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2. Theoretical Framework: Hegemony and Center-Periphery

2.1. Gramsci's Theory of Hegemony

There is a common tendency to treat great theories as perfect prescriptions which are applicable to every condition. However, the greatness of a theory or more generally of an intellectual concept, is not its ability to work in every condition, rather its ability to provide an intellectual basis for one of the possible specific explanations it pertains to. Furthermore, treating intellectual concepts in this fashion saves social scientists from being in a position in which quality controllers stigmatize intellectual concepts as good or bad. This in turn will assist social scientists, by increasing the number of possible theoretical frameworks which can be used for answering specific questions.

Such a treatment of great theories, by using them as not ultimate theories, leads to a decrease in the expectation of social scientists from the theory and an increase in the practicality and inspiration of the theory. To illustrate, analyzing the Marxist theory by this framework gives us the chance of using it for problems of the contemporary world. Originally, Marxist theory was a historical model which claimed to explain the world from a historical-economic perspective. Blaming Marxist theory as useless as a result of its determinism and failure of its foresights is one extreme, the other of which is trying to find class positions that are exclusively and exhaustively determined by the economy. However, it is not so difficult to find a moderate way to understand and use Marxist theory. Taking into account the conditions of the industrial revolution and its practice in England, is key to a moderate application of Marxist theory. Taking into consideration the extreme working conditions of the textile industry in England such as long work days, no means of work place security, and the non-existence of any kind of social security regulations can somewhat justify the relative extremeness of Marx's theory.

Throughout the twentieth century, social scientists from different disciplines have understood and used Marxist theory. Particular figures tried to eliminate particular shortcomings of the theory and also modified certain parts of the theory according to their intellectual positions. Among many scholars, Althusser tried to elaborate on the concept of ideology and false consciousness, whereas figures like Lukacs and Korsch introduced a more super-structural Marxist interpretation, and Gramsci is one of the few who tried to break the vicious cycle of economic determinism and class reductionism in Marxist theory.

As some scholars such as Mouffe and Laclau have mentioned, the Gramscian interpretation of Marxism, a philosophy of praxis in his own words, is still problematic in the spheres of economics and class reductionism. However, his openings in the sphere of the superstructure of the Marxist theory made it possible to use his explanations in various other disciplines of social sciences. His key concept of hegemony served as the basic tool for scholars from international relations to cultural studies and even from media studies to politics.

Roughly speaking, hegemony is a type of leadership, which is based on securing the consent of the subordinated through the intellectual and the moral leadership in the sphere of civil society. The conceptualization of hegemony is based on three binaries, namely (1) consent and coercion, (2) civil society and political society, and (3) organic and traditional intellectuals. Therefore an analysis of these binaries has a leading role in understanding the Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony. However, there is a basic methodological difficulty in this analysis. These three concepts and hegemony are so intertwined that it is nearly impossible to make a particular analysis for one of them without referring to the others. For example, it is impossible to talk about organic and traditional intellectuals without referring to hegemony, or vice versa. Yet, because I need a starting point to draw my theoretical framework, I will start with the analysis of binaries, although such an analysis has the potential danger of stabilizing and schematizing the theory. The way I can overcome this potential danger is by simply making frequent references to other sets of Gramscian concepts in every step of the explanation.

2.1.1. Consent and Coercion

The relationship between the ruler and the ruled has been one of the most discussed issues of social sciences. The questions of why the ruled people accept the domination of a ruler and what kinds of dynamics prevented them from rising against domination have been popular questions of political sociology. Generally speaking, we can categorize explanations in a range of one extreme at which there stands physical domination, to another that is based on psychological factors. However, the sphere of domination is a complicated issue and cannot be explained in simple terms. Furthermore, there is a common innate acceptance of the fact that people should naturally resist or try to resist domination, but they cannot do so as a result of the inexistence of certain motivations, conditions and means.

Political scientists do not bear in mind that ordinary people do not have as many problems with domination as they themselves do. There is a chance that people simply are not interested in resistance as a result of their attempts to build their own living, or simply are not capable of considering a different type of organization of society.²² That is the point Gramsci tried to elucidate with the concept of consent. His question was simple: he observed the conditions of both the agrarian population in the south of Italy and also the proletariat of the north. As a result of his observations, he concluded that the conditions and standards of subaltern people in Italy were so awful that they were on the edge of starting a revolution, as Marx suggested. However, during his political activism and prison years, he unfortunately observed the rise of the fascist movement with the support of the agrarian and working population, which was originally expected to support the revolution according to the suggestions of Marx. Unfortunately, the facts were not fitting the theory. It is at this junction that Gramsci chose to change or modify his theory instead of manipulating the facts as many in his position often do.

There was a consent-based relationship between the ruled and the ruling classes in Gramsci's Italy, and this specific kind of relationship was the real reason for the subaltern people's support of the fascist regime instead of a revolution. Although the fascist regime of Italy used coercion as a means of domination from time to time, it was impossible to lead the whole nation, which consisted of different and conflicting interest groups, only by coercion. However, the two, of course, are related and are parts of a division of labor in the rule of society. At this point, before focusing on the relationships and positions of the two in the rule of society, it is more practical to elaborate on these concepts. Gramsci defines consent and coercion as "the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government" which consist of "the "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; that is, consent is "historically" caused by prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production," and "the apparatus of state coercive power which "legally" enforces discipline on those groups who do not "consent" either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of the moments of crisis of commands and direction when spontaneous consent has failed."²³ It is very clear from this definition that consent and coercion are two *sine qua non* components of hegemony and political government. The routine is the consenting of the subaltern classes to the historically prestigious dominant fundamental group. However, the existence of ordinary and mundane consent does not exclude the potential for

²² Strinati, D. (1996). *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture*. London and New York: Routledge, p.174.

²³ Gramsci, A. (2005). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, p.12.

coercion or need for coercion, because consent may cease to exist as a result of moments of crisis.

One potential and frequent failure in the analysis of relationships of consent and coercion is considering them in a linear and hierarchical order in which consent is considered as the next step of coercion. In other words, it is the idea of gaining consent as the next and more developed tool of domination after having monopoly of coercive power. This kind of interpretation of consent and coercion or leading and domination was rejected by Gramsci himself. As he mentioned, a dominant group must have the ability to lead before it grasps governmental power, and furthermore it must continue to grasp it resolutely during its era of domination.²⁴ In Gramsci's terminology, leading is in the sphere of consent, and domination is in the sphere of coercion. Therefore, we can practically convert this sentence to: a dominant group must gain consent before it holds the coercive power, and continue to have consent after it gains coercive power. Consequently, contrary to what is supposed, coercion and consent are not opposites of each other in Gramsci's conceptualization; rather, coercion is imminent to the organization of consent.²⁵

After clarifying the relationship between consent and coercion, we can focus on the necessity of consent for a hegemonic relationship. Domination based relationships without the active and passive consent of the subaltern groups are subject to collapse. Each social group in some way can practice leadership over some others and gain their consent. However, universalizing this domination, securing it regardless of time and respondents is only possible with the gaining of consent. Local and limited domination is usual and has nothing to do with hegemony. As Gramsci wrote, "Although every party is the expression of a social group, and of one social group only, nevertheless in certain given conditions certain parties represent a single social group precisely in so far as they exercise a balancing and arbitrating between the interest of their group and those of other groups, and succeed in securing the development of the group which they represent with the consent and assistance of the allied groups-if not out and out with that of groups which are definitely hostile."²⁶ Hegemony is more than simply dominating or representing one group. Organization of more than one social group with conflicting interests- and their conflicting interests are more than a simple power relationship- is only possible with consent. To achieve hegemony, the dominant group should gain the consent of its allied subaltern groups even when acting against these groups' interests. Then the question is the possibility of consent and if it is possible, the means of securing consent. It

²⁴ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 57-8.

²⁵ Ives, P. (2004). *Language and Hegemony in Gramsci*. London: Pluto, p. 64.

