

# **Organizational Demography**

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# Citation

Kuipers, S. L., Yesilkagit, A. K., & Carroll, B. J. (2017). Organizational Demography. In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy and Governance. Springer. doi: $10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5\_3207-1$ 

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

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# Organizational Demography

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# 7 Synonyms

- Mortality; Organizational survival; Structure of
- 9 government; Termination

#### 10 Definitions

11	Termination	An organization is considered
12		terminated if it is fully abolished,
13		merged with another organization,
14		or split into different autonomous
15		new entities.
16	Transition	An organization experiences a
17		transition if it is either terminated,
18		absorbed by another organization,
19		or succeeded by another
20		organization with a new name, at a
21		new level of operation, or with
22		other new structural
23		characteristics.

# Introduction

Do bureaucracies become immortal beyond the 25 control of elected politicians, as popular wisdom 26 (or fear) often suggests? Since Herbert Kaufman 27 (1976) started to investigate this very question, a 28 new strand of research has emerged to study the 29 demography of public organizations, somewhat in 30 line with population ecology approaches in the 31 business literature. Scholars on both sides of the 32 Atlantic studied the transformation of government 33 by looking at the creation and termination of 34 public organizations. 35

The studies on survival of public organizations 36 agree on one aspect. Public organizations are far 37 from perennial. Scholars arrive at the same con-38 clusion regarding a diversity of public sector 39 populations: over time, most public organizations 40 perish. Their explanations vary, ranging from fac-41 tors such as limited public resources, elections and 42 turnovers, liabilities of newness, adolescence and 43 obsolescence, and the institutional "hardwiring" 44 of individual public organizations.

Studies on the demography of public organiza- 46 tions seldomly build on each other, as is custom- 47 ary for business administration studies in the 48 population ecology realm. In particular, disagree- 49 ment over definitions of organizational termina- 50 tion continues to divide the debate on 51 organizational survival in the public sector. As if 52 during an autopsy, different doctors arrive at dif- 53 ferent conclusions on the cause of death whereas a 54 third one claims the patient has not died at all. 55

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A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5 3207-1

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The following sections provide an overview of current insights, including the disagreements, on public organization survival. Two strands of research emerge: (1) institutionalist theories with a more "dichotomous" definition of termination and (2) those using public choice-oriented theories that consider a fine-grained range of political interventions on public organizations.

### **Politics and Legacies**

#### **Two Perspectives on Termination**

What constitutes survival and termination of public organizations, really? In the field of business administration there seems to be little discussion on what is survival and what is not. Simply put, an organization is either in business or it is not. This lack of ambiguity in business literature allows for a dichotomous definition and "biological" metaphor in studying the mortality of government organizations, referring to the "mortality," i.e., "life" and "death," of organizations. The "population ecology" approach even sees competing organizations in a given area as a "species" that can be studied to explain firm mortality and organizational founding, as well as population growth and change. Ever since Kaufman (1976) adopted the biological metaphor 40 years ago this ecology idea has been applied increasingly on populations of public sector organizations as well.

Yet studying termination of public organizations defies such a strict, dichotomous definition of what constitutes survival. Being "dead" or "alive" in bureaucracy is not a dichotomy. Policies carried out by public organizations do not often come to a definite end. In fact, bureaucratic organizations and the policies they implement seem to undergo constant structural reform. This reform drive blurs the distinction between termination or continuation in a dressed up (or down) version.

The reorganizing capacity of political executives is what makes public administration and business administration such different fields. Public organizations do not only perish because other organizations outrivaled them in securing essential resources. Political executives can deliberately axe public agencies or deny them funding

for ideological or electoral reasons. This differ- 101 ence matters for both termination definitions and 102 their implications. In the study of the survival of 103 public organizations, different perspectives on 104 politics and administration have led to a considerable fragmentation of insights.

#### The Political Control Approach

The political control perspective implies that 108 structural changes to public organizations are 109 first and foremost political acts. The observer from a political science background presumably – has an interest in studying political control over 112 the structure of government, from the perspective 113 of the principal. Each political act deserves similar 114 attention, ranging from subtle name changes of 115 organizations to fully fledged abolitions. From 116 this perspective, biological metaphors and dichot- 117 omous definitions make no sense.

The political control approach tends to define 119 most political interventions to public organiza- 120 tions as termination and (re-)creation. These 121 changes not only reflect what happens to the public sector, above all they constitute important 123 political acts representing political control over the public sector. It is important that no changes 125 go by unnoticed because ignoring name changes 126 and other events such as change of superior organization may mask important discontinuities. The 128 subtle variety includes different "termination types," such as termination by change of name, 130 form, level, or acquisition of activity.

