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## Augmented and non-augmented *HAVE*

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### 1. Introduction

This paper deals with the variety of uses of the verb *HAVE* in English, Dutch and French. In each of these languages, *HAVE* displays different usages. However, in English, *HAVE* has uses not found in the other two languages. This *HAVE* we shall refer to as augmented *HAVE*, a label that brings out the essential ingredient in the account of the difference between English *HAVE* and its Dutch and French congeners.

We defend the following claims:

a. *HAVE* (both augmented and non-augmented) is “partitive”.

This partitive nature is determined by one of the elements out of which *HAVE* is composed, viz. a reflexive element, represented throughout as *SE*. The presence of this element is responsible for the “anaphorization” requirement imposed on *HAVE*'s complement.

b. The complement of *HAVE* may be DP or TP.

A DP complement correlates with intrinsic possession. A TP complement correlates with contingent possession or happenstance. Moreover, TP complements are a kind of Small Clause, inasmuch as they are not headed by  $C^\circ$ , and hence do not allow morphological Tense. We examine the full range of possibilities for the complement structure of abstract TNS.

c. Augmented *HAVE* is the result of incorporating a dynamic P.

In English, the dynamic P is *to*. Lack of such an augment in Dutch and French accounts for the unavailability of the interpretations involving augmented *HAVE*.<sup>1</sup>

### 2. Non-dynamic possessive structures.

#### 2.1. Inherent and non-inherent possession

All *HAVE*-languages appear to feature two distinct types of stative possessive structures: alienable and inalienable. Simple alienable possessive structures are restricted to animate subjects (Belvin 1993), yielding the

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<sup>1</sup> The incorporation of this augment is not responsible for the creation of *HAVE* as a form, as one might think on the basis of Kayne's proposal. Rather, the form of *HAVE* is unaffected by this incorporation, just like the form of *GIVE* is unaffected under the incorporation of the same augment in double object constructions. However, we do not deny that the form *HAVE* may result from an incorporation of an oblique element into *BE* (which we take to be our *SE*, following Postma 1993). This oblique element is not the dynamic *to*, but rather a stative preposition.

contrast between (2a) and (2b):

- (1) a. the table has four legs  
b. John has a big nose  
(2) a. \*the table has a lamp  
b. John has \$5

This animacy effect disappears in the case of co-occurring possessives (3c), which we propose to analyze as small clauses:

- (3) a. the table has a lamp on it  
b. John has \$5 on him

To preview, we analyze the complement of *HAVE* in (3) as a Small Clause (specifically, as a Small Clause with a Tense). We argue that the well-formedness of (2b) (and the motivated) availability of animate pro.

The patterning of the inalienable possessor structure in (3) shows that, in certain environments, there is an animacy effect. This effect, more or less in the terms of Belvin (1993), is that inalienable possession is inherently internal, but that inalienable possession is external and so must be “internalized” via an animate element contained in the complement of *HAVE*, as in (3). Granting this, two questions arise:

- a. What is the source of the “internality” requirement in (2b)?  
b. In the absence of an overt anaphoric relation, as in (2b), how is the “internality” requirement satisfied?

In order to answer the first question we follow Belvin (1992) and others by assuming that *HAVE* results from the incorporation of an oblique element into *BE*. We also follow Postma (1993) in assuming that *BE* is a *SE*-morpheme.<sup>2</sup> We therefore assume the following structure and derivation:

- (4) DP<sub>i</sub> <nom> SE XP P

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<sup>2</sup> As is clear from the structure in (4), we slightly differ from Postma's proposal, the Dative phrase originates internal to the complement position it external to this complement.



SE+P=HAVE

Relevant to us is the *SE*-part in *HAVE*: its anaphoric nature gives an immediate account of the partitive relationship that exists between the subject of *HAVE* and its complement, as it would for the same partitive relationship that holds for *BE*-constructions (*John is ill* means that *being ill* is among John's properties, just as *John has a big nose* means that the nose is a part of John). The difference between *HAVE* and *BE* resides in the availability of accusative Case in *HAVE* constructions, which requires a Case-dependent DP in the complement. Hoekstra (1993) argues that *HAVE* inherits its Case-licensing potential from the incorporated P.

This analysis of *SE* is fairly close to Kayne's (class lectures) analysis of a simple reflexive *SE*-construction such as *Jean se voit* 'John SELF-sees', as in (5):

(5) Jean<sub>i</sub> SE<sub>j</sub> voit<sub>k</sub> [VP PRO<sub>j</sub> t<sub>k</sub> t<sub>i</sub>] i=j

where *Jean* is moved from the object position, *SE* is base-generated in some functional head-position. The external argument is *PRO*. *SE* is linked to *PRO* for the same reason as in (6), i.e. in order to be licit vis-à-vis the principle of Full Interpretation (FI). The *i=j* identity comes about through the manner of head-spec agreement in a way which need not concern us at this point.