²⁶ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 148.

is possible according to Gramsci and the means of securing consent is something very much related to ideological and moral leadership which will be explained in a detailed fashion in the following parts. However, for now it is efficacious to mention that: the hegemonic group does not intrinsically have consent nor does it demand it from its subalterns. It ‘educates’ its subalterns to gain consent.²⁷

What is the effect of consent in the survival of a system? What is the role of consent in a hegemonic system? What is the centrality of consent in the establishment of hegemony? Answers of these questions are mostly left to the general discussion about hegemony. But it is possible to have an idea by looking at some characteristics of a hegemonic system. Gramsci presents democracy²⁸ and the ability of becoming a popular religion²⁹ as *sine qua non* conditions of a hegemonic system and these functions of a hegemonic system are only possible with consent. In a consent-based hegemonic relationship, the ruled people should be in a condition of complete illusion of determining or resisting on their part. Under such conditions, it is the very activity of consent which reproduces the hegemonic system even when people think that they are resisting the hegemony. It is the activity of consent which makes a hegemonic system a popular religion due to the fact that the subaltern groups do not even realize that they are living in a sphere of hegemony and are tied to this hegemonic sphere by consent. As a result, consent in the Gramscian sense is a continuous process of developing consent without being recognized as such, and civil society is the medium of this process.

2.1.2. Civil Society and Political Society

The distinction between civil society and political society is another contribution of Gramsci to Marxist theory. Up until the time of Gramsci, the characteristics of civil society or the functions of civil society had been always attributed to the superstructure. That is why many Marxist scholars did not care about civil society as they treated it as a superstructural issue which is not more than a reflection of the base structure. In this respect, Gramsci’s quest for civil society is totally outside of Marxism. However, there is another way to appreciate the place of Gramsci's concept of civil society in Marxist theory. A retrospective search for the roots of the concept of civil society leads us to Hegel who had a considerable influence on

²⁷ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 259.

²⁸ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 56n.

²⁹ Mouffe, C. (1979). “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci,” in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, Chantal Mouffe (eds.), 168-204. London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, p.194.

Marx and Marxism. According to Bobbio, the distinction between civil society and political society goes back to Hegel, as the definition of civil society was borrowed from Hegel.³⁰

Like the other concepts of Gramsci, it is impossible to understand the distinction between civil and political society without referring to hegemony. For now, we can roughly define civil society as “the ensemble of organisms commonly called private.”³¹ This is a definition which will be modified later just as Gramsci modified it, but for now we will use it to understand the relationship of hegemony with civil society. By using this concept, Gramsci opened space for culture and ideology, which were cramped for space in the classical Marxism’s category of superstructure. Therefore, popular culture and the mass media, which is its main medium in modern societies, can be read and appreciated in the hegemonic sphere of civil society.³²

However, Gramsci did not totally deny the function of civil society as a superstructural element. Furthermore, he talks about the superstructures of civil society; that is, the elements of civil society such as cultural institutions and intellectuals. As he stated; “the superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare.”³³ Cultural institutions and intellectuals play the role of the trench system in a crisis of capitalism as the outer defense perimeter of the military collapses first in an attack. In times of crisis, civil society will play the same role, as it will try to defend the whole hegemonic system. If it is not powerful enough to defend whole hegemonic system, the system would sacrifice civil society institutions, like the sacrifice of the outer perimeters of an army in an enemy attack.

As Gramsci defined civil society as private, it is also a matter of personal behaviour, preferences and norms because it is a matter of organized cultural institutions.³⁴ Then, as much as regulated institutions of civil society strike root inside the segments of a society, hegemonic power is personalized and internalized. Therefore, certain functions of state power are transferred to civil society and the people who are subject to it internalize these functions. This internalization prepares the way for the production of consent. The dual layers in civil society, i.e. private layer and institutions, have a direct relationship. On the one hand there are constraints and freedom as structure and superstructure respectively, and on the other hand there are force and consent produced by institutions and ideologies respectively.³⁵ Individuals

³⁰ Bobbio, N. (1979). “Gramsci and Conception of Civil Society,” in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, Chantal Mouffe (eds.), 21-47. London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, p.30.

³¹ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 12.

³² Strinati, D. An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture, p.169.

³³ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 235.

³⁴ Jones, S. (2006). Antonio Gramsci. London& New York: Routledge, p.32.

³⁵ Bobbio, N. Gramsci and Conception of Civil Society, p.36.

in the sphere of civil society seem to make choices freely, but this freedom is a superstructural matter. In the base structure, either force of institutions or consent of subjects guarantees their “right” choices. This is the very operation of hegemony, which appears to be democratic, but actually is not. Consequently, the productive character of capitalism is also seen in the sphere of civil society. The “ethico-political dimension” of the mode of production is stressed by the term civil society whereas economical, political and ideological dimensions are stressed in classical Marxism.³⁶ The fourth dimension of the mode of production is something found in western countries according to Gramsci. In these countries, civil society is much more developed than it is in the eastern ones and that is why a revolution became possible in Russia where civil society was not developed. Therefore, the revolutionary groups in western countries should bear in mind that there are developed civil society structures and also superstructures in their countries and that thus they should adopt specific strategies, which will also include the organization of civil society besides political society and the state.

The organization of political society is something different from civil society. Political society is more tied to the state and there is an organic relationship between the two of them. From time to time Gramsci also uses political society as a synonym for the state apparatus. Furthermore, political society can be defined as a sphere in which the state uses the legal apparatus to discipline those who are undisciplined and are not developing consent. Regardless of the reason for the inexistence of consent, either as a result of a crisis of capitalism or a normative situation, the coercive capacity of the hegemonic group operates through political society to rebuild consent.

Gramsci’s interpretation of the state has a key role in understanding the distinction between civil and political society. The definition of state for Gramsci is not static, even if it is possible to find different definitions of state. Therefore, this shift in the conception of state also changes the meaning of the distinction between political society and civil society. However, it is still possible to assemble different definitions and form a specific one for specific purposes as Gramsci did. For example, it is possible to derive extended and restricted notions of the state from Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks. The extended notion of state is fused with both civil and political society. In this notion of state, it is possible to observe the reciprocal and synchronous existence of the political and civil society. On the other hand, the restricted notion of state consists of the administrative and governmental apparatus of the state and it is more closely linked to political society. Gramsci did not directly define these

³⁶ Gill, S. (1990). *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p.42.

different notions, but he talked about the state differently in different cases. It is the extended notion of state when talking about the success of Jacobins in forming a national popular, whereas it is the restricted notion of state when talking about the formation of the Italian nation-state.

Although distinction of civil and political society exists in the restricted notion of state, civil and political society are intertwined in most cases. Gramsci himself mentioned this as he made the distinction not organically but methodologically.³⁷ Gramsci used civil society to point out the relation between the state, in the restricted notion, and civil society. Thus, he underlined the dependency of civil society on the state. That's why, in some cases, he defined the state as only a political society, whereas in others as a combination of civil and political society. Consequently, civil society in Gramsci is more than a simple matter of superstructure; it's a superstructural reality. The distinction between political society and civil society is also superstructural. Political society and civil society are different superstructural reflections of the base structural hegemonic state. Intellectuals play a major role in hiding the base structural hegemonic reality and presenting it as political society and civil society.

2.1.3. Organic and Traditional Intellectuals

The question of intellectual and moral leadership always goes hand in hand with the question of ideology. In classical Marxism, the question of ideology is considered within the limits of superstructure. However, Gramsci gave more attention to ideology as he moved the question to a different sphere, and focused on the role of ideology in the securing of hegemony. Thus, intellectuals emerged as a chief category in the analysis of ideology.

Before elaborating on intellectual and moral leadership, it is essential to define the concept of intellectuals in accordance with the wider usage of the concept in Gramscian terminology. Gramsci did not define intellectuals according to some intellectual and mental characteristics, rather he claimed that these mental characteristics, which are supposed to be the ones that intellectuals possess, are the general characteristics of all human beings and the question of being an intellectual or not is something which has more to do with functions. As he wrote, "All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the functions of intellectuals" and he explains this sentence with a footnote; "Thus, because it can happen that everyone at some time fries a couple of eggs or sews up a tear in jacket, we do

³⁷ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 160.

not necessarily say that everyone is a cook or tailor.”³⁸ The act of thinking or reaching some analytic conclusions are some general characteristics of humankind but only the systematic usage of these characteristics in a professional way with specific purposes is the function of intellectuals. The question of which kind of functions should be considered as intellectual functions depends on the conjuncture in a specific society.³⁹ For example, a trade unionist can be considered as an intellectual for industrialism, a university scholar would be the ideal model of an intellectual for positivism and an adman for consumerism. Therefore, the definition of being an intellectual changes according to the needs of the society at that time and what is needed for the ensuring of hegemony. The category of professionals who meet the needs of a hegemonic system in a specific period is called intellectuals.

