Metaphysics as praxis : Rereading Dōgen's Metaphysics through Deleuzian pragmatism and Pratītyasamutpāda

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Affirming Dōgen's Metaphysics Yet in a Manner Congruent to Pratītyasamutpāda

The goal of this study is to present a new interpretation of the Japanese Buddhist monk, Dōgen Kigen's (1200 - 1253) metaphysical[1] concepts[2] of 'Total-function' (全機 *Zenki*), temporality (有時 *Uji*, 法位 *Hōi*, 経歴 *Kyoryaku*) and Buddha-nature (仏性 *Busshō*) found in his writing, the *Shōbōgenzō*. I hope to achieve this by help of insights taken from the pragmatist approach to metaphysics put forth by the French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze (1925 - 1995). The concepts I would like to utilize from Deleuze in particular are, *heterogenesis*, and the binary concept of *virtuality*/*actuality*. The objective of this new reading is to reconsider the practical function of Dōgen's philosophy by interpreting it in a manner congruent with the central Buddhist doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* (the law of cause and effect, or co-dependent arising) and in adherence to Dōgen's own concern for the priority of practice. Such an interpretation of Dōgen must overcome the problems of what I consider the two opposing poles of preceding Dōgen interpretations. These poles are, first the Critical Buddhist reading of Dōgen put forth by Shirō Matsumoto and Noriaki Hakamaya, and secondly what I call the "comparative philosophical" interpretations of Dōgen exemplified by such Dōgen studies conducted by scholars associated with the field of "comparative philosophy" as Abe Masao, T.P. Kasulis, Steven Heine, and Robert Glass.

While I will make a detailed study of how these factions interpret Dōgen in subsequent

[1] I use the term metaphysics in the loose sense of designating thoughts and concepts pertaining to abstract principles, entities or realities that are understood as functioning in ways that are not immediately apparent.

[2] I use the term "concept" strictly in the way defined by Deleuze. For Deleuze concepts are not identity conditions or propositions that must correspond to some objective 'truth,' but metaphysical constructions that function as building blocks of internally coherent systems of thought. A philosophical concept "posits itself and its object at the same time as it is created." On Deleuze's definition see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Graham Burchell, (New York: Columbia Univ., 1994), 15-34.

chapters, I would like to give a brief introductory remark on their polarizing stances just to introduce the context that the current study addresses. In short, the Critical Buddhists claim that Dōgen's metaphysical concepts do not adhere to pratītyasamutpāda since he constructs a substantive ontology transcending causality. Consequently, Critical Buddhism labels Dōgen's metaphysics as insignificant for Buddhism founded on pratītyasamutpāda. I will later argue how this conclusion is founded on the erroneous prejudice that pratītyasamutpāda is incompatible with any form of ontology. On the other hand, the "comparative philosophical" interpreters read Dōgen through the influence of 'Western' philosophy ranging from Hegel, Heidegger to phenomenology. Whereas they positively affirm the role of metaphysics in Dōgen, I will later argue how their interpretation of Dōgen is incongruent to pratītyasamutpāda.

Consequently, there is a polar divide between the Critical Buddhist reading of Dōgen that adheres to pratītyasamutpāda yet denies Dōgen's metaphysics, and the comparative philosophers who affirm Dōgen's metaphysics without duly respecting pratītyasamutpāda. Critical Buddhism is not interested in attempting to "rescue" Dōgen's many distinct metaphysical ideas from diverging from pratītyasamutpāda. Therefore, Critical Buddhism precludes re-establishing a practical role for Dōgen's ontology in what they consider "authentic" Buddhist practice founded on pratītyasamutpāda. On the other hand, the comparative philosophers reduce Dōgen to their latent prejudice that the purpose of his ontology is to describe an ultimate reality as experienced by an "enlightened" mind. This prejudice keeps them from duly applying his thought within the practical criteria of pratītyasamutpāda. The necessity for this study is rooted in a concern for affirming Dōgen's metaphysical ideas and their significance for a Buddhism rightfully founded on pratītyasamutpāda.

I will argue that these purported limitations of both the Critical Buddhist and the comparative interpreters of Dōgen are due to a common prejudice concerning the utility and significance of 'metaphysics.' This prejudice lies in their understanding that metaphysics is a 'representational' venture that claims to describe the 'true-way-reality-is.' The Critical Buddhists imply this negatively when they deny pratītyasamutpāda's incompatibility with any form of ontology and hence with Dōgen's ontology. On the other hand, the comparative interpreters imply the prejudice affirmatively

when they read Dōgen's philosophy in a manner that positively describes the 'true-way-reality-is' as based on a 'pure' experience of such a reality.

I believe the above prejudice can be bypassed by utilizing the alternative epistemology of pragmatism. While an approach akin to 'pragmatism' is historically implicit to Buddhism,[3] it lacks a concrete theoretical articulation that makes it understandable in ontological and epistemological terms familiar to the West. Hence, I believe Deleuze's pragmatism, which gives metaphysics a practical significance, can help supplement Dōgen with a theoretical pragmatist framework. I will argue that if Deleuze's pragmatism can be shown to be compatible with pratītyasamutpāda, it can be utilized as an alternative approach to understanding Dōgen's metaphysics. Consequently, this approach will allow for a new interpretation of Dōgen's metaphysical concepts without having to fall into the trap of either of the problematic positions introduced above.

In summary, the objective of the current study is as follows. I want to reconsider Dōgen's thoughts on Total-function, temporality and Buddha-nature, of which Critical Buddhism and comparative interpretations give a shortsighted picture inasmuch as they impose upon Dōgen (what I will henceforth call) a 'representational epistemology.' This error prevents the former interpretations of Dōgen to acknowledge that Dōgen's metaphysical concepts of 'Total-function,' time and Buddha-nature can have a practical use for an ethics centred on pratityasamutpada. Deleuze's philosophy, insofar as it is pragmatist and non-representational, can help to elucidate this limitation and to create a reinterpretation of Dōgen's doctrine on Total-function, time and Buddha-nature to function in concurrence to pratītyasamutpāda.

1.2 What is Pratītyasamutpāda?

The question as to whether Dōgen's metaphysics adheres to pratītyasamutpāda or not is an essential one given the fact that pratītyasamutpāda is the basis for Buddhist ethics. Should an interpretation of Dōgen's philosophy be conflicting to this basic doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda, this

[3] I will elaborate on this in the upcoming section 1.5

would imply that Dōgen's philosophy becomes ethically problematic and irrelevant for Buddhism. Therefore, to read Dōgen's Buddhist philosophy as a ground for a viable ethics requires that it be interpreted in relation to pratītyasamutpāda. I will give a more detailed examination of pratītyasamutpāda in the following chapter. However, since pratītyasamutpāda constitutes the solid basis upon which this research will read Dōgen through Deleuze, a brief introduction to this concept will be appropriate.

Pratītyasamutpāda is a basic Buddhist teaching, believed to be the direct consequence, if not the essential nature of the Buddha's enlightenment experience. It is the underlying idea that constitutes the backbone of the fundamental Buddhist teachings on the *Four Noble Truths* (Skt. *catvāri āryasatyāni*) and what is called the *three signs of existence* (Skt. *tri-laksana*).[4] When the Four Noble Truths claim that:

1) This existence is suffering
2) There is a cause to this suffering.
3) There can be an end to this suffering.
4) There is a method by which suffering can be ended

These claims are founded on the idea of pratītyasamutpāda, which is the view that all things happen by way of cause and effect. This means that all phenomena, whether physical, as things both animate and non-animate (like situations), or mental (as emotions, thoughts, cognition, etc.), cannot be conceived beyond their causal co-dependence. The significance of this idea does not merely lie in its role as an ontological theory which describes reality, but rather in its role as a conceptual tool to be applied in meditation. Pratītyasamutpāda is supposed to condition meditational practice with the understanding that all forms of human suffering can be logically related to corresponding causes. This helps individuals analyze their internal conditions through meditation so that they can ultimately clarify the causes that are creating their mental suffering. This will aid one to reveal the cause of their suffering by means of self-analysis, to understand it, and finally, to end its recurrence. This also

[4] Hakamaya Noriaki, *Bukkyo Nyumon (仏教入門)*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 2004), 150-160.

means that pratītyasamutpāda directly affirms and urges analytical reasoning (Skt. *prajñā*) as an indispensable tool for Buddhist meditational practice.[5]

Expanded to an ontological framework that can make sense of reality as a whole, pratītyasamutpāda simply entails that all phenomena, whether physical or psychical, exist by way of a causally interconnected process. Therefore, nothing exists as an independent reality: all phenomena exist as a result of a convergence of the infinite flux of causal processes. In short, there are no entities; there are only causal processes. Pratītyasamutpāda, then, justifies the contents of the *trilaksana* or the "three marks of existence" which are the three overarching facts concerning phenomenal reality attributed to the historical Buddha and which are considered essential in Buddhism.[6]

First in the trilaksana comes the idea of reality as impermanence. Since everything is subject to the fluxal process of causal change, time is always understood as impermanent, which is our lived time that ultimately leads to death. Consequently there can be no state of time transcendent to impermanence. Second is the nature of *anātman* or no-abiding-self.[7] Since everything is a product of an ongoing flux of causal processes there is no constant entity called the 'Self'[8] that can exist independent of everything else and that will persist forever. Third is the nature of reality as suffering. Since our experience of the world is impermanent, it is impossible for one to cling onto anything as an assurance to existence whether it is physical possessions, sensations, people, ideas, or a sense of permanent Selfhood. Ignorance to this reality and a repetition of craving for a satisfaction that can never be achieved will always lead to repeated suffering. Impermanence is always a critical situation for sentient beings since by nature it always leads to suffering as long as one craves for constancy.

[5] Within the Theravada and Tibetan Buddhist traditions that are most strongly associated with Indian Buddhism, the most foundational form of meditation is *Vipassana* or 'analytical meditation.' Concentrated meditational states are not an end in itself, but utilized to enhance the understanding of the self/reality by way of logical analysis.

[6] Richard King, *Indian Philosophy*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ., 1999), 77-78.

[7] According to Richard King, Buddhism does not deny the experienced reality of a self-consciousness that thinks and acts with the self-awareness of being a self. It only negates the notion of such a felt self being mistaken as a constant entity. Therefore, I find it more accurate to follow King in expressing anātman as "no-abiding-self" rather than the widely used translation of "non-self." Richard King, *Indian Philosophy*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ., 1999), 82-83.

