance, 1655-1670*

In 1655-1656 Van Goens briefly returned in the Netherlands for the first time in twenty-seven years. Using his previous experience as a diplomat, merchant and soldier, he was able to convince the VOC directors to change course towards a more aggressive expansionist policy in South Asia. By 1656 he was set to return to Asia at the head of a large fleet, with the aim of finally ejecting the Portuguese from Ceylon, Malabar and, if at all possible, Diu. This proved to be the start of an entanglement with Ceylon that would last until 1675, when he returned to Batavia. Ceylon captivated Van Goens and, even in Batavia, the major debates centered on what place the island should take in the VOC's now sizable Asian domains, and what the official policy should be in relation to the interior kingdom of Kandy. This chapter will focus on the first fifteen years of this period, 1655-1670, when Van Goens was to a large extent able to dictate the VOC's policies on Ceylon and Southern India. While on Ceylon, Van Goens faced three questions: how should the VOC rule its parts of the island? What should be the relationship between the Ceylon government and the surrounding polities, both on Ceylon with Kandy, as well as with the neighboring states in Southern India? Thirdly, how should Ceylon relate to the neighboring VOC commands of Surat, Vengurla, Coromandel and Bengal? Van Goens came up with answers to all these questions and attempted to put them into practice, thus shaping the VOC's posture in the area for the next century and more. This chapter will address the central questions of *why* and *how* Van Goens was able to so decisively shape policy on Ceylon. Throughout the 1660s, Van Goens became the VOC's 'Mr. Ceylon' and was largely successful in transforming it into a sphere of its own, the center for the company's activities in South Asia and to a large degree removed from Batavia's control. This also had its effects on Van Goens himself, who became increasingly obsessed with the island and the company's prospects there, regarding it as a potential 'second fatherland' and naming his daughter (born in 1668 in Colombo – a city, incidentally, which was rebuilt under his direction) Esther *Ceylonia* van Goens. As well as the effects on Van Goens personally, this growing obsession with Ceylon also affected the way that we as historians can study him. Over time, Van Goens came to present the island's future prospects in ever more glowing terms – if only his policies were to be followed, that is. Reports were more and more edited to convince his audience (the directors), while the veracity of reports' contents became ever more questionable. This worked for as long as Van Goens' predictions came true or were at least feasible; in the event, however, of a major crisis, this web of deception could crumble, leaving Van Goens dangerously exposed. This is the theme that binds this chapter and chapter seven together. While this chapter will focus on the 'construction of Ceylon' – in other words, on the military, administrative and commercial regulations and strategies that were enacted by the VOC, and the way in which Van Goens' personal life became entangled with it, both from a family perspective and in terms of patronage relations – chapter seven, by contrast, will focus on information control, which lay at the heart of Van Goens' ability to shape policy, and how this control started to deteriorate from 1670 onwards.

Van Goens' tenure on Ceylon is unique within the VOC's history as it is the clearest example of a regional governor breaking free from the tutelage of Batavia. The VOC's stated policy was to shift its highest commanders regularly from one assignment to the next. This prevented them from becoming too deeply embedded in their local surroundings and, of course,

served to affirm the centrality of Batavia. This was in marked contrast to, for example, the administrative structure of the East India Company (EIC) with its two, later three, competing 'presidencies'. Julia Adams has argued that the divided nature of the EIC's administration ultimately worked to its advantage as personnel stayed within their presidencies, and these presidencies checked on each other jealously. According to her argument, Batavia's centrality ultimately proved disadvantageous to the VOC as it meant that a close familial circle of connected governors and councils covered and increasingly enriched each other at the expense of the VOC.<sup>387</sup> The only challenge to Batavia's centrality was the Ceylon government under Van Goens. The most elaborate study of a period of this tenure on Ceylon is W.M. Ottow's book on the period 1655-1662. This proved a valuable tool for finding important letters in the archives as Ottow made a very comprehensive study of the official letters sent during this period.<sup>388</sup> As the subtitle of Ottow's work suggests, it is primarily an archive study, and does not offer much in the way of analysis. This chapter will make grateful use of the archival work of Dr. Ottow, while also adding some of its own and providing an analytical framework for interpreting the data. In the light of the way Van Goens' career developed in this period, and how his name and Ceylon became nearly synonymous in VOC circles, it is fair to ask whether this was the result of a conscious strategy on his part. On this question, the available literature is divided. Arasaratnam and Goonewardena present Van Goens as a staunch opponent of Raja Singha, with his actions seen as part of a conscious strategy from the outset.<sup>389</sup> In Ottow's work on the period 1655-1662, however, Van Goens is presented as perhaps the archetypical, faithful company man: Calvinist, unyielding to those who broke the rules, and attempting to further the interests of the company at every turn.<sup>390</sup> In Ottow's view, the conflict between Van Goens and Van der Meijden (see below) was the result of a clash of personalities, rather than a conscious strategy by Van Goens to undermine the latter and to seize the governorship of Ceylon for himself. This is interesting as Ottow's earlier study hinted at the lucrative private trades Van Goens must have engaged in to amass his considerable fortune.<sup>391</sup> This chapter will argue that Van Goens developed his ideas for the potential role of Ceylon in the VOC's system, and his own position on Ceylon, gradually. His early attempts to cede Jaffna to the Coromandel government seem to indicate that he did not have his extremely ambitious vision for the Ceylon government's role as an alternative power base for the VOC in Asia from the outset. Yet, by 1662, Van Goens had become both enthralled with the island itself, as well as with the opportunities it offered him to advance causes close to his heart such as proselytization of the Calvinist faith and the creation of a Dutch colony, as well as his private fortune. By the end of the period under review, Van Goens had become *the* face of an ambitious, imperial Ceylon policy, and a potent threat to the power of Batavia.

In seeking to make sense of this unique period, this chapter is divided into four sections. First, Van Goens' journey to the Netherlands in 1655-1656 will be detailed. How did he convince

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<sup>387</sup> J. Adams, 'Principals and Agents, Colonialists and Company Men: The Decay of Colonial Control in the Dutch East Indies', *American Sociological Review* 61:1 (1996) 12-28, 19-25.

<sup>388</sup> W.M. Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens, Krijgsman, Commissaris en Regent, Dienaar der V.O.C.: Archiefstudie over het Europees verlof (1655-57) en de eerste grote Ceylon-periode (1657-62): omslagjaren voor de man die van jongs af aan in V.O.C.-verband prachtig carrière maakte, maar het later bitter moeilijk kreeg* (2nd revised edition, published by author, 1996).

<sup>389</sup> The two works of Goonewardena and Arasaratnam complement each other and, though old, still present the most complete picture of the early years of the Ceylon government: K.W. Goonewardena, *The foundation of Dutch power in Ceylon 1638-1658* (Djambatan: Amsterdam 1958) and S. Arasaratnam, *Dutch power in Ceylon, 1658-1687* (Djambatan: Amsterdam 1958).

<sup>390</sup> Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens: Krijgsman Commissaris en Regent*, 259-260.

<sup>391</sup> Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens: De carrière van een diplomaat*, 289-299.

the XVII to put him in charge of the military operations in South Asia? What were the intended goals, and what means were put at his disposal? How did he forge ties with directors and other important individuals in the Republic, and was he helped in this by the networks within the VOC's Asian branch that he had built up over the previous quarter-century? Lastly, this section will briefly explore the position of the VOC in South Asia and Ceylon, especially in 1655, when Van Goens submitted his report.

The second section will detail the conquest of the final Portuguese strongholds on Ceylon, and the related offensive on the Malabar Coast that lasted until 1663. Besides the military operations themselves, this section will focus on the professional rivalry between Van Goens, the *superintendent en veldoverste* (commander-in-chief) of the VOC's Western commands, and the governor of Ceylon, Adriaan van der Meijden. The two men clashed repeatedly over policy, and Van Goens was increasingly able to subvert the office of governor to his superintendence. This led Van Goens to formally take up the position of governor of Ceylon in 1662, a position that he would hold, with a short intermission in 1664-65, for the next thirteen years.

The third section discusses the policies that Van Goens advocated in relation to Ceylon, both as *superintendent* and as governor. This section will argue that Van Goens' ideas developed throughout the late 1650s and early 1660s and that it was not until the mid-1660s that they were finalized. Although Van Goens was, in the end, firmly in favor of absolute conquest of the island, he had a keen eye for the administrative practices that could be made to serve the VOC's administration. The office of the *dessave*, a local provincial governor, which was adopted from Portuguese and pre-colonial administrative practices, is a good example of this.

A discussion of policy and administration automatically leads to the fourth section, and to the question of who would occupy these positions. And this is where Van Goens' centrality in a new network of Ceylonese servants came into play. By linking himself to the VOC elites in Coromandel, Bengal and Surat, Van Goens created a network of support in the region, with the result that he was free to play the part of the powerful patron for those wanting to hold one or more of the many positions in the new administration. These included Van Goens' son, Rijckloff junior, who arrived in Ceylon in 1658, was promoted to assistant merchant in 1662 and appointed to the important position of *dessave* of the *dessavonie* of Colombo in 1665. These connections and networks are discernable thanks not only to the official VOC papers, but also – again – to the wealth of information stored in the correspondence books of the Sweers Collection in the National Archive. These sources make it possible to gain insight into how such a network of patronage and family connections operated and to populate this with real individuals rather than merely names on paper. Lastly, this chapter will conclude by briefly recapitulating the major points and underlining how these will again play a role in chapter seven.

### **Persuading the directors: Van Goens in the Republic, 1655-1656**

Rijckloff van Goens returned from his inspection of the Western Quarters in Batavia in summer 1654. He was sent on a final diplomatic mission to the Court of Mataram in August that year and then requested to be repatriated to the Republic. The term 'repatriated' is somewhat ironic as Van Goens had never lived in the Netherlands on a permanent basis. His request was granted, however, and he left for the Netherlands on January 28, 1655 in the honorable position of commander of the homeward-bound fleet.<sup>392</sup> VOC ships on the intercontinental trips always

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<sup>392</sup> Van Leupe, 'Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens: buitengewoon raad van Indië', 304.

sailed in convoys. The function of commander of the homeward-bound fleet was a largely honorary position and a way of showing appreciation for services rendered. Returning commanders were rewarded, upon their safe return, with gifts such as silver or gold chains, commemorative medallions or goblets, or money. Van Goens, for example, received a sum of 600 guilders or a gold chain worth that amount.<sup>393</sup> There was another perk of being named commander of the fleet: the returning commander received a ‘debriefing’ from the delegated directors of the XVII. In return, the commander was expected to present the directors with an overview of the state of the company in Asia and give advice on policy. In this capacity, he was supposed to speak on behalf of the High Government of the Indies,<sup>394</sup> with his report also being submitted to the States-General. This allowed Van Goens a platform to present his views directly to the directors. Van Goens’ report (*vertooch*) is interesting in several ways. In the first place, it is much more argumentative than other reports of the same nature. Mattheus van den Broecke’s report of 1670, for example, merely gives a description of the state of the various VOC governments.<sup>395</sup> Although Van Goens also gave a description of the state of all the VOC governments, he tied this description to a central analysis and recommended policy options based on this analysis. In the *vertooch*, filed in Amsterdam in September 1655, Van Goens would pay by far most attention to the Western Quarters of the company, India and Ceylon, where the war with Portugal was being waged. Coromandel especially received much attention, with its description alone covering nearly twelve pages in the transcription made by P.A. Leupe in the nineteenth century. The description of the situation on Ceylon, though short at just one page, is particularly ominous in light of Van Goens’ later career:

*It is to be regretted that the honorable Company has not been able to drive the Portuguese from the island, from which it would have profited exceptionally, for it would have allowed Your Honors to occupy these lands with fewer costs and more advantage in the future.*<sup>396</sup>

The need for more aggressive military action to ward off competitors, to defeat the Portuguese and to restore the company’s stature in Asia formed a recurrent theme throughout the *vertooch*. Van Goens argued that the company had previously fought too half-heartedly on too many fronts at the same time. Immediate reinforcements were, therefore, needed to expel the Portuguese from Ceylon and to end the war there once and for all. Short-term investments would result, he claimed, in long-term returns. In the West of India, Diu should be taken from the *Estado*. War was also needed, in Van Goens’ eyes, on the Coromandel Coast against Golconda to restore the company’s honor and instill due respect. Here, too, there were forebodings of ideas to come as Van Goens mentioned that personnel in Coromandel could well be evacuated to Ceylon, thus making that island a safe redoubt of the VOC in South Asia. At Malacca, intervention was needed to instill proper respect for the company’s exclusive privileges and to move the tin trade to there. Further east, meanwhile, the war with Macassar was proving a steady drain on the

<sup>393</sup> P. van Dam and F.W. Stapel, *Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, eerste boek, deel II* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1929) 321-322.

<sup>394</sup> P.A. Leupe, ‘Rapport van Goens’, *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* 4:1/2 (1885) 141-180, 141. ‘representeerende de suprioren en Hoogste overheijt’.

<sup>395</sup> NL-HaNa, States-General, 1.01.02, 12564.48, Rapport van den heer Mattheus van den Broecke.

<sup>396</sup> Leupe, ‘Rapport van Van Goens’, 149. ‘Te beclagen zijnde dat d’ E. Compe. niet heeft connen gelegen comen, den Portugees van dat eijlant te verdrijven, daaraan deselve sonderlinge soude geprofitteert hebben, om die landen voortaan nae UEd. concept met minder onkosten ende meerder voordeel te mogen besitten.’



company's resources, and the need to keep the Macassarese incursions into Ambon in check had consumed all the reinforcements that had been sent over from the Netherlands during the war with England. Had these forces been free to be deployed on Ceylon and in India, great successes would have been gained. A quick resolution with Macassar was, therefore, necessary, and the company could try to stem its advance by concluding more treaties with other local kingdoms and by restricting the trade in rice to the great port. All-out warfare with Macassar was not an amenable prospect as *'we will have to kill many thousands ere he [the King of Macassar] will yield on that account, having a land so full of people that they well may be compared to ants.'* In his review, Van Goens thus noted that merely maintaining the status quo was not in the VOC's interests. Peace in the East would facilitate a major war effort in the West, where, on Ceylon and the opposite coast of Madurai, the company could conquer prosperous territories. Control of Diu would effectively beat the Portuguese and give the VOC access to a large income in the form of the Diu tolls. Now was the time, therefore, to invest in extra soldiers and fleets, and Van Goens hinted that he was open to being sent back to Asia at their head. Well aware that this was perhaps not what the directors expected, Van Goens noted *'I have, in this report on the Company's State, perhaps voiced my opinion somewhat boldly and bluntly, which in conclusion. I request and hope will be tolerated.'*<sup>397</sup> This hope was apparently fulfilled as Van Goens was selected in 1656 to command a force of thirteen ships, of which nine were large warships – some of which had been purpose-built as warships during the recent war with England.<sup>398</sup>

The *vertooch* of Van Goens and his visit to the Netherlands fit into a recognizable pattern within the VOC. The most famous example of a similar type of document is, of course, Jan Pietersz. Coen's *Discours*, written when he was head of the VOC's factory at Bantam in 1613 and submitted on January 1, 1614.<sup>399</sup> Like Coen, Van Goens addressed the directors directly and proposed important changes in strategy. Coen's *Discours* is perhaps exceptional for its clear style and catchy one-liners, a style that Van Goens lacked. Possibly, Van Goens had read the earlier document because his admonition *'that I have never spared my enemies'*<sup>400</sup> (by which he meant the enemies of the company) echoes what is perhaps Coen's most famous line: *'But do not despair, do not spare your enemies, for God is with us.'*<sup>401</sup> On the other hand, returning to the Netherlands to create a possible platform for future advancement was a strategy commonly employed by VOC servants in the first half of the seventeenth century. Coen had employed it in-between his two stints as governor-general. Among lower ranks, too, it was a common practice: Antonio van Diemen, for example, was director-general in Batavia before returning at the head of the homeward-bound fleet in 1631. After returning to Batavia in 1632, he was restored to his former office and became governor-general in 1636.<sup>402</sup> Francois Caron, who is best known for his long tenure in Japan, also enjoyed a brief Dutch interlude in 1642-1643. Carel Reyniersz. was governor of the Coromandel Coast and counselor-extraordinary of the Council of the Indies in 1636-1638, after which he

<sup>397</sup> Ibidem, 179: *'Ick hebbe in dit vertoogh van 's Comp.s. Staet apparent omtrent UEd. wat stoutelijck ende rondelijck mijn meeninge uijtgedruet, 't welck ick tot besluitj andermael versoecke mach geduijt werden'.*

<sup>398</sup> Aalbers, *Rijckloff van Goens: Commissaris en veldoverste*, 120. E. Odegard, 'The sixth admiralty: The Dutch East India Company and the military revolution at sea, c. 1639-1667', *International Journal of Maritime History* 26:4 (2014) 669-684, 679, 684.

<sup>399</sup> For the *Discours*, see: J. van Goor, *Jan Pieterszoon Coen, 1587-1629: Koopman-Koning in Azië* (Amsterdam 2015) 151-184.

<sup>400</sup> Leupe, 'Rapport van Goens', 180.

<sup>401</sup> H.T. Colenbrander, *Jan Pietersz. Coen: Levensbeschrijving* (Nijhoff: The Hague 1934) 148.

<sup>402</sup> W.M. Witteveen, *Antonio van Diemen: De opkomst van de VOC in Azië* (Pallas, Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam 2011) 127-135.



returned to the Netherlands at the head of the homeward-bound fleet. He returned to the East in 1645, having lost much of his fortune as a merchant in Amsterdam. Although he became governor-general in 1650, he was fired by the XVII when he requested to be repatriated for health reasons. He was succeeded by Joan Maetsuijcker, who then held the position for the next twenty-five years until he died and was succeeded by Rijckloff van Goens.<sup>403</sup> The pattern of Dutch intermezzos still held in the eighteenth century: Gustaaf Willem, Baron van Imhoff, the most famous eighteenth-century governor-general, was sent to the Netherlands in 1741-42 before returning to Batavia as governor-general in 1743.<sup>404</sup> These are just some examples to show that a brief European interlude was not unusual, and perhaps even the norm, in the careers of the most successful VOC servants in Asia in the first half of the seventeenth century. But why was this the case?

A stay in the Netherlands not only provided an opportunity to debate policy, but also served to connect, or reconnect, with the directors on a more personal level and so build a network of support in the Republic. For the directors, meanwhile, it could prove advantageous to forge close connections with high-ranking VOC personnel. The problem of long distances and information control by agents in Europe made it vital to bind high VOC servants to the interests of the directors. These links could be forged during a stay in Europe, as the case of Van Goens makes clear. Being able to present his ideas in person to the directors enabled Van Goens to portray himself as an expert policy-maker and company servant far more effectively than letters ever could. Van Goens delivered his report in September 1655 and, by April of the next year, was requested by the directors to come to the meeting in Middelburg to explain his ideas further. At this meeting, and a subsequent one in Amsterdam, Van Goens was asked to return to Asia: *'I was cordially requested by directors of Middelburg in Zeeland and later at Amsterdam as well, to once again serve the Company. Contemplating all that the Lord had granted me had come to me in the service of the honorable Company, I found myself obligated to do so, as the service to the fatherland and the welfare of my family seemed to invite me to do so. All the more as the friendly and cordial affection of the directors seemed to invite me to it. So I enlisted once again in God's name in my former capacity of counselor-extraordinary, with the stipulation that I would be preferred over all others for the first vacant ordinary council's seat.'*<sup>405</sup> Upon his departure in November, Van Goens was accompanied by his wife and his eldest son, Rijckloff junior, who was enlisted in the capacity of a junior merchant. His younger son, Volckert, remained in the Netherlands to continue his education and was placed in the house of his father's friend, Cornelis Weylandt, a former VOC official at Surat who had served as the head of the loge at Agra in 1640. This pattern was replicated later, when Van Goens put his second wife's daughter in a house with other contacts in Amsterdam. All in all, Van Goens' stay in the Netherlands in 1655-56 was important as it provided him with a platform to articulate his ideas and helped him build personal ties to the directors. These would come in good use later on; as his relationship with Batavia became ever more antagonistic during the 1660s, Van Goens could always count on the support of the directors.

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<sup>403</sup> F.W. Stapel, *De Gouverneurs-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië in beeld en woord* (Van Stockum: The Hague 1941) 26-27.

<sup>404</sup> *Ibidem*, 58-59.

<sup>405</sup> NL-HaNA, Van Goens, 1.10.31, inv. no. 6.

Figure 13: Map of the VOC's presence in South Asia, ca. 1663



Source: Erik Odegard 2015.

### Conquest and control

Leaving in November 1656 at the head of what became known as the 'Christmas fleet' Van Goens sailed first for the Cape and from there to Batavia. At Batavia, the reinforcements that had come over with Van Goens were disembarked and a new squadron prepared to sail west. This squadron under Van Goens met the squadron under Adriaen Roothaes, which had left Batavia in August 1657. Roothaes had a combined force of nine ships, with a total of 914 men and 307 cannon, while Van Goens left Batavia a month later with three 'yachts', one ship (by which was meant a normal East-Indiaman), a galliot and two fluyts bound for Surat and Persia.<sup>406</sup> After Van Goens joined Roothaes' fleet on the blockading station at Goa, it was decided not to strike at Diu because the Portuguese had been forewarned, but instead to reinforce the VOC's position

<sup>406</sup> Aalbers, *Rijkloff van Goens: Commissaris en veldoverste*, 122-125.

on Ceylon. First, Tuticorin, on the Madurai Coast opposite Ceylon, south of the Adams Bridge, was taken. Van Goens then led the conquest to the north, taking Mannar, Jaffna and Negapatnam in rapid succession between February and July 1658.<sup>407</sup> This settled Van Goens' reputation as an able leader and increased his status with the directors. After the fall of Negapatnam, the war moved west again, to the Malabar Coast. The Portuguese strongholds of Quilon (Coylan), Cochin, Cranganore and Cannanore needed to be taken, according to the High Government, to secure the VOC's position on Ceylon. While Quilon was indeed taken in December 1658, Governor Van der Meijden evacuated it later that year, to the dismay of Van Goens. The loss of Quilon was the final straw in a slow-burning conflict between the two men. For several months, Van Goens had been collecting information on the poor performance of Van der Meijden and then initiated a process that saw the latter recalled to Batavia to account for his actions.

### **Becoming governor: undermining Van der Meijden**

The appointment of Van Goens to the position of *commissaris en veldoverste* in the South Asian commands was imposed on the existing VOC hierarchy in the region. As commander-in-chief, Van Goens stood above the local governors and commanders in Ceylon, the Coromandel Coast, Malabar and Surat – but with a carefully-delimited mission. Van Goens was made responsible for the conduct of the war on a strategic level, although as field-commander he was occasionally also responsible on a tactical level. In addition, as part of his role of *commissaris*, Van Goens had to inspect the existing commands, weed out illegal private trade and make sure local officials were working for the company's benefit, rather than for their own profit. In short, Van Goens' mission was also an attempted solution for a severe principal-agent problem. Tales of untrammelled private trade are rampant in the biographies of VOC servants in all areas of Asia in the first half of the seventeenth century. Chapter three makes this point for the members of the High Government with whom Van Goens worked in the 1640s and 1650s, and many of whom were sent home after being charged with illegal personal enrichment. The same holds true for the lower echelons of dignitaries in the Western Quarters. The VOC-controlled areas on Ceylon were ruled by *landvoogd* (later governor) Adriaan van der Meijden. He had worked with the former commander-in-chief on Ceylon, Gerard Hulft. After Hulft died during the Siege of Colombo, Van der Meijden brought the siege to a successful end and the government of Ceylon was duly shifted from Galle to Colombo. Van der Meijden had been responsible for the decision to retain Colombo, rather than handing it over to the King of Kandy. This decision marks the moment when the VOC and Kandy truly became enemies. As governor, Van der Meijden was nominally responsible for the commercial and civilian administration of the newly conquered territories, as well as for maintaining diplomatic relations with local states, all subject to approval from Batavia.<sup>408</sup> Van Goens, as a military leader and inspector, should not have had a say in these matters except where they impinged on the war effort. This division of labor effected within the VOC in the area of large-scale war is remarkable, but little studied. Speelman in Macassar held a similar position, and this meant that the VOC actually maintained a separate military chain of command, a feature of its organization that it later lost. By this point, therefore, the company was not solely a commercial enterprise. This division of labor on Ceylon broke down in the late 1650s

<sup>407</sup> Aalbers, *Rijckloff van Goens: Commissaris en veldoverste*, 135-170.

<sup>408</sup> Wijnaendts van Resandt, *De gezaghebbers*, 58-59.

and early 1660s. The problem was that Van Goens simply would not agree not to meddle in the government of Ceylon's affairs.

As mentioned above, Van der Meijden's decision to evacuate the fort at Quilon on the Malabar Coast in the face of heavy attacks sparked Van Goens' ire, but the latter had already been building a case against Van der Meijden for months. Van Goens judged Van der Meijden incapable of bearing the responsibilities of the large and organizationally complex government of Ceylon, and accused him of turning a blind eye to questionable practices of his subordinates. Before the loss of Quilon, there had been insufficient grounds for dismissing Van der Meijden and sending him back to Batavia. After Quilon's loss, however, things were very different and he was instructed to return to Batavia in summer 1660 to defend himself to the High Government. In the meantime, Van Goens acted as provisional governor of Ceylon.<sup>409</sup>

The outcome of this case, however, was deeply unsatisfactory for Van Goens as the council ruled that '*On Ceylon it appears that various accusations were accepted all too readily and in a temper. Once accepted, they [Van Goens] have tried to substantiate these accusations and to make them into large crimes, without considering whether they could be sustained or not.*'<sup>410</sup> Van der Meijden was cleared of all charges, readmitted as counselor-extraordinary of the Council of the Indies and allowed to return to his post in Colombo. Although Van Goens handed over the administration to Van der Meijden and switched to focusing all his attention on conquering Malabar, at the first opportunity he again tried to wrest the governorship of Ceylon from Van der Meijden.<sup>411</sup> Van Goens' short interregnum was important, however, as he used it as an opportunity to remodel the colony's administrative structure. The contents of these changes will be discussed in the following section; suffice it to say here, however, that the imposition of a new administrative model was a significant move, as in this brief period Van Goens could create various new offices and populate them with his own supporters. In a later letter to the High Government quoted in Valentijn, Van Goens reacted to the 'slander' that he had had Van der Meijden deported in order to 'possess the governorship himself', thereby attesting to the fact this was something being gossiped about in VOC circles.<sup>412</sup> In his *Beschryvinge*, Van Dam went much further, arguing that Van Goens was envious of Van der Meijden's position and wanted this position for himself.

Whatever Van Goens' true motivations were, he continued to undermine Van der Meijden in all possible ways, with an instructive example of this being given in a letter reporting the state of affairs on Ceylon, signed by governor Van der Meijden and two of his councilors, Pieter de Bitter and Jacob van Rhee, on January 29, 1662. The report, addressed to the XVII in Amsterdam, detailed the status of the garrisons, the condition of trades and the progress of the refortification works, among other things. Before the letter was sent, however, Van Goens got the opportunity on February 13 to add remarks and comments in the margins. Some of these remarks are quite instructive as they show how he tried to undermine the directors' faith in their governor on Ceylon by, for example, criticizing the other two signatories, Pieter de Bitter and

<sup>409</sup> Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens: Krijgsman Commissaris en Regent*, 106-109.

<sup>410</sup> W.Ph. Coolhaas, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel III* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1968) 330, 16 December 1661. '*... soo schijnt op Seylon in 't aennemen van alderhande beschuldigingen soo tegen sijn gem. e. als andere personen van qualiteyt vrij wat gereet ende driflich geprocedeert te sijn, welcke beschuldigingen eens aengenomen sijnde, men dan naderbant met alle cracht heeft willen waermaecken ende tot groote misdaden trecken sonder veel aenschouwing te nemen, of se gefundeert conden worden ofte niet.*'

<sup>411</sup> The whole episode is well detailed in: P. van Dam and F.W. Stapel, *Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, tweede boek, deel II* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1932) 320, as well as in: F. Valentijn, *Oud en nieuw Oost-Indiën, vyfde deel* (Dordrecht and Amsterdam 1726) 141-154.

<sup>412</sup> *Ibidem*, 157.



Jacob van Rhee, and claiming: *Note: Jacob van Rhee has married the Governor's daughter and his advices is therefore not admissible. And Pieter de Bitter has not had time yet to forget much about Ceylon.*<sup>413</sup>

There was thus no way that Van der Meijden could make his case without suffering interference by Van Goens. Van der Meijden admittedly tried to pin the loss of the yacht *Hercules* on Van Goens, arguing that the latter had ordered the captain to anchor in the Bay of Galle, while the captain and pilot had argued that the bay was unsafe at this time of year.<sup>414</sup> It was Van Goens, however, who had the last word as he once again had Van der Meijden sent back to Batavia on charges of private trade. Van Goens' position was now stronger, however, than before as he had since been in direct correspondence with the company directors in the Netherlands and they ordered Van der Meijden to return home in 1663.<sup>415</sup> This time, too, Van Goens acted as provisional governor of Ceylon and combined this position with that of commander-in-chief. In 1662-1663, he was thus able to finalize the conquest of Ceylon by also conquering the Portuguese-held cities on the Malabar Coast. Cochin endured a siege from late October 1662 until early January of the next year, but eventually fell, boosting Van Goens' reputation as a conqueror (see Figure 14).

**Figure 14: Entry of Van Goens into Cochin, January 1663**



Source: P. Baldaeus, *Naaauwkeurige beschryvinge van Malabar en Choromandel: Derzelver aangrenzende Ryken, en het machtige Eyland Ceylon* (J. Janssonius van Waasberge and J. van Someren: Amsterdam 1672).

<sup>413</sup> NL-HaNA, VOC, 1.04.02, inv. no. 1234, fol. 202 verso. *Nota, Jacob van Rhee is met den Gouveneurs dochter getrouwt, niens advijs daer om in deesen niet aennemelijck is. En heeft Pieter de Bitter noch niet veel van Ceylon vergeeten*.

<sup>414</sup> Generale Missiven, deel 3, 1656-1674, p. 378.

<sup>415</sup> Van Resandt, *De gezaghebbers*, 58-59.



However, Van Goens was not able to enjoy his successes for long. Although the XVII had accepted his offer to stay on in Ceylon, and had ordered the High Government to appoint him as the new governor of Ceylon, Van Goens' wife protested to the council in Batavia that she did not wish to move to Colombo again, a city that was still being rebuilt, and requested the High Council to reward Van Goens for his services by recalling him to Batavia.<sup>416</sup> Van Goens therefore handed over control of VOC Ceylon, of which the conquered Malabar Coast possessions formed a part, to Jacob Hustaert, the former governor of Ambon.<sup>417</sup> This proved, however, to be only a temporary setback as Van Goens was reappointed to the governorship in September 1664 and returned to Ceylon later that year. Now, Van Goens was free to shape the administration of Ceylon to a much greater extent than previously. The following section will examine the administrative structure devised by Van Goens in 1661-62, and the people appointed to positions within this system.

### **Administration and policy**

Once in position as governor of Ceylon in the mid-1660s, Van Goens proposed a number of ambitious schemes that, if enacted, would have fundamentally changed both the position of the VOC on the island and that of Ceylon within the VOC's Asian network. As some of these proposals have been dealt with at some length in the available literature, this section will explore them only briefly before focusing attention on how Van Goens' proposals affected his opportunities to act as a familial head and a patron on Ceylon (or could have affected them, if they had been implemented). The question of the network construction will be taken up in the next section.

The first question to be discussed in this section, therefore, is the design of the Ceylon government's structure, and the individuals Van Goens was able to appoint to these positions. As the question of appointments will be examined from the perspective of patronage in the next section, the focus in this current section will be on the implications of the way that the positions themselves were described. The next point concerns Van Goens' plans for territorial enlargement of the Ceylon government at the expense of the Kingdom of Kandy and the emphasis that Van Goens placed on the need to build a strong network of fortifications. This ties in with the questions of trade and colonization. As will be argued, there was a discrepancy between Van Goens' plans for monopolization of trade by the company and colonization of Ceylon by Europeans.

Subsequently, the question of communications with the Republic will be examined. This is a crucial aspect of Van Goens' tenure on Ceylon as safe communications with the Netherlands allowed him, at an institutional level, to invoke orders from the directors to overrule Batavia's criticism of his policies. On a personal level, safe communications also allowed him to extend his patronage network on Ceylon to families in the Republic itself. Lastly, Van Goens' direct challenge to Batavia's dominance in VOC Asia and his vision for making Colombo the VOC's capital will be examined, and it will be argued that this was a logical consequence both of his other plans and of his experience in negotiating with Mataram in the 1640s-1650s.

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<sup>416</sup> Valentijn, *Oud en nieuw Oost-Indiën, vyfde deel*, 155-156.

<sup>417</sup> H.K. s'Jacob, *De Nederlanders in Kerala 1663-1701: De memories en instructies betreffende het commandement Malabar van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1976) LXVII.

### Administering territory

Ceylon came to be ruled quite differently from other VOC colonies in Asia as it was not until the eighteenth century that the VOC was able to control comparable territories on Java. This distinction is quite important as the VOC's administration and the offices that were available were heavily influenced by the need to administer larger territories. This is also why the short period in 1661-1662, when Van Goens took on responsibility for governing Ceylon and Adriaan van der Meijden was in Batavia facing trumped-up charges, was important. It was precisely during this period that Van Goens chose to codify the new administrative structure of the colony.<sup>418</sup> By doing so, he limited Van der Meijden's ability to design new offices and appoint individuals to fulfill them. He himself, by contrast, was able to appoint individuals in the newly regulated offices. Although these appointments required the approval of the High Government in Batavia, there is no indication that the latter was particularly concerned about who occupied the lower offices. In addition, the descriptions of the offices themselves gave a considerable push in terms of policy on Ceylon. The fact that *dessaves* were now appointed in the new administrative subdivisions of Colombo, Jaffna and Galle meant the implicit assumption that the VOC would now play an administrative role in managing the land and villages. This played well with Van Goens' insistence that the company should rule the island (or as much of it as possible) as a sovereign possession.

