



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Reframing the Diplomat: Ernst van der Beugel and the Cold War Atlantic Community

Bloemendal, N.A.

Citation

Bloemendal, N. A. (2017, September 6). *Reframing the Diplomat: Ernst van der Beugel and the Cold War Atlantic Community*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/54855>

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/54855>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Cover Page



Universiteit Leiden



The handle <http://hdl.handle.net/1887/54855> holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

Author: Bloemendal, N.A.

Title: Reframing the diplomat: Ernst van der Beugel and the Cold War Atlantic Community

Issue Date: 2017-09-06

7. The Challenge of the Successor Generation

While the preceding chapter already introduced Van der Beugel's public diplomacy efforts in constructing a sense of Atlantic community by keeping the Atlantic mindset alive in a time of détente and the democratization of foreign policy, this chapter will continue this analysis with a more specific focus on the challenge of the successor generation. After all, diplomacy is not just about short term goals such as negotiating deals and crafting policies. On a more fundamental level, diplomacy is just as much about fostering and maintaining relationships; about ideas, values and identities, about creating an environment and a climate that enables the realization of more concrete and short term goals. Likewise, the challenge of the successor generation was not so much about how to shape European integration or how to legitimize a strong Atlantic defense. Instead it was concerned with the long-term challenge of fostering and maintaining the social fabric and mindset that served as the glue that kept the Atlantic Community together.

This shared mindset as well as the social fabric supporting the Atlantic alliance was both maintained and embodied by the Atlantic elite, composed of the constellation of state officials and private individuals and organizations working to foster and maintain close transatlantic ties and who were committed to transmitting this understanding to the public at large. Both this social fabric and the "Atlantic-mindedness" that united them were for a significant part rooted in formative experiences described in earlier chapters; experiences of appeasement and war, liberation and reconstruction, followed by integration and cooperation in the face of renewed fears of war and authoritarian repression – experiences shared by those who were present at the creation.¹ On the European continent these experiences had also influenced the development of a positive image of the United States as benevolent liberator, ally and protector. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, a new generation came of age that did not share these formative experiences so central to the genesis of the Atlantic Community. They had only known peace and grew up during a period of easing tensions between East and West. What is more, the European members of this generation did not associate the Americans with benevolent deeds of liberation and reconstruction, but rather saw the United States as belligerent and corrupt as a result of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. As an imagined community, however, the Atlantic Community – and the military alliance at the heart of this community – could only live on as long as the Atlantic mindset lived on in the next generation, as long as they too recognized the importance of transatlantic bonds and as long as the social fabric that had developed during war and reconstruction could be maintained. As this chapter will demonstrate, unofficial actors like Ernst van der Beugel and the Atlantic elite networks to which he belonged went

¹ Kenneth Weisbrode, "The Political and Cultural Underpinnings of Atlanticism's Crisis in the 1960s" in *More Atlantic Crossings? European Voices in the Postwar Atlantic Community*, *GHI Bulletin Supplement 10*, eds. Jan Logemann and Mary Nolan (2014), 52.

through great lengths to foster and maintain these long term bonds and to create social structures through which new and especially younger members could be engaged, socialized and play themselves an important role in transmitting this mindset within their own spheres of influence.

A Very Serious Generation Problem

During the 1960s Ernst van der Beugel's speeches and activities were characterized by a growing emphasis on the importance of engaging and educating new generations of Americans and Europeans in Atlantic affairs. "Those who have not experienced the 1930's, during which my student generation witnessed the horrifying consequences of the lack of will-power and strength in the West, which brought the Second World War upon us, who have never experienced the simplicity of purpose of the Second World War, nor the joy of recovery and integration of the Western world, will approach the fundamental problems of international politics in a different way,"² Van der Beugel observed in the summer of 1968 – a year that would be characterized by massive student protests, dissatisfaction and unrest throughout the West. "There is no doubt a very serious generation problem in the Western World," he acknowledged. "To escape it by calling it an irresponsible action of an irresponsible and tiny but violent minority does not meet the seriousness of the problem at all. Trying to link it to specific circumstances in specific countries does not lead to anything. The classrooms at the Sorbonne were overcrowded, but were they at Columbia? Where is the negro problem in Amsterdam, or the springer concern in Rome?"³

The fact that the post-war generation perceived "the necessity of Western cooperation" as an element of the very status quo many of them detested while associating it with the 'establishment' aroused strong feelings of antagonism against it, Van der Beugel observed.⁴ "The feeling that the Cold War and the leadership of that period belong to the established order and therefore should be changed is very strong indeed among the younger generation."⁵ In addition, many youths either principally opposed the use of power, or – and this category was much larger according to Van der Beugel – they manifested a curious blindness for the essential question of the purposes of the use of power. Consequently, they repeatedly contested the use of force or regarded it with suspicion, while isolating it from its ultimate purposes.⁶ "Maybe this is the case because many of those who direct themselves against the existing order; the rebels of today, at least those in Europe, have never experienced anything but peace, freedom and economic expansion", Van der Beugel

² E.H. van der Beugel, "Leiding VS in Atlantische wereld is onmisbaar", *Het Parool*, 23 August 1968 (translation mine).

³ E.H. van der Beugel, "A new Look at European-US Relations", *Knickerbocker International*, August 1968, file 47, EvdB.

⁴ E.H. van der Beugel, "De huidige problemen van de Westelijke samenwerking", speech, 19 November 1968, box "lezingen", AHB.

⁵ E.H. van der Beugel, "Where are we going?", speech, [date unknown, probably June 1968], file 47, EvdB.

⁶ These purposes included, according to van der Beugel, the protection of a way of life, a civilization that respected individual freedom. See: Van der Beugel, "De huidige problemen van de Westelijke samenwerking."

maintained. “They have – as for the young, completely beyond their control – never stood in the conflict where the central question was whether those values would disappear. They live and agitate by the grace of those very values which they themselves want to destroy or whose endangerment they do not recognize.” Van der Beugel acknowledged that Western society demands a certain degree of dissatisfaction with its own shortcomings, but as he perceived the situation at hand, the dissatisfaction driving the wish to improve was keeling over into a blind disapproval of Western society, which in turn led to a process of self-destruction in which essential accomplishments of the Atlantic Community were falling prey to unclear emotions.⁷

Ernst van der Beugel thus perceived the alienation of big clusters of young people from the principles of the process of Western cooperation and their identification of this cooperation with ‘the establishment’ and their rebellion against this establishment – of which he himself was obviously a prominent member – as “a serious disintegrating factor” in the Atlantic Community. Hence, he argued that bringing back the serious segments of these youths to the understanding that Western cooperation was not a remnant of a bygone era, was essential to the vitality and sustainability of the Atlantic alliance.⁸ As mentioned in the previous chapter, from 1965 onwards the Vietnam War was one of the prime catalysts of discontent – in particular among the younger generation. Even so, Van der Beugel warned in 1968 that “nobody should make himself the slightest illusion that after the Vietnam conflict will be solved this clash between the young and what they consider the established order will be terminated.”⁹ The generation problem was bigger than that and in order to ensure the long term survival of the Atlantic Community and all it stood for, Ernst van der Beugel considered it particularly important to socialize promising young leaders into the Atlantic elite; in fact into the very establishment that so many of them had come to detest.

These ideas did not develop in a vacuum, however, and Ernst van der Beugel was certainly not the only one contemplating the generational challenges to maintaining Atlantic cohesion. As historians like Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith have demonstrated, similar worries with regard to “the passing of the scene of the Marshall Plan architects and the values gap with their successors” developed within broader Atlanticist circles during the early 1960s.¹⁰ These concerns would reach their zenith during the early 1980s when the term ‘successor generation’ was coined “to describe the group that will replace the McCloy,

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ E.H. van der Beugel, “Where are we going?”, speech, [date unknown, probably June 1968], file 47, EvdB.

¹⁰ Valérie Aubourg, “Problems of Transmission: The Atlantic Community and the Successor Generation as Seen by US Philanthropy, 1960s-1970,” in *Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America? The Atlantic Community and Europe*, eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Valérie Aubourg (Paris: Soleb 2011), 423; Giles Scott-Smith, “Maintaining Transatlantic Community: US Public Diplomacy, the Ford Foundation and the Successor Generation Concept in US Foreign Affairs, 1960s-1980s”, *Global Society* 28:1 (2014) 90-103;

Kissingers, Schmidts and others of the Founders Generation that created the Atlantic alliance.”¹¹

Consultancy: the Ford Foundation and the Successor Generation

In order to gain a better understanding of Ernst van der Beugel’s ideas in the context of the successor generation it is useful to take a closer look at some of his advisory work for the Ford Foundation,¹² one of the prime financial donors of the private Atlanticist organizations that together formed much of the informal infrastructure of the unofficial post-war Atlantic Community, which in turn facilitated many of Ernst van der Beugel’s private transatlantic activities.

As Inderjeet Parmar has shown, American philanthropic organizations and in particular the ‘Big three’ – the Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford Foundations – have played a significant role in the forging of American foreign relations.¹³ While the Ford Foundation entered the international philanthropy scene relatively late in the early 1950s, it soon developed into the biggest philanthropic organization in the world. In 1951 Paul G. Hoffmann, who had just stepped down as the American director of the Marshall Plan’s European Cooperation Administration (ECA) became the Ford Foundation’s president. Together with some other prominent associates from the Marshall Plan days, including his ECA colleagues Milton Katz and Richard M. Bissell as well as former High Commissioner to Germany John J. McCloy and his Political Affairs Director Shepard Stone, Hoffmann set out to develop an international affairs program, which during the 1960s and early 1970s came to focus a great deal of its attention on fostering and promoting close transatlantic ties within an Atlantic Community.¹⁴

After President Kennedy introduced the idea of an Atlantic Partnership in 1962, the Ford Foundation decided to pursue the strengthening of this partnership as the core purpose of its International Affairs program. As one 1962 Ford Foundation report pointed out; “the primary objective of the International Affairs program is to identify key persons and institutions in the Atlantic area and assist them in developing the ideas and organizations required by the new challenges and opportunities.” In helping to “accelerate the development of the Atlantic partnership” through private activity, the report emphasized that “the Foundation would not

¹¹ Stephen F. Szabo, *The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans* (London: Buttersworths, 1983), 2; “Minutes Board of Directors”, 4 March 1981, box COR1, folder 25 “Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 1982 Feb-1988 Jan”, John J. McCloy Papers, Amherst College Archive: In the early 1980s many Atlantic NGO’s including the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Atlantic Institute increased their focus on the ‘successor generation’ by trying to transmit the NATO mindset to the next generation e.g. through education and young leader programs trying to improve America’s image among Europeans but also by “trying to stimulate American educators to pay more attention to the basic values of the West and the importance of defending them.”

¹² E.H. van der Beugel to H.A. Kissinger, 8 July 1966, file 7, EvdB: “I just signed my agreement with the Ford Foundation which gives me twice a year a first class trip to the United States. I do not need much extra stimulation, but nevertheless it is a nice arrangement.

¹³ See: Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

¹⁴ Aubourg, “Problems of Transmission”, 419; Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 143-177.

support activities that can be best carried on by governmental bodies. However, it would be considered appropriate to aid activities which would be suspect or impaired if national governments engaged in them.”¹⁵ In this context, the Ford Foundation provided funding for a whole series of Atlanticist organizations including the Bilderberg Meetings, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Atlantic Institute. The latter was founded in Paris in 1961 with the purpose to “promote and develop a spirit of community among Atlantic peoples (...) the strengthening of (...) the social institutions of the Atlantic Community, the harmonization of the long range interests of the community”. The underlying goal was “to encourage the growth of a new generation of intellectuals and policy analysts working on Atlantic problems and thinking in Atlantic terms, as opposed to a national and restricted approach, therefore promoting harmonious and constructive Euro-American relations.”¹⁶

Aubourg argues that “one of the major difficulties was to create more than a few short-term projects and make this Atlantic outlook permanent.”¹⁷ In a similar vein, Giles Scott-Smith has pointed out that “the ‘belief system’ represented by the Atlantic Alliance needed to be embedded and maintained in transatlantic political culture. This awareness lay behind the efforts of many active in the public and private realms to ensure that NATO was seen as the central cornerstone of a wider and deeper social, cultural and economic Atlantic Community.”¹⁸ The generation gap posed a serious challenge to the preservation of this ‘belief system’. As J.E. Dougherty explained in his work on the psychological milieu of the Atlantic Community: “Among those who do not remember the [Second World War], or for whom it was but a dim childhood experience, the slogans of the more immediate postwar period – about the external military menace and the need for tightened community – no longer fit meaningfully into a cognitive framework that was conditioned primarily by economic boom and absence of conflict.”¹⁹ Thus, as Aubourg has demonstrated, in a search for long term approaches to maintain the ‘Atlantic mindset’ during the early 1960s the idea developed within the Ford Foundation that “the key to more durable results lay in transmitting this Atlantic perspective to the upcoming generation.”²⁰ In this context, the Ford Foundation for example justified its financial support for the University Institute headed by Max Kohnstamm in 1963 by arguing that it was a way to help “promising young scholars in developing an Atlantic approach to problems” through the identification of a set of common values and common interests, while trying to define a “community of purpose directed toward common policies and actions on issues of vital concern between Europe and the

¹⁵ “Ford Foundation - Activities to strengthen the Atlantic Partnership”, box 18, folder 182, Office Files-IA-Slater, Ford Foundation, RAC.

¹⁶ Qtd. in: Scott-Smith, “Maintaining Transatlantic Community”, 95.

¹⁷ Aubourg, “Problems of Transmission”, 422.

¹⁸ Scott-Smith, “Maintaining Transatlantic Community”, 90-91.

¹⁹ James E. Dougherty, “The Atlantic Community - The Psychological Milieu”, in *Atlantic Community in Crisis: A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship*, eds. Walter Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 47.

²⁰ Aubourg, “Problems of Transmission”, 422.

United States.”²¹ Thus, while the term “successor generation” was not coined until the late 1970s, historians like Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith have demonstrated that the concept of a ‘successor generation’ was already clearly articulated by the Ford Foundation’s staff and consultants in the 1960s. One of these consultants was Ernst van der Beugel.

