Reframing the Diplomat: Ernst van der Beugel and the Cold War Atlantic Community

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Introduction

"Here and there one still finds traces of the idea that relations between states are exclusively the business of governments", a Dutch newspaper editor wrote in the summer of 1961. The author considered this a rather archaic take on international relations. "Surely", he proceeded, "in the middle of the twentieth century we must have reached the point where the private citizen can no longer be denied the right to make contact with others should he consider this useful, even at the international level."[1] The editorial was part of a heated discussion in the Dutch press, which had been triggered by a speech delivered at the Dutch Chamber of Commerce in London by the Director General of KLM Dutch Royal Airlines: Ernst van der Beugel.[2]

Ernst van der Beugel (1918-2004) was a kind of modern Renaissance man who carved out a unique position for himself through a kaleidoscopic career that made him an influential figure not just in the Netherlands but internationally, in particular within the Cold War Atlantic Community. Born into a Jewish family during the final year of the First World War, Van der Beugel grew up in Amsterdam during the run-up to the Second World War. Instead of following in the footsteps of this father, an international investment banker with social-democratic leanings, Van der Beugel decided to pursue a career as a civil servant once the war had ended. As such, he came to play a central role in the implementation of the Marshall Plan in the Netherlands and in the international negotiations related to the European Recovery Program. In this context, Van der Beugel developed an impressive career at the cross-roads of international political, military and economic policy as the protégé of Hans Max Hirschfeld, the most powerful civil servant in the Netherlands at the time. In the process, he also developed a close emotional attachment to the United States as well as a diverse and expansive transatlantic social network bridging the public and private spheres in the Netherlands, Europe and across the Atlantic. Even so, it was above all a strong belief in *realpolitik* fed by his experiences of the run-up to the Second World War, in particular the Munich agreement of 1938 and the lessons concerning the importance of power relations that he took from these experiences and applied to the new Cold War context, that motivated van der Beugel's Atlanticist inclinations - eventually turning him into one of the "founding fathers of Dutch Atlanticism."[3]

Van der Beugel's Marshall Plan years were followed by top positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – where he was one of the main policy advisors with regards to European and transatlantic policy of Foreign ministers Stikker, Beyen and Luns and Prime Minister

[1] "Particulier in Statenverkeer", *De Rotterdammer*, July 21, 1961 (translation mine).
[2] Parts of this introduction also appeared in: Albertine Bloemendal, "Between Dinner Table and Formal Diplomacy: Ernst van der Beugel as an Unofficial Diplomat for an Atlantic Community", *New Global Studies*, 8:1 (2014): 103-119.
[3] Thomas Gijswijt, "De Trans-Atlantische elite en de Nederlandse Buitenlandse Politiek sinds 1945", in *Bezinning op het Buitenland: Het Nederlandse buitenlands beleid in een onzekere wereld*, eds. Hellema et al. (Den Haag: Clingendael, 2011), 36 (translation mine).

Drees. He participated in the negotiations leading up to the Rome Treaty and served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs responsible for European integration in the third Drees Cabinet (13 October 1956 - 22 December 1958). While this may all make for an interesting career in itself – which has been documented, for example, in Ralph Dingemans' 2008 portrait of Ernst van der Beugel[4] – this dissertation argues that what makes Ernst van der Beugel a particularly interesting figure is in fact what happened *after* he left the Dutch government in 1959 to join KLM Dutch Royal Airlines.

While Van der Beugel's transition to the private sector may at first sight appear as a fundamental break with his career as a diplomat, reality proved to be more complex. The end of Ernst Van der Beugel's official career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not mean the end of his role in transatlantic relations. Instead, his experience as a formal diplomat served as a kind of springboard to a more diffuse and free-form approach to transatlantic diplomacy as a private citizen – built on an intricate mosaic of activities in many different spheres including the worlds of government, politics, business, finance, military circles, academia, think tanks, philanthropic organizations and unofficial transnational elite networks, particularly within the Atlantic Community.

Whereas a great deal of his post-1959 transatlantic endeavors took place behind the scenes, Van der Beugel did not hesitate to use his public position either. To illustrate, in his speech at the Dutch chamber of commerce in London referred to at the beginning of this introduction, Van der Beugel had publicly beseeched the British to join the process of European integration in order to create a more healthy (read: 'more Atlanticist') balance of power in Europe by thwarting the Gaullist dream to dominate the continent, arguing that 'the Netherlands' would very much applaud this.[5] In the process, he rather bluntly criticized Gaullist France and scolded the Germans. The incident drew quite some attention in the Dutch press and the debate that followed raised interesting questions, like: What was – or ought to be – the role of a private citizen in foreign affairs? Who was Van der Beugel to speak for 'the Netherlands'? Was he just a mouthpiece of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs? And, if not, who *did* he speak for and who or what *did* he represent? But also: What would be the consequences? How did this unofficial endeavor relate to formal diplomatic relations?[6]

These were very relevant questions, especially since over the course of the 20th century advances in communication and transportation had enabled private citizens to play an unprecedented role in the conduct of international relations, thus considerably changing the diplomatic playing field. As Joe Johnson and Maureen Berman already noted in their 1977 book *Unofficial Diplomats*: "private citizens can now to a degree never before true inform