After the conquest of the north of the island, Van Goens initially considered the government of Ceylon to have become too large and unwieldy. To ensure effective governance, he proposed detaching Mannar, the Wannu and Jaffna and adding them to the Coromandel government. Jaffna could be established as a new capital for this command. Alternatively, Van Goens proposed conquest Tanjore and the establishment of a capital at Negapatna.<sup>419</sup> These ideas had been discussed with the Coromandel governor, Laurens Pit but he was hesitant to agree with such a scheme. Nevertheless, Van Goens proposed his ideas to Batavia. The High Government refused to approve such a scheme, however, as it argued that all of Ceylon faced the same threats and challenges and should thus be kept in one hand.<sup>420</sup> To accommodate this wish, Van Goens proposed appointing two subaltern commanders with regional authority in Galle and Jaffna. The governor of Ceylon at Colombo and his council, known as the Council of Ceylon or the Political Council, would direct the affairs of Colombo itself and its surrounding lands, as well as acting as a court of appeal for cases coming from the subaltern commands.<sup>421</sup> The Council of Colombo would maintain correspondence with the High Government and the directors in the Netherlands and pass on their orders to the commanders. The local commanders and their councils would, in turn, direct local affairs, rule on important cases concerning Europeans and oversee the lower administrative divisions' activities.<sup>422</sup> This division of labor was designed to ensure that the governor in Colombo would not be crushed beneath the load of managing such a large government. An important appointment in this regard was Anthony Paviljoen's

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<sup>418</sup> Van Goens issued the descriptions of the offices to Van der Meijden upon the latter's return in Ceylon in June 1661. The instructions for the highest offices were published in 1908 by the Colombo public records office: S. Pieters, *Instructions from the governor-general and council of India to the Governor of Ceylon, 1656-1665* (Colombo 1908). The title is somewhat misleading as the documents were not issued by the governor-general, but by Van Goens in his capacity as superintendent, inspector and acting governor of Ceylon.

<sup>419</sup> T. Raychaudhuri, *Jan Company in Coromandel, 1605-1690: A study in the Interrelations of European Commerce and Traditional Economies* (Martinus Nijhoff: Den Haag 1962) 57.

<sup>420</sup> Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens: Krijgsman Commissaris en Regent*.

<sup>421</sup> K.D. Paranavitana, *Land for money: Dutch land registration in Sri Lanka* (the author: Colombo 2001) 31-33.

<sup>422</sup> Ibidem. An example of the tasks for the commander of Jaffna is given in: S. Pieters, *Instructions*, 83-104.

appointment as commander in Jaffna. Paviljoen had earlier served under Laurens Pit on the Coromandel Coast and formed a bridge between the two governments, himself becoming Governor of Coromandel later in his career.

In terms of local administrative structure, perhaps the most important decision was to continue the office of the *dessave*, a lower provincial governor. It was this office that put the VOC most directly in touch with the population of the island. The office itself was adopted from Portuguese and pre-colonial practice and required intensive cooperation between the *dessave* (most often a European company servant) and the lower offices of *mudliyar* and *korale*, both of which oversaw administrative subdivisions of the *dessavonie*. The VOC thus exercised indirect rule over the areas that it claimed as its own, working at the local level through headmen and village leaders.<sup>423</sup> So how was VOC-held Ceylon administered in 1662? In the first place, it is important to note that though the VOC had removed Portuguese power from the island, it controlled a lot less territory than the Portuguese had done at the height of their power. Although the King of Kandy had proven unable to extract the VOC from its new coastal strongholds, it was a different issue in the inland provinces lying closest to Kandy. By then, the VOC's holdings on the southwestern coast had been reduced to about half the size of the Portuguese holdings there in 1638, while the entire stretch of territory between Negombo and Mannar eluded VOC control altogether. In the north, the VOC held the same possessions as the *Estado* had in Jaffna and the Wannu and claimed them as a completely sovereign possession because the former Kingdom of Jaffna had passed by conquest to the Portuguese and again to the VOC. On the eastern coast, the King of Kandy could, by 1662, freely access the ports at Batticaloa and Trincomalee/Kottiyar. All in all, the Kandyan position was much better by the early 1660s than it had been in 1638.<sup>424</sup>

Van Goens divided the VOC's holdings on the island into three groups. The governor maintained his seat in Colombo, and the area around the capital ultimately fell under the governor and council of Colombo. In the north, the commander and council of Jaffna were responsible for governing the Jaffna peninsula, the island of Mannar and the Wannu. This was mirrored in the south, where the Galle commandment administered the coastal region between Bentota and Walawe.<sup>425</sup> A simplified schematic outline is given in Figure 15.


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<sup>423</sup> S. Arasaratnam, 'Elements of social and economic change in Dutch maritime Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 1658-1796', *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 22:1 (1985) 35-54 39-40.

<sup>424</sup> Goonewardena.

<sup>425</sup> Paranavitana, *Land for money*, 21-22.

Figure 15: Organization of the government of Ceylon



Source Erik Odegard 2015, based on: Paranavitana, *Land for Money: Dutch land registration in Sri Lanka* (Colombo 2001) 21-23, 38. VOCsite.nl.

There were thus a number of important functions that needed to be filled: two commanders (Galle and Jaffna), and their respective councils (*dessaves*) at Colombo, Matara, the Wanni and Jaffna peninsula, and a similar office of *opsiender* (overseer) in the Galu Korale.<sup>426</sup> Besides these offices, a number of other important positions needed to be filled, mostly related to the central government in Colombo. Crucially, a trustworthy head of the cinnamon peelers needed to be instated. In addition, the Malabar command functioned as a subordinate command that reported to the governor of Ceylon, rather than resorting independently under Batavia. The logic behind this arrangement will be detailed in the next section. This meant that, in practice, Van Goens could also exercise great influence over appointments in Malabar. Table 5 presents lists of office-holders from 1661 to 1670 and shows how Van Goens was able to appoint his own protégées to important positions, as will also be detailed in some examples.

<sup>426</sup> K.D. Paranavitana, *Land for money*, 30-140.

Table 5: High officers in Ceylon in 1661/62, 1665, 1667, 1670.

Position	Officeholder 1661 / 1662	Officeholder 1665	Officeholder 1667	Officeholder 1670
<b><u>Colombo and Colombo dessavonie</u></b>				
Dessave of Colombo	Pierre du Pon			
<b><u>Opperkoopman of Colombo (Hoofdaministrateur)</u></b>				
Fiscal	Lucas van der Dussen*			
<b><u>Opperhoofd Tuticorin</u></b>	Laurens Pijl		Laurens Pijl	Laurens Pijl
<b><u>Jaffna command</u></b>				
Commander in Jaffna	Anthony Paviljoen	Jorephaes Vos	Jorephaes Vos	Jorephaes Vos
Dessave of Wannii	Jacob van Rhede			Maarten Huijsman
<b><u>Galle command</u></b>				
Commander in Galle	Isbrand Godske (until early 1661) Adriaen Roothaes	Adriaen Roothaes	Adriaen Roothaes	Adriaen Roothaes
Dessave of Matara	Ferdinandus Alvares	Rijckloff van Goens jr.	X	Pieter de Graauwe
<b><u>Opsiender in Galu Korale</u></b>		Rijckloff van Goens jr.	X	
<b><u>Malabar command</u></b>				
Commander	N.A.	Ludolph van Coulster / Isbrand Godske	Lucas van der Dussen	Adriaan van Reede
<b>Garrison Commander</b>			Adriaan van Reede	

Source: NL-HaNA, VOC, 1.04.02, inv. nos. 1239, 1243 1251, 1273, 1274, 1277.

\* Appointed as fiscal in 1664, but rejected by Van Goens and returned in Batavia in 1667.

As is apparent from this overview, some individuals occupied multiple positions in the Ceylon government throughout the decade 1660-1670. An interesting example is Lucas van der Dussen, who was appointed as fiscal in Colombo by the High Government in 1664, but whom Van Goens refused to accept.<sup>427</sup> This is a clear indication that Van Goens tried – successfully – to manage his own personnel administration without taking any account of Batavia's advice or even

<sup>427</sup> s'Jacob, *De Nederlanders in Kerala*, LXIX.



outright orders. It was his direct link with the Netherlands that made it possible for him to defy Batavia. The subsequent appointment of Van der Dussen in 1667 to the position of commander of Malabar, despite Van Goens' suggestion of Adriaan van Reede, was most unwelcome to Van Goens. On that occasion, however, he could not overrule it. Van Goens' general ability to arrange appointments on Ceylon to his own plan put him in a very powerful patronage position, an issue that will be explored in section four of this chapter. Looking at the list, it is also striking that while a number of positions were characterized by a rapid turnover, some officials could serve for rather long periods. A good example is Adriaen Roothaes, the commander of Galle from 1662 until 1671. Roothaes is best known for his role in the blockade of Goa during the last phases of the war on Ceylon.<sup>428</sup> Roothaes served as commander of Galle under Van Goens for over a decade and is an indication of the type of men Van Goens preferred as commanders of the subordinate commands; in other words, men with military experience and who had been in battle with Van Goens himself, such as Roothaes and Van Reede, were preferred over those who had spent their careers solely in the accounting offices.

*Fortifications, diplomacy, colonization and trade*

The idea that the company should not only be a merchant, but also a ruler of extended territories and large numbers of people not in the service of the company was thus implicit in the administrative division implemented by Van Goens in 1661. These goals were made more explicit from 1664-65 onwards as Van Goens tried to expand the VOC's control over provinces that had formerly been administered by the Portuguese, but had been taken by Kandy instead of the VOC when Portuguese power was destroyed.<sup>429</sup> Van Goens argued that it was not enough merely to control a narrow stretch of the lowlands from Negombo to Walawe, but that the VOC also needed to press its borders inland by claiming at least all the areas that the Portuguese had claimed. In addition, the company needed to control all the major ports and anchorages by fortifications so as to make sales of cinnamon to anyone other than the VOC more difficult. In 1659, when war with Raja Singha seemed imminent and the Kandyan army was engaged in forcing the population of the lands around Negombo and Colombo inland, the smaller ports of Chilaw and Calpentijn (Kalpitiya) were taken. With a small force, Governor Van der Meijden faced down a larger Kandyan army at Kalpitiya.<sup>430</sup> A year later, Van Goens initiated a return to the East Coast when he sent a force under Captain Pieter Wasch to refortify Trincomalee.<sup>431</sup> This force was withdrawn later that year as sickness had reduced the garrison. It was not until 1667 that the company returned to the East Coast permanently. It should be noted that, until around 1660, Batavia still supported most of Van Goens' actions. An occupation of Batticaloa and Trincomalee, through which most of Kandy's trade passed, had been advised by the High Government if Raja Singh could not come to terms with the VOC's continued presence on the island. However, as the damage wrought by the depopulation of the lands of Negombo and Colombo became clear, the High Government became steadily more supportive of a negotiated settlement with Kandy, while Van Goens became steadily more vociferous in his admonitions that only force would bring Kandy to reason. With the return of Van Goens to Ceylon in 1665, a

<sup>428</sup> Aalbers, *Rijckloff van Goens*, 171-191.

<sup>429</sup> Goonewardena, *The Rise of Dutch Power*, 115. Especially important in this regard is the little-known Battle of Pannara, which resulted in the VOC losing control over most of the province of the Seven Korales 'for all time to come'.

<sup>430</sup> Van Dam and Stapel, *Beschryvinge* 2.2, 279.

<sup>431</sup> *Ibidem*, 289-290.

much more aggressive policy vis-à-vis Kandy was initiated. By 1667, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Kalpitiya were being refortified with stone forts, while Kottiyar was occupied by a field sconce a year later. In the west, too, the VOC increased the lands under its control, especially in the areas east of Colombo and Negombo. Here, a series of field fortifications and small forts was constructed in the valley of the Kelani river, reaching ever closer to Kandy itself. The lack of a forceful response from Kandy against these moves reinforced the idea in Van Goens' mind that Raja Singha was weak and that Kandy would easily be conquered by the VOC.

Van Goens justified these aggressive and expansionist policies by arguing that the cinnamon monopoly could only be guaranteed if the company controlled all the island's ports. Cinnamon was peeled in the border areas between the company's lands around Negombo and the king's lands bordering those to the east. If the VOC did not keep an eye on shipping in the king's ports, Van Goens argued, cinnamon could very well be traded through them, thus undermining the VOC's monopoly. But merely extracting cinnamon was not to Van Goens' liking. If the company came to control more land, he argued, it could extract more revenues from taxes, tolls and land rents.<sup>432</sup> In addition, encouraging weavers from India to migrate to the Jaffna area would allow the company to start producing the textiles that were needed as merchandize throughout Asia in its own territory. This territory was expanded in 1673 to include the VOC's lands around Negapatnam within the Ceylon command.<sup>433</sup> If administered properly, Ceylon could both cover its own operating costs and turn a nice profit, at least according to Van Goens. Related to these ideas was the idea of turning the island into a Dutch settlement colony. This had previously been attempted at Batavia, and indeed Pieter van Hoorn was still arguing for it.<sup>434</sup> According to Van Goens, however, Ceylon was much more suited. His statement on the prospects for settling Ceylon is worth quoting in length as it clearly shows his growing infatuation with the island that increasingly came to dominate his thinking:

*Certainly, if there is to be a hope for a colony anywhere in India, it shall have to be on Ceylon, where so many people shall be able to make a living as can live there, without needing anything from the outside... This is not to be expected at Batavia, where our colony will never be able to overcome the impertinent and bellicose Javanese, neither in power not in numbers... besides it [Batavia] is a castle without fresh water and a city which needs to get the same far from its walls... which is completely different on Ceylon, which is encircled with good ports, cities and castles, all with fresh water within their walls, whose inhabitants – through the servitude of the inhabitants – will be able to live very well on agriculture. Ceylon is a compact island, lying in the heart of India, of which some have called it the navel.<sup>435</sup>*

<sup>432</sup> For a brief description of the monopolistic policies, see: S. Arasaratnam, 'Monopoly and Free Trade in Dutch-Asian Commercial Policy: Debate and Controversy within the VOC', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 4:1 (1973) 3-15, 7-8.

<sup>433</sup> Arasaratnam, *Dutch power in Ceylon*, 165-166.

<sup>434</sup> A. Weststeijn, 'The VOC as a Company-State: Debating Seventeenth-Century Dutch Colonial Expansion', *Itinerario* 38:1 (2014) 24-27.

<sup>435</sup> Van Dam and Stapel, *Beschryvinge* 2.2, XII-XIII. 'Seker, soo in India ergens hope tot colonie is, 't sal op Ceylon moeten wesen, daer haer soo veel menschen kunnen erneren, als daerop sullen kunnen wonen, sonder iets van buy ten van node te hebben....Dit is op Batavia niet te verwaghten, daer onse colonie noyt sal gestelt worden die brutale en bellicense Javanen te boven te komen, noch in maght, veel min in getal.... behalven dat het [Batavia] een casteel is sonder versch water, ende een stadt, die 't selve verre buy ten moet halen.... 't welke op Ceylon geheel anders gestelt is, sijnde 't selve rondsom versien van bequame havens, steden en castelen, alle met het versebe water bin non hare muyren, niens inwoonders door de dienstbaerheyt der inlanders seer wel kunnen bestaan op den lantbouw, sijnde Ceylon een beknopt eylandt. gelegen in 't hert van India, waarvan het sommige sehryvers de navel genoemt hebben'.

Van Goens thus envisioned Ceylon in close connection with the areas of Southern India in which the company was active. While his earlier schemes for expansion in the Caveri Delta of Tanjore had been rejected in the 1650s, Van Goens would propose similar expansionist policies during the Madurai-Tevar war of 1663-1665. Solidifying control of what was seen from Ceylon as the 'opposite shore' would enable the company to raise tolls at the Pamban channel and so complement the control the company's fort at Mannar offered on voyages from the Gulf of Mannar to Palk Strait.<sup>436</sup> But in this instance as well, Batavia refused to send the reinforcements Van Goens thought necessary for successful implementation of his scheme.

Colonization and sovereign rule over large territories with considerable autochthonous populations raised the same kinds of questions that were also raised in Brazil, the most difficult of which was, again, the question of free trade. To increase the prospects of a lively colony on Ceylon, carefully prescribed free trade was presented as an option. As in Brazil, the proponents of the policy argued that the populations over whom the VOC now aspired to rule had always enjoyed free trade and that stable rule would be jeopardized by a ban. In addition, if free trade encouraged the emergence of a Dutch colony, the garrisons could in time be reduced as the new *burghers* formed militia companies. Lastly, trade was also open to the 'Moors of Bengal', a rather vague category that was used to cover Muslim merchants from the northern Coromandel Coast and Bengal proper. Their access to the Ceylonese markets could not be prohibited as they imported crucial goods such as textiles and rice, while also exporting arak, betel nuts and, crucially, elephants. The VOC had experimented with exporting elephants by itself, but this had not been a success. Elephants were the island's second most important product, and so, on pragmatic grounds, access to Ceylon could not be prohibited. If these 'Moors' (whom Van Goens always regarded with the greatest distrust) were allowed to trade with Ceylon, why not the company's own subjects? The opponents of the policy argued, on more general grounds, that opening up a private trade from company lands went against all the maxims of the VOC and that it would '*open a door which could not lightly be closed again*'.<sup>437</sup> It was subsequently decided in 1662-1663 that the company's subjects on Ceylon would be allowed to trade freely with Bengal. However, as will be argued in chapter seven, this was not a final decision.

It is clear from all this that Van Goens came to be increasingly ambitious about the prospects for Ceylon and his own role in bringing these plans to fruition. This ambition and the increasing unwillingness to brook dissent or to see things from another perspective brought Van Goens into repeated confrontations with the High Government in Batavia. Indeed, governor-general Maetsuijcker and his council came to be ever more hesitant about Van Goens' plans. It must be noted, though, that they themselves had vacillated in their advice given to Ceylon in affairs such as the proper conduct with Kandy and support for a Dutch colony on the island. The rivalry between Van Goens and the High Government, and thus between 'Colombo' and 'Batavia', became ever more pronounced after Van Goens' return to the island in 1665.

#### *Private communications and the role of Ceylon as an entrepot*

Crucial for the successful implementation of Van Goens' policies were direct communications with the XVII in the Netherlands. The previous section has argued that, already quite early on, Batavia (i.e. the High Government of the Indies) was quite skeptical of Van Goens' plans. But

<sup>436</sup> P.M. Vink, *Encounters on the Opposite Coast: The Dutch East India Company and the Nayaka State of Madurai in the Seventeenth Century* (Brill: Leiden and Boston 2016) 388-389.

<sup>437</sup> *Ibidem*, 280.

this view of the governor and council was overruled by largely pro-Van Goens sentiment among the directors. How could Van Goens bypass the High Government and appeal directly to the directors? A first option was offered by the ancient caravan route through present-day Iraq and Syria. Letters were forwarded to the director of the factory in Persia at Gamron. 'Persia' forwarded these letters to Basra, from where they were taken overland to Aleppo and then continued their journey by ship to Italy and overland to the Netherlands. There are numerous documents from the 1650s through the 1670s that have been marked with the signifier 'Via Persia' to make it clear that they reached the VOC directors other than through normal routes.<sup>438</sup> A famous example of important news traveling along this route is Van Goens' 1674 report on the state of Ceylon's defense against French attack, which was delivered on January 5, 1675 after a journey of 328 days.<sup>439</sup> This seems to have been an exceptionally long voyage. Moree, in his study of the VOC's postal service, mentions average journey times for Dutch-Asian mail of five to six months, and sometimes as little as four months.<sup>440</sup> The Persian postal link had a number of advantages: it could offer quicker communications with the Netherlands in times of crisis, while also removing important communications from the prying eyes of the High Government in Batavia. The director of Persia was thus a possible channel for alternative communications with Patria. Table 6 shows the directors of Persia in the period 1661-1671.

**Table 6: VOC directors of Persia in 1661-1671**

Name	Period
Hendrik van Wijck	1661-1665
Huybert de Lairesse	1665-1667
Isbrand Godske	1667-1670
Lucas van der Dussen	1670-1671

Source: W. Wijnaendts van Resandt, *De Gezaghebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie op hare buiten Comptoiren in Azië* (Amsterdam 1944) 245.

The last two of these, Godske and Van der Dussen, had both served as Commanders of Malabar under Van Goens' supervision before being appointed to Persia, but both had quarreled with Van Goens (see chapter seven). This points to a reduced reliability of the Persian connection from the late 1660s onwards. Less is known of the other two men, but Huybert de Lairesse had been the permanent replacement of Dirck van Adrichem after his death in 1665. Perhaps he had got to know the latter's widow, Van Goens' second wife, in that capacity. In both cases, the men had built their careers predominantly in the Western Quarters. Direct communications offered Van Goens the option to bypass the High Government and appeal directly to the VOC directors. But this was still a relatively cumbersome route: only exceptionally were letters sent in this way, and bigger parcels, or indeed gifts, could hardly be sent through this route. Van Goens consequently started working on a far more ambitious plan immediately after returning to Ceylon in 1665, and this would bring him more obviously into direct conflict with 'Batavia' for the first

<sup>438</sup> P. Moree, *Met vriend die god geleide': Het Nederlands-Aziatisch postvervoer ten tijde van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Walburg Pers: Zutphen 1998) 55-57.

<sup>439</sup> P.A. Leupe, and J. Leeuwenson, 'Daghregister van de landreijs, gedaen bij mij Joannes Leeuwenson, secretaris van de ed. heer Ryckloff van Goens, raed ordinaris van India, super-intendent, admiraal, krijgs- en veldoverste, soo te water als te lande; dienende tot bescherming van 't eiland Ceylon, de custen van Cormandel, Mallebaer, Madure, etc. beginnende ao. 1674', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 10:1; 2 (1863) 94-144, 142.

<sup>440</sup> Moree, *Met vriend'*, 55.

time. Starting in 1665, Van Goens opened a direct shipping link from Galle to the Netherlands, thus bypassing Batavia in a much more dramatic way than had been the case with the Persian letters.

In 1664 the XVII decided in favor of direct voyages to Ceylon at the urging of Van Goens.<sup>441</sup> Dutch Asiatic shipping gives the number of outbound voyages from Ceylon in the period 1650-1675 as sixteen, most of which will have taken place in the last ten years of that period.<sup>442</sup> The products coming to Europe from Ceylon were more valuable than the cargoes from Batavia, which was a possible reason for allowing the direct sailings. This sparked intense controversy with Batavia as the direct sailings undercut its role as the central rendezvous and thus threatened the High Government's control, precisely because of the concomitant loss of information control. Indeed, this seems to have been exactly Van Goens' purpose. The private communications that Van Goens enjoyed with the directors in the Netherlands proved crucial for him as he could now go against Batavia. Contemporaries were aware that Van Goens could ignore Batavia at will. Pieter van Dam perhaps phrased it most clearly: '*But as they [the High Government] saw that he had support in these lands [from the directors] and that his conduct was approved, they did not act and let things pass.*'<sup>443</sup> Until 1670, Van Goens could rule supreme in the VOC's lands on Ceylon, sure in his support from the Netherlands and untrammelled by control from Batavia.

### **Patron-in-chief: Van Goens' familial and patronage networks, 1662-1670**

The previous sections focused on how Van Goens was able to thwart the formal hierarchies of the VOC and, to a large extent, make Ceylon into an independent command, separate from Batavia and reporting directly to the Netherlands. This was made possible, and also reinforced, by Van Goens' informal position in the social world of the South Asian VOC, both as a patron and as a family head. The ability to have an independent personnel policy (as shown above in the case of Van der Dussen), facilitated by the direct contacts with the Republic, allowed Van Goens to reinforce his links to the directors by appointing family members to positions in the Ceylon government. Meanwhile, his second marriage, in Colombo in August 1668, allowed him to create new familial networks within the VOC elite in Asia. This section will examine both of these intertwined issues: patronage and the building of familial networks. An important source for the information on patronage is provided by the correspondence book of Salomon Sweers, Jeremias van Vliet and Jacques Specx, which has been used before to illustrate how familial news from Brazil was disseminated in VOC Asia. This correspondence is also a good example of how bonds of friendship, familiarity, patronage and reciprocity were articulated and confirmed in the letters of related VOC employees and former employees. First, however, I will address the issue of marriage and remarriage, and the opportunities that this offered for creating a network of support.

#### *Marriage: the sequel*

Jacomina Roosegaard died in January 1667, and by August of that same year Van Goens had married again; this time, his marriage was to Esther de Solemne, the twenty-seven-year-old

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<sup>441</sup> J.R. Bruijn, F.S. Gaastra and I. Schöffer, *Dutch Asiatic shipping: Volume I introductory volume* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1987) 79.


<sup>442</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>443</sup> Van Dam and Stapel, *Beschryvinge* 2.2, XIV.



widow of the former head of the Surat factory, Dirck van Adrichem.<sup>444</sup> The marriage is interesting for a number of reasons. Esther de Solemne provided a network bridge to various other VOC families in Asia. Esther's sister, Sara de Solemne, was married to Carel Hartsinck, former head of the factory at Deshima and, by 1667, director-general in Batavia, although he died a month after being appointed.<sup>445</sup> Carel Hartsinck had several children, both by his former Japanese concubine and with Sara de Solemne. Hartsinck had recognized his 'Japanese' children, allowing them to advance within the VOC under the Hartsinck name. One of his sons, Willem Hartsinck, married Maria Pit, thus connecting these two powerful families with strong interests on the Coromandel Coast.<sup>446</sup> Through his marriage to Esther de Solemne, Van Goens therefore created bonds with these two families, both of which supplied important officials to the neighboring Coromandel government.

**Figure 16: Familial networks of Van Goens before his marriage to Esther de Solemne**




Van Goens' networks before his second marriage (connections shown in red). These are all familial ties: spouses, siblings, children or baptism witnesses. Made with GEPHI software.

<sup>444</sup> P.C. Molhuysen, P.J. Blok and K.H. Kossman (eds.) *Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek, zesde deel* (A.W. Sijthoff's Uitgevers-Maatschappij: Leiden 1924) 589.

<sup>445</sup> P.C. Molhuysen, P.J. Blok and K.H. Kossman (eds.) *Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek, achtste deel* (A.W. Sijthoff's Uitgevers-Maatschappij: Leiden 1924), 699.

<sup>446</sup> U. Bosma and R. Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500-1920* (NUS Press and Ohio University Press: Singapore and Athens 2008) 61.

Figure 17: Van Goens' network after marrying Esther de Solemne in 1667



Van Goens' personal network after his marriage to Esther de Solemne in 1667. Figure made with GEPHI software, Erik Odegard.

But the marriage to Esther would not last long: she died a year after their marriage, while giving birth to a daughter who, as mentioned before, would be christened Esther Ceylonia van Goens. But Van Goens would not remain a widower for long: he would remarry for a third time just a year later, to the then fifteen-year old Johanna van Ommeren.<sup>447</sup> Of her family background little is unfortunately known, but it is likely that her father was Rudolph van Ommeren who is mentioned at the Cape in 1662.<sup>448</sup> This would mean that Van Goens had again chosen to marry 'within the company', but the exact impact of the familial networks is more difficult to ascertain.

#### *Unraveling a network of patronage through correspondence*

While on Ceylon, Van Goens ensured he did not lose touch with important figures in the Republic. Besides the official correspondence sent to the directors either directly or via Batavia, he also remained in touch through his personal networks. These enabled him to disseminate news from Ceylon to potential supporters in the Republic and to receive valuable information about the directors' plans and the composition of the board of directors, the *XVII*. Though


<sup>447</sup> Van der Aa, *Biographisch woordenboek der Nederlanden*. Deel 7, 244.

<sup>448</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.04.02, VOC, inv.no 1262, folio 155. 'Originele missive van R. van Ommeren in de bhayj van de Caep de Bona Esperance aen de beren bewintbebben ter camer Amsterdam in dato 21 Februarij 1662.'

many private letters have probably been lost, a valuable set of letters has been preserved in the collection of Salomon Sweers, which was also mentioned in chapter three.<sup>449</sup> This source is valuable for a number of reasons. In the first place, it contains five letters *from* Rijckloff van Goens senior to various correspondents in Amsterdam in the early 1670s. In addition, there are two letters *to* Van Goens, also from the early 1670s, along with five letters from Rijckloff van Goens junior to various correspondents in the Netherlands in the period 1670-1673. These letters provide useful information about events and persons. Although slightly outside the 1655-1670 timeframe, they will be dealt with here as they tie in very well with the patronage networks that Van Goens senior used in building the Ceylon government and the associated familial relations.

Among other things, they provide valuable insight into the way Van Goens operated as a patron to his correspondents on Ceylon and as a client to those at home, and this aspect will be examined in the next section. Lastly, the correspondence book as a whole contains many more letters to and from Salomon Sweers and others, thus revealing the extent of the network of correspondents centered on Sweers and of which Van Goens was a part. This network is mapped out in Figure 18 for the period 1660-1674.

**Figure 18: Correspondence network around Salomon Sweers**



Source: NL-HaNA, 1.10.78, Sweers, inv. no. 2. Network of correspondence in the Sweers archive, 1660-1674. Figure made with GEPHI software. Thickness of arrows indicates intensity of contacts, as measured by the number of letters.

<sup>449</sup> NL-HaNA, Collectie Sweers, 1.10.78, inv. no. 2.

Of great interest is the fact that both Francois Caron and Frederick Coyett were part of this network. Francois Caron became the director of the French East India Company and sailed with a French fleet to Asia in 1671-1674. There, as we have seen, he came up against Rijckloff van Goens in the inner bay of Trincomalee, and the French fleet was ultimately beaten by an alliance of the VOC and the Sultan of Bijapur at St. Thomé on the Coast of Coromandel. Both Caron and Van Goens were in close contact with Sweers in the period leading up to this confrontation. There is more, however: from his personal files it is apparent that Salomon Sweers was one of the backers of the French East India Company and tried to rouse Dutch interest in this enterprise.<sup>450</sup> We are thus confronted by the fact that a leading VOC official in Asia was in close contact with the leading figures in a major attempt to break the company's privileged position in the intercontinental carrying trades. Van Goens junior referred to Salomon Sweers as *Mijn Heer en Neve* (my lord and cousin). The familial connection between the two families ran through Arent Muykens (see below). Regardless of the actual link, it is clear that, in addressing Sweers in this way, Van Goens tried to create a sense of familiarity or friendship<sup>451</sup> as the word *neve* was not only used to denote 'real' familial connections, but also to appropriate a sense of connection and friendship. It is interesting to see that the Pit family from Coromandel also corresponded with Sweers. By marrying into the Adrichem-Hartsinck-Pit families, Van Goens thus consolidated his position within this network as well. There is also another familial link: Arent Muykens, to whom Van Goens addressed one letter, was married to Adriana van Adrichem, the sister of Dirck van Adrichem. Dirck, of course, had been the first husband of Van Goens' second wife, Esther de Solemne. It is thus no coincidence that Van Goens' stepdaughter Catherina van Adrichem was raised in the home of the Muykens family. It is also interesting to note that Van Goens referred to Arent Muykens as a 'cousin'; in other words, the deceased first husband of his second wife was sufficient cause for new familial links.<sup>452</sup> The link with Muykens is striking for another reason as well: he was the successor of Cornelis Weylandt as head of the Surat factory in 1644. There is thus a recurrent pattern of links to heads and former heads of Surat: Weylandt, Muykens and Van Adrichem. Muykens also maintained contacts with other former high VOC personnel in the Netherlands and was a witness to the baptism in 1664 of Johan Andreae Cunaeus, son of a former member of the Council of the Indies, Joan Cunaeus.<sup>453</sup>

I will now focus on the contents of some of the letters and examine how Van Goens used his position of power on Ceylon to act as a patron to his subordinates and, in turn, how he sought to please his patrons in the Republic. Since the letters from Van Goens in the Sweers archive are all from the early 1670s, it is on this period that I will concentrate. In the late 1660 and early 1670s, Van Goens was at the pinnacle of his power on Ceylon. Although the Kandyan counteroffensive was a severe blow, he still had the support of the directors in the Republic and could still largely dictate policy on Ceylon. This makes these years a fascinating period in which to look for patronage networks within the VOC. The letters in the Sweers archive shed some light on this. To this end, therefore, I will examine some letters sent by Van Goens in December 1670 more closely.

<sup>450</sup> NL-HaNA, Collectie Sweers, 1.10.78, inv. no. 4, fol. 280-288.

<sup>451</sup> NL-HaNA, Collectie Sweers, 1.10.78, inv. no. 4, fol. 232-233. Van Goens jr. in a letter to Salomon Sweers, January 4, 1673.

<sup>452</sup> The link was later strengthened by the marriage of Rijckloff jr. to the daughter of Esther de Solemne and Dirck van Adrichem.

<sup>453</sup> A.J. van der Aa, *Biografisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden, deel 3* (Haarlem 1858) 914. Erfgoed Leiden en omstreken, 1004, Dopen NH Pieterskerk, inv. no. 222, fol. 103.



