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Metaphysics as praxis : Rereading Dōgen's Metaphysics through Deleuzian pragmatism and Pratīyasamutpāda

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


Shinichi Hiramoto

遍界不曾藏

"The entire universe has never been hidden."

Dōgen Kigen



METAPHYSICS AS PRAXIS:
Rereading Dōgen's Metaphysics Through
Deleuzian Pragmatism and Pratītyasamutpāda

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“In my music, I'm trying to look far ahead. Like Coltrane, I'm playing about the beauty that is to come after all the tensions and anxieties. [...] like Louis Armstrong did at the beginning. Their music was a rejoicing. It was a rejoicing about beauty that was going to happen.”

Albert Ayler

“I am the altered destiny, presence of the living myth. Music is all a part of another tomorrow, another kind of language. [...] We sing this song to a great tomorrow. We sing this song to abolish sorrow...”

Sun Ra

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ABSTRACT

This study interprets the Japanese Buddhist master, Dōgen’s metaphysical ideas concerning Buddha-nature (仏性 Busshō), Total-function (全機 Zenki), and temporality, with the help of Deleuze’s pragmatism, in a manner attempting to overcome the problems of what I view as the two opposing poles of Dōgen interpretation, as well as in a manner congruent with the central Buddhist doctrine of praṭīyasamutpāda.

The opposing poles of Dōgen interpretation are first of all, the Critical Buddhist reading of Dōgen put forth by Shirō Matsumoto and Noriaki Hakamaya, and secondly, what I will refer as the “comparative philosophical” interpretations of Dōgen exemplified by Dōgen studies conducted by scholars associated with the field of “comparative philosophy” as Abe Masao, T.P. Kasulis, Steven Heine, and Robert Glass. In short, the Critical Buddhists claim that Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts do not adhere to praṭīyasamutpāda because he constructs a substantive ontology that transcends causality. Consequently, Critical Buddhism labels Dōgen’s metaphysics as insignificant for Buddhism founded on praṭīyasamutpāda. On the other hand, the “comparative philosophical” interpreters read Dōgen through the influence of ‘Western’ philosophy ranging from Hegel and Heidegger to phenomenology. Whereas they positively affirm the role of metaphysics in Dōgen, their interpretation of Dōgen is incongruent to praṭīyasamutpāda. I argue that the limitations of both of these types of interpretation originate in their latent prejudice that metaphysics is by nature “representational.”

The question as to whether Dōgen’s metaphysics adheres to praṭīyasamutpāda or not is an essential one, given the fact that praṭīyasamutpāda is the basis for Buddhist ethics. Should an interpretation of Dōgen’s philosophy be conflicting to this basic doctrine of praṭīyasamutpāda, this would imply that Dōgen’s philosophy becomes ethically problematic and irrelevant for Buddhism. Therefore, to read Dōgen’s Buddhist philosophy as a ground for a viable ethics requires that it be interpreted in relation to praṭīyasamutpāda.

The research reconsiders Dōgen’s thoughts on Total-function, temporality and Buddha-nature, of which Critical Buddhism and comparative interpretations gives a shortsighted picture inasmuch as they impose upon Dōgen a “representational epistemology.” This error prevents the former interpretations of Dōgen to acknowledge the

potential that Dōgen's metaphysical concepts of "Total-function," time and Buddha-nature can have a practical use for an ethics centered on *pratīyasamutpāda*. Deleuze's philosophy, insofar as it is pragmatist and non-representational, can help to elucidate this limitation and to create a reinterpretation of Dōgen's doctrine on total-function, time and Buddha-nature to function in concurrence to *pratīyasamutpāda*.

Ultimately, the study utilizes Deleuze's pragmatist metaphysics of "heterogenesis" and "virtuality/actuality" to reinterpret Dōgen's metaphysics as purely practical tools to assist spiritual practice based in *pratīyasamutpāda*. In this sense the study aspires to be truthful to Dōgen's own concern for the priority of practice by reconsidering the practical function of Dōgen's philosophy under a new perspective. Each of Dōgen's concepts on Total-function, Buddha-nature, and time do not have to be 'corresponding' to a 'truth' concerning reality, but function as tools to support and enhance spiritual practice. Dōgen's concepts, rather than 'representing' Absolute 'truth,' fulfill particular functions in cautioning, encouraging, and guiding the practitioner in accordance to *pratīyasamutpāda*, so that attempting to understand these concepts itself constituted a practice of critical self-analysis in questioning one's assumption concerning experienced reality. In this sense, the study argues that Dōgen's metaphysics is *indeed* praxis that is befitting in the holistic system of Buddhist life to achieve ethical cultivation, as well as freedom from suffering.

ABSTRACT (IN DUTCH)

METAFYSICA ALS PRAKTIJK:
 HET HERLEZEN VAN DŌGEN'S METAFYSICA DOOR DE LENS
 VAN HET PRAGMATISME VAN GILLES DELEUZE EN PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA

Deze studie interpreteert de metafysische ideeën van de boeddhistische leraar Dōgen over de ‘boeddhanatuur’, ‘totale functie’ en ‘tijdelijkheid’ met behulp van het pragmatisme van Gilles Deleuze. Hierin is het doel het te boven komen van wat ik zie als de twee tegengestelde kampen in de Dōgen-interpretatie, kampen die zich opstellen rond de fundamentele boeddhistische leer van *pratītyasamutpāda*.

De twee kampen van de Dōgen-interpretatie zijn aan de ene kant de ‘kritisch boeddhistische’ lezing van Dōgen door Shiro Matsumoto en Noriaki Hakamaya, en aan de andere kant de zogenaamde ‘comparatief-filosofische’ lezingen van Dōgen door onder meer Abe, T.P. Kasulis, Steven Heine en Robert Glass. De kritische boeddhisten beweren dat Dōgens metafysische concepten niet voldoen aan *pratītyasamutpāda* omdat Dōgen een substantieontologie ontwikkelt die voorbij de causaliteit gaat. Daarom, zo redeneren zij, is de metafysica van Dōgen niet belangrijk voor het boeddhisme, dat juist is gebaseerd op *pratītyasamutpāda*. De comparatieve filosofen aan de andere kant lezen Dōgen door een Westerse bril, variërend van die van de filosofie van Hegel tot die van Heidegger en de fenomenologie. Alhoewel zij positief staan tegenover Dōgens metafysica is hun interpretatie niet congruent met *pratītyasamutpāda*. Ik zal beweren dat de beperkingen van beide lezingen voortkomen uit het vooroordeel dat metafysica van nature *representatief* van aard zou zijn.

De vraag of Dōgens metafysica al dan niet *pratītyasamutpāda* respecteert is essentieel, daar *pratītyasamutpāda* de basis vormt van de boeddhistische ethiek. Mocht een lezing van Dōgens filosofie in strijd zijn met *pratītyasamutpāda*, dan zou dat suggereren dat zijn filosofie ethische problemen oplevert en als zodanig niet relevant is voor het boeddhisme. Dōgen moet juist gerelateerd kunnen worden aan *pratītyasamutpāda* om als basis voor een dergelijke ethiek te kunnen fungeren.

Dit onderzoek houdt Dōgens ideeën over totale functie, tijdelijkheid en boeddhanatuur tegen het licht. De

kritische boeddhisten en de comparatieve filosofen schieten hier tekort, daar zij een epistemologie gebaseerd op *representatie* hanteren. Hierdoor kunnen deze lezingen niet zien wat de betekenis kan zijn van Dōgens concepten van ‘totale functie’, ‘tijdelijkheid’ en ‘boeddha-natuur’ voor een ethiek gebaseerd op *pratītyasamutpāda*. In zoverre de filosofie van Deleuze pragmatisch is en niet ‘representatieve’, kan ze helpen deze beperkte interpretatie van Dōgen te doorbreken.

Dit onderzoek maakt gebruik van Deleuzes ‘pragmatische’ concepten van ‘heterogeniteit’ en het koppel ‘virtualiteit/actualiteit’ om Dōgens metafysica te herlezen als zuiver praktisch gereedschap in functie van een actieve spiritualiteit gebaseerd op *pratītyasamutpāda*. Op deze manier probeert dit onderzoek trouw te zijn aan Dōgens voorkeur voor *oefening* door de praktische functie van Dōgens metafysica in een nieuw perspectief te beschouwen. Dōgens concepten van ‘totale functie’, ‘boeddha-natuur’ en ‘tijdelijkheid’ hoeven geen corresponderende relatie met een ten grondslag liggende werkelijkheid te hebben, maar fungeren als gereedschappen om spirituele oefeningen te ondersteunen en uit te breiden. In de plaats van als ‘absolute waarheid’ fungeren de concepten van Dōgen als waarschuwingen, aanmoedigingen en directieven in overeenstemming met *pratītyasamutpāda*, zodat de poging deze concepten te begrijpen een pragmatische en zelf-kritische uitwerking heeft op de vooronderstellingen van onze werkelijkheidservaring. Dit onderzoek stelt dat de metafysica van Dōgen ontologisch correspondeert met een praxis en zodoende het holistische systeem van het boeddhisme bevordert dat gericht is op ethische realisatie en bevrijding van lijden.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Affirming Dōgen's Metaphysics Yet in a Manner Congruent to Praṭītyasamutpāda

The goal of this study is to present a new interpretation of the Japanese Buddhist monk, Dōgen Kigen's (1200 - 1253) metaphysical¹ concepts² of 'Total-function' (全機 *Zenki*), temporality (有時 *Uji*, 法位 *Hōi*, 経歴 *Kyoryaku*) and Buddha-nature (仏性 *Busshō*) found in his writing, the *Shōbōgenzō*. I hope to achieve this by help of insights taken from the pragmatist approach to metaphysics put forth by the French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze (1925 - 1995). The concepts I would like to utilize from Deleuze in particular are, *heterogenesis*, and the binary concept of *virtuality/actuality*. The objective of this new reading is to reconsider the practical function of Dōgen's philosophy by interpreting it in a manner congruent with the central Buddhist doctrine of *praṭītyasamutpāda* (the law of cause and effect, or co-dependent arising) and in adherence to Dōgen's own concern for the priority of practice. Such an interpretation of Dōgen must overcome the problems of what I consider the two opposing poles of preceding Dōgen interpretations. These poles are, first the Critical Buddhist reading of Dōgen put forth by Shirō Matsumoto and Noriaki Hakamaya, and secondly what I call the "comparative philosophical" interpretations of Dōgen exemplified by such Dōgen studies conducted by scholars associated with the field of "comparative philosophy" as Abe Masao, T.P. Kasulis, Steven Heine, and Robert Glass.

While I will make a detailed study of how these factions interpret Dōgen in subsequent

¹ I use the term metaphysics in the loose sense of designating thoughts and concepts pertaining to abstract principles, entities or realities that are understood as functioning in ways that are not immediately apparent.

² I use the term "concept" strictly in the way defined by Deleuze. For Deleuze concepts are not identity conditions or propositions that must correspond to some objective 'truth,' but metaphysical constructions that function as building blocks of internally coherent systems of thought. A philosophical concept "posits itself and its object at the same time as it is created." On Deleuze's definition see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Graham Burchell, (New York: Columbia Univ., 1994), 15-34.

chapters, I would like to give a brief introductory remark on their polarizing stances just to introduce the context that the current study addresses. In short, the Critical Buddhists claim that Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts do not adhere to *pratītyasamutpāda* since he constructs a substantive ontology transcending causality. Consequently, Critical Buddhism labels Dōgen’s metaphysics as insignificant for Buddhism founded on *pratītyasamutpāda*. I will later argue how this conclusion is founded on the erroneous prejudice that *pratītyasamutpāda* is incompatible with any form of ontology. On the other hand, the “comparative philosophical” interpreters read Dōgen through the influence of ‘Western’ philosophy ranging from Hegel, Heidegger to phenomenology. Whereas they positively affirm the role of metaphysics in Dōgen, I will later argue how their interpretation of Dōgen is incongruent to *pratītyasamutpāda*.

Consequently, there is a polar divide between the Critical Buddhist reading of Dōgen that adheres to *pratītyasamutpāda* yet denies Dōgen’s metaphysics, and the comparative philosophers who affirm Dōgen’s metaphysics without duly respecting *pratītyasamutpāda*. Critical Buddhism is not interested in attempting to “rescue” Dōgen’s many distinct metaphysical ideas from diverging from *pratītyasamutpāda*. Therefore, Critical Buddhism precludes re-establishing a practical role for Dōgen’s ontology in what they consider “authentic” Buddhist practice founded on *pratītyasamutpāda*. On the other hand, the comparative philosophers reduce Dōgen to their latent prejudice that the purpose of his ontology is to describe an ultimate reality as experienced by an “enlightened” mind. This prejudice keeps them from duly applying his thought within the practical criteria of *pratītyasamutpāda*. The necessity for this study is rooted in a concern for affirming Dōgen’s metaphysical ideas and their significance for a Buddhism rightfully founded on *pratītyasamutpāda*.

I will argue that these purported limitations of both the Critical Buddhist and the comparative interpreters of Dōgen are due to a common prejudice concerning the utility and significance of ‘metaphysics.’ This prejudice lies in their understanding that metaphysics is a ‘representational’ venture that claims to describe the ‘true-way-reality-is.’ The Critical Buddhists imply this negatively when they deny *pratītyasamutpāda*’s incompatibility with any form of ontology and hence with Dōgen’s ontology. On the other hand, the comparative interpreters imply the prejudice affirmatively

when they read Dōgen’s philosophy in a manner that positively describes the ‘true-way-reality-is’ as based on a ‘pure’ experience of such a reality.

I believe the above prejudice can be bypassed by utilizing the alternative epistemology of pragmatism. While an approach akin to ‘pragmatism’ is historically implicit to Buddhism,³ it lacks a concrete theoretical articulation that makes it understandable in ontological and epistemological terms familiar to the West. Hence, I believe Deleuze’s pragmatism, which gives metaphysics a practical significance, can help supplement Dōgen with a theoretical pragmatist framework. I will argue that if Deleuze’s pragmatism can be shown to be compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*, it can be utilized as an alternative approach to understanding Dōgen’s metaphysics. Consequently, this approach will allow for a new interpretation of Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts without having to fall into the trap of either of the problematic positions introduced above.

In summary, the objective of the current study is as follows. I want to reconsider Dōgen’s thoughts on Total-function, temporality and Buddha-nature, of which Critical Buddhism and comparative interpretations give a shortsighted picture inasmuch as they impose upon Dōgen (what I will henceforth call) a ‘representational epistemology.’ This error prevents the former interpretations of Dōgen to acknowledge that Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts of ‘Total-function,’ time and Buddha-nature can have a practical use for an ethics centred on *pratītyasamutpada*. Deleuze’s philosophy, insofar as it is pragmatist and non-representational, can help to elucidate this limitation and to create a reinterpretation of Dōgen’s doctrine on Total-function, time and Buddha-nature to function in concurrence to *pratītyasamutpāda*.

1.2 What is *Pratītyasamutpāda*?

The question as to whether Dōgen’s metaphysics adheres to *pratītyasamutpāda* or not is an essential one given the fact that *pratītyasamutpāda* is the basis for Buddhist ethics. Should an interpretation of Dōgen’s philosophy be conflicting to this basic doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*, this

³ I will elaborate on this in the upcoming section 1.5

would imply that Dōgen's philosophy becomes ethically problematic and irrelevant for Buddhism. Therefore, to read Dōgen's Buddhist philosophy as a ground for a viable ethics requires that it be interpreted in relation to praṭīyasamutpāda. I will give a more detailed examination of praṭīyasamutpāda in the following chapter. However, since praṭīyasamutpāda constitutes the solid basis upon which this research will read Dōgen through Deleuze, a brief introduction to this concept will be appropriate.

Praṭīyasamutpāda is a basic Buddhist teaching, believed to be the direct consequence, if not the essential nature of the Buddha's enlightenment experience. It is the underlying idea that constitutes the backbone of the fundamental Buddhist teachings on the *Four Noble Truths* (Skt. *catvāri āryasatyāni*) and what is called the *three signs of existence* (Skt. *tri-laksana*).⁴ When the Four Noble Truths claim that:

- 1) This existence is suffering
- 2) There is a cause to this suffering.
- 3) There can be an end to this suffering.
- 4) There is a method by which suffering can be ended

These claims are founded on the idea of praṭīyasamutpāda, which is the view that all things happen by way of cause and effect. This means that all phenomena, whether physical, as things both animate and non-animate (like situations), or mental (as emotions, thoughts, cognition, etc.), cannot be conceived beyond their causal co-dependence. The significance of this idea does not merely lie in its role as an ontological theory which describes reality, but rather in its role as a conceptual tool to be applied in meditation. Praṭīyasamutpāda is supposed to condition meditational practice with the understanding that all forms of human suffering can be logically related to corresponding causes. This helps individuals analyze their internal conditions through meditation so that they can ultimately clarify the causes that are creating their mental suffering. This will aid one to reveal the cause of their suffering by means of self-analysis, to understand it, and finally, to end its recurrence. This also

⁴ Hakamaya Noriaki, *Bukkyo Nyumon* (仏教入門), (Tokyo: Ōkura, 2004), 150-160.

means that pratīyasamutpāda directly affirms and urges analytical reasoning (Skt. *prajñā*) as an indispensable tool for Buddhist meditational practice.⁵

Expanded to an ontological framework that can make sense of reality as a whole, pratīyasamutpāda simply entails that all phenomena, whether physical or psychical, exist by way of a causally interconnected process. Therefore, nothing exists as an independent reality: all phenomena exist as a result of a convergence of the infinite flux of causal processes. In short, there are no entities; there are only causal processes. Pratīyasamutpāda, then, justifies the contents of the *trilaksana* or the “three marks of existence” which are the three overarching facts concerning phenomenal reality attributed to the historical Buddha and which are considered essential in Buddhism.⁶

First in the trilaksana comes the idea of reality as impermanence. Since everything is subject to the fluxal process of causal change, time is always understood as impermanent, which is our lived time that ultimately leads to death. Consequently there can be no state of time transcendent to impermanence. Second is the nature of *anātman* or no-abiding-self.⁷ Since everything is a product of an ongoing flux of causal processes there is no constant entity called the ‘Self’⁸ that can exist independent of everything else and that will persist forever. Third is the nature of reality as suffering. Since our experience of the world is impermanent, it is impossible for one to cling onto anything as an assurance to existence whether it is physical possessions, sensations, people, ideas, or a sense of permanent Selfhood. Ignorance to this reality and a repetition of craving for a satisfaction that can never be achieved will always lead to repeated suffering. Impermanence is always a critical situation for sentient beings since by nature it always leads to suffering as long as one craves for constancy.

⁵ Within the Theravada and Tibetan Buddhist traditions that are most strongly associated with Indian Buddhism, the most foundational form of meditation is *Vipassana* or ‘analytical meditation.’ Concentrated meditational states are not an end in itself, but utilized to enhance the understanding of the self/reality by way of logical analysis.

⁶ Richard King, *Indian Philosophy*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ., 1999), 77-78.

⁷ According to Richard King, Buddhism does not deny the experienced reality of a self-consciousness that thinks and acts with the self-awareness of being a self. It only negates the notion of such a felt self being mistaken as a constant entity. Therefore, I find it more accurate to follow King in expressing *anātman* as “no-abiding-self” rather than the widely used translation of “non-self.” Richard King, *Indian Philosophy*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ., 1999), 82-83.

⁸ I have capitalized the term ‘Self’ whenever it refers to a notion of permanent self-agency, isolated consciousness, or individual entity/essence. Otherwise I have used the lower case when I refer to the Buddhist notion of selfhood as a practical agency conceived as itself a functioning effect of mingling causal factors without permanence or individual existence.

Ultimately, understanding the trilaksana clarifies why praṭītyasamutpāda affirms an altruistic ethics. The ‘self’ is understood only as a provisional and shifting reality that is actually a convergence of everything else that is causing it. Consequently, to be attached to the ‘Self’ and to strive to preserve what is really a non-persisting selfhood can be analyzed as nonsensical, leading to the possibility to dissolve self-centred activity and to cultivate the sense of self-sacrifice for the sake of selfless and attachment-less benevolence for others (i.e. Buddhist compassion, Pali: *mettā* or Skt.: *maitrī*). Much like how praṭītyasamutpāda is utilized to analyze our own suffering, the idea of no-abiding-self as founded on praṭītyasamutpāda conditions meditational practice focused on raising altruistic awareness. Once again this necessitates the ability of analytical reasoning. By accepting the premise that there is no constant selfhood, one can analyze one’s nature of self-centredness through meditation and to help loosen or abolish it in light of selflessness and the interdependence of all beings. Analytical reasoning as implied by praṭītyasamutpāda is also indispensable when putting altruism to action, for it is with reason that we must choose between what maybe a good or bad action in regards to the other.

Conclusively, this means that for Buddhism to maintain its conditions to practically pursue the goals of ending suffering and perfecting altruistic ethics, it must uphold praṭītyasamutpāda at any cost. On the contrary, to uphold an ontology that neglects causality and to claim that it is “Buddhist,” will collapse the whole conditions in which praṭītyasamutpāda grounds meaningful Buddhist practice. Hence, the current study considers reading Dōgen in concurrence to praṭītyasamutpāda is a dire necessity if Dōgen’s philosophy is to be a meaningful tool for Buddhist practice.

Now that we have a fair understanding of praṭītyasamutpāda, I will first offer a brief introduction to Dōgen. Subsequently, I will introduce how Critical Buddhism might be significant in its approach of the question concerning Dōgen’s philosophy and its relation to praṭītyasamutpāda.

1.3 Introducing Dōgen Kigen

Dōgen was a Japanese Buddhist monk who was born in Kyoto (1200 C.E.) and who is now revered as the founder of the Sōtō Zen Buddhist sect. According to biographical lore, Dōgen became

enthralled by the problem of impermanence and death at a very young age owing to the loss of his mother while he was still a child. Such questions of life eventually lead Dōgen to pursue Buddhism as a young monk at Mount Hiei located at the border of Kyoto and Shiga prefectures. There, Dōgen was trained in various Mahayana Buddhist doctrines that were the order of the day. Out of these doctrines, one stood out as decisive for Dōgen's pursuit of Buddhism. This was the doctrine of Original Enlightenment or Hongaku-shisō (本覚思想) which taught that all beings, regardless of their sentiency or non-sentiency, are primordially "enlightened" prior to and regardless of the pursuit of any form of Buddhist practice.⁹ Record has it that Dōgen was deeply puzzled by this doctrine, as it seems to fundamentally deny the importance and significance of Buddhist practice. If the doctrine that we are all primordially "enlightened" is true, then why did the numerous patriarchs and Buddhist masters who came before Dōgen sought practice and enlightenment? Why should one practice Buddhism at all? Nobody at Mt. Hiei was able to give Dōgen a satisfactory answer to this question. Dissatisfied with Mt. Hiei, Dōgen left to pursue this question with various Buddhist masters of his day. During one such visit to question the Tendai Buddhist abbot, Kōin (公胤 1145 - 1216) at the Onjō-ji Temple (園城寺), Dōgen was given the advice that he may only find an answer if he traveled to China to study Ch'an Buddhism. Eventually Dōgen settled to train under master Myōzen (明全 1184 - 1225) at the Kennin-ji Temple (建仁寺) in 1217.

In 1223, Dōgen was finally able to seize on his long sought opportunity to pursue Buddhist training in China. After a dangerous voyage over the ocean with his master Myōzen, Dōgen traveled to find a suitable Chinese master with whom he could pursue his Buddhist quest. Dissatisfied with many of the monks he met in China, Dōgen finally visited Mount Tiāntóng (天童山) where he met master Rújīng (如淨, Jpn. Nyōjo, 1163 - 1228) under whose guidance Dōgen is said to have attained

⁹ Hongaku-shisō has its direct roots in Chinese Buddhism and most notably in the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana Sutra* (大乘起信論 *Daijō-kishin-ron*) written in the 5-6th century AD. See: Noriaki Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 1989), 6-7, 373-375. Religious record has it that the sutra is based on a older Sanskrit version from India, but no Sanskrit or Tibetan language version remains and most modern scholarship sees the sutra as a likely Chinese creation in the 5th to 6th century AD.

perfect enlightenment and received dharma transmission in 1227. Upon returning to Japan Dōgen worked prolifically to spread what he considered the “true dharma” and practice of Buddhism. In contrast to the many Japanese Buddhists of his day who could not affirm the necessity for meditational practice, Dōgen’s understanding of Buddhism was founded on the centrality of meditation affirmed by his understanding of the dharma attained during his stay in China.

Dōgen wrote many writings to explain and promote his Buddhism until his death in 1253. He wrote on many topics ranging from guidance to meditation, formalities concerning rituals, attitudes towards daily monk-life and cooking. Out of these writings, the present study will deal mainly with his masterwork, *Shōbōgenzō* (*Treasury of the True Dharma Eye*) whose writing and editing continued throughout Dōgen’s life. In the *Shōbōgenzō*, Dōgen utilizes many sections to deal with philosophical themes related to ontology and metaphysics such as on the nature of temporality/causal continuity, and Buddha-nature all in relation to Buddhist practice. These philosophically oriented writings found in the *Shōbōgenzō* have stirred continuing scholarly interest pertaining to their originality and complexity leading to many interpretations of his philosophy. However, the tendency of many such interpretations to reiterate Hongaku-shisō, posits an important problem when considering Dōgen’s philosophy in relation to praṭīyasamutpāda. I will describe why this is problematic through the following introduction to who the Critical Buddhists are and why they may be significant for the current study.

1.4 Critical Buddhism and the Problem of Dōgen and Buddhist Ethics

As I will clarify in the next chapter, Critical Buddhism claims that Hongaku ontology contradicts praṭīyasamutpāda. If Hongaku-shisō is incongruent with praṭīyasamutpāda, the question of how and to what extent Dōgen solved the problem of Hongaku-shisō and so, freed himself from its bonds, becomes a crucial point when reading Dōgen in light of praṭīyasamutpāda. Simply reiterating Hongaku-shisō related ideas when reinterpreting Dōgen is most likely to neglect, if not deny, praṭīyasamutpāda. Since the Critical Buddhists were the first scholars who questioned the integrity of

Dōgen's philosophy in line with praṭīyasamutpāda, the following section gives a brief introduction to who the Critical Buddhists are and what they claim. This will clarify the significance of involving Critical Buddhism in the present study. And subsequently, elaborate on the ethical importance of why Dōgen needs to be read in relation to praṭīyasamutpāda.

The philological, historical and philosophical studies of Dōgen's writings have come far since Watsuji's significant study, *Shamon Dōgen*¹⁰ had opened interest for Dōgen's writings beyond their status as a purely religious object of veneration within the sectarian walls of the Sōtō Zen organization. However, despite the history of more than 80 years of Dōgen scholarship, the important question of Dōgen's philosophy and its relation to praṭīyasamutpāda had not been raised until Critical Buddhism had instigated the debate.¹¹ The reference to Critical Buddhism in this study is crucial given that the Critical Buddhists were the first Japanese intellectuals who explicitly put forth the important argument concerning the connection between praṭīyasamutpāda and ethical integrity against Japanese Buddhist doctrines including that of Dōgen. While the next chapter will show how the current study disagrees with Critical Buddhism's conclusion concerning Dōgen's metaphysics, it

¹⁰ Watsuji's *Shamon Dōgen* was originally published in 1926 and is considered the first secular study of Dōgen's philosophy. The text is available as an English translation with the following title, Watsuji Tetsurō, *Purifying Zen: Watsuji Tetsurō's Shamon Dōgen*, Trans. Steve Bein, (Honolulu: Hawaii Univ., 2011).

¹¹ For the Critical Buddhists, the problem of Dōgen and his attitude towards praṭīyasamutpāda is also related to a particular philological debate concerning the differences in content between early Dōgen's 75 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* (written between 1231-1246) and the later-life 12 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* (most of it written during the 1250s until his death in 1253). The Critical Buddhists notice a major difference in content between the earlier and later fascicles of the *Shōbōgenzō*. They consider the earlier 75 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* in which all of Dōgen's more ontologically oriented writings are included as incongruent with praṭīyasamutpāda since they interpret Dōgen as taking a stance too close to Hongaku doctrine. However, Critical Buddhism sees that Dōgen in the 12 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* seems to have replaced his earlier Hongaku influenced ideas with that of placing absolute centrality in praṭīyasamutpāda. The orthodox Sōtō Zen perspective as well as the views of scholars who share the orthodox view on the contents of the whole *Shōbōgenzō* (including both the 75 and the later 12 fascicles) had been to see it as a homogenous piece of work in which Dōgen takes a consistent stance throughout the work. The orthodox view is based on the presumption that since Dōgen had attained perfect enlightenment while in China, an enlightened monk could not have changed his mind halfway through his life. Critical Buddhism seriously challenges this assumption. The current study will not address the above debate since it is not concerned with the question of if there is continuity between the 75 and 12 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* or not. I am questioning the way Critical Buddhism interprets Dōgen's ontology on the grounds of practical significance and not on the terms of philology. The question of continuity is of little significance for this study since when we read Dōgen from a pragmatist perspective what is important is how his ideas can be made to function in support of Buddhist practice, and not the 'true' meaning, intent, or historicity of the work believed to exist independently of our concerns. For more on the continuity debate surrounding the *Shōbōgenzō* see: Steven Heine, "Critical Buddhism and Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*," *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Jamie Hubbard & Paul L. Swanson, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1997). Steven Heine, "The Dōgen Canon: Dōgen's Pre-*Shōbōgenzō* Writings and the Question of Change in His Later Works," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 24:1-2 (1997). Hakamaya Noriaki, *Dōgen to Bukkyō (道元と仏教)*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 1992), 107-108. Matsumoto Shirō, *Dōgen Shisō-ron (道元思想論)*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 2000), 244.

largely concurs with its attitude towards *prāṭīyasamutpāda* and its relation to ethics. Therefore, a brief introduction to Critical Buddhism and their argument concerning how Buddhist doctrines that do not adhere to *prāṭīyasamutpāda* undermine ethics will be indispensable.

“Critical Buddhism” is a Western label given to a Japanese intellectual movement¹² that began in the late 1980s involving two Japanese Buddhologists, Noriaki Hakamaya and Shirō Matsumoto, who both profess Buddhism as their religious faith. They call for a critical revision of the ethical responsibility held by the Japanese Buddhist (influenced) intelligentsia through a critique of their writings and the doctrines utilized in these writings by confronting them with the central Buddhist teaching of *prāṭīyasamutpāda*.¹³ The Critical Buddhists demonstrate through doctrinal critique that a Buddhism which has denied or neglected *prāṭīyasamutpāda* can no longer doctrinally or practically account for a truly altruistic ethics. Their initiative is to urge a revision of the ethical and social role of Japanese Zen Buddhists based on a renewed emphasis on Buddhism as ultimately founded on *prāṭīyasamutpāda*. In their view, this makes necessary the observance of an altruistic ethics, based on analytical and critical thinking.

As I have already mentioned, *prāṭīyasamutpāda* entails both analytical reasoning and altruism. Critical Buddhism claims that *prajñā* or what it interprets as the wisdom pertaining to the analytical discrimination of phenomena, what in Sanskrit is called *prajñā dharma-pravicaya*,¹⁴ is essential for ethics. To follow *prāṭīyasamutpāda* means that one must utilize one’s analytical abilities to understand reality, distinguish between cause and effects, good and bad. The understanding that

¹² While Western scholars often call Critical Buddhism a ‘movement,’ the label may be overblown given the fact that its most well known adherents count to a mere two intellectuals, and they do not necessarily consider themselves a tightly defined collective. It seems more that both scholars refer to each other owing to the fact that they both came to a similar perspective concerning Buddhism on individual grounds and came to incorporate each other’s ideas on tactical grounds for criticizing the Zen Buddhist mainstream.

¹³ While instigating much misunderstanding and reactive claims from both scholars and monks within and without the Japanese Buddhist community, the Critical Buddhists have not shied away from making the strong claim that such forms of Buddhism as in the case of Zen which no longer observe *prāṭīyasamutpāda* are “non-Buddhist.” However, Hakamaya does attempt to make it clear that they do not deny the historical or cultural reality of Japanese Buddhism as being ‘Buddhist.’ Rather, Hakamaya calling Zen as being “non-Buddhist” is an ethical claim contingent to his particular perspective of proper Buddhism as being one that is founded on *prāṭīyasamutpāda*. The collection of articles on the book, *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Jamie Hubbard & Paul L. Swanson, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1997) are exemplary of the kind of academic response Critical Buddhism gained outside of Japan.

¹⁴ Hakamaya Noriaki, *Hihan Bukkyo (批判仏教)*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 1990), 31. Also Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyo*, 67. This view that *prajñā* (or wisdom) pertains to analytical discrimination of phenomena can be traced to the early Buddhist school of Sarvāstivāda.

reality is impermanent also means that every situation is constantly changing whereby there cannot be a persistent, universally applicable solution to all personal and ethical problems. This means that, while the foundation of Buddhist ethics lies in compassion, all other decisions concerning what may be good or bad, and what may be the most suitable ethical action or not in each situation are never predetermined or grounded on rules or regulations. Rather, every decision necessitates the analytical evaluation of the self and the reality of every situation. For example, prior to any ethical action, it is necessary for one to question if that particular action is founded on a selfish intent or not, or if a particular action is effective or necessary for the better of the other, etc. in accordance to an adequate understanding of the situations surrounding the action. Consequently, this means ethical decision and action cannot be unconditionally overridden by such values as common sense, social status, power or rules pertaining to the status quo, but must always be individually analyzed, questioned and decided upon in accordance to evaluative decisions even if this means that at times one must go against the status quo.

The Critical Buddhist perspective is that much of Japanese Buddhism denies *prafīyasamutpāda* to the extent that it is influenced by the doctrine of Original Enlightenment (本覚思想 *Hongaku-shisō*).¹⁵ As I have briefly mentioned, questioning *Hongaku-shisō* constituted a major impetus in Dōgen’s Buddhist quest. The doctrine claims that all beings are originally and primordially endowed with a pure Buddha-nature which is itself “enlightened” and therefore all beings are “originally enlightened” even before any practice or learning of the Dharma (meaning the Buddha’s teachings) takes place. According to Critical Buddhism, the doctrine of Original Enlightenment is incompatible with *prafīyasamutpāda* since it affirms Buddha-nature as a metaphysical ground or essence to reality that is transcendent to causality. Therefore, to what extent Dōgen’s philosophy resembles *Hongaku-shisō* constitutes an essential question concerning if Dōgen is

¹⁵ Critical Buddhists understand that the doctrine of Original Enlightenment is a consequence of the historical development of Japanese Buddhism from its origins in Chinese Buddhism. Japanese Buddhism like Zen inherited much of the Chinese doctrines that ontologized or substantialized Buddhist concepts. Such concepts as enlightenment and Buddha-nature (the idea of an inherent faculty within human beings which stands for their potential for enlightenment) were developed into a sense of metaphysical ‘Truth’ (i.e. *Tathātā*, Thusness), Self-essence (*atma*), or realm (i.e. *Buddha-dhātu*, or Buddha-realm, and *Dharma-dhātu*, or Dharma realm) that exists as primordial essence and/or origin to existence. This is a problem since such ideas create a sense of permanently unchanging ground to existence which is understood as overruling reality prior to or beyond causality.

congruent with *pratītyasamutpāda*. As I will analyze in the next chapter, Critical Buddhism views that to the extent that Dōgen uncritically reiterates the ontology of Hongaku-shisō in his philosophy, it is in denial of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

Critical Buddhism claims that Hongaku-shisō directly leads to a degeneration of ethics. The problem lies on two levels. First, there is an ontological problem. Hongaku-shisō establishes Buddha-nature as a metaphysical ‘ground,’ understanding it as a primordially ‘undefiled’ (i.e. “enlightened”), unfathomable realm behind ordinary reality, which while indistinguishable from the ordinary, functions as its principle and ground. This metaphysical reality is identified with a sense of ‘perfection’ prior to and beyond human decisions or thinking as their “originally enlightened” state. If the world is primordially ‘perfect’ as-it-is, then ethics becomes unnecessary. The reason is, if our lived reality is immediately equal to perfection, nothing needs to be changed and therefore evil actions, meaning those which cause suffering to others, are affirmed as themselves playing a role in the “enlightened” whole and therefore are in no need of countermeasures. Consequently, altruistic ethics founded on *prajñā* becomes unnecessary in exchange for a simple affirmation of all existence as good-as-it-is for it is “enlightened.”¹⁶

Critical Buddhism observes that Hongaku-shisō had both a latent and conscious influence on such a degeneration of ethical responsibility as evidenced by the Japanese Zen Buddhists in their active justification of the Japanese war efforts during WWII, as well as in the cases of social injustice found in the class discrimination that were justified by the Sōtō Zen sect.¹⁷ When Hongaku-shisō’s fundamental ethical passivity is utilized in support of the state apparatus, it can easily become a

¹⁶ An exemplary case is harshly pointed out by Matsumoto in his critique of Japanese intellectual Shinichi Tsuda’s *dhātu-vādic* views on Buddhism which lead Tsuda to make such ethically questionable claims that even the most suffering outcasts in India are as they are in their suffering fulfilling their absolute role in the beauty of the all-inclusive harmony of *Tathātā*. Matsumoto, *Engi to Ku*, 137-140. For Critical Buddhism’s view against the lack of ethics in Hongaku-based philosophies also see *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 254-255. Also see Steven Heine, “Critical Buddhism and Dōgen’s *Shōbōgenzō*: The Debate Over the 75-Fascicle and 12-Fascicle Texts”, *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Jamie Hubbard & Paul L. Swanson, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1997), 256-257.

¹⁷ See Bodiford’s article for details on the discriminatory problems Sōtō Zen encapsulated until active reform was instigated. William Bodiford, “Zen and the Art of Religious Prejudice: Efforts to Reform a Tradition of Social Discrimination,” *Japanese Journal for Religious Studies* 23:1-2, (1996). Concerning the affirmative role Zen Buddhism had played in the Japanese war efforts see: Brian Daizen Victoria, *Zen at War*. 2nd Edition, (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦, *Bukkyo no Sensō Sekinin* (仏教の戦争責任) 1970, reprinted in *Ichikawa Hakugen Chosakushū* Vol.3 (市川白弦著作集 3), (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1993).

justification of power, violence and the status quo as itself unconditionally “enlightened” and thus ‘good,’ regardless if the power structure is causing harm to people.¹⁸ When such attitudes disseminate amongst the Buddhist public via the influence of monks, they can justify a form of ignorance or passivity to the evils of the state. Therefore, Critical Buddhists observe that a “Buddhism” not founded in *pratītyasamutpāda*, rather than upholding individual altruistic ethical action, actually ends up unconditionally supporting the power structure and the status quo regardless of if the status quo is causing harm and suffering. If we want to insist on Dōgen’s ongoing ethical and practical relevance today, then it will be essential to show that Dōgen needs to be read in line with *pratītyasamutpāda*. Now that we have highlighted the importance of Critical Buddhism in understanding the ethical significance of *pratītyasamutpāda* when reading Dōgen, I would like to return to introducing the common problem found in both the Critical Buddhist and the comparative interpretations of Dōgen; that is, the problem of how they tie metaphysics to ‘representation.’

1.5 The Problem of Reading Dōgen’s Metaphysics as Corresponding to Reality

The present study largely agrees with Critical Buddhism’s understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* as essential for Buddhist ethics. Therefore, it believes that reconnecting *pratītyasamutpāda* to various “Buddhist” philosophies is a matter of ethical necessity. However, I do not agree with its conclusion that Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts simply has to be put aside as “non-Buddhist.” Neither do I agree with the way comparative philosophers confuse their latent ‘Western’ (or ‘Westernized’) bias concerning metaphysics with Dōgen’s ideas, as we shall see that this enhances their tendency to reiterate *Hongaku-shisō* in their reading of Dōgen. I will argue later in this study that both the Critical Buddhist and comparative philosophical interpretations of Dōgen’s metaphysics rely on a prejudice concerning the meaning and utility of ‘metaphysics’ as exclusively tied to a correspondence theory of truth. By this, I mean that both Critical Buddhism and the comparative

¹⁸ A famous quote from Zen Master Harada Daiun Sogaku from 1939 is exemplary of such an attitude where state-sanctioned violence is considered “enlightened”: “If ordered to march: tramp, tramp or shoot: bang, bang. This is the manifestation of the highest wisdom of enlightenment. The unity of Zen and war ... extends to the farthest reaches of the holy war now under way.” Quoted in Victoria, p.xiv.

philosophical interpreters consider metaphysics to be necessarily ‘representational’ or mirroring a ‘truth’ of reality in order to explicate or describe its nature. This becomes evident in their assumption that Dōgen’s philosophy describes a ‘true-way-reality-is,’ founded on a ‘pure’ experience of such a reality.

What I am addressing as the ‘correspondence theory of truth’ or the ‘theory of representation’ is as follows. It is the epistemological theory that holds that human knowledge is made possible by the assumption that there is a corresponding relationship between the act of knowing (subjective act believed to go on “inside”) and the reality it comes to know (or objective truth that is believed to exist “outside” the Mind).¹⁹ This entails that knowing is the activity of representing reality by knowledge.²⁰ Therefore, truth and falsity are contested on the point of, first, the presumed condition that there is an objective something, fact or meaning outside the mind that can be represented, and, second by how “accurately” this object can be described through the corresponding knowledge.

On an ontological level, a correspondent theory of truth usually presumes the view of *ontological realism* that there is an objective reality existent outside the mind that is capable of grounding the truth claim of the corresponding knowledge, thought, or language that is believed to represent reality. Ultimately, the present study considers the theory of correspondence as founded on the necessity of a dualistic view of reality and knowledge that must assume the independence between the subject and the object, the knower and the known, concepts and things, signifier and signified. This means that whether conceived as ontological or as semantic, correspondence theory considers

¹⁹ The epistemology is rooted in claims made by both Plato and Aristotle. For example according to Plato: “Everything has a right name of its own, which comes by nature, and that a name is not whatever people call a thing by agreement, just a piece of their own voice applied to the thing, but that there is a kind of inherent correctness in names, which is the same for all men.” *Cratylus* 385b2 Plato, *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vol. 12, trans. Harold N. Fowler, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921), accessed January 11, 2015, <http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg005.perseus-eng1:383a>. Aristotle also implies a relationship between ‘truth’ and underlying ‘things’ when he mentions: “For there being a man reciprocates as to implication of existence with the true statement about it: if there is a man, the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, and reciprocally – since if the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, there is a man. And whereas the true statement is in no way the cause of the actual thing’s existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement’s being true; it is because the actual thing exists or does not that the statement is called true or false.” *Categories* 14b11 Aristotle, *Categories and De Interpretatione*, trans. J.L. Ackrill, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 47.

²⁰ For example, according to Rorty, a philosophy that takes representational epistemology as its foundation for the understanding of knowledge thinks, “to know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations.” Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 30th Anniversary Edition*, (Princeton: Princeton University, 2009), 3.

thought, knowledge, concepts, or language, as ‘representing’ an objective nature, whether this be a physical phenomenon (i.e. things, people, and conditions), or semantic (in the case of meanings, facts and intents), or metaphysical as in the case of abstract realities (i.e. Platonic forms, eternal principles, God, etc.).

As we will see in chapter two through a detailed analysis of Matsumoto’s interpretation of Dōgen, Matsumoto seems to imply that Dōgen’s philosophy is attempting to ‘represent’ a ‘true-way-reality-is,’ or is founded on the assumption that there is an ontological ‘truth’ to reality. In addition, we shall also show how Critical Buddhism takes the position of strict denial towards any form of metaphysics and ontology as incompatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*.²¹ Such a denial of metaphysics as in opposition to *pratītyasamutpāda* is understandable given that metaphysics is taken as ‘corresponding’ to reality. If so, metaphysics becomes an explanatory act grounded by a pre-existing reality, principle or meaning that waits to be “uncovered,” represented and articulated through metaphysical inquiry. Consequently, metaphysics understood in such a way, implies a reality that exists independently from the causally inseparable processes of living or knowing. If one is to accept this premise, it is true that to the extent the correspondent theory of truth must always assume and rely on a grounding truth that makes knowledge possible, any claim based on correspondence theory is by design incongruent to *pratītyasamutpāda*.

However, the above rejection of metaphysics only makes sense on the presumption that metaphysics is by default founded on the idea that there is a ‘true-way-reality-is,’ motivated by a search for such grounds of existence. In addition, the above denial of metaphysics assumes that *pratītyasamutpāda* itself is somehow exempt from being ontological. A fixation on the idea that metaphysics is always representational precludes the following possibilities. First, the possibility that metaphysics can work practically in congruence with *pratītyasamutpāda*. Second, the possibility that *pratītyasamutpāda* itself be understood as ontological, without having to deny its own practical significance. Such fixation do not even consider the possibility that we may be able to choose to live

²¹ This is indicative of Critical Buddhism’s debt to the Madhyamaka stance towards ontological theories. Madhyamaka is the school of Buddhist thought founded by Nāgārjuna that developed a method of powerful logical criticism founded on *reductio ad absurdum* arguments targeted towards ontologies that claim self-essence and causal independence.

in accordance to absolutely different worldviews outside of ‘representation,’ and if so, Dōgen’s metaphysics may be given a much different practical significance.

Just as well as in Critical Buddhism, we find the latent tendency towards the correspondence theory of truth in the comparative philosophical interpreters of Dōgen. I will elaborate in chapter three that four exemplary cases of comparative philosophical interpretations of Dōgen by Abe, Heine, Kasulis, and Glass testify to the same hermeneutical myopia as Critical Buddhism concerning the significance of metaphysics, yet in a different context. These scholars interpret Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts as constituting a description of the ‘true-way-reality-is’ directly experienced from an “enlightened” perspective. Such an interpretation reveals their assumption that metaphysics is by nature ‘representational.’ I will later elaborate on how these scholars read Dōgen more or less in line with Hongaku-shisō and how this mutually enhances the tendency towards understanding metaphysics as corresponding to ‘truth.’ The basic ‘representational’ assumption that metaphysical concepts correspond to a ‘true-way-reality-is’ reinforces the Hongaku premise that there is a ‘primordially enlightened’ reality grounding all existence. Such interpretations of Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts are incongruent to *pratīyasamutpāda* to the extent that they assume there is a grounding metaphysical reality beyond the causal process of impermanence.

Consequently, I believe the Critical Buddhist and comparative philosophical views concerning Dōgen’s metaphysics are limited by their implicit adherence to an epistemology of correspondent truth in understanding the utility of metaphysical concepts. Reinterpreting Dōgen in an alternative manner to Critical Buddhism, and the comparative interpretations while respecting *pratīyasamutpāda* necessitates a thorough reconsideration of the foundational epistemology, and methods with which such a task should be undertaken. Therefore, in contrast to the above approaches, I believe an analysis of Dōgen via *pratīyasamutpāda* will benefit from a primarily practice-based approach entailing an alternative epistemology of pragmatism.²² By this I mean that the merits of his philosophy need to be evaluated according to an understanding of how it (can) function and what kind

²² Concerning this point, I do agree with scholars as Kasulis and Glass in the view that Dōgen needs to be read from the perspective of practice, though we shall see in chapter three that I do not agree with the particular way these scholars utilize this perspective in their interpretations of Dōgen.

of effects it (can) cause when considered holistically in relation to its utility for actual spiritual practice.

In agreement with scholars like Schroeder, Loy and LaFleur, I believe such a ‘pragmatist’ attitude is at least partly inherent to Buddhism.²³ For example Schroeder claims that ‘pragmatism’ is apparent in the doctrine of *upāya* or *skillful means* (also translated as “expedient means,” “skill-in-means,” Jpn. 方便 *houben*). *Upāya* is a practice-based doctrine central in Mahayana Buddhism rooted in the understanding that the historical Buddha utilized many different teachings in accordance to the ability and nature of the listener.²⁴ The idea behind this is that since all humans are different, there is not one way of guidance that is effective for all. Therefore, one must pragmatically choose the most effective methods to guide the particular listener to the path to overcome ignorance and suffering.²⁵ No one teaching is absolute, and every teaching is always significant only to the extent they fulfill practical purposes. Hence, all teachings are tools and should never be a source for attachment. This aspect of *upāya* is also evident in the way the Buddha’s teachings are often likened to a raft with which one overcomes the river of suffering only to discard it once one reaches the other

²³ Several scholars have explicitly stated pragmatism as an inherent attitude in Buddhism: John Schroeder explores this aspect of Buddhism from the stance of the doctrine of *upāya* and how such an attitude transforms the way one needs to read Buddhist doctrine as purely practice-based. William LaFleur explores the pragmatic nature of how Japanese Buddhism has long embraced the question of abortion. According to his study, Japanese Buddhists have long catered to the suffering, guilt and grief of the mothers who had to abort their children by pragmatically dispensing strict adherence to Buddhist precepts, as well as suspending ideological debates of “good” or “bad” in affirming Jizō rituals as a practical therapeutic aid for family members. Rather than polarizing the population in terms of a debate of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ concerning abortion, Japanese Buddhists chose to pragmatically embrace what is a real social and individual problem that needed practical aid. David Loy explores the perspective that Buddhism is purely pragmatic in its worldview and therefore its philosophies are not concerned with ‘truth,’ but are ‘stories’ intentionally created for the sake of achieving its spiritual goals.

John Schroeder, “Nagarjuna and the Doctrine of Skillful Means”, *Philosophy East and West* 50.4 (2000).

William R. LaFleur, *Liquid Life: Abortion and Buddhism in Japan*, (New Jersey: Princeton, 1992).

David Loy, *The World is Made of Stories*, (Boston: Wisdom, 2010).

²⁴ For example, in some cases the Buddha taught through various philosophical expositions (sometimes with seemingly conflicting contents), at times through anecdotes and stories, at times through silence, through miracles etc.

²⁵ See for example:

The Lotus Sutra, trans. Gene Reeves, (Boston: Wisdom, 2008), 25. “As a king or emperor of medicine, they analyze diseases, know well the properties of medicines, give them to all the living according to the diseases, and get them to take them.”

Vimalakīrti Sūtra, trans. Dianna Y. Paul, Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai,

https://www.bdkamerica.org/digital/dBET_Srimala_Vimalakirti_2004.pdf (April 15, 2011) [Original Source,

Vimalakīrti Sūtra, trans. Dianna Y. Paul, (Berkeley: Numata Centre, 2004)].

The sutra reference skillful means as cure: “great medicine kings who were good at healing the various illnesses; provided medicine according to the illness and caused it to be taken” (70)

“Be the physician king, healing the host of illnesses. Thus should bodhisattvas comfort bodhisattvas who are ill, making them happy.” (110)

shore of Nirvana.²⁶

Mahayana Buddhism learned from such pragmatist attitudes of the Buddha to construct the idea of upāya as a resistance towards a creation of orthodoxy in praxis. Such an orthodoxy in which liberation becomes exclusive only to a fixed set of coded practices included the danger of creating attachment and fixation on these practices as ‘absolute.’ Upāya emphasized the freedom to utilize any practical means in accordance to their effectiveness when applied to different individuals and situations, even if this may at occasions lead to a transgression of monastic vows and established doctrines.²⁷ Any method of teaching/practice will become an upāya as long as it is founded on pratīyasamutpāda, prajñā cultivated from proper practice, and an authentic aspiration for enlightenment and altruism (i.e. compassion).²⁸

According to Schroeder, understanding Buddhism from the stance of upāya implies doing philosophy from an alternative perspective than a fixation on purely theoretical matters and the view that Buddhist soteriology is only a matter of having the “right” theoretical view:

“Skill-in-means” is philosophy, albeit in a different sense from the way it is traditionally conceived. Western philosophy traditionally favors theoretical reflection over praxis and devotes most of its intellectual effort to solving metaphysical problems, often with the assumption, that these problems need to be solved in order to live a meaningful life. What distinguishes the doctrine of upāya (and perhaps the entire Buddhist tradition) from this approach is that it shuns any attempt to understand Buddhism apart from its practices. Taking its cue from the Buddha’s refusal to speculate on non-soteriological problems, upāya rejects the idea that metaphysics precedes praxis or that liberation requires theoretical speculation. It is therefore profoundly philosophical and represents a critical, self-reflective movement in the Buddhist tradition.²⁹

However, the doctrine of upāya is more of a ‘practical’ attitude than a concrete doctrine elaborated in ontological or epistemological terms. The doctrine is mostly implied rather than clearly described or articulated. For this reason there is no detailed ‘philosophy of upāya’ that clearly argues for and justifies the Buddhist pragmatist attitude towards ontology and metaphysics in a manner

²⁶ Loy, *The World is Made of Stories*, 80.

²⁷ Richard H. Robinson & Willard L. Johnson, *The Buddhist Religion: A Historical Perspective*, (London: Wadsworth, 1997), 90.

²⁸ John Schroeder, “Nagarjuna and the Doctrine of Skillful Means”, *Philosophy East and West* 50.4 (2000): 562. One’s progress in cultivating prajñā and compassion will further ensure the choice and effectiveness of upāya.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 560.

readily apparent for those only familiar with the ‘Western’ tradition of philosophy. This leads to the necessity for a ‘Western’ pragmatist framework which can help elucidate Buddhist ontology on practical terms.

This is where I consider Deleuze’s philosophy may become an intellectual tool to supplement, and to enhance the pragmatist function of Buddhism. Deleuze’s conception of philosophy as a practice centered on epistemological and ontological reasoning in terms of practical utility may be relevant for justifying and articulating why Dōgen’s metaphysics can also be read pragmatically. In addition, Deleuze’s own metaphysics may be insightful when reinterpreting Dōgen’s ideas since it may provide terminologies to articulate Dōgen in a manner that does not transgress *pratītyasamutpāda*. However, for Deleuze’s pragmatism to be proven useful for Dōgen, I must show that it is compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*. The specific details of Deleuze’s pragmatism and how it may be compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda* will be analyzed in chapter four. For now it will suffice to briefly introduce how the present study understands “philosophy as practice” and how Deleuze’s pragmatism is crucial in such a view of philosophy. The fact that Dōgen’s Buddhism and Deleuze’s utility of metaphysics constitutes ‘practice’ is a crucial point, since it is from the vantage point of considering philosophy as a practical endeavor that Deleuze can be adduced to clarify Dōgen’s concepts.

1.6 Deleuze’s Pragmatism and Understanding Philosophy as Practice

What I mean by “philosophy as a practical endeavor” within the course of this study is to understand philosophy as a practical system of self-transformation involving concrete techniques such as analytical inquiry, meditation and the creation of concepts all targeted at a transformation of one’s way of life within an aspired value-system of what is considered as virtuous living. In other words, the present study understands ‘philosophy’ within the tradition that considers it as a praxis, in which according to Pierre Hadot, philosophy is understood “not as a theoretical construct, but as a method for training people to live and to look at the world in a new way.”³⁰ This means philosophy is a

³⁰ Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 107.

collection of what Foucault calls *technologies of the self*³¹ and what Hadot favours to call *spiritual exercises*. These are techniques and practices designed to critically tune one's view of the world outside of the normative³² and to transform one's way of life in accordance to the ethical virtue valued by that particular worldview.³³ To the extent that Buddhism founded on *prāṭīyasamutpāda* is an alternative worldview, which necessitates such practices as the cultivation of analytical reasoning, compassion and meditation to fulfill its ethical goals, it is by nature a praxis-based philosophy pragmatically involving various spiritual exercises.³⁴

Taking the stance of "philosophy as practice" implies that the relationship between ontology/metaphysics and ethics/practice has a much different significance than usually considered. For example, such a relationship can be inferred from Critical Buddhism's assessment of Buddhist doctrines. When it points out the ethical flaws of particular Buddhist doctrines, it implies that Buddhist ontology and ethics are considered to be connected with each other. According to their view of Buddhist doctrine and its relation to practice, Buddhist ontology either is faithful to *prāṭīyasamutpāda* and upholds an altruistic ethics, or it neglects *prāṭīyasamutpāda* and therefore destroys ethics. What is not made explicit yet implied in this view is that ontology creates the cosmology or conceptual framework within which practice is based. If the ontology cannot support or affirm an altruistic ethics, it cannot construct the conceptual backgrounds by which ethics is entailed or advocated as an aspired virtue to be cultivated through spiritual practice. If the conceptual framework does not allow for an altruistic ethics, this means that spiritual practice also loses its significance or 'edge' as a means to nurture compassionate mind and action. At worst, an ontology

³¹ Foucault derives this idea from the ancient Greek concept of *epimeleia heautou* or the "care of the self" and defines it as the technology, "which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality." Michel Foucault, *Technologies of the Self*, Ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, & Patrick H. Hutton, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 18.

Concerning how Foucault defines the "care of the self" also refer to: Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège De France 1981 – 1982*, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005), 10-11.

³² Pierre Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ., 2002), 3.

³³ Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 82, 107.

³⁴ Hadot has made repeated remarks that he cannot deny an essential proximity between the philosophical content and particular practical techniques utilized in both the ancient Hellenic and Buddhist traditions of philosophy. Pierre Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, 232-233, 278-279.

devoid of ethics can spoil spiritual practice, and the mind cultivated out of such a practice may proliferate vice by maintaining or worsening the unethical presumptions forming the ontology. In this sense the current study considers ontology/metaphysics and ethics/practice as indissolubly linked. Ontology sets the conditions for the significance of practice, and in turn, spiritual practice feeds back into the continued development of the ontology within a mutual relationship where each becomes the other's prerequisite and precondition in order to continuously affirm and maximize their mutual functions. We shall later see in chapter four how Deleuze's pragmatism, especially his concept of 'heterogenesis,' may be an adequate tool to set the philosophical backgrounds for such a perspective on the connectivity between ontology and ethics, since it deals with these two aspects as mutually implicative.

Deleuze conceived of metaphysics as being in proximity to spiritual exercises.³⁵ Therefore, a brief introduction to how Deleuze understood 'philosophy as practice' and how he utilizes pragmatism as a tool to incorporate metaphysics within practice will be appropriate. Deleuze tries to overcome not only what he views as the shortcoming of the age-old paradigm of truth-as-correspondence, but also the "postmodern" collapse of metaphysics, by developing a particular pragmatic epistemological approach which reconsiders metaphysics as a practical endeavor. Deleuze was not concerned with doing philosophy as a means to merely theoretically justify some perspective in contrast to or in critique of old paradigms of thought, such as the correspondence theory of truth. Rather, Deleuze attempts to make his philosophy a practical endeavor which functions as a technique for individuals to tackle the ethical problem of overcoming ill conscience which negates the human power to affirm life and creation. Within this context, Deleuze's philosophy attempts to make the creation of metaphysical concepts function as a technology of self-care. That is, Deleuze suggests

³⁵ Deleuze's conception of philosophy as practice becomes evident in his collaborative work with Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, that is designed to be utilized as a set of conceptual tools for individuals to re-conceive the world and the self rather than as a book of theory. This intent is most apparent in the chapter "How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?" which is written as a practical guide for one to question and to reconstitute a completely alternative way of making sense of reality for the sake of resisting ill conscience and "common sense." See: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: Minnesota Univ., 1987).

Deleuze also revealed how he found his philosophical endeavor close to how later Foucault made use of the idea of philosophy as a 'care of the self' (Grk. *epimeleia heautou*). Deleuze interprets Foucault's turn to the subject as an effort to re-conceive philosophy in the form of an ethical practice for reconstituting the self and life as an ongoing creation of a "work of art." Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1995), 94-101.

understanding metaphysics as a pure creation of abstract concepts, much like mathematical formulas, which function within an internally consistent system without the necessity for corresponding to an outside truth. According to this understanding, metaphysical concepts are created to fulfill their desired effects in practice as opposed to being a way to explicate an objective ‘true-way-reality-is.’ Such an approach to philosophy which leaves behind the concern for the searching of corresponding ‘truths’ behind or beyond phenomena, while being exclusively concerned with how concepts are made to function to fulfill particular practical purposes is what Deleuze considers “pragmatist” or a “pragmatics.”

As I will elaborate in chapter four, Deleuze’s pragmatism is developed from a particular view on the genesis of knowledge which Deleuze calls ‘heterogenesis.’ The concept of heterogenesis also ties in with how Deleuze uses the binary concepts of ‘virtuality’ and ‘actuality’ to explicate the ontological coexistence of univocity and difference without having to resort to a universalist reductionism (i.e. reducing difference to an all-encompassing One), nor to transcendence. There, I will argue as to how such Deleuzian concepts are compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda* since they do not entail a foundationalist or essentialist ontology. Ultimately these concepts will help reinterpret Dōgen’s concept of “Total-function” (全機 *Zenki*) as a key to creating a new way of making sense of Dōgen’s idea of time and Buddha-nature. This will make it possible to read Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts as fulfilling practical functions in spiritual exercises as opposed to the traditional view that Dōgen’s metaphysics is referring to a ‘true-way-reality-is’ that exists beyond causality.

1.7 The Present Study in Relation to Comparative Philosophy

The use that I will be making of Deleuzian philosophy to reinterpret the ideas of Dōgen inevitably locates this research within what has traditionally been called “comparative philosophy.” I hope my study to be of interest to both those who are only familiar with the Western tradition of philosophy and to those who are only familiar with Buddhism. However, I understand that the method of relating thinkers of diverse traditions from Asia and Europe makes the research most

readily accessible to an audience familiar with the comparative philosophical field.

The concrete aim of this research has little to do with directly addressing the problem of re-conceiving comparative philosophy. Yet, to the extent that the execution of this research urges an awareness of the strength and weaknesses of comparative philosophical approaches, it will need to clarify its stance on how it conceives comparative philosophy and how it hopes to overcome its problems. Therefore, the subsequent section will be dedicated to a brief account of the problems of comparative philosophy and how these call for a strongly individuated methodological awareness.

1.7.1 Overcoming the Problems of Comparative Philosophy: Contingency and Neutrality

According to the critique put forth by such scholars as King and Rorty, comparative philosophy faces the following problems. First, there is what Rorty calls the problem of “contingency.” All thinking (whether intentionally and/or latently) is contingent to its external contexts, for these involve the various cultural, historical, social, and political environments in which a particular thinker was set, and to its internal contexts, such as the thinker’s existential needs, purposes and values from which his/her philosophy arose. If this is true, to understand a particular thinker entails understanding these external and internal contexts as “accurately” as possible.³⁶ Consequently, a philological or historical perspective on comparative philosophy that emphasizes contextual ‘accuracy’ can undermine the act of ‘comparing’ itself by tending towards forms of relativism which King calls “cultural isolationism.”³⁷ From this perspective, ideas are so embedded within their contexts that it will be unsuitable or unjustifiable to compare or to place ideas in connection with other ideas born in “alien” contexts.³⁸

³⁶ Rorty asserts that when we try to understand a particular philosopher, we must understand “what they were up to, which thoughts comforted or hurt them and which they brushed aside or never had, we have to know what books they read” in other words to understand as thoroughly as possible the internal and external context in which that thought arose. But since putting ourselves absolutely in the shoes of these thinkers is practically impossible, we settle with “imposing the grid of our own needs upon the books these men wrote, and blanking out most of their needs.” Richard Rorty, Review of *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, by Gerald James, *Philosophy East and West* 39.3 (1989): 332.

³⁷ Richard King, *Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and the ‘Mystic East’* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 76-80.

³⁸ For example, both Rorty and Gadamer have made remarks implying that the discipline and terminology of ‘philosophy’ is purely contingent to ‘Western’ historical and cultural contexts. Both Rorty and Gadamer presume that

However, as both King and Goto-Jones have pointed out,³⁹ cultural isolationism is a highly absurd position since it ignores the fact that philosophers from the ‘Western’ past (as in the case of the ancient Greeks) are just as alien to us today as thinkers from any other tradition.⁴⁰ The argument for cultural isolationism cannot stand since the identical premise with which intellectuals like Rorty and Gadamer question the authenticity of applying the label of ‘philosophy’ onto ‘Eastern’ thought applies

‘philosophy’ is a hegemonic discipline exclusive to a particular cultural-historical development contingent to the ‘West,’ and therefore tend towards a view of cultural isolationism in which any sense of comparing radically disparate thought systems of ‘East’ and ‘West’ may either be completely impossible, bear very little significance, and/or at the least cannot be called ‘philosophy.’

According to Rorty: “What we in the West call ‘philosophy’ became what it is by successively distinguishing itself, self-consciously and insistently, from theology, natural science, and literature. The sequence of intellectual history was very different in the various parts of Asia, so we may well wonder whether applying the term ‘philosophy’ to Asian books is more than an empty gesture, a stilted compliment that creates more awkwardness than collegiality.” Rorty, *Review*, 333.

