Achieving party unity : a sequential approach to why MPs act in concert

Vonno, C.M.C. van

Achieving Party Unity

A Sequential Approach to Why MPs Act in Concert

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Cynthia Maria Cornelia van Vonno

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Promotor
Prof.dr. R.B. Andeweg

Promotiecommissie
Prof.dr. I.C. van Biezen, Universiteit Leiden
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Prof.dr. R.A. Koole, Universiteit Leiden
Prof.dr. J.J.A. Thomassen, Universiteit Twente

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Introduction

1.1 Research question

In most (European) parliamentary democracies individual Members of Parliament (MPs)[1] are constitutionally ordained as the main representative actors. Yet the political parties to which MPs belong are also considered to be actors—in fact key actors—in these parliaments. Both political theory as well as empirical political science have tended to resolve this tension between the constitutional position of individual MPs and the role of political parties to which MPs belong in favor of latter, thereby privileging the political party group as the main representative actor and object of scientific investigation.

In normative political theory the *mandate-independence controversy* (Pitkin, 1967), which revolves around the dyadic representative relationship between an individual MP and his constituents, was replaced by an almost complete adherence to the *responsible party model* introduced by the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 1950. Whereas the former comes close to neglecting political parties, the latter considers political parties to be the main representative actors. In fact, E.E. Schattschneider, the chairman of the APSA Committee on Political Parties, contended that "political parties created democracy and [...] modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties" (1942, XXVII). One of the requirements of the *responsible party model* is the precondition that MPs who belong to the same political party ought to behave in concert in order to enable the political party to implement its policy program. In other words, political party groups ought to act as unitary actors (Thomassen, 1994, 252).

From a more rationalist theoretical perspective, political party organizations are held to solve collective action problems, inherent to the political process, in both the electoral and legislative arena (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). In the electoral arena, political parties present voters with a limited number of policy programs which they promise to enact,

[1] For the sake of consistency and clarity, individual Members of Parliament (MPs) are referred to using masculine pronouns, but readers should be aware that *he/him/his/his/himself* also refer to *she/her/hers/herself*. This also holds for the more general terms 'legislator' and 'representative'.

and the party label therefore functions as a valuable cue that allows voters to predict what candidates running under the label will do once elected. In the legislative arena, unified political party groups mean that the parties in the executive can count on the support of their parliamentary counterpart, which enables them to enact into laws the policies they promised during the campaign. In other words, unified political parties enable the constitutional chain of delegation (Strøm et al., 2003), and without them the accountability of the executive and legislature to voters "falls flat" (Bowler et al., 1999a, 3), or at least is arguably more difficult to realize.

In line with the so-called virtue of unified political parties, there is a tendency to point to the significance of MPs' dissent. Indeed, the effect of MPs' dissent may range from the relatively inconsequential defeat of a government bill, to the destabilization of the party (group) leadership, to the fall of the government (Kam, 2009, 7-11). The desirability of unified political parties, however, can also be questioned. The increase in electoral volatility and decrease in political party membership (Katz et al., 1992; Mair and Van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen et al., 2012) found in many European democracies since the 1970s, cast doubt upon the legitimacy of political parties as representatives of voters and party members, especially in terms of political parties' responsiveness and accountability. If political parties' programs are not deemed representative translations of the electorate's and party members' preferences, then the representativeness of political parties, and the virtue of their unity, may also be disputed.

One could also take issue with unified political party groups when it comes to the legislature's ability to hold the executive accountable. In the Netherlands, for example, the 2003 rapport on the electoral system by minister De Graaf argued that highly disciplined, unified parliamentary party groups are problematic for the tradition of the strong separation of powers between the executive and legislative branch of government. In the United Kingdom, the 2000 Committee on Strengthening Parliament, chaired by Lord Norton of Louth, also identified the development of strong parties as contributing to the imbalance in the relationship between parliament and government, in that unified parliamentary party groups limit the ability of parliamentarians to hold government accountable. Thus, one can debate whether unified political parties enable the constitutional chain of delegation and accountability, or stand in its way.

That in practice parliamentary party group unity is the rule rather than the exception in (European) parliamentary democracies, at least in terms of parliamentary voting behavior, has led many scholars to treat party group unity as an assumption, or to take it as a given, rather than a phenomenon in need of explanation (Bowler et al., 1999a; Olson, 2003). Indeed, in numerous studies of representation, parliamentary behavior, and coalition formation, the political party group is considered the main unit of analysis (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a). Kam (2009, 2) refers to this view of the party group as a unitary actor as the orthodox view—"MPs' deviations from the party line being so infrequent and inconsequential that they can safely be ignored". This perspective is not limited to political scientists, however. In his theoretical analysis of the causes of party group unity in Germany, Patzelt (2003, 102) notes that "[b]y and large, legislators' individual voting behavior seems to be an issue of no real interest in Germany. [...] final unity of action is taken for granted to such a degree that neither the margin or actual

composition of a German cabinet's majority on the floor is treated as a topic worthy of documentation or analysis".

Although parliamentary party group voting unity may be quite common, 'normal' (Olson, 2003, 165) or even 'natural' (Patzelt, 2003, 102) in (European) parliamentary democracies, this is not say that it is equally high in all party groups, or that party group voting unity is just as common in legislatures and parties in other parts of the world. There is now a substantial body of comparative empirical research that looks at how institutional differences explain (cross-national) variations in party group voting unity (Carey, 2009; Depauw, 2003; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Sieberer, 2006). These studies undeniably contribute to our knowledge of party group voting unity across systems and our understanding of how voting unity may vary with and within institutional configurations. Jensen (2000, 210) argues, however, that if one seeks an in-depth understanding of party group unity and how it is brought about, merely looking at the outcome—parliamentary voting—is not enough. Moreover, studying the direct relationship between legislative, electoral, and party institutions and voting behavior does not allow one to distinguish between the different theoretically plausible ways in which party group voting unity is brought about. Widely recognized, for example, is that party unity may result from parties, but more specifically party groups, consisting of MPs who share the same policy preferences (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Bowler et al., 1999a; Kam, 2001a, 2009; Krehbiel, 1993, 2000). Rational-choice perspectives emphasize that party group unity may also be the consequence of party (group) leaders 'whipping' their MPs (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Bowler et al., 1999a; Hazan, 2003; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009; Krehbiel, 1993, 2000; Ozbudun, 1970). Sociological approaches, which emphasize the internalization of norms and role conceptions, add that party group unity may also arise from MPs' shared sense of allegiance to the party (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Hazan, 2003; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009). Finally, Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) as well as Skjaeveland (2001) and Whitaker (2005), point out that cue-taking may also serve as a pathway to party group unity. This entails that MPs take their voting cues from their party group specialist or spokesperson as a result of the division of labor within their party group.

Comparative scholars often make assumptions and theoretical arguments about the presence of these pathways to party group voting unity and how they may be influenced by institutions. Institutions are, for example, argued to influence the constellation of MPs and their policy preferences in parliament, thereby affecting the homogeneity of preferences within party groups (Carey, 2007; Depauw, 2003; Sieberer, 2006). Those same institutions are also, however, expected to instill in MPs particular norms of loyalty to potentially multiple actors with competing policy preferences (Kam, 2009), and provide MPs with incentives to either cooperate or compete with their fellow party group members (Carey, 2007; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Sieberer, 2006). At the same time, institutions are held to equip these competing principals, including political party (group) leaders, with carrots and sticks to elicit cooperation from their MPs (Carey, 2007; Depauw, 2003; Sieberer, 2006). Whether these pathways are actually and equally affected by institutional settings has, however, rarely been put to the test, since most studies that do deal with them consist of single-case studies that focus on one theoretical ap-

Figure 1.1: The study of party group unity



proach that highlights one pathway.[2] Scholars may thus claim that party groups that vote in unity are 'cohesive', 'homogeneous', 'disciplined' or 'loyal' as a result of these institutions, but to be frank, we do not actually know which (combinations of) pathways are at work, because the relative contribution of each of these pathways to party group unity is impossible to determine on the basis of voting behavior alone, as is the effect of institutions on these pathways.

Moreover, studies that assume that parliamentary party groups are unified, as well as those that look at the relationship between institutions and party group voting unity, tend to pay insufficient attention to the fact that these groups consist of individuals, and that party group unity results the decisions made by individuals when casting their votes (Becher and Sieberer, 2008). As pointed out by Laver (1999, 23-24) "[t]he danger of the unitary actor assumption in this context is that it may encourage us to take a quite unwarranted anthropomorphic view of how parties decide. [...] Yet a political party comprises a group of individuals, and each individual not only has his or her own utility function but is clearly capable of autonomous action".[3] Studying only the outcome—party group voting unity—, however, does not allow one to gauge *how* MPs come to vote in concert; *why* individual MPs vote with the party group line. These research questions form the starting point for the studies included in this book.

The theoretical argument put forward in this book is that the different pathways to party group unity mentioned above can be viewed as affecting MPs' decision-making process, and that this decision-making process is likely to consist of a chain of multiple steps that are ordered in a particular sequence (see Figure 1.1). In deciding whether to toe the party group line, an MP first asks himself whether he has an opinion on the vote

[2] See Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) for an exception of a single-case study, and Kam (2009) for an exception of a comparative analysis, that deal with more than one pathway.

[3] Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991, 26-27) make a similar argument, in that the unitary actor assumption ignores the chain of delegation within political parties themselves and the principal-agent relationship political parties engage in with their own MPs, as well as potential agency related problems political parties may encounter: "the very same problems of collective action that delegation is intended to overcome—prisoners' dilemma, lack of coordination, and social choice instability—can re-emerge to afflict either the collective agent or collective principal".

at hand. Due to the substantial workload of parliament and resultant division of labor applied within parliamentary party group, an MP may not have an opinion on all topics that are put to a vote in parliament. If the MP does not have an opinion, he will follow the voting cues given to him by his fellow party group member who is a specialist, or acts as the parliamentary party spokesperson, on the topic. This first decision-making mechanism resembles the cue-taking pathway to party group unity forwarded by Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a), Skjaeveland (2001) and Whitaker (2005).

If the MP does have an opinion on the vote at hand, he moves on to the second decision-making stage. Now, he ascertains whether his own opinion on the vote is in agreement with his party group's position. If so, he will vote in accordance with the party group line out of simple agreement. This decision-making mechanism is based on the preference homogeneity pathway, which holds that party group unity results from the fact that an individual is likely to join the political party with the policy program that most closely reflects his own political preferences, and parties are likely to select candidates for office whose policy preferences match those of the party (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Carey, 2007; Depauw, 2003; Krehbiel, 1993; Sieberer, 2006). An MP's opinion on a specific vote can further be (in)formed through the process of deliberation within the party group.

If the MP does not agree with his party group's position, however, he moves on to the third decision-making mechanism, party group loyalty. If an MP subscribes to the norm of party group loyalty, he will disregard his own opinion and opt for the position of his party group of his own accord. This decision-making mechanism reflects the pathway to party group unity emphasized by sociological perspectives. An MP votes with the party group out of a sense of duty, because he is aware of the expectations associated with his role as a delegate of his political party. He thus follows a 'logic of appropriateness' (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Hazan, 2003; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009; Norton, 2003).

If the MP does not subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, or his conflict with the party group's position is so intense that his loyalty does not supersede his disagreement, he could be moved to still vote with the party group in response to the anticipation, threat, promise or actual application of party discipline in the form of positive and negative sanctions, which is the fourth decision-making stage. This is the pathway to party group unity specified by rational choice inspired approaches that maintain that political behavior is determined by a 'logic of consequentiality' (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Hazan, 2003; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009; Krehbiel, 1993; Norton, 2003). Finally, if the MP has an opinion on the topic that is at odds with the position of his party group, he does not subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, and is not amenable to positive and negative sanctions, the MP will dissent and vote against the party group line.

This sequential decision-making model is admittedly not exhaustive, as it focuses on the relationship between an MP and his party group, and thus pays less attention to other potential actors that may (attempt to) influence an MP's behavior. It does provide a clear and structured model of MP decision making when it comes to voting with the party group. The first aim of this study is to ascertain the relative role that each of these decision-making stages plays in determining MPs' voting behavior in parliament. The

fact that the mechanisms are placed in a certain order is important for our understanding of how party group unity is brought about. If most MPs usually simply agree with the party group's position, for example, disciplinary measures by the political party (group) leadership are likely to be otiose, and describing party groups as 'disciplined' bodies thus paints a false picture. If, alternatively, party discipline turns out to be the most important determinant of party group unity, referring to party groups as 'homogeneous' or 'cohesive blocs' would be inaccurate, as according to the sequential decision-making model, party discipline only becomes necessary when MPs do not agree with the party group line and do not subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty.

The second aim of this study is to test the assumptions and theoretical arguments that scholars make concerning the influence of institutions on the different decision-making mechanisms. It may be, for example, that parties' candidate selection methods have a strong impact on the number of MPs who usually agree with the party group line in the first place, whereas electoral systems are relatively more important in determining the number of MPs who subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty. These findings may be interesting for policymakers and political reformers who deem unified party groups undesirable or argue that political parties' programs are not representative translations of the electorate's preferences. Following the first example above, if MPs' agreement with the party group's position is the most important determinant of their voting behavior, and this agreement is found to be influenced mainly by parties' candidate selection methods and not by electoral institutions, then reforming the electoral system as suggested by the 2003 Dutch report by minister De Graaf would not have the effect of making the parliamentary body as a whole more representative of the electorates preferences, as party candidate selection takes place before elections do. Alternatively, if political reformers would like to see MPs to be more responsive and loyal to their voters, and MPs' decision to vote with the party group out of loyalty is mainly affected by the electoral system, then altering the electoral system may have that effect.

Individual MPs' answers to questions included in various elite surveys are used to gauge the presence and relative contribution of each of these decision-making mechanisms. The first two studies in this book both rely on the 2010 international-comparative PartiRep MP Survey, which was held in 15 countries among members of 60 national and subnational parliaments. The comparative character of the survey allows us to study how the relative contributions of the different MP decision-making mechanisms differ per parliament, and whether these differences may be explained by the different institutional configurations. The third study combines the Dutch responses from the 2010 PartiRep MP Survey with the Dutch Parliamentary Studies, which were held in 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 and 2006. The Dutch case is a representative case in terms of the electoral volatility and decrease in party membership found in many European parliamentary democracies, and these survey data allow us to study whether the use of the different mechanisms has changed over time. These specific data sets are discussed more elaborately in the corresponding chapters. It should be noted, however, that as the three studies in this book rely on different data sets that do not all include identical or equally appropriate measure for each decision-making mechanism, it is not possible to include the full sequence of decision-making mechanisms in all three studies and comparisons

across the analyses should be done carefully.[4]

Logically, the ultimate dependent variable in a study of party group unity would be MPs' final behavioral outcome, usually operationalized as legislative voting. When possible and if available, aggregate voting patterns are presented in order to gauge and discuss general trends and differences, although there are limitations in terms of valid comparability due to the wide variation in voting practices across parliaments, and the fact that the voting data may reflect different periods of time (and thus different MPs). This, in combination with the fact that the surveys are anonymized and we thus do not know which response belongs to which MP, unfortunately makes it impossible to connect MPs' survey responses to their voting behavior in parliament.[5] Even if it were possible to connect MPs' survey responses to their voting behavior, the fact that party group voting unity in European democracies is very high, in some parliaments almost perfect, would make statistically testing the relative explanatory power of each of the mechanisms difficult. Furthermore, even if there was enough variance in terms of MPs' voting behavior in parliament at the aggregate level, and it were possible to connect MPs' survey responses to their voting behavior, the ultimate test of the sequentiality of the model would be to apply the model to MPs' decisions regarding specific votes. These data-related problems make the study of party unity in general, and the assessment of the sequential decision-making model specifically, more difficult, but nonetheless do not make the study at hand less interesting.

1.2 Plan of the book

First, chapter 2 reviews the history and study of representation, in both normative and empirical theory, paying special attention to the representational role ascribed to respectively the individual MP and the political party as a unitary actor. Chapter 3 then moves on to review the theoretical and empirical literature on party group (voting) unity and the pathways to party group unity, leading to the further development of the sequential decision-making model introduced above. Next, the mechanisms in the sequential decision-making model are explored in three separate studies. As stated above, individual MPs' answers to questions included in various elite surveys are used to gauge the presence and relative contribution of each of these decision-making mechanisms. Furthermore, in each chapter hypotheses are developed and then tested regarding the effects of different settings on each of the stages of MPs' decision making. Thus, the decision-making mechanisms are the main dependent variables.

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[4] The PartiRep MP Survey was translated into 14 different languages by the respective members of the PartiRep project. We assume that that this was done with utmost precision and care, but we cannot rule out that the translation process, as well as cultural context, resulted in differences in meanings and interpretations of the survey questions and answering categories.

[5] Apart from Kam (2009) and Willumsen and Öhberg (2012), most studies on party unity and its determinants have not been able to connect candidates' and/or MPs' survey responses to actual legislative (voting) behavior.

1.2. Plan of the book

The main aim of this book is to test and illustrate the potential of the sequential decision-making model, not to offer a comprehensive explanation of party group unity by including all potential independent variables found in previous literature. The first study is a synchronic cross-country analysis of MPs' decision making in 15 national parliaments that focuses on the effects of electoral institutions, political parties' candidate selection procedures and government participation (see chapter 4). The second study starts with a synchronic comparison of the relative importance of the decision-making mechanisms among national and regional representatives in nine multi-level countries (see chapter 5). The analysis is then repeated at three different levels of Dutch government (national, provincial and municipal), which allows us to keep country context and formal institutions (relatively) constant. The third and final study is a diachronic analysis of changes in behavioral party group unity (parliamentary voting and party defections) as well as MPs' decision-making mechanisms in the Dutch national Parliament between 1945 (1972 for the attitudinal data) and 2010 (see chapter 6). By focusing on one parliament through time, system, electoral, legislative and party institutions are held (relatively) constant. The final chapter brings together the three studies; we summarize our findings with regard to each of the decision-making mechanisms, and highlighting a number of implications and potential avenues for future research.

Chapter 2

Representation in parliament by individual or by political party: shifting emphasis

2.1 Representation in theory and in practice

The central normative problem of democracy is determining the proper relationship between citizens' preferences and the laws that govern them. Political representation complicates this relationship by introducing actors who mediate the preferences of citizens and political decision making (Rehfeld, 2009, 214). Although the two concepts are often thoughtlessly equated, democracy and representation have a problematic relationship (Pitkin, 2004). Etymologically the literal meaning of democracy—the people (demos) rule (kratein)—denies any separation between rulers and ruled. Whereas representation—to make present again of what is absent—specifies exactly such a separation between the represented and representatives (Ankersmit, 2002, 109; Fairlie, 1940a, 236; Pitkin, 1967, 8).

In its simplest form, the marriage of representation and democracy is viewed as a merely functional second-best alternative to direct democracy which is considered an impracticable ideal given the population size of most countries today. Representative democracy refers then to the means through which representatives are chosen: the selection method (i.e. electoral system) of representative actors is publicly approved which grants representatives the legitimacy to make political decisions. Alternatively, representative democracy is postulated as superior to direct democracy; representation not only enables democracy, but unites "the democratic principles of rule by the people with the Socratic and Platonic principle of the rule by the Wisest and Best" (Fairlie, 1940b, 459). At the core of most studies of representative democracy is the notion that representation entails a social relationship between the representatives and the repre-

sented (Eulau et al., 1959, 743), and what makes representation democratic is the link between the wants, needs and demands of the public and the behavior of representative actors in making government policy (Luttbeg, 1974, 3). Most of the literature on political representation deals with how, in the case of normative theory, this link ought to be shaped and how, in the case of empirical research, this link is shaped in practice.

Representative democracy "[...] features a chain of delegation from voters to those who govern [...] mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs in the reserve direction" (Strøm, 2000, 267). Representative democracy thus entails that political actors (agents) are delegated power to make, implement and enforce political decisions for citizens (principals).[1] It also requires representative actors to be responsive to the preferences of the public and to be accountable to that public for their behavior. Strøm (2000, 267) contends that what makes democratic regimes democratic is citizens' ability to select and control their representatives.

Political institutions provide a framework for this chain of delegation, as they not only set the rules that organize how delegation takes place, but also provide actors with tools that enable, but also limit, their own behavior as well as that of their agents in the chain. Within representative democracy one can distinguish between a parliamentary system of government, which is characterized by "a single chain of command, in which at each link a single principal delegates to one and only one agent (or several noncompeting ones), and where each agent is accountable to one and only one principal" (Strøm, 2000, 269), and a presidential system of government, which features agents that have multiple principals. In parliamentary systems of government, electoral systems provide a competitive means through which citizens elect who represents them in the parliament. Legislative institutions provide these representatives with a number of tools through which they can perform their tasks as agents of citizens, such as the ability to deliberate and vote on public policy. The legislative branch is also responsible for the selection of the executive branch of government. The executive branch, consisting of the Prime Minister and cabinet (junior) minsters, is charged with the execution of the laws made in parliament, for which the implementation is delegated to different ministries' civil servants. In presidential systems of government, electoral systems typically enable citizens to select multiple competing agents (the president, as well as the Upper and Lower Chamber of the legislative branch), and the heads of the executive departments and their civil servants report back these multiple, potentially competing principals.

In practice this chain of representation is complicated by the fact that political principals and agents are usually not individual actors but collectives with heterogeneous preferences that can be difficult to identify (Strøm, 2000, 267-268). Voters, for example, do not form a single homogeneous group in terms of identities and preferences, and the difficulties associated with the aggregation of these identities and preferences are central in many studies of political representation. The deconstruction of political par-

[1] There are a number of general arguments, not only applicable to the political realm, regarding why delegation may occur. These are a general lack of capacity and competence (and transactions costs associated with their acquisition) of actors to make timely, professional decisions, and the problems associated with social choice (preference aggregation problems), collective action and coordination at the aggregate level (Strøm, 2003, 56-58).

ties is arguably even more complicated, as they also consist of individuals with not only potentially different preferences, but also different roles, thus forming an arena in and of themselves. They also perform a multitude of different functions in both the electoral arena and legislative arena. Finally, within the legislative arena one can distinguish between individual MPs, political party groups—which consist of collectives of individual MPs—, and the legislature as a whole, as potential representative actors.

Manin (1997) describes three ideal-types of representative government: parliamentarianism, party democracy and audience democracy. One could argue that each form predominated political representation in western democracies during a particular period of modern history, although Manin (1997, 202) does explicate that the forms of political representation can coexist and fuse at a given point in time in a given country. The first two ideal-types, parliamentarianism and party democracy, can be connected to normative debates as to *how* representation ought to take form, and *who* should act as main representative actor in parliament. These normative debates function as the basis for models of representation used in the empirical analysis of political representation, with empirical models often lagging behind developments in political reality (Thomassen, 1994, 237, 240, 250). The third ideal-type, audience democracy, differs from the first two in that its normative debate is still ongoing, and the empirical models are in development. In the following sections, the three ideal-types of representative government and their associated normative and empirical models are reviewed, with special attention paid to *who* is ascribed the role of main representative actor in parliament: the individual MP or political party.

2.2 The individual as main representative actor

2.2.1 Parliamentarianism

Representation descends from a practice that that has little to do with modern democracy (Thomassen, 1994, 240). In fact, the monarchs in medieval Europe imposed it as a duty. During the period of feudalism in Europe (500 – 1500) rights, powers, and privileges depended on property ownership, and landowners from different regions were summoned as representatives to parliament to commit their locality to measures that the monarchs wished to impose. These measures mostly involved taxation, as the crown sought additional revenues to fight wars in order to defend the national interests. Gradually, parliament evolved into an arena in which representatives defended local interests in exchange for consent, which became conditional. Representation became a matter of right rather than a burden (Thomassen, 1994, 240; Pitkin, 2004, 337) although the practice can hardly be described as democratic in the sense of the selection of representatives. MPs operated as individuals and were considered to be the delegates of their communities, mandated with the task of giving or withholding their consent provisional upon redress of communal grievances.

Although most of the parliaments in Europe were dissolved during the period of absolute monarchy (1500 – 1800), the British Parliament gradually developed into the cen-

ter of power after successfully placing the sovereignty of Parliament above that of the king in the Glorious Revolution (1688). Parliament became increasingly responsible for national interests, and less an arena for the defense of local interests. Edmund Burke's (1774) speech to the electors of Bristol is renowned for reflecting this change in political practice, and signifies a critical juncture in the development of modern political thought. Burke argued that given Parliament's new role it should function as a deliberative arena in which the general good ought to be the dominant focus of representation:

> "Parliament is not a *congress* of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a *deliberative* assembly of *one* nation, with *one* interest, that of the whole—where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole" (Burke, 1887a, 96).

Following that parliament ought to act in the interest of the whole nation, Burke reasoned that this is incompatible with the practice of MPs following the instructions from their districts, and they should instead act according to their own judgment. So whereas the traditional 'mandate' style of representation holds that the represented should have control over their own representatives, either through recall right or binding instructions, Burke was a proponent of the 'trustee' style, which maintains that representatives are free to represent the interests of those they represent as they themselves see fit:

> "Their [constituents] wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; their business unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasure, his satisfaction, to theirs; and, above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But, his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you; to any man, or to any set of men living. […] You chose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a Member of Bristol, but he is a Member of Parliament" (Burke, 1887a, 95).

Burke's speech marks a transition in political thought—from the domination of mandate representation directed at local interests to independent parliamentarians focusing on national interests—that is still reflected in constitutions that were written during the democratic revolutions of the first half of the nineteenth century. Manin (1997, 204) refers to the British House of Commons in the period after the Napoleonic wars (1803-1815) as the "[...] archetype of parliamentarianism" in terms of individual representatives' autonomy, and Beer (1982) considers the period in the United Kingdom between the First Reform Act (1832) and the Second Reform Act (1867) as "the golden age of the private MP". According to Manin (1997, 204) "[t]he political independence of the individual representative is due in part to his owing his seat to non-political factors such as his local standing". Political parties, moreover, hardly existed, and if there was any form of political organization outside of Parliament it was only for elections, and the individual MP was the uncontested leader in the electoral district. If MPs acted in concert with

Figure 2.1: The style and focus of representatives' roles



Source: Eulau et al. (1959)

each other in parliament, this was on the basis of deliberation, similarities between the regions they represented, or personal ties (Depauw, 2002, 20).

2.2.2 The mandate-independence controversy

Over a century after Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol, the mandate - independence controversy (Pitkin, 1967) — whether individual representatives should act as agents who take instructions from their constituents or act according to their own mature judgment — was picked up by Eulau and his associates (1959; 1962) as the basis of the model to describe representational role orientations in their study of United States state legislators. The authors distinguish between the style (delegate or trustee) and focus (district or national level) of representation (see Figure 2.1). Accordingly, one can place representatives who act according to the instructions from their local constituents in cell A, and Burke's preferred trustees who focus on the national interests in cell D.

Although the representational role orientations typology continues to be widely applied, Thomassen (1994, 239-240) argues that the scientific interest in the mandate-independence controversy is inversely proportional to its relevance in modern representative democracy. A first problem with the role typology is that it forces representatives to choose between the delegate and trustee role, thereby treating representational roles as a mutually exclusive dichotomy. But as highlighted by Pitkin (1967, 151), "in the mandate-independence controversy both sides are probably right":

> "It is true that a man is not a representative—or at most is a representative 'in name only'—if he habitually does the opposite of what his constituents would do. But it is also true that the man is not a representative—or at most a representative in name only—if he himself does nothing, if his constituents act directly" (Pitkin, 1967, 151).

Figure 2.2: The connection between constituencies' attitudes and a representative's roll call behavior



Source: Miller and Stokes (1963)

This criticism is actually aimed at the normative underpinnings of both the 'trustee' and 'delegate' model, which contradict the nature of representation, defined as to make present again of what is absent (Ankersmit, 2002, 109; Fairlie, 1940a, 236; Pitkin, 1967, 8). A representative taking on the trustee style of representation cannot completely ignore the opinions of those he is representing, as then that what is absent is not present. But a representative cannot perfectly reproduce the opinions when taking on the role of the instructed delegate, because then there is no representation of what is absent for it is already present. For this reason the original typology was postulated as a continuum, with the delegate and trustee as the two extremes. However, by including a third middle role, the politico, for whom it depends on the circumstances whether he acts more as a trustee or a delegate, Eulau and his associates (1959; 1962) treat it as a categorical variable. Later applications of the representational role orientation typology also failed to acknowledge the continuous nature of the typology, also treating it as a categorical variable.

Another problem with the application of the representational role orientation typology in later empirical analyses is the choice between the two foci of representation: the district or the nation. Again, these two foci can be traced back to Burke's contrast of parliament as a competitive or deliberative arena. The question is whether district interests are a pertinent focus of representation when most legislators today are concerned with general policy making for which specific geographically defined local interest are arguably less relevant. Connected to this is the another criticism, which is most relevant for the study at hand: the typology does not acknowledge the political party as either a potential alternative focus of representation from the perspective of the individual representative, or representative actor in and of itself.

The Miller-Stokes model (1963, see Figure 2.2), introduced by the early Michigan school, expands on the representational style of representation (limiting the focus of

representation to the district). The empirical validity of the model was tested by comparing the congruence between constituency and representatives' attitudes in different policy domains to roll call voting behavior of representatives. The lower path of the model (ACD) describes the workings of the instructed delegate, which necessitates that the representatives perceive constituency attitudes correctly and that there is a high correlation between constituency attitudes (A) and representatives' perceptions of these attitudes (C). The upper path (ABD) presents the workings of the Burkean trustee, whose own opinion is determinant for the representatives' behavior. It may still be the case, however, that a representative expresses the will of the public in spite of himself, i.e. there is a high correlation between his own opinion (B) and those of the citizens in his constituency (A). Miller and Stokes (1963, 56) conclude that the strength of the different pathways of the model depends on the kind of issue area. In the case of social welfare, members of the US House of Representatives generally followed the upper path, taking on the role of the Burkean trustee, whereas when it came to civil rights, representatives were more likely to take on the role of instructed delegate (Miller and Stokes hypothesize that this is out for fear of electoral consequences).

Attempts were made to apply the Miller-Stokes model in a number of different countries through which it became clear that the model was not fully transferable outside the United States' presidential, single-member district system with weak political parties. Although the model does allow the testing of the modes of representation under different circumstances, therefore allowing these modes to vary, its focus is on the dyadic relationship between constituencies and their representative (which was especially problematic in electoral systems with multi-member districts), and does not account for the paramount importance of political parties in mitigating the link between representatives and the public in parliamentary systems. In presidential systems the executive has its own electoral mandate and is not dependent on a majority in legislature for its survival, whereas in parliamentary systems the executive does not have its own mandate and is very much dependent on its majority in parliament for its survival, making party group unity in parliament, at least among government parties, essential. That the political party is of overriding importance is especially apparent when it comes to Miller and Stokes' dependent variable: representatives' (roll call) voting behavior. Once political party (group) membership is taken into consideration the different pathways have very little substantive effect in parliamentary systems.

This point is made clear by Converse and Pierce's (1979; 1986) application of the Miller-Stokes model in their study of political representation in France, and Farah's (1980) study of West Germany. Both find limited feasibility of the model in the context of (hybrid) parliamentary systems and the influence of the political party overriding. Converse and Pierce therefore propose the introduction of a third representative role, the party delegate, a variety of the delegate with the party rather than the voters as the focus of representation (see Figure 2.3). Indeed, in their study of representational role emphasis the party delegate role was found to be most dominant—both in terms of individual representatives' policy preferences and roll call voting behavior—the trustee role coming in second and the voter delegate coming in a distant third. Although Andeweg and Thomassen (2005, 508) question the relevance of this triangle in how it can aid in the

Figure 2.3: Representational role emphasis



Source: Converse and Pierce (1979)

understanding of political representation in terms of the relationship between the voters and the actors who represent them, the party delegate role may help us understand the relationship between individual MPs and their political party (group).

2.3 The political party takes over

2.3.1 Party democracy

The second ideal-type of representative government identified by Manin (1997) is party democracy. The change of parliament from an arena for local interest articulation to national policy formation not only increased the power of parliament, but also the complexity of parliamentary work. The focus on national policy made it more efficient to organize along ideological lines than geographical ones, which led to cooperation among individual MPs from different regions. According to Patzelt (1999, 23), some observers go so far as to claim that that "[…] it is denounced as historical fiction [...] there has never been a 'normal' parliamentarism with individual members (instead of parliamentary groups) playing a significant role" in describing how common these forms of cooperation were. Again, it is Edmund Burke who is often cited for identifying the function of the political party in this respect, defining a political party as "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed" (Burke, 1887b, 530). He thus seemed to recognize ideology as the basis of a parliamentary party group. Duverger (1954) categorizes these parliamentary groups as 'internally created' elite (or cadre) parties, functioning as a means to align the interests of individual MPs and make parliamentary work more efficient, thereby stabilizing parliamentary politics. Examples include the forerunners of today's British Conservative and Liberal parties, the Democratic and Republican Party in the United States, and the Liberal parties in Germany, Italy and other parts of continental Europe (Lapalombara and Anderson, 1992, 396).

Thus far, individual MPs were considered the core representative actor in both political practice and political thought. Attitudes towards political parties (or factions) were generally hostile, especially among normative theorists who inspired the drafters of the constitutions (Schattschneider, 1942, 3-6). From a republican perspective, politics is

the search for the common good for the entire public, brought about through deliberation and consensus, not through competition that results in winners and losers. De Tocqueville (1835), for example, considered political parties, representing specific interests, to be inherently oppressive and to embody the danger of a tyrannical majority depriving minorities of fair representation. Those responsible for the constitutions during the democratic revolutions were so hostile towards political parties that they explicitly attempted to make government by parties impossible, or at least impracticable. That individual MPs are formally not supposed to take instructions from anyone, for example, makes the involvement of political parties in the act of representation in a strict sense unconstitutional.

The practice of coordination in parliament was also extended into the electoral arena, as parliamentary minorities attempted to boost their position in parliament by increasing their share of votes in the electorate (Aldrich, 1995). With the extension of universal suffrage at the turn of the nineteenth century 'externally created' mass parties that developed in society also entered the struggle for representation in parliament. These political parties were based on mass membership and represented those interests that were not yet present in the political system (Duverger, 1954). Voting was an expression of identity in terms of class and religion represented by parties, rather than the expression of a personal bond between voters and individual MPs in parliament. Examples of 'externally created' mass parties include the European socialist, communist, and Christian democratic parties (Lapalombara and Anderson, 1992, 396).

Early twentieth century political thinkers who acknowledged political parties were not pleased with their development. Both Ostrogorski (1902) and Michels (1915) saw parties as oligarchic organizations dominated by leaders and subordinating individuals, inhibiting the realization of democracy as the search for the common good. The economist and political realist Schumpeter (1942), however, endorsed the development of political parties. Schumpeter disputed the idea that democracy was a process of identifying the common good and he also had little faith in the public's ability to form opinions and make rational political decisions. He considered the ideal democracy postulated by liberal thinkers as impossible and undesirable, and instead offered a minimal, procedural definition of democracy as an institutional arrangement with a central role for political parties:

> "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1942, 269).
>
> "A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for power […] Party and machine politics are simply the response to the fact that the electoral mass is incapable of action other than in a stampede, and they constitute an attempt to regulate political competition exactly similar to the corresponding practice of a trade association" (Schumpeter, 1942, 283).

Schumpeter clearly held an elitist vision of democracy. Like Burke, he advocated a trustee model of political representation in the relationship between the representatives and

the represented, following Weber (1919) in stipulating that politicians should be of a high quality—suited, trained and qualified to act as representatives—and that citizens should respect the division of labor between politicians and voters. He considered representation to be a top-down relationship (Esaiasson and Holmberg, 1996), in which political parties put their views to the citizens, and citizens' preferences are endogenous to their interaction with political parties (Schumpeter, 1942, 263). In terms of the relationship between political parties and their MPs, Schumpeter (1942, 294) seemed to hold Converse and Pierce's (1979; 1986) party delegate model of representation, as he maintains that individual MPs ought to exercise democratic self-control and resist the temptation to upset or embarrass the government.[2] Duverger (1966, 7-8) also recognized this party delegate relationship between political parties and their MPs in the practice of representation, classifying political parties that had such a relationship with their MPs as 'rigid'. Again, it seems to be the Parliament in the United Kingdom that took the lead. Members of the House of Commons were organized in a very strict manner, discipline was imposed upon them in voting on all important issues, and the authority of the party group leader was not questioned (Duverger, 1966).

Many positivist theorists followed Schumpeter in their high regard for political parties as representative actors in parliament. Stokes (1999, 244) suggests that this may be because their normative world is ordered not around notions of the public good but around effective representation, for which political parties as an organizing principal are considered vital.[3] In 1950 the American Political Science Association became the primary advocate for the normative responsible party model. The 1950 report by the APSA Committee on Political Parties, chaired by E.E. Schattscheider, urged reforms to make the two political parties in the United States more "democratic, responsible, and effective" (1950, 17). The responsible party model departs from Schumpeter's competitive model of democracy in that it holds that the popular will can and must be reflected in government policy, whereas Schumpeter had little faith in the popular will (Thomassen, 1994, 251). As is the case in Schumpeter's competitive model, the responsible party model holds that political parties enable democracy through competition in the electoral arena.

There are three requirements: 1) political parties should present voters with sufficiently different policy program alternatives. These party programs should be the result of democratic decision making within the political parties and supported by a large proportion of the parties' members. 2) Voters should be aware of the differences between parties, and are assumed to then cast their vote for the political party whose program comes closest to their own policy preferences. 3) In turn, because voters base their choice on the party's program, party representatives in office are expected to follow the

[2] More specifically, Schumpeter (1942, 294) argues that "supporters of the government must accept its lead and allow it to frame and act upon a program and that the opposition should accept the lead of the 'shadow government' at its head and allow it to keep political warfare within certain rules".

[3] Mainwaring and Scully (1995), for example, argue that highly institutionalized party systems are necessary for high democratic performance, in order to offer citizens clear coherent choices (Carey, 2003, 193). Bowler et al. (1999a, 3) consider the existence of cohesive legislative voting blocs, realized through political parties, a prerequisite for effective accountability.

party program in making government policy. Indeed, the APSA report (1950, 17-18) prescribed that "[a]n effective party system requires, first, that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out the program". If representatives do not follow their party's program the report suggests possible sanctions the political party (group) could apply. Party unity in both the electoral and parliamentary arena is thus not only considered the condition for success (APSA, 1950, 20-23), but party disunity is also held to impair democratic representation. The responsible party model holds that the political party ought to be the main actor in the representational relationship, "[i]ndividual politicians play a second fiddle, at most" (Thomassen, 1994, 251).

2.3.2 The responsible party model

As argued by Thomassen (1994, 248), models that prioritize the political party have more a priori validity in the context of (European) parliamentary systems of government than models that highlight the relationship between individual MPs and their voters (or districts). Although originally postulated as a normative model, the responsible party model has been used as an empirical tool as well.

In political party models of representation, the political party is treated as a collective, unitary actor and its parliamentary counterpart is considered the main representative actor in the legislature. Thus, in terms of the three requirements of the responsible party model, it is the third—that parties must be sufficiently unified to enable them to implement their policy program—that has become a central assumption in the empirical analysis of various aspects of political representation. Indeed, if one considers the voting behavior of party group members in European parliaments, this assumption is the least problematic of the three (Thomassen, 1994, 252). Consequently, scholars use party manifestos and party strategies in the elections and coalition-formations, and aggregate speech and policy congruence on the basis of party group membership in parliament, in order to study the representational links between voters and their representative actors. How political parties, and more specifically their parliamentary groups, come to act as unitary actors, however, was for a long time taken for granted in representation studies.

The United States is generally categorized as a weak party system. Even in this weak party system, however, Cox and McCubbins (1993) recognize political parties as one of the organizing principles in legislature. However, the authors do not make the same assumptions about political parties as the literature on representation in Europe tends to do. Indeed, in defining political parties Cox and McCubbins (1993, 100) reject both structural and purposive perspectives. Whereas the structural approach, which defines parties according to observable features of their organization, is generally aimed at the extra-parliamentary rather than the intra-parliamentary organization, the purposive approach, defining parties by their goals, is criticized for assuming too much about the internal unity of parties. As highlighted by Cox and McCubbins (1993):

> "[t]he unitary actor assumption has proven valuable for many purposes – spatial models of elections and models of coalition formation come readily

> to mind – but it is not a useful starting point from which to build a theory of the internal organization of parties. Such a theory must begin with individual politicians and their typically diverse preferences, explaining why it is in each one's interest to support a particular pattern of organization and activity for the party. Accordingly, we begin not with parties and postulate collective goals but rather with legislators and postulate individual goals" (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 100).

In line with the United States tradition, Cox and McCubbins continue to give precedence to the individual representative in legislature. They take on a rational-choice perspective of individual representatives who seek reelection. There are a number of factors that improve the probability of reelection, of which the authors consider reputation to be most important. A representative's legislative activity affects his individual reputation (a private good), his political party's collective reputation (a public good), or both. Cox and McCubbins (1993, 113) argue that the realization of the latter poses a collective action problem that, left unchecked, will lead to legislative inefficiencies. Political party legislative group organizations are the key to solving this collective action problem. By creating legislative (leadership) positions that are both attractive and elective—entailing that there is intra-party competition for these positions and incumbents can be held accountable if they fail to act in the collective interest—and organizational structures, representatives will 1) internalize the collective interest of the party and 2) monitor their fellow partisans. This especially holds for the party group leadership positions which are given control over selective incentives, either in the form of positive rewards for those who cooperate, and negative sanctions to discipline party group members who defect from the party group line (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 121-122). Political party groups therefore act as 'legislative cartels' that—especially when in the majority—are able to seize power to make rules that govern the structure and process of legislation. Parties are floor-voting and procedural (having committee appointments and agenda-setting power) coalitions. In building a theory of the internal organization of parties, Cox and McCubbins heed to Panebianco's (1988, xi) complaint that "…something has been lost: namely the awareness that whatever else parties are and to whatever other solicitations they respond, they are above all organizations and that organizational analysis must therefore come before any other perspective".

Cox and McCubbins' study of the relationship between individual members of Congress and their political parties in the United States highlights the practical tension between individual representatives and their political parties in terms of rationalist economic theory. Whereas individual representatives possess an inherent tendency to value their own reputation above that of the party, political parties as organizations value their collective reputation. This parallels the tensions between individual and collective representation found in normative theory. In the empirical study of representation and legislative behavior in the context of European parliaments, this tension has been resolved in favor of the party as a unitary actor, implicitly favoring models of collective representation by political parties.

2.4 The return to the individual?

2.4.1 Audience democracy

Since the 1970s, election results in western democracies vary significantly from one election to the next, even though the socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds of individual voters have remained relatively stable (Manin, 1997, 218). Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) attribute the increased electoral volatility and weakening of voters' partisan ties to the desecularization and modernization of society. These societal changes contributed to "today's alleged crisis in representation" (Manin, 1997, 196-197), a change from party democracy to audience democracy, the third ideal-type of representative government. By audience democracy, Manin (1997, 223) means that "the electorate appears, above all, as an *audience* which responds to the terms that have been presented on the political stage".

Manin (1997, 222-223) argues that because of desecularization and modernization in a number of Western societies, no socioeconomic and cultural cleavage is more politically important or more stable than others. On the one hand, this leaves political parties vulnerable in the electoral arena, as they cannot rely on a stable voter or membership base. This has been the basis for the (mass) party in decline thesis (or rather question) (Mair, 1994; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995). On the other hand, this also entails that voters themselves do not base their decision on their socioeconomic or cultural identity, but on their perception of what is at stake in a particular election, which is decided on by politicians. This means that the initiative of electoral choice belongs to politicians, and the reactive instead of expressive dimension of voting predominates. This is very much in line with Schumpeter (1942, 263), who considered citizens' preferences endogenous to their interaction with political parties.

With the literature on political parties (and not specifically their party group counterparts in parliament), a number of authors connect these changes in the electorate to the (potentially resultant) changes in party structures (Depauw, 2002, 24-26). These are modeled, among others, by the catch-all party (Kirchheimer, 1966), the electoral professional party (Panebianco, 1988) and the cartel party (Katz and Mair, 1994). These empirical models differ from the (mass) party model and the APSA's (1950) responsible party model in that they do not assume that citizens' preferences are exogenous to their interactions with political parties, and do not hold party's policy platforms as distinct and forming the basis for voters' electoral choice. Moreover, parties' policy programs are less the result of intra-party democratic decision making and party member support.

Kirchheimer's (1966) catch-all party is a vote-seeking machine that, having lost its ideological voter and its membership base, tries to appeal to the increased number of floating voters by providing the electorate with a wide array of policy positions instead of one set ideological profile. Panebiano's (1988) electoral professional party model is a re-specification of the catch-all party, defined more precisely in organizational terms (Wolinetz, 2002, 137) and emphasizes the professionalization of politics, entailing that traditional party office holders are displaced by technical and political specialists. As

feared by both Ostrogorski (1902) and Michels (1915), the political party leadership increasingly draws power to itself. Because party leaders are less interested in servicing their party members, vote-seeking is prioritized above party-building efforts. The extra-parliamentary party organization is instrumentally aimed at winning elections for its party leaders through professionalization and political marketing. Opinion polls and marketing strategies determine not only campaign strategies, but even the party's position on issues (Depauw, 2002, 24-26). Katz and Mair's (1994) final extension, the cartel model, characterizes political parties as increasingly dependent on, and interwoven with, state instead of societal resources and interests, to the point that political parties become agents of the state.

According to Mair (1994), political parties scholars building forth on these models have taken on two strategies. On the one hand, there is a focus on collecting data on political parties: (changes in) membership numbers, financial resources and staff (and where these originate and/or how these are allocated), organization, functions of different organs and the (power) relationship between them, etc. (see for example the data handbook on political parties, Katz and Mair, 1992) in order to provide empirical data on which to base the analysis of the party in light of the changes in the electorate. On the other hand, there is also an explicit attempt to:

> "... move away from the conception of party as a unitary actor, and especially to move away from the almost exclusive concern with the relationship between parties and civil society, by disaggregating party organizations into at least three different elements, or faces, each of which interacts with the others [...] the *party in public office*, that is, the party organization in government and in parliament [...] *the party on the ground* [...] *the party in central office* ..." (Mair, 1994, 4).

That combination of these two avenues of research has led to an abundance of literature that deals with the question of party decline. Studies show that the so-called decline of the political party seems to be limited to the party on the ground; the party in central office, and especially the party in public office, seem to unaffected, or according to some have even gained in strength (as modeled by Katz and Mair's (1994) cartel model). The disaggregation of the party organization in the political parties literature has allowed scholars to differentiate between the different ways that desecularization and modernization in Western democracies has affected different parts of the political party organization. The question remains, however, how these changes have affected the relationship between the parliamentary party group and individual MPs as representatives (Katz and Mair, 2009, 762), which requires disaggregating to the level of the individual MP.[4]

Manin (1997, 227-228) expects that the ongoing change from party to audience democracy will lead representative actors in parliament to have more freedom of action vis-a-vis voters once elected, as the electoral promises "take the form of relatively

[4] This is not to say that there are no studies within the political parties literature on the parliamentary party group as a 'face' of the party (see the different country case studies in Heidar and Koole (2000), for example).

hazy images". At the same time, he predicts that due to the societal changes and party professionalization outlined above, voters will tend to increasingly vote for a person, or the image of a person, rather than a party's policy platform. Manin also specifies, however, that this personalization mainly holds for party leaders. Although political parties' parliamentary counterparts are increasingly considered part of the party leadership, and less as agents of the party-as-a-whole, Manin (1997, 231-232) expects parties to remain unified around their party leader in terms of parliamentary voting. But he also concedes that the decrease in importance of the party program will lead individual representatives to engage in a more direct personal relationship with interest groups and citizens associations. It is thus unclear what, according to Manin, the change from party democracy to audience democracy means for relationship between political parties and their individual representatives (i.e., whether there could a be return to parliamentarianism in terms of the individual MP as main actor in parliament, or a move in another direction).

There are calls for formal institutional changes from political reformers, who propose modifications of electoral and intra-party selectoral institutions in order to alter the workings of political parties, and create a more personal relationship between the voters and the individuals who represent them. These reforms target the workings of political parties in parliament in particular. Political reformers argue that giving the electorate and party members a greater say in the selection of representatives will improve the quality of representation as it increases direct responsiveness and accountability of individual MPs, implying that reformers deem that the individual—and not the political party—ought to be the main representative actor in parliament. Carey (2009, 8) notes that the proposed reforms are especially aimed at increasing the accountability of party (group) leaders, who are shielded from punishment by electoral systems (particularly in party-oriented electoral systems) that do not allow voters to discriminate among candidates as long as candidate nomination is centralized among party leaders. However, on a more general note, the call for the personalization of electoral and selectoral institutions is aimed at making all individual representatives more responsive and accountable to citizens' demands, favoring a dyadic relationship between MPs and voters instead of a collective relationship through political parties:

> "Whereas advocates of collective, partisan representation are primarily concerned with the ideological and policy content of party labels, the decisiveness of legislatures and the voters' assessments of overall government performance […], advocates of individual-level accountability are more concerned with maximizing virtues – deterring the betrayal of the demands of particular votes who picked an individual legislator as their representative" (Carey, 2009, 8).

2.4.2 Personalization

In an attempt to create a uniform conceptual approach to personalization, Rahat and Sheafer (2007) propose a typology of political personalization, of which two types are rel-

evant at this point: institutional and behavioral personalization.[5] The above mentioned calls for changes to electoral and selectoral institutions fall under institutional personalization, as they propose "the adoption of rules, mechanisms, and institutions that put more emphasis on the individual politician and less on political groups and parties" (Rahat and Sheafer, 2007, 66). Behavioral personalization can refer to either the public or politicians. Public behavioral personalization entails that the voters' increasingly place emphasis on individual politicians at the expense of the political party, whereas politicians' personalization involves a decline in party activity in favor of individual politicians' behavior. Balmas et al. (2012) further specify this typology by differentiating between centralized personalization (sometimes referred to as presidentialization), which entails that political power is increasingly placed in the hands of a few party leaders, and decentralized personalization, which means that political power is diffused from the party as a collective to those individual politicians who do not belong to the party leadership.

In their survey of the literature on personalization, Balmas et al. (2012) conclude that there is mixed evidence for the phenomenon of centralized institutional personalization, which would entail the institutional empowerment of political leaders, and party members' increased power when it comes to the selection of their party leadership (Kenig, 2009; LeDuc, 2001; Scarrow, 2001). Although less research has been done on decentralized institutional personalization, those studies that have been conducted generally point in the direction of a strengthening of the institutional position of individual politicians: Bille (2001) and Scarrow et al. (2000) both identify a trend of democratization of parties' candidate selection methods in established democracies the between 1960 and 1990. When it comes to the electoral system, the weight of the personal vote has increased in countries such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden (Karvonen, 2010). In the Netherlands, for example, the threshold for obtaining a seat in parliament on the basis of personal votes was decreased from 50 percent to 25 percent of the electoral quotient (given that the candidate's party is entitled to the seat) in 1998.

Whether these institutional changes have led to more behavioral personalization by the public and politicians is unclear (Karvonen, 2007, 13). Some studies show that voters are increasingly more likely to base their vote on the identity of the party leader instead of their evaluation of the party as a whole, whereas others find little supporting evidence for this (Balmas et al., 2012, 40). On the other hand, Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2010, 632-635) find that among the Dutch electorate the percentage of votes cast for candidates other than the party leader increased from less than 5 percent in the first post-war election to over 25 percent in 2002, pointing towards an increase in the public's decentralized behavioral personalization. They conclude, however, that voters still consider the political party to be more important than the individual candidate

[5] Rahat and Sheafer (2007, 67) also include media personalization as a third type of personalization, which entails that the media increase their focus on the individual politicians at the expense of the political party. Balmas et al. (2012) specify that media personalization is centralized when journalists and political campaigns increasingly focus on a few political leaders (presidents, prime ministers, party leaders) instead of on cabinets and political parties as collectives. Decentralized personalization means that the media increase the attention they pay to, and political campaigns increasingly revolve around, individual politicians who are not party leaders or the heads of the executive.

when casting their vote, but that within the political party the choice for an individual candidate clearly matters. In Belgium, where voters can choose between voting for a party list as a whole or an individual on a party list, the share of voters who cast a preference vote also increased from around half in the 1980s to almost two-thirds at the start of the 2000s (André et al., 2012, 7-8). In both cases, one could argue that the institutional change led to an increase in voters' personalized behavior, although the trend in increased preference voting had already set in before the institutional changes took place. Contrarily, however, Karvonen (2011) finds no evidence of a systematic increase in Finnish voters' personalized voting behavior over time. The evidence for public behavioral personalization is thus mixed.

Unfortunately, very little research has been done on whether these institutional reforms have led to any behavioral personalization by politicians (which might indicate an increase in the responsiveness and accountability of individual politicians), but the few studies that have been done do seem to point in the direction centralized behavioral personalization (Balmas et al., 2012, 40). According to Balmas et al. (2012, 40), empirical evidence of decentralized behavioral personalization in the parliamentary arena, whether individual MPs engage in more individual—instead of party—oriented behavior, is "... is hard to find. In fact, we have none, save for the case of Israel" (Balmas et al., 2012, 40). Rahat and Sheafer (2007) find that institutional personalization in Israel leads to behavioral personalization by individual representatives in both the electoral arena (campaigning for personal votes) and the parliamentary arena (measured as an increase in number of the submissions and adoptions of private member bills). The latter indicator is also used by Balmas et al. (2012) in their own study of the Israeli Parliament. Balmas et al. (2012, 43-46) add the increased use of roll call voting and the use of self-references (the use of the first person singular, for example) in parliamentary speech as possible indicators of personalization, both of which point in the direction of an increase in decentralized behavioral personalization.

2.5 Conclusion

Both parliamentarianism and party democracy have left their mark on political representation in modern day democracies. As a result of the period of parliamentarianism, most (European) parliamentary democracies still ascribe a central role to the individual MPs in their constitutions. The stranglehold of political parties, remnants of the age of party democracy, also remains, although the primacy of political parties seems to be declining, as evidenced by the increase in electoral volatility and weakening of voters' partisan ties. For some, the change towards what Manin (1997) terms audience democracy constitutes a crisis in representation, as the ability of political parties to meet standards of responsiveness and accountability is questioned. Political reformers' calls for institutional personalization highlight the tension between individual representation by individual MPs and collective representation by political parties, and seem to favor (a return to) the former.

The tension between individual MPs and their political parties as representative ac-

tors is, however, of all times. Although Manin's (1997) first ideal-type of representative government, parliamentarianism, favored the individual MP as the main representative actor, the change of parliament from an arena for local interest articulation to national policy formation already led to MPs' coordination and collective action within parliament. The extension of universal suffrage tipped the balance towards the political party as the main representative actor, as this collective organization was extended into the electoral arena. Although some consider the decline of political parties a crisis in representation, one could also argue that the primacy of the political party as the main representative actor in western democracies has been a time-bound phenomenon; it is not unequivocally desirable or virtuous in and of itself from a normative perspective. In more practical terms, democratic representation does not by definition necessitate that the balance between the individual MP and the political party favor the latter.

Even though personalization may be on the rise, political parties in most (European) parliamentary democracies still behave as unitary actors, at least in terms of their legislative voting behavior: "the usual, though not invariable, practice in the world's parliaments is that legislators vote together by party" (Olson, 2003, 165), and are by and large treated as such by both academics and political observers. That political parties act as unitary actors is certainly not automatic, however. How party group unity is established, i.e., how the tension between individual MPs and their political parties is resolved in favor of the latter, is a topic that has received only modest attention. As highlighted by Olson (2003, 165), and evidenced by the recent interest in political personalization, "[w]e pay attention to 'rebellion' or 'dissent' as exceptions, while assuming unity is the more usual behaviour and thus requires less detailed explanation [...] each body of research examines departures from its respective 'normal'".

Whether the change towards audience democracy indeed marks a crisis in representation is a normative question, as is whether unitary parliamentary parties are still, or have ever been, necessary or desirable. Empirical research cannot provide the answer. Empirical research can, however, provide an important basis for the normative debate. How party group unity is established is a key question that remains understudied. Do MPs vote with their party group voluntarily, or do they do so involuntarily in response to (threatened) negative sanctions or (promised) benefits by the party (group) leadership? If MPs do vote with their party group voluntarily, is this because they simply agree with their party group's position on the matter, or because they have been socialized to subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty and consider their party group their main principal? Do MPs even have an opinion on matters that are put to a vote in parliament, or do they rely on their party group specialist and/or spokesperson for their voting cue? The relative role of these different mechanisms, or pathways to party unity, and whether their contributions to party unity have changed through time, and whether their use differs between institutional settings, are important pieces of information if one wants implement institutional changes to increase responsiveness and accountability of representative actors, and (re-)establish the representational link between voters and individual MPs (or the primacy of the unified political party).

Chapter 3

Unpacking the unitary actor

3.1 Party group unity

Of the responsible party model's three conditions for effective representation, it is the third requirement, that political parties ought to behave as unitary blocs, that is considered the least problematic in most parliamentary systems of government. And indeed, when it comes to voting in parliament, MPs who belong to the same party group tend to vote together. Scholars also often take party group unity for granted, as evidenced by the fact that many studies on political representation and behavior tend to assume that political parties can be treated as unitary actors, and refer to the party as the main representative actor. As argued by Kam (2009, 21), however, "[u]nity is not preordained". Given the potential diversity, and possibly conflicting nature, of MPs' backgrounds, political opinions, interests, ambitions and role conceptions, one would actually expect party group unity to be "problematic and conditional rather than static and fixed" (Collie, 1984, 20). Moreover, the shift towards audience democracy and increase in personalization forecasted by Manin (1997), has led some to predict that party group unity may be becoming more difficult to maintain, which leads to the further questioning of scholars' unitary actor assumption.

Within the study of legislative behavior, and that of legislative voting in particular, political scientists concentrating on parliamentary systems of government have only paid only scarce attention to *how* party group unity is brought about. According to Collie (1984, 5), this is because "it seemed reasonable to conclude that a single factor (i.e., party) was the primacy determinant" of MPs' behavior. What the variable 'party' actually encompasses is, however, subject to disagreement. Moreover, many studies that do seek to explain party group unity tend to focus on the level of the political party group or parliament as a whole, ignoring the fact that party group unity is the result of decision making by individual MPs, who are constrained by their relationship with their political party and influenced by their institutional environment.

3.1.1 Conceptualization

The literature on party unity is plagued with conceptual confusion (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a), as the terms party unity, party cohesion, party coherence, party homogeneity, party loyalty, and party discipline are often used interchangeably. Early on Özbudun (1970, 305) defined party cohesion as "an objective condition of unity of action among party members", to which Skjaeveland (2001) added that the unity of action must be 'external' to the parliamentary party group (i.e. public) to make the concept entirely distinct from any explanatory connotation. Nonetheless, the term party cohesion is still often used in reference to mechanisms that are hypothesized to *cause* unity of action among MPs. In order to avoid this confusion, in this study the term party cohesion is avoided altogether when referring to the final outcome—MPs' concerted behavior. We follow Hazan (2003, 3) in his definition of *party unity* as "the observable degree to which members of a group act in unison" (thus referring strictly to the behavioral outcome) and reiterates the point made by Skjaeveland that the term ought to refer to behaviors external to what goes on within the parliamentary party group, which is in line with the delineation between the 'open' and 'closed' theaters of representation suggested by Copus (1997b).[1] In addition, this study focuses specifically on MPs, and thus party groups in parliament.

Kam (2001a, 95) calls attention to the fact that party cohesion (which in this study is referred to as party group unity) is often conceptualized as the inverse to dissent, but that the two are measured at different levels of analysis. Whereas party group unity is measured at the party group level, dissent is measured at the level of the individual MP. The degree of party group unity, however, results directly from the collective behavior of individual MPs; it is a function of its aggregation. MPs who assent to the party group line contribute to the group's unity, whereas MPs who dissent from the party group line contribute to the breakdown of their political party group's unity. Party group unity, therefore, is not only a collective phenomenon but also a continuous variable, since political party groups can be more or less unified, depending on the degree to which their MPs act in concert (Olson, 2003, 165).

3.1.2 Measurement

Legislative voting is usually used as a measure of party group unity. From a theoretical perspective the study of legislative voting behavior is linked to the most prominent questions in legislative studies, including the nature of representation, the role and strength of legislative party groups, and the durability of government (Collie, 1985, 471-472). In

[1] In his study of the relationship between local councilors and their party groups in the United Kingdom, Copus (1997b) classifies council sessions, council committee and public meetings, as well as the local press and electronic media, as 'open' theaters of representation because they all take place in public and enable high transparency of action. The party group and local party meetings, as well as private meetings between councilors, take place within 'closed' theaters of representation; councilors' behavior in these settings is much less transparent. Copus (1997b, 310) maintains that it is in the 'closed' theaters that councilors meet privately to determine how they will act in the 'open' theaters, entailing that what goes on within the party group (in part) determines how representatives will act external to it.

reference to the notions of representation and accountability, for example, Carey (2009, 4) argues that the act and result of voting on legislation is the most transparent and ultimately important behavior in the legislative process. Voting is an act of legislative decisiveness, and therefore demonstrates representative actors' (political parties and individual MPs) ability or failure to enact promised policy most clearly to their ultimate principals (voters) who, depending on the voting procedure, incur relatively low costs in monitoring this behavior and holding their agents to account. Given the principal-agent relationship between the political parties and their MPs, the voting stage is also the most important from the political party's perspective. In fact, political party (group) leaders often have an informational advantage over voters when it comes to monitoring the behavior of their MPs at the voting stage.

The analysis of legislative voting behavior predates the 1950's behavioral revolution and goes back to the classic studies on representation in the United States by Lowell (1902), Rice (1925) and Key (1949) (Collie, 1985, 471). The most commonly used measure of party voting unity is the Rice Index of Cohesion (Rice, 1925, 1928) which aggregates individual representatives' votes and then calculates party group unity coefficients on the basis of probability theory (the percentage of party representatives who vote alike on a given vote).[2] Given the availability of roll call voting data in the United States, it is no surprise that most legislative voting studies are about the United States Congress and House of Representatives, where party group unity is found to be relatively low.[3]

Studies of legislative voting in Western European parliaments reveal party voting unity to be generally much higher than in the United States. Many of these studies are limited to a single country case.[4] In one of the earliest comparative analyzes to include political parties from both the United States and Europe, Olson (1980) includes 10 political party groups from France, Britain, West Germany and the United States, and finds that only the French Radical Party (*Parti Radical*) scored as low as the two parties in the United States when it comes to party group unity. Harmel and Janda (1982) extend their analysis of legislative voting in the United States to include 67 (out of the total of 95) parties from 21 different countries, and find party group voting unity in all European parliaments included in their analysis to be higher than in the United States. More recently, Sieberer (2006) as well as Depauw and Martin (2009) reveal high Rice scores for a

[2] One of the disadvantages of the Rice Index specifically, forwarded by Desposato (2005), is that it may lead to a systematic overestimation in small and relatively divided party groups (Sieberer, 2006). Desposato (2005) suggests adjusting the Rice Index of Cohesion according to party group size.

[3] Early analyses by Harmel and Janda (1982) show that party group voting unity averaged 64 percent for Republicans and 69 percent for Democrats in the United States House of Representatives between 1954 and 1978. Taking on a longer period of time, Brady et al. (1979) examines changes in party group voting unity, revealing that average party Rice scores actually decreased slightly between 1886 and 1966 in the House of Representatives.

[4] For France see Wilson and Wiste (1976) and Converse and Pierce (1979, 1986), for Finland see Pesonen (1972), for Germany see Özbudun (1970) and Loewenberg (1967), for Italy see Di Palma (1977), for the Netherlands see Tazelaar (1974); Visscher (1994); Wolters (1984), for Sweden see Clausen and Holmberg (1977), for Switzerland see Hertig (1978), and for the United Kingdom see Norton (1975, 1978, 1980) and Crowe (1980). Mezey (1979) also conducted a number of single country studies.

number of European parliaments. All in all, these results on voting behavior show that, when it comes to voting, party group unity in Western European parliaments is generally very high.

As a measure of party group unity, legislative voting has a number of advantages as well as disadvantages. First, voting takes place in almost legislatures and thus, at least in theory, serves as a useful comparative measure. Voting procedures can also differ between legislatures and over time, however. In some legislatures all votes are automatically recorded (in some cases electronically) and published on an individual basis, whereas in others roll call votes are infrequent and atypical, and most votes are taken by show of hands or are registered by political party group (Owens, 2003, 15). This has skewed the quantitative empirical analysis of voting behavior and party group unity towards those legislatures that frequently make use of roll call voting procedures or register all votes automatically on an individual basis (Sieberer, 2006, 159).

Moreover, as pointed out by Carrubba et al. (2006) and Hug (2010), the reliance on votes that are recorded and published on an individual basis (roll call votes) as a measure of party group unity may lead to biased results for those legislatures in which not all votes are taken by the same procedure, as these votes do not constitute a random sample. Some legislatures require roll calls on certain issues or classes of votes and allow for other voting procedures on other issues or types of votes, thereby creating a potential selection bias. There are only a limited number of studies that address this potential bias, but Hug's (2010) study of the Swiss Parliament confirms that party group unity (measured by the Rice Index of Cohesion) is higher for votes that are automatically recorded and published on an individual basis (which include, for example, final votes and votes on urgent matters) than for votes taken through other procedures.