The first letter dates from December 15, 1670 and was sent by Van Goens in Colombo to Arent Muykens and his wife in Amsterdam. It contains some interesting insights into the networking of Van Goens. Strikingly, Van Goens does not mention the attack by Kandyan forces on the outlying forts at Arandore, Ruanwella and so on. This supports the assertions in the literature that Van Goens was careful to present only good news (or at least to present news with a positive spin) to the directors back home.<sup>454</sup> The letter does, however, contain personal information; Arent Muykens was the uncle of Van Goens' stepdaughter Catherina van Adrichem, and the latter lived with the Muykens family in Amsterdam. Van Goens enquires into her upbringing, asks Muykens to tell her to write to him and says *'I want to assure You that I will keep to my fatherly affection and the promises I made and expect from her all due obedience that a daughter owes to a father.'*<sup>455</sup> Van Goens thus clearly communicated that he saw Catherina as his own daughter and that he expected her to respect him as the patrimonial head of the family. This created a set of reciprocal obligations between Van Goens and Catherina and, in so doing, confirmed the link with her uncle, Arent Muykens. The familial ties with the Muykens family needed to be ensured, and this could be done by assuring them that Van Goens regarded Catherina, who was after all not his biological daughter, as his own, even though, in 1669, he had recently married his third wife, Johanna van Ommeren, and had a daughter of his own, Esther Ceylonia van Goens (born of his second marriage). He went on to mention that Cornelis van den Boogaart had a position in Ahmadabad and had married, and assured Muykens that Van den Boogaart would always have his favor. This is interesting as it is a pattern that also recurs in other letters. Three days later, on December 18, Van Goens wrote to Jeremias de Haas (also known as Jeremias de Haze or Jeronimo de Haes), a VOC director in the Amsterdam chamber, to inform him that *'Joan [de Haas?] has died and, because of that, I no longer have a way to show you my friendship.'* This is a key phrase: it illustrates how the concept of friendship, as studied by Kooijmans, worked in practice, while a close reading of this and other phrases like it also shows that the etiquette of friendship and intimacy that Francesca Trivellato identified as key characteristics of merchants' letter-writing also worked in the correspondence between families bound by patronage and familial bonds rather than trade.<sup>456</sup> This is illustrated by another relative mentioned by Van Goens in the same letter: *'Your honorable cousin Papensouw has apparently not been able to give Commander Voss such contentment, so we have had to prefer the merchant [Coopman] Montaig in his stead for this time.'* Here, Van Goens is explaining to an important patron why he could not advance his cousin. He goes on: *'I offered to make him head of Trincomalee, which would have made him equal in rank to Montaig, but it seems his wife made him turn it down, as she thought Trincomalee rather too isolated.... Your honor should rest assured that I am doing all I can for him, but I regret to say that he has not been able to make himself loved here. I think he is a fine chap, but his wife does not relate well to the other wives and through the fighting of women, it's often the men who are made to suffer.'*<sup>457</sup> Besides providing a fascinating insight into gender relations in the period, this shows that Van Goens tried to explain the faltering career of an important patron's cousin in terms that would not direct any blame to the cousin in question. Blaming the wife was a convenient fig leaf for avoiding having to tell a patron his cousin was inept. Van Goens could thus use his power on Ceylon to advance certain individuals and so please his patrons in Amsterdam. This example also shows that this patronage could not be given lightly or

<sup>454</sup> As argued in Arasaratnam, *Dutch Power in Ceylon*, 54-59.

<sup>455</sup> NL-HaNA, Collectie Sweers, 1.10.78, inv. no. 2, fol. 195-196.

<sup>456</sup> Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers*, 177-193.

<sup>457</sup> NL-HaNA, Collectie Sweers, 1.10.78, inv. no. 2, fol. 193.



unconditionally. The reciprocity of the patronage relations was still key, while Van Goens also had to listen to his subordinates and could not simply appoint people who were not in themselves qualified for the job.

Van Goens was successfully able to play the role of patron for another young man, Jan van Vliet, son of Jeremias van Vliet who had been married to Salomon Sweers' sister. Jan van Vliet sailed to Colombo without an assignment in the hope of getting a job on Ceylon. Van Goens was able to help him and indeed started off the latter's career in the VOC by appointing him to the position of assistant bookkeeper in Colombo.<sup>458</sup> By using patronage Van Goens was thus able to create a loyal cadre of company officials who shared his ideas on policy and who were bound to him by family ties or perhaps through private trading ventures. The issue of private trade will be taken up in chapter seven.

### Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the career of Rijckloff van Goens in the period 1655-1670, during which time Van Goens underwent a remarkable transition, going from admiral of the homeward-bound fleet to commander-in-chief and inspector for the *Werkkwartieren*, and ultimately becoming governor of Ceylon. The governorship of Van Goens on Ceylon is crucial for our understanding of the development of the VOC as an organization as it represents perhaps the only occasion where a governor of a subordinate command was able to sideline 'Batavia' and set policy for himself. This was only possible through the combination of the particular circumstances of the VOC in Ceylon and the personality of an ambitious governor such as Van Goens. When arriving in Ceylon in the late 1650s, Van Goens came with a special, but carefully circumscribed set of orders. As commander-in-chief and inspector for the Western Quarters, Van Goens was able to conduct military operations and visit VOC commands in these areas to inspect the books, but not much else. Specifically, the regular day-to-day administration of the government fell outside the scope of his assignment. This was the responsibility of the governor of the island, Adriaan van der Meijden. Van Goens was not satisfied with the latter's suitability for the position, however, and rivalry for actual control of administration and diplomacy quickly ensued. In the end, Van Goens had Van der Meijden sent to Batavia to answer for his actions on no fewer than two occasions, with Van der Meijden being ordered to return to the Netherlands during his second trip to Batavia in 1663. In both instances, Van Goens took upon himself the task of overseeing the administration of the government of Ceylon. These temporary tenures as governor were crucial, however, as they allowed him to overhaul the administrative model of the colony during its formative phase. Jos Gommans has argued that, in his wish for fortifications, Van Goens showed he wanted to separate the VOC physically from its Asian surroundings. On Ceylon, however, he proved very willing to borrow from previous Portuguese and pre-colonial administrative practices if these could be modified to serve the VOC's needs.<sup>459</sup> Still, Gommans' argument that the fortification of Cochin was an attempt to control and separate people can also be applied to Ceylon as a whole. By fortifying the entire coastline and the interior, Van Goens attempted to clearly designate what was the company's and what was not. The early attempts to merge Jaffna into the Coromandel Coast government indicate, however, that Van Goens did not

<sup>458</sup> NL-HaNa, Collectie Sweers, 1.10.78, inv. no. 2, fol. 199.

<sup>459</sup> J. Gommans, 'South Asian Cosmopolitanism and the Dutch Microcosms in Seventeenth-Century Cochin (Kerala)', in J. Gommans and C. Antunes (eds.) *Exploring the Dutch Empire: Agents, Networks and Institutions, 1600-2000* (Bloomsbury: London and New York 2015) 3-26, 10-14.

have a clear-cut vision of the future of the Ceylon government. Indeed it was not until the first half of the 1660s that he developed the ambitious vision for which he gained notoriety.

This vision entailed a single, large Ceylon government encompassing all the VOC's conquests on the island, as well as on the Malabar Coast, the Madurai Coast and the southern Coromandel Coast. Van Goens' ambitious idea was to be able to control all maritime traffic between Cranganore and Negapatnam, including the whole of the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Strait. This control was to be enforced by fortifications that would serve as bases for maritime patrols in the area and would themselves keep important ports directly in check. Diplomacy would be crucial in bringing in those local rulers who could not be conquered outright or brought to agree terms by the threat of force. The Kingdom of Kandy on Ceylon itself would need to be conquered to make Ceylon a suitable location for a Dutch settlement colony. Colombo, he argued, was a much better, healthier city than Batavia and, if Kandy was conquered, there would be no rival powers to threaten the VOC's position on the island. This was in marked contrast to Batavia, which was hemmed in by Bantam and Mataram, as Van Goens knew only too well.

But having a vision and bringing it about are two completely different things. If he was to put theory into practice, Van Goens needed to be able to override the objections of Batavia. The creation of privileged routes of communication, first by sending letters overland and later by the direct voyages inaugurated from 1665 onwards, offered Van Goens the opportunity to speak directly to the directors. This direct link with the directors enabled him to disregard opposition from Batavia in many instances, with a good example being his refusal to let Lucas van der Dussen take up his position as fiscal in the council in Colombo. The wavering policy-making by the directors is in itself interesting. Although they frequently agreed with Batavia's admonitions to keep costs under control, they never responded when Van Goens disregarded orders from Batavia, thus indirectly legitimizing the latter's actions. This allowed Van Goens largely to conduct his own personnel policy on Ceylon by appointing loyal followers and thus playing the part of the powerful patron whom potential appointees needed to placate. Indeed, when VOC secretary Pieter van Dam wrote his history of the VOC towards the end of the seventeenth century, his main complaint about the company's policy-making and the directors was that they did not let themselves be informed on the situation on Ceylon by anyone other than Van Goens.<sup>460</sup> This more negative perception of Van Goens will be examined in more depth in chapter seven, which deals with his career after 1670, and how this increasingly became synonymous with Ceylon.

By marrying Esther de Solemne, in 1667, Van Goens was able to ally himself to the powerful Hartsinck clan within the VOC, with connections both in Batavia and in Coromandel. The daughter born of this marriage in 1668 was baptized Esther Ceylonia van Goens, thus showing how enamored Van Goens had become of the area under his command. Indeed, the close association between Van Goens and Ceylon is remarkable and further testifies to the extraordinary position that he had been able to build up. As argued in chapter three, it had been VOC policy since the outset to regularly move its highest officials between areas so that they would not become too much at home in any one area. The latter, however, is exactly what happened in the case of Van Goens.

Although the personal wealth that he was able to acquire has not yet been touched on in depth in this chapter, some indications have already been given. Though Van Goens presented

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<sup>460</sup> Van Dam, *Beschryvinge* 2.2, XI-XII.

himself as a hardliner in the case of Van der Meijden, he was later more than willing to ignore what he saw as minor offenses if he judged the offender to be valuable to the government. It is perhaps no coincidence that many of these offenders had also been appointed by him. By allowing them, too, to acquire a personal fortune, Van Goens could bind them all the more closely to him personally.

By the 1670s, therefore, Van Goens seemed well placed to make the case for his ultimate project: moving the seat of the High Government from Batavia to Colombo, a city that he had rebuilt. This is the point where chapter seven takes up the narrative and, in many ways, complements the current chapter by looking at the personal capital that Van Goens acquired. It firstly examines the careers of his two sons, Rijckloff junior and Volckert, and secondly analyzes why and how Van Goens' most ambitious schemes ultimately did not materialize. The main conceptual issue in this discussion will be the idea of information control and how this could be used by an ambitious and contentious governor such as Van Goens.

## 6. Dismissing a Governor-General

*Conflicts between the XIX and Johan Maurits, 1640-1644*

Portugal erupted in rebellion against its Habsburg King Phillip IV in the winter of 1640. John, the Duke of Braganza, was then proclaimed King John (João) IV of Portugal on December 1 of that year. The news of the Portuguese rebellion placed the WIC in an awkward position as the latter had attacked Brazil as part of its strategy to weaken Spain during the Eighty Years' War. Now that Portugal, too, was at war with Spain and thus a possible ally, could the WIC continue to maintain its South Atlantic empire at the expense of Portugal? Would the Luso-Brazilians stay loyal, or at least not actively belligerent, to the company now that Portugal was independent? Or could the company perhaps even cut costs and reduce its armed forces in Brazil? These were just some of the questions confronting the WIC directors in the Republic, and the governor and council in Brazil, after December 1640, and they increasingly drove a wedge in perceptions between the directors and their governor in Brazil on issues such as maintaining the strength of the army there. The Portuguese rebellion thus sparked a period of strategic uncertainty for the WIC, exacerbating intra-company tensions that had always been latent. In this way, the winter of 1640-1641 forms a natural break between the first and second parts of Johan Maurits' tenure in Brazil. This second part of his tenure was characterized by increasingly tense relations between the company's directors in the Netherlands and their governor-general in Brazil, and these tensions ultimately led to the latter's dismissal in April 1642.

This chapter will focus on the dismissal of Johan Maurits and will place this in the context of the increasingly dire financial situation of the WIC, the Portuguese rebellion, and the changing relations between company and state in the Netherlands. Prior to April 1642, Johan Maurits had requested on several occasions to be allowed to return to the Netherlands, but these requests had all been denied by the company and the Generality, which stressed the importance of his continued presence in Brazil. By April 1642, however, these calculations had apparently changed as the XIX decided that '*We expressly and considerably request Your Excellency to remain in aforementioned Government for the period of one year (at which point the mentioned demission will be granted)*'.<sup>461</sup> Johan Maurits objected to this, arguing that he needed the express consent of the States-General before leaving Brazil. This was subsequently granted in May 1643, and Johan Maurits left the colony in May 1644, just when rebellion among the Luso-Brazilian planters was beginning to stir. The question considered in this chapter is what had changed, such that the XIX were now willing to grant this request, whereas they had previously been unwilling to do so? Strangely enough, no-one has so far studied the dismissal procedure in any detail, even though Johan Maurits' dismissal from Brazil is of the greatest importance for a proper understanding of his career path, and especially the question of whether his being allowed to leave Brazil represented a defeat or a victory on his part.

Charles Boxer argued that Johan Maurits was loath to leave. More recently, however, Simon Groenveld argued that the sources could equally well be read from a perspective that

<sup>461</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 9, second part, XIX to Maurits and the High and Secret Council, April 18 1642. '*maer U Ex.cie mits desen expresselijck en seer gedienssel. versoecken en bidden in het voorn. Gouvernemet voor den tijt van een jaer te willen continueeren (als wanneer de meergenoemde dismissie U Ex.cie van nu aff toestaen)*'.

Johan Maurits really did wish to leave.<sup>462</sup> In writing about the Mauritshuis, Evelyn de Regt, too, expresses the opinion that Johan Maurits longed to return to the Netherlands in 1642,<sup>463</sup> referring to his correspondence with Constantijn Huygens. This included a letter of May 9, 1642, which Johan Maurits finished with the following (in somewhat broken French): ‘*Also, I hope to have the honor of seeing you again soon, as my contracted period here will soon expire, to my great contentment. At Antonio Vaz, the May 9, 1642.*’<sup>464</sup> This would seem to suggest that Johan Maurits genuinely wanted to leave Brazil even before he could have known about the decision taken by the XIX a month earlier. Seen in this light, his leaving of Brazil fits into an unbroken career path, and his dismissal cannot be seen as the result of the directors’ negative perceptions of his performance.

However, there are a number of arguments that mitigate against seeing this as an open-and-shut case. In the first place, Johan Maurits was not in a better financial position when he returned to the Netherlands in 1644 than when he had left some eight years earlier. He had spent a great deal of money on his palaces in Brazil, and building the *Mauritshuis* in The Hague had cost him a fortune. Additionally, the rank in which he was re-accepted into the army – colonel – was lower both in terms of remuneration and stature than the position he had held in Brazil. Although he had negotiated that he could return to his former rank and position in the army, it is likely – in light of his attempts to become marshal of the cavalry upon his return – that Johan Maurits thought the rank of colonel was now beneath his dignity, given that he had commanded much larger forces in Brazil. It is no coincidence, therefore, that he immediately tried to be appointed to a higher rank in the army. Seen in this light, his dismissal from Brazil was a painful step backwards in income and stature, and one which he was not well equipped to deal with. This might have lessened over time as he was subsequently able to use his Brazilian collection to acquire new titles, while the WIC’s position worsened catastrophically over the second half of the 1640s. Willem Frederik, the Frisian stadholder whose diary constitutes such an important source of information, noted on September 9, 1643 that *overste* (military rank) Kijn had told him that he was of the opinion that Johan Maurits would try and stay in Brazil for another three years or so, as he would be financially ruined if he returned earlier.<sup>465</sup>

So if the dismissal is not as straightforward as it seems, how should we understand it? The lack of interest in this part of Johan Maurits’ career is puzzling, as is the lack of attention for his performance as a military commander. This, too, seems a result of a historiography that has been heavily dominated by art historians. This chapter will try, therefore, to settle the question of Johan Maurits’ departure from Brazil. To do so, I will focus on the dismissal itself, and the increasing tensions between the directors and governor-general in the period 1640-1644. Although Johan Maurits had requested to be allowed to return before, these requests had not been granted.<sup>466</sup> In the case of Artichewsky he had also used the threat of resignation to force the removal of the unwelcome colonel.<sup>467</sup> The question, therefore, is whether this was merely a

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<sup>462</sup> Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 154. S. Groenveld, ‘Die wil was goet, maer die macht te Kleijn: Brazilië in de Nederlandse Archieven van Oranje en Nassau’, in: M. Wiesenbron (ed.), *Brazilië in de Nederlandse Archieven (1624-1654): Documenten in het Koninklijk Huisarchief en in het Archief van de Staten-Generaal* (CNWS, Leiden 2008), 72-111, 102-14.

<sup>463</sup> Evelyn de Regt, *Mauritshuis* (Staatsuitgeverij, The Hague 1987) 21.

<sup>464</sup> Correspondence of Constantijn Huygens, part 3, 283-284. ‘*Aussi j’espere d’avoir l’honneur de vous revoir bientost, car mon temps s’en va finir à mon grand contentement. Dieu veuille que je puisse avoir l’honneur de vous veoir en vostre belle maison, comme estant Antonivaz, ce 9 de May 1642.*’

<sup>465</sup> *Gloria Parendi*, diary 1643, p. 21.

<sup>466</sup> Barlaeus, *Rerum per Octennium*, 310.

<sup>467</sup> See chapter 4.



standard negotiating tactic, intended to put pressure on the XIX, and which backfired, or whether remaining in Brazil was in fact agreeable to Johan Maurits. The answer to this question must be sought in the changing relations between the company in the Netherlands, its governor-general in Brazil, and the Generality. The position of the governor-general and the High and Secret Council of Brazil was dependent on relations with both the Generality (including the stadholder) and the directors of the company. The directors, in turn, were increasingly reliant on support from the Generality in the form of money, men and ships, and this made control of information coming from Brazil of the greatest importance. Getting provinces to pay extraordinary subsidies was difficult at the best of times, but unfiltered information coming from Brazil could further problematize this political process. This is why the directors were displeased with Johan Maurits' direct correspondence with the Generality. For the High and Secret Council and the governor-general, however, direct contacts with the Generality were of great importance as they could provide a tool to force the directors to take action. This issue became increasingly critical as the WIC became ever more unable to effect decisions in the XIX and enforce them.

Something went amiss in the relations between the three sides in this equation during the period under review, leading to the dismissal of Johan Maurits in 1642. To find out exactly what went wrong, this chapter will look at the dismissal process in reverse order and so starting with the imposition of a new governmental structure on the colony after the departure of Johan Maurits. This new organization and the convoluted process of finding a successor for Johan Maurits were studied in detail in Alexander Bick's excellent PhD dissertation.<sup>468</sup> For our purposes, it is important to note that the dismissal of Johan Maurits resulted not merely in his replacement, but in a complete overhaul of the governmental structure. In both the letter of dismissal of April 18, 1642 and in the regulations for the new administration of Brazil after Johan Maurits' departure, the XIX highlighted all the areas of contention between them and their governor-general. These documents will thus serve as the starting point for the analysis by allowing me to zoom in on the specific points of contention without getting bogged down in a descriptive study of 'Dutch Brazil' in general. First, however, I will discuss the composition of the XIX in the early 1640s compared with the summer of 1636, when Johan Maurits was appointed, and the changing place of the WIC within the Dutch Republic.

### **Company and state in the Netherlands: between business and politics**

The position of the WIC continued to deteriorate, both commercially and politically, throughout the later 1630s and 1640s. But this slide in power was not at all predestined or obvious to contemporaries. The company's poor financial position could still be masked by some great military victories, which held out the possibility of its being restored to profitability by force of arms. The year 1639, for example, saw not only WIC naval successes in Brazilian waters, but also a significant WIC contingent participating in the Battle of the Downs. Two of the largest ships in the combined Dutch fleet of nearly a hundred ships were from the WIC: the *Salamander* and the *Jupiter*, both of 40 guns, while there was also the *St. Laurens* of 32 guns.<sup>469</sup> Ironically, the only ship lost in the battle in the Channel on September 15, the opening battle in the Downs campaign, was the hired WIC-ship *Groot Christoffel*, the former flagship of Christoffel

<sup>468</sup> A. Bick, *Governing the Free Seas*, 131-167.

<sup>469</sup> J. Bender, *Dutch warships in the age of sail, 1600-1714: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley 2014) 50-55.

Artichewsky. This ship blew up, probably after its own gunpowder stores were accidentally ignited.<sup>470</sup>

The Portuguese revolt in 1640 and the WIC's concomitant conquests of Angola and Maranhão again offered the prospect of profitability. Although the directors were aware of the worsening position of the WIC, it was not until the second half of the 1640s that this became known to a more general public. The WIC had not made a profit or issued any dividends since the capture of the 'silver fleet' at Matanzas in 1628. The mounting pressure of operating a costly, dangerous and loss-making colonial enterprise in Brazil put increasing pressure on the WIC directors from the late 1630s onwards. Increasingly, amity between the chambers broke down and the chambers faced off against one another in attempts to direct the few profitable trades to their own chamber. This would ultimately lead to affairs such as the fight over the division of gold from the Gold Coast in 1648, when the chamber of De Maze accused Amsterdam of not sharing the gold among the chambers, while Amsterdam claimed it did not need to do so as this trade had been conducted by Amsterdam. We only know about this case because the disagreement got out of hand and the directors of the two chambers turned to the States-General to enforce their claims.<sup>471</sup> Though this particular case falls outside this chapter's period of interest, it shows what the trajectory that the WIC was on would ultimately lead to. Increasingly, the WIC had to turn to the Generality for subsidies to enable it to continue the war in Brazil. However, this meant that the WIC directors had to become involved in the political discussions on war and peace being conducted within the Dutch Republic.

By the early 1640s, Dutch domestic politics was entering what would prove to be a tumultuous period of strife and discord, and that even outlasted the signing of the Peace of Munster in 1648. Although there were several strands of debate, the most important one related to the war effort against Spain. The military accomplishments of the Republic's army in the second half of the 1630s were less impressive than before, with the capture of Breda in 1637 being the main achievement. The Spanish army of Flanders presented an ever smaller risk to the Republic, while the Catalan Revolt and the Portuguese Restoration, both in 1640, had further undermined Spain's ability to threaten the Dutch Republic.<sup>472</sup> These changing relations caused deep tensions within the Dutch political system. Whereas stadholder Frederik Hendrik had been in favor of a ceasefire or peace with Spain in the first half of his reign, the Franco-Dutch offensive and defensive alliance of 1635 had changed his views. With French support, further conquests in the south were again possible.<sup>473</sup> But continuation of the war was deeply harmful to the interests of the merchants of Holland, who faced ever higher losses of ships to the privateers of Dunkirk, with 495 ships being lost between 1642 and 1646.<sup>474</sup> This put pressure on the political coalition that had effectively ruled the Netherlands in the 1630s, had managed the war effort and the WIC, and had supported the appointment of Johan Maurits.

By the early 1640s a rift had appeared between the interests and proposed strategies of the pro-war factions around the stadholder on the one hand, and the peace-minded factions of the merchant communities in Holland on the other hand. With Spain no longer an existential threat to the core provinces of the Republic itself, the cities of Holland were ever less inclined to

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<sup>470</sup> Bender, *Dutch warships in the age of sail, 1600-1714*, 170.

<sup>471</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.0.1.02, inv. no. 12564.23, pieces 1-9.

<sup>472</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 539.

<sup>473</sup> Van Nimwegen, *Deser Landen Crijchsvolk*, 204-213.

<sup>474</sup> Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, 27.

dedicate funds to maintaining a large field army for use in offensive operations. A quick peace was in the cities' interests, while the stadholder still wished to crown his career by capturing Antwerp.<sup>475</sup> Holland itself was less inclined than ever to conquer the southern provinces as that would mean the possible admission of Brabant and Flanders into the Generality as voting members, thereby diluting Holland's strong position. Chapter four argued that the appointment of Johan Maurits to the governor-generalship of Brazil can be seen as a favor granted by the influential Amsterdam regent Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh to stadholder Frederik Hendrik. And it was precisely this coalition between Amsterdam and the stadholder that now began to fray, with immediate and grave repercussions for the WIC. By appointing Johan Maurits in 1636, the directors had chosen to align the company squarely behind a pro-war and Orangist banner. By the early 1640s, however, the WIC directors in Amsterdam, who were not only WIC directors but also regents in the city and actively involved in other branches of trade, were beginning to have second thoughts about this choice. The political crisis that was slowly enveloping the Republic by the early 1640s did not come to a head until 1650, with the attempted *coup d'état* by stadholder William II, the son of Frederik Hendrik. But for the WIC, the consequences of the crisis were immediate and significant. Besides the intra-company disagreements that it engendered, thus further stoking the flames of disagreement between Amsterdam and Zeeland in particular, it also made the WIC a puppet in a larger political game in the Netherlands and, additionally, changed the logic behind the appointment of Johan Maurits. While it had been Amsterdam, in the figure of Coenraetsz. Burgh, who had nominated Johan Maurits in the first place, it was also Amsterdam that now argued most vociferously for his dismissal, as this chapter will make clear.

In order to study the composition of the WIC's board of directors, we first need, however, to exclude the possibility that rival factional interests took over between 1636 and 1642. Frustratingly, it is still rather difficult to precisely chart the changes in the composition of the WIC's management, both at a central (XIX) and cameral level. Alexander Bick's assertion that '*We still know precious little about the way the Heren XIX functioned, the individuals that staffed its meetings, and the policies it developed*' still holds true and is equally or perhaps even more applicable to the chambers.<sup>476</sup> This is not merely a problem of a historiography that has until now tended to ignore these questions; there are also source problems at the heart of this issue. In the case of the Amsterdam chamber, for example, we are well provided with minutes of the meetings for the crucial period of 1635-1636, when it was decided to appoint Johan Maurits (see chapter 4). Unfortunately, the minutes for the years after 1636 have been lost and are only available again from 1668 onwards. In the case of Zeeland, the minutes of the meetings have been better preserved, with only two hiatuses in the years between 1626 and 1674, when the first WIC went bankrupt.<sup>477</sup> Unfortunately, Zeeland kept its minutes differently from Amsterdam as the former's minutes do not start with a list of the directors attending the meetings. This therefore makes it somewhat difficult to reliably reconstruct the composition of the Zeeland chamber, too. The smaller chambers present a varied picture. Stad en Lande is generally very well documented, but of De Maze and the Noorderkwartier we know hardly anything. The following two tables thus focus on those attending the meetings of the XIX, of which it is fortunately possible to reconstruct a better picture. This is still not complete, however, and some caveats need to be

<sup>475</sup> P.J. Blok, *Frederik Hendrik, Prins van Oranje* (Meulenhoff: Amsterdam 1924) 232.

<sup>476</sup> Bick, *Governing the Free Sea*, 96-97.

<sup>477</sup> NL-HaNa, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. nos. 20-32.

made. Firstly, attendance of the XIX meetings could vary from year to year, depending on whom the chambers decided to delegate. Marked changes in the composition of the XIX may not necessarily, therefore, point to any real changes in the chambers. Only a long-term study of all XIX meetings could produce a more comprehensive analysis. However, here, too, we are faced with source problems. The following table (Table 7) presents a picture of attendance at the XIX meetings in 1636, 1642 and 1645.

**Table 7: The XIX in 1636, 1642 and 1645**

Name	1636	1642	1645	Chamber
G. van Arnhem	X	X		States-General
Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh (Conradi)	X	X		Amsterdam
Johan de Laet	X	X	X	Amsterdam / Leiden
Pieter Duvelaer	X			Zeeland
Johan Raijt	X			
Jan van der Marct	X			Amsterdam
Johan Gijsselingh	X			Zeeland
Pieter van de Velde	X			Zeeland
Cornelis Nicolai	X			De Maze
Hogehoeck	X			Amsterdam
Eduart Man	X			Amsterdam
P. Varlot	X			
Daniel van Liebergen	X			Amsterdam
Adriaen van der Dussen	X			De Maze
P. Ben	X	X		Noorderkwartier
Reynier Reael	X			Amsterdam
Christoffer van Ewsum	X			Stad en Lande
Pieter Evertsz. Hulft	X			Amsterdam
Matthijs van Ceulen	X	X		Amsterdam
Sijmen van der Does		X		
D. Bout		X		
G. de Graeff		X		
Jasper de Maaght		X		
I.V. Harinckhouck		X		Amsterdam
B. Iselingh		X		
P. Bisschop		X		
M. de Vogelaer		X		
Jan Lemand		X		
Elias de Vaet		X		
Thomas Voorwer		X		
Ferdinando Schulenburgh		X	X	Amsterdam

P. Claes Teenijn		X		
Thomas Voorwer		X		
P. Claes Teenijn		X		
I. Vriselaer		X		
Cornelis Witsen		X		
Van de Velde		X		
Jan Louijs			X	Zeeland
Joan Radij			X	Amsterdam
David Baute			X	Zeeland
[Cornelis Dackers, assessor]			X	Assessor, Zeeland
Jeronimus Hersevoor[?]			X	Amsterdam
Alewijn Halewijn			X	De Maze
Nicolaes Tienhove			X	De Maze
Floris Huigh			X	Noorderkwartier
<i>mr.</i> Jacob Hamel			X	Amsterdam
Adriaen van Hecke			X	Zeeland
<i>Absent</i>			X	Stad en Lande
Johan Lethoor			X	Amsterdam
[Adriaen van Eede, assessor]			X	Assessor, Amsterdam
Nicolaes van der Marckt			X	Zeeland
Isaacq van Beek			X	Amsterdam
Jacob Velthuijse			X	De Maze
Bonaventura Broen			X	Amsterdam
Claes ... Dolphijn			X	Noorderkwartier
Thobias Iddekinge			X	Stad en Lande
Johan van Halewijn			X	Amsterdam

Source: NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.01, OWIC, inv. no. 2. 'X' denotes attendance of meetings.

Given the way the XIX were nominated, some variation in the composition of the board over time is to be expected. But there is still some interesting continuity over the years, especially between 1636 and 1642, and specifically in the persons of Johan de Laet, Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh and P. Ben. Crucially, all three of these men were on the committee that had negotiated the contract with Johan Maurits back in 1636. In addition, the delegate from the States-General also remained the same over these years. Although the contrast between 1642 and 1645 is more marked, we also see here the names of some individuals who were also present nearly ten years earlier. All in all, this makes it unlikely that sudden changes in the factional balance in the chambers or the XIX caused a reversal of earlier policy. Especially the attendance by Coenraetsz. Burgh, Johan de Laet and P. Ben in both 1636 and 1642 is important. These men played important roles within the company, while Burgh, for example, was also actively involved in the negotiations with Hendrik Brouwer in 1642, which will be addressed in more detail later in this



chapter.<sup>478</sup> The conflict with Johan Maurits thus cannot be adequately explained by referring to changes in the composition of the WIC's central board of directors. Rather, it seems that circumstances, of which the previously noted political crisis in the Republic was one, must have changed the relationship between the directors and their governor-general.

### **From dismissal to a new government: identifying the points of contention between Johan Maurits and the directors**

The XIX provisionally dismissed Johan Maurits from his position in Brazil on April 18, 1642, although he was requested to remain in office for another year before returning. A little over a year and a half later, the XIX settled on a new administrative model for Brazil.<sup>479</sup> Together, the two documents evidencing these events identify the points of contention between the XIX and their governor from the perspective of the XIX. For Johan Maurits' perspective, I will turn to the speech delivered to the States-General by his private secretary, Karel Tolner, in June 1642.<sup>480</sup> This document shows the points at which Johan Maurits, in his turn, criticized the performance of his employees. Together, the viewpoints of the XIX and Johan Maurits will allow me to identify the issues on which the two parties disagreed, and thus reconstruct the changes in the networks that had previously appointed Johan Maurits.

All the points of contention between the directors and the Brazilian government of Johan Maurits are addressed in the dismissal letter itself and in the papers handed to the States-General in July 1642 by Karel Tolner. The documents of April 18 (the actual dismissal letter was the second one sent that day) addressed a number of points: the separation of Angola from Brazil that had been debated that winter and spring, the reduction of troop numbers made possible (or so the directors thought) by the ceasefire with Portugal, and the issue of *mesnagie* (the need to economize in Brazil by cutting costs). This issue was taken up in the directors' stipulation that they were willing to grant Johan Maurits' request to be relieved if he stayed another year. During this year, however, the eleventh article of his contract was to be cancelled. Instead of a 'free table', which, as I argued earlier, was of great importance to Johan Maurits' position as a patron in Brazil, he would receive one thousand guilders a month, far less than the actual costs of feeding and maintaining his household, which ran at over nine thousand guilders a month.<sup>481</sup> This was, of course, deeply humiliating to Johan Maurits. By keeping him in office, but reducing the allowance for his court, the directors would force him to admit to his followers that he could no longer maintain them, thus reducing his stature and patronage. This was crucial: the 'free table' had allowed Johan Maurits to construct a court in Brazil and bind WIC officials, high Portuguese citizens and Dutch colonists together in a clientage. Taking away the dinner privileges thus meant the dissolution of this network, as the directors must have known all too well.

Further hints of tensions between the XIX and Johan Maurits are provided in the documents detailing the design for the new government of Brazil. The new structure would see a council of five voting members and a secretary, headed by a president. This president had a very different position vis-à-vis the council from that of Johan Maurits, with the former being more a

<sup>478</sup> NL-HaNA, Aanwinsten 1<sup>e</sup> afdeling ARA, 1.11.01.01, inv. no. 1359, copy of resolutions by *Heren XIX*. Burgh was involved, along with Van de Velde, De Graeff, De Vogelaer and Iselingsh.

<sup>479</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02, inv. no. 12564.17, no. 5. Extract from the register of the *Heren XIX* – the new administrative model of the colony is accepted.

<sup>480</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02, inv. no. 5756, Tolner, 15 June, lectum 17 June. Thanks to Joris van den Tol for pointing this source out to me.

<sup>481</sup> See chapter 4.

member of equal status presiding over the meetings, rather than an individual of inherently different rank and stature. Unlike Johan Maurits, the new president of what was to be styled the 'High Government of Brazil' did not have a double vote, while newly reinforced councils of justice and accounts would provide more checks and balances on the High Government. This was in direct response to earlier complaints by the accounting office in Brazil against the High and Secret Council. These points – Angola, cost reduction (*mesnagerie*) and the position of the accounting office – will be explored in more detail later on in this chapter. First, however, I will examine the mission of Johan Maurits' private secretary to the States-General in summer 1642.

