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6. Conclusion

On May 31st, 2011, the Commander of the War Colleges, General Bilgin Balanlı, was arrested after being accused of planning a coup d'état against the civil government of the country. With that decision, for the first time in the republic's history an on duty member of the TSK was arrested for such an act, even though the TSK had made five previous military interventions, two of which were *coups d'état*. Among the many reactions to this unaccustomed action, one figure was especially noteworthy concerning the dynamics of the historic hegemonic center; Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. As the new leader of the CHP, elected approximately one year ago and following a more social-democrat oriented policy, he asked the TSK to stay in their barracks and not to make any declarations or take action against this decision. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu justified his demands from the TSK by stating: any reaction from the TSK has the potential to create an image of victimization for the ruling AKP in the eyes of electorate, and therefore may cause an increase in the electoral support of the AKP in the June 12th general election that would be held less than two weeks later.⁴⁹¹

Analysis of Kılıçdaroğlu's advice to the TSK concerning the arrest of General Balanlı is explanatory from many aspects. First of all, it gives a better understanding of the poor democratic standard of Turkey and of the many legal barriers in the way of democratization. The leader of the main opposition party regards the army's inaction against the arrest of a high ranked commander not as the norm but as a strategy. Considering the inverse, one can question whether Kılıçdaroğlu would have asked the TSK to take action against the AKP if he had thought that it would cause a loss in the AKP's electoral support. The second aspect is that it illustrates the nature of the historic hegemonic center of Turkey as well as its democratic standards; Kılıçdaroğlu himself automatically assumes the TSK is an ally in his opposition to the AKP. Furthermore, the TSK's silence about Kılıçdaroğlu's advice is an indicator of the fact that the alliance between the CHP and the TSK is not one-way because the TSK could be expected to give an explanation and clarify its position – taking no action against the arrest of General Balanlı, not as a strategy but as a norm. Finally, this is not the first time that the poor democratic standards and historic hegemonic center are mentioned in

⁴⁹¹ “Kılıçdaroğlu'ndan TSK'ya: Kışlanızda Oturun, Bir Tepki Vermeyin,” Radikal, May 31, 2011, accessed June 14, 2011, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&VersionID=78841&Date=01.06.2011&ArticleID=1051214>. Whether it followed Kılıçdaroğlu's advice or not, TSK did not give any reaction to arrestment of General Balanlı. However, at the end AKP was again the winner of the June 12 general elections by taking %49.9 of the general vote.

the scope of this study, but analysis of Kılıçdaroğlu's advice to the TSK clearly reveals a change in hegemonic power; in Gramscian terms the traditional historic center loses its trenches one after another, and is forced to adopt a defensive position contrary to its earlier aggressive one. Furthermore, in Mardin's terms this also corresponds to a regression in center's power. The example of the regression of the historic hegemonic center's hegemony covered in this thesis was the government's response to the TSK's e-memorandum.

This singular fact – the court's decision of arresting of one of the highest ranked commanders of the TSK – is an indicator of the split in the historic hegemonic center, and it becomes clear that the alliance of the historic hegemonic center is now weaker than it has ever been before and may suffer a breakdown as a result of false strategy: Kılıçdaroğlu states that a part of the electorate, i.e. the urban middle class, will support the AKP more than usual against the TSK's undemocratic reaction to legal action. That means the historic hegemonic center would need more than improper discourse, fear mongering against bad Muslims, Iranization of Turkey, creeping Islamization, etc., to secure the urban middle classes' consent for its action against the AKP. As will be remembered, such a discourse was sufficient to secure the urban middle classes' consent in the February 28 Process.

A comparison of the February 28 and April 27 Processes' results helps to shed light on the weakening ties between the components of the historic hegemonic center. During the February 28 Process there was clear media support, not only as a part of capital, but also as a practitioner of ideological and moral leadership. It should also be noted that the ideological and moral leadership of the media was very effective on the urban middle class during the February 28 Process. Key evidence of the effect of the media's ideological and moral leadership in the urban middle class mobilization first occurred in the Susurluk Rallies and later in the 1999 general elections.

