Machiavelli and minor states; power politics in the international system

Duyvesteyn, I.G.B.M.

Prof.dr. Isabelle Duyvesteyn

Machiavelli and Minor States;
Power Politics in the International System

Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Machiavelli and Minor States; Power Politics in the International System

Inaugural lecture by

Prof.dr. Isabelle Duyvesteyn

on the acceptance of her position as professor of
International Studies with a Specialization in Global History
at the Universiteit Leiden
on Monday November 6, 2017

Universiteit
Leiden

Mr Rector, your Excellencies, honourable members of the board of the Institute for History, dear colleagues, dear family and dear friends,

The advantage of the Netherlands, according to former Dutch foreign minister and secretary general of the NATO alliance, Mr Joseph Luns, is that it has a lot of 'abroad'.[1] There are a lot of 'foreign affairs' to deal with for the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Luns was possibly our one true Realist foreign minister, putting material interests centre stage, rather than ideas and norms. His remark provides me with the stepping stone for the topic I would like to address this afternoon: the role of smaller states in international affairs and their under-investigated power and national interest driven behaviour.

Before I start my exposé, I need to explain why I am addressing you in English today, which is not my mother tongue and the university, while being an international institution attaches great importance to the Dutch language. The chair, however, which I have the privilege of occupying currently is associated with International Studies, which is the English taught Bachelor degree program. Since I would like to reach out to both our students and my direct colleagues in this programme, many of whom are non-Dutch speakers, I have opted to address you in English.

Talking about the foreign affairs of small states, there is a consensus that this category of states possesses limited clout in international affairs. Small states tend to exhibit overall a low level of participation in international affairs, have a limited foreign policy agenda, focus on their own region rather than globally, tend to focus on norms and soft power, on multilateralism and coalition building, and tend to embrace neutrality.[2] Apart from when they possess nuclear weapons, small states see their position and interests better served by focusing on norm creation and diffusion, and soft power.[3] Think for example about the Dutch promotion of the human rights discourse and the marketing of The Hague as the capital of international peace and justice. Small states can be seen as important norm entrepreneurs, embracing international norms and working towards their imitation and emulation.[4]

In contrast, Realist explanations put power and national interest centre stage. This perspective has for a long time dominated the study of international affairs. It proposes that foreign policy behaviour of states can be explained by considerations of maintaining and increasing, where possible, the power and position of the state. The way to go about this is by using the instruments of power available, with as most formidable, the military instrument. Machiavelli was one such thinker, who, in his advice to the Medici in Florence in the early sixteenth century, suggested that only true power will be taken seriously and increasing the power of the city state based on interest driven behaviour was of primary importance. Since Machiavelli, many international relations scholars have put forward the same idea that states are the most important players in the international domain and power and power politics is the lingua franca of their affairs.

What is a small state, what is medium and what is large? Are these assessments based on territory, size of population, economy or a combination of these factors? Traditionally large states have dominated both international relations as practice and as academic enterprise.[5] Importantly since the end of the Cold War, the research agenda widened and other actors have started to receive attention and a call for truly global international relations surfaced.[6] Many attempts have been made to define small states. We need not get bogged down in this debate. What I would like to subscribe to is a relative measure of small; small in comparison to other states.[7]

I would like to propose that the image of small states' abstinence of power politics is false. I would like to put forward for your consideration that small states are able to wield

significant power and exhibit interest driven foreign policy behaviour. To illustrate my case, I will use as an example, probably the most unlikely candidate: the Netherlands.

I hope that I have now build up your curiosity enough, so let me start by setting out my case.

There is a long standing debate about traditions in foreign policy. Hans Boogman, professor of History at Utrecht University, - my alma mater - was among the first to identify what he called the Dutch tradition in foreign affairs. In his work he placed emphasis on the role of Dutch traders and well to do middle classes, which formed a trading tradition. In his now famous dissertation, our former Minister of Defence, and my current colleague in the national advisory council on international affairs, Joris Voorhoeve, posited that there are three main continuities in Dutch foreign policy contained in the title of his PhD and subsequent book; *Peace, Profits and Principles.*[8] These three elements have provided the cornerstones of Dutch activities in the domain of foreign affairs, this large 'abroad'.

The three elements are carefully intertwined. Trade could not flourish without a stable international order and principles could be promoted when trade contacts had been established. The tradition of Peace has been embodied even in our constitution which contains an article 90, committing the Netherlands to the promotion of international law. Precursors are, for example, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, in which the first codifications of international law occurred. The tradition of Profits or the tradesman is exemplified by it currently ranking 13th in the world, based on its GDP.[9] This would logically grant it a seat among the group of largest economies in the world, the G20, which has not materialised and I will come back to this issue. Precursors to the trading tradition are the trade with the Baltics, which formed the foundation of the wealth during our Golden Age in the seventeenth century, and the building of the East and West India companies. The tradition of Principles is exemplified by our strong tendency to tell others how to do things. Not only morally and ethically as the Dutch reverend, or protestant minister, would do in the pulpit, but also in our strong agenda to promote human rights and stress on norms.