Another potential bias associated with the use of roll call votes specifically in studies of party group unity is the problem of endogeneity (Owens, 2003, 16-17). This may occur in the study of legislatures where roll calls have to be explicitly requested by (a number of) individual MPs or party groups, as roll call can be used as a disciplining tool and for signaling to the public (Hug, 2010). On the one hand, the legislative party leadership may request a roll call in order to monitor the behavior of its own MPs and force them to close ranks, thus leading to higher levels of party group unity in comparison to other voting procedures. On the other hand, however, roll may be called to draw attention to MPs' dissent and disunity in other political party groups, resulting in lower levels of party group unity than would be case if all votes were included in the analysis. As highlighted by Depauw and Martin (2009, 104), these two strategic functions of the use of roll call votes are expected to have opposite effects on party group unity scores, and therefore may cancel each other out to a certain extent.

An advantage of using legislative voting behavior as a measure of party group unity is that votes are a fairly simple measure, as voting almost always take on the form of a binary choice: MPs vote for or against the proposal, with or against the other members of the parliamentary party group, and thus either for or against their party group's position (Carey, 2009, 20). In most legislatures, however, nonvoting is also possible. First, MPs may be absent from the voting session for a variety of reasons, either professional (e.g. prior engagements) or personal (e.g. illness, family circumstances). If voting by proxy is

not possible, then this will result in nonvoting. But absence can also be purposive, i.e. an MP is physically able to attend, but chooses not to. Second, there are also legislatures also allow their MPs to formally abstain from voting even if they are present for the vote. The motivation behind purposive absence and abstention may be related to issues of party group unity, because they can be used by MPs to explicitly show discontent with the party group line, without going as far as to vote against the party group. Nonvoting can, however, still have an effect on the final outcome of the vote, depending on the rules of the legislature, as some require a minimal number or percentage of MPs to be present (or to partake in voting) in order for voting to commence or for the vote to be considered valid. Party group size, and in the case of government participation, the margin of the government majority, may also influence the effect of nonvoting on the end result of the vote. Whereas some scholars ignore nonvoting, other authors try to disentangle nonvoting according to its potential causes (Ames, 2002; Haspel et al., 1998), and still others treat nonvoting according to its effect on the outcome of the vote (Carey, 2007, 2009).

Nonvoting left aside, as opposed to other legislative behaviors, the position MPs take vis-a-vis their party group on a vote is considered rather easy to identify. Determining whether MPs' behavior is 'in concert' in the case of legislative debates and media appearances, for example, is more challenging. The focus on voting, however, leads to a disregard of these other behaviors through which the degree of party group unity may be revealed. This includes the submission, (co)signing and content of private member bills, motions and amendments, the submission and content of (written and oral) parliamentary questions, the content of legislative debates and speeches, committee work, and even public and media appearances. Each one of these situations also represents an occasion when MPs may either toe the party group line or not (Kam, 2001a, 95; Owens, 2003, 16).

That the political party (group) leadership is aware that party group unity is reflected through these other behaviors, and thus also monitor the behavior of their MPs during these other activities, is illustrated by the parties in the Dutch Second Chamber (*Tweede Kamer*), where a number of the parliamentary party groups require their members to run their oral and written questions by the party group leadership or weekly party group meeting before formally introducing them to Parliament (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2005). As such, political party (group) leaders can try to control party group unity and influence the behavior of their individual MPs through agenda control (Carey, 2007), keeping certain issues off the legislative agenda if they consider these to be politically risky, perhaps due to known or suspected intra-party group divisions (Owens, 2003, 16). Political party (group) leaders can monitor and attempt to control the behavior of their MPs not only in the final voting stage, but also in the proceeding stages, as well as other public behaviors in and outside of parliament.

Another behavioral outcome external to the parliamentary party group that has been connected to party group unity is party group defection, an MP's early departure from his parliamentary party group (Owens, 2003). Heller and Mershon (2008) and Desposato (2006), for example, explicitly connect party group switching to party group unity. One could argue that if an MP leaves his parliamentary group, either by switching to another

party group (floor crossing) or by becoming an independent, this could be taken as an indicator of party group disunity. Once the MP has left his parliamentary party group, however, party group unity can be said to have been reestablished to a certain extent. It is, however, more difficult to interpret party group defection as a case of party disunity when an MP not only defects from his party group, but actually leaves parliament altogether, as this could be done for other reasons as well, of a personal or career-oriented nature, for example.

3.2 Explaining party group unity

Within the body of literature that seeks to explain party group unity and individual MPs' voting behavior, different lines of work can be identified. On the one hand, comparative studies generally focus on how government and electoral systems, party level institutions and rules, and societal differences and changes, can explain cross-national variation in party group voting unity. On the other hand, there are also a number of theoretical and (small-n comparative case) studies that deal with the party- and individual-level mechanisms that lead MPs to vote with or against the party group line.

3.2.1 Institutions and party group unity

Comparative studies generally deal with the effects of different institutional configurations on party voting unity. Although numerous scholars alluded to the influences of institutional factors on party group unity, Ozbudun (1970) was among the first to theorize the connection explicitly. Most authors agree that the structure of the relationship between the executive and legislature, whether presidential or parliament, has a profound effect on the level of party group unity. It is in particular the (explicit or implicit) confidence rule—the fact that the executive does not have its own mandate and is dependent on the support of a majority of the legislature—found in parliamentary systems, that leads to the expectation that party voting unity is higher in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems, especially among governing parties (Carey, 2007, 2009; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Owens, 2003; Ozbudun, 1970). Indeed, past research has found party voting unity to be much higher in parliamentary systems, as is the case in European democracies, than in presidential systems, as in the United States and Latin America. A second important institutional factor is the degree of government decentralization: party groups in federal systems, where political parties are required to organize on a regional or state base, are expected to have lower levels of party voting unity than party groups in unitary systems, which allow parties to organize at the national level (Carey, 2007; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Key, 1949; Owens, 2003).

Harmel and Janda (1982) introduced electoral systems as a third important institution affecting party voting unity. Later, authors such as Carey and Shugart (1995) further specified the electoral connection, hypothesizing that electoral systems that create incentives for personal-vote seeking (candidate-oriented electoral systems) lead to lower levels of party voting unity than electoral systems that do not create such incentives

(party-oriented electoral systems). Olson (1980) and more recently Rahat and Hazan (2001), explicitly separated the candidate selection process that takes place within parties from the effects of electoral institutions, and argued that candidate selection procedures that are exclusive and centralized are expected to lead to higher levels of party voting unity than candidate selection procedures that are inclusive and decentralized. Indeed, much of what is ascribed to differences in the level of government decentralization and electoral system may actually be linked to the differences in political parties' candidate selection procedures (Depauw and Martin, 2009). Other institutional and societal factors that are expected to lead to high levels of party group unity include system stability (Owens, 2003) and electoral (de)alignment (Kam, 2009), the effective number of parties (Turner and Schneier, 1970; Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979; Harmel and Janda, 1982), party age, party (group) size, party ideology, ideological polarization (Özbudun, 1970) and the shape of political competition (Owens, 2003), the effectiveness (strength) of legislature (Mezey, 1979), and committee strength.

Although many of these hypotheses are corroborated by different studies (the difference in party voting unity between parliamentary and presidential systems, for example), some of the results concerning these different theoretical expectations about the effects of institutions on party group unity are mixed. Regarding electoral institutions, for example, Carey (2007; 2009) finds that intra-party electoral competition depresses party group unity in Latin American legislatures. In their study of the European Parliament (EP), Hix et al. (2005) also conclude that there is a relationship between voting unity within the EP party groups and the electoral system by which the members are elected. Contrarily, Depauw and Martin (2009) find that electoral rules only partly account for party roll call voting unity in their 16 European parliaments, and although Sieberer (2006) concludes that party-oriented electoral systems indeed place rigid constraints on MPs (i.e., high party group unity), his analysis also reveals that candidate-oriented electoral systems are not a sufficient condition for low party group unity. To a certain extent, the different country cases included in each of the analyzes, the different operationalizations of the institutional variables, as well as the previously mentioned disadvantages of using (roll call) voting data as a measure of party group unity, may account for these mixed results.

Carey's (2007; 2009) *Theory of Competing Principals* provides an overall framework through which to approach the effects of institutions on legislative voting behavior, but can also be used to illustrate another problem with the institutional approach. Namely, that the focus on the direct impact of institutions on legislative voting behavior ignores an important step in the process of party group unity formation, specifically, individual legislators' decision-making mechanisms. Working from the perspective of *Principal-Agent Theory*, Carey argues that institutions determine the way in which valuable resources are distributed among legislators' principals, and thus influence the extent to which legislators are dependent on—and thus accountable to—different principals. The more legislators are dependent on their political party, and more specifically, on political party (group) leaders, the more likely it is that party voting unity will be high. Contrarily, the less dependent legislators are on their political party (group) leaders, and the more institutions make them dependent on alternative, often competing principals within the

political system (such as voters, presidents, etc.) that "drive wedges into party groups" (Carey, 2009, 162), the more likely it is that party voting unity will be low (Carey, 2009, 14-20).

Carey's theory alludes to a number of different causal mechanisms that may be affected by these institutional configurations. Questions arise as to what exactly these institutions do to foster a situation in which party group unity is high. Does a lack of competing principals enable party selectorates to select only those candidates whose policy preferences are in line with their own? Does the fact that legislators owe their selection to their party leaders instill in them a sense of loyalty towards their party leaders? Or does legislators' sole dependence on the party give party (group) leaders more disciplinary leverage to (threaten to) coerce legislators to toe the party group line? Carey mentions all of these possibilities, but generally remains at a theoretical level when it comes to the workings of these mechanisms. Other authors also make assumptions or theoretical arguments as to the effects of institutions on MPs and their relationship with their political party. Bowler (2000, 177), for example, argues that parties' nomination procedures may influence the homogeneity of parliamentary party groups. Sieberer (2006, 154-155) makes a very similar argument when he hypothesizes that party leaders' control over candidate selection allows them to determine the future composition of the parliamentary party group. Depauw and Martin (2009, 117), however, contend that centralized selection methods appear to lead to higher levels of party group unity because party leaders control MPs' future careers, and legislators seem to be motivated by the desire to be promoted. And Rahat and Hazan (2001, 314, 317) argue that exclusive selectorates allow parties to reassert both party discipline and cohesion. These examples illustrate the two main problems with the institutional approach. First, the explanations offered as to the workings of these causal mechanisms and the effects of institutions on these causal mechanisms differ per study and are often limited to theory and are thus not tested empirically. Second, focusing on legislative voting behavior as the main dependent variable and indicator of party group unity, does not allow one to distinguish between the different causal mechanisms, or reasons why MPs behave in accordance or in discord with the party group line. As recognized by Krehbiel:

> "In casting apparently partisan votes, do individual legislators vote with fellow party members *in spite of their disagreement* about the policy in question, or do they vote with fellow members *because of their agreement* about the policy in question?" (Krehbiel, 1993, 238)

3.2.2 Pathways to party group unity

In line with Krehbiel (1993), part of the theoretical literature on party group unity has moved beyond the outcome of voting unity and focuses on the 'pathways to party unity' (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a), the mechanisms that play a role in generating party group unity. Returning to the conceptual confusion that was mentioned at the start of this chapter, most scholars acknowledge that party group unity can be achieved in (at least) two ways: either by MPs voluntarily sticking to the party group line as a result of

their 'like-mindedness', or alternatively doing so involuntarily under the threat, anticipation or the actual use of positive and negative sanctions by the parliamentary party (group) leadership, or other individuals and/or organs within the party that control these resources. Many authors refer to the voluntary pathway as *party cohesion*, whereas the involuntary pathway is typically referred to as *party discipline*. The former is associated with a certain consensus in values and attitudes among MPs resulting in their voluntary conformance to the party group's position, while the latter entails a form of compulsion or the enforcement of obedience, usually applied by the political party (group) leadership (or whoever controls the resources that can be used as potential carrots and sticks) (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Bowler et al., 1999a; Hazan, 2003; Krehbiel, 1993; Norpoth, 1976; Ozbudun, 1970).

The voluntary pathway, party cohesion, is also conceptualized in different ways by different scholars. Whereas some emphasize the homogeneity of MPs' policy preferences, others refer to cohesion as MPs' shared subscription to norms of party group solidarity. The former situation, that of shared preferences, is often associated with Krehbiel's (1993) preference-driven approach and is referred to in this study as *party group agreement*. It holds that party group unity results from MPs voting together simply because of their agreement about the policy in question (Krehbiel, 1993, 238). Whereas some assume that MPs' policy preferences are formed exogenously to their work in parliament, others point out that MPs' opinions may also result from processes of argumentation and deliberation as a part of their parliamentary function, through their contacts with actors outside of parliament (such as voters and party members), within the parliamentary party group, and in parliament itself.

Party group agreement assumes, however, that MPs actually have an opinion on all issues that are voted on. As pointed out by Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 657) and Whitaker (2005, 9-10) this need not be the case. Due to the workload of parliament (distributional logic, Shepsle and Weingast, 1994) and technicality of certain issues (informational logic, Krehbiel, 1991), many parliamentary party groups apply a division of labor. The party group policy specialists and/or spokespersons are responsible for the party group position (Patzelt, 2003, 106-107), as far as this position has not been stipulated in the party program, electoral manifesto or, in the case of government participation, the government (coalition) agreement. Thus, MPs may often rely on the cues given to them by their fellow party group members when it comes to issues outside their own portfolio. In the absence of MPs' personal opinions (due to a lack of information or time to invest gathering the information needed to form an opinion), party group unity can also be brought about by MPs' *cue-taking*. One could question whether cue-taking falls under party cohesion, as in this situation policy preferences are not shared, but absent in the case of some MPs. On the other hand, cue-taking is of a voluntary nature, which is in line with the general understanding of party cohesion in the literature.

The other facet of party cohesion, MPs' subscription to norms of party group solidarity that results from MPs' internalized role perception (Searing, 1991, 1994) acquired through a process of internalization and socialization in the parliamentary party group as well as through MPs' previous political party experience (Asher, 1973; Crowe, 1983; Kam, 2009; Rush and Giddings, 2011), is associated with the sociological approach and

is referred to in this study as *party group loyalty*. As is the case in any group or organization, informal norms, defined as commonly held beliefs about what constitutes appropriate conduct, may guide the behavior of parliamentary party group members. Although there is no precise threshold, it seems that a majority of group members must hold the same belief about what constitutes appropriate conduct for a norm to exist (Crowe, 1983, 908). At the same time, however, one can argue that although norms are probably created and reinforced by selection and socialization, the internalization and judgment regarding the applicability of norms in particular situations, is an individual decision. If MPs subscribe to a particular norm, and consider it relevant in a certain situation, they will apply it whether their direct environment abides by the same norm or not. Party group loyalty, as a mechanism leading to party group unity, entails that in the case of disagreement with the party group's position, MPs opt to still vote with the party group because they subscribe to the norm of party group solidarity.

Party group loyalty is often confused with *party discipline*, as both only need to come into play when there is a conflict between MPs' preferences and the party group's position, i.e. MPs vote together in spite of their disagreement (Krehbiel, 1993, 238). But whereas party group loyalty is brought about by MPs' adherence to a 'logic of appropriateness' and is of a voluntary nature, party discipline in the form of positive and negative sanctions brings about MPs' decision making according to a 'logic of consequentiality', and is of an involuntary nature. Party discipline is usually associated with a rational-choice perspective on legislative behavior, highlighting the interaction between MPs' purposive goals (policy, office, and votes) and political party (group) leaders' hierarchical control over the distribution of influence, office perks, and re-(s)election (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Crowe, 1983; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009). Positive incentives usually include the promised or actual advancement of MPs to higher positions in the party. Negative sanctions may range from threat or actual removal of MPs as parliamentary party spokespersons or committee member for a certain period of time, to the demotion on, or exclusion from upcoming electoral party lists, or even to the expulsion from the parliamentary party group.

Empirical studies that deal with these mechanisms mainly rely on attitudinal surveys[5] among MPs and/or candidates and are usually limited to a single mechanism or a single case, although there are a few notable comparative exceptions (including Jensen's (2000) comparison of the Nordic countries and Kam's (2009) study of Westminster systems). Norpoth (1976), for example, uses the interviews held in 1958-1959 for the Representation Study conducted by Miller and Stokes, and compares the policy attitudes indicated by Congressmen in the survey to roll call voting behavior in Congress (both ag-

[5] There are also studies that rely on legislative (roll call) voting records to ascertain both MPs' and party groups' policy positions. The main problem with this measure, however, is that using votes to explain voting behavior may be tautological (Jackson and Kingdon, 1992; Kam, 2001a; Vandoren, 1990). Another method is the use of experts to judge the level of agreement within a political party (group). Ray (1999), for example, conducted an expert survey for all parties in the EU and EFTA concerning the degree of dissent over European integration between 1984 and 1996. However, the problem is that although the interviewees are experts, they are still far removed from MPs' actual decision-making processes and may also not be able to distil the effects of agreement with the party group's position from other determinants.

gregated at the party group level). Norpoth (1976, 1171) concludes that shared policy attitudes leave "a partisan imprint on the ultimate voting decision of a congressman". Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) rely on the Dutch Parliamentary Studies, a series of interviews held with members of the Second Chamber (which are also used in this study), to gauge the different mechanisms. Agreement with the party group in the form of the ideological homogeneity, was found to be high, but not perfect, among the parties in the Dutch Parliament. Similarly, Willumsen and Öhberg (2012) connected Swedish MPs' voting behavior to the distance MPs perceive between their own position and that of their party on the ideological Left-Right scale (as first suggested by Kam, 2009), as indicated by MPs themselves in the Swedish Members of Parliament Surveys. Their study reveals that the smaller the distance MPs perceive, the more likely it is that MPs vote with their political party group in parliament. Bailer et al. (2011) take a different approach, by asking Swiss MPs what their individual preferences are on two specific votes in parliament, and compare these preferences to how the individual MPs actually voted during the final votes in parliament. They find that MPs' self-indicated preferences lose their explanatory power once the general Left-Right policy position of MPs' constituency and political party are taken into account.

As party group loyalty results from a process of socialization, studies often rely on years of incumbency or tenure as a proxy. Time spent in parliament does not reveal which norms MPs subscribe to or how intensely they do so, however. As is the case with policy attitudes and party group agreement, party group loyalty has also been measured through the use of elite surveys. Relying on MPs' responses to a survey held among British Members of Parliament in 1971 and 1972, Crowe (1983, 1986) attempts to gauge the relative strength of norms of party group loyalty in the British House of Commons, and shows that both frontbenchers and backbenchers consider cross-voting to be the most serious breach of party group unity.[6] Crowe (1983) also finds that the importance of a particular norm is structured by the public visibility of the behavior with which the norm is concerned and, in the case of government participation, the risk that violation of the norm poses to the government. Basing his analysis on Australian (1993), British (1992) and Canadian (1993) candidate surveys, Kam (2009, 197-201) constructs a three-point loyalty scale, and connects these responses to MPs' later voting behavior in parliament.[7] He finds that in the United Kingdom, the more importance an MP attaches to these facets of party loyalty, the less likely it is that the MP casts dissenting votes. In

[6] British MPs were asked to rank the following breaches of party discipline (in this study referred to as party group unity, as most refer to behavioral outcomes that take place outside of the parliamentary party group) according to the severity of the breach: privately expressing dissent to whips, making a critical speech in Parliament, cross-voting, abstaining, signing a critical Early Day Motion, writing critical letters and articles in the press, and making critical speeches outside the House Crowe (1983, 911).

[7] Kam (2009, 197-201) constructs a three-point loyalty scale for the British and Canadian House of Commons and the Australian House of Representatives using the questions 'In your view, how important are the following aspects of an MP's job 1) supporting the party leadership, 2) voting with the party in Parliament, and 3) defending party policy'. (Questions were included in the 1992 British Candidate Survey, the 1993 Canadian Candidate Survey, and 1993 and 1996 Australian Candidate Surveys respectively.) For the British case, Kam also interacts party loyalty with years in office and finds that there is evidence for the hypothesis of decreasing party loyalty with parliamentary experience.

Canada and Australia, however, there is no evidence that party loyalty has an impact on MPs' voting behavior. Rush and Giddings (2011) conclude that in the United Kingdom MPs who consider the party their main focus of representation and most important influence on their behavior are less likely to rebel in comparison to MPs who consider the entire nation or their constituency their main focus or influence. And in the above mentioned study by Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a), party group loyalty, measured as an MP's response to the question as to how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagreement with his party group, seems to play an increasingly important role in the Dutch Parliament over time. The study by Andeweg and Thomassen therefore explicitly associates party group loyalty with an MP's internalized role conception, specifically that of the party delegate role identified by Converse and Pierce (1979, 1986) in their study of representational roles in the European context (see chapter 2).

Norton's (2003) study of the British House of Lords exemplifies a case of party group unity brought about by party group loyalty, although he relies only on behavioral voting data. Norton points out that the members of the House of Lords lack the common backgrounds (some do not even have a political party background and many Lords are recruited from different fields) that would result in high levels of prior policy agreement. Furthermore, the House of Lords is in essence a discipline-free environment, as its members are appointed for life and there is no evidence of nomination being contingent on voting behavior commitments. Norton ascribes party voting unity (which is not complete, but high), to tribal loyalty, which he defines as the emotional or intellectual commitment of an MP to instinctively vote with his party. Russell (2012) also deals with party group loyalty in the House of Lords, but instead borrows concepts from social psychology, thereby making a novel interdisciplinary contribution. Early social psychological studies confirm that individuals conform easily to group norms, without rewards and punishment, and even without shared background or characteristics. Using survey questions, Russell taps into the House of Lord's members' 'feelings of belongingness' to the party group and how these emotions relate to MPs' attitudes towards toeing the party group line. She concludes that a sense of collective responsibility and sociability are important factors in explaining MPs' attitudes towards party voting.

Although there are many studies that claim to deal with party discipline, many of these studies actually focus on the influence of institutions, or consider any case of non-preference related voting with the party group line to result from party discipline. As highlighted above, party discipline can be difficult to distinguish from party group loyalty, and it is probably even more difficult to observe. Negative sanctions, for example, can often count on negative media attention. Therefore, the assumption is that party (group) leaders prefer to keep their application secret and behind the closed doors of the parliamentary party group. Furthermore, using negative sanctions can be costly, and when used too often may also initiate a counter-reaction, thereby leading to an increase of dissent from the party group line rather than a decrease (Depauw, 2002), making it an inefficient means of obtaining party group unity (Kam, 2009, 187-188). Norton (1978, 222-253), for example, argues that the overuse of negative sanctions was the reason behind the decrease in party voting unity in the British House of Commons during the 1970s, when the Conservative parliamentary party group was under the leadership of

Edward Heath. From what is known about the application of negative sanctions in European democracies, the overall conclusion is that their use of scarce. Depauw (2002, 125) finds that in the Belgian Parliament MPs deny the influence of sanctions on their decision to toe the party group line when voting. In the Netherlands, Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) argue that MPs' satisfaction with the current use of party discipline could mean that party (group) leaders rely less on sanctions than is often assumed. Jensen (2000) uses the same measure of party discipline as Andeweg and Thomassen in his study of Nordic MPs, which also reveals that the vast majority of MPs are satisfied with party discipline, especially when it comes to sticking to the party group line when voting. Kam (2009), who as mentioned before is one of the few who has connected attitudinal data with actual voting data,[8] argues that although policy preferences do have an impact on voting behavior, party (group) leaders also take advantage of their control over MPs' future parliamentary career to maintain party group unity.

Given that many of the empirical studies dealing with these pathways have been of a case study nature, the effects of institutions on these pathways and their associated mechanisms have not been given their due attention. As highlighted above through the example of Carey's (2007; 2009) *Theory of Competing Principals,* institutions do not affect party group unity directly, but instead affect the different mechanisms highlighted above, potentially in different ways. As is the case in the literature employing an institutional approach to explaining party group unity, scholars often make theoretical arguments and assumptions concerning how these mechanisms are affected by institutions. Electoral systems and candidate nomination procedures, for example, are hypothesized to influence the ideological composition of parliamentary party groups (leading to higher or lower levels of party agreement), but they are also supposed to instill in MPs a stronger or weaker a sense of loyalty towards their party group (depending on the number of competing principals) as well as to influence the ability of political parties to elicit party group unity through party discipline, by providing the political party (group) leadership with various kinds of carrots and sticks. It is the aim of this study to tease out the effects of institutions on each of these mechanisms separately.

Moreover, most of the studies of party group unity in European Parliaments tend to aggregate the mechanisms at the level of the party group, i.e., not only party group unity, but also its determinants, party cohesion (agreement and loyalty) and party discipline, are seen as a party level characteristic. One could argue, however, that the most accurate level to measure the workings of the mechanisms is at the level of the individual MP: party group unity "must be constructed one MP at a time" (Kam, 2009, 16). A party group that is cohesive in terms of shared ideological preferences, for example, results from each individual MP's agreement with his party group. The level of party cohesion in the form of shared norms of party group solidarity is the aggregate product of each individual MP's subscription to those norms. And a disciplined political party emerges from individual MPs' responsiveness to positive and negative sanctions. As such, a party group's final level of unity consists of the adding up of all party group members' individual behavior, and each MP's behavior results from his own decision-making process.

[8] But see Willumsen and Öhberg (2012) for a recent addition.

3.2.3 Decision-making models

In her review of legislative voting behavior literature Collie (1985) distinguishes between two schools of research: one that focuses on legislative voting at the level of the collective (i.e., the level of the political party group or legislature as a whole), and the other that looks at legislative voting at the level of the individual legislator. Collie concludes that when it comes to the latter, there is a great imbalance between the American and non-American setting in terms of the number and the content of studies. Research dedicated to the American context tends to focus on individual legislators as decision makers, whereas outside the United States "it has been assumed that *party* predicts individual decision making" (1985, 28, emphasis added), which she ascribes to the lack of variance in legislators' voting behavior. Collie also rightly points out that there is disagreement about what 'party' actually is (i.e. there is no clear conceptualization). Indeed, different authors tend to equate the party as an explanatory variable with the different pathways to party group unity discussed above. Most pointedly, however, is that it seems unrealistic to assume that whereas legislative voting behavior by American legislators results from individuals' decision-making processes involving multiple variables, MPs in the non-American setting would not engage in comparable processes.

The early studies of legislative voting in the United States were conducted within the parameters of representation studies (Collie, 1985, 494). Legislators are confronted with numerous actors and influences, and the main question is in how far legislators are responsive to each. From the start, the relative importance of party versus constituency was central to the debate. Some scholar concentrated solely on the influence of constituency policy preferences, whereas others argued that legislators' voting behavior was a function of both constituency and the party preference (Collie, 1985, 492). The relevance of legislators' personal attitudes and perceptions, as well as legislative norms and roles (Wahlke et al., 1962), were also incorporated, the latter gaining prominence with the research and findings by Miller and Stokes (1963). Questions were raised concerning the operationalization and measurement of constituency, party and legislator preferences, and the critique was that there was too much emphasis on correspondence between preferences, and not enough focus on the actual influence. The results of these different studies and approaches have been mixed, and as put by Collie (1985, 493): "[t]he fairest summary of their conclusions is that the impact of party and constituency varied between Democrats and Republicans and across issue areas, legislatures, and time".

Expanding the foci of representation beyond the constituency and the party led to the development of a number of legislator decision-making models. These include the consensus model (Kingdon, 1973), which holds that a legislator first determines whether the issue put to vote evokes controversy within the legislative arena. If not, he 'votes with the herd'. If there is controversy, the legislator ascertains whether there is any consensus on the matter among the different actors who may influence him, of which Kingdon emphasizes six: the legislator's constituency, his House colleges, the party leadership, the executive administration, the legislator's own staff, and interest groups. Again, if there is consensus on the matter among these different groups of actors, he votes

accordingly. If there is conflict, he votes with the majority of actors.

The cue-taking model, developed by Matthews and Stimson (1970), also distinguishes between multiple actors who may influence legislators' voting decisions, but contends that legislators develop hierarchies of 'cue-givers'. The authors also argue that cue-taking is only relevant when the vote at hand concerns a topic outside of the legislators' own area of specialization or expertise, thereby acknowledging the problems of decision overload and poor information. The policy-dimension model (Clausen, 1973) holds that the nature of the policy that the vote falls under determines which of the different actors the legislator will be influenced by most. Clausen finds, for example, that the influence of the party is strongest when it comes to social welfare and government management, and legislators are influenced most by the executive administration when it comes to issues of international involvement, but only when the president in office belongs to the same party. Asher and Weisberg (1978) voting-history model confirms that the actors who influence legislators' decisions differ per policy area, but the authors find that legislators are much more likely to deviate from their previous positions within certain policy areas when there is a change in the partisan composition of the House or the presidency switches partisan control.

In an attempt to integrate these models, Kingdon (1977, 571) argues that "...the legislator's search for some sort of agreement among a set of possible influences on the vote which predisposes him in a certain direction, and some further decisional process in the absence of that agreement—is a thread common to a number of the models of legislative voting". Thus legislators start out searching for some form of consensus, first in the legislative arena and second in their perceived field of influences. If no consensus can be found legislators pick cues from particular actors in light of various potential goals (e.g. constituency satisfaction, influence in Washington, good policy, etc.). Kingdon (1977, 571) further highlights that a certain sequentiality of decision-making mechanisms and rules are often implicit included in many models of legislative voting in Congress (see for example Clausen, 1973; Cherryholmes and Shapiro, 1969; Matthews and Stimson, 1970, 1975).

In the European literature, the argument that the pathways leading to party group unity can be viewed as working within a particular order is also implicitly included. Bowler et al. (1999a, 5), for example, argue that cohesion and discipline are related, in that high levels of cohesion render discipline unnecessary, but at the same time discipline requires a certain level of cohesion to be effective. On the one hand, if consensus in values and attitudes among individual representatives is high, there should be no need for disciplinary measures by party (group) leaders to obtain party group unity. On the other hand, discipline is only effective when there is a minimum level of cohesion present among members of the parliamentary party group, as the shared value that MPs place on the party group determines their responsiveness to disciplinary measures. When party group cohesion is low, MPs will not respond to (threats of) party discipline. As suggested by Hazan (2003, 3), whose use of the term cohesion encompasses both shared policy preferences and norms of party loyalty, "discipline starts where cohesion falters", indicating a sequential relationship between the two mechanisms.

In their study of the pathways to party group unity in the Netherlands, Andeweg

and Thomassen (2011a) suggest that the pathways are "different horses for different courses", and also hint at a possible sequential relationship between them. They argue that depending on the nature of the issue, MPs will have an opinion on the topic at hand or rely on the cues provided by the party group specialists and/or spokespersons. In the case of relatively uncontroversial and technical issues (and for which the party group's position is not specified in the party program and electoral manifesto), MPs will most likely rely on the cues provided by their party group specialists and/or spokespersons. In the case of politically controversial and non-technical issues, there is a high probability that MPs will have an opinion, and that this opinion is in agreement with the party group's position. MPs also vote in line with the advice of the party group policy specialists and/or spokespersons in this situation, but because they agree with them in the first place, not because they defer to their opinion. The active mechanism is thus MPs' agreement with the party group's position, and not cue-taking, because MPs do have a personal opinion on the topic. Only if MPs disagree with the party group's position or the position advocated by the party group's specialists and/or spokespersons, does party group loyalty become relevant. And finally, if all other mechanisms fail, the party (group) leadership may consider the use of sanctions.

Finally, Kam's (2009, 15) synthetic LEADS model (MPs Loyalty Elicited through Advancement, Discipline, and Socialization) is also a sequential model, but does not take the perspective of decision making by individual MPs. Instead, Kam (2009, 15) argues that party leaders' dependence on different mechanisms is contingent on the stage of MPs' careers. Ideological differences and electoral incentives set the stage for dissent to occur. Party leaders rely on positive sanctions (promotion, for example) to prompt MPs who are in the early stages of their career to vote with the party group line despite their disagreement. Positive sanctions work less well, however, for MPs who are already highly ranked and cannot be promoted, or are in the final stages of their career. Party leaders then prefer to rely on informal measures and norms of party group loyalty, acquired through the process of socialization. Finally, leaders may then resort to negative sanctions, but need to do so strategically and focused, as they may carry substantial costs.

What these models have in common is that voluntary party group agreement in the form of the homogeneity of preferences is usually the first stage in determining party group unity, with the exception of Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a), who acknowledge that MPs may not be able to form an opinion on all matters and thus implicitly place cue-taking from the party group specialists and/or spokespersons at the start of the decision-making sequence. Also, party discipline is usually positioned as a last resort, at the final stage, because of its involuntary nature and associated high costs, which make its frequent use an inefficient pathway. Thus, in the case of disagreement, party group loyalty comes into play before sanctions.

3.3 The sequential decision-making model

3.3.1 MPs' decision-making process

The model presented in Figure 3.1 forms the basis for the empirical analyses in this book. It outlines an individual MP's decision-making process in determining whether or not to vote according to the party group line (i.e., contribute to party group unity).[9] The different decision-making mechanisms, as well as the order in which they are placed, are derived from the main pathways to party group unity found in the (theoretical) literature.

First, in determining whether to vote according to the party group line on a given vote in parliament, an MP assesses whether he actually has an opinion on the matter at hand. If the MP lacks a personal opinion, he votes according to the party group line in accordance with the party group's position as stipulated in the party program or electoral manifesto, but also the voting cues provided by his fellow party group members. To a certain degree, cue-taking is made possible, but also necessary, by party groups' solution for dealing with the workload of parliament. Applying a division of labor for which MPs each specialize in, and/or act as parliamentary party spokespersons for, particular policy areas, allows party groups work more efficiently, but also entails that MPs will probably not be able to develop a personal opinion about all matters that are put to vote.

Whether an MP has a personal opinion on a particular vote is likely to also depend on whether he has a background or some expertise in the topic area, whether the MP acts as a parliamentary party spokesperson for a topic that is closely related to the issue at hand, the level of technical and detailed knowledge required to form an opinion about the vote, the amount of time and resources the MP would need to invest in developing a personal opinion, and the importance the MP personally, and/or his party (group), ascribe to the matter at hand. If the MP needs to make quite an investment in terms of time and resources to understand and then develop an opinion about a rather technical issue, and/or the issue is not that important to him or his party (group),[10] he may prefer

[9] As mentioned above, party group unity "must be constructed one MP at a time" (Kam, 2009, 16); for each vote in parliament each MP must individually decide whether to vote according to the party group line or not, and this decision-making process consists of a number of steps that are arranged in a particular order. The collective outcome, a party's final degree of unity on a particular vote, is therefore a function of all individual MPs' sequential decision-making processes.

[10] MPs' lack of an opinion may also result from the party group's (informal) rules concerning the division of labor itself. As mentioned by Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 657) the division of labor encourages MPs not to interfere in each other's policy areas. MPs therefore lack an personal opinion not (only) because they do not have the time and/or resources to invest in forming their own opinion, but because they have agreed not to interfere in other MPs' issue areas. This agreement could a formal group rule, but it could also be an informal rule, or tacit agreement, in which case it could be conceived as a party group norm, and thus is closely related to our third decision-making mechanism, party group loyalty. Alternatively, an MP could also not form an opinion on certain issues area not out of respect for the implicit normative agreement to not interfere in each other's policy areas, but because of the strategic agreement with other MPs to support each other's positions and initiatives (logrolling). It could also be that MPs do not form an opinion on votes that fall outside their own designated issue areas because they fear that if do, others may do the same to them in the future (i.e., undermine an implicit tit-for-tat strategic agreement (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a, 657)), which may make their job more difficult and may frustrate their role and authority in the party group.

Figure 3.1: MPs' sequential decision-making process



(or need) to rely on the voting cues provided by his fellow party group members. The MP has to trusts that the voting advice provided by his fellow party group members is in line with the party program and electoral manifesto, and is representative of the opinion the MP would have held had he developed his own.

If the MP does have an opinion on the matter, or he considers the development of his own opinion worth the investment of time and resources, he moves on to the second decision-making stage, at which he gauges whether there is a conflict between his own personal opinion and the position of his party group on the issue. The party group's position is to a large extent specified in the party program or electoral manifesto. Furthermore, the party group's position on a specific topic can be developed during the parliamentary term by the party group specialists and/or spokespersons, the parliamentary party group leader(s), the parliamentary party group as a whole, or even the political party as a whole, depending on the division of labor and the hierarchy within a political party. Thus, there may be an array of sources that determine the party group's position on a given vote. The main question, however, is whether the MP agrees with his party group's policy position on a particular vote in parliament. If there is no conflict, then one can say that the MP's contribution to the unity of his party group is brought about by policy agreement.

If there is a conflict between the MP's preferences and his party group's position, the MP moves on to the third decision-making stage, at which point he decides whether or not his subscription to the norm of party group loyalty overrides his conflict with the party group line. If the conflict with the position of the party group is relatively minor, and/or the norm of party group loyalty is sufficiently internalized by the MP, it ought to be enough to persuade the MP to voluntarily submit to the party group line. As highlighted in our review of the pathways to party group unity literature above, MPs' subscription to the norm of party group loyalty is likely to result from a process of group socialization through previous party experience. However, whether or not the norm is considered applicable in a particular situation is an individual MP's decision.

If the MP does not subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, or the MP does subscribe to the norm but his disagreement with the party group's position is so intense that it supersedes his loyalty to the party group, the political party (group) leadership enters into the equation at the final stage of decision making, making use of the available positive and negative sanctions to force the MP to vote according to the party group line. If (the threat of) sanctions outweigh the MP's resolve to follow his own opinion, his contribution to party group unity is brought about by the MP's obedience. If the sanctions are not enough to elicit conformity to the party group line, the MP dissents.[11] Negative

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Although this does not immediately mean that an MP lacks an opinion as a result of the fear of (threat of) negative sanctions (i.e., party discipline, which is associated with the rational-choice approach to explaining party group unity), it does mean that the decision to develop an opinion is not only based on whether an MP has the time and/or resources to do so. In a sense, both normative considerations and strategic calculations can play a role in determining whether an MP will invest the time and resources needed in developing an opinion in the first place.

[11] Some legislatures and political parties have designated votes about certain issues (e.g., the death penalty, abortion, stem cell research, gay rights, marriage, etc.) 'votes of conscience' or 'free votes' (Cowley, 1998;

sanctions may still follow. Who exactly controls which potential positive and negative sanctions may differ depending on formal and informal rules of the party organization. Whereas in some parties the parliamentary party group (leadership) may actually control the application of certain sanctions, in other parties the party group leadership itself may only an advisory role in the application of these sanctions; the sanctions being controlled by another organ of the political party organization.

The model developed above disentangles the different decision-making mechanisms derived from the pathways to party group unity highlighted in the theoretical literature. One of the most important novelties of the model is the placement of these mechanisms in a particular order, a sequence that generally matches the order usually suggested in the existing theoretical literature mentioned above, and is arguably logical from the perspective of both the individual MP and the party. As is the case with most theoretical models, however, our sequential model of MP decision-making is also a simplification of political reality.

3.3.2 The sequential logic

As stated above, the logic of the order of mechanisms in our decision-making model can be explained from both the perspective of the individual MP and the political party, specifically the party group leadership, who is likely to be responsible for the parliamentary party group's behavioral unity.[12] At the first stage of our decision-making model, an MP who does not have a personal opinion contributes to the unity of his party group by voting according to what is stipulated in the party program or electoral manifesto, or following the cues provided to him by his fellow party group members. We assume that during their political career MPs self-select into political parties whose policy positions they agree with the most, and thus that when an MP is unable to form a personal opinion, he considers the position of his own party (group), or that which is advocated by a fellow party member who is responsible for the party group's position, his default option. Party group agreement is not relevant because without a personal opinion, an MP cannot ascertain whether he agrees with the party group's position on the vote. And although he may also be toeing the party group line out of loyalty, this is not the determinant decision-making mechanism that leads him to vote with the party group when

Mughan and Scully, 1997; Pattie and Fieldhouse, Edward Johnston, 1994). In similar vein, party groups may also have formal and informal rules about under what circumstances dissent from the party group line is permissible, and thus MPs can expect that deviating from the party group line will not entail any short-term or long-term negative repercussions for the MP. In general however, these situations are the exception rather than the rule. Our model still works, as an MP still has to decide whether he has an opinion on the matter, and he is still able to gauge whether his opinion is in line with the party group's position. And even though the vote has been declared free, he may still consider it appropriate to toe the party group line out of solidarity. If this is not the case, the MP moves on to the fourth decision-making mechanisms, at which point je asks himself whether (potential) positive and negative sanctions outweigh his resolve to vote according to his own opinion. As the party (group) leaders will likely not apply party discipline in this situation, they cannot outweigh the MP's resolve to vote according to his own opinion. This means that the MP will dissent from the party group line, and that party voting unity will not be complete.

[12] This again may differ depending on a political party's rules and organization.

an MP lacks an opinion. The same holds for party discipline; while the MP without an opinion may be responsive to (threats and promises of) party discipline, it is again not likely to be the determinant mechanism of his decision to vote with the party group. Both mechanisms are only determinant of behavior when an MP has an opinion and is in disagreement with his party group's position.

Party group leaders are likely to encourage cue-taking as a means of achieving party group unity in parliament from an efficiency perspective. The division of labor not only allows party groups to deal with the workload of parliament, but the resultant decision-making mechanism cue-taking may ease and quicken party group meeting discussions on the group's position concerning the substantive content of parliamentary votes. Moreover, if an MP does have an opinion, there is always a chance of the MP disagreeing with the party group's position, in which case the party group leadership is dependent on either the MP's subscription to the norm of party group loyalty (which the party group leadership is ultimately unable to control), or the MP's responsiveness to (the threat of or promise of) sanctions, which can be costly. Moreover, the threat, promise or application of discipline in response to an MP who simply lacks a personal opinion can be considered quite premature, and may even have a negative effect on the party group leadership's authority.

Once an MP has an opinion, cue-taking is not a relevant decision-making mechanism, and he moves on to the second stage of the decision-making model, at which point he assesses whether his own opinion is in line with the party group's position. If this is indeed the case, his contribution to party group unity is determined by his simple agreement. As was the case as the earlier stage of cue-taking, the MP may also subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, or may be responsive to sanctions if they are applied, but these pathways are redundant because he already agrees with the party group's position, and thus he will contribute to party group unity by simply following his own opinion. MPs who vote with the party group line out of agreement are also likely to be preferred by the party group leadership over those who do so out of loyalty or obedience. Although an MP's subscription to party group loyalty is likely to result from, and be reinforced by, socialization and selection, and party group leaders can try to create an environment that is conducive to adherence to the norm, the internationalization, and actual application of the norm in a particular situation is an individual's own decision. Relying on an MP's subscription to party group loyalty as a pathway to party group unity carries certain risks as it makes behavioral party group unity dependent on the individual MP's decision as to whether is loyalty is strong enough to outweigh his resolve to vote according to his own conflicting opinion. When it comes to party discipline, threatening with or actually applying sanctions to elicit compliance from an MP who already agrees with the party group line anyway is likely to be considered exorbitant, and thus counterproductive. Moreover, (the threat or promise of) sanctions are always costlier than simply relying on an MP's voluntary agreement.

If an MP disagrees with the party group line, he has to decide whether his subscription to the norm of party group loyalty outweighs the intensity of his conflict with the party group's position. If this is the case, discipline is unnecessary because the MP will toe the party group line voluntarily. Although relying on an MPs' subscription to the

norm of party group loyalty is riskier for party group leaders than relying on the first two decision-making mechanisms, party group leaders are likely to still preferred that MPs vote with the party group of their own accord, as again, the unnecessary application of discipline can be costly and undermine the party group leaderships' authority. It is also likely that an individual MP prefer voting with the party group despite his disagreement of his own accord rather than being forced into obedience. Thus, in our model, (the threat of) negative or (promise of) positive sanctions are used as a last resort to get an MP to vote with the party group line despite his disagreement.

As stated above, we do not argue that for a given vote there is always only one potential decision-making mechanism present in the mind of MP. For example, an MP without an opinion may also subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, but he does not need to weigh whether his subscription to the norm outweighs his resolve to follow his own opinion, because he does not have a personal opinion to take into consideration. Moreover, an MP who lacks an opinion and does not subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty is also likely to toe the party group line as a result of cue-taking. In both cases, an MP has already decided to vote according to the party group line at the first decision-making stage; he does not need to move on to the mechanisms that follow (unless he decides that he wants to develop his own opinion, in which case the decision-making process starts over once his opinion is formed, and cue-taking will not be the determinant decision-making mechanism anymore). Agreement, loyalty and discipline thus presume that an MP has an opinion. Loyalty and discipline are only relevant decision-making mechanism when an MP disagrees with the party group's position. Discipline is only relevant when an MP disagrees with the party group line and will not vote with the party group line voluntarily despite his disagreement.

3.3.3 Simplification

The sequential decision-making model in Figure 3.1 is, of course, a simplification of what goes on in political reality. For example, determining the position of the party group, as well as the position of individual MPs, is likely to be an iterative process that takes place over weeks, months or even years, during which both the party group's and MPs' positions on the matter may change (if MPs form an opinion at all). This process of position formation does not take place in isolation, and both the party group's and MPs' positions may be influenced by actors both outside and inside the parliamentary party group. The model does not aim to explain how MPs come to their opinions, or the substantive content of their opinions, however, only how they come contribute to party group unity, by deciding to vote with the party group or not. Thus, the model only comes into play when an MP's and the party group's substantive positions on a vote (or lack thereof) are finalized. If something happens that leads to an MP (or the party group) to change his (its) position on a particular vote, the decision-making process is started over.

As opposed to the decision-making models found in the literature on the United States in the 1970s', which were developed in the context of representation studies and explicitly included the influence of different potential foci of representation (voters, interest groups, the president, etc.) on the MP, the model developed above aims to ac-

count for how MPs come to vote with their party group's position or not; it therefore only includes MPs' decision-making process in relation to the party group's final position on a specific vote. The model assumes, however, that if an MP's personal opinion is indeed influenced by other potential foci of representation, this occurs before the MP finalizes his own position. Thus, the different foci of representation may be the cause of the disagreement between the party group's position and the MP's opinion, but according to our model, their influence is already encompassed in the MP's own position on the vote. The same assumption holds for decisions made in regard to the third decision-making mechanism, loyalty. An MP's loyalty to other principals may be the reason why the MP has not sufficiently internalized the norm of party group loyalty, or account for why an MP's loyalty to his party group does not supersede his resolve to vote according to his own opinion in the case of conflict with the party group's position on a particular vote.

In our model, we acknowledge that fellow party group members play the role of cue-givers for an MP who lacks a personal opinion about a specific vote. However, if an MP decides that he does want to invest time and resources in developing his own opinion, these fellow party group members may serve as important sources of information in their opinion formation process. For an MP who does have an opinion, but one which is in conflict with the party group's position, fellow party group members may play a role in trying to change the personal substantive position of this MP through deliberation and argumentation. An MP may also try to convince his fellow party group members to change their minds and/or the party group's position. If the conflict between the MP's and the party group's position remains, internal party group discussions may still take place, but this time the aim is not to change the MP's opinion, but to persuade the MP that voting with the party group line despite disagreement would be most appropriate, i.e., to convince the MP that as a party delegate, he ought to vote with the party group line out of loyalty. Finally, although the control of positive and negative sanctions is likely to be located in the hands of different organs and individuals within the party organization (both inside and outside the party group), fellow party group members can also apply pressure and warn an MP of the potential negative consequences of dissenting from the party group line, or remind him of the potential rewards for toeing the party group line despite his disagreement. Sanctions can also take on the form of social pressure and/or rewards, which can often be quite subtle.

In other words, there is likely to be a constant process of deliberation and discussion within the party group that may influence whether or not an MP has an opinion, the substance of the opinion, and whether the MP considers his loyalty and/or the (threatened or promised) sanctions to outweigh his resolve to dissent from the party in the case of disagreement. This process is not only limited to the parliamentary party group; an MP may also enter into discussions with other members and/or parts of the party organization.[13] We argue, however, that as is the case with the influence of other po-

[13] We are aware that it is unlikely that in practices the content and aim of these discussion and deliberations will take place in such a organized fashion. Indeed, arguments pertaining to the substantive content of positions, but also those that play on an MP's party group loyalty and the consequences and benefits of an MP's decision, are likely to be used simultaneously and may even be muddled.

tential foci of representation, that these discussions and deliberation may influence the whether the MP has an opinion and the substance of his opinion, they do not affect the questions that an MP asks himself in determining whether to vote according to the party group line or not (see Figure 3.1). In other words, the fact that these discussions take place does not mean that, when deciding whether to vote according to the party group line or not, MPs do not apply the mechanisms outlined by the model.

3.4 Conclusion

The study of party group unity is confounded by terminological, conceptual and measurement ambiguities. One of the most important novelties of this study is the disentanglement of the different decision-making mechanisms derived from the pathways to party group unity highlighted in the theoretical literature, and the placement of the mechanisms that MPs apply in determining to vote with the party in a particular order. As with any model, it is a simplification of reality, and thus does not take all aspects of, and possible influence on, MPs' decision-making processes into account. The aim of our studies is not a comprehensive explanation of MPs' decision-making process including all potential independent variables, but to test the sequential approach and illustrate is potential in three studies with a limited set of variables.

As previously mentioned in the introductory chapter, the ultimate test of the model would apply it to MPs' decisions regarding specific votes. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to do so. Our survey data do, however, allow us to place the mechanisms in the sequence outlined above, and gauge the relative contribution of each of the pathways to party group unity, and see whether their contributions differ between parliaments or change over time. Moreover, the data also allow us to test the assumptions and hypotheses about the influence of these institutions on these different pathways. In the following empirical chapters, we develop and test hypotheses concerning the effects of institutions on each of the mechanisms separately, and ascertain the relative contribution of each the mechanisms, and the extent to which political parties can count on these pathways for the unity of their party in parliament.

Chapter 4

The influence of institutions: MPs' decision-making mechanisms in 15 national parliaments

4.1 The influence of institutions

As mentioned in chapter 3, the impact of institutional settings on party group (voting) unity in parliament has been both theorized and studied empirically in the existing literature on representation and legislative behavior (see for example Bowler et al., 1999b; Carey, 2007, 2009; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Morgenstern, 2004; Ozbudun, 1970; Sieberer, 2006). We argue, however, that these institutions do not affect voting behavior directly. Instead, we contend that these institutions influence MPs' decision-making process in determining whether to cast their vote in parliament according to the party group's position, or to dissent from the party group line. Relying on the 2010 PartiRep Survey in 15 national parliaments, the aim of this chapter is to ascertain what the relative contribution of the different decision-making mechanisms is to party group unity, whether this varies by country, and to what extent institutions can account for these differences.[1]

There are a number of different institutions that are hypothesized to impact legislative party unity, but in this chapter we focus on three institutions that are deemed most relevant for party group unity in the existing literature. First, most comparative studies expect the conditions under which MPs compete for (re-)election, to play an important role in determining party group unity (Carey, 2007, 2009; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Martin, 2011; Sieberer, 2006). Electoral laws that allow voters to cast a personal vote and, in the case of list systems enable voters to upset the order in which candidates are

[1] Parts of the analyses in this chapter are also included in Van Vonno et al. (2014).

elected to parliament, are expected to lead to lower levels of party group unity in parliament. The institutional characteristics of these so-called candidate-oriented electoral systems provide candidates with incentives to cultivate a personal vote and to engage in intra-party competition with their fellow candidates, which is expected to increase in intensity with district magnitude. Alternatively, party-centered electoral systems, where voters are unable to cast personal votes and cannot upset the order in which candidates are elected to parliament, are hypothesized to be conducive the party group unity, as candidates must rely on, and contribute to, the political party label as a means of appealing to the electorate. In this case, intra-party competition is argued to decrease as district magnitude increases.

Although the electoral connection is considered conventional theoretical wisdom, the empirical evidence for its influence on parliamentary party voting unity is mixed (Martin, 2014). In his analysis of party voting unity in 11 Western parliamentary systems, Sieberer (2006) follows Mitchell (2000) in his classification of electoral systems as party-oriented, intermediate or candidate-oriented.[2] Contrary to his expectations, Sieberer (2006) finds that party voting unity is actually higher in candidate-centered electoral systems than party-centered systems. Average party voting unity is highest in countries classified in the intermediate category (although variance in average party group unity is lowest in party-centered electoral systems), leading him to question the validity of the argument that party voting unity is a function of electoral rules and personal vote seeking. Carey (2007), however, finds that the level of intra-party competition in the electoral arena explains variations in party voting unity in a range of different systems across the globe,[3] and Hix's (2004) study of voting behavior in the European Parliament reveals that the electoral system by which Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are elected in their home countries influence voting unity in European party groups.[4] According to Depauw and Martin (2009), these mixed results are in part due to the different classifications of electoral systems as candidate or party-centered electoral systems used in the studies.

Depauw and Martin (2009) further argue that variations in parliamentary party voting unity that are attributed to electoral systems may actually stem from differences in political parties' internal candidate selection procedures, which take place before political parties and their candidates enter the electoral arena. Rahat and Hazan (2001) distinguish between the dimensions of inclusiveness and (territorial) centralization in the process of candidate selection. The inclusiveness dimension refers to the number of actors included in the selectorate, which may range from the entire population of

[2] Mitchell (2000) classifies closed-list proportional representation (PR), additional member systems and formally open but in practice rather closed list systems, as party-centered electoral systems. Single-member simple plurality, alternative vote and double-ballot systems are classified as intermediate electoral systems. Genuinely open-list PR and systems in which voters have a single transferable vote (STV) fall under candidate-centered.

[3] Carey (2007) simply tests whether electoral systems allow for intra-party competition or not.

[4] Hix (2004) classifies closed-list and semi-open-list PR systems as party-centered electoral systems, and fully open-list PR and STV systems as candidate-centered. He also includes district magnitude in his model as a separate variable.

the country (which is not common in European party systems), to all party members via party primaries, to a special party agency, and finally to only a select group of political party leaders. The centralization dimension refers to whether selection takes place at the local, district, regional or national level. Candidate selections procedures that are exclusive and centralized are hypothesized to lead to high levels of party group voting unity, as they place the control over candidate selection in the hands of a relatively small and homogeneous group, concentrated at the national level, that is able to (directly) monitor the behavior of incumbent MPs. Contrarily, candidate selection procedures that are inclusive and decentralized are hypothesized to lead to lower levels of party voting unity in parliament (Depauw and Martin, 2009).

There are only a few empirical studies that actually include candidate selection as a possible determinant of party group voting unity.[5] Sieberer (2006), who dichotomizes candidate selection procedures into those with high and low centralized control,[6] finds a positive relationship between centralized control and party voting unity in his study of 11 parliamentary democracies. Depauw and Martin (2009) also test for a relationship between party voting unity and candidate selection in their analysis of 16 European democracies. Using Lundell's (2004) five-point scale,[7] which combines both the centralization and inclusiveness dimensions of candidate selection procedures developed by Rahat and Hazan (2001), Depauw and Martin (2009) find that party voting unity increases as candidate selection becomes more centralized and exclusive. Both Faas (2003)[8] and Hix (2004)[9] find that MEPs are more likely to defect from their European party group line when their political party's candidate selection procedure is more centralized at the national level in their home country. Finally, although Hazan and Rahat (2006) do not look at party voting unity, they find that in the Israeli parliament the democratization of candidate selection (which entails increasing candidate selection inclusiveness) led to an increase in the adoption of private member bills, which is argued to be an individualistic form of parliamentary behavior and indicative of the 'personalization of politics'. Their

[5] In his study of party voting unity in 19 countries, Carey (2007, 94) includes a hypothesis regarding the degree of decentralization of government. Carey reasons that in unitary systems the strongest level of party organization is the national level, whereas in federal systems the subnational levels of party organization are usually more powerful. As candidate selection methods may differ between parties within the same country, looking directly at candidate selection instead of the degree of government decentralization serves as a more precise measure of power distribution within political parties.

[6] Sieberer (2006) considers centralized control high when the party leadership can select candidate directly, or proposals from the local or regional level have to be approved by the central party leadership; candidate selection centralization is low in all other circumstances.

[7] The scale developed by Lundell (2004) starts with control over selection located exclusively at the local level (1) or district level (2), and ends with control over selection located exclusively at the national level (5). In between (3-4), selection takes place at either the district, regional or national level, but other levels can exercise influence over the selection process by being able to propose candidates, actually add names to the list, or veto candidates.

[8] Faas (2003) uses three categories: candidate selection by central leadership, by party congress and by regional party organization.

[9] Hix (2004) simply dichotomizes candidate selection into centralized (national party executive or national party congress) and decentralized (regional or local party caucus).

analysis does not allow for cross-country comparison, but they do note that "Members of the US Congress, which is known for its low levels of party cohesion, are selected through highly inclusive primaries. In contrast, British, Irish, and Norwegian legislators (as well as most other West European legislators), who are selected by more exclusive selectorates, exhibit higher levels of cohesion." (Hazan and Rahat, 2006, 381).

Finally, the defining aspect of parliamentary systems, the confidence convention, is expected to generate higher levels of party group unity in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems. In parliamentary systems, the executive is dependent on the continued explicit or implicit confidence of a plurality in the legislature (Strøm, 2000, 365). Although confidence votes are not regularly used, their possibility alone is expected to lead to higher levels of party voting unity (Kam, 2009). Some authors even consider the confidence convention both a necessary and a sufficient condition for high party group unity (Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998). Carey (2007, 94), on the other hand, argues that since confidence provisions are not formally summoned on most votes, their impact may be overstated. The confidence convention is further argued to have a stronger impact on an MP when his party is in government than when his party is in opposition. For government MPs, dissent acquires a second dimension: voting against the Prime Minister and cabinet, which may bring down the government and, in some systems, may lead to early parliamentary elections. According to Carey (2007) the confidence convention cannot account for why MPs in opposition party groups vote in unity, however, as there are no additional costs associated directly with being in opposition and party voting disunity.

As stated above, our main argument is that these institutions do not affect party group unity directly, but instead affect the decision-making process MPs apply in determining how to vote in parliament. This is already evidenced by the theoretical arguments developed by scholars in their study of the relationship between institutions and party voting unity, which often highlight the impact of these institutions on different causal (i.e., MPs' decision-making) mechanisms (see section 3.2 in chapter 3). Below we outline how we expect each of these three institutions to affect the decision-making mechanisms employed by MPs. We then test our hypotheses in 15 national parliaments on the basis of the 2010 PartiRep Survey.

4.2 Expectations

4.2.1 Division of labor

During the first stage of our sequential decision-making process, individual MPs determine whether they actually have a personal stance on the vote at hand. It may be, however, that because of the considerably heavy workload in most national legislatures, MPs do not have the time or resources to form their own personal opinion on all topics (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Whitaker, 2005). In order to deal with this workload, party groups apply a division of labor among their members (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Krehbiel, 1991; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; Skjaeveland, 2001), As such, candidates' background and specialization in particular issue areas are likely to be important

criteria during parties' candidate recruitment and selection process. Moreover, MPs' specializations are likely to develop further during their time in parliament and their experience as spokespersons for their party groups in their legislative committees. This too may result in MPs being less knowledgeable and up-to-date about topics outside of their own field. If MPs lack a (strong) opinion on the topic that is put to a vote, they follow the voting advice provided by their fellow party group members who are specialized in, or act as a spokesperson for, the relevant issue area, and thus MPs contribute to party group unity through cue-taking.

In this chapter, we present some descriptive statistics for our indicators of cue-taking, but we do not formulate or test any hypotheses about cue-taking in the sequential decision-making model. First, the PartiRep survey questions do not allow us to measure the role of cue-taking during MPs' voting decision making itself (see subsection 4.3.1). Our first indicator enables us to gauge whether MPs are more likely to consider themselves generalists or specialists. We argue that if there are many specialists in parliament, this evidences that party groups are likely to apply a division of labor, and thus that MPs will need to engage in cue-taking when voting on issues that fall outside their own portfolio. Our second indicator is a question that asks respondents whether they consider it true or false that in the day-to-day practice of parliament, the party group spokesperson determines the position of the party group on his topic. We argue that if MPs answer that this is true, this also provides some evidence for the argument that party groups apply a division of labor among their MPs. Both questions, however, do not refer specifically to the role of cue-taking when it comes to MPs' decision-making process preceding a vote in parliament, which makes it problematic to place this mechanism in the sequential decision-making model. Moreover, the question that we use to measure the second decision-making stage, party group agreement, cannot distinguish between MPs who vote with the party group line because they personally agree with it, and MPs who vote with the party group because they lack a personal opinion on the topic, but *do not disagree* with the party group's position (see discussion in subsection 4.3.2 below), which also makes the inclusion of cue-taking in the sequential decision-making model problematic.

Second, the institutions that we focus on in this chapter are not likely to have a strong impact on the division of labor parliamentary party groups apply and MPs' tendency to engage in cue-taking, especially when taking our indicators into consideration. Although we argue above that specialization is likely to be an important candidate selection criterion, there is no reason to suspect that the inclusiveness of the selectorate or the centralization of the candidate selection procedure will necessarily influence the number of policy specialists and generalists, or that candidate selection procedures will impact the way in which parliamentary party groups organize their workload. Instead, the extent to which party groups apply a division of labor and MPs are able to engage in cue-taking is likely to be determined by institutions and specific rules and procedures inside the legislative arena, for which we lack the data on for the parliaments included in our analysis (but see chapter 6 for an analysis of changes in cue-taking over time in the Dutch national parliament), as well as party group size (for which we test in chapter 5).

4.2.2 Party agreement

If MPs do have an opinion on a vote in parliament, they move on to the second decision-making stage, at which they assess whether their opinion on the issue at hand corresponds with the position of their party group. Party agreement is the most basic source of MPs' toeing the party line on their own accord (Krehbiel, 1993) and is held to mainly result from a process of (self-)selection. Individuals interested in a political career are likely to join the political party with which they agree the most in terms of ideology and general policy position (Rush and Giddings, 2011), and party selectorates recruit, select and promote candidates whose preferences are most in line with their own. Thus, working under the assumption that selectorates choose candidates whose preferences match their own, the further removed from the national level (i.e., the more decentralized), and the larger the group involved in the candidate selection process (i.e., the more inclusive the selectorate), the wider the range of their preferences, and thus the more likely it is that they will choose a heterogeneous group of candidates, which will lead to lower levels of agreement in the parliamentary party group. If candidate selection is concentrated in the hands of the national party leaders, a relatively small and probably homogenous group, party agreement is likely to be higher, as party leaders are likely to select candidates who agree with the party program and electoral manifesto as much as possible. Our expectation is therefore that *MPs in parties with exclusive and centralized candidate selection procedures are more likely to frequently agree with the party than MPs in parties with inclusive and decentralized candidate selection procedures (H1a).*

When it comes to the influence of electoral institutions, we argue that party group agreement is likely to be higher in party-oriented electoral systems than in candidate-oriented electoral systems. As stated above, it is in the interest of the party selectorate to only grant access to the political party label to those candidates who reflect the party selectorate's own policy positions. Moreover, in list systems specifically, party selectorates are likely to place those candidates with whom they agree with the most at the top of the candidacy list in order to maximize these candidates' chances of (re-)election. Therefore, in party-centered electoral systems, where voters are unable to cast a personal vote and/or there is little intra-party competition and few incentives for personal vote seeking, the party's control over candidates extends into the electoral arena in terms of who is eventually elected to parliament. In candidate-centered electoral systems, where voters are able to cast a personal vote, and/or intra-party competition is strong and there are more incentives for candidates to engage in personal vote seeking, parties to some extent lose their control over who is elected to parliament. Given that the policy preferences of the electorate at large are likely to be more heterogeneous than those of the party selectorate, party agreement in parliament is likely to suffer. Moreover, as a personal vote seeking strategy, candidates may attempt to distinguish themselves from their fellow candidates with whom they compete. One strategy could be by adopting, or emphasizing, a policy position that differs from that of (the other candidates of) that help by the political party. Our hypothesis is that *MPs in party-oriented electoral systems are more likely to frequently agree with the party than MPs in candidate-oriented electoral systems (H2a).*

Finally, when it comes to the effects of government participation in parliamentary systems, one could argue that if an MP's party participates in government, this increases the likelihood that MPs will disagree with the party's position. Domestic circumstances and international pressures may lead the government to take ad hoc or unpopular measures, which governing parties' counterparts in parliament are expected to support, but individual MPs may not agree with. In the case of coalition government, governing parties may have to support certain government initiatives that are a part of the coalition agreement, but that were not originally in their party's own electoral manifesto or party program, also increasing the likelihood of MPs' disagreement with the party line in parliament. We expect that *MPs in governing parties are less likely to frequently agree with the party on a vote in parliament than MPs in opposition parties (H3a).*

4.2.3 Party loyalty

If MPs do not agree with the party group line on a vote in parliament, they move on to the next decision-making stage, at which they weigh whether their loyalty to the party group overrides their disagreement with the group's position. MPs who subscribe to the norm of party group solidarity toe the party group line voluntarily despite their reservations because they acknowledge the importance of legislative party group unity for parliamentary government. Party group loyalty is theorized to be the result of processes of socialization and internalization. Norms of group loyalty are learned not only in parliament (Rush and Giddings, 2011), but also through prior party experience (Asher, 1973; Crowe, 1983).