[4] Ralph Dingemans, "'De zon ging op en de wind was gunstig': Ernst Hans van der Beugel (1918-2004)", in *In dienst van Buitenlandse Zaken. Achttien Portretten van ambtenaren en diplomaten in de twintigste eeuw*, eds. Bert van der Zwan, Bob de Graaff en Duco Hellema (Amsterdam: Boom, 2008), 157-173.
[5] See: "Openhartige rede drs. v.d. Beugel: Fransen willen Britten niet in de E.E.G.", *Telegraaf*, July 21, 1961; "Particulier in Statenverkeer", *Rotterdammer*, July 25, 1961; "KLM-directeur wekt Engeland op toe te treden tot E.E.G", *De Tijd/Maasbode*, July 21, 1961; "KLM-president pleit in Londen voor Bonn", *De Waarheid*, July 21, 1961.
[6] See: "Moedig", *De Gelderlander*, July 25, 1961; "Particulier in Statenverkeer", *Rotterdammer*, July 25, 1961; "Vrijmoedig comentaar", *De Tijd*, July 21, 1961; "Vlucht in de politiek", *Volkskrant*, July 21, 1961.

themselves on the foreign policies of their own and other governments, visit and entertain the leaders of foreign governments, suggest new policy positions or probe for changes in policy during those meetings, bring back feelers for policy changes, and then publicize the results of those meetings to large numbers of people in the news media." As a result "an increasing proportion of international interaction bypasses, complements, or supplements traditional bilateral procedures." Johnson and Berman dubbed the range of private international relations 'unofficial diplomacy', referring specifically to "individuals and groups who have contact with private citizens or government officials from other countries as well as with their own government."[7] These developments were also visible in Cold War transatlantic relations, leaving a considerable impact on the diplomatic playing field.

Ernst van der Beugel, the Atlantic Elite and the Unofficial "Atlantic Community"

The post-war period witnessed a great intensification in transatlantic cooperation, often illustrated by the Marshall Plan, the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and the establishment of NATO – developments which were accompanied with talk of a nascent 'Atlantic Community'. The term 'Atlantic Community' was used frequently during the Cold War and meant different things to different people.[8] During the 1950's some Atlanticists even advocated the creation of a formal Atlantic Community that would politically and economically integrate the North Atlantic area. While organizations like NATO and associated institutions like the OECD and GATT played an important role in formalizing the post-war transatlantic relationship, a formal Atlantic Community never materialized. Atlanticism, however, was never restricted to these formal intergovernmental organizations.[9]

Rather, as a new generation of scholars has started to uncover, the post-war period witnessed the proliferation of many private individuals and groups promoting close

[7] Maureen Berman and Joseph Johnson, *Unofficial Diplomats* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 3-5.

[8] The phrase "Atlantic Community" was first coined in 1916 by the American philosopher journalist Walter Lippmann, but the view it reflected was rooted in 19th century ideas of shared cultural affinities and dreams of Anglo-Saxon confederation and the unity of the English speaking peoples. During and right after the Second World War, the initial Atlantic alliance of the United States and Britain broadened to include Western Europe and the popularization of an Atlantic Community became a joint transatlantic effort, considered crucial in the light of the emerging Cold War. See: Ronald Steel, "Walter Lippmann and the Invention of the Atlantic Community" in *European Community, Atlantic Community?*, eds. Aubourg, Scott-Smith and Bossuat (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 28-36; Lara C. Silver, "The Political Use of Metaphor in the Construction of the Atlantic Community" in *European Community, Atlantic Community?*, eds. Aubourg, Scott-Smith and Bossuat (Paris: Soleb, 2008) 60-73; Ronald Steel, "How Europe became Atlantic: Walter Lippmann and the New Geography of the Atlantic Community", in *Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, ed. Marco Mariano (New York: Routledge, 2010), 13-27; Interjeet Parmar,"Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power in the Intellectual Roots of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations," *International Relations*, 16:1 (2002), 53-75; Sebastiaan Reyn, "Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969" (Ph.D. dissertation, Leiden University, 2007), 29, 107-192.

[9] See: Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77; David W. Ellwood, "From the Marshall Plan to Atlanticism: Communication Strategies and Geopolitical Narratives", in *European Community, Atlantic Community?*, eds. Aubourg, Bossuat and Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 54.

transatlantic cooperation, including the international Movement for Atlantic Union, which was represented through the Atlantic Union Committee, the Atlantic Citizen's Congress (ACC), and the Declaration of Atlantic Unity group (DAU) and pursued an Atlantic federation based on the ideas set out by the American journalist and Atlantic federalist Clarance Streit in his popular 1939 book "Union Now". Other prominent Atlanticist NGO's included the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), which counted fifteen national member groups; the NATO Parliamentarians conference, the American Council on NATO, the Congress of European-American Associates, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Bilderberg Meetings and the Atlantic Institute.[10]

While most of these private organizations tended to pursue their own agenda's many of them had close ties with formal diplomatic and foreign policy establishments. After all, as multiple scholars have pointed out, a crucial characteristic of Cold War transatlantic relations was the existence of a highly integrated Atlantic elite, which consisted not only of formal government representatives but also included bankers and businessmen, philanthropists, union leaders, journalists and academics, or in the words of Giles Scott-Smith: "the loose collection of policy intellectuals and influentials dedicated to maintaining close transatlantic relations from dinner table to diplomacy and everywhere in between."[11]