This argument sounds highly convincing? It has a claim to cover the most significant trends and traditions. Still, as others have also noted, there are shortcomings; not only would it be rather difficult to falsify such broad claims, many other states would claim similar traditions with only a slightly different emphasis.

The debate about traditions in Dutch foreign policy continued with a contribution by Duco Hellema, my former colleague, in his book *Dutch Foreign Policy; The Role of The Netherlands in World Politics.* He posited that rather than principled traders, the Dutch attitude was driven by pragmatism - a fourth P after Peace Profits and Principles - and the desire to maintain the status quo. Given the international conditions, the Dutch did what was feasible, rather than what was principled in international relations. The external environment and the internal circumstances in the Netherlands deserve more attention, he claimed, to assess the Dutch identity abroad. He concluded 'It would - I am quoting him here directly - rather appear to be the international relations and the domestic material circumstances (and limitations) that explain the Dutch orientation toward maintaining the status quo'.[10]

None of the key authors in this debate has awarded significant influence to a more Realist perspective on Dutch foreign policy traditions. When treated, Realist behaviour is seen as incident and exception. Nowhere is it suggested that power politics and national interests importantly contributed to foreign policy behaviour. With the possible exception, of course, of Minister Luns, who might now run the risk of becoming the hero of my story this afternoon.

Since April 2014, the Netherlands participates in the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali in North Africa. The Netherlands is there to stabilise the state and support the government in Bamako and provides expertise in the area of mission intelligence. It is considered one of the most dangerous UN missions with a loss of over 100 UN personnel to date.

Why and how is this related to the discussion about foreign policy traditions and the argument of hard power? This case is the first example where mission participation was explicitly linked to gaining a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.[11] Participation served the political interest of obtaining a UN seat.

The United Nations Security Council is the highest decision-making body in international affairs. We saw its significance recently in the crisis surrounding North Korea, where the members voted unanimously to increase sanctions against the regime. The international system consists of states with no higher authority than the nation state. Voluntarily these states participate in the largest forum of state power, the United Nations where practically all states in the system, around 193 currently, are represented. The most important decision-making body is the Security Council with 15 members of which there are five permanent, with veto power. The permanent five are the US, China, UK, France and the Russian Federation and ten members are elected on a rotating basis. The election takes place from among all the 193 member states in the General Assembly and every year five seats are up for election for the two year term. The election takes place based on a regional grouping of five from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America and two from Western Europe and the rest of the world. To be elected the candidates need a two-thirds majority. Visibility and reputation are thus important.

Why is it interesting to be part of the Security Council? The UN Security Council represents the most authoritative forum in world politics. Its primary task is to safeguard international peace and security. At least four non-permanent members of the council need to vote in favour of a Council decision, called a resolution, for it to pass. The votes are public, not secret, and it is common to give an explanation for the voting behaviour. This is a form of significant power. The Security Council, furthermore, has enforcement power and can ask states to make available 'all necessary means' to restore peace and security. Depending on the political will of the participants, it can enforce sanctions, send out peace enforcement missions and represent the international community of states at large. Still today, 72 years after its founding, more than 60 states, almost one third, have not yet been elected to a non-permanent seat of the UN Security Council. It is thus by no means a given that every state gets an opportunity to participate.

In general, states have a limited number of foreign policy instruments at their disposal to serve international peace and security.[12] First, states can use diplomacy and negotiation to shape their foreign policy. As noted, this has been argued to be the instrument of preference of small states. According to Winston Churchill, slightly facetiously, the essence of diplomacy is the art of telling people to go to hell, in such a way that they ask for directions. This instrument has great appeal but there are serious limitations. Not only do we know that in the context of negotiating peace deals, there is a very narrow window of opportunity for talks to be effective.[13] The conflict or issue has to be 'ripe for resolution' otherwise it will not work. Also, using the instrument of soft power and persuasion is very time intensive.
A second instrument to shape foreign policy is giving aid. There is large-scale and long running debate about the effectiveness of helping others by giving aid, which has not been resolved. The idea, currently wide-spread, of helping

others to help themselves rather than doing it for them, also calls for humility when using this instrument.
The promotion of international law and its uses in foreign policy is a third instrument. In particular the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002, which is housed in The Hague, has been heralded as a major impetus to increase accountability in international affairs. However, as with the preceding instruments, the effectiveness is precarious. Research has shown that the threat of criminal prosecution can affect legitimacy.[14] Overall, an all pervasive deterrent effect is not present.
A fourth instrument, economic sanctions is heavily used in international affairs. Here as well, there are clear limitations as to their effectiveness. Both the shape of sanctions, smart sanctions and the targets, the civilian population or the leadership, need to be highly circumscribed for it to have any direct causal relationship with a desired change in foreign policy behaviour.[15] Similarly, arms embargoes, another popular instrument to curb the room for manoeuvre, is far less effective than its use would suggest.[16]
Lastly, military force is the most powerful instrument states can use. Apart from war fighting, the military instrument has been prominently used the past two and a half decades to promote peace and security by intervening in active conflict zones. While there are some optimistic assessments that peace-keeping does keep peace[17], the results so far force us to recognise that building stable political orders and sustainable peace from the outside is very difficult, if not impossible.
Overall, there are clear limitations to what these foreign policy instruments can achieve. Sanctions, embargoes and interventions should not be seen as panacea for difficult foreign policy challenges. Therefore, participation in the United Nations, where decisions about negotiations, sanctions and interventions and their effects are taken, is of weighty importance.

