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GOOD AND BAD MUSLIMS, REAL AND FAKE SECULARS

Center-periphery Relations and Hegemony in Turkey through the February 28 and April 27 Processes

door

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Geboren te Istanbul in 1983

Promotiecommissie

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1. Introduction

In the spring of 2007, I was attending a course entitled "Islam and Transnationalism" at Utrecht University, as a supplement to my MPhil study at the Department of Turkish Studies at Leiden University, which was in progress at the time. Being the only Turkish citizen in this course, on April 26 many of my classmates congratulated me on the presidency of Abdullah Gül, whom they considered president although the first round of the election had yet to take place. On the one hand, I politely reminded my friends that the elections were yet to come and their congratulations were kind, but a bit premature. On the other hand, they did remind me that the deadline for the candidacy had nearly passed, and Gül was the only candidate at the end with his party's parliamentary majority support. In the end I truly wished my worries to be put to rest, and I hoped that the presidential election process in Turkey would run smoothly and without incident. However, the Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri,* TSK) once again confirmed my anxiety and continued its tradition of intervening in politics.

Such incidents have unfortunately occurred once every decade, with the only exception being a military intervention in the beginning of 1990's, in which the TSK later revisited with the extensive February 28 Process in 1997. By the e-memorandum published from the its official website, the TSK declared that "reactionary danger"[1] arose in the presidency election process similar to the 31 March, Sheik Said and Menemen incidents and other military interventions in the Republican era. Also, according to the Kemalist discourse the same anti-republican, anti-secularist and backward stream of reaction was active in all of these cases. However, a critical historical and sociological analysis can raise some question marks about the underlying socio-political and economical power conflicts.

For example, consider the 31 March Incident in which the main demand of counter revolutionists who opposed the Second Constitutional Period in 1908 was the restoration of Shariah. Rebels organized around Dervis Vahdeti's *Volkan* newspaper started an armed insurrection in Istanbul for the restoration of Shariah. The rebels also demanded the dismissal of many statesman and officers that had supported the constitution and secular reforms. The movement of the counter-revolutionaries was successful and their demands were more or less fulfilled initially until the Action Army, *Harekat Ordusu*, which was organized by the Committee of Union and Progress, *Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, from the empire's Balkan

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[1] From now on naming practices of Kemalist discourse will not be expressed in brackets and this will not mean the writer's acceptation of the discursive weight of the concepts.

territories, occupied Istanbul and suppressed the rebellion. After the occupation of the city, martial law was introduced and two martial courts were established, executing a large number of rebels. A deeper analysis, which goes beyond the discourse of the official history, will mention that the main reason behind the acts of the counter-revolutionists, considerable number of whom were the ranker, *alaylı,* officers of the military, *ulema* and other civil servants, was not the abolition of the Shariah, but rather the government's policy of diminishing the number of civil servants in order to stop overstaffing in the bureaucracy.[2] This presented a real conflict for the *alaylı* officers whose primary source of income was from the government. Akşin also mentions that the discourse of the restoration of the Shariah was utilized during the revolt in spite of the fact that the general circumstances during the revolt were far away from a return to Islamic Rule.[3] However, the discourse on reaction, *irtica,* inherited from the 31 March Incident, was so deep and intense that even Akşin changed the title of his book in later editions to suggest fundamentalism as the true culprit even though his writing supported the opposite view.[4]

The Sheikh Said Rebellion also demonstrated the manipulation of the so-called anti-secularist actions to maintain the status quo and power relations. The rebellion that broke out in February 1925 was a result of growing Kurdish discontent in the southeastern regions of Turkey. After the Treaty of Lausanne, Kurds were far from getting the autonomy they had been promised during the independence struggle. Furthermore, with the abolition of the caliphate in the course of the secularization of the state by the Kemalists, the ties that bound Kurds and Turks together were also dissolved. At the same time, the nationalist polices of the republic, aimed at creating a national identity, were increasing. Under such circumstances, the outbreak of a rebellion in the Kurdish regions was not surprising. Although it was a rebellion motivated mostly by the Kurdish nationalist ideals more than any other, it was introduced as a reactionary movement and used for the repression of an emerging political opposition group, namely the Progressive Republican Party. The Progressive Republican Party was founded in 1924 by a group of parliamentarians who split from the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP). The new party was also secular and nationalist, but it adopted a more liberal opposition against the centralist, statist and authoritarian policies of the CHP. The Kemalist regime used the rebellion as an excuse to oppress political opposition and to introduce the antidemocratic Law of Maintenance of Order, *Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu*, although the Progressive Republicans fully supported the government in the suppression of

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[2] Zürcher, E. J. (2005). *Turkey: A Modern History*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 95-9.
[3] Akşin, S. (1972). *31 Mart Olayı*. İstanbul: Sinan Yayınları, p.290-2.
[4] Zürcher, E. J. (2002). "From Empire to Republic: Problems of Transition, Continuity and Change," Turkology Update Leiden Project Working Papers Archive, accessed February 18, 2007, http://tulp.leidenuniv.nl/content_docs/wap/fromtorep.pdf, p.25.

the revolt,[5] and the revolt was more or less suppressed before the introduction of the law.[6] As a result, The Ankara Independence Tribunal, *Ankara İstklal Mahkemesi*, which was martial court founded by the Law of Maintenance of Order, closed the Progressive Republican Party because of the accusation that the term "being respectful to religious ideas and faiths", "*efkar ve itikadi diniyeye hürmetkar*," in the party program was very suitable for the political exploitation of religion.[7] The story of the Progressive Republicans ended very dramatically, but the motto of, "political exploitation of religion" was inherited as one of the most frequently used slogans of the Kemalist establishment.

Five years later, the rising danger of reaction was seen elsewhere in Menemen, a town close to Izmir. According to the official history, on December 23, 1930, reactionary members of the outlawed Nakshibendi Sufi order[8], one of Turkey's most influential and widespread Sufi orders, arrived in Menemen from Manisa. Dervishes, members of the sufi order, led by Mehmet, started an uprising against the secular state with demands for the restoration of Shariah and the caliphate. After this outbreak, a group of gendarmes led by Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay, a young teacher and reserve officer in the army, attempted to force the rebels to surrender. However, Kubilay was unsuccessful and he was beheaded by the rebels. In short time, the additional gendarmerie units repressed the uprising. The incident would have been considered an ordinary criminal case if crowds in Menemen had done anything more than just watched the incident. The silence and non-protesting attitude of the inhabitants of Menemen was a real shock for the Kemalist leadership due to the fact that the silence of the inhabitants of Menemen was considered to be a silent and implicit support for the incident.[9] As a result, the government took harsh measures in the aftermath of this incident, arresting many people and declaring martial law. Although several years passed since this incident, the memory of Menemen is still alive in Turkey, as a demonstration of the Kemalist establishment's usage of the incident as a theme of the rising reactionary danger. Azak mentioned that despite the Kemalist determination of keeping Kubilay's memory alive, the incident and Kubilay were more or less forgotten in the late 1930's and 1940's.[10] However, the memory and image of Kubilay was revived in the 1950's as a result of the Kemalists losing power due to the transition into a multi-party system.[11] From the second popularity wave of Kubilay in the

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[5] Zürcher, E. J. (1991). *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party 1924-1925*. Leiden: E.J.Brill, p.81.
[6] Zürcher, E. J. Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic, p. 85.
[7] Sezgin, O. & Saylan, O. (1984)."Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası," in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.8, Murat Belge (eds). İstanbul: İletisim, p.2043.
[8] For an analyses of perception of Nakşibendis in the official ideology see; Şeker, F. M. (2007). *Cumhuriyet İdeolojisinin Nakşibendilik Tasavvuru: Şerif Mardin Örneği*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları.
[9] Zürcher, E. J. Turkey: A Modern History, p. 179.
[10] Azak, U. (2008). "Kubilay Icon of Secularism," *ISIM Review*, 21, p. 38.
[11] Azak, U. Kubilay Icon of Secularism, p. 38.

1950's onwards, the image of Kubilay served as the major medium for the Kemalists in secularism discussions.

Religious reaction, and the political exploitation of religious feelings, became the rationale behind a series of military interventions by the TSK that began with a military coup d'état in 1960 and continued with the recent April 27 Process. Although these rationales became the bedrock of the TSK's agenda, the tactics that the TSK used to address and justify their interventions to society evolved. In May of 1960, it was the creaking voice of colonel Alparslan Türkeş, who later founded and lead the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi,* MHP) told Turkish citizens that the TSK took over power in the country in order to liberate it from the grips of ambitious politicians who would most certainly lead the country into disaster. Furthermore, the military junta claimed that they took over power in order to re-establish democratic rule and also to cease the rising reactionary danger. The military junta began legislating itself with the introduction of the National Unity Council, *Milli Birlik Komitesi*, as the administrative body of the country. Meanwhile, the task of preparing a new constitution that would prevent ambitious politicians from leading the country into disaster again was entrusted to university professors. The military junta sought to transform the army, universities and the country's cultural life in accordance with the ethos of the military intervention; that is, limiting the effectiveness and power of civilian politics. The interventionist aims of the military junta were embodied in the National Security Council (*Milli Guvenlik Konseyi,* MGK), which was established as an advisory council to the government in internal and external affairs. In practice, the council worked as the basis for legitimizing the TSK's future interventions in civil politics, as in the cases of the February 28 and April 27 military interventions. Finally, the executions of overthrown Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers, Fatin Rustu Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, were the other legacies of the intervention that have always been remembered in the context of civilian-military relations in Turkey.

On the 12th of March, 1971, the TSK "was forced" to make an intervention by issuing a memorandum to the government. TSK announced, again by radio, the necessity of their intervention in order to stop fraternal fighting, a chaotic environment, but with the ultimate aim of fixing the so-called required conditions for a democratic rule. During the days prior to the TSK's memorandum, violence on streets and campuses had increased. The TSK asked the prime minister to establish a strong government that would be able to end the anarchy in the country. Upon receiving the memorandum, Prime Minister Demirel resigned and Nihat Erim, a CHP deputy, was appointed as the new prime minister in conformity with the TSK's will. Under the rule of Erim's technocrat government, the MGK increased its power both legally

and practically and started a war against terrorism by declaring martial law. During the witch-hunt that was operated by the MGK, the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*, MNP) of conservative politician Necmettin Erbakan and many leftist organizations were closed and many intellectuals and politicians were arrested and tortured.

Later, the TSK counterbalanced the low scale memorandum of 1971 and formed a coup d'état on the 12th of September, 1980. In the beginning of three year junta rule, which was marked with numerous instances of torture and murder, General Kenan Evren explained the justification behind the intervention, but this time from official state television channel; the TSK "was forced" once again to intervene in order to stop fraternal fighting, a chaotic environment, but once again with the ultimate aim to fix democracy in the country. Furthermore, the theme of rising reactionary danger also featured as a legitimizing element, as in the case of the Jerusalem Meeting organized by Erbakan's National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, MSP) in Konya a few months before the military intervention.[12] The basic aim of the military junta was to save country from politicians, who junta leaders regarded as wicked by nature. To achieve this aim, all parties were closed, the parliament was dissolved and all mayors were replaced with military personnel. The MGK increased its power under martial law and many intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, trade unionists, politicians and academicians were arrested and tortured. The "excuse" behind the mass arrests and torture was the fight against terrorism, in which the junta became successful to a certain extent. After three years of junta rule, the new constitution was put to a referendum at the end of which the constitution was accepted with 91.4 percent of the vote. The constitution increased the power of the MGK, limited basic liberties, granted legal immunity for the acts and members of the junta and appointed junta leader Evren as the new president with a temporary clause.

When it came to the 1990's, although ten years had passed since the last intervention, Turkey was far from the possibility of a repeated military intervention. It was widely believed that because of Turkey's established entrance to the global economic system, military interventions would completely cease. It was even claimed that with the advancement of communication and media technology, means to form a coup d'état by controlling strategic communication and media facilities such as television, radio stations, and post offices would not be possible. Indeed, such arguments at the time made sense to some extent. However, what was not foreseeable was the TSK's ability to rebuild its interventionist policy due to the

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[12] Jeremi Salt considered the meeting as the "last straw" for the military intervention. Salt, J. (1995). "Nationalism and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 31(1), p. 14-5.

general transformations the country was experiencing. The post-modern military intervention of the February 28 Process became the key indicator of the TSK's capacity and ability of transforming its avenues into intervention, also demonstrating the possibility of military intervention without the use of guns, but by simply using the influence of its civilian allies. The military intervention was dubbed "post-modern" by the deputy chief of general staff with reference to the TSK's capacity and ability to transform its means and methods of intervention. The military's familiar way of making military interventions -- with the use of guns – was regarded as the modern way of making military intervention. Thus, due to a superficial understanding of postmodernism -- regarding postmodernism as simply the next stage after modernism -- military intervention without guns was deemed post-modern. Announced as the peak point of the tension between TSK and government about rising reactionary danger several months before by newspapers and televisions, during an ordinary February 28th meeting of The National Security Council the TSK and its allies broadcasted an intervention live for the Turkish people to watch. The results of this type of intervention exercised through the civil domain was much more destructive in terms of civilian psyche than a typical one in the political domain.

The same optimistic point of view of my classmates was again shared on the eve of the presidential elections in 2007. "Never Again," was the instant answer in response to questions about the possibility of a military intervention against the election of a Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) member as the president, which was regarded as a potential sign of rising reactionary danger. However on the night of April 27 during the first round of the presidential election, the TSK issued an e-memorandum from its official web site. Giving the various examples of reactionary acts from some corners of Turkey, the TSK again warned against rising reactionary danger. What made the April 27 Process unique was not only TSK's usage of the internet technology, but also another memorandum that warned the TSK about its duties and responsibilities against government; the government's counter memorandum to the TSK.

What was this reaction and who were these reactionaries who insistently worked for the restoration of shariah rule from 1908 onwards in spite of the changing political regimes, social, cultural and economical conditions in the course of the transition from Empire to Republic and transition in the course of Republic as well? Roughly speaking, these people were the religiously conservatives[13] of Turkey including masses, politicians, poets, sufi

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[13] From now one "conservative" will be used instead of "religiously conservative." Conservatism in Turkey has more religious tones rather than political. For a more detailed discussion about conservatism in see; Frey, F. (1956). *The Turkish Political Elite*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, p.329-330, 378, 411.

circles, writers, artisans, and craftsman masses. They were intellectuals and politicians who opposed to the Committee of Union and Progress, claiming that its rule was more authoritarian than Abdulhamid II; they were Kurdish conservatives, who were unsatisfied with the nationalist and secular modernization policies of the Kemalists in the Sheik Said rebellion; they were villagers that were economically exhausted as a result of endless demands of the Kemalist regime; he was the local imam who organized the National Struggle in his town but later was expelled to the margins of society because of his traditional conservative ideas and lifestyle; they were the conservative youngsters and their families who wanted their children to be educated in official, mass education institutions of state – and therefore took its share from the modernization of the country – and receive religious education as well and as a result preferred İmam-Hatip Schools; they were Sufi Sheiks who occupied the posts of deputy presidents of First Grand National Assembly; he was Mehmet Akif Ersoy, the writer of the national anthem of Republic but later self exiled himself in Egypt; they were the whole population of Anatolia – but not urban dwellers and bureaucrats of the new regime – that were culturally, politically and economically marginalized by Kemalists and saw the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti,* DP) as a medium of opposition against Kemalists; they were socially and economically handicapped new inhabitants of large cities and conservative rural people that voted for the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP); and of course they were some marginal radical groups who demanded a so called Islamic State; but in total they were the mass majority of Turkey that expressed its politico-economical demands with a conservative religious tone, and used every opportunity to resist against the Kemalist hegemony.

This dissertation aims to examine the story of these conservatives and their demands in 1990's and 2000's to some extent and also the hegemonic Kemalist groups' ways of suppressing these demands, of taking back the positions conservatives gained, and of carrying back the achievements conservatives gained as a result of their struggle against the Kemalist hegemony. For facilitating such a research project, the current academic literature has some specific strengths and weaknesses. To begin with strengths, one should count the plenty of resources from many different theoretical schools that are devoted to understanding the "secularism discussion"[14], the "rise of political Islam"[15], and "Islam"[16] in Turkey. Aside from this general literature, there also some examples of academic work that are specifically

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[14] For example see: Çınar, A. (2005). *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Somer, M. (2007) "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly*, 28(7), 1271-1289.

[15] For example, see: Yavuz, H. (2003). *Islamic Political Identity In Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Salt, J. (1995). "Nationalism and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 31(1), 13-27.

[16] For example, see: Kara, İ. (2009). *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları; Mardin, Ş. (2007). *Din ve İdeoloji*. İstanbul: İletişim; Duran, B. (2005). "Cumhuriyet Dönemi İslamcılığı," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, Yasin Aktay (eds.), 129-156, Istanbul: İletişim.

focused on the February 28 and April 27 Processes.[17] However, the literature has so far not addressed the hegemonic perspective of the conflict between Kemalists and conservatives. As will be explained in the coming chapters, although the conflict between Kemalists and conservatives has ideological, cultural, and economic dimensions, none of these domains is explanatory on its own. To cover the conflict comprehensively, a combined hegemonic (using Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony) and historical (using Mardin's center-periphery conceptualization) approach is required. At this point, the works of Cihan Tuğal[18] and Necmi Erdoğan[19] should be mentioned as samples of a hegemonic perspective. Tuğal tries to understand the conservatives and their transformation within a hegemonic perspective; his is a thought-provoking and path-breaking approach, but one that differs from what this dissertation tries to do. On the other hand, Erdoğan examines the Kemalist NGOs' contribution to the reproduction of Kemalist hegemony and such a perspective has made a significant contribution to this research.

Another gap in the existing literature on the February 28 and April 27 Processes is in the media and discursive perspective. Although there are a limited number of works on the political-economy of the Turkish media[20] and its discourses[21], a joint perspective that focuses both on the political economy of the media and media discourse, while also taking into account the ideological and hegemonic position of the media, is missing. This is a gap the present research project aims to fill.

After this introductory chapter, the second chapter will be about the theoretical background. I will make use of two theoretical bodies; Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony and Şerif Mardin's application of center-periphery analyses to the Turkish case. I do not consider the cleavage between the Kemalist elites and the conservative masses as a unidirectional one that only originated religiously or economically. Instead, the weight of religious, cultural, economical and social differentiations between the Kemalist elites and conservative masses are equal, and every single element constitutes a motivating factor for the other elements.

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[17] For example see: Cizre, Ü.& Çınar, M. (2003) . "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102(2/3), 309-332; Çarkoğlu, A. (2007). "A New Electoral Victory for 'Pro-Islamists' or the 'New Centre-Right'? The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey," *South European Society and Politics*, 12(4), 501-519.
[18] Tuğal, C. (2009). Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism. Stanford University Press, California; Tuğal, C. (2007). "NATO's Islamists: Hegemony and Americanization," *New Left Review,* 44, 5–34.
[19] Erdoğan, N. (2000). "Kemalist Non- Governmental Organizations: Troubled Elites in Defence of a Sacred Heritage," in *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey*, Gunter Seufert and Karin Vorhoff (eds.), 251-282. Istanbul: Orient-Institut.
[20] For example see: Adaklı, G. (2006). *Türkiye'de Medya Endüstirisi: Neoliberalizm Çağında Mülkiyet ve Kontrol İlişkileri*. Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi; Tılıç, D. L. (2009). *Utanıyorum Ama Gazeteciyim: Türkiye'de ve Yunanistan'da Gazetecilik*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
[21] For example see: Heper, M. & Demirel T. (1996). "The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32(2), 109-123.

Due to this aspect, the Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony offers tremendous theoretical opportunities for these analyses. As will be explained in the coming chapter, the conceptual subsets of hegemony give the opportunity of bringing non-economical factors to the discussion; (1) the "consent" and "coercion" subset is explanatory for the role and function of the different actors' of Kemalist hegemonic group and urban middle class' mobilization against conservatives; (2) "civil society" and "political society" explain the different realms through which hegemonic power was exercised over conservatives in the February 28 and April 27 Processes; and finally (3) the differentiation between "organic and traditional intellectuals" and the "intellectual and moral leadership" function of the traditional intellectuals offer an explanatory theoretical base for locating the role of media. Also, "Historic Bloc" is a good theoretical tool for the analyses of the alliance of different elements of Kemalist elites despite their conflicting interests.

Mardin's center-periphery account will be the second theoretical framework I will use for the analyses of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. The main function of Mardin's theory will be localizing the meta-analyses of center-periphery relations for Turkey. As the Gramscian explanation of hegemony is derived from Gramsci's general reading of Italian history and the establishment of the fascist regime in Italy, Mardin further helps in adopting the Italian case to the Turkish one. Mardin also emphases the continuity between the Ottoman and Republican period and that will be helpful in building the next steps of continuity; the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Another strength of Mardin's center-periphery analyses is how it encompasses both cultural and economical aspects of the cleavage between the center and periphery, and that will be essential in displaying both the cultural and economical aspects of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Finally, the contemporary character of the center-periphery analyses will be one of the basic pillars behind the theoretical analyses of my cases.

At the end of the theoretical framework chapter, I will make a conceptualization for the analyses of the February 28 and April 27 Processes: the "Historic Hegemonic Center". The combination of these two concepts helps both to eliminate their weaknesses and combine their strengths. As a result of merging these two concepts, both Mardin's historical depth and Gramsci's analytic functionality are preserved. The static character, theoretical limitations, and geographical dependency of Mardin's center-periphery analysis are overcome by Gramscian hegemony's analytical and theoretical depth and functionality, as in the concept sets of consent and coercion, and civil society and political society. On the other hand, the class-dependent analysis and the significance of economic factors in Gramscian hegemonic

analysis are overcome by the historicity and inclusion of non-economic factors in Mardin's center-periphery analysis.

After theoretical explanations, the historical account will take the floor. In this context, I will firstly focus on the February 28 Process. The account of the February 28 Process will start with the explanation of the rise of the RP, and the dynamics that made the RP the electorate's first choice. By focusing on the rise of the RP and seeking out the factors that made the RP the winner of the 1995 elections, the interrelatedness of ideological, social, political and economic factors of the conflict between the conservative masses and historic hegemonic center will be elaborated. In so doing, the RP will be situated in its place in the history of Turkish politics. After that the chapter will continue with the RP's story and its coalition government with the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP) will be the focus. The RP's eagerness to participate in a coalition government, its search for legitimacy through ruling the country, and its ideological compromises with the TSK will explain the RP's will to fill the political gap in the center of Turkish politics. As the discussion on the rising danger of reaction started after the RP's coalition, it will also take its share in the analyses. In this part, major reactionary incidents will be analyzed. The primary focus will not be on the nature of the events, but on how such incidents were manipulated for the sake of military intervention. Then, the focus will shift to the historic hegemonic center's reaction to the rising danger of reaction, and the MGK and its briefings. The key role played by the MGK and how it was effective in the formation of the front against the RP will be the main subject of this section. As a result of the MGK's activities, the mobilization of the urban middle class masses will be told under the title of "Civil' Society at Work." The functions of Gramscian civil society and how it made a military intervention possible without the use of guns will be elaborated. The media's manipulation of the Susurluk case and attempt to build support against the RP through Susurluk will be explained as crucial tasks of civil society in the February 28 Process. As a last word about the February 28 Process, the hegemonic character, and the aims of the intervention will be analyzed in the frame of "The Process Lasts, Ad Infinutum". The way in which the 'ad infinutum' character of the February 28 Process aimed to destroy the social, political, and economic bases of conservative politics in Turkey is the major question that will be answered.

The story of the April 27 Process will be the following chapter after the chapter about the February 28 Process. The chapter on the AKP will start with an account of social and political atmosphere on the eve of the 2002 general elections. The account of the social and political atmosphere on the eve of the 2002 general elections will be explanatory about the rise of the

AKP in 2002 elections. Like the rise of RP in the previous chapter, the rise of the AKP will also be analyzed through the conjunction of both economic and non-economic factors. After the explanation of rise of the AKP, the focus will shift to the conflict between the AKP and the historic hegemonic center and how this conflict peaked with the presidential election process and further materialized with the e-memorandum. In this section the importance of the election of a president from the ranks of the AKP and its danger for the existing historic hegemonic center will be the main focus. It will be shown that the election of a president from the AKP's ranks was not only about losing one more front to the AKP, but that it also had a symbolic and effective role in hegemonic relations. Contrary to the handling of the RP, the reading of the rise of the AKP will continue with a literature review. From a Gramscian perspective, this thesis argues that although all existing orientalist, modernist, political-economic, social movements, and modernity and civil society explanations have points in explaining the rise of the AKP after 2002 to some extent, they offer very limited information about the period between 1997 and 2002, a time in which the true reasons of the rise of the AKP should further researched. Therefore, a search for an alternative account will take place after the review of existing literature about AKP. An alternative account that attempts to explain all aspects of the case that are not covered by the existing explanations should be based on the political and social atmosphere following the February 28 Process: that is, the developments of the period between 1997 and 2001. By doing so the relationship between the February 28 Process and the April 27 Process and the ways in which these processes reflected the hegemonic crisis of the existing historic hegemonic bloc will be analyzed.

The fifth chapter will be the scene of research results and a focus on the analyses of newspaper discourse during the February 28 and April 27 Processes. The chapter will start with a brief introduction to the discourse analyses model chosen for the study. Among many different approaches, Norman Fairclough's attention to text as well as discourse, his methodological inquiries, and the scope he provides for society-power relations seem to make his model the most appropriate. Fairclough's three-dimensional model for critical discourse analysis -- focusing on text, discursive practice and social practice -- will be the methodological tool of this study. After that, the justification of sample newspapers at that time period will appear in addition to criteria of inclusion and exclusion. In this discourse analysis, *Milliyet* will be examined for its representation of the modern industrial bourgeoisie, *Cumhuriyet* for its hardcore Kemalist, statist, and elitist discourse, *Sabah* for its liberal attitude targeting the urban middle classes and white-collar workers, and, finally, *Akşam,* for its insights into the mobilization of the urban poor, artisans and craftsmen. After some brief information on the fundamentals of selected methodology, a chapter will evolve with two structurally identical subtopics, respectively reserved for the February 28 and April 27

Process. Each of these subtopics will start with a textual analysis. In this part, textual characteristics of newspapers' discourse on basic incidents in these Processes will be displayed through their coverage. The February 28 Process is rich in controversial incidents, such as the establishment of the Refahyol government, the Susurluk scandal, the Fadime Şahin incident and various military briefings, that enable the observation of different textual practices. The newspapers' coverage of the TSK's memorandum will be the major object of analysis with regard to textual practices in the April 27 Process. Also, a discursive practices section that contains three subcategories will follow the textual analyses. The discursive practice is one of the mediums through which different social practices become possible and, therefore, each subcategory will cover a dominant discursive practice, a grand narrative, in the newspapers' coverage during the Processes; Good vs. Bad Muslims, Moderate and Creeping Islamization, and Islamic Revolution. Each subcategory, each grand narrative, also aims to create a social practice. For example, in the case of the Good vs. Bad Muslim discursive practice, the very aim of defining the true version of Islam is to label, define, and then repress a false or bad version of Islam. In this section grand narratives, i.e. explanations and ideas that are generated for explaining history and for generating generalizations, will also be included in the discourse analysis, as they gave some idea of how conservatives are made to be associated with international and historical examples of religious reaction. In the light of these textual analyses and discursive practices, the social aspect of discourse will be explained in the social practices section. In this part, the contribution of different civil society actors to these processes and their discourses will be analyzed through each newspaper's coverage. The results derived from these textual and discursive practices will be identified in the hegemonic analysis of the two military intervention processes, with a special focus on the activities of other members of the historic hegemonic bloc.

In the closing chapter, I will compare the results of the February 28 and April 27 Process. This final comparison will lead me to analyze the retreat of the historic hegemonic center, and to the argument that at this point the conservative *national popular* begins to replace the regressing historic hegemonic center. Finally, under the light of this argument, I will propose further research questions that will focus on the emerging conservative *national popular*.

Finally, I should state that some parts of this dissertation were submitted as a part of fulfillment of the degree of Master of Philosophy of Turkish Studies department at Leiden University.

2. Theoretical Framework: Hegemony and Center-Periphery

2.1. Gramsci's Theory of Hegemony

There is a common tendency to treat great theories as perfect prescriptions which are applicable to every condition. However, the greatness of a theory or more generally of an intellectual concept, is not its ability to work in every condition, rather its ability to provide an intellectual basis for one of the possible specific explanations it pertains to. Furthermore, treating intellectual concepts in this fashion saves social scientists from being in a position in which quality controllers stigmatize intellectual concepts as good or bad. This in turn will assist social scientists, by increasing the number of possible theoretical frameworks which can be used for answering specific questions.

Such a treatment of great theories, by using them as not ultimate theories, leads to a decrease in the expectation of social scientists from the theory and an increase in the practicality and inspiration of the theory. To illustrate, analyzing the Marxist theory by this framework gives us the chance of using it for problems of the contemporary world. Originally, Marxist theory was a historical model which claimed to explain the world from a historical-economic perspective. Blaming Marxist theory as useless as a result of its determinism and failure of its foresights is one extreme, the other of which is trying to find class positions that are exclusively and exhaustively determined by the economy. However, it is not so difficult to find a moderate way to understand and use Marxist theory. Taking into account the conditions of the industrial revolution and its practice in England, is key to a moderate application of Marxist theory. Taking into consideration the extreme working conditions of the textile industry in England such as long work days, no means of work place security, and the non-existence of any kind of social security regulations can somewhat justify the relative extremeness of Marx's theory.

Throughout the twentieth century, social scientists from different disciplines have understood and used Marxist theory. Particular figures tried to eliminate particular shortcomings of the theory and also modified certain parts of the theory according to their intellectual positions. Among many scholars, Althusser tried to elaborate on the concept of ideology and false consciousness, whereas figures like Lukacs and Korch introduced a more super-structural Marxist interpretation, and Gramsci is one of the few who tried to break the vicious cycle of economic determinism and class reductionism in Marxist theory.

As some scholars such as Mouffe and Laclau have mentioned, the Gramscian interpretation of Marxism, a philosophy of praxis in his own words, is still problematic in the spheres of economics and class reductionism. However, his openings in the sphere of the superstructure of the Marxist theory made it possible to use his explanations in various other disciplines of social sciences. His key concept of hegemony served as the basic tool for scholars from international relations to cultural studies and even from media studies to politics.

Roughly speaking, hegemony is a type of leadership, which is based on securing the consent of the subordinated through the intellectual and the moral leadership in the sphere of civil society. The conceptualization of hegemony is based on three binaries, namely (1) consent and coercion, (2) civil society and political society, and (3) organic and traditional intellectuals. Therefore an analysis of these binaries has a leading role in understanding the Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony. However, there is a basic methodological difficulty in this analysis. These three concepts and hegemony are so intertwined that it is nearly impossible to make a particular analysis for one of them without referring to the others. For example, it is impossible to talk about organic and traditional intellectuals without referring to hegemony, or vice versa. Yet, because I need a starting point to draw my theoretical framework, I will start with the analysis of binaries, although such an analysis has the potential danger of stabilizing and schematizing the theory. The way I can overcome this potential danger is by simply making frequent references to other sets of Gramscian concepts in every step of the explanation.

2.1.1. Consent and Coercion

The relationship between the ruler and the ruled has been one of the most discussed issues of socail sciences. The questions of why the ruled people accept the domination of a ruler and what kinds of dynamics prevented them from rising against domination have been popular questions of political sociology. Generally speaking, we can categorize explanations in a range of one extreme at which there stands physical domination, to another that is based on psychological factors. However, the sphere of domination is a complicated issue and cannot be explained in simple terms. Furthermore, there is a common innate acceptance of the fact that people should naturally resist or try to resist domination, but they cannot do so as a result of the inexistence of certain motivations, conditions and means.

Political scientists do not bear in mind that ordinary people do not have as many problems with domination as they themselves do. There is a chance that people simply are not interested in resistance as a result of their attempts to build their own living, or simply are not capable of considering a different type of organization of society.[22] That is the point Gramsci tried to elucidate with the concept of consent. His question was simple: he observed the conditions of both the agrarian population in the south of Italy and also the proletariat of the north. As a result of his observations, he concluded that the conditions and standards of subaltern people in Italy were so awful that they were on the edge of starting a revolution, as Marx suggested. However, during his political activism and prison years, he unfortunately observed the rise of the fascist movement with the support of the agrarian and working population, which was originally expected to support the revolution according to the suggestions of Marx. Unfortunately, the facts were not fitting the theory. It is at this junction that Gramsci chose to change or modify his theory instead of manipulating the facts as many in his position often do.

There was a consent-based relationship between the ruled and the ruling classes in Gramsci's Italy, and this specific kind of relationship was the real reason for the subaltern people's support of the fascist regime instead of a revolution. Although the fascist regime of Italy used coercion as a means of domination from time to time, it was impossible to lead the whole nation, which consisted of different and conflicting interest groups, only by coercion. However, the two, of course, are related and are parts of a division of labor in the rule of society. At this point, before focusing on the relationships and positions of the two in the rule of society, it is more practical to elaborate on these concepts. Gramsci defines consent and coercion as "the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government" which consist of " the "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; that is, consent is "historically" caused by prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production," and "the apparatus of state coercive power which "legally" enforces discipline on those groups who do not "consent" either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of the moments of crisis of commands and direction when spontaneous consent has failed."[23] It is very clear from this definition that consent and coercion are two *sine qua non* components of hegemony and political government. The routine is the consenting of the subaltern classes to the historically prestigious dominant fundamental group. However, the existence of ordinary and mundane consent does not exclude the potential for

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[22] Strinati, D. (1996). *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture*. London and New York: Routledge, p.174.
[23] Gramsci, A. (2005). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, p.12.

coercion or need for coercion, because consent may cease to exist as a result of moments of crisis.

One potential and frequent failure in the analysis of relationships of consent and coercion is considering them in a linear and hierarchical order in which consent is considered as the next step of coercion. In other words, it is the idea of gaining consent as the next and more developed tool of domination after having monopoly of coercive power. This kind of interpretation of consent and coercion or leading and domination was rejected by Gramsci himself. As he mentioned, a dominant group must have the ability to lead before it grasps governmental power, and furthermore it must continue to grasp it resolutely during its era of domination.[24] In Gramsci's terminology, leading is in the sphere of consent, and domination is in the sphere of coercion. Therefore, we can practically convert this sentence to: a dominant group must gain consent before it holds the coercive power, and continue to have consent after it gains coercive power. Consequently, contrary to what is supposed, coercion and consent are not opposites of each other in Gramsci's conceptualization; rather, coercion is imminent to the organization of consent.[25]

After clarifying the relationship between consent and coercion, we can focus on the necessity of consent for a hegemonic relationship. Domination based relationships without the active and passive consent of the subaltern groups are subject to collapse. Each social group in some way can practice leadership over some others and gain their consent. However, universalizing this domination, securing it regardless of time and respondents is only possible with the gaining of consent. Local and limited domination is usual and has nothing to do with hegemony. As Gramsci wrote, "Although every party is the expression of a social group, and of one social group only, nevertheless in certain given conditions certain parties represent a single social group precisely in so far as they exercise a balancing and arbitrating between the interest of their group and those of other groups, and succeed in securing the development of the group which they represent with the consent and assistance of the allied groups-if not out and out with that of groups which are definitely hostile."[26] Hegemony is more than simply dominating or representing one group. Organization of more than one social group with conflicting interests- and their conflicting interests are more than a simple power relationship- is only possible with consent. To achieve hegemony, the dominant group should gain the consent of its allied subaltern groups even when acting against these groups' interests. Then the question is the possibility of consent and if it is possible, the means of securing consent. It

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[24] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 57-8.
[25] Ives, P. (2004). *Language and Hegemony in Gramsci*. London: Pluto, p. 64.
[26] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 148.

is possible according to Gramsci and the means of securing consent is something very much related to ideological and moral leadership which will be explained in a detailed fashion in the following parts. However, for now it is efficacious to mention that: the hegemonic group does not intrinsically have consent nor does it demand it from its subalterns. It 'educates' its subalterns to gain consent.[27]

What is the effect of consent in the survival of a system? What is the role of consent in a hegemonic system? What is the centrality of consent in the establishment of hegemony? Answers of these questions are mostly left to the general discussion about hegemony. But it is possible to have an idea by looking at some characteristics of a hegemonic system. Gramsci presents democracy[28] and the ability of becoming a popular religion[29] as *sine qua non* conditions of a hegemonic system and these functions of a hegemonic system are only possible with consent. In a consent-based hegemonic relationship, the ruled people should be in a condition of complete illusion of determining or resisting on their part. Under such conditions, it is the very activity of consent which reproduces the hegemonic system even when people think that they are resisting the hegemony. It is the activity of consent which makes a hegemonic system a popular religion due to the fact that the subaltern groups do not even realize that they are living in a sphere of hegemony and are tied to this hegemonic sphere by consent. As a result, consent in the Gramscian sense is a continuous process of developing consent without being recognized as such, and civil society is the medium of this process.

2.1.2. Civil Society and Political Society

The distinction between civil society and political society is another contribution of Gramsci to Marxist theory. Up until the time of Gramsci, the characteristics of civil society or the functions of civil society had been always attributed to the superstructure. That is why many Marxist scholars did not care about civil society as they treated it as a superstructural issue which is not more than a reflection of the base structure. In this respect, Gramsci's quest for civil society is totally outside of Marxism. However, there is another way to appreciate the place of Gramsci's concept of civil society in Marxist theory. A retrospective search for the roots of the concept of civil society leads us to Hegel who had a considerable influence on

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[27] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 259.
[28] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 56n.
[29] Mouffe, C. (1979). "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, Chantal Mouffe (eds.), 168-204. London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, p.194.

Marx and Marxism. According to Bobbio, the distinction between civil society and political society goes back to Hegel, as the definition of civil society was borrowed from Hegel.[30]

Like the other concepts of Gramsci, it is impossible to understand the distinction between civil and political society without referring to hegemony. For now, we can roughly define civil society as "the ensemble of organisms commonly called private."[31] This is a definition which will be modified later just as Gramsci modified it, but for now we will use it to understand the relationship of hegemony with civil society. By using this concept, Gramsci opened space for culture and ideology, which were cramped for space in the classical Marxism's category of superstructure. Therefore, popular culture and the mass media, which is its main medium in modern societies, can be read and appreciated in the hegemonic sphere of civil society.[32]

However, Gramsci did not totally deny the function of civil society as a superstructural element. Furthermore, he talks about the superstructures of civil society; that is, the elements of civil society such as cultural institutions and intellectuals. As he stated; "the superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare."[33] Cultural institutions and intellectuals play the role of the trench system in a crisis of capitalism as the outer defense perimeter of the military collapses first in an attack. In times of crisis, civil society will play the same role, as it will try to defend the whole hegemonic system. If it is not powerful enough to defend whole hegemonic system, the system would sacrifice civil society institutions, like the sacrifice of the outer perimeters of an army in an enemy attack.

As Gramsci defined civil society as private, it is also a matter of personal behaviour, preferences and norms because it is a matter of organized cultural institutions.[34] Then, as much as regulated institutions of civil society strike root inside the segments of a society, hegemonic power is personalized and internalized. Therefore, certain functions of state power are transferred to civil society and the people who are subject to it internalize these functions. This internalization prepares the way for the production of consent. The dual layers in civil society, i.e. private layer and institutions, have a direct relationship. On the one hand there are constraints and freedom as structure and superstructure respectively, and on the other hand there are force and consent produced by institutions and ideologies respectively.[35] Individuals

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[30] Bobbio, N. (1979). "Gramsci and Conception of Civil Society," in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, Chantal Mouffe (eds.), 21-47. London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, p.30.
[31] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 12.
[32] Strinati, D. An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture, p.169.
[33] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 235.
[34] Jones, S. (2006). Antonio Gramsci. London& New York: Routledge, p.32.
[35] Bobbio, N. Gramsci and Conception of Civil Society, p.36.

in the sphere of civil society seem to make choices freely, but this freedom is a superstructural matter. In the base structure, either force of institutions or consent of subjects guarantees their "right" choices. This is the very operation of hegemony, which appears to be democratic, but actually is not. Consequently, the productive character of capitalism is also seen in the sphere of civil society. The "ethico-political dimension" of the mode of production is stressed by the term civil society whereas economical, political and ideological dimensions are stressed in classical Marxism.[36] The fourth dimension of the mode of production is something found in western countries according to Gramsci. In these countries, civil society is much more developed than it is in the eastern ones and that is why a revolution became possible in Russia where civil society was not developed. Therefore, the revolutionary groups in western countries should bear in mind that there are developed civil society structures and also superstructures in their countries and that thus they should adopt specific strategies, which will also include the organization of civil society besides political society and the state.

The organization of political society is something different from civil society. Political society is more tied to the state and there is an organic relationship between the two of them. From time to time Gramsci also uses political society as a synonym for the state apparatus. Furthermore, political society can be defined as a sphere in which the state uses the legal apparatus to discipline those who are undisciplined and are not developing consent. Regardless of the reason for the inexistence of consent, either as a result of a crisis of capitalism or a normative situation, the coercive capacity of the hegemonic group operates through political society to rebuild consent.

Gramsci's interpretation of the state has a key role in understanding the distinction between civil and political society. The definition of state for Gramsci is not static, even if it is possible to find different definitions of state. Therefore, this shift in the conception of state also changes the meaning of the distinction between political society and civil society. However, it is still possible to assemble different definitions and form a specific one for specific purposes as Gramsci did. For example, it is possible to derive extended and restricted notions of the state from Gramsci's Prison Notebooks. The extended notion of state is fused with both civil and political society. In this notion of state, it is possible to observe the reciprocal and synchronous existence of the political and civil society. On the other hand, the restricted notion of state consists of the administrative and governmental apparatus of the state and it is more closely linked to political society. Gramsci did not directly define these

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[36] Gill, S. (1990). *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p.42.

different notions, but he talked about the state differently in different cases. It is the extended notion of state when talking about the success of Jacobins in forming a national popular, whereas it is the restricted notion of state when talking about the formation of the Italian nation-state.

Although distinction of civil and political society exists in the restricted notion of state, civil and political society are intertwined in most cases. Gramsci himself mentioned this as he made the distinction not organically but methodologically.[37] Gramsci used civil society to point out the relation between the state, in the restricted notion, and civil society. Thus, he underlined the dependency of civil society on the state. That's why, in some cases, he defined the state as only a political society, whereas in others as a combination of civil and political society. Consequently, civil society in Gramsci is more than a simple matter of superstructure; it's a superstructural reality. The distinction between political society and civil society is also superstructural. Political society and civil society are different superstructural reflections of the base structural hegemonic state. Intellectuals play a major role in hiding the base structural hegemonic reality and presenting it as political society and civil society.

2.1.3. Organic and Traditional Intellectuals

The question of intellectual and moral leadership always goes hand in hand with the question of ideology. In classical Marxism, the question of ideology is considered within the limits of superstructure. However, Gramsci gave more attention to ideology as he moved the question to a different sphere, and focused on the role of ideology in the securing of hegemony. Thus, intellectuals emerged as a chief category in the analysis of ideology.

Before elaborating on intellectual and moral leadership, it is essential to define the concept of intellectuals in accordance with the wider usage of the concept in Gramscian terminology. Gramsci did not define intellectuals according to some intellectual and mental characteristics, rather he claimed that these mental characteristics, which are supposed to be the ones that intellectuals possess, are the general characteristics of all human beings and the question of being an intellectual or not is something which has more to do with functions. As he wrote, "All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the functions of intellectuals" and he explains this sentence with a footnote; "Thus, because it can happen that everyone at some time fries a couple of eggs or sews up a tear in jacket, we do

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[37] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 160.

not necessarily say that everyone is a cook or tailor."[38] The act of thinking or reaching some analytic conclusions are some general characteristics of humankind but only the systematic usage of these characteristics in a professional way with specific purposes is the function of intellectuals. The question of which kind of functions should be considered as intellectual functions depends on the conjuncture in a specific society.[39] For example, a trade unionist can be considered as an intellectual for industrialism, a university scholar would be the ideal model of an intellectual for positivism and an adman for consumerism. Therefore, the definition of being an intellectual changes according to the needs of the society at that time and what is needed for the ensuring of hegemony. The category of professionals who meet the needs of a hegemonic system in a specific period is called intellectuals.

The definition of intellectuals according to their functions is bidirectional. As Gramsci mentioned both the hegemony of the leading groups and the hegemony of the proletariat, he mentioned the intellectuals of the leading class and the intellectuals of the subaltern classes as well. This distinction is named as traditional and organic intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals are those who work for the continuation of the leading class hegemony whereas organic intellectuals work for the working class hegemony. However, these categories are not essential and *sui generis*. Just as the matter of being an intellectual is determined according to intellectual functions, the matter of being an organic or traditional intellectual depends on functions. That is, originating from the working class does not necessarily mean being an organic intellectual. A group of working class based intellectuals can be traditional if they support the hegemony of the leading class explicitly or implicitly. The best example of this category is trade unionists. They come from a working class origin, however in time they evolve into a category of working class elites and they work for the continuation of industrial production, not for the working class hegemony.

Gramsci explains the shift from organic intellectuals to traditional ones by the general formation of a category of intellectuals. He pointed out that different social classes have different intellectuals, but historically the leading class intellectuals absorb the intellectuals of other groups and form the category of intellectuals.[40] Therefore, we can talk about a specific solidarity of intellectuals which crosscuts the class solidarity of the subaltern classes.

Traditional intellectuals, as functionaries of the leading classes, present themselves as if they are not attached to the leading classes. By doing so, they present the interests and truths of the

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[38] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 9n.
[39] Jones, S. Antonio Gramsci, p.82.
[40] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 60.

leading classes as if they are objective truths and common interests. This is the continuation and legitimization of the *status quo*.[41] The manipulation of truths and interests has a key role in the assuring of hegemony, as Gramsci pays immense attention to the spontaneous character of hegemony. This misrepresentation is also the case for journalists. They also claim that they are true intellectuals and work for the objective truth and common interests of the society.[42] The production of truth and discourse is very central in the functioning of hegemony as it makes it more and more difficult for the subaltern groups to produce their language. Ives mentions that there is a huge gap between the thoughts and actions of subaltern groups which is the result of their inability to produce their own language and he writes;

> *"[...]there are discrepancies between the thoughts and actions of people in subaltern social groups- people who accept the hegemony of a ruling class that have very different interests from their own. Other Marxists understand ideology as a 'false consciousness' or deception based on ignorance, lack of fortitude and intellect. Gramsci suggests that this may explain why individuals hold views that are at odds with their own experiences and lives, but it cannot explain why whole groups of people adopt such positions."[43]*

Gramsci fills this gap in the explanation of the role of ideology through its link to popular culture and media. Furthermore, the concept of civil society has a central importance in the connection between ideology and popular culture. In the Gramscian explanation, ideology is not simply false consciousness; rather it is an effect of culture that prevails in civil society by the help of intellectuals. Considering the contemporary conditions in the world, the popular culture is identical with the popular media culture. It is produced, distributed and rendered prevalent in the sphere of media. Therefore, producers, distributors and interpreters of the popular media culture are the intellectuals of modern capitalism.[44]

The role of media in ideological and moral leadership is not only limited to the securing of the leading class hegemony over the subaltern classes, but also it makes compromises to consolidate the alliance of the leading classes. It is possible to talk about an organic relationship between the media elite and corporate and political elites.[45] Hegemony of the leading classes is only possible by the creation of a higher synthesis and collective will firstly in the leading alliance and secondly among the subaltern classes. The creation of a higher

[41] Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.77.
[42] Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.77.
[43] Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.78.
[44] Strinati, D. An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture, p.171.
[45] Gitlin, T. (1980). *The Whole World is Watching*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.254.

synthesis and collective will serve as the cement that will hold the society together. "This is key to the indissoluble unity of the two aspects of Gramscian hegemony, since the formation of the collective will and the exercise of political leadership depends on the very existence of intellectual and moral leadership."[46] As mentioned earlier, the subaltern classes are unable to generate their own language and terminology. As a consequence of the absence of their own terminology and language, the subaltern classes interpret the world in harmony with the language and terminology of the leading classes. Obviously, this harmony between language and an interpretation of the world does not occur in a single day, but it changes conceptions of the world through the consistent efforts of the intellectual and moral leadership and this change is one of the necessary conditions of hegemony.

2.1.4. Hegemony

In a broader sense the Gramscian theory can be defined as a social theory of power and control, and these two concepts are good starting points for an elaboration on hegemony. Hegemony corresponds to a particular form of social control which depends on the creation of consent. Generally speaking, it is possible to talk about two basic forms of social control and conformity; (1) external control, which is based on rewards and punishment and (2) internal social control, which is based on "moulding personal convictions into a replica of prevailing norms."[47] Hegemonic social control is beyond external control. However, this does not mean that it is a typical example of internal control. On the contrary, the interrelatedness of consent (internal) and coercion (external), and the cumulative character of hegemony is the trademark of the Gramscian theory. To summarize, by hegemony, Gramsci refers to a type of control, which does not exclude coercion and\or possibility of using coercion at some points during the realization process of hegemony. Moreover, at the same time, hegemony is beyond the level of coercion because it now depends on consent which automatically makes coercion unnecessary – what it makes unnecessary is the use of coercive power, not the potential for using coercive power. A Turkish saying used for defining the state affairs is very explanatory for the relationship of hegemony and coercion; "it is to have the power to fulfill the threat of being in power."

Secondly, internal control has also some differentiations due to the source of it. Femia groups these sources into three as (1) "fear of consequences of non-conformity", (2) unavailability of non-conformity or non-confirmative behavior, and (3) "conscious attachment to, or agreement

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[46] Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, p.184.
[47] Femia, J. (1981). *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.24.

with, certain core elements of society."[48] According to Femia, the third type of conformity can be classified as hegemony. However, at this point, besides the underlying concept that hegemony is again beyond the first two types of conformity, it is not exclusive to them. In addition to containing the capacity of coercion and active usage of it in earlier stages, hegemony also includes the first two types of conformity. Differentiation from external control and the first two categories of internal control while covering them might be seen as a bit ambiguous. However, checking this relationship from the opposite direction will make it clearer. For example, in a society a social group (A) has hegemonic power and control over a group (B). If A's hegemonic power over B is internal and conscious, is it possible to think any other power group, (C), has any kind of eternal or fear based control over B? If yes, will it not confront A's hegemonic position? This is the very reason why Femia's categorization of hegemonic power as internal and conscious is true but simply not enough. Hegemonic power is internal and conscious in the working sphere. However, it is also external and coercive in the potential sphere.

For a power relationship to be hegemonic, the subaltern groups should regard the interests of the hegemonic group as their own and should work for the realization of such interests consciously and naturally. Such a commitment and conformity –a commitment unconscious of being committed, a conformity unconscious of being conformed- requires a higher level of common sense and collective will. Common sense is very important for the internalization and adoption of hegemony, as Gramsci wrote;

> *"Every social stratum has its own 'common sense' and its own 'good sense', which are basically the most widespread conception of life and of man. Every philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of 'common sense': this is the document of its historical effectiveness. Common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but it is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with specific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary life. 'Common sense' is the folklore of philosophy, and is always half way between folklore properly speaking and philosophy, science, and economics of the specialists. Common sense creates the folklore of the future, that is as a relatively rigid phase of popular knowledge at a given place and time."[49]*

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[48] Femia, J. Gramsci's Political Thought, p.28.
[49] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 326.

In this definition, there are some crucial points which can give a more complete idea of hegemony. First of all, there is the "conception of life and of man". The layer at which hegemony works is so central and deep that it starts with the shaping of our conception of life and man. It is not simply politics, economics, culture and taste; on the contrary, it is the conception of life. The second crucial point is its dynamic character. It is always in a state of movement and change in order to fulfill different needs and gaps.

