

'Do the people want bread, or rules and responsibilities?' Reflections on development, law and governance, in Egypt and the Muslim world at large, from 2014 to 1979 and back.

Cleveringa Lecture, Cairo

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INTRODUCTION

This week scholars and students of Leiden University have swarmed to many places, in the Netherlands and abroad to deliver Cleveringa lectures. Thank you, Dr. Rudolf de Jong, director of this wonderful institute, for inviting me to deliver this lecture here tonight, and to all of you, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, for taking the time to attend this gathering. Let me first say a few words about the man we commemorate today, Professor Rudolph Cleveringa.

On Tuesday 26 November 1940 at 10 o' clock in the morning the dean of the faculty of law, Prof. Cleveringa, took the floor of Leiden University's main lecture hall. A few days before, the government had issued instructions to dismiss all civil servants of Jewish origin, following orders of the German occupying forces. Accordingly, Leiden University would have to dismiss ten academics including two professors. One of them was a highly respected professor of civil law, Eduard Meijers.

The dean praised Meijers' academic and human qualities, saying: *"It is this Dutchman, this noble and true son of our people, (...), this father of students, this scholar, who is being 'dismissed' by the foreigner who now rules us as an enemy"*. Subsequently, Cleveringa – the law professor who defied the law - and Meijers were arrested and deported to concentration camps. Both, however, survived the Second World War (WW2).

Meijers would become the drafter of the New Dutch Civil Code, which after his long and meticulous comparative research, would be completed in the 1990s, and replace the old French-based Dutch Civil Code. Cleveringa's assessment of Meijers qualities as a legal scholar had been correct. Meanwhile, the speech of Cleveringa himself became in the Netherlands known as a symbol of courage and justice. It befitted what has become our dominant moral paradigm: Nazi-Germany as the ultimate evil, the Jewish people as its victim – and the Dutch, those of us who had chosen the side of the Nazi's were the 'bad', those who had resisted the Nazi's were the 'good'. Thus, Cleveringa, the Leiden law professor, became a hero.

Such moral paradigms, however, are rooted in particular histories, especially histories of wars and conflicts.ⁱ Cleveringa represents a Dutch paradigm. In contrast, for Egyptian patriots, like Nasser and Sadat, World War 2 provided an opportunity to get rid of the British occupation.ⁱⁱ The Germans, fighting against Britain, were their friends whereas the Jews, who claimed land from Palestinian Arabs, were considered evil.

So, many moral paradigms vary from place to place. They keep communities, big and small, together; they also tend to exclude others. Oftentimes, law - local, national and international law - has been put in place to transcend ethnic differences, regulate human behavior on an equal footing, and provide basic rules for the resolution of conflicts.

POST WORLD WAR 2 PARADIGMS

In the West, the end of WW2 brought important changes. When Nazi perpetrators appeared before the courts of justice, many of them said to their defense that they had only obeyed the laws, and orders of their superiors. In response, prosecutors, judges, and legal scholars concluded that the Nazi laws and decisions had been illegitimate in that they violated higher principles of justice (Radbruch 1946). Thus the rule of law came to include the paradigm of human rights.

Also after WW2, global decolonisation went into full swing. In the former colonies in Asia, the Middle East and Africa new governments were fiercely nationalist, authoritarian, and mostly socialist. Development, in the sense of nation building and socio-economic progress, was the dominant paradigm. They were eager to transform their societies rapidly in modern and secular states, regarding sharia and custom as backward (Allott 1980).

A third change was the rise of massive international assistance to overcome socio-economic problems. First, in the 1950s Marshall Aid from the US helped Western Europe to get back on its feet. Subsequently, in the 1960s Europe and North America began to expand development programs to the newly independent states. An impressive international community of institutions aiming for 'development' emerged. Academics created new fields such as development studies, development economics, sociology of development, law and development, and development administration.

Meanwhile the results of most authoritarian centralist governments, in terms of economic development, were often disappointing. In the 1970s the large bureaucracies were increasingly perceived as repressive, inefficient and corrupt. The socialist transformation was never completed, and many people began gradually to lose faith in their regime and its ideology.