#### *Karel Tolner's mission*

That a sense of unhappiness with the existing situation was not felt only by the company directors is demonstrated by the mission of Karel Tolner to the States-General in July 1642. Tolner was the private secretary of Johan Maurits, and when the latter's request to return to the Netherlands to present a report on the situation in Brazil was turned down in 1640 and again in 1641, Tolner was sent to present Johan Maurits' ideas to the States-General. The fact that Tolner went to the States-General instead of to the XI is in itself already an extremely significant point. Indeed, in the document presented by Tolner, Johan Maurits argued that the most pressing matter for 'the conquest of Brazil' was a reform of its government. According to Johan Maurits, the directors did not have the experience or expertise needed to rule such a large colony and once they had gained such experience, they were replaced by others who '*did not know what the previous ones had decided upon.*'<sup>482</sup> Although the document does not spell out what the new government of Brazil should be, we can hypothesize that the particularly blunt criticism of the XIX, and the forum where this criticism was aired – a meeting of the States-General – could mean only one thing: Johan Maurits was pressing for management of the colony to be taken on by the Generality instead of the company. This was admittedly a radical idea. However, this interpretation is supported by other arguments against the directors given in the document. Johan Maurits argued that they had not kept their word when it came to providing supplies and had not realized that the conquest of Maranhão, Angola and São Tomé would only anger the Portuguese more. Furthermore, Johan Maurits presciently argued that the Portuguese rebellion against their Habsburg king only made rebellion in Brazil all the more likely, and that this made reducing the number of troops in Brazil at this juncture particularly unwise. What is more, the XIX's reticence to appoint new officers made it unattractive for good men to remain in the company's service. All in all, the XIX were not up to the task of managing the company at best, and at worst had been downright dishonest with the Brazilian government. Johan Maurits pointed out the increasing difficulties faced by the WIC in the Netherland in making decisions. On top of all that, '*the XIX do only rarely convene, and often take a recess, so that the proper occasions and seasons often pass, which are not easily reversed, and a state, so far distant as the state of Brazil, can lightly be put to risk.*'<sup>483</sup> If and when these premonitions came to pass, Johan Maurits wished to make clear that no blame could be attached to him.

By the summer of 1642, therefore, the directors of the company and Johan Maurits had all had enough of one another. The remainder of this chapter will examine the points of

<sup>482</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02, inv. no. 5756, Tolner, lectum 17 July.

<sup>483</sup> Ibidem. Dutch original: 'Daerenboven soo comen de Heeren XIX selten bij een, en scheiden dickwils op Recess, waerdoor de goete occasien, ende sesoenen menichmael voorbij gaen, die niet wederom herroepen konnen worden, ende lichtelijck een staet, soo verre afgelegen, als de staet van Brasil is, in perickel kan gestelt worden?'

contention between the two parties as expressed in the XIX's dismissal letter of April 18, 1642, and in Johan Maurits' letter presented by Tolner to the States-General in July 1642. These issues concerned the supply situation in Brazil, which both sides blamed on each other; the use of funds in Brazil for what the XIX deemed improper purposes; the status of the new, post-1641 conquests and especially Angola; and the proper use of military means in the new post-Portuguese rebellion situation. Before considering each of these aspects in turn, I will examine the changes in the High and Secret Council of Brazil chaired by Johan Maurits, given that this body had changed considerably since the latter had taken up the reins of government in 1636.

### **The High and Secret Council of Brazil**

When Johan Maurits left for Brazil in the fall of 1636, he was accompanied by three directors of the WIC as councilors: Johan Gijsselingh (Zeeland chamber), Matthijs van Ceulen (Amsterdam chamber) and Adriaen van der Dussen (De Maze chamber). In chapter four I argued that this 'heavy' council, consisting as it did of WIC directors, was intended both to support Johan Maurits and to act as a check on his considerable prerogatives. How did this work in practice? In 1639, when the 'Artichewsky case' had to be resolved, three councilors were still in place. Over the next year and a half, however, all of them left for the Netherlands and were replaced by three new men. The names of these three new councilors first appear together in a letter to the XIX on January 6, 1641, signaling that, by this date at the latest, the composition of the council had changed. In March of that year, the new councilors' contracts were discussed in the meeting of the XIX.<sup>484</sup> The Brazilian administration under Johan Maurits had no say in the selection of new councilors: Hendrik Hamel, Dirck Codde van den Burgh and Adriaan (also: Adriaen) van Bullestrate. What does the background of these new appointees reveal of the relations between XIX and the government in Brazil? Of the first, not much is known, but given that *mr.* Jacob Hamel sat on the XIX on behalf of the Amsterdam chamber in 1645, it is reasonable to assume that Hendrik, too, came from Amsterdam. Codde van den Burgh meanwhile had been sworn in as a *secretaris* of the city of Enkhuizen in November 1636.<sup>485</sup> Adriaan van Bullestrate, however, is more of an enigma. Boxer states him to be a former master carpenter in Middelburg, but without giving references for this.<sup>486</sup> The regional archives in 's-Hertogenbosch contain a document, dated September 13, 1639, in which Adriaan van Bullestrate is referred to as council and treasurer of the city of Middelburg.<sup>487</sup>

These councilors took over the reins of governing Brazil by themselves after Johan Maurits' departure, in anticipation of the new administrative model to be imposed by the WIC directors. The new model, however, was years in the making, and this council (without Dirck Codde van den Burgh, who died in 1644 and was replaced by Pieter Bas) remained in charge of Brazil during the early years of the Portuguese revolt.<sup>488</sup> Although Boxer rightly argued that the council was not lacking in experience, he did not mention that its members had already been in office for three years by the time Johan Maurits left. Additionally, the new councilors were closely connected to three of the chambers: Amsterdam, Zeeland and De Maze. This indicates a clear

<sup>484</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01 inv. no. 2. Extract from the secret resolutions of the XIX, March 30, 1640.

<sup>485</sup> E. den Hoof, *Historie der vermaerde zee- en koop-stadt enkhuisen, vervaetende haere herkomst, en voortgangh. Mitsgaders Verscheide gedenkwaardige geschiedenissen, aldaer voorgevallen* (Egbert den Hoof, Enkhuizen 1666) 85.

<sup>486</sup> Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 164.

<sup>487</sup> Brabants Historisch Informatie Centrum (BHIC) 221 Charters Provinciaal Genootschap van K & W, 1303-1845, inv. no. 587.

<sup>488</sup> *Ibidem*, and Bick, *Governing the Free Seas*, 144.

continuation of the policy, going back to the early 1630s, of tying colonial administration closely to the chambers. However, the new High and Secret Council posed persistent problems for the XIX. These problems seemed to center on one of their members, Adriaan van Bullestrate, who, from 1642 onwards, was at the heart of an increasing number of disputes between the High and Secret Council and the lower administrative staff of the company in Brazil. He was accused, for example, of selling company stores for his own account and of letting his protégés also do so, while the auction master in Recife accused him of thwarting the regular auction. Jacob van Luitsenich, who had been in charge of supplies of building materials in Recife, accused Van Bullestrate of forcing him to give up his position so that Van Bullestrate's favorite, the *fabriek* Michiel Pietersen, would have a free hand.<sup>489</sup> But that was not all: Henricus Torquinius, the head of the *raad van financiën* (also called: *rekenkamer*), the accounting office of Brazil, accused the entire High and Secret Council of stealing from the company and of hampering him in his efforts to root out corruption.<sup>490</sup> The accounting office later argued that it was entitled to send its own deputation to the XIX in order to argue its case there.<sup>491</sup> Nor was it only the WIC's employees who complained. The creditors of the merchant Cardin Estien, who had fled Recife, complained that Van Bullestrate had unlawfully claimed the merchant's estate.<sup>492</sup> Although the formal complaint, drawn up in May or June 1643, was directed at the High and Secret Council as a whole, the earlier depositions in the case referred only to the figure of Adriaan van Bullestrate.<sup>493</sup> He was likely to have been involved because Joost van Bullestrate, probably his son, had been a business partner of Cardin Estien.<sup>494</sup>

These complaints all reached the XIX and were often intentionally phrased bluntly, such as the complaint by Henricus Torquinius, of the accounting office, who wrote to the XIX '*with a letter full of complaints on the State, our board and me personally in particular... But no, as soft barbers make for festering wounds, so do those who try to hide the disasters in a state under a cloak of flattery...*'.<sup>495</sup> The High and Secret Council rallied around Van Bullestrate and refuted all allegations. It is interesting to note that though the complaints were directed at Van Bullestrate, the council as a whole stuck together in their refutations, thus indicating that Van Bullestrate enjoyed strong support from the other members of the council, including Johan Maurits. Their response was strikingly similar to the response of the (differently composed) council in the Artichewsky case; the complaints were all described as 'painted lies' and 'the result of jealousy'.<sup>496</sup> Torquinius himself, it must be noted, was not exactly a paragon of virtue as he was later charged with having an affair with the wife of the engineer Pieter van Strucht.<sup>497</sup>

<sup>489</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58, no. 95.

<sup>490</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58. Torquinius to the XIX, August 30, 1643.

<sup>491</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58, no. 59.

<sup>492</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58, deeds of attestation April 28, 1643 and May 11, 1643.

<sup>493</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58, nos. 8 and 13.

<sup>494</sup> In April 1642, a Joost van Bullestrate requested the Zeeland chamber to pay out seven months of his father. Joost van Bullestrate is recorded as having bought a number of slaves from Estien early in 1643, giving him ample time to sail to Brazil in the meantime.

<sup>495</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58, no. 94, complaints by Henricus Torquinius, August 1643. '*maer neen, gelijk sachte Barbiers stinckende wonden maecten, soo doen die gene mede die met den deckmantel van moij-weer, de rampen in een staet willen versussen.*'

<sup>496</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58, no. 45 (unfoliated).

<sup>497</sup> Interestingly, this case was ultimately prosecuted in the Noorderkwartier and the files ended up in the archives of the States-General, which is why the case does not appear in the WIC sources: NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.01, inv. no. 12551.120A, *Stukken betreffende de bemoeiingen van de Staten-Generaal met het proces voor de Raad van Justitie in Brazilië*

Regardless of the High and Secret Council's elaborate refutations, the XIX cannot have failed to gain the impression that the administration of their most important colony was collapsing under the burden of internal infighting. Though no complaints – at this stage – were directed against Johan Maurits personally, this process was taking place under his watch. The poor performance of the members of the High and Secret Council reflected poorly on Johan Maurits himself. Indeed the governor-general himself was implicated in some cases, including in the minor scandal surrounding the private use of WIC building materials by members of the High and Secret Council.

Jacob Luitsenich had accused Van Bullestrate of absconding with building materials for resale. In addition, the council had been accused in an anonymous letter of September 1642 of neglecting the fortifications in preference for the members' own houses. The council retorted that it would indeed have been better to reconstruct the fortifications around Recife in brick, rather than earth. Brick fortifications had the advantage that they required less maintenance, while earthworks generally needed to be reconstructed every year. Brickwork, however, was more costly and required the consent of the XIX. Regardless of these considerations, the council argued that the required bricks were simply not available.<sup>498</sup> However, a list made at the end of June 1643 provides clear details of the bricks used between July 1642 and the end of June 1643,<sup>499</sup> with Table 8 providing a simplified overview of the bricks used during this one-year period.

**Table 8: Use of bricks in Brazil, 1642-1643**

Destination	Number of bricks
Lodging of minor company officials	57.200
Fortifications	4.150
Kitchens aboard nine ships	16.000
'Delivered to his Excellency' (Johan Maurits)	69.000
New house of Codde van den Burgh	14.000
<b>House of <i>mijn heer</i> van Bullestrate</b>	10.000
<b>House of <i>mijn heer</i> Hamel</b>	12.000
Company buildings in Recife (two houses, prison, anchor smithy)	26.200
Sent to Guinea	6.000
Other	4.000
<b>Total</b>	<b>218.350</b>

Source: NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58, fol. 34, *Notitie van steenen soo moppen als clinquerts soo ten dienste vande Comp. door de metselaers sijn verbruyckt t sedert 2 Julij 1642 tot ultimo Junij 1643*

The high use of bricks by the members of the High and Secret Council is immediately striking. Of the total of 218,350 bricks used, no fewer than 113,000 bricks, or nearly 52 per cent, were used by the governor-general and the three members of the council. The low use of bricks in the fortifications is immediately striking and reflects the fact that most WIC fortifications were made of earth and sod with wooden palisades, rather than brick-built. The most important exception to

*tussen de advocaat-fiscaal ratione officii, en Henricus Caspari Torquinius, gewezen militair-fiscaal, over een oneerbare verhouding tussen laatstgenoemde en de vrouw van ingenieur Pieter van Strucht., 1652.*

<sup>498</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58 no. 45.

<sup>499</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58 fol. 34, *Notitie van steenen soo moppen als clinquerts soo ten dienst vande Comp. door de metselaers sijn verbruyckt t sedert 2 julij tot ultimo Junij 1643.*



this rule was perhaps Fort Ceulen, which was a Portuguese construction. The tabulated information shows that the council's claim that there were no bricks was not entirely true; rather, it was a question of priorities. Apparently, the private residences were deemed more important than the fortifications.

This contention about the supply of building materials and logistics was only worsened by the dispute that arose over the construction of a bridge linking Recife to Mauritsstad. This bridge is often presented, along with the palaces of Vrijburg and Boa Vista, as well as the urban design of Mauritsstad, as an example of the enlightened nature of Johan Maurits' rule in Brazil.<sup>500</sup> It is portrayed as unambiguously positive, and the directors' balking at the costs of construction is seen as yet another example of their penny-wise, pound-foolish attitude to colonial governance. The bridge (see Figure 19) was certainly important in that it created opportunities to further develop the built-up area of Mauritsstad, on the island of Antonio Vaz. This area, where Johan Maurits also built his most important palace, Boa Vista, with gardens and a zoo, was to be the future heart of the city. Its urban design has attracted much attention and has been attributed to Pieter Post himself.<sup>501</sup> It must be remembered, however, that at the time Frans Post made his panorama etching of Recife-Mauritsstad, the latter had still scarcely been built, while Recife is represented as a concentrated beehive of dwellings.<sup>502</sup> The plan of the town so beautifully represented in Figure 16 does not, therefore, indicate the actual but rather the ideal situation, with red color denoting the future built-up city blocks. To attain this ideal, the bridge, linking the new part of town to the old part with the port and warehouses, was crucial. To the company directors in the Netherlands, things must have appeared quite differently, however. Constructing a bridge would primarily benefit the city's population, rather than the company. Taking a generous view, it might have been argued that what benefited the population of the colony was also in the company's best interests. But the WIC could not afford to take such a generous view of colonial governance. With the slide in profitability came a natural reluctance to pay for projects such as these.

Johan Maurits had initially kept this well in mind, arguing that the costs of building the bridge would be raised by a tax on the citizens, who, it was argued, were eager to have it. By October 1642, however, it had become apparent that this eagerness for a bridge did not translate into an eagerness to pay for it. The XIX thus wrote on October 12 of that year:

*Already we hear of the unrest among the inhabitants upon the expiration of the first year [of the levy], as far as we are concerned, we do not accept the use of the Company's means to complete this bridge.*<sup>503</sup>

This sheds a somewhat different light on the XIX's reaction to Johan Maurits' building projects from that presented by Wätjen. The latter put the costs of the bridge at 128.000 guilders, which were 'advanced by the generous governor' without the XIX chipping in at all.<sup>504</sup> But the XIX had

<sup>500</sup> Van Oers, *Dutch Town Planning*, 138-151.

<sup>501</sup> Terwen, 'The Buildings of Johan Maurits van Nassau', 87-88.


<sup>502</sup> Barlaeus, *Rerum per Octennium*, after page 146.

<sup>503</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01 inv. no. 9, fol. 69. '*Wij vernemen alreede de onlusten die op het expireren van het eerste Jaer bij de voors. ingesetenen gethoont werden, wat ons belangt, wij en verstaen geesints dat de middelen vande Comp.ie tot het volvoeren vande voors. brugge sullen werden aangenent.*'

<sup>504</sup> Wätjen, *Das Niederländisches Kolonialreich*, 125. He cites NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01 inv. no. 55. Letter of the governor-general and council to the XIX to make this point, but nowhere is it mentioned that Johan Maurits would forward the costs. Instead, a levy in Recife and Pernambuco was intended to cover the costs.

made it clear from the outset that the company would not pay for this venture. The directors' resentment of this project was due not only to its high costs, but also because they had only consented to construction on the condition that the local population would pay for it. Instead, the costs were ultimately borne by the company. That this was the result of the policies of an otherwise free-spending nobleman who did not deign to speak to his financial council can only have increased the directors' displeasure. Barleaus in his panegyric on Johan Maurits spends no less than four whole pages on the bridge-building episode.<sup>505</sup> These pages offer an interesting insight into the motivations that Johan Maurits would offer of why the bridge was necessary, but also reveal how the bridge became a symbol of his power. Barleaus mentions economic and military reasons for the bridge. The bridge would open up Ant3nio Vaz for expansion of the city of Recife, allowing for more and cheaper housing. In addition, the bridge would allow safe transport of sugar across the treacherous river towards the company's warehouses and the ships at anchor. In the third place, the bridge would allow quick movement of troops in case of attack.<sup>506</sup>

Figure 19: The Recife-Mauritsstad urban complex



Source: NL-HaNA, 4.VELH, Collectie Leupe supplement, inv. no. 0619.74

The elaborate defense of the project, coupled with comparisons to the Roman bridges across the Rhine, S4one and Danube, show that Johan Maurits considered it an important part of his legacy. The symbolic importance of the bridge is supported by the description of what followed. The architect in charge of the project feared that it would not be possible to complete the bridge due

<sup>505</sup> In the Dutch translation of Honor4-Naber at least, see: Barleaus and Honor4-Nabar

<sup>506</sup> S.P. Honor4 Naber and Caspar Barleaus, *Nederlandsch Brazili4 onder het beind van Johan Maurits, Grave van Nassau 1637-1644* (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1923) 205-209.

to the treacherous current and the depth of the river. This was of course a great blow to the prestige of those who had supported it, chief of whom was Johan Maurits.

*‘Thus it seemed that the complaints by those who were accustomed to private calculations of gain, and were used to judge affairs that concern government and are useful for that task, on the same grounds, were justified - not knowing that Rulers to whom great tasks of governance are entrusted to their honor and fame lead another life. Maurits, judging that his honor was at stake if he was seen to have undertaken a project that could not be brought to fruition and that it would show weak governance if he were to forsake the interests of state through the despair of one man [the architect], took up the project himself...’<sup>507</sup>*

The bridge, therefore, had become a symbol of Johan Maurits’ power and needed to be completed at all costs as it would diminish his reputation and honor if it was left uncompleted. It seems symptomatic of a peculiar planning process, however, that the architect in charge only voiced his concerns once the project was already well under way. By 1642, therefore, there were ample grounds for the XIX to wish their governor gone, with Johan Maurits himself offering them a pretext in the shape of his repeated offers to resign. The bridge is thus illustrative of the tensions brought about by Johan Maurits’ investment into the symbols of power and proper governance (infrastructure) for which the company was ultimately liable but which it did not wish to finance.

### **Angola and Chile: increasing the sway of the South Atlantic empire**

The Portuguese revolt against Habsburg dominance, which resulted in the rebellion of 1640, created both challenges and new opportunities for the WIC. On the one hand, a natural outcome would be a ceasefire with Portugal as the latter, too, was now fighting Habsburg Spain. On the other hand, the upheavals in Iberia also offered the opportunity for quick gains at Portugal’s expense. This latter route was chosen and, in quick succession, the WIC captured Maranhão in the north-west, as well as São Tomé and Luanda (Angola) on the other side of the Atlantic. By mid-1641, the WIC’s South Atlantic empire was at its height. Though the seizure of these Portuguese colonies was perhaps technically legal, given that no Luso-Dutch peace treaty had yet been signed and ratified, it shows perhaps a certain short-sightedness in the WIC, both among the directors who ordered the capture, and in Johan Maurits and the Brazilian government who put it into practice.<sup>508</sup>

However, the conquest of Angola, in particular, also created another point of contention between the directors and Johan Maurits: who would rule this territory? Johan Maurits argued, both in letters and through the mission of Tolner, that Angola would be best ruled from Brazil. His arguments made a lot of sense: Angola and Brazil were part of the same system, given that the Brazilian sugar plantations could not function without labor supplied in the form of enslaved Africans shipped from Angola. Although the WIC had conquered Elmina in 1637, this was a

<sup>507</sup> Barlaeus and Honoré-Naber, *Nederlandsch-Brazilië*, 208. *‘Alzo schenen niet zonder eenigen glimp van recht te klagen zij, die aan particuliere berekeningen gepend, ook gewoon waren zaken die de regering aangingen en uit dat oogpunt nuttig zijn, met denzelfde maatstaf te meten – niet wetende dat Vorsten wien de taak ten deel valt de grootste zaken tot eer en roem te besturen, een ander bestaan leiden. Maurits, van oordeel, dat zijn eer ermede gemoeid was zo hij zich tot iets dat hij niet voltooiën kon had ondervonden, en dat het van zwak beleid zou getuigen het staatsbelang te verwerpen op grond van de wanhoop van een enkelen persoon, heeft de hand aan het werk geslagen...’*

<sup>508</sup> Den Heijer, *De geschiedenis van de WIC*, 76-78.



vastly inferior position from which to enter the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans. Labor from Angola was rated more highly and seen as less likely to rebel. The inclusion of Angola in the Brazilian government would thus further the position of Johan Maurits as governor-general by analogy with the position in the VOC. Shipping could also be more efficiently organized with Recife as a central node. But the directors were fiercely opposed to this idea as the inclusion of Angola in this way would indeed further the stature of the office of governor-general and, by 1642, they were keen to do away with, rather than burnish, this office. The directors argues that in Portuguese times Angola had always remained separate from Brazil and that this should be maintained. Rather than appoint Codde van den Burgh, member of the High and Secret Council as Governor in Angola under supervision from Recife, the directors opted to create an entirely new ‘southern district of Africa’.<sup>509</sup> This conflict, which served to further alienate the directors and governor-general from each other, was mentioned in the letters the directors sent to Johan Maurits in April 1642, and again in the latter’s subsequent protestations to the States-General through the person of Karel Tolner.<sup>510</sup> Angola would remain organizationally separate, though in practice was heavily dependent upon Brazil for resources and manpower.<sup>511</sup>

A year later, however, and on a different front, the directors and the Brazilian government were remarkably still able to cooperate with each other. This was in the matter of Hendrick Brouwer’s 1643 voyage to Chile.<sup>512</sup> By 1641-1642, Portugal’s remaining colonial possessions were out of reach for the WIC, with only Brazil south of the Rio São Francisco remaining part of her South Atlantic empire. Rather surprisingly, given the poor financial situation of the WIC, it was decided to send a fleet to Chile via Brazil with the aim of establishing an alliance with the Araucanian native Americans, exploiting gold and silver mines, and creating a base for operations against Spanish South America and the Manilla galleon. Henk den Heijer argued in his recent publication of the journal of the expedition that it was Johan Maurits who convinced the directors, in 1641, to organize this expedition. This claim was made in reaction to P.J. Bouwman’s assertion that it was Brouwer himself who took the initiative for the expedition.<sup>513</sup> This is interesting as it shows that at that point – August 1641 – the directors were still willing to take these ideas of their governor-general seriously. More puzzling is the way in which the expedition was organized. Hendrik Brouwer, WIC director for the Amsterdam chamber, a former VOC director and former VOC governor-general, was persuaded to take charge of the expedition.<sup>514</sup> However, he sailed from the Republic with only a small fleet of three ships. The idea was to reinforce and resupply his force in Recife and to lift troops from the Brazilian army in order to increase the size of the landing force. But by the time Brouwer’s ships dropped anchor at Recife in December 1642, there had been uprisings in both Maranhão and São Tomé, and the Brazilian government could not release the number of troops or ships needed to give a fair chance of success. Indeed, the expedition ultimately failed completely.<sup>515</sup> It is

<sup>509</sup> K. Ratelband, *Nederlanders in West-Afrika, 1600-1650: Angola, Kongo en São Tomé* (Walburg Pers, Zutphen 2000) 171-172.

<sup>510</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02., inv. no. 5756, unfoliated. Tolner to the States-General, exhibitum July 15, 1642; lectum July 17, 1642.

<sup>511</sup> C.R. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola: 1602-1686* (The Athlone Press, London 1952) 259-260.

<sup>512</sup> For a recent study of this expedition, see: H.J. den Heijer, *Goud en Indianen: Het Journaal van Hendrick Brouwers expeditie naar Chili in 1643* (Walburg Pers, Zutphen, 2015).

<sup>513</sup> Ibidem, 25-26. Bouwman, *Johan Maurits*, 76.

<sup>514</sup> NL-HaNA, Aanwinsten 1<sup>e</sup> afdeling ARA, 1.11.01.01, inv. no. 1359.

<sup>515</sup> Den Heijer, *Goud en Indianen*, 43-46.

interesting to note, however, that the XIX directors were even prepared to contemplate this move. They knew of the difficult supply situation in Brazil, but still thought it prudent for Brouwer's force to be resupplied and manned at Recife. This, more than anything else, perhaps best illustrates the dire straits the WIC was in. Only a 'silver bullet' could save the company. Also noteworthy in this context are the lengthy negotiations between the WIC directors and Brouwer over his appointment. Ultimately, Brouwer consented to lead the expedition, but only on the condition that, while in Brazil, he would rank and vote alongside the other members of the High and Secret Council. This is perhaps based on the understanding by Brouwer, an Amsterdam director, of the Artichewsky affair. With the failure of the Chile expedition, the last attempt to increase the size of the WIC's empire in the South Atlantic, ruled from Recife, came to an end. Future operations, though the actors did not know it yet, focused on retention rather than expansion. Maranhão and São Tomé had already rebelled, while there were still bands of Portuguese troops fighting the WIC in the inlands of Angola. In retrospect, it was lucky for Johan Maurits that he left when he did as this allowed later writers, especially Barlaeus, to portray his tenure as a peaceable reign and a flourishing of Dutch Brazil under an enlightened prince. It would have been impossible for Barlaeus to portray this image in 1647 if Johan Maurits had stayed but one or two more years in Brazil.

#### **Enough is enough: dismissal of Johan Maurits, and his attempts to stay, 1642-1644**

By the time the XIX decided in April 1642 to grant Johan Maurits his wish and recall him to the Netherlands, there were thus ample grounds for friction between the governor-general and the directors. Despite notable successes – most importantly, the capture of Elmina in 1637, the conquest of Porto Calvo and the subsequent pacification of the hinterlands of Dutch Brazil in the same year, and the capture of Angola and Maranhão in 1640 – the directors were displeased. Part of this displeasure was perhaps caused by the failure to take Bahia in 1638, an event that could have ended the war then and there. But, more importantly, the administration of Dutch Brazil and its dependencies was turning in on itself. The Artichewsky case, discussed in chapter four, already showed that Johan Maurits was mistrustful of the directors' intentions. By 1642, the directors also had ample evidence that their governor-general was enriching himself at the company's expense, and relations between the High and Secret Council (including the governor-general) and the lower administrations of the colony were in the process of breaking down, particularly between the councils of finances and justice and the High and Secret Council. The attempt to include Angola in the Brazilian government's sphere, albeit logical on economic and strategic grounds, was a further indication that the governor-general in Recife wanted to extend his powers and make the Brazilian government more of a counterweight to the XIX. This was against all WIC policies and ideas for the governance of the colonial empire, going back to the loss of Bahia in 1625. Since then, the XIX had consciously attempted to tie colonial governance very closely to the chambers themselves by, for example, appointing directors as councilors to Brazil in 1634, 1636 and again in 1640.<sup>516</sup> The seizure of captured slaves for his private account near Bahia in 1638, and his free spending on palaces, bridges and so on, would have inclined the directors to see Johan Maurits as a needless expense that could no longer be justified.

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<sup>516</sup> Thus somewhat modifying my statement in an earlier article, where I argued that sending directors to Brazil in 1635-1636 was a rather unique affair; see: C. Antunes, E. Odegard and J. van den Tol, 'The Networks of Dutch Brazil', in: J. Gommans and C. Antunes, *Exploring the Dutch Empire: Agents, Networks and Institutions, 1600-2000*, 77-94, 83.



Furthermore, the WIC's governor-general actively sought to dilute WIC control over its most important colony by appealing directly to the States-General and even arguing that governance of the colony should be conducted rather differently. Johan Maurits, for his part, could look back with dissatisfaction on the disputes over the payment of his share of the spoils of war seized in Brazil, the XIX's vacillating policy on the issue of free trade, the lack of supplies and reinforcements when he most urgently requested them, and the unwillingness of the XIX to extend his powers in Angola.

So there were ample grounds for tension between the parties, but how did the dismissal procedure actually take place? On April 18, the XIX decided to grant Johan Maurits' earlier requests to return home, with this decision being received in Brazil later that summer.<sup>517</sup> Johan Maurits was requested, however, to remain in office for one more year so as to ensure an orderly transition of power. Given, however, the dire straits the company was now in, the WIC could no longer bear the excessive costs of Johan Maurits' court. The XIX decided, therefore, to end his right to a 'free table' and instead to grant him a monthly sum of one thousand guilders for these expenses.<sup>518</sup> In October 1642, Johan Maurits wrote back regarding the granting of his request. Rather than being pleased, he was irritated with the directors. He complained that they had never so much as deigned to reply to his earlier requests and now he was suddenly being 'fired and summoned home'. But though he was pleased that his wish had been granted, he would not return immediately: the letter of the XIX had not been accompanied by an order of the States-General and the stadholder to the effect that he should return. Johan Maurits argued that he served two masters: the company and the Generality, and that as the latter had urgently requested him to remain in Brazil when he last broached the subject, he dared not leave without its express permission. Since Johan Maurits retained his army commission, he felt justified in informing the stadholder, his superior officer, of his actions. Simon Groenveld argued, based on letters in the *Liasen WIC*, that the back-and-forth of letters on Johan Maurits' resignation lend themselves at least as well to an interpretation that he genuinely wished to leave. In this, however, Groenveld disregarded the chronology of the decisions of the XIX. He mentions that '*just before Tolner's mission, Johan Maurits had apparently decided to request his dismissal.[...] On September 12, 1642 he notified the Chambers of the Conquests in Brazil of his decision. Their response too, was sent to the State-General. Finally the Heren XIX decided to grant his request.*'<sup>519</sup> This overlooks the fact, already mentioned in Boxer, that the XIX had already decided to dismiss Johan Maurits in April 1642. When Maurits notified the *Cameras* in September, he was thus not notifying them of *his* decision to leave, but rather of the XIX's decision to fire him. If he had genuinely wanted to return and this was merely the granting of a request, this would make no sense. Boxer, by contrast, argued that by consciously including the protestations of the local population, Johan Maurits attempted to convince the States-General and stadholder to veto the XIX's decision and to maintain him in office.<sup>520</sup>

The dismayed reactions of the *Cameras* in Brazil were forwarded to the States-General, along with the announcement that the XIX had ordered Johan Maurits to return. This is an important point: again Johan Maurits appealed to the States-General to approve a decision

<sup>517</sup> In NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 57. Johan Maurits mentions that he received the resolutions of April 18, 1642 on August 12 of that year.

<sup>518</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 2. scan 289 ff.

<sup>519</sup> S. Groenveld, "De wil was goed maar de macht te klein?: Brazilië in de Nederlandse archieven van Oranje en Nassau", in: M. Wiesenbron (ed.), *Brazilië in de Nederlandse archieven/O Brasil em arquivos neerlandeses (1624-1654): Mauritiania, vol. 3* (CNWS, Leiden 2008), 72-111, 102-104.

<sup>520</sup> Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 155.

already made by the XIX.<sup>521</sup> In a postscript to his letter of September 24, 1642, the governor-general of Brazil complained fiercely of his treatment by the XIX: *‘God knows how ungratefully I have been treated by the directors for my loyal service to this state. I will, however, remain in doing so and fulfill the service of Your High Mightinesses until such a time that Your High Mightinesses deign to recall me, which I hope will be soon. In the meantime, as I am reported that there are many false and mischievous lies told of me, I would humbly request Your High Mightinesses not to accord them any credibility without hearing from me.’*<sup>522</sup> This complaint and the forwarded reactions of the Luso-Brazilian population are open to various interpretations. I will argue that they show that Johan Maurits was putting on a performance, no doubt inspired by real indignation, with the goal of making it easier for the States-General to intervene in the management of the colony. By complaining of his treatment by the directors and forwarding the reactions of the Luso-Brazilians, he could provide the States-General with ample grounds to overrule the XIX’s decision to recall him. Though he notes that he hoped he would be recalled shortly, this can be seen as a rhetorical twist, forcing the States-General to urge him to stay in the service of the fatherland, as they had done before. This would provide an opportunity to renegotiate items that were of immediate importance to Johan Maurits: money and honor. In the decision of April 12, 1642, the XIX had unilaterally decided to end his right to a ‘free table’, and instead provided him with one thousand guilders a month for provisions and maintaining his household. But, as shown in chapter four, the actual cost of feeding Johan Maurits’ household exceeded nine thousand guilders a month. The difference would thus have to be made up either by Johan Maurits himself or by reducing the size of the household. We could even hypothesize that this was the real objective of the XIX: by forcing a reduction in the size of Johan Maurits’ household, they took away an important tool of patronage. In addition, it dealt a severe blow to a symbol of Johan Maurits’ power. Whatever the objective of the XIX, Johan Maurits was very clearly displeased as this would either cost him a lot of his own money, or would lower his status by forcing a reduction in his household. This rankled with him, and was in direct conflict with the eleventh article of his original contract, signed in 1636: *‘But on the contrary, one now cuts my food allowance so that I will hardly be able to afford the butter for my court. Consider what a sum of a thousand guilders is in proportion to a table which corresponds to my quality and office. [...] The company is obliged, on the strength of the eleventh article of the condition presented to me by your honors themselves, to keep a free table for me and my court.’*<sup>523</sup> Johan Maurits was further displeased that the XIX had requested him to stay for another year, but had not increased his pay. This was in contrast to way in which the WIC regularly treated its employees *‘who after expiration of their contracted period are offered an increase in pay’*.<sup>524</sup>

This provided an opportunity for the community of notable Luso-Brazilian residents in the colony to endear themselves to Johan Maurits. Five of them, themselves described as ‘his

<sup>521</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02, inv. no. 5757, Johan Maurits to the States-General, September 24, 1642 and April 3, 1643.