Similar to party group agreement, a candidate's loyalty to his selectorate is likely to be an important candidate selection criterion. Thus, if candidate selection is concentrated in the hands of the national party leadership, MPs are more likely to subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, than if the selectorate is more inclusive and decentralized. In the cases of the former, it is clear who an MP's main principal is (the national party leadership). The more inclusive and decentralized the selectorate, however, the more competing principals there are within the political party to whom an MP may owe his allegiance, and thus the more likely that his loyalty to the party group leadership will be diffused by his loyalty to other party members and branches of the party organization, who may disagree with the position of the party group and expect the MP to vote in line with their own, instead of the party group's, position (Carey, 2009). Therefore, we expect that *MPs in parties with exclusive and centralized candidate selection procedures are more likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than MPs in parties with inclusive and decentralized candidate selection procedures (H1b).*

The notion of competing principals is also important when it comes to the influence of electoral institutions on MPs' decision to vote with the party group's position despite disagreement. In party-oriented electoral systems in which parties control ballot access, voters are unable to cast a personal vote and/or there is little intra-party competition, MPs owe their seat to the party and benefit from the collective party reputation. The party is therefore their main principal, and thus MPs are more likely to be loyal to the party group in the case of disagreement. In candidate-oriented electoral systems, voters

can cast a personal vote and/or there is more intra-party competition, and thus there is more incentive to cultivate a personal reputation that sets MPs apart from their other party group members, and MPs are more likely to owe their seats to voters who elected on them on basis of their personal policy stances. Voters are therefore more likely to act as competing principals to the political party, and thus loyalty to the party group may be diffused to an MP's own (potential) voters. The hypothesis is that *MPs in party-oriented electoral systems are more likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than MPs in candidate-oriented electoral systems (H2b).*

Finally, the added responsibility of supporting government initiatives, and the threat of early elections if the government is brought down, may instill in government MPs a stronger feeling of responsibility towards their political party, and make them more likely to support their party group voluntarily in the case of disagreement, than opposition MPs. We expect that *MPs in governing parties are more likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than MPs in opposition parties (H3b).*

4.2.4 Party discipline

When MPs disagree with the party group line, and do not subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty or the conflict with the party group's position is so intense that it outweighs their loyalty to the party group, party (group) leaders may employ disciplinary measures in an attempt to sway their vote. At the final decision-making stage, MPs must decide whether (the promise of) positive incentives or (the threat of) negative sanctions outweigh their resolve to dissent from the party group line. As opposed to party group agreement and party group loyalty, which results in MPs' voluntarily contributing to party group unity, party discipline is an involuntary pathway.

Control over candidate selection is an important tool that can be used to discipline MPs. When candidate selection procedures are inclusive and decentralized, the national party (group) leadership's access to candidate selection as a potential and credible disciplining tool is limited. Contrarily, when the national party (group) leadership has extensive control over candidate selection, this can be very powerful disciplining tool.[10] In terms of negative sanctions, the party (group) leadership can (threaten to) not reselect an MP who is considering dissenting or has dissented from the party group line. In the case of candidacy lists, the party (group) leadership can also decrease an MP's chances of re-election by placing him near the bottom of the electoral candidacy list. In terms of positive sanctions, the party (group) leadership can do the opposite and (promise to) reselect an MP, or place him nearer to the top of the candidacy list. Therefore we expect that *MPs in parties with exclusive and centralized candidate selection procedures are more likely to be disciplined than MPs in parties with inclusive and decentralized candidate selection procedures (H1c).*

[10] Depending on the rules of the political party, the parliamentary party group leadership may be involved in candidate selection, and thus have direct access to reselection as a disciplining tool, or may play only an advisory role, making its access indirect and the use of candidate reselection as a disciplinary tool dependent on others within the party organization.

The same logic holds for electoral institutions: in party-oriented electoral systems, where political parties control ballot access and voters are unable to cast a personal vote, political parties' control over candidate selection extends in to the electoral arena. In the case of list systems, safe positions near the top of the list are very valuable to candidates, as being placed high on the party electoral candidacy list greatly increases their chances of (re-)election. In candidate-centered electoral systems, where voters can cast a personal vote and/or influence the order in which candidates are elected to parliament, the party's (leaderships') ability to use the electoral system as a credible sanctioning tool is diminished. We expect that *MPs in party-oriented electoral systems are more likely to be disciplined than MPs in candidate-oriented electoral systems (H2c).*

In Anglo-Saxon parliamentary systems such as in the United Kingdom, where government (junior) minister are also members of parliament, a governing political party technically has the power to demote a frontbencher who refuses to vote with the party's position, to the position of backbencher. However, in most countries a (junior) minister cannot simultaneously hold a seat in parliament, and therefore being a governing party does not give a party's leadership access to other tools to discipline its MP than if the party is in opposition. A governing party could promise an MP a future position in government, but there is no guarantee that the party will remain in government after the next elections. Thus, in parliament, governing and opposition party groups have access to the same disciplining tools. Depending on the rules of parliament, party (group) leaders can remove an MP from his legislative committees, or (temporarily) relieve an MP of his spokesmanship for particular topics. They can also expel an MP from the party group, and in legislatures where MPs' seats formally belong to the party, even evict him from parliament entirely, thus ending his political career. The added responsibility of government and the threat of early elections if the government is brought down, however, may make governing parties more willing than opposition parties to (threaten to) use these disciplinary measures when MPs threaten not to toe the party group line voluntarily. Our final hypothesis is that *MPs in governing parties are more likely to be disciplined than MPs in opposition parties (H3c).*

4.3 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in 15 national parliaments

This analysis relies on data collected in the context of the PartiRep project. One of the components of the PartiRep project involves a cross-national survey carried out in 15 countries among members of 65 national and sub-national legislatures. For the purpose of this analysis only respondents from the 15 national parliaments are included (see Table 4.1). Data collection took place between the Spring of 2009 and 2012, and in the timing of the data collection electoral cycles were taken into account as much as possible to minimize the impact of electoral campaigns and ensure that MPs had been in office for sufficient time to have experience with the phenomena into which our questions

inquired.[11] Depending on country context and the accessibility of MPs, MPs were invited to participate either by filling in a web-based survey or print questionnaire by hand, or were interviewed via telephone or face-to-face.[12]

On average 20 percent of national MPs participated in the survey, but the response rates vary quite a bit between countries (see Table 4.1). There are few studies of response rates themselves in political science, and in particular when it comes to elite surveys. It is therefore difficult to determine whether these response rates can be considered acceptable or are comparable to those achieved through other elite surveys. One recent example of another elite survey is the 2009 Comparative Candidate Survey, which achieved a response rate of 22 percent. During their Inaugural Conference, the members of the project had agreed that "a survey with a return rate below 20 percent of the target population (universe or sample) is not acceptable" (2007). According to this threshold, the overall response rate attained by the PartiRep survey just makes the cut. However, there are a number of individual countries for which response rates are below 20 percent: Italy (7 percent), France (9 percent), the United Kingdom (10 percent) and Portugal (12 percent). And Ireland (20 percent) and Germany (22 percent) are only just above the threshold.

The dataset's representativeness of the population was tested by the project leaders using the Duncan Index of Similarity, on the basis of which the authors conclude that "the selection closely resembles the population in most respects" (see Deschouwer et al. 2014, 11). 49 percent of respondents are from governing parties, and 51 percent are members of parties in opposition, which in almost all countries is very similar to the ratio in the population. The sample is also fairly representative of party group membership, although there are a few exceptions (Deschouwer et al., 2014, 11).[13] As such, responses are weighted to correct for these potential biases in response rates between party groups in legislatures. A second weight is applied to bring the number of responses in the different countries in line with one another. Still, country differences in response rates should be kept in mind in interpreting the analyses in this chapter.[14] Finally, the eight independents (defined as MPs whose political party only has one seat in parliament) included in the data set are excluded from the analysis, as they have no parliamentary party group to conform to.

As highlighted in subsection 3.2.1 in chapter 3, there are a number of other variables, including those at the political party and individual level, that are also argued to affect individual MP behavior and party group unity. Although the survey is deemed fairly

[11] Only in the Netherlands, Norway and Spain did data collection take place in the months prior to the national parliamentary elections.

[12] The fact that different methods of data collection were used may hve

[13] In both France and Spain, the Socialist party is overrepresented, whereas the Conservative Party is slightly underrepresented. In Italy the Partito Democratico is overrepresented, whereas Popola della Libertá is underrepresented (Deschouwer et al., 2014, 11). In Poland, the large established parties are slightly underrepresented (André et al., 2012, 109).

[14] All analyses have been checked for correlations with response rates. Noteworthy findings are discussed in the text.

Table 4.1: PartiRep MP Survey response rates for 15 national parliaments

	Population	Response		Government	Candidate selection inclusiveness			Candidate selection centralization	Electoral system	
					Primaries	Agency	Leaders	National level	Personal vote	District magnitude
Country	N	n	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	seats (n)
Austria	183	55	30	60	0	100	0	20	80	2-7
Belgium	150	70	47	62	0	88	12	12	100	5-24
France	577	50	9	0	0	0	100	2	100	1
Germany	622	134	22	43	0	100	0	0	41	1-65
Hungary	386	99	26	49	0	57	43	43	54	1-58
Ireland	166	34	20	44	55	45	0	45	100	3-5
Israel	120	39	33	49	51	28	21	100	0	120
Italy	630	45	7	44	0	0	100	100	0	6-43
Netherlands	150	63	42	37	17	83	0	100	100	150
Norway	169	46	27	57	0	100	0	0	100	4-17
Poland	460	55	12	48	0	23	77	100	100	7-19
Portugal	230	76	33	40	0	100	0	67	0	2-47
Spain	350	104	30	66	0	0	100	26	100	3-47
Switzerland	200	49	25	78	0	100	0	0	0	1-26
United Kingdom	650	62	10	47	100	0	0	0	0	1
Total / average	5043	983	20	49	11	59	30	36	59	28

Note: The 2010 PartiRep MP Survey was financed by the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office (BELSPO). The codebook and instructions for obtaining the data can be found on the PartiRep website (www.partirep.eu).

Table 4.2: Average party group unity in 15 national parliaments (Rice score)

Country	Period	Rice score
Austria	1995-1997	98.33
Belgium	1991-1995	99.06
France	1993-1997	99.33
Germany	1987-1990	96.33
Hungary	-	-
Ireland	1992-1996	100.00
Israel	1999-2000	96.88
Italy	1996-2001	96.46
Netherlands	2006-2010	99.96
Norway	1992-1993	95.90
Poland	-	-
Portugal	-	-
Spain	-	-
Switzerland	1991-1994	86.60
United Kingdom	1992-1997	99.25
Total / average		

Rice score sources: Source for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy and United Kingdom is Depauw and Martin (2009). The authors excluded both non-votes and abstentions. Source for Switzerland is Lanfranchi and Lüthi (1999). The scores for the Netherlands were calculated by the author.

representative of the population of MPs in the 15 national parliaments included in the study, and there are over 100 parliamentary party groups included in the survey, and data weights have been used to try to correct for potential biases, there are some party groups, especially the smaller ones, that are underrepresented or not represented at all, which may have made the inclusion of party (group) related factors problematic. Thus, one of the main reasons why we have opted to limit the analysis to only three main institutional variables is data-driven.[15]

In each of the sections below, we first present descriptive statistics on the four decision-making mechanisms. When possible we also validate our measures of the decision-making mechanisms with other questions from the 2010 PartiRep Survey. Each discussion of the descriptive statistics of the individual mechanisms is followed by a multivariate analysis in which we test the hypotheses developed above (with the exception of

[15] We did check for correlations between the questions used to measure the decision-making mechanisms and the potentially relevant variables included in the PartiRep dataset. Almost all of the relationships were not statistically significant, and for some the relevance and suitability of the variables (i.e., question formulation and/or answering categories formulations and variable type) for our analysis can be questioned.

cue-taking for which we did not develop any hypotheses, see subsection 4.2.1). Because all our dependent variables are categorical, logistic regression is the best multivariate method to use. In order to take the hierarchical nature of the data into account, we use a multilevel model, through which we control for the 15 parliaments and 94 political party groups that MPs are members of.

First, to test our hypotheses regarding government participation in parliamentary systems, we use a simple dummy variable that marks whether an MP's party is in opposition (0) or in government (1). Regarding the operationalization of candidate selection, MPs' parties' candidate selection procedures are classified according to the two dimensions of inclusiveness and centralization identified by Rahat and Hazan (2001) in the PartiRep dataset. These classifications are based on the expert judgments of the PartiRep project researchers from the respective countries. Inclusiveness is measured using a categorical indicator, the categories being that party selects its candidates via party primaries, a party agency or the party leadership. Most of the respondents in the 2010 PartiRep survey are selected by a party agency (59 percent), one-third are selected by party leaders, and about 10 percent are selected through party primaries. The PartiRep experts also classified the decentralization of candidate selection procedures as either taking place at the local, district, regional or national level. We have opted to combine these two dimensions into one dummy variable: candidate selection is both exclusive and centralized when it takes place at the national level by party leaders or a select party agency (1), and candidate selection is considered inclusive and decentralized when candidates are selected through party primaries at any level of the party organization, or by party leaders or a party agency at one of the subnational levels (0).[16]

Next, as explained above, the classification of the formal properties of electoral systems as either candidate- or party-oriented is not consistent in the literature, which may account for the mixed results regarding their effects on party voting unity. In line with Carey (2007), we opt for the simplest measure, and that is to differentiate between systems in which voters can formally cast a preference vote for an individual candidate (0) and systems in which voters cannot (1).[17] We also check for the effect of district magnitude (decimal logged), as one could argue that when voters can cast personal votes the intensity of intra-party competition, and thus the value of an individual reputation, increases with district magnitude, because the number of co-partisan competitors also increases. When voters cannot cast a vote for an individual candidate, the value of the political party label instead increases with district magnitude (Carey and Shugart, 1995). The frequency distributions of these variables for each of the 15 parliaments are presented in Table 4.1 .

Table 4.2 provides information on recent Rice scores for those parliaments for which these are available, as an indication of the levels of party group unity found in previous research. Party voting unity is very high in almost all of our 15 parliaments, meaning that

[16] Alternative classification of candidate selection procedures based on the expert judgment of the PartiRep project research team produced very similar results.

[17] Alternative classification of the formal properties of electoral systems based on the expert judgment of the PartiRep project research team produced very similar results.

by and large, MPs usually vote with the party group in parliament. With the exception of Switzerland, Rice scores are all above 95. As stated before, however, these scores do not allow us to ascertain the relative contribution of each of the decision-making mechanisms (see section 3.2 in chapter 3). Ideally, our explanatory model of decision making would be tested by asking MPs what motivated their choice at each stage of their decision-making process on individual legislative votes. However, the available data precludes us from doing so, and we are also unable to connect MPs' responses to the PartiRep Survey questions to their past voting behavior. We can, however, get a general idea of the relative importance that the decision-making mechanisms play in determining party voting unity, and how these may vary between countries and with different institutions, based on our 2010 PartiRep Survey. Thus the results below reflect general tendencies, but can be considered in light of these high levels of party voting unity found in previous research.

4.3.1 Division of labor

During the first stage of the sequential decision-making process, individual MPs determine whether they actually have an opinion on the vote at hand. We argue that as a result of the heavy workload of parliament and the division of labor party groups apply in order to deal with this workload, it is likely that MPs do not have the time or resources to form a personal opinion on all topics, and if they lack an opinion MPs vote according to the voting advice provided by their fellow party group members.

We lack a direct measure of cue-taking that refers specifically to its role in MPs' decision making when it comes to voting in parliament, but we can ascertain the extent to which MPs are likely to view themselves as generalists or specialists, our argument being that specialists are more likely to lack an opinion on votes outside of their area of expertise, and thus are more likely to rely on cue-taking. In the 2010 PartiRep Survey, MPs were asked whether they, in their role as a Member of Parliament, prefer to speak on a wide range of issues from different policy areas, or instead specialize in one or two policy areas. The aggregate percentage of MPs who indicate to keep up with a wide range of issues (referred to as generalist), is practically the same as the percentage of MPs who indicate to specialize (referred to as specialist, see Table 4.3). In most individual countries, however, the percentage of specialists is indeed higher than the percentage of generalists; specialists are in the minority only in Norway (16 percent), Ireland (29 percent), and the Netherlands (36 percent), followed to a lesser extent by Austria (45 percent) and Italy (47 percent). With the exception of Italy, the parliaments where specialists are in the minority are also those with the fewest number of seats (see Table 4.1), entailing that the average size of party groups is likely to be smaller as well; this may explain why in these parliaments MPs are more likely consider themselves generalists (for a further analysis of the relationship between party group size and the percentage of generalists versus specialists, see chapter 5).

We also inquired into MPs' perception of the role of the parliamentary party spokesperson in determining the position of the party on his topic. One could argue that where there is a strong division of labor, parliamentary party spokespersons play an important

Table 4.3: Specialist or generalist in 15 national parliaments (%)

	Generalist	Specialist	Total	Total (n)
Austria	55	45	100	48
Belgium	38	63	101	66
France	33	67	100	48
Germany	45	55	100	131
Hungary	42	58	100	99
Ireland	71	29	100	32
Israel	39	61	100	38
Italy	53	47	100	45
Netherlands	64	36	100	60
Norway	84	16	100	45
Poland	38	62	100	54
Portugal	36	64	100	76
Spain	37	63	100	103
Switzerland	50	50	100	48
United Kingdom	50	50	100	60
All	51	50	101	953

χ^2 (14) = 97.750, sig. = .000; φc = .324, sig. = .000

role in determining the position of the party, and MPs will also be more likely to rely on the parliamentary party spokespersons' voting advice when they do not have a personal opinion on issues put to a vote in parliament. According to the figures in Table 4.4,[18] 61 percent of all MPs answer that it is (mostly) true that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the position of the party on his topics. In most individual countries, the answering patterns are very similar to those at the aggregate level. Countries where the parliamentary party spokesperson seems to play an especially important role include Austria (85 percent answer that the statement is (mostly) true), Spain (78 percent), Ireland (75 percent) and Poland (74 percent). The exceptions are Hungary, where only 36 percent of respondents answer that the statement that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines (mostly) true (and almost half consider the statement is (mostly) false), and Italy (34 percent answer that the statement (mostly) true). All in all, these descriptive statistics do seem to imply that cue-taking may be an important pathway to party unity, although given the high levels of party voting unity found in previous studies, it is certainly not the only one.

[18] For presentation purposes the answering categories 'mostly false' and 'false' are collapsed into one category, as are the answering categories 'mostly true' and 'true'.

Table 4.4: 'The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party's position on his topic' in 15 national parliaments (%)

	(Mostly) false	Neither	(Mostly) true	Total	Total (n)
Austria	10	5	85	100	47
Belgium	23	23	55	101	66
France	30	17	53	100	49
Germany	13	19	68	100	133
Hungary	48	16	36	100	98
Ireland	25	0	75	100	32
Israel	24	12	65	101	38
Italy	25	41	34	100	43
Netherlands	22	23	54	99	65
Norway	23	9	68	100	46
Poland	6	20	74	100	54
Portugal	31	9	59	99	75
Spain	11	11	78	100	102
Switzerland	25	13	63	101	49
United Kingdom	23	21	55	99	60
All	24	15	61	100	957

χ^2 *(28) = 115.206, sig. = .000;* φc *= .248, sig. = .000*

4.3.2 Party agreement

If MPs do have an opinion on a vote in parliament, they move on to the second decision-making stage, at which they assess whether their opinion on the issue at hand corresponds with the position of the party. If this is the case, they vote with the party line voluntarily out of simple agreement. In the literature on party unity, ideological Left-Right and policy scales found in elite surveys are often used to gauge party agreement. These scales can be used to calculate a party's coefficient of agreement (Van der Eijk, 2001) or party homogeneity in terms of the difference between MPs' own position and the mean (or another central tendency, such as the median) position of all party group members. Alternatively, Kam (2001a, 103) measures the absolute distance between MPs' self-placement and the position at which they themselves place their party, as he argues that MPs may have different interpretations of the scale. In this study, we use MPs' self-reported frequency of disagreement as a measure of party agreement.

In the PartiRep Survey, respondents were asked how often, in the last year, they found themselves in the position that their party had one position on a vote in parliament, and they personally had a different opinion. This question goes further than the abstract ide-

ological and policy scales used in previous studies: the question specifies two actors (the individual MP and the party) and the event (a difference of opinion over an upcoming vote), and provides quantifiable answering categories (the frequency of disagreement over months and years). The question gives a sense of, on the whole, how often MPs disagree with their party on a vote in parliament. MPs' answers to the question remain estimations, however, although if MPs disagreed infrequently they ought to be able to recall each unique vote for which this was the case, and it is safe to assume that disagreement occurs quite frequently if MPs cannot recall the exact number of times they disagreed with their party. It could be argued, however, that since the question refers specifically to voting that it may measure MPs' behavior (and thus MPs' contribution to party group unity, the final outcome of MPs' decision-making sequence), instead of attitudinal party agreement. But the fact that the question is followed by a direct follow-up question as to how an MP *should* vote in the case of disagreement with the party's position (see subsection 5.3.3), implies that MPs are likely to have interpreted the question as inquiring into the frequency of disagreement before voting took place.

Another potential problem of the question is the fact that it refers to the position of an MP's 'party', and not specifically his party group in parliament. Thus, respondents may have interpreted 'party' as referring to the party group, but also to other parts and members of the party organization. The question does, however, also refer specifically to a conflict of positions on 'a vote in parliament', which makes it likely that respondents have interpreted the question as referring to the party group in parliament, although we cannot be sure. One more drawback of the question is that it does not allow us to distinguish between MPs who vote with the party because they agree with the party's position, or because they lack an opinion but do not *do not disagree* with the party's position (i.e., they do not have an opinion on a particular vote and rely on the voting advice provided by their fellow party members). Thus, infrequent disagreement (or more precisely, lack of disagreement) as a result of cue-taking cannot be ruled out by our measure.

Of all the MPs in our 15 national parliaments, 61 percent disagree infrequently with their party (28 percent (almost) never disagree with the party's position on a vote in parliament and 33 percent indicate that disagreement occurs about once a year, see Table 4.5)[19], meaning that it is a quite important pathway to party voting unity. Still,

[19] Of course, what these percentages mean is relative to the (average) number and the relative frequency of different types of votes (i.e. roll call or regular votes) held in each parliament per year, as well as the voting procedures per parliament. These figures are unfortunately not available for all parliaments. Hix et al.'s (2005) study of the dimensions of conflict in legislatures does offer an indication of the number of roll call votes for four of the parliaments included in our analysis. Hix et al. (2005) analyzed all roll call votes during one term in either the late 1990s or early 2000s, or part of a term if the data from the full-term were not available. They then excluded all lopsided votes (for which less than 10 percent of MPs were on the minority side) and all MPs who voted fewer than 25 times. Looking at the four parliaments in our analysis that were included in their study, we see that in Belgium there were 663 roll call votes during the 2003-2007 term, in France there were 105 roll call votes in the 1997-2002 term, in Poland there were 1,050 roll call votes during the 1997-1999 term, and in Israel there were 584 roll call votes in October and November 1999. In the Netherlands there were 6,304 votes during the 2006-2010 term, of which only 48 were taken by roll call. The question inquiring into the frequency of disagreement does not, however, specify on what type of vote disagreement takes place.

Table 4.5: Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party's position on a vote in parliament) in 15 national parliaments (%)

	Frequently disagree		Infrequently disagree			
	Once a month	Every three months	Once a year	(Almost) never	Total	Total (n)
Austria	0	21	58	21	100	46
Belgium	7	27	32	34	100	68
France	4	42	40	14	100	49
Germany	4	38	29	29	100	133
Hungary	19	31	31	20	101	99
Ireland	0	20	58	22	100	32
Israel	27	33	2	38	100	39
Italy	18	38	32	12	100	44
Netherlands	7	21	33	40	101	62
Norway	9	22	34	35	100	45
Poland	2	28	41	29	100	53
Portugal	15	35	25	25	100	76
Spain	5	16	27	51	99	103
Switzerland	13	25	50	13	101	48
United Kingdom	23	23	33	21	100	61
All	11	28	33	28	100	958

χ^2 (42) = 168.897, sig. = .000; φc = .425, sig. = .000 (four original answering categories)

χ^2 (14) = 65.801, sig. = .000; φc = .265, sig. = .000 (four answering categories collapsed into 'frequently disagree' and 'infrequently disagree')

39 percent indicate that disagreement with their party occurs frequently (28 percent disagree with the party line about once every three months and 11 percent indicate to disagree about once a month). These aggregate figures hide considerable differences across parliaments, however. Party agreement is highest among MPs in Ireland (where 80 percent indicate to disagree about once a year or (almost) never), Austria (79 percent), Spain (78 percent) and the Netherlands (72 percent), and only in Israel, Italy, Portugal and Hungary does a (small) majority of MPs indicate to experience frequent disagreement with the party on a vote in parliament.

In order to validate this indicator of party agreement, MPs' responses to the frequency of disagreement question are compared to the distance between where MPs place themselves on the 11-point Left-Right ideological scale, and where they perceive

their party to be (Kam, 2009).[20,21] 40 percent of MPs perceive no distance between their own position and their political party's position, another 40 percent perceive a 1-point difference, and the remaining 20 percent place themselves at two or more points from their party (not shown in Figure 4.1). We can therefore conclude that in general, the parties are quite homogeneous in terms of their Left-Right ideology, at least according to MPs' own perceptions. Our expectation is that the larger the absolute distance MPs perceive between their own and the party's position, the more frequently they disagree with the party. For presentation purposes, we combine all perceived distances of two or more points into one category (see Figure 4.1). The answering categories used for the question concerning the frequency of disagreement are also collapsed: 'about once a month' and 'about once every three months' are combined into 'frequently disagree', and the categories 'about once a year' and '(almost) never' are collapsed into 'infrequently disagree'.[22]

Among those MPs who perceive no ideological distance between themselves and the party, 68 percent infrequently disagree with their party and 32 percent indicate to frequently disagree. And among those MPs who perceive a 1-point difference, 61 percent infrequently disagree and 39 percent frequently disagree. This linear trend continues, in that the larger the perceived ideological distance, the higher the percentage of MPs who frequently disagree with their party over a vote in parliament. Indeed, a one-step increase in the absolute perceived distance between an MP and the party's position on the 11-point Left-Right scale increases the odds of frequently disagreeing as opposed to infrequently disagreeing with the political party over a vote in parliament by a factor of 1.359. All in all, MPs who, according to their own perception, share the ideological position of the political party are more likely to usually agree with the party on a vote in

[20] Validation of party agreement with the ideological distance MPs perceive between their own and their party's position can be framed as both convergence and nomological validation (Adcock, 2002). On the one hand, ideological placement has been used as a proxy for the influence of policy preferences on parliamentary behavior in previous studies (convergence validation). On the other hand, it can be argued that ideological distance as a measure of policy differences can be seen as a cause or predictor of the frequency of disagreement (nomological validation).

[21] The questions that ask MPs to place themselves and the political party on the Left-Right ideological scale are located consecutively in the PartiRep Survey, making it reasonable to assume that any distance indicated by MPs is conscious and meaningful. However, that MPs are first asked to place themselves may act as an anchor for where they subsequently place the political party, making the latter contingent on the former. This may lead to an underestimation of the distance MPs perceive between their own and the party's position. As is the case with the question concerning the frequency of disagreement, MPs are asked to place their 'party', and not specifically their party group, on the Left-Right scale. Thus means we cannot be sure whether respondents kept in mind their party group, or another part of their party organization, or their party members, when answering the question.

[22] Although the measurement scale is meaningful (months and years), the intervals between the answering categories differ. As the two middle answering categories (once every three months / once every year) are the most popular, dichotomizing any way other than down the middle results in a skewed distribution of responses. Although there may be context-specific theoretical arguments in favor of dichotomizing differently in specific legislatures (e.g. in some parliaments votes take place much less frequently than in others, and thus disagreement once a year may be considered quite frequent), it is best to dichotomize down the middle for the entire data set to obtain the most equal variance between the two groups.

Figure 4.1: Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party's position on a vote in parliament) and the absolute distance MPs' perceive between their own position and the position of their party on an 11-point ideological Left-Right scale in 15 national parliaments (%)



parliament. This entails that our measure is likely to be a good measure of party agreement.

Moving on to the effects of institutions on MPs' frequency of agreement, Table 4.6 presents the estimated binary logistic regression coefficients, robust standard errors, significance levels and odds ratios for each of the variables hypothesized to influence party agreement. The null model includes only the random effects (the effects of country and political party), models 1 through 3 test for individual institutions, model 4 contains all fixed and random effects, and model 5 reruns the full model but disregards the hierarchical nature of the data, and thus tests for fixed effects only.

On their own, most of our institutional variables have a statistically significant effect

Table 4.6: Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party's position on a vote in parliament) in 15 national parliaments: multilevel binary logistics regression

Predictor = frequently agree	Random effects												Fixed effects			
	Model 0				Model 1				Model 4				Model 5			
	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}
Candidate selection																
(predictor = nat. leaders or agency)					.842	.418	.044	2.321	.762	.443	.086	2.143	.543	.202	.008	1.720
					Model 2											
					β	SE	sig.	e^{β}								
Electoral system preferential voting																
(predictor = no personal vote)					.707	.389	.070	2.027	.559	.501	.265	1.749	.428	.418	.308	1.534
District mag. (decimal logged)					.366	.120	.002	1.441	.197	.213	.355	1.218	.195	.166	.243	1.215
Preferential voting * district mag.					-.876	.193	.000	.416	-.788	.264	.003	.455	-.844	.323	.010	.430
					Model 3											
					β	SE	sig.	e^{β}								
Government participation																
(predictor = government)					-.552	.240	.021	.576	-.562	.242	.020	.570	-.428	.173	.014	.652
Intercept	.534	.142	.000	1.706					.498	.300	.097	1.645	.546	.176	.002	1.727
-2 Log pseudo likelihood	4445.324								4203.014				431.727			
% correct	66.5								65.8				58.7			

on party agreement. First, candidate selection exclusiveness and centralization have a positive effect on party agreement, as expected (H1a). MPs who belong to parties in which candidate selection is concentrated in the hands of party leaders or party agency at the national level are more likely to agree with their party, than MPs who are selected by subnational party leaders or agencies, or party primaries at any level of the party organization (model 1). When placed in the full hierarchical model, candidate selection is just shy of statistical significance (model 5).

On its own, voters' inability to cast a vote for an individual candidate has a positive (almost statistically significant) effect on party agreement (model 2): when preference voting is not allowed, the odds of an MP frequently agreeing with his party increase by a factor of 2, which is in line with our hypothesis (H2a). However, the interaction between preference voting and district magnitude is in the opposite direction from what was predicted. In other words, in systems that do not allow preference voting the odds of an MP infrequently disagreeing with the party decrease as district magnitude (and thus intra-party competition) increases. The interaction effect between voters' inability to cast a personal vote and district magnitude remains statistically significant in the full model as well (model 5).

Finally, as predicted (H3a), government participation indeed has a negative effect on party agreement (model 4); MPs in governing parties are less likely to frequently agree with their party on a vote in parliament than MPs whose parties are in opposition. The difference between MPs in governing parties and those in opposition is again just shy of statistical significant after the other variables are added (model 5).

It seems that political parties in these parliamentary democracies can, to a large extent, rely on MPs' agreement with the party line for party voting unity in parliament. Moreover, with the exception of the formal properties of the electoral institutions, all of our institutional variables have the predicted effects on party agreement. Nonetheless, around 40 percent of MPs indicate to frequently disagree with their party which, given the high levels of voting unity found in previous comparative analyses, is more than one would expect if party agreement were the sole determinants of MPs' voting behavior. Parties, it seems, must also rely on other mechanisms to achieve party unity.

4.3.3 Party loyalty

If MPs do not agree with the party line on a vote in parliament, they move on to the next decision-making stage, at which they weigh whether their loyalty to the party group overrides their disagreement with the party group's position. MPs who subscribe to the norm of party group solidarity toe the party group line voluntarily despite their reservations because they acknowledge, and have internalized, the importance of party group unity for parliamentary government.

As already mentioned (see subsection 4.3.2), the question concerning the frequency of disagreement was followed by a question asking respondents how they think an MP

Table 4.7: Party loyalty (own opinion versus party's position) in 15 national parliaments (%)

	Own opinion	Party's position	Total	Total (n)
Austria	53	47	100	44
Belgium	31	69	100	68
France	64	35	100	48
Germany	53	47	100	124
Hungary	38	63	101	95
Ireland	20	80	100	31
Israel	44	56	100	37
Italy	64	36	100	44
Netherlands	11	89	100	45
Norway	15	85	100	42
Poland	51	50	101	52
Portugal	45	55	100	75
Spain	17	83	100	101
Switzerland	88	13	101	48
United Kingdom	53	47	100	55
All	38	62	100	909

χ^2 *(14) = 114.279, sig. = .000;* φc *= .359, sig. = .000*

should vote in the case of conflict between an MP's opinion and the party's position.[23, 24] Table 4.7 shows that 62 percent of MPs contend that when in disagreement with the party's position on a vote in parliament, an MP still ought to vote according to the party's

[23] As was the case with the question pertaining to the frequency of disagreement used as an indicator of party agreement, the question refers to the respondent's 'party', and not specifically the party group.

[24] In past parliamentary surveys held in the Dutch Second Chamber, the question as to how an MP ought to vote when his opinion conflicts with the position of the party included a middle answering category 'it depends'. This category was always the most popular among Dutch MPs. The omission of this category in the 2010 PartiRep Survey was associated with almost 30 percent of Dutch respondents refusing to answer the question, and a very high percentage of respondents selecting the answering category 'MP should vote according to his party's opinion' (see Table 6.18 in chapter 6). In the other 14 national parliaments included in the analysis in this chapter, however, the omission of this category seems to have had a smaller effect on the response rate: 7 percent (67 respondents) of the total number of MPs' responses to the question are missing. In comparison: 2 percent (18 respondents) of MPs from these 15 national parliaments refused to answer the question that preceded this question in the survey. Of the 65 MPs who did not fill in the question pertaining to party loyalty, 18 percent (12 respondents) filled in the survey online, 42 percent (28 respondents) filled in a hard-copy version, and 40 percent (26 respondents) were interviewed face-to-face (20 of these respondents were from the Netherlands). These percentages and number of respondents are not weighted.

position. Since the question pertains specifically to situations in which MPs disagree with the party line, this entails that the resultant behavior in these situations is not based on party agreement, and thus serves as a good indicator of party loyalty. That over 60 percent of MPs answer to voluntarily submit to the party line despite disagreement means that it is an important voluntary pathway to unity that parties can rely on. Still, 38 percent answer that in the case of disagreement an MP ought to vote according to his own opinion. Thus, if party loyalty were the sole determinant of party voting unity, we would likely see more party disunity in these parliamentary systems than is now the case. Subscription to the norm of party loyalty is particularly high among MPs in the Netherlands (89 percent), Norway (85 percent), Spain (83 percent) and Ireland (80 percent). In Switzerland, however, only 13 percent answer that an MP should follow the party line when in disagreement. Party loyalty also seems to be less prevalent in France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria and Poland, where only a minority indicate that in the case of disagreement an MP ought to opt for the party's position.[25]

In order to validate this measure of party loyalty, MPs' responses are compared to the importance they ascribed to promoting the views and interest of their party. Supposedly, MPs who attach great importance to promoting the interests and views of the party are also more likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty. Most MPs consider representing the interests of the party rather important, with more than 80 percent positioning themselves on the right end of the scale (scoring 5 points or more on the 7-point scale). Furthermore, there is a positive and almost linear relationship between ascribing importance to promoting the views and interests of the party and thinking that an MP ought to vote according to the party line in the case of disagreement. Of those MPs who assign the greatest importance to promoting the interests of the party (scoring a 7 on the scale), 79 percent subscribe to the norm of party loyalty. At the other extreme, only 47 percent of MPs who ascribe no importance to promoting the views and interests of their party subscribe to the norm of party loyalty. A one-step increase on the scale 7-point ordinal scale towards ascribing more importance to promoting the views and interests of the party increases the odds of voting with the party's position as opposed to voting to according to an MP's own opinion by a factor of 1.369. All in all, MPs' opinions about how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagreement appears to be a good indicator of party loyalty.

When it comes to the effects of institutions, we hypothesized that candidate selection procedures that are inclusive and decentralized diffuse loyalty to the party group in parliament, as this creates a situation of competing principals within the party (H2a). Indeed, on its own, being selected by national party leaders or an agency, as opposed to party leaders or an agency at the subnational level or through primaries at any level, increases the odds of subscribing to the norm of party loyalty by a factor of 1.484 (model

[25] France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom also happen to be among the countries where the attained survey response rate was low. It could be that MPs who do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty were more likely to participate in the survey than MPs who do subscribe to the norm. Maybe the former group saw the survey as a means of expressing their lack of loyalty. As far as we know, however, MPs in all countries were approached to participate in a survey about representation in general, and not specifically their relationship with their party (group).

Figure 4.2: Party loyalty (own opinion versus party's position) and the importance ascribed to promoting the views and interests of the party in 15 national parliaments (%)



1 in Table 4.8). However, once other variables are added to the model, the influence of candidate selection is not statistically significant.[26]

Concerning electoral institutions, voters' ability to cast a personal vote is also expected to lead candidates to engage in personal vote seeking, which may lead to a situation of competing principals once in parliament, and diffuse MPs' loyalty to the party (H2b). Whether personal voting is formally possible does not seem to have an effect on

[26] It may also be that the question we use to measure party loyalty is interpreted in different ways: the question asks how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagreement between an MP's own opinion and the position of the party, but does not explicate 'the position of the party' as that of the party group in parliament. Thus, respondents may have interpreted the position of the party to include that of their selectorate, or specific groups within the political party, as well. This lack of specification of what is meant by 'the party's position' also holds for our measure of party agreement, however, on which our measure of candidate selection did have a statistically significant effect.

party loyalty, however (model 2). And again, when district magnitude is taken into consideration the effect is statistically significant, but in the opposite direction from what was predicted, actually decreasing the odds of an MP voluntarily voting with the party line when in disagreement.

One could question whether the formal properties of electoral institutions accurately capture MPs' tendency to engage in (or the value they ascribe to) personal vote seeking, or their response to the dilemma they face when confronted with competing principals. In order to gauge the former, we have added a variable that includes MPs' responses to the question whether they would rather spend scarce time and resources running a personal campaign (1) or party campaign (5), measured on a five-point ordinal scale (model 4). Indeed, MPs who indicate to prefer to run a party campaign are more likely to vote according to the party line when in disagreement, whereas MPs who would rather spend their time and resources on a personal campaign (thus engaging in personal vote seeking) are less likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty (the variable is almost statistically significant on its own).

By using the choice between an MP's own opinion and his party's position as our measure of party loyalty (and thus dependent variable) we implicitly assume that voters as a potential focus of representation are nested in representatives' personal preferences. To better capture the influence of voters versus the party as competing principals on MPs' party loyalty, we use a question that asks respondents how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagreement between the voters' and the party's position. According to the theory of competing principals, an MP who chooses to vote according to his own opinion in the case of disagreement with the party's position does so because his own opinion is based on, or at least informed by, voters' preferences, and the MP wishes to remain loyal to the voters.[27] Model 5 shows that this is indeed the case, and that the choice between voters' and the party as competing principals has a very strong effect on party loyalty: On its own, the odds of an MP subscribing to the norm of party loyalty as opposed to not doing so are almost 8 times higher for an MP who selects the party's position over voter's opinions than for an MP who would opts for the voters' opinion.

Model 6 includes only all of the formal institutional variables, in which only district magnitude and the interaction effect between voters' inability to cast personal votes and district magnitude remain statistically significant (but not in the predicted direction). Adding our measures of MPs' tendency to engage in personal vote seeking and the influence of competing principals does not change the effect of these formal institutions much (model 7). In the full model, our measure of personal vote seeking is no longer statistically significant, but the effect of an MP's choice between voters' and the party as competing principals still is. Finally, we also predicted that MPs from governing parties would be more likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than opposition

[27] Another option is that an MP is not responsive to voters' interests, but considers himself a 'trustee' in terms of his style of representation and thus truly follows his own opinion (Eulau et al., 1959; Wahlke et al., 1962; Converse and Pierce, 1979, 1986). This situation is actually better captured by the question as to whether he would prefer to spend his scarce time and resources running a personal or party campaign, as one could argue that a trustee does not face a situation of competing principals; only an MP who takes on the representational style of 'delegate' does.

Table 4.8: Party loyalty (own opinion versus party's position) in 15 national parliaments: multilevel binary logistics regression

Predictor = party's position	Random effects														Fixed effects			
	Model 0				Model 1				Model 6				Model 7				Model 8			
	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}
Candidate selection																				
(predictor = nat. leaders or agency)					.395	.199	.048	1.484	.289	.269	.283	1.335	.193	.279	.490	1.213	-.057	.227	.802	.945
					Model 2															
					β	SE	sig.	e^{β}												
Electoral system preferential voting																				
(predictor = no personal vote)					.633	.582	.277	1.883	.621	.567	.274	1.861	.906	.728	.214	2.475	1.117	.561	.047	3.054
District mag. (decimal logged)					1.051	.355	.003	2.862	1.015	.409	.013	2.760	.950	.371	.011	2.586	.833	.208	.000	2.301
Preferential voting * district mag.					-1.202	.431	.005	.300	-1.200	.459	.009	0.301	-1.131	.489	.021	.323	-1.183	.420	.005	.306
					Model 3															
					β	SE	sig.	e^{β}												
Government participation																				
(predictor = government)					.275	.210	.191	1.317	.269	.216	.212	1.309	.394	.233	.091	1.483	.445	.209	.034	1.561
					Model 4															
					β	SE	sig.	e^{β}												
Personal vote seeking																				
Personal (1) or party campaign (5)					.185	.106	.081	1.203					.102	.090	.259	1.107	.143	.103	.163	1.154
					Model 5															
					β	SE	sig.	e^{β}												
Competing principals																				
Voters' (0) or party's position (1)					2.046	.332	.000	7.737					2.083	.393	.000	8.029	2.096	.220	.000	8.130
Intercept	.401	.225	.076	1.493					-.438	.226	.052	.645	-2.193	.334	.000	.112	-2.110	.345	.000	.121
-2 Log pseudo likelihood	4272.320								4051.932				3753.471				600.578			
% correct	70.6								69.7				73.4				71.3			

MPs because of the added responsibility of maintaining their party in government (H2c). On its own, government participation does not have a statistically significant effect on whether an MP will toe the party line voluntarily despite disagreement (model 3), but the variable does increase in strength in the model containing both formal institutions as well as our measures of personal vote seeking and competing principals.

All in all, 60 percent of our MPs hold the opinion that an MP ought to vote according to the party's position in the case of conflict. It is noteworthy that the formal properties of institutions seem to have less effect on MPs' tendency to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than they do on MPs' frequency of disagreement. It may be that candidates' loyalty is a less important candidate selection criterion than candidates' policy preferences are (one could argue that due to the personal normative nature of the mechanism, it is difficult for selectorates to gauge the extent to which candidates will be loyal to them).[28] It is somewhat surprising, however, that electoral institutions seem to have the opposite effect on party loyalty than what is argued in the literature concerning personal vote seeking and the notion of competing principals. Of our two individual level attitudinal measures of these concepts, the one which poses voters' and the party as competing principals does prove to have predictive power in the full model. [29]

4.3.4 Party discipline

When MPs disagree with the party line, and do not vote with the party out of loyalty, their party (group) leaders may employ disciplinary measures in an attempt to sway their votes. At the final stage of our sequential decision-making model, MPs must decide whether (the promise of) positive incentives or (the threat of) negative sanctions outweigh their resolve to dissent from the party line. As opposed to party agreement and party loyalty, which results in MPs' voluntary contribution to party voting unity in parliament, party discipline is an involuntary pathway.

As mentioned in subsection 3.2.2 in chapter 3, the observation and measurement of party discipline is problematic. First, the threat, promise or expectation of sanctions alone may be enough to elicit submission to the party line. Second, when discipline is applied, this is usually done behind the closed doors of the parliamentary party group, as public disciplining can lead to media attention which is assumed to have negative effects on the electoral prospects of the party as a whole. Finally, it is difficult to distinguish between behavior resulting from the use of sanctions and other relatively innocent factors

[28] Ideally, we would also check whether an MP's choice when force to choose between the parliamentary party group's position and his party's selectorate's opinion would prove a more accurate measure of the situation of competing principals within the political party. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to do so.

[29] Although there is a statistically significant correlation between our measure the frequency of disagreement and our measure of the voters' versus the party as competing principals, we do not include these in the multilevel multivariate analysis of party agreement (see Table 4.6) for substantive reasons. Party agreement, we argue, is not influenced by the existence of potentially competing principals, but by that when making their vote choice, voters' select the party or candidate whose policy stances are representative of their own.

Table 4.9: Satisfaction with general parliamentary party discipline in 15 national parliaments (%)

	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
Austria	41	59	0	100	50
Belgium	11	78	11	100	59
France	15	77	8	100	48
Germany	46	52	2	100	129
Hungary	26	65	9	100	97
Ireland	26	61	13	100	32
Israel	13	77	10	100	38
Italy	38	59	3	100	43
Netherlands	9	83	8	100	63
Norway	7	89	4	100	45
Poland	8	72	20	100	50
Portugal	5	73	22	100	71
Spain	6	73	21	100	92
Switzerland	29	71	0	100	44
United Kingdom	17	75	8	100	52
All	17	72	11	100	913

χ^2 *(28) = 112.700, sig. = .000;* φc *= .251, sig. = .000*

(e.g., not being placed on the electoral candidacy list for the upcoming elections may be a negative sanction applied by the party leadership, but it may also be the case that an MP simply wants to retire from politics).

Unfortunately, the PartiRep Survey does not have any questions that ask MPs directly whether sanctions are applied if an MP does not vote according to the party line, or threatens to do so (but see subsection 5.4.4 in chapter 5 for an analysis of the expected likelihood of negative sanctions among Dutch representatives). We do, however, have questions that inquire into MPs' satisfaction with general, as well as specific aspects of, party discipline in their parliamentary party group. Respondents were asked whether they thought that party discipline should be more strict than it is now, should remain as it is, or should be less strict than it is now. In interpreting the answering categories, we assume that MPs who hold the opinion that party discipline ought to be more strict are not likely to have been disciplined themselves, but feel that they personally, or their party group as a whole, suffers from the recalcitrant behavior of fellow group members. They thus value the collective benefits of presenting a united front to the outside world

Table 4.10: Satisfaction with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to sticking to the parliamentary party line in votes in 15 national parliaments (%)

	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
Austria	10	85	5	100	48
Belgium	0	89	11	100	61
France	14	77	10	101	48
Germany	11	80	9	100	126
Hungary	15	72	12	99	97
Ireland	7	81	13	101	32
Israel	16	76	8	100	38
Italy	33	61	6	100	43
Netherlands	0	96	5	101	63
Norway	4	87	9	100	45
Poland	5	80	16	101	50
Portugal	7	71	23	101	72
Spain	9	79	12	100	92
Switzerland	13	75	13	101	45
United Kingdom	12	74	14	100	54
All	9	80	11	100	914

χ^2 *(28) = 72.762, sig. = .000;* φc *= .201, sig. = .000*

above an individual MP's personal mandate and freedom.[30] Those who answer that party discipline should remain as it is probably perceive a good balance between the two, or value one above the other, but are content with how they are maintained in the parliamentary party group. And MPs who answer that party discipline ought to be less strict are those who value an individual MP's freedom and personal mandate above presenting a united front, and are likely to have experience with party discipline being used against them (or have operated under the threat of sanctions). Admittedly, however,

[30] This interpretation is in line with the distinction between individual costs and collective benefits forwarded by Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) in their analysis of the pathways to party group unity in the Dutch Parliament. In the 1990 Dutch Parliamentary Study MPs were asked an open question about the advantages and disadvantages of party discipline. Positive aspects included the collective benefits of presenting a unified front to the outside world and making clear where the political party stood, whereas negative aspects were placed primarily at the individual level (such as curtailing individual MPs' freedom and stifling creativity). Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 661) interpret these results as "party discipline is considered rational from a collective point of view, not from an individual point of view". Jensen (2000, 224-226), who uses the same question in his study of Nordic countries, comes to a similar conclusion, and dichotomizes the variable by combining the answering categories party discipline 'ought to remain as it is' and 'should be more strict'.

Table 4.11: Satisfaction with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to taking political initiatives only with the parliamentary party's authorization in 15 national parliaments (%)

	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
Austria	29	57	14	100	48
Belgium	8	79	13	100	61
France	8	83	10	101	48
Germany	11	80	9	100	127
Hungary	25	68	7	100	96
Ireland	3	71	26	100	32
Israel	12	79	9	100	38
Italy	12	79	9	100	43
Netherlands	6	88	7	101	63
Norway	12	80	8	100	46
Poland	15	64	21	100	50
Portugal	2	80	18	100	71
Spain	9	67	24	100	91
Switzerland	13	75	13	101	45
United Kingdom	11	78	11	100	52
All	11	76	13	100	911

χ^2 *(28) = 73.232, sig. = .000;* φc *= .201, sig. = .000*

the question does not allow us to gauge MPs' responsiveness to party discipline (i.e., we do not know whether they are actually disciplined into toeing the party line, or choose to stay true to their own opinion and dissent).[31]

Given that much of the comparative literature emphasizes party discipline as a prominent pathway to party group unity, it is surprising that over 70 percent of MPs are sat-

[31] Another potential problem is that the party discipline questions in the surveys do not specify which definition of party discipline MPs should keep in mind. As the term already brings about conceptual confusion within legislative studies, this may also be the case in the minds of MPs. It is unclear whether respondents make this same distinction in term of voluntary and involuntary mechanisms as we do in our decision-making model. However, in the study of party group unity in Finland by Jensen (2000, 221), MPs were asked to evaluate party cohesion and party discipline separately, with very different results: only 8 percent of Finnish MPs preferred stronger discipline, while 48 percent preferred stronger party cohesion. Although this does not help us verify *how* MPs interpret the concepts, it does make clear that MPs do see a distinction between the two. Moreover, the answering categories to the questions in the PartiRep Survey refer to 'strictness', which holds connotations with 'authority' and thus suggests discipline and sanctions imposed by the political party. It may be, however, that respondents have interpreted the question as mainly referring to negative, as opposed to positive, sanctions.

Table 4.12: Satisfaction with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential in 15 national parliaments (%)

	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
Austria	35	65	0	100	48
Belgium	60	41	0	101	61
France	60	39	2	101	48
Germany	80	20	0	100	128
Hungary	67	32	1	100	98
Ireland	60	38	2	100	32
Israel	28	68	4	100	38
Italy	41	59	0	100	43
Netherlands	22	78	0	100	63
Norway	22	73	5	100	45
Poland	59	38	3	100	49
Portugal	57	42	2	101	71
Spain	65	32	3	101	93
Switzerland	43	57	0	100	45
United Kingdom	46	54	0	100	54
All	48	50	2	100	916

χ^2 *(28) = 135.487, sig. = .000;* φc *= .274, sig. = .000*

isfied with general party discipline, answering that it should remain as it is (see Table 4.9). Satisfaction with general party discipline is highest in Norway (89 percent) and the Netherlands (83 percent). Moreover, the majority of MPs who are not satisfied with general party discipline would like to see it applied more strictly. This is especially the case in Germany (46 percent), Austria (41 percent) and Italy (38). Only in Portugal, Spain and Poland does a majority of unsatisfied MPs hold the opinion that general party discipline ought to be less strict, which according to our interpretation of the question, implies that party discipline is probably used more often in these parliaments.

Portugal and Poland are also the two countries with the highest percentage of MPs (respectively 23 and 16 percent) who think that party discipline should be less strict when sticking to the party line when voting, the question that is most in line with our measures of party agreement and party loyalty, which both also refer to parliamentary voting. Overall, however, the figures in Table 4.10 reveal that the vast majority (80 percent) of all MPs are satisfied with party discipline when it comes to voting in parliament. Satisfaction with party voting discipline is highest in the Netherlands (96 percent), Belgium (89 percent) and Norway (87 percent). In Italy, a relatively high percentage of MPs (33 percent) would like to see stricter party discipline when it comes to voting in parlia-

Table 4.13: 'Confidential party discussions usually find their way to the media' in 15 national parliaments (%)

	(Mostly) false	Neither	(Mostly) true	Total	Total (n)
Austria	60	20	20	100	47
Belgium	51	10	39	100	68
France	10	27	64	101	49
Germany	21	6	72	99	133
Hungary	33	4	63	100	99
Ireland	37	5	58	100	32
Israel	17	3	80	101	39
Italy	14	26	60	100	44
Netherlands	74	13	12	99	65
Norway	61	19	19	99	45
Poland	21	16	64	101	53
Portugal	20	3	77	99	75
Spain	11	14	76	101	102
Switzerland	25	13	63	101	49
United Kingdom	30	15	56	101	58
All	34	12	54	100	958

χ^2 *(28) = 241.124, sig. = .000;* φc *= .359, sig. = .000*

ment.

Almost the same distribution holds for MPs' satisfaction with party discipline when it comes to seeking authorization from the party group when taking parliamentary initiatives (over three-quarters of MPs are satisfied), with this time Ireland (26 percent) Portugal (18 percent), Poland (21 percent) and Spain (24 percent), as the countries with the highest percentage of MPs who feel that party discipline should be relaxed (see Table 4.11). Only in Austria (29 percent) and Hungary (25 percent) does a substantial percentage of MPs feel that party discipline should be more strict when it comes to taking parliamentary initiatives.

In light of these high levels of satisfaction with party discipline, it is interesting to draw attention to scholars' tendency to emphasize party discipline as a pathway to party voting unity. If party discipline were the main pathway to party group unity, we would expect there to be more MPs who would like to see party discipline applied less strictly. The high levels of satisfaction, however, indicate that party discipline is likely to be applied much less often than is assumed by the literature on party group unity; it is more likely that party voting unity results from the other pathways, such as party group agreement and party group loyalty, than from party discipline.

There is one exception to the pattern of satisfaction with party discipline. When it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential only 50 percent of MPs are satisfied with party discipline as it is, and among those who are dissatisfied almost all would like stricter party discipline (see Table 4.13). German MPs are most likely to want stricter party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential (80 percent), followed by MPs in Hungary (67 percent) and Spain (65 percent). Satisfaction is highest in the Netherlands (78 percent) and Norway (73 percent). These rather high levels of dissatisfaction highlights that party unity is a much broader requirement, encompassing not only the end vote, but the entire policy making process. Indeed, when asked about the day-to-day practices in parliament, over half of all MPs answer that it is (mostly) true that internal party discussions do find their way to the media (see Table 4.13).[32] Noteworthy is that these percentages are quite high in the parliaments where there is also a high percentage of MPs who would like to party discipline tightened on this aspect of party life as well.[33] This provides some evidence that there are apparently MPs who do breach the confidentiality of internal party discussions.

For our multivariate analysis of party loyalty, binary logistic regression was the obvious choice because our dependent variable is dichotomous. For party agreement we also used binary logistic regression because we dichotomized the four answering categories to the question concerning the frequency of disagreement between an MP's opinion and the party's position into 'frequently agree' and 'infrequently agree' (see subsection 4.3.2). Our measures of party discipline, however, have three answering categories. Considering the hypotheses developed above, what is of interest most is the difference between MPs who hold the opinion that party discipline ought to be less strict (implying that party discipline is indeed applied, or at least that MPs work under its threat) and those MPs who answer that party discipline can remain as it is or should be stricter. We have opted to dichotomize the variable by combining the answering categories party discipline 'should remain as it is' and 'should be more strict', as is also done by Jensen (2000) in his analysis of the Nordic countries. This way, binary logistic regression can be used to test the effects of institutions on party discipline as well. Because our measures of both party agreement and party loyalty refer specifically to voting, we use the party discipline question that asks MPs about their satisfaction with party discipline when it comes to sticking to the party line when voting in parliament.[34] Collapsing two answering categories, in combination with the fact that most of our respondents answer that party voting discipline should remain as it is, accounts for why the percentage predicted correctly by the null model is almost 90 percent (see Table 4.14).

[32] For presentation purpose the extremes of answering categories of the question as to whether it is true or false that confidential party discussions usually find their way to the media are combined: 'mostly false' and 'false' are collapsed into one category, as are 'mostly true' and 'true'.

[33] The bivariate relationship between MPs' responses to the questions as to whether confidential party discussions usually find their way to the media and their opinion on party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential is statistically significant (χ^2 (8) = 91.930, sig. = .000; gamma = -.402, sig. = .000).

[34] The analysis was repeated using MPs' satisfaction with general party discipline as dependent variable; the results were almost identical to the analysis with party voting discipline as dependent variable.

Table 4.14: Satisfaction with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to sticking to the parliamentary party group line in votes in 15 national parliaments: multilevel binary logistics regression

Predictor = should be less strict	Random effects														Fixed effects			
	Model 0				Model 1				Model 6				Model 7				Model 8			
	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}	β	SE	sig.	e^{β}
Candidate selection																				
(predictor = nat. leaders or agency)					-.305	.241	.207	.737	-.184	.230	.425	.832	-.222	.227	.422	.801	-.116	.308	.707	.891
					Model 2															
					β	SE	sig.	e^{β}												
Electoral system preferential voting																				
(predictor = no personal vote)					.116	.538	.829	1.123	.128	.530	.810	1.136	.807	.485	.097	2.241	1.107	.565	.051	3.025
District mag. (decimal logged)					-.409	.185	.027	.665	-.408	.166	.014	.665	-.056	.219	.798	.945	.013	.225	.955	1.013
Preferential voting * district mag.					.076	.326	.815	1.079	.090	.314	.775	1.094	-.757	.368	.040	.0469	-.914	.463	.049	.401
					Model 3															
					β	SE	sig.	e^{β}												
Government participation																				
(predictor = government)					.062	.265	.816	1.064	.155	.279	.279	1.168	.059	.278	.833	1.060	.170	.289	.557	1.186
					Model 4															
					β	SE	sig.	e^{β}												
Party agreement																				
(predictor = frequently disagree)					1.468	.305	.000	4.341					1.391	.283	.000	4.021	1.329	.323	.000	3.778
					Model 5															
					β	SE	sig.	e^{β}												
Party loyalty					1.117	.211	.000	3.057					.979	.274	.000	2.663	.950	.301	.002	2.587
(predictor = own opinion)																				
Intercept	-2.118	.136	.000	.120					-1.827	.176	.000	.161	-3.121	.488	.000	.044	-3.182	.457	.000	.041
-2 Log pseudo likelihood	4922.181								4607.289				4489.757				347.429			
% correct	88.4								88.3				88.4				88.1			

None of the institutional variables have the predicted effect on MPs' satisfaction with party discipline when it comes to voting in parliament (see Table 4.14). We hypothesized that when candidate selection is concentrated in the hands of party leaders and agencies at the national level, this would provide the party leadership access to positive and negative sanctions through which it could discipline recalcitrant MPs, who we argue would answer that party voting discipline ought to be less strict (H3a); this does not seem to be the case (model 1). Extending the party selectorate's power into the electoral arena (H3b), made possible when voters cannot cast preference votes, does seem to have the expected effect (model 2). And again, when combined with district magnitude, the relationship is in the opposite direction (but not statistically significant this time). And finally, our hypothesis that in parliamentary systems government parties would be more willing to use discipline on their MPs because the stakes are higher than for opposition parties (H3c) can be rejected (model 4).

More so than was the case in our analysis of party loyalty, the effects of institutions decrease even more as we move further down the sequential chain of decision-making mechanisms to the final stage of party discipline. Following the sequential nature of our model, one could argue that it need not be the existence of institutional tools that can be used to discipline MPs that determines the actual use of discipline, but the need for discipline as a result of MPs not toeing the party line on their own accord. Whereas party agreement and party loyalty involve decisions made by individual MPs, the decision to (threaten to) apply discipline is in the hands of the party (group) leadership (an MP's response to the application of discipline is, however, an individual level decision).[35] As such, we expected that MPs who frequently disagree with the party and/or do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty are more likely to be disciplined, and thus answer that party discipline ought to be less strict. Indeed, both individual level characteristics have a strong predictive effect on MPs' satisfaction with party discipline. Frequently disagreeing with the party increases the odds of answering that party voting discipline ought to be less strict by a factor of 4.341 (model 4), and not voting according to the party line voluntarily out of loyalty does so by a factor of 3.057 (model 5). Both variables remain significant in the full hierarchical model (and removing them from the model does not change the results with regard to the institutional variables, model 6). In other words, the existence of institutions does not determine the application of discipline, but MPs' lack of voluntarily party agreement and party loyalty does. As suggested by Hazan (2003, 3), whose use of the term cohesion encompasses both shared policy preferences and norms of party loyalty, "discipline starts where cohesion falters".

[35] We did not test for the effect of MPs' frequency of disagreement on party loyalty because, although party loyalty follows party agreement in our decision-making model, the subscription to the norm of party loyalty is independent of MPs' party agreement, i.e., whether or not MPs frequently agree with their party does not affect whether or not they subscribe to the norm of party loyalty, it only determines whether the second decision-making mechanism comes into play at all.

4.3.5 The sequential decision-making process

The main argument of this study is that in deciding how to vote in parliament, MPs apply these decision-making mechanisms in a particular order. An MP must first determine whether he has an opinion on the matter. If he does not, he looks to his fellow party group members for voting advice, and the MP contributes to party group unity through cue-taking. Agreement, loyalty and discipline are therefore not relevant. If an MP does have an opinion on the vote, and this happens to be in line with the position of the party group, the MP toes the party line voluntarily out of simple agreement. Again, the mechanisms further down the decision-making sequence—loyalty and discipline—do not play a role in his decision making. If an MP does have an opinion on the matter, and this is in conflict with the party group's position, an MP could still vote according to the party line voluntarily if he subscribes to the norm of party group loyalty, and his subscription the norm outweighs the intensity of the conflict with the party's position. Only if an MP disagrees with the position of the party group and his subscription to the norm of party group loyalty does not override his conflict, do party (group) leaders need to elicit him to toe the party line through (the promise of) positive and (the threat of) negative sanctions. If, at this final stage of the decision-making sequence disciplinary measures are not enough to elicit compliance, we expect that the MP will vote according to his own opinion and thus dissent from the party group line.

As mentioned earlier, this explanatory model of individual MP decision making would ideally be tested by asking MPs about how they came to the decision to vote as they did on individual parliamentary votes. We do not have the data to do so, however. But we can get a general idea of the relative importance of the three last decision-making mechanisms (party agreement, party loyalty and party discipline), at the aggregate level in the 15 parliaments under study, and thus the extent to which parties can count on these pathways to achieve party group unity. We exclude cue-taking from the sequence because whereas the questions we use to measure party agreement, party loyalty and party discipline all refer specifically to voting in parliament, the questions we use to gauge cue-taking do not so do. Moreover, as mentioned before, our indicator of party agreement cannot distinguish between MPs who vote with the party line out of agreement, or because they *do not disagree* as a result of the lack of a personal opinion.

First, 61 percent of all MPs indicate to infrequently disagree with the party's position, answering that they disagree with the party either 'about once a year' or '(almost) never' (see Table 4.15). This entails that, indeed, parties can count on party agreement as an important pathway to party unity. Next, although above we found that 62 percent of all MPs included in the survey subscribe to the norm of party loyalty (see Table 4.7), answering that an MP ought to vote according to the party's position in the case of disagreement, from the perspective of political parties, this pathway is most relevant for those MPs who frequently disagree with the party. Indeed, 21 percent of all MPs frequently disagree with the party line, but can still be counted on to vote with the party voluntarily in the case of disagreement. In most countries, the percentage of MPs found in this category is well above 20 percent (with Belgium taking the lead with 32 percent), meaning that, although not as important as party agreement, the pathway still plays a

Table 4.15: The relative contribution of party agreement, party loyalty and party discipline when it comes to sticking to the parliamentary party line in votes in 15 national parliaments (%)

	Voluntary		Involuntary			
	Agreement	Loyalty	Discipline	Unaccounted	Total	Total (n)
Austria	79	11	5	5	100	42
Belgium	65	27	3	5	100	61
France	53	10	10	28	101	47
Germany	56	19	7	19	101	117
Hungary	51	27	6	16	100	93
Ireland	79	14	3	3	99	31
Israel	39	32	2	27	100	36
Italy	42	23	7	29	101	41
Netherlands	77	22	0	2	101	45
Norway	71	26	0	3	100	42
Poland	69	9	7	15	100	47
Portugal	51	28	15	7	101	71
Spain	74	21	3	3	101	91
Switzerland	57	0	14	29	100	44
United Kingdom	59	11	11	20	101	50
All	61	21	5	13	100	858

χ^2 *(42) = 139.722, sig. = .000;* φc *= .234, sig. = .000*

Note: These percentages may differ from previous tables in this chapter because they only include respondents who answered all three questions. Unfortunately, the questions about party discipline were located near the end of the survey.

prominent role. The exception to this pattern is, Switzerland, where party loyalty does not seem to play a role for any of the MPs who frequently disagree, which is in line with the earlier findings on party group unity in the Swiss national parliament.

