State and Food in South Korea : moulding the national diet in wartime and beyond

Park, K.H.

Chapter Four

Reforming the Home Front

Garon uses the term 'social management' to describe the modern Japanese authorities' disciplinary mechanism that interfered in the daily lives of the people in order to regulate and transform their behaviour for the purpose of maintaining social order. Parallel with a repressive governance system, the Japanese government used the distinctive administrative apparatus to mobilize its people in numerous state projects. Through various campaigns to improve daily life, the government persuaded people to internalize appropriate values, such as diligence and thrift, in order to achieve the country's political and economic goals (Garon 1997: 5-7, 13). National movements for the improvement of daily life, initially designed by reformers of Meiji Japan (1868-1912) as part of modern nation-building projects to make the country stronger and wealthier, were intensified during the wars in which Japan participated during the first half of the twentieth century.

As in Japan, colonial Korea the improvement of daily life was a highly political project. Reforming the eating habits of Koreans was one of the various Japanese reform projects aimed at reordering and controlling Korean society throughout the colonial occupation.[197] The colonial authorities had intervened in the everyday diet of Koreans more intensively since the early 1930s, at a point when Korean society was especially politically and economically unstable (Miyamoto 1998: 21). The Japanese methods to improve daily life of colonial Koreans provided a fundamental basis for wartime mobilization campaign during the World War II, and even for yet another war campaign in post-colonial Korea.

This chapter deals with the government campaigns carried out in the name of improving daily life between the 1930s and the 1950s in Korea. In the first part, I will

[197] For example, in 1920 the Japanese government launched the Local Improvement Campaign (*Chihō kairyō undō* 地方改良運動), an earlier version of the Rural Revitalization Campaign which will be dealt in the first section of this chapter. For details of the colonial government's reorganization of Korean rural society through the Local Improvement Campaign, see Kim Y. H. 1996, Yi H. N. 1998, and Yun H. D. 2004.

demonstrate the colonial government's penetration into the daily lives of the Korean people through the Rural Revitalization Campaign (*Nōson shinkō undō* 農村振興運動),[198] which unfolded on a massive scale, and was eventually absorbed by the fully fledged mobilization campaign for war in 1940. I will document how the colonial authorities effectively used the improvement campaign to regulate the diet of the people on the home front. In the second part, I will explore the Japanese wartime methods to reform the wartime daily life of civilians was revived by the South Korean government's Wartime Daily Life Improvement launched faced with the Korean War (1951-1953). This chapter will argue that the campaigns for the improvement of daily life, through which the government interfered in people's everyday lives to a great degree, were a political tool used to regulate food consumption in society, especially in the time of war.

4.1 The Daily Life Improvement Campaigns

From the Rural Revitalization Campaign to the National Total Mobilization Movement

The Rural Revitalization Campaign (RCC) initiated in 1932 by the Governor-General in Korea, Ugaki Kazushige (1931-1936), was one of key policies implemented by the Japanese authorities in colonial Korea. The aim of it was to resolve an economic crisis and morally educating the population (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei 1945: 49). The primary stimulus for the implementation of the RRC was the extraordinary poverty that had prevailed in rural Korea since the latter half of the 1920s. Both the Japanese government's rice-importation policy and the collapse of the global markets caused by the Great Depression of 1929 severely affected Korean agriculture. As discussed in 1.1, the Programme for the Increase of Rice Production (*Sanmai zōshoku keikaku* 産米増殖計画), launched in Korea in 1920, was intended to develop the colony as a major rice supplier for the Japanese people. However, it was not long before the food policy disrupted Japanese agriculture. Hit by the rising imports of food from its colony, by the mid-1920s, the Japanese rice market was oversupplied, leading to a fall in prices, and Japanese farmers were protesting strongly against the government's agricultural

[198] The full name of this movement is the 'Rural, Mountain and Fishing Villages Revitalization Campaign (*Nōsangyoson shinkō undō* 農山漁村振興運動)', but I refer to this movement as simply the Rural Revitalization Campaign as the focus of this study is on rural areas.

development programme in Korea. To protect domestic agriculture, the Japanese government gradually reduced rice imports from Korea and, in 1934, completely suspended the Programme for the Increase of Rice Production (Johnston 1953: 58).

Reduced exports of rice, which accounted for 70 per cent of the value of total agricultural production in 1935 Korea, had devastating consequences for farming-household economy (Shin 1996: 69). According to a government investigation, as of 1931 more than 75 per cent, or 1,733,000 farming households, were in private debt to another individual (loans from credit and government organizations were excluded). The total amount of debt equalled more than 101,113,000 *yen*, with an average debt per farming household of 58.34 *yen*. For example, in Kyŏngsangman-do, one of the most commercialized granary areas in Korea, the highest debt recorded for a peasant was 22,000 *yen*, which was far beyond the power of a peasant farmer to recover (Lee H. K. 1936: 234). Two-thirds of farming households had debts which amounted to more than one-third of their annual income, leading to the destruction of the rural household economy and widespread starvation, expressed as 'starving hell' by one newspaper (Shin and Han 2000: 78). The catalyst for the colonial government's implementation of the RRC was the urgent need to rebuild the battered farm economy of Korea.

Another significant reason behind the launch of the RRC was the combustible political climate, which had arisen due to the growth of numerous social organizations, such as tenant unions, in 1920s rural society. Notwithstanding the colonial authorities' fear of the spread of socialist thought, their political actions prevailed in rural areas in the late 1920s, led by radical Korean nationalists and communists. For example, the 'Red Peasant Union' (*Chŏksaek nongmin chohap* 赤色農民組合) was an active network of communist peasants who protested against the Japanese imperialistic and feudal democratic system (Kanamori 1985: 158-159). In addition to becoming involved in tenancy disputes, they often confronted local governments, decrying tax policy and the officials' interference in village affairs, such as in night schools where people were taught radical ideology such as Marxism. Moreover, their slogans, frequently promoted, were 'anti-colonialism' and 'for the national liberation of Korea' (Shin 1996: 76-77). To combat the threat to administrative order, the colonial government had to take action to

increase its control over the spirit of the people, in a way that directed people's attention away from political issues and towards more personal affairs (Chi S. G. 1984: 121-123; Shin and Han 2000: 73-74). Thus, it was in this economic and political context that the campaign for the improvement of daily life was implemented.

The RRC started by building an extensive network. The logic behind this was that a well-structured organization would allow the authorities to reach the local population more easily and facilitate the enforcement of disciplinary power over their daily lives. The lead organization of the campaign, the Rural Revitalization Committee (*Nongch'on chinhŭng wiwŏnhoe* 農村振興委員會), was established under the Government-General in September 1932. With Minister of State Affairs as its leader, the Committee included ten bureau chiefs, seventeen local government agents and other officials. Local branches were created in all provincial, county (*kun*) and district (*myŏm*) government offices (Yahiro 1983: 17). Sub-groups were also formed in villages (*purak*), and were further divided into individual units. Comprised of approximately five households from each neighbourhood, the basic-unit rural revitalization committees each had a leader and specialists to lead people in the various development projects (Kim Y. H. 1996: 62, 67). This network of RRC gave the government the power to become directly involved in each farming household's domestic affairs and to provide detailed guidance on the handling of household finances, as I will show in the following paragraph.

Pre-existing rural civilian groups, such as farmers' associations that were part of the Korean Credit Association (*Kŭmyung chohap* 金融組合), were also mobilized to carry out various RRC projects. The Korean Credit Association was established in 1907 under the special protection of the colonial government, and functioned as a link between the government and farmers, facilitating credit for farmers and government-led agricultural development programmes.[199] By 1933, there were 685 credit associations, with one million members throughout the country, and these organizations became the basis of the implementation of RRC (Shin and Han 2000: 86).

[199] For further details concerning the functions of the Korean Credit Association and the transformation of Korean rural society, see Yi K. N. 2001 and Yi K. N. 2002.

The RRC began with comprehensive investigations into farming households' financial situations. This was to select the 'rehabilitation households'(*kaengsaeng nongga* 更生農家) that were to be the main objects of focus for the government's direct guidance. Details of domestic financial situations, including the sizes of the family workforces, side businesses (*puŏp* 副業) the families were engaged in, the farming situation and the families' financial circumstances (debts and savings) were collected. Specifics, such as spending on foodstuffs, including salt, sugar, fish, meat, grains and alcoholic drinks, and on fuel, medical care, education, and ceremonial occasions were also researched (Inoue 2007: 268-269). From among those studied, selected households were put under government supervision, and participated in various programmes to benefit their financial situations by improving their daily lives. Between 1933 and 1940, the scope of the campaign expanded continuously: the number of farming households included increased from 51,705 households in 2,277 villages to 746,930 households in 33,306 villages, representing more than 80 per cent of the total number of villages in the country (Matsumoto 1998: 166; Kim Y. H. 1996: 67).

While many RRC programmes were carried out by the five-household groups, the selected households were under the special management of the government. Taking into consideration their current financial situations and estimated expenditure in years to come, they were directed to develop five-year or ten-year plans for income and expenditure (Yahiro 1983: 12). The plans were made in accordance with the three objectives of the RRC – ensuring sufficient food, eliminating debts, and balancing household income and expenditure. With 'regeneration through one's own efforts' (*charyŏk kaengsaeng* 自力更生) and the 'self-sufficiency' (*chagŭp chajok* 自給自足) of farm life as their major principles, the plans included drawing up repayment schedules, creating subsidiary businesses to increase incomes, reforming daily practices and eliminating wasteful expenditure to save money (Ibid.: 37)

Detailed advice on how to achieve the goals was provided by members of the rural revitalization committees or by specially trained 'mainstays' (*chunggyŏn inmul* 中堅人物) who were trained as instructors for the programme. Between 1936 and 1940,

approximately 9,600 local people were trained at 148 training institutions throughout the country on a minimum of a one-month to a maximum of a one-year leadership programme (Shine and Han 1999: 87). Led by these people, for example, farmers were encouraged to cultivate fruit in order to save their food budget, to make and wear straw sandals instead buying rubber shoes, to weave cloth to refrain from buying textiles, to make compost, and to save money (Yahiro 1983: 36-37). All the guidance was tailored to fit the circumstances of each household. For example, when a target volume for composting was set for a certain household, the number of farm animals owned, from which the basic ingredients were produced, was considered first. The farmers' work experience was also taken into account. With such consideration of all the variables, goals were set and re-adjusted every year. When the instructors gave advice on the raising of livestock, the economic situation of each farming household was taken into consideration to ensure that the farmers could afford to feed the animals (Ibid.: 8, 38). The achievements of each household were regularly reported to the government.