The definition of intellectuals according to their functions is bidirectional. As Gramsci mentioned both the hegemony of the leading groups and the hegemony of the proletariat, he mentioned the intellectuals of the leading class and the intellectuals of the subaltern classes as well. This distinction is named as traditional and organic intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals are those who work for the continuation of the leading class hegemony whereas organic intellectuals work for the working class hegemony. However, these categories are not essential and *sui generis*. Just as the matter of being an intellectual is determined according to intellectual functions, the matter of being an organic or traditional intellectual depends on functions. That is, originating from the working class does not necessarily mean being an organic intellectual. A group of working class based intellectuals can be traditional if they support the hegemony of the leading class explicitly or implicitly. The best example of this category is trade unionists. They come from a working class origin, however in time they evolve into a category of working class elites and they work for the continuation of industrial production, not for the working class hegemony.

Gramsci explains the shift from organic intellectuals to traditional ones by the general formation of a category of intellectuals. He pointed out that different social classes have different intellectuals, but historically the leading class intellectuals absorb the intellectuals of other groups and form the category of intellectuals.⁴⁰ Therefore, we can talk about a specific solidarity of intellectuals which crosscuts the class solidarity of the subaltern classes.

Traditional intellectuals, as functionaries of the leading classes, present themselves as if they are not attached to the leading classes. By doing so, they present the interests and truths of the

³⁸ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 9n.

³⁹ Jones, S. Antonio Gramsci, p.82.

⁴⁰ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 60.

leading classes as if they are objective truths and common interests. This is the continuation and legitimization of the *status quo*.⁴¹ The manipulation of truths and interests has a key role in the assuring of hegemony, as Gramsci pays immense attention to the spontaneous character of hegemony. This misrepresentation is also the case for journalists. They also claim that they are true intellectuals and work for the objective truth and common interests of the society.⁴² The production of truth and discourse is very central in the functioning of hegemony as it makes it more and more difficult for the subaltern groups to produce their language. Ives mentions that there is a huge gap between the thoughts and actions of subaltern groups which is the result of their inability to produce their own language and he writes;

*"[...]there are discrepancies between the thoughts and actions of people in subaltern social groups- people who accept the hegemony of a ruling class that have very different interests from their own. Other Marxists understand ideology as a 'false consciousness' or deception based on ignorance, lack of fortitude and intellect. Gramsci suggests that this may explain why individuals hold views that are at odds with their own experiences and lives, but it cannot explain why whole groups of people adopt such positions."*⁴³

Gramsci fills this gap in the explanation of the role of ideology through its link to popular culture and media. Furthermore, the concept of civil society has a central importance in the connection between ideology and popular culture. In the Gramscian explanation, ideology is not simply false consciousness; rather it is an effect of culture that prevails in civil society by the help of intellectuals. Considering the contemporary conditions in the world, the popular culture is identical with the popular media culture. It is produced, distributed and rendered prevalent in the sphere of media. Therefore, producers, distributors and interpreters of the popular media culture are the intellectuals of modern capitalism.⁴⁴

The role of media in ideological and moral leadership is not only limited to the securing of the leading class hegemony over the subaltern classes, but also it makes compromises to consolidate the alliance of the leading classes. It is possible to talk about an organic relationship between the media elite and corporate and political elites.⁴⁵ Hegemony of the leading classes is only possible by the creation of a higher synthesis and collective will firstly in the leading alliance and secondly among the subaltern classes. The creation of a higher

⁴¹ Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.77.

⁴² Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.77.

⁴³ Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.78.

⁴⁴ Strinati, D. An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture, p.171.

⁴⁵ Gitlin, T. (1980). *The Whole World is Watching*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.254.

synthesis and collective will serve as the cement that will hold the society together. “This is key to the indissoluble unity of the two aspects of Gramscian hegemony, since the formation of the collective will and the exercise of political leadership depends on the very existence of intellectual and moral leadership.”⁴⁶ As mentioned earlier, the subaltern classes are unable to generate their own language and terminology. As a consequence of the absence of their own terminology and language, the subaltern classes interpret the world in harmony with the language and terminology of the leading classes. Obviously, this harmony between language and an interpretation of the world does not occur in a single day, but it changes conceptions of the world through the consistent efforts of the intellectual and moral leadership and this change is one of the necessary conditions of hegemony.

2.1.4. Hegemony

In a broader sense the Gramscian theory can be defined as a social theory of power and control, and these two concepts are good starting points for an elaboration on hegemony. Hegemony corresponds to a particular form of social control which depends on the creation of consent. Generally speaking, it is possible to talk about two basic forms of social control and conformity; (1) external control, which is based on rewards and punishment and (2) internal social control, which is based on “moulding personal convictions into a replica of prevailing norms.”⁴⁷ Hegemonic social control is beyond external control. However, this does not mean that it is a typical example of internal control. On the contrary, the interrelatedness of consent (internal) and coercion (external), and the cumulative character of hegemony is the trademark of the Gramscian theory. To summarize, by hegemony, Gramsci refers to a type of control, which does not exclude coercion and/or possibility of using coercion at some points during the realization process of hegemony. Moreover, at the same time, hegemony is beyond the level of coercion because it now depends on consent which automatically makes coercion unnecessary – what it makes unnecessary is the use of coercive power, not the potential for using coercive power. A Turkish saying used for defining the state affairs is very explanatory for the relationship of hegemony and coercion; “it is to have the power to fulfill the threat of being in power.”

Secondly, internal control has also some differentiations due to the source of it. Femia groups these sources into three as (1) “fear of consequences of non-conformity”, (2) unavailability of non-conformity or non-confirmative behavior, and (3) “conscious attachment to, or agreement

⁴⁶ Mouffe, C. *Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci*, p.184.

⁴⁷ Femia, J. (1981). *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.24.

with, certain core elements of society.”⁴⁸ According to Femia, the third type of conformity can be classified as hegemony. However, at this point, besides the underlying concept that hegemony is again beyond the first two types of conformity, it is not exclusive to them. In addition to containing the capacity of coercion and active usage of it in earlier stages, hegemony also includes the first two types of conformity. Differentiation from external control and the first two categories of internal control while covering them might be seen as a bit ambiguous. However, checking this relationship from the opposite direction will make it clearer. For example, in a society a social group (A) has hegemonic power and control over a group (B). If A’s hegemonic power over B is internal and conscious, is it possible to think any other power group, (C), has any kind of eternal or fear based control over B? If yes, will it not confront A’s hegemonic position? This is the very reason why Femia’s categorization of hegemonic power as internal and conscious is true but simply not enough. Hegemonic power is internal and conscious in the working sphere. However, it is also external and coercive in the potential sphere.

For a power relationship to be hegemonic, the subaltern groups should regard the interests of the hegemonic group as their own and should work for the realization of such interests consciously and naturally. Such a commitment and conformity –a commitment unconscious of being committed, a conformity unconscious of being conformed- requires a higher level of common sense and collective will. Common sense is very important for the internalization and adoption of hegemony, as Gramsci wrote;

“Every social stratum has its own ‘common sense’ and its own ‘good sense’, which are basically the most widespread conception of life and of man. Every philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of ‘common sense’: this is the document of its historical effectiveness. Common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but it is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with specific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary life. ‘Common sense’ is the folklore of philosophy, and is always half way between folklore properly speaking and philosophy, science, and economics of the specialists. Common sense creates the folklore of the future, that is as a relatively rigid phase of popular knowledge at a given place and time.”⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Femia, J. Gramsci’s Political Thought, p.28.

⁴⁹ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 326.

In this definition, there are some crucial points which can give a more complete idea of hegemony. First of all, there is the “conception of life and of man”. The layer at which hegemony works is so central and deep that it starts with the shaping of our conception of life and man. It is not simply politics, economics, culture and taste; on the contrary, it is the conception of life. The second crucial point is its dynamic character. It is always in a state of movement and change in order to fulfill different needs and gaps.

Intellectual input is one of the key elements in the process of change and movement. Different social groups can have different ideals about common sense in a society. Theoretically, all of these have the potential of being a hegemonic one. However, the one which is supported with intellectual input can be successful in change and mobilization, therefore that one will be the hegemonic common sense. Gramsci named this process as “renewed common sense” and defined it as a “[...] matter [...] of starting with a philosophy which already enjoys, or could enjoy, a certain diffusion, because it is connected to and implicit in practical life, and elaborating it so that it becomes a renewed common sense possessing the coherence and the sinew of individual philosophies.”⁵⁰ Therefore intellectuals directly affect conceptions of the world and man. Masses have some ideas -common sense- about the world and man. Then these ideas are shaped by intellectuals and become renewed common sense as Gramsci claims that common sense is somewhere between folklore and science, that is, it is formed by both the masses and intellectuals. The common worldview will evolve into a collective will and the collective will will work as a merging code of the society and create a collective man from ordinary people.⁵¹

The transformation process from national popular to hegemony is very useful in understanding hegemony itself. The point of existence of the two distinct categories as national popular and hegemony is illustrative in understanding the scope of hegemony. In the Gramscian sense, the national popular is related to culture and it corresponds to the existing cultural norms and practices of society. Accordingly, transformation from national popular to hegemony stands for a linkage between the existing cultural values of society and the hegemonic project of the leading group. This link is vital because denying the existing culture or trying to substitute it with an entirely new one would bring on a gap between the cultural norms of the society and the leading group.⁵² Likewise, this gap can cause a crisis which means an opportunity structure for the formation of another hegemonic group. From this

⁵⁰ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 330n.