The *SE*-component of *HAVE*-sentences can be thought of as a partitive operator: it is bound by the subject, but in order to have an interpretation, it must bind a variable in its scope, as required by FI. This analysis thus automatically yields the "internality" requirement, as is clear from (6), where *SE* must bind a pronoun inside XP.

(6) DP<sub>i</sub> P+SE<sub>i</sub> [XP --- pro<sub>i</sub> ---]

The operator status of *SE* is confirmed by examples such as (7), where it binds two pronominal variables at the same time:

(7) a. John has his hands on his back  
b. John has his money in his pocket

We now turn to the question b., viz. how the "internality" requirement is satisfied. The first step is to recognize that, in principle, a pronominal variable may arise in a number of different ways. The second step is to distinguish simple DP complements from Small Clause complements, each

associated with a distinct interpretive effect:

(8) a. HAVE DP perm  
b. HAVE [SC DP PRED] happ

In (8a), we are dealing with inalienable possession, which is satisfied by an argument of the noun heading the NP. Only relational nouns occur in this position. The position in the NP represents the inherent possessor.

(9) John P+SE<sub>i</sub> [DP \_\_\_ a [NP

A body part such as *nose* is a relational noun:<sup>3</sup> in the sense of Williams (1981), there is an experiential argument by *pro<sub>i</sub>* in (9), which acts as a variable bound by *SE*. At this point with the precise internal structure of the NP may be entirely identical to (5), if the experiential argument [Spec,DP], i.e. to the position of *John* in *John's nose* of (9) hence is as in (10). We return to the relevance of the moved Experiencer *pro<sub>i</sub>* now has the status of a PRO (1991) in the assumption that *PRO* is a locally licit in the given configuration because of the ab

<sup>3</sup> The property of being a relational noun is nevertheless syntactically represented. Obviously, a noun is relational, e.g. *fold* or *part*. Others vacillate. A clear distinction can be used relationally, or, when in opposition to *adjective*, in cases where the cases are more subtle. *Running water* is non-relational in hotel rooms, where it is depicted as clearly relational in hotel rooms, where it is depicted as clearly relational. Hence, it is possible to say *This room has running water*. Yet a further example is the concept in contexts where dogs, on a par with game animals, context-dependency does not take away the distinction. Consider the examples in (i):

(i) a. Sandy has a child  
b. Sandy has a child on her/his lap

While *child* in (ia) is necessarily relational (i.e. there is a child on her/his lap), this is not required in (ib), where the child may or may not be on her/his lap. An example of the relevance of context is given in (ii):

(ii) a. \*This table has a lamp  
b. This table has no lamp

Clearly, (iib) is used in a context in which having a lamp is not expected of tables: hence, in the given context *lamp* has become ungrammatical only under the context in which it is expected case.

parallel to the conditions in infinitival clauses.

- (10) John P+SE<sub>i</sub> [DP PRO<sub>i</sub> a [NP pro nose t<sub>j</sub> ]  
<1,2>

Turning now to the Small Clause structure in (8b): it involves a predication, and hence denotes an eventuality, i.e. a state of affairs which is temporally limited. We represent such small clauses not just as projections of lexical categories, but claim that they contain independent functional superstructure, in particular an abstract tense-position (Déchaine 1993). It should be noted that the happenstance or contingent character of these clausal complements is independent of the nature of possession. This is evident from the examples in (7), where (7a) involves two inherently possessed body parts and (7b) involves two non-inherently possessed entities, but in either case the happenstance interpretation arises. Specifically, in (7a), the particular relationship between John's hands and John's back is not inherent, but temporally limited. If it were not, then it would denote a state of affairs where John always has his hands on his back.

We now have established how the “internality” requirement is satisfied in cases of inherent possession (via a PRO experiencer), and SC complements (via overt pronouns). Yet to be accounted for is (2b), an instance of non-inherent (contingent) possession, but without an overt pronoun. We now turn to this problem.

## 2.2. The animacy effect

The ill-formedness of (2a) is predicted by our analysis: *lamp* is not a relational noun (cf. note 3). Hence, it does not provide a pronominal variable for *SE* to bind, and the structure is ruled out by FI on account of *SE* having no interpretation.

What is surprising is the well-formedness of (2b): *dollar* is not a relational noun, and does not provide a pronominal variable for *SE* to bind, leaving *SE* without an appropriate interpretation, violating Full Interpretation. We conclude that something else must be at play in the licensing of (2b). Observe that this is an instance of contingent possession. On independent grounds, we have proposed that contingent possession is to be represented as TP-complementation. These considerations lead us to postulate the structure in (11), with a pronominal variable contained in the complement of T.