According to Gadamer, “Although in the meantime the research in Eastern philosophy has made further advances, we believe today that we are further removed from its philosophical understanding. The sharpening of our historical awareness has rendered the translations or adaptations of the texts [...] fundamentally problematic [...] We cannot speak of an appropriation of these things by the Occidental philosophy. What can be considered established is only the negative insight that our own basic concepts, which were coined by the Greeks, alter the essence of what is foreign.” Gadamer quoted in King, *Orientalism and Religion*, 77.

Such tendency towards “cultural isolationism” is not limited to the Eurocentric assumptions of Western intellectuals as Rorty and Gadamer, but also occur in reverse situations with scholars who emphasize the accuracy to Eastern cultures.

³⁹ C.S. Goto-Jones, “If the past is a different country, are different countries in the past?” *Philosophy* 80 (2005): 39-41. Also see C.S. Goto-Jones, “The Kyoto School, the Cambridge School, and the History of Political Philosophy in Wartime Japan,” *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 17.1 (2009): 29.

Richard King, *Indian Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ., 1999), 235.

⁴⁰ The exclusivist nature of judging what ‘philosophy’ is and is not lies in the unarticulated Western bias that these distinctions (which are themselves products of specific movements of cultural-historical and political events within Europe), are a natural development and hence universally applicable as a measure for judging other thought systems.

Richard King, *Indian Philosophy*, 31.

This reveals that much of the isolationist arguments and exclusivist definitions of ‘philosophy’ actually involve identity politics which favors or pre-assumes ‘Western’ premises as somehow of higher or fundamental value than its counterparts. Such latent Eurocentricity not only can justify a denial of comparative studies of ‘East’ and ‘West,’ but is also problematic when it forms the ways scholars deal with studying ‘Eastern’ thought. This is evident in the problem Edward Said labeled as Orientalism, which can be defined as the reduction and transformation of “oriental” subjects via the reduction of their culture to an interpretation founded on the pre-assumed ontological and epistemological framework of the ‘Western’ colonizer.

Examples of such Eurocentric “reductionism” in studying ‘Eastern’ thought are ample in comparative philosophy and have been criticized by many scholars. For example Hossein Nasr, Hee-Jin Kim, Houston Smith and psychologist Roger Walsh points out the inherent difference in fundamental stances between the more theoretically oriented tendency of modern ‘Western’ philosophy and experientially/sooteriologically oriented foundations of Asian philosophies, and that reducing one to the pre-assumptions of the other is a grave mistake that some comparative philosophers make. King also points out similar dangers in the way Western scholars had long tended to reduce Asian philosophies outside of their specific lived realities into views molded according to Judaeo-Christian socio-cultural presumptions as in the case of reducing Indian religious thought to solely a study of texts. Additionally, Roger-Pol Droit’s study of how the understanding of Buddhism forged by 19th century German scholars reflected their own domestic intellectual climate, conflicts, hopes and fears more than the actuality of Buddhist thought is exemplary of how human understanding is embedded within socio-cultural environments. See:

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Conditions for Meaningful Comparative Philosophy,” *Philosophy East and West* 22.1: 53-61.

Hee-Jin Kim, *Eihei Dogen Mystical Realist* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004), 9-11.

Huston Smith, “Is There a Perennial Philosophy?,” *Revisoning Philosophy*, ed. James Ogilvy (New York: State University, 1992), 247-262.

Roger Walsh, “Can Western Philosophers Understand Asian Philosophies?,” *Revisoning Philosophy*, ed. James Ogilvy

to the factors which constitute what they consider their own historical-cultural narrative.⁴¹

The question of contingency leads to the second problem, the impossibility of finding a 'neutral' ground for comparing disparate philosophies.⁴² What individual intellectuals select as worthy topics of comparison and the way they do it are contingent to the particular needs, values and contextual background of that individual and the field of problems he hopes to address. For that reason it would be useless to claim a universal ground, task, goal, or methodology that neutrally applies to all 'comparative philosophy' which would merely complicate the focus of the individual

(New York: State University, 1992), 281-302.

King, *Orientalism and Religion*, 62-72, 161.

Roger Pol Droit, *The Cult of Nothingness: The Philosophers and the Buddha*, Trans. David Streight and Pamela Vohnson, (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 2003).

⁴¹King criticizes that "cultural isolationism" is also rooted in a particular prejudice that "culture" is concretely definable within geo-political boundaries. King further notes how such a view of culture is itself a product of a socio-historical particularity: "The dividing up of humanity into certain geo-cultural groupings called 'nations' is a relatively modern development. The roots of nationalism derive from social, economic and political changes in Europe from the sixteenth century onwards, but the notion of a national identity as a consciously unifying factor of people cannot be said to have been an influential social construct in Europe until the eighteenth century (and in some cases much later). Indeed, upon analysis it would seem that 'national identity' is not nearly as static and immutable as is sometimes thought." Thus the problem of this view of culture is that it misconstrues the concept 'culture' which is itself a socio-historically particular concept with the "way things are rather than simply as the way the world was divided up since the eighteenth century by Europeans (and through European hegemony, the rest of the world."

King, *Orientalism and Religion*, 78.

Post-colonial theorist, Homi Bhabha and scholar of Muslim poetry, Peter Lamborn Wilson also make similar points concerning how 'culture' cannot be staked clearly to boundaries and rather constitutes a malleable multiplicity inclusive of both internally and externally shifting influences beyond borders.

Bhabha views colonial discourse as itself an ambivalent phenomena whose power is not a simple movement from above to below, but happening in between the colonizer and the native tradition where the two hybridize in an agnostic space. Bhabha sees this as creating the conditions for possible resistance since texts are by nature prone to heterogeneous interpretations, which do not reiterate the authoritative intention of dominance, and instead can be inverted and transformed in various ways to be used against the dominant power by the native tradition. In effect Bhabha considers culture as a constantly shifting discourse that happens between two or more "traditions" hybridizing which can never be locatable or reducible to one side or another as an easy duality like that of center/margin, dominant/dominated, East/West etc. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, (New York: Routledge, 1994), 328-336.

Wilson considers the meaning of a discourse as always a shifting phenomenon that cannot be staked to grounding "truths" or "actualities." Rather, meaning is like a drift, a nomadic phenomenon constantly moving, altering, and reversing amongst those who come into contact and interpret it. Meaning drifts without location, beyond dichotomies even that of reality and poetic imagination. Culture as a constant influencing of multiple discourses and its interpretation is nomadic unhinged from "truth" so much so that it can potentially trans-mutate between poesis and reality. Peter Lamborn Wilson, *Sacred Drift: Essays on the Margins of Islam*. (San Francisco: City Light, 1993), 158-159.

Perhaps it will be more fruitful for future comparative philosophers to conceive of 'culture' more in line with the above and/or what Deleuze defines as 'rhizomes.' That is, 'culture' as a continuously shifting and hybridizing field of multiplicities that cannot be staked to a particular time or space. Then culture can be reinterpreted as no longer "a question of this or that place on earth, or of a given moment in history, still less of this or that category of thought," but a "question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again." Deleuze, *Thousand Plateaus* p.20

⁴² According to Rorty: "But there is no similarly uncontroversial starting point for comparing forms of intellectual life, much less for comparing whole cultures. As Panikkar argues in detail, any transcultural map of "philosophical problems" will lack either utility or neutrality. More generally, any selection of distinct subject matters of inquiry, or ultimate problems, or possible forms of intellectual life, or stages of maturation will itself be based on a grid of needs felt by some human beings and not by others. There is no skyhook which will lift us out of this parochialism." *Review*, 334.

studies into an abstracted field that has no real inherent coherency or clearly defined field of problems. Therefore, the impossibility of neutrality is not so much a ‘problem’ that negates comparative philosophy as it is a caution for it to revise its self-awareness concerning what it wants to do, and as Rorty suggests, to devise highly individuated methodologies to fulfill these particular purposes.

Consequently, the current study claims that the problems of contingency and the impossibility of “neutrality” should not hinder comparative philosophy. The virtue of pursuing comparative philosophy lies elsewhere than in philological studies of ‘Eastern’ thought. Its significance needs to be sought outside of what is already a hallmark of other academic disciplines. Devising highly specified methods for comparative philosophy is a sensible approach, given the fact that it is impossible to detach an individual’s choice of subjects and method of dealing with what he/she chooses to compare with their own consciously or unconsciously accepted moral inclinations. This is especially of concern for the field of comparative philosophy which since its inception includes many scholars⁴³ who do not resent asserting a strong ethical motive in the particular study they pursue which often includes ideals of humanism, brotherhood, love, unity and understanding amongst cultures, as well as critiques of Euro-centricity, etc.

Comparative philosophy will benefit from a self-awareness concerning the ethical purpose the individual scholar is influenced by in devising their methodological and conceptual schemes. In other words, there needs to be an awareness of the fact that the internal and external contingent factors in which our particular studies are located also involve our personal ethical drives or ethical presumptions that are embedded in the wider contexts that comes to shape the individual scholarly focuses. This is what Charles Taylor calls *moral frameworks*, the idea that the contingent factors which leads to the individual creation/adoption of moral stances are something that pre-exists the

⁴³ An early example of clear moral inclinations influencing the aim for comparative philosophy is Kee Swan Liat who defines comparative philosophy as a method to unite nations and to regain faith in life under a common humanity. J. Kwee Swan Liat, “Methods of Comparative Philosophy.” *Philosophy East and West* 1.1 (1951): 15. Another example is Paul Masson who defined comparative philosophy as a “condition not only of peace, but of human existence itself” in a world where everyone is inter-related. Paul Masson-Oursel, “True Philosophy is Comparative Philosophy.” *Philosophy East and West* 1.1 (1951): 8. Examples of comparative philosophers who have explicit ethical values influencing their study that continue to publish works in more recent times include: those who are more inclined towards Buddhism as David Loy, T.P. Kasulis, Robert Glass, and Sallie King and also those who are affiliated with the “Traditionalist School of Perennialist Philosophy” as Huston Smith, and Hossein Nasr.

individual, to which we are born, grow up in and thus are un-detachably embedded.⁴⁴ Taylor emphasizes that the modern tendency to stress “neutrality” in the academia and scientific positivism is not a ‘neutral’ position, but is itself a moral framework in which “neutrality” is considered “good” in relation to particular truth-values. If we accept this as a fundamental premise, then the impossibility of any form of ‘neutrality’ on which comparison can be executed will no longer be an obstacle for comparison, but rather an element that should be actively acknowledged as a basis upon which the purpose and methods for each study can be specified. In other words, a comparative philosophical study will benefit from actively affirming its individual moral stance and by individuating its method for integrating disparate philosophies for the sake of fulfilling concrete (ethical) purposes. This is preferable to doing comparative philosophy with the view that somehow the act of interpreting and comparing exists in a moral and contextual vacuum, and to be vainly indulging in the act of comparing or juxtaposing disparate philosophies as if such an act itself unconditionally reveals a universally significant or applicable body of knowledge.⁴⁵

Now that I have clarified the basic problems inherent in comparative philosophy, I will like to clarify how the current study addresses these problems with concern for its ethical directive. This should help prevent possible Buddhist and Deleuzian readers of my work from misconstruing what it

⁴⁴ Moral frameworks are irresistibly a fundamental part of how an individual comes to understand, define and articulate his/her self-existence in the world. Thus the presence of moral stances cannot be relegated from human phenomena as Taylor mentions, “orientation to the good is not some optional extra, something we can engage in or abstain at will, but a condition of our being selves with an identity.” Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1989), 68.

Taylor’s notion of moral stances is rather akin to Gadamer’s conception of ‘tradition’ in the sense that he considers moral stances as something we are born into, and latently influenced by, and is not something that can be easily shed away.

⁴⁵ Many comparative studies of the past did not consciously individuate their studies with the acknowledgement for the question of the contingency in which disparate philosophies arose. Consequently, they assume the act of “comparison” exists in a moral and contextual vacuum that can be executed without the need to clarify or justify its own methods and purposes. Such studies also tend to share the assumption that the act of “comparison” itself somehow is unconditionally significant without having to clarify a clear purpose as to why and what for they are comparing philosophies. The field of comparative philosophy has been home to numerous studies that simply compare philosophies without a purpose, as if the simple juxtaposition of ideas magically conjures significance. Though this remains to be a personal assessment, Carl Olsson’s books on comparative philosophy as well as Gereon Kopf’s comparative study of Dōgen and Nishida were such case in points where the authors simply “compared” while failing to make any purposeful claim. While I do not deny that their studies have some level of philological and/or inspirational value, I do not view the way they do comparative philosophy should be exemplary for what the field should aspire to do in the future. See:

Carl Olsson, *Indian Philosophers and Postmodern Thinkers: Dialogues on the Margins of Culture*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Gereon Kopf, *Beyond Personal Identity: Dōgen, Nishida and the Phenomenology of No-Self*, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001).

is attempting to do.

1.7.2 Deep Jazz: Clarifying My Approach to Dōgen and Deleuze

As I have described in the previous section, the current study agrees to the view that there can be no “neutral” reading of a particular thinker. To aspire to be as “neutral” as possible itself constitutes a particular value judgment and a moral directive. In comparative philosophy such a directive for “neutrality” itself becomes problematic, as there is no “neutral” ground from which disparate philosophies can be interpreted and compared. Therefore, the problem becomes of making explicit how and for what ethical reasons philosophies are interpreted and to devise a highly specified methodology that can most effectively convey that directive. Studying Dōgen’s *Shōbōgenzō* is precisely a case in point. I believe no reading of Dōgen can reach some sort of “truth-of-Dōgen” independent of the act of interpretation especially given the difficulty of his expressions which include the use of old Japanese, highly poetic sensibilities, and terminologies he does not necessarily clearly define through logical expositions (e.g. Dharma-position, Total-function, Total-exertion). Hence, I believe to read Dōgen independently from any ethical and intellectual contingency is not sensible for it risks producing a study that lacks consideration for the subtle nature of Dōgen’s philosophy as well as for its practical significance.

When the current study makes a case for reading Dōgen from the perspective of *pratītyasamutpāda* and the centrality of spiritual practice, it is undeniably taking an ethical stance in dealing with its subject. Presenting what the current study considers the ethical and intellectual problems of interpreting Dōgen that arise in relation to the ethical foundations of *pratītyasamutpāda*, necessitates an awareness of a thorough understanding of *pratītyasamutpada*, its relation to ethics within the act of interpreting Buddhist doctrine, and how past scholars interpreted Dōgen’s particularly difficult and relevant phrases. In other words, the ‘problems’ of reading Dōgen arise in contingency to how the ethical stance of the current study relates to the framework of past ‘Dōgen studies’ which is itself a collection of various interpretations. Therefore, the current study introduces

the problems of how to interpret Dōgen's metaphysics within the process of critically assessing how past scholars of Critical Buddhism and the comparative philosophical field interpreted them. For example, we shall see in chapters two and three that one of the major problems of interpreting Dōgen's metaphysics is intertwined with how to read Dōgen's view of the co-existence of plurality/wholeness, universal Buddha-nature, and practice in relation to Buddha-nature/time. The idea of an ontological simultaneity between plurality and a universal sense of Buddha-nature constitutes a particular ethical problem since interpreting the 'universal' side of the equation as an ontological ground disregards *pratītyasamutpāda* and therefore ethics.

I will present my own particular interpretation of Dōgen once all of these problems have been introduced through chapters two and three. Other's interpretations of Dōgen are merely implored as reference to construct the field of problems in which the current study addresses and in order to contrast my own analysis to past Dōgen studies. The ultimate argument through which my original reading of Dōgen will be presented functions independently of these past views precisely for the reason that it does not repeat their views, while learning from their strengths.

My motive in this study is to create a reading of Dōgen that exists nowhere, that is a philosophy of the 'Erewhon' where people are yet to tread created out of a thorough consideration of the particular functional potentials of the ideas of each thinker. I am not concerned with what kind of "truth" the ideas of Dōgen and Deleuze "represent," in the sense of assuming there is some kind of "accurate truth" or completely redeemable "cultural contexts" behind these thinkers. The current study presents what I consider to be a "better" reading of Dōgen given the context that it be applicable within a practical approach to philosophy founded on *pratītyasamutpāda*. It is an experiment to utilize Deleuze to reread Dōgen in a manner that it becomes practical for the sake of an ethical goal. In this sense the study aspires to be truthful to Dōgen's own concern for the priority of practice by bringing it under a new perspective. Yet, my analysis of Dōgen is not intended to be a mere philological explanation of Dōgen and Deleuze, or a reduction of their philosophy to one or the other paradigm in turning Deleuze to Dōgen, or Dōgen to Deleuze.

I do not claim that this particular approach to Dōgen via Deleuze is readily applicable to other

comparative studies of Dōgen or that it is the “true” way to read Dōgen. Neither does the study intend to simply compare Dōgen with Deleuze as much as it wants to integrate their ideas in an individual manner that fulfills the purposes set within its ethical stance. However, I have taken utmost care in understanding and explaining the “potentials” of what these philosophies embrace, which first necessitates an understanding of these philosophies within their respective contexts as accurately as possible. This means more than anything else, to understand for what practical purpose these philosophies were created and what functions they fulfill within that context. The study will ultimately create a “new” interpretation of Dōgen by utilizing the potentials of these two thinkers by re-positioning their philosophy within the contextual purpose of fulfilling a practical ethics founded on *prañīyasamutpāda*.

While I personally have faith in the Buddha’s teaching of *prañīyasamutpāda* as a complete and functioning system of practical philosophy that is of much use for humanity, I do not claim this study to be professing a Buddhist stance. That is, while I take the ethical implications and potentials of the doctrine of *prañīyasamutpāda* very seriously, I do not present this research as representative of a ‘Buddhist.’ I do not claim to ‘redeem’ Dōgen as rightfully Buddhist through Deleuze. Nor do I expound some kind of “truly” Buddhist philosophy via a reconsideration of Dōgen. Such was the task of Critical Buddhism and I have no intentions in repeating their claims. The current study aspires to create ideas that become different from what is purely Dōgen or Deleuze; that is a Dōgen-to-be, a Deleuze-Dōgen-in-the-making, a form of ethics-to-come, an ethics-in-the-making.

The free jazz musician Albert Ayler once described his aspirations in music as a creation of beauty and rejoicing that is to come, sounds which tells of a beauty of the future unknown to the suffering and anxiety of the present.⁴⁶ Jazz pianist Sun Ra told of his music as an “altered destiny,” that is sounds of an alternative future, music which tells of a potential of a future beyond the seemingly destined suffering of the world today.⁴⁷ I possess a similar sentiment as these aforementioned musicians when I conceive of what I aspire to achieve through the present study. That

⁴⁶ Robert Palmer, liner notes to *Live in Greenwich Village The Complete Impulse Recordings*, Albert Ayler, Impulse! IMPD-2-273, CD, 1998.

⁴⁷ Sun Ra, *Space is the Place*, Directed by John Coney, (1974; USA: North American Star System/Plexifilm, 2003.), DVD.

is, a creation of a perspective of an ethical philosophy through Dōgen and Deleuze, which in its conclusive form is no longer Dōgen, nor Deleuze, but an experiment for a future philosophy. Such a philosophy creates for the sake of a future ethics, and may work as a humble beacon of hope in a possible future.

Such motive echoes one ‘Deleuzian’ conviction I take at heart in this study that is related to his idea on ‘belief.’ Deleuze mentions:

The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half concerned us. [...] The link between man and the world is broken. Henceforth, this link must become an object of belief: it is the impossible which can only be restored within faith. Belief is no longer addressed to a different or transformed world. Man is in the world as if in a pure optical and sound situation. The reaction of which man has been dispossessed can be replaced only by belief. Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears.⁴⁸

As Deleuze had often asserted, philosophy can contribute to regaining a sense of belief in what we and reality as a whole are capable of, given that it realizes an unreserved affirmation to humanity’s potential to imagine, to experiment and to create on top of a truly ethical concern. I believe philosophy has the power to create various alternative values through experimenting with multiple new ways of re-conceiving who we can become and what the world is capable of, and through it, experiment with new modes of life which affirm existence against resentment. Perhaps this research, a nowhere that I nomadically roam, where Dōgen and Deleuze converge only to disappear and become something else, there is something insightful for Buddhists and Western oriented philosophers alike. Insights that are not fuel to stake Dōgen or Deleuze to some kind of “accurate meaning” or “truth,” but hopefully insights that may help individuals to utilize and further reinterpret Dōgen and Deleuze in their own ways and in a manner that is significant for their lives. Ultimately I hope the present study creates fuel for others to carry on to further experiments to expand the rhizomes of what we may become, a future vision of humanity and of values-to-come.

⁴⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema II: The Time-Image*, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota, 1989), 171-172.

1.8 Introducing the Chapters and their Questions

Now that the backgrounds and motives of the current study have been cleared, I will like to conclude the introductory chapter with two sections that describe the more technical aspect of the study. This section will introduce the overall organization of the coming chapters and the questions that will be involved in putting forth the final argument for a new reading of Dōgen's metaphysics that does not negate *pratītyasamutpāda*.

Chapter two deals with the problem of Critical Buddhism's reading of Dōgen. Since Critical Buddhism's Dōgen interpretation is founded on its understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* in relation to ontological critique, Buddhist practice and ethics, arguing for how and why their reading of Dōgen is limited and how it can be overcome necessitates an analysis of their view on *pratītyasamutpāda*. In addition, as I have briefly mentioned, the current study concurs with the Critical Buddhist view that neglecting *pratītyasamutpāda* leads to a collapse of ethics. This means that we must clarify to what extent the current study can agree or disagree to Critical Buddhism's view on *pratītyasamutpāda*. The case needs to be made as to which aspects of their interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* can be considered more or less generally applicable and which will lead to a limited perspective on Dōgen. Ultimately, this amounts to answering the following questions: How does Critical Buddhism define *pratītyasamutpāda* and apply it in its critique of Dōgen? Is Critical Buddhism's understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* as fundamental for Buddhist ethics applicable as a more or less general criteria to assess other Buddhist (influenced) texts in contrast to *pratītyasamutpāda*? What in Critical Buddhism's interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* leads to their particular view that Dōgen's metaphysics is incompatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*? Why does Critical Buddhism conclude that Dōgen's metaphysics neglect *pratītyasamutpāda* and therefore is "non-Buddhist"? Does this imply a prejudice that metaphysics is 'representational'?

Chapter three provisionally adopts Critical Buddhism's criteria based in *pratītyasamutpāda* to critically assess if certain doctrines adhere to *pratītyasamutpāda* or not. This will be done for the sake

of critically examining four exemplary variations of “comparative” interpretations of Dōgen’s metaphysics by Abe, Heine, Kasulis, and Glass. Are these interpretations faithful to *pratītyasamutpāda* or do they fall to an ontology and/or epistemology which leads to a collapse of ethics? If they do neglect *pratītyasamutpāda*, what are their problems and how can they be overcome? More precisely, do their reading reiterate *Hongaku-shisō* and imply the presumption that metaphysics is by nature ‘representational’?

Chapter four argues that Deleuze’s pragmatism, by virtue of the concept of ‘heterogenesis,’ can supply an effective alternative to the way both the Critical Buddhist and comparative philosophers read Dōgen’s metaphysics within the confines of correspondence theory. In addition, I will suggest that Deleuze’s metaphysical concepts of virtuality/actuality will help interpret Dōgen’s metaphysics of Buddha-nature and temporality. In order for this to be possible, I will argue how Deleuze’s ideas are compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda* and therefore applicable to Buddhism. This amounts to answering the following questions: How does Deleuze’s pragmatist concept of heterogenesis and metaphysics of virtuality work? Are these concepts compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*? How can interpreting Dōgen via Deleuze’s pragmatism overcome the problems found in both Critical Buddhism and the comparative interpretations? How can Deleuze’s pragmatism help change our perspective on *pratītyasamutpāda*, Dōgen’s metaphysics and their relation to practice?

Chapter five applies Deleuze’s pragmatist concepts such as heterogenesis and virtual/actual to an original interpretation of Dōgen’s concepts of Buddha-nature, and temporal continuity in relation to practice. I will show how reinterpreting Dōgen’s concept of ‘Total-function’ through Deleuzian pragmatism can establish the concept as a key to unfold Dōgen’s metaphysics as a whole in a manner adherent to *pratītyasamutpāda*. How can Dōgen’s concept of ‘Total-function’ be read in concurrence with *pratītyasamutpāda* through the use of Deleuze’s pragmatist concepts? How can such a new interpretation of ‘Total-function’ be utilized as a key to create a consistency out of Dōgen’s ideas on Buddha-nature, temporality and their relation to practice? How can Dōgen’s seemingly paradoxical claim for a singular moment that is simultaneously whole be made sense of without having to negate *pratītyasamutpāda*?

1.9 Concerning the Use of Japanese Sources and Vocabularies

Finally, I would like to clarify several technical points concerning the use of Dōgen and Critical Buddhist sources in this study. I have mainly resorted to using translations of Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō* by Chodo Cross and Gudo Wafu Nishijima rather than that by John Stevens and Kosen Nishiyama. The reason is that I find their translations as being more literal in approach as it tries to stay away from resorting to too much interpretation. However, since no translation is exempt from interpreting, whenever I found disagreement with certain interpretations of key vocabularies or phrases by Cross and Nishijima, I have resorted to either of the following solutions. First, I consulted alternative translations, out of which in most cases, I found Hee-Jin Kim's translations to be most agreeable.⁴⁹ Second, when I found the alternative translations to be disagreeable, I have resorted to translating the texts by myself from the original Japanese with consultation of modern Japanese translations.

As for the sources in Japanese, the following technicalities apply. For the Japanese versions of the *Shōbōgenzō*, I have mainly consulted the original version and modern translation edited by the Japanese Dōgen scholar Mizuno Yaoko. This is due to both readability and Mizuno's scholarly integrity in keeping her modern translation literal and free from interpretations as possible.⁵⁰ As for the texts by the Critical Buddhists, currently none of their books are available in full English translations. Therefore, almost all references made to their texts refer to their original Japanese and all quotations are translated by myself.

While I use most of Dōgen's conceptual vocabularies in their translated form, I have resorted to giving their original Japanese forms whenever they are introduced. All English translations of

⁴⁹ One can only hope Hee-Jin Kim will attempt a full translation of the *Shōbōgenzō* someday, but for now the few sections he has translated are limited to those referenced in his studies.

⁵⁰ The 'literal' quality of Mizuno's translations was very apparent in contrast to other modern Japanese translations that I consulted such as that by Kyoji Ishii. I found Ishii's version to be too "charged" with an interpretive approach heavily influenced by Westernized philosophical perspectives (i.e. that of Heidegger and the Kyoto-school). While such interpretive translations are noteworthy as cases for understanding how the modern Japanese intelligentsia absorbs Dōgen, they deemed useless for this particular study.

Japanese Buddhist concepts are followed by parentheses including the original Japanese Kanji script and English reading. Sanskrit or Pali terminologies will not be heavily utilized within this study owing to the fact that Dōgen himself was not educated in Buddhism through Sanskrit (his use of Buddhist terms rooted in Sanskrit are limited to their Chinese transcription). However, I have insisted in using the Sanskrit for several key Buddhist concepts that recur throughout the study and are known to be rooted in Indian Buddhism. Such is the case with terms as *pratītyasamutpāda* and *prajñā* since these ideas are not indigenous to Japanese or Chinese Buddhism, but are foundational concepts dating back to the Indian tradition of Buddhism.

CHAPTER TWO

PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA AND THE CRITICAL BUDDHIST READING OF DŌGEN

2.1 Introduction

As I have briefly mentioned in the first chapter, there are two opposite factions in Dōgen interpretation concerning his use of metaphysical ideas. The first is that of Critical Buddhism which denies Dōgen’s metaphysics while upholding pratītyasamutpāda. Second are the “comparative” interpretations which positively affirm Dōgen’s metaphysics, often under influence of ‘Western’ philosophy, yet transgress pratītyasamutpāda. I will explain in the next two chapters why none of these factions can affirm Dōgen’s metaphysics in combination with pratītyasamutpāda. This is inherent to their common prejudice that metaphysics is by nature ‘representational’ and descriptive of a ‘true-way-reality-is.’ Therefore, these two distinct varieties of Dōgen interpretation constitute a polar dichotomy that continues to tie down Dōgen’s philosophy to a correspondence theory of truth. Overcoming these views necessitates a detailed analysis of their views on Dōgen and an explanation as to how and why they are shortsighted. The current chapter will analyze the first Dōgen interpretation: that of Critical Buddhism.

As mentioned in the introduction, to read Dōgen in line with pratītyasamutpāda is based on a dire ethical concern. There is the danger that Dōgen’s philosophy can lose its ethical integrity if read without reference to the overarching framework of pratītyasamutpāda. If pratītyasamutpāda is neglected and Dōgen’s ideas are interpreted in line with the idea of Original Enlightenment where reality is considered primordially ‘perfect,’ then his philosophy cannot differentiate between good and bad, nor can it affirm the necessity for altruism, personal and socio-political change.

The relationship between pratītyasamutpāda and ethics is a point that has been argued for extensively by the Critical Buddhists especially in reference to Hongaku doctrine in Japanese Zen

Buddhism. As previously mentioned, Critical Buddhism is a Japanese intellectual “movement” spearheaded by the Buddhologists Hakamaya Noriaki and Shirō Matsumoto. They consider *pratītyasamutpāda* and the act of critique as essential to an ethically viable Buddhism. Therefore, they take Japanese Buddhist doctrines, such as that of Dōgen, under extensive critical analysis in contrast to *pratītyasamutpāda*. The current study shares with the Critical Buddhist view that *pratītyasamutpāda* is imperative for Buddhism to be a spiritual practice that functions in accordance to a viable altruistic ethics. However, while the Critical Buddhist interpretation of Dōgen is the only one which takes seriously the consequences of reading various Buddhist doctrines in critical contrast to *pratītyasamutpāda*, it has its limitations. Critical Buddhism concludes that Dōgen’s metaphysics cannot be endorsed as “authentically” Buddhist. Since Critical Buddhism’s interpretation of Dōgen fully relies on its understanding of ‘authentic’ Buddhism as founded on *pratītyasamutpāda*, we can infer that their view on Dōgen is a logical consequence of a particular aspect of their understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Of particular relevance to the current study is that Critical Buddhism denies the compatibility between metaphysics and *pratītyasamutpāda* entirely. Therefore, to what extent the current study can agree with Critical Buddhism’s view of *pratītyasamutpāda* and its application to Dōgen’s ideas needs to be discussed under reference to its criteria for ‘authentic’ Buddhism and why Dōgen is purportedly excluded from it.

Critical Buddhism is not interested in attempting to ‘rescue’ Dōgen’s many distinct metaphysical ideas from violating *pratītyasamutpāda*. Nor is Critical Buddhism interested in re-establishing a role for Dōgen’s ontology in what they consider authentic Buddhist practice. Thereby, Critical Buddhism simply labels Dōgen’s ontology as unacceptable from the perspective of *pratītyasamutpāda*. I consider this a conservative conclusion which neglects the deep wisdom found in Dōgen’s writings, a wisdom that can inspire life in accordance to *pratītyasamutpāda*. In contrast to the Critical Buddhists, the current study aspires to present a new reading of Dōgen’s conceptions of temporality and Buddha-nature, a reading that tries to do justice to their inherent relation to practice in a manner faithful to *pratītyasamutpāda*. In chapter five I will eventually reinterpret Dōgen by help of Deleuze’s pragmatist concepts, by conceiving Dōgen’s metaphysics as not ‘representational’ but as a

pragmatic tool to enhance an ethically viable application of his teachings to Buddhist practice. The current chapter lays part of the background for the above directive by analyzing what can be agreed to or not in Critical Buddhism's criteria for *pratītyasamutpāda* and how their prejudice concerning ontology conditions its view on Dōgen.

If Critical Buddhism's criteria for what does or does not adhere to *pratītyasamutpāda* are in line with preceding lineages of Buddhism, this means that their criteria are doctrinally supported and are more or less a generally applicable tool to protect *pratītyasamutpāda* from heretical ideas. This is significant, as I plan to utilize Critical Buddhism's criteria in the next chapter to critically analyze why Abe, Heine, Kasulis, and Glass neglect *pratītyasamutpāda* despite their affirmative interpretation of Dōgen's metaphysics. On the other hand, if we can successfully argue that Critical Buddhism's view of the incompatibility of *pratītyasamutpāda* and ontology is a mere prejudice, this may prove to be what limits its view of Dōgen. If true, this aspect of Critical Buddhism's understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* and how it conditions its interpretation of Dōgen will need to be analyzed in order to overcome the limitations of the Critical Buddhist view.

As we shall see in this chapter, Critical Buddhism's kinship to views put forth by their historical predecessors may show that its understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* is doctrinally correct, and its understanding of the concept's centrality in spiritual practice accurate. However, my hypothesis is that, to the extent that Critical Buddhism views *pratītyasamutpāda* as excluding ontology/metaphysics, it rests on the prejudice that ontology is by default descriptive of, or correspondent to, some kind of 'true-way-reality-is.' This prejudice makes Critical Buddhism erroneously see a general incompatibility between metaphysics and *pratītyasamutpāda* and precludes it from taking a wider view on how metaphysics could be applicable to spiritual practice. For the Critical Buddhist, to read Dōgen becomes a matter of either adhering to *pratītyasamutpāda* while denying metaphysics, or of denying *pratītyasamutpāda* while preserving metaphysics. This will become evident in the course of analyzing how Critical Buddhism interprets Dōgen's ontology as profoundly "non-Buddhist."

In order to fulfill the above directives, I will be pursuing the following questions through the

course of this chapter. The first half is dedicated to analyzing how Critical Buddhism defines *pratītyasamutpāda* and those ideas which deny it. How does Critical Buddhism define *pratītyasamutpāda* and ‘authentic’ Buddhism as founded on such a doctrine? What criteria does Critical Buddhism use to identify “Buddhist” philosophies contrary to *pratītyasamutpāda*? To what extent are these views doctrinally supported and in continuity with historically preceding views within Buddhism? And if there is a continuity, can these criteria be considered more or less generally applicable when criticising other Dōgen interpretations? Which aspect of Critical Buddhism’s view on *pratītyasamutpāda* implies a prejudice that ontology must be ‘representational’? The second half involves a detailed study of Critical Buddhism’s application of its view on *pratītyasamutpāda* in interpreting Dōgen’s views on Buddha-nature, and temporality in relation to practice. How do the Critical Buddhists apply the criteria for ‘authentic’ Buddhism to a critique of Dōgen? In precise terms, how does Critical Buddhism interpret Dōgen’s views on Buddha-nature, temporality and their relation to practice?

All of the above questions will ultimately lead to examining why Critical Buddhism’s reading of Dōgen must deny his metaphysics in contrast to upholding *pratītyasamutpāda*. Are their views on Dōgen a logical consequence of the prejudice that ontology is ‘representational’? Only by clearing these questions, can the study later argue for how Critical Buddhism’s conclusion concerning Dōgen be overcome by use of Deleuze’s pragmatism and without negating *pratītyasamutpāda*.

2.2 Elucidating Pratītyasamutpāda Through Critical Buddhism

For the Critical Buddhists, their understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda*, commonly translated as the doctrine of *co-dependent arising/origination* or also the *law of causation*, determines the authenticity of any Buddhist doctrine. According to this view, Buddhist scriptures including Dōgen are judged in accordance to their understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Since what it considers an ‘authentic’ Buddhism implies that it can only function ethically by placing *pratītyasamutpāda* over everything else, Critical Buddhism argues that “Buddhist” doctrines which favour ontological and or

epistemological perspectives which neglect *pratītyasamutpāda* cannot affirm altruistic ethics.

Therefore, to understand Critical Buddhism's description of *pratītyasamutpāda* and how they interpret Dōgen means to analyze what Critical Buddhism's leading scholars, Noriaki Hakamaya and Shirō Matsumoto, define as constitutive of 'authentic' Buddhism.

Despite Critical Buddhism's specific use of *pratītyasamutpāda* in contingency to their critical purpose, I consider its understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* shows a continuity with the notion's Indian heritage as found in its Theravada and Indo-Tibetan counterparts. We will see that the Critical Buddhists inherit many elements of *pratītyasamutpāda* interpretation relying on Theravada doctrines as well as on Madhyamaka philosophy, and to that extent there is no abrupt discontinuity between Critical Buddhism and 'pre-Critical Buddhist' forms of Buddhism. Rather, one may observe that the Critical Buddhist's view of *pratītyasamutpāda* is in conformity to or complementary with the understanding of Buddhist doctrine made by other lineages of Buddhism that also strictly adhere to the centrality of *pratītyasamutpāda* and equally consider Madhyamaka and/or Theravada teachings as of essential importance. If this is so, to what extent can the current study agree or disagree with Critical Buddhism's interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* as a more or less generally applicable criteria to assess Buddhist philosophy?

Given that the Critical Buddhist interpretation of Dōgen is reliant on *pratītyasamutpāda* and that the current study challenges Critical Buddhism's conclusion concerning Dōgen's metaphysics, there must be a point of divergence. This can be elucidated by analyzing what in Critical Buddhism's understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* leads to its conclusion that Dōgen's metaphysics is "non-Buddhist." Does this involve the presumption that metaphysics 'represents' reality? We shall examine this in the course of analyzing Critical Buddhism's view on *pratītyasamutpāda* as evident in their view on 'authentic' Buddhism.

2.2.1 'Authentic' Buddhism in Three Criteria

Hakamaya, in his interpretation of sections from the *Mahavagga sutra* of the Theravada collection known as the *Vinaya*,⁵¹ clearly expresses three basic criteria of what he believes to be 'authentic' Buddhism. I believe that these points, elaborated with further passages by Hakamaya and Matsumoto, with reference to Theravada and Mahayana doctrines implied by them, can give us a lucid summary of what constitutes their version of 'authentic' Buddhism in what I summarize as the following:

1. Buddhism is founded on the doctrine of *pratīyasamutpāda*, which is the *Twelve Nidānas* and by inference means faithfulness to the doctrines of no-abiding-self and impermanence.
2. Adhering to *pratīyasamutpāda* necessitates the use of analytical, evaluative thinking (or *prajñā*) as indispensable in practice.
3. Buddhism must be essentially concerned with an altruistic ethics that is embedded within the application of *pratīyasamutpāda* in practice.

The three criteria can each be understood as describing different implications of *pratīyasamutpāda*. The first, ontological and phenomenological, since it has to do with the nature of perceived reality as causality and impermanence, the second, epistemological since it has to do with the nature of analytical thinking in relation to practice, and third, ethical, since it describes the necessity for altruism. All these criteria are rooted in the doctrine of *pratīyasamutpāda*, therefore, they constitute a measure to assess certain "Buddhist" philosophies' conformity with the doctrine. According to Critical Buddhism's use of the criteria, we will see that the failure to abide with even one criterion means that the whole of *pratīyasamutpāda* is neglected. I will elaborate on each criterion as follows.

⁵¹ Hakamaya Noriaki, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan* (本覚思想批判), (Tokyo: Ōkura, 1989), 10-12.

2.2.1.1 First Criterion: The Twelve Nidānas - Pratītyasamutpāda as Causation

For the Critical Buddhist, pratītyasamutpāda strictly means the Buddha's practical teaching of the *twelve-fold chain of co-dependent arising* (also called the *Twelve Nidānas*), which they consider as the fundamental content of the Buddha's enlightenment experience.⁵² The concept of pratītyasamutpāda as the twelve-fold chain of co-dependent arising constitutes the Buddha's further elaboration on the Four Noble Truths,⁵³ specifically on the second noble truth, that there is a cause to suffering and third, there is the cessation of suffering. The Buddha's claim that suffering arises due to a causal process is supported by the Buddha's detailed analysis of the process involving a twelve-fold collection of causal factors. These factors are: 1) ignorance, 2) formations, 3) consciousness, 4) name-and-form, 5) the six sense fields, 6) contact, 7) feeling, 8) craving, 9) sustenance, 10) becoming, 11) (re)birth, 12) aging and dying.

The interpretations of what these twelve factors entail, and how each should be understood as causally related to each other is a matter that varies amongst different philosophies and traditions of Buddhism.⁵⁴ However, one thing is constant throughout much of Buddhism in understanding pratītyasamutpāda as the twelve-fold chain of co-dependent arising: pratītyasamutpāda clarifies in a twelve-fold process how all suffering is causally traceable to ignorance (Skt. *avidyā*). By "ignorance" what is meant is ignorance of a correct insight to the nature of experienced reality. What this "correct insight" involves becomes clear in the following supplementary summary the Buddha gives concerning the *Nidānas*. The Buddha summarizes the whole twelve-fold chain in a simple tetralemma which states: "When this is, that is; from the arising of this comes the arising of that; when this isn't,

⁵² Hakamaya Noriaki, *Bukkyo Nyumon*, 150-160. Also Matsumoto Shirō, *Bukkyo e no Michi* (仏教への道), (Tokyo: Tokyo Shosen, 1993), 44-52.

⁵³ Hakamaya, *Bukkyo Nyumon*, 160-170. Also Matsumoto, *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 70-73. The most basic articulation of the Four Noble Truths as expounded in the first sermon can be found in the various extant versions of the *Dharmacakra Pravartana Sūtra*

⁵⁴ For example there are varied views on the causal direction of each of the Nidānas, whether it should be understood in a linear process, or a reverse process, middle to end, middle to beginning, or a mutually inter-causal process.

that isn't; from the cessation of this comes the cessation of that."⁵⁵ What is implied in this statement is the fundamental law that all things happen in accordance to the process of cause and effect,⁵⁶ hence one of the translations of *pratīyasamutpāda* in English is to call it the *law of causation*. Suffering is an effect of a cause, and this cause is ultimately ignorance to the causal nature of our perceived world and 'self.' If one can understand the causes, then one will know what to stop in order to end suffering. Therefore, to end suffering necessitates a proper insight into the nature of 'self' and phenomena as a causal process. This logically ensues two more of the Buddha's fundamental teachings. These are the teachings of *anātman* (*no-abiding-self* or in Jpn. 無我 *muga*), and *anitya* (*impermanence* or 無常 *mujou*)⁵⁷ as I will elaborate in the following section.

2.2.1.1.1 Phenomena as Pratīyasamutpāda: No-Abiding-Self and Impermanence

The view that all things happen by way of a causal process as expounded in the *pratīyasamutpāda* can also be articulated in describing that all phenomena that constitute the 'I' whether physical, mental, or rooted in our perception, are characterized by a constant change in relation to their shifting conditions. In other words, since everything constituting the experience of a 'self' is a product of an endlessly shifting interaction between causes and effects, there cannot be a permanent selfhood. This leads to the Buddha's doctrine of no-abiding-self, which is posed in direct contrast against his Brahmanic contemporaries that supported the theory of a persisting *ātman* or individual essence, which was understood as identical to the supreme metaphysical reality or *Brahman*. This is the reason why later Buddhists like Nagarjuna and his Madhyamaka lineage as well as the Critical Buddhists fiercely criticise the reintroduction of ideas that parallel Brahmanic ontology into Buddhism as it means the total uprooting of the Buddha's teachings.

I consider Critical Buddhism's understanding of the doctrine of no-abiding-self to be rooted

⁵⁵ Richard H. Robinson & Willard L. Johnson, *The Buddhist Religion: A Historical Perspective*, (London: Wadsworth, 1997), 28.

⁵⁶ Matsumoto, *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 50, 52.

⁵⁷ Hakamaya, *Bukkyo Nyumon*, 140-143.

in the Buddhist phenomenology traceable to the early Theravada traditions which designate the nature of the experience of a ‘self’ as constituted by a causal interaction between what are called the “five aggregates” (Skt. *Skandhas*) or components of experienced reality.⁵⁸ The five aggregates include: 1) ‘Form’ (*rūpa*) or reality as it seems to be constituted by matter. 2) Physical or mental ‘sensations’ (*vedanā*) as experienced through the six sensing faculties including eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind which could be either pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent.⁵⁹ This happens out of the contact between matter and senses. 3) ‘Perception’ (*saññā*) or the thought process which associates experience with knowledge and formulates ideas out of experience. 4) ‘Mental formations’ (*samskāra*) which are conditioned or habituated responses formed from past experience. This involves moral responses as good and bad. 5) ‘Consciousness’ (*viññāna*) by which is meant mere sensitivity or awareness. It is the neutral palette or mind-field on which the previous four skandhas interact.

All five skandhas causally interact to create what we experience to be our ‘self’ in relation to what we sense as being ‘real.’⁶⁰ For example, our sensation of seeing a physical object leads to the formation of a particular idea of that object which then if repeated, leads to a conditioned response. One perceives a flower, finds it to be pleasant, subsequently identifies a flower with the thought of beauty and pleasure, and craves to repeat the experience by seeking more flowers. Our identifying with the accumulated memory of these past sensational and conceptual responses to the flower comes to collectively constitute part of what we misconstrue as a sense of a persisting ‘Self’ and/or ‘objective reality.’ This causal process amongst the five skandhas is included within the Twelve Nidānas between the second to sixth nidānas.⁶¹ This shows how the idea of no-abiding-self is firmly integrated within *pratītyasamutpāda*. Correct insight into the causal process of the skandhas as they unfold into

⁵⁸ This can be inferred from the fact that the skandhas constitute part of the Nidānas. Given the Twelve Nidānas is central for Critical Buddhism, both Hakamaya and Matsumoto also deals with the doctrine of the skandhas in a manner in which their significance is crucial in relation to both no-abiding-self and impermanence. See for example: Hakamaya, *Bukkyo Nyumon*, 145-150. Matsumoto, *Engi to Ku*, 27.

⁵⁹ “Mind” as mentioned in relation to the five skandhas do not imply the essentialist image that ‘mind’ is like a soul, or consciousness which exists ‘inside’ a body. Such a view is alien to Buddhist phenomenology as based in the five skandhas. ‘Mind’ is always considered a sense organ which creates certain senses like sadness, happiness, etc.

⁶⁰ For the Buddha’s detailed discourse on the nature of the skandhas refer to volume two of the *Samyutta Nikaya*, *Khandha Vagga*, sub-section “Khandha Samyutta” (SN 22.1 - SN 22.159).

⁶¹ The same processual analysis of experience is included in the Twelve Nidānas between the nidānas of: 2) formations, 3) consciousness, 4) name-and-form, 5) the six sense fields, 6) contact.

one's experience of a 'self' is considered crucial in ending ignorance and ultimately suffering.

The 'I' is not a permanent reality, but a composite of the causal process happening dependently amongst the five skandhas.⁶² Since the 'self' is a constantly changing phenomenon, attachment to any sense of a permanent selfhood is considered a fuel to the arising of suffering.⁶³ As long as one craves for security in creating a permanent identity he/she can call a "Self," by identifying one's existence with all forms of physical, mental, perceptive, cognitive, emotive, and conceptual phenomena, this fundamental ignorance of no-abiding-self will repeatedly create suffering in the perceiver.⁶⁴ The reason is, craving for permanence longs for something that is essentially non-realizable and will thus lead to an endless cycle of constant craving/attachment, fear of loss, pain of departure, unfulfillment and back to craving. Thus the doctrine of no-abiding-self primarily holds that the self is neither identical to nor identifiable with any of the phenomenal, mental, or conceptual causal conditions of experience to which we come to attach/identify ourselves with. Consequently, no (permanent) self exists isolated from causality.

The experience of the 'self' as a causal process amongst the five skandhas logically connects with the Buddha's teaching that time is impermanent. According to Matsumoto, the doctrine of impermanence is a logical consequence of how the Twelve Nidānas including the five skandhas need to be understood in practice. That is, the causal process beginning with ignorance towards the nature of no-abiding-self leading to the creation of mental formations which subsequently result in consciousness and eventually lead to old age and dying, is one which implies a lapse of time between

⁶² The five skandhas are not substantive realities and their causal relations can never produce a permanent 'essence.' The Buddha describes this through the simile of the chariot. Just as a chariot can only exist as a consequence of its dependent parts, so can a sense of 'being' happen only in dependence to the causal process of the five skandhas. This is mentioned in the *Vajira Sutta* (SN 5.10) in the collected sutras of the *Samyutta Nikaya*. See: "Vajira Sutta," *Wikipitaka - The Completing Tipitaka*, accessed July 23, 2015, http://tipitaka.wikia.com/wiki/Vajira_Sutta.

⁶³ This does not mean that Buddhism denies any sense of an agent subjectivity as some may misconstrue the nature of anātman to mean. The conventional sense of a self-consciousness that can denote itself as an "I" or "me" in daily life is never negated, rather what is denied is the view that this "I" is a permanent entity which exists outside causality. Heinrich Dumoulin, *Understanding Buddhism: Key Themes*, trans. Joseph S. O'Leary. (New York: Weatherhill, 1994), 34-35. Also see: Shohaku Okumura, *Realizing Genjōkōan: The Key to Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō* (Boston: Wisdom, 2010), 27-28.

⁶⁴ This explication of the nature of impermanence in relation to the various conditions, self and suffering is thoroughly examined especially in the *Samyutta Nikaya*, Vol.IV Salayatana Samyutta, Chapters 34-35, trans. Bhikkhuni Uppalavanna, *Metta Net*, accessed April 15, 2011, <http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/3Samyutta-Nikaya/index.html>.

each cause and the subsequent effect. The occurrence of one *nidāna*/skandha causing the subsequent *nidāna*/skandha always happens one after the other and cannot be a simultaneous causation.⁶⁵ All the skandhas, which constitute our experience of reality, are always changing in accordance to their causal process, therefore no aggregate of phenomena stays permanent. This means, there is always an irreversible movement of time between each condition causing the next. In other words, the Twelve *Nidānas* inclusive of the five skandhas, causally unfold as impermanence. Therefore, *pratītyasamutpāda* is by nature time.⁶⁶

This gives the notion of time a particular significance in Critical Buddhism. From the view of Critical Buddhism, Buddhism ought to be concerned with temporality as impermanence, that is, the time in which we are living here and now, and in which we are born, suffer and ultimately die.⁶⁷ Matsumoto defines this critical existential concern for the irreversibility of time as “religious time” (*Shukyo-teki Jikan* 宗教的時間) which conditions an individual’s awakening to spirituality. In Matsumoto’s words, “Impermanence does not mean (the mere ontological definition) that things are constantly changing. It is rather tied to the problem of our life and death. It is when we *realize* impermanence in this very unsolvable problem of our own living and dying that an individual awakens to his/her religiosity.”⁶⁸

The sense of existential crisis of religious time is further embedded in the fact that it allows no ontological ground for an assurance of permanent existence, or escape from the irreversibility of time, and ultimately death.⁶⁹ From the Critical Buddhist’s perspective this is the only time which should be of concern for a Buddhist since without proper insight into the nature of impermanence there can be no proper insight into the nature of phenomena as a causal process. Without the psychological preparedness and courage to face impermanence directly without escape, it becomes

⁶⁵ Matsumoto argues for this point within the context of his critique of Watsuji’s view that the Twelve *Nidānas* imply a simultaneous mutual “causation” amongst metaphysical conditions. Such “causality” in fact denies the linear nature of causation and consequently impermanence, since the lapse of time within the movement from one cause to the subsequent effect is negated by simultaneity. *Engi to Ku*, 34-44.

⁶⁶ Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, 2, 10-11.

⁶⁷ Hakamaya Noriaki, *Dōgen to Bukkyō (道元と仏教)*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 1992), 23.

⁶⁸ Matsumoto, *Bukkyō e no Michi*, 34. Additional phrase within parentheses added by myself for clarity of context.

⁶⁹ Matsumoto Shirō, *Engi to Ku: Nyoraizo-shiso Hihan (縁起と空 如来蔵思想批判)*, (Tokyo: Ōkura, 1989), 17, 34. Also Hakamaya, *Hihan Bukkyō*, 332.

nearly impossible to understand the Buddha's antidote to observe this causal movement. Therefore, any other theory of time that consequently negates irreversible impermanence by displacing it into some kind of otherworldly eternity, or spatializing it into infinite duration or a subsisting substratum behind phenomena cannot be endorsed. To deny impermanence that is the result of causality is to deny the law of causality (prafītyasamutpāda). We will later see how the above understanding of prafītyasamutpāda as impermanence plays itself out in Critical Buddhism's view on Dōgen's theory of time as incompatible with prafītyasamutpāda. According to Matsumoto, Dōgen is proposing a theory of time which claims a persisting substratum behind impermanence.

2.2.1.1.2 The Twelve Nidānas and Impermanence in Relation to Ontology

The nature of the causal relationship between the nidānas as irreversible impermanence leads to the Critical Buddhist view that prafītyasamutpāda is incompatible with ontology. According to Matsumoto, prafītyasamutpāda as an impermanent process cannot accommodate ontology and metaphysical realities as he mentions:

The causal nature of the Nidānas, as appearance and disappearance means that phenomena lacks any sense of ontological assurance as individually grounded 'existences.' [...] The moment Buddhism defined the actual experience of living by the causal relationship amongst the five skandhas, it had diverged from any notion of realism concerning the actual 'existence' of phenomena. Whether the five skandhas or the Twelve Nidānas, there is no difference that these are both causal relations amongst appearing and disappearing properties of phenomena. These properties are not permanent and unchanging, but unstable and therefore always in a critical situation. Our lives lack any sense of ontological basis. We can exist only as such an unstable and critically endangered causal process unfolding in time.⁷⁰

Accepting the nature of phenomena as prafītyasamutpāda, and therefore impermanent, logically ensues the view that the human's creation of ontological 'foundations' or 'grounds' of existence in order to construct the comfort of a permanently assured world and 'Self' is always bound to be illusory. Understanding that the strict observance of prafītyasamutpāda is by nature oppositional to metaphysical 'grounds' as suggested in the above quote is reasonable for practical purposes.

⁷⁰ Matsumoto, *Engi to Ku*, 27. Translated by myself.

Attempts at creating ontological ‘foundations’ or ‘grounds’ that nullify impermanence will be considered a product of a mind ignorant of the nature of phenomena as *pratītyasamutpāda* and no-abiding-self. The ignorance causes suffering, as these ‘foundations’ are like chasing castles in the air whose search leads to an endless cycle of attachment, un-fulfillment, disappointment and pain of departure. Not only may the reliance on permanent ‘foundations’ be a symptom of one’s attachment to assurance and ‘grounds,’ escapism from change and death, it can also worsen the situation by distracting one from taking the correct step to analyzing experience as a causal process. According to the Twelve *Nidānas*, a correct analysis of our experience of reality as the process of cause and effect unfolding in impermanence leads to the end of our ignorance. If so, a practitioner should not deny or escape from impermanence by believing in an a-temporal transcendental realm which ‘spatializes’ or ‘substantializes’ time by uniting it with some form of metaphysical ‘ultimate reality.’

I consider the practical implications of the above understanding of causal impermanence in relation to ontology as consistent with the practical steps needed to achieve correct insight into the nature of experience as *pratītyasamutpāda* and no-abiding-self. However, there is one theoretical problem underlying the above quote. Matsumoto seems to imply that what is ‘ontological’ is by nature always an attempt to create ‘grounds’ and, therefore, in contrast to and incompatible with the unstable and impermanent experience of life as expressed by *pratītyasamutpāda*. I infer that this is indicative of Critical Buddhism’s prejudice concerning the nature of ontology. When Matsumoto argues that *pratītyasamutpāda* is incompatible with ontology since *pratītyasamutpāda* as impermanence is contrary to the construction of any sense of ‘foundations’ or ‘grounds,’ he is implying that ‘ontology’ is by default a method to construct permanent ‘foundations’ to existence. In addition, he is implying that ‘ontology’ involves a sense of conceptual realism in believing such a ‘foundation’ to actually exist. Therefore, ‘realism’ allows ontological concepts to become an object for attachment by being considered a “valid” description of reality. This means Matsumoto holds the prejudice that ontology is by nature descriptive of, or correspondent to, some kind of ‘true-way-reality-is.’

I consider Matsumoto’s view that *pratītyasamutpāda* cannot accommodate ontology is a mere

prejudice since the view is accurate only if ontology functions ‘representationally.’ To the extent ontology as representation implies an objective and/or conceptual realism concerning the existence of the ‘reality’ it describes, it will certainly be contrary to *pratītyasamutpāda* (i.e. the causal origination of all phenomena) as it is tantamount to claiming the independent existence of reality beyond the causal process of experience. In addition, if the ‘reality’ described is one that creates a sense of a metaphysical absolute, ‘grounding’ phenomenon, then it also endangers impermanence and no-abiding-self by denying the critical reality of irreversible time and the non-existence of a permanently assured world and ‘self.’ In accordance to this view, there is no leeway to accept metaphysical ideas as compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*. Therefore, to read Dōgen becomes a matter of either adhering to *pratītyasamutpāda* while denying metaphysics, or of denying *pratītyasamutpāda* while preserving metaphysics. Such a view does not consider the possibility that there may be a way to utilize ontology in spiritual practice without having to deny our critical situation as no-abiding-self and impermanence.

The objective of the current study is to read Dōgen in adherence to *pratītyasamutpāda* in a manner significant for spiritual practice, and not to deny it as “non-Buddhist.” To that extent, we cannot agree to such a prejudice concerning the utility of ontology in relation to *pratītyasamutpāda*. We will later see through the course of analyzing Critical Buddhism’s particular interpretation of Dōgen, how this prejudice conditions the inevitable conclusion that Dōgen’s metaphysics is “non-Buddhist.” Hence this aspect of Critical Buddhism’s understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* necessitates a counter-argument for Dōgen’s metaphysics to be made to function in adherence to *pratītyasamutpāda*. Critical Buddhism’s poor view of metaphysics/ontology is unsuited for a pragmatist perspective on ontology as a practical tool and therefore needs to be overcome.

Critical Buddhism neglects the fact that ontology and metaphysics can be made to function outside representation. How can *pratītyasamutpāda* be reconceived as compatible with metaphysics if it is understood pragmatically as purely practical tools to enhance spiritual practice? How will such a view change one’s reading of Dōgen’s metaphysics? We must wait till chapter five in order to examine the full implication of these questions as it necessitates a thorough understanding of how Deleuze’s pragmatism allows for such a use of metaphysics prior to its application on Dōgen. For

now, we shall continue to examine Critical Buddhism's second and third criterion for what constitutes 'authentic' Buddhism in order to understand the full implications of following *pratītyasamutpāda* in evaluating and interpreting Buddhist doctrine.

2.2.1.2 Second Criterion: *Pratītyasamutpāda* and Analytical Reasoning (*Prajñā*)

According to Critical Buddhism, 'authentic' Buddhism defends the doctrines of *pratītyasamutpāda*, no-abiding-self and impermanence against invading views by use of analytical critique to counter philosophies that endanger the law of causation.⁷¹ This means that 'authentic' Buddhism must have as its basic insight, the importance of affirming and cultivating rational and analytical evaluative thought.⁷² This is the type of human knowledge called *prajñā*, especially as it is utilized in the Theravada traditions in the form of *prajñā dharma-pravicaya* defined as "analytical discrimination of phenomena."⁷³ Within this tradition, *prajñā* is understood as wisdom pertaining to one's ability to analytically discriminate amongst phenomena and to rationally evaluate the nature of cause and effect.

Prajñā is significant for three reasons. First, in order to achieve the correct understanding of the nature of experience as no-abiding-self produced by the causal process of the *skandhas*. Without analysis, one cannot step out of the cause of suffering that is the ignorance of the nature of causality, impermanence and no-abiding-self.⁷⁴ Second, analytical thinking is necessary for a practitioner to distinguish between numerous doctrines and interpretations of teachings in how far they rightfully consider them to be the Dharma (meaning what is in accord with the Buddha's teaching of *pratītyasamutpāda* or not). Thereby distinguishing between teachings that are effective in practice and what is not.⁷⁵ We will later see that this is precisely what Critical Buddhism does when it develops the

⁷¹ Matsumoto, *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 77-79.

⁷² Hakamaya, *Hihan Bukkyo*, 160-164, 306, 326. *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, 6. *Dōgen to Bukkyo*, 297-300.

⁷³ Hakamaya, *Hihan Bukkyo*, 31. Also *Dōgen to Bukkyo*, 67.

⁷⁴ Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyo*, 60-84.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 314-315. The idea that one's analytical decision making is central to evaluating matters is also reflective of the Buddha's own attitude towards how people should choose what to believe or not as mentioned in the *Jnanasara-samuccaya* sutra: "As the wise test gold by burning, cutting and rubbing it (on a piece of touchstone), so are you to accept my words after examining them and not merely out of regard for me." Narada. *The Buddha and His Teachings*.

criteria to criticise and to evaluate to what extent particular doctrines concur with *prāṭīyasamutpāda* or not. Third, *prajñā* is indispensable for individuals to act in accordance to the critical evaluation of what may be good or bad in different situations. This third reason is intermingled with the significance of *prajñā* in relation to ethics, therefore, I shall return to the details of this point in the next section where I describe the third criterion for ‘authentic’ Buddhism having to do with altruism.

From the Critical Buddhist stance, *prajñā* directly connects with the significance of language in understanding and expressing the teachings of the Buddha.⁷⁶ To the extent our discriminative thought and analytical abilities necessitate thinking in language, language cannot be denied or underestimated as secondary to experience. Language and concepts are indispensable tools necessary to gain correct insight into no-abiding-self by understanding the Buddha’s teachings of *prāṭīyasamutpāda* and to apply it to self-analysis.⁷⁷ Consequently, Critical Buddhism is against any idea of granting superiority to transcendental forms of experience that are considered to be beyond language and analytical thinking. Such forms of experience include variations of “mystical” experiences. From the perspective of *prāṭīyasamutpāda*, the priority granted to such forms of transcendental experiences whether they are called Zen “Kensho” (見性), “pure experience,” “direct experience” or “mystical intuition,” is problematic due to two underlying presumptions it is based. First, that there is a supreme ontological ‘truth’ or ‘ground’ transcendent to normative experience, and second, the only legitimate way to access this ‘ultimate reality’ or ‘ultimate truth’ is by transcending

4th ed., (Kuala Lumpur: Buddhist Missionary Society, 1988), 285.

Similar views are repeated in other sutras such as the *Kalama Sutra* (from the *Mahavagga* chapter of the collection of sutras known as the *Anguttara Nikaya*). In the *Kalama Sutra*, the Buddha guides students not to follow certain views purely on the point of authority, convention, prejudice or tradition, but only in accordance to one’s critical analysis of the matter. Refer to: *Anguttara Nikaya*, Vol.I “Tika Nipata”, Chapter 7 “Mahavaggo,” 5:66, trans. A.D.Jayasundere, Metta Net, accessed May 13, 2014. <http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/4Anguttara-Nikaya/Anguttara1/3-tikanipata/007-mahavaggo-e.html>.

Also see *Kalama Sutta The Buddha’s Charter for Free Inquiry*, trans. Soma Thera, Access to Insight, accessed May 13, 2014. <http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/soma/wheel008.html>.

⁷⁶ Hakamaya, *Hihan Bukkyo*, 344-345. Also Matsumoto, *Engi to Ku*, 56. *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 18-19. “Religion is not the negation of language, but it is language itself” 94.

⁷⁷ Though language and concepts are considered as necessary tools in practice, it comes with a high degree of caution that no sense of ‘realism’ is to be attached to words or concepts in that they are believed to designate independently existing realities. Language and concepts are themselves products of the causal conditions that create our experience of being human and to that extent hold no sense of ontological assurance.

Yamaguchi Zuihō, “The Core Elements of Indian Buddhism Introduced into Tibet: Contrast with Japanese Buddhism,” *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Jamie Hubbard & Paul L. Swanson, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1997), 231.

prajñā.⁷⁸ Any philosophy that prioritizes irrational, “mystical,” or transcendental experience and denounces rational, analytical and discriminative thinking denies the necessity of using such abilities to reach an adequate self-analysis to gain insight into the causal processes creating our experience of a sense of ‘self.’ Consequently, such philosophies in effect deny the necessity and significance of the doctrine of pratīyasamutpāda in spiritual practice, which is tantamount to denying pratīyasamutpāda itself.

While it is reasonable to understand that upholding prajñā is a logical prerequisite to practice pratīyasamutpāda, Critical Buddhism’s emphasis on this aspect seems to imply their denial of practical significance to any “metaphysical” notions or to experiences that may not be immediately apparent to conscious reason. If this is so, it holds true to Critical Buddhism’s prejudice that ontology/metaphysics is by nature reliant on and ‘representing’ the existence of objective ‘grounds’ and therefore any claimed experience of such a reality must be transcending prajñā. Again, such a perspective does not consider the possibility that pratīyasamutpāda need not deny metaphysical concerns, and that there may be a way to utilize them within practice under the dictates of pratīyasamutpāda and prajñā by way of pragmatism. Prajñā is indispensable to Buddhist practice, yet we do not have to conceive it as incompatible with metaphysics. We shall explore this possibility in chapter four and five where we will analyze the utility of Deleuze’s pragmatism and apply it to a reading of Dōgen. Later in this chapter we will see that Dōgen’s assigning of a sense of universality not immediately apparent to perception as found in his use of such concepts as Buddha-nature and time is a particular case in point which comes at odds with Critical Buddhism’s above prejudice and therefore leads to their view that these ideas are “non-Buddhist.”

