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Orienting India : Interwar Internationalism in an Asian Inflection, 1917-1937

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1. Mapping Indian Asianism in the interwar period

- 1.1 Interwar internationalism and Asia
- 1.2 Situating India in Asia
- 1.3 Four Asian cartographies
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1.1 Interwar internationalism and Asia

The twenty years spanning the period 1917–37 were not the first in which the interconnectedness of the world was celebrated, or India's place in it. The impact of the Russo-Japanese war on Asian thinkers and activists in general, and on India in particular, is well documented.¹ Indian anti-imperialists had worked alongside Irish activists in New York, and professed their solidarity with Egyptian anti-imperialists in London, and had even joined the Rif-Rebellion led by Abd al-Karim to fight.² The Balkan Wars, too, had seen several Indian activists side with the Ottoman Empire. Some cited anti-imperialist solidarity; others saw their involvement in terms of Asian or Islamic brotherhood.³ However, as noted in the introduction, the First World War, the Bolshevik revolution, and the establishment of the League of Nations changed the nature and potential of international encounters.

The First World War, first of all, had profoundly changed perceptions of European power structures. The War had been unprecedented in the scale and size of its destruction of lives and lands. It had also destroyed an international order, which, with the collapse of several of its constituent empires, was impossible to revive. There was an increasing realization around the world that the post-war international environment should and would be structured differently. The war also called into question the civilizational models put forward by the European empires that had fought it. This gave further impetus to anti-imperialist movements. Prasenjit Duara's argument, that the transformation of concepts of civilization following the First World War was fundamental in shaping anticolonial nationalisms, can be extended to its shaping of anticolonial *internationalisms*.⁴ The idea that the values of Christianity and Enlightenment were the only categories by which civilization was measured, was no longer a given. Neither was the imperial 'civilizing mission', which by the outbreak of

¹ Among others, B. Prasad, *Indian Nationalism and Asia (1900–1947)* (New Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corporation, 1979), 41–5; D. Wolff et al., *The Russo–Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*, Vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 2–3; T. R. Sareen, 'India and the War', R. Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo–Japanese War* (London: Routledge, 2007), 239–49.

² Fischer-Tiné, H., 'Indian Nationalism and the "World Forces": Transnational and Diasporic Dimensions of the Indian Freedom Movement on the Eve of the First World War', *Journal of Global History* 2:3 (2007): 325–44: 332–5. See also K. O'Malley, *Ireland, India and Empire: Indo-Irish Radical Connections, 1919–1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).

³ S. T. Wasti, 'The 1912–13 Balkan War and the Siege of Edirne', *Middle Eastern Studies* 40:4 (2004): 59–78. See also G. Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 34–37.

⁴ P. Duara, 'The Discourse of Civilization and Pan–Asianism', *Journal of World History* 12 (2001): 99–130.

the war had come to be the most important legitimation for colonialism.⁵ As Duara argues, Civilization went from being singular, with a capital ‘C’, to plural, with a lower case ‘c’. If this caused new national movements to turn towards their own civilizational traditions, as argued by Duara, so too did new models that appealed to larger collectives and identities present themselves. Pan-Asianism and Pan-Islamism were among the alternatives favoured by Asian thinkers.⁶ Quests for an ‘Asian identity’ or ‘Asian culture’ in this period, too, were influenced by the possibilities inherent in this transformation of civilizational concepts. Couched in the language of regionalism, the First World War had literally de-centred Europe for Europeans and non-Europeans alike: from *the* region, it became *a* region.⁷

The Bolshevik Revolution had likewise opened possibilities for international engagement. It had an immediate and momentous impact on European politics.⁸ But its effects were felt globally, and especially in territories under colonial rule. At the inaugural congress of the Comintern, the newly established Soviet Union declared itself sympathetic to the plight of the subject nations.⁹ As early as 16 January 1918, it had abrogated all former Russian claims that infringed on the Persian right of self-determination. A year later, with the civil war in Central Asia in full swing, this declaration was reaffirmed. In 1921, it was made official: Lenin repudiated all secret treaties contracted between the Czar and the imperialist powers regarding claims to Asian territories:

The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics brands as criminal the policy of the Government of Czarist Russia, which, without the agreement of the peoples of Asia and under the guise of assuring the independence of these peoples, concluded with other states of Europe treaties concerning the East which had as their ultimate object its gradual seizure. The Government of the RSFSR unconditionally rejects this criminal policy as not only violating the sovereignty of the States of Asia, but also leading to organized brutal violence of European robbers on the living body of the peoples of the East.¹⁰

This declaration may well have been circulated in Asian anti-imperialist movements at least as widely as the Wilsonian declaration of self-determination.¹¹ Asian anti-imperialists used it to prove that the Soviet Union had no designs on Asian territory and that it had delivered on

⁵ D. Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 202–6; M. Mann, ‘Torchbearers upon the Path of Progress—Britain’s Ideology of “Material and Moral Progress” in India: An Introductory Essay’, H. Fischer-Tiné and M. Mann, eds., *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India* (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 1–26.

⁶ Ç. Aydin, ‘Beyond Civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianism and the Revolt against the West’, *Journal of Modern European History* 4:2 (2006): 204–23.

⁷ For the European case, see A. I. Richard, ‘Competition and Complementarity: Civil Society Networks and the Question of Decentralizing the League of Nations’, *Journal of Global History* 7:2 (2012): 233–56.

⁸ E. H. Carr, *International Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919–1939* (London: Macmillan, 1947).

⁹ G. Adhikari, ed., *Documents on the History of the Communist Party of India. Vol. 1, 1917–1922* (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1972), 105.

¹⁰ ‘Stalin and Iran’, *Fourth International* 7:5 (1946): 132–3.

¹¹ On the competition between these two ‘moments’, see A. Mayer, *Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917–1918* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), esp. 329–67.

its promises: instead of appropriating the semi-colonial countries at its borders, which would have been easy prey in the tumultuous years after the War, it had done the opposite. It had given up without compensation all former claims on Chinese territory and renounced the Russian share of the reparations levied on the Qing Empire in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion.¹² Moreover, it had recognized China by exchanging ambassadors.

In this sense, it is important to note that the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution on most Indian Asianists was less ideological than practical. This does not deny the existence of important and early engagements with communist doctrine and with the possibilities of revolution both at home and in the world, such as those of M. N. Roy, M. P. T. Acharya, Abani Mukherjee, and others.¹³ However, from an Asianist perspective, the establishment of the Soviet Union, with its professed anti-imperialist principles, provided a powerful model and alternative to the governmental structures of Europe. In addition, with a small leap of the imagination, this was a model that could be appropriated as 'Asian', as opposed to its 'Western' alternatives. In this sense, the 'Leninist moment' far outlasted its 'Wilsonian' counterpart.

However, neither should this 'Wilsonian moment' be too easily discarded. Erez Manela has argued that the 'Wilsonian moment', which he understood mainly as the impact of Wilson's declaration of self-determination, provided a powerful universalist message to anticolonial leaders across Asia. Anticolonial leaders, particularly in India, China, Egypt, and Korea, appropriated the Wilsonian language and used it to claim their place on the newly erected stage of Geneva. The international institutions and norms created there after the war enabled anticolonial nationalists to challenge colonial powers on an international platform, the League of Nations. This supposedly circumvented and thereby weakened the imperial relationship. Manela's account, however, studies not *internationalism* but rather the internationalization of nationalisms, and it thus fails to take into account any Asian contribution to the internationalist enthusiasm that drove the post-war world. Moreover, the Indian League of Nations delegates were carefully selected by the Government of India and drawn mostly from ruling members of the Princely States. Rather than weaken the imperialist relationship, the League of Nations delegations reaffirmed it in their composition.¹⁴ As far as Asia was concerned, the proceedings at the League of Nations itself quickly turned the Wilsonian moment into Wilsonian disillusion.

Wilsonian enthusiasm did exist, but elsewhere: the new international institutions had created a large network of associated institutions, leagues, societies, and associations that sustained the work of the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization in turn. As Susan Pedersen has pointed out, every aspect of the League's work was marked by a 'symbiotic relationship with interest groups and publicity'.¹⁵ The League was a meeting place for numerous organizations and people with no official relationship to it who were drawn into the League's orbit to lobby, to organize, and to profess international solidarity on a variety of matters. Issues pertaining to imperial exploitation, a decolonized future, new regionalisms,

¹² Russia was not the only country to adopt such an arrangement; the United States converted the indemnities into a scholarship program for Chinese students.

¹³ P. Saha, *The Russian Revolution and the Indian Patriots* (Calcutta: Manisha Granthalaya, 1987).

¹⁴ This was less so in the case of the International Labour Organization, which is treated in chapter 2.

¹⁵ S. Pedersen 'Back to the League of Nations', *American Historical Review* 112:4 (2007): 1091–1117: 1092.

and many other geopolitical concerns were all hotly debated in the networks that surrounded the League. It was in these networks that the interconnectedness of the world was celebrated, and in which interwar internationalism was enacted. If the Wilsonian moment existed, it was not among Woodrow Wilson's Asian interlocutors, but here.