Besides economic and political interests, intellectual and moral unity was also required for hegemonic articulation. The role of intellectuals was critical in the formation and then mobilization of the historic hegemonic center. In the February 28 Process, the articulation of the RP to the historic center was in conformity with capitalists' economic interests. However, on the other hand, the RP was not a part of the intellectual and moral unity of the historic hegemonic center. As a result, contrary to their economic interests, capitalists continued their alliance with the historic hegemonic center and did not allow the RP to be a part of the center. In the end, they were amply rewarded for their compromises with privatizations and loans from public banks after the 1999 elections. However, in the end the February 28 Process was just a temporary solution for the hegemonic crises of Kemalist hegemony in Turkey. The

economical crises triggered by rewards given to capitalists and the political crises that followed were indicators of the fact that the February 28 Process could not cure the Kemalist hegemonic crises.

Ultimately, and after five years of continuous political and economic crisis, the February 28 Process culminated in the landslide victory of the new AKP. As a response, in the middle term capitalists and media were compelled to appease the AKP for the continuation of their economic interest. This necessity made the media and capitalists sacrifice their intellectual and moral unity, culture, way of life, and status, and therefore shifted their support to the AKP both before and after the 2002 general elections. Concerning Mardin's concepts, the AKP was still peripheral, but the center unwillingly accepted the AKP into its ranks for its own economic interests. However, in the long-term the characteristics that were sacrificed in the middle-term – or trench systems that were lost in the war of position in Gramscian terms – were still effective and therefore the support of some elements of the historic hegemonic center to the AKP were not long-lived. The election of an AKP member president was the last exit on the highway for the historic hegemonic center, and the direction of the highway was the elimination of the existing historic hegemonic center and the establishment of a new one. This fact was best portrayed by the shift in the media that supported the AKP before and after the 2002 elections but changed its attitude when the time came for the presidential election.

In the February 28 Process, conservatives embodied in the RP held onto only partial parliamentary support. However, a dominant group that aims to build hegemony has to have the ability to lead before it grasps governmental power. After the grasp of governmental power, if it continues to hold its ability to lead, then it may create its own hegemony. Defining the political sphere as an arena of hegemonic struggle between the Kemalists, i.e. historic bloc or center, and conservatives, i.e. subaltern groups or periphery, the only weapon the RP had in the February 28 Process was limited parliamentary power that meant neither leading capacity nor governmental power. However, in the April 27 Process, the AKP held the capacity to lead both before and after it grasped governmental power with its electoral and parliamentary support. With its capacity to lead, it was able to issue a counter memorandum to the TSK. However the critical move of AKP in the Process was not issuing a counter memorandum, but using its governmental power dependent upon parliamentary and electoral support. With the help of this governmental power, it was able to change the presidential election system and shift to election by popular vote instead of parliamentary vote. This change created a near guarantee for the election of a conservative president even in the worst scenario, which is in continuity with the AKP's inability to meet the 367 quorum after the 2007 general election. Due of this assured outcome, the MHP and the pro-Kurdish Peace and

Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, BDP), had no alternatives but to participate in the presidential election meeting of the parliament after the 2007 general elections. Comparing this situation to the February 28 Process, we see that due to a lack of leading capacity and governmental power the only counteraction of the RP against the February 28 MGK meeting was an attempt to bring parliament into play. This desperate action was eventually rejected even by the DYP, the governing partner of the RP. The different levels of leadership capacity and governmental power are best portrayed with the fact that media discourse in April 27 process was more positive compared to the February 28 Process. Aside from the limited amount of discursive practices in the April 27 Process, the practical results of these practices in terms of social practices was also limited.

Besides the story in political society, civil society was also different in the two Processes. The masses that were mobilized by the Susurluk Rallies in the February 28 Process were also on the streets during the April 27 Process. In both Processes, mobilized masses were given the illusion of defending their interests against the government, but in actuality they were defending the interests of the historic hegemonic center. In both processes masses were in streets, but the quality of their resistance was different. Compared to the higher degree of commitment in the Susurluk Rallies of the February 28 Process, the disagreement peaked between organizers and participants of the Republican Rallies during the April 27 Process. The same discourse was adopted by the media in two processes. In the February 28 Process, the discourse was so effective that the Susurluk rallies, which originally targeted corrupt intra-state relations – something not separate from the historic hegemonic center -- could be hijacked and used against the government to support military intervention. On the other hand, in the April 27 Process, the masses were again mobilized with the same discourse under the name of Republican Rallies. However, this time the pro-military intervention tone of the organizers of the rallies was rejected by the participants. This fact shows the declining strength of the historic hegemonic center.