[8] I have capitalized the term 'Self' whenever it refers to a notion of permanent self-agency, isolated consciousness, or individual entity/essence. Otherwise I have used the lower case when I refer to the Buddhist notion of selfhood as a practical agency conceived as itself a functioning effect of mingling causal factors without permanence or individual existence.

Ultimately, understanding the trilaksana clarifies why pratītyasamutpāda affirms an altruistic ethics. The 'self' is understood only as a provisional and shifting reality that is actually a convergence of everything else that is causing it. Consequently, to be attached to the 'Self' and to strive to preserve what is really a non-persisting selfhood can be analyzed as nonsensical, leading to the possibility to dissolve self-centred activity and to cultivate the sense of self-sacrifice for the sake of selfless and attachment-less benevolence for others (i.e. Buddhist compassion, Pali: *mettā* or Skt.: *maitrī*). Much like how pratītyasamutpāda is utilized to analyze our own suffering, the idea of no-abiding-self as founded on pratītyasamutpāda conditions meditational practice focused on raising altruistic awareness. Once again this necessitates the ability of analytical reasoning. By accepting the premise that there is no constant selfhood, one can analyze one's nature of self-centredness through meditation and to help loosen or abolish it in light of selflessness and the interdependence of all beings. Analytical reasoning as implied by pratītyasamutpāda is also indispensable when putting altruism to action, for it is with reason that we must choose between what maybe a good or bad action in regards to the other.

Conclusively, this means that for Buddhism to maintain its conditions to practically pursue the goals of ending suffering and perfecting altruistic ethics, it must uphold pratītyasamutpāda at any cost. On the contrary, to uphold an ontology that neglects causality and to claim that it is "Buddhist," will collapse the whole conditions in which pratītyasamutpāda grounds meaningful Buddhist practice. Hence, the current study considers reading Dōgen in concurrence to pratītyasamutpāda is a dire necessity if Dōgen's philosophy is to be a meaningful tool for Buddhist practice.

Now that we have a fair understanding of pratītyasamutpāda, I will first offer a brief introduction to Dōgen. Subsequently, I will introduce how Critical Buddhism might be significant in its approach of the question concerning Dōgen's philosophy and its relation to pratītyasamutpāda.

1.3 Introducing Dōgen Kigen

Dōgen was a Japanese Buddhist monk who was born in Kyoto (1200 C.E.) and who is now revered as the founder of the Sōtō Zen Buddhist sect. According to biographical lore, Dōgen became

enthralled by the problem of impermanence and death at a very young age owing to the loss of his mother while he was still a child. Such questions of life eventually lead Dōgen to pursue Buddhism as a young monk at Mount Hiei located at the border of Kyoto and Shiga prefectures. There, Dōgen was trained in various Mahayana Buddhist doctrines that were the order of the day. Out of these doctrines, one stood out as decisive for Dōgen's pursuit of Buddhism. This was the doctrine of Original Enlightenment or Hongaku-shisō（本覚思想）which taught that all beings, regardless of their sentiency or non-sentiency, are primordially "enlightened" prior to and regardless of the pursuit of any form of Buddhist practice.[9] Record has it that Dōgen was deeply puzzled by this doctrine, as it seems to fundamentally deny the importance and significance of Buddhist practice. If the doctrine that we are all primordially "enlightened" is true, then why did the numerous patriarchs and Buddhist masters who came before Dōgen sought practice and enlightenment? Why should one practice Buddhism at all? Nobody at Mt. Hiei was able to give Dōgen a satisfactory answer to this question. Dissatisfied with Mt. Hiei, Dōgen left to pursue this question with various Buddhist masters of his day. During one such visit to question the Tendai Buddhist abbot, Kōin（公胤 1145 - 1216）at the Onjō-ji Temple（園城寺）, Dōgen was given the advice that he may only find an answer if he traveled to China to study Ch'an Buddhism. Eventually Dōgen settled to train under master Myōzen（明全 1184 - 1225）at the Kennin-ji Temple（建仁寺）in 1217.

In 1223, Dōgen was finally able to seize on his long sought opportunity to pursue Buddhist training in China. After a dangerous voyage over the ocean with his master Myōzen, Dōgen traveled to find a suitable Chinese master with whom he could pursue his Buddhist quest. Dissatisfied with many of the monks he met in China, Dōgen finally visited Mount Tiāntóng（天童山）where he met master Rújìng（如淨, Jpn. Nyōjo, 1163 - 1228）under whose guidance Dōgen is said to have attained

[9] Hongaku-shisō has its direct roots in Chinese Buddhism and most notably in the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana Sutra* (*大乘起信論 Daijō-kishin-ron*) written in the 5-6th century AD.
See: Noriaki Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 1989), 6-7, 373-375.
Religious record has it that the sutra is based on a older Sanskrit version from India, but no Sanskrit or Tibetan language version remains and most modern scholarship sees the sutra as a likely Chinese creation in the 5th to 6th century AD.

perfect enlightenment and received dharma transmission in 1227. Upon returning to Japan Dōgen worked prolifically to spread what he considered the "true dharma" and practice of Buddhism. In contrast to the many Japanese Buddhists of his day who could not affirm the necessity for meditational practice, Dōgen's understanding of Buddhism was founded on the centrality of meditation affirmed by his understanding of the dharma attained during his stay in China.

Dōgen wrote many writings to explain and promote his Buddhism until his death in 1253. He wrote on many topics ranging from guidance to meditation, formalities concerning rituals, attitudes towards daily monk-life and cooking. Out of these writings, the present study will deal mainly with his masterwork, *Shōbōgenzō* (*Treasury of the True Dharma Eye*) whose writing and editing continued throughout Dōgen's life. In the *Shōbōgenzō*, Dōgen utilizes many sections to deal with philosophical themes related to ontology and metaphysics such as on the nature of temporality/causal continuity, and Buddha-nature all in relation to Buddhist practice. These philosophically oriented writings found in the *Shōbōgenzō* have stirred continuing scholarly interest pertaining to their originality and complexity leading to many interpretations of his philosophy. However, the tendency of many such interpretations to reiterate Hongaku-shisō, posits an important problem when considering Dōgen's philosophy in relation to pratītyasamutpāda. I will describe why this is problematic through the following introduction to who the Critical Buddhists are and why they may be significant for the current study.

1.4 Critical Buddhism and the Problem of Dōgen and Buddhist Ethics

As I will clarify in the next chapter, Critical Buddhism claims that Hongaku ontology contradicts pratītyasamutpāda. If Hongaku-shisō is incongruent with pratītyasamutpāda, the question of how and to what extent Dōgen solved the problem of Hongaku-shisō and so, freed himself from its bonds, becomes a crucial point when reading Dōgen in light of pratītyasamutpāda. Simply reiterating Hongaku-shisō related ideas when reinterpreting Dōgen is most likely to neglect, if not deny, pratītyasamutpāda. Since the Critical Buddhists were the first scholars who questioned the integrity of

Dōgen's philosophy in line with pratītyasamutpāda, the following section gives a brief introduction to who the Critical Buddhists are and what they claim. This will clarify the significance of involving Critical Buddhism in the present study. And subsequently, elaborate on the ethical importance of why Dōgen needs to be read in relation to pratītyasamutpāda.

The philological, historical and philosophical studies of Dōgen's writings have come far since Watsuji's significant study, *Shamon Dōgen*[10] had opened interest for Dōgen's writings beyond their status as a purely religious object of veneration within the sectarian walls of the Sōtō Zen organization. However, despite the history of more than 80 years of Dōgen scholarship, the important question of Dōgen's philosophy and its relation to pratītyasamutpāda had not been raised until Critical Buddhism had instigated the debate.[11] The reference to Critical Buddhism in this study is crucial given that the Critical Buddhists were the first Japanese intellectuals who explicitly put forth the important argument concerning the connection between pratītyasamutpāda and ethical integrity against Japanese Buddhist doctrines including that of Dōgen. While the next chapter will show how the current study disagrees with Critical Buddhism's conclusion concerning Dōgen's metaphysics, it

[10] Watsuji's *Shamon Dōgen* was originally published in 1926 and is considered the first secular study of Dōgen's philosophy. The text is available as an English translation with the following title, Watsuji Tetsurō, *Purifying Zen: Watsuji Tetsurō's Shamon Dōgen*, Trans. Steve Bein, (Honolulu: Hawaii Univ., 2011).

[11] For the Critical Buddhists, the problem of Dōgen and his attitude towards pratītyasamutpāda is also related to a particular philological debate concerning the differences in content between early Dōgen's 75 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* (written between 1231-1246) and the later-life 12 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* (most of it written during the 1250s until his death in 1253). The Critical Buddhists notice a major difference in content between the earlier and later fascicles of the *Shōbōgenzō*. They consider the earlier 75 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* in which all of Dōgen's more ontologically oriented writings are included as incongruent with pratītyasamutpāda since they interpret Dōgen as taking a stance too close to Hongaku doctrine. However, Critical Buddhism sees that Dōgen in the 12 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* seems to have replaced his earlier Hongaku influenced ideas with that of placing absolute centrality in pratītyasamutpāda. The orthodox Sōtō Zen perspective as well as the views of scholars who share the orthodox view on the contents of the whole *Shōbōgenzō* (including both the 75 and the later 12 fascicles) had been to see it as a homogenous piece of work in which Dōgen takes a consistent stance throughout the work. The orthodox view is based on the presumption that since Dōgen had attained perfect enlightenment while in China, an enlightened monk could not have changed his mind halfway through his life. Critical Buddhism seriously challenges this assumption. The current study will not address the above debate since it is not concerned with the question of if there is continuity between the 75 and 12 fascicle Shōbōgenzō or not. I am questioning the way Critical Buddhism interprets Dōgen's ontology on the grounds of practical significance and not on the terms of philology. The question of continuity is of little significance for this study since when we read Dōgen from a pragmatist perspective what is important is how his ideas can be made to function in support of Buddhist practice, and not the 'true' meaning, intent, or historicity of the work believed to exist independently of our concerns. For more on the continuity debate surrounding the Shōbōgenzō see:
Steven Heine, "Critical Buddhism and Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō," *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Jamie Hubbard & Paul L. Swanson, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1997).
Steven Heine, "The Dōgen Canon: Dōgen's Pre-Shōbōgenzō Writings and the Question of Change in His Later Works," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 24:1-2 (1997).
Hakamaya Noriaki, *Dōgen to Bukkyo (道元と仏教)*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 1992), 107-108.
Matsumoto Shirō, *Dōgen Shisō-ron (道元思想論)*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 2000), 244.

largely concurs with its attitude towards pratītyasamutpāda and its relation to ethics. Therefore, a brief introduction to Critical Buddhism and their argument concerning how Buddhist doctrines that do not adhere to pratītyasamutpāda undermine ethics will be indispensable.