- (11) John P+SE<sub>i</sub> [TP \$5<sub>j</sub> T [SC t<sub>j</sub> ... pro<sub>i</sub>]]

Simply introducing an empty pronominal is not sufficient to capture the contrast between (2a) and (2b). We must also ensure that this empty pronominal does NOT get introduced in (2a). Belvin (1993) notes that such cases of what he calls “external possession” are limited to animate subjects. Note that an animacy contrast is found elsewhere, as evidenced in (12)-(13):

- (12) a. There is a hat on the table/\*John

- b. John has a hat on (him)

- c. The table has a lamp on \*(it)

- (13) a. Ik zet een hoed op de tafel/\*Jan  
I put a hat on the table/John  
b. Ik zet Jan/\*de tafel een hoed op  
I put John/the table a hat on

These examples show that animates in certain environments are not allowed in certain kinds of environment relevant for these structures. In (12), the complement of P. Instead, we find an empty pronoun *pro* in the complement of P. *hat on*. This option is excluded in the case of inanimate subjects: *table has a lamp on*. Let us stipulate, therefore, that *pro* is not allowed in the complement of P in the system, in (13b) bound by the dative DP *John*. Going one step further, we now identify the *pro* in (12) as this animate *pro*, thus reducing the contrast in (2). However, there remains a difference: in (12) and (13b), *pro* is in the complement of an overt P, but in (11)/(2b), *pro* is in the complement of a preposition. We propose that the relevant P in (11) is the preposition *on* (cf. Hale (1986)). This preposition is distinct from the preposition *with* in English. It is close to the meaning of *with* as in *John has \$5 with him*, and *on* as in *John has \$5 on him*, but nevertheless distinct. We take it to be the hyperonym of *with* and *on*.<sup>4</sup>

The animacy requirement manifests itself in a contrast between (12) and (13) in the following contrast:

- (14) a. John has his/the window open  
b. The house has its/\*the window open

The choice of *his/its* is unproblematic: the pronoun *pro* is not allowed in [Spec,DP] if it is headed by *the*.

<sup>4</sup> The existence of an animate *pro* can easily account for the contrast between (12) and (13). The range of phenomena across various languages, e.g. English, Dutch, and German, is wide. We do not have the space to elaborate on this point. However, we note that the contrast in (12) and (13) with respect to a) the range of prepositions allowing animate subjects in the complement (cf. *John saw a snake near him/\*pro*), and b) the range of prepositions allowing inanimate subjects in the complement (cf. *John had a coat on the table/\*pro/it*). We leave these matters for further research.

<sup>5</sup> This assumption is compatible with the fact that inherent possession never features a definite determiner: *John has the nose*, *\*the house has the (beautiful) window*. The nature of the contrast in Romance may be different (cf. Vergnaud & Zubizarreta 1993). English does feature this use of the definite determiner: *John has the nose*. English does feature this use of the definite determiner in the complement of the preposition *on*: *I hit John on the nose*. We have no insight into the nature of this contrast.

(14b) with *the*, but raises the question why (14a) is grammatical with *the*. It can't be the DP *the window* which is satisfying *SE*'s requirement since *the* prevents there being a bindable PRO in [Spec,DP], so this implies that there must be another available bindable site. This would be the case if the structure of (14a) were as in (15):

(15) HAVE [<sub>TP</sub> [the window]<sub>i</sub> T [<sub>PP</sub> [<sub>AP</sub>  $\bar{t}_i$  open] Pe pro<sub>j</sub>]]

where pro<sub>j</sub> provides the required pronominal variable, and at the same time accounts for the animacy effect.

The structure in (15) presents a structural option not yet considered, viz. one in which the subject of the small clause is not occupied by DP, but by a clausal constituent, in this instance an AP-small clause. We shall consider these more complex structures below (section 3.3).

### 3. Dynamic HAVE

In this section we turn to a use of *HAVE* which is limited to English, and which we have dubbed dynamic *HAVE*, in contradistinction to the *HAVE*-structures discussed so far, which are all stative. Dynamic *HAVE* structures occur in a number of types. They all involve non-inherent (contingent) relationships, and so by hypothesis are to be analyzed as (abstract) TPs.

#### 3.1. Light verb HAVE

Let us start with the simplest case, viz. light verb *HAVE*-constructions:

- (16) a. Mary had a baby  
       i) but she doesn't anymore (stative)  
       ii) Mary is having a baby (eventive)  
   b. Mary had a cup of tea  
       i) but she used it all up (stative)  
       ii) Mary is having a cup of tea (eventive)  
   c. Mary had a shower  
       i) but now she has a bathtub (stative)  
       ii) Mary is having a shower (eventive)

These sentences are ambiguous between a stative and a non-stative (eventive) reading. Under the stative reading, the only one available for their Dutch and French counterparts,<sup>6</sup> they assert that Mary was in the

<sup>6</sup> In the perfect tense, Dutch and French also allow such inchoative interpretations, as in (i) and (ii).