⁵¹ Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, p.191.

⁵² Jones, S. Antonio Gramsci, p.7.

aspect, the national popular is strategically similar to the external means of control and lower levels of internal control, because it is a potential and exclusive domain of hegemony.

The leading group manipulates this exclusive domain and tries to create a higher synthesis for the realization of hegemony. The tool for manipulation in the exclusive domain is intellectual and moral leadership, and intellectual and moral leadership of the national popular will advance to ideological unity and serve as the cement of the society.⁵³ Therefore, hegemony in the Gramscian sense is not only the state power, but also the manipulation of how people understand the world and everyday life. For example, a specific kind of language usage or a relationship of meaning can be a precursor of the internalization of hegemony. Therefore, this thesis regards newspapers' discourse on Muslims as a specific kind of language and will elaborate on how that specific kind of language become effective in internalization of hegemony during the February 28 and April 27 Processes.

The exclusive character of hegemonic domain gains more centrality as the society becomes more capitalist and modern. To understand this relationship, one should consider different types of hegemony. According to Femia's classification,⁵⁴ it is possible to talk about three types of hegemony; (1) integral, (2) decadent, and (3) minimal. In an integral hegemony, the mass commitment to the hegemonic system would be absolute and unconditional. This kind of hegemony is only possible during extraordinary periods of societies, especially post-revolutionary periods such as Gramsci's typical example, post-revolutionary France. Secondly, decadent hegemony is a form that can be seen when the ideological consensus of a post-revolutionary period begins to break. There opens up a gap between the masses and the leading classes and therefore expansive ideological and political consensus becomes delicate. Finally, minimal hegemony is based on broader ruling classes. Ideological consensus between the leading and subaltern groups declines further, and as a result, the leading classes incorporate the elites of the subaltern classes. As a consequence, the ruling class expands. The minimal hegemony is still hegemonic in the Gramscian sense because it still preserves the exclusive domain of hegemony as it does not let any other group become hegemonic in any sense.

After elaborating on the key role of the exclusive character of the hegemonic domain, studying how hegemony derived from the exclusive domain is another question, whose answer opens ground for a better understanding of hegemony. At this point, the relationship between civil society and hegemony is explanatory, especially in talking about a modern

⁵³ Mouffe, C. *Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci*, p.184.

⁵⁴ Femia, J. *Gramsci's Political Thought*, p.46-7.

capitalist society, where media and popular culture come into prominence among the other institutions of civil society. As people confirm the ideas of the leading classes neither because of physical or mental coercion, nor ideological indoctrination, but because of adopting them as ideas of their own,⁵⁵ the leading group needs some tools to secure the adoption. As mentioned before, in modern capitalist societies, these tools are the media and the popular culture. As a result, the media and the popular culture are used for deriving hegemony from collective will and the national popular. This process can also be named as the securing of hegemony. As Jones wrote, “Gramsci argues that culture, politics and the economy are organized in a relationship of mutual exchange with one another, constantly circulating and shifting networks of influence. To this process he gives the name hegemony [...]”⁵⁶ the “mutual exchange” and “constantly circulating and shifting networks of influence” secure hegemony and derive it from collective will and the national popular. By the help of these two, the masses adopt ideas of the leading group as the ideas of their own.

Until now I have commented on the formation of hegemony and how the subaltern groups adopt the ideas of the leading group. However, formation of a leading group is also a crucial process. First of all, a leading group is not a homogeneous group. As Gramsci described it, the “historic bloc” is formed of several allied groups under the leadership of a fundamental one. The term “historic” designates the formation of the group and of the shared ideological positions and interests over time.

Then, how can different interest groups make coalitions for a hegemonic position? The answer is simple and easy, but the practice is difficult and that is why it needs some historical articulation to form such a group. According to Gramsci, every class has its own political party and the different political parties will follow the interests of the specific class they belong to.⁵⁷ There is a political division of labor between different political parties and they separate at the point of interests, but if they require each other – as Gramsci claims they do – they will unite when vital and major issues are in question.⁵⁸ According to the explanation, the moments when vital and major issues are in question are not only the test moments of a historic bloc; rather they are the moments of its formation. This is the reason why Gramsci uses the adjective “historic.” In theory many classes vie for becoming a part of the bloc. However, by different test moments through history only the ones that were capable of being involved in hegemonic articulation become the members of the historic bloc. Hegemonic articulation is more than “united economic and political objectives” but it is also “intellectual

⁵⁵ Strinati, D. *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture*, p.166.

⁵⁶ Jones, S. *Antonio Gramsci*, p.5.

⁵⁷ Gramsci, A. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 157.

⁵⁸ Gramsci, A. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 158.

and moral unity.”⁵⁹ The traditional intellectuals who are also a part of the historic bloc will propagate the intellectual and moral unity.

However, the historic bloc is also subject to disentanglement, as there will always be a tendency of conflict between the specific interests of each of the allied classes and the major dominating class. When it comes to the last analysis, the bourgeoisie will follow its own interests and “come up against the limitations of its own hegemony.”⁶⁰ In such a conflict of interests, the allied group will not totally follow the interests and directives of the bourgeoisie, that is, they will not endanger their basic interests. Moments of this kind are the crisis of hegemony and “then ‘spontaneity’ may be replaced by ‘constraint’ in ever less disguised and indirect forms, culminating in outright police measures and *coups d’état*.”⁶¹

Gramscian concepts and analyses fit the political history of Turkey, especially concerning political discussions around secularism and Islam. Furthermore, the historic bloc can additionally be used as a framework for locating the Kemalists. On the other hand, conservatives that continue their opposition to the historic bloc and its modernization project can be considered as subaltern classes, and in turn this entire struggle between them becomes one of hegemony. However, an additional theoretical-historical tool is required to fit the February 28 and April 27 processes into Gramsci’s hegemonic analysis; Mardin’s center-periphery analysis offers just such a tool.

2.2. Mardin’s Center-Periphery Analysis

Next to hegemony center-periphery analysis is a very helpful tool for the historical analysis of February 28 and April 27 Processes. Center-periphery relations have been frequently used for understanding the political and economical relations of societies. There is a vast amount of literature on center-periphery relations that consists of both theoretical and empirical approaches. For the theoretical literature, scholars like Frank and Gills,⁶² and Wallerstein⁶³ can be named as the three most leading figures. Their approaches, which consist primarily of a focus on explaining capitalist relations, are rather abstract and theoretical. In addition to

⁵⁹ Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, p.181.

⁶⁰ Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, p.183.

⁶¹ Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 61.

⁶² Frank, A.G. & Gills, B.K. (1993). “The 5,000-year World System,” in *The World System: Five hundred years or five thousand?*, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (eds.), 3-55. London: Routledge.

⁶³ Wallerstein, I. (1993). “World system versus World-systems: A Critique,” in *The World System: Five hundred years or five thousand?*, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (eds.), 292-6. London: Routledge.

these theoretical accounts, it is also possible to come across some very outstanding case and empirical studies.

Mardin's analysis of the center- periphery relations in Turkish modernization⁶⁴ is one of these outstanding empirical studies. In his key article, Mardin starts his analysis with the classical period of the Ottoman Empire and stretches it until the 1960's. Furthermore, at the conclusion of the article he suggests that the newly emerging social strata, such as the urban proletariat, can change the momentum in the center-periphery relations. Due to the attractive and outstanding character of Mardin's analysis, major scholars who concentrate on the Ottoman History and Turkish Modernization have focused on the issue and have published articles about the subject. Furthermore, it has been one of the frequently cited scholarly works of the discipline.

Beyond its popularity, the empirical and theoretical perspectives drawn by Mardin are still valid today as Turkish politics still follow the same patterns of center- periphery cleavage. It offers some insights into the major issues of Turkish politics such as secularism, the Kurdish question and the process of accession to the European Union. As will be elaborated in the coming chapters, the center-periphery cleavage also played a crucial role in the February 28 and April 27 Processes.