"Critical Buddhism" is a Western label given to a Japanese intellectual movement[12] that began in the late 1980s involving two Japanese Buddhologists, Noriaki Hakamaya and Shirō Matsumoto, who both profess Buddhism as their religious faith. They call for a critical revision of the ethical responsibility held by the Japanese Buddhist (influenced) intelligentsia through a critique of their writings and the doctrines utilized in these writings by confronting them with the central Buddhist teaching of pratītyasamutpāda.[13] The Critical Buddhists demonstrate through doctrinal critique that a Buddhism which has denied or neglected pratītyasamutpāda can no longer doctrinally or practically account for a truly altruistic ethics. Their initiative is to urge a revision of the ethical and social role of Japanese Zen Buddhists based on a renewed emphasis on Buddhism as ultimately founded on pratītyasamutpāda. In their view, this makes necessary the observance of an altruistic ethics, based on analytical and critical thinking.

As I have already mentioned, pratītyasamutpāda entails both analytical reasoning and altruism. Critical Buddhism claims that *prajñā* or what it interprets as the wisdom pertaining to the analytical discrimination of phenomena, what in Sanskrit is called *prajñā dharma-pravicaya,*[14] is essential for ethics. To follow pratītyasamutpāda means that one must utilize one's analytical abilities to understand reality, distinguish between cause and effects, good and bad. The understanding that

[12] While Western scholars often call Critical Buddhism a 'movement,' the label may be overblown given the fact that its most well known adherents count to a mere two intellectuals, and they do not necessarily consider themselves a tightly defined collective. It seems more that both scholars refer to each other owing to the fact that they both came to a similar perspective concerning Buddhism on individual grounds and came to incorporate each other's ideas on tactical grounds for criticizing the Zen Buddhist mainstream.

[13] While instigating much misunderstanding and reactive claims from both scholars and monks within and without the Japanese Buddhist community, the Critical Buddhists have not shied away from making the strong claim that such forms of Buddhism as in the case of Zen which no longer observe pratītyasamutpāda are "non-Buddhist." However, Hakamaya does attempt to make it clear that they do not deny the historical or cultural reality of Japanese Buddhism as being 'Buddhism.' Rather, Hakamaya calling Zen as being "non-Buddhist" is an ethical claim contingent to his particular perspective of proper Buddhism as being one that is founded on pratītyasamutpāda.
The collection of articles on the book, *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Jamie Hubbard & Paul L. Swanson, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1997) are exemplary of the kind of academic response Critical Buddhism gained outside of Japan.

[14] Hakamaya Noriaki, *Hihan Bukkyo (批判仏教)*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 1990), 31. Also Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyo*, 67. This view that prajñā (or wisdom) pertains to analytical discrimination of phenomena can be traced to the early Buddhist school of Sarvāstivāda.

reality is impermanent also means that every situation is constantly changing whereby there cannot be a persistent, universally applicable solution to all personal and ethical problems. This means that, while the foundation of Buddhist ethics lies in compassion, all other decisions concerning what may be good or bad, and what may be the most suitable ethical action or not in each situation are never predetermined or grounded on rules or regulations. Rather, every decision necessitates the analytical evaluation of the self and the reality of every situation. For example, prior to any ethical action, it is necessary for one to question if that particular action is founded on a selfish intent or not, or if a particular action is effective or necessary for the better of the other, etc. in accordance to an adequate understanding of the situations surrounding the action. Consequently, this means ethical decision and action cannot be unconditionally overridden by such values as common sense, social status, power or rules pertaining to the status quo, but must always be individually analyzed, questioned and decided upon in accordance to evaluative decisions even if this means that at times one must go against the status quo.

The Critical Buddhist perspective is that much of Japanese Buddhism denies pratītyasamutpāda to the extent that it is influenced by the doctrine of Original Enlightenment（本覚思想 Hongaku-shisō）.[15] As I have briefly mentioned, questioning Hongaku-shisō constituted a major impetus in Dōgen's Buddhist quest. The doctrine claims that all beings are originally and primordially endowed with a pure Buddha-nature which is itself "enlightened" and therefore all beings are "originally enlightened" even before any practice or learning of the Dharma (meaning the Buddha's teachings) takes place. According to Critical Buddhism, the doctrine of Original Enlightenment is incompatible with pratītyasamutpāda since it affirms Buddha-nature as a metaphysical ground or essence to reality that is transcendent to causality. Therefore, to what extent Dōgen's philosophy resembles Hongaku-shisō constitutes an essential question concerning if Dōgen is

[15] Critical Buddhists understand that the doctrine of Original Enlightenment is a consequence of the historical development of Japanese Buddhism from its origins in Chinese Buddhism. Japanese Buddhism like Zen inherited much of the Chinese doctrines that ontologized or substantialized Buddhist concepts. Such concepts as enlightenment and Buddha-nature (the idea of an inherent faculty within human beings which stands for their potential for enlightenment) were developed into a sense of metaphysical 'Truth' (i.e. *Tathātā*, Thusness), Self-essence (*atma*), or realm (i.e. *Buddha-dhātu*, or Buddha-realm, and *Dharma-dhātu*, or Dharma realm) that exists as primordial essence and/or origin to existence. This is a problem since such ideas create a sense of permanently unchanging ground to existence which is understood as overruling reality prior to or beyond causality.

congruent with pratītyasamutpāda. As I will analyze in the next chapter, Critical Buddhism views that to the extent that Dōgen uncritically reiterates the ontology of Hongaku-shisō in his philosophy, it is in denial of pratītyasamutpāda.

Critical Buddhism claims that Hongaku-shisō directly leads to a degeneration of ethics. The problem lies on two levels. First, there is an ontological problem. Hongaku-shisō establishes Buddha-nature as a metaphysical 'ground,' understanding it as a primordially 'undefiled' (i.e. "enlightened"), unfathomable realm behind ordinary reality, which while indistinguishable from the ordinary, functions as its principle and ground. This metaphysical reality is identified with a sense of 'perfection' prior to and beyond human decisions or thinking as their "originally enlightened" state. If the world is primordially 'perfect' as-it-is, then ethics becomes unnecessary. The reason is, if our lived reality is immediately equal to perfection, nothing needs to be changed and therefore evil actions, meaning those which cause suffering to others, are affirmed as themselves playing a role in the "enlightened" whole and therefore are in no need of countermeasures. Consequently, altruistic ethics founded on prajñā becomes unnecessary in exchange for a simple affirmation of all existence as good-as-it-is for it is "enlightened."[16]

Critical Buddhism observes that Hongaku-shisō had both a latent and conscious influence on such a degeneration of ethical responsibility as evidenced by the Japanese Zen Buddhists in their active justification of the Japanese war efforts during WWII, as well as in the cases of social injustice found in the class discrimination that were justified by the Sōtō Zen sect.[17] When Hongaku-shisō's fundamental ethical passivity is utilized in support of the state apparatus, it can easily become a

[16] An exemplary case is harshly pointed out by Matsumoto in his critique of Japanese intellectual Shinichi Tsuda's dhātu-vādic views on Buddhism which lead Tsuda to make such ethically questionable claims that even the most suffering outcasts in India are as they are in their suffering fulfilling their absolute role in the beauty of the all-inclusive harmony of Tathātā. Matsumoto, *Engi to Ku*, 137-140. For Critical Buddhism's view against the lack of ethics in Hongaku-based philosophies also see *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 254-255. Also see Steven Heine, "Critical Buddhism and Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō: The Debate Over the 75-Fascicle and 12-Fascicle Texts", *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Jamie Hubbard & Paul L. Swanson, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1997), 256-257.

[17] See Bodiford's article for details on the discriminatory problems Sōtō Zen encapsulated until active reform was instigated. William Bodiford, "Zen and the Art of Religious Prejudice: Efforts to Reform a Tradition of Social Discrimination," *Japanese Journal for Religious Studies* 23:1-2, (1996).
Concerning the affirmative role Zen Buddhism had played in the Japanese war efforts see:
Brian Daizen Victoria, *Zen at War*. 2nd Edition, (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).
Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦, *Bukkyo no Sens*ō *Sekinin (仏教の戦争責任)* 1970, reprinted in *Ichikawa Hakugen Chosakushū* Vol.3 *(市川白弦著作集 3)*, (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1993).

justification of power, violence and the status quo as itself unconditionally "enlightened" and thus 'good,' regardless if the power structure is causing harm to people.[18] When such attitudes disseminate amongst the Buddhist public via the influence of monks, they can justify a form of ignorance or passivity to the evils of the state. Therefore, Critical Buddhists observe that a "Buddhism" not founded in pratītyasamutpāda, rather than upholding individual altruistic ethical action, actually ends up unconditionally supporting the power structure and the status quo regardless of if the status quo is causing harm and suffering. If we want to insist on Dōgen's ongoing ethical and practical relevance today, then it will be essential to show that Dōgen needs to be read in line with pratītyasamutpāda. Now that we have highlighted the importance of Critical Buddhism in understanding the ethical significance of pratītyasamutpāda when reading Dōgen, I would like to return to introducing the common problem found in both the Critical Buddhist and the comparative interpretations of Dōgen; that is, the problem of how they tie metaphysics to 'representation.'

1.5 The Problem of Reading Dōgen's Metaphysics as Corresponding to Reality

The present study largely agrees with Critical Buddhism's understanding of pratītyasamutpāda as essential for Buddhist ethics. Therefore, it believes that reconnecting pratītyasamutpāda to various "Buddhist" philosophies is a matter of ethical necessity. However, I do not agree with its conclusion that Dōgen's metaphysical concepts simply has to be put aside as "non-Buddhist." Neither do I agree with the way comparative philosophers confuse their latent 'Western' (or 'Westernized') bias concerning metaphysics with Dōgen's ideas, as we shall see that this enhances their tendency to reiterate Hongaku-shisō in their reading of Dōgen. I will argue later in this study that both the Critical Buddhist and comparative philosophical interpretations of Dōgen's metaphysics rely on a prejudice concerning the meaning and utility of 'metaphysics' as exclusively tied to a correspondence theory of truth. By this, I mean that both Critical Buddhism and the comparative

[18] A famous quote from Zen Master Harada Daiun Sogaku from 1939 is exemplary of such an attitude where state-sanctioned violence is considered "enlightened": "If ordered to march: tramp, tramp or shoot: bang, bang. This is the manifestation of the highest wisdom of enlightenment. The unity of Zen and war … extends to the farthest reaches of the holy war now under way." Quoted in Victoria, p.xiv.

philosophical interpreters consider metaphysics to be necessarily 'representational' or mirroring a 'truth' of reality in order to explicate or describe its nature. This becomes evident in their assumption that Dōgen's philosophy describes a 'true-way-reality-is,' founded on a 'pure' experience of such a reality.