- (i) a. Marie heeft een baby gehad  
       Marie has a baby had "Mary has delivered a baby"  
   b. Van wie heb je dat gehad?"

possession of an object, be it a baby, a cup or a bathtub. This stativity is confirmed by the possibility of continuing the sentence in the past, as in (ii). On the eventive reading, the examples in (16) show that Mary is involved in the activity of "tea-drinking" and "showering". Their eventivity is confirmed by their compatibility with the progressive, as in (ii).

The systematic ambiguity of light verb *HAVE* constructions and their eventive interpretation is also seen from tense effects. Light verb *HAVE* is used in the simple present only in a quantificational environment, as in (17). The use of adverbs of quantification such as *often* and *usually* with light verb *HAVE* has the interpretive properties of adverbs of quantification, as shown in (17a) and (17b). In the absence of a quantifier, canonical eventives are interpreted generically (e.g. *Mary likes chocolate*), while statives are interpreted as holding (e.g. *Mary likes chocolate*). When light verb *HAVE* is used with a quantifier, it is ambiguous: on the eventive construal, as in (17a), *shows*, and on the stative construal it is akin to (17b).

- (17) a. Mary often has a shower in the morning  
       b. When Mary has a shower, she usually has a cup of tea  
       c. Mary has a shower

It is not the tense effects themselves which determine the dynamic meaning available for *HAVE*. Rather, it is the dynamic meaning of *HAVE* being dynamic that yields these tense effects. The dynamic meaning of *HAVE* follows from the dynamism of the predicate. The availability of these dynamic readings in English is also explained by the potential contributions of the semantics of tense and adverbs of quantification in (17a/b) would contribute to the dynamic meaning of *HAVE* (but cf. note 5). The eventive nature of light verb *HAVE*-sentences also explains the range of interpretations available for these structures. An eventive interpretation is available for these structures because they can be associated with a plausible activity. As an activity is easily conceivable, so that in (2a) *John has a baby* can have a (possessive) interpretation. But "babying", "tea-

- 
- Of whom have you that had "From whom did you get that book?"  
 (ii) a. Marie a eu un bébé =(ia)  
       b. Il a eu un livre de sa mère  
       He has had a book of his mother  
       "He has got a book from his mother"

These constructions are qualitatively different from those discussed so far. They are limited to perfect tense, and are also less flexible in their choice of object. The inchoative reading derives from the eventive interpretation of the participle.

are more easily construed as activities, hence the possibility of an eventive interpretation in (16).

We are left with two related questions:

- a. What is the structure of eventive light verb constructions?
- b. What is the source of their eventiveness/dynamism?

As a first step in providing an answer to these questions, note the dynamic character of (18):

(18) John had himself a cup of tea

Observe also that even without the overt presence of *himself* the sentence has a reflexive interpretation. This reflexivity is obligatory, as evidenced by the ill-formedness of (19a). In this respect, the *have*-construction contrasts with *get*, which may be, but need not be, reflexive, as shown in (19b). Consistent with this difference, in the absence of an overt reflexive, the *get*-construction is not necessarily reflexive in its interpretation, as in (19c).

- (19) a. \*John had Mary a cup of tea  
 b. John got Mary/himself a cup of tea  
 c. John got a cup of tea

The basic ingredient of our *HAVE*-analysis is that there must be an anaphoric link between the subject of *HAVE* and an A-position contained in the complement of *HAVE*. Hence, both (16) and (18) must contain a bindable site. As a first approximation, the structure of (18) is as in (20):

(20) HAVE (=P+SE<sub>i</sub>) [TP \_\_\_ T [XP [DP a cup of tea] ... pro<sub>i</sub> ... ]]

Let us run through the arguments for this partial representation. First, the relationship between *John* and *a cup of tea* is not inherent. Hence, the complement of *HAVE* must be TP. Second, there must be a pronominal element to satisfy *HAVE*'s binding requirement. This element is *himself* in (18).<sup>7</sup> We assume that *himself* is generated in the complement of *to* in the predicate position internal to XP. From there it is moved to [Spec,TP] in the manner argued for by den Dikken (1992) for double object constructions. He argues that this is an instance of locative preposing, i.e. predicate preposing by which the DP *a cup of tea*, its subject, receives case. After movement of *to himself* to [Spec,TP] *to* is in a position from where it may be incorporated into *HAVE*. At LF, *himself* is further moved to [Spec,AGROP]. This gives (21a) as the ultimate underlying structure, with its derivation (21b):

(21) a. HAVE [TP --- T [pp [DP a cup of tea] to himself]]

<sup>7</sup> Recall that we assume that there are only pronouns, as per Kayne (1991). Hence, *himself* is a pronoun, anaphorized through the addition of the *self*-morpheme, cf. Pica (1987). This anaphorization imposes a more local binding requirement.