⁷⁸ Matsumoto labels such philosophical systems that denounce analytical wisdom and language by prioritizing transcendental experience as “mysticism,” which for the sake of further clarity should perhaps be called transcendentalist mysticism. Matsumoto, *Engi to Ku*, 144-148. *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 137-140.

2.2.1.3 Third Criterion: Living Pratīyasamutpāda is to Practice Altruistic Ethics

According to Hakamaya, Buddhism teaches that each individual is of different capacities and seeks to spread the teaching of altruistic compassion under consideration of these differences.⁷⁹ How Critical Buddhism considers altruistic ethics to be imperative for ‘authentic’ Buddhism also becomes evident when Matsumoto mentions, “If there is no awareness of people’s suffering in the world, there can be no spiritual awakening. When one forgets one’s self, feels the suffering of humanity as if it were their own and comes to aspire for the complete abolition of this suffering upon the resolution for self-sacrifice, then one becomes truly human, that is a bodhisattva.”⁸⁰ One can infer that this priority given to altruistic ethics is indicative of Critical Buddhism’s adherence to the Mahayana ideal of Bodhisattva-hood in which one vows to take the path to enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings as opposed to seeking personal liberation as its goal. The practice of selfless compassion, active generosity, benevolence, empathy and the helping of others for the sake of their liberation from suffering are not the means to one’s enlightenment, but the very directive for spiritual practice. Ultimately, one seeks enlightenment not because one wants to free him/herself from suffering, but so that one can help others end suffering. To the extent that such altruism can only be realized when one is completely freed from attachment to oneself, achieving correct insight into the nature of no-abiding-self is a prerequisite that cannot be circumscribed.

Therefore, altruism ensues from the practice of *prajñā* in applying *pratīyasamutpāda* to one’s analysis of phenomena. Understanding the self and world as no-abiding-self necessitates analyzing the experience of the ‘self’ as a composite of causal aggregates none of which comprises a permanent being for each aggregate is itself a composite of causal conditions. As I mentioned in the previous

⁷⁹ Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, 12.

This aspect expresses the emphasis Critical Buddhism places on ethics as foundational for Buddhist practice as well as its imperative to be socio-politically engaged. Concerning the indispensable relation of ethics to Buddhist life Matsumoto mentions, “If one cannot accept the existence of evil in the world, there cannot be labour.” “The meaning to live and labour as a human being is, to exert oneself even if maybe a little bit, in the work to abolish this evil in the world.” *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 252.

⁸⁰ Matsumoto, *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 120.

section, the analytical, discriminative and evaluative thinking necessary in understanding this process of no-abiding-self is called *prajñā*. In the Indian tradition of Mahayana Buddhism, the growth of wisdom pertaining to one's use of *prajñā* is traditionally considered to be interrelated with the increase in the intensity of compassion⁸¹ since correct insight into the complete lack of permanent 'selfhood' in all phenomena through analytical meditation (Pāli. *vipassana*) triggers the melting away of self-centredness and the excessive attachment to self-preservation.⁸² Placing central concern over altruism in practice can also be mutually effective in achieving insight into no-abiding-self since an active realization of altruistic action as well as meditating on compassion and equanimity can help further the shift of focus from self-centredness to altruism. Either way, increase in the intensity of altruistic compassion is considered a consequence of the mutual effect of both correct insight into no-abiding-self and its actual realization in practice.⁸³

Critical Buddhism alludes to the above nature of mutual influence between *prajñā* and altruism when it considers *prajñā* as the indispensable faculty with which one must observe, analyze, evaluate and decide in every situation what is good or bad in relation to the other.⁸⁴ In addition,

⁸¹ Compassion in the Buddhist sense is not motivated by pity for this implies viewing others to be in a 'lower' state than oneself, nor is it motivated by kinship as in the case of belonging to a group as in a family, friends, or country for this implies a collective attachment to identities. Rather Buddhist compassion and loving kindness is based in a proper insight into the equanimity of all beings concerning their longing for happiness, the universal nature of human suffering, and the no-abiding-self of all phenomena (including oneself). This insight ensues a sense of equanimity amongst beings, as suffering is shared by all existence and allows for one's capacity to feel and to act upon the suffering of others as if one's own in freedom from one's desire for results and personal merit. See Dalai Lama, *The Essential Dalai Lama: His Important Teachings*, ed. Rajiv Mehrotra, (New York: Penguin, 2005), 22-29, 94-105.

⁸² Yamaguchi, 222.

On the view that *vipassana* or analytical meditation is the meditational method that most clearly reflects the practical integration of *prajñā* and *prāṭītyasamutpāda*, see Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyō*, 163.

For a more detailed description of what analytical meditation is and how it is practiced refer to: Dalai Lama, 148-153.

⁸³ Yamaguchi, 225-227, 230.

⁸⁴ Hakamaya mentions: "according to the orthodox Buddhist perspective *prajñā* is the ability to discriminate what is right (*prajñā dharma-pravicaya*)." Dōgen to Bukkyō, 133. This also means that Critical Buddhism understands 'authentic' Buddhism as fundamentally anti-authoritarian. See Matsumoto Shirō, *Dōgen Shisō-ron* (道元思想論), (Tokyo: Ōkura, 2000), 16. Also Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, 9. *Dōgen to Bukkyō*, 291.

The Critical Buddhist's strict adherence to *prajñā* means what is right or wrong, good or bad must always be critically evaluated and decided upon in accordance to every situation by each and every practitioner. This means nothing, other than the law of causation should be taken for granted and adhered to uncritically on the point of authority alone whether this authority comes in the form of absolutized dogma, government, "common sense" values, cult of personality, rank (i.e. blind adherence to gurus, and hierarchies based on "attainment"), or claimed superiority of particular religious practices. In Matsumoto's words, this is to practice Buddhism by "always searching for what is the right doctrine without ever absolutizing nor mystifying anything whatsoever while always being critical to one's self." Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 16. Succumbing to authority in deciding on what constitutes adequate views on doctrine and practice denies *prāṭītyasamutpāda* since it ignores the fundamental view that the doctrine of *prāṭītyasamutpāda* necessitates each and every human being to exercise their sovereign analytical wisdom individually in analyzing the causal process of suffering for themselves.

Hakamaya notes that since properly practiced analytical self-observance allows one to understand one's ignorance and thus reveals one's own mistakes and evils to one's self, it strengthens the aspiration for one to seek what is right and to fight evil.⁸⁵ As I have mentioned, altruism within the Indian lineage of Mahayana Buddhism is not a means, but the very principle for which spiritual practice is aimed. Prajñā realizes this aim by applying praṭītyasamutpāda to an analysis of experience in revealing the nature of no-abiding-self. In turn, altruistic action furthers one's detachment from self-centred perceptions of phenomena. This means that both prajñā and ethics are deeply integrated into the practice of praṭītyasamutpāda and that they are always foundational for 'authentic' Buddhist practice.

The priority of altruistic ethics adds to Critical Buddhism's claim that a proper application of praṭītyasamutpāda in practice cannot accommodate the view that Buddhist practice involves seeking an ultimate 'true-way-reality-is' or the attainment of a transcendental experience of such a reality.⁸⁶ In alignment with the Indian lineage of Buddhism, the goal of practice is not personal liberation through transcendent sensory experience, as Nirvana is often misconstrued in Zen. Rather, it is the cultivation of analytical wisdom by which the practice of 'great compassion' (Skt. *mahakarunā*) is realized through the deconstruction of one's understanding of the phenomenon of 'self.'⁸⁷ Therefore, Critical Buddhists oppose doctrines and practices that emphasize personal "attainment" through transcendental experiences as their central goal at the expense of cultivating prajñā, and altruistic compassion through self-negation.⁸⁸ A failure for particular doctrines or philosophical interpretations of Buddhism to uphold altruistic ethics in fact means that it fails to abide to the principle of praṭītyasamutpāda.

Though Critical Buddhism does not state this explicitly, I believe that their avoidance of

⁸⁵ Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyo*, 320.

⁸⁶ Matsumoto, *Engi to Ku*, 191-219. Hakamaya, *Hihan Bukkyo*, 160. *Dōgen to Bukkyo*, 28-29.

⁸⁷ Yamaguchi, 222.

⁸⁸ Hakamaya, *Hihan Bukkyo*, 312-313. On compassion and self-sacrifice/self denial also see Matsumoto, *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 109, 112, 120.

Both Hakamaya and Matsumoto concur with their respected senior Buddhistologist Yamaguchi Zuihō on the point of Buddhist enlightenment as having nothing to do with the 'attainment' of transcendental experiences and metaphysical 'truth,' but the analysis of phenomena in accordance to no-abiding-self in order to realize altruistic compassion. See Zuihō's analysis of Zen in contrast to the Indian lineage of Buddhism as inherited in Tibet: Yamaguchi Zuihō, "The Core Elements of Indian Buddhism Introduced into Tibet: Contrast with Japanese Buddhism," *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Jamie Hubbard & Paul L. Swanson, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1997), 220-241.

explicating altruistic ethics on an ontological level implies their adherence to the following attitude attributed to the historical Buddha. The preference for altruism should be considered a matter of practical principle based in a purely soteriological and therapeutic basis rather than an ontological one. The reason is, once questions of the existence or non-existence of pain and suffering in relation to the emptiness of the ‘self’ are discerned, one enters a labyrinth of argumentative difficulties in justifying altruism.⁸⁹ Such a question for seeking reasons and ‘grounds’ for altruism is itself contrary to the Buddha’s warning not to be consumed by questions calling for ontological assurance such as those related to the existence or non-existence of reality. Rather, the Buddha administers a pragmatic approach to the problem of suffering. Much as it is useless for a man shot by a lethal poison arrow to be questioning from whence the arrow came or who shot it in order to rescue himself from death, so it is useless for people to seek questions of existence or non-existence, finitude or infinitude, the eternality of reality etc. since it does not help solve the problem of suffering at stake.⁹⁰ To the extent that suffering is an unavoidable reality in the experience of being human and to the extent one longs to remove it, to question the existence or non-existence of an objective origin or ground to their existence is a waste of time. Rather, one should use time wisely to analyze the perceptive and mental processes which lead to suffering. A similar position can be applied to the necessity for altruism. If the

⁸⁹ Harris puts this point forth in his examination of Sāntideva’s argument for altruism in contrast to several modern critique/interpretations. Affirming altruism as a logical consequence of anātman or the ‘emptiness’ of the self leads to several difficulties. For example if the emptiness of the self allows for a conventional self, and we accept the theory of karmic rebirth, it will still be possible for one to prefer one’s own well being for the sake of his/her future conventional self above others. However if both ātman and conventional self are non-existent then no identity between one’s own and anybody’s present and future self can be established. This means one’s suffering is no more significant than the other’s and therefore if one is to remove suffering, one might as well remove all suffering. Here, altruism becomes a possible choice. However the same argument applies for total apathy. If no selves exist and all suffering is everyone’s suffering, why should one even care? Stephen Harris, “Does Anātman Rationally Entail Altruism? On Bodhicaryāvatāra 8:101-103,” *Journal of Buddhist Ethics* 18, (2011): 94-123.

I view that the above debate is based on two misunderstandings of doctrine. First misunderstanding no-abiding-self as purely ontological as opposed to being an analysis of experience. Since it is not a realist ‘description,’ it does not limit altruistic action or aspiration. And second, on the *Tiṭṭhayatana Sutta* of the *Anguttara Nikaya*, the Buddha advises any theory of a karmic continuity of the conventional self not to be accepted as either “true” nor “false” on ontological grounds, but purely on pragmatic grounds for the sake of enhancing aspiration for practice. Therefore, it is skillful to avoid ontology completely in the question of altruism. Rather, together with *praṭītyasamutpāda*, altruism should be considered a matter of practical principle that conditions everything else including Buddhist ontology, epistemology and phenomenology, but never vice-versa. From this perspective, debating altruism on the point of ontological justification is irrelevant. Altruism is not a means nor consequence of the *Bodhisattva* path, it is its very condition. For the Buddha’s view on the karmic continuity of the self see: “Tiṭṭh’ayatana Sutta,” trans. Piya Tan, *The Living Word of the Buddha*, accessed April 28, 2011, <http://earlypalsutta.googlepages.com/6.8TiṭṭhayatanaSutta03.61piya.pdf>.

⁹⁰ This is the famous “parable of the arrow” found in the *Cula-Malunkiyovada Sutta*, which is chapter 63 of the *Majjhima Nikaya* within the *Sutta Pitaka*. “Cula-Malunkiyovada Sutta: The Shorter Instructions to Malunkya,” Trans. Thanissaro Bhikkhu, *Access to Insight: Readings in Theravada Buddhism*, accessed July 28, 2015, <http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.063.than.html>.

stopping of all suffering experienced by sentient beings necessitates correct insight into no-abiding-self and altruism constitutes both the aim and the integral means of practice for such insight to be pursued, then it is only a matter of practical principle that one aspires to realize altruism. Therefore, altruistic action needs no recourse to the desire for ‘reasons,’ justifying ‘grounds,’ or personal benefit, but is a practical necessity in the whole process of alleviating suffering amongst all sentient beings.

In summary, *pratītyasamutpāda* as the pillar for ‘authentic’ Buddhism involved three main criteria. First was ontological and phenomenological in the sense that it understood the experiencing of ‘self’ and reality as constituted by an endless process of cause and effect amongst relating functions (*skandhas*) of experience, including sensory perception, consciousness, identification, value judgment, habit etc. This logically ensued the observation that causality unfolds in impermanence. While Critical Buddhism’s view on no-abiding-self and impermanence was doctrinally consistent, their view that these ideas are incompatible with ontology implied a prejudice that all ontology is ‘representational.’ The second criterion was epistemological in the sense that it had to do with the nature of understanding and thinking in relation to applying *pratītyasamutpāda* to practice. Analytical and discriminative thinking (*prajñā*) is considered indispensable in order to have proper insight into the nature of one’s experience of reality as no-abiding-self unfolding through the process of cause and effect. Third, is the ethical criterion involving altruistic ethics. Altruism was considered an unquestionable primacy in the practice of Buddhism and a thoroughly embedded practical consequence to the understanding of ‘self’ and reality as impermanent and no-abiding.

We saw that these three factors of *pratītyasamutpāda* were in debt to views inherited from Indian Buddhism through Theravada and Mahayana doctrines. In this sense, Critical Buddhism’s views of what constitutes ‘authentic’ Buddhism was not exclusive, but exist in continuity with those lineages of Buddhism who equally considered *pratītyasamutpāda* as essential for its practice. All three factors were considered relative to each other, the second and third logically and practically ensuing from a proper adherence to *pratītyasamutpāda*. Therefore, the failure to adhere to even one factor means the whole of *pratītyasamutpāda* is disregarded.

Now that we have understood what constitutes an ethically viable Buddhism founded on *pratītyasamutpāda*, the next section will introduce how Critical Buddhism applies *pratītyasamutpāda* to the criteria for ontological critique in order to identify ideas that deny *pratītyasamutpāda*. What I will present as Critical Buddhism's criteria in criticizing the ontological claims made by Sino-Japanese Buddhist philosophies as Zen and Hongaku doctrine will show a further continuity between Critical Buddhism with other lineages of Buddhism.

2.2.2 Pratītyasamutpāda Applied to the Critique of Ontological Theories

In this section, we will see how Critical Buddhism incorporates the doctrine of no-abiding-self, impermanence, and its view of the significance of *prajñā*/ethics into a systematic criteria to deconstruct "Buddhist" philosophies which propose ideas contrary to *pratītyasamutpāda* and therefore deny altruistic ethics. These criteria are influenced by historically preceding Buddhist arguments by the Madhyamaka approach to philosophical critique as expounded by its Indian originator Nagarjuna and in its inherited form as utilized in the tradition of analytical debate in Tibetan Buddhism. The goal of this section is twofold: First, to make a case for the wider applicability of Critical Buddhism's criteria concerning what is or is not "Buddhism" through describing these criteria in relation to their historical precedents. Second, to introduce in detail the criteria for identifying ideas contrary to *pratītyasamutpāda* so that the reader is prepared for understanding how these criteria are applied in both Critical Buddhism's interpretation of Dōgen and my critical analysis of other comparative interpretations of Dōgen in the next chapter.

2.2.2.1 Historical Precedents: Madhyamaka and the Debate at Samye

In ontological terms, the notion of no-abiding-self is expressed in Mahayana Buddhism, especially by Nagarjuna (ca. 150 - 250 CE) and his Madhyamaka school, as the problem of no-self-existence (Skt. *a-svabhāva*) meaning that things do not exist in and out of itself isolated from

causality. Nagarjuna's thesis as expounded in his central work the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, is that nothing can be claimed to exist by its own-being outside of causal dependency. The experience of phenomena happens through co-dependence of the skandhas under continuously shifting causal conditions and therefore is "empty" of *svabhāva*, meaning self-generation, individual-essence, or independent-being.⁹¹ Hence, there cannot be any self-asserting 'grounds' for being which exist outside the process of causal change. In accordance to this understanding, to claim the eternal existence of some form of a self-generated 'individual-essence' that subsists within matter and individuals as the 'true nature' of its existence beyond causality is a denial of the law of causation itself. Nagarjuna's critical logic was mainly targeted at his Brahmanist philosophical contemporaries⁹² who claimed the existence of a supreme metaphysical reality in the form of a permanent 'True Self' or *ātman*; a view the historical Buddha clearly opposed through his doctrine of no-abiding-self. Critical Buddhism inherits Nagarjuna's framework for problematizing claims for *svabhāva*, not for the sake of criticizing opposing Brahmanist philosophies, but to criticize philosophies within the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition as heretical.

In addition to its debt to Madhyamaka philosophy, Critical Buddhism's criticism of doctrines that deny *prāṭīyasamutpāda* has another historical precedent. This is the debate which took place at the Tibetan Buddhist temple in Samye between the Indian monk Kamalaśīla (740 - 795 CE) and the Chinese representative of Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism Héshang Móhēyan (和尚摩訶衍, 8th century, birth and death date unknown). Though Matsumoto accepts a certain level of weakness in Kamalaśīla and his teacher Śāntarakṣita's view,⁹³ he considers their argument against Móhēyan as a valid case, which

⁹¹ Anthony Birch, "Enlightenment and Time: An Examination Of Nagarjuna's Concept Of Time," <http://sped2work.tripod.com/nagarjuna.html>, (October 1, 2014).

⁹² This was most probably the essentialist and realist inclined Naiyāyika school of orthodox Hindu thought. There is also the scholarly view that Nagarjuna's intended opponents were the fellow Buddhist Sarvāstivādins and what is interpreted as the essentialist tendencies in their view of reality as composed of atomic elements ("dharmas"). I disagree to this perspective. In agreement with Schroeder, I consider such an interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda is misguided in that they consider Sarvāstivāda as purely theoretical and overlooks their central concern for praxis. Sarvāstivāda is not a 'representational' explanation of reality, but tools for meditation. Schroeder considers that while Nagarjuna did see certain elements of Sarvāstivāda as part of his intended opponent, this was not based on an ontological debate over essentialism, but over cautioning their dogmatism towards a particular meditational method, which seems to have misunderstood *prāṭīyasamutpāda*.

John Schroeder, "Nagarjuna and the Doctrine of Skillful Means", *Philosophy East and West* 50.4 (2000): 563-569.

⁹³ While Matsumoto tends more towards Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's perspectives concerning the positions taken at the debate at Samye and considers the debate an exemplary case where the problems of Ch'an/Zen philosophy has been exposed, he also considers Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's views as lurking in dangerous waters adjacent to

exposed the heresy of the Ch'an/Zen stance in contrast to *pratīyasamutpāda*. Kamalaśīla's critique against Mōhēyan can be considered a prototype to Critical Buddhism's critique of Japanese Zen, Hongaku-shisō and ultimately Dōgen as we shall see in the following sections. For this reason it will be fruitful to present a brief background to this historical debate so that we can paint a wider picture of Critical Buddhism's philosophical continuity with their historical peers.

During the eighth century, Indian lineages of Vajrayana, Theravada and Mahayana Buddhist teachings including Madhyamaka were firmly established in Tibet by such Indian monks as Padmasambhava, Śāntarakṣita (725 - 788 CE), Kamalaśīla, and the Sarvastivadins from Kashmir. Chinese Buddhists had also been active in Tibet, though in a minor degree due to having less official support from the royalty. This led to occasions where Indian monks came into intellectual contact with Chinese Buddhists. One such case happened when emperor Trisong Detsen (742 - 797 CE) invited the Chinese Ch'an master Héshang Mōhēyan to preach the dharma in Tibet. It is said that Śāntarakṣita found Mōhēyan's teachings to be in such stark contrast to the Indian tradition of Buddhism that he predicted the need for an official debate to be held between representatives of both schools. Seeing that support for Mōhēyan's teachings led to a disregard for stricter practices in the Indian lineages which promoted altruistic deeds upon the realization of no-abiding-self, Trisong Detsen eventually condemned Mōhēyan's teachings as "antisocial" in 793.⁹⁴ Emperor Trisong Detsen later revoked the decree and allowed Mōhēyan to have an official debate with Kamalaśīla at what is now called the famous *debate at Samye*, under the condition that the one who loses leaves the country. Mōhēyan was defeated and henceforth, the Indian lineage of Buddhism was considered the "correct" path to be pursued in Tibet.

dhātu-vāda. While they emphasized *pratīyasamutpāda* and the necessity of analytical thought to apply *pratīyasamutpāda* to the analysis of no-abiding-self, they both coincide with Mōhēyan on the point that there ultimately is a thought, wisdom or mode of perception which is beyond discrimination. Matsumoto considers this perspective originally arose from a misinterpretation of Nagarjuna and is weary of such a perspective, since accepting a transcendental state of 'knowing' really amounts to accepting a transcendental 'truth' or 'reality' as an object of this transcendental 'knowing' and therefore only a slip away from pure dhātu-vāda. Matsumoto on the contrary emphasizes that according to Nagarjuna, the ultimate insight into the nature of no-abiding-self does not consider an 'object' to be known, but happens only through reflective analysis of one's own experience of reality, since reality as experienced cannot be known outside of one's meditation on the causal process of the skandhas. Therefore, ultimately such insight is itself 'empty' of self-nature. In this sense, Matsumoto seems to support Nagarjuna's original Madhyamaka stance. Matsumoto Shirō, *Zen Shisō no Hihanteki Kenkyū* (禅思想の批判的研究), (Tokyo: Ōkura, 1994), 21-35.

⁹⁴ Yamaguchi, 220-221.

The debate between Mōhēyan and Kamalaśīla largely revolved around the difference in views concerning the need for gradual practical development involving analytical and discriminative thought. Mōhēyan's teachings advocated the existence of an 'ultimate reality' which immediately endowed one with a form of transcendental wisdom once the practitioner seized all thought to realize his original unity with this ultimate reality. "Enlightenment" is instant and necessitates no need for the gradual training of analytical and discriminative thinking, and rather such states of thinking need to be abolished to make way for the 'original' purity of the mind to be revealed. On the contrary, Kamalaśīla, in adherence to *pratītyasamutpāda*, considered such practices involving analytical thought as indispensable since a correct insight into *pratītyasamutpāda* and its application in analyzing experience cannot be realized without correct discrimination and analysis amongst cause and effect.⁹⁵ Mōhēyan's teaching denies *pratītyasamutpāda* on two grounds: a denial of causality by accepting the existence of a foundational metaphysical reality and considering it transcendent to analytical thought. These two grounds consequently lead to the disregard of *pratītyasamutpāda* on ethical terms as it cannot affirm the need for practicing the analysis of experienced reality in order to realize no-abiding-self which then in turn realizes compassion and altruism.⁹⁶ As we shall see in the following section, Critical Buddhism's critique of Japanese Zen and *Hongaku-shisō* follows in the footsteps of Kamalaśīla's critique of Mōhēyan.

2.2.2.2 Understanding Dhātu-vāda and its Exemplary Case, Hongaku Doctrine

Critical Buddhism's critique of Sino-Japanese "Buddhist" ontologies and epistemologies that neglect *pratītyasamutpāda* parallels the argumentative methods utilized by Nagarjuna to protect *pratītyasamutpāda* against *svabhāva*, as well as by Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla's in their criticism against Mōhēyan. The influence of these historical precedents are put to full use in the criteria Critical

⁹⁵ Matsumoto, *Zen Shisō no Hihanteki Kenkyū*, 22-25.

⁹⁶ Moreover, Mōhēyan's claim that all that is needed for enlightenment is the seizing of thought, and that Nirvana is a state liberated from all thinking could not counter Kamalaśīla's critique that such a view leads to the appalling logical conclusion that simply passing out and becoming unconscious cannot be differentiated from "enlightenment." Such an inconsistent philosophy will endanger the very significance of spiritual practice in Buddhism.

Buddhism lays out in order to identify ideas that they do not consider “authentically” Buddhist, ideas which they call, *dhātu-vāda*. *Dhātu-vāda* is a Sanskrit neologism created by the Critical Buddhist scholar, Matsumoto, to refer to ideas contrary to *prāṭīyasamutpāda*, impermanence and no-abiding-self. The term includes the word “*dhātu*” meaning ground or essence, and “*vāda*” meaning views, or philosophical stance. In short, *dhātu-vāda* means any philosophical stance founded on an ontology and/or epistemology which necessitates the assertable existence of an ontological or epistemological ‘ground.’


If we borrow several terminologies from Western philosophy, *dhātu-vāda* can be defined as ideas based on ‘realism,’ ‘foundationalism’ and/or ‘essentialism.’ Believing that reality substantively ‘exists’ as an independent object irrelative to the causal process of the *skandhas*, or that reality must be ‘based’ on an assuring ontological foundation, essence, or metaphysical truth, all constitutes *dhātu-vāda*. This can also apply to epistemological perspectives as in the case of understanding that knowledge must be ‘based’ on a corresponding meaning, reason, or truth that somehow exist apart from the causal relations amongst the experiential process of the *skandhas*.⁹⁷ To offer more examples, *dhātu-vāda* will include any philosophy that ontologically places an intrinsically existing ultimate reality or metaphysical ‘truth’ beyond, behind or as ‘essence’ to ordinary reality as principle to, assurance to, or as reason of its existence. This also applies to philosophies that define the ontological ‘ground’ as a self-contained metaphysical ‘space’ as in the case of some ultimate ‘place’ or ‘realm,’ on which everything else is fully dependent for its existence. Such ideas are all considered a form of *svabhāva* from the perspective of Madhyamaka critique.

Realism, foundationalism, and essentialism are problematic from the side of *prāṭīyasamutpāda*, since claiming the independent existence of an assuring, unchanging ‘foundation’ to reality or knowledge is tantamount to saying that such a ‘foundation’ exists in a manner

⁹⁷ According to Yamaguchi: “In its effort to decide how the mind should work, Buddhist epistemology rejects verbal conceptualizations that see real objects as spatial existences extracted from their temporal context. All such ideation is seen as a “provisional construct” erected in the service of verbal expression. Indeed “space” and “time” themselves are seen as no more than makeshift “scaffolding” for verbal expression, not the form of a priori existence itself.” 231. In other words, from the perspective of applying *prāṭīyasamutpāda* in practice, language and concepts need to be seen as itself a makeshift product of the temporal process of causal conditions (*skandhas/Nidānas*) constituting our experience of phenomena, and although are indispensable tools for *prajñā*, should never be considered as substantive ‘realities’ or actual descriptions of the ‘true-way-reality-is.’

transcendent to causal dependency and impermanence. In addition, an existential attachment or belief in such an assuring ‘ground’ to life/existence can hinder a Buddhist from properly observing the nature of impermanence and *prāṭīyasamutpāda* in their practice. Critical Buddhism calls such ‘foundations’ on which reality and/or knowledge must be based, “loci.” In turn, everything else that exists in dependency or in virtue of the ‘grounding’ locus are labeled as “super-locus.”⁹⁸

The following diagram expresses the basic structure of *dhātu-vāda*:



According to Critical Buddhism, the following points constitute the criteria for *dhātu-vāda*:

1. The locus is always ground to the super-locus (not vice-versa, the locus is always privileged, primordial and superior to the super-locus).
2. The locus is principle to (the reason of, assurance to, and/or cause of) the appearance of the super-locus.
3. The locus is understood as ultimately One (or beyond discrimination) and the super-locus is multiplicity or difference.
4. The locus exists intrinsically, but the super-locus is ultimately non-existent.
5. The locus is ‘essence’ (*ātman*) to the super-locus.

⁹⁸ ‘Super’ here does not denote a qualitative or quantitative superiority or higher value of the phenomena founded on the grounding reality, but is used in the sense of phenomena being ‘placed above’ or ‘situated on top’ of the ontological ‘ground’ or the ‘loci.’ I will refrain from substituting this term with another since it is the original English term that Matsumoto himself uses.

6. Although the super-locus is ultimately non-existent, it owns a certain quality and reason of existence by nature of the fact that it holds the locus as its essence or substance.
7. The totality of all super-loci is unconditionally embraced by the locus.
8. The locus is beyond temporality and therefore negates irreversible impermanence.
9. The super-locus is expressible by language, but the locus exists beyond language.⁹⁹

These criteria are specifically designed to counter ideas found in Zen, and Hongaku doctrine in which its debt to a metaphysical ‘ground’ is quite explicit. However, I add that a logical critique against dhātu-vāda must also apply to dhātu-vādic philosophies that seemingly undercut dhātu-vāda in terms of its superficial presentation. For example, there can be “Buddhist” philosophies that attempt to slip through dhātu-vāda on the point of rhetoric. As I will analyze in the next chapter, such will be the case in Abe’s interpretation of Dōgen that equates the Buddhist concept of *sūnyatā* (emptiness) with a sense of absolute reality, but claiming this absolute is not intrinsically existing for it is itself ‘empty’ of inherent-nature. A similar move is made by the Heideggerian interpreters of Dōgen who claim there is an absolute ground behind phenomena, but that absolute is non-substantive nothingness therefore non-being or “presence” etc. This kind of ontological rhetoric seemingly accepts that everything is only co-dependently happening, but in effect assigns an ultimate ontological ‘groundness’ to this interdependence as a whole.¹⁰⁰ I will give a detailed critique of such comparative interpretations of Dōgen in the next chapter in order to show how they ultimately fail to uphold *prafityasamutpāda*. The problem with such ideas is that no matter how these concepts are ontologically defined as not intrinsically existing, or devoid of a substantive being, they function as dhātu-vāda as long as they necessitate an ontological primacy of a locus (regardless of whether this locus is understood as a self-existing ground or not). For this reason, a logical critique of dhātu-vāda needs to include an analysis of how the ideas in question *function* in context and practice as opposed to simply adhering to how these concepts are ontologically defined.

Therefore, in addition to the aforementioned criteria defined by Critical Buddhism I propose

⁹⁹ Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyō*, 28. Also see Matsumoto, *Engi to Ku*, 5-6. 9th criterion inferred from their view on *prajñā* and language.

¹⁰⁰ This will be the case whatever name the philosophy at stake calls this metaphysical ‘ground,’ whether it be ‘emptiness’ (*sūnyatā*), ‘suchness’ (*Tathātā*), ‘Buddha-nature’ or as ‘Dharma-realms’ (*Buddha-dhātu*).

the following as the tenth criterion for dhātu-vāda. Any framework of thought which must rely on a view of reality based on concepts that function in a dual subject/object, locus/super-locus, essence/appearance, signified/signifier structure for the sake of creating some form of assertable ‘truth,’ assurance or reason to existence is dhātu-vāda regardless of their ontological claim to non-intrinsic-existence. Regardless of form, it is the necessity for and dependence of the role of a locus that makes a philosophy function as dhātu-vāda.

Critical Buddhism’s criteria are applied in their critique against what they consider an archetypal dhātu-vāda that recurs throughout Japanese Buddhism including that of Dōgen. This is a pervasive doctrine found in many aspects of Chinese and Japanese Tendai¹⁰¹ and Zen schools of Buddhism, what is called *Hongaku-shisō* (本覚思想) translated as the “Doctrine of Original Enlightenment.” Since Dōgen was originally schooled in the Tendai-influenced traditions of Buddhism that were culturally embedded in Hongaku doctrine, the Critical Buddhists analyze that its influences can be identified in Dōgen’s ideas. Matsumoto claims that many concepts that seem to be philologically traceable to Hongaku-shisō recur throughout Dōgen’s writing. Thus, understanding the Critical Buddhist position against Hongaku doctrine is important in understanding its interpretation of Dōgen. In addition, Hongaku-shisō constitutes the archetypal dhātu-vāda that has inspired many philosophical interpretations of Dōgen in the past. Much of the comparative interpretations I will be dealing with in the next chapter are no exception to this tendency. Hence, understanding Hongaku-shisō is also significant in identifying how Hongaku ideas are reiterated in these comparative interpretations of Dōgen leading to their neglect of *pratīyasamutpāda*.

In short, Hongaku-shisō is the idea that all beings are originally and primordially endowed with a pure Buddha-nature which is itself “enlightened” and therefore all beings are “originally enlightened” even before any practice or learning of the Dharma (i.e. Buddha’s teachings) takes place.¹⁰² In detail, Hakamaya interprets the Hongaku doctrine of Original Enlightenment as being

¹⁰¹ Tendai is a Japanese school of Mahayana Buddhism that shares doctrines with its precursor, the Chinese Tiantai. Tiantai doctrines came into Japan in the middle of the eighth century, but did not gain ground until the appearance of the monk Saichō (最澄) who brought more Tiantai doctrines back from China (in 805 CE) and established a temple on Mt. Hiei that eventually became the centre of Japanese Tendai Buddhism. Dōgen was originally schooled at Mt. Hiei.

¹⁰² Hongaku-shisō has its direct roots in Chinese Buddhism and most notably in the *Awakening of Faith in the*

thoroughly dhātu-vāda for three reasons. First, Hongaku-shisō identifies the concept of Buddha-nature with the existence of an ultimate self or a primordial “True Self” which functions as a form of an intrinsically existing ‘essence’ existing behind our conventional sense of selfhood.¹⁰³ This leads to the pervasive view found in Zen that an “enlightened” being is one who has realized his “True Self” as in the case of Linji’s famous dictum of the “true self without any rank.”¹⁰⁴ These views dangerously proximate the Brahmanist system of thought which will run against the Buddha’s teaching of no-abiding-self.¹⁰⁵ Since the idea of Buddha-nature in Hongaku doctrine conjures a sense of ‘Self’ as ‘essence,’ Critical Buddhists are against any variation of the Buddha-nature doctrine as a disguised reintroduction of the Brahmanist doctrine of the *ātman* back into Buddhism.¹⁰⁶ Matsumoto describes this idea of individuals “having” a primordially pure Buddha-nature as a theory of “*inherent Buddha-nature*” (仏性内在論 *Busshō Naizai-ron*), and considers it the orthodox form of Hongaku doctrine.¹⁰⁷

Second, Hongaku-shisō accepts the idea of a locus of reality¹⁰⁸ in the form of an ultimate metaphysical reality or ‘Truth’ called *Tathātā* (meaning thusness, or reality-as-it-is, Jpn. 真如 *Shin-nyo*) also understood as a spatial ‘realm of the absolute’ (*Dharma-dhātu* or *Buddha-dhātu* trans. Buddha-realm or world, Jpn. 法界 *Hokkai*). Hongaku doctrine supplements the ‘true reality’ of the ‘Self’ with such a ‘Truth’ of reality as a whole. Simply put, Buddha-nature in Hongaku doctrine is the ‘true reality’ of the ‘Self,’ and since this ‘Truth of the Self’ is itself always untainted and unhindered as an extension of the primordially undefiled ‘thusness’ of reality, Buddha-nature *is* *Tathātā* (or

Mahayana Sutra (大乘起信論 *Daijō-kishin-ron*) written in the 5-6th century AD. Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, 6-7, 373-375. Religious record has it that the sutra is based on a older Sanskrit version from India, but no Sanskrit nor Tibetan language version remains and most modern scholarship sees the sutra as a likely Chinese creation in the 5th-6th century AD.

Matsumoto traces the philosophical genealogy of Hongaku even further in claiming that the nascent ideas that eventually lead to its development can be traced back to the Tathāgatagarbha doctrines developed during the 2nd to 3rd century CE in India. Matsumoto Shirō, “Nyoraizo-shisō to Hongaku-shisō,” *Komazawa University Annual Research Journal for Buddhist Studies* Vol.63 (2005): 1-29. Also Matsumoto, *Zen Shisō no Hihanteki Kenkyū*, 588-592.

¹⁰³ Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyō*, 15.

¹⁰⁴ Linji, *Rinzai-roku* (臨濟錄), Trans. Iriya Yoshitaka, (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1989), 21.

¹⁰⁵ Matsumoto makes an extensive critical study of Linji’s idea of the “True Self” as a recurrence of the Brahmanic theory of *ātman* which was disseminated through Chinese Zen via the influence of the Hindu-oriented Mahāvairocana Sutra. Matsumoto, *Zen Shisō no Hihanteki Kenkyū*, 226-387.

¹⁰⁶ Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyō*, 27.

¹⁰⁷ Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 28-29.

¹⁰⁸ Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyō*, 27.

Dharma-dhātu) vice-versa. By virtue of this identity between individual Buddha-nature and “enlightened” reality, we are always “already enlightened,” perfect and pure to begin with despite the numerous defilements collected in the mind.¹⁰⁹ As Matsumoto and Hakamaya note,¹¹⁰ this logic constitutes the greatest ethical flaw in Hongaku philosophy since the idea of primordial perfection unconditionally affirms everything regardless of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and therefore can neither necessitate nor affirm the need for altruism or social-ethical reform. Therefore, not only does Hongaku doctrine negate praṭītyasamutpāda on grounds of introducing an ontological locus to reality and the self, it also negates praṭītyasamutpāda on the grounds of making ethics superfluous. Therefore, Hongaku-shisō undermines the possibility of gaining correct insight into no-abiding-self for the sake of realizing altruistic compassion.

Thirdly, this Tathāta qua “True Self” is understood as transcending language and discriminative thought and therefore inaccessible by such means.¹¹¹ This leads to the widely disseminated view in Chinese and Japanese Zen that an authentic insight into “enlightened” reality can happen only through “special transmission outside the scriptures without reliance on words and letters.”¹¹² Such a view necessitates Zen to become a transcendental experientialism¹¹³ based on a special form of transcendental experience called *Kensho* (見性)¹¹⁴ that is differentiated from our ordinary way of perceiving and knowing. On those grounds, much of the Zen traditions denounces analytical evaluative thinking as insignificant for enlightenment. Consequently, Zen as founded on Hongaku-shisō does not respect the idea that putting praṭītyasamutpāda into actual spiritual practice

¹⁰⁹ These ideas endowing a sense of metaphysical spatialness to the absolute which is then identified as immediately equal to one’s own ‘True-Self’ are directly rooted in the idea of *Jiji-muge-hokkai* 事事無礙法界 (meaning that “all phenomena are non-obstructing and one with the Dharma-realm”) found in Chinese Hua-yen Buddhist philosophy that is the precursor and foundations to Japanese Tendai Buddhism.

Izutsu Toshihiko, *Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism*, (Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1977), 53. Also see 1-7, 50-58, 65-82 for how Izutsu describes Jiji-muge-Hokkai in relation with Hongaku doctrine in explaining Zen selfhood as the actualization of the ultimate field in the form of the conventional self.

¹¹⁰ See chapter 1 section 1.4, also footnotes 14-16.

¹¹¹ Matsumoto in his critical study of Chinese Zen argues that meditation in the Zen tradition fundamentally means “the stopping of thought.” *Zen Shisō no Hihanteki Kenkyū*, 3-4. See also Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyō*, 124.

¹¹² Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, 376-380.

For the historicity of how the idea came to be a fundamental part of Chinese Ch’an Buddhism see:

Albert Welter, “The Disputed Place of a “Special Transmission” in Ch’an,” *The Zen Site*, accessed October 16, 2012. http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/HistoricalZen/A_Special_Transmission.htm.

¹¹³ Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, 10. Matsumoto, *Zen Shisō no Hihanteki Kenkyū*, 3-13.

¹¹⁴ Matsumoto, *Bukkyō e no Michi*, 220, 228.

necessitates *prajñā dharma-pravicaya* (or the wisdom pertaining to analytical discrimination of phenomena). Paralleling much of Kamalaśīla’s critique against Mōhēyan, this is tantamount to denying the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* itself since it denies the necessity and function of the law of causality in evaluating the cause of one’s own suffering. Such an analysis of Hongaku-shisō, therefore, logically leads Critical Buddhism to the provocative conclusion that to the extent that much of Zen is rooted in Hongaku-shisō, Zen is not Buddhism.¹¹⁵

I consider Critical Buddhism’s critique of Hongaku-shisō and Zen as both logically and doctrinally convincing since Hongaku-shisō, much like Mōhēyan’s position against Kamalaśīla, has no convincing counter argument against critique. We saw that Japanese Zen parallels much of Mōhēyan’s Ch’an philosophy in its claim. Both advocate an ontological locus and the idea that enlightenment is a personal liberation through a transcendental experience that leaves behind *prajñā* and unites the practitioner with the originally undefiled locus. As Yamaguchi Zuihō points out, Mōhēyan did not have a satisfying counter argument to Kamalaśīla’s critique that such a view neglects the practice of the *six pāramitā* or the six perfections of virtues¹¹⁶ considered essential in the process of gaining correct insight into no-abiding-self for the sake of practicing great compassion. Mōhēyan resorted to a transcendental claim that since the “enlightened” person attains a superior wisdom beyond discriminatory and analytical thinking, he/she exists beyond worldly virtues and therefore does not need the *six pāramitā*.¹¹⁷ Such a view is unconcerned of the need for actual altruistic action within the worldly dimension as integral for Bodhisattva-hood, and is purely reliant on an abstract ontological claim the validity of which cannot even be verified or evaluated. Given the fact that

¹¹⁵ Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyo*, 145-146.

Hakamaya defines Zen as a form of dhātu-vādic pseudo-Buddhism which, people like Ichikawa Hakugen also emphasize, was more a product of the attempt to syncretise Buddhism with indigenous Chinese Daoism which assimilated Buddhism to the socio-political environment of its age. From the perspective of Critical Buddhism, Zen was a “Buddhism” which succumbed to dhātu-vāda rather than to critically reflect what an authentically practical Buddhism should be against the indigenous philosophical status quo. See Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, 16-17. *Dōgen to Bukkyo*, 113, 227-229. Also see James Marks Shields, *Critical Buddhism: Engaging with Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought*, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 55-57. Christopher Ives, *Imperial Way Zen: Ichikawa Hakugen’s Critique and Lingering Questions for Buddhist Ethics*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2009), 60-68.

¹¹⁶ The six *pāramitā* includes: 1) *Dāna* *pāramitā*: generosity, giving of oneself 2) *Śīla* *pāramitā*: virtue, morality, discipline, proper conduct 3) *Kṣānti* *pāramitā*: patience, tolerance, forbearance, acceptance, endurance 4) *Vīrya* *pāramitā*: energy, diligence, vigor, effort 5) *Dhyāna* *pāramitā*: one-pointed concentration, contemplation 6) *Prajñā* *pāramitā*: wisdom, insight

¹¹⁷ Yamaguchi, 222-224.

Móhēyan could not logically differentiate between what he considered to be “enlightenment” as the stopping of discriminative thinking with the state of becoming unconscious or simply passing out,¹¹⁸ his claim for the superiority of the “enlightened” state over the practice of compassion is also appallingly unconvincing. Moreover, we can say that Móhēyan’s insistence on the primacy of attaining transcendental experience undermines the whole Bodhisattva path for it values personal liberation over altruism.

Japanese Zen is similarly unconvincing in its view of altruistic practice since by nature they share the identical ontological premise with that of Móhēyan. Much like Móhēyan, Hongaku-shisō cannot support the need for actual altruistic practices in the worldly dimension. Rather, Zen/Hongaku also resorts to a transcendental claim that since everything is “originally enlightened,” and everyone is primordially united with this locus in a manner beyond prajñā, this reveals that the world is primordially perfect in a manner incomprehensible to the normative mind and therefore in no need for correction. This is tantamount to saying that the “enlightened” one becomes an a-moral being perfected in a manner incomprehensible to our normative thinking and that he/she exists beyond the necessity for worldly ethical practices.¹¹⁹ This repeats Móhēyan’s view that the attaining of transcendental wisdom can disregard the practice of the six pāramitā. In addition, due to the transcendental nature of the Hongaku claim, the validity of their purely ontological justification for an original perfection cannot be verified or evaluated. Such a transcendental argument merely attempts to escape critique on the point of rhetoric and is not convincing on both logical and practical grounds.

In summary, Critical Buddhism followed in the footsteps of Madhyamaka and the debate at Samye in defining “non-Buddhist” those doctrines that deny causality while holding a variation of ‘realist,’ ‘essentialist’ and ‘foundationalist’ views. This included both ontological views as in advocating a ‘supreme metaphysical reality’ that functions as essence and/or ground to being, and epistemological views such as those that believe in the independent existence of an ‘ultimate truth’ transcendental to thinking. I also added to this the need to critique doctrines on the point of their

¹¹⁸ Matsumoto, *Zen Shisō no Hihanteki Kenkyū*, 31-32.

¹¹⁹ This kind of perspective seems to be reflected in stories of old Ch’an/Zen masters who act in eccentric manners beyond conventional norms of “good” or “bad” as we find in the *Linji Lu* or the *Rinzai-roku* (臨濟錄).

function so that any philosophy relying on ‘grounds’ and dualities can be identified as dhātu-vāda regardless if they use the rhetoric of ontological non-substantiality. Critical Buddhism made full use of their criteria in exposing the problem of Hongaku-shisō and Zen. Paralleling much of Kamalaśīla’s argument against Mōhēyan, Hongaku-shisō was concluded to be thoroughly dhātu-vāda.

Throughout the course of examining Critical Buddhism’s view of what is or is not “authentic” Buddhism, we have seen how Critical Buddhism’s position concerning pratīyasamutpāda is akin to its historical precedents of the Theravada, and the Indian Madhyamaka lineages inherited in Tibet. This included its debt to Theravada views on the Twelve Nidānas, and the practical necessity for analytical discriminatory thought, as well as the influence of Madhyamaka critique in defining dhātu-vāda. Critical Buddhism’s doctrinal continuity with preceding Buddhist philosophies leads the current study to consider their criteria for ‘authentic’ Buddhism and for identifying dhātu-vāda, as a more or less generally acceptable set of tools that can be shared amongst any Buddhist position that will equally consider pratīyasamutpāda, no-abiding-self and impermanence as primary for its practice. This means that the criteria are applicable to critically examine if other interpretations of Dōgen’s philosophy adhere to pratīyasamutpāda or not. We will utilize the criteria in the next chapter when we analyze four exemplary types of comparative interpretations of Dōgen and see how they fall short of affirming Dōgen’s metaphysics in concurrence with pratīyasamutpāda. In addition, accepting Critical Buddhism’s criteria for ‘authentic’ Buddhism and dhātu-vāda means that our “new” interpretation of Dōgen, to be presented in chapter five, must also adhere to the criteria if it is to be faithful to pratīyasamutpāda.

However, our previous analysis suggested Critical Buddhism’s view that pratīyasamutpāda is incompatible with metaphysics was mere prejudice owing to its assumption that metaphysics is by nature ‘representational.’ We will see in the next section how Critical Buddhism makes the case that Dōgen, despite understanding that orthodox Hongaku-shisō is heretical, could not successfully overcome Hongaku-shisō. There, I will analyze to what extent such an argument is acceptable or not. Ultimately I will show that such an interpretation of Dōgen is latently conditioned by Critical Buddhism’s prejudice that ontology is by default ‘representational.’

2.3 Matsumoto's Interpretation of Dōgen

As seen in the previous section, the current study coincides with much of what Critical Buddhism considers “Buddhism” or not. However, the current study diverges from Critical Buddhism on a crucial point concerning the relationship between *pratītyasamutpāda* and ontology. As previously stated, Matsumoto’s view that *pratītyasamutpāda* is incompatible with ontology owing to his prejudice that all ontology is ‘representational,’ is one that may be conditioning the Critical Buddhist conclusion that Dōgen’s metaphysics is “non-Buddhist.” The objective of the current study is to read Dōgen in adherence to *pratītyasamutpāda* in a manner significant for spiritual practice, and not to deny it as “non-Buddhist.” To that extent, we must seek a way not to reiterate Critical Buddhism’s assumptions in interpreting Dōgen. This necessitates a thorough understanding of how Critical Buddhism argues Dōgen’s metaphysics is *dhātu-vāda*.

Therefore the following section tries to achieve two directives in the process of analyzing Matsumoto’s critical interpretation of Dōgen’s views on Buddha-nature, and temporality in relation to practice. First, to argue for the case that Critical Buddhism’s view on Dōgen’s metaphysical ideas is conditioned by its prejudice that ontology is by nature ‘representational.’ Second, to analyze how Critical Buddhism applies its criteria for *pratītyasamutpāda* and *dhātu-vāda* in its interpretation of Dōgen, and to learn what kind of interpretation keeps Dōgen within *dhātu-vāda*, and therefore, should be avoided. This way, we can have an adequate understanding of Critical Buddhism’s view on Dōgen’s metaphysics as a point of contrast and departure when we examine our “new” interpretation of Dōgen using Deleuzian notions in chapter five.

Critical Buddhism’s identifying of Hongaku-shisō, and Zen as *dhātu-vāda* leads to its following fundamental stance in reading Dōgen. That is, to the extent that Dōgen’s thought is in line with Zen, it cannot be endorsed as “authentically” Buddhist.¹²⁰ While Matsumoto does not believe

¹²⁰ Hakamaya observes that Dōgen was himself critical against certain Zen teachings and practices that evoke orthodox Hongaku-shisō and that his philosophy continuously evidence an awareness to distance himself from Hongaku/Zen orthodoxy. Hakamaya, *Dōgen to Bukkyo*, 234. This naturally leads the Critical Buddhist stance on Dōgen to challenge the orthodox views taken by those in the

that Dōgen reiterated Hongaku doctrine in its orthodox form as the theory of ‘inherent Buddha-nature,’ he does think that Dōgen continues to draw on what I previously clarified as the three dhātu-vādic traits of Hongaku doctrine by supporting a more sophisticated form of Hongaku-shisō. The details as to how Critical Buddhism sees Dōgen as mostly in line with Hongaku and Zen will be evident in the following.

2.3.1 Universal Buddha-Nature and Constant-Abiding

Matsumoto’s interpretation of Dōgen in *Dōgen Shisō-ron* holds that much of Dōgen’s philosophy is dhātu-vāda since it never successfully overcomes the influences of Hongaku-shisō. According to this view, Dōgen develops an ontology founded on a variant of Hongaku, one which Matsumoto calls the theory of *universal Buddha-nature* (仏性偏在論 *Busshō Henzai-ron*).¹²¹ Instead of the ‘inherent Buddha-nature’ perspective, the ‘universal Buddha-nature’ perspective in its most extreme form, proposes the whole of reality as Buddha-nature itself in a relationship of immediate identity. Consequently, one does not “have” a Buddha-nature as an “originally enlightened” individual essence. Rather, we exist within Buddha-nature and participate in the totality of reality that is itself the primordially enlightened Buddha-nature. According to Matsumoto, Dōgen’s support for the later perspective is most evident in his famous reinterpretation of the Chinese line from the *Mahāpari-Nirvāna Sutra* (大般涅槃經 Chn. *Dà Bān Nièpán Jīng*) whose orthodox understanding was to read it as “All sentient beings possess Buddha-nature without exception.” Dōgen deliberately read the same sentence as “All existence *is* Buddha-nature,” thereby clarifying his most central perspective on Buddha-nature as universal Buddha-nature.¹²²

lineage of “Zen” Buddhism Dōgen is credited as founded called Sōtō Zen. Not only does Sōtō orthodoxy read Dōgen uncritically as an absolute authority, they also tend to ignore Dōgen’s own criticism against Hongaku-shisō in conflating his ideas with a more purely Zen-based philosophy that does not necessarily belong to Dōgen. This point is argued for by both Hakamaya and Jikisai. Minami Jikisai, *Shōbōgenzō wo Yomu: Sonzai suru to wa dōiu-kotoka* (正法現藏: 存在するとはどういうことか), (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2008), 12-19. Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, 319-325. However Critical Buddhism’s conclusive view on Dōgen’s philosophy is that while Dōgen was aware of the heretical dangers in Hongaku-shisō, his philosophy could not overcome its problems entirely and ultimately Dōgen’s metaphysics stayed within the confines of dhātu-vāda.

¹²¹ Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 28-29.

¹²² Hee-Jin Kim, *Eihei Dōgen Mystical Realist*, (Boston: Wisdom, 2004), 125-126.

Matsumoto claims that Dōgen’s support of the universal Buddha-nature perspective as a fundamental view of Buddhism can be further elaborated through an analysis of statements from the “Bendowa” fascicle of the *Shōbōgenzō* where Dōgen says:

So remember, in the Buddha-Dharma, because the body and mind are originally one reality, the saying that essence and form are not two has been understood equally in the Western Heavens and the Eastern Lands, and we should never dare to go against it. [...] Furthermore, we should realize that living-and-dying is just nirvana.

Remember, the lineage of the Dharma which [asserts that] “in the Buddha-Dharma the essential state of mind universally includes all forms,” describes the whole great world of Dharma inclusively, without dividing essence and form, and without discussing appearance and disappearance. There is no [state], not even *bodhi* or nirvana, that is different from the essential state of mind. All *dharmas*, myriad phenomena and accumulated things, are totally just the one mind, without exclusion or disunion. All these various lineages of the Dharma assert that [myriad things and phenomena] are the even and balanced undivided mind, other than which there is nothing; and this is just how Buddhists have understood the essence of mind.¹²³

Matsumoto points out that the essential non-dualistic idea that the mind is identified with all forms as expressed in the above quotation, is one that has its direct roots in the *Awakening of Faith Sutra* where Hongaku originates.¹²⁴ As Hakamaya claims in his study of the *Awakening of Faith*, the term “mind” (心 *shin*) functions within the sutra as an equal concept to Tathātā (thusness) which designates the ultimate nature of reality. The term “mind” is itself understood, not as an individual consciousness or ego, but as the eternally subsisting ‘true nature’ (thusness) of reality inclusive of individual consciousness.¹²⁵ Here the “mind” precedes and functions as locus to the totality of phenomenal reality. The (impersonal) mind is therefore the primordially enlightened Tathātā that works as the locus to the super-locus that is the individual’s Buddha-nature, who, as long as he/she is

The original Chinese line as quoted by Dōgen in the *Shōbōgenzō* reads as follows: “一切衆生悉有仏性。” Dōgen Kigen, *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, ed. Mizuno Yaoko, (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1990), 72.

Classical Chinese involves a certain grammatical ambiguity that allows for a variation of meanings when translated into Japanese. These grammatical tendencies are opportune for Dōgen who often makes deliberately unorthodox readings of Chinese Buddhist doctrines in accordance to his creative interpretations of these texts. On how Dōgen deliberately plays around with language see: Hee-Jin Kim, “The Reason for Words and Letters: Dōgen and Kōan Language,” *Dōgen Studies*, ed. William R. LaFleur, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1985), 54-82.

¹²³ Dōgen Kigen, *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, trans. Gudo Wafu Nishijima & Chodo Cross, (Berkeley: Numata Centre, 2007), “Bendowa”, 15.

¹²⁴ The statement, “in the Buddha-Dharma the essential state of mind universally includes all forms,” is one that is directly quoted from the *Awakening of Faith Sutra*. *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 27. Also Akiyama Hanji, *Dōgen no Kenkyū* (道元の研究), (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1935), 105-106.

¹²⁵ Hakamaya, *Hongaku-shisō Hihan*, 69-76.

deluded cannot realize its primordial identity with this true nature of reality as Tathātā.

Simply reiterating the above idea concerning the “mind” in the *Awakening of Faith* leads to the view of inherent Buddha-nature whereby all beings possessing a mind (i.e. sentient beings), possess Buddha-nature and are primordially enlightened due to that mind’s original identity with Tathātā. Dōgen is very aware of the dangerous proximity of this idea to what is called the “Senika heresy.” This is the heresy of affirming the Brahmanic view of the independent existence of an eternal Self; a view which the Buddha had originally denied.¹²⁶ Matsumoto thinks that Dōgen considered the universal Buddha-nature perspective as a solution to avoiding this heresy.

According to Matsumoto, the theory that sentient beings “have a Buddha-nature” (有仏性 *yu-Busshō*) is considered too close to the Senika heresy from the stance of Dōgen’s universal Buddha-nature. The theory is inadequate since it continues to conceive mind/body and essence/phenomenon as a hierarchical and dualistic structure. In order to overcome the shortcomings of the inherent Buddha-nature perspective, Dōgen’s universal Buddha-nature perspective adds to the basic logic of the identity between ‘mind’ and Buddha-nature found in the *Awakening of Faith* and radicalizes it by extending the notion of mind beyond sentient beings to include all non-sentient existence.¹²⁷ Thereby, his view makes ‘mind’ equal to the totality of reality. Buddha-nature, then, becomes an un-limited all-pervading ontological structure, that is non-local to a sentient being or a concept of mind hierarchically preceding phenomena. The relationship between locus and super-locus becomes monistic so that Buddha-nature immediately and unconditionally equals reality. In virtue of the nature of Buddha-nature as universally embracing and constituting the substance of every individual existence, every single entity is allowed to participate *as* Buddha-nature. According to Matsumoto, this is evidenced when Dōgen writes:

Those called “living beings,” or called “the sentient,” or called all forms of life, or called “all creatures,” are living beings and are all forms of existence. In short, “total existence” is “the buddha-nature,” and the perfect totality of “total existence” is called “living beings.” At just this moment, the inside and outside of living beings are the total

¹²⁶ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, “Bendowa”, 13-15.

¹²⁷ This includes everything without a consciousness as rocks, trees, mountains, water etc.

existence of the buddha-nature.¹²⁸

Here, Matsumoto holds that Dōgen did not dichotomize nonliving against living beings, or the non-sentient against the sentient. He rather included the later in the former. Dōgen's often repeated phrase where he identifies Buddha-nature to "fences, walls, tiles, and pebbles" (牆壁瓦礫 *shoheki-gwaryaku*) as well as his repeated claim that "mountains, rivers, and earth are all the ocean of Buddha-nature"¹²⁹ also emphasize this point.¹³⁰

In accordance to the above view, Matsumoto discusses why Dōgen favoured Chinese Zen master Guīshān Língyòu's (潯山靈祐 771 - 853) statement of "without-buddha-nature" (無仏性 *mu-Busshō*) over the theory that claims only sentient beings "have" a Buddha-nature (有仏性 *yu-Busshō*).¹³¹ Dōgen saw the theory that sentient beings do not possess Buddha-nature as much closer in the path towards a complete understanding of universal Buddha-nature. Buddha-nature is not something sentient beings "have," but *is* the totality of reality.¹³² Better yet, Matsumoto views that Dōgen's claim of "impermanence is itself Buddha-nature" (無常仏性 *Mujyō-Busshō* literally meaning "impermanence-Buddha-nature") becomes the most complete way of expressing the view that the totality of reality is without reserve in its impermanence as-it-is, is Buddha-nature.¹³³

Matsumoto observes that this logic of immediate affirmation of reality equaling the absolute can be further elaborated if we examine Dōgen's statement that, "in the lineages that discuss constant-abiding (常住 *Joju*), the myriad *dharmas* are all constant-abiding: body and mind are not divided."¹³⁴

¹²⁸ Dōgen Kigen, *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, "Busshō", trans. Gudo Wafu Nishijima & Chodo Cross, (Berkeley: Numata Centre, 2008), 4.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹³⁰ As both Tsujiguchi and Matsumoto analyzes, this evidences Dōgen's universal Buddha-nature as an extension of a lineage of views which came from the Chinese and Japanese Buddhist debate on the presence or non-presence of Buddha-nature amongst non-sentient existence. Tsujiguchi Yuichirō, *Shōbōgenzō no Shiso-teki Kenkyū* (正法眼藏の思想的研究), (Tokyo: Hokuju, 2012), 116.

The phrase "fences, walls, tiles, and pebbles" is borrowed from the Chinese Zen monk Nányáng Huizhōng (南陽慧忠 date of birth unknown ~ 775) whose view was also that of equating all existence with Buddha-nature. Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 31-34. *Bukkyo e no Michi*, 242-243.

¹³¹ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, "Busshō", 10.

¹³² Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 47-48.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹³⁴ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, "Bendowa", 15. Cross quite misleadingly translates Joju as "eternal existence" rather than constant-abiding. Therefore I have slightly modified the translation.

According to Matsumoto, the term *Jojyū*, which I have translated as ‘constant-abiding’ is one that can also be found in the *Sanjushikakotogaki* (三十四箇事書) text attributed to the Japanese Tendai monk Kokaku (皇覺, later Heian period 1068-1185 exact birth and death date unknown) which has been long considered as one of the foundational texts in the development of Japanese Hongaku-shisō. At first glance the term *Jojyū* seems like it designates the opposite of 無常 *Mujyō* (impermanence or the lack of constancy) in the traditional Indian Buddhist sense whereby the opposite of impermanence is understood as eternal existence.¹³⁵ However, Matsumoto’s analysis claims the usage of the term in *Sanjushikakotogaki* and Hongaku-shisō in general does not mean permanence or “eternal existence.” Rather the *Sanjushikakotogaki* says:

When it is said that the “phenomenal world is constant-abiding,” constant-abiding does not mean unchanging and immovable. Phenomenal reality is the principle of constant-abiding, is the principle of difference. Impermanence is as impermanence in its own way constantly-abiding and does not perish. Difference is as difference in its own way constantly-abiding and does not perish. [...] Though waves are moving, it is moving while the totality of the triple world constantly-abides without beginning or end to its movement.

Furthermore,

It is not said that sentient beings transform and become Buddhas. One is to awaken to the fact that sentient beings while remaining sentient beings, Buddha-worlds remaining Buddha-worlds is constantly-abiding.¹³⁶

Jojyū or constant-abiding does not mean that impermanent reality transforms to become eternally unchanging or a permanent absolute. Rather, every impermanent phenomenon constituting reality is as it is, constantly-abiding. Therefore ‘constant-abiding’ is a term to designate how things are in their own individual ways always already primordial Buddha-nature, enlightened and perfect without having to change from normative being to Buddha-hood or impermanence to permanence.¹³⁷ All existence is in its singular ways and movement already the expression of Buddha-nature. Matsumoto suggests that there is a direct correlation between this Hongaku idea and Dōgen’s

¹³⁵ Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 44, 47.

¹³⁶ As quoted on Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 44-45. Translated by myself.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 44-52.

understanding of universal Buddha-nature as impermanence-buddha-nature where what is impermanent is seen as Buddha-nature as-it-is. From a Critical Buddhist perspective, such a logic of immediate affirmation of phenomena as absolute cannot be supported, since it holds the great danger of being unable to necessitate and affirm ethical action, critical evaluation and change.

At first glance, the philological depth Matsumoto implores in interpreting Dōgen's view on Buddha-nature and its identity with the whole of impermanent reality as constant-abiding, seems doctrinally sound and irrefutable. However, I consider the view that the concept of Buddha-nature corresponds to a 'locus' is a product of Matsumoto's prejudice that any seemingly 'ontological' concept implies a realism. This prejudice may be conditioning Matsumoto to prefer analyzing Dōgen's use of Buddha-nature and constant-abiding with a dhātu-vāda/Hongaku oriented interpretation. In other words, the following presumption may be at stake: if all ontological statements are 'corresponding' to a locus, then everything that Dōgen says that sounds like ontology by nature must be close to Hongaku-shisō.

In addition, Matsumoto clarifies elsewhere that he considers the idea of Buddha-nature as a product of the development of Tathāgatagarbha¹³⁸ thought where what used to designate a 'potential for enlightenment' gradually became substantialized as an 'individual-essence.'¹³⁹ Matsumoto seems to be conditioned by this presumption concerning the historical narrative surrounding Buddha-nature in taking for granted that Dōgen's use of the concept must also be in continuity with these past views on Buddha-nature. A similar presumption is observable in Matsumoto's reference to the concept of 'constant-abiding.' Only because the concept of 'constant-abiding' is rooted in a Hongaku doctrine, does not mean that Dōgen utilized the term in line with its definition in the *Sanjushikakotogaki*. Dōgen's tendency to deliberately play with Chinese Buddhist terms and phrases to befit his creative reinterpretation of past doctrines may also be an indication that Matsumoto's assumption that Dōgen utilized these terms in continuity with past interpretations may not be necessarily the case.