What I am addressing as the 'correspondence theory of truth' or the 'theory of representation' is as follows. It is the epistemological theory that holds that human knowledge is made possible by the assumption that there is a corresponding relationship between the act of knowing (subjective act believed to go on "inside") and the reality it comes to know (or objective truth that is believed to exist "outside" the Mind).[19] This entails that knowing is the activity of representing reality by knowledge.[20] Therefore, truth and falsity are contested on the point of, first, the presumed condition that there is an objective something, fact or meaning outside the mind that can be represented, and, second by how "accurately" this object can be described through the corresponding knowledge.

On an ontological level, a correspondent theory of truth usually presumes the view of *ontological realism* that there is an objective reality existent outside the mind that is capable of grounding the truth claim of the corresponding knowledge, thought, or language that is believed to represent reality. Ultimately, the present study considers the theory of correspondence as founded on the necessity of a dualistic view of reality and knowledge that must assume the independence between the subject and the object, the knower and the known, concepts and things, signifier and signified. This means that whether conceived as ontological or as semantic, correspondence theory considers

[19] The epistemology is rooted in claims made by both Plato and Aristotle. For example according to Plato: "Everything has a right name of it's own, which comes by nature, and that a name is not whatever people call a thing by agreement, just a piece of their own voice applied to the thing, but that there is a kind of inherent correctness in names, which is the same for all men." *Cratylus* 385b2 Plato, *Plato in Twelve Volumes,* Vol. 12, trans. Harold N. Fowler, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921), accessed January 11, 2015, http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg005.perseus-eng1:383a.
Aristotle also implies a relationship between 'truth' and underlying 'things' when he mentions: "For there being a man reciprocates as to implication of existence with the true statement about it: if there is a man, the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, and reciprocally – since if the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, there is a man. And whereas the true statement is in no way the cause of the actual thing's existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement's being true; it is because the actual thing exists or does not that the statement is called true or false." *Categories* 14b11 Aristotle, *Categories and De Interpretatione*, trans. J.L. Ackrill, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 47.

[20] For example, according to Rorty, a philosophy that takes representational epistemology as its foundation for the understanding of knowledge thinks, "to know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations." Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 30th Anniversary Edition*, (Princeton: Princeton University, 2009), 3.

thought, knowledge, concepts, or language, as 'representing' an objective nature, whether this be a physical phenomenon (i.e. things, people, and conditions), or semantic (in the case of meanings, facts and intents), or metaphysical as in the case of abstract realities (i.e. Platonic forms, eternal principles, God, etc.).

As we will see in chapter two through a detailed analysis of Matsumoto's interpretation of Dōgen, Matsumoto seems to imply that Dōgen's philosophy is attempting to 'represent' a 'true-way-reality-is,' or is founded on the assumption that there is an ontological 'truth' to reality. In addition, we shall also show how Critical Buddhism takes the position of strict denial towards any form of metaphysics and ontology as incompatible with pratītyasamutpāda.[21] Such a denial of metaphysics as in opposition to pratītyasamutpāda is understandable given that metaphysics is taken as 'corresponding' to reality. If so, metaphysics becomes an explanatory act grounded by a pre-existing reality, principle or meaning that waits to be "uncovered," represented and articulated through metaphysical inquiry. Consequently, metaphysics understood in such a way, implies a reality that exists independently from the causally inseparable processes of living or knowing. If one is to accept this premise, it is true that to the extent the correspondent theory of truth must always assume and rely on a grounding truth that makes knowledge possible, any claim based on correspondence theory is by design incongruent to pratītyasamutpāda.

However, the above rejection of metaphysics only makes sense on the presumption that metaphysics is by default founded on the idea that there is a 'true-way-reality-is,' motivated by a search for such grounds of existence. In addition, the above denial of metaphysics assumes that pratītyasamutpāda itself is somehow exempt from being ontological. A fixation on the idea that metaphysics is always representational precludes the following possibilities. First, the possibility that metaphysics can work practically in congruence with pratītyasamutpāda. Second, the possibility that pratītyasamutpāda itself be understood as ontological, without having to deny its own practical significance. Such fixation do not even consider the possibility that we may be able to choose to live

[21] This is indicative of Critical Buddhism's debt to the Madhyamaka stance towards ontological theories. Madhyamaka is the school of Buddhist thought founded by Nāgārjuna that developed a method of powerful logical criticism founded on reductio ad absurdum arguments targeted towards ontologies that claim self-essence and causal independence.

in accordance to absolutely different worldviews outside of 'representation,' and if so, Dōgen's metaphysics may be given a much different practical significance.

Just as well as in Critical Buddhism, we find the latent tendency towards the correspondence theory of truth in the comparative philosophical interpreters of Dōgen. I will elaborate in chapter three that four exemplary cases of comparative philosophical interpretations of Dōgen by Abe, Heine, Kasulis, and Glass testify to the same hermeneutical myopia as Critical Buddhism concerning the significance of metaphysics, yet in a different context. These scholars interpret Dōgen's metaphysical concepts as constituting a description of the 'true-way-reality-is' directly experienced from an "enlightened" perspective. Such an interpretation reveals their assumption that metaphysics is by nature 'representational.' I will later elaborate on how these scholars read Dōgen more or less in line with Hongaku-shisō and how this mutually enhances the tendency towards understanding metaphysics as corresponding to 'truth.' The basic 'representational' assumption that metaphysical concepts correspond to a 'true-way-reality-is' reinforces the Hongaku premise that there is a 'primordially enlightened' reality grounding all existence. Such interpretations of Dōgen's metaphysical concepts are incongruent to pratītyasamutpāda to the extent that they assume there is a grounding metaphysical reality beyond the causal process of impermanence.

Consequently, I believe the Critical Buddhist and comparative philosophical views concerning Dōgen's metaphysics are limited by their implicit adherence to an epistemology of correspondent truth in understanding the utility of metaphysical concepts. Reinterpreting Dōgen in an alternative manner to Critical Buddhism, and the comparative interpretations while respecting pratītyasamutpāda necessitates a thorough reconsideration of the foundational epistemology, and methods with which such a task should be undertaken. Therefore, in contrast to the above approaches, I believe an analysis of Dōgen via pratītyasamutpāda will benefit from a primarily practice-based approach entailing an alternative epistemology of pragmatism.[22] By this I mean that the merits of his philosophy need to be evaluated according to an understanding of how it (can) function and what kind

[22] Concerning this point, I do agree with scholars as Kasulis and Glass in the view that Dōgen needs to be read from the perspective of practice, though we shall see in chapter three that I do not agree with the particular way these scholars utilize this perspective in their interpretations of Dōgen.

of effects it (can) cause when considered holistically in relation to its utility for actual spiritual practice.

In agreement with scholars like Schroeder, Loy and LaFleur, I believe such a 'pragmatist' attitude is at least partly inherent to Buddhism.[23] For example Schroeder claims that 'pragmatism' is apparent in the doctrine of *upāya* or *skillful means* (also translated as "expedient means," "skill-in-means," Jpn. 方便 *houben*). Upāya is a practice-based doctrine central in Mahayana Buddhism rooted in the understanding that the historical Buddha utilized many different teachings in accordance to the ability and nature of the listener.[24] The idea behind this is that since all humans are different, there is not one way of guidance that is effective for all. Therefore, one must pragmatically choose the most effective methods to guide the particular listener to the path to overcome ignorance and suffering.[25] No one teaching is absolute, and every teaching is always significant only to the extent they fulfill practical purposes. Hence, all teachings are tools and should never be a source for attachment. This aspect of upāya is also evident in the way the Buddha's teachings are often likened to a raft with which one overcomes the river of suffering only to discard it once one reaches the other

[23] Several scholars have explicitly stated pragmatism as an inherent attitude in Buddhism: John Schroeder explores this aspect of Buddhism from the stance of the doctrine of upāya and how such an attitude transforms the way one needs to read Buddhist doctrine as purely practice-based. William LaFleur explores the pragmatic nature of how Japanese Buddhism has long embraced the question of abortion. According to his study, Japanese Buddhists have long catered to the suffering, guilt and grief of the mothers who had to abort their children by pragmatically dispensing strict adherence to Buddhist precepts, as well as suspending ideological debates of "good" or "bad" in affirming Jizō rituals as a practical therapeutic aid for family members. Rather than polarizing the population in terms of a debate of 'good' or 'bad' concerning abortion, Japanese Buddhists chose to pragmatically embrace what is a real social and individual problem that needed practical aid. David Loy explores the perspective that Buddhism is purely pragmatic in its worldview and therefore its philosophies are not concerned with 'truth,' but are 'stories' intentionally created for the sake of achieving its spiritual goals.
John Schroeder, "Nagarjuna and the Doctrine of Skillful Means", *Philosophy East and West* 50.4 (2000).
William R. LaFleur, *Liquid Life: Abortion and Buddhism in Japan*, (New Jersey: Princeton, 1992).
David Loy, *The World is Made of Stories*, (Boston: Wisdom, 2010).

[24] For example, in some cases the Buddha taught through various philosophical expositions (sometimes with seemingly conflicting contents), at times through anecdotes and stories, at times through silence, through miracles etc.