The Netherlands attempted to get elected, riding on the wave of the exposure as a result of the Mali mission, on the UN Security Council and was partially successful in September 2016. Partially, because it will share a seat with Italy from next year onwards. As a sign of close European cooperation, the two states decided to end their direct competition and put in a joint bid. In 2018 the Netherlands will occupy a non-permanent seat for a year and will act as a chair for the month of March 2018. This is not the first time that the Netherlands has participated at this level of international decision-making. The Kingdom has held a non-permanent seat five times before.

My central argument this afternoon, that the Netherlands exhibits clear Realist foreign policy behaviour, is based on the following evidence. Every time the Netherlands became an elected member of the UN Security Council, it has received major exposure as participant in a large UN intervention mission. The Netherlands turns out to be a highly successful powerbroker. In fact, I would claim that the Netherlands has a perfect record. The case of Mali is not an exception but is the culmination of a long-standing tradition.[18]

The story starts with the participation in the intervention in the Korean War and an election to the Security Council in the years 1951-52. The Korean War broke out in the early summer of 1950 when North Korean troops crossed the unofficial border with South Korea. The war gave rise to the first and only peace enforcement mission by the United Nations during the period of the Cold War. The Netherlands, a founding member of the UN, participated with land and naval forces. The cabinet was under pressure from the US, but at the same time rather lacklustre because of the recent war and the troubles in Indonesia. Still, a decision was taken by the Cabinet to send Dutch troops.[19] For a large part the decision was inspired by the desire to show itself a trustworthy ally of the United States. The participating troops showed themselves very capable on the battlefield and were positively regarded by the

other contributing states.[20] The Netherlands indicated an interest in membership in the UNSC and were elected.

After the outbreak of the conflict in Lebanon in 1975, the Netherlands received an official request to provide troops for a mission. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs volunteered Dutch troops to officially act as an interposition force to monitor the situation between the warring parties on the ground. The mission became the largest, most dangerous and controversial mission the country had ever carried out.[21] Controversy surrounded the issue of the use of conscripts and financing, or rather the lack of it, by the United Nations. Again, with an appeal to its status as a trustworthy ally and participant in international affairs, The Netherlands entered Lebanon in March 1979, covering the largest UNIFIL sector of 150 square kilometres. The mission was extremely difficult, with hindsight we can now say, totally unworkable and unmanageable. This was illustrated in 1982 when Israeli forces crossed UNIFIL territory in another invasion of Lebanon. Even after the invasion, the Netherlands stayed on but the character and activities of the mission changed substantially. With a lack of successor troops, the Dutch continued for another three years. We see again the argument of reliability as an international partner play a role in the decisions. Furthermore, there were positive assessments of the overall participation. The Dutch became a non-permanent member of the UNSC in January 1983.

The next UN membership election occurred in the late 1990s. This time it was not so much participation in a mission but rather the use of another foreign policy instrument that made a difference: the pecuniary contributions to the UN coffers. At the end of the 1990s the Netherlands had become the largest net contributor, among others to the UN Development Programme. Listen to this: it was the largest contributor in absolute terms to this programme. In an op-ed piece at the time, the late Koen Koch, wrote that he did not have the foggiest why the Dutch would harbour the ambition of getting elected to the Security Council.[22] Their efforts would be better served, he argued, by getting Serbia condemned for human rights abuses, rather than by reminding others of all the bills that we had paid. The voting pledge of the Netherlands was to use foreign aid to tackle the root causes of conflict. In the end, thanks to skilful diplomacy, the Netherlands gained a seat in the Security Council for the 1999-2000 period, in the first round of voting.

The War in Iraq, which started with the invasion in March 2003, was only supported politically by the Netherlands. The precarious international legal basis was one of the reasons initially holding the country back. Still, the Netherlands managed, admirably, to draw huge political capital from it: the position of secretary general of the NATO alliance. Even though the committee of investigation, de Commissie Davids, that looked into the decision-making process, concluded in its report that the appointment of Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was not caused by the Dutch participation in the Iraq War.[23] Nevertheless, it did not form an impediment either. Revealingly, the Dutch permanent representative at NATO headquarters, Ambassador Patijn, is extensively quoted in the investigative report, saying that the Dutch contributions to peace- and stability operations were highly valued.[24] Would we have gained this position without participation?