The diversity of media available during the April 27 Process favored the increasing effectiveness of the conservatives. The shift in media, which is at the same time an indicator of peripheral actors moving to the center, resulted in a multifarious stance against the AKP. To begin with, *Cumhuriyet* experienced no change in newspaper's stance between the February 28 and April 27 Processes. However, the rest of the press was not that consistent. The ownership structure of *Sabah* was totally altered during the period between 2000 and 2005. As a result of the Ciner Group's attempts to increase its effectiveness in media, the group bought all the shares of *Sabah* from Dinç Bilgin, the former owner and close partner of the Doğan Group. However, this was not the only change in *Sabah*'s ownership, as the TMSF

confiscated the newspaper on April 2nd, 2007 – a few weeks before the e-memorandum – as payment of the Ciner Group’s debt to the state due to its bankruptcy. In the end, *Sabah*’s moderate discourse, compared to *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*, turned out to be more moderate still. This discursive stance or transformation to a more moderate discourse shows the decisiveness of economic factors on the formation of the historic hegemonic center. The old *Sabah* that allied with the regressing historic hegemonic center went bankrupt, while the new *Sabah* chose to ally with the emerging conservative hegemony and, as a result, its discourse changed noticeably. One year later, in 2008, *Sabah* was sold to the Çalık Group, which was a peripheral actor, by the TMSF. Additionally, *Akşam*’s ownership structure also changed. The newspaper, which was held by Erol Aksoy in the heyday of the February 28 Process, was sold to the Çukurova Group, a new actor in the media industry. Similarly, this change in the media ownership of *Akşam* can be traced through changes in its discourse between the February 28 and April 27 processes. Recently, in 2011, the Doğan Group decided to dispose *Milliyet* and signed a contract for the sale.

The reasoning behind the change of ownership of these newspapers, and the reflection of ownership to the newspaper discourse, are key to understanding and comparing the results of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Firstly, the former owners’ economic activity in sectors other than media is the chief reason for the ownership change. All of these economic activities were concentrated in state related economic sectors, especially in banking and privatization. For *Sabah* it was Dinç Bilgin’s banking investments, which were concentrated during and after the February 28 Process, that forced him to relinquish his newspaper to the Ciner Group. The TMSF confiscated ETİBANK, which was owned by Dinç Bilgin, because the bank used most of its loans for other companies of the group, a well known issue from the beginning onwards, which was condoned because of the newspapers support to the February 28 Process.⁴⁹² Under the rule of the Ciner Group, the newspapers’ discourse was more balanced and moderate during the April 27 Process compared to the February 28, as Dinç Bilgin’s economic and ideological commitment to the historic hegemonic center was far stronger compared to the Ciner Group. Bilgin’s position was already defined with his and his group’s close relations to the Doğan Group. On the other hand, the Ciner Group in general, and its media investments in particular, were more open to bargains and alliances in its quest to establish itself. This resulted in a balanced policy in the newspaper’s stance, and of course, balanced discursive practices against the AKP and conservatives. However, as mentioned before, this was not the last change in ownership of *Sabah*. Again in 2007, the newspaper was directly confiscated by the TMSF, and again ownership changed due to banking and

⁴⁹² For the story of Sabah group with a special focus to its economical activities rather than media sector see; Adaklı, G. Türkiye’de Medya Endüstrisi, p. 164-77.

privatization. The TMSF's confiscation occurred a few weeks before the e-memorandum and affected the discourse of the newspaper. In the end, the Çalık Group bought the newspaper from the TMSF, and subsequently the newspaper's discourse remained more government oriented in accordance with the Çalık Group's rise under the rule of the AKP.