In my analysis about the center-periphery relations, I firstly focus on the major claims of Mardin and his way of theorizing the question. Then, in the second part, I try to take the picture of parallelism and continuity between the Young Turks and Kemalists from the aspect of their approach to the periphery. Finally, I offer an argument about the major patterns of the center-periphery relations today. The distinction and categorization which I follow in this chapter also embraces a historical periodization. Mardin's article starts with the classical system of the Ottoman Empire, and then goes on with the eighteenth and nineteenth century reform movements in the Ottoman Empire, and in the republican period. In the parts about the republican period he also writes on the position of the DP in center- periphery cleavage. Therefore, in order to avoid losing sight of historical periodization, Mardin's main arguments should be the starting point of the analysis.

⁶⁴ The article was first published as; Mardin, Ş. (1973). "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus, Journal of American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 102(1), 169-90. I will use another version of the same article published in 1974.

2.2.1. Main Arguments of Mardin

Mardin focuses on the cumulative effect of different facts when he argues about the existence of a center-periphery cleavage. Moreover, instead of defining the cleavage in a specific historical setting, he rather mentions processes and phenomena. As a result, he does not focus on the Ottoman period or the Republican era specifically; rather, he prefers to elaborate on the concept of “centralization that created the modern state.”⁶⁵ According to his formulation, the reform period in the Ottoman Empire resulted in various confrontations with the forces of the periphery which consisted of the feudal nobility, the population of the peripheral cities, burghers and later industrial labor.⁶⁶ However, at this very starting point, there are some counter-arguments to those of Mardin. According to Heper, these distinct classes did not exist in the Ottoman society.⁶⁷ Heper’s argument makes sense to some extent, yet as mentioned before, Mardin does not mean the existence of these classes in a specific time in Ottoman society. Rather, he claims that some confrontation points occurred between these segments of the society as a result of the overall centralization process of Turkey. Considering the title of the article “Center-periphery Relations: A Key to the Turkish Politics?”, he does not want to argue for the existence of such class distinctions in the Ottoman society, rather he wants to use these patterns as a key in interpreting Turkish politics.

The nomadic character of the people of Anatolia has been another sphere of the center-periphery confrontation. Rather than active resistance of the nomads- if there still existed in the republican period- the nomadic character of the Anatolian population and the symbolic inheritance of nomadism served as a means of confrontation. Considering the center-periphery relations “[...] the clash between nomads and urban dwellers generated the Ottoman cultivated man’s stereotype that civilization was a contest between urbanization and nomadism, and that all things nomadic were only deserving of contempt.”⁶⁸

The same symbolic inheritance exists in the case of the pre-Ottoman nobility and the powerful families in the Ottoman periphery. The peripheral rebellions from those that contested the throne to the ones based on religious heterodoxy⁶⁹ created the same impact of contempt for the periphery and were regarded with a suspicious look.⁷⁰ Indeed, from the

⁶⁵ Mardin, Ş. (1974). “Center Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?” in *Post Traditional Societies*, S.N. Eisenstadt (eds.), 169-190. New York: Norton & Company, p. 170.

⁶⁶ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 170.

⁶⁷ Heper, M. (1980). “Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, Bahar-Yaz Sayısı (9-10), 3-55.

⁶⁸ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 170.

⁶⁹ The issue of religious heterodoxy is a bit ambiguous in the article and his other writings about the religion and center- periphery relations. More detailed critics on this issue will be held in the later parts of the chapter.

⁷⁰ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 171.

nineteenth century onwards the nobility in the Ottoman periphery caused many problems to Ottoman modernization besides the symbolic heritage of the settlement of the nomadic population in the earlier times of the empire. The long lasting warfare and some administrative reforms of the seventeenth century created a more powerful nobility in the Ottoman periphery, for the long lasting warfare in the seventeenth century required more military power and the need of military power was fulfilled by the forces provided by nobility.⁷¹ Furthermore, these military forces derived from local notables did not disband like the centralized army and served as a means of power for the local nobility.⁷² Apart from the military power, the administrative reforms of the seventeenth century also helped the nobility to gain power. Expanding tax farming and the *mütesellim*⁷³ system provided the nobility with extraordinary privileges such as selecting some officials in the far cities of the empire.⁷⁴

In addition to these points, which stimulated the center's mistrust of the periphery, Mardin also talks about the characteristic differences of the periphery and officials as representatives of the center. From these differences, one of the most distinguishing ones was the non-Muslim background of state officials. As many state officials were raised by the *devşirme* system,⁷⁵ they were very loosely tied to the rest of the society and raised to be the subjects, *kuls*, of the Sultan and the ultimate protectors of state interests.⁷⁶ This system of raising state officials resulted in a detachment both socially and religiously. On the one hand as they were raised to be state officials and their primary concern was the interests of the state, they were never sensitive to the problems of the periphery. On the other hand, their non-Muslim background also detached them from the Muslim population. Furthermore, as state officials they were exempt from taxation. Therefore, they did not face the repressive apparatus of the state in the economic sphere which was more powerful than ever in the eighteenth century.⁷⁷ Also, the increasing amount of contraband trade in the second half of the eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century due to the increasing prices in Europe opposed officials to local merchants.⁷⁸ Besides its economic advantages, exemption from the taxes underlined the fact that operators and representatives of the state power were the most

⁷¹ Kasaba, R. (1988). *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*. New York: State University of New York Press, p.15-6.

⁷² Kasaba, R. *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, p.15-6.

⁷³ State official that deputize governors in the far cities of the empire. In the mentioned period they were mostly appointed among local notables.

⁷⁴ Inalcık, H. (1977). "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration," in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (eds.), 27-52. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, p.33.

⁷⁵ In the *Devşirme* system, the young boys of non-muslim families residing in recently conquered cities were gathered and received an extensive education. At the end of this process they were raised as janissaries and state officials.

⁷⁶ Mardin, Ş. *Center Periphery Relations*, p. 171.

⁷⁷ Kasaba, R. *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, p.13.

⁷⁸ Kasaba, R. *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, p.18.

privileged citizens of the state.⁷⁹ Finally, the cultural and status differences had a great impact on the loose ties of the state officials and the populace. Mardin claims that in earlier times, successful cultures such as the Iranian culture influenced state officials both by its urban character and its “myth of the majesty of Sultan” which was only accessible to the state officials.⁸⁰ Later on, the educational differences served as another cultural point of separation between the officials and the periphery. As the reform movement in the Ottoman state system proceeded, modern schools were established for the sake of educating the state officials whom the Ottoman state needed for its own safety and preservation. On the one hand this new type of education underlined the superiority of officials among other citizens as the operators of state authority and, on the other hand, it emphasized the religious and ideological differences between the officials and the populace. The aim of new educational institutions was to raise new bureaucratic elites of the French type who were well trained, knowledgeable and privileged the interests of the state as opposed to those of the periphery.⁸¹ While the opinions of officials were shaped by the interests of the state and “positive science”, and they had the adequate means – state power – for expressing their opinions, the public opinion mostly shaped and reflected by traditional imams and preachers for whom the positivist ideology of the newly emerging type of state officials was totally unacceptable.⁸²

Mardin pays great attention to the Ottoman reform movements of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. As he asserts, reform movements of the period aimed to form a nation-state and for this purpose, they concentrated on (1) the integration of the non-Muslim groups, (2) the integration of the heterogeneous Muslim groups into the nation, and finally (3) the unification of the disconnected elements in the present political system.⁸³ However, for the Young Turks, the efforts to form a unified nation did not have the expected results. As Mardin wrote “their ineptitude and incipient nationalism combined to undermine what support they might have gathered for their regime. Lack of integration, demands for decentralized administration, as well as provincial opposition to what were considered the secular ideas of the Young Turks are a main theme of their years in power and appear within, as well as outside, Anatolia.”⁸⁴

Mardin claims that as a result of political representation gained after 1908 and the economic conditions mentioned before, the peripheral nobility gained ground. However, there are some different interpretations about the gaining ground of nobility. While Mardin talks about the

⁷⁹ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 172.

⁸⁰ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 173.

⁸¹ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 180.

⁸² İnalçık, H. Centralization and Decentralization, p.38-9.

⁸³ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 175.