It was a NATO operation that subsequently led to another notable macro foreign policy success for the Netherlands, namely a formal invitation for the G20. From this perspective, the participation in the Afghanistan interventions paid off.[25] After the attacks on 9/11 and the decision to attack Afghanistan to uproot Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the Netherlands showed itself again as a more than a trustworthy ally. The headache which the Balkan missions, in particular the disaster at Srebrenica, had caused was alleviated both by the recognition the country received based on the quantity and

quality of its delivery in the field in Uruzgan from 2006 onwards. Direct evidence of the correlation between this record and the 'rewards' received on the foreign policy stage can be found in Wikileaks documents, which indicates a clear causal relationship.

Now I have to apologise to you, and my students in particular, that I have used Wikileaks as a source to support my case. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to substantiate these claims without access, for example, to the minutes of the Council of Ministers, which would be the decision-making level where evidence for a causal link could be found. These minutes are, however, not declassified. I always advise my students to refrain from WikiLeaks not only because of the manner in which it was obtained – theft - but also because of the difficulty of corroboration. In this case, I hope you will make me one small allowance. The evidence is titillating. In a leaked diplomatic cable, the state department in Washington received a report from the US representative in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. On 3 September 2009, in a private lunch, the American Ambassador to the Netherlands, Ms Fay Levin and US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder, literally told the secretary-general of the Foreign Ministry that Cabinet should be aware that the Netherlands would not be part of the G20 were it not for Afghanistan. If the country wanted to discontinue its engagement, as was the topic of deliberations, the consequences should be clear. The decision to withdraw was taken regardless and the Netherlands did not receive an invitation for the G20 in South Korea. Based on the size of its economy, the Netherlands would, however, logically qualify. However, G20 membership is restricted to the most influential economies, both established and developing, which hold strategic importance in the world, according to the G20's own definition. Since its establishment in 2008, the G20 convenes to safeguard the functioning of the international economic system. During its latest session this year in Hamburg, our prime minister was only able to attend because Germany used its prerogative as a host to extend an invitation.

With the exception of one tour as UNSC member in the mid-sixties in which it managed to occupy the position of Chair in 1965-1966, without a clear commensurate foreign mission or contribution, the record of the Netherlands stands.

What are the problems with the argument presented so far? First, what is visible is a correlation and not necessarily a causal relationship. At this point, there is no definite proof of causality. However, as just noted in the case of the Netherlands, there are too many examples for it to be purely accidental. Second, if indeed there is a causal relationship, it is not clear how it works. Is there a desire to become a non-permanent member and does this inform the decision for mission participation? Or, alternatively, does mission participation raise the ambition level and does membership become feasible? At this point, I feel confident to claim that pure coincidence is unlikely.

What does this mean for Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nepal, and Rwanda? Why these states, you might ask? These are the states that have provided the largest contributions to UN peacekeeping operations in recent years. In fact, since 2010 the top 10 of contributing countries has consisted of small, non-Western states. They all, incidentally or not, fall in the category of states I am interested in: small states in terms of size of territory, size of population and limited instruments in international affairs. Has participation in UN missions been their ticket to a seat at the top table? Do we see this power political behaviour in other small states than the Netherlands as well? The short answer is yes.

There is an academic debate in the literature about the motivations for states to participate in international peace-keeping missions. The arguments are quite specific and

detailed but, unfortunately, omit the power political consideration.[26] Therefore it is difficult to test my claim. There is no clear explanation why power political considerations could not play a role in assessing motivations to become active on behalf of the United Nations. Only for the case of India, also a major contributor to UN missions but by no means a small state, has an argument been made that participation could increase its long standing efforts to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The omission of this aspect begs the question whether there might be research biases at play here.

The first major motivation for participation in UN missions that has been identified is financial; the state that makes troops available for a mission receives 1000 USDollar per soldier per month. For most of these states, these are very interesting amounts. The state does not always transfer directly these funds to the individual soldier, but from the perspective of the state, participation pays.

A second reason for participation is military experience. Field experience is very valuable and provides added attraction for military decision-makers and the troops they command during peace time.

A third reason to participate in UN missions are political considerations; participation provides an opportunity to demonstrate the state to be a serious and responsible member of the international community of states. This pays off in status and visibility. Relatedly, there is political and institutional spin-off in increasing the institutional capabilities of many states.

These are the reasons to participate in missions. The factors that increase the chances of election have been brought forward by statistical research and include having a good reputation.[27] The reputation can be built around the claim that the state subscribes to the core principles of the UN Charter, the maintenance of international peace and security. One way to demonstrate this commitment is participation in peace-keeping operations. Previous research has found no statistical correlation between an ambition to become a non-permanent member and an inclination to participate.[28] The reverse, a statistical correlation between peace-keeping participation and increased chances of getting elected, has found limited support. The statistical evidence indeed shows that for Asia, Latin America and Western Europe, there is a correlation.[29] This, however, leaves out our main cases of Ethiopia, Ghana and Rwanda, the top UN troop contributors. What do these individual cases reveal?