[25] See for example:
The Lotus Sutra, trans. Gene Reeves, (Boston: Wisdom, 2008), 25. "As a king or emperor of medicine, they analyze diseases, know well the properties of medicines, give them to all the living according to the diseases, and get them to take them."
Vimalakīrti Sūtra, trans. Dianna Y. Paul, Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai, https://www.bdkamerica.org/digital/dBET_Srimala_Vimalakirti_2004.pdf (April 15, 2011) [Original Source, *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*, trans. Dianna Y. Paul, (Berkeley: Numata Centre, 2004)].
The sutra reference skillful means as cure: "great medicine kings who were good at healing the various illnesses; provided medicine according to the illness and caused it to be taken" (70)
"Be the physician king, healing the host of illnesses. Thus should bodhisattvas comfort bodhisattvas who are ill, making them happy." (110)

shore of Nirvana.[26]

Mahayana Buddhism learned from such pragmatist attitudes of the Buddha to construct the idea of upāya as a resistance towards a creation of orthodoxy in praxis. Such an orthodoxy in which liberation becomes exclusive only to a fixed set of coded practices included the danger of creating attachment and fixation on these practices as 'absolute.' Upāya emphasized the freedom to utilize any practical means in accordance to their effectiveness when applied to different individuals and situations, even if this may at occasions lead to a transgression of monastic vows and established doctrines.[27] Any method of teaching/practice will become an upāya as long as it is founded on pratītyasamutpāda, prajñā cultivated from proper practice, and an authentic aspiration for enlightenment and altruism (i.e. compassion).[28]

According to Schroeder, understanding Buddhism from the stance of upāya implies doing philosophy from an alternative perspective than a fixation on purely theoretical matters and the view that Buddhist soteriology is only a matter of having the "right" theoretical view:

> "Skill-in-means" is philosophy, albeit in a different sense from the way it is traditionally conceived. Western philosophy traditionally favors theoretical reflection over praxis and devotes most of its intellectual effort to solving metaphysical problems, often with the assumption, that these problems need to be solved in order to live a meaningful life. What distinguishes the doctrine of upāya (and perhaps the entire Buddhist tradition) from this approach is that it shuns any attempt to understand Buddhism apart from its practices. Taking its cue from the Buddha's refusal to speculate on non-soteriological problems, upāya rejects the idea that metaphysics precedes praxis or that liberation requires theoretical speculation. It is therefore profoundly philosophical and represents a critical, self-reflective movement in the Buddhist tradition.[29]

However, the doctrine of upāya is more of a 'practical' attitude than a concrete doctrine elaborated in ontological or epistemological terms. The doctrine is mostly implied rather than clearly described or articulated. For this reason there is no detailed 'philosophy of upāya' that clearly argues for and justifies the Buddhist pragmatist attitude towards ontology and metaphysics in a manner

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[26] Loy, *The World is Made of Stories*, 80.

[27] Richard H. Robinson & Willard L. Johnson, *The Buddhist Religion: A Historical Perspective*, (London: Wadsworth, 1997), 90.

[28] John Schroeder, "Nagarjuna and the Doctrine of Skillful Means", *Philosophy East and West* 50.4 (2000): 562. One's progress in cultivating prajñā and compassion will further ensure the choice and effectiveness of upāya.

[29] Ibid., 560.

readily apparent for those only familiar with the 'Western' tradition of philosophy. This leads to the necessity for a 'Western' pragmatist framework which can help elucidate Buddhist ontology on practical terms.

This is where I consider Deleuze's philosophy may become an intellectual tool to supplement, and to enhance the pragmatist function of Buddhism. Deleuze's conception of philosophy as a practice centered on epistemological and ontological reasoning in terms of practical utility may be relevant for justifying and articulating why Dōgen's metaphysics can also be read pragmatically. In addition, Deleuze's own metaphysics may be insightful when reinterpreting Dōgen's ideas since it may provide terminologies to articulate Dōgen in a manner that does not transgress pratītyasamutpāda. However, for Deleuze's pragmatism to be proven useful for Dōgen, I must show that it is compatible with pratītyasamutpāda. The specific details of Deleuze's pragmatism and how it may be compatible with pratītyasamutpāda will be analyzed in chapter four. For now it will suffice to briefly introduce how the present study understands "philosophy as practice" and how Deleuze's pragmatism is crucial in such a view of philosophy. The fact that Dōgen's Buddhism and Deleuze's utility of metaphysics constitutes 'practice' is a crucial point, since it is from the vantage point of considering philosophy as a practical endeavor that Deleuze can be adduced to clarify Dōgen's concepts.

1.6 Deleuze's Pragmatism and Understanding Philosophy as Practice

What I mean by "philosophy as a practical endeavor" within the course of this study is to understand philosophy as a practical system of self-transformation involving concrete techniques such as analytical inquiry, meditation and the creation of concepts all targeted at a transformation of one's way of life within an aspired value-system of what is considered as virtuous living. In other words, the present study understands 'philosophy' within the tradition that considers it as a praxis, in which according to Pierre Hadot, philosophy is understood "not as a theoretical construct, but as a method for training people to live and to look at the world in a new way."[30] This means philosophy is a

[30] Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 107.

collection of what Foucault calls *technologies of the self*[31] and what Hadot favours to call *spiritual exercises*. These are techniques and practices designed to critically tune one's view of the world outside of the normative[32] and to transform one's way of life in accordance to the ethical virtue valued by that particular worldview.[33] To the extent that Buddhism founded on pratītyasamutpāda is an alternative worldview, which necessitates such practices as the cultivation of analytical reasoning, compassion and meditation to fulfill its ethical goals, it is by nature a praxis-based philosophy pragmatically involving various spiritual exercises.[34]

Taking the stance of "philosophy as practice" implies that the relationship between ontology/metaphysics and ethics/practice has a much different significance than usually considered. For example, such a relationship can be inferred from Critical Buddhism's assessment of Buddhist doctrines. When it points out the ethical flaws of particular Buddhist doctrines, it implies that Buddhist ontology and ethics are considered to be connected with each other. According to their view of Buddhist doctrine and its relation to practice, Buddhist ontology either is faithful to pratītyasamutpāda and upholds an altruistic ethics, or it neglects pratītyasamutpāda and therefore destroys ethics. What is not made explicit yet implied in this view is that ontology creates the cosmology or conceptual framework within which practice is based. If the ontology cannot support or affirm an altruistic ethics, it cannot construct the conceptual backgrounds by which ethics is entailed or advocated as an aspired virtue to be cultivated through spiritual practice. If the conceptual framework does not allow for an altruistic ethics, this means that spiritual practice also loses its significance or 'edge' as a means to nurture compassionate mind and action. At worst, an ontology

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[31] Foucault derives this idea from the ancient Greek concept of *epimeleia heautou* or the "care of the self" and defines it as the technology, "which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality."
Michel Foucault, *Technologies of the Self*, Ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, & Patrick H. Hutton, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 18.
Concerning how Foucault defines the "care of the self" also refer to:
Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège De France 1981 – 1982*, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005), 10-11.

[32] Pierre Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ., 2002), 3.

[33] Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 82, 107.

[34] Hadot has made repeated remarks that he cannot deny an essential proximity between the philosophical content and particular practical techniques utilized in both the ancient Hellenic and Buddhist traditions of philosophy. Pierre Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, 232-233, 278-279.

devoid of ethics can spoil spiritual practice, and the mind cultivated out of such a practice may proliferate vice by maintaining or worsening the unethical presumptions forming the ontology. In this sense the current study considers ontology/metaphysics and ethics/practice as indissolubly linked. Ontology sets the conditions for the significance of practice, and in turn, spiritual practice feeds back into the continued development of the ontology within a mutual relationship where each becomes the other's prerequisite and precondition in order to continuously affirm and maximize their mutual functions. We shall later see in chapter four how Deleuze's pragmatism, especially his concept of 'heterogenesis,' may be an adequate tool to set the philosophical backgrounds for such a perspective on the connectivity between ontology and ethics, since it deals with these two aspects as mutually implicative.

Deleuze conceived of metaphysics as being in proximity to spiritual exercises.[35] Therefore, a brief introduction to how Deleuze understood 'philosophy as practice' and how he utilizes pragmatism as a tool to incorporate metaphysics within practice will be appropriate. Deleuze tries to overcome not only what he views as the shortcoming of the age-old paradigm of truth-as-correspondence, but also the "postmodern" collapse of metaphysics, by developing a particular pragmatic epistemological approach which reconsiders metaphysics as a practical endeavor. Deleuze was not concerned with doing philosophy as a means to merely theoretically justify some perspective in contrast to or in critique of old paradigms of thought, such as the correspondence theory of truth. Rather, Deleuze attempts to make his philosophy a practical endeavor which functions as a technique for individuals to tackle the ethical problem of overcoming ill conscience which negates the human power to affirm life and creation. Within this context, Deleuze's philosophy attempts to make the creation of metaphysical concepts function as a technology of self-care. That is, Deleuze suggests

[35] Deleuze's conception of philosophy as practice becomes evident in his collaborative work with Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* that is designed to be utilized as a set of conceptual tools for individuals to re-conceive the world and the self rather than as a book of theory. This intent is most apparent in the chapter "How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?" which is written as a practical guide for one to question and to reconstitute a completely alternative way of making sense of reality for the sake of resisting ill conscience and "common sense." See:
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: Minnesota Univ., 1987).
Deleuze also revealed how he found his philosophical endeavor close to how later Foucault made use of the idea of philosophy as a 'care of the self' (Grk. *epimeleia heautou*). Deleuze interprets Foucault's turn to the subject as an effort to re-conceive philosophy in the form of an ethical practice for reconstituting the self and life as an ongoing creation of a "work of art." Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1995), 94-101.

understanding metaphysics as a pure creation of abstract concepts, much like mathematical formulas, which function within an internally consistent system without the necessity for corresponding to an outside truth. According to this understanding, metaphysical concepts are created to fulfill their desired effects in practice as opposed to being a way to explicate an objective 'true-way-reality-is.' Such an approach to philosophy which leaves behind the concern for the searching of corresponding 'truths' behind or beyond phenomena, while being exclusively concerned with how concepts are made to function to fulfill particular practical purposes is what Deleuze considers "pragmatist" or a "pragmatics."

As I will elaborate in chapter four, Deleuze's pragmatism is developed from a particular view on the genesis of knowledge which Deleuze calls 'heterogenesis.' The concept of heterogenesis also ties in with how Deleuze uses the binary concepts of 'virtuality' and 'actuality' to explicate the ontological coexistence of univocity and difference without having to resort to a universalist reductionism (i.e. reducing difference to an all-encompassing One), nor to transcendence. There, I will argue as to how such Deleuzian concepts are compatible with pratītyasamutpāda since they do not entail a foundationalist or essentialist ontology. Ultimately these concepts will help reinterpret Dōgen's concept of "Total-function" (全機 Zenki) as a key to creating a new way of making sense of Dōgen's idea of time and Buddha-nature. This will make it possible to read Dōgen's metaphysical concepts as fulfilling practical functions in spiritual exercises as opposed to the traditional view that Dōgen's metaphysics is referring to a 'true-way-reality-is' that exists beyond causality.