The government's efforts to regulate the household economy were not limited to the guidance of instructors and committee members, but in 1934 expanded the sphere of its control over the lives of people through the legislation of the Family Rites Standards (*kajŏng ŭire chunch'ik* 家庭儀礼準則). In the name of breaking outdated customs and abolishing empty formalities, the government standardized the procedure for family ceremonies – weddings, funerals, and ancestral worship – and urged people to curtail expenditure on these events (Chōsen sōtokufu gakumukyoku shakaika 1938: 36). For the Japanese authorities, the costly family rituals in Korea were seen as one of the most seriously evil customs, and the financial burden on Korean households caused by family ceremonies was frequently highlighted as problematic. Allegedly, it was not uncommon for Korean farmers sell their oxen or even their land to find the money needed for the ceremonies (Miyamoto 1998: 22, 25). To eradicate such practices, the Government-General established the Family Rites Standards and ordered a special order to provincial governors to enforce compliance with the standardized regulations. It also established the Division of Rites (*ŭiryebu* 儀礼部) in the Kyŏnghagwŏn 經學院, a Confucian educational institution, to demonstrate model rituals to people (Chōsen sōtokufu

gakumukyoku shakaika 1938: 36-37). Ensuring compliance with the 'Family Rites Standards' was a typical example of the activities on the agenda of the daily life improvement, along with various other campaigns promoted under the RRC.

While the primary aim of the RRC was to create economic revitalization of rural society, it does not necessarily mean that the project attached importance only to the material side. Governor-General Ugaki stressed the spiritual aspects – 'to value labour' (*kŭllo aeho* 勤労愛好), of 'self-reliance and self-help' (*chaju charip* 自主自立), and of 'gratitude [for the country]' (*poŭn kamsa* 報恩感謝) – as other key parts of the campaign (Chōsen sōtokufu nōrinkyoku 1940: 2). He set improving both the material wealth and the morale of the country as his high-priority tasks while ruling Korea. He considered that the failure of the earlier colonial administration in Korea had resulted from a policy of overemphasis on production and a neglect of the spiritual education of the Korean people (Shin and Han 2000: 79). As a means to stabilize social unrest in his colony, Ugaki believed that the spiritual improvement of the people was pivotal, along with creating economic vitality, and he emphasized the importance of moral persuasion in the economic revitalization programmes. The RRC is an excellent example of the sorts of projects in which his ideas were embedded.

The spiritual education advocated by Ugaki originated from the morality of Tokugawa era, which emphasized the virtues of diligence, thrift and self-reliance as the keys to escaping poverty (Garon 1997: 31). This ideology was upheld by Meiji reformers, and was central to the rural development project, one of Meiji Japan's various modernization projects, and was also embodied in social policy to deal with destitution. In the face of widespread poverty in Japan after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Japanese bureaucrats vigorously promoted the moral education of the people to teach them how to fight poverty by developing their own industries rather than relying on the government's support. Combining the value of diligence for both self-betterment and the country's prosperity, the authorities spurred on the Japanese population to improve their economic lives, emphasizing saving and austerity (Hiratsuka 1989: 90-91).

To inculcate Koreans with the spirit of thriftiness, not only for personal profit but

for the benefit of the country, was highly important to achieving the goal of 'harmony between Japan and Korea' (*naisen yūwa* 内鮮融和) advocated by Ugaki. This was the slogan for the policy of 'assimilation' (*dōka* 同化), the Japan's ultimate goal of colonial administration. The aim of the policy was to transform the Korean people into diligent, loyal, law-abiding 'imperial peoples'(*kōmin* 皇民), imbued with same values, bearing the same responsibilities, and sharing the same lifestyles as the Japanese (Peattie 1984: 40). In this respect, the RRC was one of the most important policies of the colonial administration.

As part of the RRC, spiritual enhancement was called for by the government, especially during the Week of Spiritual Awakening (*seishin sakkō shūkan* 精神作興週間). Launched in November 1931, this special campaign took place every year, giving people goals to achieve. For example, during the week of 7 to 13 November 1937, the following daily tasks were set: 1) visit Shinto shrines and learn *kokutai* ideology[200]; 2) value labour and work hard; 3) reform daily life, reflect on oneself and exercise caution; 4) enhance one's spirit of self-control and endurance, and recognize the (war) situation (of the country); 5) carry out social duties (*kongdŏk sirhaeng* 公德實行) and give service to the benefit of the public interest (*konggong pongsa* 公共奉仕); 6) respect elderly people, take care of young children, and promote health; 8) feel gratitude (for the country) (Chōsen sōtokufu gakumukyoku shakaika 1938: 134-135). Such spiritual indoctrination campaigns were promoted in parallel with the RRC (Inoue 2007: 270).

Through these spiritual indoctrination and economic revitalization projects, the colonial authorities greatly increased their ability to reach into and manage the everyday lives of the common people. Governor-General Ugaki was enthusiastic about the RRC, and sometimes made personal tours of inspection in local areas to check on the status of achievements.[201] One government official said of this: 'Now, the politics of the Governor-General have even penetrated into the 'kitchens [an extremely private sphere]' of the poor' (Yahiro 1983: 11). As Minami Jirō, who took office after Ugaki in 1938, stated, no

[200] See 6.1 for a more detailed account on the Japanese *kokutai* ideology.
[201] 'Ugaki ch'ongdok kwiimdam 宇垣総督帰任談', *Tonga ilbo* 東亜日報, 1 July 1933, p.1.

other colonial policies had thus far enabled the government to interfere so directly in the everyday affairs of the general populace as the RRC (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei 1945: 84). The web of connection between the government and the people, created during the implementation of the RRC, changed the Japanese government's control mechanism over its colonial subjects. It enabled the colonial authorities to penetrate and effectively manage the everyday life of the Korean people instead of relying exclusively on the power of repression (Shin and Han 2000: 93). Most importantly, it served as an important basis for the wartime improvement of daily life campaigns, which began in 1938 and intensified with the deterioration of wartime shortages of commodities.

In October 1940, the RRC was renamed the 'Rural and Mountain Village Production Campaign to Support the Country' (*Nōsanson seisan hōkoku undō* 農山村生産報国運動), and was absorbed into the National Total Mobilization Movement (*Kokumin sōryoku undō* 国民総力運動), a full-scale war mobilization campaign. Coincidentally launched at the same time as the New Order Movement in Japan Proper in 1940, the war campaign combined all kinds of movements active in Korea at the time. With the 'creation of an advanced defence state' (*kodo kukpang kukka kŏnsŏl* 高度國防國家建設) as the end-game, the 'expansion of productivity' (*saengsannyŏk hwakch'ung* 生産力拡充) was positioned as one of its three major aims, along with the 'unification of thought' (*sasang t'ongil* 思想統一) and 'thorough national drilling' (*kungmin ch'onghullyŏn* 國民總訓練) (Matsumoto 1998: 212). Under the framework of the full-scale war campaign, farmers' production activities were duly outlined as a part of the war mobilization projects.

As the war mobilization movement began, the rural development policy changed direction completely: the previous purpose of the rural campaign, stabilizing the livelihood of the rural population, was replaced by the 'pursuit of production expansion to support the nation' (*saenghwal poguk* 生活報國) (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei 1945: 52). On the road to the construction of a new political and economic order, within the concept of the Japanese 'New Order' that insisted on totalitarian state control over all

material and human resources,[202] the pursuit of individual prosperity was emphatically denied. The colonial authorities insisted that the operational method and principle behind the RRC, of providing guidance to individual households to improve their own living conditions based on 'individualism', should be abolished. Instead, the focus of rural development policy was shifted to production for the public interest. As part of this, the role of rural communities as a unit of production, in terms of the efficiency of its labour force and its productivity, came to be based on the ideology of Japanese totalitarianism (Anonymous 1941e: 69-70).

In accordance with this fundamental principle, in December 1940 the government ordered the drawing up of 'village-plans' (*purak kyehoek* 部落計画), these were three-year production plans for each village that focused only on production increases. With villages as the basic unit, each farming household's cultivated acreage, forms of cultivation and crop yields were included in the plans, and were reported to the government through the organizational network which had been used for RRC. However, now, the information collected had nothing to do with the economic vitality of farming households. The data were used as the basis for national projects for increasing food production as well as for setting targets for the food collection programmes designed within the nationwide system of food rationing which began in 1940 (Matsumoto 1998: 217-219). That is, the efficient organizational structure originally set up for the purpose of improving the economic situation of farmers was diverted to the benefit of the war mobilization campaign.

By 1940, all rural revitalization committees in provincial governments, counties, districts and villages had been turned into local branches of the Korean Federation for National Total Mobilization (*Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei* 国民総力朝鮮連盟), the lead war mobilization organization. The smallest groups, comprised of five households, were reorganized into 'patriotic units' (*aegukpan* 愛國班) of five to ten households each (Kokumin sōryoku Chōsen renmei 1945: 50-51). Use of the pre-existing organizations was the principal factor in the successful and rapid creation of a network of civilian groups for war campaigns, as mentioned in 2.1. As the basic unit of village life for rural

[202] For details on economic policies within the framework of the 'New Order' doctrine, see Chapter Three.

people, communities were transformed into 'administered mass organizations', as the Korean scholar Moon described the civilian groups (Moon 2005: 22-23). The groups carried out a wide range of tasks for war mobilization projects, including the campaigns for the improvement of daily life.

The Improvement of the Daily Diet for the Purposes of All-out War

The improvement of daily life was ranked as one of the major goals of the Japanese government's war campaigns. In waging total war, into which Japan was plunged from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1937) until 1945, all available national resources, not just war munitions, were mobilized towards the winning of the war. The country's fighting strength depended on how well and to what extent all of its resources were mobilized by restricting civilian consumption (Cwiertka 2006a: 115-116). Thus, in 1938, under the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement (*Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō* 国民精神総動員運動), an earlier version of the National Total Mobilization Movement, the authorities introduced a broad range of projects to control the everyday lives of its people, agitating for the improvement (*kaesŏn* 改善), reform (*swaesin* 刷新), and innovation (*hyŏksin* 革新) of daily life.

Following the launch of the war campaign in 1938, the Korean Federation for the National Spirit Mobilization[203] established 21 goals, including the 'improvement of daily life'. The proper management of the daily life of a civilian was of particular importance for securing material resources, as well as for maintaining the spiritual discipline of the people. The aims of the wartime improvement of daily life campaign are outlined below:

> In order to win the holy war, it is important to secure military supplies through reducing [civilian] consumption, thrift and saving, and an expansion of production… [a]t the same time, the stabilization of life by establishing the standards for people's daily lives, which have become increasingly hard due to

[203] When the name of the war campaign changed from the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement to the National Total Mobilization Movement in 1940, the name of the lead organization also changed from the Korean Federation for the National Spiritual Mobilization to the Korean Federation for National Total Mobilization. Hereafter, I will call this organization 'Korean Federation' in the main text.