Even if the League of Nations never achieved global representation, it was in its associational orbit that the interwar internationalist moment was truly global. Just as the effects of the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution were felt worldwide, so too were those of the new Geneva system. Together, the war, the revolution, and the league were instrumental in forging an internationalism that was equally global. The internationalist platforms that emerged from this temporary euphoria over the interconnectedness of the world believed that the hard-won international peace could be sustained by international encounter and dialogue beyond borders, races, and empires. Significantly, these encounters and conversations were not limited to the Geneva circles, or even to the metropolitan cities of Europe, but occurred in places as far apart as San Francisco and Colombo, and places as hard to reach as Baku or Tashkent. The internationalist moment was not only a global moment in terms of participation. It also occurred simultaneously in places across the world.

Reformists and revolutionaries

However, two caveats about the implied homogeneity of this 'interwar internationalism' need to be made. First, internationalism in this period was multi-dimensional, with agendas that were sometimes complementary, but more often mutually exclusive. In the case of international anti-imperialist projects, there were divergent ideas of what shape a decolonized world should take. Second, though this dissertation does follow the argument that the internationalism of the interwar period was sufficiently different from that of the surrounding decades to warrant a label of its own, there are differences between the 1920s and 1930s that deserve special mention.

The issue of multidimensionality is best visualized by reading interwar internationalism as constituting a moment that fed off the competition between two competing styles of internationalism: that of reformists and of revolutionaries. Patricia Glavin makes roughly the same separation in recognizing a 'liberal' and a 'communist' internationalism in this period, with the liberals laying their claims before the League of Nations in Geneva and the communists theirs before the Comintern in Moscow.¹⁶ Although Glavin views interwar internationalism predominantly from the perspective of European civil society, this distinction roughly holds true for non-European internationalists as well. However, the terms 'reformist' and 'revolutionary' are used here instead, because they cover a wider range of thought: reformists did not always seek to address the institutions of Geneva; and revolutionaries were not necessarily communists, and they did not necessarily look towards Moscow, as is shown in chapter 4. This separation follows Glavin's definition insofar as it also divides those who sought to participate in the existing international system from those who sought to overthrow it. This had everything to do with imagined postcolonial futures: for reformists, this future

¹⁶ P. Clavin, 'Conceptualising Internationalism Between the World Wars', D. Laqua, ed., *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars* (London: IB Tauris, 2011), 1–14: 5.

was to be achieved through full inclusion of the colonized and semi-colonized world in the international environment, on equal footing with the West. To revolutionaries, it was precisely this international arena that had to be overthrown in order for a more just and equal world to emerge.

One further complication should be made at this junction. In the associational mania that surrounded the League of Nations on the one hand, and the European obsession with the Bolshevik threat on the other, it is these two internationalisms that have received the most attention from historians to this day. However, this does not do justice to the multi-dimensionality of the international engagements of the interwar period, which fitted neither category—although there were significant overlaps—but likewise pursued internationalist agendas. World Peace and World Federation movements, for example, had adherents from every political direction and cannot be classified under either label.¹⁷ Yet others had visions of new forms of world citizenship that were deserving of a label of their own, such as the ideologically and geographically diverse networks that together constituted the Theosophical movement.¹⁸ The activities of the All-Asia Women's Congress in 1931 (section 1.4), the Congress of Asian Students in Rome in 1933 (section 3.4), or Barkatullah's attempts to reconcile communism and Pan-Islamism (section 4.1) are other cases that are hard to classify under either internationalist mode. In addition, the classificatory labels that do suggest themselves, in this case feminist, fascist, or Pan-Islamic, impose an ideological consistency on these movements that they often did not possess. Especially in the early interwar years, ideas that would seem contradictory to present-day eyes were seen rather as multiple opportunities to arrive at the same goal. In the case of Asianist movements in particular, the connections and alliances made to further aims such as Asian unification or Asian decolonization were flexible and varied.

This had everything to do with developments in the interwar years itself. If the 1920s were marked by a fairly unproblematic mixing of ideologies, the 1930s saw a hardening of ideological lines. The internationalist encounters of the 1920s resulted in sets of ideas that were, or at least appear so today, far from internally consistent. The projects of many interwar groups shared a patchwork internationalist grammar drawing on a variety of texts, theories, and thoughts. For example, many Asianist labour leaders in the Indian trade union movement used idioms now associated with communism without necessarily considering themselves communists. As shall be seen in chapter 2, many affirmed they were revolutionaries but not communists; yet others, although they availed themselves of the same rhetoric, ended up firmly in the reformist camp or even in the halls of Geneva. The appeal of the egalitarian

¹⁷ There are many studies on American pacifist movements, which increased exponentially during the First World War, and especially the role of women in pacifist movements. See J. K. Nelson, *The Peace Prophets: American Pacifist Thought, 1919–1941* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967); H. H. Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993). Fewer studies exist of international peace leagues and movements. See P. Brock, *Pacifism since 1914: An Annotated Reading List* (Toronto: P. Brock, 2000). On world federalism, see J. Bartelson, *Visions of World Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009), esp. 1–18, 159–60.

¹⁸ On Theosophy in an Asianist mode, see A. Banerjee, 'Liberation Theosophy: Discovering India and Orienting Russia between Velimir Khlebnikov and Helena Blavatsky', *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 126:3 (2011): 610–24. See also below, chapter 3.

message of world socialism should not be viewed too strictly, for it spoke to the lived realities and concerns of all trade union leaders in question.

The 1930s, by contrast, saw a ‘closing of ideologies’ that made it more difficult for anti-imperialist groups to draw and borrow from various movements and ideas, or to seek broad-based support for their agenda. Internationally, this hardening of ideological lines was influenced by the global financial crisis, the Soviet Third Period (1928–33), increasing militarism in Japan, and the Manchuria crisis, all of which shaped the regional and global alignments of Indian Asianists. From the early 1930s onwards, these developments made the initial dream of post-war international peace and decolonization increasingly less plausible. The 1930s are now largely associated with the rise of totalitarianism (whether in communist or fascist form).¹⁹ But to Indian internationalists far removed from either continental European or Japanese politics, the 1930s still held possibilities. Until the mid-1930s, Italy, Japan, and Germany, were still widely perceived as holding important lessons for colonial territories that sought to achieve fast modernization and a one-generation transition to great power status.²⁰ Soon, however, European movements and parties started to disappear from the international stage, the League of Nations faltered, and the Soviet Union brought its international projects under tight control from Moscow. In Asia, Japan shattered the relative peace. Faced with these changes, the number of international platforms shrank, and their membership became less diverse.

In South Asia itself, a similar hardening of ideological lines occurred. This stood in direct conversation with these international changes, although oftentimes masked as events that seemed more ‘local’ than they really were. The most famous of these is the Meerut Conspiracy Case. This court case marked the last and most sustained attempt by the Government of India to combat ‘communism’. The state set out to prove the alleged communist sympathies of the accused largely through an examination of their international contacts, and those of the organizations they belonged to. In the process, the Meerut Conspiracy Case defined which international interlocutors posed a threat to the state and public order, and which did not. Earlier histories that have noted these connections have subordinated them to local and nationalist narratives, ignoring their international dimensions. The case is usually viewed either as part of the history of Indian communism or of Indian nationalism.²¹ Though it was indeed linked to both, the Meerut trial is also part of the larger history of the anti-imperialist internationalism of the interwar years, and can be seen as a point where divergent groups united, if temporarily, in a common struggle. The ‘internationalization’ of Meerut is a narrative that has recently started to emerge in the wake of other histories of international anti-imperialist movements in the early twentieth century.²²

¹⁹ For a recent complication of this picture, see J. Augusteijn, P. Dassen, and M. Janse, eds., *Political Religion Beyond Totalitarianism: The Sacralization of Politics in the Age of Democracy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

²⁰ M. Framke, *Delhi–Rom–Berlin: Die indische Wahrnehmung von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus 1922–1939* (Darmstadt: WBG 2012), esp. 179–88.

²¹ See, for instance, P. Ghosh, *The Meerut Conspiracy Case and the Left Wing in India* (Calcutta: Papyrus, 1978); D. Singh, *Meerut Conspiracy Case and the Communist Movement in India* (Meerut: Research India, 1988).

²² See in particular S. Pennybacker, *From Scottsboro to Munich: Race and Political Culture in 1930s Britain* (Princeton University Press, 2009), 146–99.

The fact that international groups came together in support of the Meerut defendants, ranging from Meerut defence committees in Scotland to speeches in Trinidad and even an avant-garde theatre play, is a testament to the translocal solidarities that marked this period.²³

The interwar internationalist moment, in which the Asianist movements in this dissertation are situated, was thus marked by an ‘open’ 1920s and a ‘closed’ 1930s. Furthermore, as noted in the introduction, its periodization in Asia was slightly different from the European definition of ‘interwar’: almost all on-going projects for Asian unity were shut down with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, which spelled the end of the Asianisms treated in the second, third, and fourth chapters. However, the hopes for Asian unity that had driven these movements were not necessarily shattered along with them. It is important to note that the Second World War was an interruption, not a rupture. The Asianist rhetoric that resurfaced in 1945 was similar in both content and form to that of the interwar period. Its global setting, however, had changed. This Asianism had to relate to the new international constellations created by decolonization and the establishment of the United Nations, but was slow to adapt their precepts. The continuities of Asianist thought and ideas up to the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 and its aftermath in the early 1950s are therefore included in the last chapter of this thesis. The specific cartographical expressions of Indian visions of Asia, which follow in the next section, are therefore viewed in this extended timeframe.