⁸⁴ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 177.

demands of the decentralization of administration, Heper claims that the demands of the nobility never became effective enough to make a change in the policies of the center, and the argument about the political power of the nobility through commissions and agreements such as Document of Agreement, *Sened-i İttifak*,⁸⁵ is not valid as they never resulted in a distribution of power between the state and the nobility.⁸⁶ Heper's claims make sense to some extent but the main argument of Mardin is not the nobility gaining power, but their demand for power and the existence of a cleavage in the political sphere. Although it is not a constitutional document, The Document of Agreement should not be disregarded "because the document is really a pact between the ruler and his barons [...] As such it constitutes a high-water mark of the influence of the *ayan*⁸⁷ in the empire, who were recognized officially as partners in government. The sultan himself did not sign the document, but he did allow his imperial monogram (*tuğra*) to be put on it".⁸⁸

As the centralization problem was transferred to the republican era, the center-periphery conflict was also carried over. The intensity of the cleavage increased as a result of the Republic's uncompromising demands of centralization and nationalization. The leading sign of the center-periphery cleavage in the first years of the Kemalist regime was the formation of the second group in the First Grand National Assembly. The main unifying point of the second group was its opposition to the first group, namely the Kemalists. The second group mainly consisted of any kind of local notables, from merchants to the men of religion, and the group was led by the alienated officials.⁸⁹ The opposition of the second group was also diverse from decentralist ideas to the Islamist one like the diversity of group membership. The second group's proposed policies in the Grand National Assembly are very useful in understanding the reflection of the center-periphery cleavage in the assembly. They proposed some policies such as the decentralization of the administration, military affairs, religious affairs and political policies regarding representation.⁹⁰ However, they could not be effective, as Mustafa Kemal dissolved the assembly when he felt that it was getting out of control. In the constitutional period of the Ottoman Empire, bureaucrats supported the assembly because it meant a medium of opposition to the Sultan's monopoly on legitimacy, however later the Kemalists -former bureaucrats and officers of the empire- dissolved it and formed it in a new composition to exclude the second group.

⁸⁵ A treaty between grand vezir of Ottoman Empire and distinguished local notables of Anatolia and Thrace. The treaty signed in 1808 regulated the relations of central and local authority.

⁸⁶ Heper, M. *Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi*, p.18-25.

⁸⁷ *Ayans* were local notables of the empire.

⁸⁸ Zürcher, E.J. *Turkey: A Modern History*, p.28.

⁸⁹ Mardin, Ş. *Center Periphery Relations*, p. 181.

⁹⁰ Mardin, Ş. *Center Periphery Relations*, p. 181.

Besides the second group in the first assembly, the rebellions in the Anatolia were the other case offering insights about the scope of the center-periphery cleavage and the center's interpretation of the periphery. The Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 and the Menemen incident in 1930 aroused what Mardin calls Patrona Syndrome, that is, the fear of a blocking of the westernizing reforms of the military and administration by the so-called backward and ignorant masses.⁹¹ This syndrome was carried to the republican era by the Sheikh Said rebellion and the Menemen incident. Consequently, peasants were always regarded as backward by the Republican elites. The political culture of the republic was elitist, exclusive to the different parts of the society and regarded them as enemies; it stressed of the monopoly of the state on physical power.⁹²

The case of the DP offers many insights into understanding the Kemalists' interpretation of the peripheral opposition. According to Mardin, the DP very well represented the traditional Ottoman state image of justice and abundance and it, "promised it would bring services to the peasants, take his daily problems as a legitimate concern of politics, debureaucratize Turkey, and liberalize religious practices."⁹³ The new discourse of the DP changed the legitimacy of statehood and introduced welfare, equality, rights and freedom⁹⁴ instead of self-fulfilling ideologies of westernization and modernization of the Kemalists. These new paradigms in Turkish politics shifted the source of legitimacy from the westernization ideology to the masses, and therefore implicitly and explicitly told the masses that they are not inferior compared to the Kemalist elites of the Republic. As Mardin wrote, "there were now good reasons to claim that the RPP [Republican People's Party] represented the "bureaucratic" center, whereas the DP represented the "democratic" periphery."⁹⁵ However, this was too much and it went too far for the Kemalist bureaucracy and therefore the DP rule was ended by a military intervention. The claim that policies of the DP encouraged the reaction has been one of the leading legitimizing claims of the military intervention against the DP in 1960. Although there are some existential differences between them, and the historical conditions which made them possible are different, drawing a parallelism between the discourses of the DP, RP, and recently AKP is possible. The commonality of the counter discourse against all three of them as supporting reaction can support Mardin's thesis about the center-periphery cleavage, as well as the utilization of religion in expressing the claims of the periphery and the utilization of the discourse of reaction in suppressing the demands of the periphery.

⁹¹ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 175.

⁹² Heper, M. Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi, p.4.

⁹³ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 184.

⁹⁴ Karpat, K. (1975). "The Politics of Transition: Political Attitudes and Party Affiliation in the Turkish Shantytowns," in *Political Participation in Turkey*, Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.), 33-61. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, p.75.

⁹⁵ Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 186.

Before concluding Mardin's analysis of the center-periphery relations, it is necessary to mention an ambiguous point in the role of religion in the analysis. As mentioned before, Mardin treats religion as one of the major spheres in which the cleavage between the center and the periphery emerged. However, Mardin does not elaborate on what he means by religion in a detailed way. He mentions the religious heterodoxy in a few places in the article but does not explain the fact of how the orthodox religious character of the DP and heterodox character of Alevi belief can be explained within the limits of the same concept. However, the lack of differentiation between the two, if not more, types of religiosity should not be interpreted as a shortcoming in Mardin's conceptualization of religion in the center-periphery cleavage. Mardin is very accurate in identifying religion as the most problematic issue between the periphery and the center. The shortcoming in the theory was not in the conceptualization of religion but in the conceptualization of the center. Mardin treats the center and the state as constant and concrete categories. However, the state is not so constant and concrete while following its interests. On the one hand, it can be secular against the Sunni religious periphery like in the cases Mardin mentions, but on the other hand, it can be Sunni against the peripheral Alevi community. The same flexibility is also valid for the periphery as it can be secular and Kemalist as in the case of Alevi against the Sunni majority. At that point Gramsci's ideas about the formation of the historic bloc in moments of crisis, as well as the comprehensive capacity of the historic bloc, become helpful cures to the shortcomings of Mardin's constant and concrete definitions of center.

In conclusion, Mardin offers the center-periphery cleavage as an efficacious tool in the analysis of Turkish politics. While offering the center-periphery cleavage, he historically analyses the classical Ottoman Period, reform movements of the late Ottoman period and the Republican period under the rule of the CHP and DP. Excluding the different character of the center-periphery relations in the classical Ottoman period, he mentions a continuation between the reformers of the late Ottoman and Republican elites. As centralization, nationalization and secularization are the key common aspects of the elite character in Turkey from late Ottoman Period until today, he introduces religion as the major medium of confrontation between the center and the periphery. Although the one-sided approach to religion contains some shortcomings in the broader analysis of the politics in Turkey, the general model drawn by Mardin can still be used within the scope of this study. In other words Mardin only refers to the religious orthodoxy when he indicates religion as a ground for the center-periphery cleavage. Although there is also a cleavage between the peripheral heterodoxy and the relatively orthodox center like in the case of Alevi, my study by definition does not cover this kind of cleavage. Therefore, the mentioned shortcomings do not

constitute an obstacle for applying Mardin's model to my research. In the next parts of this chapter, I will continue to focus on the center- periphery cleavage in Turkish politics. I will focus on the continuity in the Young Turks' and Kemalists' interpretation of culture and religiosity of the periphery.

2.2.2 Populace: The Chief Culprit of non-modernization of Turkey from the Young Turks to the Kemalists

The continuity between the Young Turk thought and the Kemalist ideology has been one of the widely discussed themes of Turkish modernization. However, considering the scope of this study, this particular issue is not pertinent and I will not go into details.⁹⁶ Instead, the continuity of the center-periphery cleavage and the continuity of the ideological origins of the center-periphery conflict will be mentioned.

Mardin pays great attention to the role of modern educational institutions of the late Ottoman period in center-periphery relations. He also mentions the continuity of the spirit of the Late Ottoman and early Republican educational institutions. The main focus of the Ottoman education system after nineteenth century reforms, and then the Turkish education system, has been the bringing up of state elites who are supposed to be the representatives and instructors of the official ideology.⁹⁷ The education of the populace still has been one of the top issues of agenda of the Turkish elites, and that is why they always complain about the ignorance of the society. Although the republicans argue that the Kemalist ideology is unique and new, the understanding of the difference between the status and culture of the masses and intellectuals, are some of the legitimizing points of the societal image of both the Kemalists and the Ottomans.