¹³⁸ Tathāgatagarbha is a Sanskrit term meaning "the womb of the thus-gone-one," designating the idea that every being has an innate 'womb' or 'embryo' of Buddha-hood much like a seed which grows by being fed the Dharma. This led to the idea of Buddha-nature. The idea developed over the course of the history of Indian Buddhism (leading back to statements made in the Lotus Sutra written between 100 BCE 200 CE) and eventually became a central doctrine in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism.

¹³⁹ Matsumoto, *Zen Shisō no Hihanteki Kenkyū*, 588-592.

Matsumoto's philological presumptions and his prejudice concerning ontology precludes him from imagining how absolutely different sets of assumptions concerning the utility of metaphysics may be applied to Dōgen's use of the above concepts.

Despite these limitations, there is one thing we can learn from Matsumoto's analysis of Buddha-nature. If we are to reinterpret Dōgen's Buddha-nature as significant for practice based in *pratītyasamutpāda*, then it cannot be utilized as 'corresponding' to a substantive 'individual-essence,' or an 'originally enlightened' realm, or ground. We will now see that Matsumoto's prejudice concerning ontology also conditions his interpretation of Dōgen's view on time.

2.3.2 Constant-Abiding and Dōgen's Metaphysics of Temporality

The previously stated idea of constant-abiding gives Matsumoto a foundation for making sense of Dōgen's ideas on temporality where Dōgen seems to be advocating a view of temporal (non)continuity where each instant is cut off from past and future. This idea is elaborated in the "Genjōkōan" fascicle of the *Shōbōgenzō* where Dōgen notes:

Firewood becomes ash; it can never go back to being firewood. Nevertheless, we should not take the view that ash is its future and firewood is its past. Remember, firewood abides in its particular Dharma-position (住法位 *Jyū-hōi*). It has a past and it has a future. Although it has a past and a future, the past and the future are cut off. Ash exists in its particular Dharma-position. It has a past and it has a future. The firewood, after becoming ash, does not again become firewood. Similarly, human beings, after death, do not live again. At the same time, it is an established custom in the Buddha-Dharma not to say that life turns into death. This is why we speak of "no appearance." And it is the Buddha's preaching established in [the turning of] the Dharma wheel that death does not turn into life. This is why we speak of "no disappearance." Life is an instantaneous situation, and death is also an instantaneous situation. It is the same, for example, with winter and spring. We do not think that winter becomes spring, and we do not say that spring becomes summer.¹⁴⁰

Matsumoto considers Dōgen's use of the term "*Dharma-position*" can be traced to a particular Hongaku interpretation of a line in the *Lotus Sutra* which began with the Chinese monk, *Zhi Yi* (智顓, 538-597). In this reading, Dharma-position is understood as the description of how things

¹⁴⁰ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, "Genjōkōan", 42. Slight modifications made by myself.

do not exist outside of the Dharma or Tathātā (ultimate reality as thusness). The term Dharma is itself equated to the whole of existence. Therefore, to abide in a Dharma-position is to express how each individual existence, regardless of being sentient or non-sentient, abides within the totality of Tathātā in a constant manner that neither newly arises nor perishes, while remaining as they are in their normative state.¹⁴¹ Therefore, in Matsumoto's view, the term "Dharma-position," reiterates the concept of constant-abiding, and is a term that describes the logic of absolute identity between the locus and super-locus.

When the above is applied to Dōgen's idea of the instant cut off from past and future, it means that each instant is as it is, absolute in its singularity. Each instant is without reserve the full totality of reality as Tathātā.¹⁴² Consequently, Matsumoto claims that Dōgen's theory of time by absolutizing every instant as a singular event cut away from causal continuity, in fact denies temporality as understood through *pratītyasamutpāda* (i.e. as irreversible impermanence). This means that despite Dōgen's logic of equating Buddha-nature with impermanence, his universal Buddha-nature stance consequently keeps him from correctly referring to the critical nature of our lived time that is causally irreversible and ultimately leads to death.¹⁴³ Therefore, Matsumoto concludes Dōgen's idea of time cannot be endorsed as legitimately Buddhist since it points at a kind of permanent substratum of time that is equated with the singular moment.

Matsumoto points out that such an idea of time in which the instant is absolutized is also evident in the famous "Uji" fascicle of the *Shōbōgenzō*. As I will elaborate in the next chapter, the term *Uji* (有時) is commonly translated as "Being-time" by many English language scholars and is understood as designating the absolute unity of Being and time. However, Matsumoto does not agree with this and rather poses an alternative interpretation. When Dōgen mentions, "time is already just

¹⁴¹ Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 201-210.

¹⁴² While not a Critical Buddhist, Tsujiguchi's analysis of Dōgen's time closely echoes Matsumoto's analysis. Tsujiguchi arrives at the same conclusion not through closing up on the idea of constant-abiding, but from a philological study of the term *Zengo-saidan* (前後際断). The term is usually interpreted as "cut away from front (future) and rear (past)," but Tsujiguchi rather reads it as being "cut away from limits." This means reality should not be understood from the side of temporal categories, but the present is in itself absolute without borders. Tsujiguchi, 170.

¹⁴³ Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 209.

existence, and all existence is time,”¹⁴⁴ Matsumoto analyzes that the compound statement does not place equal value on both halves, inferring the definition that Being equals time. According to Matsumoto Dōgen intends the first statement that “time is already just existence” to hold precedence and priority over the later statement.¹⁴⁵ This leads to a completely different reading of Uji as a concept thoroughly based on universal Buddha-nature. From this perspective, Uji means that temporality is reduced to the priority of the totality of existence (or Tathātā) and not the other way around. Therefore, time as irreversible impermanence is once again denied, since every existence by virtue of being in a Dharma-position abides *as* the totality of Tathātā in which temporal movement is negated as non-arising and non-perishing. For Matsumoto, the concept of Uji reduces time to the constant-abiding nature of the totality of existence through which its impermanent nature becomes nullified to the state of mere terminology.¹⁴⁶

The above allows Matsumoto to make sense out of Dōgen’s seemingly paradoxical claim for some kind of continuity amongst time as singular instances. Dōgen notes, “Those who fail to experience and to hear the truth of being-time do so because they understand [time] only as passing. To grasp the pivot and express it: all that exists throughout the whole universe is lined up in a series (original Japanese: つらなりながら *tsuranarinagara*) and at the same time is individual moments of time.”¹⁴⁷ The phrase “*tsuranarinagara*” which Nishijima and Cross translates as “lined up in a series,” can also be more simply translated as “linked.” Either way, the term seems to designate some kind of continuity between instances, but Matsumoto emphasizes that since Dōgen claims “moments of the past and present are neither piled up one on top of another nor lined up in a row,”¹⁴⁸ what this “linked” means cannot be any sense of sequential causal continuity. It cannot be a causally connected “flow” of time in which the passing of one causal condition to the next always implies an irreversible lapse of time. Rather, Matsumoto claims that since all instances are absolute in their Dharma-positions, and therefore one moment does not become the next (vice-versa), nor one moment passes to the next,

¹⁴⁴ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, “Uji”, 143.

¹⁴⁵ Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 211.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 213.

¹⁴⁷ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, “Uji”, 145.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

“linked” here means that all singular instances are simply accumulated as the Tathātā without interference from each other. In other words each instant is not “linked” or “lined up” by virtue of a sequential causal process unfolding as impermanence, but rather because all time participates in a limitless constantly-abiding Tathātā without beginning nor end.¹⁴⁹ Consequently, this adds to Matsumoto’s interpretation that Dōgen’s view on temporality denies impermanence.

I do agree that Dharma-position is a key concept in interpreting Dōgen’s view on time. However, I do not agree that interpreting Dharma-position in line with *Zhi Yi* and constant-abiding is a good idea. Given Matsumoto’s analysis that *Zhi Yi* and constant-abiding are philologically in debt to Hongaku doctrine, interpreting Dharma-position in relation to a constant-abiding style rhetoric will automatically limit the idea within the confines of Hongaku-shisō. There are other concepts Dōgen uses in the *Shōbōgenzō* such as *Total-function* (Zenki 全機) and *Total-exertion* (Gūjin 究尽) which I consider are more indicative of Dōgen’s novel take at Buddhist philosophy and may play a key role in interpreting Dōgen’s view on Dharma-position as well as Buddha-nature away from Hongaku-shisō. In addition, the fact that the term “constant-abiding” is utilized only once throughout the whole of the *Shōbōgenzō* may be indicative of its lesser importance for Dōgen. On the other hand, Dōgen dedicates a whole fascicle to the concept of Total-function. Despite this fact, Matsumoto insists in making the Dōgen-Hongaku connection by his reference to the idea of constant-abiding.

Once again, I claim that Matsumoto’s preference for constant-abiding as the key concept to interpret both Dōgen’s use of ‘impermanence Buddha-nature’ and Dharma-positions is indicative of his prejudice that ontology is ‘representational.’ According to this prejudice, all ontology is dhātu-vāda, therefore, it seems inevitable that Matsumoto emphasizes the idea of constant-abiding that is more tactical to make the case that Dōgen’s view of time is dhātu-vāda. My view is that the concept of Total-function interpreted with insights from Deleuze’s pragmatism may become a more suited key to help make consistent sense out of Dōgen’s metaphysical ideas in a manner that adheres to prafityasamutpāda. How will such a reading radically depart from Critical Buddhism’s interpretation of Dōgen? A full-fledged alternative interpretation will be explored in chapter five. For now it will

¹⁴⁹Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 213.

suffice to learn from Matsumoto that if we are to read Dōgen’s metaphysics as compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*, then a constant-abiding based explanation should not be applied, not only to Dōgen’s view on Buddha-nature, but also to his view on time as Uji and Dharma-positions. The rhetoric of constant-abiding is too proximal to Hongaku-shisō and therefore merits complete avoidance.

2.3.3 Universal Buddha-Nature and Dōgen’s Theory of Practice

Matsumoto observes that Dōgen’s ideas on universal Buddha-nature not only have direct consequences on Dōgen’s idea of time, but also on how he ontologically justifies the absolute primacy and necessity of meditational practice. To the extent that Matsumoto’s interpretation of Dōgen’s views on the relationship between Buddha-nature and practice is an extension of his critique of Dōgen’s ‘universal Buddha-nature,’ we will see that it is bound to the conclusion that it is *dhātu-vāda*.

As briefly mentioned in the introductory chapter, Hongaku-shisō involves a paradox that Dōgen is said to have aspired to solve throughout his life as a practicing monk.¹⁵⁰ The paradox is as follows. When everything is unconditionally and immediately primordially “enlightened,” there cannot be any necessity for religious practice (and therefore why even practice meditation?). In other words, adherence to orthodox Hongaku doctrine in the form of inherent Buddha-nature cannot necessitate meditational practice. Matsumoto views that Dōgen did indeed attempt to solve this paradox by incorporating his views on universal Buddha-nature, but was unsuccessful in creating a philosophy that convincingly overcame it.

According to Matsumoto’s interpretation, Dōgen accepted that the totality of reality is primordially enlightened, but considered only the act of meditation allows this ‘truth’ to be manifested by the sentient practitioner. Universal Buddha-nature is manifested not by the *effect* of meditational practice, but by the practitioner’s very act of sitting in meditation without thought.¹⁵¹ Therefore, practice and enlightenment are unitary and the manifestation of enlightenment only persists while the

¹⁵⁰ Hee-Jin Kim, *Eihei Dōgen Mystical Realist*, 22-23.

¹⁵¹ Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 223, 235-238.

sitting is pursued. In Dōgen’s words,

In the Buddha-Dharma practice and enlightenment are completely the same. [Practice] now is also practice in the state of enlightenment; therefore, a beginner’s pursuit of the truth is just the whole body of the original state of enlightenment. This is why [the Buddhist patriarchs] teach, in the practical cautions they have handed down to us, not to expect any enlightenment outside of practice. And the reason may be that [practice itself] is the directly accessible original state of enlightenment. Because practice is just enlightenment, the enlightenment is endless; and because enlightenment is practice, the practice has no beginning.¹⁵²

This relationship between practice and enlightenment is expressed by such terms as *Shushō-Ittō* (修証一等, meaning “the unity of practice and enlightenment”) and *Shushō-Funi* (修証不二, meaning “the nonduality of practice and enlightenment”),¹⁵³ what Matsumoto calls Dōgen’s “theory of practice based on universal Buddha-nature” (仏性修遍論 *Busshō-shuhen-ron*).¹⁵⁴ Matsumoto claims Dōgen’s theory of practice is founded on the basic idea of universal Buddha-nature in which all non-sentient existence are ‘primordially enlightened’ prior to any sentient beings ever consciously realizing enlightenment. This leads to the view that sentient beings are “enlightened” only by virtue of the ‘primordial enlightenment’ of non-sentient existence (this is the Hongaku idea of *mujyō-seppo* 無常說法 which is a concept meaning that “non-sentient existence enlighten sentient beings by teaching them the Dharma”).¹⁵⁵ According to Matsumoto, these ideas can be observed in the fundamental two-part logic utilized throughout the 75 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* that elaborates Dōgen’s understanding of how the practitioner is related to enlightenment. The logic is most archetypically expressed in the following lines from the “Genjōkōan” fascicle:

A) “Driving ourselves to practice and experience the myriad *dharmas* is delusion.”

¹⁵² *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, “Bendowa”, 12. Nishijima and Cross translate 証 (shō) quite cryptically as “experience” but I have adhered to translations by Kim and Abe and have replaced it with “enlightenment.”

¹⁵³ The view that the term “Shō” 証 is to be interpreted as ‘enlightenment’ is contested by Minami Jikisai in his study of the *Shōbōgenzō*. As a strict adherent of the understanding that *prāṭīyasamutpāda* is essential to authentic Buddhism, Jikisai points out that since the Japanese term “Shō” simply means to “authenticate” or “prove” the term does not mean “enlightenment,” but rather to prove the functional authenticity of the Buddha’s teaching of *prāṭīyasamutpāda* and *prajñā* in practice. Jikisai, 38-39. I shall return to the problem of how this term should be understood later in chapter five.

¹⁵⁴ Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 215.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 131-138, 145-146. As absurd as this may sound, the idea that non-sentient existence like rocks and wood are teaching the dharma was a seriously debated stance in traditional Chinese and Japanese Hongaku doctrine.

- B) “When the myriad *dharma*s actively practice and experience ourselves, that is the state of realization.”

The first statement I have labeled (A) stands for the position of the deluded mind that thinks one innately has the ability to realize enlightenment by his/her agency trying to understand reality from his/her side alone. The second statement (B) is the basics of Dōgen’s view of a right understanding of Buddhism, that is, sentient beings are only enlightened from the side of the totality of phenomenal reality (i.e. Tathātā). Enlightenment is a reality for the practitioner only by virtue of Tathātā’s inclusivity that allows us to participate in its totality and never the other way around. Therefore, the movement from “practitioner to Tathātā” whereby the practitioner tries to understand reality from his/her perspective is considered delusional while the movement from “Tathātā to practitioner” is considered the right path.¹⁵⁶

The problem of how the practice of meditation actually functions for the realization of (B) remains an open question. In short, Dōgen’s idea of meditation solves this problem by conceiving practice as the act by which one can “join” the ‘primordial enlightenment’ of the non-sentient. According to Matsumoto’s reading of Dōgen, despite the fact that the entirety of phenomenal reality is originally enlightened, the sentient mind is deluded by its ability of discriminative thinking (Jpn. 知見 *chiken*) in order for the individual to be able to manifest that original reality without reserve.¹⁵⁷ Matsumoto claims that this view is evident in the “Bendowa” fascicle where Dōgen mentions, “This Dharma is abundantly present in each human being, but if we do not practice it, it does not manifest itself, and if we do not experience it, it cannot be realized.”¹⁵⁸ Therefore, the movement of “Tathātā to practitioner” is only manifested while the practitioner sits in meditation through which one’s attachment to all thought processes is let go in what Dōgen calls the state of “without-thinking” (非思

¹⁵⁶ Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 215-222. Matsumoto sees that Dōgen utilizes a more complex structural understanding of the relationship between meditation and enlightenment in the “Bendowa” fascicle than the one he expounds in “Genjōkōan.” There Dōgen supports the idea that the non-sentient must be enlightened first by the practice of the sentient who then in turn will be enlightened by virtue of enlightened non-sentient existence. See *Ibid.*, 62-69, 137.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 139-141, 157, 241.

¹⁵⁸ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, “Bendowa”, 3

量 *Hishiryō*).¹⁵⁹ This is the reason why both Hakamaya and Matsumoto criticize early Dōgen's views on meditational practice as non-Buddhist; they find them to be a typically Zen Buddhist influenced understanding of meditation as transcendental experientialism which consequently denies the significance of analytical and evaluative thought.¹⁶⁰ From the Critical Buddhist perspective, the nature of the meditational practice is problematic in itself, but Matsumoto further criticizes the idea that Tathātā is only manifested while the practitioner meditates in fact introduces the greatest weakness of Dōgen's logic of practice based on universal Buddha-nature.

Matsumoto points out that the idea that practitioners only manifest Tathātā while meditating compromises the absolute monism of universal Buddha-nature (in the form of understanding phenomena as unconditionally equaling Tathātā) by introducing a temporal and epistemological lapse between the locus and super-locus. A full affirmation of the 'phenomenon-as-it-is = Tathātā' logic, needless to say, can never necessitate practice, since all things are "enlightened" regardless of practice. To compromise the absolute identity between locus and super-locus means that a certain aspect of Tathātā must be hidden and no longer be immediately manifest,¹⁶¹ so that some form of practice is necessitated for it to become manifest. In the process of this "hiding away," the dualism between locus and super-locus must be reintroduced into the equation. In addition, the compromise must also reintroduce a certain sense of innate potentiality in the individual to attain enlightenment as can be noticed in Dōgen's above statement "this Dharma is abundantly present in each human being." This actually regresses the monism of universal Buddha-nature back to what resembles a dualistic inherent buddha-nature perspective.¹⁶² While both universal and inherent buddha-nature perspectives are ultimately dhātu-vāda, the former tries to overcome the heresy of supporting a view of having an 'individual-essence' (i.e. the Senika heresy) by upholding the idea of no-abiding-self against the understanding of Buddha-nature as personal 'essence.' Yet, Matsumoto concludes that attempts of

¹⁵⁹ According to Matsumoto this point is also evident in Dōgen's guide to meditation, the "Fukanzazengi" where he mentions: "Moreover, the changing of the moment, through the means of a finger, a pole, a needle, or a wooden clapper; and the experience of the state, through the manifestation of a whisk, a fist, a staff, or a shout, can never be understood by thinking and discrimination." *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 241. Also see: *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1., "Fukanzazengi", 364-365.

¹⁶⁰ Matsumoto, *Dōgen Shisō-ron*, 139-141, 240 - 241.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 236-238.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 242.

Dōgen to keep away from the Senika heresy backfired. This is due to the incompatibility of the universal Buddha-nature's absolute monism with the necessity for a dualized structure between practitioner and enlightenment when trying to fit in the necessity of practice into the formula.¹⁶³

I do agree that Dōgen's statements "Driving ourselves to practice and experience the myriad *dharmas* is delusion" and "When the myriad *dharmas* actively practice and experience ourselves, that is the state of realization," are a key in unfolding how Dōgen conceived of his metaphysics as related to practice. I also consider Dōgen's term, *Shushō-Ittō* is another key in understanding how he integrated his ideas on Buddha-nature with practice. Matsumoto's critique of Dōgen's theory of practice based on universal Buddha-nature seems logically consistent and in accord to his preceding critique of Dōgen's ideas on Buddha-nature. However, I have two points of disagreement. First, the conclusion that Dōgen simply regresses to the 'inherent Buddha-nature' perspective is only valid in contingency to Matsumoto's framework of understanding that ontological concepts of Buddha-nature are always *dhātu-vāda*. I will demonstrate in chapter five that once we accept a completely different framework of understanding the function of metaphysics by help of Deleuze's pragmatism, we can reinterpret the way Dōgen's metaphysics relates to practice in a radically different manner to Critical Buddhism without having to neglect *pratīyasamutpāda*. From such a framework, Dōgen's above statements from the "Genjōkōan" as well as his term *Shushō-Ittō* can be given a completely new significance.

Second, I find a problem in Matsumoto's view that Dōgen's theory of practice must reintroduce a dualism where the 'truth' of primordial enlightenment must be hidden away to

¹⁶³ While Critical Buddhism analyzes much of Dōgen's philosophy elaborated in his early 75 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* as not Buddhist, they do believe that later Dōgen in his 12 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* shows a fundamental change in stance considering what he understood as fundamental to Buddhism. According to Critical Buddhism Dōgen got rid of much of his metaphysical ideas concerning Buddha-nature and time and shifted to making "deep faith in *pratīyasamutpāda*" as central for Buddhist practice. Although this does not escape the area of speculation, Matsumoto feels that Dōgen's change in ideas between the 75 fascicle and 12 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* maybe indicative of a deep spiritual-existential crisis in Dōgen through which the idea of Original Enlightenment as a foundation for practice was challenged and had to be reconsidered. *Ibid.*, 244. This view that Dōgen went through a fundamental change of heart between his early and later years and that this change influenced the complete shift in the foundations of his ideas is not exclusive to Critical Buddhism. Dōgen scholar, Tsujiguchi, though not a Critical Buddhist nor in agreement with the irreconcilable philosophical discontinuity Critical Buddhists place between the 75 fascicle and 12 fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*, does agree that the analysis of the contents of the two *Shōbōgenzōs* does reveal a fundamental change in Dōgen's attitude towards the understanding of Buddhism and that this was most probably due to an essential spiritual-existential shift in Dōgen himself. Tsujiguchi, 159-160. Also refer to footnote 8 in chap. 1.

necessitate practice to reveal it. While this interpretation makes logical sense within Matsumoto's framework of understanding, it neglects Dōgen's own claim of *Henkai-fusanzo* (遍界不曾藏) or "the entire universe has never been hidden"; a statement Dōgen makes multiple times throughout the *Shōbōgenzō*.¹⁶⁴ Matsumoto's interpretation gives no sufficient explanation to the fact that in this statement Dōgen seems to be advocating the view that there is absolutely nothing that needs revealing through practice. Such a claim for absolute immanence stands in contrast to Matsumoto's view that Dōgen's view of practice is dualist and calls for transcendental experientialism for the hidden 'truth' to be manifest. I will show in chapter five how introducing a completely different framework in understanding Dōgen's metaphysics will allow us to incorporate Dōgen's claim for immanence as non-contrary to his metaphysics in relation to practice.

In summary, Matsumoto's critique of Dōgen's views on Buddha-nature took issue with the concept of 'universal Buddha-nature.' While the concept was allegedly designed to save the notion of Buddha-nature from reiterating a theory of a constant individual-essence, it could not overcome the ontological reliance on a locus in the form of a universalized Buddha-nature. Matsumoto further argued that this basic logic of immediate identification between the totality of phenomena and Buddha-nature was implied in Dōgen's view of time as singular moments. By virtue of the concept of constant-abiding, each moment was understood as perfect in itself due to its identity with totality. Hence, Dōgen's theory of time was considered as suggesting an infinite substratum of time that operated outside causal impermanence. I had argued that Matsumoto's tendency to proximate Dōgen's ideas on Buddha-nature and time with Hongaku-shisō through the utility of the concept of constant-abiding was conditioned by two factors. First was his prejudice that ontology must be 'representational,' and second was his assumption that since Dōgen uses ideas philologically traceable to Hongaku doctrine, his use must be in continuity to the dhātu-vāda evident in Hongaku-shisō. As a consequence to these presumptions, Matsumoto claimed Dōgen's application of universal Buddha-nature to meditational practice was incapable of overcoming its inconsistency and regressed Dōgen's

¹⁶⁴ The term is utilized in *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, "Busshō", 4. "Gyobutsu-Yuigi", 46,47,48. "Zazenshin", 125. "Juki", 245. "Arakan", 273. "Mochu-Setsumu", 322.

universal Buddha-nature to something akin to orthodox Hongaku doctrine. In addition, Dōgen's insistence on the attainment of a state of "without-thinking" suggested a transcendental experientialism which disregarded *prajñā*. Conclusively, Matsumoto's presumptions gave him no recourse but to claim that Dōgen's metaphysical concepts and their application to a theory of practice were all out of step with a proper adherence to *pratītyasamutpāda*.

2.4 Conclusion: The Limitations of Critical Buddhism's Reading of Dōgen

In the first half of this chapter, I have argued that Critical Buddhism's criteria for *pratītyasamutpāda* and *dhātu-vāda* are doctrinally sound in virtue of its philosophical continuity with historical predecessors. In this sense Critical Buddhism's criteria for *pratītyasamutpāda* and *dhātu-vāda* can be used as a general tool to criticise other interpretations of Dōgen in contrast to *pratītyasamutpāda*. However, I pointed out that their view that *pratītyasamutpāda* is incompatible with ontology implied the prejudice that metaphysics by nature 'represents' a supposedly existing ontological 'ground,' and therefore cannot be accepted. While it is doctrinally sound to view that *pratītyasamutpāda* as causality, no-abiding-self, and impermanence does not provide any assurance of an ontological 'locus,' to view that therefore, any ontological claim is corresponding to a 'true-way-reality-is,' is merely a prejudice rather than a logical consequence of the former.

In the second half of the chapter I analyzed how this prejudice conditions Matsumoto's interpretation of Dōgen. To the extent that Matsumoto considers ontology as always advocating a corresponding 'truth' or 'ground' there can be no other way than to understand Dōgen's metaphysics as incompatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*. Whether it be Matsumoto's view that Dōgen is advocating the existence of a 'universal Buddha-nature,' or a theory of temporality which unites all singular moments into a constantly-abiding substratum, he naturally took for granted that these metaphysical ideas are describing a corresponding ontological 'locus' that existed in a spatial or substantive manner. From such a perspective, Dōgen can only either adhere to *pratītyasamutpāda* by not doing metaphysics

or deny *pratītyasamutpāda* by doing metaphysics. As we have seen, the Critical Buddhist conclusion was the latter.

The preceding prejudice also conditioned Matsumoto's interpretation of Dōgen in another manner. The understanding that ontology can only be 'representational' will naturally lead one to identify anything that resembles metaphysical ideas in Dōgen as descriptions of reality. In this sense I considered it inevitable that Matsumoto takes for granted that any mention of the concept of Buddha-nature is by nature *dhātu-vāda* and therefore, prefer to connect Dōgen's ideas with the Hongaku definition of constant-abiding and Dharma-position which emphasizes his case that Dōgen's view on 'impermanence Buddha-nature' and singular time are *dhātu-vāda*. Matsumoto cannot but interpret Dōgen's metaphysics in proximity to *dhātu-vāda* since he is limited within his own framework of understanding ontology as well as to his philological narrative within which ideas as Buddha-nature and constant-abiding is considered inherently *dhātu-vāda*. Such a prejudiced framework cannot accommodate the imagination and creativity to reinterpret Dōgen's metaphysics away from *dhātu-vāda* and in concurrence with *pratītyasamutpāda*. Neither can it open eyes to the possibility that Dōgen's philosophy may be showing a radical break with his historical precedents in his use of ideas such as Buddha-nature and Dharma-position. With the absence of Dōgen, what his accurate intention may had been cannot be verified, however, we can still attempt to pursue hitherto unsought potentials of Dōgen's metaphysics by interpreting it by an absolutely different set of assumptions concerning the significance of metaphysics. Critical Buddhism's manner of approaching Dōgen proved to be unfit for such a task.

Despite the limitations of Critical Buddhism's interpretation of Dōgen there were several points that could be learned from both their criteria for *pratītyasamutpāda*/*dhātu-vāda* and their analysis of Dōgen. First, taking *pratītyasamutpāda* seriously means to understand that Buddhism must take altruistic ethics and *prajñā* as its primary concern through the course of gaining "correct" insight into no-abiding-self and impermanence. Second, if we are to consider Dōgen's metaphysics as compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*, it cannot be interpreted in a manner implying 'realism,' 'essentialism,' or 'foundationalism,' as any of these tendencies will lead to *dhātu-vāda*. Therefore,

Buddha-nature cannot be considered a substantive reality either as ‘individual-essence’ or as a constantly-abiding metaphysical ‘truth’ in unity with the whole of existence. Neither should Dōgen’s idea of time as Dharma-positions be interpreted as a substantialized or spatialized temporality designating the constantly-abiding totality of all moments within the singular moment. These ideas inevitably lead to a theory of practice which, much akin to Mōhēyan, jeopardized the necessity for the practice of gaining insight into no-abiding-self and impermanence through *prajñā* as founded on the primacy of altruistic ethics. Consequently, such interpretations compromise Dōgen’s claim for the priority for Buddhist practice by confining him to *Hongaku-shisō* and as a result renders it insignificant for *pratīyasamutpāda*. Our “new” interpretation of Dōgen’s metaphysics in relation to practice must avoid all of these elements to successfully incorporate his metaphysics as useful within the practice of *pratīyasamutpāda*.

Finally, I emphasize that Critical Buddhism’s conclusion concerning Dōgen is only valid to the extent ontology is considered to function ‘representationally’ and therefore, must always imply a conceptual or objective realism. Matsumoto’s interpretation that Dōgen’s ideas of ‘universal Buddha-nature,’ and time as dharma-positions are valid only if Dōgen believed that such metaphysical realities actually existed in a substantive manner. What if Dōgen’s metaphysics does not ‘describe’ or ‘represent’ a supposedly existent ‘ultimate locus,’ but functioned as purely abstract conceptual tools for practitioners to help recondition their understanding of experienced reality? What if metaphysics was understood beyond conceptual or objective realism and capable of fully functioning as tools to fulfill intended practical purposes without regards to if the ideas actually ‘corresponded’ to reality or not? How will such a pragmatist view of metaphysics change the way we can interpret *pratīyasamutpāda* as compatible with ontology? And in turn how will such a view of *pratīyasamutpāda* condition a new interpretation of Dōgen’s metaphysics?

Answering these questions must wait until chapter five for this first necessitates a detailed introduction to how Deleuze’s pragmatism and metaphysics works. But first, we must examine in the next chapter what I consider the other pole of the dichotomy of Dōgen interpretation: that of the comparative philosophers. I will criticise four exemplary types of comparative interpretations by

applying the criteria for dhātu-vāda and argue for the shortcomings of each type of interpretation.

This will ultimately make the case for why Deleuze is necessary as a solution to the shortcomings of both Critical Buddhism and the comparative interpretations.

CHAPTER THREE

DHĀTU-VĀDA AND FOUR “COMPARATIVE” APPROACHES TO DŌGEN’S METAPHYSICS

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter we analyzed how Critical Buddhism’s interpretation of Dōgen’s metaphysics was limited by its insistence that *pratīyasamutpāda* is incompatible with ontology based on their implicit prejudice that metaphysics is by nature ‘representational.’ Consequently, it concludes that Dōgen’s metaphysical ideas are *dhātu-vāda*. We also analyzed that despite the above prejudice, much of Critical Buddhism’s understanding of *pratīyasamutpāda* and its criteria for *dhātu-vāda* are in continuity with its historical predecessors. Therefore, their criteria were doctrinally sound, and applicable as a general tool to assess if other “Buddhist” philosophies adhere to *pratīyasamutpāda* or not.

There are Dōgen interpretations which I believe are in contrast with the Critical Buddhist approach yet equally short-sighted in their use of Dōgen’s metaphysics. These readings are what I call “comparative philosophical interpretations” exemplified by scholars like Abe, Heine, Kasulis, and Glass. I call them “comparative” due to the fact that many of these scholars are (or were) involved in the field of comparative philosophy surrounding the academic journal “Philosophy East and West” published by Hawaii University. These interpretations share varying degrees of influence by ‘Western’ philosophical perspectives. They take a “comparative” approach by which they utilize ‘Western’ philosophical concepts to interpret Dōgen’s philosophy. In the current chapter, I will provisionally adopt Critical Buddhism’s criteria for what does or does not concur with *pratīyasamutpāda* in order to critically analyze to what extent these comparative interpretations are *dhātu-vāda*, and to examine what can be learned from these interpretations that may be of significance for our “new” interpretation to be offered in chapter five.

While Critical Buddhism supports *pratītyasamutpāda* yet denies metaphysics, my view is that the “comparative” readings may affirm metaphysics yet neglect *pratītyasamutpāda*. How do Abe, Kasulis, Glass, and Heine interpret Dōgen’s ideas of Buddha-nature and time? Are their readings concurrent with *pratītyasamutpāda* or is it proximal to *Hongaku-shisō*? If not in agreement with *pratītyasamutpāda*, why is that so? Is it because they share the same prejudice with Critical Buddhism that metaphysics/ontology is de facto ‘representational’? If so, how does such a prejudice condition each of the comparative interpretations that I will analyze? My hypothesis is that this prejudice is implied in their common assumption that the goal of Buddhist practice lies in attaining the ‘true nature’ of reality or consciousness, rather than the perfecting of compassion based on the correct insight into no-abiding-self. This brings these scholars in line with *Zen/Hongaku-shisō* which also implied the view that the goal of Buddhist practice lies in the attaining of the ‘Truth’ of reality. Consequently, such presumptions concerning ontology in relation to practice may be conditioning the way these scholars interpret Dōgen in proximity to *Hongaku-shisō*.

The goal of the current study is to present a “new” reading of Dōgen’s concepts of temporality and Buddha-nature in relation to practice. That is, a reading that interprets Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts, through Deleuze’s pragmatism, as instrumental for the sake of spiritual practice based on *pratītyasamutpāda*. In order to make a “new” reading of Dōgen, the study cannot reiterate any of the shortcomings or limitations in both the Critical Buddhist or the comparative interpretations of Dōgen. Therefore the current chapter critically analyzes the arguments Abe, Heine, Kasulis, and Glass use concerning Dōgen’s ideas on Buddha-nature and temporality in relation to practice. The directive is to learn from the strengths and to discard the shortcomings in each of the four types of comparative Dōgen interpretations in question. Through the course of analyzing their interpretations, I will seek if their shortcomings imply the common prejudice that metaphysics is ‘corresponding’ to an Absolute ‘reality’ and that attaining this ‘Truth’ is the goal of Buddhism. Since the current study also attempts to offer an interpretation of Dōgen via the philosophical tools I borrow from ‘Western’ philosophy, the analysis will ultimately clarify how the current study is differentiated from these past interpretations and why Deleuze’s pragmatism becomes the preferred solution to the

problems found in their interpretations.

The reasons as to the selection and order of the comparative interpretations I will deal with are as follows. I will begin with a critical analysis of Abe Masao's "dialectical" reading of Dōgen's view of Buddha-nature and temporality. The priority I grant to Abe's interpretation is befit considering that his book, *A Study of Dōgen: His Philosophy and Religion* was one of the first influential book-length studies on Dōgen's philosophy published in English. Whether positively implied or critically alluded to, the influence of Abe's interpretation of Dōgen is identifiable in all the comparative scholars dealt with in this chapter. Elements of Abe's ontological argument recur in both Kasulis and Heine, while Glass critically refers to Abe's view as a point of departure. In short, Abe's interpretation reiterates the concept of Original Enlightenment as an ontological 'ground' by introducing an ultimate ontological category he calls 'nothingness' (無 Mu). Abe attempts to dislocate the dhātu-vādic nature of this 'ground' by incorporating a Hegel inspired dialectics that merges opposites into a transcendental unity. Does Abe's "dialectical" reasoning successfully keep his views on Dōgen's Buddha-nature and time exempt from Dhātu-vāda? If not, why? Is it because he implies that Dōgen's metaphysics 'corresponds' to an ultimate reality and the mystical attainment of such a reality? What can be learnt from his reading for our "new" interpretation of Dōgen?

We will see that the Heidegger inspired reading of Dōgen exemplified by Steven Heine follows most closely in line with Abe's "dialectical" reasoning. For this reason, Heine's interpretation of Dōgen will be the second to be analyzed. Examining the Heidegger inspired interpretation of Dōgen is important since this type of reading has become, whether consciously or latently, a strong influence within Dōgen studies. Perhaps due to the lasting influence of the Kyoto school's early attempts in comparing Dōgen and Heidegger's ideas on time, the Heidegger-Dōgen hybrid has long been a recurring theme in comparative philosophy.¹⁶⁵ So much so that in certain cases, a Heidegger inspired interpretation of Dōgen's concepts has been latently taken for granted without any critique or

¹⁶⁵ Correlations between Heidegger and the Kyoto school can be traced back to the 1930s when several Kyoto school philosophers as Tanabe Hajime, Keiji Nishitani and Kuki Shūzō were in direct contact with him. This perhaps lead to mutual influence and the Zen-Heidegger amalgamations found in their philosophy. Comparisons of Dōgen and Heidegger is not limited to the Kyoto school (as in Abe) and Western scholars like Heine and Stambaugh, but is also adumbrated or alluded to by Dōgen scholars like Jikisai as well as many of those who contributed articles to the book *Dōgen Studies*. The comparison seems prevalent and influential on how many people interpret Dōgen.

justification.¹⁶⁶ Given the similarity between Heine's reasoning for his Dōgen interpretation with that of other Heidegger inspired scholars such as Joan Stambaugh, I believe we can take Heine's study as an exemplary case. Do his interpretations of Dōgen's Buddha-nature and time in relation to practice adhere to *pratīyasamutpāda*? If not, is it because he implies the prejudice that ontology is 'corresponding' to an ultimate reality and that Buddhist practice is aimed at 'attaining' such a reality? Is there something we can learn from Heine's reading that may be useful for our "new" interpretation of Dōgen?

Third, T.P. Kasulis's 'phenomenological' approach to Dōgen. I consider Kasulis's reading of Dōgen's philosophy in his book *Zen Action Zen Person* holds a distinct position in Dōgen studies. The reason is that his study attempts to read Dōgen's fundamental premise for the primacy of practice from a purely practical perspective founded on what he calls the 'phenomenological' perspective as opposed to the 'ontological.' In this reading, Kasulis denies any claims for ontology and metaphysics in Dōgen by arguing that anything that sounds like ontology by Dōgen is in fact a 'phenomenological' description of the way the mind perceives reality. Kasulis's attempt to break away from interpreting Dōgen from a purely theoretical ontological basis may be of significance for the current study. By avoiding ontology all together, Kasulis may be exempt from *dhātu-vāda*, but is this really the case? How does Kasulis interpret Dōgen's Buddha-nature and time through his 'phenomenological' approach? Does his interpretation successfully integrate metaphysics with practice based in *pratīyasamutpāda* or not? What can be learned from his approach that may be of use for our interpretation of Dōgen?

Finally, I will analyze Robert Glass's 'Buddha essence' reading. Robert Glass's reading of Dōgen presented in his book *Working Emptiness* is significant since it is the only book-length study which attempts to incorporate Deleuze's philosophy in interpreting Buddhist philosophy. Though Glass's work is not a study of Dōgen per se, nor does it treat Deleuze in depth, his interpretation of

¹⁶⁶ For example widely available modern Japanese translations of Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō* like that by Kyoji Ishii takes certain Heideggerian interpretations of terms such as *Genjōkōan* and *Uji* for granted when he replaces Dōgen's language into modern Japanese. He does not take cautious steps to justify this move nor explain why he considers the interpretation valid with consideration of the differences between the two ontologies. It seems that Ishii's philosophical framework for understanding ontology is itself conditioned by his leniency towards Heidegger's ontology.

Dōgen’s view on Buddha-nature and Deleuze’s ideas on desire does constitute an important part of his ‘new’ perspective on Buddhist ‘emptiness’ and practice. Hence I will analyze Glass’s work from two angles: his interpretation of Dōgen and his use of Deleuze. How does Glass interpret Dōgen’s view on Buddha-nature? Does it concur with *pratītyasamutpāda* or not? How does Glass utilize Deleuze in his reading of Buddhism? Does it allow Dōgen to be freed from ‘representation’ or not? What can be learned from Glass’s interpretation of Dōgen and his use of Deleuze?

3.2 Criteria for Dhātu-vāda Revisited

In critically analysing the Dōgen interpretations by Abe, Heine, Kasulis and Glass, I will utilize Critical Buddhism’s criteria for what adheres to *pratītyasamutpāda* or not as presented in the last chapter. The analysis will seek to what extent the comparative interpretations veer off from *pratītyasamutpāda* towards Hongaku-shisō or not. For this reason, a brief reminder of the criteria for *pratītyasamutpāda* and how Hongaku-shisō is dhātu-vāda will be beneficial.

Pratītyasamutpāda entails that all of phenomenal reality whether tangible or not are a product of the process of cause and effect. Our experience of the ‘self’ and world is a product of a causal relationship amongst the perceptive and cognitive process of the skandhas. Hence all phenomena is of ‘no-abiding-self’ meaning there can be no intrinsically existing ‘Self’ or Being which persists independently of causality. Therefore *pratītyasamutpāda* cannot accept any views claiming the existence of an ontological or epistemological ‘locus’ in whatever form it may be (i.e. whether as objective existence of things, ‘individual-essence,’ or a metaphysical ‘supreme truth’ or ‘realm,’ or objective ‘meanings,’ and ‘reasons’). Causality always implies an irreversible movement of time or ‘impermanence.’¹⁶⁷ The practice of *pratītyasamutpāda* prioritizes altruistic ethics and necessitates *prajñā* or analytical thinking. The goal of practice is the perfection of compassion through correct analytical insight into no-abiding-self, and not personal liberation, based on an attainment of some form of ultimate transcendental ‘Truth.’

¹⁶⁷ Refer to the list of ontological criteria for dhātu-vāda in chapter two for a more detailed list of ontological claims that will consequently negate *pratītyasamutpāda*.

Hongaku-shisō or the “Doctrine of Original Enlightenment” found in Sino-Japanese Zen Buddhism is archetypical dhātu-vāda for four reasons. First, it accepts an ultimate ontological locus in the form of an “originally enlightened” metaphysical reality. Second, it interprets ‘Buddha-nature’ as a pure ‘essence’ or ‘True Self,’ whose purity is assured by its primordial identity with the ultimate locus by nature of ‘constant-abiding.’ Third, it neglects prajñā and the priority of altruism, by considering the goal of Buddhist practice as personal liberation via the ‘attainment’ of a transcendental experience of the ultimate reality. Fourth, it further neglects altruistic ethics by considering the whole of reality as primordially “enlightened,” and “perfect,” including all of its suffering and vices, hence in need of no betterment or change.

The following analysis may reveal that much of the interpretive arguments made by the comparative scholars neglect praṭīyasamutpāda by reiterating such Hongaku ideas in varying degrees. They may not use the same terminology as Hongaku-shisō, but may reiterate the same ideas, reasoning or logic under a different label. We shall begin with Abe Masao’s interpretation of Dōgen.

3.3 Abe Masao’s Dialectical Theory of Dōgen’s Metaphysics

Abe interprets Dōgen with the assumption that Dōgen’s ontology successfully solved the paradox of Hongaku-shisō which rendered meditational practice superfluous.¹⁶⁸ This is a point that is in contrast to Matsumoto’s view that Dōgen failed to solve the paradox. We will see that Abe’s argument relies on an ultimate metaphysical ‘locus’ he borrows from Zen to call Mu 無 or ‘no-thingness.’ Abe equates this ‘no-thingness’ with Tathātā,¹⁶⁹ Dōgen’s ‘impermanence-Buddha-nature’

¹⁶⁸ The paradox in short: since Hongaku-shisō considers reality primordially ‘enlightened’ and ‘perfect’ without the need for spiritual practice, all forms of Buddhist practice loses its significance; why would one practice Buddhism at all? See chapter 1 section 1.3 for how significant this “paradox” was for Dōgen’s life’s quest as a Buddhist. Also see chapter 2 section 2.3.3 for a more detailed ontological description of this “paradox.”

¹⁶⁹ Abe considers the ontological locus to defy representation, and naming, and that it is un-substantive, bottomless limitlessness itself. It can only be referred to negatively as ‘no-thingness’ or ‘emptiness’ and positively with interrogatives such as “whence” “thus” or “what” implying the Buddhist notion of Tathātā (thusness or suchness). Abe Masao, *A Study of Dōgen: His Philosophy and Religion*, ed. Steven Heine, (New York: State University, 1992), 45-49. Abe mentions, “for Dōgen Buddha-nature is neither being or non-being but thusness, or as-it-is-ness, of any and everything.” *Ibid.*, 143.

Abe considers that this limitlessness or no-thingness is the ‘truth’ of Buddha-nature as realized by Dōgen and expressed by Dōgen’s terms ‘impermanence Buddha-nature’ and ‘Whole-being is the Buddha-nature.’ *Ibid.*, 49-51, 142.

and ‘All existence is Buddha-nature.’ Abe attempts to escape his seeming reliance on a ‘locus’ by utilizing a dialectical reasoning influenced by Hegel.¹⁷⁰ Does Abe’s interpretation of Dōgen successfully avoid dhātu-vāda or does it fall prey to what Matsumoto called a theory of ‘universal Buddha-nature’? If Abe tends towards dhātu-vāda does it imply the presumption that ontology is ‘representational’? What can be learned from his interpretation as significant for our own interpretation of Dōgen?

3.3.1 Abe’s Foundational ‘Dialectic’

Abe believes Dōgen overcame the inherent paradox in Hongaku-shisō by developing the idea of the “unity of practice and enlightenment” or *Shushō-Ittō* 修証一等.¹⁷¹ According to Abe, *Shushō-Ittō* denotes how the primordial enlightenment of reality functions as the “ground or basis” on which one’s act of meditating becomes the “occasion or condition” through which the grounding reality is realized.¹⁷² In other words, the necessity for meditational practice is maintained by considering ‘original enlightenment’ as immediately manifest while one is in the act of successful Zazen meditation.¹⁷³ This is possible since, while the individual realizes Tathātā during practice, the individual transcends both ground and condition in what Abe calls ‘no-thingness.’ According to Abe this “attained reality” is not subject to accusations for objectification or for being an ontological ‘essence’ since,

Attainment (the Buddha-nature) however is not something substantial; in itself, it is nonsubstantial and nonobjectifiable no-thingness. Accordingly, through a realization of the nonsubstantiality of its ground, practice as the condition is realized as something real in terms of the ground. Thus in going beyond the irreversible relationship between attainment (the Buddha-nature) and practice (becoming a Buddha), these two aspects come to be grasped in terms of reversible identity.

Furthermore,

¹⁷⁰ Abe, 61-64. While Abe’s reference to Hegel in his discourse of Dōgen takes the form of comparison, a look at his interpretation of Dōgen shows that Hegelian dialectics is implied as part of his latent framework for understanding Dōgen’s ontology and in effect plays a more fundamental role than a simple subject for comparison.

¹⁷¹ Again for what the paradox is, refer to chapter 2 section 2.3.3.

¹⁷² Abe, 21, 26.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 29.

Attainment (the Buddha-nature), indispensable as the ground of human existence, is not a being or something substantial, but is in itself empty and no-thing. [...] It is a ground that is different from ground in the ordinary sense as simply distinguished from a condition. In this way the distinction between ground and condition in the ordinary sense is overcome. Further, the irreversibility between them is also overcome. At that point, that which is the condition is directly realized as the ground.¹⁷⁴

I consider the above as exemplary of the basic rhetoric Abe utilizes to interpret the entirety of Dōgen's metaphysics. I hope to prove this point when I will analyze Abe's interpretation of Dōgen's views on Buddha-nature and time in the following two sections. Here, Abe introduces a third metaphysical category he calls 'no-thingness' which ultimately transcends dualistic ontological categories while being inclusive of the former dualities. The dualities are not reduced into a One, whereby their differences would be eliminated by a universal unity.¹⁷⁵ Rather, the original differences between the polarities are kept intact since dualities are 'united' by virtue of the third ontological category which functions as an all-embracing locus in which all things exist and spring forth.

Abe claims that the immediate identity between normative existence and no-thingness ensures a dynamic reversibility between these ontological categories. An "enlightened" person is not suspended within either one or the other side of a polarity. Rather he/she exists in a reversible relationship between all dualities. Simply put, successful practice allows the practitioner to participate in the superior ontological 'truth-of-reality' denoted by 'no-thingness' in which all dichotomies are transcended whilst inclusively maintained. As we will see in the following analysis, such dualistic concepts found in Dōgen as in the case of 'without-Buddha-nature'/'having a Buddha-nature' and the seemingly paradoxical notion of temporal continuity/singularity, are mysteriously overcome by the mystical experience of a superior, non-substantive locus called 'no-thingness.' I will also argue how this 'dialectical' ontology cannot exempt Abe's interpretation of Dōgen from dhātu-vāda.

¹⁷⁴ Abe, 28.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 48. According to Abe, "[...] Buddha-nature is not One substance. All beings without exception are *equally and respectively* 'What-is-this-that-thus-comes.'"

3.3.2 Why Buddha-Nature as ‘Nothingness’ is Dhātu-vāda

Abe’s application of the rhetoric of resolving dualities by virtue of a transcendental ontological ‘ground’ is evident in his interpretation of Dōgen’s equating of impermanent reality with Buddha-nature as ‘impermanence-Buddha-nature’ (無常仏性 *Mujyō-Busshō*). According to Abe, the term ‘impermanence-Buddha-nature’ denotes how ‘Buddha-nature’ is neither describable as existent (i.e. “having” a Buddha-nature) nor as non-existent (i.e. ‘without-Buddha-nature’), but solely as ‘no-thingness.’

Abe contends that Dōgen’s term, ‘impermanence-Buddha-nature’ and his statement that “all existence is Buddha-nature,” describe how the “enlightened” who have experienced ‘no-thingness’ view the ‘truth’ of Buddha-nature as at once transcending the duality between condition, (i.e. act of meditation, practice), and ground, (i.e. ‘original enlightenment,’ attainment), only to simultaneously unite both with the totality of existence.¹⁷⁶ In Abe’s words, in enlightenment, “impermanence itself, which is strictly limited to time and space, is realized in its suchness as the Buddha-nature that is beyond time and space. [...] Therefore, a reversible relationship between attainment and practice, the Buddha-nature and becoming Buddha, is realized.”¹⁷⁷ This means, the ‘truth’ of ‘impermanence Buddha-nature’ as ‘no-thingness’ functions as a mediator amongst all dualities which create a “reversible” connection between them by virtue of placing them within the superseding totality of ‘no-thingness.’ As I will explain below, Abe utilizes this reasoning to make sense of the duality between ‘having’ a Buddha-nature and ‘without-Buddha-nature’ in combination with what is essentially the Hongaku logic of constant-abiding.

Metaphysical ‘no-thingness’ functions as the ultimate ontological ground on which the seeming paradox between what Dōgen describes as the idea of “having” a Buddha-nature and being “without-Buddha-nature” are united.¹⁷⁸ In addition, Abe mentions “all beings ceaselessly manifest the

¹⁷⁶ Abe, 58-59.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 60-62.

Buddha-nature while they are ever changing.”¹⁷⁹ This means, all phenomena are immediately identical to Buddha-nature by virtue of the connective function of ‘no-thingness’ without having to change or transform from one state to another. Thereby Buddha-nature transcends both existing and not existing while being simultaneously inclusive of all ontological categories without having to obstruct their respective differences. I consider this view is in effect identical to what Matsumoto pointed out as the Hongaku idea of ‘constant-abiding’ in which all being was considered “enlightened” due to its participating in the primordial purity of Tathātā while maintaining their normative form/roles. For this reason we can say that Abe’s Dōgen interpretation already veers towards dhātu-vāda by presupposing an ultimate ontological ground¹⁸⁰ and its identity with normative reality.

Abe assumes this concept of ‘no-thingness’ is exempt from critique of dhātu-vāda for it does not objectify the ontological ground. This assumption is founded on Abe’s implication that ‘no-thingness’ is empty of self-nature or intrinsic existence, and therefore does not qualify as ‘being’ or an ontological ground.¹⁸¹ However, Abe utilizes ‘no-thingness’ as an ontological ‘space’ where differences comes to inter-connectively co-exist and where paradoxes are mysteriously resolved by virtue of their emptiness. As we saw in the proximity between Abe’s ontology and the Hongaku notion of constant-abiding, I consider such a ‘no-thingness’ merely reiterates the Hongaku notion of ultimate reality as the “originally enlightened” Dharma realm or Tathātā. The idea of constant-abiding implies that since the ultimate metaphysical reality is identical with normative reality, the ultimate reality does not exist apart from the normative, but as an overlapping metaphysical ‘realm’ constituted of one constantly-abiding, inter-connective web of relations amongst all existence. The ontological interdependence amongst beings leads to its ‘emptiness’ of individual-essences.¹⁸² This is a view

¹⁷⁹ Abe, 66.

¹⁸⁰ Abe himself seems to find no problem in calling what he considers Dōgen’s supposed ‘truth’ concerning impermanence Buddha-nature as an “ultimate ontological ground.” Ibid., 44. In fact his whole system of Dōgen interpretation relies on the necessity of such a ground as the ‘truth’ attained in practice.

¹⁸¹ According to Abe, “Buddha-nature is the ground that is realized only through practice as its condition, it is not a substantial ground or a ground that is some particular thing, but a ground as no-thing, that is nonsubstantial and nonobjectifiable ground.” Ibid., 28.

¹⁸² In Mahayana Buddhism, this nature of ultimate reality existing as a web of relations is often alluded through the metaphor of the “Indra’s Net.” The Indra’s Net spreads infinitely across the whole universe with a jewel positioned at every cross-section of the net. Each jewel reflects upon every other jewel placed upon the net, each one reflecting each other onto infinity. The metaphor describes the complete lack of self-nature (sūnyatā) of all phenomena in the

described in Tendai/Huayen Buddhism as *Jiji-muge-hokkai* 事事無礙法界, or in English, the “metaphysical dimension of the unobstructed mutual interpenetration among all things and events.”¹⁸³

In my view, Abe’s ‘no-thingness’ is proximal to *Jiji-muge-hokkai* in constructing a sense of unity amongst all existence while preserving their differences by giving ultimate reality a ‘spatial’ quality in which all things are embraced without obstruction. *Jiji-muge-hokkai* is not exempt from *dhātu-vāda* by claiming that ultimate reality does not exist substantively, but only as a web of co-dependent relations amongst all things ‘empty’ of individual-essence. Regardless of the non-substantiality or ‘emptiness’ of this metaphysical ‘web-space,’ it is still an ontological locus and the fact that the idea is reliant on this locus stays intact. Similarly, Abe’s reading of Dōgen cannot escape *dhātu-vāda* since his ‘no-thingness,’ regardless of its ontological emptiness, continues to function as a grounding locus in which all other existence is embraced and subordinated. Despite resorting to the rhetoric of such an ontological locus to be empty of self-nature, the whole metaphysics continues to function on basis of the idea that individual existences reside by virtue of an ontological foundation. Hence, Abe’s idea is thoroughly embedded within *dhātu-vāda*. It simply displaces the locus from being an obvious ontological ‘absolute being,’ ‘essence,’ or ‘ground’ by claiming that it is neither ‘Being’ nor ‘non-Being,’ but ‘no-thingness’ whose nature can only be discerned by the “enlightened” mind.


The conjuring of ‘no-thingness’ simply means an introduction of a mediating ultimate ontological locus, which now includes within it and simultaneously grounds both locus (‘original enlightenment’) and super locus (difference/individual being). Therefore, rather than discarding or overcoming the necessity for an ontological ‘ground,’ Abe has in fact regressed deeper into *dhātu-vāda* (see diagram 2). Instead of having a simple structure of normative reality being indebted to one ontological locus, Abe places a second ultimate ontological locus in which both the prior locus and

universe and thus how each thing is fully interdependent on every other thing in creating one universal field of relations with no beginning, no end. David Loy, “Indra’s Postmodern Net”, *Philosophy East and West* 43.3 (1993), 481-483. Although I believe there is a way to utilize this metaphor without alluding to the web of interdependence as an ‘ultimate reality,’ i.e. simply as a pragmatic tool to expand one’s view of experience, utilizing this metaphor as a description of an ontological locus most certainly leads to the view of *Jiji-muge-hokkai*.

¹⁸³ Izutsu Toshihiko, *Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism*, (Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1977), 53. Izutsu also sees a connection between Hongaku/Zen views of a “true selfhood” with the nature of ultimate reality as *Jiji-muge-hokkai*. Zen “True Self” is the actualization of the ultimate field in the form of the conventional self. See: 1-7, 50-58, 65-82.

normative reality are embraced. Again, this structure is identical to what Matsumoto had analyzed as the Hongaku idea of ‘constant-abiding.’ If we recall from the last chapter, constant-abiding stood for the idea that all existence while being singular and distinct is simultaneously absolute by virtue of its inclusivity in the totality of Tathātā. By virtue of Tathātā functioning as an all-inclusive locus, all phenomenal differences and opposites are reconciled (without changing) as immediately *the* absolute. Abe simply supplements Tathātā with the term ‘no-thingness’ and adds that this primordial identity between phenomena and the absolute needs practice to be realized.

Diagram 2 :
Dhātu-vādic Structure of Abe's theory of Dōgen



Key: Outer circle symbolizes the all-embracing ultimate locus ('nothingness'). Also equated with Impermanence-Buddha-nature, Zen 'True Self,' and 'Nothingness-time.' It is beyond discriminative thought and temporality. Nothingness embraces both individual existence (super-locus) and originally enlightened reality (locus).

I consider Abe's theory of Buddha-nature is in effect identical to what Matsumoto described as the Hongaku-derived "universal Buddha-nature" reading of Dōgen's theory of practice. Much akin to Matsumoto's reading, Abe understands that the concept of Buddha-nature for Dōgen is

‘universalized’ as identical to the whole of reality in the form of ‘impermanence Buddha-nature,’ or ‘all existence is Buddha-nature.’ Abe merely supplemented Buddha-nature with the term ‘no-thingness.’ Either way, Buddha-nature forms a metaphysical locus equated with the “originally enlightened” nature of reality that is only revealed while successful practice is pursued. As I had previously analyzed, Abe’s debt to Hongaku-shisō was also evident in the way he justified the identity between normative reality and the ultimate locus by the logic of constant-abiding. Abe’s proximity to the universal Buddha-nature based theory of Dōgen’s practice inevitably ensues another dhātu-vādic trait in Abe, that of accepting an ‘individual-essence’ in the form of a Zen ‘True-Self,’ as I will explain below.

Recalling Matsumoto’s analysis,¹⁸⁴ we saw that maintaining the need for meditational practice in accordance to the universal Buddha-nature logic compromises the monism of universal Buddha-nature. This is because the unconditionally “enlightened” nature of reality must become concealed for the sake of practice to become necessitated as a means to realize what is not immediately apparent. This logic reverts back to a duality between ‘inherent Buddha-nature’ and the ultimate locus. Consequently, a theory of practice based on universal Buddha-nature must reintroduce the idea of an ‘individual-essence’ which is somehow in continuity with the universal locus and ensures one’s possibility to be enlightened.

Abe ignores the above fallacy altogether in accepting without question that a theory of practice based on universal Buddha-nature solves the paradox of Original Enlightenment. Yet Abe’s theory is no exception to the above critique as his interpretation of Dōgen inevitably needs to accept an ‘individual-essence.’ This is evident when Abe mentions that “for Dōgen, this absolute nothingness is the true Self, and the true Self is this absolute nothingness.”¹⁸⁵ Here, Abe uncritically accepts the Zen idea of a “true Self” as unitary with the ultimate ontological locus of ‘no-thingness.’¹⁸⁶ Again, whether Abe claims this ontological essence is non-substantial due to it being ‘no-thing,’ the idea cannot be exempted from dhātu-vāda. Any functional and practical reliance on an ontological

¹⁸⁴ See chapter 2 section 2.3.3

¹⁸⁵ Abe, 144.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 88-99.

‘ground’ is dhātu-vāda regardless of its ‘emptiness.’ Consequently, Abe veered to dhātu-vāda by denying the doctrine of no-abiding-self on two grounds: by accepting an ultimate metaphysical locus, and an ‘individual-essence’ both transcendent to causality. As we will see in the next section, Abe’s theory of Dōgen’s view on temporality follows a similar route as he continues to reiterate Hongaku-shisō by utilizing the logic of constant-abiding through his application of dialectical ‘no-thingness.’

3.3.3 Why Time as ‘No-thingness’ is Dhātu-vāda

Abe employs the same logic of ‘no-thingness’ that we encountered in the previous section to interpret Dōgen’s theory of temporality. Dōgen’s paradoxical claim for time as a collection of singularities inexplicably related to each other is explained by virtue of a superior form of time realized in no-thingness through practice. According to Abe, Dōgen’s idea that each instant constitute a singular ‘Dharma-position’ denotes how every instant is by virtue of no-thingness, the “spontaneous manifestation” of the entirety of all reality.¹⁸⁷ The Hongaku logic of constant-abiding is reiterated again in the way the paradoxical duality of Dōgen’s singular instant and continuity is transcended by the superseding ultimate reality of no-thingness, which at once includes and ties both sides of the dichotomy without negation of their difference. No-thingness then “returns” this inter-penetrative nature of ultimate reality as immediately identical to the absolute present (as Uji, ‘Being-time’).

Consequently, the duality of time and space, as well as the paradox of singularity and continuity is reversibly reconciled within the absolute present by a superior liberation from normative temporality realized via no-thingness. Therefore, temporality experienced as no-thingness, that is as “nothingness-time,”¹⁸⁸ “transcends the ordinary dimension of time and space.”¹⁸⁹ As a result, the experience of no-thingness leads time to be converted to a spatial concept (i.e. *Uji*, or ‘Being-time’) that identifies time to the entirety of existence. Albeit, this identity between temporality and ‘spatiality’ is claimed to exist in a manner that is beyond conventional comprehension of ‘space’ by

¹⁸⁷ Abe, 82-83.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 81.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 84.

virtue of one's realization of a-rational no-thingness. This means that Abe's version of Dōgen's theory of time veers towards dhātu-vāda by constructing a transcendental realm of time untouched by impermanence which simultaneously embraces the whole of impermanent reality.

Abe's above interpretation of Dōgen's time is a negation of impermanence. Because it claims the irreversible impermanence of reality is an in-authentic understanding of 'Being-time' which can only be rectified through liberation qua no-thingness that discloses the true nature of time as the absolute now. For Abe, the locus of reality (the 'originally enlightened' nature) is universal, omnipresent, and therefore beyond time,¹⁹⁰ which means his theory of Dōgen is bound to negate praṭītyasamutpāda on the grounds of denying impermanence. Rather than reflective of irreversible impermanence, the singular moment of the "absolute now" is a form of ontological time as a permanent sub-stratum that includes all other moments as coexistent within a constantly-abiding totality. Therefore, Abe neglects the criticality of impermanence and denies the causal unfolding of praṭītyasamutpāda by presenting an ontological time beyond causality. Such a view of time de-necessitates the analytical observance of lived impermanence without which we cannot analyze the cause and conditions of our sufferings. Abe's version of Dōgen simply diagnoses this impermanence as delusional and solves the problem of our critical existence by relegating 'true time' beyond said impermanence. Consequently, the need to face critical impermanence in practice is denied in favor of a transcendental experience that will realize an absolute manifestation of the true nature of time as no-thingness.

Such a view on temporality inevitably conditions Abe's view on Dōgen's spiritual practice. Abe views that reality in its primordially enlightened state (i.e. as 'no-thingness') cannot be idealized, conceptualized or objectified.¹⁹¹ Hence, the nature of how the ultimate reality unites difference and singular moments exist in a transcendental relationship to analytical thought. Therefore Abe cannot but emphasize the transcendental experience of 'no-thingness' as the crux of Dōgen's practical philosophy. This neglects the view that Buddhist practice as based in praṭītyasamutpāda prioritizes the cultivation of prajñā for the sake of altruism. Abe presumes that the goal of spiritual practice for

¹⁹⁰ Abe, 25-26.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 21.

Dōgen lies in realizing the ‘truth’ of impermanence Buddha-nature or no-thingness only by which practice can become undefiled and expressive of the originally enlightened ‘ground.’¹⁹² Not only does this prove Abe’s interpretation to be dhātu-vāda on practical grounds, but also indicates Abe’s presumption that Dōgen’s practical philosophy is founded on and aimed at the realization of an ultimate metaphysical truth and that his ontology attempts to ‘describe’ such a ‘truth’ experienced through practice. Consequently, Abe’s interpretation of Dōgen’s ontology remains bound in correspondence theory.