Intellectual input is one of the key elements in the process of change and movement. Different social groups can have different ideals about common sense in a society. Theoretically, all of these have the potential of being a hegemonic one. However, the one which is supported with intellectual input can be successful in change and mobilization, therefore that one will be the hegemonic common sense. Gramsci named this process as "renewed common sense" and defined it as a "[…] matter […] of starting with a philosophy which already enjoys, or could enjoy, a certain diffusion, because it is connected to and implicit in practical life, and elaborating it so that it becomes a renewed common sense possessing the coherence and the sinew of individual philosophies."[50] Therefore intellectuals directly affect conceptions of the world and man. Masses have some ideas -common sense- about the world and man. Then these ideas are shaped by intellectuals and become renewed common sense as Gramsci claims that common sense is somewhere between folklore and science, that is, it is formed by both the masses and intellectuals. The common worldview will evolve into a collective will and the collective will will work as a merging code of the society and create a collective man from ordinary people.[51]

The transformation process from national popular to hegemony is very useful in understanding hegemony itself. The point of existence of the two distinct categories as national popular and hegemony is illustrative in understanding the scope of hegemony. In the Gramscian sense, the national popular is related to culture and it corresponds to the existing cultural norms and practices of society. Accordingly, transformation from national popular to hegemony stands for a linkage between the existing cultural values of society and the hegemonic project of the leading group. This link is vital because denying the existing culture or trying to substitute it with an entirely new one would bring on a gap between the cultural norms of the society and the leading group.[52] Likewise, this gap can cause a crisis which means an opportunity structure for the formation of another hegemonic group. From this

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[50] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 330n.
[51] Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, p.191.
[52] Jones, S. Antonio Gramsci, p.7.

aspect, the national popular is strategically similar to the external means of control and lower levels of internal control, because it is a potential and exclusive domain of hegemony.

The leading group manipulates this exclusive domain and tries to create a higher synthesis for the realization of hegemony. The tool for manipulation in the exclusive domain is intellectual and moral leadership, and intellectual and moral leadership of the national popular will advance to ideological unity and serve as the cement of the society.[53] Therefore, hegemony in the Gramscian sense is not only the state power, but also the manipulation of how people understand the world and everyday life. For example, a specific kind of language usage or a relationship of meaning can be a precursor of the internalization of hegemony. Therefore, this thesis regards newspapers' discourse on Muslims as a specific kind of language and will elaborate on how that specific kind of language become effective in internalization of hegemony during the February 28 and April 27 Processes.

The exclusive character of hegemonic domain gains more centrality as the society becomes more capitalist and modern. To understand this relationship, one should consider different types of hegemony. According to Femia's classification,[54] it is possible to talk about three types of hegemony; (1) integral, (2) decadent, and (3) minimal. In an integral hegemony, the mass commitment to the hegemonic system would be absolute and unconditional. This kind of hegemony is only possible during extraordinary periods of societies, especially post-revolutionary periods such as Gramsci's typical example, post-revolutionary France. Secondly, decadent hegemony is a form that can be seen when the ideological consensus of a post-revolutionary period begins to break. There opens up a gap between the masses and the leading classes and therefore expansive ideological and political consensus becomes delicate. Finally, minimal hegemony is based on broader ruling classes. Ideological consensus between the leading and subaltern groups declines further, and as a result, the leading classes incorporate the elites of the subaltern classes. As a consequence, the ruling class expands. The minimal hegemony is still hegemonic in the Gramscian sense because it still preserves the exclusive domain of hegemony as it does not let any other group become hegemonic in any sense.

After elaborating on the key role of the exclusive character of the hegemonic domain, studying how hegemony derived from the exclusive domain is another question, whose answer opens ground for a better understanding of hegemony. At this point, the relationship between civil society and hegemony is explanatory, especially in talking about a modern

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[53] Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, p.184.
[54] Femia, J. Gramsci's Political Thought, p.46-7.

capitalist society, where media and popular culture come into prominence among the other institutions of civil society. As people confirm the ideas of the leading classes neither because of physical or mental coercion, nor ideological indoctrination, but because of adopting them as ideas of their own,[55] the leading group needs some tools to secure the adoption. As mentioned before, in modern capitalist societies, these tools are the media and the popular culture. As a result, the media and the popular culture are used for deriving hegemony from collective will and the national popular. This process can also be named as the securing of hegemony. As Jones wrote, "Gramsci argues that culture, politics and the economy are organized in a relationship of mutual exchange with one another, constantly circulating and shifting networks of influence. To this process he gives the name hegemony [...]"[56] the "mutual exchange" and "constantly circulating and shifting networks of influence" secure hegemony and derive it from collective will and the national popular. By the help of these two, the masses adopt ideas of the leading group as the ideas of their own.

Until now I have commented on the formation of hegemony and how the subaltern groups adopt the ideas of the leading group. However, formation of a leading group is also a crucial process. First of all, a leading group is not a homogeneous group. As Gramsci described it, the "historic bloc" is formed of several allied groups under the leadership of a fundamental one. The term "historic" designates the formation of the group and of the shared ideological positions and interests over time.

Then, how can different interest groups make coalitions for a hegemonic position? The answer is simple and easy, but the practice is difficult and that is why it needs some historical articulation to form such a group. According to Gramsci, every class has its own political party and the different political parties will follow the interests of the specific class they belong to.[57] There is a political division of labor between different political parties and they separate at the point of interests, but if they require each other – as Gramsci claims they do- they will unite when vital and major issues are in question.[58] According to the explanation, the moments when vital and major issues are in question are not only the test moments of a historic bloc; rather they are the moments of its formation. This is the reason why Gramsci uses the adjective "historic." In theory many classes vie for becoming a part of the bloc. However, by different test moments through history only the ones that were capable of being involved in hegemonic articulation become the members of the historic bloc. Hegemonic articulation is more than "united economic and political objectives" but it is also "intellectual

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[55] Strinati, D. An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture, p.166.
[56] Jones, S. Antonio Gramsci, p.5.
[57] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 157.
[58] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 158.

and moral unity."[59] The traditional intellectuals who are also a part of the historic bloc will propagate the intellectual and moral unity.

However, the historic bloc is also subject to disentanglement, as there will always be a tendency of conflict between the specific interests of each of the allied classes and the major dominating class. When it comes to the last analysis, the bourgeoisie will follow its own interests and "come up against the limitations of its own hegemony."[60] In such a conflict of interests, the allied group will not totally follow the interests and directives of the bourgeoisie, that is, they will not endanger their basic interests. Moments of this kind are the crisis of hegemony and "then 'spontaneity' may be replaced by 'constraint' in ever less disguised and indirect forms, culminating in outright police measures and *coups d'état*."[61]

Gramscian concepts and analyses fit the political history of Turkey, especially concerning political discussions around secularism and Islam. Furthermore, the historic bloc can additionally be used as a framework for locating the Kemalists. On the other hand, conservatives that continue their opposition to the historic bloc and its modernization project can be considered as subaltern classes, and in turn this entire struggle between them becomes one of hegemony. However, an additional theoretical-historical tool is required to fit the February 28 and April 27 processes into Gramsci's hegemonic analysis; Mardin's center-periphery analysis offers just such a tool.

2.2. Mardin's Center-Periphery Analysis

Next to hegemony center-periphery analysis is a very helpful tool for the historical analysis of February 28 and April 27 Processes. Center-periphery relations have been frequently used for understanding the political and economical relations of societies. There is a vast amount of literature on center-periphery relations that consists of both theoretical and empirical approaches. For the theoretical literature, scholars like Frank and Gills,[62] and Wallerstein[63] can be named as the three most leading figures. Their approaches, which consist primarily of a focus on explaining capitalist relations, are rather abstract and theoretical. In addition to

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[59] Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, p.181.
[60] Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, p.183.
[61] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 61.
[62] Frank, A.G. & Gills, B.K. (1993). "The 5,000-year World System," in *The World System: Five hundred years or five thousand?*, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (eds.), 3-55. London: Routledge.
[63] Wallerstein, I. (1993). "World system versus World-systems: A Critique," in *The World System: Five hundred years or five thousand?*, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (eds.), 292-6. London: Routledge.

these theoretical accounts, it is also possible to come across some very outstanding case and empirical studies.

Mardin's analysis of the center- periphery relations in Turkish modernization[64] is one of these outstanding empirical studies. In his key article, Mardin starts his analysis with the classical period of the Ottoman Empire and stretches it until the 1960's. Furthermore, at the conclusion of the article he suggests that the newly emerging social strata, such as the urban proletariat, can change the momentum in the center-periphery relations. Due to the attractive and outstanding character of Mardin's analysis, major scholars who concentrate on the Ottoman History and Turkish Modernization have focused on the issue and have published articles about the subject. Furthermore, it has been one of the frequently cited scholarly works of the discipline.

Beyond its popularity, the empirical and theoretical perspectives drawn by Mardin are still valid today as Turkish politics still follow the same patterns of center- periphery cleavage. It offers some insights into the major issues of Turkish politics such as secularism, the Kurdish question and the process of accession to the European Union. As will be elaborated in the coming chapters, the center-periphery cleavage also played a crucial role in the February 28 and April 27 Processes.

In my analysis about the center-periphery relations, I firstly focus on the major claims of Mardin and his way of theorizing the question. Then, in the second part, I try to take the picture of parallelism and continuity between the Young Turks and Kemalists from the aspect of their approach to the periphery. Finally, I offer an argument about the major patterns of the center-periphery relations today. The distinction and categorization which I follow in this chapter also embraces a historical periodization. Mardin's article starts with the classical system of the Ottoman Empire, and then goes on with the eighteenth and nineteenth century reform movements in the Ottoman Empire, and in the republican period. In the parts about the republican period he also writes on the position of the DP in center- periphery cleavage. Therefore, in order to avoid losing sight of historical periodization, Mardin's main arguments should be the starting point of the analysis.

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[64] The article was first published as; Mardin, Ş. (1973). "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus, Journal of American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 102(1), 169-90. I will use another version of the same article published in 1974.

2.2.1. Main Arguments of Mardin

Mardin focuses on the cumulative effect of different facts when he argues about the existence of a center-periphery cleavage. Moreover, instead of defining the cleavage in a specific historical setting, he rather mentions processes and phenomena. As a result, he does not focus on the Ottoman period or the Republican era specifically; rather, he prefers to elaborate on the concept of "centralization that created the modern state."[65] According to his formulation, the reform period in the Ottoman Empire resulted in various confrontations with the forces of the periphery which consisted of the feudal nobility, the population of the peripheral cities, burghers and later industrial labor.[66] However, at this very starting point, there are some counter-arguments to those of Mardin. According to Heper, these distinct classes did not exist in the Ottoman society.[67] Heper's argument makes sense to some extent, yet as mentioned before, Mardin does not mean the existence of these classes in a specific time in Ottoman society. Rather, he claims that some confrontation points occurred between these segments of the society as a result of the overall centralization process of Turkey. Considering the title of the article "Center-periphery Relations: A Key to the Turkish Politics?", he does not want to argue for the existence of such class distinctions in the Ottoman society, rather he wants to use these patterns as a key in interpreting Turkish politics.

The nomadic character of the people of Anatolia has been another sphere of the center-periphery confrontation. Rather than active resistance of the nomads- if there still existed in the republican period- the nomadic character of the Anatolian population and the symbolic inheritance of nomadism served as a means of confrontation. Considering the center-periphery relations "[...] the clash between nomads and urban dwellers generated the Ottoman cultivated man's stereotype that civilization was a contest between urbanization and nomadism, and that all things nomadic were only deserving of contempt."[68]

The same symbolic inheritance exists in the case of the pre-Ottoman nobility and the powerful families in the Ottoman periphery. The peripheral rebellions from those that contested the throne to the ones based on religious heterodoxy[69] created the same impact of contempt for the periphery and were regarded with a suspicious look.[70] Indeed, from the

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[65] Mardin, Ş. (1974). "Center Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?" in *Post Traditional Societies*, S.N. Eisenstadt (eds.), 169-190. New York: Norton & Company, p. 170.
[66] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 170.
[67] Heper, M. (1980). "Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi," *Toplum ve Bilim*, Bahar-Yaz Sayısı (9-10), 3-55.
[68] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 170.
[69] The issue of religious heterodoxy is a bit ambiguous in the article and his other writings about the religion and center- periphery relations. More detailed critics on this issue will be held in the later parts of the chapter.
[70] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 171.

nineteenth century onwards the nobility in the Ottoman periphery caused many problems to Ottoman modernization besides the symbolic heritage of the settlement of the nomadic population in the earlier times of the empire. The long lasting warfare and some administrative reforms of the seventeenth century created a more powerful nobility in the Ottoman periphery, for the long lasting warfare in the seventeenth century required more military power and the need of military power was fulfilled by the forces provided by nobility.[71] Furthermore, these military forces derived from local notables did not disband like the centralized army and served as a means of power for the local nobility.[72] Apart from the military power, the administrative reforms of the seventeenth century also helped the nobility to gain power. Expanding tax farming and the *mütesellim*[73] system provided the nobility with extraordinary privileges such as selecting some officials in the far cities of the empire.[74]

In addition to these points, which stimulated the center's mistrust of the periphery, Mardin also talks about the characteristic differences of the periphery and officials as representatives of the center. From these differences, one of the most distinguishing ones was the non-Muslim background of state officials. As many state officials were raised by the *devşirme* system,[75] they were very loosely tied to the rest of the society and raised to be the subjects, *kul*s, of the Sultan and the ultimate protectors of state interests.[76] This system of raising state officials resulted in a detachment both socially and religiously. On the one hand as they were raised to be state officials and their primary concern was the interests of the state, they were never sensitive to the problems of the periphery. On the other hand, their non-Muslim background also detached them from the Muslim population. Furthermore, as state officials they were exempt from taxation. Therefore, they did not face the repressive apparatus of the state in the economic sphere which was more powerful than ever in the eighteenth century.[77] Also, the increasing amount of contraband trade in the second half of the eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century due to the increasing prices in Europe opposed officials to local merchants.[78] Besides its economic advantages, exemption from the taxes underlined the fact that operators and representatives of the state power were the most

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[71] Kasaba, R. (1988). *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*. New York: State University of New York Press, p.15-6.
[72] Kasaba, R. The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, p.15-6.
[73] State official that deputize governors in the far cities of the empire. In the mentioned period the were mostly appointed among local notables.
[74] İnalcık, H. (1977). "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration," in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (eds.), 27-52. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, p.33.
[75] In the Devşirme system, the young boys of non-muslim families residing in recently conquered cities were gathered and received an extensive education. At the end of this process they were raised as janissaries and state officials.
[76] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 171.
[77] Kasaba, R. The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, p.13.
[78] Kasaba, R. The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, p.18.

privileged citizens of the state.[79] Finally, the cultural and status differences had a great impact on the loose ties of the state officials and the populace. Mardin claims that in earlier times, successful cultures such as the Iranian culture influenced state officials both by its urban character and its "myth of the majesty of Sultan" which was only accessible to the state officials.[80] Later on, the educational differences served as another cultural point of separation between the officials and the periphery. As the reform movement in the Ottoman state system proceeded, modern schools were established for the sake of educating the state officials whom the Ottoman state needed for its own safety and preservation. On the one hand this new type of education underlined the superiority of officials among other citizens as the operators of state authority and, on the other hand, it emphasized the religious and ideological differences between the officials and the populace. The aim of new educational institutions was to raise new bureaucratic elites of the French type who were well trained, knowledgeable and privileged the interests of the state as opposed to those of the periphery.[81] While the opinions of officials were shaped by the interests of the state and "positive science", and they had the adequate means – state power – for expressing their opinions, the public opinion mostly shaped and reflected by traditional imams and preachers for whom the positivist ideology of the newly emerging type of state officials was totally unacceptable.[82]

Mardin pays great attention to the Ottoman reform movements of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. As he asserts, reform movements of the period aimed to form a nation-state and for this purpose, they concentrated on (1) the integration of the non-Muslim groups, (2) the integration of the heterogeneous Muslim groups into the nation, and finally (3) the unification of the disconnected elements in the present political system.[83] However, for the Young Turks, the efforts to form a unified nation did not have the expected results. As Mardin wrote "their ineptitude and incipient nationalism combined to undermine what support they might have gathered for their regime. Lack of integration, demands for decentralized administration, as well as provincial opposition to what were considered the secular ideas of the Young Turks are a main theme of their years in power and appear within, as well as outside, Anatolia."[84]

Mardin claims that as a result of political representation gained after 1908 and the economic conditions mentioned before, the peripheral nobility gained ground. However, there are some different interpretations about the gaining ground of nobility. While Mardin talks about the

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[79] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 172.
[80] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 173.
[81] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 180.
[82] İnalcık, H. Centralization and Decentralization, p.38-9.
[83] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 175.
[84] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 177.

demands of the decentralization of administration, Heper claims that the demands of the nobility never became effective enough to make a change in the policies of the center, and the argument about the political power of the nobility through commissions and agreements such as Document of Agreement, *Sened-i İttifak,*[85] is not valid as they never resulted in a distribution of power between the state and the nobility.[86] Heper's claims make sense to some extent but the main argument of Mardin is not the nobility gaining power, but their demand for power and the existence of a cleavage in the political sphere. Although it is not a constitutional document, The Document of Agreement should not be disregarded "because the document is really a pact between the ruler and his barons […] As such it constitutes a high-water mark of the influence of the *ayan*[87] in the empire, who were recognized officially as partners in government. The sultan himself did not sign the document, but he did allow his imperial monogram (*tuğra*) to be put on it".[88]

As the centralization problem was transferred to the republican era, the center-periphery conflict was also carried over. The intensity of the cleavage increased as a result of the Republic's uncompromising demands of centralization and nationalization. The leading sign of the center-periphery cleavage in the first years of the Kemalist regime was the formation of the second group in the First Grand National Assembly. The main unifying point of the second group was its opposition to the first group, namely the Kemalists. The second group mainly consisted of any kind of local notables, from merchants to the men of religion, and the group was led by the alienated officials.[89] The opposition of the second group was also diverse from decentralist ideas to the Islamist one like the diversity of group membership. The second group's proposed policies in the Grand National Assembly are very useful in understanding the reflection of the center-periphery cleavage in the assembly. They proposed some policies such as the decentralization of the administration, military affairs, religious affairs and political policies regarding representation.[90] However, they could not be effective, as Mustafa Kemal dissolved the assembly when he felt that it was getting out of control. In the constitutional period of the Ottoman Empire, bureaucrats supported the assembly because it meant a medium of opposition to the Sultan's monopoly on legitimacy, however later the Kemalists -former bureaucrats and officers of the empire- dissolved it and formed it in a new composition to exclude the second group.

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[85] A treaty between grand vezir of Ottoman Empire and distinguished local notables of Anatolia amd Thrace. The treaty signed in 1808 regulated the relations of central and local authority.
[86] Heper, M. Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi, p.18-25.
[87] Ayans were local notables of the empire.
[88] Zürcher, E.J. Turkey: A Modern History, p.28.
[89] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 181.
[90] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 181.

Besides the second group in the first assembly, the rebellions in the Anatolia were the other case offering insights about the scope of the center-periphery cleavage and the center's interpretation of the periphery. The Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 and the Menemen incident in 1930 aroused what Mardin calls Patrona Syndrome, that is, the fear of a blocking of the westernizing reforms of the military and administration by the so-called backward and ignorant masses.[91] This syndrome was carried to the republican era by the Sheikh Said rebellion and the Menemen incident. Consequently, peasants were always regarded as backward by the Republican elites. The political culture of the republic was elitist, exclusive to the different parts of the society and regarded them as enemies; it stressed of the monopoly of the state on physical power.[92]

The case of the DP offers many insights into understanding the Kemalists' interpretation of the peripheral opposition. According to Mardin, the DP very well represented the traditional Ottoman state image of justice and abundance and it, "promised it would bring services to the peasants, take his daily problems as a legitimate concern of politics, debureaucratize Turkey, and liberalize religious practices."[93] The new discourse of the DP changed the legitimacy of statehood and introduced welfare, equality, rights and freedom[94] instead of self-fulfilling ideologies of westernization and modernization of the Kemalists. These new paradigms in Turkish politics shifted the source of legitimacy from the westernization ideology to the masses, and therefore implicitly and explicitly told the masses that they are not inferior compared to the Kemalist elites of the Republic. As Mardin wrote, "there were now good reasons to claim that the RPP [Republican People's Party] represented the "bureaucratic" center, whereas the DP represented the "democratic" periphery."[95] However, this was too much and it went too far for the Kemalist bureaucracy and therefore the DP rule was ended by a military intervention. The claim that policies of the DP encouraged the reaction has been one of the leading legitimizing claims of the military intervention against the DP in 1960. Although there are some existential differences between them, and the historical conditions which made them possible are different, drawing a parallelism between the discourses of the DP, RP, and recently AKP is possible. The commonality of the counter discourse against all three of them as supporting reaction can support Mardin's thesis about the center-periphery cleavage, as well as the utilization of religion in expressing the claims of the periphery and the utilization of the discourse of reaction in suppressing the demands of the periphery.

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[91] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 175.
[92] Heper, M. Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi, p.4.
[93] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 184.
[94] Karpat, K. (1975). "The Politics of Transition: Political Attitudes and Party Affiliation in the Turkish Shantytowns," in *Political Participation in Turkey*, Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.), 33-61. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, p.75.
[95] Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 186.

Before concluding Mardin's analysis of the center-periphery relations, it is necessary to mention an ambiguous point in the role of religion in the analysis. As mentioned before, Mardin treats religion as one of the major spheres in which the cleavage between the center and the periphery emerged. However, Mardin does not elaborate on what he means by religion in a detailed way. He mentions the religious heterodoxy in a few places in the article but does not explain the fact of how the orthodox religious character of the DP and heterodox character of Alevi belief can be explained within the limits of the same concept. However, the lack of differentiation between the two, if not more, types of religiosity should not be interpreted as a shortcoming in Mardin's conceptualization of religion in the center-periphery cleavage. Mardin is very accurate in identifying religion as the most problematic issue between the periphery and the center. The shortcoming in the theory was not in the conceptualization of religion but in the conceptualization of the center. Mardin treats the center and the state as constant and concrete categories. However, the state is not so constant and concrete while following its interests. On the one hand, it can be secular against the Sunni religious periphery like in the cases Mardin mentions, but on the other hand, it can be Sunni against the peripheral Alevi community. The same flexibility is also valid for the periphery as it can be secular and Kemalist as in the case of Alevis against the Sunni majority. At that point Gramsci's ideas about the formation of the historic bloc in moments of crisis, as well as the comprehensive capacity of the historic bloc, become helpful cures to the shortcomings of Mardin's constant and concrete definitions of center.

In conclusion, Mardin offers the center-periphery cleavage as an efficacious tool in the analysis of Turkish politics. While offering the center-periphery cleavage, he historically analyses the classical Ottoman Period, reform movements of the late Ottoman period and the Republican period under the rule of the CHP and DP. Excluding the different character of the center-periphery relations in the classical Ottoman period, he mentions a continuation between the reformers of the late Ottoman and Republican elites. As centralization, nationalization and secularization are the key common aspects of the elite character in Turkey from late Ottoman Period until today, he introduces religion as the major medium of confrontation between the center and the periphery. Although the one-sided approach to religion contains some shortcomings in the broader analysis of the politics in Turkey, the general model drawn by Mardin can still be used within the scope of this study. In other words Mardin only refers to the religious orthodoxy when he indicates religion as a ground for the center-periphery cleavage. Although there is also a cleavage between the peripheral heterodoxy and the relatively orthodox center like in the case of Alevis, my study by definition does not cover this kind of cleavage. Therefore, the mentioned shortcomings do not

constitute an obstacle for applying Mardin's model to my research. In the next parts of this chapter, I will continue to focus on the center- periphery cleavage in Turkish politics. I will focus on the continuity in the Young Turks' and Kemalists' interpretation of culture and religiosity of the periphery.

2.2.2 Populace: The Chief Culprit of non-modernization of Turkey from the Young Turks to the Kemalists

The continuity between the Young Turk thought and the Kemalist ideology has been one of the widely discussed themes of Turkish modernization. However, considering the scope of this study, this particular issue is not pertinent and I will not go into details.[96] Instead, the continuity of the center-periphery cleavage and the continuity of the ideological origins of the center-periphery conflict will be mentioned.

Mardin pays great attention to the role of modern educational institutions of the late Ottoman period in center-periphery relations. He also mentions the continuity of the spirit of the Late Ottoman and early Republican educational institutions. The main focus of the Ottoman education system after nineteenth century reforms, and then the Turkish education system, has been the bringing up of state elites who are supposed to be the representatives and instructors of the official ideology.[97] The education of the populace still has been one of the top issues of agenda of the Turkish elites, and that is why they always complain about the ignorance of the society. Although the republicans argue that the Kemalist ideology is unique and new, the understanding of the difference between the status and culture of the masses and intellectuals, are some of the legitimizing points of the societal image of both the Kemalists and the Ottomans.

In the Republican Period, the aim of educating the state elites has been to train the staff who will give priority to state affairs rather than to those of the populace, while the aim of educating the masses has been to eradicate the cultural and social structures and also the traditions of the old regime. The Republican elite considered populace's adherence to values of tradition as the primary delinquency of the masses. However, the measures taken against the "ignorance of the masses" and efforts to "enlighten" them do not work in the way the Kemalists wanted.

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[96] For a more detailed account; Zürcher, E.J. (1992). "The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic," *Die Welt Des Islams*, 32(2), 237-253.
[97] Akarlı, E.D. (1975). "The State as A Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey," in *Political Participation in Turkey*, Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Eds.), 122-135. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, p.136.

Religion preserved its central role in the center-periphery conflict during the Republican era. Although in different amounts, there was a religious motivation in the two main opposition movements of the republican era- the Sheikh Said Rebellion and the Menemen Incident. The case of the Sheikh Said rebellion itself is very useful in understanding the role of religion in the center-periphery relations. Zürcher mentions that during this rebellion the Alevi Kurds attacked the Sunni rebels because of the dual character of the rebellion, and he writes; "while the leadership was undoubtedly motivated by the desire for an autonomous or even independent Kurdistan, the rank and file acted from religious motives, demanding the restoration of holy law and the caliphate."[98] The different attitude of the Alevi Kurds and the Sunni ones is a good example of Mardin's ambiguity about the religious heterodoxy in the center-periphery relations. Moreover, the dual character of the rebellion, i.e. its being Kurdish nationalist as well as Islamist, also offers insight into the usage of religious and secularist discourse in center-periphery relations as the Kurdish nationalist motivations of rebellion are not usually stressed by the Kemalist official history. It is also possible to observe the utilization of the secularist discourse in the Menemen Incident. The incident still serves as a means of legitimacy in suppressing the religious demands of the periphery. Furthermore, scholars like Bozarslan question the place of the Menemen Incident in the secularist discourse and claim that contrary to the public sense and the Kemalist historiography, it is not even possible to find any proof to argue that the dervishes engaged in the incident were Nakshibendis.[99]

The Kemalist discourse on religion can be traced back to the Young Turks. The Young Turks also regarded religion as one of the chief obstacles to modernization. Furthermore, their solution was also similar to the Kemalists: to cleanse the religion from superstitions.[100] As Hanioğlu mentioned; "[…] the thesis of *Garbcılar*[101] was that a new 'ethic' should be created for Muslims. This thesis undoubtedly stemmed from their conviction that Islam could not keep up with modern progress. The ideal espoused by the *Garbcılar* in this field was the creation of a Protestant ethic."[102] Hanioğlu also underlines the continuity of the ideas of the Garbcılar and Kemalists as he claims that although Garbılar's dream of founding "Societies for Enlightening People's Minds" was not materialized, the new regime's "Directorate of Religious Affairs" fulfilled the same task of "enlightening" people through the Friday

[98] Zürcher, E. J. Turkey: A Modern History, p. 171.
[99] Cited in Zürcher, E. J. Turkey: A Modern History, p. 349n6.
[100] Mardin, Ş. (2007). *Din ve İdeoloji*. İstanbul: İletişim, p.144.
[101] Garbcılar means the ones who championed westernization as the only way of modernization and reforms.
[102] Hanioğlu, S. (1997). "Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic," *Studia Islamica*, 86, p.143.

sermons.[103] Furthermore, Abdullah Cevdet's[104], one of the outstanding figures of Garbcılar who spread his ideas on the modernization of religion by his publishing house, preface to one of the books of Dozy,[105] which he translated and published, is very important in terms of revealing the parallelisms of the interpretation of religion;

> *"One cannot become a Muslim by [adopting a Muslim] name, by fasting, and by performing namaz [...]Learned, erudite Doctor Dozy, who had spent his entire life with research and study, and who strived to enlighten the minds of ibadullah [Servants of God] and tried to be beneficial to people, is one hundred times more Muslim than vagabond Hamid's whose creation and desires are nefarious...Every learned and virtuous person is a Muslim. Any ignorant or immoral person is not a Muslim even if he comes from the lineage of the prophet."*[106]

The discourse of defining a new understanding of religion depending on ethics and good manners and without the practical and social parts of it, like in the words of Cevdet, was also widely used in the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Plenty of examples of this will be presented in the next parts of the study.

Young Turk attitude towards politics was also similar to their attitudes towards religion. Many Young Turk thinkers and officials regarded political and administrative issues as so important that they could not be left to the masses. Therefore, they thought that the political and administrative affairs had to be handled not by the masses but by specialists.[107] These elitist tendencies of the Young Turks were not only bequeathed from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, but also they deeply penetrated all ranks of the bureaucracy and the urban middle and upper classes with the help of the long rule of the Kemlalists as a one-party state. So how is this deeply entrenched elitist tendency reflected in contemporary Turkey?

2.2.3. The Contemporary Character of the Center-periphery Cleavage

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[103] Hanioğlu, S. Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion, p. 148.
[104] Abdullah Cevdet was one of the outstanding figures of Garbcılar that attempted to disseminate his ideas about modernized religion through his publishing house called İctihad. İctihad, that also the mane of the journal published by Cevdet, literally meaned the new interpretations of religion.
[105] Dozy, R. (1908). *Tarih-i İslamiyet.* Kahire: İctihad.
[106] Cited in Hanioğlu, S. Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion, p. 138.
[107] Hanioğlu, S. Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion, p. 145.

The question at the title of Mardin's 1974 article – "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" - should be answered for today. To what extent should Mardin's economical and political analysis be used today to explain the center-periphery relations? With which character does the center-periphery cleavage continue to exist today? These are the questions which should be answered before starting to analyze the February 28 and April 27 Processes with the theoretical perspective drawn by Mardin.

First of all, the economical aspect of the center- periphery cleavage still exists today. To some extent it can be claimed that the periphery of the country is articulated to the capitalist economy and therefore economics is not a major medium of center-periphery cleavage. However, the state mechanism still exists as one of the largest institutions one can earn a living.[108] The amount of total economic activity directly controlled by state has decreased, but state related income still serves as a differentiating point for the state elites and the masses. Moreover, the income of the bureaucrats is still not affected by market relations, similarly to the condition of the Ottoman officials who were not taxpayers. Economy is still not a variable for bureaucrats when they use the state authority. The best example of this issue is the economical crises Turkey faced until recent years. The reason for such crises was basically political. The state elites always constituted one of the sides of the crises- e.g. the crisis that originated from a discussion between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Sezer in November 2000- but they have never been affected by the crises as the masses have been. They continued living in their houses provided by the state, taking their salaries from the state, and going on holidays to the holiday spots provided for bureaucrats by state.

The modernization process of Turkey has some positive material results in terms of the center-periphery relations. Except for the extremely remote corners of the country, the centralization plan of state is fulfilled by developed communication and transport facilities. Therefore, geographic position is not as important as it was in the early times of Republic. In addition, migration to the cities has also removed the centrality of geography from the center-periphery cleavage, because through migration the peripheral elements were brought to the town. In other words, the peripheral objects of the rural areas were also carried to center. Center-periphery is no longer geographic but continues to be political, social and cultural. The periphery now means the sum of all others except those who share social, cultural and political perceptions of the center.

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[108] According to Manpower Group's survey, with its %23 increase rate, state related sectors will be one of the major employers in Turkey in 2012. For details see: ManpowerGroup. (2011). The Manpower Employment Outlook Survey for Turkey, accessed January 6, 2012.
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/MAN/1609502928x0x528392/6162B8F4-D0CE-4BF6-852E-93FFE8941AB9/Turkey_4Col_Q112.pdf

Under such conditions, the center of the society makes excessive usage of the fragmented image of society for peripherization of the other parts of society. Every layer of the social strata, every fragment of the society, and every single institution or individual needs the assistance of the state to survive. The Alevis need the assistance of the center in order to be saved from repression. The Sunnis need the assistance of the center to continue their religious activity, whose only legal medium is controlled by state. Even leftist intellectuals condone the tyrannical and undemocratic treatment of conservative actors for the sake of safety from the rising danger of reaction. Similarly, some twenty years ago nationalists needed the state to fight against the rising danger of communism because both nationalists and the state apparatus regarded the leftist activism of the 1970s and 1980s as the major threat against the unity of the state.

Through the fragmentation of civil society, the state emerges as a chief partner of it: a partner which has ties to every element of the society but never becomes the exclusive domain of any of them. It stands above the rest of society, but not unrelated to them. Sometimes it plays mediator between two conflicting groups, sometimes it targets one, and sometimes even encourages and leads others to attack a target.

The peripheral reality of Turkey, which was easily ignored by the Turkish elites before, has gained public visibility and has become impossible to disregard with the help of the modernization achieved by the Republic. Therefore, the center-periphery cleavage has been brought to the center of society. In other words, the cleavage in the periphery had been somewhat solved by the isolation of the Kemalist elites from the periphery. However, the problem reemerged in the center by the move of the peripheral elements to the center of society. Generally speaking, the economic and cultural dimensions of the center- periphery problem were brought to the center through everyday practices, which again constituted a big problem considering the formalist and imitator character of the Kemalist modernization project. Therefore, it can be concluded that the center-periphery conflict continued to exist in a transformed state. However, this is not sufficient for understanding the February 28 and April 27 processes. The new conceptualization inspired by Mardin and Gramsci will be more useful for explaining these events.

2.3. The Historic Hegemonic Center

Before moving on to the factual history of the February 28 and April 27 processes, a discussion about the previously mentioned theoretical frameworks will be useful for merging theory with the actual case to which it is to be applied. Mardin's "Center-Periphery" concept and Gramsci's "Historic Bloc" can be merged in order to better analyze the activities of the Kemalists in the two intervention processes. In my study the historic bloc and the center correspond to the same societal reality. Indeed, the two concepts fill each other's gaps with regard to understanding the Turkish case.

To start with Gramsci, hegemony is a very useful conceptual instrument for this kind of analysis. Gramscian theory offers the opportunity to better understand the sides of the conflict in the February 28 and April 27 processes. In particular, a Gramscian explanation of the formation of a historic bloc is indispensible for explaining the broadness of the alliance against conservative politics and how these different figures with conflicting interests come together. Unlike other Marxist analyses, the strength of Gramsci for this study is the fact that his conceptualization makes room for non-economic factors. However, Gramsci is a post-Marxist and Marxist in the last instance. His initial question pertains to economic relations and class conflict. Even though he proposes a new concept and a new way of understanding class, the Marxist notion of class is always on the table as the starting point of conflict. This is a shortcoming for the analysis of the February 28 and April 27 processes, in particular, and debates over Turkish modernization and secularization in general. In the Turkish case it is not class positions and relations, but non-economic factors, modernization, secularization, westernization, etc. that lie at the root of the conflict.

The chief strength Mardin's center-periphery conceptualization for the analysis of the February 28 and April 27 processes is his theory's historical depth. The center-periphery conceptualization is helpful for historicizing the conflicts in the February 28 and April 27 processes. Furthermore, center-periphery analysis underlines the importance of secularization in the conflict. Also, other non-economic sources of the conflict, such as prestige, status, and culture are stressed in Mardin. But along with these strengths, Mardin's center-periphery analysis includes some weaknesses for the purposes of this case study. First of all, the theory is too constant and one-sided to explain the complexity of the February 28 and April 27 processes. It offers less in explaining how non-economic factors merged with economic factors, and why they always overlap. Secondly, although Mardin tries to avoid geographic determinism by including broader concepts such as status, prestige, culture, and education into his model of the center and periphery, the theory by its nature tends toward geographical determinism. The fault lines Mardin proposed as the origin of the conflict still exist today with the same background, but the periphery has now become the center and vice versa. Also,

with regard to the conclusion of this study, center-periphery analysis does not offer an explanation of the formation of conservative lifestyles, prestige, or status, which also means that it cannot explain how the conflict regenerates and reproduces itself again and again.

If center-periphery and hegemonic analyses were applied to the February 28 and April 27 Processes separately, Mardin's center and Gramsci's historic bloc would define the same social actors. Similarly, whether discussing the center or the historic bloc, the social segments excluded by these concepts would be the same. However, when using Mardin's center and Gramsci's historic bloc separately, the strengths and weaknesses of each concepts also stand separately. On the other hand, combining these concepts into that of the "historic hegemonic center" serves to eliminate their weaknesses and reinforce their strengths. By merging these two concepts both Mardin's historical depth and Gramsci's analytic functionality are preserved. The same social segments that are covered by the separate usage of the two concepts are covered by this combination and the weaknesses of the original concepts are eliminated.

The static character, theoretical limitations, and geographical dependency of Mardin's center-periphery analysis are overcome by Gramscian hegemony's analytical and theoretical depth and functionality, as in the concept sets of consent and coercion, and civil society and political society. On the other hand, the class-dependent analysis and overemphasis of economic factors in Gramscian hegemonic analysis are overcome by the historicity and inclusion of non-economic factors in Mardin's center-periphery analysis. Their weaknesses having thereby been eliminated, the theoretical explanations of Gramsci and Mardin become the most appropriate theories for discussing February 28 Process and April 27 processes.

So what is the "historic hegemonic center" discussed in this study? The existence of a historic hegemonic center and a subaltern periphery becomes clear in the conjunction of ideology, politics, culture, society, and economy. In the long history of Turkish modernization, there have been always supporters and opponents of modernizing reforms and ideology, politics, culture, society, and economy always worked to determine different social groups' support or opposition to modernization. However, only with the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the emergence of a Kemalist one-party state did the historic hegemonic center take on its combined ideological, cultural, political, and economic character.

Kemalism was the ideology of the one-party state and the only legitimate ideology in the country. Being a set of attitudes and ideas rather than a clearly defined ideology[109], Kemalism was the only medium of (legitimate) existence in any of the country's ideological, cultural, political, social, and economic spheres. The ideological and political spheres were determined and limited by the Kemalist principles of secularism, nationalism, republicanism, and populism. Reflections of populism could also be observed in the spheres of culture and society as the "cultural revolution" of Kemalism spread to the far corners of the country with the help of People's Houses[110] and Village Institutes. As a necessary part of statism, the one-party state was also very active in the economic field, attempting to create a new national bourgeoisie that would be in full conformity with Kemalist principles. Finally, revolutionism/ reformism stood as the general method of applying these principles and as a continuous support for reforms.

However, the historic hegemonic center was not as monolithic or static as initially intended. During the course of Republican history, there existed many different groups within the historic hegemonic center and the spheres in which the subaltern periphery expressed its opposition to the historic hegemonic center changed. However, despite these differences, changes, splits, alliances, and partial settlements, the existence of two different groups with conflicting interests, the historic hegemonic center and the subaltern periphery, can be clearly discerned. As in the case of the Democrat Party, in which the religious demands of conservatives overlapped with the political and economic demands of an alienated segment of the Kemalist elite, in almost every moment of republican history these conflicting interests were redefined and regenerated. More recently, The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association's (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği*, TÜSİAD) position in the February 28 Process, and *Sabah* and *Akşam*'s position in the April 27 Process are the best examples of such position changes. However, despite the changes, redefinitions, and regeneration of conflicting interests, the conflict between the historic hegemonic center and the subaltern periphery has always remained. Although ideas, policies, supporting and opposing groups, alliances, and grievances have shifted, there has always been an existing power group with its interests as a whole and with the sometimes conflicting particular interests of its members and an opposing group. On the one hand there existed those who identified their interests with the continuation of the existing establishment and, on the other hand, there were those who saw their interests in the replacement of the establishment. At this

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[109] Zürcher, E. J. Turkey: A Modern History, p. 181.

[110] People's Houses and Village Institutions were the indoctrination institutions established during single party rule. For more information on People's Houses, see: A. Lamprou, *Between Central State and Local Society: The People's Houses Institution and the Domestification of Reforms in Turkey (1932-1951)* (Phd Dissertation, Leiden University, 2009).

point, the concept of the historic hegemonic center is vital, as it refers to the historical character of the conflict, which includes transformation and continuity, and its hegemonic character, thanks to which the historic hegemonic center could unite its many members despite their conflicting self-interests. As a result, the concept is a valuable theoretical tool for the analysis of complex events such as the February 28 and April 27 processes.

3. The February 28 Process: A Postmodern Coup

3.1. Rise of the Welfare Party

When it was once again allowed to engage in political activities after the military intervention of 1980, conservative politics resumed as expected. Before 1980 there had also been a powerful stream of conservative politics in Turkey. The movement, named the National Outlook (*Milli Görüş,* MG), had an anti-Western alignment and advocated a combination of moral and economic development for Turkey.[111] After its earlier incarnations were closed in the 1971 and 1980 military interventions, this time the conservative party of the MG was named the RP. Given its leader, high-rank figures and ideology, the RP was a typical National Outlook Party in the beginning. Although the continuity was not interrupted in terms of its leading cadres over the next decade, external factors were now more advantageous for the RP in the 1990's. Turkey's new social and economic conditions offered various opportunities for the RP. Capitalizing on such political advantages, the party received 21.4 percent of the national vote at its height in 1995. These new opportunities included the tolerant attitude of the state mechanism to Islam in the post-1980 period, the culturally conservative and economically liberal character of the Özal period, and the collapse of Turkey's center parties.

The ruling elite after the 1980 military coup instrumentalized religion against the leftist mobilization of the time. This attitude toward Islam – embodied by the junta leader and later president Kenan Evren – used the religion as a barrier against radical leftist politics. Evren himself often referred to "Quranic Islam" while he was expressing his ideas about the importance of order and rule for a society. In issues ranging from birth control to the increasing "communist threat," Islam was used as a way of expressing the official ideology.[112] However, the societal results of Evren's policy became different from his expectations - a clear case of the law of unintended consequences. Instead of an enlightened and instrumental Islam that would be compatible with Kemalism, conservative mobilization became the beneficiary of the situation. Conservative actors increased their influence and expanded their domain. For example, apart from the addition of mandatory religion courses to primary and secondary school curriculum, the number of students enrolled in İmam-Hatip Schools increased by 61 percent and 51 percent at the senior and junior levels, respectively.[113] The

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[111] For a detailed account of MG and its parties see: Yıldız, A. (2003). "The Politco-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook," The Muslim World, 93(2), p. 187-209.

[112] Yavuz, H. Islamic Political Identity, p.70-1.

[113] Özdalga, E. (1999). "Education in the Name of "Order and Progress" Reflections on the Recent Eight Year Obligatory School Reform in Turkey," *The Muslim World*, 89(3-4), p. 424.

increase in the number of enrolled students, but not in the number of schools, is a good example of the difference between the result of Evren's instrumentalization of Islam and his intentions. The number of İmam-Hatip Schools did not increase due to the difficulty of getting permission to set up new ones, but it was still possible to open new schools as branches of existing ones.[114]

Furthermore, Turgut Özal's governance, first as prime minister and later as president, also stimulated a tolerant attitude toward conservative activism. Among many other developments, the removal of the symbolic barriers that had previously blocked conservative actors' participation in social and political life is worth mentioning. Due to the fact that one of the major policies of the Kemalist modernization about Islam was the prohibition of any kind of Islamic representation in the public sphere, conservative actors had voluntarily remained outside of the public sphere, in addition to being excluded from it forcibly. Aktay refers to this self-imposed exclusion from the public sphere as a situation of symbolic diaspora.[115] The tolerant attitude of the Evren period and later the Özal period stimulated the process of conservative actors' entrance into the public sphere. The establishment of Islamic financial institutions, the increasing circulation of conservative books, newspapers, and magazines, and the increasing public visibility of women wearing the headscarf were prominent examples of increasing conservative public visibility from the 1980's onwards.

The formation of a new middle class was another political opportunity for the RP as a result of the policies of the post-1980 period and the Özal administration. As a consequence of Özal's liberal policies in the economic field, the small and the middle-scale businessmen of the major Anatolian cities were given access to the domestic and international market. The new emerging middle class was more conservative compared to the existing one. As they were the representatives of the periphery, values such as religion and tradition were dominant. In the beginning of the 1990's, this new middle class materialized under the umbrella of the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği,* MÜSİAD). The letter "M" in the name of the organization, which represents the word *müstakil* - independent, is often claimed to represent "Muslim" instead of *"müstakil"* due to the religious affiliations of the members of the organization. The incorporation dates of MÜSİAD's member companies and their geographical distribution provide insight into the

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[114] Özdalga, E. Education in the Name of "Order and Progress", p.424.

[115] Aktay, Y. (2003). "Diaspora and Stability: Constitutive Elements in a Body of Knowledge," in *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement*, H. Yavuz and J. Esposito (eds.), 131-155. New York: Syracuse University Press, p133-140. By "diaspora" Aktay designates a symbolic condition rather than a geographic one. According to Aktay, the sudden separation from Islamic history and the beloved Ottoman tradition, which is very well expressed in the poem of the conservative poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek as "being a pariah in one's own country and being estranged in one's own home" (p.137), are the two reasons for the existence of the symbolic diaspora.

relationship between the post-1980 period and the rise of the RP. Whereas only 280 of these companies had been incorporated in the period from 1970 to 1979, this number rose to 744 in the 1980-1989 period.[116] The geographical distribution of the member companies is also useful for understanding the peripheral character of the association, as Konya, a peripheral city, with 153 companies, comes third after metropolitan Istanbul, with 488 members, and metropolitan Ankara, with 175 members, while Kayseri, also a peripheral city, with 112 members, comes fifth after metropolitan Izmir, with 114 members.[117]

The economic visibility of the traditional Anatolian middle class was not independent from the increasing social participation of conservative actors. Rather than arising as independent social, economic and political processes, these processes emerged synchronously out of a shared set of causes. When conservative actors began participating in social life, their economic activity increased, and vice versa.

In addition to these factors, the RP's ability to capitalize on these opportunities and its mobilization of resources were crucial. When the 1990s arrived, the political arena in Turkey was in the midst of a serious deadlock. Ongoing political corruption and a series of unsuccessful coalition governments made the RP a popular, fresh and untested alternative to the prevailing political system. As a result, the party took 19.7 percent of the national vote in the local elections of 1994. On the one hand, the political opportunities described above encouraged the rise of the RP in the 1994 local elections. On the other hand, the successful administration of the RP mayors further increased support for the RP in the 1995 elections. As Yavuz wrote: "The RP's victory in the 1995 elections is less the result of Islam than of a complex set of factors. Since the local elections of March 1994, RP mayors have offered better services than their predecessors and worked hard to improve public services. Moreover, they reduced corruption and nepotism in their municipalities. The RP also acted more professionally than the other parties on the left and right."[118]

However, the picture of the political arena after the elections on December 25, 1995 was not clear. The RP was the leading party with 21.38 percent of the total vote and the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP) became the main opposition party with 19.65 percent, while the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP) came third with 19.18 percent of the total vote. Secularist public opinion favored a center-right coalition of the ANAP and DYP.

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[116] Buğra, A. (1998). "Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30(4), p.524.
[117] Buğra, A. Class, Culture, and State, p.530.
[118] Yavuz, H.M. (1997). "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey," *Comparative Politics*, 30(1), p.72.

Newspapers, in particular, openly encouraged and supported a coalition between the center-right parties that would exclude the RP. Newspapers were implicitly, if not explicitly, claiming that the military was also supporting a center-right coalition and that it was upset with the possibility of the RP becoming a part of the government.[119] Although a center-right coalition government was set up by the ANAP and the DYP, these parties were not inclined toward cooperation, because each of them was trying to eliminate the other in order to become the only representative of center-right politics. As a result, the coalition was dissolved after three months. The RP played a significant role in the collapse of the coalition government by both applying for and receiving a Constitutional Court decision that invalidated a vote of confidence for the government and, later, by setting up a parliamentary means test commission for Tansu Çiller, leader of the DYP. Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the ANAP, tried to take advantage of the means test commission to eliminate Tansu Çiller from center-right politics. As expected, the coalition dissolved on June 6, 1996.

3.2. The Conservative Party in Power: The Welfare Party & True Path Party Coalition

After the resignation of Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, the formation of a coalition government between the RP and DYP was one of two alternatives, the other of which was early elections. The second option was not received well as the parties in parliament were not optimistic about the possible results of an early election. Moreover: "Refah [RP] made a special effort to appease the 'powers-that-be' and demonstrate that it was a tenable and credibly mainstream political party. It was important for Refah to establish its legitimacy in order to fully mobilize its potential base of support, which was divided among several center right parties and a large group who did not even go to the polls."[120] Thus, the coalition government of the RP and DYP was a real win-win scenario for both parties: It served as a medium of legitimacy for the RP and as an escape route for Tansu Çiller from the parliamentary investigation. As expected, the coalition government, which was named *Refahyol* -- a combination of the names of the participating parties, the RP (***Refah** Partisi*) and the DYP (*Doğru **Yol** Partisi*) -- was established on June 28, 1996.

Intra-governmental relations and relations with the military were relatively free of problems in the first months of this government. This virtual harmony was sustained by the compromises made by the RP. As the RP's main motivation was gaining legitimacy and

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[119] A detailed account of newspapers' attitudes to the coalition formation process will be offered in the next parts of the paper.
[120] Gülalp, H. (1999). "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party," *The Muslim World*, 89(1), p.36.

securing itself a place among the center parties, the party's ideological position was not reflected in the program of the government. It was very difficult even to differentiate between the coalition protocol of Refahyol and the previous ANAP-DYP government.[121] The sharp ideological tones of the RP and the MG of Necmettin Erbakan did not rank among the projects of the RP in government.

In addition to economic policies, important parts of the RP's conservative discourse were also abandoned. During the first months of the government, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan signed very controversial documents that were entirely contrary to his party's principles. The discharge from the military of some personnel who were practicing Muslims, the extension of the mandate of the Poised Hammer Force[122] and, finally, the renewal of security agreements with Israel were some examples of the compromises the RP made in order to secure its position as a center-right party. However, Erbakan's strategy did not work. The reason for the RP's failure to secure a position among the ranks of the center right was the reluctance of the historic hegemonic center to accept a new element into the politics of the center. For the historic hegemonic center, the problem was not only rising fears of reaction or worries about secularism, but also the RP's threat of filling the political gap in the center of Turkish politics.[123] For the RP to fill the political gap in the center of Turkish politics meant a new actor in hegemonic politics, a new claimant for political power. To avoid such an outcome, the fear of reactionary danger was manipulated again.

3.3 Rising Reactionary Danger

After a relatively calm period of three months, tensions in the Turkish political arena increased toward October 1996. In Turkey the September-October period marks the beginning of the new administrative year. In this period, the Turkish bureaucracy and other state-related sectors – sectors that are occupied by the Kemalist cadres - organize the first gathering of the year for occasions such as the beginning of judicial, financial, and academic years and the parliamentary session. In the Turkish political tradition, the heads of these state organs give speeches at the first gatherings of their respective institutions. In these speeches, the wishes and intentions of these institutions are declared in the presence of all ranks of the state mechanism. This was also the case in 1996, but the content of the speeches was somehow different from previous years. The heads of these institutions mentioned the rising

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[121] Gülalp, H. Political Islam in Turkey, p.37.
[122] Coalition Forces of the USA, England and France that deployed in Turkey to protect Iraqi refugees. However, conservative politicians claimed that Poisoned Force engaged in extra-mission activities durng the Gulf War.
[123] Laçiner, Ö. (1997). "Postmodern Darbeden Sonbahar Şenliğine," *Birikim*, 99, p.4.

danger of reaction and the necessity of protecting the secular state. These warnings were a sign of the coming campaign against the coalition government. After the warnings of the bureaucrats, Mesut Yılmaz, leader of main opposition party, and Chief of General Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı took the floor again to talk about the rising reactionary danger. As expected, the media also joined the Kemalist chorus, and news articles about the rising reactionary danger started to appear on the front pages of the country's newspapers simultaneously.

It is possible to categorize the so-called major reactionary incidents that were presented by the media in this period. Some were long-standing discussions of secularism in Turkey, such as the headscarf ban in universities, the construction of a mosque in Taksim Square, and the opening of a land route to the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. The university headscarf ban was introduced by Kenan Evren, whose administration was considered to have been tolerant of conservative demands. Although under the rule of the conservative mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, some plans were made and expectations were raised for the construction of a mosque in Taksim Square, the project did not amount to more than a fantasy. In addition, the Hajj land route was an old practice that had been abandoned years ago. Demands for its reopening had always been popular in Turkish public opinion, but the prospect started to be considered a reactionary danger under the rule of the RP-DYP coalition government. The main discourse about such demands argued that the reactionaries had been emboldened by the conservative RP and that they had therefore become more demanding.