1.2 Situating India in Asia

How did this internationalist enthusiasm, and more specifically, this Asianist enthusiasm, relate to the simultaneous existence of various nationalisms on the Indian subcontinent? Sugata Bose has opened this discussion by examining the role of extraterritorial identity and universalist aspiration among the people of the Indian Ocean in the age of global empire.²⁴ He demonstrates that the dreams and goals of the colonized were never fully constrained by the borders of colonial states. Nationalism and universalism, far from being in an adversarial relationship, were bound in a strong symbiotic embrace.²⁵ Anticolonialism as an ideology was both tethered to the idea of homeland and, paradoxically, strengthened by extraterritorial affiliations. This, he maintains, is a powerful political theme, the importance of which political theorists and historians obsessed with territorial nationalism have failed to grasp.²⁶ Using examples such as those of ‘expatriate patriots’, pilgrimage networks, and Islamic universalism, Bose demonstrates that there were, in fact, many transterritorial aspects to the ‘nation in formation’. This view is supported by several other theorists of internationalism who maintain that these phenomena always transcend but do not always subvert the nation-state.²⁷ This blurring of lines between national and transnational identities is reflected in the Indian case. On the one hand, many anticolonial internationalists had visions of a new Asian

²³ C. Warden, *British Avant-Garde Theatre* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 79–80.

²⁴ S. Bose, *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

²⁵ Idem, 31.

²⁶ Idem, 68.

²⁷ Among others, Ramnath, *The Hajj to Utopia*, 3–8; Goswami, ‘Imaginary Futures’, 1461–2; Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 55.

order in which India would occupy an important place. On the other hand, we encounter Indian nationalists whose visions of independence also included visions of a new Asian order.

According to Birendra Prasad, the first expressions of Asian solidarity in India were a direct consequence of the First World War and widespread disillusionment when the British government reneged on its wartime promises. Instead of self-rule or other concessions, India received the Rowlatt Acts and the Black Act.²⁸ The imposition of martial law in Punjab and the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre had followed.²⁹ In this tense atmosphere, the All-India Khilafat Conference was convened. It was presided over by Gandhi, who urged all Hindus to cooperate on this issue, for it presented another case where wartime promises had been neglected: the terms of the treaty imposed upon Turkey belied previous announcements that Turkey would not be deprived of its West-Asian territories.³⁰ Moreover, when the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres were announced on 14 May 1920, it turned out that Mecca and Medina were no longer under the control of the Caliph. The Khilafat movement had important Pan-Islamist dimensions, but its extension into an all-India issue gave it a distinct Asianist inflection. Ansari, who had previously led an ambulance mission to Turkey in the Balkan Wars, declared that the Khilafat question was one of India's honour and freedom, but also of the emancipation of 'all the enslaved Asiatic people from the thralldom of the West'.³¹ The Indian National Congress (INC) leader and later Home Affairs Minister of independent India Chakravarti Rajagopalachari reversed this idea by stating that the Khilafat movement itself was a product of the Asian consciousness of the Indian people.³²

This Asianist dimension of the Khilafat was not just a translation for the nationalist mainstream of the translocal solidarities the Khilafat movement sought to invoke. Khilafat periodicals, too, framed their concern with the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire as a matter of Asian solidarity. The *Khilafat Bulletin*, published by the Central Khilafat Committee, stated in its editorials that Britain had 'alienated Asiatic feeling' throughout the Empire and that 'India and all of Asia' could not condone the wrong done to Turkey.³³ It also placed the Khilafat issue in a wider context of imperialist wrongdoings to Asia as a whole, which reads as a warning to the world that Asia was being taught that their claims had to be accompanied by a collective show of force:

We never had much hope of the League of Nations, and what little of a doubting kind we may have had has been destroyed by the League's absolutely servile confirmation of the Syria and Palestine Mandates; proving that the League is only, as we thought that it would be, a device for conferring a show of sanction and of international legality on the brigandage of the Allies. ... The members of the Palestine delegation, it

²⁸ Passed in 1919, the Rowlatt Acts gave the government unrestricted powers to control the press, abolished habeas corpus, and enabled trial of political offenders without jury. The Black Act was the name coined by nationalist leaders for the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, also passed in 1919.

²⁹ See most recently T. C. Sherman, *State Violence and Punishment in India* (London: Routledge, 2009), 14–37.

³⁰ Lloyd George, quoted in Prasad, *Indian Nationalism and Asia*, 75.

³¹ Dr Ansari, quoted in Prasad, *Indian Nationalism and Asia*, 83.

³² Prasad, *Indian Nationalism and Asia*, 87.

³³ Respectively, 'England's Hostile Attitude towards Turkey' and 'The Khilafat Question', 7 July 1922, pp. 2 and 4.

would seem, have yet to learn the lesson which the Turks have learnt from terrible experience: that appeals to England or to any power of Europe by an Eastern people are no use unless supported by a show of power—a power which Asiatic peoples have to raise in Asia by their organization and alliances.³⁴

The mandate system was perceived to have introduced a new form of imperialism to Asia, and the mandates in the Middle East were the final reason for the Central Khilafat Committee to reach bolder conclusions: that recent events had caused Asians to realize that they had allowed themselves to be divided by borders not of their own making. And in the realization that these borders were meaningless, Asian unity was rediscovered:

From India to Palestine, it is not a far cry, and a common feeling, though hardly yet articulate, runs through the minds of the different people. With increasing facilities for closer understanding between the people of India and their brethren beyond the artificial boundaries that separate them, there is the consciousness of their common culture and unity of purpose. Though by ignorance they have allowed themselves to be divided into water-tight ethnological compartments, the realization is gaining that at bottom they all belong to one common group, comprising the whole of Asia, and that in the long run the major issue will be Asiatic unity and civilization versus European culture and godless materialism of the West. The present is the beginning of the end, and world events are forcing—unconsciously though—the pace of a pan-Asiatic movement, broad-based on the common heritage of Oriental civilization.³⁵

As the Khilafat issue unfolded, other Asianist initiatives emerged from the INC conferences. Prominent leaders of the INC took up an Asianist agenda, including the wish to turn the perceived ‘fundamental unity of India, China, and Japan’ into the basis of a successful struggle against the cultural hegemony of the West.³⁶ In the INC, explicit Asianist tendencies can be found early on. In 1921, the possible foundation of an Asian Federation was discussed at the annual meeting of the Indian National Congress.³⁷ President Chittaranjan Das was convinced that ‘such a bond of friendship and love, of sympathy and cooperation, between India and the rest of Asia ... is destined to bring about world peace’.³⁸ Both the delegates and the general press welcomed his idea, but concrete steps towards its execution failed to materialize. This is not entirely surprising given that even Jawarlalal Nehru, the Congress’s most enthusiastic proponent of Asian relations, had his doubts. When the proposal was tabled again, he wrote to his friend and revolutionary-in-exile ‘Chatto’ (Virendranath Chattopadhyaya): ‘The Congress passed a resolution about summoning a Pan-Asiatic

³⁴ *The Khilafat Bulletin*, ‘Notes of the Week’, 28 July 1922, 2.

³⁵ *The Khilafat Bulletin*, ‘Notes of the Week’, 11 August 1922, 2.

³⁶ I. S. Friedman, ‘Indian Nationalism and the Far East’, *Pacific Affairs* 13:1 (1940): 17–29: 18.

³⁷ M. Krása, ‘The Idea of Pan-Asianism and the Nationalist Movement in India’, *Archiv Orientální* 40 (1972): 38–60: 46.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

conference in India in 1930. Nobody quite understands what this means. ... I doubt if it is at all possible to hold any such gathering in India'.³⁹

Such doubts did not deter others from initiating similar initiatives. In March 1923, AICC member Ghulam Muhammad Bhurgri revisited the idea of a Pan-Asiatic Federation with the argument that the world needed a 'real League of Nations'.⁴⁰ The Muslim League endorsed his speech, declaring that a federation of Asian nations would 'enlarge and support the Oriental Culture and maintain good and friendly relations between the various nationalities all over the East'.⁴¹ Four years later, following widespread publication in India of the Afghan king Amanullah's pan-Islamic and anti-British policies, several Indian political groups supported Amanullah's project of setting up an Asiatic League. In a rare display of Hindu-Muslim unity, the Asiatic League initiative was not only taken up by the remnants of the various Khilafat committees across India, but also by a much less likely supporter: the Hindu Mahasabha (Hindu nationalist party). During Amanullah's visit to India in December 1927, the Mahasabha officially thanked him for his understanding of Hindu sentiments, and endorsed the establishment of an Asiatic League.⁴² As may be seen from the Mahasabha's narrower understanding of Asia during the presidency of Veer Savarkar in the 1930s, this moment was very much part of the 'open' 1920s.