In conclusion, Abe’s reading of Dōgen proved to be problematic on two grounds. First it failed to uphold *pratītyasamutpāda* on all levels of his interpretation of Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts, including Buddha-nature, temporality and their relation to the nature of practice. This is due to Abe’s fundamental reliance on an ultimate ontological locus he called ‘no-thingness’ which was considered the ultimate ‘Truth’ of reality including the Self and time beyond causal impermanence. This nature of ‘no-thingness’ as transcendental to causality inevitably lead to the idea that this ‘Truth’ can only be realized through experience beyond analytical thinking. Hence the priority of altruism and *prajñā* was negated and Buddhist practice was misconstrued as centred on the realization of a cosmological ‘Truth.’ Second, such a view on Dōgen’s ontology and practice implied the unquestioned presumption that Dōgen’s metaphysics ‘corresponds’ to the ‘Truth’ he experienced through practice. Thereby, Abe’s theory of Dōgen remained confined within correspondence theory.

One thing that can be learned from Abe’s interpretation is that a dialectical reasoning for Dōgen’s metaphysics which relies on an all-embracing ultimate locus as its pivotal argument should be avoided regardless of its claim for ontological ‘emptiness.’ Any reliance on an ontological ground, whether substantive or not, leads to *dhātu-vāda* and therefore, if we are to interpret Dōgen in concurrence with *pratītyasamutpāda*, this line of reasoning needs to be abandoned altogether. In addition Despite Abe’s insistence on ‘no-thingness’ or Mu (無) as a key concept for interpreting Dōgen, the idea is not utilized by Dōgen to any significant depth throughout the *Shōbōgenzō* and

¹⁹² As Abe says, “Dōgen finds the basis for human’s liberation in a thoroughly cosmological dimension,” he seems to take for granted that the aim of Buddhist practice lies in attaining a cosmological or metaphysical ‘truth.’ Abe, 44. This prejudice is implied in several statements Abe makes throughout his book. See for example *Ibid.*, 40, 49-51, 67-68.

therefore it seems unlikely that Dōgen himself considered the concept crucial for his own philosophy. As I had pointed out in the previous chapter, I consider Dōgen's concept of 'Total-function' to be a much better contender for a key to unlocking Dōgen's metaphysics as a whole and in a manner which does not have to conjure Hongaku oriented ideas of an ontological locus. Demonstrating this case must wait till chapter five, for now we shall move onto analyzing Heine's Heideggerian interpretation of Dōgen.

3.4 Heine's Heidegger-Inspired Reading of Dōgen's Metaphysics

Heine's Heidegger inspired interpretation of Dōgen is presented within the grounds that he wants to see how insights found in Dōgen may illuminate the shortcomings and potentials of Heidegger's philosophy. While Heine does try to distinguish the differences of Heidegger and Dōgen, my view is that Heine involuntarily reads his own Heidegger oriented ontological biases into his understanding of Dōgen's metaphysics. Consequently he may be taking for granted that Dōgen's metaphysics 'corresponds' to an ultimate reality experienced through his enlightenment. I will argue through this section how Heine's interpretation of Dōgen maybe repeating a Hongaku-shisō oriented reasoning akin to Abe and that his Heideggerian biases enhances these dhātu-vādic tendencies rather than to counter it. The section will seek the following questions. Does Heine's interpretations of Dōgen's Buddha-nature and time in relation to practice adhere to *pratyasamutpāda*? If not, is it because he has a Heidegger oriented bias in understanding ontology? Does this bias imply the prejudice that ontology is 'corresponding' to an ultimate reality and that Buddhist practice is aimed at 'attaining' such a reality? Is there something we can learn from Heine's reading that may be useful for our "new" interpretation of Dōgen?

3.4.1 Hongaku-shisō and Heine's View on Buddha-Nature and Temporality

Heine's interpretation of Dōgen's ideas on Buddha-nature and time is presented in his analysis of the idea of 'impermanence Buddha-nature' in relation to *Uji* 有時, or what he translates as "Being-time." Heine defines Dōgen's idea of Being-time as a "primordial time" that is hidden behind our normal experience of reality and "constitute the foundations of existence itself."¹⁹³ According to this understanding Heine supports the idea that there is an ultimate ontological locus behind the ordinary appearance of existence and that this locus is identical to the 'true-way-time-is' as "primordial time."¹⁹⁴ Successful meditational practice reveals this reality to the practitioner.

While Heine does not use the term 'constant-abiding' or *Jojiyū* per se, he does utilize a reasoning much akin to Abe which reiterates the logic of constant-abiding in order to make sense of the relationship between individual existence and the ultimate locus as well as moments to the whole of "Being-time." This tendency can be observed in Heine's definition of Dōgen's 'impermanence Buddha-nature' as the fundamental identity between primordial time and Buddha-nature. According to Heine, "beings are invariably temporal occurrences; time always presences as *all* beings."¹⁹⁵ This means, the true nature of time is identical with the 'truth' of the whole of existence in the form of a universalized Buddha-nature or *Tathātā*. This idea reiterates the Hongaku concept of constant-abiding in which every individual existence is itself the whole of Buddha-nature without having to go through any qualitative change. Heine applies this idea in combining Dōgen's views on Buddha-nature with time as singular 'dharma-positions.' Each instant becomes singular and complete unto itself without

¹⁹³ Steven Heine, *Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dōgen*, (Albany: State University, 1985), 61.

¹⁹⁴ This presumption that there is an ultimate 'truth' to reality which embraces both normative reality without obstructing it is shared by Stambaugh. However Stambaugh does try to avoid a pure repetition of the constant-abiding logic and Abe styled dialectics by describing this ultimate reality in terms of process metaphysics. According to Stambaugh, the "third" ontological category which transcends and includes within it all dualities without obstruction "do not land in a third term at all but continuously leap off into another dimension." Stambaugh replaces this third "term" with a non-objectified, limitless dynamic movement that is not a place-thing, but a process, a *doing* or, *happening* that cannot be categorically divided. This does not exempt Stambaugh's interpretation from *dhātu-vāda* since she has merely replaced the ontological locus with the 'process' itself. Her fundamental reliance on the idea of an ontological 'ground' remains. Joan Stambaugh, *Impermanence is Buddha-nature*, (Honolulu, University of Hawaii, 1990), 93.

¹⁹⁵ Heine, *Existential and Ontological*, 51.

having to change: “There is no-thing/no-self which changes. Impermanence is no more or less than the impermanently innate and unceasing dynamism of non-self without reference to or contrast with other supposedly stable thing or process outside it.”¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, the singular moment becomes the absolute totality of all primordial time (i.e. the entirety of Buddha-nature) where, “The total penetration and realization of any single practice, explanation or experience at this very time fully discloses the entire Dharma-realm because all beings, all selves, and all Buddhas at each and every moment are harmoniously and simultaneously linked together.”¹⁹⁷

Heine is saying that authentic time fully manifests in the present moment by virtue of its connection to the whole of impermanent existence. Since all existence is co-dependent and inter-connected to each other, each singular moment constantly-abide as the full totality of Buddha-nature. Every singular instant is, while being innately impermanent, already the totality of Buddha-nature without having to change. Thereby the paradoxical connectivity between singular instants is explicated. Each moment as it is, non-obstructively extends limitlessly, and multi-directionally throughout all times due to it constantly-abiding as the entirety of Buddha-nature.¹⁹⁸

Heine concludes that Dōgen surpasses Heidegger in the sense he overcomes any sense of substantive ontology by completely merging all existence with the non-self-existing totality of primordial time.¹⁹⁹ However, Heine, like Abe, overlooks that simply escaping from substantive ontologies in which things intrinsically exist, cannot free a philosophy from being dhātu-vāda. As I had presented in the last chapter, any idea reliant on an ontological or epistemological ‘locus’ regardless of it being in-substantive or not, neglects causality and therefore is dhātu-vāda.

Heine argues that Dōgen is claiming the presence of a ‘true nature’ of reality in the form of primordial time or ‘impermanence-Buddha-nature,’ which can only be manifested authentically through practice. This argument presupposes a dhātu-vādic design of thought whereby there is a locus to super-locus structure of reality. Whether or not this ontological locus is claimed to be non-self-

¹⁹⁶ Heine, *Existential and Ontological*, 90.


¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 127-130.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 98-99.

existence, or non-substantive as a “insubstantial presence,”²⁰⁰ the foundational presupposition that there is some form of ‘true nature’ of reality that is not immediately accessible yet foundational to all other existence and knowledge cannot be but dhātu-vāda (see diagram 4). Such a dhātu-vāda oriented interpretation of Dōgen has direct consequences on Heine’s understanding of Dōgen’s view on practice as we shall see in the following section.

Diagram 4: Dhātu-vādic Structure of Heine’s Interpretation of Dōgen



3.4.2 The Heidegger Bias and its Consequence on Dōgen’s View on Practice

The presumption that Dōgen’s philosophy ‘corresponds’ to an ultimate nature of reality that is only attained through practice, seems to come hand-in-hand with Heine’s Heidegger oriented prejudice in understanding ontology. The greatest problem of Heine’s use of Heidegger as a

²⁰⁰ Heine, *Existential and Ontological*, 95.

referential framework in reading Dōgen maybe that his interpretation of Heidegger is itself dhātu-vāda in structure and therefore non-compatible with a Buddhism strictly founded on praṭītyasamutpāda. Heine equates Dōgen's impermanence Buddha-nature, and Being-time with a Heidegger inspired sense of ultimate Being which he calls "presence."²⁰¹ However, no matter how Heine may consider the problem of the "being of beings" as not that of a 'thing-in-itself' but an "insubstantial presence," the fundamental nature of how he understands Heidegger's metaphysics where the "being of beings" functions as an ontological locus remains.

Furthermore, Heine implies that an authentic mode of Buddhist life is possible only when one sheds mistaken ontologies and realizes the 'true' nature of impermanence Buddha-nature, Being-time or primordial time through practice. Heine considers the realization of non-self in meditational practice is necessary for an authentic ontological understanding of primordial time.²⁰² Realization of non-self and an authentic ontology jointly manifests the 'true nature' of primordial time as one's own authenticated being. This presupposition that Dōgen is suggesting the need to search for an 'authentic ontology' through practice is further evidenced when Heine mentions such statements as, "Both Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* and Dōgen in the *Shōbōgenzō* maintain that the problematics of existence and the limitations of metaphysics are fundamentally and directly related to basic misconceptions concerning time."²⁰³ And, "Heidegger and Dōgen agree that primordial time is the starting point of philosophical reflection, the ground of existential freedom, and the basis for the convergence between these dimensions."²⁰⁴ Furthermore, "Dōgen unhesitatingly stresses that existential awakening to non-self is necessarily coterminous with the overcoming of derivative ontologies based on an inauthentic self-fixation."²⁰⁵

Such an idea of searching for an 'authentic ontology' that is founded on an ultimate assurance, reason, ground, cause, or 'true nature' of existence, as central to a philosophical praxis, is

²⁰¹ Joan Stambaugh in her comparative study of Dōgen and Heidegger shares Heine's presumption that Dōgen is promoting the need to penetrate into a 'true nature' of existence and that this nature is some kind of "*presencing*." Stambaugh, 100.

²⁰² Heine, *Existential and Ontological*, 125.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 65.

incompatible with the central doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*. As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, the concern for Buddhism as founded on *pratītyasamutpāda* is not to reveal the ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ nature of reality, but to cultivate altruism by way of achieving a correct insight into the causal nature of one’s experience of the world and self through *prajñā*. When we consider the above, Heine’s Heideggerian or existentialist premise that a more ‘authentic’ mode of Buddhist life can only be realized through one’s attainment of an authentic experience of reality becomes a tremendous limitation when imported into Buddhism. Such an idea dislocates the centrality of practice founded on *pratītyasamutpāda*. It relegates altruistic compassion and *prajñā* to a secondary position, valuing practice as a method to attain the ‘true nature’ of reality and self, which will automatically ensure “enlightenment.” In addition, such a view that Dōgen’s ontology ‘authentically’ corresponds to the ‘true-way-reality-is,’ implies that ontology is by nature descriptive or ‘representational’ to reality and therefore continues to tie down Dōgen to correspondence theory. Consequently, Heine’s utility of Heidegger as a tool to elucidate Dōgen proves inapplicable for a pragmatist understanding of metaphysics as compatible to *pratītyasamutpāda*.

Despite the concern for authentic ontology, Heine also shows a tendency towards a view of practice as transcendental experientialism. For example, he mentions the primordial unity of ‘impermanence-Buddha-nature’ and ‘Being-time,’ “Represent two-fold perspectives of the selfsame, holistic, dynamically unfolding reality conceptually ungraspable yet experientially ever-manifest in each and every particularity.”²⁰⁶ If Heine means that the nature of primordial time is “conceptually ungraspable,” it cannot but jeopardize his claim that an authentic ontological understanding of the ‘true nature’ of existence is essential for an authentic mode of Buddhist life. What is conceptually ungraspable can never be authentically ontologically articulated; how can one even talk about some kind of ‘authentic’ ontology? If such was the case, this would also position Heine’s idea closer to *dhātu-vāda* by reiterating the Hongaku premise that the locus is beyond analytical thought.

Heine’s tendency to emphasize the transcendental experience of the ‘true-way-reality-is’ as

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 28. Again, Stambaugh coincides with Heine on the point that Dōgen’s meditative practice aims at attaining a transcendental experience or “spiritual intuition” that “involve a different way of perceiving both space and time; they perceive the world differently from the way it is usually perceived.” Such a view veers to *dhātu-vāda* by neglecting *prajñā* and altruism. Stambaugh, 106

central to Dōgen, together with his reliance on a Hongaku oriented logic of identity between individual existence and the ultimate locus may also be endangering *pratītyasamutpāda* on ethical terms. I previously pointed out how Heine’s ontological understanding of Dōgen’s time and Buddha-nature reiterates Hongaku-shisō. This was apparent in his interpretation of ‘impermanence Buddha-nature’/‘primordial time’ as an ultimate ontological locus and how he explained its identity with normative reality through the logic of constant-abiding. Consequently, Heine promotes the Hongaku idea of direct identity between locus and super-locus whereby individual existence is understood as it is in the present, the perfect totality of the locus. In Heine’s words, “Dōgen stresses that the totality of the present moment is not to be considered a metaphor for eternity, but the full discovery, realization and affirmation of being-time just as it is.”²⁰⁷ Such a philosophy of unconditional affirmation of immediate reality as ‘enlightened’ cannot necessitate practice and ethics based on *prajñā*. The necessity for analytical thought that discriminates what is good or bad becomes displaced in favor of attaining a transcendental experience that reveals primordial time. Indeed, *prajñā* is never a concern for Heine. According to him, Buddhism is about becoming an authentic being through uncovering of a fundamental ontology based on an authentic experience of the ‘true nature’ of reality.²⁰⁸ This leaves no recourse for Heine but to understand Buddhist compassion as something transcendent to thought and is endowed within the ‘true nature’ of reality. As a result, compassion becomes a non-personal “automated response” which spontaneously acts through us²⁰⁹ as opposed to being a quality that must be actively cultivated through analytical evaluation in every situation.

In summary, Heine’s interpretation of Dōgen’s Buddha-nature, time and their relation to practice was analyzed as entailing *dhātu-vāda*. His view on Buddha-nature is *dhātu-vāda* since he interpreted it as an ultimate ontological locus. His view on time is *dhātu-vāda*, since he interpreted Dōgen as claiming a ‘primordial time’ outside causality. And Heine’s view on Buddhist practice also went the same route, since Heine neglected *prajñā* and altruistic ethics by considering the transcendental experience of ‘primordial time’ as primary to practice. These views implied both his

²⁰⁷ Heine, *Existential and Ontological*, 129.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 9-11.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 150.

Heideggerian bias that an authentic mode of life necessitates the understanding of a fundamental ontology which describes the ‘true-way-reality-is,’ and his prejudice that Dōgen’s metaphysics must be describing reality realized through enlightenment. These presumptions kept his interpretation of Dōgen within the confines of correspondence theory. In this way, while Heine’s comparative reading of Dōgen is a bold attempt to read²¹⁰ Dōgen side by side with the ideas of a Western thinker, it cannot be considered as affirming Dōgen’s metaphysics while adhering to *pratītyasamutpāda*.

One thing we can learn from Heine is that to the extent Heidegger is understood as promoting the idea of an ultimate ontological ‘truth’ and that an authentic life is only possible by the attainment of such a ‘truth’ of Being, the Heideggerian approach inevitably veers towards *dhātu-vāda* and correspondence theory. Therefore, Heidegger may not be the best tool to interpret Dōgen beyond ‘representation’ and in line with *pratītyasamutpāda*.

The following section will analyze how Kasulis’s “phenomenological” approach to Dōgen, though distinguished from the purely representational approach to ontology taken by Abe and Heine, still repeats many of the shortcomings I had pointed out in both of their Dōgen interpretations.

3.5 T.P. Kasulis’s ‘Phenomenological’ Approach to Dōgen

Kasulis’s interpretation of Dōgen is presented within the context that he attempts to create a universal theory of Zen philosophy based on what he calls the “phenomenological” approach. This approach largely departs from the view found in Abe and Heine where Dōgen’s philosophy was understood as ‘corresponding’ to an ultimate ontological locus. The “phenomenological” understanding sees Zen philosophy as not involved in explaining the world but with how the mind interacts with reality. Consequently, Kasulis refuses to read Dōgen’s philosophy as ontology but as a phenomenological enterprise. According to Kasulis, anything that Dōgen says which may sound like

²¹⁰ Whether this is intended or not is a different story. Heine does not claim to be making a “new” philosophy by combining Dōgen and Heidegger, but in effect his comparison ends up doing so largely due to his latent Heidegger influences. Hence his Dōgen interpretation is neither purely Dōgen nor Heidegger, but an integration of the two. Though this may have been unintended on Heine’s side, such an attempt to read disparate ontologies into each other should be respected as a creative move. Although from the perspective of the current study, his particular choice of Heideggerian philosophical tools, and his tendency towards *Hongaku-shisō* proved unacceptable.

ontology is in fact a description of the way we experience reality through consciousness.²¹¹

However, my view is that Kasulis's approach may not successfully free Dōgen from correspondence theory and dhātu-vāda due to two presumptions that he takes for granted. That is his basic acceptance of Zen/Hongaku philosophy in interpreting Dōgen and his presumption that there is a 'true' mode of consciousness behind our normative state of mind. In the course of analyzing if this is the case I will answer the following questions. How does Kasulis interpret Dōgen's Buddha-nature and time through his "phenomenological" approach? Does Kasulis successfully stay away from dhātu-vāda by avoiding ontology altogether? Does his interpretation successfully integrate Dōgen's views on Buddha-nature and time with practice based in praṭīyasamutpāda? What can be learned from his approach that may be of use for our interpretation of Dōgen?

3.5.1 Buddha-Nature as "Pre-Reflexive Consciousness"

Kasulis interprets Dōgen's concept of the unity of practice and enlightenment with a particular predisposition concerning the nature of consciousness. This is to presume there exists a state of pre-reflexive consciousness that is prior to any sense of discriminative thought or the reflexive effort to stop thought. Kasulis equates this primordial state of the mind with Dōgen's ideas of Buddha-nature, the Zen 'True Self' and enlightenment. This means that Kasulis already veers towards dhātu-vāda by uncritically accepting the Zen premise for the existence of a 'True Self.' In order to elaborate the above, Kasulis concurs with Abe's use of dialectics to explain how the concept of 'impermanence-Buddha-nature' at once transcends, makes possible, and includes within it both 'with Buddha-nature' and 'without Buddha-nature.' Applying the same logic allows Kasulis to conceive pre-reflexive consciousness (Dōgen's 'without-thinking') as preceding, superseding and making possible both thought and non-thought without hindering their individual functions.²¹²

Meditational practice is thus the method by which one 'returns' to this pre-reflexive state

²¹¹ T.P. Kasulis, *Zen Action Zen Person*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1981), 69.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 73-74, 81-82. Also 75-76 concerning the functional primacy of without-thinking over all other modes of thinking.

while not negating the functions of thinking and non-thinking, but simply observing them as what is happening. Thereby, practice and enlightenment are one “as long as one maintains a pure state of without-thinking, one is a Buddha.”²¹³ Dōgen’s equating of impermanence with Buddha-nature is understood as the way we experience reality as a continuous flux from the side of pre-reflexive consciousness without referring them to discriminating concepts, since in this state of ‘without-thinking’ “the ceaseless unfolding of experience is the only reality.”²¹⁴

Here Kasulis implies that replacing an ontological concern for explaining reality with the concern for describing experience by pre-reflexive consciousness is enough to counter accusations for dhātu-vāda.²¹⁵ Placing religious practice as the foundations from which Dōgen is interpreted will deter readings from having to directly concern ontological and metaphysical problems. In addition, by conceiving discussions on reality as strictly a problem of how it is experienced as opposed to how they exist, Kasulis’s “phenomenology” at first sight seems as if it returns to the basic Buddhist phenomenology of understanding the experience of reality as a causal composite of the skandhas. However, this is not the case, as I will explain below.

Kasulis’s “phenomenology” is not Buddhist, but Western in scope and overlooks the fact that it foundationally function with dhātu-vādic ontological and epistemological presumptions. These presumptions involve the view that there can somehow be an “objective” consciousness that can observe the nature of our experiences without itself having to be entangled within the relation of our experience and our observing consciousness. There is irony in claiming a way of experiencing reality that is unmediated by various causal factors that conditions the mind such as the contexts in which we exist and the various conceptualization we either latently or consciously accept in making sense of ourselves and the world. The irony lies in the ignorance towards its own status as a concept. A concept created out of a particular framework of experiencing and making sense out of the concept of consciousness. Rather than adhering to the Buddhist idea that any experience of a ‘self’ that observes reality is itself a product of the causal process of the skandhas, Kasulis’s phenomenological method is

²¹³ Kasulis, 84.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 82.

problematic in that it somehow places consciousness outside of experience. This ignores the problem that we cannot but understand and conceptualize consciousness without our experiencing of it, that consciousness is itself conceived through our experiencing of the phenomena of consciousness. From the perspective of the twelve *nidānas*/five *skandhas*, the consciousness we come to feel as ‘ourselves’ and through which we experience reality is itself a product of the causal connection of the *skandhas*. Instead, Kasulis supports the existence of a form of consciousness that is itself transcendent to causality, and therefore transgress *prāṭhyasamutpāda*. Such a view is in agreement to Kasulis’s Zen presumption that there exists a ‘True Self’ behind normative consciousness.

In other words, Kasulis’s “phenomenological” approach functions by the epistemological presupposition of a primary state of consciousness (as pre-reflexive consciousness) that is unmediated by conditions. This pre-reflexive consciousness then functions as a transcendental ground for all subsequent states of consciousness. Kasulis equates this pre-reflexive consciousness with Dōgen’s concept of ‘without-thinking.’ This however does not overcome the fact that this primary state of ‘without-thinking’ functions as a locus to the arising of discriminative thought (the super-locus). Therefore, Kasulis’s system of Dōgen interpretation cannot escape *dhātu-vāda* as it fundamentally relies on the absolutizing of a transcendent notion of consciousness to function as an epistemological ground.

Consequently, the “phenomenological” stance is incapable of escaping a correspondence theoretical framework. This is because Kasulis necessitates a ‘transcendent absolute’ not in the form of a ‘thing,’ or ‘truth’ but in the form of an ‘objective’ consciousness which somehow lies outside experience. According to such a perspective, Dōgen’s philosophy must be understood as ‘correspondent’ to the ‘true’ state of consciousness he has experienced. Strangely, Kasulis also defeats his own purpose for avoiding ontology when he introduces an ontological element in his claim that the unmediated “pure consciousness” experiences reality as the “pure presence of things as they are.”²¹⁶ Furthermore, Kasulis mentions that ‘without-thinking’ through a “proper sitting authenticates the enlightenment already there.”²¹⁷ Such statements evidences how Kasulis’s view on Dōgen does

²¹⁶ Kasulis, 73.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 78.

not oppose the prevalent Hongaku-shisō based ‘universal Buddha-nature’ reading where Buddha-nature is equated with the ‘universal enlightenment’ of the whole of existence that is revealed while meditation is maintained. This means that Kasulis’s interpretation latently accepts an ontological ground to reality.

In an effort to escape accusations for dhātu-vāda, Kasulis borrows from Heidegger to describe the ultimate way things exist ‘as they are’ as a “presence”²¹⁸ rather than an ontological thing-in-itself:


Phrases like *being such*, *the presence of things as they are*, and *the what-is-in-front-of-me* are not meant to be illuminating statements about the nature of the universe. But they do indicate the pre-reflective experience at the basis of consciousness. [...] It is not an objective description so much as a pointer showing us the way to authenticating what we are.²¹⁹

Despite the above explanation, the use of the concept of ‘presence’ does not allow Kasulis’s framework to escape dhātu-vāda. Because of Kasulis’s dhātu-vādic presumption about a ‘true experience’ of reality that enables normal experience. Kasulis’s claim transposes this ‘true nature’ from a ‘truth’ of existence to a ‘true nature’ of consciousness. Regardless, the locus to super-locus design of thought stays intact (see diagram 3).

²¹⁸ Kasulis, 83-86.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 86.

Diagram 3:
Dhātu-vādic Structure of Kasulis's Phenomenological Reading of Dōgen



3.5.2 Temporality Experienced from “Pre-Reflexive Consciousness”

Kasulis's interpretation of Dōgen's view on time follows the same logic of reducing Dōgen's concept to a 'pre-reflexive consciousness.' Much like how Kasulis interpreted 'impermanence Buddha-nature' as the nature of reality experienced by an enlightened being, the concept of Uji or "Being-time" is also interpreted as denoting how the enlightened person experience time through pre-reflexive consciousness as "neither time nor being per se; we experience temporal existence."²²⁰ In other words, the inseparability of being and time expresses the nature of how reality from the side of pre-reflexive consciousness is experienced as a non-categorized temporal flux. Kasulis also describes

²²⁰ Kasulis, 79.

this as follows: “When we take the experience of change as it is and make no projections beyond what is directly given, there is simply the unending experience of flux.”²²¹

Kasulis interprets Dōgen’s seemingly paradoxical notion of isolated instants and the continuity between those instants as follows. The isolated instant simply denotes the way a practitioner experiences reality as a “right now” through ‘without-thinking’ since conceptual concerns for past and future do not arise.²²² This does not mean past and future do not exist, but only that the practitioner is freed “from considerations of past and present,” and experiences reality within a “total involvement in the nowness of temporal events.”²²³ Dōgen’s singular moments are yet another way reality is experienced from a different state of consciousness where the perceiver understands reality as a “flow.”²²⁴ Kasulis’s point is that these concepts do not represent the objective ‘true-way-time-is,’ but how they are experienced in accordance to different states of consciousness. Consequently, the different ways temporality is experienced can simultaneously exist without obstructing each other since they are not the ‘true-way-reality-is’ but are varied descriptions of the way the mind experiences it. Ultimately the nature of ‘without-thinking’ does not negate the continuity of past, present, and future since the state of ‘without-thinking’ does not cause the rise of categories, and therefore the way reality is experienced in terms of such categories is neither affirmed or denied.²²⁵ Kasulis’s interpretation of ‘without-thinking’ therefore reiterates Abe’s dialectics within his “phenomenological” context. ‘Without-thinking’ becomes the all-inclusive mode of consciousness which embraces both the experience of the singular instant and time as “flowing” continuity without hindering their distinctive nature. In spite of Kasulis’s concern for spiritual practice, his interpretation of Dōgen’s theory of time is dhātu-vāda as I will show below.

By locating without-thinking prior to either the creation of categories of time or the reflexive negation of it, Kasulis admits that “it is in this sense that zazen is outside temporal categories.”²²⁶ What is experienced by pre-reflexive consciousness, whether it be the nature of reality or time, must

²²¹ Kasulis, 81.

²²² *Ibid.*, 80.

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ *Ibid.*

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 79.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

be transcendent to analytical thinking and normative reality.²²⁷ In other words, pre-reflexive consciousness makes lived time as impermanence insignificant. While he also adds that this “does not reject temporality itself,”²²⁸ such a statement is mere formality. The reason is, placing ‘without-thinking’ as the aspired state of consciousness in meditation, displaces the practitioner’s need to observe the nature of impermanence in relation to his/her suffering. Therefore, the “phenomenological” approach necessarily ends up taking the transcendental experientialist understanding of Buddhist meditation to its logical extreme. Attaining the ‘true’ experience of time as Being-time necessitates the transcendental experience of reality through pre-reflexive consciousness as the goal of Buddhist practice.

Positioning the “enlightened” mind and the nature of reality he/she experiences as beyond the normative leads to a lack of concern for the critical situation that we are living an irreversible time in which we ultimately die. Consequently, the necessity for the foundational affirmation of *praṭīyasamutpāda* in practice, as unfolded in irreversible impermanence, loses its significance. When the ‘true nature’ of experiencing reality becomes located beyond discriminative thought and lived time, there can no longer be any edge to the necessity of observing impermanence regardless if ‘pre-reflexive consciousness’ does not reject the notion.

Akin to what we observed in Heine, the above transcendentalism also leads to an ethical fallacy. The idea that altruistic compassion needs to be cultivated through one’s use of *prañā* in gaining correct insight of the nature of no-abiding-self becomes completely displaced. Leaving ethics only to the unverifiable authority of a transcendently experienced automated “compassion” that cannot be critically evaluated.²²⁹ Hence, Kasulis’s application of pre-reflexive consciousness to Dōgen’s notion of time deny *praṭīyasamutpāda* for it neglects impermanence, and the necessity for altruism and *prañā* in practice.

²²⁷ Not surprisingly, Kasulis interprets *prañā* as “intuitive wisdom” to have it concur with his view that enlightened experience of reality is beyond discriminative thought. Thereby he ignores the definition of *prañā* as analytical thinking. See Kasulis, 97.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁹ Much like Heine, Kasulis supports the idea that authentic Buddhist ethics is based on the automatic response made possible by the enlightened mind who has transcended analytical thought. See 93-99. The danger of such a view has already been pointed out earlier by Critical Buddhism that it leaves action non-subject to critical evaluation, but solely reliant on the unverifiable authority of transcendental religious experiences. Refer to chapter 2 section 2.2.1.3.

One point we can learn from Kasulis's interpretation of Dōgen is his introduction of a major turn in perspective from Abe and Heine in terms of how to approach the relation between Dōgen's philosophy and his priority for practice. Kasulis's view that Dōgen's ontological ideas are utilities for spiritual practice rather than "ontology" descriptive of reality per se, may be beneficial for reading Dōgen beyond a correspondence theoretical framework. This view, if understood from a pragmatist perspective that ontology or epistemology do not need to 'correspond' to a 'truth,' but are significant to the extent they fulfill practical functions, may help free Dōgen's metaphysics from correspondence theory. As I will try to show in the next chapter, Deleuze's pragmatism may help provide a framework to take such a practice-centred understanding of Dōgen's metaphysics to its logical extreme.

However, Kasulis did not take the possibility of this practice-centred approach to its full as he prematurely dismissed ontology/metaphysics, without critical analysis of his own latent choice of a dhātu-vādic onto-epistemology as the foundation for his "phenomenology." Kasulis harboured a fear towards ontology in a manner similar to the Critical Buddhists in that he considers ontology as *by nature* 'representational' and therefore entailing an attachment to 'truth.' Consequently, Kasulis refrains from affiliating Dōgen with ontology altogether and is not able to present a way to understand ontology/metaphysics as itself non-representational and purely practical. Instead, Kasulis forced Dōgen's ontology into his dhātu-vādic "phenomenology." Therefore, Kasulis stays short of constructing an interpretive framework that can reconcile metaphysics with practice without recourse to dhātu-vāda. Instead of following the Buddhist phenomenology of the skandhas based in prañīyasamutpāda, Kasulis's interpretation of how reality is experienced by Dōgen proved the foundation of his "phenomenology" to be dhātu-vāda.

In summary, Kasulis's "phenomenological" approach inevitably lead him to dhātu-vāda since he considered a 'pre-reflexive consciousness' to exist beyond causality and praññā. Equating the Zen theory of a 'True Self' to this 'pre-reflexive consciousness' meant that in effect this consciousness functions as an 'individual-locus' or 'true state' of consciousness superior to all other forms of consciousness. Despite Kasulis's seeming avoidance of ontology, he also accepted the existence of an

ontological locus when he claimed the reality experienced by the enlightened is the “pure presence of things as they are.” Kasulis jeopardizes his own “phenomenological” approach by introducing a fundamental ontology of “presence” as the ‘true-way-reality-is.’ Together with his presumption of a ‘pre-reflexive consciousness’/‘True Self,’ this acceptance of an ultimate ontological locus of “presence,” reverted his interpretation of Dōgen to Zen/Hongaku-shisō.

Kasulis’s “phenomenological” approach also steered Dōgen’s ideas on time towards dhātu-vāda, since Being-time was interpreted as the ‘true-way-time-is-experienced’ transcendent to normative consciousness and lived impermanence. This presumption that there is a ‘true’ experience of consciousness and reality, whether it be Being-time or “presence,” also had consequences in Kasulis’s view of Dōgen’s practice. Kasulis’s idea of Dōgen’s practice was centred on the attaining of the ‘true’ state of consciousness which revealed the ‘true’ transcendental experience of reality. Therefore, Kasulis neglected praṭītyasamutpāda on practical and ethical terms since his idea of Buddhist practice did not respect the primacy of cultivating altruism through praññā.

As we can infer from the above, Kasulis reiterated the prejudice also shared by Abe and Heine, in considering Dōgen’s practice as centred on the attainment of some grounding ‘truth.’ Albeit for Kasulis this was not only an ontological ‘truth,’ but also an epistemological ‘true’ state of consciousness. Consequently, Kasulis also took for granted that Dōgen’s ontology ‘corresponded’ to the way reality is experienced through the ‘true’ state of consciousness attained by the enlightened. This means that Kasulis’s approach to Dōgen, despite his prioritizing of its practical significance, could not overcome correspondence theory.

3.6 Robert Glass’s “Buddha-Essence” Reading of Dōgen

Robert Glass’s interpretation of Dōgen tries to critically depart from the kind of ontology found in Abe and Heine in a different manner from Kasulis’s “phenomenological” approach. Glass’s views on Dōgen is presented within the context of his aim to construct what he calls a “third” view on Buddhist ‘emptiness’ (Skt. *sūnyatā*) that can give the idea of Buddha-nature a positive role in

Buddhist practice by overcoming two versions of what he sees as a flawed interpretation of ‘emptiness.’ The first is the reading of emptiness which interprets it as “presence.” The second is emptiness interpreted as a tool for negation to negate all ontological grounds into an infinite deferral.

Glass’s use of Deleuze is limited to the concept of ‘desire,’ which he does not utilize in direct reference to Dōgen, but in the process of presenting what he considers authentic Buddhist practice based on his “third” view of emptiness. This is a view of meditation as a practice subtracting negative desires, rather than as a method to stop or transcend thinking. We will see in the following analysis if Glass’s interpretation successfully affirms Dōgen’s metaphysics without neglecting *pratītyasamutpāda* or like Abe, Heine and Kasulis results in *dhātu-vāda*. In addition, I will analyze if Glass’s use of Deleuze is concurrent with *pratītyasamutpāda* and if it helps construct a view of Buddhism freed from correspondence theory.

The current section will try to answer the following questions. How does Glass try to solve what he finds to be problematic in Abe and the Critical Buddhist understanding of emptiness / Buddha-nature? Is it successful? How does Glass interpret Dōgen’s view on Buddha-nature? Does it concur with *pratītyasamutpāda* or not? How does Glass utilize Deleuze in his reading of Buddhism? Does it allow Dōgen to be freed from ‘representation’? Does Glass’s interpretation of Dōgen and his use of Deleuze imply the prejudice that ontology is ‘representational’? What can be learned from Glass’s interpretation of Dōgen and his use of Deleuze?

3.6.1 The Two "Flawed" Views on Emptiness and Buddha-Nature

According to Glass the “presence” type of understanding ‘emptiness’²³⁰ or *sūnyatā* defines it as a conceptual tool that “empties” each existence of its ‘self-being’ by virtue of their inclusivity within the co-dependence of all existence. This leads to a positive ontologization of

²³⁰ Though Glass uses the term emptiness, he is referring to Abe’s use of ‘no-thingness.’ While the term emptiness and nothingness often tend to be utilized interchangeably in Western Buddhist scholarship. Glass doesn’t seem to be so concerned about the fact that these terms are actually distinct, the former is the Japanese *Ku* 空 and the later *Mu* 無, both can be read as having very different connotations. The former a tool to designate how phenomena is empty of self-nature, and the later an ontological nothing, an empty dimension or realm. Glass does not distinguish between the terms much in the same way Kyoto school philosophers like Abe also seem to conflate the two.

prafītyasamutpāda akin to what I previously explained as the Tendai concept of Jiji-muge-hokkai. ‘Emptiness’ becomes the term which describes the totality of co-dependent relations amongst all existence constituting a primordially ‘pure’ metaphysical ‘realm’ or ‘space’ that is inclusive of normative existence. This type of emptiness ultimately affirms the entirety of existence as “presence” connected through a dialectical inclusion of both is/is not by the mediation of emptiness.²³¹

Glass considers Abe, Kasulis and the Heidegger inspired interpretations of Dōgen to be more or less in line with the above mentioned “presence” type of interpretation of prafītyasamutpāda and emptiness.²³² The common problem Glass finds in this type of reading is that ‘emptiness’ as the dialectical affirmation of both is/is not through the superseding inclusivity of ‘no-thingness’ ends up unconditionally affirming everything and therefore undermines ethics by disregarding the need to distinguish between good and bad.²³³ Such an all-embracing affirmation does not sit in well with Glass’s view of Buddhist practice. Glass considers Buddhist practice to be based on the idea of transforming desire from one form to another. He sees meditation as the process through which negative, or unnecessary desires are subtracted in order to leave necessary virtuous desires such as the aspiration for enlightenment, and finally to uncover the individual’s primordial Buddha-nature.²³⁴ Therefore, the “presence” type of ‘emptiness’ which ends up unconditionally affirming everything cannot support the idea of Buddhist practice as a choosing and subtracting amongst favorable and unfavorable desires.

Glass’s above critique of the “presence” type of theory of ‘emptiness’ is a case in point which parallels what we examined as the Critical Buddhist’s critique of Hongaku-shisō. Abe’s unconditional affirmation of all existence is identical to the Hongaku logic of constant-abiding in which ‘all phenomena equals the Absolute’ without transformation. The idea of constant-abiding affirmed all existence as originally ‘pure’ due to its participation in the primordially “enlightened” totality of Buddha-nature, Tathātā or emptiness. In both Abe and the original Hongaku doctrine, ‘emptiness’ as the ultimate ontological ground includes all dichotomies and therefore nullifies the need for their

²³¹ Glass, 47-48.

²³² Ibid., 30.

²³³ Ibid., 47-48, 63.

²³⁴ Ibid., 63-67.

distinction, thereby neglecting the need to discriminate what is good and bad.

Glass does not problematize Hongaku-shisō per se, and he does not seem to realize that these features he considers the “presence” version of emptiness are philologically rooted in Hongaku doctrine. As I have analyzed to this point, the recurrence of the logic of constant-abiding in Abe, Heine and Kasulis merely means that these scholars reiterate Hongaku-shisō. I will later analyze how Glass’s neglect for analyzing Hongaku-shisō as related with what he saw as the problem of the “presence” reading of emptiness, may be influencing his interpretation of Dōgen’s Buddha-nature to veer towards dhātu-vāda. For now we shall return to Glass’s second pole of the dichotomy of views on emptiness.

What Glass considers the second interpretation of emptiness utilizes sūnyatā as a tool to negate all ontological grounds into an infinite deferral. Glass considers this type of emptiness to be most strongly present in the negative theology of Mark C. Taylor and the various Derrida influenced readings of Buddhist emptiness.²³⁵ Glass also considers the Critical Buddhists as embracing the second type of understanding.²³⁶ I consider this an inaccurate assessment on the side of Glass, the reason of which I will offer later. Glass’s overarching critique of the above views of emptiness is that they both cannot affirm a sense of “ground” for Buddhist practice in the form of a positive Buddha-nature, let alone to support a form of meditational practice that is based on such an affirmation of Buddha-nature as being a positive ontological reality.²³⁷ Glass’s view is that when ‘emptiness’ is understood as the infinite negation of svabhāva,²³⁸ this leads to a “negative” understanding of praṭīyasamutpāda whereby the co-dependence of existence results in an infinite “absence” of Being. Glass’s concern is that such a “negative” view on emptiness and praṭīyasamutpāda allows no sense of ground to be created for practice.

The above view may be more or less appropriate to the Derrida influenced deconstructivist approach to Buddhism Glass finds in Taylor. However, I will argue in the next section that Glass’s

²³⁵ Glass, 48-51. Glass seems to have in mind such Derrida-Buddhism studies as: Robert Magliola, *Derrida on the Mend*, (West Lafayette: Purdue University, 1984).

David Loy, “Indra’s Postmodern Net”, *Philosophy East and West* 43.3 (1993).

²³⁶ Glass, 64.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Svabhāva means ‘self-being,’ ‘individual-essence,’ or ‘to exist independently of causality.’

premature inclusion²³⁹ of the Critical Buddhists in this camp is not only shortsighted, but may be revealing of the fundamental flaw in his understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Together with an analysis of Glass’s attempted solution to the above problems he finds in both the “presence” and “negational” view on emptiness, a closer look at what may be his limited view on *pratītyasamutpāda* may clarify if Glass is conditioned by *dhātu-vāda* or not.

3.6.2 Glass’s ‘Essentialist’ Buddha-nature and its Relation to *Pratītyasamutpāda*

Glass’s solution to the lack of ethics in Abe’s interpretation of Dōgen, as well as the lack of practical grounds in the negational reading of emptiness, is to read Dōgen from what he calls the “subtraction/essence” view of emptiness whose inspiration comes from *Tathāgatagarbha*.²⁴⁰ In doing so Glass seems to be unaware of Matsumoto’s critique of *Tathāgatagarbha* as the nascent theory which eventually developed into *Hongaku-shisō*.²⁴¹ Glass’s wholehearted acceptance of *Tathāgatagarbha* as the solution to the problems of emptiness is ironic. As I previously pointed out, Glass does not identify the roots of the problem of what he called the “presence” version of emptiness as really the problem of ideas reiterated from *Hongaku-shisō*. In order to present a solution to the problem, he in fact delves into the very roots of the development of *Hongaku* doctrine rather than avoiding it. This choice may lead to Glass’s interpretation of Dōgen to inevitably veer towards *dhātu-vāda* as we shall see in the following analysis.

From Glass’s “subtraction/essence” view, emptiness is not understood negatively as the emptiness of intrinsic nature of phenomena, or positively as an all-inclusive whole. Rather, Buddha-nature is positively existent as a universal primordial ‘essence.’ Glass argues that Dōgen does not interpret Buddha-nature from the perspective of co-dependent arising. Since Dōgen does not say Buddha-nature or *Tathātā* is a collection of many individual existences that are causally inter-

²³⁹ While Glass does name the Critical Buddhists, he does not offer any kind of analysis of their ideas to prove his point.

²⁴⁰ Glass, 64-67. See chapter 2 footnote 135 for a brief explanation on *Tathāgatagarbha* thought.

²⁴¹ Refer to chapter 2 section 2.3.1 for Matsumoto’s linking of *Tathāgatagarbha* with *Hongaku-shisō*. Also refer to chapter 2 section 2.2.2.2 footnote 99.

penetrating, but is One. To support his claim, Glass largely resorts to phrases in the “Ikka-no-myōju” fascicle of the *Shōbōgenzō*:

The whole universe in ten directions is one bright pearl.²⁴² [...] This bright pearl’s possession of reality and lack of beginning are limitless, and the whole universe in ten directions is one bright pearl. Without being discussed as two pearls or three pearls, the whole body is one right Dharma-eye, the whole body is real substance, the whole body is one phrase, the whole body is brightness, and the whole body is the whole body itself.²⁴³

According to Glass, the pearl is a metaphor for Buddha-nature/Tathāta. He emphasizes that Dōgen never says the whole universe is equal to many pearls co-dependently existing, but simply says that it is *one* substantive bright pearl.²⁴⁴ Buddha-nature is One universal ‘essence’ that is shared amongst all individuals. Yet, the fact it is shared does not indicate the unconditional inclusion of the individual in the One, but a unilateral relationship of the superior primordially ‘pure’ One whose ‘purity’ shared by individuals must be revealed through practice.²⁴⁵ The meditational practice which gets rid of unnecessary desires finally reveals this primordial ‘essence’ as one’s true ‘pure’ nature. Such a view of Buddha-nature as primary to practice is indicative of Glass’s stance that he considers praṭīyasamutpāda not as a primary teaching in Buddhism, but secondary to Buddha-nature as ontological essence.²⁴⁶ This view of Buddha-nature as a universal ‘essence’ is in violation of praṭīyasamutpāda and no-abiding-self, for it is tantamount to claiming that such an ‘essence’ exists independently of causality.²⁴⁷ This means that despite Glass’s critique of Abe, he also reiterates Hongaku-shisō, albeit in its ‘inherent Buddha-nature’ form and with an additional concern for practice which subtracts negative desires. Glass’s choice of Tathāgatagarbha as a tool to go beyond the problem of emptiness as “presence” and negation in fact does nothing but to regress him back to Hongaku-shisō.

I consider Glass’s above tendency towards dhātu-vāda is also conditioned by his shortsighted view on praṭīyasamutpāda. Glass is oblivious to the foundational practical significance of

²⁴² *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, “Ikka-no-myōju,” 50.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 52.

²⁴⁴ Glass, 76.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 76-78

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 62-63.

²⁴⁷ As Glass himself admits, “enlightenment is somehow ‘uninvolved’ with the conditioned realm.” Glass, 77.

praṭītyasamutpāda in its most basic form as the twelve nidānas and how it ensues the mainline teachings of impermanence, altruism and no-abiding-self.²⁴⁸ Here, Glass is in harsh contrast to the stance of the current study as well as that of the Critical Buddhists who consider praṭītyasamutpāda as ethically and practically fundamental to Buddhism. Consequently, Glass misreads the Critical Buddhist position on praṭītyasamutpāda and emptiness as confined within what he defined as the negative or deconstructionist views on emptiness which lack a ground for practice. According to Hakamaya, sūnyatā (emptiness) defeats its own purpose if interpreted as an ultimate metaphysical ‘Truth’ or mediator which ties all existence into the whole of Tathātā, for it will end up functioning as a ‘locus.’ Emptiness is only an ontological tool to negate all sense of a ‘locus’ to reality, and cannot be endorsed as itself some form of absolute reality.²⁴⁹ Matsumoto adds that even emptiness as a tool to negate ontological and epistemological ‘loci’ must be criticized if it ends up negating praṭītyasamutpāda / twelve nidānas. In other words, Matsumoto claims that emptiness as a negating tool to critique dhātu-vāda, functions efficiently only when praṭītyasamutpāda is the very ground upon which it is based.²⁵⁰

Glass’s view that praṭītyasamutpāda understood as a negative emptiness endangers a ground for practice is mistaken since he overlooks the fact that praṭītyasamutpāda as the twelve nidānas/no-abiding-self/impermanence *is* the very grounds for Buddhist practice.²⁵¹ Buddha-nature cannot replace

²⁴⁸ Refer to the section on praṭītyasamutpāda in chapter 2 to see how the ideas of no-abiding-self and impermanence are tightly woven into praṭītyasamutpāda.

²⁴⁹ Hakamaya, *Hihan-Bukkyo*, 335-339. Also *Bukkyo Nyumon*, 205-206.

²⁵⁰ Matsumoto, *Engi to Ku*, 355-359. Matsumoto’s point is in contrast to the popular misconception found largely in scholarly readings of Nagarjuna which claim that Nagarjuna’s emptiness negates all ontological positions and puts forth no views of its own, or that Nagarjuna’s thesis is emptiness itself. It is an established view for example in Tibetan Buddhism which takes praṭītyasamutpāda as fundamental to its practice, that ‘emptiness’ is a tool to reinforce praṭītyasamutpāda/causality and puts forth no views of its own for its ground *is* praṭītyasamutpāda itself. This view was argued for and cemented by the Tibetan master of the Madhyamaka path, Tsongkhapa (1357 - 1419) in his interpretation of Nagarjuna.

See: Thupten Jinpa, *Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy: Tsongkhapa’s Quest for the Middle Way*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 28-29.

Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness: A Tibetan Buddhist Interpretation of Madhyamaka Philosophy*, (Somerville: Wisdom, 2003), 150.

Ewing Chinn also argues for the view that praṭītyasamutpāda is the grounds on which Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka system functions to reject ontologically realist views. Ewing Chinn, “Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Doctrine of Praṭītyasamutpāda,” *Philosophy East and West* 51.1 (2001), 54-72.

²⁵¹ Glass is also shortsighted in his view that emptiness as negation destroys the ground for ethics. As Thupten Jinpa points out in reference to Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Nagarjuna, ‘emptiness’ as a negational tool cannot undermine ethics for it is a purely practical tool to cause change upon oneself through the application of praṭītyasamutpāda in life. Negation based on ‘emptiness’ must be used in moderation in accordance to the practical necessities of praṭītyasamutpāda and cannot be used for purely theoretical speculation that may refute conventional reality. ‘Emptiness’ is utilized on the grounds of ethics founded on praṭītyasamutpāda. (Thupten Jinpa, 31.) In this

this ground if we are to understand that *pratītyasamutpāda* is essential for an ethically viable practice of Buddhism. To the extent that Dōgen himself uses the concept of Buddha-nature, we can agree to Glass that the idea should be affirmed as significant for practice. Yet, if we are to interpret Dōgen's use of the term in adherence to *pratītyasamutpāda*, we cannot follow Glass's example. Buddha-nature should not be understood as a 'locus,' but a practical tool which functions within the confines of *pratītyasamutpāda*. What kind of form such a view on Buddha-nature may take will be explored in chapter five, for now I shall conclude the section with a summary on how Glass veered to *dhātu-vāda*.

By considering Buddha-nature a positive ontological 'essence' that is more important in practice than *pratītyasamutpāda*, Glass's view of Buddhism proved to be purely contrary to *pratītyasamutpāda*. Consequently, rather than fulfilling his aspiration of presenting a "new" way of reading Dōgen's Buddha-nature, his reading regresses to *dhātu-vāda*. Glass's claim about one substantive Buddha-nature, which is shared as essence amongst all individual beings, results in something resembling pure Brahmanism. Glass merely adds a penchant for meditational practice to it, which focuses on subtracting desires as opposed to reiterating the Zen fixation on transcending discriminative thought. In this sense we can see that Glass followed in the Zen/Hongaku premise of affirming the positive ontological existence of an 'individual essence' whether it be called Buddha-nature, emptiness or the 'True Self.' As a result, he could not present an adequate counter argument to Abe's ethically flawed all-affirmative 'no-thingness,' since he neglected the entirety of *pratītyasamutpāda*, no-abiding-self, *prajñā* and altruism.

To the extent Glass accepts a primordially existent 'individual-essence' that must be revealed through practice, and that he considers Dōgen's statements to be proof of this 'essence,' his interpretation of Dōgen also took for granted that it 'describes' a corresponding reality. Consequently, much like Abe, Heine ad Kasulis, Glass's interpretation confined Dōgen to correspondence theory. Glass reiterated the prejudice that Buddhist practice is centred on the attainment of some primordial 'Truth' and that Dōgen's ontology describes the attainment of such a 'Truth.' This prejudice that ontology is 'representational,' conditions Glass's view on Dōgen to be fundamentally *dhātu-vāda* for

 sense, Glass's observance that certain negationist theories of emptiness lack ethical ground maybe attributable to the fact that such theories also neglect the grounds of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

it presupposes an ontological or epistemological ‘ground’ to be revealed and represented. In addition, understanding the revealing of such a ‘ground’ to be the goal of Buddhist practice neglects practice as the realization of altruism by use of *prajñā* to achieve correct insight into no-abiding-self through *praṭītyasamutpāda*.

I will argue in the next section that Glass’s use of Deleuze may be equally unsatisfactory from the perspective of *praṭītyasamutpāda*. Glass simply reduces Deleuze’s philosophy to his own ‘essentialist’ ontology rather than using it within the context of Deleuze’s endeavor to leave behind correspondence by pragmatism.

3.6.3 Glass’s Use of Deleuze in Connection to Buddhism

Glass utilizes Deleuze’s idea on desire within the context of articulating his view of Buddhist meditation as a method to choose between necessary and unnecessary desires. Deleuze defines two qualities of desire: plateau and climax. The former designates the maintenance of habituated desire, a repetition of the same, the maintenance of a plateau state of being. The later designates flight from the plateau state, desire for constant change, movement or becoming. Glass identifies the former with unnecessary or unfavorable desires that needs to be subtracted in meditation and the later with necessary desires that needs to be strengthened.²⁵² Glass’s use of Deleuze in connection with a theory of Buddhist practice may be praiseworthy for being a bold attempt at a creative integration of philosophies. However, Glass’s use of Deleuze may be fundamentally flawed, as I will clarify below.

The problem in Glass’s use of Deleuze is that he forces Deleuze’s ideas into his old-school ‘essentialism’ and consequently neglects Deleuze’s philosophical context. As I will analyze in the next chapter, Deleuze’s philosophical system attempts to do philosophy outside the tradition of correspondence by creating a particular pragmatism developed out of empiricism. The objective is the ethical and practical search for what we are capable of, or how one should live, beyond representation and pre-determined designs. Any idea that there is a pre-determined, or primordial ‘truth’ or ‘being’

²⁵² Glass, 85-89.

that is waiting to be revealed or identified, as in the case of Glass's view on Buddha-nature, is incompatible with Deleuzian thought. In other words Deleuze's philosophy is antithetical to Glass's theory of 'essence.' Glass simply fails to interpret Deleuze within the wider context of how and for what purpose his philosophy functions.²⁵³ As a result, Glass's use of Deleuze not only reduces Deleuze to 'essentialism,' inasmuch as it does not add anything new to his articulation of desire, but it also continues to confine Dōgen's ideas to dhātu-vāda and correspondence theory. If we are to utilize Deleuze to read Dōgen's metaphysics beyond correspondence theory and dhātu-vāda, we cannot follow Glass's example.

How can Deleuze be utilized in ways other than Glass? Can Deleuze help free metaphysics from correspondence theory? How can Deleuze's philosophy be understood as compatible with praṭīyasamutpāda? Can Deleuze help interpret Dōgen's metaphysics in congruence with praṭīyasamutpāda and beyond dhātu-vāda? We will explore these questions in the next chapter where I will present Deleuze's concepts that will become necessary tools for our "new" interpretation of Dōgen in chapter five.

3.7 Conclusion: The Limitations of the Four Frameworks of "Comparative" Interpretation

Whether it was Abe, Heine, Kasulis, or Glass, all the four comparative frameworks for reading Dōgen that I have analyzed proved inadequate to reinterpret Dōgen beyond dhātu-vāda. Abe simply reiterated Hongaku doctrine by introducing a third ontological locus he called 'no-thingness' in order to unite dichotomies in a transcendental unity untouched by causality. Heine failed to rid dhātu-vāda by reiterating Hongaku-shisō in accordance to his Heidegger inspired bias that Dōgen is claiming a 'truth-of-being.' Kasulis, introduced an important shift of focus in reading Dōgen as purely practical, and attempted to escape ontological dhātu-vāda, but ended up presenting a dhātu-vādic view

²⁵³ Consequently, Glass also misinterprets Deleuze's use of the term 'essence' as in continuity with his own understanding. For Deleuze 'essence' is a term which appropriates a concentration of 'forces.' Forces meaning 'becoming' which is the process of internal-differentiation/multiplicity, which is also equated to empiricist 'experience.' Deleuze's limited use of the term 'essence' therefore is not as an ontological locus, but a provisional articulation of the nature of how a multiplicity of forces concentrate and appropriate a particular phenomenon.

of the human mind by claiming a ‘pure consciousness’ independent of causality. While Glass introduced the creative possibility of utilizing Deleuze to read Buddhism, he failed to make effective use of Deleuze to steer away from dhātu-vāda as he claimed a positive ontological reality to Dōgen’s Buddha-nature.

These four readings shared a common prejudice which tied their interpretation of Dōgen to correspondence theory. A conclusive analysis of this common prejudice may help clarify what it is in their readings that should not be repeated for our interpretation of Dōgen to be freed from correspondence and dhātu-vāda.

3.7.1 The Common Prejudice that Metaphysics is ‘Representational’

All four scholars repeated the prejudice that Dōgen’s philosophy ‘corresponds’ to some ‘true’ nature of reality, whether this be of existence or the mind, and presumed that the purpose of his practice is to experience such a ‘truth.’ In Abe, Heine, and Kasulis these assumptions lead to an understanding of meditational practice as a transcendental experientialism through which prajñā and altruism is negated. Glass introduced a new sense of practice as the subtraction of desires, but neglected praṭītyasamutpāda as secondary to the uncovering of ‘essence.’ Hence, Glass also reiterated the same prejudice that practice is aimed at the revealing of the ‘truth’ of one’s primordially ‘pure’ essence. Therefore, while each scholar attempted to respect the priority of practice in Dōgen as expressed in his idea of Shushō-Ittō, none was able to meaningfully connect Dōgen’s ontology and practice in a manner that respected praṭītyasamutpāda, prajñā, and altruistic ethics.

Much of these fallacies have their cause in a fundamental problem in the way these thinkers analyze Dōgen. They conceive of ontology as representational, and as an explanatory or descriptive venture supposed to mirror the ‘true’ nature of reality, whether this be objective reality or the reality of consciousness. As I have previously explained, correspondence theory is essentially dhātu-vāda for it must always propose an assertable ground or ‘truth’ to which our experience and knowledge correspond. The idea that there is a more ‘authentic’ reality, a more ‘authentic’ way of experiencing

reality, or a more ‘authentic’ state of consciousness than what we normally perceive, is founded on correspondence theory. This is so since the idea assumes the assured existence of a ‘true-way-reality-is’ which, while not being susceptible to representation by our normative ways of understanding, can be mirrored through transcendent or religious experiences.

Therefore, the idea that Buddhist practice must strive to more accurately mirror this reality in our understanding and that we must strive to attain the experience through which the ‘truth’ of reality or the mind is realized are bound to be dhātu-vāda. In the case of all four scholars, an emphasis on practice did not lead them to make a leap beyond metaphysical thinking in terms of correspondence, but rather to place practice/experience as a form of ‘verification’ or the assertable source for the contents of Dōgen’s ontology. These views suggest the reader to conform to a predefined set of answers concerning what ‘reality’ is, the ‘mind’ is, or what ‘enlightenment’ is, whose authority is only asserted by the ‘truth’ of Dōgen’s enlightenment. Thereby, the representational structure of their understanding of Dōgen was very clear: meditational practice is prioritized since it reveals the hidden ‘truth of reality’ which then grounds Dōgen’s claims. In order to overcome such ‘representational’ presumptions in reading Dōgen, a pragmatist turn must be made in the way we understand Dōgen’s philosophy in relation to spiritual exercises.

3.7.2 Turning Towards Deleuze’s Pragmatism as a Solution

We saw that several lines of thought found in Kasulis and Glass may still be useful for the current study. This was Kasulis’s view that Dōgen’s ontological ideas are utilities for practice rather than as “ontology” descriptive of reality per se. And, Glass’s view that the concept of Buddha-nature has a positive role in practice and therefore should not be neglected, and that Deleuze’s philosophy may help elucidate that role. However, both Kasulis and Glass did not pursue the possibilities of these lines of thought to much effect as their interpretive frameworks were fundamentally rooted in dhātu-vāda. Therefore, they could not utilize these perspectives for the sake of interpreting Dōgen’s metaphysics in a manner congruent to prafityasamutpāda and beyond correspondence theory. How

can Dōgen's ideas on Buddha-nature, and time as dharma-positions be interpreted in a manner that does not need to reiterate Hongaku ideas as constant-abiding or a 'True Self,' and in a manner which does not neglect practice based on altruism and *prajñā*?

Critical Buddhism dismissed Dōgen's metaphysics entirely according to their presumption that ontology is by nature corresponding to a grounding 'truth'; a view which also conditioned their prejudice that *prafīyasamutpāda* is incompatible with ontology. The comparative interpretations affirmed Dōgen's metaphysics yet in a manner that reiterated Hongaku-*shisō*, hence veered to *dhātu-vāda*. To the extent they understood Dōgen's metaphysics as founded on his enlightenment experience, they also reiterated the common prejudice with Critical Buddhism that Dōgen's metaphysics must be 'describing' a 'truth-of-reality.' According to these perspectives, Dōgen's metaphysics was either denied or affirmed in accordance to the common prejudice that his ideas must 'represent' a grounding 'truth,' thereby confining Dōgen's philosophy to correspondence theory. This means that, if we are to depart from the fear towards metaphysics as harboured by the Critical Buddhists, or the influences of Hongaku-*shisō* that was repeated throughout the comparative interpretations, we must adopt a completely different framework of understanding metaphysics.

Deleuze's pragmatism and metaphysical concepts may be the solution to overcome these shortcomings. Through this pragmatism, metaphysics may be released from the role of mirroring reality to being purely practical tools to achieve a desired effect. Thereby, Dōgen's idea of the priority of practice can be stressed in a much radical form than Abe, Heine or Kasulis, so that practice can be reconciled with the centrality of *prajñā* and altruism without any concern for having to 'represent' or 'attain' a grounding 'truth.' From this perspective, the entirety of Dōgen's philosophy consists of "tools" to enhance practice in accordance to *prafīyasamutpāda* without the necessity for mirroring or pointing at the 'true-way-reality-is.' The existence or non-existence of 'truth' is irrelevant; rather, it is only significant to the extent that it conditions the function of any philosophical concept for achieving the practical aim of Buddhism as founded on *prafīyasamutpāda*. Hence, Dōgen's concepts as Buddha-nature, and dharma-positions may be given new life as practically significant in accordance to *prafīyasamutpāda*.

In order to draft the frameworks for offering such an interpretation of Dōgen, the next chapter will introduce Deleuze's pragmatism and several of his metaphysical concepts within the context of his vision of making philosophy practical for the sake of exploring how we may live. Through the course of introducing Deleuze's ideas that are necessary for our "new" interpretation of Dōgen, I will ultimately argue why Deleuze's philosophy is not dhātu-vāda and therefore, is compatible with praṭītyasamutpāda. Furthermore, Deleuze's pragmatism may help us to cast away Critical Buddhism's prejudice that praṭītyasamutpāda is incompatible with ontology and to reconceive praṭītyasamutpāda as conditional for Buddhist metaphysics. In opposition to Glass's failure of utilizing Deleuze to free himself from dhātu-vāda and correspondence theory, we will see that Deleuze's pragmatic metaphysics is by nature antithetical to dhātu-vāda.

CHAPTER FOUR
DELEUZIAN PRAGMATISM AND METAPHYSICS

4.1 Introduction

In the last chapter, I had analyzed the pros and cons of four types of comparative interpretations of Dōgen from the perspective of *pratīyasamutpāda*. I had concluded that all four interpretations by Abe, Heine, Kasulis and Glass not only veered to *dhātu-vāda* by reiterating various aspects of *Hongaku-shisō*, but also shared one limitation. It was their presumption that Dōgen's ontology is describing a 'true' state of reality or of consciousness. This implies that all four readings assumed that Dōgen's ontology functions within a correspondence theoretical framework which conditioned their interpretations within *dhātu-vāda*.

On the other hand, there were several points that could be learned from their readings. Kasulis introduced the initial approach of viewing everything Dōgen says from its utility in practice. However, Kasulis did not take this approach to full effect due to his fundamental reliance on a phenomenological framework which lead him to presume the existence of an objective 'true' consciousness which transgressed into *dhātu-vāda*. In addition, Kasulis tried to avoid ontology altogether rather than to read Dōgen's ideas as metaphysics.²⁵⁴ Glass put forth the view that Dōgen's ideas on Buddha-nature should be of use in meditational practice. This is a view the current study will also attempt to argue for, yet Glass failed to affirm and interpret Buddha-nature in a manner congruent to *pratīyasamutpāda* by taking an essentialist perspective. In addition, while Glass made the bold move to incorporate Deleuze's philosophy in his interpretation of Buddhist practice, he merely reduced Deleuze to his essentialist ontology and failed to use Deleuze in a manner which may have

²⁵⁴ Additionally Kasulis was ambivalent as to how far he took this avoidance of ontology, since despite this seeming avoidance, he latently accepted a fundamental ontology of 'presence,' which again made him veer to *dhātu-vāda*.

freed his Dōgen interpretation from correspondence theory and dhātu-vāda.