However, the RP itself also provided much additional ammunition for the Kemalists to use to bolster its claims about the rising reactionary danger. First among these was Erbakan's visits to Islamic countries such as Libya, Egypt, Malaysia and Indonesia. Although earlier Turkish prime ministers had visited these countries as well,[124] the timing and character of Erbakan's visits was severely criticized by the media, especially the Libyan dictator Colonel Qaddafi's treatment of the prime minister, which was a real diplomatic scandal and was also criticized by Erbakan's supporters as well as going too far in the eyes of secularists.

Erbakan's proposal of an Islamic solution to the Kurdish question and the Sincan incident can be considered as having been the last straw for the Kemalists. Toward the end of the 1990s, Turkey was proceeding in its struggle against the PKK, Kurdish armed insurgence organization, through military means. However, the core of the Kurdish problem still existed, as the demands of the Kurdish population had not been met. At that point, Erbakan offered the classical formula of the instrumentalization of religion as the cement of a society.

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[124] Howe, M. (2000). *Turkey Today: A Nation Divided over Islam's Revival.* Oxford: Westview Press, p.137-8.

Although the Kemalists had been applying the same formula to Turkish society, Erbakan's attitude was more Islamic compared to the cultural Islam of the Kemalists. For example, Erbakan and his party were loudly pronouncing the brotherhood of all Muslims, the idea of *Ummah*, whereas Kemalist discourse was more silent on the Islamic part of the discourse and contented itself with mentioning the brotherhood of Turks and Kurds. Secondly, the Sincan incident was another cornerstone illustrating the rising reactionary danger. The RP mayor of Sincan, a provincial town close to Ankara, organized a Jerusalem Night at the end of January 1997. The Iranian ambassador was invited to speak at this program. Although the Association for Solidarity with Jerusalem had organized similar solidarity nights several times in the past[125], this one was different, as the speech by the Iranian ambassador fit very well into the narrative of the Iranization of Turkey. Another reason for the TSK's harsh reaction to the Jerusalem Solidarity Night was the origin of this type of event: Ayatollah Khomeini, the religious-clerical leader of the revolution in Iran, first established such celebrations in revolutionary Iran. Jerusalem Nights, which were events aimed at increasing solidarity with Palestinian Muslims and protesting Israel's occupation of Jerusalem, was also utilized for the spread of a new regime to all segments of society.[126] Furthermore, the mayor of Sincan, Bekir Yıldız, was a member of the RP. A few days later, the military responded to the Jerusalem Night with a parade of tanks on the main street of Sincan.[127] Although the military cadres claimed that the tanks' appearance on the streets of Sincan was a previously planned regular training move, it was widely considered a warning to the RP.[128]

Among all of these incidents, the Fadime Şahin episode was the most effective and serviceable case in favor of claims about a rising reactionary threat. In the last days of 1996, the self-proclaimed Sufi sheikh Müslüm Gündüz, who was wanted by the police for violating the secular regime of Turkey by gathering with his followers in the great mosques of big cities for the remembrance and recitation of God and violating laws on religious dress, was raided while he was together with a woman named Fadime Şahin. The incident was covered as the drama of Şahin by the media, because Gündüz was half naked when the policed broke into his house with television cameras in tow. Şahin appeared in the news releases of the major television channels and claimed that she had been deceived by Gündüz and that her religious feelings had been exploited by him. In a few days, Fadime turned into a celebrity

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[125] Howe, M. Turkey Today, p.138.
[126] For more details about Jerusalem Nights and its role in Islamic solidarity see: Reiter, Y. (2008). *Jerusalem and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
[127] This was not the first time the TSK utilized a Jerusalem Solidarity Organization for its intervention. The huge Jerusalem meeting organized in Konya before the 1980 military intervention was also counted among the factors that "forced" the TSK to intervene. Salt, J. Nationalism and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment, p. 16.
[128] The military's intention of introducing its measures as totally lawful is worth pondering, as exemplified by its insistence on the "previously organized training move" of the tanks in Sincan. Moreover, its emphasis on the Domestic Service Law of the Turkish Armed Forces when fighting against 'rising danger of reaction' was the same kind of action.

and her former relationships with other self-proclaimed sheikhs, such as Ali Kalkancı, were uncovered. Furthermore, Şahin claimed that the children of certain famous RP members were also followers of her ex-lover-sheikh Kalkancı. Furthermore, Kalkancı's ex-wife Emire Kalkancı also proceeded to make sensational confessions about the so-called deviant relationship between politics, Sufi orders and sex. Although the incident was brought to court and several lawsuits were filed against Kalkancı and Gündüz, the claims of Şahin and Emire Kalkancı were never proven. The manipulation in the Şahin incident will be covered in detail later in this study. For now, it can be said that the incident and its manipulation by the media were the trademarks of the process just as the Susurluk incident, which will be also covered in subsequent sections. Such incidents of rising reactionary danger were regarded as threats to the secular character of the state and, as a result, the state apparatus started to take measures in order to defend itself.

3.4. 'The System Defends Itself': The National Security Council and Briefings

Once the necessary conditions for a military intervention were set by the discourse about a rising reactionary danger, it was the military's turn to begin taking more drastic measures. Its first move was an ordinary MGK meeting on February 28.

The MGK is a constitutional body that was formed by the 1982 Constitution. However, the official website of the council traces its establishment back to 1933.[129] According to the official site of MGK, the period between 1933 and 1949 is known as the Secretariat General of Supreme Defense Assembly Era, the period between 1949 and 1962 is the National Defense Supreme Council and Secretariat General Era, the period between 1962 and 1983 is the National Security Council and Secretariat General of National Security Council Era under the provisions of the 1961 Constitution, and, finally, the period from 1983 until the present is the National Security Council and Secretariat General of National Security Council Era under the provisions of the 1982 Constitution. The official interpretation of the continuity of the council offers insight into the role of the Turkish Army in politics and establishes legitimacy through a link to the Atatürk era. The main aim of the establishment of the National Security Council in 1962, which at that time consisted of five high-ranking military officers - namely, the chief of general staff, the commanders of the army, navy, air forces, and gendarmerie - and five civilians - the president, prime minister, and the ministers of interior affairs, foreign

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[129] "Historical Background," accessed June 01, 2011, http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Ingilizce/Tarihce/tarihce_en.htm

affairs and national defense - was to supply a legitimate basis for the military's intervention into politics.[130]

After the council's regular February 28 meeting, a press release was issued. Such meetings and press releases were normal for the Council, but the content of the press release of this meeting was extraordinary, as the council – or rather the military side of the council - wanted the government to take harsh measures against the so-called rising danger of reaction. The content of the statement and its discourse, which threatened the government with "sanctions," "*yaptırımlar*" if it neglected to take action against the rising danger of reaction, was regarded as a memorandum. After the MGK meeting, Prime Minister Erbakan tried to face the memorandum by directing the issue to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, TBMM). However, he reached an impasse as neither the president of the assembly, the leaders of the opposition parties, nor his partner Tansu Çiller supported him. After the unsuccessful attempt at directing the issue to the assembly, Erbakan made another attempt to respond to the memorandum by not signing decisions passed by the National Security Council. As the prime minister, he was "officially" a member of a council that had threatened him with "sanctions," and therefore these decisions needed his signature in order to be legal. This attempt also lacked both public and political support and, after a month of resistance, Erbakan signed the decisions.[131]

Two documents were created after the February 28 MGK meeting. The first was a press statement[132] that consisted of four articles. The first article of the statement contained information about the participants, venue, and date of the meeting. The second article was reserved for the Kurdish issue, and the third for the Cyprus problem. Aside from the fourth article, the context was typical of press statements made by the MGK. However, the fourth article, which constituted nearly the half of the whole statement, was very different from usual MGK press statements. The article was an examination of "movements opposed to the regime that were looking to establish a base against the Republic of Turkey, which is known as a democratic, *laic*, social state and a state governed by the rule of law bounded with Atatürk nationalism." The article called for the enforcement of laws against the rising

[130] Heper, M.& Güney, A. (2000). "The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience," *Armed Forces& Society*, 26(4), p. 637.

[131] Although 15 years have passed since the February 28 Process, there is still controversy about whether or not Erbakan signed the MGK decisions. Supporters of Erbakan claim that he did not sign the decisions, but signed the press release of the February 28 MGK meeting. However, in the end the MGK decisions were sent to the office of the prime minister as the MGK's proposals to the government.

[132] Yıldız, A. (2000). *28 Şubat: Belgeler*. İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, p.93-5. It is difficult to find the exact content of the MGK's proposals to the government as they were not released to the press. These decisions were declared to the cabinet as proposals to be implemented. However, after the February 28 meeting of the MGK, newspapers issued more or less the same content. In this study I will use Abdullah Yıldız's collection of documents of the February 28 Process.

reactionary danger, and stated that "*laicism* in Turkey is not only the guarantee of the political regime but also the guarantee of democracy and social peace, and it is a way of life." The striking point in the statement is that it regards democracy as external to the political regime it mentions. The statement was not detailed about the proposed measures against the rising reactionary danger. Rather, it underlined the principle of *laicism* and the importance of this principle from the aspect of characteristics of the state and societal peace. The possible results of acts contrary to this principle were mentioned as "new tensions and sanctions," "*yeni gerilimler ve yaptırımlar*".

The press release identified the problem, whereas the second document[133] detailed the MGK's proposals to the government, demanding measures against the rising reactionary danger. The general themes of the text start with a conventional declaration about the need for the enforcement of existing laws and making new ones if needed for the fight against the rising reactionary danger. Furthermore, in many points - articles 1, 12-16, and 18 - the text refers to laws and legal arrangements. Moreover, later it also specifically calls for the enforcement of existing laws and regulations against outdated/backward, *çağdışı,* clothing, the hides of sacrificial animals, private security staff and the protection of Atatürk. This stress on the enforcement of existing laws and regulations was in order to stop the prevailing tolerant attitude of the state mechanism toward Islam. After the laws and regulations, education was the second most-stressed issue in the text, with demands that the legislative organ introduce eight-year mandatory education, decrease the number of İmam-Hatip Schools, and finally subordinate education institutions that claimed to be under the control of sufi orders to the Ministry of Education.[134] The ideological make-up of the state's civil servant ranks was also stressed in the text as a hot item, and other state institutions were advised to adopt the TSK's policy of discharging those members of the staff who are practicing Muslims as a means against ideological staffing.

The MGK wanted the government to fight against the rising danger of reaction with the assistance of other elements of the historic hegemonic center. Although Erbakan avoided direct confrontation with the military and did not deny its claims, he was not eager to follow its instructions. Erbakan's main strategy was to buy time. When he was asked about the MGK decisions, he accused the media of formulating an artificial agenda. Erbakan was justified in his accusations of an artificial agenda, but he targeted the intermediary, not the instigator, which was the military. The meetings of the MGK in March and April were calm, as the

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[133] For the second document see: Yıldız, A. 28 Şubat: Belgeler, p.95-7.
[134] The schools in question are private secondary schools whose curriculum is controlled by the Ministry of Education. The discussions about these institutions originated from the claims that these schools had unofficial ties with Sufi orders or other types of religious communities.

military set time aside for the government to execute the February 28 MGK decisions. In the meantime, the military was increasing the tension day by day and asking for the cooperation of civil society. They insisted that their real aim was not to use power, but that they expected politicians and the parliament to follow the instructions of the MGK.[135] Their expectations from the parliament meant a change in parliamentary arithmetic, which started slowly with DYP representatives going over to the opposition. Yet the tension between the government and the military did not develop as slowly as the change in parliamentary balance, because the armed forces increased tension as "one senior officer went so far as to call the prime minister "a pimp" for going with his family on the pilgrimage to Mecca as guests of Saudi Arabia. When Erbakan urged the military to sanction the officer, they refused."[136]

The MGK meeting in May was crucial as time was now up for the government. In the meeting the generals called the government to account for the lack of measures taken against the rising reactionary danger. The result was nothing more than a delusion for the military. Therefore, the military employed the second phase of their action plan; organizing other elements of the historic hegemonic center - or civil society in their terminology. In this phase, the military organized briefings for judges, the media and civil society organizations.

3.5. Civil Society at Work: Activities of NGOs and Non-State Actors

Unlike former military interventions, the February 28 Process was a military intervention that was realized through civil society in the Gramscian sense. In the February 28 Process, the Armed Forces chose to organize so-called civilian forces[137] to overthrow the coalition government instead of directly targeting the government with memorandums and/or physical interventions by using their armed advantage. The civilian forces, which consisted of the judicial organs, bureaucracy, universities, trade unions, trade associations and, finally, the media, played crucial roles in overthrowing the coalition government. The contribution of NGOs to the process was so ironic that some of the so-called NGOs, such as the Association for Kemalist Thought (*Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği*, ADD) and the Association for the

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[135] Howe, M. Turkey Today, p.140.
[136] Howe, M. Turkey Today, p.140.
[137] The usage of the word 'civil' in Turkish makes the discussion more tragic. The Turkish word for civil is '*sivil*', borrowed from the English word 'civil'. However, there had been a manipulation in the meaning of the word when it was carried into Turkish, as the word '*sivil*' means "non-military" in Turkish. Therefore, the interpretation of civil society is also biased by this change in meaning, as all non-military groups are regarded as part of civil society. Furthermore, Non-Governmental Organizations are called Civil Society Organizations in Turkey. The inexistence of an organic tie between these organizations and the military has been the only variable in considering an organization as a part of civil society. From this aspect, the Kemalist NGOs are considered part of civil society regardless of their ideas being hegemonic and statist.

Support of Modern Life (*Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği*, ÇYDD)[138] demanded the military to take control of the government, using the slogan "Army Do Your Duty," *"Ordu Göreve."* Actually, the existence and activities of these two organizations can be traced back to the period before the process, as they considered Kenan Evren's tolerant and instrumentalizing policies regarding Islam as a deviation from the principles of Kemalism. That is to say, before the process they had been critical about the opportunity structures which made the rise of the RP possible. Therefore, during the process, such organizations worked as an extension of the official body of the TSK and, not very surprisingly, high-ranked retired officers occupied the presidencies of these organizations. The stance of the Kemalist NGOs was full of contradictions concerning their relationships with the state. As already mentioned, before the end of the 1990s these groups had accused the army and other state institutions of compromising the principles of the Kemalist revolution and being tolerant of conservative politics. For example, Erdoğan mentions that the ADD established a foundation called the Foundation for Kemalist Thought, *Atatürkçü Düşünce Vakfı*, a kind of property that cannot be confiscated according to law, because they thought that there was a possibility of being closed after a military coup like the one in 1980.[139] Despite the fact that they feared the potential negative consequences of a military coup, they supported the campaign and role of the military in the February 28 Process. Besides their contradictory relationship with the military and their role in the process, the Kemalist NGOs had a particular agenda, which was the hegemonic projection of Kemalism. In his detailed research of the discourse of such NGOs, Erdoğan states: "The discourse of associations like the ADD and the ÇYDD re-accentuates and re-articulates Kemalism into a new context so as to make it hegemonic over social. It attempts to construct a new and civil collective will that would serve as the subject of Kemalist restoration, or as a supplement of the official project."[140]

The Susurluk Scandal is of central importance for understanding the historic hegemonic center's mobilization. On November 3, 1996, Turkish people learned from news sources that a car accident had occurred near a town called Susurluk. However, after a short time, it was revealed that it was not an ordinary car accident. There were four people in the car at the time of the accident: (1) a senior police officer, Hüseyin Kocadağ, (2) an outlaw heroin smuggler who was also accused of killing several people in the context of intrastate mafia relations and was wanted by Interpol, Abdullah Çatlı, (3) a former beauty queen and Çatlı's girlfriend,

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[138] The English translation of "*çağdaş*" is always problematic. Normally, "*çağdaş*" means contemporary. However, because Kemalists associate the modern with the contemporary, they use the word "*çağdaş*" as a synonym of modern. For example, when I was a sociology student in the Middle East Technical University in 2004, the course name "Postmodern Sociology" was "corrected" by the office of the dean into "Contemporary Sociology" because the dean was unable to imagine a contemporary condition that was beyond modernity.

[139] Erdoğan, N. Kemalist Non- Governmental Organizations, p.271.

[140] Erdoğan, N. Kemalist Non- Governmental Organizations, p.280.

Gonca Us, and, finally, (4) a DYP deputy for Şanlıurfa who was the leader of an anti-PKK Kurdish tribe, Sedat Edip Bucak. After a few hours passed, people began to question the context that had brought these people together. The incident created suspicions in society about the interrelationships between the mafia, politics and the state. As a result of society's increasing sensitivity about the incident, people started a protest to demand an investigation of the incident and intrastate relations by turning their lights on and off every night at 21.00. The protests were named the "One Minute Darkness for Everlasting Light," *"Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık"* campaign.

In the beginning, society's reaction to the incident had nothing to do with the RP, as the party had been out of the state mechanism for years. However, the RP spokespersons, especially Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan, belittled the people's demands in order to protect their coalition partner.[141] The explanations of the RP members suddenly created public sentiment against the RP and the coalition. Now the RP became the center of attention and people were demanding the resignation of the government every night during their protests. Of course, the media also played an important role in channeling discomfort against the RP.[142] Public opinion's sensitivity lasted only a few months as the agenda in Turkey was taken over by the rising reactionary danger of the February 28 Process. However, the RP's ordeal related to Susurluk continued. The internalized method of the protests - turning lights on and off - was used against the rising reactionary danger. In the second rally of protests that started after the critical May meeting of the MGK, people started turning their lights on and off for the resignation of the government. Thus, public sensitivity and method of protest about the Susurluk incident accumulated and were manipulated against the conservative party. At the beginning of protests the word light was used concretely as the opposite of darkness. However, as soon as the protests became popular, the word also took on an abstract meaning and the campaign turned against conservative politics. NGOs were very active in the transformation of the campaign against conservative politics. For example, the Isparta branch of the ADD declared after a regional meeting that, "Our light will be shining over the gangs, the reactionaries and those who use the headscarf as a political symbol."[143] In addition to combining Susurluk and reaction, these lines are also critical with respect to discourse. Instead of directly referring to headscarf itself, the declaration targets "those who use the headscarf as a political symbol." The following remarks by Ives reflect this discourse very well: "Traditional intellectuals, as functionaries of the leading classes, present themselves as

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[141] While criticizing the protests Şevket Kazan blundered by referring to the prejudiced urban legend about the Alevi community in Turkey. Kazan's blunder made the situation more tragic as he confronted the number one example of "good Muslims" of the official discourse.
[142] Finkel, A. (2000). "Who Guards the Turkish Press? A Perspective on Press Corruption in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1), p.163.
[143] Erdoğan, N. Kemalist Non- Governmental Organizations, p.253.

if they are not attached to leading classes. By doing so, they present the interests and truths of leading classes as if objective truths and common interests."[144] As will be mentioned in the discourse analysis chapter, newspapers also claimed that their criticisms were not against Islam itself, which is followed by good Muslims, but rather that they were against the deceivers of Islam, i.e. the bad Muslims.

All in the same breath, a civil society alliance was being formed against the RP. Major employers' associations and trade unions in Turkey – the Confederation of Public Employees Trade Unions (*Kamu Emekçileri Sendikası,* KESK), the Confederation of Turkish Tradesman and Craftsmen (*Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Konfederasyonu,* TESK), the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu,* TÜRK-İŞ), the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu,* DİSK), and finally the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (*Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği,* TOBB) – allied against the coalition government. With a declaration signed on May 4, 1997, the leaders of these unions demanded the government's resignation. The timing of the declaration was significant, as it was just after the unsuccessful posing of the question of confidence among opposition parties. During the process, the alliance organized several rallies against the government and fully adopted the historic hegemonic center's discourse of the rising reactionary danger.

Later, the largest association of capitalists, TÜSİAD, also became involved in the alliance. The alliance was very significant, considering the different backgrounds and ideologies of the associations, such as KESK, TÜRK-İŞ and DİSK, which were leftist trade unions; TOBB and TESK, which were middle class employees' organizations; and TÜSİAD, which was an organization of upper-class capitalists that is publicly known as the Employer's Club. For example, TÜSİAD used to be a politically liberal organization that supported the market economy. Until the February 28 Process, the organization supported the democratization of Turkey and in several policy papers prepared by the organization existing civil-military relations in Turkey were harshly criticized.[145] However, during the February 28 Process, the organization changed its tone and backed the military's intervention in Turkish politics.[146] It seems that the pro-center and elitist attributes of TÜSİAD were dominant over its capitalist characteristics and, as a result, TÜSİAD preferred to act in this manner. The change in the position of TÜSİAD proves the explanations of Gramsci on crisis moments. According to

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[144] Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.77.
[145] For a list of TÜSİAD reports and their contents see: http://www.tusiad.org/information-center/reports/ accessed March 09, 2012.
[146] Demirel, T. (2004). "Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40(1), p. 137.

Gramsci, the moments when vital and major issues are in question are not the testing moments of a historic bloc; rather they are the moments of its formation.[147] The relationship of TÜSİAD and ÇYDD is another example of the formation of the historic bloc, because the ÇYDD began to receive financial support from TÜSİAD.[148] Before the process, the ADD used to be critical of financial support, and generally the ADD considered the ÇYDD as not sufficiently Kemalist. When a crisis moment like the process occurred, the ÇYDD turned out to be a fully Kemalist organization and developed good relationships with the relatively statist ADD and liberal TÜSİAD. The formation of a strong relationship with both parties shows the hegemonic capacity of Kemalism in Turkey.

Not surprisingly, the coalition government could no longer resist this rising pressure and Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan resigned on June 17, 1997. Coalition parties tried to demonstrate that the resignation was a consequence of coalition protocol, by which a rotation in the office of the prime minister between Erbakan and Çiller was made after the government fulfilled half of its pre-appointed time. In fact, the coalition protocol really ordered such a rotation, but in this it occurred prematurely. However, the plan did not work because of the fact that President Demirel did not appoint Çiller as prime minister. Demirel's decision was entirely lawful but not just. According to precedent and established practices, Demirel was expected to appoint Çiller as prime minister due to the fact that the two-party coalition still formed the majority of the parliament. Nevertheless, Mesut Yılmaz was appointed as the prime minister. In the meantime, the Democratic Turkey Party (*Demokrat Türkiye Partisi*, DTP) of Hüsamettin Cindoruk was formed by parliamentarians who had suddenly and successively decided to resign from the DYP during the governmental crisis. Despite the fact that the resignations from the DYP had started before the resignation of Prime Minister Erbakan, the government block lost its majority amidst the resignations during the government formation process of the ANAP and Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DSP). In the end, Mesut Yılmaz formed a minority government consisting of his ANAP, Bülent Ecevit's DSP, and Hüsamettin Cindoruk's DTP. Receiving a vote of confidence for Yılmaz's government only became possible with the support of the CHP. However, the process did not end with the overthrow of the coalition government. On the contrary, the overthrow of the coalition government and the establishment of a new one were the preparatory stages for "cleansing Islam from the public sphere."[149] The problems with the military faced by the succeeding government of Mesut Yılmaz despite its dedication to fighting the rising danger of reaction offers insight into the interventionist aims of the TSK

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[147] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p.158.
[148] Erdoğan, N. Kemalist Non- Governmental Organizations, p.279.
[149] Yavuz, H. M. (2000). "Cleansing Islam From the Public Sphere," *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1), 21-42.

behind the discourse of the rising danger of reaction. These interventionist aims were declared in the statement: "The Process Lasts Ad Infinitum."

3.6. "The Process Lasts Ad Infinitum": The Cleansing of Islam from the Public Sphere.

It is said that the Turkish military has never been particularly eager to intervene in civil politics. Due to the fact that military regimes in Turkish history were not long lasting, many commentators make this claim.[150] Even if this common-sense claim was true, the military intervention of February 28 is an exception. As Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu stated in a reception in the first days of 2001, the February 28 Process was meant to last for a thousand years.[151]

The aim of the process was to silence all conservative claims and to banish the conservative actors back to their symbolic diaspora. Therefore, the process did not finish when Erbakan resigned from the office of prime minister, nor with the banning of the RP on January 16, 1998. Furthermore, it is difficult to set an end date for the period. It can even be said that the process is still continuing, considering the adoption of the same discourse of the rising reactionary danger today. Naturally, however, the scope and potency of the process have decreased over time.

As stated before, there was a political opportunity structure for conservative demands in Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s. During the process, these political opportunities were reversed. The rapid rise of conservative actors in the public sphere decelerated, if not halted entirely, through the process. Education was one of the issues emphasized most by the military during the process. As mentioned before, the military in their briefings claimed that the educational institutions run by reactionaries should be closed down in order to fight against the rising reactionary danger. Therefore, during the process, the educational means of the conservative opposition were amputated. The closure of junior high school-level İmam-Hatip Schools, discrimination against İmam-Hatip graduates in university entrance exams, the headscarf ban in universities, and the pressure on private conservative education institutions were aimed at blocking conservative upward mobilization through education. Secondly, the economy was considered another sphere in which an arduous fight against the reactionaries was necessary. The military claimed that the so-called Green Capital, *Yeşil Sermaye*, economically supported the reaction in Turkey. As a consequence, harsh measures were taken

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[150] There are also more scholarly examples of this claim. See: Lombardi, B. (1997) "Turkey-Return of the Reluctant Generals?" *Political Science Quarterly*, 112(2), 191-215.
[151] Koru, F. "Mantık ve Dilbilimin İzinde," Yeni Şafak, January 18, 2001, accessed June 1, 2011, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2001/Ocak/18/fkoru.html

against companies that were accused of being reactionary. Thirdly, staffing was another issue pointed out by the Kemalists as one of the indicators of rising reactionary danger, and harsh measures were also taken against conservative personnel in state institutions. Just as the military advised in their briefings, other state institutions also started dismissing practicing Muslim staff, claiming that they were reactionaries. Last but not least, the Kemalist establishment claimed that reactionaries made use of loopholes in laws in order to expand their sphere of influence. In order to stop the usage of these loopholes, new legal arrangements were made by the government that was established after the resignation of Erbakan. By taking these measures, the Kemalists hoped to destroy the social, political and economical bases of conservative politics in Turkey forever, and this is what is meant by the *ad infinitum* character of the intervention.

However, while nobody thought that the February 28 Process would last *ad infinitum,* nor did anyone think that it would be mostly stopped by majority rule of the AKP that started in 2002. Yet the AKP majority was not free from problems in terms of civilian-military relations or the debate over secularism.

4. The Presidential Election and e-Memorandum

In order to understand the April 27 Process, it is essential to analyze the AKP and the factors behind its rise. Therefore, the aim of the chapter is to investigate the AKP and its rise. The investigation will first provide the basic factual history of the AKP. After this, different theoretical accounts that were offered by scholars to explain the case of AKP will be summarized. Finally, a partly new theoretical approach will be proposed for the analysis of the AKP. The new approach will be proposed through the criticism and rejection of some parts of the existing literature and, of course, by drawing inspiration from other parts. At the end, this new approach will also be placed into the general theoretical framework of the dissertation: the Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony and Mardin's center-periphery analysis.

4.1. Rise of the AKP

The AKP's 34.29 percent landslide electoral victory in the November 2002 general elections constituted the first step in a series of election victories that the AKP would have during its political life. The election victory that the AKP achieved in the first election it participated in less than one year after its establishment is a key point that should not be overlooked. Yet, it is not the starting point, even though many accounts that will be given as examples in the following section treated it as such. In order to maintain a historical perspective in the discussions of secularism in Turkey and in this dissertation, an accurate analysis of the AKP should start with (1) the political and social atmosphere in Turkey on the eve of the 2002 elections, (2) the condition of the electorate in the above-mentioned period and (3) the messages of the AKP that were transmitted to the electorate at this time.

4.1.1. The Political and Social Atmosphere on the Eve of the 2002 General Elections

Looking at the general social and political atmosphere in the country before the 2002 general elections, it can be said the February 28 Process did not last for a thousand years as hoped by Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu. However, in the last years of the 1990s and the first years of the 2000s, military tutelage was still prevailing in Turkish politics. Arguments between succeeding prime ministers and TSK were good indicators of the TSK's continuing

involvement in Turkish politics. At the end of 2001, Army Commander Yaşar Büyükanıt defined the situation as follows:

> *"It is important to learn the Atatürkist thought system. However, the main thing is to turn lifestyles into a behavior type that is in conformity with this thought system. Those countries that fail to form a common denominator are in an environment of conflict. Our common denominator is a secular and democratic Turkey within an Atatürkist thought system and unitary structure. Every action that does not converge with this common denominator is an enemy of our nation and homeland and must be fought. The Atatürkist thought system is your only soldier."[152]*

It should be noted that Büyükanıt gave this speech in the opening ceremony of the Gülhane Military Medical School and at that time the coalition government of the DSP, MHP and ANAP was in power, which meant that the reactionaries of the February 28 Process had been away from power for three years and all the recommendations of the February 28 MGK meeting were being realized. What Büyükanıt defined as the "Atatürkist Thought System" was the official ideology of the Turkish state, which the TSK utilized as a source of legitimacy for its interventions in civil politics. As very clearly revealed in the statement, the TSK regarded any attempt at deviance from the official ideology as hostility toward the Republic and itself as well. Furthermore, the TSK's tutelage was not limited to the political realm but also expanded to the social realm with the aim of bringing lifestyles into conformity with the official ideology. As a result of this understanding, the political realm of the country was extremely narrowed down and took on an artificial character.

The characteristics and structures of the governments that succeeded Refahyol reflected this constrained and artificial political atmosphere. The 1999 general elections were the first since the February 28 Process. The coalition government established after the 1999 elections between the statist and central leftist DSP, the nationalist and rightist MHP, the and central right and liberal ANAP had been the most long-lived coalition government in Turkey's history. In other words, the long life of the coalition government despite the considerably different party programs, policies and historical backgrounds of the coalition partners showed the constrained and artificial character of the Turkish political realm during and after the February 28 Process. The formula for this harmony within the coalition government consisted in the fact that the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP), which succeeded the RP, and the DYP

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[152] "Gata Açılışında Laiklik Uyarısı," *Radikal*, February 10, 2001, accessed June 01, 2010, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=16233

were the only opposition parties in the parliament. Any change in the coalition government would have meant the inclusion of either the FP or the DYP in the government. However, it was well-known that the TSK was against the FP and the DYP, which were regarded as responsible for the rising danger of reaction. This was the reality that Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit referred to when he frequently said that the country did not have an alternative government.[153]

Being unsure about the possible results of an early general election and in the company of a powerful force majeure, i.e. the TSK, the coalition partners could only continue their "consistent cooperation." However, the constrained and artificial character of the political realm erupted with a discussion between President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in the MGK meeting on 19 February, 2001. It was again a MGK meeting that set the scene for another turning point in Republican history. It was claimed that President Sezer threw a copy of the Turkish constitution in Prime Minister Ecevit's face. According to political rumors, President Sezer accused the government of corruption. As a response to the president's accusations, it was rumored that Deputy Prime Minister Hüsamettin Özkan called President Sezer unthankful because it had been Ecevit's government that nominated and elected Sezer as president.[154] Ecevit stated in the press conference held after the aborted MGK meeting that this was a huge crisis. Contrary to what was expected, the government was not dissolved after the crisis and the coalition partners did not call for an early election. The "consistent cooperation" of the government was still continuing despite the huge crisis.

On the other hand, the government could not prevent the economic crisis that was triggered by the political crisis. On February 21, only three days after the MGK crisis, the economic situation was regarded as the deepest economic crisis in the history of the country,[155] which had already been in a crisis since 1998. The paradox that the deepest economic crises in the history of the country broke out in the term of its most consistent coalition government is the key element for understanding the artificial and constrained political realm of the period.

Meanwhile, Turkey continued to experience other firsts. The tension in the streets was also rising to an unprecedented level. This time it was not student groups or activists that went out but artisans and craftsmen; the most conservative and traditional classes. The rallies that started with the throwing of a cash register at Prime Minister Ecevit by a bankrupted artisan

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[153] "Derviş'e Cevap" *Sabah*, April 30, 2001, accessed June 01, 2011, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2001/04/30/p01.html.
[154] For details of the political rumors see: "Türkiye Sizinle Gurur Duyuyor" *Radikal*, February 20, 2001; "Hortum Patladı" *Yeni Şafak*, February 20, 2001;İşte O Tartışma" *Star*, February 20, 2011.
[155] Cizre, Ü.& Çınar, M. Turkey 2002, p. 318.

gained a communal character and spread to every corner of the country. Turkey witnessed craftsmen's and artisans' protest rallies in Konya, Ankara, Kayseri, İzmir, Gaziantep, Sivas, Çankırı and Kocaeli. The protests of artisans and craftsmen reflected the dimensions of the huge crisis that the country was passing through. The protest of any social group and their dissatisfaction with the condition of the country was quite normal in Turkey. However, when the people in the street constituted the most traditional segment of the society that had never gone out in protests before, it meant that the issue was deeper than simple dissatisfaction or discomfort. That is, it corresponded to a certain hegemonic crisis that had been held at bay with the help of the February 28 Process in the short run but deepened by that same process in the long term. While economic and social crises were deepening, Ecevit's health was also deteriorating. Ecevit, who was 77 at the time, was moved to a hospital on May 5, 2002. After his treatment, which lasted longer than one week, Ecevit was discharged from the hospital. However, after a short time he returned to the hospital and his condition was serious toward the end of June 2002. It was not surprising that Turkey, experiencing the deepest economic and social crisis of its history, its prime minister having been hospitalized for severe health problems, faced the dissatisfaction of the urban middle class and the conservative electorate.

4.1.2. The Urban Middle Class and the Conservative Electorate

The condition of the urban middle classes, who supported the February 28 Process but later faced the deepest social and economical crisis in Republican history, and of the conservative electorate under such a crisis environment is also important for understanding the rise of the AKP.

The winners of the 1999 general elections were the central leftist DSP and the nationalist and right wing MHP. The reason these two parties came first and second in the election goes back to the February 28 Process and it is indicative of the condition of the urban middle class and the conservative electorate on the eve of the 2002 elections. The historic hegemonic center of Turkish capitalism defined reaction and PKK as the country's two problem axes. The mobilization of the urban middle classes in the February 28 Process and later the results of the 1999 elections show that the urban middle classes seemed satisfied with this understanding on the part of the historic hegemonic center.

Having the advantage of being the prime minister when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was captured, Bülent Ecevit and his DSP came first in the 1999 general elections with 22.19 percent of the vote. Furthermore, Ecevit's DSP's "faith-respectful secularism,"

"inançlara saygılı laiklik" was also a factor in its party's election result. The party was secular enough to submit to the TSK's demands for increasing its influence in politics, and respectful and tolerant enough to assuage the concerns of conservatives and urban middle classes that were also uneasy about a crisis like the February 28 Process despite the fact that they supported the secularist measures in the process. The same binary of reaction and PKK was also evident in the 17.98 percent of the vote the MHP received in the 1999 elections. As nationalists, the MHP fit very well the role of the hawk in a period when people expected the execution of Abdullah Öcalan. Being the hawk in the struggle against the PKK was not the only expectation from MHP. With its conservative character, the party was also expected to represent the conservative masses, whose means were crippled by the February 28 Process. Although it never had an Islamist tone, the MHP, which even made an electoral alliance with the RP in the 1991 general elections, was the second-best choice for the conservatives. Furthermore, popular conservative figures like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek[156] also formed a transparent zone between the conservative masses and the MHP.[157] As a result of these historical ties, the MHP became the address of the conservative electorate who did not support the FP, the successor of the banned RP. Furthermore, the iron fist of the MHP also played a role in the conservative electorate's choice of the MHP rather than the FP. Mehmet Bekaroğlu[158] claims that the FP did not manage to put forward an astute and powerful opposition and that the electorate therefore abandoned the party not because of its victimhood, but because of its being helpless and incompetent.[159] However, the MHP disappointed the conservative electorate in the very first step during the opening ceremony of the TBMM. Far from supporting Merve Kavakçı, the headscarf-wearing deputy of FP, against those who claimed Kavakçı could not take the deputy oath with her headscarf on, the party asked its member, Nesrin Ünal, a headscarf-wearing deputy, to take her headscarf off during the meetings of the TBMM. Thus, this party failed to satisfy the conservative sectors of Turkish society.

Although they supported the "appropriate" parties against reaction and the PKK, which were Turkey's major problems according to the understanding put forward during the February 28 Process, it is difficult to say the urban middle classes and conservatives were satisfied, as none of the problems that caused the February 28 crisis were solved. On the contrary, Turkey's long-standing problems of corruption, underdevelopment, unemployment, and

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[156] Kısakürek was a well-known conservative poet. Kısakürek's nationalist tone was also as powerful as his conservatism in the ideology he formulated as "the Great East."

[157] Duran, B. (2005). Cumhuriyet Dönemi İslamcılığı, p.135.

[158] Mehmet Bekaroğlu, an academician, was a deputy from the VP between 1999-2002. In this period Bekaroğlu tried to formulate an effective opposition to the government and historic bloc that was not only limited to the secularism debate.

[159] Bekaroğlu, M. (2007). *"Adil Düzen"den "Dünya Gerçekleri"ne Siyasetin Sonu*, Ankara: Elips, p.32.

political and economic instability were deepened as a result of these extraordinary conditions; that is, the artificial and constrained character of the social and political realms. Therefore, it can be said that the urban middle classes and conservative electorate were ready to be flexible voters in the coming elections if they received the appropriate political messages and program. Under such circumstances it is important to understand the ideology and message of the AKP.

4.1.3. The Ideology and Message of the AKP

While the country's atmosphere of crisis and ambiguity continued, along with the resulting dissatisfaction of the electorate, the popularity of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party, which included many figures from center-right besides the reformist wing of MG, increased. Erdoğan and his party's public relations policies offered an alternative to the Turkish electorate in the crisis conditions. In his visits to several Anatolian cities both before the establishment of the party and during the election campaign, Erdoğan talked to thousands of people. During his speeches he recited the first verse of a popular song, which was also frequently sung in stadiums in football matches: "We Walked Together On These Roads," *"Beraber Yürüdük Biz Bu Yollarda."* The crowds replied to Erdoğan with the second verse: "We Got Soaked Together Under the Rain," *"Beraber Islandık Yağan Yağmurda."* This kind of populist and comprehensive political language brought the support of a right wing and liberal electorate that had never supported a MG party before. Pointing to the military tutelage over civilian politics, he was stating: "We will stand tall, but we will not become obstinate," *"Dik Duracağız ama Dikleşmeyeceğiz."* With the first part of the motto he was targeting the MHP, which had been the earlier preference of conservative votes but later became a disappointment because of its compromising politics with the TSK. The second part of the motto targeted the previous MG parties, which were criticized for being "too radical" and irreconcilable with the TSK and other state institutions. Thus, he constantly emphasized that the AKP would not be an ideological party, but a practical one.

The ideologists of the AKP conceptualized the party's ideology of "ideology-lessness" as conservative democracy. However, neither scholars in the field nor the ideologists who first coined the term, Ömer Çelik and Yasin Akdoğan, have defined it yet. In spite of party's many years in power now and the many documents its ideologists produced, it is still impossible to infer the boundaries of the term, what it excludes or includes. Yet, the non-definition of the term does not depend on a technical impossibility but rather on a choice: ideology-lessness. For example, in various academic and political documents written by Çelik and Akdoğan,

after declaring the death of ideology, they mention the "opportunities" of conservative democracy instead of its definition.[160]

The first part of the concept – conservatism, *muhafazakarlık* – has nothing to do with the conceptual discussions of political science. When referring to conservatism, the AKP and its actors were not talking about conserving the political system and its norms; rather, they meant the conservation of social and cultural norms, which were highly intertwined with religiosity. The cultural, social and religious connotations of the concept offered the AKP a discursive opportunity to define the priorities of the party, as when Mehmet Ali Şahin, an influential AKP member, declared that the headscarf was not a priority of the party.[161] Şahin's message was clear: "Although we are all conservatives like you, for now we are unable to solve the headscarf problem," and he was sure that the message was also understood clearly by the electorate.

The second part of the concept was also an opportunity to communicate with the urban middle classes and the capitalists. By underlining democracy, the AKP stressed that it had differentiated itself from the traditional MG line and appreciated the market economy and capitalist democracy. Indeed, as mentioned in the chapters about the RP and the February 28 Process, seen from a Gramscian perspective, the RP was also ready to come to terms with capitalist democracy and market economy, but either its reconciliatory message was not clearly submitted to the historic hegemonic center or the historic hegemonic center was not very eager to receive the message. Contrary to the RP, the AKP's luck was that it was more powerful than the RP against the historic hegemonic center. Its message regarding the market economy and capitalist democracy was more powerful and understandable and, finally, the historic hegemonic center was more in need of cooperation than it had been in 1997. It should be noted that the 2001 economic crisis was destructive for the country's major capitalists in the long term, as well as being disastrous for lower-income groups in the short term. In terms of a Gramscian conceptualization, one part of the historic hegemonic center, capitalists and\or media, was in a position such that it had to defend its specific interests rather than the general interests of the historic hegemonic center, which meant the collapse of the hegemonic alliance built in the February 28 Process and the building of a new one with the AKP, even if it was

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[160] See; Akdoğan, Y. (2006). "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," in *The Emergence of A New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, M. Hakan Yavuz (eds.), 49-65. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press; Akdoğan, Y. "AK Parti'nin Siyasi Çizgisi Olgunlaşıyor", *Yeni Şafak*, January 11, 2004, accessed June 01, 2011, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2004/ocak/11/yakdogan.html; Çelik, Ö. "Muhafazakarlık ve Demokratlık," *Sabah*, January 11, 2004, accessed June 01, 2011, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/01/11/celik.html.
[161] "Şahin: Önceliğimiz Türban Değil İşsizlik," *Milliyet*, May 24, 2006, accessed June 01, 2011, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/05/24/siyaset/siy02.html.

only temporary. The huge support of the central media for the AKP both before and after the 2002 general elections was the chief indicator of the new alliance.[162]

In conclusion, the political and social crises on the eve of the 2002 elections, the dissatisfaction of the urban middle class and the conservative electorate in the election process and, finally, the AKP's ideology and communication strategy were the main reasons for the landslide election victory. Besides these influential factors, the attitude of the historic hegemonic center toward the AKP was also influential both in the election results and the AKP's performance, i.e. its ability and capacity to rule the country. However this attitude did not remain stable towards the presidential elections.

4.2. The Presidential Elections and the e-Memorandum

The temporary coalition between the AKP and the capitalist wing of the Turkish historic hegemonic center started to dissolve during the presidential election process. The real problem for the capitalist wing of the historic hegemonic center was not a conservative president or the headscarf of a potential conservative president's wife. The problem that caused a split in the alliance between the AKP and the capitalist wing of the Turkish historic hegemonic center was the former's strong chance at creating a "national popular" and replacing the existing historic hegemonic center with a new one or, in other words, eliminating the traditional capitalist classes from the formation of a new historic hegemonic center.

The AKP's five years of majority rule had created a suitable base for the flourishing of a new modernity, sociality and political economy that in the end had the potential to create a new national popular. The change in the media industry is a good example of the creation of a new national popular. This time it was not only the conservative media institutions that were supporting the conservatives; the center media was also supporting the AKP and its societal base. The fact that Ömer Çelik's columns in which he formulated and publicized the conservative democracy ideology had been published in *Sabah* was just one of the indicators of the changing balances in the historic hegemonic center. Another example of this shift was the increasing visibility of conservative popular figures on TV channels. Figures like Fehmi

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[162] The reports and comments from the center media indicate support for the AKP; "Anadolu Ihtilali," *Sabah*, November 04, 2002; "Sosyal Patlama Sandıkta Oldu," *Hürriyet*, November 4, 2002; "AKP Tek Başına İktidar," *Milliyet*, November 4, 2002;

Koru[163] became increasingly sought-after commentators for newscasts and current affairs programs while discussing government policy. The conservative bureaucrats who had been removed from their posts over accusations of being reactionaries in the February 28 Process started to return to civil service in higher ranks and they joined the existing conservative bureaucrats whose promotions had been increased by the AKP. The story of Central Bank Director Durmuş Yılmaz is a good case for understanding the promotion of conservative bureaucrats. Yılmaz, who was appointed as the bank's director in 2006, was the third name sent to the President by the government for appointment because the previous candidates' appointment had been blocked by President Sezer due to their supposed incompatibility with the basic principles of the republic – principles that were mentioned in the speech of then-Army Commander Yaşar Büyükanıt, which quoted previously. Although Yılmaz was also incompatible with the secular character of the Republic, President Sezer somehow accepted his appointment. However, the appointment was harshly criticized by the center media, which claimed that the professional qualities and lifestyle of Yılmaz did not meet the criteria for being a Central Bank director. In the end, Yılmaz, whose term finished in May 2011 and who was then appointed as chief advisor to the President, was regarded as one of the most successful Central Bank directors.[164] Parallel to these developments in the bureaucracy, conservative businessmen that had been exposed to a witch-hunt based on the claim that they represented a reactionary danger got their seats reserved on the plane of the prime minister for foreign visits in order to sign international trade agreements. İmam-Hatip high school graduates and students whose right to higher education had been crippled in the February 28 Process, and as a result continued their university education abroad, started to return to Turkey as bureaucrats, white-collar workers and academicians.[165]

In 2007, the hot topic on the political agenda was the possibility of a change in the post of the presidency paralleling the direction of the change in the bureaucracy, the media and the business world. While the discussion on the profile of the new president was continuing, Sabih Kanadoğlu, an ardent Kemalist and retired chief prosecutor of the Court of Appeals, claimed that a qualified majority (3/5) of the parliament was needed as the meeting quorum for a presidential election.[166] When Kanadoğlu first put forward his argument, his claims were

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[163] Fehmi Koru is a conservative columnist and political analyst. Koru has close ties with AKP member politicians. In particular, his close friendship with President Abdullah Gül, who had been prime minister and minister of foreign affairs before being elected as president, attracted significant public attention.
[164] Ertuğrul Özkök, who in the beginning thought that Yılmaz's appointment was not professional but political, later apologized to Yılmaz and commented that he was one of the most successful directors not only for himself but also for the international authorities; Özkök, E. "Meğer O Ayakkabıyı Biz Ters Giymişiz," *Hürriyet*, April 15, 2011, accessed June 01, 2011, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/17551589.asp
[165] For more informatiom about İmam Hatip Graduates after the February 28 Process see; Çağlar, İ. (2011). From Symbolic to Physical Diaspora: İmam Hatip Graduates in Europe. Unpublished Research Report. Utrecht University.
[166] Kanadoğlu, S. "AKP Tek Başına Seçemez," *Cumhuriyet*, December 12, 2006, p.8.

not taken seriously and were regarded as the desperate efforts of an old-school Kemalist. However, as the presidential election drew nearer, the historic hegemonic center realized that there was no option other than this so-called 367-formula to prevent the election of a conservative as the president.

While these discussions were going on, the media did not find it difficult to use its traditional means of opposition to the conservatives and began to publish news and comments about the gradual Islamization of the country and the AKP's weakness in defending the country's interests against PKK:

> *"As the controversy grew more bitter, secular media outlets run by the Doğan family began publishing the illustrated life stories of the headscarf-wearing wives of AKP ministers and high-level civil servants. Such, the coverage implied, would be the permanent fate of Turkish women if the headscarf ban were not maintained. And not only that: Turkey would become an Islamic state. The conspiracy theories about Islamization, oddly enough, are fueled by strong anti-American sentiment."[167]*

Like the Susurluk Rallies of the February 28 Process, in this period a series of rallies were organized under the name of "Republican Rallies," *"Cumhuriyet Mitingleri"*. Again the main hegemonic civil society apparatus of the historic hegemonic center, i.e. the Kemalist NGOs, were on the scene as the organizers of the rallies. While the rallies were being organized by the ADD, which was led by Şener Eruygur, the retired commander of the gendarmerie, on April 12, two days before the ADD's first meeting in Ankara, Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükkanıt explained that he hoped not a "fake," *"sözde"* but a "real," *"özde"* secular president would be elected. The Ankara Republican Rally took place at Tandoğan Square with the participation of thousands of people, who later walked to Anıtkabir and finished the rally there.[168] The Republican Rallies continued after the e-memorandum issued by the TSK on April 27. Other crowded rallies took place on April 29 in Istanbul and on May 13 in Izmir, in addition to smaller ones organized in Çanakkale and Manisa on May 5.

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[167] Elver, H. "Lawfare and Wearfare in Turkey," *Middle East Report Online*, April, 2008, accessed September 09, 2008, http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/elverINT.html

[168] The exact number of participants in the rallies was controversial. The organizer ADD claimed that the number of participants was more than a million, whereas Reuters, quoting a senior police officer, stated that more than 300.000 people attended the rally; "Hundreds of thousands rally against Turkish Government," Reuters, April 14, 2007, accessed May 10, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/14/us-turkey-presidency-protest-idUSL1445102820070414

Besides controversy over the number of participants in these rallies, there were also ambiguities regarding the socio-political composition of the crowds and the message they wanted to give. First of all, the organizers and participants of the rallies should be differentiated. Among the organizers and prominent figures that took the stage and delivered speeches there were NGO's like the ADD, the ÇYDD and the Republican Women's Association and figures such as Türkan Saylan, Nur Serter, Necla Arat and Tuncay Özkan. Türkan Saylan, Nur Serter and Necla Arat are retired old-school Kemalist academicians who were chief actors behind the headscarf bans in universities in the 1990s. Tuncay Özkan is a journalist who supported the center-right Mesut Yılmaz in the 1990s and turned out to be a Kemalist-nationalist, *ulusalcı*, against the AKP in 2000s. Now Özkan has been arrested and is accused of being a member of an intra-state criminal organization that planned a coup d'état against ruling AKP. Both the outlook of the organizing community and the speeches they delivered in the rallies were a far stretch from democratic norms and values. However, fortunately, the "thinly veiled pro-military"[169] message of the organizers was not shared by the participants.[170] The middle class urban participants[171] were not in conformity with the militarist tone that could be heard from the stage. The participants, who chanted the slogan "Neither Shariah, nor coup, but fully independent Turkey," "*Ne Şeriat Ne Darbe, Tam Bağımsız Türkiye*" clearly stated that they were against a military intervention.

As a result of the manipulation of the historic hegemonic center and the media, participants in the Republican Rallies were fearful about the dangers of reaction and Kurdish separatism that supposedly awaited Turkey in the near future under the rule of the AKP. The alternative modernity offered by the AKP to the less modernized segments of Turkish society and the resulting increase in public visibility for these previously less-modernized segments in the high-status spheres that were previously totally defined and therefore dominated by the middle-class urban participants of the Republican Rallies, created a desire to preserve and protect modern lifestyles.[172] As will be demonstrated in the discourse analysis chapter, this sensitivity was manipulated by the media into a fear of creeping and gradual Islamization and subsequently mobilized in the form of Republican Rallies. The stress on a "fully independent Turkey" in the slogans chanted in the Republican Rallies was the result of the rising

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[169] Barkey, H. J. & Çongar, Y. (2008). "Deciphering Turkey's Elections: The Making of A Revolution," *World Policy Journal*, 24 (3), p.64.

[170] Further see the news about participants' protests against the organizers; "Mitingte 'Özgürlük Çıkışı'", *Birgün*, May 15, 2007, accessed May 10, 2011, http://www.birgun.net/actuel_2007_index.php?news_code=1179069900&year=2007&month=05&day=13; "İzmir Mitingine Damgasını Vuranlar," *Yeni Şafak*, May 13, 2007, accessed May 10, 2011, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?t=13.05.2007&i=45179.

[171] Yavuz, M. H. & Özcan, N.A. (2007). "Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages," *Middle East Policy*, 14 (3), p. 123-4.

[172] Somer, M. Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey, p.1278.

nationalism in the country that was again affected by the tone of newspaper discourse in the period.

Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt's press conference on April 12 was another important turning point in the discussions about the presidential election. In the beginning, the focus of the press conference was not the presidential election, contrary to what was expected by the journalists who attended the conference. Only at the end of the conference did Büyükanıt talk about the presidential election and state that the TSK was expecting a president who was "really, not superficially (pseudo)," "*sözde değil özde,*" in full conformity with the basic principles of the Republic. These words from Büyükanıt and the reactions of the journalists in attendance reflected the militant position of the journalists in Turkey. Among many other questions, after noting that it was not allowed for military officers' wives to wear a headscarf and that the president was the supreme commander of the TSK, Taki Doğan of the *Habertürk* Television Channel asked what the TSK's reaction would be if someone whose wife wore a headscarf was elected as president – the supreme commander of the army by definition.[173] Büyükanıt reacted to the question by stating that he understood and accepted the question but would not answer it. After Doğan, Murat Yetkin of *Radikal* took the floor and, noting that Büyükanıt had explained his desire for the election a president who was really in conformity with the basic principles of the Republic, Yetkin asked whether Büyükanıt felt any doubt about that. As an answer Büyükanıt had a negative attitude to the question, and he only said that he had no doubts about the election of a president who was in conformity with the basic principles of the Republic. Büyükanıt was far from showing the iron fist that had been expected and provoked by the attending journalists. Finally, unsatisfied with Büyükanıt's reply, Emin Çölaşan of *Hürriyet* grasped the microphone from Yetkin and, mentioning that there was a certain name that was supposed to be the candidate for the presidency, asked whether "that certain name" was really in conformity with the basic principles of the Republic. Büyükanıt, clearly more civilian-minded than Çölaşan, said he did not want to talk about particular names.

Not taking the 367-condition and the Republican Rallies seriously, the AKP seemed uninterested in these discussions. When asked about them, prime minister answered that the presidential elections would not be on their agenda until election time. Furthermore, Erdoğan stated that the opposition parties played with the presidential elections like children playing a game.[174] Not heeding the historic hegemonic center's threats regarding the quorum and

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[173] Chief of The Command Yaşar Büyükanıt's Press Conference, 12/04/2007.
[174] Selçuk Küçükşahin, "Bir AKP'liyi Cumhurbaşkanı Seçtirmeyenler," *Hürriyet*, May 14, 2007, accessed June 01, 2011, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6509159&p=2.

military intervention[175], Erdoğan delayed declaring his party's candidate for presidency until the last minute. On April 24, three days before the first round of elections and the last day of the applications for the candidacy, Erdoğan declared Abdullah Gül as the AKP's candidate for the presidential election.

Normally, Erdoğan's declaration of Gül as the presidential candidate was not something problematic or unexpected due to the democratic standards of Turkey and earlier precedents. The last three presidents before Gül had been the only Turkish presidents without a military background. Özal, the first of these, was the leader of the ANAP that was the majority ruling party during the election period. Süleyman Demirel, the second, even lacked the majority Özal had. He was the leader of the DYP, which was the winner of the last elections and the bigger partner in the ruling coalition government. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the third, was the president of the Constitutional Court and nobody even considered his name among the potential candidates until Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit of the post-February 28 Process mentioned his name. As a result of the constrained and artificial political atmosphere of the period, a great consensus was reached around Sezer, who displayed a democratic character until he was elected as the president and was known by the liberal and pro-freedom speeches he delivered once a year in the opening ceremonies of the Constitutional Court. Considering these past practices, Gül's candidacy for the presidency would not have been an unexpected situation in terms of the political tradition of Turkey. Furthermore, Erdoğan did not nominate himself, but chose a more moderate figure, Gül, for the presidency. However, Gül's presidency was opposed on the grounds of a lack of a consensus. This was a condition, just like the 367 quorum, that had never been sought for previous presidents.

The AKP was the only party and Abdullah Gül was the only candidate that was present in the parliament when it gathered for the first round of the presidential election on April 27. At the end of the first round, Gül took 357 votes but could not reach 367, which was the majority-quorum needed for being elected in the first round. However, 367 was also the meeting quorum according to the CHP and, therefore, the opposition party brought the election before the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court was expected to explain its decision before the second round that would be held three days later. However, the TSK took the initiative

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[175] In a conference he gave, while commenting on the AKP's intention to elect a conservative president, Kanadoğlu referred to Adnan Menderes and the 1960 coup d'état and stated, "Those who do not take lessons from history will face the same end"; "Eski Başsavcıdan Tehdit Dolu Konferans," *Zaman*, March 11, 2007, accessed June 01, 2011, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=511602&title=eski-bassavcidan-tehdit-dolu-konferans. Furthermore, Deniz Baykal claimed that there would be a clash in the country if the Constitutional Court approved the presidential election, Ahmet Kekeç. "Daha Çılgını Var," *Star*, April 28, 2011 accessed June 01, 2011, http://www.stargazete.com/politika/yazar/ahmet-kekec/daha-cilgini-var-haber-347466.htm

from the Constitutional Court and issued a memorandum on its website at midnight on April 27.[176]

 The e-memorandum started with the cliché of a reactionary danger that had been increasingly targeting the secular Republic in the recent past. After that, examples of this rising reactionary danger were mentioned. The first example was from Şanlıurfa, regarding a children's choir's singing of religious songs in a meeting organized for the celebration of the Prophet Muhammed's birthday. However, it was not the first time the same organization was cited as an indicator of rise of rising reactionary danger. The organization was previously reported by *Milliyet* on April 24.[177] The second example was also an event in the context of the celebrations of the Prophet Muhammed's birthday. It was again religious songs and a children's choir that were regarded as a sign of the rise of reactionary danger in Denizli and it was again *Milliyet* that previously reported the event.[178] After the demonstration of the evidence of the crime, the e-memorandum declared the culprit: it was the administrative organs that let the events be organized. The e-memorandum stated that the attitude of the administrative organs toward these kinds of reactionary actions did not comply with the chief of general staff's definition of real seculars. In its final section, the e-memorandum brought the presidential election to the center of the argument and stated that as a result of the cited examples of rising reactionary danger, the secular character of the republic had begun to be discussed in the presidential election process. The e-memorandum concluded with the threat of a *coup d'état* as in the MGK press release of February 28: The TSK is a party in the discussions on secularism and the presidential election and it shall display its attitude and actions when it is needed.

Contrary to the usual discourse of the TSK, what was unique in this incident was the counter-memorandum issued by the government's spokesperson, Cemil Çiçek, the day after the e-memorandum.[179] Instead of retreating like previous governments against the military's opposition, the government clearly stated that the e-memorandum was regarded as a declaration made against the government and that this was unacceptable in a democratic system. Furthermore, reminding its audience of the fact that the TSK was an official institution under the command of the Office of the Prime Minister, any kind of statement by the TSK that targeted the government was not acceptable. The government's counter

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[176] e-memorandum can be reached from;
http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2007/BA_08.html,
accessed May 20, 2011. Recently in September 2011 the TSK removed the e-memorandum from its official website.
[177] "Türbanlı Küçüklerden İlahiler," *Milliyet*, April 4, 2007, p.1.
[178] "Denizli'de Türbanlı İlköğretim Korosu," *Milliyet*, April 4, 2007, p.1.
[179] "Turk Govt Condemns Army Threat to Intervene in Poll," *Reuters*, April 28, 2077, accessed May 20, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/28/uk-turkey-president-idUSL2868113720070428.

memorandum also underlined the timing of the proclamation and concluded that the e-memorandum would be regarded as an attempt to influence the Constitutional Court in its decision about the presidential election.

The Constitutional Court's decision to invalidate the first round of the presidential election with the excuse of the absence of the majority quorum (367) came almost immediately after the e-memorandum. The decision, which would have been questioned even if the TSK had not issued the e-memorandum, entirely lost its social and legal legitimacy. However, it was still binding for the presidential election. On May 6, the parliament met again to repeat the first round of the presidential election. The parliament was again incapable of meeting the quorum because of the absence of the CHP. The government therefore decided to call for early elections, as required by the constitution in the event of a failure to elect a new president. The election of the new president became the first task of the new parliament that would be established after the general elections. However, the deadlock in the presidential election process was not because of the quorum or any other secondary factors such as the personality of the candidate or his wife's headscarf. The deadlock was in the relationship between the AKP and the historic hegemonic center.

4.3. Reading the AKP and the Historic Hegemonic Center

There is a very significant body of literature on the AKP. Many scholars from different theoretical schools have discussed various characteristics of the AKP. Of course, like every other body of academic work, the literature on the AKP is also subject to certain criticisms. The criticisms may be about the general shortcomings of the theoretical body within which the scholars prefer to speak or they may be based on the particular features of a given analysis. However, with regard to the literature on the AKP, most of the analyses unfortunately have two specific shortcomings regardless of the capacities of the various theoretical tools used and the personal tendencies of the analyst.

The first common shortcoming of such analyses is a kind of problem of anachronism. Most of the time analyses of the AKP deal with an account of how the AKP became successful in ruling the country in the fields of education, health, transportation and the economy. Moreover, once a comparative perspective with the record sheet of Turkey's traditional right and left-wing political parties is offered, it becomes nearly impossible for the reader to not be convinced by the arguments that display these successes as the reasons for rise of the AKP. But while they are extremely convincing in explaining the electorate's continuing support of

the AKP in the 2007 elections, they say nothing about the first success of party in the 2002 elections.

The other characteristic of existing literature on the AKP is retrospective analysis. Scholars precisely "designate" the presidential election crisis as the starting point of the analyses and then continue with the results of the presidential election crisis, the fault lines and strategies of the AKP and the other parties in the crisis. Most of the time the analysis finishes with an evaluation of the "results of the crisis" if the presidential election process finished by the time the article was written; or predictions – unfortunately most of the time wishes – for the possible results of the presidential election crisis if the presidential election process had not finished by the time the article was written. In both cases the presidential election crisis is treated as a unit that naturally started before the presidential election, continued during the election process and finished with the election of Abdullah Gül as the new president. Unfortunately, none of these analyses answers questions such as these: Why did the AKP and the other parties in the presidential election crisis not settle on a middle way like they did in many cases between 2002 and 2007? What was the role of previous developments in the disagreement between the AKP and the other parties in the crisis? What was it that changed with the election of a president like Abdullah Gül, rather than somebody else?

To answer these questions together with many others, to overcome the two major shortcomings of the existing AKP analyses and, finally, to generate a more accurate account of the AKP, a literature analysis seems to best way to begin. Grouping will be an effective means to start the analysis of existing literature on the AKP. However, it should be mentioned that grouping will be used as a methodological tool, which means that the groups will not be exhaustive or exclusive. Although it is possible to mark some scholars who strictly follow a theoretical school in the analysis of the AKP, the majority of scholars can be placed in several schools. In addition to the diversity among the different works from a given scholar, it is even possible to observe different theoretical explanations in a single work. With these methodological reservations in mind, the following grouping is suggested: (1) Orientalism and Modernization Theory, (2) Political Economy Theory, (3) Social Movement Theory, (4) Modernity and Civil Society Theory.

As a result of the abundance of literature on the AKP, it is impossible to cover all the examples of a theoretical explanation. Therefore, there must be some limiting of the amount of literature that will be covered for each theoretical explanation. The first of the selection criteria will be the type of publication. Articles and chapters in edited volumes will be preferred to books because they are more focused on a single issue. Secondly, well-known

and established scholars advancing a theoretical explanation will be preferred to others. Finally, typical examples of a theoretical explanation will be preferred to others regardless of the reputation of the author.

Using this criteria an overview of orientalist and modernist explanations for the rise of the AKP can be made as follows:

4.1.1. Orientalism and Modernization Theory

In their explanations for the rise of global Islamic movements in general and the Turkish AKP in particular, culture, tradition and nature are the concepts used most often by the disciples of orientalism and modernization theory. According to the scholars of these schools, there are fundamental cultural differences between the East and the West and these cultural differences make it impossible for eastern cultures to abandon traditional values and norms for modern ones. Moreover, scholars who are closer to orientalism than modernization theory claim that the nature of Islam is very political and, therefore, not compatible with modern notions of democracy, human rights and freedom.

Scholars of orientalism and modernization theory who study conservative movements and the AKP of Turkey claim that the AKP as a successor of the MG tradition is hostile to the secular character of Turkish Republic. However, because of the harsh reaction of Turkey's civil and military bureaucracy to religious fundamentalism, the AKP has to hide its real aims and keep the Islamization of Turkish society as a hidden agenda. Otherwise, the Turkish Constitutional Court would ban the party with many other further sanctions like the ones that were applied to former political parties of the MG. Therefore, the AKP prefers methods of gradual Islamization. It uses small and underground attempts rather than direct confrontations with the defenders of secularism.

Michael Rubin's piece is a typical example of the orientalist and modernist explanations of the AKP. In his article Rubin makes a reference to the "hidden agenda" discussion and writes that Erdoğan's actions contradict his rhetoric:

> *"His actions often contradict his rhetoric. He has endorsed, for example, the dream of Turkey's secular elite to enter the European Union, but only so far as to*

enact reforms demanded by Brussels to dilute the role of the military, which traditionally serves as guardian of the Turkish constitution." [180]

The claim that, rather than fully adopting the European Union's norms on democracy and human rights, the first aim of the AKP's reforms is to limit the political influence of the military is also accepted by other scholars in the field. However, by invoking the TSK, which violated the Turkish constitution through direct and indirect coups several times in the history of the Turkish Republic, as a "guardian of the Turkish constitution," Rubin manipulates the conflict between the AKP and the TSK, and presents the TSK as the defender of democracy and constitutional rule.

Rubin further claims that Erdoğan and his AKP are applying a policy of gradual Islamization and threatening Turkish secularism. According to Rubin, education, the judiciary and other segments of the civil bureaucracy are domains in which the AKP is applying its gradual Islamization policy. Rubin claims:

"Traditionally, Turkish students had three choices for their secondary education: they could enroll at so-called Imam Hatip religious schools and enter the clergy; they could enter vocational schools to study a trade; or they could matriculate at secondary high schools, enter university, and then move into either the public or private sectors. Erdoğan changed the system: by equating Imam Hatip degrees with high schools degrees, he enabled Islamist students to enter university and qualify for government jobs, despite never having mastered Western fundamentals." [181]

It is clear that Rubin lacks some basic information on Turkey, Turkish politics and the Turkish education system. It seems that Rubin does not know that from 1971 onwards İmam-Hatip School graduates, like graduates of other vocational schools, had the right of university admission, but that this right was taken away in the February 28 Process and that, therefore, the AKP was not trying to equate the degrees of İmam-Hatip graduates with high school degrees, but was attempting to return to the pre-1998 status quo. As a result of Rubin's lack of information on Turkey - and on Islam as well - he thinks that there is a distinct class of clergy in Islam and that by graduating from İmam-Hatip Schools in Turkey, people can become a part of Rubin's imaginary clergy. Also, with the final sentences quoted above

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[180] Rubin, M. (2007). "Will Turkey Have an Islamist President?" *American Enterprise Institute for Public Research*, February (1), p.3.
[181] Rubin, M. Will Turkey Have an Islamist President?, p.4.

Rubin equates being an İmam-Hatip student with being an Islamist student and this is only possible with the essentialist and holistic interpretations of orientalism. Finally, the claim that İmam-Hatip graduates "never mastered Western fundamentals" shows a lack of basic information that can be obtained with a simple web search.

There are many other examples of a fundamental lack of information in Rubin's piece. Although it is not worth discussing and analyzing them in a detailed way, some other cases can be cited as examples, such as his mention of "a Saudi-style headscarf" worn by the prospective first lady of Turkey[182], a Turkish private finance institution named "Eski Finans,"[183] a "Higher Education Board composed of university rectors,"[184] Erdoğan's "multimillion-dollar villa in Istanbul,"[185] and "the very real threat of street violence that might lead Erdoğan to call early elections."[186]

R. Quinn Mecham's piece is the second example of orientalist and modernist explanations of the AKP.[187] However it should be noted that, compared to Rubin's article, Mecham's work is less orientalist and can be considered within the boundaries of academic literature. Mecham's article starts with an analysis of the FP. This party was established as the successor of the RP, which was dissolved by the Constitutional Court as a result of the February 28 Process. Mecham explains the political language and priorities of the FP and claims that because of "the possibility of military intervention, a fear of legal closure by the courts, and the need to maintain and expand their electoral constituency"[188] the FP adopted a more democratic and liberal attitude. Mecham mentions that with the split in the MG after the closure of the FP, the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi,* SP) constituted the traditional wing and the AKP constituted the moderates. According to Mecham, the landslide electoral victories of the AKP can be explained as follows: "Felicity was the successor to previously banned parties, and thus a party that was unacceptable to secular forces in the political establishment. As the AK Party [AKP][189] appeared to have a greater chance of maintaining its legality, voters searching for a Islamically-minded alternative to the government strategically opted for the AKP, believing it

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[182] Rubin, M. Will Turkey Have an Islamist President?, p.1.

[183] Rubin, M. Will Turkey Have an Islamist President?, p.3. Most likely he was attempting to refer to Asya Finans, the private finance institution known to be close to the Gülen Movement – a Turkey-based transnational religious community that was named after its leader, Fethullah Gülen. The movement owns many commercial companies, including numerous media institutions, in addition to some 100 Turkish schools opened worldwide.

[184] Rubin, M. Will Turkey Have an Islamist President?, p.4. The Turkish Higher Education Board is not composed of university rectors. The members of the board are appointed by different state institutions such as the presidency, parliament, government, etc.

[185] Rubin, M. Will Turkey Have an Islamist President?, p.5.

[186] Rubin, M. Will Turkey Have an Islamist President?, p.7.

[187] Mecham, R. Q. (2004). "From the Ashes of Virtue, A Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly*, 25(2), 339-358.

[188] Mecham, R. Q. From the Ashes of Virtue, p.350.

[189] Throughout the text, explanations in square brackets belong to the writer.

had a greater chance of becoming an important player."[190] Mecham also mentions that the majority of the electorate that previously voted for the RP and the FP were not ideologically Islamist. Rather, they were "sympathetic to Islamic issues but voted for Erbakan's movement as an act of protest against the existing political establishment." Therefore, the AKP's moderate stance gained support from the electorate.[191] Additionally, he claims that the "most important reason for the AK Party's dramatic success […] was a series of strategic decisions by party leaders to moderate their message and image in an attempt to appeal to the more secular-minded center-right."[192]

Mecham defines the self-fulfilling true direction for conservative politics in Turkey as abandoning an ideological stance and instead adopting capitalist democracy. Moreover, ignoring the historical background of discussions about secularism in Turkey, Mecham claims that the electorate's expectation from a conservative political party is also compatible with the self-fulfilling direction he defined for conservative politics. In conclusion, although his taking of the FP as the starting point for analysis and his comparison between the AKP and the FP are worth mentioning as strengths the Mecham's piece, it should still be criticized for its modernist tone, lack of broad historical perspective on the discussion of secularism in Turkey and its lack of regard for the other factors behind the rise of the AKP, such as political economy.

In general, the orientalist and modernist explanations ignore the Turkish experience of secularism and, therefore, Turkish historicity. In the absence of these considerations, the orientalist and modernist explanations depend on ideal types and reductionist and generic explanations. However, conservative movements in Turkey are not simply anti-regime, fundamentalist movements, but a complex set of demands and ideologies related to the economy, identity, politics and cultural differentiation. Therefore, although the orientalist and modernist explanations are accurate in pointing out the AKP's shift in discourse and the role of legal and extra-legal constraints in this shift, they entirely ignore the transformation that the conservatives underwent and the interaction between the AKP's shift in discourse and the transformation of the conservatives in the country. Furthermore, what the orientalist and modernist explanations missed was the influence of political economy on the rise of the AKP.

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[190] Mecham, R. Q. From the Ashes of Virtue, p.353.
[191] Mecham, R. Q. From the Ashes of Virtue, p.353.
[192] Mecham, R. Q. From the Ashes of Virtue, p.353.

4.1.2. Political Economy Theory

Scholars of political economy studying Islamism in general and the AKP in particular, focus on economic factors in order to explain the rise of the AKP. Political economy explanations focus on class relations, unemployment in cities, especially among university graduates, rural to urban migration and provincial businessmen. Furthermore, they interpret the social and political dissatisfaction of traditional groups as a reflection of an economic situation.

Although it does not directly refer to the AKP, the article by Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu[193] is one of the leading works that brings the social and political dissatisfaction of traditional groups into the discussion. Their explanation of Turkey's recent political economy starts with a detailed analysis of the economic crisis Turkey faced in 2001,[194] which is generally missing in the work of other scholars studying the same subject. At the end of the analysis, Keyman and Koyuncu conclude that the reasons for and the solution to the economic crisis are not only economic, but also political.[195] They write:

> "A long term, effective and democratic solution not only to February crisis, but more importantly to the structural problems of the state-centric Turkish modernity lies in an attempt to restructure state-society relations by taking into consideration the changing sociological and institutional nature of the political economy of Turkish capitalism."[196]

They proceed to explain that "the changing sociological and institutional nature of the political economy of Turkish capitalism" brings with it "the legitimacy crisis of the strong-state tradition" and "the emergence of alternative modernities."[197] They further claim that these two processes cannot be understood without reference to "the process of globalization, which involves mostly Turkey's full-membership application to the EU."[198] At that point Keyman and Koyuncu mention that "despite the differences with respect to their specific claims to identity and modernity, the economic actors all locate themselves as strong supporters of the process of European integration."[199] MÜSİAD is one of these economic

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[193] Keyman, E. F. & Koyuncu, B. (2005). "Globalization, Alternative Modernities and the Political Economy of Turkey," *Review of International Political Economy*,12(1), 105-28.
[194] Keyman, E. F. & Koyuncu, B. Globalization, Alternative Modernities, p.106.
[195] Keyman, E. F. & Koyuncu, B. Globalization, Alternative Modernities, p.107.
[196] Keyman, E. F. & Koyuncu, B. Globalization, Alternative Modernities, p.107-8.
[197] Keyman, E. F. & Koyuncu, B. Globalization, Alternative Modernities, p.109.
[198] Keyman, E. F. & Koyuncu, B. Globalization, Alternative Modernities, p.110.
[199] Keyman, E. F. & Koyuncu, B. Globalization, Alternative Modernities, p.111.

actors and "today, it is not possible to analyze the globalization of Turkish economic life without reference to MÜSİAD and the dissemination of its sub-units through the country."[200]

On the subject of the AKP, Ziya Öniş is one of the leading scholars of the political economy school. Among his numerous works on the AKP, the book chapter titled "The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party" is a good example for analysis.[201] In the chapter Öniş suggests three factors in order to understand the rise of the AKP. Firstly, according to Öniş, "the party has been extremely successful in constituting a cross-class electoral alliance, incorporating into its orbit both winners and losers from the neo-liberal globalization process."[202] Secondly, "the strong track record of the AKP's predecessors, the Welfare and the Virtue Parties at the level of municipal governments is another key element of importance."[203] Finally, "the failures of the conventional or established parties of either the center-right or the center-left in achieving sustained and equitable growth, in avoiding costly financial crises, and in tackling the problem of pervasive corruption have also paved the way for the party's unprecedented electoral success in the recent era."[204] Further, Öniş claims that the question of whether the AKP will be successful in sustaining its electoral success is also mainly about the economic performance of the party: "Clearly, an adequate answer to this question requires a systematic and critical analysis of the AKP government's performance, notably in the economic realm."[205]

Öniş mentions that AKP's chief strength in bringing together the losers and winners of global neo-liberal policies is its ability to appeal to "diverse segments of Turkish society using religion as an effective mechanism of mutual trust and bondage."[206] Through such an explanation Öniş pays attention to non-economic factors that have been essential in the rise of the AKP. In doing so, he tries to overcome the major loophole in the political economy theory.

Yıldırım's book chapter on the AKP[207] and its relations with workers is a good sample of the political economy perspective on the party. Yıldırım analyzes the dual approach of the AKP to workers, who constituted both the party's major source of electoral support and the major

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[200] Keyman, E. F. & Koyuncu, B. Globalization, Alternative Modernities, p.112.

[201] Öniş, Z. (2006). "The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party," in *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy and the AK Party*, Hakan Yavuz (eds.), 207-34. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

[202] Öniş, Z. The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, p. 207.

[203] Öniş, Z. The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, p. 207.

[204] Öniş, Z. The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, p. 207.

[205] Öniş, Z. The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, p. 208.

[206] Öniş, Z. The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, p. 212.

[207] Yıldırım, E. (2006). "Labor Pains or Achilles' Heel: The Justice and Development Party and Labor in Turkey," in *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy and the AK Party*, Hakan Yavuz (eds.), 235-57. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

group that was affected negatively by the party's liberal economic policies.[208] The major strength of Yıldırım's piece is that, although it takes economical factors as the starting point of analysis, it is not confined to economic relations but includes identity politics that sometimes - as in the case of the AKP - dominate the field of economy. Therefore, although economic explanations have an important role in explaining the rise of the AKP, non-economic factors such as the role of elites and activists, resource mobilization, and opportunity structures also offer insights into the party's ascendancy.

4.1.3. Social Movement Theory

Social movement theory basically focuses on the role of activists and elites in the transformation of conservative politics and looks at resource mobilization and opportunity structures to explain the rise of the AKP. Scholars of this school claim that the Turkish conservative elites and activists, seeing the harsh secular opposition of the primarily military bureaucracy, developed a moderate policy and rhetoric as a result of a political learning process.[209]

According to Çınar[210] the transformation of conservative politics began immediately after the February 28 Process with the FP. Underlining the split in the FP as one between the older and younger generations, Çınar claims:

> *"The younger generation [...] favored an Islam-sensitive, rather than Islamist, political stance and employed a more comprehensive and consistent language of democracy and human rights. In this way, they hoped to be able to fill the political vacuum created by the February 28 Process, to make inroads into Turkey's power structure and to better represent the interests of Islamic identity without risking their own political survival."[211]*

As quoted above, the February 28 Process not only stimulated a political learning process for the AKP, but also created an opportunity structure which Çınar describes as "the political vacuum created by the February 28 Process."

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[208] Yıldırım, E. Labor Pains or Achilles' Heel, p. 235.
[209] Aydın, S. & Çakır, R. (2007). "Political Islam in Turkey," *Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document*, 265/April, 1-3.
[210] Çınar, M. (2006). "Turkey's Transformation Under the AKP Rule," *The Muslim World*, 96(3), 469-486.
[211] Çınar, M. Turkey's Transformation Under the AKP Rule, p.472-4.

Somer[212] explains the transformation as a middle-class phenomenon and talks about a conflict between secular and religious elites:

> *"The religious-conservative elite are challenging the status of the secularist state elite. The new elite ascended power by challenging old-style Islamists of the Erbakan tradition and culturally Muslim –conservative yet secularist politicians of the Demirel tradition. Economically competition is occurring between the secularist big business elite and the recently emerged Islamic-conservative business elite."[213]*

Çarkoğlu's "The New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey"[214] also pays attention to the new generation of conservatives that appeared as an alternative to both the traditional conservative elites and also the secular elites. In contrast to the majority of analyses of the AKP, which depend on quantitative surveys, Çarkoğlu's research takes into account new trends in the Turkish electorate and the position of AKP supporters according to these new trends. In the end, one of the major conclusions of the research is as follows: "The electoral base of AKP in November 2002 were primarily coming from a relatively younger generation having significant religious conservative traits."[215]

As a general evaluation of the social movement accounts of the AKP, one of the basic strengths is the stress on the transformation of conservatives after the February 28 Process. While explaining this transformation, social movement theorists differentiate themselves from the modernists and orientalists that regard the transformation as discursive and pragmatic. Social movement theorists tend to explain the transformation as an internalized one. Although figures like Çarkoğlu concentrated on electoral behavior, the question of how the masses supported the transformation should be answered; that is, if they really supported the transformation and whether the modernity and civil society approach can explain their support for the conservative transformation.

4.1.4. Modernity and Civil Society Theory

Modernity and civil society accounts are more explanatory in terms of the point where the social movement theory fails in its explanation of the conservative masses' support for the

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[212] Somer, M. Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey, p.1271-89.
[213] Somer, M. Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey, p.1275.
[214] Çarkoğlu, A. (2006). "The New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: Bases of the Justice and Development Party in Changing Electoral Space," in *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy and the AK Party*, Hakan Yavuz (eds.), 160-81-57. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
[215] Çarkoğlu, A. The New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey, p. 175.

transformation of the elite and activists. Indeed, modernity and civil society theorists do not ignore the role of activists and elites. However, they also introduce new experiences of civil society and different "modernities" in order to explain how the masses participated in the transformation. At this point Göle introduces the difference between Islamism and post-Islamism in her "Snapshots of Islamic Modernities":

> *"The actors of Islamism acquired professional profiles, increased their diversity and their public visibility. This was true not only of the militants and politicians, but also of engineers, lawyers, intellectuals, novelists, and journalists; all contributed to the production, transmission, and dissemination of Islamic values and discourse. In addition to political activism, forms of artistic and intellectual expression entered into the domain of Islamic cultural criticism with the publication and circulation of newspapers, periodicals, novels, films, and music. [...] In other words, Islamism is concomitant with the formation of new middle classes and is on the way to creating its own intellectual, political and entrepreneurial elites, drawing on their increasing public visibility and commercial success. We can speak of a post-Islamist stage in which Islamism is losing its political and revolutionary fervour but steadily infiltrating social and cultural everyday life practices."[216]*

Therefore, it can be said that the diversification of professional profiles from politicians to novelists and musicians and increasing public visibility are the major factors behind the spread of the transformation from the elites to the masses. Of course, civil society is the major medium of the spread together with (alternative) modernity;

> *"They [the new actors of Islamism] often became "Islamist" by following a common path: after moving from their small provincial towns to cities, they encounter, during their years in high school and university, the works of authors who set up the landmarks of contemporary Islamist ideology."[217]*

Educational capital, therefore, is seen as the major way of experiencing modernity:

> *"As new actors of Islamism are endowed with two sources of educational capital-religious and secular-they communicate Islamic idiom to the public debate. New*

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[216] Göle, N. (2000). "Snapshots of Islamic Modernities," *Deadalus*, 129(1), p.93-4.
[217] Göle, N. Snapshots of Islamic Modernities, p.95.

actors of Islamism regain authority through the use they make of religious knowledge, but also through their criticism of modernity as cultural program."[218]

Considering the effectiveness of the İmam-Hatip graduates in conservative politics in general and the AKP in particular, the attention Göle pays to the role of education seems useful.[219] However, the same İmam-Hatip graduates were also on the scene in the pre-February 28 period. Therefore, one should ask why the transformation took place during the AKP period rather than some other period. Göle answers this question by referring to the snapshots she picked in her article:

"These snapshots may indeed be considered as marginal, not representative of the Islamist movement. Stories about veiled students, the Islamic writer, the sex scandal in a religious order, an Islamic hotel for summer vacations, the Muslim sociologist - all may seem trivial. But it is precisely with these seemingly insignificant and unconnected threads that we intend to weave a new vision."[220]

Göle claims that the articulation and accumulation of "these seemingly insignificant and unconnected threads" has contributed to the transformation of conservative activism in Turkey. In other words, it is a matter of time for these snapshots and "seemingly insignificant and unconnected threads" (read as alternative modernities) to form modernity.

Yavuz is another figure who has paid great attention to the notion of Islamic modernity and civil society in explaining the AKP. In the introduction to his edited volume,[221] Yavuz claims that as a result of the liberal economic policies of the state, a new conservative bourgeoisie emerged and this new bourgeoisie is the real factor behind the transformation of the AKP.[222] Where Yavuz differs from the other disciples of the modernity and civil society school is that he does not presume an inevitable clash between the secular state and conservative civil society. In fact, Yavuz claims that there is a mutual relationship of transformation between the two and that, thanks to the transformation of the Kemalist state, opportunity spaces were opened for conservative civil society and, in turn, conservative civil society facilitated the Kemalist state's transformation.[223]

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[218] Göle, N. Snapshots of Islamic Modernities, p.98.
[219] Many of the influential members of the AKP, including Erdoğan, are graduates of the Istanbul İmam-Hatip School from the period between 1965 and 1975.
[220] Göle, N. Snapshots of Islamic Modernities, p.114.
[221] Yavuz, M. H. (2006). "The role of the New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation of the Turkish Islamic Movement," in *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy and the AK Party*, Hakan Yavuz (eds.), 1-19. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
[222] Yavuz, M. H. The role of the New Bourgeoisie, p.4-6.
[223] Yavuz, M. H. The role of the New Bourgeoisie, p.8.

It is clear that Yavuz's explanations, like most of the others overviewed so far, are valuable for understanding the different factors contributed to the rise of the AKP, but cannot help explain how a party came to be the majority government less than one year after its establishment. An alternative reading is required to answer this question.

4.1.5. An Alternative Account

Putting aside the Orientalist explanation because of the criticisms put forward, the other three theoretical explanations - political economy, social movement and civil society - have useful elements for understanding the rise and evolution of the AKP. Although they do not qualify as exhaustive and exclusive explanations, the current theoretical explanations can be good tools of analysis for the AKP's rise from 2002 onwards and especially for the 2004 local elections and the 2007 general elections. Yet they say almost nothing about the party's rise in 2002, when less than one year had passed after its establishment. They offer only explanations about limited specific perspectives of the case.

An alternative account that attempts to explain all aspects of the case that are not covered by the existing explanations should depend on the political and social atmosphere after the February 28 Process; in other words: the developments of the period between 1997 and 2001. The political and social atmosphere after the February 28 Process was a typical example of what Gramsci has conceptualized as "hegemonic crisis." Especially the dissatisfaction of the traditional classes that always constituted the backbone of hegemony and the display of this dissatisfaction as rallies are the key elements of the hegemonic crisis in terms of this study.

The hegemonic crisis in itself constituted the real reason for the February 28 Process and deepened afterwards. The hegemonic crisis also offered one of the most valuable chances for power for the AKP in the hegemonic struggle. As mentioned before, it was not only the dissatisfied electorate that supported the AKP in the hegemonic struggle. On the eve of the 2002 election and for a long time after the election, the relative support of capital and media for the AKP also continued. According to Gramsci, there is a relationship similar to a political division of labor between the different political actors as a result of their separation at the point of interests but if they require each other – Gramsci claims they do - they will unite when vital and major issues are in question.[224] According to this explanation, the moments when vital and major issues are in question are not the test moments of a historic bloc; rather

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[224] Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 158.

they are its formative moments. The pre-2002 period in Turkey was a crisis moment for capitalist democracy and that is why the historical elements of capitalist democracy agreed on articulating the AKP in order to overcome the crisis.

At this point questioning the reasons for the shift in the AKP's discourse requires more examination in terms of the new alliance between the AKP and the capitalists. The harsh opposition of the Kemalist establishment was counted as the main reason for the shift in the AKP's discourse.[225] According to this explanation, as a result of the February 28 Process, the conservative politicians "recognized the red lines of Turkish secularism" and for Erdoğan in particular this lesson cost four months in prison.[226] Although agreeing that conservatives passed through a political learning process that was stimulated by the February 28 Process, what must be asked is whether it was Turkish secularism or Turkish capitalism that taught the lesson. Furthermore, this line of questioning will also bring the conceptualization of the historic hegemonic center into the discussion.

Throughout its long history, conservatism in Turkey as an oppositional movement has always been aware of the red lines of Turkish secularism and it has always been harshly and clearly warned once it even came close to forgetting its place. Conservatism in Turkey has been very well aware of the coercive capacity of political society and has also tried to challenge or short circuit it. What was alien to Turkish conservatives until they met with the February 28 Process was civil society and its hegemonic capacity. For example, conservatives always knew the importance of the parliamentary majority for ruling the country, the limits according to which they can challenge the Turkish secularism with a parliamentary majority, and the results of challenging the secular character of the country. Yet, they did not have any idea how quickly they could lose their parliamentary majority or how rapidly they could lose their electoral support once they challenged the historic hegemonic center of the country, especially the capitalists. Also, they discovered that they needed the support of the media as well as popular or parliamentary support. Therefore, the AKP generated its new message, and shifted its discourse not only for the state apparatus but also for its traditional electorate, capitalists and the media.

On the eve of the presidential elections, the AKP enjoyed electoral support that increased every day and the support of the new class of capitalists, which started to form before the AKP but reached its peak with the AKP, as is mentioned by the political economy theorists.

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[225] See; Taşpınar, Ö. (2007). "The Old Turks' Revolt," *Foreign Affairs*, 86(6), 114-130; Dağı, I. (2004). "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 13(2), 135-151.
[226] Taşpınar, Ö. The Old Turks' Revolt, p.123.

At this time the party was creating its new sociality, as mentioned by the social movement theorists, and its new modernity and elites within this new modernity, as mentioned by modernity and civil society theorists.

Under such conditions, the election of a conservative president would constitute the roof of the building of a new historic hegemonic center whose basement was the majority rule of the AKP and whose body was the shift of power in the media, bureaucracy, business and civil society. Once such a structure was built, the need of the AKP for the capitalist wing of the existing historic hegemonic center as a conveyor system would decrease. Furthermore, in terms of the existing historic hegemonic center, this also meant the emergence of new opponents. The election of a conservative president meant the starting point of the road leading to the point of no return and therefore marked the split of the alliance between the AKP and the capitalist wing of the historic hegemonic center. As a result of this split, the media, as part of the existing historic hegemonic bloc, participated in the April 27 Process through textual, discursive and social practices that will be analyzed in the following chapters. The theoretical tools of Gramsci and Mardin and an analysis of case studies, the February 28 and April 27 processes, and media discourse are crucial for understanding how the media participated in these processes.

5. Theory, Case and Analysis

5.1.Theory and Case

The theoretical framework of Gramsci and Mardin is crucial while analyzing the sub-dimensions of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Therefore in the following section, it is necessary to establish a link between theoretical perspectives and the factual history of the February 28 and April 27 Processes.

The center-periphery model of Mardin presents a sufficient foundation for understanding the major characteristics of the secularism discussion in Turkey, and more specifically during the intervention periods. According to the aforementioned theoretical framework by Mardin, two intervention processes can be considered as one of the recent cases, in which the underlying conflict of the center and the periphery was active. After drawing a general perspective with the help of Mardin's theory, Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony offers various explanations to how civil society and the media acted during this process.

While explaining the February 28 and April 27 Processes with the help of Mardin's and Gramsci's models, it is necessary to begin with a clarification of the relationship between Mardin's center and Gramsci's hegemonic center. Concerning this case, the phenomenon addressed by Mardin's center and Gramsci's historic hegemonic center is the same: The Kemalist establishment that was the major force against the conservative politics. Using Mardin's concept, the Kemalist establishment represents the center of society as it dominated the main cultural, economic, social and political institutions. In addition the intervention of the military with the help of civil society during those two processes can also be regarded within this framework. On the other hand, the Gramscian analysis of hegemony supplements understanding as to how and why such an intervention occurred. As essentially a conflict between the hegemonic center and the subaltern periphery, the first task to understand this conflict is to define the conflicting sides.

The "historic hegemonic center" refers to the part of society which is also named as the "Kemalist establishment" in the previous sections of the text. Kemalism in this formation does not only stand for an ideology but also for the material alliance adhering to this ideology in spite of the ideological disintegration of some components of the alliance. Although this may sound a bit paradoxical the hegemonic situation unites the historic hegemonic center in

spite of the ideological disintegration. As Yavuz mentioned "The raison d'être of the Kemalist establishment is to keep the Islamic 'other' at bay, and this struggle is what unifies the military-bureaucratic establishment." [227] The "other" was the rising reactionary danger in the February 28 and April 27 processes, the utilization of the discourse of communist threats against leftists and, more recently, the utilization of a separatism discourse against Kurdish political activism. More specifically, the military and the civilian bureaucracy, the center-based capital including media corporations, the universities and Kemalist civil society formed the historic hegemonic center against the conservative subaltern periphery during the February 28 and April 27 Processes.

From the components of the historic hegemonic center, the ideological position of the center capital was deeply different from the others. The center capital embodied in TÜSİAD had occupied a more liberal and democratic position before the February 28 Process. For example, TÜSİAD prepared many policy papers, which were very critical of the bureaucracy, for the democratization of Turkey. Moreover, they were also critical of other business associations and trade unions for their support of the current political system in Turkey. However, when the hegemonic exclusive domain of the center was threatened by the subaltern periphery, this association took its place within the historic hegemonic center together with its partners, including the bureaucracy, other business associations and trade unions which it had criticized in the past. A similar change was also observable in TÜSİAD's stance during the April 27 Process.

As aforementioned, the integrative capacity of the historic hegemonic center is one of the major prerequisites for hegemony. During the February 28 Process and partly during the April 27 Process, it is possible to observe the functioning of the integrative capacity of the historic hegemonic center. The primary executor of integration during the February 28 Process was the center's media. The role of the media as a part of the historic hegemonic center is best explained by the intellectual and moral leadership concept of Gramsci. On the other hand during the April 27 Process, some media institutions covered in the study and many others that are not covered were not so eager to participate in the Process even though it was still possible to talk about media as a part of the historic hegemonic center. The footprints of change in the media's position during these two processes can be traced to the change in their capital structures. However, for now it is more appropriate to postpone the analysis of media ownership to the preceding sections as to not distract from the analysis of the nature of the relationship between the media and the historic alliance.

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[227] Yavuz, H. Cleansing Islam From the Public Sphere, p.25.

The media functioned as the intellectual and moral leadership by manipulating the perception of the conservative threat against the center's hegemony as the rising danger of reaction. The creation of popular consent among the urban middle classes only became possible by media manipulation. It was risky to target conservative values, ideas and politics openly because such a strategy had the probability of bringing about mistrust from religious people. Therefore, the media firstly manipulated the distinctions of good and bad Muslims, which had been a typical topic of Kemalist discourse since the 1920's, and transferred all the negative characteristics of bad Muslims to conservatives. The inception of terminology was one of the critical functions of the media's intellectual and moral leadership. When the subaltern classes adopted the language of the leading classes, they start to interpret the world in the way leading classes do as a result of that adoption. Considering its historical and ideological roots the Turkish media was well suited to the task of producing the language of the leading class. Since the first generation of journalists in Turkey, a positivist and didactic attitude has been a leading characteristic of Turkish media.[228] A discourse on good and bad Muslims is a language generated by the Turkish hegemonic elites, especially the journalists and politicians. As a result, once the good and bad Muslim talk was adopted and internalized by the subaltern periphery as a hegemonic language, the subaltern periphery has been unable to follow its own interests. One such example can be found with the trade unions cooperating with TÜSİAD against the conservative peripheral segments of the society, with which they surely have more common interests, values and life styles.

In addition to intellectual and moral leadership, economic and corporate sacrifices also served as tools that contributed to the maintenance of the hegemonic bloc.[229] The leading class in the Gramscian[230] sense, or the center in Mardin's conceptualization, should make some sacrifices, and reorganize economical activities in order to fulfill the interests of its elements, and in this case namely the media. Concerning the February 28 Process, we can see that after the establishment of the new coalition government, or more specifically the government that succeeded the RP-DYP coalition Government, the Turkish media industry was amply rewarded with privatizations in the energy and concessions in the banking sector in which the Turkish media industry had already started to invest.[231] By 1998, the five largest media

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[228] For a detailed account of early journalist in Turkey see: Kocabaşoğlu, U. (2010). *"Hürriyet"i Beklerken: İkinci Meşrutiyet Basını*. Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

[229] Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, p.183.

[230] The basis of Gramscian distinction of class is more diverse than the classical Marxist conceptualization of class. Marx defines class in economical terms whereas Gramsci offers a combination of economic, social and cultural elements. According to the Gramscian conceptualization, even labor union leaders can be a supporter of the hegemony of the leading class by contributing to the continuation of it.

[231] Adaklı, G. (2001). "Yayıncılık Alanında Mülkiyet ve Kontrol," in *Medya Politikaları*, Beybin Kayanlıoğlu, Sevilay Celenk, Gülseren Adaklı (eds.), 145-203. Ankara: İmge, p.185-7, 190-7.

conglomerates- the Doğan Group of Aydın Doğan, the Medya Group of Dinç Bilgin, the Rumeli Group of Cem Uzan, the İhlas Group of Enver Ören and the Avrupa Group of Erol Aksoy- held 80% of the market in Turkey.[232] In addition to the cartelization of the media sector, these conglomerates also invested in non-media sectors such as insurance, banking, marketing, and energy. For example, the Doğan Group, the largest conglomerate, owned Dışbank, POAŞ (Petrol Office Joint Stock Co.), Ray Insurance and Doğan Energy. The second largest Medya Group owned İnterbank, Etibank, Çukurova Steel Industry, and Halk Insurance.[233] However, without an ideological position as a part of the historic hegemonic center, such economic endeavors would not be enough to gain strong media support for the process.

As a result of the media's manipulation of good and bad Muslims, the consent of the urban middle classes to the Processes was secured. The consent and support of the above-mentioned classes to the Processes constituted the civil society dimension of the interventions. Moreover, there was an existing branch of civil society such as the Kemalist NGOs for which a consent creation process was unnecessary, as historically they had identified the Kemalist hegemony as the number one issue on their agenda. However, these organizations lacked popular support. During these Processes, either popular support was channeled to these organizations, or these organizations diverted attention and popular support, as in the cases of the Susurluk demonstrations and Republican Rallies.

The motivation behind university support for these Processes were more or less similar to the motivation of the bureaucracy, as they occupied a central position in the ideological formulation of the hegemony of the center. In other words, the creation of consent, which was needed in securing the support of civil society, was not necessary for universities, as they were closer to the ideological center of the historic hegemonic center. Academicians, as a part of traditional intellectuals, were historically very committed to Kemalism. Although they can adopt different ideological positions as leftists or liberals, their position in the center-periphery conflict has been always pro-center. Turkish academia is still under the influence of the positivist and elitist tradition of the Young Turks, especially in the spheres related to religion and populace.[234]

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[232] Medya Dökümantasyon Birimi (1998). *Mediascape Türkiye 98*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi & Konrad Adenauer Vakfı, 54.
[233] Adaklı, G. Yayıncılık Alanında Mülkiyet, p.164-165.
[234] For a more detailed analysis of historical accounts of the Turkish intellectuals' interpretation of Islam see; Demir, A. İ. (2004). *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Aydınlarının İslam'a Bakışı*. İstanbul: Ensar Neşriyat.

Generally the efforts of the Kemalist establishment and especially the military, to include civil society in the Processes were not for democratic purposes. Rather it was for the halting of any kind of democratic evolution which would lead to a decline in the military's role in Turkish politics. This paradox in the mobilization of civil society demonstrates the suitability of Gramsci's model in the explanation of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. For example, the protests about the Susurluk incident were valuable in terms of democratization of Turkey and the growing role of civil society in Turkish politics. However, the anti-democratic ends derived from the protest were at odds with the initial aim of the Susurluk protest, namely open, cleaner politics and society. The following lines of Cizre and Çınar[235] offer accurate concluding remarks on the discussion of civil society during the process;

"In trying to undermine the RP's popular appeal and create an order characterized by social discipline centralized authority, and hierarchical integration. The military has been very successful in establishing a new relationship with targeted groups in society. It has appealed directly to the organized groups of the modernized urban-secular sectors—the business world, media, academia, public prosecutors, judges, leaders of civil societal associations—and even held briefing meetings with them to warn of the extent and magnitude of the Islamic threat. The rising salience of civil society for the general staff, however, has not arisen from the search for a free public space, rule of law, limited state power, democratic consensus and compromise over power sharing. On the contrary, there is a widespread belief among the secular-urbanites that the intensity of the Islamic threat may require the suspension of democratic freedoms and limitation of representative principles and institutions. To this end, these sectors have given the TAF [Turkish Armed Forces] a strong hand in crushing what they see as a threat to the regime's existence"

Kemalist NGOs were also at the scene during the April 27 Process in an attempt to hijack the Republican Rallies and presidential elections discussion, with the purpose of creating an opportunity for the military's intervention in civilian politics.

Not the existence of the subaltern periphery, but rather its efforts to remove its own subaltern characteristics and to move towards the center of the society was a problem that could not be tolerated by the historic hegemonic center. A move towards the center also meant an attempt to form a hegemonic position, and therefore not only the ideology of the RP and AKP, but

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[235] Cizre, Ü. & Menderes, Ç. Turkey 2002, p. 232.

also the societal and political bases of their political success were unacceptable for the Kemalist establishment. By stating the societal and political bases of their political success, this refers to the political opportunity structure and resource mobilization of the RP and AKP, which are mentioned in the previous chapters of the text.

The real line of confrontation in the processes was not the ideology of conservatives or their discourse. It does not seem plausible to claim that the Processes were totally against the Islamic ideology of the RP and AKP because they were in search of ways to reconcile with the Kemalist establishment when the Processes started. Therefore, this fact offers crucial support for the claim of the intentions of the historic hegemonic center, and especially of the military, during the Processes; it was never about the danger of rising reaction but rather the danger of losing its hegemonic position. Therefore, discourse was the basic tool for manipulating the danger of losing the hegemonic position and turning it into the danger of rising reaction. Critical discourse analysis is the tool to show how this manipulation worked.

5.2. Critical Discourse Analysis

As the role of the media in the processes is one of the main focuses of my study, my research naturally centered on the Turkish media. Of the different forms of media, the written press is the most convenient to study. Therefore, daily newspapers published during the processes will be the main materials for analysis. However, considering the huge number of dailies published during the period under review, I needed to set a limit to make the study feasible. As I focused on the ideological positions of the Turkish media as members of the historic hegemonic center, the media ownership structure and other economic activities of the media owners, I limited my research according to media ownership structures and ideological positions. Therefore, *Milliyet* of Doğan Group as vanguard of the Turkish media capital, *Cumhuriyet* as core Kemalist media, *Sabah* for the sake of following the effects of change in the media ownership, and finally *Akşam* for Çukurova Group's search of a place among media conglomerates are the four most applicable samples. In this sampling each newspaper corresponds to a different position. *Milliyet* was considered the most statist among the papers of the Doğan Group and *Cumhuriyet* has a unique position and importance, as it is the core and trademark of Kemalist media in Turkey. On the other hand, *Sabah* was a good sample with its urban middle class reader profile and liberal stance; and *Akşam* targeted urban lower classes with its more populist tone.

Firstly, *Milliyet* represents the modern industrial bourgeoisie. With its investments in fields from banking to the automobile industry, Doğan Group stands at the center of capitalist relations in Turkey and has become one of the three largest and financially strongest group of firms in Turkey.[236] Besides *Milliyet*'s economic position as a part of the Doğan Group, its societal relations are also crucial considering the urban classes and newspaper readership in Turkey. Doğan Group has several newspapers in Turkey and each of them addresses a different part of the society. For example, nowadays *Radikal* has a more intellectual and leftist editorial policy and readership whereas *Posta* has a more jingoist and populist line. Like *Radikal* and *Posta*, *Milliyet* has a specific policy and readership. *Milliyet's* readership was the urban middle classes and the daily specifically addressed them. As the urban middle class formed the backbone of the center during the mobilization during the Processes, *Milliyet* also had an ideological importance as well as an economic one.

Secondly, *Cumhuriyet* has a more statist and elitist discourse. Ideologically it follows the positivist state ideology and its readership consists mostly of elitist Kemalists. It can also be said that *Cumhuriyet* still follows the elitist and didactic tendencies of the first representatives of the Turkish Press in the nineteenth century, as Heper and Demirel state: "[…] the elite journalists of the time (as well as those of later periods) took on the role of didactic intermediaries between an idealized West and a backward society." [237] Thus, both the readership profile and ideological position of *Cumhuriyet* correspond to the historic hegemonic center.

Sabah with its more liberal attitude targets urban middle classes and white-collar workers. The analysis of the newspaper was expected to offer ideas about the position and manipulation of young, educated, urban dwellers. On the other hand, the capital structure of the newspaper is also useful for analyses. During the Febrary 28 Process, Dinç Bilgin owned *Sabah*. During the April 27 Process, Park Group of Turgay Ciner owned the newspaper and it was in need of political support for its ongoing court cases. In the middle of the Process, as a result of the cases, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency confiscated *Sabah* as part of the group's bankruptcy.

Finally, *Akşam* was expected to give insight into the mobilization of the urban poor, artisans and craftsmen. The newspaper which was owned by Erol Aksoy in February 28 Process, was sold to the Çukurova Group after the Process. Furthermore, the quest of the Çukurova Group,

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[236] For more information about the Doğan Group and its economic activities see;
http://www.doganholding.com.tr/index.asp
[237] Heper, M. & Demirel T. The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey, p. 109.

which is the conglomerate that owns *Akşam*, for finding a place among the media conglomerates of Turkey, also offers insight into the formation of traditional and new hegemonic alliances.