<sup>522</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02, inv. no. 5757, Johan Maurits to the States-General, September 24, 1642, *‘Hoe ondangbaerlick ick van Bewinthebberen beloont worde, voor mijn getrouw dienst, aen desen staedt bewesen, wiet Godt, sal niet te min hier in patienteren ende den dienst van Uwe Ho:Mog. nae mijn vermoogen waernemen, tot dat uwe Ho:Mog gelieven sal mij ’t huis ontbieden, t’welcke verhope dat in corten sal geschieden. Ondertusschen also ick bericht wordt datter vele valsche en schelmachtige leugenen tegens mij worden uijtgestroit wil uwe Ho:Mog. onderdanigh versocht hebben daer aen geen gelove te geven sonder alvoren mij daer op te hooren.’*

<sup>523</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 57, *‘maar ter contrarie men besnijdt mijn mondcosten soodanich datter nauwelijcx de boter tot mijn hofhoudinge moge nuytvalen, ick geve ieder een te considereren wat proportie een simme van duijssent guldens ter maant heeft wegens een disch die met mijn qualiteijt en charge over een compt De Comp. is nuyt cracht vant 11 arlu[articul] der conditien mij bij Ued. Hr. selfst voorgedragen en gepresenteert verbonden voor mij ende mijn gevolg te houden een vrije tafel.’*

<sup>524</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 69, with special thanks to Joris van den Tol for pointing me towards this source and for generously providing a transcription.

Excellency's loyal servants' – Paulo Antonio Dias, Gregorio de Barros Pereira, Cosmo de Crasto Paços, João Vieira and Anto Vieira – offered to pay a voluntary tax of half a *pataque* on every chest of sugar in order to help fund the household costs of Johan Maurits by, for example, providing uniforms for his footmen.<sup>525</sup> They phrased this brilliantly by observing that '*Your Excellency is so abhorrent of all avarice*'.<sup>526</sup> Clearly, Johan Maurits' need to keep up a court befitting a nobleman 'of his distinction' created opportunities for the local communities to endear themselves to the governor and to obtain favorable conditions for their own operations. Even, however, in this diminished position, Johan Maurits' status as governor-general of Dutch Brazil was far higher than what he could hope to enjoy at home as colonel in charge of a regiment of Walloon infantry. His monthly pay in Brazil was higher, he could afford a larger retinue of followers, and he commanded more troops and ships over a vastly larger area of operations. If he returned to the Netherlands, he could, of course, try to obtain a promotion to a rank of high standing and remuneration, but this was by no means certain. His status as a Nassau nobleman would count for little in competition with other Nassaus from more senior branches of the family. So status in itself was an excellent argument for Johan Maurits to use in an attempt to stay. Another was money. Despite his excellent monthly salary in Brazil, Johan Maurits was still on the cusp of bankruptcy in 1642, the Mauritshuis and his Brazilian palaces having devoured his income. In his diary, Willem Frederik, the Frisian stadholder, noted the dire financial straits of the Brazilian governor-general in September 1643:

*Overste [a lower officer rank] Kijn told me that Count Mauritz had only got three extraordinary presents, one worth 180 thousand guilders – 600 chests of sugar of 300 guilders a chest. And then two other ones, not worth as much, so that the three presents of the Portuguese merchants are worth between the four- and five hundred thousand guilders, all of which he has lavished on the house, except for some debts which he also repaid [...] his intention was to stay some three years longer, though he pretends otherwise, to prosper a bit. He has also built a house there, which has cost him much, over 100 thousand guilders. In total he still has 300 thousand guilders with him, and if he returns so soon he will be ruined, for the house in The Hague needs to be furnished to suit its state, and his household as well, which is not feasible.*<sup>527</sup>

This is a powerful statement on how a fellow nobleman judged Johan Maurits' intentions and possibilities in the fall of 1643, shortly after the latter had informed the States-General that he would not be returning in the spring of 1643 but only later. In addition, he then requested confirmation that the States-General agreed to his return.<sup>528</sup> This appeal was overruled by a similar but reverse appeal by the XIX to confirm his dismissal. Johan Maurits was nevertheless

<sup>525</sup> In the source the Portuguese names are (mis)spelled as follows: Paulo Antonio Daens, Gegorio de Baros Pereira, Cosmo de Crasto Pacos, Joa Vierro and Anto Viera.

<sup>526</sup> Koninklijk Huisarchief, A4 collectie Johan Maurits, inv. no. 1454, fol. 275-276.

<sup>527</sup> *Gloria Parendi diary 1643, '... den oversten Kijn seide mij, dat graf Mauritz maer drie extraordinaerische presenten hadde bekomen, een van 180 duisent gulden, te weten 600 kisten suycker ende elck kist gold 300 gulden. - Daernaech noch twee andere, die sooveel niet weert waeren, sodat dese drie presenten van de Portegise coophuyden beloopt tuschen de vier- en vijfmael hondertduisent gulden, dewelcke hij alle aen het huys heeft gehangen, behalven eenige weinich schulden die oock betaelt sijn, [...] Dat sijn opinie oock was daer noch een jaer off drie te blieden, als gaf hij anders uyt, om noch yetwas te prospereren, dan hij daer oock een huys gebant heeft, 'twelck hem veel kost, oover de 100 duysent gulden. - Dat hij in alles noch bie hem heeft 300 duisent gulden, ende als hij so rasch weerkomt, dat hij geruïneert is, want naer advenant het gebau van het huys dat in Den Haech staet, moet het gemeubleert sijn ende het huysholden oock daernaech, niet doenlijck.'*

<sup>528</sup> NL-HaNA States-General, 1.01.02 inv. no. 5757, Johan Maurits to the States-General, April 3, 1643.

still able to postpone his departure from Brazil until May of the following year, and so more than two years after the XIX had dismissed him. His final act of governance was to compose his ‘political testament’, in which he offered advice on and insight into the governance of Brazil. This document was prescient, like the papers presented by Tolner, as it identified the greatest threat to the colony – now that there was an official ceasefire with Portugal – as a revolt by the planters. To prevent this, the population needed to be governed gently, and religious freedom liberties for Catholics should be maintained. Johan Maurits’ ‘testament’ has been analyzed, and lauded, elsewhere, but it is noteworthy that, when in the Republic, he presented this document first to the States-General and only later to the XIX. This fits in well with the mission by Karel Tolner, who also argued that governance of the colony needed to change. The ‘testament’ can thus be seen not only as well-meant advice for better governance of the colony, but also as an attempt to change the colony’s relationship with the company and the Dutch state. When the preparations for the *secours* came up for debate in 1646, Johan Maurits once again stressed that despite the revolt, good relations with the planters were crucial, noting that ‘*the conquest of Brazil without the Portuguese would not offer the company much advantage.*’<sup>529</sup> Again, this advice was offered to the States-General rather than to the directors of the company, with whom he had an ongoing dispute over back-payments.<sup>530</sup>

### Conclusion

This chapter has examined the tenure of Johan Maurits in Brazil from 1640 onwards, focusing on the development of his relations with the directors of the WIC, as well as with the lower branches of administration in the government of Brazil, and asking whether we can accurately argue that Johan Maurits was fired, or whether his return to the Netherlands can better be understood as the belated granting of his own wishes. In seeking to answer this question, this chapter has taken a closer look at the institutional development of the government of Dutch Brazil after the Portuguese revolt against Habsburg rule in 1640. The focus has been on the development of the highest level of governance in the colony, the High and Secret Council. This has been another overlooked aspect in the career of Johan Maurits, along with the appointment procedure and his performance as a military commander in Brazil. The chapter has shown that the WIC’s government of Brazil broke down through internecine strife in the first four years of the 1640s. It could be said that this was the second time this had happened as similar disagreements over the rights and duties of subaltern councils – such as the councils of justice and finance, and the public works department, which this chapter dealt with at length – had also arisen in the first half of the 1630s. This casts a somewhat different light on the tenure of Johan Maurits in Brazil. Although his tenure has often been described as the ‘happy years’ of the colony, this chapter has shown how the colonial administration entered a deathly spiral of strife and bickering in the second half of this tenure. This spiral helps, in large part, to explain the sudden and dramatic losses incurred shortly after open rebellion broke out in the second half of the 1640s, while also helping to explain the background to the dismissal of Johan Maurits, and showing that it was indeed a dismissal.

At the heart of the WIC’s problems in Brazil were a lack of finances and, from the early 1640s onwards, the changing position of the WIC and its ventures in Dutch domestic policies.

<sup>529</sup> NL-HaNA, States-General, 1.01.02, 12564-20A, unfoliated. Johan Maurits to the States-General, January 29, 1646.

<sup>530</sup> Evaldo Cabral de Mello, *De Braziliaanse affaire*, 43.



The winding-down of the war effort against Spain, and the increasingly antagonistic relations between the stadholder and, especially, Amsterdam, meant that the alliance that had supported the WIC throughout the 1630s had started to break down. This alliance between Amsterdam (in the figure of Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh) and the stadholder, as I argued in chapter four, had also provided the impetus and support for Johan Maurits' appointment in 1636. A breakdown in this alliance had obvious implications for his position.

But events in Brazil also made themselves felt in the perception of Johan Maurits' performance among relevant circles in the Netherlands. His lavish spending on his court, personal projects such as the bridge connecting Recife and Mauritsstad, misappropriations of public funds and goods, and the persistent claims of corruption and embezzlement among members of the High Government had cast a shadow over his performance. However, this was not entirely Johan Maurits' fault. To understand where he went wrong, it is insightful to make a brief comparison with Adriaan van Bullestrate, who was at the center of many of the complaints leveled against the Brazilian government in the period 1640-1644. In contrast to Johan Maurits, Adriaan van Bullestrate remained in office until the new administration took over in 1646.<sup>531</sup> This seems puzzling at first sight: if Johan Maurits was removed, why not the obviously problematic Bullestrate? The answer lies in the latter's regional background and backing. He had been council and treasurer of Middelburg prior to his Brazilian appointment, and frequently forwarded private memos directly to the Zeeland chamber.<sup>532</sup> His relatives regularly appeared in the minutes of the Zeeland chamber, requesting the right to withdraw funds from his account.<sup>533</sup> Van Bullestrate obviously enjoyed good relations with the Zeeland chamber and they shielded 'their' man in Brazil. Once again, this reflected the fractured state of the WIC's administration overseas.

In contrast to the VOC, the WIC's high colonial officials very clearly represented a specific chamber. The only exception was Johan Maurits, who no longer had the backing of a powerful chamber. Although Zeeland would in principle be inclined to support a Nassau, it must be remembered that Johan Maurits had, in effect, singlehandedly scuttled Zeeland's attempts to close the trade to Brazil in the late 1630s.<sup>534</sup> That would have endeared him to Amsterdam, but the growing rift between the stadholder and Holland's most powerful city also undermined Johan Maurits' standing in that chamber. Johan Maurits' actions in the Artichewsky case also damaged his position, especially with the crucial Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh, who had been behind the appointments of both Artichewsky and Johan Maurits. These trends were exacerbated by Johan Maurits himself, who did not actively try to gain the support of the chambers and individual directors. Instead, his attempts to go over their heads and appeal directly to the States-General made him even more of an opponent. Could he have foreseen the consequences of this? Willem Frederik's diary again contains an insightful observation:

*He has made a big mistake in not getting to know the chambers and the directors, leaving everything to the States-General and His Highness [stadholder Frederik Hendrik], who were then unable to maintain him. and the directors, being jealous of him, have piqued him in every which way, for he did not*

<sup>531</sup> Bick, *Governing the Free Seas*, 167-171.

<sup>532</sup> In 1643, for example, the following letters: NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. no. 58.55; inv. no. 58.132, June 11, 1643; inv. no. 58.68, August 13, 1643; inv. no. 58.83 September 18, 1643; inv. no. 58.84 21-9-1643; inv. no. 58.86 October 20, 1643. In addition, there were letters from the Zeeland directors addressed only to Van Bullestrate.

<sup>533</sup> NL-HaNA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01 inv. no. 25, April 7 1642.

<sup>534</sup> See chapter 4.



*know them and did not write them enough, but only to the States and His Highness, always complaining of the directors that they did not meet their promises.*<sup>535</sup>

Did Johan Maurits actually wish to end his assignment in Brazil? This is unlikely for the reasons mentioned earlier: money and honor. His actions also seem inconsistent with this wish. Why, for example, send Karel Tolner to The Hague in 1643 if he could simply have followed the orders of the States-General and returned of his own accord? The very formalistic argument that he served the state as well as the company smacks of a delaying tactic, intended to give the States-General time to intervene. The contents of Tolner's documents support this line of thinking as Johan Maurits argued in these documents for a change in the administration of the colonies. The fact that the XIX took the opportunity of Johan Maurits' dismissal to remodel the entire administrative model for the colony shows the XIX's deep dissatisfaction with his performance as an administrator.

So Johan Maurits was dismissed, while the equally problematic Adriaan van Bullestrate was allowed to remain in office. The former's dismissal was admittedly coupled with an order to stay in Brazil for a while longer. But by denying Johan Maurits the instrument of the 'free table', the directors knowingly and consciously decided to break the networks around their governor. It is unsurprising that Johan Maurits protested fiercely against exactly this provision, which was both humiliating and financially costly. The dismissal hurt Johan Maurits in the short term as his previous earnings in the Republic were only a fraction of what he had earned in Brazil. In addition, the governor-general's social standing in Brazil was rather higher than that of an infantry colonel. In the long run, however, the dismissal proved to be a blessing in disguise as Johan Maurits left before Brazil erupted properly in revolt in 1645. This, in turn, made it possible for Caspar van Baerle (Barlaeus) to present the tenure of Johan Maurits as the 'happy period' of Dutch Brazil in his *Rerum per Octennium in Brasilia* of 1647. This image was strengthened by the publication of Willem Piso's *Historia Naturalis Brasiliae* the following year. Over the years, Johan Maurits was also able to build on this image by exchanging his collection of paintings for honorific titles and noble gifts, thus burnishing his reputation as a count, and later a prince, of the German Empire. Johan Maurits' exploits after Brazil will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of this book. Suffice it to say here that during the later 1640s and 1650s, as Dutch Brazil fell, he was able to successfully turn his collection of Braziliana into a network of connections linking him to several of Europe's royal houses, thus boosting his prestige, albeit not improving his credit rating. Though Brazil in effect marked the death knell of the WIC, Johan Maurits was able to turn his tenure there into a long-term success by burnishing his reputation and honor to such an extent that subsequent biographies and historiography were based largely on material produced to promote this vision of an 'enlightened prince in the tropics'. Getting dismissed at the right time played a crucial role in this long-term success.

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<sup>535</sup> Willem Frederik, *Gloria Parendi*, diary 1643. 'Dat hij een groote foute heeft gedaen, de caemers ende de bewinthebbers niet te kennen, laetende het alles op de Staeten-General en S.H. affloopen, die hem daernaer niet hebben kunnen maintaineren, ende de bewinthebbers van hem jalous sijnde, hebben hem bie alle maeniren gepijckeert, omdat hij haer niet meer en kende, want hij noit ofte weinich aen haer schreef, maer all aen de Staeten en S.H., ende klaechde altijd seer oover de bewinthebbers, dat se haer beloften niet hielden.'



## 7. Conflict in the Council

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### *Van Goens' final decade, 1670-1680 and the loss of information control*

This chapter will explore the final phase of Van Goens' career, from 1670 until his death in 1682. This was a particularly tumultuous period in an already remarkable career since although Van Goens reached the zenith of the VOC hierarchy in Asia by becoming governor-general in 1678, his tenure as governor-general was exceptionally unproductive as he was increasingly blocked by an uncooperative council. This period of his career thus provides an interesting contrast between success and failure, as well as highlighting an important tension at the very heart of the VOC: the discrepancy between personnel policy and commercial strategy.

Van Goens was able to rise to the top of the company hierarchy because of the strong backing he enjoyed from important VOC directors in Amsterdam. But this same group became ever more critical of his policies and strategies on Ceylon, and this led to conflicted policy-making and extended disputes within the High Government of the Indies. Tellingly, Van Goens was not formally fired by the XVII, but requested to be allowed to resign because of the council's vehement opposition to his policies. True to form, he then traveled to the Netherlands in 1681 in the hope of repeating his success of the 1650s: to sway the directors by a personal meeting. This meeting was to be on behalf of his son, Rijckloff van Goens junior, who he hoped would be able to rise to become governor-general himself. The attempt was in vain, however, as Rijckloff van Goens senior died shortly after arriving in the Netherlands. Though he died in Amsterdam, he was buried in The Hague as the mayor, Joan Huydecoper, did not want Van Goens buried within Amsterdam's walls.<sup>536</sup> Van Goens was therefore buried in the *kloosterkerk* in The Hague. This was a fitting choice as it was here that stadholder Maurits had gone to a counter-remonstrant service to signal his support for the hardline Calvinists, way back in 1617. The *kloosterkerk* had thus become a central site to the counter-remonstrants, of whom Van Goens had always been part.

In studying the final decade of Van Goens in Asia, this chapter will make a number of related points. The first, the incompatibility of personnel policy and overall strategy, has already been mentioned. The second, the idea of *information control*, will be explored in depth as Van Goens was in the enviable position of being able to control the flow of information coming from Ceylon, especially information flowing to the directors in the Netherlands. This allowed him to present the effects of his proposed (and enacted) policies in a much more positive light than they actually merited. The subsequent loss of this control was catastrophic as the sudden outburst of information conflicting with Van Goens' official reports crucially diminished his reliability in the eyes of the directors and the High Government in Batavia. This chapter will spend some time moving back and forth between Amsterdam, Colombo and Batavia so as to place the important actors in their proper setting. The third important point to be made concerns the VOC directors in the 1670s, with the focus on the changing composition of the XVII in the early 1670s underlining the extent to which the VOC directors were now part of the political elite of the Republic and how shocks external to the company could have a profound impact on its governance. The shock in this case was, of course, the French invasion of 1672, followed by the near-collapse of the Republic and the purging of the city councils of Holland by stadholder William III. This was the classic case study that underpinned D.J. Roorda's study of factional and

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<sup>536</sup> Zandvliet et al., *De 250 Rijksten van de gouden eeuw*, 86.

party-political struggles in the Republic, as discussed in the Introduction. However, the purging of the Amsterdam city council also had major ramifications for the composition of the VOC's board of directors in the 1670s and 1680s. The rise to power after 1672 of the faction around Gillis Valckenier had a significant impact on Van Goens' career, as well as on those surrounding him. This effect would go from very positive in the early 1670s to highly negative in the final years of the decade and the early 1680s, a conundrum that will be explained in this chapter. The fourth main point to be addressed concerns the fate of the clients of Van Goens during the 1670s and after his death. I will pay special attention to the fates of his two sons, Rijckloff junior and Volckert, as their careers tell a lot about Van Goens senior's ability to promote the careers of those close to him.

This chapter is thus divided into four main sections: firstly the issue of information control and its implications for company policy-making from a perspective of Van Goens' position on Ceylon; secondly the conflict between policy goals as seen from Colombo, Batavia and Amsterdam; thirdly the effects of the outbreak of war in 1672, both in Asia and in the Netherlands; and finally the ability of Van Goens to protect and further the careers of those individuals close to him. The chapter will also tell a chronological tale, beginning with the situation on Ceylon in 1670, as Raja Singha counterattacked and demolished Van Goens' projections of easy annexation of the entire island. The tale will continue through the French invasion of 1672 and its effects on the VOC and Van Goens personally to the latter's promotion to Batavia in the mid-1670s with the status of a war hero and his subsequent falling-out with much of the council there, and end with his appointment as governor-general and ultimately his retirement in 1680.

### **Information control and company policy-making**

The strong position that Van Goens had built up in Ceylon during the 1660s and into the 1670s allowed him, to a large extent, to control the flow of information from the island. Information features in several different ways in the theory and debate on Early Modern long-distance trade. Sheilagh Ogilvie states that traders wanted to 'transform *uncertainty* into *risk*'.<sup>537</sup> This meant moving from something that could not be measured or calculated precisely because it was unknown to something that could be taken into consideration when making business decisions, and thus could be deflected or provided for by means of insurance. To make sound business decisions, merchants needed information on markets, supply, demand and the political situation. Ogilvie argues that merchant guilds and companies (whether chartered or regulated) were not more efficient in providing qualitatively good information on business conditions.<sup>538</sup> This focus on the *efficiency* of chartered companies compared with that of non-incorporated merchants is predominant in the economic history literature on the topic. On these kinds of topics, the performance of the institutionalized information-gathering by the VOC (and other chartered companies) is compared with that of private merchants. Ogilvie argues that the private merchants were more efficient. This contrasts with Carlos and Nicholas, for example, who argue that chartered companies filled an organizational need and enjoyed efficiencies of scale in gathering information.<sup>539</sup> The weakness of this entire body of literature is that it approaches the topic

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<sup>537</sup> Ogilvie, *Merchant Guilds*, 344.

<sup>538</sup> *Ibidem*, 344-390.

<sup>539</sup> A.M. Carlos and A.J. Nicholas, "Giants of an earlier capitalism": The chartered trading companies as modern multinationals', *Business History Review* 62:3 (1988) 398-419, 398-419, 404-407.

backwards. Many economic historians seek to interpret the companies either as precursors of modern forms of corporations, or not. However, as this entire thesis has argued (in agreement with Philip Stern's recent work), the chartered companies were much more than mere merchants: by the 1660s, the VOC was a state in Asia, as the directors realized only too well. To interpret their complex overseas organizations primarily as a mercantile or commercial organization consequently ignores a crucial characteristic of their decision-making processes. The VOC, for example, gained many of its most important return cargoes not by virtue of its trade, but by virtue of its 'high government' in areas of production.<sup>540</sup> Products were not bought on open, competitive markets; instead, the VOC sought to use its armed force or diplomacy to create geographic areas in which it dominated the markets for specific goods, with Van Goens' policies on pepper in Malabar and cinnamon on Ceylon being perfect examples of such practices. This meant that the VOC needed very different modes of governance and information-gathering than if it had simply been a large form of mercantile organization. Focusing on 'efficiency' overlooks this crucial aspect.

Ogilvie argues that the VOC restricted itself in its information-gathering primarily to '*the type of trade goods required and the state of the market in imported products, and even in those limited spheres information was often incomplete.*' This is a gross simplification of the type of information that the company requested its servants to gather. The reason that the VOC archives are such an important source for Early Modern Asian history today is because the VOC made its servants overseas also systematically gather information on politics, religion, warfare and the like. It is furthermore instructive that both Ogilvie as well as Jones and Ville refer to a much earlier work by Holden Furber, who argued that much of the material sent to the Republic was simply never read.<sup>541</sup> This is belied by the intense debates on many issues among the directors, as well as the internal-use-only history of the company compiled from the VOC's archives by the then-secretary, Pieter van Dam.<sup>542</sup> In addition, one only has to look at the *personal* archives of VOC directors and governors held in the archives in The Hague to see that not only was the information read, but it was also intensely analyzed, criticized and debated.<sup>543</sup> These claims about the insufficient gathering and processing of information therefore have to be dismissed as being unsubstantiated by the source material.

In all this, an important point has been overlooked. Individuals could consciously manipulate information in order for their own policy suggestions to be considered more acceptable. This is different from the simple withholding of information that features in the principal-agent literature.<sup>544</sup> The latter was presumably done in order to create favorable conditions for (illegal) private trade at the expense of the company's official trade. The conscious

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<sup>540</sup> G. Knaap, *De 'core business' van de VOC; Markt, macht en mentaliteit vanuit overzees perspectief* (inaugural lecture: Utrecht 2014) 21.

<sup>541</sup> S. Ogilvie, *Institutions and European Trade* 357. S.R.H. Jones and S.P. Ville, 'Efficient Transactors or Rent-Seeking Monopolists? The Rationale for Early Chartered Trading Companies', *The Journal of Economic History* 56:4 (1996) 898-915, 906. *Rival empires of Trade in the Orient* (1976) 191.

<sup>542</sup> Van Dam and Stapel, *Beschryvinge van de Oost-Indische Compagnie*. This published version is based on the manuscripts in the VOC archives in The Hague: NL-HaNA, VOC, 1.04.02, inv. nos. 4621-4629. An example of a book published for a wider audience in the period itself and partially based on secret VOC documents is: I. Comelin, *Begin ende voortgangh van de Vereenighde Nederlantsche Geotroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie: Vervatende de voornaemste reysen, by de inwoonderen der selver provincien derwaerts gedaen* (Johannes Jansonius: Amsterdam 1646).

<sup>543</sup> For this period, see, for example, the archives of the Radermacher family, the Sweers collection and the Hudde collection in the Dutch National Archives in The Hague, and the Huydecoper collection in the Utrecht Archives.

<sup>544</sup> Carlos and Nicholas, 'Agency Problems in Early Chartered Companies', 857.



manipulation of information by Van Goens was on a completely different scale and of a completely different order of magnitude. In the first place, it does not seem to have been done with the aim of private trade in mind. Rather, Van Goens manipulated information to make his recommended policy – the conquest of the entire island – seem like the most economical and rational strategy. Of course, conquest would have offered kickbacks of all sorts to Van Goens personally, but his main aim seems to have been to steer *official* company policy in a certain direction, rather than merely seeking to create favorable conditions for murky personal profits. Van Goens was already a very wealthy man by this point, thus increasing the unlikelihood that adding to his personal wealth was his main motivation. Non-monetary rewards, however, could still exert a powerful influence. The glory and honor associated with successful implementation of his policies could have been an important reason to persevere, in addition to a deeply-held belief that Ceylon could – and should – become a ‘second fatherland’ in Asia. Secondly, the scale on which Van Goens worked and the types of information manipulated were quite different. Van Goens succeeded in misleading the company’s directors for years, thus leading them to support his plans despite objections from Batavia. This required the support, or at least non-opposition, of the majority of the company’s high-ranking personnel on the island. The social construction of this new elite within the company should thus be examined more closely. Firstly, however, it is time to consider the subjects on which Van Goens sought to manipulate information. This automatically leads to a closer examination, in the next two sections, of the government of Ceylon and the relations with Kandy.

The latent crisis concerning the setting of consistent policy for Ceylon came to a head in 1679-1680 after Rijckloff van Goens junior, who had been governor of Ceylon since 1672 in practice and since 1675 officially, left the governorship of the island. This meant that, for the first time in nearly twenty years, information could emanate from the island that had not first been approved by a Van Goens. Senior had arrived in Ceylon in 1658 in the wake of the fall of Colombo and, with a brief intermission in 1663-1664, had held the position of either governor or commander-in-chief for the *Westerkwartieren* until departing for Batavia in 1675. The succession by his son had continued the family’s hold on power and the official company hierarchy of the island. This had also meant, importantly, that the Van Goenses remained in control of information emanating from the island, despite critical reports from the government of Ceylon throughout the 1670s, as Kandy struck back and the budgetary woes of the government of Ceylon intensified. Yet while developments on the island had clearly worried the VOC directors in the Republic, they had not doubted the veracity of the official reports coming from Ceylon. And while the directors may have become more hesitant to believe the spin that Van Goens (father or son) put on events, they did not question his thoughts. However, a remarkable shift in the news from Ceylon became discernable when Van Goens junior was removed from office in 1679 and his successor, Laurens Pijl, the former Commander of Jaffna, took up the reins of power on Ceylon. This held true for all the important issues that had been debated: the policy towards Kandy, the character of Raja Singha, the need for territorial control, and the position of the company as a sovereign on the island.<sup>545</sup>

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<sup>545</sup> Arasaratnam, *Dutch Power in Ceylon*, 92-97.

### Fighting over policy: Amsterdam, Batavia, Colombo

Although never complete and heavily shaken by the Kandyan move to open warfare in the 1670s, the control that Van Goens was able to exert on information emanating from Ceylon allowed him to present his preferred policies as reasonable and feasible. The system of information control described in the previous section thus had a twofold goal: to allow the government of Ceylon a free hand in making choices on personnel policy, and to promote the policies preferred by the leadership of the Ceylon government. So what were these policies and why did Van Goens need his system of information control to be able to promote them? This section will explore the policy prescriptions as developed in Colombo and Batavia and analyze how and why a significant conflict between the two was, in this setting, unavoidable. As decisions on policy were ultimately taken in the Republic by the XVII, it is here that the two issues of policy and information control really became intertwined. Because of the extent to which Van Goens could control information coming from Ceylon, he was very successful, at least initially, in presenting his plans to the XVII, and especially to an important faction within the Amsterdam chamber. So what were the basic points in this fight over policy?

By the late 1660s, Van Goens was well entrenched in the Ceylon government. As chapter five has argued, he was able to link himself familiarly to the important VOC elites in the neighboring commands, especially the Pitt and Hartsinck families on the Coromandel Coast. These ties gave him cover for his actions on Ceylon as the governors of these neighboring areas did not reflect critically on his actions on Ceylon. As also argued in chapter five, Van Goens envisioned a VOC conquest of the entire island, with the aim of turning it into a VOC settlement colony and an entrepot for trade with South Asia. This strategy differed from the initial plans to control only the best cinnamon lands in the coastal stretch from Galle to Negombo and brought the VOC into direct confrontation with Raja Singha, the King of Kandy. This necessitated higher than anticipated expenditure on garrisons and fortifications, and this expenditure, moreover, could not be fully covered by the income generated on Ceylon. This cycle of loss-making was the prime problem that Van Goens had to resolve. Rather, however, than coming to terms with the inherent problems in his preferred strategy, Van Goens chose to present alluring vistas that could be realized if only his plans were implemented *in full*. Under these plans, Kandy had to be subdued quickly and decisively so as to allow a reduction in the garrisons needed on the island. Effective Dutch colonization and the settlement of free burghers would, in turn, ease the problem of supplies as private merchants could then be entrusted with shipping food to the island. This would also reduce the need for soldiers and consolidate the VOC's grip on the island.<sup>546</sup> To lure colonists, Van Goens argued, it would be enough to offer them land. It is interesting to see that he was simultaneously able to support the mutually exclusive goals of colonization and strict monopoly control of the island's trade.<sup>547</sup> The reason for this dissimulation was Ceylon's unenviable position as a loss-making establishment in the VOC's Asian books. Table 9 shows the annual deficit of the government of Ceylon in the period 1666-1675.

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<sup>546</sup> An argument made quite early on by Van Goens and Van der Meijden in a letter to the High Government in April 1660: NL-HaNA, VOC, 1.04.02, inv. no. 1123, fol. 164.

<sup>547</sup> Arasaratnam, *Dutch Power in Ceylon*, 159-176.

**Table 9: Income and expenditure of the Ceylon government in the late 1660s and first half of the 1670s (in guilders).**

Year	Expenditure	Income	Deficit
1666-67	1,041,378-19-11	974,487-16-10	246,891-3-1
1667-68	1,088,496-12-6	852,464-11-14	236,032-0-8
1668-69	1,197,539-3-1	926,673-0-0	270,866-3-1
1669-70	923,469-19-14	678,639-4-15	244,830-14-15
1670-71	1,001,611-13-4	471,256-1-4	530,355-12-0
1671-72	1,088,060-5-8	600,218-16-3	487,841-9-5
1672-73	1,250,831-13-3	591,319-2-5	659,512-10-10
1673-74	1,366,215-5-9	635,633-15-15	730,579-9-10
1674-75	1,500,022-12-1	840,248-18-7	457,554-6-9

Source: S. Arasaratnam, *Dutch Power in Ceylon*, 73.

These numbers do not reveal the full significance of Ceylon for the VOC. Ceylon produced cinnamon that was fetching more than a million guilders a year on European markets. Besides sending cinnamon to Europe, Ceylon also sent bales to Batavia, as well as to the Indian factories, free of charge. From eighteenth-century data, we know that some 71 per cent of cinnamon production was sent to Europe, with most of the remainder being forwarded to Batavia.<sup>548</sup> This was delivered to Batavia or the Netherlands for a pittance of 2 *stuivers* per pound, while prices in Europe varied between 3.06 and 4.9 guilders per pound.<sup>549</sup>

An earlier attempt by Van Goens to offset Ceylon's losses in the Asian books against the profits garnered from its cinnamon in both Asia and Europe was met by a stern rebuke. Clearly then, these numbers, which perhaps unfairly painted Ceylon as purely a burden on the VOC, had to be justified or explained away. Rather, however, than apologizing for the high costs of his proposals and attempting to placate views by proposing budget cuts, Van Goens opted for a more aggressive strategy.

#### *The emperor strikes back – August 1670*

The losses incurred by the Ceylon government were the result, on the one hand, of the rebuilding work that simply had to be done in the aftermath of the conquest and, on the other hand, of unpredicted externalities such as the outbreak of war with England in 1664, with England and France in 1672 and with Kandy in 1670, all of which necessitated higher expenditure on defense. More fundamentally, Van Goens argued that the poor results from Ceylon were attributable to the incomplete implementation of his policies. By conquering the entire island, Van Goens argued, the VOC could raise enough revenue through taxation and trade with the inhabitants to cover the costs of the commercial-military system that had been built up. This would require the company to expand inland and to reduce the Kingdom of Kandy. In August 1670, however, Raja Singha finally responded to the VOC's slow-moving expansion inland and attacked the company's outlying fortifications, first the fort at Arandora and then the Ruanwella and Sitawaka forts on the upper reaches of the Kelani river. This was an embarrassment for Van Goens as he had always claimed that Raja Singha was sickly and weak and would not respond to the territorial

<sup>548</sup> A. van den Belt, *Het VOC-bedrijf op Ceylon: Een voorname vestiging van de Oost-Indische Compagnie in de 18de eeuw* (PhD dissertation, Leiden 2008) 54.