Kenneth Weisbrode has pointed out that it was no "historical accident" that these private organizations and meeting places proliferated in the mid-1950s and 1960s. During this period diplomacy started to grow more accustomed to the presence of the mass media while bureaucracies became more complex, creating a need for "alternative, 'unofficial' purveyors of elite consensus and continuity." Weisbrode emphasizes that the role of these private organizations and meeting places was "something more subtle and powerful than their ostensible roles as policy talking shops and cheerleaders." Instead, "they were at once alternative spaces for policymaking and policy planning as well as important catalysts and incubators of political consensus among a diversifying and increasingly contentious bevy of leaders."[12] The networks, think tanks, foundations, exchange programs and other private organizations that linked this transatlantic elite were just as much part of the transatlantic fabric as NATO itself. As Thomas Gijswijt has demonstrated, "at times they even succeeded where NATO, to a certain degree failed; e.g. in building a consultation infrastructure that

[10] On the unofficial dimension of Cold War transatlantic relations see: David Ellwood, "What Winning Stories Teach" in *Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, ed. Marco Mariano (New York: Routledge, 2010); Valérie Aubourg, "Creating the Texture of the Atlantic Community", in *European Community, Atlantic Community?*, eds. Aubourg, Bossuat and Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 390-415; Kenneth Weisbrode, *The Atlantic Century: Four Centuries of Extraordinary Diplomats who Forged America's Vital Alliance with Europe* (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2009), 165-170.

[11] Giles Scott-Smith, "Ghosts in the Machine? Ernst van der Beugel, the Transatlantic Elite, and the 'New' Diplomatic History" (Oratie, Leiden, 2009). On the Atlantic elite see also: Thomas Gijswijt, "Beyond NATO: Transatlantic Elite Networks and the Atlantic Alliance", in *Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges Beyond Deterrence in the 1960s*, eds. A. Wenger et al. (London: Routledge, 2007), 50; Kees van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class* (London: Verso, 1984); Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 66.

[12] Kenneth Weisbrode, *The Atlantic Century*, 168.

went beyond purely military and strategic issues."[13] Thus, in the absence of formal transatlantic political structures the unofficial dimension of transatlantic relations only gained in importance.

Furthermore, among the transatlantic elite – many of whom had worked together on projects such as the Marshall Plan or the creation of NATO followed by common ventures in pursuit of Atlantic unity and cooperation – a sense of shared values, experiences and interests developed (especially in the context of the Cold War), which created an almost tangible sense of Atlantic community; a sense of community which they in turn tried to spread and foster, either individually or through transnational Atlanticist networks and NGO's.[14] Throughout his career, Ernst van der Beugel moved as a spider through this intricate web of formal and informal transatlantic relations – first as an official government representative and from 1959 onwards through positions in almost all the different spheres represented among the Atlantic elite.

After close cooperation with the private sector during the Marshall Plan, Van der Beugel eventually entered the business world through KLM Dutch Royal airlines in 1959; first as vice-president and between June 1961 and January 1963 as its president. He also mingled with captains of industry on the boards of governors of a varied collection of European and American corporations, including Merck, Sharp & Dohme, the Xerox corporation, Estel, the Diebold Group, Petrofina and General Electric.[15] Next to that, he occupied significant positions in the financial sector, for example on the supervisory boards of S.G. Warburg, Bank Mees & Hope and ABN.

In 1960 Van der Beugel consolidated his position among the Atlantic elite through his appointment as Honorary Secretary General of the Bilderberg meetings – one of the main informal meeting places of the unofficial Atlantic elite.[16] He would occupy this position until 1980, serving in the words of Henry Kissinger as the 'glue' that kept the network together.[17] In addition, he served on the boards of private international relations councils including the Ditchley Foundation, the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship, the Paris based Atlantic Institute and the Dutch Association for Foreign Affairs. What's more, between 1973 and 1985 Van der Beugel served as the chairman of the prestigious London based International Institute for

[13] Gijswijt, "Beyond NATO", 50.
[14] Ibid.; Weisbrode, *The Atlantic Century*, 13, 72; Valérie Aubourg, "Problems of Transmission: The Atlantic Community and the Successor Generation as Seen by US Philantrophy, 1960s-1970s", in *Atlantic, Euratlantic or Europe-America?*, eds. Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2011), 416-443.
[15] For a complete list see appendix A: Directorships E.H. van der Beugel.
[16] On the Bilderberg Meetings see: Thomas Gijswijt, "Uniting the West: the Bilderberg Group, the Cold War and European integration, 1952-1966" (PhD diss., Heidelberg University, 2007); Ingeborg Philipsen, Diplomacy with Ambiguity: the Bilderberg Organization 1952-1977 (PhD diss., Københavns Universitet, 2009); Ian Richardson, Andrew Kakabadse and Nada Kakabadse, *Bilderberg People: Elite Power and Consensus in World Affairs* (London/New York: Routledge, 2011); Valérie Aubourg, "Organizing Atlanticism: The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute 1952-63," in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945-1960* , eds Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003); Hugh Wilford, "The CIA, the British Left, and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?", in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945-1960* , eds Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (London: Frank Cass Pubilshers, 2003), 225-261.
[17] H.A. Kissinger, interview with the author, 4 January 2012.

Strategic Studies (IISS). Meanwhile, he also maintained close ties with the 'Big Three' American private philanthropic organizations: the Ford, Rockefeller and the Carnegie Foundations, which financed many of the Atlantic NGO's and their unofficial transatlantic activities.[18]

After writing a dissertation on European integration as a concern of American foreign policy, Van der Beugel also entered academia in 1966 as professor of Western Cooperation after the Second World War at Leiden University. As such, he did not only share his knowledge within the university's ivory towers but also came to manifest himself as a public intellectual who avidly contributed to the public debate on international affairs and who was regularly consulted as an expert on European and transatlantic relations by businessmen, journalists and government representatives alike. Through his activities in all these different spheres he developed an illustrious network that provided access to the likes of Henry Kissinger, David Rockefeller and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands.