In the turbulent decades surrounding independence, two interlinked questions thus figured prominently in the Indian public sphere alongside the national question per se: how an independent India would situate itself in a decolonizing Asia, and how and by whom this new 'Asia' was to be shaped. But if this Asia could be accorded an identity and a mission, this left unanswered the question of who and what this 'Asia' included as a continent. What cartography, or cartographies, accompanied such visions of Asia? It is worth 'mapping' what these different Asias included and excluded, for they clearly express the intentions of its proponents. The analysis below is informed by Sumathi Ramaswamy's use of the concept of the 'geo-body'.⁴³ Taken as an expression that is 'ephemeral unless hard and regular work is undertaken to produce and maintain its materiality', the geo-body is inherently fragile, yet capable of producing powerful reverence and affinity.⁴⁴ Her views on the cartographic 'peninsularisation' of India, moreover, help one visualize Asia as seen from India.⁴⁵

A closer look at different points of the compass as seen from India may serve to illustrate the diversity of Asianist engagements. The following four cartographies of Asia co-existed in the turbulent decades surrounding independence, but were informed by very different ideas of what constituted Asia. Here, the image of Asia as a 'blank canvas' onto which various regionalist visions could be projected is particularly apt.⁴⁶ As noted above, all should be viewed in the context of an expanding League of Nations (and later the United

³⁹ P. C. Joshi Archives of Modern History, Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, League against Imperialism File 7: Nehru to Chattopadhyaya, 16 January 1929. Chattopadhyaya is further treated below in chapter 2.

⁴⁰ Prasad, *Indian Nationalism and Asia*, 108. Emphasis added.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² *Indian Quarterly Register* 2 (1927): 330–4.

⁴³ S. Ramaswamy, 'Visualising India's Geo-body: Globes, Maps, Bodyscapes, *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 36 (2002): 151–89.

⁴⁴ Ramaswamy, 'Visualising India's Geo-body', 152–3.

⁴⁵ Idem, 166.

⁴⁶ Steadman, *The Myth of Asia*, 35.

Nations) membership, which was slowly starting to include Asian nations, the emergence of Soviet republics in Central Asia, and from 1945 onwards, a rapidly decolonizing Asia. Faced with these changes, the question of what ‘Asia’ encompassed and how its constituent parts should relate to each other became particularly acute. As Stephan Hay reminds us, ‘each Asian Orientophile has entertained a somewhat different notion ... his image of the East consisting usually of an expanded version of those particular traditions he most wished to revitalize’.⁴⁷

The next sections thus explore a directional ‘view from India’ which makes the Asianisms discussed here unique from their counterparts elsewhere in Asia. The ‘Province of Pan-Asia’ as envisioned by revolutionary exile Mahendra Pratap will be examined, which included a mythical Turan in the heart of the continent among its five ‘districts’. Rameshwari Nehru looked further north in defining an Asia working for peace and nuclear disarmament, which explicitly included the whole Soviet Union as an Asian country. The third Aga Khan emphasized India’s ties with West Asia based on a conception of Asia that he could propagate publicly as India’s chief delegate to the League of Nations. Finally, Hindu Mahasabha president Veer Savarkar looked east in claiming Asia as a Hindu-Buddhist space, the cartography of which reinforced the Mahasabha’s views of India’s own Hindu identity. These four cases have been selected because they represent cardinal points on the compass, and therefore the different ways in which Asia could be viewed from India.

1.3 Four Asian cartographies

The Asian heartland: Mahendra Pratap’s ‘Turan in the Province of Pan-Asia’

Mahendra Pratap (1886–1979), born in the minor Indian princely state of Hathras, embarked on his first trip around the world at the age of twenty-one.⁴⁸ As a self-styled revolutionary exile, he devoted his life to achieving the unification of Asia. To Pratap’s mind, Asian unification was a crucial prerequisite for his ultimate goal of World Federation. The ‘Province of Pan-Asia’ was to become one of five provinces that would form the government of a federated world. Pratap’s quixotic Pan-Asianist thought has been largely forgotten today. So too has his periodical *World Federation*, which had to be smuggled into British India, in which he reported his activities and explained his plans for Asia and the world. Pratap’s activities as a highly mobile Pan-Asianist revolutionary exile are treated in detail in chapter 4. What is relevant to this overview of Asianist cartographies is the fact that he took Central Asia as the core of a united Asia.

This focus on Central Asia is noteworthy in itself. Over the course of the twentieth century, the spatial form of Central Asia shifted many times. The political upheavals in Central Asia in the opening decades of the century created multiple political divisions. The erasure of Tartary from global geography during the time of the Soviet Union has been termed a form of ‘cartographical dismemberment’, while after the Second World War, Central Asia disappeared almost entirely from the geographical imagination—eventually disappearing into

⁴⁷ S. Hay, *Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 315.

⁴⁸ For a more detailed account of Pratap’s life and thought, see C. Stolte, “‘Enough of the Great Napoleons!’” Raja Mahendra Pratap’s Pan-Asian Projects (1929–1939)’, *Modern Asian Studies* 46:2 (2012): 403–23.

the disciplinary cracks of Area Studies in the 1950s.⁴⁹ However, as Central Asia was receding from view in western cartographies of Asia, it re-emerged in others. One of its incarnations was as Turan.

Although consistently referring to (parts of) Central Asia, the term Turan has multiple connotations. In post-Avestan traditions, it referred to the area north of the Oxus River (Amu Darya). From the seventh century, it became identified with those areas of Central Asia inhabited by Turkic tribes. In Safavid Persia, ‘Turan’ was conflated with Uzbek. In a more general sense, ‘Turan’ was often used to contrast the nomadic areas of Central Asia to the urban or sedentary cultures of, for instance, Persia. To yet others, the term invoked conquerors and empire-builders.⁵⁰ This ascription of particular characteristics to the otherwise vague cartography of Turan took unexpected forms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—notable proponents include Sultan Galiev, the ‘Red Tartar’ who briefly dabbled in a socialist Pan-Turan on behalf of the Bolsheviks,⁵¹ but also Puccini, who composed *Turandot* (‘Daughter of Turan’) in 1926.⁵² In the latter days of the Ottoman Empire, Turanism became a political ideology that offered an alternative to Pan-Islamism. A movement towards closer association with, or even outright expansion to the Central Asiatic plateau as the semi-legendary home of the Turkic peoples, it extolled a Turkic ethnicity as opposed to the theocratic interracialism of the community of Islam.⁵³ In this understanding, Turan included the Crimean Tatars, Turkmens, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz, but could really encompass any people from the Black Sea to Vladivostok. Pan-Turanists from outside the Ottoman Empire, such as the Hungarian Orientalist Ármín Vambéry, even accused the Ottomans of having become ‘de-Turkified’, their Mongol characteristics lost beneath a cultured urban veneer.⁵⁴

How did Pratap, an Indian anti-imperialist, come to incorporate Turan in his conception of Asia’s future? The term ‘Turan’ itself had long been in use in India, with ‘Turanī’ referring to invaders on horseback but also to the feared and valued military leaders from across the Himalayas during the Mughal period.⁵⁵ In the early twentieth century, it was immortalized by Iqbal, who in his *Payam-i-Mushriq* (A Message from the East) wrote: ‘You are still tied to colour and to race / So you call me Afghan or Turkoman / But I am first of all a man, plain man / And then an Indian or Turanian’.⁵⁶ However, it is more likely that Pratap’s

⁴⁹ M. Lewis and K. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 177–8.

⁵⁰ T. Lothrop Stoddard, ‘Pan-Turanism’, *The American Political Science Review* 11:1 (1917): 12–23: 16.

⁵¹ M. Hauner, ‘Russia’s Geopolitical and Ideological Dilemmas in Central Asia’, R. Canfield, ed., *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*, 189–216 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 202.

⁵² *Turandot* may be considered somewhat of a Pan-Asian opera in itself, with a cast consisting of a Chinese emperor, Timur as the dethroned and exiled king of the Tatars, a prince of Persia, a Mandarin bureaucrat, and a prince of unknown origin who turns out to be Timur’s son but falls in love with the Chinese emperor’s daughter.

⁵³ G. Arnakis, ‘Turanism. An Aspect of Turkish Nationalism’, *Balkan Studies* 1 (1960): 19–32: 23.

⁵⁴ Arnakis, ‘Pan-Turanism’, 26.

⁵⁵ J. Gommans, ‘Turans in Mughal India’, paper for the ‘Cultural Encounters Across Central Asia’ workshop, Leiden University, 28 September 2012.

⁵⁶ M. H. Husain, *A Message from the East: A Translation of Iqbal’s Payam-i Mashriq into English Verse* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1977), 161. See also M. Ishaque, *Modern Persian Poetry* (Calcutta: Israil, 1943), 145.

incorporation of Turan in his cartography of Asia was strategic. Always in search of allies, before embarking on his expedition to Afghanistan in 1916 (treated further in chapter 4), he was in touch with the Turkish War Minister Enver Pasha, the most famous proponent of Pan-Turanism.⁵⁷ And at least one of Pratap's colleagues on this expedition, Kasim Bey, discussed Pan-Turanism with King Habibullah.⁵⁸ In a similar vein, Pratap had high hopes for the Soviet Union's Pan-Turanian sentiments. Although abandoned by the Bolsheviks in the mid-1920s, a group of Russian intellectual exiles still advocated Eurasianism by emphasizing the commonalities offered by the Turanian myth; others saw a natural alliance with Russia's 'Asiatic sisters' against the Romano-Germanic colonizers.⁵⁹ The latter idea would have been particularly appealing to Pratap as a Pan-Asianist and anti-imperialist. It is no coincidence that Pratap's Turan was actually an acronym: *Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, SiberiA, TurkestaN*.