In 1966 Ernst van der Beugel was asked by the Ford Foundation to write a report on the future of the Atlantic Institute, which had not lived up to the foundation’s hopes and expectations during the first five years of its existence. This raised the question whether the institute was still worth Foundation support and if so, how should the institute be reorganized? Ernst van der Beugel, who was also involved with the Atlantic Institute as a member of its working party on the problem of Britain’s entry into Europe, was also critical about the way the Institute was functioning.²² Even so, in his consultant reports he argued that from the perspective of “everybody who thinks that the cohesion of the Western World is still one of our primary objectives” there was an “urgent need” for a good Atlantic Institute – especially as an instrument “to keep these thoughts alive and to transmit them to the ruling generation and especially to those who are going to govern in the public, private and academic sectors of life.” As Van der Beugel explained in more detail:

The generation who has lived through the thirties and still has the collapse of appeasement in its blood is approximately the same generation which has witnessed the ‘great acts’ of the 1948-1954 period in Atlantic relations. They are now between 50 and 75. Many of them are still in the leading establishment but they are practically fading out.

The younger generation in Europe is pragmatic and less committed to any concept. Vietnam and the disappearance of the probability of an overt Soviet aggression plus the birth of the welfare state in Europe puts, to say the least of it, their feelings for the necessity of strength in the Western World in a different perspective.

We – the older generation – have failed to transmit to them the message in which we believe. This message is that the Atlantic countries dispose of a unique reservoir of talent and resources. This reservoir can only be used if we live in a cooperating, organized and structured Western world.²³

There were a few “instruments available” according to Van der Beugel to address this problem, but they either did not function on a permanent basis – Bilderberg, for example – or they did not function “properly and imaginatively”. Consequently, Van der Beugel reasoned that the Atlantic Institute “should be the Center (and I also mean this in the physical sense) of

²¹ Ibid., 422.

²² E.H. van der Beugel to Joe Slater, 9 January 1967, box 27, folder 286, Office Files, IA – Slater, FFA, RAC.

²³ E.H. van der Beugel to S. Stone and J.E. Slater, September 1966, box ID#18170-Report#010747, Unpublished Staff and Consultant Reports, IA – Joseph E. Slater, FFA, RAC.

those who are concerned with Atlantic relations. To put it in an oversimplified way, it should be a Bilderberg on a day-to-day basis”.

In addition, Van der Beugel emphasized the value of visitor and exchange programs, maintaining that “there is no better investment in the cause of American-European relations than bringing Europeans closer to the American society, preferably by bringing them over here but also by American programs in Europe.”²⁴ He referred to the Columbia-Leyden Program of American Law as a good example of a program bringing Americans to Europe²⁵, but considered it of greater importance to create opportunities for Europeans to visit the United States arguing that “the real problem in American-European relations is primarily with Europeans and not with Americans.” In this context he believed that the Atlantic Institute should act as the selection place for programs intended to bring Europeans to the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, vice-versa, arguing that “in the political field one should concentrate on the intellectual left labor wing and the Catholic right wing. They should see America. In the academic and journalistic field, one should concentrate on people who might learn that the U.S. is concerned about the year 2000 and we in Europe are not.”²⁶ Obviously, Van der Beugel talked from experience when he mentioned that “there is no single field in which investment yields so much as in the field of showing Europeans what the U.S. is really like”, but whereas his generation of leaders had been brought in direct contact with Americans and American society through the Marshall Plan, similar formative experiences now had to be consciously created through Foreign Leader Programs, educational exchanges, and other trans-Atlantic meeting places. The Atlantic Institute, like the Bilderberg Meetings, should also concentrate on functioning as such a “meeting place”.

Van der Beugel also believed that the Atlanticists could learn from Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for a United Europe with regard to its ‘policy statement’ aspect, arguing that “the Atlantic Institute should from time to time (and not as an exclusive activity) issue policy statements on actual problems” which “through the composition of the board carry the weight of having a real political background.” To accomplish this, a “good Atlantic Institute should be carried by a representative board which consists of people who are responsible for the political decisions in their countries along the lines of what Monnet did in his Committee.” Last but not least, Van der Beugel recommended “a complete change in the Board of Governors in the sense that the establishment of 1950 should, to a great extent, be replaced by a younger generation.”²⁷

²⁴ E.H. van der Beugel to Shepard Stone and Joseph E. Slater, June 13, 1967, box ID#18975, Report#010874, IA-Joseph E. Slater, FFA, RAC.

²⁵ On the connections between the Ford Foundation and the Leyden-Columbia Summer Program in American Law and The Hague Academy, as well as Ernst van der Beugel’s role in this, see: Giles Scott-Smith, “Expanding the Diffusion of US Jurisprudence: The Netherlands as a ‘beachhead’ for US Foundations in the 1960s”, in *American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Helke Rausch and John Krige (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 210-232.

²⁶ E.H. van der Beugel to Shepard Stone and Joseph E. Slater, June 13, 1967, box ID#18975, Report#010874, IA-Joseph E. Slater, FFA, RAC.

²⁷ Ibid.

Jim Huntley, a former U.S. Foreign Service officer and one of the founding fathers of the Atlantic Institute who had joined the Ford Foundation's International Program in 1965, responded with great enthusiasm to Van der Beugel's recommendations. "Van der Beugel sees the Institute as I saw it from the very beginning: the place where the vital interests of the Atlantic countries are thoroughly discussed and from which policy statements emanate. It should be largely a meeting place, a planning center, and a leadership development organization", he wrote to his Ford Foundation colleagues Joe Johnson and Shepard Stone. "In my opinion, Ernst van der Beugel is the man for Director General of the Atlantic Institute. (...) I really cannot think of anyone besides Ernst who is equal to the task, although if he were not willing, another person could probably be found after a thorough search."²⁸

Ernst van der Beugel, however, tried to convince his colleagues at the Ford Foundation to appoint Max Kohnstamm, who also worked as a consultant for Ford, to this position. Van der Beugel "strongly recommended" to Foundation officials that "we should do everything to bridge the gap between the 'Europeans' and the 'Atlanticists' which unfortunately exists." According to Van der Beugel "not many things have hurt the Atlantic movement in Europe so much as this feeling that you either were a European or an Atlanticist", arguing that this was "the reason that the real political appeal has been monopolized by the European movement."²⁹ To bridge this schism, Van der Beugel argued "a man should be appointed as Director who could personify the fact that there is not and should not be any antagonism between the two priorities of European unification and Atlantic cohesion." Max Kohnstamm was the ideal man for this job according to Van der Beugel.³⁰ This, however, was exactly what Huntley – who considered Kohnstamm as too Europeanist for his taste – was trying to prevent. He lamented the fact that the Atlantic Institute had originally "been launched on a course that would mainly support the Kennedy (but really Monnet-Ball) concept of Atlantic Partnership, not a broad transatlantic community of nations bound together in a complex web of intergovernmental institutions and less concrete but still very real habits of thought and heart built on a thousand or more years of common history."³¹ While Kohnstamm would mean a continuation on the Monnet-Ball course, Ernst van der Beugel would be better suited to steer the Institute into the latter direction. In the end Jack Tuthill, a highly regarded former U.S. career diplomat became the new Director General, while both Max Kohnstamm and Ernst van der Beugel joined the Institute's revised Board of Governors together with 14 other newly-elected governors – most of whom – like Van der Beugel's old Marshall Plan friend Robert Marjolin and his fellow Bilderberg Steering Committee member Otto Wolff von Amerongen – did certainly not belong to the younger generation. Other recommendations

²⁸ James R. Huntley to J.E. Slater, December 6, 1966, box 27, folder 187, IA/Slater, Ford Foundation, FFA, RAC.

²⁹ Van der Beugel to Stone and Slater, 13 June 1967, box ID#18975, Report#010874, Unpublished Reports, FFA, RAC.

³⁰ See for example: E.H. van der Beugel to George W. Ball and Siegmund Warburg, 6 September 1967, box 96, folder 8, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

³¹ James R. Huntley, *An Architect of Democracy: Building a Mosaic of Peace* (Washington DC: New Academic Publishing, 2006), 201.

made by Van der Beugel did come back, however, in the eventual grant request for the restructured Atlantic Institute, which argued that:

One of the prime requirements for such a center is the need to increase communication and understanding among the younger leaders in Europe and the United States. As suggested above, the opportunities for meeting and working together which were afforded emergent leaders in the immediate post-war era through the negotiations for new forms of international cooperation – the Marshall Plan, NATO, EEC, OECD and others – no longer exist in the same full measure. Established leaders at least have the Bilderberg meetings as a forum for an exchange of ideas but no similar opportunity is afforded to the younger generation, and it would be the aim of the Institute to work out a design for seminars which might ultimately result in something like a junior Bilderberg – without, however, detracting from the development of the specific meetings and workshops mentioned earlier in this section.”³²

Jim Huntley furthermore went on to extensively quote Van der Beugel’s ideas on the successor generation as a motivation to support an ambitious Young Leaders Program for the Atlantic Community through the Atlantic Institute.³³ The Ford Foundation was certainly not the only American foundation supporting these kinds of efforts, however. While skeptical towards the Atlantic Institute as a whole, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, for example, also supported the Atlantic Institute’s Young Leaders Program, which was “conceived as a means of renewing those post-war working relationships among exceptional individuals, which have served the Atlantic Community so well in the recent past.” Here too the initiative was propelled by the idea that “if the necessary channels of communication can be established, and these emerging leaders can get acquainted with each other and exchange ideas on common problems, they can establish that community of ideas and goals so necessary if the Western peoples are to resolve together the issues which confront them in the decades ahead.”³⁴

It is helpful to look at Van der Beugel’s recommendations for the Atlantic Institute because it provides insight into the way in which he believed private actors and institutions should contribute to fostering close transatlantic relations and the importance of socializing younger generations in this endeavor. Even so, Ernst van der Beugel’s role as a consultant on and governor of the Atlantic Institute was rather marginal compared to his role as a professor of Post-War Western Cooperation, a supporter of exchange and visitor programs and his leadership in the Bilderberg Meetings where he acted on these ideas by becoming one of the

³² “Request for a grant of \$160,000 to the Atlantic Institute for a five-year program of expanding activity in the field of studies and seminars for the promotion of Atlantic Unity”, Grant File 65-161, Reel 2757, FFA, RAC.

³³ “A Program for Development of Rising Young Leaders”, discussion Paper/Office of IA, December 7, 1966, box 18, folder 192, IA/Joseph E. Slater, FFA, RAC.

³⁴ “Young Leaders Program - Outline of a Study Project by the Atlantic Institute”, box 144, Atlantic Institute, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.

driving forces behind a constant effort to educate new generations and to rejuvenate the Atlantic elite.

Bilderberg and the pursuit of a ‘continuous rejuvenation’

Among those involved in the Bilderberg Meetings there was a certain understanding of Bilderberg as a vehicle to sustain the trans-Atlantic relationships and contacts that had originally developed during the Marshall Plan era by developing and maintaining the human infrastructure of an evolving Atlantic Community. As William P. Bundy³⁵, who succeeded Joseph E. Johnson as Honorary Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings for the United States explained in response to the question why Bilderberg was founded:

During the period of the Marshall Plan, many Americans in government and in certain sectors of private business were in close touch with all the European countries that were participating in the program. When the Marshall Plan came to a close in 1953 there was on the European side a very strong desire to maintain the kind of close contact with Americans in and out of government that had been established during that period. There was a concern that there would be a loosening of ties and perhaps a return to the kind of economic nationalism that had been such a terrible feature of the period between the First and Second World War. It was felt that we needed to maintain the strong cooperation that had developed in the field of defense and economics on both sides of the Atlantic. We needed a continuing forum where leaders on both sides of the ocean could come together – responsible people in many walks of life. That is my understanding how the conference came about and that is still the spirit in which it is conducted.³⁶

While this describes just one dimension of Bilderberg’s genesis it certainly was an important component and one in which Ernst van der Beugel played a central role.³⁷ As Bundy related while looking back on his relationship with Ernst van der Beugel, “It was largely through Ernst that I came to realize the high degree to which Bilderberg was built on the relations formed during the period of the Marshall Plan. He was a direct link to a vitally important segment of history, in which the Netherlands had played a special part from the outset. He knew everybody from that time and their successors, and it was a privilege to observe, and in time,

³⁵ William P. “Bill” Bundy was an American attorney and intelligence expert who worked as a CIA analyst in the 1950s until he joined president Eisenhower’s Commission on National Goals. He also served as an advisor on foreign affairs to presidents Kennedy and Johnson. During this period he became deeply involved in Vietnam War policy, first as deputy to Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze during the Kennedy years and later as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs under Johnson. After the election of Richard Nixon, he moved on to academia. In 1969 he started teaching at MIT and in 1973 he moved on to Princeton University where he worked as a professor for the rest of his life. Between 1975 and 1980 he served as the American Honorary Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings.

³⁶ “Interview: with William P. Bundy”, *Freeman Digest*, November-December 1978, p. 41, Scrapbook XVI, AHB.

³⁷ See also Thomas Gijswijt, “The Bilderberg Group and Dutch-American Relations” in *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations*, eds. Hans Krabbendam, Cornelis A. van Minnen and Giles Scott-Smith (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009), 908; Aubourg, “The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute”, 103.

share in those bonds.”³⁸ While a significant segment of the Bilderbergers shared a common history from the Marshall Plan days, which had helped to facilitate the creation of the organization during a time of growing transatlantic tension, the Bilderberg Meetings were not just meant to serve as an annual reunion of those good old days. Rather, as Van der Beugel pointed out, it was meant as an instrument to “*keep the relations good*” – in the future as well.³⁹ In this context, the need to involve “a larger number of ‘new faces’ as much as possible to be recruited from the younger generation” was recognized as early as 1961.⁴⁰ In December 1963, Ernst van der Beugel informed Prince Bernhard about the necessity of a reorganization of the Steering Committee, arguing that its current composition severely prevented “the much needed circulation of fresh, young blood” which “guarantees that Bilderberg remains a vital organism.”⁴¹ As Van der Beugel explained:

The problem is that we are too much inclined to invite people, who are *arrivé* either in the public or the private sector. It is obvious that the Bilderberg Conferences are only worthwhile when a significant part of the participants occupy important positions. On the other hand it is of great importance that we also get people, who are not yet *arrivé*, but of whom it is likely that they will become so in the future, or that they will have influence on important individuals.”⁴²

Even worse, the Steering Committee was stuck with quite some individuals who not even belonged to either one of the above-mentioned categories anymore. Instead, their main trait was that they once “had been *arrivé*”. The number of European members of the Steering Committee had also grown considerably over the years, which was problematic because all of its members were to be invited to every Bilderberg Meeting. As a result, they “blocked” a great amount of the available seats, sometimes even representing half of the total number of participants.⁴³ Meanwhile the Bilderberg leadership was slowly ageing.⁴⁴ Consequently, what was needed, according to Van der Beugel was a rejuvenation of the Steering Committee, which meant that some of Bilderberg’s European “ambassadors in the different countries” had to be replaced. This was obviously going to be a “delicate problem” that would be accompanied with some “difficult conversations”, but it could no longer be avoided.⁴⁵ The reorganization of Bilderberg’s leadership was subsequently discussed during the Steering Committee meeting at the 1964 Bilderberg Conference in Williamsburg, Virginia, where the

³⁸ William P. Bundy, contribution to “Book on Ernst”, box 27, Folder 1, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL.