The international community, still dominated by the West got itself more involved, not only for development, but also for democracy and human rights. At the same time the liberalising state, however, allowed for the comeback of powerful religious and traditional groups and their leaders. In Egypt, President

Sadat had to ask Islamist groups for their help in ousting a socialist political elite and their Russian advisers. In Iran in 1979 Khomeini staged his Islamic Revolution against the Shah's regime, and in the same year Zia ul-Haq introduced *Zina* legislation in Pakistan. Islamism became a new powerful paradigm.

TO MINYA, AND TO HANYA

In the spring of 1979 I came to Egypt to write a Master thesis in development administration, about how local government institutions interacted with villagers and vice versa. I had studied law but was now eager to become a social scientist. In Cairo I had joined my wife, Marileen van der Most van Spijk, a medical anthropologist, who worked for a Leiden-based research project called Women and Development, funded by The Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs. She was to study women and health in Upper Egypt (Most van Spijk 1982) When we arrived at the gate of the University of Minya that spring, there were armed soldiers standing on the surrounding roofs. At the university there were great tensions. Fundamentalist students were requiring gendered segregation of classes, and I remember that they had written on the walls: 'Come, O Khomeyni' ('*Ta'ala, ya Khomeini*'). Professor Abdel Minam Shauqi, our supervisor, taught sociology and social work. He also was the head of the provincial branch of the National Democratic Party. The professor allocated students to my wife and me, to assist us and to learn from us - perhaps also to keep an eye on us. My wife's student-assistant had an elder brother who had been a teacher in a remote village bordering the Bahr Yusuf close to the Eastern desert. The village was called Hanya.ⁱⁱⁱ He introduced my wife to his former colleagues, teachers who lived in the village. One of them, Muhammad, rented his house to us, where we would live with some interruptions until the summer of 1981.

The socialist revolution had also touched Hanya. The estate of the landlord had disappeared, and land had been redistributed. The village now had a Primary School, and an Agricultural Cooperative Society led by an agronomist. There also was, supposedly, a traditional village government, led by the *umdah* and two *shaykh-al-balad*'s, each from one of the main families. The *umdah*, among other tasks, was responsible, to the police, for law and order, and commanded the night watch (*ghufara*) consisting of a few armed men. In a neighboring village, at 2 km, there was a Health Unit with a medical doctor, nurses, and midwives. There also was the office (*nuqta*) of the Police Captain (*zabit*), and his men. At 5 km there was a principal village, Amadi, with an administrative center serving all surrounding villages, including the office of the Chief Village Administrator, Eng. Gamal, the premises of an elected Village Council, a Bank for Agricultural Credit, and lastly the so-called Social Unit, belonging to the ministry of Social Affairs. These institutions were there to foster people's participation in development. Some worked fairly well, others less so (Otto 1993a)^{iv}.

During the first weeks in Hanya, I tried to find out who the *umdah* was, the traditional village head. On a morning I met Mahmud, a wealthy farmer, who told me that he was the *umdah*. Other villagers, however, told me that Mahmud had

indeed put his candidacy on behalf of his family, the 'Adil clan, but that the leader of the other family, the Othman clan, Hagg Husayn, had lodged a complaint with the Directorate of Security, which would run the elections. Years ago Mahmud had crossed the desert to Libya, to escape from military service and earn a lot of money in a few years. Now this was used against him.

Apparently village politics was dominated by a continuous struggle between two rivaling clan leaders, 'Abd al-Hakam of the 'Adil clan and Hagg Husayn of the Othman clan, and their associates. Any election, any effort to control a government institution from below, would sooner or later turn into one of their political battles. It was feared that especially elections for *umdah* in Hanya would evoke armed conflict and violence between the two clans – as had happened in the past. So the Security Directorate had postponed Hanya's elections for *umdah*. During our two years in Hanya, no *umdah* was elected. In the district and provincial capital, Hanya was often referred to as a rather traditional, unruly, if not primitive, village. To us, however, most people were generally welcoming and generous.

A BAKERY?