<sup>549</sup> Arasaratnam, *Dutch power in Ceylon*, 189-191.

gains made by the VOC on his orders. Although the Kandyan offensive of 1670 did not really threaten the VOC's position on Ceylon (as Kandy could never hope to successfully besiege the great fortresses), it acted as a 'wake-up call' for the directors and other VOC officials alike. Batavia had opposed many of Van Goens' more ambitious projects since the second half of the 1660s, given that the proposed move of the capital from Batavia to Colombo constituted a direct threat to the High Government, as did Van Goens' direct communications with the directors. This direct link with the Netherlands was backed up by a largely supportive Ceylonese bureaucracy. In the 1670s, however, Van Goens' policies came under intense criticism from VOC personnel on Ceylon itself, with numerous officials starting to voice criticism of him in letters destined for the Netherlands. Even before the attack, the way in which Kandy was portrayed had become very important in Van Goens' plans as he had to 'sell' the idea of conquest to the directors. In the aftermath of the short-lived rebellion in the late 1660s that provided the impetus for redeploying VOC forces on the East Coast, Raja Singha was increasingly portrayed as a weak king. A king, moreover, who was despised by his subjects and without an heir. This portrayal of Raja Singha as weak was intended to suggest that conquest would be easy. His lack of an heir and his supposed tyranny were designed to provide the VOC with a moral case for taking over the kingdom. Events, however, were to unfold quite differently as, in 1670, Kandy successfully mounted an offensive against the most advanced inland posts of Van Goens' creeping expansion: the forts in the Kelani Ganga valley.<sup>550</sup> This was a shock of the first order to Van Goens' project for Ceylon. Even Kandy's ability to mount an attack, let alone to succeed against the VOC outposts, was a shock, given that Van Goens had previously argued that Kandy was moribund and would not resist annexation. This portrayal was thus clearly proven to be false. Attention then quickly turned to how to proceed after Kandy's attack. Van Goens argued that all-out war with Kandy was now unavoidable and that Raja Singha's surprising resilience in the face of the VOC's creeping expansion did not refute the basic soundness of his proposals to annex the whole of the island. In a letter to the directors of November 1670, Van Goens and the council give seven arguments in favor of expanding the company's control over the island. The first of these clearly summarizes the thinking in the council of Ceylon at that time:

*That Ceylon should be kept in such a state and in its entirety and not only in part, for if the least bit of it were to be occupied by any other power, the entire island would not only be brought into great turmoil but it would also divert from the profits on which it [the Ceylon government] has to exist.<sup>551</sup>*

The war with Kandy threw Van Goens' reliability into doubt, thus casting a shadow over his other policy prescriptions. In the short term, however, it allowed him to increase the VOC's control over the island's trade, with the ports previously accessible by Kandy, and which had been allowed to maintain their contacts with India, now being closed and a monopoly being proclaimed. This monopolization of commerce was also intended to promote colonization. Until 1675, VOC burghers on Ceylon were encouraged to trade, but although trade did indeed increase, the burghers did not become engaged in the agricultural production for which Van

<sup>550</sup> Arasaratnam, *Dutch Power in Ceylon*, 53-61.

<sup>551</sup> NL-HaNA, VOC, 1.04.02, inv. no. 1274, fol. 35-37, 'Dat Ceylon van soodanigen gelegentheijt moet warden gehouden en om 't selve gebeel en geensints voor gedeelte te besitten dewijl het minste gedeelte daer van door een ander beseten zijnde 't geheele eylandt daer door niet alleen tot groote alteratie soude werden gebracht maer oock gediverteert vande proffijten daer op het bestaen moet.

Goens had held such high hopes. By 1675, therefore, even Van Goens argued that there should be no further concessions to the burghers as their profits from trade were detrimental to the company. This was, in effect, an admission of defeat for his plans for colonization and private trade.<sup>552</sup>

The VOC's monopolization of trade was disastrous for the island's welfare as many crucial staples and basic commodities, such as rice and textiles, were mainly imported from India. The VOC's attempts to control the island's chief exports – cinnamon and areca nuts – deprived villagers of the ability to buy the food and textiles they needed.<sup>553</sup> The VOC lacked the ships needed to import these commodities in the quantities necessary to meet demand, while it also proved impossible to incentivize Indian merchants, chiefly from Bengal, to sail to Ceylon with rice if they could not buy cinnamon, areca nuts or shanks at competitive prices. In the short term, therefore, famine threatened and the VOC had to free up valuable ships to buy rice on the Karnataka Coast and to distribute it in the worst-hit areas at its own expense.<sup>554</sup> The precipitous decline in commerce also affected the duties levied by the VOC and so hit the VOC in its treasury. These problems were compounded by Kandyan disruptions of cinnamon-peeling in the western lowlands. The VOC was thus caught in a double bind: its expenditure rose by more than fifty per cent between 1670 and 1675 because of the need to field more troops, while its annual income fell from nearly 930 thousand guilders in 1668-1669 to 470 thousand in 1670-1671, although recovered somewhat in later years.

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<sup>552</sup> Arasaratnam, *Dutch Power in Ceylon*, 209-210.

<sup>553</sup> S. Arasaratnam, 'Elements of social and economic change in Dutch maritime Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 1658-1796', *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 22:1 (1985) 49.

<sup>554</sup> The problem of convincing Indian merchants to import rice, while at the same time controlling exports of the commodities in which these merchants were interested is detailed very well for a slightly later period in: S. Arasaratnam, 'Dutch Commercial Policy in Ceylon and its effects on the Indo-Ceylon Trade (1690-1750)', *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 4:2 (1967) 109-130, 111.



Figure 20: Political map of Ceylon 1670



Source: Goonewardena, *Dutch Power in Ceylon*. as a base map the British 1805 map by A. Arrowsmith was used, as this precisely showed the positions of forts and the existing borders. As reference, the post 1767 borders are also shown, illustrating the territorial control in the west in Van Goens's period.

### **A breakdown of reciprocity: Van Goens, Van Reede and the loss of Malabar**

A first significant blow to Van Goens' projects in Ceylon and South India, as well as a leak in his system of information control, came in 1670 with the separation of the Malabar command from Ceylon. This was an important moment as it not only signaled a loss of control over Malabar, but, owing to Van Goens' inability to deal with this setback, also resulted in one of his most important clients becoming an inveterate enemy. This man was Adriaan van Reede tot Drakensteyn, a rare nobleman in VOC service. Van Reede had enlisted as a soldier with the company at young age and was present at both sieges of Cochin. His conduct during the siege had impressed Van Goens, who took him on as a client and who furthered his career in the coming years by offering him the same kind of opportunities to broaden his professional experience that he himself had enjoyed. Though Van Reede started his career as a soldier, Van Goens ensured that his client was also given opportunities to develop other skills during, for example, inspection tours in northern Ceylon in 1665 and as head of the VOC establishment in Quilon. When Isbrand Godske resigned as commander of Malabar in 1668, Van Goens nominated Van Reede to succeed him. The High Government did not, however, follow this nomination and instead appointed Lucas van der Dussen.<sup>555</sup> To placate Van Reede, he was appointed '*first captain of the Ceylon government*'.<sup>556</sup>

The departure of Godske and the appointment of Van der Dussen requires some extra attention as this was the first in a series of three resignations of commanders of Malabar provoked by disagreements with the governor of Ceylon: Godske in 1668, Van der Dussen two years later, and Van Reede in 1676. Isbrand Godske had served with Van Goens and Hustaert in the first Siege of Cochin, but left the VOC's service in 1662. Van Goens wrote a very positive report and was sorry that Godske had left the company.<sup>557</sup> However, the latter returned to serve VOC two years later and was appointed commander of Malabar in 1666 at the express orders of the XVII. The previously amicable relationship between Van Goens and Godske then rapidly began to deteriorate. Van Goens attempted to keep Godske's predecessor, Van Coulster, in office and when Godske voiced doubts about the feasibility of maintaining a pepper monopoly, arguing that the only way to secure domination of the market was by offering higher prices, the relationship collapsed. Godske left in 1668 to become director of Persia and later governor of the Cape.<sup>558</sup> His successor was Lucas van der Dussen, whom Van Goens had refused to accept as fiscal in Colombo just a few years before (see chapter five). Van Goens had nominated Van Reede as commander, but his proposal was ignored. The appointment of Van der Dussen shows that the High Government was still able to intervene in the appointment procedures in Ceylon if it so wished. This created an unworkable relationship between Malabar and Ceylon as the new commander of Malabar was now a bitter rival of his direct superior. So when Van der Dussen, too, offered his resignation in 1669, the High Government took an important decision: at Van Goens' recommendation, Van Reede would succeed Van der Dussen, but Malabar was from then on to be detached from Ceylon:

*After ample deliberation it has been approved to elevate Cochin, and the places which resort under it, as a separate command, not dependent on the Ceylon government... and to prevent the sad*

<sup>555</sup> Heniger, *Adriaan van Reede and Hortus Malabaricus*, 22-23.

<sup>556</sup> W. Ph Collhaas, *Generale Missiven*, deel III, 596.

<sup>557</sup> s'Jacob, *Nederlanders in Kerala*, LXVIII.

<sup>558</sup> *Ibidem*.

*discord, unrest and disputes that for several years have occurred between the aforementioned commandment [Malabar] and Ceylon... and also because Lord van Goens, aforementioned, has let it be known through his letters that he is averse to remain in that government much longer, in which case it will be easier to find a qualified person than when Malabar would remain part of the same.*<sup>559</sup>

Van Reede's appointment was presented by the High Government as a compromise. Van Reede had inspected Malabar on behalf of Van Goens and reported negatively on Van der Dussen. The High Government noted that this should make Van Reede ineligible to succeed him. In this case, however, the rules were ignored and Van Reede was appointed. But the relationship between the patron in Colombo and his client in Cochin quickly soured, as had also been the case with Van Goens and Godske some years earlier.

Like Godske, Van Reede dared to voice the opinion that making Malabar profitable would be challenging and that profitability was conditional upon free exports of the Malabar areca nuts. Van Goens proved unable, however, to accept differing opinions, even from a client such as Van Reede. The relationship between the two men consequently quickly soured as Van Goens tried to manage a command that was formally no longer under his remit, while Van Reede was answerable to Batavia rather than Colombo for his performance in Malabar. From 1670 onwards, Van Reede quickly developed into one of the most outspoken opponents of Van Goens and his policies. The fact that Van Reede was a former client is illustrative of Van Goens' inability to delegate and to offer his clients the opportunity to make their own name in the company. This was a mutual failure of the reciprocity underlying every patron-client relationship. Van Goens could not reasonably expect his clients to remain loyal if they were not offered opportunities to make a name for themselves.

Although Malabar became detached from Ceylon, Van Goens' appointment in 1672 to his old position of superintendent, admiral and commander-in-chief upon the outbreak of war with France still allowed him to meddle in Malabar's affairs and to continue agitating for its return to Ceylon. His disagreement with Van Reede had significant consequences when the latter moved to Batavia as extraordinary council of the Indies in 1677 and where he was asked to write a review of Van Goens' policies on Ceylon and Malabar. This was a clear indication of the Batavian council's disapproval of Van Goens as, by then, it was clear that Van Goens and Van Reede were rivals. This decision by Batavia was all the more ominous since Van Goens had been appointed director-general in Batavia in 1676. By supporting Van Reede in this matter, the High Government, led by governor-general Maetsuijcker, signaled to Van Goens their opposition to his appointment. The criticism by Van Reede and the other criticism emanating from Ceylon in the second half of the 1670s will be dealt with later in this chapter, after I have analyzed the impact that 1672 and the war with France had on the career prospects of Van Goens, who arrived in Batavia shortly after Van Reede in 1677.

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<sup>559</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.04.02, VOC, inv. no. 684, p. 198-201. 'nae rijpe deliberatie goetgevonden het selve vast te stellen, ende Cochin metter plaetse daer onder sorterende tot een appart Commandement te erigeren van het Ceijlons gouvernement niet dependeren... daer met oock verhoopen af te snijden, ende voor te comen de verdrietoge Cavillatien, onlusten ende dispuijten eenige jaren herwaerts tusschen het voros. Commandement ende Ceijln voorgevallen... mitsgaders oock om dat d'Heer van Goens meergenoempt, bij sijne brieven te kennen geeft, sijn ongenegentheijt, om veel langer in dat gouvernement te continueeren, en dat ons alsdan gemakelijcker sal valllen, daer toe een ander bequaem persoon uijt te vinden, dan of den omslagh van Mallabaer oock tot laste van het selve waer gelaten.'

Van Reede was perhaps the most important, but by no means the only critic of Van Goens on Ceylon and Malabar. From the mid-1670s onwards, as Van Goens' grasp on the information flows from Ceylon weakened, more critical reports began to emanate from the island. Before examining these reports, however, I will first consider the effects, both in Europe and Asia, of the outbreak of war with France in 1672.

### **A year of disasters and beyond, 1672-1679**

In the summer of 1672 a new threat was added to the already precarious situation of the Ceylon government: war with France and England. With the VOC being acutely vulnerable to invasion as most of the best troops had been redeployed on the frontier with Kandy, especially in the uplands above Colombo and Negombo, the outbreak of hostilities with France and England in March/April of that year could have spelled disaster for the company on Ceylon. In reality, England was actually not much of a threat as the EIC was dysfunctional and no match for the armed might of the VOC. France, however, had sent a singularly powerful squadron to Asia in 1670 under the joint command of Jacob Blanquet de la Haye and the notorious former VOC employee François Caron. The purpose of this singularly powerful expedition – totaling nine navy ships (including five ships-of-the-line and one frigate), as well as three vessels from the *Compagnie des Indes Orientales*, with 2100 men and 238 cannon – was to erode VOC power in Asia.<sup>560</sup> This formed part of Jean-Baptiste Colbert's strategy of destroying Dutch commercial strength worldwide. In principle the French squadron had a strong position as France had a secret alliance with England and the fleet could thus expect support from the EIC at its installations at Bombay and Madras. Portugal ultimately decided not to become involved in this conflict, despite the allure of having such powerful allies in a renewed war against the VOC.<sup>561</sup> Meanwhile the VOC's great fortification program on Ceylon and the Malabar Coast had not yet been completed, and VOC troops on Ceylon were stretched due to the war with Kandy.

Arriving in Surat in September 1671, the fleet sailed south, past the Malabar Coast, where Commander Adriaan van Reede hastily finished the defenses, and headed for Trincomalee on Ceylon. Here, the French hoped to effect a connection with Raja Singha by being granted permission to erect a factory and fort in the inner bay. This evoked a strong response from the VOC. Rijckloff van Goens had already been reinstated in his old capacity of *superintendent, admiraal en veldoverste*, with his son Rijckloff junior being in charge – albeit not yet officially – of the government of Ceylon. Interestingly, the appointment document reflects the state of Dutch intelligence at that time: it mentions that Van Goens would command the VOC's forces in the West (India, Ceylon, Persia) in the coming war with France and Portugal.<sup>562</sup> As we just saw, Portugal decided to remain neutral, while England joined in the fray. The latter, however, was a most ineffective ally for the French in Asia, and the coming hostilities were consequently predominantly a Dutch-French struggle, in which Van Goens reaffirmed his reputation as an able diplomat and field commander.

Though the French had not yet attacked the fort at Trincomalee, they had expelled Dutch sentries from the inner bay and were constructing defenses at its entrance. Not wishing to start a major conflict, Van Goens, now with twelve ships, inaugurated a blockade of the Bay of

<sup>560</sup> D.F. Lach and E.J. van Kley, *Asia in the Making of Europe* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1994) 99.

<sup>561</sup> J.J. Ames, *Renascent Empire?: The House of Braganza and the Quest for Stability in Portuguese Monsoon Asia, c.1640-1683* (Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam 2000) 209.

<sup>562</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.10.32, Collectie Van Goens Goens, inv. no. 17.

Trincomalee, locking the French fleet inside.<sup>563</sup> This meant that the French fleet would have to rely on Kandyan support to sustain itself, support which proved not to be forthcoming. This is an interesting case and merits some closer study as it reflects both on the success of Van Goens' strategy of isolating Kandy and on Raja Singha's ineptitude in making powerful allies at this crucial juncture. Arasaratnam, who wrote on the episode from the Kandyan perspective, finds no flaws in Raja Singha's conduct and blames the French for the ultimate failure of perhaps Kandy's best chance of enlisting foreign help in getting rid of the VOC. He argues that the French proved to be very poor allies of Raja Singha. They refused to openly attack the VOC as they had not yet received news of the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. As a result, the Kandyans got nothing in return for the valuable Bay of Kottiyar. In noting this, Arasaratnam did not zoom out to see the bigger picture: Kandy, on its own, could never have forced the Dutch out of Ceylon as it lacked the necessary artillery and naval force. Any effort to placate the French and keep them on the Kandyan side was consequently justified, including much more generous provisioning. Arasaratnam describes the nascent alliance between Kandy and France as a meeting of equals. It was not: Kandy needed the French squadron much more than the French needed Kandy, and locking up the French ambassador after the fleet had left for the Coromandel Coast did not help Kandy's chances of developing long-term alliances.<sup>564</sup> French-Kandyan cooperation was also likely to have been hampered by the VOC's close watch on the Ceylonese ports and waters, in itself a result of Van Goens' insistence on erecting fortifications and keeping a large force on Ceylon.

The French fleet, starving at Trincomalee, left the bay in July 1672 and headed for the Coromandel Coast, with Van Goens in pursuit. By capturing Meliapore on the Coromandel Coast, the French acquired a base of operations, but at the same time angered the Qutb Shahi of Golconda, who joined an anti-French alliance. Until September 1674, Meliapore was intermittently besieged by forces from Golconda on land, and by VOC fleets commanded by Van Goens at sea.<sup>565</sup> The eventual capitulation of the French garrison underlined Van Goens' aura as a capable military commander and diplomat. Indeed it is likely that the 'Moorish gold fine woolen tunic with belt and turban', mentioned as having belonged to Van Goens senior in the inventory taken after Rijckloff van Goens junior's death, was given at this stage of his career.<sup>566</sup> This underlines the importance of effective diplomacy for Van Goens personally. By convincing the Qutb Shahi to cooperate with the VOC, Van Goens brought the siege to a successful end, thus enhancing his reputation in the Netherlands as a successful commander. In addition, the gifts given by the Qutb Shahi were valuable in their own right and hint at the kinds of spoils that a successful commander and diplomat could amass during his career. Golconda was world-famous for its diamond mines, and the same inventory mentions that the gold and silverwork of the Van Goens' family was inlaid with some three hundred diamonds and that the family possessed some 1950 loose diamonds.<sup>567</sup> Though Van Goens was never convicted for private trades, these figures make it clear that he was very successful at amassing a considerable private fortune. However, the

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<sup>563</sup> Van Dam and Stapel, *Beschryvinge*, 1.2, 624.

<sup>564</sup> Arasaratnam, *Dutch power in Ceylon*, 61-66.

<sup>565</sup> G.J. Ames, 'Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy: A reappraisal', *French Historical Studies* 16:3 (1990) 536-559; page 549 onwards describes the ill-fated expedition from the French perspective.

<sup>566</sup> A.M. Lubberhuizen-Van Gelder, 'Rijckloff van Goens de jonge en zijn bezittingen', *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde/Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia* 101:1 (1942) 289-310, 306.

<sup>567</sup> *Ibidem*, 306.



war with France had other effects besides burnishing Van Goens' military reputation, and these included the significant ramifications for the composition of the VOC's board of directors.

*Factional strife amidst invasion: the effect of '1672' on the VOC in the Republic*

The Anglo-French declaration of war and the invasion of the Republic did not have an effect on the VOC merely in Asia. After war was declared in March-April 1672, the French quickly proceeded also to overrun the Dutch border defenses. The speed of the French advance was shocking to contemporaries, with areas over which the Dutch and Spanish had competed for years, even decades, being overrun within a matter of weeks. In mid-May, Wezel fell, along with the other Lower Rhine fortresses garrisoned by Dutch troops – including Rees, where Van Goens had been born. A month later, on June 12, the French crossed the Rhine at Lobith and, within a month, a whole range of fortresses quickly fell into French hands: Arnhem capitulated on June 17, followed by Doesburg on June 21, Deventer on June 22 and Zwolle, Utrecht and Kampen all on June 23, with Zutphen falling two days later. Only Nijmegen defended itself, but it, too, ultimately capitulated on July 9. By then, the French advance westwards had stalled, roughly at the border between the provinces of Holland and Utrecht. After Utrecht fell on June 23, the provincial board of engineers for Holland had decided to inundate the low-lying polder lands on the border of the two provinces. Louis XIV's vacillation after taking Utrecht, confident that the Republic was beaten, gave just enough time to create a continuous defensive barrier to shield Holland and the battered States' army. An elderly Johan Maurits was in charge of one of the main sectors of this 'water line', commanding the northernmost area with the crucial fortresses of Muiden and Weesp.<sup>568</sup> With the exception of a venture to Charleroi, the States' army was confined to defensive positions behind the water line until late 1673.<sup>569</sup>

However, the invasion also had other important consequences. The rapid collapse of the Republic's defense caused widespread rumors of betrayal by the leading regents within the States of Holland. This criticism was directed against the party leaders who had opposed William III's ascension to the office of stadholder, and especially Johan de Witt, with the latter's murder by a mob of Orangists being a sad and well-known low point in the panic of 1672. Roorda argued, however, that important factional fights were taking place amidst all this obvious party-political posturing. Behind the seemingly ideologically-driven debates about the relationship between States and the Generality and the nature of sovereignty and the role of the stadholder in all this, underlying factional interests in the cities of Holland were now conspiring to use the upheaval for their own interests. This resulted, in August 1672, in the empowerment of William III to replace, if necessary, members of the city councils of Holland.<sup>570</sup> This was an extremely powerful tool as most urban councils coopted new members and so a one-off elevation of followers of Orange could have long-lasting effects. Though the purging of the city councils took place in all cities in Holland, this section will concentrate mainly on Amsterdam since, besides Amsterdam being of course the most important chamber within the VOC, the effect on the support for Van Goens can be seen most clearly there. Although the purges of city councils in September 1672 were seemingly unrelated to the dynamics of the allocation of directorships within the VOC, these being separate institutions, the two were in reality closely connected. VOC directors were nominated in triplicate by the principal shareholders, being those who had invested (in the case

<sup>568</sup> Bouman, *Johan van Maurits van Nassau*, 166-176.

<sup>569</sup> Van Nimwegen, *'Deser landen chrijchsvolck'*, 367-375, describes the invasion and the defense of the water line.

<sup>570</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 804.

of Amsterdam) at least 6000 guilders in the company. Election, however, was by the city council (or the Provincial States in the case of Zeeland). This meant that individuals with support in the city council would also find the support they needed to be elected as VOC directors. Indeed, directorships became an integral part of the division of jobs within the urban elite and one of the prizes for which rivaling factions would compete. In the eighteenth century, directorships were awarded on the basis of ‘contracts of correspondence’, which regulated the allocation of jobs.<sup>571</sup> But the effect of a change in the composition of the city council would only become noticeable in the Amsterdam chamber’s directorships over the course of time as the eighteen directors of the chamber Amsterdam generally remained in office for the rest of their lives (contrary to the relevant stipulations in the company’s charter). Only, therefore, when positions became available naturally could new directors from dominant factions be appointed.<sup>572</sup> So when the city council of Amsterdam was purged in September 1672, this did not affect the VOC chamber in Amsterdam until later in the 1670s. The main beneficiaries of the change in Amsterdam in the fall of 1672 were Gillis Valckenier and the faction that supported him. Valckenier had been mayor of Amsterdam, but had been excluded from the plush offices in the elections of 1671, an event that Bontemantel described as an ‘eclipse of the sun’.<sup>573</sup>

The Valckenier faction perhaps best illustrates the nature of factional politics in the Republic as it did not form a coherent group either in terms of previous party-political affiliations (Valckenier himself having been a States party supporter until 1670) or in religious or social terms.<sup>574</sup> What bound the sixteen new appointees to the city council in 1672 was their relations to Gillis Valckenier. The social backgrounds of these men differed widely, with some being drawn from the ranks of militia officers and others from merchant circles. But the most coherent group, the ‘core’ of the new council, was composed of direct family members of Valckenier and his two associates, Joannes Hudde and Adriaan van Beuningen. Hudde himself was a cousin of Valckenier. The triumvirate of Valckenier, Hudde and Van Beuningen ruled Amsterdam from 1672 onwards, and placed an increasingly heavy stamp on VOC policy-making throughout the 1670s. Coenraad van Beuningen ascended to the directorship in February 1681, shortly after the death of Valckenier.<sup>575</sup> Table 10 shows the changes in the composition of the directors of the VOC chamber in Amsterdam between 1671 and late 1679.

Table 10 shows that the changes in the composition of the Amsterdam chamber during the period 1671-1679 were incremental rather than revolutionary. But their effect was important nonetheless as, with the exception of Damas Guldewagen, who was appointed by the Haarlem council, all the new directors were from the Valckenier faction. Of these six new appointments, Louis Trip was related to Gillis Valckenier as his daughter had married Valckenier’s son, while Gerrit Hooft and Cornelis de Vlamingh van Oudshoorn were related through the latter’s marriage to a niece of Hooft. The directors of the Amsterdam chamber were thus characterized by their manifold, overlapping and multi-faceted links.

<sup>571</sup> Roorda, *Partij en factie*, 25-26, 53. Adams, ‘The familial State’, 516.

<sup>572</sup> Gaastra, *Bewind en beleid*, 33-41.

<sup>573</sup> Roorda, *Partij en factie*, 180-181. H. Bontemantel and G.W. Kernkamp, *De regeeringe van Amsterdam, soo in 't civiel als crimineel en militaire, tweede deel* (Martinus Nijhof, The Hague 1897) 168.

<sup>574</sup> Roorda, *Partij en factie*, 185.

<sup>575</sup> Gaastra, *Bewind en beleid*, 256-259.

**Table 10: The twenty directors of the VOC chamber in Amsterdam, 1671 and 1679.**

	<b>Directors in Amsterdam 1671</b>	<b>Other positions</b>	<b>Directors in Amsterdam at end of 1679</b>	<b>Other positions</b>
1	Joan Munter		Joan Munter	
2	Daniel Bernard		Daniel Bernard	
3	Joan Hulft	Council until 1672	Louis Trip	Appointed in council 1672
4	Nicolaas Rochusz. van Capelle	Council until 1672	Nicolaas Rochusz. van Capelle	
5	Jeronimus de Haze		Jeronimus de Haze	Succeeded by Coenraad van Beuningen in 1681
6	Gillis Valckenier		Gillis Valckenier	
7	Dirck Tulp		Dirck Tulp	
8	Pieter van Loon		Jan Rodenburgh	
9	Cornelis Backer		-	Seat only filled in 1681 by Jan de Vries
10	Pieter de Graef	Council until 1672	Pieter de Graef	
11	Cornelis Graafland		Cornelis de Vlamingh van Oudshoorn	Burgomaster in 1676-80
12	Joan Huydecoper		Joan Huydecoper	
13	Hendrik Brouwer	Director on behalf of Leiden	Hendrik Brouwer	Director on behalf of Leiden
14	Lambertus Reynst	Mayor, removed 1672	Gerard Bors van Waveren	Appointed in council 1672
15	Cornelis van Vlooswijk		Cornelis van Vlooswijk	
16	Nicolaas Pancras	Ally Valckenier	Gerrit Hooft	
17	Hendrik Scholten		Joannes Hudde	
18	Isaac Hochepped		Isaac Hochepped	Dismissed 1680
19	Cornelis Silvius	Director on behalf of Haarlem	Damas Guldewagen	Director on behalf of Haarlem
20	Hendrick Becker	Appointed in council 1672	Hendrick Becker	

Source: Gaastra, *Bevind en beleid*, 256-260.

Reading the lists of marriages and family connections in Elias' *De vroedschap van Amsterdam* can be confusing as it quickly becomes clear that everyone who was anybody was related to many other important families. We know, as mentioned before, that family ties, however remote, were important for a person's professional and personal connections. But having a relatively coherent group of family connected directors did not result in coherent policy-making. Indeed, there

were major disagreements within the directorship of Amsterdam, even within the Valckenier faction. These included a latent tension between the ideas of Gilles Valckenier himself and those of Joannes Hudde, Joan Huydecoper and Pieter van Dam, the XVII secretary. The role of Huydecoper is illustrative of how the factional politics of the city council spilled over into the VOC's management. Joan Huydecoper had belonged to the faction of Cornelis de Graeff. After his patron's death in 1664, Huydecoper joined the faction in the city council led by Gerard Hasselaer. But his new patron could not offer him sufficient incentives to persuade him to continue his support. After the faction led by Gillis Valckenier offered Huydecoper a directorship in the VOC, Huydecoper duly shifted his allegiances to Valckenier.<sup>576</sup> As long as Valckenier dominated both the city council and the VOC chamber in Amsterdam, his 'creatures' like Hudde and Huydecoper were expected to follow his lead in making company policy. After Valckenier's death in 1680, however, these two men became more critical of the policies that Van Goens had advocated to Valckenier.

These voices were joined in 1681 by that of Coenraad van Beuningen, a long-time Valckenier ally in the council and a grandson of Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh, who had appointed Johan Maurits back in 1636.<sup>577</sup> Van Beuningen's appointment was important as he took the seat of Jeronimus de Haes, who died in 1681. Like Valckenier, De Haes had been an important patron of Van Goens and his network in Asia. The connection between Van Goens and De Haes has already been addressed in chapter five, when the role of Van Goens as a patron on Ceylon was discussed. The same letter reveals more of the connections between the two men, with Van Goens thanking De Haes as follows: '*Your honor has so obliged me by sending the red wines that I wish with what I have earned this, as my health seems to be fed and cultivated greatly by the red wine and which is why I would wish that my delegates could yearly obtain and forward me one or two oxbeads.*'<sup>578</sup> Reciprocal gift-giving, of course, served to strengthen the bonds between patron and clients.

The loss, in quick succession, of both men meant that the Van Goens faction in Asia was suddenly without any strong support in the most important VOC chamber. Hudde and Van Beuningen, supported by secretary Van Dam, now embarked on a fundamental reinterpretation of what the company was and should be in Asia. The VOC, they argued, had become rather too much like a state in Asia, whereas it should have been a merchant. The high costs and unfulfilled promises of Van Goens' campaigns of conquest on Ceylon and Malabar played an important role in this shift. As Van Beuningen noted:

*It is in a certain degree true that the Dutch East India company is a company of state as well as of commerce. It would be wrong and hurtful, however, if those who have been entrusted with its management in Asia were to conclude from this fact that it was proper to make efforts to occupy, to conquer and to fortify for reasons of state alone, rather than for commercial advantages.*<sup>579</sup>

<sup>576</sup> Kooijmans, *Vriendschap*, 144-147.

<sup>577</sup> Coenraad van Beuningen was a son of Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh's daughter Catharina Burgh. Elias, *De Vroedschap*, deel 1, 513.

<sup>578</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.10.78, Sweers, inv. no. 2, fol. 178: '*UE heeft mijn met den gesonden rooden wijn soodanig geobligeert dat ick wel wenste waer meede ick sulcks soude verdienen, schijnende mijn gesontheitj doorde roode wijn gevoet en seer gecultiveert te werden en daerom wensten ick mijn gemagtigden condon obtineeren jaerlijcx een a twee oxshoofden herwaers te senden*'.

<sup>579</sup> Dutch original, as quoted by Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, 57: '*'t Is een gemeen ende in seeckeren sin waerachtig seggen dat de Nederlandsch Oost Indische Compagnie is niet alleen een Compagnie van commercie maer oock van staat. Edoch 't selve soude en seer verkeerd ende schadelijck impressie geven in de gedachten van degeende die bet Bewidt van deselve Compagnie is towertrouwt, indien bij haer daeruyt besloten wiert, dat men om insighten vn Staet, ende niet alleen om voordelen te doen door commercie moeyte ende kosten voor 't occupereen, conquesteren, fortificeren... moet aanwenden*'.

This sentiment, penned in 1685, was a clear rebuke of the kind of strategic thinking that Van Goens had practiced. And it came at exactly the same time as Van Goens' eldest son requested advancement in Asia (see later on in this chapter). This turned out to mark a monumental shift in the company's self-perception. Although the VOC did not give up its arms, it became much more reluctant to engage in expansive military adventures in South Asia. This policy of neutrality was not of much help in the rapidly changing eighteenth-century India. Van Beuningen even tried to calculate whether abandoning the fortifications and garrisons in Malabar and becoming a pure merchant would not be of more benefit to the company.

#### *Criticism from Ceylon*

Van Reede had been requested by the Batavian council to write a review of Van Goens' policies on Ceylon and Malabar when he arrived there in 1677. This became a lengthy piece, combining a history of the VOC's presence on the island and a description of the wars and difficulties between the VOC and Kandy with a great amount of tabulated information on the incomes, outlays, troop strengths and troop requirements that would be needed if the fortification programs advocated by Van Goens were to be carried out in full.<sup>580</sup> This tabulated information proved especially effective as it presented a clear argument, backed up by (seemingly) iron-clad numbers. In addition, Van Reede argued that the manifold reconstructions of fortifications had been undertaken uneconomically. Of Colombo, Van Goens' pride and joy, Van Reede said:

*The capital Colombo, conquered from Portugal with so much effort, expenditure and blood, had been furnished with many beautiful buildings and churches, which were all laid to waste and destroyed. One can verily say that of that great city no stone was left untouched, which was not necessary, for everything could have remained as it was without diminishing the strength of that fortress, as circumference was expanded.*<sup>581</sup>

Though Van Reede also criticized Van Goens' projections for trade and profits, the most damning arguments centered on the program for building fortifications as this was seemingly the most important objective. Van Reede took what he considered normal manning levels for fortifications in Europe, three men per Rhineland Rod (3.77m). Using this total, Van Reede criticized Van Goens' insistence that his new fortifications would be defensible even against a European adversary. Van Reede simply listed all the fortifications and multiplied the length of their walls by the number of men required to defend them. According to this first calculation, an army of no fewer than sixty *thousand* men would be required – clearly the stuff of fantasy. By making some concessions to his original calculations, Van Reede reduced this number to around thirty thousand men. This was still a damning figure, given that the VOC regular army never amounted to more than around ten thousand.<sup>582</sup> However, this seemingly objective calculation was actually a clever piece of rhetoric. Van Reede had made some basic assumptions in his

<sup>580</sup> NL-HaNA, Hoge Regering Batavia, 1.04.17, inv. no. 544.