³⁹ EvdB/Kersten Oral History, p. 737: “Van der Beugel: Meer: ‘om de contacten goed te houden’” (translation mine, emphasis mine).

⁴⁰ “Meeting of the Advisory Committee at the ‘Century Club’, New York”, 17 November 1961, file 61, Bilderberg.

⁴¹ E.H. van der Beugel to HRH Prince Bernhard, 16 December 1963, file 66, Bilderberg (translation mine).

⁴² E.H. van der Beugel to HRH Prince Bernhard, 20 October 1963, file 66, Bilderberg.

⁴³ E.H. van der Beugel to HRH Prince Bernhard [no date, probably 1964 - before Williamsburg Conference], file 67A, Bilderberg, NAH; Ingeborg Philipsen, “Diplomacy with Ambiguity: the history of the Bilderberg Organization, 1952-1977” (PhD diss., Copenhagen University, 2009), 103.

⁴⁴ “Het Steering Committee”, A.T. Lamping, 6 March 1964, file 68A, Bilderberg.

⁴⁵ E.H. van der Beugel to HRH Prince Bernhard, 20 October 1963, file 66, Bilderberg.

Steering Committee agreed that “this situation ran counter to the widely-felt and widely-expressed desire that the Bilderberg Meetings should undergo a strong and continuous rejuvenation process.”⁴⁶

The rejuvenation process that Van der Beugel initiated was also received with approval by the Ford Foundation’s Director of the International Affairs program Shepard Stone – himself a frequent Bilderberg participant – who asserted in a letter to Joe Johnson, the American Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings, that he was convinced that Van der Beugel’s suggested improvements were very much needed. When Stone travelled around Europe he found many “younger men who are now assuming larger responsibilities in parliaments, universities, and business” but who were not represented at Bilderberg. “Bilderberg does not include, in my opinion, a sufficient number of new faces, either European or American”, he argued. “As one looks back to Williamsburg, one might say that we should have had one of Goldwater’s young men on hand. This would not have been to my personal taste, but it might have been useful to all of us.”⁴⁷ It is not unlikely that Van der Beugel had in fact been informally instructed by Stone, who was a close friend of Van der Beugel, to put greater emphasis on the socialization of promising young leaders in Bilderberg as this would happen repeatedly during the years that followed.⁴⁸ In their June 1964 interim report to the Ford Foundation, the Bilderbergers made sure to underscore that “Both the Americans and the Europeans are conscious of the need to involve younger persons, and particularly future leaders, in the Bilderberg Meetings, and are making efforts to increase the number of such persons.”⁴⁹ This emphasis on the successor generation would from this moment on remain a constantly recurring element in Bilderberg’s reports to the Ford Foundation. Stone, in turn, tried to help the Secretaries-General in their scouting efforts by providing Johnson “on a confidential basis” with a list of young leaders composed by Ford’s International Affairs department for possible Bilderberg selections, while reassuring his Ford Foundation colleague Joseph E. Slater that they were “working actively on the new crop.”⁵⁰

While the overhaul of the Steering Committee was a first step towards this goal, its members still found it difficult to include the desired amount of younger participants – younger meaning in this case ‘under 45’.⁵¹ Consequently, in his August 1966 memorandum that warned against Bilderberg running out of sync with “the great mass of people and most especially the young” mentioned in the preceding chapter, Van der Beugel also pushed for a

⁴⁶ “Minutes of the Steering Committee Meeting held at Williamsburg”, 20 and 22 March 1964, file 67A, Bilderberg.

⁴⁷ Shepard Stone to Joseph E. Johnson, 24 August 1964, Grant files, Bilderberg, PA56-341, Reel 5464, FFA, RAC.

⁴⁸ See for example: “American Friends of Bilderberg, 24 January 1968”, box 22, folder 12, George W. Ball Papers, PUL: “The second is the importance of continuing to get both new faces and young faces. In the latter connection, officials of the Ford Foundation, with whom we now have an application pending for a further grant for Bilderberg, have repeatedly stressed to me the importance they attach to Bilderberg’s not becoming a closed group and to the desirability of seeking out younger people who seem likely to play key roles in their countries in the near future.”

⁴⁹ “Interim Report to the Ford Foundation on Activities of the Bilderberg Meetings for the period 1 July 1963-15 June 1964”, Ford Foundation Grant File, Bilderberg, PA56-341, Section 3: Reports, Reel 5464, FFA, RAC.

⁵⁰ S. Stone to J.E. Slater, 17 December 1964, box 18, folder 193, IA/Joseph E. Slater, FFA, RAC.

⁵¹ Joe Johnson to Joseph E. Slater, 12 May 1965, box 18, folder 191, IA/Joseph E. Slater, FFA, RAC.

further rejuvenation of the Bilderberg meetings, this time with a prime focus on facilitating the integration of still younger members into the transatlantic establishment through its choice of subjects as well as its list of invitees. "It is a good thing", Van der Beugel maintained, "that Bilderberg is after all an 'establishment' group. It could not function otherwise. But it would be a pity if we should become increasingly an emeritus 'establishment' group of 1952. If this analysis should be correct (and I hope very much that it is not) then we should draw the consequences in the choice of our subjects and especially in the composition of the participants."⁵²

Ernst van der Beugel's August memorandum was extensively discussed during a Steering Committee meeting at Soestdijk Palace⁵³ in October 1966, where Van der Beugel explained that "in proposing to invite younger people with diverging opinions he did not mean the attendance of new participants with an entirely negative attitude towards basic assumptions of Bilderberg, but the people he had in mind should have constructive alternatives. Moreover, they should have the qualifications of 'coming men' and have a certain following. A percentage of 25 to 30 of this group on the total number of participants should be aimed at." According to the minutes of the meeting, "all members present agreed with Mr. van der Beugel's suggestions."⁵⁴ Even so, actually living up to these standards continued to prove a challenge for the Steering Committee.⁵⁵ At the Cambridge meeting in 1967, 25% of the American participants were under 45 years of age, but only four of them were under 40.⁵⁶ Ernst van der Beugel provided an example of the kind of younger individual with a "diverging" – but not *too* diverging – opinion he had in mind by inviting the 35 year old Dutch social-democrat Piet Dankert, with whom he had debated the PvdA's stance on the Vietnam War not long before, and who became the PvdA's spokesperson on Foreign Affairs and Defense the year after. Even so, it was not until the 1969 conference in Marienlyst, Denmark that "a conspicuously successful effort was made to include a larger proportion of younger people in each of the delegations."⁵⁷

⁵² E.H. van der Beugel to Members of the Steering Committee of Bilderberg, August 1966, file 7, EvdB.

⁵³ Soestdijk Palace was the residence of the Dutch Queen and Prince Bernhard in Baarn, the Netherlands.

⁵⁴ "Minutes of Steering Committee meeting at Soestdijk Palace on October 9, 1966", box 76, file 3, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁵⁵ See for example: "Final report to the Ford Foundation (...) 13 June 1963 - 1 May 1968", box 76, file 4, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL. "There has been marked success in getting new faces but some difficulty in getting as many younger people as we seek. This is partly because members of the steering committee on both sides of the Atlantic tend to think in terms of persons who have already 'arrived' and it is difficult for the administrators on both sides to counter this tendency. Also it has proved easier to identify promising younger persons among scholars and parliamentarians than among businessmen. The two Honorary Secretaries-General are constantly endeavoring to find more young people and hope to be more successful in 1969 than in 1968. In this connection we hope to benefit from the files of names of up-and-coming young people in the possession of the Ford Foundation."

⁵⁶ Joseph E. Johnson to Joseph E. Slater, 20 December 1967, Bilderberg Grant File, 56-341, Reel 5464, FFA, RAC; "Final report to the Ford Foundation (...) 13 June 1963 - 1 May 1968", box 76, file 4, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁵⁷ "Interim Report to the Ford Foundation Grant 56-341E", May 1968-August 1969. Ford Foundation Grant File, Bilderberg, PA56-341, Section 3: Reports, Reel 5464, FFA, RAC.

Bridging the Generation Gap: from Marienlyst to Woodstock

During his preparations for the Marienlyst conference, Ernst van der Beugel had emphasized that the rejuvenation process should be stepped up in “an effort to increase the participation of much younger people who are much nearer to the views of the student generation in vital matters of foreign policy and other relevant problems.” Out of 80 participants at least 20 should come from the age group between 25 and 40 and they should not only be chosen on the basis of their age, but also on the basis of their opinion about policy matters. To illustrate what he meant by this, Van der Beugel suggested that the Bilderberg ambassadors should “reach out for the [Eugene] McCarthy and younger Kennedy people in the United States and the analogue groups in Europe.”⁵⁸

Besides, the topics discussed at the conference departed from previous practice in that the agenda for the first time included a social issue: “Elements of Instability in Western Society.” The year before, a first attempt to use Bilderberg as a forum to come to grips with the challenges posed by the younger generation had been made by a last minute modification of the Conference programme when it was decided rather ad-hoc to set the Saturday evening aside for a discussion of the “student problem.” This discussion had been introduced through a twelve page statement on this topic by James A. Perkins of Cornell University, who had argued that students should be perceived as members of a new ‘pre-adult class’ that distinguished itself by its early freedom, late responsibility, and detachment from the adult world combined with high motives and a genuine idealism which had not been tempered by adult contact, as a result of which they had “not seen how idealism must be modified in life by experience.”⁵⁹ To counter the negative effects of this emerging new pre-adult class, Perkins stated that “We must put the ladders down for this group or else they are going to be at the mercy of their own ignorance and their own naïveté and continue to view the adult world as essentially hostile and unfriendly and one they want no part of.”⁶⁰ The formal addition of a related social issue to the agenda of the Marienlyst conference now indicated a more serious attempt to use the Bilderberg Meeting as a forum to come to grips with the challenges posed by the younger generation to Atlantic stability.

In response to Van der Beugel’s renewed call for younger participants, Canadian Steering Committee member Tony Griffin wrote to the European Secretary-General that he was “looking carefully into whom we might get in the category of a youngish man identified with the ‘New Left’ but who is not also on the periphery of lunacy.”⁶¹ In this context, he suggested to invite “not so much a member of youthful activism as their very prophet”, namely the media theorist Marshall McLuhan who had coined the famous phrase “the medium is the message”. While McLuhan was well beyond the age limit he was “renowned

⁵⁸ E.H. van der Beugel to Members of the Steering Committee, September 24, 1968, box 76, file 4, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁵⁹ “Remarks by dr. James A. Perkins”, 27 April 1968, box 22, Folder 12, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ T. Griffin to E.H. van der Beugel, 24 December 1968, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

as [a member of] the avant-garde” and “closely identified with the problems of instability” Griffin argued, and as such he was invited to the conference.

During the conference, Professor Daniel Bell of Columbia University and Professor Ralf Dahrendorf of Konstanz University in Germany delivered the papers on general elements of instability in Western society. Bell’s paper was meant to ignite a discussion on the sources of alienation among the young and the question to what extent this was a response to the Vietnam War, whereas the sheet with discussion points that came with Dahrendorf’s paper included questions like “what can we learn from student unrest – and how should we react to it?” and: “Are student unrest, the personalization of power, regionalism and hippiedom symptoms of the same ‘disease’ and is there any political action which can, and has to be taken in relation to it?”⁶² The second agenda item that was discussed – ‘Conflicting attitudes within the Western World toward relations with the USSR and the other Communist states of Eastern Europe in the light of recent events’ – “also took into account the attitudes and views of youth.”⁶³ For this item the paper was prepared by François Duchêne, van der Beugel’s colleague at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Looking back on the conference, Ernst van der Beugel was very pleased with the result. “It was a superb conference” he wrote to Kurt Birrenbach. “The experiment to mix 15 young and rather radical men with the older group proved to be a complete success.”⁶⁴ According to the 1969 interim report to the Ford Foundation Van der Beugel was not the only one who believed this was the case:

The combination of a high proportion of younger participants, representation of a wide range of views, and topics of unusual interest produced lively and often exciting discussions. Comments during and after the meetings indicated that veteran Bilderbergers viewed this as one of the most successful, in terms of the mutual education that is de *raison d’être* of Bilderberg. While perhaps few converts were made, there was unquestionably greater understanding of the issues, and, it is to be hoped, greater awareness of other points of view. Marienlyst Bilderberg helped bridge not only the Atlantic gap but the generation gap.⁶⁵

While planning the next conference Ernst van der Beugel felt “strongly about the necessity that we repeat the Marienlyst approach in inviting at least 25% young people with this kind of attitude apparent at our last conference.” It had not only been a useful experiment according to Van der Beugel, but – also important, since this was one of the main worries in the process

⁶² “The Bilderberg Conference: Daniel Bell Paper - Questions for Discussion”, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁶³ “Interim Report to the Ford Foundation – Grant 56-341E, May 1968-August 1969”, Ford Foundation Grant File, Bilderberg, PA56-341, Section 3: Reports, Reel 5464, FFA, RAC.

⁶⁴ E.H. van der Beugel to Kurt Birrenbach, 13 May 1969, file 8, EvdB. See also: E.H. van der Beugel to H.A. Kissinger, 13 May 1969, file 8, EvdB.

⁶⁵ “Interim Report to the Ford Foundation – Grant 56-341E, May 1968-August 1969”, Ford Foundation Grant File, Bilderberg, PA56-341, Section 3: Reports, Reel 5464, FFA, RAC. See also: “Minutes Steering Committee Meeting 11 May 1969”, box 22, folder 13, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

of engaging younger participants – “it did not in the least hurt the cohesion of the group and the ‘ambiance’ of the discussion as some had feared.”⁶⁶ The latter analysis was not shared by everyone, however.