Bangladesh has participated over the years in 54 missions in over 40 countries.[30] Its specialty is police forces, including female policing which it advertises. Between 2000-2010 it received 1,2 billion USDollars from the UN for its participation. And indeed, it was a member in 2000-2001. In 2014 in a subsequent bid to get elected, Bangladesh withdrew its candidacy in favour of Japan, representing the Asia-Pacific region. This occurred in exchange for an economic assistance package worth 5,7 billion USDollar.[31] If you would like to know the price of a UN seat, Bangladesh has established it. Japan had already been a non-permanent member ten times prior.

Ethiopia, for a number of years has been in the top ten of troop contributors. The country has a long standing and close relationship with the UN. It was a founding member, and participated in the Korean War, where it suffered over 100 casualties and in the Congo War of 1960. In 1963, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, in a notable speech to the General Assembly stated that - and I quote - "the Charter of the United Nations expresses the noblest aspirations of man", adding "these, too, are only words; their value depends wholly on our will to observe and honor them and give them content and

meaning.".[32] This Ethiopia has done. Its most recent peace-keeping activities focus exclusively on Africa. The country has been elected to a non-permanent seat for the 2017-2018 period. In its promotional package Ethiopia showcased its peace-keeping record. Allegedly, the country has the largest number of female peace-keepers in the field. Prior to this most recent election, Ethiopia participated in 1967-68 and 1989-1990. Even though there is no direct temporal overlap, we see the correlation in practice.

Ghana, with currently an overall contribution of 3000 troops, around 20% of its armed forces, occupied a seat in 2006-2007. Prior membership occurred in 1962-1963, and 1986-1987. Ghana is a long standing UN member, with Ghanian diplomat Kofi Annan being a notable and successful Secretary-General of the organisation. Ghana has also been a regular contributor to UN Missions and participated, like Ethiopia, in the Congo conflict, which, I propose, can be possibly linked to its UNSC membership in 1962-1963 period. The Ghanian constitution drafted in 1992, like the Netherlands, contains an article (number 40) which stipulates that the country should seek the promotion of international law. In 2006-2007 Ghana was elected to the Council which was heralded as a recognition that 'Ghana has come of age', according to the Ghanian Foreign Minister.[33]

Nepal has been a member of the Security Council in 1994-1995 and in 2013-2014. It has contributed over 100,000 troops to over 40 UN missions in total. Not only did it participate in the UNIFIL operation in Lebanon, it was also active in the Balkans in 1994, coinciding with its membership of the Security Council. And again, Nepal displays a similar correlation as the previous three states.

Rwanda was a member in 2013-2014. Prior to this, Rwanda participated at the top table during the genocide in 1994. Since then, Rwanda has raised its profile and has become a regular UN contributor in particular since the early 2000s. The genocide experience has contributed to a discourse on preventing genocide elsewhere, exemplified by Rwanda participation in the mission in Darfur.[34]

At this point, we can conclude that the correlation is more widespread than recognised either in academic investigations or in the public discourse. We do not need sophisticated statistics or mathematics to work out that all five states that have been top contributors to the peace-keeping missions of the UN, have also all been a member of the Security Council in recent years. This is not a random phenomenon. This correlation is important and significant because it demonstrates, that from among all the instruments the state could use to promote foreign policy goals, the use of the military instrument by small states in the context of the UN pays off. Small states turn out to be very apt at using their military to advance power political interests - perhaps not in the conventional sense by waging war, but there is significant macro political effect. Being a recognised member of the international system of states and talking about the affairs that concern us all, is no mean feat for these states.

Further evidence that the correlation is being recognised, are found in public statements. Malaysia is another state which has latched on to the idea that participation in missions might have a positive effect on UN election chances. As only a small contributor in absolute numbers, it has tried to raise its profile by advertising its expertise in training programmes for peacekeepers mainly from developing countries.[35] It did in fact manage to get elected for the 2015-2016 term.[36]

Interestingly, the government of Canadian prime-minister Justin Trudeau has announced in August 2016 that it aims to do something about the abysmal state of Canada's participation in UN missions. - I am not sure whether Canada is actually a small state or a medium size state [sorry Mark, my husband, is Canadian and the debate is still raging whether

Canada or the Russian Federation is the largest state, it remains unresolved but Canada with only 33 million inhabitants - minus one - can also be seen as a small state] Canada has been traditionally among the states that warmly supported the UN's role in crisis and stability operations. It hosted, for example, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that drafted the now prevalent and still highly debated Responsibility to Protect idea. The idea was very novel because it rephrased the right to state sovereignty and non-interference into an obligation to protect its citizens. Canada, however, has in recent years consistently featured at the bottom of the list of participating states.[37]

The cases looked at so far provide support for my thesis this afternoon that small states are apt at playing the power political card. However, the argument is witness to several challenges. First, as noted, a correlation is not necessarily a causal relationship and the direction of the potential causality would warrant further investigation, which I would warmly welcome. In particular the features of the global history research agenda of investigating parallel and global commonalities and differences, based on a multi-disciplinary perspective, opens interesting avenues.