Only 5 percent of MPs frequently disagree with the party, do not ascribe to the norm of party loyalty, and answer that party voting discipline ought to be less strict (which we argue to be indicate that MPs are disciplined, or at least operate under the threat of sanctions), meaning that of the three pathways included in our sequential decision-making model, the contribution of party discipline is the lowest. However, given the high levels of party voting unity found in most of these parliaments, it is odd that 13 percent of MPs remain unaccounted for. These MPs frequently disagree with the party, do not vote with the party out of loyalty, and do not think that party discipline should be less strict, instead answering that it should be even more strict, or remain as it is. It could be

that some of these MPs rely mostly on cue-taking for their voting decisions, which we are unable to include in the sequential decision-making model due to the formulation of the question. It may also be that our measurement of party discipline, which admittedly requires quite a bit of interpretation and does not actually inquire into the role of party discipline in MPs' decision making, leads to an underestimation of the role that sanctions play the decision-making process of MPs.

4.4 Conclusion

When it comes to the determinants of party group unity, parties can generally count on MPs voluntarily toeing the party line, with party agreement playing the most important role in MPs' decision making, followed by party loyalty in the case of disagreement. Party discipline, although probably underestimated by our decision-making model, seems to play a secondary role in determining whether MPs conform to the party line or dissent in most of our 15 parliaments. Although we are unable to place the division of labor pathway and associated mechanism of cue-taking in our sequential model, the fact that in most countries the majority of MPs (completely) agree with the statement that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the position of the party on his topic serves as an indication that parties do apply a division of labor, and that cue-taking is likely to play an important role as well.

The influence of institutions tends to decrease as we move through the sequential decision-making process. Whereas candidate selection and government participation do have the predicted effects on party agreement, the effects of these institutions are much weaker when it comes to party loyalty. And although exclusive and centralized candidate selection procedures and voters' inability to cast a personal vote, in theory, provide political party leaders with additional sanctioning tools that can be used to discipline their MPs, MPs' satisfaction with party discipline does not seem to be affected by these institutions either. Instead, and following the logic of our sequential decision-making model, MPs who frequently disagree with the party, or do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty in the case of disagreement, are more likely to prefer less strict party discipline, which we hold to be indicative of MPs' past experience with sanctioning by the party (group) leadership.

Concerning the effects of the formal properties of electoral institutions on MPs' decision making mechanisms, the results are somewhat unexpected. In all our multivariate analyses, voters' inability to cast a personal vote has a positive, yet not a statistically significant, effect on MPs' decision-making mechanisms. Yet, in combination with an increase in district magnitude (which is theorized to increase the value of the political party's reputation in the electoral arena, Carey and Shugart, 1995), voters' inability to cast a personal vote does not result in MPs being more likely to frequently agree with the party, stay loyal to the party despite their disagreement, or answer that discipline ought to be less strict. These rather unexpected findings may, in part, be accounted for by our rather crude measure of the formal properties of electoral systems and the classification

of particular countries.[36] As mentioned before, previous studies on the effects of electoral settings on party voting unity have also yielded mixed results, and thus this study forms no exception. However, our alternative (individual level) attitudinal measure for the dilemma of competing principals does have a statistically significant effect on party loyalty. It may thus be that formal institutions do not determine the extent to which MPs are loyal to one principal or another, or that if electoral institutions do provide the means to discriminate between candidates, the electorate does not do so on the basis of party loyalty. This may be because they find it of less importance than, for example, party agreement, or because they are unable to accurately gauge candidates' loyalty due to the personal normative nature of the decision-making mechanism). As mentioned before (see section 3.2 in chapter 3) party loyalty is theorized to result from MPs' socialization through (previous) experience as representatives of their political party, however, the internalization and actual application of norms is an individual's decision; if an MP subscribes to a certain norm, he will apply it whether his (electoral institutional) environment promotes it or not.

This also taps into the 'one- or two-arena debate', as postulated by Bowler (2000), which focuses on whether party group unity in the legislative arena is actually affected by, or insulated from, the institutions and changes electoral arena. This debate is addressed further in chapter 6, where we tackle the question from an alternative perspective by focusing on changes in the relative contribution of MPs' decision-making mechanisms over time in the Dutch national parliament. For now, we continue our analysis of the effects of institutional settings on the decision-making mechanisms MPs apply in determining whether to vote with the party group or dissent, by looking at the differences between representatives in legislatures at different levels of government.

[36] As mentioned in footnote 17, alternative classifications of electoral systems based on the expert judgment of the PartiRep project research team yielded very similar results.

Chapter 5

Different pathways for different levels: representatives' decision-making mechanisms at the national and subnational level

5.1 Different pathways for different levels of government

The previous chapter focused on the effects of a number of institutions on MPs' decision-making mechanisms and the pathways to party group unity in 15 national parliaments. In most democracies, representation is not limited to the national level, however, and political parties are active in the electoral and legislative arenas at the lower levels of government too. As such, the normative and rationalist arguments for party democracy and its associated criterion of party unity (see chapter 3) are likely to hold at the subnational level as well. Indeed, although the number of studies on representation at the subnational level is limited in comparison to those concerning the national level, existing research points in the direction that unified political party groups are the rule in representative assemblies in parliamentary democracies at the subnational level as well. However, we have reasons to expect that the way in which party groups achieve unity, and thus the relative importance of representatives' decision-making mechanisms, is different at the subnational level than it is at the national level.[1]

[1] Note that our aim is to compare representatives' decision-making mechanisms and the way in which parties achieve party group unity at the national and subnational levels of government; we do not deal with the interaction between representatives and their parties at multiple levels of government, which is also argued

Surveying the literature, it seems safe to assume that in most (European) parliamentary democracies, politics at the subnational level is dominated by political parties, as is the case at the national level. Leach and Copus (2004, 337), for example, describe political representation at the municipal level in the United Kingdom as typical of *'party*ocracy'. And in their comparative analysis of the influence of political parties at the local level, Denters et al. (2013, 669) rate the local government system of the Netherlands, along with that of Austria, Norway and Sweden, as 'party democratic' with a strong emphasis on party discipline, party loyalty and the implementation of the party program. In passing, Deschouwer (2003, 218) mentions that in Belgium, party discipline is high at both the federal and regional level, whereas in Switzerland party discipline is actually stronger in the cantons than it is in the federal parliament. The fact the political party is taken to be the main representative actor in many studies on electoral (Jeffery and Hough, 2001; Laffin et al., 2007; Scarrow, 1997), legislative (Allers et al., 2001; Jeffery, 1999) and government politics (Bäck, 2003b,a, 2008; Seitz, 2000) at the subnational level, also indicates that the political party model stands at the basis of representation at the lower levels of government.

There are also a few studies that focus on the subnational level that deal with party (voting) unity specifically. Copus (1997a,b, 1999b), for example, finds that municipal councilors in the United Kingdom struggle to combine the party group system, with its emphasis on party unity through loyalty and discipline, with their scrutiny role, but usually end up privileging the former over the latter. Copus bases his analyses on the 1986 Widdicombe committee of inquiry's research team, which found that 92 percent of Conservative, and 99 percent of Labour councilors, indicate to usually or always voting together in the municipal council (Copus, 1997a, 62-63).[2] Patzelt (2003, 102) argues that in Germany, the 16 state (*Länder*) legislatures do not bother to keep any systematic record of individual members' voting behavior (with the exception of the infrequent occurrence of roll call votes), because "... final unity of action is taken for granted to such a degree that neither the margin nor the actual composition of a German cabinet's majority on the floor is treated as a topic worthy of documentation ...". Stecker's (2013) later analysis of party unity on roll call voting in 16 German state parliaments between 1990 and 2011 is one of the most comprehensive analyses of party voting at the subnational level. He finds that in 77.5 percent of the 2402 analyzed votes perfect party unity is achieved, with the average index of agreement reaching over 95, leading him to conclude that perfect unity is the rule rather than the exception at the German state level (2013, 6).

The subnational level has also been used in a semi-experimental research design to discriminate between the explanatory power of the sociological and rationalist / institutionalist approaches with regard to party group (voting) unity. In her study on budget voting in Berlin's 23 city district councils in 1997, Davidson-Schmich (2001) finds that the vast majority of the party groups in western Berlin city district councils voted in unison.

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to be a lacuna in the study of representation in general, and political parties in particular (Deschouwer, 2003; Kjaer and Elklit, 2010).

[2] The figures taken from the 1986 Widdicombe committee of inquiry's research team are based on survey responses, not actual voting behavior.

Party groups were less unified in eastern Berlin, where in the majority of the city district councils at least one party group experienced dissent when voting on the budget. In an earlier study, Davidson-Schmich (2000) also personally observed assembly and committee voting in seven western and six eastern Berlin city councils between 1997 and 1998, and found that whereas in western districts the established parties voted in perfect unity on almost all votes, their eastern counterparts were less likely to do so.[3] The author concludes that most eastern Berlin parties responded to the introduction of western German political institutions with stronger party discipline, although lower levels of ideological cohesion (which resulted from the fact that eastern political parties did not have enough time to develop clear stances on local issues), preexisting normative opposition to party discipline, and smaller candidate pools (which make it difficult for party (group) leaders to credibly (threaten to) sanction party group members) explain why party voting unity was below the levels found in western Berlin city councils.

Davidson-Schmich (2003) later extended her analysis of the German subnational level in her study of party voting unity in eastern German state legislatures during the 1990s, where party group unity on both roll call and regular votes on substantive matters increased dramatically throughout the first decade after Germany's reunification.[4] She also explicitly compares the voting behavior in these recently established eastern German state legislatures to the voting behavior in the national *Bundestag* during its first terms (1949-1953, 1953-1957 and 1957-1961), during which the development towards increased party voting unity was clearly mirrored. With party groups obtaining Rice scores very close to 1.0 by 2000, party voting unity in these eastern German state legislatures was near complete and closely resembled voting unity in the western German state legislatures. Finally, both Cowley (2001) and Dewan and Spirling (2011) explicitly compare party unity on roll call votes between the national Westminster parliament and the regional Scottish Parliament. Cowley (2001), whose analysis only covers the first year of the Scottish parliament, concludes that there are no noteworthy differences in party voting unity between the national and subnational parliament. Dewan and Spirling's (2011) analysis is more complete, as it deals with the two first terms of the Scottish parliament. During both terms the Rice scores attained by the Scottish party groups was well above 95 (including free votes), which leads the authors to conclude that party group unity is "as prevalent and robust in the Scottish Parliament as in the

[3] In the eastern districts, it was the Party of Democratic Socialism (*Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus*, PDS) that did not vote in unity in 52 percent of the 25 analyzed votes. The Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei*, SPD) (92 percent), Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union*, CDU) (80 percent) and Alliance '90 / The Greens (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*) (80 percent) in the eastern districts were clearly more unified, albeit less than the SPD (100 percent), CDU (100 percent) and Alliance '90 / The Greens (97 percent) in the western councils (78 votes were analyzed in the western councils) (Davidson-Schmich, 2000, 17-18). Davidson-Schmich (2000, 15-16) excludes votes on which the entire council voted unanimously, and counts abstentions as defections because abstaining representatives usually publicly announced that they were abstaining because they disagreed with their party group's position.

[4] Davidson-Schmich (2003) bases her analysis on roll call votes and a sample of floor debates, voting declarations and regular legislative votes obtained from the plenary session transcripts for the years 1991, 1996 and 2000.

House of Commons" (2011, 341).[5]

Although these studies show that party group (voting) unity seems to be as high at the subnational level as it is at the national level, this does not automatically entail that the way in which party group unity is brought about is the same at both levels of government. Within one country, the electoral and legislative institutional settings that are held to affect the different pathways to party group unity may be different at the subnational levels than they are at the national level. However, one could also argue that there are differences between the national and subnational level that hold across countries. For example, subnational parliaments tend to be smaller than national parliaments in terms of the number of legislative seats, which entails that party groups are generally smaller as well. This is likely to affect the way in which party groups function, and thus may also affect the way in which representatives come to their voting decisions. Moreover, the smaller size of constituencies at the subnational level may also affect representatives' decision making, as they are likely to have a closer and more direct relationship with their voters. On the other hand, whereas the number of national parliaments in one country is usually limited to one (unicameral) or two (bicameral), territorial decentralization entails that at one subnational level multiple representative assemblies exist, which means that the total number of seats that political parties need to fill is a lot higher at the subnational level than it is at the national level. Intra-party competition is therefore likely to be lower at the subnational level, thus affecting candidate (re-)selection criteria, and also party (group) leaders' ability to employ candidate selection as a disciplining tool.

All in all, our argument is that although representatives at the national and subnational level employ similar decision-making mechanisms in determining whether to vote with or dissent from the party group line, the relative importance of the mechanisms, and therefore the contribution of the pathways to party group unity, may differ at the different levels of government. In the next section, we outline how we expect each of the four mechanisms included in the decision-making model is affected by the general differences between the national and subnational level. We first test these hypotheses on the national and regional legislatures in the nine multilevel countries included in the 2010 PartiRep Survey. Subsequently, we test the same hypotheses on Dutch data that allows us to add the local level to the national and regional levels.

5.2 Expectations

5.2.1 Division of labor

In most countries, the job of a national MP is a full-time occupation with a considerably heavy workload. In order to deal with this workload, parliamentary party group are likely to apply a division of labor (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Krehbiel, 1991; Shepsle

[5] Another example of a cross-level comparative analysis is Di Virgilio and Pinto's (2013) study of roll call voting in the Italian national parliament and the regional councils of Emilia Romagna, Latium and Lombardy. The authors seeks to explain voting behavior in general, however, and do not deal explicitly with party group unity.

and Weingast, 1994; Skjaeveland, 2001), for which parties select candidates who are specialized in a particular policy area and who as MPs are likely to subsequently act as the parliamentary party spokesperson for these topics in their legislative committees. As a result of their workload and specialization, it is likely that national MPs do not have the time or expertise to form an opinion on all topics outside of their portfolio, and thus rely on their fellow party group members for voting advice.

At the subnational level, the workload is (comparatively) lighter than at the national level (depending on the degree of decentralization), and one could argue that subnational representatives are more likely to have the time to form their own opinion about a wider range of topics. On the other hand, being a representative at the subnational level is usually not a full-time occupation (this usually depend on the size of the district, among other things), entailing that representatives may hold another job as well, which limits the time they can spend on their representative function. But because subnational legislatures and party groups are usually smaller than at the national level, party groups have fewer members over which they can divide the workload, and party groups are less able to apply a strict division of labor. Moreover, government jurisdictions and decision-making powers also tend to become more limited as we move down the ladder of government levels, which entails that political party groups need fewer specialists and policy experts in order to develop the party's stance. Thus, we argue that during the process of candidate recruitment and selection, parties are less likely to select policy specialists, and instead prefer to opt for candidates who are able to keep up with the full range of issues that play a role at the subnational level. These generalists are more likely to have a personal opinion on a broad range of topics, and therefore less likely to rely on their fellow party group members for voting instructions. We therefore expect that *subnational representatives are less likely to engage in cue-taking as a result of the division of labor than national MPs (H1)*.

5.2.2 Party agreement

There are also a number of reasons to expect differences between national and subnational level with regard to representatives' second decision-making mechanism, party group agreement. This pathway entails that representatives do have a personal opinion on a particular vote, and that this opinion coincides with the position of their party group. They thus vote with their party group's position out of simple agreement.

From the perspective of the political party, party agreement is a relatively reliable and 'easy' pathway to party group unity, as it does not require relying on representatives' voluntary subscription to the norm of party group loyalty or their responsiveness to positive and negative sanctions. Therefore, parties try to maximize agreement among their representatives before entering the legislative arena. The extent to which potential candidates' own policy preferences match the ideological profile of the party, and their agreement with the party program and electoral manifesto, are thus important recruitment and selection criteria at all levels of government.

As mentioned above, subnational legislatures are usually smaller than national legislatures, and thus party groups are also generally smaller. This entails that the number

of (potentially conflicting) viewpoints in the party group is likely to be smaller as well (Hare, 1952; Mohammed, 2001; Wessels, 1999). On the other hand, we argue that as a result of their small size, subnational parties are more likely to select policy generalists as opposed to specialists, which may again increase the number of opinions on matters that are put to a vote. But whereas large party groups are likely to employ a hierarchical group organization and thus decision-making schemes (e.g., a division of labor organized around policy specialists who provide voting advice to the rest of the members of the party group, or a decision-making rule that grants the party group leadership the authority to determine the party group's final position), small groups are more likely to engage in consensus and unanimous decision making (Burawoy, 1979; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Romme, 2004). Combined with the argument that subnational parties are more likely to select policy generalists, this may entail that individual representatives are more involved in determining the position of the party group during the parliamentary party group meeting the first place, which would make them more likely to agree with the position of their party group when the issue is put to a vote. This leads to the expectation that *subnational representatives are more likely to frequently agree with the party than national MPs (H2)*.

5.2.3 Party loyalty

At the third stage of the decision-making sequence, representatives who disagree with the position of the party group on a vote must decide whether their subscription to the norm of party group loyalty overrides their conflict with the party's position. If so, representatives submit to the party group line voluntarily.

Again, party group loyalty is likely to be an important candidate selection criterion at all levels of government, and although the decision to adhere to the norm lies with individual representatives, party group loyalty is argued to be the result of a process of socialization; representatives internalize norms of solidarity through their previous party experience. In their study of career patterns, for which they use the same PartiRep Survey and background data as is used in this study, Pilet et al. (2014, 212-215) find that although the majority of representatives included in their analysis had been active at only one level of government, 20 percent of national MPs had previously been active as a representative at another level of government, whereas only 6 percent of regional representatives had been. Although the authors omit other types of previous party experience and the total amount of time representatives had already been active in party politics from their analysis, their study does provide some evidence for the claim that MPs at the national level are more likely to have previous party experience, and are therefore more likely to be socialized into norms of party group loyalty, than representatives at the subnational level.

Moreover, party group loyalty may also be weaker at the subnational level than at the national level due to the relatively smaller size and closer proximity—in terms of both geography and population—of representatives' constituencies. This may lead subnational representatives to engage in a more direct dyadic relationship with their voters, who act as competing principals to political parties (Carey, 2007, 2009). Copus (1999a, 89)

contends that due to both the nature of the issues that dominate the decision-making agenda and as well as the closeness of citizens to the political systems at the local level specifically, "[i]t is [...] at the local rather than national level, that the potential for connection between governor and governed is greatest". Although Copus' (1999a) study focuses on the municipal level in the United Kingdom, one could argue that the lower the level of government, the more likely that representatives' loyalty to the political party group is diffused by their loyalty to voters.

Indeed, in his comparison of constituency representation in legislatures at the Federal and *Länder* level in West Germany, Patzelt (2007, 59-64) finds that *Länder* representatives have a stronger desire to represent their constituents' views closely, and are less inclined to vote against their constituents' preferences, than national MPs. In line with Copus (1999a), Patzelt's (2007) explanation for this difference is that the smaller districts at the regional level allow for closer linkage between representatives and their voters. Relying on the same PartiRep Survey as is used in this study, Dudzinska et al. (2014, 26-28) find that the percentage of representatives who are classified as 'voter delegates' is slightly higher at the regional than at the national level in both multilevel and unitary settings,[6] and that voter delegates are more likely to consider the people in their constituency, and their voters specifically, a much more important focus of representation than other potential foci of representation.[7] André et al. (2014, 172-173, 184), who also use the PartiRep Survey data, observe that regional representatives tend to prioritize constituency work more than their national counterparts,[8] and that this prioritization

[6] Dudzińska et al.'s (2014, 26) study is based on respondents' transitive patterns of answers to three questions concerning the their styles of representation (Wessels and Giebler, 2010). In the PartiRep Survey, respondents are asked how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagreement between 1) his own opinion and his party's position, 2) his own opinion and his voters' positions, and 3) his party's position and his voters' position. A respondent who indicates that the party's position should prevail above both his own opinion and the position of his voters is categorized as a *party delegate*, a respondent who selects his voters' position above both his own opinion and his party's position is considered a *voter delegate*, and a respondent who chooses his own opinion above his party's and his voters' position is labeled a *trustee*. Respondents who do not consistently select one above the other two have intransitive preferences when it comes to their style of representation (only 5 percent of respondents included in Dudzińska et al.'s (2014, 26) analysis is categorized as such).

[7] In order to determine respondents' focus of representation, Dudzińska et al. (2014) use the PartiRep Survey question 'How important is it to you, personally, to promote the views and interests of the following groups of people?'. The different foci included are: a) 'all the people who voted for you' (only included for respondents in legislatures with a preferential electoral system or single-member districts), b) 'all the people who voted for your party', c) 'all the people in your constituency' (or area of residence for Israel and the Netherlands), d) 'your party', e) 'a specific group in society', f) 'in your region' (option was only put to regional MPs, excluding Austria), and g) 'all the people in the country' (included for respondents in all national legislatures, and only in the regional legislatures in Austria, Belgium and Switzerland).

[8] In the PartiRep Survey, respondents are asked what they consider the most important task they themselves fulfill as an MP, which is used to gauge respondents' role orientation as developed by Searing (1994). Respondents are categorized as *policy advocates* if they consider 'influencing government policy' most important. *Parliament men* pick 'liaising between members of the parliamentary party and the party leadership and managing Parliament's business' above the other tasks. *Welfare officers* consider 'providing assistance to individual voters in their dealings with public authorities' most important, whereas *local promoter*s hold the opinion that 'looking after the collective social and economic needs of the local area' is their most im-

also translates into more time spent in the constituency itself and more constituency-oriented behavior in the legislative arena (the proportion of legislative initiatives that are derived from meetings with individual citizens, for example, is higher at the regional level than at the national level). All in all, given that constituencies' opinions are likely to be more diverse than, and not always consistent with, the party group's position, it is probable that subnational representatives, who are more likely to have a stronger direct connection with their constituencies' than national MPs, are also more likely to experience a pull away from the party group in terms of their loyalty in the case of disagreement with the party's position. Our third hypothesis is therefore that *subnational representatives are less likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than national MPs (H3)*.

5.2.4 Party discipline

At the final stage of the decision-making process, representatives whose opinion on a vote conflicts with that of the party group, and who do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty, are confronted with disciplinary measures by the party (group) leadership in order to elicit them to vote with the party group, albeit involuntarily. At this stage of the decision-making process, representatives decide whether defying the party group's position outweighs the potential negative repercussions they may incur if they dissent. Parties can also try to get their representatives to vote the party group line by promising certain rewards for doing so.

In principle, political party (group) leaders at the subnational levels of government have access to many of the same types of carrots (positive sanctions) and sticks (negative sanctions) that political party (group) leaders at the national level have. But because subnational representatives are less dependent on their party than national representatives, the threat or actual use of these tools is probably less effective than at the national level. Whereas in most countries national MPs 'live off politics' (Weber, 1919) and are employed full-time, subnational representatives usually only engage in politics part-time, and in some countries are even non-salaried, receiving only modest financial compensation for their work. Moreover, given that only a small percentage of subnational representatives are eventually promoted to higher positions within their party organization or are selected as representatives at higher levels of government, subnational representatives are also less dependent on their political party in terms of their future career ambitions, which are likely to extend beyond the political realm. Thus, because representatives at the lower levels of government do not depend as much on their party for their (future) livelihood, they have far less to lose when confronted with the (threat or promise of) sanctions when they threaten to dissent from the party group line, rendering the sanctions themselves less effective. Moreover, as a result of the large number of seats to fill at the subnational level, intra-party competition is lower, and parties are also limited in their ability to use candidate reselection as a credible disciplining

portant job. André et al. (2014) combine the latter two categories into *constituency members* (Strøm, 1997, 167).

tool. Finally, the use of formal discipline often necessitates drawing on party group hierarchy, but because party groups are generally smaller at the subnational level than at the national level, doing so could have a structural negative effect on the functioning of the party group, and thus the party group leadership at the subnational level is likely to think twice before doing so. All in all, we expect that *subnational representatives are less likely to be disciplined than national MPs (H4).*

5.3 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies

In order to test the hypotheses developed above, we first take a look at differences between national and regional parliaments in the nine multilevel countries included in the PartiRep Survey.[9,10] Whereas at the national level about 24 percent of MPs from these multilevel countries participated in the survey, response rates are slightly higher at the regional level with on average 27 percent of representatives from the selected legislatures participating in the survey (see Table 5.1). We are again faced with the fact that the national level response rates for Italy (7 percent), France (9 percent) and the United Kingdom are below the threshold set by the members of the Comparative Candidate Survey (2007). At the regional level, all country response rates are above 20 percent, although with 21 percent, Switzerland and Italy are only just above the threshold. These figures should again be kept in mind during the analyses that follow.[11]

At the national level, MPs from governing parties and MPs whose parties are in the opposition are represented almost equally in these nine multi-level countries (49 percent are government MPs, and 51 percent are opposition MPs, not shown in Table 5.1). At the regional level, about 66 percent of respondents are from governing parties, and 34 percent are members of the opposition. The sample of surveyed representatives closely resembles the population not only in terms of government-opposition, but also party group membership (of which there are over 100), although there are a few exceptions (Deschouwer et al., 2014, 11).[12] In the tables below, responses are weighted for party group and parliament size, and respondents from party groups with only one legislative seat are excluded from the analysis. Table 5.1 also displays the regional legislatures' 2006 scores on the Regional Authority Index (RAI) on the self-rule and shared

[9] For a description of the PartiRep Survey data collection process, see chapter 4.

[10] For the purpose of this analysis, the national/federal parliaments included in the PartiRep Survey are referred to as 'national parliaments', and the subnational representative assemblies (including *Länder*, communities, regional assemblies, etc.) are referred to as 'regional parliaments'.

[11] All analyses have been checked for correlations with response rates. Noteworthy findings are discussed in the text.

[12] See footnote 13 in chapter 4.

Table 5.1: 2010 PartiRep MP survey response rates for national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies

	National			Regional									
							RAI score (surveyed legislatures)						
Country	Population	Response		Population					Survey			Response	
	Seats (N)	(n)	(%)	Legislatures (N)	Seats (N)	Seats mean (n)	Self-rule	Shared rule	Legislatures (n)	Seats (n)	Seats mean (n)	(n)	(% of survey)
Austria	183	55	30	9	448	50	12.0	6.0	9	448	50	172	38
Belgium	150	70	47	4	313	78	9.0-13.00	5.0-7.0	4	313	78	93	30
France	577	50	9	28	1721	61	8.0	0.0	2	141	71	40	28
Germany	622	134	22	16	1867	117	12.0	9.0	4	417	104	145	35
Italy	630	45	7	20	986	49	13.0	1.0-5.0	7	391	56	83	21
Portugal	230	76	33	2	104	52	12.0	3.5	2	104	52	42	40
Spain	350	104	30	17	1206	71	13.0	1.5	4	418	105	168	40
Switzerland	200	49	25	26	2688	103	15.0	4.5	25	2639	106	555	21
United Kingdom	650	62	10	2	189	95	8.0-13.0	3.5	2	189	95	45	27
Total / mean	3592	645	24	127	9522	75	11.8	4.1	59	5060	86	1343	27

Regional parliaments included in the PartiRep Survey per country:
Austria (*Länder* or states): Burgenland (36 seats), Kärnten (Carinthia, 36 seats), Niederösterreich (Lower Austria, 56 seats), Oberösterreich (Upper Austria, 56 seats), Salzburg (36 seats), Steiermark (Styria, 56 seats), Tirol (36 seats), Vorarlberg (36 seats) and Wien (Vienna, 100 seats).
Belgium (*Gemeenschappen* or communities, including Brussels): Brussels (89 seats), Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft Belgiens (German Speaking community, 25 seats), Vlaanderen (Flemish region, 124 seats) and Wallonië (Wallonia, 75 seats).
France (administrative regions, including Corsica): Aquitaine (85 seats) and Poitou-Charentes (56 seats).
Germany (*Bundesländer* or states, including Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen): Brandenburg (88 seats), Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony, 152 seats), Rheinland-Pfalz (101 seats) and Thüringen (88 seats).
Italy (regions): Calabria (50 seats), Campania (60 seats), Lazio (51 seats), Lombardia (80 seats), Toscana (55 seats), Valle d'Aosta (35 seats), and Veneto (60 seats).
Portugal (autonomous regions): Azores (57 seats) and Madeira (47 seats).
Spain (autonomous communities):Andalucia (109 seats), Catalunya (135 seats), Pais Vasco (Basque country, 75 seats), and Valencia (99 seats).
Switzerland (cantons): Aargau (140 seats), Appenzell Ausserrhoden (65 seats), Basel-Landschaft (90 seats), Basel-Stadt (100 seats), Bern (160 seats), Fribourg (110 seats), Genève (100 seats), Glarus (80 seats), Graubünden (120 seats), Jura (60 seats), Luzern (120 seats), Neuchâtel (115 seats), Nidwalden (60 seats), Obwalden (55 seats), Sankt-Gallen (180 seats), Schaffhausen (60 seats), Schwyz (100 seats), Solothurn (100 seats), Thurgau (130 seats), Ticino (90 seats), Uri (64 seats), Valais (130 seats), Vaud (150 seats), Zug (80 seats) and Zürich (180 seats).
United Kingdom (devolved governments): Scotland (129 seats) and Wales (60 seats).
Note: The 2010 PartiRep MP Survey was financed by the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office (BELSPO). The codebook and instructions for obtaining the data can be found on the PartiRep website (www.partirep.eu).

rules dimensions (Hooghe et al., 2008,?).[13]

5.3.1 Division of labor

Our first hypothesis is that, as a result of the smaller size of subnational legislature and their party groups, subnational party groups are less able to apply a division of labor and therefore also less likely to select policy specialists, and thus that subnational representatives are less likely to engage in the cue-taking than national MPs (H1). In terms of their size, the nine national parliaments included in our analysis consist of 399 seats on average (see Table 5.1), with the British House of Commons taking the lead (650 seats), followed by the Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, (630 seats), the Germany *Bundestag* (622 seats) and the French *Assemblée Nationale* (577 seats). The Belgian *Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers* has the fewest number of seats (150 seats), followed by the Austrian *Nationalrat* (183 seats). With an average of 86 seats, the regional legislatures selected for the survey are twice (in the case of Belgium and Switzerland) to 11 times (in the case of Italy) as small as their national counterparts. Given that in most of our nine multilevel countries the regional legislatures are considerably smaller than the parliaments at the national level, it is safe to assume that their party groups are generally smaller as well.

As a result of the smaller size of party groups, we expect there to be fewer policy specialists, and more generalists, at the regional level than at the national level. However, at the aggregate level, and in most individual countries, the differences between the levels of government when it comes to the percentage of representatives who indicate to specialize in one or two policy areas (referred to as specialists), or prefer to speak on a wide range of issues from different policy areas (referred to as generalists), is practically the same. At both levels of government slightly more than half of the respondents consider themselves specialists (57 and 55 percent respectively), and slightly less than half describe themselves as generalists (44 and 45 percent respectively, see Table 5.2). There are a few individual countries where the differences between the levels are larger, with Spain, Italy, and Portugal corroborating our hypothesis. Notably, in France the percentage of specialists is 17 percentage points higher at the regional level than it is at the national level. This is odd given the fact that the French administrative regions are among the smallest and they also have the lowest regional authority (RAI) score (see Table 5.1). There are also more specialists at the regional level than at the national level in Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland (although the differences in the latter countries are very small). The regional parliaments in these countries are

[13] The RAI scores displayed are those for 2006. The self-rule score, which ranges between zero and 15 points, is calculated by adding the scores legislatures obtain on the items 'institutional depth' (0 to 3 points), 'policy scope' (0 to 4 points), 'fiscal autonomy' (0 to 4 points), 'assembly representation' (0 to 2 points) and 'executive representation' (0 to 2 points). The score for shared rule, which ranges from zero to 9 points, is calculated by adding the scores legislatures obtain on the items 'law making' (0 to 2 points), 'executive control' (0 to 2 points), 'fiscal control' (0 to 2 points) and 'constitutional reform' (0 to 3 points). The total RAI score ranges from zero to 24 points and is obtained by adding the scores for self-rule and shared rule (the total RAI score is not shown in Table 5.1) (Hooghe et al., 2008).

among the largest, and all also have the highest RAI scores (with the exception of the United Kingdom).

Respondents were also asked whether they consider it true or false that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the position of the party on his topic. As we predict that subnational representatives are less likely to engage in cue-taking than national MPs, we expect that regional representatives are more likely than national MPs to consider the statement false. Although the differences between the national and regional level are statistically significant, they are not very large: 23 percent of the total number of regional representatives consider the statement (mostly) false, which is only two percentage points more than at the national level (see Table 5.3).[14] Moreover, the percentage of regional representatives who answer that it is (mostly) true that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the position of the party (64 percent) is slightly higher than at the national level (60 percent). When looking at individual countries, regional representatives are more likely to consider the statement (mostly) false than national MPs in Spain, Austria, France and Germany. In Portugal, Belgium, Italy and United Kingdom, regional representatives are actually more likely to indicate that the parliamentary party spokesperson does indeed determine the party's position. All in all, when it comes to cue-taking the differences between the national and regional level in our nine multilevel countries are not very large, not in line with our expectations, and not consistent between countries.

5.3.2 Party agreement

We expect that subnational representatives are more likely to frequently agree with the party's position than national MPs (H2). The reasoning behind this is that, as a result of the smaller size of party groups at the subnational level, representatives are more likely to be involved in determining the party group position on a wider range of issues in the first place, and therefore more likely to agree with the position of the party group on issues that are put to a vote in parliament.

The issues that are relevant for the day-to-day decisions that are put to a vote in legislatures at the subnational level, however, differ from the national level in that they are less likely to be ideologically charged, and are more likely to be of a practical, technocratic-administrative nature (De Vries, 2000). Party agreement in terms of representatives' own position and their perception of their party's position on the Left-Right ideological scale, as is sometimes done in studies of party group homogeneity, is therefore too abstract a measure to gauge the true essence of party agreement at the subnational level (Copus and Erlingsson, 2012; Denters, 1993; De Vries, 2000; Kuiper, 1994). We therefore rely on the same measure of party agreement as used in chapter 4: the frequency of disagreement. In the PartiRep Survey, respondents were asked how often, in the last year, they found themselves in the position that their party had one opinion on a vote

[14] For presentation purpose the extremes of answering categories of the question whether it is true or false that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the position of the party are combined: 'mostly false' and 'false' are collapsed into one category, as are 'mostly true' and 'true'.

Table 5.2: Specialist or generalist in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National				Regional			
	Generalist	Specialist	Total	Total (n)	Generalist	Specialist	Total	Total (n)
Austria	56	44	100	48	56	44	100	167
Belgium	38	62	100	68	35	65	100	92
France	34	66	100	49	17	83	100	40
Germany	45	55	100	131	44	56	100	142
Italy	53	47	100	45	66	34	100	83
Portugal	36	64	100	76	43	58	101	41
Spain	36	64	100	104	52	49	101	168
Switzerland	54	46	100	48	53	47	100	552
United Kingdom	50	50	100	60	46	55	101	45
All	44	57	101	629	45	55	100	1330

χ^2 (8) = 20.434, sig. = .009; φc = .159, sig. = .009 (country differences, national level)

χ^2 (8) = 59.282, sig. = .000; φc = .264, sig. = .000 (country differences, regional level)

χ^2 (1) = .521, sig. = .471; φ = .018, sig. = .471 (national versus regional level, all)

Table 5.3: 'The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party's position on his topic' in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National					Regional				
	(Mostly) false	Neither	(Mostly) true	Total	Total (n)	(Mostly) false	Neither	(Mostly) true	Total	Total (n)
Austria	8	8	84	100	47	17	17	66	100	163
Belgium	23	22	56	101	68	23	3	74	100	92
France	32	16	53	101	50	40	16	44	100	39
Germany	12	20	68	100	133	19	14	66	99	144
Italy	25	40	35	100	43	31	18	51	100	81
Portugal	30	10	60	100	75	7	13	80	100	42
Spain	9	10	81	100	103	23	8	69	100	168
Switzerland	19	14	66	99	49	25	10	65	100	548
United Kingdom	23	22	55	100	60	19	18	62	99	45
All	21	19	60	100	628	23	13	64	100	1322

χ^2 (16) = 79.589, sig. = .000; φc = .223, sig. = .000 (country differences, national level)

χ^2 (16) = 58.020, sig. = .000; φc = .261, sig. = .000 (country differences, regional level)

χ^2 (2) = 9.821, sig. = .007; φc = .077, sig. = .007 (national versus regional level, all)

Table 5.4: Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party's position on a vote in parliament) in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National						Regional					
	Frequently disagree		Infrequently disagree				Frequently disagree		Infrequently disagree			
	Once a month	Every three months	Once a year	(Almost) never	Total	Total (n)	Once a month	Every three months	Once a year	(Almost) never	Total	Total (n)
Austria	0	21	58	21	100	46	3	19	54	25	101	168
Belgium	8	28	31	33	100	70	12	27	37	25	101	93
France	4	43	40	14	101	50	8	14	21	57	100	38
Germany	5	37	29	29	100	133	1	28	35	37	101	143
Italy	18	38	32	13	101	44	9	40	33	19	101	82
Portugal	15	35	25	24	99	76	3	23	15	58	99	42
Spain	4	16	27	53	100	104	3	10	19	67	99	167
Switzerland	11	31	50	8	100	48	8	40	33	19	100	552
United Kingdom	23	23	33	20	99	61	3	18	53	27	101	45
All	11	31	34	24	100	632	6	24	33	37	100	1330

χ^2 (24) = 127.445, sig. = .000; φc = .229, sig. = .000 (four answering categories, country differences, national level)

χ^2 (24) = 165.033, sig. = .000; φc = .254, sig. = .000 (four answering categories, country differences, regional level)

χ^2 (3) = 45.581, sig. = .000; φc = .166, sig. = .000 (four answering categories, national versus regional level, all)

χ^2 (1) = 28.472, sig. = .000; φ = .131, sig. = .000 (four answering categories collapsed into 'frequently disagree' and 'infrequently disagree', national versus regional level, all)

in parliament, and they personally had another. As already explained in chapter 4, this question goes further than abstract ideological and policy scales: the question specifies two actors (the individual MP and the party) and the event (a difference of opinion over an upcoming vote), and provides quantifiable answering categories (the frequency of disagreement over months and years).[15]

In line with our hypothesis, the percentage of representatives who infrequently disagree with their party's position on a vote in parliament is quite a bit higher in our regional legislatures (33 percent disagree with the party's position once a year, and 37 percent indicate do to so (almost) never) than in the national legislatures (34 percent disagree once a year, and 24 percent (almost) never do so) when all respondents from all countries are taken together (see Table 5.4).[16] The differences between the regional and national level are greatest in Portugal, France, the United Kingdom and Germany. Belgium and Switzerland are the only countries where the percentage of respondents who infrequently disagree with their party's position is higher among national MPs than among regional representatives, but in both countries the differences between the levels are not very large. Thus, given the difference between the regional and national level in the aggregate, and the consistency between countries, it seems that party agreement, as a pathway to party group unity, plays a relatively more important role in bringing about party group unity at the regional level than it does at the national level.

5.3.3 Party loyalty

We hypothesized that subnational representatives are less likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than national MPs (H3) because they are likely to have less party experience through which socialization into norms takes place, and because subnational representatives are more likely to have their loyalty to the party group diffused by their loyalty to their voters. As a follow-up to the question about the frequency of disagreement, respondents were asked how an MP ought to vote in the situation that the party has one position on a vote in parliament, and they personally have a different opinion.[17]

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[15] In chapter 4, which deals with all of the 15 national parliaments included in the PartiRep Survey, the frequency of disagreement was compared to the absolute distance MPs perceive between their own and their party's position on the ideological Left-Right scale as a means of validation. There is a negative linear relationship between the two: the larger the absolute distance perceived by MPs, the more likely that they are to frequently disagree with their party. We can thus assume that the frequency of disagreement is also a good measure for party agreement at the national level, where ideology is likely to play a more important role than at the subnational level. At the regional level, the relationship between the two variables is substantially weaker (see Van Vonno et al., 2014).

[16] At the regional level, the two countries with the highest percentage of representatives who frequently disagree with their party (Italy and Switzerland) are also the two countries with the lowest response rates. It could be that representatives who frequently disagree with their party are more likely to participate in the survey than representatives who usually agree. This relationship does not seem to hold, however, at the national level, as respondents from countries with low response rates are not systematically more likely to frequently disagree.

[17] As mentioned before in chapter 4 (see footnote 24), in past parliamentary surveys held in the Dutch Second Chamber, the question as to how an MP ought to vote when his opinion conflicts with the position of the

Table 5.5: Party loyalty (own opinion versus party's position) in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National				Regional			
	Own opinion	Party's position	Total	Total (n)	Own opinion	Party's position	Total	Total (n)
Austria	50	50	100	44	28	72	100	162
Belgium	33	67	100	70	32	68	100	92
France	64	36	100	49	35	65	100	40
Germany	54	46	100	124	30	70	100	141
Italy	63	37	100	44	44	56	100	81
Portugal	46	55	101	75	37	63	100	42
Spain	18	83	101	102	16	84	100	163
Switzerland	88	12	100	48	75	25	100	546
United Kingdom	53	47	100	55	42	58	100	41
All	52	48	100	611	38	63	101	1308

χ^2 (8) = 121.908 sig. = .000; φc = .394, sig. = .000 (country differences, national level)

χ^2 (8) = 84.814, sig. = .000; φc = .318, sig. = .000 (country differences, regional level)

χ^2 (1) = 33.789, sig. = .000; φ = .144, sig. = .000 (national versus regional level, all)

The answering category 'an MP ought to vote according to his party's position' is taken to be indicative of a respondent's subscription to the norm of party loyalty.

Surprisingly, the percentage of respondents who answer that an MP ought to vote according to the party's position in the case of disagreement is actually higher at the regional level (63 percent) than at the national level (48 percent, see Table 5.5). Moreover, when looking at the differences between the levels of government in individual countries, there is not a single country where the percentage of regional representatives who indicate to vote according to the party's position in the case of disagreement is lower than among national MPs.[18]

By using the choice between an MP's own opinion and his party's position we implicitly assume, however, that voters as a potential focus of representation are encompassed representatives' answer to vote according to their own personal preferences. In other words, a representative who answers that an MP ought to vote according to his own opinion may do so because his own opinion is informed by the voters' opinion; by voting according to his own opinion, he is loyal to voters' who act as a competing principal to the party. As a more precise indicator of the influence of voters as competing principals of the political party, we can also look at respondents' answer to the question how an MP ought to vote if his voters' opinion conflicts with the party's position. According to the theory of competing principals, we would expect that regional representatives are more likely to pick the voters' opinion over their party's position. There are hardly any differences between the levels of government, however, as the majority of all respondents at both the national (62 percent) and regional level (59 percent) answer that in the case of disagreement, an MP ought to vote according to his party's position (see the columns labeled 'All' in Table 5.6). If we look at the individual countries, there does not appear to be a consist pattern: in Spain, the United Kingdom and Belgium, and to a lesser extent in Portugal and France, national MPs are more likely to choose the voters' opinion over the party's position, whereas in Austria, Switzerland and Italy, regional representatives are more likely to do so (not shown in Table 5.6). In most countries, the differences between the levels of government are not very large, which seems to imply

party group included a middle answering category 'it depends', which was always the most popular among national MPs. The omission of this category in the 2010 PartiRep Survey was associated with almost 30 percent of respondents refusing to answer the question, and a very high percentage of respondents selecting the answering category 'MP should vote according to his party's opinion' (see Table 6.18 in chapter 6). In the nine countries included in the analysis in this chapter, however, the omission of this category seems to have had a smaller effect on the response rate. For all nine countries combined, only 5 percent (34 respondents) of national MPs' responses to the question are missing. Almost the same holds for the regional level (3 percent, 35 respondents missing). In comparison: 2 percent (13 respondents) of national MPs, and 1 percent (13 respondents) of regional representatives refused to answer the question that preceded this question in the survey (these percentages and number of respondents are not weighed).

[18] The percentage of regional representatives who would answer than an MP ought to vote according to his own opinion in the case of disagreement is highest in Italy and Switzerland, where response rates were also the lowest. It could be that MPs who do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty were more likely to participate in the survey than MPs who do subscribe to the norm. In both cases, however, the percentages of national MPs who answer that an MP ought to vote according to his own opinion are also among the highest when compared to the other countries.

Table 5.6: Party loyalty (own opinion versus party's position) and competing principals (voters' opinion versus party's position) in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National					Regional				
	All	Own opinion	Party's position	Total	Total (n)	All	Own opinion	Party's position	Total	Total (n)
Voters' opinion	38	74	26	100	206	41	62	38	100	540
Party's position	62	37	63	100	374	59	22	79	101	713
Total	100					100				
Total (n)	589					1263				

Competing principals (voter's opinion versus party's position)

χ^2 (1) = 1.133, sig. = .287; φ = .027, sig. = .287 (national versus regional level, all)

Party loyalty (own opinion versus party's position) & competing principals (voter's opinion versus party's position)

χ^2 (1) = 224.137, sig. = .000; φ = .379, sig. = .000 (national versus regional level, all)

Note: The number of respondents in the last column do not add up to the total number of respondents included in the first column ('All') because the last column only includes respondents who answered both questions.

that the hypothesized greater influence of competing principals at the regional level is probably not as strong as we predicted.

Table 5.6 also shows that around three-quarters of national representatives who choose voters' opinion over the party's position, also indicate to vote according to their own opinion instead of the party's position when the two conflict. This entails that it is likely that their lack of subscription to the norm of party loyalty can, in part, be accounted for by their loyalty to voters as competing principals. Of the regional representatives who indicate to vote according to the opinion of the voters instead of the party's position, however, the percentage who would then also let their own opinion trump that of the party is lower than at the national level (62 percent). So, not only is party loyal stronger at the regional level than at the national level, which is not in line with our expectations, the influence of voters as competing principals to party on those representatives who do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty seems to be (slightly) weaker at the regional level than at the national level.

5.3.4 Party discipline

Because subnational representatives are less likely to depend on their political party for their livelihood and future careers, we expect disciplinary measures to be less effective at the subnational level, and therefore party discipline to play a less important role in determining party group unity at the subnational level than it does at the national level (H4). As was explained in chapter 4, the actual use of party discipline is difficult to observe, and thus we use the same question that inquires into representatives' satisfaction with party discipline in their party. Representatives who indicate that party discipline ought to be less strict are those who are likely to have been disciplined in the past and/or who value the freedom of an individual representative above the collective benefits of acting as a united front, whereas representatives who answer that it should be more strict consider the benefits of a united front more important than a representative's individual mandate, and would like to see their fellow party group members put on a tighter leash. Finally, those who answer that party discipline should remain as it is probably perceive a good balance between a representative's individual freedom and the collective benefits of party group unity, or at least agree with the way in which the two are balanced by the party (group) leadership.

At the aggregate level, the difference between national and regional representatives' satisfaction with general party discipline is practically non-existent: in both cases around 70 percent are content with general party discipline, around 20 percent think it should be applied more strictly, and 10 percent would like to see less strict general party discipline (see Table 5.7). Moreover, only Portugal and Spain seem to corroborate our hypothesis that party discipline is less strict at the regional level; in all other countries, the percentage of respondents who hold the opinion that party discipline should be less strict is either almost the same as at the national level, or actually higher (notably in Italy, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Belgium).

The answering patterns are not very different when we inquire into specific aspects of party discipline. When it comes to party discipline in sticking to the parliamentary

Table 5.7: Satisfaction with general parliamentary party discipline in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National					Regional				
	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
Austria	41	59	0	100	50	22	77	1	100	167
Belgium	11	77	13	101	61	17	64	19	100	82
France	16	77	7	100	49	12	78	10	100	30
Germany	45	53	2	100	129	38	59	2	99	128
Italy	38	59	3	100	43	25	58	17	100	80
Portugal	4	73	22	99	71	7	80	13	100	36
Spain	6	71	24	101	93	12	80	8	100	163
Switzerland	27	68	6	101	44	24	75	1	100	463
United Kingdom	16	76	9	101	52	20	61	19	100	41
All	21	69	10	100	592	20	70	10	100	1190

χ^2 (16) = 126.652, sig. = .000; φc = .411, sig. = .000 (country differences, national level)

χ^2 (16) = 76.392, sig. = .000; φc = .223, sig. = .000 (country differences, regional level)

χ^2 (2) = .585, sig. = .746; φc = .020, sig. = .020 (national versus regional level, all)

Table 5.8: Satisfaction with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to sticking to the parliamentary party line in votes in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National					Regional				
	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
Austria	8	85	8	101	48	4	91	5	100	167
Belgium	1	87	12	100	63	8	74	18	100	81
France	14	77	10	101	49	7	86	7	100	29
Germany	11	82	8	101	126	7	89	5	101	130
Italy	32	62	5	100	43	13	72	15	100	79
Portugal	6	71	23	100	72	7	82	12	101	36
Spain	9	80	11	100	93	3	91	6	100	165
Switzerland	12	80	8	100	45	18	75	8	101	465
United Kingdom	12	74	14	100	54	15	70	16	101	41
All	12	77	11	100	593	9	81	10	100	1193

χ^2 (16) = 67.573, sig. = .000; φc = .212, sig. = .000 (country differences, national level)

χ^2 (16) = 42.923, sig. = .000; φc = .168, sig. = .000 (country differences, regional level)

χ^2 (2) = 5.716, sig. = .057; φc = .061, sig. = .057 (national versus regional level, all)

Table 5.9: Satisfaction with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to taking political initiatives only with the parliamentary party's authorization in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National					Regional				
	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
Austria	28	60	12	100	48	14	80	6	100	167
Belgium	8	80	12	100	63	15	57	29	101	81
France	9	82	10	101	49	3	76	21	100	29
Germany	12	79	10	101	127	14	81	6	101	129
Italy	13	78	10	101	43	2	75	23	100	80
Portugal	1	81	18	100	71	7	80	13	100	36
Spain	9	64	26	99	92	3	90	7	100	163
Switzerland	9	84	8	101	45	13	78	10	101	462
United Kingdom	11	78	11	100	52	19	63	18	100	41
All	10	78	13	101	590	10	76	15	101	1188

χ^2 (16) = 41.244, sig. = .001; φc = .166, sig. = .000 (country differences, national level)

χ^2 (16) = 67.578, sig. = .000; φc = .211, sig. = .000 (country differences, regional level)

χ^2 (2) = 1.110, sig. = .574; φc = .027, sig. = .574 (national versus regional level, all)

Table 5.10: Satisfaction with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National					Regional				
	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
Austria	36	64	0	100	48	39	61	0	100	167
Belgium	58	41	1	100	63	52	47	1	100	82
France	60	38	2	100	49	67	33	0	100	30
Germany	80	20	0	100	128	64	36	0	100	130
Italy	40	59	1	100	43	38	56	6	100	80
Portugal	56	43	1	100	71	53	44	3	100	36
Spain	66	33	1	100	94	56	43	1	100	165
Switzerland	46	52	2	100	45	24	77	0	101	466
United Kingdom	46	54	0	100	54	65	35	0	100	41
All	56	43	1	100	595	51	48	1	100	1197

χ^2 (16) = 53.073, sig. = .000; φc = .187, sig. = .000 (country differences, national level)

χ^2 (16) = 79.596, sig. = .000; φc = .227, sig. = .000 (country differences, regional level)

χ^2 (2) = 4.258, sig. = .119; φc = .053, sig. = .119 (national versus regional level, all)

Table 5.11: 'Confidential party discussions usually find their way to the media' in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National					Regional				
	(Mostly) false	Neither	(Mostly) true	Total	Total (n)	(Mostly) false	Neither	(Mostly) true	Total	Total (n)
Austria	60	20	20	100	47	66	8	26	100	162
Belgium	50	10	40	100	70	45	12	42	99	93
France	10	27	63	100	50	50	20	31	101	39
Germany	21	6	73	100	133	52	5	43	100	142
Italy	15	25	60	100	44	30	23	48	101	83
Portugal	21	3	76	100	75	48	13	39	100	41
Spain	10	12	78	100	103	33	11	56	100	168
Switzerland	27	11	62	100	49	77	6	17	100	551
United Kingdom	29	14	57	100	58	67	7	26	100	45
All	24	14	62	100	629	52	12	36	100	1324

χ^2 (16) = 120.709, sig. = .000; φc = .274, sig. = .000 (country differences, national level)

χ^2 (16) = 90.716, sig. = .000; φc = .231, sig. = .000 (country differences, regional level)

χ^2 (2) = .142.809, sig. = .000; φc = .294, sig. = .000 (national versus regional level, all)

party line in votes, which is most relevant for the study at hand, there are again no significant differences between the national and regional level (see Table 5.8). The same holds for when it comes to seeking authorization from the parliamentary party before taking political initiatives (see Table 5.9). Moreover, in both cases there is not a consistent pattern when we look at the differences between national MPs and regional representatives in the individual countries; in some countries the percentage of representatives who would like to see party discipline applied less strictly is higher at the national than at the regional level, whereas in other countries it is the other way around.

There is one exception to this overwhelming satisfaction with party discipline, and that is when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential; at both levels of government over half of respondents answer that party discipline should be more strict, and only 1 percent think it should be less strict (see Table 5.10). However, when asked whether they agree with the statement that confidential party discussions usually find their way to the media, the answering patterns for the two levels of government are quite different: whereas at the national level 62 percent considers the statement (mostly) true, only 36 percent of regional representatives answer that this is the case (see Table 5.10).[19] The majority of regional representatives actually consider the statement (mostly) false. Thus, while the majority of representatives at both levels of government are apparently concerned with keeping internal party discussion confidential, their concern seems most merited at the national level. It could be speculated that political parties are under more (media) scrutiny at the national level, and there is more pressure to present a united front.

5.3.5 The sequential decision-making process

The main argument of this study is that the decision-making mechanisms dealt with individually above are ordered in a particular sequence. If a representative does not have an opinion on a particular vote, he follows the voting advice given to him by his fellow party group's members and thus engages in cue-taking. Therefore, agreement, loyalty and discipline are not important for getting the representative to vote with the party's position and contribute to party group unity. Likewise, if a representative does have an opinion on a vote, and he is in agreement with his party group's position, whether he subscribes to the norm of party group loyalty is not relevant, and the party (group) leadership also does not have to coax him to follow the party line through (the promise of) positive and (the threat of) negative sanctions. A representative who has an opinion that conflicts with the position of the party group moves on to third decision-making stage. If his subscription to the norm of party group loyalty overrides the conflict, this drives him to toe the party group line on his own accord, and thus discipline is still unnecessary. Finally, if a representative has a conflicting opinion and his subscription to the norm of party group loyalty does not outweigh the intensity of the conflict, party

[19] For presentation purpose the extremes of answering categories of the question as to whether it is true or false that confidential party discussions usually find their way to the media are combined: 'mostly false' and 'false' are collapsed into one category, as are 'mostly true' and 'true'.

discipline becomes relevant as a means of getting the representative to fall in line, albeit involuntarily. If, at this final stage of the decision-making sequence, the party (group) leadership's disciplinary measures are not enough to elicit compliance, we expect that the representatives will vote according to his own opinion and thus dissent from the party group line.

As already discussed in chapter 4, such an explanatory model of decision making would ideally be tested by asking representatives what motivated their choice at each stage of their decision-making process on individual legislative votes. Unfortunately, the available data preclude us from doing so. We can, however, get a general idea of the relative importance that three of the decision-making mechanisms, party agreement, party loyalty and party discipline, play in determining party voting unity, since the three questions that we used to gauge these mechanisms all specifically refer to voting in parliament. (In order to gauge party discipline, we use the question that inquires into a respondent's satisfaction with party discipline specifically when it comes to sticking to the parliamentary party line in votes, see Table 5.8.) Including the relative contribution of the first stage, cue-taking, is problematic as the questions that we used to gauge it do not refer to voting, and do not specifically ask whether respondents have an opinion, or whether, in their opinion, MPs (should) vote according to the parliamentary party spokesperson's voting advice when a personal opinion is lacking. Moreover, the question used as an indicator of the second decision-making mechanism, party agreement, also does not allow us to exclude representatives who lack a personal opinion. In other words, we do not know for certain if representatives who indicate to infrequently disagree with the party do so because they actually share the opinion of the party, or because they have no personal opinion on the matter. For these two reasons the first stage of the decision-making process, cue-taking, is omitted from the model.

The first column in Table 5.12 includes the percentage of representatives who indicate to infrequently disagree with the party's position. For presentation purposes, the answering categories 'about once a month' and 'about once every three months' are combined into 'frequently disagree', and the categories 'about once a year' and '(almost) never' are collapsed into 'infrequently disagree'.[20] As we saw above, and in line with our hypothesis (H2), when all representatives are taken together, party agreement is higher, and thus plays a more important role in determining party group unity, at the regional level (71 percent) than it at the national level (58 percent). The pattern is also consistent in most individual countries, with the exception of Switzerland and to a lesser extent Belgium, where the percentage of representatives who infrequently disagree with the party is higher at the national level than at the regional level.

Next, party loyalty is only relevant for those representatives who indicated to frequently disagree with the party. The percentage of representatives who frequently disagree with their party's position, but still toe the party line out of a sense of loyalty, is slightly higher at the national level (17 percent) than at the regional level (14 percent). Thus, although we found above that party loyalty was stronger at the regional

[20] See footnote 22 in chapter 4 for a discussion of the dichotomization of the frequency of disagreement variable.

Table 5.12: The relative contribution of party agreement, party loyalty and party discipline when it comes to sticking to the parliamentary party line in votes in parliament in national and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%)

	National						Regional					
	Voluntary		Involuntary				Voluntary		Involuntary			
	Agreement	Loyalty	Discipline	Unaccounted	Total	Total (n)	Agreement	Loyalty	Discipline	Unaccounted	Total	Total (n)
Austria	78	13	4	4	99	42	79	13	2	6	100	161
Belgium	64	28	3	5	100	63	63	20	8	8	99	80
France	53	10	10	27	100	48	78	3	3	16	100	28
Germany	57	18	7	18	100	117	70	21	1	8	100	126
Italy	43	22	6	30	101	41	51	22	6	21	100	77
Portugal	52	28	14	7	101	71	72	16	4	8	100	36
Spain	78	20	1	1	100	92	88	8	2	2	100	160
Switzerland	59	2	8	31	100	44	53	9	4	35	101	456
United Kingdom	60	10	11	19	100	50	79	15	0	6	100	37
All	58	17	8	17	100	568	71	14	3	12	100	1161

χ^2 (24) = 112.589, sig. = .000; φc = .227, sig. = .000 (country differences, national level)

χ^2 (24) = 102.948, sig. = .000; φc = .216, sig. = .000 (country differences, regional level)

χ^2 (3) = 28.982, sig. = .000; φc = .141, sig. = .000 (national versus regional level, all)

Note: These percentages may differ from previous tables in this chapter because they only include respondents who answered all three questions. Unfortunately, the questions about party discipline were located near the end of the survey.

level when looking at all representatives regardless of whether they frequently or infrequently disagreed with their party's position (see Table 5.5), it seems that in the case of disagreement, a larger proportion of national MPs than regional representatives can be counted on to vote according to the party's position out of loyalty. In other words, the mechanism is more important at the national level than it is at the regional level. This is in line with our hypothesis (H3), albeit that the difference between the levels of government is small (only 3 percentage points). The exceptions to this pattern are the United Kingdom and Germany, where the percentage of representatives who frequently disagree but do vote according to the party line out of loyalty is higher at the regional then at the national level, and Austria and Italy, where the percentages are the same for both levels of government.

Finally, the sequential decision-making model also reveals that party discipline plays a more important role at the national level than at the regional level, which is as we expected (H4). At the national level, 8 percent of the total number of MPs frequently disagree with the party, do not hold the opinion that an MP should vote with the party in the case of disagreement, and would like to see party discipline be applied less strictly when it comes to voting in parliament (which, according to our interpretation, implies that they are more likely to have experienced discipline in the past than representatives who are satisfied with party discipline as it is or answer that party discipline ought to be stricter). At the regional level, 3 percent of representatives fall into this category, and there is slightly less variance between countries. The pattern is generally consistent between countries (with the exception of Belgium and to lesser extent Spain, where the percentage of regional representatives who indicate to frequently disagree, to not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty, and to like to see discipline applied less strictly is higher at the regional level than at the national level).

17 percent of national MPs and 12 percent of regional representatives are still unaccounted for: they frequently disagree with the party, do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty in the case of disagreement, and do not seem to have been disciplined in the past, as they indicate that party discipline when it comes to voting in parliament can remain as it is, or should be even stricter. For some legislatures our findings are in line with previous studies on party group unity, such as in the case of the Swiss national parliament, where party voting unity has been found to be relatively lower than in other European national parliaments (see chapter 4). In general, however, our model would predict more dissent and less party group unity than is now the case in these parliaments (as far as we know). As explained before in chapter 4, party discipline may be underestimated by the model as a result of the formulation of the survey question, and we are unable to include cue-taking as a first decision-making stage for similar reasons. These two limitations of the model may, in part, explain the relatively high percentage of representatives who are currently unaccounted for.

In terms of our findings, we find few differences in terms of the number of generalists and specialists at the two levels of government, and regional representatives are unexpectedly more likely than national MPs to indicate that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the position of the party. Moreover, with the exception of party agreement, the differences we do find between the two levels of government are

not very large. One reason for this may the fact that many of the regional legislatures included in our analysis are much more similar to their national counterparts than we assumed. Indeed, in terms of size, some of the regional parliaments included in the PartiRep Survey represent rather large districts, and also have around 100 seats, which means that party groups are still likely to be quite large. In addition, quite a few of the regional parliaments also have RAI scores close to 20 (out of a maximum of 24, see footnote 13), meaning that these parliaments are likely to have quite broad jurisdictions and political authority, which require a certain level of professionalization. Indeed, for some of these regional parliaments, we know that their representatives are employed full-time and receive a good salary, which means that they are still very much dependent on the party for their livelihood and future careers, thus living 'off' politics (see, for example, Gunlicks' (2003, 252-260) study of the German Lander parliaments).[21] In addition, the comparison between the levels of government is confounded by the fact that in some countries, the subnational levels of government also have electoral and legislative institutions (which are held to influence MP decision making, and thus party group unity, see chapter 4) that are different from those at the national level.

Fortunately, we have data for one country, the Netherlands, where the electoral and legislative institutions at the national and subnational levels of government are very similar, and the questions from the PartiRep Survey were put to national, as well as both regional and local municipal councilors. By comparing these three levels, we increase the variation on the dependent variable, while keeping the institutional settings at the national and subnational levels of government relatively constant. The Netherlands is a decentralized unitary country, in which the decision-making powers at the subnational levels are much weaker than at the national level. The subnational parliaments, especially at the municipal level, are also much smaller than the regional parliaments studied above, entailing that party groups are also generally smaller as well. Moreover, we know that Dutch provincial and municipal councilors receive a fairly modest compensation for their council work, and that most engage in politics part-time, usually maintaining another job in order to sustain their livelihood (www.gemeenteraad.nl, 2014).

5.4 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils

As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6, party voting unity is, and always has been, very high in the Dutch Second Chamber. Little to no research has been done, however, on the voting behavior of representatives at the subnational levels of government in the Netherlands. Most provincial and municipal councils provide the council minutes and voting results on their websites, and since 2008 a number of municipal councils have

[21] Of the countries included in the PartiRep Survey, Swiss national MPs are not employed full-time (Power, 2012, 50).

also started collectively publishing their voting records online on the website 'how does my council vote?' (*wat stemt mijn raad?*). On the basis of a general overview of the figures presented on these websites, one can conclude that party voting unity is probably very high at the subnational level as well. Another source for municipal party voting unity is Van der Meij's (2013) analysis of municipal council voting in the city of Leiden. Van der Meij finds that in 99.59 percent of votes taken in the city council between 2006 and 2010, none of the councilors from the six largest parties dissented from (the majority of) their party group. Between 2010 and 2013 there was no dissent in 99.79 percent of votes. In a much older work dating back to the 1960s, Morlan (1964) highlights that even back then, party bloc voting was already the rule in Dutch municipalities.[22] Thus, although we have limited data on the subnational levels, it seems safe to assume that party group unity is quite high at all levels of government in the Netherlands.

The fact that many of the formal institutions that are deemed to influence party group unity are very similar at all three levels makes the Netherlands an ideal case for cross-level comparison. First, representatives at all three levels of government are elected through direct elections every four years, and at all levels the electoral system is one of Proportional Representation. However, whereas at the national level the fall of government may result in the dissolution of the Second Chamber and early elections, the electoral cycles at the subnational levels are fixed. If confidence in the executive branch is lost, parties renegotiate their coalition agreement, or a new coalition is formed consisting of a different combination of parties.