The story of *Akşam* was also more or less similar to that of with *Sabah*. Erol Aksoy, the former owner of the paper during the February 28 Process, was a banking sector origin investor who concentrated his investments in media sector as he observed the advantageousness of holding media power while being involved in banking and privatization. However, in the end he was also forced to sell his media investments, which at its peak included SHOW TV, CINE5, *Akşam* and %25 of Aydın Doğan's *Hürriyet*, to the Çukurova Group. The sales could not stop Aksoy's fall, and the TMSF confiscated İktisat Bank, Aksoy's bank.⁴⁹³ The change of ownership had direct effects in newspaper discourse. As noted in the social practices section, the two only extreme examples of Islamic Revolution discourse in *Akşam*'s coverage during the April 27 Process were respectively produced as a reaction to two state institutions' decisions against the Çukurova Group's Turkcell and SHOW TV. That means the newspaper engaged in social practices during the whole April 27 Process. Its tone in two samples was one that called for reconciliation rather than showing hostility. In the discursive change of *Akşam*, the same dynamics were also in action as in the discursive change of *Sabah*. The Karamehmet Group, as the new owner of the newspaper, was more open to, and in need of, cooperating with the government, as can be seen in the Turkcell and SHOW TV examples, compared to the more established and committed Erol Aksoy. Aksoy's share in Aydın Doğan's *Hürriyet* is a good indicator of his already defined position in the historic hegemonic center. This openness to and dependency in the government was reflected in a more moderate stance in the newspaper's discourse, except in the cases mentioned above.

In the third case involving the sale of *Milliyet* by Aydın Doğan, the newspaper owner's investments in the state related sectors and finance were also at the center -- again a clear indicator of the media's relationship with the historic hegemonic center. An incident known as the Hilton Case helps to shed light on the Group's relations to the government. When Aydın Doğan bought the land under the old Hilton Hotel for 254 million dollars, this was seen as an unprofitable investment. However, observers of the media sector noted that Aydın Doğan's plan was to secure a change in construction plans of the related part of the city and create a huge profit for himself.⁴⁹⁴ Observers were right, and that was the way that the things

⁴⁹³ Topuz, H. (2003). *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basını*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, p. 334.

⁴⁹⁴ Tiliç, D. L. Utanıyorum Ama Gazeteciyim, p. 411.

operated for investments of large media conglomerates in Turkey. However, Aydın Doğan could not make his dreams of the Hilton Hotel come true, as the AKP controlled the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and refused to make any change in construction plans. What is more explanatory from the aspect of media discourse is that Turkish public opinion was informed about the full details of the Hilton Incident by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his 2007 election campaign. In many election meetings, Erdoğan told the electorate that Aydın Doğan requested an appointment from him in order to discuss the Hilton issue, which he always rejected. Erdoğan claimed that the Doğan Group's newspaper and television reports about the gradual Islamization of Turkey increased in number during the election period, as a result of his party's refusal of the Hilton plan.

The Hilton incident was not the only conflict between Aydın Doğan and the government. In the period between 2003 and 2010, different state institutions including the Capital Markets Board of Turkey and Ministry of Finance issued significant financial penalties against the Doğan Group.⁴⁹⁵ The discharge of Emin Çölaşan and Bekir Coşkun, the two most ardent Kemalist columnist of Doğan Newspapers, and then the Hürriyet's editor in chief Ertuğrul Özkök's leaving his post were regarded as Aydın Doğan's compromises with the government. Çölaşan, the first to be discharged, wrote a book titled "We have been expelled o my people, do not forget us!" "*Kovulduk Ey Halkım, Unutma Bizi*," and claimed that Doğan fired himself as a compromise to the government.⁴⁹⁶ The name of Çölaşan's book was further informative pertaining to the employment of secularism discourse by media for their economical interests, as he used an adaptation of the motto used by the *Cumhuriyet* when reporting about the Uğur Mumcu assassination in 1993, a widely used element of discourse about the violent character of bad Muslims: "We have been shot o my people, do not forget us!" "*Vurulduk Ey Halkim Unutma Bizi*." Çölaşan also utilized the same discourse as *Cumhuriyet* utilized against the conservatives. What is crucial in the change in the ownership structure of *Milliyet* is that, although the change in the ownership structure took place in 2011, which is long after the period the study covers, other newspapers whose ownership structures analyzed were not as powerful as the Doğan Group. Under the conditions that the Doğan Group partly achieved in order to sustain its position in the historic hegemonic center, the other relatively weak media institutions that needed cooperation with the government were unable to cover the cost of an ardent opposition of the AKP and conservatives. The Doğan Group, in the short term, supported the AKP before and after the 2002 elections in accordance with its economic

⁴⁹⁵ For detailed information about financial penalties against the Dogan Group see; "Maliye'den Doğan Holding'e Tek Kalemde 826 Milyon Ceza," *Star*, February 19, 2009, accessed June 14, 2011,

<http://www.stargazete.com/ekonomi/maliye-den-dogan-holding-e-tek-kalemde-826-milyon-ceza-170044.htm>;

"SPK'dan Doğan'a Para Cezası," *Samanyoluhaber*, March 04, 2010, accessed June 14, 2011,

http://finans.samanyoluhaber.com/h_398275_spkdan-dogana-para-cezasi.html.