After a meeting of the American Steering Committee, lawyer, diplomat and veteran Bilderberger Arthur Dean⁶⁷ wrote a letter to the general Steering Committee in which he pointed out that while Ernst van der Beugel had “quite properly wished to lower the age of those who participate”, the experimental composition of the group in Marienlyst had – in contrast to what Van der Beugel claimed – actually impaired the atmosphere of the meeting as he experienced it. “Due to the number of sociologists and younger people from vocations and callings generally not previously invited”, he wrote, “the character of the interchanges was quick and brisk and some such as that of Professor McLuhan were both tiresome, repetitious and unproductive.”⁶⁸ It appears, however, that in the end not so much the young as the sociologists, and McLuhan in particular, received most of the blame for spoiling the atmosphere in Marienlyst. Years later an anonymous Bilderberger would tell a journalist of *The Times* that McLuhan had been invited to Bilderberg as a “daring move” in an attempt to be “*really* radical” adding that during the conference the Canadian prophet of the successor generation had “used so many four letter words that we had learnt our lesson.”⁶⁹ As Dean mentioned in his report of the general Steering Committee meeting at Soestdijk Palace on October 8, 1969, there “was unanimous agreement that he should not be invited to another Bilderberg meeting.” In addition, there was “extended discussion as to whether people holding high offices in government would come if you had a preponderance of young men of the sociological type.” While the Steering Committee did not reach a definite conclusion on this, Dean mentioned that there “seemed to be a general consensus that we should not again invite sociologists to a Bilderberg meeting.” It might be possible though, that this analysis mainly projected his own disagreements with sociologists, as already expressed in the discussion with the American Steering Committee and the remarks in his letter to the general Steering Committee. Even so, Dean added that there was also “a general feeling that we should continue to invite younger persons in the fields that we decided upon to discuss.”⁷⁰ The other Steering Committee members agreed, however, that it did not “seem advisable to

⁶⁶ E.H. van der Beugel to Members of the Steering Committee, September 17, 1969, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁶⁷ Arthur H. Dean had been on the Bilderberg Steering Committee since 1957. Dean served as a negotiator and advisor to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. He had helped to negotiate the Korean Armistice Agreement which ended the Korean War, was chief of the delegation to the talks that eventually produced a partial nuclear test ban treaty in 1963 and was credited with helping to persuade President Johnson in 1968 to stop the bombing of North Vietnam and to not seek re-election. See: Albin Kress, “Arthur H. Dean, Envoy to Korea Talks, Dies at 89”, *The New York Times*, December 1, 1987.

⁶⁸ Arthur H. Dean to Bilderberg Steering Committee, October 2, 1969, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁶⁹ “The Bilderberg Group: an exclusive club”, *The Times*, April 18, 1977, p. 9. See also: Philipsen, “Diplomacy with Ambiguity”, 138.

⁷⁰ “Arthur H. Dean's notes on the meeting of the Steering Committee at Soestdijk Palace on Wednesday, October 8, 1969”, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

invite still younger people (20 years old), as this would probably be harmful to the cohesion of the conference.”⁷¹

On Van der Beugel’s instigation the Steering Committee decided to repeat the experiment during the 1970 conference in Bad Ragaz, Switzerland – not only with regards to the invitees, but also with respect to the nature of the topics to be discussed.⁷² With one exception the general feeling within the Steering Committee was that the discussion about instability in Western Society had by no means been exhausted while its subject remained of prime importance. Therefore, van der Beugel suggested to continue the discussion; this time with a focus on one specific element of the general instability discussed in Marienlyst. Since “one place where the sources of instability present themselves in the most obvious way is the University” Van der Beugel suggested the “problems, function and future of the university in our society” as the first topic to be discussed at the following conference. The one person who was not so sure about continuing the Marienlyst discussion – the one exception mentioned above – was in fact the Swiss lawyer and diplomat Victor Umbricht, the host of the 1970 conference in Bad Ragaz. He believed it might be better to postpone a continuation of the discussion on instability until 1971 which would enable the Bilderbergers to gain “valuable additional experience as to how instability is developing and how it should be handled” so that they would be able to confront the issue with “more aloofness to present-day happenings.” While Van der Beugel fully recognized the validity of these arguments he explained that he was nevertheless still inclined to press for discussing the university problem in 1970. “I feel that especially the situation at our universities is a burning problem”, he wrote, “relevant to all of us whether we work in the field of politics, business, journalism or the academic world.”⁷³

The importance of the university was also recognized in the American Steering committee, but the exact approach was a matter of extensive discussion in which all the major traits of the successor generation problem passed the revue. Jack Heinz suggested to amend Van der Beugel’s topic to “the changing role of the university in relation to society”, emphasizing that he was not proposing a discussion of student disorders but of the significance of things like the popularity of Democratic presidential candidate and Vietnam war critic Eugene McCarthy among students, the suspension of university activity on 15 October 1969 to protest the war in Vietnam, and the confrontation between Columbia University and the blacks of Harlem. “Clearly”, he argued, “the university today is no longer the ivory tower institution of the past, and this is having far-reaching repercussions.” The

⁷¹ “Minutes, Steering Committee Meeting, May 11, 1969”, box 22, folder 13, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

⁷² “Minutes of the meeting of the Steering committee at Soestdijk, October 8, 1969”, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL: “There was a general consensus that again 20-25% of the number of participants should be chosen not only from the age group of approximately 25-40 but also on the basis of their diverging views on basic issues of policy.”

⁷³ E.H. van der Beugel to Steering Committee, box 22, folder 13, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

American banker David Rockefeller⁷⁴, however, was skeptical “as to whether the topic was sufficiently ‘Atlantic’ in scope and suggested to adapt the subject to “the impact of student disorder on Atlantic unity.” George Ball subsequently felt that the topic was “interesting in the light of the fact that today’s graduate students, who will soon occupy positions of leadership, are a generation away from the War”, arguing that “their experiences and priorities are vastly different from those of the pre-war generation: they no longer find the confrontation with the USSR relevant and think that too much attention is given to it: they grew up with the bomb and are therefore used to it; they have a greater deal of contempt for the older generation. The young, moreover are in the vanguard of the opposition to Vietnam War since they are the ones whose lives are most immediately tested by it. It is the issue of the war that unites them most firmly against their parents’ generation.” American Secretary General Joe Johnsen eventually proposed that “one way of approaching this topic might be to recruit a ‘young person’ on each side of the ocean to write a paper dealing with the priorities on foreign affairs” which should be “representative of the views of a rather large cross-section of the post-war generation.” While this idea appealed to most American Steering Committee members, Arthur Dean interjected that proposing a discussion on dissent of the young would result in losing a good part of the membership of Bilderberg. According to him at most ten to twenty per cent of the young actually shared the views attributed to them by George Ball, and he believed that there was “no need to devote too much time to them.” The other American Steering Committee members disagreed, however. While it was probably true that no more than ten per cent of the young would “take to the barricades”, the economist, former World Bank director and Exxon Corporation executive Emilio Collado pointed out that “a vast majority of the young does hold priorities very different from ‘ours’.”⁷⁵ In the end, the Steering Committee decided to go ahead with the “Future function of the university in our society” as the first agenda item.⁷⁶

In this context, James A. Perkins, the American president of Cornell University delivered a paper on the ‘University and Society’ while Edgar Faure, who had just stepped down as France’s minister of Education in 1969 – a capacity in which he had pushed through major reforms of the French universities – delivered a paper on “Transformations in Society and the Replanning of Education”. The Bilderbergers also decided to follow up on Joe Johnson’s suggestion to ask two younger participants, both academics, to serve as ambassadors for their generation. To this end, the 30 year old Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison delivered a paper on “‘Young Americans’ Attitudes towards Foreign Policy for the 1970s” while Van der Beugel asked the 35 year old German political scientist Karl Kaiser of the

⁷⁴ David Rockefeller, the youngest son of Standard Oil scion John D. Rockefeller, Jr., was chairman and chief executive of the Chase Manhattan Corporation.

⁷⁵ “Minutes of Meeting of US Bilderberg Steering Committee, 2 October 1969”, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁷⁶ “Arthur H. Dean’s notes on the meeting of the Steering Committee at Soestdijk Palace on Wednesday, October 8, 1969”, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

University of the Saarland as a representative for the European youngsters on “Priorities in Foreign Policy.”⁷⁷

The Old Guard in Defense of the Capitalist System

As a second agenda item for the Bad Ragaz conference, Van der Beugel had originally suggested to either take an important political or economic subject of current importance (...) or to “continue the discussion of the first day from a completely different angle e.g. “Problems, function and future of private enterprise in our society.”⁷⁸ This topic greatly appealed to the Americans, who were concerned about the image of private enterprise in the US – especially among the young. “Many young people are convinced that corporations earn huge profits which are spent on ‘riotous living’ of the directors,”⁷⁹ they observed. David Rockefeller had on multiple occasions publicly voiced his concerns on this topic. “Many of the attitudes expressed by the generation treading upon our heels are both uncongenial and deeply disturbing”, he had written in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin. “But they are realities, and angry denunciation will not cause them to vanish.” What might actually help to make them disappear, Rockefeller argued, was “for those of us who are over thirty to display in our professional lives precisely those qualities which our youthful critics say we lack – open mindedness, intellectual honesty and commitment to responsible social progress.” To foster among the young an appreciation of the importance of business and the profit motive, which many of them had come to despise, it was necessary to “demonstrate through action that the profit motive, properly employed, constitutes a powerful tool with which to achieve the goals that the best of our young people profess to want.” To this end, Rockefeller argued, “we must show beyond dispute that business can become the engine of progress in such areas as civil rights” as well as in fighting “poverty, urban decay, and pollution of the environment.”⁸⁰ This sentiment was also present during the Steering Committee meeting at Soestdijk Palace, where there was a general agreement between the Americans and the Europeans that they should “try to get younger people in order to convince them that private enterprise was not wholly bad, and also to try to convince them that turning everything up to the state was not the most appropriate solution.”⁸¹

⁷⁷ Karl Kaiser, “Priorities in Foreign Policy”, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL; James A. Perkins, “The University and Society”, series 7, box 53:50, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL; Graham T. Allison, “Young Americans’ Attitudes towards Foreign Policy for the 1970s”, series 7, box 53:51, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL; Edgar Faure, “Transformations in Society and the Replanning of Education”, Series 7, box 53:49, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL.

⁷⁸ E.H. van der Beugel to Members of the Steering Committee, 17 September 1969, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁷⁹ “Minutes of Meeting of US Bilderberg Steering Committee, 2 October 1969”, box 77, folder 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁸⁰ “David Rockefeller, *The Milwaukee Sentinel*, May 23, 1968” - reprinted with permission from the Harvard Alumni Bulletin, accessed December 5, 2016, <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19680523&id=THhQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=txEEAAAAIBAJ&pg=3052,4514943&hl=en>.

⁸¹ “Arthur H. Dean’s notes on the meeting of the Steering Committee at Soestdijk Palace on Wednesday, October 8, 1969”, box 77, file 5, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

While the topic of business and the young did not turn up on the official agenda of the 1970 Bad Ragaz conference, it was discussed at the conference. Even so, there was still a strong desire within the Steering Committee to go deeper into this topic afterwards. Within the American Steering Committee, Gabriel Hauge, Tony Griffin and Arthur Dean in particular expressed a strong desire to see an agenda item, which had continuity with the “discussion on the environmental-cultural situation” in Bad Ragaz. This time, however, they believed “thoughtful business leaders or industrial leaders should prepare the papers and lead the discussion” on this topic. “If there is, as there must be, positive and constructive thinking on these problems in the international business community let it be advanced at Bilderberg and let a few younger people listen, criticize, etc.”⁸²

Shepard Stone, the Ford Foundation’s Director of International Affairs, also again expressed his support for Bilderberg’s shift in focus, this time with regards to the content of the meetings. As he wrote to Ernst van der Beugel: “though foreign policy and economic problems undoubtedly have larger appeal to most of our members, you have been right, I believe, to emphasize in recent years youth, university and environmental questions which are influencing decisions on international relations.”⁸³ It was important not to lose this momentum now, he emphasized. In connection with this subject area, however, he believed it would be better not “to have young people or professors write the papers and tip off the discussion.” Instead, Stone proposed to ask two thoughtful businessmen, one European and one American, to write the papers and to open the discussion by explaining what established leaders, bankers, industrialists, lawyers and public officials are doing to meet the challenge of the environment and of social and intellectual change. “What is the response of administrators, industry, the law to the attitudes and criticisms of the young? What are they doing to achieve understanding of these problems, build bridges to the young who are their inevitable successors? What are they doing to expose the young to the complexity of problems, to work together in getting at new solutions where required or to fortify old and tested points where valid?”, Stone wondered. “To put this range of questions to thoughtful men of the David Rockefeller, Cy Vance, Otto Wolf type”, he believed, “might stimulate creative thinking among our older members and increase their interest.”⁸⁴ Young participants would ‘undoubtedly’ challenge and debate these presentations, Stone believed, but it might serve as “a method to maintain interest in problems to which we should continue to give our attention.” In other words, reversing the roles of the young and the scholars on the one hand and the business and government leaders on the other might have a stimulating effect on both sides at the next conference. It might also, Stone added, “help to stimulate European-American leaders to think through problems they have sometimes tried to avoid.”⁸⁵ The desired defense of private enterprise eventually happened at the 1971 conference in

⁸² Arthur H. Dean to Joseph E. Johnson, 29 September 1970, box 77, file 6, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁸³ S. Stone to E.H. van der Beugel and J. Johnson, 5 May 1970, box 77, file 6, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Woodstock, Vermont where “The contribution of business in dealing with current problems of instability” was put on the agenda next to attempts to deal with détente and the “possibility of a change of the American role in the world and its consequences.” Thus, while Bilderberg had started out as an instrument to mediate transatlantic friction by building bridges among the Atlantic elite, it was now also perceived as a vehicle to bridge the generation gap as part of the broader effort to sustain Western cooperation and all its stood for – including the capitalist system as represented by private enterprise.

