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Informal constitutional change: constitutional change without formal constitutional amendment in comparative perspective

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Informal constitutional change

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Constitutional change without formal
constitutional amendment in comparative
perspective

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¹ Which stems from the Latin term *promovendus*, meaning the one moving forward, advancing, growing.

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