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The savage as living ghost: representations of Native Americans and scholarly failures to dismantle the notion of the savage

Chen, C.

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Author: Chen, C.

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Chapter Two

Diremption, Satire and Difference within: Strengths and Weaknesses of a Poststructuralist Attempt to do away with the Notion of “Savage”

Introduction

The title of this chapter may seem immediately flawed. Anyone only slightly familiar with poststructuralism or deconstruction would immediately counter that neither poststructuralism nor deconstruction attempt “to do away with” concepts. Yet, what do they do with notions such as “the savage”? Poststructuralism and deconstruction clearly do not accept this notion as the building block of a hierarchical opposition. Thus we can conclude that there is at least something they want to do away with. As such, question in this chapter will be: to what extent can poststructuralism or deconstruction do away with the notion of the savage?

In the previous chapter, in a re-assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of a structuralist attempt to deal with the savage-civilized opposition, I discussed the dialectical and hierarchical relation between savagery and civilization. I also considered Lévi-Strauss’s attempt to bring in the notion of savage thought as the substrate of scientific thought and how this structure was also traceable in Golding’s *Lord of the Flies*. The results noted that there was not so much a master-slave dynamic in play between savagery and civilization, but rather an architectural relation that questioned the logic of oppositional categories as mutually exclusive, and further drew attention to the stubborn historicity of these categories, which enhances the difficulty of discarding them. The persistence of categories and tropes that define the relation between self and other, as I showed, makes the writer of *Lord of the Flies* a “bricoleur,” limited by the materials at his disposal, even though he manages to re-arrange these materials in combinations that deprive them of their comforting familiarity.

In this chapter, I work on the notion of savage in terms of “difference within,” which means that I will look at the inner dynamic of civilization that is energized or propelled due to its entanglement with the concept of the savage.

As to the meaning of “difference within,” Barbara Johnson argues: “Difference... is not what distinguishes one identity from another. It is not a difference *between* (or at least not between independent units). It is *a difference within*” (3). In contrast to “difference between,” “difference within” does not suggest a comparison between different entities, but looks into one entity without assuming a totalized and integrated identity of this entity as it stands opposite to, or at least remains distinct from, another one. To read “savage” as a difference within means to subvert the idea of an

essentialized identity of “the” savage, to infinitely defer the process of reaching a universal and totalized notion of the savage, or to study how its definition is constantly produced by an internal dynamics.

To that aim I will stage a dialogue again between two paradigmatic texts, this time Huxley’s novel *Brave New World* (1932), which depicts a so-called civilized world and reveals different positions taken in it by savages, and two texts by the poststructuralist historiographer Hayden White. As to the theme of the intertwinement of civilization and savagery, White discusses it specifically in his article “The Forms of Wildness: Archaeology of an Idea,” published in a volume under the telling title *The Wild Man Within: An Image in Western Thought from the Renaissance to Romanticism* (1972), edited by Edward Dudley and Maximillian E. Novak. In another seminal study titled *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe* (1973)—the second work by White I will mobilize in my analysis—White emphasizes the literary origins of historiography and explains different styles of historical accounts. As will become clear, the relationship between civilization and savagery differs in each of the historiographical styles distinguished here by White, and one of them is of special relevance to *Brave New World*. Based on White’s ideas, the novel can be read both as satire, a literary genre, and as Satire, in a historiographical sense: as a form of history in which civilization and savagery intertwine and wrestle with each other. The question addressed in this chapter is whether deconstructing such an “intertwinement” can really open up an alternative to the dynamic in play.

My argument will develop in four steps that all relate to my conclusion of deconstruction as satirical in nature or as White’s Satire. First, I will consider the novel as literary (postmodern) satire. Here I will take the etymology of satire seriously. It has two major sources: one is *satyr* and the other is *lanx satura*. *Satyr* is “the half man-half beast, suggesting that satire is lawless, wild, and threatening,” while *lanx satura* is “the ‘mixed’ or ‘full platter,’ suggesting that satire is a formless miscellany, and food for thought” (Griffin 6). Second, I will consider the mode of historiographical emplotment that White defined as Satire and examine how this can be brought to bear on the novel. In this context, I will also consider a genealogical tendency in deconstruction as a mode of Satirical emplotment itself. Third, I will consider how the novel can be seen as a deconstructive attempt *avant la lettre* with the subjects’ being the captive to their world, or of a world, as its major theme.¹ Finally, and fourth, I will discuss how one can deconstructively satirize such captivity, but perhaps without escaping the fact that one remains captured in deconstructive Satire. To this order I will focus particularly on the representations of Native Americans in the novel to see how in relation to them the deconstructive attempt works out (or does not work out).

¹ The theme of captivity will be further discussed later in this chapter. For example, in the novel, John the savage tries to break through the boundary of the civilized world, but still cannot live independently and remains the captive of the civilized world.

2.1 *Brave New World* as satire²

After one hundred years, Huxley's novel continues to enjoy an international reputation.³ His works in general have drawn interest since initial publication, but *Brave New World* stands out and has been discussed amply.⁴ Because of the popularity of the novel, the phrase *brave new world* has even become a ubiquitous catchphrase in the titles of articles and books, for instance, in the biotechnological field. Titles such as "Gene regulation: The brave new world of RNA," *Designing Babies: The Brave New World of Reproductive Technology*, or *Remaking Eden: Cloning and beyond in a Brave New World*, are cases in point. These works use *brave new world* to refer to a world that is different, more advanced, and further developed.

However, even by looking at the etymology of the word *brave*, we find that *brave new world* does not signify a more civilized or superior world at all and that the title is, actually, an ironic one. The title is a quote from Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, which is in turn one of the most studied texts by Shakespeare in the context of postcolonialism, with the character of Caliban as a paradigmatic figure of the ignoble savage. In Act V, scene 1 of the play, the daughter of the protagonist, Miranda, misjudges some people who have been magically conjured up on the uninhabited island where she and her father were left stranded. She exclaims what wonderful new creatures have come into their lives and what a brave new world this will make possible. At the time the word *brave*, derived from "late 15c., from Middle French *brave*," would still mean "splendid, valiant," from Italian *bravo* "brave, bold." Yet originally the term would also mean "wild, savage," possibly from Medieval Latin *bravus* "cutthroat, villain," and from Latin *pravus* "crooked, depraved."⁵ That is to say, etymologically *brave* is used to refer to both excellence and wildness, savagery and violence. As a title, *brave new world* itself comes to connote a paradox, then, in which *brave* and *new*, savagery and civilization coexist. As a consequence, the title opens the possibility to read the novel as satire—in the sense of the literary genre.

Generally the novel has been read as paradigmatic of modernism. In a study that deals with its influence on Kurt Vonnegut's first novel, *Player Piano*, Todd F. Davis contends:

Vonnegut, like Huxley and Orwell, concerns himself with science and sociology but the manner in which he approaches his subject differs so

² As will be explained further in the end of this section, here I intend to use *satire* with a small letter "s" to refer to literary genre in order to distinguish it from *Satire* with a capital letter "S" in White's sense.

³ At the turn of the twenty first century, the International Aldous Huxley Society (AHS) has been founded to promote the academic study of Huxley's thoughts and writings and to support the Centre for Aldous Huxley Studies (CAHS) to organize academic meetings and send delegates to international conferences, see <<https://www.uni-muenster.de/Anglistik/Huxley/ahs.html>>. At the same time, CAHS is responsible for two publications *Aldous Huxley Annual: A Journal of Twentieth-Century Thought and Beyond* edited by Bernfried Nügel and Jerome Meckier and series "Human Potentialities" edited by Lothar Fietz and Bernfried Nügel.

⁴ Most recent research can be seen from Gavin Keulks's article "Aldous Huxley: A centenary bibliography (1978-1995)." In this article, Keulks provides a detailed bibliography of works on Huxley, in which themes, such as Huxley and Shakespeare, Huxley and Utopia, Huxley and satire are discussed extensively.

⁵ On the etymology of *brave*, see <<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=brave>>.

radically from his precursors that to speak of their work in the same breath is oxymoronic. The more than half century ... affords us ... to discern the absurdly satiric nature of Vonnegut's social criticism. The seeds of postmodern thought beginning to sprout ... are truly revolutionary when measured against the modernist ideas of Orwell and Huxley. (41)

Here *Brave New World* is considered to be serious as opposed to Vonnegut's satire. Yet the satirical quality of the novel is not ignored completely and is mentioned by critics, for example, Jerome Meckier who stated that the novel is "less a traditional anti-utopia and more a satirical novel of ideas" (450). Now satire, of course, may simply have the aim to ridicule another's position. Yet it may also aim to explicitly satirize something while implicitly exploring a serious suggestion for something else. For instance, in his travel book, *Beyond the Mexique Bay* (1934), Huxley stated that Europeans and Americans would benefit from "a salutary element of primitivism" (257). He may have suggested this in the context of a deeper pessimism that became evident in the 1946 foreword to *Brave New World*. In the foreword he stated that the novel was written with the idea that "human beings are given free will in order to choose between insanity on the one hand and lunacy on the other." Given this choice, which is satirical in its phrasing, the novel could have implicitly proposed an alternative, one other than the choice between "an insane life in Utopia, or the life of a primitive in an Indian village" (1946, vii-viii). It becomes clear that here the primitive is no longer "salutary" but connotes "lunacy." He or she cannot provide a "salutary" alternative, in the sense of something like an ideal community where life would somehow be "whole," lived free from tragedy, or lived in truth (1931, 3-18). So, both societies introduced in the novel are "posited upon a negation of this 'whole truth'" and the novel is described in this context as, again, "a bitterly destructive satire" (Firchow 1966, 460).⁶

Now as the very terms "utopia" and primitivism suggest, the satire deals with a certain concept of history, here, that involves past, present situation and future ideal. Especially the novel's reflection on the *past* might not be evident in first instance since it is often characterized as the sketch of a future: "*Brave New World* is either a perfect-world utopia or its nasty opposite, a dystopia, depending on your point of view: its inhabitants are beautiful, secure, and free from diseases and worries, though in a way we like to think we would find unacceptable" (Atwood ix-x). Most critics of the novel read it as a "dystopia as well as anti-utopia" (Nugel, et al. 287).