- b. HAVE+to<sub>i</sub> [TP [t<sub>i</sub> himself]<sub>j</sub>] T [pp [DP

We note on the side that given the choice of *himself* is the only option, as otherwise *himself* locally bound, *a cup of tea* being a local access. had a pronoun (*him*) been chosen, such movement would be precluded in order to avoid a principle B violation. A pronoun and a reflexive pronoun is thus as

complement position of *nose* in (9) and PRO in (10). Having identified the structure associated with *li*, we consider the source of its eventiveness. We propose that *li* is responsible for the dynamic nature of *HAVE* in Dutch and French do not have a dynamic *HAVE* construction that there is no candidate preposition which could be incorporated via incorporation. To be sure, the Dutch preposition *aan* is not dynamic, as is the French preposition *à*. An observable: *A train to London* or *This train is going to London* hence dynamic, whereas *Un train à Paris* or *Le train à Paris* is a stative reading.<sup>9</sup> The difference between *aan/à* and

<sup>8</sup> Zribi-Hertz (p.c.) points out the existence of a complement of *HAVE*, as in (i), which differs in meaning from (ii):

- (i) John had the room to him\*(self)/ \*Mary  
 (ii) John had him\*(self)/ \*Mary a room

Does (i), with a 'stative' *to*, underly 'dynamic' *to*? This is in line with Kayne's assumption that only pronouns exist, and that *to* is an indication of local binding. Underlying (ii), then, is (iii), rather (iii), parallel to (iv):

- (iii) John had a room to him  
 (iv) John had \$5 on him(\*self)

The problem with (i), therefore, is why the pronoun *him* is possible. The assumption is that an invisible local antecedent is present in the complement of *to*.

(vi) John<sub>i</sub> had [<sub>SC</sub> the room [<sub>XP</sub> e<sub>i</sub> ... to himself]<sub>j</sub>]  
 We are thus led to ask what the nature of XP is. The proposal to make, but the idea would be that the structure prohibits incorporation of *to* in this case. The semantics of *to* is comparable to that of other restrictive predicates, such as *only*.

<sup>9</sup> There is a clearly directional preposition *vers* in French. These prepositions appear to have properties from the other prepositions mentioned (*te* in Dutch, *naar* in Dutch cannot incorporate into the verb). The condition from the complement of P is normally possible. The condition that the stranded P be (almost) adjacent to the verb is not.

*beslissing is aan Jan, La décision est à Jean*, where apparently a stative preposition is used. English must stativize *to* in this case, by adding *up*, as in *The decision is \*(up) to John*.

### 3.2. Causative HAVE

In addition to the light verb dynamic *HAVE* discussed in the previous section, English *HAVE* has a further dynamic use, which is also absent in Dutch and French, viz. so-called causative *HAVE* (cf. Ritter & Rosen 1991), illustrated in (22).

- (22) a. John had me dance with Sandy  
b. John had Bill kissed by the Mafia

Again applying the logic developed so far, we are led to postulate the structure in (23):

- (23) HAVE [TP .... T [SC [IP ....V...] [p to] pro]]

The reasoning goes as follows:

- Causative *HAVE* is contingent. By hypothesis, this means that its complement is TP.
- The *SE* component of *HAVE* requires the presence of a pronominal variable, which must be contained in a prepositional predicate
- The prepositional predicate must be headed by *to*, the incorporation of

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extraction is not possible in the case of *naar*: it requires that the adverb *toe* is added, cf. (iic):

- (i) a. Ik ben op het dak geklommen  
I am on the roof climbed "I have climbed on the roof"  
b. Het dak waar ik op geklommen ben  
The roof where I on climbed am  
(ii) a. Ik ben naar school gelopen  
I am to school walked "I have walked to school"  
b. De school waar ik naar \*(toe) gelopen ben  
The school where I NAAR to walked am

Secondly, while locational prepositions allow for the formation of "postpositional" constructions, as in (iiib), this is excluded with *naar*:

- (iii) a. dat ik in de tuin wandel                      b. dat ik de tuin in wandel  
that I in the garden walk                      that I the garden in walk  
(iv) a. dat ik naar de winkel wandel              b. \*dat ik de winkel naar wandel  
that I NAAR the shop walk              that I the shop NAAR walk

This might be taken to constitute independent evidence for the impossibility to incorporate this directional preposition. A parallel fact concerning French *vers* is that whereas various prepositions in various dialects allow for some form of stranding (e.g. *dedans* "inside", *dessus* "on top", as well as *J'ai voté pour* "I voted in favor \_\_\_"), cf. Zribi-Hertz (1984), no such stranding is ever allowed by *vers*.

which is responsible for the dynamic character. Recall that with light verb *HAVE* it is possible relation overtly, by means of a reflexive, as in (20). This is also possible with causative *HAVE*:

- (24)a. \*John had+to<sub>i</sub> [TP [t<sub>i</sub> himself]<sub>j</sub> T [SC [IP ...]]]  
b. \*John had+to<sub>i</sub> [TP [t<sub>i</sub> himself]<sub>j</sub> T [SC [IPB ...]]]