In this perspective, even the least pervasive 132 event (name change) reflects a significant act of political control over a public organization. For 134 instance, the Dutch government decided to name 135 the Air Traffic Security the Air Traffic Control 136 Netherlands from 1998 onwards. "This name 137 change signals an outward and transboundary 138 approach to air traffic control. ATC has long 139 been a domestic issue, but increasingly became a 140 joint European and global responsibility – an evo- 141 lution reflected in its name change. Though the 142 agency continues as an organization this event can be interpreted as a termination of its previous 144 form, and a start of a 'new' phase in a new 145 form" (Kuipers et al. 2017). Seemingly small 146 changes still represent a discontinuation of "key 147

structural features." The political control perspec-148 tive identifies such a discontinuation or structural 149 change as an "event," implying some form of 150 termination. 151

## The Institutional Legacy Approach

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The contrasting approach implies that changes in the structure of government are the consequence of the fact that public organizations have their own interests (probably continuation). The public organization adapts to its environment and sees political interventions as a necessary evil that becomes part of the legacy to be carried into its future. The organizations themselves take center stage and their study - from a public administration or sociological institutional background focuses on what organizations do to strike root, survive, and prosper. Biographical accounts of the rise and demise of particular organizations go hand in hand with life and death metaphors.

The institutional legacy approach would therefore advocate a more dichotomous definition of termination instead of the subtle variety discerned by the political control approach. Organizations only perish when they cease to exist in any form. All other events in the life of a public organization are forms of adaptation, perhaps even on its own initiative, in its struggle to survive. For instance, the Tennessee Valley Authority rose from an organization created to protect the region against flooding and soil erosion while at the same time exploit hydroelectric power to a nuclear power house 50 years down the road. The New York Port Authority born out of an interstate conflict about railroad freight rates was a seriously underfunded attempt to increase economic cooperation on both sides of the Hudson River. It turned into an engineering and transportation powerhouse, responsible for harbor and airport development, bus and truck terminals, in addition to building bridges and tunnels. Institutionalists focus on how public organizations form their mission from the moment of their inception and how the legacy that the organization built over time becomes the seeds of its eventual demise. The political control approach above would instead dissect the life of the TVA or the Port Authority "different" in different durations for

organizations, whereas students of institutional 195 legacy emphasize the integrity of the institution, 196 adapting over time.

# Different Perspectives Relate to Different Research 198 Designs and Methods

Institutional legacy arguments require compara- 200 tive case studies instead of large N studies on 201 populations. Case studies allow for a definition 202 of termination that depends largely on the judg- 203 ment of and substantiation by the researcher. The 204 researcher builds an argument and in turn pro- 205 vides the reader with ample substance on each 206 case heuristically to validate the argumentation. 207 Yet even some large N studies take the organiza- 208 tion and its institutional legacy as vantage point. They discern "maintenance," "succession," or 210 organizational change categories go-between life and death. These studies use com- 212 parable definitions, but they do not explain events. 213 Their distinction between terminating events and 214 maintenance events does, in spite of their large 215 number of observations, not allow for regression 216 analysis and event history modeling to generate 217 statistically robust explanations.

The political control studies employ large 219 N statistical regressions. In order to find out 220 which political factors influence survival, authors 221 employ event-history analysis to explain "termi- 222 nation" events. The method does not tolerate cat- 223 egories between life and death, so most changes in 224 the organizational structure are considered a ter- 225 mination event. Yet even studies that do statisti- 226 cally investigate the factors that affect survival use 227 different definitions such that their findings have a 228 different base, and as such they do not add up in a 229 meta-analysis.

The more studies focus on organizational char- 231 acteristics as a theoretical explanation for sur- 232 vival, the more they tend to use dichotomous 233 termination definitions that imply stability. 234 Those studies that see political control as the 235 main survival explanation focus on events indi- 236 cating organizational discontinuity. The next sec- 237 tion presents an overview of the most important 238 factors and findings from current studies to con- 239 struct a model of organizational survival.

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# Organizational Survival in the Public **Sector: Towards a Model**

In spite of their disagreement on definitions of organizational termination, this section compares the results of existing studies on survival of public organizations. The result is a theoretical model of determinants of organizational survival and overview of common findings and disagreements in existing research. This section first introduces the hypotheses and ends with a summary of findings.