The very underpinning of the gloomy worldview captured by the dystopian sketch allows for a comparison between Golding in the previous chapter and Huxley in this one. Both Huxley and Golding believed that the First World War (in the case of Huxley) and the Second World War (in the case of Golding) had changed the consciousness of human beings, and their consciousness had been alienated and invaded by "strangers from within," which was the original title of the manuscript that Golding submitted for *Lord of*

⁶ Huxley discusses the "whole truth" in "Tragedy and the Whole Truth," an essay in *Music at Night and other Essays* and argues that "the whole truth," correspond fairly closely with our actual or potential experience.

the Flies (Baker 321). It led one of the early Golding scholars, James R. Baker, to state that: "The theme of demonic possession was most vital to Golding's purpose, and again it demonstrates the bond with Huxley" (321). As Baker's choice of words suggests, there is not an outside force taking control of people (much like Prospero in *The Tempest* has magical control over others), rather people are possessed by demons that they carry with them and in them.

I will partly follow the trend of reading the novel as anti-utopia, because it is far from introducing an ideal world. It is more like a prophecy of the danger of an emerging world controlled by biotechnology and in that context satirizes the efforts to establish an ideal civilized world. Yet precisely because of this latter aspect, the novel also reflects a distinctly Western history of progress and Enlightenment, in which the figure of the savage plays such an important role. This was already hinted at as well in Huxley's fascination with primitivism (a fascination that was more generally shared by modernist authors).⁷

The theme of the savage in this novel cannot be missed. Its main protagonist is called John the Savage and the novel depicts the efforts of people in the civilized world to keep savagery and civilization apart. They do this by means of building wired fences between the civilized world and what is called the Savage Reservation, located in New Mexico.⁸ This was a state that had only recently, from Huxley's 1932 perspective, become a part of the United States. In 1912 it had become the 47th state (followed by Arizona, also in 1912). Thus, the "New" of "New Mexico" is on the one hand a matter of historical reality, but also a hint that the novel might be as much about the past as about the future. It connotes the colonial New World from which savages would have to be, and in fact *were* chased away. By implication, it connotes both the colonial and neo-colonial endeavor of the United States with their "manifest destiny," which was to replace the old and tired colonial powers of Europe. Yet within the novel it also connotes another new world, namely the world that readers view as a future world. In the novel, this new world opposes the old one: in the new world people are mechanically produced and as a result sex is freed from any procreative function, while in the old world people lead primitive lives and have sex to procreate. It is within this context that the "savage within" comes to play such a dominant role, for explicit and implicit reasons. Explicitly, the United States, and New Mexico in particular, have former "savages" "within." New Mexico has several important reservations where Native Americans lived at the time. The diegesis of the novel, obviously, concerns a different reservation, but it is hard to miss the reference.⁹ Moreover, as a differing figure, the savage is both a defining and

⁷ For studies on the relation between the savage and Enlightenment, see Barkan et al. (1995), Camayd-Freixas and González (2000), Sweeney (2004), and Hutchinson (2009).

⁸ In this chapter, "the civilized world" and "the Savage Reservation" are used as neutral terms to refer to different places discussed in the novel.

⁹ It is almost an agreement among Huxley scholars that the Savage Reservation scenes and John's Indian vocabulary, which "come from the Zuni and the Hopi pueblos in New Mexico and Arizona," probably reached "Huxley through D. H. Lawrence's several essays on tribal dances and his novel *The Plumed Serpent*" (Higdon 137). With particular regard to the Snake Dance, David Leon Higdon argues that Huxley's accurate depiction of Indians is mostly based on his own life experience to New Mexico in 1926 and his readings of books, such as Annual Reports of the Ethnographical Division of the Smithsonian Museum and anthropologist Frank Hamilton Cushing's writings on Zuni life and culture.

uncontrollable signifier, as becomes clear in the novel through the role of John the Savage and of Native Americans in it.

The character of John is not a savage ethnically or anthropologically. In fact he is born from a relation between the Director (who is in charge of the biotechnological baby factory in the civilized world that produces happy human beings), and Linda (a woman left by the Director in the Reservation in New Mexico). John the Savage's trip to the civilized world breaks the assumption that savages live somewhere else or in the past. The novel is an embodiment, here, of what Brown argued in his analysis of the Enlightenment problematic of the savagery-civilization opposition: "One cannot locate the savage clearly on the outside, in the place of a non- or pre, precisely because it is sought to make up for an internal insufficiency" (70-71). That is to say, it is imprecise to locate the savage in a geographical outside (somewhere else), or a historical outside (long ago), because the construction of modern civilization requires savagery as its internal partner. The concept of savage does not have a solid or a fixed position in this context, but is "a differing figure of uncertain position within a system of positioning," in the context of a more general reflection on Western history (71).

The historiographical quality of the novel is partly evidenced by the fact that it is based on historical research. It should be noted that during the 1930s when the novel was written, there was an American craze for everything Mexican-Indian. However Huxley was not so much carried away by this fancy (Kiernan 112) and when Huxley dealt with Native American customs in the novel, this is the result of research, and was not simply a matter of repeating well-known clichés of the time. As Huxley admitted in an interview with George Wickes and Ray Frazer, "I had to do an enormous amount of reading up on New Mexico, because I'd never been there. I read all sorts of Smithsonian reports on the place and then did the best I could to imagine it" (1963, 198).¹⁰ He did so in an explicit struggle with the way in which the novel related to the history of "the" world. Huxley believed that human history is unfixed and always under construction, and stated:

Generalized history is a branch of speculation, connected (often rather arbitrarily and uneasily) with certain facts about the past. Circumstances alter; each age must think its own thoughts. Not until there is a settled and definitive world order can there be such a thing as a settled and definitive version of human history. (1932, 15)

Depicting history through the particularity of the novel had a more general aim then. Huxley sketched the efforts of people in a so-called civilized world to achieve a pure civilization, while indicating that in this endeavor savagery was only seemingly something "out there." For him, human history was not a matter of continuous change, let alone progress, but something intrinsically fragmented. This fragmentation may be a modernist issue (according to the logic of "the centre cannot hold") but as we will see in the last part of this chapter, it is very well possible to read the novel as postmodern, or as a form of deconstruction *avant la lettre*. Or, it appears to be adequate to read the

¹⁰ Here Huxley seems to forget his trip to New Mexico in 1926.

novel as a satire aimed at those who think they can build a new world with a “settled and definitive world order.”

The figure of the savage is an ideal vehicle to study the modes of positioning that are demanded in the construction of Western history in its attempt to fend off contingency and consider history in terms of its so-called civilized aims and goals. To study this historiographical construction, I will use a study that can be called paradigmatic for a poststructuralist approach to history: White’s *Metahistory: The historical imagination in nineteenth-century Europe*. I do so to investigate whether or how the poststructuralist approach, still an avant-garde matter in the early seventies of the twentieth century before it got institutionalized, is successful in its attempt to deal with the damaging consequences of the concept of the savage on the level of representation. As will become clear the novel embodies the possibility of reading it *historiographically* as what White defined as Satire. So, again, in what follows I will use “satire” with a small letter “s” to indicate the literary genre and “Satire” with a capital letter “S” to indicate the historiographical mode of writing and its potential in the writing of history that White is talking about. My question is: How is Satire—this very historiographical form—used in relation to savages?

2.2 Prefigurative Emplotment of History: Historiography and the Potential in Satire

In *Metahistory*, White analyzes “the deep structure of the historical imagination of nineteenth-century Europe” (ix). He works on historical accounts by both historians such as Jules Michelet, Leopold von Ranke, Alexis de Tocqueville and Jacob Burckhardt, and philosophers of history, such as Georg Hegel, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche and Benedetto Croce (x). His study was meant as an intervention in the debate at the time “over the nature and function of historical knowledge” (2). For him, historical work is “a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse” (2). That is to say, the writing of history does not limit itself to the description of events that take place in a chronological order, but it is an all-encompassing narrative process of construction. As White makes clear, historiography thus becomes an aesthetic construct:

I believe, the historian performs an essentially *poetic* act, in which he prefigures the historical field and constitutes it as a domain upon which to bring to bear the specific theories he will use to explain “what was *really* happening” in it...

Through the disclosure of the linguistic ground on which a given idea of history was constituted, I have attempted to establish the ineluctably poetic nature of the historical work and to specify the prefigurative element in a historical account by which its theoretical concepts were tacitly sanctioned.
(x-xi)

For White, then, historical work does not include “objective” historical facts, but becomes a poetic act performed by the historian. This is because before the historian represents or explains what has happened in the historical field, he already has specific

literary prefigurations in his mind in which he embeds the historical facts. It is this prefiguration, or emplotment, that vectorizes history. Or, as White argues: "In the poetic act which precedes the formal analysis of the field, the historian both creates his object of analysis and predetermines the modality of the conceptual strategies he will use to explain it" (31). This is to say that in the performance of historiography as a poetic act, before the historian encounters the data of the historical field, there is already a prefigured structure in his mind that can be used to represent and explain these data. The historian not only creates his object of analysis, but also pre-determines the conceptual strategies he uses to explain his object as existent in time, and determining "history."