⁴⁹⁶ See Çölaşan's book: Çölaşan, E. (2008). *Kovulduk Ey Halkım Unutma Bizi*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.

interests. Later, in the middle term, it used the discourse against the prospect of a president being elected from the ranks of the AKP because of its alliance with the historic hegemonic center. Now it tries to protect itself from the rage of the AKP by adopting a moderate discursive stance.

Addressing information about the change in the media ownership structures after the February 28 Process, it can be argued that (1) the media groups' relationship with the government have become effective in their ownership structures, (2) the change in ownership, which was related to the media groups' relationship with the government, has a direct effect on their discourse and finally (3) the diversification of media ownership, and as a result media discourse produced a low level of commitment by the urban middle class masses to the April 27 Process compared to the February 28, even though the media campaign and discourse was effective in mobilizing masses during the Susurluk and Republican Rallies.

In addition to the media's participation in the historic hegemonic center and its discourse as a function of intellectual and moral leadership, other elements of civil society should also be analyzed for a more accurate comparison of the results of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. At that point, re-emphasizing the theoretical framework will be more beneficial. As aforementioned in the theoretical framework chapter, Gramsci employs the concept of minimal hegemony and defines it as a condition of hegemony when the consent of subaltern classes to the hegemonic ones decline. According to Gramsci, once a historic bloc enters the phase of minimal hegemony, the only way of sustaining its leading role is to incorporate the elites of the subaltern classes. Considering the hegemonic crisis of the Turkish historic hegemonic center, one would expect the elites of the subaltern classes to be incorporated in order to increase its capacity of intellectual and moral leadership as happened in the post-1980 period, by the incorporation of conservatives into the historic hegemonic center against the so called leftist danger. However, as mentioned before, the historic hegemonic center during the February 28 crisis did not open its doors to the conservative elites and blocked peripheral actors' moving to the center, and instead tried to overcome the hegemonic crisis by totally removing conservative actors from the equation. In contrast, in 2000 the economic and social crises left no other alternative other than calling conservatives to action. Although the historic hegemonic center tried to put a stop to the incorporation of conservatives into the historic hegemonic center through the April 27 Process, by this time a balance had been reached in the power struggle between the subaltern and leading classes. The government's counter memorandum to the TSK's e-memorandum is the embodiment of the balance that was reached during the power struggle.

Furthermore, the role of the AKP supported/supporting media, bureaucracy, businessmen, and NGOs should not be ignored. For example, the majority of the members of the Constitutional Court that annulled the first round of the presidential election by legislating a 367 quorum, were Kemalist-oriented lawyer's but the head of the court, Haşim Kılıç, a conservative who was appointed by Turgut Özal (after the change in the law of Constitutional Court that enabled the appointment of non-jurist bureaucrats as Özal was unable to find any qualified and conservative jurist to appoint). Although they were not pro-AKP, other elements of civil society were not as committed to mobilization against the AKP as they were in the February 28 Process. Compared to the Susurluk Rallies of the February 28 Process, the number of NGOs that supported and attended Republican Rallies were limited. It was not possible to see a joint declaration by the capitalists of TÜSİAD, middle and low scale businessmen of TOBB and TESK, or labor unions such as TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK and KESK on the scale that participated during the February 28 Process. Therefore, the differentiation that is observed in media ownership and media discourse can also be seen in civil society.