<sup>581</sup> NL-HaNA, Hoge Regering Batavia, 1.04.17, inv. no. 544. *'De hoofdstad Colombo, met zoo veel moeijten, kosten, en bloet den Portugees ontnoomen, was voorsien met veel pragtige gebouwen, en kerken, diemen alle tesamen heeft onder de voet geworpen, en geslegt, sodat van die groote stad men seggen mag, dat den eenen steen opden andren niet gelaaten is, 't welke niet noodzakelijk is geweest, maar had alles konnen blijven, en egter omtrent de sterkte der vestingh geen hinder doen, want den omtreck is vergroot.'*

<sup>582</sup> Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*.



calculations, and these went unexplained and unchecked. The total mileage of the fortifications was actually a poor proxy for calculating required troop strengths as many fortifications made the most of their location, often leaving only a single front open to attack, and thus reducing the manpower required for a lasting defense. But the numbers gathered by Van Reede left a lasting impression on a group of directors and Pieter van Dam, the company secretary. The latter used Van Reede's report in his *Beschryvinge*, as did François Valentijn in his *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indiën*.<sup>583</sup> But Van Reede was not the only person whose criticism of Van Goens reached the directors' ears in this period. Van Goens' departure from Ceylon and his succession by his son (made formal in 1676) triggered a storm of criticism.

On November 3, Joost Segenaar, lieutenant in the Colombo garrison, penned his criticism of Van Goens' policies on Ceylon. His '*brief elucidation of the isle of Ceylon*' largely made the same points as made by Van Reede, but focused more on the adverse effects of Van Goens' proclaimed monopolies on the island. The war with Kandy had spread discontent with the company to the coasts of Madurai and Coromandel and had actually made the VOC more vulnerable. Excluding the 'Bengal Moors' – Muslim traders from Bengal – from the opportunity to trade on Ceylon had greatly harmed the trade in elephants and areca nuts as it was only possible to trade these items profitably by cooperating with these merchants. The pearl fisheries, too, were harmed by Van Goens' monopolies, given that the only people now fishing the banks were robbing them and fishing without a license.<sup>584</sup> Another, anonymous, letter of 1678 also highlighted the high costs incurred by the fortification projects favored by Van Goens.<sup>585</sup> The anonymous author argued that these costs simply could not be borne and proposed reductions. Although the author is anonymous, he is likely to have been a member of the Ceylon council or a high official working in Colombo as he cited figures from the papers of the Ceylon government. Besides criticizing the rule of the Van Goenses, these documents also show that, by then, there was also an audience for this criticism among the directors in Amsterdam. Another interesting point of criticism in the anonymous letter refers to houses that Van Goens senior had arranged to be built for himself in Colombo, Jaffna and Negapatnam. This is a faint echo of the kind of criticism that Johan Maurits also received in Brazil. Van Goens' plans included plans for a large palace for the governor of Ceylon in Colombo. A comparison of this structure with the palace of the governor-general in Batavia, completed in the 1640s during the tenure of Cornelis van der Lijn, clearly shows the aspirations that Van Goens had for Ceylon: the governor's palace would be fit to become the governor-general's palace if and when the seat of the VOC government were to be shifted (see Figures 18 and 19). Like *Vrijburg*, the governor's house in Colombo also contained a large garden, where plants from Ceylon and South India were collected. And like Johan Maurits, Van Goens was criticized for overly ambitious building programs. Unlike in Johan Maurits' case, however, the criticism of Van Goens never really caught on. A difference in rhetoric may have helped in Van Goens' case. Whereas Johan Maurits presented *Vrijburg* as his personal palace – *Friburgum Aula Comitum* – in the map inserted into Baldaeus' book, the large building in Colombo was referred to as '*the Governor's house in Colombo*'.<sup>586</sup> By making the association less personal and more institutional, it became more palatable and less threatening.


<sup>583</sup> Van Dam and Stapel, *Beschryvinge* 2.2, 309. F. Valentijn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indiën*, deel 5, 247-285.

<sup>584</sup> NL-HaNA, VOC, 1.04.02, inv. no. 4895.

<sup>585</sup> NL-HaNA, VOC, 1.04.02, inv. no. 4897.


<sup>586</sup> See, for example, the description of *Vrijburg* in the ground plan in C. Barlaeus, *Rerum per octennium in Brasilia*, 144, and NL-HaNA, 4.VEL, Collectie Leupe, 985.

**Figure 21: Ambitions in stone: the palace of the governor and council of Ceylon.**



Source: NL-HaNA, 4.VEL, Collectie Leupe, inv. no. 985.

**Figure 22: The competition: the palace of the governor-general in Batavia, 1648.**



Source: NL-HaNA, 4.VEL, Collectie Leupe, inv. no. 1231C.

**Batavia: Director-general and governor-general, 1676-1681.**

Again successful in command, Van Goens received a most unwelcome promotion: he was appointed director-general, the second-highest office in Batavia. This meant, however, that he would have to leave his beloved Ceylon. This posed a number of problems for Van Goens. In the first place, he had been keeping a close watch on the government of Ceylon ever since the early 1660s. Over time, he had presented his views on what the company should try to achieve there, and in so doing had knowingly manipulated information sent to his superiors, whether in Batavia or the Netherlands, in order to build support for his proposed policies. This is best shown by his about-face in the way he presented the Kingdom of Kandy and Raja Singha. Leaving Colombo entailed the risk that a new governor, who would perhaps not share Van Goens' ideas, would discover and report on this deception. In addition, Van Goens had built up a closely-knit network of support during his decade and a half on Ceylon, both by extending familial ties and by playing the role of patron. In Batavia, by contrast, he had few friends and family who could support him. The first point was somewhat overcome by having his son Rijckloff junior succeed him as governor of Ceylon, albeit not yet officially, back in 1672. But this unprecedented succession of father by son in the same position became a target of criticism in its own right. The second problem – lack of a network – proved much more difficult to overcome. Table 11 shows the members of the High Government of the Indies in January 1675 prior to Van Goens' accession to the council later that year.

**Table 11: The members of the High Government of the Indies in January 1675**

ID	Name	Position	Remarks
1	Joan Maetsuijcker	Governor-general	Governor-general since 1653
2	Nicolaes Verburgh	Director-general	Director-general since 1668. Removed 1675 to make way for Van Goens
3	Laurens Pit		Former governor of Coromandel 1650-1663. Dismissed 1677
4	Pieter Overtwater		Ordinary council since 1669. Dismissed 1677
5	Cornelis Speelman		Former governor of Coromandel in 1663-1665
6	Pieter van Hoorn		Dismissed 1677
7	Sybrand Abbema	Extraordinary council	Father-in-law of Maetsuijcker, extraordinary council since 1673. Dismissed 1677

Source: Gaastra, *Bevind en beleid*, 273-274.

Van Goens was appointed to the High Government of the Indies in replacement of Nicolaes Verburgh, who was ordered to return to the Netherlands. This makes it clear that the directors in the Republic intended for Van Goens to succeed the now elderly Maetsuijcker. Pieter van Dam argued that the reason given for his recall – Verburgh's alleged disagreements with governor-general Maetsuijcker – was in fact an excuse as Verburgh was recalled with full honors and remuneration. The directors, Van Dam argued, favored Van Goens and preferred to have him in a position to succeed the aging and increasingly feeble Maetsuijcker.<sup>587</sup> It was indeed the

<sup>587</sup> Van Dam and Stapel, *Beschryvinge deel 3*, 87.



Amsterdam chamber that had argued most vociferously for the dismissal of Verburgh, thus showing the strong support for Van Goens in the VOC's most powerful chamber.<sup>588</sup>

However, the way in which Verburgh was forced out did not help establish an easy working relationship between the new director-general and the council. By then Joan Maetsuijcker had been governor-general for twenty-two years and had established a powerful position in Batavia. Even a smuggling case brought against his wife in 1670 could not dislodge him.<sup>589</sup> His father-in-law, Sybrand Abbema, was appointed as an extraordinary member in 1673, while Maetsuijcker had also established strong working relationships with the other members of the council. Van Goens had, of course, always corresponded with Batavia, but had often ignored its advice or gone over the council members' heads to the directors. Through the Hartsinck family link, Van Goens was related to Laurens Pit, whom he had also encountered as governor of Coromandel in the 1660s. Cornelis Speelman, too, had been governor of Coromandel. Between Van Goens' accession to the council in August 1675 and July 1677, another two members joined: Constantijn Ranst at the same time as Van Goens, while Anthonij Paviljoen joined in November 1676. A year later, the directors enforced radical changes to the High Government: the regular councils Pit, Overtwater and Van Hoorn and the extraordinary councils Paviljoen and Abbema were to be fired, as was Andries Boogaert, governor of Ambon. This amounted to a wholesale cleansing of the High Government. In their stead Balthasar Bort, Willem Volger and Anthony Hurdt were appointed as ordinary councils and Adriaan van Reede, Willem van Outhoorn, Joannes Camphuys, Jacob Joris Pits and Constantijn Nobel as extraordinary councils.<sup>590</sup> Though not all of these individuals – Adriaan van Reede being a good example – were closely connected to Van Goens, neither were they closely connected to Maetsuijcker. A relatively junior council would also be more easily dominated by the experienced Van Goens. To understand the background to this unprecedented change of government, and Van Goens' role in it, we need to examine a letter sent by Van Goens to Gillis Valckenier in 1676.

*A letter to Valckenier: gossip from the Council*

Femme Gaastra has argued convincingly that a letter written by Van Goens in 1676 'As accompaniment to the letter to the Gentlemen XVII with the homeward-bound fleet (sent November 22 under the flag of his Lordship Director Verburch)', and nowadays to be found in the Hudde collection in the National Archives, was in fact addressed to Gilles Valckenier, the powerful VOC director and mayor of Amsterdam.<sup>591</sup> In this letter Van Goens presented a very frank and critical view of the situation in Asia, both as regards the policies followed, as well as the composition of the High Government. It is particularly interesting that Van Goens not only specifically criticized the council members who were removed in 1677, but also praised Speelman, the only pre-1675 member of the High Government to be retained in 1677: '*Speelman being a man who has always held me in high esteem, and I have held him in no less esteem, for we have known each other a long time and maintained good friendship*'.<sup>592</sup> The letter furthermore confirms the tense relationship between governor-general Maetsuijcker and the newly-appointed director-general. Van Goens saw a direct

<sup>588</sup> Gaastra, *Bewind en beleid*, 120-121.

<sup>589</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.04.02, VOC, inv. no. 686. Briefly mentioned in: Gaastra, *Bewind en beleid*, 120.

<sup>590</sup> Gaastra, *Bewind en beleid*, 121.

<sup>591</sup> Ibidem, 123. NL-HaNA, 1.10.48, Collectie Hudde, inv. no. 5. '*Tot geleijdens vanden brieff aende Heeren 17 en met de retourvloot (22 gber onder de vlagge van 'd H directeur Verburch afgesonden)*'.

<sup>592</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.10.48, Hudde, inv. no. 5. '*Speelman een man die mij altijd seer hoogh, en ick hem niet minder g'estimeert hebbe, gelijk oock wij melcanderen langh gekent en goede vruntschap onderhoudende hadde.*'

conflict of interests between the city of Batavia and the company: Batavia prospered by giving Asian merchants more licenses to trade, but these licenses, in turn, hurt the company. Van Goens was especially critical of the traditions that allowed the city's elite – the members of the High Government first and foremost – to profit from the company's trade. He mentions the custom of allowing the wives of members of the High Government to select their choice from wines imported to Batavia on the company's ships. A strict pecking order applied in this respect: first the wife of the governor-general, then the director-general's wife and so on. The remainder was auctioned off, with the husbands' accounts being charged for the proceeds of the auction. But since the best wines had, of course, already been selected, this auction resulted in a considerable loss for the company. The wives of the members of the High Government then sold some of their selection on the black market. Van Goens was able to put an end to this since his wife was first in the hierarchy as Maetsuijcker's wife had died. However, this did not endear him to the wives of the members of the High Government, nor in all likelihood to the councils themselves: *'but the other [wives] are so wrathful that some of their husbands follow their women, from which it might seem to Your Honor that I am perhaps not as well suited to serve as director[-general] as the ladies might have wished.'*<sup>593</sup>

However, the letter to Valckenier also points to a weakness that would hamper Van Goens in his years as governor-general: his incoherent network. Van Goens had expected to be able to rely on Speelman and Constantijn Ranst for support, but now found out that these two men hated one another so much that the good relationship that Goens had had with Ranst, mentioned as a cousin of the addressee, was now lost: *'the aforementioned Ranst presently showing such antipathy that the friendship which I had infallibly established now seems completely cut off.'*<sup>594</sup> Even in those cases where Van Goens had expected cooperative behavior from his clients, his plans were foiled by antipathy between them. Constantijn Ranst was in any case a problematic ally: his conduct in Bengal before being appointed to Batavia meant that he was isolated in the council and not much use to Van Goens as an ally.<sup>595</sup> Overtwater, meanwhile, was angry with Van Goens because of the latter's support for the dismissal of Jacob Cops, a relation of Overtwater's wife, on charges of private trade.

Convincing a powerful patron to dismiss many of his rivals was thus a chance for Van Goens to improve his own position in anticipation of Maetsuijcker's death, which occurred in January 1678, shortly after the changes came into effect. But the rivalry between Speelman and Ranst and indeed the appointment of Van Reede already show that the changes in the High Government were perhaps not radical enough to firmly establish Van Goens as governor-general. Indeed, his tenure at the head of the VOC in Asia in 1678-1681 was wrought by strife and dissent with the High Government. This can best be illustrated by examining the careers of his sons, Rijckloff junior and Volckert van Goens.

<sup>593</sup> NL-HaNA, 1.10.48, Hudde, inv. no. 5, *'soo sijn d'andere egter soo vergramt, dat sommige mans de wijven navoegen, ende waer nijt UEd can blijcken, dat ick misschien niet soo bequaem ben, tot het bedienen vande directie, als de Juffrouwen welgaarne hadden'*.

<sup>594</sup> Ibidem, *'toonende op gem. Ranst jegenwoordich soo grooten affkeericheijt, dat daer door nu de vruntschap die ick onseijlijke vast gestelt had, geheel verschijnt affgesneden'*.

<sup>595</sup> For the problems of Ranst in Bengal in the 1670s, see: F. Gaastra, 'Constantijn Ranst en de corruptie onder het personeel van de VOC te Bengalen, 1669-1673', in: S. Groenveld, M.E.H.N. Mout and I. Schöffer (eds.), *Bestuurders en Geleerden: Opstellen over onderwerpen uit de Nederlandse geschiedenis van de zestiende, zeventiende en achttiende eeuw, aangeboden aan Prof. Dr. J.J. Woltjer bij zijn afscheid als hoogleraar van de Rijksuniversiteit Leiden* (De Bataafse Leeuw: Amsterdam 1985) 126-136.



### The sins of the father: the sons of Van Goens in the VOC

So how did the changes in Van Goens' position in the chain of communication in Asia impact on his ability to act as a patron to other company officials? This question can best be answered by looking at the careers of the two men most closely linked to Van Goens: his two sons, Rijckloff junior (1642-1687) and Volckert van Goens (1644-1693). A brief study of their careers in the 1670s and 1680s reveals the changes in their father's ability to dominate company policy-making and protect his clients. Although the careers of the two sons within the VOC were quite different, they also show remarkable parallels. Rijckloff, the older son, succeeded his father as governor of Ceylon in January 1672.<sup>596</sup> As the objections from Ceylon show, this in itself became a cause for complaints. Volckert enjoyed a different career: having studied law in the Netherlands, he sailed for Batavia in May 1676 to take up a position on the Council of Justice in Batavia.

Rijckloff van Goens junior had worked with and under his father on Ceylon from the mid-1660s onwards, first as *opsiender* of the Galu Korale and the dessave of Matara. Upon his father's advancement to superintendent in January 1672, Rijckloff junior was promoted to the governorship of Ceylon and, in this capacity, largely followed his father's policies of trying to increase the company's territorial control on Ceylon and completing the program of fortification. But his position on Ceylon was undermined by the loss of information control described earlier in this chapter, while the adversarial stance he propagated also came under increased scrutiny from Batavia. As Arasaratnam has written a comprehensive overview of the struggles between Colombo and Batavia during these years, it is unnecessary to go into much detail here.<sup>597</sup> The struggle was resolved in 1680, when Rijckloff junior was ordered to come to Batavia and offered the honorable position of *Commissaris en Vistateur-Generaal over de subalterne comptoiren in India* – commissioner and inspector-general of the subaltern commands in India.<sup>598</sup> This position allowed the High Government to use Rijckloff junior's undeniable experience in the area without actually making him responsible for managing one of the company's regional administrations. It was thus an honorable 'way out' for a problematic governor.

When Rijckloff junior arrived in Batavia in January 1680, however, he communicated that he did not wish to accept this position. This was an insult to the authority of the High Government. Given the close cooperation between father and son in earlier years, and the strong role of Van Goens senior as a patrimonial family head, it seems unlikely that senior was caught unawares by this development. It is possible that father and son had agreed that it would be better for Rijckloff junior to travel to the Netherlands in an attempt to communicate directly with the directors, much as senior had done a quarter of a century before. But the High Government was not prepared to let matters pass so easily. A key role in the discussions on Rijckloff junior was taken by the man upon whom Van Goens had previously lavished so much praise: director-general Cornelis Speelman. In the meeting on January 19, Speelman raised the question of whether Van Goens senior should have a seat in the meetings to discuss his son: '*For he is a son of his Lordship, the Governor-General.*'<sup>599</sup> A week later Van Goens senior refused to leave the meeting, presided over by Speelman, but he was outvoted by the council and forced to leave, thus clearly showing that controlling the Council of the Indies was now well beyond his ability. In a further

<sup>596</sup> Generale Missiven, deel 3, p. 792.

<sup>597</sup> S. Arasaratnam, *Dutch Power in Ceylon*, 77-100.

<sup>598</sup> F.W. Stapel, *Cornelis Janszoon Speelman* (Nijhoff: The Hague 1936) 123.

<sup>599</sup> Ibidem, 123. '*ten aansien by een soone van Zijn Edelheyt, den here Gouverneur-Generaal*'.

stroke of misfortune, Rijckloff senior's third wife died on July 21, still only twenty-one years old.<sup>600</sup> Van Goens junior again refused a commission to inspect the Moluccas. In an attempt to placate the Council of the Indies, Van Goens senior announced that his son would volunteer for an inspection commission to Sumatra. But the council, led by Speelman, refused this offer, arguing that it would not do to advance a man who had twice defied the wishes of his superiors. Rijckloff van Goens junior responded by requesting in September 1680 to be allowed to return to the Netherlands. He left on November 1 of that year, crucially as commander of the fleet and thus able to explain his vision for the company to the directors upon arrival in the Netherlands.<sup>601</sup> This strategy worked as Rijckloff junior was appointed ordinary council of the Indies in 1682 and left for Batavia two years later. He was overtaken at the Cape by none other than Adriaan van Reede, by then the *Commissaris-Generaal* (specially empowered inspector-general) with far-reaching powers to root out perceived corruption.<sup>602</sup> The two men quarreled at the Cape and, in December 1684, after hearing of the death of governor-general Speelman, Rijckloff van Goens wrote to the XVII to remind them of the promises made in regard to his advancement in the event of the death of either the director-general or the governor-general. Since both Speelman and his director-general Balthasar Bordt had died, Van Goens expected at least to be appointed director-general. This did not come to pass, however, as the directors who had appointed Van Reede to his position did not look kindly on the legacy of Van Goens. Indeed, the letter of December 1684 had the opposite of its intended effect, with the directors angrily responding that as Van Goens was not content with a lower position, it would be best for him to return to the Netherlands. Rijckloff van Goens junior died on board the *Oosterlant* on his way to the Netherlands in May 1686, followed only a few weeks later by his wife, Catherina van Adrichem.<sup>603</sup>

Rijckloff van Goens senior, however, had another son who lived into adulthood and served the company – and who was also fired. At the same time as matters surrounding Rijckloff junior were slowly spinning out of control in 1680, the other son of Van Goens, Volckert, was also embroiled in a scandal that would terminate his career. Volckert was born in Batavia in 1644 and sent to the Netherlands for his upbringing in the 1650s. It was for his sons that Van Goens senior wrote the autobiography that featured so prominently in the previous chapter on Van Goens. Volckert van Goens studied law in the Netherlands and left the Republic in May 1676 as *opperkoopman* (chief merchant) on board the East Indiaman *Wapen van Alkmaar*, a 160-foot ship of the largest charter.<sup>604</sup> He was to take up a position as an extraordinary member of the council at Batavia and a member of the council of justice, a logical appointment in view of his background in law. This background did not stop him, however, from transgressing the company's rules from the very start. Once clear of the anchorage and the coast, the *Wapen van Alkmaar* was intercepted by a small vessel, and a large number of barrels of wine and German beer were placed aboard. After notification of this transgression against the *artikelbrief* was received by the directors, Volckert van Goens was ordered to return to the Netherlands.<sup>605</sup>

It was not, however, until 1680 that Volckert sailed back, ironically on the fleet commanded by his brother. Throughout this period he served on the council of justice – no doubt shielded by his father, who was then governor-general. Once back in the Netherlands in

<sup>600</sup> Lubberhuizen-Van Gelder, 'Rijckloff van Goens de Jonge en zijn bezittingen', 292.

<sup>601</sup> Ibidem, 124.

<sup>602</sup> Lubberhuizen-Van Gelder, 'Rijckloff van Goens de Jonge en zijn bezittingen', 293.

<sup>603</sup> Ibidem, 299-302.

<sup>604</sup> VOC site: <http://www.vocsite.nl/schepen/detail.html?id=10022>. (3-3-2017).

<sup>605</sup> Van Dam and Stapel, *Beschryvinge 1.1*, GS 63 655-656.

February 1681, Volckert and *schipper* (captain) Willem Hagendoorn were questioned by the delegated directors of the *Haags Besoigne*, and especially by the company secretary, Pieter van Dam, an inveterate opponent of Van Goens senior.<sup>606</sup> Interestingly, the Van Goens family archives also contain an extract of the minutes and resolutions on the case.<sup>607</sup> Captain Hagendoorn was questioned first, and confessed that the barrels had been taken aboard. Upon questioning, Volckert van Goens said he had no recollection of the event. Hagendoorn was then questioned again, but would testify only after being given written confirmation that he would not be prosecuted for his own transgressions. Afterwards he attested that the barrels had belonged to Volckert van Goens and were destined for private sale in Batavia.<sup>608</sup> It is unlikely that Volckert had organized the whole operation himself as he lacked the capital to purchase the goods. Hagendoorn mentioned that a certain Van der Meulen had delivered the *mom*, a type of German beer. However, Volckert had been swindled by his suppliers as a number of barrels had contained not *mom*, but far inferior ship's beer, and had therefore fetched only low prices in Batavia. Hagendoorn qualified his entire testimony by saying: '*...that he could give some more disclosure, but that he would not be able to prove it, as matters of this nature – conducted between four eyes – are unverifiable...*'<sup>609</sup>

Despite being confronted by Hagendoorn's confession, Volckert persisted in denying any wrongdoing. This proved a successful strategy: given that it was now a case of the captain's word against his, there were insufficient grounds for a formal conviction. However, the delegated directors decided that Volckert would receive his wages only for the period until he had been ordered to return to the Netherlands, and during the voyage home. The years he remained in Batavia, dragging out his return, would therefore remain unremunerated. Volckert van Goens ultimately left the company's service, settled in Schiedam in the Netherlands and was in due course elected to the magistracy.<sup>610</sup>

The case of Volckert van Goens is in itself interesting as it provides insight into a type of illegal private trade that is rarely if ever mentioned in the literature: the smuggling of high-quality European goods – beverages in this case – to the Asian settlements. Good-quality spirits were in especially high demand, and on one occasion Rijckloff van Goens senior thanked his contacts in the Netherlands for sending him good wine.<sup>611</sup> This, it must be remembered, was before the Cape became a major wine-producing area. But Volckert van Goens' case is interesting for another reason as well: he was fired from the company, despite his father's connections. It shows that, by then, the structure of support for the Van Goens family within the VOC hierarchy in the Netherlands had collapsed. Although Van Goens senior was able to shield his son from an early return, this cannot have endeared the directors to him. This in turn helps explain why Volckert van Goens' beer smuggling received so much attention in Van Dam's *Beschryvinge*.

## Conclusion

The period 1670-1681 was a period of change and upheaval for Rijckloff van Goens. It is also a period that is difficult to grasp and analyze as many of the events and decisions taken during this time seem contradictory. I have argued that, to a large extent, the personnel and strategic policies of the directors were not aligned. Van Goens enjoyed strong support among the directors of the

<sup>606</sup> Which explains why the case received so much attention in Van Dam's book.

<sup>607</sup> NL-HaNA, Goens, van, 1.10.32, inv. no. 31.

<sup>608</sup> NL-HaNA, Goens, van, 1.10.32, inv. no. 31.

<sup>609</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>610</sup> Molhuysen, Blok and Kossman, *Nieuw Nederlands biografisch woordenboek, deel 6*, 591.

<sup>611</sup> NL-HaNA, Sweers, 1.10.78, inv. no. 2.

Amsterdam chamber, with the figure of Gillis Valckenier forming a central node in that network. This support would see Van Goens promoted to director-general in 1677 upon the dismissal of his predecessor Verburgh. However, support of Van Goens did not translate into support for his policies, something that he himself did not seem to realize. Though the faction around Valckenier furthered Van Goens' career well into the 1670s, as witnessed by his promotion to director-general, this did not mean that, by that time, the directors still supported his ambitious vision for Ceylon. It was this misunderstanding that in large part helped to make Van Goens' tenure as governor-general so unproductive.

So why did the directors' views change over the course of the 1670s? In the 1660s, they were generally supportive, not only of the person of Van Goens, but also of his policies. Even the calamitous counter-strike by Raja Singha in 1670 did little to dent their confidence in Van Goens, at least at first. What made a difference was the collapse of Van Goens' stranglehold on information emanating from the island over the course of the 1670s. Whereas in the 1660s Van Goens was able to control information on the island's situation, by the mid-1670s critical sounds were emanating from Ceylon itself, including from individuals such as Adriaan van Reede and Joost Segenaar who could credibly claim to know what was actually going on. These critics strengthened the critical voice of the High Government in Batavia, who had always seen Van Goens' project on Ceylon as a threat to its power. What is more, these critics were now also able to reach an audience in the Netherlands, as is testified by the fact that the critical letters were taken from the regular correspondence and stored together in a separate file. The crucial node at the Dutch end of the network that was slowly turning against Van Goens seems to have been the secretary of the XVII, Pieter van Dam.

Van Goens faced a number of setbacks in seeking to implement his grand strategy in the early 1670s. Firstly, the separation of Malabar from Ceylon in 1670 meant that his vision of a united South Asian VOC command controlling the littoral from Cranganore to Negapatnam, including the Gulf of Mannar, the Palk Strait and the coastal waters of Ceylon itself, remained unfulfilled. Furthermore, this separation created an implacable foe in the figure of Adriaan van Reede tot Drakensteyn. The evolution of the relationship between Van Reede and Van Goens is particularly interesting as it shows Van Goens' failure as a patron. Unwilling to let important clients make their own judgments and rule subaltern commands such as Malabar as they saw fit, Van Goens succeeded only in turning clients into foes and losing control over Malabar. This setback was compounded in the same year by the Kandyan counterattack. The latter also meant a disruption of cinnamon-peeling and so worsened the outlook for the Ceylon government's finances.

The outbreak of war with France in 1672 was an excellent opportunity for Van Goens to once again prove himself to be a capable military commander. His success in repulsing the French attack on Ceylon and his successful Siege of Meliapore in cooperation with Golconda were likely to have been instrumental in his advancement to director-general. In an attempt to retain control over Ceylon, and thus control the flow of information that might hamper his proposed policies for the island, Van Goens – in an unprecedented move – had himself succeeded by his eldest son, Rijckloff junior. Although familial ties were crucial for advancement in the VOC, the direct succession of a father by his son in the same position had not previously been seen. Van Goens junior had admittedly been well-trained for the job, having been *dessave* of the lands around Colombo. However, while the advancement might have been defensible on 'meritocratic' grounds (Van Goens junior did indeed have the experience and qualifications

needed for the job), it still looked like the creation of a dynasty and was roundly criticized by opponents of the father's policies.

The advancement of Rijckloff van Goens senior to the position of governor-general was in many ways an anticlimax: appointed to the highest office of the VOC in Asia, he could not convince even the purged post-1677 council to support his policies. His long tenure on Ceylon meant that, by the late 1670s, he was less well connected with the elite in Batavia. This problem was exacerbated by tensions between the very individuals Van Goens had counted on for support. His network of support lay on Ceylon, while his old friends in Batavia were dead or retired. Even purging the council to meet Van Goens' requirements did not help as the people Van Goens had identified as possible allies, most notably Cornelis Speelman, were not amenable to his ends. The long association of Van Goens with a regional 'Ceylonese' strategy made it difficult for him to reach out to a cadre of officials who had mostly made their career in the Far East and the Indonesian archipelago and who realized that a focus on Ceylon and India would threaten their career prospects and those of their clients as they lacked the experience needed to rise to high office in Ceylon.

By the late 1670s, the situation in the Netherlands, too, had begun to change. As a consequence of the political changes in 1672, vacant directorships were filled by members of Valckenier's clique over the course of the next decade. But while these men formed a coherent familial group, their opinions on policies for the company were in fact widely divergent. Four men became increasingly important: the directors Joannes Hudde, Joan Huydecoper van Maarsseveen and Coenraad van Beuningen, and the secretary Pieter van Dam. These individuals turned decisively against the militarized, aggressive and expansionist policies advocated by Van Goens and towards a (relatively) more pacific, mercantile position for the VOC in Asia. This change was effected in the 1680s and 1690s, with direct and dire consequences for the remaining members of Van Goens' network in Asia. This episode will be dealt with in the conclusion to this book. For now, it is enough to conclude that the height of Van Goens' career marked a turning point for the VOC. Never again would the company play the same important role in the wars between Europeans in Asia. While the EIC discovered the importance – and potential profitability – of military power over the course of the eighteenth century, the VOC – still moved by the exhortations of Pieter van Dam – tried, wherever possible, to avoid the outlays for fleets and armies. As a result, and in the words of Winius and Vink, post-Van Goens the 'merchant-warrior' was pacified.<sup>612</sup>

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<sup>612</sup> G.D. Winius and M.P.M. Vink, *The Merchant-warrior pacified: the VOC (The Dutch East India Co.) and its Changing Political Economy in India*.



# Conclusion

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## Introduction

Having studied and analyzed the careers of two Dutch colonial governors over the course of the seventeenth century, it is now time to take a step back and zoom out. What does this detailed study teach us about issues such as career-making in general in the seventeenth century and the nature of the Dutch chartered companies? And what does the nature of the career paths of the selected individuals tell us about the origins, trajectory and future of what we may call the early modern Dutch empire? This study began by posing the question of how the chartered companies selected their overseas governors, and how governors, once in position, managed to sustain their careers. I developed the hypothesis that appointments of colonial governors of the chartered companies were related much more to the factional politics of the Dutch chamber cities than to the appointment of agents in long-distance trades. Working from this premise, I hypothesized that successful governors needed to develop mutually supporting relations with various different networks and groups of people – directors, colleagues, local states and colonial society – at different points in their careers. So how do these hypotheses hold up after the careers of two such governors have been studied in some detail? In the introduction I argued that there were four sets of networks that were important for making a career overseas: networks with company directors, with colonial colleagues, with colonial society, and with local states and rival European powers. These networks were critical at different points in time during a career. And this development is the common thread running through the introduction, based around the three career moments (appointment, tenure and dismissal) that have structured this research as a whole.

## Career beginnings

The beginnings of the two men's careers in the respective companies present perhaps the strongest contrast between the selected governors. Rijckloff van Goens worked his way up through the VOC's Asian hierarchy from the early 1630s onwards, while during that same decade Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen entered the WIC's service at the highest level, being appointed governor-general of Brazil. Van Goens used marriage as a crucial tool to forge new contacts and acquire new patrons, whereas Johan Maurits never married. The differences at this phase thus loom large. But a closer examination also reveals good grounds for comparing and connecting the two.

One aspect that has repeatedly come up in the course of this research is the entanglement of the companies' commercial policies with political debates within the Republic and visions of empire in the colonies. Commerce, Dutch politics and empire all exerted pressure on the networks that supported colonial governors in office. But the strongest of these was the influence of Dutch domestic politics, governed by the rules of factional strife. In both cases, the hypothesis that appointments to colonial governance were closely linked to the political, factional game of the urban elites vying for honorable appointments proved sustainable. The appointment of Johan Maurits to Brazil, for example, can only be understood by taking into account the relationship between the city of Amsterdam and the stadholder during the first half of the 1630s.

But the exact ways in which Dutch domestic politics influenced individual careers half a world away differed quite markedly in the two cases. Johan Maurits started his WIC career at the

highest rung in the company's overseas career ladder, while Rijckloff van Goens worked his way up from a lowly position to reach the top. In the latter case, marriage was a crucial tool for early advancement as it opened the way for a skilled company servant to come into contact with powerful individuals who could realize his talent and see to it that his career advanced in leaps and bounds. Family played a different but no less important role in Johan Maurits' case as he came equipped with a powerful set of familial ties – the Nassau name – that would open most doors for him. The fact that Johan Maurits did not marry does not in itself disprove the importance of familial connections; instead, it shows that, in the case of the high nobility, these ties operated rather differently than in the case of a man like Van Goens.

The motivations for advancement in the two cases were also quite different. I have argued that the initiative taken by Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh to appoint Johan Maurits as governor-general of Brazil was inspired by his wish to repay a favor to stadholder Frederik Hendrik and to show the stadholder he was a faithful ally. In the case of Van Goens, the motivations were more direct: he belonged to a network of Amsterdam directors for whom his appointment would mean an expansion of their faction overseas. While the appointment of Johan Maurits was thus inspired by *party*-political considerations, the appointment of Rijckloff van Goens was inspired by *factional* politics. And these backgrounds pursued the two men throughout their careers.

### **Mid-career: tenure in Brazil and Ceylon**

The second phases of the two men's careers are more readily comparable. Once in power in Brazil and Ceylon, both governors needed to maintain a number of important connections in order to retain power. First and foremost, the ties with their principals in the Netherlands needed to be preserved. I refer here to principals rather than to company directors as Johan Maurits clearly thought that, besides the company directors, he was also accountable to the States-General and the stadholder. Access to networks in the Republic allowed governors to remain in office, but, more than that, it meant they could wield the power of patronage to build loyal followings in Brazil and Ceylon respectively.