A second challenge is accountability. If indeed there is a causal link between the participation in UN missions and the election to the UN Security Council, accountability needs to be reconsidered. In particular in the case I am most familiar with, the Netherlands, the government has, as far as I am aware, never justified participation in, or assessed mission success afterwards, based on positive macro foreign policy effects. Based on article 100 of our constitution, parliament does not have a formal right of decision. It has a right to be informed and has a major role in the accountability afterwards.[38] Neither the justifications beforehand, in the shape of the article 100 letter stipulating the detailed motivation for participation, nor in the reports to parliament afterwards, has there been mention of this macro political success. Participation in missions might contribute or help to stabilise countries in crisis, it is also highly effective to raise the profile and the chances of participation at the top tables in international affairs. The problem is that geo-strategic success has not formed a significant part of the accountability process and has not been properly recognised in parliament. Furthermore, it has not been recognised in public debates, by the general public, the taxpayers. Would we think differently, if we were to take this factor into consideration, when deciding on mission participation?

I will come to my conclusions. What have I contributed so far with my story?
First, modesty is warranted when it comes to use of foreign policy instruments. The panoply of instruments is large but their effectiveness is circumscribed, which invites humility. Still, small states are power players, just as large states are. Appearances notwithstanding, I have tried to argue that power politics matters for small states as well. Lawrence Freedman has also concluded in his major tome on Strategy that small states need to be 'cunning' and agile in wielding the instruments they command.[39] This indeed they have done.

Second, I have added a fifth P to the list of Dutch foreign policy traditions: peace, profits, principles and pragmatism go hand in hand with power politics. I agree with my predecessors that power politics did not possess an overriding influence but to describe it as alien to the foreign policy establishment is wide off the mark.
As for Foreign Minister Luns, with whom I started my talk, I hazard a guess that he would agree. I had the pleasure of meeting him once; as a very young and impressionable student when I was a member of a student association and we had invited him for a talk. Being very tall and having a commanding voice that carried far into the lecture hall without a microphone, he told us indeed how foreign affairs worked.

Third, previously in my first inaugural speech as special chair in Strategic Studies at the Institute of Political Science, I claimed that many states in the international system, including the Netherlands, have suffered from an inability to think strategically. The art of formulating clear and feasible political aims and making available the required means to achieve them has become lost. My argument today can possibly be seen as a tiny corrective to this. My practical policy advice would be: pay more attention to the details of international power politics, as well as to the macro-political spin off of engaging in missions to create a safe and secure environment abroad.[40]

Fourth, I have possibly tried to argue that Canada is a minor state rather than a major one. The Russian Federation wins both in square kilometres and number of inhabitants.

Finally, my close colleagues and students at this point will have wondered how I have managed to pull off a speech of this length without mentioning the name of Clausewitz, my intellectual hero of long standing. I will not disappoint you. Of course Clausewitz, as the father of military and strategic thought has something to contribute here. Understand the war you are fighting, is the wisdom he imparted. Translated this would mean: grasp the environment in which you are active, and grab opportunities when they present themselves.

I would like to close with a couple of words of gratitude. First of all, I am indebted to the University Board, the Faculty Board and the Board of the Institute for History for the trust and confidence they have bestowed on me. I feel truly blessed. Since I started, I have felt so more than welcome.

I stand here alone, however, science is not something that you do one your own. I would like to thank, first of all, my students. I have the privilege to guide and teach you in this important and formative phase in your life. It is a wonderful experience to return to the classroom, meet you all with your eager minds and share with you my enthusiasm for the field of global history and international relations. Trust me, I learn as much from you, as you – hopefully – learn from me.

The scientific enterprise cannot do without inspiring colleagues both near and far, who continually challenge me and keep me on my toes. It is a great pleasure to work with you. The fact that I have been honoured to serve the field in this present capacity is also a recognition for all of you that our debate and exchanges have borne fruit. Not only my students and colleagues deserve recognition but also my numerous teachers and mentors over the years. I remember fondly in particular the late Jan Geert Siccama.

A little over four years ago I stood here for the first time delivering my inaugural speech as a Special Chair in Strategic Studies. Here on this front row sat the proudest mother in the whole world. She thoroughly enjoyed herself that afternoon and evening and commented afterwards, saying: I did not know you had so many great and interesting colleagues and friends. She is sorely missed, every single day. Today my very proud father sits here on the front row, my number one fan, with my precious sister, the younger of the two of us, but often the older in wisdom and experience. Thank you for your help, in good times and in bad. Without you I could not have done this.

Finally, my own small state: Antoinette, Etienne, Benedict and Sebastian. I am so indebted to you for so many things. Thanks foremost for the gift of love and thank you for providing that necessary balance to my busy work with a happy and full home life. And finally, Mark, thanks for skilfully managing our Ministries of Domestic and Foreign Affairs, thanks for bringing out the best in me and for everything else.

I have said.