> the current circumstances [the Sino-Japanese War], is crucial for keeping people's spirits up and maintaining good health…
>
> (Anonymous 1938a: 5)

While practicing economy in everyday life, maintaining one's health was also emphasized as an important part of the wartime improvement of daily life campaign. This suggests that it was not just materials but also manpower that was considered an important resource to be mobilized to increase the fighting strength of the country. Health care came to be considered as the improvement of daily life, a crucial strategy for the Japan's war campaign.

The importance of efficient health maintenance was frequently emphasized through the publication of dietary guidelines. For example, in January 1939, the Korean Federation announced 'Guidelines for the improvement of national life in a time of national emergency' (*pisangsi kungmin saenghwal kaesŏn an* 非常時國民生活改善案). Comprised of five categories – clothing, eating, housing, amenities and social morale – it provided practical advice on how to achieve substantial savings in daily life. Concerning eating, four principles were set down:

> a. To have simple meals focusing on the enhancement of health and nutrition
> b. To give thanks before meals and have meals together at the same table and at the same time[204]
> c. To simplify parties for ceremonial occasions and entertaining and refrain from creating excitement
> d. To cultivate the habit of serving tea to guests to abolish the practice of offering alcoholic drinks (in Korean households)
>
> (Anonymous 1938b: 13)

As is made clear in the first point above, the authorities emphasized the nutritional aspects of the diet, along with the rationalization of eating, as part of the wartime campaign. In Korea, the ideas of nutrition and dietary rationalization had been introduced from the end of nineteenth century, coincidently with the launch of home economics education for women. Home Economics developed within the frame of Japan's nation-

[204] Traditionally, the time and space for home eaten meals in the Korean household was segregated by sex and age, thus, not all family members shared the eating space and dining table. A more detailed explanation about this custom will be followed in 6.1

centred educational principles which aimed at training Korean women as loyal Japanese subjects who had modern but humble living practices to serve to the country. From the end of 1930s, the scientific aspects of diet were indispensable in implementing Japan's austerity policy for its efficiency in economics and nourishment – it enabled people to eat the most nutritious food for the lowest possible cost and lowest quantity of food. [205]

The Korean scholar An T'ae-yun stated that the promotion of the nutritional knowledge in diet was limited to urban housewives (2006b: 62). Certainly, nutritional science was new knowledge at that time, and the level of rural women's school education, through which women had the opportunity to learn such things, was much lower than that of urban women. As of 1936, the rate of female primary school enrolment in rural areas was 9.6 per cent, while in cities it was 34.5 per cent (Kim S. J. 2006: 503). However, in practice, the nutritional aspect of diet was emphasized as an important component in the improvement of diet in rural people, if not as much as for educated city dwellers. Economically efficient nourishment was crucially important for the enhancement of health and the prevention of disease, which directly affected the productivity of the rural people who accounted for approximately 80 per cent of Korean population (Chang S. H. 1941b: 28). At that time, the decline in health caused by malnutrition among Korean people was a serious problem. By 1941, the mortality rate among children under the age of ten had reached 30 per cent. The chief reason for this was said to be maternal malnutrition during pregnancy. Poor nutrition was also responsible for an estimated 40,000 tuberculosis patients throughout the country and the low life expectancy of Koreans, which was less than 40 years (Chang S. H. 1941a: 133-134). In light of the increasing demand for wartime labour, the improvement of rural diet relying on the scientific solution was indispensable for the colonial government.

Kajŏng chiu 家庭之友 (Home's Companion), the official magazine of the Women's Association (*puinhoe* 婦人會), is an excellent source that shows what was the authorities' campaigns of dietary improvement in rural areas was like. The Women's Association was a sub-group of the Korean Credit Association, the government-linked

[205] Details on the development of home economics and politicisation of it will be discussed in Chapter Six of this study.

finance agency that, as previously mentioned, had been utilized for many kinds of the government's rural projects including the RRC. As a semi-official organization for rural women, the Women's Association had engaged in various rural development programmes and in the RRC since the 1930s.[206] Aimed at more than 120,000 members in around 4,000 associations throughout the country, the monthly magazine *Kajŏng chiu* was intended to act as a text book, and included wide-ranging practical information to help rationalize farming practices and reform daily life (Inoue 2000: 34-35).

For example, the magazine serialized various cookery columns, entitled '*Nongch'on yori* 農村料理' (Rural cooking), '*Sin yŏngyang kangjwa* 新營養講座' (New nutrition lecture), and '*Sin yŏngyang dokpon* 新營養読本' (New nutrition reader). Through these articles, nutritional knowledge and recipes using cheap and readily available ingredients were regularly introduced. Most of the articles were written and edited by prominent Korean women educators, such as Pang Sin-yŏng 方信榮(1890-1977)[207] and Son Chŏng-gyu 孫貞圭 (1896-?).[208] Even though it was difficult to bring about a scientific transformation all at once in rural home-cooked meals, the magazine helped to improve nutrition by using available ingredients and adopting nutritional knowledge in everyday meal preparation (Chang S. H. 1941b: 28).

In order to teach rural women how to prepare the most nutritious food at the lowest possible cost, cooking methods, the nutritional information of foodstuffs, and the function of important nutrients, such as carbohydrates, proteins and vitamins, were published frequently in the cookery columns. For example, as an economical way of consuming protein, cheap fish (i.e., anchovies and sardines) and bean curd were recommended instead of expensive meat (Pang S. Y.1939a: 40-41; Pang S. Y. 1939b: 33-36). Instructions were also given for cooking techniques that offered better nutritional intake. The columns encouraged the reduction of boiling times for vegetables to avoid

[206] See Arimatsu 2006 for an account of the colonial government's policy toward rural Korean women and the roles of the Women's Association.
[207] One of the most prominent educators of home economics in Korea. For detailed account of her educational activities, see 6. 2.
[208] Son was a teacher of Keijō Higher Normal School for seventeen years since 1922, and was involved in the government-supported daily life improvement campaigns since the end of the 1930s. She wrote the first text book of housework (*kasa* 家事) for middle schools in decolonized Korea in 1949.

destroying their nutrients, the careful boiling and consumption of offal, fish heads and even bones, and the use of every last crumb, including the skins of carrots, potatoes and radishes (Pang S. Y. 1939b: 36; Anonymous 1939a: 40). In order to absorb sufficient quantities of a variety of nutrients, it was advised that people should eat a broad ranging diet (Pang S. Y. 1939b: 36). Such dietary advice was provided through cartoons, as shown below.

Figure 4-1: A cartoon entitled 'Pursuit of nutrition' in *Kajŏng chiu* magazine (April, 1939)

For example, a 1941 article called '*Nongch'on yŏngyang kaesŏn-ŭi silche* 農村營養改善의 實際' (The reality of the improvement of nutrition in rural areas), provided detailed advice about how to improve family meals in a nutritionally-appropriate way. It was suggested that 1600 kilo calories, two-thirds of an adult male's daily calorie requirement, should come from staple foods, with the remaining 800 kilo calories coming from other foodstuffs. By eating three *hop* and three *chak* (approximately 320 grams) of

grain, it was possible to consume 32 grams of protein out of the total daily requirement of 80 grams. The remaining 48 grams of protein were to be supplied from side dishes (Chang S. H. 1941b: 28-29). Such instructions were accompanied by example meal plans, as shown in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1: A sample daily menu (to be served with staples) and ingredients, as suggested in *Hantō no hikeri* magazine[209]

Breakfast	Lunch	Dinner
Bean paste soup Soybean paste, 40 grams Chinese cabbage, 40 grams Anchovies, 40 grams White (or sweet) potatoes, 80 grams *Kimch'i*[210]	Grilled fish or meat, 6 grams Boiled potatoes, 80 grams *Kimch'i*	Soup Meat, 50 grams Beans, 40 grams White potatoes, 30 grams Vegetables, 30 grams *Kimch'i*

Source: Chang S. H. 1941b: 28-29.

As mentioned previously, the purpose of *Kajŏng chiu* was its practical use as an educational tool for rural women. In the reports of local associations, which were frequently featured in the magazine, it was reported that many group leaders got their members together to read the magazine so that they could effectively disseminate the dietary advice and other information to them (Anonymous 1937: 60; Son C. H. 1938: 15). However, in practical terms, it is hard to imagine that rural housewives were able to prepare meals in the ways suggested in the magazine. To follow the meal planning demonstrated in the magazine, housewives would have had to understand the nutritional requirements of each family member, calculate all the nutritional values of the foodstuffs and weigh every single ingredient in order to prepare proper family meals.

The impracticality of the dietary instructions was actually pointed out in a suggestion made by a local association leader to the publisher of *Kajŏng chiu*. When she had held a cooking class using the recipes featured in the magazine, her members had

[209] From May 1941, *Kajŏng chiu* was renamed *Hantō no hikari* 半島の光 (The Light of the Peninsula).
[210] A traditional fermented Korean dish generally made with Chinese cabbage and a variety of condiments, such as chilli powder, spring onions, garlic, ginger and salt.

complained that the dishes were too 'extravagant' to be prepared in farming households (Yamane 1937: 33). The dishes which received unfavourable comments from her members were:

a. Steamed cucumber (cucumber, meat, leek, garlic, unripe chilli pepper, salt, ground sesame seeds, sesame oil, pepper and soy sauce)

b. Young radish *jangach'i*[211] (young radishes, chilli peppers, leek, salt, ground sesame seeds, garlic, soy sauce and oil)

c. White potato *jangach'i* (white potatoes, beef, leek and soy sauce)

d. Courgette *namul*[212] (courgette, meat, red peppers, salt, oil, ground sesame seeds and chilli powder)

e. An egg dish (eggs, pork, beansprouts, leek, peas, salt, sesame oil and pepper)

f. A bean curd dish (bean curd, eggs, leek, wheat flour, salt and sesame oil)

g. Pan-fried aubergine (aubergine, sugar and soy sauce)

(Son C. G. 1937: 26-30)

One reason why these dishes were unsuitable for home-cooked meals might have been the expensive ingredients used. Three (a, c, and d) of the seven dishes shown above include meat products which were difficult to obtain for the majority of rural people.

The actual state of home-cooked meals in farming households was very different to that represented by the meal suggestions. For example, a diet survey of 3,010 Korean households carried out in 1939 by Professor Takai from Keijō Imperial University revealed that approximately 30 per cent of Korean people, including growing children, did not consume any animal protein in a year. According to the survey, for more than five per cent of Koreans *kimch'i* was the only accompaniment to staples (Takai 1940: 74). Another study of more than 100 farming households in *Talli* village, in Ulsan, Kyŏngsangmam-do, carried out by a research team from Tokyo Imperial University found similar results. The study showed that during July and August 1936, 96 per cent of the nutrients consumed by those surveyed came from grain, while the daily intake of animal products was almost zero (Chōsen nōson shakai eisei chōsakai 1940: 96-97).