While the minimal hegemony of the historic hegemonic center continued to diminish, conservatives started to build their “national popular” in the period including the April 27 Process. In other words, it can be said that the centralization of peripheral actors and the marginalization of central actors occurred simultaneously. Thanks to the February 28 experience, conservatives realized that they were unable to challenge the hegemony with their activities in political society that depended on their limited electoral support. Therefore, they began to examine various other ways to influence the sphere of civil society. At that point, using the Gramscian conceptualization is once again apt. As mentioned before, Gramscian theoretical subsets have a mutual and dependent relationship in the course of securing hegemony. On the one hand, conservative elites' and civil society's affinity increases as a result of the party's influence in the political society. On the other hand, increasing the influence of conservative elites, civil society and life styles – or alternative modernities in Göle's terms that were mentioned in the fourth chapter, supplies a base for the political society's activities in the second phase. This process also increases conservative credibility as well as status, and as a result the capacity of allying with other non-Kemalist actors. The counterpart of this trend in the media discourse is that, on the one hand, not all media institutions produce discourse like they did in the February 28 Process and, on the other hand, the discourse itself is not as credible as it was in the February 28 Process. For example, as a result of the discrediting and resultant ineffectiveness of the good vs. bad Muslims discourse, the real vs. fake secularists and the real vs. fake nationalists discourse was produced and circulated in the April 27 Process.

The search for a conservative national popular to replace the Kemalist hegemony or centralization of peripheral actors included a quest for increasing their influence in civil society, as well as building partnerships with existing civil society actors such as leftists, liberals and other social segments that were also unsatisfied with the Kemalist modernization, such as Alevis and Kurds. Although these attempts did not produce a result, the AKP's turning a hand to the Kurdish and Alevi problems can be regarded as an indicator of their intentions in civil society. At least at the discursive level, the AKP offers much, which was not offered by the RP, to other actors. In doing so the AKP offers a conservative hegemony against the hegemony and discourse of the historic hegemonic alliance.

The 2011 general election resulted in a landslide victory for the AKP. With almost fifty percent of the total vote, and debates on a new constitution during the election campaign seeming to be the hot button issue, these are all crucial indicators that verify the dissertation's concluding remarks on the trend that the conservative national popular has been replacing the regressive Kemalist hegemony. Another aspect worth mentioning in this context is the "new CHP," as defined by its recently elected leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. According to Kılıçdaroğlu and other supporters of the new CHP, the party's ties with the people weakened and the party itself became stuck in a narrow societal base that only included the highest income group, as the CHP has nothing but pillars of Kemalism to offer to the people.⁴⁹⁷ Therefore, the new CHP needs to broaden its horizons and open communication with different segments of society, which is nothing but simply turning its face towards the periphery. The new route of the CHP's conscious and intense effort to dismiss any discussion on secularism in the recent election process is thought provoking to say the least. Finally, discussions around the new constitution both indicate the regression of existing hegemony and the conservatives' chances of replacing existing hegemony with a conservative national popular, which is in other words replacing the central actors with the peripheral ones. In political society the new constitution will define new rules that will bind political actors. In civil society, considering the AKP's huge electoral support, a new constitution legislated with the initiative of all other political and social actors, but mostly the AKP, will mean a source of recognition, prestige, status and acquiescence; something necessary for transforming their leadership to a national popular and then to hegemony, for the AKP and conservatives. Whether the discussion on a new constitution will come to fruition or not, the quest itself is another indicator of the regression of the existing hegemony. From the perspective of this dissertation, in addition to the many examples given and the many analyses made above,

⁴⁹⁷ For a detailed account of the new CHP see Kılıçdaroğlu's interview: " 'CHP dine karşı' algısı değişecek" *Radikal*, March 4, 2012, accessed March 15, 2011, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetayV3&ArticleID=1080639&CategoryID=78>

another brief indicator of the regression of the existing hegemony is the decline in the discursive practices of newspapers, the transformation of media discourse, and the media discourse's loss of influence in the April 27 Process.

In conclusion, the questions that intended to be thought provoking from the aspect of the analyses of Turkish politics, with a historical perspective on hegemony and center-periphery, are the ones which focus on the conservatives' attempts to create a new national popular, as well as the historical and societal bases of the new potential conservative national popular. In light of the conclusions that have been drawn, an alternative reading of Turkish modernization from the eyes of the conservative masses can be beneficial in the analyses of hegemonic and center-periphery relations in Turkish society. Furthermore, this alternative reading of Turkish modernization will in turn become a basis for examining hegemony from the perspective of the subaltern groups that once gave consent to hegemony or the ones those asked to create consent to hegemony, and for examining the center from the perspective of the periphery.