1.7 The Present Study in Relation to Comparative Philosophy

The use that I will be making of Deleuzian philosophy to reinterpret the ideas of Dōgen inevitably locates this research within what has traditionally been called "comparative philosophy." I hope my study to be of interest to both those who are only familiar with the Western tradition of philosophy and to those who are only familiar with Buddhism. However, I understand that the method of relating thinkers of diverse traditions from Asia and Europe makes the research most

readily accessible to an audience familiar with the comparative philosophical field.

The concrete aim of this research has little to do with directly addressing the problem of re-conceiving comparative philosophy. Yet, to the extent that the execution of this research urges an awareness of the strength and weaknesses of comparative philosophical approaches, it will need to clarify its stance on how it conceives comparative philosophy and how it hopes to overcome its problems. Therefore, the subsequent section will be dedicated to a brief account of the problems of comparative philosophy and how these call for a strongly individuated methodological awareness.

1.7.1 Overcoming the Problems of Comparative Philosophy: Contingency and Neutrality

According to the critique put forth by such scholars as King and Rorty, comparative philosophy faces the following problems. First, there is what Rorty calls the problem of"contingency." All thinking (whether intentionally and/or latently) is contingent to its external contexts, for these involve the various cultural, historical, social, and political environments in which a particular thinker was set, and to its internal contexts, such as the thinker's existential needs, purposes and values from which his/her philosophy arose. If this is true, to understand a particular thinker entails understanding these external and internal contexts as "accurately" as possible.[36] Consequently, a philological or historical perspective on comparative philosophy that emphasizes contextual 'accuracy' can undermine the act of 'comparing' itself by tending towards forms of relativism which King calls "cultural isolationism."[37] From this perspective, ideas are so embedded within their contexts that it will be unsuitable or unjustifiable to compare or to place ideas in connection with other ideas born in "alien" contexts.[38]

[36] Rorty asserts that when we try to understand a particular philosopher, we must understand "what they were up to, which thoughts comforted or hurt them and which they brushed aside or never had, we have to know what books they read" in other words to understand as thoroughly as possible the internal and external context in which that thought arose. But since putting ourselves absolutely in the shoes of these thinkers is practically impossible, we settle with "imposing the grid of our own needs upon the books these men wrote, and blanking out most of their needs." Richard Rorty, Review of *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, by Gerald James, *Philosophy East and West* 39.3 (1989): 332.

[37] Richard King, *Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and the 'Mystic East'* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 76-80.

[38] For example, both Rorty and Gadamer have made remarks implying that the discipline and terminology of 'philosophy' is purely contingent to 'Western' historical and cultural contexts. Both Rorty and Gadamer presume that

However, as both King and Goto-Jones have pointed out,[39] cultural isolationism is a highly absurd position since it ignores the fact that philosophers from the 'Western' past (as in the case of the ancient Greeks) are just as alien to us today as thinkers from any other tradition.[40] The argument for cultural isolationism cannot stand since the identical premise with which intellectuals like Rorty and Gadamer question the authenticity of applying the label of 'philosophy' onto 'Eastern' thought applies

'philosophy' is a hegemonic discipline exclusive to a particular cultural-historical development contingent to the 'West,' and therefore tend towards a view of cultural isolationism in which any sense of comparing radically disparate thought systems of 'East' and 'West' may either be completely impossible, bear very little significance, and/or at the least cannot be called 'philosophy.'

According to Rorty: "What we in the West call 'philosophy' became what it is by successively distinguishing itself, self-consciously and insistently, from theology, natural science, and literature. The sequence of intellectual history was very different in the various parts of Asia, so we may well wonder whether applying the term 'philosophy' to Asian books is more than an empty gesture, a stilted compliment that creates more awkwardness than collegiality." Rorty, *Review*, 333.

According to Gadamer, "Although in the meantime the research in Eastern philosophy has made further advances, we believe today that we are further removed from its philosophical understanding. The sharpening of our historical awareness has rendered the translations or adaptations of the texts […] fundamentally problematic […] We cannot speak of an appropriation of these things by the Occidental philosophy. What can be considered established is only the negative insight that our own basic concepts, which were coined by the Greeks, alter the essence of what is foreign." Gadamer quoted in King, *Orientalism and Religion,* 77.

Such tendency towards "cultural isolationism" is not limited to the Eurocentric assumptions of Western intellectuals as Rorty and Gadamer, but also occur in reverse situations with scholars who emphasize the accuracy to Eastern cultures.

[39] C.S. Goto-Jones, "If the past is a different country, are different countries in the past?" *Philosophy* 80 (2005): 39-41. Also see C.S. Goto-Jones, "The Kyoto School, the Cambridge School, and the History of Political Philosophy in Wartime Japan," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 17.1 (2009): 29.

Richard King, *Indian Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ., 1999), 235.

[40] The exclusivist nature of judging what 'philosophy' is and is not lies in the unarticulated Western bias that these distinctions (which are themselves products of specific movements of cultural-historical and political events within Europe), are a natural development and hence universally applicable as a measure for judging other thought systems. Richard King, *Indian Philosophy,* 31.

This reveals that much of the isolationist arguments and exclusivist definitions of 'philosophy' actually involve identity politics which favors or pre-assumes 'Western' premises as somehow of higher or fundamental value than its counterparts. Such latent Eurocentricity not only can justify a denial of comparative studies of 'East' and 'West,' but is also problematic when it forms the ways scholars deal with studying 'Eastern' thought. This is evident in the problem Edward Said labeled as Orientalism, which can be defined as the reduction and transformation of "oriental" subjects via the reduction of their culture to an interpretation founded on the pre-assumed ontological and epistemological framework of the 'Western' colonizer.

Examples of such Eurocentric "reductionism" in studying 'Eastern' thought are ample in comparative philosophy and have been criticized by many scholars. For example Hossein Nasr, Hee-Jin Kim, Houston Smith and psychologist Roger Walsh points out the inherent difference in fundamental stances between the more theoretically oriented tendency of modern 'Western' philosophy and experientially/soteriologically oriented foundations of Asian philosophies, and that reducing one to the pre-assumptions of the other is a grave mistake that some comparative philosophers make. King also points out similar dangers in the way Western scholars had long tended to reduce Asian philosophies outside of their specific lived realities into views molded according to Judaeo-Christian socio-cultural presumptions as in the case of reducing Indian religious thought to solely a study of texts. Additionally, Roger-Pol Droit's study of how the understanding of Buddhism forged by 19th century German scholars reflected their own domestic intellectual climate, conflicts, hopes and fears more than the actuality of Buddhist thought is exemplary of how human understanding is embedded within socio-cultural environments. See:

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Conditions for Meaningful Comparative Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* 22.1: 53-61.

Hee-Jin Kim, *Eihei Dogen Mystical Realist* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004), 9-11.

Huston Smith, "Is There a Perennial Philosophy?," *Revisioning Philosophy*, ed. James Ogilvy (New York: State University, 1992), 247-262.

Roger Walsh, "Can Western Philosophers Understand Asian Philosophies?," *Revisioning Philosophy*, ed. James Ogilvy

to the factors which constitute what they consider their own historical-cultural narrative.[41]

The question of contingency leads to the second problem, the impossibility of finding a 'neutral' ground for comparing disparate philosophies.[42] What individual intellectuals select as worthy topics of comparison and the way they do it are contingent to the particular needs, values and contextual background of that individual and the field of problems he hopes to address. For that reason it would be useless to claim a universal ground, task, goal, or methodology that neutrally applies to all 'comparative philosophy' which would merely complicate the focus of the individual

(New York: State University, 1992), 281-302.
King, *Orientalism and Religion*, 62-72, 161.
Roger Pol Droit, *The Cult of Nothingness: The Philosophers and the Buddha*, Trans. David Streight and Pamela Vohnson, (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 2003).

[41]King criticizes that "cultural isolationism" is also rooted in a particular prejudice that "culture" is concretely definable within geo-political boundaries. King further notes how such a view of culture is itself a product of a socio-historical particularity: "The dividing up of humanity into certain geo-cultural groupings called 'nations' is a relatively modern development. The roots of nationalism derive from social, economic and political changes in Europe from the sixteenth century onwards, but the notion of a national identity as a consciously unifying factor of people cannot be said to have been an influential social construct in Europe until the eighteenth century (and in some cases much later). Indeed, upon analysis it would seem that 'national identity' is not nearly as static and immutable as is sometimes thought." Thus the problem of this view of culture is that it misconstrues the concept 'culture' which is itself a socio-historically particular concept with the "way things are rather than simply as the way the world was divided up since the eighteenth century by Europeans (and through European hegemony, the rest of the world."
King, *Orientalism and Religion*, 78.
Post-colonial theorist, Homi Bhaba and scholar of Muslim poetry, Peter Lamborn Wilson also make similar points concerning how 'culture' cannot be staked clearly to boundaries and rather constitutes a malleable multiplicity inclusive of both internally and externally shifting influences beyond borders.
Bhabha views colonial discourse as itself an ambivalent phenomena whose power is not a simple movement from above to below, but happening in between the colonizer and the native tradition where the two hybridize in an agnostic space. Bhabha sees this as creating the conditions for possible resistance since texts are by nature prone to heterogeneous interpretations, which do not reiterate the authoritative intention of dominance, and instead can be inverted and transformed in various ways to be used against the dominant power by the native tradition. In effect Bhabha considers culture as a constantly shifting discourse that happens between two or more "traditions" hybridizing which can never be locatable or reducible to one side or another as an easy duality like that of center/margin, dominant/dominated, East/West etc. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, (New York: Routledge, 1994), 328-336.
Wilson considers the meaning of a discourse as always a shifting phenomenon that cannot be staked to grounding "truths" or "actualities." Rather, meaning is like a drift, a nomadic phenomenon constantly moving, altering, and reversing amongst those who come into contact and interpret it. Meaning drifts without location, beyond dichotomies even that of reality and poetic imagination. Culture as a constant influencing of multiple discourses and its interpretation is nomadic unhinged from "truth" so much so that it can potentially trans-mutate between poesis and reality. Peter Lamborn Wilson, *Sacred Drift: Essays on the Margins of Islam*. (San Francisco: City Light, 1993), 158-159.
Perhaps it will be more fruitful for future comparative philosophers to conceive of 'culture' more in line with the above and/or what Deleuze defines as 'rhizomes.' That is, 'culture' as a continuously shifting and hybridizing field of multiplicities that cannot be staked to a particular time or space. Then culture can be reinterpreted as no longer "a question of this or that place on earth, or of a given moment in history, still less of this or that category of thought," but a "question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again." Deleuze, *Thousand Plateaus* p.20

[42] According to Rorty: "But there is no similarly uncontroversial starting point for comparing forms of intellectual life, much less for comparing whole cultures. As Panikkar argues in detail, any transcultural map of "philosophical problems" will lack either utility or neutrality. More generally, any selection of distinct subject matters of inquiry, or ultimate problems, or possible forms of intellectual life, or stages of maturation will itself be based on a grid of needs felt by some human beings and not by others. There is no skyhook which will lift us out of this parochialism." *Review*, 334.

studies into an abstracted field that has no real inherent coherency or clearly defined field of problems. Therefore, the impossibility of neutrality is not so much a 'problem' that negates comparative philosophy as it is a caution for it to revise its self-awareness concerning what it wants to do, and as Rorty suggests, to devise highly individuated methodologies to fulfill these particular purposes.