As a consequence, in a sense every historical work has a metahistorical basis, which is comprised of "the dominant tropological mode and its attendant linguistic protocol" (xi). Like a deep structure within language, there is also a poetic structure within historical works. To explain the "metahistorical" basis or the poetic structures, White argues that there are five different levels of conceptualization in the historical works: chronicle, story, mode of emplotment, mode of argument, and mode of ideological implication (5). These different levels of conceptualization answer questions in different ways and make different "styles" of historical thinking possible. In White's view, "a historiographical style represents a particular combination of modes of emplotment, argument, and ideological implication" (29). "Emplotment is the way by which a sequence of events fashioned into a story is gradually revealed to be a story of a particular kind" (7). Following the line indicated by Northrop Frye in his *Anatomy of Criticism*, White distinguishes four different modes of emplotment: Romance, Tragedy, Comedy, and Satire (7):

By an extension of Frye's ideas, it can be argued that interpretation in history consists of the provisions of a plot structure for a sequence of events so that their nature as a comprehensible process is revealed by their figuration as a *story of a particular kind*. (1978, 58)

In other words, in order to interpret historical events and also to organize them in terms of a sequence or plot, historians have to resort to a structure that is *generically* marked, like in Romance, Tragedy, Comedy and Satire. Every plot structure also defines the prefigurative element in historiographers' minds (as discussed above). It is the plot structure that "transforms a chronicle of events into a 'history'" (62).

Specifically, Romance is "a drama of self-identification," including the hero's transcendence, victory and finally liberation from the world (1973, 8). Satire is the opposite of Romance, in offering a history in which people remain "captives of the world" (9). In Comedy, there is harmony between the natural and the social, which is worthy of celebration, while in Tragedy, after extensive struggle, a hero reconciles with the world and works within the limitations of the world (9). Apart from modes of emplotment, modes of argument are another way in which historians interpret historical material and give their text a specific shape. White introduces four different modes of argument: formalist, mechanistic, organicist and contextualist. Formalist historians emphasize the

importance of categorization, labeling, and identification of objects, while a contextualist argument explains events in terms of similar events and their contexts. Organicist historians “tend to be governed by the desire to see individual identities as components of processes which aggregate into wholes that are greater than, or qualitatively different from, the sum of their parts,” while the mechanistic argument seeks to find the laws that govern human activities (15).

Satire can resort to all four aforementioned modes of argument. However, because there is “a certain elective affinity between the mode of explanation and the mode of emplotment in historians of undeniably classic stature,” Satire is often bound with the contextualist mode of argument (1978, 66). As White contends, the choice for a certain mode of emplotment and certain mode of argument “are products of a third, – more basic, interpretative decision: a moral or ideological decision” (67). White introduces four modes of ideological implication, namely anarchist, radical, conservative and liberal, and then claims that “Satire can be used... for either Conservative or Liberal purposes, depending upon whether the object satirized is an established or an emerging social force” (1973, 67). If the object satirized concerns an established social force, then the use of Satire is liberal, and if the object is an emerging social force, of, say, progress, it is conservative.

What the novel satirizes through fiction are the emerging results of biotechnological and socio-scientific techniques. As such, one could argue that the novel is conservative in that it wants to propagate what the novel deems a “savage” reservation. Yet what is also satirized is the attempt of so-called civilized powers to distinguish themselves from savages. Here the use of satire would fit in with a liberal agenda, given that the people who are satirized are those who claim to have civilized themselves, leaving behind a savage pre-history. The two ambiguously come together when those who are satirized are those who want to counter a newly emergent order, not as the inevitable result of biotechnological developments, but as the possibility of a new savage order. So as for being liberal or conservative in terms of White’s Satire, the novel is ambiguous. In what follows I would like to work out in more detail why this is so.

As has been hinted at above, Huxley’s novel can be considered as a straightforward literary satire, in the context of it being an (anti-)utopian narrative. Yet by suggesting a history that considers civilization to be superior to savagery, the novel also inscribes itself in a form of historiography. Is this inscription modeled according to the literary prefiguration, as Satire? According to White, such Satire is different from other modes of emplotment in that:

The archetypal theme of Satire is the precise opposite of this Romantic drama of redemption; it is, in fact, a drama of diremption, a drama dominated by the apprehension that man is ultimately a captive of the world rather than its master, and by the recognition that, in the final analysis, human consciousness and will are always inadequate to the task of overcoming definitively the dark force of death, which is man’s unremitting enemy. (9)

So contrary to Romance, where there is still hope of mankind being saved in some way or another (“redemption”), satire is hopeless in that it confronts mankind with a fragmented world (“diremption”). This implies that human beings cannot master the world, but remain the captives of a world that is ruled by a definite end point: death. In the novel, this attitude is embodied most explicitly by John the Savage, who tries to be the master of his own fate, and yet cannot change this fate or the world defining it. Thus, he remains captive to a fragmented world, as a result of which he feels forced to commit suicide.

According to White, and contrary to stories cast in other plot-modes, such as Romance, Comedy and Tragedy, stories cast as Satire gain effects by “frustrating normal expectations about the kinds of resolutions” (8). In Satire, people cannot find resolutions and its authors tend to have a pessimistic view. In *Metahistory*, White for instance reads Burckhardt’s famous cultural historical studies in the nineteenth century as Satire, and argues that in Burckhardt’s estimation: “The truths taught by history were melancholy ones. They led neither to hope nor to action. They did not even suggest that humanity itself would *endure*” (230). Similarly, Huxley’s novel holds a melancholic attitude towards the future, which is why, when compared with H. G. Wells (or the prophet of scientific optimism), Huxley is understandably called a “prophet of gloom” by Peter Bowering (98). Huxley does not believe that humanity itself can endure and he shares with Burckhardt the same kind of pessimism towards the world. This can be evidenced explicitly in the ending of the novel, the suicide of John the Savage.

Satire refuses “to provide the kinds of formal coherencies one is conditioned to expect from reading Romance, Comedy, and Tragedy,” and this is also formally evidenced in the novel by the frequent recurrence of Shakespeare quotes (H. White 1973, 28). Studying several quotes from Shakespeare’s works, Morag Shiach argues that they embody the “characteristic universe of Huxley’s fictional parties, where meaning emerges from the cumulative drops of fragmented conversation and quotation rather than presenting itself as continuous or coherent” (214). That is to say, these quotes, in the end, are not taken up in a coherent whole, but develop into what is a disparate collection, through accumulation of the seemingly unrelated fragments. They may even be analogous, here, to the historical works by Burckhardt, that were defined by White as “an ‘arbitrary’ arrangement of the materials for purposes of presentation and analysis” (H. White 1973, 237).

Such arbitrariness can be traced in the figure of John the Savage, precisely in his relation to Shakespeare. As a child John finds it difficult to understand life in the Savage Reservation, because the only person he can ask questions to is his mother, and she does not understand life in the Savage Reservation either. He does not like the Native American Popé, who sleeps with his mother, but he does not know why he has this dislike. He struggles with the problem until one day he comes across a book *The Complete Works of William Shakespeare* (Huxley 2007, 113). This is an arbitrary encounter, though not that arbitrary, of course, in the context of Europe’s cultural history and Shakespeare’s towering position in it. After reading the book, he finds that “they gave him a reason for hating Popé; and they made his hatred more real; they even made Popé himself more real” (114). This is to say, the works by Shakespeare provide

John with “the prefigurative element” discussed by White, so that John is not only able to express himself but also to understand his life in a larger picture, which is a picture framed by the European canon (1973, xi). Still, one can easily imagine that he could have found another book, through which this very construction might have been shaped in a radically different way, which brings us back to arbitrariness.

In the context of European and Western history, John’s hatred for Popé may not be that arbitrary, considering that Popé is a Native American. Furthermore, neither the character’s name, John the Savage, nor the concept of the savage itself, are arbitrary in the novel and in Western history. With respect to this, can deconstruction deal with the concept of the savage in a liberating (say emancipatory) way? Or is deconstruction Satirical in itself, in White’s sense of the word, as a result of which we remain “captives of the world” in which the savage has at some point been introduced without ever going away anymore, or connoting the dark end point of life: death (9)? Let me consider this by focusing on the genealogical aspects in White’s work, and in the novel’s performative reconstruction of a genealogy as satire.

As a strategy of reading, deconstruction became well-known through works of Jacques Derrida who defined its quality and aims differently, or gave it different emphases. In *Positions*, he mainly discusses an important step in deconstruction—the reversion of the hierarchy between oppositional terms: “To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment” (1981, 42). In *Limited INC*, he further describes two processes involved in the deconstruction of the opposition, which are “a *reversal* of the classical opposition *and* a general *displacement* of the system” (1988, 21). “Deconstruction does not consist in moving from one concept to another, but in reversing and displacing a conceptual order as well as the non-conceptual order with which it is articulated” (21). To reverse the hierarchy between the oppositional terms is an important step in deconstruction, and to criticize the very system on which the hierarchy is established is the second step in this process. It is also crucial for Derrida that deconstruction does not appeal to “higher logical principle or superior reason but uses the very principle it deconstructs” (Culler 1982, 87). The practitioner of deconstruction, as Culler lucidly explains, “works within the terms of the system but in order to breach it” (86). Laying out Derrida’s practice of deconstruction, Culler notes: “To deconstruct a discourse is to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that produce the supposed ground of argument, the key concept or premise” (86). In this context, deconstruction is much more than a reading practice. Terry Eagleton made the political potential of Derrida’s deconstruction explicit and argued that deconstruction is “an ultimately *political* practice, an attempt to dismantle the logic by which a particular system of thought, and behind that a whole system of political structures and social institutions, maintains its force” (1996, 128). That is to say, the task of deconstruction is not to dissolve all truths, meanings and identities, but rather to discover and dismantle the way these terms are produced by language, social institutions and practices. In this way, deconstruction opens up possibilities for multiple truths, meanings and identities.