Notes

[1] The author would like to thank Ms Elif Polat for very helpful research assistance. Jaap Ramaker, former permanent representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands at the United Nations, has been kind enough to share his personal recollections of the election process in 1998. Furthermore, the author is very grateful to Dirk Barth, Dr Thijs Brocades Zaalberg and Dr Christ Klep for comments and suggestions on earlier versions of these arguments. Any remaining errors are my own.

[2] Neal G. Jesse and John R. Dreyer *Small States in the International System: At Peace and at War* Lanham: Lexington Books 2016, 32. Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gsthl (eds) *Small States in International Relation*s University of Washington Press, 2006.

[3] Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power; The Means to Success in World Politics* New York: PublicAffairs 2005.

[4] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization*, 52, 4 (1998), 887-917.

[5] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* New York: McGraw Hill, 1979.

[6] Jesse and Dreyer *Small States in the International System,* xiii.

[7] Jesse and Dreyer *Small States in the International System,* 6-7.

[8] Joris Voorhoeve, *Peace Profits and Principles* Dordrecht: Springer, 1979.

[9] Jonathan Gregson, 'The Richest Countries in the World', *Global Finance*, 1 March 2017. Available at: https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/richest-countries-in-the-world?page=1.

[10] Duco Hellema *Dutch Foreign Policy; The Role of The Netherlands in World Politics* Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2009, 399.

[11] 'Complete tekst VN-speech Willem Alexander', 28 September 2015. Available at: https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/complete-tekst-vn-speech-willem-alexander; also, Niels van Willigen, 'A Dutch Return to UN Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 23, No. 5 (2016), 702-720. E. van Outeren, 'Een Afrikaanse missie in een Afrikaans tempo', *NRC Handelblad*, 18 oktober 2014. Available at: https://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2014/10/18/een-afrikaanse-missie-in-een-afrikaans-tempo-1429100. Maite Vermeulen, 'Waarom gaan er Nederlandse soldaten naar Mali', *De Correspondent*, 18 oktober 2014. Available at; https://decorrespondent.nl/292/Waarom-gaan-er-Nederlandse-soldaten-naar-Mali-/53254362568-246c8c6f.

[12] Isabelle Duyvesteyn, 'The Effectiveness of Intervention Instruments in Armed Conflict; Conflict Resolution is the Only Solution?', in: Gelijn Molier and Eva Nieuwenhuys (eds) *Peace, Security and Development in an Era of Globalization; A multidisciplinary approach to the process of peace building after armed conflict* Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, 99-128.

[13] Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Bart Schuurman, 'The Paradoxes of Negotiating with Terrorists', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 39, 4 (2011), 677-692.

[14] Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons, "Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?" *International Organization,* 70, 3 (2016), 443-75.

[15] Dursun Peksen, 'Autocracies and Economic Sanctions; The Divergent Impact of Authoritarian Regime Type on Sanctions Success', *Defense and Peace Economics*. Published on-line: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1368258.

[16] Damien Fruchart, Paul Holtom, Siemon T. Wezeman, Daniel Strandow and Peter Wallensteen, *United Nations Arms Embargoes; Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour* Stockholm: SIPRI and Uppsala University 2007.

[17] Virginia Page Fortna, 'Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after

Civil War', *International Studies Quarterly*, 48 (2004), 269-292.

[18] See also: Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Luuk Arlar, 'Nederland en humanitaire interventie', in: Jacco Pekelder, Remco Raben en Mathieu Segers (red.), *De Wereld Volgens Nederland* (Amsterdam: Boom 2015), pp. 221-245.

[19] Christ Klep en Richard van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kabul; De Nederlandse Militaire Deelname aan Vredesoperaties sinds 1945* Den Haag: SDU 2005, 34-45.

[20] Klep en van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kabul*, 44.

[21] Klep en van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kabul*, 73.

[22] Koen Koch, 'Nederland Kruideniert met Veiligheidsraad', *Trouw*, 26 september 1998.

[23] *Rapport Commissie van Onderzoek Besluitvorming Irak* Amsterdam: Boom 2010. Available at: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2010/01/12/rapport-commissie-davids, 208.

[24] *Rapport Commissie van Onderzoek Besluitvorming Irak*, 210.

[25] 'Uitnodiging G20 dankzij Uruzgan', 15 January 2011, available at: https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/uitnodiging-g20-dankzij-uruzgan. This is based on the following document available on this webpage: ambtsbericht 224468.

[26] There is a study from 1995 which has investigated self-interested motivations for participation in UN missions, however, the timeframe is limited to the Cold War period 1948-1990. It does find evidence for a Realist argument. Laura Neack, 'UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?', *Journal of Peace Research*, 32, 2 (1995), 181-196.

[27] Axel Dreher, Matthew Gould, Matthew D. Rablen and James Raymond Vreeland, 'The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council', *Public Choice*, 158, 1-2, (2014), 51-83. Jan Schmitz & Johannes Schwarze , 'Determinants of the Election of Non-Permanent Members to the United Nations Security Council, An Empirical Analysis' September 30, 2011. Available at: http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Conf5_Schmitz-30.09.11.pdf.