The current study attempts to interpret Dōgen's metaphysical ideas of Buddha-nature and temporality by adherence to praṭītyasamutpāda, altruistic ethics and in a manner faithful to Dōgen's concern over the priority of practice. In order to do so, the Critical Buddhist denial of all ontology as dhātu-vāda, or the reiteration of Hongaku inspired dhātu-vāda in the comparative interpretations of Dōgen's ontology should be abandoned. I had shown in the past two chapters that both of these views implied the same prejudice that ontology/metaphysics must be by nature 'representational.' Therefore, Dōgen's metaphysics was understood as a description of a corresponding 'truth' of reality or of the mind. The idea that Dōgen's metaphysics corresponds to reality is dhātu-vāda since the correspondence theoretical framework implies the existence of a corresponding 'truth' independent of the causal process of experience. Rather, the current study hopes to free Dōgen from dhātu-vāda by interpreting his metaphysics as purely practical tools for spiritual practice that does not need to be 'correspondent' to any objective 'truth.' In this sense the current study takes Kasulis's approach of seeing Dōgen's ontology as practically significant to its logical extreme by divorcing ontology from correspondence. My conviction is that Deleuze's concepts based on his empiricist pragmatism, such as 'heterogenesis,' 'internal difference,' and 'virtuality/actuality' can be helpful to achieve such an interpretation of Dōgen. However, we must utilize Deleuze in a manner different from Glass's example. Rather than reducing Deleuze's ideas to essentialism or correspondence theory, Deleuze may offer us a fully alternative approach to metaphysics.

Deleuze's pragmatism may present us with an alternative attitude in utilizing metaphysics centred on how concepts function and for what purpose, as opposed to explicating what reality is. Upon such an understanding, metaphysical concepts do not (and may not necessarily have to) represent corresponding 'truths.' Rather, they become necessary functions for our process of making sense of the world. We will see in this chapter that from the perspective of Deleuze's pragmatism the question of metaphysics becomes: what metaphysical concept, and for what purpose? When this is applied to praṭītyasamutpāda, we may be able to resolve the Critical Buddhist prejudice that praṭītyasamutpāda is incompatible with ontology. Praṭītyasamutpāda may be articulated as a

conceptual condition within which Buddhist practice functions as opposed to being understood as a concept designating the ‘true-way-reality-is.’

When such a pragmatist view of *pratītyasamutpāda* is applied to Dōgen, the question becomes transformed from the representational concern of what kind of reality are his concepts of Buddha-nature and time entailing, to the practical question of how can Dōgen’s concepts of Buddha-nature and time be made to *function* for the practical purpose laid out by *pratītyasamutpāda*? Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts may not have to correspond to some ‘ultimate reality’ or ‘the true-way-reality-is,’ but be purely functional to achieve practical purposes. Such a pragmatist framework may help in presenting an interpretation of Dōgen’s metaphysics which overcomes the limitations of correspondence theory. This may eventually allow us to affirm Glass’s insight that Buddha-nature is an important concept for Buddhist practice yet in a manner beyond correspondence to an ontological ‘locus.’

However, for Deleuze’s concepts to be applicable to an interpretation of Dōgen respecting *pratītyasamutpāda*, we must analyze if Deleuze’s concepts are themselves compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*. In contrast to Glass, our aim is to understand and utilize Deleuze’s ideas within his contexts of re-conceiving philosophy as practice beyond correspondence theory. This way, we can avoid reducing Deleuze’s ideas to contexts that may not be compatible with his pragmatist stance. Reducing Deleuze’s ideas to an ontology based on representation, essentialism, foundationalism, transcendentalism, and realism, preclude giving full scope to the maximum potential of his concepts. The reason for this will become apparent through the course of the following analysis that Deleuze’s philosophy may be fundamentally antithetical to such perspectives in philosophy. If so, this may be opportune for the current study as it may help locate Deleuze’s philosophy as compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda* which equally do not sit in with the above philosophical views.

Making the case that Deleuze’s concepts may be useful tools to read Dōgen necessitates answering the following questions. How does Deleuze conceive metaphysics as practical in relation to his ethical stance? How does his empiricist based pragmatism and his metaphysical ideas on virtuality/actuality function in relation to such practice? Are these ideas compatible with

praṭītyasamutpāda? If so, how can they help reconcile praṭītyasamutpāda with ontology and interpret Dōgen’s concepts of Buddha-nature and time in relation to practice beyond correspondence theory and dhātu-vāda?

4.2 The Ethical Backgrounds for Pragmatism

The compatibility between Deleuze and Buddhism founded on praṭītyasamutpāda may first be sought in how Deleuze’s philosophy may be designed to be practical. As we saw in our analysis of praṭītyasamutpāda in chapter two, Buddhist ideas such as causality, no-abiding-self, and impermanence were integrated within the practice of cultivating altruism through correct insight into the nature of experienced reality. In this sense the ontological implications of praṭītyasamutpāda was incorporated within the practice of ethics by conditioning, affirming and supporting the analysis of experience through which altruism is realized. Deleuze’s philosophy may be opportune as a tool to read Dōgen if, and only if it also considers ontology or metaphysics as related to the problem of ethics.

My hypothesis is that Deleuze’s pragmatism establishes the justifications as to how metaphysics can become the tool to construct the conceptual conditions in which certain ethical practices and modes of life can be enhanced. Therefore, examining how Deleuze’s pragmatism and metaphysics of virtuality works first asks for an explanation of how Deleuze’s conception of the act of metaphysical thinking is tied in with his particular ethics of life. This is important since I believe that Deleuze’s pragmatism does not simply replace representation and transcendence with a pragmatist epistemology and ontology. Rather, his metaphysics functions in a manner that becomes “practical” for the sake of fulfilling an ethical purpose. For Deleuze, thinking metaphysically is not a theoretical endeavor; it itself becomes praxis founded on a particular ethics. Therefore, we will need to understand Deleuze’s ethical purpose and how it is linked to the specific problems of representation and transcendence in order to lay the basis of Deleuze’s pragmatism and ultimately help argue why it may be compatible with praṭītyasamutpāda. How does Deleuze’s ethics condition his view of

making metaphysics practical? Does this involve the overcoming of correspondence theory and transcendentalism? If so, will this help locate Deleuze's ideas as compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*?

4.2.1 To Do Away with Ill Conscience: Deleuze's Ethics of Life

The ethical significance Deleuze gives to metaphysics could be summarized by a simple question that forms a maxim for his philosophy. This question is, "What is life capable of?" or, reworded in a more practical manner, "How might one live?"²⁵⁵ Deleuze considers the act of creation as fundamental to existence and that life, the act of thinking, and the creation of concepts all partake in this fundamental activity. Hence, any negative forces that obstruct the potentials of creation to be realized to its nth power must always be resisted. For Deleuze, the correspondence theory of truth, and the privileging of the concept of transcendence in the epistemological and ontological frameworks that have historically moulded the modern mind are hindrances that prevent the realization of this fundamental potential of creation within life. Therefore, ontology needs a thorough reconsideration in order to overcome this problem of representation and transcendence.

For Deleuze, ontology and metaphysics are not a hindrance in addressing this concrete problem of life; accordingly, he finds the question of the "death of philosophy" or the "death of metaphysics" to be absolutely devoid of meaning.²⁵⁶ According to Deleuze, ontology and metaphysics are not in and out of themselves the root of oppression against the creative potential of existence. Deleuze conceives that as long as we can create new ways of understanding and making use of

²⁵⁵ The view that Deleuze's philosophy can be understood as first and foremost involved with the problem of life in transforming the way we conceive of ourselves and reality is shared by such scholars as, Todd May, *Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction*, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 2005), 1-25. John Rajchman, *The Deleuze Connections*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 80-111. Claire Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze*, (London: Routledge, 2002), 1-2. Simon O'Sullivan, "The Production of the New and the Care of the Self" on *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New* (London: Continuum, 2008), 91-103.

²⁵⁶ Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: the Clamor of Being*, Trans. Louise Burchill, (Mineapolis: Minnesota Univ. 2002), 21. Jean-Jacques Lecercle, *Deleuze and Language*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 247-248. Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari*, (London: Routledge, 1989), 78. May points out that while for Foucault and Derrida to leave behind the dogmatic image of thought means to abandon ontology, "Deleuze does not agree. Ontology itself has strange adventures in store for us, if only we can think differently about how it might be conceived." May, *Gilles Deleuze*, 80-81.

metaphysics, metaphysics continues to hold great potentials to become a tool with which we can create new worldviews, questions, and re-conceptions of what the world and we ourselves are capable of. The problem rather lies in the way metaphysics ties to representation and transcendence. As Deleuze and his co-author Guattari set out extensively in their two *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* volumes, they consider the problem of representation and transcendence as deeply related to human psychological conditions that negate the creative potentials of life. They also observe that the modern social-apparatus constructed by the epistemological and ontological regime of representation, identity, and transcendence seeds these conditions as tools to subjugate people to their power.²⁵⁷ Therefore, overcoming representation embedded in our lives is not only an individual ethical concern, but simultaneously a social/political one, since in effect, it can resist power and free creation from oppression.

Deleuze borrows from Nietzsche in calling these psychological conditions, ‘ill conscience’ or ‘bad conscience.’ Ill conscience is exemplified by such psychological states as resignation, resentment, guilt, reactivity, revenge, nihilism, sad affections and regret. These psychological states share one common feature, which is, that they hinder one’s ability to give unreserved affirmation to the powers of creation, or in other words, they negate life.²⁵⁸ If metaphysics is to become an efficient tool to aid the realization of what we are capable of beyond ill conscience, then it needs to leave behind representation and transcendence. In this sense we can see that Deleuze’s philosophy is founded on an ethical concern which it wants to address through practical philosophy. However, to argue for what extent this ethical foundation is compatible with *pratyasamutpāda* necessitates further analysis of how Deleuze considers the problem of representation and transcendence to be embedded in our psychological conditioning by ill conscience. This leads to examining what Deleuze called

²⁵⁷ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: Minnesota Univ., 1987), 282, 111-148. Also on *Dialogues II* Deleuze states: “We live in a world which is generally disagreeable, where not only people but the established powers have a stake in transmitting sad affects to us. Sadness, sad affects, are all those which reduces our power to act. The established powers need our sadness to make us slaves.” (46)

²⁵⁸ For example, resignation keeps one away from acting and creating by tying one down to a form of determinism or fatalism founded on an obsession with a judgment of what is to come. Resentment always ties one down to a sense of inferiority and self-denial in contrast to an allegedly superior other. Reacting rather than acting overtakes one’s mind by the need to protect preconceived ideas, statuses and identities, rather than to realize an undeterminable sense of pure creation without attachment to static dogmatism.

‘common sense’ as I will analyze in the following section.

4.2.2 ‘Representation’ and ‘Transcendence’ in Relation to ‘Common Sense’

I had previously analyzed how *pratītyasamutpāda* cannot accommodate ‘representation’ and ‘transcendence.’ The former implies a realism of matter and/or idea which exists apart from the causal process of experience and the later implies an independent existence beyond causality. To the extent *pratītyasamutpāda* conditions Buddhism to understand phenomena as the experience of the causal process of the *skandhas*, this cannot allow for a clearly distinguished independent subject in contrast to an objective reality, as we saw in the doctrine of no-abiding-self. All phenomena including the ‘self’ are a shifting experience which happens by way of the causal relation amongst the *skandhas*. Therefore, if we can show how Deleuze also considers the problem of representation, realism, transcendence, essentialism and foundationalism as problematic, we can make a stronger case for the compatibility between his ideas and *pratītyasamutpāda*. In addition, clarifying what Deleuze calls ‘common sense’ will help elucidate how he analyzed the epistemological and ontological problems of representation and transcendence and how these problems lead to the unavoidable necessity for his pragmatist turn.

Deleuze observes that the ills of representational thought are typified in what he calls ‘common sense,’²⁵⁹ which becomes a major problem for life to affirm and realize its maximum potential to create. ‘Common sense’ for Deleuze is what designates an epistemological framework in which concepts and images are exclusively tied to the correspondence theory of truth whereby ideas pertaining to singularities, multiplicities, constant change and differences are subordinated to homogeneity, identity, reduction to hegemonic ideas and meanings. Common sense makes difference secondary by reducing it to representation and identity, since it relies on the assurance of a three-fold identity structure that is taken for granted. This threefold structure runs as follows.

²⁵⁹ For Deleuze’s view on “common sense” see: Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, Trans. Mark Lester, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1990), 77-80. Also John Marks, *Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity*, (London: Pluto Press, 1998), 80-81.

First is the unquestioned expectation that the ‘Self’ perceiving the object is a constant self-identical subject, which stands in contrast to an “objective” world existing “outside” of the ‘Self.’ I will later explain why I believe that this view implies the notion of the ‘Self’ as a persistent essence which complies with what Buddhism problematizes as *svabhāva*. Secondly, common sense takes for granted that this dualistic structure of “inside self” coming in relation to an “outside” reality universally constitutes all of reality/experience, and therefore, is identical throughout all phenomena.²⁶⁰ Thirdly, common sense takes for granted that there exists an assured identity between the knowledge gained by the “inside” self and the objective “outside” reality to which the knowledge corresponds, and that this knowledge is always identical amongst all “selves” coming into contact with that particular “outside” reality. In other words, common sense takes a static and universal notion of knowledge for granted. Let us apply this threefold identity structure of common sense by using the example of a “subject” perceiving a tree. Common sense understands that the “self” that is seeing the tree will always be the predefined “self” and the tree the self perceives will always be what we came to define as the tree. The idea that we may be capable of more than what we defined as our “selves” or that the tree we are perceiving may be capable of more than what we came to identify it to be is neglected by common sense. Consequently, common sense is based on a reduction of difference to a mutual consensus founded on the idea that there must be a common ground amongst all things that makes understanding phenomena possible. In short, common sense is an understanding of reality based on compliance to *doxa*, representation, foundations, hegemonic rules, and static knowledge, and cannot be efficiently expressive or affirmative of multiplicity, difference, creativity, novelty and constant change (or movement, becoming).

Deleuze also observes that the problems of common sense / theory of correspondence repeat what he views as an ill tendency in the way the concept of transcendence had been valued throughout the history of Western thought. For Deleuze, concepts pertaining to transcendence are typified by two overarching qualities. On the one hand, transcendence necessitates two ontological substances which are distinct yet somehow interact. On the other hand, one of these substances is valued as

²⁶⁰ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, Trans. Paul Patton, (London: Continuum, 2004), 226.

qualitatively superior to the other.²⁶¹ Deleuze agrees with Nietzsche on this and observes that placing some kind of superior transcendent reality as being primary to, overruling, and constituting the reason of ordinary reality has led to a history of resentment and ascetic self-denial, inhibiting their power to create in contrast to the omnipotence attributed to transcendence. The qualitative superiority granted to what is transcendent (whether it be God, some Absolute Truth, entity, or metaphysical reality) means that transcendence is privileged at the expense of our immanent reality. Our immanent reality must always be subordinated and negated in order to preserve the superiority of transcendence. Consequently, transcendence seeds ill conscience since it hinders a full affirmation of the creative potentials of life through a prejudice about the limits of what our immanent existence is capable of.²⁶²

The dualism between ‘Self’ and ‘outside reality’ embedded in the representational structure of common sense repeats the above shortcomings of transcendence. Because the ‘subject’ is considered ontologically privileged as preceding and in a position of coordinating what is ‘outwardly real.’ The tree has no meaning or knowledge produced without a ‘Self’ that perceives it; the knowledge of the tree and the significance for its existence is only created when the ‘Self’ interacts with it. According to the dualism of representation, the tree never assumes significance; it is always the judging subject that is superior to the tree, organizes, gives meaning, and value to the knowledge of the exterior world. Here, the assumed self-contained nature and centrality of the ‘subject’ is always considered naturally granted, unhindered, unaltered, uninfluenced and un-violated by the ‘exteriority’ it comes to understand; therefore the subject/self always transcends the exteriority (it comes to know).²⁶³ Consequently, the concept of the ‘Self’ becomes a common sense concept, something considered to be ‘obvious’ and to somehow be universally common as a ‘dogmatic image of thought’ which dictates

²⁶¹ May, *Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction*, 29-31.

²⁶² This aspect of Deleuze’s practical philosophy that shuns transcendence in preference for a life in immanence, also owes to the influence of Spinoza. In Spinozist terms ill conscience will refer to what he calls “sad affections” which hinder a ‘body’s’ capacity to affirm its innate power to create ideas expressive of its own cause, un-reliant to outside forces (i.e. reaching ‘adequate ideas’ that “are true ideas, which are in us as they are in God. They are not representative of states of things or of what happens to us, but of what we are and of what things are.”). Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza Practical Philosophy*, Trans. Robert Hurley, (San Francisco: City Light, 1988), 74.

As to the link between Deleuze’s practical philosophy and Spinoza also see:

Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1993), 56-111.
Stephen Zepke, *Art as Abstract Machine: Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze and Guattari*, (London: Routledge, 2005), 41-75.

²⁶³ May, *Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction*, 28.

and judges what is an “acceptable” view of selfhood by reduction of all difference to the boundaries of the concept. In short, transcendence, whether as a concept of Self, God, or some principle law, is considered ‘obvious’ whose state of reality is somehow intrinsically-grounded (*causa sui*) and therefore assures common sense as its grounding principle. All differences are measured and judged in contrast to the supposed universality of this principle that negates difference in accordance to what is “acceptable” within its boundaries.

In addition to the above, the dualism of “subject” and “object” embedded in transcendence and representation introduces a form of ontological and epistemological determinism concerning the origins of knowledge. Deleuze and Guattari find such determinism in representation so problematic that they even refer to representation as a recurring disease that is “humankind’s fundamental neurosis,” its “interpretosis.”²⁶⁴ Representation introduces determinism since it places knowledge as rooted in the form of a corresponding truth that is ontologically and epistemologically pre-existing “outside” our mind whether beyond or beneath phenomena, and hidden from immediate reality as a principle of, or as the meaning waiting to be “discovered” by the subject.²⁶⁵ To this extent, ‘common sense’ tends towards a foundationalism and/or an essentialism that believes knowledge is predetermined by either an ‘objectively’ existing ground, or an intrinsic ‘truth’ within each existence waiting to be uncovered. Therefore, “interpretosis” limits the human psychology to a belief that there *must be* “some meaning or truth awaiting interpretation, revelation or disclosure.”²⁶⁶ Consequently, “interpretosis” is a source for ill conscience in the form of fatalism, resignation and nihilism since it is an obsession with pre-judgments concerning what life and reality are capable of. Such a view cannot accommodate the potential that knowledge and meaning may be seen as a continuously mutating reality that is taking place as an inseparable process, whose location is indeterminate by “outside” or “inside,” but always in the “middle.”²⁶⁷ With interpretosis, life loses its creative impetus since one has

²⁶⁴ Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 114.

²⁶⁵ As Colebrook points out, Deleuze and Guattari’s critical view of transcendence can well be described in alliance with Foucault’s views on transcendence as a reliance on an ‘exteriority’ as a foundation to knowledge, which leads to an ‘ethics of knowledge’ that imagines “if we get the facts about some outside world right then we will know what to do.” For Deleuze this ethics limits what life is capable of since it is always caught up in chasing an image of what is right which is understood to exist prior to/exterior to the act of thought or language. It traps thought in the image that thought or language must be founded upon its assertability to this exterior truth. Colebrook, 71.

²⁶⁶ Colebrook, 71.

²⁶⁷ Deleuze often describes of the way reality should no longer be conceived of a clear division between subject

already decided on how reality works and can only act and understand in accordance to that view. Consequently, life becomes an obsession with constructing comfort zones by “discovering” preordained meanings, which should be “out there,” and will be the eternal solution that solves problems once and for all.

In summary, Deleuze problematized representation on both ontological and epistemological grounds in relation to his ethics. Representation hinders conceiving phenomena in terms of difference and constant creation by implying the self-identity of a subject in contrast to the objective world. The subject was considered transcendently privileged to the reality it comes to know, as it was believed to be independent of and unhindered by reality. The knowledge the subject gains from reality was considered identical amongst all cases and therefore universally applicable. In addition, knowledge and meaning were considered preordained and independent from the experience of knowing, a condition Deleuze called interpretosis. Collectively, this means that representation implies a form of ontological essentialism in understanding the duality of subject and object as well as a foundationalism of knowledge which believed preordained ‘meanings’ or ‘truths’ assures the discovery or revealing of the corresponding knowledge.

The tendency towards transcendence as implied in common sense/representation will also be considered problematic from the perspective of *prāṭīyasamutpāda*. *Prāṭīyasamutpāda* will not sustain transcendence since the idea that all things are subject to the process of cause and effect does not allow any concept or entity to be privileged as somehow outside of this process as an existence independent of causality. In this sense, Buddhism as founded on *prāṭīyasamutpāda* is a philosophy entailing a worldview in which all aspects of phenomenal reality is considered absolutely immanent to causality. The idea that there is some kind of independent ground to life, whether this be the ‘Self,’ a principle, metaphysical entity, ‘essence,’ meaning or ‘truth’ of reality that transcendently overrules or assures phenomena from beyond causality is considered a logical fallacy from the argument of *prāṭīyasamutpāda*. Consequently, Deleuze’s criticism towards common sense’s reliance on the assurance of a preordained ‘Self’ and ‘meanings’ subject to interpretosis, coincides with Buddhism’s

and object, but always happening as an un-locatable relational becoming in the “middle.” Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 21, 23, 25.

concern for attachment to grounds though for different reasons. The former is critical of ‘grounds’ for the sake of overcoming determinism in order to affirm life as fundamentally creative and becoming. On the other hand, common sense will be problematic for Buddhism since the attachment to ‘grounds’ it implies hinders the correct observation of impermanence and no-abiding-self. However, these philosophies share the worldview that phenomena are constantly changing. In addition, how these respective philosophies practically engages this worldview for the sake of ethics, brings these philosophies together against the common problems of transcendentalism, representation, realism, essentialism, and foundationalism.

I consider what Deleuze claims to be the problem of an independent subject that is both intrinsically existing, and transcendently privileged over objective reality, as well as the problem of preordained ‘truths,’ can be put in the Buddhist term of *svabhāva*. If we recall, *svabhāva* is the idea that things exist independently by their intrinsic nature, and are self-generated, implying that everything possesses an ontological, epistemological or psychological ‘essence’ transcendent to causal dependence. These ideas are problematic since they negated impermanence and the doctrine of no-abiding-self. We will later see in our analysis of Deleuze’s empiricist reasoning behind his pragmatism, that his ideas on ‘experience’ in relation to the subject may further this observation that Deleuze’s view on ontological and epistemological grounds is close to Buddhist no-abiding-self. Though Deleuze and Buddhism are clearly different in terms of backgrounds and motive, to the extent Deleuze considers philosophy practical and does not side with representation, realism, transcendence, essentialism and foundationalism, his ideas can be considered compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*.

4.3 Pragmatism: Metaphysics as Heterogenesis

Up to this point of our analysis, we saw that Deleuze’s ethical concern to leave behind representation and transcendence gave us the first clues to locate his philosophy in proximity to Buddhism. For one thing, Deleuze’s view that philosophy ought to be practical for an ethical directive that necessitates the transforming of how we conceive of ourselves and reality coincides with the

Buddhist view that philosophy serves the priority of ethics which needs self-transformation to be realized. Secondly, there was a commonality between how Deleuze and Buddhism view phenomena as changing and what they consider as antithetical to this stance. These included conceptions like representation, realism, transcendence, essentialism and foundationalism. The compatibility between Deleuze's philosophy and *pratītyasamutpāda* may be further cemented through an analysis of Deleuze's pragmatism proper and how it functions based on an empiricist reasoning.

This leads to our next point as to how Deleuze makes metaphysics practical for the sake of answering the question of "How might one live?" Deleuze's use of metaphysics entails the question of life's movement beyond the dogmatism of 'common sense.' This is achieved through considering how life can be continuously conceived and reconceived in multiple ways "to attain the non-stratified by freeing life wherever it's imprisoned."²⁶⁸ To rethink the problem of ontology as the question of how one might live is to urge the transformation of our own understanding of what we (and the world) are capable of and to actually utilize our thinking to live life in creative ways. Deleuze introduces a "new way" to understand and utilize metaphysics for the sake of constantly questioning and recreating our views concerning the self and the world to overcome ill conscience in its many guises. This "new way" is Deleuze's pragmatism as founded on his empiricist concept of 'heterogenesis.' If metaphysics can be utilized pragmatically, one can abandon the view of life as merely a contest for the assertability of truths. Metaphysics, therefore, may be considered as the creation of new concepts to enhance ways of living beyond representation. The question of philosophy may become both pragmatic and practical: "How can ontology and epistemology be made to function?" for us to live outside representation and transcendence.

The current study will utilize this pragmatist framework for grounding metaphysics in order to formulate how Dōgen's ideas can function outside of correspondence theory and in a manner truthful to *pratītyasamutpāda*. Hence, understanding how Deleuze's empiricist pragmatism and especially his idea of heterogenesis works is crucial. It will constitute the epistemological foundation with which I will articulate how *pratītyasamutpāda* is compatible with ontology. And on top of this

²⁶⁸ Eric Alliez, *The Signature of the World: What is Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy?*, (London: Continuum, 2004), 111.

compatibility, to interpret Dōgen’s philosophy beyond the latent reliance on correspondence theory we saw in the two opposing poles of Dōgen interpretation. However, for this framework to be applicable to a reading of Dōgen’s Buddhism we need to further analyze if it is compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*. Therefore, the current section will continue to argue for Deleuze’s philosophy’s compatibility with *pratītyasamutpāda* over the course of analyzing how Deleuze’s pragmatism functions.

4.3.1 A Pragmatism Born from Empiricism

Deleuze’s pragmatist thinking is most explicitly elucidated in his early study *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (1953) as well as in his later essay entitled *Hume* published in 1972. However, the themes of empiricism and pragmatism are developed throughout Deleuze’s oeuvre as the founding concepts of his philosophy, often through references not only to Hume, but also to Alfred North Whitehead and American pragmatism.²⁶⁹ Therefore, elucidating the pragmatist framework of understanding metaphysics needs to begin with the following analysis of Deleuze’s pragmatist epistemology and ontology, which was influenced by his interpretation of Hume and various tenets of empiricism. Gaining a sufficient understanding of Deleuze’s empiricism will help lay the foundations as to how his pragmatism functions and to further analyze the case that it is compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*.

There is an epistemological and an ontological aspect to Deleuze’s pragmatism that are so closely connected to each other that it is impossible to deal with them separately. Hence, it may be more accurate to speak of an onto-epistemology. Yet, if I were to distinguish these aspects for the convenience of briefly introducing them, it would be as follows. First, the epistemological foundation

²⁶⁹ Deleuze finds a degree of resonance between his empiricism and what he observed as similar movements in American pragmatism where salvation has been replaced by experimentation based on a question of trust or confidence. According to Deleuze, American pragmatism is an “attempt to transform the world, to think, a new world or new man insofar as they create themselves,” that fights “against the particularities that pit man against man and nourish an irremediable mistrust; but also against the Universal or the Whole, the fusion of souls in the name of great love or charity,” which “replace knowledge with belief, or rather “confidence” – not belief in another world, but confidence in this one, and in man as much as God.” Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, Trans. Daniel W. Smith & Michael A. Greco, (Minneapolis: Minnesota Univ., 1997), 87. On American pragmatism and Deleuze also see: Rajchman, 19. And: *Deleuze and Pragmatism*, ed. Sean Bowden, Simone Bignall & Paul Patton, (New York: Routledge, 2015).

of Deleuze's pragmatism is based on an empiricist approach to reality; what Deleuze calls "modern skepticism."²⁷⁰ Modern skepticism replaces the prejudiced subject-object divide of representation with the observation that knowledge cannot be isolated from the process of experience, and, therefore, cannot be justified "subjectively" or "objectively" either. Consequently, the idea that a stable "objective ground" guarantees knowledge must give way to an alternative understanding of the genesis of knowledge which Deleuze and Guattari call "heterogenesis." Briefly, heterogenesis entails that all categorical explanations of reality (the creation of concepts) needs the simultaneous invention of a respective transcendental condition on which the explanation can be grounded. Transcendental conditions which supposedly explain principles, causes and meanings are not considered objective 'truths,' but are themselves concepts which need to be invented as necessary functions for subordinate concepts which take that condition for granted to make sense. This justifies the necessity for a new way of understanding the function and significance of metaphysics. It does not explain or represent reality, it rather invents concepts for the sake of fulfilling intended functions.

Second, the ontological aspect of Deleuze's pragmatism is based on turning the concept of 'experience' into an ontological concept that functions as the transcendental condition on which the epistemological theory of empiricism is elaborated. This will reveal heterogenesis to also function as an ontological concept.²⁷¹ I will further elaborate on how "modern skepticism" leads to heterogenesis, what heterogenesis is and how it involves an ontological aspect in the coming two sections. If we can make the case that these concepts do not negate *prāṭīyasamutpāda*, heterogenesis may become instrumental for articulating *prāṭīyasamutpāda* in a manner that its compatibility with metaphysics is apparent. This is in opposition to the Critical Buddhist prejudice that *prāṭīyasamutpāda* is incompatible with metaphysics since they assume metaphysics is *de facto* 'representational.' If heterogenesis can establish an alternative role to metaphysics without reliance to correspondence or *dhātu-vāda*, then there will no longer be any problem for metaphysics to be integrated within the practice of *prāṭīyasamutpāda*.

²⁷⁰ Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essay on A Life*, (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 44.

²⁷¹ In Alliez's description of heterogenesis (also called ontogenesis), "knowing is ontological." Alliez, *The Signature of the World*, 60-61.

4.3.1.1 Overturning the Mind / Object Duality: Modern Skepticism

What Deleuze calls empiricism's "modern skepticism" is basically skepticism against the non-verifiable nature of the "objective ground" the correspondence theory of truth takes for granted. While correspondence theory holds that knowledge can be grounded by the assertability of an "outside" truth, empiricism holds that the correspondence between "outside" truth and "inside" knowledge can never be verified nor objectively claimed to actually exist as it would require a *tertium comparationis*. This is because empiricism observes that everything we consider to be part of the reality we perceive must be mediated by our experiencing it and therefore cannot be verified to possess any sense of an objective independent existence. If this is the case, we cannot say things exist independently in a subject-object divide, nor can knowledge exist in a manner, which asserts an "objective" truth. We can only say that *the inseparable process of experience is happening*. This is because discerning logic cannot verify how things are in-and-of-themselves,²⁷² or can it verify if our knowledge of a thing truly corresponds to an "objective" reality in an independent manner outside of our experience of objects.

I consider this empiricist framework does not impede with the Buddhist phenomenology of the twelve nidānas and five skandhas. According to *pratītyasamutpāda*, phenomena is never considered from the stance of realism as it leads to the problem of independent objective realities implying *dhātu-vāda*. Rather, understanding the world and self, was considered as the problem of understanding how our experience of reality happens by way of the causal relationship between materiality, perception, cognitive, psychological and affective reactions and habituations (i.e. the skandhas). In other words, from the perspective of *pratītyasamutpāda*, phenomena is always the experience of causality and never the problem of existence per se. It is not concerned about any 'reality' outside of this process. In this sense, the priority of experience found in Deleuze's empiricism can be analyzed as non-contrary to *pratītyasamutpāda* which equally considers reality as a

²⁷² In deed, from such a perspective we cannot even verify if things can really exist in-and-of-themselves.

product of experience as opposed to being objectively existing.

The non-verifiable nature of the subject-object divide does not imply empiricism is claiming a type of idealism whereby only the subjective mind exists. From the perspective of empiricism, the so-called “human mind” cannot be privileged over experience as a transcendental ground from which reality is judged. We cannot see, feel or locate our ‘Mind’ as an independent reality away from our process of experiencing it, but rather, our ‘Mind’ can only be revealed to us through the process of our experiencing. Therefore, the phenomenon that we define as “our minds,” “ego” or “our subjectivity” is itself a product of experience, the “subjective mind” possesses no qualitative or quantitative privilege over all other phenomena. The entire process of the appearance of the subject is understood as an “effect” or emergent property of experiences.²⁷³ In other words, experience is not what is *given* to a subject, rather it is the subject that is formed in the given, that is, in experience, and “if the subject is constituted within the given, then, in fact, there is only a practical self,” and never a transcendent pre-founded self or “ego.”²⁷⁴

I consider this empiricist view of the ‘self’ adds to the compatibility between Deleuze and *prāṭīyasamutpāda*. The view that the ‘self’ is an effect of experience and therefore does not exist as a grounded reality does not impede with the doctrine of no-abiding-self which equally denies the independent existence of a ‘self.’ From the perspective of *prāṭīyasamutpāda* only conventional or practical ‘selves’ exist which are conceptualizations of our own making arising from the causal experience of the *skandhas*. Otherwise, no permanent or independent ‘Self’ exists transcendent to the causal process of the *skandhas*. What we experience as our ‘self’ is always a product of causality. Though Deleuze’s view on the subject does not specify experience as experience of causality, it will not hinder *prāṭīyasamutpāda* for it equally denies essentialism, foundationalism, realism and transcendentalism. Therefore, Deleuze’s empiricism can be subordinated to the central function of *prāṭīyasamutpāda*.

For Deleuze, understanding the self as a continuous effect of experiences overturns the view

²⁷³ Colebrook, 73-74, 81.

²⁷⁴ Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature*, Trans. Constatin V. Boundas, (New York: Columbia Univ., 1991), 91, 104.

of the subject as definable through a dualistic design of the interior vs. exterior (mind/body dualism). Instead there is only the “outside” or the plane of experiences, in which the subject itself is constituted and in which it participates.²⁷⁵ Therefore, empiricism in virtue of modern skepticism not only radically challenges the duality of representation (subject vs. object), but also undercuts transcendence. This gives way to a worldview whereby reality becomes absolutely immanent since empiricism observes that the human mind cannot conceive nor talk of a reality that is not part of the process of experiencing, all existence including our own thoughts and concepts becomes a process happening *within* experience. This immanence is also un-contrary to *pratītyasamutpāda* according to which all phenomena, ideas or ‘truths’ are always effects of causality and therefore immanent to the experience of the causal process of the *skandhas*.

Whenever Deleuze mentions “experience” as preceding all knowledge and concepts in his conception of an empiricist epistemology, this is inseparably intertwined with an ontological aspect. Empiricism’s observation that all things we consider to be reality can only happen and be understood inseparably within the process of our experience entails that on ontological terms, one can say that *all phenomena are experience*. According to Deleuze, such empiricism understands “experience” not as experience experienced by a pre-defined subject but as *just experience*, that is, as a multiplicity of *impersonal experiences* that precede the ‘event’ we call the ego while including it.²⁷⁶ With reference to the strong Spinozist influence in Deleuze, we can also articulate this in Spinozist terms: there is only one substance that constitutes reality, whether psychical or physical, this *substance is experience*. Experience then is primary to knowledge and Being.²⁷⁷

For Deleuzian empiricism, the un-assertability of correspondence between knowledge and truth makes the obsession with searching for independently existing truths, principles and grounds to existence futile. In contrast to the representational view that knowledge originates in an “objective” truth, modern skepticism’s view that reality is taking place within experience and therefore irreducible

²⁷⁵ Deleuze, *Pure Immanence*, 38. Deleuze’s often repeated phrase that “there is only an outside” is another way to say that there is never an inside/outside duality, but only the field of inseparable multiplicity of experience.

²⁷⁶ Colebrook, 87.

²⁷⁷ This conclusion is indicative of Deleuze’s influence from the “radical empiricism” of William James. For a close analysis of the Jamesian influence on Deleuze see Gregory Flaxman, “A More Radical Empiricism,” in *Deleuze and Pragmatism*, ed. Sean Bowden, Simone Bignall, and Paul Patton. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 66-74.

to a subject-object duality, leads to an alternative view on the genesis of thought, knowledge and concepts. According to Deleuze, knowledge of the “outside object” does not exist beyond our experience of it as an assuring “objective ground,” waiting to be “discovered.” Rather, our experience of thinking simultaneously co-creates the knowledge and the transcendental grounds on which that knowledge rests. From such an understanding, any concept which denotes a principle or ground to reality, being, or subjectivity do not pre-exist experience as transcendentally given, but is understood as created in and through the process of experience. Deleuze and Guattari denote this epistemological condition of the relational process inseparably constituting both “subject” and “object,” with the term *heterogenesis*.²⁷⁸ Heterogenesis constitutes the crux of Deleuze’s claim that concepts can be understood as functional outside correspondence, foundationalism and transcendentalism. Through the course of this section I had analyzed how each of the empiricist concepts leading up to the development of heterogenesis did not impede *pratīyasamutpāda*. Consequently, I argue that heterogenesis can be the alternative framework in which we can articulate *pratīyasamutpāda* as non-contrary to metaphysics. And later, by virtue of this redefined stance on metaphysics, we can interpret Dōgen’s metaphysics as integrated within *pratīyasamutpāda*. I will make the case for the compatibility between heterogenesis and *pratīyasamutpāda* in the upcoming analysis.

4.3.1.2 Heterogenesis

Deleuze’s heterogenesis entails that all creation of concepts including speculations on the genesis of phenomena presupposes the creation of transcendental concepts which conditions all other subordinate concepts. In other words, any creation of concepts including those intended to describe

²⁷⁸ The concept of “heterogenesis” is inspired by biologist, Gilbert Simondon’s view on the “ontogenesis,” in which “relation must be understood as constitutive, as part of the entity under consideration.” See Eliot Albert, “Deleuze’s Impersonal, Hylozoic Cosmology,” *Deleuze and Religion*, ed. Mary Bryden, (London: Routledge, 2001), 191-192. For more on Deleuze and ontogenesis also see Alliez, *The Signature of the World*, 53-62. For Deleuze’s reference to Simondon see Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 307-308. Deleuze and Guattari uses the term “heterogenesis” rather than reiterating Simondon’s term “ontogenesis,” to emphasize that every process of an ontogenesis of knowledge or concepts creates something new (something ‘other,’ ‘hetero’) out of disparate elements un-locatable and beyond the separatism of “subject” and “object” yet all relating within experience. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Graham Burchell, (New York: Columbia Univ., 1994), 20-21, 199. Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. Paul Bvains and Julian Pefanis, (Indianapolis: Indiana Univ., 1992), 50-51. See also Colebrook, 70. Alliez, 101.

causes, foundations or meanings behind reality must in fact simultaneously create or take for granted certain transcendental conditions (or cosmological frameworks) in which those concepts can make sense and function as a proposition. This entails that ideas and concepts do not by nature represent a correspondent truth. Instead, for concepts to function as ‘representational’ it must be contingent on a wider conceptual framework which is itself not ontologically grounded, but must be created within the process of thought.²⁷⁹ Here, Deleuze makes a clear distinction between what are ontologically “transcendent” and what are “transcendental concepts,” transcendental concepts having nothing to do with transcendent realities. For Deleuze, there are no transcendent “things,” but only invented transcendental concepts or conditions, which are themselves immanent to experience and are created to fulfill certain purposes.²⁸⁰ If we can apply this idea to Dōgen’s Buddhism, we can make the claim that all of his ontological and metaphysical concepts, rather than describing reality, are designed to fulfill particular practical functions in accordance to the transcendental conditions of *prafityasamutpāda*. Accordingly, Dōgen’s ideas on Buddha-nature, and temporality can be given a radically different interpretation to that of the Critical Buddhist and the comparative readings.

The nature of heterogenesis further ensures the absolute immanence²⁸¹ of empiricist philosophy. From the perspective of empiricism, any transcendental metaphysical concept, whether it be God, eternal principles, ‘truth,’ or Platonic Ideas that are believed to be the grounding principle to normative reality are not granted any sense of an assured ontological privilege as an independently existing ‘objective ground’ nor as the ‘true-way-reality-is.’ On the contrary, since modern skepticism observes that the subject/object divide cannot be adequately asserted due to the very nature of

²⁷⁹ Deleuze and Guattari make full use of the idea of heterogenesis to understand the function of concepts in their work, *What is Philosophy?* This is especially evident in the section where they discuss Descartes’ concept of the *cogito* in relation to Kant’s objection against the concept. In this work, concepts are treated as not representational, but functional and only making sense within the conceptual contingency through which it was necessitated. This is essentially an application of heterogenesis on articulating the mechanism of philosophical concepts. *What is Philosophy?*, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Graham Burchell, (New York: Columbia Univ., 1994), 26-27, 32.

²⁸⁰ In Deleuze’s words: “The transcendent is not the transcendental. Were it not for consciousness, the transcendental field would be defined as a pure plane of immanence, because it eludes all transcendence of the subject and of the object.” *Pure Immanence*, 26.

²⁸¹ What Deleuze means by immanence is an absolute immanence that “is in itself: it is not in something, *to* something; it does not depend on an object or belong to a subject. [...] Immanence is not related to Some Thing as a unity superior to all things or to a Subject as an act that brings about a synthesis of things: it is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence.” *Pure Immanence*, 26-27.

experience, empiricism considers that no transcendental metaphysical concept can really assert the objective truth of such a metaphysical reality. Rather, to the extent that such metaphysical “realities” must be conceived or interpreted through the experience of the human mind, they cannot designate independent realities, but are always created through experience. Simply put, all metaphysical realities are considered primarily as concepts of our creation and hence never ontologically transcendent, but immanent to experience.

The above perspective reflects Deleuze’s reliance upon Alfred North Whitehead’s rule of empiricism whereby “the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained; and the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced (creativity).”²⁸² Consequently, heterogenesis understands all birth of principles and transcendent grounds as a matter of practical inventions that can no longer be seen as self-contained transcendent ‘truths’ or ‘laws,’ but only as transcendental concepts fulfilling particular functions. The idea of heterogenesis, therefore, while not attributing any “objective” reality to transcendence, does not negate the functional necessity of transcendental concepts within our thought process for us to make sense of reality. Heterogenesis is therefore compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda* since it is antithetical to any claim that considers reality as existing independently or transcendently in relation to the causal process of experience. Much like how Buddhism considers phenomena as an ongoing product of the causal mingling between the *skandhas*, Deleuze’s heterogenesis allows us to understand metaphysical concepts as never representing objective realities, but always products of the process of experience. When applied to *pratītyasamutpāda*, all we have to add is that this experience *is* the experience of causality.

How heterogenesis re-conceives the relationship between metaphysics and spiritual practice can be elucidated with the example of Plato’s metaphysics. Plato’s concept of eternal forms or Ideas claims that all physical things exist in virtue of their being grounded in the transcendental reality of

²⁸² Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. vii

For a more detailed view on Whitehead’s influence on Deleuze’s conception of empiricism see Isabelle Stengers, “Deleuze and Guattari’s Last Enigmatic Message,” *Angelaki* 10.2 (2005): 164-166. Also see Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 355-356 for a statement of Deleuze’s admiration for Whitehead for doing a philosophy in which concepts are empiricist and based on experience as opposed to being representational.

eternal forms of which physical reality is a degraded copy. Plato must first create the transcendental concept of ‘eternal forms’ in order for the explanation that the forms are essential to all phenomena to be a functioning proposition that is consistent to his ontology. Rather than revealing the ‘objective truth’ of the reality of eternal forms, Plato is in fact creating that very worldview as he invents and expands on the conceptual system of his philosophy based on that transcendental condition. The worldview founded on the concept of eternal forms ultimately functions to put forth Plato’s ethical argument concerning the existence of an absolute Idea of the Good and that moral perfection lies in one’s striving to attain this Idea. This leads to the practical aspect of Plato’s metaphysics that promotes the necessity to choose to live the moral life of a philosopher. Since the fundamental worldview founded on forms influences the way Plato observes, understands and experience’s life, it also moulds the world Plato experiences. So we can say that the world Plato creates in turn also conditions and influences the development of himself, his concepts, and his spiritual exercises. This means that inasmuch as we want to explain and give answers to the question as to how the world *is*, rather than ‘objectively’ represent this world, we in fact cannot but co-create the nature of that very world we hope to explain. And in turn, the world conditions or creates our very own act of thinking and living.²⁸³ Heterogenesis then asserts the empiricist view of how the “objectivity” or “subjectivity” of the phenomenal world cannot be established as a clear divide, which makes the notion of an accurate representation of a world believed to exist outside our language and mind void of significance.

As Deleuze later supplements the concept of heterogenesis with the term, the “fold,” the process of heterogenesis can be visually expressed by the act of folding.²⁸⁴ Imagine a purely abstract piece of paper or a flat plane that is infinitely folded, and refolded to form new shapes and numerous different planes that are distinct yet inseparable to each other due to it being constituted out of one

²⁸³ Deleuze also finds a parallel to heterogenesis in the biologist Francisco Valera’s concept of autopoiesis where the “subject and object are each other’s reciprocal and simultaneous prerequisite and precondition.” Alliez, 60.

²⁸⁴ The concept of the “fold” is most extensively utilized in Deleuze’s books on Foucault and Leibniz. See Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold*, trans. Tom Conley, (London: Continuum, 2006). And Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Sean Hand, (London: Continuum, 2006). Also refer to Simon O’ Sullivan’s concise explanation of the concept of the fold on his article, *Various Entries on the Deleuze Dictionary*, <http://www.simonosullivan.net>, June 2005, Accessed September 23, 2013. <http://www.simonosullivan.net/articles/deleuze-dictionary.pdf>.

univocal substance that is the one plane. Much akin to this “folding” heterogenesis expresses the inseparability of the subject and object, the inside and the outside within the univocal process of experience from which they are simultaneously born. The relation of subject and object, abstract concepts and transcendental concepts on which they are grounded, are like folds of the same paper, their relations constantly changing, creating different folds, different shapes, different forms and relations of reality out of the same fabric that is experience.

The nature of heterogenesis assures that ‘experience’ as a transcendental ontological concept, which sustains the conditions for articulating reality in empiricist terms, is never representational in kind, but always functional. Empiricism does not make use of the concept of experience as primary to reality because this is the the ‘true-way-reality-is.’ Rather, the concept is invented as a pragmatic principle in accordance to what empiricism aspires to do, or in Deleuze’s words “philosophy must constitute itself as the theory of what we are doing, not as a theory of what there is. What we do has its principles; and being can only be grasped as the object of a synthetic relation with the very principles of what we do.”²⁸⁵ This “principle of what we do” in the case of Deleuze’s empiricism is something Deleuze learns from Hume. Deleuze inherits from Hume the understanding of the function of empiricism as the method by which the traditional philosophical obsession with truths, and grounds is replaced by a pragmatic concern for making philosophy fulfill practical moral and political concerns through the invention of concepts.²⁸⁶ As previously described, this moral concern for Deleuze is the creation of new modes for life beyond ill conscience.

The above leads to the pivotal point in Deleuzian pragmatism that is *belief*. Because modern skepticism observes that the correspondence between knowledge and truth cannot be asserted, knowledge becomes a matter of choosing which invented grounding principle to believe in.

Therefore, belief becomes naturalized, by which all knowledge becomes a matter of belief. The

²⁸⁵ Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 133.

²⁸⁶ Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 132.

According to Deleuze, “empiricists are not theoreticians, they are experimenters: they never interpret, they have no principles.” *Dialogues II*, 41.

According to Hayden, “Deleuze’s point is that Hume, like Deleuze himself, sought to make philosophy more practical, in the sense that it is directed towards questions regarding active composition of an intensive world (or worlds)” Patrick Hayden, “From Relations to Practice in the Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze,” *Man and World* 28 (1995): 284.

Also see Constatin V. Boundas, translator’s introduction to *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature*, by Gilles Deleuze (New York: Columbia Univ., 1991), 6.

significance of knowledge and concepts shifts from being ‘representative’ of ‘objective grounds’ to a matter of choosing between qualitatively different beliefs to maximize one’s aspired purpose.²⁸⁷ In contrast to doing philosophy as a search for meaning and truth, empiricism founded on modern skepticism makes philosophy primarily concerned with functions, as Deleuze mentions, “we should not ask what principles are, but what they do. They are not entities; they are functions.”²⁸⁸ Here, there is a fundamental shift of attitude in practicing philosophy, where the obsession of searching for Truth and Being shifts to pragmatically choosing what knowledge/concepts to believe in for their practical functions. Deleuze calls this shift, the “empiricist conversion.”²⁸⁹ This means that the question of philosophy is transformed from “What is truth?” “What is Being?” or “What is the meaning?” to the practical question of “How do particular matters and concepts work? Which principles should I choose? And for what purpose?” ultimately leading to the question of creating new ideas, which is “What new concepts can be made to work to fulfill particular purposes?”²⁹⁰

The question of empiricist philosophy then becomes a pragmatic choice between different concepts suiting different purposes. Therefore, Deleuze’s empiricism allows him to re-conceive the creation of metaphysical concepts beyond representation and transcendence entirely. Consequently, metaphysics becomes a method of constant experiment in creating new worldviews for the sake of maximizing our powers to realize the ethical purposes we have set. To create new ways of making sense of reality through metaphysics and ontology means to create new modes of living founded on such novel views on reality.²⁹¹ In other words, by creating an ontology, understanding the world and living in accordance to that ontology, we in fact co-create the reality we understand. This is possible

²⁸⁷ Deleuze, *Pure Immanence*, 44.

²⁸⁸ Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 132. See also Colebrook, 88.

²⁸⁹ Deleuze, *What is Philosophy?*, 74-75.

²⁹⁰ Deleuze, *Pure Immanence*, 17. And also Hayden, 287.

Deleuze’s observation is that Hume’s entire philosophy begins and is founded on top of such an “empiricist conversion.” *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 28.

²⁹¹ According to May, in Deleuze’s vision, “The destiny of philosophical concepts and philosophical positions lie not with truth or falsity of their claims but with the vistas for thinking and living they open up,” and “that way of doing philosophy is not interested in whether what is seen really exists: Is there difference really? Nor does it, like fiction, assume that there is no such thing as difference, really, but that if we make it up we can create new and interesting worlds. Philosophy is not inspired by truth, but it is not inspired by fiction either. Instead, philosophy creates a way of seeing this world in which we live that disturbs the verities we are presented with, that opens up new ways of seeing and of conceiving this world that, rather than true or false, are interesting, remarkable, or important.” May, *Gilles Deleuze*, 22.

since we come to understand that the way we conceive of ourselves and the world is profoundly related to how we choose and design our lives. Thus to explore and to change how we perceive and understand reality *is* to change the way we live.

Such a practical approach to metaphysics is fully applicable to *pratītyasamutpāda* since it is detached from any concern for the realism of existence or of ontological grounds. Heterogenesis repeats none of the problems rooted in conceiving being or ideas as independently existing (i.e. *svabhāva*) which made representation, essentialism, foundationalism, realism and transcendentalism all problematic from the side of *pratītyasamutpāda*. The concern is shifted from the attachment to the assurance of existence and grounds to how we can make concepts function and for what ethical purpose.

Conclusively, each of my analysis of Deleuze's ethical and empiricist backgrounds as well as their development into the pragmatist concept of heterogenesis made the case that Deleuze's pragmatism is fully compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*. Therefore pragmatism and heterogenesis allows us to overcome the prejudice that Dōgen's metaphysics must be 'corresponding' to an ultimate 'truth.' When this pragmatist stance is applied to a reading of Dōgen, the question is transformed from a concern for "What is the true nature of reality Dōgen is referring to?" or "What is the truth of Dōgen's words?" to "How can Dōgen's philosophy be reinterpreted in a manner that enhances Buddhist practice founded on *pratītyasamutpāda*?" Such a reinterpretation will be attempted in the next chapter. However, before this is possible we must overcome another prejudice that was problematic in the Critical Buddhist interpretation of Dōgen. The prejudice that *pratītyasamutpāda* is incompatible with ontology despite itself harbouring ontological elements. No reading of Dōgen's metaphysics can be considered to adhere to *pratītyasamutpāda* as long as this prejudice is not sufficiently explained away. I will analyze in the next section how applying heterogenesis to an understanding of how *pratītyasamutpāda* relates to spiritual practice may help reason why *pratītyasamutpāda* is compatible with ontology.

4.3.2 Articulating Pratītyasamutpāda through Heterogenesis

If we recall Matsumoto and Kasulis's views on Dōgen, they both rejected ontology as by nature 'representational.' In the case of Matsumoto, this implied that pratītyasamutpāda is completely incompatible with ontology despite it ensuing the ontological criteria upon which all other dhātu-vādic ontologies were negated. Denying an ontological sense in pratītyasamutpāda is bound to be a paradoxical claim. The reason is as follows: even if pratītyasamutpāda is understood through basic Buddhist phenomenology as a practical explanation that human suffering happens due to a causal process amongst the nidānas/skandhas, one is still taking the law of causality as a transcendental ontological and epistemological premise with which to understand reality and oneself.

Applying the framework of heterogenesis in articulating the relationship of pratītyasamutpāda to Buddhist practice may help construct a counter argument to the above prejudice. By shifting from correspondence theory to pragmatism, pratītyasamutpāda can be understood like any other concept; that it is a heterogenesis. Pratītyasamutpāda is not an independently existing law granted ontological and epistemological privileges as a universally valid explanation to reality that solves all problems regardless of differences in environment. Rather, the concept of pratītyasamutpāda is conditioned by the Buddhist values within which it functions; that is to end suffering and to be practically founded on the primacy of altruistic ethics. In this way, pratītyasamutpāda is itself a heterogenetic concept that is the simultaneous prerequisite and precondition on which these Buddhist values are both formed from and function within as practical alternatives for the Buddhist to realize a 'better' life outside of the worldviews of normative society.

Understanding pratītyasamutpāda as a heterogenesis solves the conundrum of pratītyasamutpāda as hosting an ontological aspect despite being antithetical to the conception of any other (dhātu-vādic) ontology. The problem of if pratītyasamutpāda is or is not compatible with metaphysics, is transformed from a concern for the acceptance or non-acceptance of an underlying ontological nature to pratītyasamutpāda, to how this ontological aspect of pratītyasamutpāda can be

conceptually interpreted and utilized for the sake of enhancing practical functions. The common prejudice that ontology describes a corresponding reality, as well as Critical Buddhism's hesitance of seeing *prafityasamutpāda* as compatible with ontology is overcome. The ontological aspects *prafityasamutpāda* entails do not have to be understood as representational, but simply as pragmatically functional for the sake of enhancing the practical purpose of fulfilling altruistic ethics through correct insight into causality. *Prafityasamutpāda* does not describe reality in any representational sense; rather, it assumes the role of doing so as a transcendental condition upon which the Buddha's teachings and practices targeted at the cultivation of altruism and the overcoming of suffering will work.

The 'empiricist conversion' of Deleuze suggested that concepts do not have to be asserted by 'objective' reality for it to have a practical effect. All that is necessary is that one has an evaluative understanding and conviction (or 'belief') in the concept they choose as practically useful in its function to yield effects for their aspired purpose. As such, *prafityasamutpāda* functions as the transcendental concept which Buddhist's must believe in order to make subsequent concepts and spiritual practices function effectively for the sake of the ethical purposes set by *prafityasamutpāda*. Consequently, *prafityasamutpāda* can be understood as the absolutely foundational framework, or the transcendental condition upon which the Buddhist spiritual techniques of self-care, targeted at the elimination of suffering and the cultivation of an ethical mind/conduct, functions most effectively as an internally consistent system of practices.

Such an understanding of *prafityasamutpāda* makes it possible to reconcile Buddhism founded on the centrality of *prafityasamutpāda* with the idea of utilizing metaphysical concepts. *Prafityasamutpāda* and metaphysics are not mutually exclusive; rather the former conditions the pragmatic utility of the later. Buddhist metaphysics do not/or need to correspond to the 'true-way-reality-is,' for its purpose is to pragmatically enhance the effectivity of the spiritual practices founded on the idea of *prafityasamutpāda*. In the next chapter, this view on the practicality of the concept of *prafityasamutpāda* will be the basis on which I will re-interpret Dōgen's ontological understanding of *prafityasamutpāda* expressed in his concept of Total-function.

Now that the pragmatist framework which overcomes the prejudice that Dōgen's metaphysics is by nature 'representational' and that praṭīyasamutpāda is incompatible with metaphysics has been clarified, I will move on to analyze the final set of conceptual tools the present study hopes to borrow from Deleuze. These are the metaphysics of difference and its articulation through the concepts of 'virtuality' and 'actuality.'

4.4 Making Pluralism = Monism: Virtuality and Actuality

The concepts in question here are Deleuze's view of *multiplicity* or *difference* (what he also calls "*internal difference*" and *becoming*) in relation to a dynamic univocity made possible through his understanding of giving reality two qualities; that of the *virtual* and the *actual*. These concepts may be useful for the current study in order to interpret Dōgen's seemingly paradoxical views on temporality. We had seen in the Critical Buddhist and comparative interpretations of Dōgen, that his views on temporality as somehow simultaneously singular as Dharma-positions and continuous in a holistic manner posited a great difficulty for it to be interpreted in adherence to praṭīyasamutpāda. Critical Buddhism denounced the idea as founded on the Hongaku premise of constant-abiding implying a reliance on an ontological locus. I had analyzed that Abe, Heine, and Kasulis all followed suit in utilizing a variation of the constant-abiding based reasoning. The singular instants of Dharma-positions were considered participating in the interdependent totality of an ever-constant realm of primordial enlightenment, hence simultaneously singular and whole without having to compromise its singularity. As long as such a line of reasoning continues to be applied to Dōgen, his metaphysics of time cannot be understood as in concurrence with praṭīyasamutpāda. How can Deleuze's concepts of virtuality and actuality help us free Dōgen's views on time from such a reliance on an ontological locus and help make sense of it as functional in accordance to praṭīyasamutpāda?

The current section will analyze how describing reality through the dual concepts of virtuality and actuality supplements the aforementioned concept of heterogenesis with an exclusively metaphysical connotation. Virtuality and actuality may be functioning by way of tying seemingly

dualistic and hierarchical ontological concepts into an immanent univocal structure by making them share one and the same sense of reality whereby each side becomes each other's prerequisite and precondition. In this sense, virtuality and actuality helps articulate the ontological relationship between individual phenomena and a metaphysical totality to which they are connected, in a manner that bypasses transcendence, foundationalism and the subject/object divide of correspondence theory. If so, these ideas may help resolve the seemingly paradoxical coexistence of singularity with univocity found in Dōgen's metaphysics in a manner congruent with *pratītyasamutpāda*.

4.4.1 Univocity and Empiricism

Much of Deleuze's concepts in question here have been inspired by Bergson and are elucidated in Deleuze's works *Bergsonism*, and *Difference and Repetition*. A significant portion of what I analyze below are based on these works. However, 'univocity' is a concept Deleuze inherits from the ontological debate harking back to Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. This concept merits a brief introduction. For Aquinas humans can only speak of God analogously. For example, when one says, "God is good," the "goodness" of God is only applicable in an analogous sense to human "goodness." Therefore, God never shares the same 'predicate' with that of humans, implying a qualitative difference in 'being' between God and man. Duns Scotus objected to Aquinas by claiming that things are describable in the same sense described of God, implying that both God and man shared the same sense of 'being,' though in a modally distinct manner (i.e. in differences of degree).²⁹² Therefore, for Duns Scotus, it can be said that both God's and man's 'being' is attributed 'univocally.' Deleuze's borrows his use of the concept of 'univocity' from this idea designating how all beings share the same sense of 'being.' However, Deleuze creates a maxim for the 'univocity of being' in a radically different manner from Duns Scotus. For Deleuze univocity means that, "being is said in a

²⁹² Dun Scotus's inference is that if what we can say of the 'being' of normative phenomena were only analogous to God vice a versa, then the significance of metaphysics itself will crumble. The object of metaphysics is not God, but its goal, that is to come closer to revealing the nature of Gods existence through discourse on being. If so, the theory that postulates we cannot speak of God as sharing a univocal 'being' with his creations, voids the possibility of constructing any a posteriori arguments establishing the existence of God. Hence, for Scotus, God and his creation must share a univocal sense of 'being.' For Scotus, the idea that human thinking can describe of God analogously already implies univocity.

single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself.”²⁹³ In other words Deleuze’s concept of univocity has a Spinozist overtone which allows us to rephrase the above quote as follows: there is one substance which constitute reality, this substance is difference itself, and by virtue of this fact, all individual phenomena share the same sense, that is difference. Deleuze’s view on univocity also amounts to saying that for him, “pluralism = monism.”²⁹⁴

The above proposition echoes an earlier Spinozist formula I have used to describe Deleuze’s ontology of empiricist ‘experience,’ whereby the univocal ‘substance’ constituting all phenomena was said to be ‘experience.’ Deleuze tends to repeat concepts that function in identical ways throughout his oeuvre, but by supplementing it with completely different terms in accordance with their intended setting. Such is the case with his idea of empiricist experience which is interchangeable with other concepts as in the case of his proposition concerning the univocity of being, where ‘experience’ is supplemented with the concept of ‘difference itself.’ In short, for Deleuze, the empiricist notion of experience *is* difference itself.²⁹⁵

The fact that Deleuze’s view on ‘difference’ supplements his empiricist views on ‘experience’ is opportune for the current study as it ensures the compatibility between Deleuze’s metaphysics of difference with *prafītyasamutpāda*. As I had analyzed previously, Deleuze’s viewed that experience is prior to any other ontological, epistemological or psychological category and that everything we come to ‘understand’ about phenomena is itself always conditioned by experience. This idea did not contradict Buddhism’s view that phenomena is always a product of the experience of the causal interaction between the *skandhas*. The fact that the metaphysics of ‘actuality’ and ‘virtuality’ is founded on such a view on ‘experience’ or ‘difference,’ in addition to Deleuze’s fundamental pragmatism which makes his metaphysical concepts purely practical as opposed to representational, allows for the basic inference that these concepts are non-contradictory to *prafītyasamutpāda*.

²⁹³ Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 36.

²⁹⁴ Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 23. For Deleuze “pluralism” is equivalent to “empiricism,” designating a way of perceiving philosophy as founded on the primacy of experience/difference. Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson, (New York: Columbia Univ., 1986), 4.

²⁹⁵ Boundas, 7-8. Bergsonian process metaphysics therefore adds onto Deleuze’s empiricist foundations to make his philosophy “an empiricism for which difference is the generative force of the actual.” Hayden, 283.

The concepts of virtuality and actuality helps Deleuze articulate his view that “pluralism = monism” within the framework of his metaphysics of ‘difference.’ Therefore, understanding these concepts and to make the conclusive case that they are compatible with *prātīyasamutpāda* necessitates an analysis of Deleuze’s views on ‘difference.’

4.4.2 The Virtual Univocity of Actual Differences

In accordance to Deleuze’s empiricism and loyalty to absolute immanence, he wants to find a way to articulate abstract concepts of difference in a manner that do not rely on principles of transcendence and identity/representation which he sees exemplified in Hegel’s notion of difference.²⁹⁶ The alternative Deleuze finds to Hegelian difference is giving Bergson’s understanding of pure difference, or ‘difference itself’ as internal production, a Scholastic interpretation as internal cause, or *causa sui*. Here difference is not created and sustained by dialectics based on an accidental reliance to an Other (where difference is always a secondary attribute to being), but is primary to being as it’s own necessary continuous self-production²⁹⁷ of difference, what Deleuze later, in *Difference and Repetition*, calls ‘*internal difference*.’²⁹⁸ This means, phenomenal reality is considered a movement or process of *becoming* that is continuously producing its own difference through self-differentiation

²⁹⁶ Deleuze understands Hegel’s difference as fundamentally based in identity since difference can only be conceived in contrast to others as a negation of what it is not. In addition it hosts transcendentalism since negation functions in a way which preserves its own absolute self-identity (in order to create difference from contrast) and this allows Hegel to assert negation as a transcendent form of understanding “which supersedes in such a way to preserve and maintain what is superseded, and consequently survives its own supersession.”

G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Trans. A.V. Miller, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998), 115.

Hegelian difference also hosts a sense of universalist reductionism where negation promises the return of an ultimate convergence of all difference back to unity brought on by the power of double negation as synthesis. In Hegel Deleuze sees a philosophy that opposes the one and the multiple that ultimately tries to subsume the later to the former by the encompassing totality of contradiction, thus what is essentially a grand archetype of “common sense” ontology that easily complements the state apparatus that is supportive of reducing individual singularities under the oppressive unity of a central power.