Consequently, the current study claims that the problems of contingency and the impossibility of "neutrality" should not hinder comparative philosophy. The virtue of pursuing comparative philosophy lies elsewhere than in philological studies of 'Eastern' thought. Its significance needs to be sought outside of what is already a hallmark of other academic disciplines. Devising highly specified methods for comparative philosophy is a sensible approach, given the fact that it is impossible to detach an individual's choice of subjects and method of dealing with what he/she chooses to compare with their own consciously or unconsciously accepted moral inclinations. This is especially of concern for the field of comparative philosophy which since its inception includes many scholars[43] who do not resent asserting a strong ethical motive in the particular study they pursue which often includes ideals of humanism, brotherhood, love, unity and understanding amongst cultures, as well as critiques of Euro-centricity, etc.

Comparative philosophy will benefit from a self-awareness concerning the ethical purpose the individual scholar is influenced by in devising their methodological and conceptual schemes. In other words, there needs to be an awareness of the fact that the internal and external contingent factors in which our particular studies are located also involve our personal ethical drives or ethical presumptions that are embedded in the wider contexts that comes to shape the individual scholarly focuses. This is what Charles Taylor calls *moral frameworks*, the idea that the contingent factors which leads to the individual creation/adoption of moral stances are something that pre-exists the

[43] An early example of clear moral inclinations influencing the aim for comparative philosophy is Kee Swan Liat who defines comparative philosophy as a method to unite nations and to regain faith in life under a common humanity. J. Kwee Swan Liat, "Methods of Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* 1.1 (1951): 15.
Another example is Paul Masson who defined comparative philosophy as a "condition not only of peace, but of human existence itself" in a world where everyone is inter-related. Paul Masson-Oursel, "True Philosophy is Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* 1.1 (1951): 8.
Examples of comparative philosophers who have explicit ethical values influencing their study that continue to publish works in more recent times include: those who are more inclined towards Buddhism as David Loy, T.P. Kasulis, Robert Glass, and Sallie King and also those who are affiliated with the "Traditionalist School of Perennialist Philosophy" as Huston Smith, and Hossein Nasr.

individual, to which we are born, grow up in and thus are un-detachably embedded.[44] Taylor emphasizes that the modern tendency to stress "neutrality" in the academia and scientific positivism is not a 'neutral' position, but is itself a moral framework in which "neutrality" is considered "good" in relation to particular truth-values. If we accept this as a fundamental premise, then the impossibility of any form of 'neutrality' on which comparison can be executed will no longer be an obstacle for comparison, but rather an element that should be actively acknowledged as a basis upon which the purpose and methods for each study can be specified. In other words, a comparative philosophical study will benefit from actively affirming its individual moral stance and by individuating its method for integrating disparate philosophies for the sake of fulfilling concrete (ethical) purposes. This is preferable to doing comparative philosophy with the view that somehow the act of interpreting and comparing exists in a moral and contextual vacuum, and to be vainly indulging in the act of comparing or juxtaposing disparate philosophies as if such an act itself unconditionally reveals a universally significant or applicable body of knowledge.[45]

Now that I have clarified the basic problems inherent in comparative philosophy, I will like to clarify how the current study addresses these problems with concern for its ethical directive. This should help prevent possible Buddhist and Deleuzian readers of my work from misconstruing what it

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[44] Moral frameworks are irresistibly a fundamental part of how an individual comes to understand, define and articulate his/her self-existence in the world. Thus the presence of moral stances cannot be relegated from human phenomena as Taylor mentions, "orientation to the good is not some optional extra, something we can engage in or abstain at will, but a condition of our being selves with an identity." Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1989), 68.
Taylor's notion of moral stances is rather akin to Gadamer's conception of 'tradition' in the sense that he considers moral stances as something we are born into, and latently influenced by, and is not something that can be easily shed away.

[45] Many comparative studies of the past did not consciously individuate their studies with the acknowledgement for the question of the contingency in which disparate philosophies arose. Consequently, they assume the act of "comparison" exists in a moral and contextual vacuum that can be executed without the need to clarify or justify its own methods and purposes. Such studies also tend to share the assumption that the act of "comparison" itself somehow is unconditionally significant without having to clarify a clear purpose as to why and what for they are comparing philosophies. The field of comparative philosophy has been home to numerous studies that simply compare philosophies without a purpose, as if the simple juxtaposition of ideas magically conjures significance. Though this remains to be a personal assessment, Carl Olsson's books on comparative philosophy as well as Gereon Kopf's comparative study of Dōgen and Nishida were such case in points where the authors simply "compared" while failing to make any purposeful claim. While I do not deny that their studies have some level of philological and/or inspirational value, I do not view the way they do comparative philosophy should be exemplary for what the field should aspire to do in the future. See:
Carl Olsson, *Indian Philosophers and Postmodern Thinkers: Dialogues on the Margins of Culture*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Gereon Kopf, *Beyond Personal Identity: Dōgen, Nishida and the Phenomenology of No-Self*, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001).

is attempting to do.

1.7.2 Deep Jazz: Clarifying My Approach to Dōgen and Deleuze

As I have described in the previous section, the current study agrees to the view that there can be no "neutral" reading of a particular thinker. To aspire to be as "neutral" as possible itself constitutes a particular value judgment and a moral directive. In comparative philosophy such a directive for "neutrality" itself becomes problematic, as there is no "neutral" gound from which disparate philosophies can be interpreted and compared. Therefore, the problem becomes of making explicit how and for what ethical reasons philosophies are interpreted and to devise a highly specified methodology that can most effectively convey that directive. Studying Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō* is precisely a case in point. I believe no reading of Dōgen can reach some sort of "truth-of-Dōgen" independent of the act of interpretation especially given the difficulty of his expressions which include the use of old Japanese, highly poetic sensibilities, and terminologies he does not necessarily clearly define through logical expositions (e.g. Dharma-position, Total-function, Total-exertion). Hence, I believe to read Dōgen independently from any ethical and intellectual contingency is not sensible for it risks producing a study that lacks consideration for the subtle nature of Dōgen's philosophy as well as for its practical significance.

When the current study makes a case for reading Dōgen from the perspective of pratītyasamutpāda and the centrality of spiritual practice, it is undeniably taking an ethical stance in dealing with its subject. Presenting what the current study considers the ethical and intellectual problems of interpreting Dōgen that arise in relation to the ethical foundations of pratītyasamutpāda, necessitates an awareness of a thorough understanding of pratityasamutpada, its relation to ethics within the act of interpreting Buddhist doctrine, and how past scholars interpreted Dōgen's particularly difficult and relevant phrases. In other words, the 'problems' of reading Dōgen arise in contingency to how the ethical stance of the current study relates to the framework of past 'Dōgen studies' which is itself a collection of various interpretations. Therefore, the current study introduces

the problems of how to interpret Dōgen's metaphysics within the process of critically assessing how past scholars of Critical Buddhism and the comparative philosophical field interpreted them. For example, we shall see in chapters two and three that one of the major problems of interpreting Dōgen's metaphysics is intertwined with how to read Dōgen's view of the co-existence of plurality/wholeness, universal Buddha-nature, and practice in relation to Buddha-nature/time. The idea of an ontological simultaneity between plurality and a universal sense of Buddha-nature constitutes a particular ethical problem since interpreting the 'universal' side of the equation as an ontological ground disregards pratityasamutpada and therefore ethics.

I will present my own particular interpretation of Dōgen once all of these problems have been introduced through chapters two and three. Other's interpretations of Dōgen are merely implored as reference to construct the field of problems in which the current study addresses and in order to contrast my own analysis to past Dōgen studies. The ultimate argument through which my original reading of Dōgen will be presented functions independently of these past views precisely for the reason that it does not repeat their views, while learning from their strengths.

My motive in this study is to create a reading of Dōgen that exists nowhere, that is a philosophy of the 'Erewhon' where people are yet to tread created out of a thorough consideration of the particular functional potentials of the ideas of each thinker. I am not concerned with what kind of "truth" the ideas of Dōgen and Deleuze "represent," in the sense of assuming there is some kind of "accurate truth" or completely redeemable "cultural contexts" behind these thinkers. The current study presents what I consider to be a "better" reading of Dōgen given the context that it be applicable within a practical approach to philosophy founded on pratītyasamutpāda. It is an experiment to utilize Deleuze to reread Dōgen in a manner that it becomes practical for the sake of an ethical goal. In this sense the study aspires to be truthful to Dōgen's own concern for the priority of practice by bringing it under a new perspective. Yet, my analysis of Dōgen is not intended to be a mere philological explanation of Dōgen and Deleuze, or a reduction of their philosophy to one or the other paradigm in turning Deleuze to Dōgen, or Dōgen to Deleuze.

I do not claim that this particular approach to Dōgen via Deleuze is readily applicable to other

comparative studies of Dōgen or that it is the "true" way to read Dōgen. Neither does the study intend to simply compare Dōgen with Deleuze as much as it wants to integrate their ideas in an individual manner that fulfills the purposes set within its ethical stance. However, I have taken utmost care in understanding and explaining the "potentials" of what these philosophies embrace, which first necessitates an understanding of these philosophies within their respective contexts as accurately as possible. This means more than anything else, to understand for what practical purpose these philosophies were created and what functions they fulfill within that context. The study will ultimately create a "new" interpretation of Dōgen by utilizing the potentials of these two thinkers by re-positioning their philosophy within the contextual purpose of fulfilling a practical ethics founded on pratītyasamutpāda.