In a report to the Ford Foundation covering the 1969-1971 period, the Bilderbergers explained that “strenuous recruitment had led to a marked increase in the number of participants under forty.” Even so, there still remained some difficulty in getting as many younger people as they had sought, a situation the report attributed to the fact that many members in the Steering Committee – who were responsible for recruiting and suggesting participants – still had the tendency to “think in terms of persons who have already ‘arrived’.” This was especially problematic for the selection of participants from business and government since, as they argued “few people in business or government ‘arrive’ before 40”. In contrast, it had been “easier to identify outstanding young persons who are scholars and politicians than to find them in other walks of life.”⁸⁶ What is more, while the American Secretary General Joe Johnson believed that Bilderberg could help participants “to understand their fellows of different ages, experience, and points of view” he also recognized that there existed a certain tension between the old guard and the new generation at the Bilderberg meetings. “There are at Bilderberg as elsewhere dialogues of the deaf; the young may sometimes fail to press their points vigorously; there may be manifestations of an old school tie spirit among the veterans of the Marshall Plan and NATO; the generation now coming to or on the threshold of power may be impatient or scornful of the backward glance, the apparent nostalgia, of their seniors”, he explained. “Nevertheless”, he concluded his evaluation, “I know no other place in which European and North-American men – and as of 1972, women – of diverse nationalities, professions, ages, experiences, and interests can explore each other’s views and prejudices and establish contacts that may have significance and utility for the world of the ‘70s.”⁸⁷

As Joe Johnson pointed out, in 1972 the Steering Committee had for the first time also invited women to participate in the Bilderberg Meetings. Before 1972, some women had been present; most prominently the Dutch crown-princess Beatrix, the eldest daughter of Prince Bernhard and Queen Juliana, who was present at the Bilderberg meetings from 1962 onwards. Formally, though, she was not a participant but an “observer” during those first years.⁸⁸ In 1972, the Steering Committee departed from its habit of exclusively inviting male participants by inviting a first set of prominent women including Miriam Camps (whose work

⁸⁶ “Ford Foundation Report of Bilderberg Meetings 1969-1971” Ford Foundation Grant File, Bilderberg, PA56-341, Section 3: Reports, Reel 5464, FFA, RAC.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Philipsen, “Diplomacy with Ambiguity”, 138.

Van der Beugel greatly admired), the Italian journalist Marion Dönhoff and the French journalist and politician Françoise Giroud, the Dutch economics professor Maria J. t Hooft, the British Labor politician Shirley Summerskill and Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands to fully participate as well. From correspondence between Ernst van der Beugel and Sydney Gruson of the New York Times it appears that Van der Beugel was in fact in favor of including women at an earlier stage, but that it was the chairman – Prince Bernhard – who had prevented this. As Van der Beugel told Gruson, who in 1971 suggested to include female participants: “I agree with your judgment (...) it takes, however, quite some time to break the very strong conviction of our Chairman of having women at the conference. It is a slow process but I know that in the end we will win.”⁸⁹ It seems that the Ford Foundation also played a role in pushing this change through. Nevertheless, as in the case with the young, introducing women into Bilderberg remained a “slow process” as Van der Beugel had warned. “The ‘lady-participants’ worked very well”, Van der Beugel remarked in June 1972, “It will, however, be difficult to keep up the level because in spite of ‘women’s lib’ the reservoir is not unlimited.”⁹⁰

The level of younger participants also fluctuated after the 1969-1971 experiments. Moreover, in 1972 the Steering Committee also discussed diversification by welcoming Japanese participants. They eventually decided against this, however, after which David Rockefeller set up the Trilateral Commission in 1973, which did include Japanese participants and became one of Bilderberg’s rival organizations.⁹¹ “Despite all the declarations of intentions to rejuvenate the membership of the organization”, Ingeborg Philipsen concluded in her dissertation on the Bilderberg meetings, “the SC members preferred to draw on their established network when choosing the participants, which meant that the average Bilderberg participant of the period was a white man in his sixties.”⁹² Eventually, it would take a severe crisis to create the opportunity for Ernst van der Beugel to push through a more fundamental rejuvenation of the Bilderberg Meetings.

Bilderberg and the Lockheed Scandal: an Existential Crisis

On February 7, 1976 news broke that during statements made during investigations of the Church Committee in the U.S. Senate it had been asserted that a “senior Netherlands official” had been involved in a huge bribery scandal concerning the American aerospace company Lockheed.⁹³ Rumor had it that this Dutchman was Bilderberg chairman Prince Bernhard. It would not take long before the Dutch Prime Minister, Joop den Uyl, put forward a statement

⁸⁹ E.H. van der Beugel to Sydney Gruson (The New York Times), 6 July 1971, file 9, EvdB.

⁹⁰ E.H. van der Beugel, “Note on Bilderberg”, 28 June, 1972.

⁹¹ On the Trilateral Commission see: Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Dino Knudsen, *The Trilateral Commission and Global Governance: Informal Elite Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

⁹² Philipsen, “Diplomacy with Ambiguity”, 138.

⁹³ For an in-depth study on the Lockheed Scandal, see: Gerard Aalders, *Het Lockheed Schandaal* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011).

confirming that Prince Bernhard – “the flying Dutchman of industry”⁹⁴ – was indeed the person referred to in the evidence and that the government had decided to conduct an investigation while underlining that this did not mean that Prince Bernhard “was guilty of any reprehensible act.” The Prince, in turn, stated that he “had never received or accepted any money from Lockheed and invited an investigation concerning the development that resulted into his being named in this affair.”⁹⁵

Ernst van der Beugel – who was internationally known as a close associate of Prince Bernhard – put his reputation at stake by defending the Prince in Dutch media. “I have been in close working relationship with His Royal Highness for twenty-five years. I am totally convinced that there is no beginning of truth in these rumors,” he declared on a Dutch TV newscast the day after the statements were made in the U.S. Senate.⁹⁶ Van der Beugel also reassured members of the Bilderberg Steering committee that there was nothing to worry about. “I should like to repeat what I told you on Sunday”, he wrote in a telegram to his American counterpart Joe Johnson, “I am totally and completely convinced that nothing irregular has happened and that even if P.B.’s name is mentioned in Lockheed’s files, this in no way proves anything.”⁹⁷ Nevertheless, Van der Beugel considered the case “a terrible headache”. The only way in which the issue could be solved, he believed, was when it would become clear to whom the money had in fact been paid. “I have good hope that the Dutch government will direct its activity to that purpose, because denials, arguing that the Prince was not involved, are not sufficient. The positive proof has to be delivered to show where the money did indeed end up. We keep our fingers crossed,” he wrote to his Dutch-American friend Peter Fleck.⁹⁸

The Bilderberg Steering Committee followed the developments closely as they unfolded. Just days after the news broke Arthur Dean called a meeting of the American Steering Committee together to discuss how to deal with the evolving situation. The upcoming Bilderberg conference was planned to take place in the Homestead near Hot Springs, Virginia and Dean feared that considering the circumstances “it may be difficult to get acceptances of the prominent personages in Europe who have been invited and of the U.S. officials who have been or are being invited. We may encounter difficulty in getting contributions from prospective American donors.”⁹⁹ On March 8, the Wall Street Journal reported that the 1976 Bilderberg Conference had in fact been cancelled after U.S. leaders invited to the conference

⁹⁴ Alden Hatch qtd. In: “A Slap for the Prince”, *Newsweek*, April 5, 1976.

⁹⁵ E.H. van der Beugel to Joe Johnson, February 9, 1967, telegram, forwarded to the members of the Steering Committee on February 9, 1967, Series 8, box 64: 50, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL.

⁹⁶ Joseph E. Johnson to Members of the Steering Committee, February 9, 1976, Series 8, box 64: 50, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL.

⁹⁷ E.H. van der Beugel to Joe Johnson, 9 February 1967, telegram, forwarded to the members of the Steering Committee on February 9, 1967, series 8, box 64: 50, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL.

⁹⁸ E.H. van der Beugel to Peter Fleck, 9 February 1976, file 38, EvdB (translation mine).

⁹⁹ Arthur H. Dean, Memorandum to U.S. Steering Committee, 10 February 1976, box 77, folder “1975-80, Bilderberg 1976 - Lockheed, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.

had expressed doubts about accepting the invitation “in view of the official investigation in the Netherlands”, which was confirmed by the Bilderberg Secretariat in The Hague.¹⁰⁰

The Europeans, however, appeared less concerned about the allegations against the Prince. A number of them had in fact indicated to Shepard Stone, who agreed with them, that the Homestead conference ought to be held despite the circumstances and they complained that “the Americans were really pressuring the Prince to postpone or to give it up.”¹⁰¹ As Ernst van der Beugel explained in a letter to the European members of the Steering Committee, “there was ‘without any doubt a difference between the approach of most Europeans and most Americans involved.’ In the US, there was a greater sensibility about these matters in an ambiance which, according to [Van der] Beugel, had ‘all the characteristics of a ‘witch-hunt.’” Even so, Van der Beugel recognized that it would be better to “preserve Bilderberg and to not get our meeting involved in undesired and malicious publicity.”¹⁰² From Secretary General Joe Johnson’s correspondence, it appears that Van der Beugel was in fact quite irritated by the attitude of certain Americans in this context. After a visit to Prince Bernhard in March, Johnson told Stone that he had found the Prince “in very good spirits”, explaining that while he was “clearly annoyed at some of our American colleagues, he was much less bitter than Ernst who seemed to me to have gone a bit off the deep end.” Johnson had told Van der Beugel so, and “for once in our long association we had some rather sharp words.” More importantly, though, Johnson “came away from the palace more convinced than ever that P.B. [was] not guilty either in fact or in intent.” Instead, the American Secretary General was “very impressed by his attitude”, relating that the Prince “was most emphatic, incidentally, in his determination to keep Bilderberg going ‘until I die.’”¹⁰³ In the end, despite American pressure to postpone the Homestead meeting, the Steering Committee seems to have had enough confidence in its chairman to plan the next Steering Committee meeting at Soestdijk Palace in the fall – following the release of the report by the Dutch investigation committee. As Van der Beugel wrote to Canadian Steering Committee member Tony Griffin:

My guess about the report of the Commission of Inquiry is that the report will come out in the middle or at the end of August, but I must repeat that it is only a guess. As to the contents I remain completely confident. I therefore have every reason to believe that the October Meeting of the Steering Committee will take place as we have planned. I have no recent news from our American friends, but I am in close touch with them. I think that everything is completely under control.¹⁰⁴

The report was eventually released on 26 August, 1976 and “all hell broke loose” after it became clear that the Prince had in fact been found guilty of accepting a \$1.1 million bribe

¹⁰⁰ “Bilderberg Conference Led by Prince Benrhard Is Cancelled this Year”, Wall Street Journal, 8 March 1976.

¹⁰¹ Shepard Stone to Joseph M. Johnson, 26 March 1976, Series 8, box 64:50, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL.

¹⁰² Qtd in: Philipsen, “Diplomacy with Ambiguity”, 251.

¹⁰³ Joseph E. Johnson to Shepard Stone, 2 March 25, 1976, series 8, box 64:50, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL.

¹⁰⁴ E.H. van der Beugel to A.G.S. Griffing, file 39, EvdB.

from the Lockheed Corporation to ensure that the Dutch government would buy the American Lockheed F-104 Starfighter aircraft instead of the French Dassault Mirage 5.¹⁰⁵ The event plunged the Bilderberg Meetings into an existential crisis recovery from which was uncertain at best. It was this crisis, however, that offered Ernst van der Beugel a window of opportunity to push through the more fundamental rejuvenation of Bilderberg that he had pursued for years.

After the report of the Commission of Three was accepted by the Dutch government as well as by the Queen and the Prince and debated in Parliament, Ernst van der Beugel first of all met with Foreign Minister Max van der Stoep to discuss the Bilderberg Meetings. According to Van der Beugel's report to the Bilderberg Steering Committee he explained to Van der Stoep "that Bilderberg was a private organization but that [he] always had been in touch with the Dutch Government if matters of foreign policy arose which could have an effect on the constitutional position of H.R.H." This time, however, Van der Beugel explained "I came to see him because in the new circumstances I could neither fruitfully talk to my colleagues in the Steering Committee nor to H.R.H. without knowing the opinion of the Netherlands government." The two Dutchmen "agreed immediately that continuation of the chairmanship of Bilderberg by the Prince was out of the question." Subsequently, Van der Beugel discussed two other options, namely to liquidate Bilderberg at the end of the year or to continue without the Prince. Because he "felt that Bilderberg as an instrument and as a formula was unique in the transatlantic dialogue which was more necessary than ever", Van der Stoep expressed "a strong preference" for a continuation of the Bilderberg Meetings.¹⁰⁶ Next to that, he believed that it would be better if the Bilderberg Meetings would not be terminated as an "immediate consequence of the change in the position of the Prince." While the Prince had played an important role in the Meetings, Bilderberg had "substance on its own" and "liquidation now would create the impression that it had been a kind of private club of the Prince and would be retroactively depreciating," the Dutch foreign minister argued.¹⁰⁷

After consulting Max van der Stoep, Ernst van der Beugel started to solicit the opinion of the European members of the Steering Committee by telephone. He also consulted some former participants who were not members of the Steering Committee including the German economist and politician Helmut Schmidt, the British labor politician Denis Healey, the Dutch banker and former prime-minister Jelle Zijlstra and OECD Secretary General Emile van Lennep. Could Bilderberg survive this crisis? A great majority believed it was worth trying and

¹⁰⁵ E.H. van der Beugel to Dr. A. Polak Daniels, file 39, EvdB.

¹⁰⁶ This was certainly not the only time a Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed appreciation for the role of the Bilderberg meetings in transatlantic diplomacy. In 1955, for example, when Queen Juliana had tried to put a halt to Prince Bernhard's involvement in the Bilderberg Meetings, the Dutch cabinet resisted this move, as Thoams Gijswijt has pointed out "in part because Beyen felt that the Bilderberg meetings served a valuable purpose" and "realized that the prince was a considerable international asset for the Netherlands" especially since the "Bilderberg connection opened even more doors for the prince than his royal title already did." Thomas Gijswijt, "The Bilderberg Group and Dutch American Relations" in *Four Centuries of Dutch American Relations*, eds. Hans Krabbendam, Cornelis A. van Minnen and Giles Scott-Smith (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009), 814.