For Deleuze, the concept of difference as based on Hegel’s dialectical negation cannot fulfill the prerequisite for a positive ontology that can free difference from being conceived in connection to representation and transcendence so that it can be given unreserved affirmation for its creative properties. Deleuze observes contradiction as a concept arrived through a purely abstract theoretical basis and is too general and inefficient to make sense of singular differences, since “the singular will never be attained by correcting a generality with another generality.” Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam, (New York: Zone Book, 1988), 14-15.

²⁹⁷ Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1993), 6-8, 17.

²⁹⁸ Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 97.

without the need of any oppositional or contrasting identity against other beings. This means that internal difference is always a qualitative difference, or a differing in kind. Since the process of self-differentiation never repeats the same, but is always a *repetition of difference*, internal differences cannot be conceived in comparison or contrast to sameness (i.e. in accordance to identity), as they are always singularities.²⁹⁹ In continuity with Deleuze's empiricist view of phenomena as the shifting process of experience, this view of difference as internally changing singularities does not impede with the Buddhist view of impermanence as it precludes any sense of self-identity or independent existence.

Deleuze's internal difference is juxtaposed with another kind of difference originally articulated by Bergson as 'discrete multiplicity.' Discrete multiplicity designates the kind of conceptualization of difference based on quantitative differences, numerical differences or differences of degree as opposed to the qualitative difference of internal difference.³⁰⁰ Discrete difference is proximal to the actual physical difference we usually take difference to be when interacting with reality. It is the kind of difference we think is differentiated in relation to each other, like how we will differentiate on terms of comparison/contrast and juxtapose a tree to a human being and count them as separate entities. In accordance with the absolute immanence entailed by his philosophy, Deleuze wants to avoid creating a hierarchy between internal difference and discrete differences by giving one side a transcendent ontological status at the expense of the other.

In order to preserve the integrity of absolute immanence without reiterating representation / identity, Deleuze adopts Bergson's ideas to create an immanent metaphysics whereby singular differences can coexist with a sense of a univocal relationship amongst all differences. The aim for such a metaphysics being neither to reinforce a sense of difference as a collection of monadic singularities un-relative to each other nor reinforce a kind of universal reductionism Deleuze sees in

²⁹⁹ Much akin to the vitalist philosophy of Bergson from which Deleuze is strongly influenced, the concept of internal difference or becoming always has a metaphysical connotation to it in the sense that it designates a sense of an undercurrent or "substance" to phenomena as a constantly changing processual flow of creation (what Bergson understands is the vital force of life itself, of life's force of self-production beyond determination, what he calls the *élan vital* which works within a particular time he calls *pure duration* which expresses itself as constant movement). See John Marks, *Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity*, (London: Pluto Press, 1998). Marks makes a strong point as to the deep influence of vitalism on Deleuze's philosophy.

³⁰⁰ Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 39-42.

Hegel which subsumes all difference to the unity of sameness. Therefore, the question becomes, how can some sort of univocal continuity be constructed amongst internal differences, which are absolutely singular to each other (and therefore resist homogenization)? This question also amounts to asking how can the purely abstract difference of internal difference be connected to physical discrete differences? In effect, creating a metaphysics which successfully answers these questions leads to fulfilling the seemingly paradoxical formula of “pluralism = monism,” whereby the multiplicity of singular differences exists in a univocal relationship.

Deleuze finds in Bergson a metaphysics that answers this question by making internal difference simultaneously coexist with a sense of dynamic univocity amongst each singularity without reduction to universality. This is achieved by one of Deleuze’s most central metaphysical concepts adopted from Bergson, that of placing two distinct qualities to reality: the *virtual* and *actual*. Deleuze adopts these terms from Bergson’s distinction of two concepts of being; first is what amounts to Bergson’s view of pure being, the infinitely cumulating totality of processual internal difference in itself, *pure duration* or its accumulation as *pure recollection*, which are *virtualities* and secondly the expression of *pure recollection* in physical form as individual discrete differences which are *actualities*. What links the virtual to the actual is the vital process of differentiation that is the movement of actual differences passing into a cumulative virtual past within the creative process of becoming (or ‘duration’).

Deleuze considers pure recollection as not only an accumulation of all passing moments, but simultaneously a metaphysical collection of all future potentiality.³⁰¹ Therefore, pure duration is a constant indivisible process of self-differing actualizing or ‘individuating’ metaphysical ‘potentials’ into physical differences which constantly passes and accumulates back into duration as pure recollection. Consequently, the simultaneous correlation between future potential actualizing into the present, and passing into memory entails that the future, present and past share one and the same sense of reality and leads to granting a purely metaphysical status to past memory. *Pure recollection* is not a

³⁰¹ Deleuze eventually conceptualizes duration/pure recollection in combination with his interpretation of Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ as a non-linear and circular time movement that folds back onto itself. Consequently, pure recollection not only designates an ontologically accumulative “pure past,” but also simultaneously denotes the infinite totality of all future potentiality.

subjective psychological memory, but a purely ontological memory as an impersonal *virtuality*, or *duration itself*, which works as “a single past in which all psychological memory participate.”³⁰² Here the virtual reality of the past as pure recollection becomes more than a subjective reality, since it coexists simultaneously with the actual present as each other’s simultaneous prerequisite and precondition.³⁰³

The virtual and actual are always constituted of the same ontological reality, which is the infinite self-differentiating process of potentiality continuously actualizing (or ‘individuating’) into events. All discrete differences will be understood as the continuously actualizing expressions of the one virtual ‘substance’ that is the internally differing process of pure duration/experience. Hence, we can observe that pure duration/recollection functions as the transcendental condition within which a sense of univocity is assigned to all individual differences. The plurality of all singularly individuating differences are univocal to each other by virtue of participating in one indivisible process of pure duration. Consequently, the relation between virtuality and actuality creates a consistency out of the seeming paradox of Deleuze’s claim that “pluralism = monism” and reinforces his rule of univocity where “being is said of [...] in a single and same sense, of all its individuating differences.”³⁰⁴

We can now see that concepts such as ‘pure recollection’ or ‘pure duration’ function as the virtual, transcendental conditions by which the univocal relationship between actual differences is constituted. On the other hand, the nature of actual discrete differences passing into a virtual past, or the process of potentials actualizing into concrete events mutually functions as the condition on which the transcendental condition is possible. In other words, virtual conditions and actual expressions always function in a heterogenetic manner in which they are each other’s reciprocal precondition and prerequisite. Whether the concepts of virtuality and actuality are explained through the relationship between singular differences passing to a pure recollection, or as virtual potentials actualizing into individual events, the fundamental function of the concepts remains the same. Virtuality and actuality

³⁰² May, *Gilles Deleuze* 47.

³⁰³ Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 55-60.

³⁰⁴ Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 36.

always function by tying seemingly dualistic and hierarchical ontological concepts into an immanent univocity by having them share one and the same sense of reality whereby each side becomes each other's prerequisite and precondition.

At first glance it is easy to mistake Deleuze's binary concept of virtuality/actuality as a logic of transcendental monism whereby the metaphysical Oneness of pure duration overrides individual differences by reduction to the 'Oneness of Being.'³⁰⁵ If this was the case, there is no way the concept can be compatible with *prāṭītyasamutpāda* as it will imply foundationalism. This is why it is significant to understand Deleuze's metaphysics in reference to his pragmatist/empiricist framework and as an application of heterogenesis. Accordingly, we can see that the virtual has no correspondence to Being since Deleuze's empiricism shifted his concern from the question of what is Being to the question of phenomena as experience. In addition, his pragmatism assured that no metaphysical concept needs to represent reality, but to fulfill functions for intended purposes. Virtual concepts whether it be pure duration, pure recollection, impersonal experience, or internal difference, do not describe or correspond to substantive reality, but are utilized upon the understanding that they are purely abstract concepts significant only to the extent they can fulfill certain practical purposes.

Furthermore, heterogenesis allows us to clarify that the relationship between the virtual and actual are not unilateral, and reductive where the virtual presides over the actual, but rather each is each other's prerequisite and precondition. Therefore, the concepts of virtuality and actuality can be used to understand the relationship between transcendental metaphysical concepts and the individual phenomenon the concepts purport to explain: transcendental concepts are the virtual conditions on

³⁰⁵ This kind of interpretation of Deleuze is exemplified by Badiou who assumes that Deleuze's binary concepts such as virtual/actual shows a relationship whereby "going beyond a static (quantitative) opposition always turns out to involve the qualitative raising up of one of its terms."

Alain Badiou, *Deleuze the Clamour of Being*, Trans. Louise Burchill, (Minneapolis: Minnesota Univ. 2002), 10. Therefore according to Badiou, ontological priority always lies in those concepts which are variations of univocal reality (i.e. the virtual) which Badiou views is what constitutes a "beings qua Being" for Deleuze since "beings are but modalities of the One, and the One is the living production of its modes (Badiou, 48)." For Badiou, Deleuze is simply a disguised recurrence of a metaphysics of the One ala Plato.

Peter Hallward argues in continuity with Badiou, that Deleuze's ontology and metaphysics of difference prioritizes the virtual above the actual, always abstracting the actual to virtuality and therefore is a "philosophy of (virtual) difference without (actual) others."

Peter Hallward, *Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation: Out of this World*, (London: Verso 2006), 3.

The common problem in these readings of Deleuze is that they ignore Deleuze's pragmatist framework in understanding metaphysics as well as his understanding of concepts as heterogenesis.

which actual phenomena are placed, both made to share one and the same sense of reality (which for Deleuze was experience/internal difference). This sense of univocity between the concepts of virtuality and actuality reinforces an immanent and non-representational ontological status of transcendental concepts such as “pure duration,” “becoming,” empiricist “experience,” etc. in relation to the actual phenomena linked to these concepts.

The virtual and actual form a simultaneous heterogenesis, a fold unto each other out of the same fabric that is difference/experience much like how transcendental concepts and the phenomena these concepts explain are each other’s simultaneous prerequisite and precondition. As a result, ‘virtuality’ and ‘actuality’ can be considered fully compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda* since it does not imply any sense of correspondence theory, realism, essentialism, transcendentalism, foundationalism or hindrance to practical ethics. Therefore, these concepts can be utilized to explain Dōgen’s metaphysical concepts that describe reality both on a transcendental holistic level and on an individual level without having to conjure the image of a literal ontological transcendence by connecting both levels of reality within a univocal relationship. I will demonstrate in the next chapter how applying this concept on Dōgen’s views on time as Dharma-positions, and it’s relation to a universalized sense of Buddha-nature as ‘Total-function’ will allow for an interpretation which makes sense of its seeming paradox in a manner congruent to *pratītyasamutpāda*.

4.5 Conclusion: Deleuzian Pragmatism and *Pratītyasamutpāda*

Through the course of this chapter I had argued that each aspect of Deleuze’s pragmatism were all compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*. Beginning with his ethical concerns against representation and transcendence, his idea of heterogenesis which founded his view of metaphysics as practical, ending with his metaphysics of actuality/virtuality. Consequently I concluded that all of these ideas are applicable to Buddhist doctrine. This was because Deleuze’s ideas do not negate *pratītyasamutpāda*, but can complement it.

The reason for the complementarity was twofold: First, both concern philosophy in terms of

its practicality for the sake of fulfilling an ethical purpose. Second, both *pratītyasamutpāda* and Deleuze's philosophy are antithetical to similar philosophical ideas. Namely, these ideas were:

- 1) *Representation or identity*, both as the identity between knowledge and object as well as the self-identity of phenomena such as believing there can be a thing-in-itself or a constant Self.
- 2) *Subject/object duality or objective and conceptual realism* implying the belief that reality and/or ideas exist in-and-of-itself independently of the process of experience.
- 3) *Transcendence* implying the existence of privileged ontological realities as God, Self or Truth viewed as the principle to or essence to phenomena existing beyond experience.
- 4) *Essentialism and foundationalism*, implying the existence of essences, foundations, truths or meanings that grounds phenomena and knowledge beyond or prior to experience awaiting to be discovered.

Deleuze's pragmatism can be restated in a somewhat ontological manner. From the perspective of Deleuze's pragmatism, no assertable "objective reality" or entities can be said to exist, and the least we can say is that *only functions are happening*. Consequently Deleuze's concepts do not understand reality as substantively grounded in any manner, but always as happening in the form of a process of shifting functional relations amongst experiences un-locatable in any exclusive positions (i.e. "outside" vs. "inside"). These aspects of Deleuze's philosophy makes his concepts completely compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda*'s view that no independent, self-asserting substantive reality can exist, but that *only the experience of causality is happening*. The only supplementation needed to make Deleuzian empiricism/pragmatism fully compatible with *pratītyasamutpāda* is to specify the priority of experience constituting phenomena as the *experience of causality*.

Deleuze's fundamental pragmatism leads him to view thought as not representing some "outside" reality, but significant inasmuch as they fulfill functions. Deleuze's concept of heterogenesis presented a way of understanding the relationship between transcendental metaphysical concepts and subordinate philosophical concepts as neither representational, nor hierarchical and dualistic. Rather, concepts exist in an inseparable and mutually ever-changing process of folding in

which they are each other's prerequisite and precondition. Transcendental metaphysical concepts do not (and do not have to) represent corresponding absolute truths; rather, they are a necessary function for our process of making sense of the world. Through heterogenesis, concepts are understood as a practical part of how we experience reality in forming the way we understand its nature.

Accordingly, I had resolved the prejudice that *prañīyasamutpāda* is incompatible with ontology by considering *prañīyasamutpāda* as itself a heterogenetic concept, a transcendental concept which conditions all Buddhist philosophy and practice. Consequently, any metaphysical or ontological concept can be utilized in Buddhism given they can function within the conditions of *prañīyasamutpāda*. Upon this basis, we can now interpret the way Dōgen's metaphysical concepts may function within the framework of *prañīyasamutpāda*.

In summary, our original interpretation of Dōgen will utilize the following tools elucidated in this chapter. First, Deleuze's pragmatism laid out an alternative attitude in doing philosophy that is to be centred on how concepts function and for what practical purpose as opposed to describing the 'true-way-reality-is.' This will be the fundamental stance I will take for granted in interpreting Dōgen. Second, with regards to expressing reality, Deleuze's pragmatism amounted to saying that only functions (or relations) are happening as opposed to asserting the existence of objective entities. This may be helpful when interpreting Dōgen's concept of Total-function as a key to unfolding his ideas on Buddha-nature and time. Third, there is a way to articulate differences as singular yet existing in a univocal relationship to each other by virtue of the concepts of 'virtuality' and 'actuality.' By utilizing this binary concept, singular differences can be understood as sharing (or participating in) a univocal sense of reality with metaphysical reality. In this way, singular differences can be connected with transcendental concepts that designate a sense of unity without reliance on principles of representation or transcendence, nor do they have to exist in a paradoxical, or hierarchical relationship in which differences are subsumed by the 'perfection' or 'grounding' of the One. Rather, the concepts of both difference and unity can be seen as working in an immanent relationship between virtuality and actuality in which they are each other's simultaneous prerequisite and precondition. This concept may become useful when interpreting Dōgen's seemingly paradoxical claims of the

simultaneous singularity of time and phenomena as Dharma-positions and its univocity within Total-function. As to how all of these concepts will be put to full use, we shall see in the upcoming chapter where I will present my “new” interpretation of Dōgen’s metaphysics.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE FUNCTIONING UNIVERSE - RE-READING DŌGEN'S METAPHYSICS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a new reading of Dōgen's understanding of Buddha-nature and temporality in relation to practice via a key reinterpretation of Dōgen's concept of *Zenki* 全機, or *Total-function*. The task will be achieved by adapting Deleuze's pragmatist approach to utilizing metaphysics. My goal is to interpret Dōgen's ideas in a manner that affirms his use of metaphysical concepts while fully adhering to *pratīyasamutpāda*. To the extent that *pratīyasamutpāda* is central to Buddhism in order for it to function ethically, a "Buddhist" metaphysical system cannot endanger its basic principles. I had argued in the previous chapter that one way to understand *pratīyasamutpāda* as incorporating metaphysics is to conceive the significance of ontology as pragmatically designed for practice as opposed to being explicatory or corresponding to a 'true-way-reality-is.' This way Buddhist ontology does not have to be either 'positive' or 'negative' in having to imply a corresponding relation to substantive truths; indeed, it does not have to imply *any* relation to substantive truths. Rather, ontology is understood as a set of ideas whose necessity and status of reality is granted to the extent that it fulfills practical functions whose directive is dictated by *pratīyasamutpāda*.

As I have previously explained,³⁰⁶ this pragmatic rereading of *pratīyasamutpāda* in Deleuzian terms means that *pratīyasamutpāda* is itself a heterogenetic concept that is simultaneously its own fundamental prerequisite and precondition upon which all other ontological ideas and practices functions in accordance. In this chapter, I will apply such an understanding of *pratīyasamutpāda* on a

³⁰⁶ See chap. 4 section 4.3.2

reading of Dōgen's concept of Total-function. Total-function then becomes the transcendental condition within whose framework, Dōgen's ideas on Buddha-nature and temporality works in contingency for the sake of aiding spiritual practice. Ultimately, this will free Dōgen's metaphysics from the correspondence theory of truth, realism, essentialism and foundationalism and reconsider it as integral to praxis, and suggest that to think metaphysically in itself constitute part of a spiritual exercise. Seeking this line of thought concerns the answering of the following questions through the course of the current chapter. How can we reinterpret Dōgen's metaphysical ideas of Buddha-nature and time in a manner which is congruent to *pratītyasamutpāda* and while affirming Dōgen's priority for practice? Can the pragmatist concept of heterogenesis help interpret the concept of Total-function as a key into Dōgen's metaphysics as a whole? If so, how will Total-function make consistent sense out of Dōgen's ideas of singular Dharma-positions and Buddha-nature without having to revert to *dhātu-vāda*? How will these interpretations differ from what we had seen in Critical Buddhism and the comparative interpretations?

This chapter will begin with an original reinterpretation of Dōgen's 'Total-function.' The concept may be understood as giving a metaphysical sense to *pratītyasamutpāda* yet in a manner that undercuts the kind of *dhātu-vāda* associated with Hongaku thought. My aim is to elaborate on how the concept of Total-function can become a transcendental condition upon which Dōgen's other ontological concepts of *Total-exertion* (Gūjin 究尽), *Buddha-nature* (Busshō 仏性), time as *Living-time* (Uji 有時), and *Dharma-positions* (Hōi 法位) are integrated to function. Secondly, I will reinterpret Dōgen's idea of Buddha-nature in relation to Total-function. This will be done through close analysis of how Dōgen conceived of human activity as involved within the holistic process of phenomena that is denoted by his idea of *Practice-confirmation* (Shushō 修証) and Total-exertion. Finally, I will reinterpret Dōgen's metaphysics of time in relation to Total-function with emphasis on his idea of Dharma-positions and *momentary-passage* (kyoryaku 経歴) that explains how he conceived time as both singular moments and multi-directionally continuous. Both Dōgen's ideas on Buddha-nature and time will be dealt with side by side since I view that they can be strongly

associated with each other through the concept of Total-function and essentially share very similar structures. I will utilize Deleuze's idea on pragmatism, heterogenesis and virtuality/actuality throughout these sections of the chapter in order to re-conceive Dōgen's metaphysical concepts as ultimately pragmatically designed to function in ways that enhance Buddhist practice/life as opposed to explicating the 'true-way-reality-is.'

5.2 Re-Ontologizing Prañīyasamutpāda: Dōgen's Total-Functioning of the Universe

In chapter two we saw how Matsumoto used the Hongaku concept of constant-abiding as a key to interpret Dōgen's metaphysics. On the other hand, I had analyzed in chapter three how the comparative interpretations, while they may not have referred to the concept by name, also utilized the same logic as constant-abiding in explaining Dōgen's views on Buddha-nature and time. To the extent that constant-abiding was philologically in debt to Hongaku-shisō and was by nature dhātu-vāda, this consequently lead to interpretations of Dōgen's metaphysics which negates prañīyasamutpāda. I had also shown how both the Critical Buddhists and the comparative scholars shared the common prejudice that ontology is 'representational' and how this may have influenced the choice of constant-abiding as their preferred key to read Dōgen. In addition, the choice itself enhanced their presumption that Dōgen's metaphysics must be 'describing' a 'true-way-reality-is' which by nature limited Dōgen within the bounds of correspondence theory and dhātu-vāda. Therefore, I had concluded that constant-abiding is not an effective concept to utilize if we are to interpret Dōgen beyond dhātu-vāda.

What happens if we divorce Dōgen's metaphysics entirely from correspondence theory and replace constant-abiding with another concept to function as key into Dōgen's metaphysics? Despite the influence of his Hongaku and Zen upbringing, Dōgen articulates a highly original ontological understanding of prañīyasamutpāda. This becomes evident in Dōgen's concept of *Total-function* or *Zenki* (全機). I consider *Zenki*, or *Total-function* to be a perfect contender for such a key concept to unfold Dōgen's metaphysics. Unlike constant-abiding which Matsumoto ties to Dōgen through

philological inference, Total-function is an original concept Dōgen himself uses prominently in the *Shōbōgenzō*. In contrast to the Critical Buddhist and the comparative scholars who interpreted Dōgen with reference to Hongaku-shisō through constant-abiding and Jiji-muge-hokkai, I will show how Total-function works in a manner contrary to dhātu-vāda. Hence, Total-function may help break Dōgen away from his seeming proximity to Hongaku-shisō.

Moreover, I will show in this section how Total-function is Dōgen's own interpretation and application of *pratītyasamutpāda* within his philosophy. Given that Total-function is Dōgen's particular understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda*, we will see that it can be understood as the basic concept on which all of Dōgen's other metaphysical ideas on Buddha-nature and temporality function. With the help of Deleuze's 'heterogenesis,' I will argue how Total-function can be understood to be the transcendental condition within which Dōgen's other metaphysical concepts can be articulated in adherence to *pratītyasamutpāda*. This means, Total-function can be seen as a metaphysical concept that implies *pratītyasamutpāda* as the condition on which to make sense of phenomena as a whole. To conceive of reality as Total-function can work as a spiritual exercise with which to reconsider the nature of 'self' and of our daily experiences. In this manner, Total-function acts as a practical critique to normative understandings of reality in order to replace it with *pratītyasamutpāda*. Ultimately, this will enable Dōgen's philosophy to become a heterogenetic system of practical philosophy founded on an original ontological and epistemological³⁰⁷ adaptation of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

5.2.1 Phenomena as Total-Function

Total-function is most extensively dealt with in the "Zenki" fascicle of the *Shōbōgenzō*. In this fascicle, Dōgen articulates his own understanding of how to make sense of the significance of life and death in accordance to *pratītyasamutpāda* (as causal co-dependency). In order to elaborate on what Total-function means, I will like to give particular emphasis on the following passage:

³⁰⁷ We will later see that Dōgen's ontology of *pratītyasamutpāda* also involves epistemological elements as he applies Total-function on an idea of 'mind' and how it interacts with reality.

Life can be likened to a time when a person is sailing in a boat. On this boat, I am operating the sail, I have taken the rudder, I am pushing the pole; at the same time, the boat is carrying me, and there is no “I” beyond the boat. Through my sailing of the boat, this boat is being caused to be a boat – let us consider, and learn in practice, just this moment of the present. At this very moment, there is nothing other than the world of the boat; the sky, the water, the shore have all become the moment of the boat, which is utterly different from moments not on the boat. So life is what I am making it, and I am what life is making me. While I am sailing in the boat, my body and mind and circumstances and self are all essential parts of the boat; and the whole earth and the whole of space are all essential parts of the boat.³⁰⁸

Taking the analogy of sailing on a boat, here Dōgen elucidates how a particular activity in life is made possible by a web of causally related processes. *Pratītyasamutpāda* is incorporated into a way of perceiving and understanding reality as a whole by emphasizing how everything that occurs are causally interdependent on each other’s particular function. The boat can function as a “boat” only because there is a causal relationship between the infinite chain of conditions in which it is set, including its relation with the subject that perceives and makes use of it. In other words, the present activity of the sailing boat is relative to the person who uses it, the manner in which it is used, and to each and every other causal processes simultaneously happening and conditioning the activity of the boat. Such conditions includes all physical, perceptive, cognitive, conceptual, and emotive aspects that simultaneously makes the experience of sailing on a boat possible by working co-dependently to each other. For example, the activity of sailing is causally conditioned by the nature of the water on which the boat floats, the sky, the wind, the shore to which it is headed, the mind that is perceiving the boat, the sensations felt, etc. In turn, each of these elements are caused by an infinite web of other elements. All these elements function by virtue of its co-dependence within an endless network of forces and functions allowing for the present functioning of the boat and the rower.

To elaborate further, we can say that the nature of how each individual phenomenon works in a particular situation is made possible through their relation with every other phenomenon that co-creates the particular contingency in which that particular phenomenon arises. To return to Dōgen’s example, the boat only becomes a ‘boat,’ something with the function of taking something or someone over a body of water, when the mind conceives its utility, at which moment the function of the

³⁰⁸ Dōgen Kigen, *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Zenki”, trans. Gudo Wafu Nishijima & Chodo Cross, (Berkeley: Numata Centre, 2008), 356.

perceiver simultaneously becomes realized as an ‘I-who-sail,’ or somebody with the capability to row the boat across. This moment is not unilateral or hierarchical in the sense that the subject is ontologically privileged over the object (as would be understood following a Cartesian subject/object divide), where the conscious subject is lopsidedly privileged to attribute a utility and name to an object. Rather, the function of every phenomenon is conceived as a mutually undetachable process of co-creation that cannot be divided between “subject” and “object.” This becomes particularly evident where Dōgen emphasizes that “while I am sailing in the boat, my body and mind and circumstances and self are all essential parts of the boat,” suggesting that a subject within a particular activity cannot be detached from the circumstances and the phenomena he/she is participating in. The “I,” the boat, and everything else simultaneously occurring around it, cannot occur independently to the particular causal role all phenomena are playing in relation to each other.

Therefore, the person and the boat at that moment of “riding,” are a convergence of all other functions of the universe co-dependently causing the particular activity of “I am rowing the boat.” When “I” row a boat, everything else in the universe from the tiniest atomic vibrations to massive inter-galactical movements are functioning with me simultaneously to make that moment possible. Consequently, reality is no longer understood as a collection of independently existing “subjects” and “objects,” but a web of interdependent functions. In this sense, one’s conscious activity participates in creating life as “what I am making it,” while simultaneously all other interdependent causes are making my own activity possible, where “I am what life is making me.” Ultimately, every moment of life is an effect of all the simultaneous causal processes creating the experience of the moment and therefore, “life is the manifestation of all functions.”

Dōgen understands each individual phenomenon as realizing a singular function in the universe and each singularity as an expression of Total-function. Dōgen expresses this in the following lines where he discusses the Buddha’s teaching of the nature of life and death, as *Fushō* 不生 (non-appearance) and *Fumetsu* 不滅 (no-disappearance):

Present becoming is life, and life is present becoming. At the moment of this present

becoming, there is nothing that is not the “total” becoming of life, and there is nothing that is not the “total” becoming of death. This momentary function can cause life to be and can cause death to be. The very moment of the present in which this function is realized is not necessarily great and not necessarily small, is neither the whole world nor a limited area, and is neither long-lasting nor short and pressed. Life in the present exists in this function, and this function exists in life in the present. Life is not [a process of] coming (appearance); life is not [a process of] leaving (disappearance); life is not a manifestation in the present; and life is not a becoming. But still, life is “the manifestation of Total-function,” and death is “the manifestation of Total-function.” Remember, among the countless *dharmas*³⁰⁹ that are present in the self, there is life and there is death. Let us quietly consider whether our own present life, and the miscellaneous real *dharmas* that are coexisting with this life, are part of life or not part of life. [. . .] There is nothing, not a single moment nor a single *dharma*, that is not part of life. There is nothing, not a single matter nor a single state of mind, that is not part of life.³¹⁰

The above passage forms an application of Total-function in understanding the occurrence of “life” and “death” as singular events. Every moment of life does not appear (begin) nor disappear (end), since it is always the ongoing outcome of the Total-functioning of all aspects of phenomenal reality without beginning and end. Likewise is death. Therefore, life does not consist of a linear causality or continuity where there is a clear beginning and a clear end. Life does not become death, or death life. Rather, the moments of life and death are both singular effects of the whole causal process of Total-function in that particular moment. Every phenomenon is a singular realization of a particular function by participation in a beginningless and endless interdependent process of functions; hence, according to Dōgen, everything is part of the Total-functioning of “life.”

In summary, *Total-function* (*Zenki* 全機) is the term Dōgen uses to denote the nature of how each singular phenomenon³¹¹ is caused by every other phenomenon that are simultaneously

³⁰⁹ In this case the word “dharmas” does not refer to the teachings of the Buddha, but simply in its Abhidharmic usage, to designate the many elements constituting phenomena.

³¹⁰ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Zenki”, 355-356.

³¹¹ As we have seen in chapter 2 *pratītyasamutpāda* disallows any notion of experienced reality as composed of entities or Being (i.e. self-grounded, and independently existing), in favor of viewing reality as the experience of cause and effect that is constantly changing. Consequently, I find it unfavorable to apply terms such as ‘being’ or ‘existence’ as a unit of experienced reality within a Buddhist context. Since each aspect of experienced reality are a snippet of a continuous process of causal becoming, it will make more sense to apply such terms as ‘occurrence,’ ‘happening,’ ‘activity,’ or as Dōgen suggests, ‘functioning.’ From the perspective of *pratītyasamutpāda*, even inorganic and seemingly static things as rocks and metal is a shifting occurrence in relation to our experience (for its physical form, constitution, relative significance i.e. for what it is used, etc. are continuously changing in relation to the causal conditions it is located). Therefore, even ‘things’ are an ‘occurrence’ or ‘activity.’ However, since words such as ‘activity’ or ‘occurrence’ are not usually tied to insentient things or matter (both organic or inorganic) within a Western context, I use the word ‘phenomenon’ as a looser supplement to ‘activity,’ ‘occurrence,’ or ‘functioning’ as meaning a “unit of experienced causal reality,” i.e. a particular experienced thing, activity or organism.

functioning in a infinite web of codependent causes that are creating the contingent conditions upon which that particular phenomenon arises. The individual function of a particular thing, activity or organism, that is the particular role or capacity the phenomenon plays within the network of cause and effect, is made possible by the co-dependent functioning of all phenomena, while its individual role is simultaneously indispensable within the whole.

In order to understand Total-function, it may be effective to imagine each individual phenomenon as a singularly formed cog-wheel of multiple shapes and sizes (denoting their particular function in the universe). Each cog is interlocked with the spinning of every other cog in an infinitely extending co-dependent movement without beginning or end. The particular function of an individual cog simultaneously necessitates the functioning of every other cog for its individual role to be made possible, while each individual cog plays an indispensable function in the movement of the whole. This means Total-function conceives phenomenal reality as a heterogenesis where every aspect of phenomena is simultaneously another's prerequisite and precondition which makes possible the unfolding of each phenomenon in relation to our experience. Each and every other aspect of phenomena are "folded" sides of one co-dependently functioning phenomenal reality. No individual function can happen without Total-function, and the Total-functioning of the universe cannot occur without each and every interrelated phenomenon.

I consider such an ontological expansion of *pratīyasamutpāda* does not impede with the basic Buddhist phenomenology that the experience of phenomena is considered the product of the causal mingling of the *skandhas*. Total-function is loyal to the fundamentals of *pratīyasamutpāda* in not assigning any sense of *svabhāva* to phenomena or assuming a conceptual realism where *pratīyasamutpāda* becomes an ultimate 'truth' of existence. Instead, Total-function supplements basic Buddhist phenomenology by viewing our experience of phenomena as an indivisible causal process amongst functions which is itself a product of every other function, hence never independently existing. The causal process and function of the *skandhas* will be included within Total-function. In addition, 'Total-function' adapts the idea that all phenomena is a product of causality beyond our immediate field of individual experience to include the impersonal level of phenomenal reality as a

univocal whole. Thereby, Total-function constructs a virtual aspect to *praṭītyasamutpāda* which emphasizes the role of causality as a transcendental and cosmological condition within which Buddhist practice should be undertaken. In order to clarify how this idea is differentiated from Hongaku concepts of constant-abiding or *Jiji-muge-hokkai*, I will elaborate on the above point further in the following section.

5.2.2 Total-Function is Not Hongaku-shisō

Total-function rearticulates the ontological aspect of *praṭītyasamutpāda* in a manner radically different from Hua-yen/Tendai notions of *Jiji-muge-hokkai* which is the backbone of Hongaku-shisō.³¹² Hua-yen conceptions of *praṭītyasamutpāda* defended the existence of an ultimate ‘truth’ of reality perceived in the form of a ‘realm’ of interdependency without intrinsic existence. This metaphysical ‘space’ or ‘Dharma-realm’ is considered the primordially enlightened ontological ‘ground’ for normative existence, which then is subsequently re-united with ordinary reality, thereby functioning as the assurance for the “original enlightenment” of all existence. This then lead to the idea of constant-abiding whereby all normative existence was considered “originally enlightened” without having to transform itself by virtue of their inclusivity within the primordially enlightened interdependent realm. Consequently, *Jiji-muge-hokkai* betrayed the principle of *praṭītyasamutpāda* and no-abiding-self by accepting a ‘locus’ to phenomena and by making the realist assumption that *praṭītyasamutpāda* literally exists as the ultimate ‘locus’ of being. While the individual aspects constituting the interdependent ‘Dharma-realm’ may be without intrinsic existence, the concept of the ‘Dharma-realm’ as a whole ended up assuming the role of an ontological essence/ground of phenomena.

Both *Jiji-muge-hokkai* and constant-abiding works by way of a transcendental monism in which the all-inclusive Dharma-realm or *Tathātā* exists beyond causality and is ontologically privileged over the individual beings by which it is constituted. Each being is assured as to its

³¹² See chap.3 section 3.3.2 and chap. 2 footnote 57.

“enlightenment” by their subordination to the transcendental whole which functions as an ‘essence’ and/or ‘ground’ to individual existence. Consequently, doctrines based in Jiji-muge-hokkai hold a ‘representational’ and ‘realist’ view of praṭītyasamutpāda as corresponding to a ‘true-way-reality-is’ attributing a ‘thingness’ and/or ‘ground’-like function to the co-dependence implied by praṭītyasamutpāda. Therefore, these doctrines also betray the basic Buddhist insight that the question of reality as of concern from the perspective of praṭītyasamutpāda should only be to analyze the *experience* of phenomena according to causality, as opposed to believing in an underlying ‘ground’ to such experiences.

On the other hand, the concept of Total-function works in a manner that does not necessitate the existence of a transcendental ‘ground,’ ‘essence’ or ‘source’ to which ordinary reality must obey. Dōgen’s Total-function constitutes causal co-dependence not in a realm of ultimate ‘truth’ to be united with ordinary reality, but in the very fabric of the processual unfolding of our ordinary experience here and now. This co-dependence becomes possible once it is understood how the nature of praṭītyasamutpāda is not grounded in some transcendental ‘realm’ of primordial truth accessible in a manner beyond reason. According to Dōgen’s ontology of praṭītyasamutpāda as Total-function, the law of praṭītyasamutpāda *is* the causal process of the Total-functioning of ordinary phenomena as we experience them in our daily lives. Praṭītyasamutpāda unfolds through every phenomenon simultaneously functioning in a causal relationship to each other as one processual movement of immanent phenomena. Therefore, Total-function does not account for ‘ontological grounds’ or a realist ‘thingness’ to the concept of praṭītyasamutpāda. Rather, it expresses an immanent plane of experience where everything including ourselves are inter-relationally functioning and that praṭītyasamutpāda (i.e. causality) is the very nature of that functional process of experienced reality.

In Total-function we can say that neither independent ‘beings’ exists, nor an ultimate nature of reality which grounds ordinary phenomena. Instead, *only functions are happening* that co-dependently create an absolutely immanent, univocal process of impermanent phenomena. Consequently, Total-function constitutes a framework for articulating our experience of reality as an absolute immanence which I believe is echoed in Dōgen’s often used phrase of *Henkai-fusanzo* 遍界

不曾藏 或 “the entire universe has never been hidden.”³¹³ According to such an understanding, there cannot be any ontologically or epistemologically privileged form of reality, experience, concept, or existence that functions as a ‘ground’ to the way we ordinarily experience our world. Neither can there be any aspect of reality or experience that is transcendently hidden beyond or beneath our immanent reality. This means that observing and understanding Total-function does not necessitate transcendental experientialism, but necessitates the observance of our daily reality through *prajñā*. From the perspective of Total-function, *pratītyasamutpāda* is always the very nature of how all things are experienced here and now.

The fact that *pratītyasamutpāda* becomes ontologically immanent to our ordinary reality does not mean Total-function justifies that we are all ‘primordially enlightened’ as in *Hongaku-shisō*. Total-function does not represent some kind of ultimate reality that assures “enlightenment.” As I had elaborated earlier,³¹⁴ this study views *pratītyasamutpāda* as a transcendental concept pragmatically created as the contingent grounds on which to make Buddhist practice function most efficiently to achieve its goals; the goal being cultivation of altruism and the elimination of suffering. Therefore, *pratītyasamutpāda* is not a ‘representational’ concept which corresponds to the ‘true-way-reality-is,’ but rather is an alternative way of practically reconceiving the self and world so that spiritual practices which are founded on the concept of *pratītyasamutpāda* become more efficient in achieving concrete practical aims (i.e. analyzing, understanding and stopping the occurrence of various forms of suffering, and dismantling self-centredness for empathy).

Given that Dōgen’s Total-function is his original adaptation of *pratītyasamutpāda*, it too needs to be understood as pragmatic. Dōgen’s Total-function is an ontological concept designed to pragmatically aid spiritual practice based on *pratītyasamutpāda* and not to theorize on a ‘true-way-reality-is.’ Total-function forces us to reconsider our beliefs concerning world and self. It is a concept to help ourselves go beyond views which habituate us in suffering, such as worldviews which keep ourselves ignorant to what causes our suffering, or worsen our attachments to particular

³¹³ See for example *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Busshō”, 4. “Gyobutsu-Yuigi”, 46,47,48. “Zazenshin”, 125. “Juki”, 245. “Arakan”, 273. “Muchu-Setsumu”, 322.

³¹⁴ See chap. 4 section 4.3.2

psychological conditions, peoples, situations and things that are causing our suffering. Total-function ultimately replaces the “common sense” worldview which frames the way we understand and live our lives with that of *pratītyasamutpāda*. By this replacement, one can thoroughly apply *pratītyasamutpāda* on understanding the self and world thereby paving the foundations to practice the analysis of why and how one’s suffering arises.

As much as *pratītyasamutpāda* functions as the contingent grounds on which Buddhist spiritual exercises work, I consider Total-function as playing the role of the transcendental condition upon which Dōgen’s other metaphysical concepts can be positioned for the sake of practice. The following sections will demonstrate how Total-function works as the central tool to create consistent sense out of Dōgen’s interpretation of Buddha-nature and temporality. By applying Total-function onto Dōgen’s view of Buddha-nature and temporality, we will see how he utilizes these concepts as aids to question our own understanding of reality and how we participate in the world in light of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

5.3 The Groundwork for Dōgen’s Buddha-Nature

Despite their divergent interpretations of Dōgen’s philosophy, scholars as Abe, Heine, and Matsumoto agree on the point that Dōgen’s ontology is deeply related to his view on spiritual practice. I largely concur on this point and understand that Dōgen’s metaphysics of Total-function is integral to his conception of activity or practice. Dōgen’s idea that our experience of phenomena is an infinite process of Total-function leads to an alternative understanding of how we participate in what we experience to be reality. Ultimately, I will argue that Dōgen’s conception of how we participate in reality may lead us to the idea that Buddha-nature denotes the ‘realization of one’s potential for enlightenment’ through actual practice, in contrast to the view that Buddha-nature is an ontological ‘ground’ or ‘essence.’ This way, Buddha-nature becomes pragmatic for the sake of emphasizing practice founded on *pratītyasamutpāda* as opposed to explicating a ‘true-way-reality-is.’

Dōgen’s view on how we interact with reality through practice is elaborated in his ideas of

Shushō-Ittō 修証一等 and *Gūjin* 究尽 or *Total-exertion*. However, the term *Shushō-Ittō* has often been tied to *dhātu-vāda*. As we saw in Abe, Heine, and Matsumoto’s interpretations of Dōgen, definitions of *Shushō-Ittō* often times tended towards a variation of Hongaku doctrine. This can be seen in how they interpreted *Shushō-Ittō* as the “unity of practice and enlightenment,” invoking an automatic reference to the ontology of Original Enlightenment. In these readings, practice was seen as unitary with “enlightenment” since the primordially pre-existent “enlightenment” was only manifested through and while the practitioner was in the act of meditation.

In the case of Critical Buddhism, this connection with *Shushō-Ittō* and *Hongaku-shisō* was utilized to make a case against Dōgen. As Matsumoto had demonstrated, not only does this view deny *prāṭīyasamutpāda* on ontological grounds, but also because it affirmed what I called transcendental experientialism. By implying that enlightenment is transcendent to rational thought, the technique of meditation is considered as solely based on the need to cease such thought patterns. While the critique is legitimate, Critical Buddhism allowed no leeway for an alternative interpretation that may be adherent to *prāṭīyasamutpāda*. On the other hand, the comparative interpreters utilized the connection between *Shushō-Ittō* and *Hongaku-shisō* to make a positive case for Dōgen’s ontology as a development of *Hongaku-shisō*. This means their interpretations also reiterated the basic *dhātu-vāda* of Hongaku doctrine. Therefore, a thorough reinterpretation of *Shushō-Ittō* together with a new translation of the term is necessary to pave way for a pragmatist reading of Dōgen’s ontology of Buddha-nature and practice. In this section, I will explore how the concept of Total-function can help us interpret Dōgen’s *Shushō-Ittō* and Total-exertion beyond *Hongaku-shisō* in order to pave the groundwork to understand Dōgen’s take on Buddha-nature.

5.3.1 Total-Function and Practice-Confirmation

Dōgen’s following two-part statement made in the “*Genjōkōan*” fascicle summarizes the way he conceived practice in relation to his ontology of Total-function: “Driving ourselves to practice and experience the myriad *dharmas* is delusion. When the myriad *dharmas* actively practice and

experience ourselves, that is the state of realization.”³¹⁵ Previous examinations of the same statement in chapter two showed how Critical Buddhism interprets the above as exemplary of Dōgen’s tendency towards dhātu-vāda. According to Matsumoto the later part of the statement shows how Dōgen views enlightenment in line with the Hongaku idea of *mujyō-seppo* 無常說法 (Eng. “The insentient teach the dharma”).³¹⁶ *Mujyō-seppo* is an extension of the Hongaku idea that all of reality is primordially enlightened. *Mujyō-seppo* considered non-sentient aspects of reality (here labeled, “dharma” by Dōgen) as ‘pure’ and perfectly “enlightened” while sentient beings, although also “originally enlightened,” are considered qualitatively “less” or far from that “original” state due to their entanglement in discriminative thought. Therefore, *Mujyō-seppo* claims that sentient beings can only attain “enlightenment” by virtue of the “enlightened” state of the totality of non-sentient reality.

Matsumoto analyzed that Dōgen’s assertion of a “unity of practice and enlightenment” or *Shushō-Ittō* 修証一等 and also *Shushō-Funi* (修証不二, the “non-duality of practice and enlightenment”) expanded on the above Hongaku idea by claiming that this ‘original enlightenment’ is manifested only through and while the student practices *Zazen* meditation, during which his/her discriminative thought ceases, making way for the primordially enlightened reality to accept he/she into its original purity. We shall return to the above statement from the “*Genjōkōan*” fascicle later, after we see how applying Total-function may transform the way we can interpret Dōgen’s perception of Buddhist practice in relation to his ontology. This will eventually lead to an interpretation of the above statement in a manner beyond dhātu-vāda that is in contrast to *Mujyō-seppo*. However, this first necessitates freeing the concept of *Shushō-Ittō* from its implied connection with Hongaku-shisō.

As opposed to the connection both Critical Buddhism and the comparative scholars made between *Shushō-Ittō* and Hongaku-shisō, I would follow an interpretation put forth by Minami Jikisai which helps isolate *Shushō-Ittō* from Hongaku ontology. *Shō* 証 is a word that means to confirm, to prove or to authenticate, *Shu* 修 means to learn in practice. *Ittō* 一等 simply means “equal” or “of

³¹⁵ Dōgen Kigen, *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, trans. Gudo Wafu Nishijima & Chodo Cross, (Berkeley: Numata Centre, 2007), “*Genjōkōan*”, 41.

³¹⁶ See chap. 2 section 2.3.3

equal value.” The Hongaku version of Shushō-Ittō as meaning the unconditional ontological equality of practice and enlightenment substantialized both “practice” and “confirmation” into noun functions as if they are some kind of a self-referential ‘thing’ that no longer stands for the original verb function as an action, occurrence or happening. For Hongaku inspired interpretations, *Shō* or “confirmation” means enlightenment and since for them, “enlightenment” is the revealing of what was originally there (Tathātā or the Dharma-realm), “enlightenment” becomes identified with a noun-function with a ‘thingness’ or ‘spatial’ quality. This is to say that dhātu-vādic interpretations seem to overlook or downplay the basic understanding that one does not *have, reveal* or *gain* practice, enlightenment or confirmation, but must *do* practice, *do* confirming, *become* enlightened.

As it is repeatedly demonstrated through Dōgen’s stoic attitude towards practice evident throughout the *Shōbōgenzō*, Dōgen is not an armchair Buddhist and his philosophy is one that is founded on the strong motivation to overcome the problem of suffering through practice.³¹⁷ In accommodating Dōgen’s strong impetus towards the necessity of following the Buddha-path, spiritual practice needs to be considered an activity which must be faced by the whole of one’s being, his/her existential impetus, and persistent will to pursue the problem of suffering at heart. The perfection of altruism and the overcoming of suffering is not something that is promised by some ‘primordially enlightened’ reality without the need for one’s aspiration to practice. “*Doing practice*” does not mean enlightenment is automatically manifest just by the formal act of posing in meditation. On the contrary, the aims of Buddhist practice necessitates a diligent sustenance of one’s aspiration to help others and to overcome suffering, as well as an attitude to conceive practice as one with their constantly changing situations of life.

Therefore, with respect to the seriousness and urgency Dōgen places on practice, I agree with Jikisai and refuse to interpret Shō 証 as “original enlightenment,” but simply as “confirming.” So Shushō 修証 will mean ‘Practice-confirmation,’ which is to practice and to confirm the teachings of

³¹⁷ Kim reflects on this existential “edge” in Dōgen’s attitude towards seeking the Buddha-path when he mentions: “If the world was as fleeting and transient as a morning dew, and this was not mere sentiment but a fact in life, then how was one to commit oneself to specific expressions and activities so that they were simultaneously one’s self-realization and self-expression of Buddha-nature? This was the ultimate question that concerned Dōgen throughout his life. [...] For Dōgen it was not a matter of whether to commit, but how to commit – that is how to make a specific commitment in complete freedom.” *Mystical Realist*, 140.

the Buddha through that practice. Thus, Shushō-Ittō means to practice the Buddha-Dharma (i.e. *pratīyasamutpāda*) and to confirm the function, effectivity and validity of *pratīyasamutpāda* is one and the same act.³¹⁸ In accordance to this understanding we can reinterpret how Dōgen placed crucial primacy in spiritual practice as the foundations of the Buddha path. Practice is primary because, the perfection of altruism and release from suffering does not happen outside of practicing and confirming *pratīyasamutpāda* through the effects of that practice. Therefore, Dōgen’s case for the ‘primacy of practice’ is freed from a simple ontological priority attributed to the equality of practice and original enlightenment. Now that the notion of Practice-confirmation has been freed from *dhātu-vāda*, the next section will describe how it relates to Dōgen’s idea on action in relation to Total-function, what he calls *Total-exertion* (*Gūjin* 究尽). Dōgen’s understanding of how each human’s action participates in Total-function will eventually help reinterpret Buddha-nature in a practical manner unreliant to *dhātu-vāda*.

5.3.2 Total-Function and Activity as Total-Exertion

Dōgen’s concept of *Gūjin* (究尽) or *Total-exertion* can be understood as an application of his idea of Practice-confirmation within the ontological framework of Total-function. The idea of *Gūjin* can be explained through reference to a poetic and eloquent analogy found in the “Genjōkōan” fascicle in which Dōgen expresses how the bird in the sky and the fish in water relate to their causally dependent environment through their individual activity of flying and swimming:

When fish move through water, however they move, there is no end to the water. When birds fly through the sky, however they fly, there is no end to the sky. At the same time, fish and birds have never, since antiquity, left the water or the sky. Simply, when activity is great, usage is great, and when necessity is small, usage is small. Acting in this state, none fails to realize its limitations at every moment, and none fails to somersault freely at every place; but if a bird leaves the sky it will die at once, and if a fish leaves the water it will die at once. So we can understand that water is life and can understand that sky is life. Birds are life, and fish are life. It may be that life is birds and that life is fish. And beyond this, there may still be further progress. The existence of [their] practice-and-

³¹⁸ Minami Jikisai, 正法現藏: 存在するとはどういうことか (*Shōbōgenzō wo Yomu: Sonzai suru to wa dōiukotoka*), (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2008), 19-22.

confirmation, and the existence of their lifetime and their life, are like this. This being so, a bird or fish that aimed to move perfect its knowing of water or the sky [only] after getting to the bottom of water or utterly penetrating the sky, could never find its way or find its place in the water or in the sky. When we find this place, this action is inevitably realized as the universe. When we find this way, this action is inevitably the realized reality of the present (*Genjōkōan*). This way and this place are neither great nor small; they are neither subjective nor objective; neither have they existed since the past nor do they appear in the present; and so they are present like this. When a human being is practicing and experiencing the Buddha's truth in this state, to get one *dharma* is to penetrate one *dharma*, and to meet one act is to perform one act. In this state the place exists and the way is mastered, and therefore the area to be known is not conspicuous.³¹⁹

When the activity of birds flying through the sky or fish swimming in water is perceived and understood from our normative perspective, we tend to understand them as independently existing things that coincidentally 'occupies' an objective 'space' (sky, water) unrelated to the active agent. On the contrary, this analogy expresses Dōgen's conception of phenomena through Total-function. Reality is understood and experienced as the functional relationship of all phenomena. When Dōgen mentions, "so we can understand that water is life and can understand that sky is life. Birds are life, and fish are life. It may be that life is birds and that life is fish," 'life' can be interpreted as the whole of Total-function. The quote expresses how the role of the sky and bird, fish and water do not exist apart from each other, but all participate in Total-function through their singular roles.³²⁰ Each phenomenon mutually realizes their individual functions through their convergence in the activity of "flying" and "swimming." The act of the bird flying is a continuous inseparable process of the causal occurrence of all-things-allowing-the-bird-fly (in Dōgen's words: "no end to the sky") while this continuity never obstructs the distinct function of each phenomenon (in Dōgen's words, "Acting in this state, none fails to realize its limitations at every moment, and none fails to somersault freely at every place"). The very act of the bird-flying-through-the-sky and the fish-swimming-through-the-

³¹⁹ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, "Genjōkōan", 43-44.

³²⁰ Dōgen's logic of the Total-function of phenomena taken up in his case of the boat and rower, bird and sky, life and death is reminiscent of one of Nagarjuna's critical analysis of movement in his *Mulamadhyamaka Karika*. There, Nagarjuna examines the fallacy of describing somebody as walking since what is already walking cannot walk again. The former perceptual understanding tends to dualize the walker and the activity of walking as if they are dualistically separated, but from Nagarjuna's perspective based on *prāṭītyasamutpāda* and emptiness (non-self-existence) of each and every aspect of reality, the walking subject and his/her realized action of movement cannot exist apart from each other and rather is a mutual function. See Nagarjuna, "Investigations of Coming and Going" in *Mulamadhyamaka Karika*, trans. Stephen Batchelor, Sharpham College, accessed April 28, 2011, <http://www.stephenbatchelor.org/verses2.htm#Investigation of Coming and Going>.

water is the convergent realization of the Total-function of the universe without beginning or end. This is what Dōgen calls “Total-exertion,” denoting how the fully exerted activity of the present realizes/affirms the entire causal movement of Total-function.

This means that individual activity and the Total-functioning of phenomena constitute a heterogenesis working as each other’s reciprocal prerequisite and precondition. Total-function makes possible the bird’s Total-exertion in the act of flying, while simultaneously, its activity participates in an indispensable role within the Total-functioning of the universe, thereby affirming *pratītyasamutpāda* at work within activity. In the case of the bird and the fish, the Total-function of all phenomena is realized through their activity of flying and swimming, thus if they no longer fly or swim, there can no longer be a “bird” or “fish” (“if a bird leaves the sky it will die at once, and if a fish leaves the water it will die at once”). The function of the sky mutually affirms and makes possible the role of the bird’s flight while the bird’s Totally-exerted activity of flight simultaneously affirms the function of the sky and the whole of Total-function. In other words, there cannot be Total-function without each participant’s Total-exertion in its activity vice-versa.

In conclusion, Total-exertion is essentially a concept that articulates how each-and-every phenomenon participates in Total-function through individual activities. Total-exertion expresses how each phenomenon acting out its singular function to it’s fullest both evidence and affirm this Totally-functioning nature of phenomena. The following section will now explain how this idea of Total-exertion applies to human activity, specifically Buddhist practice.

5.3.3 Buddhist Practice as Total-Exertion

As it is with birds and fish, human beings also realize the Total-functioning of all phenomena by their present activity. For the follower of the Buddha-path this activity is the moment in which they are engaged in the wholehearted Practice-confirmation of the Buddha-dharma. Practitioners cannot adhere to *pratītyasamutpāda* while they are limited to a conception of themselves and the world as existing as isolated units. On the other hand, applying *pratītyasamutpāda* to every moment with the

self-awareness of Total-function leads to a different outlook in understanding one's actions in relation to reality. One comes to view their life's actions as participating in the causal process of the universe while that causal process simultaneously makes possible his/her experience of living. Applying Total-function to life, practice and confirmation is united since to aspire to take care of one's own and other's suffering through Total-exertion in spiritual practice *is* to confirm the function of *praṭīyasamutpāda* unfolding in the world and the self as Total-function. In addition, the process of Practice-confirmation is one with a practitioner's Total-exertion since the confirmation of the teaching of *praṭīyasamutpāda* is only realized in and through one's exertion in Buddhist practice.

From the perspective of the participating subject, the moment of Total-exertion is experienced as a complete submergence in the present activity as if there is nothing else. For this reason Dōgen mentions that “at the time of life there is nothing else, but that moment of life, and at the time of death there is nothing else but that moment of death. Therefore at time of life one should exert to enact nothing else but to live, and at the time of death exert nothing else but to prepare for death”³²¹ and that “Life is the realization of Total-function. Death is the realization of Total-function.”³²² This full submergence in a particular activity perfectly realizes the whole of Total-function within that present action. This is the case with a practitioner of Buddhism Totally-exerting oneself in Buddhist practice, whether it is to reflect on *praṭīyasamutpāda*, practice meditation or acting with the aspiration to release oneself and others from the cycle of suffering.

Therefore, for the Buddhist practitioner Total-exertion is to wholeheartedly affirm and to partake body and mind to maximize the particular spiritual practice in the present. This is to put oneself into spiritual practice as if there is nothing else in the world that is of higher concern, and as if that one particular activity is responsible for the whole of phenomenal reality as the convergent point of Total-function. Dōgen expresses this sense of causal continuity and responsibility one's Totally-exerted practice has with the whole of phenomenal reality when he says: “supreme activity is neither a contrivance of the self nor that of others; it is activity undefiled. The power of such an activity sustains

³²¹ From *Shōbōgenzō*, “Shoji” translated by myself from the original Japanese Dōgen Kigen, *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.4, ed. Mizuno Yaoko, (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993), 466.

³²² Translated by myself from the Japanese on Dōgen Kigen, *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Zenki”, ed. Mizuno Yaoko, (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993), 85.

my self and others. Its import is such that all the heaven and the entire earth of ten directions enjoy the merit of my activity. Even if neither the self nor others are aware of it, such is the case.”³²³

With an adequate understanding of Practice-confirmation and Total-exertion, we can now return to reinterpret Dōgen’s following statement beyond dhātu-vāda: “Driving ourselves to practice and experience the myriad *dharmas* is delusion. When the myriad *dharmas* actively practice and experience ourselves, that is the state of realization.” Applying the concept of Total-exertion onto Dōgen’s analogy of the person rowing a boat I will explain the above as follows. While one is limited by a dualistic worldview in situating the experience of the self as an independently existing entity isolated from the functioning of the boat, wind, shore, and the myriad co-dependent phenomena co-creating the experience of the moment, he/she is living the state where “driving ourselves to practice and experience the myriad *dharmas* is delusion.”³²⁴ On the contrary, when the actual action of rowing a boat is affirmed and maximized out of a transformed understanding of one’s participation and continuity with Total-function; the activity of a self-rowing-boat-on-water-to-the-shore becomes a Total-exertion.

Therefore, Dōgen’s later statement, “When myriad *dharmas* actively practice and experience ourselves, that is the state of realization,”³²⁵ can be interpreted as expressing the moment when one practices Buddhism in Total-exertion. In this moment one negates the view that he/herself is an independent entity by fully understanding *pratītyasamutpāda* as unfolding in Total-function. Consequently, the practitioner acts in full affirmation of all else which co-dependently creates the activity of the moment through him/her, allowing all the elements co-creating our experience of reality to “actively practice and experience ourselves” through which one “universally realize the whole of reality by using the whole of reality.”³²⁶

Total-exertion as a concept which integrated Total-function into human activity works to assert the necessity to involve *pratītyasamutpāda* in every aspect of the Buddhist practitioner’s life.

³²³ *Shōbōgenzō*, “Gyōji” as translated by Kim, *Mystical Realist*, 63. (Slight modifications by myself with consultation of the original Japanese)

³²⁴ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, “Genjōkōan”, 41.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.

³²⁶ *Shōbōgenzō*, “Uji” as translated by Kim, *Mystical Realist*, 157.

The concept does not need to express how the nature of activity ‘truly-is,’ but rather pragmatically positions the Buddhist’s life within the transcendental conditions of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Thereby, ‘Total-exertion’ reinforces how the aim to perfect altruism and to be released from suffering cannot exist outside of one’s sustained exertion in practice, only through which the Buddha-Dharma (i.e. *pratītyasamutpāda*) can be confirmed to work. There is no ‘enlightenment’ that is assured by a substantive ontological ‘ground,’ automatically and unconditionally manifested through practice. Rather, the effects/confirmation of practice cannot happen outside of the practitioner’s conscious aspiration and willingness to understand, live, and practice in accordance to the teachings of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Concepts such as ‘Total-exertion’ and ‘Total-function’ assume the role of a ‘grounding’ worldview to pragmatically enhance the functions of practice. In this sense, Dōgen’s attitude towards placing absolute primacy over practice was not concerned with a purely theoretical ontological interest. Rather, Buddhist practice is simply practice, it is one’s actual activity founded on *pratītyasamutpāda*, and ontology is always a tool to support its efficiency. ‘Total-exertion’ then leads to a complete reformulation of how the concept of Buddha-nature functions within Dōgen’s practical philosophy.

5.4 Dōgen and Buddha-Nature

As I have previously touched upon, Buddha-nature is a concept that originally meant an individual’s ability or potential of realizing enlightenment. The concept later developed a largely metaphysical significance when the idea came to include an ontological connotation as an individual-essence equated to the primordially undefiled *Tathātā*. I examined in chapters two and three that both the comparative interpreters and Critical Buddhists interpreted Dōgen’s use of Buddha-nature in relation to such ontology rooted in *Hongaku-shisō*.³²⁷ In contrast to Critical Buddhism, I do not view

³²⁷ See chap. 2 and 3. Scholars like Abe, Glass, and Heine reasserted this type of *dhātu-vādic* understanding of Buddha-nature in their interpretation of Dōgen. However, Glass differentiated himself from a simple reassertion of the formula by criticizing the Abe-style reiteration of *Hongaku* doctrine. The problem was that Abe ended up de-necessitating ethical choice in spiritual practice by affirming all things (equated with Buddha-nature) as primordially perfect. Glass attempted to put forth an alternative by emphasizing the practical significance of the concept of Buddha-nature over pure ontological theory, but ultimately diverted from *pratītyasamutpāda* by claiming Buddha-nature to be a universal ontological locus that positively exists. On the other hand, Critical Buddhism viewed all variations of the

that the concept of Buddha-nature is unconditionally dhātu-vāda. While I agree to those like Glass who claim the concept of Buddha-nature has a practical significance,³²⁸ my reinterpretation reads Dōgen's understanding of the concept as articulated in a manner that is purely functional as opposed to corresponding to some form of grounded ontological 'essence.' The following reinterpretation of Dōgen's take on Buddha-nature will demonstrate how a strict adherence to praṭīyasamutpāda does not have to deny the concept of Buddha-nature and that it can be understood as beneficial for practice. The key to realizing this is to read Buddha-nature as interwoven with Dōgen's view of praṭīyasamutpāda as Total-function and its realization in practice as Total-exertion.

In short, I will argue that Dōgen's idea of Buddha-nature has two large practical functions: a virtual and actual one. First, is its virtual role as a transcendental ontological concept that articulates reality on a holistic level. On this level, Buddha-nature functions as a supplementing term to Total-function/prāṭīyasamutpāda and works as the condition in which spiritual practices are set. Second, is the actual role of Buddha-nature as denoting the reality of the person as each one's 'individual Buddha-nature.' On this level, I will argue that Buddha-nature becomes a purely practical concept. Buddha-nature is simply returned to its original connotation as one's 'potential' to be enlightened which is realized only through one's aspiration, motivation and will to totally-exert oneself in spiritual practice. The virtual and actual aspects of Buddha-nature function as a heterogenesis; that is they are not isolated, but rather function as each other's prerequisite and precondition. The virtual aspect sets the framework for spiritual practice, while the actual practice feeds back into the virtual as participating in its process. Each aspect affirms each other and in effect, maximizes the significance

Buddha-nature doctrine to be a dhātu-vādic throwback to Brahmanic philosophy, which the historical Buddha critically denied. Matsumoto and Hakamaya does accept that Dōgen did not admit any essentialist sense of Buddha-nature as being a individual-essence within beings that endows their potential for enlightenment to be teleologically realized in time. However, they concluded that while Dōgen denies the essentialist version of Hongaku thought, he ends up with a developed version of it. This version no longer view Buddha-nature as an individual-essence, but what Matsumoto called Dōgen's idea of "Universal Buddha-nature" where Buddha-nature becomes identical with the whole of reality. Thereby Matsumoto concluded that Dōgen merely progressed from one dhātu-vāda to another.

³²⁸ In addition to Robert Glass, Sallie B. King also makes an argument against Critical Buddhism as to the practical significance of Buddha-nature in Buddhism. However, King does not seem to realize that defending the concept of Buddha-nature on grounds of emptiness of self-essence does not relieve her of utilizing the concept of sūnyatā as a locus. See Sallie B. King, "The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature is Impeccably Buddhist", *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism*, ed. Jamie Hubbard & Paul L. Swanson, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1997), 174-192. In my view, the only way Buddha-nature can be defended is to understand it as a purely pragmatic concept.

of spiritual practice.

5.4.1 Virtuality of Buddha-Nature: Buddha-Nature is Total-Function and ‘Mind’

In order to understand the virtual function of Dōgen’s Buddha-nature, I will start with an interpretation of Dōgen’s view that Buddha-nature is united with the whole of phenomena by way of Total-function. Since Dōgen views that this equality of Buddha-nature and phenomena is attributed to the univocal nature of the Buddhist understanding of ‘mind,’ the task of reading this aspect of Dōgen’s views on Buddha-nature largely relies on reinterpreting the concept of ‘mind’ in relation to Total-function. This will pave the way to clarify how the virtual metaphysics of Buddha-nature works as the explanatory framework in which its practical function is enhanced on the actual level.