There are a total of 150 seats in the Second Chamber, and the number of seats to be distributed at the subnational levels varies between 39 and 55 in the 12 provincial councils, and between 9 and 45 seats in the municipal councils.[23] Just like at the national level, in provincial and municipal elections voters are presented with a ballot displaying lists of candidates as ordered by the political parties, and cast their vote for an individual candidate. The number of seats obtained by a party is determined by the total number of votes for a party's candidates in the entire province or municipality, and at the national level votes are pooled nation-wide. In order to obtain a seat on the basis of preference votes a candidate must cross the threshold of 25 percent of the electoral quota, or 50 percent at the municipal level if the number of seats in the council is less than 19 (as is the case in smaller municipalities). And even though they can only be elected via their political party's list, once in the legislative arena representatives at all three levels of government formally vote without a binding mandate (Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, article 67.3 and article 129.6) and are also under no legal obligation to give up their seat to their party if they are expelled, or voluntarily defect, from their party group.

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[22] Morlan (1964, 323-324) mentions that sometimes formal council voting did not even take place because the outcome was already known, as councilors had detailed information (presumable about the positions of all the political parties) before the council meetings.

[23] The number of municipalities in the Netherlands is consistently decreasing. During the municipal elections in 2011 there were 418 municipalities. The number of seats in the councils at the subnational level is based on population size.

Next, the implementation of the 2002 Local Government Act and 2003 Provincial Government Act led to the replacement of the old monistic system by one of strict dualism at the two subnational levels. This entails that at the municipal level the position of alderman (*wethouder*) cannot be combined with membership of the municipal council, and at the provincial level membership of the provincial government (*Gedeputeerde Staten*) is incompatible with that of the provincial council (Denters and Klok, 2005; De Groot, 2009, 431).[24] Thus, executive-legislative relations at the subnational levels of government today mirror those at the national level where the position of (junior) minister cannot be combined with that of MP. At all levels of government executive-legislative relations are dominated by political parties (see section 6.2 in chapter 6 for a discussion of the dominance of political parties in the Dutch Second Chamber). In her study on the implications of the Local Government Act, for example, De Groot (2009, 19-20) comments that one of the main complaints of the old monistic system was the application of party discipline by council aldermen. Denters (1993, 78) makes a similar observation, in that the monistic executive-legislative relations allowed for little debate in the municipal council because most policy had already been decided on beforehand by the coalition leadership. Although the new system of dualism could lead to a weakening of political parties' control over executive-legislative relations at the subnational levels, anecdotal evidence does not point in this direction (Korsten and Notten, 2005).

Finally, although formally a decentralized unitary system, the powers of the subnational levels of government are limited to such a degree that in the past the Netherlands was generally considered a unitary system (Toonen, 1990). According to the Dutch constitution, the provincial and municipal governments in the Netherlands can take on any competence as long as it does not violate national policy or constitutional bounds (article 124). In practice, the municipal, but especially the provincial level of government, has the power to act autonomously over only a relatively narrow set of policy areas and is to a large extent limited to the implementation and execution of legislation passed at the national level (this is referred to as co-administration or co-governance) (Korsten and Tops, 1998). The provincial level's jurisdiction mainly encompasses infrastructure and environmental policy. Municipalities share responsibility with the national and provincial governments for local land management, urban development, infrastructure, transportation, the economy, the environment, social affairs, welfare, employment and education (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014). The continuous processes of decentralization to the municipal level, of which the most recent include increased municipal responsibilities for certain social and welfare policy domains (such services for the disabled, youth policy, social assistance, and work and income), contribute to the debate as to whether the Netherlands ought to be considered a unitary system or a decentralized unitary system. What is important for our analysis, however, is that even when taking the processes of decentralization into account, the fact is that the jurisdictions and powers of the three levels of government vary considerable.[25]

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[24] Comparable changes also recently took place in the United Kingdom as well as a number of Scandinavian countries (Haus and Sweeting, 2006, 273).

[25] According to Hooghe et al. (2008, 271), in 2006 the Dutch provincial level obtains a RAI score of 8.0 on the

Table 5.13: PartiRep MP Survey response rates for the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils

	Population		Sample		Response			
	Legislatures	Seats			Started survey		Finished survey	
	N	N	n	%	n	%	n	%
National	1	150			63	42	62	41
Provincial*	12	564			139	25	112	20
Municipal**	418	9538	2000	21	513	26	407	20
Municipal level national parties' local branch					397	77	306	75
Municipal level local parties					116	23	101	25

* The provinces are Drenthe (41 seats), Flevoland (39 seats), Friesland (43 seats), Gelderland (55 seats), Groningen (43 seats), Limburg (47 seats), Noord-Brabant (55 seats), Noord-Holland (55 seats), Overijssel (47 seats), Utrecht (47 seats), Zeeland (39 seats) and Zuid Holland (55 seats).
** The municipalities selected for the sample are Graafstroom (13 seats), Oudewater (13 seats), Strijen (13 seats), Zoeterwoude (13 seats), Bedum (15 seats), Bernisse (15 seats), De Marne (15 seats), Hattem (15 seats), Littenseradiel (15 seats), Lopic (15 seats), Montfoort (15 seats), Opmeer (15 seats), Rijnwaarden), Simpelveld (15 seats), Texel (15 seats), Uitgeest (15 seats), Voerendaal (15 seats), Bladel (17 seats), Bodegraven (17 seats), Dantumadiel (17 seats), Enkhuizen (17 seats), Gennep (17 seats), Heeze-Leende (17 seats), Nuth (17 seats), Oirschot (17 seats), Slochteren (17 seats), Staphorst (17 seats), Vianen (17 seats), Weesp (17 seats), Zandvoort (17 seats), Dongeradeel (19 seats), Leerdam (19 seats), Maasdriel (19 seats), Aa en Hunze (21 seats), Borger-Odoorn (21 seats), Dalfsen (21 seats), Dinkelland (21 seats), Edam-Volendam (21 seats) Heemstede (21 seats), Kaag en Braasem (21 seats), Leusden (21 seats), Sint-Michielsgestel (21 seats), Stein (21 seats), Waddinxveen (21 seats), Winterswijk (21 seats), Boxtel (23 seats), Castricum (23 seats), Deurne (23 seats) Meppel (23 seats), Sneek (23 seats), Tytsjerksteradiel (23 seats), Gedrop-Mierlo (25 seats), Goes (25 seats), Heemskerk (25 seats), Hellendoorn (25 seats), Oud Ijsselstreek (25 seats), Steenwijkerland (27 seats), Zuidplas (27 seats), Zwijndrecht (27 seats), Berkelland (29 seats), Overbetuwe (29 seats), Pijnacker-Nootdorp (29 seats), Rijswijk (29 seats), Waalwijk (29 seats), Kampen (31 seats), Roermond (31 seats), Assen (33 seats), Leidschendam-Voorburg (35 seats), Lelystad (35 seats), Amstelveen (37 seats), Deventer (37 seats), Hengelo (27 seats), Apeldoorn (39 seats), Arnhem (39 seats), Amsterdam (45 seats) and Utrecht (45 seats).
Note: The Dutch extension of the 2010 PartiRep MP Survey to the provincial and municipal levels was also financed by the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office (BELSPO).

Our analysis of the decision-making mechanisms at the three levels government in the Netherlands relies on data that was also collected in the context of the PartiRep project.[26] As is shown in Table 5.13, 42 percent of representatives of the Dutch Second Chamber participated in face-to-face interviews in the spring of 2010. At the provincial and municipal level representatives were invited by e-mail to fill in a shorter internet

self-rule dimension (which ranges from zero to 15 points), and a 6.5 on the dimension of shared rule (which ranges from zero to nine points). The total RAI score obtained by the Dutch provinces is 14.5. The RAI score does not capture local government (Schakel, 2008, 149).

[26] Parts of the analyses in this section formed the basis for Van Vonno and Andeweg (2014).

version of survey, which was available online in December 2010 and January 2011.[27] At the provincial level all 564 councilors were approached, resulting in a response rate of around 25 percent, with 20 percent completing the survey. At the municipal level, a stratified cluster sample based on council size was drawn. For the purpose of stratification, municipal councils were divided into four categories based on their size: small (17 seats or less), medium-small (19 to 29 seats), medium-large (31 to 37 seats) and large (39 seats or more).[28] This yielded a response rate of about 26 percent, and a completion rate of 20 percent. As is often the case with lengthy Internet surveys, the attrition rate among provincial and municipal respondents is quite high (Crawford et al., 2001), despite the efforts that were made to shorten the web-based version of the survey.

At both the provincial and municipal level the distribution of respondents across the various local branches of national parties is very similar to the distributions found in the population of council members (not shown in Table 5.13). Furthermore, of the municipal councilors who completed the survey, three-quarters are members of local branches of national parties and the remaining 25 percent are members of parties that are only active at the municipal level.[29] These distributions are roughly equal to those found in the population of municipal councilors (Hendriks and Schaap, 2011). Finally, 58 percent of municipal respondents, and 67 percent of those at the provincial level, are members of governing parties. At the national level, only 38 percent is coded as such. (Only members of the *Christen-Democratisch Appèl* (CDA) and *ChristenUnie* (CU) are considered governing parties. Members of the *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA) are coded as being in opposition, because the PvdA had dropped out of the government a few weeks before the survey was scheduled to take place.)

5.4.1 Division of labor

Returning again to our first hypothesis, we expect that subnational representatives are less likely to engage in cue-taking than national MPs (H1). The argument is that as a result of the smaller size of legislatures and party groups, subnational party groups are less likely to apply a strict division of labor which requires specialization, and are more likely to recruit policy generalists. Generalists are more likely than specialists to have an opinion on a wider range of topics, and therefore less dependent on the voting advice given

[27] The data collection process among the members of the Second Chamber took take place in the months prior to elections in June 2010, which were held early as a result of the fall of the Balkenende IV government. The electoral cycle was also coming to an end at the provincial level at the time of the survey; the scheduled elections took place in March 2011, which was a few weeks after the survey was taken offline. Municipal council elections had taken place in March 2010, the same year the survey had been put online (December 2010).

[28] These categories are based on the size categories used by the Association of Dutch Municipalities (*Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten*, VNG) From each category 20 percent of municipalities were randomly selected. In the analyses below, differences at the municipal level that are related to council size are only mentioned if they are statistically significant.

[29] Of the 13 councilors representing provincial parties (i.e., parties that are only active at the provincial level) at the time of the survey, only 1 participated; this respondent is excluded from the analysis.

Table 5.14: Specialist or generalist in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

	Generalist	Specialist	Total	Total (n)
National	62	38	100	58
Provincial	62	39	101	136
Municipal	70	30	100	500

χ^2 (2) = 5.281, sig. = .071; φc = .087, sig. = .071

Municipal councils only: council size

	Generalist	Specialist	Total	Total (n)
Large	56	44	100	77
Medium-large	68	32	100	78
Medium-small	73	27	100	227
Small	76	24	100	118

χ^2 (3) = 10.816, sig. = .013; φc = .147, sig. = .013

to them by other party group members. As mentioned above, the Dutch Second Chamber consists of 150 seats, which is the same number as the smallest national parliament included in the international-comparative analysis above (Belgium). The size of the 12 Dutch provincial councils varies between 39 and 55 seats, and municipal councils in the Netherlands have between 9 to 45 seats, which means that the subnational councils are between 3 and 17 times as small as the national parliament. The number of seats in the Dutch provincial and municipal councils is also well below the average number of seats in the regional parliaments included in the international-comparative analysis (86 seats). Moreover, the policy-making jurisdictions of the two subnational levels of government in the Netherlands are quite narrow, especially when compared to the powers of the some of the regional parliaments included in the international-comparative analysis above.

In our international-comparative analysis of the nine national legislatures and their regional counterparts, there was hardly any difference between the levels of government in terms of the percentage of representatives who consider themselves specialists and those who conceive of themselves as generalists. In fact, specialists were in the majority at both levels of government (see Table 5.2). In the Netherlands, however, generalists are in the majority at all three levels of government, and at the municipal level the percentage of generalists is almost 10 percentage point higher than at the other two levels of government, which is in line with our hypothesis (see Table 5.14). If we focus on the municipal level only, the percentage of generalists increases as the number of seats in a municipal council decreases, reaching 76 percent in the smallest municipal

Table 5.15: 'The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party's position on his topic' in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

	(Mostly) false	Neither	(Mostly) true	Total	Total (n)
National	19	21	60	100	63
Provincial	21	25	54	100	135
Municipal	32	20	48	100	499

χ^2 (4) = 10.545, sig. = .032; φc = .087, sig.=.032; gamma = -.185, sig. = .004

councils, which is 20 percentage points more than in the largest municipal councils (see the bottom half of Table 5.14). Thus even at the municipal level itself, the smaller the council, the more likely representatives are to consider themselves generalists.

When it comes to whether the party group spokesperson determines the party's position on his topic, which is used as a means of gauging the division of labor which is likely to spur cue-taking, we found few differences between the national and regional legislatures in the nine countries analyzed above; the majority at both levels of government considered the statement (mostly) true, and contrary to our expectations, this percentage was slightly higher at the regional level than at the national level (see Table 5.3). In the Netherlands, most representatives at all levels also consider it to be (mostly) true that the party group spokesperson determines the position of the party on his topic (see Table 5.15). However, there percentage of representatives who consider the statement (mostly) true decreases with the level of government, and the percentage of representatives who answer (mostly) false increases as we move down the ladder of government levels: whereas 19 percent of national MPs consider the statement (mostly) false, 21 percent of provincial and 32 percent of municipal councils think so.[30] These results point in the direction that subnational representatives are less likely to engage in cue-taking than national MPs, thus corroborating our hypothesis.

The Dutch version of the PartiRep Survey also included an additional question that may help us further assess the importance of the party specialists, and thus the role of cue-taking, in determining party group unity at the three levels of government. We asked representatives what they consider to be the main decision-making center in their parliamentary party group (see Table 5.16).[31] Whereas 61 percent of the respondents from

[30] At the municipal level, 61 percent of councilors from the largest municipalities (39 seats or more) consider the statement that the party group spokesperson determines the position of the party on his topic (mostly) true. The percentage of councilors from the smaller municipalities who considers the statement (mostly) true varies between 40 and 47 percent. The pattern is not perfectly linear and not statistically significant, however (χ^2 *(6) = 16.136, sig. = .013; φc = .127, sig.= .013; gamma = -.058, sig. = .313*).

[31] The question that asks respondents to identify the main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group was taken from the earlier 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Studies.

Table 5.16: The main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

	Meeting	Committee	Specialist	Leadership	Total	Total (n)
National	61	20	13	7	101	56
Provincial	73	11	12	5	101	112
Municipal	86	5	6	3	101	408

χ^2 (6) = 29.590, sig. = .000; φc = .160, sig. = .000

the Second Chamber consider the party group's meeting to be the main decision-making center, this percentage is significantly higher at the two subnational level: respectively 74 percent at the provincial level and 86 percent at the municipal level.[32] At the national level, 33 percent of MPs select either the party group committees or specialists as the party group's main decision-making center, as opposed to 23 percent of provincial councilors and only 11 percent of municipal councilors. This provides some evidence for the argument that party groups at the higher levels of government are likely to apply a stricter division of labor than at the lower levels of government.

5.4.2 Party agreement

As we expected (H2), our international-comparative analysis of nine multilevel countries revealed that although the majority of representatives at both the national and regional level indicate to infrequently disagree with the party's position, regional representatives are more likely to do so than national MPs (see Table 5.4). The pattern in the Netherlands is the same: the majority of respondents at all levels of government indicate to disagree infrequently with the party's position, and thus at all levels parties can to a great extent rely on party agreement for the unity of their party group. In line with our hypothesis, provincial and municipal councilors are more likely to disagree infrequently than national MPs (see Table 5.17). The difference between the Dutch levels of government is not very large and it is not statistically significant, however.

At all levels of Dutch government, the percentage of representatives who disagree infrequently with the party is higher than the aggregate percentages of national and regional representatives in the nine multilevel countries. Whereas in the Dutch case 71 percent of national MPs disagree infrequently (answering that they either disagree only

[32] Although the percentage of councilors who consider the party group meeting the most important decision-making center increases as the size of the municipal council decreases, the differences between municipal councilors from different sized councils are not statistically significant (*χ^2 (9) = 6.762, sig. = .662; φc = .074, sig.=.662*). Noteworthy, however, is that the percentage of representatives who consider the party group specialist the most important decision-making center is twice as high in largest municipal councils (12 percent) then it is in the smaller municipal councils (between 5 and 6 percent).

once a year or (almost) never), only 58 percent of all national respondents combined from the international-comparative analysis do so (a difference of 13 percentage points). At the subnational level in the Netherlands, 84 percent of provincial councilors, and 81 percent of municipal councilors infrequently disagree, in comparison to 70 percent of all regional representatives combined (a difference of 14 and 11 percentage points, respectively). Most of these percentage differences are owed to a higher percentage of Dutch representatives answering that they (almost) never disagree with the party's position, however. In other words, party agreement is generally higher at all levels of government in the Netherlands than it is in the international-comparative survey, but the relative difference between the levels of government is about the same in both analyses. Thus, it does not seem to be the case that increasing our variance on the independent variable (legislature size) has an effect on party agreement; the effect seems to be related to country context.

On the other hand, if we zoom in on the municipal level itself, we see that councilors from the largest municipalities (37 seats or more) are more likely to frequently disagree with the party's position (11 percent indicate that this occurs about once a month, and 24 percent answer that it occurs about once every three months) than councilors from the smaller municipalities (in the smallest municipalities with 17 seats or fewer, for example, 7 percent disagree with the party's position about once a month, and 8 percent do so about once every three months, see the bottom half of Table 5.17). Noteworthy is also the difference in the percentage of municipal councilors who (almost) never disagree: in the largest municipalities 28 percent indicate to do so, whereas in the smaller municipalities between 44 and 52 percent answers that they (almost) never disagree. Therefore, at the municipal level itself, council size seems to have an effect on party agreement.

We hypothesized in subsection 5.2.2 that party agreement would be stronger at the subnational level than at the national level because subnational representatives are more likely to be involved in determining the position of their party in the first place, as party groups are more likely to be smaller at the subnational level of government, and small groups are more likely to engage in consensus and unanimous decision making. The fact that the percentage of representatives who consider the party meeting the main decision-making center of the party group increases as we move down the ladder of government levels already provides some evidence for this expectation Table 5.16). In the Dutch version of the PartiRep Survey, we also asked respondents directly whether they feel involved in the decision making in the party group.[33] Although at all levels of government very few representations indicate to feel (completely) uninvolved in party group decision making, the percentage of representatives who select the extreme answering category 'completely involved' increases by over 20 percentage points as we move from the national to the provincial to the municipal level (see the figures in the

[33] The question that asks respondents whether they feel involved the decisions in the party group, was inspired by the battery of questions included in the 2007 survey that Russell (2012) put to the British House of Lords for her analysis of party unity in what could be considered a discipline-free environment.

Table 5.17: Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party's position on a vote in parliament) in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

	Frequently disagree		Infrequently disagree			
	Once a month	Every three months	Once a year	(Almost) never	Total	Total (n)
National	7	22	33	38	100	60
Provincial	2	15	34	50	101	137
Municipal	5	14	36	45	100	498

χ^2 (6) = 7.798, sig. = .253; φc = .075, sig. = .253 (four answering categories)
χ^2 (2) = 3.922, sig. = .141; φc = .075, sig. = .141 (four answering categories collapsed into 'frequently disagree' and 'infrequently disagree')

Municipal councils only: council size

	Frequently disagree		Infrequently disagree			
	Once a month	Every three months	Once a year	(Almost) never	Total	Total (n)
Large	11	24	37	28	100	75
Medium-large	3	12	42	44	101	78
Medium-small	3	14	35	49	101	227
Small	7	8	34	52	101	118

χ^2 (6) = 25.206, sig. = .003; φc = .130, sig.=.003 (four answering categories)
χ^2 (3) = 15.796, sig. = .001; φc = .178, sig. = .001 (four answering categories collapsed into 'frequently disagree' and 'infrequently disagree')

column 'all' in Table 5.18).[34]

Table 5.18 also shows the relationship between representatives' answers to the question about their involvement in party group decision making cross-tabulated with their

[34] For the previously presented tables that included 5-point ordinal scale answering categories, the extremes of the scales were collapsed for presentation purposes. However, because for the question whether representatives feel involved in the decision making in the party group the answering patterns are heavily skewed towards 'agree' and 'completely agree', the extremes 'completely disagree' and 'disagree' and combined with the middle category 'neither'. We assume that a respondent's agreement with the statement reflects the extent to which he indeed personally feels involved in the decision making in the party group. Therefore, for the sake of presentation, we renamed the answering categories to reflect the extent of involvement: the answering category 'completely agree' is labeled 'completely involved', 'agree' is renamed 'involved', and the combination category of '(completely) disagree / neither' is now '(completely) uninvolved / neutral' (see Table 5.18).

Table 5.18: Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party's position on a vote in parliament) and 'I feel involved in the decision making in the party group' in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

		All	Frequently disagree	Infrequently disagree	Total	Total (n)
National	(Completely) uninvolved / neutral	3	50	50	100	2
	Mostly involved	48	32	68	100	28
	Completely involved	49	24	46	100	29
	Total	100				
	Total (n)	61				

χ^2 (2) = .898, sig. = .638; φc = .123, sig. = .638

		All	Frequently disagree	Infrequently disagree	Total	Total (n)
Provincial	(Completely) uninvolved / neutral	4	60	40	100	5
	Mostly involved	37	33	67	100	42
	Completely involved	58	6	94	100	66
	Total	99				
	Total (n)	113				

χ^2 (2) = 18.548, sig. = .000; φc = .405, sig. = .000

		All	Frequently disagree	Infrequently disagree	Total	Total (n)
Municipal	(Completely) uninvolved / neutral	2	67	33	100	6
	Mostly involved	27	28	72	100	109
	Completely involved	72	13	87	100	290
	Total	100				
	Total (n)	407				

χ^2 (2) = 21.476, sig. = .000; φc = .230, sig. = .000

χ^2 (2) = 38.145 sig. = .000; φc = .257, sig. = .000

(Frequency of disagreement & I feel involved in the decision making in the party group & government level)

χ^2 (4) = 18.402, sig. = .001; φc = .178, sig. = .001; gamma = .327, sig. = .000

(I feel involved in the decision making in the party group & government level)

Note: The number of respondents in the last two columns may not add up to the total number of respondents included in the first column ('All') because the latter two columns only include respondents who answered both questions.

self-indicated frequency of disagreement.[35] At all levels of government, party agreement increases as representatives feel more involved in the decision-making process in the party group. The relationship is, however, much stronger at the two subnational levels of government than at the national level. Thus, it may indeed be the case that party agreement at the subnational level is more likely to result from councilors' involvement in determining the position of their party in the first place.

5.4.3 Party loyalty

Moving on to the next decision-making mechanism, we saw in our international-comparative analysis that regional representatives are actually more likely than national MPs to answer that in the case of disagreement with the party's position, an MP ought to vote according to the party's position (see Table 5.5), which was not in line with our hypothesis (H3). However, when in our sequential decision-making model we excluded representatives who indicate to frequently agree with the party, party loyalty was more important at the national level, albeit only slightly so (see Table 5.12).

In the Netherlands, however, the pattern is as we expected: whereas at the national level 86 percent of MPs indicate to vote according to the party's position in the case of disagreement,[36] this percentage drops to 57 percent at the provincial level, and only 40 percent at the municipal level (see Table 5.19).[37] The norm of party loyalty seems to have a much stronger footing among national MPs than among subnational councilors, especially those at the municipal level. At the municipal level, we see that councilors from the largest municipal councils (37 seats or more) are most likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty (see the bottom half of Table 5.19); this may be explained by the fact that the largest city councils in the Netherlands tend to be more strongly politicized along party lines than those in smaller municipalities.[38]

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[35] The answering categories are again dichotomized into 'frequently disagree' and 'infrequently disagree'.

[36] As already mentioned in footnote 17, almost 30 percent of Dutch national MPs refused to answer the question (also see Table 6.18 in chapter 6).

[37] Another finding worth mentioning is the difference between the levels of government when looking at representatives whose parties partake in government. First, at all levels of government the percentage of representatives who subscribe to the norm of party loyalty in the case of disagreement with their party is higher for government representatives than it is for those in opposition (χ^2 *(1) = 10.009, sig. = .002;* φc *= .123, sig. = .002)* . However, whereas 80 percent of national MPs who belong to governing parties indicate to vote according to the party's position in the case of disagreement, only 46 percent of provincial, and 52 percent of municipal government representatives agree. This difference may be explained by the fact that while at the national level, disunity within governing parties carries the risk of the fall of the cabinet after which early elections (usually) take place, at the subnational levels this is not the case because the electoral cycles are set (although this does not exclude the possibility that the a new coalition consisting of a different combination of parties can be formed). As mentioned before, however, the PvdA is coded as an opposition party because it had left the coalition at the time of the survey. We cannot be sure, however, if the members of the PvdA who participated in the survey answered the survey questions based on their then-current position in the opposition, or their experience as members of a governing party. If the latter is the case, this may influence the results.

[38] At the municipal level, councilors who belong to the local branch of a national party are more likely to vote

Table 5.19: Party loyalty (own opinion versus party's position) in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

	Own opinion	Party's position	Total	Total (n)
National	14	86	100	43
Provincial	43	57	100	134
Municipal	60	40	100	492

χ^2 *(2) = 40.918, sig. = .000;* φc *= .247, sig. = .000*

Municipal councils only: council size

	Own opinion	Party's position	Total	Total (n)
Large	47	53	100	74
Medium-large	68	33	101	77
Medium-small	62	38	100	225
Small	79	41	100	116

χ^2 *(3) = 17.348, sig. = .062;* φc *= .122, sig. = .062*

Competing principals

According to the theory of competing principals, representatives' decision to vote according to their own opinion in the case of conflict with the party group's position may be the result of their loyalty to their voters. In other words, a representative may indicate to vote according to his own opinion instead of the position of the party because his own opinion is informed by the position of his voters (which is at odds with the position of the party group), and he wishes to remain loyal to his voters. In our international-comparative analysis, we looked more closely into the question of voters as competing principals, by including representatives' opinions on how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagreement between his voter's opinion and the party's position. At both levels of government around 60 percent of representatives indicate to vote according to the party's position instead of the voters' opinion, and there are no statistically significant differences between the levels (see Table 5.6), indicating that in general, and contrary to our expectations, regional representatives do not pay more heed to the voters than national MPs do. Moreover, although at both levels the majority of those who answer that the voters' opinion trumps the party's position also think that an MP ought to vote according to his own opinion when in conflict with the party's position (which is likely to mean that these representatives are indeed influenced by voters' as competing princi-

according to the party's opinion in the case of disagreement (43 percent) than councils who belong to parties that are only active at the municipal level (31 percent) (χ^2 *(1) = 4.667, sig. = .031;* φ *= .097, sig.=.031).*

pals), the percentage is (slightly) lower at the regional level.

In the Netherlands, however, we expect larger differences between the levels of government, especially between the municipal level and the two higher levels of government. In their study of the 2010 municipal elections, Boogers et al. (2010) find that the average percentage of preference votes cast for a candidate other than the party leader ranged from 35 to 63 percent,[39] which is much higher than the 16 percent cast in the Second Chamber elections in that same year (Van Holsteyn and Andeweg, 2012). The fact that voters are more likely to cast preference votes during municipal elections may mean that municipal councilors are more likely to be loyal to their voters who act as competing principals to the political party. Little is known about voters' use of preference votes during provincial elections, but considering that turnout for these elections is quite low,[40] and that one of the main complaints is the provincial level's disconnect from citizens, it is probable that voters are less likely to cast preference votes at provincial elections then they are at national and municipal elections. Provincial councilors are thus expected to experience less of a pull away from the party group by their voters than municipal councilors.

Indeed, the percentage of representatives at the municipal level (36 percent) who indicate to opt for their voters' opinion instead of the party's position is higher than at the provincial (22 percent) and national level (8 percent) (see the column labeled 'All' in Table 5.20).[41, 42] Although the percentage differences between the levels are larger than those found in the international-comparative analysis (see Table 5.6), with the maximum of 36 percent at the municipal level, the influence of voters' as competing principals to the party does not seem to be very strong at any level of government in the Nether-

[39] One should keep in mind, however, that only seven municipalities were included in Boogers et al.'s (2010) study (Almere, Delfzijl, Den Haag, Maassluis, Deurne, Tilburg and Dinkelland).

[40] The turnout for the 2007 provincial elections was 46 percent. This is 8 percentage points lower than the turnout for the 2010 municipal elections (54 percent) and 29 percentage points lower than the turnout for the 2012 elections for the Second Chamber (75 percent). All three elections mentioned directly precede the data collection for the PartiRep Survey. Van Tilburg (1991, 164) ascribes the low turnout for the provincial elections to voters' lack of knowledge about the responsibilities and powers of the provincial government. This is in line with the findings by Van der Eijk and Schild (1992, 94-95), who show that voters generally consider institutions at the provincial level far less important than at the national level, and Hendriks and Tops (2003, 302), who contend that "[p]rovincial government, forming the other level of subnational government, is significantly less important than local government in terms of the citizen–government interface [...]. In comparison, provincial government is more abstractly government oriented, while local government, with its prominent role in policy-implementation and service provision, is more concretely citizen oriented".

[41] At the municipal level, 31 percent of councilors from the largest municipalities (39 seats or more) answer that an MP ought to vote according to the voters' opinion in the case of conflict with the party's position, whereas 46 percent of councilors from the smallest municipalities answer that an MP ought to adhere to the voters' opinion. The pattern is not perfectly linear for councilors from medium-sized councils, however (χ^2 *(3) = 7.943, sig. = .047;* φc *= .132, sig.=.047*).

[42] Of all Dutch respondents, 25 percent of government respondents, and 37 percent of those in opposition, indicate to choose the opinion their voters' over the position of their party (χ^2 *(1) = 11.347, sig. = .001;* φ *= .135, sig.= .001).* If we only look at representatives whose parties are in government, only 6 percent of national MPs opt for their voters' opinion, while 18 percent of provincial councilors do so, and 25 percent of municipal councilors do.

Table 5.20: Party loyalty (own opinion versus party's position) and competing principals (voters' opinion versus party's position) in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

		All	Own opinion	Party's position	Total	Total (n)
National	Voters' opinion	8	33	67	100	3
	Party's position	92	6	94	101	33
	Total	100				
	Total (n)	48				

χ^2 (1) = 2.678, sig. = .102; φ = .273, sig. = .102

		All	Own opinion	Party's position	Total	Total (n)
Provincial	Voters' opinion	22	74	26	100	27
	Party's position	78	34	66	100	100
	Total	100				
	Total (n)	129				

χ^2 (1) = 13.969, sig. = .000; φ = .332, sig. = .000

		All	Own opinion	Party's position	Total	Total (n)
Municipal	Voters' opinion	36	74	26	100	160
	Party's position	64	34	66	100	294
	Total	100				
	Total (n)	459				

χ^2 (2) = 22.769, sig. = .000; φ = .224, sig. = .000

χ^2 (1) = 47.161 sig. = .000; φ = .276, sig. = .000

Party loyalty (own opinion versus party's position) & competing principals (voter's opinion versus party's position) & government levels

χ^2 (2) = 21.203, sig. = .000; φc = .183, sig. = .000

Competing principals (voter's opinion versus party's position) & government levels

Note: The total number of respondents in the last column do not add up to the total number of respondents included in the first column ('All') because the total in the last column only include respondents who answered both questions.

lands. However, at both the provincial and municipal level of government, councilors who would vote according to voters' opinion in the case of conflict with the party's position, are also more likely to vote to follow their own opinion when in disagreement with the party (74 percent at both levels). In other words, there is some evidence that at the lower levels of government, councilors who vote according to their own opinion in the case of disagreement with the party's position, may do so because their own opinion is informed by the voters' opinion, and thus their loyalty to the party is diffused by voters' acting as competing principals.

Party group solidarity and representatives' internalization of norms of party unity

The sociological approach to party group unity and its determinants highlights parties' (leaders') efforts to create an environment which fosters party group solidarity and voluntary party-oriented behavior (Crowe, 1983; Hazan, 2003). Again, the Dutch version of the PartiRep Survey allows us to delve deeper into whether representatives actually experience a strong sense of solidarity in the party group.[43] The expectation is that national MPs are more likely to perceive a strong sense of solidarity in the party group than at the subnational councils are, as the higher level of intra-party competition at the national level allows parties to apply a stricter candidate selection procedure, of which previous party experience and the internalization of the norm of party group loyalty (often obtained through previous party experience) are likely to be important criteria. Moreover, the fact that the decision-making powers of the national level are much stronger than those of the subnational levels, also entails that there is more at stake, which could also contribute to party group members' voluntary subscription to the norm of party group loyalty, and thus MPs' perception of a stronger sense of solidarity in their party group.

Table 5.21 shows that the majority of representatives at all levels report such a sense of solidarity, but whereas almost 80 percent of representatives at both the national and municipal level (completely) agree that there is a strong sense of solidarity in their party group, only 60 percent of provincial councilors (complete) agree.[44] Noteworthy is also that the percentage of provincial councilors who (completely) disagree (16 percent) is quite a bit higher than at the other levels of government (respectively 5 and 6 percent). This may be caused by the fact that provincial party groups generally meet less often than groups at the other levels of government in the Netherlands, which to a certain extent may limit the party group leaders' ability to build and foster a strong feeling of solidarity. Also, the relatively small size of councils and party groups at the municipal level, and resultant high level of involvement of individual representatives in party group decision making (see Table 5.18), could explain why the percentage of municipal councilors who

[43] The Dutch formulation of the question is: *'Er heerst een sterk gevoel van saamhorigheid in de fractie'* (translation CvV). *Saamhorigheid* can be translated into solidarity or unity in English.

[44] For presentation purposes the extremes of answering categories of the question as to whether there is a strong feeling of party unity in the party group are combined: 'completely disagree' and 'disagree' are collapsed into one category, as are 'completely agree' and 'agree'.

Table 5.21: 'There is a strong feeling of unity in the party group' in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

	(Completely) disagree	Neither	(Completely) agree	Total	Total (n)
National	5	16	79	100	61
Provincial	16	24	60	100	113
Municipal	6	16	79	101	405

χ^2 (4) = 19.769, sig. = .001; φc = .131, sig.= .001; gamma = .218, sig. = .011

Table 5.22: 'An individual representative's freedom or party unity' in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

	Individual's freedom	←	↔	→	Party unity	Total	Total (n)
National	2	0	16	51	31	100	61
Provincial	3	15	16	44	21	99	117
Municipal	5	14	29	39	12	99	416

χ^2 (8) = 35.689, sig. = .000; φc = .245, sig.= .000; gamma =-.328, sig. = .000

agree with the statement is quite high.[45]

Although representatives may observe a strong feeling of solidarity in their party group, in order for an individual representative's behavior to actually be driven by norms of loyalty, these must be internalized. As indicator of this internalization, we use a question that was included in the Dutch version of the survey which asked representatives to indicate what they consider more important: an individual representative's freedom or the unity of the party. At all levels of government the majority of representatives opt for party unity (see Table 5.22).[46] There are, however, significant differences between the government levels when it comes to the distribution of responses along the scale. Whereas 82 percent of national level MPs place a high value on party unity (selecting a 4 or a 5 on the 5-point scale), this figure drops to 65 percent among provincial, and 51 percent among municipal councilors. Although at all levels very few representatives place

[45] The difference between government and opposition MPs and their reactions to the statement that there is a strong sense of unity in the party group is only statistically significant at the national level, where 95 percent of MPs from governing parties (completely) agree, in comparison to only 68 percent of opposition MPs (*χ^2 (2) = 7.032, sig. = .030; φc = .340, sig.=.030).*

[46] Because collapsing the 5-point scale into a 3-point scale would hide some interesting differences between the levels of government, the original 5-point ordinal answering scale is kept intact for the choice between a representative's individual freedom and the unity of the party.

a high value on an individual representative's freedom, the relatively high percentage of subnational representatives who place themselves towards the middle of the scale indicates that these subnational councilors, especially at the municipal level, tend to opt for more of a balance between a representative's freedom and party unity. This implies that the internalization of the norms of party loyalty is indeed probably weaker at the subnational levels than it is at the national level in the Netherlands.

Party group decision-making rules

Besides a general feeling of party group solidarity, and an individual's internalization of the importance of party group unity, there may also be situations in which representatives consider voting with the party group in the case of disagreement with the party 'appropriate', depending on the origins of the party group's position and on how widely the position of the party is shared by the other members of the party group. In the Dutch version of the PartiRep Survey, we presented respondents with a number of these potential situations, and asked them whether an MP who disagrees with the party position on a vote in parliament still ought to vote according to the party's position.[47] As we found party loyalty to be stronger at the national level than at the subnational level, we also expect that subscription to these (informal) decision-making rules will be stronger among national MPs than subnational representatives.

First, majoritarian and consensus decision-making rules seem to be quite important at all levels of government (see Table 5.23). About half of national MPs agree that when the majority or all of the members of the party group (excluding the representative himself) share the opinion of the party, this constitutes a good reason to vote with the party despite disagreement. In line with our expectations, provincial and municipal councilors are less sensitive to majority and consensus decision-making rules, although still over a third of councilors at both levels do think these are good reasons to opt to vote with the party's position when in disagreement.

In our sequential decision-making model, we assume that in order to deal with the workload of parliament parties apply a division of labor, and that representatives engage in cue-taking when they do not have a personal opinion on a particular topic. One could argue, however, that it be considered appropriate behavior to follow the voting advice of the party group specialist and/or spokesperson not only when representatives lack an opinion, but also when they disagree with the party's position. Although the percentage of national MPs who consider following the voting advice of the party group specialist in the case of disagreement with the party's position appropriate behavior is not very high (16 percent), it is still twice as high as at both subnational levels. There are even larger differences between the levels when the party's position originated with the party group leadership: 19 percent of national MPs consider this a good reason to vote with

[47] The survey described four situations, and respondents were given the option to answer either yes or no. Respondents were also allowed to fill in other reasons that would lead one to vote according to the party line despite disagreement (open-ended question). At all levels, the party manifesto or the coalition agreement as the origin of the party's position were mentioned by many representatives as reasons to vote with the political party even when in disagreement.

Table 5.23: Situations in which an MP who disagrees with the party's position on a vote in parliament still ought to vote according to the party's position in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (% who answer affirmatively)

	National	Provincial	Municipal
When the entire party group (excluding the MP himself) shares the party's position *χ^2 (2) = 2.146, sig. = .342; φc = .056, sig. = .342*	45	39	36
When a majority of the party group shares the party's position *χ^2 (2) = 9.960, sig. = .007; φc = .121, sig. = .007*	50	37	31
When the party's position originated with the party group committee or specialist *χ^2 (2) = 4.054, sig. = .132; φc = .077, sig. = .132*	16	8	8
When the party's position originated with the party group leadership *χ^2 (2) = 25.046, sig. = .000; φc = .191, sig. = .000*	19	4	4

the party despite their disagreement, whereas only 4 percent of subnational councilors agree. In line with our expectations, party loyalty and other norms of party-oriented behavior do indeed seem to play a stronger role in the Dutch Second Chamber than in the subnational councils.

5.4.4 Party discipline

Satisfaction with party discipline

When it comes to party discipline, the initial results of the international-comparative analysis do not support our expectation that party discipline would be used less often at the subnational level (H4): at both the national and regional level, the vast majority of representatives are satisfied with general party discipline, and at both levels only 10 percent would like to see general discipline be applied less strictly (see Table 5.7). Once placed in our sequential decision-making model, however, party discipline does play a stronger role at the national level than at the regional level (see Table 5.12).

In the Netherlands, representatives at all level seem comparatively more content with how general party discipline is applied than the representatives in our international-comparative analysis, as at all levels of government the percentage of respondents who answer that party discipline should remain as it is, is higher. The differences between the levels are not very large either, but the percentage of municipal councilors who prefer less strict general party discipline (4 percent) is lower than at both the provincial (10 percent) and national level (8 percent) (see Table 5.24).[48] This is (in part) in line with

[48] At the municipal level, 14 percent of councilors from large councils (37 seats or more) hold the opinion that

Table 5.24: Satisfaction with general & specific aspects of parliamentary party discipline in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

General party discipline

	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
National	12	80	8	100	61
Provincial	11	80	10	100	113
Municipal	8	88	4	100	407

χ^2 (4) = 8.621, sig. = .071; φc = .086, sig.=.071; gamma = -.054, sig. = .635

Sticking to the parliamentary party line in votes

	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
National	0	95	5	100	61
Provincial	5	84	12	100	111
Municipal	2	92	5	100	409

χ^2 (4) = 9.631, sig. = .047; φc = .091, sig.= .047; gamma = -.154, sig. = .239

Taking political initiatives only with the parliamentary party's authorization

	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
National	7	87	7	100	61
Provincial	6	87	6	100	111
Municipal	8	87	5	100	408

χ^2 (4) = .687, sig. = .953; φc = .024, sig.=.953; gamma = -.097, sig. = .417

Keeping internal party discussions confidential

	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
National	25	75	0	100	61
Provincial	5	96	0	100	112
Municipal	6	94	1	100	409

χ^2 (4) = 30.422, sig. = .000; φc = .162, sig.=.000; gamma = .440, sig. = .007

Keeping position in committee in tune with party position

	More strict	Remain as it is	Less strict	Total	Total (n)
National	12	84	5	100	61
Provincial	13	82	5	100	112
Municipal	10	88	2	100	403

χ^2 (4) = 4.987, sig. = .289; φc = .066, sig.=.289; gamma = -.043, sig. = .712

our hypothesis that sanctions are less effective, and therefore applied less often, at the lower levels of governments.

Dutch representatives are also overwhelmingly more satisfied with party discipline when it comes to more specific aspects of the party life than the representatives in our international-comparative analysis (see Table 5.24), but in most cases the differences between the levels are again not very large; for most of these specific aspects the percentage of representatives who would like to see discipline applied less strictly is only a few percentage points lower at the subnational levels than at the national level. There is a difference between the levels when it comes party discipline when voting in parliament: the percentage of provincial representatives who would like to see less strict party discipline is over twice as high as at the national and municipal level,[49] which seems to imply that voting disciplining occurs most often at the provincial level in the Netherlands.

Another aspect for which there is a noteworthy difference between the levels of government in representatives' evaluation of party discipline regards keeping internal party discussions confidential. A quarter of national MPs feel that party discipline ought to be more strict, in comparison to respectively only 4 percent of provincial councilors, and 6 percent of municipal councilors. Moreover, when asked whether confidential party discussions usually find their way to the media in the day-to-day practice of parliament (see Table 5.11), 13 percent of national Dutch MPs agree (see Table 5.25). The percentage of subnational councilors who consider the statement (mostly) true is much lower at (only 1 percent of provincial and 3 percent of municipal councilors). Thus, whereas the regional representatives in the international-comparative analysis appear unnecessarily concerned with party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential (see Table 5.10 and Table 5.11), this concern does not seem to be present at the Dutch subnational level.

Likelihood of negative sanctions

Although it is difficult to observe (the threat and/or application of) sanctions, in the Dutch version of the PartiRep Survey we did ask representatives how likely sanctions are when a representative repeatedly does not vote according to the party line. This may give us some insight into which types of negative sanctions are actually applied by party (group) leaders to get their representatives to fall in line. Sanctions can vary in terms of their severity, their visibility to those outside the party group, and the extent to which they can be applied immediately (see Table 5.26) or are delayed until the next elections (Table 5.27). As we hypothesize that discipline is less effective, and therefore used less often, at the subnational level than at the national level, we also expect that subnational

general party discipline ought to be less strict. In the smaller municipalities, the percentage ranges from 1 to 6 percent (χ^2 *(6) = 22.600, sig. = .001; φc = .167, sig.= .001; gamma = -.278, sig. = .028).*

[49] There are no differences between differently sized councils for any of the specific aspects of party discipline, with the exception of when it comes to voting with the party in the council. 12 percent of councilors from the largest councils (37 seats or more) would like to see stricter party discipline. For the other councils this percentages ranges between 0 and 6 percent (χ^2 (6) = 11.603, sig. = .071; ϕc = .119, sig. = .017; gamma = -.128, sig. = .071).

Table 5.25: 'Confidential party discussions usually find their way to the media' in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

	(Mostly) false	Neither	(Mostly) true	Total	Total (n)
National	71	16	13	100	63
Provincial	93	5	2	100	137
Municipal	91	6	3	100	500

χ^2 (4) = 30.163, sig. = .000; φc = .147, sig.=.000; gamma = -.289, sig. = .029

representative will also consider the application of specific types of sanctions less likely than national MPs.

When it comes to punishing a representative who repeatedly does not toe the party line by removing him as a party group spokesperson (a reasonably severe, public sanction that can be applied by the party group leadership without much delay), the differences between the levels of government are as predicted.[50] The percentage of representatives who consider this a (very) likely consequence of voting dissent decreases as we move down the ladder of government levels, and the percentage of who consider this a (very) unlikely sanction increases.[51] We also asked respondents whether a rebellious representative will have trouble finding support for his own political initiatives among the other members of his party group.[52] This sanction can take place quite covertly within the boundaries of the party group, which minimizes the chance of negative con-

[50] Removing someone as a party group spokesperson or expelling him from the party (group), are not only, or even primarily, used as sanctions when a representative dissents from the party line in voting, but also if party group unity is breached in other ways. Recent examples from the Dutch national parliament include the removal of parliamentary party spokesperson Paul Tang (PvdA, finance), who leaked the budget figures (*Miljoenennota*) to the media in 2009. Rita Verdonk (VVD), who had received more preference votes than party leader Mark Rutte in the 2006 national election, was expelled from her party in 2007 for publicly criticizing both Rutte's leadership as well the party's policy position on specific issues. In 2013, Louis Bontes (PVV) was also expelled after publicly criticizing party leader Wilders. These sanctions may also be employed when a representative acts in a way that calls into question his integrity concerning a specific issue for which he is parliamentary party spokesperson, or fails to inform his party about certain issues from his past. This happened to Eric Lucassen (PVV, defense) in 2010, who had failed to inform his party that he had been found guilty of sexual misconduct when he was a petty officer in the army (for other examples, see Lucardie et al. 2006).

[51] At the national level, the percentage of government MPs who consider it (very) likely that a representative will be removed as a party group spokesperson (67 percent) is over twice as high as it is among opposition MPs (32 percent) (*χ^2 (2) = 7.567, sig. = .023; φc = .349, sig.=.023).* At the other levels of government there are no statistically significant differences between government and opposition representatives.

[52] 83 percent of national MPs from governing parties, and 55 percent of national MPs from opposition parties, consider it (very) likely that a representative who repeatedly dissents from the party could have trouble finding support for his own political initiatives among the other members of his party group (*χ^2 (2) = 8.567, sig. = .014; φc = .372, sig.=.014).* At the other levels of government there are no statistically significant differences between government and opposition representatives.

Table 5.26: The likelihood of immediate negative sanctions when a representative repeatedly does not vote with the party line in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

The representative will have trouble finding support for his own political initiatives among members of his party group

	(Very) unlikely	Neither	(Very) likely	Total	Total (n)
National	24	10	66	100	62
Provincial	17	14	69	100	134
Municipal	19	14	67	100	474

χ^2 (4) = 2.049, sig. = .727; φc = .039, sig.=.727; gamma = -.008, sig. = .915

The representative will be removed as a party group spokesperson

	(Very) unlikely	Neither	(Very) likely	Total	Total (n)
National	32	23	45	100	62
Provincial	31	30	39	100	130
Municipal	39	28	33	100	466

χ^2 (4) = 6.049, sig. = .196; φc = .068, sig.=.196; gamma = -.144, sig. = .028

The representative will be expelled from the party group

	(Very) unlikely	Neither	(Very) likely	Total	Total (n)
National	70	17	13	100	60
Provincial	54	36	11	100	132
Municipal	59	26	15	100	476

χ^2 (4) = 9.640, sig. = .047; φc = .085, sig.=.047; gamma = .049, sig. = .498

sequences for the image of the political party. There are, however, very few differences between the levels of government when it comes to the percentage of representatives who consider this a (very) likely sanction (around two-thirds at all levels).

There are also almost no differences between the levels when it comes to those who consider this a (very) likely sanction (although in this case, these percentages are very low, ranging from 11 to 15 percent), but national MPs are again more prone to consider the expulsion of an MP (very) unlikely (70 percent) than subnational representatives (54 percent at the provincial level, and 59 percent at the municipal level). By expelling a representative, a party runs the risk of losing the seat (as the representative can remain in parliament or the council as an independent member) and any control it might still have over the behavior of the representative. This is especially pressing for government

Table 5.27: The likelihood of delayed negative sanctions when a representative repeatedly does not vote with the party line in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

The representative will not be appointed to one of the important parliamentary committees after the upcoming elections

	(Very) unlikely	Neither	(Very) likely	Total	Total (n)
National	10	24	66	100	62
Provincial	11	24	64	100	132
Municipal	20	21	59	100	471

χ^2 (4) = 8.236, sig. = .083; φc = .079, sig.=.083; gamma = -.141, sig. = .045

The representative will be placed on an unelectable position on the political party electoral list

	(Very) unlikely	Neither	(Very) likely	Total	Total (n)
National	8	23	69	100	62
Provincial	9	19	72	100	134
Municipal	15	20	65	100	471

χ^2 (4) = 4.751, sig. = .314; φc = .060, sig.=.314; gamma = -.126, sig. = .095

The representative will not be placed on the political party electoral list

	(Very) unlikely	Neither	(Very) likely	Total	Total (n)
National	15	28	57	100	61
Provincial	12	28	60	100	134
Municipal	25	26	49	100	468

χ^2 (4) = 12.901, sig. = .012; φc = .139, sig.=.012; gamma = -.204, sig. = .002

(coalition) parties with a small majority.[53] This might explain why national MPs are more prone to consider this type of sanctions (very) unlikely than representatives at the subnational level, where coalitions are more often oversized.

Party (group) leaders may prefer sanctions in the long-term because applying too much pressure in the short-term may result in dissenters leaving the party group—and taking their seats with them. When it comes to the likelihood of delayed sanctions, the differences between the levels are as expected. Not being appointed to the important committees after the next elections, for instance, is considered quite likely at all levels of

[53] The differences between government and opposition representatives are, however, not statistically significant at any of the three levels of government.

government, but the percentage of representatives who consider this a (very) unlikely sanction is twice as high at the municipal level (20 percent) as it is at the national and provincial level. This sanction still involves a representative actually being renominated (and reelected), however. Depending on a party's selectoral procedures, party (group) leaders can also punish a representative by placing him on an unelectable slot on the party electoral list for the next election, or excluding him from the electoral list completely, which in essence means ending the representative's political career.[54] The use of the party electoral candidacy lists, as well as committee appointments, can conceal the use of discipline, because it is difficult to distinguish the application of sanctions from other factors motivating parties and representatives' choices.[55]

At all levels of government at least two-thirds of representatives consider it (very) likely that a representative will be placed in an unelectable slot if he repeatedly votes against the party's position. Being excluded from the party electoral list completely is also considered (very) likely by the majority of representatives at all levels. The percentage of representatives who consider these sanctions (very) likely is lowest at the municipal level, however, and one-fourth of municipal councilors even consider it (very) unlikely that a dissenting councilor will not be selected for the next elections. This could, in part, be explained by the recruitment problems that political parties at the subnational level have in the Netherlands, where competition for subnational positions is quite low in comparison to the national level given the large number of council seats at the provincial and municipal level (in 2011 there were 564 provincial councilors and around 10,000 municipal councilors). In combination with the decline in party membership that political parties have been experiencing over the past decades (Van Biezen et al., 2012), many parties have trouble finding sufficient candidates for the subnational level. Thus, threatening to exclude a councilor from the party electoral list is less likely to be interpreted as a realistic threat at the municipal level.

Added to this is the fact that subnational councilors are generally less dependent on their representative function for their livelihood than national MPs. Municipal councilors are officially non-salaried, but receive a financial compensation of between 235 and 2200 euros per month (depending on municipal population size, see www.overheid.nl,

[54] A representative could still create his own new political party to enter into the elections. At the national level, however only few of these new parties have been able to gain representation in parliament (see subsection 6.3.1 in chapter 6). It is unlikely that this would be very different at the subnational levels of government.

[55] In her comparative analysis of party discipline, based on interviews with party group leaders and experts five European parliamentary systems (Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the European Parliament), Bailer (2011) finds that candidate nomination as a means of exerting power over party group members is most powerful and commonly used in the Netherlands. Bailer (2011, 12) asked party group leaders and experts to rate the use of different tools as a disciplinary mechanisms on a scale ranging from never (0) to very often (4). The average score given by Dutch party group leaders was a 2.4 on the scale, which is very high when compared to the scores given by party group leaders in the other parliaments (for which the average score ranged between 0.4 and 1.0). Experts on the Netherlands scored the use of candidate selection as a means of exerting influence over individual MPs in the Netherlands a 3.0 on the scale, which is also higher than the average score given by experts on other countries (the expert average score ranged between 1.5 and 2.0).

2015a). The compensation received by provincial councilors is about 1100 euros per month (regardless of provincial population size, see www.overheid.nl, 2015b). According to a recent online survey conducted by Gemeenteraad.nl, over half (52 percent) of municipal councilors even have a full-time job. Councilors from small municipalities are most likely to combine their council work with a full-time job, whereas councilors from larger municipalities are more likely to work part-time (www.gemeenteraad.nl, 2014). National MPs, on the other hand, have a salary of over 7300 euros per month (Parlement & Politiek, 2015a). In other words, only at the national level, and in the largest municipal councils, are Dutch representatives likely to be able to live 'off' politics.

On a general note, taken together with their high satisfaction with party discipline, it seems that Dutch representatives are aware of these potential consequences, and for the most part accept them. However, given the fact that for most of these different sanctions, over half of the respondents at all levels of government considered them (very) likely, it may be that party discipline, or at least its threat, plays a more important role than the responses to the satisfaction with party discipline question would lead us to believe. In line with our hypothesis, these results seem to confirm that party discipline, and in particular the application of delayed sanctions through the use of party's candidate selection processes, is indeed less common at the subnational level than at the national level.

5.4.5 The sequential decision-making process

We now place the decision-making mechanisms in our sequential model, again excluding the first stage of cue-taking. In the first column in Table 5.28, we see that at all levels of Dutch government, party groups can to a great extent rely on their representatives to toe the party line out of simple agreement, but that as expected (H2) party agreement plays a slightly more important role at the provincial (81 percent) and municipal level (82 percent) than it does at the national level (77 percent). Note, however, that these percentage differ from those in Table 5.17 (where the percentage of representatives who disagree infrequently with their party was 71 percent at the national, 84 percent at the provincial level, and 81 percent at the municipal level) because Table 5.28 only includes representatives who answered all three questions included in the sequential decision-making model (i.e., the frequency of disagreement, how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagreement with the party's position, and satisfaction with party discipline when it comes to voting in parliament).[56]

Representatives who frequently disagree with the party line move on to the next decision-making stage, which is to ascertain whether their subscription to the norm of party loyalty outweighs their resolve to vote according to their own opinion in the case of conflict. At the Dutch national level, parties can count on another 21 percent of their MPs to submit to the party line voluntarily despite their disagreement, and the percentage decreases as we move to the lower levels of government: 15 percent of

[56] Again, as mentioned in footnote 17 almost 30 percent of Dutch national MPs refused to answer the question we use to measure part loyalty (also see subsection 6.5.3 in chapter 6).

Table 5.28: The relative contribution of party agreement, party loyalty and party discipline when it comes to sticking to the parliamentary party line in votes in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)

	Voluntary		Involuntary			
	Agreement	Loyalty	Discipline	Unaccounted	Total	Total (n)
National	77	21	0	2	100	43
Provincial	81	15	3	3	102	109
Municipal	82	9	2	7	101	404

χ^2 *(6) = 15.342, sig. = .038;* φc *= .110, sig. = .038*

Municipal councils only: council size

	Voluntary		Involuntary			
	Agreement	Loyalty	Discipline	Unaccounted	Total	Total (n)
Large	63	19	7	11	99	57
Medium-large	87	3	0	10	100	62
Medium-small	83	9	2	6	101	189
Small	88	7	0	5	99	96

χ^2 *(9) = 25.102, sig. = .003;* φc *= .249, sig. = .003*

These percentages may differ from previous tables in this chapter because they only include respondents who answered all three questions. Unfortunately, the questions about party discipline were located near the end of the survey, and 20 national MPs refused to answer the question pertaining to party loyalty.

provincial councilors, and 9 percent of municipal councilors, thus confirming our expectation that the importance of party loyalty as a decision-making mechanism decreases with government level (H3). Together, these two voluntary pathways to party group unity—party agreement and party loyalty—account for 98 percent of national MPs, 94 percent of provincial councilors, and 91 percent of municipal councilors. It is therefore not shocking that very few representatives move on to the final decision-making stage. Party discipline seems to play a slightly more important role at the two subnational levels (3 percent of provincial councilors and 2 percent of municipal councilors) than at the national level (0 percent). Although absolute percentages at the subnational levels are not high, and percentage differences between the levels of government are not large, this is not in line with our hypothesis (H4), and it is also a bit surprising considering our findings concerning respondents' own indication of the likelihood of sanctions, especially those that involve candidate selection at the national level. Again, it could be that, as a result of the formulation of the question used to measure party discipline, our se-

quential decision-making model underestimates the importance of party discipline (see chapter 4). However, with 98 percent of national MPs already accounted for by the two voluntary pathways to party group unity, it is unlikely that a more precise formulation of the party discipline question would have yielded very different results.

At the Dutch municipal level, we see that the greatest differences can be found between councilors who belong to the largest municipalities (37 seats or more) and those who belong to the three categories of smaller municipalities (see the bottom half of Table 5.28). First, the percentage of councilors who can be counted on to disagree infrequently with the party, and thus contribute to party voting unity out of simple agreement, is quite a bit lower in the largest municipal councils (63 percent) than it is in the smaller ones (ranging between 83 and 88 percent). Party loyalty, however, is stronger among those who frequently disagree in the largest municipalities (19 percent) than it is in the smaller ones (ranging between 3 and 9 percent). Finally, 7 percent of councilors from the largest municipal councilors frequently disagree, do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty, and indicate that party discipline when it comes to voting in the council ought to be less strict. For the smaller municipal councils, this ranges between 0 and 2 percent. Even at the municipal level itself, we see that most of our expectations are met: party agreement increases as municipal council size decreases, whereas party loyalty and party discipline decrease in importance.

5.5 Conclusion

In general, we can conclude that although all four pathways to party group unity are present at both the national and subnational level of government, the relative importance of these pathways, and thus the way in which representatives come to decide to vote with the party and contribute to party group unity, differs at the different levels of government. In both the international-comparative analysis as well as in the Dutch case, party agreement played a stronger role at the subnational level, whereas party loyalty and party discipline, when placed in our decision-making sequence, decreased in importance as we moved down the ladder of government levels.

Contrary to the first analysis of national and regional parliaments in nine multilevel countries, our analysis of the Dutch case allowed us to control for the effects of country context, electoral institutions, executive-legislative relations and party system. It also enabled us to increase the variation in terms of district, parliament and party group size. Moreover, in the Dutch case there are certainly differences between the levels of government when it comes to their jurisdiction and political authority, as well as representatives' dependence on the political party for their livelihood and careers. For our indicators of cue-taking, as well as party loyalty, we found larger differences between the levels of government in the Netherlands than was the case in our international-comparative analysis. The results were also more consistent with our expectations.

The inclusion of additional questions in the Dutch version of the PartiRep dataset also allowed us to explore each of the mechanisms in more detail. Noteworthy, for example, is that subnational representatives are much more likely to identify the party group

meeting as the main decision-making center, and are likely to feel more involved in the decision making in their party group, than national MPs. The fact that there is a strong relationship between subnational representatives' feeling of involvement in party group decision making and their frequency of disagreement, entails that at these lower levels party agreement is not only owed to preexisting exogenously formed policy preferences (or the lack thereof), but also the result of collective decision making and debate within the parliamentary party group. At the national level there does not seem to be a relationship between MPs' feeling of involvement and their frequency of disagreement, but MPs are more likely to agree that the party group spokesperson determines the position of the party on his topic, and are more likely to identify the party group committee or specialist as the main decision-making center (although the majority also chooses the party group meeting). This, as expected, points in the direction of a stronger division of labor in party groups at the national level, and a greater tendency to engage in cue-taking.

Surprisingly, the regional representatives in our nine multilevel countries are more likely to answer that in the case of disagreement between an MP's opinion and the party's position, an MP should stick to the party line. In the Netherlands, however, we found that party loyalty is weaker among subnational representatives, who are also more likely to have their loyalty to the party diffused by voters (although the influence of voters as competing principals is likely to be limited, given that at even at the lowest level of government only about one-third of councilors would vote according to voters' opinion instead of remaining loyal to the party's position when the two conflict). At all levels of Dutch government, representatives report a strong feeling of solidarity in their party group (albeit slightly less so at the provincial level), but the internalization of the norm of party unity versus the freedom of an individual representative is much weaker at the subnational level. That there is a strong feeling of party solidarity at the municipal level may also be related to the different mode of collective party group decision making.

Finally, in both our analyses, party discipline seems to play the least important role in determining party (voting) unity. However, as mentioned before, our indicator of party discipline requires quite a bit of interpretation as to the underlying meaning of 'satisfaction with party discipline', and what representatives mean when they answer that it should be more or less strict. Our inquiry into the likelihood of different types of sanctions in the Dutch case seems to indicate that we may be underestimating the role that (the treat of) negative sanctions play, particularly those that can be kept hidden from the public, and those that involve candidate selection.

As mentioned before, one of the limitations of the international-comparative analysis of the nine multilevel countries is that we do not control for the formal electoral and legislative institutions that are deemed to influence the pathways to party unity. Moreover, we assume that government level captures a number of different variables, some of which we lack data for. These include those that have already been theorized and explored in other studies on party group unity, such as representatives' district size and the relationship representatives' have with their voters (i.e., the extent to which voters' act as competing principals, Carey, 2007, 2009). However, we also argue that government level captures a number of variables that may affect MPs' decision making

that have been not been explored by previous research on party unity, such as the extent to which representatives are dependent on their party for their (future) livelihood (i.e., whether representatives are salaried or receive only a modest (financial) compensation, and whether they engage in their representative function full-time or they do so part-time and are also employed elsewhere, etc.). Future research on representatives' decision making and party group unity in general, and the differences between government levels specifically, could further explore these variables.

Chapter 6

Changes over time: party group unity and MPs' decision-making mechanisms in the Dutch national parliament over time

6.1 The one- or two-arena model

Chapter 2 describes the changes in both the practice and theory of representation over time as outlined by Manin (1997). Whereas parliamentarianism holds the individual MP to be the main representative actor in both theory and in practice, the political party is the central representative actor in party democracy. However, the decrease in the number of party members (Katz et al., 1992; Mair and Van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen et al., 2012) and party identifiers in many advanced industrial democracies (Dalton, 2000, 25-27), as well as the increase in electoral volatility (Dalton et al., 2000, 38-48), cast doubt on political parties' ability to maintain their role as main representative actor. Manin predicts that audience democracy, which is associated with increased electoral volatility and partisan dealignment, will lead to the return of the individual MP (especially the party leader) in the electoral arena, but he is less clear about the effects of these changes on the relationship between MPs and their parties in the legislative arena in general, and party group unity in particular.

Some authors argue that electoral volatility and partisan dealignment do have consequences for party group unity in the legislative arena (André et al., 2013; Kam, 2009). Kam (2009, 73-74), for example, argues that dealignment and MPs' dissent 'appear to travel together'. In his analysis of MPs' voting behavior in four Westminster systems between 1945 and 2005, he finds that the differences in electoral dealignment are likely to explain the different development of voting dissent between the United Kingdom

and Canada (where dissent became more frequent and extensive over time) and Australia and New Zealand (where dissent remained a rare phenomenon). In the former two countries, party identification and party popularity among voters decreased over time, whereas in the latter two countries this was much less the case.

The arguments by those who contend that electoral volatility and partisan dealignment affect MPs' dissent and party group unity the legislative arena are generally in line with the 'two-arena model' (Mayhew, 1974), which holds that MPs are primarily vote-seeking, and that their behavior in the legislative arena is determined by institutions and incentives in the electoral arena. Thus, party group unity in the legislative arena is "seen as a consequence of the need to fight and win elections" (Bowler, 2000, 158); the utility of acting in concert with the other members of the party group is determined by its benefits in the electoral arena. According to the two-arena model, if the political party label as a decisive cue for voters decreases in importance, candidates are more likely to use individualistic strategies to appeal to the electorate. Dissenting from the party group line in the legislative arena may be one of these strategies. Indeed, Kam (2009, 128) finds that in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand, dissent tends to earn MPs more name recognition and approval, mainly among non-partisan and weakly partisan voters.[1]

Bowler (2000), however, finds little evidence of a decline in party group unity over time. If anything, MPs in European parliaments tend to stick to the party group line more, rather than less (with the exception of the United Kingdom).[2] Bowler thus argues that MPs and their party groups in the legislative arena may be insulated from changes in the electoral arena. In other words, MPs and parties 'compartmentalize' their legislative and electoral roles (Norton and Wood, 1993, 38; Kam, 2009, 128). This is in line with the 'one-arena model', which holds that in the legislative arena MPs are not predominantly vote-seeking but instead care primarily about policy, and secondarily about office resources that allow them to pursue policy more effectively (Bowler, 2000, 163; Thies, 2000, 250). Party group unity is thus generated by institutions and incentives in the legislative arena itself (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). According to the one-arena model, as long as within parliament party groups consist of relatively like-minded politicians who care about policy (Thies, 2000, 251), and being a member of a party group offers procedural advantages that are beneficial to MPs' pursuit of policy, and the party group (leadership) is granted the tools to solve collective actions problems among its members, MPs have an incentive to act in concert.