After elaborating on the criteria of inclusion, mentioning the criteria of exclusion is also required for accuracy of the sampling. The Turkish newspapers representing the conservative media, as well as other parts of the center media and the radical leftist media were excluded. Beginning with the conservative media, their position in the Processes was irrelevant as they were against the historic hegemonic center by their nature. However, there can be some discursive differences in challenging the Processes according to their different origins, but these discursive differences by definition are not included within scope of this study. Secondly, other parts of the center media at that time such as the Rumeli Group, were also excluded as the Doğan Group, Medya Group and Çukurova were the largest media conglomerates in Turkey and their analyses gave idea about the general nature of media ownership structures in Turkey. Finally, the radical leftist media was excluded, as their readership was far away from the historic hegemonic center, and therefore irrelevant concerning the effect of this kind of media on the historic hegemonic center.

Considering the preparation period before the process and the incidents after the fall of the coalition government, this particular study covers a two-year period for the analysis of February 28 Process. As Prime Minister Erbakan's term of office started on June 28, 1996, and ended on June 17, 1997, the period covering 1996 and 1997 will be exhaustively analyzed in terms of the preparation period and the consequences of the process. At first sight, the coverage of periods from the beginning of 1996 to the beginning of Prime Minister Erbakan's office in June 1996, and from the end of prime minister's term of office in June 1997 to the end of the year is inappropriate. However, considering the fact that the preparation stage of the February 28 Process started even earlier than the beginning of 1996, as the RP's first conspicuous rise was at the local elections of 1994 and the stage in which the results came to fruition started after the prime minister's resignation in June, the coverage of these periods becomes more apparent. In regards to the April 27 Process, a shorter period of analyses was sufficient as the April 27 Process was more compact in terms of preparation and results. The discussions about the presidential election, which were held in April, did not start earlier than the beginning of 2007. Therefore, contrary to the February 28 Process, tracing the analysis to earlier dates was not needed for the April 27 Process. On the other hand, the general elections on 22 July constituted a certain final point for the April 27 Process, and with the inclusion of a margin of safety, the end of 2007 was taken as the final date of these analyses.

Different interpretations of critical discourse analysis vary between the macro-sociological society and power perspective of Michel Foucault and the micro-sociological actor perspective of Ron Scollon.[238] Furthermore, Siegfried Jager's approach can be named as the most structuralist approach as it is close to the Foucauldian perspective, and Teun van Dijk's approach as the "social cognitive approach."[239] Among the many different accounts Fairclough's attention to text as well as discourse, his methodological inquiries and the scope of the society-power relations, seem to make his model the most convenient. Fairclough offers a three dimensional model for critical discourse analysis as his attention focuses on text, discursive practice and social practice.[240] As Titscher states, critical discourse analysis for Fairclough is "the analysis of relationships between concrete language use and the wider social cultural structures. […] He attributes three dimensions to every discursive event. It is simultaneously a text, discursive practice – which also includes the production and interpretation of texts- and social practice."[241] According to Fairclough every social practice is a construction of social identity; a construction made through the different representations of the social world.[242] The discursive practice is one of the mediums through which different social practices become possible. In the relation to text, discourse and social practice, Fairclough underlines the concept of production as, "a social practice as a practice of production brings together different elements of life into a specific local relationship – types of activity, spatial and temporal locations, material resources, persons with particular experiences, knowledge and wants, semiotic resources including language."[243]

Content analysis and coverage of the newspapers will be the first step of critical discourse analysis. In this first step, newspapers' textual activities in relation to basic incidents in the February 28 and April 27 processes will be analyzed. The February 28 Process is rich, in terms of incidents such as the establishment of the Refahyol government, the Susurluk incident, the Fadime Şahin incident and military briefings, for observing textual practices. The newspapers' coverage of the TSK's memorandum will be the major object of analysis with regard to textual practices in the April 27 Process.

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[238] Meyer, M. (2001). "Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, Ruth Wodak & Michael Meyer (eds.), 14-31. London: Sage Publications, p.17.
[239] Meyer, M. (2001). Between Theory, Method and Politics, p.18.
[240] Fairclough, N. (2000). "Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research: The Discourse of Welfare Reform," *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 4(2), p.167-9.
[241] cited in Richardson, J. E. (2007). *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach From Critical Discourse Analysis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.37.
[242] Fairclough, N. Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research, p.167-8.
[243] Fairclough, N. Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research, p.168.

After content analysis, discursive practices will be second part of discourse analysis. More specifically how the good and bad Muslims were presented to the reader and what kind of characteristics defined these two categories. Furthermore, in this type of discourse analysis of newspapers, what is not written is as important as what is written. Actually, the very aim of defining the true version of Islam in this case is to label, define, and then repress a false or bad version of Islam. Therefore, figuring out the false and bad version of Islam and answering the question of why they are considered false and bad will be the concluding remarks of this part of the analysis. Moreover, two other major discursive practices, i.e. Moderate and Creeping Islamization and the Sudden Islamic Revolution, of the period, will be also analyzed in the same way.

Finally, considering the social practices section of the critical discourse analysis offered by Fairclough, aforementioned theoretical analysis will be at work at this stage. The results derived from textual and discursive practices will be located in the hegemonic analysis of the two intervention processes, with a special focus on the activities of other members of the historic hegemonic bloc. In conclusion, a link will be developed demonstrating the various dimensions of hegemonic relations in Turkey and textual analysis of the media in the February 28 Process is a good starting point for developing this link.

5.2.1. The February 28 Process

5.2.1.1. Textual Analysis

After the national elections, the media campaign against the RP and DYP started although they were not in power yet. At this stage of the campaign, the *Cumhuriyet* seemed more enthusiastic than others, as the general atmosphere found in the *Cumhuriyet*'s pages were very negative about the results of the elections. In essence, the *Cumhuriyet* columnists were belittling various kinds of government projects, as Mustafa Balbay wrote "the Hodja's [meaning Erbakan][244] tours are futile, Çiller's tours are a fashion show."[245] Any effort of the coalitions, either by the RP or DYP was shown as ineffective and unproductive. The tone of the campaign hardened when the RP and ANAP got closer to establishing a coalition government. According to the *Cumhuriyet*, the majority of the ANAP parliamentarians were uneasy about the idea of a government composed of the ANAP and RP. A parliamentarian was complaining about the fact that, if his party sets up a government with the RP, he could

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[244] Throughout the text, explanations in square brackets belong to the writer.
[245] Mustafa Balbay, Cumhuriyet, 01.02.1996, p.19. Balbay uses rhyme here as the Turkish word for futile is nafile and the Turkish for fashion show is defile.

not look at his neighbors, daughter and wife in their eyes because of his shame.[246] The *Cumhuriyet* also reported from a Sufi sheik settled in northern Cyprus that the fez and turban will be legal again with the help of the coalition of the RP and ANAP.[247] According to the *Cumhuriyet*, the efforts of the RP and ANAP were due to the fact that both parties had ties with the Nakshibendi order.[248] Oral Çalışlar of the *Cumhuriyet* claimed that:

> "Another dimension of the cooperation between the two parties is the Nakshibendi order. There are many Nakshibendi parliamentarians in both parties. First of all Necmettin Erbakan, the founders of the RP and prominent members are Nakshibendis. Whereas in the ANAP, a Nakshibendi group of parliamentarians led by Korkut Özal are trying to act as a bridge in the formation of a coalition."[249]

Sabah was also uneasy about a coalition government between the ANAP and RP and addressed Mesut Yılmaz from its headline;

> "Do not sell out the Republic for the sake of your job: Yılmaz, who has forgotten the promises he made to the public before the elections, has started to make efforts to bring to power the Refah Party, whom he had indicated to be "the big danger". Yılmaz started bargaining with Erbakan yesterday in order to form a coalition."[250]

The coalition efforts between the RP and ANAP turned out to be unproductive in spite of the claimed Nakshibendi ties and a coalition government was set up between the ANAP and DYP. After a short time, the coalition of the ANAP and DYP was dissolved and a new one was established between the RP and DYP. According to *Sabah*, the majority of the DYP members were against the coalition:

> "It is noted that if the impression that Çiller will form a coalition with Refah after the meeting of Çiller with Erbakan gets stronger, a large group of DYP parliamentarians, who are sensitive regarding the subject of secularism, are getting ready to object to this through a declaration. In addition, women who

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[246] Cumhuriyet, 06.01.1996, p.4.
[247] Cumhuriyet, 07.01.1996, p.1.
[248] Cumhuriyet, 06.01.1996, p.5.
[249] Cumhuriyet, Oral Çalışlar, 17.02.1996, p.12.
[250] Sabah, 15.02.1996, p.1.

support the DYP have already started to send faxes to the headquarters in large numbers as well.”[251]

Once a coalition had been established between the RP and DYP, the *Cumhuriyet* again claimed Sufi order ties. It claimed that the government secured the vote of confidence "with the help of Sufi order ties and deputy transfers."[252] Furthermore the *Cumhuriyet* was not alone in claiming that Sufi-order ties were effective in the formation of the government, as *Sabah* claimed that Sufi Sheikhs, who described the Refahyol Government as the greatest holy alliance of the Republic, came into action to establish the government."[253]

Newspapers intensified their opposition to the Refahyol coalition government after the Susurluk incident. As mentioned before, the societal mobilization secured by the Susurluk protests were channeled against the government through the newspapers. For example, the *Milliyet* organized a campaign named "Decent and Enlightened Society."[254] The *Cumhuriyet* also adopted the same formula.[255] The *Milliyet* reported the Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan's criticisms about the Susurluk protests as "The Minister is like a Sheikh al-Islam."[256] Furthermore, Hikmet Çetinkaya of the *Cumhuriyet* claimed that the Sufi order ties were also active in Susurluk as two major figures of the intra-state relations, "Abdullah Çatlı and Haluk Kırcı were also protected by a Sheikh."[257]

The sensitivity about Susurluk was utilized in various ways against the RP and DYP. Derya Sazak of *Milliyet* did this by linking the Susurluk and Fadime Şahin incident as, "both Fadime Şahin and the truck driver in Susurluk[258], Hakan Gökçe, were people coming from the suburbs, and both saw the Refah as a source of hope and both were deceived."[259] *Milliyet* also reported that Fadime Şahin's father and brothers were angry at the RP as they had voted for the RP in the elections but the RP claimed that the incident around Fadime Şahin, Müslüm Gündüz and Ali Kalkancı was a media fabrication.[260] The general theme in both examples is "being deceived by the RP," although the cases had nothing to do with the RP. Although Güngör Mengi of *Sabah* did not directly refer to the RP while commenting on the Fadime Şahin incident, being deceived by bad Muslims was also a common theme in his column;

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[251] Sabah, 13.06.1996, p.1.
[252] Cumhuriyet, 09.07.1996, p.1.
[253] Sabah, 31.05.1997, p.1.
[254] Milliyet, 12.11.1996, p.14.
[255] Cumhuriyet, 06.01.1997, p.17.
[256] Milliyet, 15.02.1997, p.1.
[257] Cumhuriyet, Hikmet Çetinkaya, 11.01.1997, p.5.
[258] The driver of the truck that was involved in the car accident in Susurluk.
[259] Milliyet, Derya Sazak, 06.01.1997, p.14.
[260] Milliyet, 05.01.1997, p.14.

"Fadime Şahin, who was as young as his granddaughter, was not a bait thrown in front of him in order to bring shame on Müslüm Gündüz. Fadime was his victim. In reality, a new example of the truck incident in Susurluk was experienced there on a small scale. While the police and journalists expected to find an old man in black clothes, they caught a naked man and a naked woman in bed. This aspect of the incident was unlucky for them but this is luck for the masses that are the target of those who exploit the religion. If this had not happened, Fadime Şahin would not have been talked about, the masks of these peddlers who exploit the beautiful religion of Islam by stirring up misgivings in the public would not have been dropped and who knows how many young people would have been deprived of the chance to be warned against this ugly trap."[261]

Besides the Susurluk and Fadime Şahin incidents, there were also other incidents which were utilized against the RP and the government. For example, a circular issued by the General Command of the Gendarmerie about prayer rooms in the institution and reactions to the circular were represented as the rising reactionary danger. In the circular, the command issued some new regulations about the physical conditions of the prayer rooms and banned the civil staff from using the prayer rooms. As a reaction to the circular, some RP deputies issued parliamentary inquires to the Minister of National Defense.[262] As a result, the TSK were uneasy about the criticisms of the circular and issued a press statement about the incident. The *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*'s reactions to the press statement were as follows: the *Cumhuriyet* used the headline, "Army raised its voice against the religion-mongers,"[263] and the *Milliyet* went with "Hard rebuke from the Army."[264] *Sabah* preferred to display the inquiry as revenge; "Revenge Motion from Refah."[265] *Akşam* was more moderate about the circular incident and presented it as a "dangerous struggle":

"The other day the military responded with a harsh statement to the motion debate that started between the military and Refah. Yesterday, the Ministry of Defense, which had been silent regarding attacks to the military, was accused. A military official who is close to the Office of the Chief of General Staff said that the army had been targeted for attrition for months and complained that the politicians, and especially the ministry of defense had been silent for a long

[261] Sabah, Güngör Mengi, 06.01.1997, p.3.
[262] Milliyet, 26.03.1996, p.15.
[263] Cumhuriyet, 27.03.1996, p.1.
[264] Milliyet, 28.03.1996, p.1.
[265] Sabah, 29.03.1996, p.1.

time. The military official said that those pro-PKK forces who want to establish a Kurdish-Islamic state want to wear down the army"[266]

The following lines of Hikmet Çetinkaya included grand narratives in the discussions of the circular;

"People who today blame the army of being enemies of religion as a result of its prayer room circular, are the people who slaughtered Kubilay like a sheep."[267]

The *Cumhuriyet*'s and *Milliyet*'s interpretation of military briefings on the rising reactionary danger also gives clues about the centrality of their position during the Process. Although there are many other examples, one particular headline of a news report of *Cumhuriyet* is very revealing; "Briefings activated the opposition."[268] It seems that the *Cumhuriyet*'s claim about the effect of the briefings on the opposition was confirmed by the *Milliyet's* headline; "The Last Warning from the Army."[269] *Sabah* claimed that judges and labor unions asked for a special briefing from the military about the rising reactionary danger,[270] whereas *Akşam* preferred a more neutral wording and just reported the briefings without any comment.[271]

Many other examples of the themes presented here and other themes which are not presented here were covered by the newspapers during this period. Furthermore, discursive practices always assisted these textual practices.

5.2.1.2. Discursive Practices

The discursive practices of newspapers can be grouped into three basic hegemonic discourses; (1) Good vs. Bad Muslims, (2) Moderate and Creeping Islamization and finally a (3) sudden Islamic revolution.

5.2.1.2.1. Good Muslims vs. Bad Muslims

Good and Bad Muslim concepts were important tools for the legitimization of the "cleansing of Islam" campaign, as they helped in the creation of an imagined Muslim identity, which

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[266] Akşam, 28.03.1996, p.5.
[267] Cumhuriyet, Hikmet Çetinkaya, 21.06.1996, p.7.
[268] Cumhuriyet, 13.06.1997, p.1.
[269] Milliyet, 12.06.1997, p.1.
[270] Sabah, 12.06.1997, p.24.
[271] Akşam, 11.06.1997, p.9.

was favored over all other expressions of Muslim identity. The imagined Muslim category is defined in relation to its "other". On the one hand, there are truehearted and pure Muslims and on the other hand, there are the exploiters of religion, namely the reactionary and fundamentalist Islamists. There are reciprocally defined characteristics for these two artificial categories of Muslims. Pure Muslims are honest, clean, knowledgeable and humble whereas bad Muslims are dishonest, dirty, ignorant and show-offs. While good Muslims are engaged in personal supplication to God in their private spheres, bad Muslims' religiosity exceeds the limits of the personal sphere and expands into the public sphere, and as a result creates the rising reactionary danger in the form of either an Islamic revolution or gradual Islamization.

According to the Kemalist positivist understanding, religion should not exceed its secularist limits. Once it exceeded its limits, the basic principles of a secular society were under threat and those who somehow contributed are bad Muslims like the conservative political actors of the February 28 Process;

> *"Yes, exactly 73 years later Turkey has pains in the face of a big mistake. Moreover, these pains are created not by the "religious" people but those proponents of religion[272] who perceive civilization, the world culture as "infidelity".*
> *Yes, "proponents of religion..." the "proponents of religion" who present themselves as "religious" and use religion as a tool for politics..."[273]*

Of course the ones who are making a big mistake after 73 years and who present themselves as pious people although not being so, were none other than the RP party members. The February 28 Process was not a fault of the military but rather a necessity that the military, executed reluctantly in order to fix the conservative actors' fault. The same logic was also prevalent in the perception of the General Command of Gendarmerie's circular about the prayer rooms. The report of the *Milliyet* from military sources reflected this logic;

> *"By mentioning that the practicing Muslims who were discharged were not people who are engaged in their daily praying, fasting, and supplication to God, Military sources stated that these kind of staff members were discharged because they engaged in organized activities."[274]*

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[272] The original word is "*dinbaz*", which is a manufactured word by the author with a connotation of clowning, acting while using religion.
[273] Sabah, Fatih Çekirge, 19.03.1997, p.13.
[274] Milliyet, 25.09.1996, p.17.

In this statement, the words "organized activities" must be read as public visibility. Therefore, the "people who are engaged in their daily praying, fasting and supplication to God," stood for the public silence of religiosity whereas people "engaged in organized activities" were fired from military ranks as they gained public visibility for their religiosity. The participation in organized activities was represented as the only determinant of being a religionist. Furthermore, "being engaged in daily praying, fasting and supplication to God" was supposed to be an exclusive and exhaustive category which meant that if a person was "engaged in his\her daily praying, fasting and supplication to God", then he or she should not be engaged in any kind of societal activities. If he\she did, his\her prayers and religiosity could not be genuine.

> *"Everybody can go and pray in silence when it is the time. The only condition*
> *for this is not to delay public service."*[275]

Bülent Serim wrote these lines as a response to the discussions about the military's circular about prayer rooms. Serim also claimed that public service was a material and worldly thing that should be clearly separated from prayers that were considered to be spiritual. The discussion on the military's circular was crucial in displaying the typical element of a positivist understanding of religion; the restriction of its domain to individual conscience:

> *"Islam has experienced its most respectful, most honorable and most*
> *authentic following under the Republican Turkey. The place of Islam became*
> *the free conscience of free people. The insurance that assured this for the*
> *past 70 years has been secularism."*[276]

The title of above quoted piece was, "The Sun Will Rise." The title itself was an obvious reflection of a positivist understanding, with its image of the rise of light over darkness. However, there were some other cases in which the dark rose over light:

> *"Quran on the computer: fundamentalist aggression towards secularism"*[277]

The report was about software which contained the text of the Quran, its Turkish translation and its recitation. Digital technology and the Quran were regarded as inconsistent, as one belonged to the material sphere and the other to the spiritual sphere and therefore the Quranic

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[275] Cumhuriyet, Bülent Serim, 15.04.1996, p.6.
[276] Sabah, Güngör Mengi, 19.05.1997, p.3.
[277] Cumhuriyet, 15.04.1996, p.6.

software was regarded as aggression towards secularism. Anything which was material cannot be reconciled with anything from the spiritual sphere, and, according to the hegemonic Kemalist interpretation, genuine Islam was limited to the spiritual sphere:

> "*Temples are the places of religion. Conscience, which is the almighty maqam [adobe], is the place of religion.*"[278]

> "*In the secular republic, the slogan "Islam, The True Way" can only be written in one place. It is the people's conscience. It is the people's hearts. It is people's spiritual worlds.*"[279]

According to same logic not the headscarf itself, but the person who wears it and the place where it is worn constituted a problem. According to this positivist ideology, every place has an appropriate dress code:

> "*Tansu Çiller picture caption: Tansu Çiller wore a headscarf when Quran was being recited. Berna Yılmaz picture caption: Of course Berna Yılmaz also covers her hair in funerals.*"[280]

Picture 1

There was no problem with the headscarf of Berna Yılmaz, who "of course" wore a headscarf during funerals, or even Tansu Çiller's headscarf unless they wore them in the Grand National Assembly like the supporters of the RP. Every style of clothing had a specific place and the public sphere was not suitable for headscarves. Religion should be limited to a person's conscience, and headscarves within the private sphere.

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[278] Cumhuriyet, M. İskender Özturanlı, 08.04.1996, p.2.
[279] Cumhuriyet, Aytekin Ertuğrul, 29.07.1996, p.2.
[280] Sabah, Can Ataklı, 04.11.1996, p.6.

The Positivist understanding of religion was also widespread in *Akşam*'s coverage, as it was idealized as the best way of being a good and genuine Muslim;

> "It is imperative that the officials at the top of our army are both Muslim and Atatürkist. We thank God that until now such commanders have served at the top levels of our army and they continue to do so. From our chairman of the General Staff General Karadayı to all the ranks of command need to possess such a qualities that we can look into our future with trust. The second element is the justice organization. Those who are at the head of justice also inhale the breath of Atatürk. The honorable head of the Supreme Court Yekta Güngör Özden is a real Atatürkist and the spokesman of the real Muslims."[281]

What is interesting in the above piece is that, although a Muslim image was idealized, its characteristics were not mentioned. Therefore the reader does not know on what grounds Karadayı and Özden were idealized as real Muslims. The only clues, which may give an idea about the characteristics of these people, were their official duties. Furthermore, the religiosity of these people did not include any public visibility. Therefore conformity to the state order and public visibility constituted the criteria of being a real and good Muslim.

Contrary to the state official's case, when a religious functionary was presented as a real and good Muslim, the proposal had to be supported with various pieces of evidence;

> "May he not deprive us of his intercession... Our Prophet was asked, "What is religion?" He replied "it is good morals." When he was asked to explain jihad, which is indicated to be war with the enemy, our beautiful prophet said "real jihad is struggle with your own self" and thereby emphasized that the most important worship is purification from bad feelings, thoughts and wrong deeds. Our prophet was a modern person who was polite, serious-minded, but who could make jokes when necessary, who dressed clean, who was careful about cleanliness, who even brushed his teeth. [...] It is a pity that today, some groups that claim that they follow him in the best way turn Islam into a cause of division [discrimination, dividing people]. We need new religious official types who see religion as good morals and offering services to people. In this regard, a name that is becoming more prominent is the honourable Fethullah Gülen."[282]

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[281] Akşam, Cenk Koray, 05.04.1996, p.4.
[282] Akşam, Rıza Zelyut, 02.04.1997, p.10.

> *"Fethullah Hodja sees religion mostly as a divine path that looks inside human beings. Fethullah Hodja emphasizes religion together with being equipped with the information of the era we live in and enlightenment. [...] Fethullah Hodja also indicates that in history religion had not been turned into show as much as today and he calls Muslims to avoid ostentatiousness."[283]*

Fethullah Gülen is the leader of a Turkey-based transnational religious community. Gülen and his movement tried to create a moderate and liberal Islamic image.[284] The reason why Fethullah Gülen represented as a real good Muslim was a number of characteristics that were all some way related with each other: good manners, purification from bad ideas and feelings, personal hygiene, being dignified, serving to people. According to these characteristics, religion was confined to good manners and personal characteristics. Fethullah Gülen was the representative of the good interpretation of Islam against those who constitute the other side: show-off bad Muslims. It was again the issue of public visibility that matters in the discourse on good and bad Muslims. It should be kept in mind that any kind of rituals, public prayers or dressing codes was not accepted as a part of being a good Muslim.

Once all the rules and societal aspects of religion were put aside, then the Islamic identity was no more a problem for the prevailing hegemonic system as you would have reduced religion to a matter of conscience:

> *"The genuine religious functionary knows that the focus of it [religion] is the heart, and he leaves it there as a spiritual need. With this characteristic, religion is an abstract framework formed to take away the pains of death, etc."[285]*

The abandoning of the formal practices of religion has a key distinctiveness in the good and bad Muslim categorization and also in one's honesty;

> *"One day I said in the classroom: "The essence of religion is to do good and avoid evil. We were in a session of the course named "Political Ideas and Regimes". I looked at the two headscarf wearing students in the classroom. They were whispering among themselves. It seemed that they disagreed with my comment, because if they agreed with my comment, it would not be necessary to*

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[283] Akşam, Rıza Zelyut, 19.04.1997, p.10.
[284] For more information about Gülen and his movement see: Yavuz, H. M. (1999). "Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen," The Middle East Journal, 53(4), p. 584-605.
[285] Cumhuriyet, Serhat Kestel, 23.09.1996, p.2.

follow some formal rules. At least, the necessity would decrease. In that case, following formal rules would not determine the genuineness of a religious individual. Goodness and honesty would."[286]

The writings of Hüseyin Batuhan are very interesting in terms of presenting the hegemonic discourse on religion as a matter of good manners;

"We use the concept of religious for people who pay attention to religious beliefs and practices in their daily lives. In this sense religious is the person who tries to purify him\herself in terms of ethics, to glorify his humanity and in addition to those who try to properly fulfill religious responsibilities such as praying and fasting"[287]

For the sake of the hegemonic discourse, Batuhan acted like a theologian and built a hierarchy between religious responsibilities, something, which actually could not even be done by a theologian. For him the ethical aspect of religion was more important than religious beliefs and practices. Besides living religion in one's own conscience, one also needed to wear swimming suits in order to be genuine Muslims:

"The Anatolian Muslims have practiced Islam in a reformist way for centuries. Instead of following the dogmatic rules of religion, they have understood Islam as a relationship between the human beings and God, and have regarded the issue as an issue of conscience. For this reason, instead of prioritizing the formal practices such as daily praying, fasting and the pilgrimage, they have paid attention to the principles such as honesty, protecting the poor and not oppressing other people. In the evening time, they would drink alcohol; instead of following the exact rules of covering themselves they would wear their swimming suits and go to the beach. From time to time, they would perform the daily prayers and fasting; there were even some of them who never performed these [prayers, fasting] in their entire lives."[288]

An important detail about *Akşam*'s discourse on the good and bad Muslims is that in conformity with the hegemonic position of Kemalism over some Alevi groups, Alevism was directly put forward as an example of being a good Muslim against bad Muslims. Columnist

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[286] Cumhuriyet, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, 24.09.1997, p.3.
[287] Cumhuriyet, Hüseyin Batuhan, 30.09.1997, p.2.
[288] Cumhuriyet, Oral Çalışlar, 24.08.1997, p.4.

Rıza Zelyut, who is an Alevi, was the leading figure in promoting Alevism as a way of being a good Muslim:

> *"So what are the other conditions to be an Alevi? Firstly, one must have a genuine belief. [...] This belief must not be used for material interest or political power. It is imperative that worship is not turned into show. In order to be an Alevi, one must never transgress with regards to the rights of others. [...] You can never turn religion and worship into a show. [...] Dear Erbakan, dear Refah party supporters, it is not easy to be an Alevi."[289]*

The dress code has key distinctiveness in the good and bad Muslim discourse. One of the spheres in which Islam should not intervene, so that people could be modern Muslims rather than reactionaries, fundamentalists, or political Islamists, was dress code;

> *"I am talking about the women who are dressed in black chadors that leave open only a few centimeter squares of their faces. [...] Is it possible not to realize that these men and women are militants who want to show-off [about being religious] rather than "good Muslims" who are respected."[290]*

The amount of attention paid to physical appearance in the formation of the hegemonic discourse on religion was due to the fact that the public visibility of religion had a core importance for hegemonic interpretation. Therefore generally acts, like wearing a headscarf or being a Sufi order member, could be enough for someone to be regarded as a religionist whereas for others it may not be:

> *"At first sight, it is assumed that women in black chador, who are organized under the name of "Thursday Mothers"[291], have a religionist identity. [...] Despite wearing black chadors, Reyhan and Nuran sharply criticize many religionist foundations and agents. Arguing that neither the Welfare Party nor the Shariah supporting media have any relation to "true Islamism", the two girls got furious while discussing this."[292]*

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[289] Akşam, Rıza Zelyut, 29.05.1996, p.8.
[290] Milliyet, Metin Toker, 12.09.1996, p.17.
[291] The Thursday Mothers, as they first organized in Argentina, was a group of mother gathered in Plaza De Mayo in Boines Aires for protesting the disappearing of around 30.000 people under the junta rule in Argentina in 1977. The Turkish Thursday Mothers was a small-scale organization and it is difficult to came across more information about them except the news report quoted.
[292] Cumhuriyet, 14.01.1997, p.4.

Women who at first sight seemed to be religionists turned out not to be when they criticized the conservative institutions. These women in chador were saved from being religionists due to the fact that they were opposing the RP and Sufi orders.

> *"Florence Breulilac is a 27 year old French woman. Her life has changed after a trip from Kapadokya to Konya. She started living in Turkey and she started to receive education in Sufism after dropping her studies in painting. Nowadays, she is attending dhikr [invocation] and sema sessions in Numan Dergahı [a Sufi lodge] twice a week."[293]*

The tone of the news about Florence Breulilac's religionist activities was very positive. Many religionists' activities may not be that bad when they are performed by foreigners, by those who are "guests" and have no influence in Turkey. Therefore it is very clear that the discourse on good and bad Muslims was primarily about the hegemonic power discussions of Turkey.

Once religion was reduced to a divine way towards inner world, then prayers and rituals were problematized and there cannot be any better tool than the RP parliamentarians' Hajj journey for problematizing the prayers:

> *"Have you seen the pictures of our parliamentarians at the airport? It seems that they stripped to a state of being half naked in front of respectable passengers and these grown men posed naked. They are going on pilgrimage, so it is said that they are wearing their ihrams.[294] They are not aware of what kind of bad manners they are displaying by stripping naked in front of people, but at least if they looked at the ordinary pilgrim candidates around them, they would see that this journey can be done wearing a light jacket and a pair of pants. Also, as if their family is one of barbers, they have scissors in their hands and they are cutting each other's hair. What is it for? Because they are having a pilgrim shave. Is such a job done at the airport in front of the journalists? You'll say, "it would not be a show otherwise..." You are right."[295]*

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[293] Milliyet, 28.11.1996, p.1.

[294] A situation and set of restrictions –such as one's having hair cut, shaving, using perfumes, and arguing with others even one is right, that Muslims pilgrims should follow during their Hajj. The word is also used for specific type of clothing that covers the body with the help of two piece of white fabric, one for the lower and the other for the upper body. Man should cover their body in that way during their Hajj.

[295] Akşam, Tayyar Şafak, 15.04.1997, p.9.

At first sight it seemed that what the author criticized was not the Hajj itself but the way parliamentarian pilgrims behaved during their Hajj journey. However, what the author missed was the fact that the place where pilgrims should wear their *ihram* depends on whether their plane goes to Mecca or Medina. Parliamentarians whose planes arrived at Mecca should wear their *ihram* at their point of departure, whereas other pilgrims whose plane arrived in Medina could dress in their *ihram* in Medina. Not knowing this fact, the author supported his criticism about parliamentarians with the better examples; ordinary pilgrims around them. On the other hand, the author's lack of knowledge was not all that important for the reproduction of the discourse. What the author sees as a bad Muslim show-off act was not the place where *ihram* was worn but who wore it; pilgrim parliamentarians. Again another report from *Sabah*, blames pilgrim parliamentarians for being show-offs because they fulfilled the ordinary necessities of Hajj;

> *"The pilgrimage trip of the parliamentarians, who went to Mecca with a discount tariff, who stayed in special tents with air condition, passed mostly as a "show". 6 ministers, 54 parliamentarians and the deputy speaker of the parliament immediately visited the Ka'ba for the "umrah" tawaf. Then they went to the guesthouse assigned by the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the show of cutting hair started. The ministers and parliamentarians took the scissors in their hands and cut each other's hair and so they left the state of ihram. [...] The parliamentarians settled in the tents near Mina, which are equipped with air conditions, on the eve of the Eid al-Adha.. In tents, there was the dhikr [invocation] show of the RP parliamentarians."[296]*

The acts that were presented as showing off in the report were ordinary necessities of the Hajj. The reason why ordinary necessities of Hajj prayer were presented as showing off was the identity of the pilgrims: parliamentarians. According to the positivist understanding of religion, being religious as much as going to pilgrimage while at the same time being worldly by working in politics is a contradiction.

According to Rıza Zelyut one should visit the Ka'ba of the heart instead of visiting the Ka'ba in Mecca. In his column titled "Journey to the Ka'ba of the Heart" he said:

> *"Those who know that the religion of Islam is based on good morals, clean thoughts and useful work, are unanimous that the real Islamic behavior is not*

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[296] Sabah, 20.04.1997, p.3.

hurting people. [...] All those who are sane enough know that going on the hajj while upsetting people, transgressing the rights of others, even embezzling state funds is nothing other than fooling oneself. Undoubtedly, those who turn going to Hajj into a show and fool the people cannot fool Allah..."[297]

As mentioned before, the discourse of good and bad Muslims was a multilayered one and many components of the discourse could be presented in the same breath, as in the aforementioned examples. While criticizing the visibility of prayers and rituals of the bad Muslims, the author reproduced their dishonest image. In the end the message was clear: people who went to pilgrimage as a show-off act were those who appropriated others' rights and the property of the state.

Honesty was one of the frequently referred characteristics that belonged to a good Muslim. According to the discourse, bad Muslims' religiosity was not genuine but a tool to cover their dishonesty. Therefore any religious act of bad Muslims should be tested by honesty and parliamentarians' Hajj visit was a good opportunity for this:

"Yesterday 5 ministers and 53 parliamentarians, the majority of whom are from Refah, went to Hajj on a special plane, together with their spouses. Directorate of Religious Affairs also rented a hotel in Mecca for the parliamentarians for whom it arranged a special discount."[298]

At first sight the only discursive element in the report was the stress on the special organization of the pilgrimage and the special discount for parliamentarians. However, the discursive practice was intensified with the other report that was published next to the quote above:

"Directorate of Religious Affairs: halal income is necessary. Hasan Şakir Sancaktar, who is a member of the Higher Board of Religious Affairs of the Directorate of Religious Affairs explained the conditions of going on the Hajj to Sabah in this way: [...] of course in order to go to Hajj, income must be halal, the rights of the state and nation must not have been transgressed, one must put up with the pains that all the pilgrims suffer in general and one must perform this worship with patience."

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[297] Akşam, Rıza Zelyut, 15.04.1997, p.10.
[298] Sabah, 12.04.1997, p.29.

The message was so clear; they might go to pilgrimage but they did not meet the requirements of honesty. When it came to honesty, the category associated with following the formal rules and being honest at the same time was presented as an impossible category. If one followed the formal rules, then one could not be a genuine Muslim as he\she lacked honesty. Being a practicing Muslim was the chief reason for questioning of one's honesty:

> *"According to our religion, parliamentarians who go on pilgrimage will be cleaned from their sins just as newborns and will have to be very careful about their way of life. The prohibitions listed below will be the rule for parliamentarians who go on the pilgrimage: 'He must not lie, he must not deceive people, he must not receive benefits through unfair means, he must not be engaged in trading influence, he must be tolerant, he must not gamble, he must not drink alcoholic drinks…'*
> *When they come back, we shall see…"[299]*

These lines imply that all the parliamentarians who went on the pilgrimage have the listed bad habits. Furthermore, the writer seemed unconvinced that parliamentarians would quit these bad habits when they returned from pilgrimage. However, the listed habits were potential forms of corruption for the other parliamentarians who did not go on the pilgrimage as well, and this was not something restricted to the pilgrims. Yet, they were not following the formal rules of religion, so they were not questioned. RP parliamentarians were more vulnerable to being questioned as to their honesty. The message was so clear; they might go to pilgrimage but they did not meet the requirements of honesty. Therefore their Hajj was not a genuine religious act but one aimed at the exploitation of people's religious feelings, just like their role in the annual sacrifice:

> *"Approximately 2.5 million animals are sacrificed in Eid Al-Adha. The monetary value of the sacrificed animal skins exceeds 3 trillions. Those who exploit the religion are stirring up a fight over "collecting skins" and thereby exploiting the beliefs of the plain Muslims."[300]*

Besides the claims of exploitation of religious feelings for economic interest, more concrete corruption claims were also linked to the RP:

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[299] Milliyet, Hikmet Bila, 14.04.1997, p.2.
[300] Sabah, Can Ataklı, 29.01.1997, p.6.

Picture 2

> *"He was very close to Erbakan: Erol Yarar, who is the head of the "Association of Independent Businessmen" of which those businessmen who are close to Refah are members, is accused of collective smuggling. It is indicated that the machines that Yarar, who is known to be close to Erbakan, imported from abroad as new yet are in fact used."*[301]

The claim that Yarar and Erbakan were close was also supported by the photo posted with the report. The aim of the report was to make the reader associate Yarar and Erbakan, and therefore reproduce the discourse about dishonesty of conservative politicians.

When the subject is changed from the Hajj to the Ramadan, the same questioning and test were still on the table for practicing Muslims:

> *"All right, but what kind of a Ramadan is this? What kind of an iftar[302] table? What kind of a sahoor?[303] [...] Is fasting for purifying the Muslim soul from wrongdoing and depravity, or not? Those who are performing Islamism on TV have contaminated Islam in the political mud."*[304]

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[301] Sabah, 29.04.1996, p.1.
[302] The meal with which Muslims break their fasting.
[303] In Ramadan Muslims eat sahoor meal in the early morning before starting to fast.
[304] Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 20.02.1996, p.2.

Discourse on the dishonesty of bad Muslims was not always reproduced with reference to formal religious acts such as Hajj, fasting, or explicit claims of corruption. In other cases, creating an unfavorable image about the source of a conservative actor's wealth by exaggerating the amount of their wealth was also a method:

> "The charity dinner organized by the Ankara Women's Branch of the Welfare Party for Southeast Turkey witnessed an interesting auction. In the auction, which was introduced as, "Auction in the Refah's Way," deutschmarks, bracelets, bangles and rings from women and millions from men rained down; every rise in price was accepted as a donation."[305]

In this example the discourse was reproduced by ignoring the charitable intention of the auction, and instead of the intention, the amount of money and goods offered was emphasized. By adding the message that not only Turkish liras but also deutschmarks, and not only millions in money but also bracelets, bangles and rings were offered, the exaggeration effect was perpetuated.

Another important discursive practice of the February 28 Process was the Fadime Şahin incident. Müslüm Gündüz, a claimed sheikh who exploited Fadime, was a useful figure and image to associate with the bad Muslim category, and therefore supported the discourse. Another negative characteristic attributed to bad Muslims was being libidinous:

> "The majority of those [Sheikhs] are sex maniacs. There are some who built harems by being slaves of their out-of-control sexual desire. Sexual desire is the basic instinct for those people. There is no moral code which is not violated and no true religious order not manipulated for this purpose."[306]

According to this discourse, once religious organizing became possible, people who organized by religious means, that is, the conservatives, religionists, followers of Shariah, or Islamists in hegemonic terms- started the exploitation of religious feelings and in most cases, this was sexual exploitation. Doğan Heper from the *Milliyet*[307] also preserved the same discourse. However, it is not necessary to conduct an analysis of his writings as he directly

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[305] Milliyet, 16.05.1997, p.2.
[306] Milliyet, Metin Toker, 06.01.1997, p.15.
[307] Milliyet, 14.01.1997, p.14.

puts the "sex-smelling" Sufi orders on one side and the "pure", "clean", "genuine" Muslims on the other.

Modern women would also become sex objects of libidinous and womanizing bad Muslims as in the case of Fadime Şahin in relation to Müslüm Gündüz:

Picture 3[308]

The picture was pertaining to a commission meeting in the parliament. In the meeting, a RP deputy petitioned about the scarcity of running water in his polling district and said that because of the scarcity even the sexual life of the residents were negatively affected. In the cartoon we see a bad Muslim man with his beard and cap sleeping next to a woman whose head is not covered. The bad Muslim image of the man was stressed while there was no reference or implication for the woman. It was a bad Muslim, libidinous and womanizing, who seduced a modern woman.

A bad Muslim woman was not only a sex object, but also cast in a passive role in every aspect of life, even with her freedom to participate in headscarf rallies:

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[308] Sabah, 02.04.1996, p.11.

"At the Language, History and Geography Faculty, male students protested the requirement of pictures without headscarves from female students. About 100 students unfurled a green flag and demanded Shariah. [...] The students, who gathered in front of the university, demanded that the ban on headscarves be lifted. During the headscarf rally with a green flag, it was noted that male students were in the majority."[309]

In the headscarf discussion, one of the leading arguments of Kemalists is that women do not cover their head out of their free will but that their fathers, husbands or elder brothers make them cover their heads. The report made reference to this argument and mentioned the passive position of women in Turkish society.

As is to be expected in the context of the hegemonic discourse, negative actions, thoughts and attitudes toward women were not depicted as the norms of Islam but as the faults of bad Muslims:

It is said that preacher Mehmet Akyüz from Of county of Trabzon province gave a speech during the opening of the Culture and Cooperation Foundation in the county of Of. [...] I would like to say to you that we should not forget that there are also enlightened religious officials by sharing this with you. The speech was like this: "[...] Our Quran would never tolerate such a degree of unfairness as putting women under pressure for the sake of the people who see women on the streets and cannot control themselves. One must say that democracy should not be the freedom to develop ignorance. This would betray the purpose of democracy as well."[310]

"There are those who push the truly superior aspects of Islam to one side and who create thousands of wrongs in line with their own wishes and recent examples have shown that. Respect, love and tolerance, which are the central values of Islamic morals, reach their peak in the attitudes and behavior to be shown to women."[311]

But for those, who did not understand the "real superiority of Islam," for the Shariah followers in other words, the position of women was far from, "respect, love and tolerance:"

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[309] Sabah, 05.10.1996, 25.
[310] Sabah, Can Ataklı, 17.10.1996, 06.
[311] Sabah, Yılmaz Karakoyunlu, 18.01.1997, p.19.

"Mentioning that women are only for sex for the followers of Shariah, author Yusuf Ziya Bahadınlı said that "A woman for these people is a machine for having children and a servant. A woman is both an instrument of joy, a servant and also an inferior being [...] As soon as women and men get together, they remember the bed."[312]

Historical connections were also presented to consolidate the hegemonic discourse about the religionists and sex. For example, İlhan Selçuk cited excerpts from Erzulumlu İsmail Hakkı's writings on the ways of increasing joy during sexual intercourse and concluded there was not much change from Erzurumlu İsmail Hakkı to Müslüm Gündüz, as Erzurumlu İsmail Hakkı was also known as a Sufi.[313]

The gender related issues constituted a large part of the discourse concerning good and bad Muslims. The basic claim of the discourse was the following: "The gender relations of bad Muslims are deviant." Deviance may be libidinousness or a general maltreatment and unapproved perception on women:

"When the swimsuit crisis erupted, I remembered a "Shariah supporting advertisement" that I had seen recently. These Refah people are interesting, they shout Shariah every day and then they deem all kinds of populism acceptable under the category of "we are adapting to the contemporary era". We did not know, but it seems that the Refah supporting women have been swimming in the sea, but with special swimsuits. The swimsuits that are in fashion this year have been put on sale. It is called "haşema". "What does it mean?" you ask. If you unravel each syllable, then it appears. "Hakiki Şeriat Mayosu" (i.e. Real Shariah Swimsuit). The swimsuit is covered from the neck to the ankles. They wear a cap on the head. I asked: "So when they go into the sea, doesn't this swimsuit stick to the body and display a sexy picture?" I was told that this does not happen. It turns out that this is the most special feature of these swimsuits."[314]

"Enjoying the sea with chador: In March, the wives of the Refah parliamentarians who came to the camp in Antalya Belek strolled on the

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[312] Cumhuriyet, 02.11.1996, p.2.
[313] Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 29.03.1997, p.2.
[314] Sabah, Can Ataklı, 03.03.1996, 06.

beaches with chadors. The interesting life in the camp, which had been
postponed due to the accident that Aydın Menderes had, attracted the attention
of the people in the vicinity to a great extent."[315]

A woman's image is both an indicator and a carrier of Kemalist modernization and therefore it constitutes one of its taboos. RP-member women in their special swimming suits were regarded as an attack on this taboo because these women accepted neither Kemalist modernization nor tradition. By swimming they rejected the traditional societal codes on the one hand and by wearing their own special swimming suits they rejected the Kemalist modernization on the other. They practiced their own modernization and also their own religiosity. Their own modernization contradicted Kemalist modernization, and their own religiosity with the Kemalists' good Islam as well. As a result they were labeled as Shariah followers, i.e. bad Muslims. Another function was to alienate the conservative actors from the reader; the bad Muslims from the good Muslims. Their special swimming dresses were presented as new, surprising, shocking news from a fantastic alien planet as if the reader did not have any conservative relative, friend, colleague or neighbor around. The RP-member swimming women and their new image were so surprising that this, "interesting experience attracted huge attention from the people in the vicinity."

Besides being libidinous, violence was another characteristic associated with the bad Muslims according to the hegemonic discourse. During the February 28 Process, the claim that conservatives arming with pump rifles was an urban legend produced by the MGK and of course reproduced by the hegemonic media:

"The Festival of Municipalities", which was organized on the occasion of the
third anniversary of the RP taking power in the municipalities, was
experienced exactly like a carnival. In the fair, in which each municipality
advertised for itself, turbans, fez, pump rifles and headscarves appeared. [...]
The Düzce Municipality booth, where there were pump rifles and handguns,
attracted the greatest attention. It was also noted that there were pump rifles
and user manuals for these at the booth. [...] At the fair, men with turbans were
assigned the job of meeting the visitors and the Üsküdar Municipality
distributed paper fezzes."[316]

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[315] Sabah, 09.04.1996, 17.
[316] Sabah, 28.03.1997, p.13.

"An action was added in parliament to the provocations of the Refah spokesmen. The proposal to require a license for pump rifles was rejected in the commission. It had been found by the intelligence organizations of the state that pump rifles have reached a number that is threatening for security and the MGK had taken a precautionary decision regarding this. Even the most ignorant people who watch violence films on TV have learned what pump rifles are useful for. A pump rifle is not a hunting weapon. Who can say that a pump rifle fair that is established at the religious publications fair is for the purpose of encouraging religious people to start hunting?"[317]

The reports about "the arming of the reactionaries" were not always explicit like the ones quoted above. However, in the comprehensiveness of the hegemonic discourse of the February 28 Process, it was not difficult to fill in the blanks once any reference to pump rifles had been made;

"Confusing advertisement: Yesterday the Islamist daily Akit published a 'meaningful' advertisement for its readers. An advertisement published in the paper gives its readers a piece of good news; 'It is the right time to buy a weapon…because the hunt is starting'."[318]

It was not so difficult to guess what was there in the omitted parts of advertisement published in the daily *Akit*. However, by taking away the advertisement out of its context the *Milliyet* tried to plant doubts about the supposedly violent agenda of the RP.

The reproduction of discourse on violence was not limited to pump rifles. On the contrary, hegemonic media exploited any occasion that was somehow suitable for the propagation of the discourse. The following news report was about an attack against President Süleyman Demirel. At the end of the story, it became clear that the aggressor was a mentally unbalanced person and this was not his first crime. However, this was not an obstacle to reproducing the discourse of violence:

"It was reported that Ibrahim Gümrükçüoğlu, who attempted to assassinate President Demirel, is from a "sufi order" and that "dhikr" gatherings are held

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[317] Sabah, Güngör Mengi, 22.03.1997, p.3.
[318] Milliyet, 07.08.1997, p.15.

at his home. A jalabiya, turban and a flag with a crescent and Arabic writings
on it were found in the basement of his home."³¹⁹

In order to empower the attack story and strengthen the image of violent bad Muslims, it was necessary to find more elements that could be associated with violence. In the absence of guns, bullets and blood; a jalabiya, turban and flag with crescent and Arabic writing, all of which were found in his basement, filled the gap.

Regardless of the condition of the person who made the claims, any indication of violence and crime about bad Muslims could find its place in *Akşam*'s coverage:

> *"The man who escaped from Refah: Akşam reporters have found the Beykoz*
> *Municipality Accounting director Suat Doğan, who is reported to have*
> *confiscated the funds of Beykoz Municipality and absconded. Suat Doğan*
> *said that he would surrender to the police and disclose all of the documents*
> *he had in his possession if his safety was ensured. He said: "The day after I*
> *disclose the documents the Refah administration at the Beykoz Municipality*
> *would be dismissed from their jobs. The RP-Mafia relations would be*
> *revealed in every detail. It would become obvious who hired people to get*
> *Yusuf Ekşi of the DSP shot."³²⁰*

The man speaking in the report was a suspect of embezzlement and wanted by the police. However, because the incident took place in a RP-run municipality, the suspect was depicted as a victim escaping from the RP members.

The excerpts quoted below are another example of the fact that the scarcity of guns and bombs did not prevent the use of this discourse:

> *"Refah party leader Erbakan was welcomed with a military ceremony in*
> *Konya, where he was conducting his first trip as prime minister. Erbakan used*
> *the Prime Ministry's ATA aircraft for the first time. Prime Minister Necmettin*
> *Erbakan made his first domestic trip after receiving a vote of confidence in*
> *Konya, which is known as the fortress of his party. Contrary to expectations,*

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³¹⁹ Akşam, 20.05.1996, 06.
³²⁰ Akşam, 21.01.1996, 12.

Erbakan was met in a more low-profile manner in Konya compared to the trips

he made when he was the leader of the opposition.”[321]

The title of the report quoted above was "Erbakan Displayed Power in Konya" and, together with implicit references such as Konya being the "fortress" of the party, it included military tones that drew associations with violence. Violence was an important theme of good vs. bad Muslims discourse. According to this theme, violent bad Muslims will not refrain from using violence in order to introduce Shariah, but until that time they will be moderate and deceitful to secure the necessary conditions for its establishment.

5.2.1.2.2. Moderate and Creeping Islamization

During the February 28 Process, the Turkish political domain witnessed the intensive use of a certain term in political discussions: *takiyye*. The Arabic origin of the word and the fact that it is especially important in Shi'i Islam made the concept very effective in the reproduction of the hegemonic discourse regarding conservatives. The usage of the *takiyye* discourse and the social practices at which the use of the discourse in February 28 Process was aimed was bidirectional. The first usage was a more traditional one: the conservatives hid their real aim of establishing a Shariah state and instead worked toward the gradual Islamization of society, which in the end meant the same thing as a Shariah state. This type of *takiyye* is essentially dissimulation. On the other hand, the second usage of the discourse aimed at the conservative masses and tried to put distance between the conservative masses and conservative politicians. With many reports and comments about the rich and luxurious lifestyles of conservative politicians, the discourse aimed at transmitting a message to the conservative masses: "Look! They are not like you. They only seem similar to you. They exploit your religious feelings for their economic and political interests." This second usage of *takiyye* essentially means hypocrisy. Ultimately, the common points of both dissimulation and hypocrisy were the misleading presentation of oneself and the deception of people for one's own advantage. In dissimulation it was the secular republic and its supporters who were deceived: Dissimulating bad Muslims hid their real goal of an Iran-style state and presented themselves as moderate Muslims. However, they continued with the gradual Islamization of Turkey. In hypocrisy it was the genuine Muslims who were being deceived: Hypocritical bad Muslims hid their real goals of growing richer or abusing women and presented themselves as innocent Muslims.

According to the discourse, there is nothing these dissimulators would not do for their interests. They could even deny their religion:

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[321] Sabah, 13.07.1996, 13.

"The Hodja is a complete Machiavellian!

He will almost renounce religion and faith for the sake of being in power. He sees all means as acceptable in order to be in the position of the prime minister. It can even be said that he is a master of takiyye."[322]

Of course, the dissimulative image went hand in hand with an image of unreliability:

"There were two paths that Erbakan, who is really like a pair of pliers, believed in and would never give up walking with determination: one is the "national outlook" and the other is "power." While walking on these two paths, it is thought that the September 12, 1980 coup delayed him from reaching his target for seven years. Yet he has managed to turn every event that seemed to be against him in his favor: military interventions had a positive impact on him and his path to power was shortened a little more."[323]

A person who could make use of any condition to achieve his goal of power could also make use of religion and this was the expected attitude of a bad Muslim.