[211] *Jangach'i* is a fermented food made with various kinds of vegetables and stored in soybean sauce, soybean paste or red pepper paste.

[212] *Namul*, one of the basic side dishes eaten by Koreans, is made with vegetables. The vegetables are sometimes served raw, sometimes fried lightly in oil, or sometimes slightly boiled, but are always well seasoned.

Despite a variety of efforts to improve rural diets to make them more scientifically nutritious, these survey results suggest that the nutritional information and instructive recipes provided were irrelevant to the actual everyday diets of village people.

While rather theoretical advice for meal preparation was a regular feature in women's magazines, it was the government's production policy that actually significantly affected and contributed to shaping the everyday diets of rural Koreans. The changes to the crops cultivated in Oesamni village in Kyŏnggi-do, brought about by the government's food collection programme, offer a case in point. Comprised of 335 villagers in 59 households, the rural village had a relatively small paddy field, where the rice crop was raised, compared to the acreage of dry fields. In accordance with the implementation of the 'village plans' programme of 1940, production targets and a collection quota were set for the village. While the actual average yield of rice crop per household was 162 *sŭng* (approximately 232 kilograms),[213] when the plan was made the production targets set for three years were, respectively, 400 *sŭng* (572 kilograms) in 1942, 410 *sŭng* (572 kilograms) in 1943, and 420 *sŭng* (586 kilograms) in 1944 per household. In order to achieve the targets for rice collection, people had to reduce their own consumption and increase the yield of barley, which became a substitute for their rice staple (Yi K. N. 2004: 809-810). However, the increase in barley production inevitably accompanied a reduction in the yields of other crops, since the acreage of the dry field was limited. Therefore, the production of soybeans, which was next to barley in terms of yield in the village, was restricted. Soybeans hold a very important place in the Korean diet. They are cooked with rice or other grains, and used as the raw materials for making soy sauce, soybean paste, and bean curd. As mentioned previously, the consumption of bean curd was frequently encouraged by dieticians as a cost-effective source of protein. However, notwithstanding such advice, it became increasingly difficult for the villages to eat bean curd because of the government's food policies.

The more state control over agricultural production was intensified, the more production was concentrated on what the government needed. Part of Oesamni village's

[213] One *sŭng* 升 is equivalent to approximately eighteen litres or 1.43 kilograms.

arable field was turned over to cotton production for important military supplies. The cultivation of sweet and white potatoes, the raw materials for making alcohol to be used with imported gasoline, was also promoted under the production plans directed by the government (Yi K. N. 2004: 812). It goes without saying that such wartime programmes greatly changed agricultural production, which thus far had supported the villagers' diet. The example of Oesamni village demonstrates that the wartime diet of rural people was by no means improved; rather, it became poorer as state control over agricultural production was strengthened.

The state management of production was not the only factor which regulated the diet of the farming population. Like the numerous food-saving campaigns implemented in the cities, there were calls to save food resources in rural areas too. As seen in the case of Oesamni village, securing rice production was the most important aspect of the war mobilization campaign. Although Korea's role as rice supplier for Japan had once ended by the mid-1930s, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War it again assumed responsibility for providing rice to feed the people in Japan Proper. To secure an adequate supply of rice for the Japanese people, the colonial authorities devoted concerted efforts to controlling rice consumption in Korea.

The many kinds of rice-saving campaigns were frequently included in the reports from the local women's associations in *Kajŏng chiu*. They formed the basis for many of the regular activities of women's associations throughout the country. For example, each household was required to collect a spoonful of rice per person three times a day in rice sacks or jars distributed by the associations (Anonymous 1939c: 14). The collected rice was then brought to the regular meetings of their associations, or collected by the local leaders, and sold collectively. The money was deposited with the Credit Association to be used to finance the war effort. In addition to the regular saving schemes, rice was also collected for special purposes. A women's association in P'yŏngan-pukto set aside a special week for saving rice in 1938, when housewives collected four spoonfuls of rice a day. Money obtained from the sale of the rice was donated to the country as a National Defence Donation to the Imperial Army (Son C. H. 1938: 16).

As the rationale to pursue an increase in production capacity, the Japanese government persistently urged for the reform of the daily practices of Koreans, labelling them 'evil'. In order to reduce food consumption, the Korean people's 'extravagant' eating habits were frequently highlighted as bad practices that needed to be corrected by the Japanese authorities. For instance, in 1943, the Hwanghae-do local government set the goal of 'trying to correct the Korean people's bad habit of eating too much' as one of its dietary guidelines, which was announced though the *Chŏnsi nongmin tokpon* 戰時農民読本(Wartime Farmers' Reader), a book issued to provide advice to the public on how to lead a frugal life (Hwanghae-do nongjŏnggwa 1943: 60-61). The reason for this perception that Koreans over-ate is presumed to be due to the monotony of the side dishes eaten as part of the diet, and the extremely high reliance on staple foods for energy intake, which mentioned previously in this section. However, in terms of calorie intake, it seems this Japanese observation was not true. According to a research team at Tokyo Imperial University, as of 1936, a farmer's daily calorific intake in *Talli* village equalled 2,996 kilo calories. This was lower than that of the Chinese and Japanese: the Chinese consumed 3,461 calories[214] and the Japanese 3,400[215] (Chōsen nōson shakai eisei chōsakai 1940: 44-45, 91).

Notwithstanding the actual circumstances, the 'wasteful' eating habits of Korean people were frequently included in government's guidelines to improve daily life. For example, Standards of Daily Life in the situation of Emergency (*Pisangsi saenghwal kijun yangsik* 非常時生活基準様式) established in 1938 included agenda to 1)obey the principle of having simple meals; 2) set only one bowl of soup and *kimch'i* as side dishes at breakfast; and 3) cook staple foods less than twice per day, and have cold dishes at lunch (Chōsen sōtokufu 1938, quoted in Ch'oe Y. R. 1994: 79-80).

Farmers eating and drinking between meals (these snack were known as *kansik* 間食) was another example of bad practice according to the Japanese. In rural Korea *kansik* was traditionally prepared by richer farmers for the peasants and wage-workers for during

[214] During 1922 and 1925, 1,070 farmers in six localities were studied.
[215] During 1917 and 1924, per adult in Japan Proper.

or after work, especially when there was collaborative work during the busy farming season. Eating snacks during a break or after the day's work together was valuable for the peasants and workers, who usually lived on a frugal diet. According to the Japanese scholar Matsumoto, in this way *kansik* functioned as income redistribution in rural society (1998: 172). Moreover, it was an important motivator for working hard and for enhancing the spirit of teamwork that the colonial government sought to encourage. However, the colonial authorities saw the practice as a waste of time, money and farmers' labour, and prohibited it in the name of the ban on entertainment and the consumption of alcoholic drinks. Instead, farm workers were expected to provide their own meals (Yi K. N. 2004: 824-825). Even when the government's control of the diet went against the concept of Japanese totalitarianism, their inconsistent policy was justified in the context of wartime austerity policy. What people were required to do in the name of improvement was to live frugally and dedicate their surplus to the country.

It is difficult to establish to what extent the colonial government's efforts to reform the eating practices of Koreans by promoting thriftiness eased the food shortages farmers faced as a result of state food controls. For example, scholars report that some farmers in Japan during the first half of the 1940s had plenty of food because they were able to grow what they needed, even though this required tremendous effort due to labour shortages and other difficulties. They consumed more rice than before, and enjoyed greater comfort by selling the food at higher prices to the urban population who were suffering severely from the food shortages.[216] Similarly, Korean farmers engaged in illegal trading with city dwellers who journeyed into the countryside with money or goods to barter for food, as I have illustrated in Chapter Three.

However, it seems clear that not all Korean farmers were able to make a decent living by selling their farming products and making savings. This is what one researcher who conducted a diet survey in 1940 had to say about the dietary conditions in one farming village:

I felt so sad to hear that a woman, who represented herself as a notable person,

[216] For example, see Cwiertka 2006a: 130-131 and Scherer 1999: 110-111.

> stated at a meeting to discuss rural problems that, 'The problem is that Korean farmers consume too much rice these days. We need to encourage them to eat barley with rice'… Today, Korean farmers are, in fact, at risk of starvation…My survey of a farm village near Taegu revealed that there are, surprisingly, 43 kinds of roots of grasses and [bark of] trees eaten by farmers… [t]hey make *kaetŏk* [217] by combining mugwort, white potatoes, grasses, and powdered barley or wheat…Normally, this 'special' food is not eaten until the first month [in the lunar calendar] of the new year [after the harvested foods of the previous year have been completely eaten up]. However, even before the first month, farmers who have been hit by famine or who are in extreme poverty are forced to eat this food.
>
> (Im C. S. 1940: 30)

The testimony above clearly reveals that the call for the improvement of diet, which was vigorously disseminated all over the country, was completely divorced from reality. Moreover, many farmers bore a heavy burden on the home front as food producers without enough food for themselves. The situation of several villages hit by drought and food damage in 1939 in Kyŏngsangnam-do, Chollanam-do, and Ch'ungch'ŏngnam-do was covered by journalists for the *Chosŏn ilbo* newspaper in 1940:

> Since last autumn, [the farmers in a village in Kyŏngsangman-do] have eaten porridge made with buckwheat and the roots of grasses. In order to overcome this unprecedented disaster, they have borne the lowest standard of living, saving rice to the utmost and eating a breakfast made with the bark of trees.
>
> (Pyŏn Y. G. 1940: 39)

> To save rice, city dwellers are encouraged by the government to eat 70 per cent polished rice instead of white rice, and more of other grains, such as barley, beans, and red beans. Despite being the people who cultivate rice with their own hands, the farmers [in a village of Chŏllanam-do] hardly see the rice; they eat gruel made with dried mugwort and grasses, barley flour, millet and buckwheat…
>
> (Ch'oe I. S. 1940: 40)

> There are 117 households in [Namsŏn] village [in Ch'ungch'ŏngnam-do]

[217] Steamed cakes.

> including two landlords, sixteen part-owner farmers, and 99 tenants….even when they get a good harvest it is impossible to secure sufficient food for all the village people. Therefore they are accustomed to having to overcome the barley hump. Since early autumn, people have begun to devote all their efforts to collecting the leaves of soya and red beans, chestnuts, and edible wild plants.
>
> (Yu I. C. 1940: 43)

The reports from the farming villages above were made in spring 1940, a few months after the serious crop failure; thus it is an exaggeration to say that farmers always bore such severe hardship. However, as the war progressed, the government requisitioned more and more of what the farmers produced, leaving less and less food for their own consumption. In such a situation, the people in farming villages could not think much beyond survival, let alone of improving home-cooked meals using knowledge of the nutrient value of foodstuffs. The wartime campaign for the improvement of daily life was another name for the austerity programme that supported the country's war efforts.