Yet the multiple meanings disclosed by deconstruction depend on the genealogical

tendency in deconstruction. Etymologically, genealogy refers to “tracing of a family,” “making of a pedigree,” and “folk tale.”¹¹ That is to say, genealogy involves a continuous process of movements as well as traces left by these movements. The reference to “folk tale” implies that genealogy is not limited to the elite, but opens up plenty of possibilities. Similarly, deconstruction does not entail an overthrowing of all the meanings of the text by declaring the text’s meaninglessness, but rather a discovery of the multiple and even contradictory meanings of the text in relation to its historical background (but also all other contexts in which it is called to function). As to the binary opposition between civilization and savagery, the task of deconstruction is not to eliminate the opposition once and for all, but to work on the dynamic relationship of its terms and expose how these dynamics are produced in its historical and contemporary contexts.

In tracing the idea of the savage as a wild man in his article “The Forms of Wildness: Archaeology of an idea,” White describes a genealogy of wildness and argues that in modern times, wildness is more related to a form of lunacy:

In modern times the concept of wildness ... tends to be conflated with the popular notion of psychosis, to be seen therefore as a form of sickness and to reflect a personality malfunction in the individual’s relation with society, rather than as a species variation or ontological differentiation. (1972, 35)

This is like saying that in modern times, wildness, and by implication savagery, have shifted meaning, following the logic of Derrida’s *différance*. In his discussing the intertwinement of civilization and savagery, White argues that the meanings of those “self-authenticating” terms, such as “wildness,” “madness” and “heresy,” are not stable, but are complicated and constantly in flux. White argues: “They are rather, complexes of symbols, the referents of which shift and change in response to the changing patterns of human behavior which they are meant to sustain.” (5). As a consequence, wildness does not refer to something ontologically different from civilization, but has been internalized, not just with, but also through, a *difference*. This kind of “internalized” savagery not only questions the boundary between civilization and savagery, but also affirms the value of the savage’s dialectical antithesis “civilization.” White argues:

The notion of “wildness”... the ideas of “madness” and “heresy”... These terms are used not merely to designate a specific condition or state of being but also to confirm the value of their dialectical antitheses: “civilization,” “sanity,” and “orthodoxy,” respectively. (4)

The terms “wildness,” “madness” and “heresy” are used to refer to a specific condition or state of being as “culturally self-authenticating devices.” On the one hand, they define themselves, in the sense that their meanings are so pellucid that they do not need other

¹¹ Etymologically, genealogy refers to “early 14c., ‘line of descent, pedigree, descent,’ from Old French *genealogie* (12c.), from Late Latin *genealogia* ‘tracing of a family,’ from Greek *genealogia* ‘the making of a pedigree,’ from *genea* ‘generation, descent’ (see *genus*) + *-logia* (see *-logy*). An Old English word for it was *folctalu*, literally ‘folk tale.’ Meaning ‘study of family trees’ is from 1768.” For more information, see <<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=genealogy>>.

concepts or further explanation to confirm their values (4). On the other hand, they contribute to confirming the values of their antitheses, such as “civilization,” “sanity,” and “orthodoxy,” which implies that it is necessary to dwell upon their meanings always in connection to their antitheses.

Simply put, the terms “wildness,” “madness” and “heresy” are context-bound and have different contents at different times. Here, White brings in the comparison with Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, which shows how the different contents of “insanity” operate in different religious, political and economic contexts. Thus “the term ‘insanity’ has been filled with a religious content during periods of religious enthusiasm, with a political content during times of intensive political integration, and with an economic content during ages of economic stress or expansion” (Foucault in H. White 5). Similarly, the meaning of savagery is also context-bound. In some contexts, the savage is closer to the trope of ignoble savage, someone to fear since he is mad, insane, morally corrupted, evil and uncivilized. In other contexts, the savage evokes the trope of the noble savage, someone to admire and to desire for since he is pure, innocent and noble.

Taking all these in consideration, it is possible to read *Brave New World* in a poststructuralist way. It is not immediately clear whether the novel deconstructs or supports the well-established hierarchical opposition between savage and civilized. The latter option, though, seems rather unlikely in the light of the novel’s satirical nature.

2.3 *Brave New World* Considered as Deconstruction *avant la lettre*: Oppositions that Make one Captive of/to the World

The novel shows “how, in the future, mechanisms will have fully dehumanized us” and “subsequent generations will become the slaves and victims of metallic and mathematical monsters” (Clark 140). Despite the evident satire, here, there is a clear geographical boundary between “the civilized world,” and “the Savage Reservation,” which confirms the binary opposition between the civilized and the savage (Huxley 2007, 89, 38). In the civilized world, people think that they are more advanced, developed and progressive than inhabitants in the Savage Reservation. To keep from being contaminated by the savages and to prevent savages from escaping, a high-tension wire fence has been built to set the civilized world apart from the Savage Reservation. “To touch the fence is instant death,” and usually people born in the Savage Reservation are not allowed to leave and “are destined to die there” (88). Only a limited number of people in the civilized world can go to the Savage Reservation. As the pilot told Bernard Marx and Lenina Crowne during their trip to the Savage Reservation, the inhabitants in the Reservation have to be obedient to the civilized, since they “have got enough experience of gas bombs to know that they mustn’t play any tricks” (91). This also indicates that the boundary has been established through the violent oppression of savages by the civilized.

However, the sharp geographical boundary is constantly challenged by travels of people from the civilized world, as well as people from the Savage Reservation. For people in the civilized world, the Savage Reservation is so different from their world that it has become a place of interest. Thus, Bernard and Lenina travel from the civilized

world come to visit the Savage Reservation to see something exotic and different. Lenina is shocked to see life in the Savage Reservation, because what she assumes to be civilized is questioned in this Reservation. During their trip, they come across John the Savage, who is born in the Savage Reservation but has civilized parents, mother Linda and father Thomas, director of the London Hatchery and Conditioning Center (D.H.C.). After learning that John is a son of the director Bernard is very interested, particularly because the very same director aims to exile Bernard. Thus, Bernard decides to take John back to the civilized world, because he wants to leverage John's identity to humiliate the director and avoid being sent away by him. John's travels to the civilized world help us chart the topography of the novel, which mainly consists of four different places: the Savage Reservation, the civilized world, exile places, where Bernard and Helmholtz Watson are sent away, and the lighthouse, where John ends his life. Through this topography, the novel shows us a mixture of savagery and civilization, in which the Native American Reservation, the contemporary world, and the future mechanical world are sampled together.

Whether we can read the novel as a satire depends on a play with oppositions that can be described as intertwined, like the intertwinement of civilization and savagery. Dustin H. Griffin writes, if "satire is often an 'open' rather than a 'closed' form, that it is concerned rather to inquire, explore, or unsettle than to declare, sum up, or conclude" (95). Read as satire, the novel can never be finally nailed down to a single interpretation of civilization or savagery, because multiple meanings and voices can be heard within it. These multiple meanings make it possible to read the novel as performing a deconstructive practice. This brings us back, however, to a principal distinction between literal satire and historiographical Satire.

In *Grotesque Anatomies: Menippean Satire Since the Renaissance*, the Australian scholar and poet David Musgrave highlights the satirical potential in Derrida's work. Musgrave quotes Derrida by stating that the secret or the meaning of the text is closely linked "with the realm of the grotesque: the margin, the shadows, the underground" (207). Deconstructive practice means to show "how texts come to embarrass their own ruling systems of logic" and "show this by fastening on the 'symptomatic' points, the *aporia* or impasses of meaning, where texts get into trouble, come unstuck, offer to contradict themselves" (Eagleton 116). The grotesque shifts into satire, then, when a text implicitly comes to make ridiculous the very thing it purports to say, as a deconstructive practice: a "self-defeating, self-deconstructing." As such, the novel works on a double level. As a literary satire, it projects its criticism outside of the text, which is why its agenda can be liberal or conservative, or both at the same time. As a deconstruction of Western history on a larger scale, the book works akin to historiography, however, thereby becoming Satire in White's sense. Here the protagonist, Western man, with its internal savagery, is not able to escape from a world by means of deconstruction, but stays caught within it. Let me test this out in relation to several aspects of the novel.

Lord of the Flies is a story about "sexless" boys in a sense that sex is not involved in the children's lives or at least remains invisible in the novel. Although these children can be categorized as both ignoble and noble savages, depending on their age, sex and human reproduction has not become a part of their lives. As such, the novel is

remarkable because in Western discourse, the sexuality of the ignoble savage and the noble savage is a major point of concern. The sexual activity of ignoble savage is regarded as violent and brutal, while in the case of the noble savage their sexual activity is often regarded as the ultimate manifestation of pure love or, at least, a love with harmonious connotations. As if forming the opposite of *Lord of the Flies*, *Brave New World* foregrounds sexual activity as a major theme. The savages who are clearly depicted here as ignoble, live a monogamous life and sexual activity is only encouraged between husband and wife for the sake of reproduction. That is to say, only adult couples are allowed to have sex and any other kind of sexual activity is regarded as obscene. By contrast, among the civilized, sexual activity is prevalent and they have complete freedom in having sex. The sexual age limit is nonexistent: even when they are children, “moderns” begin to engage in sex games. They cannot understand the conditions under which sex functions in the Reservation. However, while civilized people have complete freedom to have sex, it is regarded as unnatural and shameful to have children as the result of sexual activity. Linda, who is from the civilized world, at one point argues that having children is “like dogs. It’s so revolting” (Huxley 2007, 105); it turns one “into a savage” (109). In the civilized world, there is another way of reproduction, which is faster and regarded as “lovely” progress by its Director (86).