While trying to find out whether the state institutions met the needs of the villagers, I also asked them a question about whether Hanya was in need of a particular village project. People expressed several demands for infrastructure, a bridge, drinking water supply, and electricity. Also they asked for social services, a youth club, a health unit, an ambulance. Some asked for a new mosque. But by far the highest demand was for a bakery. In rural Upper Egypt bread was the main staple food. The government used to sell subsidised flour to licensed bakeries, where people could buy their bread at low prices, one piaster per loaf in 1979.

Now the people from Hanya had to line up before bakeries in other villages, where often they were not well served. They would end up with old bread, bread of bad quality, too little bread, or no bread at all. Self-help by baking bread was practiced in the village, but the costs were much higher than those of subsidised bread. Hence, the people of Hanya wanted a bakery, more than anything else.

Most villagers said that the government had failed to establish a bakery in Hanya because they lacked a *wastah*, i.e. a personal connection in the government, such as for example a governor, a minister, an undersecretary, or a member of parliament. Other villages, which had such *wastah*, were much better off, they said.

People had hoped that a certain rich villager would open up a bakery, but rumor went that he did not want to subject himself to the strict government supervision of the ministry of Supply, with the risk of severe penalties.

Hence, villagers began to discuss the feasibility of other ways to get Hanya its bakery.

The main strength of the bakery project was probably that it was a home-grown idea. But yet there were problems with its social feasibility. The conflicts between family clans, and the mutual distrust were such that many doubted this

could ever happen. 'We cannot collaborate', villagers used to complain, and 'we don't do things in any organized way' (*'mafish tanzim'*). So, people would depend on *wastah*, and ultimately on God.

Did many villagers themselves already lack trust in such project, the local administration was even less enthusiastic. 'Villagers would only quarrel, and make a mess of it', local officials said, 'such plan can only be feasible if it would become a pure government project.' 'After all', the Chief Administrator. Eng. Gamal said, 'do the people of Hanya want bread, or do they want responsibilities and rules? Let us do it, we can construct a very good bakery, a big one, it will provide employment to Hanya's people.'

A recurring question was of course who would pay the investment costs. At the Dutch embassy in Cairo we were assured that that problem could be solved. A simple application for a small embassy project^v could do the job. And so it happened. A positive side effect was that the ambassador had become interested in the province of Minya as a potential focus area; he asked me for some assistance to help preparing an official visit to the Governor. The visit of the ambassador solved at once the project's problems of access. The Governor was willing to help the project, and as soon as he had given his orders to support the village bakery in Hanya, it was, as one villager said as if 'the world was electrified' (*'al dunya kahrabit'*). Officials of the governorate and district came and went to measure the land, make drawings, and help with license applications.

Did people in Hanya accept responsibilities and rules, i.e. would village people be capable of self-management of such project? Three of them, a teacher and two engineers, who had been involved in the discussions from the outset, would indeed turn into excellent project leaders. They fulfilled all requirements to be successful in this demanding context. They could work well together. They were not involved in village politics; in fact they did not like the inter-clan conflicts at all but because of their respective kinship bonds with the two clan leaders, as a group they were considered to represent both rivaling clans. Finally, they were sufficiently capable in technical, financial and organisational matters, and could deal with local bureaucrats. Their selection could be a case study in itself. In fact, I had had to promise to both clan leaders, separately, that I would see to it that those three would be appointed, and no one else.

The villagers refused the bakery to become a state project. 'Government officials', people said, 'will suck up all the profits'. On the other hand, the Dutch embassy would not be willing to just fund a private entrepreneur from amongst the villagers. So, it had to be an intermediate village organization.^{vi} The Egyptian law provided for the possibility to establish a Cooperative Association for Village Development (CAVD). Such associations would fall under the supervision of the ministry of Social Affairs. To cut a rather long story short, Hanya's CAVD was established as a legal entity, and its new board members (see below) opened an account in the Village Bank.