As highlighted by Bowler (2000, 159-160), the discussion of the one-arena and two-arena model "suggests a (deceptive) straightforward line of empirical attack". In order to ascertain which of the two models is correct, one could simply correlate party (roll call) voting unity in the legislative arena with electoral volatility or partisan dealignment in the electoral arena. The reliance on roll call votes specifically could be problematic in a comparative analysis, however, because voting procedures differ between legislatures and

[1] Kam (2009) basis his analysis on the 1997 British Election Study and the 1993 New Zealand Election Study.

[2] Bowler (2000) looks at party group voting unity during the 1980s and 1990s in France, Germany, Norway and Switzerland. He also presents statistics on voting dissent for Denmark and the United Kingdom.

over time (Owens, 2003), and in some parliaments their summons may be endogenous to parties' procedural advantages in the legislative arena, which would make correlation with changes in the electorate spurious.

Moreover, as pointed out by Kam (2009, 73-74), aggregate level analyses of voting behavior do not allow one to determine why an MP is more or less likely to toe the party group line, i.e., which decision-making mechanism is affected by changes in the electorate (two-arena model), or is influenced by parties' procedural advantage over MPs in the legislative arena (one-arena model). Whereas Kam contends, in line with the two-arena model, that casting a dissenting vote could be an electoral strategy, one could argue (as André et al., 2011 do) that the mechanism that is affected here is party group loyalty, because when in disagreement with the party group line, the MP chooses to let his loyalty to a competing principal, i.e. (potential) voters, trump his loyalty to the party group (see also Carey, 2009). Alternatively, Krehbiel (1993, 259-260) argues that MPs' preferences are largely exogenous to the legislative arena, and that legislative party groups may have become more heterogeneous as a consequence of the influx of those who have also been affected by the social changes underpinning partisan dealignment. If party groups are more heterogeneous in terms of their MPs' policy preferences, this makes it more likely that MPs will disagree with each other in the first place. From the perspective of the one-arena model, which emphasizes the procedural advantages of party groups, and specifically their leaders, over MPs, aggregate levels of voting behavior do not allow one to pinpoint whether party group leaders use their control over access to policy making (agenda-setting power, for example) and selective benefits (such as committee assignment and removal) in the parliamentary arena as a positive or negative sanction to elicit party group unity through obedience.

As admitted by Bowler (2000, 159), "neither view on its own offers a complete explanation for the presence of parties inside chambers". The debate over party group unity as originating inside ('parties in office') or outside ('parties in the electorate') of the legislature tends to overlook the fact that 'parties as organizations' may play an important role as gatekeepers, and that parties' procedural advantage over individuals extends beyond the legislative arena into the electoral arena through candidate selection procedures (Bowler, 2000, 177-178). Whereas Kam seems to hint that dealignment will cause MPs to be less loyal to their party, and Krehbiel expects that the social changes underpinning partisan dealignment may lead to more heterogeneous party groups in terms of MPs' policy preferences, party leaders' control over candidate selection procedures may allow them to minimize, or even counteract, the effects of these changes, by ensuring that only loyal candidates whose policy preferences match those of the party are nominated. Moreover, candidate selection procedures can also help limit MPs' defection by serving as potential disciplining mechanisms as well. As parties' procedural advantages obtained through candidate selection are located outside the legislative arena, and institutionalized within the electoral systems, some have argued that the explanations of party group unity offered by the 'parties as organizations' perspective fall under the two-arena model (Linek and Rakušanová, 2005, 427). On the other hand, 'parties as organizations' also act within the legislative arena through the creation and maintenance of informal party group rules that reach beyond the power granted to parties by

the legislature's formal institutions and rules. An example is the application of a strict division of labor among its group members, which spurs MPs to engage in cue-taking when they themselves lack the time or expertise to form an opinion on a matter put to a vote (although this is in part encouraged by a parliament's committee system). In other words, 'parties as organizations' act in both arenas.

According to the 'parties in the electorate' perspective, we would expect party group unity to decrease over time because partisan dealignment and electoral volatility would bring forth MPs who are more likely to frequently disagree with their party group, and who are less likely to vote according to the party group line out of loyalty in the case of disagreement.[3] In this case, parties' procedural advantages in the legislative arena are not enough to counteract these changes. Alternatively, according to the 'parties in office' perspective, we would expect no decrease in party group unity over time. We may still see an increase in party group preference heterogeneity and MPs' disagreement with the party group's position, and a decrease in party group loyalty among MPs, but the effects of these changes on party group unity would be contained by parties' procedural advantage over MPs and their ability to solve collective action problems among their members within the legislative arena. Finally, if party group unity remains unchanged, and some of the pathways to party group unity seem negatively affected by changes in the electorate whereas others have been strengthened, this points in the direction of the 'parties as organizations' thesis. This would entail that within the legislative arena political parties have taken measures to control the behavior of their MPs beyond those formally accorded to them by the rules of parliament, and parties' procedural advantages over individuals extend beyond the legislative arena into the electoral arena through candidate selection procedures. In other words, 'parties as organizations' have actively taken measures to curtail and thus neutralize the effects of electoral volatility and partisan dealignment in the electoral arena.

Solving this puzzle necessitates a case which displays high electoral volatility and partisan dealignment, and for which we have behavioral data that enables us to measure party group unity, and survey data that allows us to gauge potential changes in the use of these different decision-making mechanisms, all over an extensive period of time. Unfortunately, there are few parliaments for which this data is available over the necessary time span (Owens, 2003). The Dutch case offers a unique opportunity, however, because we have both data on MPs' party group defections and voting behavior (both regular and roll call) over a long period of time (1945-2010), as well as MPs' responses to surveys held at five points in time (the 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Studies). We also present data from the Dutch part of the 2010 PartiRep MP Survey. However, because the formulation of some of the questions and answering categories differ quite a bit from those in the Dutch Parliamentary Studies, we only include the 2010 PartiRep MP survey in our longitudinal analyses when these are the same as in the Dutch Parliamentary Studies.

[3] Partisan dealignment and electoral volatility are likely to have a stronger effect on MPs' group loyalty when electoral institutions are candidate-centered than when electoral institutions are party-centered.

Table 6.1: Average electoral volatility and second order personal votes in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2012

Election	Parties represented in parliament (n)	Volatility (% of seats)	Personal votes (% of cast votes)
1946	7	-	3.1
1948	8	4.0	3.2
1952	8	5.0	4.4
1956	7	7.0	3.4
1959	8	5.3	6.6
1963	10	6.0	9.6
1967	11	10.0	10.8
1971	14	13.3	11.5
1972	14	13.3	10.5
1977	11	12.7	8.3
1981	10	9.3	7.5
1982	12	10.0	9.6
1986	9	11.3	17.4
1989	9	5.3	11.0
1994	12	22.7	19.4
1998	9	16.7	21.3
2002	10	30.7	27.1
2003	9	16.0	18.5
2006	10	20.2	22.8
2010	10	22.7	15.9
2012	11	15.3	18.9
Mean	10	12.84	12.42

Note: For electoral volatility the Pedersen Index (1979, 3) is used, which defines electoral volatility as 'the net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers'. It is measured as the aggregate seats gained (or lost) of all winning (or losing) parties in an election.

6.2 The Dutch case

6.2.1 The electoral arena

The Netherlands is a representative case in terms of the changes in the electorate described above, which according to the two-arena model should lead to lower levels of party group unity in the legislative arena. During the 1950s and 1960s, Dutch society was strongly segmented (pillarized) and the voters in each of the different pillars (*zuilen*) were tied to particular political parties through a strong sense of identity and loyalty, thus creating a highly structured and stable electorate. During this period

of pillarization, the Social Democratic PvdA (*Partij van de Arbeid*) and the smaller left-socialist PSP (*Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij*) represented the socialist pillar, while the conservative-liberal VVD (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*) represented the liberal pillar. The Catholic pillar was represented by the KVP (*Katholieke Volkspartij*). The Reformed (*Gereformeerd*) ARP (*Anti-Revolutionaire Partij*), the Dutch Reformed (*Nederlands Hervormd*) CHU (*Christelijk-Historische Unie*) and the smaller Orthodox Protestant GVP *(Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond*) represented the Protestant pillar. In 1980 the KVP, ARP and CHU formally fused together to form the Christian Democratic CDA (*Christen-Democratisch Appèl*). From the mid-1960s onwards a process of depillarization set in, and electoral volatility increased and party membership decreased in step with most other Western European countries. By the 1990s, however, electoral instability in the Netherlands was higher than in all other Western European countries, save Italy (Mair, 2008, 237-238; also see Table 6.1), making it a crucial case study.

Whereas electoral volatility increased over time, the electoral system itself remained quite stable (Van der Kolk, 2007, 271-273). Our focus is on the House of Representatives, or Second Chamber (*Tweede Kamer*),[4] which consists of 150 members (100 until 1956) elected every four years via a system of Proportional Representation introduced in 1917.[5] During national elections voters are presented with a ballot paper displaying lists of candidates as ordered by the political parties, and cast their vote for an individual candidate. The number of parliamentary seats obtained by a party is determined by the total number of votes for the party's candidates pooled nationwide. The electoral system (which uses the Hare quota) is therefore quite open; the threshold for gaining access to parliament for new and small parties is quite low, and the composition of parliament is very sensitive to changes in the electorate (Andeweg, 2005). Indeed, Mair (2008) ascribes the increase in electoral volatility to the fact that the openness of competition between parties was unable to constrain the electoral effects of the depillarization, secularization and individualization of Dutch society.

The degree to which the electoral system is party-oriented is of special importance with regard to party group unity. In order to obtain a seat on the basis of preference votes a candidate for the Dutch Second Chamber must cross a threshold of 25 percent (50 percent until 1996) of the electoral quota. Andeweg and Van Holsteyn (2011) do detect a trend in voters increasingly casting intra-party preferences votes (those not cast for the party leader who is usually placed first on the list) between 1946 and 2012 (see Table 6.1), but voters tend to select candidates who would have been elected on the basis of their list position anyway. The number of candidates who obtain a seat in parliament on the basis of preference votes who would not have been elected on the basis of their parties' list ordering has increased since the change of the electoral quota threshold in 1996, but is still limited to only one or two per election (see Table 6.2). Although voters' increased use of personal votes (which Rahat and Sheafer (2007) consider a form of public behavioral personalization, see subsection 2.4.2 in chapter 2) has been offered

[4] The Dutch nomenclature differs from what is customary in the international literature, where the Lower House is called the First Chamber, and the Upper House is the Second Chamber.

[5] In 1970 compulsory electoral voting was abolished, which led to a decrease in voter turnout.

Table 6.2: MPs who entered the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on the basis of preference votes who otherwise would have not have done so on the basis of their list position and the number of votes obtained by their political party 1946-2012

Election	Party	Name	Votes (n)
1959	KVP	Karel van Rijckevorsel	91,000
1972	KVP	Dolf Hutschemaekers	27,900
1986	VVD	Theo Joekes	250,000
1998	CDA	Camiel Eurlings	24,000
	CDA	Annie Schreijer-Pierik	17,400
2002	ChristenUnie	Tineke Huizinga-Heringa	19,800
2003	ChristenUnie	Tineke Huizinga-Heringa	19,650
	LPF	Hilbrand Nawijn	21,200
2006	D66	Fatma Koşer Kaya	34,564
2010	D66	Pia Dijkstra	15,705
	CDA	Sabina Uitslag	15,933
2012	CDA	Peter Omtzigt	36,750

Note: the number of votes are taken directly from the website of the Dutch Parliamentary Documentation Center (*Parlement & Politiek*, 2015e).

as an explanation for decreases in party group unity from the perspective of the two-arena model (Van Wijnen, 2000, 449; Krouwel, 2003, 79), in the Netherlands voters' use of personal votes seems to be embedded within the choice for a party (which Andeweg and Van Holsteyn (2011) term second-order personalization).

Thus, even though the Dutch list system is formally flexible, due to voters' own behavior preference voting it is generally ineffective, which leads Mitchell (2000) to categorize the Dutch electoral system as party-centered. Association with the political party label is therefore important to candidates and since the order of the list is difficult to overturn a candidate's position on the list has significant consequences for his chances of (re-)election (Marsh, 1985, 367). As an electoral strategy, an MP is better off convincing the party candidate selection committee to grant him a high position on the list than campaigning for preference votes amongst the electorate (Andeweg, 2005). On the other hand, voters' propensity to cast preference votes has increased over time,[6] and Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012, 177-178) show that MPs who do engage in individual campaigns tend to obtain more preferences votes than MPs who do not engage in individual campaigns, which indicates that preference votes campaigns can be effective in influencing voters.

[6] This, in combination with the fact that the electoral system has become slightly more candidate-centered, leads Karvonen (2010, 104) to categorize the Netherlands as mixed-positive in terms of personalization.

6.2.2 The legislative arena

Constitutional & parliamentary rules

According to the one-arena model, MPs will act in concert regardless of changes in the electoral arena if the constitutional and parliamentary rules give MPs better access to policy making when they belong to a legislative bloc than if they were to act alone. There have been relatively few changes to the Dutch constitutional and legislative rules over time, entailing that any changes in party group unity are not likely to find their origins in the legislative arena.

At first glance, the procedural advantages granted to party groups in the legislative arena seem quite limited, and there are few formal constraints on individual MPs. The Dutch constitution clearly favors individual MPs, as most legislative rights with regard to policy making (such as the initiation of both regular and roll call voting, the submission of private member bills, amendments and resolutions (*moties*), and the asking of written and oral questions) belong to the individual MP. MPs also formally vote without a binding mandate (article 67.3),[7] but as is the case in most legislatures, the Dutch constitution requires that all decisions be made by majority vote (article 67.2),[8] meaning that in order to be effective in terms of policy making, MPs need to cooperate with each other, which is most likely to occur among MPs who belong to the same party group.

In contrast to many other European parliaments, there is little formal regulation of political parties and their parliamentary caucuses (Lucardie et al., 2006, 126), and the parliamentary party group is no more than a collective label for its individual MPs (Andeweg, 2000, 98). In fact, there is no mention of political parties in the Dutch constitution (Lucardie et al., 2006, 126; Van Biezen, 2008, 341; Van Biezen, 2012, 194; van Biezen and Borz, 2012, 331, 337) nor are there are any special party laws, with the exception of those concerning party financing (Van Biezen, 2008, 341). Moreover, although in practice party groups have existed since the second half of the nineteenth century in the form of ad hoc parliamentary clubs (Elzinga and Wisse, 1988), they were also absent from the Second Chamber's Standing Orders (*Reglement van Orde van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal*) until the 1960s. Since 1966, the Standing Orders define a PPG *(fractie)*[9] as all Members of Parliament who were declared elected on the same electoral list (article 11.1). An MP is, however, under no legal obligation to give up his seat to his party if he is expelled from, or voluntarily leaves, his parliamentary party group. Seceded MPs need only to notify the Speaker of the House of their breakaway to be recognized as a

[7] Until the constitutional revision in 1983, MPs voted without both a binding mandate and consultation. It was, however, argued that this gave the impression that MPs were not allowed to consult their political party, their voters or other actors, which was considered an inaccurate reflection of political reality (Dölle, 1981). It can be argued, therefore, that this constitutional change was of limited impact on the relationship between MPs and their parties.

[8] A double majority in both the upper and lower House is required when it comes to changing the constitutions.

[9] Most party groups also have a board consisting of around three MPs (depending on the size of the party group), which is considered the party group leadership.

separate parliamentary party group, and there is no minimum number of seats to qualify as such.

There are, however, also a number of procedural advantages accorded to party groups specifically. The funding that party groups receive to hire staff, as well as plenary speaking time, and committee membership and chairs, are distributed roughly proportional to party group seat share, with special consideration for smaller party groups (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014, 168-169). Once speaking time is distributed, party groups are left to select their own spokespersons (Andeweg, 2000, 98). And although the Speaker of the House is formally responsible for committee appointment and removal (article 25), he acts on the proposals of the party groups (Franssen, 1993, 28), and party group leaders meet informally to discuss the distribution of committee chairs (Döring, 2001, 41). Thus policy spokesmanship and committee membership are in practice controlled by the party group (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011b; Damgaard, 1995), and can be used by party (group) leaders as positive and negative sanctions to solve collective action problems among their members.

Parliamentary party group rules

Some parties have elaborate statutes and parliamentary party group standing orders stipulating rules concerning MPs' behavior inside, but sometimes also outside, of parliament. These rules also often grant the party (group) leadership certain powers to solve collective action problems among their members. According to the Standing Orders of the Christian Democratic CDA (2003, article 82), for example, candidates are expected to sign a document declaring their assent to the party program and electoral manifesto. Similarly, in the Social Democratic party PvdA (2012, article 14.10) all party representatives are expected to commit themselves to promoting and achieving the objectives of the party. In both parties, the parliamentary party group Standing Orders further stipulate that MPs are bound by the decisions made during the weekly party group meeting, even if they were not present at the meeting. In most party groups the weekly parliamentary party group meeting, which all party representatives are expected to attend, is the highest party authority and most important decision-making arena. The meeting usually takes place at the beginning of the week and as a rule the discussions that take place during these meetings stay behind closed doors.

In most parties, if an MP wants to depart from the party group line when voting in parliament, he is expected to give due notice. In the CDA (2003, article 83) potential candidates do so before they are even taken into consideration for nomination in the form of a *gravamen*, which entails that candidates register their 'principled, insurmountable conscientious objections' (Voerman, 2002, 43, translation CvV) concerning specific parts of the party's electoral manifesto. However, according to the 1986 gravamen regulations (*gravamenreglement*), a *gravamen* cannot be used to stop the creation or continued survival of a government (Koole, 1992, 243-244) which arguably severely limits its utility to the individual MP. According to the PvdA's Standing Orders, MPs are expected to inform the other members of the party group at the weekly meeting of their (preferably previously announced) disagreement with the party's position before the vote takes place

in parliament (Lucardie et al., 2006, 130). Lucardie et al. (2006, 132-133) note that in *GroenLinks*, according to the party group communications officer, there is no formal requirement of party group unity during voting, although the party group does admit to try to reach unanimity prior to the vote as much as possible.

Some parties, such as the PvdA (2012, article 1.22.12), the Liberal Democrats (D66) (2002, article 2.8.5.j), the GreenLeft *(GroenLinks)* (2012, article 28.3) and the Socialists (SP) (2003, article 15.1) require their representatives to sign a document stating that they will give up their seat if they are asked to do so. This may occur if an MP is reprimanded by his party (group) (which may be a consequence of voting dissent) or if he voluntarily leaves the parliamentary party group. The Standing Orders of the Liberal VVD (2009) do not stipulate any such rules concerning the giving up of an MP's seat. There are, however, informal rules that call for the same procedure. When in 2006 MP Rita Verdonk was reprimanded for criticizing party leader Mark Rutte, for example, the political party board asked her to give up her seat in parliament or face expulsion from the political party. After first being expelled from the parliamentary party group, she kept her seat in parliament, and her party then ended her VVD membership (Benneker, 2007).

Some parties also try to control their MPs' use of other individual parliamentary rights. In the case of the CDA, PvdA and Social Christian party (*ChristenUnie*), for example, parliamentary questions, motions and amendments need to be put to the party group at the weekly meeting, or if pressed for time, to the party group leader or the head of relevant internal committee, before they are introduced in parliament (Lucardie et al., 2006, 129, 131; Van Schendelen, 1992, 80-81). The CDA and *ChristenUnie* also regulate contact between individual MPs and the media, as do most party groups.

All in all, many of these internal party rules make up for the lack of procedural advantage granted to parties by the formal rules of the legislature (although one should not underestimate the power of committee and spokesperson assignment). One could argue that these internal party rules and practices are unconstitutional given the individual MP's free mandate (Andeweg, 2000, 99). And indeed, a political party cannot take an individual representative to court for not voting according to the party group line or leaving the parliamentary party group without giving up his seat to his party. However, as argued by Elzinga and Wisse (1988, 184-189), an individual is allowed to voluntarily bind himself to the formal and informal party rules. *De jure,* MPs are free to follow their own opinion. *De facto*, however, MPs are politically and morally bound to follow the party group line, and political parties dominate the day-to-day life of MPs in parliament.[10]

6.3 Party group unity over time

According to the one-arena model, we would expect to see few changes over time in terms of party group unity; although MPs in the Netherlands have quite a few individual

[10] Elzinga and Wisse (1988), compare an MP's mandate to an individual's right to property; although the individual has a right to property, he is free to voluntarily give up, or refrain from exercising, that right. According to Elzinga and Wisse (1988) the same principle holds for MPs and their personal mandate.

rights, in practice party groups control committee membership and issue spokesmanship, and parties themselves have quite elaborate standings orders that aim to further control the behavior of their MPs beyond the formal rules of parliament. Little has changed over the past decades in regard to the party groups' procedural advantages and the availability of tools to solve collective action problems within the parliamentary arena. According to the two-arena model, however, MPs are predominantly vote-seeking, and we would expect a decrease in party group unity as a result of an increase in electoral volatility and partisan dealignment, regardless of parties' procedural advantages inside parliament. As in other countries (Karvonen, 2010), Dutch voters have increased their use of second order preference votes, albeit that the number of MPs who obtain a seat in parliament who would have not done so on the basis of their original list position remains limited. Nonetheless, this does not preclude MPs from using strategies (such as voting dissent) in an attempt to appeal to voters on an individual basis, which form an impediment to party group unity. Below, we rely on two measures of party group unity (party defection and party voting unity) in order to ascertain whether there have indeed been any changes over time.

6.3.1 Party group defection

MPs' early departure (i.e. before the next elections) from their parliamentary party group is used as our first indicator of party group unity and MPs' dissent (Owens, 2003). Defection takes place when an MP leaves parliament and thus automatically gives up his seat, which the national Electoral Council then offers to the next eligible person on the MP's party's candidacy list from the previous election. According to the website of the Dutch Parliamentary Documentation Center (*Parlement & Politiek*, 2015e) on average around one-fifth of MPs (about 32) left parliament before elections per parliamentary term between 1956 and 2012, of which about half (on average 16) did so because they were appointed to government.[11] For the other half it is difficult to ascertain what motivated them to leave parliament early because the reasons officially forwarded (a job offer elsewhere or personal circumstances, for example) may be used as a guise to cover up factors related to party group unity. An MP may, for example, leave parliament voluntarily because he regularly finds himself at odds with the party group's position, and feels that he cannot be loyal despite disagreement. Recent examples of MPs who gave up their seats to their party are PvdA MPs Désirée Bonis and Myrthe Hilkens, who in 2013 both took issue with their party group's position in parliament, which they argued was too heavily influenced by their party's coalition agreement with the VVD.

An MP may also be pressured by his party to give up his seat, or in the most extreme case, may be expelled from the party when in conflict. Although an MP is under no legal obligation to give up his seat when pressured or expelled, he may wish to honor the (informal) party rule to do so. Sometimes these conflicts between an MP and his party

[11] In the Netherlands there is a strict division of roles, responsibility and membership between the executive and parliamentary branch of government, and the position of (junior) minister is incompatible with the position of MP.

take place in the public sphere, but more often they are kept out of the eyes of the public, making it difficult to identify these cases. The Dutch Parliamentary Documentation Center (*Parlement & Politiek*, 2015e) lists a total of 11 MPs who left parliament early due to a conflict with their party since 1956.[12] In an earlier study of why Dutch national MPs leave parliament,[13] De Vos (1990, 42-43) finds that over half of the reasons forwarded for departure related to an MPs work in the Second Chamber and party group. Of these, only a few can be directly related to tensions between an MP and his party group when it comes to party group unity, however.

An MP can also defect from his party group but remain in parliament. Although in the Netherlands it is an MP's legal right to remain in parliament, he is likely to be accused of seat robbery (*zetelroof*). Theoretically, there are two types of defection applicable to the Dutch case that involve an MP remaining in parliament: an MP could form an independent group, or he could switch to another party group.[14] Most studies that deal with party defection focus on the latter (Owens, 2003, 18-20). In both cases, the fact that the MP remains in parliament can be interpreted a sign of conflict with the party group and therefore party group disunity, either due to intense and frequent disagreement with the party position, lack of loyalty or the party's application of sanctions. In contrast to an MP who gives up his seat to his party, an MP who remains in parliament does not have his party's best interest at heart, and ignores any internal party commitment he may have made pertaining to his seat. An MP is likely to defect from his party group if he considers the benefits (which may include a better ideological fit,[15] increased chances of re-election, legislative perks or even a cabinet post) to be higher than if he were to remain in his current party group, and if he perceives the transactions costs of defection to be low (Desposato, 2006).

Heller and Mershon (2008, 910-911) also consider defection a reaction to party discipline. If an MP votes against the party group line, or regularly finds himself (intensely) at odds with the party group position, and this disagreement often supersedes his loyalty to his party group, there is a good chance that he will face (the threat of) sanctions, including expulsion. In the case of expulsion, which parties are likely to only use as an *ultimum remedium*, his defection from the party group would be involuntary. Recent examples from the Dutch case include VVD member Rita Verdonk, who was expelled from her party in 2007, and Louis Bontes' expulsion from the right-wing PVV (*Partij voor de*

[12] The basis for these figures is unknown and the categorization is somewhat unclear. For the year 2013, for example, there are no cases listed under conflict. This means that the above mentioned examples of PvdA MPs Désirée Bonis and Myrthe Hilkens are likely to fall under either the category 'health/personal' or 'other reasons'.

[13] A total of 104 MPs who left parliament were interviewed. These figures include MPs who, between 1972 and 1982, left parliament early, but also those who were not placed on the party's electoral list, or those who were selected but not elected, during the elections that followed (De Vos, 1990, 159-160).

[14] According to Shabad and Slomczynski (2004), party switching (both within and between parliamentary terms) can also be the result of 'structural factors', such as party dissolutions, party splits and party mergers (which all may be connected to intense party disunity).

[15] Studies show that when MPs switch parties they are likely to do so within the same ideological family (Heller and Mershon, 2008).

Vrijheid) party group in 2013. MPs may, however, also decide to 'jump before they are pushed', i.e., leave the party group before they are expelled (Jones, 2002, 177).

Since the Second World War there have only been 42 instances of an individual or group of MPs (involving a total of 58 MPs) who left and/or were removed from their party group and formed their own group in the Dutch parliament (see Table 6.3). Although the total number of defections is quite low, it has increased over time. Whereas there was only 1 (involving 4 MPs) case in the 1950s, there were 5 (6 MPs) in the 1990s, and 11 (12 MPs) in the first half of the 2010s. If we look more closely, however, we see that this type of defection usually occurs in new parties, represented in parliament for the first or second time. Two of the parties to have recently gained representation in parliament, the right-wing LPF (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*) and the PVV, experienced quite a number of these defections, albeit for different reasons. Whereas the LPF lacked strong leadership (its party leader Pim Fortuyn was assassinated 9 days before the 2002 parliamentary elections), resulting in chaos in the party, the PVV is renowned for its strong leadership, which seemed to backfire in the Spring and Summer of 2012 with the defection of a number of MPs who remained in parliament as independents. One and a half year later three more MPs left the party group; Louis Bontes was expelled from the party group for criticizing the workings of the party group board, and both Ronald van Vliet and Joram van Klaveren defected in response to party leader Geert Wilders' statements about Dutch Moroccans made on the evening after the municipal elections in 2014. Moving a bit further into the past, the pensioners' party AOV (*Algemeen Ouderen Verbond*), represented in parliament between 1994 and 1998, experienced quite a few splits. And in the 1960s and 1970s, there were also a number of defections from the famers' party BP (*Boerenpartij*) as well.

Among the established parties in the Netherlands, however, party group defection did not occur very often, each party having experienced defection only two or three times over the entire period since the Second World War. Thus, the changes in the electorate, which include an increase in electoral volatility, in combination with the highly proportional and thus very open electoral system, do not seem to have affected the unity of established parties (as measure by party group defections), but have increased the number of defections through the introduction of an increased number of new parties in the Dutch parliament. That this type of defection usually occurs in new parties may be the result of both the MPs, as well as the party organization as a whole, being relatively new to politics and parliament. MPs who are new to politics, and do not have a history of party membership, are likely to be less socialized into the norm of party group loyalty than MPs. And new political parties probably have little experience recruiting and selecting candidates (and are likely do so quite hastily as most new parties compile their electoral candidacy lists just before elections), which may lead to lower levels of homogeneity in terms of the policy preferences of their MPs, which makes it more likely that their MPs will frequently disagree with the party group's position. Moreover, it may also be that new parties are less effective at controlling the behavior of their MPs through internal parliamentary party group rules.

By becoming an independent or forming an independent group an MP is freed from the restrictions of belonging to a party group (depending on the size of the indepen-

Table 6.3: Parliamentary party group defections in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2015

Date	MPs (n)	Former party group	Independent
14-04-1958	4	CPN	Group-Gortzak
13-12-1966	1	Boerenpartij	Group-Voogd
27-02-1968	3	KVP	Group-Aarden
27-06-1968	4	Boerenpartij	Group-Harmsen
12-12-1968	1	Group-Harmsen	Group-Kronenburg
14-05-1970	2	PvdA	Group-Goedhart
28-07-1970	1	PvdA	Veenendaal-van Meggelen (joined Group-Goedhart)
09-02-1971	1	Boerenpartij	Group-Verlaan
13-09-1971	1	NMP	Group-De Jong
30-03-1976	1	CHU	Group-Huijsen
22-06-1976	1	D'66	Group-Nooteboom
08-12-1983	2	CDA	Group-Scholten/Dijkman
05-12-1984	1	Centrumpartij	Group-Janmaat
23-04-1985	1	RPF	Group-Wagenaar
18-04-1985	1	Group-Scholten/Dijkman	Not applicable (Scholten joined PPR in parliament)
21-01-1986	1	PSP	Group-Van der Spek
21-09-1993	1	PvdA	Group-Ockels
11-10-1994	1	AOV	Group-Hendriks
30-05-1995	2	AOV	Group-Wingerden/Verkerk
06-09-1995	3	AOV	Group-Nijpels
31-03-1998	1	Group-Wingerden/Verkerk	Group-Verkerk
07-10-2002	2	LPF	Group-De Jong
13-10-2002	1	LPF	Group-Wijnschenk
03-02-2004	1	SP	Group-Lazrak
03-09-2004	1	VVD	Group-Wilders
23-06-2005	1	LPF	Group-Nawijn
07-07-2006	1	LPF	Group-van Oudenallen
16-08-2006	1	LPF	Van As (joined Group-Nawijn)
11-09-2006	1	Group-Nawijn	Group-Van As
06-09-2006	1	VVD	Group-Van Schijndel
20-09-2006	1	LPF	Eerdmans (joined Group-Van Schijndel)
14-09-2007	1	VVD	Member-Verdonk
20-03-2012	1	PVV	Member-Brinkman
03-07-2012	2	PVV	Group-Kortenoeven/Hernandez
06-07-2012	1	PVV	Member-Van Bemmel
29-10-2013	1	PVV	Member-Bontes
21-03-2014	1	PVV	Member-Van Vliet
22-03-2014	1	PVV	Van Klaveren (joined Group-Bontes)
28-05-2014	1	50Plus	50Plus/Baay-Timmerman (returned to 50Plus)
06-06-2014	1	50Plus	Member-Klein
13-11-2014	2	PvdA	Group Kuzu-Öztürk
25-03-2015	1	VVD	Member-Houwers

dent group). He also obtains relatively better access to parliamentary resources than he had as a member of a (larger) party group because special consideration is given to small party groups in the distribution of finances to hire staff, plenary speaking time, and committee membership and chairmanship. If the defecting MP is on his own he also automatically becomes the party group chairman, which leads to an increase in salary.[16] He will, however, still have to work together with other party groups in parliament in order to attain his own policy goals. Moreover, becoming an independent is not a wise choice in terms of a future political career. Many party defectors do end up creating new parties which they enter into the next election,[17] of which only a few have gained representation in parliament. In 2006 the MP Geert Wilders, who left the VVD in 2004 but remained in parliament as an independent until the next election, gained representation in parliament with his right-wing PVV, and has been present since. The green-progressive PPR (*Politieke Partij Radikalen*), which was created in 1968 by a number of MPs who had split from the Catholic KVP, also had consistent representation in parliament from 1971 until 1989, when it first participated in elections under the flag of *GroenLinks* with the left-socialist PSP (*Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij*), the communist CPN (*Communistische Partij van Nederland*) and Christian-progressive EVP (*Evangelische Volkspartij*). Usually, however, the parties created by these independents are unsuccessful. That so many try might also be explained by the electoral system, which is highly proportional and affords even parties with a small electoral support access to parliament (Nikolenyi and Shenhav, 2009).

When it comes to party switching, there are three instances of an MP joining an already existing independent group consisting of MPs who had previously left the same party, and one case of two MPs from different parties forming one independent group (in 2006 LPF member Joost Eerdmans joined Anton van Schijndel who had been expelled from the VVD). There is, however, only one case of an MP switching to another established parliamentary party group (i.e., a group of MPs declared elected on the same electoral list) within the same parliamentary term. Stef Dijkman entered parliament as a representative of the CDA in 1982 and joined the Political Party of Radicals (*Politieke Partij Radikalen*, PPR) party group in 1985. His switch was not direct, however, as he first formed an independent party group with Jan-Nico Scholten (who had also left the CDA) for two years before joining the PPR party group. Generally, political parties in the Netherlands are weary of accepting and promoting MPs who sat in parliament for another party, especially within the same parliamentary term.[18]

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[16] Parliamentary party group chairmen (*fractievoorzitters*) receive an additional 1 percent of the compensation afforded to regular MPs, plus an additional 0.3 percent per member of their party group (*Parlement & Politiek*, 2015a).

[17] Although it is possible to start a new party while in parliament as an independent group or member, the independent group or member is not referred to by the name of the new party in the parliament. The new party must be formed outside of parliament and participate in elections and win its own seats in order to obtain the formal status of a parliamentary party group.

[18] There are only a few cases of MPs who leave parliament as a member of one party and return as a representative of another after elections. Margot Kranenveldt-van der Veen, for example, gave up both her seat and party membership of the center-right LPF (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*) in the summer of 2006, and returned to

While in the comparative literature party defection is often considered to be motivated by MPs' (electoral) ambitions, it is questionable whether party defection in the Netherlands fits into this mold. Party group switching within parliament is very rare because established parties generally do not accept MPs from other parties, and forming an independent group may involve some short term legislative perks, but usually entails the end of the MP's (national) political career. Thus, in terms of an MP's (political career) ambitions, he is better off staying in his party, or leaving parliament voluntarily if the conflict with his party group becomes severe. An MP who does defect but stays in parliament, apparently feels that he is serving his voters (or his purse for the short term), or representing a particular group of party members, by staying in parliament as an independent. The fact that the number of individual or groups of MPs who left their party group but stayed in parliament as independents has increased over time means, however, that parliament is not insulated from changes in the electoral arena. But it is not the case that the party group unity (as measured by party group defections) of the established parties has suffered as a result of the changes in the electorate. Instead, the increase in electoral volatility in the relatively open Dutch electoral systems has resulted in an increase in the number of new parties that, likely as a result of their newness to politics and their lack of an institutionalized party organization, are more likely to experience party defections.

6.3.2 Party group voting

Voting procedures

As mentioned above, in the Dutch parliament most decisions are taken by simple majority vote (Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, article 67.2). Voting is announced on the agenda which is published ahead of time as much as possible, and in the Second Chamber nowadays usually takes place on Tuesdays after the weekly question hour. In order to ensure that voting is valid, the Speaker of the House only opens the plenary meeting of the day when more than half of the 150 MPs are signed in as present in parliament's building.

According to the Second Chamber's Standing Orders, voting need only take place if one or more MPs (including the Speaker, who is a voting member) ask that it do so (article 69.1 and 69.4). In practice, however, the members of the Presidium Committee implicitly exercise their right as MPs to request that voting take place when they compile the plenary agenda.[19] The Speaker can also propose that decisions be taken without a vote (article 69.4). This is referred to as the gavel (*hamerslag*) procedure: the Speaker makes a statement which is registered in the parliamentary records and the proposal is accepted with a knock of the gavel (Wolters, 1984, 182-183). Before the knock, individual MPs and party groups may request that the parliamentary records show that they were

parliament the following year as a representative for the PvdA.

[19] The Presidium committee consists of a number of MPs from different party groups, including the Speaker and Deputy Speakers.

against the decision, ensuring that their opposing position is registered. If this happens, the proposal is assumed to be accepted with the support of the other members who are present. The gavel procedure is primarily used for procedural matters and for substantive matters if the opposing minority is considered to be small.[20]

There are two voting procedures parliament can follow: regular or roll call voting (articles 69.3 and 70.1).[21] For a regular vote the MPs who are present on the floor cast their vote by a show of hands and do so on behalf of all the members of their party group; the number of MPs physically present on the floor is not counted (*Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* website, 2015a). Until 1969 the parliamentary records did not register the voting position of party groups, but only mentioned the outcome of the vote and the names of individual MPs who explicitly requested that their position be recorded (which for a regular vote is necessary if an MP wishes to dissent from his party group's position position).[22] Since 1969, the rule is that the parliamentary records register the position of each individual party group as well (Wolters, 1984, 183).[23] This practice is evidence that party group unity in the Dutch parliament is quite high, as the procedures by default assumes that party representatives vote in unison.

In a roll call vote each individual MP verbally announces his position (aye or nay) (article 70.4). As the vote takes place at the individual level, the number of MPs physically present on the floor for the vote is important to meet the quorum for the vote to be valid (more than half of the 150 MPs need to be present) and for the outcome of the vote. The Speaker will sometimes adjourn the meeting and let the division bell in the building sound again in order for more MPs to make their way to the plenary hall, even allowing time for parties to rally their troops from outside the building if necessary. The Speaker may also close the meeting and call a new meeting at a later time (article 70.5). A roll call can also be also requested when the results of a vote taken by the show of hands procedure are unclear, as long as the request comes before the Speaker accepts the vote (with a knock of the gavel) (article 70.2).

Before 1887, roll call voting was formally required for all parliamentary decisions. But already in 1851, the Speaker implemented the gavel procedure mentioned above

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[20] Because strictly speaking voting does not take place during the gavel procedure, these votes are not included in the analysis. If these were included this would most likely result in higher party group voting unity scores.

[21] Written (and thus secret) voting is a third procedure voting, which is used when parliament votes on appointments (articles 74 to 86). This practice is, for example, nowadays used for the appointment of the Speaker of the House, for which it was first used in 2002 with the election of Frans Weisglas (VVD) as Speaker.

[22] For the years before party group positions were registered in the parliamentary records (*Handelingen der Staten-Generaal*) voting positions were inferred from party groups' (MPs' positions taken in the earlier debate. One drawback of this method is that it does not take into account that party groups may have changed their position between the debate and the vote, without affecting the outcome of the decision. This is quite unlikely, however.

[23] Both the gavel procedure and the regular voting procedure are usually categorized as anonymous voting in comparative studies on parliamentary voting procedures (Saalfeld, 1995, 532-533). Since 1969, however, the parliamentary records include the positions of party groups for regular votes, thus making the positions of party groups public. Furthermore, individual MPs' can request that their vote be registered, meaning that MPs can make their own position public if they wish to do so.

(Pippel, 1950, 364), presumably to save time. This practice was formalized in the constitution of 1887, with the inclusion of the clause that voting takes place if requested by any one MP. When exactly the practice of regular voting was implemented is unclear. In an earlier publication on the workings of parliament, Van Raalte (1959, 190) mentions that the method of rising in place, which constituted the 'regular' voting procedure at the time and is referred to as chamber gymnastics (*kamergymnastiek*),[24] was used only sporadically until the increase in the number of parliamentary seats from 100 to 150 in 1956, which made the use of the roll call voting procedure even more time-consuming than before.[25] The method of rising in place was formalized as the regular voting procedure in the Second Chamber's Standing Orders in 1967 (Wolters, 1984), and was itself formally replaced by the show of hands procedure in 1983.

The parliamentary records (*Handelingen der Staten-Generaal)* include almost 60,000 substantive matters that were put to a vote between 1946 and 2010, including amendments (31 percent), bills (8 percent) and motions (56 percent). The changes in voting procedures described above in part can account for the decrease in the number and relative share of roll call votes between 1946 and 2010: in the earlier parliamentary terms, around half of all votes were taken by roll call (see Table 6.6). In total, however, only about 1,750 votes (3 percent of all votes) were taken by roll call since the first election after the Second World War, out of which 1,107 took place before the formalization of the method of rising in place in 1967, and a total of 1,464 before 1983 when the show of hands procedure was implemented. Since then, the percentage share of roll call votes per parliamentary term dropped to around one percent or less, although in absolute terms, the number of roll call votes taken per parliamentary term increased again slightly since the second half of the 1990s.

A word on absence

As mentioned in chapter 3, abstention and absenteeism (non-voting) are generally ignored in studies of party group unity (but see Carey (2007, 2009) for exceptions). Abstention is formally not possible when voting in the Dutch parliament. MPs can implicitly abstain by not showing up in parliament or a voting session, or by leaving the floor during a particular vote (Bovend'Eert and Kummeling, 2010, 526). This type of 'abstention' is often of a symbolic nature: an MP may not agree with his party group's position on a particular vote, but not disagree enough to actually vote against his group, or may even have been requested by his party group to leave the floor rather than publicly vote against the party line.[26] For a vote held by the regular show of hands procedure these purposive absences have no effect on the end result because the MPs who are present

[24] This is still the official procedure in the Dutch Senate (*Eerste Kamer*) (Bovend'Eert and Kummeling, 2010, 526).

[25] Bovend'Eert and Kummeling (2010, 528) note that a roll call vote takes between six and eight minutes. This does not include the time it takes for MPs to make their way to the floor.

[26] It is, however, difficult to distinguish between symbolic absenteeism and absence brought about by, for example, MPs who leave the floor to attend to a phone call or visit the restroom.

on the floor are held to vote for all the members of their party group, and voting is registered per party group. For roll call votes, however, absences can influence the end result of a vote, since a majority of the total number of MPs signed in as present in the building is required for the vote to pass.[27]

Sometimes roll call votes are requested purposely when the absence of MPs is known to other party groups. In 1994 during the formation of the first Purple coalition, for example, the opposition parties *GroenLinks*, VVD and D66 asked for a roll call on a motion that prohibited the caretaker Minister of Internal Affairs (Ed van Thijn, PvdA) and the caretaker Minister of Justice (Ernst Hirsch Ballin, CDA) to continue their involvement with the Interregional Criminal Investigation Team (*Interregionaal Rechercheteam*, IRT) for the remainder of the cabinet formation period (Boom and Voorn, 1994). That evening, a number of MPs were participating in the filming of the amusement program 'Star Battle' *(Sterrenslag*) and were called back to parliament for the vote. Of the MPs who were on the set of the TV program, two VVD MPs, Robin Linschoten and Anne Lize van der Stoel, and one from *GroenLinks*, Marijke Vos, did manage to make it to parliament in time for the vote. The PvdA MPs Henk Vos and Evan Rozenblad, however, arrived in parliament after the vote had already taken place. The motion was accepted (61 against 59 votes) and led to the resignation of both caretaker ministers.

Absence during roll call voting can further be used to stall for time. In 1955, for example, the Communist party was able to prevent a vote from taking place by first requesting a roll call vote, and then having all its MPs stand behind the green curtain at the back of the plenary hall, thereby ensuring that the vote could not take place because the quorum of MPs for the vote to be valid was not met (Van Raalte, 1959, 189). A more recent example is that of the PVV in 2012, when its party leader Geert Wilders requested a roll call vote because he wanted to delay voting on the European Stability Mechanisms (ESM) pending a court case (NOS, 2012). There are, however, very few cases of recorded absences during roll call votes. This might indeed be because absenteeism is used to stop a vote from taking place by not meeting the necessary quota (and therefore there is no record of the vote), or MPs might not even sign in to parliament on the day they plan to symbolically abstain. Both seem unlikely to occur frequently, however.

Of all votes included in the data set based on the parliamentary records, there are about 1,000 recorded absences. Of these absences, 90 percent were recorded during a single parliamentary term (1982-1986). Those mainly responsible for these absences during that period are Hans Janmaat (40 percent), who was the only representative for the Center Party (*Centrumpartij*), the independent Jan-Nico Scholten (25 percent) and, to a lesser extent, Cathy Ubels (12 percent) from the Christian-progressive EVP (*Evangelische Volkspartij*) and Gert Schutte (12 percent) from the Orthodox Protestant GVP *(Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond*). As a rule, therefore, absences that are recorded are a characteristic of small party groups consisting of only one, occasionally two, MPs. This makes sense since if these MPs are not present on the plenary floor themselves there is

[27] There are also cases of the informal practice of 'pairing' between government and opposition MPs who cannot be present in parliament during a roll call vote. It is, however, not possible to ascertain whether pairing occurred during a particular vote because there is no formal record of the practice.

no one to cast a vote for their part group, and therefore the parliamentary records show that they (and their entire party group) are absent. As parliamentary party groups consisting of only one member are not included in the calculation of party group unity and dissent scores below (because there is always perfect party group unity in a group consisting of only one representative), absenteeism can safely be ignored for the purpose of this study.

Frequency of MPs' dissent

Previous studies on voting in the Dutch Second Chamber, of which there are only a few, show that party voting unity is high, even near complete (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a, 4). One of the earliest analyses of roll call votes was conducted by Tazelaar (1974) who covered the end of the period of pillarization, and estimated that for the six largest parties during the De Jong Cabinet (1967-1971) party group unanimity varied between 92 and 98 percent (cited in Wolters, 1984, 183). Visscher (1994) also looked at party group unity in the period between 1963 and 1986, and concluded that although there was slightly higher disunity during the Den Uyl Cabinet (1973-1977), unity was almost complete during the rest of the period, especially in the larger parliamentary party groups. Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 658) provide information on voting between 1998 and 2008. During this period parliament voted a total of 14,532 times out of which there were only 67 votes (0.46 percent) in which at least one MP (1.37 on average) deviated from the party group line.

Table 6.4 shows the percentage of votes in which at least one MP voted differently than the majority of his party group, for all groups combined (excluding those with only one seat) in each parliamentary term since the first election after the Second World War.[28] On average, dissent occurs quite infrequently in the Dutch parliament; in less than 1 percent of all votes did at least one MP vote against his party group. The frequency of dissent also decreased over time. Starting at around 8 percent in the 1946-1948 parliamentary term, the frequency of dissent increased slightly during the parliamentary terms in the first half of the 1960s, but dropped to around 2 percent at the start of the 1970s, and continued to decrease to even less than 0.1 percent as of the end of the 1990s.

The average frequency of dissent is higher for the roll call votes (about 8 percent) than regular votes (less than 1 percent). For roll call votes, there are two noteworthy outliers. During the 1963-1967 term at least one MP deviated from the party group line in 21 percent of the 127 roll call votes held. Roll call vote dissent occurred most frequently in three parties during this term: the KVP (43 times), the ARP (25 times) and PvdA (22 times) (not shown in Table 6.4). The KVP managed to bring down two governments led by prime ministers from its own party during that period. The first, the

[28] There is no statistically significant relationship between the types of proposals (amendments, bills or motions) and party voting unity, therefore the analysis below only focuses on the differences between the method of voting, regular and roll call. Furthermore, four percent of proposal types are unknown, and there are a few votes that took place for which the method of voting is unknown. These are excluded from the analysis.

Table 6.4: Percentage of votes in which party group unity was not complete in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010 (%)

Start term	Parties (n)	All votes	(n)	Regular votes	(n)	Roll call votes	(n)
1946	7	8.3	88	0.6	1	9.8	87
1948	8	5.2	202	3.5	51	6.2	151
1952	8	5.2	196	2.6	60	8.2	136
1956	7	6.5	106	3.3	27	9.9	79
1959	8	10.0	189	5.0	40	13.8	149
1963	10	8.2	166	3.7	35	21.0	131
1967	11	2.5	363	1.8	239	7.2	124
1971	14	2.2	152	1.8	119	11.3	33
1972	14	2.6	746	2.3	640	7.6	106
1977	11	0.7	226	0.7	211	5.7	12
1981	10	0.4	32	0.4	32	0.0	0
1982	12	0.2	95	0.2	89	5.5	6
1986	9	0.3	40	0.2	31	18.8	9
1989	9	0.2	77	0.3	75	2.6	2
1994	12	0.2	76	0.1	57	4.0	19
1998	9	0.1	47	0.1	42	1.0	5
2002	10	0.1	14	0.0395	4	6.8	10
2003	9	0.1	78	0.1	69	2.3	9
2006	10	0.0159	12	0.0133	10	0.6	2
2010	10	0.0078	5	0.0	0	1.1	5
Mean / total	10	0.6	2,910	0.4	1,832	7.6	1,078

χ^2 (1) = 12376.290, sig. = .000; φ = -.157 sig. = .000
(total votes, regular versus roll call)

Marijnen Cabinet, fell because of inter-party and intra-party disagreement about the government's public broadcasting policy and advertisement revenues from public channels (Van der Heiden, 2010).[29] The Cals Cabinet, which was formed near the end of 1965, was brought down by its own party group leader Norbert Schmelzer during the 1966 parliamentary budget debates (*Algemene Beschouwingen*), when he introduced a motion asking the government to take additional measure to decrease government expenditure. The motion was interpreted as a motion of no confidence by Prime Minister Jo Cals, who resigned that same evening (known as the 'Night of Schmelzer') (Van Kessel,

[29] The motion-Baeten, introduced by a KVP MP, called the Marijnen Cabinet to make haste in making its position on the matter public, which indirectly led to the fall of the Cabinet (Van der Heiden, 2010, 155-166).

Table 6.5: Percentage of votes in which party group unity was not complete in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD averages only (%)

Party	All votes	(n)	Regular votes	(n)	Roll call votes	(n)
CDA*	2.1	1,366	1.2	720	13.9	646
PvdA	1.0	557	0.7	373	10.5	184
VVD**	0.6	331	0.3	182	8.5	149

* Figures before 1977 include voting by the CDA's predecessors, the ARP, CHU and KVP.

** Figures before 1948 include voting by the VVD's predecessor, the PvdV (*Partij van de Vrijheid*).

2010). In both cases, the KVP parliamentary party group leadership turned against the government's position, forcing MPs to choose between the two.

Over the entire time period, the KVP is the party that suffered from the most frequent dissent during roll call votes. Dissent by at least one KVP MP occurred 278 times between 1946 and 1977, the year that the party first participated in elections under the flag of the CDA together with the ARP and the CHU. This may, in part, account for the high percentage in the frequency of dissent in the CDA over the entire period (13.9 percent, see Table 6.5) which includes the dissent within its predecessors. If only the parliamentary periods after the electoral merger of the three Christian parties in 1977 are included, the frequency of dissent during roll call votes for the CDA drops to 7.6 percent (6.3 percent for the PvdA and 3.4 percent for the VVD after 1977, not shown in Table 6.5), totaling 20 cases of dissent, of which 11 occurred during the first period after the electoral fusion.

A final noteworthy outlier shown in Table 6.4 is that during the 1986-1989 term there was dissent in almost 19 percent of roll call votes. Only nine roll call votes were held in total, however. Of these nine votes, MPs from the CDA and D66 did not vote in unison on one vote each, the PvdA did not vote as a unified bloc on three votes and the members of the VVD did not vote together on four votes. One of the issues that led to disunity in the PvdA and VVD was the continuation of the state-paid pension to the families of former MPs, brought about by the controversial case of the 'black widow', Florrie Rost van Tonningen-Heubel, whose husband had been an MP for the Nationalist-Socialist movement (*Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging*, NSB) before the Second World War.

In sum, the percentage of votes for which at least one MP voted differently from the majority of his party group is quite low, entailing that dissent occurs quite infrequently in the Dutch parliament. Moreover, the frequency of dissent has actually decreased over time, which is not what would be expected if the changes in the electoral arena had affected MP behavior in the legislative arena as predicted by the two-arena model.

Rice scores

The most common party group unity score is the Rice score, named after Stuart Rice (1925), which is calculated per party group (i) per vote (j) by taking the absolute difference in the percentage of votes for and votes against. The Rice score can range from 0 (when an equal number of MPs from the same party group vote Aye and Nay, in other words, the party is split on the vote) to 100 (all MPs from the same party group vote the same).

$$RICE_{ij} = \frac{|\%Aye_{ij} - \%Nay_{ij}|}{\%Aye_{ij} + \%Nay_{ij}}$$

As suspected, party group unity has always been high in the Netherlands, with the average Rice scores for all votes starting out at 96.32 percent during the 1946-1948 parliamentary term, and averaging at 99.81 percent for the entire period (see Table 6.6). One can still detect an increase in party group unity, however, as at the end of the 1960s party group unity for all votes increased to above 99 percent, after which it continued to increase, reaching over 99.99 percent in the latest term investigated (2006-2010). The only political party to go below 99.90 percent since the turn of the century is the LPF (99.78 percent in 2002-2003 and 99.88 percent 2003-2006, not shown in Table 6.6).

When it comes to regular votes, new and small party groups have relatively low Rice scores. The party with the lowest Rice score for regular votes (85.11 percent) is the NMP (*Nederlandse Middenstandspartij*), a party aimed at representing the interests of business owners and entrepreneurs, which was only in parliament for one short term between 1971 and 1972. The party group consisted of two MPs of whom one (De Jong) defected and became an independent in 1971 (see Table 6.3). The left-socialist PSP (*Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij*) comes second in terms of the lowest Rice score for regular votes, scoring 92.53 percent in its first parliamentary term in 1959-1963, and together with the Reformed SGP (*Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij*) (97.31 percent, three seats) and the communist CPN (*Communistische Partij van Nederland*) (95.50 percent, three seats) pulls down the average for the 1959-1963 parliamentary period. (Interestingly, these three parties score the highest Rice scores for roll call votes during this period.) Starting in the 1977-1981 period, no party group, large or small, has scored below 99.76 percent for regular votes (not shown in Table 6.6). Thus, although the introduction of more new parties, which could be ascribed to the increase in electoral volatility and partisan dealignment, has led to an increase in the number of MPs who leave their party but stay in parliament since the 2000s (see subsection 6.3.1), it does not seem to have had an effect on party group voting unity.

There is a statistically significant difference in average party group unity between roll call and regular votes. Over the entire period, party group unity averaged 97.06 percent for all roll call votes and 99.89 percent for all regular votes. The difference is greatest during the 1986-1989 period, the only time when the average Rice score for all party groups combined dipped below 90 percent for roll call votes (of which there were 8 that period). D66 (93.75 percent), the PvdA (79.87 percent) and the VVD (65.00 percent) score their lowest average Rice score for roll call votes in this period, the VVD's

Table 6.6: Average party group unity in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010 (Rice score)

Start term	Parties (n)	All votes	(n)	Regular votes	(n)	Roll call votes	(n)
1946	7	96.3215	162	99.8918	24	95.6484	138
1948	8	97.8546	587	98.5462	210	97.4426	377
1952	8	97.9735	526	98.9185	289	96.6750	237
1956	7	97.8219	234	98.9612	114	96.6442	120
1959	8	96.2602	256	97.9663	102	94.9957	154
1963	10	96.9950	236	98.8805	105	95.3674	131
1967	11	99.2239	1,187	99.4835	1,034	97.2668	153
1971	14	99.2463	588	99.4141	562	95.3699	26
1972	14	99.1685	2,247	99.2769	2,137	96.9910	110
1977	11	99.8671	4,629	99.8807	4,589	98.2127	40
1981	10	99.9288	806	99.9283	802	100.0000	4
1982	12	99.9679	5,953	99.9733	5,941	97.2676	12
1986	9	99.9140	2,644	99.9494	2,636	88.2493	8
1989	9	99.9669	4,255	99.9674	4,244	99.7852	11
1994	12	99.9508	4,078	99.9678	4,033	98.2537	45
1998	9	99.9831	5,054	99.9838	4,995	99.9120	59
2002	10	99.9668	952	99.9951	937	98.0039	15
2003	9	99.9763	5,933	99.9792	5,890	99.5749	43
2006	10	99.9981	7,541	99.9982	7,505	99.9627	36
2010	10	99.9985	6,304	100.0000	6,256	99.7911	48
Mean / total n	10	99.8163	54,172	99.8973	52,405	97.0630	1,767

F-test = 45,868.456 (sig. = .000);
t-test (df = 14,243.430) = 26.449 (sig. = 000)
(total votes, regular versus roll call votes means, equal variance not assumed)

score being the lowest average party group unity score for roll call votes in the Dutch parliament in the entire period under study. The CDA's score on roll call votes in 1986-1989 period (91.00 percent) also comes close to its lowest score (89.69 percent in 1977-1981, the first parliamentary term after its electoral fusion) (not shown in Table 6.6). If the CDA's and VVD's predecessors are included in the calculation of its average Rice score for the entire period since the first election after the end of the Second World War, their party group unity scores are pulled down (see the bottom of Table 6.6). If only the period after the electoral fusion of the CDA in 1977 is considered, the party group unity scores of the three largest parties is well above 99 percent for roll call votes (99.94 for both the CDA and the PvdA, and 99.96 for the VVD).

Table 6.7: Average party group unity in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (Rice score)

Party	All votes	(n)	Regular votes	(n)	Roll call votes	(n)
CDA*	99.3626	66,192	99.7294	61,556	94.4926	4,636
PvdA	99.8099	54,157	99.8976	52,404	97.1905	1,753
VVD**	99.8236	53,995	99.9301	52,404	96.6356	1,751

* Figures before 1977 include voting by the CDA's predecessors, the ARP, CHU and KVP.

** Figures before 1948 include voting by the VVD's predecessor, the PvdV.

At first glance, the difference in party group unity between regular and roll call votes does seem to hint that roll call votes are requested strategically when MPs or party groups suspect disunity in other groups, as suggested by Depauw and Martin (2009). When one looks closely at the parliamentary records, however, it is often the Speaker of the House who asks for the vote to take place by roll call. This request by the Speaker usually coincides with a prior debate in which it is clear that there are MPs who wish to vote differently from the other members of their party group, or immediately after a regular vote has already taken place for which the result is unclear. These differences in voting unity between regular and roll call votes provides evidence for the claim by Carrubba et al. (2008) and Hug (2010) that relying only on roll call votes to gauge party group unity may lead to selection biases. Most important for the study at hand, however, is the finding that in terms of their Rice-scores on both regular and roll call votes, parties' voting unity is very high in the Dutch parliament, and has actually increased over time.

Number of dissenting MPs

Table 6.8 the depth of dissent, i.e., the number of MPs who vote differently from the majority of their party group (Kam, 2009), per parliamentary term. Dissent is usually limited to one MP, and the general trend is that the depth of dissent also decreased over time. Whereas the depth of dissent for roll call votes was highest in the terms before 1971, for regular votes dissent was deepest during the terms between 1967 and 1977.

Over the entire period, the cases of deepest dissent occurred in the KVP, with 48 cases of six or more MPs dissenting on regular votes in the period before 1977, and 85 cases of six or more MPs voting against the party group on roll call votes (not shown in Table 6.8). Of the latter, 38 occurred in the 1972-1977 parliamentary term, during which the KVP participated in government together with the ARP, PvdA, PPR and D66. The KVP and ARP had, however, already committed themselves to formation of the CDA with the CHU, which was left out of the cabinet. Whereas the PvdA and D66 considered the cabinet to be a parliamentary cabinet (which entails that there is a detailed coalition agreement that is influenced by, and can count on the support of, the parliamentary

Table 6.8: Number of dissenting MPs in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010

	Regular votes (n)								Roll call votes (n)							
Start term	1	2	3	4	5	6+	Split	Total	1	2	3	4	5	6+	Split	Total
1946	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	38	18	9	5	3	7	7	87
1948	33	7	1	1	0	1	8	51	69	33	17	8	2	19	3	151
1952	37	15	2	1	0	0	5	60	58	32	13	8	8	8	9	136
1956	18	7	1	0	0	1	0	27	39	10	7	5	3	15	0	79
1959	27	4	4	2	0	0	3	40	56	21	18	13	10	27	4	149
1963	25	2	6	1	0	1	0	35	40	23	17	12	7	25	7	131
1967	109	53	20	22	11	23	1	239	45	20	18	12	6	17	6	124
1971	58	24	13	10	8	5	1	119	10	7	3	2	4	7	0	33
1972	309	120	73	41	15	78	4	640	55	17	7	4	7	13	3	106
1977	85	41	32	3	8	42	0	211	4	0	2	2	0	7	0	12
1981	14	9	3	1	2	3	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	39	21	7	3	3	16	0	89	1	0	1	0	0	2	2	6
1986	12	1	3	0	0	15	0	31	1	1	0	0	0	7	0	9
1989	56	5	5	2	1	6	0	75	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
1994	41	14	1	1	0	0	0	57	9	5	1	0	0	3	1	19
1998	32	8	2	0	0	0	0	42	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	5
2002	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	1	2	0	0	1	0	10
2003	61	5	1	2	0	0	0	69	6	1	0	1	1	0	0	9
2006	8	1	0	0	0	1	0	10	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
2010	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	5
Total %	52.9	18.4	9.5	4.9	2.6	10.5	1.2	100	41.6	17.6	10.9	6.7	4.7	14.7	3.9	100
Total n	969	337	174	90	48	192	22	1,832	448	190	117	72	51	158	42	1,078

party groups), the Christian parties ARP and KVP viewed the Den Uyl Cabinet as extra-parliamentary (because there was no real coalition agreement, but a coalition program to which the parliamentary party groups were not bound) (*Parlement & Politiek*, 2015b, 2015c).

In this first parliamentary term after the electoral list fusion of the Christian parties 1977, dissent occurred both frequently and deeply in CDA party group, with in total almost 100 cases of dissent (86 during regular voting and 11 during roll call) of which there were 24 occurrences of more than six MPs dissenting (18 on regular votes and six roll call votes) (not shown in Table 6.8). During the 1980s, the frequency and depth of dissent in the CDA subsided. Since the 1990s, the CDA has joined the VVD as one of the two (large) parties with the deepest dissent.

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the depth of dissent is very limited in the Dutch parliament. The deepest case of dissent has involved the PvdA party group.[30] In 2003, four PvdA MPs voted against their party group's position that favored sending troops to Iraq. Several PvdA MPs also voted against their party's position on the introduction of an automatic organ donor registration system. A recent outlier is the 2003-2006 parliamentary term, during which there were a total of 69 cases of dissent (including those in the PvdA mentioned above). 18 of these cases occurred in the relatively young and troubled LPF, which suffered from a few party group defections as well (see subsection 6.3.1). Finally, VVD MP Stef Blok was responsible for six of these recent cases of dissent because he repeatedly voted against his party group on the day that the final report 'Building Bridges' (*Bruggen slaan*) of the parliamentary committee investigating the integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands was voted on in parliament in 2004. Stef Blok was the chairman of the committee.

Finally, whereas dissent by one or two MPs is, if it occurs, generally a characteristic of large parties in the Dutch parliament, party groups splitting on a vote (when half the party votes yea and the other half votes nay) is a characteristic of small parties with fewer than six legislative seats (not shown Table 6.8). The CHU, a medium sized party, the seat number of which ranged from eight to thirteen between 1946 and 1977, also managed to split on twelve roll call votes. All in all, however, the number of MPs who dissent is usually limited, and the number of cases in which more than one MP dissents from the majority of his party group has decreased over time.

The descriptive statistics above show that party group unity in the Netherlands has not only remained strong over time, but that it has actually increased in strength. There are very few cases of MPs leaving their party but remaining in parliament (we can say little about those who left parliament, however), and although there seems to be an increase in the number of party group defections over time, these defections have generally been limited to a number of new parties represented in parliament since the 2000s. We see this same pattern in terms of the difference between new and established parties in party groups' Rice scores, albeit that the pattern is limited to an earlier period in time; since the end the 1970s, party group unity has almost always been above 99.9

[30] Overall the PvdA comes in second in terms of the depth of dissent over the entire period of study, with 46 roll call and 85 regular votes in which more than six MPs dissented.

percent, and both the frequency and depth of dissent have decreased over time.

6.4 Expectations

Given our findings above, it would seem that the legislative arena is insulated from changes in the electoral arena, since electoral volatility and partisan dealignment seem to have had little effect on party group unity in terms of defections and legislative voting, especially when it comes to established parties. It could also be that the changes in the electorate have affected some of the pathways to party group unity (i.e., the legislative arena is not insulated from the electoral arena), but that party groups' procedural advantages within the legislature are strong enough to elicit party group unity anyway. From the perspective of political parties, however, one could argue that relying solely on the rules in the legislative arena would be a risky strategy. It seems more likely that parties have actively taken measures, in both the legislative and electoral arena, to counteract the effects of electoral volatility and partisan dealignment on their MPs' legislative behavior. Taking the perspective of 'parties as organizations', we hypothesize how parties have tried to strengthen each of the pathways to party group unity, and thus influence the associated MP decision-making algorithm that is central to this book. We then test these expectations using the 1972, 1978, 1990, 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Studies, and the Dutch data from the 2010 PartiRep survey.