Fig. 1. Sketch of Turan in Pan-Asia, by Mahendra Pratap [*World Federation* 7: (1935)].

This map (fig. 1), published in *World Federation* in mid-1935, reveals some of Pratap's plans for Asia. First of all, the Province of Pan Asia was also known as 'Buddha' (he dubbed Europe and Africa 'Christ' and 'Mohemmod' respectively), a religion which parts of Central and East Asia had in common. In Pratap's cartography of Asia, Turan did indeed bridge both,

⁵⁷ On Enver Pasha's visions of a future Asia, see S. Yilmaz, 'An Ottoman Warrior Abroad: Enver Paşa as an Expatriate', *Middle Eastern Studies* 35:4 (1999): 40–69.

⁵⁸ T. Hughes, 'The German Mission to Afghanistan, 1915–1916', *German Studies Review* 25:3 (2002): 447–76: 469.

⁵⁹ Hauner, 'Russia's Geopolitical and Ideological Dilemmas in Central Asia', 207–8.

‘from Turkey to Kamchatka’.⁶⁰ His choice of Srinagar as the intended capital of the Province of Pan-Asia, too, seems to have been inspired by its importance to Pratap’s treasured Central Asian caravan routes. The capital of Turan was to be Tashkent.⁶¹ Pan Asia was further to be divided into four districts: Turan (Central Asia), Aryan (South Asia), Golden Aryan (Southeast Asia), and Golden Land (East Asia), of which Turan was by far the largest. Interestingly, the Middle East had no place in Pan Asia: it was attached to Mohemmod/Africa as the district ‘Arab’. However, this seems to have been rather a consequence of Pratap’s focus on Central Asia as the basis of his cartography, than indicative of a conscious exclusion of Islam as an Asian religion. In fact, Pratap would later be at loggerheads with the Hindu Mahasabha over this issue, maintaining that Islam was as ‘Aryan’ as Hinduism and Sikhism.⁶²

Although Pratap lived in Japan for most of the 1930s, Central Asia continued to determine his spatial understanding of the continent. After the Pan-Asiatic Conferences of Nagasaki and Shanghai, Pratap proposed to hold the third conference in Kabul. When this conference failed to materialize in the late 1920s, he revisited the plan in 1937 and proposed hopefully: ‘So far the Japanese Government has not taken any official steps to organize Asia. Here is an opportunity for the government of Afghanistan to take a lead in the matter. Afghanistan can invite Asiatic governments to send their representatives to the next Afghanistan national festival. On that occasion we can have the first Asiatic Official Conference ... accepting the principle of a World State’.⁶³ Pratap thus formulated a unique cartography of Asia in which Turan figured not only as the geographical heart of the continent, but also as its future core. With Srinagar as the capital of Pan Asia, Kabul as an important base of operations, and Tashkent as the capital of Turan, Pratap quite literally re-centred Pan-Asianism.

Looking North: Rameshwari Nehru and the Inter-Asian Relations Conference

Pratap’s contemporary Rameshwari Nehru (1886–1966) was similarly fascinated by the landmass north of the Himalaya, but gave expression to her cartography of Asia in a completely different way. Having spent much of her early career as a social reformer and women’s rights activist, she became active in the All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) during the interwar years, and especially so from the 1930s. Her Asian engagements started here. The AIWC had convened an All Asia Women’s Conference in Lahore in January 1931, which brought together delegates from Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, Burma, and Japan.⁶⁴ Heralded as a ‘New Dawn in the East’, the Rani of Mandi opened the conference with the following words:

⁶⁰ M. Pratap, *World Federation*, September 1939.

⁶¹ M. Pratap, *World Federation*, October 1939.

⁶² M. Pratap, *World Federation*, April 1938.

⁶³ M. Pratap, *World Federation*, January 1937.

⁶⁴ According to the *Hindustan Times*, ‘All Asian Women’s Conference in Lahore’, 22 January 1931. Basu and Ray give only Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Japan, and Persia: A. Basu and B. Ray, *Women’s Struggle: A History of the All India Women’s Conference 1927–1990* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1990), 132. However, given that the *Hindustan Times* also published a list of delegate’s names, their list is probably correct.

This is the first gathering of its kind in Asia. We meet to promote cultural unity among women of Asia to place at the services of humanity these qualities which are peculiar to our Oriental civilization: to stamp out those evils which have crept into our civilization; to pick out and adopt those qualities of civilization and culture which have elevated the West to a pinnacle of social and material prosperity; to benefit ourselves by exchange of experience in our respective countries; and lastly, to advance the cause of World Peace.⁶⁵

Rameshwari Nehru had attended this conference, and became one of the founders of a permanent committee, which hoped to convene more All Asia Women's Conferences in the future. In 1932, this led to a collaboration with the Oriental Women's Conference at Tehran.⁶⁶ In 1934, the committee grew into a large but short-lived 'All Asia Committee' with fifty members from across India.⁶⁷ The All Asia Women's Conference was officially represented by a permanent delegate to the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship in Geneva. And when this Alliance held its twelfth Congress in Istanbul in 1935, the Asian Committee sent a delegation who reported that 'Asiatic Womanhood was fully represented, demanded, and was readily granted, an equality of status and opportunity in trying to solve the problems which affect the womankind of all countries and nations'.⁶⁸

A second All Asia Women's Conference failed to materialize because it was to be convened in Japan, and as the 1930s progressed that country became an increasingly unattractive location for an international conference. Rameshwari Nehru's and her colleagues in the AIWC voted against a merger with the Oriental Women's Conference 'on the grounds of maintaining their identity'.⁶⁹ This had more to do with their mental geography of Asia than with the group itself, which propagated a reformist route to gender equality and was connected to the same international platforms as the Oriental Women's Conference. However, 'Oriental' in this group was taken to mean largely Middle Eastern and Persian, which did not correspond to the identities of many members of the Asian Committee. Given these difficulties, the Sino-Japanese war dealt the final blow in 1937, and Rameshwari Nehru and her colleagues of the All Asia Committee felt that it served 'no useful purpose by merely keeping up an association which exists more on paper than in reality'.⁷⁰ The Committee was disbanded and until revived in the wake of Rameshwari Nehru's Asianist activities after independence.

In the meantime, Nehru directed her attention towards other Asianist initiatives. Initially, during the 1940s and especially in the years immediately after independence, she became a vocal advocate of inter-Asian governmental cooperation. She was a consultant for several of the newly established Indian ministries, including the Ministry of Home Affairs.

⁶⁵ 'To Advance World Peace', *Bombay Chronicle*, editorial, 21 January 1931.

⁶⁶ Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), All India Women's Congress (AIWC) archive: All Asia Women's Congress (AAWC) Correspondence: Report, 165.

⁶⁷ NMML, AIWC Archive, AAWC 1934–1936: Minutes of the meeting of the members of the Permanent Committee of the All Asian Women's Conference, held at Karachi on 2 January 1935.

⁶⁸ *Amrita Bazaar Patrika*, 'Lessons of Istamboul—Asiatic Women in International Conference', 4 August 1935.

⁶⁹ NMML, AIWC Archive: AAWC circular no. 6 of 1936 Ujjain, 9 June 1936.

⁷⁰ NMML, AIWC Archive: AAWC circular no. 6 of 1936 Ujjain, 9 June 1936.

When it decided against international cooperation in combating the trafficking of women, she replied that ‘there is an international traffic in oriental women and girls ... and the bulk of this traffic is traffic in Asiatic women from one country in Asia to another’.⁷¹ To her mind, ‘closer collaboration between the Inter-Asian authorities’ was crucial.⁷² After Independence, however, her Asianist activities shifted from governmental work to civil society organizations working for peace and disarmament, notably the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society and the All India Peace Council. The resulting voyages and conferences were essential to the Asian vision she propagated in later life.

As a board member of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, she advocated cooperation with Soviet Russia on the basis of its contribution to Asian culture, hosting a Russian ballet group, a folk dance party, and several musicians.⁷³ To the *Indian Express* she declared that there were several aspects of Soviet life that India ‘could profitably learn from’.⁷⁴ Aware that the inclusion of Russia in her understanding of Asia might not be shared by all, she declared:

I am afraid at present there is a great deal of suspicion and misunderstanding in connection with Russia. We mix it up with communism and particularly the Indian Communists, and, therefore, anything however innocent connected with Russia is looked upon with suspicion and disfavor by practically all politicians whose horizon is limited to politics alone. I therefore feel that it is necessary for us to cultivate contacts on all non-political levels to remove external and internal tensions.⁷⁵

As president of the All India Peace Council, Rameshwari Nehru was the driving force behind the Conference of Asian Countries held in New Delhi 6–10 April 1955. The story of this gathering has disappeared in the wake of historians’ overwhelming attention to the Bandung conference, which opened eleven days later and in which the other Nehru—Jawaharlal was a first cousin of Rameshwari’s husband Brijlal—played an important role.⁷⁶ However, whereas Bandung was an intergovernmental meeting, the 1955 Delhi conference followed directly in the footsteps of the 1947 Asian Relations Conference by gathering non-governmental representatives for an international discussion on the future of Asia, which was to be built on a shared sense of continental solidarity.⁷⁷ It also copied the 1947 conference by structuring its

⁷¹ NMML, *Rameshwari Nehru Personal Papers* (RNPP), Subject File 3—Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ NMM, RNPP, Subject File 24: Indo-Soviet Cultural Society Correspondence, Notice: 25 September 1953.