The most important statements related to Dōgen’s conception of Buddha-nature are the often referred to phrase found in the “Busshō” fascicle where Dōgen quotes the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*: “All living beings totally have the Buddha-nature: The Tathāgata abides [in them] constantly, without changing at all.”³²⁹ Soon after the above, Dōgen intentionally plays around with the Chinese characters that form the former statement to mean “All living beings totally exist *as* the Buddha-nature” which he further elucidates as follows,

Those called “living beings,” or called “the sentient,” or called “all forms of life,” or called “all creatures,” are living beings and are all forms of existence. In short, “total existence” is “the Buddha-nature,” and the perfect totality of “total existence” is called “living beings.” At just this moment, the inside and outside of living beings are the “total existence” of “the Buddha-nature.” The state is more than only the skin, flesh, bones, and marrow that are transmitted one-to-one, because “you have got” my skin, flesh, bones, and marrow. Remember, the “existence” [described] now, which is “totally possessed” by “the Buddha-nature,” is beyond the “existence” of existence and nonexistence. “Total existence” is the Buddha’s words, the Buddha’s tongue, the Buddhist patriarchs’ eyes, and the nostrils of a patchrobed monk. The words “total existence” are utterly beyond beginning existence, beyond original existence, beyond fine existence, and so on. How much less could they describe conditioned existence or illusory existence? They are not connected with “mind and circumstances” or with “essence and form” and the like.³³⁰

What Dōgen means by “living beings” here is not limited to beings with consciousness or life

³²⁹ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Busshō”, 3.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

in an anthropocentric sense as he explains:

The meaning of “all living beings,” as described now in Buddhism, is that all those that have mind are “living beings,” for minds are just “living beings.” Those without mind may also be “living beings,” for “living beings” are just mind. So minds all are “living beings,” and “living beings” all “have the Buddha-nature.” Grass, trees, and national lands are mind itself; because they are mind, they are “living beings,” and because they are “living beings” they “have the Buddha-nature.” The sun, the moon, and the stars are mind itself; because they are mind, they are “living beings,” and because they are “living beings” they “have the Buddha-nature.”³³¹

Matsumoto had interpreted the above as evidence to Dōgen’s tendency towards *Mujyō-seppo* and ‘universal Buddha-nature’ that identifies the whole of reality (including non-sentient beings) with *Tathātā* and hence Buddha-nature. On the contrary, I reinterpret that the way Dōgen wants to make Buddha-nature extensive and inclusive of the whole of phenomena in the above statements is because for Dōgen, Buddha-nature is something that exists within and through the Total-functioning of phenomena. This is also evident in how Dōgen articulates Buddha-nature as equal with impermanence in the form of ‘impermanence-Buddha-nature’ or *Mujyō-busshō* 無常仏性.³³² Impermanence is a consequence of the constantly changing causal process of phenomena; as such, to equate Buddha-nature with impermanence is yet another way to describe Buddha-nature as inseparable from Total-function.

Further elaborating on the metaphysical or the ‘virtual’ justification of Buddha-nature’s relation with Total-function necessitates understanding what ‘mind’ means when Dōgen mentions: “minds all are ‘living beings,’ and ‘living beings’ all ‘have the Buddha-nature.’” Dōgen equates Buddha-nature with mind in putting forth the idea that Buddha-nature is the whole of phenomenal reality. This identity posed between Buddha-nature, mind and phenomena leads to a simple conclusion that mind is also Total-function. To be more precise, mind is a phenomenon that is inseparably happening in and through the Total-functioning of all phenomena.³³³

³³¹ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Busshō”, 21.

³³² *Ibid.*, 13-14. Here Dōgen takes up the words of the Sixth Zen patriarch “That without constancy is the Buddha-nature” and expresses his idea that Buddha-nature is one with impermanent reality.

³³³ This sense of understanding mind and reality as non-dualistically interwoven as a co-dependent reality, recalls the fundamental psychological focus inherited from the heritage of Indian Buddhism, especially to the ideas of Yogacara thought. What became the central pillar of Yogacara doctrine can be identified in the *Sandhinirmocana Sūtra* and later elaborations by the monks Asanga and Vasubandhu (400–500 CE). The most basic foundation of Yogacara is

Dōgen’s idea of mind is not a subjective consciousness that we ‘possess,’ nor is it limited to the psyche in opposition to matter, as it tends to be in Cartesian dualism. Adhering to *prafityasamutpāda* disallows any theory of an independently existing, self-contained idea of consciousness. Consciousness is itself an ongoing product of a causal process of the *skandhas* undetachably involved with all aspects of phenomena. In this manner, the mind is understood as neither exclusively subjective nor objective, but rather seen from the co-creative role it plays in understanding, perceiving, and experiencing phenomenal reality.

Mind and Total-function are a heterogenesis each the prerequisite and precondition of each other. What human’s experience as reality is an ongoing product of how our mind causally functions in relation with every other phenomenon while simultaneously this ‘mind’ is itself made possible by the Total-functioning of all phenomena. Our individual mind is part of the process of Total-function itself and is what comes “into and out of being with the psycho-physical activities of the mind and the creative activities of the physical universe.”³³⁴ Therefore, mind is claimed to be omnipresent and constitutive of reality,³³⁵ not because it corresponds to an underlying ontological ‘truth’ grounding phenomena, but because it is something that does not exist outside of or apart from the Total-functioning of phenomena (including the psycho-physical process of the *skandhas* going on in the perceiving subject which we experience as “our consciousness”).³³⁶ Simply put mind *is* the process of

their view that the way we are experiencing the world is conditioned by our consciousness. Thus all existence are primarily cognitive appearances that cannot be without the mind perceiving it. Therefore, ‘mind’ is in a co-dependent relation to what we consider reality. Since the Yogacarin’s took for granted that all experience of reality (including the reality of what we call our “self”) is conditioned by our consciousness (for there is no way to experience it outside of it) they understood that it is impossible to situate a purely isolated subjective consciousness anywhere. Therefore Yogacarins understood that a clear distinction between what is consciousness and not consciousness cannot be made since the way reality is experienced is co-dependently conditioned. See: Dan Lusthaus, “What is and isn’t Yogacara?”, Resources for East Asian Language and Thought, accessed May 2, 2011, <http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro-uni.htm>.

³³⁴ Kim, *Mystical Realist*, 121.

³³⁵ In Dōgen’s words: “There is conscious mind and there is unconscious mind; there is mind in which the body is present and there is mind in which no body is present; there is mind before the moment of the body and there is mind after the moment of the body. When the body is born, there are different kinds of birth—from womb, from egg, from moisture, and from transformation—and when the mind is born, there are different kinds of birth—from womb, from egg, from moisture, and from transformation. Blues, yellows, reds, and whites are the mind. The long, the short, the square, and the round are the mind. Living-and-dying and coming-and-going are the mind. Years, months, days, and hours are the mind. Dreams and fantasies, and flowers in space, are the mind. The spray of water, foam, and flame are the mind. Spring flowers and the autumn moon are the mind. Each moment is the mind. And yet it can never be broken. For this reason the real form of all *dharmas* is the mind, and buddhas alone, together with buddhas, are the mind.” Dōgen Kigen, *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.3, “Sangai-yuishin”, trans. Gudo Wafu Nishijima & Chodo Cross, (Berkley: Numata Centre, 2008), 65.

³³⁶ If we are to articulate this on metaphysical terms with a nod to the way Deleuze utilizes the concept of ‘experience’ with a Spinozist bent, mind is understood as the ‘substance’ with which all phenomena consists of.

Total-function and this is what is meant when Dōgen coins the Buddhist term *Sangai-yuishin* (三界唯心) or “Triple-world is Mind only.”³³⁷

Equating Buddha-nature with Total-function does not lead to Dōgen simply equating Buddha-nature with enlightenment as is customary in Hongaku doctrine, as he distinguishes, “those who realize enlightenment, those who know, are Buddhas, but the Buddha-nature is beyond enlightened knowing and enlightened understanding.”³³⁸ Reinterpreting Dōgen’s Practice-confirmation and Total-exertion lead to understanding that enlightenment does not exist as some kind of noun function outside of the aspiration and realization of actual practice. Consequently, Dōgen does not see Buddha-nature as something with a purely theoretical ontological connotation as “existence,” “non-existence,” “essence and form.” This becomes evident in our following analysis of the actual practical role Buddha-nature plays for the individual practitioner.

Rather than equating Buddha-nature with an ontological ‘ground’ or ‘essence,’ Dōgen prefers to position the concept of Buddha-nature as immanent to the ordinary experience of Totally-functioning phenomena happening here and now, inclusive of everything regardless of living or nonliving. This placing of Buddha-nature within Total-function constructs the ‘virtual’ ontological condition that affirms its actual practical role. The idea of spiritual practice as Total-exertion placed one’s activity within a causal continuum with the whole of Totally-functioning phenomena. As the sky makes possible the bird’s flight and the water makes possible the fish’s swimming, the Total-functioning of all phenomena is what makes the Buddhist practitioner’s present Practice-confirmation possible. How Total-function is the condition upon which our activity is set leads to an understanding of Buddha-nature as a practical tool in its ‘actual’ application on the level of the individual practitioner. In the following section I will argue how Buddha-nature can be understood as one’s

‘Substance’ here does not denote any sense of physical materiality or thing-ness. Rather, it is a virtual concept denoting how the nature of mind is an inter-functioning causal process that is constitutive of what humans consider reality in a particular situation.

³³⁷ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.3, “Sangai-yuishin,” 61-69. The Buddhist term “Triple World” or Sangai (三界) is used as a general term meaning the whole of experienced reality. The “triple” refers to the Buddhist view that what we consider reality is an amalgam of volition, matter and non-matter. The idea of the “Triple World is mind only” is often mistaken for an idealist statement where reality is reduced to the mind, but Dōgen in keeping with his views on Total-function consider the phrase descriptive of how the mind cannot be neither exclusively ‘subjective’ nor ‘objective’ and always co-creative of reality.

³³⁸ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Busshō”, 5.

actual will or ‘aspiration’ in spiritual practice.

5.4.2 Actuality of Buddha-Nature: Buddha-Nature is the Aspiration for Practice

I previously analyzed how the equality between ‘mind’ and Total-function means that the mind through which Buddha-nature comes to be realized by the practitioner is not an independent ‘thing’ that he/she “possesses,” but the Total-functioning of all phenomena that does not exist outside or apart from one’s activity. Therefore, Buddha-nature is not something one “has”³³⁹ as an ‘individual-essence,’ which unconditionally guarantees enlightenment in the future. Buddha-nature as the whole of Total-function works as the ‘virtual’ condition that makes one’s spiritual practice possible. Since the Buddhist must Totally-exert him/herself in their spiritual practice to co-enact Total-function to its fullest, we can infer that Buddha-nature as manifest in an individual’s activity is causally relative to one’s aspiration, motivation and will to exert oneself in the Buddha path.

Understanding Buddha-nature as the process of Total-function itself, means that in actual practice Buddha-nature is realized within one’s Total-exertion. If so, the ‘actual’ function of Buddha-nature may be seen as a concept denoting one’s *will* and *aspiration* to Totally-exert oneself in Practice-confirmation, only through which one’s potential to be enlightened becomes a reality.

The above inference concerning the connection between Totally-exerted practice and Buddha-nature is evidenced in Dōgen’s following statement where he expresses Buddha-nature as nothing else, but one’s actual aspiration in practice:

“wanting to know the meaning of the Buddha-nature” does not only mean knowing. It means wanting to practice it, wanting to experience it, wanting to preach it, and wanting to forget it. Such preaching, practicing, experiencing, forgetting, misunderstanding, not misunderstanding, and so on are all “the causes and circumstances of real time.” To reflect “the causes and circumstances of real time” is to reflect using “the causes and

³³⁹ See *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Busshō”, 21-23. Concerning Dōgen’s problematization of expressing Buddha-nature as something we “have.” In addition since Buddha-nature is not a “thing” nor “essence” endowed by existence, but is what is one with and realized through the inter-functionality of phenomenal reality, it will also be reasonable to a certain extent to claim that “Buddha-nature does not exist” as we can see in Dōgen’s comments about Zen Master Daien’s teaching that “All living beings are without Buddha-nature.” Although of course such a statement still comes short of describing Buddha-nature’s existence as itself Total-function, hence Dōgen’s final preference for the term ‘impermanence-Buddha-nature.’

circumstances of real time”; it is mutual reflection through a whisk, a staff, and spoon. On the basis of “imperfect wisdom,” “faultless wisdom,” or the wisdom of “original awakening,” “fresh awakening,” “free awakening,” “right awakening,” and so on, [“the causes and circumstances of real time”] can never be reflected. “Just reflecting” is not connected with the subject that reflects or the object of reflection and it should not be equated with right reflection, wrong reflection, and the like: it is “just reflection” here and now. Because it is “just reflection” here and now it is beyond subjective reflection and it is beyond objective reflection. It is the oneness of “real time and causes and circumstances” itself; it is transcendence of “causes and circumstances”; it is the Buddha-nature itself, the Buddha-nature rid of its own substance; it is Buddha as Buddha himself; and it is the natural function as the natural function itself.³⁴⁰

The idea that “just reflecting” on the “causes and circumstances of real time” is itself Buddha-nature is reflective of the relationship between Total-exertion and Buddha-nature. Dōgen is saying here that Buddha-nature only occurs in and while a practitioner aspires for enlightenment, Totally-exert him/herself in practice by reflecting on the nature of *praṭītyasamutpāda* in their lived reality here and now. The quality or content of the reflection is secondary, as it is primarily the aspiring (“wanting”) to understand and the realization of that aspiration in Totally-exerted practice that sets in motion Buddha-nature as the ‘potential to be enlightened.’ Therefore, Buddha-nature is not diminished by “misunderstanding,” “forgetting” or “imperfect wisdom” as long as the primal aspiration and will for Total-exertion is present. Given that one is Totally-exerted in practice, Buddha-nature is inclusive of his/her doubts, wanderings and be-puzzlement within their wholehearted practice. As a result, Buddha-nature is not an independent ‘essence’ in an individual that guarantees enlightenment, but what is realized only within the actual willingness and enactment of activity. In short, Buddha-nature *is* one’s will or aspiration for Buddhist practice.

This point concerning Buddha-nature as realized only in one’s aspiration to practice is also strongly evident in the explanations Dōgen gives about a *Kōan*³⁴¹ he quotes in the “Zazenshin” fascicle. The story goes that Zen Master Daijaku was sitting in meditation when Zen Master Daie asked him why he is sitting. To this Daijaku simply answered, “aiming to become Buddha.” Dōgen, by nature of his adherence to *praṭītyasamutpāda*, does not give this statement a teleological

³⁴⁰ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Busshō”, 6.

³⁴¹ The word *Kōan* 公案 (also written as 公案) refers to a set of practices in Chán (Zen) Buddhism where monks are challenged with short sayings, riddles, questions or stories by old Chán masters which are said to be expressive of the nature of Buddhist realization of reality.

interpretation nor sees the statement as a statement of purpose, and rather interprets it as meaning that,

Remember, the words of Daijaku are that to sit in zazen is, in every case, “aiming to become buddha” To sit in zazen is, in every case, “becoming buddha” as “aiming.” The “aiming” may be before the “becoming buddha,” may be after the “becoming buddha,” and may be just the very moment of “becoming buddha.” Let us ask for a while: How many instances of “becoming buddha” does one such instance of “aiming” entangle? This entanglement is further entwining with entanglement. At this time, all cases of entanglement as totally “becoming buddha” in separate instances, and as totally “becoming buddha” always being exactly itself are individual instances of “aiming.” We cannot flee from a single instance of “aiming.” At a time when we flee from a single instance of “aiming,” we lose body and life. [But even] the time when we lose body and life is an instance of entanglement as “aiming.”³⁴²

Here, Dōgen is saying that Buddha-nature actualizes in the very instance of “aiming” or aspiring for it in practice. Understanding Buddha-nature as the process of Total-function itself, means that in actual practice Buddha-nature is realized within one’s Total-exertion. In other words, the ‘actual’ function of Buddha-nature is to denote how one’s potential to be enlightened becomes reality only through Total-exertion in Practice-confirmation. ‘Aspiring’ for Dōgen is not simply just a thought, but is itself part of spiritual practice³⁴³ that realizes the potential for Buddhahood in and through Total-exertion, in spite of all the entanglements the practice may involve.³⁴⁴ The practitioner’s problems, be-puzzlement, and doubts which arises from their Totally-exerted aspiration and practice are all considered part of the process of Totally-exerted activity, hence part of Buddha-nature (i.e. one’s potential to end suffering) rather than an obstruction.

Buddha-nature as the ‘realized potential to end suffering’ actualized through one’s present aspiration and practice means that Buddha-nature is an absolutely immanent metaphysical concept

³⁴² *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Zazenshin”, 117-118.

³⁴³ Jikisai, 228.

³⁴⁴ See also Jikisai’s analysis of the Zazenshin fascicle, Jikisai 224-237.

Similar ideas reflective of how Dōgen conceives of aspiration and practice as primary in Buddhism and therefore one with Buddha-nature can also be found in the following statements from the *Shōbōgenzō*:

“The activity which realizes those activities – it is our activity now. The now of activity is not the self’s primordial being, eternal, and immutable, nor is it something that enters and leaves the self. The Way called now, does not precede activity; as activity realized, it is called now.” *Shōbōgenzō*, “Gyoji” as translated by Kim, *Mystical Realist*, 164.

“The many kinds of being and the many individual beings which [live] as existence-time in darkness and in brightness, are all the realization of our own effort, and the momentary continuance of our effort. We should learn in practice that without the momentary continuance of our own effort in the present, not a single *dharmā* nor a single thing could ever be realized or could ever continue from one moment to the next.” *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, “Uji”, 147.

“The great Way of the Buddhas and ancestors consists always in these supreme activities, never interrupted in their continuation: the aspiration for enlightenment, practice, enlightenment, and nirvana. These four activities never allow even a single interval between them. This is the perpetuation of the Way through activity.” *Shōbōgenzō*, “Gyoji” as translated by Kim, *Mystical Realist*, 63. (Slight modifications by myself with consultation of the original Japanese)

that is immediately apparent in its actual expression. As Dōgen mentions:

The words “Wanting to know the meaning of the Buddha-nature” mean, for example, “Really knowing the meaning of the Buddha-nature just here and now.” “Should just reflect real time, causes and circumstances” means “Know causes and circumstances as real time, just here and now!” If you want to know this “Buddha-nature,” remember “causes and circumstances as real time” are just it. “When the time has come” means “The time has come already! What could there be to doubt?” Even if there is a time of doubt, I leave it as it is, it is the Buddha-nature returning to me. Remember, “the time having come” describes not spending any time in vain through the twelve hours: “when it has come” is like saying “it has come already.” And because “the time has come,” “Buddha-nature” does not arrive. Thus, now that the time has come, this is just the manifestation before us of the Buddha-nature, whose truth, in other words, is self-evident. In summary, there has never been any time that was not time having come, nor any Buddha-nature that was not the Buddha-nature manifesting itself before us.³⁴⁵

This means that Buddha-nature is never a “hidden” or “transcendent” phenomenon which is either an ‘individual-essence’ hidden away by our impurities or a ultimate ‘realm of truth’ unreachable by rationality and language. Rather, Buddha-nature and Practice-confirmation is always an immanent, and evident reality in the present that *is* one’s wholehearted conduct of the Buddha-path. This view re-emphasizes that Buddha-nature is not a concept denoting an independent metaphysical reality outside of causality, but *is* our Totally-exerted participation within the process of causality.

I will summarize the relationship between the metaphysics of Buddha-nature and one’s aspiration for Totally-exerted Practice-confirmation with the help of Deleuzian terms. Dōgen’s Buddha-nature is a heterogenetic concept that has both a virtual and actual side to its function. The virtual aspect is its function as a transcendental condition whereby Buddha-nature denotes Total-function itself and therefore the unfolding of *prāṭīyasamutpāda* in the experience of phenomenal reality. As a virtual concept, Buddha-nature assumes the role of a transcendental ‘ground’ on which all the other ideas and practices can work. Buddha-nature’s actual aspect is as ‘individual Buddha-nature’ or the individual’s realization of his/her potential to free oneself from suffering. The individual aspect of Buddha-nature occurs as the full realization of Total-function through one’s Total-exertion in aspiring for enlightenment and doing Buddhist practice. The virtual and actual sides of the concept are merely seeing the same univocal process from different gradient perspectives. The

³⁴⁵ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, “Busshō”, 7.

former is seen from a holistic level and the later on an individual level. These sides of Buddha-nature are at basis folds of the same univocal process of ‘mind’/Total-function; in other words prafityasamutpāda unfolding in the actual causal process of our experiencing of phenomena and our actions.

At baseline, my view is that Dōgen’s version of Buddha-nature returns the concept to the most basic and practical sense of its meaning as a ‘realizing of one’s potential for enlightenment,’ but by re-articulating it within his ontology of Total-function. Buddha-nature as the realizing of one’s potential to be freed from the cycle of suffering is not a metaphysical ‘being’ that independently exists or function as an ontological ground/innate essence. Rather, the metaphysics of Buddha-nature in which Buddha-nature is equated with Total-function, aspiration and practice, simply means that the potential for enlightenment naturally will not occur without one’s aspiration to Totally-exert him/herself for enlightenment in actual Practice-confirmation. The possibility for enlightenment (i.e. Buddha-nature) only occurs while the practitioner aspires and Totally-exerts oneself to end suffering and to cultivate altruism. Simply, Buddha-nature *is* nothing else but the ‘realization of one’s potential for enlightenment’ born in one’s aspiration to achieve the cessation of suffering as reflected in one’s present spiritual practice.

As a result of the preceding analysis, Dōgen’s view of Buddha-nature is reformulated as a purely pragmatic concept as opposed to the former Hongaku inspired views equating Buddha-nature to some “True Self,” “individual-essence” or “Dharma-realm” which grounds, explains or promises enlightenment. The following section will now analyze how this concept functions pragmatically to assist Buddhist practice in contrast to former Hongaku inspired views.

5.4.3 Dōgen and Buddha-Nature: The Practicality of Buddha-Nature

If we recall, former Hongaku views of Buddha-nature as enlightenment itself and the pure assurance of our unity with ‘original enlightenment’ lead to a negation of the necessity for practice. One no longer needs practice to become “enlightened” when he/she already is “primordially

enlightened.” Therefore, Hongaku doctrine voided Buddhism of its fundamental necessity for practice and to cultivate a mindful analysis of experience to free oneself and others from suffering.

From the perspective of *prafityasamutpāda*, viewing Buddha-nature as an inherent ‘individual-essence’ or a ‘seed’ that intrinsically guarantees an enlightenment to be realized in the future, but is somehow deficit in the present, is also problematic. Such an idea may hinder or discourage one’s attitude in practice in two ways. First, it may fixate the practitioner to a teleological mindset that prejudices what ‘enlightenment’ is, leading to an attachment to misleading conceptualizations of reality (i.e. *dhātu-vāda*) and/or a nihilism that makes the goal of enlightenment too hopelessly far for achievement. Second, believing one has an inherent ‘enlightenment’ that is ontologically promised can lead to an indolence towards sustaining one’s conscious aspiration and impetus to practice Buddhism.

On the other hand, Dōgen’s concept of Buddha-nature makes it most effective and encouraging in faith and conduct for the students of the Buddha-path by undercutting the former *dhātu-vādic* views on Buddha-nature. In short, Dōgen’s version of Buddha-nature is the idea that there will always be the potential for freedom from suffering as long as we are wholeheartedly exerting ourselves for self-betterment in spiritual practice regardless of, or rather through, our doubts and entanglements. As opposed to being a purely theoretical concept, such an understanding of Buddha-nature positions the concept in the concrete problem of life and the fundamental question of the need and aspiration to cultivate oneself to overcome suffering.³⁴⁶

If students conceived of Buddha-nature as a potentiality that is realized in and through their aspiration and practice, they will benefit from a more productive mindset in transforming one’s worldview, and in cultivating their minds in accordance to *prafityasamutpāda*. In detail, this “benefit” happens in four ways. First, Dōgen’s understanding of Buddha-nature as one with aspiration and practice, pragmatically functions for the sake of supporting and encouraging the Buddhist practitioner to take one’s practice seriously and with greater diligence. Secondly, its inclusivity towards

³⁴⁶ Jikisai expresses this “edge” he observes in Dōgen’s notion of Buddha-nature as follows: “the existence of Buddha-nature as itself *prafityasamutpāda* and impermanence is not something that can be understood purely by concepts, but through actual awareness in experience,” Jikisai, 92.

entanglements also encourages the practitioner's hope in sustaining his/her aspiration to fulfill the aim of the Buddha-path (i.e. cessation of suffering and perfection of altruism/empathy) away from nihilism or resignation amidst hardships and doubt. Thirdly, to re-conceive, and experience one's whole-hearted practice as co-dependent with the whole of Total-function helps assert the centrality of *pratītyasamutpāda* in life by placing him/her within the causal process of *pratītyasamutpāda* unfolding as the phenomenal reality we experience here and now. Finally, this sense of the practitioner being a crucial participant responsible for the whole of Total-function, strengthens the necessity for altruistic awareness and responsibility in acting towards others. We will now see that this practical approach to metaphysics put to exhaustive use through the concept of Total-function is also applicable to Dōgen's understanding of time.

5.5 Dōgen and Temporality

If we recall, Matsumoto considered Dōgen's concept of time was an extension of the idea of 'constant-abiding' found in Hongaku doctrine where individual phenomena were identified with the whole of *Tathātā*. According to this logic, each moment was singular and perfect unto itself since it was immediately equal to the totality of *Tathātā*. Each phenomenon/moment was as it is in its current state, inclusive of all defilements and hindrances, already the "original enlightenment" of *Tathātā*. I had analyzed that scholars like Abe, and Heine, largely followed this same logic in interpreting Dōgen's idea of *Uji* (有時) and hence reiterated *dhātu-vāda*. These scholars often translated 有時 as 'Being-time' which was indicative of their presumption that there is a notion of a grounding 'Being' or 'existence' behind the concept which again implied *dhātu-vāda*.

How can we articulate Dōgen's idea of a seemingly paradoxical coexistence of temporal singularity and continuity without relying on *dhātu-vāda*? Achieving this task will once again involve the use of the concept of Total-function and necessitates an alternative translation of *Uji* that will free us from the paradigm of 'Being.' Much in the same way Total-function is crucial in reinterpreting Buddha-nature, I consider the concept will help us untangle Dōgen's views on time and continuity

beyond dhātu-vāda. In short, I will argue that temporal moments are both singular and somehow continuous because they are the momentary effect of the Total-functioning of reality and not due to their identification with an all-inclusive ontologically grounded 'Being.'

5.5.1 Uji: Living-time

As I touched upon in chapter three, Uji (有時) is translated as “Being-time” by many scholars who tend to read Dōgen through Heidegger or phenomenology, including T.P. Kasulis, and Steven Heine. The translation is misleading since the term ‘Being’ is contingent to the history of Western ontology and implies a sense of materiality or ground in referring to what is existent. As I have repeatedly emphasized, Buddhism does not concern itself with the question of an intrinsically existing ‘being-ness’ in whatever disguise, whether it be called “presence.” Rather, all phenomena, regardless of their psychological or material nature, are considered inter-causally dependent, impermanent and constantly changing. This means that reinterpreting Dōgen’s notion of time beyond dhātu-vāda necessitates an alternative translation of Uji that is not tied to dhātu-vāda. Reinterpreting Dōgen’s famous concept of Uji through Total-function will become a leeway to create a new translation of the term which will then help reinterpret Dōgen’s other ideas on temporality as a whole.

Dōgen elaborates on the idea of Uji in the following statements:

When we [re-]order ourselves, [in accordance to pratīyasamutpāda] and understand the whole of reality as [inter-relative to] the self, we should deeply examine each and every phenomena within that reality as themselves time. Just as particular things do not obstruct one another so particular time does not obstruct one another. For this reason the whole of time simultaneously arises with the Buddha-aspiring mind, and the mind simultaneously with the arising of time. Same holds true of practice and enlightenment. [Re-]order the self and observe. Such is the principle of time of the self.

We should learn in practice that by virtue of this functioning of reality as time in the present as it is, the whole earth includes myriad phenomena and hundreds of things, and each phenomenon and each thing exists as the whole earth. Such understanding is the first step [on the way] of practice. When we come to realize the place in the functioning of reality as it is in the present, there is just one concrete form and one concrete phenomenon that is [beyond] understanding of form and non-understanding of form, [beyond] understanding of phenomenon and non-understanding of phenomenon. Because reality is only this exact moment, all moments of ‘Uji’ are the whole of time, and all form

and phenomena are time. The whole of existence and the whole universe exists in individual moments of time. Let us pause to reflect whether or not any of the whole of phenomena or whole universe has leaked away from one's observation of the present moment of time.³⁴⁷

In the above, Dōgen is essentially claiming that all phenomena *is* time and time *is* phenomena.³⁴⁸ Since for Dōgen, 'phenomena' *is* Total-function, this means time *is* Total-function. Therefore, the word *yū* (有), which means 'existing,' 'to be,' or 'to have' in the compound term 'Uji' (有時), simply means 'all phenomena,' in other words, all that is Totally-functioning to create our experience of living. Consequently, the term Uji denotes Dōgen's insistence that temporality *is the same process* as the Total-functioning of phenomena, inclusive of ourselves that are also participating within that causal process. This is in line with the basic Buddhist phenomenology of understanding experience as the causal process of the skandhas. As I have previously examined, the question of 'existence' from the perspective of *prāṭīyasamutpāda* is limited to the question of our *experience of existing* as unfolding through the causal process of the skandhas which is the experience of living itself. Therefore, the question of "yū" (有) and "ji" (時), or time, in "Uji" (有時) can be interpreted as the experience of existing in time unfolding as Total-function. This simply means the experience of lived time, or time as we live it, therefore I will translate Uji (有時) as 'Living-time.'

Rather than interpreting Uji as a purely ontological equality between Being and time, time equated with Total-function ultimately leads to the idea that Uji means time *is* *prāṭīyasamutpāda* (i.e. causality) functioning in our ordinary experience of living. This idea that Living-time is the unfolding of Total-function will help make sense out of how Dōgen considered each moment as singular occurrences or what he called 'Dharma-positions' (*Hōi* 法位).

³⁴⁷ Translated by myself based on the original Japanese. Dōgen Kigen, *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.2, ed. Mizuno Yaoko, (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993),47-48. with consultations of interpretations by Kim, *Mystical Realist*, 150 and Jikisai, 148.

³⁴⁸ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, "Uji", 143-144.

5.5.2 Time as Singular Moments: Dharma-Positions

For scholars as Abe and Heine, Dharma-position (Hōi 法位) indicated the nature of how every moment is singular and perfect unto itself due to their ontological identity with Tathātā. On the contrary, I will argue that Dharma-position denotes how every moment is an individuated outcome of the multiplicity of converging functions that causes that moment to unfold, and how this constitutes the moment's singular 'position' within the process of Total-function. Recalling Dōgen's metaphysics of Total-function, each phenomenon/aspect of reality was considered a singular expression of the Total-functioning of all phenomena. *Dharma-position* is then an application of this idea of singularity in rearticulating temporality under the light of Total-function.

Dōgen's views on each moment as singular in relation to the causal continuity of Total-function is elaborated in the following quote:

Firewood becomes ash; it can never go back to being firewood. Nevertheless, we should not take the view that ash is its future and firewood is its past. Remember, firewood abides in its particular Dharma-position. It has a past and it has a future. Although it has a past and a future, the past and the future are cut off. Ash exists in its particular Dharma-position. It has a past and it has a future. The firewood, after becoming ash, does not again become firewood. Similarly, human beings, after death, do not live again. At the same time, it is an established custom in the Buddha-Dharma not to say that life turns into death. This is why we speak of "no appearance." And it is the Buddha's preaching established in [the turning of] the Dharma wheel that death does not turn into life. This is why we speak of "no disappearance." Life is an instantaneous situation, and death is also an instantaneous situation. It is the same, for example, with winter and spring. We do not think that winter becomes spring, and we do not say that spring becomes summer.³⁴⁹

While it seems like common sense to understand there is a linear temporal continuity and causal relationship between firewood becoming ash, Dōgen insists not to see this phenomenon as a movement from a past to a present situation. The reason to this is because firewood and ash both exist in their respective *Dharma-positions* (Hōi 法位, or place within the Dharma).

From the perspective of Dōgen's use of *pratītyasamutpāda*, 'firewood' or 'ash' cannot be

³⁴⁹ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, "Genjōkōan", 42. Slight modifications in translation made by myself.

existing as such because they possess an essence of ‘firewood-ness’ or ‘ash-ness’ waiting to be identified by a perceiver. Rather, these things become ‘firewood’ or ‘ash’ because they come to actualize the role of firewood or ash through their causal co-dependency with everything else Totally-functioning to make that role possible. This includes the perceiver’s activity that conceptualizes and co-creates the utility of the wood for the sake of starting a fire. In other words, there can be no independently existing ‘thing’ called firewood or ash outside of Total-function that is making the current role of firewood as firewood, ash as ash possible. Therefore, every present moment of each phenomenon is a singular effect of the converging of Total-function unfolding as Living-time within a particular situation. In this sense, Dōgen says, “the whole of existence and the whole universe exists in individual moments of time.” For firewood to be acting as firewood there is a particular way the whole of reality simultaneously functions for that role of the firewood to occur, likewise so for ash to function as ash, etc.

Consequently, Dōgen says that the continuity between firewood to ash is “cut away” from a linear temporality going from a past to a future and constitutes a singular Dharma-position. It is also the reason why Dōgen says that winter does not become spring or spring became summer. Each of these seasons are the singular effect of a particular way phenomena Totally-functions in unfolding the nature and appearance of the season in a manner we experience and label as “spring” or “winter.” As it was with Buddha-nature and Total-function, Living-time (i.e. Total-function unfolding in time) and Dharma-positions constitute a heterogenesis between ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’ concepts whereby both are each other’s prerequisite and precondition. The whole of reality as Total-function occurring in Living-time works as the virtual condition upon which each actual moment unfolds in a singular manner. In turn, the singularity of each moment indispensably participates in the temporal unfolding of Total-function, thereby inhabiting a particular ‘position’ within Total-function. While this explains the nature of Dōgen’s singular moment, however Dōgen also claims that these singular moments somehow share a sense of continuity. I will analyze how this can be understood without recourse to dhātu-vāda in the following section.

5.5.3 The Virtual Univocity of All Singular Moments

Despite Dōgen's insistence on the idea of the singularity of every moment that does not "pass" from present to a past, nor "come" from future to present, nor "go" from present to future, he does say that there is some kind of continuity to time; what he calls by a verb, *Kyoryaku* 経歴, what I translate as 'momentary-passage.' According to Dōgen:

Existence-time has the virtue of momentary-passing. That is to say, from today it momentary-passes to tomorrow; from today it momentary-passes to yesterday; from yesterday it momentary-passes to today; from today it momentary-passes to today; and from tomorrow it momentary-passes to tomorrow. Because passage through singular moments is a virtue of time, moments of the past and present are neither piled up one on top of another nor lined up in a row; and, for the same reason, Seigen is time, Ōbaku is time, and Kōzei and Sekitō [all names of past Buddhist masters] are time. Because subject-and-object already is time, practice-and-confirmation is moments of time.³⁵⁰

The hour of the horse [11AM – 1PM] and the hour of the sheep [1-3PM], in relation to things arrayed in the world now, are as they are by virtue of abiding in their Dharma-positions, constantly moving up and down.³⁵¹

The kind of continuity expressed here can be clarified in relation to the nature of Living-time as Total-function. Total-function denoted how every phenomenon are causally co-dependent to each other's particular functions infinitely in every direction. Consequently, the Total-functioning of all phenomena that constitutes each Dharma-position could not be seen as a simple linear causal movement from one clearly locatable cause to an effect where there is a clear beginning and end, or a simple linear temporal relationship of past to a future. Living-time unfolding in a single Dharma-position is never unilateral, linear or sequential, but simultaneously moving in (to and from) each and every other direction and is "multi-directional and multi-dimensional."³⁵² Therefore, time is a dynamic process of inter-functioning singularities, whose movement and sense of continuity constitutes a multiplicity.

³⁵⁰ *Shōbōgenzō*, Vol.1, "Uji", 145.

³⁵¹ *Shōbōgenzō*, "Uji", as translated in Kim, *Mystical Realist*, 162.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, 162

Accordingly, ‘momentary-passage’ denotes the multi-directional causal continuity between Dharma-positions as opposed to a linear ‘flow’ of time or the view that all Dharma-positions are united by reduction to the metaphysical substratum of *Tathātā*. In other words, the Total-functioning nature of phenomena constitutes the ‘virtual’ condition on which ‘actual’ singular moments can momentary-pass. Each singular moment owns a sense of univocal relationship amongst each other by virtue of it all participating in one inseparable ‘virtual’ process of Total-function. Total-function or the causal process of experienced reality plays the role of a univocal connectivity amongst all singularity.

Matsumoto criticised Dōgen’s theory of time as denying impermanence since he interpreted Dōgen’s multi-directional time as a metaphysical substratum persisting in a manner unconditioned by the irreversible impermanence of lived reality. On the contrary, interpreting Uji as ‘Living-time’ unfolding through the process of Total-function does not deny irreversible impermanence in any way. As Dōgen says that “firewood, after becoming ash, does not again become firewood” and “human beings, after death, do not live again,” the fact that each Dharma-position is multi-directionally co-dependent to each other does not mean time can be reversed or that impermanence is denied. Rather, Living-time re-articulates the nature of impermanence as embedded within a multi-directional causal relationship as opposed to a simple unilateral relationship from a clear past to a clear teleological end. To the extent that Living-time is the very process of *pratīyasamutpāda* multi-directionally unfolding in time, the nature that all causal processes are constantly changing is undeniable. Therefore, whether causal change is multi-directional, time is always impermanent.

In addition, neither does this view on time attempt to escape from or deny the reality of death, but it practically suggests looking at it from a radically different perspective founded in *pratīyasamutpāda*. In other words, Dōgen’s view of temporality as Living-time, Dharma-positions and momentary-passage urges practitioners to come to terms, reconsider, and analyze how one’s conception of the inescapable reality of impermanence and death are related to one’s suffering, by befitting it within the context of *pratīyasamutpāda*/Total-function. This leads to understanding how articulating temporality as Living-time is at heart integrated with spiritual practice, as I will conclude

in the next section.

5.5.4 The Practical Significance of Dōgen’s Metaphysics of Time

Dōgen insisted that time is inseparable from Total-function and therefore, it is co-dependent to one’s living, aspiring and practicing as a Buddhist. This understanding pragmatically works as a conceptual tool to help the practitioner reformulate their mindset whereby *prafītyasamutpāda* becomes central and immanent to all aspects of their lives. Understanding time as the process of Total-function means, that time is affirmed through one’s Total-exertion in Practice-confirmation of the Buddha’s teaching of *prafītyasamutpāda*. One’s aspiring and living the Buddha path *is* the unfolding of *prafītyasamutpāda* as Living-time. Living-time does not exist as some kind of ontological ‘truth.’ One does not ‘reveal’ or ‘attain’ Living-time as an ‘authentic’ nature of time. Rather, one’s Totally-exerted practice *is already* the unfolding of Living-time within the present process of activity. Dōgen himself stated this point in an earlier quote: “Because subject-and-object already is time, practice-and-confirmation is moments of time” and that “the whole of time simultaneously arises with the Buddha-aspiring mind, and the mind simultaneously with the arising of time. Same holds true of practice and enlightenment.” In short, to Totally-exert oneself in Practice-confirmation is Living-time unfolding as Total-function.

The above demonstrates that Dōgen’s views on time are not statements claiming the ‘true-way-reality-is’ or the ‘true-way-temporality-is.’ Rather, Dōgen’s view on time and continuity functions pragmatically to enhance practice in two ways. First, is to further assist the practitioner to place him/herself within the worldview of *prafītyasamutpāda* by working together with his concepts of Total-function and Buddha-nature. Understanding that all forms of suffering happens by causality and therefore to observe what it is that causes one’s suffering necessitates the acceptance of *prafītyasamutpāda* as a transcendental condition on which to make sense of reality. If so, understanding temporality in terms of *prafītyasamutpāda* is not an option, but a necessity for Buddhist practice. This is why Dōgen criticizes “common sense” views on time, so that his students actively

attempt to purge these views from their minds in replacing them with a thorough application of *praṭīyasamutpāda* in every aspect of life.³⁵³ Thereby, accepting Living-time means that the law of *praṭīyasamutpāda* not only permeates through a practitioner's understanding of phenomena, but also within their conception of temporality.

Second, by virtue of the practitioner accepting their causal connection within Living-time, a sense of urgency, diligence and responsibility in Totally-exerted practice is born, affirming the practitioner to partake in practice beyond nihilism. By understanding the lack of an independent 'self' amongst the causal-dependency of phenomena, one comes to take seriously the responsibility of one's life and action in relation to the Total-functioning of the whole of phenomena. As one should Totally-exert themselves in practice as if one is responsible for the whole of reality, so should one act with a sense of responsibility and utmost concern for the irredeemable value of time. Therefore, every follower of the Buddha-path should not waste any time and practice diligently as if the entirety of time is dependent on that one practice.

Conclusively, Dōgen's concepts of Total-function, Total-exertion, and Buddha-nature, together with Dōgen's concepts of temporality seen in his ideas of Living-time, Dharma-positions, and momentary-passage, collectively worked to assist practitioners to actively question their own normative beliefs concerning how they conceptualize the self and world in light of *praṭīyasamutpāda*. Ultimately, the concepts urged practitioners to re-conceive their relationship with reality and practice through *praṭīyasamutpāda* and encouraged them to diligently practice Buddhism beyond resignation or nihilism.

³⁵³ Dōgen criticizes two views on time which at heart shares the same mistake of denying *praṭīyasamutpāda* by dualizing time as separated from the subject and from the causal process of reality itself. In these views, time is either viewed as a simple measurement of temporal units which "flies by" independent of ourselves or reality, or time is viewed as some kind of series of "containers" or "space" independent from ourselves and through which we simply move through once and never return. See *Shōbōgenzō* "Uji" as translated in Kim, *Mystical Realist*, 148, 152.

5.6 Dōgen's Metaphysics: Conclusion

Whether it is reading Dōgen's ideas on Buddha-nature, Total-function, Practice-confirmation, Living-time or Dharma-positions, I have demonstrated that reading them with the help of Deleuzian pragmatism and heterogenesis freed them from dhātu-vāda. Consequently, I have shown that despite his unrelenting emphasis on the primacy of practice, Dōgen's philosophy was never in conflict with ontology and metaphysics. Rather, his philosophy utilized metaphysics pragmatically in a manner that it conditioned and assisted spiritual practice in various ways. The concept of Total-function worked as the transcendental condition on which to place all of Dōgen's ideas exhaustively within *pratītyasamutpāda*. As a result, Total-function and its application on human activity as Total-exertion further allowed Buddha-nature and Living-time to be re-conceived in a manner that never described reality on 'representational' terms. Rather, these metaphysical concepts became practically significant by introducing the law of *pratītyasamutpāda* as a catalyst for each practitioner to re-conceive the self and reality through every aspect of his/her life. Each metaphysical concept had multiple functions in cautioning, encouraging, and guiding the practitioner in accordance to *pratītyasamutpāda*, so that attempting to understand these concepts itself constituted a practice of critical self-analysis in questioning one's assumption concerning experienced reality. In this sense, Dōgen's metaphysics *is* praxis befitted in the holistic system of Buddhist life to achieve ethical cultivation and the freedom from suffering.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION: METAPHYSICS AS PRAXIS

6.1 What This Research Has Done

Reinterpreting Dōgen through Deleuze's pragmatist metaphysics allowed the current study to put forth the argument that Dōgen's metaphysical ideas concerning Buddha-nature, and temporality were not expressive of a 'true-way-reality-is,' but radically pragmatic in kind, intended to support spiritual practice. Metaphysics does not explain reality-as-it-is. Rather, it explains what a particular philosophy *considers to be* reality within and through its embeddedness to that very process of experiencing and articulating reality. When this Deleuzian view was accepted as a foundation for practical philosophy, metaphysics no longer had to 'prove' an asserting 'truth of reality'; rather, it became a practical tool to assist one's care-of-the-self in accordance to the spiritual and ethical framework set in accordance to what that philosophy chose as its preferred conditions of reality.

In other words, ontology and metaphysics are 'stories'³⁵⁴ we create to make sense out of reality. If such 'stories' condition the way we live, overcoming the sufferings born from such world- and self-conceptualizations first necessitates a change in these 'stories' themselves. One must then rewrite the 'story' through which we base our understanding of the world and self and then transform our way of living in accordance to such a new vision. Dōgen's Total-function or *pratītyasamutpāda* is one such 'story' pragmatically set to reconsider the way we live.³⁵⁵ Therefore, applied to Dōgen's Buddhist framework, to think metaphysically came to work as a spiritual praxis for us to re-conceive

³⁵⁴ By 'story' I do not imply a derogatory sense that they are 'fictitious,' rather, in agreement with David Loy I am implying how our narrative thought process is itself entangled with the creation of what we consider to be 'reality.' In this sense we can consider our 'story' creation and the reality we live are a heterogenesis. See: David Loy, *The World is Made of Stories*, (Boston: Wisdom, 2010).

³⁵⁵ As David Loy points out, such a pragmatist view on the role of Buddhism leads to a fundamental question concerning its practical function: Is Buddhism a spiritual practice that merely replaces normative worldviews with a "better-functioning" 'story' that helps one end suffering? Or, is the Buddhist 'story' suggesting that there is ultimately a way out of all story-creation? Both seem to be implied. Loy, *The World is Made of Stories*, 33-45.

how the world and we ourselves relate in ways beyond that which habituates us in suffering by applying *pratītyasamutpāda* to every aspect of our lives. So far, we have seen that such a radically pragmatist approach to metaphysics as praxis is not only applicable to, but helped emphasize, the absolute primacy Dōgen placed on spiritual practice as constitutive of Buddhism proper.

In this way, I was able to establish a reading of Dōgen’s concepts of Practice-confirmation, Total-exertion, Dharma-position, and Living-time as each functioning in a heterogenetic manner in relation to the central concept of Total-function that was Dōgen’s preferred worldview founded on *pratītyasamutpāda*. Rather than each concept understood as *dhātu-vāda* corresponding to a particular objective ontological and/or epistemological ‘truth,’ all concepts functioned within the confines of the transcendental conditions of Total-function/*pratītyasamutpāda* as each other’s mutual prerequisite and precondition. In this sense, Dōgen’s philosophy worked as an internally consistent system of practical philosophy founded on the ontological, epistemological and ethical criteria of *pratītyasamutpāda*. This allowed Dōgen’s philosophy to overcome what I considered the limitation in the Critical Buddhist and the “comparative” interpretations; a limitation, which I argued, was rooted in their implicit reliance on the correspondence theory of truth in understanding the role of metaphysics.

My particular reading of Dōgen and my ethical inclination to be faithful to *pratītyasamutpāda* in the study is not only conditioned by the ‘stories’ created by Buddhism and Deleuze, it is also a product of my personal needs, aspirations and values in life. My interpretation of Dōgen born from the amalgam of these contingencies is no longer explicitly ‘Dōgen,’ ‘Deleuze’ or ‘myself,’ but a philosophy of the ‘Erewhon’ open for others to tread, interpret, transform and take into the future. To this extent, I do not claim that my interpretation of Dōgen is the ‘truth’ of Dōgen. At the most, I have argued for a “better” or “effective” reading of Dōgen given that it is to function within the spiritual and ethical aims laid out by *pratītyasamutpāda*. Consequently, I view that my reading of Dōgen was at least faithful to and did particular “justice” to the absolute primacy Dōgen himself placed on spiritual practice. Though the final verdict lies in the readers themselves, I hope that this interpretation convincingly redeemed Dōgen from *dhātu-vāda* and restored the relevance of his metaphysics as a functional practical philosophy in line with *pratītyasamutpāda* and ethics. As

long as we do not close the doors by pinning Dōgen on some conclusive ‘truth’ of what his philosophy must be, I believe that Dōgen’s thought will continue to speak to us in ways significant for our problems today. Hence, I only hope that many more will attempt to radically reread Dōgen alongside *pratītyasamutpāda* in ways relevant for their own spiritual and existential quests, so that his philosophy continues to live as practically effective tools for us to live better lives.

However, before I conclude the study, there are two concrete suggestions concerning what it may further contribute to beyond the confines of Dōgen or Deleuze studies. First is a suggestion that the pragmatist approach to practical philosophy may be complementary to philological and historical approaches, and second is a suggestion for the possibility of further studies for the integrative approach between ‘Western’ pragmatism and Buddhism (vice-versa).

6.2 The Pragmatist Approach as Complementary to Cultural and Philological Approaches

While I have clarified how the current study is differentiated from purely philological approaches to Dōgen, and hence much of what I have presented may seem to lack philological relevance, I suggest that the current thesis may also be complementary to philological approaches. By this, I mean the method of reading Buddhist philosophy taking seriously an absolute centrality of practice and thereby, interpreting and evaluating doctrines based on *what they do* in practice rather than what they represent, may be useful as an additional position from which practice-based philosophies can be understood.

To understand the practical necessity, function and aims a particular philosophy involves necessitate the utility of our imagination and sympathy in attempting to place ourselves as close as possible within the internal contingency of the thinkers in question. This means to attempt to imagine and delve into the psychological, and emotional concerns/conditions (e.g. existential concerns, sufferings, and anxieties) as well as the ethical values, questions and aspirations the thinker possibly embraced in relation to what kind of practical aim his/her philosophy is concerned about. This also involves the necessity to consult philological and cultural studies of the philosophy in constructing an

idea as to what kind of external contingencies the philosopher dealt with. This means to understand the particular social, cultural and intellectual climate in which the thinker's internal conditions were related to. Second, we sincerely adopt the internal contingencies of the thinker as one with our own ethical concerns in life and society today, in order to figure how their philosophy functions as practice. In other words, one could say that such a method of understanding practical-philosophy is itself a form of spiritual-exercise.

Such an approach may complement rather than undermine philological and cultural approaches to studying practical philosophies such as that of the 'Eastern' traditions like Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism, as well as those of ancient Greece and the 'Western' mystical traditions. If understanding a particular philosophy means to reproduce as 'accurately' as possible the particular internal and external contingencies which shaped that philosophy, and we take for granted the condition that 'perfectly' recovering the whole of such contingencies is impossible, then it maybe that we can never in reality, claim an assertable 'truth' of a particular philosopher. The best we can do is to attempt to come close as possible to the various contingencies which produced the philosophy in creating *what we think* is their intention and meaning, and to adapt this philosophy to *what use we want to make of it* from a multi-angular, multi-disciplinary approach. If so, a practice-centred pragmatist approach to philosophy can be of much significance in addition to the philological, historicist, and cultural approaches. While philological and cultural approaches to philosophy helps to clarify the external contingencies, such as the cultural and philosophical climate that influenced a particular thinker, a practice-based approach, by focusing on the questions of how a philosophy functions and for what practical purpose, helps approach the internal contingencies which motivated the creation of the philosophy. For this reason, it may help construct a fuller picture of the thinker and his/her philosophy. In addition, though the following aspect may not be directly fruitful for philological approaches, such a method of interpretation whereby we synchronize our own existential and ethical needs with the sufferings, existential concerns, anxieties and ethical aspirations of the thinkers in question will help adapt these philosophies as significant tools to approach our own ethical problems today.

6.3 Suggestions for Further Integrations of Buddhism and ‘Western’ Practical Philosophy

Perhaps a practice-based, pragmatist reading of Buddhist doctrine, such as the one I have utilized reading Dōgen, can be significant in a wider application in the field of Buddhist studies and comparative philosophy. Such a pragmatic approach may contribute to the following. First, to promote an alternative way of understanding Buddhism in general, where practice is absolutely central and its philosophical endeavors are all understood as pragmatically utilized for the sake of practice. Second, to ultimately present possibilities to further dissolve the separation between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ philosophy as a tool to reunite humanity for the sake of solving common ethical problems. This does not mean to reduce human multiplicity to a theoretical, universal value of ‘humanity,’ as we have done in the past, but to utilize philosophy as a tool to connect people upon the observation of the fundamental and common experiences of living. The coming together of a practice-based approach to philosophy on either side of the ‘East’ ‘West’ divide concerned about ethical and, psychosomatic self-betterment, as well as the solving of personal and social suffering may reunite humanity on the grounds of what all of humanity shares: that is our life, our condition of living as humans with common sufferings, and our aspiration to overcome these sufferings.

6.3.1 The Further Significance of Integrating ‘Western’ Pragmatism with Buddhism

As I had previously noted³⁵⁶ I believe a ‘pragmatist’ attitude to practical philosophy is inherent to Buddhism for example in the form of the doctrine of upāya. However, the fact that the doctrine of upāya is more of a practical attitude than a concrete doctrine elaborated in ontological or epistemological terms may have led to its obscurity from the view of ‘Western’ philosophy. This may have also contributed to the scarcity of scholarly interpretations of Buddhist doctrine that emphasize upāya. In this sense, I believe that the kind of integrative approach I have taken between

³⁵⁶ See chapter 1.

‘Western’ pragmatism and Buddhism may be beneficial for further studies. Deleuze’s pragmatist attitude in re-conceiving metaphysics was of particular significance since Deleuze created a detailed ontological and epistemological reasoning behind how metaphysics is to become practical. While pragmatism is not a stance limited to Deleuze, his philosophy was singular in the sense that he considered philosophy as a practical endeavor, did not deny metaphysics and had utilized pragmatism to transform how metaphysics can become practical. Such a philosophy was helpful in articulating what I considered Dōgen’s pragmatic utility of metaphysics for the sake of Buddhist practice, in a manner more familiar to ‘Western’ philosophical perspectives. In this way, reading Buddhist doctrines in connection with ‘Western’ pragmatism may further complement the inherent Buddhist tendency towards metaphysical inquiry and pragmatism by giving it an ontological and epistemological ‘voice’ that will help it to be communicated to ‘Western’ audiences. As I have demonstrated through the complementary nature between Deleuze and *prāṭīyasamutpāda*, there is a way to make such integrations without having to endanger the ethical foundations of Buddhism.

My use of ‘Western’ pragmatism was limited to Deleuze, yet I believe that it maybe equally insightful for further studies to read Buddhist philosophy by utilizing other ‘Western’ thinkers who are either pragmatists or are influenced by pragmatism like William James, Alfred North Whitehead, or Richard Rorty. Their philosophies may help shed a light on different aspects of how Buddhist philosophy functions from multiple angles. In addition, my use of Deleuzian pragmatism in reading Dōgen was limited to the topics of Buddha-nature, and temporality. It is possible for further studies to make a more extensive reading of Dōgen’s philosophy by applying a similar pragmatist perspective to every aspect of Dōgen’s thought.

6.3.2 The Further Significance of Buddhist Philosophy to ‘Western’ Practical Philosophy

Schroeder’s quote in the introduction of this study described Buddhism as practice-based and in contrast to his view that “Western philosophy traditionally favors theoretical reflection over

praxis.”³⁵⁷ This is a view whose one-sidedness becomes evident when we consider the re-emphasizing of the role of spiritual-practice from within the ‘Western’ tradition of philosophy exemplified by Deleuze, Foucault, Hadot and Shusterman.³⁵⁸ Upon the convergent concern for spiritual practice, perhaps the complementarities between Buddhism and ‘Western’ philosophy can run much deeper than is often considered.

As we had seen in Dōgen, practice is considered absolutely primary in Buddhism and all other philosophical concerns function as tools to enhance practice. In this sense Buddhist philosophy has no purely ‘theoretical’ concern intended to just ‘explain’ or ‘describe’ reality since all of its activity functions for the sake of fulfilling the ethical concern for cultivating altruism and ending suffering. Therefore, in Buddhism no duality exists between rational inquiry, spiritual practice and life itself. All aspects of our living are tools and occasions for us to become a more compassionate being.

While Deleuze’s philosophy does suggest a similar mode of philosophizing where ethics and practice becomes important, his philosophy stays short of emphasizing practice as foundational to every aspect of his philosophy to the extent observable in Buddhism. In addition, despite Deleuze’s ethical concern to counter ill conscience, his ethics does not involve a clear emphasis towards altruism; an ethical stance I believe is crucial in addressing the state of suffering in the world today. Nor does Deleuze put forth or have access to a set of concrete, clear, tried and tested forms of spiritual-exercises as in the case of the various Buddhist meditation techniques and the wealth of understanding of the human mind accumulated by the history of utilizing these techniques. In this sense there is still the danger that Deleuze studies overlook Deleuze’s concern for practice and end up in a purely ‘theoretical’ rut isolated from concerns for ethics, life or spiritual-practice.

As both Hadot and Foucault has shown, ancient Greek traditions of philosophy without a

³⁵⁷ John Schroeder, “Nagarjuna and the Doctrine of Skillful Means”, *Philosophy East and West* 50.4 (2000): 560.

³⁵⁸ Pierre Hadot revisions the practical significance of ‘Western’ philosophy through his study of ancient Hellenic thought (for reference to Hadot see chapter one). Richard Shusterman attempts to create a modern practical philosophy with its own therapeutic spiritual exercises founded on the tradition of ‘Western’ pragmatism. See: Richard Shusterman, *Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life*, (New York: Routledge, 1997). Richard Shusterman, *Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 2008).

doubt also incorporated various concrete spiritual-exercises involving certain forms of meditation and thought training. However, these systems are no longer a living tradition and the accurate details as to how these techniques are to be practiced and what kind of physical effects and states of consciousness they produce cannot be fully understood from the lack of documentations that remain. Even if Hadot, Foucault, Deleuze and their followers wanted to reinstate or adapt forms of concrete spiritual practices as was exercised by the ancient Greeks into their philosophy, the option is limited.

For the above reasons, ‘Western’ philosophical attempts to re-emphasize spiritual practice may benefit from Buddhist insights in two ways. First, is to gain insight into the significance of making altruist ethics and spiritual practice absolutely primary. This involves the concern for how to pragmatically integrate all aspects of philosophizing and human activity into this central concern of living an ethical life. Second, to experiment with the many forms of meditation that has been historically tried and tested in Buddhism in order to: a) perhaps adopt and adapt these techniques into ‘Western’ systems of philosophy, or b) to try them and to see how they work in order to gain possible insights into understanding or reinterpreting what form the ancient Hellenic technologies-of-the-self took and how they may have functioned.

Granted, such integrative philosophies will become something ‘other’ than what is identifiable as purely ‘Buddhist’ or ‘Western’ philosophy. Rather, they may present the potential of a ‘Buddhism-to-come,’ a ‘philosophy-to-come’ that transforms traditions for the sake of pragmatically addressing the ethical problems we face today. While sincerely tracing the practical contingencies that necessitated the original philosophies, such integrative approaches based in pragmatism may take the form of philosophies freed from attachment to itself by understanding itself as ‘stories.’ I hope the current study may become inspirational for such future studies that make the best out of these ‘stories’ as practical tools to restore conviction in the world and ourselves, to overcome geo-political divides and ‘self-centredness’ to reunite humanity upon the common experience of ‘life’ for the sake of creating an alternative, more compassionate future than tradition allows.

GLOSSARY

Buddha-nature: Concept that originally meant an individual's ability or potential of realizing enlightenment. The concept later developed a largely ontological significance when the idea came to include the connotation as an individual-essence equated to the primordially undefiled Tathāta

Constant-abiding (Jojuū): Hongaku idea that each and every phenomenon is already "enlightened" in virtue of its inclusion within the totality of Tathāta or the primordially enlightened realm without having to change or transform itself.

Dharma-position (Hōi): Dōgen's idea that each moment in time inhabits a singular position within the total movement of phenomenal reality (Total-function).

Dhātu-vāda: Sanskrit neologism created by Matsumoto designating philosophical views founded on an ontological and/or epistemological 'ground.'

Heterogenesis: Deleuzian term designating how all concepts must first presuppose a wider worldview or cosmological framework within which that concept can be understood as a valid proposition. This implies that concepts do not 'represent' reality, but are an intrinsic system in which the relationship between transcendental concepts which conditions subordinate concepts (e.g. Platonic Ideas / physical reality) are not unilaterally 'representational,' but in effect only possible as each other's prerequisite and precondition.

Hongaku-shisō (Original Enlightenment): Sino-Japanese Buddhist doctrine claiming that all existence is primordially "enlightened" regardless of practicing or learning the Buddha's teachings.

Jiji-muge-hokkai: Tendai/Huayen Buddhist concept translated as "metaphysical dimension of the unobstructed mutual interpenetration among all things and events." Designates the nature of Tathāta or the Dharma-realm as a metaphysical dimension where each and every other phenomenon exist by causal interdependence thereby forming one beginning-less and endless web of being. Jiji-muge-hokkai can be seen as the consequence of the constant-abiding nature of all phenomena.

Mujyō-seppo: Hongaku idea that non-sentient aspects of reality are 'pure' and 'perfectly' enlightened while sentient beings, although also originally enlightened, are considered qualitatively "less" or far from that "original" state due to their entanglement in discriminative thought. Therefore, Mujyō-seppo claims that sentient beings can only attain "enlightenment" by virtue of being 'taught' enlightenment from the totality of non-sentient reality.

Prajñā: In Buddhism, this is the human faculty of understanding pertaining to analytical and discriminative thought. It is necessary as the basic ability to analyze one's own experience of self and world by applying pratīyasamutpāda to the understanding of one's process of cognition, reaction, habit, etc. This is pursued in order to grasp the cause of one's suffering and to dismantle self-centredness for the sake of cultivating compassion. Prajñā also involves an intuitive intelligence that is believed to grow in response to one's progress in analysis and compassion.

Pratīyasamutpāda: A fundamental doctrine in Buddhism designating all of experienced reality as a product of the process of cause and effect.

Shushō-Ittō: Dōgen's term often interpreted as the "unity (or equality) of practice and enlightenment." However, since this interpretation implies Hongaku-shisō, the current study translates it as 'Practice-confirmation' meaning that, "to practice the Buddha-Dharma (i.e. pratīyasamutpāda) and to confirm the function, effectivity and validity of pratīyasamutpāda is one and the same act."

Skandhas (Five Aggregates): Term utilized in Buddhist phenomenology denoting components of experience. Our experience of ‘self’ and the ‘world’ are considered an effect of the causal process happening amongst the skandhas. The five skandhas include: 1) ‘Form’ (*rūpa*) or reality as it seems to be constituted by matter. 2) Physical or mental ‘sensations’ (*vedanā*) as experienced through the six sensing faculties including eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. 3) ‘Perception’ (*saṃjñā*) or the thought process which associates experience with knowledge and formulates ideas out of experience. 4) ‘Mental formations’ (*samskāra*) which are conditioned or habituated responses formed from past experience. 5) ‘Consciousness’ (*viññāna*) by which is meant mere sensitivity or the neutral mind-field on which the previous four skandhas interact.

Svabhāva: Sanskrit Buddhist term designating the non-Buddhist ontological view that reality intrinsically exists by its own nature and therefore independent of causality. This is considered antithetical to the Buddha’s teaching of no-abiding-self and impermanence. The correct view implying the ‘emptiness’ of ‘essence’ on the other hand is called **asvabhāva**.

Tathātā: Buddhist concept often translated as “thusness” or “suchness” originally designated an enlightened person or the Buddha himself. This eventually came to include an ontological connotation as the ‘true-nature’ of reality in the form of an ‘enlightened’ and pure metaphysical reality prior to concepts.

Total-function (Zenki): Dōgen’s idea that everything is fulfilling a singular and indispensable function within the totality of phenomenal reality and that each function happen by virtue of its interdependence to the function of each and every other phenomenon.

Total-exertion (Gūjin): Dōgen’s idea that everything exerts its own functional abilities to its fullest within the web of Total-function. Every fully exerted activity is a convergent point of Totally-functioning reality. For the follower of Buddhism this means exerting oneself without reserve on spiritual practice as if nothing else is of higher concern.

Twelve Nidānas: Translated as “The twelve-fold chain of co-dependent arising.” Buddha’s claim that suffering arises due to a causal process involving a twelve-fold collection of causal factors (i.e. nidānas). This is a fundamental doctrine in Buddhism implying *pratītyasamutpāda*. Also includes within it the Five Skandhas.

Uji (Living-time): Dōgen’s idea that time is indistinguishable from our experience of ordinary reality. Time is one and the same movement as the process of causality in which we participate. Previous interpretations founded on Hongaku assumptions translated the term as ‘Being-time’ implying an automatic reference to a non-Buddhist idea of an ontological ‘ground’ to existence.

Virtuality/Actuality: A binary ontological concept used by Deleuze to denote the heterogenetic relationship between abstract metaphysical concepts which describe reality on a holistic and universal level (i.e. the virtual) with that of the actual phenomena they purport to describe or condition (e.g. God and man, or Platonic Ideas and physical reality etc.). According to this concept, what is the metaphysical/virtual and what is actually happening always exists in an immanent univocal relationship by virtue of each side sharing one and the same ontological quality (i.e. substance, or ‘sense’). Using this idea allows transcendental concepts referring to the universal, holistic level of existence to be utilized in a manner without having to imply a literal ontological transcendence, reductionism, foundationalism or universalism.

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