To actually build the bakery, the project needed land, labour, materials, and more money. For each of the resources, efforts to obtain them posed new challenges. 'Abd al-Hakam, for example, offered a piece of land of his, for free. This gesture caused Hagg Husayn to threaten a complete withdrawal of his clan. For 'if the bakery will be on 'Abd al-Hakam's land, he will claim it as his own project'. So, a 'neutral' piece of land had to be identified, *in casu* state land, which brought its own problems. To cut this story once more the story short, the three project leaders worked and worked, they got more and more tired but persisted, often coming up with creative solutions, for example in the procurement of building materials (see Otto 1993b: 36).

Meanwhile, all their work was hardly noticed by fellow villagers who until the construction actually would start remained skeptical, as usual. Hearing some talk about a bakery but not seeing it, they said to each other that it must be 'empty talk' (*'kalam fadi'*). Walking through the village, people sometimes began to shout at me 'Where is that bakery, mr. Michael?' (*'fayn al makhbaz , mr. Michael ?'*)

When the bakery was finally built and well in operation, some people began making baseless accusations of the project leaders suggesting that they were using the project for private gain. One villager in particular, Mustafa, was hungry for local power and began to rally against the project leaders. Facing so much distrust after having made so many sacrifices, one of them stepped down, disappointed.

Beside such struggles with fellow villagers over the years, the project leaders sometimes had to deal with local officials abusing their authority. Initially, for example, the health inspector first had refused to give approval for the establishment of the CAVD because its 'office' – a room in a mud house - did not fulfill the legal requirements of having a flush toilet, a shower, and glass windows. At first he was not at all convinced by the argument that no house in Hanya had a flush toilet, a shower, or glass windows.

Much later, after years of successful operation, the head of the social unit, used Mustafa's ill-conceived complaint as a pretext to dismiss the CAVD's board and take over its management and bank account. When it appeared that afterwards that under this governmental management all the money had disappeared from the CAVD's account, 'Abd al-Hakam finally stepped in, exercised his political power, forced the man to pay everything back within 24 hours, and had him suspended from office, immediately.

There were problems with the various private entrepreneurs; the builders who had been contracted to build the bakery, and the specialists who would make the ovens; the bakers, who would lease the bakery from the CAVD. The builders made a promising start but then failed to turn up for quite a while. Later, at some point, the baker, tired of people's complaints about his bread, would leave the bakery and close it, taking the keys with him. Fortunately the board was able to obtain a court order to reopen the bakery and bring the baker back to work.

In spite of all these problems and struggles, the bakery survived and provided Hanya's people with bread. However, when a second project leader also gave up

and stepped down, the legal entity of the CAVD was finally dissolved by the ministry of Social Affairs. The bakery was then brought under Hanya's pre-existing Cooperative Association for Islamic Welfare.

Case studies are used in social sciences to provide in-depth insights. In order to generalize on the basis of this study of a village bakery in the legal form of a CAVD, one would have to ask 'Of what is this a case?' (Lund 2014) At the time in 1979 I looked at it primarily as a case study of a participatory rural development project. Now, given my present academic work, I would look more closely at its socio-legal dimension, as a case study of what local people do with legal rules. Thirdly, I could also look at it as a case of an abandoned type of international assistance from the Netherlands to Egypt. Here are some reflections on each of these three cases.

REFLECTIONS ON A CASE OF PARTICIPATORY RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Before the project came about, Hanya's collective need of a bakery could not be met by the government, neither by the private sector, nor by any community based voluntary group. On the side of the village community, there was the problem of conflicts between family clans, i.e. of exclusion at a local level. Whereas, among close family members and friends, people were usually generous, loyal and trustful, at village level there was lots of mutual distrust, constant envy, and destructive gossip. 'Abd al-Hakam and Hagg Husayn were too busy with managing their own clan and politicking against the other, to work towards community development for the village as a whole. So small-scale ethnic conflict and mutual exclusion blocked development.

This is not to say that the villagers could not organise. But their planning and organization, their responsibilities addressed mostly their private spheres. They were able farmers, some of them were big traders. If someone died, the message would efficiently be conveyed to all who needed to know, and out of the blue there would be a huge number of guests, chairs, of food, and drinks, an enormous tent.