This immediately brings us to the second important network: colonial colleagues and subalterns. The ways in which the two cases constructed a clientage were different. Johan Maurits built a court and, in so doing, tied the WIC officers and important Portuguese citizens of the colony to himself in his capacity as 'the count in Brazil' – much like Willem Lodewijk could offer patronage in his public capacity as stadholder of Friesland, or in his private role as a nobleman. Within the WIC, however, this duality was unusual and created discord between Johan Maurits and the directors. Van Goens, lacking noble status, did not have the option of creating a personal court. This is visible in the description of the large palace built in Colombo, which was always referred to as 'the governor's palace'. Van Goens could bestow patronage only in his capacity as governor of Ceylon (or superintendent). Yet in this capacity he certainly had a powerful position as Ceylon became one of the largest VOC governorships in terms of the number of personnel, while the sheer size of his command meant there were many positions needing to be filled. Furthermore, his familial links to the Pitt and Hartsinck families in Coromandel meant that favored underlings could also be put forward for advancement there. Both tenures thus reveal the dual position of colonial governors as patrons and clients and thus highlight the two networks that were crucial for long-term success.

In both cases, the original motivations and interests behind their respective appointments continued to exercise great influence on the men's careers. In the case of Johan Maurits, the motivation for his appointment made his position vulnerable to a change in the relations between the stadholder and the dominant faction in Amsterdam. And this indeed materialized in the early 1640s. Since Johan Maurits had not developed personal relations with important directors, he depended on the stadholder and the States-General to sustain him in his position. This vulnerability was compounded by the treatment of Christoffel Artichewsky in 1639. Though the directors were to blame for the latter's unclear instructions and the lack of a distinct hierarchy between the governor and the new general of the artillery, Johan Maurits is likely to have eroded his own base of support by his brusque eviction of Artichewsky from Brazil. Albert Coenraetsz. Burgh had overseen the appointment of the latter, while Artichewsky's draft letter complaining about his treatment in Brazil was also addressed to Burgh – and this was certainly no coincidence. In the case of Van Goens, changes in the factional make-up of the council and chamber in Amsterdam could potentially undermine his position in Asia. Although the events of 1672 certainly had an effect on the council and the chamber, the slow replacement of directors meant a delay of several years before this percolated to Asia. Initially, Van Goens' position was strengthened by the ascendancy of Gillis Valckenier, but this changed after a number of years. Indeed it was precisely those individuals brought in through their factional allegiance to Valckenier – Hudde, Huydecoper and, ultimately, Van Beuningen (who, incidentally, was a grandson of Burgh) – who proved to be the undoing of Van Goens, his policies and the career of his son Rijckloff junior. The factional nature of Dutch domestic politics thus did not guarantee stable policy-making in the companies. This effect had been noticed earlier, when the directors became increasingly critical of the policy proposals of Van Goens, while nevertheless supporting him personally. Personnel policy and grand strategy were thus poorly integrated even in the VOC. That Van Goens did not seem to have contemplated changing his policies is also evidence of his stubbornness.

The colonies at the heart of the stories of Johan Maurits and Rijckloff van Goens – Brazil and Ceylon – were in many ways completely different. But they were still closely linked: the open hostilities in Brazil in the 1640s prompted renewed Dutch-Portuguese warfare in Asia from 1652 onwards, and the VOC's conquest of the remaining Portuguese strongholds on Ceylon, in Coromandel and Malabar, was a direct result of the war in Brazil. If the WIC's attempt to conquer Brazil thus marked the 'imperial moment', as Wim Klooster has argued, that imperial moment was transferred to the East in the 1650s, when the VOC conquered a string of Portuguese-controlled towns on Ceylon and in southern India. In both cases, the fundamental problem facing the companies, and their governors, was control over territory and people. In Brazil, the pressing questions included how to secure the cooperation of the Luso-Brazilian mill-owners and sugar planters and how far to extend the borders of the colony. In his construction of a nobleman's court, Johan Maurits gave one possible answer to these questions. In Ceylon, the problem was slightly different: should the company try to exert territorial power at all and, if so, to what extent? Van Goens continued to advocate conquest of the entire island and a much more aggressive, territorial stance for the VOC in the entire South Asian theater of operations. Burgeoning company trades needed to be supported by a strong territorial base and a population of Dutch (or at least European) colonists. Governing over territories with mixed populations of company employees, free Europeans, local inhabitants and a large enslaved population (African in Brazil, and Indian in Ceylon) meant that the companies in Brazil and Ceylon needed to

develop intricate levels of governance that went well beyond running a trading firm. For the governors involved, the creation of local administrations meant there were also more positions available to be filled by patronage. With the exception of Batavia, both Brazil and Ceylon outranked any other company possessions in terms of numbers of employees. Within VOC Asia, Ceylon could even form a credible threat to the supremacy of Batavia in terms of the numbers of soldiers posted, free citizens settled and the value of return goods.

But governing over large numbers of company officials presented risks as well as advantages. Negative news from the colonies could fatally undermine the support for an individual's continued tenure in office among directors in the Republic. Various different strategies were available to mitigate against disgruntled underlings complaining to Europe. A first strategy was, of course, to use patronage to appoint only supportive underlings. And both men applied this strategy while in office, with Van Goens' refusal to accept Lucas van der Dussen's appointment as fiscal and the conflict between Johan Maurits and Christoffel Artichewsky being good examples of this.

A second strategy was to try and control the flow of information from the colony to the Republic. This was much more feasible on Ceylon than in Brazil. There were fewer ships making the voyage from Ceylon to the Netherlands, and the only place of departure was Galle. In addition, these were all company ships, whereas the presence in Brazilian waters of licensed private traders meant a possible loss of information control. In the case of Johan Maurits, therefore, a conscious strategy of discrediting critics, instead of seeking to control information, seems to have been followed, with his outraged reaction to the letter of Artichewsky again being an excellent example.

Similarly, colonial populations needed to be placated so that they would not complain directly to the directors of mismanagement. Johan Maurits was an expert at presenting a picture of support for his policies and his person from the population of Brazil. All his offers of and requests for dismissal were accompanied by protestations from – carefully selected – colonists who argued that his departure from Brazil would mean the immediate ruin of the colony. This policy of purposely sending conflicting information ensured that the fractious WIC would not quickly come to a decision to honor his request to leave. And this leads on to the next level of comparison: the ways the companies operated in the Netherlands.

#### *The companies compared*

Turning from the overseas world to the Dutch Republic itself, this research has highlighted the very different ways in which the companies operated in the Republic itself. The most important and most striking outcome is that comparison with the WIC immediately makes clear how harmonious relations between the various chambers of the VOC were. In the case of the WIC, the interests of the individual chambers were often poorly aligned. This resulted in frequent disagreements between the chambers, while the organization of the company meant these disputes could not be adequately resolved by the XIX. At times, therefore, chambers consciously tried to politicize the company's affairs by appealing to the States of Holland or the States-General. Decisions were frequently overturned if underlying factions within the company temporarily held a majority owing, for example, to meetings of the XIX being held in Zeeland and not all members from other chambers showing up. This meant that even before the company's finances became an inextricable mess, the WIC did not operate as it should have, not least because of the enormity of the task it had burdened itself with. As Jan Glete put it, the WIC

failed to aggregate the interests behind Atlantic trade, colonization, trade and privateering properly. In other words, the company did not become a platform on which these interests could meet, agree on policy and pursue their shared interests. Instead, it became a platform where various interests fought over primacy and tried to subsume others to their particular goals. Instead of being released from the burden of protecting these interests in the Atlantic, the Dutch state thus became ever more responsible for supporting and protecting the interests of the company abroad. This led to the very situation that the company had been designed to prevent, with events in the Atlantic threatening the concord between the allies at home. Despite its institutional shortcomings, however, the WIC was still able to maintain a large army in Brazil for nearly quarter of a century. This is a surprising feat and a topic worthy of further study.

By contrast, the VOC in the Netherlands seems to have been a very consensual and stable organization. There were, of course, differences of opinion between chambers and between factions within individual chambers, but the overall relations between the chambers were much more harmonious than in the case of the WIC. As noted, however, these more amicable relations in the Netherlands did not necessarily make for stable policy-making. The XVII had been critical of the position of Rijckloff van Goens since the early 1670s, yet remained supportive of Van Goens as a person. This made for schizophrenic policy-making, with the VOC being unable to decide whether it was a merchant or a colonial-state. These questions dogged the company for the entirety of its existence.

As the WIC did not survive failure in Brazil, it is worth contemplating whether the continued presence of Johan Maurits in Brazil would have made any difference to the outcome there, as has sometimes been suggested. Given the problems of the WIC, this seems difficult to imagine. Even though he may have enjoyed more loyalty and support from the Luso-Brazilians, Johan Maurits would still have needed money, supplies, fresh recruits and ships from the Netherlands. And all of these were assets that the WIC was increasingly unable to provide. The only conceivable succor for Brazil was a fundamentally different relationship between the Republic and the overseas world, so that the armies and navies of the Republic and its treasury would be used directly to sustain an overseas empire. And it was exactly a change of this magnitude that Johan Maurits proposed when he sent his private secretary to the States-General in 1642. It is no surprise that his proposals to this effect were never implemented as this was exactly what the creation of the companies had been intended to prevent. The early modern Dutch empire, which certainly existed, was predicated on cooperation between the companies and the state. But just as the companies could not function without the Dutch Republic, so, too, was the Republic unable to operate in the overseas world without the companies and their governors.

### **Career end and recollection**

In both cases, dismissal was requested by the governors themselves. In neither case, however, was this their preferred course of action. In the case of Johan Maurits, I have argued that his offer of resignation was not genuine, while Van Goens' return to the Netherlands seems to have at least been partly inspired by a wish to influence the directors to support his elder son, Rijckloff junior. In both cases, a collapse of different networks was at the core of their loss of office. For Johan Maurits, it was his troubled relationship with the directors that led to his departure, while for Van Goens, the trouble started in Asia itself, among his colleagues, and only



then spread to Europe, with the conflict with Van Reede showing the limitations of Van Goens as a patron and the extent to which these undermined his position.

The careers of both individuals within the chartered companies thus ended in acrimony. Indeed, this discord was the reason for my selecting them as research cases in the first place. But their lives beyond the companies also diverged in interesting ways. Van Goens died shortly after returning to the Netherlands in 1682, with his death, and that of his son Rijckloff junior, being followed by a roll-back of some of the policies he had advocated and by the dismantling of his network of clients by the Van Reede mission in the late 1680s and early 1690s. In another way, however, Van Goens had a lasting impact on the VOC. The conquest and fortification of many formerly Portuguese strongholds in Ceylon and southern India fundamentally changed the position of the VOC in the area, with Malabar in particular remaining an unresolved issue for the coming century. On Ceylon, meanwhile, the relationship between the VOC's focus on the procurement of cinnamon and its control over territories and populations remained a point of debate for many years. In the eighteenth century, governor Van Imhoff advocated a return to the agricultural policies advocated by father and son Van Goens, as well as advocating a conquest of Kandy.<sup>613</sup> Despite the purges by Van Reede in the 1680s and 1690s, rivalry between Batavia and Colombo remained a permanent feature of internal VOC relations in Asia, with Van Goens' unfinished business continuing to haunt the company until the end of its existence.

Johan Maurits presents a completely different picture: although the loss of Brazil in 1654 precluded his decisions and tenure from having any long-term effects, he was expertly able to influence the way in which Dutch Brazil was remembered, such that his tenure came to be seen as the 'good period' of the colony. Through the dissemination of his collections of curiosities and art, and the publication of the *Rerum per octennium*, Johan Maurits won the battle for recollections of Brazil and, as a result, was until very recently practically synonymous with the colony. From the ashes of Dutch Brazil, Johan Maurits was able to construct an flattering image of himself that proved a sound basis for his dealings with the elite of Europe over the coming decades.

### Visions of empire

By contrasting the ways in which two individuals made their careers within the chartered companies and by comparing and connecting the colonies they governed and the companies they served, this research contributes to a clearer picture of the early modern Dutch empire. East and West were connected through the entangled elite in the Netherlands, which had a stake in both companies. In addition, events in Brazil had a significant impact on events in Asia, while the VOC's conquest of Cochin and Cannanore had important ramifications for the WIC's ability to collect payment from Portugal for Brazil. Brazil was the 'imperial moment' for the Dutch in the Atlantic, while during his tenure on Ceylon Van Goens made the clearest articulation of the benefits of empire for the VOC in Asia. Through the careers of these governors, therefore, a different view arises of the Dutch Republic as an actor on the world stage in the seventeenth century.

The two governors had visions that are difficult to reconcile with a view of primarily commerce-oriented companies. Van Goens was adamant that securing the VOC's control of the cinnamon trade required colonization of the island by Dutch settlers. In addition, he was not content with merely controlling the island's coastal lands as his ultimate goal was to conquer the

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<sup>613</sup> Van Dulm, 'Zonder eigen gewinne en glorie', 42.

island in its entirety. This support for colonization changed over time. Initially, in the 1660s and early 1670s, Van Goens had wanted colonists to engage in agriculture as well as commerce. To this end, the VOC needed to help them set up farms and plantations and allow them to become involved in the intra-Asian trades, primarily with Madurai, Malabar, Coromandel and Bengal. By 1675, however, this vision had changed. The colonists' lack of success in setting up farms contrasted with their success in the intra-Asian trades from Ceylon. Though the colonists had initially been unable to compete with local merchants, especially those from Bengal, the VOC's support in the 1670s created a protected market, with the result that trade by colonists flourished to such an extent that it threatened the VOC's own trades. By 1675, therefore, Van Goens was no longer in favor of measures intended to support the colonists in their trade. This shows the difficulty of reconciling ideas of settlement and the rights of settlers with the very jealous protection of the company's privileges. All the same, Van Goens' insistence on the need to secure the VOC's possessions in Asia by means of sovereign control of territory, colonization and strong armed forces seems far removed from a supposedly pacific, mercantile Dutch version of empire-building. The strength of the VOC's self-image as a merchant firm rather than an Asian state is reflected in the backlash against Van Goens' ideas that continued to dog the VOC for more than a century.

Johan Maurits, too, developed a vision of empire that was unpleasant to the WIC's directors. In the case of the WIC, this vision was made more difficult by the company's signal inability to make up its mind on any issue for any length of time. Johan Maurits insisted, for example, that the rights of the Portuguese planters be respected since any successful colony would require their cooperation. Combined with his support for free trade, this presents a vision of an empire more concerned with control of territory and production than with the monopoly on shipping that the WIC pursued. Though Johan Maurits was in all likelihood correct in his assessment, these suggestions are likely to have harmed his base of support in Zeeland, which was in favor of strict adherence to the monopoly. This lack of realism in the chambers of the WIC is especially striking. Furthermore, Johan Maurits correctly grasped the integrated nature of the South Atlantic system. He understood that, after its capture, Angola should resort under Brazil. But the insistence of the WIC directors that the *de facto* organizational model should be maintained, whereby all regions reported to the Netherlands separately, meant that Angola was separated from Brazil. Without enslaved Africans Brazil could not function, and only Angola could provide them; arguing for the inclusion of Angola in the Brazilian government was thus a logical position to take.

### **Principals and agents**

The appointments, career sustainment and dismissals of Johan Maurits and Rijckloff van Goens also shed new light on the principal-agent problem in the early modern world. While the historiography, such as it is, focuses on institutionalized solutions (contracts, bonds and salaries), the two cases studied point to different solutions in the Dutch context. In the case of Van Goens and the VOC, direct familial links between directors and important agents overseas (governors, commanders and members of the High Government) ensured that VOC agents overseas were at least committed to serving a familial interest that went well beyond short-term financial gain. By offering the prospect that service in the East would mean possible accession into the urban administrations in the Netherlands, the company directors were able to present company service as a viable method of both intragenerational and intergenerational social mobility.

Another way to achieve this same effect was by extending patronage links from directors to governors overseas. This was a logical extension to the overseas area of client networks that leading regents were supposed to support. By connecting to overseas agents through patronage, directors could at the very least try to ensure that agents overseas remained loyal to their interests within the company by, for example, helping family members to gain promotion. Again, there are multiple examples from the career of Van Goens where this was clearly on display. As a consequence of this patronage, future research should pay far more attention to divisions within the body of directors.

As long as the goal remained a return to the Netherlands, high company officials needed to keep their self-enrichment within limits deemed by the directors to be acceptable. This did not mean, however, that private trade was impossible or always problematic. By allowing specific individuals to profit from private trade, the directors could reward servants seen as useful or loyal. This last point is especially clear in the case of Van Goens. He was seen as a loyal servant of the VOC, but was still able to amass a fortune of one hundred thousand guilders by the mid-1650s. Surely this was the result of illegal private trade? But allowing higher officials to transfer such sums to the Netherlands after years of service in the East was a way of encouraging other employees to sign up for another tour in the East in the hope that they, too, would be allowed to acquire and bring home a fortune. The close relations between Van Goens and at least some of the VOC directors meant that he could be trusted not to bankrupt the company in Asia, given that this would have harmed his connections in the Netherlands who were important to the future prospects of Van Goens and his children.

The reverse may have applied in the case of Johan Maurits. By appointing an outsider to the highest position, the WIC directors communicated to their employees in Brazil and elsewhere that their career prospects would encounter a ceiling, thus encouraging them to increase their short-term profits by embezzling funds and engaging in private trade to the detriment of the company. Regardless of the personal merits of Johan Maurits, his appointment clearly communicated to all WIC personnel that there was a very real limit to their ability to effect social mobility through the company. This while the opportunity to achieve social advancement, for oneself or one's children, was a crucial motivation for individuals to enlist with the companies in the first place. In the WIC's case, appointing an outsider undermined this motivation and so also undermined the empire that the company hoped to build. In both cases, therefore, the failure or success of the companies that the two men served were crucially influenced by the careers and career opportunities of their servants.

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## Summary in Dutch

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Dit proefschrift toont aan dat carrière maken in de geötrooieerde Nederlandse compagnieën van de zeventiende eeuw een kwestie was van het maken van de juiste connecties. Door in detail de benoemingen, periode in bestuur en het ontslag van twee koloniale gouverneurs te onderzoeken laat dit proefschrift zien hoe patronage en patrimonialisme invloed uitoefenden op de samenstelling van het bestuur overzee. Ook stelt de vergelijking tussen Oost en West, VOC en WIC, het proefschrift in staat bij te dragen aan discussies over de redenen voor de mislukking van de WIC, de geötrooieerde compagnie als organisatievorm en de specifieke kolonies Ceylon en Brazilië. De onderzochte gouverneurs, Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679) en Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens (1619-1682) laten zien dat de geötrooieerde compagnieën zich al vroeg ontpopten tot koloniale bestuursorganisaties. Beiden zouden zich niet herkennen in het stereotiep van de VOC (of WIC) als de voorloper van de moderne NV. Uit de denkbeelden en geschriften van beiden komt duidelijk naar voren dat controle over territorium en bevolking een hoofddoel was binnen hun visies van de rol van de compagnieën overzee. Deze uitgesproken visies vormen ook een belangrijke reden voor het ontslag van beiden. Door voor zowel de VOC als de WIC in detail te onderzoeken hoe steun voor een individu bij aanstelling omsloeg naar afkeuring en uiteindelijk leidde tot ontslag laat het proefschrift zien hoe compagniesbeleid in de praktijk gevormd werd en waar de twee compagnieën van elkaar verschilden.

De twee compagnieën in wiens dienst de beide gouverneurs het bewind voerden in hun respectieve kolonies hebben overeenkomsten en een aantal belangrijke verschillen. Gezien de lof die het organisatiemodel van de VOC in de literatuur wordt toegewuifd is het de vraag waarom de vergelijkbare organisatie van de WIC tot een zo teleurstellend resultaat leidde. De WIC laat in vergelijking met de VOC een aantal opvallende verschillen zien in de organisatie die dit helpen te verklaren. Het meest opvallend is de rol van de Heren XIX in vergelijking met die van de Heren XVII bij de VOC. Waar de laatsten in de praktijk steeds meer een centraal bestuur gingen vormen waar beslissingen werden genomen die vervolgens uitgevoerd werden door de kamers, onderging the WIC deze ontwikkeling niet. Het centrale bestuur van de Heren XIX stond veel meer op een gespannen voet met de kamers en kon de soms hoog oplopende conflicten tussen de kamers voorkomen noch oplossen. In de praktijk richtten de kamers zich daarom steeds vaker tot de Staten-Generaal om te helpen de interne conflicten te beslechten. Dit had ook een effect op de benoemingsprocedure van gouverneurs. Waar de benoeming van Rijckloff van Goens tot directeur-generaal door de Heren XVII werd genomen, waarschijnlijk op instigatie van in diens patronen in de kamer Amsterdam, laat de benoeming van Johan Maurits in 1636 een heel ander patroon zien. Hier werd uitdrukkelijk afgesproken dat deze benoeming een zaak was van de Heren XIX waar de kamers niet in gekend hoefden te worden. Het is evident dat dit de positie van Johan Maurits ten opzichte van de kamers niet sterker maakte.

Een ander opvallend verschil in de manieren waarop de beide compagnieën bestuurders overzee benoemden is te zien in de functies van de raden waarmee beide gouverneurs moesten werken. Bestuur in de koloniën was in het Nederlandse geval altijd een collectieve aangelegenheid. De functie van gouverneur of gouverneur-generaal laat zich het best omschrijven als dat van een voorzitter van een koloniaal bestuurscollege. Gouverneurs konden niet of slechts bij hoge uitzondering zelf beslissingen nemen, in de normale gang van zaken waren beslissingen een aangelegenheid van de hele raad waar zaken door stemming werden besloten. In het geval van de VOC waren de functies als lid van de verschillende raden, waarvan de Hoge Regering van Indië in Batavia de hoogste was, zowel begerenswaardige posities om na te streven voor ambitieus personeel, als een bestand waaruit de hoogste gezagdragers werden gerekruteerd. Door uit het eigen personeelsbestand te rekruteren liet de VOC aan werknemers zien dat bevordering naar de hoogste rangen een mogelijkheid was bij een lang dienstverband. De WIC daarentegen benoemde haar gouverneur-generaal direct vanuit de Republiek. De keuze voor Johan Maurits was ingegeven door binnenlandse politieke overwegingen in de Republiek. De raadsleden die samen met hem werden aangesteld, Johan Gijsselingh, Matthias van Ceulen en Adriaen van der Dussen waren bewindhebbers toen

ze werden aangesteld als raden in het bestuur van Brazilië. Dit is in de WIC-geschiedenis geen uitzondering. Meer dan de VOC probeerde de WIC bestuur in Patria en overzee te integreren door bewindhebbers te benoemen in het bestuur van, of af te vaardigen naar, de kolonies. Dit had wel als gevolg dat de tegenstellingen tussen de kamers ook het overzeese bestuur gingen plagen en dat toezicht op het bestuur lastiger was. Bewindhebbers lieten zich minder goed door andere bewindhebbers controleren.

Tegen deze bestuurlijke en organisatorische achtergronden werden beide individuen aangesteld als gouverneur of gouverneur-generaal van beide compagnieën. De gelijkkluidende titels verhullen ook hier belangrijke verschillen. Johan Maurits was officieel de ‘Gouverneur-, Luitenant- en Admiraal-Generaal van de Conquesten in Brazilië’ een titel die gemodelleerd lijkt naar die van de stadhouder in de Republiek. Maar de functie van WIC gouverneur-generaal in Brazilië was minder alomvattend dan zijn titelgenoot in Batavia. De laatste stond aan het hoofd van het gehele VOC-apparaat in Azië, terwijl Johan-Maurits alleen Brazilië en Maranhao onder zich had en zelfs moest dulden dat Angola als een apart bestuur werd georganiseerd. Ook hier lijkt het WIC-bestuur in de Republiek meer moeite te hebben gehad met het uit handen geven van macht. Opvallend is dat de WIC bezittingen in het Atlantisch gebied veelal niet met elkaar in connectie stonden, elkaar niet konden bijstaan en aparte contacten met het bestuur in Nederland onderhielden. Hoewel de vroegmoderne Atlantische wereld getypeerd werd door connecties binnen het Atlantisch gebied, werkten deze connecties niet ten faveur van het WIC-bestuur, in tegendeel. De aanstellingen van de beide gouverneurs laten verschillende wegen naar de top zien. In het geval van Van Goens ging een lange carrière binnen de compagnie vooraf aan zijn benoeming tot gouverneur van Ceylon en uiteindelijk (in 1678) tot gouverneur-generaal. Johan Maurits werd direct vanuit de Republiek aangesteld als hoogste bestuurder in de meest belangrijke kolonie van de WIC. Dit illustreert goed de verschillende netwerken die nodig waren voor een hoge aanstelling, maar ook dat niet alle netwerken op elk moment van even groot belang waren. De vroege carrière van Van Goens lijkt belangrijk te zijn beïnvloed door zijn huwelijk met Jacomina Roosegaard, een wat oudere weduwe van de garnizoenscommandant van Batavia. Het is waarschijnlijk dat hij via haar in contact kwam met de leden van de Hoge Regering en zo in aanmerking kwam voor promotie. Succesvol optreden in Azië leidde tot een aanstelling als commandeur van de retourvloot en daarmee kreeg Van Goens de gelegenheid om zijn denkbeelden aan de bewindslieden in de Republiek voor te leggen.

De aanstelling van Johan Maurits laat zich minder goed verklaren door zijn eerdere functioneren. Zijn rol in de belegering van de Schenkenschans was minder belangrijk dan wel is beweerd. Op het moment van benoeming (juni 1636) was Johan Maurits praktisch failliet door de hoge kosten die de bouw van het Mauritshuis met zich mee brachten. Ook had hij geen ervaring in handel of bestuur en was hij nog nooit buiten Europa geweest. Waarom dan toch het bestuur van de belangrijkste WIC-kolonie aan hem toevertrouwen? Het antwoord licht besloten in de figuur die zijn benoeming voorstelde: Albert Coenraets. Burgh, WIC-bewindhebber van het eerste uur, lid van de vroedschap van Amsterdam en toekomstig burgemeester. Burgh onderhield namens Amsterdam ook de contacten met de stadhouder, Frederik Hendrik. De benoeming van de neef van de stadhouder tot de belangrijkste WIC-functionaris overzee lijkt alleen vatbaar te zijn in het perspectief van de relaties tussen Amsterdam en de stadhouder.

In functie hadden beide gouverneurs een verantwoordelijkheid naar de bewindhebbers van de beide compagnieën. Maar om hun functie te behouden moesten ze ook collega's in de koloniën tevreden houden. Ook moest voorkomen worden dat kolonisten of lokale bevolking het compagniesbestuur dwars zouden zitten of zouden klagen over het bestuur. Hiermee hadden beide gouverneurs problemen. Van Goens kon op Ceylon in de jaren zestig nog wel rivalen buitenspel zetten en door een strakke controle van uitgaande brieven een effectief informatie over de werkelijke toestand op het eiland controleren; na de oorlog met Kandy in 1670 werd dit lastiger. Om andere compagniespersoneel aan zich te binden zetten beide mannen patronagerelaties in. In het geval van Van Goens was zijn directe band met de bewindhebbers een sterk voordeel, dit werd nog versterkt na 1665 door de directe scheepvaartverbindingen met Patria vanuit Galle. Van Goens kon effectief de Hoge Regering in Batavia omzeilen en zo zijn favorieten aan goede banen in Ceylon helpen. Het belangrijkste middel van Johan

Maurits om WIC-dienaren in Brazilië aan zich te binden was zijn hofhouding. De vrije tafel die Johan Maurits en zijn hofhouding genoten was cruciaal. Hoewel het WIC-bestuur zich waarschijnlijk iets anders had voorgesteld, liet Johan Maurits geregeld vijftig mensen of meer mee-eten. De kosten hiervoor bedroegen in 1643 ongeveer 9000 gulden in de maand. Door de bestuurlijke elite van de kolonie elke dag van eten te voorzien kon Johan Maurits de graaf in Brazilië de formele hiërarchische relatie van Johan Maurits de gouverneur-generaal tot dat bestuur vervangen door een persoonlijke. Hierdoor viel voor een belangrijk gedeelte het toezicht op zijn functioneren weg. Dit bleek al duidelijk in de affaire Artichefsky, waarin de door het WIC-bestuur in Nederland benoemde Christoffel Artichefsky, een veteraan van de eerdere campagnes in Brazilië, in 1639 zonder veel omhaal terug werd gestuurd omdat zijn functieomschrijving een belediging zou zijn voor Johan Maurits. In de brieven gaf de laatste ook al aan dat hij dacht dat Artichefsky was benoemd om zijn functioneren in de gaten te houden. Pottenkijkers die niet gebonden konden worden aan het hof van de graaf werden dus uit Brazilië geweerd. Het mag geen wonder heten dat de verhouding tussen gouverneur-generaal en de WIC-bewindhebbers meer en meer bekoelde. In het geval van Van Goens is de benoeming in Batavia in 1676 een keerpunt: in Ceylon had hij een sterk netwerk opgebouwd wat hem beschermde voor kritiek, in Batavia had hij die steun niet. In zijn afwezigheid van Ceylon was er ook meer ruimte voor kritiek op zijn beleid en deze kritieken wisten nu ook de bewindhebbers te bereiken. De positie van Van Goens werd meer en meer onhoudbaar.

Hoewel beide gouverneurs werden ontslagen en na ontslag ook de door hen opgebouwde netwerken overzee werden ontmanteld, hadden ze toch een belangrijk effect op de compagnieën. Voor de WIC bewindhebbers was het ontslag van Johan Maurits een aanleiding om het hele bestuur opnieuw op de schop te gooien. Dit vond plaats op het moment dat de opstand van de Portugezen in Brazilië losbarstte. Gedurende een cruciale periode was het bestuur van Brazilië verzwakt. De visie van Van Goens op de VOC als territoriale macht in Zuid-Azië en de daarmee gepaard gaande hoge kosten maakten het VOC-bestuur in Nederland in de decennia na 1680 afkerig van militaire uitgaven en directe territoriale controle. Hierdoor kon de VOC in het midden van de achttiende eeuw niet goed inspringen op de veranderende omstandigheden in India die juist meer militaire uitgaven en direct bestuur vereisten. De compagnieën werden blijvend beïnvloed door de visies en het functioneren van Van Goens en Johan Maurits.



## Curriculum vitae

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Erik Lars Leendert Odegard was born in Amersfoort on the 28<sup>th</sup> of November 1986. After completing his secondary education at the Stdelijk Gymnasium Johan van Oldenbarnevelt in Amersfoort, he studied history at Leiden University, obtaining his Bachelor's degree in maritime history in 2009 and his research master's in Colonial and Global history in 2012. In September of that year he started his research as a PhD in Leiden in the NOW-funded project 'Challenging Monopolies Building Empires in the Early Modern period' supervised by dr. Catia Antunes. During his PhD Erik became the first research fellow at the National Archives of the Netherlands, working on the VOC-collection. After completion of his PhD-contract, Erik taught history at Leiden University. In December 2017 he received the Ernst Crone fellowship for maritime history at the Maritime Museum in Amsterdam. Erik is the review editor for the *Tijdschrift voor Zeegechiedenis*.

## Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift van Erik Odegard

### Colonial Careers: Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, Rijckloff Volckertsz. van Goens and Career-making in the Early Modern Dutch Empire

1. Om een succesvolle carrière in de koloniën op te bouwen moesten individuen een band opbouwen met drie verschillende groepen: bewindhebbers in de Republiek, collegae overzee en met de lokale of koloniale samenleving waarin zij zich bevonden.
2. Beide gouverneurs laten een visie op koloniaal bestuur zien die zich slecht laat rijmen met het gangbare beeld van het vroegmoderne Nederlandse imperium als zijnde louter maritiem. In de denkbeelden van Van Goens en Johan Maurits nam de controle van territorium een belangrijke plaats in.
3. In het debat over het *principal-agent* probleem is te weinig aandacht voor de persoonlijke banden – familiebanden of patronagerelaties – die controle konden faciliteren of juist ondermijnen.
4. Carrière binnen de VOC was in de 17<sup>e</sup> eeuw voor een belangrijk gedeelte afhankelijk van het maken van de juiste connecties. Dit maakt het echter nog geen nepotisme. Men kon geen carrière maken zonder goede connecties, maar om goede connecties op te bouwen waren eigen kwaliteiten een vereiste.
5. De conflicten rond de hofhouding van Johan Maurits in Brazilië laten goed zien dat zijn functioneren als Gouverneur-Generaal namens de WIC in conflict kwam met zijn positie als edelman in Brazilië.
6. Het verdient aanbeveling dat het succesvolle TANAP programma wordt uitgebreid naar het Atlantisch gebied, of dat er een Atlantische tegenhanger opgericht wordt voor studenten en onderzoekers uit Suriname, Guyana, Brazilië, Ghana, Senegal, Angola, Tobago en de Verenigde Staten.
7. Gezien de rijke Braziliaanse literatuur over de WIC-kolonie in Noordoost Brazilië verdient het aanbeveling dat er een fonds gesticht wordt om goed Portugeestalig onderzoek uit Brazilië in het Nederlands te vertalen.
8. Het huidige slavernijdebat laat zien dat elke generatie haar eigen geschiedenis ontdekt. In dit bestek is de figuur van Johan Maurits erg interessant. Een ouder al te positief beeld, mede ingegeven door de tolerantie ten opzichte van Joden, slaat nu om naar een negatiever beeld, ingegeven door zijn houding ten opzichte van slavernij. Dit laat zien dat het vellen van morele oordelen over het verleden niet eenvoudig is en niet eenduidig kan.
9. In de historiografie van het Nederlandse koloniale rijk wordt de cesuur van 1795 al te strak getrokken. Juist in het bestuur van het imperium is het interessant om te kijken naar de continuïteiten in de periodes voor en na 1795.
10. Het is hoog tijd dat de koloniale en maritieme geschiedenis van de Bataafse Republiek onderzocht wordt.
11. Het valt te verwachten dat de Europese defensiesamenwerking en taakspecialisatie gebruikt zal worden als excuus om verder in de defensieorganisatie en –budget te snijden.