A well-known bogeyman of Turkish secularism, i.e. Iran, was also used in the context of *takiyye*. Iranian secularists were also not aware of religious reaction until it was too late, thanks to the dissimulation of Iranian religionists:

"General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı emphasized his sensitivity with regard to the subject of secularism at the reception he gave on the occasion of the August 30 Victory Day and he narrated an anecdote related to the Iranian commanders who fled Iran after Khomeini overthrew the shah's regime. His memory is like this: [...] "One night we had the opportunity to chat with one of the force commanders [of the Shah's regime]. We were together at dinner. Of course they have left their country, their armies have been dispersed, they are in a bad state psychologically. They told me such things that I could not help asking: "So were you not aware that such a reactionary development was taking place?" The Iranian commander replied: "Dear general, if you look at a flower constantly, you cannot see that that flower is growing. For

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322 Sabah, Hasan Cemal, 21.06.1996, p.19.
323 Akşam, 01.07.1996, p.9.

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example, you cannot even realize how a rose is opening. This is what happened to us."[324]

The message was clear: under RP rule, Turkey also faced the danger that Iran had faced before the revolution and, therefore, in order to avoid becoming like Iran, the army must take measures. The fact that the same story was also told in same words in the April 27 Process is helpful for understanding the fear-mongering function of the hegemonic discourse.

Of course, conservatives needed an army to establish a theocratic state like Iran. With talk of pump rifles, the historic hegemonic center armed the Islamist "army" and the excerpt quoted below gathered the army itself:

"This is what Refah wants, students as loyal as soldiers."[325]

Picture 4

The subject of the column from which the photo was taken was the debate over imam-hatip high schools which had started after the February 28 MGK meeting. The message the writer wanted to convey was as follows: İmam-hatip high schools were not only high schools, but also army barracks where a reactionary army was gradually being trained.

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[324] Sabah, 01.09.1996, p.1.
[325] Sabah, Can Ataklı, 26.03.1997, p.6.

During the February 28 Process, the conservative actors frequently referred to universal concepts such as democracy and human rights to defend themselves. The adaptation of this new language was also seen as an instance of dissimulation. Besides stoking the general discourse about sexual abuse, the cartoon below[326] also insulted the conservative discourse about universal concepts:

 (Democracy, Human Rights)

Picture 5

In the cartoon, the adaptation of the concepts of democracy and human rights was equated with the hegemonic discourse of *üfürükçülük,* healing with breath.[327] According to this discourse, religionists deceived genuine Muslims and engaged in sexual abuse under the pretext of *üfürükçülük*. The discourse about deception was also linked to the issues of democracy and human rights. In the cartoon the young lady, deceived by a reactionary bad Muslim, corresponds to the Turkish Republic and the message was the same: dissimulating bad Muslims deceiving the Turkish Republic through the use of the concepts of democracy

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[326]Cumhuriyet, Turhan Selçuk, 09.01.1997, p.12.
[327] Especially according to Sufi interpretation of Islam, verses of the Quran, in addition to medical practices, are a source of physical healing for Muslims. It is a widespread practice for people to ask religious figures who are regarded as good, practicing Muslims to recite Quran verses for their cure. According to the tradition, after the recitation of the Quran the person who recited the verses finishes the session by calling "Hu," a name of Allah that literally means "He" in Arabic, and blowing their final breath toward the one seeking to be cured.

and human rights were just like hypocritical bad Muslims deceiving innocent Muslims for their sexual ends.

The discourse on women had a fear mongering character in some cases. It was generated and circulated as a message that the existence of these "interesting and strange" women was not only a source of attraction, but also a danger for others because they try to gradually transform the rest of society to fit their own norms:

> "Ayfer Yılmaz, who used to wear skirts above the knee when she was the undersecretary of treasury and when she was a minister in the DYP-ANAP coalition, immediately changed her style when her party entered into a coalition with Refah. [...] Minister of state Yılmaz kept the hemline of the skirt of the light green suit she recently had made long, down to the ankles."[328]

> *Cartoon Tag: Mesuth [Mesut Yılmaz] wants to join the government, but…*
> *Mesut Yılmaz: What can we do, Berna. I told you that you would have to deal with it for a while.*
> Picture 6[329]

The message was clear: Anyone involved with these "strange" and "interesting" bad Muslims would be gradually transformed like Minister Ayfer Yılmaz, who started to wear a long, green skirt or Mesut Yılmaz's wife, who would start to wear the chador if her husband formed a coalition government with the RP.

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[328] Sabah, 13.07.1996, p.1.
[329] Sabah, 17.02.1996, p1

However, it was not only Ayfer Yılmaz who started gradually changing her lifestyle. Even the Grand National Assembly was being changed:

> *"After the Refahyol government received its vote of confidence, 40 women who wore turbans and chadors came to the Parliament yesterday. The women came to the Dikmen gate together, took visitor cards and entered the general assembly hall. [...]Women who wore turbans sat together at the parliament lodge and watched the discussion on the parliamentary research motion given by the RP on the obligatory savings deduction. The guests listened to Ertan Yülek of the RP."[330]*

> *"After the Refah party came to power, the human scenes at the parliament changed rapidly. After the coming of women who wore turbans and black chadors to the Turkish Grand National Assembly last week, the Parliament was also the scene of interesting scenes yesterday. However, this time the guests were not only natives. Foreign guests also came with their distinctive clothing. Among those who came to the parliament were Mecca Aziziya Mosque imam Sheikh Nimetullah Hodja and Osman Özdemir from among the Erzurum Naqshibandi sheikhs. Nimetullah Hodja and the Naqshibandi sheikh attracted attention to themselves with their interesting clothes."[331]*

While the discourse of delusion targeted a wider audience, the aim of the hypocrisy discourse was the conservative masses. The hegemonic media tried to put distance between the conservative masses and conservative politicians. To this end, the "luxurious" and "wealthy" lifestyle of the conservative politicians was displayed in an exaggerated manner. Not only political figures, but also their families became a target of the discourse of hypocrisy. The image of great wealth was used to raise questions about the sincerity of conservative politicians:

> *"Nermin Erbakan, who is the first turban wearing first lady, uses a 300S Mercedes, which she owns. The car, which is worth 3.5 billion liras, was given by Necmettin Erbakan to his wife. Nermin Erbakan accessorizes her clothes*

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[330] Sabah, 10.07.1996, p.21.
[331] Sabah, 17.07.1996, p.31.

with modern boots and shoes and she wears diamond rings and diamond bracelets."[332]

The report was more about Nermin Erbakan's car and jewellery than about the fact that she had become the first lady. The report about Erbakan's daughter Elif's school is similar:

"The Directorate of Student Affairs at Bilkent University said that the registration of Elif (who was a student at the department of interior architecture and decoration) was deleted because she had been dismissed. [...]Her friends said that Elif is an introvert, that the biggest problem for her had been the drawing classes and that she had skipped the drawing classes because the students were required to draw pictures using live models. Her friends said that a green Mercedes brought her to the school."[333]

Her reluctance with regard to using naked models, the color and the model of her car were the basic elements in the report rather than the current situation of her studies. But the Erbakan family's ordeal with Mercedes cars was not finished with Elif:

"The night blue Mercedes coupe driven by Prime Minister Erbakan's son Fatih Erbakan is the hot item of the day in the capital. [...] There are three possibilities behind the Mercedes: 1. Fatih Erbakan bought it by saving his pocket money. 2. His father gave it to him. 3. The car belongs to the RP."[334]

The analysis of the possible ways in which Fatih Erbakan acquired the night blue Mercedes coupe offers insights into the efforts aimed at producing doubts about the RP. To start with, it was very difficult for a university student to buy a Mercedes by saving his pocket money. The stress on "saving pocket money" implied the impossibility of this option. The second option was that Necmettin Erbakan had given him the car. The text implies that, under normal conditions, there would be nothing interesting in the issue to merit being "the hot item of the day in the capital" if the car had been a gift from Necmettin Erbakan. Therefore, the only real possibility was the third option, which meant that the RP bought the car for Fatih Erbakan with money donated from its supporters, people whose way of life drastically differed from that of the Erbakan family and who were deceived by the religious image of the Erbakans.

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[332] Sabah, 01.07.1996, p.10.
[333] Sabah, 06.07.1996, p.27.
[334] Milliyet, 16.02.1997, p.1.

The following lines from *Akşam* clearly indicated the intended effect of the hypocrisy discourse on the conservative masses. Furthermore, by making references to Erbakan's *iftar* dinner in the prime minister's residence, a hot item of discussions on religious reaction in the February 28 Process, the column's capacity of reproducing this discourse doubled. Mercedes cars once again made an appearance:

> *"Remember the latest iftar meal issue... what were left in people's minds most strongly were the Mercedes cars of the honourable effendi. Driving around in these Mercedes cars in front of the eyes of this poor nation and then talking of religion and faith has no place in the eyes of Allah."*[335]

Driving such cars in front of poor people was not the only evidence of hypocrisy and the deception of poor, genuine, good Muslims:

> *"A wedding without a bride: The wedding of Merve Baş, who is the niece of Mustafa Baş from the RP, brought together RP members at the Hidiv Palace. Bride Merve Baş did not allow her pictures to be taken despite the fact that her family gave permission. [...] The guests sat in gender-segregated fashion and they were offered an extravagant banquet in open buffet style. A firework display was also made. [...] It was found out that 3 billion [lira] were spent for the wedding, where 2,000 guests attended and contractor Mehmet Emin Erkan gave his son a Mercedes of the latest model."*[336]

People that spend 3 billion lira for a wedding are still regarded as supporters of an Islamic revolution. This is the power of discourse: these bad Muslims who are so articulated to the capitalist system and consumption society are feared to be planning an Islamic revolution as in Iran, Algeria, or Afghanistan.

5.2.1.2.3. The Islamic Revolution

Next to the danger of a slow and surreptitious takeover, the danger of a "reactionary armed uprising" was one of the chief motifs of the discursive practices of the February 28 Process. Claiming that a slow and surreptitious takeover is underway and that, at the same time, a sudden armed uprising is imminent is nonsense, of course, but it is not an obstacle to generating discourse. The reactionary armed uprising discourse was reproduced with reference to both international and domestic events. Among the international cases there

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[335] Akşam, Behiç Kılıç, 19.01.1997, p.10.
[336] Akşam, 29.09.1996, p.4.

existed Iran, Afghanistan and Algeria, whereas incidents like Sivas and Menemen were the domestic ones.

In the reproduction of this discourse, references to the actual discussions of the time were frequently used:

Newspaper: Religious fundamentalists slaughtered seven more women in Algeria.
Man: Oh!!! How backward these men are! Haven't they heard about pump rifles?
Picture 7[337]

The claims about pump rifles, which were a discursive theme and media fabrication, were used in order to establish a similarity between Turkey and Algeria.

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[337] Cumhuriyet, 25.03.1997, p.5.

With talk of violence and the danger of Islamic revolution, the reproduction of the discourse became stronger. The first task for newspapers was to fabricate evidence *ex nihilo* because one of the major characteristics of the MG was their non-violent attitude. For example, four MG parties were banned until now, but in none of these cases did the court claim any kind of violent agenda for the parties, although all were banned because of "being a focus of reactionary acts." However, with the help of this grand narrative and media fabrications, attempts were made to create an association with violence in the minds of the people. False claims about the arming of the RP can be shown as an example of these media fabrications:

> "*Prime Minister Erbakan today depends on his militia forces. That is why Oğuzhan Asıltürk [one of the leading figures of the RP] is always saying "Our armed force is our faith" and he goes on threatening eighty percent of the society. [...] If you have the guts, take to the streets and shout: 'Shariah will be introduced, the Seculars will die miserably'. Come to the streets and we shall show you. You cowards!"*[338]

It is possible to observe here the manipulation of a conservative *cliché* to reproduce the discourse about the violent tendencies of the RP. It is very clear that Asıltürk uttered the slogan "Our armed force is our faith" to deny claims about the arming of the RP. However, Hikmet Çetinkaya reversed this and presented Asıltürk's words as threatening the people who did not vote for the RP.

After the fabrication of evidence of violent intentions on the part of conservatives, a second and harder task awaited the newspapers: denying the claims of success of an armed reactionary uprising and assuring people that the TSK was capable of defeating such a potential threat:

> "*People who say "Civil war starts when a military intervention takes place" are whistling in the dark... because of fear. Will they resist the army by using pump rifles? The absence of any difference between the weapons that the people have and those of the army is something for which there is no example even in the decline period of the Ottomans.*"[339]

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[338] Cumhuriyet, Hikmet Çetinkaya, 12.02.1997, p.5.
[339] Cumhuriyet, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, 13.04.1997, p.3.

Thanks to these lines from Kışlalı, *Cumhuriyet* readers were assured that they would be safe from an Algerian-style civil war with the help of the beloved TSK. That meant that Turkey would not be Algeria, but that it still might become Afghanistan:

> " *[quoting from a conversation with an Afghan taxi driver in USA] the cab driver turned out to be a namesake. He is an Afghan immigrant. He became very warm to us when he found out that we were Turks. He is a big guy with a black beard. Tarık Şara teased him about his beard: 'The Taliban who came to power in Afghanistan made it mandatory to grow beards. Hey look, you don't need to be afraid!' The Afghan driver laughed: 'Look at yourself! In less than a month, Sheikh Necmettin Erbakan is going to make you grow a beard, too.'"[340]*

When it came to the case of Iran, the status of women was the subject referred to most often in order to associate it with Turkey. Columnists always underlined the subordinate position of women in Iran and warned readers about the danger of becoming like Iran. Cüneyt Arcayürek gave a good example of this method when he was commenting on Iranian President Rafsanjani's visit to Turkey. He made a comparison between Iranian first lady Faize Rafsanjani and Turkish first lady Nazmiye Demirel and asked whether Turkish women wanted to be like Mrs. Rafsanjani or Mrs. Demirel. The answer was easy: Turkish women should be aware of the danger of the Iranization of Turkey under RP rule, if they did not want to be covered like Mrs. Rafsanjani.[341]

Tansu Çiller's gender constituted a valuable opportunity for the media in terms of "Iran and women talk." For example, while commenting on the coalition government between RP and DYP it was stated that:

> "*Coercion is now useless. There could not have been an agreement between the DYP, which has the West as its objective, and the RP, which is focused on the East. They said, 'It happened,' but it is seen that it could not happen. This was a mut'a marriage, both sides obtained an important part of what they wanted. Tansu Çiller, who escaped the High Court[342], obtained what she dreamt of and so she was able to sleep again.*"[343]

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[340] Sabah, Hasan Cemal, 03.01.1996, p.27.
[341] Cumhuriyet, Cüneyt Arcayürek, 22.12.1996, p.19.
[342] According to the Turkish constitution, members of the government are to be judged by the Constitutional Court under the name of the High Council.
[343] Sabah, Güngör Mengi, 07.03.1997, p.3.

In this report, the narrative reproduced the womanizing characteristic of bad Muslims. The nature of the partnership between the DYP and the RP was mentioned together with *muta* marriage, which is a kind of a fixed-term marriage strictly forbidden in Sunnism, but permissible in most Shi'i schools and practiced particularly in religious circles in Iran mainly in order to fulfill sexual desires. Although the report did not directly associate the Turkish case with Iran and did not contain any elements of armed uprising, it was a good example of how such discourse functions. It established the relationship in an indirect way through the element of *muta* marriage, which was also widespread in Iran before the revolution but became a focus of interest in Turkey after the revolution as an element of the "Iranization of Turkey" discourse.

Akşam also did its share in reproducing the discourse on armed Islamic uprising. However, being more moderate, *Akşam* used an implicit style:

> *"At the show of the RP supporters who prayed a janaza prayer[344] for the Palestinians who died in Jerusalem, a group unfurled a green flag and shouted the slogan 'long live Shariah.' The demonstrators also burned the Israeli flag at the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara. The group did not let Ahmet Tunç, a member of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Council from the RP, speak and shouted, 'This arena does not belong to the RP, but to Muslims.' Then the group shouted the slogan 'long live Shariah' and started to march toward the Israeli embassy. The police tried to stop the group by spraying water with paint."*

> *"Friday prayer through coercion with weapons: Taliban in Afghanistan forced 3 thousand people into a mosque and forced them to pray the Friday prayer at gunpoint. Those who objected to the order were threatened with death. Extremist religionist Taliban forces, which seized power in Afghanistan, forced the people of Kabul to pray the Friday prayer at gunpoint."[345]*

Both reports found their place on the first page of *Akşam* next to each other. In the first one the standard elements of a bad Muslim rally, i.e. the green flag and call for Shariah, were generously offered. The report claimed that the rallying call for Shariah was organized by the RP-members, but somehow these RP organizers did not let another RP member speak and shouted, "This arena does not belong to the RP, but to Muslims." Despite the existence of

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[344] A kind of Muslim prayer performed after one's death.
[345] Akşam, 05.10.1996, p.1.

contradicting elements, the report was still an effective tool to combine the violence of bad Muslims with the Islamic revolution grand narrative thanks to the second report placed next it: Coercion and prayer were central elements in both reports.

During the February 28 Process, any demonstrations or rallies organized by conservative groups in order to seek their rights were presented as a type of Sivas Incident. On July 2, 1993, after an event organized by the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, an Alevi-based NGO, the Madımak Hotel in Sivas, which was hosting participants from the conference, was set on fire and 33 people died. The people who set the hotel on fire claimed that Aziz Nesin, one of the participants, had insulted Islam.

> *"Militants with turbans [headscarf], jalabas, black chadors and beards marched at Üsküdar Anadolu Imam Hatip saying that religion has been insulted. This is an incident like Sivas."[346]*

With supplementary elements like turbans and beards, the protest of conservative people against eight-year mandatory education, was presented as a Sivas-like incident.

The discourse on armed Islamic uprising was so effective that in some cases even telling the story without naming it was also enough:

> *"[...] About 100 reactionaries who revolted after 8 people who insulted Atatürk were detained, attacked the police directorate building and rescued their friends. [...] According to the report prepared by the delegation sent to Sorgun by the CHP, the incident developed like this: When the police directorate of the county detained 8 people upon the order of the prosecutor, students from the AKABE student dorm and members of the Association for the Protection of Poor Youth gathered 100 people by saying: 'The prosecutor is gathering people from the mosques. Muslims have been detained' They set off for the police directorate of the county. The crowd shouted slogans against the prosecutor and 'Allahu Akbar' and they were stopped by the county governor near the police directorate. Pro-reaction demonstrators said that they would not give up the action unless their friends were released. As a result of bargaining, 8 people were delivered to the mayor of Sorgun from the RP with 'bail' and the crowd dispersed."[347]*

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[346] Cumhuriyet, Hikmet Çetinkaya, 12.10.1996, p.5.
[347] Sabah, 10.04.1996, p.33.

The above-mentioned report was a very good example of the extent to which a grand narrative can become effective. In this example there was no direct reference to the Sivas Incident of 1930, but the plot was the same: Some bad Muslims, i.e. AKABE Association members, gathered people claiming that Muslims had been arrested. A final detail that associated AKABE Association members with RP members was the complementary element of the discourse. The incident was associated with Sivas and the RP members are associated with the bad Muslims in Sivas who set the hotel on fire. Of course, like very discursive practice, this one too has a social aim.

5.2.1.3. Social Practices

As mentioned before, according to Fairclough, every discursive practice aims at a social practice and it is a prerequisite of a social practice. During the February 28 Process, the aim of the social practice was to silence all conservative claims and cleanse Islam from the public sphere because conservative actors, the periphery/subaltern groups, were regarded as threats to the hegemonic position of the historic hegemonic center. Therefore, the allies of the historical center campaigned in order to push the conservative actors away from the center of the society. In this section, the role of the historic hegemonic center in this campaign will be presented.

Together with civil society, the media played a key role in the campaign against the conservative actors during the process. The existence of the historic ties between the media and civil society as the members of the historic hegemonic center can be understood through the activities of the historic hegemonic center just after the elections. After the elections, as a member of the historic hegemonic center, and owner of the largest business conglomerate, Rahmi Koç called on other center-right and left parties for unification against the RP:

> *"Rahmi Koç, who is the head of the administrative council of Koç Holding, indicated that Turkey had a tradition of being ruled by two big parties and said: 'The right should unite on the right and the left should unite on the left of center. [...]If the parties want to survive, they must definitely unite, otherwise one of them will be eliminated.' [...] Koç said the following on the Refah-army discussion "Our army is the most institutionalized, organized force in Turkey. If they said something, they must have felt the need to say something."[348]*

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[348] Akşam, 14.02.1996, p.6.

The unification of the center parties against the danger of the RP was a common theme during the process. Similar to Rahmi Koç calling for unification just after the election, this time *Akşam* itself called for center-right unification after the February 28 crisis:

> *"The Turkish people want an end to the fight within the center right as soon as possible in order to solve problems rapidly and to ensure political stability. The secret of success: Citizens indicated that the crisis in Turkey was quickly moving toward a dangerous point and that they miss the days when the center right made Turkey experience breakthroughs by coming to power on its own during the Menderes, Demirel and Özal periods. Longing for the golden age: Most of the society believes that the center right can only return to its golden days with the coming together of Çiller and Yılmaz. People are saying that "Turkey can only move forward like this when entering the 2000s."*[349]

Akşam's discourse during the process was more moderate than other media groups analyzed in this study. It always tried to follow a balanced policy between the historic hegemonic center and subalterns and sought the government's support against the other major media conglomerates, namely the Doğan and Medya Groups. However, the timing of the above-quoted report shows that, as a result of the closure case against the RP, *Akşam* lost its hope of support from the RP against its opponents and therefore invested in the prospects of a post-RP process.

As major elements of the historic hegemonic center, trade unions and associations were also part of the discussions during the process. The discussion on the trade unions and associations started after the general elections because the trade unions' and associations' elections also took place in the same period. Newspapers claimed that the RP assisted its supporters in taking control of trade unions and associations:

> *"MÜSİAD has designs on the trade associations: The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessman (MÜSİAD) interfered with the chamber elections after the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce elections. MÜSİAD, which acted to capture the Chambers of Mechanical Engineers and Chambers of Architects, started to organize gatherings on behalf of the 'Group of Call for Solidarity' [...] Mustafa Aral, who defined his group as democratic,*

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[349] Akşam, 27.05.1997, p.1.

secular and patriotic, called attention to the attempts of the anti-secular RP to be organized in the ranks of the chambers."[350]

"The Mosque Debate in the Chamber Elections: MÜSİAD uses demagogy in order to capture chambers that seemed to be an obstacle to its expectations."[351]

"Democrats won the chamber elections: RP proponents, who were supported by Tayyip Erdoğan and MÜSİAD, lost"[352]

"The 'chambers war' of Refah is not ending: The Refah Party, which obtained the highest votes in the early general elections, is making efforts to bring those who are close to its image into the administration. [...] Refah supporters, who have lost the elections of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Industry, Chamber of Mechanical Engineers and Topographical Engineers, have now mobilized for the Chamber of Civil Engineers."[353]

It is possible to observe the effectiveness of the discourse of good and bad Muslims in the campaign against peripheral subaltern elements. The reference to MÜSİAD's "demagogy" about mosque building and the "democratic, secular and patriotic" character of the opposing groups located the chamber elections within the overall picture of good and bad Muslims. The message was clear: MÜSİAD, the subaltern class, the periphery, the bad Muslims, were again using religion, demagogy about mosque building, against democratic, secular and patriotic members of the chamber and were thereby against the historic hegemonic center and good Muslims.

Not only newspapers' discourse about the elections, but also the chambers' activities with other parts of civil society solidified their position as members of the allied center, as seen in the example of the Chamber of Physicians' actions just two weeks after the MGK meeting of February 28. Furthermore, a close look at the activities of chambers during the process gives insights about their importance and why conservative actors' quest for a role in the chambers resulted in intense opposition from the central elements:

"Doctors' Response to Reaction: Doctors who gathered for the Medicine Day celebrations in front of the Taksim Republic Statue expressed their demand for

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[350] Cumhuriyet, 12.01.1996, p.7.
[351] Cumhuriyet, 13.01.1997, p.3.
[352] Cumhuriyet, 15.01.1996, p.6.
[353] Akşam, 26.01.1996, p.12.

a "secular state": Celebrations were held around the country to observe Medicine Day. Visiting Anıtkabir, Deans of the Faculty of Medicine explained that they will not compromise with regard to the principles of secularism, democracy, and the rule of law."[354]

Under normal circumstances, it would be good for a democratic civil society to hear the diverse ideas of different segments of society about on-going political discussions in the country. However, the problem in the Turkish case, which makes the statements hegemonic rather than democratic, was that the explanations of the different segments of society were not diverse in any sense. The content of the civil society organizations' explanations seemed to be cast in the same mould:

"Basic Principles Trodden Under Foot: Pharmacists want intellectuals to claim republican gains: Chairman of the Istanbul Chamber of Pharmacists Mustafa Türenç said that the basic principles of the republic are being trodden upon and the existence of their professional problems are ignored in addition to the problems that emanate from the regime crisis in Turkey."[355]

"The pro-Shariah party shall be closed: Full Support to Savaş [the chief prosecutor who filed the case to ban the RP] from the general assembly of the Turkish Bar Associations: Turkish Bar Associations Chairman Eralp Özgen said that the demand for the continuation of the existence of political parties that did not accept the principle of democracy, that aimed at changing the unchangeable articles of the constitution, which are concerned with the basic characteristics of the state and that even consider shedding blood for this sake is open to questioning."[356]

The chambers were mobilized and, as a result, they, along with Eralp Özgen, started to become aggressive. He participated in reproducing the hegemonic discourse against the RP by referring to the "blood shedding aims" of the RP. Furthermore, the professional identity of the speaker made the case tragic, as it seemed that ideological concerns came before professional ethics.

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[354] Cumhuriyet, 15.03.1997, p.7.
[355] Cumhuriyet, 15.05.1997, p.7.
[356] Cumhuriyet, 25.05.1997, p.5.

The bargains between the government and the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions were another example of ideological concerns being prioritized above professional ethics. There were also other labor unions bargaining with the government for a labor agreement. HAK-İŞ was one of those who made a deal. As a result, the chairperson of TÜRK-İŞ accused HAK-İŞ of compromising.[357] Furthermore, the TÜRK-İŞ chairperson claimed that HAK-İŞ signed the agreement as a result of its ideological position. However, the signing of the same agreement under the same terms by seven labor unions which were affiliated with TÜRK-İŞ[358] and later by almost all of the other trade unions[359], and the subsequent deposing of the chairpersons of the labor unions who had agreed with the government in collective bargaining by the TÜRK-İŞ administration[360] demonstrated that it was TÜRK-İŞ that was acting ideologically by not coming to terms with the government over collective bargaining.

Not only chambers and trade unions, but also official institutions took their place in the historic hegemonic center against conservatives:

> *"During the ceremony that was organized at the High Court of Appeals on the occasion of the start of the judicial year and in which President Demirel and Prime Minister Erbakan also participated, the harsh speeches of High Court of Appeals Chairman Müfit Utku and chairman of the bar associations Eralp Özgen caused tension. Utku said in his speech that 'the point we reach when we put reason at the foundation of the state is secularism, and the point we reach when we put religion at that foundation is Shariah.' Utku's words were applauded by the audience, and it was seen that Erbakan and the ministers from the RP became annoyed and did not applaud the chairman."[361]*

It is important to note that the judges raised these criticisms two months after the establishment of the coalition government between the RP and the DYP in a time period when neither controversial incidents like the Fadime Şahin or Sincan cases, nor the MGK meeting, had occurred yet. Therefore, it can be said that, like other elements of the historic hegemonic center, the judges did not act against the rising danger of reaction, but rather directly produced this rising danger in the discursive realm.

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[357] Cumhuriyet, 13.04.1997, p.3.
[358] Cumhuriyet, 15.04.1997, p.3.
[359] Cumhuriyet, 14.04.1997, p.3.
[360] Cumhuriyet, 17.05.1997, p.12.
[361] Akşam, 07.09.1996, p.1.

The historic hegemonic center against the coalition government was so extensive that in addition to official institutions, it also included football clubs, which were normally known as apolitical. Commenting on Tansu Çiller having been greeted with boos and jeers by football fans, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı of *Cumhuriyet* congratulated these fans and invited other fan groups both to jeer the government and support the ADD.[362]

These remarks of Ahmet Taner Kışlalı very well reflected Kemalist civil society and its tasks in the Gramscian sense:

> *"[...] are we at the point of 'either coup d'état or counter-revolution' ?*
> *No!*
> *Because the unarmed forces have not said their final word. There is hope in the process that brought together those who gave up hope – from DİSK to TÜRK-İŞ, from the ADD to the tradespeople and trade unions, from the ÇYDDs to the women's organizations and professional chambers. And in the parliamentarians who are affected by the process and say no to the dictatorship of the chairpersons. Now a Kemalist 'call' is being signed as the common view of the 'unarmed forces' ... forces that unite around the right things... people who grow strengthened as they share the right things... The darkness of the country will shrink as this light gets bigger."*[363]

The ideological position of the historic hegemonic center also corresponded to the classic center-periphery fault line of Turkish politics. It is possible to observe the urban middle and upper-class projections in the campaign. Moreover, the geographic distinction was also influential. The campaign was supported by the well-educated urban middle and upper classes, although the support was presented as if it was nationwide. For example, *Cumhuriyet* reported the protests after Susurluk under the headline "The People Enjoyed This Rally Very Much."[364] However, the text was about demonstrations in Ankara, İzmir and İstanbul. The sub-headings in the text were "Enthusiasm on Mumcu's Street,"[365] "Protest with Candles in İzmir", "Torches in İstanbul." All the stories of the rallies were from the three largest cities in Turkey. *Cumhuriyet*'s attitude of accepting İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir's support as being sufficient to conclude that "the people" enjoyed the rally also offers insights about the historic hegemonic center's perception of "the people." The other example of the support of "the people" for the rally was:

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[362] Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Cumhuriyet, 11.03.1996, p.3.
[363] Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Cumhuriyet, 05.02.1997, 03.
[364] Cumhuriyet, 09.02.1997, 07.
[365] The street in Ankara on which Uğur Mumcu's house was located.

> *"154 civil society organizations, including labor and business confederations, chambers, many associations and labor unions, made a simultaneous declaration in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir."[366]*

> *"320 academicians from METU [Middle East Technical University, based in Ankara], Ankara, Hacettepe [based in Ankara], İstanbul, Boğaziçi [based in Ankara], Ege [based in Izmir] and 9 Eylül [based in Izmir] Universities declared that Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan's attitude has been flouting science and scientists as a result of his explanations."[367]*

The discussions around eight-year mandatory education provide a fruitful path to trace the historic hegemonic center. Just after the MGK memorandum, some deputies from different parties brought a bill for eight-year mandatory education.[368] While the discussions surrounding the issue of mandatory education were continuing, *Milliyet* organized a fund drive. Deniz Baykal supported *Milliyet*'s campaign, the logo of which was a candle and whose motto was as follows: "A Light for Enlightened Future."[369] Various trade unions and associations supported *Milliyet*'s campaign both politically and financially.[370] The plotline of the campaign made it more of a hegemonic than a democratic civil society organization. The military dictated the necessity of eight years of mandatory education. After that a group of parliamentarians introduced a bill, then a newspaper organized a fund drive and an opposition party and various non-governmental organizations, which supported the military's intervention for the overthrow of the government, supported the campaign.

The motives of the historic center were economic as well as ideological. The case of green capital was an informative one for understanding the economic motivations of the historic hegemonic center. Two weeks before the February 28 MGK meeting, *Milliyet* reported that the conservative bourgeoisie were not limited to a few peripheral merchants, but rather that they had started to own large conglomerates.[371] In the period when conservative capital constituted one of the hottest items of the rising reactionary danger debate, many news reports related to investigations against Islamic capital found space in newspapers like this one in *Cumhuriyet*:

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[366] Cumhuriyet, 30.03.1997, p.1.
[367] Cumhuriyet, 25.05.1997, p.5.
[368] Milliyet, 07.02.1997, p.17.
[369] Milliyet, 09.08.1997, p.1.
[370] Milliyet, 13.08.1997, p.1.
[371] Milliyet, 11.02.1997, p.1.

> *"Whilst the chief prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals filed the case with the Constitutional Court, it has been said that the cash flow and resources of conglomerates and private finance institutions that work with Islamic capital and are known to be connected to the RP are under investigation."[372]*

It seemed that these investigations reached a conclusion when *Milliyet* reported that the TSK had created a green capital list and ordered its units to boycott the listed companies and further called on other people and institutions that were sensitive about secularism to boycott them.[373]

The words of Yalçın Doğan from *Milliyet* reflect the center-periphery character of the February 28 Process and the recent expression of the center-periphery cleavage through the public space and ways of life. Doğan's remarks made a further conclusion unnecessary for this issue:

> *"Refah is Everywhere: We may be up against the 'most widespread, most calculated, and most resourceful organization which reaches all segments of the society!' The 'fabulous body', which composes the political existence of the Welfare Party, gradually strikes its roots on a daily basis. The organization, which spreads from sports to the health sector, from the business world to the media, is now right in front of our eyes. Using the advantages of being in power, the RP is rapidly developing in every sphere and in every corner of Turkey."[374]*

The reason the writer of the above lines felt so threatened and targeted, and tried to make his readers feel the same way, was not the rising Islamic influence of the RP or any kind of turning away from republican ideals. Rather, it was the RP's coming to terms with republican ideals and trying to take its space within the play. Using the same logic, the RP would not have been so threatening for the historic center if it had preserved its radical tone also in the government. A RP that isolated itself in its ideological ghetto, did not try to reach wider segments of the society and preferred to talk and act only for its traditional societal base would not be so problematic for the historic hegemonic center, because naturally it would not be an alternative national popular party. Therefore, the story of the RP was the story of "center-alization" of the periphery in Turkey. It was the story of the periphery that started to

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[372] Cumhuriyet, 23.05.1997, p.5.
[373] Milliyet, 06.06.1997, p.1.
[374] Milliyet, Yalçın Doğan, 30.07.1997, p.16.

be seen in the center. The February 28 Process was one of blocking the "center-alization" of the periphery. With the same logic, also AKP was regarded as a threat to the secular character of the republic and the April 27 Process was aimed at stopping the AKP from creating its own conservative national popular.

### 5.2.2. April 27 Process

5.2.2.1. Textual Analysis

The Turkish Armed Forces issued the e-memorandum at midnight on April 27. Newspapers did not have much time to develop a strategy for presenting the memorandum in their April 28 issues. In the limited time period between midnight on April 27 and the early morning of April 28, when newspapers have should begun to be printed, newspaper editors and owners did not have the time to change their developing strategy by negotiating with actors such as the government, the TSK, the bureaucracy and non-governmental organizations on how to present the TSK's clear threat of a coup. Therefore, it is clear that the urgent reaction of the newspapers and, therefore, the newspaper owners, only depended on their general hegemonic positions, which were, of course, directly related to their economic and ideological positions. Although it does not make much difference for the analysis of *Cumhuriyet*'s stance, this urgency makes great sense in the analysis of the textual practices of the newspapers that had a more moderate and middle-way stance in the whole process.

To start with *Sabah*, this newspaper tried to formulate a policy of balancing between the government and the TSK. The TSK's e-memorandum could only find a place in the middle pages of the newspaper.[375] The news report titled "Midnight Notice from General Staff" did not include any commentary about the incident. The editors of *Sabah* found it sufficient to cite the text of the e-memorandum. By choosing the word "notice" instead of "memorandum," it also avoided any connotations of a military intervention in the text of the report. The tendency of *Sabah* was to report the TSK's e-memorandum as if it were an ordinary and natural part of the presidential election process.

In the next day's issue, April 29, although it refrained from opposing the TSK's memorandum, *Sabah* seemed more committed to supporting the government. The headline of the April 29 issue was "No to the Coup: The midnight notice of the Command of the General Staff caused

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[375] Sabah, 28.04.2007, p.29.

a big discussion. Even the opposition, which criticizes the government, united on the point that the only solution is democracy."[376] A cartoon from Salih Memecan also indicated the breadth of the anti-intervention front as reflected by *Sabah*:

Picture 8[377]

In Salih Memecan's cartoon the image of a single man marching military-style in the wrong direction and being warned by somebody else, made *Sabah*'s stance clear. The second major item that found its place on *Sabah*'s front page was government spokesperson Cemil Çicek's counter memorandum to the TSK. Although in the report it also presented Çicek's words that directly targeted the armed forces, in the leading section of the report *Sabah* avoided confrontation with the military and preferred a quotation from Çicek that seemed to represent a general call to all parties: "Let us foil such efforts: Çicek made a call to foil attempts to bring about a confrontation between the government and the command of the General Staff." In this text *Sabah* did not directly criticize the Armed Forces, but merely presented timid support for the government, as if supporting democracy.

Akşam also preferred to place the e-memorandum in its inner pages, rather than in the headlines.[378] The *Akşam* report was titled "Harsh 'Secularism' Warning from the Army" and it focused on the military's threat of direct intervention:

> "The Command of the General Staff indicated that the recent discussion of secularism was being watched with anxiety and said that 'one must not forget the Turkish Armed Forces is a party to these discussions and that it is the absolute defender of secularism.' They will put forward their attitude clearly when it becomes necessary."

[376] Sabah, 29.04.2007, p.1.
[377] Sabah, 29.04.2007, p.1.
[378] Akşam, 28.04.2007, p.11.

Akşam also highlighted the e-memorandum's references to the TSK's expectation of a president who was "really, not fake," *"sözde değil özde"*, in full conformity with the basic principles of the Republic and the military's "stable determination" in protecting the principle of secularism. *Akşam* also focused on the consensus on the e-memorandum among the high ranks of the TSK:

> *"It was done with the approval of all of them: It was found out that the statement that was issued late last night by the Command of the General Staff was done with the approval of all of the force commanders. The force commanders, who met two days ago upon the call of Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt, addressed the discussions that were taking place in the process of the presidential elections. The commanders agreed on making a statement, but they waited for the completion of the first round of the presidential elections."*

Although *Akşam* did not blame the government directly, it supported the e-memorandum. However, *Akşam*'s support changed the next day. On 29 April, *Akşam* adopted a more balanced policy between the government and military and made a call to both parties from its front page with the following headline: "Do Not Ruin This Country: A Call for Common Sense from *Akşam*."[379] *Akşam*'s editor-in-chief, Serdar Turgut, explained the reasons for the newspaper's call in an editorial published on the front page:

> *"Both the parties to the discussion and the opposition parties are afraid that an economic fluctuation will result on Monday (tomorrow) if a compromise is not reached. In fact, this is the most important problem of the Turkish people. People who have not forgotten the pains of the last crisis expect the state to prevent a new crisis. When speaking of the events, many politicians reminded people of those who suddenly became unemployed, the work places that were closed, the sadness that was suffered in the last crisis. The government and the military must not forget this."*

Without making any reference to the arguments of the government or the military, in the second day's coverage *Akşam* warned both the government and military not against the danger of reaction or the danger of military intervention, but against the threat of an economic crisis. It did not seem interested in the first lady's headscarf or the democratization of Turkey,

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[379] Akşam, 29.04.2007, 01.

but in a potential fall in the markets on Monday. Furthermore, the government's counter-memorandum also found its place on the cover page of *Akşam*'s April 29 edition. Quoting spokesperson Cemil Çiçek, *Akşam* highlighted the government's warning to the military as follows:

> *"Implying that you are under our orders: The harsh secularist practice of the Command of the General Staff wreaked havoc on the agenda. Erdoğan, Gül and 10 ministers held an urgent meeting. Minister of Justice Çicek warned General Büyükanıt in front of the cameras: "You are subordinate to the Prime Minister."*

When citing Çiçek's explanation, *Akşam* again emphasized a potential economic crisis and claimed that Çiçek gave the military the following message: "If negative developments emerge in the economy, you are responsible."

Milliyet used the headline "Harsh statement from the Command of the General Staff" when reporting the e-memorandum on its front page on April 28. *Milliyet*'s first page coverage was devoted to the key parts of the e-memorandum. There was also another report on the inner pages, but it was neutral and did not include any commentary.[380] On the other hand, *Milliyet*'s coverage on April 29 was rich in terms of comments that gave clues about *Milliyet*'s stance. Parallel to the first day's headline, *Milliyet*'s chose "Harsh response from the government" for the second day's report on the first page. What was illuminating in *Milliyet*'s coverage for the second day was the editorial that was published anonymously on the front page:

> *"When holding an election for such a sensitive office, which should embrace everybody, seeking a compromise as wide as possible was required by common sense. Taking such care would be the most effective behavior to prevent the country from entering the territorial waters of tension. It is obvious that the party in power has failed to manage this process well. The AKP, which won 2/3 of the seats in the parliament with only 34% of the votes of those who voted in the election, has managed the presidential election as it liked with the understanding that "the majority has the power over all things" and it refrained from dialogue with the main opposition party. In this process, the fact that "being religious" could be defined as a criterion for the competence of the president has been a sad situation for a secular country."[381]*

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[380] Milliyet, 28.04.2007, p.24.
[381] Milliyet, 29.04.2007, p1.

It is clear that *Milliyet* saw the government's approach as more problematic than the e-memorandum, which it continued to support.

Cumhuriyet reported the e-memorandum in a headline on its front page on April 28 as follows: "Statement from the Military: Command of the General Staff: the Turkish Armed Forces is a party to and defender of secularism. It will put forward its attitude clearly when necessary."[382] *Cumhuriyet* was the only newspaper that reported the TSK's threat of military intervention as a highlight on its front page. Other key points of the e-memorandum, according to *Cumhuriyet*, were as follows: "Nobody Should Doubt," "It is Serious That Precautions Were Not Taken," and "We Shall Fulfill Our Duty." Such a formulation and presentation of the key points of the e-memorandum highlighted the TSK's threat of direct military intervention.

What made *Cumhuriyet*'s stance peculiar among the other newspapers was its (non)presentation of the government's response to the e-memorandum. While other newspapers preferred to highlight the government's response, *Cumhuriyet* reported it as an unimportant detail. The highlight of *Cumhuriyet*'s 29 April edition was "Ankara is Tense: The Statement of the Command of the General Staff Has Put the Government in Trouble, the Opposition Has Demanded Elections."[383] The government's response could only find its place as follows:

> "The statement of the Command of the General Staff caused hectic hours in
> Ankara. Prime Minister Erdoğan assessed the situation after meeting with
> Abdullah Gül and other ministers. Cemil Çiçek, who explained the opinions of
> the government, asserted that the warnings were aimed at influencing the
> decision making process of the Supreme Court and said that 'the Command of
> the General Staff is subordinate to the Prime Minister.' TBMM Speaker Arınç
> pointed out: 'The Turkish Armed Forces are expressing their sensitivity
> regarding secularism. This is very natural.'"

Cumhuriyet was reluctant in reporting the government's response to the TSK, but it was not nearly so hesitant in its discursive practices.

5.2.2.2. Discursive Practices

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[382] Cumhuriyet, 28.04.2007, p.1.
[383] Cumhuriyet, 29.04.2007, p.1.

Just as in the case of the February 28 process, there were also three grand narratives that were used for the mobilization of urban middle classes against the ruling AKP during this process: (1) Good vs. Bad Muslims, (2) Moderate and Creeping Islamization and, finally, (3) sudden Islamic revolution.

5.2.2.2.1 Good vs. Bad Muslims

Republican Rallies took pride of place in the reproduction of the discursive distinction between good and bad Muslims, sincere and show-off Muslims, Anatolian and Arab Muslims in the April 27 Process:

> *"The participants responded to the words of Prime Minister Erdoğan, who had referred to 'Infidel Izmir,' with placards such as 'Infidel Izmir will put the false Muslims in their place.'"*

Picture 9[384]

A clear distinction between good and bad Muslims can be seen in the report and in the accompanying image. As an example of good Muslims, the old lady with her traditional headscarf and the Turkish flag she held stood against the false Muslim referred to in the text. Furthermore, the resemblance between the old woman with her traditional headscarf and the

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[384] Sabah, 14.05.2007, 24.

Turkish flag she held and Mustafa Kemal's mother, Zübeyde Hanım, whose image that can be seen on the left-hand side of the same photo, is also noteworthy as a discursive practice.

> *"It attracted attention that among the participants in the rally in Manisa were women who wore turbans, as in Ankara and Istanbul, with Atatürk posters in their hands."*

Picture 10[385]

The woman above with her black headscarf entirely overlaps with the image of a woman that could easily have been shown in *Akşam*, or any other newspaper covered in the study, as the image of a woman that was attending a "Shariah-supporting, reactionary" rally. Had she been at such a rally, her clothing would be defined as a black chador. But, because she attended a Republican Rally, she did not threaten the secular character of the Republic.

The chief motif in the background of the Republican Rallies was reduced to the issue of the covering of women's bodies and this issue was politicized through the libidinousness of bad Muslims. The two excerpts below from the same column were good examples of this politicization and its connection with bad Muslims:

> *"A young girl from among one of my university students said this about the Çağlayan rally: 'It was a packed crowd. There were no incidents of harassment for hours. I did not even feel a single symptom. On the contrary ...*

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[385] Akşam, 06.05.2007, 15.

the young men around us almost protected us, a group of young girls. [...]Remember the Taksim Square scandal four months ago. What kinds of things those lumpen bums did to the young women in that crowd. Both the people in Taksim and those in Çağlayan are the people of this land but ... the consciousness and culture of the gatherings are very different. For those who cannot find a name for the flood of people in Çağlayan, this is called: 'The Notice of the Unarmed Forces.'[...] In the rally square, CNN Turk reporters were walking among the people and asking for their opinions. One of them had covered her head as Turkish women have done for centuries. That is, she had tied a knot under her chin. The reporter asked: 'Slogans such as 'Çankaya is closed to the turban' are being shouted. You cover your head, too, but you are at the rally. Why?' The covered woman replied: 'I wear a headscarf, but it is not political or anything.'"[386]

As someone turns into a bad Muslim once engaged in politics, the headscarf also becomes the sign of a bad Muslim when it is worn at Çankaya, in the presidential residence of the Republic. On the other hand, it is the traditional and innocent cloth of Turkish women when it is worn at Republican rallies. Not surprisingly, when good Muslims wore good headscarves at Republican rallies, it was impossible to come across any sexual harassment.

The distinction between the sincere Muslims and those who exploit such people was the chief motif in the analyses and comments on the AKP and presidential election process, as in this piece[387] from Orhan Erinç:

> *"Since it is known that nobody would object to those citizens who can be defined as 'dininde diyanetinde,'[388] the effort to have "sıkmabaş" [a derogatory term for a type of head covering that does not show any part of the hair or neck] perceived in the same way was intensified in order to take advantage of this."*

The term *"dininde diyanetinde"* had a key role in the effectiveness of this discourse. As mentioned in the piece, nobody objects to those who are *"dininde diyanetinde."* A person defined as *"dininde diyanetinde"* is someone religious who strictly follows religious instructions. What makes a *"dininde diyanetinde"* individual different from a reactionary is the domain in which religion becomes effective. For a *"dininde diyanetinde"* individual,

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[386] Milliyet, Güneri Civaoğlu, 01.05.2007, p.19.
[387] Cumhuriyet, Orhan Erinç, 07.05.2007, p.7.
[388] A term used for defining the Kemalist ideal type of a religious individual who only concentrates on his/her religious life and is not interested in any kind of worldly issue.

religion is a matter of personal belief, conscience and personal ethics, while, for a reactionary, it also includes the social, political and economic domains. Therefore, those who did not limit their actions to the boundaries of *"din-diyanet"* or those who were also interested in political activity, e.g. candidacy for presidential elections, were met with criticism and disapproval.

Seemingly unrelated reports or comments that did not directly refer to the presidential election, but implicitly connected to conservative politics in other ways, were also used as supporting pillars of the good and bad Muslim discourse. Religion, i.e. good religion, was the one that was reformed or modernized:

> *"Atatürk was not content with this [Turkish translation of the Quran] either. He had artists named Fahire Fersan and Refik Fersan read these chapters for gramophone records and had them distributed across the country. Those who have a mullah's mind have a lot to learn from Atatürk with regard to 'religion' and 'secularism.' If this attempt by Atatürk had been completed, if the process of becoming contemporary through enlightenment had continued, maybe we would not have been still discussing secularism."[389]*

According to this discourse there was always something, some modern components, absent in religion and this absence should have been filled by Atatürk's attempts at creating a Turkish Islam. Furthermore, the usage of *mullah,* i.e. the religious functionary in Shiite Islam, functions as a reference to the theme of the Iranization of Turkey. Although bad Muslims and those who were exploited by bad Muslims frustrated the plans of Atatürk, there is still some chance for this, such as a technological articulation of religion:

> *"Imam Özdemir, who made the Kemalpaşa Mosque in Izmir leap forward by an era, doubled the number of people in his congregation. The imam, who puts a laptop on the rahle [a small table for holding the Quran], preaches digitally using a wireless microphone."[390]*

The missing part of the religion, in terms of being modern, was filled by the use of a remote microphone and a laptop. The major reason for the "leaping forward by an era" of the mosque was the replacement of the Quran, which is normally put on the *rahle*, with the laptop. *Cumhuriyet* would regard this replacement as a threat to secularism because positivist

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[389] Milliyet, Güneri Civaoğlu, 06/02/2007, p.17.
[390] Milliyet, 31/03/2007, p.20.

ideology is more hardcore in *Cumhuriyet*'s discourse, as in a 1996 news report titled, "*Quran on the computer: fundamentalist aggression toward secularism.*"[391]

In other cases, the absence of modernity in the religion was filled not by a modern addition, but by the exclusion of some traditional element, as in the case of supposed Mevlevis:

> "*Again striking questions came from young people in the program in which Rumi was discussed in all aspects. Why was the head of Esin Hanım, the granddaughter of Rumi and someone close to religion, uncovered? Is the Mevleviyet a sufi order? [...] How did Atatürk see the Mevlevis? Here are some headings for you from this different program:*
> *- The Mevlevis were among the greatest supporters of the War of Liberation. They were awarded with the Medal of Independence with a green ribbon. Abdülhalim Çelebi was a deputy of Mustafa Kemal in the first parliament.*
> *- Covering is a matter of personal preference. Judging people based on their clothes is the biggest of mistakes.*
> *- One should not see the Mevleviyet as a sufi order. This is a path, a way of life, a custom, a culture.*"[392]

Where there was no modern inclusion and no abandonment of a traditional element, the good and sincere Muslim could only exist as a nostalgic case:

> "*We are in the month of Ramadan. We have innumerable iftar [Ramadan dinner] invitations in front of us. The religious information that I received in my childhood taught me that iftar was observed with the family or that it was provided to the poor. However, now the iftars of today are offered as a political show.*"[393]

Only the traditional Anatolian village was the location of the pure, sincere Muslim. Religiosity that was expressed within the limits of the pastoral life of Anatolian tradition was sanctified, whereas the same religious expressions in urban life were disapproved of. Any kind of religious expression that was brought to the city was not reconcilable with the positivist understanding of religion, because religion was regarded as something that was only suitable to the primitiveness of the pastoral life.

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[391] See note 277.
[392] Milliyet, Abbas Güçlü, 09.02.2007, p.19.
[393] Milliyet, Can Ataklı, 08.02.2007, p.16.

Although the conservative political actors were not a part of the imagined category of "Anatolian religion," the masses who were good Muslims were a part of it and, of course, it was only because of being deceived by the bad Muslims that those good Anatolian Muslims voted for the AKP:

> "While rightfully reacting to the people who politicize Islam and politicize the headscarf, some people started to move this away from the axis of the AKP and began to insult Islam and the headscarf. This attitude offends the sincere Muslims and those citizens who wear the headscarf because of their beliefs. This attitude may push those people, who do not like the AKP, toward the AKP and make them fall out with the country."[394]

In conformity with the discourse of the politicization of Islam, any expression of Islam that went beyond the limits of personal life was disapproved of and regarded as an act of bad Muslims. The AKP, i.e. bad Muslims, deformed the elements that characterized traditional Anatolian Islam and put foreign factors both from the East and the West in their place:

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
[394] Milliyet, Melih Aşık, 01.05.2007, p.12.

Picture 11[395]

The first message of this image was related to the religiosity of the AKP, which was entirely different from the religiosity of the Anatolian people, the sincere Muslims. They did not worship God as the traditional, sincere Muslims of Anatolia. They worshipped the USA, the EU and the PKK and exploited the religious feelings of genuine Muslims.

Besides the general distinction between the good and bad Muslim, there were other themes and characteristics that were used to support the image of the bad Muslim. What is important for these sub-themes is that the categories of good and bad Muslims were generated as holistic categories at the discursive level. Therefore, any act that corresponded to one of the sub-themes automatically implied that the perpetrator belonged to the category as a whole.