In the Republican Period, the aim of educating the state elites has been to train the staff who will give priority to state affairs rather than to those of the populace, while the aim of educating the masses has been to eradicate the cultural and social structures and also the traditions of the old regime. The Republican elite considered populace's adherence to values of tradition as the primary delinquency of the masses. However, the measures taken against the "ignorance of the masses" and efforts to "enlighten" them do not work in the way the Kemalists wanted.

⁹⁶ For a more detailed account; Zürcher, E.J. (1992). "The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic," *Die Welt Des Islams*, 32(2), 237-253.

⁹⁷ Akarlı, E.D. (1975). "The State as A Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey," in *Political Participation in Turkey*, Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Eds.), 122-135. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, p.136.

Religion preserved its central role in the center-periphery conflict during the Republican era. Although in different amounts, there was a religious motivation in the two main opposition movements of the republican era- the Sheikh Said Rebellion and the Menemen Incident. The case of the Sheikh Said rebellion itself is very useful in understanding the role of religion in the center-periphery relations. Zürcher mentions that during this rebellion the Alevi Kurds attacked the Sunni rebels because of the dual character of the rebellion, and he writes; “while the leadership was undoubtedly motivated by the desire for an autonomous or even independent Kurdistan, the rank and file acted from religious motives, demanding the restoration of holy law and the caliphate.”⁹⁸ The different attitude of the Alevi Kurds and the Sunni ones is a good example of Mardin’s ambiguity about the religious heterodoxy in the center-periphery relations. Moreover, the dual character of the rebellion, i.e. its being Kurdish nationalist as well as Islamist, also offers insight into the usage of religious and secularist discourse in center-periphery relations as the Kurdish nationalist motivations of rebellion are not usually stressed by the Kemalist official history. It is also possible to observe the utilization of the secularist discourse in the Menemen Incident. The incident still serves as a means of legitimacy in suppressing the religious demands of the periphery. Furthermore, scholars like Bozarslan question the place of the Menemen Incident in the secularist discourse and claim that contrary to the public sense and the Kemalist historiography, it is not even possible to find any proof to argue that the dervishes engaged in the incident were Nakshibendis.⁹⁹

The Kemalist discourse on religion can be traced back to the Young Turks. The Young Turks also regarded religion as one of the chief obstacles to modernization. Furthermore, their solution was also similar to the Kemalists: to cleanse the religion from superstitions.¹⁰⁰ As Hanioglu mentioned; “[...] the thesis of *Garbcılar*¹⁰¹ was that a new ‘ethic’ should be created for Muslims. This thesis undoubtedly stemmed from their conviction that Islam could not keep up with modern progress. The ideal espoused by the *Garbcılar* in this field was the creation of a Protestant ethic.”¹⁰² Hanioglu also underlines the continuity of the ideas of the *Garbcılar* and Kemalists as he claims that although *Garbcılar*’s dream of founding “Societies for Enlightening People’s Minds” was not materialized, the new regime’s “Directorate of Religious Affairs” fulfilled the same task of “enlightening” people through the Friday

⁹⁸ Zürcher, E. J. Turkey: A Modern History, p. 171.

⁹⁹ Cited in Zürcher, E. J. Turkey: A Modern History, p. 349n6.

¹⁰⁰ Mardin, Ş. (2007). *Din ve İdeoloji*. İstanbul: İletişim, p.144.

¹⁰¹ *Garbcılar* means the ones who championed westernization as the only way of modernization and reforms.

¹⁰² Hanioglu, S. (1997). “*Garbcılar*: Their Attitudes Towards Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic,” *Studia Islamica*, 86, p.143.

sermons.¹⁰³ Furthermore, Abdullah Cevdet's¹⁰⁴, one of the outstanding figures of Garbçılar who spread his ideas on the modernization of religion by his publishing house, preface to one of the books of Dozy,¹⁰⁵ which he translated and published, is very important in terms of revealing the parallelisms of the interpretation of religion;

“One cannot become a Muslim by [adopting a Muslim] name, by fasting, and by performing namaz [...] Learned, erudite Doctor Dozy, who had spent his entire life with research and study, and who strived to enlighten the minds of ibadullah [Servants of God] and tried to be beneficial to people, is one hundred times more Muslim than vagabond Hamid's whose creation and desires are nefarious...Every learned and virtuous person is a Muslim. Any ignorant or immoral person is not a Muslim even if he comes from the lineage of the prophet.”¹⁰⁶

The discourse of defining a new understanding of religion depending on ethics and good manners and without the practical and social parts of it, like in the words of Cevdet, was also widely used in the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Plenty of examples of this will be presented in the next parts of the study.

Young Turk attitude towards politics was also similar to their attitudes towards religion. Many Young Turk thinkers and officials regarded political and administrative issues as so important that they could not be left to the masses. Therefore, they thought that the political and administrative affairs had to be handled not by the masses but by specialists.¹⁰⁷ These elitist tendencies of the Young Turks were not only bequeathed from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, but also they deeply penetrated all ranks of the bureaucracy and the urban middle and upper classes with the help of the long rule of the Kemalists as a one-party state. So how is this deeply entrenched elitist tendency reflected in contemporary Turkey?

2.2.3. The Contemporary Character of the Center-periphery Cleavage

¹⁰³ Hanioglu, S. Garbçılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion, p. 148.

¹⁰⁴ Abdullah Cevdet was one of the outstanding figures of Garbçılar that attempted to disseminate his ideas about modernized religion through his publishing house called İctihad. İctihad, that also the name of the journal published by Cevdet, literally meant the new interpretations of religion.

¹⁰⁵ Dozy, R. (1908). *Tarih-i İslamiyet*. Kahire: İctihad.

¹⁰⁶ Cited in Hanioglu, S. Garbçılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion, p. 138.

¹⁰⁷ Hanioglu, S. Garbçılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion, p. 145.

The question at the title of Mardin's 1974 article – "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" - should be answered for today. To what extent should Mardin's economical and political analysis be used today to explain the center-periphery relations? With which character does the center-periphery cleavage continue to exist today? These are the questions which should be answered before starting to analyze the February 28 and April 27 Processes with the theoretical perspective drawn by Mardin.

First of all, the economical aspect of the center- periphery cleavage still exists today. To some extent it can be claimed that the periphery of the country is articulated to the capitalist economy and therefore economics is not a major medium of center-periphery cleavage. However, the state mechanism still exists as one of the largest institutions one can earn a living.¹⁰⁸ The amount of total economic activity directly controlled by state has decreased, but state related income still serves as a differentiating point for the state elites and the masses. Moreover, the income of the bureaucrats is still not affected by market relations, similarly to the condition of the Ottoman officials who were not taxpayers. Economy is still not a variable for bureaucrats when they use the state authority. The best example of this issue is the economical crises Turkey faced until recent years. The reason for such crises was basically political. The state elites always constituted one of the sides of the crises- e.g. the crisis that originated from a discussion between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Sezer in November 2000- but they have never been affected by the crises as the masses have been. They continued living in their houses provided by the state, taking their salaries from the state, and going on holidays to the holiday spots provided for bureaucrats by state.

The modernization process of Turkey has some positive material results in terms of the center-periphery relations. Except for the extremely remote corners of the country, the centralization plan of state is fulfilled by developed communication and transport facilities. Therefore, geographic position is not as important as it was in the early times of Republic. In addition, migration to the cities has also removed the centrality of geography from the center-periphery cleavage, because through migration the peripheral elements were brought to the town. In other words, the peripheral objects of the rural areas were also carried to center. Center-periphery is no longer geographic but continues to be political, social and cultural. The periphery now means the sum of all others except those who share social, cultural and political perceptions of the center.

¹⁰⁸ According to Manpower Group's survey, with its %23 increase rate, state related sectors will be one of the major employers in Turkey in 2012. For details see: ManpowerGroup. (2011). The Manpower Employment Outlook Survey for Turkey, accessed January 6, 2012. http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/MAN/1609502928x0x528392/6162B8F4-D0CE-4BF6-852E-93FFE8941AB9/Turkey_4Col_Q112.pdf

Under such conditions, the center of the society makes excessive usage of the fragmented image of society for peripherization of the other parts of society. Every layer of the social strata, every fragment of the society, and every single institution or individual needs the assistance of the state to survive. The Alevis need the assistance of the center in order to be saved from repression. The Sunnis need the assistance of the center to continue their religious activity, whose only legal medium is controlled by state. Even leftist intellectuals condone the tyrannical and undemocratic treatment of conservative actors for the sake of safety from the rising danger of reaction. Similarly, some twenty years ago nationalists needed the state to fight against the rising danger of communism because both nationalists and the state apparatus regarded the leftist activism of the 1970s and 1980s as the major threat against the unity of the state.