Three categories of factors seem to matter in the literature on survival of public organizations: (1) demographic explanations centering around the age of the organization, (2) design explanations implying that "birth characteristics" of organizations will influence future survival chances, and (3) contextual or functional explanations that reveal why some public organizations survive changes in their environment as opposed to

The perhaps most prominent and oldest factor of interest to students of organizational survival is the age of the organization. Common wisdom holds that organizations tend to survive infinitely after they reached maturity. Empirical studies demonstrated that an organization's survival chances do not monotonically increase with age, however. New organizations are particularly vulnerable because they have not been able to nest themselves and their routines sufficiently in their environment. In their early years, political volatility or growing pains may be fatal to the budding organization. Also, particular vulnerabilities can arise for the riper organization: obsolescence becomes a threat when an organization's functionality cannot keep up with changes in their environment (think of a steamboat inspection service, or a firm such as Kodak) or when their mission has been accomplished (fighting polio). If organizations' hazards increase both when they are very young and very mature, the survival chances of an organization would resemble an inverted U-curve.

In between, the hazards of the juvenile organization may increase. In its infant years, when its legislative support base has just been established and its proponents are still in office, the organization can develop relatively unharmed. More than a

decade down the road, the organization has suffi- 288 ciently secured its resources and support base to fend of competitors and opponents. However, in 290 the in-between period, the organization's hazards 291 rise because the protective shield of its creators 292 may have diminished, and it becomes vulnerable 293 to termination efforts by its opponents. Also, during the organization's adolescence, legislative 295 actors have had time to learn about the organiza- 296 tion and its accomplishments or performance 297 (Carpenter and Lewis 2004). This learning may result in the increased likelihood of fatal critique 299 and termination. Each age effect results in a dif- 300 ferent hypothesis related to survival.

H1. A public organization is less likely to survive 302 in the first five years after creation (liability of newness). After five years the termination 304 chances of public organizations decrease.

H2. Public organizations are more likely to be 306 terminated in their 'adolescent' years (>5 < 10)

H3. A public organization is likely to become 309 obsolete at some point and thus faces 310 increased hazards when it has reached a mature age (>30).

Second, organizational survival in the public 313 sector can be explained by looking at the agen- 314 cies' "birth characteristics" or "DNA." Some 315 organizations simply have a stronger design, 316 they are "hardwired" for survival. Hardwiring 317 theory especially dominates in political science, 318 where organizations are seen as embodiments of 319 political interests. Political science intrinsically 320 links the acts of organizational change to 321 legislative-executive decision-making. Instead of 322 the invisible hand that weeds out some organiza- 323 tions in a population, public sector organizations 324 sometimes face very visible opponents. Politically 325 informed "attacks" on bureaucracy are predict- 326 able, so creators try to "hardwire" their organiza- 327 tional offspring into survival. The effects of institutional design result in the following 329 hypotheses:

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- H4. Organizations established by formal law 331 have higher chances of survival than organi-332 zations established by decree. 333
- H5. Organizations set up at arm's length of gov-334 ernment have higher chances of survival 335 than organizations that operate in the hier-336 archy of a ministerial department or execu-337 tive office. 338

Another product of intentional hard wiring is 339 the organization's internal structure. Organizations' structural traits such as whether they are 341 governed by a board or not (single administrators) 342 could also have an impact on survival. 343

344 H6. Organizations governed by a board are more likely to survive than organizations governed 345 by a single administrator. 346

An increasing number of termination studies 347 have included the organizational "type" (advisory, 348 regulatory, executive) as a factor of influence. 349 Two types that stand out in the literature 350 (advisory and regulatory versus the rest) are both 351 included here. The distinct hypotheses reflect that the assumed influence on survival differs. 353

- H7. Advisory organizations have less likely to 354 survive than other types of public 355 organizations. 356
- H8. Regulatory organizations have 357 chances of survival than other types of public 358 organizations. 359

Some organizations are intended to be termi-360 nated from the start. Their "sunset clause" spec-361 ifies when, or under what conditions, the 362 organization will be abolished. 363

H9. When organizations are created with a sun-364 set clause, they are unlikely to survive that 365 clause and mature into 'old age' (>average). 366

Third, termination studies on public organiza-367 tions usually control for political and economic 368 indicators. The general expectation is that turn-369 over is likely to affect survival of organizations in 370 a negative way because incoming elects will

probably attack the creations of their predeces- 372 sors. In addition, a rightwing government will 373 probably aim to downsize the public sector. Eco- 374 nomic indicators also serve as an important con- 375 trol: when government revenues go down, it 376 seems less inclined to spend resources on uphold- 377 ing public organizations. The opposite effect may 378 also hold: recession makes incumbents unwilling 379 to dismantle government organizations unlikely 380 because in the short run this will increase 381 unemployment.