[28] Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia 'Supplying Peace; Participation in and Troop Contribution to Peacekeeping Missions', *Journal of Peace Research*, 48, 6 (2011), 699-714.

[29] '[T]here is a positive link between troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions and election probability for Asia, Latin America and Western Europe'. Dreher, Gould, Rablen and Vreeland, 'The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council'.

[30] See also: http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-bangladesh/.

[31] Clint Richards, 'Abe Trades Investment for Security Council Seat'. 9 September 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/abe-trades-investment-for-security-council-seat/.

[32] Ludger Schadowsky, 'Ethiopia gets Non-Permanent Security Council Seat', *Die Welle*, 28 June 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-gets-non-permanent-un-security-council-seat/a-19362933.

[33] 'Ghana Joins the UN Security Council', *The Stateman*, 10 October 2015. https://www.modernghana.com/news/87796/ghana-joins-un-security-council.html.

[34] The record of these top contributors is, however, not without controversy. Many of these states have been criticised because of poor democratic and human rights records at home. How can we expect these states to promote peace and security abroad when the domestic situation at home is far from exemplary? The Ethiopian information pack for the 2016 election round stated that the country has the ambition to use its seat to further 'promote peace and security through dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution'. Ethiopia itself is run by an authoritarian regime and civil liberties are under pressure. Anti-terror legislation, for example, has been used against

internal opposition. (Schadowsky, 'Ethiopia gets Non-Permanent Security Council Seat') Nepal, in some soul searching after a shattering defeat in a race against Indonesia in 2006, blamed its record at home and the failure to deal with the Maoist insurgency, as the most important factor for its loss. The defeat came with the lowest number ever of votes in the General Assembly. (M.K. Pokhrel, 'Humiliating Defeat; Who is to Blame?', *The Himalayan Times*, 26 October 2006. Available at: https://thehimalayantimes.com/opinion/humiliating-defeat-who-is-to-blame/) The Rwandan election in 2013-2014 has also been criticised based on charges of support for militias in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo.

35 'Malaysia's peace-keeping contribution a "big plus" to get UNSC seat', *Thai PBS*, 17 May 2014. http://englishnews.thaipbs.or.th/malaysias-peace-keeping-contribution-big-plus-get-unsc-seat/

36 Malaysia's Security Council Seat website: http://malaysiaunsc.kln.gov.my/.

37 'Canada pledges more peacekeepers in bid for UN Security Council seat', *France24*, 9 August 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160827-canada-trudeau-pledges-more-un-forces-bid-international-role.

38 Klep en van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kabul*, 14-16.

39 Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013. Jan Willem Honig, 'The Tyranny of Doctrine and Modern Strategy; Small (and Large) States in a Double Bind', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 39, 2 (2016), 261-279.

40 See also the argument by Honig that small states have increasing room to develop and pursue independent strategy: Honig, 'The Tyranny of Doctrine and Modern Strategy'.

Prof.dr. Isabelle Duyvesteyn

since 2015	Appointment Professor of International Studies/ Global History at the Institute of History, Leiden University.
2012-2017	Appointment Special Chair in Strategic Studies, supported by the Foundation for Strategic Studies, with a focus on international security, at the Institute of Political Science, Leiden University.
since 2008	Member of the Advisory Council on International Affairs, Committee on Peace and Security.
2007-2012	Project leader of the VIDI project, 'A History of Counter-terrorism 1945-2005.
2001-2015	Assistant Professor, and since 2007 Associate Professor, at the Department of History and Art History/ History of International Relations, Utrecht University.
2001	Assistant professor, Faculty of Military Operational Sciences, Netherlands Royal Military Academy.
1997-2001	PhD in War Studies, King's College London.
2996-2997	Junior Researcher, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.
1991-1996	BA and MA in Liberal Arts with a specialisation in History of International Relations and Political History, Utrecht University

Duyvesteyn argues in her inaugural speech that most small states in international affairs have always self-identified as focused on norms and soft power. Hard power and safeguarding material interests is supposedly anathema to these states. However, this identification of small states as norm entrepreneurs and coalition builders, she argues, obfuscates some very notable power political behaviour. Based on the case of one of the most unlikely contenders for playing the power political card, i.e. the Netherlands, she demonstrates that power political behaviour is also visible in the foreign policy domain of small states. Not only the Netherlands but several other small states in the international system have been very apt at putting forward their militaries, in the context of United Nations peace and stability missions, and get elected to the United Nations Security Council. A seat in Security Council is seen as the top prize in international affairs. The correlation between using the most powerful instruments of state to create visibility, and the reaping of notable macro-political effects, a seat at the top tables in international affairs, has a longer pedigree. Moreover, it is shared among a group of small states that has put their militaries in harm's way on behalf of the UN and which have subsequently become notable participants in international politics.

Universiteit Leiden
The Netherlands