⁷⁴ NMM, RNPP, Subject File 24: Indo-Soviet Cultural Society Correspondence, 13 August 1954, RN to editor, *Indian Express*.

⁷⁵ NMM, RNPP, Subject File 24: Indo-Soviet Cultural Society Correspondence, 23 September 1953, to Zakir Hussain.

⁷⁶ On the Bandung Conference as a crucial moment in the history of decolonization, see C. Lee, *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2010). On the symbolic importance of Bandung, see N. Shimazu, ‘Places in Diplomacy’ *Political Geography* 31:6 (2012): 335–36.

⁷⁷ On the 1947 conference, see G. H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966); A. Acharya, ‘Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?’ *International Security* 28:3 (2004): 149–64. In this connection, it should be noted that the widely accepted historiographical narrative that the Asian Relations Conference sparked

proceedings in discussion groups on diplomatic, cultural, and social issues, including women's rights. The 1947 Asian Relations Conference has gone down in history as the only Asian conference ever to invite the Republics of the Soviet Union,⁷⁸ yet the 1955 conference did so, too. As Jawaharlal Nehru had said in his inaugural address to the 1947 conference, India was uniquely situated to bring Asia together; and Rameshwari Nehru and her colleagues felt the same way. As the abovementioned Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, who was also a prominent peace activist, wrote to Rameshwari Nehru, 'this continent is split into three parts: the Islamic mid-west area, east- and southeast Asia, and India. ... India's heart is with the east- and south-eastern people, but history has forged a very strong bond with the mid-west. So she feels she is part of either of these—maybe she is thus in an advantageous position, commanding a perspective which the others do not enjoy'.⁷⁹ In this way, the conference situated India as the centre from which Asia extended in all directions.

However, though the conference invited writers, peace activists, scientists and social workers, its final list of delegates showed a considerable imbalance towards 'Red Asia'. Among the attendees were delegations from, among others, Soviet Russia, Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. The Soviet delegation sent representatives hailing from Russia, but also from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and Turkmenistan.⁸⁰ The other delegations included Japan, Nepal, Burma, Laos, Ceylon, Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Mongolia. Interestingly, Indonesia sent a full delegation as well, although the Delhi conference had not been appreciated at all by Sukarno, who felt it might upstage Bandung.⁸¹ Sukarno had complained to Jawaharlal Nehru, who, despite intensive correspondence with Rameshwari Nehru on the matter, did not succeed in discouraging her from holding the conference. As a result, Nehru explicitly dissociated himself from his relative's initiative.⁸² Jawaharlal's Asia, once no less inclusivist than Rameshwari's, had become subject to other diplomatic considerations.

Regarding the list of delegations, Nehru was not the conference's only critic. Some felt that Soviet attendance defeated the very purpose of promoting Asian solidarity: 'More! It embraces Russia as an Asian nation. And, what is far worse still, it refuses to take due note of Russian imperialism in Siberia, and in North Korea and Chinese mainland and certain other countries of Asia. ... It will force [the nations of Asia] eventually nearer and nearer the heels of Communist Russia in the false pretext of reducing world tension, or of building peace and solidarity in Asia'.⁸³ But despite the critics, few conferences were ever better attended. As most of the meetings were held outdoors, an estimated 2,000 people gathered to cheer the 188 delegates as they arrived at the conference opening.⁸⁴ A dais was erected for the delegates,

Bandung, which sparked Belgrade, and that therefore the Asian Relations Conference foreshadowed the non-aligned movement, is in need of revision.

⁷⁸ According to Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, 69.

⁷⁹ NMML, RNPP, C. Rajagopalachari to Rameshwari Nehru, 4 June 1956.

⁸⁰ NMML, RNPP, File 28 Afro-Asian Solidarity. Preparatory Committee in the USSR: list of names.

⁸¹ Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, 189.

⁸² NMML, RNPP, File 27 Asian Solidarity 1954–8, in particular 24 March 1955: Jawaharlal Nehru to Rameshwari Nehru.

⁸³ NMML, RNPP, File 26 World Council of Peace, 1953–1960: 'A look into the Conference of the Asian Countries' by C. Parameswaran.

⁸⁴ *Bombay Chronicle*, 7 April 1955, 1.

with a specially-made map of Asia showing all the countries represented with their flags. Nationalist dailies such as the moderately left-leaning *Bombay Chronicle* carried reports of each congress day on their front page, which may have contributed to the fact that by the closing ceremony, crowds had swollen to 25,000 people.⁸⁵

The atmosphere was perhaps best reflected in the gathering of writers at the conference. Several Indian associations such as the Romain Rolland Club and the Tagore Society gave a reception, at which Manarasidas Chaturvedi, an Indian MP, emphasized strongly that the conference was not a communist-inspired stage-piece. In accordance with the spirit of the conference, Japanese poet Setsukpo Tammo Kyoko Nagase, Chinese author Pa Chin, Vietnamese poet Tran Khanh Van, and Central Asian Soviet author Mirza Khurshunzade issued a joint statement that ‘all the Asian countries had had common cultural bonds for centuries. They had also the common object of establishing lasting peace and building up their respective countries for prosperity and happiness of the people’.⁸⁶

The resolutions at which the conference finally arrived, however, indicated tension rather than unity. The geographical spread of countries covered in the list of resolutions did reflect the inclusivist Asian cartography on which the conference was founded. But the Arab delegations’ motion that Israel be considered ‘an implement of imperialism’ did not carry.⁸⁷ The Israeli delegation, already angry because they had been demoted to ‘observers’ rather than ‘delegates’ (ostensibly due to an administrative mistake), vehemently protested. In the end, Rameshwari Nehru explained to the Israeli delegation that ‘instead of blaming all the Israelites as being aggressors, we persuaded the Arab delegates to limit their remarks to a certain section of the people termed as the ‘ruling class’. The Arab delegates did not appreciate it ... but agreed to it to avoid the break-up of the Conference. Our acceptance of this resolution was also due to the same reasons’.⁸⁸ In the end, the conference could only arrive at a condemnation of colonialism and imperialism, and call for a ‘normalization of diplomatic relations between all countries of Asia’. Among the other resolutions were a demand for admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations; the restoration of relations severed during the war; and that Japan be accorded full equality in the comity of nations.⁸⁹

The Delhi conference, by far the largest undertaking in Rameshwari Nehru’s long career as an internationalist social reformer, adopted the most inclusive map of Asia among the cartographies considered here. It also sparked a series of Asian spin-off conferences, such as the Asian Women’s Conference and the Asian Writers Conference, which continued to include the Soviet Union and its Central Asian republics.⁹⁰ Eventually this Asian people’s alternative to the Asian governments’ Bandung, which had grown out of Rameshwari Nehru’s personal network of internationalist peace and women’s rights activists, grew into a People’s Solidarity Movement which she led through the 1950s. It convened several more international meetings, but did not long survive after Rameshwari Nehru stepped down.

⁸⁵ Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, 250.

⁸⁶ *Bombay Chronicle*, 6 April 1955, 3.

⁸⁷ NMML, RNPP, File 26: Arab Delegation.

⁸⁸ NMML, RNPP, File 28: 7 May 1955, letter Rameshwari Nehru to ‘My dear Friends’.

⁸⁹ NMML, RNPP, File 26: Resolutions (incomplete).

⁹⁰ Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, 255.

Looking West: Asia in the imagination of Aga Khan III

Sultan Muhammad Shah, Aga Khan III, the forty-eighth imam of the Shi'a Ismaili Muslims (1877–1956), put forth very different cartography of the continent.⁹¹ He offered a very concrete geographical definition of Asia as 'extending from Aden to Mesopotamia and from the two shores of the Gulf to India proper, from India proper across Burma, including the Malay Peninsula, and thence from Ceylon to the States of Bokhara, and from Tibet to Singapore'.⁹² Political scientist Werner Lévi has argued that this statement by the Aga Khan, made in 1918, was the first expression of India as a 'pivot' in the region, and 'has remained fashionable ever since'.⁹³ The Aga Khan's cartography of Asia was informed by two underlying notions of the shared historical connections that to him defined Asia: those offered by the caravan routes through the Central Asian landmass, not dissimilar to the 'Asian heartland' concept put forward by Pratap; and the common Asian heritage of Islam. For instance, he had always considered Turkey to be an Asian country, and had warned as early as 1913 that 'Turkey must in the future be an Asiatic Power; she must concentrate on Asia'.⁹⁴ To a certain extent, the Aga Khan's own family reflected the relations between these two ideas: his grandfather had been forced to leave Persia, taking refuge in Bombay, in which city the Aga Khan, though born in Karachi, spent most of his youth. But his family still retained a large following in Central Asia. So much so, that when Mahendra Pratap passed through the Oxus valley in Badakhshan, the border region between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, he encountered many of the Aga Khan's followers in remote places like Wakhan, Ishkashim, and Shighnan and found this peculiar enough to mention in his diary.⁹⁵

In this regard, it deserves mention that the Aga Khan did not fit well into a Pan-Islamic mould. Much has been written on the Khilafat movement of the early 1920s and its connections to anti-imperialist movements in Asia generally and India in particular. However, the movement's distinctive form of Pan-Islamism in India cannot be equated with Asianism. It offered a vision of a strong *umma*, the community of the faithful, whose territory incidentally overlapped with large areas of Asia; but Asianism was not its driving feature. The Aga Khan's conception of Asia, by contrast, was informed by his Muslim identity and his interests as the imam of the Ismaili, but it was not Islamocentric. While he frequently invoked Muslim sentiments, he considered himself very much part of a diverse Asia with multiple religious and cultural identities. In that sense, his invocation of Islam and his inscription of it into the history of all of Asia is more reminiscent of the multifarious networks across Asia that made up the 'Arabic Cosmopolis' as described by Ronit Ricci, than of the blueprint offered by 'untranslated' Arabian Islam.⁹⁶

⁹¹ For a brief evaluation of Aga Khan's conception of Asia see Stolte and Fischer-Tiné, 'Situating India in Asia', 72.