Through the fragmentation of civil society, the state emerges as a chief partner of it: a partner which has ties to every element of the society but never becomes the exclusive domain of any of them. It stands above the rest of society, but not unrelated to them. Sometimes it plays mediator between two conflicting groups, sometimes it targets one, and sometimes even encourages and leads others to attack a target.

The peripheral reality of Turkey, which was easily ignored by the Turkish elites before, has gained public visibility and has become impossible to disregard with the help of the modernization achieved by the Republic. Therefore, the center-periphery cleavage has been brought to the center of society. In other words, the cleavage in the periphery had been somewhat solved by the isolation of the Kemalist elites from the periphery. However, the problem reemerged in the center by the move of the peripheral elements to the center of society. Generally speaking, the economic and cultural dimensions of the center- periphery problem were brought to the center through everyday practices, which again constituted a big problem considering the formalist and imitator character of the Kemalist modernization project. Therefore, it can be concluded that the center-periphery conflict continued to exist in a transformed state. However, this is not sufficient for understanding the February 28 and April 27 processes. The new conceptualization inspired by Mardin and Gramsci will be more useful for explaining these events.

2.3. The Historic Hegemonic Center

Before moving on to the factual history of the February 28 and April 27 processes, a discussion about the previously mentioned theoretical frameworks will be useful for merging theory with the actual case to which it is to be applied. Mardin's "Center-Periphery" concept and Gramsci's "Historic Bloc" can be merged in order to better analyze the activities of the Kemalists in the two intervention processes. In my study the historic bloc and the center correspond to the same societal reality. Indeed, the two concepts fill each other's gaps with regard to understanding the Turkish case.

To start with Gramsci, hegemony is a very useful conceptual instrument for this kind of analysis. Gramscian theory offers the opportunity to better understand the sides of the conflict in the February 28 and April 27 processes. In particular, a Gramscian explanation of the formation of a historic bloc is indispensable for explaining the broadness of the alliance against conservative politics and how these different figures with conflicting interests come together. Unlike other Marxist analyses, the strength of Gramsci for this study is the fact that his conceptualization makes room for non-economic factors. However, Gramsci is a post-Marxist and Marxist in the last instance. His initial question pertains to economic relations and class conflict. Even though he proposes a new concept and a new way of understanding class, the Marxist notion of class is always on the table as the starting point of conflict. This is a shortcoming for the analysis of the February 28 and April 27 processes, in particular, and debates over Turkish modernization and secularization in general. In the Turkish case it is not class positions and relations, but non-economic factors, modernization, secularization, westernization, etc. that lie at the root of the conflict.

The chief strength Mardin's center-periphery conceptualization for the analysis of the February 28 and April 27 processes is his theory's historical depth. The center-periphery conceptualization is helpful for historicizing the conflicts in the February 28 and April 27 processes. Furthermore, center-periphery analysis underlines the importance of secularization in the conflict. Also, other non-economic sources of the conflict, such as prestige, status, and culture are stressed in Mardin. But along with these strengths, Mardin's center-periphery analysis includes some weaknesses for the purposes of this case study. First of all, the theory is too constant and one-sided to explain the complexity of the February 28 and April 27 processes. It offers less in explaining how non-economic factors merged with economic factors, and why they always overlap. Secondly, although Mardin tries to avoid geographic determinism by including broader concepts such as status, prestige, culture, and education into his model of the center and periphery, the theory by its nature tends toward geographical determinism. The fault lines Mardin proposed as the origin of the conflict still exist today with the same background, but the periphery has now become the center and vice versa. Also,

with regard to the conclusion of this study, center-periphery analysis does not offer an explanation of the formation of conservative lifestyles, prestige, or status, which also means that it cannot explain how the conflict regenerates and reproduces itself again and again.

If center-periphery and hegemonic analyses were applied to the February 28 and April 27 Processes separately, Mardin's center and Gramsci's historic bloc would define the same social actors. Similarly, whether discussing the center or the historic bloc, the social segments excluded by these concepts would be the same. However, when using Mardin's center and Gramsci's historic bloc separately, the strengths and weaknesses of each concepts also stand separately. On the other hand, combining these concepts into that of the "historic hegemonic center" serves to eliminate their weaknesses and reinforce their strengths. By merging these two concepts both Mardin's historical depth and Gramsci's analytic functionality are preserved. The same social segments that are covered by the separate usage of the two concepts are covered by this combination and the weaknesses of the original concepts are eliminated.

The static character, theoretical limitations, and geographical dependency of Mardin's center-periphery analysis are overcome by Gramscian hegemony's analytical and theoretical depth and functionality, as in the concept sets of consent and coercion, and civil society and political society. On the other hand, the class-dependent analysis and overemphasis of economic factors in Gramscian hegemonic analysis are overcome by the historicity and inclusion of non-economic factors in Mardin's center-periphery analysis. Their weaknesses having thereby been eliminated, the theoretical explanations of Gramsci and Mardin become the most appropriate theories for discussing February 28 Process and April 27 processes.

So what is the "historic hegemonic center" discussed in this study? The existence of a historic hegemonic center and a subaltern periphery becomes clear in the conjunction of ideology, politics, culture, society, and economy. In the long history of Turkish modernization, there have been always supporters and opponents of modernizing reforms and ideology, politics, culture, society, and economy always worked to determine different social groups' support or opposition to modernization. However, only with the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the emergence of a Kemalist one-party state did the historic hegemonic center take on its combined ideological, cultural, political, and economic character.

Kemalism was the ideology of the one-party state and the only legitimate ideology in the country. Being a set of attitudes and ideas rather than a clearly defined ideology¹⁰⁹, Kemalism was the only medium of (legitimate) existence in any of the country's ideological, cultural, political, social, and economic spheres. The ideological and political spheres were determined and limited by the Kemalist principles of secularism, nationalism, republicanism, and populism. Reflections of populism could also be observed in the spheres of culture and society as the "cultural revolution" of Kemalism spread to the far corners of the country with the help of People's Houses¹¹⁰ and Village Institutes. As a necessary part of statism, the one-party state was also very active in the economic field, attempting to create a new national bourgeoisie that would be in full conformity with Kemalist principles. Finally, revolutionism/reformism stood as the general method of applying these principles and as a continuous support for reforms.

However, the historic hegemonic center was not as monolithic or static as initially intended. During the course of Republican history, there existed many different groups within the historic hegemonic center and the spheres in which the subaltern periphery expressed its opposition to the historic hegemonic center changed. However, despite these differences, changes, splits, alliances, and partial settlements, the existence of two different groups with conflicting interests, the historic hegemonic center and the subaltern periphery, can be clearly discerned. As in the case of the Democrat Party, in which the religious demands of conservatives overlapped with the political and economic demands of an alienated segment of the Kemalist elite, in almost every moment of republican history these conflicting interests were redefined and regenerated. More recently, The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association's (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği*, TÜSİAD) position in the February 28 Process, and *Sabah* and *Akşam*'s position in the April 27 Process are the best examples of such position changes. However, despite the changes, redefinitions, and regeneration of conflicting interests, the conflict between the historic hegemonic center and the subaltern periphery has always remained. Although ideas, policies, supporting and opposing groups, alliances, and grievances have shifted, there has always been an existing power group with its interests as a whole and with the sometimes conflicting particular interests of its members and an opposing group. On the one hand there existed those who identified their interests with the continuation of the existing establishment and, on the other hand, there were those who saw their interests in the replacement of the establishment. At this

¹⁰⁹ Zürcher, E. J. *Turkey: A Modern History*, p. 181.

¹¹⁰ People's Houses and Village Institutes were the indoctrination institutions established during single party rule. For more information on People's Houses, see: A. Lamprou, *Between Central State and Local Society: The People's Houses Institution and the Domestification of Reforms in Turkey (1932-1951)* (Phd Dissertation, Leiden University, 2009).

point, the concept of the historic hegemonic center is vital, as it refers to the historical character of the conflict, which includes transformation and continuity, and its hegemonic character, thanks to which the historic hegemonic center could unite its many members despite their conflicting self-interests. As a result, the concept is a valuable theoretical tool for the analysis of complex events such as the February 28 and April 27 processes.