Women were at the forefront among these sub-themes. The discourse about the bad treatment of women by bad Muslims, the womanizing character of bad Muslims, and the subordinate position of women against bad Muslim men were the frequently used elements for the women theme. Like the general category of good and bad Muslims, the women sub-theme was also generated both by specific references to the presidential election process and by the more general references to conservative politics and actors. In accordance with the historical perception that the Republic was represented by a young lady, whereas the bad Muslims were deceivers of the young lady,[396] any reference to sexuality in the frame of the presidential elections gains a discursive dimension, as in the front-page cartoon shown below:

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[395] Cumhuriyet, 05.07.2007, p.17.
[396] For an analysis of the usage a female personification of the Republic, see; Kara, İ. Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam, p. 26.

Picture 12[397]

This cartoon, which was published before Gül's election, depicts the construction of a *harem* at the residence of the president. Then-president Sezer asks the first lady whether she has any information about the construction of the *harem*. Literally, *harem* means forbidden. In the context of housing, it means the part of the house that is used by women and forbidden to male strangers. As a discursive element, construction of a *harem* makes references to the womanizing character of bad Muslims in accordance with the orientalist image of the Ottoman Imperial Harem, which is thought of as a place full of women whose only task was to fulfill the Sultan's sexual desires.

It is interesting to see that the historic hegemonic center's perception of the AKP-oriented president is close to the orientalist painters' image of the *harem*. As in the case of the categories of good and bad Muslims, the Islamic good treatment of women was something that could not be seen in modern life, only in the ruins of history:

> *"In the Selçuk state, mayors were always women. They were called "hatun." Wine was drunk at the meals and banquets. Human figures were also used in the decorations of the mosques. Omar Hayyam was able to continue his life by moving from Iran to the Selçuk regime. The Selçuk state experienced*

enlightenment long before the West. The Selçuk state created Anatolian Islam.”[398]

Staying within the limits of the text, it is very easy to see how enlightenment was understood and what were considered as its inevitable components or indicators. According to the text, because of the participation of women in politics, alcohol consumption and the usage of the human image in the decoration of mosques, the Selçuks experienced enlightenment earlier than the West. Also, the enlightenment that the Selçuks experienced made their interpretation of religion legitimate and this legitimate version of Islam is called "Anatolian Islam". At this point, the concentration of Kemalist romanticism and fantasy on Anatolia should be noted.

Although tales of sexual abuse were not as widespread as in the February 28 Process, it was also possible to came across the libidinous character of bad Muslims:

> *"A married imam deceived three young girls by sending the message 'I am seeking serious girls who are considering marriage' on TV in subtitles”[399]*

At first sight the news seemed to be the report of a criminal act. However, upon closer investigation, the report was referring to the deception of Fadime Şahin by Müslüm Gündüz during the February 28 Process. According to the discourse, a bad Muslim could not see anything else but a sex object whenever he looked at a woman, even if she wore a headscarf:

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[398]Milliyet, Melih Aşık, 03.06.2007, p.19.
[399]Sabah, 17.01.2007, p.1.

Picture 13[400]

While normally accused of being a bad Muslim and part of the rising reactionary danger, a woman who wears the headscarf can at the same become the victim of male bad Muslims. According to this, women do not wear a headscarf of their free will, but are forced by their fathers and brothers to do so. This overlaps with the deception of good Muslims – women who wear the headscarf but do not actually want to do so - by bad Muslims; in this case, their fathers and brothers:

> "Those women in sıkmabaş[401] were married off by their fathers when they were 15 and had to drop out of high school, could not go to Nevizade Street,[402] the cinema, the theatre, listen to jazz with their girlfriends all their lives. They were not seen with a glass of wine in their hands even once, they did not swim in the sea with a swimsuit."[403]

Amongst these sub-themes, the issue of dishonesty has a key role. According to this sub-theme, dishonesty was a *sine qua non* of the bad Muslim identity, whereas honesty was a key characteristic of good Muslims and, therefore, any bad Muslim who ran for the presidential election should prove his\her honesty:

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[400] Cumhuriyet, 14.07.2007, p.3.
[401] A derogatory term for the headscarf.
[402] One of the popular scenes of Istanbul's night life.
[403] Cumhuriyet, Hikmet Çetinkaya, 21.08.2007, p.4.

"Recep Tayyip Erdoğan [...] is determined to become a candidate for the presidency. This is his preference… and his right as a citizen. But he has to convince the nation before becoming a candidate that he has nothing to do with these 'sufi order' rumors. With his actions and discourse… This cannot be done by having billboards prepared "from the state coffers" and by saying 'may I be sacrificed for its crescent and the star.'"[404]

The connection with Sufi orders was again used as an identity marker that fit into the bad Muslim category. This time Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's potential candidacy for the presidential office was opposed due to presumed ties to the Sufi community. Furthermore, the claim that the prime minister used state resources for his personal campaign adds the element of dishonesty to the discourse. The stress on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's need to prove, both with his words and acts, that he was not linked with Sufi orders is a good indicator of the period's frequently used discourse of fake and real secularists.

The themes of Sufi orders and the deception of good Muslims for economic and political ends recurred frequently in the process, as seen above. By definition the bad and disapproved version of Islam was not authentic; it was not a belief derived from the original core of Islam, but manufactured by conservative politics in order to exploit the religious feelings of sincere Muslims for political ends:

"In the Prophet Muhammad's period there were no Sufi orders or religious communities...
such skills were invented later on...
The money that is off the books that appeared after the multi party period in Turkey is not accounted for...
Because both Sufi orders and religious communities are economic interest organizations at the end of the day...
So, when we say democracy and elections, what happens in the end?...
Will the members of sufi orders or religious communities vote with their free will and according to their political-economic positions and ideas?...
Or will the members vote according to the will of their sheikhs?..."[405]

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[404] Sabah, Hincal Uluç, 07.02.2007, p.19.
[405] Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 02.06.2007, p.2.

By stressing the multi-party shift in Turkish politics as a turning point in the exploitation of religion for political and economic gains, the writer again referred to another representation of religiosity which exceeded the limits of being *"dininde diyanetinde."* With the normalization that took place during the multi-party shift in Turkish politics, religion became the object of political bargaining and negotiation processes, which was regarded as an absolute deviation from the positivist understanding of religion. Furthermore, the same trend of being the object of political bargaining and negotiation was not only regarded as a deviation from the authentic Islam, but also as a deviation from the authentic Turkish Islam, Anatolian Islam:

> *"The AKP is the name of a political movement which attempts to inject some imported and invented religious behaviors that do not exist in the Anatolian Islam tradition, saying "this is who we are!" to some Western people and institutions that are ignorant of Turkey and with the slum-dwellers that leave the villages but cannot become urbanized either by wrapping it up with political ambition and with the political and bureaucratic support of a greedy bourgeoisie."[406]*

Once bad Muslims are concerned, any usage of money must contain a hidden catch. In the example quoted below, the problem was not the way bad Muslims, the NGO that was linked with a Sufi order, gain money, but the way they used it. Normally funding needy students is an approved act, but when bad Muslims do it is not and it also makes the funding Muslim community bad Muslims, members of Sufi orders:

> *"Mesudiye mayor Ahmet Baki Yılmaz said that Mesvak was connected with the Sufi order that is also known as "Süleymancı"[407] and that they [the municipality circles] were disturbed by the small courses that this organization had opened in recent years. He said that in relation to these courses, deeper Sufi order links were provided to the students under the guise of scholarships."[408]*

The dishonesty was also associated with the conservative politicians with the help of the claim that they were hiding their real aims and their real outlook:

> *"Some words are striking, they irk you...*

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[406] Cumhuriyet, Erendüz Atasü, 17.05.2007, 2.
[407] A Turkish religious community that mostly concentrated its efforts on religious education.
[408] Sabah, 15.02.2007, 16.

For example, two words:

Fraud ...

Deceptiveness...

Both are the same thing!...

Yet in today's Turkey, the religious people who claim to be Muslims are engaged

in deception by exploiting sacred values..."[409]

It is very clear that conservative politicians were not regarded as Muslims, but as people who pretend to be Muslims in order to use the advantage of being a Muslim, to gain political support due to the high value attached to being a Muslim. Furthermore, the ultimate aim of this was personal interest, which is contrary to Islam:

"The rule of the AKP has turned into theft, bribery, exploitation, deception,

corruption, opportunism, and dirty tricks of embezzlement that has not been seen

before...

son-in-laws..

nephews..

sons...

[the rule of the AKP turned into the rule of] people of takiyye, in the mobilization

of kin and relatives!...

Is it these people who are Muslims?...

These are people who use sacred Islam to rob the country, to sell it to foreigners

and for embezzlement from state resources...

These people are the enemies of Islam...

These are tricksters who use being a Muslim for their dirty politics..."[410]

Besides the claim of dishonesty attributed to bad Muslims, any kind of wealth or money-related issue was also designated as a negative characteristic for the bad Muslims. Anybody can have a lot of money and spend it in any way, but not a Muslim, because Islam and wealth cannot be reconciled, as one belongs to the sphere of conscience and the other to the world:

"Those who want to live close to the leader of the İsmailağa community[411] or

the mosque in Istanbul Çarsamba are paying TL 100-135 more in rent. The

houses that are on sale cost TL 20,000 more.[...] A house of 240 square meters,

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[409] Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 09.06.2007, p.2.

[410] Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 06.04.2007, p.2.

[411] One of the largest Nakshibendi groups in Istanbul.

which belongs to Fatih Talu, who is one of the teachers of the community, is on

sale for TL 500,000 without any bargaining."[412]

One of the basic rules of the market was at work, but it was presented as something extraordinary and unexpected. The extraordinary and unexpected character of the case was due to the work of market rules for a Muslim community. According to the positivist Kemalist understanding, market rules were not expected to work in a Muslim community because the former was mundane, whereas the latter was other-worldly. The religious community mentioned in the report, which is one of the most widespread Naksibendi groups in Turkey, was a good tool for distinguishing bad Muslims.

Violence was another sub-theme that was utilized during the process as a negative characteristic of bad Muslims. Two cases that were given as examples of rising reactionary danger in the military's e-memorandum were derived from newspapers and were examples of the violence discourse:

> *"The children who appeared on the stage with uniforms and headscarves in the*
>
> *Holy Birth[413] Conference sang devotional songs. Men and women in the*
>
> *audience were segregated in the hall."[414]*

In the report being referred to, an effective element of discourse is used: the uniform. The uniform evokes a linkage with the army that will be used for the declaration of Shariah. The typical usage of the uniform as a discursive element was to point out its appearance on the bodyguards of the conservative politicians, as presented in the previous chapters. Also, the existence of children as part of the discourse made it more effective, because it addressed the discourse of creeping Islamization. By working on children, bad Muslims slowly steal the enlightened future of the Republic:

> *"It was disclosed that children were brainwashed every morning in the al-*
>
> *Qaida home named 'Adayış Child Club' in Konya. The chidren, who are*
>
> *between the ages of four and seven, are made to swear an oath saying, 'I will*
>
> *become a martyr for jihad' [...] The 'oath' that is recited at the kindergarten*
>
> *named ADAYIŞ is like the philosophy of the al-Qaida organization. Each*
>
> *morning, the children are forced to swear an oath saying 'keeping my promises,*

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[412] Milliyet, 28.05.2007, 01.
[413] Celebrations of the Prophet Muhammed's birthday.
[414] Milliyet, 24.04.2007, 23.

sacrificing my existence for the cause, for the sake of Allah' instead of saying,

'I am a Turk, I am truthful.'"[415]

The Quran Course Oath is an example of the cult theme in newspaper reports on religious reaction. In this example, the location of the oath, Konya, which is known as a conservative city, and the international group al-Qaida were two supporting and refreshing factors that updated the cult theme for 2007, just a few months before the presidential elections.

The usage of the violence sub-theme in the April 27 Process was not limited to being one of the inspirational sources of the e-memorandum. In 2006 and 2007 Turkey witnessed a series of ultra-nationalist murders. First, on 5 February, 2006, the catholic priest of the Santa Maria Church in Trabzon was murdered. After that, a Turkish national Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink, who was on trial accused of insulting Turkish identity, was murdered on 19 January, 2007. The most violent of these ultra-nationalist murders was the Zirve Publishing House massacre in Malatya, in which two German and one Turkish catholic missionaries were murdered. All of these murders were the results of a stream of ultra-nationalist sentiment that escalated in opposition to the ruling AKP. However newspapers were also very effective in establishing a rising danger of reaction on the basis of the murders of Hrant Dink and missionaries in Malatya just before the presidential election:[416]

> *"Hizballah-Style Execution: In Malatya a group that raided a publisher that distributes Bibles tied the hands of three people, one of whom was a German, behind their backs on a chair and cut their throats. The manner of the execution brought Hizballah to mind, but there are still doubts as to the circumstances behind the incident."[417]*

> *"The brutality in Malatya drew attention to the latest meeting of the National Security Council. The latest NSC statement had emphasized that 'the activities of the terror organization of Hizballah and the measures taken against it were reviewed.'"[418]*

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[415] Akşam, 17.03.2007, p.1.

[416] Etyen Mahcupyan, a Turkish national Armenian journalist, was one of those who pointed out the manipulation of the ultra-nationalist murders against the ruling AKP: Mahcupyan, E. "Hrant's Parasites," Today's Zaman, February 2, 2012, accessed March 26, 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-270333-hrants-parasites.html

[417] Akşam, 19.04.2007, p.1.

[418] Akşam, 19.04.2007, p.14.

Although the examples cited above made reference to the violence of bad Muslims, they did not link the murders to the presidential elections. However, in other cases the presidential election and other political elements were clearly present:

"Turkey is ruled by the government of a prime minster who says 'secularism and being a Muslim do not belong together, you can either be secularist or a Muslim' and 'Hitler was secular too.' In the ruling period of this government, religion is constantly a material of trade and an excuse to boast. The speaker of the parliament is bragging, saying, 'We will elect a religious president.' He is dividing the society into religious and non-religious people...
As you push secularism to the side, of course you remove religious toleration as well... Of course religious toleration gets replaced by religious fanaticism, especially in less developed minds. These pawns are then easily manipulated. The murders of Priest Santoro and Hrant Dink and the Malatya murders are a result of this climate and environment."[419]

"Former chairman of the Imam-Hatip Graduates and Members Association İbrahim Solmaz said the following:
'There are drugs and prostitution in all schools except the imam-hatip schools!'
This education system is producing a mass that can elect someone who thinks everybody other than himself is a prostitute and a junkie. Then people get 'agitated,' as you know, then people get burned and lynched, as you know."[420]

Grand narratives regarding bad Muslims were used as constructive elements in the above-mentioned excerpts in which political elements were explicitly used. In the first excerpt, religion's treatment as a matter of pride was perceived as a deviation from secularism and presented as the reason for the murders of Priest Santoro and Hrant Dink and the Malatya Incident. Less developed minds were the key element in the causal relationship. Religion is perceived as something that belongs to less developed minds. However, once it was made a matter of pride, it exceeded the limits of less developed minds and as a result it became the reason for the above-mentioned murders. In the second excerpt, the word "agitation," "*galeyan*," was the constructive element which established the link with the grand narratives. The stress on burning people was a reference to the Sivas Incident.

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[419] Milliyet, Melih Aşık, 20.04.2007, p.17.
[420] Milliyet, Ece Temelkuran, 06.06.2007, p.15.

"When the Sufi order-supported feudal culture takes over Turkey:

- there are no values, no rule left in the society.

- people want to solve problems through violence, even murder. [...]

Who are those who condition the voters by intertwining urban looting and

religious education and those who surrender Turkey to the feudal slum culture

which is supported by the assistance of the Sufi orders?

Those who sacrifice the intellectuals to the hit men?"[421]

The writer claimed that conservative political actors acquired their position with the help of the Sufi orders and that the reason the Sufi orders were so successful in building this kind of influence over the electorate was the poverty of the sincere Muslims and their lack of education. Once a relationship between the Sufi orders and conservative political actors was constructed, the establishment of a relationship between the Sufi orders and violence was the easy part, as has already been addressed in the beginning of this section. In the end, the whole set of relationships was connected to "the murder of the intellectuals." The theme of "the murder of the intellectuals" was updated with the murder of Hrant Dink:

"A note was recorded in his personal records that the head of the intelligence

department, Ramazan Akyürek, who became the focus of the instigator-informant

debates after the Hrant Dink murder, was a 'supporter of Fethullah Gülen' when

he was the deputy director of İstanbul's security."[422]

"I don't know if eyes will open after the murder of Hrant Dink.

Will the murderers be found?

If they are found, what will happen?

The murderers who bombed Cumhuriyet were caught after they raided the

Council of State and committed murder. What happened?... Nothing... The

catching of the hit men did not solve anything. Where is the solution?... In this

question: Are you aware of the danger?" [423]

"[writing about the Hrant Dink murder investigation] However there are claims

that the teams conducting the investigation have faced obstruction ... and even

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[421] Cumhuriyet, Emre Kongar, 05.02.2007, p.3.

[422] Cumhuriyet, 01.02.2007, p.5.

[423] Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 21/01/2007, p.2. "Are You Aware of the Danger?" was the slogan of Cumhuriyet's widely circulated campaign both through newspapers and television channels with the claim that the Republic was in danger under AKP's rule

that they could not get the necessary support. The role of Sufi orders organizing in the security institutions is also implied!"[424]

According to above quoted lines, Sufi orders and conservative actors were associated with violence in general and the Dink murder in particular.

The violence sub-theme as a characteristic was also generated without any reference to actual discussions of the presidential election process. Although they did not contain any references to the political discussions of the period, they reproduced the theme with supporting elements:

"[...] Because of a 'foster mother' scandal in one of the largest child care centers in Istanbul, the 'religion teacher' who was the group official was dismissed. The job contracts of three 'foster mothers' were cancelled."[425]

The report was titled, "the guilty one is the religion teacher". The report was about maltreatment in a childcare center. At the end of the investigation three foster mothers who were found to have engaged in maltreatment and a supervisor who was a religion teacher were dismissed. However, in the title and body of the report the religion teacher was presented as the perpetrator of the maltreatment, with a special focus on his or her area of expertise: religion.

The linkage with a Sufi order was a functional tool that was also activated for the sub-theme of violence:

"Gülden, who is the wife of municipality employee Hasan Akkaya, said, 'My husband was in a Sufi order for 13 years. Recently he wanted to leave, but they did not let him. Every day he was asking for his past wrongdoings and mistakes to be forgiven when leaving the house [as one would do in the Islamıc tradition when one thinks that death might be imminent]. The Sufi order gave the punishment of abstaining from eating. He did not eat for 20 days."[426]

With the claim that leaving was not possible, Sufi community membership was presented as a one-way path. With the help of this one-way path, Sufi community membership was equated with the mafia, which it is also not possible to leave. On the other hand, people were

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[424] Cumhuriyet, 06/02/2007, p.1.
[425] Milliyet, 07/02/2007, p.4.
[426] Sabah, 13.01. 2007, p.20.

estranged from the Sufi communities, which were presented as so powerful as to be able to force an individual to not eat for 20 days.

As a result of rising nationalism during the April 27 Period, another good-bad discourse was generated which was not on the scene during the February 28 Process. In accordance with the "fake and real seculars," "*sözde ve özde laikler,*" which was used by Chief of General Staff Büyükanıt in his explanations about the real and fake secularists, a similar real/fake discourse was generated for everything:

> "*Büyükanıt said, "I hope that a person who is attached to the basic values of the republic, who is really attached to the ideal of a secular, democratic and social state of law, but attached to this in the real sense, not just in words, and who reflects this in his behavior, will be elected as president*"[427]

> "*What our fake intellectuals, fake professors and fake scientists do not know or do not want to know is that the number of real Atatürkist people who will put them in their place and who will confront those who make efforts to turn our country into a 'outdated' and 'backward' state by separating our country from his principles and revolutions is not insignificant at all!*"[428]

The lion's share in the real/fake discourse was held by nationalism. Traditionally, nationalism has been the ideology of the right. As such, left wing actors, which *Cumhuriyet* considered itself to be, used to distance themselves from nationalism. However, from the April 27 Process onward, nationalism has become one of the major elements of the Kemalist discourse. At that point, the Kemalist circles needed to differentiate themselves from the traditional religiously conservative nationalist line, *milliyetçilik* in Turkish, and, therefore, they preferred using the term *ulusalcılık*. Literally, both terms have the same meaning, but in the political arena *ulusalcılık* corresponded to a more secular, anti-EU and anti-USA form of nationalism.[429] Due to the emergence of *ulusalcılık* as a distinct and influential political discourse, the composition of traditional nationalism, *milliyetçilik*, as it was perceived by the Kemalist circles has changed. Reactionary elements which are associated with the bad Muslims were also attributed to the bad nationalists:

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[427] Cumhuriyet, 13.04.2007, p.1.
[428] Cumhuriyet, Hüner Tuncer, 02.01.2007, p.2.
[429] For more information about ulusalcılık, see; Uslu, E. (2008). "Ulusalcılık: The Neo-nationalist Resurgance in Turkey," *Turkish Studies*, 9(1), 73-97.

> *"The fact is, apart from the efforts of some to present 'ulusalcılık' as equivalent to nationalism and racism in order to destroy the concept of national interest [...], mutual influence on the basis of religion, sects, Sufi orders, and customs have more weight in the rising nationalism and chaos of concepts."*[430]

Hrant Dink's murder, which was actually a result and, at the same time, an indicator of rising nationalism, produced a paradoxical position for *Cumhuriyet*. Normally, by claiming that the AKP government was weak in defending national interests against minorities, including Armenians, who were supported by the EU and the USA according to *Cumhuriyet*, the newspaper positioned itself on the nationalist front. However, after the murder, *Cumhuriyet* made an effort to differentiate itself from the nationalists. At that point the discourse of the violent character of the bad Muslims was a life vest for *Cumhuriyet*:

> *"Some people want to drag Turkey toward a 'blind nationalist line' ... [...] Köfte-maker*[431] *Nihat Acar in Gelibolu is lumpen and he has nothing to do with patriotism. He is a religionist, nationalist and fascist like the hit man and instigator of the Hrant Dink murder. [...] In this country, it is very easy to find a lumpen hit man, an action man who says "homeland-nation" ... Let us desist from picking on each other, making fun of the real patriots...don't forget that every socialist, every revolutionary is a patriot!"*[432]

Supporting the rising nationalism and generating a discourse on nationalism also had certain side effects: a series of ultra-nationalist murders, such as the murders of Hrant Dink and Priest Santora and the Malatya murders. In order to overcome this side effect, the real/fake nationalism discourse was activated:

> *"A campaign of conflating concepts and hitting below the belt is being conducted using the Hrant Dink murder. For example, there is an intense effort to conflate the concepts of 'murderer' and 'ulusalcı.' Can a murderer who is the man of fascists or the pawn of imperialists be an 'ulusalcı'?[...] Ulusalcılık is republicanism, secularism, Atatürkism and independence... It is an anti-imperialist attitude."*[433]

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[430] Cumhuriyet, Şükran Soner, 13.03.2007, p.13.
[431] Köfte is a traditional Turkish meal.
[432] Cumhuriyet, Mustafa Balbay, 31.01.2007, 5.
[433] Milliyet, Melih Aşık, 26.10.2007, p.15.

Once the causal relationship between murders and ultra-nationalism was nullified with a self-evident argument, the next task was to relate murders and rising nationalism with religious reaction, i.e. the bad Muslims:

> *"Two racisms are unfortunately escalating by feeding off each other... 'Reaction' and 'racism...' Do not narrow the angle by thinking that one is less dangerous than the other. It would be useful to take a look at the discussions of 'Is the danger facing Turkey racism or reaction?' from this perspective."*[434]

Intra-state criminal organizations were the other undesirable components of *ulusalcılık* and they were, therefore, also positioned on the same side as the bad nationalists:

> *"A 'patriotic forces union' has been talked about for some time.*
> *At the moment, 21 people have been detained and 15 people have been arrested...*
> *Who are these people? What do they do?*
> *In the operations, false soldier IDs, drivers licenses, yellow press cards, weapons, bullets and bombs were seized...*
> *It is definite that these people are in a religionist-fascist structure...*
> *Their job is working in a militia...*
> *The job of collecting checks, bonds!!... [...]*
> *There is a religionist fascist structure in this matter, but an "ulusalcı" identity is presented for the incident and, thereby, the real patriots, Atatürkists, are being blamed for whatever reason..."*[435]

Once those undesirable characteristics of *ulusalcılık* were attributed to traditional nationalism, which was already a bad category, it was easier to associate them all with the AKP and bad Muslims:

> *"The proof that this current of Turkish-Islam synthesis, which pushes citizens into a marginal position, which is being built on the basis of the cemaat, which includes the Sufi orders, which completely contradicts the Atatürkist nation-state concept, in which religionism and racism are intertwined, has nothing to do with*

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[434] Milliyet, Güneri Civaoğlu, 13.03.2007, p.17.
[435] Cumhuriyet, Hikmet Çetinkaya, 10.07.2007, p.13.

the Atatürkist nationalist current is that AKP was first in the listing of the most nationalist parties among those who participated in Milliyet's survey.''[436]

The real/fake nationalist discourse was also visible in *Milliyet*'s coverage in conformity with the rising nationalism of the period:

"As is known, the shame bill, (sorry, the oil law) that was returned by President Sezer had passed from the parliament with the votes of the AKP parliamentarians. So, wasn't there any objection from the AKP to the bill to which the Chambers of Geophysicians and Petrol Engineers, the Petrol-İş trade union and similar organizations, as well as the CHP, DYP and ANAP all objected? Let us say it immediately: there was…

AKP Adana parliamentarian Başoğlu not only objected to many articles in the bill, but also added an annotation in the text that passed from the commission.''[437]

The title of the column from which the above- sample quoted was "Patriotic AKP Member". As a result of his opposition to the law on the oil market, Atilla Başoglu, an AKP parliamentarian, became a patriot. On the other hand, other AKP parliamentarians, i.e. those except Atilla Başoğlu, became traitors because they supported a law that was not advantageous for Turkey but for the USA and the EU, as in the case of a military action against Northern Iraq in order to stop PKK:

Picture 14[438]

[436] Cumhuriyet, Ali Sirmen, 13.03.2007, p.4.
[437] Milliyet, Melih Aşık, 14.02.2007, p.16.

The massage of the photo was clear; the real nationalist Turkish army, which is at the same time the fearless defender of the Republic against the bad Muslims, wants to take a military action against PKK in Northern Iraq, but it is prevented by the fake-nationalist and bad Muslim government, which is clearly a product of the USA, as indicated by the label attached to it.

In other cases rising nationalism and the discussion of nationalism were directly used to support the investments of media conglomerates, as when Serdar Turgut of *Akşam* used the nationalism discourse to support the communication company of the Çukurova Group:

> *"Since the government has recently started to give special importance to nationalism, I especially wanted to give this example. You know that Turkcell is a real national company. It is a company that was created with the entrepreneurship of Turkish capitalists and the creativity of Turkish infrastructure and a company of which every person who calls himself a nationalist should be proud. [...] I am asking those who try to engage in nationalism with billboards and vacuous slogans: What kind of nationalism is this? Do you have the right to trip up the businessmen and capital of this country in this way? Would the Turkish people, who have always loved those who gave them jobs and food, forgive the people who do this?"[439]*

Serdar Turgut activated the real/fake nationalism discourse for the Turkcell Company, which was owned by the same conglomerate as *Akşam* and against which the Ministry of Finance had taken legal action. Serdar Turgut suggested that real nationalism requires supporting companies like Turkcell, not blocking their efforts.

By definition, discursive practices have a huge effect on reproducing the perceived reality for their target group. However, discourse is not confined within the limits of the reality that was reproduced by it. In other words, any discursive practice that aims at a social practice can include the reproduction of contradictory realities for the sake of the intended social practice. The relation between the discourses of sudden Islamic revolution and of moderate and creeping Islamization, shared a contradictory existence for the sake of the same social practice.

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[438] Milliyet, 12.06.2007, p.15.
[439] Akşam, Serdar Turgut, 15.01.2007, p.15.

5.2.2.2.2. Moderate and Creeping Islamization

During the April 27 Process, while all kinds of discursive practices on sudden Islamic revolution, such as Iran and Algeria were being reproduced, another discourse on moderate and creeping Islamization was also circulating. The main reason for the need of adopting the moderate and creeping Islamization discourse was the more moderate stance of the ruling AKP compared to its ideological successors, such as the RP. Therefore, there was an effort to develop a discourse of moderate and creeping Islamization. The moderate and creeping Islamization discourse also included global cases like Indonesia:

> *"The place is the capital of the Banda Aceh state of Indonesia... Shariah law has been applied in the state since 2001 and a Muslim woman whose name and crime have not been disclosed is awaiting the execution of the punishment of caning. ... It is noted that the person who will beat her is also a woman. [...] Aceh accepted Shariah four years ago in the aftermath of the civil war."[440]*

Once an emphasis was placed on Shariah and violence, the other details became so unimportant that it enabled the newspaper to give conflicting dates about when Aceh started to be ruled by Shariah: both since 2001 at the beginning and for the last four years at the end of the paragraph. At first sight the report seemed not to contain any reference to conservative politics in Turkey. However, in the agenda of the period, which was occupied by the moderate Islam discourse and the presidential elections, Indonesia filled the same space Iran had filled in the sudden Islamic revolution discourse.

> *"Things are turning upside down in Indonesia, which is considered one of the examples of the moderate Islam style. In the regions that are affected by the fundamentalists, those women who go out on the street at night are punished by imprisonment, thieves have their hands cut off."[441]*

> *"No women can wear shorts now, one cannot have a meal before iftar in Ramadan, people are praying collectively in the Ankara metro in such a way that it obstructs human traffic, etc. ... [...]*
> *In the coming year you are going to see that Turkey will change a lot. Especially after the elections you will see that Turkey is going to become a "moderate Islamic country." For example, those people who are close to the*

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[440] Sabah, 13.01.2007, p.1.
[441] Milliyet, 03.03.2007, p.9.

AKP and the conservative sections are going to come to the key spots in the mainstream media. You're going to see that our life on the street will change as well."[442]

The two excerpts quoted above were good examples of the power of discourse in fear-mongering. The Malaysia and Indonesia cases were compared with the case of Iran and identified as a model for the Turkish conservative in the February 28 Process[443]. At that time, as a part of the good and bad Muslim discourse, Malaysia and Indonesia were presented as good Muslims because of their moderate tone compared to Iran. However, in 2007 being moderate Muslims turned out to be a great danger that may result in the restriction of women's clothing choices; a real fear for urban middle class women.

It was claimed that the moderate and creeping Islamization of Turkey was very similar to the pre-revolution period in Iran. Fear mongering with the claim of the "Iranization" of Turkey continued, as in the headline of *Cumhuriyet*: "They Come Gradually":

"Khazai, who had to flee his country (An Iranian Scholar): The mullahs in Iran were also presented as moderates [...] Khazai said that Iran should be a lesson for Turkey and added, "I am sceptical of moderate Muslims. The mullahs never said that they were going to introduce an Islamic model. People thought that they would bring democracy."[444]

The news addressed scholars and academicians, some of whom supported the AKP even though they were not traditionally conservative, because of the gradual improvements it had made in the field of human rights and democratization. Aside from the fear-mongering effect, these grand narratives were also used as a foundation for the good and bad Muslim discourse:

"Islam is a sacred religion...
but moderate or radical, what is the real name of an 'Islamic state model'? .
One word:
Reaction!
So what is reaction?..

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[442] Milliyet, Ece Temelkuran, 04.04.2007, p.5.
[443] For example, a news report appeared on the 20th page of the November 19 issue of Cumhuriyet defining Malaysia as a country with an Islamic, but not fundamentalist, identity. The report also claimed that the Muslim identity in Malaysia was not publicly visible.
[444] Cumhuriyet, 18.08.2007, p.1.

Iranian president Mahmud Ahmedinejad had started to hunt women on the streets of Tehran...

The hair of that woman that spilled over from her headscarf, the bangs of this woman that spilled over from her turban; were they in conformity with Islamic covering or not? ...

This is what (political) reaction is!.."[445]

Constructive structures employed in the above excerpt were the public visibility of Islam and the bad Muslims' treatment of women. Declaring that Islam was a holy religion but that any version in the political sphere was the same in terms of reaction was an example of the Kemalist positivist understanding of religion, which limited religion within the boundaries of conscience and could not accept any further expression.

The dissimulation theme directly associated with the presidential elections and the AKP-supported potential candidates' intentions were questioned:

"Those politicians in our country who would like to show that they are ready to serve the 'super power' who hide their long beards and turbans inside their heads, but who reflect their dark mentality in the turbans of their wives [...] gave the impression that they sent the message 'I can be your presidential candidate' to the US administration. These cannot go beyond being people of takiyye, merchants of faith who have been educated in madrasa-like schools."[446]

There were two different implications of dishonesty in the lines quoted above. First, the writer claims that the real aim of the president candidacy was to serve a "super power." Therefore, candidates who come from a conservative background hid the real aims of their candidacy for the presidential office. The second implication was about the very point of coming from a conservative background. As is known, the conservative politicians of the time did not have an outlook similar to the stereotype of a reactionary Islamist.[447] According to the writer, this was because they hid their turbans and long beards in their heads. Apart from the negative effect of wearing a turban and having a long beard, dishonesty was also associated with the conservative politicians with the help of the claim that they were hiding their real aims and their real outlook - read as ideology. In the end, by declaring the conservative politicians as

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[445] Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 06.05.2007, p.2.
[446] Cumhuriyet, Arif Çavdar, 04.03.2007, p.6.
[447] The fact is that the stereotype of a reactionary Islamist is almost the same as the stereotype of a "muslim terrorist."

nothing but people of takiyye, merchants of faith, the entire story was bound within the broader discourse of good and bad Muslims.

The chief of general staff's "real/fake secularist" explanation was frequently used as an element of the dissimulation-hypocrisy theme;

> *"The imam of the Haci Ahmet Özeltürkay Mosque placed a box like a money-box in front of the door. Why? So that those citizens who come to the Friday prayers and who like giving to charity could donate to the mosque… They did. They received prayers for their well-being. The prayer ended. They opened the box. They counted the money... And the scandal was revealed. A 100 lira note... A 50 lira note... Were counterfeit. Yes, counterfeit. That is, not real [özde]... But fake donations [sözde]..."*[448]

The excerpt quoted above is a good example of the transitional capacity of the discourses and themes. The honesty theme of the bad Muslim discourse can be articulated by the dissimulation discourse and they were both associated with the real/fake explanation of the chief of general staff.

Again, the danger came from dissimulating bad Muslims, but this time their treatment of women was the subject:

> *"I watched the May 19[449] ceremonies in Ankara on TV…. President Sezer and Prime Minister Erdoğan sat next to each other in the VIP box….*
> *The eyes of RTE [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan] were not visible..*
> *He was wearing dark glasses. [...]*
> *Does RTE, who was wearing dark glasses, deem the May 19 ceremonies a kind of blasphemy? ...*
> *Is he engaged in takiyye?..*
> *With which glasses can a mentality that subjects women to covering from her hair to her toes look at young women at the May 19 celebrations?*
> *Dark glasses!..*"[450]

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[448] Sabah, Yılmaz Özdil, 28.04.2007, p.3.
[449] One of the national holidays in Turkey. According to the official history, the date corresponds to Mustafa Kemal's arrival in Samsun to start the National Liberation movement.
[450] Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 20.05.2007, 2.

The reason the author described sunglasses as "dark glasses," "*kara gözlük,*" and the reason the name of the cloth that covered the lady's face in the *Cumhuriyet*'s advertisement[451] was a "dark chador," "*kara çarşaf,*" were the same: It was Kemalism's everlasting binary of dark and light. That dark, dissimulating womanizer and bad Muslim Erdoğan will replace the president sitting next to him in a few months. The current president, Sezer, also emphasized the same danger in his speech at the opening ceremony of the Military Academy a few days after the chief of general staff's real/fake explanation:

> *"President: The dimensions of the reactionary threat that has followed the republic like a sneaky shadow are worrying. [...] Foreign powers want the political regime of Turkey to be transformed into a 'moderate Islamic republic' under the name of a 'democratic republic' so that Turkey can be a model to Islamic countries. Moderate Islam means religious rules affecting the social, economic and legal order of the state to some extent."[452]*

An example of the reorganization of social, economic, political and legal spheres according to religious norms can be seen in the official May 19 celebrations:

Photo Tag: 43 years before, 43 years after

Picture 15

> *"Date: May 19, 1964. Venue: Manisa Akhisar. Female students are wearing short-sleeve shirts and shorts at the ceremonies of the Festival for Commemorating Atatürk, Youth and Sports. Date: May 19, 2007. Venue: the same. But the girls are wearing long-sleeve track suits."[453]*

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[451] Cumhuriyet made a series of advertisements under the slogan, "Are you aware of the danger? Support Your Republic"

[452] Akşam, 14.04.2007, p.12.

[453] Milliyet, 22.05.2007, p.19.

The photo and the news report ran under the title "From where to where." The message was clear: Under the rule of the AKP, Turkey had gone 43 years back in time and the message was transmitted by the amount of the girls' bodies that were left visible. The reason the girls were covered does not change the accuracy of the message:

> "This year there were not just gymnastics movements at the May 19 ceremonies. Various scenes were also displayed. Therefore, girls wore red and boys wore white outfits. In order to ensure the integration of the colors in the shapes they were going to form in the scenes, the outfits were designed to be long-sleeved and with pants."[454]

Although the reason for the long-sleeved outfits was the integration of the colors for the show, according to the discourse, bad Muslims were libidinous people who could not see women as individuals but always focused on their femininity and, as a result, tried to cover their bodies.

The claim that women's visibility in public life was gradually decreasing was presented as the chief indicator of gradual Islamization:

> "Today the basic principles of the secular democratic republic and its gains are under heavy attack. Secularism has been undermined to a large extent, the social structure has broken down completely...
> Today it is impossible to see women on the streets and avenues in Anatolia!..At this point, what is the duty that falls upon the Turkish Armed Forces? To protect the constitutional order with the authority given by the constitution!.."[455]

> "'The Board of Education indicated that the cream on the cake in the textbook seemed similar to Arabic letters and it warned the Provincial Directorate of Primary Education. Eğitim-Sen [a trade union in the field of education] said 'the cream brings to mind the 'basmala' [the Arabic prayer invoking the name of God]."[456]

The point in the report was not the similarity of the cream filling and the basmala, but rather the perception of irreconcilability between religion and modern education. According to the

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[454] Milliyet, 22.05.2007, p.19.
[455] Cumhuriyet, Hikmet Çetinkaya, 12.04.2007, p.5.
[456] Milliyet, 06.03.2007, p.16.

discourse, through these small and seemingly unimportant threats, moderate Islam exceeds its limits and starts to Islamize the public sphere. The same kind of irreconcilability also existed for modern consumption patterns, such as going on holiday;

"There used to be six tesettür [Islamic covering] hotels in Turkey in 2002. The number of these hotels, where women and men utilize many services in gender-segregated fashion, and which serve conservative segments of society, went up to 27 in the last year."[457]

At first sight, the report seems not worthy to quote, as it uses a neutral discourse and reports the increase in the number of conservative hotels – the type of hotels mostly preferred by conservative people because they offer gender segregated beaches and swimming pools and do not serve alcohol. The only interesting thing in terms of discourse analysis is the stress on the rapid increase in a short time, as this corresponds to the creeping Islamization discourse. However, when the report is considered together with another one in the same issue, the link with the Islamization discourse becomes clearer:

*"[Reporting about a research questionnaire conducted with students in a high school] There was also the question of 'how religious do you describe yourself?'
In the 76th question of the survey, which was answered by students between the ages of 9 and 17. The students were asked to rank their answers to the question."*[458]

Here the discourse was not reproduced by a single report, but by the conjunction of the two. On the one hand there is a neutral report about the increasing number of conservative hotels. However, when discourse is concerned, numbers are never just numbers. In this excerpt *Milliyet* addressed the fears of the urban middle class individuals and activated their fear of gradual Islamization. Consumption patterns – e.g. going on holiday - were used for to induce fear in accordance with the urban middle class character of the reader. Furthermore, in combination with the first report, the second report used another example of gradual Islamization. Reading both news reports together, it must not have been very difficult for the urban middle class reader to connect the two and become worried about his or her children in the school who are asked about their religious beliefs.

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[457] Milliyet, 09.06.2007, p.17.
[458] Milliyet, 09.06.2007, p.14.

The sphere of education was very fruitful for the reproduction of the gradual Islamization discourse because, like consumption patterns, education also directly addressed the urban middle classes through their children. The message was clear: If you do not want your children to be gradually deceived, be aware of the danger:

> *"A family that started to have suspicions because of the changes in the ideas and behavior of their daughter who studies at the Bağcılar High School found that a prayer room had been established in the basement of the high school and recorded this on camera. In the video, girls and boys come to the prayer room separately and pray. The deputy director of the school also participates in the prayer of the male students. [...] The father, I.K., who spoke about the changes in his daughter, said the following: 'They brainwashed my daughter. Now she has become a child that constantly reads books on religious subjects. Right now she is listening to religious devotional songs on TV. She is getting up at five in the morning and praying.'"*[459]

The real strength of the report was a quotation from the father of one of the female students, as he claimed that his daughter had been brainwashed. The family realized a sudden change in their child's behavior. The story of the student was very similar to the paranoia of the Kemalists: Until the last day the reactionaries, i.e. the bad Muslims, will move slowly, i.e. gradual Islamization, and once all the necessary conditions are established, they will declare a Shariah regime. Again the middle class family notion was activated and parents were mobilized for the sake of their children.

However, gradual Islamization was not limited to the educational sphere, but spread to all aspects of social life:

> *"Yüksel street, which is a common spot for demonstrations and press releases, almost turned into an open-air prayer room yesterday because of the Friday prayer. When there was no more room in the prayer room in the basement of a business center that is located at the entrance of the street, the citizens who wanted to pray spilled over into the street. The congregation prayed by spreading out prayer mats and cardboard on the road used by pedestrians instead of going to Kocatepe, which is one of the biggest mosques in Turkey. The scene that took place on Yüksel street, where there are cafes and bars and which*

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[459] Milliyet, 31.05.2007, p.3.

is the meeting point of university students and young people, surprised those who saw it."[460]

"The prayer room that the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality opened at the Kızılay station has lots of people at each Friday prayer time and these people spill over outside in a way that obstructs the pedestrian traffic. [...] While the scene that is repeated every Friday affects the pedestrian traffic at the metro, Kocatepe Mosque, which is only 600 meters from the Kızılay station, can remain empty at the prayer time."[461]

It was not the first time the size of a mosque was inadequate for the praying crowds during the Friday Prayer and it will not be the last. However, according to the discourse this was something new, as the people sitting in the cafes were surprised. That means it was not something usual, but just another indication of the gradual and creeping Islamization that had started to dominate public life gradually, like the prayer room in a public transport ferry:

"Our reader Ramazan Gezginci describes as follows his proposal regarding the news in our newspaper yesterday, which reported that prayer rooms for men and women were seen in the plan of the Istanbul city ferries:
Next to these rooms, a room should be opened for cursing thieves, dishonorable people, those who speak differently when in opposition and when in power, those who do not fulfill the many promises they make, those who use religion for politics, those who cannot account for their assets and properties, those who say 'I borrowed from my son,' those who bully their own citizens and then become as meek as a mouse in front of foreigners, those who gift public organizations to their supporters under the name of privatization, those who are unfair to the orphans and take what is rightfully theirs, those who are engaged in embezzlement on a large scale, those who are supporters of Ali Dibo."[462]

The reason for the annoyance in the report was the existence of a prayer room on the ferries. However, the annoyance was not directly expressed. Instead the attribution of dishonesty, together with many other bad characteristics, was used as a discursive method. In the end the message that those who reserved a room in the ferry for praying were bad Muslims was made very clearly.

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[460] Milliyet, 12.05.2007, p.16.
[461] Milliyet, 10.03.2007, p.19.
[462] Ali Dibo is an idiom used for gang-like structures that participate in corruption. Milliyet, Melih Asik, 12.01.2007.

In the end, when gradual Islamization reached its peak, when Turkey reached the point of no return like pre-Revolutionary Iran, the gradual, moderate and creeping Islam would give way to guns;

> "[Quoting from a reader's email] Claims that some radical groups have acquired weapons are circulating around. It is claimed that years ago some people prepared themselves for an environment of armed conflict on the streets."[463]

Gradual Islamization will give way to Islamic revolution and the time of radical groups that have "prepared themselves for an environment of armed conflict on the streets" will come.

5.2.2.2.3. The Islamic Revolution

Examples of Islamic revolutions from around the world and domestic examples of communal violence were frequently stressed to create another grand narrative in this period. According to this narrative, there was an ever-present danger of sudden Islamic armed uprising in Turkey and conservative actors were the hidden organizers and agents of these potential riots. Historicity and specificity were not considered in the reproduction of this discourse, as if Iran or Afghanistan could be a model for the Turkish experience. Both historic cases could be associated with actual discussions of Turkey:

> "[commenting on the Malatya murders] What does the type of killing remind you of? Isn't it exactly the same as the executions broadcast by the al-Jazeera channel? ...Weren't the hangmen cutting the throats of the detainees after tying them up and making them sit, saying that they had insulted the religion? ...
> [the murderers] are staying in a student dorm...because the students are preparing for the university exam...that is, they have "the future" in their minds in fact... They are able to go toward death while thinking of their future...
> Students... what does this word remind you of?...
> Taliban!..."[464]

Not all examples of the Islamic revolution grand narrative were so explicit. Some reproduced the discourse without any explicit reference to the Turkish case;

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[463] Akşam, Güler Kömürcü, 01.05.2007, p.17.
[464] Sabah, Hıncal Uluç, 20.04.2007, p.23.

> *"One hundred thousand people demonstrated against the actions of those religionists who follow a fanatical imam in Pakistan in order to establish a regime similar to that of the Taliban, saying 'no to extremism.'"*[465]

At first sight, the report seemed to be a normal piece of journalism. However, when it is read together with many Republican Rally reports, which were printed in the following pages of the same issue, its effectiveness in reproducing the discourse becomes clearer. The number of participants in the Republican Rallies and the message that the crowds were "supporting neither a military intervention nor Shariah" was the key characteristic of the Republican Rallies, according to the media. Therefore, the number of participants in the Pakistan rally and the moderate message given by the participants became the connecting elements in the reproduction of the discourse in the context of the Turkish Republican Rallies.

The Taliban portion of the grand narrative enabled the drawing of connections with the imam-hatip schools (as the Taliban's base is constituted by medrese students), the mistreatment of women and any kind of hostility toward art. The sample below did not include all of these functions, as it only referenced hostility toward art. Nevertheless, it was noteworthy in the way it built a connection with the Saudi regime:

> *"[The Saudis] mean to say: 'Here is modernity for you. Here are the latest technology, buildings, modern car parks, shopping centers. What else do you want?'*
>
> *Didn't they destroy the 'Ejyad Castle,' which was a 350-year-old Ottoman heritage?*
>
> *Just like how the Taliban destroyed the Buddha statues...*
>
> *In short, tolerating the destruction of the AKM [Atatürk Culture Center], which is 'one of the most unique symbols of republican architecture' means being the Taliban...*
>
> *Allowing such an act by the Taliban in Taksim Square, which is the heart of Istanbul, means allowing all kinds of Taliban-style acts from now on, and we cannot consent to that."*[466]

Ejyad castle is one of the Ottoman legacies in the Muslim holy city of Mecca. The castle was destroyed by the Saudi regime in 2002 to expand the area for prayer. The destruction was

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[465] Milliyet, 17.04.2007, p.15.
[466] Cumhuriyet, Nilgün Cerrahoğlu, 02.04.2007, p.17.

controversial and it was highly criticized among the Turkish public. The reference to the destruction of Ejyad Castle operates on the good and bad Muslims discourse: The Saudis, who were also Muslims, but bad ones, destroyed the castle with the pretence of doing something good for Muslims, just as bad Muslims deceive good Muslims with religion. There were two other aspects that should be mentioned in the above sample. The first its holistic and, consequently, reductionist character. Similar to the case of the characteristics of good and bad Muslims, the Taliban narrative cannot be divided into its components, either. The AKM is one of the largest cultural centers in Istanbul and also contains the only opera house in the city. However, the destruction of the AKM means more than the destruction of a cultural center. Besides being the only opera house in the city, the AKM has a symbolic and monumental character, because for some supporters of a modern and European lifestyle, going to a Western classical music concert in the AKM is not only about appreciating art, but also the reconfirmation of modern and European values.[467] If the AKM was demolished, which would have been a Taliban-style act, all other Taliban-style acts would also occur, such as the forced veiling of women. Second was the stress on Taksim Square, because with the Republic Monument, the Square stands as the modern and republican image of Istanbul, compared to other squares like Beyazıt and Sultanahmet, which are traditional and Ottoman and contain huge mosques.[468]

Among the domestic narratives that made their appearance, the Menemen Incident, the beheading of a young teacher and reserve army officer named Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay by so-called Nakshibendis in 1930, was one of the most widely used. In the Menemen narrative, the relationship was built through a historical identity. In the excerpts quoted below, the presidential election was highlighted and, not very surprisingly, *Cumhuriyet*'s opposition to a president with a background in the AKP origin was expressed through the Menemen incident. In the first one, Prime Minister Erdoğan was situated against Kubilay and the president and chief of general staff were located alongside Kubilay, and naturally against Erdoğan. It was very clear that the Kubilay front must not lose the office of the presidency, for which Prime Minister Erdoğan was expected to stand as a candidate. Also, the term perverted soul, *sapık ruhlu,* designated the libidinous characteristic of the bad Muslims. In the second example, the Kubilay theme was employed again for the presidential elections, but this time through Republican Rallies. In this text, besides standing alongside Kubilay and, therefore, belonging to the good Muslims, the office of the president was presented as the "castle of science and reason":

[467] Çınar, A. Modernity, Islam, and Secularims in Turkey, p.4.
[468] For the importance of Taksim Square for the "contemporary image" of Istanbul, see: Çınar, A. Modernity, Islam, and Secularims in Turkey, p. 115-9.

"A fact appeared when commemorating Third Lieutenant Kubilay, who sacrificed his life in order to save our republic from the religion peddlers, Shariah supporters, and bigots with perverted souls, along with the watchmen Hasan and Şevki, who died with him, in a large ceremony in Menemen... Apart from the messages of our president and the chief of general staff, no voice was heard from the speaker of the parliament, prime minister or the members of the government... I wonder why? Is it because they are afraid of the spirit of Kubilay? In order not to confront thousands of Kubilays in Menemen again?"[469]

"Returning to the nation, which the main opposition will refer to, is somewhere else, it is in the social opposition that is developing outside the parliament... it's in the hundreds of thousands who scream 'Turkey is secular and shall remain secular' at Atatürk's mausoleum and in the squares, who curse political reaction in Menemen...[...] This is no ordinary presidential election. Yes or no to an independent, contemporary, secular Atatürk republic? Political reaction is climbing up to Çankaya [i.e. the president's office]. Shariah, whichever camouflage it uses, may not enter the castle of science and reason!"[470]

The Sivas Incident can be cited as another example of domestic themes that were very closely related to the violent characteristic of bad Muslims. On July 2, 1993, after an event organized by the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, an Alevi-based NGO, the Madımak Hotel in Sivas, which was hosting participants from the conference, was set on fire and 33 people died. The people who set the hotel on fire claimed that Aziz Nesin, one of the participants, had insulted Islam. The incident was also utilized as a grand narrative in the April 27 Process:

"The Sivas massacre was commemorated in front of the Madımak Hotel, where the murder was committed, by a crowded group, even though 14 years have passed since then. The crowd, which shouted slogans of 'the murderers shall be held accountable by the people,' was booed by a group of 50 that was waiting in front of the provincial public library. Then the demonstrators gathered in front of the Madımak Hotel and shouted 'alive' while the names of the deceased were read out loudly one by one. Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association head Kazım Genç, who spoke here, emphasized that the mentality that created the massacre was in power with all its cadres and said, 'We shall maintain our struggle

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[469] Cumhuriyet, Akın Duru, 03.01.2007, p.6.
[470] Cumhuriyet, Alpaslan Berktay, 04.01.2007, p.7.

against imperialism, fascism, racism, reaction and poverty with determination in the 14th year of the Sivas massacre.'"[471]

As a final example of the grand narrative of Islamic revolution, the lines quoted below from *Akşam*'s editor-in-chief and his anger toward the head of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (*Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu*, RTÜK) clearly demonstrate the social practices that were aimed at the Islamic revolution grand narrative specifically, as well as all other discursive practices in general. RTÜK fined SHOW TV, a television channel that was also owned by the media conglomerate holding *Akşam*, because of the violence portrayed in Valley of Wolves, *Kurtlar Vadisi*, an ultra-nationalist TV series, and as a result Turgut wrote about the head of RTÜK as follows:

"Those who are close to him say that he really likes being called "mullah" anyway. Apart from this, the attribute of "preference mullah" [a mullah that does not respect people's preferences, but decides their preferences for them] is a job description that is compatible with the meaning and importance of today, because whatever the job description of the head of RTÜK, it might sound as if there is a modern perception. The way the present chairman works, his behavior and his outlook on life fit the definition of a "mullah" perfectly. The man deleted in an instant a series that had become very popular among the public. Moreover, he is also telling tons of lies about what he is doing and how he is doing it. We would have believed his lies if there were no witnesses. Look and see, this "mullah" will not stop, he will constantly interfere with our free will, he will take the right of preference from us. [...] 'The censor mullah' will do his job successfully, if he is approved, this scum can even be promoted to 'Ayatullah' from 'mullah.' Turkey has been turned into such a country. [...] If you do not want to live in the kind of country that is desired by the mullah, then resist these people, protect your legal rights and life choices."[472]

Although the decision of RTÜK was not an issue of adult content or protecting the morals of the community, but rather a result of the series' violent content being broadcast in prime time, Serdar Turgut preferred to use the 'mullah' metaphor that was always functional regardless of the topic. In other words, the *mullah* theme is always aimed at social practices -- protecting the interests of the media conglomerate.