¹⁰⁷ E.H. van der Beugel to the members of the Steering Committee, September 27, 1976, box 23, folder 3, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

expressed a preference for a continuation of the Bilderberg Meetings.¹⁰⁸ During that same week, Van der Beugel also visited the Prince, whose position as chairman of the Bilderberg Meetings had become untenable and Van der Beugel was the one who had to tell him that it was time to resign – a task which he experienced as “extremely unpleasant.”¹⁰⁹ While a few individuals like the Italian Giovanni Agnelli and the Frenchman Edmond de Rothschild thought it was ridiculous that anyone would need to step down due to such an affair, the overall consensus within the Steering Committee was that the prince had to go.¹¹⁰ The Americans with whom Ernst van der Beugel met in New York on the 17th of September, and David Rockefeller in particular, were unforgiving in their judgment and did not want to be associated in any way with the scandal that surrounded the Prince. While Van der Beugel agreed that Prince Bernhard had to resign, he was offended by the harshness of the response by some of the Americans who until then had been frequent guests at Soestdijk Palace. While Van der Beugel was personally disappointed in Bernhard and losing his chairmanship of the Bilderberg Meetings was a big blow to the Prince, both men maintained that the event did not damage their relationship.¹¹¹

“The Smoothest Coup d’état in the history of the Atlantic Alliance”

It was decided that the fall meeting of the Steering Committee, originally planned at Soestdijk Palace, would take place at the Savoy Hotel in London instead – under the chairmanship of Max Kohnstamm. With regards to the future of Bilderberg a special study group would be assembled. The big question was: should the Bilderberg Meetings continue and if so, in what form? As a memorandum from the American Steering Committee put it: “Events have produced an occasion to review and re-evaluate the Bilderberg meetings which had been running for 23 years with little change in format and organization.”¹¹² It was this forced re-evaluation that offered Ernst van der Beugel the opportunity to push through the more fundamental rejuvenation of Bilderberg that he had pursued for years.

At the October and January committee meetings the consensus was “that the need was as great as ever for an informal Atlantic Community forum such as Bilderberg.”¹¹³ The Working Party decided to leave the traditional format of the conferences unchanged. While

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ EvdB/Kersten Oral history, p. 719.

¹¹⁰ EvdB/Kersten Oral history, p. 718.

¹¹¹ HRH Prince Bernhard, contribution to “Book on Ernst, box 27, Folder 1, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL, p. 719-720: “Subsequent events have in no way changed our friendship.” Prince Bernhard had clearly betrayed Ernst van der Beugel’s trust in the process. The day before the news confirming the prince’s involvement in the Lockheed Scandal broke, Ernst van der Beugel had called Bernhard to ask whether there really wasn’t anything to worry about after which the prince had denied everything. According to Ernst van der Beugel’s daughter, Aukelien van Hoytema-van der Beugel, her father certainly felt hurt by this betrayal, but he could also deeply love people despite their faults, which she considered to be very characteristic of Ernst van der Beugel. Aukelien van Hoytema-van der Beugel, interview with the author.

¹¹² “American Steering Committee Members Discussions on Bilderberg”, October 4, 1976, box 23, Folder 3, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

¹¹³ “Minutes of the Meeting held by the Steering Committee at Torquay, England on April 22, 1977”, George box 23, Folder 5, W. Ball Papers, PUL.

opening up the Bilderberg Meetings to Japanese participants was once more considered, the members of the working party decided against this, arguing that “there was an established camaraderie in Bilderberg, a shared cultural tradition, which risked being lost in widening membership.” Furthermore, “it looked as if considerable difficulties between Europe and America lay ahead, and it was important to preserve a unique forum like Bilderberg, designed as it was to foster transatlantic understanding through personal contact.” In addition, by now the Trilateral Commission “already provided an excellent means for including the Japanese in discussions with the West.”¹¹⁴ To ensure frank and open discussion, the working party considered it essential to preserve the private character of the meetings, with no quotations or attributions allowed.

With regards to the organization and leadership of the conferences it was decided that a European chairman would be chosen for three years. While Van der Beugel had already before the Lockheed affair indicated that he wanted to retire as Secretary-General, “the consensus was that it would be difficult for Bilderberg to have to break in the same year with a new Chairman and a new European Secretary General, especially given the detailed administrative functions of the latter office.”¹¹⁵ This was all the more complicated since Joe Johnsen, who in 1975 had announced that he would leave the Bilderberg Meetings after the Homestead meeting, would already be replaced by Bill Bundy.¹¹⁶ Consequently, “at the urging of the other members of the Working Party, Ernst van der Beugel therefore agreed to carry on with his duties for an additional year, i.e. until after the 1978 conference – on condition that in the interim the Steering Committee would work hard at locating a suitable successor.”¹¹⁷ Meanwhile, it was decided that the members of the Steering Committee would rotate by arranging staggered terms of five years, with no member eligible for re-election until he had been off the Committee for at least one year. The Working Group furthermore asked Van der Beugel, Bundy and Griffin to get together as a sub-committee to decide about the composition of the Steering Committee and to draw lots for the rotation of its members. This rotation of Steering Committee members had as its object the “refreshing of the Committee from year to year, as new members took the place of retiring ones.”¹¹⁸

It was in this context that Ernst van der Beugel finally demanded that the Steering Committee would be thoroughly rejuvenated and that an operation would be set in motion to facilitate the smooth transfer of the Bilderberg Meetings from its ‘founding fathers’

¹¹⁴ “Minutes of the Bilderberg Working Party Meeting, London, January 22, 1977”, box 23, folder 3, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ “Minutes of the Meeting held by the Steering Committee at Soestdijk Palace on October 19, 1975”, box 23, folder 3, George W. Ball Papers, PUL. For William P. “Bill” Bundy see chapter 7, footnote 35.

¹¹⁷ “Minutes of the Bilderberg Working Party Meeting, London, January 22, 1977”, box 23, folder 3, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

¹¹⁸ “Minutes of the Meeting held by the Steering Committee at Torquay, England on April 22, 1977”, box 23, Folder 5, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

("Bilderberg One") to the next generation ("Bilderberg Two") by 1980.¹¹⁹ If Bilderberg was to continue, Van der Beugel maintained, we should "use the time left to us to create Bilderberg II in the sense that it would be carried in all aspects by the younger generation" – meaning an age group between +/- 30 and +/-50 years of age. More concretely, Van der Beugel explained, "That means a brand new Steering Committee with only Daniel Janssen, Thierry de Montbrial, Niels Norlund and Theo Sommer from the present Steering Committee with the addition of Chris Bertram, Victor Halberstadt, Andrew Knight, Leon Lambers and others from the European side and also a complete set of younger Americans."¹²⁰ To this end, Van der Beugel invited the above mentioned younger Europeans who were to be "instrumental in 'carrying' Bilderberg Two" to his house in The Hague to hear their opinions and to solicit their views on this endeavor. Meanwhile, Bill Bundy organized a parallel meeting on the other side of the ocean by inviting younger Americans including Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, Jack Bennett of Exxon, *Foreign Affairs* editor James Chase, Paul B. Finney of Fortune magazine, Charles Getchell of the Gray, Wendell & Clark law firm, lawyer, civil rights activist and president of the National Urban League Vernon Jordan, Winston Lord - who had just left the State Department to become the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, former president of CBS and founder of the private investment concern Tayler & Company Arthur Taylor; Labor leader Murray Finley of the Clothing Workers Union, Nicholas Katzenbach who had moved to IBM after having served under both president Kennedy and president Johnson, Georgetown professor and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Kissinger's closest counselor and associate at the NSC and the U.S. State department Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who now served as a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, president of the Brookings Institution Bruce MacLaury and the automobile executive, professor of economics and frequent government adviser Marina von Neumann Whitman – all of whom had participated in past Bilderberg Meetings.¹²¹ Both groups expressed strong support for carrying on Bilderberg "on the grounds that Europeans and North Americans need more than ever to cooperate and understand each other's viewpoints, while at the same time there will continue to be the possibility of serious differences in outlook and policy on central

¹¹⁹ EvdB/Kersten Oral History, p. 682: "Toen ik wegging heb ik meteen geëist – dat kan ik wel zeggen, ik had het natuurlijk wel voor een groot deel te vertellen – dat het steering committee verjongd werd, toen Victor het van mij overnam. Want, zo heb ik het ook altijd gezegd: we kunnen in 1980 niet zitten met het establishment van 1960. Dus wij zijn, met een enkele uitzondering, het establishment van 1960 en jullie moeten nou maar kijken dat je het verjongd. Dat is ook gebeurd. Dat is volledige gebeurd."

¹²⁰ "Future of Bilderberg", 25 May 1978, Box 23, Folder 6, George W. Ball Papers, PUL. The Belgian businessman Daniel Janssen worked for the multinational biopharmaceutical company *Union Chimique Belge* (UCB). Thierry de Montbrial was responsible for the establishment of the Center of Analysis and Projection at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1973 where he also became the first Head Director of the Policy Planning Staff. Niels Norlund was a Danish journalist and foreign news editor for the *Berlingske Tidende*. The German journalist Theo Sommer served as editor in chief of the German newspaper *Die Zeit*. The German journalist Christoph Bertram served as the director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London at the time. The Dutch economist Victor Halberstadt already served as professor of Public Finance at Leiden University at the time. The English journalist Andrew Knight worked as an editor at *The Economist*.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*; W.P. Bundy to the "Tony Griffin Working Party" of the Steering Committee, October 12, 1978, box 23, Folder 6, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

economic and other issues.”¹²² Furthermore, it was decided that the transition from Bilderberg I to Bilderberg II should be completed during a “grand finale” at the Bilderberg Conference in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1980. Before that date, a new Steering Committee should have been constituted and a new top set of officers selected, ready to take over. “After that”, Van der Beugel and Bundy reported, “it is up to the youngsters.”¹²³

While some members of the Steering Committee felt that an effective transition to the successor generation could be made gradually without the rather dramatic contrast implied by the labels “Bilderberg I” and “Bilderberg II”, the great majority endorsed Van der Beugel’s operation as illustrated by an analogy to the motor car industry by the Italian industrialist and principal shareholder of Fiat Gianni Agnelli: “There were times, he said, when a ‘face lift’ would do, but at other times a whole new model was needed, and Bilderberg now found itself in the latter situation.”¹²⁴ Those members in the Steering Committee who had felt some hesitation at first also “expressed their agreement after having heard the various arguments” and there was “no doubt” that the “younger groups” convened by Van der Beugel and Bundy, which included younger members of the present Steering Committee, could “produce the nucleus around which a Bilderberg II [could] be constructed.”¹²⁵

The Dutchman Victor Halberstadt, a finance professor at Leiden University and Van der Beugel’s protégé, was chosen as the new Honorary Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings for Europe while it was decided that Paul B. Finney would succeed Bill Bundy on the American side. While the Younger Working Groups decided to keep the same overall structure, they did consider introducing some changes, including “slightly more austere meeting places than have sometimes been the case in the past”, cutting the overall size of the group from 100 to 75-80 participants and having one or more of the five conference sessions on a split-up basis by topic. As the Bilderberg Conferences were transferred to the next generation during the 1980 “grand finale” in Aachen, Victor Halberstadt described the event as “the smoothest coup d’état in the history of the Atlantic Alliance. But even more remarkable: it is a coup d’état staged by one of the principals in Bilderberg who carefully planned to be dethroned and on top of that acquired the support of his friends to do so.”¹²⁶

The transfer of Bilderberg I to Bilderberg II was a crowning achievement to Van der Beugel’s decades long efforts to ensure the long term survival of transatlantic bonds through the rejuvenation of the Bilderberg Meetings. It was also in this moment that his prior efforts, the many ‘face-lifts’ he had executed – e.g. by attracting younger participants – gained in relevance, since the connections he had nurtured during the preceding years had paved the

¹²² William P. Bundy, “Notes on the views of the European and American ‘Younger Groups’”, London, 3 November 1978, box 23, Folder 6, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

¹²³ E.H. van der Beugel and William P. Bundy to the Members of the Steering Committee, October 11, 1978, box 23, Folder 6, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

¹²⁴ “Minutes of the Meeting held by the Steering Committee at the Office of S.G. Warburg & Co. Ltd.”, 4 November 1978, box 23, folder 6, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ V. Halberstadt, 19 April 1980, contribution in “Book on Ernst”, box 27, Folder 1, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL.

way for this transition since they had helped to provide the human infrastructure that facilitated this transfer of Bilderberg to a new generation. Indeed, as the Turkish Bilderberg Steering Committee member Selahattin Beyazit pointed out, Ernst Van der Beugel had been “very much instrumental in creating an attachment to the concept of Bilderberg among its younger members.”¹²⁷ Consequently, to use Shepard Stone’s terminology: since Van der Beugel had been “actively working on the new crop” he could now harvest the results. As a consequence, the “Atlantic mindset”; the “belief system represented by the Atlantic alliance” could live on at least a little longer among this section of the transatlantic elite. “All I can say here and now,” Halberstadt said as he took over Bilderberg’s management, “is that I’ll try to succeed Ernst as Secretary-General in the fashion we all agree on: to spread the word from generation to generation so that peace and friendship will come much closer than they are today.”¹²⁸

“NATO-Professor”

While Bilderberg was “without doubt” an essential part of Ernst van der Beugel’s life, it was not his Bilderberg-work that he missed the most as he retired, but his professorship in Leiden which had offered him another prominent stage from which he could convey his ideas about and experience of post-war Atlantic cooperation to the next generation.¹²⁹

Ernst van der Beugel worked as professor of Western Cooperation after the Second World War at Leiden University from 1966 until 1984. It was an honorary position for which he received only 2.500 guilders a year, but which he thoroughly enjoyed.¹³⁰ “I found it extraordinary enjoyable to convey my opinion or my story or my analysis to younger people,” Van der Beugel recalled. “I enjoyed dealing with these young people, because (...) I could be helpful in their career choice.”¹³¹ Van der Beugel taught an elective course on Western Cooperation after the Second World War to students in the history and law departments. Attendance for this course grew from about a dozen students during the first year to 70-100 students in later years, including many future diplomats.¹³² One of these students was the later NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who studied in Leiden between 1967 and 1973. After he took Van der Beugel’s course he also graduated under Van der Beugel’s supervision with a thesis on the American Military Presence in Europe. “His classes were fascinating”, De Hoop Scheffer recalled. “He was a transatlanticist *pur sang*, but also the first man whom I met as a young student who was able to put his story on transatlantic affairs in a

¹²⁷ S. Beyazit, 18 March 1980, in: “Book on Ernst”, box 27, Folder 1, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL.

¹²⁸ V. Halberstadt, 19 April 1980, in: “Book on Ernst”, box 27, Folder 1, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL.

¹²⁹ EvdB/Kersten Oral History, p 730: “Maar het [Bilderberg] is zonder twijfel een zeer essentieel stuk van mijn leven geweest”.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 743, 745.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 744.