Michel Foucault stated that the supervision of details, the smallest fragments of everyday life, is linked with discipline – in the general formula for domination – to provide the holder with power (1991: 137, 140). For the colonial authorities, managing the everyday lives of the Korean populace was a political tool used to reorder colonial society for the purpose of stabilizing the colonial administration. Under the name of the improvement of daily life, the government created a dense organizational network which connected the state and ordinary people, and effectively used 'surveillance' and 'normalization', the two greatest instruments of disciplinary power, to control the Korean people's daily lives (Foucault 1991: 184).

Although the improvement of wartime diet called for by the Japanese government was in fact nothing but the curtailment of food consumption, the campaign was a significant and logical supporter of the wartime food management programme. The intricate connection between state power, war mobilization and daily life of people led to a revival of the wartime improvement of daily life movement by the South Korean government during the Korean War.

4.2 The Daily Life Improvement Campaigns Recycled in 1951

The Korean War and the Reform of Wartime Daily Life

The Korean War, which broke out in June 1950 and ended with an armistice in July 1953, greatly damaged Korean society. During the three-year conflict, 1,998,966 Koreans were killed or injured, including 990,968 civilians (Yi T. G. 2000: 258). The war devastated an economy that had previously been showing signs of recovery from an inflationary spiral that had occurred after the country's liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Between January and May 1950, money issues fell by 20 per cent, and the long-standing upward trend in prices took a downward turn: the rate of price increases on previous months was fifteen per cent in January 1950, 6.1 per cent in March, and just 1.1 per cent in April. In May, prices had fallen by 4.4 per cent (Ibid.: 202). The cost of the physical damage caused by the war, the destruction of major industries, the social infrastructure and buildings, had reached three billion US dollars. This was equivalent to two years' total national income at that time. The damage devastated the country and left more than 12 per cent of Korean people homeless (Ibid.: 249, 255, and 258).

However, the human casualties and astronomical material damage were not the only outcomes of the Korean War. The war significantly established the relationship between the authorities and the Korean people, providing the South Korean government with a powerful incentive to control the daily lives of the people in pursuit of total mobilization for the war effort. The Korean government's mobilization campaign, carried out in the name of the wartime improvement of daily life, marked the revival of the Japanese campaign during the Second World War that required Korean people to aid the nation's war effort, both materially and morally, by practicing austerity in their everyday lives.

On 2 August 1951, in an attempt to encourage austerity and increase social discipline, the Ministry of Social Affairs issued 'Practical Guidelines for the Daily Life of the Population in Wartime' (*Chŏnsi kungmin saenghwal silch'ŏn yogang* 戰時國民生活實践要綱). They were issued approximately one month after the discussion of an armistice began between the Soviets and the UN, the allied powers of North and South

Korea respectively (Cumings 2010: 31). By this time, combat command had been completely handed over to the UN force and, in practical terms, the South Korean government had taken a step back from the war. Even though the fighting continued, the conflict was limited to areas near to the 38th parallel of the Korean peninsula, which remains a militarized border between the two Koreas today. With the relative stabilization of the front, the South Korean authorities set about reorganizing the social order and managing people on the home front so that they could support the war, both materially and spiritually (Mun S. S. 1999: 45-46).[218] Most important and urgent was the recovery of the country's economy in order to finance the huge war expenses. As of 1950, state expenditure was 2.8 times the country's total income, of which more than 80 per cent was spent on the war (Yi T.G. 2000: 204). Placed in this situation, the South Korean government officially launched a mass campaign to mobilize the population behind the war effort by actively implementing austerity policies.

The authorities' intention behind the establishment of the 'Practical Guidelines for the Daily Life of the Population in Wartime' was announced in the following way:

> Ever since the 6.25 Incident [the Korean War], brave Korean soldiers have been fighting, sacrificing themselves with the righteous UN forces to secure the country and the peace of mankind in this holy anti-communist war. Contemporary war is total war which requires the citizens on the home front to brace themselves to face the war, and to stay in tune with the battles on the front line. We must return to a war footing, both materially and spiritually, and militarize life on the home front. Only when we are armed at home, shall we be victorious and save face in front of the fallen patriots and soldiers on the battlefield. Accordingly, we have established some basic provisions for daily life for the citizens at war, and we call for them to be put into practice…
>
> (Ch'ongmuch'ŏ 1951: 169)

The day-to-day lives of citizens were regarded as a critical component in mobilizing for the war effort. Taking the position that militarizing the home front was as essential as

[218] Mun Sang-sŏk states that the South Korean government strengthened the state's repressive power and administrative infrastructure to mobilize social resources from July 1951. For example, in his research, he illustrated the power of the national police increased greatly between 1950 and 1951 (Mun 1999: 49, 65).

fighting on the front line, the government stressed that people's lives had to be tightly controlled in order to achieve victory in the war. Similarly to the Japanese colonial authorities, the South Korean government called on the nation to brace itself for war, and to wholeheartedly cooperate with state economic policies by reforming living practices. As clearly expressed above, the Korean people were required to return to the frugal wartime lives that they had been urged to follow during the final years of the Japanese occupation. The only difference this time was that people were encouraged to practice economy to serve their own country, not the Japanese Empire. Thus, the issue of reforming the daily lives of the Korean populace once again drew governmental attention as a significant component in sustaining the Korean War.

The Guidelines were developed for the implementation of an austerity programme. They comprised practical advice on how to economize on all aspects of food, clothing and shelter, along with points on 'inculcating national morale' (*kungmin todŏk* 國民道德), 'wartime moderation' (*chŏnsi chŏlche* 戰時節制), and 'conquering evil customs' (*p'yepung kyojŏng* 弊風矯正). With regard to food, the following agenda was set.[219]

Food

A. Principles

a. Value nutrition and hygiene, and to simplify meals to fit with the wartime economy and life

b. Cut waste in eating to the utmost, and to cooperate with the state's economic policies

B. Practical points

a. Save rice and eat other grains [barley] with rice

b. Eat simple meals, obeying the principle of 'one bowl of soup' and 'one side dish'

c. Have a 'no beef day' and a 'no alcoholic beverages day'

d. Do not drink alcoholic drinks during the day

e. Have fixed mealtimes

f. Correct children's picky eating

g. Do not waste food by preparing more than necessary

h. Eschew drinks parties as much as possible

i. Prepare one's own packed lunches (applies to government officials, salaried workers and labourers)

[219] For the rest of the Guidelines, see Appendix II.

(Ch'ongmuch'ŏ 1951)

All in all, we can find many similarities between the above guidelines and the campaign agenda stressed by the Japanese government during Korea's colonial era. Beginning with reducing the consumption of rice, alcoholic drinks and meat, the guidelines were intended to conserve food resources by simplifying meals. Korean eating habits that had also been criticized as bad practice by the colonial government, such as offering many side dishes and the separation of eating by the sexes and ages of family members, were again prohibited despite the fact that following the guidelines was entirely voluntary. The authorities appealed to the patriotism and morality of the Korean nation to obey these stipulations (see Appendix I). However, after a few months, the guidelines were incorporated into the Wartime Daily Life Improvement Campaign (*Chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn undong* 戰時生活改善運動), and were made legally binding.

With the proclamation of the Wartime Daily Life Improvement Act (*Chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏnpŏp* 戰時生活改善法)[220] on 18 November 1951, the government was handed unprecedented power to control the everyday lives of the Korean people. The act introduced a series of compulsory regulations aimed at 'increasing the national morale of the people in times of war through the innovation and simplification of daily life' (Taehanmin'guk chŏngbu kongboch'ŏ 1951: 1). In order to bring the management of restaurants under control, it prohibited the selling of alcoholic beverages in restaurants before 5 p.m. and the operation of high-class Korean restaurants without permission by presidential order. Singing, dancing and the employment of women for the purposes of entertainment at restaurants were prohibited. Sumptuary regulations were also introduced. The government was able to regulate the import, production, sale, and even wearing of luxury clothes, whenever such actions were considered necessary. In addition the act stipulated the setting up of a Wartime Daily Life Improvement Committee (*Chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn wiwŏnhoe* 戰時生活改善委員會),[221] which played a central role throughout the 1950s in coordinating and driving various austerity projects in the name of the wartime improvement of daily life (Ibid.).

[220] Hereafter the WDLI Act.
[221] Hereafter the WDLI Committee.

Ten days after the issuance of the act, the WDLI Committee was constituted under the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Minister and Vice-Minister of Social Affairs were appointed as the organization's leader and vice-leader respectively, and six sub-committees, moral (*toŭi* 道義), ceremonial (*ŭirye* 儀礼), clothing (*ŭibok* 衣服), food (*ŭmsik* 飮食), shelter (*chut'aek* 住宅) and surveillance (*kamsi* 監視), were set up.[222] The establishment of local branches followed. Committees for the Promotion of Wartime Daily Life (*Chŏnsi saenghwal ch'ŏkchin wiwŏnhoe* 戰時生活促進委員會) were formed within the local government jurisdictions of cities and provinces throughout Korea.[223] In Taegu city, for instance, the Committee comprised the city's mayor, department heads and police chiefs.[224] Mobilizing this nationwide network of committees, the WDLI Committee took the lead in implementing full-scale campaigns to encourage frugality by changing the consumption patterns of the Korean people.

Prominent among the WDLI Committee's activities was the control of restaurants. As the fact that the WDLI Act included many regulations affecting restaurants shows, restricting the activity of eating establishments and the amount of food and drink sold in them was integral to reforming the eating habits of the Korean people. The popularization of eateries in Korea began during the colonial era with the flow of Japanese migrants who wanted to maintain a Japanese lifestyle (Cwiertka 2010a: 31), but this trend had escalated after the country's liberation. For example, the number of high-class restaurants grew from ten to 55 between August 1945 and February 1947, and, in Seoul alone, the number of female entertainers working at such restaurants increased from 500 to 1,300 between August 1945 and December 1948.[225] As of August, 1947, more than 3,300 establishments

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[222] 'Sahoebu, chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn wiwŏnhoe chojik 사회부, 전시생활개선위원회조직', *Seoul sinmun* 서울신문, 1 December 1951. Electric document, available at http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_023_1951_11_28_0040 (accessed 20 June 2012)

[223] 'Sahoebu, chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn undong silch'ŏn kyehoek chunbi 사회부, 전시생활개선운동실천계획준비',*Taegu maeil* 대구매일, 12 June 1952. Electric document, available at http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_025_1952_06_07_0070 (accessed 20 June 2012)

[224] 'Taegu-si, chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn Taegu-si ch'ojik wiwŏnhoe chojik 대구시, 전시생활개선 대구시조직위원회 조직', *Taegu mael*, 15 June 1952. Electric document, available at http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_025_1952_06_14_0100 (accessed 20 June 2012).