An obvious difference between light verb *HAVE* and dynamic *HAVE* is in the nature of the lower Small Clause-subject: in (24a) it is a DP, but in (23) it is an IP. This points to a Case contrast. In (18), given the structure in (21), *himself* allows the DP subject of the SC to share Case with *to* (following den Dikken 1992). However, in (24), *himself* is itself the subject of the SC, but rather it is the subject of the TP. Therefore, this DP must itself move to [Spec,TP] in order to get Case. If locative preposing is possible with Spec's, a Case violation would result. (As before, to apply, the reflexive does not have an appropriate licit pronominal is animate pro.)

If this account of the ill-formedness of (24) is correct, it does not involve *to* incorporation after movement to [Spec,TP]. But this leaves the following question: how then can *to* raise to *HAVE* in order to enter the Spec of *HAVE*. This leaves [Spec,TP] as a landing site for *to*. Thus, *to*-incorporation is licensed in one of two ways: preposing as in (21) or via successive head movement. This is impossible if the subject of the SC is complex, i.e. if it is contained in a larger constituent.

This reasoning also accounts for why there are no examples of *\*John had me dance with Mary nasty*, with a structure like (25):

- (25) HAVE [TP --- T [SC [IP DP ...] AP]]

Predicate preposing is inapplicable in this instance because the DP is embedded in the subject of SC. This DP must move to [Spec,TP] in order to be able to reach the available [Spec,TP] position. If that A is not able to move to T, the option of head movement is available either. The assumption that P may, but cannot, move independently justified by i) the absence of tensed V in the SC, ii) the presence of prepositional elements in T and in the SC. In any way, we account for the unavailability of AP-preposing in (25) of (abstract) T in happenstance constructions with a subject more complex than a DP.

In addition to having bare infinitives as causative complements, we also find participial complements as in (26):

(26) John had Bill examined

The structure of these constructions is essentially that of (23). If participial phrases are a kind of IP, the absence of a reflexive (*\*John had himself Bill examined*) is accounted for in the same way: *Bill* has to be able to move to [Spec,TP] to be Case-licensed, and this is incompatible with locative preposing (which is the ultimate source of the reflexive).

At this point, one might ask how (26) differs from a perfect construction, such as (27):

(27) John had examined Bill

(27) does not involve dynamic HAVE. Under our assumptions, this means that there is no *to* incorporation. (27) does involve a TP-complement, but in this case, the TP is the participial structure itself. The structure of (27) is as in (29), while that of (26) is as in (28):

(28) HAVE [TP ... T [SC [TP ... T-en [VP pro V Bill]] to pro]]

(29) HAVE [TP ... T -en [VP pro V Bill]]

In (28), the preposition *to* incorporates into HAVE, yielding causative HAVE (i.e. dynamic HAVE with an event denoting complement). The (covert) pronominal complement of *to* satisfies the binding requirement imposed by SE, accounting for the “reflexive beneficiary” interpretation. The pronominal external argument of V is not bound by SE, but remains free. The object *Bill* raises to the inner [Spec,TP], as is usual in passives, and further raises to the dominating [Spec,TP] at LF in order to be able to reach [Spec,AGR<sub>OP</sub>]. (The same LF movement was posited in connection with (25).

The much simpler construction in (29) instantiates a real T, i.e. a past, which is interpreted as a secondary tense (i.e. Aspect), situating the time of the event denoted by the VP in the past relative to the temporal anchoring point of the tense of HAVE (cf. Guéron & Hoekstra 1994). V (or its participial form) raises to T. The binding requirement imposed by SE is now satisfied through the external argument pro. As in the case of inherent possession (cf. (10)), the argument pronominal bound by SE is moved to the position of [Spec,TP], i.e. to a PRO-compatible position. The object *Bill* is moved to the matrix [Spec,AGR<sub>OP</sub>], to satisfy the case provided by HAVE. This movement is postponed until LF.

Consistent with our analysis, the interpretations of the structures in (28)-(29) are distinct. (28) has a causative interpretation, with the external argument not bound by SE (and hence not bound by the matrix subject). SE's binding requirement is satisfied via the pro in the complement of the P head *to*, which is itself incorporated into HAVE. (29), on the other hand, is a simple control structure: the external argument of the embedded verb is

bound by SE, and hence bound by the matrix subject.

### 3.3. Experiential HAVE

In this section we turn to the experiential HAVE-

(30) John had a bee sting him on the nose

We analyze it as an instance of non-dynamic HAVE. (30) is an instance of complex happenstance construction. In such constructions the binding requirement of SE is satisfied by a pronominal element, *him* in this example. Belvin (1994) shows that experiential constructions are subject to anaphoric binding requirement in the same way as other cases of complex constructions. The presence of this internal anaphoric link, forced by SE, obviates the need to appeal to any other site for a binding site. The structure of such examples is therefore (31):

(31) John<sub>i</sub> HAVE [TP ... T [VP a bee sting pro<sub>i</sub>]]

with movement of *sting* to T and *a bee* to [Spec,TP]. In HAVE-constructions favor animate subjects and animate subjects are able of experiencing events as Belvin (1994) shows. In experiential HAVE prefers animate subjects and animate predicates, inanimate subjects are not totally acceptable. In examples such as *This castle had many visitors pass through* or *John's house always had a lamp on it*, inanimate non-verbal happenstances (*John's house always had a lamp on it*), animates and inanimates are able to be in a certain state.