¹³² EvdB/Kersten Oral History, 744

geopolitical context. I found that quite unique. There is not a whole lot of attention for that aspect in the Netherlands; we don't really like that."¹³³

Ernst van der Beugel's emphasis on the geopolitical aspect as De Hoop Scheffer called it was in fact a very conscious effort by Van der Beugel to counter the Dutch preoccupation with more moralistic judicial approaches to foreign policy. Instead, Van der Beugel's teaching was characterized by a strong anti-ideological and anti-emotional tone, which was also present in his general contributions to the public debate in the Netherlands. Above all, he tried to convey the importance of power in foreign affairs over the importance of international law and judicial aspects.¹³⁴ After all, one of Van der Beugel's main worries about the next generation was that many youngsters questioned or even principally opposed the use of power while even more of them "manifested a curious blindness for the essential question of the purpose of the use of power" as a result of which they contested the necessity of a strong Atlantic defense which Van der Beugel considered a sheer necessity for Western security.¹³⁵ Ernst van der Beugel traced his own emphasis on the importance of power back to his memory of the appeasement at Munich in 1938 and tried to convey this experience and the lessons he took from this to a generation that had not lived through these experiences and tended to be at best skeptical towards the use of power.¹³⁶

Next to advocating a more realist political approach (as opposed to a moralist judicial approach), Van der Beugel tried to convey "the miracle of American foreign policy of 1945-1955,"¹³⁷ trying to keep the memory of America's positive post-war role in Europe alive in the face the fresher yet more sour memories of the Vietnam War. In this context, he did not hide the fact from his students that he detested the revisionist literature on America's role in post-war Europe, which he discarded as 'fables'.¹³⁸ "I have always tried to convey a very clear opinion", Van der Beugel explained. If students wanted to understand the origins of the Cold War, for example, he would tell them that entire libraries could be filled with the literature on the subject, but "I recommend you to read these three books."¹³⁹ Then you'll know what you

¹³³ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, interview with the author, 4 February 2013 (translation mine).

¹³⁴ EvdB/Kersten Oral History, p. 757: "Ik heb dus gepleit voor een meer politieke benadering van buitenlands politieke vraagstukken, maar dat moet ik dan aanvullen als, laat ik zeggen, tegenmove in wat in Leiden en in Nederland natuurlijk toch ook nog erg gebruikelijk is. Een politieke benadering betekent voor mij het zeer bewust maken van macht."

¹³⁵ Van der Beugel, "De huidige problemen van de Westelijke samenwerking".

¹³⁶ EvdB/Kersten Oral History, p. 756: "ik vraag me af of ik zulke uitgesproken opvattingen zou hebben gehad zonder de ervaring van de dertiger jaren. Jullie kunnen je toch nauwelijks voorstellen, want om het nou heel stenografisch te zeggen, wat München heeft betekend. En als je dat ook weer op een hele eenvoudige manier wilt interpreteren, dan is het niet inzetten van macht in een situatie waarbij je veel erger zou kunnen voorkomen door het wel inzetten van macht."

¹³⁷ EvdB/Kersten Oral History, p. 756.

¹³⁸ E.H. van der Beugel, "Ons Amerikabeeld: Boosdoener en/of Weldoener?" in *Te beginnen bij Nederland: Opstellen over oorlogen vrede*, ed. Van der Beugel et. al. (Amsterdam: G.A. van Oorschot, 1983), 21.

¹³⁹ Van der Beugel did not specify which three books, but the reading list in the syllabus for his course on "Western Cooperation after WWII" in 1973/1974 contained: B.H.M. Vlekke, *Tweespalt der wereldrijken, de tegenstelling tussen Oost en West in wezen en wording* (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1953); Louis, J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (London: Harper & Row, 1967); W. Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York/London: Harper, 1947); G.F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); But he

need to know” while adding that “this is my opinion and I believe I am right. If you want to acquaint yourselves with an opposing opinion, then this is the literature you should consult.”¹⁴⁰ This is also confirmed by his course syllabus and lecture notes of former students, as well as by the experience of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who remembered that Van der Beugel had a very clear opinion which he conveyed during his classes. “He was not a man who one could easily oppose. It was a different time, the 1960s and professors had an enormous amount of command and authority. He in particular. He took very clear positions. You could contest that, but you’d have to be very well-prepared. He was not somebody who said let’s listen carefully and then I will be prepared to adapt my opinion.”¹⁴¹

Despite the fact van der Beugel tried to convey a very clear opinion, which was not always very popular, he never became a direct target of student protests during the 1960s. The closest student protests ever came to directly affecting Ernst van der Beugel seems to have been campus unrest not in Leiden but at Harvard, where he was a frequent guest ever since Henry Kissinger had invited him to conduct research for his PhD dissertation at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs in 1963.¹⁴² He would also frequently visit this Ivy League university to give guest lectures. Moreover, in 1967 van der Beugel had been the driving force behind the establishment of an Erasmus Lectureship in Dutch Civilization at Harvard “designed to bring to Harvard visiting lecturers from Holland and other countries who are distinguished specialists in various aspects of economics, history, and the art of the Netherlands.”¹⁴³

The establishment of the lectureship was above all meant as an expression of Dutch gratitude and a “symbol of friendship” between the Netherlands and the United States

also assigned revisionist literature, including: G. Kolko, *The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943-45* (London: Wiesenfeld and Nicholson, 1969), followed by a list works criticizing this revisionism, for example in R.J. Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); H.J. Morgenthau, “Historical Justice and the Cold War: The Politics of War, by Gabriel Kolko”, *The New York Review of Books* (July 10, 1969). In the same syllabus, Van der Beugel mentions that it is important to pay attention to the revisionists, after which he basically burns them down one by one arguing that in the end the only revisionist that could be taken seriously was Kolko. Syllabus, “Geschiedenis van de Westelijke Samenwerking”, private archive C.A. Admiraal, p. 7-11.

¹⁴⁰ EvdB/Kersten Oral History, p.756.

¹⁴¹ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, interview with the author, 4 February 2013 (translation mine): “Hij had zeker een duidelijke mening. Kwam naar voren tijdens de colleges, maar hij deed dat niet op een manier.... Het was niet een man die je makkelijk tegensprak. Het was een andere tijd, zestiger jaren. Een professor had een enorm gezag en autoriteit. Zeker hij. Hij had heldere standpunten, daar kon je tegenin gaan, maar dan moest je wel goed beslagen ten ijs komen. Het was niet iemand die zei van ‘laat ik nou eens uitgebreid gaan zitten luisteren en dan ben ik wel bereid m’n mening aan te passen.’”

¹⁴² In 1963 Harvard’s Center for International Affairs started to focus more on transatlantic relations. What is more, the Center “had a distinct advantage when it came to facilitating contacts with governmental actors who had played key roles in the management of transatlantic interactions. As Karl Kaiser, one of the key participants in this aspect of the Center’s research program put it: “In my own work on transatlantic relations, a few phone calls and I could interview Dean Acheson or Paul Nitze, and important members of the Senate. It was really wonderful.” See: David C. Atkinson, *In Theory and in Practice: Harvard’s Center for International Affairs 1958-1983* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 59-61. It appears that Ernst van der Beugel also made use of these contacts to arrange interviews within the American Foreign Policy establishment for his PhD dissertation, which also further acquainted him with these individuals.

¹⁴³ “Erasmus Lectureship on the civilization of the Netherlands”, HUC XXX, box 63, 23-E-1, Harvard University Archives, HCL.

commemorating Secretary Marshall's commencement speech twenty years earlier in which he announced the European Recovery Program. Through his extensive social network Ernst van der Beugel raised \$200,000, ninety percent of which was collected through contributions by private individuals, companies and organizations in the Netherlands and from the Dutch community in the United States.¹⁴⁴ Van der Beugel convinced the Dutch government to contribute the other 10 percent and to commit itself to finance travel and library expenses in the future.¹⁴⁵ During a ceremony on June 7, 1967, the Lectureship was formally presented to Harvard University by Prince Bernhard. In his speech, which may very well have been written by Ernst van der Beugel¹⁴⁶, he used the occasion to draw special attention to the challenges posed by a younger generation "prepared to test the solidity of the foundations that were laid in the post-war world, to X-ray the values we, their elders, used to cherish." In this context, it was crucial according to the Prince "to see to it that in spite of the changes that have taken place, some principles and objectives will survive this scrutiny".¹⁴⁷ The key principle he was referring to was the idea that Europe and the United States could not do without each other. The establishment of the Erasmus Lectureship was meant to strengthen this relationship and, as Prince Bernhard explained, to be taken as "a sign of urgency. The urgency to bring the peoples of our world closer together, not so much through improving their means of travel but particularly by extending their fields of communication."¹⁴⁸ If instigated by the Dutch government this would certainly have been labeled as an example of 'cultural diplomacy' by diplomatic historians. Orchestrated by a private individual, in the broader context of this research, it could as well be seen as an act of private cultural diplomacy. Ernst van der Beugel was subsequently appointed as the 1969 Erasmus lecturer and meant to give a series of lectures on "the Integration and Disintegration in Western Cooperation" and "American-European relations from the Dutch point of view". His lectures, which had been planned for the spring eventually had to be postponed to the fall due to student protests – unrelated to Van der Beugel's visit – during which Harvard's University Hall was seized and held for eighteen hours, when police were called in to remove the students, after which the university remained in a state of crisis, with a number of students in the College and other parts of the University going on strike.¹⁴⁹

In contrast, Leiden was not a hotbed of student protests. Even so, in a letter expressing his sympathy to his colleague H. Daudt of the University of Amsterdam – where student

¹⁴⁴ "The Netherlands to Present \$200,000 Chair to Harvard", *The New York Times*, June 2, 1967; "Leerstoel is symbool van vriendschap met de VS", *Nieuwe Haagse Courant*, 8 June 1967.

¹⁴⁵ "Address of HRH Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands", Harvard University, June 7, 1967, box 63, HUC XXX, 23-E-1, Harvard University Archive, HCL.

¹⁴⁶ It is not unlikely that this speech was actually written by Ernst van der Beugel, who during the late 1960's and early 1970s frequently wrote speeches for the Prince and the Harvard speech shares quite some similarities with regards to both style and content – including the same key quotes – with speeches delivered by Van der Beugel at the time. For more speeches written by Ernst van der Beugel for HRH Prince Bernhard see: "Lezingen E.H. van der Beugel", AHB.

¹⁴⁷ "Address of HRH Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands."

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. See Also: "Dutch Establish Post at Harvard", *The New York Times*, 11 July 1967.

¹⁴⁹ Verna C. Johnson (administrative assistant to Dean Ford at Harvard) to E.H. van der Beugel, 18 April 1969, file 9, EvdB.

unrest was much more intense – van der Beugel did mention that there were also signs of what he liked to call “the silent inquisition” at Leiden University. Van der Beugel himself attributed the fact that he had not fallen prey to this ‘inquisition’ himself to the fact that his course was an elective and that it was only chosen by students who did so deliberately because it appealed to them. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recalled that there even was a small group of students – including himself – who were “deeply devoted” to the professor. The fact that Ernst van der Beugel could talk from personal experience and actually knew many of the key players of the history he taught gave a certain “sex appeal” to his course that some students thoroughly enjoyed.¹⁵⁰ He also frequently interrupted his course schedule to discuss current events in foreign affairs as they unfolded. Van der Beugel conceded that this might undermine the academic depth of the course, but he considered it more important that his students would be better equipped to make sense of what they read in the newspapers.¹⁵¹

Since the course was scheduled in the last year of their studies, combined with the fact that Van der Beugel also served as a thesis advisor, many students approached him for advice on their future. As a result of the fact that Van der Beugel also took his student’s oral exams at his home, it was a *va-et-vient* of boys and girls who wanted to discuss their work or desired advice on their future at the Van der Beugel home in The Hague. De Hoop Scheffer also extensively discussed his future with Professor Van der Beugel. After all, it was through his course that De Hoop Scheffer had become interested in peace and security studies.¹⁵² “I come from a family where foreign policy played no major role – it was not in my genes”, De Hoop Scheffer explained, but “he introduced me to that entire field of policy and made me accustomed to it and from that my entire career has unfolded.” When De Hoop Scheffer inquired Van der Beugel about a career at the Foreign Service the professor discussed the pros and cons with him. He told him that the foreign service was certainly a possibility, but also warned a young De Hoop Scheffer for the limitations of the job, telling him that he should realize that as a foreign servant he would be “his master’s voice” and that he should not have the illusion that he could independently act upon his own ideas – limitations Van der Beugel had experienced himself before he left the government, a move that allowed him to give a more independent twist to his transatlantic activities. He also warned his student that life in the Foreign Service could be hard on one’s partner. “He always remained an all-things-considered-man”, De Hoop Scheffer recalled. Once De Hoop Scheffer had determined what he wanted to do, Van der Beugel provided him with very concrete advice on how to pursue his ambition to become a diplomat. “He recommended me to pick international economic relations as an elective course – for which I am still thankful – and to write my thesis on a transatlantic subject”, De Hoop Scheffer recalled. “You could see that he did what he did with great pleasure and enthusiasm and by doing so he demonstrated ‘I take that generation

¹⁵⁰ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, interview with the author, 4 February 2013 (translation mine).

¹⁵¹ Prof. A. van Staden, “T.g.v. het afscheid van Prof. van der Beugel”, 16 november 1984, Scrapbook #22, AHB.

¹⁵² “Former Secretary-General of NATO to be appointed professor,” accessed December 5, 2016, <http://www.news.leiden.edu/news/former-secretary-general-nato-appointed-professor.html#sthash.HCKxYnQW.dpuf>.

seriously and I try to educate them in my spirit.”¹⁵³ In his own acceptance speech as professor at Leiden University in 2010 De Hoop Scheffer would mention Ernst van der Beugel as his “great example and teacher.”¹⁵⁴

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was far from the only Dutch diplomat to pass through van der Beugel’s class. According to van der Beugel, any Leiden student who had the ambition to join the Foreign Service followed his course.¹⁵⁵ Consequently, he greatly contributed to the education of future diplomats – not only in Leiden, but he was also closely involved in the formal education of future diplomats through his position as chairman of the “Leergang Buitenlandse Betrekkingen” of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he helped to determine the content of the training course for new diplomats.¹⁵⁶ Ernst van der Beugel also used his network to provide introductions and recommendations for those students he considered to be promising, preferably with a positive attitude towards NATO.