6.4.1 Division of labor

Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) contend that cue-taking is encouraged by the Dutch parliament's specialized committee system. As mentioned above, committee membership is distributed proportionally to party groups (with special consideration paid to smaller party groups), and thus within each party group MPs specialize in, and/or act as spokespersons for, the issue areas dealt with in their parliamentary committee(s). Larger party groups usually also have their own internal system of committees, often mirroring those in parliament. This entails, however, that MPs are more likely to rely on their fellow party group members for voting advice when it comes to issues outside of their own portfolio (and those not included in the party program, or in the case of government participation, the coalition agreement). Moreover, MPs may be encouraged to not interfere with the policy areas of their fellow party group members in exchange for more independence and freedom in their own issue area, as part of a tacit tit-for-tat agreement within the party group (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a).

Even though the number of specialized committees was reduced from 29 permanent committees in 1990 to only 13 in 2006 (Oldersma, 1997, 147-148; Van Vonno, 2012, 131) there has been an overall increase in the number of committee meetings over time, whereas the number of plenary meetings has remained relatively stable since the 1970s (see Table 6.9). This means that MPs spend more time working within their own committees, thus strengthening the division of labor in parliament as a whole, but also within party groups. This also means that MPs are likely to be increasingly reliant on

Table 6.9: Use of parliamentary rights in the Second Chamber of the Dutch National Parliament 1956-2012

Period	Meeting		Legislation			Oversight		
	Plenary	Committee	Government bills	Private member bill	Amendments	Written questions	Urgent debates	Resolutions
1956-1960	74	273	258	0	101	228	6	-
1960-1964	79	354	251	1	187	268	5	20
1964-1968	58	368	281	1	130	621	3	63
1968-1972	87	639	269	7	262	1389	15	171
1972-1976	100	597	271	3	493	1498	12	249
1976-1980	94	736	298	5	728	1532	15	639
1980-1984	96	1124	318	4	1483	1305	15	831
1984-1988	102	1286	259	7	1460	1011	15	597
1988-1992	99	1078	261	3	1085	736	12	872
1992-1996	100	1051	270	6	1030	990	9	535
1996-2000	103	1429	248	6	1188	1571	8	898
2000-2004	97	1367	259	10	na	1692	9	1118
2004-2008	102	1475	249	13	na	2147	37	1470
2008-2012	107	1594	240	11	510	2902	61	2643

Source: Andeweg and Irwin (2014, 172)

their fellow party group members for voting advice when it comes to issues dealt with in other committees. As there have been no changes in the parliamentary rules in terms of the number of required committee meetings, the increase in the number of committee meetings has probably been initiated by MPs and their party groups themselves. In addition, even though the number of government and private member bills has remained relatively stable, the total number of amendments and resolutions has increased over time, entailing that more votes are taken in parliament.[31] MPs are thus required to vote on more topics, and again, the majority of these votes will probably be about issues that do not fall within their area of specialization. Add to this the fact that MPs spend more time in their committees, and therefore have less time to form an opinion on all matters that fall outside their own portfolio, it is likely that MPs increasingly rely on the cues given to them by their fellow party group members. The hypothesis is therefore that *cue-taking as a result of the division of labor in the Dutch national parliament has increased over time (H1).*

6.4.2 Party agreement

Whereas cue-taking as a decision-making mechanism is relevant under the condition that MPs do not always have the time or resources to form their own opinion, party agreement, as a determinant of party group unity, involves MPs voting together on the basis of shared ideological and policy preferences (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Kam, 2009; Krehbiel, 1993). In other words, there are issues, usually ideologically charged, on which MPs simply agree with each other and with the position of their party as a whole and their party group in particular. Since this is a relatively 'easy' pathway to party group unity, the expectation is that political party (group) leaders prefer to maximize the homogeneity of policy preferences of their (candidate) MPs in order to decrease the likelihood of disagreement in the first place, thereby limiting the need for alternative mechanisms to elicit party group unity, such as discipline. The necessity and advantages of including MPs with specific expertise and backgrounds in certain specific policy areas, however, means that those are responsible for the recruitment and initial selection of candidates for the electoral list cannot only take (candidate) MPs' agreement with the party program and electoral manifesto into consideration during the recruitment and selection process. Moreover, there may also be electoral reasons to select particular candidates who may not be in complete agree with the party on all issues, but who is deemed to be attractive to certain (groups of) voters. Parties' ability to influence party agreement is argued to be determined by the electoral system and parties' candidate selection procedures, as well as the process of deliberation that takes place within the parliamentary party group. One could argue that in the Netherlands, the combination of the party-oriented electoral system and parties' relative freedom when it comes to candidate selection, enable 'parties-as-organizations' to extend their procedural advan-

[31] This increase in parliamentary activity could also be offered as an example of decentralized political behavioral personalization (see subsection 2.4.2 in chapter 2). Our interest in it here, however, is its consequence for MPs' sequential decision-making process.

tages over individuals into the electoral arena.

Rahat and Hazan (2001) offer a framework to classify parties' candidate selection methods according to four dimensions, of which the decentralization of selection methods (where, or at what level of the party organization, are candidates selected?)[32] and the inclusiveness of selectorate (who can select candidates?) are most relevant to the discussion at hand.[33] The more the candidate selection process is controlled by the national party leadership (i.e., the more centralized the method and the less inclusive the selectorate), the more it is able to control the final composition of the list, and thereby maximize the homogeneity of policy preferences among its MPs. At first sight, candidate selection in the Netherlands has changed such that we may expect party agreement to have decreased over time.

In the Netherlands there has always been minimal state interference when it comes to candidate selection, leaving political parties free to organize it as they see fit. According to Hazan and Voerman (2006, 155), the 1917 change in the electoral system to one of Proportional Representation, which treats the entire country as one constituency, enabled the centralization of candidate selection procedures in the hands of the national party executive, which was responsible for the recruitment and selection of candidates, and the drafting of the provisional list. The provisional list was then put to party members who could influence the ranking of candidates indirectly via representatives at party conferences or directly via membership ballots. Although the involvement of party members (or their representatives) in the finalization of the candidacy list means that parties' selectorates can be classified as rather inclusive, this stage of candidate selection generally did not affect the composition of the list; at most a candidate was moved up or down a few slots (Lucardie and Voerman, 2004; Hazan and Voerman, 2006).

In the 1960s a number of parties abolished individual members' votes, resulting in a less inclusive selectorate, and instead gave regional party organizations a greater say in the composition of the provisional list, which entailed a more decentralized procedure and limited the power of the national party organization. In the early 1990s candidate selection procedures again became more centralized, as for example in both the PvdA and VVD the power of the regions over the provisional list was taken away and given back to the central party organization. In return, local representatives at the party conference were granted the final vote, thereby again increasing the inclusiveness of the selectorate. By the early 2000s, most parties further democratized their candidate selection procedures allowing for direct participation by their members in the selection of candidates and/or the leading candidate or 'list-puller' (*lijsttrekker*) (who are then placed first on the list), making the selectorate even more inclusive (Hazan and Voerman, 2006; Hillebrand, 1992; Koole and Leijenaar, 1988; Lucardie and Voerman, 2007).

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[32] Above, the degree of decentralization is described as territorial. It can, however, also be functional (i.e., including the functional representation of women, minorities, etc.) (Rahat and Hazan, 2001, 304).

[33] The other two dimensions deal with who can be selected (with the entire electorate representing the most inclusive pole and the restriction to only party membership plus additional requirements (such as length of party membership) at the most exclusive end of the continuum) and how candidates are nominated (by voting procedures or appointment) (Rahat and Hazan, 2001).

Today, in most political parties it is the national party executive that dominates the preparatory phase and coordination of candidate selection. The national party executive formulates a set of candidate selection criteria (such as age, regional origin and policy specialization) and appoints a special selection (and sometimes recruitment) committee, which makes recommendations to the executive, which in turn drafts a provisional list (Lucardie and Voerman, 2007). Informally, however, party executives and special committees often consult the parliamentary party group leadership in evaluating incumbent MPs, who thus play an advisory role (Louwerse and Van Vonno, 2012). Hazan and Voerman (2006, 150, 155) categorize today's candidate selection procedures as centralized, given the role of the national party executive and the fact that in most parties selection takes place at the national level, and quite inclusive, as a result of party members' formal involvement in the finalization of the candidacy list and their ability to vote on leading candidates. [34]

Hazan and Voerman (2006, 149, 158) argue that increasing the inclusiveness of the selectorate could lead candidates to employ more individualistic strategies as a means of appealing to party members in order to increase their chances of (re-)selection. If successful, this could influence the composition of the candidate list, resulting in the nomination of candidates whose preferences are more akin to the party membership instead of the party leadership. In her analysis of policy preference congruence between CDA, PvdA, VVD and D66 party members and their representatives in parliament in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, Den Ridder (2014, 200-226, 331) finds that although preference homogeneity is generally lower among party members than among their representatives, the level of average congruence between the preferences of party members and their representatives in parliament is quite high and has not systematically increased or decreased over time. This suggests that the effects of party democratization are likely to be limited in terms of party group preference homogeneity in the legislative arena.

In addition, Hazan and Voerman (2006, 149) argue that a high degree of centralization in the hands of the national party organization can minimize the effect of increased inclusiveness. Indeed, the fact that the provisional lists presented by the party executive and/or selection committees remain largely unaltered indicates that the direct influence of party members remains minimal. This, and the fact that the composition of the list and the order in which candidates are placed is also difficult to overturn at the electoral stage, means that political parties, and especially the party leadership and national executive, have a strong procedural advantage over the individual in the electoral arena (Bowler, 2000; Sieberer, 2006).

Given that the influence of party democratization is probably quite limited, and the national party organizations have reestablished their centralized control over candidate

[34] Selection procedures are less centralized and more inclusive in *GroenLinks*, which formally does not involve the executive; the party council appoints a committee that makes recommendations to the party conference. And the members of D66 are allowed to express their preferences for the candidate list by means of postal ballot, on the basis of which an advisory committee (appointed by the party conference) determines the ranking on a provisional list, which is then put to the party conference. The final exception is the PVV, which formally has only one member (the party leader Geert Wilders) who makes all decisions himself, making its selection procedure very centralized and exclusive (Lucardie and Voerman, 2007).

selection, it is likely that, in an attempt to curtail the potential effects of partisan dealignment, parties have made an effort to select candidates whose policy positions are in agreement and closely match those stipulated in the party program and electoral manifesto, thereby increasing the homogeneity of the party group in parliament, and minimizing the need for alternative measures of maintaining party group unity. As a result of streamlining candidates in terms of policy positions, we expect that *party agreement in the Dutch national parliament increased over time (H2)*.

6.4.3 Party loyalty

In the case of disagreement with the party group line, an MP may still vote with the party group voluntarily because he subscribes to norms of party group loyalty and thus follows a 'logic of appropriateness'. Electoral volatility and partisan dealignment are argued to have a negative effect on party group loyalty because MPs may be more likely to choose to vote according to the position of other (potential) principals (i.e., voters) in the case of disagreement with the party group line. Although the decision to adhere to the norm of party group loyalty lies with the individual MP, party selectorates can try to influence the number of MPs in the parliamentary party group who adhere to the norm, and the extent to which MPs do so.

As is the case with party agreement, the national party leadership's centralized control over candidate selection plays a determining role when it comes the degree of solidarity in the party group. To a certain extent, candidates are socialized into norms of party group loyalty through their previous experience within the party or as party representatives at other levels of government (Asher, 1973; Crowe, 1983; Kam, 2009; Rush and Giddings, 2011), and being nominated as a candidate for the national parliament is considered a rewards for these former party activities (Secker, 2000, 300). Although the number of first-timers in parliament has increased over time as a result of both electoral volatility and party selectorates' own tendency to increasingly opt for new instead of incumbent candidates (Thomassen et al., 2014, 185-186), the percentage of MPs with previous party experience has remained relatively stable over time (Secker, 2000, 300; but also see *Parlement & Politiek* 2015d). Given the risks for party group unity associated with electoral volatility and partisan dealignment, candidates' previous track record when it comes to subscription to the norm of party group loyalty as a selection criterion has likely increased in importance over time. All in all, we expect that parties have been able to counteract the effects of electoral volatility and partisan dealignment, and that *party group loyalty in the Dutch national parliament has increased over time (H3)*.

6.4.4 Party discipline

Party discipline entails that an MP submits to the party group line involuntarily in response to (the promise or threat of) positive or negative sanctions by the party (group) leadership (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Crowe, 1983; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009). In this case, an MP disagrees with the party group line and either has not sufficiently internalized the norm of party group loyalty, or the conflict with the group's position is

so intense that it supersedes his loyalty. As highlighted elsewhere in this book, parties have a number of different tools through which they can attempt to persuade MPs to obey the party despite their disagreement and lack of loyalty. Within the parliamentary arena, parties' control over committee membership and issue spokesmanship serve as important procedural advantage that can be used to elicit MPs' obedience. MPs who follow the party group line can be rewarded with the more prestigious committees and topics, whereas those who defy the party group can have their committee membership and spokesmanship taken from them. The fact that in the Dutch parliament an increasing amount of parliamentary work takes place within parliamentary committees means that the impact of such punishments, as perceived by MPs, may have increased over time. Thus, although the actually use of committee membership and issue spokesmanship as a means of disciplining MPs may not have increased over time, one can argue that the party's carrots have become increasingly tasty and the sticks increasingly hard.

What has increased over time is the number of cabinet (junior) ministers with previous parliamentary experience. Before 1967, 53 percent of cabinet (junior) ministers had previously held the position of MP. Between 1967 and 1986 this percentage rose to 69 percent, but dropped to 61 percent between 1986 and 2006. In the period between 2007 and 2012, however, 81 percent of cabinet (junior) ministers had been an MP prior to their promotion to the government (Thomassen et al., 2014, 187), which means that (potentially) governing parties have probably increased the use of (the promise of) government positions as a positive incentive to influence MPs' behavior.

Again, candidate selection also serves as an important tool with which party (group) leaders can (promise to) reward or (threaten to) punish their MPs. Knowing that in many Dutch parties the national party executive and selection committee consult the party group when evaluating incumbent MPs (Louwerse and Van Vonno, 2012), recalcitrant MPs can be credibly threatened or actually punished with an unelectable slot on, or even removal from, the candidacy list. That candidate selection may be an important disciplinary tool is illustrated by an example offered by Koole and Leijenaar (1988, 205), who mention that the "...six CDA parliamentarians who voted against the installation of Cruise Missiles on Dutch Soil in 1986 paid the penalty by being relegated to much lower positions on the advisory list at the next election, although their supporters in the branches did manage to get them moved a little on the final list." Moreover, our earlier analysis of party discipline in the Dutch case in chapter 5, revealed that MPs consider being placed on an unelectable position on the party electoral list, or not being reselected at all, a likely response to an MP who repeatedly does not vote with the party group (see Table 5.26 in subsection 5.4.4). Furthermore, although the increase in electoral volatility has led to an increase in the number of seats exchanged between parties as a result of elections over time (see Table 6.1), the number of new MPs in parliament cannot sole be ascribed to changes in the electorate; parties themselves are increasing less likely to reselect incumbent MPs (Thomassen et al., 2014, 185-189; Van den Berg and Van den Braag, 2004, 69-71), making it more likely that party (group) leaders make good on their threat to not reselect MPs who disobey.

Moreover, whereas during the period of pillarization many MPs in the Netherlands were recruited from, but could also return to, the organizations within their pillar after

their time in politics (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a, 665), depillarization has meant that these ties between political parties and other societal organizations have disappeared, as has automatic recruitment and career advancement within the societal pillar. In addition, since the 1970s the position of MP has become a full-time profession. Although once in parliament an MP's income is secured because the party cannot legally oblige him to give up his seat, parties do control whether the MP will be selected for upcoming elections, and thus MPs are solely dependent on the party for their future income if they would like to pursue a career in politics. Both depillarization and professionalization entail that over time MPs have become more dependent on their political party for their career and livelihood, which means that the weight of candidate reselection as a disciplining tool has probably increased over time. All in all, we expect that as a pathway to party group unity, *party discipline in the Dutch parliament has increased over time (H4)*.

6.5 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in the Dutch Second Chamber

As stated, the Dutch case provides a unique opportunity to test the hypotheses developed above because the 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Studies[35] provide attitudinal data based on face-to-face interviews over a long span of time. As stated before, although we include data from the Dutch part of the most recent 2010 PartiRep MP Survey, we only include it in our discussion of longitudinal trends when the formulation of the questions and answering categories allows us to do so.

Although the response rate attained for the first surveys was 90 percent or more, there seems to be a trend towards a decrease in response rates with 76 percent of MPs participating in the 2006 survey, and only 43 percent in the PartiRep Survey in 2010 (see Table 6.10). Both the 2006 and 2010 surveys took place in the months prior to elections, however, which probably negatively influenced MPs' willingness to participate in the survey.[36] In addition to their regular parliamentary duties, most were also involved in

[35] Parts of the analyses in this section are replications of those found in Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a). The replications used the original 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Studies (i.e., raw data).

[36] When it comes to the timing of the surveys with respect to the elections for the Second Chamber, the interviews for the 1972 survey were held in the Spring of 1972, about one year after the scheduled April 1971 elections, and six months before the November 1972 elections, which were held as a result of the unexpected early fall of the Biesheuvel I Cabinet in July of that year. Most of the interviews for the 1979 survey were held in November and December 1978, more than two years after May 1977 elections, and two years before the May 1981 elections (the Van Agt I Cabinet completed its entire term). In 1990 the survey was held approximately one year after the September 1989 elections, and the next elections were held in May 1994 (the Lubbers II Cabinet also ran its entire term). The 2001 survey was held three years after the May 1998 elections, and one year before the scheduled elections in May 2002 (the Kok II Cabinet fell early, but only a few weeks before the scheduled elections). Finally, in both 2006 and 2010, the surveys were held in the months leading up to the elections for the Second Chamber. In 2006, early elections were held in November due to the fall of Balkenende II Cabinet that was caused by D66's withdrawal from government

electoral campaigning, and thus did not have the time to participate in the surveys.

The first four Dutch Parliamentary Surveys attained response rates above 90 percent, with the distribution of MPs among party groups, and governing or opposition parties, very closely matching those found in the Second Chamber at that time. For the 1972 survey, the respondents from the CDA's predecessors (ARP, CHU and KVP) are presented jointly (as was also done for the voting data); these parties fought under one electoral list as of the 1977 elections. For the 2006 survey, the response rate of MPs per party group varied from 38 to 100 percent, averaging at about 75 percent per party group. The ratio between respondents whose parties participated in government (48 percent) and those in the opposition (52 percent) is almost exactly the same as that in the parliament itself at the time. Because D66 ended support for the coalition and withdrew from the cabinet before the interviews were held (see footnote 36), it is coded as an opposition party. For the 2010 PartiRep Survey, the response rate of MPs per party group varied from 0 to 100 percent, the average being around 36 percent per party group. In this case, the PvdA had dropped out of government, and is thus treated as an opposition party. Still, respondents from government parties are slightly overrepresented: 37 percent of respondents are from governing parties, whereas 31 percent of the MPs in parliament were from governing parties when the 2010 PartiRep Survey was held.[37]

In previous chapters we were able to combine MPs' responses to different survey questions and follow an individual MP through the different steps of the decision-making sequence central to this study (excluding the division of labor pathway and the associated cue-taking mechanism). Although the mechanisms are ordered as stipulated in our sequential decision-making model, they are dealt with separately and at the aggregate MP level for each available survey. The reason is that because of the formulation and nature of some of the survey questions, especially those pertaining to the first two decision-making mechanisms (cue-taking and party agreement), it is not possible to track the number of MPs who move into the next stage of the decision-making sequence. Moreover, comparison over time is sometimes problematic, since not all of the questions that are used to gauge the four different decision-making mechanisms are included in all of the surveys, nor are they formulated consistently over time.[38]

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in June. In 2010, the PvdA dropped out of the Balkenende IV Cabinet in February and elections were held in June.

[37] Differences between MPs who belong to governing parties and those in opposition are only mentioned when these are statistically significant.

[38] Ideally, we would have connected MPs' survey answers to their actual voting behavior or defection. This would have made it possible to see whether an individual MP who (occasionally) votes against the party group, or leaves his parliamentary party group, differs from his peers in his application of the different decision-making mechanisms. Respondents were, however, guaranteed anonymity, and the fact that defections and voting dissent occur so very infrequently in the Dutch Parliament might have made it possible to identify individual MPs' responses.

Table 6.10: Dutch Parliamentary Studies and PartiRep MP Survey response rates for the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament

Year	Survey	Response	
		n	%
1972	Dutch Parliamentary Study	141	94
1979	Dutch Parliamentary Study	139	93
1990	Dutch Parliamentary Study	138	92
2001	Dutch Parliamentary Study	135	90
2006	Dutch Parliamentary Study	114	76
2010	*PartiRep MP Survey*	*65*	*43*

Note: The 1972, 1979, 1990 and 2001 Dutch Parliamentary Studies were financed by the Dutch National Science Foundation (*Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek*, NWO). The 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study was financed by the Dutch government's advisory Council on Public Administration (*Raad voor het openbaar bestuur*, ROB). The author would like to thank Rudy B. Andeweg and Jacques J.A. Thomassen for sharing these surveys. The 2010 PartiRep MP Survey was financed by the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office (BELSPO).

6.5.1 Division of labor

In the Dutch Parliamentary surveys, MPs were asked whether, when it comes to bills that they did not deal with themselves for the party group, they usually vote according to the advice of the parliamentary party spokesperson.[39] The figures in Table 6.11 indeed confirm that most MPs in the Dutch parliament usually rely on the voting cues provided by their fellow party group members. In line with our hypothesis, there also seems to be an increase in cue-taking over time: whereas in 1972 almost 80 percent indicated that MPs usually vote according to the advice given to them by their parliamentary party spokesperson, in the 2006 survey over 95 percent do so.[40]

[39] Respondents were asked to respond to the statement 'As an MP you usually vote according to the advice of the parliamentary party spokesperson when it comes to bills that you did not deal with yourself for the party group' (*Als Kamerlid stem je bij wetsvoorstellen die je niet zelf voor de fractie behandeld hebt, doorgaans volgens het advies van de fractiewoordvoerder*, translation CvV). The Dutch Parliamentary Studies surveys use different answering categories for the question used to gauge cue-taking. The 1972 and 1979 surveys provided respondents with three answering categories: 'that is the case', 'that is somewhat the case', and 'that is not the case'. The 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Studies asked respondents to answer whether they agree with the statement on a five-point ordinal scale. For presentation purpose the three answering categories from 1972 and 1979 are used, and those from the 2001 and 2006 surveys are combined: 'fully agree' and 'agree' are combined into 'that is the case', 'fully disagree' and 'disagree' are collapsed into 'that is not the case', and 'partly agree, partly disagree' is included in the middle category 'that is somewhat the case' (see Table 6.11).

[40] In the 2010 PartiRep Survey MPs were asked a different question, namely whether they agree with the statement that 'The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party's position on his/her

Table 6.11: 'As an MP you usually vote according to the advice of the parliamentary party spokesperson when it comes to bills that you did not deal with yourself for the party group' in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2006 (%)

	1972	1979	1990	2001	2006
That is the case	79	91	-	96	96
That is somewhat the case	19	8	-	2	5
That is not the case	2	1	-	2	0
Total %	100	100	-	100	100
Total n	99	138	-	135	110

χ^2 (6) = 27.830, sig. = .000; φc = .179, sig.=.000; gamma = -.495, sig. = .000

Table 6.12 shows what MPs' identify as the main decision-making center within their parliamentary party group. The question was included in the Dutch version of the 2010 PartiRep Survey, but unfortunately it was not a part of the 1972 Dutch Parliamentary Study questionnaire. Moreover, in 1990 it was only posed to members of the CDA, PvdA and VVD; MPs from small party groups were excluded. For the sake of comparison, the bottom of Table 6.12 shows only the responses of MPs from the three largest party groups for the other years as well. When comparing the top and bottom halves of the table, we see that the inclusion of small party groups is associated with a higher percentage of MPs identifying the weekly parliamentary party meeting (and to a lesser extent the party specialist) as the main decision-making center, especially in later years. That the percentage of MPs who identify the party group committee as most important is higher when only the CDA, PvdA and VVD are included makes sense since smaller political parties usually do not have a system of internal party group committees in which the spokespersons for adjacent policy areas meet. The percentage of MPs who identify the party group leadership as the main decision-making center is roughly the same whether small parties are included or not. When MPs from small parties are excluded,

topic'. 60 percent of MPs (mostly) agree that this is indeed the case, 19 percent (mostly) disagree, and 22 percent neither agree or disagree (not shown in Table 6.11). At first glance this could be taken an an indicator that the importance of cue-taking seems to have decreased since the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study. One should keep in mind, however, that although at the individual level an MP may take his voting cues from his fellow party group members, it may be quite another matter, from the perspective of an MP, to let one individual decide the position of the party as a whole. The party's position may already be formulated in the electoral manifesto or party program, for example, or may be broadly determined during the weekly parliamentary party group meeting. In other words, whereas the 2010 PartiRep question refers to the role of party group spokespersons in determining the party group position (and thus may be a better indicator of the division of labor within a party group), the Dutch Parliamentary Studies' question inquires into more specifically into the role of cue-taking in MPs' decision regarding their voting behavior.

Table 6.12: The main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1979-2010 (%)

All

	1979	1990	2001	2006	*2010*
Meeting	51	-	37	33	*59*
Committee	39	-	29	24	*19*
Specialist	8	-	27	34	*14*
Leadership	3	-	8	10	*9*
total %	100	-	100	101	*102*
total (n)	134	-	123	104	*58*

χ^2 (9) = 44.236, sig. = .000; φc = .188, sig. = .000

CDA, PvdA and VVD only

	1979	1990	2001	2006	*2010*
Meeting	48	26	27	32	*52*
Committee	43	53	39	31	*23*
Specialist	8	13	24	27	*16*
Leadership	2	9	10	11	*9*
total %	101	100	100	100	*100*
total (n)	120	102	90	82	*44*

χ^2 (12) = 46.438, sig. = .000; φc = .188, sig. = .000

the parliamentary party group meeting and committee rival each other as the main decision-making center, although the parliamentary committee seems to have been losing ground to the party group specialist (until the 2010 survey, see the discussion below). The increase in the importance of individual specialists as decision makers may provide some evidence as to the increased specialization and professionalization of MPs, and the consolidation of a strict division of labor within parliamentary party groups.

MPs' responses in 2010 are out of step with the earlier surveys, however.[41] The party group meeting is most important, at the expense of both the party group committee and specialist. At first glance, the increase in the importance of the party group meeting could be related to the decrease in the number of seats attained by the 'large' established

[41] The formulation of the question and available answering categories was exactly the same in all five surveys.

parties, which may, among other things, be the result of the increase in the number of party groups in parliament. For both the PvdA and VVD, the increase in the importance of the party group meeting is confined to the 2010 survey (not shown in Table 6.12), which was preceded by the 2006 parliamentary elections in which both parties had shrunk in terms of their share of seats (the PvdA went from 42 seats in the 2003 election to 33 seats in the 2006 election, and the VVD went from 28 to 22 seats). However, for the CDA this increase of importance of the party group meeting, and decrease in the importance of the party group committee, is already visible in the 2006 survey (not shown in Table 6.12), at which time it had obtained 44 seats in the 2003 election, which is 1 more seat than in the 2002 election, and 13 more than it had after the 1998 election. Moreover, with 41 seats, the CDA still constituted as a 'large' party group (by Dutch historical standards) at the time of the 2010 PartiRep Survey. This, this explanation does not seem to hold for the CDA. Only time will tell whether the high percentage of MPs who identify the party group meeting as the main decision-making center in the 2010 survey is a single occurrence, or whether the importance of the party group meeting will continue to grow over time.

Even if we accept the 2010 survey as valid, the role of the party group specialist is still more important in this most recent survey than it was in the 1979 and 1990 studies. On balance there do some to be some indications that cue-taking and the division of labor in parliamentary party groups, especially large ones, has strengthened over time and may therefore have an increased contribution to the high levels of party group unity in the Netherlands.

6.5.2 Party agreement

Unfortunately, the question concerning the frequency of disagreement with the party's position on a vote in parliament, which we used to gauge party agreement in our analyses in the previous chapters, was not included in any of the Dutch Parliamentary Studies. In all six surveys respondents were asked to place both themselves and their political party on a number of different policy scales,[42] including the ideological Left-Right scale. MPs' self-placement on policy scales found in elite surveys are often used to calculate party group agreement coefficients (Van der Eijk, 2001). In order to gauge whether there are any changes in party group agreement over time, Table 6.13 shows Van der Eijk's (2001) agreement coefficients for the three largest established parties in the Dutch parliament (CDA, PvdA and VVD). The coefficient of agreement, which is designed specifically for ordinal rating scales, ranges from -1 (entailing complete dispersion and thus polarization among MPs from the same party group) to 0 (which occurs when MPs are spread equally across the scale) to +1 (when there is complete agreement between party

[42] The surveys are generally not consistent when it comes to the policy areas scales that MPs are asked to place themselves on, making the longitudinal analysis of party group homogeneity based on MPs' self-placement for specific policy areas difficult.

Table 6.13: Party group ideological homogeneity on the Left-Right scale in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (coefficient of agreement)

	1972	1979	1990	2001	2006	*2010*	Mean
CDA	.76	.75	.68	.71	.77	*.61*	.71
PvdA	.84	.77	.83	.83	.84	*.87*	.83
VVD	.71	.68	.93	.65	.85	*.79*	.77

Note: These agreement coefficients may differ from those found in Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 663) as a result of a different transformation of the scales used in the surveys (see footnote 43).

group MPs).[43]

As this is a replication of the analysis in Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 61-64) (with the addition of the 2010 PartiRep data), it is not surprising that the results are very similar. The parliamentary party groups of the three largest established political parties in the Netherlands are very homogeneous on the ideological Left-Right scale, as well as in regard to specific issues (not shown in Table 6.13), as most coefficients are above 0.5 and thus closer to complete homogeneity than to complete dispersion. This indicates that agreement is likely to be an important pathway to party group unity in the Dutch parliament. However, although there are some fluctuations, there is no systematic change in party group homogeneity, entailing that it does not seem to be the case that party group agreement has increased over time. Although this does point in the direction of the one-arena model and that parliament may be isolated from the electoral arena, it could be still be the case that party (group) leaders have taken measures to counteract changes in the electoral arena (just enough to maintain party agreement, instead of increasing it).

As pointed out by Kam (2001a, 103), however, it need not be the case that MPs who place themselves at the same position on a policy scale also see themselves at equal distance from the party's position, as they may have different interpretations of the position of their party. Kam suggests that it may instead be better to measure how far MPs subjectively perceive themselves to be from their party's position. In all five of the Dutch Parliamentary Studies, as well as the PartiRep Survey, MPs were asked to place both themselves and their political party on an ideological Left-Right scale, allowing for the calculation of the absolute distance MPs perceive between their own and their party's

[43] Before calculating the Van der Eijk's (2001) coefficient of agreement, the scales for all the Left-Right ideological placement questions were converted to a 7-point scale using the formula y = a + bx (Irwin and Thomassen, 1975, 417-418). For the 9-point scale (which was used in the 1972 and 1979 Dutch Parliamentary Studies) where 1 must equal 1 and 9 must equal 7, the formula used is y = 1/4 + 3/4*x. For the 11-point scale (which was used in the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study and the 2010 PartiRep Survey) , where 1 must equal 1 and 11 must equal 7, the formula y = 2/5 + 3/5*x is used. For the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study and 2010 PartiRep Survey the values were first recoded so that 0 equals 1 and 10 equals 11 by adding 1.

position.[44] As we saw in previous chapters, a large perceived distance between an MP's position and that of his party is associated with frequent disagreement with the party's position on a vote in parliament, whereas a small perceived distance between an MP's policy position and that of his political party entails that an MP frequently agrees with the party line; a relationship that also holds for the Dutch national parliament in the 2010 PartiRep Survey (see chapter 4 and chapter 5).[45]

Table 6.14 shows that, contrary to our hypothesis, party agreement in terms of the ideological distance MPs perceive between their own and their party's position has actually decreased over time. In 1972 65 percent of MPs place themselves on the same position as their party, whereas in the 2010 PartiRep Survey only 33 percent of MPs do so. From 1979 to 2006, however, the percentage who perceive no difference between their own and their party's position remains quite stable at around 50 percent. There thus seem to be two large dips in party agreement: in the 1979 survey and in the 2010 survey (although we must be careful about interpreting the 2010 survey as a part of a trend given the different nature of the survey and the lower response rate). Starting with the 2006 survey, however, there is an increase in the percentage of MPs who perceive a distance of two points or more, hinting that in the case of the 2010 dip, the decrease had already set in before.

The three largest established parties, PvdA, VVD and CDA, follow the general trend of a decrease in the percentage of MPs who perceive no difference between their own position and that of their party (see Table 6.15). The decrease in party agreement over time is greatest within the CDA. One might expect a sharp decrease in the 1979 survey, since this was the first survey after the 1977 elections, which the ARP, CHU and KVP fought with one electoral list for the first time before the official creation of the CDA in 1980.[46] Party agreement can be expected to be lower in a newly merged party groups, and indeed, in terms of party voting unity, the party group suffered relatively frequent and deep dissent during its first parliamentary term (see subsubsection 6.3.2). Instead of a one-time dip, however, the decrease in party agreement continued and deepened, especially in the 2006 and 2010 surveys, even though voting unity was reestablished and consolidated to near perfection following the initial period after the fusion. The perceived ideological distance among PvdA MPs follows the general trend but also oscillates over time. There are two notable dips in party agreement: in the 1990 and 2006 surveys. The VVD also follows the general trend, with one very large dip in 1979, and

[44] The questions are located consecutively in all 5 surveys, making it reasonable to assume that any distance indicated by MPs is conscious and meaningful. However, that MPs are first asked to place themselves may act as a pull for where they subsequently place the political party, and that the latter is contingent on the former. This may lead to an underestimation of the distance between MPs and the political party.

[45] The surveys include Left-Right ideological scales of different lengths: the 2010 PartiRep Survey and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study use an 11-point scale, the 2001 and 1990 Dutch Parliamentary Studies use a 7-point scale, and the 1979 and 1972 Dutch Parliamentary Studies use a 9-point scale. In order to compare the distance on the ideological scales over time, the scales are converted to an ordinal 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10 (see footnote 43 for the conversion formulas).

[46] For the 1972 survey, the MPs from the ARP, CHU and KVP are all included as CDA in the tables. MPs were asked, however, to place the ARP, CHU or KVP, depending on the political party they belonged to.

Table 6.14: Perceived ideological distance on the Left-Right scale in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010 (%)

	1972	1979	1990	2001	2006	*2010*
0	65	52	52	53	49	*33*
1	30	38	41	41	33	*47*
2+	5	11	8	6	18	*20*
Median	0	0	0	0	1	*1*
Mean	0.42	0.66	0.58	0.49	0.79	*0.91*
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	*100*
Total n	133	125	116	128	107	*64*

χ^2 (30) = 94.130, sig. = .000; gamma = .188, sig. = .000

again in 2010.

There are also significant differences in perceived ideological distance between MPs whose party is in government and those in opposition (see Table 6.16). With the exception of the 2001 survey (in which the difference between government and opposition is very small), government MPs are more likely to perceive a difference between their own and their party's position and, usually a higher percentage of government MPs is more likely to experience a difference of two points or more. This may be explained by the coalition nature of Dutch government, which often forces MPs whose parties partake in government to support certain unpopular measures or compromises that are included in the government coalition agreement. As the party has signed the coalition agreement, it is likely that MPs associate the coalition agreement with the position of their party. However, when looking at the difference in perceived ideological distance for the CDA, PvdA and VVD it does not seem to be the case that MPs' perceived ideological distance co-varies with their parties' government participation (see Table 6.15).

Instead, the difference between MPs whose party is in government and those in opposition may be the result of the fact that parties in opposition tend to be small or medium sized party groups. Indeed, the larger the party group the more likely MPs are to perceive a difference between their own and their party's position on the scale (see Table 6.17). Whereas 74 percent of MPs whose party has five or fewer seats in parliament perceive no distance between their own and their party's position, only 64 percent of medium size party groups (six to nineteen seats) do so, and only 48 percent of large party groups (twenty seats of more) do so. MPs from large party groups are also most likely to perceive a distance of two points of more (12 percent MPs from large party groups, and only 3 percent of MPs from both medium and small party groups). This may have to do with the fact that in small party groups MPs may be more personally

Table 6.15: Perceived ideological distance on the Left-Right scale in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (%)

CDA

	1972	**1979**	**1990**	2001	**2006**	***2010***
0	**62**	**56**	**50**	52	**36**	***10***
1	**31**	**36**	**36**	40	**39**	***48***
2+	**8**	**8**	**14**	8	**25**	***43***
Median	**0**	**0**	**0**	0	**1**	***1***
Mean	**0.48**	**0.58**	**0.67**	0.58	**0.94**	***1.38***
Total %	**101**	**100**	**100**	100	**100**	***101***
Total n	**52**	**36**	**36**	25	**36**	***21***

χ^2 (30) = 43.450, sig. = .012; gamma = .346, sig. = .000

PvdA

	1972	1979	**1990**	**2001**	2006	*2010*
0	67	60	**36**	**51**	39	*50*
1	31	37	**58**	**46**	48	*44*
2+	3	4	**7**	**2**	13	*6*
Median	0	0	**1**	**0**	1	*0*
Mean	0.44	0.46	**0.73**	**0.48**	0.81	*.56*
Total %	101	101	**101**	**99**	100	100
Total n	39	52	**45**	**41**	31	18

χ^2 (30) = 43.050, sig. = .058; gamma = .191, sig. = .022

VVD

	1972	**1979**	1990	**2001**	**2006**	*2010*
0	**81**	**14**	73	**61**	**56**	*36*
1	**13**	**50**	20	**30**	**13**	*55*
2+	**6**	**36**	7	**9**	**31**	*9*
Median	**0**	**1**	0	**0**	**0**	*1*
Mean	**0.25**	**1.5**	0.33	**0.45**	**1.0**	*0.73*
Total %	**100**	**100**	100	**100**	**100**	*100*
Total n	**16**	**22**	15	**33**	**16**	*11*

χ^2 (25) = 41.762, sig. = .019; gamma = .007, sig. = .952

Bold = in government at the time of the survey

Table 6.16: Perceived ideological distance on the Left-Right scale in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament: government-opposition (%)

	All		1972		1979		1990		2001		2006		*2010*	
	Gov	Opp	Gov	Opp	Gov	Opp	Gov	Opp	Gov	Opp	Gov	Opp	*Gov*	*Opp*
0	47	59	64	67	40	63	42	74	54	52	41	54	*13*	*45*
1	39	35	29	31	41	34	48	23	41	43	30	34	*50*	*45*
2+	14	6	7	2	19	3	10	3	6	5	28	12	*38*	*10*
Median	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	*1*	*1*
Mean	0.71	0.49	0.44	0.40	0.93	0.42	0.70	0.29	0.49	0.50	1.0	0.62	*1.29*	*0.68*
Total %	100	101	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	99	100	*101*	*100*
Total n	368	305	75	58	58	67	81	35	84	44	46	61	*24*	*40*

χ^2 (6) = 19.715, sig. = .003; gamma = .256, sig. = .000 (all years combined)

Table 6.17: Perceived ideological distance on the Left-Right scale in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament: party group size (%)

	Small (5 or less seats)	Medium (6 to 20 seats)	Large (21 or more seats)
0	74	64	48
1	23	33	40
2+	3	3	12
median	0	0	1
mean	0.29	0.40	0.64
Total %	100	100	100
Total n	35	121	517

χ^2 (24) = 20.462, sig. = .000; gamma = .358, sig. = .000.

involved in determining the position of the party group in the first place. As we saw, MPs from small party groups are more likely then MPs from larger party groups to identify the weekly parliamentary party meeting as the main decision-making center. Moreover, small parliamentary parties are more likely to consist of only those candidates who were ranked at the top of their party's candidacy list, who are more likely to have previous party experience and who held top positions in the party organization. It thus makes sense that they would perceive little to no distance between their own and their party's position, as it is likely that they themselves were involved in the formulation of the party program.

We are, however, left with a discrepancy between the fact that there is no change over time in terms of the ideological homogeneity of party groups based on MPs' self-placement, while the average difference between an MP's self-placement and his perception of his party's position has increased over time. This could be caused by MPs interpreting the positions on the scales differently, as argued by Kam (2001a, 103). We have no reason to believe, however, that MPs' tendency to do so would have increased over time.[47] There is another explanation for the difference between the two findings. MPs who do place themselves at a distance with respect to their party's position on the Left-Right ideological scale tend to do so in the same direction. Most MPs tend to place themselves to the left of where they perceive their party to be, with the exception of the VVD MPs, who place themselves to both the left and the right of their party (not shown in Table 6.14). Thus, in terms of the effects of changes in the electoral arena on the pathways to party unity in the parliamentary arena, it would seem that depillariza-

[47] It could also be that the Left-Right ideological scale is too abstract and therefore does not accurately gauge what parliamentary voting is actually about. It is unlikely, however, that the level of abstraction has increased over time.

tion has not led political party selectorates to diversify their selection of parliamentary candidates in terms of their policy preferences as a means of appealing to a wider voter audience.

Related to this is that in all of the surveys the question that instructs MPs to place their 'political party' does not specify which part of the political party organization MPs should keep in mind. We have no way of knowing whether MPs place the position of the parliamentary party group, the extra-parliamentary party or the party-as-whole (and whether this includes party members) on the ideological Left-Right scale. If most MPs think of the party group's position when answering the question, it is indeed likely that this increase in disagreement involves concrete votes in parliament.

If, however, MPs interpret the question as referring to the extra-parliamentary organization or party-as-a-whole, it is more difficult to know whether this also has implications for the relative importance of agreement when it comes to determining party group voting unity in parliament. At first glance, the finding that MPs have become more likely to experience a larger distance between their own and their political party's position would seem to actually provide some evidence for the popular assumption that since depillarization parties have become 'catch-all' as a conscious electoral strategy, with a more diffuse ideological identity in order to appeal to as many voters as possible (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a). If this is true, the fact that party group policy homogeneity based on MPs' self-placement has not decreased but remained high would again mean that this broadening of ideological profile has not affected the parliamentary party group in the same way. However, as most MPs place themselves in the same direction from their party's position, it is likely that the ideological profiles of parties have not become more catch-all, but have rather moved in one direction (or at least according to MPs' perception).

On the other hand, the party group is bound to the electoral manifesto and the party program, which in most parties are determined the members and/or board of the political party (organization) outside of parliament. Thus, even if MPs interpreted the question as referring to the extra-parliamentary party or the party-as-a-whole, there may still be more frequent disagreement with the party's position in parliament when a vote concerns an issue for which the party's position is determined outside of parliament.

In conclusion, it seems that although parties have been able to maintain a high degree of ideological homogeneity among their MPs, party agreement in terms of distance MPs perceive between their own and their party's position has increased over time. Thus, although MPs might still usually agree amongst themselves, this does seem to indicate that disagreement with the party's position, whether origination in or outside of parliament, has become more likely over time, meaning that the chance that MPs find themselves at odds with the position of their party has increased over time.

6.5.3 Party loyalty

As opposed to other measures used in this chapter, the question used to measure party group loyalty refers directly to voting in parliament. In the Dutch Parliamentary Studies, MPs were asked whether, in the case of disagreement with their party group's position

Table 6.18: Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group's position) in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010 (%)

	1972	1979	1990	2001	2006	*2010*
Own opinion	40	22	11	10	5	*12*
It depends	53	65	69	66	66	-
Party (group) position	7	14	20	24	31	*88*
Total %	100	100	100	100	101	*100*
Total n	141	130	138	135	105	*45*

χ^2 (8) = 84.783, sig. = .000; φc = .256, sig. = .000 (1972 - 2006 only)

Note: Whereas the question in the earlier Dutch Parliamentary Studies refers to the party group (*fractie*) position, the question in 2010 PartiRep Survey refers to the party's (*partij*) position.

on a vote in parliament, an MP ought to vote according to his own opinion or the party group's position. The latter answer is taken as indicative of an MP's subscription to the norm of party loyalty.

In line with the hypothesis, subscription to the norm of party group loyalty has increased over time (see Table 6.18). The percentage of MPs who think that in the case of disagreement an MP ought to vote with the party group has steadily increased from 7 percent in 1972, to 31 percent in 2006. When comparing MPs' responses to the Dutch Parliamentary surveys, for which that the 'it depends' answering category was included, one can see that the percentage of MPs who think that 'it depends' stays quite stable, whereas the percentage of MPs advocating that an MP who disagrees with the position of his party ought to follow his own opinion has decreased over time from 40 percent in 1972 to only 5 percent in 2006. The three largest parties in the Dutch parliament (CDA, PvdA, VVD) follow the same general pattern, although the moment at which the trend sets in is different for each of the parties (see Table 6.19). Among PvdA MPs the increase in the percentage of MPs who subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty occurred quite early (in the 1979 survey) and remained rather stable over time. Loyalty among CDA MPs increased as of the 1990 survey, whereas among VVD MPs there was a definite increase as of the 2001 survey.

In the 2010 PartiRep Survey, the question refers to a conflict between an MP's and the 'party's' position, not specifically the party group. This makes its comparison to the Dutch Parliamentary Studies problematic. In addition, the answering category 'it depends' is not included as an answering category, forcing MPs to choose between the two options.[48] The percentage of respondents who answer that an MP ought to vote

[48] In the 2010 PartiRep Survey 20 MPs refused to answer the question, often indicating to the interviewer that 'it depends' (not shown in table).

according to the party's position is very high (88 percent). It is noteworthy that the category that subscribes to the norm of party loyalty 'profits' more from the absence of the option 'it depends' than the category that includes MPs who feels that an MP should vote according to his own opinion in the case of disagreement.

The threat of early elections if the government is brought down could lead one to expect that government MPs have a stronger feeling of responsibility towards their party, and are thus more likely to voluntarily support their party group in the case of disagreement, than opposition MPs (Van Schendelen, 1992, 82). The responses in Table 6.20 are not always consistent with this expectation: whereas in the 1990 and 2001 surveys government MPs are more likely to vote according to their party group's opinion in the case of disagreement than opposition MPs, in all other years opposition MPs are more likely to do so (with the exception of 1972, when 7 percent of both government and opposition MPs subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty). Moreover, if we look at the largest established parties that have participated in government over the past 40 years specifically (CDA, PvdA and VVD, see Table 6.19), it does not seem to be the case that moving from the government to the opposition bench has a systematic effect on the percentage of MPs who subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty. Within each of these established parties the increase in the percentage of MPs who subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty over time is stronger than the effect of government participation. Table 6.20 shows that opposition MPs generally are more likely to vote according to their own opinion than government MPs, but again the pattern is not consistent over time and does not seem to hold for the CDA, PvdA and VVD individually.

6.5.4 Party discipline

As has become evident throughout this study (see subsection 3.2.2 in chapter 3 and subsection 4.3.4 in chapter 4, gauging party discipline and its actual use is difficult. In the 2001, 2006 and 2010 surveys, MPs were asked for their opinion about party discipline in their party. Unfortunately, the question was not asked in earlier surveys, making it impossible to trace MPs' opinions concerning party discipline over a longer period of time. In all three surveys more than three-quarters of MPs are satisfied with general party discipline in their party, as they answered that general party discipline should remain as it is (see Table 6.21). Of those who indicate to be dissatisfied with party discipline, there seems to be a small increase in the percentage of MPs who hold the opinion that party discipline ought to be more strict, which is rather surprising if MPs indeed associate party discipline with coercion. Although it is difficult to interpret these answering categories, we argue that MPs who indicate that party discipline ought to be more strict are those who value the collective benefits of presenting a united front to the outside world above an individual MP's freedom and personal mandate. Those who answer that party discipline should remain as it is probably perceive a good balance between the two, or value one above the other, but are content with how they are maintained in the parliamentary party group. And MPs who answer that party discipline ought to be less strict are those who value an MP's freedom and personal mandate above presenting a united front, and are likely to be those who were confronted with (threats of) party discipline in the past.

Table 6.19: Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group's position) in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (%)

CDA

	1972	**1979**	**1990**	2001	**2006**	***2010***
Own opinion	**36**	**26**	**15**	4	**3**	***15***
It depends	**57**	**70**	**57**	60	**64**	***0***
Party (group) position	**7**	**5**	**28**	36	**33**	***85***
Total %	**100**	**101**	**100**	100	**100**	***100***
Total n	**58**	**43**	**47**	25	**36**	***13***

χ^2 (8) = 37.155, sig. = .000; φc = .298, sig. = .000 (1972 - 2006 only)

PvdA

	1972	1979	**1990**	**2001**	2006	*2010*
Own opinion	49	14	**4**	**12**	0	*15*
It depends	49	63	**71**	**69**	74	*0*
Party (group) position	3	22	**25**	**19**	26	*65*
Total %	101	99	**100**	**100**	100	*100*
Total n	39	49	**48**	**42**	31	*13*

χ^2 (8) = 46.086, sig. = .000; φc = .332, sig. = .000 (1972 - 2006 only)

VVD

	1972	**1979**	1990	**2001**	**2006**	*2010*
Own opinion	**25**	**23**	11	**3**	**7**	*0*
It depends	**69**	**64**	79	**71**	**47**	-
Party (group) position	**6**	**14**	11	**27**	**47**	*100*
Total %	**100**	**101**	101	**101**	**101**	*100*
Total n	**16**	**22**	19	**34**	**15**	*7*

χ^2 (8) = 16.865, sig. = .000; φc = .282, sig. = .000 (1972 - 2006 only)

Bold = in government at the time of the survey

Table 6.20: Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group's position) in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: government-opposition (%)

	All		1972		1979		1990		2001		2006		*2010*	
	Gov	Opp	Gov	Opp	Gov	Opp	Gov	Opp	Gov	Opp	Gov	Opp	*Gov*	*Opp*
Own	16	21	33	50	25	19	10	14	7	15	4	5	*20*	*10*
Depends	64	62	59	43	68	62	64	79	70	58	54	73	-	-
Party group's	20	17	7	7	8	20	26	7	23	27	41	22	*80*	*90*
Total %	100	100	100	100	101	101	100	100	100	100	99	100	*100*	*100*
Total n	374	275	81	60	70	69	95	43	87	48	46	59	*15*	*30*

χ^2 (2) = 3.236, sig. = .198; φc = .071, sig. = .198 (all MPs; 1972 - 2006 only)

Table 6.21: Satisfaction with general party discipline in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 2001-2010 (%)

	2001	2006	2010
More strict	2	9	11
Remain as it is	87	76	81
Less strict	11	15	8
Total %	100	100	100
Total n	135	110	63

χ^2 (4) = 9.456, sig. = .051; φc = .124, sig. = .051; gamma = -.192, sig. = .083

MPs' responses to the questions pertaining to specific aspects of party discipline, included in the 2006 and 2010 surveys (see Table 6.22), provide some additional insight into the circumstances under which party discipline is more or less likely to be applied, accepted, or even desired. When it comes to sticking to the party line during parliamentary voting, the question most relevant to party voting as an indicator of party group unity, almost 95 percent of MPs are satisfied with party discipline as it is. Party voting unity therefore seems fairly undisputed in the Dutch parliament. This also seem to hold for seeking permission from the party group before taking parliamentary initiatives; around 85 percent of MPs indicate to be satisfied with party discipline for this aspect of parliamentary behavior as well.

The one exception to this pattern is the MPs' evaluation of party discipline. When it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential the majority is satisfied with party discipline, but almost all of those who are dissatisfied would like to see party discipline be applied more strictly (34 percent in 2006 and 24 percent in 2010). This highlights that party group unity is not just about the final vote in parliament, but refers to a much broader requirement that comprises the entire policy making process. Apparently, there are MPs who do breach confidential intra-party discussions, otherwise there would not be MPs who would like to see party discipline applied more strictly. It also seems, however, that those who do breach party confidentiality get away with it, or at least accept the consequences, otherwise there would have been more MPs who indicate that party discipline should be less strict.

That a relatively high percentage of MPs would like to see stricter party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential, however, means that maintaining (the appearance of) a united front is considered very important and it is something that MPs and parties are actively concerned about. In the parliamentary arena, other parties may try to profit from parties that do not present a united front earlier in the policy making process, by putting certain controversial issues on the agenda, framing debates and proposals in such a way as to elicit MPs' dissent, or even calling

Table 6.22: Satisfaction with specific aspects of party discipline in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 2001-2010 (%)

Sticking to the parliamentary party line in votes

	2006	2010
More strict	1	5
Remain as it is	93	95
Less strict	7	0
Total %	101	100
Total n	108	63

χ^2 (2) = .752, sig. = .687; φc = .067, sig. = .687; gamma = -.059, sig. = .855

Taking political initiatives only with the parliamentary party's authorization

	2006	2010
More strict	8	6
Remain as it is	84	87
Less strict	7	6
Total %	99	100
Total n	114	63

χ^2 (2) = .210, sig. = .900; φ = .035, sig. = .900; gamma = .033, sig. = .877

Keeping internal party discussions confidential

	2006	2010
More strict	34	24
Remain as it is	66	76
Less strict	1	0
Total %	101	100
Total n	110	63

χ^2 (2) = 2.174, sig. = .337; φ = .113, sig. = .337; gamma = .197, sig. = .243

for roll call votes strategically. MPs and parties may also be concerned with the consequences of the appearance of parliamentary party disunity in the electoral arena. New parties that are troubled by party disunity tend not to return to Dutch parliament for a second or third term (the LPF, for example). In his analysis of Westminster parliaments Kam (2009), for example, finds that voters tend not to vote for parties they perceive to be disunited. Although his analysis only includes the influence of party voting disunity, it seems that parties and their MPs are not only concerned with party group unity in the final policy making stage (i.e., voting), but also during the process preceding it.

6.6 Conclusion

Even though electoral volatility and partisan dealignment in the Netherlands have increased through time, they do not 'appear to travel together' (Kam, 2009, 73-74) with MPs' dissent in the national parliament. Party group unity has always been very high in the Netherlands, whether measured in terms of voting unity, the frequency or depth of MPs' dissent, or MPs' defection from their party group, especially when it comes to the established parties. Moreover, and in line with the findings in Bowler's (2000) study of other European parliamentary democracies, party voting unity has even increased slightly over time. When voting dissent does take place, both in terms of its frequency and depth, this seems to be a characteristic of new parties (e.g., the LPF in the 2000s, as well as in the parties that fused into the CDA at the end of the 1970s). Party group defections, when they occur, are also a characteristic of new parties. In the established parties, the frequency and depth of voting dissent are limited, and party defections take place only sporadically.

This seems to indicate that parliament is insulated from the changes in the electorate, pointing to the one-arena model that emphasizes the procedural advantage that 'parties in office' have over MPs in the legislative arena (Bowler, 2000). There are, however, some changes over time in the relative contribution of the different pathways to party group unity outlined in this study. Whereas the ideological homogeneity among MPs from the same party group has remained high over time, average party agreement, in terms of MPs' perception of the distance between their own and their party's position on the ideological Left-Right scale, has decreased over time. Although we cannot be sure, this does seem to indicate that the parliamentary arena is not insulated from the electoral arena. Still, given that party group unity scores have stayed above 99 percent and have actually increased slightly since the first survey, parties' procedural advantages over individual MPs in the legislative arena may have been sufficient to counteract this decrease in party agreement over time.

The percentage of MPs who identify the party group specialist as the main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group, as well as the percentage of MPs who indicate to take their voting cues from the parliamentary party spokesperson, have increased over time as well, indicating that MPs have increased their reliance on cue-taking as a decision-making mechanism. Because cue-taking as a decision-making mechanism takes place before agreement, as it follows from MPs not having the time and resources

to form their own opinion on matters put to a vote, it is likely that MPs' increased reliance on the cues of their fellow party group members has to a certain extent contained the effects of the decrease in party agreement. Given that the increase cue-taking is likely to be connected to the increase in parliamentary activity over time, and the fact that the latter cannot be ascribed to any changes in the formal rules and/or organization of the Dutch parliament itself, it is likely that this increase in cue-taking has been brought about by either individual MPs themselves, or their parties acting as 'organizations'.[49]

The percentage of MPs who indicate to subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty has also increased over time.[50] Although parties can try to socialize MPs into the norm of party group loyalty once they reach the parliamentary party group, it is more likely that subscription to the norm has increased in importance as a candidate selection criterion. This entails that 'parties as organizations' have taken advantage of their control over candidate selection, and have thus been attempted to counteract the effects that electoral volatility and partisan dealignment seem to have had on party agreement.

The fact that party agreement has decreased, whereas cue-taking and party loyalty have increased, indicate that parliament is not insulated from changes in the electorate, but that parties have not stood idle either and relied solely on the roles of the legislative arena in order to maintain party group unity. Instead, parties have responded to the changes in the electorate through the extension of their procedural advantages into the electoral arena through candidate selection. Although parties have been unable to counteract the effects of electoral volatility and partisan dealignment on party agreement, they have been able to do so for cue-taking and party loyalty.

Finally, our data do not allow us to study the actual application party discipline, nor are we able to trace the changes in MPs' satisfaction with party discipline over an extended period of time. We therefore do not know if party (group) leaders have responded to the changes in the electorate by increasing their use of (the threat of) party discipline. The fact that in the last three surveys MPs are not very concerned with party discipline in general, when it comes to voting or seeking authorization from the party before taking parliamentary initiatives, means that party group unity in these areas is not really an issue; the great majority of MPs probably stick the party line and abide by the party (group) rules voluntarily or otherwise readily accept the consequences of not doing so. That those who are unsatisfied with party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential are more likely to want party discipline to be more strict, indicates that MPs are concerned with maintaining (the appearance of) a united front not only when voting, but also during other stages of the policy making process. This concern with maintaining the appearance of a united front again indicates that it is unlikely that parliament is insulated from the electoral arena.

[49] It may be that policy specialization has become a more important selection criteria in the process of candidate selection, but we do not have the data to corroborate this argument.

[50] The different formulation of questions used in the 2010 PartiRep Survey make an analysis over all six surveys problematic, but the trend is already present in the first five surveys.

Chapter 7

The sequential approach evaluated

7.1 The decision-making mechanisms

Treating political parties as unitary actors is one of the most prevalent assumptions in both political theory and empirical political science, as well in practice. Party group unity in parliament is considered 'normal' (Olson, 2003, 165) or even 'natural' (Patzelt, 2003, 102), and as such is often taken for granted. However, as pointed out by Kam (2009, 16) party group unity "must be constructed one MP at a time". We argue that party group unity is a collective phenomenon, that the degree to which party groups are unified is the result of the aggregation of individual MPs' behavior, and that each individual MP's behavior is brought about by his individual decision-making process consisting of a number of different stages that take place in a particular order. Although our decision-making model may not be exhaustive and represent somewhat of a simplification of MP decision making, it does include the most important pathways identified in the literature on party group unity.

Moreover, although previous studies on party group unity have found voting unity to co-vary with particular institutional configurations, the main argument forwarded in this book is that parliamentary party unity is not affected by institutions directly, but that these institutions affect the decision-making mechanisms that MPs apply in determining whether to toe the party group line or dissent from it. Indeed, this is often implicitly acknowledged in research that focuses on explaining party voting unity in the theoretical arguments used to underpin the hypotheses about the effects of institutions on party group unity. In our three empirical studies, we studied the occurrence and the relative contribution of these pathways, i.e., to what extent party groups in parliament can count on each of the mechanisms to get their MPs to fall in line, and whether and how these co-vary with different cross-country institutional settings (chapter 4), levels of government (chapter 5), and changes in the electoral arena over time (chapter 6).

In most of the 15 national parliaments included in our first study (chapter 4), previous research shows party voting unity to be very high—in some cases close to perfect (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Carey, 2007, 2009; Carrubba et al., 2006, 2008; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Kam, 2001a,b, 2009; Lanfranchi and Lüthi, 1999; Sieberer, 2006). However, studies that focus on the ultimate dependent variable—party voting unity—do not tell us anything about *how* MPs come to vote with the party group, and whether the relative contribution of the different decision-making mechanisms that MPs apply is the same in all parliaments. In other words, the decision-making mechanisms applied by MPs that parties can generally count on for their MPs to toe the party group line,—cue-taking, agreement, loyalty and obedience—may differ per individual MP, and per parliament. In addition, and in line with what is mentioned above, we expected each of the decision-making mechanisms to be affected by institutional settings, and in the first study we focused on the influence of parliamentary government (and thus the difference between MPs whose parties partake in government and those in opposition), electoral institutions and MPs' parties' candidate selection procedures.

Although the number of studies on party group unity at the subnational level pales in comparison to those that deal with party group unity at the national level, party (voting) unity seems to be the rule in (European) parliamentary democracies at the subnational level as well (Copus, 1997a,b, 1999b; Cowley, 2001; Davidson-Schmich, 2000, 2001, 2003; Denters et al., 2013; Deschouwer, 2003; Dewan and Spirling, 2011; Patzelt, 2003; Stecker, 2013). However, because at the subnational level electoral districts, legislatures and party groups are smaller than at the national level, and the subnational levels' powers and jurisdiction are more limited than the national levels', we expected that the way in which party groups achieve unity, i.e., the relative contribution of the different decision-making mechanisms, is different at the subnational level than it is at the national level. In our second study (chapter 5), we first analyzed representatives' application of the decision-making mechanisms in the national and regional parliaments from the nine multilevel countries included in the PartiRep Survey. We then repeated the analysis of the four sequential decision-making mechanisms at the Dutch national, provincial and municipal level, as the case offered us more variation on the independent variable, and allowed us to keep the country context and institutional settings constant.

Our third and final study (chapter 6) dealt with the question whether the changes in the electoral arena over time, including increased electoral volatility and partisan dealignment, have affected MPs' behavior and parties' ability to maintain party group unity in the legislative arena (the 'two-arena model', Mayhew, 1974). We looked at behavioral party group unity in terms of the number of party defections (measured in terms of MPs who leave their party group but stay in parliament), party voting unity (Rice scores) and the frequency and depth of voting dissent over time in the Second Chamber of the Dutch national parliament. Our analysis showed that although party defections are infrequent, their occurrence has increased slightly over time. This is, however, mainly the result of the increase in the number of new party groups in parliament; the number of defections among established parties is limited to two or three over the entire period since the Second World War. Party voting unity is very high, and has even increased slightly over time. At first sight, this would seem to indicate that (established)

parties' ability to maintain party group unity is unaffected by changes in the electorate, and that parliament is indeed isolated from the electoral arena (the 'one-arena model', Bowler, 2000). However, we argue that this is unlikely, as relying solely on the institutions of parliament to maintain party group unity would be a risky strategy from the perspective of political parties. We therefore expected that while the changes in the electoral arena may have affected certain decision-making mechanisms, 'parties as organizations' have taken active measures to increase the relative contribution of other mechanisms to counteract, and thus minimize, the effects of the changes in the electorate.

In the subsections and tables below, we summarize our findings from the three studies, and draw comparisons between the studies for each of the decision-making mechanisms. As mentioned in the introduction of this book, because the studies involved numerous different parliaments at different levels of government at different points in time, and the survey questions used to measure the decision-making mechanisms sometimes differ across the three studies, comparison across the studies should be done carefully. This section is followed by with some suggestions of avenues for future research, with a specific focus on ways in which we can improve our measurement of the decision-making mechanisms in MP surveys. The chapter ends with a discussion of the implications of our findings.

7.1.1 Division of labor

According to the sequential decision-making model, when determining how to vote in parliament, an MP first gauges whether he has a personal opinion on the vote at hand. An MP may not have a personal opinion on all topics that are put to a vote, and may not have the time and resources to enable him to form a personal opinion. If this is the case, the MP votes according to the cues given to him by his fellow party group members who are specialized in, and/or who act as a spokesperson for the party group on the matter, or the party group leadership itself. Cue-taking as a decision-making mechanism is made both possible and necessary by the party group's application of a division of labor; in order to deal with the workload of parliament it is more efficient for party group members to each specialize in particular policy areas. As highlighted in chapter 3, cue-taking is an often (implicitly) acknowledged, but probably the most under-researched, pathway to party group unity.

We did not formulate any hypotheses concerning the influence of electoral and candidate selection institutions on cue-taking for our study of the 15 national parliaments, because we argued that this pathway is likely to be most affected by legislative institutions, such as parliamentary party group size, legislative workload and parliamentary (party group) rules. However, our descriptive statistics provide some evidence of parties' application of the division of labor in our 15 national parliaments, as 50 percent of MPs consider themselves specialists, and over 60 percent answer that it is (mostly) true that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the party's position on his topic (see subsection 4.3.1, not shown in Table 7.1). From this we can infer that MPs are likely to engage in cue-taking when it comes to voting on issues outside of their arena of

expertise for which they lack a personal opinion.