While I personally have faith in the Buddha's teaching of pratītyasamutpāda as a complete and functioning system of practical philosophy that is of much use for humanity, I do not claim this study to be professing a Buddhist stance. That is, while I take the ethical implications and potentials of the doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda very seriously, I do not present this research as representative of a 'Buddhist.' I do not claim to 'redeem' Dōgen as rightfully Buddhist through Deleuze. Nor do I expound some kind of "truly" Buddhist philosophy via a reconsideration of Dōgen. Such was the task of Critical Buddhism and I have no intentions in repeating their claims. The current study aspires to create ideas that become different from what is purely Dōgen or Deleuze; that is a Dōgen-to-be, a Deleuze-Dōgen-in-the-making, a form of ethics-to-come, an ethics-in-the-making.

The free jazz musician Albert Ayler once described his aspirations in music as a creation of beauty and rejoicing that is to come, sounds which tells of a beauty of the future unknown to the suffering and anxiety of the present.[46] Jazz pianist Sun Ra told of his music as an "altered destiny," that is sounds of an alternative future, music which tells of a potential of a future beyond the seemingly destined suffering of the world today.[47] I possess a similar sentiment as these aforementioned musicians when I conceive of what I aspire to achieve through the present study. That

[46] Robert Palmer, liner notes to *Live in Greenwich Village The Complete Impulse Recordings*, Albert Ayler, Impulse! IMPD-2-273, CD, 1998.

[47] Sun Ra, *Space is the Place*, Directed by John Coney, (1974; USA: North American Star System/Plexifilm, 2003.), DVD.

is, a creation of a perspective of an ethical philosophy through Dōgen and Deleuze, which in its conclusive form is no longer Dōgen, nor Deleuze, but an experiment for a future philosophy. Such a philosophy creates for the sake of a future ethics, and may work as a humble beacon of hope in a possible future.

Such motive echoes one 'Deleuzian' conviction I take at heart in this study that is related to his idea on 'belief.' Deleuze mentions:

> The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half concerned us. […] The link between man and the world is broken. Henceforth, this link must become an object of belief: it is the impossible which can only be restored within faith. Belief is no longer addressed to a different or transformed world. Man is in the world as if in a pure optical and sound situation. The reaction of which man has been dispossessed can be replaced only by belief. Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears.[48]

As Deleuze had often asserted, philosophy can contribute to regaining a sense of belief in what we and reality as a whole are capable of, given that it realizes an unreserved affirmation to humanity's potential to imagine, to experiment and to create on top of a truly ethical concern. I believe philosophy has the power to create various alternative values through experimenting with multiple new ways of re-conceiving who we can become and what the world is capable of, and through it, experiment with new modes of life which affirm existence against ressentiment. Perhaps this research, a nowhere that I nomadically roam, where Dōgen and Deleuze converge only to disappear and become something else, there is something insightful for Buddhists and Western oriented philosophers alike. Insights that are not fuel to stake Dōgen or Deleuze to some kind of "accurate meaning" or "truth," but hopefully insights that may help individuals to utilize and further reinterpret Dōgen and Deleuze in their own ways and in a manner that is significant for their lives. Ultimately I hope the present study creates fuel for others to carry on to further experiments to expand the rhizomes of what we may become, a future vision of humanity and of values-to-come.

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[48] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema II: The Time-Image*, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota, 1989), 171-172.

1.8 Introducing the Chapters and their Questions

Now that the backgrounds and motives of the current study have been cleared, I will like to conclude the introductory chapter with two sections that describe the more technical aspect of the study. This section will introduce the overall organization of the coming chapters and the questions that will be involved in putting forth the final argument for a new reading of Dōgen's metaphysics that does not negate pratītyasamutpāda.

Chapter two deals with the problem of Critical Buddhism's reading of Dōgen. Since Critical Buddhism's Dōgen interpretation is founded on its understanding of pratītyasamutpāda in relation to ontological critique, Buddhist practice and ethics, arguing for how and why their reading of Dōgen is limited and how it can be overcome necessitates an analysis of their view on pratītyasamutpāda. In addition, as I have briefly mentioned, the current study concurs with the Critical Buddhist view that neglecting pratītyasamutpāda leads to a collapse of ethics. This means that we must clarify to what extent the current study can agree or disagree to Critical Buddhism's view on pratītyasamutpāda. The case needs to be made as to which aspects of their interpretation of pratītyasamutpāda can be considered more or less generally applicable and which will lead to a limited perspective on Dōgen. Ultimately, this amounts to answering the following questions: How does Critical Buddhism define pratītyasamutpāda and apply it in its critique of Dōgen? Is Critical Buddhism's understanding of pratītyasamutpāda as fundamental for Buddhist ethics applicable as a more or less general criteria to assess other Buddhist (influenced) texts in contrast to pratītyasamutpāda? What in Critical Buddhism's interpretation of pratītyasamutpāda leads to their particular view that Dōgen's metaphysics is incompatible with pratītyasamutpāda? Why does Critical Buddhism conclude that Dōgen's metaphysics neglect pratītyasamutpāda and therefore is "non-Buddhist"? Does this imply a prejudice that metaphysics is 'representational'?

Chapter three provisionally adopts Critical Buddhism's criteria based in pratītyasamutpāda to critically assess if certain doctrines adhere to pratītyasamutpāda or not. This will be done for the sake

of critically examining four exemplary variations of "comparative" interpretations of Dōgen's metaphysics by Abe, Heine, Kasulis, and Glass. Are these interpretations faithful to pratītyasamutpāda or do they fall to an ontology and/or epistemology which leads to a collapse of ethics? If they do neglect pratītyasamutpāda, what are their problems and how can they be overcome? More precisely, do their reading reiterate Hongaku-shisō and imply the presumption that metaphysics is by nature 'representational'?

Chapter four argues that Deleuze's pragmatism, by virtue of the concept of 'heterogenesis,' can supply an effective alternative to the way both the Critical Buddhist and comparative philosophers read Dōgen's metaphysics within the confines of correspondence theory. In addition, I will suggest that Deleuze's metaphysical concepts of virtuality/actuality will help interpret Dōgen's metaphysics of Buddha-nature and temporality. In order for this to be possible, I will argue how Deleuze's ideas are compatible with pratītyasamutpāda and therefore applicable to Buddhism. This amounts to answering the following questions: How does Deleuze's pragmatist concept of heterogenesis and metaphysics of virtuality work? Are these concepts compatible with pratītyasamutpāda? How can interpreting Dōgen via Deleuze's pragmatism overcome the problems found in both Critical Buddhism and the comparative interpretations? How can Deleuze's pragmatism help change our perspective on pratītyasamutpāda, Dōgen's metaphysics and their relation to practice?

Chapter five applies Deleuze's pragmatist concepts such as heterogenesis and virtual/actual to an original interpretation of Dōgen's concepts of Buddha-nature, and temporal continuity in relation to practice. I will show how reinterpreting Dōgen's concept of 'Total-function' through Deleuzian pragmatism can establish the concept as a key to unfold Dōgen's metaphysics as a whole in a manner adherent to pratītyasamutpāda. How can Dōgen's concept of 'Total-function' be read in concurrence with pratītyasamutpāda through the use of Deleuze's pragmatist concepts? How can such a new interpretation of 'Total-function' be utilized as a key to create a consistency out of Dōgen's ideas on Buddha-nature, temporality and their relation to practice? How can Dōgen's seemingly paradoxical claim for a singular moment that is simultaneously whole be made sense of without having to negate pratītyasamutpāda?

1.9 Concerning the Use of Japanese Sources and Vocabularies

Finally, I would like to clarify several technical points concerning the use of Dōgen and Critical Buddhist sources in this study. I have mainly resorted to using translations of Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō* by Chodo Cross and Gudo Wafu Nishijima rather than that by John Stevens and Kosen Nishiyama. The reason is that I find their translations as being more literal in approach as it tries to stay away from resorting to too much interpretation. However, since no translation is exempt from interpreting, whenever I found disagreement with certain interpretations of key vocabularies or phrases by Cross and Nishijima, I have resorted to either of the following solutions. First, I consulted alternative translations, out of which in most cases, I found Hee-Jin Kim's translations to be most agreeable.[49] Second, when I found the alternative translations to be disagreeable, I have resorted to translating the texts by myself from the original Japanese with consultation of modern Japanese translations.

As for the sources in Japanese, the following technicalities apply. For the Japanese versions of the *Shōbōgenzō*, I have mainly consulted the original version and modern translation edited by the Japanese Dōgen scholar Mizuno Yaoko. This is due to both readability and Mizuno's scholarly integrity in keeping her modern translation literal and free from interpretations as possible.[50] As for the texts by the Critical Buddhists, currently none of their books are available in full English translations. Therefore, almost all references made to their texts refer to their original Japanese and all quotations are translated by myself.

While I use most of Dōgen's conceptual vocabularies in their translated form, I have resorted to giving their original Japanese forms whenever they are introduced. All English translations of

[49] One can only hope Hee-Jin Kim will attempt a full translation of the *Shōbōgenzō* someday, but for now the few sections he has translated are limited to those referenced in his studies.

[50] The 'literal' quality of Mizuno's translations was very apparent in contrast to other modern Japanese translations that I consulted such as that by Kyoji Ishii. I found Ishii's version to be too "charged" with an interpretive approach heavily influenced by Westernized philosophical perspectives (i.e. that of Heidegger and the Kyoto-school). While such interpretive translations are noteworthy as cases for understanding how the modern Japanese intelligentsia absorbs Dōgen, they deemed useless for this particular study.

Japanese Buddhist concepts are followed by parentheses including the original Japanese Kanji script and English reading. Sanskrit or Pali terminologies will not be heavily utilized within this study owing to the fact that Dōgen himself was not educated in Buddhism through Sanskrit (his use of Buddhist terms rooted in Sanskrit are limited to their Chinese transcription). However, I have insisted in using the Sanskrit for several key Buddhist concepts that recur throughout the study and are known to be rooted in Indian Buddhism. Such is the case with terms as pratītyasamutpāda and prajñā since these ideas are not indigenous to Japanese or Chinese Buddhism, but are foundational concepts dating back to the Indian tradition of Buddhism.