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[471] Cumhuriyet, 03.07.2007, 1.
[472] Akşam, Serdar Turgut, 18.02.2007, p.5.

5.2.2.3. Social Practices

In light of the foregoing analysis of the textual and discursive practices of the newspapers' coverage during the April 27 Process, the picture of the political economy of the period can be drawn. The first thing this picture can show us about the political economy of the period and the final aim of the textual and discursive practices conducted within it, are the limits of the historical hegemonic center of the April 27 crisis. As in the February 28 Process, the main actors of the civil and military bureaucracy were very effective during the process:

> "At the 139th anniversary of the Council of State, the judiciary criticized politics again and a definition of political reaction that will be discussed extensively was put forward. Council of State head Sumru Çörtoglu said that all actions that are contrary to the principles and revolutions of Atatürk were reaction."[473]

Seen from the perspective of the social practices of the newspapers' discourse, the analysis of the above-quoted report from *Sabah* is explanatory in two ways. First, it is a good example presenting the hegemonic alliance between the judiciary and the other participants of the historic hegemonic center. Furthermore, in terms of this hegemonic alliance, it gives an idea about the comprehensiveness of the hegemony of the historic hegemonic center by defining every act that is contrary to Kemalist principles and reforms as reaction. Second, *Sabah*'s discourse in reporting the event, which was also reported by all the other newspapers covered in the study, is also useful for understanding the failure in the formation of the hegemonic bloc. Underlining that judiciary "again" criticized politics and made a "very controversial" definition of reaction, *Sabah* gave the government a tool to use against the historic hegemonic bloc. On the other hand, the judiciary's hand was still powerful against the government thanks to other actors of the judicial wing of the historic hegemonic center:

> "Turkish Bar Associations Union head Özdemir Özok said that the AKP was the political formation of the 'sufi order-politics-trade' relationship, which was a product of the September 12 coup d'état."[474]

> "The deans of the law faculties expressed their reactions to the inability to make appointments for the vacant positions in the high judicial organs because of the absence of the minister of justice and his representatives at the High

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[473] Sabah, 11.05.2007, p.25.
[474] Milliyet, 01.04.2007, p.22.

Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). In the joint statement made by 11
deans of law faculties from various universities, the government was criticized
and it was said that 'we expect this situation, which interferes with the
independence of the judiciary, to be brought to an end.'"[475]

Universities' support for the historic hegemonic center was not confined to the Faculties of Law, either:

"YÖK Chairman Prof. Teziç said that the constitution package, which involves
the election of the president by the public, was a very serious issue and added
that 'this arrangement would lead to an invitation for an authoritarian regime
in Turkey. It is very dangerous." [476]

"YÖK Chairman Teziç reacted harshly to the constitutional amendment that
involves the election of the president by the public: the political majority of
today wants to seize not only the government, but also the state. This would be
an invitation to an authoritarian regime."[477]

The distinction between governmental power and state power in Teziç's comments is worth mentioning, as it overlaps with the Gramscian distinction between civil society and political society. What Teziç meant by governmental power corresponds to political society, while state power is equivalent to civil society, to the domain of hegemony and consent. According to Teziç, the state is something outside the political realm and it is too valuable to be left in the hands of politicians. Following the same logic, what Teziç meant by the authoritarian regime of the political majority attained by capturing civil society was the creation of a new consent, the realization of a new hegemony by a new hegemonic alliance.

Republican Rallies were the mobilization of the existing, but weakening historic hegemonic center:

"The rally yesterday is the rebellion of an honorable nation against being
treated like a 'flea.' The psychological operation that the USA, the EU and
their desks inside tried to apply by spending massive amounts of wealth has
failed. It went bankrupt, it was defeated... this is its summary. If the funeral of

[475] Milliyet, 25.03.2007, p.21.
[476] Cumhuriyet, 12.05.2007, p.1.
[477] Akşam, 12.05.2007, 11.

Hrant Dink is broadcast live for eight hours on the TVs and if the fact that two million people marching to the Atatürk Mausoleum screaming 'we are all Mustafa Kemal' is not shown on the same TVs... We had said this. Let us say it again... The Turkish press will live with this unforgettable shame from now on."[478]

A clear statement of traditional Kemalist perceptions, but then, in the very same issue of *Sabah* another columnist had this to say:

"There will be a rally in Ankara next Saturday. It is presented as 'loyalty to the republic' but everyone knows the truth: to prevent the election of Prime Minister Erdoğan as president by provoking the military. To try to use the bayonet to make people do what they could not do at the ballot box."[479]

Contrast this with *Cumhuriyet*'s perception:

"Those who look at the red squares and gnash their teeth are the merchants of faith who have equipped society with sufi orders and religious communities, they have enormous monetary power…

What will the citizens, who pay for their own red and white crescent and star and participate in the rallies, do in the face of the monetary power of the religionists? …

The elections will be held soon…

And they have neither a satisfactory organization...

Nor sufficient money...

Moreover, they are divided…Those who want to divide Turkey have fragmented the organizations that are against the religionist parties."[480]

The three examples quoted above explain why the existing historic hegemonic center was weakening. The first two are from the same newspaper, but written by different columnists. Contradictory comments from the different columnists of a newspaper is a usual practice in the press, but in this case the totally opposite perspectives of the two columnists tells us about more than the openness of a newspaper, especially considering the monophony of Turkish

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[478] Sabah, Yılmaz Özdil, 15.04.2007, 03.
[479] Sabah, Emre Aköz, 13.04.2007, p.20.
[480] Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 01.05.2007, p.2.

newspapers in such vital issues. In the transition period of *Sabah*, which resulted in a total change in its ownership and, therefore, in its discourse and stance, on the one hand Yılmaz Özdil, who supported the Republican Rallies but complained of the (non)presentation of the meetings in the media, represented the previous ownership of the newspaper and, thus, the weakening historic hegemonic center. On the other hand Emre Aköz represented the next ownership and the new formulation of the historic hegemonic center. The third excerpt was from *Cumhuriyet* and written by İlhan Selçuk, for decades a representative of the existing historic hegemonic center. It was as constant as it was decades ago, but not so powerful anymore. At that point it should also be noted that *Cumhuriyet* has always had a very limited readership compared to newspapers like *Sabah* and *Akşam* that address a wide readership. Furthermore, *Cumhuriyet*'s influence depended on its role as spokesman for the Kemalist elite, so with the weakening of the historic hegemonic center, it automatically lost its importance.

Similar to the hijacking of the Susurluk Rallies in the February 28 Process, a rally hijacking also took place in the April 27 Process. This time the people's sensitivity against PKK violence was hijacked for the sake of the mobilization of the historic hegemonic center. Increasing nationalist reaction against terror attacks was channeled against the government with the help of public demonstrations that used the same motives and style as the Republican Rallies:

> *"'Homeland' rallies will follow the 'republican' rallies: the request of the Turkish Armed Forces for a massive reflex against terror received a response. Some civil society organizations took the decision to organize 'homeland' rallies. The organizations, which are led by the ÇYDD, will also hold 'silent rallies against terror.'"[481]*

> *"Approximately 3,000 METU graduates, who came from different parts of the world and Turkey, held a march to Atatürk's mausoleum yesterday on the grounds that Atatürk's principles and the republic are being systematically eroded."[482]*

The role of the TSK as the triggering actor of the nationalist rallies is worth mentioning in terms of the hegemonic alliance.

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[481] Akşam, 09.06.2007, p.11.
[482] Milliyet, 24.06.2007, p.19.

The hegemonic alliance was not stable and, in some cases, certain groups in the alliance may break off from the alliance and seek a new one. Çukurova Groups seemed to be on the edge, but needed some extra motivation for entering into the new hegemonic alliance and announced its need for extra motivation through an editorial in its newspaper *Akşam*:

> "*Since the government has recently started to give special importance to nationalism, I especially wanted to give this example. You know that Turkcell is a real national company. It is a company that was created with the entrepreneurship of Turkish capitalists and the creativity of Turkish infrastructure and a company of which every person who calls himself a nationalist should be proud. [...]I am asking those who try to engage in nationalism with billboards and vacuous slogans, what kind of nationalism is this? Do you have the right to trip up the businessmen and capital of this country like this? Would the Turkish people, who have always loved those who gave them jobs and food, forgive the people who do this?*"[483]

Akşam offered the government a chance to prove its nationalism over Turkcell, a communication company owned by the Çukurova Group and that had some problems with the Capital Markets Boards of Turkey during the time when the rallies were organized. As a response to the rising nationalism of the period, the ruling AKP put many advertisements on billboards in major cities. Through the editorial, *Akşam* told the AKP that engaging in "nationalism with billboards and vacuous slogans" is useless. Instead, the AKP should support a national company like Turkcell, if it wants to make use of the increasing nationalism of the rallies. Otherwise, Turgut warns the government against losing the support of "Turkish people, who have always loved those who gave them jobs and food;" that is, Turkcell.

One of the outstanding characteristics of the historic hegemonic center formation of the April 27 Process was the discord among the media. Unlike in the February 28 Process, the political-economic interests of the central media outlets were not compatible. The consequences of the disharmony among media institutions were reflected in newspapers in the shape of reports and columns that were critical of the indifference of some newspapers to the process and the Republican Rallies:

> "*Look at the scenes in our sector outside of the Doğan Media....*

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[483] Akşam, Serdar Turgut, 15.01.2007, p.15.

Apart from 1-2 groups that do not have wide access and that are secular, 2 newspapers and a television channel that have been confiscated by the state (I exonerate my colleagues who work there and their journalistic principles)… The rest are newspapers, TV channels and radio channels that support the AKP."[484]

"The president spoke with the journalists at the opening of the Atatürk Museum Villa, pointing out that the republican rally was very good and said that "the messages at the rally were spot-on. I watched the press in amazement.' Sezer said that the press had managed the presidential election process very badly."[485]

The economic competition between the newspapers and the conglomerates which owned them was the basic reason behind the disharmony among the newspapers in the process:

"A young businessman was standing next to me. He asked a question that everybody speaks of but nobody dares to ask to my face: 'Mr. Altaylı, as far as I know, you worked in the Doğan group for 13 years. Now you write articles against your former group due to POAŞ [Petrol Office Joint Stock Co.]. There is no doubt as to the accuracy of what you write, but still, doesn't this disturb you?'"[486]

"Aydın Doğan is using his own media as a weapon so that Sabah-ATV, which was taken over by the TMSF [Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency], will rot in the hands of the state. He is having its reporters write reports that will affect the judiciary and it is advising the TMSF through his lawyers."[487]

Although not covered by the research of this study, the existence of more powerful alternative newspapers and the centrist newspapers' reaction to these alternative newspapers is also worth mentioning in terms of the historic hegemonic center because the coverage of these alternative newspapers constituted different resources for the people the center was trying to mobilize in the April 27 Process:

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[484] Milliyet, Melih Aşık, 08.05.2007, p.19.
[485] Cumhuriyet, 20.04.2007, p.1.
[486] Sabah, Fatih Altaylı, 17.01.2007, p.21.
[487] Akşam, 28.06.2007, p.1.

"It's unbelievable, the other day we (together with our editor-in-chief İbrahim Yıldız) made a list of the religionist newspapers that are distributed free of charge...

The result?

One million, 200 thousand...

No, you did not read this wrong, in today's Turkey one million, 200 thousand newspapers are distributed free of charge everyday...

How big a monetary power is this?...

Who is providing the money?..."[488]

"Anavatan party parliamentarian Sarıbaş asked whether there was any takiyye in the sale of the Star newspaper during parliamentary questions, and he asked for the prime minister and Minister of Energy Güler to respond."[489]

Star newspaper, which was previously owned by the Uzan Group, was confiscated by the TMSF as a result of the bankruptcy of the Uzan Group's Imar Bank. Later, the newspaper was put to tender by TMSF. At the end of the tender, Star was sold to the Koza Group, which is close to the ruling AKP according to many, such as the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper.

Supporting and protecting the republic was never only about supporting and protecting the republic:

Picture 16[490]

Through this advertisement *Cumhuriyet* – which literally means republic in Turkish - the newspaper called for the support of the people for the Republic, which *Cumhuriyet* thought was under threat. On the other hand, it called for the support of people for itself, for the newspaper *Cumhuriyet.* It should also noted that in the advertisement 1881, the birth date of

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[488] Cumhuriyet, Mustafa Balbay, 07.01.2007, p.2.
[489] Cumhuriyet, 07.01.2007, p.6.
[490] Cumhuriyet, 04.03.2007, p.1.

Mustafa Kemal, was picked as the birth date of Republic of Turkey and 2007, the year that presidency elections was held, was picked as its date of death. The message was clear: Once an AKP-oriented president was selected, it would be the end for the Republic. *Cumhuriyet* identified itself with the Republic through the identity implied by its name. It asked support both for itself and for the Republic. Although the Republic of Turkey continued to live after 2007, beyond the date of death *Cumhuriyet* had imagined, *Cumhuriyet* did not insofar as the newspaper and the historic hegemonic alliance it belonged to began to weaken after 2007, a fact that is among the major conclusions of this research.

6. Conclusion

On May 31st, 2011, the Commander of the War Colleges, General Bilgin Balanlı, was arrested after being accused of planning a coup d'état against the civil government of the country. With that decision, for the first time in the republic's history an on duty member of the TSK was arrested for such an act, even though the TSK had made five previous military interventions, two of which were *coups d'état*. Among the many reactions to this unaccustomed action, one figure was especially noteworthy concerning the dynamics of the historic hegemonic center; Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. As the new leader of the CHP, elected approximately one year ago and following a more social-democrat oriented policy, he asked the TSK to stay in their barracks and not to make any declarations or take action against this decision. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu justified his demands from the TSK by stating: any reaction from the TSK has the potential to create an image of victimization for the ruling AKP in the eyes of electorate, and therefore may cause an increase in the electoral support of the AKP in the June 12th general election that would be held less than two weeks later.[491]

Analysis of Kılıçdaroğlu's advice to the TSK concerning the arrest of General Balanlı is explanatory from many aspects. First of all, it gives a better understanding of the poor democratic standard of Turkey and of the many legal barriers in the way of democratization. The leader of the main opposition party regards the army's inaction against the arrest of a high ranked commander not as the norm but as a strategy. Considering the inverse, one can question whether Kılıçdaroğlu would have asked the TSK to take action against the AKP if he had thought that it would cause a loss in the AKP's electoral support. The second aspect is that it illustrates the nature of the historic hegemonic center of Turkey as well as its democratic standards; Kılıçdaroğlu himself automatically assumes the TSK is an ally in his opposition to the AKP. Furthermore, the TSK's silence about Kılıçdaroğlu's advice is an indicator of the fact that the alliance between the CHP and the TSK is not one-way because the TSK could be expected to give an explanation and clarify its position – taking no action against the arrest of General Balanlı, not as a strategy but as a norm. Finally, this is not the first time that the poor democratic standards and historic hegemonic center are mentioned in

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[491] "Kılıçdaroğlu'ndan TSK'ya: Kışlanızda Oturun, Bir Tepki Vermeyin," Radikal, May 31, 2011, accessed June 14, 2011, http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&VersionID=78841&Date=01.06.2011&ArticleID=1051214. Whether it followed Kilicdaroglu's advice or not, TSK did not give any reaction to arrestment of General Balanlı. However, at the end AKP was again the winner of the June 12 general elections by taking %49.9 of the general vote.

the scope of this study, but analysis of Kılıçdaroğlu's advice to the TSK clearly reveals a change in hegemonic power; in Gramscian terms the traditional historic center loses its trenches one after another, and is forced to adopt a defensive position contrary to its earlier aggressive one. Futhermore, in Mardin's terms this also corresponds to a regression in center's power. The example of the regression of the historic hegemonic center's hegemony covered in this thesis was the government's response to the TSK's e-memorandum.

This singular fact – the court's decision of arresting of one of the highest ranked commanders of the TSK – is an indicator of the split in the historic hegemonic center, and it becomes clear that the alliance of the historic hegemonic center is now weaker than it has ever been before and may suffer a breakdown as a result of false strategy: Kılıçdaroğlu states that a part of the electorate, i.e. the urban middle class, will support the AKP more than usual against the TSK's undemocratic reaction to legal action. That means the historic hegemonic center would need more than improper discourse, fear mongering against bad Muslims, Iranization of Turkey, creeping Islamization, etc., to secure the urban middle classes' consent for its action against the AKP. As will be remembered, such a discourse was sufficient to secure the urban middle classes' consent in the Febrary 28 Process.

A comparison of the February 28 and April 27 Processes' results helps to shed light on the weakening ties between the components of the historic hegemonic center. During the February 28 Process there was clear media support, not only as a part of capital, but also as a practitioner of ideological and moral leadership. It should also be noted that the ideological and moral leadership of the media was very effective on the urban middle class during the February 28 Process. Key evidence of the effect of the media's ideological and moral leadership in the urban middle class mobilization first occurred in the Susurluk Rallies and later in the 1999 general elections.

Besides economic and political interests, intellectual and moral unity was also required for hegemonic articulation. The role of intellectuals was critical in the formation and then mobilization of the historic hegemonic center. In the February 28 Process, the articulation of the RP to the historic center was in conformity with capitalists' economic interests. However, on the other hand, the RP was not a part of the intellectual and moral unity of the historic hegemonic center. As a result, contrary to their economic interests, capitalists continued their alliance with the historic hegemonic center and did not allow the RP to be a part of the center. In the end, they were amply rewarded for their compromises with privatizations and loans from public banks after the 1999 elections. However, in the end the February 28 Process was just a temporary solution for the hegemonic crises of Kemalist hegemony in Turkey. The

economical crises triggered by rewards given to capitalists and the political crises that followed were indicators of the fact that the February 28 Process could not cure the Kemalist hegemonic crises.

Ultimately, and after five years of continuous political and economic crisis, the February 28 Process culminated in the landslide victory of the new AKP. As a response, in the middle term capitalists and media were compelled to appease the AKP for the continuation of their economic interest. This necessity made the media and capitalists sacrifice their intellectual and moral unity, culture, way of life, and status, and therefore shifted their support to the AKP both before and after the 2002 general elections. Concerning Mardin's concepts, the AKP was still peripheral, but the center unwillingly accepted the AKP into its ranks for its own economic interests. However, in the long-term the characteristics that were sacrificed in the middle-term – or trench systems that were lost in the war of position in Gramscian terms – were still effective and therefore the support of some elements of the historic hegemonic center to the AKP were not long-lived. The election of an AKP member president was the last exit on the highway for the historic hegemonic center, and the direction of the highway was the elimination of the existing historic hegemonic center and the establishment of a new one. This fact was best portrayed by the shift in the media that supported the AKP before and after the 2002 elections but changed its attitude when the time came for the presidential election.

In the February 28 Process, conservatives embodied in the RP held onto only partial parliamentary support. However, a dominant group that aims to build hegemony has to have the ability to lead before it grasps governmental power. After the grasp of governmental power, if it continues to hold its ability to lead, then it may create its own hegemony. Defining the political sphere as an arena of hegemonic struggle between the Kemalists, i.e. historic bloc or center, and conservatives, i.e. subaltern groups or periphery, the only weapon the RP had in the February 28 Process was limited parliamentary power that meant neither leading capacity nor governmental power. However, in the April 27 Process, the AKP held the capacity to lead both before and after it grasped governmental power with its electoral and parliamentary support. With its capacity to lead, it was able to issue a counter memorandum to the TSK. However the critical move of AKP in the Process was not issuing a counter memorandum, but using its governmental power dependent upon parliamentary and electoral support. With the help of this governmental power, it was able to change the presidential election system and shift to election by popular vote instead of parliamentary vote. This change created a near guarantee for the election of a conservative president even in the worst scenario, which is in continuity with the AKP's inability to meet the 367 quorum after the 2007 general election. Due of this assured outcome, the MHP and the pro-Kurdish Peace and

Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi,* BDP), had no alternatives but to participate in the presidential election meeting of the parliament after the 2007 general elections. Comparing this situation to the February 28 Process, we see that due to a lack of leading capacity and governmental power the only counteraction of the RP against the February 28 MGK meeting was an attempt to bring parliament into play. This desperate action was eventually rejected even by the DYP, the governing partner of the RP. The different levels of leadership capacity and governmental power are best portrayed with the fact that media discourse in April 27 process was more positive compared to the February 28 Process. Aside from the limited amount of discursive practices in the April 27 Process, the practical results of these practices in terns of social practices was also limited.

Besides the story in political society, civil society was also different in the two Processes. The masses that were mobilized by the Susurluk Rallies in the February 28 Process were also on the streets during the April 27 Process. In both Processes, mobilized masses were given the illusion of defending their interests against the government, but in actuality they were defending the interests of the historic hegemonic center. In both processes masses were in streets, but the quality of their resistance was different. Compared to the higher degree of commitment in the Susurluk Rallies of the February 28 Process, the disagreement peaked between organizers and participants of the Republican Rallies during the April 27 Process. The same discourse was adopted by the media in two processes. In the February 28 Process, the discourse was so effective that the Susurluk rallies, which originally targeted corrupt intra-state relations – something not separate from the historic hegemonic center -- could be hijacked and used against the government to support military intervention. On the other hand, in the April 27 Process, the masses were again mobilized with the same discourse under the name of Republican Rallies. However, this time the pro-military intervention tone of the organizers of the rallies was rejected by the participants. This fact shows the declining strength of the historic hegemonic center.

The diversity of media available during the April 27 Process favored the increasing effectiveness of the conservatives. The shift in media, which is at the same time an indicator of peripheral actors moving to the center, resulted in a multifarious stance against the AKP. To begin with, *Cumhuriyet* experienced no change in newspaper's stance between the February 28 and April 27 Processes. However, the rest of the press was not that consistent. The ownership structure of *Sabah* was totally altered during the period between 2000 and 2005. As a result of the Ciner Group's attempts to increase its effectiveness in media, the group bought all the shares of *Sabah* from Dinç Bilgin, the former owner and close partner of the Doğan Group. However, this was not the only change in *Sabah*'s ownership, as the TMSF

confiscated the newspaper on April 2nd, 2007 – a few weeks before the e-memorandum – as payment of the Ciner Group's debt to the state due to its bankruptcy. In the end, *Sabah*'s moderate discourse, compared to *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*, turned out to be more moderate still. This discursive stance or transformation to a more moderate discourse shows the decisiveness of economic factors on the formation of the historic hegemonic center. The old *Sabah* that allied with the regressing historic hegemonic center went bankrupt, while the new *Sabah* chose to ally with the emerging conservative hegemony and, as a result, its discourse changed noticeably. One year later, in 2008, *Sabah* was sold to the Çalık Group, which was a peripheral actor, by the TMSF. Additionally, *Akşam*'s ownership structure also changed. The newspaper, which was held by Erol Aksoy in the heyday of the February 28 Process, was sold to the Çukurova Group, a new actor in the media industry. Similarly, this change in the media ownership of *Akşam* can be traced through changes in its discourse between the February 28 and April 27 processes. Recently, in 2011, the Doğan Group decided to dispose *Milliyet* and signed a contract for the sale.

The reasoning behind the change of ownership of these newspapers, and the reflection of ownership to the newspaper discourse, are key to understanding and comparing the results of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Firstly, the former owners' economic activity in sectors other than media is the chief reason for the ownership change. All of these economic activities were concentrated in state related economic sectors, especially in banking and privatization. For *Sabah* it was Dinç Bilgin's banking investments, which were concentrated during and after the February 28 Process, that forced him to relinquish his newspaper to the Ciner Group. The TMSF confiscated ETİBANK, which was owned by Dinç Bilgin, because the bank used most of its loans for other companies of the group, a well known issue from the beginning onwards, which was condoned because of the newspapers support to the February 28 Process.[492] Under the rule of the Ciner Group, the newsapers' discourse was more balanced and moderate during the April 27 Process compared to the February 28, as Dinç Bilgin's economic and ideological commitment to the historic hegemonic center was far stronger compared to the Ciner Group. Bilgin's position was already defined with his and his group's close relations to the Doğan Group. On the other hand, the Ciner Group in general, and its media investments in particular, were more open to bargains and alliances in its quest to establish itself. This resulted in a balanced policy in the newspaper's stance, and of course, balanced discursive practices against the AKP and conservatives. However, as mentioned before, this was not the last change in ownership of *Sabah*. Again in 2007, the newspaper was directly confiscated by the TMSF, and again ownership changed due to banking and

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[492] For the story of Sabah group with a special focus to its economical activities rather than media sector see; Adaklı, G. Türkiye'de Medya Endüstirisi, p. 164-77.

privatization. The TMSF's confiscation occurred a few weeks before the e-memorandum and affected the discourse of the newspaper. In the end, the Çalık Group bought the newspaper from the TMSF, and subsequently the newspaper's discourse remained more government oriented in accordance with the Çalık Group's rise under the rule of the AKP.

The story of *Akşam* was also more or less similar to that of with *Sabah*. Erol Aksoy, the former owner of the paper during the February 28 Process, was a banking sector origin investor who concentrated his investments in media sector as he observed the advantageousness of holding media power while being involved in banking and privatization. However, in the end he was also forced to sell his media investments, which at its peak included SHOW TV, CINE5, *Akşam* and %25 of Aydın Doğan's *Hürriyet*, to the Çukurova Group. The sales could not stop Aksoy's fall, and the TMSF confiscated İktisat Bank, Aksoy's bank.[493] The change of ownership had direct effects in newspaper discourse. As noted in the social practices section, the two only extreme examples of Islamic Revolution discourse in *Akşam*'s coverage during the April 27 Process were respectively produced as a reaction to two state institutions' decisions against the Çukurova Group's Turkcell and SHOW TV. That means the newspaper engaged in social practices during the whole April 27 Process. Its tone in two samples was one that called for reconciliation rather than showing hostility. In the discursive change of *Akşam*, the same dynamics were also in action as in the discursive change of *Sabah*. The Karamehmet Group, as the new owner of the newspaper, was more open to, and in need of, cooperating with the government, as can be seen in the Turkcell and SHOW TV examples, compared to the more established and committed Erol Aksoy. Aksoy's share in Aydın Doğan's Hürriyet is a good indicator of his already defined position in the historic hegemonic center. This openness to and dependency in the government was reflected in a more moderate stance in the newspaper's discourse, except in the cases mentioned above.

In the third case involving the sale of *Milliyet* by Aydın Doğan, the newspaper owner's investments in the state related sectors and finance were also at the center -- again a clear indicator of the media's relationship with the historic hegemonic center. An incident known as the Hilton Case helps to shed light on the Group's relations to the government. When Aydın Doğan bought the land under the old Hilton Hotel for 254 million dollars, this was seen as an unprofitable investment. However, observers of the media sector noted that Aydın Doğan's plan was to secure a change in construction plans of the related part of the city and create a huge profit for himself.[494] Observers were right, and that was the way that the things

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[493] Topuz, H. (2003). *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basını*. Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, p. 334.
[494] Tılıç, D. L. Utanıyorum Ama Gazeteciyim, p. 411.

operated for investments of large media conglomerates in Turkey. However, Aydın Doğan could not make his dreams of the Hilton Hotel come true, as the AKP controlled the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and refused to make any change in construction plans. What is more explanatory from the aspect of media discourse is that Turkish public opinion was informed about the full details of the Hilton Incident by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his 2007 election campaign. In many election meetings, Erdoğan told the electorate that Aydın Doğan requested an appointment from him in order to discuss the Hilton issue, which he always rejected. Erdoğan claimed that the Doğan Group's newspaper and television reports about the gradual Islamization of Turkey increased in number during the election period, as a result of his party's refusal of the Hilton plan.

The Hilton incident was not the only conflict between Aydın Doğan and the government. In the period between 2003 and 2010, different state institutions including the Capital Markets Board of Turkey and Ministry of Finance issued significant financial penalties against the Doğan Group.[495] The discharge of Emin Çölaşan and Bekir Coşkun, the two most ardent Kemalist columnist of Doğan Newspapers, and then the Hürriyet's editor in chief Ertuğrul Özkök's leaving his post were regarded as Aydın Doğan's compromises with the government. Çölaşan, the first to be discharged, wrote a book titled "We have been expelled o my people, do not forget us!" "*Kovulduk Ey Halkım, Unutma Bizi,*" and claimed that Doğan fired himself as a compromise to the government.[496] The name of Çölaşan's book was further informative pertaining to the employment of secularism discourse by media for their economical interests, as he used an adaptation of the motto used by the *Cumhuriyet* when reporting about the Uğur Mumcu assassination in 1993, a widely used element of discourse about the violent character of bad Muslims: "We have been shot o my people, do not forget us!" "Vurulduk *Ey Halkim Unutma Bizi."* Çölaşan also utilized the same discourse as *Cumhuriyet* utilized against the conservatives. What is crucial in the change in the ownership structure of *Milliyet* is that, although the change in the ownership structure took place in 2011, which is long after the period the study covers, other newspapers whose ownership structures analyzed were not as powerful as the Doğan Group. Under the conditions that the Doğan Group partly achieved in order to sustain its position in the historic hegemonic center, the other relatively weak media institutions that needed cooperation with the government were unable to cover the cost of an ardent opposition of the AKP and conservatives. The Doğan Group, in the short term, supported the AKP before and after the 2002 elections in accordance with its economic

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[495] For detailed information about financial penalties against the Dogan Group see; "Maliye'den Doğan Holding'e Tek Kalemde 826 Milyon Ceza," *Star*, February 19, 2009, accessed June 14, 2011, http://www.stargazete.com/ekonomi/maliye-den-dogan-holding-e-tek-kalemde-826-milyon-ceza-170044.htm; "SPK'dan Doğan'a Para Cezası," *Samanyoluhaber*, March 04, 2010, accessed June 14, 2011, http://finans.samanyoluhaber.com/h_398275_spkdan-dogana-para-cezasi.html.
[496] See Çölaşan's book: Çölaşan, E. (2008). *Kovulduk Ey Halkım Unutma Bizi*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi.

interests. Later, in the middle term, it used the discourse against the prospect of a president being elected from the ranks of the AKP because of its alliance with the historic hegemonic center. Now it tries to protect itself from the rage of the AKP by adopting a moderate discursive stance.

Addressing information about the change in the media ownership structures after the February 28 Process, it can be argued that (1) the media groups' relationship with the government have become effective in their ownership structures, (2) the change in ownership, which was related to the media groups' relationship with the government, has a direct effect on their discourse and finally (3) the diversification of media ownership, and as a result media discourse produced a low level of commitment by the urban middle class masses to the April 27 Process compared to the February 28, even though the media campaign and discourse was effective in mobilizing masses during the Susurluk and Republican Rallies.

In addition to the media's participation in the historic hegemonic center and its discourse as a function of intellectual and moral leadership, other elements of civil society should also be analyzed for a more accurate comparison of the results of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. At that point, re-emphasizing the theoretical framework will be more beneficial. As aforementioned in the theoretical framework chapter, Gramsci employs the concept of minimal hegemony and defines it as a condition of hegemony when the consent of subaltern classes to the hegemonic ones decline. According to Gramsci, once a historic bloc enters the phase of minimal hegemony, the only way of sustaining its leading role is to incorporate the elites of the subaltern classes. Considering the hegemonic crisis of the Turkish historic hegemonic center, one would expect the elites of the subaltern classes to be incorporated in order to increase its capacity of intellectual and moral leadership as happened in the post-1980 period, by the incorporation of conservatives into the historic hegemonic center against the so called leftist danger. However, as mentioned before, the historic hegemonic center during the February 28 crisis did not open its doors to the conservative elites and blocked peripheral actors' moving to the center, and instead tried to overcome the hegemonic crisis by totally removing conservative actors from the equation. In contrast, in 2000 the economic and social crises left no other alternative other than calling conservatives to action. Although the historic hegemonic center tried to put a stop to the incorporation of conservatives into the historic hegemonic center through the April 27 Process, by this time a balance had been reached in the power struggle between the subaltern and leading classes. The government's counter memorandum to the TSK's e-memorandum is the embodiment of the balance that was reached during the power struggle.

Furthermore, the role of the AKP supported\supporting media, bureaucracy, businessmen, and NGOs should not be ignored. For example, the majority of the members of the Constitutional Court that annulled the first round of the presidential election by legislating a 367 quorum, were Kemalist-oriented lawyer's but the head of the court, Haşim Kılıç, a conservative who was appointed by Turgut Özal (after the change in the law of Constitutional Court that enabled the appointment of non-jurist bureaucrats as Özal was unable to find any qualified and conservative jurist to appoint). Although they were not pro-AKP, other elements of civil society were not as committed to mobilization against the AKP as they were in the February 28 Process. Compared to the Susurluk Rallies of the February 28 Process, the number of NGOs that supported and attended Republican Rallies were limited. It was not possible to see a joint declaration by the capitalists of TÜSİAD, middle and low scale businessmen of TOBB and TESK, or labor unions such as TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK and KESK on the scale that participated during the February 28 Process. Therefore, the differentiation that is observed in media ownership and media discourse can also be seen in civil society.

While the minimal hegemony of the historic hegemonic center continued to diminish, conservatives started to build their "national popular" in the period including the April 27 Process. In other words, it can be said that the centralization of peripheral actors and the marginalization of central actors occurred simultaneously. Thanks to the February 28 experience, conservatives realized that they were unable to challenge the hegemony with their activities in political society that depended on their limited electoral support. Therefore, they began to examine various other ways to influence the sphere of civil society. At that point, using the Gramscian conceptualization is once again apt. As mentioned before, Gramscian theoretical subsets have a mutual and dependent relationship in the course of securing hegemony. On the one hand, conservative elites' and civil society's affinity increases as a result of the party's influence in the political society. On the other hand, increasing the influence of conservative elites, civil society and life styles – or alternative modernities in Göle's terms that were mentioned in the fourth chapter, supplies a base for the political society's activities in the second phase. This process also increases conservative credibility as well as status, and as a result the capacity of allying with other non-Kemalist actors. The counterpart of this trend in the media discourse is that, on the one hand, not all media institutions produce discourse like they did in the February 28 Process and, on the other hand, the discourse itself is not as credible as it was in the February 28 Process. For example, as a result of the discrediting and resultant ineffectiveness of the good vs. bad Muslims discourse, the real vs. fake secularists and the real vs. fake nationalists discourse was produced and circulated in the April 27 Process.

The search for a conservative national popular to replace the Kemalist hegemony or centralization of peripheral actors included a quest for increasing their influence in civil society, as well as building partnerships with existing civil society actors such as leftists, liberals and other social segments that were also unsatisfied with the Kemalist modernization, such as Alevis and Kurds. Although these attempts did not produce a result, the AKP's turning a hand to the Kurdish and Alevi problems can be regarded as an indicator of their intentions in civil society. At least at the discursive level, the AKP offers much, which was not offered by the RP, to other actors. In doing so the AKP offers a conservative hegemony against the hegemony and discourse of the historic hegemonic alliance.

The 2011 general election resulted in a landslide victory for the AKP. With almost fifty percent of the total vote, and debates on a new constitution during the election campaign seeming to be the hot button issue, these are all crucial indicators that verify the dissertation's concluding remarks on the trend that the conservative national popular has been replacing the regressive Kemalist hegemony. Another aspect worth mentioning in this context is the "new CHP," as defined by its recently elected leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. According to Kılıçdaroğlu and other supporters of the new CHP, the party's ties with the people weakened and the party itself became stuck in a narrow societal base that only included the highest income group, as the CHP has nothing but pillars of Kemalism to offer to the people.[497] Therefore, the new CHP needs to broaden its horizons and open communication with different segments of society, which is nothing but simply turning its face towards the periphery. The new route of the CHP's conscious and intense effort to dismiss any discussion on secularism in the recent election process is thought provoking to say the least. Finally, discussions around the new constitution both indicate the regression of existing hegemony and the conservatives' chances of replacing existing hegemony with a conservative national popular, which is in other words replacing the central actors with the peripheral ones. In political society the new constitution will define new rules that will bind political actors. In civil society, considering the AKP's huge electoral support, a new constitution legislated with the initiative of all other political and social actors, but mostly the AKP, will mean a source of recognition, prestige, status and acquiescence; something necessary for transforming their leadership to a national popular and then to hegemony, for the AKP and conservatives. Whether the discussion on a new constitution will come to fruition or not, the quest itself is another indicator of the regression of the existing hegemony. From the perspective of this dissertation, in addition to the many examples given and the many analyses made above,

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[497] For a detailed account of the new CHP see Kılıçdaroğlu's interview: " 'CHP dine karşı' algısı değişecek" *Radikal*, March 4, 2012, accessed March 15, 2011,
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetayV3&ArticleID=1080639&CategoryID=78

another brief indicator of the regression of the existing hegemony is the decline in the discursive practices of newspapers, the transformation of media discourse, and the media discourse's loss of influence in the April 27 Process.

In conclusion, the questions that intended to be thought provoking from the aspect of the analyses of Turkish politics, with a historical perspective on hegemony and center-periphery, are the ones which focus on the conservatives' attempts to create a new national popular, as well as the historical and societal bases of the new potential conservative national popular. In light of the conclusions that have been drawn, an alternative reading of Turkish modernization from the eyes of the conservative masses can be beneficial in the analyses of hegemonic and center-periphery relations in Turkish society. Furthermore, this alternative reading of Turkish modernization will in turn become a basis for examining hegemony from the perspective of the subaltern groups that once gave consent to hegemony or the ones those asked to create consent to hegemony, and for examining the center from the perspective of the periphery.

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Samenvatting

De processen van militaire inmenging van 28 februari en 27 april, die de laatste twee schakels vormen van Turkije's lange keten van militaire ingrepen *in de politiek*, verschillen van de voorgaande militaire interventies vanuit het oogpunt van hoe zij werden uitgevoerd, van de partijen die erbij betrokken zijn en van de doelen die van hen verwacht werden. Het proces van 28 februari ontleent haar naam aan de *vergadering van* de Nationale Veiligheidsraad van 28 februari 1997. Hoewel de vergadering normaal was, waren de besluiten en het persbericht na afloop ervan bijzonder. De Nationale Veiligheidsraad, die, hoewel bestaand uit zowel militaire als burger leden, overheerst werd door militairen, beweerde dat de religieuze *reactie* in het land *een steeds groter probleem werd* gedurende de regeringstermijn van de coalitieregering van die tijd, die bestond uit de religieus conservatieve Welvaartspartij van Necmettin Erbakan en de rechtse Partij van het Rechte Pad van Tansu Çiller. Volgend op de vergadering van de Nationale Veiligheidsraad van 28 februari vroegen militairen de regering in een verklaring maatregelen te nemen tegen het 'stijgende reactionaire gevaar'. De militairen dreigden de regering met 'sancties' wanneer deze niets zou ondernemen.

Vele betrokkenen bij het maatschappelijk middenveld namen later deel in de discussies omtrent de religieuze reactie, die zijn piek bereikte ten tijde van de vergadering van de Nationale Veiligheidsraad. Gaande de ontwikkelingen deden kranten verslag van 'reactionaire gebeurtenissen' in verschillende uithoeken van het land. Veel instituties uit het maatschappelijk middenveld *(werkgevers- en werknemersorganisaties, universiteiten, advocaten en gerechtelijke instellingen)* spraken één voor één hun steun uit voor de strijd tegen het stijgende reactionaire gevaar. Gemobiliseerd door de intensieve mediacampagne begon de stedelijke middenklasse met het doven van hun lichten thuis om negen uur 's avonds om te protesteren tegen de regering en om haar aftreden te eisen. De invloed op en leiding van het proces door het leger bereikte een hoogtepunt toen tanks de hoofdstraat van de wijk Sincan in Ankara inreden. Als gevolg van de toenemende druk trad de regering uiteindelijk af op 17 juni 1997. Dit bracht het proces echter niet ten einde, integendeel: het was het startsein voor een nieuwe fase van militaire inmenging. De regeringen die de Erbakan-Çiller coalitie opvolgden begonnen een campagne in naam van de strijd tegen de religieuze reactie, waarin men ijverde voor een belemmering van sociale mobiliteit voor de conservatieven in het onderwijs, in de economie en in de politiek. De inspanningen voor de strijd tegen de religieuze reactie heeft zeker gezorgd voor een toename *van de invloed van het*

leger en zijn controle op de politiek. Als gevolg hiervan had Turkije aan het begin van dit millennium een geforceerd en kunstmatig politiek klimaat dat vooral werd geleid door militairen.

Het geforceerde en kunstmatige klimaat van de politieke arena had ook invloed op de economie: Turkije onderging een economische crisis in 2000 en 2001. Het beperkte en kunstmatige karakter van het politieke domein barstte met een gesprek tussen president Ahmet Necdet Sezer en premier Bülent Ecevit in de MGK vergadering van 19 februari 2001. Er werd beweerd dat president Sezer een boekje van de Turkse grondwet in het gezicht van premier Ecevit gooide. Zoals Ecevit vermeld in depersconferentie na de mislukte MGK vergadering dat dit een "enorme crisis". Als gevolg van economische en politieke crisissen besloot Turkije tot vervroegde verkiezingen over te gaan, op 3 november 2002. De Partij voor Rechtvaardigheid en Ontwikkeling (AKP), opgericht door en onder leiding van Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, behaalde 34 procent van de stemmen en werd daarmee de winnaar van de vervroegde verkiezingen. Voor de tijd van de AKP was Erdoğan lid van de verboden Welvaartspartij van Erbakan, en was veroordeeld tot vier maanden cel vanwege een toespraak die hij hield in de hoogtijdagen van het proces van 28 februari, toen hij burgemeester van Istanbul was. De eerste jaren van de AKP regering kenden relatief weinig problemen. Onder het bestuur van deze partij, die een meerderheid in het parlement genoot, vond er een ommekeer plaats van het geforceerde en kunstmatige politieke klimaat, hoewel de relaties met het leger nog niet volledig genormaliseerd waren. Een grote economische groei was er gerealiseerd door de regering van de AKP na de crisis. Echter, aan de vooravond van de presidentsverkiezingen in 2007, werden de burgerlijk - militaire verhoudingen weer tot heet hangijzer in verband met *de door het leger waargenomen* stijgende reactionaire dreiging.

De mogelijkheid dat er een president met een AKP achtergrond gekozen zou worden was onacceptabel voor Kemalistische kringen, vooral voor het leger, daar de president volgens de Turkse Grondwet tevens opperbevelhebber is van het leger. Vanwege hun ongemak begonnen de Kemalistische instituties van het maatschappelijk middenveld, die ook aanwezig waren tijdens het 28 februari proces, 'Republikeinse Bijeenkomsten' te organiseren, waarvan de deelnemers de slogan 'Noch Sharia, Noch Coup' scandeerden.

Abdullah Gül, een prominente figuur binnen de AKP, was de enige kandidaat voor het presidentschap, die verkiesbaar was door het parlement. De oppositie was van plan om Güls presidentschap te verhinderen door de verkiezing te boycotten en de verkiezingsuitslag voor te leggen aan het constitutioneel hof. Aan het einde van de eerste verkiezingsronde die rond het middaguur op 27 april 2007 gehouden werd, behaalde Gül niet het vereiste aantal

stemmen om te worden verkozen en zo kwam de presidentsverkiezing tot een tweede ronde. Op dezelfde dag legde de Republikeinse Volkspartij, de voornaamste oppositiepartij, de eerste ronde van de verkiezing voor aan het constitutioneel hof met de eis om de eerste ronde te annuleren omdat het quorum niet zou zijn behaald. Het leger wachtte de beslissing van het hof niet af en verklaarde in een memorandum op haar officiële website *dat het ongerust was over* een verkiezing van een president die het beschouwde als zijnde vijandig tegen de basisprincipes van de republiek. Net als het communiqué dat was uitgegeven na de vergadering van de Nationale Veiligheidsraad van 28 februari dreigde het leger de regering ook dit maal met sancties wanneer een dergelijke president toch zou worden verkozen. Kort na het memorandum van het Turkse leger annuleerde het constitutioneel hof de eerste ronde van de presidentsverkiezingen en schreef de regering vervroegde verkiezingen uit, zoals voorgeschreven door de Turkse grondwet wanneer het parlement niet in staat is een president te kiezen. AKP werd wederom de winnaar van de vervroegde verkiezingen van 22 juli 2007 met 47% van de stemmen. Na de verkiezingen, werd Abdullah Gül, de kandidaat van AKP, verkozen als de nieuwe president van Turkije, in tegenstelling tot 28 februari, waar het leger niet succesvol was hun wensen in vervulling te laten brengen.

In tegenstelling tot eerdere interventies wendde het Turkse leger tijdens de interventieprocessen van 28 februari en 27 april niet direct haar dwingend vermogen aan. In plaats daarvan mobiliseerde het de media, het ambtenarenapparaat, de rechtbanken, universiteiten, handelsorganisaties en NGO's en bracht het een indirecte interventie teweeg middels het maatschappelijk middenveld. De media was een actieve deelnemer aan deze beide processen, zowel als deel van het kapitaal alsmede als een actief instrument dat de stedelijke middenklassen mobiliseerde en leidde.

Deze scriptie analyseert de rol van de media in deze twee processen alsmede de praktijk van het mobiliseren van de stedelijke middenklassen middels tekstuele, discursieve en sociale functies. De analyses van deze twee interventieprocessen, met speciale aandacht voor het gedrag van de media, hebben een bijdrage geleverd aan de wetenschappelijke literatuur over Turkije, die niet echt overvloedig is wanneer het gaat om mediastudies.

De dissertatie maakt gebruik van de Fairclough's discourse analyse theorie, welke aandacht besteedt aan tekstuele en sociale praktijken, alsmede discursieve praktijken, Antonio Gramsci's hegemonie en civiele samenleving theorue en Şerif Mardin's toepassing van centrum-periferie theorie op de Turkse casus als de voornaamste theoretische kaders voor de analyses en het onderzoek. Uit de analyses van het gedrag van de media en zijn discours blijkt dat de traditionele Kemalistische kern heeft geprobeerd zijn alleenheerschappij veilig te

stellen met behulp van de media, het ambtenarenapparaat, de rechtbanken, universiteiten, handelsorganisaties en NGO's in de interventieprocessen van 28 februari en 27 april.

Een andere bijdrage van deze dissertatie is de observatie van interventieprocessen als culturele en politiek-economische conflicten in plaats van als botsingen tussen 'seculieren' en 'reactionairen'. Verschillende groepen die normaal gesproken tegenstrijdige belangen hebben, verenigden zich tijdens de interventieprocessen. Gramsci's concept van 'historisch blok' is cruciaal om de motieven, die verschillende sociale groeperingen deden samenkomen in deze processen, te doorgronden. Ook Gramsi's concept van 'intellectueel en moreel leiderschap' is leerzaam voor het begrijpen van de leidende rol van de media, die werd gerealiseerd middels discours, in interventieprocessen. De analyse van het conflict over de alleenheerschappij tussen de Kemalisten en de religieus conservatieven is ook nuttig om te kunnen begrijpen dat het conflict niet alleen ging over materiële middelen, macht of cultureel domein, maar ook over een breder domein dat alles omvat: het domein van de alleenheerschappij. Vanuit dit oogpunt was militaire inmenging in de politiek niet alleen beperkt tot het politieke domein, maar besloeg het gehele maatschappelijk middenveld – *de "civil society"* volgens de definitie van Gramsci.

Aan de andere kant is Mardin's toepassing van de centrum-periferie theorie op het Turkse voorbeeld bruikbaar om de historische ontwikkeling van het conflict tussen de Kemalisten en de conservatieven te kunnen doorgronden. De historische beschrijving door Mardin biedt de mogelijkheid om de uitgangspunten van 28 februari en 27 april in het geschiedkundige licht van de Turkse modernisering te zien. De laatste functie van Mardin's theorie is het kunnen gebruiken van Gramsci's theorie, die ontwikkeld is voor het verklaren van andere historiciteiten, voor het voorbeeld van Turkije.

Het concept van "Historic Hegemonic Center" dat is opgesteld met behulp van de theorieën van Gramsci en Mardin, is een nieuwe conceptualisatie die deze dissertatie biedt. Met behulp van deze nieuwe conceptualisatie wordt het mogelijk om de stabiliteit. Door de hulp van de nieuwe conceptualisering welke Mardin's centrum-periferie ondersteunt met het perspectief van de hegemonie werd de toepassing van Gramsci's hegemonistische analyse op de Turkse casus mogelijk.

Deze dissertatie beschouwt de media als deel van het "Historic Hegemonic Center" en analyseert haar discours. Het voornaamste betoog is het volgende: De media hebben de militaire interventieprocessen van 28 februari en 27 april gesteund als deel van het "Historic Hegemonic Center". Het media discours gebruikte termen als 'goede' versus 'slechte'

moslims, een typisch Kemalistisch discours dat reeds in de jaren '20 werd gebruikt, om de heersende conservatieven als slechte moslims te bestempelen. Het doel van deze discursieve praktijk was het mobiliseren van goede moslims, dat zijn de stedelijke middenklassen, tegen de slechte moslims, dat zijn de heersende conservatieve partijen, en uiteindelijk het veiligstellen van de steun van het volk voor de interventieprocessen. Deze dissertatie onderbouwt dit betoog met de analyses van de discoursen van 'goede' versus 'slechte' moslims, van 'gematigde en moderne islam', van 'sluipende islamisering' en van 'islamitische revolutie', in de kranten die tijdens de interventieprocessen van 28 februari en 27 april verschenen.

Alle drie de grote verhalen bestonden uit verschillende subthema's, zoals eerlijkheid, de goede vs. slechte moslims discours, de Indonesische manier van geleidelijke en gematigde islamisering discours en tot slot Iraanse manier van revolutioinaire islamisering discours. In dit onderzoek is getracht de toepassing van deze grote verhalen en thema's weer te geven door middel van het discours analyse van vier Turkse kranten. 'Milliyet' van Dogan Groep als voorhoede van de mainstream van de Turkse media, 'Cumhuriyet' als de meest prominente Kemalistische media, 'Sabah' als een casus welke de mogelijkheid geeft om de effecten van verandering van media-eigenaar te onderzoeken en ten slotte 'Akşam' van Cukurova Groep welke een plaats zocht onder de media-conglomeraten zijn de vier casussen voor mijn analyse.

Curriculum vitae

İsmail Çağlar, born in Istanbul on May 10, 1983, obtained his BA degree from the Sociology Department of Middle Eastern Technical University in 2006. In the same year he was accepted as an MPhil student at Leiden University's Turkish Studies Department. Following his graduation from the MPhil program in 2008, he continued as a Ph.D. Candidate in the same department. In the meantime, he conducted sociological and historical researches, including a research project on university students in Europe who graduated from Turkish imam-hatip high schools. The research report is under editorial revision at Amsterdam University Press for publication under the title: "From Symbolic to Physical Diasporas: Turkish Imam-Hatip High School Graduates in European Universities". During this research process he was employed as a junior researcher by the Religious Studies Department at Utrecht University.