While personal interests including social status, financial gain and a certain dose of vanity should not be disregarded, Van der Beugel was also driven by diplomatic goals, and in pursuit of these goals he continued to play a role on the transatlantic diplomatic playing field as a member of the Atlantic elite. Thus, Ernst van der Beugel is a good example of the kind of 'unofficial diplomat' described by Johnson (who himself served for many years as the U.S. Honorary Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings) and Berman. Even so the history of his private diplomatic endeavors – while recognized by some historians – has not been thoroughly studied and thus remains cloaked in mystery.[19] He has been described as a "natural networker", an "artist in the field of human relations"[20], and a "one man pressure group; someone who brings everyone in contact with everyone while functioning as the central linkman." In his book on Dutch power structures, journalist Joris van den Berg also described Van der Beugel as a "master-plotter on the power map of the Netherlands" and applied the Dutch soccer term '*aangever*' to illuminate his political role, referring to the soccer player who provides the crucial assist that enables a team member to score a goal.[21] Another observer has compared Van der Beugel's activities to the role of an 18th century French woman holding a *salon*.[22] While these are telling descriptions, they only scratch the

[18] On the role of foundations see: Interjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: the Ford, Carnegie, & Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Volker R. Berghahn, "The Ford Foundation and the Forging of the Atlantic Community after World War II", in *European Community, Atlantic Community?*, eds. Aubourg, Bossuat and Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2008) 92-112; Valérie Aubourg, "Problems of Transmission", 416-443; Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[19] Ernst van der Beugel does pop up in some studies involving post-1959 Dutch-American relations, see for example: Kim van der Wijngaart, *Bondgenootschap onder Spanning: Nederlands-Amerikaanse Betrekkingen, 1969-1976* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2011); Gijswijt, "De Transatlantische Elite"; Giles Scott-Smith and David Snyder, "'A Test of Sentiments': Civil Aviation, Alliance Politics, and the KLM Challenge in Dutch-American Relations", *Diplomatic History* 37:5 (2013).

[20] C.L. Patijn to V. Halberstadt, 14 January 1998, file 1, C.L. Patijn Papers, National Archives the Hague (NAH) (translation mine).

[21] Joris van den Berg, *De Anatomie van Nederland* (Amsterdam: de Bezige Bij, 1967), 172-174 (translation mine).

[22] Jérôme Heldering, "Afscheid van een tijdperk", *NRC Handelsblad*, October 14, 2004, p. 9 (translation mine).

surface of his activities and no in depth study on Van der Beugel's role in transatlantic affairs including both the official and unofficial realms of diplomacy has been done. A lack of appreciation for the unofficial realm and its actors is not only visible with regards to the historical treatment of Ernst van der Beugel. The historiography of Dutch diplomacy and diplomats generally lacks in depth studies of the unofficial realm of foreign policy and the informal activities of private diplomatic actors in it.[23] This is remarkable, especially since a small country like the Netherlands might actually be able to profit disproportionally from building strong personal relationships through informal networks and a leading role in unofficial circuits like the Bilderberg meetings, which – in the absence of considerable hard power – might enable them to punch somewhat 'above their weight' in the diplomatic arena.

Meanwhile, the changes in the diplomatic landscape described above, in particular the proliferation of non-state actors and the importance of the unofficial realm, are only increasing in relevance and are having serious implications for the ways in which diplomacy is to be carried out – also today. In its 2010 strategic report *Attached to the World: on the Anchoring and Strategy of Dutch Foreign Policy*, the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) emphasized that the first step towards an effective Dutch foreign policy within the current international context is "to be aware and acknowledge that we live in a hybrid world (…) in which the worlds of state politics and non-state networks exist next to each other" and that this situation demands new approaches to foreign policy. While originally Dutch diplomacy was focused on 'directing', in the new hybrid world cooperation with non-state actors is crucial requiring a new emphasis on 'facilitating' and 'connecting'. In the hybrid world of state and non-state actors, the authors would like to see the Netherlands at the center of significant networks arguing that "the more prominent its position in the network (a large number of contacts, the appreciation of other actors), the greater its capacity to acquire knowledge and services from other actors, to regulate the transmission of information and products within the network, and to determine agendas and frame debates."[24]

The wakeup call provided by the WRR report aimed at the foreign policy arena is also relevant to academia. While the diplomatic playing field has dramatically changed, especially with regards to "how and where diplomacy is done, as well as in who is seen to be engaging in diplomacy", and despite developments in global and transnational history, many diplomatic historians – not just in the Netherlands – still look at diplomacy and diplomatic relations

[23] Some shorter pieces do focus on the unofficial dimension. See for example: Giles Scott-Smith, "A Dutch Dartmouth: Ernst van Eeghen's Private Campaign to Defuse the Euromissiles Crisis", *New Global Studies* 8:1 (2014); Thomas Gijswijt, "The Bilderberg Group and Dutch-American Relations", in *NL-USA: Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations*, eds. Krabbendam, van Minnen and Scott-Smith (Amsterdam: Boom: 2009), 808-818; Gijswijt, "De Transatlantische Elite". An example of a more in depth-study concerning a private citizen on the diplomatic playing field is: Wouter Meijer, *Ze zijn gék geworden in Den Haag: Willem Oltmans en de kwestie Nieuw Guinea* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2009).