⁹² W. Lévi, *Free India in Asia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1952), 31–2.

⁹³ Lévi, *Free India in Asia*, 32.

⁹⁴ *Times of India*, 14 February 1913, quoted in K. K. Aziz, ed., *Aga Khan III: Selected Speeches and Writings of Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah*. Vol. 1, 1902–1927 (London, 1997), 407.

⁹⁵ Mahendra Pratap, *My Life Story*, 65.

⁹⁶ R. Ricci, *Islam Translated: Literature, Conversion and the Arabic Cosmopolis of South and Southeast Asia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2011), 11; 265.

During the 1930s, the Aga Khan received a platform for his ideas through the international institutions in Geneva with which he was involved. As India's chief delegate to the League of Nations between 1932 and 1938, he was also active in the Red Crescent Society and the Geneva Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. At these organizations he chose to put forward his views from an Asianist perspective. The Aga Khan saw no contradiction between his multiple identities as a Muslim, an Indian, and an Asian. Instead, he saw them as complementary, so much so that he advocated political union of West and Central Asia into a federation.⁹⁷ But unlike Pratap, who had abandoned his Indocentric views when he went into exile, the Aga Khan viewed every Asian connection through an Indian lens. For instance, when Turkey entered the League of Nations in 1932, he stated that 'the history of India has been linked for countless centuries with that of Turkey, sometimes in the clash of rivalry, but more often with ties of culture and friendship. ... India thus gives Turkey a triple welcome to the League: as age-long neighbours and co-operators in culture and civilization; as recent opponents; and now we can say, with confidence, as life-long friends'.⁹⁸ When Iraq joined the league, he emphasized the 'long and intimate spiritual, cultural and economic relations between India and the lands that today form the Kingdom of Iraq'.⁹⁹

Central Asia was incorporated into his geo-imaginary Asia through a similar emphasis. He noted 'a big Muslim square' from Samarkand to Sind and from Egypt to Constantinople',¹⁰⁰ and he invoked the same image in incorporating China into this geography, by saying that 'China is our good neighbour ... and with her province of Turkestan we have had, since time immemorial, friendly cultural and economic relations'.¹⁰¹ This inclusion of China through its Turkic provinces is rare. In this period, Indo-Chinese connections were affirmed by many, but primarily on the basis of the shared experience of European domination (by invoking the treaty ports) or on the basis of a shared Buddhist heritage (see below).¹⁰² Insofar as the overland caravan routes were invoked, this was only to demonstrate that they had been travelled by Buddhist monks during the spread of Buddhism.

However, it would go too far to say that Eastern Asia played no role in the Aga Khan's geo-imaginary. When the Sino-Japanese dispute was brought before the League, the Aga Khan volunteered to mediate because 'I felt that it was my duty as India's representative—as an Asiatic—to do all I could in bringing about a direct understanding by conversations between China and Japan ... while such a departure by an Indian representative, at a time when India was still without self-government, might seem unusual ... the value of an Asiatic intermediary in a solely Asiatic dispute might be considerable'.¹⁰³ But the majority of his Asianist exultations were directed at West and Central Asia. When

⁹⁷ Lévi, *Free India in Asia*, 31.

⁹⁸ Speech at the General Assembly of the League of Nations, 6 July 1932. In K. K. Aziz, ed., *Aga Khan III: Selected Speeches and Writings of Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah*. Vol. 2, 1928–1955 (London: Kegan Paul International, 1997), 906.

⁹⁹ Speech at the General Assembly of the League of Nations, 3 October 1932. In Aziz, *Aga Khan III*, 2.911.

¹⁰⁰ Speech, National League in London, 2 July 1933. In Aziz, *Aga Khan III*, 2.935.

¹⁰¹ Speech at the Special Session of the League of Nations, Geneva, 8 March 1932. In Aziz, *Aga Khan III*, 2.901.

¹⁰² Frost, 'That Great Ocean of Idealism', 263–6; Stolte and Fischer-Tiné, 'Situating India in Asia', 71–9.

¹⁰³ Aga Khan III, *The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World Enough and Time* (London: Cassell and Company, 1954), 253. Emphasis in original.

Afghanistan was admitted into the League, he proclaimed that 'no representative of India, no Muslim, no Asiatic could play his part on this historic occasion unmoved'.¹⁰⁴ He synthesized India's religious and cultural variety into a single sphere of 'Asian-ness' and directed this amalgam towards a shared commonality with, in this case, Afghanistan:

For India, however much she may seek from the West her political institutions, remains a true daughter of the East, proud of her Eastern blood, her Eastern languages, her Eastern cultures. These she shares with Afghanistan, and seventy millions of her people share, as I share, with Afghanistan in the glorious brotherhood of Islam.¹⁰⁵

The Aga Khan consciously played up his multiple identities as a South Asian, a Muslim, an internationalist and the religious leader of a sect scattered throughout Asia, in order to speak in a Pan-Asian idiom. He invoked Asia's historical interregional connections to map an Asia that was held together by the routes of trade and by religion. He continued to look at Asia from an Indian perspective, and in doing so looked largely to West Asia, with which region he had more affinity. But even if the Asian Relations Conferences would later include all Arab countries, in keeping with Nehru's preference of maintaining close contacts with the Arab world, the Muslim East fell off the Asian map for others.

Looking East: Veer Savarkar's religious cartography of Asia

To Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966), who remains a controversial figure to this day, the Muslim East did indeed fall outside of what he considered as 'Asia'.¹⁰⁶ His focus lay entirely on East and Southeast Asia, with India as the westernmost point on the Asian map. The resulting geo-imaginary reflected what he considered as the unifying identity marker of Asia: the Hindu-Buddhist religion. Islam, and with it most of Central and Western Asia, had no place in his cartography of the continent. Where the Aga Khan had approached China through Turkestan, this was precisely the part of China that Savarkar abhorred. Rather Far from being the heart of the continent, Central Asia was depicted as an existential (and external) threat:

China was once ruled by the Tartars, and when the Tartars embraced Islam, these Moslems made China their home. ... But the great Buddhistic Empire which rose on the ashes of the Tartars showed the Moslems their right place and they were more or less thoroughly reduced to unquestioning subjection. But with the fall of the Chinese Empire, the Japanese conquest and the simultaneous rise and spread of the Pan-Islamic

¹⁰⁴ Speech in the General Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva, 27 September 1934. In Aga Khan III, *Memoirs*, 1039.

¹⁰⁵ *Idem*, 1040.

¹⁰⁶ Savarkar is simultaneously remembered as a revolutionary advocating armed rebellion, author of *The Indian War of Independence*, father of Hindutva Nationalism, and vocal opponent of Gandhi. Accounts of his life range from the hagiographical to the highly critical. The concern here, however, is with Savarkar's metageography of Asia.

movement ... Chinese Moslems refused to merge themselves with the Chinese, but maintained that they should keep up their separate entity.¹⁰⁷

Given these diametrically opposed ideas, there was little love lost between Savarkar and the Aga Khan. The mutual dislike dated back to a discussion on Madan Lal Dhingra's assassination of William Hutt Curzon Wyllie in 1909. The moderately loyalist Aga Khan had argued that the attack should be condemned. Savarkar, as a revolutionary nationalist, protested, after which a physical fight ensued. As the communalist issue intensified, so did their enmity. One *casus belli* was the issue of *Shamsi* Ismailis, known to Savarkar as the *gupti* (secretive) Ismailis in Punjab, a community that wore 'Hindu' dress but had followed the Aga Khan since the 1910s. This intensified Savarkar's view that his religion was under threat, and he vowed to 'save the Hindu Society from the dangerous practices of these gupti followers of the Aga Khan'.¹⁰⁸ In the 1930s, as both directed their attention to the future of Asia, their differences of opinion took on literally continental proportions.

In order to claim Asia as a Hindu-Buddhist continent, it was first necessary to establish that Hinduism and Buddhism were one, an undertaking enthusiastically appropriated by the Hindu Mahasabha, in which Savarkar had risen to prominence after his release from jail in 1924.¹⁰⁹ The Hindu Mahasabha Working Committee passed a resolution advocating cultural contact between Hindus and Buddhists in Burma: 'Buddhism, to which the majority of the Burmese belong, was of Indian origin. In fact, in the beginning it was only a reformation movement among the Hindus. Hence Buddhists are as much Hindus as Protestants are Christians'.¹¹⁰ This was fully in line with the Hindu-Buddhist unity that Savarkar had defined in his *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* Of the Buddha he said: 'Thou art ours as truly as Shri Ram or Shri Krishna or Shri Mahavir ... when the law of Righteousness rules triumphant on this human plane, then thou will find the land that cradled thee, and the people that nursed thee, will have contributed most to bring about that consummation'.¹¹¹ When Savarkar became president of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1937 (the same year that the Aga Khan was elected president of the Muslim League), Hindu-Buddhist Asia became somewhat of a trope in Mahasabha circles. Because of it, relations with Buddhist organizations elsewhere in Asia were actively pursued.