Overall, the content of van der Beugel’s courses reflected his own views, personal experience and analyses as expressed in his other writings and speeches as well. There was a complete unity in his thinking that found expression through a diverse body of activities of which academia was just one component. During the late 1970s and early 1980s van der Beugel also agitated against the prevalent moral and ideological argumentation in the public debate which according to him fostered an anti-Americanism that found expression in concerns about human rights, cultural anti-Americanism and especially in the debate on nuclear weapons. The latter was especially clear in the protests ignited by the 1979 NATO decision to place American nuclear cruise missiles in Western Europe. With regard to all these elements on the “menu of anti-Americanism” van der Beugel came to America’s defense in the Dutch public debate for which he was somewhat scornfully given the label of “NATO-professor” by one journalist.¹⁵⁷ In 1983, he enthusiastically participated in an offensive against the peace movement through a book publication with “Essays on War and Peace.”¹⁵⁸ His own contribution to this book focused on the America-image in the minds of the Dutch and the generational transition from an image of the United States as benefactor – determined by the “great acts of the post-war period” as he himself had experienced them – to a malefactor – an image that emerged especially after the experiences of Vietnam and Watergate, two major formative experiences of the post-war generation, which had helped to foster a negative image of the United States, which was further fed by such things as concerns about human rights abuses and the deployment of nuclear weapons on Dutch soil during the

¹⁵³ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, interview with the author, 4 February 2013 (translation mine).

¹⁵⁴ Prof. mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Opkomst G20: Bedreiging voor Gevestigde Instiuties?” Accessed December 5, 2016, <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/19576/Oratie%20De%20Hoop%20Scheffer.pdf?sequence=1> (translation mine).

¹⁵⁵ EvdB/Kersten Oral History, p. 746.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 749.

¹⁵⁷ Oral history, p 765.

¹⁵⁸ E.H. van der Beugel et al. *Te Beginnen bij Nederland: Opstellen over Oorlogen Vrede* (Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 1983).

1970s and early 1980s. It was above all this image of America as “benefactor” that he tried to convey to the next generation as well as the public at large.

Ernst van der Beugel was convinced that the negative image of the United States was for a great part the result of a lack of proper knowledge of American society. In this regard he underlined the importance of bringing young people, but also other up-and-coming leaders who were bound to occupy influential positions in society, in touch with American society through exchange programs and visitor programs. He recommended students, friends and employees to spend time in the United States and was closely involved with such ventures the Columbia-Leyden exchange program and the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship – an international leader exchange program set-up by a group of businessmen in honor of president Eisenhower.¹⁵⁹ To illustrate, in 1980 Ernst van der Beugel and Victor Halberstadt discussed “the desirability” that the up-and-coming Dutch journalist Harry van Wijnen, who was a likely candidate to succeed Van der Beugel’s friend Herman Sandberg as editor in chief of the Dutch daily *Het Parool*, to “get a decent American experience.” Van der Beugel had asked Halberstadt to see if it would be possible to station him for some time at the Council of Foreign Relations or a similar institution. “Even if he does not succeed Herman”, Van der Beugel wrote to Halberstadt, “I think it will be of great importance.”¹⁶⁰

Overall, Van der Beugels efforts to create meaningful encounters with American society or with the Atlantic elite for up-and-coming leaders like Schmelzer, Dankert, Benthem van den Bergh and Harry van Wijnen were very much in line with NATO’s and the U.S. State Department’s public diplomacy efforts to “‘socialize’ and ‘familiarize’ up and coming leaders (...) with the United States as part of their political education” through such programs as the Fulbright Program and the State Department’s Foreign Leaders Program or the NATO leader program.¹⁶¹ In the process, “transatlantic social and intellectual bridges were build and strengthened in situations where ideological divides could easily widen out of control.”¹⁶² In his private efforts, Van der Beugel focused on similar target groups as these programs, which is also underlined by the fact that Schmelzer, Dankert and Van Wijnen had also been grantees of these government directed programs.¹⁶³ Ernst van der Beugel’s endeavors through Bilderberg – Bill Bundy even called Van der Beugel a “talent-scout” in this context¹⁶⁴ – and his involvement in exchange programs, supplemented by individual efforts through his social network, complemented and strengthened these more formal efforts, which Van der Beugel greatly valued. In fact, when during the 1960s the number of participants in the U.S.

¹⁵⁹ “History of EF”, accessed December 9, 2016, <https://www.efworld.org/about-us/history>.

¹⁶⁰ E.H. van der Beugel to V. Halberstadt, 24 March 1980, file 43, EvdB.

¹⁶¹ Giles Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire: The U.S. State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain, 1950-70* (Brussels: Peter Lang AG., 2008) 324.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 323.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 479, 481.

¹⁶⁴ Bill Bundy, contribution to “Book on Ernst”, box 27, Folder 1, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL: “Ernst the talent scout. Established or rising reputations, who counts, who has ideas – has anyone in these twenty years known more of these in the Atlantic firmament at least? Or been more subtle in the diplomacy of snaring the right fish for the annual net?”

Government sponsored “Leader Grant Program”, which had “been extremely successful in the past in encouraging prominent visitors from the Netherlands to learn at first-hand about the people and institutions of the U.S., and to help transmit their motives, thoughts, aspirations and accomplishments to the Netherlands” had been reduced from 8 in 1960 to 1 in 1969, Van der Beugel was deeply concerned about the consequences. So was the American ambassador to The Hague Bill Tyler. Once Van der Beugel became aware of this, he encouraged the American ambassador to compose a memorandum describing the importance of such programs for Dutch-American relations and negative consequences of an American cut back “of U.S. Government support to exchanges of persons programs”, which he offered to personally forward to Henry Kissinger.¹⁶⁵ Both men considered the mentioned cuts “unacceptable”, especially – as the eventual memorandum also pointed out – during a time in which “American society is more than ever before under close scrutiny by the people of the Netherlands. Yet their curiosity for the most part can be satisfied only by the distortions that the superficial treatment of American events by modern mass communications presents to them.”¹⁶⁶

When Van der Beugel turned 65 in 1983 – retirement age in the Netherlands – his friends decided to arrange the perfect gift as a tribute to his efforts to foster and maintain the transatlantic relationship by establishing an Ernst van der Beugel fellowship at the Fletcher School of Law and diplomacy of Tufts University. This gift, which was meant to represent Van der Beugel’s influence behind the scenes, his Atlanticist principles and his “position on the impossible crossroads of academia, education, business, government, domestic and foreign affairs”, was awarded to Van der Beugel in the presence of a diverse group of politicians and former politicians as well as many prominent leaders from the worlds of business, finance, journalism, academia and the government.¹⁶⁷ The fellowship allowed for the annual selection of one Dutch individual, preferably between 20 and 40 years of age, to study for three months in the United States at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.¹⁶⁸ This gift was meant, Victor Halberstadt explained, to enable Ernst van der Beugel to “continue his activities as a private diplomat.”¹⁶⁹ The funds for the fellowship were raised from corporations and other private entities and individuals in the Netherlands. The board of the foundation responsible for the selection of students consisted of Ernst van der Beugel, Victor Halberstadt, Max van der Stoel and Jelle Zijlstra.¹⁷⁰ The first individual selected by the board was Ben Knapen, a

¹⁶⁵ William R. Tyler to E.H. van der Beugel, 17 January 1969, file 8, EvdB.

¹⁶⁶ William R. Tyler to E.H. van der Beugel, 30 January 30 1969, “Enclosure 1: Draft on Leader Grant Program”, file 8, EvdB.

¹⁶⁷ Victor Halberstadt, “Opmerkingen bij aanbieding Ernst H. van der Beugel Fellowship”, 2 February 1983, Scrapbook XVIII, AHB.

¹⁶⁸ G.M.V. van Aardenne, “Toespraak Z.E. Drs. G.M.V. van Aardenne, Minister van Economische Zaken”, Scrapbook XVIII, AHB.

¹⁶⁹ Halberstadt, “Opmerkingen”.

¹⁷⁰ “Ernst H. van der Beugel Fellowship Established”, Scrapbook XVIII, AHB.

promising young journalist whose work Van der Beugel admired.¹⁷¹ Eventually, Knapen would move on to become the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2010.

While Van der Beugel gradually retired from more and more of his activities – sometimes voluntarily as in Bilderberg and sometimes reluctantly as was the case with his retirement from Leiden university – the Dutch minister of Economic Affairs remarked that this would probably not deter many from consulting the wisdom of the Atlantic *eminence grise* in the future as well “if only because you may very well be the last 'private' diplomat for whom few doors in the Western world remain closed,” the minister remarked.¹⁷² Ernst van der Beugel probably only welcomed this as he had always done, since as he mentioned in his farewell speech from Bilderberg: “I was , I am and I will always be committed to the central purpose of Bilderberg: Fostering better understanding between the U.S., Canada and its Western European Friends”, because, he once more explained: “the destiny of those relations determines all our destinies.”¹⁷³ Even so, it was now “up to the youngsters.”¹⁷⁴

Conclusion

From the early 1960s onwards, Ernst van der Beugel manifested himself as one of the driving forces behind a constant effort to educate new generations and to rejuvenate the Atlantic elite. While he continued his role in the public debate explaining and defending the U.S. to Dutch audiences and the Dutch and European position to American audiences, trying to foster a conducive climate for close transatlantic cooperation, this chapter has emphasized his concern with the education and socialization of potential future leaders within the Atlantic Community in an effort to foster and sustain both the mindset and social fabric at the heart of the transatlantic relationship. While these activities pursued a very clear diplomatic goal, they were carried out in an unofficial capacity and on the basis of private initiative, operating independently from nation-stations. As such, these efforts might not capture the attention of traditional diplomatic historians despite the fact that they were part of one and the same transatlantic diplomatic process. New Diplomatic History, however, allows us to see how Ernst van der Beugel as an unofficial diplomat contributed to the transatlantic diplomatic landscape through his attempts to address the challenge of the successor generation. He did so in different roles and through different channels, for example as a consultant for the Ford Foundation, as Secretary-General of the Bilderberg Meetings, as a board member of the Atlantic Institute, through his involvement in exchange programs and training programs for future diplomats as well as through his professorship at Leiden University.

Ernst van der Beugel's work as a consultant for the Ford Foundation, one of the key funders of the Atlantic NGOs, offers a glimpse into the world of private foundations which

¹⁷¹ Ben Knapen, interview with the author, 4 February 2013.

¹⁷² G.M.V. van Aardenne, “Toespraak Z.E. Drs. G.M.V. van Aardenne”.

¹⁷³ E.H. van der Beugel, “Mijn afscheid van Bilderberg op 19 april in Aken”, Scrapbook XVII, AHB.

¹⁷⁴ E.H. van der Beugel and William P. Bundy to the Members of the Steering Committee, 11 October 1978, box 23, folder 6, George W. Ball Papers, PUL.

pulled a great part of the strings within the unofficial Atlantic Community based on their own private policy agendas, informed by the ideas solicited from consultants such as Ernst van der Beugel. They pursued their own goals, by their own means, but it is important to realize that they maintained close ties to the formal foreign policy establishments in Europe and the United States. Like Ernst van der Beugel, many individuals involved in these foundations once served as formal government officials themselves. In that sense, they are a typical product of the revolving door between government employment, academia, think tanks, law and consultancy firms, the financial world and foundations that so much characterizes the East Coast Establishment. Of their own accord they chose to support formal diplomatic goals that they agreed with, such as helping to “accelerate the development of the Atlantic partnership” through private activity with a focus on “activities which would be suspect or impaired if national government’s engaged in them.”¹⁷⁵ As a consultant, Ernst van der Beugel helped to give direction to their private policy agenda, specifically emphasizing the need to address the challenge of successor generation, while also putting these ideas in practice through his direct role in private organizations pursuing these very goals.

In the absence of “the opportunities for meeting and working together which were afforded emergent leaders in the immediate post-war era through the negotiations for new forms of international cooperation – the Marshall Plan, NATO, EEC, OECD and others” , Van der Beugel attached great value to the creation of similar formative experiences through visitor and exchange programs, in particular those focused at brining young Europeans into close contact with American society.¹⁷⁶ To this end, he was closely involved in and an avid supporter of such programs, including the Columbia-Leyden exchange program and the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship and through individual efforts through his own social network, which he also used to help recently graduated students from Leiden to start their careers.

At Leiden University he furthermore used his professorship as an extra platform to educate the next generation on the importance of the transatlantic relationship for which he was labelled a ‘NATO-professor’. As such, he tried to keep the positive memory of the American role in the liberation, reconstruction and protection of Western Europe alive in the face of more recent memories of Vietnam and Watergate and a revisionist history that fed images of the U.S. as a belligerent, corrupt and imperialist nation. He also tried to explain the importance of power relations to a generation that had only known peace and grew up amidst the popularity of moralism and the spread of Hollanditus fed by the idealism of the Netherlands as a guiding country, as the Jeanne D’ Arc of the world – a spirit he remembered very well from the days of the run-up to the Second World War, and which he associated with his memories of appeasement at Munich, which he had so bemoaned and detested.

¹⁷⁵ “Activities to strengthen the Atlantic Partnership”, box 18, folder 182, Office Files - IA - Slater, FFA, RAC.

¹⁷⁶ “Request for a grant of \$160,000 to the Atlantic Institute (...) for the promotion of Atlantic Unity”, Grant File 65-161, Reel 2757, FFA, RAC.

As Secretary General Van der Beugel used the Bilderberg Meetings as an important instrument to engage and socialize promising young individuals from different fields into the Atlantic elite and to create a forum in which not only transatlantic tensions, but also generational friction could be mediated. Despite Van der Beugel's efforts, and despite the fact that there was a certain understanding among those involved in Bilderberg that the organization should serve as a vehicle to sustain the transatlantic relationships and contacts that had originally developed during the Marshall Plan era by developing and maintaining the human infrastructure of an evolving Atlantic Community, the rejuvenation of the Bilderberg Meetings was no easy task. Eventually it was pushed through the window of opportunity created by the existential crisis caused by the key role of Bilderberg chairman Prince Bernhard in the Lockheed scandal. This crisis, however, also demonstrated the value attached to Bilderberg in the context of transatlantic relations by those who had been involved in the meetings – including official government representatives and younger participants. Thus, Ernst van der Beugel manifested himself not just as a transatlantic mediator, but also as a mediator between generations.