[24] Ben Knapen et al, *Attached to the world: On the Anchoring and Strategy of Dutch Foreign Policy* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 11.

through a classical Westphalian lens.[25] The result is a blind spot with regards to the unofficial realm of diplomatic relations, which in fact has become increasingly important over the course of the 20th century – and which was already present long before that.[26] As this dissertation will demonstrate, the hybrid world – consisting of an official and an unofficial realm – described in the WRR report already existed during the Cold War. That this required a different attitude towards diplomacy was something that Ernst van der Beugel already anticipated half a century ago. 'Facilitating' and 'connecting' were two of his key trademarks, although his activities also went beyond this. Nevertheless, diplomatic historians have been slow to adapt their state-based analytical frames to the changing diplomatic arena.[27] This is not to say that this state-centered historiography has not been of fundamental importance. Its authors are the 'giants' on whose metaphorical shoulders this research will stand. They have laid a critical foundation on which we can now build to expand our understanding of the diplomatic process by adding more in depth explorations of the unofficial sphere in an attempt to provide a more holistic understanding of diplomacy in a globalized world. Because, as Geoffrey Allen Pigman has argued, "if the idea of diplomacy is to remain useful, the profusion of types of actor and venue implies that our understanding of what diplomacy is and who does it needs to be broadened accordingly."[28]

Towards a New Diplomatic History

Important steps in this direction have recently been taken by historians leading the way towards a New Diplomatic History (NDH) that seeks to add new layers of investigation by focusing on the informal or unofficial realm of diplomacy.[29] This includes "reassessing the role and identities of those involved in the diplomatic realm, and how the distinctions between official state diplomats and non-state actors have become blurred" through "a

[25] Geoffrey Allan Pigman, *Contemporary Diplomacy: Representation and Communication in a Globalized World* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 22. On relevant developments in global and transnational history see: Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History: Past, Present and Future* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).

[26] See: Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its evolution, theory and administration* (London/New York: Routledge, 2011), 229; Kenneth Weisbrode, *Old Diplomacy Revisited: A Study in the Modern History of Diplomatic Transformations* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 16-17; Important in this context is also the inherent social nature of the diplomatic profession, which admits no clear demarcation between private and official life (as Weisbrode for example also points out). For the role of the private realm in diplomacy in premodern history see: Maurits Ebben and Louis Sicking, "Nieuwe diplomatieke geschiedenis van de premoderne tijd: een inleiding", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 127:4 (2014), 541-552.

[27] In the context of post-war transatlantic relations, see for example the following key textbooks: David Ryan, *The United States and Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003); Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Benedikt Schopenborn and Barabara Zanchetta, *Transatlantic Relations Since 1945: an Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945.* While Lundestad clearly recognizes the importance of unofficial elite networks and meeting places like the Bilderberg Meetings, his book does not fully integrate this dimension of the diplomatic process in his own study. The overall approach is state-centered and mostly focused on the outcomes of the diplomatic process.

[28] Pigman, *Contemporary Diplomacy*, 23.

[29] Giles Scott-Smith, "Private Diplomacy, Making the Citizen Visible", *New Global Studies* 8:1 (2014), 2.

'broadening' and a 'deepening' of diplomatic studies: a widening of its field of interest, and a focusing of its attention on the individual, the particular and the ephemeral."[30]

While diplomatic history has acknowledged the informal activities of formal diplomats as well as the role of Track-Two diplomacy, which pays attention to informal efforts aimed at conflict resolution in tandem with formal negotiations, NDH scholars perceive the informal realm as worthy of investigation in its own right, allowing for the possibility of "a kind of Derridean rejection of the orthodox dualism that privileges the state over the non-state."[31] While NDH seeks to do away with the rigidity of the distinction between state and non-state actors, this does not mean that it deems the study of nation-states irrelevant or tries to supplant more traditional methods of international diplomatic scholarship. Instead, "it attempts to enrich this scholarship by an approach that is more transnational than international in that more attention is given to the role of individuals and non-governmental organizations in diplomatic practice who are often bypassed in the more orthodox study of diplomatic interaction and who cannot be bound by orthodox understandings of the 'national interest' or national identity" claiming that their stories need to be featured more prominently, as do historical analyses of their *modus operandi*.[32]

Thus, New Diplomatic History calls for more in depth explorations and analyses of the process and machinery of diplomacy as opposed to a preoccupation with its outcomes. NDH scholars recognize "that where their subjects sit in and out of officialdom is important, but generally less important, than what they do and how and why they do it."[33] Thus, as the very nature of diplomatic practice and the role (and the very notion) of the diplomat is being transformed in an ever-more dynamic global context, they "try to re-conceptualize the concept of 'diplomacy' and 'the diplomat' by questioning the traditional limitation of regarding them as no more than representatives of governments attending official meetings". As a consequence, it touches upon the very identity and meaning of diplomacy itself and how it changed through the 20th century and attempts to sketch the broader playing field of 'diplomacy' that developed during this period. As Scott-Smith puts it: "Once the frame of 'diplomacy' is altered, so the kinds of actors who become visible change with it."[34] So, who then is a diplomat within this new diplomatic framework? Kenneth Weisbrode, one of the trailblazers of NDH provides the following definition:

> [T]he history of diplomats focuses on people who perform diplomatic roles, which means anyone who imparts to himself or herself the role of intermediary for reasons beyond his or her own individual interests. They need not serve or