Savarkar's cartography of Asia was influenced strongly by Greater India thought, which held that ancient India had played an active role in the cultural and religious development of Southeast Asia.¹¹² The thesis that India had been not only a highly developed civilization long before its contact with Europe, but also a hegemon and a civilizational force in Asia, was primarily propagated by the Greater India Society in Calcutta, established in

¹⁰⁷ V. Savarkar, 'Moslim Chinaman: Hidden Motive of Chinese Moslem Mission to India', *Selected Works of Veer Savarkar*, vol. 3 (Chandigarh: Abishek Publications 2007), 525.

¹⁰⁸ NMML, Savarkar Private Papers (hereafter SPP), 6450/23: A. P. Sinha to Savarkar, 5 June 1938.

¹⁰⁹ First in the Ratnagiri chapter, and nationally from 1937. D. Keer, *Veer Savarkar* (1950; repr. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966), 171.

¹¹⁰ *Hindu Outlook*, 25 May 1940, 3. The resolution itself was made several years previously.

¹¹¹ V. D. Savarkar, 'Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?' *Selected Works of Veer Savarkar*, vol. 4.484.

¹¹² S. Bayly, 'Imagining "Greater India": French and Indian Visions of Colonialism in the Indic Mode', *Modern Asian Studies* 38:3 (2004): 703–44.

1926, and through publications by its members, notably Kalidas Nag, P. C. Bagchi, and R. C. Majumdar.¹¹³ (The Greater India Society is treated further in section 3.3.) Of concern here is that it was but a small step to claim that India had ‘civilized’ Asia through the expansion of Hinduism and Buddhism. As the Greater India idea was translated from academic publications into the popular press, this was the shape it assumed in the Hindu Mahasabha. In view of this, it is perhaps peculiar that the Mahasabha did not view India as the natural leader of Hindu-Buddhist Asia. Instead, it looked towards Nepal as the only independent Hindu country in the world. All through the 1930s, the Mahasabha kept up a frequent, if one-sided, correspondence with the Nepali court, urging them to rise to the occasion and show Asia the way, ‘now that the awakening of the Pan-Hindu consciousness is making us Hindus in Nepal and outside, realizing the oneness of our life as an undivided and indivisible nation’.¹¹⁴

Some in the Mahasabha were even ‘devoutly cherishing the hope of a speedy consummation of our great ideal of creating a federation of powerful and peace-loving Hindu nations from the Himalayas to Ceylon and from Sindh to far-off Java’,¹¹⁵ but this went too far for Savarkar himself. His map of Asia, from which Muslim regions were excised, was a call for a united stand against the ‘slow penetration of Islam’,¹¹⁶ rather than a proposal for Asian political federation. Savarkar advocated a *Hindu Dharma Parishad*, not a *Hindu Rashtra Parishad*—that is, roughly, a Hindu ‘religious’ association rather than a Hindu ‘national’ one.¹¹⁷ He made the difference explicit when he called for closer contact with East Asia in the name of Hindu religious brotherhood, but explained: ‘Hinduism is one of the constituents of Hindutwa [sic] which we share with the Japanese, Chinese and all our co-religionists. The Japanese and the Chinese are our co-religionists but they cannot be our co-nationalists. We have a religion but no nation in common’.¹¹⁸

However, the vocabulary of the Hindu-Buddhist Asia concept soon became an idiom in which not only Mahasabhists were conversant, but also those who petitioned the organization with agendas of their own. Savarkar’s private correspondence offers insight into both the transnational networks fostered by this perceived Hindu-Buddhist unity and the existing revolutionary networks that were eager to use the rhetoric for their own ends. Savarkar maintained a lively correspondence with Rashbehari Bose in Tokyo, who wrote in 1938: ‘The Buddhists are also Hindus, and every attempt should be made to create a Hindu block extending from the Indian Ocean up to the Pacific Ocean. For this purpose, the Hindu Sabha should take immediate steps for establishing branches of Mahasabha in Japan, China, Siam and other countries of the Pacific and sending their representatives for creating solidarity among the Eastern races’.¹¹⁹ Although Savarkar was reluctant to devote Mahasabha resources for international activities, he had no objection to revolutionaries creating their own

¹¹³ K. Nag, *Greater India (A Study in Indian Internationalism)* (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1926); P. C. Bagchi, *India and China* (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1927); R. C. Majumdar et al., *History and Culture of the Indian People* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1951–77).

¹¹⁴ NMML, SPP, 6449/22: Mahasabha to His Excellency the Maharaja, 1935.

¹¹⁵ NMML, SPP, 6449/22: Thakur (Rashbehari Bose) to Shinde Esq, V. P. Hindu Mahasabha Ratnagiri, 10 January 1930.

¹¹⁶ NMML, SPP, 6450/23, Statement by Savarkar, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, 11 August 1938.

¹¹⁷ NMML, SPP, 6450/23: Savarkar to Rashbehari Bose, 14 November 1938.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ NMML, SPP, 6450/23: Rashbehari Bose to Savarkar, 11 July 1938.

momentum. Orders went out through the general secretary in Bombay: 'Our President will be glad and feel obliged if you yourself take the lead and start a branch of the Hindu Mahasabha in Japan even though it may not show a large number of members. But it cannot fail to be an authorized international mouth piece of the Hindu Mahasabha and Hindudom as such in Eastern foreign countries'.¹²⁰ Privately he wrote to Rashbehari Bose that his 'scheme of building a Pan-Hindu temple in Japan is excellent'.¹²¹

1.4 Conclusion

The First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the establishment of the League of Nations, had each influenced the creation of a new internationalist momentum in the interwar years. In India, this internationalist moment had distinct Asianist overtones. Its first expressions after the war took place in the wake of All-India support for the Khilafat question, which caused the Khilafat movement to be expressed in terms of Asian solidarity rather than Pan-Islamism. The 1920s, furthermore, saw the emergence from the mainstream of the nationalist movement of several initiatives for the establishment of a Pan-Asiatic federation.

Asianism thus figured in the visions of alternative world and Asian orders of anticolonial internationalists as well as nationalists. Questions of how an independent India would situate itself in a decolonizing Asia, and how and by whom this new 'Asia' was to be shaped, were intimately linked. However, it is worth mapping out what concrete cartographic images of Asia underlay these ideas, for they reveal the diversity of Asianist agendas in India in this period. This chapter has offered four examples: Savarkar was not in search of Asia's geographical heart, but of a unifying religious identity, as expressed by a cartography that was limited to those regions that still followed the religions developed in India. Like Savarkar, Pratap excised the Middle East from his map of Asia, but for very different reasons. For Savarkar, this cartographical deletion served to demonstrate that Islam was not an Asian religion; for Pratap, the erasure put further emphasis on the dominance of 'Turan'. And while Pratap's 'Turan' overlapped largely with Rameshwari Nehru's focus on the Soviet Union and its Central Asian republics, her inclusivist conception of Asia was based on ideas of post-imperial solidarity and reconstruction rather than on a historical understanding of what the various Asian regions had in common. The latter view was very much that of the Aga Khan, who based his Asia on the shared heritage of Islam as well as the connectivity of historical trading routes.

These four vignettes have demonstrated that in the decades surrounding independence, multiple cartographies of Asia co-existed. These cartographies, while informed by different assumptions of what Asia was and how its future should be shaped, have other features in common: they are not easily reconciled with traditional narratives of Pan-Asianism (as understood in its predominantly East Asianist form). They fail to conform to ideas of a spiritual, non-materialist Asia as opposed to a soulless and industrialized West, as attributed to Tagore and other Indian thinkers. Instead, the four Asianists described here offered cartographies of Asia that were driven by locally shaped agendas and present a view from

¹²⁰ NMML, SPP, 6450/23: Rashbehari Bose to Savarkar, 18 August 1938.

¹²¹ NMML, SPP, 6450/23: Savarkar to Rashbehari Bose, 14 November 1938.

India. With the exception of Mahendra Pratap, who refashioned himself as somewhat of an honorary ‘Turani’ by going into exile and renouncing his Indian citizenship, they saw a special role for India as the geographical, spiritual, or political heart of Asia. While for Savarkar the importance of India to Asia was historically informed, the Aga Khan and Rameshwari Nehru saw India as a potential leader of a decolonizing Asia.

In 1927, nationalist and Gandhian J. M. Gupta envisioned an India that would be ‘mistress of the Indian Seas, leader of an Asiatic Zollverein, and upholder of the right of the coloured races throughout the world’.¹²² None of the thinkers above were quite as jingoistic as all that. Rather, they demonstrate that in whichever direction the compass pointed, Asia was something of a terra incognita in which multiple regionalist ideas and visions could plant their flag.

¹²² J. M. Gupta in the *Indian Quarterly Register* (1927): 374.