It is not hard to see how Huxley is satirizing several positions at the same time here. He addresses what has been at the core of sexual acceptance for centuries within Christian context and shifts it to the Savage Reservation. And by uncoupling sex from its reproductive function, he shifts a colonial fantasy into the heart of a post-modern civilization. Yet where does this leave us in terms of White’s Satire?

The question is pertinent because historiography is a major theme of the novel as well, or rather anti-historiography. “Huxley’s future rulers” believe that “the past is dangerous,” and as a consequence, people are trained to be hostile towards history (Firchow 2007, 69). In a lesson given by the Director, people are told that “most historical facts *are* unpleasant” (Huxley 2007, 19). He also warns his students that “when you’re not accustomed to history, most facts about the past *do* sound incredible” (27). Later, the Controller also says: “I suppose, that beautiful and inspired saying of Our Ford’s: History is bunk” (29). For him, history is uncultivated, savage and backwards, and thus should be discarded. Analogously the leaders of the civilized world hold a contemptuous attitude towards their ancestors. As the Controller says: “Our ancestors were so stupid and short-sighted that when the first reformers came along and offered to deliver them from those horrible emotions, they wouldn’t have anything to do with them” (39). Because their ancestors have emotions, and do not take soma as the moderns do, they are regarded as fools. There is even “a campaign against the Past,” in the context of which museums are closed and historical monuments are blown up (43). In accordance with this, historical books are forbidden. “For the same reason as we don’t give them *Othello*: they’re old; they’re about God hundreds of years ago. Not about God now” (204). That is to say, in the civilized world, anything historical or old is equated with savagery, and thus should be eradicated.

In the civilized world, it appears then that people have a stable present *without* any connection to the past and future, just as in Zeno’s paradox of the flight of an arrow, the

flying arrow is at rest.¹² What they can see or experience is only the ever present. However, the constant battle against the past and the future implies that the past or the future cannot be eradicated completely. In terms of deconstruction, the anxiously stabilized present requires, or even depends on both history and future as the opposite others. That is to say, as I will show in the following, the absolute distinctions between the past, the present and the future dissolve, and the present established by the Controller *contains* the past and the future, in the double sense of the verb “to contain”: it comprises past and future and controls both, or keeps them bound (as in “containment”). In terms of the novel doing a deconstruction *avant la lettre*, here, there are some pivotal resonances with the way Derrida himself theorized the present.

In laying out Derrida’s stance towards the present, Culler in *On Deconstruction* states the following:

The past is a former present, the future an anticipated present, but the present instance simply is: an autonomous given. But it turns out that the present instant can serve as ground only insofar as it is not pure and autonomous given. If motion is to be present, presence must already be marked by difference and deferral. We must, Derrida says ... think the present starting from/in relation to time as difference, differing and deferral The notion of presence and of the present is derived: an effect of differences. “We thus come,” Derrida writes, “to posit presence no longer as the absolute matrix form of being but rather as a ‘particularization’ and ‘effect’. A determination and effect within a system that is no longer that of presence but of difference” (Marges, p. 17/“Differance,” p. 147). (Culler 1982, 95)

I give the long quote because, to me, it appears to be pivotal in thinking through the critical (or satirical, or Satirical) potential in deconstruction, but also in its resonance with the way in which the present is dealt with in *Brave New World*. To be sure, as Derrida says, the present and presence have lost their absoluteness, that is to say: they have lost their hierarchical position of superiority. At the same time, we find ourselves in a closed circle or rather, the concentration that deconstruction demands implies that the flying arrow is brought to a standstill in an analysis of its ever deferred arrival, or its ever differentialized present-ness.

As Boletsi remarks in her analysis of Louis Althusser’s theory: “Ideology – as well as language in structuralist theories – functions like a closed system, in which subjects are formed and trapped, as it were, without the option to escape” (2010, 206). Boletsi is dealing, here, with Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in which Althusser resorts to a figure of a divine voice and argues that this divine voice not only constitutes its subjects, but also subordinates them through processes of interpellation, which further implies that ideology creates subjects. Here as well, it is as if the novel is ahead of its time, in describing a “Voice,” which is constantly broadcast to people in the civilized world. It is a voice that helps to produce and subordinate its subjects, as well as

¹² I take this image from Jonathan Culler’s *On Deconstruction* (1982, 94).

keeps them trapped (Huxley 2007, 20). Sometimes, the Voice imposes ideas upon people, such as “everybody is happy now” (63). Because these sayings “are repeated a hundred and fifty times every night for twelve years,” almost all people believe that, indeed, they are happy (63). Sometimes, the Voice also helps to solve a crisis. After John calls for the Deltas to give up soma, there is unrest among them. At this moment, “from out of the Synthetic Music Box a voice began to speak” (188). This “angelic Voice” tries to persuade them to be “happy and good... At peace, at peace” (189). Thanks to “the Voice’s richly affectionate, baritone valedictions,” “the Deltas were kissing and hugging one another” (189). This Voice helps to pacify people and prevents them from getting angry, which is an emotion that might produce change or that might disrupt the everlasting present. Moreover, the Voice is present in almost all the places in the civilized world, and its omnipresence makes it easy for people to accept “Voice” as the truth and firmly believe in its eternal authority. It even infiltrates the daily conversation of the civilized (like between Fanny and Lenina) with propaganda in such a way that conversation and propaganda fuse (43-47). The system is, indeed, closed—although it demands a lot of work from the Controllers to keep it closed.

Now, as Boletsi makes clear, Althusser’s ideology concept can be placed within the context of structuralist linguistics. Derrida is post-structuralist, and in poststructuralism closed system is turned into a dynamic one, one of constant production through difference and deferral. In that context, for instance, the repetition of propaganda does not mean that its meaning remains the same, but that it may open up other possibilities. In *Limited INC*, Derrida argues:

Iterability alters, contaminating parasitically what it identifies and enables to repeat “itself”; it leaves us no choice but to mean (to say) something that is (already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say), to say something other than what we say and would have wanted to say, to understand something other than . . . etc. (62)

That is to say, although we can repeat what we have just said, what we repeat is not something we have just said or something we would have wanted to say. It is no longer possible to fix the meaning of what we repeat, because meaning is always changing and renews itself through repetition. Of course, this does not indicate that the meaning of each repetition is completely different from that of previous repetitions; it is partly different and partly similar to the meaning of previous repetitions. Based on Derrida’s idea, we can argue that through repetition, multiple and often conflicting meanings are continuously produced. This kind of repetition also happens in the novel. For example, after seeing the dirty conditions in the Savage Reservation, Lenina is shocked and repeats: “cleanliness is next to fordliness” (Huxley 2007, 94). She is conditioned to believe that civilization is always associated with cleanness and tidiness, whereas savagery is related to dirt. “Yes, and civilization is sterilization,” Bernard answers (94). Here Bernard’s answer is paradoxical, because of the different meanings of the word *sterilization*. On the one hand, *sterilization* implies tidiness, which affirms the boundary between civilization and savagery. On the other hand it refers to the state of being

lifeless and unable to reproduce, which implies the doom of civilization. The double meaning of the term is again satirical, in its ridiculing the idea that there could exist a world that is sterile (meaning clean). In this context, expanding on Derrida's work, Musgrave suggested that paradox "represents a puncturing of the notion that there can ever be a single, adequate system of thought, argument, or opinion to describe or account for the world" (199). That is to say, paradox opens up possibilities for the co-existence of different thoughts, arguments, and opinions. Or, Philip Holland argued: "Its proper force is not that of affirmation or negation but of experiment, of the testing of received ideas" (130). Paradox does not confirm or negate, that is, but brings ideas together in order to experiment or test these ideas. Bernard's repetition of "civilization is sterilization" paradoxically confirms *and* questions the hierarchical opposition between civilization and savagery and, through satire opens up another alternative attitude towards civilization.

Yet, although satire, paradox, and experiment may all seem to be liberating forces, they are so because with post-structuralism Bolet's closed-ness is no longer there in terms of space (as when a voice envelops us in space). However, closed-ness now has come to reside in terms of time: the present is time and again produced as eternal and identical to itself. This allows deconstruction to be satirical, as when a system proclaims the present to be absolute and we can laugh at the anxious work to make it appear as absolute. Yet does such an "absolute" present allow deconstruction to be more than satire, or is it, basically, Satire in that we remain captive of an ever effectively made present world, in which false oppositions are time and again deconstructed but in doing so also effectively reproduced—be it with a difference?

The captivity of people is thematized and satirized extensively in the novel. The strongest metaphor for the character's captivity in their world is the use of soma. With soma, Huxley's characters become the positive counterpart to what a few decades later would be defined as the one-dimensional man, depicted by philosopher Herbert Marcuse in his book *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. In this society, people living in the real world would only come to pursue the false needs created by industrial society; they lack critical thinking, are numb and remain under complete social control. In the novel, soma makes all sorrows, worries and anxiety disappear; people become happy and relaxed and feel as if they have entered paradise. Within paradise, the concept of time changes dramatically as people cannot feel the transience of time. For example, when Linda is nearing death, she is given a lot of soma so that she will not feel pain. This overdose of soma is harmful to her health and will shorten her life. However, as Dr. Shaw explains, soma helps to lengthen life, because he tells John to "think of the enormous, immeasurable durations it can give you out of time. Every soma-holiday is a bit of what our ancestors used to call eternity" (Huxley 2007, 134). Soma helps people forget unpleasant situations and real life, including the passage of time. Without a concept of time, everything becomes eternal. With soma, people become "slaves," who assume that their society is stable and eternal in the sense of ever present (186).