- H10. Political turnover negatively affects sur- 383 vival of public organizations.
- H11. A right wing (majority in) government neg- 385 atively affects survival public organizations.
- H12. Incumbency of a political executive of 388 another political color than the organiza- 389 tion's creator (so-called 'unfriendly govern- 390 ment') negatively affects survival of public 391 organizations.
- H13. When total government revenues decrease, 393 the likelihood of survival of public organi- 394 zations decreases as well.

The next section provides an overview and 396 discussion of the actual impact of these factors 397 on organizational survival according to a set of 398 recent studies.

## **Comparative Findings**

Section three has not yet revealed how these fac- 401 tors fared in empirical analyses on the public 402 sector. The table below presents the findings 403 from the studies reviewed for each of the hypoth- 404 eses above. Positive relation to survival is indi- 405 cated by a "+" and a negative effect on survival by 406 a "-." So a "+" for newness does not mean that 407 the liability of newness is confirmed, but that 408 newness has a positive effect on survival. 409 A tested but inconsequential factor is indicated 410 by an "x" and the "U" stands for nonlinear effects 411 (for instance, insulation from presidential interfer- 412 ence is a liability in the first 6 years of an 413

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organization's lifespan but protects it in the long run; see Boin et al. 2010) (Table 1).

According to this overview, on average 54% of the cases perish during the period studied, about 1.5% of the studied population annually. This result officially debunks the myth of immortality. The varying time periods of the studies require us to temporalize the results. The comparably high percentages of 52% (Boin et al. 2016) and 58% (Greasley and Hanretty 2014) become very different termination rates when divided by the number of years of the studied period.

Nine factors seem to have a significant unidirectional effect on survival. Old age increases survival chances (H3), and so does a regulatory function (H8), and a firm legislative base (H4). Adolescence (H2) is a hazard, but different explanations rival for this effect. Advisory organizations (H7) are more likely to be terminated and, not surprisingly, this also goes for organizations set up with a sunset clause (H9). Political turnover most likely negatively impacts the survival of public organizations, because new political executives tend to reorganize the administration (H10). Unfriendly incumbencies (i.e., political executives of a different political ideology H12) are likely to terminate the administrative agencies their political opponents previously created. Rightwing incumbencies (H11) often have negative effect on survival.

The incumbent government's ideology can also interact with other factors. Götz et al. (2015) point out that leftwing incumbents tend to be less likely to terminate administrative organizations, unless pressure for budgetary austerity increases (factors 11 and 13). Likewise, Greasley and Hanretty (2014) conclude that public organizations' termination hazards increase under rightwing governments in "normal" times (low to moderately high budget pressure). When public debt increases, organizations face higher termination risks under leftwing rule. Greasley and Hanretty additionally argue: "the effect of greaterthan-average debt on agency termination is negative for very young agencies, and for older agencies, but positive for agencies in their third to seventh years" (p. 17). So leftwing incumbencies under economic strain are most likely to target adolescent agencies for termination (which fits 462 with our hypothesis 2).

Surprisingly, the effects of economic downturns also point in other directions. Carpenter and Lewis (2004) challenge conventional wisdom 466 with their finding that budgetary pressure 467 decreases survival chances for public organizations (H13). In fact, their budgetary surpluses 469 increase the hazards, and deficits make terminations less likely. The short-term cost of organizational termination would make such decisions 472 unfavorable in times of austerity (Carpenter and 473 Lewis 2004, p. 222). By contrast, James et al. 474 (2015) found that budgetary pressure increases 475 termination hazards whereas Park (2013) and 476 Boin et al. (2016) tested the same factor but 477 found no significant effects.

Insulation from executive interference (arm's 479 length status – H5) can make organizations more 480 likely to survive than those created in proximity to 481 the President, but not all studies agree (Lewis 482 2004 vs. Boin et al. 2010). Disagreement also 483 exists regarding newness (H1): being green can 484 both help the organization to survive and prove to 485 be a liability (see Table 1).

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# **Conclusion and Future Research**

Explanations for the survival of public organiza- 488 tions abound. This chapter offered an assessment 489 of each potential factor by comparing different 490 research findings. The factors that were confirmed 491 in several studies could together form an integrated model of organizational survival in the 493 public sector. Such an integrated model would 494 predict that regulatory tasks, creation by law, and 495 being older than 12 years makes organizations 496 most likely to survive, but by no means hazard- 497 free. In any case, hazards for public organizations 498 increase when political winds change and new 499 incumbents enter office. Rightwing executives 500 may be more likely to terminate public organizations in normal times but beware of the leftwing 502 executives under budgetary constraints. Such an 503 integrated model could best be tested on large 504 N datasets by using event-history analysis. 505 Revealing underlying mechanisms, discovering 506

Organizational Demography, Table 1 Overview and comparison of findings.