Or, when a fire erupted in the village within seconds, young men were on simple ladders, working efficiently together, putting buckets of sand or water to extinguish the fire. An hour later, long after the work was done, we would hear the bell of the fire brigade's car, arriving from the district capital. People would smile and say 'such is the government' (*'al-hukuma kida'*) – and offer the driver food and cigarettes.

In 1979 the people of Hanya generally saw the government as legitimate. Yes, it exercised strict control but it was less repressive than it had been under Nasser's rule. And through the Agricultural Cooperative Society it still provided peasants with cheap seeds and fertilizer. There was free irrigation water, cheap public transport, and social services. Nasser's land reform still remained one of the very few examples around the world of a successful redistribution, and Sadat had continued this policy.

Some of the local level officials were honest and responsive, however, others were weak and indifferent, meeting people's requests with their trusted I-B-M motto of *Insha'Allah* (God willing), *Bukra* (tomorrow), *Ma'alaysh* (let it be). The head of the Social Unit, an official who was formally in a key position to support such project, had used his legal powers to obstruct the bakery project for his own private gain.

Villagers frequently had such bad experiences with state officials. Hence, they preferred to simply avoid the government where possible and evade its efforts to regulate.

Hence it was quite a step for the project leaders to start to accessing the legal-institutional framework, and it proved indeed to be cumbersome at times. 'You cannot let the documents travel alone', they taught me, 'you always have to be with the paper all the time so that when an official must do something, you are with the paper at his desk'. During this action research I was, as a foreigner with useful contacts, in a way just the *wastah* Hanya had missed. We were lucky to find in the Dutch embassy an accessible and flexible donor, ready to sponsor small projects.

The ambassador during his visit to the governorate of Minya played his role as a super-*wastah* perfectly. He came to the village to offer the donation, delivered a speech as a promoter of participatory development, attaching some sensible conditionalities to the donation, and finally acted as local peace-builder bringing a sense of unity to the rivaling family clans.

REFLECTIONS ON THE BAKERY AS A SOCIO-LEGAL CASE

The socio-legal approach does not look at law as a set of rules but rather at what people do with rules. Throughout the bakery case Egyptian law was far from self-propelling. If people of the village community needed the law, it had to be put in motion for them, with outside efforts. But local officials in charge of participatory rural development were not ready to deal with the legal dimensions of, say, establishing a CAVD. When Hagg Husayn heard that the Chief Village Administrator had told me 'What do the people want, bread, or rules and responsibilities, he said to me: 'You see, mr. Michael, a Chief Village Administrator should be a sociologist, who understands people, or a lawyer, who understands the rules. But he is an agricultural engineer. And you know, an agricultural engineer in Egypt is nothing but a peasant dressed in a suit.'

When in the nineties I came to see Hagg Husayn again, he lived in a new house, far outside the village center, in the middle of his fields. I asked him how he had obtained permission to build here, as it seemed a blatant violation of the land use law. 'You know what the land use law is worth in this country, Mr. Michael. 200 pounds. I went to Cairo, with a relative who knew someone there, and that is what was paid.' So, the law is not self-propelling. From the foot of the pyramids, people work their ways upwards to actually disempower the law if that suits their interest. Even though the government does make efforts to enforce the law, making it work in such circumstances requires a constant struggle.

The bakery case also taught me that parts of Egypt's national law did not work locally. For the CAVD to have a Board, the law prescribed that the CAVD's General Assembly (all members) shall elect the members of the board. But every sensible person in the village advised to avoid both the prescribed registration of CAVD members and the election of a board. This would only cause lots of trouble and conflict, they said. So, a report was made of a meeting that was never held, and a report provided evidence of a voting process that never took place; this was done in order to avoid turmoil and save the project. In sum, for the benefit of development a solution had to be found around the law, and this was something the villagers were good at.

According to what Ehrlich would have called 'the living law' of the village, villagers leading such project would have to comply with the directives of either 'Abd al-Hakam or Hagg Husayn. Hence any major project decision, any step required to comply with state law and official orders, had to be explained to them and submitted for their informal approval. Thus some traditional shuttle diplomacy had to be conducted to get this divided community behind the project.