Infantilism is another means through which ideology takes effect in its capacity to keep the characters captive of their world. Different from the infantilism as discussed in

chapter one, here infantilism refers to the self. The former kind of infantilism was used to degrade others as childish and naïve in order to conquer them or put them under control. Here infantilism is mobilized to make the self innocent and happy. Everybody is encouraged to be as naïve as infants, because as Lenina says at one point, “Our Ford loved infants” (81). Again, the satirical allusion to Christianity is obvious. It was Lord Christ who said: “Let the little children come to me, and do not hinder them, for the kingdom of God belongs to such as these” (*New International Version*, Luke. 18:16). Here the Christian allusion is transplanted to a quasi-secular system in which it is believed that a civilized simple mind is stable, while the mind of savages is full of possibilities and thus unstable. To produce a stable and simple mind, the Controller remade humanity and has to continue remaking humanity (Firchow 2007, 92).

This infantilism implies the absence of self-directed research or scholarly development. “Books and loud noises, flowers and electric shocks – already in the infant mind these couples were compromisingly linked; and after two hundred repetitions of the same or a similar lesson would be wedded indissolubly. What man has joined, nature is powerless to put asunder” (Huxley 2007, 17). So, people are held captive in that they are conditioned to hate books and to shun nature instinctively and unalterably. As nonreaders, they consume more, while they do not indulge themselves into intellectual thinking or the appreciation of the beauty of nature (19). Their main activities are working, consuming and having fun. They are limited within the “unseen wires,” which implies that they are conditioned to love their servitude, accept rules without doubting them, and lose the ability to think or to ask questions (17). This measure is quite successful in producing dull and unintelligent citizens. For instance, when John asks his mother Linda more about chemicals, which are popular in the civilized world, “Linda never seems to know. The old men of the pueblo had much more definite answers” (113). Indeed, the old men in the Savage Reservation seem more intelligent and can account for their lives much better.

In a novel such as this the hatred towards books takes on a distinct satirical tone because it almost provokes one to move to a meta-level, as in Hutcheon’s famous study on meta-history. Yet before moving to such a meta-level, let me give two last examples of characters being captured in the civilized world: one that is explicitly linked to the element of education, the other to the element of community.

As “an instrument of intellectual education,” sleep-teaching or hypnopaedia plays a function in the novel similar to ideology. It is used to repeat slogans or propaganda and establish a stable society. “Sixty-two thousand four hundred repetitions make one truth” (40). For example, Lenina is born in the civilized world and she has been conditioned to such an extent that she only tends to repeat what she has been told. When she finds that Bernard is upset, she recommends soma to him and tells him that “Remember, one cubic centimeter cures ten gloomy sentiment” (77). After learning that Bernard wants to know what passion is and to feel something strong, Lenina warns him that “When the individual feels, the community reels” (81). She emphasizes the importance of individual peace, since she has been taught that emotions and feelings are bad for the stability of society. After she hears that Bernard will be sent to Iceland, she tries to comfort him and quotes: “Was and will make me ill,... I take a gramme and only am,” which implies that

the past and the future will make one unhappy and as long as one has soma, one can still enjoy the present (90). When she feels uncomfortable in the Savage Reservation, she feels the need to have soma and says: "A gramme is better than a damn" (100). Even when John is furious towards her and accuses her of being a frivolous coquette, she stutters: "A gra-amme is be-etter..." (170).

To guarantee that every person and activity is under control, isolation is forbidden in the civilized world. When Dr. Gaffney introduces John to the civilized world, he tells him: "We don't encourage them to indulge in any solitary amusements" (142). Solitariness is not welcome and is regarded as kind of sickness, because an isolated space may escape from the supervision of the Controller and is thus thought to be harmful to the stability of the civilized world. In the novel, the exiles, such as Bernard and Helmholtz, suffer from this kind of sickness, since they often feel out of place and doubt society. Their behavior and thoughts keep challenging the psychological boundary between civilization and savagery that keeps the system in place.

Because of his "physical defect" Bernard, for example, is regarded as queer by others and girls do not like him either (57). To avoid embarrassment and humiliation, Bernard wants to remain alone and indulge in solitary amusements, which makes him even more queer. He once says: "It makes me feel as though... [...] as though I were more *me*, if you see what I mean. More on my own, not so completely a part of something else. Not just a cell in the social body" (78). He is once accused by the Director because of "his heretical views on sport and *soma*, [by] the scandalous unorthodoxy of his sex-life, and [by] his refusal to obey the teachings of Our Ford" (129). Unlike other people in the civilized world, he doubts the sport they engage in and soma's ability to make people happy. He prefers to stay alone, so that nobody will bother him. This tendency to be isolated does not fit in the civilized world. He is labeled as "an enemy of Society," "a subverter," and "a conspirator against Civilization itself" by the Director (129-30). In the end, Bernard is exiled to Iceland for his queerness, just as his friend Helmholtz.

As such, it is clear that those who refuse to be the implicit captives of the world will be made captives explicitly; collective and happily embraced captivity is replaced by individual enforced and punitive captivity. In my final section I want to take the deconstructive, satirical quality of the novel in addressing this captivity to a meta-level in an attempt to answer the question posed above: Is Huxley's satirical deconstruction in the end analogous to deconstruction-as-Satire in that it keeps not so much the fictional characters captured in the world of the *diegesis*, but also the readers in the oppositions that structure their real world?

2.4 Savage Native Americans: Deconstruction as the Captive of Satire¹³

As a Satire, the novel satirizes seemingly correct and positive concepts, such as civilization, stability, progress, community and happiness. With respect to these, "The deconstruction of a text does not proceed by random doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text itself" (Johnson 3). Likewise, the novel does not randomly reverse the hierarchical opposition

¹³ Here "Satire" refers to the one in White's sense.

between civilization and savagery, but foregrounds the tension between civilization and savagery, which complicates the interrelation of these notions. In doing so, the novel itself can be regarded as performing a deconstructive practice. The novel does not abolish the boundaries or distinctions between civilization and savagery once for all, but shows the impossibility of establishing pure civilization or savagery, which emphasizes their dynamic relationship. In the novel, the spatialization and temporalization of savagery in terms of its being “out there” and “back in time” are explored due to the clearly demarcated geographical distribution of savage and civilized spaces. However, conceptually speaking, the savage lives within civilization itself and contributes to constructing civilization. In terms of space, the savage does not limit itself to the Reservation, but actually infiltrates the civilized world literally through the figure of John the Savage. In terms of time, the savage can exist in the past, the present and the future as well, and it can be either infant-like or adult-like. In this deconstructive practice, civilization fails to eliminate savagery, but depends on it in order to maintain an orderly system.

In the above, I argued that the distinction between satire and Satire implies a shift to a meta-level, in the sense that both fictional characters and readers remain captives of the world. This shift also applies to deconstruction itself, which keeps questioning the totality and unity of the contemporary world, but at the same time, remains captured by it. In “Grotesque logic in the work of Jacques Derrida: Menippean satire, deconstruction and postmodern,” Musgrave defines deconstruction as satirical. To that order, he introduces a genealogy of Menippean satire, which can be traced from Menippus and Plato to Nietzsche, and to Derrida (192). Genealogically,

As a grotesque form of literature, Menippean satire straddles the nihilistic, the affirmative, the speculative and the silly and represents a bewilderingly heterogeneous field for speculation, imitation and study....

... the Menippean interpenetrates with the scholarly or the philosophical discourse in a particularly concentrated way that often leaves the fantastic, or coarsely bodily to one side, substituting for it wildly digressive, often paradoxical and intricate arguments and scholarly sophistications that could be characterised as a *grotesque logic*. (31; 192)

Menippean satire plays a double role in that it both negates and affirms at the same time. Besides the grotesque logic, it also takes on several other prominent features, such as “Hybridity, irony, intertextuality, fragmentation, formal variation, parody and self-reflexivity” (195). In Derrida’s writings, parody appears frequently, which is “typical of Menippean intertextuality and brings into play a multiplicity of voices” (205). The use of parody implies that there is no longer monologue, or one authoritative voice, but multiple voices can be heard simultaneously. Derrida’s work “offer[s] the possibility of discovery with the grotesque operating as a mode that can yield liberating possibilities” (207). Specifically, these “liberating possibilities” interest me here, since I am looking at the possibility to liberate society from the civilization-savage opposition.

In the previous section, I discussed the novel as a deconstructive practice. As a deconstructive practice itself, the novel is open to further deconstruction, because “there is no definitive reading, all texts contain contradictions, gaps, and disjunctions – they undermine themselves” (Chandler 93). In my final section of this chapter, I will test the implications of this deconstructive expansion through focusing on the explicit representation of Native Americans in the novel. On the one hand, as I will show, their representation both confirms and questions Eurocentric ideas of Native Americans, while on the other hand it reveals the simultaneity of civilization and savagery. If, with respect to all this I want to ask whether deconstruction is perhaps not only satirical in nature but also, historiographically, Satire, and what are the consequences of this?

First, let me look at the Savage Reservation, which covers “... five hundred and sixty thousand square kilometers, divided into four distinct Sub-Reservations, each surrounded by a high-tension wire fence” (Huxley 2007, 87). This Savage Reservation is perhaps not a real description of, but at least similar to the modern Reservation for Native Americans, who are to inhabit a specific area with restrictions. The similarity is strengthened when in the novel the civilized people are told that “a savage reservation is a place which, owing to unfavorable climatic or geological conditions, or poverty of natural resources, has not been worth the expense of civilizing” (141). The conditions in the Savage Reservation are so terrible that people from the civilized society don’t want to inhabit it or know more about it. As a result, they have no idea how many savages live in the Savage Reservation and cannot understand the customs of the savages, such as the ritual through which they ask for rain. In their mind, “repulsive habits and customs” are kept in the Savage Reservation, which is indicative of their haughty and scornful attitude towards “Indians and half-breed... absolute savages” (88-89).