A further observation provides a strong corroboration of the assumptions we have made. None of the happenstance constructions has an overt reflexive subject of the clausal complement. (32). There is one exception to this general rule, which is (32):

- (32) a. \*John had himself sick  
b. \*John had himself in the hospital  
c. \*John had himself sit on a bee's nest  
d. John had only himself to look after

The problem is similar to that posed by *with*-absorption. The same restriction against reflexive subjects with the matrix subject.

- (33) a. \*with (only) himself ill, John .  
b. \*with (only) himself in the hospital  
c. with only himself to look after

The limitation of *himself* in *with*-constructions with animate predicates suggests a possible venue for the explanation. The external predicate itself contains a gap, bound by an empty subject. This gap is strongly bound by *himself*. The relevant structure

(34) [with [<sub>SC</sub> [only himself]<sub>i</sub> [<sub>CP</sub> O<sub>i</sub> [<sub>IP</sub> PRO<sub>i</sub> to look after t<sub>i</sub> ]]], John<sub>i</sub> ...

Suppose that these binding relations establish a (derived) chain, and that the binding requirement on *himself* may be satisfied within this chain, e.g. in the manner of reconstruction or a copy-analysis (cf. Chomsky 1993). For our purposes, we may take *only himself* to also be present at the position of t<sub>i</sub>, as a full copy which is not spelled out at PF, and that licensing of *himself* may be satisfied from this position. This licensing involves as per Chomsky (1992), *SELF* movement to INFL, as well as a suitable binder in the Spec of INFL. These requirements are met in the structure in (34), where INFL is present and PRO serves as a local binder.

In other contexts, a *himself* subject of the *with*-construction cannot be licensed under these assumptions: *SELF* movement must be to INFL, the only INFL available is external to the *with*- phrase. As *with*- phrases are adjuncts and hence islands for movement, *SELF* movement is blocked, and the reflexive is therefore illicit.

(35) \*[ with [<sub>SC</sub> [(only) himself] [<sub>AP/VP</sub> ... ]

This approach carries over to our happenstance structures in (32). By hypothesis, happenstance structures are TPs. The structure of (32) is as in (36):

(36) John HAVE [<sub>TP</sub> T [<sub>SC</sub> himself X]]

This T (INFL) provides the local attachment site for *SELF*-movement, thus preventing *SELF* from moving any further.<sup>10</sup> This then accounts for the island effect, parallel to the islandhood of *with*-constructions. A further condition on the licitness of *SELF* is the presence of a suitable binder in the local Spec. This condition is not fulfilled in the happenstance structures: [<sub>Spec,TP</sub>] serves as an intermediate landing site for the residue of *himself* on its way to [<sub>Spec,AGR<sub>OP</sub></sub>] at LF. Only (32d) is allowed, as here again reconstruction into the infinitival structure is possible as discussed.

Complements to causative *HAVE* do permit a reflexive, as shown in (37).

(37) John had himself dance with Mary

There is however a notable difference in the derivation of these structures. Compare (36) with (23), repeated here as (38), now with *himself* as the subject of IP:

<sup>10</sup> There is a potential problem with this account: we might expect that *himself* moves in its entirety to [<sub>Spec,AGR<sub>OP</sub></sub>], and that *SELF*-movement proceeds from the derived position, moving *SELF* to the matrix T, where a suitable antecedent is available. This would yield a grammatical outcome of these constructions. *SELF*-movement is restricted to the embedded T. Movement of *himself*, with subsequent *SELF*-movement, brings an anaphor outside of its local binding domain. The local binding domain is the embedded TP since TP contains an attachment site for *SELF* as well as an accessible SUBJECT.

(38) HAVE [<sub>TP</sub> .... T [<sub>SC</sub> [<sub>IP</sub> *himself* ....V...]

In (38), *SELF*-movement will attach *self* to T. How is the binding requirement satisfied in this structure? Recall that *SELF* undergoes successive head-movement, resulting in *SELF* moving to T. If the complement of *to*, which functions as the antecedent of PRO, is required by *HAVE*, moves to [<sub>Spec,TP</sub>], then PRO. The derived structure then is as in (39).

(39) HAVE+to<sub>i</sub> [<sub>TP</sub> PRO<sub>j</sub> T+self<sub>k</sub> [<sub>SC</sub> [<sub>IP</sub> ...]