As was shown above, lower officials often tended to slow down the law's implementation by sticking to some provision, some unfulfilled condition. But after high level support of the governor was ensured, with the help of the ambassador, officials worked incredibly fast and efficient: the world had indeed been electrified.

When a baker had closed the bakery in breach of his contract, the court could be accessed to provide an effective remedy. So, this part of the legal system worked effectively and served the project well.

Whereas law is supposed to contribute to justice, the impact of law much depends on what people do with its rules. Over the last decade the widespread abuse of legal rules by government officials has undoubtedly contributed to the popular support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Their call for restoring Islamic justice, however, has left key questions open. Would it be egalitarian justice, libertarian, or utilitarian justice? Would their interpretation of God's law be puritan or moderate?

REFLECTIONS ON A CASE OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

From the perspective of Hanya's villagers, small was beautiful in international aid. The small and flexible embassy project fund was the catalyst they needed to get into action. The success of the project did create a lot of goodwill, in the village and wide surroundings. Many years later, even generations later, people still remembered how the Dutch helped people in need. It may be hard, though, to measure such type of impact by conventional project monitoring and evaluation tools.

Thirty years ago I moved from the study of rural development administration in Egypt to the study of law and legal reform in Indonesia. One of the lessons I had learnt from development administration, was that a development project in

order to be successful should be a two-way learning process (Korten 1982). If so much inside knowledge and hard efforts were required to carry out a project as simple as a village bakery, what about changing a legal system, in which complex laws, legal institutions and processes are all interdependent.

So, at Leiden University we began to make in-depth case studies of Indonesian law, as it was made, applied, and taught in legislatures, courts, bureaucracies, and law schools. Through the research and from our Indonesian research partners we learned much about constraints and opportunities for legal change, and the potential of certain change agents. The research informed a major Dutch aid program for legal development that we helped carrying out from 1985 to 1992. This program was followed by other legal development programs, from Canada, the USA, Australia and other donors. They all helped to train a generation of jurists, many of whom would be called to important positions after Suharto's government had come to an end in 1998.

Over the last 20 years, international rule-of-law and human rights programs have become part of a large scale 'industry'. In foreign aid the emphasis has gradually shifted from projects aimed at basic developmental needs to projects in support of the rule of law, of human rights, and of the private sector.

Around the world much donor money, in fact hundreds of millions of US dollar annually, is spent to strengthen countries' legal systems. Many consultants are hired to run this 'business' but serious doubts remain whether such large scale rule of law support enhances access to justice for the ordinary men and women, in spite of the efforts made to evaluate and to measure numbers of people trained and manuals distributed.

Furthermore, Makau Mutua has argued that over the last decades the discourse on human rights - a centerpiece of the rule of law - in the context of international relations, has gradually lost its appeal in recipient countries. The West, he says, is seen as using double standards, being self-centered, and simplifying the dilemmas and difficulties of recipient countries. I do agree with this part of the argument but at the same time our research in several developing countries shows that on the ground human rights are increasingly valued and applied as means of legal empowerment.

In Libya, after the fall of Gaddafi, the international donor community pledged large sums to restore 'the rule of law' in Libya. We, at Leiden University, were lucky to find a few good partners at the University of Benghazi, in order to conduct collaborative research the result of which was helpful for those donors who want to be informed. Such academic collaboration seems to be cheaper, more sustainable and perhaps even more promising than the larger projects of the big entrepreneurs in the Rule of Law industry, who come and go.

No big programs are per se needed for vital legal progress. For a reliable and convincing interpretation of the recent 6 November ruling in which Libya's Supreme Court deemed the Tobruk parliament and the Al-Thinni government illegal, surprising and silencing the international community, one excellent and trusted Libyan legal scholar is sufficient. Instead of focusing mainly on large scale training, small scale collaborative socio-legal research could and should in

my view become a key instrument of international assistance in legal development.

BACK TO EGYPT TODAY

I have been away from Egypt for twenty years, so I feel a bit like a stranger. But reading short stories by Khaled al Khamissi, in his recent book simply entitled 'Taxi' helped me to reconnect. I recognized a strong continuity of the Egyptian way of life. It seems that below the surface of major changes, much of the Egyptian life and soul have remained the same: the struggle for survival, the sense of humor, the joy and pressures of family life, the distrust of politics and foreigners, the deep belief in Allah, the bribe-taking policemen, the frustrations in government offices, people's generosity and politeness: it is all there, still.