For my argument it is of relevance, here, that the literary world of satire suddenly becomes uncannily *referential* here. When John the Savage addresses the civilized world as “the Other Place” or refers to it by its geographical name, London, this London feels appalling. For example, when John sees that here conception and birth have been removed from human bodies to labs and everyone is “decanted” from bottles (6). He is shocked to see that ideas, such as family, marriage, father and mother, are regarded as taboos. His reaction to the civilized world may, in a deconstructive sense, question the assumed civilization, yet that civilization is in its description clearly fictional. So, whereas the mechanical reproduction of human beings has no referential status and remains fictional (at the time of the novel’s writing), with the Indian reservation we have an opportunity to at least sense the reality of real people living in real reservations.

This shimmering through of people in a real world in characters or situations portrayed in the novel can also be evidenced in quotes such as this:

“Queer,” said Lenina. “Very queer.” It was her ordinary word of condemnation. ‘I don’t like it. And I don’t like that man.’ She pointed to the Indian guide who had been appointed to take them up to the pueblo. Her feeling was evidently reciprocated; the very back of the man, as he walked along before them, was hostile, sullenly contemptuous. (92)

Here Lenina and her Native American guide are brought together in an asymmetrical distribution of colonial contempt that again connotes the reality of such meetings and confrontations. So what we have on the one hand, then, is the satirical deconstruction of well-known oppositions and on the other hand the *reality* of them. The result is confusing.

In *Lord of the Flies*, there are a few explicit references to Native Americans, but they are clearly *played* by young boys. In contrast, in *Brave New World*, representations of Native Americans are plentiful. Note, these depictions are far from being “adequate” representations. They seem rather distorted, because of the Eurocentric perspective of the narrator. Consequently, we can hardly find any positive image of Native Americans. The following passage is indicative of the novel’s negative, derogatory representation of Native Americans:

An almost naked Indian was very slowly climbing down the ladder from the first-floor terrace of a neighboring house – rung after rung, with the tremulous caution of extreme old age. His face was profoundly wrinkled and black, like a mask of obsidian. The toothless mouth had fallen in. At the corners of the lips, and on each side of the chin, a few long bristles gleamed almost white against the dark skin. The long unbraided hair hung down in grey wisps round his face. His body was bent and emaciated to the bone, almost fleshless. Very slowly he came down, pausing at each rung before he ventured another step. (94-95)

The old Native American man forms a sharp contrast with the young, energetic and happy people in the civilized world. People in the civilized world can change the process of ageing to such an extent that they remain young-looking and healthy until the age sixty. In their sixties, they die in a special Hospital for the Dying in a soma-induced ecstasy. As the Controller says: “They’re well off; they’re safe; they’re never ill; they’re not afraid of death...” (194). Even though one day they will die, “They learn to take dying as a matter of course” (142). Death does not terrify them and does not involve any sorrow or sadness.

The contrast between the old Native American and the young civilized people seems to imply, then, the superiority of civilization over savagery, of life over death, or at least, the cruel inevitability of aging and death. Given the novel’s satirical tenor, however, we infer that the opposite holds. The so-called happy shiny civilized society is in fact considered to be inferior. The one aspect that troubles such a satirical reading is mentioned almost in passing here, though it is pivotal. Whereas the old man is described almost entirely in terms of what is the case with his aging body, there is one *metaphor* that disturbs:

His face was profoundly wrinkled and black, like a mask of obsidian

With the mentioning of obsidian we find the same mixing of satire with the real as we discovered in the passage dealt with above. Obsidian is a glass-like, volcanic material

that was used in prehistorical times and by Native Americans to make cutting tools, arrowheads or plates. As the illustration of “obsidian” by Wikipedia has suggested, “Native American people traded obsidian throughout the Americas.”¹⁴ Moreover, obsidian can be found abundantly in New Mexico; obsidian nodules found there run under the name of “Apache Tears.”¹⁵ It is a name derived from an Apache legend: during an ambush by soldiers of U.S. Cavalry, 50 of the Apache warriors are killed within minutes and the left 25 Apaches chose to jump over the cliff to their deaths rather than being killed by the White. After hearing the news of their death, the Apache women become sad and their tears become black stones—Apache Tears—upon hitting the ground (Grimes).¹⁶ Apaches Tears are thought to have the healing power and are able to “heal grief, providing insight into the source of distress and promoting forgiveness” (Hall 216). It is said that those who possess such stones do not have to cry again. In this context, on the one hand, Apache Tears seem to connote the forgiveness of Native Americans. On the other hand, ironically, the sorrows of Native Americans have been kept in the form of stone, which may indicate that their sorrows may last forever. So, if the face of the old Native American is compared to obsidian this is not just an accidental metaphor. With it, the historically real imposes itself. Moreover, in this choice of words, a colonial mode of reading the savage face is connoted as the word suggests that this face is “impenetrable.” As a consequence, the distinction civilized-savage is not deconstructed through satire. It is rather, confirmed. It is even confirmed by repetition, as when a dancing performance by several young Native Americans is described as follows: “Bright blankets, and feathers in black hair, and the glint of turquoise, and dark skins shining with heat” (Huxley 2007, 97). Here the “dark skins shining with heat” resembles both the volcanic and the glassy appearance of the skin.

However, Native Americans may not simply be an easy vehicle for colonial projection, particularly if we take gender and sexuality into account too. Linda is not a Native American woman, but she is mistaken to be one because of the assumption in the civilized world that everybody in the Reservation is a savage Native American. Based on the way she is depicted from Lenina’s perspective, stereotypes of savage Native American women come distinctly in play:

A very stout blonde squaw stepped across the threshold and stood looking at the strangers staring incredulously, her mouth open. Lenina noticed with disgust that two of the front teeth were missing. And the colour of the ones that remained... She shuddered. It was worse than the old man. So fat. And all the lines in her face, the flabbiness, the wrinkles. And the sagging cheeks, with those purplish blotches. And the red veins on her nose, the bloodshot eyes. And that neck – that neck; and the blanket she wore over her head – ragged and filthy. And under the brown sack-shaped tunic those enormous breasts, the bulge of the stomach, the hips. Oh, much

¹⁴ See <<http://casitasdegila.com/blog/obsidian.html>>.

¹⁵ “A more recent, common name that is often given to these obsidian nodules is that of ‘Apache tears,’ a name coined by mineral collectors, rockhounds and lapidary enthusiasts for the obsidian nodules found in the American Southwest...” (de Gila).

¹⁶ See <<http://www.nativehistorymagazine.com/2013/02/the-legend-of-apache-tears.html>>.

worse than the old man, much worse! And suddenly the creature burst out in a torrent of speech, rushed at her with outstretched arms and ... (102)

In the next chapter I will come back to the qualification of women—like this female character here—as “squaw,” a name often used pejoratively.¹⁷ What is of more interest, here, is the repeated bodily degradation that connotes savagery: the missing front teeth, the color of the rest of the teeth, the flabbiness, the wrinkles, the sagging cheeks, the “enormous breasts, the bulge of the stomach, the hips.” In Western discourse, there is a tradition to depict Native American women as savages, with hanging breasts in order to degrade them.¹⁸ Here Linda’s “enormous breasts” define her as savage, which is grotesque, since she is, originally, not one of the savages. Accordingly she can become “the creature,” as a monstrous mixture of both human and animal.

The theme of the gendered body is extended to that of sexuality when the narrator comes to speak of their marriage system. For Native Americans, marriage is “For always. They make a promise to live together for always” (168). The Warden, one of the Alpha-Minus and chief administrator, depicts the Savage Reservation to Bernard and Lenina before they set off as follows:

... about sixty thousand Indians and half-breeds... absolute savages... our inspectors occasionally visit... otherwise, no communication whatever with the civilized world... still preserve their repulsive habits and customs... marriage, if you know what that is, my dear young lady; families... no conditioning... Monstrous superstitions... Christianity and totemism and ancestor worship... extinct languages, such as Zuñi and Spanish and Athapascan... pumas, porcupines and other ferocious animals... infectious diseases... priests... venomous lizards... (88-89)

Here the ellipses on the one hand indicate Warden’s manner of speaking: “Once started, he went on and on – booming,” while on the other hand, they are icons for the awkward silences during his speech, because neither Bernard nor Lenina is interested in his talk (87). More importantly, the entire passage is the linguistic variant of a collage: a set of thematically loosely connected fragments glued together. Superficially read, Warden’s contemptuous and arrogant attitude towards Native Americans in the Reservation confirms conventional Eurocentric images of Native Americans. Yet on closer examination it appears that he is mixing up all sorts of groups, beliefs, practices and languages. For example he mixes up “Zuñi and Spanish and Athapascan.” Zuñi and Athapascan are indeed spoken by Native Americans in New Mexico and Arizona. Yet Spanish has a radically different historical background. Likewise, Christianity, totemism, and ancestor worship are mentioned in one breath here too, despite different origins.

The mixing up of things is less explicit, but with greater implications, in relation to gender and sexuality. This aspect is alluded to here by the fragments “half-breeds” and “marriage, if you know what that is, my dear young lady.” In reality, Native American

¹⁷ The origin of squaw will be discussed in detail in chapter three of this thesis.