[30] Kenneth Weisbrode, "The Task Ahead", September 20, 2012, http://newdiplomatichistory.org/the-task-ahead/.
[31] Scott-Smith, "Private Diplomacy", 6; For an overview of recent scholarship on 'Track Two Diplomacy, see: Peter Jones, *Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).
[32] Scott-Smith, "Private Diplomacy", 2; Kenneth Weisbrode, "The New Diplomatic History: An Open Letter to the Membership of SHAFR", December 2008, taken offline, but still accessible through the Internet Archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20110820101715/http://www.shafr.org/passport/2008/december/Weisbrode.pdf.
[33] Kenneth Weisbrode, "The Task Ahead". See also: Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy, 208.
[34] Scott-Smith, "Making the Citizen Visible", 3.

> represent states, although many do. They must, however, serve a set of interests, a cause or collective unit above and beyond themselves, and which in some way involves the crossing of borders and the inter-relationship of political entities.[35]

It is this 'functional' or 'operational' definition of 'the diplomat' emphasizing not so much the position of a diplomatic actor in or out of officialdom, but rather the performance of a 'diplomatic role' that this study will build on. In doing so, it will, however, like Johnson and Berman did, still distinguish between 'formal' or 'official' diplomats on the one hand – referring to those individuals formally representing a nation state, and 'unofficial' or 'informal' diplomats on the other hand, who may also be referred to as 'private' or 'independent' diplomats, 'diplomatic entrepreneurs' or 'diplomats without portfolio.'[36] When Ernst van der Beugel exchanged the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the private sector, he became one of these unofficial diplomats, operating specifically in the context of Cold War transatlantic diplomacy.

Research Question

While traditional approaches to diplomatic history have prevented an in depth study of Ernst van der Beugel's transatlantic role through both official and unofficial diplomatic networks, this dissertation will contribute to this new brand of scholarship by answering the following research question: *How does New Diplomatic History offer a different appreciation of Ernst van der Beugel's role in transatlantic diplomacy compared to traditional state-centered diplomatic narratives?* In order to answer this research question, this dissertation will analyze Ernst van der Beugel's role in Cold War transatlantic affairs with a focus on the continuation of his diplomatic role as a private citizen, guided by the following subquestions: What did Van der Beugel's 'diplomatic role' entail – what was his *modus operandi* – and what enabled the continuation of this role in transatlantic diplomacy as a private citizen? What motivated Ernst van der Beugel's transatlantic activities and what was the set of interests, the cause or collective unit above and beyond himself that Ernst van der Beugel represented as a private diplomat?[37] But also: how did Van der Beugel perceive his own post-1959 role in transatlantic relations and how did his unofficial transatlantic activities relate to formal diplomacy?

To properly assess Ernst van der Beugel's 'diplomatic role' as a private citizen three case studies have been selected based on the three perceived challenges to the Atlantic Community that preoccupied Ernst van der Beugel the most: the Gaullist challenge during the 1960s, the problem of maintaining transatlantic strength in a time of détente, the breakdown of the Cold War consensus and the democratization of foreign policy during the late 1960's

[35] Weisbrode, "The Task Ahead".
[36] See: Giles Scott-Smith ed., "Who is a Diplomat? Diplomatic and Policy Entrepreneurs in the Global Age", *New Global Studies* 8:1 (2014); Linda Fritzinger, *Diplomat without Portfolio: Valentine Chirol, His Life and 'The Times'* (London/New York: Tauris, 2006); Carne Ross, *Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
[37] Weisbrode, "The Task Ahead".

and the early 1970s, and the long-term challenge of transmitting the Atlanticist mindset to the next generation that had not lived through the same formative experiences as the generation that had been 'present at the creation' of the Atlantic Community. Together these case studies give an overview of the nature, diversity and scope of Ernst van der Beugel's unofficial diplomatic endeavors. In line with NDH the focus will be on the process and machinery of diplomacy rather than on its outcomes in the more traditional forms of treaties or policy papers. The diplomatic goals pursued by Ernst van der Beugel and his peers tended to be more subtle and fundamental, often not so much focused on immediate decisions, but rather on such things as creating a favorable atmosphere for transatlantic cooperation by fostering close personal relationships, mutual understanding and an 'Atlantic mindset', thus strengthening the social and intellectual fabric of the Atlantic Community and laying the groundwork for the realization of more concrete and short term goals.

A re-appreciation of Van der Beugel's role in transatlantic affairs focusing on the continuation of his 'diplomatic role' as a private citizen through the lens of New Diplomatic History also requires a re-evaluation of the pre-1959 period, including the development of his views and network during his career with the Dutch government. After all, while it tends to be obvious what an official diplomat ought to represent, namely his or her nation state – while executing the policy set out by the nation's leadership – this is not necessarily as obvious in the case of private actors. As independent agents they can set out their own course, based on their own convictions. Hence, in order to understand an unofficial diplomat's position on the diplomatic playing field it becomes more important to explore the personal convictions and motivations of these private actors in the diplomatic arena. In addition, if Van der Beugel's role in the diplomatic process was not solely determined by his official ties to a nation-state, this also begs the question: what other factors enabled him to continue to play a role in transatlantic diplomacy once these formal ties to the nation state had been severed? A reassessment of Van der Beugel's pre-1959 career in the light of his later role as a private actor will also help to answer this question.