Of course there have been major changes as well. It is said that the country is appearing more Islamic than when we left in 1981. I am not sure what that means. People in Hanyu were deeply religious but it seemed at that time that hardly anyone in the village sympathized with the Muslim brothers. Observers wrote that many of Upper Egypt's villagers voted for Mursi, disappointed as they were in Mubarak's regime. But whether such support will endure, is unclear.

All over the world good governance has become complicated, and in Muslim countries the complexity has an extra dimension due to claims made by puritan and radical Islamists.

When state-sponsored and foreign-supported paradigms of development, aid, good governance, and justice lose their credibility, alternative paradigms may gain support. Against this background the key challenge for all Muslim governments and their international partners remains essentially to work towards inclusive socio-economic development, honest governance, social justice, and a strong criminal justice apparatus. Besides, there remains a need for convincing moral paradigms about the *maslaha*, the public interest, supported by homegrown, moderate, theological and moral discourses.

CLEVERINGA'S MESSAGE

Ladies and gentlemen, in 2002 the Cleveringa memorial lecture in Leiden was held by the then mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, a former law professor, and like Meijers, of Jewish descent. It was a year after 9/11, and only months after the assassination of maverick politician Pim Fortuyn, who had revived ethnic politics in the Netherlands, with a strong anti-Islam sentiment, putting hundreds of thousands of mainly Turkish and Moroccan immigrant families in an unfortunate position.

Mayor Cohen first revealed that his mother as a student had been among Cleveringa's audience. She related that it had felt like 'balm for her soul' and that she strongly had the feeling of being included, instead of excluded. Mayor Cohen noted in his speech that after 9/11 many Dutch Muslims felt excluded and alienated. Suddenly, the society had become divided, between 'us' and 'them'.

Hence, he argued for the need of inclusive policies and full participation of all citizens. Today, much still remains to be done. Teaching Arabic at this institute, here in Cairo, to Dutch and Belgian students, seems to be at least a useful contribution.

In sum, ladies and gentlemen, Cleveringa's message of inclusion, though rooted in Dutch history, is a universal message about fairness, about justice. Exclusion and repression tend to backfire, leading to resistance and conflict, blocking national unity and socio-economic progress.

Again and again, the challenge for mankind is to overcome these primordial, ethnic differences and conflicts– whether at the levels of family, clan, village, country, or globally –, and find credible paradigms which help people to willingly share responsibilities, to shape reasonable rules and apply them reasonably. As for the bakery case, may there be bread for everyone in Hanya village, and in the global village, may the ground of this country be often electrified in the way it was in this case, may the 'Abd al-Hakam's and the Hagg Husayn's of this world live and let live in peace, and may the Dutch-Flemish Institute in Cairo continue its mission for many years to come.

Thank you for your attention.

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Notes

ⁱ Mayor Eberhard van der Laan of Amsterdam made this point in a 2014 lecture.

ⁱⁱ Anwar Sadat's (1978: 41-55) autobiography is clear on this point.

ⁱⁱⁱ The name of the village and the names of all persons mentioned in this lecture are not their genuine names. I changed them for the sake of people's privacy. The facts mentioned, however, are real. The case study was elaborated in my PhD thesis (Otto 1987) and in a research report (Otto 1993b); the latter included events that took place between 1981 and 1992.

^{iv} The government institutions were analysed in my thesis (Otto 1987). A summary of the findings was published as a book chapter (Otto 1993a).

^v At the time Dutch embassies in developing countries used to manage a program of small embassy projects (Kleine Ambassade Projecten, or KAP).

^{vi} In development administration many scholars addressed the question as to what should be the prime mover of development, the state, the market, or local voluntary associations. In the early 1990s Esman noted the emergence of a paradigmatic consensus. In the context of this bakery project the solution consisted indeed of an interesting mix of the three. On 'intermediacy' see also Landau (1980).