		Boin	Boin						Götz		James
	MacCarthaigh	et al.	et al.	Park	O'Leary	Bertelli and	Carpenter and	Lewis	et al.	Greasly and	et al.
	2014	2010	2016	2013		Sinclair 2016	Lewis 2004	2004	2015	Hanretty 2014	2015
1. Newness	ı			×	1	ı	+			+	
2. Adolescence			_	×			I			1	
3. Old age		+		×	+	+				+	
4. Law based	×	×	+	×			+	+			
5. Arm's length		n					+	+		+	
6. Board		n	×					1			
7. Advisory organization					_	×				I	
8. Regulatory organization		×				×		+		+	+
9. Sunset clause		×	1			(		ı			
10. Political turnover		I	×	ı	×		I	I			×
11. Rightwing incumbency		×	×			>		×	ı	Ω	
12. Unfriendly incumbency		×	×		×		5,4			×	ı
13. Budgetary pressure/debt			×	×			+		ı	Ω	l
% terminated	37 <sup>a</sup>	75	52	39	39	49	57	59	58	58	72
% terminated annually	0.4	1.0	0.7	2.3	NA	NA	1.1	1.2	NA	2.5	3.1

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<sup>a</sup>Derived through personal correspondence with author; NA means exact figures are not available

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new variables, and explaining outliers would benefit from a case-oriented study, as advocated within the institutional legacy approach.

To enrich future discussions on organizational survival and transformation of the public sector, it seems imperative to abandon the binary definition of organizational termination. Instead, a focus on "transitions" would help to build on the diversity of existing research and allow for more analytical leverage. The word "termination" implies a definite "end" of a period in which an organization took on a particular form. Meanwhile the organization itself did not end. The preferred, more neutral term "transitions" refers to beginnings and ends of phases through which organizations evolve. Such transitions are both dependent variables in their own right and explanatory factors for survival – a great number of sudden transitions could be a prelude to full termination, or the total absence of transitions could indicate an ultimately fatal condition of rigidity. A sequence of transitions could reflect a pattern of staged adaptation to changing resource levels (Levine et al. 1981). The total sum of transitions of individual organizational units reflects a transformation government.

Transitions pertain to all the structural changes to the organization that can be measured consistently and reliably over time, such as changes to the organization's name, superior organization, hierarchical level, status as staff or line unit, structural autonomy by law, as well as mergers, splits, and abolishments. This approach allows building both on existing datasets for event-history analysis and on studies that use a dichotomous definition of survival. Coding all detailed changes as events allows for multivariate regression analyses and statistical explanations on survival in the public sector. The compatibility to institutional legacy studies is enabled by the possibility to discard more subtle transitions such as name changes in the dataset in order to study long institutional durations only interrupted by more definite passings such as mergers or splits.

Important steps have been made in studying the transformations of public organizations individually and the state in total, since Kaufman started his study on organizational mortality in

1976. However, today many studies on survival 555 in the public sector focus only on independent 556 agencies, in majoritarian political systems 557 (cf. Park 2013; Greasly and Hanretty 2014; 558 James et al. 2015; Bertelli and Sinclair 2016; 559 Boin et al. 2016). Rich harvest is waiting in a 560 demographic study of both autonomous agencies 561 and bureaus within national ministries in conti- 562 nental Europe. Such populations would allow for 563 systemic comparisons on the vulnerability of 564 autonomous versus embedded public organiza- 565 tions and the effects of institutional design 566 between majoritarian and consensual systems. 567 Additionally, policy preferences in coalition governments probably affect administrative reform 569 and organizational termination in a different way than in single party governments. Building on 571 findings of Götz et al. (2015) and Greasley and 572 Hanretty (2014), future studies could probe into 573 the effects of political ideology under different 574 circumstances or for different organizations. There is much to gain from a study on the relation 576 between policy agendas (the Comparative 577 Agendas project), policy preferences (the Mani- 578 festos data on electoral programs), and the structure of government in different policy areas.

Empirical research has now established that 581 public organizations do perish and that organiza- 582 tional design can serve as a shield against termination hazards. Future studies need to probe deeper into how specific political power plays and particular policy preferences impact the structure of government.

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Acknowledgments The authors gratefully acknowledge 588 funding for the project SOG-Pro by the Dutch National Science Foundation (project number 464-13-113), see also http://www.sog-pro.eu/sog-pro.html. Arjen Boin, Muiris MacCarthaigh, and the convenors and participants of the Permanent Study Group 'Governance of public sector organizations' at the EGPA annual conference in Toulouse. August 2015, provided us with valuable comments on 595 earlier versions.

# **Cross-References**

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