¹⁸ See Rawson (2002).

ideas on sexuality, gender and marriage were quite different from those of Westerners. The socio-cultural anthropologist Evelyn Blackwood, who worked on the cultural significance of female same-sex relations among Native Americans of the western tribes, argued that: "The Western ideology of feminine and masculine traits actually has little in common with these Native American gender systems, within which exist large areas of overlapping tasks" (42). Much like the civilized people in the novel, Native Americans in the western tribes enjoyed the freedom to have sex outside or next to marriage. They could have premarital and extramarital sexual relations and "Sexuality clearly was not restricted by the institution of marriage" (35). Differently, then, from "Indians" in the novel, the marriage of Native Americans was not "for-ever" (Huxley 2007, 120). Among them, "individuals often had a series of marriages, rather than one permanent relationship; divorce was relatively easy and frequent for both women and men" (Kelly and Spier qtd. in Blackwood 34). At the same time, same-sex relations were widely accepted among Native Americans. "Natives did not construct gender deductively and intransitively, they did not view masculinity and femininity as mutually exclusive genders" (Valdes 210). They were "neither essentially androsexist nor essentially heterosexist" (210). They did not adopt a strict distinction between male and female, but acknowledged and welcomed the two-spirit people, who carried features of both masculinity and femininity.¹⁹ In contrast, in the novel, "Indians" are both androsexist and heterosexist and we cannot see any trace of two-spirit savages in the Reservation.

What we see, then, is rather that the "Indians" in the novel have been moralized as Christians, something is hinted at here by the mentioning of "marriage" next to "Christianity" and "priests," who are mentioned in one breath with "venomous lizards." It is only in this light that it is understandable that the Indian children in the Reservation are prohibited to have sex before marriage. Also, based on the way John the Savage describes marriage among "Indians," we can see that their marriage is monogamous and "can't be broken" (Huxley 2007, 120). Distinctly different from actual ideas on marriage by Native Americans, as introduced above, the marriage among Indians in the novel is, again, more similar to Christian marriage. In fact, their belief system seems to have been Christianized as well, such as when both Jesus and their traditional gods (such as "Pookong") are worshipped at the same time (101). Ironically or satirically, in terms of sexuality, marriage and belief system, it seems that the "Indians" presented in the novel are more like Christians.

The question, however, is how much of this deconstruction-in-practice survives when it is superimposed by classical European descriptions of Native-American rituals. For instance, in the novel, the performance of a Snake Dance is depicted as follows:

A padding of soft feet made them turn round. Naked from throat to navel,
their dark brown bodies painted with white lines ("like asphalt tennis

¹⁹ Lots of research has been done on the two-spirit Native Americans, and Gregory D. Smithers has gave us a good summary in his article "Cherokee 'Two Spirits': Gender, Ritual, and Spirituality in the Native South." According to his research, there are many terms used to refer to the queer or gay Native Americans, such as *berdache*, *cross-gender*, and *two-spirit*. Before the early 1990s, in scholarly discourse, the term *berdache* is more commonly used (Smithers 633). To emphasize the female role, J. M. Carrier uses *cross-gender* instead of *berdache* and *two-spirit*.

courts," Lenina was later to explain), their faces inhuman with daubings of scarlet, black and ochre, two Indians came running along the path. Their black hair was braided with fox fur and red flannel. Cloaks of turkey feathers fluttered from their shoulders; huge feather diadems exploded gaudily round their heads. With every step they took came the clink and rattle of their silver bracelets, their heavy necklaces of bone and turquoise beads. They came on without a word, running quietly in their deerskin moccasins. One of them was holding a feather brush; the other carried, in either hand, what looked at a distance like three or four pieces of thick rope. One of the ropes writhed uneasily, and suddenly Lenina saw that they were snakes. (93-94)

Almost everything in this passage belongs to the Eurocentric stereotypes of Native Americans as savages. Here, I agree with Hisashi Ozawa who argued that the "image of the Reservation inhabitants, although free from the conventional view of 'vanishing Indians,' is still subject to another prejudice... the views of 'primitive Indians'" (140-41). In her analysis of the role that snakes play in Huxley's work, Eva Opperman argued that it "seems as if Huxley had deliberately mixed the Indian and the Christian religions in order to create an especially striking contrast by juxtaposing savage religiousness with 'civilized' atheism" (193). That is to say, on the one hand, the grotesque mixture of Native American customs and Christian beliefs enables the ritual by the Reservation inhabitants to take on some "civilized" elements, while on the other hand, it can also be read as a satire of the civilized Christian religion in the sense that it is not superior or more advanced but actually similar to the rituals of Native Americans. Thus, the pertinent question is what the end sum may be of this "mixing." The question can be answered by considering the difference between satire and Satire in relation to deconstruction.

Conclusion

In "The Deconstructive Angel," M. H. Abrams treated deconstruction "as parasitic on the main text" (Nayar 46). In response to Abrams, in "The Critic as Host," J. Hillis Miller worked on the etymology of both parasite and host to show that deconstruction is part of every text, as Derrida himself had also argued already. For Miller, "'parasite' was originally something positive," while 'host' can be either a guest or a strange entity and even an enemy (442). In discussing the parasitic nature of deconstruction he argued: "On the one hand, the 'obvious and univocal reading' always contains the 'deconstructive reading' as a parasite encrypted within itself, as part of itself, and, on the other hand, the 'deconstructive' reading can by no means free itself from the metaphysical, logocentric reading it means to contest" (Miller 444-45). In a sense Miller confirms, here, what I have been arguing above, in a double sense. Due to its satirical nature, Huxley's *Brave New World* is an almost explicit deconstruction itself, what I called deconstruction-in-practice. Yet, as such, it cannot free itself from what it contests. I would like to rephrase this as: it remains *wedded* to what it contests. To be sure, the parasitic analysis implies, as Miller states, that there is always "alien guest in the home"

(443). That is also why Miller argues that deconstruction is a “rhetorical discipline” (443). As the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* explains, “deconstruction is parasitic in that rather than espousing yet another grand narrative, or theory about the nature of the world in which we partake, it restricts itself to distorting already existing narratives, and to revealing the dualistic hierarchies they conceal” (Reynolds).²⁰ Like a parasite, deconstruction keeps troubling the very system it depends on.

Consequently, whereas the satirical element in deconstruction may lead towards heterogeneity, I want to argue that the result of deconstruction’s historiographical and parasitical nature will tend to be Satirical in White’s sense, in that we remain captive of the world from which we try to escape. Let me give just one more example of this historiographical and parasitical nature of deconstruction: the basically *tracing* tendency in deconstruction’s attempt to do away with hierarchical oppositions that does not get us out of world, but leaves us within one.

In the novel, hierarchy is satirized. For instance, in the civilized world, after the “Bokanovsky Process” and the “pre-natal treatment of the embryos,” people develop into five different groups: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon. Among these five groups, there is a hierarchy, in which Alphas form the elite, while Epsilons are at the bottom of the ladder. In terms of human intelligence they are not equal. For example, Epsilons “don’t need human intelligence,” while Alphas are the most intelligent (Huxley 2007, 11). This kind of class hierarchy is necessary to maintain social stability, because as “the result of the Cyprus experiment” has shown, if everyone in the society is Alpha, it will not be stable (196). So far the satirical deconstruction-in-practice may be clear, for any natural underpinning of hierarchy is explicitly made artificial here. Yet what happens if this is linked to *racial* hierarchy, with its more pertinent rhetoric-biological implications?

At some point, John the Savage remembers that “Othello ... was like the hero of *Three Weeks in a Helicopter* – a black man” (149). In the civilized world people are conditioned to hold a prejudice against Blacks, who are despised as inferior, but have an extraordinary ability to reproduce. For example, when the Director introduces the speed of fertilization in the tropical Centres, such as Singapore and Mombasa, he argues “... You should see the way a negro ovary responds to pituitary! It’s quite astonishing, when you’re used to working with European material. Still... still, we mean to beat them if we can...” (6). Blackness is involved as well in “Elementary Class Consciousness.” In these lessons, Betas are told that “... Delta Children wear khaki.” This leads to the response: “Oh no, I don’t want to play with Delta children. And Epsilons are still worse. They’re too stupid to be able to read or write. Besides they wear black, which is such a beastly colour. I’m so glad I’m a Beta” (22). This is clearly satire again and might yet be another example of deconstruction-in-practice. Yet deconstruction remains wedded to the strong oppositions that are being invoked; it has to retrace and retrace again, thus performing a Whitean *Satire* that does not manage to escape the world described.

Even when the binary opposition between the civilized White and the savage Native Americans has been overturned, twisted and mixed as impressively as in this novel, the deconstruction of the binary opposition between savagery and civilization can only get

²⁰ See <<http://www.iep.utm.edu/derrida/>>.

that far. It may have shown that the civilized parasitically depends on the savage, which implies that the civilized need to define themselves through the exclusion and subordination of the savage. Yet it remains the case, as Jack M. Balkin noted: “Almost all deconstructive arguments can be understood to *depend* upon some form of nested opposition” (emphasis added, 1689). This “nested opposition” is “not a denial that a conceptual opposition is coherent, real, or useful in some contexts. It is rather a resituation of the opposition that allows us to see both difference and similarity, both conceptual distinction and conceptual dependence” (1671). The savage, as a difference-within, implies the nested opposition between civilization and savagery, in which both are mutually dependent and similar in some respects while nominally differentiated in other respects. Yet this is not where the dependence stops. Deconstruction also *depends* on the opposition.

Or, as a difference-within, savagery may be “set free” from the binary opposition with civilization, just as it may become an elusive concept impossible to locate or to eliminate. It is surely no longer limited to the place far away or back in history. It may take different positions and leave behind many traces, which make it possible to discuss it without pinpointing it. Yet in what can be described as a successful attempt not to essentialize “the savage,” a poststructuralist approach cannot do away with the term either. I have argued that in following the many traces that the savage has left behind in European and Western history, poststructuralism remains in the end Satirical, in White’s sense. It dirempts things, in the etymological sense of “taking apart,” and by doing so, it shatters the illusion of unity and One-ness. It is liberal in that it satirizes the emergence of so-called civilization; it is conservative in that it satirizes the attempt of others to get away from an opposition that clearly “is” in the sense that it *remains*, in whatever shifted or deferred position. In both cases poststructuralism remains caught in the very world that it tries to take apart.