One might ask whether the presence of PRO in [<sub>Spec,TP</sub>] blocks the Case-licensing of *him* (the residue of *SELF*-movement). In the case of (24), the Case needy DP is not a complement but is embedded in its subject. The crucial difference is that in (39) XP preposing, (39) involves head movement of *to* to make [<sub>Spec,TP</sub>] and the next higher Spec empty, thus allowing *him* to skip the occupied [<sub>Spec,TP</sub>].

The reflexive following *HAVE* in (18) is unproblematic. *tea* receives Case in the manner discussed above. *himself* is sitting in [<sub>Spec,TP</sub>], and hence the matrix T is the attachment site for *SELF*-movement.

#### 4. Conclusion

Our analysis of a large number of *HAVE*-constructions is based on the assumptions. Apart from the general assumptions, we have argued that many of *HAVE*'s constructions are explained if the hypothesis of *SE* is adopted.

It is the presence of a *SE*-component which is the crucial difference between the subject of *HAVE* and a position in the complement of *HAVE*:

(40) NP<sub>i</sub> P+SE<sub>i</sub> [<sub>XP</sub> pro<sub>i</sub> ]

The anaphorizing effects all follow from this single assumption. We postulate an animate pro, for which independent movement is possible. The second assumption we made is that inherent possession and contingent possession are represented by distinct categories. Inherent possession is represented by a DP complement, headed by a relational noun which is the argument that is ultimately licensed as a PRO in the matrix T.

(41) NP<sub>i</sub> P+SE<sub>i</sub> [<sub>DP</sub> PRO<sub>i</sub> ... ]

Contingent possession correlates with a Small Clause structure. A null Tense position. At this point, it is appropriate to consider the possibilities. If the Small Clause is headed by a relational noun, this yields an "external possessor" construction, which is restricted to animate subjects. The anaphorizing effects all follow from this single assumption.

from the presence of animate *pro*, complement to *Pe*:

(42)  $NP_i$  P+SE<sub>*i*</sub> [TP [T [SC DP [PP *Pe pro* ]]]]

Happence *HAVE* is associated with essentially the same structure, except the Small Clause (usually) contains an overt pronominal: (43a) *John had a bee sting him on the nose*, (43b) *The house has its windows open*, and (43c) *The table has a lamp on it*.

(43) a.  $NP_i$  P+SE<sub>*i*</sub> [TP [T [SC [VP ]]]]

b.  $NP_i$  P+SE<sub>*i*</sub> [TP [T [SC [AP ]]]]

c.  $NP_i$  P+SE<sub>*i*</sub> [TP [T [SC [PP ]]]]

The postulation of animate *pro* also captures the subtle contrasts in (14) that occur with happenstance *HAVE*, and which we analyze as instances where the prepositional Small Clause has in its subject/specifier position something other than a DP, as in (44). This corresponds to examples like *John has the window open*, possible only with animate subjects.

(44)  $NP_i$  P+SE<sub>*i*</sub> [TP [T [SC AP [PP *Pe pro* ]]]]

Yet another environment where *pro* satisfies the binding requirement imposed by the *SE*-component of *HAVE* is in the perfective, where the subject of the embedded VP is *pro* (e.g. *John had examined Bill*):

(45) HAVE [TP ... T -en [VP *pro V Bill* ]]

Taken together, (42), (43), (44) and (45) constitute non-augmented *HAVE*.

We furthermore presented an account of the differences in the use of *HAVE* between English on the one hand and Dutch and French on the other. The essential ingredient is the availability of a dynamic preposition in English, whose incorporation into *HAVE* yields augmented *HAVE*. *To*-incorporation arises either through locative preposing of the dative predicate, or through cyclic head-movement of *to*, each correlated with distinct syntactic effects. Locative preposing yields (eventive) light verb *HAVE*, whose bindable site may be a covert animate *pro* (46a), e.g. *John had a cup of tea*, or an overt reflexive (46b), e.g. *John had himself a cup of tea*.

(46) a.  $NP_i$  P+SE<sub>*i*</sub> [TP [T [SC DP [PP *to pro\_i* ]]]]

b.  $NP_i$  P+SE<sub>*i*</sub> [TP [T [SC DP [PP *to himself\_i* ]]]]

Finally, causative *HAVE* arises when the specifier/subject of the Small Clause headed by *to* is an IP (rather than a DP), as in (47). This accounts for not only bare-infinitive complements (*John had me dance with Sandy*), but also for participial complements (*John had Bill examined*).

(47)  $NP_i$  P+SE<sub>*i*</sub> [TP [T [SC IP [PP *to pro\_i* ]]]]

There is one use of *HAVE* which we have not considered in this paper, viz. the modal *HAVE*-construction. It occurs in all three languages, which suggests that it instantiates non-augmented *HAVE*:

(48) a. John has to do that

b. Jan heeft dat te doen

c. Jean a à faire cela

We shall not try to provide an account of this raise the hypothesis that *HAVE* in this case is which makes its status rather distinct from the the focus of our paper.

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