While Ernst van der Beugel clearly plays a central role in this narrative, this study intends to move beyond the individual and to approach Van der Beugel's multifaceted career as a window upon the world in which he operated, offering valuable insights about the Cold War transatlantic elite and the informal dimensions of transatlantic diplomacy. By following an individual like Ernst van der Beugel through his activities within this transatlantic web we can gain a better understanding of how it functioned; about the ways in which the Atlanticist elite tried to foster, manage, and sustain a Cold War Atlantic Community and how these transnational elite-networks enabled a private individual like Ernst van der Beugel to function as an unofficial diplomat in pursuit of transatlantic unity based on common values and interests as well as a common threat. [38]

[38] While there was no official "Atlantic Community", Ernst van der Beugel and many other members of the Atlantic elite in particular did perceive themselves as part of an Atlantic Community. Thus, like Aubourg and Scott-Smith, I will approach the 'Atlantic Community' concept based on the following assumptions: "that the Atlantic Community, as a

Why such a perspective is crucial to gain a better understanding of the role of the unofficial dimension in Cold War transatlantic diplomacy may become clear by looking at a study from a state-centered perspective that nevertheless acknowledges Ernst van der Beugel's unofficial role in the transatlantic diplomatic process, namely Kim van der Wijngaart's excellent book on Dutch-American relations during the 1970's "Bondgenootschap onder Spanning". Van der Wijngaart does a terrific job of incorporating Ernst van der Beugel's unofficial role within a state-centered framework. But, by looking at Van der Beugel from this perspective, his activities may come across as an incidental guest role on the diplomatic stage by one individual who once belonged to the diplomatic establishment. When we flip the perspective, however, as this dissertation attempts to do, it becomes clear that Ernst van der Beugel's activities were not just incidents, but part of a continuous and concerted effort by members of the unofficial transatlantic elite to partake in the multidimensional management of the transatlantic relationship; that these individuals were not playing an incidental guest role on the transatlantic stage, but were part of the diplomatic troupe, of the very social fabric of transatlantic diplomacy – and that they did not need to work in tandem with nation-states to contribute to and partake in the transatlantic diplomatic process. These unofficial actors do not necessarily execute tasks given to them by nation states, but often follow their own diplomatic agendas, based on their own initiative – at times in cooperation with a nation state, but also independently. These things only become clear when we change the perspective, when we approach the diplomatic process not from the perspective of the state, but through the eyes of the unofficial diplomat. This is what this dissertation intends to do.

While many studies on the Atlantic Community have focused on American conceptions of the transatlantic relationship often linked to the construction of an unofficial American 'empire', this dissertation will offer insight into the perspective and agency of a European Atlanticist in his attempts to foster and defend Atlantic unity under strong American leadership, thus further complicating more simplistic conceptions of Europeans passively undergoing American hegemony without playing an active part in the process themselves in pursuit of their own perceived national and transnational interests.[39] Thus, as Ernst van der

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regional notion, was a product of the representations and imagination of individuals and groups in the sense of Benedict Anderson's 'imagined communities', and of the communication and discursive strategies of particular actors; that it was rooted in and produced by specific political contexts and expressed a distinctive political representation of the world; and that it performed a legitimizing function for institutions, political movements, and asymmetric power relations operating within the transatlantic relationship." Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith, "The Transatlantic Imaginary: Constructing the Atlantic Community during the early Cold War", in *European Community, Atlantic Community?* eds. Aubourg, Bossuat and Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 14. Next to approaching the 'Atlantic Community' as 'imagined community', I will describe the constellation of formal and informal transatlantic organizations and networks described in this introduction as the embodiment of an "unofficial Atlantic Community".

[39] See: Geir Lundestand, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe 1945-1952", *Journal of Peace Research* 23:3 (1988), 262-277. Geir Lundestad was one of the first historians to complicate this image in the late 1980s. As Mary Nolan put it: "America was hegemonic, but Western Europe consented; it was, to borrow Geir Lundestad's phrase, 'an empire by invitation,' or perhaps more accurately, by invitations from national elites that were accepted by the population with varying degrees of enthusiasm." Mary Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890-2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 205. Nevertheless, discussions of

Beugel guides us through both the public and the private spheres of half a century of transatlantic relations we can gain access to the unofficial dimensions of the Atlantic Community from a European perspective; to a world that still remains for a great part veiled in obscurity, but which was nevertheless an integral part of post-war transatlantic diplomacy.

Sources

Once the importance of the private and unofficial realm within the diplomatic process is recognized, it also becomes crucial to expand archival research beyond the formal government archives. Consequently, while the traditional sources of diplomatic history derived from government archives including formal diplomatic correspondence, telephone conversation transcripts and internal notes of Foreign Ministries as well as other government agencies have certainly not been neglected, the majority of primary sources analyzed for this dissertation have been derived from private archives – including privately owned documents, which have not been officially released to the public at large from the personal collections of Ernst van der Beugel, Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller.

In addition to an analysis of relevant literature and archives, this study has also made use of oral history sources. Ernst van der Beugel himself participated in multiple oral history projects, including three interviews kept by the Truman Library concerning the Marshall Plan.[40] By far the most important oral history project that has been used for this research, however, is the result of an extensive series of interviews with Ernst van der Beugel set up by Albert Kersten in the early 1990s, which resulted in over a thousand pages of material on Van der Beugel's life and career.