[225] 'Kuksa-nŭn tadan hande yuhŭngga man-ŭn pŏnch'ang nŭnŭni yorijip naonŭni yudubunmyŏn 國事는 多端한데 遊興街만은 繁盛느느니 料理집 나오느니油頭粉面', *Tonga ilbo*, 29 January 1946, p.2; 'Sudo-ŭi hyangangmyŏn imo chŏmo haebang hu nŭnŭngŏs-ŭn ŭmsikchŏm ppun 首都의 享樂面 이모

serving food and drink were operating in the capital.[226] The ubiquitous presence of restaurants, cafes, bars and eating houses, and people's expenditure on eating and drinking at such places, was highlighted as a significant drain on people's resources.

A more serious problem was the fact that a large number of eateries operated without authorization. For example, as of 1946, there were 400 eateries without licences in Ponjŏng town in Seoul, in addition to a corresponding number of authorized establishments.[227] In 1949, the proportion of cafes, bars and eateries illegally operating in Seoul was more than twenty per cent of the total number of establishments.[228]

While the majority of illegal businesses were small-scale and owned by those repatriated after the country's liberation, they were a serious concern for the government as food and drink consumed in them was beyond the control of the state. As discussed in 2.1, in the years following Korea's liberation from Japanese rule, the shortage of rice remained a major problem, and its consumption was strictly controlled through food rationing schemes. Reviving this colonial precedent, the authorities in post-colonial Korea implemented various restrictive measures to curb rice consumption. For example, prohibitions of unlicensed brewing using rice,[229] the sale and consumption of alcoholic drinks during the daytime,[230] and the consumption of pure white rice[231] were repeatedly imposed by the authorities. Even though the government devoted much effort to enforcing compliance with the regulations, not every business operator obeyed them, and

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저모 解放後에 느는것은 飮食店뿐', *Tonga ilbo*, 12 February 1947, p.2; 'Saenghwal sukchŏng-ŭi p'iryo 생활숙정의 필요', *Tonga ilbo*, 7 December 1948, p.1.

[226] 'Ŭmsikchŏm-e ch'ŏlt'oeryŏng ch'iral-ŭl chŏngbi kyehoek 飮食店에 鐵槌令 七割을整備計劃 ', *Tonga ilbo*, 31 August 1947, p.2.

[227] 'Ŭmsikchŏm nŏmu mant'a Ponjŏng-sŏ ch'wich'e 飮食店너무만타 본정서 취체', *Tonga ilbo*, 29 January 1946, p.2.

[228] 'Sŏul sinae ŭnsikchŏm-ŭi hyŏnhwang 서울시내飮食店의현황', *Sŏul sinmun*, 7 November 1949. Electric document, available at http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_015_1949_11_06_0080 (accessed 20 July 2012)

[229]'Yangju-e chŏngjiryŏng soju man-ŭn cheoe 釀酒에停止令燒酒만은 除外', *Tonga ilbo*, 22 March 1946, p.2; 'Milchu sŏnghaeng-ŭro ilban pudam kajung, yangjo kŭmjiryŏng narin hu-ŭi chibang tongt'ae 密酒盛行으로一般負擔過重 釀造禁止令나린后의 地方動態', *Tonga ilbo*, 21 November 1946, p.2.

[230] 'Nassul-ŭn kŭmdan 낫술은 禁斷', *Tonga ilbo*, 29 March 1949, p.2; 'Saenghwal kaesŏnan silsi yoryŏng kyŏlchŏng 生活改善案實施要領決定', *Tonga ilbo*, 15 April 1950, p.2.

[231] 'Yangjŏng maesang-esŏ sobi ŏkche-ro chŏnhwan!糧政買上에서消費抑制로轉換!', *Kyŏnghyang sinmun* 京鄕新聞, 22 March 1949, p.4.

the unauthorized eateries were especially unlikely to follow the rules.[232] For the government, such infractions were a serious obstacle to controlling the consumption of scarce food resources.

In the name of the improvement of daily life, the government sought to tighten its grip on restaurant management and to reduce the number of eateries. From 1 December 1951, the day that the WDLI Act came into effect, there was a one-week crack-down on restaurant operations, coordinated by the WDLI Committee. As the head regulatory group, officials from the Ministries of Health, National Defence, Home Affairs and Justice were appointed, and local surveillance groups were organized. They forced closures of high-class restaurants, monitored restaurants arguing for environmental health, and detected instances of non-compliance with regulations based on the WDLI Act.[233]

The restrictions imposed on restaurant management included time restrictions for the sale of alcohol and maximum prices for foods and beverages sold in shops, largely recycling the measures implemented under the Japanese controlled economic system. Alcoholic drinks were only allowed to be offered between 5 p.m. and 11 p.m. The prices of more than 60 dishes categorized as Korean, Western and Chinese, were fixed by order of the government. Ceiling prices for both alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks - tea, coffee, milk and cocoa - were set, ranging from 500 *wŏn* to 1,100 *wŏn*. Rice mixed with other grains (in a ratio of at least 30 per cent) was set as the standard staple food. The quantities of alcoholic drinks allowed per capita were also stipulated: the allowance for *chŏngju*[234] was up to two *hap* (approximately 360 millilitres), for *soju*[235] and whisky up to one *hap* (180 millilitres), and for *t'akchu*[236] and beer up to five *hap* (900 millilitres). Furthermore, the style in which meals were served was also determined. Under these regulations, it was illegal to offer set meals of more than three dishes per person.[237] Those who broke the

[232] 'Sarinju-e kyŏngjong sinae yojŏng, ŭmsikchŏm, tan'gug-esŏ ilche kŏmsaek 殺人酒에警鍾 市內料亭, 飮食店 當局에서一齊檢索', *Tonga ilbo*, 2 February 1946, p.2; 'Kŏllyodŭn p'unggibŏm Chongno-sŏ p'alsipch'ilgŏn chŏkpal 걸려든風紀犯 鍾路署서 八七件摘發', *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, 15 December 1946, p.3.
[233] 'Imsi haptong kŏmch'altae chojik 臨時合同檢察隊組織', *Tonga ilbo*, 27 November 1951, p.2.
[234] A clear wine made by separately filtering the fermented wine from the grain.
[235] A strong distilled alcoholic drink made from grain or potatoes.
[236] A milky, sweet alcoholic beverage made from rice. Also known as *makŏlli*.
[237] 'Kogŭp yojŏng p'yeji muhŏga ŭmsikchŏm tansok kanghwa 高級料亭廢止無許可飮食店團束强化', *Tonga ilbo*, 2 December 1951, p.2.

regulations faced a maximum fine of 500,000 *wŏn* or a misdemeanour imprisonment under the WDLI Act.[238]

While the government's initial focus was on controlling the restaurant industry, by May 1952, state control had expanded to the general populace after the Cabinet's agreement that the rules of operation be based on the WDLI Act. In addition, restrictions on food consumption and expenditure on eating out, and policies to save rice, such as the prohibition of confectionary production using rice, were strengthened. The government urged people to limit the number of side dishes served at home to less than two.[239]

Echoing the Japanese war mobilization campaign, the rules of operation set the framework for public campaigns. Setting the first day of every month as 'The day for the Improvement of Spiritual Life' (*kungmin chŏngsin saenghwal kaeson il* 國民精神生活改善日), various campaigns were developed by local authorities led by the central government. The goal set for the campaigns was to improve national morale and encourage citizens to practice frugality.[240] In order to effectively disseminate state orders and campaign agendas, the mobilization of the people using the *kungminban* 國民班 (national units) and the *purak* 部落 (village) network was ordered depending on localities. The *kungminban* were the successors of the *aegukpan* 愛國班 ('patriotic units'), civilian units created in 1938 by the Japanese government, which had assumed various administrative functions to support war campaigns until 1945. A village was the basic unit in the rural community on which the colonial authorities particularly focused when increasing wartime productivity, as explained in 2.2. The civilian groups, initially created for carrying out the Japanese war mobilization programmes during the World War II was reused by the Korean government for the purpose of putting state war policies into effect under the pressure of the Korean War.

In accordance with the establishment of the rules of operation, the government actively organized projects to reorder the wartime daily life of civilians. From June 1952,

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[238] 'Imsi haptong kŏmch'altae chojik 臨時合同檢察隊組織', *Tonga ilbo*, 27 November 1951, p.2.

[239] 'Chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏnpŏp sihaeng sech'ik 23-il kungmu hoeŭi t'onggwa 戰時生活改善法施行細則 23 日 國務會議通過', *Tonga ilbo*, 25 May 1952, p.2.

[240] 'Chŏnsi saenghwal-lo kaesŏn, kungmu hoeŭi yogang-ŭl kyŏlchŏng 戰時生活로改善, 國務會議要綱을 決定', *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, 26 May 1952, p.2.

the authorities began a three-month campaign to improve daily life in twenty major cities. Through public lectures, radio broadcasts, street parades, posters and banners, people were charged with eliminating wastefulness in all aspects of clothing, food and shelter.[241]

In addition to state-led public education, various special campaigns were designed by the private sector. For example, in March 1952, a meeting took place between government officials from the Bureau of Public Information (*Kongboch'ŏ*), police officers, and the leaders of the Restaurant Association (*Ŭmsikchŏm hyŏphoe*) and Teahouse Association (*Tabang hyŏphoe*). As a way to spiritually educate the people on the home front, the leaders of the Restaurant and Teahouse Associations agreed to play military songs three times a day and put war slogans on the walls of hotels, restaurants and teahouses throughout the country.[242] Public competitions were organized to create the slogans used in the national campaigns. For instance, in a contest organized by the police in 1953, a motto designed by a female student that said 'Let's patronize homemade products, let's reject luxuries' was selected.[243] Such contests were held regularly, and the selected slogans were spread to the general populace through the meetings of the *kungminban* and village units.

It was only on 5 November 1963, ten years after the Armistice Agreement was signed between North and South Korea, that the WDLI Act was officially abolished (Taehanmin'guk chŏngbu kongboch'ŏ: 1963). This legal foundation, originally designed to ensure people lived thriftily and to improve national morale for sustaining the state's war efforts, remained in effect long after the war ended. For instance, even in 1957, four year after the armistice, the WDLI Committee continued to exist, leading improvement campaigns, such as 'The week of the Improvement of Daily Life in Wartime'.[244] Repeatedly evoking the image of war and the vulnerability of the country, the government continuously involved itself in people's lives and encouraged them to practice economy in daily life. It was because reforming living practices of the people

[241] 'Chŏnsi kungmin saenghwal ch'okchin chugan sŏlch'i 戰時國民生活 促進週間設置', *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, 2 June 1952, p.2.
[242] 'Tabang-sŏ kun'ga leko-t'ŭ 다방서 군가레코-트', *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, 19 March 1952, p.2.
[243] 'Sigyŏng mojip p'yoŏ ipsŏn 市警募集 標語入選 ', *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, 11 February 1953, p.2.
[244] 'Saenghwal kaesŏn wiwŏnhoe-rŭl kaech'oe 生活改善委員會를開催', *Chosŏn ilbo* 朝鮮日報, 12 June 1957, p.2.

was a significant component in managing the post-war country.