Although our expectation was that cue-taking would play a less important role at the subnational level than at the national level as the result of the relatively smaller size of parliaments and party groups which limits party groups' ability to apply a division of labor among their party members (see Table 7.1), we actually found very few differences between regional and national representatives in our nine multilevel countries (see subsection 5.3.1). It may be that the national and subnational legislatures in these countries are more similar then we assumed them to be. In the Dutch case, however, the percentage of representatives who consider themselves specialists is slightly higher at the national level than at the subnational levels, and we found that at the municipal level itself, the percentage of specialists decreases with municipal council size (the latter is not shown in Table 7.1). Moreover, the percentage of representatives who consider the statement that the party group spokesperson determines the position of the party group on his topic (mostly) true, as well as the percentage who identify the party group specialist or leadership as the main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group, also decrease as we move down the ladder of government levels (see subsection 5.4.1). It therefore seems, that at least in the Netherlands where we were able to include relatively small municipal councils which are likely to have very small party groups, that the division of labor and associated decision-making mechanism of cue-taking play a less important role at the subnational level than at the national level, as expected.

In our study on the Dutch national parliament over time, we argued that in order to deal with the increased workload of parliament, cue-taking as a decision-making mechanism would have increased in importance over time as party groups are expected to have increased the strength of the division of labor. There are indeed some indications that over time Dutch MPs have increased their reliance on the cues given to them by their party group spokesperson when it comes to voting on matters that MPs did not deal with themselves for the party group. Moreover, when it comes to the main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group, the percentage of Dutch MPs who identify the party specialist or the party leadership as the main decision-making center also increased over time, which points in the direction of the consolidation of a stricter division of labor and hierarchical decision making within the parliamentary party group (see subsection 6.5.1).

7.1.2 Party agreement

If an MP does have a personal opinion on the matter that is put to a vote, he moves on to the second decision-making stage, at which he assesses whether his opinion coincides with the position of his party group. If this is the case, an MP votes according to the party group line out of simple agreement. As opposed to the division of labor and its associated decision-making mechanism cue-taking, party group members' shared preferences as a pathway to party group unity is probably most widely acknowledged and theorized (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Bailer et al., 2011; Hazan, 2003; Kam, 2001a, 2009; Krehbiel, 1993; Norpoth, 1976). And all three of our studies do indeed confirm the importance of agreement as a decision-making mechanism in determining representatives'

Table 7.1: Division of labor: summary of expectations and findings

Expectation	Cases	Findings
Chapter 4: no expectations with regard to the influence of institutions on MPs' propensity to engage in cue-taking.	15 national parliaments	-
Chapter 5: subnational representatives are *less likely* to engage in cue-taking as a result of the division of labor than national MPs.	National and regional legislatures in 9 multilevel countries	*No difference* between national and regional representatives when it comes to considering themselves specialists (-), and regional representatives are slightly *more likely* to consider the statement that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the party's position (mostly) true (-); patterns are not consistent between countries.
	Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils	Municipal councilors are *less likely* to consider themselves specialists than provincial councils and national MPs (+), *more likely* to consider the statement that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the party's position (mostly) false (+), and *more likely* to consider the party meeting the main decision-making center (+).
Chapter 6: cue-taking as a result of the division of labor in the Dutch parliament has *increased* over time.	Dutch Second Chamber	The percentage of MPs who answer that they usually vote according to the advice of the parliamentary party spokesperson has *increased* over has time (+), and the percentage of MPs who identify the party specialist or party leadership as the main decision-making center has *increased* over time (+).

Note: (+) means that the findings are in line with our expectations; (-) means that this is not the case.

voting behavior.

In order to gauge party agreement, we used a question included in the 2010 PartiRep Survey that asked respondents how often they disagree with the party's position on a vote in parliament. Of all MPs in our 15 national parliaments, 60 percent infrequently disagree with the party on a vote in parliament. And although there are some differences between parliaments, in all countries over half of MPs indicate that they disagree infrequently with the party line, entailing that in all parliaments party agreement is likely to be a relatively important pathway to party group unity. In terms of the influence of institutions, we argued that party selectorates are likely to select candidates whose policy preferences match their own, and thus expected MPs in parties with exclusive and centralized candidate selection procedures to be more likely to frequently agree with the party line than MPs in parties in which candidate selection is more inclusive and decentralized, because the latter is likely to encompass a larger selectorate (which is likely to have a broader range of preferences) and limits the national party's (leadership's) control over which candidates are selected to run for election (see Table 7.2). And indeed, in our 15 national parliaments, MPs from parties in which candidate selection is concentrated in the hands of the national party leaders or a national party agency are more likely to usually agree with the party than MPs who are selected by subnational party leaders or agencies, or party primaries at any level of the party organization (see subsection 4.3.2).

Building on this same line of argumentation, we hypothesized that MPs in party-oriented electoral systems (where voters are unable to cast a preference vote and/or there are few incentives for personal-vote seeking and intra-party competition) would be more likely to frequently agree with the party than MPs from more candidate-oriented electoral systems, because in the case of the former a party's selectorate's control over candidates extends into the electoral arena. Our results are somewhat mixed, however. Although on its own voters' inability to cast a personal vote for an individual candidate has a positive effect on party agreement, this effect actually decreases when district magnitude increases. This may be the result of our rather crude measure of the 'party-orientedness' of electoral systems, or the coding of particular countries.[1]

We also find that government participation has a negative effect on MPs' propensity to frequently agree with the party in our 15 national parliaments. This is in line with our reasoning that domestic and international circumstances, and in the case of coalition government, the coalition agreement, may lead governments to take (*ad hoc*) measures that are not included in the party program or electoral manifesto, which their parliamentary counterparts are still expected to support, but individual MPs may not agree with.

The percentage of representatives who infrequently disagree with the party's position on a vote in parliament in the nine multilevel countries is higher at the regional level than at the national level, entailing that party agreement is a relatively stronger pathway to party group unity at the subnational level (see subsection 5.3.2). This is in line with our hypothesis, as we expected that party agreement would play a relatively

[1] As mentioned in footnote 17 in chapter 4, alternative classifications of the formal properties of electoral systems were also tested, yielding similar results.

Table 7.2: Party agreement: summary of expectations and findings

Expectation	Cases	Findings
Chapter 4: MPs in parties with exclusive and centralized candidate selection procedures are *more likely* to frequently agree with the party than MPs in parties with inclusive and decentralized candidate selection procedures.	15 national parliaments	Bivariate and multivariate: MPs in parties in which candidate selection is concentrated in the hands of national party leaders or a national party agency are *more likely* to frequently agree with the party than MPs in parties in which candidate selection takes place at the subnational level or through primaries at any level of government (+).
Chapter 4: MPs in party-oriented electoral systems are *more likely* to frequently agree with the party than MPs in candidate-oriented electoral systems.	15 national parliaments	Bivariate: MPs in electoral systems in which voters cannot cast a personal vote are *more likely* to frequently agree with the party than MPs in electoral systems in which voters can cast a personal vote (+), and in electoral systems in which voters cannot cast a personal vote, the odds of an MP frequently disagreeing with the party *decrease* as district magnitude increases (-). Multivariate: *No difference* between MPs in electoral systems in which voters can or not cast a personal vote (-) and in electoral systems in which voters cannot cast a personal vote, the odds of an MP frequently disagreeing with the party *decrease* as district magnitude increases (-).
Chapter 4: MPs in governing parties are *less likely* to frequently agree with the party than MPs in opposition parties.	15 national parliaments	Bivariate and multivariate: MPs in government parties are *less likely* to frequently agree with the party than MPs in opposition parties (+).
Chapter 5: subnational representatives are *more likely* to frequently agree with the party than national MPs.	National and regional legislatures in 9 multilevel countries	Regional representatives are *more likely* to frequently agree with the party than national MPs (+), and when placed in our sequential decision-making model party agreement plays a *more important role* at the regional level than at the national level (+).
	Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils	Provincial and municipal councilors are *more likely* to frequently agree with the party than national MPs, but the differences are not statistically significant (+/-), when placed in our sequential decision-making model party agreement plays a (slightly) *more important role* at the provincial and municipal level than at the national level (+/-).
Chapter 6: party agreement in the Dutch national parliament has *increased* over time.	Dutch Second Chamber	Party group Left-Right ideological homogeneity has *remained high* over time (+/-); MPs have become *more likely* to perceive a *larger distance* between their own and their party's position on the Left-Right scale over time (-).

Note: (+) means that the findings are in line with our expectations; (-) means that this is not the case.

more important role at the subnational level as a result of the smaller size of parliaments and party groups. Although party agreement is stronger at all levels of government in the Netherlands than in almost all of the nine multilevel countries in the PartiRep Survey, the percentage point difference between the national and the subnational levels of Dutch government is about the same as between the national and regional level in our nine multilevel countries. At the municipal level, the percentage of councilors who indicate to frequently agree with the party increases as council size decreases, thus supporting our argument that party agreement is easier to obtain in smaller party groups (see subsection 5.4.2).

In the Dutch case we also saw that whereas there is no relationship between national MPs' involvement in the party group and the frequency of disagreement, at the subnational level the more councilors feel involved in the decision making of their party group, the more likely they are to frequently agree with their party on a vote. Given that the percentage of representatives who completely agree that they feel involved in the decision making in their party group is much higher at the lower levels of government (especially the municipal level) than at the national level, the analysis of the Dutch case provides evidence for the notion that party agreement is not only determined by institutions external to the parliamentary arena (such as candidate selection), and that the mechanisms do not stand in isolation of each other; party agreement is also dependent on the way in which party group decision making is organized (i.e., whether party groups apply a division of labor and allow the party group spokesperson to determine the position of the party group, or party group decision making and position creation is organized in a more collective manner within the party group).

Although the Dutch Parliamentary Studies do not allow us to assess the frequency of disagreement in the Dutch parliament over time, we were able to ascertain both the ideological homogeneity among the party group member from the three largest parties, as well the distance all MPs perceive between their own and their party's position on the Left-Right ideological scale. Our expectation was that parties would have taken measures to counteract the effects of electoral dealignment by making party agreement a more important candidate selection criterion over time. Whereas parties have been able to maintain a high degree of ideological homogeneity among their MPs within their party group, the distance MPs perceive between their own and their party's position actually increased over time (see subsection 6.5.2). Given this increased distance, it is likely that Dutch MPs have over time become more likely to find themselves at odds with the position of their party.

7.1.3 Party loyalty

At the third stage of our decision-making sequence, at which an MP finds himself in the situation that his party group has one position on a vote in parliament, but he himself does not share that position, an MP must decide whether his subscription to the norm of party group loyalty is strong enough to move him to vote with the party line voluntarily despite his agreement. In our 15 national parliaments, 60 percent of all the MPs answer that an MP ought to vote according to the party's position in the case of conflict with the

MP's own opinion, which means that on its own, party loyalty is also a powerful pathway to party group unity (see subsection 4.3.3). There are substantial differences between countries, however, ranging from 89 percent of Dutch MPs subscribing to the norm of party loyalty, to only 13 percent of Swiss MPs doing so. When placed in our sequential decision-making model, 20 percent of all MPs frequently disagree with the party, but still vote with the party out of a sense of loyalty, entailing that in comparison to party agreement, party loyalty is of less importance in getting MPs to toe the party line voluntarily (see subsection 4.3.5).[2] Thus on average the party groups in these parliaments can count on the two voluntary pathways of party agreement and party loyalty for almost 80 percent of their MPs. That in our sequential decision-making model party loyalty is less important than party agreement is, of course, the result of the order in which we place party agreement and party loyalty in our decision-making sequence. However, the order of mechanisms was extensively theorized, and is also matched by the formulation of the question used to measure party loyalty, which inquires specifically into the situation in which an MP's opinion and the party's position conflict (i.e., following the stage at which an MP gauges whether his own personal opinion matches the party's position).[3]

When it comes to the influence of institutions on MPs' propensity to subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, we expected MPs from parties with exclusive and centralized candidate selection procedures to be more likely to subscribe to the norm than MPs from parties with inclusive and decentralized candidate selection methods. In the same vein, we hypothesized that MPs who are elected through party-oriented electoral systems would be more likely to indicate to remain loyal to the party than MPs in candidate-oriented electoral systems (see Table 7.3). The underlying argument of both these expectations is that the former institutional configurations minimize the extent to which MPs are confronted with competing principals (either in the form of a broader selectoral body or the voters in the electorate) who may diffuse MPs' loyalty to the party group in parliament. However, although on its own candidate selection does have the predicted effect on party loyalty, voters' inability to cast a personal vote does not, and both do not have the predicted effect on party loyalty in our multivariate model (see subsection 4.3.3).

As an alternative to the formal properties of electoral systems, we also added two variables to our model that gauge MPs' attitudes concerning (and the value they ascribe to) personal vote seeking and their choice when it comes to a conflict between their two main principals: the voters and their party. Our analysis revealed that MPs who prefer to run a party campaign as opposed to a personal campaign are also more likely to vote according to the party's position instead of their own opinion in the case

[2] As discussed in each of our empirical chapters, we are unable to include the first stage of our decision-making sequence, cue-taking, in our sequential decision-making model due to the formulation of the questions we used to gauge cue-taking. This is discussed in more detail in the suggestions for future research (see section 7.2).

[3] The theorized order between party agreement and party loyalty was also matched in the 2010 PartiRep Survey, where the question used to measure party loyalty was a direct follow-up question to the questions which asks how often the respondent finds himself in disagreement with the party's position, which was used to gauge party agreement.

of conflict, but the difference disappears in the full model. We also found that MPs who hold the opinion that an MP ought to vote according to voters' opinion instead of the party's position when the two conflict, are also more likely to opt for their own opinion over the party's position (this variable is statistically significant on its own as well in the multivariate model). In other words, whereas our formal institutional variables that are theorized to influence the degree to which MPs are confronted with competing principals to the party group do not have the predicted effect on MPs' propensity to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty, our attitudinal measure of the importance MPs ascribe to the voters versus the party as competing principals does.

Our third and final hypothesis for our 15 national parliaments was that MPs' from government parties would be more likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than opposition MPs because the added responsibility of supporting government initiatives and the threat of early elections would instill in government MPs a stronger feeling of loyalty. Although in the predicted direction, on its own government participation does not have a statistically significant effect on party loyalty. The variable is just shy of statistical significance in the full model, however.

Returning to the logic of the competing principals theory, one of the main differences between the national and subnational level of government is the relatively smaller size and closer proximity (in terms of both geography and population) of subnational representatives' constituencies, which we expected to lead subnational representatives to engage in a more direct relationship with voters who may diffuse representatives' party loyalty. We thus hypothesized subnational representatives to be less likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than national MPs, but our analysis of party loyalty on its own reveals the opposite (see subsection 5.3.3). However, when we only include representatives for whom party loyalty is a relevant decision-making mechanism, i.e. those who indicate to frequently disagree with the party line, party loyalty is, as expected, stronger among national MPs than among regional representatives (see subsection 5.3.5). When comparing the three levels of Dutch government, party loyalty is strongest at the national level when including all representatives, as well as in the sequential model when we only include those who frequently disagree with the party on a vote in parliament (see subsection 5.4.3 and subsection 5.4.5).

As was the case in our analysis of MPs in 15 national parliaments, in both the analyses in chapter 5, we looked more closely at the influence of MPs' choice when confronted with a conflict between voters' opinion and the party's position (not shown in Table 7.3). We found no difference between national and regional representatives; in both cases around 60 percent places the party's position above the voters' opinion. In the Dutch case, the percentage of representatives who answer that an MP ought to vote according to the voters' opinion instead of the party position does indeed increase as we move down the ladder of government levels, but with a maximum of 35 percent opting for voters' opinion at the municipal level, the influence of voters' as competing principals does not seem be very strong at any level of government in the Dutch case. However, at the Dutch provincial and municipal level, of the councilors who answer than MP ought to stick to the voters' opinion instead of the party's position, two-thirds also answer that an MP ought to vote according to his own opinion instead of the party's position when the

Table 7.3: Party loyalty: summary of expectations and findings

Expectation	Cases	Findings
Chapter 4: MPs in parties with exclusive and centralized candidate selection procedures are *more likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than MPs in parties with inclusive and decentralized candidate selection procedures.	15 national parliaments	Bivariate: MPs in parties in which candidate selection is concentrated in the hands of national party leaders or a national party agency are *more likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than MPs in parties in which candidate selection takes place at the subnational level or through primaries at any level of government (+). Multivariate: *no difference* between MPs in parties in which candidate selection is concentrated in the hands of national party leaders or a national party agency and MPs in parties in which candidate selection takes place at the subnational level or through primaries at any level of government (-).
Chapter 4: MPs in party-oriented electoral systems are *more likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than MPs in candidate-oriented electoral systems.	15 national parliaments	Bivariate: *No difference* between MPs in electoral systems in which voters cannot cast a personal vote and MPs in electoral systems in which voters can cast a personal vote (-), but in electoral systems in which voters cannot cast a personal vote, the odds of an MP subscribing to the norm of party loyalty *decrease* as district magnitude increases (-). MPs who prefer running a party campaign over a personal campaign are *more likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty (+), and MPs who indicate that an MP ought to vote according to the party's position instead of voters' opinion are *more likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty (+). Multivariate: *No difference* between MPs in electoral systems in which voters cannot cast a personal vote and MPs in electoral systems in which voters can cast a personal vote (-), but in electoral systems in which voters cannot cast a personal vote, the odds of an MP subscribing to the norm of party loyalty *decrease* as district magnitude increases (-). *No difference* between MPs who prefer to run a party campaign and those who prefer to run a personal campaign (-), but MPs who indicate that an MP ought to be vote according to the party's position instead of voters' opinion are *more likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty (+).
Chapter 4: MPs in governing parties are *more likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than MPs in opposition parties.	15 national parliaments	Bivariate *no difference* between MPs in government parties and MPs in opposition parties (-). Multivariate: MPs in governing parties are *more likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than MPs in opposition parties (+).
Chapter 5: subnational representatives are *less likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than national MPs.	National and regional legislatures in 9 multilevel countries	Regional representatives are *more likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than national MPs (-), but when placed in the sequential decision-making model party loyalty plays a *less important role* at the regional level than at the national level (+).
	Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils	Municipal and provincial councilors are *less likely* to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than national MPs (+), and when placed in our sequential decision-making model party loyalty plays a *less important role* at the subnational levels than at the national level (+).
Chapter 6: party group loyalty in the Dutch national parliament has *increased* over time.	Dutch Second Chamber	The percentage of MPs who subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty has *increased* over time (+).

Note: (+) means that the findings are in line with our expectations; (-) means that this is not the case.

two conflict. This can be interpreted as meaning that for most of those councilors who do not subscribe to the norm party loyalty and thus vote according to their own opinion, this decision may be influenced by their loyalty to the voters as competing principals to the party. In our nine multilevel countries, representatives who consider voters' opinion more important than the party's position are also more likely to opt for their own opinion when in conflict with the party's position, but the relationship is weaker at the regional level than at the national level.

Finally, in the Dutch national parliament, party loyalty increases in strength over time; the percentage of MPs who indicate that in the case of disagreement an MP ought to vote according to the party line increases over time, whereas the percentage of MPs who think that an MP ought to hold his ground and vote according to his own position, decreases over time (the percentage of MPs who answer that it depends remained relatively stable, see subsection 6.5.3). This is in line with our hypothesis, for which we argued that over time party loyalty as a candidate selection criterion would have increased in importance as parties tried to counteract the effects of partisan dealignment and electoral volatility.

As is clear from the summary above, our studies provide mixed results when it comes to party loyalty. Whereas in our analyses of the three levels of Dutch government and the Dutch national parliament over time, our findings with regard to party loyalty generally meet our expectations, this is not the case in the studies of the 15 national parliaments and the national and regional legislatures from the nine multilevel countries. In both of these analyses, we have variation in the percentage of representatives who subscribe to the norm of party loyalty, but this variation does not seem to correspond to the differences in institutional settings that are theorized to influence the extent to which representatives are confronted with competing principals to the party. It could be that even if electoral institutions provide the means to discriminate between candidates on the basis of their loyalty to different principals, candidates' subscription to certain norms is a less important selection criterion than party agreement seems to be, or that the electorate is unable to accurately gauge candidates' loyalty. Admittedly, the operationalization of the formal electoral institutions that are deemed to affect the extent to which representatives are confronted with competing principals is up for discussion, and thus our findings with regard to these formal institutions may not be very robust. Our attitudinal measures of the importance that representatives ascribe to voters' versus the party do have the predicted effect, however. Thus it could be that the theory of competing principals has merit, but not through formal institutions, but representatives' personal internalization of norms of party versus voter loyalty, which are likely to be the result of their (previous) experience as representatives of their party, or his legislative party group environment. The judging of the applicability of these norms is an individual MP's decision, and seems largely unaffected by his electoral institutional environment.

7.1.4 Party discipline

If an MP has an opinion on the matter that is put to a vote, but his opinion does not correspond to the party's position, and he does not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty,

Table 7.4: Party discipline: summary of expectations and findings

Expectation	Cases	Findings
Chapter 4: MPs in parties with exclusive and centralized candidate selection procedures are *more likely* to be disciplined than MPs in parties with inclusive and decentralized candidate selection procedures.	15 national parliaments	Bivariate: *no difference* between MPs in parties in which candidate selection is concentrated in the hands of national party leaders or a national party agency and MPs in parties in which candidate selection takes place at the subnational level or through primaries at any level of government (-). Multivariate: *no difference* between MPs in parties in which candidate selection is concentrated in the hands of national party leaders or a national party agency and MPs in parties in which candidate selection takes place at the subnational level or through primaries at any level of government (-).
Chapter 4: MPs in party-oriented electoral systems are *more likely* to be disciplined than MPs in candidate-oriented electoral systems.	15 national parliaments	Bivariate: *No difference* between MPs in electoral systems in which voters cannot cast a personal vote and MPs in electoral systems in which voters can cast a personal vote (-). Multivariate: *No difference* between MPs in electoral systems in which voters cannot cast a personal vote and MPs in electoral systems in which voters can cast a personal vote (-).
Chapter 4: MPs in governing parties are *more likely* to be disciplined than MPs in opposition parties.	15 national parliaments	Bivariate and multivariate: *no difference* between MPs in government parties and MPs in opposition parties (-).
Chapter 5: subnational representatives are *less likely* to be disciplined than national MPs.	National and regional legislatures in 9 multilevel countries	*No difference* between regional and national representatives (-), but when placed in our sequential decision-making model, party discipline plays a *less important role* at the regional level than it does at the national level (+).
	Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils	Municipal councilors are slightly *less likely* to prefer less strict party discipline than national MPs and provincial councilors (+), and are also *less likely* to consider negative sanctions (very) likely (+). When placed in our sequential decision-making model, party discipline plays a very small, but slightly *more important role* at the subnational levels than at the national level (-).
Chapter 6: party discipline in the Dutch national parliament *increased* over time.	Dutch Second Chamber	Unable to study over a long period of time; but the percentage of MPs who prefer less strict party discipline is *low* in Dutch parliament (based on the 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study and 2010 PartiRep Survey).

Note: (+) means that the findings are in line with our expectations; (-) means that this is not the case.

or his conflict with the party's position is so intense that it supersedes party loyalty, an MP's party group (leadership) may still try to elicit the MP to toe the party line through sanctions. Our final pathway to party group unity is therefore party discipline, which entails that representatives vote with the party line involuntarily out of obedience in response to the anticipation, promise, threat or actual application of positive and negative sanctions by the party group (leadership). In all three of our studies, we measure party discipline by inquiring into representatives' opinions on whether party discipline ought to be less strict (which we take to be indicative of that representatives have experience being disciplined or operate under the threat of sanctions), more strict or remain as it is. And in all of our studies, representatives are overwhelmingly content with general party discipline as it is, as well as with most specific aspects of party discipline, including party discipline when it comes to sticking to the party line when voting in parliament. As discussed before in each of our three empirical chapters, our questions regarding representatives' satisfaction with party discipline required quite a bit of interpretation, which may have resulted in an underestimation of the importance of the pathway. On the other hand, in all of our studies the voluntary pathways of party agreement and party loyalty account for a very large percentage of representatives' voting behavior once the three mechanisms are placed in the sequential decision-making model, which does seem to indicate that party discipline is not as relevant a pathway to party group unity as is often (implicitly) assumed in the literature.

In our study of the 15 national parliaments, we expected candidate selection procedures that are exclusive and centralized to enhance the (parliamentary) party's leaders' ability to credibly (threaten or promise to) use candidate reselection as a disciplining mechanism, and that party-oriented electoral systems further extend this control into the electoral arena (see Table 7.4). We also hypothesized that the responsibility of government and threat of early elections would make governing parties more willing to (threaten or promise to) use discipline than opposition parties. MPs' satisfaction with party voting discipline is not affected by any of the formal institutions, however. But MPs who either frequently disagree with the party line, or do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty, are more likely to want less strict party voting discipline, which is in line with our argument that discipline is only relevant when voluntary pathways fail to bring MPs to toe the party line on their own (see subsection 4.3.4). It therefore seems that it is not party leaders' access to institutions that can be used to credibly punish or reward MPs that determines whether they are disciplined, but MPs' decisions at the earlier stages of the decision-making sequence.

We expected party discipline to be less common at the subnational level than at the national level because subnational representatives are likely to be less dependent on their party for their (future) career and livelihood than national MPs are, rendering the use of discipline less credible and thus less effective. Although there are no differences between the regional and national level in our nine multilevel countries when it comes to their satisfaction with party discipline on its own, party voting discipline did play the expected stronger role at the national level than at the regional level once placed in our sequential decision-making model (see subsection 5.3.5). In the Dutch case the percentage of representatives who indicate that party discipline ought to be less strict is also in-

deed lower at the municipal level than at the national level (subsection 5.4.4). Given the high levels of satisfaction with party discipline at all three levels of Dutch government, it is a bit surprising that when asked about the likelihood of specific types of sanctions, in most cases over two-thirds considered the sanction (very) likely, which also indicates that our model may underestimate the role of party discipline. Lower level representatives are, however, also more prone to consider sanctions less likely, however.

Finally, we also expected the use of party discipline to have increased over time in the Dutch national parliament because MPs have become increasingly dependent on their party as a result of the demise of societal pillars, and the fact that the function of MP has become a full-time occupation. But because only the last three surveys (the 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Studies and the 2010 PartiRep Survey) contain questions concerning party discipline, we were unable to assess whether there are any changes in party discipline over a longer period of time for the Dutch national parliament. However, the fact that in these three later surveys over three quarters of Dutch MPs are satisfied with the level of general party discipline in their party, and over 90 percent are satisfied with party discipline when it comes to voting in parliament, indicates that party discipline, when it is applied, is likely to be considered acceptable and voting unity fairly undisputed (see subsection 4.3.4).

Another final finding worth mentioning is the fact that in all three of our studies, representatives tend to be least satisfied with party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential. As mentioned before, the fact that many representatives would like to see stricter party discipline when it comes to this specific aspect of party life highlights that party group unity is not just about the final vote in parliament, but a much broader requirement that comprises the entire policy making process. MPs seem to be worried about the appearance of disunity, which serves as another indication that the legislative arena is not insulated from the electoral arena.

7.2 Suggestions for future research

Our studies reveal that institutions affect the decision-making mechanisms in different ways. Whereas MPs' frequency of agreement seems to be most strongly influenced by changes and institutions outside the parliamentary arena, this is less the case for MPs' propensity to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty. MPs' satisfaction with party discipline, which we interpret as indicative of MPs experience with their party's application of party discipline, seems least affected by the institutional configurations in which MPs and parties are situated. In our analysis of 15 national parliaments, we use rather rough measures of candidate selection procedures and electoral institutions, which may account for some of the unexpected results. However, given that in our cases these institutions are quite party and country specific, a more precise classification may have led to high levels of multicollinearity with the countries and parties to which these MPs belong (which we already take into account by using a multilevel model). Furthermore, for our analysis of the regional and national parliaments in nine multilevel countries in chapter 5, we do not control for electoral and legislative institutions, and use the levels

of government to which MPs belong as a proxy for constituency size, legislative authority, party size, and the extent to which MPs are dependent on their party for their livelihood and future career. In our study of the Dutch national parliament, we similarly use time as a variable to capture the potential effects of electoral volatility and partisan dealignment. Although using proxies was unavoidable as a result of data restrictions, future research could further explore these relationships using more precise measures.

Our studies also show that the relative contribution of the decision-making mechanisms differs between parliaments, levels of government, and over time, which research that focuses solely the outcome, MPs' voting behavior, is unable to provide insight into. All of the studies were based on (preexisting) elite surveys, however, and as such we were limited in our ability to accurately gauge the relative contribution of some of the decision-making mechanisms. Moreover, our analyses of representatives' responses sometimes required quite a bit of interpretation. Although repeating existing questions in future elite surveys certainly has its merits in terms of diachronic comparison, we do have some suggestions for prospective elite surveys that would to enable us to measure the (relative) role of decision-making mechanisms more precisely.

For our measures of cue-taking, for example, we argued that if an MP considers himself a specialist, it is reasonable to assume that he will not have an opinion on all matters that are put to a vote and thus need to engage in cue-taking. And we took MPs' agreement with the statement that the party specialist determines the position of the party in parliament as an indication of parties' application of the division of labor. But we did not have a question that inferred specifically into the role of cue-taking in MPs' decision-making process when it comes to voting in parliament. Moreover, the question we use in our first two studies to gauge party agreement, the frequency of disagreement, is unable to discriminate between MPs who indicate that they infrequently disagree because they almost always share the position of the party, or because they lack an opinion on the matter at hand (and thus *do not disagree*). For these reasons, we were unable to include cue-taking in our sequential decision-making model, and this limited our ability to assess its relative contribution, which might have led to an overestimation of the importance of the decision-making mechanisms in the stages that follow.

As outline in Figure 3.1 (see chapter 3), at the first stage of our decision-making model, an MP asks himself whether he has a personal opinion on the vote at hand. Thus, in order to include this stage in our decision-making sequence, a first question to introduce to future MP surveys could be 'When it comes to voting in parliament, how often are you faced with the situation that you do not have a personal opinion on a vote?'. We cannot expect, however, MPs to remember exactly how many times this occurred. As is the case with the answering categories to our question concerning the frequency of disagreement (i.e., our measure of party agreement in chapter 4 and chapter 5), we would probably then need to use broad frequency descriptions ('about once a month', 'about once every three months', 'about once a year' and '(almost) never') as answering categories. This question could then be followed by one that asks 'What do you (usually) do when you do not have a personal opinion on a vote in parliament?', with the following answering options:

1. I invest time and resources to form my own opinion.
2. I vote according to the party position as stipulated in the party program and/or electoral manifesto.
3. I vote according to the advice of the party group spokesperson on that topic.
4. I vote according to the advice of the party group leadership.

According to the sequential decision-making model, respondents who pick the first answer move on to the second stage of the decision-making process, which involves assessing whether their own opinion corresponds to the party's position. If a respondent selects one of the other three answers, this means that he engages in cue-taking. The inclusion of three alternative sources would give us more insight into the relative importance of these sources as potential voting cue-givers.[4]

The question used in our first two empirical studies to measure party agreement, the frequency of disagreement, is appropriate for the sequential decision-making model as it refers specifically to voting and specifies the actors (the MP and his party) and the situation at hand (a disagreement over a vote). It allowed us to move beyond the use of abstract Left-Right ideological and policy scales, and enabled us to place both party agreement as well as the stages that followed in the sequential decision-making model. The fact that it precedes our measure of party loyalty is also a positive characteristic, as we can safely assume that respondents were likely to interpret the question as inquiring into the frequency of disagreement before voting takes place (and thus that it does not measure behavioral party group unity).[5]

The question that we used to measure party loyalty is the same as the one developed by Eulau et al. (1959), later amended by Converse and Pierce (1979, 1986), to measure representational role orientation and style (the party delegate role).[6] It was also used by

[4] Alternatively, instead of asking respondents to select only one answer to the question about what they (usually) do in the situation in which they do not have a personal opinion on a vote, we could ask respondents to rate each of the answering categories an ordinal scale in terms of their likelihood (as we did for the questions concerning the likelihood of negative sanctions in the Dutch version of the PartiRep Survey (see subsection 5.4.4 in chapter 5). This would, however, make it more difficult to place the question in the sequential decision-making model.

[5] The original answering categories ('about once a month', 'about once every three months', 'about once a year' and '(almost) never'), and especially their dichotomization into the two categories 'frequently disagree' and 'infrequently disagree' for the sequential decision-making model, is open to criticism, because the number of votes taken may differ across parliaments. Our argument is, however, that if disagreement occurs about once a year or (almost) never, an MP ought to be able to recall each of these infrequent occasions on which disagreement it took place individually, whereas if it occurs about once a month or once every three months, the MP may not be able to recall each case individually and thus can be classified as disagreeing frequently.

[6] We have assumed that an MP's adherence and thus loyalty to the opinions of other potential foci of representation, which may act as potentially competing principals to the political party, are subsumed in an MP's own opinion. In doing so, we do not differentiate MPs who take on a 'trustee' style of representation from those who could be labeled 'voter delegates' (Converse and Pierce, 1979, 1986). Furthermore, our study is far from exhaustive in terms of the influence of other potential competing principals and other actors who

Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) to gauge party loyalty in their earlier study of the pathways to party group unity in the Dutch parliament. As is the case with our measure of the frequency of disagreement, the question refers specifically to the two relevant actors (although in this case, it refers to 'an MP' in the abstract, and not the respondent himself) and a specific situation (a disagreement over a vote). We interpreted it as referring specifically to normative reasons to vote with the party line voluntarily, but must admit that we cannot be completely sure that all the representatives in the different surveys interpreted the question and answering categories in the same way. Some may have interpreted it as indeed referring to normative motivations exclusively (which is implied by the use of the term *should* in the answering categories), whereas other may also have taken rationalist calculations and the possible (threat of) party discipline into account in their answer. In order to avoid this confusion in future surveys, the question could be formulated more specifically: 'Disregarding any positive and negative consequences for the MP personally, how do you think an MP should vote in the case of disagreement between the MPs' opinion and the party position on a vote in parliament?'

Finally, when it comes to our measure of party discipline, we argue that MPs who answer that party discipline ought to be less strict are those who have experienced discipline in the past. It is unlikely that someone who has personally experienced discipline in the past would like to see discipline be applied more strictly, but one could argue that an MP who has been disciplined in the past could still be satisfied with party discipline as it is, as he accepts the need for discipline, and agrees with the way in which an MP's individual freedom and the collective benefits of party group unity are balanced within his party. Although we do use MPs' assessment of party discipline when it comes to voting according to the party line in parliament specifically in our sequential decision-making model, the question suffers from the same limitations as do our measures of the first decision-making mechanism, cue-taking (i.e., we are unable to specifically gauge an individual MP's personal responsiveness to positive and negative sanctions when it comes to voting). We thus may have underestimated the importance of party discipline throughout our analyses. However, including it in our model is less problematic than is the case for our cue-taking question because party discipline is the last stage in our decision-making model. As an alternative, future surveys could reformulate the question concerning party discipline when it comes to voting in parliament to 'How do you think your party group (leadership) will respond in the case of disagreement between an MPs' opinion and the party's position on a vote in parliament?', or more specifically, 'How do you think the party (group) leadership will respond when an MP expresses his intent to not vote according to the party line?', with the following answering categories:

1. The party (group) leadership will let the MP vote according to his own opinion.

2. The party (group) leadership will make the MP vote according to the party's position.

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try to influence the behavior of parliamentary actors. Our argument is, however, is that this study focuses on the relationship between MPs vis-à-vis their parties specifically.

The first answer indicates that an MP would be allowed to dissent from the party line, whereas the second implies that the party (group) leadership will apply pressure in order to elicit obedience from the MP (although the former answering category admittedly does not exclude the possibility of the party (group) leadership applying negative sanctions in the long term). The question could be followed by a question that inquires into the likelihood of different negative sanctions, similar to the question that was included in the Dutch version of the PartiRep Survey (see subsection 5.4.4 in chapter 5).

These suggestions for future elite surveys would provide for a fuller understanding of the sequence, and enable us to measure the relative contribution of each of the decision-making mechanisms more precisely than we were able to do in our studies. Aggregated at the level of the parliaments, the use of elite surveys as the main source of data enables us to analyze MPs' application, and the relative contribution, of these mechanisms as general tendencies. However, as evidenced by the popularity of the answering category 'it depends' when it comes to the question whether in the case of disagreement an MP should vote according to his own opinion or the party's position in the Dutch Parliamentary studies (see subsection 6.5.3), an individual MP's decision-making process is likely to be affected by variables other than those included in these studies. If we want to go beyond the study of general trends and look more closely at the circumstances that may affect MP decision making, and further test and refine our sequential decision-making model, other data sources and research methods may be preferred.

As highlighted earlier (see the discussion of the simplification of the sequential model in subsection 3.3.3 in chapter 3), whether or not an MP has an opinion is likely to depend on the importance and substance of the vote at hand. An MP who lacks a personal opinion may usually follow the voting advice provided by the party spokesperson or party leadership, but if the vote is important to him personally, he may invest time and resources to form his own opinion. It may also be that the MP first had a personal opinion, but was convinced to alter his position based on substantive discussions in the party group meeting or with actors outside of parliament. Again, the fact that others were able to change the MP's opinion may be influenced by the substance of, and importance ascribed to, the vote (by either the MP himself or the actors with who he deliberates). As we have acknowledged, the substance and importance of the vote can also affect whether or not an MP votes with the party out of loyalty: even if an MP has internalized the norm of party loyalty, there may be some issues about which an MP (or those actors outside the party group who he considers his political principals) feels very strongly, and thus on which the conflict is so intense that it supersedes his loyalty to his party group.[7] Finally, the importance of the vote may also influence the extent to which the party (group) leadership is willing to apply sanctions, and the MP is willing to incur them. Admittedly, the studies in this book have not been able to take this into account. One could argue, however, that the substance and importance of the vote do not change the questions MPs ask themselves in determining to vote with the party line or not, or the

[7] Furthermore, an MP's subscription to party loyalty, as well as his responsiveness to sanctions, may not only depend on the substance and the importance of the matter put to vote, but also on the stage of an MP's career (Kam, 2009).

order in which they do so.

In addition, we have not taken into account the fact that MPs are constantly involved in numerous different decision-making processes that take place simultaneously over an extended period of time. This means that that the factors that play a role in one decision may affect a decision on a different vote. The parliamentary party group is not only a deliberative arena, but also a political arena. An MP may, for example, not form an opinion about a certain vote because he promised a colleague that he would vote with the party group, in exchange for his colleagues support on his own proposal. His lack of an opinion is therefore not only dependent on his lack of time and resources, or on the substantive content and importance of the vote, but also by his promise to colleague on a different vote. Or an MP may disagree with the party groups position, but may again toe the party line because he exchanged his support on the vote at hand for support from a colleague on other issue. As we saw in Table 5.26 in chapter 5, the majority of Dutch representatives at all levels of government answered that it is very likely that an MP who (repeatedly) does not vote according to the party group line will have trouble finding support among his fellow party group members for his own initiatives. It is therefore likely that the active mechanism here is an MP's fear of negative repercussions, and thus party discipline.

The fact MPs are involved in multiple simultaneous decision-making processes over an extended period of time means that MPs have repeated experience with the decision-making process. This may entail that, on a particular vote, MPs' decisions at earlier stages of the decision-making process may be influenced by their anticipated decisions at later stages in the sequence. Their anticipation being based on their own personal previous voting experience. The lack of a personal opinion, and resultant decision to vote with the party as a result of cue-taking, for example, could also arise from an MP's general subscription to the norm of party loyalty being so strong, that an MP decide that he need not even bother developing a personal opinion, as he is convinced that even if he disagrees, he will vote with the party's position out of loyalty anyway. The MP may also not form an opinion because he anticipates that if he disagrees with the party's position, sanctions will be applied to which the MP knows he will be responsive. Thus, if both MPs and party (group) leaders are aware of this order the decision-making mechanisms, and MPs' decisions at earlier stages of the model may indeed be influenced by their anticipation of their decision at the stages that follow, we may overestimate the relative importance of the first mechanisms in the model, especially that of cue-taking. In addition, the possibility of anticipation may blur the lines between the mechanisms, and thus may also lead MPs (and therefore also researchers) to muddle the decision-making mechanisms.

As mentioned in the introduction to this book (see page 7 in chapter 1), the ultimate dependent variable in a study of party group unity would be individual MPs' final behavioral outcome. Thus, the ultimate test of the sequential decision-making model would be to apply it to individual MPs (who are at different stages of their career) as they come to their voting decision (or other types of behavior) on different topics. In order to do so we would need to obtain access to individual MPs and, ideally, the party groups to which they belong. Access to individual MPs would enable us to study how MPs come to

their voting decisions on specific votes. This would require either a large research team of observers and interviewers, or limiting the study to a few specific MPs, comparable to Richard Fenno's (1978; 1990) study of US legislators in the 1970s. In order to take into account that MPs are constantly confronted with multiple votes from different issue areas to which they ascribe different degrees of importance, and to gain better insights into the role of the decision-making mechanisms, as well as the role of anticipation, we would need have multiple observations and interviews over time. All in all, accessing the individual MP and directly study their decision-making process in relation to specific votes would allow us to not only further test the model in its current form, but also refine is in order to deal with complicating factors such as the fact that MPs are involved in constantly involved in multiple decisions on different votes, and the associated possibility of anticipation by both the MP himself as well as others, including his political party (group) members and leadership.

Accessing the parliamentary party group,[8] and specifically the interactions between group members behind the scenes and during the meetings of the parliamentary party group, would enable us to observe the processes of cue-taking and deliberation within the group, and get a glimpse of the application of party discipline in terms of both positive and negative sanctions, as well as the role of subtler forms of (group) pressure and persuasion. This could take on the form of a single-case study of one party group, although accessing multiple party groups would allow for comparison of groups of different ideologies, sizes, age, etc., that may have different styles of leadership and group decision-making. Although there are a few examples of journalists and researchers being allowed behind the closed doors of the parliamentary party group (for the Netherlands, see Van Westerloo (2003) for an example), it is likely that this will be a difficult research method to apply.[9] As has become apparent in all three of our studies, representatives tend to worry about the appearance of party disunity, evidenced by the fact that many would prefer stricter party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confidential. One suggestion could be to start at the lower levels of government, as this allows researchers to tap into a large number of legislative assemblies, and thus party groups and individual representatives, who may be easier to gain access to than those are the national level. Keeping in mind the rather low response rates obtained through the 2010 PartiRep Survey, lower government levels could also serve as a source of data for future elite surveys on representation in general, and party group unity in particular. Our findings suggest that although the sequential decision-making model seems rele-

[8] At the start of this research project, we approached all the parliamentary party groups in the Dutch Second Chamber with the request to allow us to observe their party group meetings. Unfortunately, not enough of the party groups were willing to participate to allow for variation of on key independent variables (government versus opposition, large versus small parties, etc.) that may influence the workings of the party group and the pathways to party group unity, and which would have enhanced our ability to guarantee anonymity. In the end, even the parties that had initially shown interest withdrew from the project.

[9] One of the potential weaknesses of the observer method of data collection and analysis is that the presence of an observer may influence the behavior of the subjects of study (Gillespie and Michelson, 2011, 262). The fact that in our surveys MPs seem to worry about keeping internal party discussions confidential may increase the risk of altered behavior.

vant at all levels of government, the relative role of the decision-making mechanisms differs at the levels of government, however, which researchers who do follow up on this study of party group unity and MPs' decision-making should keep in mind.

7.3 Implications

By approaching party group unity from the perspective of individual MPs' decision making, this book makes an important contribution to our understanding of what party group unity actually consists of, and how it is brought about. All three of our studies reveal that the vast majority of representatives vote with the party out of simple agreement, and that when representatives disagree with the party's position, most can be counted on to still toe the party line out of a sense of loyalty despite their disagreement. In all of our studies, only a small percentage of representatives would prefer less strict party voting discipline, and the majority of MPs are actually quite satisfied with party voting discipline as it is. Moreover, when put in the sequential decision-making model, party voting discipline plays the least important role of the three mechanisms (cue-taking is not included in the decision-making sequence). Thus, party group unity mainly results from MPs' voluntarism, whereas party discipline plays a secondary role.

The analysis of the Dutch Second Chamber over time (chapter 6) showed that although the Left-Right ideological homogeneity of party groups in parliament has remained relative high, MPs have become more likely to perceive a larger distance between their own opinion and the party's position, entailing that, at least from the perspective of MPs themselves, party agreement seems to has suffered over time. For the Dutch case, we were unable to look at MPs' satisfaction with party discipline over a long period of time, but given the fact that in both the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study and the 2010 PartiRep Survey over 90 percent of respondents answers that they are satisfied with party voting discipline as it, it is unlikely that parties nowadays rely much on discipline, or have increased its use over time in response to the decrease in party agreement. We do see, however, that the percentage of MPs who subscribe to the norm of party loyalty has increased over time. Thus, even in the face of decreasing party agreement, Dutch parties themselves are able to, and are likely to actually prefer to, count on MPs' voluntarily loyalty rather than apply party discipline for their MPs' voting behavior. Party discipline is costly both from the perspective of MPs, as well as political parties. An MP who needs to be (repeatedly) coaxed or threatened into voting according to the party group line is likely to suffer in terms of his standing in the party group as well as his future political career (see subsection 5.4.4 in chapter 5). And if parties apply too much discipline, or do so too often, this is likely to be counterproductive, as the constant threat and application of sanction is likely to affect MPs' solidarity with the party group leadership, and thus their loyalty to the political party.

Given the high levels of party group unity in (most) of the parliaments included in our three studies, however, party discipline is still relevant. In all three of our studies, the voluntary pathways to party group unity can account for most, but not all, of the MPs in the sequential decision-making models. Moreover, our analysis of the 15 national

parliaments (chapter 4) shows that at the individual level, MPs who do not agree with the party line or do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty are most likely to prefer less strict party discipline. Our findings confirm the theoretical argument forwarded by Bowler et al. (1999a) and further specified by Hazan (2003), that "discipline starts where cohesion falters". Describing party groups that act as unitary actors as disciplined, as is often done by both scholars and political commentators alike, does not paint a representative picture of the way in which parties achieve their unity. Depicting these parties groups as cohesive seems more accurate, but does not encompass the entire picture.

Now that we have a better insight into the way in which MPs come to the decision to vote with the party, what does this entail for our models of representation? According to Manin (1997, 196-197), "today's alleged crisis in representation" involves a change from the predominance of party democracy to audience democracy, resulting from the desecularization and modernization of society (see chapter 2). Whereas party democracy is characterized by an electorate organized along relative stable social-economic cleavages whose votes express their identity in terms of class and religion, Manin (1997, 226-228) argues that audience democracy involves reactive voting based on 'hazy images' of parties' electoral promises, but increasingly more the images projected by individual politicians, especially party leaders. Manin is clear on what party democracy entails for the relationship between MPs and their parties, but he remains rather vague in terms of what a shift towards audience democracy means for MPs and their parties in parliament.

When we base our answer to the question on what we know from previous studies about MPs' voting behavior, the short answer seems to be 'not much'. Party voting unity in the 1990s and 2000s is found to be high in (most) the parliamentary democracies. In other words, in terms of the relationship between MPs and their parties when it comes to voting in the legislative arena, the political party model seems to have held its ground, and audience democracy does not seem to be much different from party democracy. Most studies on parliamentary voting do not, however, allow us to look at changes in voting unity over time. Kam's (2009) study of four Westminster systems is an exception. He finds that that while in the United Kingdom and Canada voting dissent has become more frequent and extensive over time, this is not the case in Australia and New Zealand. He concludes that MP dissent and electoral dealignment 'appear to travel together', which would entail that the changes in the electorate have indeed affected the relationship between MPs and their parties in parliament. This does not seem to be the case in the Dutch Second Chamber, however, as our analysis shows that voting unity has remained high, and has even increased over time, in the face of electoral volatility and partisan dealignment.

As opposed to Kam (2009), however, we were able to assess changes in the different pathways to party voting unity over time for our case of the Dutch national parliament, where we find that party agreement in terms of the distance MPs perceive between their own and their party's position has increased over time, but party Left-Right ideological homogeneity has not. This discrepancy between perceived distance and party ideological homogeneity may be the result of MPs suffering from the same 'hazy image' of their party as that Manin claims voters do as a part of audience democracy. Party loyalty,

however, has increased over time, meaning that it is likely that Dutch parties have taken action to curtail the effects of changes in the electorate by increasing the importance of party loyalty as a candidate selection criterion. Whether parties in other parliaments have faced comparable changes in party agreement, and have responded in similar ways is not known, but there is little reason to assume that they would have not at least tried. That Kam (2009) does find an increase in voting dissent in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, however, seems to indicate that not all parties have been equally successful in their attempts.

Our analysis of the 15 national parliaments showed that party agreement as a pathway to party group unity is most affected by formal institutional configurations, especially parties' candidate selection (our results regarding electoral institutions are somewhat mixed). Thus, if political reformers would like to see a change in the composition of parliament in terms of the constellation of individual representatives' preferences, appealing to parties to democratize and decentralize their candidate selection procedures could be a way forward. This does not guarantee, however, that MPs will forge a closer relationship with their voters in terms of loyalty, that parties will not increase their use of discipline, and thus that this will impact party voting unity. Representation is, of course, not limited to parliamentary voting, and it could be that the altering institutions would result (or has already resulted) in other types of behavioral personalization by individual MPs. In their studies of the Israeli Parliament, for example, both Rahat and Sheafer (2007) and Balmas et al. (2012) conclude that there over time has been an increase in decentralized behavioral personalization (measure in terms of the number of submissions and adoptions of private member bills, the use of roll call votes, and self-references in parliamentary speeches), and that this is likely to have resulted from institutional personalization (see subsection 2.4.2 in chapter 2). Given the advantages of parliamentary party group unity, however, it seems likely that parties will resist, and otherwise curtail, any changes that may diminish their role in the political chain of delegation (especially when it comes the legislative voting), if they have not done so already.

As a final remark, it is paradoxical that party group unity is deemed necessary for political representation, and sometimes even considered virtuous, but also carries a negative connotation. In the Netherlands, for example, MPs are often characterized as voting cattle (*stemvee*) subjected to *kadaverdiscipline*, blindly obeying the party's demands. The finding that MPs generally vote with the party of their own accord out of agreement and/or loyalty, and that discipline is usually not necessary and thus only plays a marginal role in determining MPs' voting behavior, should be used to shed new light on the debate concerning the freedom of in the individual MP and party group unity, as the two do not seem to be mutually exclusive.

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[1] In the text of this book, surname prefixes have been used as part of authors' surnames. In the bibliography, entries with authors with surnames that contain prefixes are alphabetized according to those prefixes.

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Dutch summary

Politieke partijen worden door velen gezien als de belangrijkste politieke actoren, vooral als het gaat om vertegenwoordiging in het parlement. Dit geldt niet alleen voor bepaalde stromingen in de politieke theorie en de (empirische) politieke wetenschap, maar ook voor de praktijk. Dit komt in grote mate door het feit dat, in de meeste (Europese) parlementaire democratieën, fractie-eenheid bij stemmingen in het parlement eerder regel dan uitzondering is. Hoewel fractie-eenheid in deze parlementen gebruikelijk is, is het niet overal 'normaal' (Olson, 2003, 165), en is het empirisch gezien niet per se 'natuurlijk' (Patzelt, 2003, 102). Fracties bestaan uit individuele parlementsleden, die overigens in de meeste (Europese) parlementaire democratieën door de grondwet juist formeel erkend worden als de vertegenwoordigende actoren. *Hoe* parlementsleden tot hun beslissing komen om wel of niet in overeenstemming met het standpunt van de fractie te stemmen, en *waarom* individuele parlementsleden met hun fractie meestemmen, zijn de onderzoeksvragen die het uitgangspunt vormen voor de studies opgenomen in dit boek.

Onderzoek naar fractie-eenheid richt zich vaak op de vraag of en hoe fractie-eenheid bij stemmingen varieert als gevolg van institutionele verschillen tussen verschillende parlementen en politieke partijen (Bowler et al., 1999b; Carey, 2007, 2009; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Faas, 2003; Hix, 2004; Kam, 2009; Martin, 2011; Martin et al., 2014; Morgenstern, 2004; Ozbudun, 1970; Sieberer, 2006). Deze vergelijkende onderzoeken bevatten vaak assumpties en theoretische argumenten over de invloed van instituties op de *pathways to party group unity*, de verschillende manieren waarop fractie-eenheid tot stand gebracht wordt. Andere onderzoeken die deze *pathways to party group unity* bestuderen zijn meestal casusstudies die zich vaak maar op één *pathway* binnen één parlement focussen, en nemen over het algemeen de fractie of het hele parlement als niveau van analyse (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Bailer et al., 2011; Bailer, 2011; Depauw, 2002; Crowe, 1980, 1983, 1986; Krehbiel, 1993; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009; Norpoth, 1976; Norton, 2003; Russell, 2012). In beide stromingen van de literatuur wordt het individuele parlementslid vrijwel altijd genegeerd. Terwijl, als puntje bij paaltje komt, het juist het individuele parlementslid is die beslist om wel of niet met het fractiestandpunt mee te stemmen. Bij iedere stemming is de mate van fractie-eenheid het resultaat van de optelsom van de beslissingen van individuele parlementsleden.

Dit boek introduceert een model van de stappen die parlementsleden doorlopen bij

de beslissing om wel of niet met de fractie mee te stemmen, geïnspireerd op de Amerikaanse besluitvormingsmodellen over het stemgedrag van leden van *Congress* uit de jaren zeventig (Asher and Weisberg, 1978; Cherryholmes and Shapiro, 1969; Clausen, 1973; Kingdon, 1973, 1977; Matthews and Stimson, 1970, 1975). Het belangrijkste theoretische uitgangspunt van dit boek is dat het besluitvormingsproces bestaat uit een aantal stappen met ieder een eigen besluitvormingsmechanisme, die parlementsleden sequentieel doorlopen. De besluitvormingsmechanismen, afgeleid van de bestaande literatuur over de *pathways to party group unity — cue-taking*, *agreement*, *loyalty* en *obedience —*, worden dus in een specifieke volgorde geplaatst. In de empirische studies in dit boek, die voornamelijk gebaseerd zijn op enquêtes onder individuele volksvertegenwoordigers, beoordelen we steeds de relatieve rol van ieder van de besluitvormingsmechanismen apart, en waar mogelijk ook samen in de sequentiële volgorde. Verder wordt onderzocht in hoeverre het belang van de mechanismen bij het tot stand brengen van fractie-eenheid verschilt tussen nationale parlementen (hoofdstuk 4), tussen de niveaus van overheid (hoofdstuk 5), en door de tijd (hoofdstuk 6).

Consistent over alle studies blijkt dat fracties bijna altijd op de vrijwillige bereidwilligheid van hun leden kunnen rekenen. De meeste parlementsleden stemmen met de fractie mee omdat 1) zij geen persoonlijke mening hebben over de kwestie en dus het stemadvies van hun fractiespecialist, -woordvoerder of -leiding volgen (*cue-taking*), of 2) zij wel een mening hebben, maar deze simpelweg overeenkomt met het fractiestandpunt (*party agreement*), of 3) zij het oneens zijn met het fractiestandpunt, maar de norm onderschrijven dat, in het geval van onenigheid met de fractie, een parlementslid zich moet schikken naar de positie van de fractie (*party loyalty*). In tegenstelling tot wat vaak (impliciet) wordt aangenomen, is fractiediscipline (*party discipline*), wat inhoudt dat de parlementsleden de fractielijn onvrijwillig volgen onder de belofte van een beloning of de dreiging van sancties, zelden nodig.

Uit vergelijkend onderzoek blijkt dat de mate van fractie-eenheid bij stemmingen varieert tussen verschillende institutionele configuraties (Bowler et al., 1999b; Carey, 2007, 2009; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Faas, 2003; Hix, 2004; Kam, 2009; Martin, 2011; Martin et al., 2014; Morgenstern, 2004; Ozbudun, 1970; Sieberer, 2006). Echter, instituties hebben niet een direct effect op stemming, zij hebben een effect op het besluitvormingsproces en de besluitvormingsmechanismen van individuele parlementsleden. In de eerste studie (hoofdstuk 4) wordt onderzocht hoe de besluitvormingsmechanismen beïnvloed worden door de kandidaatsselectiemethoden van partijen (mate van decentralisatie en inclusiviteit van het selectoraat), het kiesstelsel (districtsgrootte en de mogelijkheid tot het uitbrengen van een voorkeurstem) en regeringsdeelname van de partij. Dit eerste onderzoek maakt gebruikt de internationaalvergelijkende 2010 PartiRep MP enquête, afgenomen onder leden van het Huis van Afgevaardigden in 15 landen. Uit eerder onderzoek over deze parlementen blijkt dat de fractie-eenheid bij stemmingen zeer hoog is—in sommige gevallen bijna perfect (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Carey, 2007, 2009; Carrubba et al., 2006, 2008; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Kam, 2001a,b, 2009; Lanfranchi and Lüthi, 1999; Sieberer, 2006).

Parlementsleden die zitting nemen namens partijen met gecentraliseerde en exclusieve selectiemethoden zijn eerder geneigd om het vaak eens de zijn met hun partij

(*party agreement*). Selectiemethoden hebben een minder sterk effect op de partijloyaliteit van een parlementslid, en lijken helemaal niet op partijdiscipline van invloed te zijn. De resultaten met betrekking tot de invloed van de formele eigenschappen van een kiesstelsel zijn gemengd; dit ligt waarschijnlijk deels aan de niet zo fijnmazige operationalisering van het kiesstelsel in het onderzoek. Wat betreft partijloyaliteit lijken de formele eigenschappen van het kiesstelsel in ieder geval minder van belang dan de waarde die een parlementslid zelf hecht aan een voorkeurstem en/of het voeren van een persoonlijke campagne om voorkeursstemmen te trekken. Parlementsleden die hier weinig waarde aan hechten zijn meer geneigd om toch loyaal met de partij mee te stemmen indien zij het oneens zijn met het partijstandpunt. Regeringsdeelname blijkt van negatieve invloed te zijn op *party agreement*: meer parlementsleden geven aan het vaker oneens te zijn met hun partij wanneer deze in de regering zit, terwijl het aantal parlementsleden dat partijloyaliteit in het geval van onenigheid onderschrijft juist hoger is onder regeringspartijen. Het gebruik van partijdiscipline lijkt niet te worden beïnvloed door de drie gekozen instituties.

Hoewel het aantal onderzoeken naar fractie-eenheid op het subnationale niveau verbleekt in vergelijking met het aantal op het nationale niveau, lijkt fractie-eenheid ook op de lagere niveaus van (Europese) parlementaire democratieën vaak voor te komen (Copus, 1997a,b, 1999b; Cowley, 2001; Davidson-Schmich, 2000, 2001, 2003; Denters et al., 2013; Deschouwer, 2003; Dewan and Spirling, 2011; Patzelt, 2003; Stecker, 2013). Maar: op het subnationale niveau zijn kiesdistricten, vertegenwoordigende organen en fracties kleiner dan op het nationaal niveau, en bevoegdheden beperkter. De verwachting voor de studies in hoofdstuk 5 was dat dit een invloed zou hebben op de relatieve rol van de verschillende mechanismen. Bij de vergelijking van de vertegenwoordigers uit de negen *multilevel* landen opgenomen in de internationaal-vergelijkende 2010 PartiRep enquête, blijken de verschillen echter klein, behalve dat *party agreement* zoals verwacht een grotere rol speelt op het subnationale niveau dan op het nationale niveau.

In Nederland is de 2010 PartiRep enquête gehouden onder vertegenwoordigers op het nationale, provinciale en gemeentelijke niveau. De data uit de enquête maken het mogelijk om verder onderzoek te doen, waarbij het land en de institutionele context constant worden gehouden, terwijl het verschil in grootte van kiesdistricten, vertegenwoordigende organen, en fracties wordt vergroot. In Nederland zien we dan ook wél een verschil in de relatieve rol van de mechanismen, vooral als we kijken naar het verschil tussen het nationale en gemeentelijke niveau. *Party agreement* speelt een grotere rol op het gemeentelijke niveau, terwijl *cue-taking* en *party loyalty* juist een kleinere rol lijken te spelen bij het tot stand brengen van fractie-eenheid op het gemeentelijke niveau.

Het laatste onderzoek (hoofdstuk 6) richt zich op veranderingen in de relatieve rol van de besluitvormingsmechanismen door de tijd. In veel (Europese) democratieën is er de afgelopen decennia sprake van electorale volatiliteit en *dealignment*, wat volgens het *two-arena model* (Mayhew, 1974) een negatieve invloed zou kunnen hebben op fractie-eenheid. Echter, volgens het *one-arena model* is het parlement relatief geïsoleerd van wat daarbuiten gebeurt (Bowler, 2000) en hebben veranderingen in de electorale arena weinig effect gehad op het gedrag van parlementariërs en fractie-eenheid in het parlement.

De Nederlandse casus is representatief in termen van electorale volatiliteit en afname in partijlidmaatschap ten opzichte van tal van Europese parlementaire democratieën. De casus heeft ook het voordeel dat de meeste institutionele variabelen die van invloed zouden kunnen zijn op fractie-eenheid en de *pathways to party unity* door de jaren heen niet (veel) zijn veranderd.

Uit het onderzoek beschreven in de eerste helft van het hoofdstuk blijkt dat fractie-eenheid in de Tweede Kamer vanaf de Tweede Wereldoorlog altijd hoog is geweest, en zelfs lijkt te zijn toegenomen, vooral als we kijken naar de fracties van de gevestigde partijen. Het aantal fractie-afsplitsingen ligt heel laag, en fractie-eenheid bij stemmingen is heel hoog. Op het eerste gezicht lijken de veranderingen in de electorale arena geen invloed te hebben gehad in de parlementaire arena. Op basis van de Nederlandse parlementsonderzoeken 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 en 2006, alsmede het Nederlandse deel van het 2010 PartiRep onderzoek, is het mogelijk om ook te kijken naar verandering in de relatieve rollen van de besluitvormingsmechanismen. Dan lijkt het erop dat *party agreement* onder parlementsleden is gedaald, terwijl het aantal parlementsleden die de norm van fractieloyaliteit onderschrijven is gestegen. Ook is het aantal parlementsleden die zichzelf specialist achten (in tegenstelling tot generalist) gestegen, wat erop kan duiden dat parlementariërs vaker (moeten) vertrouwen op het stemadvies van hun fractiegenoten (*cue-taking*). Enerzijds lijkt de vermoedelijke daling in party agreement te wijzen in de richting van het *two-arena model*. Anderzijds lijkt het erop dat de (gevestigde) partijen actieve maatregelen hebben genomen om de relatieve bijdrage van de andere *pathways to party group unity* te verhogen om de effecten van de veranderingen buiten het parlement te minimaliseren.

De studies tonen aan dat de besluitvormingsmechanismen inderdaad beïnvloed worden door instituties (hoofdstuk 4), niveaus van de overheid (hoofdstuk 5) en verandering door de tijd (hoofdstuk 6). Wel is het zo dat *party agreement* het sterkst wordt beïnvloed, en dat dit minder het geval is voor de andere besluitvormingsmechanismen. De belangrijkste bevinding blijft echter dat fractie-eenheid overwegend op bereidwilligheid blijkt te zijn baseert. Paradoxaal is dat fractie-eenheid noodzakelijk wordt geacht voor de politieke vertegenwoordiging, maar dat het ook een negatieve connotatie draagt. In Nederland bijvoorbeeld worden Kamerleden vaak gekenmerkt als 'stemvee' onderworpen aan 'kadaverdiscipline', blind gehoorzamend aan de eisen van de fractie. De bevinding dat parlementsleden meestal uit eigen beweging bijdragen aan fractie-eenheid, en dat fractiediscipline meestal niet nodig is en dus slechts een marginale rol speelt, kan worden gebruikt om een nieuw licht op werpen op het debat over de vrijheid van het individuele parlementslid en fractie-eenheid. De twee lijken elkaar namelijk helemaal niet uit te sluiten.

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Curriculum Vitae

Cynthia Maria Cornelia van Vonno (Alphen aan de Rijn, 1984) spent her youth in Taiwan, Qatar, Brazil and Puerto Rico where she attended international schools. Upon return to the Netherlands, she obtained her pre-university International Baccalaureate Diploma at the Rijnlands Lyceum Oegstgeest (2000-2002). After completing the *propaedeuse* year at the University College Utrecht (2002-2003), she switched to Leiden University, where she acquired a Bachelor in Political Science (2003-2006), followed by a Master of Philosophy (Research Master) in Political Science Institutions and Institutional Analysis (2006-2008). Cynthia worked as a teaching assistant and research assistant both during and after her studies (2007-2009). She conducted her PhD research at the Political Science Institute, first as a part of a PhD appointment (2009-2012), and later alongside a (part-time) Teaching Instructor contract. She has been a Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations since 2014.