The use of oral history always involves risks.[41] Consequently, the author has tried to build her argumentation as much as possible on written primary sources. In chapter one, however, the use of oral history is relatively heavy due to a lack of alternative sources concerning Van der Beugel's childhood and upbringing. What is most important about this period, however, is Ernst van der Beugel's memory of this period, which allows us to understand how he interpreted these experiences, and how his interpretation of these experiences impacted his views. That is exactly what the oral history captures.

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transatlantic relations still remain quite one-dimensional and the role, agency and initiative of Europeans in Cold War transatlantic relations remains understudied.

[40] In 1964 van der Beugel participated in an oral history project by Philip C. Brooks and in 1970 he participated in another oral history project for the Truman Library conducted by Theodore A. Wilson.

[41] It is important to be aware of the fact that oral history never presents a direct gateway to the past, making it more prone to factual errors. For starters, oral history depends on the memory of individuals, which tends to be flawed as people forget things or generate false memories. Interviewees may also have their own reasons and interests to present the story in a distorted way on purpose. In addition, oral history does not only depend on the interpretation of actual events, but it is also the result of a specific interaction between interviewer and interviewee at a specific moment in time, which may also color the answers that are generated. For a more comprehensive discussion on the challenges and complexities uniquely related to doing oral history research see: Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, eds., *The Oral History Reader* (New York and London: Routledge, 1998); Lynn Abrahams, *Oral History Theory* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

In addition, the author has conducted interviews with a selection of individuals who knew Ernst van der Beugel well, including former diplomat and Secretary of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community Max Kohnstamm, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, former Dutch Prime Minister Piet de Jong, former Dutch CHU politician and Minister of Development Assistance Berend Jan Udink, former Dutch Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ben Knapen, the Dutch journalist and political commentator Jérôme Heldring, former KLM President Sergio Orlandini, the former Dutch diplomat Rob van Schaik and the Dutch historian Professor Henk Wesseling as well as Ernst van der Beugel's daughter Aukelien van Hoytema – van der Beugel and his second wife, Nelletje van der Beugel-Schas who, prior to their marriage, served as a secretary for the Bilderberg Meetings. While there are some references to these interviews in the chapters that follow, they have mainly been used as a source of background information for the author.

Structure

This dissertation consists of seven chapters, which are more or less chronologically structured, even though the last three chapters, containing the three case studies, have a somewhat more thematic character.

The first chapter introduces the reader to Ernst van der Beugel and the milieu in which he grew up. It deals with Van der Beugel's childhood, his student years during the 1930's and his survival as a Jewish youngster during the Second World War. A key element in this chapter is Van der Beugel's experience of the run-up to the Second World War – including the Munich agreement, an event Van der Beugel himself referred to as 'the great mistake of the West'. These events made a huge impact on Van der Beugel and his later approach to foreign policy as was the case for many members of his generation.

The Second chapter, "Present at the Creation", focuses on the beginning of Van der Beugel's career for the Dutch government, his first trip to the United States and his role in the Marshall Plan. By doing so, this chapter covers a decisive formative period not only in the career of Ernst van der Beugel and the development of his Atlanticist sympathies, but in the development of a transatlantic mindset and social fabric in a more general sense by demonstrating how the Marshall Plan – in which the American and European governments closely cooperated with business and industry, labor unions, defense circles and a diverse collection of other 'experts' – served as a catalyst for public-private cooperation in the United States, in Europe and on a transatlantic level. Close cooperation during the Marshall Plan years produced many transatlantic relationships that would form the nucleus of a transatlantic social network tied together by shared experiences, hopes, fears and goals. In this unique context on the crossroads of the public and private spheres at the cutting edge of international strategic and economic policy, Ernst van der Beugel developed into a key player

and expert with access to a complex web of public and private networks woven across the Atlantic during the post-war reconstruction of Europe.

While the second chapter emphasizes the post-war Marshall Plan *context* in which Ernst van der Beugel was active and the public-private structures and social networks that developed during this period, the third chapter focuses more specifically on the development of Ernst van der Beugel's political *ideas*, in particular with regards to the process of European integration and the transatlantic relationship. It covers the entire period of Van der Beugel's career with the Dutch government both as a civil servant and as State Secretary by focusing on the debates that unfolded during this period, his experience in the negotiations that led to the Rome Treaty and his effort to include England in the process of European integration – an effort that he would not abandon even after leaving formal diplomacy. It was also in this context that Van der Beugel as an official government representative was directly confronted with the power exercised by unofficial actors behind the scenes of transatlantic diplomacy, leaving a lasting impression on him. By the time he left the Dutch government his Atlanticist ideas had mostly crystalized – as had his fear for Gaullist challenges to an Atlantic oriented Europe.

Chapter four describes Van der Beugel's transition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the private sector as he joined KLM Dutch Royal Airlines. It emphasizes the continuity of Van der Beugel's transatlantic activities as a private citizen and attempts to identify some of the key factors that motivated and enabled this transition. It also introduces the three case studies that make up the remaining chapters, each of which focuses on another perceived challenge to the Atlantic Community and the ways in which Ernst van der Beugel endeavored to counter these challenges through his private diplomatic endeavors. Thus, chapter 5 focuses on the Gaullist challenge during the 1960s, chapter 6 deals with the problem of maintaining transatlantic strength in a time of détente and the democratization of foreign policy during the 1970s, while chapter 7 deals with the more long-term challenge of the 'successor generation'. Together these chapters will shed light on the nature of Van der Beugel's unofficial transatlantic activities, on the ideas behind these activities and the relationship between these private endeavors and formal transatlantic diplomacy.