The Post-war Reconstruction of South Korea and the New Daily Life Campaign

In 1954, the Wartime Daily Life Improvement Campaign was renewed as the New Daily Life Campaign (*Sinsaenghwal undong* 新生活運動). Largely relying upon the framework constructed during the wartime saving campaigns, the matter of improving day-to-day living was repositioned as a post-war reconstruction project. The authorities argued for the need for an extensive modification of people's daily practices. In order to move the whole society towards modernization and the development of the country, the Korean authorities encouraged morality and thrift among the nation (Chŏng H. J. 2004: 97-98).

First and foremost, the authorities sought to use a mass campaign to improve the situation of the nation's economy, which had deteriorated during the Korean War. The prospectus written by officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs, which remained the leading force in the national campaign throughout the 1950s, clearly shows that the chief objective of the campaign was the nation's economic reconstruction.

> The New Daily Life Campaign requires strength of will to lead one's life in this way and a determined attitude towards everyday life…Fundamental principles and goals must be set to establish a steady economic structure…[i]t is vital that we review our daily practices with consideration of regional differences before launching an initiative. The government must take firm steps to stabilize the new political and economic order and turn an inflationary situation into deflation by introducing a system of appropriate taxation, a savings programme, state bonds and a lottery… [T]o curb prices, to tighten import controls, to encourage the use of domestic products and to stimulate an increase in production are integral parts of the austerity policy…
>
> (Pogŏn sahoebu Punyŏguk in 1956, quoted in Chŏng H. J. 2004: 98-99)

As clearly demonstrated above, the New Daily Life Campaign set concrete goals and methods for reforming daily life. Positioning morality and thrift as integral parts of improvement, the introduction into everyday life of rationalization based on scientific concepts was set as one of the major goals. The following end goals were set for the New

Daily Life Campaign.

> Establishing morality (*toŭi hwangnip* 道義確立)
>
> Building good character, training to be a good citizen (*kongmin* 公民),[245] mental preparation, understanding the concept of equality, the transformation of [bad] customs
>
> Reconstruction and recovery (*kŏnsŏl puhŭng* 建設復興)
>
> Respect for creativity, development of resources, honing of skills, cooperation and solidarity, austerity in living
>
> Scientific living (*kwahak saenghwal* 科學生活)
>
> Breaking of bad customs, health and welfare, rationalization of clothing, rationalization of eating habits, rationalization of shelter
>
> (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 76)

Based on these three goals, codes of conduct for practicing rationality in daily life were established for both urban and rural living.

> Five guidelines for living an austere urban life
>
> a. To pay attention to the time
> b. To conserve goods
> c. To simplify wedding ceremonies
> d. To abstain from drinking alcoholic drinks during the day
> e. To use imported tobacco in moderation
>
> Five guidelines for rationalizing rural living
>
> a. To pay attention to the time
> b. To devote oneself to economic self-reliance
> c. To simplify ancestral ritual ceremonies
> d. To improve environmental hygiene
> e. To increase the love of one's hometown
>
> (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 75-77)

While the New Daily Life Campaign was designed for the purpose of the post-war reconstruction of Korea, the 'improved living' presented by the authorities differed little from the components of WDLI campaigns, which originated from the Japanese version of war campaigns. That is, the framework of improvement advocated by the Japanese colonial government, a fundamentally good part of the campaign agenda, remained. The objectives shown above regarding dietary reform had been prominent components of the

[245] Literally, a 'public person'.

colonial campaign for the improvement of daily life.

One demonstrable similarity between the Japanese colonial improvement of daily life campaign and the Korean campaign is the administrative effort made to standardize family ritual ceremonies. In 4.1, I explained that the Japanese government regarded the Korean traditional family rites, which often involved large amounts of consumption, as wasteful. With the establishment of the Family Rites Standards in 1934, the colonial government exhorted Korean people to observe modified familial ceremonies under the Rural Revitalization Campaign. Even after the Campaign was absorbed into a major war campaign, the agenda remained one of the austerity programmes of the Japanese colonial government. For the Korean authorities, as the above-quoted guidelines reveal, the costly tradition of familial rituals was also seen as one of the major obstacles to rationalizing the daily life of the nation. In 1956, by the WDLI Committee, the Ritual Standards (*ŭirye kyubŏm* 儀礼規範) were developed. These guidelines set out the rules for weddings, funerals and ancestral memorials, and even filled in the details, such as providing standard formats for wedding invitations (Pogŏn sahoebu chŏnsi saenghwal kaesŏn wiwŏnhoe 1958: 3, 19). At first, the stipulations were not binding, but in 1969 the Ritual Standards were given legal force by a presidential decree, undergoing several revisions during the 1980s. Between 1973 and 1976, for example, the number of violation of this regulation reached 2,268 cases (Ko W. 2006: 214). Throughout the 50-year implementation of the state-led campaigns, the Korean people's deeply rooted family rituals underwent a gradual process of rationalization.

The Role of the Women's Bureau in Establishing the New Daily Life

While the WDLI Committee was crucial in implementation of the state's austerity campaigns, the *Punyŏguk* 婦女局 (Women's Bureau) was also one of the leading forces in driving the government's improvement of daily life campaigns. The Women' Bureau, created on 14 September 1946 under the Ministry of Health and Welfare,[246] was the first governmental organization exclusively for the administration of matters related to women

[246] Due to governmental reorganization, the Women's Bureau transferred to the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1948 and, in 1955, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Welfare were unified as the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.

and led by female officials. Ko Hwang-gyŏng (1909-2000),[247] a female educator who had played a significant role in driving the Japanese austerity projects during the WWII, was appointed as the first leader of the Women's Bureau.

The major aims of the establishment of the Women's Bureau were the advancement of the economic and political status of Korean women by promoting their entry into public affairs and improving women's welfare and the abolition of the licensed prostitution system[248] (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 50-51). To this end, the organization of local offices soon followed: beginning in June 1947 with the Women's Division (Punyŏgwa 婦女課) within Seoul Municipal Government, Women's Sections (*Punyŏgye* 婦女係) were gradually established in each city and provincial government across the country (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 53).

While women's social and political advancement was set as the chief goal of the Women's Bureau, in practical terms, its administration was largely focused on educational activities (Hwang C. M. 2002: 173). The officials of the Women's Bureau believed that educational enlightenment was the most urgent and crucial thing for the advancement of women who wished to become active members of society by participating in public life (Chŏng H. J. 2004: 52). They strongly emphasized those public roles taken by women in the newly established 'egalitarian democracy'; however, they also highlighted women's household tasks, the conventional duty of the Korean woman. Based on the notion that housekeeping and women's public work should go hand-in-hand, they insisted that women had to achieve a good balance between work and family. In order to juggle the two, household chores needed to be rationally and efficiently managed. The bureaucrats believed that it was the Korean woman's duty to actively carry out public roles, by rationally managing domestic affairs, for the sake of building the new nation (Ibid.: 53). Just as housewifery moved from being a private matter to a public concern within the ideology of the 'wise mother, good wife' (*hyŏnmo yangch'ŏ*) under Japanese government policy, as will be discussed in 6.1, the matter of

[247] She remained in office until 1948. She was a key member of the Korean Women's Problem Research Association, an organization that took the lead in implementing the wartime improvement of daily life campaign in colonial Korea after 1937. See 5.1.
[248] The system had been in effect since 1916, and was abolished on 14 November 1948 (Hwang C. M. 2002: 174).

domesticity was also considered an important component of service in liberated Korea. The Women's Bureau was central to keeping the connections between domesticity and the issue of national development, which had been established in colonial era, in post-colonial Korea. The principle of the organization was materialized through women's policy the majority of which was consisted of the campaigns to improve daily life for subsequent decades in South Korea.

The rational management of domestic affairs was one of the most important goals of the educational programmes coordinated by the Women's Bureau. For instance, in June and September 1947, two-day and three-day lecture courses were organized throughout the country for local members. From 5 to 15 September 1947, a Cultivation Course for Leaders of the New Daily Life (*Sinsaenghwal chidoja suyanghoe* 新生活指導者修養會) was held, led by the central organization. On these courses, branch members who to assume teaching role, were taught about the correlation between the household economy and the national economy, along with political and social issues, such as election law and the problem of the licensed prostitution system (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 52-55). The *Ŏmŏni hakkyo* 어머니학교 (Mother's School) programme, a weekend school designed for ordinary women, which took place in March and April 1948 in Seoul, acquired a good reputation. More than 100 participants received practical education applicable to everyday life, in areas such as hygiene and housekeeping. This programme was soon fixed as a regular part of the educational curriculum of the Seoul City Women's Division and was also spread to other areas (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 55-56).

With the implementation of the New Daily Life Campaign in 1954, the Women's Bureau played a key role in carrying out the post-war campaign alongside the WDLI Committee. For example, the 'Improvement of the wartime daily life of women' was set as one of the five aims of a five-year plan outlined by the organization in 1952.[249] With slogans calling for the breaking of evil habits, the expulsion of luxuries, the use of domestic products, and the introduction of a scientific basis for living, it actively encouraged frugality and rationalization in household management. The campaign was

[249] 'Sahoebu punyŏguk, punyŏ saŏp 5-kaenyŏn kyehoek iban chung 사회부 부녀국, 부녀사업 5 개년 계획 입안 중', *P'yŏnghwa sinmun* 평화신문, 25 April 1952. Electric document, available at http://www.history.go.kr/url.jsp?ID=NIKH.DB-dh_025_1952_04_25_0120 (accessed 21 July 2012)

conducted through radio broadcasts, public lectures, and the circulation of educational materials among women, such as *Ŏmŏni hakkyo* 어머니학교 (Mother's School) and *Puin saenghwal tokppon* 婦人生活読本 (Women's Life Reader) (Han'guk haengjŏng sahoebu 1954: 43-44).

Among the various publications issued by the Women's Bureau, an official magazine called *Saesallim* 새살림 (New Housekeeping) is an excellent source that shows what was meant by the 'new life' that the Korean authorities were keen to bring into the domestic lives of the people. The magazine was published from 1947 until 1961[250] and was intended to educate women to be good homemakers, able to manage housework economically by providing them with a wide range of knowledge to reform domestic life. In the first anniversary issue of 1948, the Minister of Health and Welfare emphasized the crucial role of women in domestic life, and expressed his hope that 'the magazine would be a leader and a good friend to 15 million Korean women' (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 57-58). Although originally aimed at educated women in urban areas, the magazine was also distributed to rural areas across the country and used as an educational material by the local Women's Bureau leaders (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 75).

Saesallim included practical advice on how to improve and rationalize household management. In accordance with the aim of introducing a scientific basis for living, one of the goals of the New Improvement of Daily Life Campaign, the introduction of a scientific understanding and attitude towards diet was emphasized. To prepare more nutritious and hygienic meals, at a lower cost, was a fundamental principle of dietary rationalization. For example, as a method of scientifically reforming the daily diet, meal planning was strongly encouraged. Housewives were required to maintain the health of family members cost-effectively, and to save food resources by managing the daily diet in a well-planned manner. As a way to save housewives' time and labour, meal planning was actively encouraged as one of the essential elements of 'cultural' household management (P'yŏnjipsil 1957; P'yŏnjipsil 1958). Table 4-2 shows a weekly meal plan suggested by

[250] Although *New Housekeeping* was introduced both as 'monthly' and 'bimonthly' in an official publication issued by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 57, 75), it seems that this magazine was published on an irregular basis. For example, while it was first published in January 1947, the eighth volume was only issued in January 1958.

the magazine to help the housewife prepare such rationalized home meals.

Table 4-2: A weekly menu suggested in 1958 by *Saesallim* magazine

	Breakfast	Lunch	Dinner
Monday	Steamed barley, seaweed soup, *kimch'i*,	Cold rice, hot water, *kimch'i*	*Sujebi* [251], *kimch'i*, *changatchi*[252]
Tuesday	Steamed coarse grains, *k'ongbiji*,[253] *changatchi*	Cold rice, hot water, bean paste soup, *kimch'i*	Wheat-flour noodle soup, *kimch'i*
Wednesday	Steamed coarse grains, cabbage soup, *puch'u kkaktugi*[254]	Steamed bread, vegetable casserole, *puch'u kkaktugi*	Steamed coarse grains, hot pepper leaves *changatchi*, *puch'u kkaktugi*
Thursday	Steamed coarse grains, pan-fried young radish, *kimch'i*	Steamed sweet potatoes, vegetable soup, *kimch'i*	Steamed rice with bean sprouts, bean paste soup, *kimch'i*
Friday	Steamed barley, vegetable soup, *k'ongbiji*	*Sujebi*, *kimch'i*, *changatchi*	Steamed coarse grains, vegetable soup, *k'ongbiji*
Saturday	Steamed coarse grains, red pepper paste stew, *changatchi*	Wheat-flour noodle soup, *kimch'i*, *changatchi*	Steamed coarse grains, green onion *changatchi*
Sunday	Steamed white rice, radish soup, *kkaktugi*[255]	Steamed sweet potatoes, *kimch'i*, a grilled wheat cake	Steamed coarse grains, *namul* [256]

Source: *Saesallim* 새살림, January 1958, quoted in Kim Ŭ. G. 2007: 201-202

As was true of a range of previous state-led improvement movements, the rationality stressed in the New Daily Life Improvement Campaign was due to the need to save food resources – especially rice. Most of the staple foods suggested in the menu above were coarse grains, tubers and wheat-based foods, which had been encouraged as substitute foods by the authorities within the framework of the rice-saving policy.

Eating wheat-based foods was a particularly significant food strategy that was promoted in parallel with saving rice. In 1.2, I explained that the shortage of rice had

[251] Dumpling soup made with wheat-flour dough.
[252] A fermented food made with various kinds of vegetables and stored in soybean sauce, soybean paste or red pepper paste.
[253] Coarse soup made from bean-curd waste.
[254] A kind of *kimch'i* made with leaks and oriental turnip.
[255] A kind of *kimch'i* made with oriental turnip.
[256] A basic side dish eaten daily by Koreans, made with vegetables. The vegetables were sometimes served raw, sometimes lightly fried in oil and sometimes gently boiled, but were always well seasoned.

been a grave problem in post-colonial Korea, and that the food deficit was supplemented by food aid – the majority of which was wheat (flour) – from America.[257] After the Korean War, the Korean government's dependence upon the wheat delivered from America increased. The food resource could ease the rice shortage and the revenue from sales of the shipped food was an important source of income for the Korean government. In other words, the consumption of wheat-based foods not only closely related to the food problem, but also to the matter of economy of the country. Until South Korea achieved self-sufficiency in rice in the 1970s, boosting the consumption of wheat-based foods remained a significant economic policy of the South Korean government (see Chapter Seven).

As part of the rice-saving movement, encouraging the consumption of wheat-based foods was an integral part of the improvement campaigns. The concept of nutrition was the most frequently applied rationale behind state efforts to develop new eating habits unfamiliar to the Korean people. Under the flag of the scientific improvement of eating habits, the nutritional aspect of wheat flour and other foodstuffs was emphasized as an essential criterion in selecting what was to be eaten. Pak In-sun, the leader of the Women's Bureau between 1958 and 1960, stressed that eating wheat-based foods at least once a day would improve home-cooked meals in terms of nutrition, economy and the time taken up by meal preparation (Kim Ŭ. G. 2007: 204-205). The Women's Bureau actively engaged in propagating wheat-based food in home cooking. For example, after the Korean War ended in 1953, the Women's Division of Seoul City government made an arrangement with amateur cookery schools in each ward in the city to hold cooking classes that targeted the women in each area. At the classes, women learned how to make white bread and other dishes and snacks using wheat flour (Pogŏn sahoebu 1987: 158). In 1956, South Korean President Syngman Rhee (1875-1965) himself called for people to eat brown rice and grains other than rice, such as barley, stressing the insufficient vitamins in rice and the advantage of the cost-effective nourishment available by eating other grains.[258]

[257] At first the aid was provided free of charge, but from the 1960s, charges were gradually introduced.
[258] 'Hyŏnmisik aeyong haja, Yi taet'ongnyŏng siksaenghwal kaesŏn-ŭl kangjo 玄米食愛用하자 李大統領食生活改善을 强調', *Tonga ilbo*, 28 September 1951, p.2.

In order to promote scientifically appropriate and rational eating habits, the Women's Bureau and the WDLI Committee established the Korean Provisional Nutritional Standards (*Han'guk chamjŏng yŏngyang kijun* 韓国暫定營養基準) in 1959. Their aim was to outline the standard nutritional requirements for different groups of people so that housewives could use them as the basis for rationalized cooking (Mun S. H: 1960). Even though particular emphasis had been placed on the nutritional aspect of diet before the announcement of the Standards, the basis for the requirements used thus far had been the dietary reference intakes set up in foreign country (Kim Ŭ. G. 2007: 208). However, these standards were exclusively created for Korean people, taking into consideration their eating habits and the average food expenditure per household. Along with calories, the minimum daily requirements of major nutrients, such as protein, calcium and vitamins, were determined for six groups classified by sex, age and amount of labour. Eight model recipes using seasonal ingredients were included with the standards (Mun S. H: 1960).

The establishment of nutritional standards by the South Korean government had much in common with the Japanese government's wartime food policy, which had also implemented the use of dietary standards by establishing 'National diet' in 1941. Laying out the minimum nutritional standards for the nation, the Japanese authorities advocated the rationalization of nutrition, which meant ensuring that the labour force was sufficiently maintained using the minimum quantity of food necessary, as food resources were rapidly deteriorating at that time. In an attempt to implement a food-saving campaign, the South Korean government also relied on the use of science to ensure efficient nourishment, reviving the Japanese war strategy of the scientific diet. That is, the scientific solution on which the wartime Japanese government relied upon to handle the food shortage during WWII was influential in Korean government's implementing food policies during and after Korean War to reform Korean people's diet.

By the end of the 1950s, the government's efforts to disseminate nutritional knowledge and raise housewives' interest in the scientific aspects of the diet seem to have produced results. For example, an article in *Tonga ilbo* in 1959 reported that the terms 'nutrition' and 'calories' had become trendy among housewives, and that cookery classes

were bursting with young and middle-aged housewives in urban areas.[259] A readers' letter to the magazine *Yŏsŏnggye* 女性界(Women's World) testifies that housewives were active in putting nutritional knowledge into practice in their home cooking:

> 'Since I have learnt that fat, calcium and vitamins A, B1 and B2 are often lacking in our diet, I pay particular attention to supplying these nutrients when I prepare meals. I fry food, make stir-fried rice with a lot of oil, and use mayonnaise to increase fat intake… To boost the intake of vitamin A, I prepare one *kŭn* [600 grams] of beef liver each week, and stir-fry beta-carotene–rich food, such as carrot, in order to increase the absorption of nutrients.'
>
> (Chŏn Ch'ang-hŭi 1959, quoted in Kim Ŭ. G. 2007: 208)

It would be misleading to assume that all Korean housewives achieved such a scientific improvement in their home cooking. As the colonial government's drive to rationalize and improve had little to do with the poor diet of the rural people (see 4.1), the Korean government's campaign seems not to have huge impact on the home-cooked meals of the rural population. Since their diet was already so frugal, they did not need to go so far as to choose different ingredients to save rice, as a Korean scholar pointed out in 1959 (Kim Ŭ. G. 2007: 207).

Despite this, however, the government's initiatives to change the eating habits of the Korean people proved essential as the improvement of daily life campaign unfolded during the 1950s, setting the tone for the Korean authorities' systematic and increasing intervention into the daily diets of its people during the subsequent decades. Most importantly, by the 1970s, the New Daily Life Campaign, run by the Women's Bureau in the 1950s, had been integrated into the *Saemaŭl undong* (New Village Movement), which had a critical impact on the lives of the majority of the South Korean population (see 5.2).

As a result of the Korean War, the centuries-old social class system collapsed, along with the economy and the social infrastructure (Cumings 1997: 270). The concept of social integration the Korean authorities sought to achieve to reorganize the society can be explained as the process of unifying the fragmented people as members of nation, and forcing them to internalize their duties to meet the state's needs (Kang I. C. 1999:

[259] 'Tosi saenghwal man-ŭn chinilbo 都市生活만은 進一步', *Tonga ilbo*, 17 December 1959, p.4.

204-205). In this regard, the campaign for the improvement of daily life was an effective political tool, not only in encouraging thrifty among the nation, but in the integration of society. By linking domestic life with national prosperity, the government strengthened its control over the daily lives of the Korean people. Even after the cease-fire, the authorities made conscious efforts to maintain a 'proper' understanding of the horrors of war and the vulnerability of the country among the people, and called for social integration and modernization (Ibid.: 210). The Korean War is an important historical event that significantly contributed to strengthening a strong connection between the state and the Korean people.

It is important to note that the improvement of daily life campaign carried out during and after the Korean War was not only administrative measures for war-waging but also part of the modernization project of the country. The authorities' increasing involvement in reforming the eating habits of Koreans was done in the name of scientific improvement, and was gradually accepted by the people as part of the modernization process. Ironically, however, the modernization proposed by the authorities was nothing but the reuse of the wartime policies used by the Japanese colonial government to enforce frugality among its people.